

GENDER AND CORRUPTION

Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research

Edited by Helena Stensöta
and Lena Wängnerud

POLITICAL
CORRUPTION
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Political Corruption and Governance

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Helena Stensöta • Lena Wängnerud
Editors

Gender and Corruption

Historical Roots and New Avenues for Research

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is a true pleasure to participate in intense discussions with scholars who share the same research interests. This book comes out of the workshop “Gender and Corruption,” which was held at the Quality of Government, (QoG), Institute at the Department of Political Science, University of Gothenburg, for two days in May 2016. Most authors in this volume participated in the conference and we have selected papers that reflect the width and depth of the topic. It is our hope that the vivid atmosphere of the conference will be apparent for readers.

The book owes much to the QoG Institute, an inspiring research milieu for scholars who are—like we are—interested in human welfare, equality, and progress when it comes to the situation for women vis-à-vis men around the globe. We are indebted to all our colleagues at the QoG Institute for creating a stimulating and creative intellectual environment. We owe special thanks to Alice Johansson, who helped to organize the conference and also has been helpful in the completion of this book, and Richard Svensson for helping us with last-minute graphs.

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Helena Stensöta and Lena Wängnerud

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PART I

Introduction



Why Expect a Link Between Gender and Corruption?

Helena Stensöta and Lena Wängnerud

It happens that you meet with a skeptical smile when you say that you study the link between gender and corruption. Feminist scholars tend to hint that you are trapped in stereotypes, whereas mainstream scholars tend to hint that you are dealing with an aspect of minor importance. Our answer, when met with this skepticism, is that, over and over again, the gender factor gives rise to significant results in studies on corruption—a high presence of women tends to be correlated with low levels of corruption—and there is a need to understand why this correlation appears. Moreover, our point of departure is not that women are inherently “fair,” but that gender differences are rooted in culture and social structures. Thus, the gender factor should not be seen as a monolithic phenomenon, but rather as a hub for complex relationships. The aim of this book is to investigate the historical roots of the effect of gender, to explore relationships between gender and corruption in a large number of contexts, and to discuss new avenues for research. The contribution is not intended to promote one specific gender theory, but to display nuances and fine-grained understanding. The theoretical propositions forwarded by the

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chapters can only be summarized broadly. Here we will highlight two main ideas:

First, norms attached to regime type and institutions seem to affect how the link between gender and corruption plays out. Gender differences are more suppressed in authoritarian states than in democracies. Even within democracies, they are more suppressed through bureaucracy than in the electoral arena. In short, it is in contexts where there is room for women to maneuver and where norms allow for personal experiences to make an imprint that we most likely can expect the presence of women to curb corruption. Second, the relationship is less about “women” and “men” as exclusionary categories than about gender equality processes. Gender egalitarianism, the striving for equal treatment of women and men, has put countries on a route to good governance, but has also sparked far-reaching changes within organizations such as political parties and has made voters in corrupt contexts look more favorably on female political candidates.

Before we present the various chapters and the ideas behind this book in more detail, we will give an overview of some of the previous research in the area.

INITIAL EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE

It was the article “Are Women Really the “Fairer” Sex? Corruption and Women in Government,” by David Dollar, Raymond Fisman, and Roberta Gatti at the Development Research Group of the World Bank that presented the initial empirical evidence of a link between gender and corruption. The article was published in the *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* in 2001, but the main results had, through draft versions, been disseminated before that. In fact, Daniel Kaufmann (1998) at the World Bank was one of the first to mention a possible link between gender and corruption. In 2001, another research group with a connection to the World Bank, consisting of Anand Swamy, Stephen Knack, Young Lee, and Omar Azfar, published a study with similar results to those of Dollar et al. in the *Journal of Development Economics*. These early studies have been very influential, and they constitute the point of departure for most current research in the field. The article by Dollar et al. presents a large cross-country study and establishes that the proportion of women in parliament has a significant effect on corruption, even when other factors, such as overall level of social and economic development, political and civic

freedom, average years of schooling, and ethnic fractionalization are taken into account (Dollar et al. 2001). The core measurements consist of an index of corruption based on the International Country Risk Guide, data from the World Bank and figures for the percentages of women elected to national parliaments from the Inter-Parliamentary Union database. The article is rather short, and the point is to prove the expected relationship: that higher rates of female participation in government are associated with lower national levels of corruption.

In this first study, the assumption that women are more honest than men was never tested but was underpinned by results from previous research suggesting, for example, that women are more likely than men to exhibit “helping” behaviors and to base voting decisions on social concerns (Eagly and Crowley 1986; Goertzel 1983). Dollar et al. pointed to the need to be cautious when interpreting the results, but at the same time they stated that “there may be extremely important spinoffs from increasing female representation: if women are less likely than men to behave opportunistically, then bringing more women into government may have significant benefits for society in general” (Dollar et al. 2001, pp. 427–428).

The study by Swamy et al. utilized a wider range of data and was more complex in design. Swamy et al. did a cross-country comparative study using data from the International Country Risk Guide, the World Bank, and Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index as measurements of corruption. They distinguished between different forms of female participation: women government ministers, women in national parliaments and women in the labor force. Since all gender factors display significant results on the level of corruption, the researchers merged these categories into a “women’s participation index” (Swamy et al. 2001, p. 43) when they did multivariate analysis and controlled for a set of “standard” variables (GNP per capita, average years of schooling, ethnic and religious factors, colonial history, and political freedoms), to show that, on average, greater female participation results in less corruption. Swamy et al. also used micro data from the World Value Surveys, in which respondents were asked their opinions on the acceptability of various dishonest or illegal behaviors. Moreover, they used micro evidence from a World Bank study of corruption in Georgia, which included a survey of 350 firms. Their analyses showed that firms owned or controlled by men were less likely to “never” pay bribes than those owned or controlled by women, even after controlling for the size, ownership, sector, and scope of the firm and the education of the manager/owner (Swamy et al. 2001, pp. 34–35).

Finally, they added data on the changes in women's position and the extent of corruption within countries over time. They emphasized the use of several distinct datasets and careful analyses when they underpinned their argumentation:

We are making a simple point: to question the central finding of this paper, one needs to argue that the results of careful analyses of several distinct data sets have, by sheer fluke, all been biased in the same direction. Our conclusion, that there is indeed a gender differential in tolerance for corruption, is more plausible (Swamy et al. 2001, p. 25).

INITIAL THEORETICAL REASONING

The study by Dollar and colleagues especially has been accused of bringing forward stereotypical beliefs about women as a new anti-corruption force (e.g., Goetz 2007). One reason for this criticism may be the lack of thorough theoretical reasoning. The group around Swamy included a more comprehensive discussion on the role of the gender factor and ended their article by suggesting a number of hypotheses for why gender has an effect: that women may be brought up to be more honest or risk averse than men; that women, who are typically more involved in raising children, may find they have to practice honesty in order to teach their children appropriate values; and that women may feel that laws exist to protect them or, more generally, that girls may be brought up to have higher levels of self-control than boys, which is assumed to affect women's propensity to indulge in criminal behavior.

Hung-En Sung (2003) pointed to the role of long-term trajectories in his criticism of the initial studies. Sung used the Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International and distinguished between different forms of female participation. Most important is that he introduced a number of liberal democracy indicators, such as rule of law, freedom of the press, and electoral democracy and presented them as part of an alternative explanatory theme. This is different from using variables as "controls," since it heightens the status, theoretically and empirically, of the selected indicators. In brief, the conclusion from Sung's study was that when liberal democratic institutions are integrated into the analyses, the gender factors drop dramatically in both statistical significance and substantive relevance. Sung argued that liberal democracy is the common root producing both gender equality and good governance and that correlations

detected in the initial studies thus should be seen as spurious: “gender equality and government accountability are both great achievements of modern liberal democracy” (Sung 2003, p. 718). Anne-Marie Goetz also turned to long-term trajectories in her criticism of the studies from Dollar et al. and Swamy et al. Goetz (2007, p. 99) opposed a “myth-making” about male and female nature in corruption research and suggested, as an alternative approach, examining the differences in how men and women are recruited to political positions:

The point is that the ways women are recruited (or not) to the leadership and rank-and-file of political parties restrict their opportunities for engaging in corrupt activities. These restrictions have to do with women’s relative exclusion from male patronage networks, and the sexual danger associated with inclusion.

Whereas Sung highlighted the role of liberal democracy, Goetz highlighted the role of patriarchal power structures, but both ended up stating that the initial studies overemphasized the role of the gender factor.

CURRENT TRENDS IN GENDER AND CORRUPTION RESEARCH

The importance of current inquiries into the link between gender and corruption should be seen against the backdrop of the vast flora of research arguing that corruption, defined as the act of using public power for private ends, is a major destructive force for both humans and human societies. Research has convincingly shown how corruption is one of the most detrimental factors currently afflicting the economies of developing countries. It undercuts various dimensions of human well-being such as health, education, and access to clean water, as well as negatively affecting subjective dimensions such as human self-reported well-being and happiness (Halleröd et al. 2012; Holmberg and Rothstein 2012; Swaroop and Rajkumar 2002; Treisman 2007). Moreover, corruption may have deeper destabilizing consequences in society, as it arguably threatens not only the direct output of government but also its prerequisite: people’s willingness to pay taxes (Svallfors 2013). These negative consequences are found in both developing and developed countries.

We see three major trends in contemporary research on gender and corruption; these are outlined below. One strand of research builds on Goetz’s work and acknowledges there is a link between the proportions of

women in government and national levels of corruption, but sees this as a question of reversed causality; that is, in contrast to the initial studies claiming that higher proportions of women cause lower levels of corruption, these studies theorize on corruption as an obstacle to the political recruitment of women. The suggestion is that corruption causes gender inequality. Bjarnegård (2013) spelled out the reasoning in the following way, highlighting that women are not trusted in clientelist networks harboring sensitive exchanges:

[I]n clientelist systems, opportunities for electoral corruption are gendered in that only those with access to networks, those with connections within the local or national elite, those with resources to finance corrupt behavior, and those who are already influential in society are in positions to be considered assets in clientelist networks and are the only ones who will be trusted with the sensitive nature of the exchange (p. 37).

In a study of 167 regions in 18 European countries, Sundström and Wängnerud (2016) demonstrated that where levels of corruption are high, the proportion of women elected to local councils is low; conversely, where the proportion of women is high the levels of corruption are low. Sundström and Wängnerud suggested that corruption indicates the presence of shadowy arrangements that benefit the already privileged and pose a direct obstacle to women when male-dominated networks influence political parties' candidate selection. They also suggested that there is a more diffuse, indirect signal effect derived from citizens' experiences with a broad range of government authorities; the presence of corruption is presented as a signal of "no equal treatment" that makes women, who otherwise would have stepped forward, unwilling to stand as candidates (see also Kenny 2013; Stockemer 2011).

A related strand of research focuses on opportunity structures. What is highlighted in this research is that women usually earn less money than men and that, due to family responsibilities in the private sphere, they are also less involved in public matters. Naci Mocan (2008; see also Torgler and Valev 2006) developed the logic behind the argument:

All else the same, highly educated and high-income individuals should have higher exposure to being asked for a bribe by a government official because of their higher earning capacity and because they are likely to have more opportunities to interact with government officials (p. 3).

Namawk Alhassan-Alolo (2007) used vignette-styled scenarios to collect data from public servants (78 males and 57 females) in two public institutions in Ghana: the police service and the education service. Respondents were presented with imaginary scenarios involving corrupt conduct by officials—for example, accepting a gift in the course of public duty—and they were asked to express their level of approval or disapproval for each one. It was found that females did not demonstrate higher ethical standards than men. In line with other studies focusing on opportunity structures, Alhassan-Alolo concluded that, when exposed to concrete situations involving bribery, women do not prove to be any less corrupt than men. The finding from Ghana is intriguing, but other studies have questioned the generalizability of the results. Alatas et al. (2009) conducted experiments in Australia, India, Indonesia, and Singapore; they argued that these differed in regard to patriarchal structures. They concluded that unequal gender structures in developing countries suppress gender differences in relation to corruption, whereas the more equal gender structures of Australia allow them to emerge: “In relatively more patriarchal societies where women do not play as active a role in the public domain, women’s views on social issues may be influenced to a greater extent by men’s views” (Alatas et al. 2009, p. 678).

A third strand of contemporary research on the link between gender and corruption delves deeper into the mediating role of institutions. Based on a Large-N sample and a design that resembles the initial studies by Dollar et al. and Swamy et al., Justin Esarey and Gina Chirillo (2013; see also Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017) demonstrated that the relationship between levels of women in government and levels of corruption appears in democracies but not in authoritarian states. Moreover, they found that tolerance of corruption among the general public also follows this trend. Esarey and Chirillo theorized on the interplay between formal (regime type) and informal (norms) institutions when they contended that women, as members of a disadvantaged group, have stronger self-interest in following norms, because due to discrimination they are likely to be punished more severely for any transgressions. Democracies contain a strong norm against corruption; women are more perceptive of this norm than men, hence a gender difference appears in democratic states.

Figures 1.1 and 1.2 underpin the importance of distinguishing between regime types and also update the analyses (the study by Dollar et al. (2001) utilized data from 1990 whereas the two figures below build on data from 2014). In both figures, corruption is measured using the Control of




Fig. 1.1 The correlation between proportions of women in national parliaments and levels of corruption in a world-wide sample. Note: The measure Control of Corruption comes from the World Bank. Higher values equal lower levels of corruption. Figures for the proportion of women in national parliaments come from Inter-parliamentary Union. Data reflects the situation in 2014 (Data retrieved from the Quality of Government Standard Dataset, version Jan 2017 (Teorell et al. 2017))

Corruption indicator from the World Bank. This is commonly used in corruption research and captures perceptions of the extent to which public power in a country is exercised for private gain. The number of women in national parliaments comes from the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Figure 1.1 includes all countries in the world with a national parliament (and available data), whereas Fig. 1.2 includes only democratic states. We have used the well-renowned *Economist* index to distinguish between full democracies and nondemocratic states. The results show a much stronger correlation between the proportion of women in parliament and the Control of Corruption measure in the group of full democracies (49 cases) than that including almost all countries in the world (185 cases).

Stensöta et al. (2015) took the institutional perspective further when they hypothesized that the bureaucracy, even within democratic states,

so-called input side of government is quite different from the logic of impersonality at the output side; in the electoral arena the dominating logic is to stand out to others to attract attention, and, in the long run, votes. Personal attributes may therefore be used to improve one's visibility and reputation in the electoral arena. Thus, women candidates may, for strategic reasons, present themselves as "clean" outsiders, but they may also be driven by ideological considerations and the wish to represent disadvantaged groups such as women.

A final theme to touch upon before we present the outline of this book is the study by Watson and Moreland (2014) that brings further evidence to the strand of research initiated by Dollar et al. (2001) and Swamy et al. (2001) arguing that women in government may cause lower levels of corruption. Watson and Moreland (2014) used time-series analysis of 140 countries, from 1998 to 2011, to analyze the relationship between women's descriptive representation—the number of female elected representatives—and citizens' perceptions of corruption. Their analysis largely confirms previous findings: a positive relationship between large numbers of women and low levels of corruption. What, besides the number of female elected representatives, has a positive effect in multivariate regression analysis is the substantive representation of women, which concerns the content of the political process. Watson and Moreland included measures of health expenditures and pregnancy protection as indicators of substantive representation; the analyses demonstrate that perceptions of corruption are lower in countries with a higher substantive representation of women. Watson and Moreland were careful not to draw hasty conclusions, but thus far they have shown the most convincing results that changes in levels of corruption, brought about by the presence of women legislators, can be a result of substantive representation. In sum, Watson and Moreland suggested that women legislators focus on issues of particular interest to women citizens, such as social spending and women's rights. As a next step, the passing of laws about gender issues may, especially if they are designed to protect disadvantaged groups, influence citizens' perceptions of corruption and quality of government in the broader sense.

Summing up, in the wake of the initial studies there was a heated debate on whether there was a link between gender and corruption or if relationships should be seen as spurious (Sung 2003). In addition, since the World Bank (2001, p. 12) used correlations to state that "women can be an effective force for rule of law and good government," another heated debate started regarding women's political participation as a "quick-fix"

or tool for certain means, but not as an end in itself. Since then, research has developed, and the contemporary questions ask when, how, and why the link between gender and corruption appears.

THE OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

Based on our survey of previous research, we suggest five interesting avenues along which studies can be conducted, which also corresponds to the way the book is organized:

1. Historical accounts of why some countries develop along a path of corruption while other countries develop along a path of good government are frequent in the area, but specific gendered accounts of these processes are largely lacking.
2. The relationship between gender and corruption has been found to be strongest within the electoral arena, which suggests that in-depth studies of relationships between male and female voters and male and female politicians will be promising for further research.
3. Previous analyses have also tentatively suggested that different mechanisms apply to different institutions, such as bureaucracies versus national parliaments, arguing that each institution contains its specific logic of appropriateness that mediates the link between gender and corruption. This suggestion should be studied in greater detail.
4. Fourth, the question of what role women may play in the change from an equilibrium of corruption towards an equilibrium of good government is, of course, in many ways the ultimate question for how gender matters for corruption. There is a need for studies that push research further and capture the conditions under which the influx of women actually can change equilibria of corruption.
5. Lastly, there is a need for theoretical elaboration on the suggested mechanisms at work, triggering an effect of gender. Moreover, an important normative foundation for arguing against corruption can be derived from feminist exchange theories. This task involves rethinking conventional, monetary based, understandings of the concept of corruption. For new avenues of research to emerge there is also a need for studies that takes *gender* seriously and deepens the understanding of masculinity versus femininity as social constructions.

To achieve theoretical and empirical progress, this volume brings together both established scholars and newcomers in the field of gender and corruption. The contributing authors rely on different methods and data, which underscores the width of the present field. The volume includes large cross-country comparative studies as well as case studies on different regions of the world, such as Brazil, Mexico, Tanzania, the Arab region, Russia, the United States, and Europe. A core idea behind this book is that we will reach a deeper understanding of the phenomenon at hand—the link between gender and corruption—if we also include more demanding cases, that is, cases where previous studies suggest little or no effect of gender, such as in authoritarian states and in the bureaucracy. It should be noted that the definition of corruption, quality of government, and similar concepts, varies to some degree, but all chapters discuss their specific approach.

The first two chapters (together with this introduction) examine basic links and long-term trajectories. In Chap. 2 Amy C. Alexander departs from the finding that, *ceteris paribus*, when a country performs well in gender equality, it performs well in quality of government and vice versa. The chapter adds to this literature a theory that considers gender equality within households fundamental in understanding the historical roots of quality of government. Alexander argues that greater gender egalitarianism in early household formation patterns creates a core basis of “bottom-up” support for higher quality of government and related civic norms, namely, generalized social trust. From this perspective, the chapter works with fertility data for gauging the long-term effects of household gender equality on generalized trust and quality of government from 1800 to today. In Chap. 3 Bo Rothstein introduces the concept of *impartiality* to the discussion. The chapter makes a number of important claims: That corruption has detrimental effects on overall human well-being; that most existing programs for combatting corruption have not delivered; that increased gender equality seems to be one important factor behind getting corruption under control; that impartiality in the exercise of public power, not least when it “translates” into meritocracy in the public administration, has a powerful effect both on increasing gender equality and lowering corruption and, finally, that impartiality in the exercise of public power as an ideal turns out to be difficult to reach. It is, Rothstein concludes, reasonable to take a “Churchillian” (non-ideal) approach to this. As with democracy, impartiality is not a perfect system, but all other systems for delivering quality of government have turned out to be worse.

The second section of the book delves deeper into the role of voters and interactions within the electoral arena. In Chap. 4, Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Justin Esarey and Erika Schumacher evaluate whether voters perceive of comparable male and female candidates differently in terms of how likely they are to be involved in a corruption scandal and punish them differently if they are involved in corruption. They conducted survey experiments in two countries: the United States (with high electoral accountability) and Brazil (with moderate to low electoral accountability) to determine if differential treatment is the causal mechanism linking women's representation and corruption. The findings show only weak and statistically uncertain evidence from both countries that citizens perceive women as less corruptible than men, and there is no evidence that voters punish women more harshly than men for corruption scandals. In Chap. 5 Lindsay J. Benstead and Ellen Lust move to another part of the world and investigate the role of perceived incorruptibility in Arab elections. More precisely, the chapter examines whether and how perceptions about women's incorruptibility shape their electability. The findings show that many citizens see female politicians as less corrupt. However, many others state that men are less corrupt, a view that the authors suggest is consistent with "hostile sexism." When asked directly, people who state that women are less corrupt or who see no difference between men and women in their propensity to engage in corruption are more likely to say that they would vote for females, but a survey experiment casts doubt on the conclusions. The conclusion reached in this chapter is that *gender egalitarianism*, not positive bias, may be most likely to benefit females, consistently with gender role congruity and ambivalent sexism theories.

In the final chapter of the second section Elin Bjarnegård, Mi Yung Yoon, and Pär Zetterberg examine whether electoral gender quotas reduce or reproduce corruption. The authors suggest that quotas may *reduce* corruption only if they provide a clean slate, i.e., if quota candidates are recruited from new networks and are given their own mandate to act on a range of issues once in parliament. However, quotas are more likely to *reproduce* corruption if quota candidates are recruited from existing networks and are expected to protect an already corrupt party line. The authors apply the theoretical framework to an empirical case—Tanzania—and suggest that the latter scenario is most likely in stable electoral authoritarian regimes.

The third section of this book discusses the role of the bureaucracy, or what is often referred to as the output side of politics. In Chap. 7, Helena

Stensöta argues that although high bureaucratic quality is considered a major curbing factor for corruption in mainstream literature, the relationship between corruption and women in the administration is understudied. Stensöta demonstrates how institutional theory can be used to make sense of the finding that gender seems to matter less in the bureaucracy than in the legislature, by suggesting that gender is mediated by an enforcing institutional logic in the legislature and a suppressing institutional logic in the bureaucracy. The empirical analysis sustains this view. Here then, gender is comprehended as a “raw-material” to these institutions, that is molded, yet not created by them. Further, the discretion within *front-line bureaucracy*, suggests that gender may matter more in this type than in other forms of bureaucracy. In Chap. 8, Marina Nistotskaya and Helena Stensöta broaden the discussion by looking at effects on an outcome variable such as infant mortality. The focus is on the role of the legislature versus the bureaucracy in Russia—a large electoral autocracy. Previous research revealed a connection between increased women’s political representation (WPR) and responsiveness to women’s interests in democracies; however, knowledge about this in non-democracies is, the authors argue, practically non-existent. Building on both authoritarian regimes and gender and literature from informal institutions, they theorize WPR effects in the context of autocratic regimes, explaining why the positive dynamics between WPR and women-friendly policy outcomes and outputs may be disrupted there. Employing an original dataset from 80 subnational political units in Russia, Nistotskaya and Stensöta find that larger numbers of women in regional legislatures are associated with higher rates of infant mortality, while the level of democracy moderates the relationship. The analysis reveals no association between higher numbers of women in senior bureaucratic posts and child mortality.

In section four of the book, all the chapters deal with the question of what role women may play in the change from equilibrium of corruption towards equilibrium of good government. In Chap. 9, Amy C. Alexander and Andreas Bågenholm depart from analyses at the aggregate level, showing a positive link between the percentages of women in elected office and lower levels of corruption. This research, the authors argue, has not focused much on the individual-level behavior of MPs, but has nevertheless assumed individual-level mechanisms behind this link. Thus, there is a need to open this “black box” in order to find out whether female politicians actually engage successfully in anti-corruption efforts and to a higher extent than men. Alexander and Bågenholm investigate

whether female politicians' have politicized corruption more often than men in election campaigns during the last twenty-five years. The results show that even though female candidates tend to politicize corruption more frequently, they rarely make it to powerful positions so cannot influence policies directly. In Chap. 10, Marcia Grimes and Lena Wängnerud utilize data collected over different periods of time at the subnational level in Mexico. This chapter suggests that, as the impetus for women's entry into politics is often exogenous to political organizations, once successful, it may disrupt the existing modus operandi of politics and create a window of opportunity for additional change. If anti-corruption efforts *concurrently* figure on the policy agenda, then changes both in formal laws and informal norms related to corruption may ensue. The analyses include a large number of control factors and uncover evidence that causation may run in two directions; that greater representation of women in government may cause decreased corruption and that corruption in government inhibits women's entry into the political arena.

In Chap. 11, Mattias Agerberg, Maria Gustavson, Aksel Sundström, and Lena Wängnerud examine an episode in Argentina where a local mayor diverted money intended for a program to counter domestic violence to investments in a Malvinas veterans' house. This was in clear violation of official procedures. The Argentinian example speaks to women's grassroots perceptions of corruption as the non-delivery of public services and misuse of public funds. The chapter presents reasons why women (as a group) gain more than men (as a group) from a state on track and explores, using a cross-country comparative design, whether a well-functioning government auditing agency may be a useful tool for women in progressing towards good governance. The results show that the relationship between the proportion of women in parliament and national levels of corruption is mediated by two factors: installment of auditing agencies and substantive representation of women, i.e., the room available for policies targeting women citizens. Initial relationships between the proportion of women in parliament and levels of corruption become insignificant when the two mediating variables were introduced. The authors conclude that there is a need for further studies on the role of government auditing.

The final section of the book includes three chapters that represent especially promising avenues for new research. In Chap. 12, Helen Lindberg and Helena Stensöta discuss how feminist theories can be used to understand the phenomena of corruption. The authors explore what it

means to expand the definition of corruption into sexual corruption and to use theories of patriarchy to make sense of its dynamics. Lindberg and Stensöta highlight the meaning of sexual corruption and problematize, using feminist theories, how asymmetrical opportunities along gender and the public/private divide contribute to theories on gender and corruption. The chapter concludes that men are the beneficiaries of sexual corruption, and therefore, corruption is an additional risk for women connected to male power. Furthermore, the feminist ambition to dismantle the distinction between private and public spheres means that every misuse of power can be seen as corruption, with far-reaching empirical consequences for its study.

In Chap. 13, Elin Bjarnegård argues for the need to bring the role of masculinity to the fore in future studies of gender and corruption. Hitherto, most research has focused on the role of women and the values they may bring to positions of power. This chapter turns the question around and problematizes the role of male-dominated networks. The core of the argument is that corruption indicates the presence of shadowy arrangements that benefits the already privileged, which in most countries tend to be men. Based on data from Thailand, it reveals how women are locked out of positions of power, since they are not trusted as partners in the network of sensitive exchanges. In the final chapter—an epilogue—Helena Stensöta develops the reasoning on the two main contributions of the volume: that gender equality processes (and not just women) may curb corruption and that institutional theory is useful for understanding how the link between gender and corruption plays out. Stensöta moves on to reflect beyond these conclusions and states that institutional theory makes it important to also inquire into individual level mechanisms. The chapter calls for increased carefulness in transferring ideas of mechanisms from one context or problem to another; possible pitfalls of this are highlighted. It is further proposed to distinguish broadly between “refraining from” and “actively protecting” as two equally valid mechanisms that may enhance good government. A final reflection on how gender and power is connected in the field ends the chapter.

This volume has brought together research on gender and corruption from varying perspectives, establishing the research field of gender and corruption as an important field of its own within research. The presentation above of the various chapters makes it clear that the aim of this book is not to contribute streamlined results, all going in the same direction.

Rather, we wanted to use gender as a lens to show complexities and contradictions in corruption research. Recruiting women to power is no “quick fix” in the fight against corruption but, under certain circumstances, gender equality and the presence of women in positions of power can be of importance.

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The Historic Roots of Quality of Government: The Role of Gender Equality

Amy C. Alexander

Recent research has shown that barriers to quality of government, such as systemic corruption, are “deeply rooted in the underlying social and historical political structure” (Uslaner and Rothstein 2016, p. 3). This focus on the historical roots of quality of government has primarily emphasized developments in state-managed “top-down” achievements such as universal education. This chapter adds to this literature a theory that also considers gender equality within households fundamental to understanding the historical roots of quality of government. Under this perspective, I argue that greater gender egalitarianism in early household formation patterns creates a core basis of “bottom-up” support for higher quality of government and related civic norms, namely, generalized social trust.

Under higher quality of government, governments realize the impartial, reliable, competent and trustworthy exercise of public authority. Thus, sorting out any historical driver of quality of government is difficult work. When we observe the global historical variation in quality of government, countries move along slow, path-dependent trajectories. In short, quality of government has deep roots, so any driver must also have

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deep roots. From the perspective of historical depth, theory and evidence suggest that gendered norms, institutions and behavior are up to the task. Indeed, it is through gender patterns that we observe some of the earliest human tendencies to legitimate the power of some over others as natural and uncontested. We also observe great variation over time in the transition of those patterns towards universal, impartial treatment.

Moreover, a recent and now rapidly growing literature establishes a number of positive links between various aspects of gender equality and quality of government. This suggests close links between gender equality and the provision of a host of public goods, including democratic accountability (Coleman 2004; Fish 2002; Goetz 2007; Norris and Inglehart 2003; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Welzel 2013), intra and interstate peace (Hudson et al. 2012), economic growth (Blackden et al. 2007; Coleman 2004; Duflo 2012; Kabeer and Natali 2013; Klasen 2002; Seguino 2000; World Bank 2011), economic development (Luiten van Zanden et al. 2017); rule of law (Branisa et al. 2010) and low corruption (several chapters in this volume; Dollar et al. 2001; Goetz 2007; Branisa et al. 2010; Swamy et al. 2001). In this case, numerous studies confirm that *ceteris paribus* when a country performs well in gender equality, it performs well in quality of government and vice versa.

Nevertheless, while the literature continues to firmly establish this link, it remains contested whether (a) it exists because gender equality is simply one of many quality of government outcomes or (b) it is *a key driver* of a higher quality of government. This begs the question: Are there good reasons to assume that gender equality plays a role as a *driver* of countries' varying quality of government across the globe?

This chapter engages that question head on and argues that it is through gender systems that individuals internalize some of the most pervasive grassroots experiences with power. This has profound implications for the more formal culture of power that masses accept and elites execute, which in turn impacts societal achievements in generalized trust and impartial government practices.

In the pages that follow, the theoretical section covers why, more generally, one might consider gendered socialization a process that impacts a society's larger culture of power and why this has implications for generalized trust and quality of government. This section also discusses the theoretical and empirical leverage we gain from looking more deeply at the unique development of gender equality in the household in Northwestern Europe circa 1500 as being indicative of how early mass grassroots patterns

in gendered norms and behaviors placed countries on either virtuous or vicious trajectories when socializing and exercising power.

The empirical section evaluates hypotheses derived from theory. In particular, I bring in global fertility data that estimate countries' fertility rates as early as 1800. I use this to gauge the strength of the relationship between historical household gender equality and current levels of generalized trust and quality of government. I argue that fertility rates grant an insight into the informal, grassroots structures of equality that operate largely through gendered norms in households and are vital to the historical development of trust and quality of government.

THEORY

Gendered Socialization, the Culture of Power and Quality of Government

Patriarchy and the Culture of Power Definitions of patriarchy abound and scholars have observed wide variation in patriarchal systems, both culturally and historically (see, for instance, Acker (1989), Goldberg (2008), and Patil (2013) for reviews). We can, however, turn to Walby (1990, p. 214) for some consensus on a core definition, “patriarchy is a system of social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women.” Based on this definition, in the end, patriarchy is a system of unchecked power that finds its legitimacy in how gender is socialized. This system is not only discriminatory, but it also tends towards patterns of corruption in the sense that, conceivably, such a system could lead men to abuse their power through female exploitation for private gain, such as sexual pleasure and freedom from unpaid labor (see Chap. 12 this volume). In short, patriarchal gendered socialization generates a widespread, informal culture of power that seriously undermines the quality of government norms.

Many in the literature consider the key normative principle behind quality of government “impartiality” (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). The quality of government rests on both input and output impartiality. Input impartiality is accomplished through procedures that achieve and maintain impartiality in authorizing and holding accountable those in power. Many would agree that the principle of political equality at the core of democratic

institutionalization exemplifies this kind of impartiality. Output impartiality is impartiality in the exercise of public authority.

On the flip side, two forms of bad government are highlighted in the literature: corruption and discrimination. The standard definition of corruption is abuse of public office for private gain. Here, the use of public authority is partial to one's own selfish interests; the power holder uses public authority for his or her own private gain. Discrimination operates through other-regarding partialities in the authorization and exercise of power; some are regarded as inferior and are therefore repressed relative to others. In both cases, power is used to undermine rather than promote both social trust and the public good.

To return to the implications for gendered socialization, patriarchal systems thrive by referring to biological differences between women and men to legitimate *partial authorization of some to power relative to others and the partial exercise of power over some relative to others*. This leads to multiple, highly pervasive, highly visible symbols and acts of discrimination and abuse of power for male gain. These repeated, "normalized" experiences create a legitimacy basis for other forms of authoritarian, partial treatment. Among these, for instance, are past and present injustices that rest on a biological and/or religious authorization of the unequal worth of some relative to others by such "natural" legitimacy bases as birth right, ethnic/racial right, divine right or familial right. Ultimately, the informal culture of power that results makes *impartiality* in the authorization and exercise of power seemingly unnatural as it appears exceptional to the "everyday" order of things. This presents a formidable barrier to the development of values that societies need to develop a higher quality of government.

For the same reasons, a critical source of civic cooperation—generalized trust—cannot evolve. Generalized trust is linked to higher quality of government as one of the key civic norms that creates a civil society context which increases the quality of government (Holmberg and Rothstein 2017; Rothstein and Uslander 2005). In a culture of unequal treatment, such as that indicative of a patriarchal culture, people generally think in terms of rigid in-group/out-group divisions. In such a culture, it is extremely difficult to develop a generalized form of trust that bridges group boundaries (Welzel and Delhey 2015). Consequently, civic cooperation across group boundaries is blocked. The result is a weak civil society, the absence of solidarity beyond the in-group, nonexistence of a sense of the public good and, overall, an under-developed capacity among the

citizens to join forces in the face of shared concerns. This creates serious collective action problems that are inimical to quality of government; it becomes the norm to govern for one's own benefit and the benefit of selected support groups.

Gender Diversity and the Culture of Power While the patriarchal roots of gendered socialization are nearly universal, there is powerful evidence of historical and cross-national variation away from patriarchal gendered socialization and towards support for equal treatment, value and capability regardless of sex (Alexander et al. 2016; Alexander and Welzel 2010, 2015; Inglehart and Norris 2003). This change operates largely through female empowerment; gendered socialization transitions from primarily legitimating female exploitation and repression to legitimating female value and capability. By creating new norms that prioritize universal value and capability, the informal practice of power in everyday interactions is transformed. The everyday relations of power between the sexes become more contested and negotiated as progressive gendered socialization diversifies human motivation, access to power, power norms, the exercise of power and empowered interests by (slowly) dissolving sex-ascribed roles. This directly challenges hegemonic and masculine cultures of power which stifle generalized trust and, ultimately, achievements in quality of government.

*Early Patterns of Household Gender Equality: The “Bottom-Up”
Roots of Quality of Government Norms and Practices*

So far, we have considered the plausibility of gender equality as a key driver of quality of government purely on theoretical grounds. To buttress these ideas, I turn to one of the major historical developments in grass-roots patterns of gender equality that set Northwestern Europe apart in its gender egalitarian trajectory from 1500 to the present day, relative to other world regions.

Why Northwestern Europe? Since large-scale data projects, such as those conducted by the World Bank, Transparency International, the Quality of Government Institute and the Varieties of Democracy Project, have begun to measure corruption or other aspects of quality of government, Northwestern Europe is consistently the world regional leader in quality of government achievements. It is, for instance, in this region where we find the most effective democracies, those that not only offer the

widest set of civil and political liberties but also see the most effective implementation of those rights and liberties in the everyday lives of the people they govern (Alexander and Welzel 2011). This region also has the longest, virtuous historical path dependency in quality of government. In this case, any attempt to support the idea of gender equality as a driver of quality of government must identify a pattern of equality in the region's gender systems that is unique and has deep historical roots.

Such evidence indeed exists. Around 1500, several authors note a unique pattern of relatively higher levels of gender equality in household formation in Northwestern Europe (Hartman 2004; Hajnal 1965, 1982; Kok 2017; Todd 1985).¹ Based on an array of qualitative and quantitative global evidence, these scholars emphasize, in particular, the late marriage, single-family household pattern; a pattern of household formation that is unique in its relative empowerment of women and girls compared to others across the globe. The more standard household formation patterns, which one sees outside Northwestern Europe, followed an early marriage, multi-family structure (Kok 2017). While there was regional variation across the globe in marriage age and the scope of household extended kin, the patterns in Northwestern Europe were unique (Kok 2017). Figure 2.1 provides a summary of the key differences between the Northwestern European system and other systems as highlighted by Hartman (2004) and Kok (2017).

This early turn in household equality in Northwestern Europe created a system of relative impartiality in the approach to differences in sex which encouraged more universalism in the development of skills and social bonds (Hartman 2004; Kok 2017). According to Warner et al. (1986) this is possibly due to the fragility of the single-family household. The nuclear unit consists of just a two-person partnership. Thus, there is not a surplus of kin for the purposes of labor replacement during instances of high demand or disasters (e.g., sickness, accident or violence). This creates an informal network of contracted servitude from outsiders both to fill labor demands and to act as a kind of insurance. For young adults, this contracted servitude acted as an extended stage of skill development and resource acquisition prior to founding one's own household (Hartman 2004; Kok 2017). Thus, as an externality of these household patterns, we see a virtuous exchange between servitude and non-kin-related labor opportunities. Outside servitude is required to compensate for a lack of extended kin, and this creates opportunities for young women and men to develop skills as well as to acquire a resource base by providing service in

Late Marriage, Single Family Household	Early Marriage, Multi-Family Household
<p>Late female age of marriage, autonomy in partner selection, both mature adults, more egalitarian partnership</p> <p>Timing of marriage based on employment opportunity and savings for both men and women, emphasis on female as a partner</p> <p>Two person partnership, husband is head of household, more horizontal structure</p> <p>Fragility over the life-cycle, partnership with wife is crucial to household survival, wife reliance and value, more female empowering</p> <p>Fragility over the life-cycle, demand for contracted domestic service, outsider reliance, diverse social bonds, out group oriented</p> <p>Young adult pre-marital male and female contracted mobility to various households, diverse social bonds, out group oriented</p> <p>Gender convergence, women have more skill development, economic autonomy, mobility and household decision-making power</p> <p>System of relative impartiality in approach to sex differences, encourages universalism in the development of skills and social bonds. With servitude contracts we see early forms of institutionalization which could be a precursor to egalitarian state capacity.</p>	<p>Early female age of marriage, arranged marriage, female adolescent and male adult, more authoritarian partnership</p> <p>Timing of marriage based on biological events, female puberty, emphasis on female as a reproductive resource</p> <p>Male kinship hierarchy, father or widower head of household, sons in line as heirs, more hierarchical structure</p> <p>Kinship surplus for household labor, production and care of kin, sons' wives and daughters are expendable, more female exploitative</p> <p>Son preference and female exploitation acceptable, male kin network reliance, kin bonds, in group oriented</p> <p>No male or female pre-marital mobility from natal household, kin bonds, in group oriented</p> <p>Gender divergence, rigid division of sexual labor</p> <p>System of relative sex-based partiality, clientelistic networks, mistrust of outsiders and high internal inequality justified on the basis of natural differences.</p>

Fig. 2.1 Comparison of household systems

“outsider” households. It also allows them to more autonomously choose life partners. Ultimately, this system divorces skill development, caring, resource acquisition and partner choice from the kinship system; in so doing, it creates unique opportunities for the more impartial treatment of roles that are assumed throughout the lifecycle and within the household. In short, this system is unique in its induced level of gender convergence.

It is the relative empowerment of women and girls that largely drives this convergence and sets the system apart (Kok 2017). One of the quintessential mechanisms of empowerment is the extent to which the single-family system creates a situation where women marry later. The relative fragility of the system makes it crucial for women and girls to develop a range of skills prior to forming a household. This phase of skill development raises the age of female marriage. The value attributed to women thereby transitions from being capable of reproduction to being a capable partner. This results in women who enter into marriage as mature adults with greater skills, some economic autonomy and experiences, and with social bonding that is not limited to kin.

In contrast, the reliance on kin for labor that is indicative of multi-family households centers the value attributed to women on their ability to reproduce (Kok 2017). It becomes essential that women are maximized for this purpose during their child-bearing years. Hence, marriageability is largely biologically determined and focused on female reproductive potential. Girls are married off as adolescents to mature, adult men. This severely reduces their autonomy in both the marriage relationship and the household. Under this power differential, the kinship hierarchy is male, following the male bloodline. This leaves women outside the household power structure. In this case, compared to the single-family household, we see a dramatic divergence in the autonomy that men experience as compared to women within the household and over the lifecycle.

The way that these two systems diverge in gendered socialization and the culture of everyday power has some important normative implications that carry weight in considering gender equality a mechanism for the development and deepening of generalized trust and quality of government. The gendered socialization and behavior in the late marriage, single-family household generates greater value for equality and out-group trust while the early marriage, multi-family household generates greater value for inequality and in-group trust. Indeed, the single-family system diverges in the degree to which behavior and socialization encourages

universalism in the everyday development of skills and social bonds. This is a powerful generator of norms needed to eventually support the more formal institutionalization of egalitarian state capacity, such as that achieved through universal schooling (Uslaner and Rothstein 2016). This is the case both civically, by generating contexts conducive to generalized trust, and as a matter of state management, through increased support of state investment in widespread capabilities, such as the achievement of universal schooling.

Thus, in the end, the informal turn towards greater gender egalitarianism in early household formation patterns is potentially a key complement to state-managed turns towards the universal provision of public goods. This bottom-up pattern that generates (relatively speaking) greater impartiality norms and behaviors complements top-down patterns that also generate the same norms and behaviors. Hence, ultimately, together, these forces create an optimal historical environment for the early development of generalized trust and quality of government and for virtuous trajectories along these lines into the future.

HYPOTHESES, DATA, METHODS AND RESULTS

In this section we turn to some long-term, cross-national evidence for support of the theory that historical household patterns of gender equality generate the normative bases that build and deepen trust and quality of government. Before heading into the discussion of the analysis and the presentation of results, I present hypotheses, describe the data and offer a brief outline of the analytical strategy for evaluating the hypotheses.

Hypotheses, Data and Methods

Hypotheses I derive the following hypotheses from the theory presented above.

- H1: Lower fertility in 1800 will have a positive, independent effect on quality of government in the 2000s under control of other potentially confounding historical drivers.
- H2: Lower fertility in 1800 will have a positive, independent effect on generalized trust in the 2000s under control of other potentially confounding historical drivers.

Data To support my theoretical expectations, I assume that fertility rates are an acceptable measure for capturing the historical variation in gender equality in households. In the literature describing the Northwestern European household, Hartman (2004), Hajnal (1965, 1982) and Kok (2017) note that a lower fertility rate is an externality of the relative empowerment of women under the late marriage, single-household system. Moreover, the fertility rate data creates the opportunity to conduct global, systematic comparison from the pre-modern era to the present day. Thus, we gain tremendous temporal leverage with this indicator in comparison to existing gender indicators. All global fertility data measured in 1800 are taken from the Gap Minder database (www.gapminder.org/).

Ultimately, I am interested in the impact of fertility rates measured in 1800 on quality of government and generalized social trust today. To measure the global variation in quality of government, I use the World Bank's Rule of Law data for 2012. To measure the global variation in generalized social trust, I take survey data from waves 5 and 6 of the World Values Surveys. The years covered span 2005–2013.

I control for mass education levels, Protestant religious legacy, democracy, percentage of family farms and gross domestic product in purchasing power parities. I use Uslaner and Rothstein's (2016) data to measure mass education levels in 1900. This measures the average years of schooling of people in a country. As I have elaborated above, I consider this the most important historical control, given its particular relevance to corruption's historical roots. Thus, I include this variable in every model.

I control for a Protestant religious legacy. The religion in history with the strongest emphasis on individualism is arguably Protestantism. This religion came into being through the Reformation, which coincided with the early colonial period and the florescence of pre-industrial capitalism. Not coincidentally, these succeeded mostly in those regions of Europe where we also see the unique turn towards late marriage, single-household formation. Protestantism's emphasis on individualism in relationships forged with God is considered a mechanism of greater equality and autonomy through increases in mass literacy and plural, decentralized institutionalization of the church. This is a candidate for a key historical driver for which one must control. A Protestant legacy is measured as the percentage of Protestants in a country in 1980 using data from the CIA World Factbook.

Another plausible driver could be a longer heritage with democratic institutions. As I mentioned above, input impartiality is accomplished

using procedures that achieve and maintain impartiality in authorizing and holding accountable those in power. Many would agree that the principle of political equality at the core of democratic institutionalization exemplifies this kind of impartiality. Thus, it is important to control for the early institutionalization of democracy. The level of democracy is measured in 1900 using the Polity IV data.

The literature also suggests that the prevalence of autonomous family farms indicative of pre-modern Northwestern Europe could be a historical driver of country trajectories in quality of government. The medieval “hide system” in Northwestern Europe is probably the best-known example (Mitterauer 2010). In this system, the family farm operated as an autonomous production unit in cultivating its own slot of land, the “hide.” Farmers voluntarily joined village associations that served to self-administer their joint affairs and to represent their interests vis-à-vis the lord. Powelson (1997) describes this particular form of social organization as “contractual feudalism.” This early practice of contracting could be a powerful normative source of values attributed to accountability and impartial treatment in power relations. Thus, it is important to control for this as a contending historical driver. The percentage of family farms data is measured in 1870 and comes from Vanhanen.

Finally, countries’ level of market resources could drive increases in multiple forms of capacity, such as higher capacity in human capital and technology, which has historical implications for countries’ current levels of quality of government. This is a final key control that I include in the analysis. Gross domestic product measured in purchasing power parities is measured in 1800 using data from the Gap Minder project.

Analytic Strategy To test H1 and H2, I use ordinary least squares regression analysis to look at the effect of lower fertility on quality of government and generalized trust under the relevant controls.

Results

Table 2.1 displays the results of the ordinary least squares regression analysis. Each model includes the fertility data, mass education data and one control variable due to sample size.² As I noted earlier, the universal schooling thesis is the strongest competitor theoretically, thus, I include this control in every model. The results are consistent with both H1 and H2.

Table 2.1 The influence of historical drivers on rule of law and generalized trust

	<i>DV: rule of law 2012</i>				<i>DV: generalized trust</i>			
	<i>M1</i>	<i>M2</i>	<i>M3</i>	<i>M4</i>	<i>M5</i>	<i>M6</i>	<i>M7</i>	<i>M8</i>
Fertility 1800 (inverted)	.36***	.29***	.36**	.30***	.23 [†]	.26*	.31*	.23*
Mass schooling 1900	.48***	.61***	.60***	.57***	.79***	.75***	.51*	.47***
Democracy 1900	.01 [†]	–	–	–	–.00	–	–	–
GDP PPP 1800	–	.06	–	–	–	–.14	–	–
% Farms 1870	–	–	.00	–	–	–	.25	–
% Protestants	–	–	–	.13 [†]	–	–	–	.34**
Adj. R ²	.73***	.73***	.71***	.74***	.75***	.66***	.80***	.73***
N	41	75	35	75	25	39	21	39

Note: Entries are standardized coefficients based on Ordinary Least Squares regression analysis. *** $p \leq .001$, ** $p \leq .01$, * $p \leq .05$, [†] $p \leq .10$

Whether predicting today's variation in rule of law or generalized social trust, lower fertility in 1800 and higher average schooling in 1900 are positive and significant and the two strongest historical drivers in the models. In fact, in the majority of the models, the third possible historical driver does not reach significance and, yet, the explained variance across all models is high, above an adjusted R² of .70 in most cases. In this case, lower fertility rates consistent with the expectations in H1 and H2 is a significant and positive predictor of rule of law and generalized social trust under control of all competing historical drivers. Lower fertility rates constitute the strongest historical driver, along with levels of mass education, of rule of law and generalized social trust today.

CONCLUSION

While the relationship between gender equality and quality of government finds widespread acceptance in the literature, the question of the role of gender equality as a driver or an outcome is contested terrain. This chapter argues that it is through gender patterns that we observe some of the earliest human tendencies to legitimate the power of some over others as natural and uncontested and, therefore, gendered socialization plays a role in understanding countries' historical trajectories in quality of government.

It is through experiences with gender in households that individuals internalize some of the most pervasive grassroots' experiences of power; this has profound normative implications for the more formal culture of power that the masses accept. To evidence a role for historical gendered socialization, I focus on the unique development in gender equality in the household in Northwestern Europe circa 1500. As today, countries in Northwestern Europe perform best in trust and quality of government practices, their early, unique pattern in household formation is potentially indicative of how early grassroots mass patterns in gendered norms and behaviors places countries on either virtuous or vicious trajectories in civic trust and quality of government practices. I then turned to an analysis of the relationship between fertility rate data from 1800 and measures of quality of government and generalized trust today under control of other historical drivers. According to the results, along with mass education, the level of fertility is a key historical correlate of quality of government institutions and generalized trust. In this case, historical patterns of gender equality help us understand countries' achievements in generalized trust and quality of government today.

Yet, while these long-term developments in gender equality appear to matter, the influence of these long-term patterns should not be interpreted as being *deterministic* of countries' futures. A deterministic approach fails to acknowledge the role of globalization in potentially accelerating gains in gender equality through intergovernmental consensus and transnational activism. In addition, such a perspective potentially underestimates human agency and the catalytic potential of social movements for gains in gender equality. In this sense, shorter-term variation in gender equality is *as important* for understanding the gender equality/quality of government link.

NOTES

1. The pattern covers "England, the Low Countries, much of Scandinavia, northern France, and the German-speaking lands" (Hartman 2004, p. 6).
2. The number of cases for which the mass education data and trust data is available is much more limited than the fertility rate data. In this case, for predicting rule of law, I have seventy-five cases and for generalized social trust, thirty nine. These numbers drop slightly with some controls which also have limited data. Statistical power is strongly affected by sample size, which can lead to a Type II error in statistical hypothesis testing. With so

few cases it is therefore possible that the multivariate analysis will fail to detect the significance of fertility rates inverted and education unless the effect of this variable is large (Miles and Shevlin 2001). The number of predictors included in the multivariate analysis will further exacerbate this problem. Thus, it is important to keep the number of additional controls in each multivariate model low to decrease the limits on statistical power with small samples (Tabachnick and Fidell 2009). For examples of similar analytic strategies in related published research on gender and democratization see Alexander (2012) and Welzel (2002). Thus, I limit my models to just one control variable.

