


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Dealing with Conflict in Africa

The United Nations
and Regional Organizations

Edited by
Jane Boulden



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DEALING WITH CONFLICT IN AFRICA

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Acknowledgments

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Beginning in 2000, the CIS has pursued this research agenda by engaging in research on a number of interrelated themes, including the role of international organizations in the transition from war to peace, the response of international organizations to new threats to international peace and security, the attitudes of states and groups to international organizations, and the issues associated with regionalism, regional organizations, and security. This book addresses this last theme by examining how regional actors in Africa, in conjunction with the UN (or in its absence), have sought to deal with conflict, and what that tells us about regional responses to security issues generally as well as the relationship between regional actors and the UN.

The chapters included in this book are the product of a workshop that was held jointly by the Centre for International Studies with the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York in May 2001. As editor I am indebted to the contributors to this volume and also to Professor Thomas G. Weiss at the Ralph Bunche Institute for providing such congenial surroundings and institutional support for the workshop. Special thanks are due to Professor S. Neil MacFarlane, Director of the Centre for International Studies while the work for this volume was undertaken, for his commitment and support to the project. In addition, I would like to thank Gabriella Pearce at Palgrave, New York, for her ongoing patience and support of this work.

List of Acronyms

ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative
AFDL	Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone)
ALiR	Alliance pour la Libération du Rwanda
ANAD	Accord de non-aggression et d'assistance en matière de défense, also: Treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defense
AU	African Union
BMATT	British Military Advisory and Training Team
CAR	Central African Republic
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (IGAD)
CMC	Conflict Management Centre
CNDD	National Council for the Defense of Democracy, also: Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie (Burundi)
COPAX	Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa
DDR	Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration and resettlement
DOP	Declaration of principles
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EAC	East African Community
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ELF	Eritrean Liberation Front
EPLF	Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front

EU	European Union
FAC	Forces armées congolaises
FAR	Forces Armées Rwandaises
FAZ	Forces Armées Zairoises
FDD	Forces for the Defense of Democracy, also: Force pour la Défense de la Démocratie (Burundi)
FNL	Forces Nationales de Libération (Burundi)
FRODEBU	Front for Democracy in Burundi
GUNT	Gouvernement d'union nationale de transition (Chad)
IDPs	Internally displaced peoples
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IGADD	Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification
IMC	International Monitoring Committee (Burundi)
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
IPF	IGAD Partners Forum
ISDSC	Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (SADC)
JMC	Joint Military Commission
MIPROBU	Mission for the Protection and Restoration of Trust in Burundi
MISAB	Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui
ML	Mouvement de Libération (DRC)
MLC	Mouvement pour la libération du Congo
MNFs	Multinational forces
MONUC	UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Democratique du Congo)
NAM	Non-aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCOs	Noncommissioned Officers
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NMOG	Neutral Military Observer Group
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NSCC	New Sudan Council of Churches
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OLMEE	OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea
OMIB	Observer Mission in Burundi
OMIC	Observer Mission in the Comoros
ONUC	United Nations Operation in the Congo
OLS	Operation Lifeline Sudan

PPP	People to People Peace (Sudan)
RCD	Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie
RECAMP	Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SANDF	South African National Defence Force
SCOPK	Special Committee on Peacekeeping
SMC	Standing Mediation Committee (ECOWAS)
SPDF	Sudan People's Defence Forces
SPLM/A	Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
TPLF	Tigray Peoples Liberation Front
TSZ	Temporary Security Zone (Ethiopia-Eritrea)
UN	United Nations
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNMEE	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOSOM	United Nations Operations in Somalia
UPRONA	Union for National Progress Party (Burundi)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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Introduction

Jane Boulden

The purpose of this book is to examine the issues associated with the increased emphasis on UN cooperation with regional organizations in carrying out international peace and security tasks and to do so with a particular focus on Africa.

Why study this issue? After the end of the Cold War and in the wake of the successful UN-sponsored military campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraq, the UN Security Council asked the secretary-general to provide it with a report outlining the ways in which the UN might deal with international peace and security issues in the new environment created by these two events. The result, *An Agenda for Peace*, put forward a number of proposals for new and resuscitated mechanisms for dealing with conflict. Among them was a suggestion that the UN draw on the support of regional organizations as a way of spreading the burden of UN efforts to deal with conflict. The secretary-general argued that greater cooperation with regional organizations could help lighten the burden of the Security Council as it sought to deal with the numerous conflicts now on its agenda, while also strengthening and democratizing UN efforts to deal with conflict.¹ Regional organizations were also perceived to offer certain advantages in carrying out regional conflict management tasks. As they are of the region, regional organizations bring strong background knowledge and existing personal and professional contacts to the process, permitting an ease of access and an ability to exert pressure that may not be available to the UN. For that reason, their involvement may seem less intrusive and be more welcome than that of the UN. And, because they are the first to be affected by the conflict in question they are more likely to generate the political will necessary to take immediate measures to deal with the conflict.

The secretary-general's proposal received general support but little in the way of thorough analysis before it was put into practice in various ways in both Europe and Africa, drawing regional organizations into largely undefined relationships with the UN in the midst of difficult and contentious efforts to deal with serious conflicts within their regions. Since then, the international community has acquired considerable and varied experience in a mechanism that is relatively new. These developments also generated a burst of interest in the idea in the academic literature.² Much of this literature, however, was written in the early 1990s before the bulk of the experiences examined here occurred, and very little of it offers a case study comparative approach. It is appropriate, therefore, to examine the practical experience of regional organizations' involvement in international conflict management in order to draw some specific lessons from this experience with a view to informing future efforts.

Why focus on Africa? First, because Africa is the region in which the assumptions and ideas associated with cooperative efforts between regional organizations and the UN have been most tested. Even while *An Agenda for Peace* was being written, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was engaging in its first intervention in Liberia. ECOWAS went on to be significantly involved in the conflict in Liberia and later in Sierra Leone. Other regional organizations in Africa have followed their lead and become involved in conflicts on a number of occasions and in a number of ways. There is, therefore, some significant experience to draw on here. Since that experience involves more than one regional organization, differing relationships with the UN, and different types of conflict, the African case studies have the potential to generate conclusions based on a comparative assessment. In addition, for those advocating a greater role for regional organizations in international peace and security, Africa is the region that has been held out as the one with the most to gain from such a development. The argument is that involving regional organizations in conflict management provides an opportunity for local actors to have greater input into the conflict management process—an "African solutions for African problems" approach—and to strengthen themselves in the process. An examination of the actual experience of regional organizations, therefore, will provide an opportunity to test these assumptions.

Second, the nature of the UN's experience in Africa has had an enduring and significant impact on the way in which the UN has dealt with conflict generally in the post-Cold War period. The impact of the UN's withdrawal from Somalia, followed by its failure in Rwanda has been considerable. An awareness of the high price of failure has affected many aspects of UN

operations since and has been one of the main reasons behind various efforts to rethink the way in which the UN deals with international peace and security. The experience contributed to a widespread hesitancy on the part of member-states to participate in operations dealing with complex conflicts. During the second half of the 1990s, the frequency with which the UN entered into new operations diminished almost to Cold War levels. The impact of Somalia and Rwanda was also evident in the ways in which Western states have responded to the Bosnian and Kosovo crisis, both in terms of the level of resources committed to those conflicts and, in the case of Kosovo, in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) decision to proceed without a UN Security Council mandate.

The third reason for the focus on Africa is that the UN's efforts to deal with conflict in Africa have generated mixed results at best. Failures and as yet unfinished efforts far outweigh success stories. Africa continues to struggle with long-standing, intractable conflicts whose continuation is a testament to the international community's inability to deal adequately with these situations. Countries such as Angola and Somalia have been left to an existence that continues to be dominated by conflict in the absence of any significant international response or after repeated UN efforts of intervention have failed. By anybody's count, the African continent is the source of the majority of the world's ongoing conflict. The imperative to develop and strengthen the international community's ability to deal with conflict more appropriately and efficiently is justified on this basis alone.

This book's focus is the context and nature of UN–regional organization interaction in Africa. In approaching this topic, the book examines three interrelated aspects of the issue: what has been said and done at the institutional level on these issues at the UN, what has been said and done by African regional organizations, and what has happened in practice in African conflict situations that have involved both regional organizations and the UN.

This approach will allow a comparison of the theory and the rhetoric with the practice, the actual experience on the ground. Such an assessment will help address a number of related questions that fall roughly into three categories. What can we learn, first about the role of regional organizations in conflict situations, second about the role of the UN, and third, on the basis of the first two what do we learn about the nature of the relationship between regional organizations and the UN, based on the African experience? Together these three categories will address questions such as, to what extent, if at all, has the UN–regional organization relationship developed in response to conflict in Africa? What is the nature of that relationship? What factors contributed to its development or lack of development? Are there tasks to

which regional organizations are better suited than other international actors? To what extent are regional organizations able to act in an impartial manner? What kind of constraints and opportunities are placed on the UN and on regional organizations or on each other in such situations?

By way of establishing the broader theoretical and practical context in which the case studies are situated, the first section of the book deals with overall themes. Chapter 1, what has been occurring at the institutional level at the UN by providing an overview of the Security Council debate on Africa and on the idea of greater cooperation with regional organizations, and placing that in the context of the operations the UN Security Council has authorized. The purpose here is to document as well as analyse the UN approach, with a view to establishing the rhetorical markers against which actions taken can be measured. In chapter 2, Eric Berman and Katie Sams document what has been occurring at the institutional level within the African regional organizations studied here in terms of their efforts to take on conflict management tasks. Their inventory indicates the extent to which regional organizations have evolved to take on these tasks but also shows that the financial, material, and political resources available for such tasks remain minimal and uneven. To complete the section on overall themes, in chapter 3 Clement Adibe engages in a comparative exercise that raises a number of the theoretical questions associated with regional organizations in the process of making an argument for the necessity of greater cooperation between regional organizations, especially the African Union (AU, formerly the Organization of African Unity (OAU)), and the UN.

The second section of this book contains the case studies. Six case studies were chosen to represent the spectrums of regional organization as well as UN involvement, with some form of regional involvement in the conflict being the baseline requirement. This last requirement means that two cases of profound importance to both the UN and conflict in Africa—Somalia and Rwanda—are not examined here. These two experiences contributed a great deal to the desire on the part of the UN to encourage greater cooperation with regional organizations in Africa. While the very limited involvement of regional actors in these situations means they are not covered here as separate case studies, their impact is widely felt and thus they are often discussed in the case study chapters.

Within the six case studies, there are two variables distinguishing them from one another: the level of participation of the organizations (both the UN and regional organizations) and the nature of the regional actors involved. With respect to the second variable the cases span a spectrum that includes regional organizations with considerable experience in the field

of conflict management (Sierra Leone and Liberia) to nascent regional organizations taking their first steps in this field (Sudan, Congo) to ad hoc regional arrangements developed in response to a conflict (Burundi). With respect to the level of organizational participation, the cases represent a range of differing levels of UN involvement, from virtually none (Sudan) to large-scale involvement (Sierra Leone and Eritrea–Ethiopia), as well as differing levels of regional involvement (from strong involvement in West Africa to weak involvement in Central Africa).

Because of the variations involved, and in order to allow the authors to focus on the key elements of the story needed to answer the questions posed, the case studies vary in their length. The chapter on Liberia, for example, takes advantage of the fact that the background to the Liberian conflict is extensively covered elsewhere and the length of time that has passed since the events in question, to focus more specifically on the nature of the relationship between the UN and ECOWAS. By contrast, the activities of both regional actors and the UN in other conflicts such as in the Congo or Burundi are very recent and have received little in the way of sustained attention, so considerable background is provided here.

A valid concern is the extent to which these case studies will provide a solid foundation for useful comparison. Though often treated otherwise, African conflicts are widely varied, the international community's response to them also varies, and regional organizations within Africa differ considerably in their *raison d'être* and their capabilities. It may be that one of the conclusions generated by this approach is that the differences between the various African cases are so significant that they should not be so directly compared. But such a conclusion needs to be arrived at on the basis of careful study rather than assumed.

As with any investigative enterprise there are inherent difficulties here. The case studies do not fit into neat packages that present themselves for direct comparison. Regions and conflicts overlap and are interconnected. Regional organizations differ considerably in their mandates, capabilities, and area of application. Indeed, an agreed definition of what constitutes a regional organization remains elusive.³ In part, this is a function of the difficulties inherent in defining what constitutes a region, a problem amply demonstrated by the African situation. The AU involves all African states and is generally thought of as a regional organization. The literature in this field often refers to other regional institutional entities in Africa as subregional organizations, although this term seems to be simply a function of the preexistence of a continental or region-wide organization in the form of the AU rather than a term that indicates any major functional distinction between regional and subregional organizations.

The framers of the UN Charter quite deliberately chose to avoid defining regional organizations in the Charter because of fears that such a definition would restrict inclusion and would lend itself to politically motivated interpretations as to which organizations qualified as such for the purposes of the Charter.⁴ Instead, the Charter refers simply to regional agencies or arrangements without defining the terms any further. Such terminology seems much better suited to the African experience than the term regional organization, as its comprehensiveness leaves open the possibility of ad hoc regional arrangements while still including more established institutional arrangements such as ECOWAS and the AU.

Any effort to define regional organization runs up against issues relating to the purpose, the degree of institutionalization, and the nature of decision-making in these organizations. While such factors are important determinants in analyzing the role of regional organizations, they are not critical in determining whether or not a given organization warrants examination for the purposes of this study. As the focus in this book is on the roles and relationships of regional entities, a functionally oriented approach is taken. Regional organizations are considered to be multistate geographically synchronous institutional entities that have played or are playing a role in conflict situations in Africa.

In order to fully understand the nature and implications of regional organizations and UN involvement, the case studies provide considerable background and discussion of the events and decisions made in the conflicts in question. The case studies are not intended, however, to provide comprehensive descriptions or analyses of the conflicts. In dealing with conflict-related analyses there are inevitably a number of major themes that play a role and there is no shortage of them here. The impact of colonialism and decolonization, attitudes about sovereignty and statehood, attitudes of Western states toward Africa, the role of ethnicity, and the internal political dynamics of the conflicts are all touched on in the case studies in various ways. This is not, however, a book about the sources of conflict in Africa or the desirability (or undesirability) of international intervention in those conflicts. The focus of the cases remains fixed on the involvement of the UN and regional organizations, their interaction (or lack thereof), their individual and joint impact on the conflict, and what this tells us about the idea and the practice of regional and international conflict management in Africa.

Editor's Note

Between the time that this book was written and the time it went to press, a number of developments occurred with respect to African regional

organizations that merit mention. The most notable is the transformation of the Organization of African Unity into the African Union. This occurred in July 2002. Where appropriate this change is noted in relevant chapters. The newness of this change, however, means that it has not had an impact on the case studies included here. For simplicity's sake all references to the OAU have been left as such, when reference is made to the organization or its activities after July 2002, the AU reference is applied.

Also of note is that beginning in September 2002, ECOWAS undertook mediation efforts in the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. A peace agreement, the Marcoussis Accord signed on January 24, 2003, as well as a Security Council resolution,⁵ give ECOWAS responsibility for the protection of key government officials, disarmament and demobilization, assistance in establishment of a government of national reconciliation, and the protection of civilians. As of March 2003, 1,264 ECOWAS troops were deployed in Côte d'Ivoire.⁶

Notes

1. The secretary-general argued: "Regional organizations participating in complementary efforts with the United Nations in joint undertakings would encourage States outside the region to act supportively. And should the Security Council choose specifically to authorize a regional arrangement or organization to take the lead in addressing a crisis within its region, it could serve to lend the weight of the United Nations to the validity of the regional effort. Carried forward in the spirit of the Charter, and as envisioned in Chapter VIII, the approach outlined here could strengthen a general sense that democratization is being encouraged at all levels in the task of maintaining international peace and security, it being essential to continue to recognize that the primary responsibility will continue to reside in the Security Council." *An Agenda for Peace*, UN, June 1992, para. 65.
2. See S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "Regional Organizations and Regional Security," *Security Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Autumn 1992), pp. 6–37; Benjamin Rivlin, "Regional Arrangements and the UN System for Collective Security and Conflict Resolution: A New Road Ahead?" *International Relations*, vol. XI, no. 2 (August 1992); Christopher J. Borgen, "The Theory and Practice of Regional Organization Intervention in Civil Wars," *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, vol. 26, no. 4 (Summer 1994), pp. 797–835; Michael Barnett, "Partners in Peace? The UN, Regional Organizations and Peace-keeping," *Review of International Studies*, vol. 21 (1995), pp. 411–433; Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements, the UN, and International Security: A Framework for Analysis," in Thomas G. Weiss, ed., *Beyond UN Subcontracting* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 3–29; Connie Peck, *Sustainable Peace, The Role of the UN and Regional Organizations in Preventing Conflict* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Michèle Griffin, "Blue Helmet Blues,

Assessing the Trend Towards ‘Subcontracting’ UN Peace Operations,” *Security Dialogue*, vol. 30, no. 1 (March 1999) pp. 43–60. For a look at the issue through the lens of humanitarian issues see David O’Brien, “The Search for Subsidiarity: The UN, Regional Organizations and Humanitarian Action,” *International Peacekeeping*, vol. 7, no. 3 (Autumn 2000), pp. 57–83.

3. For background on this debate, as well as on the debate about regionalism generally, see Louise Fawcett, Andrew Hurrell, eds., *Regionalism in World Politics, Regional Organization and International Order* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and David A. Lake, Patrick M. Morgan, eds., *Regional Orders, Building Security in a New World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997).
4. For more on the background to Chapter VIII in the UN Charter see Clement Adibe, Chapter 3, in this volume and Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1958).
5. Security Council Resolution 1464, February 4, 2003.
6. “ECOWAS Chiefs Propose Increase in Force in Cote d’Ivoire,” *Accra Mail*, posted on allafrica.com, March 6, 2003.

PART I

Overall Themes and Issues

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CHAPTER 1

United Nations Security Council Policy on Africa

Jane Boulden

The combined effects of the UN withdrawal from Somalia, and its failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda, prompted a retrenchment and reassessment of UN operations in Africa. Daunted and chastened by the scale of the problems they faced in Somalia and Rwanda, frightened of getting bogged down indefinitely in a complex and protracted conflict, and unwilling to take on the high risks of financial, personnel, and political losses, the major powers in the Security Council retreated from their initial post–Cold War enthusiasm for engagement in conflict. This was an across the board retreat, not one specifically associated with Africa. It was in Africa, however, that the Security Council’s immediate post–Cold War enthusiasm was most evident, both in terms of the numbers and the types of operations authorized. And it was, therefore, in Africa and because of Africa, that the retreat was the most keenly felt.

At about the same time as the crises in Somalia and Rwanda, the UN was expressing heightened interest in the idea of increased cooperation with regional organizations on issues relating to international peace and security. The shift toward greater cooperation with regional organizations is associated with *An Agenda for Peace* and the moves to develop new ways in which the UN could deal with conflict. The idea is not a new one. The potential role of regional organizations in helping the Security Council to deal with conflict was recognized at the founding of the organization and is articulated in Chapter VIII of the Charter. The idea gained a certain prominence during

NATO's involvement in the UNPROFOR operation in Bosnia. But even before *An Agenda for Peace* regional organizations were playing an international peace and security role in Africa with ECOWAS's operation in Liberia.

As this chapter indicates, these two trends—the retrenchment from Africa and the interest in the role of regional organizations—played into each other. The idea that regional organizations could play a larger role in international peace and security took on increased attractiveness in the context of the Security Council hesitancy about new operations.

In the literature about the various UN operations in Africa as well as in the literature about UN peace operations generally, the existence of a general trend toward devolution—that is toward a greater use of regional organizations or groups to undertake UN-authorized operations is often assumed or discussed without any sense of whether or not this is actually the case. Part of the purpose of this chapter is to determine whether or not it is true that the UN has given regional organizations a greater role in dealing with conflict in Africa and whether or not this has come about because of an active UN policy or as an ad hoc response to events. To do this, the first section of the chapter will outline and discuss how the Security Council has chosen to deal with African conflict situations and to what extent regional organizations have played a role. The second section of the chapter will examine the debate that has occurred within the Security Council on this issue. Since Kofi Annan took on the job of secretary-general, the Security Council has undertaken to look specifically at the situation in Africa. This has generated reports and debate on a variety of African-related issues. This chapter will examine the UN debate about international peace and security issues in Africa, with a specific focus on the role of regional organizations. In combination, therefore, the two sections of the chapter will provide a sense of whether or not the Security Council has been increasingly turning to regional organizations to deal with conflict issues in Africa, and why, and in what context it is, or is not, doing so.

United Nations Operations in Africa

General Characteristics

Of the 20 UN operations in Africa, four have been in Angola, three in Somalia, two in the Congo, two in Rwanda, and two in Sierra Leone, meaning that well over half of the operations have occurred in five countries. Of all of the operations in Africa, it is remarkable that only one operation occurred during the Cold War (19 of them have taken place in the post-Cold War era). This was not for a lack of situations that could have

used a UN response, but is an indication of the degree to which Africa was permeated by the effects of the Cold War. The exception to the UN's abstinence from Africa during the Cold War was the first UN operation in the Congo from 1960 to 1964. The Congo was one of the few places in Africa at that time that, until independence, remained outside of the Cold War struggle for influence in Africa. This fact contributed to the Soviet and U.S. willingness to accept a UN operation there, if only as a way of buying time to ensure the other side did not get a foothold there first.

While almost 30 years separate the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) from all of the later UN operations in Africa, the overall characteristics of the operation and the situation it sought to address are remarkably consistent with the operations that came later. Except for the very small-scale operation to oversee the withdrawal of Libyan personnel from the Aouzou strip area in Chad in fulfillment of an International Court of Justice decision, and the recent operation to monitor the cessation of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, all UN operations in Africa, including ONUC in the 1960s, have dealt with internal conflicts. In a very general way, these internal conflicts can be characterized as being the result of transitional times in the countries in question: they are postcolonial or post-Cold War or both. The conflict is the product of the struggle for power among different groups in the country in the vacuum that results from the transition.

Almost without exception UN operations in Africa have been associated with tasks relating to some form of peace agreement. The peace agreement is often but not always the result of UN efforts to facilitate a peaceful resolution to the crisis. As a consequence, UN involvement may be part and parcel of the agreement itself or it may be requested after an agreement has been achieved to help facilitate implementation. Because of their association with peace agreements, these operations generally include, *inter alia*, any combination of the following tasks: monitoring the withdrawal of troops from a given area; monitoring a cease-fire; overseeing and implementing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of forces; the protection of civilian populations, including refugees or internally displaced peoples; and overseeing elections.

There are three instances in which the UN Security Council authorized an operation in Africa in the absence of a peace agreement: the first UN operation in the Congo in 1960–1964, all three operations in Somalia, and the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL).¹ All of these operations were contentious and difficult, with the UN withdrawing completely from Somalia, and withdrawing most of its personnel from Sierra Leone when rebels overran the capital city.

The Mandates

For the most part, the Security Council response to conflicts in Africa has been to authorize a Chapter VI peacekeeping operation. This in spite of the fact that many of these situations have rarely fit the traditional peacekeeping criteria. The conflicts are internal. Often not all of the warring parties have given consent to the operation, cease-fires are broken, and conflict is ongoing or resumes after the operation is in place.

There have been only a few instances in which the Security Council has used Chapter VII to authorize the use of force beyond self-defense in Africa. These fall into two categories: situations in which Chapter VII authorization is built into the mandate from the beginning and situations in which Chapter VII authorization is added on to the mandate after the operation has begun, in response to developments on the ground. The UN efforts in Somalia are the only example of the first category. Two of the three operations in Somalia had Chapter VII authorization (these are also situations in which no peace agreement was in place). The Security Council used Chapter VII of the Charter to authorize the Unified Task Force operation in Somalia to use force in order to establish a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid. The United Nations Operation in Somalia II also had Chapter VII authorization, this time to carry out a range of military tasks, including disarmament, associated with a very broad-based peace-building mandate.

In the second category, both operations in the Congo had a mix of Chapters VI and VII authorization, as does the current operation in Sierra Leone. In these cases, the Security Council added Chapter VII authorization to the mandate in response to a deteriorating security situation in the field. In these instances, the additional authorization of the use of force beyond self-defense is not a blanket authorization but is associated with specific tasks. In ONUC, the first operation in the Congo, the Security Council authorized the use of force “as a last resort” in order to prevent civil war.² It later added a further authorization of the use of force beyond self-defense in order to ensure the withdrawal of foreign military and paramilitary personnel.³ In the most recent operation in the Congo, the additional authorization gives UN troops the authorization to take “necessary action” in order to protect UN personnel and facilities, ensure the security and freedom of movement of personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat.⁴ And in Sierra Leone, the Security Council gave the mission a similar mandate to “take the necessary action” to ensure security, freedom of movement, and protection of civilians.⁵ This mandate was later expanded to include other specific tasks, including security at disarmament sites, key government buildings, facilitating humanitarian aid, and in assisting Sierra Leone law enforcement officials in the implementation of their own tasks.⁶

Regional Organization Involvement

The framework for the relationship between regional organizations and the UN is found in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. Chapter VIII outlines a system that provides for regional arrangements to settle disputes through those arrangements where possible, before submitting them to the Security Council. Regional entities are, however, required to keep the Security Council fully informed of activities “undertaken or in contemplation” relating to international peace and security. For its part, the Security Council may use regional arrangements for enforcement action “where appropriate” but “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements . . . without the authorization of the Security Council” (Article 53). Together these articles suggest quite an active and cooperative relationship between regional arrangements and the UN. In practice, however, until the end of the Cold War, virtually no formal activity took place under Chapter VIII auspices.⁷

The idea of greater cooperation between regional organizations and the UN was revived by the UN secretary-general’s report, *An Agenda for Peace*, in 1992. *An Agenda for Peace* placed emphasis on the idea that regional organizations might be used to support UN peace efforts across the spectrum of operations from preventive diplomacy to post-conflict peace building. The secretary-general indicated that using regional organizations would not take away from the Council’s “primary” responsibility in dealing with international peace and security,

but regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with United Nations efforts could not only lighten the burden of the Council but also contribute to a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs.⁸

In theory, the model of cooperation with regional organizations sees the Security Council authorizing an operation and then, either as part of that authorization or in a separate decision, asking a regional arrangement to undertake the authorized tasks. This theoretical model is based on the primacy of the UN Charter provisions and the role of the Security Council as the only entity with the power to authorize the use of force. In practice, events have rarely followed this sequence.

Two years prior to the appearance of *An Agenda for Peace*, an African regional organization had already taken the initiative in conflict management. In August 1990, ECOWAS established the ECOWAS monitoring group (ECOMOG) in response to the crisis in Liberia. Later that month, on August 24, 1990, ECOMOG was deployed in Liberia and began a sustained

military operation there. ECOMOG was engaged in serious and ongoing hostilities in Liberia, and was effectively an intervention force. The UN's own portrayal of events euphemistically says that the UN "supported" the ECOWAS efforts to end the civil war,⁹ even though the operation did not have Security Council authorization and it was five months before the Security Council voiced an opinion on the matter, and then only in the form of a presidential statement giving general support to ECOWAS's efforts.¹⁰ It was more than two years after ECOMOG deployed in Liberia, before the Security Council passed a resolution dealing with the Liberian conflict. The resolution placed an arms embargo against Liberia and authorized the appointment of a special representative of the secretary-general.¹¹ Although the Security Council notes the request and the invitation by ECOWAS for the UN to send observers, no action was taken. It was another year, not until after the signing of a formal peace agreement, before the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of a peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL).¹²

A different sequence of events occurred in the Central African Republic (CAR). In January 1997, a meeting of a group of African leaders seeking to deal with the problems in the CAR, agreed to send an inter-African force to CAR to help restore peace and security there and to undertake disarmament of the rebel groups. Known as MISAB (Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui) the mission involved troops from six countries.¹³ As with UNOMIL it was some time—six months—before the Security Council dealt with the situation. In contrast to their response to Liberia, however, this time the Security Council passed a resolution specifically authorizing the mission. Not only did the Security Council "welcome" the efforts of MISAB and "approve" of the "continued conduct . . . of the operation in a neutral and impartial way" but the Security Council also invoked Chapter VII of the Charter and authorized MISAB participants as well as states supporting them to "ensure the security and freedom of movement of their personnel."¹⁴ It was another year, and then only after France threatened to withdraw its support for the operation, before the Security Council created a peacekeeping mission to oversee the implementation of the peace agreements.¹⁵

The UN response to ECOWAS involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict took a different course. In May 1997, the Kabbah government was overthrown by a military coup. In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Nigeria intervened militarily in support of the Kabbah government but was unsuccessful in pushing out the military junta. ECOWAS gave a form of approval to the intervention in June but did not actually authorize an ECOMOG mission until August. The purpose of the ECOMOG force was to monitor

the implementation of a cease-fire. This authorization was later extended to include assistance toward the reinstatement of the government.¹⁶ Again, the Security Council did not react immediately to the intervention. In July it issued a Presidential Statement that strongly supported an OAU appeal to ECOWAS and the international community to help with the restoration of the government in Sierra Leone, and which welcomed the involvement of the ECOWAS foreign ministers and their mediation efforts. But the statement gave no sense of approval or disapproval of the ECOWAS operation and no sense that the Security Council was on the verge of its own response.¹⁷ Five months after the coup, in October 1997, the Security Council imposed an arms and oil embargo on Sierra Leone, authorizing ECOWAS, under Chapter VIII of the Charter, to ensure the implementation of the oil embargo.¹⁸ A February 1998 ECOMOG military operation resulted in a collapse of the junta and a reinstatement of the Kabbah government. In response the Security Council lifted the embargoes and then in July, authorized the creation of a peacekeeping mission, UNOMSIL.¹⁹ UNOMSIL's mandate was primarily to monitor ECOMOG's activities and to observe disarmament efforts (under ECOMOG protection), as well as to monitor respect for human rights.

Another deterioration of the situation led to the evacuation of most of UNOMSIL in January 1999. ECOMOG troops eventually took control of the capital city and reinstalled the government. This sequence of events led to the negotiation of the Lomé Peace Agreement in July 1999. As a consequence, the following month the Security Council expanded the role for UNOMSIL and then a few months later authorized a new mission, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), to replace UNOMSIL and to oversee the implementation of the Lomé Agreement.²⁰ In establishing the new operation, the UN's efforts relied considerably on the continued commitment of ECOWAS to ensuring the implementation of the peace agreement. In his report to the Security Council outlining a concept of operations for UNAMSIL, the secretary-general indicated that the entire plan "is predicated upon ECOMOG remaining in Sierra Leone."²¹

This brief overview indicates that the Security Council has had a remarkable propensity to allow regional interventions involving the use of force. In response to regional interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and CAR, the Security Council took an initial "no comment" approach to the situation. When it finally did deal with the conflicts it chose to keep its distance, giving vocal support to the existing regional efforts and taking very limited initial steps itself. Such a policy provided tremendous freedom to the regional groups involved. The Security Council imposed no constraints on their

actions and did not formally (or even informally) disapprove of the fact that their initial actions were taken without the authorization of a Security Council mandate.

The lack of attention and fuss accorded to the fact that these military interventions have occurred without Security Council authorization stands in sharp contrast to the international debate that accompanied the non-Security Council authorized NATO intervention in Kosovo. And even in the debate about NATO actions in Kosovo, the African experiences were not raised as precedents. This is a reflection of the pervasive lack of attention to events in Africa rather than a sense that there is one standard of action for Africa and one for Europe. Differing standards of action are not the reason for the disparity in responses, but they are most definitely a product of that disparity.

The record also indicates that the Security Council's willingness to consider authorizing its own operation changes once a peace agreement is in place. Even then, however, the Security Council chooses to rely heavily on the existing regional operation to provide the major military presence and security, and rather than providing support and resources to the regional operation itself the Security Council calls on member-states to provide financial and other resources to the regional operation.

The Security Council Debate

The Focus on Africa

Beginning in 1995, the Security Council focused on the problems associated with conflict in Africa, in recognition both of the specific needs there and of the UN's own problems in dealing with them. In response to two requests for action,²² on November 1, 1995, the secretary-general responded with a report on "Improving preparedness for conflict prevention and peacekeeping in Africa."²³ The secretary-general noted that the lack of personnel, financial, and other resources posed real difficulties in UN operations in Africa, but that "these difficulties are not confined to operations in Africa."²⁴ In this context, much of the secretary-general's report focused on how African peacekeeping capabilities could be improved within the context of the general efforts to improve UN peacekeeping capabilities. Accordingly, the secretary-general's report discusses at length how African member-states could make use of standby arrangements for peacekeeping troop contributions, UN training efforts, and general UN attempts to ameliorate preparation and coordination of peacekeeping planning and implementation. In terms of specific

proposals to strengthen the OAU, the secretary-general proposed that a UN liaison officer be placed at OAU headquarters, that a staff exchange program be established between the two organizations, and that the UN provide assistance to the OAU in establishing a situation room and provide the OAU with information about peacekeeping training in which other states can participate.²⁵

In contrast to the tenor of the debates and proposals in later years, the secretary-general's report continuously places the issue of improving African preparedness in these areas within the overall context of the UN's own efforts. The last paragraph of the report drives this point home when the secretary-general notes, "irrespective of the level of preparedness and the effectiveness of cooperation between organizations" success, in the end, depends on the willingness of the parties to a conflict to settle their dispute peacefully and the willingness of UN member-states, especially those in the Security Council, to provide the necessary support and resources for successful mandate implementation.²⁶

In September 1997, the Security Council met at the level of foreign ministers to discuss ways of addressing and preventing conflict in Africa. Almost every speaker supported recent actions by the OAU to play a greater role in dealing with conflict in the region and the broader idea of encouraging greater involvement of regional and subregional organizations in the process generally. In each case, however, emphasis was also placed on ensuring that such actions took place within the context of the UN Charter. The statements of the foreign ministers at the meeting all supported the idea that Africa was an issue of particular concern. In his remarks the secretary-general suggested that there was now a consensus that the solution of Africa's problems lay with Africans themselves and that this determination, in turn, required a reevaluation of the role of the international community in support of Africa. "In place of interventionism it promised a mature relationship based on mutual support and trust."²⁷

The presidential statement issued as a result of the meeting placed emphasis on the important contributions that could be and were being made by subregional organizations in Africa and supported efforts to strengthen the capacity of regional groups to contribute to peacekeeping operations "including in Africa, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations." Concluding that "the challenges in Africa demand a more comprehensive response," the Security Council requested the secretary-general to prepare and submit recommendations on ways to prevent and address conflict in Africa and to establish a foundation for peace there.²⁸

The Secretary-General's Report

This is the process that begins a shift in the Security Council's focus from looking at the issue of how to deal with conflict in Africa as part of the broader question of how the UN responds to conflict to dealing with Africa as a particular region that needs special attention. In his 1998 report to the Security Council, the secretary-general provides an indication of why that should be so. He stated that the situation in Africa represents a particular problem for the international community, one that extends beyond the traditional question of defending states to become "a matter of defending humanity itself." And he argues that the African situation represents failure at a number of levels.

By not averting these colossal human tragedies, African leaders have failed the peoples of Africa; the international community has failed them; the United Nations has failed them. We have failed them by not adequately addressing the causes of conflict; by not doing enough to ensure peace; and by our repeated inability to create the conditions for sustainable development.²⁹

The secretary-general's report is remarkable in that it is quite forthright about the state of the relationship between the international community and Africa and the impact this is having. The secretary-general speaks of the international community's reluctance to assume the costs of involvement in Africa and even of "paralysis" of action. "This reluctance seems to go well beyond the lessons that Somalia offers, and it has had a particularly harsh impact upon Africa."³⁰ The consequences work in both directions. According to the secretary-general, not only has the international community pulled back from Africa but this has also generated a commensurate retrenchment on the part of African states "to marginalize the United Nations from further political involvement in the region's affairs."³¹

The Role of Regional Organizations

The secretary-general states that the support of regional and subregional initiatives is "both necessary and desirable."³²

Such support is necessary because the United Nations lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa. It is desirable because wherever possible the international community should strive to complement rather than supplant African efforts to resolve Africa's problems.³³

The secretary-general conditioned his support of the greater use and support of regional organizations, however, demonstrating his sense that while there were advantages to be gained by such a move there were also some serious potential pitfalls. In particular, he voiced concern about the implications of authorizing the use of force by coalitions of states. Perhaps reflecting the experiences in Liberia, Somalia, and even the Persian Gulf, the secretary-general noted that the Security Council needed to improve its ability to monitor such activities to ensure that the mandate was being fulfilled as authorized. In fact, the secretary-general's discussion of this issue is heavily couched with concern that the shift toward greater devolution of tasks would bring with it greater distance in terms of the lines authority. Thus the secretary-general says: "We should not, however, draw the conclusion that such responsibilities can henceforth be delegated solely to regional organizations, either in Africa or elsewhere. Delegation does not represent a panacea for the difficult problems facing peacekeeping."³⁴ And, with respect to the question of strengthening the capacity of African organizations to undertake peacekeeping he warns: "These efforts are not in any way intended to relieve the broader international community of its collective obligations under the Charter of the United Nations."³⁵

The secretary-general then went on to sound a general warning, while at the same time bringing the question of Africa back into the wider realm of the UN's ability and determination to act generally.

Failure to act in the face of serious threats to peace and human lives in Africa threatens the credibility and legitimacy of the United Nations not only in the area of peace and security but also in its other areas of work. Moreover, wide disparities in the international community's commitment to preventing or containing conflicts in different regions impede the ability of the United Nations to promote a stable and just international order anywhere.³⁶

The Security Council Response

The Security Council met on April 24, 1998 to consider the secretary-general's report. The statements made at the meeting were wide-ranging but generally supportive of the secretary-general's report. Many speakers, African and non-African, talked of a "partnership" between the UN and Africa. General support was also given to the idea of making greater use of regional arrangements and of strengthening the capacity of African regional organizations to play such a role, though such support was almost always

conditioned with the caveat that the Security Council must maintain its primary responsibility for international peace and security. Along the lines of the partnership idea, a number of speakers used the word “complementary” to describe the preferred relationship between the UN and regional arrangements, implicitly cautioning against any sense that the regional organizations should take the lead on these issues or that the Security Council should shirk its own responsibilities.

The following month, in Resolution 1170, the Security Council established a working group of Council members for a six-month period to review the secretary-general’s recommendations and establish a framework for their implementation.³⁷ The resolution also expressed the Security Council’s “intention” to hold ministerial meetings on Africa on a biennial basis. The Security Council’s working group established six subgroups to cover specific issues: the effectiveness of arms embargoes, strengthening African peacekeeping capabilities; regional cooperation; an international mechanism for maintaining security and neutrality of refugee camps; arms flows; and enhancing the Security Council’s ability to monitor activities it authorizes.

The activities of the subgroup on developing African peacekeeping capabilities resulted in a Security Council Presidential Statement on September 16, 1998. The statement reaffirmed the Security Council’s support for strengthening Africa’s capacity to participate in peacekeeping operations and focused primarily on the provision of training assistance.³⁸ As a final note, the Security Council “stresses the need for it to be fully informed of peacekeeping activities carried out or planned by regional or subregional organizations” and emphasized the importance of a regular flow of information between these organizations and the UN. With that end in mind the Security Council “encourages” the secretary-general to establish a UN liaison mechanism with those organizations and “invites” member-states who are also members of the organizations in question to provide the UN with information about their peacekeeping activities.³⁹ That same day the Security Council passed a resolution resulting from the subgroup on arms embargoes. The resolution, *inter alia*, called for the various Security Council sanctions committees to get in touch with regional and subregional organizations, especially in Africa, as a way of improving their ability to monitor the implementation of arms embargoes.⁴⁰

Two days later, the Security Council passed a resolution on the question of regional cooperation.⁴¹ The resolution urged the secretary-general to assist in establishing an early warning mechanism within the OAU and in strengthening the existing OAU conflict management centre. The Security Council suggested that the secretary-general use the United Nations Trust

Fund for Improving the Preparedness for Conflict Prevention to fulfill this goal. At a general level the Security Council commended the various efforts being made by states, regional organizations, and the UN to enhance African preparedness and capabilities. At the more specific level the resolution called on the secretary-general to enhance and develop communication and collaboration measures between the UN and the OAU and subregional organizations.

There was little that was earth-shatteringly new in these resolutions or statements. They called for small-scale steps that would mark improvements or consolidation of existing measures or decisions. In these measures the Security Council did a lot in the way of encouraging and urging others, particularly the secretary-general to take various actions. But there was nothing in the way of innovative change or of any form of support of the process beyond the resolutions and statements.

The Foreign Ministers Meeting

The Security Council met again at the level of foreign ministers on September 24, 1998 as the first meeting in the series of biennial meetings authorized by the Council. The discussion was more wide-ranging than the foreign ministers meeting that launched the Africa-focused process. Speakers expressed concern about the continued deterioration of conflicts in Africa and placed less emphasis on the potential or current role of regional organizations. Instead, speakers placed the question of peace in Africa in the broader context of economic, social, and political concerns. Many speakers pointed out that achieving peace in Africa required a broad approach that included recognition of the importance of development, trade, dealing with the debt issue, and making some attempt to control arms transfers. On the issue of cooperation with regional groups, the presidential statement that was issued as a result of the Security Council meeting commended the efforts of African states and organizations to resolve conflicts peacefully and called on all states to provide “financial and technical support” to help strengthen those organizations’ ability to deal with “conflict prevention, the maintenance of peace and security and dispute settlement.”⁴²

On November 30, 1998, the Security Council issued a Presidential Statement dealing with the role of regional organizations. While generally supportive of the “increasingly important role” regional arrangements can and should play, the statement focused on how adequate linkage and accountability could be maintained in situations where regional arrangements or coalitions of states play a role. In establishing general standards for

such operations, the Security Council outlined the basic criteria it uses for any operations. Namely that there should be a “clear mandate, including a statement of objectives, rules of engagement, a well-developed plan of action, a time-frame for disengagement, and arrangements for regular reporting to the Council.”⁴³

Recognizing that cooperative relationships of this kind take a variety of forms, the Council outlined a number of ways in which monitoring of activities and information flow might occur. These methods included the attachment of a UN liaison officer or team to operations, the regular submission of reports and regular briefing meetings, and the possibility of co-deployment of UN observers in operations being implemented by regional arrangements. Adding to its list of general criteria for these operations, at the end of the statement the Council emphasized the need for “a clear framework for cooperation and coordination” between the UN and regional arrangements when both were operating in the same mission. The clear framework should include a statement of the objectives of the operation, a “careful” delineation of the respective roles and responsibilities of the organizations, the areas of interactions of the forces and provisions for the safety and security of personnel. “The Council also stresses the importance of ensuring that United Nations missions maintain their identity and autonomy with regard to operational command and control and logistics.”⁴⁴

The Progress Report

In contrast to the level of activity generated by the secretary-general’s report in 1998, UN action on Africa was relatively low-key during 1999. On September 25, 1999, the secretary-general issued a progress report on his original report, outlining the steps that had been taken in response. On the issue of peacekeeping, a number of specific measures had been undertaken with the OAU. The two organizations were working together on a staff exchange program, and had agreed that the UN Secretariat would serve as a clearinghouse of information on enhancing Africa peacekeeping capabilities. Some specific measures had also been taken with respect to improving training for African peacekeeping. In terms of African support to UN peacekeeping, a further 11 African states had joined the UN Standby Arrangement System for a total of 23 participating African states.⁴⁵

While the secretary-general expressed his belief that “a beginning has been made” in strengthening cooperation between the UN and African regional organizations, he also expressed a strong word of caution about the way forward in the absence of resources. At that point in time, for example, the

United Nations Trust Fund for Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa had received only one donation, from the United Kingdom, for a total of US\$250,745.⁴⁶ He appealed again for generous donations to the trust funds as well as for bilateral and multilateral donations, saying: “The Secretariat’s efforts are severely constrained—and in some cases even jeopardized—by the absence of resources.”⁴⁷

Indeed this was the most persistent and strongest theme of the secretary-general’s progress report. While speaking of “dramatic changes for the better” in Africa and of a “refreshing willingness to acknowledge past mistakes and sincerely, work together for a better common future”⁴⁸ the secretary-general warned that these positive developments needed a response in order to consolidate them.

Of course, it falls first to Africans to help themselves; but those nations making good-faith efforts and adopting enlightened politics deserve much greater support than they are now receiving. Where the international community is committed to making a difference, it has proved that significant and rapid transformation can be achieved. There is no excuse for not doing what is reasonable and doable . . . Never have the nations of Africa been better placed to benefit from outside involvement and help. The right kind of assistance now, carefully directed to those best able to use it, could boost Africa’s own courageous efforts, and help Africans turn a corner and set the stage for a brighter future.⁴⁹

The Security Council Debate

After the submission of the secretary-general’s progress report, the Security Council held two days of debate on the issue. By now the international response to the crisis in Kosovo, in particular NATO’s moves toward organizing a bombing campaign, was having an impact on the UN generally. In his speech to the Security Council, the secretary-general sounded a warning about the implications of the activity and decisions surrounding the Kosovo crisis, noting if the UN is to retain its credibility the international community’s commitment to dealing with conflict “must be applied fairly and consistently irrespective of region or nation.”⁵⁰ This was a theme that was echoed repeatedly in the two days of deliberations on the secretary-general’s progress report. In particular, Nigeria pointed out that the international community was spending \$1.50 per day per refugee while in Rwanda and Sierra Leone the amount spent was 11 cents per day.⁵¹ A second and related concern expressed by a number of African speakers was that the Security Council would turn to the use of regional organizations as a way of abdicating its

responsibility for dealing with conflict. In the context of the time, this concern seemed to reflect a sense that the possibility of NATO taking action in Kosovo would encourage a general handing off of activity to regional organizations by the Security Council. For Africans, an ongoing link to the UN is vital. No regional organization there possesses either the authority or the resources to undertake significant action independently and in the absence of the interest of major powers, the UN is Africa's most important tool for keeping the outside world engaged.

By December, when the Security Council held an open debate on the situation in Africa, these themes were being voiced with more determination and concern. The looming crisis in Kosovo and the apparent determination of NATO to respond with force, even in the absence of a Security Council mandate, accentuated the disparity in the international community's responses to crises in Europe and those in Africa. Speakers from African states expressed a high level of frustration about this disparity. They argued that in spite of the level of debate and rhetoric in recent years, Africa was increasingly being left to fend for itself while considerable resources and efforts were being made in other regions. Many said that what was needed was not further debate but action and commitment. Referring to the Security Council's attitudes, the representative from Gambia spoke of a "policy of neglect" and the Brazilian representative spoke of a "distant and cautious" attitude that was haunted by the "ghosts of failure" and a feeling of "chronic impotence."⁵² South Africa indicated that there was a general perception in Africa that the Security Council's response to the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was a "litmus test" for the UN. This statement prompted a response from the Netherlands during the open debate on the situation in the Congo that occurred the following day. The representative of the Netherlands said that the test was not for the Security Council but was for the parties to the conflict. African and non-African states responded in turn by reiterating their view that there was a fundamental problem with the inconsistency of the Security Council's response that was separate from the question of the commitment of the parties to the conflict. Had the major powers given even a small proportion of the level of support to the Congo peace process that they were giving to Kosovo, the peace process in the Congo would be much further advanced and more stable than it was at that moment.⁵³

More diplomatically, the secretary-general focused on the question of a lack of adequate resources. He asked the Security Council to consider urgently how regional operations could be more fairly and efficiently financed and suggested that it was not fair to expect Africans to engage more fully in peacekeeping tasks without assistance. On that point he also

indicated that the Secretariat itself had a resource problem that was not helped when the Security Council gave it tasks but then left the financing to voluntary contributions. This concern was echoed by the Canadian representative who indicated that the devolution of responsibility for dealing with a number of conflict-related issues had occurred with little regard for whether or not the regional arrangements had the capacity to carry out these tasks. In the Canadian view, the UN's own mechanisms needed to be strengthened and improved. The challenge, therefore, was not to create new mechanisms but to ensure that the existing ones work properly.⁵⁴

Although the Security Council debates indicate an ongoing concern about conflict in Africa (January 2000 was designated "the month of Africa"), they generated little in the way of concrete action. Hope for a change in that pattern came in January 2002 when Mauritius submitted a specific set of guidelines for orienting the discussion.⁵⁵ The resulting Security Council debate led, *inter alia*, to agreement on the creation of an Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa.⁵⁶ Once convened the Ad Hoc Working Group established a very specific program of work.⁵⁷ Reflecting an overall trend away from an emphasis on regional organizations, greater cooperation with the AU and other regional organizations was one element of that program, but only one element of seven.

The Wider Debate on Peacekeeping

The question of the role of regional organizations, and to some extent the specific examples in Africa, were also dealt with in the wider debate that has been occurring within the UN on how to strengthen and improve the organization's ability to carry out its peacekeeping operations. That debate has been informed by three recent interrelated reports and discussions: the Special Committee on Peacekeeping's (SCOPK) report on the secretary-general's responding report, the Special Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (known as the Brahimi Report), and a report issued by the Lessons Learned Unit on cooperation with regional arrangements.

The SCOPK report,⁵⁸ the secretary-general's response to it,⁵⁹ as well as the Lessons Learned report⁶⁰ all reiterated the now standard themes of support for the idea of increased cooperation with regional organizations and the need for greater coordination and dedication of resources.

In the wake of the operations in Bosnia and Rwanda, in March 2000, the secretary-general established an independent panel to examine the UN's approach to peace operations with a view to developing proposals that would help ensure that the situations and failures of these operations do not recur.

The report is extensive, covering a wide range of issues associated with peace operations. The report provides only one paragraph on the question of cooperation with regional organizations, essentially endorsing the concept without providing any further comment or proposals.⁶¹ Given the extensive and detailed nature of the report, its very limited acknowledgment of the role of regional organizations is notable. Following that lead, after considering the report's recommendations, on November 13, 2000, the Security Council passed a resolution outlining its response to the report. The resolution accepts and acts on a number of the report's recommendations but makes no mention of the potential role of regional organizations in peace operations.⁶²

Conclusions

The debate within the Security Council is revealing in a number of ways. First, because it is a debate. The ongoing discussion in the Security Council, while sometimes a dialogue of the deaf, is at minimum a forum in which the question of how to deal with conflict in Africa is addressed and where African states can voice their views on the situation. The very fact that the Security Council accepts that African conflict issues warrant attention in and of themselves, beyond dealing with specific crises, is itself important.

Second, while no one questions the value of the idea of greater involvement and cooperation with regional organizations, the debate demonstrates just how deep the divide is between African states and the rest as to the desired path forward and what is needed to get there. African countries, along with some of the other non-permanent members of the Security Council, express a consistent message. While willing and interested in the idea of greater involvement of regional organizations in dealing with conflict, they persistently emphasize the need for UN engagement in the process in any form and at every stage of the process. Permanent members, while varied in the specifics of their positions, support the idea of greater cooperation with regional organizations and the idea of enhancing their capacity to deal with conflict, but they avoid committing the UN, through the Security Council, to on-the-ground involvement of the type that occurred in the first half of the 1990s.

This is a story of contradictory messages and impulses. At the level of debate, the Security Council has expressed willingness and even a desire for greater cooperation with regional organizations in Africa. They have done so with the unceasing reminder that this cooperation must occur within the context of the primacy of the provisions of the UN Charter. This reminder has been accompanied by an ongoing concern about the loss of control that

might be engendered by greater cooperation and delegation to regional organizations. This concern is evidenced in the Security Council's focus on the mechanics of institutional linkages—developing ways of monitoring activities that have been delegated to regional organizations, developing better liaison and communication systems, and requirements for detailed ongoing reporting from the field.