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CHAPTER 3

Corruption, Gender Equality and Meritocracy

Bo Rothstein

An article titled “Medical Care in Romania Comes at an Extra Cost”, *New York Times* (March 9, 2009) reported the following story: “Alina Lungu, 30, said she did everything necessary to ensure a healthy pregnancy in Romania: she ate organic food, swam daily and bribed her gynecologist with an extra \$255 in cash, paid in monthly instalments handed over discreetly in white envelopes. She paid a nurse about \$32 extra to guarantee an epidural and even gave about \$13 to the orderly to make sure he did not drop the stretcher. But on the day of her delivery, she said, her gynecologist never arrived. Twelve hours into labor, she was left alone in her room for an hour. A doctor finally appeared and found that the umbilical cord was wrapped twice around her baby’s neck and had nearly suffocated him. He was born blind and deaf and is severely brain damaged...Alina and her husband, Ionut, despair that the bribes they paid were not enough to prevent the negligence that they say harmed their son, Sebastian. “Doctors are so used to getting bribes in Romania that you now have to pay more in order to even get their attention,” she said.¹

This story is just one of an almost endless stream of media coverage of how corruption negatively affects the life of people around the world (cf.

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World Bank 2010). The attention both from research and policy organizations has resulted in a massive increase in programs launched by international and national organizations to alleviate the corruption problem. Under the euphemism of “good governance,” such programs have become central for many developing countries as well. However, it is important to emphasize that the corruption problem is not confined to the developing world. Several analyses of the economic problems in Greece as well as studies of the collapse of the financial markets in 2008 have pointed to corruption as a main factor (Johnson 2009; Kaplanoglou and Rapanos 2013; Kaufmann 2008). The aim of this chapter is to present an analysis of the relationship between corruption and gender equality from a public policy perspective. More precisely, I will make five claims: (1) Corruption in its various forms is a very serious social ill. (2) Most existing programs and initiatives for combatting corruption have not delivered. (3) Increased gender equality seems to be one important factor behind getting corruption under control. (4) Impartiality in the exercise of public power, not least when it “translates” into meritocratic recruitment and promotion in the public administration, has a powerful effect on increasing gender equality and lowering corruption. (5) Impartiality in the exercise of public power is an ideal that turns out to be difficult to reach. It is therefore reasonable to take a “Churchillian” (non-ideal) approach to this. As with democracy, impartiality is far from a perfect system, but all other systems have turned out to be worse.

FROM RESEARCH TO POLICY

Defining corruption has turned out to be a major theoretical problem. In a recent publication I have tried to find a solution to this by conceptualizing what should be the opposite of corruption, that is, what is the *quality of government* (Rothstein and Varraich 2017). This conceptualization is based on the idea of *impartiality* as the central norm that should guide public officials when they implement laws and policies. Surprisingly, results from the many efforts to increase the quality of government and get corruption under control are meager. For example, Francis Fukuyama writes that the international development and aid community “would like to turn Afghanistan, Somalia, Libya, and Haiti into idealized places like ‘Denmark’ but it doesn’t have to slightest idea of how to bring this about” (Fukuyama 2014, p. 25). Another example comes from noted anti-corruption scholar Alina Mungiu-Pippidi who states: “By and large, the

evaluations piling up after the first fifteen years of anti-corruption work showed great expectations and humble results” (2015, p. 178). A third example can be taken from Dan Hough’s recently published book *Analysing Corruption* which summarizes the current state of affairs in the following way: “although there are a multitude of anti-corruption options out there, success stories are depressingly thin” (Hough 2017, p. 171). There are countries that have improved their control of corruption, but hardly any of these changes have been achieved through any international aid and development policy. In any case, considering the money and policy energy that has gone into the “good governance” agenda from the international aid and development regime, we are facing nothing less than a massive policy failure. This is, however, not the place to try to explain this failure (but see Rothstein and Tannenbergh 2015; Rothstein and Varraich 2017). Instead, the focus will be on which political and policy strategies that can be taken from the recent results show that gender equality has a positive effect on lowering corruption and increasing the quality of government. One reason for this focus on policy is that the step from research results to policy is a complicated one; it is not a self-evident or non-normative way to make this step. Research results do not automatically translate into policy recommendations, as the latter must take into account a number of issues related both to normative problems of legitimacy and empirical issues related to possible problems that can occur in the implementation process as problematic “side-effects” (Rothstein 2017).

The main problem for this chapter is how we should think about the relationship between gender equality and quality of government from a policy perspective. The reason for taking the issue of how to move from research results to policy seriously is, of course, that we are not dealing with just a theoretical/conceptual issue but with a “real life” problem. People around the world are suffering from a low quality of government and are, sometimes literally, “dying of corruption” (Holmberg and Rothstein 2011). Given the massive policy failure and huge lack of knowledge of how to help societies to break out of systemic corruption, we are in desperate need of “institutional devices” that we, as scholars, can present to the policy community with some confidence. However, it is important that we do not present institutional solutions that either cannot be implemented or would create a backlash in terms of legitimacy. If we make mistakes in how we recommend the move from research results to policy, the cost in terms of human well-being is potentially huge.

GENDER EQUALITY AND CORRUPTION

As noted in the introduction to this volume, research on the relationship between gender and corruption took off in early 2000s. While this work was often critiqued on the grounds of the relationship being spurious, i.e., a well-functioning state both curbs corruption and promotes gender equality, others, particularly feminist scholars, critiqued how women's participation in political life was portrayed as a tool to combat corruption, and not as a goal in itself. This school of thought turned the focus around and began studying how male networks shut women out of the inner sphere of political power, where a sizable share of corrupt transactions take place (Bjarnegård 2013). It has also been argued that women in many countries are more tied to the family and private sphere than men and therefore have fewer opportunities to engage in corruption. It should be noted that this does not explain why women would help to lower corruption once faced with these opportunities. A third alternative theory suggests that the effects arise from different social roles, where women are conditioned to avoid risks and to care for others.

Researchers at the Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg have developed an alternative theory which focuses more on rationality and women's choice of action. An underlying assumption is that women as a group not only have less power than men but also fewer economic resources. Refraining from corruption thus becomes rational to save scarce resources to pay for food or the welfare of the children, who are seen as being the woman's responsibility. Wängnerud (2012, 2015) emphasizes that women who reach political positions of power often have a different background to their male colleagues. In Mexico, female politicians have typically started their careers within civil society organizations, and have thus built their power base there (Grimes and Wängnerud 2010; Chap. 10 in this volume). Corruption tends to undermine the relationship with civil society, so female politicians have a rational incentive to refrain from it so as not to alienate their supporters and jeopardize their political careers. Grimes and Wängnerud (2010) show that sub-national regions with high numbers of female politicians exhibit lower levels of corruption than other regions. Moreover, regions with a high numbers of female politicians saw perceived levels of corruption reduced from 2001 to 2010, indicating that female politicians not only contribute to containing corruption levels but may also help break the sub-optimal corruption equilibrium. Wängnerud argues that a high number of female politicians,

particularly in developing countries, is often the result of pressure from both domestic and international organizations. When this coincides with a public debate on combating corruption, it may provide a window of opportunity for change.

To this, I would like to add that most corruption is illegal and, as is well known from criminology, men are hugely overrepresented when it comes to committing serious crimes. The standard figure is that more than 95 percent of those convicted of serious crimes are men (Abrahams 2015; Heidensohn and Silvestri 2012; Maguire et al. 2007). As stated by noted criminologist Frances Heidensohn:

such a robust and long-established finding...[that] it's not like other findings...Certainly since industrialisation [and the availability of reliable data]... you have a very consistent, established finding that women are the minority of offenders, they don't commit such serious crime, they don't do it so often, and their criminal careers are shorter and less professional (cited in Abrahams 2015).

Whether this is a result of socially constructed templates for gendered behavior or if it is caused by some other more biological/genetic factors is not an issue that political scientists in general (and certainly not this author) have the competence to solve. It should be added that criminologists in this area have not presented anything close to a unified theory about this gigantic variation in gendered behavior (Heidensohn and Silvestri 2012; Kruttschnitt 2013; Steffensmeier and Allan 1996). However, I am frequently surprised by the negative approach often taken in gender studies when considering genetic/biological explanations. This “fear of essentialism” is, from a policy perspective, not well grounded. Consider the following example:

One day, the biologists come out of their labs and say to the world: We have now found the gene and we can with confidence say that homosexuality is genetically/biologically determined. Depending on our normative orientations, two completely different policies can follow. One is, of course, that homosexuality is completely “natural,” like being red-haired, and we have therefore absolutely no reason for discriminating against people with this sexual orientation. However, it is also possible to take the position that we should invest in research to find a medical treatment for this behavior. The same reasoning would follow if our colleagues in biology came out from their labs and stated that they have evidence that there

is no genetic or biological factor that can explain homosexuality, so this sexual orientation must be a somehow “socially constructed.” Depending on our normative orientation, we can either say that in a liberal democracy, people have the right to “construct” themselves as they please, or we can say that this is a behavior that is “chosen” so those making this choice have to take the consequences, including being discriminated against (adapted from Brown 2001). The point is that no policy prescription follows automatically from an empirical research result. Normative analysis must be added and must always be considered when we take the step from empirical results to policy prescriptions (Rothstein 2017).

Additionally, recent results from experiments trying to capture actions like “honesty” and “cheating” also support this point in what is known as “public goods” games where experimental researchers have tried to capture the propensity to avoid paying taxes. In what seems to be the largest research project carried out on the issue so far, Sven Steinmo and collaborators have carried out experiments on around 1500 participants in four countries (Italy, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States). Their results show that “men and women significantly differ in their willingness to comply with their taxes across countries and conditions. These differences are remarkably large and are consistent across a wide variety of institutional choices. Simply put, women appear to be much more tax compliant than men in every country and under every condition” (D’Attoma et al. 2017, p. 2). What is also remarkable is that they find the largest difference in honest behavior between men and women in Sweden, the country with by far the highest ranking (least unequal) of the four in the United Nations Gender Inequality Index. This implies that extensive policies for gender equality do not automatically translate into lower gender differences when it comes to honest behavior, at least none that can be measured using experiments. Another interesting result from this project is that attitudes towards risk have a negligible effect, meaning that women are more likely to pay their taxes “even when their degree of risk acceptance is kept at an identical degree to their male cohorts” (p. 7). These results are also supported by a meta-analysis of 63 experimental studies showing that women (and non-economists) “appear to exhibit greater propensities to tell the truth” (Rosenbaum et al. 2014).

My point is that following the extreme difference in gendered behavior when it comes to crime and the experimental results about “honest play,” it should not come as a surprise that if women were to hold a greater number of positions of power in a political system, corruption would become

less common. The reason for this analytical parallel is, of course, that almost all forms of corruption are, in fact, illegal. Given the dismal result so far from anti-corruption efforts, I can see no reason for not recommending increased gender equality in the public sector as a way to reduce corruption, even if we do not know how the causality operates. From a policy perspective, one may take inspiration from Swedish law about the right of patients in the public healthcare sector.² According to this law, health care personnel (read: doctors) are allowed to prescribe a treatment on two different grounds. The first is “scientific evidence,” which implies that scientific knowledge has been established for how the causality works. The second, according to the law, is “known experience,” which implies that scientific knowledge about the causality between the treatment in question and the health of the patient does not exist. Still, experience shows that the treatment/drug improves the health of patient and this makes it legal for healthcare personnel to prescribe and use the drug/treatment in question. For a serious problem like systemic corruption, if increased gender equality according to systematic experience results in an improved quality of government, as a policy-oriented social scientist I can see no reason why I should not recommend this “cure” even if I am not certain about how the micro-level causal mechanism(s) operate.

If the issue is to lower corruption, we need to ask: “What is corruption?”. As is well-known, the conceptual issue about how to define corruption is far from solved (Heywood 2014). One way to do this is by trying to define the opposite of corruption. In a number of previous publications, I have argued that the opposite to corruption should equal (high) quality of government and that the basic norm for such a quality is the following: “*When implementing laws and policies, government officials shall not take anything into consideration about the citizen/case that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or the law*” (Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Rothstein 2011). Moreover, from both normative and empirical analysis, I have argued that such a definition is universal in the sense that it is not bound by culture or history (Rothstein and Torsello 2014; Rothstein and Varraich 2017). As the eminent political philosopher John Rawls has stated: “it is supposed that if institutions are reasonably just, then it is of great importance that the authorities should be impartial and not influenced by personal, monetary, or other irrelevant considerations in their handling of particular cases” (Rawls 1971, p. 58).

IMPERSONAL OR IMPARTIAL?

Fukuyama (2014) as well as North et al. (2009) use the term “impersonal” instead of the term suggested (“impartial”). This is, in all likelihood, seen by these authors as merely a terminological and not a conceptual difference. However, in dictionaries, *impersonal* is defined as “*having or showing no interest in individual people or their feelings; lacking emotional warmth*”,³ or as “*lacking friendly human feelings or atmosphere; making you feel unimportant.*”⁴ In contrast, “impartial” is typically defined as “*not supporting one person or group more than another.*”⁵ or as “*not prejudiced towards or against any particular side or party; fair; unbiased.*”⁶

The reasons for why we should prefer “impartial” to “impersonal” is based on the notion that states, when producing public goods/services, do not only or even for the most part rely on personnel that have legal training or orientation (Fukuyama 2014, p. 95). Fukuyama also argues that this type of bureaucratic rigidity, when policies are implemented with “*no interest in individual people or their feelings*” is what people usually despise about the state apparatus. Instead, both western and developing states use a number of professions or semi-professions such as doctors, teachers, school principals, nurses, urban planners, architects, engineers, social workers, etc. when implementing public policies. For many of these professions, the idea that they would be working according to the “rule of law” in the sense that they implement rules in an “impersonal” manner makes little sense. They do, of course, follow the laws, but as is well-known from the literature about policy implementation, the laws that are supposed to guide what these professions do have to be quite general, thereby they do not entail precise information of how to handle each and every case (Hill and Hupe 2002; Winter 2003). Instead, what is important for these groups when implementing public services is the standards, knowledge and ethics that are established by their professions. Moreover, we do not want nurses, teachers, people that work in elderly care or doctors to have “*no interest in individual people or their feelings*” or to be “*lacking emotional warmth*” when they do their job. On the contrary, we want them (and they usually also want) to be personally engaged in and committed to their job (Brante 2014, pp. 124–132). Some feminist scholars have presented this modus operandi as a special “logic of care” as opposed to, for example, an economic logic of rational self-interest or a bureaucratic logic of strict rule-following (Stensöta 2010, 2015; Tronto 2013). For example, parents at a typical Danish public pre-school do not

want the pre-school teacher to be “*lacking friendly human feelings*” when teaching and taking care of their children. However, they would be extremely upset if they were to discover that the pre-school teachers had given special favors or treatment to some children because their parents had paid them money under the table or because they belonged to a particular ethnic or religious group. The only legitimate reason they have for giving some children more attention than others is if this can be motivated by the standards established by the profession of what is good teaching and care for different children (Brante 2014, pp. 124–132). The professional groups in the state are supposed to have some autonomy/discretion in order to use their professional competence and judgement, but this should not be used in a way that can be deemed as giving undue favors. In other words, they should be impartial but not impersonal.

DOES IMPARTIALITY IN GOVERNMENT INCREASE HUMAN WELL-BEING? EMPIRICAL RESULTS

What constitutes gender equality is a widely debated issue. This is not the place to enter this huge debate except by making the claim that impartiality is an important ingredient in many definitions of gender equality. Simply put, it should make no difference when you apply for a job, when you need health care, when you are graded in school or when your research article is evaluated if you are a man or a woman. The simple argument I want to put forward is that impartiality leads to meritocracy which goes hand-in-hand with gender equality. The QoG Institute has carried out an expert survey covering 105 countries to capture the degree of impartiality in the public administration. A number of questions from this survey have been used to construct an “impartiality index” (Teorell and Rothstein 2012). There are many measures for comparing human well-being in different countries. One problem with many of these indexes is that they are comprised of large numbers of variables including, sometimes, measures of gender equality. The implication of this is that many of the variables that we would like to use for explaining variations in human well-being are already in the index measuring human well-being. For this reason, Holmberg (2007) has put forward “the Good Society Index” which consists of only three variables: Infant mortality, expected living and subjective well-being (also known as “happiness”). As shown in the figure below, the correlation between impartiality in the exercise of public power and the “Good Society Index” is substantial (Fig. 3.1).




Fig. 3.1 Good society index and impartial public administration

The correlation between impartiality in the public administration and the GSI is relatively strong. Moreover, a recent paper by Ahlerup et al. (2016) analyzing twenty countries in Sub-Saharan Africa shows that countries whose governments are perceived as impartial by the population are more likely to experience sustained economic growth. They conclude that “in order to ensure economic development, it is not only important to choose the “right” policies, but also to implement these policies in a fair manner” (Ahlerup et al. 2016, p. 78).

In a recently published book, Dahlström and Lapuente have made a strong case for the positive effects of controlling corruption in a meritocratic civil service (Dahlström and Lapuente 2017). They argue that the preferred system is when the power of democratically elected politicians is balanced by the influence of a meritocratically recruited civil service. The causal mechanism they identify is that these groups have different sources of legitimacy and that they are held accountable to different standards. Politicians in power base their legitimacy on the level of electorate support they can muster together with the support they get from party activists to which they are held accountable. Meritocratic civil servants and experts in

government base their legitimacy on respect within their peer-groups to which they are held accountable. Dahlström and Lapuente (2017) argue that when groups with different sources of legitimacy have to work closely together, they will monitor each other and this “pushes both groups away from self-interest towards the common good.” Logically, this also implies that “abuse of power will be more common if everyone at the top has the same interest, because no one will stand in the way of corruption and other self-interests.” Thus, what determines success or failure in these two groups are very different. This elegant theory is supported by a wealth of both historical and large-n comparative empirical analyses. Empirically, meritocratic recruitment of civil servants, as opposed to political appointment, is found to reduce corruption and increase the quality of government. This remains true even when controlling for a large set of alternative explanations, such as political, economic, and cultural factors, that previously were seen as being important for the functioning of the public sector. The conclusion is that a professional bureaucracy, in which civil servants are recruited strictly on the basis of their qualifications and skills, rather than their loyalty to politicians, is a very important factor for handling the “fairness” question in the epistemic approach to democracy as it has been operationalized here. One mechanism behind this is that, when faced with corruption or inefficient management of public resources, it is easier for a civil servant to protest or act as a whistleblower, than if he or she were dependent on and loyal to the politicians. The chance that of someone exposing corruption or other forms of malfeasance is simply larger if the potential exposé is not dependent on those engaged in the corruption.

Empirically, the extent to which the civil service is politicized in OECD countries varies enormously. Figures are somewhat uncertain, but the lowest seems to be Denmark where only about twenty-five “ministerial advisors” are exchanged when there is a change of government. In Sweden, it is about 200, in Italy about 1600. In the United States the number of “spoils” appointments are about 3500 and in Mexico about 70,000 civil servants leave their positions if a national election results in a change of government (Garsten et al. 2015).

To this one should add that meritocracy, everything else being equal, increases the competence in the public sector and thereby state capacity. Data from an Expert Survey for the study of the public administration in 126 countries, carried out by the Quality of Government Institute, finds a positive correlation between a measure of impartiality in the civil service and several standard measures of population health including the UNDP measure of human well-being (Holmberg and Rothstein 2015). A study

of Peru and Bolivia finds that the implementation of aid programs can be seriously obstructed if there are high turnover rates among public sector employees, especially if they are recruited on a political basis (Cornell 2014). The reason is that loyalty among politically recruited public officials lies with the appointing political party, rather than with the public institution; politically recruited officials are therefore often reluctant to take over the implementation of aid programs that have been established under the former government. This is problematic for development agencies; as the implementation timeline of aid programs often does not correspond to the term of office of the elected government appointing public sector personnel. Another study finds that the politicization of the civil service can lead to the production of “politically tainted” public statistics (Boräng et al. 2017). The simple correlation between meritocratic recruitment and corruption is, as shown in the figure below, quite impressive (Fig. 3.2).




Fig. 3.2 Meritocratic recruitment and corruption (Sources: Meritocratic recruitment is taken from the QoG Institute’s Expert Survey (Dahlström et al. 2011) and the measure of Corruption is from World Bank Control of Corruption Index 2010)

IS IMPARTIALITY POSSIBLE? A “CHURCHILLIAN” APPROACH

One way to theorize the effect of gender equality is that a government that makes it clear that gender discrimination in the recruitment and promotion in the public sector will no longer be tolerated sends a very strong “signal” to society about its willingness to respect the principle of impartiality. Given the situation in many, if not most, countries in the world when it comes to gender equality in the public sector, such a signal (or as game theorists would have it, a “credible commitment”) implies a fundamental change in the social contract between the state and its citizens. If the state should no longer discriminate based on gender, maybe it should also not discriminate based on money (=bribes), ethnicity (=nepotism) or political affiliation (=clientelism).

In this discussion, Fukuyama has argued that acting according to norms such as impartiality does not “come naturally” to humans. Instead, if given a position of power, according to Fukuyama (2014, p. 89) our “natural inclination” is to use this power to promote our self, our family, our kin, friends, clan, tribe and, one could add, political faction or party. Nepotism seems to be a strong factor when looked at empirically (and nepotism usually favors sons instead of daughters). The understanding that impartiality in the exercise of public power should take precedence over various forms of self- or group interests is, according to Fukuyama, something that must be learnt through some form of public ethos, for example by how we train students who are likely to work in the public sector.

The problem, however, is that we have at least four strong approaches in the social sciences which in an almost axiomatic way denies the possibility of impartiality. Inspired by neo-classical economics, the public choice approach to government starts from the assumption that civil servants are operating according to the “rent-seeking model” where agents are self-interested utility maximizers (Mueller 1989).⁷ This is, of course, an axiom that is antithetical to impartiality. The same can be said of most economic analyses built on the notion that what dominates human motivation is self-interest (Weingast and Wittman 2006). In Marxism, the state is usually seen as an arena for the exercise of interest-based politics which, of course, rules out the notion of impartiality (Therborn 2008). In what is known as political economy, various forms of material or positional (power) interests dominate. In addition, several identity-oriented approaches where the idea that a person with identity X could make an impartial evaluation of the merits of a person with identity Y, is seen as

being impossible (Burke and Stets 2009). Iris Marion Young, for example, states the following: “the ideal of impartiality serves ideological functions. It masks the ways in which the particular perspectives of dominant groups claim universality, and helps justify hierarchical decision making-structures” (1990, p. 97). She also stated that impartiality is an “impossible ideal because the particularities of and affiliation cannot and should not be removed from moral reason” (ibid). In addition, the approach in development studies known as “post-colonialism” understands principles such as impartiality as an expression of Western semi-imperialist ideology (de Maria 2010). In sum, the idea of defining the opposite of corruption based on the notion of impartiality is far from uncontroversial.

Feminist researchers seem to have a more mixed approach to the idea of impartiality. Several feminist scholars have argued that the interests of women are best served if rules are transparent, clear and applied in what I would call an impartial manner (Kittilson 2007). For recruitment to electable positions in political parties, Bjarnegård (2013) has shown that lack of formal rules is detrimental to gender equality. In recruitment to academic positions, several studies show that a system including clear rules and explicit standards tends to be positive for increased gender equality (Brouns 2000; Husu 2000; van den Brink et al. 2006).⁸ There is also a negative effect of corruption on general intergenerational social mobility. In a corrupt or clientelistic system, families with strong economic resources seem to be able to use their money or contacts/networks to get their comparatively unambiguous and/or untalented children into good schools and jobs for which they are not qualified (Charron and Rothstein 2016). In most societies, this would favor sons more than daughters.

However, there are plenty of studies, also using methods such as controlled experimental approaches, showing that, for example, student evaluations of academic teachers, teachers’ evaluations of and attention to students and employers’ evaluation of job candidates are prone to gender bias, race/ethnic bias and bias against people with some types of immigrant background (for some recent examples see Bursell 2014; Grohs et al. 2016; MacNeill et al. 2015; Midtboen 2016; Nunley et al. 2015). Some of this bias is intentional and some probably unintended. Be that as it may, the overall effect is what counts. Acting according to the norm of impartiality thus seems quite difficult. The empirical support for some kind of “inbuilt” propensity for bias when A is going to decide what B is going to get (job, promotion, housing, benefit) seems strong.

How to deal with these results is, from a policy perspective, neither easy nor self-evident. One problem is how to decide how much preferential treatment a group should have given the existence of systematic bias above. A second problem is what sort of compensatory instruments should be used (quotas, “soft” affirmative action, monetary compensation or extra resources). A third problem is that while some members of a group can be victims of discrimination it is not certain that this is the case for everyone in the group. Various forms of preferential treatment may benefit only the “elite” within the discriminated group, perhaps leaving the rest even worse off. A fourth problem is how many and which groups we should include in various compensatory schemes. In a Scandinavian type of society, to take one example, we need to count social class, gender, sexual orientation, various forms of medical disabilities, a number of religions and ethnicities and maybe also age. To take another example, the University of California at Davies now counts seven sexual orientations in their resource center for support for sexual minorities.⁹

In principle, none of these identity groups are mutually exclusive (even if, admittedly, some are probably quite rare). Two “biological” sexes times seven sexual orientations times ten ethnic groups times five religions times five types of physical disabilities (or challenges) make 3500 possible combinations. Implementing preferential treatment for all these groups in a way that would receive broad-based legitimacy is probably impossible and would, in all likelihood, create a bureaucratic and administrative “nightmare.” Many decisions in the implementation process would be seen as favoritism and even as various forms of corruption (Lilla 2016; Rothstein 2016). From the perspective of increased social justice (including the feminist perspectives), this is likely to be a hard choice.

One way to think about this “unsolvable” problem could be to adapt a “Churchillian” approach. Like liberal representative democracy, impartiality as a quality of government may be far from a perfect system, but given the empirical results presented above, it may be the best we can come up with since all the alternatives are worse. Another comparison is with political equality as the basic norm for liberal representative democracy suggest by noted democracy theorist Robert Dahl (1989). Given the very large and usually accumulative differences between citizens in economic resources, human capital and usable networks, every known democracy today must be said to be light years away from anything that comes even close to the realization of political equality. It is not certain that the deviations from the principles of impartiality in the exercise of political power

mentioned above are greater than the differences in equal possibilities to influence politics via the system of representative democracy. In both cases, as the political philosophers would state it, we are in for non-ideal theory. If we could find a way to measure how far the two ideals are from reality, I would put my money on the principle of impartiality being closer to the ideal than the principle of political equality.

NOTES

1. See <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/09/world/europe/09bribery.html?pagewanted=all>
2. Svensk författningssamling 2014:821 (Swedish Statute Book 2014:821).
3. Merriam-Webster. Available at: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/impersonal>
4. Oxford Dictionaries. Available at: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/learner/impersonal>
5. Oxford Dictionaries. Available at: <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/learner/impartial>
6. Collins Dictionaries. Available at: <http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/impartial>
7. This *Handbook of Public Choice* does not have index entries for the terms “corruption” or “impartiality.”
8. Many thanks to Elin Bjarnegård for her generosity in orienting me in this field of research.
9. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersexual and A-sexual. See <http://lgbtqia.ucdavis.edu/>

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PART II

Citizens and the Electoral Arena



Gender and Citizen Responses to Corruption among Politicians: The U.S. and Brazil

*Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Justin Esarey,
and Erika Schumacher*

As this book has made clear already, research on the relationship between women's representation and corruption has established an important correlation between the two—greater women's representation is related to reduced corruption (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001). Yet, studies also show that the relationship is context-dependent: it exists in some countries but not others (Alatas et al. 2009; Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Schwindt-Bayer 2016). One explanation for this is that the relationship is conditional upon electoral accountability, whereby the link is stronger when electoral accountability is high and weaker when it is low (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017). However, research has not established exactly why this would be the case.

One possible explanation is rooted in how politician gender shapes voter perceptions of politician corruptibility and whether voters punish corrupt male and female politicians differently. Specifically, voters may perceive of the corruptibility of female and male politicians differently, with women being less likely to be viewed as corrupt than men. Voters may also punish corrupt women more harshly than corrupt men because

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their behavior does not conform to gender stereotypes of women being more honest, more trustworthy, and less corrupt than men. Women in office should recognize this and be less likely to engage in corruption. This would only occur, however, in settings of high accountability, where voters have the ability to punish elected officials directly at the voting booth. It should be less likely to occur in settings of low accountability. Unfortunately, this causal mechanism has not been thoroughly explored by empirical research.

In this chapter, we describe a pair of survey experiments that we conducted to determine whether empirical support for this “differential treatment” explanation exists. We conducted one experiment in a country with high electoral accountability—the United States—and the other in a country with moderate to low electoral accountability—Brazil.¹ We asked citizens in both countries to evaluate the corruptibility of a hypothetical governor. In the U.S., where voters can and do exercise electoral accountability, we also asked respondents whether they would vote for a corrupt governor. The treatment in both questions is the sex of the governor, with half of the survey respondents evaluating a female governor and the other half evaluating a male governor. If the theory just described is correct, we should see that (a) respondents in the high accountability context perceive women as less corrupt, but those in the low accountability context do not, and (b) respondents in the high accountability context are less likely to vote for a corrupt female governor compared to a corrupt male governor.

We find statistically uncertain evidence in both countries that respondents are more likely to think male governors will be embroiled in a corruption scandal during their term in office than female governors. The substantive magnitude of this gender difference is similar in both countries, but the difference is at or just beyond conventional thresholds for statistical significance. In addition, the differences in Brazil are concentrated in one demographic group—women—and in one treatment condition. That finding is inconsistent with the theory we were testing, and we are unsure of the explanation for the finding. We also find that respondents in the United States do not differ in their punishment of corrupt male and female governors. Our overall conclusion, then, is that this evidence leans against differential perception and punishment as the causal mechanism for a context-dependent relationship between women’s representation and corruption.

THE DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT THEORY OF GENDER AND CORRUPTION

The differential treatment theory of gender and corruption has two key parts. First, it argues that voters perceive of the corruptibility of male and female elected officials differently, with women being less likely to be viewed as corrupt than men. This idea is rooted in traditional stereotype literature that links women in office with more feminine stereotypes of honesty and trustworthiness. If voters view women as more honest and trustworthy than men, then they may also view women in elected office as less corruptible than their male counterparts. Second, the theory presumes that those views of corruptibility will translate into voting behavior that more harshly punishes women than men when women deviate from the gendered stereotype of being less corruptible. In other words, if a woman engages in corruption, then voters will be more likely to vote against her than they would a man who engaged in corruption. As Dolan (2010, p. 70) writes, “Gender stereotypes about the abilities and traits of political women and men are clear and well documented and could easily serve to shape an individual’s evaluations about the appropriate level and place for women in office.”

Much research exists that shows that gendered stereotypes of male and female politicians exist (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Dolan 2004, 2010, 2014; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Murray 2010; Sanbonmatsu 2002), and more specifically, citizens tend to view women as more honest than men (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Dolan 2004, 2014; McDermott 1998). Studies have also found that stereotypes can translate into voters’ political attitudes and behaviors (Alexander and Andersen 1993; Dolan 2010; Fox and Smith 1998; Sanbonmatsu 2002). Sanbonmatsu (2002, p. 31), for example, found that “Voters’ gender schemas give rise to a baseline preference to support either male or female candidates.” The honesty stereotype itself has been found to contribute to more willingness to support female candidates than male ones. McDermott (1998) found in a California study that individuals who thought ethics were an important problem in government were more likely to vote for a female candidate for governor.

Studies evaluating how gender stereotypes influence views of women and men in office suggest some potential differential treatment around scandals, both corruption-based and non-corruption-based. Funk (1996)

finds that voters are more likely to punish officials for scandalous behavior when those officials are viewed as “warm.” That study created two officials: an official that is strong and competent, and an official that is warm and charismatic. Subjects of the study evaluated these officials in one of two randomized conditions: the official has either undergone a marriage scandal or a tax evasion scandal. The study showed that voters on average viewed the tax evasion scandal as more severe for both candidates. However, candidates viewed as “competent” were punished mildly for a marriage scandal, whereas candidates viewed as “warm” were punished almost as severely for a marriage scandal as they were for a tax scandal.

Focusing on corruption, more specifically, Żemojtel-Piotrowska et al. (2016) examined how women were treated in response to corruption scandals and found some evidence of less-positive evaluations of female politicians who had been associated with a corruption scandal. Barnes and Beaulieu (2014) also examined corruption with a national survey experiment in the U.S. and found that the presence of women in government reduced suspicions of fraud. Then, in a related study, they and Saxton (2018) found that citizens think that women will be less corrupt police officers than men. However, they found that the most compelling explanation for this was the fact that people think women are more risk averse than men and are more likely to be political outsiders. Viewing women as more honest than men did not lead to any stronger views that women will be less corrupt police officers.

Much of this research suggests support for a differential treatment explanation for why women’s representation might lead to lower levels of corruption. But, it has not been tested comparably in high and low accountability political contexts, where recent research suggests the relationship between women’s representation and corruption varies. If differential treatment explains the relationship between women’s representation and corruption, then we should expect to find empirical support for the following two hypotheses in high accountability political systems:

Hypothesis 1: Fewer voters will view a female politician as corruptible than a male politician.

Hypothesis 2: More voters will vote against a corrupt female politician than a corrupt male politician.

In low accountability systems, there are two possible outcomes consistent with a theory of differential treatment by gender. Voters might view female and male politicians as equally corruptible, and therefore have no differential expectation of their behavior on which to base disproportionate punishment (and thus women in office will be no less corrupt than men). It could also be the case, however, that voters view women as less corruptible than men, but nevertheless do not behave differently by disproportionately punishing them for corruption (and therefore providing little incentive for women to be less corrupt). In other words, we could observe voters' perceptions of women's and men's corruptibility being similar or being lower for women in office, but we would not expect either to translate into different behavior among voters.

A TEST IN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL

We analyze the differential treatment theory in the high accountability political context of the United States and the moderate-to-low accountability political context of Brazil. Esarey and Chirillo (2013) suggest that the relationship between women's representation and corruption is conditional on the level of democracy in countries (more democratic = more accountability), and Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2017) identify four additional indicators of electoral accountability that they find moderate the women's representation and corruption relationship—the absence of corruption norms, a parliamentary system of government, freedom of the press, and the personalistic nature of electoral rules.

According to these criteria, the U.S. is a high accountability context. Although it is a presidential system, it is a strong democracy with significant freedom of the press, a general absence of corruption norms, and personalistic electoral rules in the form of single-member districts for the House of Representatives and two-member districts for the Senate with party primaries.² In contrast, Brazil is in the moderate-to-low range on many of these dimensions. It did score 8 out of 10 on the Polity Index and 2.0 on the Freedom House Index in 2015, placing it in the “democracy” and “free” categories of each organization, respectively. However, it has corruption norms, with a corruption score of 43 out of 100 (100 is “clean” on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index) in 2012 and 2014. This ranked it 76 out of 167 countries and placed it just ahead of countries such as India, Thailand,

and China. It scored a 45 on the 2015 Freedom House Freedom of the Press index (on a scale of 1–100, with a higher score being less free) and was considered having only a “partly free” press. It is also a presidential system, rather than a parliamentary one, which indicates less accountability on the “form of government” dimension. It does have an open-list proportional representation electoral system in the lower house of the national parliament, which is highly personalistic, but it scored only a 7 on the Johnson and Wallack (2005) personalism scale (range is 1–13, with 13 being the most personalistic).

We conduct survey experiments in both the United States and Brazil to test the differential treatment theory; however, the United States experiment is the primary test we provide because it explores whether citizens perceive of the corruptibility of female and male elected officials differently *and* whether or not they would vote for a corrupt politician. The Brazilian experiment only explores corruptibility due to limits of the experimental design—the experiment was conducted for a different project and did not include a question about voting for a corrupt politician (Schwindt-Bayer and Reyes-Housholder 2017). The Brazilian analysis still provides a useful test of the first part of the differential treatment theory in a low accountability system—whether citizens have different views of male or female politicians or view women as less corruptible than men.

THE U.S. EXPERIMENT

Our survey experiment focuses on a hypothetical elected governor and asked respondents to imagine themselves in a neighborhood similar to their own, but in a different state to minimize bias from an experience with an actual governor in their own state (Schwindt-Bayer and Tavits 2016; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013). We provided every participant in the survey experiment with a short description of this governor that varied only on the sex of the governor:

Imagine you live in a neighborhood like yours, but in a different state. In that state, a [man/woman] from your party was just elected governor. The new governor promises to create jobs, improve access to healthcare and education and fight crime and corruption. [His/her] approval ratings are fairly high, and [he/she] has strong support from many citizens in the state.

We then asked respondents to answer a question about the corruptibility of that governor. Specifically, the question was “How likely do you

think this governor would be involved in a corruption scandal at some time during the term?” with answers on a four-point scale³ (from “very likely” to “not likely at all”). Our analyses below invert and dichotomize the responses into *not likely* (=0) and *likely* (=1) for ease of analysis and presentation.

After answering this question, respondents were told that the governor they had just read about had been recently accused of corruption. The prompt varied only on the sex of the governor, with the respondents assigned a female governor treatment in the previous prompt also assigned a female governor treatment in this prompt and those having read about a male governor again assigned the male governor treatment. The prompt read:

Now, suppose the governor you just read about became embroiled in a corruption scandal while serving in office. Specifically, a well-respected newspaper has reported that [he/she] illegally accepted campaign contributions for [his/her] upcoming reelection campaign in exchange for awarding government contracts to donors.

We then asked respondents if they would consider electing this person again. Specifically, we asked “Would you vote for this governor if he/she was running for re-election in an upcoming election?” and allowed for yes (=1) or no (=0) responses. This treatment and question allows us to test whether citizens punish male and female governors differently when they engage in corruption. Overall, then, we are exploring two parts of the theory of differential treatment of male and female politicians: whether voter attitudes towards the likelihood of governors engaging in corruption differ depending on the sex of a governor, and whether female governors are less likely than male governors to be re-elected after engaging in corruption.

We used Qualtrics for the survey platform and sampling. The Qualtrics sample is a convenience sample, a common sampling technique for these kinds of survey experiments. A convenience sample is not necessarily a representative sample, but the Qualtrics sample does contain significant diversity in its respondent characteristics. Our sample included a total of 422 respondents: 210 were men and 210 were women (with two respondents not answering this question about their gender). Half of the sample received the male governor treatment and the other half received the female governor treatment.

Additionally, we asked questions at the beginning of the survey about respondents' demographics and political interest. Specifically, we asked about respondents' gender (male/female),⁴ age in years, education level,⁵ race/ethnicity,⁶ region of residence,⁷ and political interest.⁸ The treatment conditions appear well balanced on these covariates: we found no evidence of statistically significant differences in any of these contextual variables when comparing the subjects in each treatment condition.

United States Findings

We examine the treatment effects with simple bivariate comparisons of the percentage of respondents who viewed the governors as corruptible and would vote for them again.⁹ Overall, the results show some difference in the perceptions of the corruptibility of male and female governors and who punishes corrupt male and female governors, but the differences are only borderline statistically significant. Focusing first on the corruptibility question, we find that the proportion of respondents that answered that a governor was “somewhat likely” or “very likely” to engage in a corruption scandal while in office was somewhat different for female governors and male governors (the rightmost column in Fig. 4.1). Forty-five percent of respondents considered the male governor likely to engage in corruption while in office, while 36 percent of respondents considered the female governor likely. This is almost a nine percentage-point difference (95% confidence interval: $[-0.956\%, 18.7\%]$); however, a difference of proportions test reports a two-tailed p -value of 0.080, a result at the margins of conventional thresholds for statistical significance. In multivariate logit models (see Column 1 of Table 4.1), the governor sex treatment is associated with a two-tailed p -value of 0.062, another result at the margins of conventional thresholds for statistical significance, with male governors being perceived as more corruptible than female governors.

We then examine responses to the question about corruptibility according to the sex of the respondent, shown in the left and center columns of Fig. 4.1. Fewer respondents of both sexes thought the female governors would be corruptible compared to male governors, but again, the differences are not statistically significant. Thirty-eight percent of men thought female governors would be corruptible, whereas 46 percent of men thought male governors would be corruptible. Thirty-four percent of women thought female governors would be corruptible whereas 43 percent of women thought that male governors would be corruptible. However, difference of proportions tests find that both of




Fig. 4.1 Proportion of US respondents who think male and female governors are likely to engage in a corruption scandal while in office, by respondent sex (with 95% confidence intervals)

these differences are statistically insignificant using conventional thresholds (possibly because dividing the sample into male and female respondents reduces the power of the experiment). In multivariate logit models, we find no evidence that male and female respondents differed in their views of the corruptibility of male and female governors (see the interaction term in the model of Column 2 of Appendix Table 4.1).

To determine whether respondents punish corrupt male and female governors differently, we conduct similar analyses using the vote question in our survey. We find that similar proportions of respondents would vote

for male and female governors who had engaged in corruption while in office (the rightmost column in Fig. 4.2). The proportion of respondents who would vote for a governor after a reported scandal is 22 percent for the male governor and 20 percent for the female governor. While this suggests a slightly harsher punishment for the female governor, we find that $p = 0.566$ for a difference of proportions test. In other words, there is no substantively meaningful or statistically significant evidence that respondents are less likely to punish the male governor for corruption compared




Fig. 4.2 Proportion of US respondents who would vote for male and female governors after they have engaged in a corruption scandal while in office, by respondent sex (with 95% confidence intervals)

to the female governor. This conclusion is also supported by a multivariate logit model (Column 3 in Table 4.1), which shows no statistically significant treatment effect of the governor being female on the respondent's choice to vote for a corrupt candidate.

Disaggregating by sex of the respondent (the leftmost and center columns in Fig. 4.2), we see larger differences in the proportion of men who would vote for male and female governors. Twenty-six percent of men would re-elect a male governor who had engaged in corruption compared to only 22 percent who would re-elect a woman. The gap is smaller for female respondents. Nineteen percent would re-elect a man but only 18 percent would re-elect a woman. Both of these gaps suggest harsher punishment for female governors than male governors, but the p -values for difference of proportions tests indicate that neither of these differences is statistically distinguishable from zero. Multivariate logit models find no statistically significant difference for how men and women respond to the treatment of a female corrupt governor (compared to a male corrupt governor) when choosing to vote (Column 4 in Table 4.1).

In sum, the survey experiment in the high electoral accountability context of the United States reveals some substantively meaningful (albeit statistically uncertain) differences in how respondents perceive the corruptibility of male or female governors. However, we find no substantively or statistically meaningful evidence that respondents would treat male and female candidates differently at the ballot box if they were suspected of engaging in corruption. Taken as a whole, the evidence suggests that it is unlikely that differential treatment of male and female governors explains why corruption levels would be lower in high accountability contexts that have women in public office.

THE BRAZILIAN EXPERIMENT

The Brazilian survey experiment presented respondents with one of four treatment prompts that provided a description of a recently elected governor in a hypothetical state varying on the sex of the governor and the state's past history with a female governor.¹⁰ In this analysis, we are not concerned with how differences in the state's history with female governors might affect views of corruptibility. We are concerned only with differences that may emerge as a result of varying the sex of the governor. As a result, we analyze the survey experiment results below focusing primarily on governor sex differences. Due to the survey design, however, we make

sure to note whether those differences exist where a previous history with female governors existed or not.

Following the prompt, the survey asked a set of questions. One of these questions was about how corruptible the respondent thought the governor would be and was the same question used for the U.S. survey experiment. The survey also contained data on respondent demographics: sex (male/female), age in years, social class,¹¹ and region¹² and asked two questions about respondents' race and political interest.¹³ To correct for residual imbalances in some covariates,¹⁴ these factors are included as control variables in the multivariate logit models presented in Appendix Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Respondents were also asked two post-treatment manipulation check questions, to determine whether they received the governor sex and past history with a female governor treatments. The first question asked: "Is the newly elected governor a man or a woman?" and 84 percent of respondents answered the question correctly. The second question asked: "Has the state already had a female governor?" and 75 percent of respondents answered the question correctly. Combining the two questions, 65 percent of respondents answered both correctly, indicating that they fully received the treatment. In the analyses below, we present results for the full set of respondents and the reduced sample of those who answered both questions correctly. The latter sample offers a stricter test of the hypothesis because it focuses on those respondents who we can be highly confident were paying attention to the survey and comprehended the treatments.

For robustness, the survey asked respondents a follow-up question after all other questions were asked. The question was "Were you thinking of a specific state in Brazil or a specific politician when you responded to these questions?" If the respondent answered yes, then he/she was prompted to select a state from a drop-down list and/or write in the name of the politician they were thinking of. We use a binary measure of whether a respondent was thinking of a specific state or politician as a control in our multivariate analysis.

Netquest, in São Paulo, Brazil, fielded the survey experiment. They used a convenience sample of Brazilians (Boas 2014, 2016; Samuels and Zucco 2014), but their panel does include Brazilians from every major region and features a fairly balanced dispersion in terms of social class.¹⁵ The sample was block randomized by sex of the respondent to allow comparison of differences in treatment effects for men and women. The sample included a total of 1600 individuals, 800 men and 800 women, aiming for approximately 200 male and 200 female respondents per treatment group (Boas 2014; Samuels and Zucco 2014).

Brazilian Findings

On the whole, the results of the survey experiment suggest that Brazilian respondents perceive of the corruptibility of male and female governors similarly. Figure 4.3 presents the results of a simple bivariate comparison of responses to the corruption question by treatment. Almost the same percentage of survey respondents who evaluated a female governor and a male governor in the context of no history with women in office—52 percent—thought the hypothetical governor was likely to become involved in a corruption scandal (fourth from the left in Fig. 4.3). In the context of a history with female governors (the leftmost bars in Fig. 4.3), a six-percentage point difference emerged (95% confidence interval of the difference: $[-1.25\%, 13.2\%]$); 53 percent of those who evaluated a male governor thought he was likely to become embroiled in a corruption scandal, but only 47 percent of those who evaluated a female governor thought she was likely to be corruptible. This difference is in the direction we would expect with more respondents thinking men are likely to be corruptible than women and is similar in magnitude to the gender difference in corruptibility we found in the U.S. experiment, but the p -value for a difference in proportions test is slightly above any conventional threshold for statistical significance ($p = 0.109$, two-tailed).

When we examine the responses to the corruption question by sex of the respondent, we find that the difference in views of male and female governors in the treatment where a female governor has previously held office comes primarily from female respondents. Only 42 percent of the women who evaluated a female governor thought she was likely to engage in corruption compared to 56 percent of the women who evaluated a male governor. A difference of proportions test inside of this subgroup was statistically significant at conventional levels ($p = 0.010$, two-tailed). There was no statistically significant difference in the evaluation of a female governor's corruptibility compared to a male governor for male respondents in this condition or for either sex in the treatment condition with no history of a female governor. Thus, the main difference in evaluations of the corruptibility of governors in the Brazilian experiment is that more women think male governors are corruptible than female governors when women have held office previously in the hypothetical state.

Figure 4.4, however, suggests caution in overstating those findings. It presents a bivariate comparison of corruptibility in the male and female governor treatments for only those respondents who correctly responded to both of the survey manipulation checks. This narrows the sample to just those who were paying close attention to the survey and demonstrated




Fig. 4.3 Proportion of Brazilian male and female respondents who think male and female governors in states with and without a history of women in politics will be engaged in a corruption scandal while in office (all respondents, with 95% confidence intervals)

that they correctly received the treatment about both the sex of the governor in the prompt and whether the state had a history with at least one female governor. The figures reveal very similar proportions of female respondents, male respondents, and all respondents thinking male and female governors are likely to be involved in a corruption scandal while in office.¹⁶ None of the comparisons of treatment groups are near typical thresholds for statistical significance. The largest substantive difference is, again, among female respondents' views of female and male governors in hypothetical contexts where women have held office, but the difference is only three percentage points and not statistically significant. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that while these comparisons benefit from focusing on respondents that we are confident received the experimental treatment, they suffer from lower power resulting from a reduced sample

size ($n = 1032$ instead of $n = 1592$), particularly in the models assessing respondent sex differences (there are between 102 and 167 subjects in each of the columns in Fig. 4.4).

To explore the robustness of the models, we ran several additional analyses. First, we estimated multivariate logit models that included the controls described previously (see Appendix Tables 4.2 and 4.3). Given that the samples are reasonably well balanced on demographics, it is not surprising that the multivariate results are similar to what we presented in Figs. 4.3 and 4.4. The treatment effect (of being a female governor) on corruptibility is only statistically significant at conventional levels in the context of a state's previous history with female governors (Appendix Table 4.2, Columns 1 and 2). There, respondents are less likely to think women are




Fig. 4.4 Proportion of male and female Brazilian respondents who think male and female governors in states with and without a history of women in politics will be engaged in a corruption scandal while in office (only respondents who answered both manipulation check questions correctly, with 95% confidence intervals)

corruptible than they are to think that men are corruptible. This finding is conditional upon the sex of the respondent with the treatment having no effect on men but being statistically significant for women (with $p < 0.01$ for the sum of associated logit coefficients), similar to what the bivariate comparisons showed. When we narrow the analysis just to those respondents who answered the manipulation questions correctly (Appendix Table 4.3), those statistically significant differences again disappear.

We also examined whether the results were biased by respondents thinking of specific states and politicians, despite asking them to think only of a hypothetical scenario. About 55 percent of respondents said they were thinking of a specific state or politician. The multivariate models find that those who were thinking of a specific state or politician were more likely to think the hypothetical governor would be embroiled in a corruption scandal. Bivariate analyses (not shown) of the survey responses by whether or not respondents had someone or some state in mind reveals mild evidence that the results could be biased by this. The previous finding that more respondents think male governors will become corrupt than will female governors in a context where women have been governor previously is only statistically significant ($p = 0.0748$) for those respondents who were thinking of a specific state or politician. Any “Dilma effect” is negligible, however. Respondents who said they were thinking of Dilma Rousseff specifically ($n = 115$) had no different views of the corruptibility of male and female governors than those who did not report thinking of her.¹⁷

In sum, our analysis of the survey experiment testing differences in respondents’ views of the corruptibility of male and female governors in Brazil reveals that women are thought to be less corruptible than men only among female respondents in a case where subjects are told that there is a history of prior female governors and when those who failed the manipulation checks were included in the analysis. Perceptions of corruptibility do not strongly vary by the sex of a governor in our models.

CONCLUSION

This chapter explores whether a theory of differential treatment of women in public office explains why women’s representation is related to reduced corruption. We conduct two survey experiments to do this. One experiment is in the United States, a country with high electoral accountability

where we would expect significant gender stereotyping of female office-holders as less corruptible and greater punishment of women in office who do engage in corruption. The other experiment is conducted in Brazil, a country with lower electoral accountability and where we would expect to see gender stereotyping without differential punishment or no gender stereotyping at all. There is some evidence, albeit uncertain and conditional, that women are perceived as less corrupt in both countries, at least in some contexts. However, we find no evidence that voters in the U.S. disproportionately punish women at the ballot box for engaging in corruption. This latter finding is perhaps most important and leads us away from concluding that differential treatment of female politicians explains why women's representation leads to less corruption in contexts of high electoral accountability but has little to no relationship to corruption in low accountability contexts.

Our findings are suggestive and important but not conclusive. The limited external validity of survey experiments such as these, the fact that we test this in only two countries, and the low power of our design inside of certain subgroups means that more research is necessary to definitively determine if, when, and where voters may perceive of women in office as less corrupt than men and punish them more strongly when they deviate from their anti-corrupt gender stereotypes.

If differential treatment is not the explanation for women's representation reducing corruption levels, then what is? Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2017) provided another line of reasoning to support the observational evidence that the relationship between women's representation and corruption is stronger in democracies with high electoral accountability than democracies with low electoral accountability. They argued that it could be linked to differential risk aversion between women and men. Significant evidence exists that women are more risk averse than men, and in high accountability contexts, that risk aversion would be triggered and would reduce the incentive to engage in corrupt activities, thereby reducing overall levels of corruption. This explanation has not been subjected to empirical testing either, but the findings of this chapter—that a differential treatment theory is not strongly supported empirically—underscore the need for that testing. Understanding *why* women's representation may cause reduced corruption in governments continues to be a critically important part of research on gender and corruption.

APPENDIX

Table 4.1 Multivariate logit models for all respondents in the United States

	<i>Dependent variable</i>			
	<i>Corruptibility</i>		<i>Vote support</i>	
Treatment: female governor	-0.389*	-0.359	-0.161	-0.299
	(0.209)	(0.295)	(0.251)	(0.342)
Female subject	-0.135	-0.106	-0.333	-0.478
	(0.210)	(0.290)	(0.254)	(0.354)
Female gov. X female subject		-0.061		0.302
		(0.418)		(0.507)
Age	-0.017**	-0.017**	-0.015	-0.015
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Education	-0.056	-0.056	0.022	0.022
	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Political interest	0.111	0.111	0.027	0.033
	(0.133)	(0.133)	(0.167)	(0.167)
Race: White	-0.594	-0.598	1.134	1.167
	(0.744)	(0.744)	(0.838)	(0.840)
Race: Black	-0.648	-0.652	0.940	0.971
	(0.770)	(0.770)	(0.850)	(0.853)
Race: Asian	-1.329	-1.338	1.726	1.784*
	(1.024)	(1.026)	(1.075)	(1.082)
Race: Hispanic	-0.404	-0.409	0.459	0.495
	(0.784)	(0.784)	(0.878)	(0.880)
Race: Other race	-0.461	-0.470	-0.970	-0.920
	(0.794)	(0.796)	(1.175)	(1.177)
Region: Southeast	-0.151	-0.153	0.842**	0.850**
	(0.318)	(0.318)	(0.387)	(0.388)
Region: Midwest	-0.037	-0.038	0.393	0.399
	(0.278)	(0.278)	(0.365)	(0.365)
Region: West	0.065	0.061	0.614	0.631
	(0.328)	(0.329)	(0.412)	(0.414)
Constant	1.125	1.119	-2.135*	-2.127*
	(0.950)	(0.951)	(1.122)	(1.122)
Observations	406	406	406	406
Akaike Inf. Crit.	558.350	560.329	426.942	428.587

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$

Table 4.2 Multivariate logit models for all respondents in Brazil

	<i>Dependent variable</i>			
	<i>Corruptibility</i>			
	<i>No history</i>	<i>History</i>	<i>No history</i>	<i>History</i>
Treatment: Female governor	0.046 (0.149)	-0.259* (0.147)	0.022 (0.202)	0.049 (0.212)
Female subject	-0.003 (0.153)	-0.129 (0.153)	-0.029 (0.213)	0.158 (0.210)
Female gov. X female subject			0.050 (0.291)	-0.586** (0.293)
Age	-0.009* (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	-0.009* (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)
Social class	-0.002 (0.064)	-0.032 (0.062)	-0.002 (0.064)	-0.034 (0.062)
Race: Black	-0.324 (0.279)	0.031 (0.286)	-0.321 (0.280)	0.040 (0.287)
Race: Parada	-0.212 (0.176)	-0.045 (0.171)	-0.212 (0.176)	-0.041 (0.171)
Race: Indigenous	0.831 (0.836)	1.193 (1.182)	0.834 (0.836)	1.101 (1.176)
Race: Yellow	0.282 (0.504)	0.361 (0.496)	0.280 (0.504)	0.294 (0.499)
Race: No response	0.276 (0.611)	0.353 (0.658)	0.278 (0.611)	0.374 (0.661)
Region: Northeast	0.310 (0.293)	0.020 (0.281)	0.310 (0.293)	0.011 (0.281)
Region: Southeast	0.215 (0.294)	0.128 (0.279)	0.214 (0.294)	0.138 (0.279)
Region: South	-0.023 (0.307)	0.004 (0.305)	-0.026 (0.308)	-0.006 (0.305)
Region: Central west	0.289 (0.313)	-0.004 (0.314)	0.287 (0.313)	-0.017 (0.315)
Political interest	-0.234*** (0.080)	-0.137* (0.079)	-0.234*** (0.080)	-0.136* (0.079)
Correct manipulation responses	-0.446*** (0.168)	-0.166 (0.149)	-0.447*** (0.168)	-0.147 (0.150)
Thinking of state or politician	0.332** (0.151)	0.278* (0.149)	0.331** (0.151)	0.283* (0.149)
Constant	1.142** (0.516)	0.854* (0.511)	1.156** (0.522)	0.693 (0.517)
Observations	800	781	800	781
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1111.667	1101.587	1113.637	1099.585

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4.3 Multivariate logit models for respondents in Brazil who answered both manipulation checks correctly

	<i>Dependent variable</i>			
	<i>Corruptibility</i>			
	<i>No history</i>	<i>History</i>	<i>No history</i>	<i>History</i>
Treatment: Female governor	-0.138 (0.174)	-0.091 (0.196)	-0.034 (0.239)	0.020 (0.287)
Female subject	-0.031 (0.180)	-0.119 (0.204)	0.091 (0.263)	-0.015 (0.284)
Female gov. X female subject			-0.219 (0.345)	-0.206 (0.390)
Age	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.007)
Social class	-0.019 (0.075)	-0.071 (0.082)	-0.019 (0.075)	-0.074 (0.083)
Race: Black	-0.555 (0.349)	-0.123 (0.383)	-0.560 (0.349)	-0.107 (0.384)
Race: Parada	-0.354* (0.206)	-0.192 (0.227)	-0.348* (0.206)	-0.185 (0.227)
Race: Indigenous	0.678 (0.862)	0.633 (1.260)	0.673 (0.864)	0.612 (1.256)
Race: Yellow	0.428 (0.593)	-0.841 (0.902)	0.447 (0.594)	-0.832 (0.903)
Race: No response	-0.139 (0.699)	-0.183 (1.032)	-0.142 (0.702)	-0.196 (1.032)
Region: Northeast	0.078 (0.368)	-0.323 (0.360)	0.068 (0.368)	-0.316 (0.360)
Region: Southeast	-0.171 (0.363)	-0.364 (0.353)	-0.177 (0.363)	-0.357 (0.353)
Region: South	-0.239 (0.384)	-0.467 (0.383)	-0.235 (0.384)	-0.459 (0.384)
Region: Central west	0.070 (0.384)	-0.290 (0.416)	0.072 (0.384)	-0.286 (0.416)
Political interest	-0.212** (0.097)	-0.232** (0.109)	-0.213** (0.097)	-0.229** (0.110)
Thinking of state or politician	0.507*** (0.178)	0.233 (0.195)	0.514*** (0.179)	0.241 (0.196)
Constant	1.025* (0.622)	1.535** (0.676)	0.974 (0.627)	1.466** (0.688)
Observations	580	449	580	449
Akaike Inf. Crit.	815.679	644.495	817.276	646.216

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

NOTES

1. Both experiments received human subject approval from the Rice University Institutional Research Board (IRB). U.S. experiment: study number IRB-FY2017-332; Brazilian experiment: study number IRB-FY2016-607.
2. The U.S. scored 22 on the 2015 Freedom House Freedom of the Press ranking indicating that its press is “free.” It scored a 74 out of 100 (100 = clean) on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index in 2014, ranking it the 16th cleanest government out of 167 countries. On Johnson and Wallack’s (2005) personalism index, it scored a 10 out of 13, with 13 being the most personalistic.
3. Respondents in this survey could choose to leave this or any other question blank.
4. Drawing from the language used in the National Election Study, the question asked for a respondent’s “gender,” not “sex.” Thus, we use “gender” to discuss this question and the findings in this section. The Brazilian experiment, by contrast, asked for a respondent’s “sex.”
5. Respondents could select from one of the following categories: less than high school degree; high school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED); some college but no degree; associate degree in college (two-year); bachelor’s degree in college (four-year); master’s degree; doctoral degree; professional degree (JD, MD).
6. Respondents could select among the following categories, including the possibility of selecting multiple options: White/non-Hispanic, Black or African-American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, Hispanic, or Other. The number of respondents who reported being Pacific Islander, Native American, or Other was so small that we classified all such responses as being in a combined “Other” category to use in our analyses. Because these are not mutually exclusive categories, Appendix Table 4.1 reports coefficients for all categories.
7. Respondents reported their state of residence. We then classified states as being in one of four regions: North, Midwest, Southeast, and West.
8. Respondents could select from one of the following four categories: very interested, somewhat interested, not very interested, and not interested at all.
9. Specifically, we employ difference of proportions tests using `prop.test` in R (R Core Team 2017). The chi-square values on which the difference of proportions tests is based use the Yates’ continuity correction, which is the default in R.
10. The Brazilian survey experiment was conducted in Portuguese. The translated prompt is the following: “Imagine you live in a neighborhood like yours, but in a different state. In that state, a [man/woman] from a

moderate party (neither extreme right or extreme left) was just elected governor. In the past, the state [has never had a female governor/has had a female governor]. The new governor promises to create jobs, improve access to healthcare and education and fight crime and corruption. [His/Her] approval ratings are fairly high, and [he/she] has strong support from many citizens in the state.” The prompt described the governor as “moderate” to downplay the significance of party ideology. In Brazil, the main cleavage among parties is not left-right, but whether the party supports the executive party in power, so the experiment aimed to minimize party ideology in the prompts (Samuels and Zucco 2014).

11. Social class is rated on a six-point scale, with 1 = upper class and 6 = lower class. In our sample, the lowest category had no respondents in it.
12. Respondents could select from the following categories: north, northeast, southeast, south, and central west.
13. The race and political interest questions were: (1) Do you consider yourself white, black, brown, indigenous or yellow? (with respondents selecting only one of these categorical options or “other”), and (2) How interested are you in politics? (with answers on a four-point ordinal scale from “very interested” to “not interested at all”). Unlike the U.S. experiment, respondents in the Brazilian experiment could choose only one racial category; thus one category (white) is excluded in the analyses of Appendix Tables 4.2 and 4.3.
14. The sex distribution across treatment groups was the following (male–female): Male governor, no history: 55.2–44.8 percent; Male governor, history: 44.1–55.9 percent; Female governor, no history: 49.8–50.2 percent; Female governor, history: 51.0–49.0 percent. The chi-square test for independence was statistically significant at conventional levels ($p = 0.0193$) as a result of the sex distributions in the two groups given the male governor treatments not being well balanced. We also found some evidence of imbalance in whether subjects answered both manipulation checks correctly: a chi-square test for independence of treatment and manipulation checks was statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), with the largest difference being an apparent excess of those answering both questions correctly in the “no history, female” treatment. Finally, we found evidence of imbalance in whether subjects were thinking of a specific state or politician (discussed in the next paragraph): a chi-square test for independence between treatment and this question was statistically significant ($p = 0.007$), with respondents in the female governor treatments being more likely to be thinking of a specific state or politician than men.
15. For details on Netquest’s Brazilian panel characteristics, see www.netquest.com/papers/panelbook_en.pdf, page 3.

16. Note that there is no statistically significant gender difference in whether respondents got the manipulation questions correct. Sixty-six percent of women got both questions correct as did 64 percent of men (chi-squared test for difference of proportions $p = 0.285$).
17. Specifically, in a linear regression predicting corruptibility, a multiplicative interaction term between (a) a dummy identifying subjects who were thinking of Dilma Rousseff and (b) the female governor treatment is statistically insignificant for all subjects, subjects in the condition with a history of a female governor, and subjects in the condition with no history of a female governor.

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Why Do Some Voters Prefer Female Candidates? The Role of Perceived Incorruptibility in Arab Elections

Lindsay J. Benstead and Ellen Lust

Among stereotypes regarding women (e.g., that they are gentle, nurturing, kind; Eagly and Karau 2002), the belief that women are less corrupt may be one that benefits female politicians. Indeed, some literature on gender and corruption takes as a point of departure that when women are stereotyped as less corrupt than men, women benefit electorally. Perhaps the belief that women are less corrupt increases their support at the polls?

Yet, studies focusing on social psychology of gender, which have been partially tested in electoral politics (Benstead et al. 2015) but seldom explored in relation to the gender and corruption debate, suggest that this might not be the case. Theories of gender role congruity (Eagly and Karau 2002) and ambivalent sexism (Glick and Fiske 2001) suggest that rather than supporting women's electability, stereotypes that women are less

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corrupt equate to benevolent sexism. These theories argue that seemingly “positive” stereotypes essentialize women and reinforce gender inequality.

Hostile and benevolent sexism may not only affect women’s ability to be elected. Gendered power relations may also affect how they are treated once in office. Consider that expectations that women are less corrupt may lead female public officials to be met with particularly strong hostility when they are discovered engaging in corruption (Mathis 2015; Watts 2016; Mapondera and Smith 2014)—i.e., behavior that violates their prescribed gender roles (Cialdini and Trost 1998; Rudman and Glick 2008). This theory and recent examples of female politicians who have been scrutinized for corrupt behavior (e.g., Chile’s Cristina Fernández de Kirchner,¹ Malawi’s Joyce Banda²) suggest that positive views of women as less corrupt may not level the playing field.

Despite a great deal of attention to gender and corruption (Frank et al. 2011; AlHassan-Alolo 2007; Barnes and Beaulieu 2014; Stensöta et al. 2015), we still do not fully understand the extent to which the public see women as less corrupt, and if they do, how this stereotype impacts women’s electability. Nor has the gender role congruity theory literature theorized about and tested the specific impact of attitudes about corruptibility on electability. The focus has been instead on whether women are truly less prone to act corruptly, and if so, why (e.g., Bjarnegård 2013; Chirillo and Esarey 2013; Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001; Rivas 2013; Goetz 2007).

In this chapter, we theorize about the relationship between views about women’s incorruptibility and their chances at the polls. We draw on competing hypotheses from the existing literature and test them using original public opinion polls with embedded survey experiments conducted in Jordan and Tunisia after the 2011 uprisings. First, we consider the extent to which stereotypes regarding gender and corruption are widely held and connect them conceptually with gender role congruity and ambivalent sexism theories. Second, using direct questions about voter choice, we consider whether individuals who state that they believe women are less corrupt would be more likely to state that they would vote for a woman. Finally, using survey experiments, which reduce the impact of social desirability bias, we assess whether stereotyped cleanliness impacts the electability of female vis-à-vis male candidates. We find that, under some circumstances, respondents who hold egalitarian views may be most likely to support female candidates.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

We explore two sets of hypotheses.³ The first is derived from views widely held in the policy spheres, while the second set is drawn from literature in social psychology of gender, which emphasizes gender stereotypes and citizens' views of the qualities of successful leaders.

EGALITARIAN VIEWS AND HOSTILE AND BENEVOLENT SEXISM

A prevalent view in policy circles suggests that women are less likely to engage in corruption (Transparency International 2014). These practitioners and scholars do not, to our knowledge, explicitly suggest that female candidates' perceived cleanliness could benefit them at the polls. However, given that many citizens view corruption as a problem, we might expect that candidates who are stereotyped as being "uncorrupt" would benefit electorally. Parties and government agencies might even put forward female candidates—particularly at times of heightened public concern about corruption—as a means of signaling their commitment to anti-corruption strategies. Such a strategy would be based on the expectation that *the perceived incorruptibility of women will increase the willingness to vote for female candidates*.

Yet, this view may be naïve. Particularly under weak rule of law, including in authoritarian and transitional democracies throughout Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, or Eastern Europe, voters may view corruption, not cleanliness, as essential for political success. The view that corrupt leaders are more effective in some settings and among some voters follows from gender role congruity theory. As Eagly (1987) and her colleagues posited, gender-based bias stems from the lack of overlap between gender roles and leader roles, and is less pronounced but present among women. Where women have been absent from political leadership, and where the political system does not reflect the rule of law, bias against female candidates based on their perceived incorruptibility may be even more marked and undercut their chances at the polls. Moreover, seeing women as less corrupt may be a form of benevolent sexism, which has been found worldwide and is internalized by men and women. Benevolent sexism sees women as the fairer sex who need men to protect them and to manage society's decision-making functions (Glick and Fiske 2001). Together, benevolent and hostile forms of sexism—or, what Glick and Fiske (2001) call ambivalent sexism—reinforce inequality by treating women as tokens and justifying rewards

and punishments to ensure that women accept a lower status. Women who do not conform to this ideal or who violate gender norms may be punished.

Thus, a competing expectation, drawn from gender role congruity theory and consistent with a theory of ambivalent sexism, anticipates the opposite effect. The more women are seen as being less corrupt, the more they will also be seen as lacking the characteristics for effective leadership—particularly in a setting where corruption is seen as a necessity for succeeding politically.⁴ Hypothesis 2 suggests that *those who view women as less corrupt are less likely to see women as electable*, both because they essentialize women (i.e., they espouse a form of benevolent sexism) and because they view female candidates as lacking the traits associated with effective leadership. Those who see women as being more corrupt (i.e., those who espouse hostile sexism), would also be more likely to hold bias against women at the polls. In contrast, those who see women in an egalitarian light—i.e., as no more or less likely to be corrupt—are more likely to see women as being equally competent as men. This leads us to expect that *those who view women and men as being equally likely to be corrupt are most likely to support female candidates*.

CANDIDATE ROLES

At the same time, the extent to which voters find the stereotype that women are less corrupt appealing, and thus the extent to which they are willing to vote for them, may depend on the types of appeal that voters prefer. For instance, voters may find a female candidate who presents herself as a nurse or kindergarten teacher—i.e., more consistently with traditional gender roles and traits—more appealing than they do a woman who runs with a background as a successful businesswoman or athlete—i.e., more consistently with the stereotyped competencies of males. Voters may find women who are running on competencies that are associated with female traits to be more compelling, particularly those voters who prefer such appeals.

Moreover, some skills may be seen as compatible with, if not enhanced by, a willingness to engage in more corrupt behavior. Consider, for example, candidates who run on appeals to their business savvy. Business success is often viewed as being compatible with corruption, particularly in authoritarian and transitional regimes. For instance, when asked how important bribes are for getting ahead, 24 percent of Tunisians rated this a ‘10,’ on a scale from 0–10, where 10 is very important. In Jordan, 5 percent of the respondents gave it this rating (Pew 2014). The prevalence

of corruption in business is demonstrated by business surveys. When asked whether they believed that they had lost business due to a competitor paying a bribe (reflecting on whether bribery is widespread), 73 percent of firms responding to Transparency International's Putting Corruption Out of Business survey (2011) stated that they had. Corruptibility is closely associated with successful business in much of the world. Thus, citizens who want to vote for business candidates are unlikely to be affected by how corruptible they believe male and female politicians to be.

It is also possible that the relationship depends on the political orientation of individual citizens—specifically the demands that they make on elected officials. Put differently, the type of candidate appeals that attract them and, relatedly, the extent to which corruption is compatible with fulfilling these demands affects the electability of women. Thus, we anticipate that *voters will be more likely to prefer female candidates who run on appeals that are congruent with clean government. It should have little effect on the support for candidates whose appeals are more consistent with corrupt practices, such as running a successful business.*

To summarize, we test three hypotheses:

H1. Voters who view women as less corrupt are more likely to vote for a female candidate. (Conventional wisdom)

H2. Voters who view women and men as equally likely to be corrupt are more likely to support a female candidate than those who see women as more (i.e., hostile sexism) or less (i.e., benevolent sexism) corrupt. (Gender role congruity hypothesis)

H3. Voters will be more likely to prefer female candidates who run on appeals that are congruent with clean government. More specifically, voters prefer female candidates who run on appeals of civil society. (Clean government)

CASES

We examine these hypotheses through a study of Jordan and Tunisia. Both countries have majority Arab, Muslim populations. However, they differ in a number of ways. We argue that this increases confidence in the generalizability of our findings.

As shown in Table 5.1, Tunisia and Jordan differ with regard to their population, national income, and natural resources. As of 2012, Tunisia was beginning its democratic transition. It was considered Partly Free, and

Table 5.1 Features of Tunisia and Jordan

	<i>Tunisia</i>	<i>Jordan</i>
<i>Regime type</i>		
Freedom house score (2012) ^a	3.5 Partly free	5.5 Not free
Institutional setting ^b	Transitional democracy	Lynchpin monarchy
<i>Economic conditions</i>		
Population (millions, 2012) ^c	11.1	7.5
GNI per capita (current US\$, 2012) ^c	\$4213	\$4561
Oil dependency ^d	Low	Low
<i>Gender</i>		
% women in lower/single house ^e	26.7% of 217 (2012)	10.8% of 120 (2012)
Parliamentary gender quota (for most recent election held 2011 or earlier)	Legislated candidate quotas	Reserved seat quota
<i>Corruption</i>		
Transparency international ranking (2015) ^f	76/168	45/168

^a “Freedom in the World 2012”

^b Lust (2011)

^c United Nations Statistics Division

^d Oil dependency is defined as the proportion of export earnings from oil and natural gas: 0–33% (low); 34–65% (moderate); and 66–100% (high). Cammett (2011, p. 101)

^e “Women in National Parliaments” (2015)

^f Transparency International (2016)

had a Freedom House score of 3.5. Unlike Tunisia, Jordan’s regime remained relatively stable and calls for regime change were less strident than in the other three countries. At the same time, neither is a consolidated democracy where rule of law is weak. Thus, we expect that in both, female candidates running on business appeals might be particularly disadvantaged relative to those running as civil society candidates in both contexts. Economically, Tunisia and Jordan were similar, with a GNI of between \$3000 and \$4500.

The cases also differ with regard to the participation of women in politics, which has been found to affect the extent of benevolent and hostile sexism views in society (Beaman et al. 2009). Both had some form of parliamentary gender quota in their most recent election before the survey was conducted, but the proportion of women elected was 11 percent in Jordan versus 27 percent in Tunisia. Attitudes toward women as political leaders also differed. When asked about the extent to which citizens

disagreed that men make better political leaders, only 18 percent in Jordan and 24 percent in Tunisia disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement (World Values Survey 1981–2014). With regard to corruption, Jordan was ranked forty-fifth (out of 168 countries) according to Transparency International, while Tunisia was ranked seventy-sixth. Given the differences in these cases, the more that we find a similar effect of candidate gender and type on electability, the more confidence we will have that the effect will be similar both in other Arab countries as well as worldwide where similar biases against female candidates exist.

DATA AND METHODS

The data are from national surveys conducted in Tunisia in 2012⁵ and Jordan in 2014.⁶ The survey includes direct measures of the perceptions of gender, corruption, and voting preferences, as well as a survey experiment. The experiment allows us to overcome problems of social desirability bias in our analysis of the influence of gender on electability. More specifically, the variables employed were:

Attitude toward gender and corruption. Respondents' attitudes toward gender and corruption are measured with the direct question: "In general, would you say that male or female deputies are less likely to be involved in corruption or would you say there is no difference?" Man ("1"), No difference ("2"), and Woman ("3").

Attitude toward voting for a woman. Respondents' positions on voting for women were measured in two ways. First, they were asked a direct question: "How likely are you to vote for a list that contains a female at the head," with more likely, equally likely, and less likely as response categories. Second, their attitudes were ascertained through a low-information experiment. Respondents were given basic biographical information about the candidate and presented with a series of questions to rate how likely respondents would be to vote for these hypothetical party lists and/or political candidates with various traits.

The first question in the experiment describes a candidate with experience in a civil society organization aimed at promoting local development, and the second is a business person emphasizing improving the national economy. For each question, a respondent received one of two treatments: A male or a female civil society candidate, followed by a male or female

business candidate in Tunisia and a candidate who focuses on the national economy in Jordan. Both business and the economy are seen as being consistent with the competencies of males (Lawless 2004; Huddy and Terkildsen 1993). Half of the sample was placed at random in each group.⁷ Chi-square tests between the treatment and the sampling units (electoral districts and urban/rural delegations) and between the treatment and all of the independent variables found that randomization was effective (not shown in a table). Specifically, the experiment read as stated in Table 5.2, regarding the candidate on the list in Tunisia, where the elections were strictly proportional representation (PR). In Jordan, the prompts described a candidate, not the first candidate on the list, since the majority of candidates run as individuals and the electoral system combines national PR and Single Non-Transferrable Vote (SNTV). The questions read: Please tell me how likely you would be to vote for each of the following candidates or party lists in the future. Would you definitely not vote for (“1”), probably not vote for (“2”), probably vote for (“3”), and definitely vote for (“4”)? These slight differences in question wording may lead some to question the comparability of the experiments. However, note that maintaining strictly equivalent language would have been more problematic in this case, given that references to lists or candidates would appear appropriate to citizens in one country but not the other. Moreover, competence on the economy and business are both considered as consistent with male gender roles (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993; Eagly and Karau 2002).

We also included a number of control variables. These included age, rural residence, education, attitudes toward religion and politics, and interviewer gender (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.2 Experimental treatments

	<i>Tunisia</i>	<i>Jordan</i>
Civil society treatment	The list of a party aimed at promoting local development. The first candidate on the list is a <i>woman/man</i> who heads a <i>civil society organization that has helped children obtain clothing and school supplies</i>	A <i>woman/man</i> who heads a <i>civil society organization that has helped children obtain clothing and school supplies</i>
Business treatment	The list of a party which focuses on improving <i>Tunisia's economy</i> . The head of the list is a <i>woman/man</i> who has run a <i>successful business</i>	A <i>woman/man</i> who focuses on <i>improving Jordan's economy</i>

Table 5.3 Measurement control variables

Age: Age in years

Rural residence: Census designation (0 = Urban, 1 = Rural)

Education: Six categories from 1 = Illiterate to 6 = Graduate school

Religious orientations: “Religious leaders should not influence government. Strongly agree (“4”), agree (“3”), disagree (“2”), and strongly disagree (“1”)”

RESULTS

Stereotypes of Incorruptibility

First, let’s consider the extent to which citizens perceive female politicians to be less corrupt than their male counterparts. We find important variation in our samples in the extent to which women are seen as being less corrupt and a substantial (and unexpected) difference in the extent to which citizens also see males as being less corrupt. As shown in Table 5.4, in Tunisia, 30 percent of our sample view females as less corrupt, while in Jordan, 17 percent hold this view. Males and females hold similar views, with Tunisian women 2 percent less likely to hold this stereotype and Jordanian women 3 percent less likely to hold the view.⁸ We argue that these views are what the ambivalent sexism literature views as “benevolent sexism” (Glick and Fiske 2001).

Many citizens hold the view that there is no difference in women’s and men’s propensities to act corruptly—what we call egalitarian views. These views are found among 51 percent of the sample in Tunisia (53% of men and 50% of women), and 36 percent of the sample in Jordan (39% of women and 33% of men). More surprising is the extent to which citizens hold the view that males are *less* corrupt. This view corresponds with what many consider to be “hostile sexism,” and is found among 42 percent of the Jordanian sample and 15 percent of the Tunisian sample. More women hold egalitarian and fewer hold hostile sexist views in both countries, a finding consistent with existing literature which holds that sexist views, while more common among men, are also held by many women. Slightly more females hold benevolent sexist views in Tunisia, while more men hold these views in Jordan.

We caution against drawing the conclusion that these societies differ in the prevalence of sexism. The sampling method was purposive in Jordan, leading to an over-representation of rural areas. It is important to consider both the differences in the nature of the samples and between the views of men and women in these countries. Similar findings in the relationship between

Table 5.4 Perceived corruption of male and female politicians (%), by respondent gender

<i>Tunisia</i>			<i>Jordan</i>				
	<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Total</i>		<i>Female</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Total</i>
No difference	49.7	52.5	51.0	No difference	39.5	33.0	36.3
Woman	30.8	28.6	29.7	Woman	15.8	18.6	17.2
Man	14.6	16.2	15.3	Man	38.4	45.2	41.7
Don't know/refuse	5.0	2.8	4.0	Don't know/refuse	6.3	3.3	4.8
Not significant. Data weighted			$p < .01$, Data unweighted				

Question wording: "In general, would you say that male or female deputies are less likely to be involved in corruption or would you say there is no difference?"

these views and support for female candidates, despite the differences in the samples, gives us confidence in the generalizability of the findings.

*Direct Question: Impact of Perceptions
of Women's Incorruptibility on Desire to Vote
for Women in Jordan and Tunisia*

We estimate the impact of stereotypes regarding gender and corruption on the likelihood that citizens would vote for a female candidate. We do so by first using models of a direct question, which asks respondents how likely they would be to vote for a list that contains a woman at the head of it (in Tunisia) or how likely they would be to vote for a female candidate (in Jordan). These allow us to test whether attitudes toward women and corruption increase or decrease support for female candidates overall, in line with hypotheses 1 and 2. We cannot test the demand for clean government hypothesis through models of direct questions (hypothesis 3) because the candidates are not distinguished by appeals. We use an ordered logit with three outcomes: More likely to vote for a list headed by a female/a female candidate; equally likely; and less likely to do so. We control for respondent gender, interviewer gender, rural residence, higher education, higher religiosity, and higher age.

We find that both men and women who say that men are less corrupt are not likely to say that they would vote for a woman. (Full results are available upon request to authors.) As an example, we focus on the changes in the probability that men and women will say that they are likely to

vote for a list headed by a woman (Tunisia) or a female candidate (Jordan).⁹ In Jordan, we find that these men are 10 percent more likely than those who see men and women as equally corrupt to say that they would be *less likely* to vote for a woman. Similarly, women who state that men are less corrupt are nearly nine percentage points more likely than those who hold gender egalitarian views to say this ($p < .01$). In contrast, men and women who view women as *less* corrupt are nine and eight percentage points less likely, respectively, to say that they would be less likely to vote for a woman, when compared to those who believe that there is no difference between men and women with regard to corruption ($p < .01$).

We find very similar results in Tunisia. Men and women who see men as less corrupt are nearly three and six percentage points, respectively, less likely than those who see men and women as equally corruptible to say that they would be more likely to vote for a woman. That is, those who state that men are less corrupt are unlikely to see female candidates as electable. The results of other comparative categories run in the same direction as those found in Jordan, although they are not statistically significant.

Thus, we find some support for the hypothesis that seeing women as less corrupt improves their electability. In general, those who state that men are less corrupt—those perhaps displaying hostile sexism—are less likely to say that they would be likely to vote for a female candidate. Those who state that they view women as less corrupt are somewhat more likely to state that they would be inclined to vote for this candidate. Importantly, those who say that there is no difference between men and women appear as or more likely to vote for a woman than those who state that women are less corrupt. These statistics, however, are not significant. We now turn to the experimental questions to test the clean government hypothesis.

Experimental Results

The experiment allows us to examine not just the extent to which those holding different attitudes toward gender and corruption are more or less likely to vote for a woman, but also to consider whether this differs by candidate appeals. That is, the experiment also allows us to test the hypothesis that corruption is a less salient factor when individuals consider voting for a business-oriented candidate than they do when voting for a candidate from a civil society background. With this method we also test our hypotheses

unobtrusively and reduce social desirability and response set bias (i.e., responding to questions with similar response options in the same way).

We run ordered logistic regression and examine between-group differences in the likelihood that they would say that they would definitely not vote for, probably would not vote for, probably would vote for, and definitely would vote for the candidate in question (e.g., male civil society, female civil society, male business candidate, or female business candidate).

The experiment finds no substantively or statistically significant differences in Tunisia. The analyses in Tunisia (not shown in a table) do not demonstrate that respondents are more or less likely to support candidates depending on their attitudes regarding gender and corruption. That is, those who reply that men or women are more likely to engage in corruption, and those who state that there is no difference, do not appear more or less likely to support civil society candidates, whether male or female, than those who hold different attitudes to support civil society candidates. The same is true with regard to candidates running on business appeals. Respondents' attitudes toward corruption do not appear to drive their preferences for candidates.

In contrast, in Jordan we find a significant relationship between attitudes toward gender and corruption and preferences toward candidates. As shown in Table 5.5, men who believe that males are less corrupt, when compared to those who state that there is no gender difference in the propensity toward corruption, are nearly thirteen percentage points less likely to say that they *definitely would* vote for a *male* civil society candidate ($p < .05$). Men who believe that women are less corrupt are about twelve percentage points more likely to say that they definitely will support a male civil society candidate as compared to those who state that women are less corrupt ($p < .05$). Similarly, men who state that men are less corrupt are also about ten percentage points less likely to say that they would vote for a *female* civil society candidate ($p < .05$), and five and seven percentage points, respectively, more likely to say that they definitely or probably would not vote for such a candidate, compared to those who say that there is no difference ($p < .05$). In short, among Jordanian men, the experiment lends support to the hypothesis that attitudes toward corruption affect support for civil society candidates.

Female respondents in Jordan exhibit similar relationships between their attitudes toward gender and corruption and their willingness to support civil society candidates. Somewhat surprisingly, women who believe

Table 5.5 Percentage change in the likelihood of respondent saying he or she would vote for a candidate, given attitudes toward gender and corruption (Jordan)

<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Attitude</i>	<i>Male respondents</i>			<i>Female respondents</i>		
		<i>Definitely not vote for (%)</i>	<i>Probably not vote for (%)</i>	<i>Probably vote for (%)</i>	<i>Definitely not vote for (%)</i>	<i>Probably not vote for (%)</i>	<i>Probably vote for (%)</i>
Male civil society	Man vs. no difference	4.5†	9.0†	-13.3*	4.4†	9.0†	-13.3*
	Woman vs. no difference	-4.2†	-8.4†	12.1*	-4.2†	-8.4†	12.2*
	Woman vs. man	5.3*	6.7*	-10.1*	4.5*	6.8*	-11.0*
Female civil society	Man vs. no difference	4.8†	6.2†	-9.4†	4.1†	6.3†	-10.2†
	Woman vs. no difference						
	Woman vs. man						
Male business	Man vs. no difference				1.0*		-5.4†
	Woman vs. no difference						
	Woman vs. man				-1.0†	2.7†	

(continued)

Table 5.5 (continued)

<i>Treatment</i>	<i>Attitude</i>	<i>Outcomes</i>					
		<i>Male respondents</i>			<i>Female respondents</i>		
		<i>Definitely not vote for (%)</i>	<i>Probably not vote for (%)</i>	<i>Probably vote for (%)</i>	<i>Definitely vote for (%)</i>	<i>Definitely not vote for (%)</i>	<i>Probably vote for (%)</i>
Female business	Man vs. No difference	7.9*	7.1*	-13.8*	7.3*	7.2*	-14.4*
	Woman vs. no difference						
	Woman vs. man	-6.6*	-5.6*	10.7*	-6.1*	-5.7*	11.2*

Change in predicted probability for a 41-year-old respondent in an urban area who is interviewed by a female, has some secondary education, and who agrees that religious leaders should not influence government. Only significant differences shown
 †p<.10 *p<.05

that males are less corrupt, when compared to those who state that there is no difference, are nearly thirteen percentage points less likely to say that they definitely would vote for a *male* civil society candidate ($p < .05$). Perhaps this reflects a more general appreciation of these individuals for the civil society candidate, whether male or female. Women who state that men were less corrupt were more than 11 percentage points less likely to support a female civil society candidate than those who stated there was no difference ($p < .05$), and they were about five percentage points more likely to say that they definitely would not vote for this candidate than those who state there is no difference ($p < .05$).

We also find that attitudes toward corruption are related to the electability of business candidates in Jordan. Men who believe that men are less corrupt are less likely to voice support for business candidates than those who hold other views regarding gender and corruption. Compared to men who state that there is no difference between men and women regarding corruption, men who say that men are less likely to be corrupt are nearly eight percentage points more likely to say that they definitely would not vote for a female business candidate ($p < .05$), seven percentage points less likely to say that they probably would not vote for this candidate ($p < .05$), and almost fourteen percentage points less likely to say that they definitely would vote for this candidate ($p < .05$). Significant differences are also found between those who state that women are less corrupt and those who believe that men are less corrupt. Men who state that women are less corrupt are almost seven percentage points less likely to say that they definitely would not vote for a female business candidate ($p < .05$), about six percentage points less likely to say that they probably would not vote for the female business candidate ($p < .05$), and nearly eleven percentage points more likely to say that they definitely would vote for this candidate ($p < .05$). Among male respondents, attitudes toward gender and corruption are not significantly related to the likelihood of voting for a male business candidate.

The relationship between female respondents' attitudes toward gender and corruption and support for business candidates is very similar in Jordan. There is little relationship between attitudes and the propensity for women to support male business candidates. The only statistically significant finding is that women who believe that men are less corrupt are one percentage point more likely to say that they definitely would not vote for a male business candidate than those who hold egalitarian attitudes ($p < .05$). Women who hold the attitude that men are less corrupt than

woman are also less likely to express support for a female business candidate, compared to those who believe there is no gender difference. These respondents are fourteen percentage points less likely to say that they definitely would vote for the female business candidate ($p < .05$), nearly seven percentage points more likely to say that they definitely would not vote for, and seven percentage points more likely to say that they probably would not vote for, such a candidate ($p < .05$). In contrast, women who state that women are less corrupt are more likely than those who say that men are less corrupt to support a female business candidate. These women were eleven percentage points more likely to say that they definitely would vote for this candidate ($p < .05$), about six percentage points less likely to say that they definitely would not vote ($p < .05$), or probably would not vote for the female business candidate ($p < .05$ and $p < .10$).

DISCUSSION

The three sets of analyses yield some surprising findings. They not only give insights into the relationship between these attitudes and support for women, but also suggest an important need to rethink the ways in which these stereotypes drive voting, and the extent to which attitudes toward corruption drive voter behavior.

We find that both men and women are far more likely to express the view that men are *less* corrupt than is often conventionally portrayed (i.e., hostile sexism). In Tunisia, only 30 percent of respondents believed that women were less corrupt, while in Jordan, 17 percent agreed with this view. Respondents were more likely to believe that women and men were equally likely to be corrupt: 51 percent in Tunisia and 36 percent in Jordan. More surprising, and overlooked in the literature, was that large proportions in each country stated that men were less corrupt (contrary to expectations in literature on gender and corruption). Forty-two percent of Jordanians and 15 percent of Tunisians stated that men were less corrupt. In Tunisia, males and females held similar views in this regard. That this view—which we consider a form of hostile sexism—is far more prevalent in Jordan than Tunisia may be because the Tunisian regime has long been at the forefront of efforts to promote gender equality. It may also be due to the rural bias of the sample in Jordan. In either case, it is not only striking that this segment of the population exists, but also that it appears to be the most likely to take gender into account when determining who to support in elections.

The analyses lend a great deal of support for a variant of the conventional wisdom hypothesis. We do find that attitudes toward gender and corruption drive voting; however, it is attitudes that *men* are less corrupt, more than attitudes that women are less corrupt, which appears to drive voting. The analysis of the direct question on gender and corruption and that on willingness to vote for a female candidate found some evidence that those who see women as less corrupt are more likely to vote for a woman. Yet, what is most striking is that the results are primarily driven by whether men are seen as being less corrupt. This segment of the population, which includes both men and women, are less likely to vote for a woman compared to those who see women as being less corrupt and those who see them as equal. These results are found in both Jordan and Tunisia.

Analysis of the experiment also provided some support for this variant of conventional wisdom, but it also tempers our findings. We find that both men and women who believe that men are less corrupt are significantly less likely than those who see them as equally likely to be corrupt to vote for a female business candidate. Similarly, those who saw women as less corrupt were more likely to vote for a female business candidate. For both men and women, however, there was little statistically or substantively significant difference in their attitudes toward gender and corruption and support for candidates. Thus, while this evidence is in line with conventional wisdom to some degree, it is not equally strong across candidate types.

Moreover, the experiment reveals a reverse relationship between the attitudes toward gender and corruption and the support for civil society candidates. We find that both men and women who view men as being less corrupt are less likely to support civil society candidates, whether male or female. In contrast, those who see women as being less corrupt are more likely than those who see men as being less corrupt to support civil society candidates. That is, there is a clear relationship between attitudes toward gender and corruption and the likelihood of supporting civil society candidates. It does not appear to be driven by gender, however, but rather to reflect a more general proclivity of those who hold pro-male attitudes and those holding pro-female attitudes to support candidates who make civil society-based appeals.

Notably we find these relationships to be significant in Jordan, but not in Tunisia. Jordanians and Tunisians may have very different considerations driving the relationship between corruption and electability. We do not expect this to be the case, however, given that the patterns of the

relationships are very similar across the two countries. The difference is that they do not reach statistical significance. A second explanation is that there is a much smaller percentage of Tunisians who state the view that men are less corrupt (15%). The result is that this group is very small in testing the experimental model, thus often failing to find statistical significance.

Finally, it is important to note that the analyses do not lend strong support to the gender role congruity or the clean government hypotheses. Gender role congruity theory would have anticipated that driving the results was the group who stated that there is no difference between men and women. However, this was not the case; those who say that men are less corrupt were the most important driver of the analysis. The clean government hypothesis would have predicted that those who saw women as being less corrupt would be more likely to vote for female civil society candidates but not significantly more likely to vote for male civil society candidates. Yet, we find that the attitude that women are less corrupt makes individuals more likely to vote for both female and male civil society candidates. Moreover, with regard to the clean government hypothesis, we anticipated that those who saw men either as more or equally corrupt would be more likely to vote for male business candidates, and those who viewed women either as more or equally corrupt than men would be more likely to vote for female business candidates. If an ability to navigate effectively in less rule-of-law systems is an added value, then it should be equally valuable for men and women. Yet, we find that those who believe that women are less corrupt are more likely to vote for female business candidates. Moreover, there is no significant difference for male business candidates.

Taken together, the results suggest that the relationship between attitudes regarding gender and corruption and electability are not as straightforward as are often believed. It appears that even in countries where corruption is a major issue, it may not be the attitude toward gender and corruption, *per se*, that drives voting behavior. Indeed, the greater likelihood that those who see women as being less corrupt to support civil society candidates, and of those who see men as being less corrupt to eschew them, suggests that the attitudes toward corruption are part of a bundle of attitudes that drive voter preferences. Our gap in our understanding of the relationship between gender, corruption, and electability not only shows how this affects voters' views of the candidates, but the extent to which they consider these to be salient attributes in choosing candidates.

CONCLUSION

Our research sheds light on the complex interplay between gender inequality and corruption noted by policymakers. Without offering evidence that women are actually more or less corrupt, the analysis shows that stereotypes that women are less corruptible—which may be particularly common in countries with little experience of women in government—may help women at the polls, in some cases, yet, it may also be detrimental.

We recognize that perceived stereotypes about women being less corrupt could, to a large extent, measure general attitudes towards having more women in government. At the same time, we find that this stereotype does not operate in a straightforward way on the likelihood of voting for a female candidate; it suggests that the belief that females are less corrupt is not merely a measure of desiring more women in government.

Much more research is needed to determine under which conditions the stereotypes regarding gender and corruption play an important role. In this chapter, we have focused on two cases that are static, looking at the impact of these attitudes across different candidate types. There is also reason to believe, however, that the issues of corruption may be more salient in some elections than others (e.g., following corruption scandals). Different societal contexts may play a role, particularly if it impacts on how voters engage in strategic voting. The comparison between Tunisia and Jordan suggests that such differences may be at play. Research that can further unpack these relationships is needed if we are to understand how stereotypes impact the electability of women candidates, and the possibilities for political empowerment.

NOTES

1. Politidec, D. (2016). “Cristina Fernández de Kirchner Indicted Again on Corruption Charges.” Available at: www.nytimes.com/2016/12/27/world/americas/argentina-cristina-fernandez-kirchner-mauricio-macri.html. Accessed September 15, 2017.
2. Dulani et al. (forthcoming).
3. We began this research in 2011 when we prepared the first of the two surveys in Tunisia. Although we did not prepare a pre-analysis plan, we designed the study with the express goal of testing the role of gender stereotypes in shaping women’s electability.
4. Eagly (1987) shows that women were seen as being extremely capable in areas such as child rearing and hosting, and often as superior to men with

regards to traits such as honesty and kindness; however, they were not seen as having qualities associated with effective leadership (e.g., decisiveness, strength). Benstead et al. (2015) find evidence of gender role congruity theory in Tunisia.

5. The Tunisian Post-Election Survey (TPES) was a face-to-face household survey conducted October 8–November 30, 2012 by the Transitional Governance Project (2017). Probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling was used to select 73 urban and rural communes located in 16 electoral districts ($N = 1220$). The response rate was 63 percent. The poll was conducted by Benstead, Lust, and Malouche, with support from the National Science Foundation, Portland State University, Princeton University, and Yale University.
6. In Jordan, the sampling design differed slightly given different goals of the surveys, but there is no reason to believe that this affected the results of the direct models or survey experiment. A multistage stratified sample design was employed to select participants. Electoral districts were stratified by region (north, central, and south) and, within each region, size (small, medium, and large). Interviews were carried out with eligible Jordanian voters living and/or registered in one of twelve electoral districts purposively selected within these strata ($N = 1488$). The survey was conducted in 2014 by the Program on Governance and Local Development (2015), Yale University by Lust, Kao, and Benstead.
7. This was the case in Tunisia. In Jordan, the statements were randomized to show either the male statement or female one first. This eliminated order effects.
8. This is consistent with findings from Lebanon (Shalaby 2016).
9. For a 41-year-old respondent in an urban area who is interviewed by a female, has some secondary education, and who agree that religious leaders should not influence government.

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Gender Quotas and the Re(pro)duction of Corruption

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Electoral gender quotas have been adopted in a large number of countries in which political corruption is a major problem. Hitherto, the relationship between gender quotas and corruption has received limited theoretical and empirical attention. This chapter addresses this research lacuna by, first, theorizing the relationship and presenting a framework for the potential links between quotas and corruption. Second, we apply the theoretical framework to an empirical case—Tanzania—where quotas have been in place for over three decades.

To theorize the relationship, we highlight two competing arguments by drawing on corruption literature and research on gender quota adoption, but also on research on, for instance, legislator behavior, political recruitment, and institutional theory. First, within corruption literature, some studies have suggested that women's legislative representation in large proportions helps to reduce corruption. The underlying assumption of these studies is that women, for various reasons, are less likely to engage in corrupt behavior than men. As quotas are an explicit strategy to level out

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the gender gap in representative politics, it might be argued that they thereby (at least implicitly) can serve as a tool to *reduce* corruption. Second, research on quota adoption has argued that quota reforms sometimes are initiated strategically by authoritarian governments, as a tool to strengthen the regime's electoral power and legitimacy. Under such circumstances, quotas may rather *reproduce* corrupt political networks and practices. Thus, taking these conflicting claims into consideration, we suggest that quotas, per se, may have the potential to either reduce or reproduce corruption.

We construct a theoretical framework in which we take the design and implementation of the quota policy into account. More specifically, we examine two perspectives—quotas as “a clean slate” and quotas as a “tool on the menu of manipulation” (Schedler 2002)—along two different dimensions: individual recruitment (how quota women are recruited) and policy influence (what they do in parliament). With “a clean slate” we refer to the extent to which electoral quotas are designed as a new pathway to politics, providing an avenue for political newcomers. With a “tool on the menu of manipulation” we refer to the variety of methods used by electoral authoritarian regimes to manipulate election outcomes by adapting democratic rules to their electoral benefit. We suggest that if women elected through quotas are recruited from new networks with no exposure to a corrupt political system, *and* they are given their own mandate to act on a range of issues once in parliament, then quotas may constitute “a clean slate” and thus help reduce corruption. However, if the reform is designed in a manner that recruits women from already existing, corrupt networks, and the elected women are expected to protect an already-corrupt party line, then quotas may just provide non-democratic regimes with yet another “tool on the menu of manipulation.” In that case, quotas are likely to reproduce corruption. This argument presupposes that any gender differences in corrupt behavior have more to do with newness vs. embedded complicity than with women vs. men per se.

We apply the framework by examining the interplay between quotas and corruption in a stable electoral authoritarian regime that for a long time has suffered from political corruption: Tanzania. We suggest that quotas in such a setting of continuity are more likely to reproduce corruption than to reduce it: women elected through quotas in that country are unlikely to be agents of change or efficient anti-corruption fighters. We conclude by putting this suggestion in relation to quota adoption in countries where the political system is in flux. In these contexts, the potential

for quotas to constitute a “clean slate,” and thus reduce corruption, may be bigger.