And yet, in practice the Security Council has shown quite a different face. In response to regional military initiatives taken without Security Council authorization, it has demonstrated relatively little concern for ensuring the primacy of the Charter and has been remarkably unprotective of its own turf. In addition, even with respect to the more mechanical organizational questions such as liaison and coordination, the actual resource commitment from the Security Council to these issues has been quite limited. Very little of the discussion and concern in Security Council debates is translated into supportive action. And nowhere is the disparity between words and practice more evident than in the financial resources member-states have been willing to commit to follow up on the verbal pledges. In the aftermath of the Somalia and Rwanda experiences, the increased interest in cooperation with and strengthening of regional arrangements in Africa has been portrayed as a way of empowering Africans to take greater control of their own futures and of decreasing the extent of external involvement in the continent. While African countries have been generally receptive to this idea, the problems are so extensive and severe that it is unrealistic to expect that they can take on this task without assistance from the international community.

The question of a greater role for regional organizations, as a separate issue, has come full circle in the midst of the debate on Africa. What started as a general idea that came to have a specific focus in Africa has returned to being one of a number of ideas about how to improve the organization's ability to deal with international peace and security issues.

In coming back full circle, though, the impetus for the idea has changed. When the secretary-general first made his proposal for a new look at the role of regional organizations in *An Agenda for Peace*, the idea was that regional organizations could help to take up the slack or "lighten the burden" of the Security Council during a time of unprecedented activity for the organization. By contrast, in the aftermath of Somalia and Rwanda, regional organizations are seen as taking up the slack not because of stretched resources and major commitments but because of the Security Council's unwillingness to take the risks or commit the resources necessary to deal effectively with conflict in Africa. In this latter instance, therefore, the greater reliance on

regional organizations is a result of an unwillingness to commit rather than because the idea has intrinsic merit.

The impact of the NATO military operation in Kosovo on all of these factors cannot be underestimated. The scale of the operation and the absence of a Security Council mandate confirmed the perception among African countries that the unwillingness of the major powers to become involved in African conflict situations is primarily due to an absence of political will and an unwillingness to take risks in Africa. This belief is the source of the increasingly frequent statements by African and other Security Council members that greater participation by regional organizations cannot be an excuse for the Security Council to shirk its responsibility. Devolution must not be a cover for disengagement. The Swedish representative articulated this best when he said that Africa was not seeking “special” treatment but was only looking for “equal” treatment.

Notes

1. A fourth example not involving a peace agreement is the UN operation in Chad, which monitored troop withdrawals ordered by the International Court of Justice.
2. Security Council Resolution 161, February 21, 1961.
3. Security Council Resolution 169, November 24, 1961.
4. Security Council Resolution 1291, February 24, 2000, para. 8.
5. Security Council Resolution 1270, October 22, 1999.
6. Security Council Resolution 1289, February 7, 2000, para. 10.
7. For a good overview of how Chapter VIII was developed in the early stages of the debate and negotiations on the formation of the UN Charter, see Ruth B. Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter, The Role of the United States 1940–1945* (Washington DC: Brookings, 1958), pp. 107–108, 398–399, 472–474.
8. *An Agenda for Peace*, S/24111, June 17, 1992, para. 64.
9. See, e.g., the information on the UN website: http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/unomil.htm. Last visited March 6, 2003.
10. S/22133, January 22, 1991.
11. Security Council Resolution 788, November 19, 1992.
12. Security Council Resolution 866, September 22, 1993.
13. Burkino Faso, Chad, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, and Togo. For more on the mandate of the mission see Eric G. Berman, Katie E. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000), pp. 222–224.

14. Security Council Resolution 1125, August 6, 1997.
15. Security Council Resolution 1159, March 27, 1998.
16. For more on this see chapter 5 by W. Ofuately-Kodjoe in this volume.
17. S/PRST/1997/36, July 11, 1997.
18. Security Council Resolution 1132, October 8, 1997.
19. Security Council Resolution 1181, July 13, 1998.
20. Security Council Resolution 1270, October 22, 1999.
21. S/1999/1003, September 23, 1999.
22. In 1995, the secretary-general received two requests to deal specifically with the question of greater cooperation and support of regional organizations in Africa. The first request, from the Security Council, asked the secretary-general to consider ways of improving practical cooperation and coordination between the UN and regional organizations, with particular attention to the needs of the OAU. S/PRST/1995/9, February 22, 1995. The second request, a few months later, came from the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations. The Committee asked the secretary-general to examine and develop proposals that had been made to improve the UN's ability to respond rapidly to emergency situations in Africa, especially through cooperation with the OAU. A/50/230, June 22, 1995.
23. A/50/711-S/1995/911, November 1, 1995.
24. *Ibid.*, para. 16.
25. *Ibid.*, para. 40.
26. *Ibid.*, para. 44.
27. As quoted in SC/6420, September 25, 1997.
28. S/PRST/1997/46, September 25, 1997.
29. The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa, Report of the Secretary-General, A/52/871-S/1998/318, April 13, 1998, para. 5.
30. *Ibid.*, para. 29.
31. *Ibid.*, para. 29.
32. *Ibid.*, para. 41.
33. *Ibid.*, para. 41.
34. *Ibid.*, para. 44.
35. *Ibid.*, para. 45.
36. *Ibid.*, para. 46.
37. Security Council Resolution 1170, May 28, 1998.
38. S/PRST/1998/28, September 16, 1998.
39. *Ibid.*
40. Security Council Resolution 1196, September 16, 1998.
41. Security Council Resolution 1197, September 18, 1998.
42. S/PRST/1998/29, September 24, 1998.
43. S/PRST/1998/35, p. 2.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

45. Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of the Recommendations Contained in the Report on the Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa, S/1999/1008, September 25, 1999, paras. 19–27.
46. *Ibid.*, para. 28.
47. *Ibid.*, para. 101.
48. *Ibid.*, para. 97, 99.
49. *Ibid.*, para. 103, 105.
50. “Secretary-General Highlights Positive Changes in Africa,” SG/SM/7153AFR/177, September 29, 1999.
51. SC/6736, September 30, 1999.
52. SC/6771, December 15, 1999.
53. SC/6674, December 16, 1999.
54. SC/6671, December 15, 1999.
55. S/2002/46, January 11, 2002.
56. S/PRST/2002/2, January 31, 2002.
57. See the briefing given to the Security Council by the Group’s Chairman. SC/7406, May 22, 2002.
58. In its 1999 report, the SCOPK supported strengthened cooperation between the UN and regional arrangements. As with every other UN document dealing with this issue, the Committee emphasized the primacy of the UN and that such cooperation must occur within the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The Committee also added that enforcement measures could only be carried out by regional arrangements with Security Council authorization. The Committee gave its support to the general efforts to build peacekeeping capacity in African member-states. It specifically asked states to focus on enhancing the OAU’s capabilities and asked that states contribute both to the OAU Peace Fund and the UN’s Trust Fund for capacity building. “Comprehensive review of the whole question of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects,” A/54/87, June 23, 1999, paras. 115–116.
59. The secretary-general noted the Committee’s support of the idea of greater cooperation with regional arrangements and observed, as he has elsewhere, that such cooperation poses “considerable challenges,” especially with respect to differing mandates, and financial and logistical resources. The secretary-general went on to note the participation of African states in a number of ongoing peacekeeping operations and made the point that strengthening the capacity of African states to engage in peacekeeping contributed to the ability of the UN to deal with conflict generally. This is one of the few instances in which the idea of building African peacekeeping capacity is placed in the context of supporting the UN’s capabilities as a whole rather than as a way of helping Africans to help themselves. “Implementation of the recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, Report of the Secretary-General,” A/54/670, January 6, 2000, para. 90.

60. The UN's Lessons Learned Unit issued a report on cooperation between regional organizations and the UN. The report used six case studies to propose a framework of mechanisms and principles to be used in guiding future efforts. The report necessarily takes a broad view of the issue and contains little that is Africa specific. The proposed principles for cooperation represent a distillation of all of the various proposals and ideas on this issue that have so often been discussed within the various forums of the UN. The report called for ongoing and dynamic consultation beginning before an operation is authorized, clear mandates, regular information flow to and from the Security Council and the UN generally, shared expertise, a common understanding of doctrine and approach, and sufficient political and financial support. The report also put forward a number of proposals for ways of enhancing cooperation, including the development of specific methodologies for greater ongoing consultation and the development of joint doctrine and joint training exercises. While the report does not provide dramatic new proposals for ways forward, it has value in that it is the only time in which the various issues surrounding the question of greater cooperation between the UN and regional arrangements are drawn together and drawn on to elaborate a set of guidelines for action. UN, Lessons Learned Unit, "Cooperation between the United Nations and Regional Organizations/Arrangements in a Peacekeeping Environment, Suggested Principles and Mechanisms," March 1999.
61. The Charter clearly encourages cooperation with regional and subregional organizations to resolve conflict and establish and maintain peace and security. The UN is actively and successfully engaged in many such cooperation programmes in the field of conflict prevention, peacemaking, elections and electoral assistance, human rights monitoring and humanitarian work, and other peace-building activities in various parts of the world. Where peacekeeping operations are concerned, however, caution seems appropriate, because military resources and capability are unevenly distributed around the world, and troops in the most crisis-prone areas are often less prepared for the demands of modern peacekeeping than is the case elsewhere. Providing training, equipment, logistical support, and other resources to regional and subregional organizations could enable peacekeepers from all regions to participate in a UN peacekeeping operation or to set up regional peacekeeping operations on the basis of a Security Council resolution. Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, August 23, 2000, para. 54.
62. Security Council Resolution 1327, November 13, 2000.

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CHAPTER 2

The Peacekeeping Potential of African Regional Organizations

Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams

Introduction

This chapter seeks to determine how effective African regional organizations have been in conducting peacekeeping¹ and to analyze their efforts to improve their capabilities to manage and resolve conflicts. To do this, the first section reviews the peacekeeping missions that African regional organizations have undertaken and highlights the political, military, and financial constraints from which they have suffered.² The second section describes and assesses various peace and security mechanisms that African regional organizations are establishing as well as other measures they are taking to enhance their preparedness. Based on this overview, the concluding section then draws some lessons for both regional organizations and UN efforts in the future.

The focus of this chapter is the three regional organizations that are dealt with in this volume: the AU, ECOWAS, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Special attention is also paid to the Treaty on Non-Aggression, Assistance, and Mutual Defense (ANAD) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), as ANAD fielded a peacekeeping operation and IGAD has been especially active in conflict prevention. Other regional organizations have taken steps toward establishing institutional mechanisms for dealing with regional conflict,³ but

they are not covered here as their experience is limited and they do not feature in the book's case studies.

African countries have extensive peacekeeping experience. Thirty-six states have participated in UN operations since 1960, and two-thirds of them have contributed formed units at company-strength or above. All but three have provided military observers or civilian police. Of the 54 UN peacekeeping operations that have occurred by mid-2001, African countries have taken part in all but ten. They have also participated actively in Western-led multinational forces (MNFs); 22 have sent troops, military observers, or civilian police to 12 different operations, from Korea in 1950 to Kosovo in 2001. Moreover, they have shown an increasing political willingness to participate in such operations. Prior to 1988, just 12 African countries had taken part in UN missions, and most of them had only sent peacekeepers to ONUC in the early 1960s. Since 1999, 29 have contributed Blue Helmets, most to more than one mission. African countries have participated in all but one of the non-African-led MNFs that have received UN authorization since 1990.

Yet it is erroneous to conclude from such statistics and trends that African countries possess a capability to undertake peacekeeping on their own. The preponderance of the formed units they furnished has consisted of infantry troops with limited mobility. Since ONUC, only five African countries have contributed specialized units to UN peacekeeping operations. The structure and benefits associated with UN peacekeeping operations, however, make it easier and more attractive for many African states to participate. Countries providing Blue Helmets are assisted with deployment to the mission area, transportation to their areas of operation, and resupply once in position. The financing scheme for UN peacekeeping operations is sufficiently generous to enable the governments to cover their expenses and usually operate at a profit. African countries providing troops to non-African-led MNFs operate under similar conditions except that the level of reimbursement (if any) is substantially reduced.

African countries are nevertheless assuming a leading role in peacekeeping on their continent. External factors have played a large part in this trend. After a brief period of hyperactivity, beginning in 1993 the UN Security Council became increasingly unwilling to authorize large, multifaceted UN peacekeeping operations—especially in Africa. The end of the superpower competition for ideological and political support on the African continent also influenced events. Internal factors played an important role as well. African states realized that the status quo was unacceptable and that they would have to become more self-reliant in responding to armed conflict and complex humanitarian emergencies in their midst. A growing number of

African countries no longer viewed state sovereignty as sacrosanct, which facilitated such developments.

African Organizations' Peacekeeping Operations

African-led peacekeeping efforts have centered on regional organizations. Of the 20 African-led missions that were operational by June 2001, only five have occurred on a purely ad hoc basis.⁴ The other 16 missions have been undertaken by four regional organizations: the AU; ECOWAS; SADC; and ANAD.

African regional organizations have acquired the vast majority of their peacekeeping experience over the past ten years. The OAU, the continent's oldest and most universal organization,⁵ was the first to field a peacekeeping operation. In the early 1980s, it supported two missions in Chad. A decade later, the Organization deployed three missions in Rwanda. It then undertook observer missions in Burundi (1993), in the Comoros (1997), in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (1999), and in Eritrea and Ethiopia (2000). In West Africa, ECOWAS has taken the lead both diplomatically and militarily in responding to crises. ECOWAS has deployed three sizable peace missions—first in Liberia (1990), then in Sierra Leone (1997), and most recently in Guinea-Bissau (1998)—and has authorized a fourth operation in Guinea (2000). ECOWAS is not the only organization in West Africa to have deployed a peacekeeping force. ANAD dispatched a small observer mission along the border between Burkina Faso and Mali in 1986. In Southern Africa, SADC members have fielded two multinational operations—in DRC and in Lesotho—both in 1998.

The Organization of African Unity

Chad (1980–1982)

The OAU's peacekeeping initiatives in Chad in the early 1980s represent the first time an African regional organization fielded a peacekeeping force. An ill-fated 1979 Nigerian mission had OAU diplomatic support, but was fundamentally a bilateral arrangement between Chad and Nigeria. In January 1980, a battalion from Congo (Brazzaville) arrived in the Chadian capital, Ndjamena, as the result of an OAU-sanctioned peace conference. This second operation proved no more effective than the Nigerian force and was withdrawn after three months. A third mission was deployed in November 1981. It lasted just long enough to oversee a conclusion to the civil war in June 1982. Whereas the OAU only considers the third undertaking to have been an "OAU" operation, the second one, which was known as the

“OAU Neutral Force,”⁶ is also considered here, as the OAU secretary general was to head the agreed-upon monitoring commission according to the peace agreement.

The 1980 OAU mission suffered so greatly from insufficient political will and financial resources that its likely military deficiencies were never tested. Although the force was conceived as multinational, only one of three countries that offered troops sent its contingent. OAU member-states proved reluctant to fund the operation. Congo (Brazzaville), with the aid of an Algerian airlift, eventually did contribute an infantry battalion, and Ethiopia provided the force commander. The Congolese rarely left their barracks and returned home with the aid of France shortly after the civil war flared up again.⁷ Even if all three countries had sent troops as proposed and the sought-after money had been raised, the success of the operation would have been questionable given the unworkable mandate and the chaotic political environment within Chad.

Western prodding and largesse, along with Libya's actions, provided the impetus for the OAU to establish another peacekeeping force. In December 1980, Libya sent thousands of troops to Ndjamena to support Goukouni, the head of the *Gouvernement d'union nationale de transition* (GUNT). The next month, Chad and Libya announced plans to unify their countries, heightening concerns in many Western and African capitals. In response to these events, France made known its intention of providing financial support for an OAU peacekeeping force in Chad.⁸ Libyan President Muammar Qaddafi's decision to abruptly withdraw his troops from Chad in October 1981 and the fear that this would lead to greater instability brought matters quickly to a head. On November 14, Weddeye and OAU Secretary General Edem Kodjo, meeting in Paris, agreed to terms for an OAU force.

The mission was fraught with problems from the outset. The initial estimated annual cost for the force, US\$163 million, was adjusted to US\$192 million⁹—ten times the OAU's annual budget. By one account, the OAU raised only US\$400,000 for the operation.¹⁰ Several countries that had pledged troops withdrew their offers upon learning that the OAU was not in a position to finance their participation. In the end, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire sent roughly 3,500 troops,¹¹ under a Nigerian commander.¹² Zaire's battalion, the first to arrive in November 1981, was hamstrung in part because the OAU did not know what to do with it, as the Organization's initial deployment plan was clearly not going to materialize.¹³

The operation also suffered from logistical shortcomings as well as command and control problems. The terrain was inhospitable, and it was impossible to purchase spare parts and fuel on the local market. The OAU's material contribution to the mission was largely limited to supplying green

berets and badges toward the end of the operation.¹⁴ Participants' reliance on their Western benefactors¹⁵ rather than the OAU made the force commander's task of exercising effective control more difficult. Inadequate communication with the OAU secretary general and the Secretariat in Addis Ababa compounded his problems. The secretary general's special representative was unable to properly inform the Secretariat of developments or to receive instructions on how best to proceed. Instead of going through Addis Ababa, the force commander communicated with OAU Chairman Daniel T. arap Moi in Nairobi, who used supplemental military observers to keep himself informed of developments.¹⁶

A noticeable lack of political support also undermined the mission. Many countries—including several that pledged troops—were hostile to the GUNT.¹⁷ The deployment of a capable, more proactive peacekeeping force would have impeded Hissène Habré and his *Forces armées du nord* from seizing control of the country. When Habré's troops wrested control of Ndjamena from Goukouni in early June, Moi immediately called for the return of all troops by the month's end.

Rwanda (1990–1993)

More than eight years passed before the OAU undertook another peacekeeping mission. In 1990, largely at the initiative of OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim, the government of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) concluded an agreement whereby a small group of OAU military observers would help resolve the armed conflict that had broken out that October. Even before the 15-member Military Observer Team from Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire deployed in April 1991, it was clear to all that the force's size and composition were insufficient and inappropriate. In March 1991, a second agreement provided that the original observer team would be replaced by a larger group of military observers from countries outside the region, to be known as the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG). Fifteen months later, NMOG was enlarged and renamed NMOG II.¹⁸

Although NMOG I and NMOG II were of modest size, the OAU had a difficult time fielding the forces. By September 1991, six months after NMOG I was authorized, only 15 OAU military observers were in the country.¹⁹ The mission never reached its expected strength of 50 military observers.²⁰ In July 1992, the force consisted of 40 military observers from Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zimbabwe. Nigeria also provided five noncommissioned officers (NCOs) as well as the force commander.²¹ NMOG II was intended to total 240 military personnel, as Salim acknowledged that the OAU could not sustain a larger force and would have to rely on outside

assistance to deploy even one company.²² (The OAU believed a force of at least 1,200 men would be required to effectively patrol the demilitarized zone.²³) In the end, Congo (Brazzaville), Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia were able to field most of the observers sought, but only Tunisia provided formed units—two infantry platoons. The Nigerian head of NMOG I retained his command.²⁴

Notwithstanding the problems NMOG II encountered operationally in Rwanda, it achieved its political objectives in New York. From the time NMOG I was created, the OAU tried to prod the Security Council into sending a UN peacekeeping force to Rwanda. In June 1993, the council approved a small observer mission along the border between Rwanda and Uganda. In October, the council established the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), a comparatively robust peacekeeping force of 2,217 troops and staff officers, 331 military observers, and 60 civilian police.²⁵ NMOG II was integrated with UNAMIR in November 1993.

Burundi (1993–1996)

Once NMOG II was subsumed into UNAMIR, the OAU believed a useful precedent had been established and sought to replicate it elsewhere without much concern for how it would be done. An opportunity presented itself in Burundi²⁶ given the potential for ethnic violence following the October 1993 military coup in which President Melchoir Ndadaye was killed. Chris Bakwesegha, then head of the OAU Conflict Management Division, described the OAU as being “flush with success” from its initiative in Rwanda. There was a general expectation within the OAU that if an agreement were reached with the new government in Burundi, then certain foreign countries would likely contribute to an OAU peacekeeping initiative.²⁷ Financial and operational considerations, therefore, did not weigh heavily in the OAU’s decision to send a peacekeeping mission to Burundi.

The OAU focused its energies on convincing Bujumbura to accept an OAU mission and had to settle for a smaller force than envisioned. Initially, discussions centered around an OAU proposal to send 180 observers as part of an “International Mission of Observation and Protection for the Restoration of Confidence.”²⁸ This number was eventually reduced to 47 because the Burundian military strongly opposed the intervention.²⁹

Deployment of even this smaller force was significantly delayed. The Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB) comprised officers from Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Tunisia and was under Tunisian command. The mission’s civilian component was in place by mid-December 1993, a month after the force had been established. The first military

observers arrived in February 1994, but OMIB did not reach full strength until that October.³⁰

Although OMIB did not serve as a catalyst to Security Council action, it played a useful role in and of itself. Tensions were extremely high between the minority Tutsi-led government and Hutu civilians. Both the government and rebels frequently undertook military action. OAU observers served as useful intermediaries and helped diffuse numerous explosive situations.³¹ The decision to augment OMIB by an additional 20 military observers in March 1995³² suggests that Bujumbura, the OAU, and foreign donors viewed the mission favorably. The military component was withdrawn shortly after the July 1996 coup.

The Comoros (1997–1999)

Following the withdrawal of OMIB, a full year passed before the OAU agreed to deploy another peacekeeping mission, this time in the Comoros. The decision to authorize the Observer Mission in the Comoros (OMIC) was taken in August 1997, after the island of Anjouan declared itself independent from the Comoros that July.³³ If ever there were an instance when the OAU could agree to act with unanimity and alacrity, one would be hard-pressed to find a better example as secession would create a dangerous precedent. OAU member-states could not countenance Anjouan's decision to break from the islands of Grande Comoros and Mohéli to join the archipelago's fourth island, Mayotte, as a French territory.

OMIC lasted a little more than a year and was unsuccessful in helping to resolve the conflict. Indeed, the OAU failed to persuade Anjouan to permit the scheduled deployment of the peacekeeping force from Egypt, Niger, Senegal, and Tunisia. As a result, only 20 of the 27 authorized observers joined OMIC.³⁴ While the observers provided some valuable humanitarian assistance and confidence-building measures, their mediating role was never fully utilized. On April 30, 1999, the army seized power in a bloodless coup. OMIC was withdrawn the following month.³⁵

Democratic Republic of the Congo (1999 to date)

The OAU then committed military observers to the DRC.³⁶ In July 1999, six African countries with troops engaged in the DRC signed the Lusaka Cease-Fire Agreement, which included a series of measures to resolve the conflict that had broken out the previous August.³⁷ The two main rebel groups fighting the central government in Kinshasa accepted the provisions the following month.³⁸ The agreement called for the OAU to oversee a Joint Military Commission (JMC) intended to build confidence among the

warring parties so that further details for a final settlement of the conflict could be worked out. The Security Council established the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) on August 6, but only authorized the deployment of up to 90 military liaison personnel.³⁹ On October 1, 1999, the OAU agreed to head the JMC and provide Neutral Investigators to support its activities.

The JMC demonstrated that the OAU has made some progress in fielding peace missions but underscored many long-standing constraints. Particularly noteworthy is the relatively quick deployment of the JMC. On October 11, the head of the mission, from Algeria, chaired the first meeting of the JMC, and the full complement of the 30-strong team of Neutral Investigators from Algeria, Malawi, Nigeria, and Senegal was in place by the end of November.⁴⁰ However, the OAU was excessively reliant on largesse from others, which was often not forthcoming, and the JMC suffered greatly from a lack of resources.⁴¹ The Neutral Investigators were withdrawn in November 2000, with MONUC assuming their functions. As of June 2001, the two-person mission consisted of the JMC Chair, from Kenya, and a civilian assistant.⁴²

Eritrea and Ethiopia (2000 to date)

As OMIC was withdrawing from the Comoros, Ethiopia and Eritrea⁴³ went to war against one another. Two years passed before the OAU succeeded in negotiating a settlement. In June 2000, both sides agreed to a cease-fire and to withdraw their armed forces to the positions they held prior to the onset of hostilities. It was further agreed that demarcation of the countries' shared border, among other issues, would be negotiated under the auspices of the OAU. The UN Security Council subsequently approved a peacekeeping force, the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE). The OAU decided to field a much smaller OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia–Eritrea (OLMEE), which would co-deploy with UNMEE and help implement the UN's mandate.

The OAU experienced the usual problems deploying a force expeditiously but has had fewer operational difficulties. It took four months for the OAU to dispatch 11 military personnel—a team half the size of what had been planned. Algeria, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Tunisia contributed the force, which was under Ghanaian command. The OAU has provided OLMEE with sufficient office space, communication equipment, and vehicles.⁴⁴ The mission benefits greatly, however, from an informal relationship with the much larger UN operation. UNMEE allows OLMEE personnel to use its aircraft and has provided other services and equipment free of charge.⁴⁵

The Economic Community of West African States

Liberia (1990–1999)

The creation of ECOMOG was an ad hoc response to the Liberian crisis.⁴⁶ In December 1989, Charles Taylor and his National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) commenced military operations against the government of President Samuel Doe. By April 1990, Taylor's forces had captured Buchanan, Liberia's second largest city, and Taylor was positioning his troops to lay siege to the capital, Monrovia. Desperate, Doe turned to Nigeria's President Ibrahim Babangida to find a solution, be it diplomatic or military, to save his government. At Babangida's request, the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government established a Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) in May 1990, which in turn established ECOMOG in August.

ECOMOG's creation exacerbated long-standing tensions between anglophone and francophone ECOWAS members. Several francophone states strongly objected to its deployment, most notably Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire. The deployment of an ECOMOG force comprised almost entirely of anglophone member-states underscored the political division within ECOWAS. All four of Liberia's anglophone counterparts in ECOWAS participated in the initial force: the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone. The sole francophone participant, Guinea, had experienced a massive influx of refugees from Liberia since the outbreak of the civil war.

The intervention also stirred fears of Nigerian intentions that cut across linguistic lines. Even the anglophone countries participating in the force were wary of Nigeria, as evidenced by their disagreements with it over the nature of ECOMOG's mission. Although Nigeria initially tried to camouflage its dominant role in the force by consenting to a force commander from another country, it abandoned such efforts in the wake of Doe's murder in September 1990. Nigeria blamed Ghanaian Force Commander Lt. Gen. Arnold Quainoo for Doe's capture, which was carried out in the ECOMOG compound, and pushed to assume a greater role in commanding the force. After Quainoo, all subsequent force commanders were Nigerian. Moreover, Nigeria provided the bulk of the force, which grew substantially during the course of the conflict.

For most of ECOMOG's involvement in Liberia, ECOWAS member-states pursued uncoordinated and competing strategies. At one point, the francophone countries took the lead in mediating the conflict while the Nigerian-led ECOMOG still sought a military solution. ECOWAS member-states continued to support and create different Liberian factions.

Logistical problems and equipment shortfalls hindered ECOMOG operations. At the outset, troop contributors did not coordinate their logistical needs and capabilities. According to Quainoo, each country simply did what it could.⁴⁷ The contingents were expected to assemble in Freetown, Sierra Leone's capital, and travel from there to Monrovia by sea.⁴⁸ These problems delayed the force's arrival in the mission area. Moreover, ECOMOG's concept of operations was not determined in advance of deployment. The force was not equipped to conduct counterinsurgency operations. For example, at one point during the operation ECOMOG reportedly had only one functioning helicopter—designated for the force commander's personal use.⁴⁹ ECOWAS had initially agreed that each troop-contributing country would be self-sufficient for the first 30 days, after which the ECOWAS Secretariat would take over. Yet financial constraints prevented the Secretariat from providing logistical support to ECOMOG at any point during the operation, and troop-contributing countries had to continue to resupply their own contingents.⁵⁰

ECOMOG experienced numerous command and control problems. From the beginning, the force had difficulty harmonizing tactics.⁵¹ The peacekeeping doctrine of most ECOMOG troop contributors was largely undeveloped.⁵² Anglophone and francophone participants had distinct traditions, as did individual armies. The fact that countries taking part in ECOMOG spoke different languages was also an obstacle. Particularly at the beginning of the operation, communication between ECOMOG contributors and even within national units was difficult owing to incompatible equipment and a lack of radios.⁵³

ECOMOG was only nominally accountable to ECOWAS, which exercised little oversight and provided minimal political guidance. This became increasingly true during the latter part of the mission. ECOWAS member-states failed to energetically support the ECOWAS Special Representative Joshua Iroha of Nigeria, and he was withdrawn after about two years.⁵⁴ Political and legal advisory positions in ECOMOG were not filled due to financial difficulties. As a result, the ECOMOG force commander was often called upon to perform a political as well as a military role,⁵⁵ made more difficult by the lack of a Status of Forces Agreement.⁵⁶

ECOMOG was continually beset with financial difficulties. In 1990, the Standing Mediation Committee created a Special Emergency Fund and determined that all of the expenses relating to ECOMOG would be drawn from that fund. Yet the Fund received no contributions.⁵⁷ Each troop-contributing country thus bore the financial burden for its contingent. Western assistance was slow in coming. Even after the UN established a trust fund for Liberia in

September 1993 and convened a Conference on Assistance to Liberia in October 1995, ECOMOG remained in a precarious financial state. The insufficient funding had an adverse effect on troop morale and discipline. Soldiers and officers reportedly pawned equipment and supplies.

Although ECOMOG is credited with bringing the Liberian civil war to a close, this achievement does not counterbalance its previous track record. A new force commander, an influx of Western military assistance and West African troops, as well as a growing war-weariness all combined to enhance ECOMOG's effectiveness. ECOMOG ultimately supervised the implementation of the final cease-fire and oversaw the July 1997 elections, which Taylor won handily. When assessing ECOMOG's performance, however, the entire period of its involvement in Liberia must be reviewed, not only the later events.⁵⁸

Sierra Leone (1997–2000)

As in Liberia, the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone⁵⁹ was largely a Nigerian-crafted, impromptu response to the civil war. With Charles Taylor's backing, a small band of Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels led by Foday Sankoh invaded south eastern Sierra Leone from Liberia in March 1991. The rebels succeeded in gaining power in May 1997, when the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) overthrew President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. Sankoh ordered his RUF forces to support the AFRC and its leader, Maj. Johnny Paul Koroma, and an alliance between the two groups was formed. Nigeria intervened quickly in support of the Kabbah government, characterizing its action as an ECOMOG initiative although ECOWAS had not authorized the military action. Formal ECOWAS approval was not granted until August 1997, when the ECOWAS Authority extended the scope of ECOMOG's activity to Sierra Leone.

Notwithstanding their belated formal approval of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG intervention, ECOWAS member-states were troubled by its implications and were understandably wary of Nigerian intentions. Granted, the RUF had committed numerous well-publicized atrocities and there was a general recognition that altruistic impulses played a role in Abuja's decision to intervene. Yet countries in the subregion were also concerned that Nigeria had hijacked ECOMOG and that the force had become an instrument of Nigerian domination. Moreover, some ECOWAS members were reluctant to become involved in another expensive ECOMOG mission. Given that Burkina Faso and Liberia were assisting the RUF rebels, their commitment to ECOMOG was suspect. Anglophone–francophone tensions within the subregion had eased since the early 1990s but were still an issue.

Although ECOWAS states tried to rein in Nigeria, their efforts were unsuccessful. The ECOWAS “approval” did not sanction the full-scale military intervention that Nigeria had sought. Indeed, some ECOWAS member-states viewed their authorization as an effort to limit Nigeria’s activities. However, Nigeria determined its own military strategy and did not consult other ECOWAS members. Abuja was able to do its own bidding in part because the force remained Nigerian-stacked and Nigerian-led. At the height of its involvement, Nigeria is widely reported to have had more than 10,000 soldiers serving in Sierra Leone. No other troop contributor provided more than a single battalion. All ECOMOG force commanders in Sierra Leone were Nigerian. Nigeria was thus able to brush aside the preference of other states in the subregion for continued diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis, and pursued a military solution instead.

In addition to the inherent difficulties a conventional force faces when fighting a guerrilla war on foreign territory, ECOMOG experienced operational shortcomings of its own making. In February 1998, Nigeria launched a successful offensive to recapture Freetown from the rebels and restore Kabbah’s government. It proved unable to gain control over the rest of the country, however. ECOMOG lacked the requisite equipment and logistical support. A shortage of trucks and helicopters as well as weapons and ammunition restricted its activities and limited its effectiveness. Participating ECOMOG states did not accept information from other countries with troops in the field and generally insisted on operating autonomously.⁶⁰

Corruption, poor discipline, and lack of *esprit de corps* all figured heavily in ECOMOG’s problems. A significant part of the officer corps was reportedly in Sierra Leone for personal profit. Because of the lucrative trade in diamonds and the possibility of engaging in other business ventures, a Nigerian officer’s loyalty to Abuja’s military regime was seen as more important than competence or conduct.⁶¹ NCOs and foot soldiers also became entrepreneurs, albeit on a smaller scale. Many Nigerian soldiers did not go home for several years (having come directly from serving in Liberia) and were not regularly paid. They grew dispirited and unmotivated. Nigerian troops were not the only ones reported to have improperly profited as part of ECOMOG.⁶² Other ECOMOG contingents were accused of selling some of the logistical support that had been provided to them.

Only after the January 1999 rebel attack on Freetown did Western countries react significantly to ECOMOG’s situation. In January 1999, Nigerian troops suffered tremendous casualties during a rebel offensive. Frustrated by the brutality of the war and the difficulties they had encountered, ECOMOG forces retaliated, staging a violent counteroffensive.⁶³

Abuja subsequently announced that it would withdraw its soldiers from Sierra Leone. Western countries responded by considerably stepping up their support for ECOMOG.⁶⁴ African countries—aided by the influx of Western support—provided more peacekeepers.

Yet this enhanced level of support for ECOMOG was short-lived. The July 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement called for ECOMOG to assume the lead, with the extant small UN observer mission remaining in a supporting role. In October, however, the UN Security Council decided to replace its observer mission with a much larger force. Certainly, the council took note of the pledge by Nigeria's newly elected civilian President Olusegun Obasanjo to bring Nigerian troops home. However, widespread concern about the suitability of Nigeria and ECOMOG to implement the peace agreement was the motivating factor behind the council's decision. The last ECOMOG troops left Sierra Leone in May 2000.

Guinea-Bissau (1998–1999)

The origins of ECOMOG's involvement in Guinea-Bissau were also ad hoc. In June 1998, army officers led by former Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ansumane Mane⁶⁵ attempted to overthrow the government of President João Bernardo Vieira. Immediately following the coup attempt, Guinea and Senegal intervened militarily in support of Vieira. There was initially some confusion as to when and how the force present in Guinea-Bissau actually became an "ECOMOG" operation. Meeting in July to consider Vieira's request that ECOMOG deploy in Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS foreign and defense ministers extended ECOMOG's activities to Guinea-Bissau and expressed their support for the rapid intervention by Guinea and Senegal. Thus, at the outset, it appeared that Guinean and Senegalese troops were to form the backbone of the ECOMOG force. This raised the concern that any country willing and able—not only Nigeria—could hijack ECOMOG for its own purposes. During the course of subsequent meetings, however, it became increasingly clear that the Guinean and Senegalese troops would not be welcome in the peacekeeping force. In the November 1998 Abuja Accord, Vieira and Mane agreed to the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Guinea-Bissau and the simultaneous deployment of an ECOWAS mission.

The size of the ECOMOG force that ultimately deployed reflected the limited capacities of troop-contributing countries. The ECOMOG force commander initially recommended a force of 2,000, to be augmented to 5,000 during the election period. The ECOWAS Secretariat then asked member-states to contribute troops on the basis of these figures. Benin, the Gambia, Niger, and Togo together pledged some 1,500 troops. In the end,

however, the four countries contributed less than half of this number, who served under Togolese command. The “requirements” were subsequently reduced to reflect the pledges that had been received.⁶⁶

ECOWAS was unable to field even this smaller ECOMOG force on its own. In December 1998, ECOWAS Executive Secretary Lansana Kouyaté stated that until sufficient financial assistance and logistical support were secured, it would be impossible to predict when the ECOMOG force could become operational.⁶⁷ France then offered to help deploy the battalion and backstop the operation.⁶⁸ The first ECOMOG troops arrived in December, with the bulk of the force deploying in February 1999. All of the Guinean and Senegalese soldiers were withdrawn by the end of March.

Despite the considerable French assistance, logistical and communication problems nevertheless hampered the effectiveness of the force. ECOMOG lacked four-wheel drive vehicles as well as radio communication equipment.⁶⁹ Troops only ventured out of the capital, Bissau, on day trips to reduce the risk of losing contact with the force headquarters. When hostilities flared up in early May 1999, ECOMOG experienced a communication breakdown, and it was impossible to establish contact with the ECOMOG High Command.⁷⁰

The small size of the operation also compromised its ability to carry out its duties. Kouyaté acknowledged that ECOMOG’s troop strength and scant resources delayed or reduced some of its activities. According to ECOMOG, insufficient numbers prevented it from deploying along the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal border, as called for in the November 1998 Abuja Accord.⁷¹ When the junta ousted Vieira on May 7, 1999, ECOMOG soldiers were in no position to prevent the renewed fighting and remained in their barracks.⁷² Within a month, the entire force had withdrawn.

In spite of its difficulties, ECOMOG in Guinea-Bissau signaled a welcome and significant departure from previous initiatives. The charge that ECOMOG is simply a Nigerian tool is no longer persuasive. The force comprised one anglophone and three francophone countries. Two ECOWAS member-states were expressly forbidden from participating in the force because the military junta objected to their presence. This was the first time that a party’s demands regarding ECOMOG’s composition were heeded. ECOMOG also operated in accordance with a clearly defined mandate. A comprehensive agreement signed between ECOWAS and representatives from the two parties to the conflict put in place a legal framework for ECOMOG’s presence on the ground.⁷³ In a noteworthy departure from past practices, ECOWAS also began submitting periodic reports to the UN Security Council concerning its activities in Guinea-Bissau.⁷⁴

Guinea

Most recently, ECOWAS authorized an ECOMOG operation to monitor the border areas between Guinea and Liberia. During the second half of 2000, tensions between Guinea and Liberia escalated sharply; the number and scale of military incursions across their shared border were growing. ECOWAS determined that its initial plans for a 250-strong military observer team would be insufficient to quell the violence and proposed a multinational force of two battalions in its stead. In December 2000, ECOWAS established the operation. Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal have offered troops.⁷⁵

It is unlikely that this force will materialize. Donors have not appeared eager to support the force financially or logistically. The OAU has pledged US\$300,000,⁷⁶ and Germany provided communication equipment and has offered US\$250,000.⁷⁷ Even so, the requirements far exceed existing resources and donor generosity. In addition, Conakry has refused to consent to the force's deployment. Moreover, the UN Security Council has not endorsed the creation of the ECOMOG force. ECOWAS, despite making face-saving pronouncements that plans for the mission are continuing, fully appreciates that Security Council support will not be forthcoming and has made such support a precondition for the force's deployment.

The Southern African Development Community

*The Democratic Republic of the Congo (1998 to date)*⁷⁸

The initial military response of SADC countries to the most recent uprising in the DRC was not a SADC action per se, despite participant countries' claims to that effect. On August 2, 1998, a new rebellion broke out in north-eastern DRC and soon posed a serious threat to the government of President Laurent Désiré Kabila. The *Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie* (RCD), which enjoyed the active support of Rwanda and Uganda, quickly made inroads against Kabila's *Forces armées congolaises* (FAC). Following a series of selective "regional" meetings, Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe announced that SADC had unanimously agreed to Kabila's request for assistance on August 18. The next day, the defense ministers of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe declared that their three countries would come to fellow SADC member DRC's assistance. South African President Nelson Mandela, then SADC chairman, challenged Mugabe's authority to send troops on behalf of SADC and pressed for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Tensions between Mandela and Mugabe on SADC's position grew, and the prospects for SADC to play an effective role in resolving the conflict diminished.

The intervention received SADC approval retroactively, but it did not signify a true consensus or transform the coalition into a “SADC force.” After meeting with other SADC heads of state during the September Non-Aligned Summit, Mandela announced that SADC unanimously supported the three countries’ military intervention in the DRC. His about-face was an attempt to reflect some form of unity in SADC, yet South Africa continued to push for a diplomatic rather than a military solution.⁷⁹

Troop-contributing countries deployed quickly and effectively, using their own assets. Contingents from Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe arrived in the DRC within days of pledging their assistance. It is widely reported that Angola and Zimbabwe each initially contributed some 2,500 troops, while Namibia gave some 250. Luanda provided the bulk of the logistical support required to deploy the force, which was under the command of Zimbabwe. Besides airlifting its own troops, the Angolan air force transported Namibian and Zimbabwean soldiers to the DRC as well as Zimbabwean tanks and armored vehicles.⁸⁰ It also ferried FAC contingents within the country.⁸¹ Harare provided helicopters and light transport aircraft.⁸² Shortly after their arrival, the allies successfully defended the country’s capital, Kinshasa, which had been on the verge of falling to rebel forces.

It has proven much more difficult for Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe to sustain their contingents in the field than to deploy them. While coalition forces were reclaiming rebel-held positions in the west, the RCD was advancing virtually unchecked through much of the rest of the country. Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe provided additional troops—believed to number some 20,000 at their height—but they proved insufficient. Although under unified command, the allies have generally operated autonomously and their activities have not always been coordinated. The country was simply too large, the roads too dilapidated or poorly developed, and the rebels too numerous, organized, and well armed for Kabila and his SADC backers to defend or retake many remote positions. Brig. Ed Ndiatwah, who served as a commander of the Namibian contingent in the DRC and also as Deputy force commander, attributes the military stalemate to logistical problems.⁸³ Unable to obtain necessary support from home, the troops have had to live off of the land at the expense and to the detriment of the local populace. Moreover, the DRC’s allies have partly financed their operations in the DRC by securing valuable mining concessions and carrying out other entrepreneurial activities.⁸⁴

As the war enters its fourth year, troops from Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe remain in the DRC,⁸⁵ and the conflict’s resolution is still a long way off. The Lusaka Agreement of July 1999 has provided a useful

framework, but progress has been very slow. President Laurent Kabila's assassination in January 2001 and his son Joseph's ascension to power have jump-started the peace process. The UN, which had previously limited its involvement to unarmed observers, has begun to deploy infantry battalions in the country. The parties to the accord have begun to withdraw their troops and pull back in significant numbers. Still, many non-state actors with a stake in the conflict are not part of the negotiations, and crucial issues such as nonvoluntary disarmament have not been meaningfully addressed.

Lesotho (1998–1999)

In September 1998, Botswana and South Africa intervened in Lesotho without explicit SADC authorization. Fearing unrest in the wake of an international commission's decision upholding the results of parliamentary elections in which his ruling party won 79 of 80 seats, Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili requested several SADC member-states to intervene militarily in support of his government. The Combined Task Force, comprising troops from Botswana and South Africa, crossed into Lesotho on September 22. From the outset, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) claimed that the intervention took place under "SADC auspices" in accordance with "SADC agreements."⁸⁶ The organization had not, however, authorized the intervention.⁸⁷

Operation *Boleas*, as the intervention was known, was essentially a South African undertaking that enjoyed the political support of a few countries from the subregion. Botswana's initial contribution to the mission was limited to a motorized infantry company (130 personnel) and a battalion command element (15). By contrast, about 500 South African troops initially deployed in Lesotho. South Africa also provided air and medical support as well as the force commander. Mozambique and Zimbabwe supported the action politically.⁸⁸

Ironically, the intervention's harshest critics may have been within South Africa's foreign and defence ministries. Although the operation was expected to be both quick and easy, it was not. South Africa fully anticipated that the troops it sent would be sufficient to resolve the situation peacefully. According to Ambassador Jackie Selebi, then Director-General of South Africa's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the idea was that "maximum visibility but minimum force" would suffice.⁸⁹ The SANDF encountered stiff resistance from the outset, however. Selebi believes that the rebellious soldiers became emboldened upon realizing that the South African troops were not prepared to fight.⁹⁰ Much of the capital, Maseru, was laid to ruins, and thousands of people were uprooted from their homes.

The SANDF was ill-prepared to respond to the unexpected developments. The initial mission was much smaller than what was needed to put down the unrest. The force would eventually grow to more than 3,000 troops. The SANDF claimed that the government did not have a clear national security policy and admitted that the units involved were not combat-ready. SANDF Lt. Gen. Deon Ferreira stated that there were limited reserves of ration packs and spare parts due to cuts in defense spending. He also acknowledged that no scenario planning was done because there were no aerial photographs.⁹¹

Operation *Boleas* eventually restored a semblance of calm, and a negotiated settlement was reached between Mosisili and the aggrieved opposition parties. In October 1998, they agreed to establish a Transitional Committee responsible for organizing new elections within 18 months.⁹² Troops from the Combined Task Force began to withdraw in significant numbers in December 1998,⁹³ and the operation concluded on May 15, 1999.⁹⁴

The Treaty of Non-Aggression Assistance and Mutual Defense

Burkina Faso and Mali (1986)

ANAD is the only other African subregional organization to have deployed a peacekeeping mission. Four days after fighting broke out between ANAD members Burkina Faso and Mali in December 1985, the ANAD Council of Ministers convoked the organization's first extraordinary meeting. A cease-fire was successfully negotiated, and an ANAD Commission of Observers was agreed upon.⁹⁵

The ANAD force, which was quite limited in size and duration, accomplished its mission in less than a month. Each of ANAD's seven member-states contributed two observers—including both belligerents—with Benin also sending two observers.⁹⁶ In addition, Côte d'Ivoire provided air support and significant financial assistance.⁹⁷ The 16-strong observer force, which deployed at the beginning of January 1986, withdrew at the end of the month once tensions between Burkina Faso and Mali had eased.⁹⁸

African Organizations' Efforts to Enhance Their Peacekeeping Capacities

African regional organizations have begun to establish formal peace and security frameworks and otherwise develop their peacekeeping capabilities. Recognizing the need to take a more proactive stance in African conflicts, the OAU established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and

Resolution in 1993. The ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, established in 1999, is designed to standardize ECOWAS involvement in peacekeeping. In 1996, SADC created the Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security and continues to address issues surrounding its structure and leadership. Organizations with no prior peacekeeping experience are also developing structures to promote peace and security. For example, IGAD is developing the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN).⁹⁹

The Organization of African Unity

The premium that OAU member-states place on noninterference in their internal affairs largely explains why the OAU did not field a peacekeeping operation in its first 17 years and why it was reluctant to create a new mechanism to address peace and security issues. OAU member-states' lack of enthusiasm for intervention in conflicts is clearly seen in the organization's early dispute resolution structures, which were largely undeveloped and unused.¹⁰⁰ Thus, in many ways what is most surprising about the OAU's initiative in Chad is not that it took so long to happen, but that it happened at all. The end of the Cold War provided the impetus for the OAU and many of its member-states to attempt to redress the failings of the peacekeeping force in Chad and to develop the organization's conflict resolution machinery. The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution was adopted at the OAU Summit in Cairo in June 1993. Despite the Mechanism's name, the predilections of many OAU member-states ensured that its focus would be on conflict prevention, more than management or resolution.

Decision-Making

The Mechanism provided for a new decision-making body called the Central Organ, which can authorize peacekeeping operations in a timely manner. The Central Organ is loosely modeled on the Bureau of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and comprises between 15 and 17 countries elected annually from the five subregions on the basis of geographical representation. Unlike the Bureau, however, the Central Organ meets regularly on three levels: annually, at the heads of state and government; biannually, at the ministers of foreign affairs; and monthly, at ambassadors accredited to the OAU. It has also met extraordinarily. Consensus is required, and its decisions are binding at all three levels.¹⁰¹

To a large degree, the Central Organ has worked just as intended; it has rarely authorized missions and then only on a small scale. Over the past eight years, the three levels have met according to plan. The monthly ambassadorial-level meetings have taken decisions that previously could only be taken by the heads of state. Yet because consensus is required, the Central Organ has only managed to authorize four modest missions. For all intents and purposes, none of these missions has overlapped another¹⁰² nor involved formed units. Indeed, the largest mission, OMIB, comprised less than 70 military observers. Yet, OMIB's military component was larger than the deployed strengths of OMIC, the JMC, and OLMEE *combined*. It is doubtful that the OAU will undertake peacekeeping on a larger scale than this for the foreseeable future.

Secretariat

The Mechanism somewhat strengthened the secretary-general's position by increasing the human and material assets at his disposal. Tasks of the newly reconstituted Conflict Management Centre (CMC) include collecting and disseminating information relating to current and potential conflicts, presenting policy options to the secretary-general, coordinating regional peacekeeping training policies, and managing field missions.¹⁰³ The CMC, which has undergone numerous changes, consists of four sections: Conflict Management and Resolution; Field Operations Unit; Preventive Diplomacy, Research, and Early Warning System; and Central Organ Secretariat.¹⁰⁴

Much more effort has been put into restructuring the CMC than seriously augmenting its capabilities. Additional staff has been recruited since 1999, when the OAU's conflict management machinery only had 14 personnel. By mid-2001, however, only half of the envisioned 49 positions had been filled.¹⁰⁵ Current staffing levels have prevented the CMC from functioning at full capacity. For example, the CMC's Situation Room, which was to be manned 24 hours a day seven days a week, is open 12 hours a day Monday through Friday, and four hours a day on the weekend.¹⁰⁶ Simply recruiting more personnel will not solve the problem. A 1998 command-post exercise held at the CMC showed that the staff was reluctant to share information and work together as a team.¹⁰⁷ This issue has yet to be adequately addressed.

Mission Planning and Support

The CMC staff certainly has succeeded in increasing the OAU's peacekeeping capacity from where it was in 1993 when the Mechanism was established. It has developed significant administrative, financial, institutional,

and operational structures for peacekeeping missions. Rules of engagement have been formulated, standardized daily subsistence allowance levels for mission staff have been set, and personal gear and equipment have been procured and effectively utilized in the field. While these accomplishments are on a more limited scale and have taken longer than some—especially important Western donors—would have liked, they nevertheless represent a step forward.

There is little reason to believe that the OAU would undertake meaningful peacekeeping operations if only the capacity of the CMC were more robust. According to the program document, one of the OAU's chief aspirations is to be able to support two 100-strong observer missions simultaneously.¹⁰⁸ The tepid response to the OAU's initiative for each of the five African subregions to train and identify at least 100 military observers and provide these lists to the OAU for possible deployment suggests that even this relatively modest goal may not be realized. This may well be the best that can be hoped for and would represent a significantly enhanced capability. Yet it is a capability for which there is little need. Most crises demand a much greater response. Mention is not made, however, of developing a larger capacity.

Financing

The Peace Fund provides a critical source of financing for the Mechanism. Given the difficulties that the OAU encountered in funding NMOG,¹⁰⁹ it was deemed important to have an independent source of money for OAU peace and security initiatives. The Fund is designed specifically to support initiatives of the Central Organ, and more generally, to develop the Conflict Management Centre. It is divided into two parts: General Peace Fund and Special Contributions. The OAU may spend contributions to the General Peace Fund as it pleases, whereas the Special Contributions allows donors to earmark their support for particular projects. In addition, 6 percent of the OAU's regular budget is committed to the Peace Fund. This sum, which is approximately US\$1.8 million per year, is deposited regardless of OAU member-states' level of arrears.¹¹⁰ As of March 31, 2001, the Peace Fund had received almost US\$41 million since its creation on June 1, 1993.¹¹¹ The majority of this money has been used to underwrite OAU observer missions.