QUOTAS AND CORRUPTION: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Research on electoral gender quotas has grown dramatically during the last decade, as a result of the rapid expansion of quota policies across the globe. According to the Quota Database (2016), over 100 countries practice some kind of quotas today. Whereas a fairly large literature has analyzed why and how quotas are adopted and diffused (e.g., Bush 2011; Hughes et al. 2015; Krook 2009) and how quotas they shape processes of representation (e.g., Franceschet et al. 2012), there has not been much focus on the potential consequences of quota adoption and implementation on corruption. However, quotas have partly been introduced to profoundly break established male-dominated powerstructures, change party behavior, and level the playing field in parties’ processes of candidate selection (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2011; Rahat 2009). In countries and parties where the established party structures are based on predominantly informal practices plagued by nepotism and corruption, quotas may help curb corrupt practices, if women are less likely to engage in corrupt practices than men.

However, the idea that bringing more women into parliament reduces corruption is contested. While a fairly large number of studies have, in different ways, pointed to strong correlations between different indicators of gender equality on the one hand and levels of corruption on the other hand (Barnes and Beaulieu 2014; Bjarnegård 2013; Dollar et al. 2001; Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Goetz 2007; Grimes and Wängnerud 2010; Stensöta et al. 2015; Stockemer 2011; Sundström and Wängnerud 2016; Sung 2003; Swamy et al. 2001; Tripp 2001a), the causal direction of this relationship is disputed. Crudely, two options could be suggested: Either women are less prone to engage in corrupt behavior than men, and increased access to power thus contributes to lowering or even effectively curbing corruption; or corrupt political systems are less inclusive and thus less likely to include women. Whereas research focusing on how corruption hinders women has mainly focused on recruitment processes and how access to decision-making power is influenced by corruption, the proposition that women politicians would enact change in corruption levels has focused more on policy change. While there are macro-level analyses supporting this proposition, we still know very little about *how* women

politicians would manage to combat corruption, and which policies they devise would actually have these beneficial consequences.

Within research on gender quotas, the limited number of analyses that have touched on the relationship between quotas and corruption mainly suggest that quotas are unable to reduce corruption. The quota policies only focus on the outcome of (s)election processes and thus do not stipulate *how* exactly women elected through quotas are to be selected (e.g., Dahlerup 2007). It has been argued that quotas reproduce male party leaders' control over largely informal candidate selection procedures (Baldez 2006; Hassim 2009). In authoritarian and corrupt societies, scholars conclude that the reproduction of patronage-based selection procedures means that quotas mainly provide illegitimate regimes with a solid block of supporters in parliament (Goetz 2003; Hassim 2009; Tripp 2001b).

However, research on quota adoption has shown that quotas are not designed in a uniform way, not even within specific quota types such as reserved seats (where a number or percentage of seats are earmarked for women). This means that the extent to which party leaders are able to control, first, who gets access to the legislature through quotas, and second, what these women do once they accede to office, is likely to vary across countries. For instance, in Pakistan and Tanzania the reserved seats are filled by the political parties after the general election, whereas in Uganda women are directly elected by male and female citizens (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2014). As a consequence of these differences in quota design, the extent to which quotas reproduce corrupt intra-party practices may potentially vary across countries.

Moreover, research has also shown that even within individual countries, quotas are implemented in different ways by political parties (e.g., Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2016a, b; Hinojosa 2012; Murray 2010). These differences are manifested in various ways, for instance, in the extent to which party leaders control the (s)election processes (e.g., Hinojosa 2012), or in the extent to which the processes are guided by formally institutionalized (or bureaucratic) rules (e.g., Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2016a, b). Thus, taken together, gender quotas may be designed and implemented in a number of ways, generating a variety of relationships between women elected through quotas and male-dominated party leaderships—both with respect to how these women are recruited and with respect to the policy influence they have once taking office. As a consequence, we suggest that quotas—depending on their design and

implementation—may have the potential to both reduce and reproduce corrupt practices.

To theorize the relationship, and thus to understand under what circumstances quotas contribute to the reduction or reproduction of (political) corruption in countries with widespread corruption, we examine quotas along two dimensions: individual recruitment and policy influence. The former refers to the ways in which quota legislators are recruited, whereas the latter focuses on their (potential for) agency once they have acceded to office. Thus, the idea here is that both *how* representatives are elected (including *who* the representatives are) and *what* they do in parliament affects the impact of quotas on corruption.

As for individual recruitment, we suggest that quotas contribute to curbing corruption if and only if their introduction produces “cleaner” (s) election procedures. Where this is the case, new MPs may increasingly be (s)elected through meritocratic principles that take formal qualifications into account, thus producing a new type of politician: one who is not indebted to leaders within corrupt networks. Conversely, quotas are suggested to reproduce existing corrupt patterns if women elected through quota mechanisms are (s)elected in the same way as any other representatives. In this case, it is likely that women need to be part of corrupt networks in order to be nominated and elected. Women entering politics through such quotas would thus owe their power to corrupt networks, in which providing services and favors is the way of doing politics. Studies (e.g., Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2011, 2014) have argued that quotas that integrate women into the political system may be desirable from the point of view of downplaying women’s difference as political actors. However, if the explicit purpose is to instrumentalize the difference of women (such as their perceived incorruptibility), quotas that run parallel to and are separate from the ordinary system would be preferable. Reserved seats are examples of such quotas, if decentralized (i.e., if organizations or functions can appoint or select representatives). In Africa, Rwanda, Uganda and Tanzania have different forms of quotas for women, where quota-seat candidates are selected in very different ways from open-seat candidates.

As for policy influence, we suggest that quotas contribute to reducing corruption in a corrupt setting if and only if quota women are given a mandate that is distinctly different from the mandate of other members of parliament (MPs). This is intimately tied to recruitment: how you are recruited will likely influence who you feel you are beholden to, and most politicians

would not bite the hand that feeds them. For a politician who has gained access to politics with the help of a corrupt network, it would therefore be risky to unveil the very mechanisms that she has benefited from. Again, different types of quotas may give rise to different types of mandates. While candidate list quotas make it virtually impossible to separate quota politicians from other politicians once elected, politicians elected on reserved seats are often seen to be given a mandate to represent their own group, which might mean that they can take on issues important to them, independent of party discipline. If quotas provided women with a separate mandate, it might make them more able (though not necessarily more willing) to work against corrupt activities that other party members engage in. Quota women could also work in cross-partisan networks to combat corruption.

Table 6.1 demonstrates the two stylized, ideal-typical ways in which quotas can work when it comes to gender and corruption. Either, they provide a clean slate for recruitment as well as policy mandate, opening up for new possibilities and separate patterns of political legitimacy, or they are used as a tool on the menu of manipulation, thus coopting women elected on the quota, reproducing corrupt patterns. It is likely that our framework should be seen as a continuum rather than a question of either-or, but for the sake of analytical clarity they are here specified as two stylized options.

This chapter draws together research on gender and corruption by focusing on both recruitment and policy. Specifically, it investigates not only how gender affects access to power (recruitment) but also presence and influence (policy). One way of investigating the mechanisms between gender and corruption is to study how quotas influence access and influence to power and how they shape the opportunities for women either to work as independent agents or to become part of the existing networks.

In the remainder of this chapter, we apply the framework to a country that for a long time has suffered from political corruption: Tanzania. In

Table 6.1 Framework for potential links between quotas and corruption

	<i>Reduce corruption: Women elected provide a clean slate</i>	<i>Reproduce corruption: Women elected are items on the menu of manipulation</i>
Individual recruitment	Separate recruitment mechanisms (i)	Network/corrupt recruitment (iii)
Policy influence	Own mandate (ii)	Party line, nested corruption (iv)

short, we suggest that quotas are more likely to reproduce than reduce corruption in the type of electoral authoritarian regime that Tanzania represents.

QUOTAS AND CORRUPTION IN TANZANIA: A CASE STUDY

The reduction of corruption remains a big issue in the public debate in Tanzania. The unabated levels of political corruption and the gradual increase in the number of special seats begs the question of the relationship between quotas and corruption reduction. Tanzania, where over 80 percent of women MPs occupy quota seats, is a good example of whether quotas can serve as a tool to fight corruption. We examine the relationship between quotas and corruption, focusing on the recruitment mechanisms of special-seat MPs and ask if group dynamics foster or hinder quota MPs' ability to tackle corruption. This case study draws on our interviews with party leaders and special-seat MPs in Tanzania. Specifically, Bjarnegård and Zetterberg conducted field work on recruitment procedures of political candidates in the three major parties (the Chama cha Mapinduzi [CCM], the Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo [CHADEMA], and the Civic United Front [CUF]) in Tanzania in 2013. Their study on recruitment builds on party documents as well as on interviews with around 25 party officials. Yoon interviewed around 50 quota MPs over time (in 2007, 2008, and 2013) about the elections and duties of quota MPs.

The United Republic of Tanzania (hereafter referred to as Tanzania) was born in 1964 as a result of the merger between Tanganyika (Tanzania mainland) and Zanzibar. The single political party in Tanganyika (the Tanganyika African National Union) and in Zanzibar (the Afro-Shirazi Party) also merged in 1977 and created CCM, which was the only political party in Tanzania until the country adopted multi-party rule in 1992. Since its first post-independence multi-party elections in 1995, the country has held elections every five years based on a first-past-the-post, single-member plurality system.

Like most democratizing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Tanzania is a one-party dominant state, where the ruling party, CCM, has dominated election outcomes. However, the degree of CCM's dominance has decreased somewhat in the recent elections, due in part to high level of political corruption (e.g., the embezzlement and misuse of public funds, tax evasion, and taking bribes) which has significantly undermined the credibility of the ruling party. In 2015, the country was ranked 117th on

the Transparency International's 167 country corruption perception index (CPI), scoring 30 out of 100 (on a scale where 100 means very clean) (Transparency International 2016). Despite President John Magfuli's commitment to zero tolerance on corruption, the 11th parliament, elected in October 2015, has already been engulfed by multiple bribery allegations lodged against parliamentary committee leaders for taking bribes from parastals or local authorities in return for promises to approve their financial accounts (Kenyonko 2016). Though low on the CPI ranking, the country has surpassed most other countries for female legislative representation. As of February 2016, women accounted for 36.6 percent of parliamentary seats, and Tanzania was ranked 25th on the Inter-Parliamentary Union's 191 country list (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2016). Its relatively high rank for female legislative representation is due mainly to the reserved-seat system (special-seat system), which the country adopted in 1985 to increase women's representation in the legislature (Yoon 2016).

The Tanzanian legislature consists of constituency MPs, special-seat MPs, ten MPs nominated by the president, five MPs from the House of Representatives of Zanzibar, and the Attorney General as an ex-officio member. During single-party rule, the country reserved fifteen parliamentary seats for women and another fifteen for CCM mass organizations (the Union of Tanzanian Women, Parents, Workers, Youth, and Universities). With the adoption of multiparty-rule, the country abolished special seats for mass organizations (Yoon 2008). Special seats for the legislature are proportionally distributed based on the number of valid votes in the parliamentary election. Parties, to be qualified for special seats, must meet the 5 percent threshold. The number of special seats has gradually increased over time, from 37 in 1995 through 75 in 2005 to 113 in 2015 (Yoon 2016).

The system has brought CCM disproportionate shares of special seats in the earlier parliaments, due mainly to the weak opposition. However, as the opposition has gained more electoral strength in recent elections, the system has also benefited the opposition parties (i.e., CHADEMA and CUF) by distributing more special seats for the opposition. According to the National Electoral Commission (1997), the first multi-party election in 1995 allocated nine of thirty-seven special seats for the opposition (24.33%). However, the latest parliamentary election, in October 2015, and subsequent by-elections, in March 2016, collectively allocated forty-seven of 113 special seats (41.59%) for the opposition (thirty-seven for CHEDEMA and ten for CUF).¹

We now turn to the recruitments and mandates of special-seat MPs to examine whether quotas serve as an instrument to reduce or reproduce corruption in Tanzania.

Individual Recruitment of Special-Seat MPs

The selection process for the special seats runs parallel to and is separate from the selection process for the ordinary seats. Political parties submit the names of special-seat nominees to the National Electoral Commission. However, section 86A(4) of the National Elections Act 2010 states: “The names of the women candidates proposed to the Commission shall be in order of preference.” Parties, therefore, should rank their special-seat candidates. After each parliamentary election, the National Electoral Commission proportionally distributes special seats based on the number of votes each party received. It declares special-seat candidates from political parties as MPs (section 86A[6]). According to section 86A(8) of the Act, the list of special-seat candidates’ names will not change during the entire parliamentary term and will be used by the Commission to fill any vacancy. Unlike the president, MPs have no term limit, and many women have occupied special seats for multiple terms.

The same party gatekeepers that select ordinary candidates are thus also involved in the selection and ranking of the special-seat candidates, albeit to a different extent. The specific selection mechanisms vary across the parties as do the preferences for certain types of candidates.

Party Recruitment

CCM has a selection procedure for special seats that is separate from the candidate selection for ordinary constituency candidates all the way up to the formal endorsement of the nominees by the National Executive Committee. Before that, the candidates are recruited, assessed and ranked by the party’s women’s wing, the *Umoja wa Wanawake Tanzania* (UWT) which, like its mother party, is highly decentralized. Specifically, each regional conference of the UWT forwards the names of top aspirants to the UWT national congress, which ranks and nominates special-seat candidates (Yoon 2008). The chairperson of UWT is always ranked first on the party’s nomination list for special seats. The UWT national congress also nominates two special-seat MPs for each of the following groups: UWT, disabled, NGOs, employees, and universities.

In the case of CHADEMA, all party members participate in the special-seat primaries at the district level. The primary results are then forwarded to the Secretary of the women's wing, *Baraza la Wanawake Chadema* (BAWACHA), which votes on names and submits them to the party's National Executive Council. The party's Central Committee makes the final nomination decisions.² The party's attempts to formalize the candidate selection process and to delegate more of the responsibility to its women's wing have not been successful. For example, during the 2010 candidate-selection process, there were strong allegations of fraud, so the party leadership abruptly called off the BAWACHA voting process and instead called on a consultant from a university to apply selection criteria to the special-seat nomination process.³

CUF has a strong geographical stronghold, which includes the islands of Zanzibar (Unguja) and Pemba. Most of its MPs, including special-seat MPs, are from these two islands. CUF's nomination practice is more centralized and leader-focused than CHADEMA's, as it has no clear formal internal rules for nomination (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2016a). The party leadership, particularly the Executive Committee and the General Assembly, make most of the important decisions about all types of candidate selection, including the selection of special-seat candidates. Unlike the women's wings of CCM and CHADEMA, CUF's has no formal role to play in nominating special-seat candidates, other than offering informal recommendations.⁴ Thus, in CUF, the same selectors nominate both constituency and special-seat candidates.

Desired Type of Candidate

Some aspirants for special seats are outgoing special-seat MPs seeking reelection. A small number of outgoing female constituency MPs also compete for special seats. (In Tanzania, the parliament is dissolved before the general elections.) In CCM, the preferential polls for special seats are very competitive; aspirants must campaign hard to win votes. Aspirants for special seats in CCM should be UWT members. As all female CCM members automatically become members of the UWT, this is usually not a limiting requirement. The autonomy of the UWT is contingent upon its continued close ties to the party and is mostly limited to advocating for women's issues. Some UWT representatives describe UWT's role as "the arm of CCM" which does everything it can to assist the party.⁵ Thus, according to those representatives, the UWT prefers candidates with

proven records of serving women at the local level, who are well prepared to cater women's issues in a broader context.⁶

The special-seat women of CHADEMA form a majority of the total number of female representatives of the party, and their responsibility is not limited to women's issues (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2016a). The Secretary General of CHADEMA emphasized that women elected on special seats should "participate in all national programs and add an impact,"⁷ implying that special-seat candidates have to show their worth in dealing with a variety of issues. However, according to one of the constituency secretaries in CHADEMA, in reality, anyone who is committed and able to invest time and money in the party is likely to be nominated for a special seat.

Like the CHADEMA Secretary General, the Executive Secretary of the CUF women's wing does not see it as important that special-seat women are concerned only with women's issues.⁸ In CUF, to be nominated as a special-seat candidate, long-term loyalty and commitment to the party is important.⁹

Policy Influence of Special-seat MPs

What can special-seat MPs accomplish once in parliament? This section discusses the overall attributes of special-seat MPs affecting their ability to fight corruption, focusing on their own priorities, the influence of party discipline, and their general political skills, including the ability to form alliances and negotiate their own agenda.

Priorities of Special-seat MPs

In some ways, the priorities of special-seat MPs are similar to those of constituency MPs: they have duties inside of the parliament and run various projects (e.g., water projects, building girls' schools, roads, and dispensaries, micro-financing for women, etc.) in their respective regions (each region consists of multiple constituencies). Anti-corruption, however, has never been a priority for female MPs, including quota MPs.

According to MPs, voters in Tanzania make voting decisions based on candidates' ability to bring services to the electorate or based on candidates' previous service records (retrospective voting behavior).¹⁰ Voting is result-based, stated a female MP.¹¹ Though indirectly elected, special-seat MPs should also be accessible in their regions, if interested in reelection. Unlike constituency MPs, however, special-seat MPs do not have access to

the Constituency Development Catalyst Fund, distributed to constituency MPs for their constituency development projects. The lack of resources, therefore, poses a challenge to their efforts to bring services to their regions.

Though CHADEMA and CUF expect their special-seat MPs to be engaged in diverse issues, women MPs tend to focus on issues concerning women, children, and families (Yoon 2011). As such, most of their projects are geared toward serving these interests and those of community development, except for specific constituency needs in the case of female constituency MPs. The priorities of the Tanzanian Women Parliamentary Group (TWPG), which includes all female MPs, are also women centered (e.g., training female MPs, increasing women's legislative representation, and promoting issues of women, family, and children in the parliament).

Special-seat MPs identify capacity building through more training as their most urgent need to be effective legislators. For female MPs' capacity building, the parliamentary women's caucus, TWPG, offers intensive training sessions for a few days before each new parliament. The training sessions include mock parliamentary sessions and the rules and codes of parliamentary conduct (e.g., how to ask questions, how to debate, how to bring private bills, etc.).¹² The lack of skills, of course, is not limited to special-seat MPs. Other MPs also lack skills. Moreover, the question of legitimacy of special seats as a mechanism to enter parliament may undermine special-seat MPs' ability to maneuver. Many male MPs believe that women should compete on equal terms with men for parliamentary seats.¹³

Party Discipline

There are no independent candidates in Tanzania. To become an MP, she/he should belong to a party. The Government Chief Whip and the Leader of the Official Opposition are in charge of maintaining party discipline. The Government Chief Whip supervises "the performance of ministers within the House as well as that of the other members of the ruling party, in order to ensure that they generally act as one solid team in supporting their government" (Msekwa 2015). The Leader of the Official Opposition also ensures unity and discipline of the opposition (Ibid).¹⁴

Party discipline has undermined cooperation among female MPs from different parties¹⁵ on a range of issues, including the potential to combat corruption. The selection process of special-seat MPs appears to solidify their party discipline. As discussed above, special-seat MPs are elected by their parties through intra-party competitions among women, and they

are indebted to their parties for their entry into parliament. Furthermore, given that parties order the names of special-seat candidates, their continuous party loyalty is placed high on the candidate list in case of reelection.

*The Relationship Between Special Seats
and Corruption in Tanzania*

Do special seats in Tanzania work to reduce or to reproduce corruption? The above analysis illustrates how special-seat candidates are recruited and what they can do once elected. First, we investigated whether the recruitment of individual women to special seats is separate from the ordinary recruitment or whether it is based on existing party networks. In fact, despite the fact that the quota system is formally designed to operate separately from the ordinary candidate selection, the same gatekeepers are often in charge. The extent to which this is the case varies across the parties. CCM's recruitment procedure, we find, is the most separate. However, even though the recruitment is largely in the hands of its women's wing, UWT, CCM is a "machine party" which co-opts and controls all its partisan networks. Thus, while the special-seat candidates picked by the UWT for the CCM special seats are not necessarily connected to the same networks as the candidates picked by other gatekeepers for constituency seats, they are nevertheless recruited from within its partisan networks. In CUF, there is no distinction: the same selectorate nominates both constituency-seat and special-seat candidates. In none of the parties are special-seat candidates selected from a clean slate.

When it comes to the role of elected special-seat representatives, their role, in most ways, is similar to that of constituency MPs; there is no indication that either constituency MPs or special-seat MP prioritize anti-corruption work. Rather, they tend to pay more attention to having local connections and demonstrating concrete results in their constituencies and regions. Women MPs generally focus on issues related to women and children. Their focus seems to be more connected to their sex than to their status as a special-seat MP. Party discipline is strong, and it is not easy for women to build cross-partisan agendas on their interests. Therefore, women on special seats do not have a strong mandate of their own. They are indebted to the party for their seats, and expected to tow the party line.

Given the above analysis, it appears that special seats in Tanzania work to reproduce, rather than reduce, corruption. Corruption is widespread in Tanzanian party politics; thus, dependence on existing networks implies dependence on corruption. All three parties have faced allegations of corruption in the recruitment process to special seats. For example, UWT's special-seat primaries have been tainted with vote-buying activities. There was also an allegation that CCM fielded 'fake' candidates for CHADEMA special seats.¹⁶ Some influential men in CHADEMA, according to the Secretary-General of BAWACHA, fielded their wives and relatives to gain more influence. At an individual level, various media sources reported that some special-seat aspirants bribed voters with food, drink, and transportation to the voting stations to solicit their votes. Moreover, there have also been allegations of sexual corruption (sexual favors in exchange for political positions or influence) in the parties with women being particularly exposed.¹⁷ The allegations of sexual corruption have given rise to rumors about any woman candidate or MP who is viewed as being close to male colleagues.¹⁸

CONCLUSION

This chapter developed a theoretical framework on the relationship between quotas and corruption and applied it to Tanzania. Special seats could, in theory, have the potential to provide a clean slate for politicians if they are recruited in a new way and equipped with a mandate that enables them to combat political corruption. However, as the analysis above suggests, clean slates are rarely provided in (party) politics. Political parties and their internal logic generally play a large role in guiding the behaviors and agendas of elected representatives—regardless of whether or not they are elected through quotas.

Contrary to the significant negative relationship between female legislative representation and corruption reported by some empirical studies, there is no given relationship between the two in countries like Tanzania, where we have seen a significant increase in female legislative representation due to the special-seat system, and yet persistent and high levels of political corruption. As for their individual recruitment, a closer look at the profiles of special-seat MPs suggests that most special-seat candidates are party loyalists who have established a track record of service to their parties. Specifically, they have held various leadership posts within their parties or in their parties' women's wings, advancing their political career

within the party. Considering that the political parties are likely to nominate aspirants with a proven record and name recognition within the party, the quota system does not bring fresh blood to politics. Their individual recruitment is not independent of the already corrupt system. Furthermore, the duties of special-seat MPs outside of the parliament, other than their wider areal coverage, are not different from those of constituency MPs. In a stable electoral authoritarian state like Tanzania, quotas are not mainly implemented as a mechanism to enhance female legislative representation. The CCM has carefully coopted the women's wing so that they can safely delegate the candidate selection to it. In CCM, candidates are given a clearer mandate to represent women, but this effectively limits their influence over other issues. Quota seats have been used mainly as a tool to augment the parliamentary representation by the parties.

The quota system in Tanzania is designed in such a way that women on special seats can be clearly distinguished and they could thus be given a specific mandate. This could emphasize the perceived difference of women and thus constitute a springboard for combatting political corruption. However, for special-seat women in Tanzania, combatting political corruption would imply biting the hand that feeds them and, given their recruitment path, it would probably fall back on them. The lack of capacity and skills also undermines their ability to fight corruption, as does male resistance to the quota system and questions about the women's legitimacy.

The Tanzanian experiences resonate with feminist institutionalist research that has shown how persistent informal practices and power hierarchies may be, even where formal rules are changed (Chappell 2015; Kenny 2013; Waylen 2007). All political parties strive to maximize their own power, and nowhere is this more true than in electoral authoritarian states (Bjarnegård 2013; Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2016a). Electoral gender quotas are examples of electoral engineering (c.f. Zetterberg 2009b), and as such they are not necessarily signs of dynamic societal changes from below. Quotas should thus not be equated with political equality. Yet, many studies have treated political representation as an indicator of political equality without taking into account the impact of electoral gender quotas on gendered representation patterns. This conflation can cause us to draw the wrong conclusions about the difference that women in politics make (c.f. Bjarnegård and Melander 2013). By combining a focus on recruitment and policy influence, this chapter

shows how and why women on special seats in Tanzania are not in a position to be agents of change or efficient anti-corruption fighters.

The findings from our case study raise the question as to whether the possibilities for quotas to constitute a “clean slate” are bigger in other political contexts than in Tanzania. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to empirically address that question, we tentatively suggest that context does matter: whereas special seats in Tanzania have been designed, adopted, and implemented in a process mostly characterized by continuity, we believe that the preconditions for quotas to reduce corruption are bigger when they are introduced in a process of dramatic change. For instance, in a constitutional reform process in a post-conflict situation or following regime change, the rules of the game are under negotiation—sometimes under the supervision of the international community. Under such circumstances it may be easier to design and implement quotas in a way that make women less indebted to, and dependent on, old elites and their corrupt networks.

Thus, to shed further light on the relationship between quotas, parliamentary representation, and corruption, future research should pay increased attention to the design and implementation of electoral reforms and the types of opportunities and incentives they create for different political actors in specific political contexts.

NOTES

1. The data were collected from National Electoral Commission (2015).
2. Mi Yung Yoon’s interview with Susan Kiwanga, first-term CHADEMA special-seat MP, Dodoma, June 5, 2013.
3. Bjarnegård and Zetterberg’s interview with Dr. Wilbrod Slaa, the then Secretary General of CHADEMA, November 2013.
4. Bjarnegård and Zetterberg’s interview with Nuru Awadh Bafadhil, Executive Secretary of CUF Women’s Wing, and with members of a local CUF women’s wing November 2013.
5. Bjarnegård and Zetterberg’s interview with representatives of the CCM women’s wing, the UWT, November 2013.
6. Bjarnegård and Zetterberg’s interview with representatives of the CCM women’s wing, the UWT, November 2013.
7. Bjarnegård and Zetterberg’s interview with Dr. Slaa, then Secretary General of CHADEMA, November 2013.
8. Bjarnegård and Zetterberg’s interview with Nuru Awadh Bafadhil, Executive Secretary of CUF Women’s Wing, November 2013.

9. Bjarnegård and Zetterberg's interview with Muhamed Mkandu, Ward Secretary CUF, November 2013.
10. Mi Yung Yoon's interviews with MPs, Dodoma, June 2013.
11. Mi Yung Yoon's interview with Rita Mlaki, then a female constituency MP, Dodoma, June 2008. She is currently a special-seat MP representing NGOs.
12. Mi Yung Yoon's interview with Anne Makinda, then the Deputy Speaker, Dodoma, June 2008.
13. Bjarnegård and Zetterberg's interview with CUF male MPs, November 2013. Yoon's interviews with male MPs over time.
14. Pius Msekwa was the speaker of Tanzania from 1994 to 2005.
15. Mi Yung Yoon's interview with Slaa, then the Secretary General of CHADEMA, Dodoma, 19 June 2008; Mi Yung Yoon's interview with Fatima Maghimbi, a CUF female constituency MP in the 2005–2010 parliament, Dodoma, June 2014. She was the only female constituency MP from the opposition.
16. Bjarnegård and Zetterberg's interview with Suzan Lyimo, Secretary General of BAWACHA and Naiomi Kaihula, CHADEMA special-seat MP, November 2013.
17. Bjarnegård and Zetterberg's interview with Dr. Slaa, the then Secretary General of CHADEMA, November 2013.
18. Bjarnegård and Zetterberg's interview with Suzan Lyimo, Secretary General of BAWACHA and Naiomi Kaihula, CHADEMA special-seat MP, November 2013.

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PART III

Engendering the Bureaucracy



Corruption and Female Representation in the Bureaucracy

Helena Stensöta

While initial research on gender and corruption argued for a straightforward and general relationship between more women and lower levels of corruption (Dollar et al. 2001), research today has moved into contextualizing the argument about how women matter for corruption, mainly by exploring how different contexts mediate the relationship in different ways. Indeed, research has shown that context affects both the strength and the direction of the relationship between gender and corruption. Research on the relationship between gender and corruption in the legislature has developed increasingly sophisticated models to explain how the association is mediated by institutional and/or contextual circumstances, and so it may be assumed that bureaucratic features also mediate the impact of gender. These mediating factors may, however, be composed differently from factors in the legislature.

On an overall level, gender and corruption seem to be *less* related in bureaucracy. The relationship between corruption and the share of women in the administration varies, however, between different parts of the world, and in addition, the different characters of bureaucracy seem to interact in

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different ways with gender. Moreover, not all levels of bureaucracy work in similar ways; in particular, the frontline level can be distinguished due to the discretionary room to maneuver that employees enjoy. Following studies in implementation and representative bureaucracy, gender might matter more at the street level than at other levels in bureaucracy.

I start by outlining the theoretical expectations that can be formulated regarding how the relationship between corruption and gender in the bureaucracy plays out. I suggest using institutional theory to make sense of the link between gender and corruption by distinguishing between two major types of institutional logics: logics that *enforce* individual and/or group-specific qualities in relation to corruption, and logics that *suppress* them. This proposition has previously been put forward by Stensöta et al. (2015), and their argument is recalled here, including the empirical demonstration on whether gender in the bureaucracy matters for corruption in comparison with the way gender in the legislature relates to corruption. Further, I outline an idea of gender as “*raw material*,” which sees gender as emanating from outside the decision-making institutions. This way of understanding gender differs from the feminist institutionalist perspective, where it is seen as being produced by the institutions.

I further outline expectations for how gender may matter in frontline bureaucracy. Given the notion of raw material and the discretion that gives employees greater leeway, gender is expected to play a greater role in frontline bureaucracy. Although there are some empirical studies that suggest that gender at the frontline plays little or no role in corruption, the complexity of the field, as described by research on implementation and representative bureaucracy, suggests that existing studies may not be broad enough to allow for general conclusions. I end by summarizing the mechanisms by which raw-material qualities are mediated by institutional logics to affect levels of corruption.

THEORY

The bulk of research on gender and corruption has been oriented to exploring the link between gender and corruption in the legislature, and there is also considerable research on gender and corruption among citizens. The findings in these areas show a small but consistent relationship between women and lower corruption, and factors that mediate this relationship are specified, as other chapters in this volume acknowledge.

A large part of government consists, however, of the administration, that is, the bureaucracy. According to Max Weber, the analysis of the state should presumably be conducted by analyzing the state as a *form of administration*. Weber offered that the reason a particular state endures owes not so much to the input side of government, the legislature, but is more a matter of how the state is organized, thus, its output sphere (Weber 1978). Indeed, as the general field of corruption studies has shown, the quality of bureaucracy plays a crucial role in good government (Rothstein and Teorell 2008).

From this background, it is odd that the relationship between corruption and female representation in the bureaucracy has not been explored in more detail. Could it be that impartiality or other characteristics of the bureaucracy, is so strong that gender becomes extraneous? If so, is this true for bureaucracies in all parts of the world and at all levels? Following from this, I discuss the question: How does the relationship between gender and corruption play out in the bureaucracy?

Distinguishing Institutional Logics

When theorizing about the importance of gender and bureaucracy, I suggest using institutional theory to specify expectations and theoretical propositions (see also Stensöta et al. 2015). Institutions can be defined as frameworks within which human interaction takes place (North 1990) and likewise as sites in which a specific “logic” prevails that affects the strategies used by actors within these institutions (March and Olsen 1989).

The expected logic of a bureaucracy can be delineated from Max Weber (1978), who argued that the major merit of bureaucracy is that it formalizes interaction, and hence, makes personal affections and priorities irrelevant. The bureaucratic logic can therefore be described as enhancing the impartial handling of cases by suppressing other preferences and orientations, thereby strengthening actors’ abilities to see behind any personal characteristics of the client and realize impartiality (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). Thus, it can be hypothesized that the bureaucracy *suppresses* gender differences.

In contrast, a logic of the electoral arena can be outlined by using the work of Manin (2007), who argued that individual candidates need to stand out to attract votes. We can reason that standing-out strategies can make use of group-specific experiences and/or stereotypes of, for example,

gender. Hence, the legislature provides hypothetically a logic that *enforces* individual or group qualities of those seeking entry, such as gender.

*The Notion of Raw Material Based on Asymmetrical Axes
of Power and Experiences*

If we reason that institutional logics suppress or enforce individual properties, this assumes that such properties are attached to actors *before* they enter the institutions. Actors are then comprehended not as “empty boxes,” but as characterized by particular features. The notion of “*raw material*” (see also Stensöta et al. 2015) captures properties connected to gender in this latter way. Gender as raw material is not a biological or essentialist property of the individual, but composed from the socially constructed position that an individual or group has in a particular society.

What particular features of a societal context do we need to pay attention to when focusing on how gender is composed? Feminist theories that problematize how macro structures in society affect the relationships between women and men can be taken as a point of departure. In the chapter by Lindberg and Stensöta in this volume, the point of departure is taken in feminist materialist theories focusing on the mechanism of exploitation. In this chapter, the argument more generally points at patterns that structure gender relations. Iris Marion Young (2002) argued that on the structural level, “we all find ourselves passively grouped according to structural relations” (Young 2002, p. 422). According to her, these structural relations with importance to gender can be captured along three axes: the sexual division of labor that, in most modern societies, directs women to have more experience of reproduction than men; the normative heterosexuality; and the gendered hierarchies of power, which address the importance of power asymmetries. Asymmetries along these axes give rise to gender-specific power differences and experiences, and possibly preferences. Hence, based on the idea of these axes, we can expect women to be less corrupt because they are less inclined to be hurtful, not only because of their deeper involvement in care responsibilities, anchored in reproduction, but also because they have less power.

Going back to the theoretical model proposed here, the notion that institutions enforce or suppress “raw-material” qualities might explain why the impact of institutions on women and men differs. However, we can also discuss how these qualities can vary between regime types, such as

authoritarian, democratic or welfare state. This can help to account for why the same type of institution may have different mediating power, depending on context. Hence, we can address outcomes due to both variation in institutions and variation in the raw material.

The notion of “raw material” may give the impression that its substance is “automatic” and part of the socialization of individuals, and hence, that it does not require deliberate choice of action. The proposition here, however, is that it is based in choice. Many norms that we follow daily, for example, not exceeding the speed limit, waiting for the green light when crossing the street, or engaging in environmentally friendly garbage disposal, may represent social norms that we have been, more or less, socialized into following; nevertheless, we make a choice when we decide to actually follow them and not to transgress. In this sense, we can argue that any raw-material quality that favors a particular behavior forms a deliberate decision for the person following it.

A further note about how the understanding of gender advanced here differs from feminist institutional perspectives is required, as feminist institutionalism is currently developing into an important line of research. Feminist institutionalism commonly understands gender as being produced by these institutions (Krook and Makay 2011). While this is certainly a valid theoretical proposition, and one that has produced a lot of interesting results, it is not the only possible proposition. For example, if we are interested in accounting for change, then it is problematic to describe actors as more or less “empty shells” for whatever norms are transmitted by the institutions (see also Stensöta 2017; Thomson 2017).

GENDER AND CORRUPTION AT THE FRONT LINE

A further line of distinction within bureaucracy that has not been discussed before in the area of gender and corruption concerns the level, specifically the frontline level, of bureaucracy. There is abundant research arguing that the circumstances within frontline bureaucracy differ from those within the bureaucracy at large. According to Michael Lipsky (1980), the “front line” of government is where public employees interact directly and recurrently with clients/citizens and where these employees enjoy considerable power over the clients’ lives. Typical street-level bureaucratic professions are teachers, social workers, and law-enforcement personnel. Frontline workers are given discretion because, when making decisions according to their work assignments, they need to pay attention

to such a large number of contextual conditions that it is not possible to prescribe a course of action fully in laws and regulations—there are simply too many circumstances in the working and task environment that may have to be taken into account.

There are several reasons why the link between gender and corruption within frontline bureaucracy may differ from circumstances within public administration in general. First, if we consider the capacity of bureaucratic organizations to induce impartial behavior in their employees, the discretion enjoyed by street-level bureaucrats represents a challenge to this principle, as street-level bureaucracy is characterized by employees who have discretion to let their decisions be influenced by context. Hence, we can hypothesize that the suppressive power of the bureaucracy is lower at the frontline, and that gender therefore may matter more for corruption than in bureaucracy generally. There are several examples of policy initiatives that take inspiration from similar ideas, for example, reforms to employ women in traffic law enforcement in Mexico as a way to combat corruption (see, for example, Watson and Close 2016).

A second point is slightly less straightforward and concerns the substance of policy, that is, the types of good or services that the bureaucracy provides. Street-level bureaucracy often deals with providing services of different kinds, and many of these are related to care: health care and medical treatment are clearly related to care, but teachers and schooling also have a caring component, as part of the task is to foster children, not just to educate them. Even law enforcement may have a caring component when the precautionary work is emphasized (Stensöta 2004), and prison management may have consequences for the inmates that can be discussed from the perspective of care ethics (Coverdale 2014).

Care and care ethics have a particular stance in studies of gender, as ethics represents a way to attach expectations of substantive content and form to gender in a non-essentialist way. Briefly stated, ethics of care theory argues that contextual considerations are important to fully understand the complexity and moral connotations of problems. Importantly, second-generation care ethicists do not make any essentialist claims about women and care, but argue normatively for the general importance (or centrality) of care in societies (Hankivsky 2014; Sevenhuijsen 1998; Stensöta 2015; Tronto 1994). Related to the problem discussed here, we could hypothesize that the substance of care in frontline work, as it connects with the asymmetrical axis in society along reproduction, may enhance the importance of gender even further, as these two factors may enhance each other.

This, however, leaves the question, through which mechanisms would we expect women to matter for corruption at the frontline? The first notion, that women are less corrupt as raw material, connects them to reproduction and care, a propensity to not hurt, and to a situation where they have less power. These connections may be further attached to a sense of solidarity with the state. This notion of solidarity and an alliance between women and the state is discussed elsewhere in this volume (Agerberg et al., (2018); chapter 11, and Stensöta (2018), chapter 14).

However, such an alliance may not be as valid at the street level. Previous research on implementation argues that there is less obedience to the state at this level; this is replaced by a loyalty to the clients (Lipsky 1980). Even though orientations such as “statesmanship” have been discovered among frontline workers (Østergaard and Stensöta 2017), the strongest expectation would be that the state loyalty is not as strong at the front line. What other expectations replace this state solidarity can be drawn from the literature on representative bureaucracy, which explores the impact of group representation in bureaucracy. The literature distinguishes between “passive” representation, i.e., the proportional reflection of the employees to the population, and “active” representation, i.e., whether groups also substantively (with regard to content) represent their groups. “Passive” representation is important from a perspective of rights and non-discrimination; it may also have symbolic power and increase legitimacy among groups who feel that they have a representative of “their own” (Ricucci et al. 2014, p. 537). Substantive representation, however, refers to the way employees may advance the interests of their group by their decisions. For instance, Vicky Wilkins (2007) found that female employees granted child support more generously than men, which was interpreted as being rooted in group loyalty. Returning to the area of gender and corruption, one expectation may be that corruption at the front line is asymmetrical in the sense that some groups are “spared” from being asked for bribes.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In the following I explore how the institutional logics mediate the relationship between gender and corruption in the bureaucracy versus in the legislature. The findings are also presented in Stensöta et al. (2015). Figures 7.1 and 7.2 illustrate the relationship between corruption (Control of Corruption, World Bank, The Quality of Government (QoG) Standard

Dataset, version 6 Apr 11) and the representation of women in the bureaucracy (Fig. 7.1), using data on the share of women in the bureaucracy in EU countries (level 1, European Commission 2005) and in parliament (Women in Parliament, Inter-Parliamentary Union 2005) (Fig. 7.2).

The analysis indeed reveals two quite different relationships. As can be seen, Scatterplot 1 shows no relationship between the share of women at level 1 of the administration and levels of corruption. In the bivariate analysis of corruption (Control of Corruption) and share of women in administration (EC level 1), the coefficient is 0.00 (t 0.04), and the adjusted R2




Fig. 7.1 Bivariate relationship between the number of women in administration (European Union Level 1) and levels of corruption. *Comment:* Scatterplot 1 shows the relationship between Control of Corruption and the number of women in Level 1 administration (European Commission data). There is no relationship between the share of women in administration (Level 1) and the Control of Corruption. The coefficient is 0.00 (t 0.04), and the adjusted R2 is below zero ($n = 29$). Perception of Corruption shows similar results; the coefficient is -0.01 (t -0.34) and the adjusted R2 is below zero ($n = 30$) (Sources: Women in administration level 1; European Commission. Control of Corruption; World Bank, The QoG Standard Dataset, version 6 Apr 11 (Stensöta et al. 2015))




Fig. 7.2 Bivariate relationship between the number of women in parliament and Control of Corruption (European Union). *Comment:* The explanatory power of share of women is strong; the adjusted R2 is 49 percent. The coefficient (Control of Corruption) in the bivariate analysis is not very high (0.05^{***} ($P > |t| 0.000$) ($t = 5.25$)), but it is significant. The Perception of Corruption index shows similar results; women explain 54 percent of the variation in Perception of Corruption, and the coefficient in the bivariate analysis is 0.135^{***} ($t = 5.93$) (Sources: see Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg; Control of Corruption (World Bank) Women in parliament; Inter-Parliamentary Union, The QoG Standard Dataset, version 6 Apr 11 (Stensöta et al. 2015))

is zero ($n = 29$). Scatterplot 2 shows the bivariate relationship between corruption and the share of women in parliament for the same countries as in Scatterplot 1. As becomes clear, the explanatory power of the share of women in relation to corruption is strong; the adjusted R2 is 49 percent. The coefficient (Control of Corruption) in the bivariate analysis is not particularly high, but it is significant (0.05^{***} ($P > |t| 0.000$) ($t = 5.25$)).

Assessing the argument more closely, a similar comparison can be performed using data from a global sample ($n = 80$) collected through the QoG Expert Survey 2008–2010 (Source: Quality of Government Institute Expert Survey 2011) (Figs. 7.3 and 7.4).




Fig. 7.3 *Bivariate* relationship between corruption and the proportional share of women in administration (QoG Expert survey). *Comment:* The explanatory power of the share of women in administration on corruption (Control of Corruption) is 8 percent. The coefficient in the bivariate analysis is 0.32^{**} ($P > |t|$ 0.003) ($t = 3.05$) ($n = 91$). The corresponding figure for the Perception of Corruption index is 6 percent (the coefficient in the bivariate analysis is 0.61^{**} ($P > |t|$ 0.008) ($t = 2.72$ $n = 95$)) (Sources: Quality of Government Expert Survey 2008–2010, Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg (Teorell et al. 2011); Control of Corruption (World Bank) (Stensöta et al. 2015))

Using the more expanded QoG Expert Survey data, covering a wider set of countries, including parts of the world outside Europe, Scatterplot 3 (Fig. 7.3) shows how the explanatory power of the share of women in the bureaucracy increases to 8 percent (using the measure Control of Corruption). The coefficient in the bivariate analysis is 0.32^{**} ($p > |t|$ 0.003 [$t = 3.05$; $n = 91$]). As comparison, Scatterplot 4 (Fig. 7.4), shows the relationship between the share of women in parliament and levels of corruption for the same countries that were examined in the QoG Expert Survey dataset, and here the variance explained by the share of women increases to 25 percent (Control of Corruption); the coefficient in the bivariate analysis is 0.05^{***} ($p > |t|$ 0.000 [$t = 5.54$; $n = 88$]).




Fig. 7.4 *Bivariate* relationship between the number of women in parliament and Control of Corruption. *Comment:* The explanatory power of the share of women is strong; the adjusted R2 is 49 percent. The coefficient (Control of Corruption) in the bivariate analysis is not very high (0.05^{***} ($P > |t| 0.000$) ($t = 5.25$)), but it is significant. The Perception of Corruption index shows similar results; women explain 54 percent of the variation in Perception of Corruption, and the coefficient in the bivariate analysis is 0.135^{***} ($t = 5.93$) (Sources: Women in national parliament upper house, Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation; Quality of Government Expert Survey 2008–2010, Quality of Government Institute, University of Gothenburg (Teorell et al. 2011); Control of Corruption (World Bank) (Stensöta et al. 2015))

To sum up, in the EU countries there is no relationship between women in bureaucracy and corruption. In the global sample, there *is* such a relationship pointing in the direction of more women and lower corruption; however, in this sample, the relationship between women in the legislature and lower corruption is also stronger.

To become more confident about the actual strength of the relationship, a multivariate analysis includes the following five controls used in previous research: (1) a logged measure of GDP per capita purchasing power parity (2005) (log version), (2) a dummy variable measuring former colony ver-

sus no colony (2005), (3) enrollment in secondary education (UNESCO) as a measure of literacy—preferable to the literacy measure from the World Bank that limits the population considerably, (4) political freedoms, and (5) level of ethnic homogeneity.¹ These controls are included in the analysis of the global sample, together with an exploration of the idea of institutions mitigating gender as raw material. It is hypothesized that the relationship between women in the administration and lower corruption diminishes as the organizational strength of bureaucracy increases. Strength of bureaucracy is captured as the extent to which the bureaucracy is able to successfully protect its employees and to distinguish itself from the surrounding society and politics. Empirically, this is measured by the use of formal examination systems and special public employment laws, both derived from the QoG Expert Survey 2008–2010 (Quality of Government Institute Expert Survey 2011). The countries are assessed by the degree to which they meet this value. Another strategy would have been to characterize each country as adhering to a certain tradition (1) and not another (0). Here the analysis follows the approach used in Quality of Government (Rothstein and Holmberg 2012), but differs from Peters (2008).

Indeed, the analysis reveals that when bureaucratic principles of strength increase, the relationship between more women and less corruption decreases. When the formal examination system variable is zero, the share of women has a positive effect (coefficient 0.52*) on Control of Corruption, meaning that corruption decreases. The interaction term (−0.10*) shows that when bureaucratic principles increase in strength, the relationship between more women and less corruption decreases. The same pattern is seen when the alternative measure Perception of Corruption is used, but then the strength of the coefficient doubles. In the interaction model, the coefficient for the share of women increases to 1.15*, the coefficient for the formal examination system to 0.96*, and the interaction term to −0.24*.

RESEARCH ON GENDER AND CORRUPTION AT THE FRONT LEVEL

The hypothesis about the relationship between corruption and gender at the front line is not examined empirically in this chapter, but some previous empirical studies on how gender at the front level matters for corruption are reviewed. As was hinted at above, these studies do not find much

support for gender being of importance at the front line. The studies are, however, limited to a few countries and mainly to law enforcement. Considering the complexity of the field of implementation and the difficulties of drawing general conclusions in the field at large (Meyers and Lehman Nielsen 2012), these findings may not be generalizable.

In the paper “Are Women Better Police Officers,” Wagner et al. (2016) examined the power of gender in judgment and behavior among police officers in Uganda, using an experiment in which vignettes were distributed to 600 Ugandan police officers. The study found that, overall, it did not matter whether the victim or the police officer depicted was introduced as a woman or a man. However, police officers who illegitimately put money into their own pocket, that is, engaged in petty theft, were condemned more harshly when they were depicted as females. Further, and contrary to the hypothesis of women being less corrupt, the study found that male respondents were significantly more likely to state that they would report misbehavior and corruption. This latter result could be partly due to men being hired in higher positions in the police force (79 percent of the administrative positions are held by men), which might mean that they are more aware of proper conduct.

Another study by Alhassan-Alolo (2007) used an experiment among public servants in Ghana (Ghana Police Service and Ghana Education Service) and explored the question of whether women maintain high ethical standards in the public realm when social obligations require certain acts of corruption. The survey used vignettes and contrasted the importance of (a) opportunities for corrupt acts, and (b) social roles, capturing whether the behavior of an individual was seen as contingent upon the expectations that others in one’s in-group have about appropriate behavior. The results showed no statistically significant differences between female and male public employees in any of the tested hypotheses. However, some differences were noted in how a corrupt act might be defended: one female stated, for example, that the chief director fulfilled her social responsibility to her community by the potentially corrupt act, while similar reasoning was not connected to men. The article concluded that integrating women into the public sector is an act that supports social justice in making representation more equal; however, it should not, in itself, be seen as a remedy for corruption.

Even though these two studies point in one direction—that gender does not matter—again, considering that frontline bureaucracy as a field is

characterized by complexity, we need more research before we can rule out the importance of gender at the frontline for corruption. This research may fruitfully use models to explain how gender as raw material may be mediated by institutions that suppress and/or enforce gender differences. It should also be noted that citizens' perceptions on the relationship between gender and corruption at the frontline, may be important to reduce concerns about corruption (Barnes et al. 2017).

CONCLUSION

To sum up, this chapter started from a puzzle that the representation of women in the legislature seemed to be more strongly related to lower corruption compared with women's representation in bureaucracy. It was argued that institutional theory can be used to make sense of this finding, as institutions mediate the relationship between women and lower corruption. Two different logics mediating this relationship were described, enforcing logic in the legislature that strengthens the relationship between women and lower corruption, and a suppressing logic in the bureaucracy that limits the relationship. In contrast to feminist institutionalism theory, gender was not comprehended as being produced only by the institutions, but as raw-material connected to the actors who enter the institutions. Raw-material qualities were, in turn, seen as shaped through societal norms; these can be seen as anchored in institutions on higher level of analysis, such as regime and policies. The front-line bureaucracy was distinguished as a special type of bureaucracy where raw material qualities may matter more for two reasons. First, because discretion make the suppressive power less strong and second because the substance of the tasks performed in many frontline bureaucracies can be related to care, which in turn address one important asymmetry in society between women and men. Hence, we can argue that as these features coincide; the closer experience of women and care, and the substance of the policy tasks performed, they may enforce each other, and thus strengthen a link between women and lower corruption. Table 7.1 summarizes the institutional logics discussed in the chapter.

The Table 7.1 describes the suppressing and enforcing institutional logics in the bureaucracy and the legislature as described above. However, raw material qualities may also be divided along other societal axes, that shows asymmetrical divisions between groups, or even, the term may be

Table 7.1 How institutional logics mediates the relationship between gender as raw-material and corruption

	<i>Bureaucracy</i>	<i>Front level bureaucracy</i>	<i>Legislature</i>
Suppressing	Bureaucracy formalizes interaction and thus <i>suppresses</i> gender as raw-material	The suppressing power of the bureaucracy is less strong as discretion is high	–
Enforcing	–	Gender as raw-material is strengthened as tasks of frontline bureaucracy has similar substance as gender asymmetries in society	Politics urges actors to “stand out” in order to attract votes, which <i>enforces</i> gender as raw-material

Comment: This table summarizes the discussion in this chapter where suppressing and enforcing institutional logics are distinguished and suggested to apply in the main spheres of legislature and bureaucracy including its subcategory front line bureaucracy

used to distinguish how norms of varying strength in the population may be important for how other decision-making institutions work in a particular context. Hence, we could argue that different orientation of this raw-material, make the impact of different institutional logics play out differently. Future research may help to specify raw-material orientations in different contexts, with regard to different asymmetrical axes, and also specify further how institutions in varying contexts mediate these raw qualities.

NOTES

1. This selection of controls is based on controls used in previous research, above all, three studies: First, the work of Hung-En Sung (2003), who found the relationship between women and corruption to be spurious, while using as controls GDP per capita, poverty, illiteracy, and rule of law (including freedom of the press and electoral democracy). Second, the work of Swamy et al. (2001), who found that the share of women curbs levels of corruption, applying the following controls: logged GDP per capita, average years of schooling, Catholic proportion, Muslim proportion, former British colony, never colonized, largest ethnic group in percentage, and political freedoms. Third, the initial study by Dollar et al. (2001), who used the controls logged GDP per capita, civil liberties, schooling, openness, ethnic fractionalization, and colonial dummies.

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Is Women's Political Representation Beneficial to Women's Interests in Autocracies? Theory and Evidence from Post-Soviet Russia

Marina Nistotskaya and Helena Stensöta

A burgeoning literature explores the implications of women's political representation (WPR).¹ Within this larger field a strand of research examines the link between WPR and “good government,” pointing to the conclusion that more women in elected posts usually leads to corruption-free government (Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017). Another line of inquiry is concerned with the effects of increased political representation of women on policy outputs and outcomes (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004; Ennsner-Jedenastik 2017; Holman 2014), especially those, such as child education and health, that are valued by women (Blahotra and Clots-Figueras 2014; Bratton and Ray 2002; Clots-Figueras 2011, 2012; Halim et al. 2016; Hicks et al. 2016; Smith 2014; Svaleryd 2009).

By now, this literature has ample evidence on the positive link between the increased political representation of women and women-friendly

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policy outputs and outcomes. Nevertheless, inquiry is limited to democracies, with a predominant focus on national parliaments; little attention has been paid to women in local politics and in public bureaucracies. Our knowledge about the connection between women's numerical representation and the fulfillment of their interests in non-democracies is practically non-existent. This gap is particularly striking, considering a recent upward trend of non-democratic tendencies in the world (Levitsky and Way 2010) and the fact that in many non-democracies around the globe women hold a non-trivial proportion of seats in national parliaments (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2017). To explore the effects of female political representation in non-democracies is, therefore, important from both scholarly and policy perspectives.

This chapter sets out to explore this gap theoretically and empirically. Building on the insights from the literature on electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2013) and on gender and informal institutions (Johnson 2016), we develop a set of testable propositions about the effects of WPR in electoral and bureaucratic arenas on policy outcomes related to women's interests. We then test these propositions in the context of subnational government in an archetypical electoral autocracy (Russia), using original data collected by the Quality of Government Institute and data from Russia's Statistics Service on socioeconomic and political conditions across 80 constituent units (regions) of the Russian Federation.

The pattern found the relationship between WPR and child mortality—the selected measure of policy outcomes valued by women—is the opposite to that observed in democracies: a higher proportion of women in regional legislatures is associated with higher child mortality rates. Our findings also suggest that this negative relationship is weakened in regions with higher levels of democracy, supporting the previously identified moderating effect of democratic accountability (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017). We find no effect of women's representation in bureaucracy, which is also in line with previous empirical studies (Stensöta in this volume; Stensöta et al. 2015).

The chapter makes an important contribution to the literature on WPR, by theorizing and empirically testing its effects in the context of non-democratic political regimes. By distinguishing between WPR in electoral politics and in senior bureaucratic management, we contribute to both fields with a novel theoretical framework and the first large-N empirical tests of the effects of WPR in a non-democracy. Finally, we contribute to the knowledge on circumstances of WPR in Russia, an empirical

setting for which empirical data beyond anecdotal evidence have until now been rare.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Women's Political Representation in Democracies

A growing literature has investigated the implications of WPR on policy outputs and outcomes that are of value to women. A basic assumption for the positive impact of WPR on women-friendly outcomes is that men and women have different policy preferences, which finds strong empirical support in the data on both voters and elected representatives (for a recent study, see McEvoy 2016), and a “politics of presence” framework (Phillips 1995) which provides theoretical grounds for a link between descriptive and substantive representation. While some scholars argue that women’s interests are not universal (Chattopadhyay and Duflo 2004), and others problematize women’s interests beyond “a ‘feminist’ shopping list of demands” (Celis and Childs 2012, p. 213) as constructed through, and not simply reflected in, political advocacy on their behalf (Celis et al. 2014), the notion that women’s interests have a core, originating in their specific life experiences, remains widely accepted in the literature. Within it, child welfare, health, and education have been identified as key domains over which women have strong policy preferences (Blahotra and Clots-Figueras 2014; Bratton and Ray 2002; Clots-Figueras 2012; Svaleryd 2009; Halim et al. 2016; Quamruzzaman and Lange 2016; Swiss et al. 2012).

Evidence from a variety of empirical settings largely supports the notion that the increased presence of women in legislatures brings about policies reflective of women’s interests (Bratton and Ray 2002; Cowell-Meyers and Langbein 2009; Smith 2014; Wängnerud 2009; but see Lloren 2014). When it comes to policy outcomes, empirical evidence largely points in the same direction. For example, in a seminal paper Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) exploited a unique natural experiment of random assignment of gender quotas across Indian village-level councils to investigate whether the increased political representation of women affected the provision of public goods. They found that in areas led by women councilors, spending shifted in favor of those public goods that were prioritized by local women. Clots-Figueras (2012) and Halim et al. (2016) found that an increased share of female politicians leads to better public provision in education. Similarly, a positive impact of increased WPR was observed in child health

(Blahotra and Clots-Figueras 2014; Quamruzzaman and Lange 2016; Swiss et al. 2012).

Although the existing literature has made considerable progress elucidating the connection between WPR and women-friendly policy outputs and outcomes, the inquiry is limited to democracies, with a predominant focus on national parliaments. Furthermore, little attention has so far been paid to the effect of the increased presence of women in public bureaucracies (but see Stensöta et al. 2015; Suzuki and Avellaneda 2017). Our knowledge about the connection between women's numerical representation in politics and bureaucracy and the achievement of women-friendly outputs and outcomes in non-democracies is practically non-existent (but see Devlin and Elgie 2008). This gap is particularly striking, considering both an increase in the prevalence and durability of authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010) and the fact that in many non-democracies around the globe, women hold a non-trivial proportion of seats in national parliaments (e.g., in Rwanda (61 percent), Cuba (49 percent), or Tanzania and Belarus (36 and 34 percent, respectively) (Inter-Parliamentary Union 2017). To explore the effects of female political representation in authoritarian contexts is important both from an academic and a policy perspective.

THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

WPR in the Context of Electoral Authoritarianism

The post-Cold War global political landscape has been characterized by an increase in the prevalence and durability of authoritarian regimes (Levitsky and Way 2010). Trying to explain this phenomenon, a burgeoning comparative politics literature has emphasized that successful authoritarian regimes are those that make use of nominally democratic institutions (Schedler 2013). A major focus of the literature has been on control and manipulation of elections. As Schedler (2002, pp. 36–37) puts it, “By organizing periodic elections they [autocrats] try to obtain at least a resemblance of democratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy external as well as internal actors. At the same time, by placing those elections under tight authoritarian controls they try to cement their continued hold on power.” The control over elections is exercised through what Schedler (2002) termed a “menu of manipulation,” which is “broad and ever widening” (Schedler 2013, p. 3). It includes many items spanning all stages of the process from arrangements regulating access to state resources and media,

as well as other tendentious treatment of opposition candidates and parties by state institutions, to gerrymandering, pre-election filtering of nominations, mass pro-regime political rallies, and outright electoral fraud, vote-buying, and electoral intimidation (Bækken 2015; Debre and Morgenbesser 2017).

Autocrats constantly improve the menu of manipulation, and this is reflected in a considerable and growing body of research on the topic. The idea that women's promotion to politics may as well be one of the applications in the autocrats' toolbox has, however, not received dedicated consideration so far, despite some research pointing in this direction. For example, a number of case studies have shown that male party elites tend to promote to politics women that they can control, such as relatives or politically inexperienced women (for review, see Zetterberg 2009, p. 25). Further, Goetz (2002, p. 573) discussed the ways in which affirmative action, such as quotas, has worked in Uganda as a tool of "control of women in politics." Specifically, the policy of reserved seats, combined with tight control over the candidate nomination procedure by the male hierarchy of the dominant party, has enabled the ruling party "to hand-pick 'malleable' women" (Krook 2007, p. 371) who do not challenge the status quo (Goetz and Hassim 2003; Tripp 2013). Consequently, "increased women's representation has had little effect on policy outputs" (Devlin and Elgie 2008, p. 237). Similarly, several recent studies on gender and Russian politics suggest that Putin's regime uses WPR in ways that seriously restrict the agency of women politicians' agency (Chandler 2013a, b; Cook and Nechemias 2009; Johnson 2016; Sperling 2015).

Why Do Non-democracies Promote Women in Politics?

What might be the reasons for the increased WPR in non-democracies? First, academic scholarship and advocacy literature has long considered increased WPR, even at the level of descriptive representation, as a normatively desired objective of democratic governance (Mansbridge 1999; Sapiro 1981; Young 2000), so that the idea eventually gained the status of an international norm (Towns 2010), as evidenced, for example, by the spread of gender quotas (Bush 2011; Krook 2009). It is with the aim of legitimizing their rule, particularly to their external audience, that authoritarian leaders may respond to such normative pressure by increasing the number of women in politics.

Congruent with this is the literature on gender norms as a tool in international relations. As Towns (2010) has argued, norms may serve the

function of establishing hierarchies in the international society. Adherence to certain norms, such as gender equality, allows international relations actors to identify a relative standing of states in such a hierarchy. In other words, women's suffrage (historically) and gender quotas are of utility to dictators who want to improve the relative standing of their countries in the international pecking order.

Increased WPR may also serve a legitimizing role for the domestic audience. Non-competitive elections, especially in single-party regimes, provide only a minimal amount of legitimacy, because citizens are less likely to seriously consider them as a functioning representative institution (Malesky and Schuler 2010, p. 499), as evidenced, for example, by a mass protest movement in Russia during the 2011–2012 electoral cycle. Under these conditions, the increased number of women in elected and appointed positions may serve a useful function to boost domestic legitimacy. For example, Cook and Nechemias (2009, p. 41) argued that in modern Russia, at least since 2003, the promotion of women in politics was “a strategy designed to demonstrate that all groups and significant mass organizations were lined up in support of United Russia”—the electoral vehicle of Putin and his group. In an attempt to systematize scattered theoretical insights and empirical findings on the value of WPR for dictators, Johnson (2016) has argued that dictators promote women to politics for the needs of their regimes and “for functions based on emphasized femininity,” such as “showgirls” when the regime needs to legitimate and win elections, or “political cleaners” when, it is threatened by corruption.

Finally, as women comprise a large bank of voters, dictators may want to exploit its potential by increasing the number of women politicians, especially when faced with the risk of falling electoral support (Goetz 2002; Bjamegård and Zetterberg 2016). In short, authoritarian leaders have a number of reasons to increase WPR to create a façade of representation, democracy, and accountability, strongly suggesting that WPR is an overlooked item on the menu of authoritarian manipulations.

Why Increased WPR May Not Be Beneficial for Women's Interests in Non-democracies

Fundamentally, our argument that there may be no positive effect from the increased number of women in non-democracies is based on the verdict of the literature on electoral authoritarianism that in non-democracies

the essence of formal democratic institutions is emasculated or even subverted: “elections without democracy,” as Schedler (2002) metaphorically put it. At the same time, the idea of “democratic advantage”—that is, that democracies fare better in terms of human well-being compared to autocracies—is based on the notion that elections link government policies to the preferences of the people by allowing citizens to choose, among candidates with competing policy programs, those who best represent their preferences (representation), and by providing incentives for incumbents to adopt policies reflective of the voters’ preferences (accountability). But if representative democracy is only a façade, then the “democratic advantage” of representation and accountability, leading to higher levels of human well-being, will be lost.

Consider, for example, the case of Russia. It is widely accepted that elections at all levels in Russia, especially since Vladimir Putin’s ascension to power in 2000, have been “engineered” to such an extent that this “deprives elections of their primary functions of political choice and elite circulations” (Golosov 2011, p. 623; Brown 2009; Krastev and Holmes 2012). All political parties are “effectively controlled by the Kremlin” and one party (United Russia) “overwhelmingly dominated the landscape of party politics,” winning elections in each region (Gel’man 2008, p. 913). Moreover, the national legislature, controlled by United Russia, has gradually lost policymaking autonomy, turning into “the mad printer” of hastily drafted and barely debated laws, and the political clout of the upper chamber of the national legislature has long been diminished to that of a “rubber stamp” (for review, see Nistotskaya 2014). In other words, in Russia, as in many other non-democracies, the integrity of democratic institutions, such as elections, parties, legislatures, courts, media, and civil society, are severely undermined. This, in turn, raises serious doubts about the very possibility of a positive substantive effect of formal political representation in general and of WPR in particular.

Our account, which emphasizes the lack of democratic substance in formally democratic institutions, is fully congruent with that of Johnson (2016, p. 649), who underscored the strength of informal political institutions in Putin’s Russia. She argued that in Russia “women are more likely to be found in the posts and institutions that have been emasculated by informal politics.” Moreover, Johnson (2016) holds that women are recruited to politics mostly through informal channels, and then the same informal mechanisms that get them fast-tracked “box them in” to roles that suit the needs of the regime, such as “showgirls” and “loyalists” when

the regime needs to showcase representation and elections, and “stand-ins” and “political cleaners” in times of crisis or change.

Snippets of the insight that, in Putin’s Russia, women politicians lack genuine agency can be found in both academic scholarship and reputable media (Chandler 2010, 2013a, b; Cook and Nechemias 2009; Johnson 2016; Kittilson and Schwindt-Bayer 2012; Kiryukhina 2013; Sperling 2015; Sobolevskaya 2007). For example, in an interview with a Russian broadsheet newspaper in 2006, Russian sociologist Olga Kryshatanovskaya noted: “Politics remains an environment where men rule and women are used as decorations...and are entrusted with the most insignificant roles... they are not independent [actors]” (Izvestia 2006). In 2013, Kryshatanovskaya maintained that the existing male-dominated political system “only “let in” women politicians who don’t have their own opinions, look good and are essentially puppets” (Kiryukhina 2013). A recent article in the *Guardian* provides further reinforcement of this argument by saying that while “feminist scholars posit that including women in decision-making leads to policies that are...more likely to address issues of interest to women and ordinary citizens..., Putin’s female political elite mostly refutes such an analysis” (Sokirianskaia 2017). Women who reach the highest positions in politics are either “technocrats helping the regime run smoothly, or women with reputations as democrats who help legitimise non-democratic procedures. But they do not shape the political agenda” (Sokirianskaia 2017).

In other words, there are enough theoretical reasons and sufficient anecdotal evidence to suggest that WPR may represent an overlooked item on the menu of manipulations available to authoritarian rulers, resulting in the emasculation of the genuine agency of women in politics. In electoral authoritarian regimes, higher numbers of women in politics would signify less representation and accountability and hence the lack of “democratic advantage.” If this is true, it is reasonable to expect that WPR has no impact on women-friendly policy outcomes. The effect may even be negative, as women are “boxed in” in roles that suit the needs of the regime and, more importantly, are tightly controlled in those “boxes” by the informal—virtually all male—elite, whose purposeful push for “traditional values” of narrow heteronormative roles for women and men, and even outright sexism and misogyny, are well-documented (among others, Chandler 2013a; Johnson 2014, 2016; Horvath 2016; Sokirianskaia 2017; Sperling 2015; Wilkinson 2014). Having hand-picked those women, who are most amenable to their preferences, this informal elite

then controls them using “a potent cocktail of sexism, and threat of humiliation or violence” (Johnson 2016, p. 648). Under these conditions, pushing for women’s interests is not rational and may even be dangerous, as proven by the harsh prosecution of rock band Pussy Riot. Further, since promotion to politics is arranged through informal channels, it makes it also very easy to demote women, which ensures compliance with the demands of their patrons vis-à-vis patriarchal and other anti-women values. As Sperling (2015, pp. 190–191) notes, women in Russia’s national legislature “stay absolutely within the bounds [set by their male patrons], and say what they’re told to and no more.” Under such conditions, female politicians are likely to support policies that are harmful to women, rather than promoting their interests.

While there are numerous examples, the case of decriminalization of domestic violence that was signed into law by Putin in February 2017 illustrates the point particularly well. Domestic violence is a big problem in Russia: various estimates put the number of women who die at the hands of domestic abusers at between 9000 and 14,000 a year (Nechepurenko 2017; REGNUM 2008).² The law, which was condemned by Amnesty International as “riding roughshod over women’s rights,” “a sickening attempt to further trivialize domestic violence” (Kirey 2017), and by Human Rights Watch (2017) as “a huge step backwards,” was initiated by four women legislators, members of the dominant United Russia party, and co-sponsored by another eight women from both houses of the parliament. The bill sailed through with 67 out of 71 women MPs in the lower chamber and 25 out of 30 women senators in the upper chamber voting for it.

Based on the discussion above, we put forward the following hypotheses regarding the effects of WPR on women-friendly policy outcomes:

H₁: In non-democratic polities the extent of women’s representation in elected offices will have no effect on women-friendly policy outcomes.

H₂: Non-democratic polities with higher levels of women’s representation in elected offices will on average perform worse on women-friendly policy outcomes, compared to non-democratic polities with lower levels of women in elected offices.

H₃: The level of democracy moderates the effect of WPR on women-friendly outcomes by weakening the strength of negative association.

WPR in the Bureaucratic Arena

The WPR agenda is predominantly focused on women in elected posts, omitting an important institutional arena—bureaucracy (but see Stensöta in this volume; Stensöta et al. 2015; Suzuki and Avellaneda 2017). While the standard logic of WPR would suggest that a greater number of women in bureaucracy would have a positive effect on bureaucratic decisionmaking, Stensöta et al. (2015, p. 481) have argued that formalization of human interaction within bureaucracies may restrain the impact of office holders' characteristics such as gender on bureaucratic policymaking. By absorbing individual experiences and preferences into routines and taken-for-granted procedures, bureaucracies *de-gender* policymaking, thereby weakening the positive effect of women in bureaucracy on socially valued outcomes, such as corruption.

How do the relationships between women in bureaucracy and women-friendly outcomes unfold in non-democracies? One can argue for a positive effect, since the higher formalization of bureaucratic structures is normally associated with the higher protection of bureaucratic decisionmaking from undue interference by individual politicians (Nistotskaya and Cingolani 2016), making public managers less susceptible to patriarchal and other anti-women proclivities of individual politicians. Considering the formalization of bureaucracies in many historical contexts, such as Franco's Spain, Japan's Meiji Restoration, or Brazil's Getulio Vargas (Lapiente and Nistotskaya 2009), we expect this relationship to hold, irrespective of the type of regime. Further, one can argue that the de-gendering effect of formal bureaucratic structures (as per Stensöta et al. 2015) may be less applicable to senior bureaucratic posts, whose occupants enjoy relatively higher autonomy compared to rank-and-file bureaucrats, allowing greater latitude for their gendered experiences and preferences to bear on bureaucratic policymaking processes and outcomes. Hence, we put forward the following testable proposition:

H₄: In non-democratic polities higher women's representation in senior bureaucratic positions will be positively associated with better performance on women-friendly policy outcomes.

However, sound gender policies face a formidable problem of poor implementation or even "pseudoactions," when the measures implemented are very limited in scope and for the most part are one-off interventions

(Spehar 2016). This account suggests that the higher presence of women in bureaucracy, even if they are “femocrats,” is not a robust answer to the challenge of implementation unless basic issues of administrative capacity, such as strategic planning, program budgeting, and interagency coordination, are sorted out. Finally, in the light of the above discussion of WPR in electoral politics, it is plausible to suggest that WPR may not only be imitative of democracy, but also of good governance. For example, given pervasive corruption and the failure of Russia’s rulers to address the country’s many developmental challenges (Goldman 2010; Dawisha 2014), putting more women into senior bureaucratic positions has been a relatively easy way to counteract the threat to the regime emanating from poor government performance on provision of public goods and widespread corruption (Johnson 2016).³ Indeed, when discussing the roles reserved for women in Russian politics, Johnson (2016) clearly positions the roles of “political cleaners” and “workhorses” within the bureaucratic arena. While several women were appointed as regional chief executives when dissatisfaction with corruption was particularly high, “workhorses” tend to be promoted in areas such as child welfare, health, social welfare, or labor, where real progress for the cause of women’s interests is questionable for three main reasons. First is the regime-protecting intent of fast-tracking women to the apex of bureaucracy. Second is the deeply patriarchal outlook of their male patrons (Johnson 2016). Third, is the inadequacy (Gel’man and Starodubtsev 2016)—or at best unevenness (Nistotskaya 2014)—of administrative capacity available to those bureaucrats. Given the reasons outlined above, we expect negative relations:

H₅: In non-democracies higher women’s representation in senior bureaucratic positions will be positively associated with worse performance in women-friendly policy outcomes.

Finally, given that a few existing empirical studies (Stensöta et al. 2015; Suzuki and Avellaneda 2017) found no relationship between the increased numerical representation of women in bureaucracies and women-friendly outcomes, the null hypothesis cannot be ruled out.

H₆: In non-democratic polities the extent of women’s representation in elected office will have no effect on women-friendly policy outcomes.

DATA AND METHOD

We examine the link between WPR in elected and senior bureaucratic posts, on the one hand, and women-friendly policy outputs in the context of Russia's subnational politics on the other. Russia is an archetypical electoral autocracy with considerable variation in political and socioeconomic development between its primary administrative units (regions), set out by the asymmetry of their starting conditions and a period of genuine policy autonomy in the 1990s. Despite a decade of centralization (Petrov et al. 2014), there is still considerable policy variation between the regions, be it broader regulation of the economy or financial or primary health care policies (for an overview, see Sheiman and Shevski 2017). Further, although by 2005 all regional political regimes could be classified as autocratic, there are still substantial difference in terms of the levels of political pluralism, the strength of social society, media freedom, and intra-elite competitiveness (Golosov 2011; Saikkonen 2016). Methodologically, the subnational structure of comparison allows us to control for many factors by way of design, which increases the confidence that central mechanisms are identified.

The key explanatory variable is the percentage of seats in regional legislatures that are occupied by women MPs (provided by Russia's Statistics Service). This measure was taken at three separate points in time: 2008, 2012, and 2014. The resulting variable (WPOL) is the average of the three, ranging between 3 and 40 percent. WPR in the bureaucratic arena (WBUR) is the percentage of top managerial positions in regional bureaucracies occupied by women. This is a novel indicator, constricted by the authors, based on publicly available information from the official websites of Russia's regional governments.

Infant mortality was selected as a measure of women-friendly policy output for two main reasons. First, child welfare, education, and health are regarded as central interests of (many) women (Blahotra and Clots-Figueras 2014; Bratton and Ray 2002; Clots-Figueras 2011, 2012; Halim et al. 2016; Hicks et al. 2016; Smith 2014; Svaleryd 2009). Second, since increased WPR was found to be positively associated with a reduction in child mortality in a democratic context (Blahotra and Clots-Figueras 2014), an empirical test in the same policy area in the context of a non-democratic political system will serve as a useful reference point for future research. We employ a standard indicator for infant mortality: the number

of deaths of infants under one per 1000 live births, using figures obtained from Russia's Statistics Service for 2015.

We test the association between WPR in elected and bureaucratic posts and infant mortality under a set of standard controls, informed by relevant literature on child mortality (Blahotra and Clots-Figuera 2014; Engster and Stensöta 2011). First, to control for the powerful argument that both the outcome and explanatory variables may be functions of economic development, we employ gross regional product per capita (GRPpc, logged, 2013). Similarly, to control for the notion that the observed levels of human development and of women's representation may be determined by the trajectories of democratic development, we control for the level of democracy in 2006–2010, as measured by a composite indicator (Petrov and Titkov 2013), which has been used in numerous studies. Further, we employ the Moscow Carnegie Center's measure of corruption and a dummy REPUBLIC, as a proxy for gender norms of indigenous cultures, which may be different from those present in the Russian culture. In addition, we control for the quality of the regional human capital, measured as the share of people in employment with university-level education in 2013, and fertility rates, as proxy for women's agency in reproductive matters (2005). Appendix Table 8.2 provides descriptions and sources of variables.

RESULTS

Table 8.1 reports estimates of the conditional correlation between the shares of women in regional legislatures (WPOL) and top bureaucratic posts (WBUR), on the one hand, and infant mortality, on the other. WPOL is consistently significant at the 99 percent level across all model specifications and signed positively, as expected, meaning that higher levels of WPR in electoral politics are associated with higher levels of infant mortality. In contrast, WBUR enters as statistically not significant in all models. The data therefore provide support for H₂, positing the negative association between women in electoral posts and policy outcomes, and H₅, predicting no relationships between the increased number of women bureaucrats and women-friendly outcomes.

Regarding the control variables, the direct impact of the level of economic development (Models 3–8) and democracy (Models 4–6) is as postulated by the literature: the higher the GRPpc and the democratic

Table 8.1 Women in Russia's regional legislatures and senior bureaucratic positions, and infant mortality

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
VARIABLES							
WPOL	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.01)
WBUR		0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
LogGRPpc			-0.13*** (0.05)	-0.09** (0.04)	-0.09** (0.05)	-0.09** (0.04)	-1.11*** (0.04)
DEM				-0.09** (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	-0.07* (0.04)	1.13*** (0.06)
CORR				-0.11** (0.05)	-0.11** (0.05)	-0.08** (0.04)	-0.08** (0.04)
REPUBLIC					0.03 (0.07)	-0.12* (0.07)	-0.09 (0.06)
EDUC						-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.04)
FERTILITY						0.02*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)
WPOL*DEM							-0.01*** (0.00)
Constant	1.92*** (0.07)	1.92*** (0.09)	3.44*** (0.57)	3.58*** (0.54)	3.55*** (0.55)	2.75*** (0.50)	2.43*** (.47)
Observations	82	82	82	82	82	82	82
R-squared	0.10	0.10	0.18	0.29	0.30	0.52	0.60

Note: Standard errors in parentheses, *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

development, the lower the child mortality. At the same time, lower levels of reproductive autonomy of women (fertility rate) are associated with higher levels of infant mortality. The data fit the model reasonably well: the fully specified model, examining the independent effects of both main predictors (Model 6), explains about 60 percent of the variance in the dependent variable.

To examine the hypothesized moderating effect of democracy (H_3), we model the interaction effect between WPOL and infant mortality, conditional on the levels of democracy (Model 7). The interaction term enters statistical significance at the 99 percent level and is signed negatively, as expected. Figure 8.1 visualizes the interaction effect and provides further insight: one can observe that the improvement in a region's democracy




Fig. 8.1 Average marginal effect of WPOL on infant mortality conditional on the level of democracy

score dampens the negative effect of WPOL on infant mortality, thereby providing support to H_3 .

Overall, the results of the analysis suggest that in the context of electoral authoritarianism higher numbers of women in electoral politics lead on average to inferior policy outcomes related to women's interests. At the same time, democracy works as a moderating factor for this association: in more democratic regions the negative relationship between a higher number of women politicians and infant mortality is weakened. In other words, even in the overall context of electoral authoritarianism, democratic affordances of regional political regimes play an important role in the enhancement of women's welfare. When it comes to WPR in the bureaucratic arena, neither of the directional hypotheses (H_4 or H_5) is empirically substantiated; instead, the data provide support for the null hypothesis (H_6).

CONCLUSION

This chapter set out to address a large gap in the literature on gender and politics on the relationship between WPR and women-friendly policy outcomes in non-democracies. Building on the insights from the literature on electoral authoritarianism and on gender and informal institutions, we argued that the emasculation of formal democratic institutions and their replacement with informal rules of the game that are set and enforced by male-dominated elites would rule out the expectation of a positive link between WPR and women-friendly policy outcomes. Conceptualized as an item on a menu of manipulations, higher WPR in non-democracies is considered imitative of representativeness and accountability, which forfeits the “democratic advantage” of human development (the null hypothesis). At the same time, women are “boxed in” to roles that suit the needs of the regime and are tightly controlled in their “boxes” by their male patrons. This deprives women politicians of genuine autonomy, reducing them to the “yes-men” of their (often paternalistic) patrons, which makes a proposition of the negative association plausible.

With regard to the bureaucratic arena, we argued that both directional hypotheses are conceivable. The positive association is theorized in terms of a firewall, arising from higher formalization of bureaucratic structures, that may isolate public managers—men and women in democracies or autocracies—from undue influence of individual politicians. However, the fundamental problems with administrative capacity cannot be solved by the increased number of “femocrats,” pointing to a likely negative association. Finally, WPR may not only be imitative of democracy, but also of good governance. Pervasive corruption and the failure of many authoritarian rulers to address developmental challenges faced by their countries make women’s promotion to senior bureaucratic positions a relatively cheap way to counteract threats to the regime emanating from these problems. Johnson’s (2016) account of contemporary Russia, where senior women bureaucrats function as “cleaners” of corruption and “work-horses” in the care areas suggests that the original intent of women’s promotion to the top of the bureaucracy may not be to address women’s interests, but to mitigate threats to the regime and pacify female voters. Real progress for the cause of women’s interests is particularly questionable when the values of their patrons are patriarchal and the resources their positions command are limited.

We formulated a set of testable propositions and empirically probed them in the context of a large electoral autocracy. Using a novel dataset of the eighty subnational political units of the Russian Federation, we showed that, in Russia, higher WPR in electoral and bureaucratic arenas clearly has no advantage to outcomes that women care about. While higher WPR in electoral politics is robustly associated with higher infant mortality, higher numbers of women in senior administrative positions appears to have no effect on the outcome in question. The interaction term analysis provides additional insight by revealing that the improvement in regions' democracy scores reduces the negative effect of WPOL on infant mortality; this is congruent with the literature on the moderating effect of democratic accountability (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017).

Although the theoretical framework employed implies that the causal arrow runs from WPR to infant mortality, the cross-sectional nature of our data does not allow us to rule out reverse causality, which is a considerable limitation of this study. We are also mindful of the omnipresent risk of omitted variable bias, which constitutes the second limitation of this iteration of the analysis. Improved breadth and depth of data on WPR would be the ideal strategy to overcome these limitations.

Our findings speak to a growing literature on the substantive effects of WPR. We contribute to this literature by providing a novel theoretical account of the association between increased WPR and women-friendly policy outcomes in non-democracies and the first large-N empirical assessment of the postulated relationships in the context of electoral authoritarianism. Testing our hypotheses in different types of autocracies would help to evaluate the robustness and generalizability of our findings and to further nuance the theory.

A tentative policy message of this research is that an ever-present normative pressure for higher women's participation may lead in some political settings of the globalized world to the veneer of representation, accountability, and good governance, which, as our research indicates, can adversely influence women-friendly policy outcomes. At the same time, the nature of the moderating effect of subnational democracy, observed in context of an increasingly authoritarian character of the national political regime, points to a likely source of changes leading to the realization of women's interests.

APPENDIX

Table 8.2 Description and sources of variables**Dependent Variables**

Infant mortality: the number of deaths of infants under one year old per 1000 live births, log transformed. Year: 2015. Source: Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation (FSSS).

Independent Variables

WPOL: percentage of seats in regional legislatures occupied by women. Year: 2008, 2012, 2014, averaged. Source: FSSS.

WBUR: ratio of women to the number of senior managerial positions in the regional administrations. Senior managerial positions are heads of the structural units of the regional executives, excluding governors and vice-governors. For the purpose of this chapter, they are considered as political positions. Year: 2014. Source: authors, constructed from the official websites of the regional governments.

Control Variables

GRPpc: gross regional product per capital (log transformed). Year: 2013. Source: FSSS.

EDUC: Share of employed with higher education, percentage. Year: 2013. Source: FSSS.

DEM: a composite index of democracy, based on expert assessments of the following: fairness of elections, political pluralism, strength of civil society, and freedom of media. Year: 2006–2010, averaged. Source: Petrov and Titkov (2013).

CORR: expert assessment of the extent of crony capitalism, corruption scandals, and the effectiveness of the anti-corruption measures (higher values—lower corruption). Year: 2006–2010, averaged. Source: Petrov and Titkov (2013).

REPUBLIC: a dummy variable, capturing whether the constituent unit of the Russian Federation is an ordinary region or a republic; the latter are the historical territories of certain indigenous ethnic groups, which in the Soviet and post-Soviet past, but not currently, enjoyed certain constitutionally guaranteed political autonomies. In the majority (but not all) of these entities indigenous ethnic groups constitute the majority of the population.

NOTES

1. This project has received funding from the Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (agent agreement SG014–1147:1).
2. In comparison, in the United States, a country with twice the population of Russia, this figure stands at about 1000 a year (Nechepurenko 2017).
3. While Russia's regional bureaucracies employ a non-trivial number of women in bureaucratic posts that wield policymaking powers (in 2008–2016 about 70 percent of such posts in regional governments were occupied by women (FSSS 2017)), they used to be “concentrated at the bottom

of the administrative ladder” and men tended to occupy the most senior posts (Brym and Gimpelson 2004, p. 102). A purposeful drive to recruit women to politics that has been seen in Putin’s Russia since about the mid-2000s has also touched upon senior bureaucratic positions. Our original data on the number of women in senior bureaucratic positions across Russia’s regions in 2014 shows that on average about a quarter of the most senior bureaucratic posts were occupied by women. This ranges from no women at all to almost 55 percent of such posts.

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PART IV

Gender, Change, and Corruption



Does Gender Matter? Female Politicians' Engagement in Anti-corruption Efforts

Amy C. Alexander and Andreas Bågenholm

A growing body of evidence links gender inequality and corruption. Evidence from across the globe reveals a rather robust pattern: where inequality is high, corruption is likely high and vice versa (Bauhr et al. 2017; Branisa and Ziegler 2010; Bjarnegård 2013; Dollar et al. 2001; Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017a; Goetz 2007; Jha and Sarangi 2015; Sung 2003; Swamy et al. 2001; Sundström and Wängnerud 2016; Vijayalakshmi 2008; World Bank 2001). By far the largest evidence base for evaluating this link comes from studies of women's inclusion in elected political office. Indeed, Stensöta et al. (2015) note that it is particularly in analysis focusing on the electoral arena that the expected effects of gender inequality most consistently appear. The bulk of these studies focus on the relationship between women's presence in national legislatures and countries' levels of corruption (Bjarnegård 2013; Dollar et al. 2001; Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017a; Jha and Sarangi 2015; Sung 2003; Swamy et al. 2001).

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While these studies typically find a robust link between women's presence in legislatures and levels of corruption (see, however, Sung 2003), theory and evidence is profoundly contested, especially as concerns as to *how* women's inclusion in political office leads to lower levels of corruption. A key omission in approaches to evaluating this link seriously stag-nates progress on this front. To our knowledge, not a single study employs an empirical strategy that evaluates women's variation from men in engagement with corruption opportunities or in support and develop-ment of anti-corruption policies. This creates a rather large "black box" in terms of what action women actually take to combat corruption as politi-cal office-holders or public authorities, relative to men. Yet, establishing that evidence or lack thereof is crucial to greater scholarly consensus on the existence of the gender inequality/corruption link and underlying mechanisms.

The theoretical section of the chapter maps the general theory and evi-dence of the gender inequality and corruption link and then turns to the more specific work on women in political office. This section concludes with a discussion of the lack of research on what action women actually take as political office-holders or public authorities to combat corruption relative to men. In the empirical section, we focus on the extent to which female party leaders in Europe and presidential candidates in Latin America politicize corruption in electoral campaigns in comparison to their male counterparts. The results show that even though female candidates may politicize corruption more frequently, they rarely make it into positions of power.

THEORY

Mapping the General Link: Gender Inequality and Corruption in the Literature

A recent and growing body of evidence links gender inequality and cor-ruption. Evidence from across the globe reveals a rather robust pattern: where inequality is high, corruption is likely high and vice versa (Branisa and Ziegler 2010; Bjarnegård 2013; Dollar et al. 2001; Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017a; Goetz 2007; Jha and Sarangi 2015; Sung 2003; Swamy et al. 2001; Sundström and Wängnerud 2016; Vijayalakshmi 2008; World Bank 2001). While there seems to be consen-sus *that* the two are linked, *how* remains contested.

First, scholars present conflicting evidence as to the causal direction of the relationship (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017b). Some research supports a direction running from corruption to gender inequality; corruption creates conditions favoring male dominance and resource exploitation that disproportionately harm women and girls and almost exclusively privilege men (Bjarnegård 2013; Sundström and Wängnerud 2016). Other research supports a direction running from gender equality to lower corruption (Alexander and Ravlik 2015; Dollar et al. 2001; Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017a; Jha and Sarangi 2015; Swamy et al. 2001). Here we see the evidence fracture even further, particularly in terms of the support for the mechanisms through which higher gender equality might lower corruption (Rothstein and Tannenbergh 2015).

One strand of research suggests that gender equality socializes norms of impartiality that support a culture of anti-corruption (see Chap. 2 in this volume). A second strand sees a more direct implication for women's inclusion, conceiving of women as agents that are more likely to directly or indirectly combat corruption (Alexander and Ravlik 2015; Dollar et al. 2001; Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017a; Goetz 2007; Jha and Sarangi 2015; Rothstein and Tannenbergh 2015; Swamy et al. 2001). In support of women as direct challengers, some research looks to differences in gendered socialization that vary male and female predispositions to engage in corrupt behavior, such as risk and risk aversion or selfishness and care (Dollar et al. 2001; Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017a; Rothstein and Tannenbergh 2015; Swamy et al. 2001). Other research looks to the widespread marginalization of women from decision-making power, whether in politics or the economy. From this perspective, women's rather universal experience of marginalization from power insulates them from abusive power rings, which increase their ability both to avoid and criticize such corrupt behavior (Goetz 2007; Branisa and Ziegler 2010; Rothstein and Tannenbergh 2015; Vijayalakshmi 2008).

In addition to assumptions that women are likely to directly challenge corruption, research also considers action women potentially take that indirectly combats corruption. This research points to what has been conceptualized as *the women's interest mechanism* (Alexander and Ravlik 2015). Here, research suggests that women's increased support of policies that improve conditions for women and girls leads to improved monitoring and delivery of public services, which, in turn, lowers corruption

(Alexander and Ravlik 2015; Jha and Sarangi 2015; Rothstein and Tannenbergh 2015).

Among research that considers a link between gender inequality and corruption, an additional theoretical nuance is raised by some scholars. Some studies find that the link between gender inequality and corruption is conditional on the larger context in which various actors operate. One strand of literature suggests this is conditional on the type of institutions considered (Stensöta et al. 2015). There is some evidence that while the link is present in electoral institutions, like national legislatures, this does not appear to be the case in public service institutions. Another strand of literature, introduces the importance of effective institutions for holding people accountable, like a free press (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017a). Here there is evidence that the link between gender inequality and corruption is present only in countries where levels of accountability are relatively high. A final strand of literature suggests that establishing the link may be conditional on the type of social sector. One study finds a strong link in the political sector with women's inclusion in political office, but not in the economic sector with their inclusion in the labor force (Jha and Sarangi 2015).

Finally, one additional area of contestation raises the issue of spuriousness by questioning whether the observed link between gender inequality and corruption is real or is caused by a third factor (Sung 2003). Some evidence suggests that a fairer system may be behind both and that the link is thereby spurious (Fig. 9.1).

Mapping the Link Among Elected Political Office-Holders

By far the largest evidence base for evaluating the link between gender inequality and corruption comes from studies of women's inclusion in elected political office. Indeed, Stensöta et al. (2015) note that it is particularly in analysis focusing on the electoral arena that the expected effects of gender inequality most consistently appear. The bulk of these studies focus on the relationship between women's presence in national legislatures and countries' levels of corruption (Bjarnegård 2013; Dollar et al. 2001; Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017a; Jha and Sarangi 2015; Sung 2003; Swamy et al. 2001), although a few studies also examine the link at the subnational level (Bauhr et al. 2017; Sundström and Wängnerud 2016). While these studies typically find a robust link




Fig. 9.1 The gender inequality/corruption link: Summarizing contested theory in the literature

between women's presence in legislatures and levels of corruption (see, however, Sung 2003), particularly in democratic states (Esarey and Chirillo 2013), theory and evidence is similarly contested.

In terms of causal direction, the majority of studies support the inclusion of women in political office as a cause rather than an effect of lower corruption (Dollar et al. 2001; Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017a; Jha and Sarangi 2015; Swamy et al. 2001), however, studies by Bjarnegård (2013) and Sundström and Wängnerud (2016) suggest that the direction may run from corruption to women's exclusion from elected office. While the evidence leans towards an effect running from women's inclusion to lower corruption, more nuanced tests of whether this is conditional on particular contexts and the mechanisms through which women's inclusion has an impact are just beginning to emerge.

A key, recent study takes the field further on both fronts. Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2017a) find that the effect of a higher presence of women in national legislatures on lower corruption is conditional on countries' overall level of laws holding people accountable. In short, women's presence matters only among nations scoring high in accountability. They lodge this explanation in more general theories of gender differences in risk acceptance and risk aversion. Noting a large evidence base that women tend to be more risk averse, they posit that women's greater inclusion in legislatures curbs corruption only in settings where engaging in such behavior is particularly risky. Where corruption is unchecked due to a lack of accountability mechanisms, women are just as likely to engage.

This is a positive step forward. First, Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2017a) raise the more complicated issue of contextual conditionality; more general theories of the gender inequality/corruption link may play out differently in different settings. Second, where they do evidence a link, they offer support for one of the proposed theoretical mechanisms on how gender equality lowers corruption: female legislators directly challenge corrupt behavior by not engaging in it. Third, to explain why this is conditional on levels of accountability, they interpret the evidence to support one of the proposed theoretical mechanisms on why we might expect women to challenge corruption compared to men: gendered socialization makes female legislators more risk averse than men.

This is by far one of the most theoretically comprehensive and methodologically sophisticated studies on the link between women's holding political office and corruption. However, even this evidence simply

scratches the surface of a more definitive understanding of *how* women's presence in legislatures leads to lower levels of corruption. Like other studies of this kind, we are left with a rather large "black box" in terms of what action women actually take as legislators relative to men to combat corruption. Indeed, in later research, Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer also call for more evidence of this kind, which would allow the field to more directly determine "why, when and how much women's representation changes corruption" (2017b, p. 28).

As far as we can tell, this is a problem that plagues the evidence base not only for elected political office-holders but also for political office holders. To our knowledge, not a single study employs an empirical strategy that focuses on evidence that female office-holders systematically vary from men in engagement with corruption opportunities or in support and development of anti-corruption policies. Yet, we consider establishing that evidence or lack thereof crucial to greater scholarly consensus on the existence of the gender inequality/corruption link and underlying mechanisms.

Opening the Black Box to Overcome Two Critical Problems with Previous Research

We have identified two more concrete problems with the previous research that our new turn in evidence and analysis will help overcome.

First and touched upon above, so far research in this field tries to explain why women's presence in legislatures may lead to lower levels of corruption without exploring whether female legislators actually do engage more actively against corruption than their male counterparts. This creates the following problems. One, having this matching individual-level evidence would significantly stack the cards against reverse causality. It becomes more difficult to suggest that the arrow runs from lower corruption to women's inclusion in the face of widespread evidence of women's abstention from corruption and support of anti-corruption policies when compared to men. Two, without the individual-level evidence, current research makes inferences about individual female legislators by deducing from statistics that describe the group. Such an inferential strategy runs the risk of an ecological fallacy. Committing such fallacies is particularly likely in inferring from the group effect that individual women directly combat corruption as opposed to indirectly combat corruption or vice versa. Since plausible theories support both expectations, this is a serious issue, one

definitively overcome *only* by looking at what women actually do. Three, contextual conditionalities might give us some leverage in inferring individual-level mechanisms from the macro-level data (as in Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer (2017a)). However, the likelihood of error through such complicated modeling techniques is high. With amassed individual-level data, sorting out mechanisms behind women as corruption challengers such as gendered socialization or power marginalization is accomplished by simpler, more reliable, tests. For instance, individual-level data such as survey data can be used to test whether differences in gendered socialization explain any gender gaps in challenging corruption. Or, individual-level data such as that which traces the background experiences and pathways to power of women who actively challenge corruption could give us an insight into the extent to which they are relatively marginalized from power, how, and if this is a source of their anti-corruption efforts. Four, greater nuance in understanding the mechanisms behind women's inclusion and lower corruption opens up individual-level evidence. For instance, the literature is imprecise on whether women directly challenge corruption, and if they do this either passively by avoiding the behavior, actively by supporting anti-corruption policies, whistle blowing, or both. Teasing this out is only possible with individual-level data.

Second, there are reasons for considering female legislative representation a rather weak proxy when it comes to understanding the relationship between women's inclusion in political decision-making more generally and levels of corruption. We know from the literature that corruption spans societal levels; it is both petty and grand, and plagues not only the input side of politics but also the output side. In much of the literature on the link between women's political office-holding and corruption, the corruption measures proxy such widespread corruption outcomes, yet, the women's inclusion measure is reduced to their presence in various legislatures. We can put this limitation into perspective by focusing on what we might typically expect in terms of the influence of an ordinary MP. As an MP, the potential to actually influence policies is rather small, particularly if you are challenging strong elite interests. Naturally, MPs belonging to large and/or incumbent parties will have more say than those belonging to small opposition parties, but it is still difficult to see how an increase from, let's say, 20 to 35 percent of women would make much of a difference in terms of the impact on anti-corruption efforts and, in the end, on the level of corruption. Moreover, being newly elected and hence inexperienced

makes this impact even less likely. There is also quite a wide variation in parliamentary influence among democracies, which implies that the increase in female representation in countries with weak parliaments can hardly be the reason behind lower levels of corruption. In sum, there is clearly a need to focus on other more influential positions and to be more sensitive to the different political contexts to spot the positions from which corruption could be influenced. The more expansive view on women's inclusion across various arenas of political decision making would thus give the women's inclusion thesis more empirical leverage. In the sections that follow, we describe our research strategy, data and methods and present and discuss the results of the analysis.

RESEARCH STRATEGY, METHODS AND DATA

As discussed above, to test whether female politicians have a direct impact on the level of corruption, one needs to identify the positions from which they may actually influence anti-corruption policies, which eventually may lead to reduced levels of corruption. We have identified seven such positions, but there are probably more.

It is a reasonable assumption that the more power there is to a position, the more potential and greater likelihood there is for a direct impact on policy change. First, executives or heads of governments, presidents in presidential systems and prime ministers in parliamentary systems, are naturally the most influential positions, even though most systems impose some more or less severe constraints in terms of veto players. The executives decide on the policy priorities and have the overall responsibility for implementation and intended outcomes. Second, ministers or cabinet members in charge of relevant policy areas also have a potentially strong position for influencing policy at different stages in the process (i.e., proposing, drafting and implementing legislation). Third, Members of Parliament are, as discussed above, less powerful, but their influence may vary depending on a number of factors, such as position in committees, party size and incumbency. They may propose legislation and, depending on the parliamentary situation, also draft legislation in committees. Fourth, and slightly outside the realm of politics, heads of important agencies relevant for anti-corruption advocacy may influence policies in this area by informally proposing legislation, as well as being involved in the drafting, most importantly the implementation of legislation. Fifth,

and more indirectly, party leaders may put pressure on the government to act by politicizing an issue (e.g., in election campaigns or in parliamentary or public debates). This could be accomplished by simply pointing out that the government is not doing enough or by accusing the government of being corrupt themselves. Sixth, under similar lines of reasoning, we are likely to see corruption politicized by candidates for public offices such as an MP or president. Finally, seventh, and outside politics, leaders of civil society organizations potentially have influence in raising the popular awareness of corruption through organizing campaigns, rallies and demonstrations.

In this chapter we focus on two types of positions, presidential candidates in Latin America and party leaders in Europe. In the first instance (presidential candidates), we examine all presidential election campaigns in Latin America since 2000 comparing the extent of politicization of corruption between male and female candidates.¹ In the second instance, we study the parliamentary election campaigns in Europe since 1990 in order to see whether parties led by women tend to campaign on corruption more frequently than male-led parties.² Considering the above critique of previous research, we admit that these are preliminary and therefore limited analyses. Nevertheless, these indicators, although far from sufficient, give us some important early insights into how female politicians or would-be politicians differ from their male colleagues. If women were more inclined to fight corruption and have a direct impact on the corruption levels, one would expect female candidates and party leaders to bring up the issue more often than men in election campaigns.

Data

The information on the politicization of corruption has been collected from election reports in three political science journals: *Electoral Studies* 1990–2015, *West European Politics* 1990–2015 and the *European Journal of Political Research* 1992–2015. For Latin America, only *Electoral Studies* and Wikipedia, have been used. For Europe, three additional sources have been used: European Parties Elections & Referendums Network (EPERN), Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) and *The Economist*. Even though the election reports have a common structure (background, electoral system, the contending parties, the electoral campaign, the results and the out-

come), the contents and extent of the sections vary. There is certainly a risk that the issue of anti-corruption has been underreported, particularly if the issue was not central in the campaign and/or advocated by peripheral parties. There may be an obvious risk, however, that smaller parties and marginal candidates are not taken into account in these reports. Since these are often women, this runs the risk that women's anti-corruption engagement may go unnoticed. Our strategy has been to use several sources for each election to detect as many instances of politicization of corruption as possible; but even if some instances were not included in the reports, one can assume that those candidates also attracted very little attention and thus had little impact on the rest of the candidates, let alone on levels of corruption.