Disillusionment among donor countries over the slow pace of progress threatens the Fund's viability. About two out of every three dollars the Fund has received comes from sources outside of Africa.¹¹² The United States, by far the most generous benefactor,¹¹³ has substantially reduced its levels of support in recent years. It is critical for the OAU that an understanding with its donors be reached, as it cannot rely on its member-states alone to support

OAU peace initiatives. Voluntary contributions to the Peace Fund from African countries have not been significant.¹¹⁴

The Economic Community of West African States

ECOMOG's experiences in Liberia and Sierra Leone prompted discussions among ECOWAS member-states to develop an institutionalized mechanism for conflict prevention, management, and resolution,¹¹⁵ and a new framework has gradually taken shape. As early as 1993, with the adoption of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty, the intention to elaborate a new security structure was apparent.¹¹⁶ Yet the issue was not addressed at the level of the ECOWAS Authority until more than four years later. The process was jump-started in 1997, when the ECOWAS heads of state and government agreed in principle to set up a formal mechanism to prevent, manage, and resolve conflict as well as to supervise peacekeeping in the subregion. In December 1999, the Authority adopted the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.¹¹⁷

Decision-Making

The Mechanism has put in place a new ECOWAS institution, the Mediation and Security Council, completely altering the way ECOWAS peace and security decisions are supposed to be made. The council's principal tasks include authorizing political and military interventions and determining mandates for such missions. It comprises nine member states: the serving ECOWAS Chair, the previous Chair, and seven states elected by the Authority for a two-year-period. In carrying out its functions, the council operates at three levels. A Committee of Ambassadors accredited to ECOWAS will meet monthly. A Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Internal Affairs, and Security will meet quarterly to discuss the general political and security situation in the subregion. The nine heads of state will meet twice per year and will make the final decisions on any measures to be taken. All of the council's decisions require a two-thirds majority.¹¹⁸

This new decision-making structure has begun to function as intended, although it is still too early to judge its effectiveness. The provision for a two-thirds majority means that no member-state on its own can veto a Mediation and Security Council decision. The council has now convened at all three levels. Yet it did not meet at the ambassadorial level until June 2001,¹¹⁹ because a number of ECOWAS member-states delayed in accrediting their ambassadors to ECOWAS.¹²⁰ Until the council begins functioning smoothly and regularly at this level, its effectiveness will be compromised,

given that ambassadorial meetings are easier to convene and more frequent than ministerial or heads of state meetings.

Secretariat

To help ensure that the council's decisions are implemented, the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism spells out enhanced functions for the executive secretary in the domain of peace and security and establishes a separate division within the Secretariat to service the council. Under the terms of the Protocol, the executive secretary is responsible for political, administrative, and operational aspects of ECOWAS field missions and convenes meetings of the Mediation and Security Council and supporting Organs: the Defense and Security Commission, the Council of Elders,¹²¹ and ECOMOG. To manage and oversee ECOWAS field activities, a new branch—the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defense, and Security—has recently been established within the ECOWAS Secretariat. This Office is expected to consist of a Department of Political Affairs, a Department of Humanitarian Affairs, a Department of Defense and Security, and an Observation Monitoring Centre.¹²²

In spite of these positive developments, there remains a concern about the ability of the ECOWAS Secretariat to assume the responsibilities envisaged for it in the realm of peace and security. There are real limits as to what the Secretariat's staff can accomplish given their small numbers, the ever-increasing demands placed upon them, and the scant resources at their disposal. Before the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defense, and Security was created, the two-person Legal Affairs Division was saddled with much of the organization's peace and security work. The small Information Division also assumed a number of related responsibilities. The new Deputy Executive Secretary's Office should ease the workload of other divisions, but it will take some time before this office is fully staffed and functioning efficiently. Indeed, as of mid-2001, the Office comprised only two staff members: the deputy executive secretary and a military adviser.¹²³

Moreover, some of the activities to be carried out by the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary appear of questionable value given other priorities. To enhance its capacity for both "early warning" and "early action," the Mechanism sets up a Sub-Regional Security and Peace Observation System, comprising an Observation and Monitoring Centre at the ECOWAS Secretariat as well as Observation and Monitoring Zones within the subregion. The subregion will be divided into four Observation and Monitoring Zones, headquartered in Banjul, Ouagadougou, Monrovia, and Cotonou.

Field offices in every ECOWAS member-state will submit information to the zonal headquarters, which in turn will submit reports to the Observation and Monitoring Centre at the ECOWAS Secretariat.¹²⁴ The European Union (EU) has provided funding for this initiative, and in mid-2001 the deputy secretariat was moving ahead with recruitment of personnel. Broadly speaking, preventive diplomacy is a worthwhile and intelligent policy option. However, the greatest challenge facing the subregion is finding a meaningful response to existing conflicts and working to contain them. If donors provide funds for the Sub-Regional Security and Peace Observation System, they will make less money available for other—more deserving—ECOWAS programs. It is hard to envision how the Sub-Regional Security and Peace Observation System scheme will provide decision-makers with any greater information or analysis on disturbing and destabilizing trends and events than already exists through civil society and diplomatic channels.

Mission Planning and Support

The Mechanism recasts ECOMOG as a standby force comprised of national contingents from ECOWAS member-states. In addition to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, ECOMOG may undertake smaller observation and monitoring missions, humanitarian missions, preventive deployment actions, peace-building operations, and policing activities.¹²⁵ At the inaugural meeting of the Defense and Security Commission in July 2000, 11 ECOWAS members identified the maximum number of troops that they could commit to the ECOMOG standby force. As a starting point, the Defense and Security Commission determined that each member should contribute at least one company as a sign of solidarity.¹²⁶

The Mechanism also seeks to bring ECOMOG missions under civilian control. The Mechanism provides that a Special Representative of the Executive Secretary will be named for each ECOMOG operation. This individual will be appointed by the Mediation and Security Council, upon the recommendation of the executive secretary. The Special Representative will serve as the Chief of Mission and will be responsible for determining its political orientation, directing peacekeeping activities, and initiating negotiations among the relevant actors. In addition, the Special Representative must maintain constant contact with and submit regular reports to the executive secretary.¹²⁷

Although the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism does not explicitly refer to the issue of *matériel*, ECOWAS is addressing the equipment woes that have long plagued ECOMOG. At its July 2000 meeting, the Defense

and Security Commission recognized that contingents should be provided with equipment needed to guarantee them combat readiness and autonomy. As a starting point, Nigeria has pledged to provide the standby units with two warships and four Alpha jets. The Defense and Security Commission also recognized the need to establish a permanent logistics base but decided that, as a temporary measure, any remaining equipment from ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone would be stored in Lagos.¹²⁸

Unlike the planned-for Sub-Regional Security and Peace Observation System, efforts to make ECOMOG more self-sufficient and to impose institutional oversight are long overdue. Designating units to serve in a standby capacity is an important undertaking because it sensitizes ECOWAS member-states to their potential role in any regional military deployment. It should force the Secretariat to begin to work through critical questions. Establishing consistent communication channels between the ECOWAS Secretariat and the field will help ensure that the mission does not deviate from its mandate. An in-house logistics base could provide important administrative checks and balances, reduce corruption, and encourage donor support. Making ECOMOG less dependent on a single member state for *matériel* and force projection is a worthy objective.

It will take years, however, for these ambitious measures to noticeably improve ECOMOG's capabilities. Indeed, designating standby units does little to increase operational preparedness. A state's willingness to participate in a standby force is not tantamount to a commitment to furnish troops.¹²⁹ Naming a Special Representative of the Executive Secretary for an ECOMOG operation is not akin to ensuring effective civilian control. While an improved logistical capacity will have a positive effect on troop morale, discipline, as well as command and control, a much bigger problem is the failure of some ECOMOG troop contributors to pay their contingents an acceptable wage in a timely manner—an issue that must be addressed. Given the shortage and poor quality of the equipment possessed by ECOWAS member-states and the reluctance of donor countries to provide *matériel*, a well-stocked logistics depot is a long-range goal.

Peacekeeping Training

ECOWAS members have also improved their peacekeeping preparedness through various training initiatives. Five ECOWAS members—Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, and Senegal—have received African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) training from the United States. The United States has also recently begun training and equipping West African troops for peace

enforcement.¹³⁰ Through its *Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix* (RECOMP) initiative, France has supported several peacekeeping field exercises in the subregion, including *Guidimakha* in 1998 and most recently *Kozah* in 2001.¹³¹ The French-supported Zambakro Peacekeeping School in Côte d'Ivoire, which opened in June 1999, offers peacekeeping instruction to African officers from the subregion and beyond. With French assistance, several national military staff colleges in ECOWAS countries provide training to other nationals.¹³² The United Kingdom provides peacekeeping instruction to the subregion, primarily through its British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) stationed at the Ghanaian Armed Forces Command and Staff College.¹³³ All such initiatives should serve to enhance the abilities of ECOWAS members—and therefore ECOWAS—to respond to crises within the subregion.

Significantly, most such training initiatives have not involved the ECOWAS Secretariat, although there is a recognition that this is a necessary step. For example, the ECOWAS Secretariat was not involved in the planning or the execution of *Guidimakha* or *Kozah*. However, the Secretariat did take part in *Blue Pelican*, a map exercise co-sponsored by France and the United Kingdom at the ECOWAS Headquarters in November 2000. Similarly, the Secretariat was invited to participate in ACRI's first multinational exercise, held in Senegal in July 2001. Recognizing the imperative of implicating the ECOWAS Secretariat in such activities, the Mechanism provides that the executive secretary will contribute to peacekeeping training. Tasks in this domain include supporting the development of common training programs and instruction manuals for national training centers, organizing courses in the regional peacekeeping centers, developing these centers into subregional centers for the implementation of the mechanism, and organizing periodic exercises and joint operations for staff and commanders.¹³⁴

Financing the Activities of the Mechanism

The Mechanism also seeks to redress the funding problems that have plagued past ECOMOG peace operations. Recognizing that the current system of assessed contributions to the annual ECOWAS budget is not working, ECOWAS is in the process of instituting a community levy to fund the Secretariat's activities. Under the new system, ECOWAS member-states will be taxed 0.5 percent on their imports from outside the subregion.¹³⁵ A percentage of this levy will be earmarked for funding the Mechanism. Beyond this, funds within the Executive Secretariat's annual budget will be identified for peace and security activities. Under the new

system, troop-contributing countries should not have to bear the full financial burden of their military involvement; rather ECOWAS intends to take financial responsibility after the first three months of a given operation. The Secretariat also intends to organize logistics, in consultation with the host country as well as troop contributors. The Council of Ministers will determine the remuneration and conditions of service for ECOMOG personnel.¹³⁶

A lack of adequate financial resources threatens to undermine the organization's ambitious plans. ECOWAS's annual budget is modest and its arrears are comparatively great.¹³⁷ Notwithstanding all of the suggested means of acquiring funds under the new Mechanism, it is doubtful whether ECOWAS will be able to secure adequate resources for the proposed initiatives. The Community levy was first instituted in the 1993 ECOWAS Revised Treaty. More than eight years later, it still has not entered into force. Thus, earmarking a percentage of the levy for the Mechanism's activities is a long-range plan, at best. Moreover, unless the Secretariat's annual budget is increased substantially, funds earmarked for the Mechanism's activities will not be terribly significant. Although international support for ECOMOG initiatives has grown, ECOWAS should not rely too heavily upon voluntary contributions. These financial uncertainties (and the high costs of past ECOMOG missions) also cast doubt upon the Secretariat's stated intention of assuming financial responsibility for ECOMOG peacekeeping operations after three months. Without sufficient financial resources, ECOMOG contributors may be forced to continue to develop creative financing schemes or decline to adequately pay their soldiers. In the past, these policies have engendered corruption and poor discipline among participating officers and troops.

Southern African Development Community

Long-standing tensions within SADC over the subregion's peace and security machinery have recently shown signs of abating. SADC members have been attempting to set up a formal security framework since 1994, but infighting has stalled the process. The Organ on Politics, Defence, and Security was established at the June 1996 SADC Summit in Gaborone, and Mugabe was elected as its first Chair. Subsequent to this meeting, however, a fissure became apparent within SADC regarding the relative autonomy of the Organ. South Africa maintained that the body should be a SADC substructure reporting directly to the SADC Summit, whereas Zimbabwe asserted that the Organ should function essentially as a parallel structure to SADC, under a separate Chair. Hopes that the matter could be resolved quickly proved unrealistic. After numerous SADC Summits and ministerial meetings, a draft Protocol on Politics, Defence

and Security Co-operation was approved at the March 2001 SADC Summit, as part of a broader exercise to restructure the organization.¹³⁸ As of June 2001, the Protocol had yet to enter into force.

Decision-Making

The draft Protocol clarifies the Organ's relationship to SADC and describes its functioning. It provides that the Organ is part of SADC and thus will be integrated into the organization's structures. The Organ will report directly to the SADC Summit. The Organ's Chair, a head of state, is responsible for the overall policy direction of the Organ. This person, who is to serve for a one-year period, cannot also be the Chair of the SADC Summit. Decisions will generally be taken by a "troika" comprising the current, preceding, and incoming Organ Chairs.¹³⁹

The draft Protocol also delineates the Organ's substructures. It provides that a Plenary Ministerial Committee, composed of ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs, Defence, State Security/Intelligence, and Public Security/Police, will operate below the Organ and will be responsible for coordinating its work. In turn, two additional ministerial-level committees will function below this committee: the Politics and Diplomacy Ministerial Committee and the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC). The Politics and Diplomacy Ministerial Committee is a new body, which will comprise Ministers of Foreign Affairs. The ISDSC, which actually predates the creation of SADC and has long served as the nexus for defense and security cooperation in the subregion, will continue to comprise Ministers of Defence, Public Security, and State Security.¹⁴⁰ Both the Politics and Diplomacy Ministerial Committee and the ISDSC can establish substructures as needed. The country that chairs the Organ is to also chair its subsidiary structures. A quorum for all meetings is two-thirds of the membership, and decisions are to be taken by consensus.¹⁴¹

It is important not to oversell the potential impact of an "operationalized" Organ, at least in the short term. Granted, a functioning Organ is a prerequisite for SADC to address regional peace and security issues. The fact that SADC members have agreed on the Organ's structure signifies an important shift in thinking among SADC states: that any military action must be based on a collective SADC decision—and not by individual members or a select group of countries. It remains to be seen, however, how sincere SADC members will be in their efforts to empower the Organ. Given the disparities among SADC states in terms of their commitment to democracy, rule of law, and human rights, the effectiveness of the Organ will remain in question.

Secretariat

It is hoped that the SADC Secretariat will eventually service the Organ, although this issue has not been conclusively decided. Until now, the Secretariat has been substantially divorced from the decision-making process in the peace and security domain. In the interventions in the DRC and Lesotho, the Secretariat has not played a very visible or transparent role and has not exercised any operational oversight. As of mid-2001, the Secretariat had no person or position dedicated to working on “political–military” or peace and security issues.¹⁴² As an interim arrangement, the country that chairs the Organ will provide its secretariat.¹⁴³ Before the August 2001 Summit, however, it is hoped that the SADC Secretariat will have taken on new responsibilities in the realm of peace and security and will have begun to establish new structures to service the Organ. The SADC Secretariat, for its part, is preparing to bring on additional staff.¹⁴⁴

Mission Planning and Support

Plans to establish a standby brigade under the ISDSC’s supervision have effectively been put on hold. As the idea was originally conceived, each member-state was supposed to earmark formed units as well as headquarters staff. The arrangement should have been operational by the end of 1998, but little progress was made due to the impasse concerning the Organ. According to Maj. Gen. Daan Hamman, former de facto secretary of the ISDSC, the SADC Organ must initiate a number of the actions, such as determining the procedure for deploying peacekeepers. The civilian structures to manage the peacekeeping operation must also be decided upon and established.¹⁴⁵ Although the Organ is now becoming operational, SADC members have not moved forward on this initiative. It is clear that the organization would be unable to field and sustain a brigade-sized force.

The ISDSC has also been involved in more modest and realistic preparatory initiatives. For example, its Defence Sub-Committee has solved a number of technical problems associated with disaster relief support operations. It has also approved a syllabus for peace-support training, based on the UN model, which SADC defense forces will use. It is working to develop operational procedures and ensure that standing operational orders are in place as well. Recognizing the importance of a secure and reliable communication network, the ISDSC has established a satellite communication system linking the various SADC governments. This “high-level hotline” became operational in early 1999.¹⁴⁶

Peacekeeping Training

Notwithstanding the nonfunctioning of the Organ, SADC members have undertaken some important peacekeeping training initiatives. The Zimbabwe-based SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre has been tasked to coordinate and harmonize peacekeeping education training in the subregion. With advisory and financial assistance from donor countries, especially Denmark,¹⁴⁷ the Centre has improved its training facilities and expanded its peacekeeping course offerings. From 1995 until March 2001, the UK BMATT based in Harare also provided peacekeeping training bilaterally to several SADC members in the recipient's country.¹⁴⁸ In addition, a South African nongovernmental organization, with Norwegian support, has provided training to civilians in peacekeeping operations.

The subregion has also initiated regional peacekeeping training exercises. The first such exercise, *Blue Hungwe*, was held in April 1997. Some 1,500 troops from ten SADC countries participated in the exercise, which Zimbabwe hosted and organized with British assistance.¹⁴⁹ In April 1999 in South Africa, some 4,500 military personnel from 12 SADC countries participated in exercise *Blue Crane*, which also included military observers and civilian police.¹⁵⁰ A majority of SADC countries have also participated in the French-led field training exercises *Tulipe* (May 1999) and *Geranium* (May/June 2000) in Madagascar and Réunion, respectively—both of which focused on peacekeeping themes.¹⁵¹ Tanzania and France, within the framework of RECAMP, will cohost exercise *Tanzanite* in February 2002, bringing together some 800 participants from throughout the SADC subregion.¹⁵²

Financing

It remains unclear how the activities of the Organ will be financed. As an integral component of SADC, the Organ will have to form part of the SADC budget. In the past, no part of the SADC budget has been allocated to peace and security initiatives. SADC member-states are in the process of restructuring the assessment scheme. The March 2001 SADC Summit directed the Council of Ministers to devise a new formula for contributions from member-states. As of mid-2001, however, no decision had been taken. Plans for funding SADC peacekeeping initiatives are still long-range.¹⁵³

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development

While IGAD has become increasingly preoccupied with peace and security issues, it will continue to focus on preventive diplomacy and peacemaking—not peacekeeping. Unlike most other African organizations, IGAD was

created chiefly to address humanitarian concerns.¹⁵⁴ Like others, it has subsequently turned its attention to peace and security issues. IGAD began its mediation efforts to end the Somali conflict in 1991, and in 1993 it undertook a leading role in trying to find a diplomatic solution to the war in the Sudan.¹⁵⁵ To better manage these initiatives, IGAD heads of state and government adopted a revised charter and agreed to strengthen and restructure the permanent Secretariat. Nevertheless, the Secretariat, which has effectively doubled the number of its staff to around 20,¹⁵⁶ relies heavily on donor assistance for its activities. In 1998, a five-element “Programme on Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management” was elaborated and a Division of Political and Humanitarian Affairs created, including a Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution section. The Programme focuses on conflict prevention and does not include a peacekeeping component. Indeed, IGAD is focusing its attentions on setting up a Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism, and has recently moved from the conceptualization to the implementation phase.¹⁵⁷ IGAD’s potential to contribute to regional peacekeeping is negligible. For the foreseeable future, its efforts to resolve and manage conflict will be confined to the realm of diplomacy.

Conclusion

Care must be taken not to be dismissive of or overly negative about what African regional organizations have achieved. The UN, with far more resources than any African regional organization, has experienced many similar shortcomings.¹⁵⁸ For example, the UN also routinely fails to deploy its missions in a timely manner and recruits many ill-trained, ill-equipped, and ill-prepared troops. Whereas the UN has been developing its peacekeeping doctrine, standard operating procedures, and rules of engagement for more than half a century, African organizations have much less experience. A cursory glance at the troubles that resource-rich institutions such as NATO, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the EU have encountered in Kosovo underscores the difficulties and risks that peacekeeping entails.

Yet failing to recognize and address the real limitations of African regional organizations’ peacekeeping performance is problematic. For too many years, the UN—at its highest level—has encouraged and applauded regional efforts to promote peace and security without raising appropriate concerns. The UN has frequently chosen not to criticize shortcomings that would have benefited from being exposed and rectified rather than covered up and aggravated. Too often the UN has highlighted gross numbers rather than gross

violations. Western capacity-building programs, while welcome, are relatively insignificant—especially in the short term.

African regional organizations have themselves begun to acknowledge many of their shortcomings and are trying to remedy them while building upon their strengths. The OAU has distinguished itself by having created a flexible decision-making body in the Central Organ. Also, OAU action has sometimes prompted the international community to become more meaningfully involved—as was the case in Rwanda. Moreover, no single country has misused the OAU to provide convenient political cover to pursue its own agenda. However, the OAU has used the Central Organ sparingly and in a limited capacity. Of the four missions that the Organ has authorized, the average strength has only been 35 military observers and essentially none has run concurrently. It is unlikely that the OAU will attain its modest objective of fielding two 100-strong military observer missions simultaneously. Yet there is value in the OAU—and its donors—setting their sights on trying to achieve smaller, more realistic goals. Worse than deciding not to undertake multifaceted peacekeeping operations, is undertaking them halfheartedly and ineffectually. The CMC has created some useful standard operating procedures and administrative guidelines (which other regional organizations could replicate), but it is still far from meeting the weighty demands that have been thrust upon it.

ECOWAS has distinguished itself from the OAU in carrying out sizable and robust peacekeeping. Moreover, the advent of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security represents an important turning point for the organization, and many of its components are beginning to fall into place. Despite this progress, ECOWAS must do more to rein in some of its members or it will remain a tool for promoting hegemonic aspirations more than securing peace. Nigeria is understandably sensitive to criticism of its leadership role in the ECOMOG operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone given the casualties it has sustained and the expenses it has incurred. Moreover, Nigeria's opposition to the raging anarchy in Liberia as well as to the RUF can be arguably seen as morally defensible. Nevertheless, many of Nigeria's hardships were self-imposed. Troublesome questions concerning Nigeria's activities in ECOMOG deserve further exploration. However, until the UN or other elements of the international community are willing to take sustained and meaningful action to end the spiraling conflicts in West Africa, both ECOWAS and Nigeria deserve to be encouraged and engaged so as to improve on previous performance.

SADC's potential peacekeeping role is not as promising as it once was, but there may be renewed cause for optimism. The split between Mandela

and Mugabe has yet to be repaired. Indeed, the divide has widened and two distinct blocs within the subregion are discernable. Yet SADC member-states have nevertheless undertaken numerous peacekeeping training and other capacity-building initiatives. Moreover, it is encouraging that SADC has approved the draft Protocol on the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation. Significantly, the SADC coalitions in the DRC and Lesotho distinguished themselves from other subregional initiatives in the degree to which the troop contributors were able to deploy and remain operational without foreign assistance. In the DRC, the troop contributors have largely sustained their operations by undertaking commercial activities in the theater, which raises a different set of concerns.

For the foreseeable future, the willingness of African countries to undertake peacekeeping through regional organizations will continue to far surpass their capacities. Operations undertaken by African regional organizations generally remain dependent on Western largesse to function relatively smoothly. Too often, Western assistance—whether financial aid, equipment, or help with deployment—is too little too late. When it is forthcoming, the regional organization almost always performs better. When it is denied or withdrawn, the mission cannot be undertaken or continued. Besides strengthening each individual organization, much more thought must be given to how these organizations relate to one another as well as to the UN and how the international community can more adroitly provide assistance. The likelihood that the UN Security Council will once again substantially reduce its presence in Africa adds urgency to the problem.

Notes

1. For the purposes of this paper, “peacekeeping” is broadly defined to include small observer missions as well as large enforcement actions.
2. In describing the experiences of these organizations, very brief outlines of the conflicts in question are given for explanatory purposes. The focus, however, is to examine the institutional experience over time. Greater detail and discussion of the course of events relating to the conflicts themselves can be found in the case study chapters.
3. These include the East African Community (EAC) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS).
4. These include the two inter-African forces sent to Zaire in the 1970s in support of Kinshasa, the 1979 Nigerian initiative to help broker an end to the civil war in Chad, the multinational deployment in Mozambique in the 1980s, and the coalition formed to support an African-brokered peace agreement in the Central African Republic in the 1990s.

5. In July 2001, the OAU voted to evolve into AU. As of June 2001 the transformation is not yet complete.
6. See Roy May and Simon Massey, "The OAU Interventions in Chad: Mission Impossible or Mission Evaded?" *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1998), p. 48.
7. Nathan Pelcovits, "Peacekeeping: The African Experience," in Henry Wiseman, ed., *Peacekeeping: Appraisals and Prospects* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1983), pp. 277–278.
8. Dean Pittman, "The OAU and Chad," in Yassin El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman, eds., *The OAU after Twenty Years* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), p. 315.
9. See *Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options*, OAU Information Services Publication—Series (II), 1993, p. 39, para. 116.
10. Mamadou Bah, Director, Political Department, OAU Secretariat, "Statement on the Maintenance of Regional Peace in Africa," in *Disarmament: United Nations Regional Disarmament Workshop for Africa, Lagos, Nigeria, 3–7 April 1989* (New York: UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, April 1980), p. 99.
11. According to the OAU, Nigeria provided 2,000 troops, Zaire 700, and Senegal 600. *Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options*, p. 39, para. 117.
12. Amadu Sesay, "The OAU Peace-Keeping Force in Chad: Some Lessons for Future Operations," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1995), p. 194.
13. Pittman, "The OAU and Chad," p. 315.
14. 'Funmi Olonisakin, "African 'Home-made' Peacekeeping Initiatives," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Spring 1997), p. 355.
15. Senegal and Zaire received substantial assistance from France. The United States provided significant support to Nigeria. See Pittman, "The OAU and Chad," p. 316.
16. Partly in an effort to compensate for the reduced presence, at least four African countries—Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, and Zambia—contributed military observers to the mission. Written correspondence with Maj. Gen. Romeo Ola Ishola Williams, former Chief of Defence, Operations, Training and Plans, Nigerian Ministry of Defence, August 6, 1999.
17. Pittman, "The OAU and Chad," p. 317.
18. Interview with Chris J. Bakwesegha, former Head, Conflict Management Division, OAU Secretariat, June 18, 1999, New York; and written correspondence with Sam B. Ibok, Head, Conflict Management Division, OAU Secretariat, January 26, 1999 and May 3, 1999.
19. *The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993–1996* (New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 14, para. 34.
20. See "Document 2: Letter dated 6 August 1992 from the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Salim Ahmed Salim, to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Concerning Implementation of the 14 July 1992 Cease-Fire Agreement," in *The United Nations and Rwanda: 1993–1996*, pp. 149–150.

21. Written correspondence with Ibok, January 26, 1999.
22. UN Document S/26488, *Report of the Secretary-General on Rwanda*, September 24, 1993, para. 14.
23. See Gustave Zoula, "OAU Peacekeeping Operations: Past Experience and the Challenges of New Perspective," Paper, *UK/Zimbabwe Workshop on Peacekeeping*, January 23–27, 1995, Harare.
24. Written correspondence with Ibok, January 26, 1999 and May 3, 1999.
25. UN Document S/RES/872 (1993), October 5, 1993; see S/26488, paras. 31–38, 41, 47.
26. For further information see Gilbert Khadiagala, chapter 8 in this volume.
27. Interview with Bakwesegha, November 30, 1998.
28. Chris J. Bakwesegha, "The Role of the Organization of African Unity in Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution," *International Journal of Refugee Law*, Special Issue (July 1995), p. 213. The peacekeeping operation was also to include 20 civilians.
29. Interview with Bakwesegha, November 30, 1998.
30. Written correspondence with Ibok, May 3, 1999.
31. Interview with Col. Djibril Sangaré, former Head, Medical Officers, OMIB, current Security Officer, OMIB, September 17, 1998, Bujumbura.
32. Written correspondence with Ibok, January 26, 1999 and May 3, 1999.
33. Richard Cornwell, "Africa Watch, Anjouan: A Spat in the Indian Ocean," *African Security Review*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1998), pp. 57–58.
34. Written correspondence with Ibok, May 3, 1999.
35. The OAU has since imposed sanctions and as of mid-2001 maintains a civilian liaison office on the ground. Written correspondence with Sam B. Ibok, Director, Political Affairs Department, OAU Secretariat, June 8, 2001.
36. For further information see Tatiana Carayannis and Herbert Weiss, chapter 9 in this volume.
37. The six signatories included Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Burundi, which also has military personnel in the DRC, claimed that it was not a belligerent and refused to sign the accord.
38. The *Mouvement pour la libération du Congo* (MLC) and the *Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie* (RCD) signed the accord on August 1 and 31, respectively.
39. UN Document S/RES 1258 (1999), August 6, 1999.
40. Written correspondence with Ibok, September 7, 2000.
41. The Regional JMC in Kabalo, for example, never convened due to insufficient logistical support from the RCD and Rwanda. (Written correspondence with Ibok, June 8, 2001; see also "OAU monitors enter DR Congo," *BBC News*, November 16, 1999, www.bbc.co.uk.) This is not to suggest that the lack of resources alone explains the lack of progress made in the peace process. Rather, the far greater cause lay with the limited political will among the combatants to find a diplomatic solution.
42. Written correspondence with Ibok, June 8, 2001.

43. For further information see Leenco Lata, chapter 6 in this volume.
44. See Festus Aboagye, "Towards New Peacekeeping Partnerships in Africa?: The OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia-Eritrea," *African Security Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2001, p. 26. The planned-for three, three-person OAU observer teams for UNMEE's three sectors never materialized.
45. Interview with Col. Festus Aboagye, Senior Military Expert for OLMEE, OAU Secretariat, October 7, 2001, by telephone.
46. For further information see 'Funmi Olonisakin, chapter 4 in this volume.
47. Interview with Lt. Gen. (Rtd.) Arnold Quainoo, former Force Commander of ECOMOG in Liberia, March 17, 1999, Accra.
48. In the end, Nigeria airlifted the Gambian and Guinean troops to Freetown. Segun Aderiye, "ECOMOG Landing," in MA Vogt, ed., *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peace Keeping* (Lagos: Gabumo Publishing, 1992), p. 97.
49. Herbert Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/1997), p. 167.
50. Olonisakin, "African 'Home-made' Peacekeeping Initiatives," pp. 363–364. In addition to maintaining its own contingent, Nigeria provided most of the heavy weapons, military aircraft, and naval vessels, as well as the oil products for the entire operation. Max Ahmadu Sesay, "Collective Security or Collective Disaster? Regional Peace-keeping in West Africa," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (1995), p. 217.
51. Abiodun Alao, "Peacekeeping in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Liberian Civil War," *Brassey's Defence Yearbook* (London: Brassey's, 1993), p. 343.
52. See Jennifer Morrison Taw and Andrew Grant-Thomas, "U.S. Support for Regional Complex Contingency Operations: Lessons from ECOMOG," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (1999), p. 65.
53. Howe, "Lessons of Liberia: ECOMOG and Regional Peacekeeping," p. 168.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 164.
55. Olonisakin, "African 'Home-made' Peacekeeping Initiatives," p. 361.
56. The Status of Forces Agreement was not signed until June 1998.
57. Interview with Roger Laloupo, Director, Legal Affairs, ECOWAS Secretariat, March 11, 1999, Abuja.
58. A small ECOMOG contingent remained in Liberia to help oversee the destruction of small arms collected prior to the 1997 elections. The last troops departed Liberia in October 1999.
59. For further information see W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, chapter 5 in this volume.
60. Interview with Col. Peter Norman, former Defence Adviser, British High Commission to Sierra Leone, March 8, 1999, Lagos.
61. 'Funmi Olonisakin, "Mercenaries Fill the Vacuum," *The World Today*, Vol. 54, No. 6, June 1998, p. 148.
62. Credible reports that Guinea sold its *matériel* as it was preparing to join the UN operation raise questions about Guinea's previous equipment losses as part of

- ECOMOG. See Eric G. Berman, "Re-Armament in Sierra Leone: One Year after the Lomé Peace Agreement," *Small Arms Survey Occasional Paper No. 1* (December 2000), p. 18.
63. There is ample evidence that ECOMOG soldiers summarily executed suspected rebels. See, e.g., "Sierra Leone: Getting Away with Murder, Mutilation and Rape," *Human Rights Watch* (July 1999), www.hrw.org.
 64. In January 1999, the United Kingdom pledged an additional US\$1.65 million, ("IRIN-West Africa Update 373," January 5, 1999, www.reliefweb.int) followed by a US\$16.5 million matching grant in March. (Ehichioya Ezomon, Sola Dixon, and Moses Ayo Jolayemi, "Britain spends N4.5 billion on Sierra Leone, says Cook," *The Guardian* (Lagos), March 11, 1999, pp. 1–2.) Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United States were among other Western countries to increase their assistance.
 65. Mane had been sacked earlier in the year on charges of selling arms to Senegalese rebels. (A parliamentary inquiry into the matter subsequently exonerated him.)
 66. Interview with Laloupo, March 11, 1999. Mali subsequently offered a 125-strong contingent. (UN Document S/1999/294, *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1216 (1998) Relative to the Situation in Guinea-Bissau*, March 17, 1999, para. 11.) However, it never deployed.
 67. "IRIN-West Africa Update 361," December 16, 1998, www.reliefweb.int.
 68. France transported ECOMOG troops to Guinea-Bissau aboard a French naval vessel and supplied a number of military trucks. Paris also provided participating countries with *per diems* for their peacekeepers.
 69. See UN Document S/1999/294, para. 13.
 70. "Situation Report: Fighting Breaks Out in Bissau," *UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*, May 8, 1999, www.reliefweb.int.
 71. UN Document S/1999/294, para. 15. The failure of ECOMOG to deploy along the northern border was also reportedly due to the fact that the military junta had not authorized this action. See "Humanitarian Situation Report Guinea-Bissau: 27 March–13 April 1999," *UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs*, April 14, 1999, www.reliefweb.int.
 72. Written correspondence with UN official, April 9, 2001.
 73. UN Document S/1999/445, *Agreement Defining the Operations, Composition and Status of ECOMOG on the Territory of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau dated 22 March 1999*, April 20, 1999.
 74. See UN Document S/1999/432, Annex, *Report on the Situation in Guinea-Bissau Prepared by the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS*, April 16, 1999.
 75. Interview with Col. Dixon Dikio, Military Adviser, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Political Affairs, Defense, and Security, ECOWAS Secretariat, July 27, 2001, Dakar.
 76. *Final Report*, Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the Mediation and Security Council, December 13, 2000, Bamako, Item 3, www.ecowas.int.
 77. "German Government to Provide \$250,000 to Airlift ECOMOG Troops," *ECOWAS Press Release*, February 5, 2001, www.ecowas.int.

78. For further information see Tatiana Carayannis and Herbert Weiss, chapter 9 in this volume.
79. Interview with Horst Brammer, Deputy Director, SADC Political Affairs, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, August 27, 1999, by telephone. Mandela was also likely aware that South Africa might soon intervene militarily in Lesotho—as it did later in September—and wanted to quell potential criticism.
80. “More Deployed as Casualties Rise,” *The Zimbabwe Independent*, August 28, 1998, www.allafrica.com.
81. Howard W. French, “Congo’s Fate Lies in the Hands of Neighbors Grown Used to Intervening,” *International Herald Tribune*, August 19, 1999.
82. “More Deployed as Casualties Rise.”
83. Brig. Ed Ndiatwah, “Opinions: An Overview of the DRC Campaign,” *Namibia Defence Journal*, Vol. 11, No. 8 (November 2000–January 2001), p. 9.
84. See for example, UN Document S/2001/357, Letter dated April 12, 2001 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, *Report of the UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, April 12, 2001, which also details similar activities of Rwanda, Uganda, and others.
85. In June 2001, Namibian President Sam Nujoma pledged that the Namibian contingent would be fully withdrawn by the end of August. “Namibia-DRC: Nujoma says all foreign troops to be withdrawn from Congo,” *IRIN*, June 25, 2001, www.reliefweb.int.
86. “SA, Botswana Troops Move into Lesotho,” *Chief of Joint Operations: SANDF*, September 22, 1998, www.woza.co.za.news.
87. At the SADC Summit in Grand Baie the week before, SADC heads of state and government had merely “expressed concern at the civil disturbances and loss of life following the recent elections” and “welcomed the mediation initiative led by the South African government.” UN Document S/1998/915, Annex I, *Final Communiqué of the 1998 Summit of the Heads of State or Government of the Southern African Development Community of 14 September 1998*, October 5, 1998, para. 17.
88. In addition to Botswana and South Africa, Mosisili had also reportedly invited Mozambique and Zimbabwe to intervene militarily. Mark Malan, “Regional Power Politics Under Cover of SADC—Running Amok with a Mythical Organ,” *ISS Paper No. 35*, October 1998, p. 7.
89. Indeed, the South African armored vehicles sent to Lesotho were not heavily armed. For example, blank cartridges were fired to make its presence felt while limiting the potential for bloodshed and property damage. Interview with Amb. Jackie Selebi, Director-General, South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 26, 1999, Geneva.
90. *Ibid.*
91. “South African Army Admits Mistakes in Lesotho,” *PanAfrican News Agency*, November 3, 1998, www.allafrica.com.

92. "Lesotho deal reached," *BBC News*, October 15, 1998, www.bbc.co.uk. As of June 2001, however, the elections had still not been held.
93. "Bulletin No. 96/98," *South African Department of Defence*, December 4, 1998, www.mil.za.
94. "Bulletin No. 40/99," *South African Department of Defence*, May 24, 1999, www.mil.za. A training element of 300 soldiers from Botswana and South Africa remained in Lesotho.
95. "LANAD a 10 Ans: 1977–1987," pp. 29–30, courtesy of Togolese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
96. *Ibid.* Benin, which has since become a full member of ANAD, had observer status in the organization at the time, as did Guinea.
97. Written correspondence with Rear Adm. Alexandre Diam, Secretary-General, ANAD Secretariat, April 12, 1999.
98. "LANAD a 10 Ans: 1977–1987," p. 30.
99. ECCAS and EAC have also begun to elaborate new mechanisms. ECCAS established the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) in 1999. In 2001, EAC signed a treaty that provided for the creation of a common defense pact.
100. For example, even though the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration is one of the OAU's four principal organs, it never became operational.
101. Written correspondence with Ibok, January 26, 1999.
102. In November 2000, OAU Neutral Investigators were withdrawing from the JMC while OLMEE was deploying. As of June 2001, the OAU's JMC consisted of a single military officer and a civilian adviser.
103. The OAU, *The OAU Programme for Strengthening the Conflict Management Centre*, October 1999, para. 1.16, courtesy of U.S. Embassy to Ethiopia.
104. Aboagye, "Towards New Peacekeeping Partnerships in Africa?: The OAU Liaison Mission in Ethiopia–Eritrea," p. 30.
105. See written correspondence with Ibok, June 8, 2001, and *The OAU Programme for Strengthening the Conflict Management Centre*, Annex A.
106. Written correspondence with Ibok, June 8, 2001.
107. Interview with former U.S. government official, May 1, 2001, by telephone.
108. See *The OAU Programme for Strengthening the Conflict Management Centre*, para. 1.27.
109. The OAU has described that relatively small mission's cost as "staggering." *Resolving Conflicts in Africa: Implementation Options*, p. 56, para. 175.
110. Written correspondence with Ibok, June 8, 2001.
111. *Report of the Secretary-General on the OAU Peace Fund as of 31 March 2001*, April 27, 2001, courtesy of OAU Secretariat.
112. Written correspondence with Ibok, January 26, 1999, May 3, 1999, and September 7, 2000.
113. As of March 2001, the United States had given the OAU Peace Fund US\$10.8 million. The second largest donor, Belgium, had contributed

US\$2.24 million, *Report of the Secretary-General on the OAU Peace Fund as of 31 March 2001*.

114. Only 12 African countries had made voluntary contributions to the Peace Fund as of March 2001, for a total of US\$1.96 million. *Ibid.*
115. The previous framework, which included the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression as well as the 1981 Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense, had never become operational.
116. The Treaty refers to the need to “establish a regional peace and security observation system and peace-keeping forces where appropriate” but does not expand upon the structure of the envisaged framework. *ECOWAS 1993 Revised Treaty*, Article 58, www.ecowas.int.
117. *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*, December 10, 1999, Lomé, www.ecowas.int.
118. *Ibid.*, Articles 4–14.
119. “Ambassadors of Mediation and Security Council Meet in Abuja,” *ECOWAS Press Release No. 58/2001*, June 18, 2001, www.ecowas.int.
120. *ECOWAS Executive Secretary’s 2000 Annual Report*, para. 354, www.ecowas.int.
121. The Defense and Security Commission, which is composed of political and military representatives from ECOWAS member-states, serves as a technical and advisory body to the Mediation and Security Council. The ad hoc Council of Elders comprises eminent persons who, on behalf of ECOWAS, use their good offices and experience to play the role of mediators, conciliators, and facilitators, *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism*, Articles 18–20.
122. *Ibid.*, Articles 15–16.
123. Written correspondence with Dikio, December 21, 2001.
124. *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism*, Articles 23–24.
125. *Ibid.*, Article 22.
126. Nigeria indicated that it could make available three battalions, while Ghana and Senegal pledged two battalions apiece. Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, and Togo each offered one battalion. The Gambia pledged one company. No data was available from Cape Verde, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, and Sierra Leone (*Inaugural Meeting of the ECOWAS Defense and Security Commission*, July 20, 2000, Accra, paras. 25 and 27, www.ecowas.int). Côte d’Ivoire subsequently indicated that it could furnish a battalion, including medical and combat support services. Written correspondence with Dikio, December 21, 2001.
127. *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism*, Article 33.
128. *Inaugural Meeting of the ECOWAS Defense and Security Commission*, paras. 29–30, 36–37.
129. The very limited success that the UN has had with its Stand-by Arrangements System should be kept in mind.
130. Two Nigerian battalions were trained in the year 2000, and one battalion each from Ghana and Senegal began training in May 2001. The third and final phase

of the training program will include three additional Nigerian battalions and is scheduled to begin in September 2001.

131. Eight ECOWAS members participated in *Guidimakha*, a ten-day exercise that Senegal hosted in February 1998, and nine participated in the week-long *Kozah*, which Togo hosted in April 2001. Liberia and Sierra Leone are the only ECOWAS member-states yet to participate in French-sponsored exercises.
132. Interview with Lt. Col. Patrick de Gramont, Officer in Charge of Central Africa—Peacekeeping, Military and Defense Cooperation Unit, General Directorate of Political and Security Affairs, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, March 20, 2001, Paris.
133. Among other tasks, BMATT runs the annual four-week peacekeeping module in the senior command and staff course (which typically has 22 Ghanaian participants and 15 participants from other countries). Documentation provided by BMATT West Africa.
134. *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism*, Article 30.
135. Interview with Laloupo, March 11, 1999.
136. *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism*, Articles 36–39.
137. In 1999, e.g., ECOWAS's annual budget was US\$10 million, and it was owed some US\$40 million. Interview with Halima Ahmed, Deputy Director, Legal Affairs, ECOWAS Secretariat, March 11, 1999.
138. See *Final Communiqué*, Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, Windhoek, March 9, 2001, para. 11, courtesy of SADC Secretariat. The Summit agreed to regroup the existing 21 sectors based in and administered by SADC members into four clusters (Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment; Infrastructure and Services; Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources; and Social and Human Development and Special Programmes) to be located at the SADC Secretariat. See *ibid.*, para. 15; see also, *SADC Today*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (April 2001), p. 1, www.sadc.int.
139. See *Final Communiqué*, Extraordinary Summit of SADC Heads of State and Government, Windhoek, March 9, 2001, para. 11; written correspondence with Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies, May 9, 2001.
140. Written correspondence with Cilliers, May 9, 2001. Prior to the creation of SADC, the ISDSC, a substructure of the Front Line States, dealt with various individual and collective defense and security issues in the subregion on an ad hoc basis. After the dissolution of the FLS in July 1994, the ISDSC continued to exist in anticipation of its role as an institution of the future SADC peace and security mechanism. Until the controversy over the Organ was settled, the ISDSC remained detached from other subregional structures. Interview with Brammer, August 27, 1999, by telephone.
141. Written correspondence with Cilliers, May 9, 2001.

142. Written correspondence with U.S. government official, May 7, 2001. The brief of the SADC Coordinator for De-mining, Small Arms Trafficking, and Disaster Management, is strictly limited to those three issues.
143. Written correspondence with Cilliers, May 9, 2001.
144. Interview with Brammer, May 3, 2001, by telephone.
145. Interview with Maj. Gen. (Rtd.) Daan S. Hamman, former de facto secretary, ISDSC, January 21, 1998, Halfway House; and written correspondence with Hamman, February 18, 1998 and July 7, 1999.
146. Ibid.
147. Besides financial support, Denmark has also provided expertise and promoted the development of a “clearinghouse” that will, among other things, monitor peacekeeping training activities, identify new regional training requirements, and keep a record of trained peacekeeping practitioners and instructors in the subregion and beyond. Kurt Mosgaard, “Training Co-ordination: the NACC Clearing House Concept,” in Mark Malan, ed., “Resolute Partners: Building Peacekeeping Capacity in Southern Africa,” *ISS Monograph No. 21*, February 1998, p. 88.
148. The United Kingdom withdrew its BMATT from Zimbabwe in March 2001, but plans to carry out its scheduled activities until the end of 2001. Interview with Mark Bowden, Conflict Management Adviser (Africa Command), UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, March 16, 2001, London.
149. Interview with Brig. Adrian Naughten, Commander, BMATT Southern Africa, January 26, 1998, Harare.
150. See Kwezi Mngqibisa, “Exercise Blue Crane,” in Cedric de Coning and Kwezi Mngqibisa, eds., *Lessons Learned from Exercise Blue Crane* (Kwa-Zulu Natal: The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Conflicts, 2000), p. 13. The two SADC states that did not contribute troops were the DRC and the Seychelles.
151. Angola, the DRC, Lesotho, and Swaziland are the only SADC countries not to have contributed troops to either exercise.
152. Interview with Lt. Col. Christophe Pitiot, Desk Officer for Sub-Saharan Africa, World and Means Division, Joint Staff, French Ministry of Defense, March 21, 2001, Paris.
153. Written correspondence with Cilliers, June 5, 2001.
154. Created in 1986 as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development, the name was changed to its current incarnation in 1996.
155. IGAD did initiate high-level talks with leaders of Eritrea and Ethiopia following the outbreak of hostilities in May 1998, but it was in no position to intervene meaningfully—even if the combatants had sought its services, which they did not. Concerning IGAD’s diplomatic efforts in the Sudanese conflict, Egypt (which has long sought to become an IGAD member but has been denied entry primarily because of Ethiopian objections) and Libya undertook a separate high-level mediation initiative in 1999. IGAD’s efforts continue, however.

156. Written correspondence with Juliet Bateyo Kamara, Chief, Documentation and Information, IGAD Secretariat, August 24, 1999 and September 29, 1999.
157. Interview with Makumi Mwangi, Director, Centre for Conflict Research, April 12, 2001, Nairobi.
158. See UN Document A/55/305—S/2000/809, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, August 21, 2000.

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CHAPTER 3

Do Regional Organizations Matter? Comparing the Conflict Management Mechanisms in West Africa and the Great Lakes Region

Clement E. Adibe

Introduction

In the decade that has elapsed since the end of the Cold War, even the most optimistic assessment of the African interstate system would concede that sub-Saharan Africa sits uncomfortably in a precarious and oftentimes unpredictable security environment. To be sure, there has been a palpable diminution of insecurity, real or imagined, in much of southern Africa since South Africa successfully ended apartheid and rejoined the community of nations in the early 1990s. In East Africa, Uganda's painfully prolonged civil war ended, for the most part, with Yoweri Museveni consolidating his power and emerging thereafter as a regional power player. In central Africa, a remarkable rebirth is taking place right at the very locus of one of the worst tragedies on the continent. The genocide against Rwanda's Tutsi population has since produced a constellation of forces that have now made possible the process of building a nation-state along the classical European model where empirical and juridical sovereignty intersect. The state that is emerging in Rwanda now is being built from the bottom-up and, in the process, leaving no doubt as to the source of power; namely, the victorious RPF. In the DRC—formerly Zaire—Mobutu Sese Seko was finally driven

out of office by Laurent Kabila, who was himself summarily denied the opportunity to repeat the insanity of prolonged despotism. As the columnist Jim Hoagland put it rather bluntly; Kabila “did not lift a finger to raise his country out of its pitiable ruins.” Instead, he “spent his three-year reign cutting deals with Western entrepreneurs eager for Congo’s diamonds, oil, arms contracts, whatever.”¹ Even West Africa—that enduring symbol of Kaplan’s “coming anarchy”—seemed to have inexplicably pulled back from the precipice as dictators passed on either as a result of natural causes (as was the case with Côte d’Ivoire’s Houphouët-Boigny) or avoidable cardiac arrest, such as Nigeria’s General Abacha. Those who survived, such as Ghana’s Jerry Rawlings, emerged as icons of democracy’s third wave and apostles of the developmentalist state. Indeed, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the conflict in Liberia that only a few years earlier was the dominant theme of the region’s panic diplomacy, had been consigned to history. Thus, in 2001, the much-hyped Bubonic Plague out of West Africa that the world would come to fear the most was not widening civil war but “slave ships” and the disingenuous activities of seemingly ubiquitous fraudsters.

From this rather generous assessment it would appear that the post-Cold War era has turned out not to be so terrible after all, but that would be misleading. In reality, it is not “morning again” in Africa. As I shall attempt to demonstrate in this chapter, there is a higher probability now than at the beginning of the 1990s that a truly convulsive conflict, with a much greater humanitarian impact, will engulf whole regions in sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, a recent editorial by the *Chicago Tribune* suggests that this scenario, which it calls “Africa’s First World War,” is already underway in Central Africa.² My argument in this chapter is that this doomsday scenario, while probable, can be avoided by means of what I shall henceforth refer to as “embedded multilateralism,” that is an institutionalized but nuanced mechanism of collaboration between the UN and regional organizations in multiple issue-areas. As the West and central African conflict cases examined in this chapter will demonstrate, the principal lesson of the past decade of international interventions in African conflicts is that regionalism and state power (i.e. realism) matter but, to paraphrase John Ruggie, a UN-oriented multilateralism matters even more.³

This chapter is divided into four parts. The first examines conceptual and definitional issues. The second discusses the place of regional organizations in the conflict resolution processes in Africa since the end of the Cold War. The third evaluates the comparative experiences of conflict management mechanisms in West Africa and the Great Lakes region in relation to three key factors: the causes and nature of the conflicts; the impact of regional

intervention on the conflict; and the role of the UN in the process of conflict resolution. The fourth and concluding section of this chapter makes an argument for embedded multilateralism in Africa.

Conceptual Considerations: The United Nations and Regional Organizations

The relationship between the UN and regional organizations will continue to be one of the more fascinating aspects of contemporary multilateralism because it is not embedded but rather ad hoc. It is also a relationship that evokes two contradictory trajectories in international relations: the unbridled internationalism of idealism and the hegemonism of coldhearted realism. It is clear from the historical evidence now available to us that these antinomies were already present in preliminary discussions leading up to the establishment of the UN. As early as 1942, British and American planners were already pondering the implications of the UN proposal on their respective national positions in the global hierarchy of power after the war. By 1943, Churchill would have an answer to what his Foreign Office had described as “America’s aspirations to world hegemony.”⁴ According to Howard:

Churchill himself, in the immediate aftermath of the Casablanca Conference in January [1943], set out his views of a postwar world where aggression would be held in check by a continuing alliance of the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union, who together would form the nucleus of a World Council, while *regional councils* for Europe, the Pacific and the American Hemisphere would be responsible for settling disputes within their own territories.⁵

The provisions for “regional arrangements” outlined in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter are a compromise between “Churchill’s desire for regional councils” and “Roosevelt’s nakedly hegemonic ambitions”⁶ It is a compromise that did not make the tension disappear then, and we have no reason to believe that it would now, but we must find innovative ways to live with it.

The evolution of the UN and myriad regional organizations all around the world since the end of World War II has occurred in ways that even the most accomplished statesmen of the twentieth century, Churchill and Roosevelt, could not have foreseen. In one of the greatest ironies of modern diplomacy, Churchill, faced with the prospect of Soviet domination after World War II, would use the occasion of his 1946 “Iron Curtain” speech in Fulton, Missouri, to make the most persuasive case for American hegemony.

On its part, the United States would assume the challenge of hegemony but in ways that did not revolve around the UN. Indeed, as the UN membership widened to include newly decolonized states, the United States became increasingly uncertain and ambivalent about the UN and sought to rely instead on regional organizations, especially the NATO, to project its power globally.⁷ This leads to the second irony. Churchill's vision of regional arrangements would be realized but not as he had anticipated. His highly prized Commonwealth of Nations would become too ceremonious to be studied seriously as an international organization. Instead, the model of regional organization for much of the world would emerge as the EU.⁸

The point of this historical reflection is to emphasize the ironies that have marked the evolution of regional organizations and their relationship to the UN. It is an area of inquiry where serendipity may be more determinative of outcome than the grand strategy of rational choice. If that is the case, we cannot assume automaticity in the relationship between the UN and regional organizations on a wide range of issue areas, especially on security. Embedded multilateralism requires proactive actions in the area of institution building, confidence building, norm creation, dissemination and enforcement as a matter of routine.

Unlike the UN, there is no unifying logic to the establishment of regional organizations. Indeed, what constitutes a "regional" organization is a matter of interpretation. For example, the EU, the Organization of American States (OAS), and the AU are some of the best-known regional organizations. Their qualification as regional organizations is based primarily upon the criterion of geographical proximity. Yet, the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN), ECOWAS and SADC are commonly referred to as "subregional" organizations although their members are geographically proximate as well. The criterion of geography begins to fade even further when we add the NATO to the list of regional organizations. Canada and the United States are so geographically separated from Western Europe that an additional criterion must be at work, in this case ideological affinity. Aside from geographical proximity and a common ideology, however, other definitional criteria for regional organizations include shared historical experiences and cultural affinity.⁹

The study of regional organizations thus far has shown that these criteria have made little difference to the perennial problem of operationalization, as is evidenced by the palpable reluctance on the part of many scholars to accept the Commonwealth of Independent States as a regional organization despite their members' obvious geographical proximity and history of shared political institutions and ideology.¹⁰ Further complexities have been introduced by a recent study that questions the statist assumptions inherent

in previous scholarship, which sees regional organizations as cooperative activities by *states* in one or several issue-areas. Muthiah Alagappa has argued that the emphasis on states may be confining, especially in light of post-Cold War activism of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). He therefore defines regional organizations as “cooperation among governments *or* non-governmental organizations in three or more geographically proximate and interdependent countries for the pursuit of mutual gain in one or more issue-areas.”¹¹

A recent survey of the academic literature on regionalism by Patrick Morgan came up with the following five criteria for identifying a region, and hence regional organization:

1. Self-consciousness of members that they constitute a region, and perceptions by others that one exists.
2. Geographical propinquity of members.
3. Evidence of some autonomy and distinctiveness from the global system, so that it “refracts” the power of that system.
4. Regular and intense interactions among members—notable interdependence.
5. A high level of political, economic, and cultural affinities.¹²

The criteria of regional self-definition and consciousness and of relative autonomy from the global system are especially useful in an era where globalization appears to go in tandem with the “deconstructionist” imperative of postmodernism. They are even more useful in understanding regional organizations in Africa, which, it now appears, are in a state of permanent deconstruction. Accordingly, the definition of regional organization that I adopt in this study is from Andrew Hurrell. It refers to “a set of policies by one or more states designed to promote the emergence of a cohesive regional unit, which dominates the pattern of relations between the states of that region and the rest of the world, and which forms the organizing basis for policy within the region across a range of issues.”¹³ This definition allows us to study regions with varying degrees of institutionalization, while focusing on their self-perception or definition, as well as the nuances of power politics.

Regional Organizations and Africa’s Postcolonial Diplomacy

African diplomacy, as it has existed in the past four decades of postcolonialism, has been anchored on the institutionalized brotherhood diplomacy of the OAU. Although formal and distant, the OAU—which was transformed

into the AU in July 2000¹⁴—provided leaders of emerging African states with a forum for venting their understandable frustrations with building nation-states amidst an inhospitable domestic and international environment.¹⁵ Thus, the annual summits of the organization were an occasion for hugs, backslapping, colorful photo-ops and eloquent communiqués designed to communicate to the rest of the world the *fact* of African unity despite the sociopolitical distortions brought on by a century of European colonialism. The OAU was exceptionally effective in developing and reinforcing the norm of nonintervention in African diplomacy as a means, quite paradoxically, of preserving the principle of *uti possidetis* despite the much-lamented imposition of arbitrary borders by European colonial states. The legal source of the OAU norm of nonintervention was Article III of OAU Charter, which clearly spells out the following principles:

1. The sovereign equality of all Member States.
2. Non-interference in the internal affairs of States.
3. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence.
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration.
5. Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring States or any other States.¹⁶

These principles have been reiterated in the Constitutive Act of the AU, with the exception of the condemnation of political assassination. A number of other principles have been added to the original principles that have been carried into the new organization. These include the “condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes in government,” the “respect for democratic principles, human rights, rule of law and good governance,” and the right of the AU to “intervene in a member state . . . in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.”¹⁷

The norm of nonintervention in African diplomacy also arose out of practical considerations or *realpolitik*. As John Clark has observed: “African rulers understood that intervention in neighboring states would evoke counter-intervention, usually through support of insurgencies.” Consequently, he argues, “the principled statements of mutual respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity made in Addis Ababa in 1963 and ritualistically repeated thereafter reflected not only the devotion to an ideal, but also the best insurance of regime security.”¹⁸

Based on the foregoing analysis, therefore, it is hardly an exaggeration to contend that regime survival and a generous conception of racial identity, which, according to Ali Mazrui, is rooted in the shared history of “humiliation and colonization by the white races,”¹⁹ have been the agglutinative principles of the OAU and of African diplomacy in general, in the face of manifest racial, religious, ethnic and ideological differences across this vast continent. As the postindependence era progressed and the euphoria of colonial liberation began to wear off, the OAU became increasingly unable to be of any significant assistance to African states and populations as they faced pressing developmental and security challenges from the 1970s onward. In response, African states began to form smaller regional and functional organizations that are nuanced enough to reflect regional specificities and dynamics. As a consequence, Africa is host to a multitude of “subregional” and functional organizations characterized by multiple membership²⁰ as states seek effective multilateral mechanisms for dealing with problems that are particular to their region. The most prominent amongst these organizations in sub-Saharan Africa are ECOWAS, the EAC, which was defunct and is now being rejuvenated, and the SADC. In the aftermath of Great Power disinterest in Africa since the end of the Cold War era, the bulk of the problems that these organizations have sought to deal with center around conflict management in the face of large-scale social, economic, and political dislocations. The last secretary general of the OAU, Salim Ahmed Salim, admitted this much in 1996: “Conflicts and domestic tension have had devastating effects on the lives of people in Africa, as well as on their efforts towards meaningful socioeconomic transformation, integration, and development.”²¹

The Universal Versus the Regional: Changing the Terms of the Discourse

The extent to which regional organizations are better suited than the UN to respond adequately to the security and developmental problems confronted by the world's regions remains a matter of continuing theoretical and empirical interest to students and practitioners of international organizations. A decade ago, amidst the euphoria of a quick Allied victory in the Gulf War and subsequent American predisposition toward a policy of “regional management of regional conflict,” MacFarlane and Weiss argued, quite in contrast to the common wisdom of the time, that “the hopes placed on regional organizations are unduly optimistic, if not altogether *misplaced*.”²² Based on empirical analysis of regional security initiatives in Southeast Asia, Africa and

Central America, they reasoned that regional organizations

are far less capable than the United Nations to deal with regional security. The concept of regionalism is inchoate and not useful as a policy tool to guide decisions under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. The institutional capacities of regional organizations are extremely feeble, so much so that they have not been able to carry out mandates in peace and security. Finally, the so-called comparative superiority of organizations in the actual region in conflict—familiarity with the issues, insulation from outside powers, need to deal with acute crises—are more than offset by such practical disadvantages as partisanship, local rivalries, and lack of resources. In short, there is good reason to doubt not just the will but also the capacity of regional organizations to perform well in the management of conflict within their areas. The end of the Cold War does little to change this conclusion.²³

Understandably, former OAU secretary general, Salim A. Salim, weighs in on this debate on the side of regional organizations. Because he is, by virtue of his position, right in the middle of this debate, I should like to quote his argument in some length:

Regional organizations are the first line of defense in the search for solutions to conflicts. For one thing, the proximity of these organizations to the theater of conflicts gives them incisive knowledge into the genesis of those conflicts and of the key players involved. This proximity and knowledge are important if we to have a head start in trying to forge a consensus for the resolution of a given conflict. Of course, there are factors of shared culture, geography, and history that play a critical function in conflicts and conflict resolution in any given region. We always see how these factors interplay both in determining the course of conflicts and in the means of resolving them. Invariably, it becomes necessary in any attempt at resolving conflicts to have a firm grasp of these factors and how to use them constructively in the process of consensus building that is so crucial in times of crisis.²⁴

The dialectical character of this argument is not lost on Salim. The proximity of regional organizations to the theater of conflicts is not necessarily a conducive factor in conflict resolution as it could taint the organization's objectivity and exercise of self-restraint.²⁵ Salim acknowledges these deficiencies but responds to them in a rather ingenious way:

At times, however, this proximity generates tension and undermines the spirit of impartiality between neighbors, sometimes to the extent that

they become part of the problem. At any rate, a regional approach is most effective when the participation of neighbors sharing borders is managed properly and is best when these are excluded from certain conflict-management situations affecting each other. On the other hand, combining the principle of neighborhood with the principle of distant impartiality serves to address this issue to a considerable extent. This is critical because at times keeping neighbors entirely out of each other's problems carries the risk of fomenting suspicion and resentment.²⁶

In light of these considerations, therefore, Salim proposes a conflict resolution model in which the OAU would serve as a conduit between the UN and subregional organizations:

Between the United Nations and sub-regional organizations lies the Organization of African Unity as a regional entity for conflict management. The biggest advantage of having the Organization of African Unity midway is that the organization is neither too far from, nor too near to, the theater of conflicts. In its direct involvement, the OAU is also in a position to coordinate all the activities relating to conflict as performed by the various sub-regional entities.²⁷

Salim's extensive efforts to establish an OAU presence in conflict resolution efforts in post-Cold War Africa are born out of necessity. In the past decade, the OAU has been largely irrelevant to the conflicts of the new era. Its structural and operational rigidity combined to keep it out of touch with Africa's sociopolitical realities. As the conflict resolution processes in West Africa and the Great Lakes region demonstrate, the OAU has been reduced to the position of an observer, while the heavy lifting has been shouldered by subregional organizations—ECOWAS in West Africa and, to a lesser extent, the SADC in the Great Lakes region—and the UN. Moreover, the effectiveness of the conflict resolution efforts of the subregional organizations in West Africa and the Great Lakes region is a function of the degree of institutionalization attained by these organizations prior to the outbreak of conflict. It is to these cases that I now turn.

Comparing Conflict Management Strategies in West Africa and the Great Lakes Region

In the section that follows, I shall attempt to compare the conflict management strategies in West Africa and the Great Lakes Region by focusing on

three major factors: the causes, nature and management of the conflicts; the impact of regional intervention; and the role of the UN.

The Causes, Nature, and Management of the Conflicts

The ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian conflicts in the 1990s brought the organization to international attention because, in part, it effectively assaulted the conceptual and empirical sanctity of the OAU's norm of non-intervention in the internal affairs of African states. To be sure, this norm had been challenged by several civil conflicts on the continent, from Biafra in the 1960s to Chad in the 1980s, but these challenges emerged from "rogue states" and, consequently, had little impact on the status of the norm. The ECOWAS intervention, however, was different for several reasons. It was multilateral and appeared to be grounded in some interpretation of international law.²⁸ As Ofodile has observed, this latter reason was why the ECOWAS intervention was *not* "condemned by the United Nations as 'a flagrant violation of international law.'" ²⁹ Quite to the contrary, as we shall see later in this chapter, the UN commended the intervention and, subsequently "joined ECOWAS in what was to become the first joint peacekeeping mission by the UN and a regional organization anywhere in the world."³⁰ Finally, the intervention brought to an empirical end the OAU norm of non-intervention in internal affairs, thereby prompting new thinking on ways of managing African conflicts by Africans. Before elaborating on the impact of the intervention, let me briefly discuss the conflict in Liberia, why ECOWAS got involved in it and the nature of the organization's intervention.

The Economic Community of West African States in Liberia

The ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, which began in August 1990, might not have happened had the splintering of the NPFL in July been avoided by its mercurial leaders, Charles Taylor and Prince Yormie Johnson. The immediate consequence of the departure of Prince Johnson from the NPFL and his subsequent formation of the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL) to counter Taylor's march on the Executive Mansion was the opening of the doors for their neighbors to exercise undue influence on Liberia's future. Early in 1990, President Doe sought the assistance of his few remaining friends in the subregion. One of them, General Ibrahim Babangida, then president of Nigeria, would prove crucial because his country is the region's largest state, the effective regional hegemon. From what we now know, Doe and Babangida sensed that the inability of the insurgency

movement to cohere would buy them enough time to put together an intervention plan. Before discussing the details of the ECOWAS intervention, it is fitting to examine the causes of the conflict in Liberia.

The structural maladies that underpinned the Liberian state for over a century finally buckled, in 1990, under the enormous pressure of an incompetent despotism. As many scholars have noted, the structural contradictions that eventually led Liberia down the path of anarchic meltdown preceded, and indeed may have led to the *coup d'état* that brought Master-Sergeant Samuel Doe to power in 1980. They include (mis)perceptions of civilizational differences between Americo-Liberians and their native kinfolk; excessive dependence on a resource economy that was susceptible to wild gyrations in international prices for primary commodities; the contradictions of globalization and vulnerabilities to Cold War politics, deep ethno-linguistic and class divisions; and the kleptocratic tendencies of patron-clientelism.³¹ As important as these variables may be in understanding what Alao has correctly described as the complex and “paradoxical epithets” of the Liberian conflict, the burden of analysis is to establish causation and not all of these should have caused the conflict.³² My position, therefore, is that Liberia’s journey toward state collapse was hastened and accomplished with remarkable efficiency by a pattern of brutality and sustained misrule that defined the administration of President Doe between 1980–1990. The causal variable, which conforms to Waltz’ Second Image, is despotic rule, simply defined as government without the consent of the people as expressed through the well-tested means of competitive elections.³³ Master Sergeant Doe’s seizure of power by a military coup in 1980 at the age of 28, was new for Liberians whose military had managed to remain apolitical and to respect constitutional rule despite the recurrence of coups in neighboring West African states. The sheer brutality and barbarism displayed by his gang upon assuming power in Monrovia was as shocking to ordinary Liberians, the majority of whom did not particularly like the ancien regime, as it was offensive to the leaders of Liberia’s neighboring states. While some aspects of the regime’s *modus operandi* were not necessarily unprecedented, as Alao has suggested, they did nonetheless send “cold waves down the spines of many West African leaders, who feared that Doe’s style could become a precedent for their own armed forces.”³⁴ As the military coups that summarily terminated the democratic experiments in Ghana (1982) and Nigeria (1983) demonstrated, these leaders had good reasons to fear the negative implications of the Doe phenomenon on good governance in the subregion.³⁵

Doe’s disrespect for life and the human rights of his own people continued even after he had consolidated his regime. As he became progressively

paranoid, Doe “began to eliminate his former associates in the coup plot, so that, within three years [of coming to power], all the 16 colleagues who plotted the coup with him had either been killed or had fled to safety to neighbouring countries.”³⁶ Doe also exhibited similar recklessness in his handling of the economy. It took very little time for the new regime to completely mismanage the Liberian economy, which for a long time had been the envy of neighboring West African states because of the unusual support it received from the U.S. Treasury Department.³⁷ By far the worst victim of Doe’s mis-handling of state affairs was Liberia’s hitherto model military. On this, Alao was right on the mark when he reasoned:

Due to years spent suppressing domestic opposition, countering coup attempts and the total replacement of professionalism by ethnic and other primordial considerations, the AFL [Armed Forces of Liberia] had, by the mid-1980s, become badly organized, poorly, completely weak and ineffective. There was no clearly articulated military doctrine or discipline among its members, and the fact that many of them engaged in looting, rape and extortion [of their own people] made them completely unpopular. By this time, their ability to withstand any carefully planned and sustained attack was doubtful.³⁸

The picture that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that of a society prime for insurgency. According to Steven Metz:

There are common structural, institutional, and psychological features which combine to form the preconditions for insurgency These include the macro-level maldistribution of wealth, un- and under-employment, poverty, anxiety and confusion generated by rapid modernisation, the collapse of traditional social structures, corruption, factionalisation, and inefficiency within the regime, frustration brought about by unrealistic expectations concerning the government’s capabilities, repression, weak or non-existent national identity, and inadequate political mechanisms for peaceful change.³⁹

Doe’s Liberia met these conditions and so fell apart as soon as a group of militia belonging to the NPFL moved into the Nimba countryside from neighboring Côte d’Ivoire in December 1989. The ensuing conflict and the destruction that followed have been brilliantly documented and analyzed by many scholars.⁴⁰ It suffices to mention that one of the paramount features of this conflict, namely excessive factionalization and fragmentation of the rebel

forces, which, like despotism, will shape the conflict in the Great Lakes Region, made the task of external intervention all the more treacherous. As Uganda's experience in the DRC clearly shows, the quicksands of unstable alliances make sustained partnerships difficult, as rebel allies of today are the opponents of tomorrow.⁴¹ Worse still, factionalization unduly extended the duration of the conflict and the attendant misery that was visited upon the civilian population.

The spread of the Liberian conflict into Sierra Leone and later into Guinea, confirms the fears expressed early in 1990 about the potential domino effect of the NPFL insurgency. Given this context, a good measure of the relevance of regional organizations will be their ability to *contain* or *confine* potentially destabilizing conflicts within as minimum a location as possible. As we now know, despite the many shortcomings in the execution of the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia (see Berman and Sam, chapter 2 and Olonisakin, chapter 4 in this volume), the organization was singularly successful in containing the conflict within the immediate vicinity of Liberia and thus prevented the entire subregion from an all-out war. As Ofuately-Kodjoe admits, albeit skeptically, it took ECOWAS a long time to achieve this feat, but the point is that it did prevent the conflict from becoming the wildfire of regional anarchy especially after 1993, "when the UN and ECOWAS were able to impose and enforce an effective arms embargo on Liberia."⁴² As I have argued elsewhere, although the ECOWAS–UN partnership suffered serious problems of coordination at the level of command and control, the partnership achieved a normative breakthrough in the West African peace process by according the ECOWAS Peace Plan the moral authority it had lacked prior to 1993.⁴³

Aside from the partnership with the UN, the other crucial factor in this success is the high degree of institutionalization achieved in ECOWAS before the outbreak of conflict in 1990. The absence of this factor in the Great Lakes region resulted in a situation where neighboring states, unencumbered by the complexity of institutional decision-making and diplomacy imposed by regional organizations, engaged in a free-for-all struggle to assert their presence and protect their "national interest." In West Africa, the primal desires of states for assertiveness, influence, control and hegemony were present, as evidenced, for instance, by the conflicting national foreign policy interests of Nigeria and Ghana on the one hand, and Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, on the other.⁴⁴ However, they were checked and balanced by the tedium, nuances and annoying hoops of ECOWAS decision-making structures. In effect, ECOWAS was able to *process* the competing personal and national egos that ran rampant during the course of its involvement in

Liberia. In a recent assessment of its activities in the security issue-area, the ECOWAS Secretariat concluded: "It is fortunate that on each occasion [i.e. outbreak of conflict], the ECOWAS sub-region, *unlike the other regions in Africa*, has been able to set in motion . . . conflict resolution procedures which have made it possible to *circumscribe* its crises. ECOWAS peace-keeping activities have in the main been considered commendable despite a few shortcomings . . ." ⁴⁵ In my view, such aggregative functions of regional organizations become especially useful in times of conflict, and will be sorely missed in the Great Lakes regions where the crash of Rwandan-Hutu President Habyarimana's plane in 1994 set in motion a series of events that culminated in an all-out war in the region.

The Conflict in the Great Lakes Region: Where are Thy Neighbors?

In contrast to the conflict in West Africa where ECOWAS became the de facto and de jure focus of various mediation efforts, the conflict that has wracked the central African region since 1994 has been remarkable for the manifest absence of a regional institutional organ that can filter, dilute and absorb the conflagrating effects of a large-scale conflict. To be sure, the OAU and the SADC took steps to contain the conflict in the Great Lakes region, especially after the successive collapse of the regimes in Rwanda and Congo between 1994–1995. However, these efforts largely faltered because of the absence of effective institutionalization in the region. In the central African conflict, according to John F. Clark, we see the weaknesses that result from the absence of institutional or state hegemony in a region characterized by systemic vulnerabilities to conflict. Since engineering the miraculous revival of the developmentalist state in Uganda in the early 1990s, President Yoweri Museveni had set his eyes on rejuvenating the defunct East African Community to serve "Uganda's economic interests." ⁴⁶ From all indications, Museveni was well on his way to realizing this dream, but ran into a seemingly insurmountable obstacle in Congo's Laurent Kabila who in 1998 took his country "into the SADC regional trade bloc," a much stronger rival to the EAC. ⁴⁷ The effect of Kabila's decision was to make Congo rather than Uganda "the object of South African capital" and, for that reason, Kabila had committed an "unforgivable sin" against Museveni. ⁴⁸ The EAC–SADC rivalry speaks to the hegemonic vacuum created and sustained by South Africa's post-apartheid policy of benign disengagement in the arena of regional "high politics" and the resulting absence of an all-encompassing subregional organization in East–Central Africa. This fact is made even more obvious by an examination of the evolution of the conflict in the Great Lakes region.

Not unlike in West Africa, the proximate causes of the conflict in the Great Lakes region are related to the inherent propensity of despotic regimes

to engender conflict. Nowhere is this more evident than the politics of Rwanda, the epicenter of the Great Lakes conflict. Here, unlike in many other African states with similar problems, the sad legacy of European colonialism's policy of institutionalized ethnic conflict between native groups, was carried to the level of unspeakable horror: genocide.⁴⁹ Despite decades of acrimonious relationship between Rwanda's Hutu and Tutsi populations, the orgy of killings that culminated in genocide in 1994 was largely prevented until an enabling environment was provided by a sustained period of authoritarian rule under the Rwandan military. The story of the genocide in Rwanda has been told so well by many scholars that it does not warrant an extensive discussion in this chapter.⁵⁰ My modest objective here is to posit and emphasize a causal linkage between this tragedy and the closure of the political space to the great majority of *citizens* that is, and remains, the crux of the governance question in Africa. This point has been made very eloquently by Mahmood Mamdani who has argued that the continuation of the "*bipolar* political identities" of Hutu and Tutsi in the postcolonial era was the consequence of the failure of the Rwandan state to embark upon the citizenship project, by which is meant the accordance of civil rights to all individuals as members of the civic community irrespective of their race, ethnicity and creed.⁵¹ Such accordance of political rights is beyond the capacity of authoritarian regimes, which are inherently averse to individual liberty. Not surprisingly, according to Mamdani, the violence between Hutu and Tutsi "is connected with the failure of Rwandan nationalism to transcend the colonial construction of Hutu and Tutsi as native and alien" respectively.⁵²

Before things fell apart in 1994, Rwanda endured decades of low intensity conflict, which resulted in mass Tutsi exile to neighboring states, especially Uganda and Zaire—now known as the DRC. A major event in the escalatory ladder occurred in 1990 when the RPF, which was composed mainly of young Tutsi militia based in Uganda, invaded Rwanda along its northern borders with Uganda. This move, which bears close semblance to the situation in West Africa, triggered panic within the political hierarchy of the Hutu-dominated government in Kigali. Government forces were hurriedly dispatched to the northern borders but failed initially to "wipe out" the rebels. Against this backdrop, the Rwandan government, headed by Hutu moderate, Juvénal Habyarimana, accused Uganda of aiding the rebel forces. In addition, the government launched a massive propaganda drive in Rwanda, the effect of which "was that all Tutsi inside the country were collectively labeled as accomplices of RPF."⁵³ Similarly important is the way in which the Hutu-led government recast the principal claims of the RPF for the rights of citizenship for Rwanda's marginalized Tutsi population.

According to Mamdani, the government's propaganda was singularly successful in selling the proposition to the Hutu majority that "the Tutsi question was not one of *rights*, but of *power*," and that "the real aim of the RPF was not rights for all Rwandans, but power for the Tutsi."⁵⁴ As Mamdani has remarked quite sarcastically, in the context of the tumultuous history of Hutu–Tutsi relationship in Rwanda, "surely, no worse calamity could befall Rwanda" than "the return of Tutsi power."⁵⁵ For this reason, according to Kuperman, "elements within the ruling Hutu clique prepared their own 'final solution' to retain power and block what they perceived as a Tutsi attempt to reconquer Rwanda after thirty-five years of Hutu emancipation. These Hutu extremists apparently believed that by preparing to kill all of Tutsi civilians in Rwanda they could prevent the country from being conquered by the rebels."⁵⁶ Clearly, the Hutu-dominated government in Rwanda succeeded in not only creating a permissive environment for the crime of genocide but also put in place a mechanism for executing the act:

they imported thousands of guns and grenades and hundreds of thousands of machetes. They also converted and expanded existing political party youth wings, which previously had engaged only in low-level physical intimidation, into fully fledged armed militias and provided some of them with formal military training. To foment Hutu fear and anti-Tutsi hatred they also created a new private radio station . . . [T]hey also established a clandestine network of extremists within the army to take charge when the time came.⁵⁷

Tragically, the time came on April 6, 1994 when President Habyarimana and his entourage were killed when his plane crashed while returning to Kigali from a meeting in Arusha, Tanzania. Although the RPF was widely suspected of culpability in downing President Habyarimana's plane, Hutu extremists directed their rage at the innocent civilian Tutsi population of Rwanda. "Within hours [of President Habyarimana's death], they commenced the genocide of Tutsi,"⁵⁸ and were so efficient at it that, by most accounts, about 500,000 Tutsis—or three-quarters of their original population—had been killed within two weeks of unrelenting massacre.⁵⁹ Faced with such large-scale massacre of its people, the RPF moved its forces rapidly into Rwanda's capital, Kigali, with a minimum of resistance from a poorly equipped and heavily demoralized Rwandan army. Their victory, however, was overshadowed by the scale of destruction left by the Rwandan army and the sheer burden of rebuilding a country wracked by decades of conflict. Worse still, the massive concentration of elements of the Rwandan

army, now in exile in eastern Congo, posed an immediate security threat to the stability of the new regime in Kigali. Faced with this strategic dilemma, the RPF, with the momentum on their side, made the crucial decision to go after the remnants of the Rwandan army and the much-dreaded Hutu militia, the *Interahamwe*, who had taken refuge in Congo. Such incursions into the territory of an independent state effectively changed what was hitherto a civil conflict into an interstate war.

The DRC suffered especially from the political changes in Rwanda because, like the former, the DRC had been gradually disintegrating under the weight of Mobutu Sese Seko's despotism and unparalleled kleptocracy. Mobutu had held on to power since 1964 because of the extensive patron–client relationships he had built and the crucial military, intelligence, economic and political support he had enjoyed from Western powers. All that changed in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War, and with it came the rapid decline of his regime as it became less invincible and more vulnerable to the ever-present cracks in his ethno-political coalition. Mobutu's weaknesses were widely exposed by a series of events unleashed by the RPF victory in Kigali in 1994.⁶⁰ Thanks to Zaire's porous borders, many Rwandan Hutus had taken the path of self-exile to Zaire's eastern border with Rwanda. Paradoxically, eastern Zaire's province of South Kivu is also home to thousands of Tutsis who had fled from years of Hutu oppression, joined, in 1994, by survivors of Hutu genocide. As I have explained elsewhere:

This particular turn of events led to a rather bizarre situation in which the perpetrators and survivors of genocide now lived together, not in harmony, but in anticipation of renewed violence. The situation was especially tense in Zaire's eastern province of South Kivu which is home to several generations of Tutsis, numbering about 300,000 people in Banyamulenge community. To these Tutsis, who are themselves marginalized by the Mobutu regime, the presence amongst them of genocidal Rwandan Hutus, many of whom had actively participated in the large-scale massacre of their Tutsi kith and kin, was particularly disconcerting. Not surprisingly, they readily collaborated with RPF authorities in Kigali who were actively seeking to bring to justice members of the Hutu militia and elite whom they suspected of participating in the Tutsi genocide.⁶¹

Mobutu's persistent maltreatment of the Banyamulenge came to haunt him in the last years of his regime. In 1981, Mobutu stripped the Tutsi descendants of Banyamulenge of their Zairean citizenship, "thus rendering

them stateless” and hence vulnerable to legal and illegal acts of harassment by the Zairean state.⁶² Following the massacre of their kin in Rwanda by the Mobutu-supported Hutu government and militia, the Banyamulenge grew increasingly restless and concerned by the presence and activities of the Interahamwe militia in their midst. In one incident in spring 1996, according to O’Ballance, the Hutu militia “cleared thousands of Banyamulenge from the Masisi area (north of Uriva) in order to use it as a base for cross-border raids into Rwanda.”⁶³ The Mobutu government did little to restrain the Hutu militia and to reassure the Banyamulenge. Quite to the contrary, the government initiated measures designed to frighten, antagonize and endanger the lives of its Tutsi minority population:

During the summer [of 1996] a series of skirmishes occurred between the Banyamulenge and the Interahamwe Militia, and these developed to such an intensity that on 8 October the acting Governor of South Kivu gave the Banyamulenge six days to leave Zairean territory. Those who failed to leave would be treated as rebels and expelled or put to death.⁶⁴

The stage was set for interstate war between Rwanda and Zaire and Paul Kagame who, at the time, was Rwanda’s vice president and defense minister, acknowledged this reality and indicated that “if Zaire wanted war, Rwanda was ready.”⁶⁵

Mobutu’s regime, and Zaire with it, collapsed rapidly, like a house of cards, in May 1997. Supported and equipped by Uganda and Rwanda, Mobutu’s nemesis, Laurent Kabila, led his forces to a series of military victories that forced Mobutu out of power after three decades of despotic rule. In needlessly attempting to position himself as the new Mobutu rather than open up Congo’s political process to all its citizens, Kabila antagonized Congolese factions and so relied increasingly upon his foreign allies for his personal and regime security. His cupidity for power rather than governance led him to political choices that were fraught with the citizenship dilemmas of his predecessor. Soon after gaining power in Kinshasa with the help of Rwanda and Uganda, Kabila realized that “the presence of so many prominent Tutsi and Banyamulenge in his regime did not sit well with most Congolese citizens, who regarded them as foreign occupiers.”⁶⁶ Because of his regime’s lack of political legitimacy, Kabila was especially vulnerable to this criticism. So, rather than spend his vast political capital on the civic education of his constituency, Kabila chose instead to take the familiar and dangerous route of preying on “the ethnic prejudices of his countrymen” [*sic*] for reasons of political expediency.⁶⁷ Indeed, by mid-1998 Kabila had ordered “the expulsion of all Tutsi troops” from the DRC.⁶⁸

In short, Kabila's Congo was looking a lot like Mobutu's Zaire in its treatment of the Tutsi minority population and in its dealings with the RPF-led government in Kigali. By the later half of 1998 Rwanda and Uganda began actively and openly supporting Congolese factions that were attempting to topple Kabila. The regional conflict was widened at the end of summer 1998 when Rwanda directly dispatched forces in an unsuccessful attempt to seize Kinshasha, thereby triggering the combined intervention by Zimbabwe and Angola in support of Kabila.⁶⁹ Thus, as the twentieth century drew to a close, it appeared as though the East–Central–Southern African region was poised for an all-out war (see Carayannis and Weiss, chapter 9 in this volume).

Assessing the Impact of Regional Intervention on Regional Stability

In general, forcible forms of regional intervention have characterized the conflicts in West Africa and the Great Lakes region. From the beginning, the conflicts had regional ramifications and, by their very nature, roped in a succession of states in what became Africa's first real experiment in realist alliance politics. However, a careful review of the two cases turn up some interesting contrasts as well.

The rapid spread of the conflict in the Great Lakes region to engulf the central and southern African subregions raises an interesting question in light of the central theme of this volume, and that is: where were the neighbors who could have helped contain the conflict? As is evident from the discussions in the preceding section, in the Great Lakes region the neighbors were busy catering to their national or regime interests largely unencumbered by the constraints of regional institutional diplomacy. Although the circumstances of the conflicts in West Africa and the Great Lakes region are strikingly similar—despotic origins of conflict, the presence of a well-armed rebel organization with political and military support from a sister state, the death of a principal character (President Doe in Liberia and Habyarimana in Rwanda) and rumblings of hegemonic ambitions and enlarged egos—the outcomes of the conflicts in both regions could not have been more dissimilar. In West Africa, the conflict was arrested very early on, although it threatened to explode and did spill over into another state before it was rearrested and contained. Throughout the decade-long effort by ECOWAS to manage the conflict that began in Liberia in 1990, at no time did the armies of West African states engage each other. In the Great Lakes region, by contrast, the conflict spread rather quickly from Rwanda to Congo and instantly pitted the other states in the region against each other. This was possible mainly because, unlike in West Africa, no single regional organization was strong

enough and/or sufficiently willing to take on the task of regional security management. Given its history and the weakness of its political structures, the OAU was hardly in a position to take proactive measures in the form of a peacekeeping operation (see Berman and Sams, chapter 2 in this volume).

Following the admission of South Africa into the SADC after the end of the apartheid era, the once vibrant organization was paralyzed by the virtual cold war that had existed between Mugabe and Mandela over what appears to be personality conflict and struggle for regional hegemony. For this reason, the deployment of Zimbabwean, Angolan, and Namibian troops in support of the Kabila regime over South African reservations and objections, all but made it impossible for the SADC to take on a peacekeeping role in support of its widely acclaimed political efforts to resolve the conflict in the Great Lakes region without risking an open dissension within its ranks. As Weiss and Carayannis have argued in chapter 9 of this volume, it is not surprising, therefore, that most of the efforts by SADC to mediate an end to the war in the DRC failed as most of SADC's powerbrokers were themselves participants in the war. As a consequence, SADC conveniently opted to take a backseat to *whoever* was willing to risk its reputation and resources into resolving the region's conflict. It is against this backdrop that, perhaps, the greatest paradox of contemporary African diplomacy occurred when white-European France's *Opération Turquoise* was launched, to much acclaim in 1994, as the only serious humanitarian/peace-enforcement operation to be deployed to date in a region where a shared history of white supremacy is the lowest common denominator (see Weiss and Carayannis, chapter 9 in this volume). It was the French, not the neighboring African states or the SADC, that sought the authority of the UN Security Council to establish and maintain Safe Humanitarian Zones in Rwanda and later in Congo to service the needs of civilians.⁷⁰ In West Africa, this responsibility was borne from the outset by ECOWAS in what Alao has termed "the burden of collective goodwill."⁷¹ In sum, the evidence from these two cases point to one fact: that regional organizations can contain and limit the spread of regional conflicts.

In terms of the impact of regional intervention on regional stability, ironically, the intervention in both regions—by a regional organization in West Africa and by self-aggrandizing individual state-actors in the case of the Great Lakes region—were aimed at an early containment of the conflicts in the interest of regional stability. However, both forms of interventions actually had the effect of deepening, prolonging and widening the conflicts across the region. Neither of the interventions was able to contain the conflicts to its original source. In West Africa, ECOWAS failed in limiting the conflict

to the shores of Liberia. Despite a relatively early deployment, ECOMOG watched as the conflict spread into Sierra Leone in 1991, resulting in the overthrow of the government of Joseph Momoh. Thereafter, Sierra Leone's descent into anarchy was assured (see Ofuately-Kodjoe, chapter 5 in this volume). As I have argued earlier, ECOWAS was steadfast in its commitment to containing and ending the deadly conflicts. Its concerted efforts saved West Africa from the sort of free-for-all conflict that wracked the Great Lakes region in the absence of any concerted regional institutional mediation efforts. Nevertheless, the evidence from West Africa and the Great Lakes region suggests that the presence or absence of regional organizations has little effect on the length and duration of the conflicts. Its effect was merely on the *direction* of the conflicts, not the timing of their resolution.

In the Great Lakes region, what began as the fulfillment of a *quid pro quo* between Rwanda's RPF and the Museveni government in Uganda in the aftermath of the Tutsi genocide, quickly snowballed into an all-out struggle for regional hegemony and, even more importantly, for control of Congo's enormous economic resources. Take, for example, this account of "illicit" network of economic interests in the Great Lakes region by William Reno:

Kabila received help from Angolan and Rwandan troops and was given Ugandan weapons. Kabila's presence provided some personal payoffs. For example, Salim Saleh, the Ugandan anti-insurgent leader and brother of the president, expanded his business reach to include a gold mine in Kisangani after the AFDL [i.e. Kabila's forces] had captured the area. These arrangements also showed the reluctance of neighboring rulers and internal insurgents to dissolve Zaire, resorting instead to regional networks to achieve their aims.⁷²

A UN report submitted in April 2001 supports these claims when it concluded, "The illegal exploitation of [Congo's] resources by Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda took different forms, including confiscation, extraction, forced monopoly and price-fixing. Of these, the first two reached proportions that made the war in the Democratic Republic of the Congo a very lucrative business."⁷³ In West Africa, such abuses occurred, especially in diamond-rich Sierra Leone, but they were actions consistent with the pandemic of corruption rather than actions consistent with state policy, warranting the establishment of a special investigating panel of the UN.⁷⁴ It is plausible that such tendencies, which were amply exhibited by some members of the Nigerian contingent to ECOMOG, were checked by the multilateral involvement of ECOWAS, which rendered such behaviors criminal and embarrassing to national authorities.

The Role of the United Nations

Clearly, the picture that emerges thus far is that state intervention in the Great Lakes region is largely uncoordinated and is driven instead by the competing national or regime interests of the intervening states. In the absence of an overarching regional institution in the Great Lakes region, the UN has had to step in much earlier than it did in West Africa. The Security Council authorized MONUC in 1999.

Prior to the establishment of MONUC, the UN Security Council had authorized and deployed UNAMIR, which lasted until the genocide in Rwanda in 1994. UNAMIR was a peacekeeping operation whose mandate was to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement. However, despite the best efforts of its commander, Gen. Roméo Dallaire, the mission was forced to dramatically reduce its numbers, just as the genocide occurred. The circumstances surrounding the failure of UNAMIR prompted widespread condemnation of the UN and Western powers for their failure to act in Rwanda, and this criticism may have spurred the quick UN authorization of the French-led *Opération Turquoise* in 1994 as a Chapter VII mandate with an explicit humanitarian purpose. The success of *Opération Turquoise* was followed by the Security Council's authorization of a second UN mission, UNAMIR II, to build upon the gains made by the French-led operation in 1994. Thus, unlike in West Africa, we see in the Great Lakes region a history of early engagement on the part of the UN to mediate the conflict. In the absence of a regional institutional mechanism for conflict resolution, it fell on the UN to prod, cajole and induce the region's states to take collective responsibility for the maintenance of peace in the region.

In West Africa, the UN role was limited, for the most part, to diplomatic assistance. Here, it was ECOWAS, not the UN, that took the lead in a wide array of conflict resolution mechanisms, including good offices, peacekeeping, cease-fire monitoring, and peace-enforcement. Indeed, between 1990 and 1993 the UN was actively discouraged by ECOWAS from direct involvement in the conflict resolution processes for fear of exacerbating existing regional frictions. Thus, in 1993 when ECOWAS hammered out the Cotonou Agreement, it accepted a mediatory role for the UN within the framework of a partnership.⁷⁵ UNOMIL, which was authorized by Security Council Resolution 866, was structured as a "support mission" to complement the activities of a regional organization in a partnership for peace:

Since the role foreseen for UNOMIL is to monitor and verify the implementation of the [Cotonou] Agreement, its concept of operation necessarily must be parallel to that of ECOMOG . . . UNOMIL would

thus... deploy observer teams in concert with ECOMOG deployment.... UNOMIL and ECOMOG would collaborate closely in their operations.⁷⁶

Simply put, the presence of a regional organization matters, for it allows the UN to do what it does best: providing legitimacy for collective actions in the service of international peace and security. In West Africa, as in Kosovo in later years, the UN did not have to do the dirty job of facing down uncooperative factional militias, the containment of which is a *sine qua non* for any meaningful effort toward a political or diplomatic solution. That job falls to a regional organization, while the UN maintains the moral high ground by insisting upon strict adherence to humanitarian principles and international humanitarian law. Where such regional organizations are absent or incapable of acting as UN partners, such as was the case in the Great Lakes region, then the UN faces “the cruel dilemmas” of having to assume the responsibility for maintaining the peace by *default*, with all its attendant risks and criticisms.⁷⁷

Conclusion: The Imperative of Embedded Multilateralism

This comparison of the conflict management mechanisms in West Africa and the Great Lakes region point to the imperative need for embedded multilateralism in thought and praxis as various tiers of the emerging structures of global governance contemplate how best to respond to the manifold problems, opportunities and challenges presented by the remarkable transformation currently underway in Africa.⁷⁸ In this regard, the presence of regional actors—whether they are individual states, regional institutions or NGOs—and the UN will continue to be a prominent feature of Africa’s conflict resolution process for a long time. Underscoring this reality are structural factors in contemporary international politics that are captured in the odd phrase “Africa fatigue.”⁷⁹ As Mats Berdal has correctly opined, the post–Cold War policy preferences of Western powers—most notably the United States, Britain and, to some extent, France—for “African solutions to African problems,” may have complicated the environment for peace operations by encouraging a multiplicity of players with divergent objectives.⁸⁰ Given this particular condition, the evidence from the regions examined in this chapter suggest that there is room for greater coordination between the various actors currently engaged in one form or another in peace operations in Africa. In this regard, my focus has been on two such actors, regional organizations and the UN.

The conflict management experiences in West Africa and the Great Lakes region are significant not because they represent two distinct

approaches to the problem, but because they show that there is a place for multilateralism—whether in the form of regional organizations or the UN—in contemporary world politics, *especially* in the security issue-area. In the words of Margaret Carey, these cases show that “peacekeeping operations in Africa, whether led by the United Nations or by a group of African states, will remain a *collaborative* effort, demanding the involvement of the international community as a *whole*.”⁸¹

I should conclude with the timely observations made by the former OAU secretary general, Salim Ahmed Salim, which embodies the imperative for embedded multilateralism in the new era:

Regional organizations are . . . the pillars upon which the United Nations must anchor its global peace agenda. The UN needs the cooperation and, indeed, the partnership of regional organizations if it is to be fully effective in brokering peace and ending conflicts. This is why . . . it will be *necessary* for the UN to seek to expand and deepen its consultations with regional organizations as well to help strengthen them. For this reason, the United Nations should, at the political and institutional level, begin to see regional organizations as partners in a shared agenda of peace.⁸²

Notes

1. Jim Hoagland, “Will the World Squander Another Chance to Rescue Congo?” *Chicago Tribune*, January 26, 2001, p. 15.
2. “Ending Africa’s First World War,” *Chicago Tribune*, April 5, 2001, p. 24.
3. John G. Ruggie, ed., *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
4. Michael Howard, “The United Nations: From War Fighting to Peace Planning,” in Ernest May and Angeliki Laiou, eds., *The Dumbarton Oaks Conversations and the United Nations, 1944–1994* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 3.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 3–4 (emphasis added).
6. *Ibid.*, p. 4.
7. The “ousting” of the United States from the UN Human Rights Commission on May 3, 2001 is yet another manifestation of the tension between the UN and the United States. For details, see Barbara Crossette, “U.S. is Voted Off Rights Panel of the U.N. for the First Time,” *The New York Times*, May 4, 2001; Marc Lacey, “U.S. Attacks Rights Group for Ousting It,” *The New York Times*, May 5, 2001; and Roger Cohen, “News Analysis: To European Eyes, It’s America the Ugly,” *The New York Times*, May 7, 2001.
8. See, among others, Walter Mattli, *The Logic of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Edward Mansfield

and Helen Milner, eds., *The Political Economy of Regionalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

9. See, among others, William Thompson, "The Regional Subsystem: A Conceptual Explication and a Propositional Inventory," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 17, no. 3 (1973), pp. 89–117; David Lake and Patrick Morgan, eds., *Regional Orders: Building Security in a New World* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements, the UN, and International Security: A Framework for Analysis," in Thomas G. Weiss, ed., *Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998), pp. 3–29; William Coleman and Geoffrey Underhill, eds., *Regionalism and Global Economic Integration* (London: Routledge, 1998).
10. One notable exception to this is S. Neil MacFarlane, "On the Front Lines in the Near Abroad: The CIS and the OSCE in Georgia's Civil Wars," *Beyond UN Subcontracting*.
11. Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements, the UN, and International Security," p. 6 (emphasis added).
12. Patrick Morgan, "Regional Security Complexes and Regional Orders," in *Regional Orders*, p. 26.
13. Andrew Hurrell, "Explaining the Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics," *Review of International Studies*, vol. 21, no. 4 (1995), pp. 331–358.
14. Although the weaknesses of the OAU were well known in Africa, the timing and circumstance of its demise were not predicted. At their summit meeting in Lomé, Togo, in summer 2000, African heads of states and governments adopted the Constitutive Act of the African Union, which, they hoped, would meet the new challenges facing the continent in the new millennium. The summit elected Amara Essy as secretary general of the new organization.
15. Jeffrey Herbst, *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); and Francis Deng and Terrence Lyons, eds., *African Reckoning: A Quest for Good Governance* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998).
16. The Charter of the Organization of African Unity (Addis Ababa: OAU, 1963), www.oau-oua.org. Article VI of the Charter further reinforces these provisions.
17. Article 4, Constitutive Act of the African Union, July 11, 2000.
18. John F. Clark, "Realism, Neo-Realism and Africa's International Relations in the Post-Cold War Era," in Kevin Dunn and Timothy Shaw, eds., *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 97.
19. Ali Mazrui, *Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977), p. 27.
20. Many African states belong to more than one regional or functional organization at the same time. For example, Côte d'Ivoire has multiple membership in the ECOWAS as well as the *Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine*, while Swaziland has membership in four regional organizations, including SADC,

- the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa and the Southern African Custom Union. All are members of the OAU. For details, see Daniel Bach, ed., *Regionalisation in Africa: Integration and Disintegration* (London: James Currey, 1999), especially chapters 1–3; and Ademola Oyejide, Ibrahim Elbawi and Paul Collier, eds., *Regional Integration and Trade Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).
21. Salim A. Salim, "The OAU Role in Conflict Management," in Olara Otunnu and Michael Doyle, eds., *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century* (Lanham, MD.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), p. 245.
 22. For an insightful analysis of the debate, see S. Neil MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "Regional Organizations and Regional Security," *Security Studies*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1992), p. 7 (emphasis added).
 23. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
 24. Salim, "The OAU Role in Conflict Management," p. 246.
 25. Neither does it necessarily guarantee an early arrival in the theater of conflict, as Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams have shown in their study. Despite their proximity to Liberia, African peacekeepers outside of ECOMOG could not be deployed in the theater because of logistical constraints, which were only overcome several months later by America's airlift support. Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 2000).
 26. Salim, "The OAU Role in Conflict Management," p. 246.
 27. *Ibid.*, pp. 246–247.
 28. Notwithstanding which side won the legal argument, it suffices for me that the proponents of the intervention considered the international legal status of their action. For differing opinions on the legality of the ECOWAS intervention, see Richard Akinjide, "ECOWAS Intervention in the Liberian Imbroglio: Legal Issues," *West Africa*, December 24, 1990–January 6, 1991, pp. 3090–3091; Anthony Ofodile, "The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia," *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, vol. 32, no. 2 (1994), pp. 381–418; and Jeremy Levitt (1998), "Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in International Conflicts," *Temple International and Comparative Law Journal*, vol. 12, no. 2 (1998).
 29. Ofodile, "The Legality of ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia," p. 382, fn. 1.
 30. Abiodun Alao, *The Burden of Collective Goodwill: The International Involvement in the Liberian Civil War* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1998), p. x.
 31. See, among others, Yekutiel Gershoni, *Black Colonialism: The Americo-Liberian Struggle for the Hinterland* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985); Amadu Sesay, "Historical Background to the Liberian Civil War," in Margaret Vogt, ed., *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping* (Lagos: Gabumo Press, 1992); W. Ofuately-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia,"

- International Peacekeeping*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1994), pp. 261–302; and Alao, *The Burden of Collective Goodwill*, especially chapter 1.
32. Alao, *The Burden of Collective Goodwill*, p. x.
 33. This position is similar to that taken by Ofuately Kodjoe, note 31, who argued that the conflict in Liberia “was triggered by the failure of the Doe regime to survive a crisis of legitimacy caused by its inability to transform itself successfully from a military dictatorship”
 34. Alao, *The Burden of Collective Goodwill*, p. 9.
 35. See, among others, Toyin Falola and Julius Ihonvbere, *The Rise and Fall of Nigeria’s Second Republic, 1979–1983* (London: Zed Publishers, 1985); Richard Joseph, *Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Mohammed B. Sillah, *African Coup d’etat and the Revolutionary Mission of the Military: A Case Study of Jerry Rawlings in Ghanaian Politics* (Lawrenceville, VA: Brunswick Publishing Co., 1984); Zaya Yeebo, *Ghana: The Struggle for Power* (London: New Beacon Books, 1991); Paul Nugent, *Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana: Power, Ideology and the Burden of History, 1982–1994* (London: Pinter Publishers, 1996); and Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
 36. Alao, *The Burden of Collective Goodwill*, pp. 10–11.
 37. Before 1985, the Liberian economy and currency was denominated in U.S. dollars. In a region where hard currency is highly prized because it is very scarce, Liberia’s close economic ties to the United States was an extraordinary asset, which attracted lots of immigrants from neighboring states.
 38. Alao, *The Burden of Collective Goodwill*, pp. 14–15.
 39. Steven Metz, “Insurgency after the Cold War,” *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, vol. 5, no. 1 (1994), p. 64.
 40. See, among others, Vogt, *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG*; Ofuately-Kodjoe, “Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict”; Clement E. Adibe, “The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership,” *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 18, no. 3 (1997), pp. 471–488; Alao, *The Burden of Collective Goodwill*; Berman and Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa*; David Francis, *The Politics of Economic Regionalism: Sierra Leone in ECOWAS* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers, 2001); and Adekeye Adebajo, *Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).
 41. See Clark, “Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo,” especially pp. 278–285.
 42. Ofuately-Kodjoe, “Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict,” p. 283.
 43. Adibe, “The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership,” especially pp. 477–485.
 44. For details, see Ofuately-Kodjoe, “Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflicts,” pp. 271–281; and Adibe, “The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership,” pp. 471–488.

45. ECOWAS, *Economic Community of West African States, 1975–2000: Achievements and Prospects* (Abuja: ECOWAS Secretariat, 2001), p. 56 (emphasis added).
46. John F. Clark, “Explaining Ugandan Intervention in Congo: Evidence and Interpretations,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 39, no. 2 (2001), pp. 261–287.
47. Ibid., p. 276.
48. Ibid., p. 276.
49. For an excellent examination of this characteristic of colonial rule in Africa, see Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); and *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
50. See, among others, Alain Destexhe, *Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (New York: New York University Press, 1994); René Lemarchand, “Rwanda: The Rationality of Genocide,” *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, vol. 23, no. 2 (1995), pp. 8–11; Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Arthur Klinghoffer, *The International Dimension of Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: New York University Press, 1998); Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We will be Killed with Our Families* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998); Alan J. Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute, 2001); Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds., *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire* (Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1999); John Berry and Carol Berry, *Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory* (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1999); and Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*.
51. Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 74 (emphasis in the original).
52. Ibid., p. 34.
53. United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 341.
54. Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 191 (emphasis added).
55. Ibid., p. 190.
56. Kuperman, *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention*, p. 12.
57. Ibid., p. 12.
58. Ibid., p. 12.
59. Ibid., p. 20. See also Alison Des Forges, *Leave None to Tell the Story: Genocide in Rwanda* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999), pp. 15–27. Other sources put the number of deaths at 800,000. See, e.g., Mats Berdal, “Peacekeeping in Africa, 1990–1996: The Role of the United States, France and Britain,” in Oliver Furley and Roy May, eds., *Peacekeeping in Africa* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1998), p. 50.
60. For an insightful account, see Edgar O’Ballance, *The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960–98* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), especially chapters 11–13.