The electoral reports have been coded in terms of whether any party or candidate used anti-corruption rhetoric (i.e., referring to the need to fight corruption in more general terms) and/or corruption allegations against other parties during the election campaign, and who the party leader was at the time of the election.

As mentioned above, this study is a first attempt to look at what female politicians actually do and say regarding corruption, which makes a novel contribution to the literature. With that said, this strategy has many shortcomings. The politicization of corruption is not the same as influencing anti-corruption legislation, let alone reducing the level of corruption. We argue, however, that such ambitions should be considered a likely precondition. If no such ambition is even visible at the campaign stage, it seems unlikely that those issues will be prioritized once in office. One shortcoming with looking only at party leaders is that women may influence the policy priorities of their party, without being the leader; this implies that male-led parties that politicize corruption may do so due to strong female pressure. Such potential routes of influence are very hard to detect and, for now, our measure will have to suffice. Another problem is the low number of female party leaders and candidates in high-corruption countries, which is where corruption is most frequently politicized. Moreover, in relatively non-corrupt countries, the share of female party leaders is higher, but corruption is rarely politicized in low-corrupt contexts (see Bågenholm and Charron 2014). Again, this makes it difficult to know if the absence of female politicization is due to the lack of need or demand for anti-corruption policies.

RESULTS

In this section we will present our results, first on the extent to which female presidential candidates in Latin America politicized the issue of corruption in election campaigns compared to their male contenders. Second, we look at European parliamentary elections and examine whether parties with female leaders politicized corruption more often than parties with male leaders.

Politicizing Corruption in Latin America

Our first indicator of female politicians' engagement against corruption comes from presidential election campaigns in Latin America from 2000 to 2014. As shown in Table 9.1, sixty-one elections were held in the seventeen countries covered, of which forty-seven were reported in *Electoral Studies*; information on corruption was found on Wikipedia in an additional two instances. Of the 461 candidates participating in those elections, fifty-one (11.1%) were women.³ Chile has the highest percentage (26%), whereas no female candidates participated in El Salvador, Nicaragua and Uruguay. In twenty-five of the forty-nine elections covered by *Electoral Studies* and Wikipedia (i.e., roughly 50%), corruption was reported to be an issue: Uruguay, Chile and El Salvador are the only countries where it never occurred. The number of candidates that politicized corruption was larger, however, since many candidates might have campaigned on that issue in the same election. About 9 percent of all candidates politicize corruption but, as is shown in Table 9.2, female candidates are more than twice as likely to campaign on corruption as their male counterparts. Almost 18 percent of all female candidates have politicized corruption compared to only 8 percent of the men. Even though female candidates only make up 11 percent of the sample, they are responsible for 21 percent of the instances of politicization, whereas the male figures are the reverse: 89 and 79 percent respectively. Women are thus clearly over-represented in terms of voicing the issue of corruption in election campaigns and probably even more so, as all nine (all male) candidates in the Guatemalan election in 2003 were said to stress the issue of corruption, driving the male share up substantially.

Brazil and Argentina have the highest number of women who politicized corruption (3 and 2 times respectively). In Mexico, Peru, Colombia and Bolivia it happened once.

Table 9.1 Politicization of corruption in Latin American presidential elections 2000–2014

<i>Country</i>	<i>Number of elections (covered by ES)</i>	<i>Total number of candidates</i>	<i>Total number of female candidates (%)</i>	<i>Instances of politicization by men/women (%)</i>
Mexico	3 (3)	15	2 (13.3)	1/1 (7.7/50.0)
El Salvador	3 (1)	11	0 (0)	0/0
Guatemala	4 (2)	49	6 (12.4)	10/0 (23.3/0)
Honduras	4 (4)	23	1 (4.3)	3/0 (13.6/0)
Costa Rica	4 (4)	41	2 (4.9)	5/0 (12.8/0)
Panama	3 (1)	14	1 (7.1)	1/0 (7.7/0)
Nicaragua	3 (3)	13	0 (0)	2/0 (15.4/0)
Colombia	4 (3)	32	5 (15.6)	1/1 (3.7/20.0)
Ecuador	4 (3)	40	4 (10.0)	2/0 (5.6/0)
Peru	4 (4)	47	6 (12.8)	4/1 (9.8/16.7)
Bolivia	4 (4)	32	1 (3.1)	0/1 (0/100.0)
Chile	4 (4)	23	6 (26.1)	0/0
Argentina	3 (1)	32	7 (21.9)	0/2 (0/28.6)
Uruguay	3 (3)	20	0 (0)	0/0
Paraguay	3 (2)	27	3 (11.1)	2/0 (8.3/0)
Brazil	4 (3)	33	7 (21.2)	1/3 (3.8/42.9)
Venezuela	4 (2)	9 ^a	0 (0)	1/0 (11.1/0)
Total	61 (47)^b	461	51 (11.1)	33/9 (8.0/17.6)

Sources: *Electoral studies* election reports and Wikipedia

Note:

^aThe actual number of candidates in Venezuela was twenty-nine, but in all but one of the elections the top two candidates won more than 99 percent of the vote, which makes the rest irrelevant

^bWikipedia has been used to complement *Electoral Studies*. In two cases where *ES* reports have been missing, politicization has been reported by Wikipedia. In an additional six cases, *ES* reports existed but did not mention any politicization of corruption

Table 9.2 Comparing male and female presidential candidates' share of politicization of corruption in Latin America 2000–2014

	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>All</i>
Share of candidates	88.9 (410)	11.1 (51)	461
Share of instances of politicization	78.6 (33)	21.4 (9)	42
Share of candidates that politicized corruption	8.0	17.6	

The female candidates have been quite successful in terms of outcomes. In seven instances, female candidates won (Chinchilla in Costa Rica, Kirchner twice in Argentina, Rousseff twice in Brazil and Bachelet twice in Chile) and in another five they have been top three. It also seems that an anti-corruption ticket has paid off. The average vote share for the female candidates who politicized corruption is 13.4, compared to 8.1 for all fifty-one, despite the fact that none of the winning candidates politicized corruption in their campaigns. The best results were achieved by Elisa Carrió, the runner up in Argentina in 2007, who won 25 percent of the vote. An additional four female anti-corruption candidates came in third and only two received less than 5 percent of the votes. Even though none of the female anti-corruption candidates won any of the races it cannot be excluded that the good performance in general for female anti-corruption candidates may have put indirect pressure on the government. Whether or not that is the case remains to be seen, however; more evidence is obviously needed to substantiate this. However, it should suffice to say that female politicians seem to have a considerably higher interest in fighting corruption than their male counterparts and have also been quite successful electorally in relation to their small number. The more corruption is politicized the more likely it is that voters will start to care and either vote for those candidates or demand sincere reforms from the established political elites.

Politicizing Corruption in Europe

Politicizing corruption has been an increasingly frequent phenomenon in European parliamentary election campaigns, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, where the problems of corruption are generally much more severe (see Bågenholm and Charron 2014, p. 913). In Western Europe, which is relatively well-off in this respect, anti-corruption rhetoric is rarely voiced during election campaigns. This means that corruption is most often politicized in countries where female involvement in politics is fairly limited.

In this section, we focus on female leadership, namely the extent to which female party leaders politicize corruption more frequently than their male counterparts. One hundred and forty-four parties led by women contested a total of 204 parliamentary elections in thirty-one democratic countries between 1990 and 2015. In comparison, parties led by men

have competed 1199 times. The average share of female party leaders is thus a mere 10 percent, although the trend is increasing. There is also wide country variation: Norway is by far the most equal country in this respect, with 43 percent of female party leaders on average on Election Day,⁴ followed by Sweden, a distant second with 26 percent. At the other end of the scale, there are five countries (Estonia, Malta, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia) where no female party leaders have contested an election (see Fig. 9.2).




Fig. 9.2 Average share (%) of female party leaders in Europe 1990–2015 (Note: Only party leaders at the time of an election have been included and only parties that either had representation before the election or which gained it afterwards. Source: Wikipedia)

In sixty-two of the 204 elections analyzed (i.e., 30%) corruption has been politicized. The total number of specific instances of politicization is 115, which implies that several parties campaigned on corruption in the same election. As expected, considering the limited number of female party leaders, there were very few cases where such parties campaigned on corruption. Only on six occasions, or around 5 percent of all instances of politicization, has that happened: twice in Austria (1999 and 2013) and once in Lithuania (2004), Hungary (2006), Slovakia (2010) and Croatia (2011), respectively. In 95 percent of the cases, corruption has thus been politicized by parties led by men. The share of male and female party leaders who politicize corruption is also clearly in favor of the men: 9 percent of all male party leaders have politicized corruption, whereas only 4 percent of the female party leaders have done so. In contrast to the Latin American cases above, it would seem that female politicians in Europe are less likely than men to engage against corruption. The comparison is not totally fair, however, as the countries with the most problems with corruption and hence the highest frequency of politicization, also happen to be the countries where women are poorly represented at the top level. In countries where corruption is a frequent electoral issue, it seems that women are at least as engaged in fighting corruption as men. In the thirteen Central and East European countries in the sample, the share of female party leaders is only 4.3 percent and of these twenty-two leaders, four politicized corruption (i.e., 18%). The corresponding figure for men is 13.3 percent. The underrepresentation of women party leaders thus changes into an overrepresentation when focusing on the most corrupt countries in Europe.

It is worth noting, however, that all “anti-corruption parties” with female leaders were established parties, which had, as their main focus, issues other than corruption. The very successful new anti-corruption parties, typically established by non-politicians and with anti-corruption as their single or at least most important issue, have, in contrast, all been created and led by men. There are thirty such examples, of which many made it all the way to the government and even to the office of prime minister (see Bågenholm 2013). So, even if female party leaders are at least almost as likely to politicize corruption in those countries where that happened, it seems that female party entrepreneurship concerning anti-corruption is very limited or, so far, actually non-existent. That may, again, be due to the fact that female leaders are rare in Central and Eastern Europe, where the phenomenon of successful new anti-corruption parties are the most common.

Looking more closely at the six “cases,” three of the female party leaders were politically peripheral figures, whereas three of them had governmental experience. Jadranka Kosor was the Croatian Prime Minister in 2011, but she lost the election. Presumably, this was because voters cared more about the declining economy than anti-corruption efforts. In Lithuania, Kazimiera Prunskienė became Minister of Agriculture following the election in 2004 and in Slovakia Iveta Radicova obtained the position of prime minister in 2010, a position she held for two years. There are no indications that any of them or made an effort to fight corruption during their terms in office. We can conclude this brief section by saying that it is quite unlikely that the limited female engagement against corruption has had any major impact on the levels of corruption more generally and that the cases are too few to suggest that women have effectively pressured their male counterparts to engage more actively in curbing corruption.

CONCLUSION

To sum up our findings, we can conclude that female politicians seem to be just as keen or even keener on fighting corruption than their male counterparts, at least when it comes to campaign promises. That finding is more pronounced among presidential candidates in Latin America than among political party leaders in Europe, where women, on average, are slightly underrepresented in politicizing corruption. However, when looking at the most corrupt countries, only parties with female leaders are more likely than male-led parties to politicize corruption. Hence, there are indications that female involvement in politics actually increases the awareness and salience of corruption, which is a necessary precondition for voter accountability and eventually cleaner governments. It is also important to stress the gulf between politicizing corruption and actually curbing it. Very few of the most ardent corruption fighters are anywhere near positions from which they potentially can influence anti-corruption policies in a positive direction.

Thus, our findings suggest that there is little evidence of a direct link between female involvement in politics and greater anti-corruption efforts that result in lower levels of corruption. Admittedly, the lack of substantive positive results in terms of corruption may be explained by the fact that it is especially difficult for women to win representation in the countries in most need of anti-corruption measures, due to a combination of low gender equality, clientelism, and lack of democracy, which is used to hinder opposition and, in particular, those who threaten the privilege of the elite.

This chapter is just a first attempt to peak into the “black box.” Future research should focus on the concrete actions and accomplishments of female politicians and preferably by looking at executive positions from which women may influence anti-corruption legislation directly.

NOTES

1. The countries included are Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay.
2. Included here are thirty-one countries with a population above 100,000 that have been considered Free by Freedom House, as the correlation between female parliamentary representation and level of corruption only exists among democracies. The Central and East European countries are thus included from 1990, except for Romania, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, which enter the analysis in 1996, 2003, 2006 and 2009, respectively.
3. In Venezuela the two major parties won more than 99 percent of the votes; so far, none of those candidates have been women. In addition, a large number of candidates take part, but they are not counted here as their votes shares are extremely small.
4. Only party leaders at the time of an election has been included and only for parties that were represented in parliament before or after that election. Thus, non-parliamentary parties are not counted.

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Gender and Corruption in Mexico: Building a Theory of Conditioned Causality

Marcia Grimes and Lena Wängnerud

Despite significant legal and institutional advancements in recent decades, corruption continues to undermine efficiency and impartiality in government operations in Mexico. The nature and extent of corruption, as well as variations within the country for example between agencies and among local and state level governments have received attention both in policy and academic research (cf. Morris 2005, 2009). What has to date gone unexplored in Mexico is precisely the link between women's representation and corruption, widely identified elsewhere. This chapter builds on panel data from a biennial household survey capturing experiences of corruption at various levels of government, which allows for a nuanced examination of the link, both (i) whether the presence of corruption adversely affects women's entry into politics, and (ii) whether women, once elected, affect the prevalence of corruption.

The case of Mexico both adds to the mounting correlational evidence linking women's representation to the prevalence of corruption in a political system, but also suggests new theoretical insights regarding the possible

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mechanisms at work. More precisely, the chapter points to specific *concomitant conditions* we argue are necessary for positive developments to ensue, and especially in contexts in which corruption has been highly prevalent. Briefly, this study suggests that the impetus for women's entry into politics is often exogenous to political organizations and therefore, once successful, may disrupt existing "modus operandi" of politics, creating a window of opportunity for subsequent change. In particular, if anti-corruption efforts concurrently figure on the policy agenda, then changes both in formal laws and informal norms related to corruption may ensue.

The issues of corruption and women's representation have converged in the Mexican political landscape in recent years, as Victoria Rodríguez (2003) documents in *Women in Contemporary Mexican Politics*. Rodríguez (pp. 221–222) describes how the organization *Mujeres en Lucha por la Democracia* (Women Fighting for Democracy), MLD, was formed in the wake of the 1988 presidential election in Mexico by a group of women who "vehemently" protested the electoral fraud. MLD launched a series of meetings throughout the country aimed at compiling the demands and proposals of Mexican women around two overarching themes: gender equality and democracy. Rodríguez (2003, p. 222) describes how MLD presented their demands to various parties and government agencies throughout the period 1994–2000. During this time period there were also attempts to organize a women's party in Mexico *Partido de la Mujer Mexicana y la Familia*; in the end the group fell short of the requirements for becoming a political party, but they raised issues of "female qualities" and linked them to good governance (Rodríguez 2003, p. 223). Women in Mexico have thus mobilized in a direct effort to redress malfeasance such as electoral fraud and to promote good governance. While noteworthy, we argue that the effect on levels of corruption from women's entry into politics may also be *indirect* and that transformations linked to this avenue are potentially more far-reaching.

Women seek to enter politics for myriad reasons, and Mexico is no exception. It is important to note that there has been significant external pressure on the established political parties to increase the number of women elected. Mexico first implemented a quota recommendation in 1993, and a law from 2000 requires all political parties to comply with a clearly articulated national quota law (Schwindt-Bayer 2010). Thus, while women may seek to enter the political realm expressly to work toward enhancing government probity, we argue that women's entry into politics may trigger a reduction in corruption even when this is not the case. We

believe that pressure from a large group of outsiders can spark processes of disruptional reflection: the specific aim of this chapter is to develop a model where strengthened norms of rule compliance play a vital role.

The empirical analyses examine corruption and female representation at the municipal level in Mexico and show that female representation is associated with reductions in levels of corruption between two survey waves (2001 and 2010), even when factors such as economic development and women's overall role in society are taken into account. The analyses also uncover evidence; however, that causation may run in the other direction as well. We thus underscore the notion that greater representation of women in government causes decreased corruption *and* that corruption in government inhibits women's entry into the political arena.

CORRUPTION AS AN OBSTACLE TO THE ELECTION OF WOMEN

Early studies showing a relationship between the proportion of women in government and national levels of corruption (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001) focused on the potential impact from the election of women on levels of corruption. Swamy et al. (2001) suggested a number of mechanisms that may be at work at the micro-level: that women may be socialized to be more honest or risk averse than men; that women, who are typically more involved in raising children may find they have to practice honesty to teach their children appropriate values; that women may feel that laws exist to protect them or, more generally, that girls may be brought up to have higher levels of self-control than boys. All these mechanisms are assumed to affect women's lower propensity to indulge in criminal behavior. These initial studies spurred a heated debate on direction of causality—what effects what—and scholars like Sung (2003, 2012) instead suggested that both good governance and gender equality are components of a country's overall political development towards liberal democracy. Goetz (2007, p. 99) has also convincingly argued that patronage networks are exclusive, giving women fewer opportunities to engage in corruption, suggesting that they are less corrupt because of circumstances, rather than inherent honesty.

A number of more recent studies substantiate Goetz's argument, documenting corruption as an obstacle to women's political participation (Bjarnegård 2013; Stockemer 2011; Sundström and Wängnerud 2016). Bjarnegård (2013) argued, based on an in-depth study in Thailand, that

women are excluded from clientelistic networks as they lack both connections within the local or national elite, and the required resources to finance corrupt activities. In a study of 167 regions in eighteen European countries, Sundström and Wängnerud (2016) confirmed an inverse relationship between levels of corruption and the proportion of women elected to local councils. Sundström and Wängnerud suggested that corruption indicates the presence of shadowy arrangements that benefit the already privileged and pose a direct obstacle to women in a number of ways. Male-dominated networks influence political parties' candidate selection. They also suggested that there is a more diffuse, indirect, signal effect derived from citizens' experiences with a broad range of government authorities; the presence of corruption is presented as a signal of "no equal treatment" that makes women, who otherwise would have stepped forward, unwilling to stand as candidates.

To conclude, a growing body of research highlights corruption as an obstacle to women's entry into politics, with exclusionary, illicit networks seen as the primary obstacle. This is consistent with insights suggesting that in any context in which corruption is moderately to highly prevalent, transforming the modus operandi from corrupt and collusive transactions to public-regarding and rule-bound behavior also involves overcoming a number of large-scale and nested collective action dilemmas (Persson et al. 2012). Mexico, a country considerably wracked by corruption, presents an interesting case as it is plausible to argue that the inclusion of women in government would, in isolation, be insufficient to trigger changes. Women who enter politics may do so merely by finding a means to enter illicit networks. Before unpacking our own argument, however, we first survey the arguments as to why the inclusion of women may affect levels of corruption.

WHY THE INCLUSION OF WOMEN MAY CURB CORRUPTION

Taking a bird's-eye view, the theoretical reasoning in scholarship linking the inclusion of women in government to lower corruption has developed along two major lines; one emphasizing a risk-aversion mechanism (Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017) and the other a women's interests mechanism (Alexander and Ravlik 2015; Jha and Sarangi 2015). The first suggests a gender difference in relation to a willingness to engage in corruption at the individual level, and that more women in office lowers corruption by merit of the fact that a larger

proportion of representatives are risk-averse and therefore disinclined to engage in corrupt acts. The second instead emphasizes that support for social developmental policies means that women representatives will be likely to push for more and better-functioning state institutions.

Although the causal chain outlined in studies proposing a women's interest mechanism is rather long, empirical evidence supporting the core ideas exists. Of special importance is the study by Watson and Moreland (2014) who used a time-series analysis of 140 countries, from 1998–2011, to analyze the relationship between women's descriptive representation—the number of female elected representatives—with citizens' perceptions of corruption. Their analysis largely confirms previous findings of a positive relationship between large numbers of women and reduced levels of corruption. What, besides the number of female elected representatives, has a positive effect in multivariate regression analyses is the substantive representation of women. This, in turn, has implications for the outcome of the political process. Watson and Moreland included measures of health expenditure and pregnancy protection as indicators of substantive representation; the analyses demonstrate that perceptions of corruption are lower in countries with higher levels of substantive representation of women. In short, Watson and Moreland suggest that women legislators focus on issues of particular interest to women citizens, such as social spending and women's rights. The passing of laws about gender issues may, especially if they are designed to protect disadvantaged groups, influence citizens' perceptions of corruption and quality of government in the broad sense. Moreover, a study from Brollo and Troiano (2016) used an objective measure of corruption based on government audits at the local level in Brazil. They showed that the probability of observing a corruption episode is between 29 and 35 percent lower in municipalities with female mayors than in those with male mayors. In addition, they were able to show that female mayors did a better job at providing public goods such as prenatal care delivery.

We find that both theorized mechanisms, risk-aversion and women's interests, while plausible, ignore compelling insights that corruption is a highly stable equilibrium not easily subject to change. Moreover, the historical record demonstrates that women entering government is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the reduction of corruption. Most established democracies attained comparatively low levels of corruption well before women began to enter political office, and countries such as Argentina and Bolivia today have comparatively high levels of female representation yet continue to evince high levels of corruption.

A THEORY ON CONDITIONED CAUSALITY

This study develops a theoretical argument regarding under what conditions female representation might be expected to curb corruption, one which also is sensitive to the evidence showing that corruption itself affects women's success in attaining political office. It therefore develops a theory of *conditioned and reciprocal causality*. The theoretical argument incorporates important insights on corruption as a phenomenon. An important explanation of the robustness of corruption is that it involves overcoming large-scale and nested collective action dilemmas. Those who engage in and benefit from corruption have strong material incentives to continue acting corruptly; moreover they have a disincentive to behave honestly if they believe that others intend to opt for self-interested strategies (Persson et al. 2012). In contrast to some other collective action dilemmas, defection in the form of engaging in corruption entails violation of the law, which can help explain why it is not only stable but also somewhat exclusionary. Engaging in corruption, even in the instances in which it may be profitable for all parties involved in the transaction, entails collusion, i.e., a degree of confidence among those involved that transgressions will not be revealed. Corruption therefore becomes a system in its own right with norms of reciprocity (regarding favors, obligations, and turning a blind eye), and is therefore a system heavily dependent on interpersonal relationships (e.g. Graham 1990; Karklins 2005; Persson et al. 2012). When corruption is conceptualized this way, rather than merely as individual-level non-compliance with rules and policies, it becomes clear why entry into the political realm is less a matter of merit or promoting the most qualified candidates, and more the function of patronistic exchange, social networks and linkages (Bjarnegård 2013; Goetz 2007; Stockemer 2011).

Unequal access to political power also constitutes a stable state not readily subject to change. Corruption and gender inequality may thus intersect and reinforce one another via mechanisms of exclusion and collusion within the sphere of political power. Even highly stable equilibria are subject to disruption given sufficient pressure for change, however, and disruption on one front may allow for the simultaneous disruption of other subsystems in an organization. Recent decades have seen a global push for increasing the number of women in elected office. However, research shows that pressure from international organizations like the United Nations is not enough to spark change; in most cases there is a need for additional pressure, most often from national women's movements that put pressure on political parties to recruit women in large numbers.¹

We argue that the inclusion of women may open up a window of opportunity for further changes on myriad fronts, including changing norms of corruption. More precisely, we therefore suggest that the entry of women into politics is likely to reduce corruption *if there is a contemporaneous pressure for this specific change in the political arena and society more broadly*. How then might an influx of women into the political arena dovetail with—and enhance—the impact of an anti-corruption policy agenda? We propose that several mechanisms may come into play:

First, when corruption is high on the public agenda, the perception that women are less corrupt may give women an electoral advantage. Kostadinova and Mikulska (2017) present evidence that parties in countries such as Bulgaria and Poland have recruited large numbers of women on the basis that they constitute “outsiders,” individuals not already embroiled in political machinations. Thus, in a climate in which anti-corruption figures prominently on the public agenda, women may have a new-found edge. Female representatives may find they gain political standing by joining such reform efforts, and may also find anti-corruption reform in line with their larger political agenda. Rodríguez (2003, p. 87) contends, in her study on Mexico, that “problems threatening the home, the land, and the family—problems to which women seem to be more directly connected—have brought women into the forefront...in state-society interactions.” It may, in other words, not be necessary to reduce corruption to lower barriers for women’s entry into politics, it may suffice if the political climate is such that anti-corruption efforts yield electoral rewards. Second, as women enter office and the pressure to address issues more central to women’s political agenda increases, it may become necessary to put in place stricter monitoring of state operations as suggested by Alexander and Ravlik (2015) and Jha and Sarangi (2015). Women candidates in Mexican politics tend to enter the political arena after they have gained experience in grassroots community-based organizations (Rodríguez 2003, p. 231), which may intensify this mechanism. Given such a background, women in elected office may, to a greater extent than in other contexts, have a political agenda building on issues of social justice, and therefore see a need to promote improvements in government capacity and efficiency.

The theoretical argument, summarized in Fig. 10.1, is thus one of conditioned causality with feedback mechanisms. The model reflects recent insights on the nature of corruption as a highly stable equilibrium and emphasizes that the entry of a new set of actors such as women might create the disruption needed to allow for change. An anti-corruption climate




Fig. 10.1 Good government and female representation: modelling iteration and feedback mechanisms

might, to some extent, aid women’s movements in their attempt to gain access to political power. Once in office, women may be highly disinclined to engage in corruption (as risks of detection and sanctioning are high), and even inclined to push for reform (to further their desired policy agenda). Finally, reform-minded men may welcome new collaborators and the ensuing disruption of “politics as usual” may be sufficient to allow meaningful change to take place.

The model presented in Fig. 10.1 cannot be tested with available data, but the case of Mexico presents an appropriate setting for examining the most important links due to the considerable subnational variation, but also due to the fact that anti-corruption efforts have, in fact, figured strongly on the policy agenda in recent decades. Reform efforts began with a constitutional reform in 1977, but gained in intensity and credibility in 2000, with the election of Vicente Fox, the first president elected for more than seven decades who was not from the dominant party *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI), and who thus had “no formal links to the prior authoritarian regime” (Morris 2009, p. 85). Fox’s agenda included the passing of an access to information law considered to be among the strongest in the world at the time. While Mexico as a country rates as highly corrupt in the rankings, some regions approach a condition of state capture, while others resemble countries in the moderately corrupt range (Morris 2005, 2009; see also Table 10.1). Given the degree of decentralization in Mexico, local and state governments are also an important locus for change on many

Table 10.1 Descriptive statistics for all variables

	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Std. Dev.</i>	<i>Min</i>	<i>Max</i>
Municipal corruption 2001	10.5	5.9	2.4	26.2
Municipal corruption 2010	8.1	4.9	0.4	21.5
Percent women in municipal council	30.1	9.6	0.0	48.0
Percent rural	37.0	18.0	8.5	74.5
Percent low income	51.9	13.4	22.2	75.9
Percent literate	91.3	4.9	78.6	96.9
Percent women employed	35.1	4.9	24.2	43.5
Percent women in state legislature	19.4	6.6	8.0	39.0
Political party competition (1 = yes)	0.6		0	1
ATI before 2004 (1 = yes)	0.7		0	1
De facto transparency (% compliance with e-government requirements)	76.5	12.5	51.5	97.2
Average population per municipality	77,510	98,450	6150	568,890
State population	3,050,000	2,651,000	512,000	14,000,000

Notes on sources: Municipal corruption: mean rates of bribe-paying (% who paid a bribe) in six municipal services used within the past year, month or week. Services in battery: (1) issuance of a certificate of birth, death, marriage or divorce, (2) transactions related to vehicles, (3) obtaining a driver's license, (4) access to municipal water, (5) services from the public registry, and (6) garbage removal. 2010 survey by Transparencia Mexicana

Percent women in municipal council (*regidores*), 2005. Data from Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal (Frias 2008)

Percent women in state legislature. Data from Sistema Nacional de Información Municipal (Frias 2008)

Percent rural = percentage of the state's population living in towns with fewer than 5000 inhabitants. Percent low income = percentage of the state's population with a salary of less than two minimum wages. Demographic data are all from 2000 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía)

Political party competition: 0 = continued hegemony of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), 1 = two- or multi-party system established in the state

ATI before 2004: Access to Information law adopted in 2004 or before, data from Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos (IFAI). Available at: www.metricadetransparencia.cide.edu

social and political parameters, including anti-corruption efforts and the number of women elected (Snyder 2001, p. 99).

DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT

Mexico is a federation of thirty-one states, subdivided into 2440 municipalities (Mexico City is excluded from the analyses). The analyses employ data on the municipal level, but use states as the unit of analysis. A number of services that are susceptible to bribe-solicitation, and are included in the bribe-paying survey, are under the jurisdiction of municipal governments

(Morris 2009). Aggregating to the state level is, however, necessitated by the fact that disaggregated data on women in municipal government are not available. The analyses build on bribe-paying data for both 2001 and 2010 and examine the effect of women in politics on corruption using a lagged dependent-variable model. Data on women in municipal government are only available for 2005, which affords less analytical power to the analyses of the effects of corruption on women's entry into politics.

Measuring Corruption and Women's Representation

The Mexican chapter of Transparency International, *Transparencia Mexicana*, has carried out a National Survey on Corruption and Good Governance surveys on several occasions (www.tm.org.mx). The survey contacts approximately 15,000 heads of households and poses questions regarding respondents' experiences with corruption (Morris 2009; see also Berliner and Erlich 2015). The survey includes a large battery of questions on whether respondents had availed themselves of a service and, if affirmative, whether they had paid a bribe in the transaction. The items included in the municipal index used here refer to: (1) obtaining or expediting the issuance of a certificates of birth, death, marriage or divorce, (2) transactions related to vehicles such as deed transfers, (3) obtaining a driver's license, (4) gaining access to municipal water, (5) soliciting proof of land use or other service from public registry, and (6) obtaining garbage removal. All six of these services are handled by municipal governments and the questions referred to the timeframe of the past 12 months or less. The measure reflects the percentage of transactions that involved paying bribes.² The measure of representation is the percentage of *regidores* (municipal council members) who are women in 2005, averaged at the state level (originally compiled by Frias 2008).

Control Variables

Control variables include factors that may affect women's representation, or that may change between T1 and T2 (2001 and 2010) and may also effect change in the prevalence of corruption. The analyses, therefore, consider demographic conditions, such as the percentage of the state's population living below two minimum wages, the percentage that live in towns with fewer than 5000 residents, and literacy rates, all taken from the *Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía* (INEGI), the census bureau

of Mexico. Such factors may affect citizen's collective capacity to hold government accountable. Considerable cultural variation also exists among regions in Mexico, including with respect to norms related to gender. The analyses seeking to explain women's entry into politics therefore also include two measures to capture this variation: labor force participation among women, and the percentage of women in state legislatures.³ As Morris (2005) found population size correlated with levels of corruption in a state level analysis, we include this in the corruption models. The analyses also examine if political and institutional factors affect the prevalence of corruption and women's electoral success. First, we control for the existence of political competition in the state, using Ríos-Cázares and Cejudo (2009, p. 31) coding of states as either uncompetitive (i.e., the PRI is still dominant, coded as 0), and those with some degree of competition (i.e., dual party or multiparty, coded as 1). Political competition may both facilitate anti-corruption reform and may also lower the threshold for women to enter politics as parties have an incentive to identify and promote the most competent candidates irrespective of gender (Folke and Rickne 2012).

Sung's argument (2003, 2012) that female representation and the mitigation of corruption are both expressions of a broader process of political development also has relevance for our study. A thrust to strengthen rule of law in a region may both stem corruption and open up the political realm for newcomers. To capture any such effects, the models control for whether the state had enacted an access to information law (AtI) in 2004 or before (data from *Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información y Protección de Datos* (IFAI)). In 2001, the federal government enacted a comprehensive AtI law and subsequently required all states to implement similar such laws, but compliance was considerably more expeditious in some states than in others. We do not hypothesize that the early adoption of an AtI law directly affects women's prospects in local politics, but it may tap into a change in underlying conditions that may shape these prospects. In a similar vein, we also control for the extent to which state governments have actually complied with the directives regarding access to information in 2010. The *Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas* (CIDE) publishes a metric of transparency which codes the rate of compliance with AtI legislation (i.e., the extent to which information required by law to be published digitally on state government agencies' websites is, in fact, available (expressed as a percentage)). The measure is from 2010 and serves as a proxy indicator for government capacity and the existence of a political will to reform.

RESULTS

The descriptive statistics shown in Table 10.1 confirm that considerable variation exists within Mexico with respect to levels of corruption, but also in terms of economic development, size, and women's success in politics.

The smallest in population (Baja California del Sur) has approximately 500,000 inhabitants while the largest (México) has 14 million. In terms of corruption, paying bribes occurred in some states very rarely, with less than 1 percent of citizens' attempting to access services using bribes (Baja California del Sur, 2.6 percent in Aguascalientes), while in other states, about 20 percent of all services involved the payment of bribes (18 percent in Oaxaca and 21 percent in México respectively). Of the thirty-one states, political competition exists in twenty (roughly 60 percent) and twenty-one implemented an access to information law before 2004 (fortunately for methodological reasons, not the same twenty states). With respect to women's representation in municipal councils, state averages ranged from zero in Oaxaca, 17 percent in Chiapas and 48 percent in Tamaulipas.⁴ Indigenous communities in Oaxaca follow the "usos y costumbres" in the election of their community and/or municipal leaders, which prevent women from holding office. The analyses with women's representation as the dependent variable therefore include a dummy for Oaxaca. In state legislatures, women occupy 8 percent of seats in Durango and as many as 39 percent in Quintana Roo.

Corruption as a Determinant of Women's Political Representation

The theoretical model in Fig. 10.1 suggests that while women entering government may create an opening for additional change, high levels of corruption may also exclude women from politics. We start by examining this latter link (i.e., whether corruption in 2001 shows an association with women's representation in 2005, independent of other factors). Due to the small number of cases, the first set of analyses control for social and economic factors while the second control for political and institutional factors (Table 10.2).

The correlation coefficients in the first column indicate that women are more strongly represented in local government in states with higher literacy rates and a smaller proportion of the population living in rural areas, as well as a larger proportion of the population living in poverty

Table 10.2 Social and economic development and women's representation in local government (OLS with robust standard errors)

	<i>Bivariate (Pearson's r)</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Literacy	0.49**	1.07 (0.53)**	0.55
% Rural	-0.34*	0.01 (0.19)	0.02
% Low income	-0.29	0.16 (0.21)	0.22
% women in state legislature	0.26	0.31 (0.32)	0.22
Labor force participation	0.17	-0.11 (0.46)	-0.06
Oaxaca		-22.7 (3.5)***	-0.43
Constant		-77.53 (57.51)	
$N = 31$		$R^2 = 0.50$	$R^2_{adj} = 0.38$

For measurement details, see notes to Table 10.1

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

(though the latter is not statistically significant, suggesting that many states also deviate from the pattern). The two measures of gender equality—the proportion of women in state level legislatures, and labor market participation—are both positively associated with women's electoral success in local politics, although these associations are not sufficiently robust to meet minimal limits of statistical significance.⁵ Interestingly, only literacy is associated with women's representation in the multivariate model.

The analysis in Table 10.3 instead examines whether municipal corruption in 2001 is linked to women's electoral success in 2005 controlling for political and institutional factors. The analyses presented in Table 10.3 suggest that women's electoral success to some extent relates to several aspects of the political setting and climate. The bivariate analyses in the first column indicate that de facto government transparency correlates with the proportion of women in local government, but this association disappears under control for other factors. The two factors that retain a relationship with female representation in the multivariate model are political competition and municipal corruption. How strong is then the association between bribe paying in 2001 and female representation 2005? The most and least corrupt states differ in rates of municipal bribe-paying by 24 percentage points (between 2 and 26 percent of all transactions). The estimate for municipal corruption in the multivariate model (-0.4) suggests that these two extremes would differ in women's representation by 9.6 percentage points, other factors held constant. The estimated effect of corruption on women's representation remains significant and substantively

Table 10.3 Political and institutional factors and women representation in local government (OLS with robust standard errors)

	<i>Bivariate (Pearson's r)</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta</i>
Municipal corruption 2001	-0.41**	-0.40* (0.20)	-0.24
Political competition	0.34*	4.59* (2.67)	0.23
Early adoption of AtI law	0.17	1.31 (3.62)	0.07
Compliance with AtI law	0.41**	14.5 (11.1)	0.19
Oaxaca		-19.74** (4.86)	-0.37
Constant		19.94** (9.82)	
<i>N</i> = 31		$R^2 = 0.49$	$R^2_{adj} = 0.38$

For measurement details, see notes to Table 10.1

* $p < 0.10$; ** $p < 0.05$

strong under control for the percentage of low income and rural residents in the state, though not under control for literacy (not shown in table). Thus, while not entirely independent of the level of socio-economic development in a region, entrenched corruption seems to weaken women's prospects in the political arena.

Women in Government: An Antidote to Corruption?

The second set of analyses examine whether the presence of women in politics has bearing on levels of corruption. The data allow for a more robust examination of this dynamic than most previous studies in that we control for corruption at a previous point in time. To the extent that, for example, cultural norms of reciprocity shape the propensity to solicit and offer "gifts" in the form of bribes, they would do so approximately equally at two measurement points nine years apart. In sum, it allows for an examination of factors linked to change in the dependent variable. A bivariate analysis shows that corruption rates in 2010 do, in fact, tend to be lower in states with more women in local government. Literacy and lower levels of poverty also correlate with the prevalence of corruption. These associations concur with the findings of cross-country analyses, which document a strong relationship between corruption and almost all indicators of economic well-being and development (Treisman 2007). Women's political representation at the state level does not, however, exhibit any relationship with municipal level corruption, nor does the size of the rural population in the state.

The multivariate model provides robust support for the contention that women in political office may affect the prevalence of corruption in a jurisdiction independent of levels of social and economic development (Table 10.4). The estimate suggests that the difference in levels of corruption between the states in which women have been least and most successful in local politics (which ranges from 0 to 48) is 7.2 percentage points. These factors combined explain roughly a third of the variation in local corruption measured as bribe paying. Supplementary analyses not shown in the table consider whether GDP or log GDP have any relationship with rates of bribe paying but no such association seems to exist in the context of Mexican states. The findings of the model also remain unchanged if population, the only factor which Morris (2009) finds to correlate with corruption, or average population per municipality, are controlled for.

Due to the limited number of units of analysis, the link between women's representation and corruption controlling for political development indicators is explored in a separate model (Table 10.5). Early adoption of an AtI act, as well as a high degree of compliance by publishing information digitally, arguably signal an atmosphere of reform in a state and the existence of political will to mitigate corruption. The analyses below examine whether these currents of change, to the extent that they also pick up reform-mindedness at the local level, have any bearing on corruption at the municipal level and whether the presence of women in politics retains a relationship with corruption once these factors have been taken into

Table 10.4 The effects of gender on corruption in local government in 2010, controlling for development indicators and corruption 2001 (OLS with robust standard errors)

	<i>Bivariate (Pearson's r)</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Beta</i>
% Women in municipal government	-0.35*	-0.15* (0.08)	-0.28
Literacy	-0.30*	0.12 (0.32)	0.12
% Rural	-0.05	-0.15* (0.09)	-0.53
% Low income	-0.31*	0.21** (0.09)	0.58
% women in state legislature	0.01	0.11 (0.07)	0.14
Municipal corruption 2001	0.55***	0.36 (0.21)	0.43
Constant		-10.2 (34.05)	
<i>N</i> = 31		<i>R</i> ² = 0.45	<i>R</i> ² _{adj} = 0.29

For measurement details, see notes to Table 10.1

p* < 0.10; *p* < 0.05; ****p* < 0.01

account. The results of model 1 indicate that women's representation is associated with local corruption independent of other apparent attempts to work toward better government in Mexican states, and is in fact the only factor that exhibits any association with corruption, even in bivariate analyses (not shown). The patterns are less robust, however, with respect to whether women's representation effects change in levels of corruption. Model 2 controls for corruption in 2001, and while the estimate remains negative, it is not significant.

The fact that none of the political and institutional factors examined have bearing on local corruption is noteworthy. States with early adoption and extensive compliance with transparency laws are not systematically less corrupt than laggards in the transparency reforms. Either state level reforms leave local corruption untouched or, alternatively, transparency does not have the transformative power that policy proponents suggest. Similarly, states with more political competition do not show signs of moving toward cleaner government than those still dominated by a single party. With respect to this parameter, it is safer to assume that a lack of political competition on the state level also suggests a lack of competition in local level politics. The reverse is not necessarily true, however, political competition at the state level does not ensure that local elections in all the municipalities in the state are contested. PRI dominance may reign at the local level even if other parties have made inroads at the state legislature. More fine-grained analyses are certainly needed on these issues.

Table 10.5 The effects of gender on corruption in local government in 2010, controlling for political and institutional factors and corruption 2010 (OLS with robust standard errors)

	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>Model 2</i>	
	B	Beta	B	Beta
% Women in municipal government	-0.25 (0.13)*	-0.48	-0.14 (0.11)	-0.26
Party competition	2.0 (2.0)	0.19	0.76 (2.41)	0.07
Early adoption of AtI law	0.13 (2.19)	0.01	1.08 (1.52)	0.10
Compliance with AtI law	5.8 (9.8)	0.15	8.29 (8.87)	0.21
Municipal corruption 2001			0.42* (0.23)	0.51
Constant			-10.2 (34.05)	
<i>N</i> = 31			<i>R</i> ² = 0.37	<i>R</i> ² _{adj} = 0.21

For measurement details, see notes to Table 10.1

**p* < 0.10

CONCLUSION

The analysis of Mexican local governments suggests that the relationship between gender and corruption may indeed run in two directions: Corruption in local government, the models suggest, inhibits women's success in electoral contests at the local level. Even once indicators of economic and political development have been taken into account, levels of corruption in 2001 retain a substantively strong relationship with the proportion of women in local government in 2005. Socio-demographic factors also, to some extent, account for women's political success, as does political competition, in congruence with research from a context as different as Swedish municipalities (Folke and Rickne 2012). De facto government transparency also shows a bivariate relationship with women's electoral success, but this disappears under control for local corruption, which to some extent speaks against the contention that gender equality and corruption in government are merely expressions of a broader process of political development.

The extent to which women gain access to local government legislative bodies also affects corruption in municipalities farther down the road. We subject this thesis to a tough test, not least due to the small number of cases and because the operationalization of corruption is perhaps not the most theoretically plausible type of corruption affected by women in legislative office, but also because our results provide rigorous support for the contention that an increase in women's representation can trigger a *change* in levels of corruption. Are women, then, the fairer sex? Not necessarily. Corruption is not first and foremost an expression of moral failure at the individual level, but rather a system of behavioral norms, incentives and inherent logics of rational action, and in some contexts even mechanisms to sanction those who fail to behave in accordance with these norms (Karklins 2005; Persson et al. 2012). Even if women *were* inclined toward more rule-bound behavior, they are certainly not impervious to social learning and adaptation; entry into and socialization into the political realm would require women to decipher and adapt to the practices in place.

The exclusion of women from politics is, however, itself an expression of a rather stable set of gendered roles in society—a barrier which numerous historical examples suggest does not dissolve of its own accord. The historical record instead indicates that women's entry into the political

realm results from prolonged efforts on the part primarily of women's movements to convince parties to address the barrier in a proactive manner. Norms and organizational logics become visible and subject to re-examination and renegotiation in a way they otherwise are not, creating an opening for further introspection and renegotiation of praxis and its underlying logics. This theoretical account implies a nuanced understanding of the gender-corruption nexus, and a limited scope for the transformative effect of female representation in terms of the mitigation of political corruption. In order for women's electoral success to have any bearing on corruption, anti-corruption efforts must already exist in the policy discourse and presumably also have momentum in the form of strong advocates both within and from outside political institutions and assemblies (i.e., pressure from below but also from higher levels of government or international actors). Absent such an ideational current, it seems unlikely that an increase in the number of women in politics will effect a change on corruption. The effect of gender on corruption does not, in other words, axiomatically travel in time and space.

NOTES

1. For recent publications on the role of gender quotas and different kind of pressures for increasing the number of women elected see Dahlerup (2006), Krook (2009), and Tripp and Kang (2008).
2. The number of people indicating having used any of these services ranges from 65 in Tamaulipas to 343 in Sonora, though all but Tamaulipas have at least 120 reporting having used at least one of these services. There is no systematic relationship between number of respondents per state and rates of reported bribe paying, i.e., the varying response rate (or alternatively variations in the extent to which residents of a state sought these services) does not seem to be a source of measurement error.
3. The three major parties implemented gender quotas in the 1990s that may have contributed to women's electoral success in some states more than others. In this sense, the proportion of women in the state legislature may say more about party strategies and shares than gender norms. The extent to which parties enforced quotas also varies, however, with the PRD being a forerunner in this regard (Bruhn 2003), and it is a fair assumption that regional gender-related norms may also have informed parties' choices regarding the enforcement of quotas locally.
4. See Frias (2008) for a discussion and details on how data was collected in this region.

5. That said, an examination of outliers suggests that the state of Quintana Roo is an outlier with strong leverage, with a high proportion of women in the state legislature but comparatively few women in municipal councils. If this influential outlier is excluded, the correlation coefficient is 0.4 ($p < 0.05$). In the multivariate analyses, if Quintana Roo is also excluded, women's representation at the state level shows a strong and robust relationship to women in local politics ($B = 0.64$, $p = 0.06$), and the adjusted R-squared increases to 0.49.

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Gender Aspects of Government Auditing

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In a province in Argentina, public funds intended for a program to counter domestic violence were invested in a Malvinas Veterans' House. A local mayor diverted the money in clear violation of official procedure. However, the case was detected, and the United Nations Democracy Fund partnered with the Fundación Mujeres en Igualdad to implement the *Organizing Women against Corruption* project. The focus of the project was to increase public awareness of corruption, but most importantly, to provide individuals and non-governmental organizations with tools for requesting information about the financing and enforcement of gender policies. The UN contends that initiatives such as the one described above have been successful in returning funding to the originally budgeted activity and thereby strengthening the position of women and lowering the level of corruption in local communities (UNDP 2010).

The story told above is about monitoring of the state, in this case, local government in the form of the mayor who misused a public position in return for political favors (UNDP 2010, p. 29). The Argentinian example speaks to grassroots women's perceptions of corruption as the *non-delivery*

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of public services. When grassroots women in affected communities are asked about tools to curb corruption, they bring forward monitoring of public service delivery as one of the most important aspects. In this chapter, we build on that experience, reported by the UNDP (2010, 2012), and ask whether government agencies created to keep the state “on track” can be a part of the story of the link between gender and corruption. Previous research has demonstrated that higher proportions of women in government are correlated with lower levels of corruption (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001; see Chap. 1) but it is still not clear what factors come into play in that relationship. It may be the case that women in positions of power, and not only grassroots women, ask for monitoring of the state and thus contribute to the curbing of corruption.

Our study is explorative, and as we move on we will analyze the national level rather than local communities. Almost all countries around the world have an established supreme audit institution (SAI), defined as “national audit agencies responsible for auditing government revenue and spending” (World Bank 2001). However, the organization of these SAIs varies in several aspects relating to effective oversight and monitoring, such as their degree of professionalism and degree of independence from the government, and whether they communicate their results to the public. More specifically, we will examine to what extent the quality of auditing agencies mediates the effect from proportions of women in parliament on national levels of corruption; thus, we test whether higher proportions of women are associated with well-functioning auditing agencies, which further down the road is associated with lower levels of corruption. We will also introduce reasoning on the role of policies targeting women citizens. In the example from Argentina, grassroots women partnered with the UN on a very gender-specific issue, that is, domestic violence. The question arises whether women in national parliaments have, in comparison to their male counterparts, extra incentives to push for a state on track. One such incentive may be that those areas affecting the everyday lives of women citizens are particularly vulnerable when monitoring of the state is weak.

This research area, focusing on gender aspects of government auditing, is largely unexplored. After this introduction, we will proceed to discuss previous research on the link between SAI and national levels of corruption. Thereafter, we review research on the link between gender and corruption and discuss the mediating power of institutions such as the bureaucracy versus the parliament. The third step is to start a discussion on how the different parts can be connected and to present our

reasoning in a preliminary model. In the empirical part of the chapter we explore to what extent the relationship between the proportion of women in parliament and national levels of corruption is mediated by two factors: instalment of auditing agencies and substantive representation of women (i.e., the room available for policies targeting female citizens). The results suggest that initial relationships between the proportion of women in parliament and levels of corruption become insignificant when the two mediating variables are introduced. Based on these results we believe that further studies on auditing agencies, at both the national and local level, are helpful in the development of fine-grained understandings of the way that women in positions of power are linked to levels of corruption.

NATIONAL AUDITING AGENCIES AND CORRUPTION

Gustavson and Sundström (2016) have noted that literature studying the impact of auditing on public sector outcomes seldom focuses on corruption per se. Among the exceptions are two intervention studies by Duflo et al. (2012, 2013). These studies implemented field interventions with randomized controls that sought to reduce corrupt behavior. The major finding from Duflo et al. (2012)—investigating teacher absenteeism in India, a common type of corruption where public teachers do not show up for work but pocket their salary and keep other jobs on the side—was that the threat of being inspected is critical. When the officials are being watched, to keep their public employment they act according to incentives, and the misuse of public funds in this context is thus reduced. The study by Duflo et al. (2013) focused on the impact that third-party auditors have on corruption. The findings from this study suggested that the corrupt behavior in focus—officials employed to inspect polluting factories accepting bribes to be lax in their controls of emission standards—was reduced in the treatment group that was targeted by auditors. Hence, these experimental studies lend support to the reasoning that there are causal effects on corruption in the public sector from having well-functioning auditing institutions.