61. Clement E. Adibe, "Strategic Coercion in Post-Cold War Africa," in Lawrence Freedman, ed., *Strategic Coercion: Concepts and Cases* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 302.
62. O'Ballance, *The Congo-Zaire Experience, 1960–98*, p. 164.
63. Ibid., p. 164.
64. Ibid., p. 164.
65. Ibid., p. 164.
66. Clark, "Explaining Ugandan Intervention in the Congo," p. 268.
67. Ibid., p. 279.
68. Ibid., p. 271.
69. Ibid., p. 280.
70. See, among others, Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda* (Paris: Development Center of the OECD, 1996); J. Matthew Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda," in William J. Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Politics and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 367–407; Scott Feil, *Preventing Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in Rwanda* (New York: Carnegie Corporation, 1998); and Kuperman, *The Limits of Humnitarian Intervention*.
71. Alao, *The Burden of Collective Goodwill*.
72. Ibid., p. 174.
73. United Nations, *Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo* (New York: United Nations Office of the Secretary-General, April 12, 2001), p. 6, para. 25.
74. William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998); and William Reno, "The Business of War in Liberia," *Current History* vol. 95, no. 601 (May 1996).
75. See Adibe, "The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership," pp. 477–485.
76. S/26422, September 9, 1993, p. 4.
77. These dilemmas increase significantly in the "complex political emergencies" that have been the most common forms of threat to international peace and security since the beginning of the new millennium. For details, see Michael Bryans, Bruce Jones and Janice Stein, *Mean Times: Humanitarian Action in Complex Political Emergencies—Stark Choices, Cruel Dilemmas* (Toronto: University of Toronto, Program on Conflict Management and Negotiation, 1999).
78. For an insightful examination of the social, political, economic and security aspects of such transformation, see Peter J. Schraeder, *African Politics and Society: A Mosaic in Transformation* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's Press, 2000); and for a penetrating analysis of the challenges of global governance, see James N. Rosenau, "Governance in the Twenty-First Century," *Global Governance* vol. 1 (1991), pp. 13–43.

79. Furley and May, eds., *Peacekeeping in Africa*, chapter 1.
80. Mats Berdal, "Peacekeeping in Africa, 1990–1996: The Role of the United States, France and Britain," in Furley and May, eds., *Peacekeeping in Africa*, pp. 49–79.
81. Margaret Carey, "Peacekeeping in Africa: Recent Evolution and Prospects," in Oliver Furley and Roy May, eds., *Peacekeeping in Africa*, p. 27 (emphasis added).
82. Salim, "The OAU Role in Conflict Management," p. 250 (emphasis added).

PART II

Case Studies

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CHAPTER 4

Liberia

*'Funmi Olonisakin*¹

Regional actors, including regional and subregional organizations, have certain inherent advantages, which make them better suited to dealing with conflict in their neighborhoods. The impact of conflict in a country is felt first by its neighbors in various ways including, for example, the influx of refugees and other cross-border activities that have the potential to create insecurity for these states. Thus, neighbors would very often have a vested interest in seeing a resolution of such conflicts and are willing to act through their regional or subregional conflict management structures. In addition to the political will to act, these regional actors often possess superior knowledge of their neighborhoods, the prevailing norms and idiosyncrasies of the people—attributes that actors outside of that region may not readily possess.

However, these same qualities, which make regional actors ideally suited to managing conflict in their neighborhoods, also serve to constrain them and to pose challenges for their attempts at regional conflict resolution. This interest in seeing a resolution of local conflicts and their knowledge of the local situation mean that regional organizations and their representatives may not be neutral or perceived as impartial, thereby causing their credibility to be questioned by conflicting parties. Furthermore, despite possessing abundant political will, regional organizations may not always have the capacity to take the level of action needed to deal with the level of conflict in their neighborhood.

For these reasons, a complementary role by the UN is seen as the way forward for regional conflict resolution. The UN is well placed to fill the gaps

in the efforts of regional organizations. It commands relatively more resources, and the organization is often accepted as a more neutral actor than regional organizations. At the same time, what the global organization lacks in political will is complemented by the regional organizations, which might be more willing than the UN to take on more dangerous tasks in the bid to deal with conflicts in their region. But in reality, combining these attributes in ways that would work on the ground has been a challenge.

The UN has, in the years since the end of the Cold War, increasingly sought to collaborate with regional organizations in dealing with regional conflicts. In his *An Agenda for Peace*, former UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali remarked on the potential of regional organizations to contribute to “preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking and post-conflict peacebuilding.”² The first attempt at the type of cooperation being sought by the secretary-general occurred in Liberia in 1993, when a UN Observer force was authorized to work together with a regional peacekeeping mission in the same area of operation. The secretary-general remarked that the Liberia experience “represented a good example of systematic cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations, as envisaged in Chapter VIII of the Charter.”³

This chapter discusses that first experience in Liberia and the main challenges that confronted the joint attempt of the UN and ECOWAS to deal with the Liberian conflict, highlighting important lessons for other places. The first section of the chapter provides an overview of the background to the Liberian conflict. The second section discusses the nature of the ECOWAS intervention up until 1993 when the UN authorized a peacekeeping operation. The third section, examines the UN involvement in Liberia. The fourth section then discusses the nature of cooperation between ECOWAS and the UN, and the issues raised by this experience. Based on this analysis, the final section draws some conclusions about the Liberian experience for other such cooperative operations.

The Liberian Conflict

The Liberian conflict was amongst the earliest in the post-Cold War period to warn of a more intense pattern of armed conflict. It exhibited all the characteristics of the vicious intra-state conflicts that have become all too familiar in the post-Cold War period.

Like many other conflicts that have since been played out in the region, the Liberian war was waiting to happen. It was the result of generations of unresolved conflict. The crisis has its roots in the unusual creation of the state

of Liberia, the oldest independent African state, which was founded by free American slaves in 1822.⁴ The Americo-Liberian settlers who comprised less than 5 percent of the population embarked on a systematic domination of the indigenous population whom they met on the land. Their authority over the people was maintained through control of the social and political institutions, which formed the center of power and influence—the True Whig Party, the Church and the Masonic Temple. The settler-dominated True Whig Party won all elections in Liberia from 1877 to 1980, whilst aboriginal Liberians were underrepresented in party and government.⁵ Before 1904, indigenous Liberians were not permitted to contest for public office unless they were Christians, imbibed Western lifestyle and had denounced paganism for three years.⁶ The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) was an important tool by which the settler community maintained control over indigenous Liberians.

In 1980, when Samuel Kanyon Doe, an indigenous Liberian, emerged as the country's head of state, following the removal of President Tolbert in a bloody coup, indigenous Liberians enthusiastically interpreted this development as a positive, new, beginning for the country. However, the euphoria was short-lived because of Doe's militarization of the Liberian society and his regime's implementation of repressive policies, which widened the divisions amongst indigenous Liberians that had been previously united against settler domination. Doe began to surround himself with members of his Krahn ethnic group. His reign was characterized by gross abuses of human rights. The Doe regime is remembered for its atrocities against Liberian citizens largely conducted through the AFL, which was responsible for looting, rape, arson, flogging, arbitrary arrests, and summary executions.⁷ Doe's Krahn ethnic group dominated the AFL. Opposition to Doe was brutally suppressed as political opponents as well as members of the press were intimidated, arrested, and arbitrarily imprisoned. The rebellion, led by Charles Taylor, which began in northeastern Liberia on Christmas Eve in 1989, marked the beginning of the end for Samuel Doe, who would later die in the custody of one of the warring factions. The conflict quickly escalated into a vicious civil war.

The bitterness generated by decades of unresolved conflict was reflected in the brutality with which the Liberian war was waged. The restraining danger of superpower confrontation, which previously contained a number of African conflicts and prevented them from escalating to extreme levels of horror, was no longer present. Warring parties were therefore unrestrained in their use of force. The rules of war and international humanitarian law were flagrantly violated as conflicting parties used civilians as the primary war

objectives and the focus of violence. Protagonists sought to strike at their opponents' heartland by destroying the very things that were considered to be of greatest value to them—their families and homes, regardless of whether or not they were directly engaged in the war as combatants. It is estimated that more than 200,000 lives were lost in the Liberian war. By October 1990, refugees in neighboring states had numbered over 600,000.⁸

In Liberia, as in other complex emergencies that would subsequently occur in Africa, the state had collapsed with the government's loss of control over much of the regions within Liberia's territorial boundary; and power had devolved into the hands of warlords. The war, which was initially between Doe's government and Taylor's NPFL, became a peacemaker's nightmare with the proliferation of warring factions. In 1995, there were eight recognized parties to the conflict. Those that signed the Abuja Agreement of 1995 included the AFL; the NPFL, the largest rebel group; the Central Revolutionary Council a splinter group from the NPFL; the Liberian Peace Council; the Lofa Defence Force; the Liberia National Conference and the United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO), which was split into two camps—ULIMO-K and ULIMO-J.

The Economic Community of West African States Intervention

The humanitarian tragedy that unfolded in Liberia, evident in the mass destruction of infrastructure and the high levels of civilian casualties sustained, made it difficult for the country's neighbors to ignore the war. The reluctance of the warring parties to reach a peaceful settlement and the continued human suffering, made some form of intervention imperative. Although some member-states of ECOWAS had initially supported different factions in the conflict,⁹ the organization became involved in attempts to resolve the Liberian crisis in May 1990 and this continued until July 1997, when elections were conducted in Liberia.

In May 1990, at an ECOWAS summit in Banjul, in response to the situation in Liberia, the organization established the Standing Mediation Committee.¹⁰ With the expectation that it would be able to negotiate a lasting settlement, the SMC dispatched a peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, to Liberia. The initial force included troops from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, with the largest contingent in ECOMOG, and Sierra Leone.¹¹ This force (which was later expanded) was responsible for the maintenance of order through the different phases of the Liberian conflict from 1990 until the conclusion of elections in 1997.



Map 4.1 Liberia.

ECOWAS struggled to achieve a minimum level of stability in Liberia during the first few months of ECOMOG deployment. The initial plan that ECOMOG would implement an arranged peace did not succeed. The largest warring faction, the NPFL led by Charles Taylor (who would later become president of Liberia) had rejected the peace plan and when the force was deployed in August 1990, it came under fierce attack from the NPFL. The mandate of ECOMOG was amended from peacekeeping to enforcement in September 1990.¹² This enabled ECOMOG troops to engage in combat operations with the NPFL, which was later dislodged from the capital. The single most important achievement of ECOWAS in October 1990 was its ability to drive Charles Taylor's NPFL out of the immediate vicinity of the capital, allowing the humanitarian agencies to return to deliver desperately needed assistance. At an ECOWAS meeting in Bamako, Mali, a cease-fire agreement was signed by all parties to the conflict (only three in number at the time) in November 1990.¹³

The response of ECOWAS to the Liberian crisis highlighted two important factors. First, is the important stabilizing role that regional organizations can play in their neighborhoods. Regional actors are likely to take decisive action when external actors do not have the political will to act. Regardless of their political positions in the conflict, countries in the West African sub-region were able to muster the political will to respond to the crisis in Liberia. This happened at a time when the rest of the international community was less concerned with developments in the region and attention was focused instead on the looming crisis in the Persian Gulf. It was difficult for countries that would bear the burden of refugees and deal with the spillover effects of the war to turn a blind eye to developments in Liberia. Thus, the sheer force of events in Liberia led those states to take action even when it was clear that they had various political differences.

Second, regional actors are often compelled to employ more severe strategies to deal with difficult conflict, where and when they have the ability to do so. ECOWAS needed to respond to the Liberian crisis at the appropriate level. Even if the UN had been able to respond to the Liberian situation politically, it is doubtful that it would have been able to take the type of enforcement action that was commensurate with the situation that existed on the ground. Massacres of civilians continued unabated. In order to halt the atrocities that were being committed against innocent civilians, ECOMOG was mandated to force the troops out of Liberia's capital city, Monrovia. To do this, it had to be prepared to sustain a significantly high level of casualties.

Despite this bold step from ECOWAS, the subregional organization faced serious challenges in dealing with the Liberian crisis. Following the signing

of the cease-fire agreement in November 1990, it was assumed that the political actors in ECOWAS would be able to build on this by negotiating a lasting settlement to the conflict. This was not possible. Despite several peace conferences and agreements,¹⁴ the conflict escalated again in October 1992, when the NPFL launched a major attack on ECOMOG (known as Operation Octopus) and nearly succeeded in taking control of Liberia's capital city, Monrovia. ECOMOG had to once again embark on enforcement action to subdue the forces of the NPFL. After ECOMOG resisted the NPFL attacks and successfully drove the force out of Monrovia, it went on the counteroffensive, seizing strategic locations such as the ports of Greenville and Buchanan from the NPFL. This counteroffensive was brought to an end with the negotiation of the Cotonou Agreement. The agreement was negotiated at a peace conference convened jointly by ECOWAS and the UN in Geneva and was signed on July 25, 1993 at an ECOWAS meeting in Cotonou.¹⁵

A number of reasons have been outlined for the failure of ECOWAS efforts to bring about a lasting settlement during this period. The very strategy that allowed ECOMOG to create a measure of stability in Monrovia, also constrained the organization from achieving a lasting settlement to the conflict. This was the strategy where the same force alternated between peacekeeping and enforcement. Some commentators have argued that the use of force by ECOMOG and its intimidating presence in Liberia thereafter, with heavy weaponry, served to increase the NPFL suspicion of the force and its leader's uncompromising attitude.¹⁶ However, the view that Taylor's ambition to become the president of Liberia at all costs was the real issue gained ground later.

But beyond this, other issues affected ECOWAS' ability to find a lasting settlement to the Liberian crisis after successfully securing the first cease-fire agreement. First was the political division between key ECOWAS member-states, which in turn influenced the behavior of some of the warring factions. For example, Nigeria reportedly provided material support to Samuel Doe at the initial stages of the conflict. When it later sought to play the role of peacemaker and peacekeeper in the conflict, the NPFL not only perceived Nigeria as a partial actor, it did not trust ECOWAS to deliver the resignation of Samuel Doe as initially discussed. The subsequent deployment of ECOMOG was thus met with hostility by the NPFL.

This situation was compounded by the fact that there was initially no unity of purpose within ECOWAS on the Liberia question. It appeared that member-states were not united in their approach. For example, while ECOMOG troops remained on the ground as attempts were being made to

reach a settlement to the conflict, support for the NPFL continued from some member-states, particularly from Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. By this time, Nigeria appeared to have replaced its support for Doe with a greater agenda—that of regional hegemony, an agenda that was easier to pursue after the death of Samuel Doe.¹⁷

While observers often perceived differences in the positions of key member-states like Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire as the result of old Anglophone–Francophone rivalry, there was evidence to suggest that this situation resulted more from the personal interest of the leaders. In the case of Nigeria, relations between the administrations of Samuel Doe and President Babangida were very cordial as opposed to the cool relations between Doe and the civilian administration of Shehu Shagari in Nigeria. Babangida's administration contributed generously to the Graduate School of International Relations in Liberia named after the Nigerian president.¹⁸ On the other side, the former Ivorian leader, Houphouët Boigny supported anti-Doe forces out of deep-seated resentment for Samuel Doe. After his rise to power, Doe had murdered A.B. Tolbert, son of the former president of Liberia, and son-in-law of Houphouët-Boigny. Doe had promised Boigny that A.B. Tolbert, who was pulled from the safe haven provided by the French embassy in Monrovia, would be unharmed. It is believed that Boigny never forgave this act.¹⁹ Thus, ECOMOG fate hung on the personal interests of several leaders and the different political interests of several ECOWAS member-states.

Apart from these factors, many of the problems encountered by ECOWAS in Liberia were “teething” problems, which were unavoidable for an organization that was dabbling in conflict resolution of that magnitude for the first time. ECOWAS might have benefited from the political and material support of the UN in order to conclude the work it started in Liberia. The organization had, up until 1992, assumed the burden of the military operations in Liberia on its own. The Cotonou Agreement in July 1993 presented the opportunity for such UN support.

The Involvement of the United Nations

The political involvement of the UN in the Liberian conflict began in 1992, following the NPFL's launching of Operation Octopus in October. Prior to this period, the role of the UN had been limited to humanitarian assistance. The first real UN political response to the Liberian crisis came in November 1992 when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 788, calling on the parties to the conflict to observe a cease-fire and endorsing an embargo on

the transfer of weapons to Liberia.²⁰ The Cotonou Agreement provided the blueprint for ECOWAS–UN cooperation in dealing with the Liberian conflict. The Cotonou Accord, among other things, sought to address issues that had created a stumbling block in the previous agreement.²¹ One was the need to build the confidence of the NPFL by expanding the ECOMOG force to include other countries, thereby reducing Nigerian domination, which was one of the NPFL's reasons for rejecting previous peace plans. Responsibility for the implementation of the accord was thus placed with the expanded ECOMOG force, which would now include troops from Uganda and Tanzania and a UN observer force. After sending a technical team to evaluate the situation in August, on September 22, 1993, the UN Security Council created UNOMIL.²² As the Security Council indicated in its resolution, this was “the first peacekeeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in co-operation with a peacekeeping mission set up by another organization.”²³

The Cotonou Agreement placed an enormous premium on disarmament, and it divided responsibility between UN observer troops and ECOWAS in implementing the disarmament plan. ECOMOG was assigned the task of conducting the primary duties relating to implementation while UN troops were tasked with supervising the process. For example, ECOMOG was empowered to disarm combatants and noncombatants in possession of arms and to search for hidden weapons.²⁴ It was also required to create buffer zones or to seal borders between Liberia and its neighbors (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Sierra Leone), in addition to monitoring all points of entry. UN troops, on the other hand, were required to be present in these places in order to “monitor, verify and report on any and all of the foregoing and implementation thereof.”²⁵

ECOMOG was also authorized to enforce peace but the accord placed restrictions on its enforcement powers. Contrary to previous practice, in which ECOMOG could embark on enforcement action immediately upon receiving instruction from the political authority in ECOWAS (although those political masters were themselves often military personnel, e.g., General Babangida of Nigeria and his successor, General Sani Abacha), ECOMOG was now required to follow certain procedures before enforcement action could be undertaken. The Violation Committee provided for in Article 8(2) of the accord was to first report cease-fire violations to the UN observer mission, which would then conduct an investigation and attempt to resolve the problems. If this problem persisted, UNOMIL was required to submit its findings to the Violation Committee, which would, in turn attempt to persuade concerned parties to remedy the situation. It was only

after these efforts had failed that ECOMOG was required to “resort to the use of its peace-enforcement powers against a violator.”²⁶ UNOMIL’s terms with respect to enforcement were also circumscribed. When the Security Council established UNOMIL, it included a provision in its mandate that specified that the UN mission was to remain outside of enforcement actions. The Security Council resolution states that UNOMIL “without participation in enforcement operations” was to coordinate with ECOMOG in the discharge of its responsibilities.²⁷

In spite of the Cotonou Agreement, the expansion of ECOMOG and the deployment of UNOMIL, the situation continued to be unstable in Liberia, and problems in UNOMIL–ECOMOG coordination continued. In November 1995, in the wake of increased fighting, including attacks on UN military observers, the Security Council decided to amend UNOMIL’s mandate and decrease the size of the mission to a maximum of 160 military observers.²⁸ Thereafter, UNOMIL’s role remained small scale, with the total number of deployed observers ranging from 5 to 10 after the evacuation of most UN personnel in April 1996.²⁹ This remained the case until the elections in July 1997. By contrast, ECOWAS continued its role and strengthened its presence in the country.

Conclusion

Although the terms of collaboration between the UN and ECOWAS were clearly stated in the Cotonou accord and reflected in the mandate of UNOMIL, the relationship between UNOMIL and ECOMOG on the ground in Liberia was not so smooth. UNOMIL was in practice, unable to supervise the activities of ECOMOG, which was already on the ground in the area of operation. ECOMOG continued with many of its previous operating procedures, which placed restrictions on the UN force. Despite the stipulation in the accord that UNOMIL would enjoy freedom of movement throughout Liberia (see article 3(l)), this was not so in practice. ECOMOG, which was technically in charge of the security of Liberia and was also to provide security for the UN force, placed restrictions on its movement. One of the secretary-general’s reports on Liberia highlighted this problem and confirmed that there were cases “when UNOMIL military and civilian staff have been stopped and harassed at ECOMOG checkpoints.”³⁰ In reality, the UN was in control neither of the political or military situation on the ground. As Mackinlay and Alao aptly note:

Many Liberians saw UNOMIL as subordinated to ECOMOG. For them, the signs were visible in everyday events on the street. They saw UNOMIL

vehicles stopped and searched at ECOMOG roadblocks. UNOMIL was also required to observe the curfew times and influential Liberians asked—how could UNOMIL be “verifying” their activities when ECOMOG was free to act, unmonitored, during the hours of darkness.³¹

Explaining the Problems in UN–ECOWAS Collaboration

The failure to achieve the type of cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS envisaged in the Cotonou Accord is attributable to a number of factors. First, the foundation for a good working relationship had not been established. The UN entered the Liberia scene long after ECOWAS and ECOMOG had developed their own rhythm for operating on the ground and it was difficult to adjust to a new way of doing things. The lack of precedent for this type of collaboration meant that both organizations had to devise their own way of dealing with the situation on the ground as they occurred.

Second, apart from the late involvement of the UN in the Liberian conflict, the timing of the deployment of UNOMIL—at the end of combat operations and the beginning of a relatively stable peacekeeping period—created some degree of resentment among many ECOMOG soldiers. They argued that UNOMIL was arriving after the painful process of shedding their blood for Liberians had been concluded and they therefore resented that the UN was coming to share in the glory.³² According to an ECOMOG Officer:

Those ordinary people who enjoyed ECOMOG facilities since 1990 appreciate ECOMOG. They do not feel the practical effects of UNOMIL. Many feel that UNOMIL has yet to prove their reason for being here.³³

Third, ECOMOG officers argued that the provisions of the Cotonou Agreement, which required UNOMIL to monitor the force “symbolized mistrust.” Thus, whilst many ECOMOG officers publicly claimed to understand the terms of the peace agreement and stated that they would work to implement it, they sometimes gave the appearance of being in competition with UNOMIL. Prior education and orientation of ECOMOG troops might have served to alleviate some of this problem.

Fourth, the relationship that existed between ECOMOG and its political body, ECOWAS, in turn adversely affected working relations between UNOMIL and ECOMOG. In many respects, ECOMOG was not accountable to ECOWAS. Political direction from the latter was often absent on the ground. For the first few years, prior to 1995, ECOWAS had no political representative such as a Special Representative of the Executive Secretary

on the ground in Liberia. Political representatives only traveled to Liberia periodically. Thus, in the absence of a political authority on the ground that could curb its excesses, the force became accustomed to taking control of both the political and military aspects of the operation. This problem was highlighted by ECOMOG officers and outside observers alike.

Fifth, ECOMOG suffered severe logistic problems, which could not but affect its ability to implement tasks such as the provision of security for UNOMIL staff. Despite the expansion of ECOMOG to include two battalions from Uganda and Tanzania, its overall troop strength was still inadequate for the task at hand. The force was unable to deploy to all parts of Liberia and indeed to some of the areas where UNOMIL staff operated. Financial constraints within ECOWAS and in troop-contributing countries led to long delays in resupply, with equipment in disrepair and spares in short supply. Additionally, morale amongst other ranks in particular was low as a result of irregular payment of the meager operational allowance. This logistics situation further served to fuel ECOMOG's resentment of UNOMIL, which was well equipped and whose staff were paid at least five times the rate of their ECOMOG counterparts.

Lastly, the local community's perception of the UN presence in Liberia may have fueled the situation. The following statement in a local newspaper sums up the local sentiment in the period following the deployment of UNOMIL:

The idea of a UN Observer Mission in Liberia was not the best course of wise action to have been taken by the United States and the United Nations at this time, after having neglected Liberian people throughout the many years of our misery. UNOMIL is another of the expensive exercises in the symbolic use of superpower politics in the world community.³⁴

The Lessons of Liberia

The experience of the UN–ECOWAS collaboration in Liberia provided a number of useful lessons, some of which might have served as a guide for the collaboration that would again occur between both organizations in Sierra Leone in later years. The Liberian experience highlighted several factors upon which the success of any collaborative effort between the UN and regional organizations must rest.

First, it underscored the need for the UN to be involved in efforts to resolve a conflict at the earliest stages of that conflict if it is to retain its moral authority to act later. Second, it highlighted the importance of ensuring UN political authority over joint UN and regional attempts at conflict resolution. Ceding control to regional bodies in the overall management of regional

conflicts may threaten the legitimacy of the UN as a universal body authorized to maintain international peace and security. If the UN is to participate at the operational level, it is important that its role not be reduced to the barest minimum, where regional organizations would be seen to have usurped the authority of the UN. It is better for the UN not to deploy at all than to deploy in smaller numbers and at lower levels than the regional body. Even where the UN retains political authority over an entire operation, the presence of UN military personnel in much smaller numbers than regional troops may serve to erode the confidence of the local population and the credibility of the UN with the warring parties, who may perceive the organization as weak. Such perceptions by the conflicting parties and the local community might serve to undermine the peace process.

In the years following the collaboration between the UN and ECOWAS in Liberia, the UN has worked to improve its communication with regional organizations, through high-level, working-level and ad hoc meetings at headquarters between the UN and individual regional organizations. Such contacts have led to efforts to harmonize concepts between the UN and regional organizations as well as development of modalities for collaboration between regional organizations and between them and the UN. The cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS is one of those at a more advanced stage. Collaboration between both organizations in recent times is best exemplified by the response to the conflict in Sierra Leone, which assumed a new dimension in May 2000, with the withdrawal of ECOMOG from Sierra Leone after a period of enforcement and stabilization and “re-hating” of many of those ECOMOG troops under UN authority (UNAMSIL). The political efforts by ECOWAS to ensure stability in the Mano River Union as a whole (including Liberia, which has once again become unstable and a major security threat in the neighborhood), has been done in coordination with the UN. All these efforts would form the basis for strengthening the cooperation between both organizations.

Notes

1. Please note: the views expressed in this chapter are entirely those of the author's and not necessarily the views of her employers.
2. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace* (New York: United Nations, 1992), p. 37.
3. S/25402, March 12, 1993.
4. For detailed discussions on the origins of the Liberian state, see Amos J. Benyan, *The American Colonisation Society and Creation of the Liberian State: A Historical Perspective, 1822–1990* (Larnham: University Press of America, 1991);

- Tom Shick, *Behold the Promised the Land: A History of Afro-American Settler Society in Nineteenth Century Liberia* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980); and Yekutiel Gershoni, *Black Colonialism: Liberian Scramble for the Hinterland* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1985).
5. See Joseph Saye Guannu, *An Introduction to Liberian Government* (New York: Exposition Press, 1982), pp. 53–55.
 6. See Gershoni, *Black Colonialism*, pp. 22–23.
 7. For accounts of gross abuses of human rights and atrocities committed by the Doe regime, see *Report of US Lawyers Committee for Human Rights* (New York, November 1986); and Michael Massing, *Best Friends: Violations of Human Rights in Liberia, America's Closest Ally in Africa* (Mimeo, 1986).
 8. Figures reported by UNHCR, in Cote d'Ivoire. See *Africa Research Bulletin* (October 1–31, 1990), p. 9873.
 9. Divisions within ECOWAS continued to be a problem in the early stages of ECOWAS involvement. See, e.g., Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2000), pp. 88–91.
 10. The ECOWAS, Decision A/DEC.9/5/90, Relating to the Establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee, Banjul, May 20, 1990. Reprinted in Marc Weller, ed., *Regional Peace-keeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 39. The SMC's initial membership was Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo.
 11. The mandate for ECOMOG, as established by the SMC, was to monitor the cease-fire. In conjunction with the decision to establish ECOMOG, the SMC also called for the establishment of a broad-based interim government and elections within 12 months. ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, Decision A/DEC.1/8/90, reprinted in *ibid.*
 12. Lt. Col. A. Olaiya, "ECOMOG Mission and Mandate," *The Peacemaker*, No. 1 (September 1991–March 1992), p. 11.
 13. The parties to the Liberian conflict at this stage were the AFL, the NPFL, led by Charles Taylor and the INPFL, a splinter group of the NPFL, led by Prince Yormie Johnson. The INPFL would later be neutralized following the 1992 ECOMOG response to the NPFL attacks on Monrovia. Thereafter, the INPFL was not party to other peace agreements in Liberia.
 14. For a detailed analysis of these peace agreements and the peace negotiations between November 1990 and October 1992, see Margaret A. Vogt, ed., *The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold Attempt at Regional Peacekeeping* (Lagos: Gabumo Publishers, 1992). See also, W. Ofuately-Kodjoe, "Regional Organizations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOWAS Intervention in Liberia," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Autumn 1994), pp. 261–302 for a detailed discussion of the politics of the background and politics of the ECOWAS intervention.
 15. The full text of the Cotonou Agreement is available on the United States Institute for Peace website, at: <http://www.usip.org/library/pa/index/>

pa_liberia.html (last visited March 7, 2003). For more on the Agreement see, Abiodun Alao, John Mackinlay, and 'Funmi Olonisakin, *Peacekeepers, Politicians and Warlords* (New York: United Nations University Press, 1999).

16. See, e.g., Kofi Oteng Kufuor, "The Legality of the Intervention in the Liberian Civil War by the Economic Community of West African States," *African Journal of International and Comparative Law*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1994).
17. Doe was killed in September 1990, while in the custody of Prince Johnson's troops, after being taken from ECOMOG headquarters. For more on this episode see, C.Y. Iweze, "Nigeria in Liberia: The Military Operations of ECOMOG," in Margaret A. Vogt, A.E. Ekoko, eds., *Nigeria in International Peacekeeping 1960-1992* (Lagos and London: Malthouse Press, 1993), pp. 217-243.
18. Nigeria is said to have spent \$20 million toward the establishment of the Babangida Graduate School of International Relations in Nigeria. African Concord, August 27, 1990.
19. See *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 32, No. 10 (May 17, 1991).
20. Security Council Resolution 788, November 19, 1992.
21. The previous agreement was the Yamoussoukro IV agreement. This agreement was reached on October 30, 1991 and came about as a result of a series of meetings of the ECOWAS Committee of Five, an adjunct to the SMC. The agreement included provisions for a cease-fire, disarmament and elections. Implementation of the agreement was blocked by the NPFL.
22. Security Council Resolution 866, September 22, 1993.
23. Ibid.
24. Cotonou Accord, Article 6(7).
25. Cotonou Accord, Article 4(3).
26. Cotonou Accord, Article 8(3).
27. Security Council Resolution 866, September 22, 1993, para. 3(h).
28. Security Council Resolution 1020, November 10, 1995.
29. See, e.g., S/1996/858, October 17, 1996.
30. S/1995/473, June 10, 1995. See also, Amnesty International, *Liberia: A New Peace Agreement—An Opportunity to Introduce Human Rights Protection*, September 20, 1995, p. 21.
31. John Mackinlay and Abiodun Alao, "Liberia 1994: ECOMOG and UNOMIL Response to a Complex Emergency," *United Nations University Occasional Paper Series*, No. 1 (January 1995), p. 28. See also, 'Funmi Olonisakin, "UN Co-operation with Regional Organizations in Peacekeeping: The Experience of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Autumn 1996), p. 40.
32. Interviews conducted with ECOMOG Officers and other ranks in June and July 1994.
33. Personal interview with the Gambian Contingent Commander in Liberia, July 1994.
34. "UNOMIL: The Irony of Peacekeeping," *New Democrat Weekly* (Monrovia) (June 30-July 6, 1994), p. 10.

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CHAPTER 5

Sierra Leone

W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe

Introduction

In the aftermath of the Cold War, there has been increasing discussion of the possibilities of collaboration between the UN and regional or subregional organizations in the maintenance of peace and security. This emphasis on regional organizations was based on the widely held belief that in the aftermath of the Cold War there were new possibilities in getting the UN to function as it was originally intended. This emphasis was also a reflection of a belief that as most of the new conflicts that the UN was facing were internal conflicts, rather than interstate wars, the major powers in the Security Council would be more willing to undertake peace operations in these conflicts if regional or subregional organizations were also involved. Thus, the idea of a division of labor between the UN and regional organization in the resolution of regional conflict gained popularity among senior UN officials as well as some scholars.¹

There are those who argue that this optimistic view of the potential of regional organizations is misplaced. According to this view, regional organizations “generally lack the credibility, the capacity and hence, the clout to act effectively as agents for collective security and peaceful settlement.”² In addition, while the regional organizations may have the advantage of proximity to the conflict, salience of local issues and institutional flexibility, they are also likely to suffer from conflicting national interests, and a lack of capacity, resources and experience, which can limit their usefulness for peacemaking, peacekeeping and enforcement.³

In spite of the potential disadvantages, there was initially a great deal of optimism about the effectiveness of these joint operations.⁴ During the 1990s, in Africa, as elsewhere, the UN and several regional organizations collaborated in a variety of peace operations. However, there have been significant differences in the types and scope of these collaborations. For instance, in the case of Liberia, the UN played a subsidiary role to the regional organization, ECOWAS, while in the case of Somalia the UN played the major role while a regional organization, the Organization of Islamic States, played a minor role. However, in the wake of the many failures and debacles that we have seen lately in Somalia, Rwanda and elsewhere, doubts about the capacity of these collaborative efforts to bring these operations to successful conclusions have begun to resurface.⁵

The objective of this chapter is to analyze the relationship between the UN and ECOWAS in their joint intervention in Sierra Leone. On the basis of such analysis it may be possible to make at least tentative generalizations about the possibilities and limitations of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations in peace support operations, and develop lessons that can guide future operations. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section provides a brief overview of the roots of the Sierra Leone conflict. The second section discusses the sequence of events associated with the ECOWAS and UN interventions. In the third section, the chapter discusses the nature of the cooperation between the two organizations and the issues raised as a result. On the basis of this discussion, the fourth section examines the experience using the concepts of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement as the framework for analysis. The final section draws some conclusions about the future of such operations.

The Roots of the Conflict

The roots of the conflict in Sierra Leone are situated deep in the social and historical fabric of the country. Specifically, the roots of the crisis lie in the inability of the country to produce a coherent political culture as a result of the cleavages in the society and their historical development during the colonial and postcolonial period, culminating in the proliferation of sectarian demands on a basically illegitimate and impotent governing structure.

Sierra Leone is made up of 16 indigenous ethnic groups. Two main groups, the Temne in the north and the Mende in the south, form about 30 percent each of the total population, in a distribution called multiethnic bipolarity.⁶ The other ethnic groups are scattered around the area known as the protectorate. Perched on top of this ethno-social system are the Creoles,

a comparatively tiny exogenous group (about 2 percent of the total population) who are descended from repatriated slaves from the United Kingdom, Nova Scotia, and slave ships, who were settled by the British on the Crown Colony in and after 1808.⁷ The Creoles were established as a cultural and elite society. As such, they mimicked British colonial society, spoke an English-based Creole, and controlled the colonial bureaucracy as well as the major commercial interests.⁸ Commonly called the “Black British,” the attitude of the Creoles to the indigenous Sierra Leonians was that of condescension. They saw the indigenes as inferior, and adopted toward them a type of “civilizing mission” ideology, or the “westernized black man’s burden.”⁹ As Sierra Leone society evolved, these “tribal” cleavages, and their manipulations by the British have had profound economic, social and political consequences that have contributed to the present crisis.

From the late 1700s, when Britain first colonized the area, until 1961 when the colony became independent, it was administered very much like the other British colonies in Africa. Characterized by both British imperial officials and historians as “divide and rule,” the point of imperial rule was to exploit the land of the Africans for the production of agricultural raw materials and the extraction of minerals, for the industrial development of Britain. As a feature of this pattern of government, the British encouraged ethnic divisions of labor. Thus throughout the colonial period ethnic identity and ethnic patterns of interest articulation became a significant characteristic of political activity in Sierra Leone.

Politically, the Creoles began to lose power as a result of their small numbers, their geographical isolation, their exogenous character and their unwillingness to participate in the political process with the indigenes. Thus, as independence approached and the British imposed electoral politics on the colonial society, the field of political power was opened up to the indigenes. In the immediate preindependence and postindependence period, politics in Sierra Leone took on the character of a zero-sum game in which the two major ethnic groups saw politics as a contest in which the objective was to seize control of the state and use it for the good of one’s ethnic group. In addition, the differential access of ethnic groups to political, social and economic opportunities during the colonial period, created a mind-set in which ethnic animosities continued to be part of the collective memories of many groups, so that even though they are sometimes overlaid by other identities and other grievances, ethnic grievances are never too far from the surface, and, therefore, they are always there for political entrepreneurs to exploit. The social effects of the economic and political system was to produce debilitating poverty, poor education and, therefore, poor employment



Map No. 3902 Rev. 4 UNITED NATIONS
December 1999

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Map 5.1 Sierra Leone.

opportunities, and a lack of confidence in the ability or willingness of the elites to do something about it. The pattern of economic development, with its emphasis on diamonds, destroyed the agricultural base of the economy, which increased exponentially the problem of rural poverty and unemployment.

Sierra Leone achieved independence in April 1961. Soon after independence, it was clear that the fissures in Sierra Leonian society had started to

crack. The British had managed to install a successor government under the conservative Sir Milton Margai as the leader of the Sierra Leone Peoples Party. Margai died in 1964 and was succeeded by his half brother Sir Albert Margai. In March 1967, Siaka Stevens and the rival All Peoples' Congress won the elections. However, before he was inaugurated, a military coup stopped him from assuming power. Two more coups followed, the second of which restored the constitution and Stevens to power in April 1968. In 1978, the Stevens government established a policy of one-government rule. For the five terms that it was in office the Stevens government was characterized by massive corruption, mismanagement, scandals and repression. The reaction of the population to this situation took the form of strikes, bloody demonstrations, attempted coups and counter coups. Finally, in 1985, under tremendous popular pressure, Stevens retired, and Maj. Gen. Joseph Momoh succeeded him as the party's choice for president. The economic, social and political unrest did not end with the demise of Siaka Stevens. The government of Sierra Leone had lost all credibility and legitimacy, and it had developed the reputation of a corrupt elite that was actively conniving with foreigners to loot the resources of the country, especially the diamonds.¹⁰

In the forefront of the demonstrations and strikes were the students. Spurred on by the shortage of food and the rampant corruption and mismanagement, many other groups such as day workers, lower civil servants, teachers, merchants and members of the military joined in. As long as the level of the opposition to the government was limited to demonstrations and riots that could be relatively controlled, the governments and elites felt that they could repress the protests. The situation changed dramatically in the early 1990s with the appearance of groups that were armed and intent on overthrowing the government.

This was the scene when, on March 23, 1991, a group of rebels crossed over from Liberia into Sierra Leone to fight the Momoh government. The rebel group, known as the RUF, quickly set up operations in the Eastern border town of Bomaru.¹¹ The RUF soon set about taking over the eastern and southern part of the country. Within a year they were controlling over half of the country, and most of the diamond producing areas. On May 1, 1992, a group of young army officers of the Sierra Leone Army under the leadership of Captain Valentine Strasser staged a coup and took over the government from General Momoh. Captain Strasser moved quickly to consolidate his power. He dissolved the legislature and moved immediately to shore up his security. In March 1993, he accepted the assistance of two battalions of Nigerian troops in an effort to reclaim control of territory in the north of the country and consolidate security generally in the face of increasing rebel military action and civilian casualties. The following year, he launched a

recruitment drive, which increased the size of the Sierra Leone military to about 12,000 (including 12-year-olds). In March 1995, he signed an agreement with a South African private security company, Executive Outcomes to help in the fight against the RUF, and he developed a collaborative relationship with the kamajors.¹² Under the leadership of Chief Hinga Norman and with the cooperation of Executive Outcomes, Strasser's initiatives led to some successful fighting of the RUF.

In January 1996, his deputy, Julius Maada Bio, deposed Strasser in a coup. Bio opened negotiations with the RUF and then agreed to hold national elections. National elections were held on February 26, 1996. A second round in March brought Ahmed Tejan Kabbah to power as president. The successful elections brought new hope for peace and on November 30, 1996, the Kabbah government and the RUF signed an agreement known as the Abidjan Accords.¹³ The accords called for an immediate cease-fire; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of all combatants; amnesty for RUF members, the transformation of the RUF into a political party, the downsizing of armed forces on both sides and the expulsion of Executive Outcomes. In addition, senior RUF members were to be given posts in the government, and a training program for rebels was to be established. For its part, the RUF agreed to release 8,000 prisoners, and submit to the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program.

The peace accord did not last. Through the early part of 1997, the situation in the government remained unstable and insecure. With Executive Outcomes out of the country, the Sierra Leonian government slipped back into its previous vulnerable condition. Neither the Kabbah regime nor the RUF reduced their forces and President Kabbah decided to fund the Kamajors because he lacked trust in the army.¹⁴

On May 25, 1997, Maj. Johnny Paul Koroma launched a coup, seizing control of the government after eight hours of brutal fighting. Moving quickly to consolidate his power, he suspended the constitution, abolished political parties, established the AFRC, and invited the RUF to join the AFRC in a coalition government. For its part, the RUF accepted the invitation to join the government, and declared that its rebellion was over. For the next nine months, the RUF was part of the government of Sierra Leone.

The Economic Community of West African States and United Nations Interventions

The overthrow of the Kabbah government prompted the involvement of ECOWAS. At the time of the coup, a number of Nigerian troops were already based within Sierra Leone and on June 1, the Nigerian navy attacked

Freetown from the harbor, apparently believing that, in conjunction with support from their troops already in Freetown, the military attack would force the junta to step down. The Nigerian operation did not succeed and thereafter the focus shifted to negotiation in an effort to overturn the coup.

Internationally, the coup received no support and the government was not recognized by other states. By chance an OAU summit was being held in Harare just as all this was occurring in Sierra Leone, and the OAU issued a statement condemning the coup and calling for a restoration of the democratically elected government, symbolizing a new trend in the OAU of the nonacceptance of governments produced by military coups.¹⁵

On June 27, the foreign ministers of ECOWAS met at Conakry, and made a decision to work toward the “immediate restoration” of the Kabbah government. This was to be achieved by three measures: dialogue, sanctions and the use of force. The foreign ministers created a committee of four, consisting of Nigeria, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, to oversee the implementation of these measures.¹⁶ These decisions were endorsed by ECOWAS heads of state at a summit held at Abuja on August 28, 1997. At the summit, ECOWAS leaders decided to pursue stronger measures and agreed to impose regional sanctions on Sierra Leone. The sanctions involved a “total embargo on all supplies of petroleum products, arms and military equipment” as well as a requirement to abstain from doing any business with Sierra Leone. The ECOWAS leaders mandated the Committee of Four (later the Committee of Five) to oversee the implementation of the sanctions.¹⁷

Through this period, UN involvement was minimal, following a trend begun when the conflict in Sierra Leone was first brought to the attention of the Security Council. The beginning of UN involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict can be traced back to February 1995, when the secretary-general of the UN, Boutros Boutros-Gali dispatched Mr. Berhanu Dinka as his Special Representative to Sierra Leone.¹⁸ The appointment was in response to an official request from the government of Sierra Leone for the assistance of the secretary-general in the negotiations between the government and the RUF. As the secretary-general’s Special Envoy, Ambassador Dinka assisted in the negotiations that led to the Abidjan Accords.

Thereafter, the UN’s involvement remained fairly low-key. A proposal for a possible UN mission to facilitate the implementation of the Abidjan Accords was left unpursued.¹⁹ The UN Security Council condemned the overthrow of the Kabbah government²⁰ but said little else, choosing not to make reference to the Nigerian intervention. Continuing to keep its distance, and withholding any direct comment on the ECOWAS action, in July 1997, the Security Council issued a statement that, *inter alia*, supported the OAU appeal to ECOWAS leaders to restore constitutional order.²¹

By August, the Security Council strengthened its stand by declaring that the Security Council would, “in the absence of a satisfactory response from the military junta” take “appropriate measures” to restore the democratically elected government of Dr. Kabbah. The Security Council also indicated that “the military junta’s attempt to set conditions for the restoration of the democratically elected government is unacceptable.”²² A month after the ECOWAS decision to impose regional sanctions, the UN Security Council followed their lead and passed a resolution imposing an arms and oil embargo on Sierra Leone, as well as a travel ban on members of the military junta and their families. In addition, the Security Council established a committee to oversee the sanctions and authorized ECOWAS to ensure the implementation of these provisions.²³

The ECOWAS Committee of Five met with representatives of the junta in Conkary in October 1997. The resulting agreement, known as the Conkary Accords, was signed on October 23, 1997.²⁴ The agreement called for an immediate cease-fire, the return of refugees and displaced persons and the return of constitutional rule, effective from April 1998. Most importantly, the accord provided for immunities and exemptions from prosecution for those who participated in the May 1997 coup. The implementation of the cease-fire was to be overseen by ECOMOG, with the assistance of a UN military observation group.

Once again, however, events overtook the peace plan. In February 1998, in response to attacks against them, ECOMOG troops launched an offensive against the RUF and the junta and drove them out of Freetown. As a result of this pressure, the AFRC/RUF junta reached an agreement for the return to power of Kabbah. This action was followed by Security Council Resolution 1156, on March 16, 1998, welcoming the return to office of the democratically elected government of Kabbah, and lifting the arms embargo against the government of Sierra Leone. After the failure of the initial attempt to broker the Conakry Agreement with the AFRC/RUF in October 1997, and its success in ousting the latter from Freetown in February 1998, ECOMOG settled in as the security arm of the Kabbah government. However, again, the peace did not hold. The RUF regrouped and through the summer continued with military operations against the government.

On April 17, 1998, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1162 sending a ten-member military liaison force on a 90-day mission to Sierra Leone, to report on the military situation there and to assist the future planning of the activities of ECOMOG. Later, on June 13, 1998, expressing concern over the security situation in Sierra Leone, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1181, establishing UNOMSIL in Sierra Leone for a six-month

period.²⁵ The team was to comprise 70 military observers, who were to monitor the security situation in Sierra Leone and ECOMOG's role in the disarmament process.

Nonetheless, the security situation continued to deteriorate. On January 6, 1999, the RUF and AFRC forces made a devastating attack on Freetown. The fighting was so fierce that thousands of people, including President Kabbah, fled the city and UNOMSIL personnel were forced to evacuate. After two weeks of fighting, ECOMOG forces pushed them back.²⁶

The Lomé Agreement

At the same time, in January and February, ECOWAS launched a new diplomatic offensive involving meetings in Conakry with UN officials including Francis Okello, the Special Representative of the secretary-general, Foday Sankoh, and other rebels representing the RUF, the Sierra Leone Army, defected soldiers and representatives of the Kabbah regime.²⁷ After two months of negotiation, these talks produced a cease-fire agreement on May 18, 1999. This was followed, on May 25, 1999, by the beginning of direct talks between the government of Sierra Leone and the RUF. With the involvement of a variety of actors, including the UN, ECOWAS and the OAU, the negotiations resulted in the Lomé Agreement on July 7, 1999.

The Lomé Agreement called for a cessation of hostilities, and the establishment of a program of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of combatants.²⁸ There was also to be a government of national unity, and power sharing between the Kabbah government and the RUF/AFRC junta in which several RUF and AFRC members were given major cabinet positions. Sankoh got the position of vice president, and chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development, and Koromah was designated as chairman of the Committee for the Consolidation of the Peace. There was also blanket amnesty for crimes committed, and the establishment of human rights, truth and reconciliation commissions. Initially there seemed to be reasons for optimism regarding the effectiveness of the Lomé Agreement. First, there were reports of rebels arriving at Lungi and Freetown to centers that were operated jointly by UNOMSIL and ECOMOG. Second, the UN Security Council decided to triple the size of UNOMSIL from 70 to 210 military observers, and increase its military and medical capabilities.²⁹ It was expected that this move would increase the effectiveness of UNOMSIL in monitoring the Agreement.

A few months later, on October 22, 1999, the Security Council terminated UNOMSIL, and created, in its stead, UNAMSIL, a larger mission

with a planned deployment of 6,000 soldiers and 260 military observers.³⁰ According to the secretary-general, "The main objectives of the UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone remain to assist the efforts of the Government of Sierra Leone to extend its authority, restore law and order and stabilize the situation progressively throughout the entire country, and to assist in the promotion of a political process which should lead to a renewed disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program and the holding, in due course, of free and fair elections."³¹ The UN secretary-general appointed Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji as his Special Representative to Sierra Leone.

The mandate of UNAMSIL includes cooperation with the government of Sierra Leone in the implementation of the terms of the Lomé Agreement, and specifically assistance with the program of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. In addition, UNAMSIL was mandated to provide security for UN personnel and the government of Sierra Leone, and to provide support for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and for elections. Four months later, the Security Council decided to increase the size of UNAMSIL. By Resolution 1289, of February 7, 2000, it voted to double the UNAMSIL size to 11,100, including the 260 military observers already deployed. The new resolution extended the Chapter VII authorization of Resolution 1270 to include the provision of

security at key locations and government buildings, in particular in Freetown, important intersections, and major airports, including Lunge airport; to facilitate the free flow of people, goods and humanitarian assistance along specified thoroughfares; to provide security in and all sites of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration program; to coordinate with and assist, the Sierra Leone law enforcement authorities in the discharge of their responsibilities; and to guard weapons, ammunition and other military equipment collected from ex-combatants and to assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction.³²

Due to the widespread expectation that Nigeria³³ and other ECOMOG contributors would be withdrawing its forces from Sierra Leone, the security situation in Sierra Leone deteriorated significantly in the beginning of 2000. To begin with, Foday Sankoh announced publicly that UNAMSIL was a threat to the security of the people of Sierra Leone. Following this declaration, the AFRC/RUF forces proceeded to reignite the conflict. In the eastern part of the country, rebel forces attacked UNAMSIL forces, and there were almost daily reports of outbreaks of violence.

In May 2000, more than 500 UN peacekeepers were abducted by the RUF.³⁴ As a result of demonstrations in front of his house, Foday Sankoh was

captured and imprisoned by government forces. In the meantime, 450 Kenyan UNAMSIL forces were blocked by the RUF from entering Makeni pursuant to the terms of the agreement. Finally, RUF elements and West Side Boys abducted 500 UN peacekeepers.³⁵ The UN operation was on the verge of total collapse. In response to these events, in mid-May, Great Britain launched a major military intervention in Sierra Leone to oversee the evacuation of its foreign nationals, and then later to reestablish security in the capital.³⁶

In an effort to deal with the deteriorating situation, the UN Security Council voted to increase UNAMSIL's size from 11,100 to 13,000 to allow for the rapid reinforcement of the military component of UNAMSIL and the provision of additional resources needed to fulfill the mandate.³⁷ On July 5, 2000, the UN Security Council imposed an 18-month ban on the trade of unidentified rough diamonds from Sierra Leone. Over the course of the summer, UN troops engaged in a series of military actions and political negotiations in an effort to restore stability and free the hostages. In September 2000, British paratroopers successfully invaded the camp of the West Side Boys where they had been holding 11 British troops. In spite of these actions, and assurances by Acting Force Commander Major General Agway that UNAMSIL forces had started peaceful deployments into RUF-held areas in Makeni, Mabguraka, Lunsar and others, the security situation did not change much.

The Abuja Agreement

On November 10, 2000, a day of talks in Abuja between the government and the RUF, as well as ECOWAS, led to an agreement known as the Abuja Agreement. Under the terms of the agreement the parties agreed to, *inter alia*, an immediate cease-fire, recommencement of the DDR program and freedom of movement for UNAMSIL troops. In spite of this agreement, instability and violence continued, and cross-border fighting took hold on Sierra Leone's borders, especially with Guinea. By January 2001, the RUF controlled more than half of the country including most of the diamond areas.³⁸

On May 2, 2001, in a surprising move, probably precipitated by its losses at the hands of the Guinea Armed Forces, the RUF entered into discussions with the Sierra Leone government, ECOWAS and UNAMSIL, in Abuja. The parties agreed to simultaneous disarmament and participation in the DDR program, and freedom of movement for UNAMSIL to deploy throughout the country to monitor and supervise this activity. The RUF agreed to return the vehicles and equipment it had seized from UN troops by May 30, 2001. Meeting in Freetown two weeks later, the parties signed a second communiqué and the UN Special Representative announced the "cessation of all hostilities" and a guarantee of the unimpeded movement of

all persons, good and services throughout the country. These conditions were formally agreed to on May 15, 2001, which presumably signaled the terminal point of the war.

This agreement seemed to open the way for a real transition to conditions of sufficient peace and stability to allow the DDR program to gather momentum,³⁹ and eventually for elections. On March 28, 2002, the Security Council voted to extend UNAMSIL's mandate for another six months and formalized an expansion of the mandate to include efforts to facilitate preparations for the upcoming elections. Elections were successfully held on May 14, 2002.

Cooperation Between the United Nations and the Economic Community of West African States

From the immediate aftermath of independence in 1961, through the regimes of the Margai brothers, Siaka Stevens, Momoh and Kabbah, and the inter-regnum coups of Strasser and Bio, this process of recycling alliances continued, until it degenerated into general armed conflict in March 1991 when the RUF crossed over from Liberia and triggered the interventions. The situation in Sierra Leone into which ECOMOG, and later UNOMSIL and UNAMSIL were injected was extremely confused and volatile, characterized as it was by a civil war, a succession of coups, counter coups and attempted coups, in which many groups were contending for power without any particular regard for the legitimacy of their methods.

The consideration of the conflict in Sierra Leone by the UN and ECOWAS were initiated independently of each other. The first official act of the UN on the Sierra Leone situation was in 1995, when the UN secretary-general appointed Mr. Berhanu Dinka as his Special Representative to Sierra Leone, with instructions that he was to work with the OAU and ECOWAS to negotiate a settlement leading to the return of Sierra Leone to civilian life. By contrast, the initial deployment of Nigerian troops into Sierra Leone two years later was decided and justified on the basis of a bilateral self-defense treaty between Sierra Leone and Nigeria, and later with ECOWAS authorization. The objective of the deployment was to overturn a military coup and restore the elected government of Tejan Kabbah.

At the outset, however, there was a sense on the part of the UN that it would have to work together with ECOWAS in order to achieve its objectives in Sierra Leone. There were many instances in which cooperation between the two was evident. For instance, when the Security Council imposed an embargo and a travel ban on high officials of the Sierra Leone government, it authorized ECOWAS to enforce it. Similarly, under the Conakry Agreement, which was brokered by the ECOWAS Committee

of Five, the cease-fire was to be monitored by ECOMOG *and* UN observers, if the UN approved. Furthermore, when ECOMOG troops ousted AFRC/RUF elements from Freetown and returned Kabbah to Freetown, the Security Council terminated the oil embargo, and expanded the office of the Special Envoy to include UN military liaison officers and security advisory personnel.

In the resolution establishing UNOMSIL, the Security Council

commends the positive role of ECOWAS and ECOMOG in their efforts to restore peace, security and stability throughout the country at the request of the Government of Sierra Leone, and notes the role of ECOMOG in assisting the implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan adopted by the Government of Sierra Leone including the provision of security and responsibility for arms collection and destruction.⁴⁰

The Security Council's establishment of UNOMSIL was with the understanding that it would function under the protection of ECOMOG, and the first phase of UNOMSIL deployment was limited to ECOMOG-secured areas.

In addition to the cooperation between the UN and ECOWAS in the field, the UN secretary-general took the lead in dealing with one of the main problems facing both organizations. Right from the outset, both UN and ECOMOG operations were hamstrung by funding and troop shortages. Money was needed for the actual operations of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of combatants, and to stabilize the Kabbah regime after it was reinstated.⁴¹ Money was also needed for the deployment of the troops.

In response to this situation, the secretary-general devoted a great deal of effort to raising funds for both ECOMOG, and UNAMSIL. Among the many occasions on which he pleaded for funds and resources for both ECOWAS and UNAMSIL was his March 1998 request for US\$11.2 million to rehabilitate, disarm and demobilize combatants in Sierra Leone after the reinstatement of Kabbah, in order to stabilize the regime.⁴² In the aftermath of ECOMOG's expulsion of the junta, at the request of the Security Council,⁴³ the secretary-general established a trust fund for Sierra Leone. Donations to the trust fund were to be used to support ECOMOG logistic needs and rehabilitation activities in the country, including the DDR program.⁴⁴ On July 31, 1998, the secretary-general held a meeting with West African officials, Western diplomats and NGO representatives in an effort to raise funds for ECOMOG.⁴⁵ In spite of his efforts, both UNAMSIL and

ECOWAS were perpetually plagued by shortage of cash and donations to the Trust Fund were modest at best. In December 2000, the secretary-general reported that the Trust Fund had received contributions totaling \$2.2 million. By comparison, the total amount approved by the General Assembly for UNAMSIL was \$476.7 million for one year, and the unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNAMSIL were \$180 million.⁴⁶

Aside from the question of financing, the UN had difficulty in generating sufficient troop contributions from member-states. In September and October 2000, UNAMSIL suffered a serious blow when the Indian government and then the Jordanian government announced that they would be withdrawing their troop contributions at the end of their rotation. Replacement troops were eventually found, avoiding a serious setback to the mission.⁴⁷ In addition to the problems of maintaining the troops, the issue of casualties was also a serious concern for troop-contributing states. For instance, during the attacks on UN troops in summer 2000, some 233 Indian troops were captured at Kailahum. Although they were later freed by British troops, these events contributed to the decision of the Indian government to withdraw its troops from Sierra Leone.⁴⁸

Another cause of unwillingness of states to provide peacekeepers was dissatisfaction with some aspects of the mission and serious internal problems within UNAMSIL. For instance, on July 7, 2000, Russia announced that it was suspending the deployment of its troops to Sierra Leone until the Security Council had defined the mandates for the troops more specifically.⁴⁹ On July 15, 2000, Nigeria stated that it would send troops to Sierra Leone under the command of UNAMSIL only on three conditions: U.S. training and equipping of seven battalions of Nigerian troops, a change in the UNAMSIL mandate from peacekeeping to peace enforcement and a change in the UNAMSIL commander to a Nigerian officer.⁵⁰ Apart from the requirement that a Nigerian be named to the post of UNAMSIL commander, the other conditions were met and Nigeria was one of the most significant contributors of troops to UNAMSIL.⁵¹

As a result of these difficulties the secretary-general dispatched an assessment team to Sierra Leone to review UNAMSIL's situation, and consider how the operation could be made more effective.⁵² The assessment team found a number of serious problems with UNAMSIL.⁵³ The team's recommendations prompted changes within UNAMSIL, and on the basis of its report the secretary-general provided recommendations for changes in UNAMSIL's mandate. These recommendations, in part, contributed to the Security Council's expansion of the mandate in Resolution 1313, on August 4, 2000. By this resolution, the Security Council strengthened the mandate to

include, inter alia, patrolling the main access routes to the capital, assisting the government in extending its authority throughout the country and to “deter and where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile action or threat of imminent and direct use of force.”⁵⁴ The resolution also called for accelerated troop rotations, an increase in maritime and aviation assets, the strengthening of UNAMSIL reserves, the provision of special combat and logistical support, improved communications, a single chain of command and effective command control structures.

Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace Enforcement

As instruments of conflict management and resolution, the UN and ECOWAS used the strategies that are usually associated with international peace operations. These included peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Sometimes these methods were used sequentially, but more often they were used simultaneously. The first UN operation, UNOMSIL, was conceptualized as a peacekeeping operation with a mandate to monitor a cease-fire and supervise the disarmament, demobilization and reinterpretation of combatants. The initial mandate of ECOWAS was more ambiguous, leaving the possibility of mediation but emphasizing enforcement. However, throughout the conflict, the peacekeeping forces of both the UN and ECOWAS slid easily from one type of peace operation into another.

Peacekeeping

Unlike traditional peacekeeping, internal peacekeeping has evolved into the practice of policing of cease-fires, encampment of troops, disarmament and demobilization. In some cases, there are added responsibilities such as conducting elections, and the reestablishment of public order. The ability of peacekeeping forces to accomplish these functions depends on a number of factors. First, there has to be some peace to be kept. Specifically, rebel groups and fighters should indicate a willingness to stop fighting, establish a cease-fire and welcome the peacekeeping force.⁵⁵ In so far as mediation efforts do yield cease-fires, it is likely that such forces will be under attack from one or another faction within the territory, so that the force will easily slide into a posture of peace enforcement or become one of the parties to the conflict. A second factor is that in this internal peacekeeping, the forces do not stay along a border. Instead of the interposition of a small force along the border, as with traditional peacekeeping, the requirement in internal peacekeeping is to deploy forces throughout the country. Depending on the size of the area to be patrolled, this task can be enormous. This problem may be

compounded by such factors as the topography, vegetation and climatic conditions of the country.

Since the AFRC/RUF had already declared its determination to fight the ECOMOG and UN forces, the conditions for successful peacekeeping in the traditional sense did not exist, and the peacekeeping function of ECOMOG was dead on arrival. However, peacekeeping is essentially a temporary solution designed to hold the situation in place, pending a more permanent solution. Typically, both sides of the conflict attempt to use whatever means they can muster, including the manipulation of the peacekeeping forces, to improve or consolidate their position. Thus the eventual effectiveness of the peacekeeping force should not only be to freeze the situation, but to reduce the capacity of the factions to resume hostilities at the same or a higher level. ECOMOG and UNOMSIL/UNAMSIL forces were never able to accomplish this, because they became partisan combatants rather than impartial peacekeepers, thus inviting armed activity against them. ECOMOG and UNAMSIL were not only transformed into peace enforcement operations, but they also became two of the leading contestants for power, in the armed conflict. Their inability to control the situation was also due to the requirement for consent. UN forces forever had to ask the RUF for permission to deploy its forces, and the RUF often denied such access. This problem demonstrates the difficulties associated with the determination of the necessary force-levels for these operations, and the issues of communication, command and control posed by them.

Furthermore, both ECOMOG and UNOMSIL were always victims of insufficient force. The result is that both ECOMOG and UN forces were severely handicapped in terms of their ability to deploy. Not only were the forces seriously inadequate, but also, intelligence regarding the movements of the factions and assessment of logistical needs was severely compromised, and the command and control of forces became a huge problem. Under such circumstances, the troops could not function as a peacekeeping force. ECOMOG troops had to be withdrawn many times so as not to subject them to the superior forces of rebel troops. It was not until late 2001, when the parties committed themselves to peace, and troops were appropriately built up, that the UN could finally deploy forces in enough of the country to carry out the DDR functions of encampment and disarmament with some modicum of success.

Peacemaking

Peacemaking was clearly within the mandates of UNAMSIL and ECOMOG, and both organizations made several individual and joint attempts to mediate between the various combatants. The UN and ECOWAS

were involved in the achievement of the four major agreements relating to the conflict. Of these, only the last, the Abuja Accords, produced apparently sustainable results, and then only after military defeats brought the parties back to negotiations to reaffirm their commitment to an agreement made six months earlier. Successful mediation is contingent on four factors: (1) the issues(s) of contention in the conflict, (2) the identity of the parties, (3) the status, resources and skills of the mediator, and (4) the actual strategies used by the mediator in the conflict resolution process. In the Sierra Leone situation, the necessary conditions for successful mediation were absent. Taking each factor in turn, first, some conflicts are inherently more difficult to solve than others. For instance, conflicts over borders may be easier to resolve than conflicts over scarce water resources. Therefore the inherent manageability or intractability of a conflict will have an effect on how successful mediation of it might be. In this case, basic issues of struggle over power and resources are one of the most difficult to resolve.

Second, the difficulty in resolving a conflict may also depend on the parties involved and their perceptions of their relations with the other parties to the conflict. For instance even conflict over very scarce resources, which are usually very difficult, may be amenable to solution if the parties see each other as basically amicable, with other shared common interests, and with whom they have a long history of cooperation rather than conflict. The fact that the participants in the Sierra Leonian conflict have had a long history of mutual animosity did not make mediation any easier.

The third factor in the probability of success of mediation is the status of the mediator. Even under the most salutary conditions, it matters who the mediator of the conflict is, and what kinds of skills he or she brings to the negotiating table. A mediator performs three essential roles in the mediation process: communication, formulation and manipulation. A successful mediator should be able to keep channels of communication open to all parties to the conflict. He or she should know enough about the particular conflict in which they are engaged so as to be able to make creative proposals for the solution of the conflict. The mediator should also be able to convince and cajole them into accepting the proposed compromises.

Neither the UN nor ECOWAS presented any proposals that could help to resolve the conflict. In most of the negotiations, ECOWAS and the UN repeated the litany of requiring a cease-fire, encampment, disarmament, demobilization and elections. This is because the UN and ECOWAS failed to grasp the true nature of the conflict. The Lomé Accords suggest that the mediators believed that the worn formula of DDR and elections would resolve the issue. They then adopted a form of power-sharing in which the

RUF was effectively granted control over the exploitation of diamonds. Finally, they developed the notion that putting the compliance of the accords in the hands of “moral guarantors,” many of who came to power through military coups would bring peace. All this shows that the requirements of the role of mediators were beyond the capabilities of the mediators.

The UN and ECOWAS also failed to perform the fourth function of mediation successfully. This function requires the selling of solutions to the disputing parties. Successful mediation requires the ripening of the conflict. This ripening occurs when the parties realize that they cannot impose a unilateral solution on the dispute, and that any attempt to do so will result in either an interminable debilitating “plateau” or stalemate, or a catastrophic “precipice” leading to an abrupt decline in their fortunes.⁵⁶ In the absence of such a realization, it is the responsibility of the mediator to “encourage” them to this conclusion, through actions designed to block unilateral solutions. Due to the partisan actions of ECOMOG, ECOWAS was never able to perform this function.

The aspect of the internal nature of a conflict, which is the most difficult for mediators, is in the manipulation of the various parties into accepting the idea of ending the conflict by compromise. As indicated earlier, some of the blame for the diplomatic impasse should go to the UN and ECOWAS for their inability to create the conditions under which all the warring factions would be motivated to negotiate in good faith. In order to be able to perform these functions, the mediator has to have the trust and confidence of the parties to the dispute. ECOWAS was never able to obtain and maintain the trust of the factions. Not only did the UN and ECOWAS not have the ability to manipulate the factions into a perception of the advantage of cooperation over the bleak consequences of their attempts to win the war unilaterally, but their chosen strategies were obviously partisan. At the end, the Abuja Accords were primarily an agreement between the RUF and the Sierra Leone government. This confirms the idea that a negotiated settlement is most likely when the parties adopt the perception of the need to compromise in order to avoid a precipitous drop in their circumstance or an interminable catastrophic stalemate.

Peace Enforcement

The performance of the UN and ECOMOG troops in the realm of peace enforcement was plagued by failure. The reasons for this situation were largely due to the fact that they did not have the resources or the strategies to take effective action against the rebels. The conditions associated with success in enforcement action are: the existence of a leader willing and able to

take responsibility for the action, the quick and clear identification of the target of the proposed enforcement action and the ability to attack the target with superior force.⁵⁷

Leadership was not a problem for ECOWAS. From the beginning, it was clear that the operation was initiated by Nigeria, and was mostly paid for by Nigeria, at an average cost of US\$1 million a day, and manned almost entirely by Nigerian troops. Nigeria also took the lead role in the diplomatic activities associated with the various agreements. The effect of this situation was not entirely positive. First, the high-handed way in which Nigeria “led” the coalition undermined the ability of the coalition to develop a consensus on the identification of the target of the enforcement action, and what kind of negotiating stance ECOWAS should take in negotiations. It was not a secret that the president of the Cote d’Ivoire did not support the ECOMOG intervention. At one time during the operation Blaise Compaore, the president of the Côte d’Ivoire stated publicly that he supported the AFRC/RUF.

These disagreements were not limited to ECOWAS. There were disagreements between ECOWAS and the UN on numerous occasions regarding the relative roles of ECOMOG and UNAMSIL in field operations. There was also a major disagreement between Nigeria and the Secretariat with regard to the withdrawal of Nigerian/ECOMOG troops.⁵⁸ As discussed earlier, in July 2000, Nigeria offered to send troops under UNAMSIL command under certain conditions. One of the conditions was that UNAMSIL be put under the command of a Nigerian field commander, a condition not met by the UN. There was also a serious dispute between Nigerian forces serving in UNAMSIL and the Indian commander of UNAMSIL, General Jetley.⁵⁹ These problems had a significant effect on the ability of UNAMSIL and ECOMOG to work effectively in the field.

Another problem has to do with the difficulty in identifying the target of the enforcement. This is always a political decision, which has to be negotiated within the high political decision-making command of the organizations engaged in the intervention. In internal wars, the target is not at all certain. It is more likely that the target will change. One reason for these changes is political considerations among the members of the group involved in the intervention. Another reason for such changes is the tendency of the factions to try to use the enforcement mechanism to further its own objectives and to get it to fight on its side against other factions. In Sierra Leone, there does not seem to have been a problem regarding the identification of the RUF as the target of the enforcement action. However, the ambiguity of the situation led to vacillations between attempting to destroy the RUF on one occasion, and giving the top leadership senior positions in the government on another.

The most serious problem in internal enforcement action is the application of appropriate force to the target in order to get the right results. As noted earlier, the fact that the conflict is taking place within a country usually complicates the issues of the determination of necessary force-levels, intelligence, command and control of the force and strategies to be adopted in the conflict. Frequently, decisions are made with regard to force-levels that turn out to be inadequate as a result of less than adequate knowledge of the extent of the area to be patrolled, the strengths of the fighting forces and their movements. If the enforcement force has to fight several factions at one time, there are additional problems of availability of forces, and their terms of engagement. For instance, in many internal situations, movements of some factions may constantly surprise the peace operations force, so that strategic planning becomes extremely complicated by the need to react to these movements. The UN operation, in particular, suffered from difficulties relating to lower than required force levels, and constraints in armament and rules of engagement. This was especially evident in summer 2000 when large numbers of UN personnel were taken hostage.

Incompatibility of Strategies

As I have shown earlier, under conditions of internal conflict, each of the peace operations techniques require certain conditions in order to be effective. For peacekeeping, the requirement is the establishment of an armistice or truce, and the use of a force, which is neutral in composition and behavior to maintain the peace. For mediation, the requirement is the ability of the mediator to instill in the parties the notion that they cannot win by force, and therefore they should pursue a negotiated settlement. For enforcement, the requirement is to be able to mount a campaign against the target with a large enough force to be able to impose an agreement. As a result of the fluid nature of internal peace operations, there is the danger of attempting to use one or another technique at a time and place when the conditions for the success of these operations are nonexistent. For instance, as we have seen, there are conditions under which the chances of successful peacekeeping are relatively high. One such situation is when a peace agreement has already been established through mediation. However, this same situation is one of the conditions under which the chances of successful mediation are particularly problematic. This is due to the fact that under conditions of internal conflict, keeping the peace produces conditions of stalemate that creates the feeling on the part of the partisans that their conditions of success may be enhanced if they could regroup, so that a mediated compromise would not be necessary.

Furthermore, the nature of the agency of peacekeeping is not necessarily the same as the recommended nature of the agent of peacekeeping. For instance, peacekeeping requires that the force be neutral, while enforcement requires that the force be antagonistic to one side. Under such circumstances, an attempt by the same agency to carry out both peacekeeping and peace enforcement functions simultaneously is to doom both operations to failure. In Sierra Leone, ECOWAS was constantly caught in this situation. By virtue of its intervention in order to restore the Kabbah government to power, the rebels could not accept ECOMOG as an impartial peacemaker. As we have seen, this contributed to the failure of ECOWAS in all its mediation efforts. In turn, the failure of ECOWAS to make peace also doomed the peacekeeping functions of ECOMOG. As a result, ECOMOG quickly slid into a peace enforcement mode, only to return at a later stage to mediation and peacekeeping. Many observers have recommended that in peace operations, different techniques be assigned to distinctly different agents.

Conclusion

Advocates of the active participation of regional organizations in regional conflicts, in conjunction with the UN, base their views on the logic that this would lead to a sharing of responsibilities, the elimination of duplication of effort, the allocation of specific tasks to the cooperating partners and achievement of a division of labor that would generate efficiency through specialization. In order for this specialization to be effective, it is necessary to understand the comparative advantages of the partners. Unless tasks are assigned to organizations on the basis of what they do best, cooperative efforts are not likely to produce any successes.

For some time, top UN officials as well as scholars and researchers have advanced the idea of collaboration between the UN and regional organizations, so much so that it has acquired the character of gospel. However, there has been very little work on the issue of the capabilities of international organizations regarding the various aspects of conflict management and conflict resolution. In the past few years, however, there has been some development in research on the factors that are likely to enhance the probability of success in various operations. For instance, it has been shown that the strategies of peacekeeping, peacemaking and peace enforcement are more likely to succeed under certain circumstances, and that while some of these circumstances are embedded in the situation at hand, some of them can be based on attributes of the intervening organizations, and some of them can be manipulated by these organizations.

The UN and ECOWAS went into the Sierra Leone intervention with an ideological commitment to the idea of coordination. They made serious attempts to coordinate their efforts even though the objectives of the two organizations were established independently of each other. The initial mandates of the Special Representative of the secretary-general were framed in terms of peacemaking. Based on the orthodoxy that peacekeeping should be preceded by an armistice, the UN did not move to establish a peacekeeping force until the signing of the Lomé Agreement, at which point it authorized the formation of UNOMSIL. Consistent with that concept, the force was small, defensive and neutral, and its objective was to monitor compliance with the terms of the agreement and the DDR activities. Throughout this period, UNOMSIL was not able to guarantee its own security outside Freetown and a few other major cities, nor could it fulfill its mandate unless it was allowed to do so by the AFRC/RUF. Still, in spite of the pleadings of Kofi Annan, the successful examples of British intervention, and Executive Outcomes, the Security Council was reluctant to consider enforcement action to retrieve territory from the rebels. It was not until it became clear that ECOMOG troops would definitely be withdrawn from Sierra Leone, that the Security Council resolved to operationalize UNAMSIL as a fighting force, and even then its ability to use force was carefully circumscribed.

ECOMOG's initial deployment was designed to force the junta to restore Kabbah to the presidency. Thus it was primarily an enforcement action, with a small mediation function. However, its mediator role was immediately compromised by virtue of its defense of the Kabbah government, and later its role as the security wing of UNOMSIL. In this situation, ECOWAS/ECOMOG established a stalemate in which the RUF could not hold Freetown for long, and ECOMOG was left guarding Freetown.

Apart from the general commitment to cooperation, there does not seem to have been any prior consultation regarding the need for the intervention, the timing of it and general plan for dealing with the issue between the UN and ECOWAS. The two organizations seem to have had different objectives. As a result, they had different mandates for the field operators. Most important, there does not seem to be any sense of a division of labor, so that all the organizations were involved in the same activities. The result of this situation was that there was confusion as to what each partner should be doing. Sometimes, there was a duplication of functions, with members of both ECOWAS, and the UN, all engaged in peacemaking. At other times, opportunities in peace operations went by the board without any of the organizations taking note of them.

On a purely practical level, the idea that regional organizations should participate in conflict resolution is sensible. First, conflicts are regional by

definition. They may be intra-state, but as demonstrated in Sierra Leone, they are also regional. They are linked with the region in a variety of cross-border ethnic or religious identities and also connected with the region in cross-border behavior such as subversion, intervention, smuggling, arms trafficking. Therefore there is justification in the argument that regional conflicts have salience for these countries. Furthermore, these countries are likely to intervene on certain levels whether any one agrees or not. A good example of this phenomenon is the relations between Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea.

At the same time, the UN bears primary responsibility for international peace and security, and it cannot abdicate its responsibility in this regard indefinitely. Therefore, the idea of cooperation between the UN and regional organizations is sensible. The real problem is that such collaboration is not destined to produce salutary results. Such results may be benign. Whether or not they are will depend on the ability of the organizations to engage in the kind of division of labor that will permit them to use the different peace-keeping strategies that fit the conditions on the ground.

Notes

1. Benjamin Rivlin, "The United Nations and Regionalism in an Era of Globalization," in *Envisioning the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century*. Proceedings of the Inaugural Symposium on the United Nations System in the Twenty-First Century (Tokyo: United Nations University, 1997), pp. 137–150.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
4. For an account of the debate on the desirability and necessity of coordination of UN and regional organizations in peace operations, see Benjamin Rivlin, "Regional Arrangements and the UN System for Collective Security and Conflict Resolution: A New Road Ahead?" *International Relations*, vol. 11, no. 2 (August 1992), pp. 95–110. See also, Linda B. Miller, 1967, "Regional Organizations and the Regulation of Internal Conflict," *World Politics*, vol. 19, no. 4 (July), p. 78; Inis Claude, *Swords into Plowshares* (New York: Random House, 1984), p.115.
5. Neil S. MacFarlane and Thomas G. Weiss, "The UN, Regional Organizations and Human Security," *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 2, no. 1 (1998).
6. Yusuf Bangura, "Strategic Policy Failure and State Fragmentation: Security, Peacekeeping and Democratization in Sierra Leone," in Ricardo R. Laremont, ed., *The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa* (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2001), p. 136.
7. Abner Cohen, *The Politics of Elite Cultures: Explorations in the Dramaturgy of Power in Modern African Society* (Berkeley: University of California, 1981).
8. John W. Nunley, *Moving with the Face of the Devil: Art and Politics in Urban West Africa* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987).

9. For a discussion of the role of the Creoles in Sierra Leone society, see Cohen, *The Politics of Elite Culture*; J.R. Cartwright, *Political Leadership in Sierra Leone* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978); and Nunley, *Moving with the Face of the Devil*.
10. For more on the role of diamonds in Sierra Leone history and politics see John L. Hirsch, *Sierra Leone, Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), and Ian Smillie, Lansana Gberie and Ralph Hazleton, *The Heart of the Matter, Sierra Leone, Diamonds & Human Security* (Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada, January 2000).
11. There is some dispute as to the class and ethnic composition of the early RUF members. Most writers agree that, whatever their background, they have been a mixture of intellectuals and town lumpen who had gone into exile in the 1980s and acquired some training in Libya. See Ibrahim Abdullah, "Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary Front," *African Development*, vol. XXII, no. 3–4; Yusuf Bangura, "Strategic Policy Failure and State Fragmentation: Security, Peacekeeping and Democratization in Sierra Leone," in Laremont, *The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa*, pp. 143–169.
12. The kamajors are a form of citizen militia based in rural areas and developed in response to the inability of the government to maintain security. They later became the Civil Defence Force. See P.K. Muana "The Kamajoi Militia: Violence, Internal Displacement and the Politics of Counter-Insurgency," *African Development*, vol. 32, no. 3, 4 (1997).
13. The text of the agreement is available at the United States Institute for Peace website: http://www.usip.org/library/pa/index/pa_sierra_leone.html (last visited March 9, 2003).
14. *Janes Defence Weekly*, vol. 26, no. 24 (December 11), 1997.
15. Andrew Meldrum, "Annan and OAU Leaders Endorse Intervention Against 'Usurpers,'" *The Guardian*, June 3, 1997, p. 14; Howard W. French, "Nigeria, Set Back by Sierra Leone Rebels, Flies in More Troops," *New York Times*, June 3, 1997, p. A7.
16. The communiqué can be found at: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/ecowas062697.html> (last visited March 9, 2003).
17. ECOWAS, Twentieth Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government, "Decisions on Sanctions Against the Junta in Sierra Leone," Abuja, August 28–29, 1997, available at: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/ecowas082999.html> (last visited March 9, 2003).
18. S/1995/120, February 7, 1995.
19. S/1997/80, January 26, 1997.
20. S/PRST/1997/29, May 27, 1997.
21. S/PRST/1997/36, July 11, 1997.
22. S/PRST/1997/42, August 6, 1997.
23. Security Council Resolution 1132, October 8, 1997.

24. The text of the communiqué is available at the United States Institute of Peace website: http://www.usip.org/library/pa/sl/sierra_leone_08251997.html. The peace plan text is available at: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/conakryaccord.html> (last visited March 9, 2003).
25. The week previously, the Security Council voted to lift the arms embargo. Security Council Resolution 1171, June 5, 1998.
26. *The Economist*, January 16, 1996, p. 42.
27. *Ibid.*
28. The text of the agreement is available at the United States Institute of Peace website: http://www.usip.org/library/pa/index/pa_sierra_leone.html (last visited March 9, 2003).
29. Security Council Resolution 1260, August 20, 1999.
30. Security Council Resolution 1270, October 22, 1999.
31. S/2001/228, March 14, 2001, para. 58.
32. Security Council Resolution 1289, February 7, 2000.
33. Nigerian troops had sustained heavy losses in Sierra Leone and Nigerian involvement in ECOMOG's operations in Sierra Leone was increasingly unpopular at home and the issue had been a major topic of discussion in the 1999 Nigerian elections.
34. For reports of the situation at this time see, Blaine Harden, "Sierra Leone Insurgents Kill 7 in U.N. Force and Capture 49," *New York Times*, May 4, 2000, pp. A1, A6; Christopher S. Wren, "U.N. Says Sierra Leone Rebels Now Hold 92 Peacekeepers," *New York Times*, May 5, 2000, p. A14; Norimitsu Onishi, "Fighting Resumes Near the Capital of Sierra Leone," *New York Times*, May 8, 2000, pp. A1, A10; Blaine Harden and Christopher S. Wren, "U.S. Plans to Help Airlift U.N. Forces into Sierra Leone," *New York Times*, May 9, 2000, pp. A1, A6.
35. *Jane's Intelligence Reports*, vol. 12, no. 4 (April 2000).
36. British troops later also became involved in retraining security forces in the country.
37. Security Council Resolution 1299, May 19, 2001.
38. RUF leader Foday Sankoh was the head of the commission that was charged with issuing licenses for mining, *The Mining Journal*, January 28, 2000, p. 55.
39. See, e.g., Danna Harman, "In Sierra Leone, Rebels Slowly Trade in Kalashnikovs," *Christian Science Monitor*, November 7, 2001. "Fighters 'Disarmed' in Sierra Leone," *BBC News* online, January 6, 2002. Clarence Roy-Macaulay, "Sierra Leone Government, Rebels Declare End to 10-Year War, Burn Thousands of Weapons," *Boston Globe*, January 18, 2002.
40. Security Council Resolution 1181, June 13, 1998.
41. *Jane's Defense Weekly*, vol. 29, no. 11 (March 18, 1998).
42. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
43. S/PRST/1998/5, February 26, 1998.
44. S/1998/249, March 18, 1998.
45. *The Economist*, August 8, 1998, p. 40.

46. S/2000/1199, December 15, 2000.
47. "UN Finds More Troops for Sierra Leone Force," *Financial Times*, October 20, 2000.
48. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 34, no. 2 (July 12, 2000). Douglas Farah, "UN Rescues Hostages in Sierra Leone," *Guardian Weekly*, July 20–26, 2000.
49. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 34, no. 3 (July 19, 2000).
50. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 34, no. 4 (July 26, 2000).
51. For example, as of December 2000, Nigeria was the leading troop contributor, providing 3,294 of a total 12,455 UNAMSIL troops. S/2000/1199, December 15, 2000.
52. The assessment team was led by a former assistant secretary-general, Manfred Eisele and was in Sierra Leone from June 2–8, 2000.
53. S/2000/751, July 31, 2000, para. 54.
54. Security Council Resolution 1313, August 4, 2000.
55. For a discussion of the conditions for successful peacekeeping, see Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 266. See also Paul Diehl, "The Conditions for Success on Peacekeeping Operations," in Paul Diehl, ed., *The Politics of International Organizations: Patterns and Insights* (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1989), pp. 173–188.
56. I am indebted to William Zartman for this idea. See William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). For other analyses of mediation in ethnic situations see Timothy Sisk, *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1996). Dale Spencer and William Spencer "Third Party Mediation and Conflict Transformation: Experiences of Ethiopia, Sudan and Liberia," in Kumar Rupesinghe, *Conflict Transformation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995). Jacob Bercovitch and Allison Houston "The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence," in Jacob Bercovitch ed., *Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and Practice of Mediation* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).
57. Inis Claude, *Swords into Ploughshares* (New York: Random House, 1984), p. 252.
58. *Jane's Defence Weekly*, vol. 33, no. 2 (January 12, 2000).
59. General Jetley accused his Nigerian deputy and other Nigerian forces of cooperating with the RUF and of working to perpetuate the conflict because they were personally profiting from diamond mining under RUF control. The Guardian reprinted part of the internal UN memo in which General Jetley makes these accusations. See, Ewen MacAskill, "UN Gets Warning Shot on Peacekeeping: Huge Corruption in Sierra Leone Shows the Need for Rapid Reform," *The Guardian*, September 9, 2000, p. 16. Also see, "Internal Disputes Mar UN Mission," *Washington Post*, September 10, 2000. It was also generally believed that one of the reasons for the RUF attack of Freetown in January 1999 was due to the fact that senior Nigerian officers gave misinformation to General Jetley as a result of the tension.

CHAPTER 6

The Ethiopia–Eritrea War

Leenco Lata

Introduction

The multiplicity of its proximate and distant historical causes, coupled with its diverse forms of manifestation, makes fitting the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict into neat conventional categories a very challenging undertaking. Analyzing and adopting policies and measures that would achieve its resolution, however, demands a prior ability to fit the conflict into known categories. Conflicts are commonly believed to fit into either the interstate (international) or the intra-state (domestic) categories. The latter is further divided into intercommunal or interethnic and intra-communal or intra-ethnic. The main argument of this chapter is that the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict defies attempts to fit it neatly into just one of these types. Intervention by the UN and its allied regional bodies hence will succeed in achieving sustainable peace between and within these two entities only to the extent that all the diverse forms of manifestation of the conflict are understood and addressed.

Picking the most pivotal cause from among the array of stipulated causes of the Eritrea–Ethiopia conflict proves just as challenging. Border dispute, economic issues, the divergence of the ideologies of the groups ruling the two entities, differing visions and nature of state types, the contrast between democracy in one state and authoritarianism in the other, are all offered as some of the causes. But which one (or ones) is decisive, the resolution of which would pave the way for addressing all others? Here again intervention will succeed to the extent that the ultimate underlying cause or causes is uncovered and addressed.

There is yet another source of complication. The people currently ruling both Ethiopia and Eritrea began their political careers by denouncing the Western powers as imperialists. The extent to which this ideological thinking continues to linger and to influence their behavior as state leaders cannot be definitively determined. There are indications of its survival at least among the rulers of Ethiopia. Furthermore, these leaders lack confidence in international organizations such as the UN and the OAU due to a number of historical reasons. These sentiments must be taken into account when trying to assess the long-range effectiveness of intervention by the UN and the OAU, as well as the United States and the EU.

A few general remarks about Ethiopia, Eritrea and the rulers of the two neighboring states is in order before proceeding any further. Ethiopia's Soviet-style federal system (instituted in 1995) supposedly affords its more than 70 nations and nationalities (called ethnic groups by others) the right of self-government. The leaders of the Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF), coming from the minority Tigrean nation (7 percent of Ethiopia's population of close to 60 million), have been dominating the country since 1991 by controlling the surrogate fronts that they created for other groups. Nine officially recognized nationalities make up Eritrea's population of 3.5–4 million. The leaders of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF), renamed as the People's Front for Democracy and Justice in 1994, dominate Eritrea's highly centralized unitary government. The EPLF's most powerful leaders belong to the Tigrinya-speaking Eritrean highlanders who, to outsiders, are indistinguishable from the neighboring Tigreans of northern Ethiopia.

The outbreak of hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998, is almost unanimously described as bewildering. War between two of the world's most impoverished countries was described as "incomprehensible" by a writer in *The Economist*.¹ Another reporter stated, "absolutely no one imagined it could happen."² Surprisingly these are the views of even the protagonists. Asked how the conflict came about, the Eritrean president, Isaias Afewerki, responded, "It is very difficult to easily find an answer." His Ethiopian counterpart, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, said "I was surprised, shocked, puzzled" by the incident.³ In the view of the Kenyan foreign minister, Bonaya Godana, "the two countries have gotten into a situation which . . . none of them really wanted to get into."⁴ Evidently, some force beyond the control of the two sides pushed them suddenly and inexplicably into a situation of war. Such an assessment becomes even more astonishing for two reasons. First, the officials now ruling the warring countries attained maturity adhering to a doctrine of Marxist historical materialism, according

to which the course and ultimate goal of historical development are determined strictly by organized deliberate human action. Second, it is hard to ponder how groups who have been routinely called “control freaks”⁵ could be impelled to go to war under the influence of factors beyond their control.

These two leaders, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia and President Isaias Afewerki of Eritrea, had once joined forces to pull off spectacular and unprecedented history-making exercises. They collaborated in defeating Black Africa’s largest and best-equipped armed forces, those of the Mengistu regime, in 1991. They went on to bring about Eritrea’s separation from the rest of Ethiopia amicably and systematically, an event without precedent in Africa’s postcolonial history. They collaborated in restructuring the rump Ethiopian State along totally unconventional lines. This too was pulled off with minimum disorder. In the process, they qualified as pioneers of African renaissance in the eyes of Western powers who solicited their wisdom and intervention in effecting changes as far away as Rwanda and the Congo. The dissonance between what they appeared to be and what they turned out to be brings to the fore fundamental philosophical questions. Are these shakers and makers of history themselves merely the hapless agents of history? Is the conflict in which they find themselves the product of their deliberate choice in their continuous history-making project or vice versa? These questions are our entry point for looking at the causes and manifestations of this conflict. The chapter has two main sections. The first section deals with the background to the conflict, and the second discusses the role of the UN and the OAU, now the AU. The conclusion then builds on this analysis to argue that the nature of the two organizations has led them to focus on territorial border issues at the expense of addressing the fundamental causes of the conflict.

Background

Whose Conflict?

Now that these two former comrades-in-arms are at loggerheads, scholars have come forward to posit the distant and recent historical sources of the conflict. Richard Trivelli, believes that uncovering the root causes of the present conflict requires some understanding of “the dynamics of the relationship between the Tigrinya speaking people of the Eritrean highlands (Kebesa) and Tigray,⁶ and the former guerrilla movements dominated by them and currently governing Eritrea and Ethiopia.”⁷ How the relationship between the two Tigrinya-speaking communities evolved through the centuries fits into the distant historical category, which will be discussed next. This will be

followed by a similar review of the history of relations between the two guerrilla movements spawned by these societies.

Looking at the similarities and dissimilarities of the Kebesa and Tigray communities is germane because of the way this conflict is often understood. Although the war is officially between Eritrea and Ethiopia, “The people who are fighting each other should not be viewed as all of Ethiopia against all of Eritrea . . . It’s really Tigrayans and Eritreans going at each other.”⁸ Surprisingly, prominent Tigreans and Eritreans concur with this view. Ghebru Assrat, a TPLF Politburo member, is certain that “only Tigray and not the whole of Ethiopia” is being targeted by the Eritreans.⁹ And the Eritrean, Alemseged Tesfai, asserts that the war is due to Tigrean ambition to occupy the whole or parts of Eritrea “not for Ethiopia as a whole . . . but . . . to enhance the interests of Tigray.”¹⁰ Hence, the war, in essence, is between the Tigreans who dominate Ethiopia and the rulers of Eritrea, and emanates from their conflicting interests and aspirations. Patrick Gilkes’s assertion that the leaders of both Eritrea and Tigray “come from the same Tigrean ethnic group”¹¹ would thus make it tempting to situate their dispute in the intra-ethnic category of conflicts.

Trivelli’s analysis of the evolution of relations between the Kebesa and Tigray peoples depicts a different picture. He identifies three distinct stages of identity change by reviewing these two communities’ history of association and disassociation. First, until the eighteenth century, these two communities “maintained a strong feeling of being Ethiopian (Habesha) and, within this Habesha culture, of forming a distinct group different from the Amhara.”¹² Second, developments between that time and the late stage of Italian colonialism in Eritrea created a sentiment in which “the ‘Eritreanness’ or Eritrean identity of the modern strata of Kebesa society manifested itself not as an identity distinct from the Habesha or Ethiopian identity, but rather as a distinct sub-category within the wider Habesha identity which was opposed to the other Habesha sub-category ‘Tigray.’”¹³ Trivelli’s inference that the Tigrinya speakers had evolved into two distinct groups by the late phase of Italian rule makes classifying conflict between them as interethnic quite tempting. Trivelli’s thesis regarding the differentiation of the Kebesa and Tigray identities, however, is questionable for a number of reasons. The 1950s Eritrean aspiration of uniting with the Tigray region to create a greater independent Eritrea, in particular, contravenes his conclusion.

The third stage of identity differentiation that, he believes, soon eclipsed this one would tend to imbue the conflict with an inter-“national” character. Trivelli argues that this change of identity came about during the slow rise of Kebesa nationalism, in the form of Eritrean nationalism, starting in

the 1960s. The self-identification that once distinguished Eritrean Habesha from Tigray (Amhara) Habesha was gradually replaced by one that opposed Eritrean identity to an Ethiopian one.¹⁴

Tigrean academic, Alemseged Abbay, denies that this identity transformation has been effected. He argues that the ordinary folk of the Kebesa still continue to identify more with Tigreans than with the other peoples of Eritrea, just as ordinary Tigreans feel closer to the Kebesa people than to their fellow Ethiopian Amharas, Muslims or the Nilotic Kunamas. It is the post-victory Eritrean political actors' ambition to create Eritreans and nurture Eritrean-ness that is driving "self-definition and boundary delimitation" and which in particular is necessitating "marking the boundary with Tigray."¹⁵ Abbay enumerates policy decisions taken by Eritrean leaders to promote this disassociation with Tigray.¹⁶ One of the measures that he mentions, playing up the history of "conflict of any nature with the Tigrayans,"¹⁷ is relevant to the issue at hand. If one accepts Abbay's views, the Eritrean political actors' efforts to install an identity boundary were just starting when the war concerning the geographical border broke out. Hence, identity differentiation was not a factor that caused the war but it could very well become its end result. Ruth Iyob echoes this stand when she states that the conflict highlighted "unresolved key issues of territorial demarcations (boundaries) and political demarcations (identity or citizenship)."¹⁸ Hence, scholars from diverse backgrounds agree that the process of identity change was still inconclusive when the conflict erupted. Whether one of war's end results should be making territorial and identity boundaries coterminous is a matter that raises fundamental practical and ethical questions.

As the two warring states are ruled by forces that emerged from the ranks of the Tigrinya speakers of Eritrea and Ethiopia, war between them inevitably takes on an interstate character. The UN and other interstate bodies in particular find it cumbersome to approach and treat the conflict in any other way. However, there is a widespread opinion especially in Ethiopia that runs contrary to this stand. To the opponents of Eritrea's independence, this war is strictly an intra-state affair. Hence, for them the conflict will conclude only when Ethiopia's "traditional" borders are restored, not in the contested locality of Badme but at the Red Sea Coast. Therefore, they consider settlement of the present conflict through border delimitation illegitimate and a waste of time. Even those Tigrean rulers of Ethiopia who may go along with the dispute's designation as interstate would reject equating it with "international" due to their peculiar definition of the term *nation*. We now turn our attention to this and a discussion of the two movements spawned by Eritrean and Tigrean societies.

Similar and Dissimilar Movements

Eritrean nationalist thinking was inevitably influenced by the notion prevailing throughout the world in the early 1960s concerning self-determination. Self-determination then was universally understood to have “only the function of bringing independence to people under alien colonial rule.”¹⁹ In addition, “the peoples so entitled (i.e. to independence) are defined in terms of the existing colonial territories, each of which contains *a nation*.”²⁰ Other notions of “nation” or “self-determination” were stigmatized, particularly in Africa, after the disastrous Biafran attempt to secede from Nigeria. All Eritrean factions, therefore, distinguished their invocation of self-determination from other cases in the rest of Ethiopia. Italian colonial rule was used as the legitimating factor for Eritrea’s entitlement to independent nationhood while “secessionism” was said to apply strictly to other cases of self-determination’s invocation in Ethiopia. In the event, the Eritrean attempt to absolve themselves from the accusation of secession by arguing that “Eritrea is no Biafra” since its “borders were fixed and its national identity defined by colonial history, like the rest of colonial Africa,”²¹ persuaded very few.

While Eritrean militants were busy invoking the then orthodox version of nationhood and self-determination, a different trend was emerging in the rest of Ethiopia. Finding a striking similarity between feudal Ethiopia and Czarist Russia, Bolshevik-wannabe Ethiopian student radicals started adopting Lenin’s policy on self-determination and Stalin’s definition of nation. They ended up embracing two central themes in Lenin’s approach to self-determination. First, struggles for self-determination are deemed legitimate only in so far as they are conducted under the leadership of a proletarian vanguard party. Second, the vanguard party should champion the right to self-determination in a manner that will avert state disintegration. In addition, Stalin’s definition of the nation as “a historically evolved, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested in a community of culture”²² was embraced. As a result, entities commonly called tribes in Africa, or ethnic groups elsewhere, were designated as nations or nationalities in the Ethiopian leftist parlance.

From this period on, movements that started appearing on the Ethiopian political scene, including the TPLF, invoked this definition of the term nation and Lenin’s approach to the principle of self-determination. This was also the time when a large number of Eritrean Kebesa educated youth were joining the Eritrean liberation movement. This period contrasted with the previous decade during which the movement drew its recruits primarily from the predominantly Moslem lowlands. Coupled with the introduction of Marxism–Leninism by the student radicals, this demographic change had

important implications. Younger and more radical elements took control of the original liberation front, the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), by deposing its traditionalist leadership. The change of leadership alone, however, proved insufficient to reassure a Kebesa-centered faction (led by Isaias Afewerki) that harbored serious grievances regarding the treatment of recruits from its region. These Christian recruits had been alienated by the earlier ELF leadership's articulation of Eritrea's cause as an Islamic struggle against Christian Ethiopia. Under the prevailing mood, they were often looked upon as potential agents of the Ethiopian regime. The resulting schism eventually culminated in the emergence, in 1970, of several factions called Popular Liberation Forces which merged in September 1973 to herald the birth of the EPLF. Although the two splinter groups, the ELF and the EPLF (and their various Ethiopian allies) both professed Marxism–Leninism, fostering a sustainable alliance between them proved unattainable.

To outsiders, the EPLF and the TPLF appeared indistinguishable during the 1970s and most of the 1980s, for they had more in common than with any other groups. Nonetheless the groups had some significant differences and during these two decades their relationship was often tempestuous.²³

Cooperation was resumed only in 1988, at a time when the possibility of defeating the Derg regime looked more promising than at any previous time. It was to take advantage of the regime's deteriorating situation that the two fronts decided to put their differences aside and to resume joint military activities.

The main political problems that led to periods of discord and suspicion were divergent definitions of the term *nation*, differing premises regarding levels of entitlement to self-determination and the relevance of the colonial experience in determining these two issues. EPLF leaders argued that the history of Italian colonial rule automatically qualified Eritrea as a single nation entitled to independence. Hence, Eritrea's case was described as a "colonial question" to be settled only by the achievement of independence. All other cases, however, were designated as "national questions" to be resolved in a manner that preserves the unity of the rest of Ethiopia.

The TPLF's adherence to Stalin's definition of the term *nation* led to the earliest incident of discord with the EPLF. The TPLF's initial manifesto of 1976 advocated the independence of a Greater Tigray nation, which, consistent with Stalin's definition, embraced the Tigrinya-speaking peoples of Tigray and highland Eritrea. Its implication for Eritrea's integrity was obviously disturbing to the EPLF, leading to a cooling of relations. An alliance between the two fronts was restored in 1979 when the TPLF re-designated

the Tigrayan question as a “national question.” Friendship and cooperation lasted until 1983 when relations were soured once again. At this stage, the TPLF introduced another controversy when it began blurring “the distinction between the colonial and the national question”²⁴ by arguing that referenda are the only legitimate resolution for both cases of self-determination. The only time a compromise of sorts led to the resumption of cooperation between the two Fronts occurred after the defeat of the Derg regime in 1991. The TPLF then openly endorsed Eritrea’s independence while EPLF leaders declared the postponement of their *de jure* independence until after a referendum two years later. However, private musings by TPLF leaders, and some of their one-sided policies toward Eritrea, indicate their expectation that this independence would be either temporary or would at least be subordinated to the two groups’ long-range joint economic and security interests. We will return to this crucial issue later on.

The TPLF’s exploitation of the territorial dispute as a pretext for attacking its other erstwhile Eritrean ally, the ELF, is informative and relevant in view of what happened later. The ELF was administering Badme and its environs when it first entered into an alliance with the TPLF. The fledgling TPLF in fact welcomed the extension of ELF operations into large parts of western Tigray during this period (about 1975–1977), because it was eager to gain combat experience by participating in joint actions.²⁵ But when relations turned sour, primarily due to other disputes,²⁶ the TPLF not only staked claim to Badme and its environs but also took unilateral measures to uproot ELF structures and to expel Eritrean peasants. The resulting rancor was endlessly and stridently aired, and steadily intensified as a rationale for TPLF siding with the EPLF in a final showdown that resulted in the ELF’s expulsion from Eritrea. The efficacy and simplicity of harping on the emotive issue of the border dispute to rationalize going to war to settle some other agenda had thus been added to TPLF’s increasing repertoire of political machinations. The TPLF continued to administer the said area thereafter until May 1998. Despite the seesawing of relations during this entire period, surprisingly, the EPLF never publicly demanded the repossession of a territory that colonial treaties place within Eritrea. So the initial exchange of gunfire that triggered the May 1998 incident did not take place at Badme *per se* but deeper inside Eritrea proper, as we will elaborate later on.

The Stipulated Causes of the Conflict

As the preceding discussion demonstrates, typifying the war that broke out between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998 as inter- or intra-ethnic, inter- or intra-state, inter- or intra-national depends on the perspective of

the designator. Coming during the first decade of Eritrea's separation, marked by the fluidity of its political and communal identity, and due to conflicting expectations, the conflict can perhaps best be described as an interstate war that is strikingly similar to intra-state conflict.²⁷

The border dispute as the cause of the Ethiopia–Eritrea war deserves more attention, as that is how the resolution of the conflict is being approached. Many, in fact, prefer to reduce the cause of the war to this single issue. For example, for Paul Henze, the Eritrea–Ethiopia war happened simply because Eritrea invaded Ethiopia.²⁸ By contrast, Patrick Gilkes argues, “the conflict has really little to do with territory.”²⁹ U.S. diplomats concur with this view by asserting, “the dispute between Ethiopia and Eritrea involves a longer background than a simple border dispute.”³⁰ Despite repeatedly agreeing with these opinions, the protagonists have found that presenting the border dispute as the ultimate cause of the conflict is convenient in their litigation at international forums. Empirical data, in fact, support those who dismiss the territorial dispute as the ultimate and sole cause of the war. By analyzing incidents over a 40-year period (1950–1990), Birger Heldt concludes “that a territorial dispute is a virtually necessary—but not sufficient—condition for interstate war.”³¹ And in the views of another authority territorial disputes are not so much a source of war as an excuse.³²

Hence, dealing with the excuse while leaving the underlying causes unaddressed does not augur well for sustainable peace between and within Eritrea and Ethiopia. The initial exchange of gunfire that triggered the war has to be seen in conjunction with two other matters in order to make some sense. These are, first, the concerned regimes' divergent expectations regarding Eritrea's future and second, how this impacted on their economic relations.