In contrast to the studies above, Rutherford (2014) found that audit interventions increased schools' performance on some indicators, while there were no improvements on others. These patterns relate to the importance of the way public sector performance is defined and measured. In the present study the outcome variable is national levels of corruption.

We see the degree of corruption as a feature that may have further ramifications for different types of performance, as bribery often induces implementation failures and hampers bureaucratic efficiency. The assumption we are making is that “good auditing” may be a mediating factor between proportions of women in parliament and levels of corruption. To substantiate that view we need to discuss the concept of quality with regard to national auditing agencies.

Conceptualizing Good Auditing

We build on Gustavson and Sundström (2016) to argue that there are three main principles that can be regarded as essential elements in a definition of good auditing. The first is the principle of *independence* (Flint 1988; Hollingsworth et al. 1998; Mautz and Sharaf 1961; Normanton 1966; Power 1999, 2005). If there is no separation between the oversight mechanism and the public sector that is subjected to control, the oversight mechanism would instead have primarily a self-evaluation function (Wildavsky 1979). There is an obvious risk that self-estimation would overvalue performance and downplay underperformance and other problems in the organization due to management’s desire to present a picture of effectiveness and success (see Meier et al. 2015).

The second principle of good auditing, Gustavson and Sundström (2016) have argued, is *professionalism*. The creation of specific auditing agencies builds on the notion that officials working for these agencies are more able than ordinary citizens and politicians to control financial transactions and the ethical conduct of agents in very complex organizations such as contemporary public administrations. Scholars also argue that professionalism among officials conducting oversight activities generates better outcomes in terms of improving performance of the auditees (Boyne et al. 2002; Gustavson 2014; Isaksson and Bigsten 2012). In addition to controlling the public sector, auditing also builds in recommendations to the auditee with the aim of improving its performance (Reichborn-Kjennerud 2013). For their recommendations to lead to improvements, the auditors’ understanding of these organizations must be significant (Boyne et al. 2002, p. 1199).

The third and last principle that Gustavson and Sundström (2016) presented provides that the foundation of good auditing is *recognizing the people as the principal*. The organization of public administrations in contemporary societies can be described as a chain of delegation. The people

delegate authority to elected politicians, who in turn delegate power to various public agencies, their management, and the individual public officials. Who should be considered the principal in this vertical accountability framework then depends on where we focus in the chain of delegation (Brandsma and Schillemans 2013). Although delegation builds on a shift in thinking about who should be considered the principal, from a democratic perspective it can be argued that the main principal, whose will and power are delegated, is ultimately the people. The question then becomes how auditing can be organized to enable the people to become a true principal, for whom auditing agencies hold the public-sector organizations to account. The literature pinpoints that communication of the findings from audits is a crucial aspect of this accountability process. This point is illustrated in the example from Argentina that opens this chapter; the focus of the project *Organizing Women against Corruption* was to increase public awareness of corruption and provide individuals and non-governmental organizations with tools for requesting information about the financing and enforcement of gender policies.

In addition, there is research analyzing government auditing from a gender perspective (Sharp 2000). Most focus in this area has been directed towards gender-sensitive budget audits. A key term in this research area is “selective unattentiveness,” and gender-sensitive budgets have emerged in a context of accumulating evidence that government budgets do not allocate expenditures evenly between the sexes.

The core argument in gender auditing is that women as a disadvantaged group in society are particularly dependent on a well-functioning state. The starting idea is that without systematic gender auditing, public policies will generate new (or perpetuate old) inequalities between men and women. This is in line with the reasoning in the UNDP report “Corruption, Accountability and Gender: Understanding the Connections” (2012, p. 10), which highlights that women are the primary users of basic public services such as health, education, water, and sanitation, and are therefore particularly sensitive to non-delivery. Since grand corruption often occurs in the form of illicit commissions at the point of procurement, this reduces the overall quantity of public services available for distribution and affects the equitable distribution among different population segments. Goetz and Jenkins (2005) suggest that such leakages are more common with resources earmarked for marginalized groups. One mechanism at work seems to be that these groups often lack the political power to protest.

WOMEN IN GOVERNMENT AND CORRUPTION

The first publications demonstrating a link between gender and corruption did not pay much attention to different spheres of society. Dollar et al. (2001) drew conclusions on the effect of “women in government”—a rather broad concept—with data reflecting proportions of women in the national parliaments and theoretical reasoning referring to pro-social behavior among women in general. Swamy et al. (2001) used several different datasets and made, among other things, a distinction between the proportion of legislators in the national parliament who are women and the proportion of ministers and high-level government bureaucrats who are women, but in the end, they merged various datasets and emphasized that *all* data showed a gender differential in tolerance for corruption (see Chap. 1).

In an early in-depth study of the bureaucracy, Alhassan-Alolo (2007) gathered data on Ghanaian male and female officials’ attitudes towards corruption in public sector environments—the Ghana Police Service and Ghana Education Service—rife with opportunities and networks of corruption. Her finding was that females did not exude higher ethical standards than men, and she warned that “the gender probity argument” used, for example, by the World Bank, to justify women’s inclusion in the public realm could grossly backfire, as women may not necessarily prove less corrupt than men when exposed to opportunities for corruption.

Stensöta et al. (2015) distinguished between the input and output spheres of government and compared how the relationship between corruption and, on the one hand, female presence in administrative institutions, and, on the other hand, female presence in the electoral arena, plays out. The empirical analysis, based on a selection of 30 European countries, showed that while the relationship between a higher share of women in national parliaments and lower national levels of corruption is strong and holds for a number of controls, the relationship between the share of women in administrative positions and levels of corruption is much weaker. Drawing on institutional theory, they argued that the bureaucratic/administrative institution and the electoral arena provide different “logics of appropriate behavior and action.” The bureaucratic logic can be described as to suppress any personal preferences and attributes, reflected in the Weberian ideal of the impartial rule-following bureaucrat. Quite a contrary logic can be expected to thrive in national parliaments. Inspired by the work of Manin (2007), Stensöta et al. (2015) reasoned that political

candidates are motivated to “stand out” in the electoral arena, and thus women can be triggered to use gendered attributes such as being a “clean” outsider in electoral races (Kostadinova and Mikulska 2017).

In conclusion, there seem to be emerging findings that the gender factor is suppressed in bureaucratic institutions but triggered in the electoral arena. However, this does not mean that all agencies within “the bureaucracy”—the administrative branch of government—are irrelevant for scholars trying to understand gender dynamics in relation to corruption. What we examine in this chapter is the role of good auditing, not of women bureaucrats per se.

WOMEN IN PARLIAMENTS AS ADVOCATES OF WOMEN’S INTERESTS

Some scholars suggest that risk aversion makes women in elected positions abstain from corrupt transactions (Esarey and Chirillo 2013). Other scholars, however, suggest that there may be a “women’s interest mechanism” at work (Alexander and Ravlik 2015). In essence, the argument contends that female politicians’ support of policies that improve conditions for female citizens, such as family and health policies, is especially dependent on a “state on track,” where resources are used for public goods rather than private gain. Thus, certain policy preferences among women politicians constitute an impetus to strive for a strict monitoring of the state, which, in the long term, may lower levels of corruption (Alexander and Ravlik 2015; Jha and Sarangi 2015; Stensöta et al. 2015). This reasoning is underpinned by a study from Watson and Moreland (2014) suggesting that women legislators focus on issues of particular interest to women citizens, such as social spending and women’s rights. In the next step the passing of laws about gender issues may, especially if they are designed to protect disadvantaged groups, influence citizen’s perceptions of corruption and quality of government in the broad sense.

The main takeaway from the studies on the women’s interest mechanism is that the objective for women’s activities in elected positions may not be to counter corruption as such. Rather, the main target may be sustaining policies strengthening the position of women vis-à-vis men. A way forward in the debate on the effect of gender on levels of corruption is thus to elaborate further on *direct* and *indirect* effects of women’s political participation. Direct effects may be the result of women being risk

averse and less willing to participate in corrupt interactions, as suggested by Esarey and Chirillo (2013). Indirect effects may, however, be the result of activities directed towards certain public policies, which, further down the road, affects levels of corruption.

Another way to give credibility to this line of reasoning is to highlight that advocacy of women's interests often means expanding the duties of the state. An historical example of this can be found in a study on the introduction of female suffrage in the United States. Lott and Kenny (1999) used cross-sectional time-series data for 1870–1940 to examine state government expenditures and revenues. They were able to distinguish between states that voluntarily introduced female suffrage and those that introduced it as a result of the Nineteenth Amendment, and thereby could take pre-existing tendencies—gender cultures—in a state into account. The results showed that suffrage coincided with immediate increases in state government expenditures and revenue. They anchored their results in reasoning about a certain pressure from women citizens on expansive government policies:

Since women tend to have lower incomes, they benefit more from various government programs that redistribute income to the poor, such as progressive taxation. Hence, single women as well as women who anticipate that they may become single may prefer a more progressive tax system and more wealth transfers to low-income people as an alternative to a share of a husband-uncertain future income. (pp. 1164–1165)

Similar results on gendered investments are found in a study making use of a natural experiment design. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004) focused on the effects of reservation policies in local councils in the Indian regions of West Bengal and Rajasthan. Chattopadhyay and Duflo showed that women elected as leaders under the reservation policy invested more in the public goods more closely linked to women's concerns: drinking water and roads in West Bengal and drinking water in Rajasthan. They suggested that the mechanism at work is that the preferences of female leaders are closely aligned to the preferences of women citizens, therefore they end up serving them better. A related study also shows that the very areas that randomly received a high share of elected women also witnessed lower instances of corruption in the following years compared to those areas with no gender quota (Beaman et al. 2011; see also Pande and Ford 2012).

Contemporary research on women in parliaments in Western democracies tends to demonstrate a link between women politicians and advocacy

of women's interests. At the macro level, evidence indicates that societies that elect larger numbers of women also tend to be more gender equal in other respects than societies that elect fewer women (Inglehart and Norris 2003). At the micro level, evidence indicates that women in elected office prioritize issues of particular importance to female citizens, such as social policy, family policy, and gender equality (Thomas 1994; Lovenduski and Norris 2003; Diaz 2005; Dodson 2006; Wängnerud 2009). Studies in the Nordic countries, where the number of women elected has long been high, have found a shift in emphasis as the number of women in office increases, with women's interests being accorded greater scope and being situated more centrally on the political agenda (Skjeie 1992; Bergqvist et al. 2000; Wängnerud 2015).

The critical reader can object that expansion of the state could lead to even more opportunities for corrupt transactions. Watson and Moreland (2014, p. 400) discuss the possibility that as resources allocated to social programs increase, the possibility of corrupting influences between the elected officials and the beneficiaries similarly increases. However, in their study focusing on government health expenditures and laws supporting pregnancy protection, they found rather quite the opposite: higher levels of substantive representation of women—policies targeting women's everyday lives—tend to go hand-in-hand with lower levels of perceived corruption, even under control for variables such as GDP, regime type, and geographic region. This encourages us to start to connect the building blocks “women in parliament,” “government auditing,” “substantial influence,” and “national levels of corruption.”

Even though research on gender and corruption has been going on for quite some time, the link between women in parliament and levels of corruption remains under-researched. The suggestion we are making is that a well-functioning national auditing agency may be part of the story of how women's political participation affects levels of corruption. We do not suggest, however, that the auditing agency necessarily has to focus on gendered topics; the key here is an auditing agency monitoring the performance of the public sector in general. Thus, we assume that good auditing will have broad effects and, among other things, enable the delivery of goods to disadvantaged groups such as women. The assumption we are making is also that, on average, men in politics, in situations of little or no monitoring, pay limited attention to policies affecting women citizens, whereas women in political positions are expected to be more responsive. Figure 11.1 presents our preliminary model:




Fig. 11.1 Preliminary model linking female leadership to corruption

A number of previous studies have shown that there is a correlation (A) between the proportion of women in parliament and levels of corruption. Other studies have shown that there is a correlation (B) between proportions of women in parliament and the room available for policies targeting women citizens. However, there has been no previous research to test the correlation (C) between the proportion of women in parliament and the instalment of government auditing. This test, on link C in Fig. 11.1, is therefore one of our most important contributions to the ongoing debate on causality in gender and corruption research. We will use a mediating variable framework to see whether the initial relationship (link A in Fig. 11.1) is affected by the variables government auditing and policies targeting women citizens/substantial influence. The micro foundations must be explored in greater detail, but what we are suggesting is an indirect effect on corruption levels—that women politicians, to advocate the interests of women citizens, need to push for certain policies, and this serves as an impetus to strive for tools such as good auditing that keep the state on track and prevent leaks, secretly diverted funding, et cetera.

RESEARCH DESIGN: THE MEDIATING VARIABLE FRAMEWORK

As stated above, our theory suggests that the effect of a higher presence of women in parliament on corruption might be (to some degree) indirect. This can be rephrased as an expectation that a different gender composition in the parliamentary arena might produce different political outputs

which, in turn, affect the level of corruption. As discussed elsewhere, we suggest that better auditing might be one such political output. To capture these effects empirically, we deploy a *mediating variable framework* (see Aneshensel 2013; Baron and Kenny 1986).¹

To establish mediation, the independent variable must significantly affect the dependent variable, and the independent variable must have a significant effect on the mediating variable. The mediating variable must, in turn, show a significant effect on the dependent variable, while controlling for the independent variable. The remaining effect of X (women in parliament) on Y (corruption) when the mediating variable is included in the model is the direct effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable (Baron and Kenny 1986). In the case of *complete mediation* this effect is no longer statistically different from zero. However, this should not be interpreted as X being unimportant in explaining Y. Rather, this suggests that the effect of X is transmitted via one or more intervening variables.

This framework is easily extended to the case with multiple mediating variables. In our theory we suggest that the effect of the share of women in parliament is mediated by two variables: the instalment of auditing agencies and government health spending (as an indicator of women's substantive representation). Relating this to the mediating variable framework, we expect the share of women in parliament to have a significant effect on a country's level of corruption. We also expect the share of women in parliament to have a significant effect on the quality of auditing agencies and substantive influence/policies targeting female citizens (we use government health spending as a proxy). Finally, compared to the first model, we expect the effect of the share of women in parliament on corruption to be significantly diminished in the full model that includes both our mediating variables.

We utilize structural equation modelling (SEM) to test the direct and indirect effect of women's political representation on corruption, and to estimate to what extent the effect is mediated by our proposed intervening variables (the quality of auditing and government health spending). SEM is a tool for path analysis that is ideal for performing mediation analysis by estimating several simultaneous equations. This method also lets us calculate the direct, indirect, and total effect of our included variables by different postestimation techniques. In the following section we describe the data we use to carry out this analysis.

DATA AND VARIABLES

Dependent Variable

We use the World Bank's Control of Corruption index to measure our focal dependent variable. In an often-cited passage, the World Bank defines corruption as "the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption as well as 'capture' of the state by elites and private interests" (Kaufmann et al. 2011, p. 4). The index is compiled from data from multiple sources, including expert assessments and surveys of business people and citizens, resulting in a measure of the *perceived* control of corruption in a country. This is the measure most commonly used in the previous literature on gender and corruption at the country level. Higher values indicate better control of corruption.

Main Independent Variable

The data on women's political representation comes from the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2014). We use the measure of the share of women in the lower house of the legislature that is standard in the literature. In countries with both an upper and a lower house we use the data on the share of women in the lower house, also a standard procedure in this literature (Wängnerud 2009).

Mediating Variables

To measure the quality of auditing, we use original data from the Quality of Government (QoG) Expert Survey 2015. The survey is based on the assessment of 1294 country experts, covering 122 countries, where each country is represented by at least three experts (Dahlström et al. 2015). Three questions in the survey are used to measure the quality of auditing in a country. The questions ask the experts to assess whether the national audit office is independent from the government, whether the auditors at the national audit office have the appropriate education and qualifications, and lastly, whether the national audit office regularly and objectively communicates its results to the public. The possible answers range from 1 ("not at all") to 7 ("to a very large extent"). The answers were aggregated to the country level (by taking the mean of all experts in a country), and

the mean values for the three different questions were then compiled into a standardized quality of auditing index ($\alpha = 0.937$).

We use government health spending as a second mediating variable. Following Watson and Moreland (2014), we use this as a proxy for women's substantive policy influence in parliament. Health spending is an issue frequently linked to women's interests and is a policy area shown to be prioritized by female legislators (Bhalotra and Clots-Figueras 2011; Jones 1997; Schwindt-Bayer 2006). We use the World Bank's measure of total health spending as a percentage of GDP to operationalize this variable.

Control Variables

To account for potential spurious correlations we include a number of control variables in our full model. Economic variables have repeatedly been shown to be significantly related to the level of corruption (Treisman 2007), and we therefore include log of GDP per capita and log of trade as a percentage of GDP as economic controls. These data are figures provided by the World Bank and by the QoG dataset (Teorell et al. 2015). Sung (2003) argued that the relationship between the number of women in parliament and corruption is spurious and a result of political context. In the light of this we also include the level of democracy, measured by Freedom House/Imputed Polity scores (Hadenius and Teorell 2005) and a dummy variable for closed-list proportional representation (Electoral System Design Database 2014). Following Swamy et al. (2001), we include the share of the population who are Muslim, Catholic and Protestant as "cultural proxies," potentially related to women's status in society and/or levels of corruption. These data are taken from La Porta et al. (1999). Lastly, we include a set of regional dummies to account for regional differences in between countries.

RESULTS

Table 11.1 shows the results from our full SEM with robust standard errors, including the full set of controls. The first model in Table 11.1, Model 0, denotes the simple model where we regress the share of women in parliament on national levels of corruption. The other three columns, Models 1 to 3, report the findings from the structural equation models.

Notably, there are three important findings. First, Model 1 shows that there is a significant effect from women in parliament on the quality of

Table 11.1 Structural equation models: results


	<i>0</i> <i>DV: Control of</i> <i>corruption</i>	<i>1</i> <i>DV: Quality of</i> <i>auditing</i>	<i>2</i> <i>DV: Health</i> <i>spending</i>	<i>3</i> <i>DV: Control of</i> <i>corruption</i>
Women in parliament	0.018** (0.007)	0.023* (0.012)	0.069** (0.020)	0.005 (0.389)
Quality of auditing				0.218*** (0.059)
Total health expenditure (% of GDP)				0.108** (0.031)
Log of GDP/capita	0.337** (0.117)	0.140 (0.102)	0.015 (0.227)	0.304** (0.095)
Log of trade (% of GDP)	0.174 (0.185)	-0.033 (0.223)	-0.988 (0.561)	0.288 (0.152)
Level of democracy	0.139*** (0.035)	0.281*** (0.050)	0.089 (0.087)	0.069* (0.032)
Proportional representation	-0.270 (0.158)	-0.232 (0.235)	-1.197* (0.529)	-0.090 (0.130)
Protestant proportion	0.013*** (0.003)	0.003 (0.005)	0.009 (0.010)	0.011*** (0.003)
Muslim proportion	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.020* (0.009)	0.000 (0.002)
Catholic proportion	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.013 (0.007)	0.001 (0.002)
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Intercept	-5.088*** (1.363)	1.369 (1.398)	11.601*** (3.066)	-6.642*** (1.155)
Countries (<i>N</i>)	102	102	102	102
Log Pseudo likelihood		-2638.0272		
Equation-level <i>R</i> ²	0.74	0.57	0.55	0.80

Comment: Model 0 is the simple model denoting the direct effect of the variable women in parliament on the dependent variable (DV) control of corruption. The DVs in models 1 and 2 are, respectively, quality of auditing and public health care spending. The DV in model 3 is control of corruption. Robust standard errors are shown in the parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

auditing. Second, we find from Model 2 that there is an effect from this variable also on our proxy measure of substantive interest, health spending as a percentage of GDP, which is statistically significant. Third, Model 3 shows that, when analyzing corruption as the dependent variable, the effect from women in parliament is reduced and not statistically significant when the variable measuring auditing and women's substantive influence

is taken in to account. The main results can be illustrated in two different models where Model A shows initial relationships, direct effects of women in parliament on levels of corruption, and Model B shows the indirect effect mediated via the quality of auditing and the substantive influence of women in parliament (Fig. 11.2).

Model A. The total effect of the share of women in parliament on national levels of corruption.



Model B. The indirect effect of the share of women in parliament on national levels of corruption mediated via the quality of auditing and the substantive influence of women in parliament.




Fig. 11.2 Estimating the indirect effect of women in parliaments on levels of corruption (Note: * = $p < 0.05$, ** = $p < 0.01$, *** = $p < 0.001$)

To test whether the total indirect effect of women in parliament translated by our two mediators is statistically different from zero, we apply the bootstrap procedure suggested by Mallinkrodt et al. (2006). The standard error for the indirect effect based on 1000 iterations is estimated to be 0.005, which reflects a p -value of 0.018. The effect is thus statistically significant, and our results suggest that 76 percent of the total effect of women in parliament on corruption is translated by our two mediating variables.²

CONCLUSION

We started off with a concrete example from Argentina where the mechanisms at work were quite clear: By exercising their right to access information on government expenditures, local women uncovered that the mayor had secretly diverted money intended to strengthen the position of women in the local community. A toolkit was produced that included materials on the Access to Information Law along with a road map for individuals and non-governmental organizations on requesting information about the financing and enforcement of gender policies. The UNDP pictures a “success story,” where money was returned to the originally budgeted activity. Future research should try to produce similar evidence on the micro foundations—what is happening inside the “black box”—when women in national parliaments affect levels of corruption. We have started to investigate one plausible tool, good auditing, but we are aware that there may be other plausible tools or toolkits at work. Our contention, however, is that dynamics going on in the electoral arena need to be concretized and thus de-mystified. In this chapter, we propose that women in elected seats may have different interests than their male counterparts and therefore may be more willing to install policy devices to audit government conduct. Furthermore, we propose that it is important to separate those polities in which women actually gain substantive influence (often measured as a larger proportion of the budget allocated to health spending) from those in which women do not.

All in all, research proposing a causal relationship between women in parliament and levels of corruption would gain from employing a wider perspective than is normally the case. That includes moving beyond definitions of corruption focusing on bribes and looking at mechanisms hindering delivery of public services. We do not suggest that all female politicians are advocates of women’s interests, but the likelihood of finding advocates

of women's interests increases if male dominance in the electoral arena decreases.

The empirical analysis of this paper tentatively supports the reasoning that the direct effect of the share of women in parliament on corruption is mediated by our two proposed variables: instalment of government auditing and the room available for policies targeting women citizens. We judge the support strong enough to push for further studies in the area, and from our point of view, the most important paths to follow are to find real-world evidence such as the case from Argentina and spell out the different stages in which women in elected office may play a role. Elected assemblies are made up of various arenas and, for instance, the role of women in political parties and women in the most powerful positions such as president and prime minister should be investigated in greater detail (cf. Chap. 9 in this volume).

NOTES

1. In technical terms, the basic case of analysis of mediation entails a single intervening variable (Z) linking the focal independent variable (X) to the focal dependent variable (Y). This basic model of mediation can be operationalized with three regression equations: First, regressing Y on X gives the *total effect* of the focal independent variable X on the focal dependent variable Y , captured by the regression coefficient β_1 . Second, Z (the mediating variable) is regressed on X , providing the estimate of β_2 , which is the direct effect of X on Z . Last, Z is added to the first model, providing an estimate of the effect of Z on Y (β_3), while X is held constant, as well as an estimate of the *direct effect* of X on Y (β_4), with Z held constant. The magnitude of the effect mediated by Z in this example is given by the difference between β_1 in the first model and β_4 in the last model ($\beta_1 - \beta_4$). The three models can be written as (1) $Y = \alpha + \beta_1 X + \varepsilon$, (2) $Z = \alpha + \beta_2 X + \varepsilon$, (3) $Y = \alpha + \beta_3 Z + \beta_4 X + \varepsilon$.
2. Dividing the total indirect effect by the total effect gives $0.013/0.017 = 0.76$ or 76%.

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PART V

New Avenues for Research



Corruption as Exploitation: Feminist Exchange Theories and the Link Between Gender and Corruption

Helen Lindberg and Helena Stensöta

During the past two decades, as gender and corruption has developed into a research field in its own right, the main efforts have been directed to exploring *empirically* the relation between gender and corruption and to drawing theoretical conclusions based on these inferences. There are, however, a number of interesting, more purely theoretical questions connected to this theme. The chapter discusses two such questions: First, from a feminist perspective, should we rethink and possibly expand on the definition of the concept corruption? Second, can we use feminist theories more particularly to understand the mechanisms that link gender to corruption?

In sum, we call for a redefinition and expansion of the term corruption, as *sexual corruption*. Although this term has been introduced before,

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referring to the transaction of sexual services in exchange for power or goods (Wängnerud 2012; Goetz 2007), and Transparency International discusses sex as “an informal currency in which bribes are paid” (Transparency International 2014, p. 4), the concept has not been fully developed. We further this discussion in several ways, first, by elaborating more systematically on what forms of corruption can be distinguished if we regard sex and care as currencies, and systemizing in what types of situations sexual corruption might occur.

We further expand on what it means to incorporate into the study of gender and corruption two concepts prevalent in feminist theory: First, we consider the concept of patriarchy, or asymmetrical opportunity structures with regard to gender, in relation to the nexus gender and corruption, and conclude that such structures highlight an additional risk for women connected to male power. Men are the potential beneficiaries of sexual corruption. We also conclude that we need to distinguish between degrees of patriarchy for the theory to be empirically useful. Second, in relation to the public/private divide, we assert that the feminist ambition to politicize the private sphere may suggest that all misuse of power can be called corruption. This means that acts that have been identified as private may become visible as corruption.

An additional contribution to the study of gender and corruption from feminist theory is to introduce the term *exploitation* into the study of gender and corruption. Empirically, we may argue that corruption is wrong, as it works to the detriment of many human goods considered important, such as human well-being, economic prosperity, trust, and the like. However, if we want to discuss why corruption is bad from a more theoretical point of view, we can use the concept of exploitation. Very briefly, the concept states how an exchange is tilted to the benefit of one party at the expense of the other. Grounding the study of gender and corruption in this concept gives us a normative argument for why corruption is wrong: it deepens inequality.

Hence, with the help of feminist theory and by asserting sex as currency, we climb the conceptual ladder of corruption, so to speak, and extend analytically the mainstream conception of corruption; in so doing, we finally propose an extension of the field of studies of corruption.

In this chapter, we continue the inquiry started by Ann-Marie Goetz (2007) and Ann Towns (2015) by expanding even more on what type of acts can be brought under the conceptual umbrella of “sexual corruption.” Especially, we argue that the idea of “women as cleaners,” can be

discussed as another type of sexual corruption. After this presentation of types of corruption, we continue with the more in-depth theoretical contribution of our chapter, where we follow the lines of inquiry into patriarchy and the public/private divide.

DEFINING SEXUAL CORRUPTION FROM A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE

The common mainstream definition of corruption is to “use public office for private gain” (see, e.g., Ackerman 2016). Hence, mainstream theories of corruption center around the inappropriate transgression of the boundary between private and public. The currencies that are commonly exchanged are money, commodities, or power.

It was the work on women as “political cleaners” by Anne-Marie Goetz (2007) that first urged us to rethink the link between gender and corruption from a perspective of patriarchy. Goetz problematized how the uneven power balance between women and men was important for our understanding of the link between gender and corruption. She directed our attention to the fact that women are more severely affected by corruption, both because they are excluded from networks where corruption takes place, meaning that they have fewer opportunities to take advantage of corruption, and because women are more often required to pay various forms of bribes, as petty corruption, because they are often in charge of everyday tasks that require public services and for which bribes can be demanded to grant access. Goetz also turned against the idea that women would be “useful” to the state. If we are to discuss usefulness in relation to women and the state, she argued, the only perspective is how women can use the state to advance their rights and demands. She also argued that when it comes to access to public services that are necessary for survival, such as access to health care, women would not be more “moral” than men, but they would do whatever is required to keep their family and children healthy. What she turned against was the conception of women as more intrinsically honest, and the relevance of this for corruption. Although Goetz thereby pointed out the link between gender, power, and corruption on the research agenda and provided illustrative examples, she did not analyze the connections more systematically.

A more in-depth theoretical discussion on what it means to discuss sex as currency in corrupt transactions has been presented by Ann Towns (2015), who, apart from deepening the theoretical framework for sexual

corruption, also used examples from the field of diplomacy to illustrate what sexual corruption might mean in practice. According to Towns, sexual corruption can be defined as “transactional relationships that involve the trade of sex for services, benefits or goods tied to public office” (p. 51). Towns argued that the phenomena that the concept of sexual corruption refers to are not new, but that we are not used to think about them as corruption. We are familiar with the phenomenon of how sex is traded against personal gain, as “stories about the relationship between sex and public power abound in popular media and popular culture” (p. 51), but this is not explicitly called corruption. For example, the term “honey trap” is used derogatorily when a person uses sex, the appeal of sex, or enticing sex to force another person into a course of action. Further, the likewise derogatory term “casting couch” refers to a person trading sex for entry into a public or professional organization. Both these examples refer to situations in which a person uses sex to gain something, similar to the way a person can use money as currency to gain something. Therefore, Towns argued, we can use the term “sexual corruption,” when sex is the trade used for a corrupt act.

Towns further made us aware of how this expansion of the concept means more complicated theoretical models about the intersection between money, sex, and power, and she suggested understanding this with different feminist materialist theories. For one, sex may obviously entail physical desire for one or both parties involved, in a way that a monetary bribe generally does not. This means that a person can have the desire to provide sexual bribery in a way that one does not have to pay a bribe. Second, sex can function as an *expression of power* and a way to establish and maintain domination. Indeed, feminist theoretical scholars have elaborated on how intricate is the combination of sex, power, and desire. For example, in *Money, Sex and Power*, Nancy Hartsock claimed that “*to the extent that either sexual relations or other power relations are structured by a dynamic of domination/submission, the others as well will operate along those dimensions, and in consequence, the community as a whole will be structured by domination*” (Hartsock 1985, p. 163). Therefore, Hartsock argued, it is vital to address in what ways *eros* structures our community. Third, Towns asserted that there is a risk of sexual misconduct and sexual exploitation whenever there are power differentials between those that hold power in an organization and those that are dependent on the organization for goods and services. Following from this, she argued, we can assume that whenever there is inequality in an

organization, there is a risk of sexual harassment that might contribute to sexual corruption.

Towns also gave us concrete situations in which corruption, as sexual currency is played out: Sexual corruption, she argued, takes mainly two forms: The first concerns a transaction between two parties, where one person has power to allow something that the other person wants. In this case, the corrupt transaction is similar to those where money is exchanged, but the currency is sex. A real-world example concerned ten South Korean diplomats posted at the country's consulate in Shanghai, who were accused of trading government documents for sex with a Chinese woman. The other form of sexual bribery involves a third party who is hired to perform services, in this case sexual services. Here, the actual corrupt transaction also involves two parties, but the person offering the bribe does not involve her- or himself in the transaction, but instead hires a third party. There are documented cases where people have been bribed with visits to a strip club or a hotel room with prostitutes.

We argue that in previous research on sexual corruption there is a confusing conceptual mix of different acts that might be regarded as exploitation, sexual corruption, and/or sexual bribery. This is unfortunate, because it muddles our perception of what sexual corruption is, and whether it is something bad or good, or perhaps neutral. We see a need to distinguish between exploitation, sexual corruption, and sexual bribery. In this chapter, we assert these problems are connected with all of the above.

FORMS OF SEXUAL CORRUPTION

To start with, we consider the term sexual corruption, as introduced by Towns, as a promising concept, even if we emphasize that our usage of the term sexual corruption is distinguished from and should not be confused with the legalistic conception of "sexual corruption," which in American law means enticing of a minor (this is State law in most states, for instance, Pennsylvania¹).

We define sexual corruption, as below. Thereby, we expand the definition of sexual corruption or sex as corrupt currency to involve three basic features:

1. The presence of a self-sacrificing "womanly" person as a possible realization of care. We argue that the gendered expectation of self-sacrifice and womanliness can be used as a currency of care.

2. The “presence of a temptation as possible realization of a promise of sex.” We argue that beauty can be a materialization of the latter or used as currency for a promise of status.
3. Actual sex or sexual services (as defined previously by Towns).

This three-part definition of sexual corruption, which can be placed on a continuum from the “weakest” appearance, care services, through the presence of temptation, and finally, actual sex.

To note, there are also instances where sex is clearly forced upon the person “giving” sex, for example, when sexual assault or rape is concerned, or in the situation of “trafficking.” Trafficking is a clear case of sexual violence, and sexually based illegal behavior. Should it then also be included in a definition of sexual corruption? The answer depends on how much we want to emphasize that corruption is a mutual exchange, meaning that it involves some benefit for both parties, even though this may be highly asymmetrical. If we include forced sexual exchange, it is questionable whether this is beneficial at all to the person forced to provide sex. Table 12.1 lists the forms of sexual corruption and provides descriptions of the types of situations and the parties involved. It further notes whether the type of corrupt situation being described is new, in relation to mainstream descriptions, or whether the situation has been described before, and only the currency is new. We also add reflections about whether the description means that corruption happens more often with this expanded definition. We need to specify whether these are totally new situations of corruption that are not problematized when we discuss corrupt acts through other currencies, or whether the mechanisms and situations in themselves are known, however with this new currency.

(1) *Sexual petty corruption*

The first (1) interaction is when two parties are involved in a transaction, and person A has the power to give person B something that he/she wants. This can be a public official issuing visas (an example mentioned by Towns), or it can be a frontline bureaucrat, such as a law enforcement officer issuing a speeding ticket or the like. Here, instead of paying a monetary bribe, a sexual service could be offered. We call this situation “*sexual petty corruption*.”

Problematizing this situation, first, do we know how often this is actually happening in real life as opposed to a product of sexual fantasies of people in A’s position about how much more exciting their job could be? Consider first that access to health care is involved; poor women might

Table 12.1 Forms of sexual corruption

<i>Label</i>	<i>Forms of sexual corruption</i>	<i>Typical of sexual corruption (= new corrupt situation)?</i>	<i>Power–sex–corruption nexus</i>
1 Sexual petty corruption	Person A in a lower civil servant position receives a benefit from person B for providing a service, e.g., health care, or for failing to report an offense, e.g., a speeding ticket	No	This asymmetrical exchange is possible when there are power differences between A and B (using sex as currency must be considered costly by the provider)
2 Sexual grand corruption	Person A in power can be corrupted by person B wanting to gain access to his/her power by offering sexual services	No	This asymmetrical exchange is possible when there are power differences between A and B (using sex as currency must be considered costly by the provider)
3 Transmitted sexual corruption	B pays C to perform sexual services to A in exchange for a service or slipping out of the net	No, if, e.g., construction services can be offered by another third party	A broader repertoire of currencies may attract a broader set of actors to actually accept a bribe
4 Sex secrets as blackmail	A knows private (sexual) things about B and uses this knowledge to gain favors	Yes	Typically, secrets with political power involve sex
5 Use of the power–beauty factor	Person A with public power is attractive, such that her/his presence makes person B behave in a certain way	Yes	Typically, powerful men are aroused in this way
6 Care as a gendered opportunity for corruption	Person A in power can be corrupted by person B, who wants to have access to A's power, by offering care as a service	Yes	Likely to occur in gendered organizations or social status field as a gendered opportunity

not have the means to pay for treatment, and as women worldwide have fewer resources than men, the situation is likely to occur more often for women than for men. Women may be asked for sexual favors to get treatment for their children, and given the severity of the situation, as the relationship involved is thick and emotional, the cost paid may feel little against the possible injury/sickness of a loved one. Another often-used example concerns traffic offences. However, here we consider it less likely that a person would provide sexual favors in exchange for not getting a speeding ticket. Paying for exceeding the speed limit by offering, for example, a “blow job” may seem like a costly way of paying for such an offense; people who do not have the money to pay a traffic ticket most likely also do not have the money for a car. Hence, this makes it unlikely that this situation would occur, on a frequent basis.

We can assume that the first situation requires a power differential between A and B, as paying for sexual services must be regarded as costly.

(2) *Sexual grand corruption*

A second example (2) likewise concerns a transaction between two parties, however, one where the recipient of the bribe (A) is a person in political or public power, i.e., higher up in the hierarchy. Here, we can also think of a person B wanting something from A and being prepared to offer a bribe to receive it. Person B may then offer not only monetary bribes but also sexual services. This type of relationship is also not peculiar to sexual corruption. Here, just as in the previous case, we can reason that the expansion of corrupt currencies to sex may widen our assertion of what counts as opportunity structures.

An example of this type of situation occurred when Bill Clinton apparently accepted sexual services from Monika Lewinsky. Person A with public power is seduced by person B. Here the currency is not primarily money, but consensual sex and desire, a so-called “honey trap.” The benefit to Person B may be the sex itself or an intrinsic sense of status (given that the “relationship” was intended to be secret). Person B might then be able to use the situation to get a sense of power from their closeness to A, or even to gain some power of his/her own.

(3) *Transmitted sexual corruption*

A third form of situation (3) involves a third party, C, who is paid by B to receive the wished-for good from A. The relationship between B and C is made out by payment for sex, just as in any prostitution or call girl (call person) transaction. For A this means that he/she has the possibility of

enjoying paid sex without having to feel that he/she is actually paying for it. This is an important difference, not only monetarily but also morally, as paying for sex still carries a stigma that makes people refrain from it. If sex can be attained without actually buying it, then more people might be tempted. This type of relationship is also not unique to sexual corruption; it can also be found when person B is giving, for example, construction help, in building/repairing A's private estate.

(4) *Using sex secrets as pressure*

A fourth situation (4) is when a person A knows things about B that he/she uses to blackmail B to perform services. A person in power becomes vulnerable because of his/her sexual transactions that are conducted outside of the corrupt transaction, but where knowledge of these transactions is used by the third party. The types of things that B may not want to be revealed may be information about their sexual preferences or activities. This type of situation is usually not mentioned within corruption literature, but could be seen as one where desire, sex, and power are linked; hence it is relevant when studying the phenomenon of sexual corruption. We can imagine, for instance, a member of parliament having a secret sexual identity used by others for blackmailing purposes. We are aware of how the security services might use compromising material (so-called "kompromat"—information about a public figure or politician) for blackmail or to ensure loyalty (see, e.g., Ledeneva 2013).

(5) *Use of the power/beauty factor*

This has not been discussed before in relation to sexual corruption. It concerns a person A who has such beauty or status that his/her presence is used to persuade or sway person B to act in a specific way. In literature and in stories in the Old Testament of, for instance, Esther, this is well known as a political factor. But can we see any relevance today? We might see Ivanka Trump, who has a position of power in the Trump administration because of her personal relationship to her father, the President. Could it be that her beauty is actually used as a currency of power by the Trump administration in political deals with Japan and China? Ivanka Trump is reportedly immensely popular there because her physical appearance encapsulates a desired Western beauty ideal (tall, blonde, thin, white) (see, e.g., Fifield 2017).

(6) *Women as presumed cleaners through care?*

In the theory of love power, Anna Jónasdóttir (1994) asserted that it is from the gendered exchange of sex and care that women's oppression

originates. The exchange of ecstasy/care is asymmetric between women and men, where men gain power and women lose energy. Therefore, we also need to probe how we can expand the notion of corrupt currencies into care. This means that acts of care can also be discussed as corrupt currencies alongside money and sex. We would like to argue that care is another gendered factor that has not been discussed before in relation to sexual corruption. We suggest a situation where Person A has public or monetary power, and Person B wants access to spillovers of this power by offering care as a service. Even though it is not usual, we suggest it might exist, and furthermore, that it is a gendered opportunity.

Here we can imagine at least two different cases. One is person A wanting either to get or keep a job in an organization mired in gendered performance expectations. She thus abides by these and provides extra caring services either formally or informally required of a man. For instance, we think of nurses or female doctors in a hospital, or female lecturers and professors in a university, who often take on a much heavier “mothering role”; caring then becomes politicized in terms of taking on a heavier load of responsibility, more patient or student contacts, and more administrative work, as well as being “emotional cleaners,” and so on (see, e.g., Granberg 2014). Or, consider a stay-at-home wife who cares for a much older spouse who has public and/or monetary power; and she does so to keep her status in various non-profit organizations that she engages in only because of the mandate given to her as the wife to this older spouse, who might not want or need sex, but rather care for himself and for their children. Care here is generally defined and understood as an embodied integral capacity and basic approach to morality, that is, a “*species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. That world includes our bodies, ourselves, and our environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web*” (Tronto 1993, p. 103).

There are some types of corruption as traditionally defined, where we see *no equivalence* within sexual corruption: This, for example, is the case with vote buying, when citizens are persuaded by services or goods to vote for a particular candidate. We have difficulty imagining that sexual corruption could be offered so broadly. We also have difficulties finding modern examples of when person A would offer his/her own sexual services to attach to political allies in similar ways, as such a person could use his/her monetary resources to achieve this.

EXPLOITATION AS A MECHANISM OF SEXUAL CORRUPTION

Although previous arguments about sexual corruption have highlighted that expanding the concept of corruption to include sex as currency means complicating the possible mechanisms involved, no one has gone into depth about what it means in more detail to bring feminist theories of exploitation, patriarchy, and capitalism—so-called second-wave feminist materialism—into the discussion of sex and corruption.

In the following section, we discuss how two features of feminist materialist theories may contribute to the discussion: the term patriarchy, or what we prefer to call asymmetrical opportunity structures, along (1) the gender divide, and (2) the public/private divide. We argue that these are two possible ways in which feminist materialist theories can be used to advance the study of corruption.

We argue that feminist materialist theories can and should be brought into the discussion to explicate what causes sexual corruption and why it is bad. Even though we assume that corruption is a bad thing, which is mostly backed up by its devastating consequences for human subjective well-being, and there is an established consensus of thought that corruption hampers the prosperity of human societies, it is another thing to convincingly argue that corruption, or here, sexual corruption, is normatively bad. We can, however, ground such an argument by bringing in the concept of exploitation. Exploitation describes an asymmetrical exchange where one party gains while another has to pay.

Feminist materialist theories of the dual structures of patriarchy and capitalism hold, simply stated, that there is an overall power asymmetry between women and men, where the underlying mechanism is men's exploitation of women, which gives men as men a structural and economic advantage in a capitalist system over women as women (see, e.g., Firestone 1970; Ferguson 1991). This means that, using theories of exploitation, patriarchy, and capitalism, we can refute the assumption of seemingly mutual exchanges of desire in sexual corruption and unpack a possible systematic oppression, where women as women are subordinate and vulnerable.

Feminist materialist theories departing from such understanding of exploitation, patriarchy, and capitalism are focused on how we can understand sex and power and how sex is involved in reproducing public and economic power. They are therefore useful for the problems discussed here: sex and the misuse of power as corruption. We would expect these

theories to be able to contribute to our understanding of the forms of sexual corruption that involve a variety of sexual practices.

Within feminist materialist theory, theoretical attempts to explain the specific sex–money–power relationship have been elaborated in a variety of different ways; for this chapter we find the theory of love power developed by Anna G. Jónasdóttir (1994) particularly compelling. Jónasdóttir used the fundamental tenets of historical materialism but applied them to sexuality as a way of theorizing how structures of male power are produced and reproduced using the medium of sexuality and love, also understood as currency. Jónasdóttir originated the concept of “love power” as being analogous with Marxian “labor power” and argued that men derive their authority by virtue of their collective exploitation and surplus worthiness of women’s socio-sexual capacities, understood as the “love power” freely given by women to men. In contemporary Western societies, socio-sexual relations possess a historically unique autonomy, since the forces binding the sexes together are less strictly regulated outside of sexuality. Jónasdóttir argued that the concept of love power captures how exploitation is a power structure enabled by patriarchy, with an inherently unequal social structure, similar to the exploitation of labor power in capitalism that Marx spoke about (see, for instance, Marx 1971/1887). Thus, love power works to enhance a surplus for men, analogous to how capitalism derives a surplus from the production of goods that ends up in the pockets of the capitalist. In a similar sense, *love power* lands up as a surplus power to men, placed there by the work of women, similar to the way the monetary surplus from the production of goods is actually derived from the work performed by workers (see also Gunnarsson 2014).

In sum, her theory provides a theoretical foundation as to why there is a structural power differential between men and women in our society that infuses all interactions. Within this frame, women are more vulnerable because of their willingness to give care and sexual love to the man. He then exploits and usurps this surplus value to enhance his performance in public life. Furthermore, it is also the nature of exploitative situations that the privilege of exploiters pushes down shame and contradictions onto the exploited; this becomes their problem and makes them feel complicit in their own powerlessness (see, for instance, an interview with Monica Lewinsky by Ronson 2016). Hence, whenever love and sex are used as currency, the theory of love power says that men gain a little bit more and women lose a little bit more in the consensual transaction of love, sex, and care.

ASYMMETRICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES AND SEXUAL CORRUPTION

Referring to the examples in Table 12.1, which gender do we imagine as being the one gaining from the transaction? Problematizing the genders of persons A and B in example (2), Grand corruption (higher in the hierarchy), the example of person A with public power (a politician, civil servant or someone with a position in public life) who can bribe person B to keep their power, it seems unlikely, or we have yet to hear about, a female politician or civil servant using sex or the promise of sex to buy loyalty or votes. It is difficult to imagine the power part in this transaction being something else than a man. It could be a man having sex with another man, but could it be a woman? In other words, is sexual corruption something that only men are vulnerable to? This is, of course, both an empirical and a theoretical question that must be studied further.

Also, in example (3), it is easy to intuitively gender the person who is receiving the bribe as a man. We have several examples of powerful men who have been invited to sex clubs as part of a business deal (e.g., a Sweden municipal civil servant Wångmar 2013). It is, however, more difficult to picture a woman offering sexual services to anyone “below her” to maintain her power. Rather, this invokes the image of a person who is losing his/her status and power.

In sum, the examples above all give the intuitive picture that the person receiving the benefit of the sexual bribe is a man. The person giving the bribe may be male or female, but the beneficiary is most easily pictured as being a man. What does this mean? We may have prejudices that suggest this is how power inequalities and sexuality work, but it also may highlight what theories of patriarchy are about: namely, that male power is present in all sexual acts. Why this is so can be understood using the theory of “love power.”

If we think about men as being the ones who, as a group, benefit from corruption in terms of money, the picture that comes to mind in terms of grand corruption is of men at the top, who bribe other people either to gain or keep their greater power. The conclusion that can be drawn from using these theories is that *sexual corruption* as an overarching concept is *already in its definition* gendered, so that women as a group lose and men gain.

From this we can further hypothesize that in a patriarchal society, or a society distinguished by asymmetrical gendered opportunity structures,

aside from shutting women out, there is an additional risk involved when men have political power, as they are potentially vulnerable to being bribed by sex, in a way that women are not. Or, as Goetz has shown, women in, for instance, Pakistan and Bangladesh who do not have a high-profile male supporter take a sexual risk when they run for office.

However, we also understand that it might be rational for a powerless person to use sex as currency to get what she wants. Here we have examples where it seems that the power structure, rather than gender, can enforce using sex as currency. For instance, in Denmark there has recently been a case where a middle-aged female employee at a refugee shelter took sexual advantage of a young male asylum seeker (Vaccari 2017).

Feminist materialism say that society is shaped by structures that give men as a group benefits in the form of a surplus from any transaction, while women are left with a deficit. Patriarchal norms hold that generally, in our society, exchange is in the favor of men. This may be connected to the idea that women are “purer” or more honest, as they do not exploit in this system, leading initially to the idea that women are less corrupt. However, does the potential exploitation of a group necessarily mean that this group has a finer moral character?

In conjunction with Jónasdóttir’s theory of love power, we find particularly useful Goetz’s suggestion of “gendered opportunity structures in corrupt exchanges” (Goetz 2007). But we need to go further than Goetz. Instead of assuming that the main reason women have exhibited a preference for less corrupt behavior is simply that they have been excluded from opportunities for such behavior, we argue, applying the theory of love power to corruption, that whenever there might be a patriarchal opportunity structure and a public/private divide, in our exploration of the relationship between gender and corruption we have to ask whether there are plausible reasons to believe women, as women, might be more insensitive to committing certain corrupt acts, but at the same time more vulnerable to the exploitative effects of corrupt acts.

THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE

The second theme we want to bring into the discussion is the public/private divide. According to feminist theory, there is no such thing as the “private” sphere. The definition of what is politics, and where power resides, includes all of society and the so-called private sphere. This has implications for our conceptual and empirical understanding of corruption.

Analytically dismantling the public/private divide has been central to feminist theory. Feminist scholars have for a long time agreed that women are doubly alienated in a capitalist patriarchal society and that the public/private split denies women full personhood and citizenship (Okin 1989; Pateman 1988). Women are relegated to their work as mothers and homemakers, primarily situated in the private sphere, while men are given full citizenship and agency and the power to act and move in the public sphere. Walby, for example, distinguished between private and public patriarchy, arguing that private patriarchy tries to prevent women from entering the public sphere of economic and political power, while public patriarchy segregates women in the public sphere. In short, patriarchal capitalism operates to keep women, whether in the public or the private sphere, in unpaid or less-well-paid caring labor, thus maintaining the inequality between women and men. (Walby 1990; Ferguson 1991). Liberal feminists have also focused on the need to equalize social and material resources and adjust the power asymmetries between women and men that are upheld by a public/private divide (see, e.g., Nussbaum 1999).

If we follow the feminist project of unveiling and dismantling the factual politicization of the private sphere—thus Millett’s famous rallying cry, “the private is political”—then the definition of corruption as “using public office for private gain” not only becomes something of an impotent travesty but also conceals practices of sexual corruption, because they may be present in contexts not previously identified as being political in the mainstream conception of corruption. Instead, as feminist scholars call attention to the way general asymmetries of power transgress the public and private divide, we may even arrive at the conclusion that *every misuse of power is corruption in some form, regardless of the personal gains involved*. Clearly, this might help us to see corrupt acts in contexts that we previously have not assumed to be contexts of corruption, such as different spheres of intimacy and privacy.

What does this mean in the practice of (researching) gender and corruption? One implication that can be drawn from this reasoning is that the study of corruption becomes the study of the abuse of power in general. This does point to an interesting line of inquiry, just as the study of power presented by Foucault changed our understanding of power. This does not mean, however, that all researchers must follow our lead. Studies of corruption in a more traditional sense will still be the main field of research, albeit now enriched with a hypothesis of corruption that is conceptually wider, thereby unpacking new empirical consequences.