Two assumptions may have influenced the way Eritrean leaders conceptualized their new state's future. First, they fought harder and longer than any other movement. And their victory resulted not only in the attainment of their “independence” and sovereignty, intact and unconditionally³³ but also in the installation of a new regime in the Ethiopian capital. Second, they have always considered the attainment of independence as the highest form of self-determination. Their expectation regarding what should follow their hard-fought achievement of independence impacts on all aspects of their internal policy and external relations. It is possible that they expected a relatively higher level and faster pace of economic and social advancement to naturally follow the attainment of independence. In addition, convinced that “the natural history of the people of Eritrea was interrupted by colonialism,”³⁴ they anticipated completing the process of national integration by performing “miracles in peaceful nation-building”³⁵ perhaps to attain

a national unity stronger than at any previous time. Asserting that “[u]nless peace, justice and prosperity prevail in Eritrea, the independence we won with heavy sacrifices will be meaningless,”³⁶ they defined “building an independent and modern Eritrea”³⁷ that should “find itself among the developed countries”³⁸ as their new mission. All of this is laudable and would not have mattered if it were not countered by different expectations on the part of those ruling Ethiopia.

My own discussions with Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles in 1992, lead me to partly concur with Alemseged Tesfai’s assertion that the Ethiopian rulers’ preference was “to see, not an independent Eritrea, but one linked to Ethiopia in a federal arrangement.”³⁹ The prime minister offhandedly informed me of his expectation that Eritrea will imminently rejoin Ethiopia, although the form of such a link was not put as explicitly. The divergence of the two groups’ expectations regarding Eritrea’s future relations with Ethiopia generated equally divergent views concerning the political, military and economic policies they pursued once in power. Discussing the economic aspect of this situation is much more informative.

Eritrea and Ethiopia concluded a series of agreements in 1993, of which, one dealt with economic relations. In the views of Alemseged Tesfai, this agreement was mutually advantageous to both parties if it did not in fact favor Ethiopia. Discussing Ethiopian allegations of Eritrean abuse of the common currency, he states, “How a country that uses someone else’s currency can be deemed an exploiter is yet to be convincingly explained.”⁴⁰ The Eritrean practice of manipulating the exchange rate to amass hard currency is, however, attested to by many, including Trivelli, who writes that the Eritrean government “openly violated the spirit of the currency union by pursuing its own policy in regard to exchange rates of hard currency within Eritrea.”⁴¹ Tesfai does admit that conditions were much more congenial for Eritrean investments in Ethiopia than the other way around although he attributes this to the divergence of the two countries’ citizenship laws.⁴² Other economic arrangements also favored Eritrea. Ethiopia’s decision to turn over 30 percent of the Assab refinery’s output to Eritrea gave them a source of hard-currency savings, and favored Eritrea more than Ethiopia.⁴³ What is most important, however, are the perceptions of the two sides as to the Ethiopian government’s motivation in entering into economic arrangements that many would testify favored Eritrea.

I find Trivelli’s explanation of the Ethiopian side’s motivation quite plausible: “The TPLF leadership . . . hoped that the benefits of the economic privileges given to Eritrea and Eritreans would ultimately induce or even force the Eritrean leadership to re-enter into some form of political union

with Ethiopia.”⁴⁴ Other policies that TPLF leaders were pursuing during this time show an attempt to send one clear signal to the Eritreans. They were attempting to portray Eritrean/Tigrean relations as being more intimate than those with their “fellow Ethiopians.” Arming Eritreans residing in Ethiopia while simultaneously disarming Ethiopian nationals is perhaps the most prominent of these signals.⁴⁵ Even Eritrean sources assert that support by Eritreans residing in Ethiopia played a critical role in enabling the TPLF to prevail over its internal challengers.⁴⁶ It is hard to determine what the Eritrean leaders thought of TPLF motivation in pursuing economic and security policies that favored Eritrea and Eritreans. We can only surmise that they might have considered it a reward for their role in putting the TPLF in power in Ethiopia.

We thus can see two starkly contrasting visions placing the two sides on a collision course. The TPLF and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi seem to have adopted the plan of enticing Eritrea back into some form of linkage with Ethiopia, which would have derogated from Eritrea’s bona fide independence. The Eritrean leaders’ most cherished aspiration, on the other hand, was to consolidate Eritrean independence and national unity and turn Eritrea into a modern and prosperous nation. Nothing bears better witness to the existence of two parallel visions than the diverging perception of the respective leaders of the economic role of Tigray and Eritrea.

Alemseged Tesfai states, “The Ethiopian strategy (i.e. economic), as officially expounded, was based on the development of its agricultural potential and the building up of a chiefly agriculture-related industry.”⁴⁷ On the other hand, “Eritrea had adopted an outward looking, export and free market-oriented strategy.” Those who observed the way the economic roles of the two entities (Ethiopia and Eritrea) were being conceptualized in Asmara concluded, “the EPLF’s economic policy aimed for Eritrea to serve as the industrial centre to an Ethiopian hinterland that would provide raw materials and serve as a market for its finished goods.”⁴⁸ The issue becomes more complicated because TPLF leaders aspired to create an identical relationship between Tigray and the rest of Ethiopia. They started working to turn Tigray into “an export-oriented enclave,” in a total departure from the agriculture-related tasks they assigned to other regions of Ethiopia. Hence, it is the economic roles assumed by Eritrea and Tigray in relation to the rest of Ethiopia that became the underlying cause of the tension. Either Eritrea and Tigray would merge and develop their industrialized economies with the rest of Ethiopia serving as a common hinterland or the resulting competition would have made indefinite tension between them inevitable.

The sudden upsurge of the Tigray region's economy by itself would have had significant repercussions for Eritrea and the rest of Ethiopia. And Tigray's economic and social change is nothing but spectacular. An international airport, a university, the mushrooming of schools and clinics, the erection of numerous industrial establishments became a reality in Tigray almost overnight. The social implication of the steep rise in construction and other economic activities is dramatic. Tigray, traditionally an exporter of unskilled labor, particularly to Eritrea, entered a new phase when it became an importer. The daily wages of unskilled construction workers in Mekelle rose to eight Birr by mid-1990s, "double that received in Bahr Dar, capital of neighboring and *wealthier* Amhara."⁴⁹ People in the rest of Ethiopia, of course, harbored envy about this dramatic change and grumbled that they lacked the wherewithal to do something about it. More directly relevant for the topic under discussion is the impact of this on Eritrean thinking. Tigray demonstrated that remaining within Ethiopia by manipulating "self-determination" as a policy of domination could be a means for effecting social and economic development at a higher level than the one expected to follow independence in Eritrea. The wisdom of insisting on independence as the only reliable precursor to a relatively higher level of prosperity was thus demonstrated to be at least questionable.

Irony abounds in this whole drama. The Eritreans were in a better position to take central power in Ethiopia in 1991, perhaps with the Tigreans and other forces serving as their junior partners. Western powers were in fact urging them to do so, according to rumors circulating in 1990. They could not because of proximate and distant historical reasons. First, any moves that they might have made in such a direction would have revived the memory of the divisive politics of the 1950s. Second, EPLF leaders had become hostages of their decades-long rhetoric that portrayed independence as the most coveted and ideal outcome of liberation struggles. And third, going back on the tacit promise that only the EPLF could be trusted in bringing about Eritrea's independence would have also conflicted with their decades-long rhetoric. Hence, they had to settle for ruling over less than one-seventeenth of the population in whose liberation they played the leading role.

Things would not have been as complicated had the Ethiopian government that presided over Eritrea's separation been one led by people from non-Tigrinya-speaking background. In the event, Tigrinya-speaking cousins (literally) were forced to declare each other as "foreigners" while pretending to have closer associations with other societies with whom, in reality, they had much less in common. Nothing more dramatically demonstrates the absurdity of this situation than what happened during the July 1991

Addis Ababa Conference. Meles Zenawi, the chairman of the Conference and president of the country from which Eritrea was seeking separation, served as Isaias Afewerki's interpreter when the latter presented Eritrea's case in Tigrinya. This was not a case of begrudgingly accepting an externally imposed division of a community, as elsewhere in Africa, but deliberately reimposing it without involving the affected societies in open discussions about its short- and long-term implications. Such deliberation would have perhaps restricted such a division to the juridical sphere while leaving other intra-communal relations relatively unaffected. In the absence of this assessment of options and scenarios, the innate nature of the state buttressed with the notion of nation building was bound to necessitate the rendering of identity and state boundaries as coterminous. As a result, accentuating the history of differences and exacerbating petty squabbles into outright hostilities became inevitable.

Starting from a Deadlock

One thing became self-evident within days of hostilities breaking out between Eritrea and Ethiopia. Nothing short of the use of massive force was bound to change the positions assumed by the protagonists. The outbreak of hostilities was instigated by an exchange of gunfire on May 6, 1998 somewhere in the vicinity of a locality called Badme. The treaty of 1902 defined the border in this general area. The relevant article of the treaty reads as follows.

Commencing from the junction of the Khor Um Hagar with the Setit, the new frontier follows this river to its junction with the Maieteb, following the latter's course so as to leave Mount Ala Tacura to Eritrea, and joins the Mareb at its junction with the Mai Ambessa. The line from the junction of the Setit and Maieteb to the junction of the Mareb and Mai Ambessa shall be delimited by Italian and Ethiopian delegates, so that the Canama (Kunama) tribe belong to Eritrea.⁵⁰

Although the proposed delimitation was never carried out, the line connecting the Setit/Maieteb and Mareb/Mai Ambessa junctions started appearing as a straight line on all subsequent maps. (Negash and Tronvoll believe that the straight line is due to Italian manipulation.)⁵¹ What is the location of Badme in relation to this line? And where exactly did the incident of May 6, 1998 take place also in relation to this imaginary line? According to sketches provided by the Eritreans, Badme is located slightly to the northwest of this line. That it had been under Tigrean administration since the early 1980s was never contested by the Eritreans, and evidently was not the issue

that led to the May 6 incident. According to the Eritreans, the initial exchange of gunfire occurred at a location that was newly designated as part of the Tigray region. However, the Eritrean push of May 12, 1998 evidently did not stop at just reversing the alleged new designation of the border but went as far as Badme.

Alluding that they merely advanced as far as the border delineated by the relevant colonial treaties, the Eritreans subsequently asserted obstinately that they had not crossed Ethiopia's internationally recognized borders. The Eritrean Foreign Ministry statement of May 15, 1998, which asserted, "Eritrea has not violated the internationally recognized borders between the two countries to encroach on Ethiopian territory," became their main line of argument. And this was countered by the Ethiopian side's similarly stubborn demand that the Eritreans vacate Ethiopia's sovereign territory by withdrawing to the positions they held prior to May 6, 1998. The Ethiopian Parliament and Council of Ministers met on May 13, 1998 and passed a resolution demanding an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Eritrean invading forces and warned that Ethiopia reserved the right to defend its territorial integrity and sovereignty. The two parties were thus determined to base the legitimacy of their respective positions on irreconcilable premises. Borders defined by colonial treaties became the ultimate points of departure for the Eritreans while the Ethiopians appeared convinced that "long-term administration of the border areas constituted ownership."⁵²

Observers now realize that maps released by the Tigray administration⁵³ after 1993, evidently to perpetuate this ownership claim, started showing the border "bulging beyond the straight line of the colonial boundary." And most of the fighting in 1998 and 1999 took place "between the colonial border recognized by Eritrea, and boundary as marked on the new Tigrean maps."⁵⁴ Since the disputants were basing their respective claims on virtually parallel principles, proposing a settlement by finding a common ground between them proved impossible. The dispute was thus framed in such a way that settlement could be found only if one party chooses or is forced to back down. The mediation process was hence maneuvered so that anyone trying to arbitrate had to tacitly or directly pass judgment.

International Response

Mediation efforts were kicked off within days of the conflict breaking out and continued to expand in scope and participation side by side with rising hostility and plummeting hopes for peaceful settlement. The first to undertake mediation was a group called the "Facilitators" made up of Vice

President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, Susan Rice of the U.S. Department of State and Gayle Smith of the U.S. National Security Council. The Facilitators shuttled between Asmara and Addis Ababa from May 17 to 29, 1998 and then submitted their recommendations. The salient points of their proposal were:

the parties commit themselves to seeking the final disposition of their common border, determined on the basis of established colonial treaties and international law applicable to such treaties;

an observer mission, organized by the Government of Rwanda and supported by the United States, be deployed to Badme as soon as possible;

within 24 hours of the arrival of the observer team, Eritrean forces begin to re-deploy to positions held before May 6, 1998, and that, immediately following, the civilian administration in place before May 6, 1998, return.

The Ethiopians scored their first diplomatic victory when they succeeded in persuading the Facilitators to embrace the idea of Eritrean withdrawal “to positions held before May 6, 1998.” But what exactly was the geographical location of this position? And who would determine what constitutes an acceptable extent of Eritrean withdrawal? Determining what constitutes satisfactory Eritrean withdrawal was implicitly made an Ethiopian prerogative when the Facilitators eschewed dealing with these details. Eritrea’s preference was for the Ethiopians to publicly declare the extent of their territorial claims by citing geographical coordinates, which could then be verified by making comparisons with the relevant articles of applicable colonial treaties. Not surprisingly, Ethiopia, on June 4, 1998, announced its acceptance of the Facilitators’ proposals. The Eritreans considered such a proposal a non-starter for two reasons. First, it would be contrary to their insistence that no internationally recognized boundary was breached and would thus amount to surrendering one’s territory. Second, acceptance of the principle of withdrawal would serve as a confirmation of Ethiopia’s accusation of Eritrean aggression. The Ethiopian authorities’ prerogative to determine the areas they administered until May 6, 1998 and to restore their administration figured in all later proposals.

The Organization for African Unity Takes Over Mediation

The next body that took up the mediation effort was the 34th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, held in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, from June 8 to 10, 1998. The proposal adopted at this summit also embraced the idea of Eritrean withdrawal from

Badme and its environs to positions they held prior to May 6, 1998. Coming at a time when the idea of deferring to regional organizations influenced its approach to African conflicts, the UN also found it politic to endorse the OAU proposals. The U.S. government, having participated in the initial articulation of the proposals, not only continued backing them but also reinforced all subsequent OAU efforts to operationalize them. The EU, too, gave all-out support to the OAU-led mediation effort. Rarely have influence and efforts been orchestrated in such a manner in the search for the resolution of an African conflict.

Having their condition implanted in the initial proposal of the Facilitators, which was embraced by all succeeding recommendations, the Ethiopians continued to broadcast it not merely as being fair but as a clear designation of Eritrea as the aggressor. Prime Minister Meles, for example, in his speech to the OAU Assembly at Ougadougou, interpreted the Facilitators' proposal as determining that "aggression does not and cannot pay" and that "what was done by force must be undone." The Eritreans wanted a clear declaration of Ethiopia as the guilty party for detaining thousands of Eritreans and expelling others. Hence, President Isaias Afewerki, in his speech to the same assembly, asked that the proposal's paragraph dealing with humanitarian issues be reworded so as to "reflect that it is only one party, Ethiopia, that is culpable." And he warned the audience to beware of Ethiopia's intention "to browbeat the OAU into imposing its dictates on Eritrea."⁵⁵ Eritrea's problematic relationship with the continental body, to be elaborated later, could only deteriorate once these appeals to evenly apportion wrongdoing were not heeded.

Contrary to the emerging practice elsewhere in Africa, the Horn's nascent subregional body, the IGAD, was in no position to significantly contribute to the mediation effort. To the contrary, the agency, which was strife-ridden from its inception, was further destabilized by the outbreak of hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia. It was paralyzed to an unprecedented extent when its Eritrean Executive Secretary was denied readmission into Djibouti, where IGAD's headquarters is located, subsequent to tension marring Djibouti/Eritrea relations. The agency's normal operations could be restored only after the replacement of its Eritrean Executive Secretary.

The OAU scrupulously adhered to the established convention of eschewing contacts with liberation fronts fighting against the regimes ruling member-states. On the other hand, forces fighting against European colonialism and/or white racism were given material, political and moral support. The latter group thus held the OAU in high esteem and was afforded easy access to its institutions and functions. Forces fighting against brutal African

regimes, however, could only watch with despair while the OAU turned a blind eye to atrocities that were often at least comparable to those committed by racist/colonialist regimes. Hence, Yoweri Museveni, at his maiden OAU summit, lambasted the continental organization for its one-sided denunciation of crimes committed in Africa. He argued that the OAU's "failure to condemn such gross violations of human rights [such as the massacre of 800,000 Ugandan citizens under the Idi Amin and Obote regimes] undermined its moral authority to criticize other abuses, particularly of the South African government."⁵⁶ Even the murder of its first secretary general, Diallo Telli, by the Boigny regime of Côte d'Ivoire in 1977, was ignored by the OAU, for raising the issue would have run contrary to the orthodox principle of noninterference in member-states' internal affairs. After cataloguing these and other cases of grave human rights violations that failed to move the organization, Mathews concludes, "the record of the OAU in the matter of protection of human rights in Africa has been simply appalling!"⁵⁷

Antigovernment forces in the Horn of Africa and the general public in the Ethiopian capital have reasons for voicing even more harsh criticisms of the OAU. Despite horrendous human rights violations being committed literally on the doorsteps of its headquarters in Addis Ababa, the OAU remained completely silent. The notorious Karshale prison, teeming with thousands of prisoners, often held for years without trial, is situated adjacent to OAU headquarters. The din rising from this collection of unfortunate humanity, audible almost a kilometer away, in fact constitutes a constant background to the OAU headquarters' atmosphere. In addition, the prison compound often served as a killing ground. Many of the Ethiopian officials who were executed and buried in mass graves in the prison compound on the night of November 23, 1974 were acquaintances of OAU officials and staff members. Moreover, during the 1977–1978 Red Terror, numerous OAU officials likely drove to work by circumventing the bodies of victims dumped on the streets. How these officials felt when witnessing these atrocities is not known for none expressed their feelings publicly. Not surprisingly, the Ethiopian capital's public saw OAU representatives as just another callous bunch of bureaucrats who may be guilty of similar crimes in their own countries.

All the liberation fronts fighting against successive Ethiopian regimes thus inevitably harbored a very cynical view of the OAU. Eritrean movements' views happen to be stronger for a number of reasons. Their conviction that Eritrea's case perfectly fits the OAU Charter's inference that colonial entities should emerge as independent nations led them to expect at least the kind of attention afforded them by the Arab League and the Islamic Conference Organization. Their resulting disappointment was further exacerbated after

Western Sahara was admitted as an OAU member despite its case being identical with that of Eritrea. Furthermore, their opportunity to plead the Eritrean case was seriously constrained since the OAU headquarters is located in Addis Ababa where also many of the summits are held.

Hence, Eritrea gained its independence and qualified as an OAU member not because of the continental organization's support but in spite of its objective opposition. As the first state to come into existence by breaking away from a member-state, Eritrea's position in the OAU was unique. The latent tension inherent in the way it gained independence and membership was not defused by Eritrean leaders' behavior at OAU summits. The Eritrean president's speech at his first OAU summit appearance criticized the organization for disregarding "numerous violation of its charter by regional hegemony and dictatorial elites" (meaning the case of Eritrea) and was taken "as an affront." The resulting resentment colored the OAU's sentiment about Eritrea and led to its "inability to present itself as a neutral and credible mediator" of the post-1998 conflict.⁵⁸ Once again, the OAU headquarters' location in the Ethiopian capital became an additional complicating factor. This became evident when the Ethiopian government declared "Eritrea's permanent representative to the OAU as *persona non grata*." Arguing that their rights of representation had been infringed, the Eritreans were forced to demand the convening of the 69th Session of Council of Ministers at a neutral venue, failing which, they argued, the Ethiopia/Eritrea conflict should be taken off its agenda.⁵⁹

Thus Eritrea's image in the OAU started off by being problematic. This enabled the Ethiopian officials to harp on "Eritrea's arrogance and its disdain for Africa"⁶⁰ and to claim it harbored "utter contempt"⁶¹ for the continental body. Eritrea's occasional candid expression of dissatisfaction with "the shortcomings of the OAU peace proposal" was mainly due to "its higher expectations," argued a statement of the Eritrean Foreign Ministry.⁶² Such candid criticism of the organization and its officials earned them little sympathy. President Isaias Afewerki, for example, blamed Eritrea's nonacceptance of the OAU Framework Agreement on the OAU secretary general's failure to provide the clarifications requested by his government. Coming after Eritrea had publicly aired its refusal to withdraw "from territories it legitimately brought back under its control,"⁶³ this could have only sounded like a disingenuous pretext.

Eritrea's isolation in the OAU was exacerbated by its nonacceptance of OAU Framework Agreement. It was only subsequent to losing Badme to the Ethiopians in February 1999 that it declared its acceptance. Thereafter, it was Ethiopia's turn to seek one pretext after another to avoid concluding a peace agreement. During this period, both sides went on an arms procurement spree to prepare for a more decisive showdown.

The following three documents were eventually formulated in response to endless demands for clarification by both sides: the Framework Agreement, Modalities for Implementing the Framework Agreement and Technical Arrangements. The first had been in existence since the OAU Summit held a month after the outbreak of hostilities in mid-1998. The second document was put together at the following Summit held in Algiers in July 1999. And an OAU technical committee drew up the Technical Arrangements a month after Eritrea's acceptance of the Framework Agreement.

One of the new sticking points was Ethiopia's insistence on OAU observers instead of the newly proposed UN peacekeeping force. They argued that "bringing in the UN changed the 'ownership' of the peace process,"⁶⁴ although the OAU admitted that it is "constrained in its logistics and financial means" to undertake such a task.⁶⁵ This impasse, and others like it, was engineered as Ethiopia made preparations to militarily settle the dispute.

In the last round of fighting, in May 2000, Ethiopia breached Eritrean defense lines to advance far beyond the territory under contention. Its advances were halted only in response to rising international pressure as well as additional Eritrean concessions in the reformulation of the Technical Arrangements. Ethiopia had thus achieved its aim of determining the extent of Eritrea's withdrawal and could credibly describe the action as a reversal of aggression.

A brief discussion of the protagonists' attitude toward the UN, the United States and the EU is in order before we proceed further. At the dawn of their political career, the present rulers of both Ethiopia and Eritrea had to embrace an anti-imperialist ideology for two reasons. First, opposing and denouncing imperialism was fashionable at the time. Second, the regime that they set out to fight was a favorite ally of the Western powers particularly of the United States. Consistent with the politics of the Cold War era, they thus considered themselves as members of the opposing anti-imperialist socialist camp. It is hard to gauge how much of the mentality shaped by adherence to such an ideology continued into the 1990s and after they had become statesmen.

There are indications that such sentiments do survive at least in the TPLF. Whether to stick to the tradition of anti-imperialism or not was one of the issues that led to its Central Committee splitting almost in half in March 2001. The "moderate" slim majority argued that cultivating a relationship of both partnership and struggle with "imperialism" was necessary under current conditions. The minority hard-liners, however, insisted that only a relationship of struggle is appropriate, declaring, "Imperialism is and has been our enemy." Hence, they denounced as "treacherous surrender" their opponents' adoption of policies under U.S. pressure. One such policy decision that figured in the controversy was signing the peace agreement with Eritrea.

Succumbing to the pressure of the United States, a power that knuckles under after suffering only a little over a dozen casualties (as happened in Somalia), must seem inappropriate to those who go to war not necessarily to achieve gains but to prevail by affording higher casualty rates. One can only speculate that at least a milder form of the “moderate’s” position may survive also in Eritrean ruling circles. The perception that the UN and the EU, and the OAU even more so, take their cue from the United States is also likely to influence the thinking of the protagonists.

The United Nations Mission

Three bodies were created to implement the peace agreement that Ethiopia and Eritrea ultimately signed in Algiers on December 12, 2000.⁶⁶ One body, to be created by the OAU in consultation with the two parties and the UN, was tasked with investigating the origins of the conflict (i.e. the incidents of July and August 1997 and May 6, 1998). A Boundary Commission, constituted of two nominees from each side and a neutral president elected by the four (failing which the UN secretary-general would appoint one), was created to settle the border dispute based on each side’s claims and the relevant treaties. And a similarly constituted Claims Commission was formed to arbitrate the loss, damage or injury by one government against the other. Implementing the mandate of the Boundary Commission necessitated the formation of a UN peacekeeping force. Prior to the signing of the peace agreement, the Security Council passed two resolutions authorizing the creation of a peacekeeping force in the area. The first resolution, passed on July 31, 2000, created a mission of 100 military observers in anticipation of a larger force.⁶⁷ On September 15, 2000, the Security Council passed Resolution 1320 (2000) authorizing the deployment of 4,200 troops, including the original 100 observers as well as 120 more.⁶⁸ The mandate of the UNMEE included responsibility for monitoring the redeployment of Ethiopian troops and the maintenance of a 25-kilometer-wide temporary security zone (TSZ). The creation of the TSZ was expected to pave the way for the settlement of the border dispute through boundary demarcation in accordance with the determinations of the Boundary Commission.

Much effort was invested in fully and fairly incorporating the concerns of both parties when framing the agreement’s articles that led to the creation of these bodies. Article provisions that seem to be at loggerheads indicate this approach. Ethiopia’s stand was that the conflict erupted strictly due to the exchange of gunfire on May 6, 1998. Eritrea, however, insisted that incidents going back to July and August 1997 created the atmosphere that ultimately

led to war. Hence, the provision for the investigation of the incidents of 1997 as well as that of May 6, 1998 was meant to address the concerns of both parties. How the Boundary Commission will reconcile the stipulation “respect for the borders existing at independence” with “pertinent colonial treaties and applicable international law” in resolving the border dispute is not easy to imagine. Ethiopia, for example, could cite the former to legitimize its hold on Badme and Zalambessa, for these areas were under its administration even after Eritrea’s independence in 1993. On the other hand, “almost every map issued since colonial times shows Zalambessa, and many other areas now claimed by Ethiopia, in Eritrean territory.”⁶⁹ Even if territorial claims were the sole and ultimate cause of the war, any deviation from one party’s favored principle could generate indefinite resentment, rendering whatever peace is achieved at best fragile.

The agreement clearly dispensed with any intimation of such evenhandedness when determining how the TSZ was to be created. Based on Ethiopia’s relatively superior military disposition, the agreement stipulates that Ethiopia would withdraw only from Eritrean territories taken after February 6, 1999 (the last round of fighting) to the positions that it unilaterally declares were under its administration prior to May 6, 1998. This confirmed Ethiopia’s original intention. The 25-kilometer buffer zone would thus be carved out of areas recognized even by Ethiopia as Eritrean territory. Consequently, the mandate that the UNMEE is expected to impartially implement was drawn up in a partial way, confirming the distinction that Jane Boulden aptly draws between impartiality in framing and in implementing a mandate.⁷⁰ The impact of such a starting point on the expectations of the parties may easily tarnish the outcome resulting from even a scrupulously impartial implementation of the UNMEE and Boundary Commission’s mandates.

The expectation of the Ethiopian side could reflect two factors: first, all the territory they now hold was theirs prior to May 6, 1998; second, it was regained at heavy sacrifices both in human life and financial costs. How then would they willingly cede territory that is twice theirs if the adjudication process so determines? Will doing so not trigger dissension within the ruling party even under the best of circumstances? As it is, disagreements over the peace agreement have already triggered the most serious crisis within the ruling party’s leadership, as has been mentioned. Could even the slim majority manage to cling to power if it accepts cession of any territory that it originally declared as Ethiopian and expended tens of thousands of lives to regain?

Historical precedents may influence Eritrea’s expectations. Eritrea’s distant and recent historical experiences seem to teach its rulers at least two lessons.

First, that the world accepts facts created on the ground even when it is done in contravention of international obligations. Eritrea was federated with Ethiopia pursuant to UN Resolution 390 of 1950. However, the UN and other powers remained silent when Ethiopia unilaterally abrogated this resolution a decade later. Eritrean appeals to the UN and the world at large fell on deaf ears. Second, their more recent experience demonstrates the tendency of world powers to pressure the weaker side to make one concession after another. For example, although the Technical Arrangements were initially declared not to be subject to amendments, mediators asked Eritrea to accept innumerable changes demanded by Ethiopia at the time the latter was putting final touches to its last military offensive.

As a consequence, both parties might adhere to expediency and reluctantly accept some determinations temporarily while exploring other means of achieving outcomes they consider more satisfactory. Both sides may, therefore, continue the struggle by other means, including supporting each other's armed opposition. Focusing on the interstate dimension of the interrelated conflicts within and between the two countries is likely to prove too simplistic.

UNMEE officials started implementing their mandate in an upbeat mood. Legwaila Joseph Legwaila, the UN Special Representative of the secretary general (SRSG), was heard stating, "we are doomed to succeed here" soon after Ethiopian troops started withdrawing from the front line.⁷¹ He had reasons to be optimistic at that stage. Ethiopian withdrawal went smoothly, resulting in full compliance by early March.⁷² However, on the same day, Eritrea halted the repositioning of its troops by claiming that Ethiopian withdrawal was incomplete. Translating the precise technical definition of the TSZ into an equally indisputable operational map appeared to generate the controversy. UNMEE's early statements concerning the dispute tended to hold Eritrea responsible for reneging on the agreed procedures for creating the TSZ.⁷³ However, UNMEE announced its discovery of Ethiopian troops deep inside the TSZ, a week after this controversy erupted, thus confirming Eritrea's original accusation.⁷⁴ A sophisticated troop withdrawal verification process employing air reconnaissance, vehicle patrols and global position satellite measurements was evidently insufficient to avert these kinds of claims and counterclaims. It was then Ethiopia's turn to disagree with UNMEE. Just when Ethiopia and UNMEE started squabbling, Eritrea ended its suspension of troop movements and declared its plans to finalize evacuation of the TSZ by April 6, 2001. Ultimately, UNMEE had to unilaterally declare the creation of the TSZ on April 18, 2001.⁷⁵ Although neither side has formally accepted the map reflecting this determination by the end of the year, the separation of forces has been honored.⁷⁶

This, more than anything else, indicates the belligerents' expectations regarding the resolution of the border dispute. Ethiopia's belief is that the boundary demarcation should occur somewhere north of where its armed forces are currently positioned. Eritrea, of course, expects that border demarcation will lead to the Ethiopians vacating some of the positions they are currently holding. Only time will tell how this will be worked out.

The Commissions

Available information indicates that at least two of the three commissions, the Boundary and Claims Commissions, have been active during the second half of 2001. There is no information, however, as to whether the third one has even been created. The Ethiopian foreign minister gave a lengthy interview in late December 2001 summarizing the activities of the Boundary and Claims Commissions. But he made no reference to the body that was supposed to investigate the incidents of July and August 1997 and May 6, 1998. According to the minister, arguments before the Boundary Commission were scheduled to be concluded by December 21, 2001. The Commission's ruling is expected some time in February 2002. In addition, both sides have made their submissions to the Claims Commission.⁷⁷

The situation in the TSZ was routinely described as stable and calm in UNMEE press releases for most of the second half of 2001. The imminence of Boundary Commission ruling, however, seems to threaten this stability. The Ethiopian foreign minister, in his speech to the UN General Assembly on November 15, 2001, accused Eritrea of amassing troops on the common border.⁷⁸ He repeated the same accusations when he addressed the Security Council the following day.⁷⁹ His Eritrean counterpart declared these claims as "baseless" in his statements to the same bodies.⁸⁰ The Ethiopian media went further to report the invasion of northwestern Ethiopia by Eritrean forces. However, in his press conference of November 23, the SRSG dismissed both the claims of Eritrean troop build-up and the invasion of Ethiopian territory.⁸¹ The year 2001 ended with the Eritrean president vowing to end the conflict with Ethiopia.⁸²

Tactical glitches in the implementation of the UNMEE mandate pale beside the strategic implications of treating the border dispute as the pivotal factor that led to the Ethiopia–Eritrea war. The widespread opinion in the early days of the war that the boundary issue was just one among many of its causes was apparently forgotten when drawing up the principles for the conflict's final and permanent resolution. The focus on the border dispute meant that UNMEE was conceptualized as a classical case of peacekeeping.

Classical peacekeeping tries to achieve at least the separation of belligerents or at most to act as a permanent interposition force.⁸³ The international community is unlikely to shoulder the financial burden needed to indefinitely station an interposition force in the area. Separating the armies of the belligerents, while the border dispute is being sorted out, is seductively simple but is inherently inadequate. The factors that ultimately resulted in the surfacing of violent conflict were imbedded in the pre-conflict situation. Merely returning to it appears to render future outbursts of conflict inevitable, in turn necessitating the UN “being called upon over and over again to repeat the same operations.”⁸⁴ A more promising and sustainable resolution lies not in a return to the past but in moving forward by breaking new ground. In particular, it requires a departure from the relations, thinking and power configurations of the past that made the conflict possible in the first place.

Conclusion

Efforts and influences to resolve the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict were orchestrated to an unusual degree. The OAU mediation of the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict is likely to go down in history as a turning point in the agency’s handling of conflicts in the continent. The juncture at which the organization started playing a leading role in addressing such issues could be remembered as historical. It may also be remembered as the historical juncture at which the orchestration of UN, United States and EU backing for an OAU mediation effort entered a new threshold. When OAU labor delivered a peace agreement on December 12, 2000, it had to hand over the bulk of the remaining task to the UN, primarily because it lacked the necessary financial and other resources. Only time will tell how successfully it will discharge its mission of forming one of the three Commissions stipulated in the peace agreement. One would only hope that such an intensive engagement has provided the OAU’s Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution an opportunity to accumulate experience and to polish its assets identification and accessing procedure. The OAU’s major constraint, by its own admission, is lack of financial and other resources. Hence, the continent most in need of peacekeeping and peace-building activities happens to be the one least able to fund them.

It is very unfortunate that the conflict resolution process has tacitly reduced the causes of the war to the single issue of the border. Approaching it strictly as an interstate dispute is not likely to lay the basis for sustainable peace between and within the two countries. The institutional and

ideological orientation of the UN and the OAU, however, requires drawing a clear distinction between interstate and intra-state manifestations of conflict. This chapter's main contention is that the Eritrea–Ethiopia war in fact defies making this kind of distinction. The protagonists as well as knowledgeable observers agree that the war resulted from Tigray's and Eritrea's conflicting interests and aspirations and not from those of the whole of Ethiopia and Eritrea.

Grasping one important feature of the diverse conflicts raging in the Horn of Africa appears imperative for achieving sustainable peace within and between these two entities. The region's interstate and intra-state conflicts connect in a seamless manner and resonate with each other to a degree rarely witnessed elsewhere. In the words of Terrence Lyons, "The Horn of Africa region . . . has been the site of endemic inter- and intrastate conflict for decades." Furthermore, "[t]he many conflicts are interlinked in a regional 'security complex,' a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another."⁸⁵ These interlinked conflicts can be resolved only by redefining sovereignty, the basis of citizenship and the meaning of borders.⁸⁶ Other authorities also assert that conventional approaches to sovereignty, territorial integrity, nation and nation building need to be reassessed to address and resolve the Horn's conflicts.⁸⁷

The leaders of the two countries, however, love invoking the conventional concept of sovereignty *ad nauseam* without paying any attention to its internal underpinnings or its implication for the reality of interdependence at the regional and global stages. In the words of Boutros Boutros-Ghali, however, the theory of "absolute and exclusive sovereignty" has never corresponded with reality. He thus admonishes state leaders "to understand this and to find a balance between the needs of good internal governance and the requirements of an ever more interdependent world." He also advises that the self-determination of peoples and other important precepts such as sovereignty and territorial integrity should cease to be seen as standing in opposition.⁸⁸ The UN and other regional bodies are unfortunately nowhere close to upholding these recommendations. And they continue to put emphasis on the conventional attributes of the state, sovereignty and territorial integrity. The resolution of conflicts raging in large parts of the Horn, however, seem to demand heeding the former UN secretary general's recommendations.

The UN was founded on the premise that interstate conflict constitutes "the major threat to peace and security,"⁸⁹ as are other interstate bodies. Hence, they are more focused on settling interstate disputes. What is needed, however, is an alternative security architecture that shifts the focus to the

security of individuals and grassroots communities and treats these as the foundation of the security of substate entities, of individual states and their regional aggregations. Numerous scholars recommend this alternative security architecture.⁹⁰ Unless such an approach is adopted, sustainable peace is likely to continue to elude the Horn.

In my opinion, the resolution of the Ethiopia–Eritrea conflict, as currently enunciated, completely sidesteps its fundamental causes. The ultimate cause of this conflict, I believe, is the failure or inability to seek to reconcile the opposite tendencies prevailing throughout the region. The region is facing pressures for integration as well as disintegration. It is also a site where the process of fusion and fission remains active. Reconciling these tendencies requires striking a balance between juridical state independence and the reality of the concerned peoples' interdependence culturally, economically and environmentally. An imaginative rearticulation of relations between communities and their common states and among states reconfigured along similar lines seems to be the only way to reconcile these tendencies. Negotiating such balance has important implications for how we approach and handle such concepts as (a) sovereignty and territorial integrity, particularly borders, (b) independence/self-determination, and (c) nation building. Jettisoning the urge to concentrate the exercise of sovereignty in a single institution or person and sharing it vertically and horizontally seems to be in order. Thus portions of sovereignty need to be transferred to substate entities to empower grassroots communities, while other portions need to be shared at the supra-state level to legitimate subregional, continental and global bodies. Self-determination, which continues to be a live agenda in all of the Horn of Africa, also needs to be reconceptualized as a principle that serves the purposes of simultaneous decentralization and regionalization. In a region marked with a high degree of pastoral lifestyle, borders should be de-emphasized and not perceived as Chinese walls. The notion of nation building and the accompanying agenda of cultural homogenization also need to be jettisoned.

Ethiopia and Eritrea had a unique opportunity to pioneer this approach at the beginning of the last decade. Unfortunately, the immediate and distant political traditions of the groups that ended up dominating the two countries militated against a sincere pursuit of such a course. Unfortunately, the UN and the OAU, taking their cue from the United States, ended up putting more emphasis on stability even at the cost of good governance. This confirmed the protagonists in their comfortable frame of mind.⁹¹ The end result was the use of force to subdue all range of internal opposition with the tacit or overt sanctioning by the international community. The culture of settling internal disputes by force inevitably spilled over into interstate relations

leading to a war in which tens of thousands of lives were lost. The conclusion of this war can be treated as an important turning point for the two states. Their leaders could be helped to make a fresh beginning or a settlement that merely papers over the underlying differences runs the risk of making a relapse inevitable.

Notes

1. “Ethiopia and Eritrea: Lethal Punch-Up,” *The Economist*, September 25, 1999, p. 55.
2. Cathy Jenkins, “A Clash of Egos,” *BBC News*, June 14, 1998, www.news.bbc.co.uk (last visited March 9, 2003).
3. Karl Vick, “Leaders Personify Clash in Horn of Africa: Erstwhile Allies’ Tensions Parallel Conflict between Ethiopia, Eritrea,” *The Washington Post Foreign Service*, June 17, 1998, p. A20.
4. Abebe Andualem, “Africa Conflict Locked in Stalemate,” *Associated Press*, July 17, 1998.
5. Ruth Iyob, “The Eritrean Experience: a Cautious Pragmatism?” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 35, no. 4 (1997), p. 649.
6. Tigray is the name of one of Ethiopia’s federal states and is the homeland of Tigrinya-speaking Ethiopians. Kebesa is the Tigrinya word for highland and refers to areas of Eritrea inhabited by Tigrinya-speaking Christian Eritreans.
7. Richard Trivelli, “Background Notes on the Ethiopia–Eritrean War,” [all citations in this work are from personal communication later published in *Afrika Spektrum*, Fall Edition (1999)], p. 1.
8. Chester Crocker as quoted by Patrick Gilkes, “From Comrades to Adversaries,” *BBC News*, www.bbc.co.uk, June 8, 1998 (last visited March 9, 2003).
9. From a mimeographed monitoring of TPLF radio broadcasts made available by the Eritrean Government.
10. Alemseged Tesfai, “The Cause of the Eritrean–Ethiopian Border Conflict,” paper presented at conference organized by Heinrich Boll Foundation, March 15–17, 1999, Nairobi, Kenya, p. 2.
11. Patrick Gilkes, “Stubborn Leaders and National Pride,” *BBC News*, May 12, 2000, www.bbc.co.uk (last visited March 9, 2003).
12. Trivelli, “Background Notes,” p. 3.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
15. Alemseged Abbay, *Identity Jilted or Re-imagining Identity: The Divergent Paths of the Eritrean and Tigrayan Nationalist Struggle* (Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1998), pp. 224–225.
16. He mentions: (1) the Orthodox Church’s 1,600-year-old unity was ruptured, (2) the traditional Gregorian calendar was replaced with the Julian version although ordinary Kebesa Eritreans still relate only to the former. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
18. Ruth Iyob, *Re-Configuring Identities: A Clash of Vision(s) in the Horn of Africa 1991–1999* (Bern: The Swiss Peace Foundation, 1999), p. 8. Patrick Gilkes indirectly concurs with these two scholars by describing the Red Sea and Horn region as a zone where the process of fusion and fission remains incomplete. Patrick Gilkes, *Ethiopia—Perspectives of Conflict 1991–1999* (Bern: The Swiss Peace Foundation, 1999), p. 57.
19. Rupert Emerson, *Self-determination Revisited in the Era of Decolonization* (Cambridge: Harvard University, Center for International Affairs, 1964), p. 29.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 28. Emphasis added.
21. Berekhet Habte Selassie, “The OAU and Regional Conflicts: Focus on the Eritrean War,” *Africa Today*, 3rd/4th Quarters (1989), p. 66.
22. Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1947), p. 8.
23. Starting in mid-1970s, the TPLF entered into a series of oscillating, mutually opportunistic and purely tactical alliances with one or the other of the Eritrean fronts (ELF and EPLF). The TPLF came into existence in 1975 supported by and in alliance with the EPLF. When relations between it and the EPLF soured a year later, the TPLF shifted its alliance to the rival Eritrean front, the ELF. It was back in alliance with the EPLF in 1979 and in conflict with the ELF. The TPLF and the EPLF eventually joined forces to drive the ELF out of Eritrea in 1981. TPLF relations with the EPLF started souring once again in 1983 culminating in open rupture by 1985. Alemseged Tesfai describes the cycle of relations between the TPLF and Eritrea and Eritreans as one that “started with love, turned to hate and, by independence time, reverted back to love again” only for hatred to become consummate after May 1998. Alemseged Tesfari, “‘The March of Folly’ Re-enacted: A Personal View,” unpublished mimeographed essay, 1999, pp. 5, 9. Of course, it is highly possible that the Tigreans, too, depict Eritrean feelings toward them in a similar way. Trivelli tries to offer a plausible explanation for this volatility of relations between the two movements. He infers that the leaderships of the two Fronts failed to openly discuss their differences and to find their democratic resolutions. Hence, underlying political and psychological differences were merely papered over during periods of friendship. He blames the undemocratic way the Fronts were structured and led by people who “harboured the strong conviction that destiny had chosen them to achieve the liberation of their nations” for this state of affairs. Trivelli, “Background Notes,” p. 21.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
25. John Young, “The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Fronts: A History of Tensions and Pragmatism,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 34, no. 1 (1996), p. 106.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 106.
27. In the views of Negash and Tronvoll, the “war has most of the characteristics of a civil war between one people spread out in two countries.” Tekeste Negash and

- Kjetil Tronvoll, *Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War* (Oxford: James Currey, 2000), p. 94.
28. Paul Henze, "Eritrea's War Against Ethiopia: Causes and Effects, Reflections, Prescriptions," January 25, 2000, Ethiopian government website, www.ethiospokes.net/Opinions/January2000/o2501001.htm (last visited March 9, 2003).
 29. Gilkes, "Stubborn Leaders and National Pride," May 12, 2000.
 30. *Addis Tribune*, website of the week of February 10, 1998, www.addistribune.com.
 31. Birger Heldt, "Domestic Politics, Absolute Deprivation, and Use of Armed Force in Interstate Territorial Disputes, 1950–1990," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 43, no. 3 (1999), p. 451.
 32. Stephen Kocs, "Territorial Disputes and Interstate War, 1945–1987," *Journal of Politics*, vol. 57 (1995), pp. 159–175.
 33. EPLF, *A National Charter for Eritrea: For a Democratic, Just and Prosperous Future* (Asmara: Adulis Printing Press, 1994), p. 8.
 34. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
 35. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
 36. *Ibid.*, p. 1.
 37. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
 38. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
 39. Alemseged Tesfai, "'The March of Folly' Re-enacted: A Personal View." Unpublished manuscript made available to me by the author, p. 2.
 40. Alemseged Tesfai, "The Cause of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Conflict," paper presented at conference organized by Heinrich Boll Foundation, March 15–17, 1999, Nairobi, Kenya, p. 10.
 41. Trivelli, "Background Notes," p. 16.
 42. Tesfai, "The Cause of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Conflict," p. 6.
 43. Trivelli, "Background Notes," p. 15.
 44. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
 45. Monitoring of TPLF radio made available by the Government of Eritrea.
 46. Tesfai, "The Cause of the Eritrean-Ethiopian Border Conflict," p. 5; and Asmarom Legesse, *The Uprooted: A Scientific Survey of Ethnic Eritrean Deportees from Ethiopia Conducted with Regard to Human Rights Violations* (Asmara: Citizens for Peace in Eritrea, 1999).
 47. Tesfai, "The Cause of the Eritrean–Ethiopian Border Conflict," p. 8.
 48. John Young, "Post Civil War Transitions in Ethiopia," paper presented at Conference on Peacebuilding in Africa: Cases and Themes, June 23–24, 2000, Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto, p. 21.
 49. John Young, "The Tigray and Eritrean Peoples Liberation Fronts: a History of Tensions and Pragmatism," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol. 34, no. 1 (1996), p. 84. Emphasis added.
 50. Habtu Ghebre-Ab, *Ethiopia and Eritrea: A Documentary Study* (Trenton, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1993), p. 15.

51. Negash and Tronvoll, *Brothers at War*.
52. Iyob, *Re-Configuring Identities*, p. 26.
53. One very important absurdity must be grasped to understand the issue of the border. The border dispute was dealt with as a strictly internal affair of the Tigrinya speakers of Ethiopia and Eritrea until the outbreak of hostilities in May 1998. The Tigray regional administration appeared to exercise the prerogative of determining the border without the involvement of non-Tigrean officials of the Federal Government.
54. *BBC News*, "Border: A Geographer's Nightmare," news.bbc.co.uk, May 12, 2000 (last visited March 9, 2003).
55. Copies of both speeches were made available by Eritrean government officials.
56. K. Mathews, "The OAU and Political Economy of Human Rights in Africa: An Analysis of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981," *Africa Today*, 1st and 2nd Quarter (1987), p. 85.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
58. Iyob, *Re-Configuring Identities* p. 11.
59. Panafrican News Agency, "Eritrea Wants Neutral Venue to Discuss Border Conflict," March 22, 1999, <http://allafrica.com/stories/199903220076.html> (last visited March 9, 2003).
60. Quoted in Addis Birhan, *Eritrea a Problem Child of Ethiopia: Causes, Consequences and Strategic Implications of the Conflict* (Addis Ababa: Marran Books, 1998), p. 171.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
62. Government of Eritrea, Statement of the Foreign Ministry, March 24, 1999.
63. *Ibid.*, May 23, 1998.
64. Martin Plaut, "Horn Conflict: Devil in the Detail," *BBC News*, news.bbc.co.uk, March 13, 2000 (last visited March 9, 2003).
65. "Ethiopia-Eritrea: Fighting Flares Up As Peace Envoys Visit," IRIN (IRIN is the Nairobi-based Integrated Regional Information Network of the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)), March 24, 1999.
66. Full text of the agreement is available on the USIP website: http://www.usip.org/library/pa/eritrea_ethiopia/eritrea_ethiopia_12122000.html (last visited March 9, 2003).
67. Security Council Resolution 1312, July 31, 2000.
68. Security Council Resolution 1320, September 15, 2000.
69. "Hope in the Horn," *The Economist*, February 17, 2001.
70. Jane Boulden, *Peace Enforcement* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001).
71. "Hope in the Horn," *The Economist*, February 17, 2001.
72. UNMEE, "UNMEE Verifies Ethiopian Redeployment," UNMEE/PR/38, March 7, 2001.
73. See, e.g., UNMEE, "Press Briefing by Secretary-General's Special Representative for Ethiopia and Eritrea," UNMEE/PR/40, March 14, 2001.

74. UNMEE, “UNMEE Protests Presence of Three Ethiopian Military Companies Inside Prospective TSZ,” UNMEE/PR/45, March 22, 2001. IRIN, March 22, 2001.
75. UNMEE, “Establishment of the Temporary Security Zone: Statement by Head of UNMEE Legwaila Joseph Legwaila,” UNMEE/PR/51, April 18, 2001.
76. UNMEE Public Information, “Edited Transcript of Press Conference by the Special Representative for the Secretary-General Legwaila Joseph Legwaila,” November 23, 2001.
77. Interview of Ethiopian Foreign Minister in Amharic posted at Walta Information Center website: www.waltainfo.com.
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CHAPTER 7

The Sudan

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Introduction

Since its onset in 1955, the Sudan civil war has, for most of its history, been a low priority on the agenda of the international community, and the UN, in particular. The genesis of the conflict was a failure by the Sudan government to honor an agreement that provided for a federal system of administration.¹ Immediately after repudiating the agreement, the government was faced with a mutiny in the South, which favored federal administration, sparking off Africa's longest civil war. The first phase of the conflict, which stretched from 1955 to 1972 when the Addis Ababa declaration was signed, hardly raised global concern. Constrained by their charters, which provide for the territorial integrity of member-states and the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of member-states, the UN as well as the OAU, were reluctant to intervene in a conflict viewed as an internal matter. For most political players, the conflict was a low-key hit and run operation by a rag tag band of "malcontents" called the *Anyanya*. At the same time, Africa generally was embroiled in liberation struggles that emphasized continental unity. Moreover, the impact of the war did not rise to a level that attracted global scrutiny or sanctions.

The dynamics of this conflict would change dramatically, however, and attract considerable attention in its second phase. Erupting in 1983, a critical feature of this phase was the formation of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement and its armed wing the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A). To date, the conflict continues to draw in new actors and interests that complicate attempts to resolve it. Its scale and scope have

expanded, as has the growing interest in campaigning for its resolution. While the trajectory of this conflict is marked by moments that brought blips of hope, most of its history has been one of frustration. Attempts to deliver peace have been characterized by a sluggish process of stalemates and cease-fires that have been turned into convenient rearmament periods by the parties to the conflict. Over time, the scale and magnitude of its humanitarian consequences have multiplied beyond the commitment of the campaigns for its resolution.

Recently however, the momentum for a peace process in the Sudan has increased. This is explained by an increasing realization on the part of the international community that the conflict is more than a domestic affair. It has interlocking regional, continental and global dimensions, with complex implications for conflict resolution. Since the mid-1990s, increasing proof points to the involvement of Sudan in international terrorism and support for Islamic fundamentalism in global militarism. Regionally, this conflict has sparked off a myriad of security and geostrategic concerns. Increasingly, there is a multiplication of interests that relate to Sudan's natural and subterranean wealth, including the Nile waters. And finally, there is mounting pressure, both within and outside Sudan, by a growing constituency that is concerned about issues of governance and human rights in the Sudan. Unfortunately, this growing interest is hardly matched by action on the ground. Compared to other conflicts, in Africa and elsewhere, the Sudan conflict remains one of the most forgotten human tragedies today. The UN is yet to engage fully in seeking peace in the Sudan.² Although regional actors, in particular IGAD have initiated a peace process, actors in the region remain lukewarm and are hampered by a lack of resources in their attempts to resolve the conflict. As local, national, regional and international interests continue to frustrate any peace processes, the volume and intensity of destruction, death, morbidity, famine, slavery and displacement continues to grow.