WHY IS (SEXUAL) CORRUPTION WRONG?

Although the central analysis here concerns descriptive theories of corruption, the discussion may also contribute to a normative argument of why corruption is wrong. More particularly, we draw on Lindberg's earlier work (2009) and argue that feminist theories about exploitative relations between men and women also are normatively oriented. Here, we mean that, so far, we have not discussed why an exploitative sexual corruption is wrong or right. We argue that exploitation can normatively be condemned and should actively be prevented because it contributes, with the help of social practices such as sexual corruption, to uphold an unequal distribution of resources from women to men in gendered opportunity structures in a patriarchal society.

However, as daunting as this might seem, instead of presupposing that there is an underlying objective system of oppression with inherent systemic dominance by men over women, leaving women or men with little agency, we might instead find the metaphor of the "golden chain" more useful in describing exchange situations in sexual corruption (Lindberg 2009). Following this reasoning, we could discuss how women and men might engage in different varieties of sexual corruption for mutual and consensual gain. Being a woman and using sex or care in exchange for public gain might, objectively, be better than any other given alternative. Far from an ideal exchange situation, it is still "*distributional consequences of an unjust inequality in the productive assets and resources*," as Roemer once defined exploitation, but it is voluntary and consensual (Roemer 1993). Of course, we then must ask ourselves the next question: What distribution of social and material resources is morally right? There has been an ongoing moral philosophical discussion about preferences and choice that, of course, will be important in this context; however, that is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss further. It is enough to conclude here that Goetz's assumption of gendered opportunity structures affecting women's and men's tendency to corruption is correct.

Furthermore, the character of that corruption seems to go very well with defining "*exploitation as a hoarding of opportunities*," that is, a mechanism that naturalizes categorical inequality, such as between different categories of gender or class, and thus explains the durability of inequality and the persistence of its institutions (Tilly 1999). From this we can conclude that exploitation, meaning hoarding of opportunities by one group from another, within a gendered opportunity structure might enforce structural inequality between women and men. That being said, we should

also be wary of moral paternalism. We should not be blind to those relations that might very well be exploitation, but are mutually advantageous and voluntarily agreed (Wertheimer 1996). Thus, the normative addition that we make here to mainstream corruption theory, with the help of the feminist theory of love power, is that we might understand mechanisms or social practices of exploitation and sexual corruption not as being bad in themselves, but rather because exploitation is a mechanism of hoarding of opportunities that in gendered opportunity structures might open up for sexualized opportunism in corruption, enforcing gendered categorical inequality where women are in more dire sexual danger and are socially more vulnerable and disempowered than men.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has elaborated further on how the concept of corruption can be expanded through consulting feminist theories. In previous research this has led to development of the concept *sexual corruption* and to the proposition that including sexual corruption as one form of corruption means that theories on mechanisms become more complicated. We have further expanded on the concept of sexual corruption, arguing that sexual corruption can come in three forms: *care*, *temptation of sex through beauty*, and *actual sex*. We have further suggested that there are six situations typifying sexual corruption: (1) sexual petty corruption, (2) sexual grand corruption, (3) transmitted sexual corruption, (4) sex secrets as pressure, (5) use of the power/beauty factor, and (6) care as a gendered opportunity for corruption. The three last situations (4–6) are new for sexual corruption.

Furthermore, we have discussed and called into question how the traditional definition of corruption rests on a firm belief in a division between the public and the private. If feminist theories urge us to abolish the division between public and private spheres, arguing that policies and power reside in both, then this takes the bite out of common definitions of corruption. What seems to be the alternative emerging is that all power asymmetries may give rise to corrupt behavior, regardless of whether this is “using public office for public gain in appropriate ways” or “using power for private gain.” We have added a normative argument against exploitation, understood as the hoarding of opportunities by one group from another, which in a gendered opportunity structure in a patriarchal society might lead to different varieties of sexual corruption where women are

both sexually and socially vulnerable and disempowered, and categorical inequality is maintained.

This further means that we theoretically can derive a hypothesis about the ever-present danger that when men are at the top, they may be sexually corrupted. This is true above all for the forms of corruption involving care and sexual temptation.

Our contribution therefore provides not only with a descriptive extension of the concept of corruption, as in Table 12.1, but also presents a compelling normative argument for why there is a need to conceptualize and explore the gendered character of the complexities and varieties of sexual corruption. Here, we go theoretically further than previous scholarly contributions about sexual corruption, arguing that there are practices where women as women may, in asymmetrical patriarchal power structures in gendered institutions, and in acts previously not noticed or identified as corruption, such as sexual petty corruption and care, suffer from added sexual danger and/or social vulnerability.

Having said this, we are not suggesting the use of “gendered opportunity structures in corrupt exchanges” as an encompassing objective system with no variation; that would not be particularly useful for empirical research. To be able to assess a variety of empirical phenomena and explore sexual corruption more systematically, we need to be able to distinguish degrees of patriarchy and varieties of sexual corruption.

Lastly, we also suggest that if we want to use theories of patriarchy and a general theory of love power in empirical research, we need to be able to assess variation in patriarchal strength between countries or institutions. We hope that this chapter has opened a new conceptual door into the vast field of corruption studies, facilitating novel empirical explorations where our proposed varieties of sexual corruption might be further discussed and examined. We welcome and look forward to those inquiries.

NOTES

1. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6301.

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Focusing on Masculinity and Male-Dominated Networks in Corruption

Elin Bjarnegård

The lion's share of the literature on gender and corruption focuses on the role of women in politics and the values they may bring to positions of power. Such a focus is also reflected in the contributions in this volume. This chapter argues for the need to inquire why such a focus has been predominant in the literature to date. While it is not uncommon for gender studies to focus on previously excluded women, this chapter investigates what happens when we move the role of men and masculinities in relation to corruption to the fore. Doing so also necessitates assessing the plausibility of a relationship between corruption levels and men in politics by carefully attending to the mechanisms that would make corrupt systems prone to inclusion of already corrupt men while effectively excluding outsiders such as women.

The core of the argument of this chapter is that corruption indicates the presence of shadowy arrangements that benefit the already privileged and those who are part of close-knit networks, which in most countries tend to be men. This chapter contributes a review of studies investigating the proposition that high levels of corruption prevent women from entering

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politics. Based primarily on data from Thailand and on research already presented elsewhere (e.g., Bjarnegård 2013), the chapter reveals how women are locked out of positions of power, since they are not trusted as partners in the network of sensitive exchanges.

There are several reasons for why it is important to take a closer look at the relationship between gender and corruption and the assumptions that underlie the interpretations of it. First, the focus on women as bringing something different to politics reflects the understanding of male politicians as the norm, and that the way in which they act as politicians is ‘politics as normal’ and goes unproblematized. Yet, the relationship between corruption levels and the representation of women can just as well be described as a relationship between corruption and the number of men in parliament (Bjarnegård 2013). This chapter thus seeks to engender corruption by investigating how certain corrupt processes are shaped by and for men, excluding women. Moving in this direction puts the spotlight on the actual interpersonal workings of corruption, and the different opportunities that it creates for different individuals (Goetz 2007; Tripp 2001).

CORRUPTION AND WOMEN

As noted in the introductory chapter and, indeed, throughout this book, the relationship between gender and corruption has received increased attention the past decades. This has meant that women, previously relatively absent in corruption studies, have been added to the picture. Studies in the early 2000s that seemed to suggest that women are less corrupt than men (Dollar et al. 2001; Swamy et al. 2001) gained a lot of attention and even policy influence when this assertion was reiterated in the World Bank Report *Engendering Development* (2001). The report stated that the findings in the above studies “lend additional support for having more women in the labor force and in politics – since women can be an effective force for rule of law and good government” (p. 13). It should, perhaps, not come as a surprise that many jumped to the conclusion that women, by virtue of their differences and incorruptibility, would solve the male-dominated problem of corruption (Bjarnegård 2013). Research and practice in all fields are full of examples of “gender” being used as a synonym for ‘women’, rather than meaning that men are analyzed as gendered beings. Mainstream political science is built on an unproblematized male norm where male political dominance was long seen simply as “politics.” The same is true for the study of corruption. For a long time, corruption

has been studied without a gendered face on the actors, and when corruption is engendered, it analyses the ‘new’ political minority women rather than the political majority men.

In line with the suggestion by the World Bank, research has focused on the role of women in parliament and politics more broadly to better understand under what circumstances women are willing and able to enact real and lasting change of a magnitude that would make a difference for national levels of corruption. Later contributions are, however, increasingly nuanced, bringing in feminist scholarship to better theorize the relationship, and paying attention to institutional amplifiers and constrains as well as mechanisms that could support the relationship—but men are still seldom named as men. Instead research on the asymmetrical experiences of women and men tend to describe women as deviations from a male norm, rather than scrutinizing the norm itself. As we have seen in various chapters in this book, prominent research has pointed to how women are held to higher moral standards than men and punished harder for any wrongdoing, particularly in democracies. If corruption comes at a higher cost for women, it is argued, we should not be surprised to find that women are also more risk averse than men (Esarey and Chirillo 2013; Barnes and Beaulieu 2014; Stensöta et al. 2015; Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017).

What is noteworthy in the above studies is that they all focus on women as a potential solution to the problem of corruption. Their theoretical contributions concern how women can affect conditions for corruption, while corruption itself—the problem description—remains in the background as do the individuals enacting it. This is the case both in relation to the design of the studies (the idea is to investigate when women make a difference) and to the way in which the results are framed in terms of women’s difference. The above results could also be recounted with a slightly different narrative, namely that men tend to “get away” with corrupt behavior in democracies, both because there is a greater tendency among men themselves to be careless enough to take high risks, but also because they will enjoy greater impunity and therefore they do not run the risk of being punished in the same way as women (c.f. Bergqvist et al. 2016). Moreover, it is important to consider that research seems to suggest that strong bureaucratic norms are needed to constrain the corrupt behavior of men, but not of women. This framing of the issue of gender and corruption is—arguably—just as correct. The above studies build on rigorous statistical analyzes with a dichotomous measure of sex where we

should just be able to exchange she for he and turn the results around. However, the framing of men as part of the problem of corruption is probably more controversial than the framing of women as part of the solution.

Another interesting aspect of these studies is that they imply that if some politicians do not have the incentive to engage in corruption, this will have an impact on measures of good governance at the national level. Although the conditions under which women tend to be averse to corruption have been clarified, it is still unclear what these women do in terms of effective policy making or combatting corruption. This is particularly interesting considering that research on gender relations in parliaments around the world points to the difficulties women as policy makers face in many countries. Women are still a minority in male-dominated parties and parliaments; even where large advances have been made, they often feel marginalized (Childs and Krook 2008). Both researchers and practitioners caution us to distinguish between access, presence and the actual influence of women (Hassim and Goetz 2003) but in research and policy-making alike, the presence of women is often argued for in instrumental terms. In peace-making processes, too, the presence of women is used instrumentally to reach a more sustainable peace, but the mechanisms by which they are expected to do so remain unclear (Bjarnegård and Melander 2014, 2017). While getting elected may be a prerequisite for influencing decision making, it is far from a panacea. Many women lack the connections and alliances needed for efficient policy making.

There has also been an engendering of corruption studies, in the sense that the gendering processes that underpin corrupt practices and exchanges have been brought to the fore. Research focusing on how corruption hinders women has mainly focused on how access to decision-making power is influenced by corruption, thus reversing the causal claim that the presence of women has an impact on corruption. Not all the research investigating this causal direction analyzes men and masculinities, but the line of reasoning is open to such an analysis. Sung (2003, 2012) has argued that the relationship between gender and corruption is spurious: it is a fair system i.e., liberal democracies, that bring about both rule of law and more gender equality in parliaments. However, we know that there is considerable variation in both levels of corruption and representation of women also among liberal democracies. Sundström and Wängnerud (2016) therefore study local councils in European democracies only, and are able to demonstrate that there is still an effect of corrupt systems on

the representation of women: the quality of governance has an impact on the number of women also among democracies. Stockemer (2011) studies a different region, Africa, and finds that democracy per se seems to have little to do with the representation of women: African democracies have fewer women parliamentarians than the more autocratic states on the continent (see also Bjarnegård and Melander 2011; Fallon et al. 2012). However, he demonstrates that corruption does prevent gender equal representation. The proposition is that this may be due to weakly institutionalized party structures but strong, informal, political networks (Stockemer 2011). The claim that attention needs to be directed to the structures of corruption itself, and how they may be gendered, comes out of the literature primarily investigating how corruption inhibits women, rather than the other way around. Early on, Goetz (2007) pointed to the differential access and opportunities of individuals to engage in corruption.

How access and opportunities for corruption come to favor men will be the topic of investigation in the remainder of this chapter. If political recruitment takes place in exclusive, close-knit networks, it will be difficult for outsiders, including women, to get in. According to this argument, corruption necessitates informal networks built on trust, secrecy and protection and it thus fosters a culture of preferred similarity in recruitment processes. Diversity, on the other hand, is in corrupt contexts seen as being both unpredictable and potentially damaging. It is argued that the study of men can contribute to the missing link in the study of corruption and gender. One such link is demonstrated by a review of work on clientelism and male networks in Thailand, and there is a call for an increased number of studies that focus on if and how men, critically studied *as men*, are favored in different corrupt constellations (Bjarnegård 2013).

WHY THE INFORMAL SIDE OF POLITICS BENEFITS MEN

Studying corruption implies studying the informal side of politics. Whereas some bureaucratic political systems can be analyzed fairly well using a framework of primarily formal institutions, in other systems—particularly those where corruption is high, and politics is shaped by unwritten rules—an exclusive focus on formal institutions will lead to serious misconceptions about how these countries actually function and the logic by which political actors abide (c.f. Radnitz 2011, p. 353). The field of feminist institutionalism has pointed out that such misconceptions also include the different roles women and men are expected to play in informal institutions

as well as the unintended gendered consequences of certain informal political practices (see, e.g., Chappell 2006; Kenny 2007; Mackay and Waylen 2009; Krook and Mackay 2011).

Informal institutions are, in accordance with Helmke and Levitsky (2004), defined as socially shared rules for behavior, and they are typically not regulated by any written documents. Yet, they tend to be stable and difficult to change. This is because they are often developed as a response to an unpredictable formal political sphere—and part of their inherent purpose is thus to create predictability and stability. This, combined with the fact that informal practices are, by nature, less tangible and identifiable than their formal counterparts, explains why they are particularly ‘sticky’.

We will zoom in on the informal institution clientelism. Clientelism is one of the most commonly mentioned informal institutions in the literature (e.g., Lauth 2000; Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 2006; Hydén 2006; Radnitz 2011) and although it goes well beyond corrupt exchanges, they usually form part of it. Nepotism, bribery and vote-buying are some common features of political corruption that can be found to some extent in most clientelist systems. Clientelist political practices imply an exchange of personal favors for political support. It is thus an inherently political practice, as it is intimately linked to gaining votes, winning elections, and maintaining electoral support (Piattoni 2001). For political campaigning, it implies replacing debates about universal policies with promises of particularistic services, and in terms of political recruitment it implies finding a candidate who can supply and distribute services and goods, rather than someone who is ideologically stable and rhetorically skilled. The reason that informal institutions are so often exemplified by clientelism is probably because it is such a common political institution around the world. A lot of research has been conducted on the political logic and practices of clientelism, and we know enough about its regularities and function to be able to safely conclude that it is, indeed, an institution. It is an *institution* because of the way in which it structures social interaction and the behavior of political actors. In many countries, supplying particularized favors and goods to constituents is key to electoral success.

Clientelism also involves many people. Far from being a simplistic relationship between a patron and a client, it requires the building and maintenance of large, intricate, and localized networks reaching out from the top levels to every locality to distribute services, goods, and/or money offered in exchange for political support. Clientelism is *informal* because the rules of behavior are unwritten and only evident to insiders. The fact

that discernible behavioral regularities do not emanate from written legal documents does not imply that such practices are necessarily illegal. Many aspects of clientelism can be found in a number of political systems, such as an increased focus on the person rather than the party, as well as the increased influence of groups external to the organized party (e.g., lobbying groups, factions, or networks). Other aspects, such as vote-buying, are considered to be illegal, so, from the perspective of the practitioner, they need to be kept secret and protected.

Two interrelated aspects of clientelism are of particular interest here: its *stability* and its *gendered nature*. These two features contribute to clientelism's role in creating a male-dominated institutional continuity. The stability of informal institutions is dependent on their relationship to formal institutions. Informal institutions sometimes compete with or replace ineffective formal institutions (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). In Thailand, clientelism has become particularly important because the surrounding formal political environment is so turbulent, unsteady, and unpredictable. Constitutions come and go and are often drafted to serve the interests of those presently in power. Political parties, too, come and go, sometimes because political factions merge with other parties and sometimes because they are banned from politics. Most governments in Thailand's modern history have been unstable; and very few have served a full term. Even the democratic institutional setting is often questioned and frequently overturned by military intervention (McCargo 2002). It would be unwise for political actors wishing to stay in the political game to invest important political resources in formal institutions that are so volatile. Instead, investments are made outside the formal political sphere, in informal institutions that can function regardless of the formal framework. Clientelist networks have the distinct advantage of being constant and independent of formal unstable surroundings—even though their very purpose is to influence the outcome of formally held elections. The localized support networks that work their way down from the top echelons of the party to the village level are not temporary in nature, but are a constant feature of Thai society. Investing in the clientelist way of doing politics can thus be interpreted both as a risk-reducing strategy and as a way of maintaining traditional, informal politics (Bjarnegård 2013). In light of women being seen as more risk averse, and therefore less likely to engage in corruption, it is interesting to note that, for many men, corruption does not primarily imply taking a great risk, rather the opposite: it implies being invited into a secure sphere with an established way of doing politics.

The very fact that clientelism is a risk-reducing strategy for men has gendered consequences. According to Hydén, clientelism is often associated with male power holders even though it is not, in theory, gender specific (Hydén 2006, p. 79). Women are also involved in solving voters' problems and thus providing services, but the services provided by women are not recognized as political (Szwarcberg 2012). In practice, the clientelist networks that are viewed as political and rewarded with political power are highly male dominated (Tripp 2001; Beck 2003; Goetz 2007; Bjarnegård 2013). This is, in part, because only people with access to resources that can be distributed in the clientelist exchange are invited as network members. These people are often local bureaucrats with strong ties to people in their area and with access to budgets for infrastructure and development. In Thailand, as well as in many other places, they are almost always men (Bjarnegård 2013; but see also Epstein 1981; Pennings and Hazan 2001). In addition, however, the semi-legal character of some clientelist practices, such as vote-buying and nepotism, makes it imperative that network members can be trusted and predicted. A number of studies have suggested that social homogeneity is perceived as facilitating communication and that people tend to believe they can predict the behavior of people of the same sex to a higher degree than people of the opposite sex (prominent examples include Lipman-Blumen 1976; Kanter 1977; Ibarra 1992).

Only political actors who have access to the *instrumental* resources that need to be distributed and that *also* have the *expressive* resource of sex-specific trust of actors higher up in the hierarchy are considered as potential players in the clientelist game (c.f. Ibarra 1992). Here, the type of social capital individuals with access to both these resources possess is called *homosocial capital* (Bjarnegård 2013). Unlike the concept of social capital, gender is, here, an integral part of the concept itself. Unlike the concept of homosociality, homosocial capital highlights the fact that this is to be seen and understood as important political capital—available only to those who can amass the relevant resources—with which elections can be won. Homosocial capital thus signifies a social capital reserved for members of the same sex. Although the political exclusion of women is the consequence of clientelism and its emphasis on homosocial capital, its explanatory power lies in its focus on the preservation of male dominance. Informality, clientelism, and homosocial capital may have exclusionary consequences, but we can only really understand the causes of exclusion if we strive to understand the benefits that bonding homosocial capital has

for group members. The desire to be in power—and to stay in power—is one of the maxims of political life. Male reluctance to give up power is thus both rational and partly understandable, given that practices that conserve and reproduce male dominance are institutionalized and taken for granted in all spheres of society. One important challenge for feminist institutionalist analyses is, therefore, to ‘develop the conceptual tools to analyze masculine power advantages, and to recognize the consequences of masculine beliefs and preferences in politics’ (Duerst-Lahti 2008, p. 182).

‘Gendering men’ does not imply demonizing the practices of men by viewing them as patriarchal conspiracies or as a hurdle providing a backdrop for analyses of female power and powerlessness. Instead, analyzing men as gendered beings means trying to understand their actions given their position as men. Many of men’s “everyday practices” can be better understood as informal institutions and socially accepted practices that are, in large part, yet to be unveiled and fully understood.

The inherent purpose of creating stability and predictability also explains why informality often brings about gendered consequences, rewarding (certain) men while excluding women. Where a formal meritocracy is absent, political and bureaucratic recruitment is instead based on particularism, trust, and what is here called homosocial capital. The maintenance of a predictable clientelist system requires the recruitment of predictable clientelist candidates. The in-depth empirical analysis of the candidate selection of two Thai political parties demonstrates that the way in which political parties select candidates simultaneously cements male power and the predominance of a clientelist way of doing politics. The chapter thus contributes to our understanding of the logic behind informal institutional continuity and the naturalization of masculine power (c.f. Duerst-Lahti 2008).

WHY MEN RECRUIT MEN IN CORRUPT SYSTEMS: ILLUSTRATIONS FROM THAILAND

How does the informal and male-dominated institution of clientelism seep through formal institutions to influence political outcomes? In order to investigate this, we must look more closely at the recruitment of politicians to determine how formal arrangements of recruitment interact with informal expectations and practices. Although of general relevance, issues of recruitment are always partly context based and cannot be understood in

isolation from the broader societal and electoral context in which it takes place (Hazan 2001). Who is deemed as either a suitable politician or a potential government official is determined by the political climate.

Candidate selection within political parties has the function of a formal institution. Political parties usually have a legally stipulated monopoly on putting forward political candidates for election. In polities where candidates win elections based on ideological standpoints and promises of directions within policy-making, picking a winning candidate implies taking the candidate's ideological standpoint and loyalty to the party into account. In a political setting driven by clientelist concerns, the task of selectors is to pick the candidate with the most far-reaching and stable clientelist network, as clientelist services translate directly into votes.

The focus here is on corrupt and almost completely male-dominated political networks in Thailand, operating to secure as many votes as possible before the Thai parliamentary election of 2005 under the election rules stipulated by the Constitution of 1997 and in two different political parties—the Thai Rak Thai (now defunct) and the Democrat party. In 2005, 400 of the 500 seats in parliament were constituency-based single-member districts. It should be noted that the constitution, and with it the election system on which this analysis is based, changed following the 2006 military coup and again after the 2014 military coup and is no longer in place. Before Thailand's democratization was stalled, however, it experienced a long period of democratic elections. Although democratic, electoral corruption was high and the key for anyone seeking electoral success in Thailand was to be able to build, maintain and use clientelist networks efficiently. These networks were often built on informal and close-knit peer groups whose members felt that they shared an identity that facilitated cooperation within the group. Members commonly included national candidates, village headmen, sub-district heads, other local notables and local politicians, and village canvassers (Nelson 2005). Direct vote-buying was one important and recurring activity in the larger clientelist pattern in which these networks were crucial (Nelson 2005; Callahan 2005).

These networks were not only electoral—they worked constantly. Although direct vote-buying was intensified right before an election, the system of distributing other types of services and goods—attending funerals and weddings, providing advice or a budget for infrastructure, schools, house renovation etcetera—were ongoing all year round. Most voters in rural Thailand based their electoral choice on the activities and

members of these localized networks. For the national candidate building the network, it was essential to ascertain both that the network members' behavior could be predicted and that they could be trusted. The consistency of activities was essential. Many network activities were also illegal or at least 'shady'. Vote-buying was the most obvious example of outright illegal activity, but it was also the case that local politicians were considered government officials and, as such, were supposed to be politically neutral and not officially affiliated to any political party. National candidates, however, needed a party affiliation to stand for election. The networks, explicitly linking government officials to national candidates, thus had to stay informal and members had to keep a low profile officially, while being very explicit about their connection in front of voters. Trust and prediction, typical examples of *expressive* resources, were thus important in recruitment to the networks.

There was, however, a clear advantage to including supposedly neutral bureaucrats in supposedly partisan networks. For national candidates and local government officials, being in the same network was a win-win situation. National candidates, on the one hand, could not personally reach out to every locality of their constituency. They needed people with personal relationships to people in as many places as possible. Sub-district heads and village headmen, on the other hand, needed the budgets that national candidates—incumbents in particular—could provide for local development. It was clear that the position of local government official was an *instrumental* resource that national candidates needed to tap into. Both resource components that make up *homosocial capital* were thus present in the clientelist networks in Thailand. To keep these networks both stable and efficient, men recruited men.

We can also see that the vast majority of those elected in Thailand—at all levels and in all kinds of elections—were men. The parliamentary representation of men was generally around 90 percent, but public administration at the local level was even more male dominated: before the military coup in 2006, 96.7 percent of village heads and 97.6 percent of sub-district heads (elected from the pool of already elected village heads) were male (UNDP 2006). In order to get elected to parliament there is, however, the potentially constraining issue of candidate selection. Even if we are convinced that clientelism is gendered to the advantage of men, the question remains: how do clientelist concerns seep through the formal function of candidate selection of political parties?

Candidate selection has been labelled “the secret garden of politics” because of the great importance it plays in representative politics, on the one hand, and the secrecy that surrounds the methods by which political parties actually select their candidates, on the other (Gallagher and Marsh 1988; see also Bjarnegård and Kenny 2016). There is a need to explicitly put the Thai clientelist setting in relation to the candidate selection of political parties in order to understand how a male-dominated corrupt institution such as clientelism translates to male-dominated political representation. The answer is that political parties in Thailand received many of their votes directly through the clientelist networks; the safest way of securing a candidacy was, therefore, to be in charge of a large clientelist network, guaranteeing many votes. Party candidate selection in Thailand was not bureaucratized in the sense that it was “detailed, explicit, standardized, implemented by party officials, and authorized in party documents” (Norris 1996, p. 202; see also Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2016). If candidate selection is formalized not only in function, but also in practice, there should be written regulations specifying issues such as *who* selects the candidates, *when* the candidate selection process occurs, and according to *which criteria*. The steps in a formalized candidate selection process are also transparent, as compared to the informal candidate selection process (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg 2016). Norris claims that an informal process is, instead, “relatively closed, gatekeepers have considerable discretion, the steps in the application process are familiar to participants but rarely made explicit, and procedures may vary from one selection to another” (Norris 1996, p. 203). Pre-coup Thailand was certainly a case of the latter. Rules were generally not followed very strictly; candidate criteria were seldom applied to find a suitable candidate. Instead, the informally institutionalized practice was to appoint as party candidate the person who could secure the highest number of clientelist votes. The fact that written rules were not adhered to does not imply that there were no institutions at play. Informal practices, too, can be institutionalized. In this view, institutionalization is more about whether a practice is widely known, accepted, and enforced, than whether it is in line with formal party regulations. Informal recruitment procedures often follow certain patterns and unwritten rules anticipated and known by those involved in the process. Such a procedure is, although informal, nevertheless institutionalized (Freidenberg and Levitsky 2006).

The pre-coup Thai case provides the missing link between corruption and the underrepresentation of women. It illustrates how crucial it is to

understand why some corrupt practices benefit (certain) men, while effectively excluding women. In very corrupt contexts, corruption facilitates persistent male dominance. It is only when corruption decreases that we can expect meritocracy have an impact on party recruitment, which will allow women to gain access to decision-making positions.

CONCLUSIONS

Focusing on the role of masculinity and male-dominated networks in politics provides a new perspective to the study of gender and corruption. It goes to the heart of corrupt practices to understand how they actually function in their day-to-day working. When such an in-depth understanding is gained, it is easier to understand and determine how gender operates in corrupt networks. Who has the required resources? Who is trusted and why? Homosocial capital is a concept that allows us to ask to what extent political resources are gendered to the benefit of men and to the detriment of women.

Widespread corruption shapes the behavior of political actors and such behavior has gendered consequences. Among such consequences, we must include a gendered status quo, i.e., a continued male dominance in politics, the bureaucracy and the surrounding networks because corruption facilitates the reproduction of male power. This chapter uses the insights from the field of feminist institutionalism by explicitly dealing with the issue of clientelism as a persistent and male-dominated informal institution of which corruption forms an integral part. Feminist institutionalism, especially with a focus on “the inner life of institutions” can help us unveil not only the gendered face of many formal and informal practices, but also the manner in which the interaction between different kinds of institutions contributes to the persistent rewarding of the masculine norm.

This has been illustrated by the role that clientelism plays in recruitment to political and bureaucratic positions in Thailand. Actors striving to reach political or bureaucratic positions in Thailand adapt to the constraints and opportunities created by clientelism to increase predictability in an otherwise very unpredictable setting. Clientelism requires the building and maintenance of large and localized networks to help distribute services, goods and/or money in exchange for political support. A clientelist network is perceived as being more predictable, efficient and stable the more homosocial capital it contains. Homosocial capital is created where network members feel that they, in one and the same network

member, find instrumental as well as an expressive resources. For men, this is usually a man. Men have access to more monetary resources in Thailand, and here, as elsewhere, people feel that they can predict the behavior of and trust a person of the same sex to a higher degree than they can a person of the opposite sex.

Clientelism and its emphasis on homosocial capital in networks is not enough to create either a male-dominated local bureaucracy or a male-dominated parliament. The clientelist influences must be allowed to seep through formal arrangements. In this case, the focus is on the way in which political parties selected candidates for national elections. The dynamics of institutional interaction, taking place at different levels and between different types of political institutions, were evident in Thai candidate-selection processes. In Thailand, candidate selection procedures were predominantly informal. Clientelism includes shady activities such as (more or less) direct vote-buying; it is difficult to imagine a formal candidate framework that would allow such illegal activities to serve as criteria for selection.

This chapter provides one example of how the focus on men and male networks in relation to the practices of corruption can provide the missing link in gender and corruption studies. Future research should continue to combine statistical analyses with a deep understanding of what corruption entails in day-to-day life. When the trends and mechanisms established by such different studies match, we will understand more about what lies behind the association between gender and corruption.

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Final Thoughts: Taking Stock and Reflections on Ways Forward

Helena Stensöta

From the initial proposition of women as a universal remedy for corruption, launched by the World Bank some twenty years ago, research has increasingly given credit to the inherent complexity of the relationship between gender and corruption. As a result, the first relationship—comprehended as fairly straightforward—has revealed intricate underlying configurations. The twelve chapters in this volume forward our knowledge of this complexity and thereby contribute to the theoretically and empirically active research field of gender and corruption, which enjoys increased scholarly attention as well as continuing extra-political policy interest.

This epilogue deepens the discussion on the two main contributions that were outlined in the introduction. Although it is a delicate task to summarize the main findings of the volume, as one of its merits is precisely to show the complexity of the gender and corruption nexus, the chapters yield two overarching takeaways: First, they highlight how gender equality contributes to curbing corruption. Second, they promote and deepen the idea that institutional theory can be used to make sense of how gender and corruption are related. Both these contributions are outlined below.

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In addition, this epilogue offers some reflections of its own, ending in a proposal. One important point of discussion is the issue of individual-level mechanisms. While institutional theory has proven important to advancing theories on gender and corruption, this raises further questions about the individual-level mechanisms. Starting from the notion of raw material, as presented in Chap. 7, I reflect on the dangers of translating mechanisms from one type of problem or context to another without deeper reflection and urge increased carefulness. I propose to broadly distinguish the individual-level mechanisms “*refraining from*” and “*actively protecting*” as two different ways to enhance good government. A final reflection is made on the understanding of power within studies of gender and corruption.

FIRST CONTRIBUTION: THE IMPORTANCE OF GENDER EQUALITY

The first major contribution of the volume holds that gender equality is important when discussing gender and corruption and searching for ways to enhance good government and curb corruption. Gender equality is, of course, related to women having influence; however, gender equality may also represent a mechanism of its own, and it might both pave the way for and strengthen female influence. As such, it represents a novel mechanism in the field.

That pressure for gender equality may be important for gender and corruption is shown in the chapter by Marcia Grimes and Lena Wängnerud, in the case of Mexico. The authors argue that pressure for gender equality may bring larger numbers of women into government in a relatively short time span, which increases the possibility that they will have an impact. However, there also needs to be a discussion about the harmful effects of corruption in order for women to become actors for clean government. Hence, streams of problems need to meet streams of actors for change to occur, which is what the windows of opportunity theory presented by Kingdon (1995) suggests. Here, gender equality is discussed as an indirect factor through which gender affects corruption.

The importance of gender equality is also put forward in the chapter by Amy C. Alexander, where she argues that equality in the household is an historical predictor of good government. Using an original dataset reaching far back in history, she holds that household equality is a “root cause” of good government in contemporary societies. The independent variable

of household equality is a new contribution to the area of gender and corruption, and likewise an example of how gender equality may be important.

Bo Rothstein, in his chapter, also holds gender equality as important, and a prerequisite of quality of government. Rothstein has long advocated for the way impartiality enhances good government and curbs corruption; however, here he argues that gender equality is an important mechanism leading to impartial behavior. Rothstein argues that through gender equality people learn that “others are just as yourself.” Thus, the capability to regard people of different sexes as “the same” is comprehended as a basic insight that makes impartial judgment and behavior possible.

The chapter by Lindsay J. Benstead and Ellen Lust, which analyzes whether and how perceptions about women’s incorruptibility shape their electability, also finds support for gender equality being important. Their study explores this question in the setting of the semi-authoritarian countries Jordan and Tunisia, and finds that gender egalitarianism, not positive bias towards women as being non-corrupt, is most likely to benefit female electability. The chapter provides an example of how corruption may help to explain variations in female political representation.

Leslie A. Schwindt-Bayer, Justin Esarey, and Erika Schumacher also, in a sense, address gender equality as they explore whether the link between women’s representation and corruption is made out of “differential treatment” along gender lines, which can be taken as a measure of gender *inequality*. In previous work, the authors have argued that women’s greater risk aversion inclines women to avoid corrupt transactions to a higher degree than men, and that accountability structures may trigger a stronger risk avoidance among women (Esarey and Schwindt-Bayer 2017). Here, they challenge this hypothesis by proposing that it is the differential perception of corruptibility (women being less corrupt) that provokes differential punishment for corrupt acts (women being harder punished) and that this latter is the reason why there is a smaller likelihood of women being corrupt. However, this new proposition does not find empirical support, which, so the authors argue, points back to the mechanism of risk aversion.

The theoretical chapter by Helen Lindberg and Helena Stensöta likewise discusses gender equality, but from a theoretical perspective, as it deepens the discussion on how structural asymmetries of power may affect the relationship between gender and corruption. Lindberg and Stensöta argue that feminist materialist theories are useful for the study of gender

and corruption, first, because they help us to extend the types of corrupt “currencies,” especially with the inclusion of sex as currency, as in the term “sexual corruption,” and second, because the notion of asymmetrical exploitative power relations can help us theorize on why women lose more than men in corrupt arrangements. From a feminist materialist perspective, then, power and gender are intertwined, and this makes exploitative power part of any analysis on gender (and corruption). In this notion of exploitative power, a normative argument against corruption can be grounded, which is a contribution, as most propositions ground the “bad” in corruption in empirical outcomes, not in the way it sustains exploitative power and inequalities.

SECOND CONTRIBUTION: INSTITUTIONS MEDIATING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GENDER AND CORRUPTION

The second major takeaway from the volume is that institutional theory helps when theorizing on how contextual factors mediate the relationship between gender and corruption. Although this notion has been discussed before, the proposition is deepened in the chapters in this volume, not the least because institutions in new contexts are explored, as are new types of institutions. It is striking that most previous studies on gender and corruption are set in democratic states. The empirical breadth of the chapters in this volume, exploring the relationship between gender and corruption in authoritarian states such as Russia, Jordan, Tunisia, Tanzania, and Thailand, therefore makes an important contribution to the field. Indeed, an important contribution of this volume is the in-depth knowledge of how the relationship between women and corruption plays out in authoritarian states.

To review, institutional theory holds, very broadly, that actors’ judgments, decisions, and actions are moderated by institutions providing norms and logics. The chapter by Stensöta outlines the starting point for how institutional theory can be used to make sense of the link between gender and corruption, building on earlier work by Stensöta, Wängnerud, and Svensson (2015). A bureaucratic institutional logic may *suppress* the relationship between women and lower corruption, while a legislative institutional logic may *enforce* it. The chapter further distinguishes itself by criticizing views of bureaucracy as monolithic; rather, it suggests that frontline bureaucracy be singled out, as it may involve other logics where gender matters more. This chapter thereby sets the stage for the more extensive discussion on how institutional theory can be used in the field.

Two chapters explore new types of institutions, hitherto not problematized in the field of gender and corruption, and inquire into how they mediate the relationship between gender and corruption. The chapter by Mattias Agerberg, Maria Gustavson, Aksel Sundström, and Lena Wängnerud discusses the institution of auditing and argues that it is gendered, so that women's interests in a well-functioning state may be enhanced through a stronger auditing institution, and thus, better or more equal distribution of public services. The chapter demonstrates a link between women in parliaments, well-functioning auditing systems, and national levels of corruption and discusses reasons why (a) women as a group gain more from a state on track than men as a group, and (b) women in national parliaments have, in comparison to their male counterparts, extra incentives to push for an auditing agency monitoring the state.

The chapter by Elin Bjarnegård, Pär Zetterberg, and Mo Young Yoon analyzes the quota system, a tool that can be seen as an institution, and whether women entering parliaments as the result of quotas are likely to curb corruption. The authors use as illustration the case of the stable electoral authoritarian regime of Tanzania, which for a long time has suffered from political corruption. They conclude that in such a setting, quotas are more likely to reproduce corruption than to reduce it, as it is less likely that women will be agents of change. However, quotas may curb corruption in this context, if (a) candidates are selected from a new group, and (b) candidates are given independent power to influence decisions.

As hinted at above, institutional theory can also be used to theorize on how *regime* may affect the relationship between women and corruption, as a regime can be thought of as “a set of institutions,” or institutions can be seen as subcomponents of regimes. Hence, democratic and authoritarian regimes send out different signals on incentive structures, which affect citizens' strategies, not the least because a democratic and an authoritarian regime offer different degrees of security on the rules of the game. Indeed, quite different relationships emerge in an authoritarian context.

In the chapter by Marina Nistotskaya and Stensöta, the idea that female representation can be used as an item on the “menu of manipulation” in authoritarian states is put forward and explored. The chapter expands the analysis of gender and corruption to include how female representation in legislatures and bureaucracies at the regional level in Russia affects the policy outcome of child mortality. Child well-being is considered part of women's interests and is operationalized as the absence of child mortality.

In democracies there is a positive correlation between more women in legislatures and greater child well-being. However, when Russian regions are compared, the reverse relationship is revealed: increased female representation is related to higher child mortality. It is suggested that authoritarian regimes may use female representation to mimic democracy and possibly cover up bad policy outcomes, and this is a further novel mechanism introduced into the field of gender and corruption through discussions in this volume.

Further, the chapter by Benstead and Lust, on the situation in the semi-authoritarian states of Jordan and Tunisia, as well as the chapter by Bjarnegård, Zetterberg, and Yoon, also helps to shed light on the link between gender and corruption in authoritarian states.

In sum, the study of gender and corruption in electoral authoritarian states indicates that the representation of women in relation to corruption may be hollow, such that more women may even be correlated to worse government. This points to the importance of power, and (relative) autonomous action, in being able to curb corruption.

This last point is also addressed in the chapter by Amy C. Alexander and Andreas Bågenholm, in which it is argued that research often assumes a link between women and less corruption, but seldom explores this link directly. The chapter compensates for this deficit by exploring whether female politicians in office have actually done more to politicize corruption than their male counterparts during the last 25 years of presidential candidates in Latin America and party leaders in Europe. The analysis reveals that female candidates tend to politicize corruption more frequently; however, they rarely make it to positions that are powerful enough to actually influence policies directly.

Power is also problematized in the chapter by Bjarnegård, where she problematizes male corrupt networks and argues for changing the focus toward analyzing corrupt male networks.

MOVING FORWARD: THEORIZING ON INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL MECHANISMS

The last part of the epilogue offers some reflections emanating from the above discussion. While institutional theory has proven important to forward theories on gender and corruption, this leads to further questions about the individual-level mechanisms. To account for change, we need

not only to be informed about the pressure that institutions exercise on human action, but also to discuss what actors “bring in” to these institutions.

I start from the notion of the raw material, as presented in Chap. 7, to discuss in greater detail how we might think about what actors “bring in” with them to the institutions, and how this may vary between groups of people and contexts. The notion of raw material is presented in Chap. 7 by Stensöta and holds that “raw material” is a description of how actors are composed when they enter decision-making institutions (see also Stensöta et al. 2015). As such, raw material is not biologically derived, but rather is comprehended as being formed by norms anchored in surrounding institutions. It is argued that society is structured around certain axes that provide asymmetrical experiences of reproduction, heterosexuality, and access to power. These asymmetries affect the composition of the raw material. As the raw material is considered gendered, mechanisms that curb corruption may exert different strengths on women and men, and there might also be mechanisms that are only important for one or the other of the sexes.

What I particularly want to problematize is the, often hasty, interpretation of behaviors as risk avoiding, while it seems that the same behaviors could just as easily be motivated by an urge to protect. Many studies do not explore empirically which of these motivations the actual mechanism embodies, but assume from studies in other fields that women are more risk averse than men and that this is the mechanism. However, even if these two motivations may bring about similar kinds of behavior, they provide quite different logic as to *why* the behavior happens, and this should be discussed more fully.

I call for a deeper and more careful exploration of these matters, and suggest that inquiry be focused using two broad types of mechanisms: a “*refraining from*” mechanism that works by making people avoid a certain behavior, and an “*actively protecting*” mechanism that works by making people actively protect something they find valuable. I will argue that these concepts are less value-laden than some others often used, and that they are clearly distinct from each other. In the following, I critically discuss the mechanism more often referred to in the literature, risk aversion, and problematize how it is transferred across problems and contexts. I will further discuss the notion of women’s interests, and also here problematize how the mechanism is pictured.

Problematizing Risk Aversion

The notion of women being more risk-averse than men, and the proposition that this is an important link between gender and corruption, may seem solid, as it is backed up by experiments in a range of fields using the stimuli/situation of risk and indicating that women are more risk averse than men. However, the majority of these experiments study financial risks (Byrnes et al. 1999). Among the experiments focusing explicitly on the gender and corruption nexus, risk-taking is framed as the risk of being prosecuted or portrayed publicly as a corrupt person. These experiments indicate that women have an increased fear of punishment. According to Schulze and Frank (2003), non-risky environments show no gender differences in corruptibility, but in risky (real-world) situations, women seem less corruptible (see also Frank et al. 2011; Dreber and Johannesson 2008; Rivas 2013).

My point is, first, that even though these results seem solid in the context where they are elaborated, we should be careful about drawing conclusions from risk behavior in one situation and applying them to risk behavior in another. We do not know whether the way a person acts either in relation to financial risks or the risk of being publicly portrayed in negative terms is similar to the way this person would act if, for example, the lives of those close to that person, were threatened. Financial risk most likely does not tap into the place where people feel most vulnerable. The famous example from moral theory, “Heinz’s dilemma”, where Heinz has to contemplate whether or not to steal the medicine that his mother needs to cure her of her fatal disease (Kohlberg 1981), illustrates how a threat to the lives of close ones can make us bend rules of society that we otherwise would follow without hesitation. Hence, we should specify more carefully what type of corruption problem we have in front of us, and what type of dilemma it represents, and be more careful about transferring ideas on mechanisms across contexts and problems.

A second critical point concerns the inquiry as to whether the concept “risk avoidance” is value neutral. Feminist theories often argue that, in our societies, the concepts attached to females or female attributes are devalued—is this true also for risk aversion? Admittedly, there are areas in society where risk avoidance is clearly considered something to strive for. For example, we teach children to be cautious and considerate, which can be seen as the opposite of taking risks. Likewise, in traffic, we are encouraged to choose the safer option, and in Sweden the Swedish Transport

Administration (Trafikverket) encourages people to “drive like women,” (meaning to drive more cautiously). To be careful to sustain one’s health is another example. At the same time, however, there are other areas in society where risk avoidance is not considered in a positive light. Imagine, for example, the financial sector or even the entrepreneurial sector at large; in these areas there is not much to be gained if one is reluctant to take risks. Politics is another area where risky behavior is probably necessary for progress, as there is always a degree of uncertainty about how a proposal will be received among voters. Hence, risk can also be a necessary component for success in many fields. We can also reflect on the value-ladenness of the concept by reflecting on how the opposite of risky behavior is assessed. If the opposite of taking risks is to be taken for “a coward,” then this is hardly a quality that is looked upon with admiration. Further, the concept of being a coward is also gendered in the sense that, in most cultures, it is more problematic for a man to be a coward or to avoid risk than for a woman. Against this background it is questionable whether we can regard “risk aversion” as a neutral concept. This may lead us to be even more cautious about using this interpretation of what is actually promoting the relationship between gender and corruption.

“Actively Protecting” Mechanisms

An alternative way to theorize on actions in relation to corruption sees non-corrupt acts as decisions to actively and positively defend something. The notion that women have a particular political interest goes back to the concept of “women’s interest,” which described an alliance between women and a more encompassing welfare state (Hernes 1987). While, in the 1980s, feminists across the globe were reluctant to see the state as a possible ally to women, feminists in the Nordic countries formulated a contrary idea of the state as an ally. They argued that welfare-state policies allowed women to combine care and career, by providing public childcare that, on the one hand, made it possible for mothers to work, and on the other hand, employed many women in the public service sector; hence, women had an interest in this type of state. The term “women’s interest” was later revived in the context of women’s global rights. Alexander and Ravlik (2015) have argued that women might benefit from a state which formulates laws that both protects women and has the capacity to enforce them.

However, to have an interest in the launching of these policies is one thing, but why would this translate into an interest in good state *functioning*? The most logical suggestion, I reason, is that the types of policies discussed as women's interests, above, require a certain size of government, a large state, and that this is not possible without clean government, as people are only willing to pay high taxes if they know these resources are being used for their intended purposes (Persson and Rothstein 2011). Connections between women and a clean state are also discussed in the chapter by Agerberg et al., exemplified by the institution of auditing.

Thus, we may outline a mechanism of women's interest, as interest in certain policies that require a clean state to be realized, and also in a state with a certain capacity so that laws of protection can be realized.

A last reflection can be made on the label "*women's* interest." How far is the label *women* defensible or can the interest be expanded to include all persons in the situation of, traditionally, women? Could the mechanism also involve men as actors? If we want to add this notion, we can think of a "universal caregiver" mechanism, which alludes to how Nancy Fraser has developed a theoretical model for capturing when care responsibilities are divided, as in the "universal breadwinner and care giver parity" (2000; see also Stensöta 2004).

The raw-material notion reflects asymmetries in societal structures, and there are structures other than gender that can be important for affecting raw-material qualities. Research in social psychology supports the idea that there are variations in how people relate to social responsibility beyond gender, through the distinction between pro-social and pro-selfish behavior. Pro-social behavior first captured situations where bystanders might choose to interfere in situations concerning unknown others, but has later been expanded to include behaviors to the benefit of unknown others and/or collective groups (Dovidio et al. 2006). Schematically, pro-social behavior stands against self-interest mechanisms and favors the provision of public goods (Ledyard 1995). De Cremer and Van Lange (2001) have shown that "prosocials" feel more responsible to further a group's interests than "proselfs," and that it is a feeling of social responsibility that accounts for the difference in choices. Further, prosocials are more likely to reciprocate their partners' actions than proselfs. There are studies indicating that women and men are pro-social to similar degrees, but with a different emphasis, that men are more associated with agentic attributes, whereas women are more associated with communal attributes (Eagly 2009).

We started this discussion in the second part of the epilogue by proposing to use two overarching concepts, “*refraining from*” and “*actively protecting*.” These two concepts are proposed as overarching concept sunder which several mechanisms can be subsumed. The “refraining-from” mechanism is less value-laden than ideas of risk aversion and opportunism. As it describes a motivation that hinders an act, it is distinct from mechanisms that describe a motivation of actively reaching out and defending something. The “actively protecting” mechanism describes such a defense, and different versions of women’s or universal caregiving interest or pro-social motivations can be placed under its umbrella. We look forward to future promising research exploring in greater detail how these two types of mechanisms are mediated by different types of institutions and thereby affect the link between gender and corruption/good government.

THE QUESTION OF POWER

Finally, perhaps the strongest argument that one must counter when studying gender and corruption is whether the relationship between more women and lower corruption is not only a matter of power? The notion of power as important for gender and corruption was first problematized by Ann-Marie Goetz (2007), who formulated two propositions for future research: Does corruption hinder female representation? Are women less corrupt because they have less access to corrupt networks (i.e., they have fewer opportunities to commit corrupt acts)?

If power is regarded as an explanation that can be assessed against others to explain corruption, it is assumed that gender and power can be disentangled, so that we can measure an effect of gender separate from an effect of power. Then the question becomes whether women curb corruption as newcomers, not as women and, if so, whether newcomers from all groups that are not included in corrupt networks may have a similar effect?

Indeed, there are global power differences to the disadvantage of women that affect most features of society, and consequently, women’s lack of power is likely to play a role in their lesser engagement in corruption, and this also spurs an interest in the male-dominated corrupt networks, which the chapter by Bjarnegård discusses in more detail.

However, from a feminist materialist theoretical perspective, it is not possible to disentangle power and gender, as asymmetries between genders with regard to power are seen as infused in all relations in society.

Hence, if gender and power are regarded as being intertwined, this effectively requires that all approaches to gender and corruption also discuss power. Indeed, we can picture power as an intertwined factor behind various propositions or, as is argued in the chapter by Lindberg and Stensöta, women may be more reliant on the state because they, and their responsibilities, are subordinated in society; risk aversion or the choice of being “kind” may be the only option available to a person too weak for revenge (Stack 1997).

To sum up, it is the varying approaches that work to stimulate research, just as the richness of this volume, hopefully, is stimulating for readers and for future inquiry in the field of gender and corruption.

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