Attempts to resolve this conflict have remained ad hoc, sporadic and lacking in coordination, and in this fragmentation is the critical challenge to resolving the problem. Besides not engaging at all, the UN has failed to provide guidance, coordination or any support to initiatives such as those by IGAD (1993–), Egypt and Libya (2000–) and Nigeria (1991–1993). Driven by varying, and sometimes conflicting interests, each of these initiatives have failed to sustain pressure on the parties to the conflict to conclude a valuable peace deal. I argue in this chapter that sustainable peace can only result from a systematic engagement by the international community, in this case the UN; identification and support for a focal point, in this case IGAD; and maintaining sustained pressure on all parties to the conflict to deliver peace

to the people of Sudan. The way forward, therefore, is in pursuing clearly defined objectives, coherently, within a framework that embraces a range of strategies that guide involvement of multiple actors at the international, regional, national and local levels. Whether such concerted action delivers peace will depend on the extent to which it provides political platform(s) and space for the Sudanese to air, process and decide the future of their country. With the mounting pressure to address the Sudan conflict, in particular the current interest within the Bush administration, the UN is now more likely to get involved directly, or through support for IGAD.

After presenting the core aspects of the Sudan conflict, I suggest ways of creating a staggered but concerted initiative that includes the UN, IGAD and national and local actors, in ending one of Africa's bloodiest civil wars. The chapter is organized in five sections. Section one provides a short background that defines the nature and consequences of the conflict. Section two outlines the performance of IGAD, discusses the challenges it faces and discusses proposals for strengthening and bolstering its facilitative capacity. Section three looks at local and national initiatives, and explores the manner in which these can contribute to the peace process. Section four looks at the international community, in particular the UN, and the role it has (and has not) played in the various Sudan peace efforts. On the basis of this analysis, a number of conclusions on the role of both the UN and IGAD are presented in the final section.

Background

For much of its postindependent existence, Sudan has been at war with herself.³ Apart from a period of peace between 1972 and 1983, all its civilian and military governments have been dogged by what is termed the "southern problem."⁴ Erupting in 1955, a year before independence,⁵ the conflict pitched the government against a group of Southerners, the *Anyanya*, the precursor to today's SPLM/A. Over time, parties to this conflict have multiplied remarkably. Although the two protagonists remain the most significant, a number of groups are involved. A fundamental difference among these groups is that some seek to secede while others support Sudan's territorial integrity. The SPLM/A's call for the unity of the Sudan remains contagious and is a source of anger for some marginalized African communities in the East, Nuba and Darfur regions, who seek full independence. An important party to the conflict was the Sudan People's Defence Forces (SPDF), formed in 1991, after splitting from the SPLM/A. For 11 years, until 2002, the SPLM/A and SPDF fought intense battles over the control of territory in

the South. On January 6, 2002, the leaders of these two groups signed a declaration merging their movements.⁶ Whether this covenant will hold, and how it shapes the conflict and the peace process is a question for the future. In the North, the National Democratic Alliance has emerged as a veritable challenger of the government.

Over time, what was initially defined as a North–South conflict has evolved into a series of conflicts, buttressed by varying elements including religion, race, lack of the rule of law, geopolitical and strategic interests. In recent years, especially since the resumption of the war in 1983, the identity of the nation has become acutely contested. Whereas the North draws its identity from Islam and Arabization, the southern identity is best understood as one of resistance to the North. The rebels in the South stand against Islamic identity and assimilation.⁷

Nonetheless, critical as the identity question is, it is not the only issue to define and shape this war. Developments in the last three decades have gradually, and consistently, changed the nature of the conflict from a classic ethno-religious conflict to one mainly over resources. In this (complicating) configuration, the economic and resource crisis in the North has become the driving force in the civil war. In the last three years, the subterranean resources of the Sudan, especially its oil, have become catalysts to the war.⁸ Since 1999, the Sudan government has been earning hundreds of millions of dollars from royalties paid by foreign companies exploring and drilling oil. This provides the government with greater means to acquire armaments. Further, it offers a greater motive to accelerate its assault on disfavored groups.⁹ On the whole this situation acts as a disincentive for the government to remain committed to the peace process. Unsurprisingly, the military balance has shifted in favor of the government in the last three years.¹⁰ To facilitate unabated exploration and extraction of oil, which it continues to encourage, the government is involved in the accelerated removal of populations from resource-rich areas. This is pursued through tactics such as a scorched earth policy, torture and terror.¹¹

Convinced that it could defeat the rebellion militarily, the government intensified the war within its borders. Citing security concerns, it decided to deal with the “southern problem” by military means and increased its acquisition and stockpiling of arms from its global suppliers. In addition, the government undertook national mobilization in the defense of the “motherland.”¹² Around this rallying call, the government created, sponsored and protected armed militias that have become notorious in terrorizing civilian populations deemed to be supporters of the rebellion.¹³

The dynamics of this war weave into the entire Horn of Africa region, with unpleasant regional implications. Throughout the 1990s, this war was a source of heightening tensions in the Horn of Africa. The Sudan accused nearly all its neighbors, namely Ethiopia, Uganda and Eritrea of opening doors and supporting groups engaged in destabilizing it. In particular, it blamed them for providing an outlet and support for the main rebel group



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Map 7.1 Sudan.

in the South, the SPLA. It also charged that these governments were supporting the internal resistance fermenting in northern Sudan, in opposition to the government's attempt to consolidate and enforce its vision of the Islamic *Sharia* law. In 1995, Egypt joined the list of unhappy neighbors, accusing the Sudan of sponsoring Islamic "fundamentalist" groups from the Middle East associated with the attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarak.¹⁴ As the Sudan and its neighbors pointed fingers at each other, the 1990s were marked by heightened insecurity that almost dragged the Horn of Africa into a full-fledged regional war.

A confluence of these factors has unleashed a deepening humanitarian crisis, with multiple negative consequences. Since 1983, it has caused an estimated two million deaths, seen more than four million people displaced internally, impoverished the populations of southern Sudan, perpetrated torture, degrading and inhuman treatment and resulted in Africa's largest relief operation under the banner of the UN, namely, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS).¹⁵

The war has also caused massive refugee outflows that are an enormous burden to the region. At the end of 2000, official estimates indicate over a quarter of a million Sudanese had sought asylum in neighboring countries: Uganda (166,000), the DRC (30,000), Kenya (60,000), Central African Republic (35,000), Chad (25,000) and Ethiopia (59,000).¹⁶ This enormous movement across borders is paralleled by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons associated with increased insecurity. Border areas are particularly vulnerable and bear the brunt of violence. For instance, the border axis between Kenya, the Sudan and Uganda has become a fierce battlefield, with cattle rustling between the Toposa (from the Sudan), Turkana (Kenya) and Karamanjong (Uganda), escalating to unprecedented levels.¹⁷

As the crisis in the Sudan deepened, the region was witnessing burgeoning crises elsewhere, following the withdrawal of superpower patronage at the close of the 1980s. In Ethiopia, the government of Mengistu El Mariam was overthrown, in Somalia, Said Barre's government collapsed, in northern Uganda the internal insurgency escalated, while in Kenya political violence swept through the country. As insecurity intensified, a consensus on the need to address regional security collectively began to form among regional leaders. Acknowledging that peace and security were precursors to regional development, the leadership committed itself to seeking peace. A decision was then taken to start with the longest civil war in the region, the Sudan conflict.¹⁸ This decision raised expectations for the settlement of the conflict, but it turned out to be a blip of hope. Toward the close of the 1990s, and particularly after 1998, the military situation stalemated, famine plagued

large sections of the South and the mediation process stalled. Another ray of hope began to shine in 2000, and continues to glow as the world embraces the Sudan in the fight against terrorism following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. Whether and how the coalition fight against terrorism will dovetail into the aspirations of the people of southern Sudan for their right to self-determination is certainly not clear yet.

The Role of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development

Created in 1986 by Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, (and now Eritrea), the Sudan and Somalia, the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification (IGADD) was mandated to address the endemic ecological (drought and desertification) and humanitarian crisis in the Horn of Africa. During the 1990s, changes in the geopolitics of the region, in particular the end of superpower patronage exposed countries in the region to greater security risks. As insecurity in the region continued to spread and intensify, in March 1996, member-states signed an agreement expanding the mandate of IGADD to include peace and security. Arguing that peace and security were prerequisites for the much-desired development, the member-states identified three broad mandates: peace and security, development, and the earlier ecological and humanitarian issues. To reflect this new momentum and shift in focus, the name of the organization was changed to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The new IGAD provided for the creation of a regional mechanism for the prevention, management and resolution of inter- and intra-state conflicts within the subregion.¹⁹ Pledging to resolve outstanding security problems and to preserve peace, security and stability in the region, IGAD undertook to reinvigorate the Sudan peace process, which until then had been a marginal activity of the organization.²⁰

Attempts by states in the Horn of Africa to resolve the Sudan crisis can be compartmentalized into two phases. The first is from 1993 to 1995 (IGADD) and the second is post-1996 (IGAD).

Phase One

After the collapse of the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1982, and the resumption of war, the first attempt at resolving the conflict was made by Nigeria. Between 1991 and 1993, Nigeria sought in vain to bring the two sides to an agreement. Steered by President Babaginda, this initiative comprised the Abuja conference, held in July 1991, and subsequent negotiations in 1992 and 1993, all of which saw the positions of the two sides harden. At the heart

of the disagreement was whether the Sudan could be a theocratic or secular state. The Khartoum government refused to allow the option of self-determination for the South on the agenda of the negotiations and insisted on the maintenance of its Islamic federal system, in which the South would be exempted from a few Islamic laws and punishments. Expressing this position, one of the government negotiators observed, "if referendum means referendum about separation or self-determination, we have to reject it." The head of the delegation Al Amin Khalifa stated its position more bluntly: "Separation comes from the mouth of the gun . . . not by debate."²¹

Following the collapse of the Abuja conference, after having made an initial unsuccessful attempt to mediate in the Somalia crisis, IGADD decided, at the request of Omar El Bashir, in September 1993, to involve itself with the Sudan conflict. In November 1993, the first Summit of IGADD Heads of States Peace Committee met in Kampala and set up a Ministerial Standing Committee on the Sudan conflict. Comprising the foreign ministers of Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea, this committee was mandated to draw up an agenda and program of work for a negotiated settlement to the Sudan conflict. The first session of the Standing Committee, held in March 1994, deliberated the principles that would underpin the framework for the search for peace, interim arrangements and the establishment of a humanitarian committee. In May 1994, a second session adopted a draft Declaration of Principles (DOP) as a basis for resolving the conflict. The declaration identified four essential elements necessary to a just and comprehensive peace settlement. These were: a commitment by all parties to use peaceful means in resolving conflicts; respect for the right to self-determination; the separation of religion from the state; and recognition of the heterogeneous nature of the Sudan and the promotion of the Sudan as a democratic, secular state.²²

A third session of the Ministerial Standing Committee met in July 1994 to discuss the draft DOP. However, disagreement emerged on two critical issues: the question of separation of state and religion; and self-determination of the South, about which the government of Sudan continues to express reservations. Al Amin Khalifa who headed the Sudanese delegation to Abuja rejected the DOP and insisted that a referendum only cover the future status of the South within the Sudan. Even this minimal degree of support for a referendum caused the government to replace Khalifa with Ghazi Salah al-Din as the chief negotiator.²³ When the fourth session of the Standing Committee was held in September 1994 to try and resolve these differences, the positions of both parties continued to polarize and harden. Salah Al-Din insisted that *Sharia* was "irreplaceable" and that self-determination lacked any legal or moral basis. This saw the talks break down. The absence of an

authority to ensure compliance and the apparent inability of the regional states to enforce basic conditions for negotiations was to become the main obstacle to the progress of the Sudan process at this stage.

Committed to moving the peace process forward, a summit of the IGADD Heads of States Peace Committee met shortly after this adjournment to review the process and decide on a future course of action. Out of this summit came two decisions that were to form the basis for later action. Consensus was reached that the IGADD initiative should continue and that the DOP should be the basis for negotiations. Arguing that it was “duty bound to ‘Islamize’ and ‘Arabize’ the whole of Sudan,” the Government of Sudan rejected these decisions and withdrew from the negotiations, stalling the talks for more than 33 months.

Phase Two

Following the 1996 agreement to change IGADD to IGAD, pressure was exerted on the Sudan to comply with the spirit of the new IGAD. An Extra-Ordinary Summit of IGAD on the Sudan problem was held in July 1997.²⁴ At this meeting, the Government of Sudan accepted the DOP as the basis for discussion and withdrew its reservations on the issues of state and religion, and the self-determination of the South.²⁵ However, it argued then, as it continues to do today, that the DOP document is not legally binding. While this move provided the much-needed impetus to advance the peace process, the need for a structured approach to guide it quickly became apparent.

To provide continuity in the process, an IGAD ministerial subcommittee on the Sudan Peace Process was constituted. At its first session, held in September 1997, the subcommittee mandated the IGAD Secretariat to seek external financial assistance to aid negotiations; requested IGAD members to provide financial assistance; and recommended the establishment of a peace fund to sponsor the peace talks. Meanwhile, the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A agreed to cooperate fully in the search for a negotiated solution. Despite increasing eagerness to get the process going, the process stalled for the next six months. After intense lobbying, the second ministerial subcommittee was convened in May 1998. During this meeting, progress was made when the government agreed to the idea of a referendum on self-determination after an undefined interim period. Shortly after this, the third session was held in Addis Ababa in August 1998, during which an agreement was reached that the borders of the “South” would be determined as they stood at independence on January 1, 1956. The parties also agreed to observe a three-month cease-fire to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian relief.

However, the issue of Islam remained contentious, as religion is deeply entrenched in the constitution of May 1998 and in the October 1999 laws.

Besides the parties to the conflict, several local and international actors have also signed on, and endorsed the DOP. These include the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), The World Council of Churches, Care International, Doctors without Borders, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), International Committee of the Red Cross, IGAD Partners Forum (comprising United States, Canada, Norway, Britain and Netherlands), the Coalition for Peace in the Horn-US and the Working Group on the Horn-Canada. In addition, the OAU and the UN expressed their support for the DOP.²⁶

The hope associated with these developments was quickly dashed after a connection was made between the attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and Sudan's support for Osama Bin Laden. Immediately after the attacks, the already fragile relationship between Sudan and most of the region deteriorated.²⁷ Its relations with Kenya, a prime mover of the peace process, soured considerably. The regional context was made more complicated by the outbreak of war between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998. Thus, after the third session of negotiations, in August 1998, the peace talks stalled, for nearly a year, until July 1999, when the fourth session was convened. This lull reinforced the realization that moving the process forward needed a permanent structure, beyond the ad hoc arrangements that characterized attempts until then, to engage on a continuous basis with all parties concerned. It was also agreed that a ministerial organ lacked the time, leverage and capacity to sustain the momentum required for the peace process. To overcome this shortcoming, IGAD member-states established a permanent IGAD Secretariat on the Sudan Peace Process in July 1999. Chaired by Kenya, and based in Nairobi, the Secretariat was placed under Ambassador Daniel Mboya, who was made an IGAD Special Envoy. The Secretariat was mandated to create and coordinate technical committees to help move the peace process forward on a regular basis, within the framework of the DOP.

The Secretariat identified four primary areas for negotiations: the right to self-determination for the people of southern Sudan; self-administration for southern Sudan; secularizing the constitution; and equitable sharing of resources among all Sudanese people. Four committees were constituted and are operating to address these issues. The SPLA leadership has proposed the formation of an African IGAD Partners Forum, to operate alongside the donor-constituted IGAD Partners Forum (IPF). Such a structure, they argued, would provide an opportunity to draw lessons beyond the immediate subregion. Proposed members of such a forum are Nigeria, Egypt

and South Africa, all seen as having the requisite experience to inform the Sudan peace process. Further, these states are viewed as having the muscle to compel the Government of Sudan to engage in a “critical dialogue” about the war.

Outstanding Issues and Challenges

While there has been significant development in structures and processes toward the settlement of this conflict, several issues remain unresolved. Principal among them is the question of self-determination for the South, which the Sudanese government remains reluctant to accept. There are also disagreements related to the definitions of fundamental issues. In particular, parties have adopted different interpretations of the southern border. The Government of Sudan argues that the Abiei region falls in the North, while SPLA views the area as a Dinka homeland, and therefore as being in the South. The marginalized regions of the Nuba Mountains and the southern Blue Nile region have also not been dealt with. These border disputes must be read within the context that most of the Sudan’s subterranean wealth lies on this belt. Further, the Government holds the *Sharia* law as supreme throughout the Sudan, a matter that generates great unease within certain quarters.²⁸ There are also criticisms that the negotiations concentrate on two parties, the government in Khartoum and the SPLM/A, to the exclusion of a number of other key stakeholders. A combination of these factors raises the risk of this process suffering a crisis of legitimacy.

In spite of these difficulties, political developments in the Sudan have provided opportunities for the peace process. The formation of the National Democratic Alliance by a number of political opposition parties in the North, and the power struggle between El Bashir, prime minister of the Sudan, and his former ally, Hassan Al Turabi, has somewhat changed the course of the conflict. The dissolution of parliament while Al Turabi was speaker, his placement under house arrest and later imprisonment in early 2001, created splinters within the government.²⁹ These developments also provided a window of opportunity to push for negotiations. However, neither IGAD nor any other actor seized this opportunity.

Institutionally, a look at the IGAD provides lessons that are key for future engagement. First, it indicates that a subregional organization can play a major role in shaping peace negotiations, by providing a framework within which such a process can take place. IGAD has nurtured the development of an institutional basis for the Sudanese peace process. However, IGAD’s ability to deal with the conflict in the Sudan is limited by its mandate, which confines its activities to the realm of diplomacy. Article 7 of the 1996 agreement requires member-states to create mechanisms “for the prevention,

management and resolution of inter and intra-State conflicts *through dialogue*" (emphasis added). So far, member-states have considered this the acceptable *modus operandi*, but this reduces the options available to the organization in dealing with a situation as complex as the Sudan.

The weakness in the mandate of IGAD is compounded by a slackening political commitment. The political commitment of leaders of this region is not matched by action. As a club of weak states, IGAD is without the resources necessary to support sustained dialogue and peace negotiation. This weakness has been transplanted into the peace process. For instance, there is no provision within its budget to support the peace Secretariat for the Sudan. This means the process is heavily dependent on external resources. These have neither been guaranteed nor have they flowed regularly. Between 1999 and May 2001, the fund had received a total of US\$1 million, which was hardly enough to organize and sustain negotiations on a continuous basis. The peace negotiations have, therefore, been plagued by frequent breakdowns, resulting in loss of momentum.

The Secretariat has so far failed to sustain the momentum of the peace process. It does not organize follow-up meetings to the peace talks, nor does it have the means to jump-start negotiations when they breakdown. The process has been characterized by long lull periods when negotiations stall. For instance, between early 2000 and March 2001, when President Moi visited Khartoum in an effort to revitalize the talks, no substantive meeting was held. In other words, the peace Secretariat is hostage to political dynamics within IGAD member-states.

Institutional weaknesses have been compounded by the political dilemmas associated with negotiators who are inextricably involved in the conflict. All of the four lead states—Ethiopia, Eritrea, Uganda and Kenya—have had difficulties fronting an impartial disinterested negotiator, because they are associated with supporting the rebellion against the Government of Sudan. This situation explains, in part, the origin of the Egypt–Libya initiative that paralleled the IGAD one.³⁰ Recently, the relationship between Egypt and Libya on the one hand, and Sudan on the other has been reinforced economically by a signing of border trade agreements.³¹ The potential of this emerging alliance to derail the IGAD-led process is real. It would, for example, provide the Government of Sudan with an excuse to jettison the entire IGAD process, believing that IGAD no longer has credibility or leverage. So far, the ability of IGAD to reassure other regional actors that self-determination is not necessarily a threat to their interests is questionable. The ongoing attempt by President Moi of Kenya, the chair of the Sudan peace process, to integrate the Egypt–Libyan initiative to the IGAD one presents an opportunity for a concert of action, and needs support.

If Kenya is to continue chairing the IGAD initiative, a foremost question is how its leadership can be turned to best advantage. So far, the relationship between the Secretariat and other structures engaged with the Sudan conflict such as Ministries of Foreign Affairs in the IGAD member countries, who form an advisory board to the envoy, and the Office of the President in Kenya, which is the lead agent, is not clearly defined. This has caused confusion and immense frustration in terms of locating and dealing with the locus of power in this peace process.

The Potential of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development to Lead the Sudan Peace Process

A question that is persistently asked is whether IGAD is the right forum for negotiating the Sudan peace process.³² For all its faults, the IGAD process has settled on the outlines of a peace deal, based on self-determination for southern Sudan; it has also gathered momentum that saw the negotiations take off. IGAD managed to bring Sudan to the negotiating table and settled on an outline of a peace deal, in the form of the DOP, around which consensus continues to grow. Finally, IGAD oversaw the establishment of the Secretariat in Nairobi. In short, the IGAD process, however fragile, provides an institutional basis on which the peace process can be taken further.

However, the idea that IGAD remains the focal point for the Sudan peace process must be followed immediately with a caveat. If IGAD is to add value and move the peace process forward, its members have to develop clarity of mind that would facilitate the pursuance of a preferred option. Core objectives need to be clarified or prioritized, such as whether the peace process is moving toward a federal or unitary state, a confederal arrangement, an autonomous region or an independent sovereign state. To date, IGAD has been pushing for multiple, unclear, sometimes, contradictory options. For instance, the DOP provides for self-determination of the South while simultaneously safeguarding the unity of the Sudan. In April 2001, when President Moi of Kenya met President Bashir in Khartoum, seeking ways to revitalize the peace process, he illuminated this ambiguity by urging President Bashir to grant the South self-determination within an acceptable autonomous or semi-federal arrangement.³³ Other proposals include focusing on self-determination as a means of forcing the government to adopt internal reforms that make the option of unity more attractive to southerners.³⁴

Besides achieving this conceptual clarity, IGAD needs to deal with two issue areas: the technical question that arises in trying to give substance to a peace agreement; and the political question of how to achieve a consensus

internally, regionally and internationally.³⁵ The substance of the agreement could be aided greatly by clarity with respect to disaggregating definitions, areas of dispute such as resource control, sharing of power and deliberations on whether the DOP provides the basis for a comprehensive solution. Such clarity would help in prioritizing the steps toward peace, identifying interim arrangements and establishing the modalities of negotiation in terms of organizing sessions to avoid long breaks in between negotiations.

The second broad set of issues is related to political challenges that make a peace deal workable. Politically, an IGAD framework needs to provide for inclusiveness of all interested parties and incorporation of other agreements such as the Asmara declaration,³⁶ thought to go beyond the DOP in terms of providing for a referendum for the South. This would enhance participation and possibilities of dealing with concerns of parties other than the main ones to the conflict. Further, it involves answering the question of what political forces to put in place in support of a peace deal. Within the Sudan, there is a need to address the wavering commitment to self-determination of the South. The constituency for peace in the South needs to include actors in the North, some of whom still believe that self-determination in the South is a tactical concession and that southern Sudan cannot be independent and autonomous.³⁷ The SPLM/A concern that accepting self-determination for southern Sudan within the 1956 borders is a strategy by the North to divide the movement calls for attention. One way of dealing with this is by engaging in parallel but separate track of negotiations, internationally supervised, for the Nuba and southern Blue Nile. In other words, there is a need to initiate processes that provide guarantees for both sides. For instance, if a unitary Sudan is a proposition, it is imperative that the SPLM/A is reassured and believes that it can have political representation in both the South and North within a united federal Sudan.³⁸ IGAD is not well placed to offer such guarantees, and this is where the role of the international community, the UN in particular, becomes crucial in terms of a process of confidence building.

Actors at the National and Local Level

In the last five years, the numbers of opposition parties and groups associated with some or all of the demands pursued by rebel groups in the South have been on the rise in the North. This adds immense internal political pressure on the government in Khartoum. The unexpected signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Hassan Al Turabi³⁹ and the SPLA in February 2001, pledging cooperation in opposing the regime in

the North is a testimony to the deepening rift within the ruling elite.⁴⁰ Whether this pressure will create sufficient conditions for the government to deal with the South remains to be seen. So far, the government has promised internal changes including making declarations about its commitment to deal with the question of self-determination in the South. In January 2001, the minister of state in the Ministry of External Relations, Gabriel Roric Jur, promised a referendum on the status of southern Sudan. In a radio interview he spoke of three alternatives for southern Sudan, namely: a unitary Sudan; a federal system; or separation based on good neighborliness.⁴¹ While this declaration provides a basis from which to pressure the government to make good its promises, political developments are wearisome. The government, in spite of its minister's proclamation, extended for another year the state of emergency declared in 1999. Atrocities, killings and forceful removal of populations continue to occur, especially in the oil-rich areas of the Nuba Mountain and Blue Nile regions. This state of affairs led Catholic bishops to castigate the UN for its aloofness, proclaiming it a shame for the UN to stand by with folded hands as such atrocities continue.⁴² At the domestic level, the government has pledged constitutional changes and holds sporadic (secret) talks with the SPLM/A. While such developments have the potential to increase the momentum toward peace, they risk marginalizing the regional peace initiative, particularly if they continue to be pursued outside its framework.

The Local Actors

The year 1997 was a turning point for the communities in southern Sudan then experiencing increasing insecurity and heightening despair. Prospects for peace were worsening following the split within the SPLA and the multiplication of state-sponsored militia groups. As the humanitarian agencies grappled with the humanitarian disaster that accompanied this situation, fragile church structures began to encourage and facilitate local peace initiatives. One of these, the People to People Peace (PPP) initiative, which concerns itself with conflict resolution at the grassroots level, is expanding remarkably. Conceived within the framework of the NSCC, this initiative was borne out of extensive consultations and meetings between the SPLM and the NSCC in Yei County, after the former recognized and endorsed the role and contribution of the church in the peace process. Started in 1997, the initiative had two main objectives: to create a chaplaincy for the SPLA, and to provide continuous dialogue between the SPLM/A and the people. Focusing on resolving conflicts at the local level, the PPP

initiative trains people in leadership, conflict resolution and reconciliation skills. Operationally, it uses traditional methods of conflict resolution based on, among other things, dialogue, mutual forgiveness and compensation. Its broad vision is to cultivate and promote a culture of peace and tolerance.

After consultations with, and advice from, chiefs and elders, the NSCC started peace-building activities with the Nuer and Dinka communities on the West Bank. In March 1999, the NSCC organized the Wunlit meeting, which marked the beginning of negotiations that led to the Dinka/Nuer Wunlit Accord, signed at the end of the meeting by some 300 chiefs from the Dinka and Nuer communities. This accord provided for immediate cessation of hostilities, guarantee for the freedom of movement and charted out the modalities for sharing common resources and the terms for peaceful coexistence. Since the signing of the accord, there is increased access to shared resources such as fishing sites, farmland, grazing areas and trade between the Nuer and the Dinka. In August 1999, another meeting produced an agreement, signed in Chukudum between the Dinka and Didinga. Like the previous one, this initiative transformed once hostile relationships into relations of mutual understanding and respect.

Encouraged by the success achieved in the West Bank, the PPP initiative focused its program on intercommunal conflicts in the East Bank, in the Bor areas of the Upper Nile. Consultations with leaders of various communities saw a breakthrough that led to the Liliir peace conference held in May 2000. This meeting endorsed the Wunlit Accord and discussed issues related to access to animal grazing areas, water points, return of abducted children and women and declared an amnesty for previous offenses against people and property. The meeting ended with a public covenant between all ethnic groups and the signing of a comprehensive document pledging peace and reconciliation.⁴³ Like the previous accord, this accord has been upheld and peace at the community level restored. In July 2001, the NSCC organized a stocktaking workshop in Kisumu, Kenya. Attended by leaders from the areas that had signed the accords, this meeting sought to identify the gaps that could be addressed by follow-up activities as a means of sustaining the peace.

The extent to which these processes will be exported to other areas will depend on whether the framework for peace designed and pursued by other actors will build on their success. Potentially, these initiatives provide an opportunity to nurture peace from the bottom-up, grassroots and community levels. Although small and fragile they can anchor larger political processes. In terms of governance, their existence is also an opportunity for the growth of a nascent and vibrant civil society, which would play a critical role in supporting the peace process at the grassroots levels. Further, these

processes are creating a pool of local knowledge and expertise, which interventions can, if well designed, tap into and benefit from. In an attempt to participate in the regional peace initiative, the NSCC has sought observer status within the IGAD process. The challenge for IGAD lies in recognizing these initiatives and creating space for them to multiply.

Over time, the SPLM/A has attempted to transform itself from a rebel movement to a de facto government. Starting in 1984, it developed its own penal and disciplinary laws, which established general courtmartial, district courtmartial and summary courtmartial for the administration of justice in liberated areas.⁴⁴ Responding to demands for the separation of political activities and objectives from its military wing, the SPLA has instituted some restructuring. In 1994, it organized a National Convention that established the New Sudan People's Liberation Act (1994), which provided for, inter alia, the separation of the army from the civil administration.⁴⁵ In areas where it has a presence, the SPLM/A has established administrative structures. In the Nuba Mountains, it has a functioning civil administration and a regional assembly that meets regularly and legislates on major issues. The 1994 convention was followed by a series of conferences to operationalize its resolutions. Among them were a civil authority conference, a lawyers' conference, a women's conference, church conferences and an economists' conference. These meetings not only attracted international support they were also critical to the emergence of non-OLS relief cum development activities. They also helped forge networks between the various Sudanese actors. For instance, the community-based peace activities undertaken under the banner of the NSCC had their roots in the understanding stemming from these meetings and consultations.

Local structures provide an opportunity to improve governance inside the territories under rebel control. So far, the SPLM/A has benefited from training courses on administration and international humanitarian law under the USAID and other programs. Need exists to boost and strengthen available capacity, as a way of nurturing local administration and creating building blocks for future governance that will ensure sustainable peace, once the conflict is resolved. Again, such an effort can only be realized within a clearly designed intervention strategy.

International Actors and the Sudan

The last three years have witnessed mounting pressure for the international community and the UN to engage in the Sudan conflict. In addition to the

numerous human rights organizations that have been calling on the UN to intervene and end the war and associated atrocities, pressure groups within certain Western countries such as the United States, Canada and Sweden are increasingly urging their governments to address the conflict in the Sudan. Within the United States, congressional pressure led President Bush to appoint Senator John Danforth as the Special Envoy for Peace in the Sudan, in September 2001. His responsibilities include exploring the prospects of the United States playing a catalytic role in the search for a just end to the civil war and in enhancing humanitarian service delivery to ameliorate the effects of war. Since his appointment, Senator Danforth has made two trips to the Sudan and met representatives of the main parties to the conflict.⁴⁶ In this regard, he is believed to have been instrumental in pressurizing the leadership of both the SPLM/A and the SPDF to come up with the January 2002 declaration of unity.⁴⁷ In addition, he has visited with the representatives of several governments that have been supportive to the search for peace in the Sudan.

A consortium of Western European donor countries has also been watching developments in the Sudan closely. Originally referred to as Friends of IGAD, the core members of this group were Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. These countries began to engage with the Horn of Africa in the late 1980s. They played a critical role in the revitalization of IGAD and have continued to be significant donors and advisers to the IGAD Secretariat. This club of states has recently opened up to new membership and now includes members of the EU. To reflect this change in orientation the forum changed its name to the IGAD Partners Forum.⁴⁸

Pressure has also been mounting at the regional level, beyond IGAD, particularly in North Africa and across the Red Sea, with a number of states intervening in seeking peace in the Sudan. The most significant manifestation of these efforts coalesced in a joint initiative by Egypt and Libya, which the Government of Sudan signed in autumn 2001. Aware of the potential of this initiative to disrupt or weaken the IGAD process, the ninth summit of the IGAD heads of states and governments, in Khartoum in January 2002, mandated the president of Kenya, who chairs the Sudan peace process, to explore ways of integrating the IGAD and Egypt–Libya initiatives.⁴⁹ These regional and bilateral initiatives need to be managed in ways that produce multifaceted and coordinated action; otherwise they risk complicating the Sudan peace process further. The desired coherence is only attainable through a framework provided by an actor that enjoys higher authority and legitimacy, and is perceived as impartial. More fundamentally, involvement in the Sudan must address the challenge of organizing responses that build on and support ongoing initiatives, rather than overshadow, destroy or

undermine the progress achieved thus far. The UN is uniquely placed to provide such robust leadership. Unfortunately, the UN has not demonstrated any leadership in the Sudan.

The United Nations and the Sudan Conflict

At a time of growing challenges to African peace and security, the UN is either conspicuously absent from the region or, if present, has had its role substantially marginalized.⁵⁰ The emerging division of labor between the UN and regional organizations emphasizes the former's reliance on the latter to deal with security. This is troubling for Africa where the demand for peacekeepers is arguably the greatest, yet indigenous capacity faces the greatest obstacles. Faced with grave threats to their security, and aware of the Security Council's reluctance to become meaningfully involved in conflicts on their continent, the 1990s saw African states strive to respond to conflict and complex humanitarian emergencies in their midst. To this end, they have shown a greater willingness to prepare for and undertake diplomatic and military actions jointly with the UN. In addition, African regional organizations have restructured their mandates to allow for the creation of collective security mechanisms.⁵¹ However, in the face of the scale of conflicts, their capacities remain limited.

The UN's largest and primary presence in the Sudan comes in the form of relief operations—in particular Operational Lifeline Sudan.⁵² While some commentators argue that this operation has ameliorated the human suffering in southern Sudan, others criticize it for being ineffective. Some critics argue that in spite of the large amounts of resources associated with OLS since it began in 1989, the people of southern Sudan are no better protected against famine than they were then.⁵³ This situation is blamed largely on the fact that OLS relies on “negotiated access.” This means that the UN and all humanitarian actors must seek and obtain permission from the Khartoum government, as well as the SPLA, before delivering aid. In some cases, the government has used its prerogative to obstruct aid to “enemy” populations. For instance, on various occasions, the government has allowed OLS operations in government-controlled areas in the Nuba Mountains (south of Kodofan), to the exclusion of SPLA administered areas. This means some communities that deserve assistance remain without, defeating the purpose of the operation. In May 1998, reflecting this concern, Kofi Annan, the UN secretary-general, obtained a promise from the Sudanese government to permit the UN humanitarian access to the SPLM-controlled areas of the Nuba Mountains. However, this promise was not

honored, nor was the government held accountable for the consequences that followed. Anxious to stay in good terms with both sides, the UN has remained unwilling to criticize the government when aid is blocked. This has led to calamities in places like Bahr el Ghazal in March 1998, where thousands of people died for lack of relief assistance.⁵⁴ Such occurrences have led to the conclusion that OLS is part of the war effort rather than an operation that ameliorates its negative consequences.

As far as the civil conflict is concerned, the UN reaction can at best be described as ambivalent. Wars based on claims for self-determination, such as the one in the Sudan, are among the most deadly and intractable conflicts on the peace and security agenda of the UN. In demanding to exercise the right to self-determination, southern Sudan presents a situation where secession is probably a preferred option. However, the UN has remained reluctant to lend support for such claims. The UN has, therefore, been playing on the margins of the problem. In spite of the length of this conflict, and its security ramifications, the UN Security Council has not passed a single resolution dealing with the conflict. The extent of the council's activity has been in response to the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa in June 1995. The council passed three resolutions relating to the incident, imposing sanctions on the Sudan in order to pressure it into handing over suspects in the assassination attempt.⁵⁵

Does the United Nations Have a Role in the Sudan?

The involvement of the UN in the Sudan is desirable now more than ever. Given the myriad interests at play, only the UN can provide the type of leadership required. Only the UN has an impartial image, which is crucial in reenergizing and pushing the negotiations to a successful conclusion. UN engagement in the Sudan can take one of two forms. The first would involve the creation of a framework for a UN brokered peace. Such a framework requires determining the parameters that guide negotiations, designing the terms of negotiation and perhaps appointing a UN negotiator to guide and move the process to its conclusion. Within such a framework one can envisage a UN mission with a mandate to make and enforce peace as a basis for a transitional national or regional administration.⁵⁶ The mandate of such a mission would include demobilization, initial reconstruction and rehabilitation, facilitating repatriation of refugees and developing quick-impact projects as a measure to stabilize populations. An expanded and sustained Mozambique-type involvement provides a prototype for such a model of UN involvement.

A second form of UN involvement would involve the UN engaging in revamping, reinforcing and complementing the existing IGAD initiative for

Sudan. A critical challenge for this model lies in ensuring that the UN supports IGAD without overshadowing it, setting up a parallel peace process that might reverse the progress achieved thus far or getting involved in ways that are detrimental to regional peace and security. Embracing existing initiatives calls for the UN to focus on three critical areas, namely, the IGAD Secretariat, pressuring key parties to deliver peace and establishing support structures.

The IGAD Secretariat

A first step is for the UN to reinforce and support IGAD as the focal point and the exclusive vehicle for negotiating peace in the Sudan. This will enhance the legitimacy of the IGAD framework, act as a disincentive for any parallel initiative and boost the status and commitment of IGAD member-states. In addition to legitimizing IGAD, UN support ought to enhance the capacity of the Sudan Peace Process Secretariat, located in Nairobi. Specifically, the UN can provide expertise to strengthen the Secretariat's technical committees, which deal with the substantive issues for discussion and negotiation between the warring parties. The UN can also strengthen the process of shuttle diplomacy, now conducted by Kenya's foreign minister, by providing him with a team of experts that focus on critical aspects of the negotiations, and that keep the Sudan agenda alive with concerned governments.

Putting Pressure on Key Actors

A second level where the UN can play a crucial role is in exerting pressure on both national and international actors to remain committed to the peace process. First among these actors are the parties to the conflict. Critical among these is the Government of Sudan, which needs to be persuaded to return to the negotiating table, to demonstrate commitment to the search for peace and to keep its promises. To monitor developments within the Sudan, the UN can, and should, appoint a full-time Special Representative of the secretary-general on the Sudan. Proposals on the table include creating an international ombudsperson for minority rights, with a mandate, profile and mission similar to that of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's High Commission for national minorities, or strengthening the offices of the US Presidential Special Envoy for Peace in the Sudan and/or the United Nations Rapporteur on Human Rights in the Sudan. Such an office would maintain sustained pressure on actors within the Sudan to deliver peace.

The UN is also well placed to put pressure on the Sudan to respect international conventions and treaties to which it is a signatory. The Sudan

is a signatory to both the 1926 Slavery Convention and the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery. While the Government of Sudan maintains that there is no slavery in the Sudan, and responded to a 1995 UN General Assembly resolution on human rights in the Sudan by establishing a Special Committee to Investigate Slavery and Disappearances in 1996,⁵⁷ emerging evidence points to the contrary. Reports continue to indicate that slavery is alive in this country, claims that have been further confirmed by the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Sudan, Leonardo Franco.⁵⁸ So far, the Sudan's support for the global coalition against terrorism is a step in the right direction. However, to have relevance in the context of the conflict, the international community will have to expand the scope of its pressure on the Sudan, to include issues of its government's relationship with its citizens.

As a member of the AU, the Sudan is bound by its Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa. It is also bound by the 1989 International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries (though not in force), which prohibits the use of mercenaries.⁵⁹ The indications that the government is sanctioning the formation, existence and operation of militia that reign terror in parts of southern Sudan is in contravention of these instruments. The UN should demand compliance with international standards and put pressure to bear on the Sudan. The appointment of the Sudan to the UN Human Rights Commission in 2001 provides an added point of pressure for the UN in calling the government to be accountable.

Second, the UN is well placed to exert pressure and influence on other interested states to support a process toward peace. In particular, it can act to prevent states like Egypt and Libya from sabotaging the peace process by ensuring that their interests and fears will be addressed within the negotiating framework. In this case, the decision by the ninth IGAD summit of heads of state and governments, to integrate the Egypt–Libyan initiative to the IGAD framework is a starting point for cooperation between these two initiatives.

The UN can also bring pressure to bear on the IGAD as the facilitative organ for the Sudan peace process. If it supports IGAD's capacity, it can also demand accountability or seek partnership toward peace in the Sudan. So far IGAD has been accountable only to itself and any minor differences among member-states directly affects the negotiation process. If the UN played an overseer's role, stalemates of this kind would be reduced considerably.

Establishing Support Structures

Finally, the resources and political clout needed to sustain negotiations as well as peace, once a deal is clinched, can only come from the international

community. Such support is essential to processes and structures that support peace. Key among them is the process of confidence building across all actors involved. Confidence is the basis upon which goodwill and drive for concession during the negotiations is built. It also enables negotiators to deal with and allay the fears of various parties. The situation in the Sudan generates fears in and beyond the Sudan about the implications of self-determination for the South. These can only be eliminated by concerted confidence-building measures. Such measures would also safeguard the peace process from being taken hostage by extremist forces on either side. The international community needs to make strong gestures to the Nuba, starting with the delivery of humanitarian assistance and extension of cease-fires to the region, as a process of confidence building. Only the UN can undertake this kind of operation without jeopardizing the peace process. This is because the UN enjoys a high level of legitimacy, and it is also less likely to run the risk of being perceived as a partial broker. More importantly, it has the capacity to mobilize the scale of resources required for such activities, from a wider range of donors and governments across the world.

Resources are critical in supporting the peace process, as well as achieving sustainable peace. Negotiating peace is slow, painful and expensive. Resources are, therefore, a necessary and crucial element to the whole process of supporting peace structures and processes. One approach for boosting the resources available is to boost the IGAD peace fund. Since its creation, in 1999, this fund has received approximately US\$1 million. Spending this money was limited to paying for the negotiation sessions and not any other support or preparatory activities. Yet, the Secretariat has no mandate to fundraise for other equally important activities. For the past three years, this Secretariat has been cash-strapped and unable to prepare adequately for sessions.⁶⁰ Sustained peace negotiations will depend on the availability of resources and facilitation in terms of preparations prior to the negotiations. Resources will also be crucial in ensuring a sustainable peace. In this case, the UN can, and should, devise a comprehensive reconstruction plan for the Sudan to address the three critical challenges that will face the country whether it goes the unitary or confederal way.

The first of the challenges is providing for genuine pluralism, whether the Sudan remains unitary or separated. This requires a major reformulation of the current constitutional framework that is based on the Islamic *Sharia* law. The second challenge relates to the question of devolution of power. Genuine devolution of power can work only if it goes hand-in-hand with the devolution of control over resources (notably land) and a restructuring of the basis of the Sudanese economy. Whether the Sudan remains as one nation or splits requires confronting questions related to the access, control and

distribution of resources. How this is resolved will determine the sustainability of peace. International assistance can play a key role in supporting these political changes and in backstopping an interim arrangement. Finally, there is the sensitive issue of security forces. A successful transition to peace and democracy in the Sudan is likely to stand or fall on the question of security services, armies and militias. Experiences from similar situations in Africa, and elsewhere, indicate that incomplete or mismanaged disarmament and demobilization is a likely cause of resumption of war. The demilitarization of the Sudanese society and politics is a particular challenge because there are so many armed groups with ethnic, political, religious and commercial loyalties across the country. Military and armed groups from either side could hold the transition hostage to their agendas. A transitional government that can steer between these dangers without lapsing into authoritarianism or anarchy will demand considerable skill, legitimacy and resources. The need to buttress a government and associated structures operating in a fragile political and military environment cannot be emphasized enough. A UN framework, with a mission whose mandate is to make and enforce peace can curtail the impact of any negative forces that may characterize this period.

Conclusion

The Sudan question calls for multifaceted and coordinated action. Such action should aim to deliver an honorable peace that all can accept without undue loss of face. Given the number of actors and interests involved and the nature of pressure at work in the Sudan, only a credible and sustained involvement of third parties, representing the international community, can ensure achievement of peace with justice.⁶¹ Some analysts propose that the United States, in concert with the IGAD partners forum take the lead role in the Sudan peace initiative. I am inclined to oppose this view. I argue that only a UN-sponsored, regionally led peace process has the legitimacy and status of impartiality required for the tasks in the Sudan. A UN-led or UN-sponsored initiative is unlikely to suffer from being associated with one or several member-states. To cater to regional interests and to draw from previous initiatives, I have argued that UN involvement should build on and support the IGAD regional mechanism. Difficult as it is, the Sudan conflict presents the UN with an opportunity to reclaim its role as the custodian of international peace and security.

In sum, solutions proposed by numerous analysts, such as the restructuring of the national framework, the decisive defeat and domination of the

South or the partition of, or disintegration of the Sudan, generate dilemmas that call for actors to take brave strategic choices at the national, regional and international level. Any evasion in confronting such uncomfortable choices is likely to lead to failed attempts at peace in the Sudan. As Francis Deng and others conclude, the only viable course to end the Sudan's war is through a hard-nosed strategy based on diplomacy, heightened engagement with all parties, enhanced inducement and punitive measures and concerted multi-lateral initiatives.

Finally, the peace process in the Sudan needs to be conceived within a regional framework, in response to the realization that the problems of this region are interconnected and that the peace, security and the stability of neighboring countries is indivisible. With such a daunting call, the five million dollar question can be stated as follows: is the international community, led by the UN, ready to bring pressure to bear on the critical stakeholders in this process, and further, will it provide the necessary and sufficient guarantees to make the Sudan peace process workable and sustainable?

Notes

1. The agreement was concluded by Britain and Egypt, as a basis for protecting their mutual interests. In this case, access to the Suez Canal for Britain, and continued use of the Nile waters for Egypt.
2. The UN's minimalist approach is evident in its own fact sheet on the Sudan. See "United Nations and Sudan," at <http://www.un.org/peace/africa/pdf/Sudan.pdf> (last visited March 9, 2003).
3. The history, nature and development of the civil war in the Sudan are a subject of numerous publications. For the causes and origins of the war, see e.g., A.H. Idris, "State Building, Race Making and Violence in Southern Sudan: The Legacy of Slavery," paper presented at the workshop on *State Formation and Political Identities in the Horn of Africa*, Institute of African Studies (IAS), Columbia University, April 6, 2001; Francis Deng, paper at the IAS Workshop, *ibid.*; Korwa G. Adar, *Sudan: The Internal and External Contexts of Conflict and Conflict Resolution*, Writenet Paper No. 06/2000, UNHCR, 2000. Gerard Prunier, *Identity Crises and the Weak State: The Making of the Sudanese Civil War*, UNHCR, Writenet Country Papers, 1996, and Ann Lesch, *The Sudan: Contested National Identities* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1999).
4. The Sudan has, since independence, been governed by civilian parliamentary democracies (1956–1958; 1964–1969; 1986–1989) and totalitarian military regimes (1958–1964; 1969–1985; 1989–present), all of which were characterized by a glaring absence of the participation of the southern Sudanese.
5. The Sudan became independent on January 1, 1956.

6. This declaration was based on two principles: the administration of the Sudan as a Confederal/Federal united secular democratic country in an interim period and the self-determination of the people of southern Sudan. It provided for the immediate cessation of hostilities, the combining of previously antagonistic military units into a single fighting force; the conduct of operations against the Khartoum regime; the free movement of people in all liberated areas and the constitution of technical committees to work out the details of integrating the military forces and the political and governance structures. See, *The Nairobi Declaration on Unity Between the SPLM/A and SPDF*, Nairobi, January 6, 2002.
7. For more on this see, Francis M. Deng, "Sudan, An African Dilemma," in Ricardo René Laremont, ed., *The Causes of War and the Consequences of Peacekeeping in Africa* (Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2002), pp. 61–89.
8. An increasing number of oil companies from China, Canada, Malaysia and Sweden have obtained concessions to exploit oil in the Sudan.
9. This was confirmed in a recent study by the UN Commission for Human Rights Rapporteur, Grehart Braum. African Church Information Service, April 17, 2001.
10. After the 1989 coup, military procurement rose dramatically from US\$204 million in 1990 to more than US\$766 million in 1992. Current estimates indicate that the Sudan is spending over US\$1 million per day in its campaign, Adar, *Sudan: The Internal and External Contexts of Conflict*, p. 7.
11. See e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 17–18; Amnesty International, *Sudan: Oil in the Sudan*, AFR 54/001/2000, 2000.
12. As part of this policy, the government enforces a mandatory military training as a precondition for university and college admission in the Sudan.
13. Government forces include the regular army; members of ethnic groups armed by the previous governments of Presidents Sadiq al-Mahdi and Muhammed Nimeiri; and government-organized militia, in particular the Popular Defence Forces (PDF) with its holy warriors (mujahedin) who claim to be fighting a jihad. See e.g., Amnesty International, *Sudan*, AFR 54/001/2000.
14. This incident saw the Sudan blacklisted as a state sponsoring terrorism, a development that further isolated it from the community of nations.
15. Since 1989, OLS is estimated to have cost in excess of US\$60 million annually. The United States alone has contributed some US\$1.6 billion to humanitarian operations in southern Sudan thus far. See Hans van de Veen, "Who has the Will for Peace?" in Monique Mekenkamp, Paul van Tongeren and Hans van de Veen, eds., *Searching for Peace in Africa. An Overview of Conflict Prevention and Management Activities* (European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1999). Also see A/56/412, September 27, 2001, for a description of ongoing activities under OLS.
16. These estimates exclude those of Sudanese in Eritrea and Ethiopia. For refugee flows and their destination, see UNHCR, *Refugees by Number*, Geneva, 2002. Sudan also hosts some 392,000 refugees.

17. Of these three communities, the Turkana have suffered the most, in terms of loss of humans and animals. Demographic figures indicate that their numbers have declined by nearly a third in the last 15 years. While famine and drought have contributed to this development, violent acts and insecurity are a significant contributing factor to their dwindling numbers. See Monica K. Juma, *The Politics of Humanitarian Assistance. The State, NGOs and Displacement in Kenya and Uganda (1989–1999)*, D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 2000, pp. 140–142.
18. This initiative was built on an early attempt by Nigeria, dubbed the Abuja conference, steered by General Babaginda. Interview with Stephen Wundu, SPLM/A Representative (Ambassador Designate) in Washington DC, October 2001.
19. Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Agreement Establishing the IGAD, IGAD/SUM-96/AGRE-Doc, Nairobi, March 21, 1996.
20. For a detailed analysis of the IGAD capacity to respond to crisis and conflict see, Monica K. Juma, “IGAD and EAC Blocs in the Promotion of Regional Security: Lessons for SADC,” in Christopher Landsberg and Mwesiga Baregu, *From Cape to Congo: Southern Africa’s Evolving Security Challenges* (Boulder, Lynne Rienner, 2003). For a detailed analysis of the peace processes in the Sudan, see Stephen Wundu and Ann Lesch, *Battle for Peace* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999), and also Abdelwahab El-Affendi, “The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan: The Limits of Regional Peacemaking?” *African Affairs*, vol. 100, no. 41 (2001), pp. 581–599. For further background information also see the IGAD website: www.igadregion.org.
21. Cited by Ann Lesch, January 11, 1999, in comments on the evolution of the positions of self-determination held by the SPLA and the NDA, at consultations on the Sudan held by the United States Institute for Peace, available online at: <http://www.usip.org/oc/sr/ann-lesch.pdf> (last visited March 9, 2003).
22. The text of the DOP is available at: <http://www.usinternet.com/users/helpsudan/dop.pdf> (last visited March 9, 2003).
23. Interview with Steven Wundu, SPLM/A Representative in Nairobi, April 12, 2002.
24. The signing of a peace agreement between the government and three rebel factions on April 21, 1997 generated some initial momentum toward these negotiations. While an important political signal, the main opposition groups rejected the agreement. The agreement is available online at: <http://www.sufo.demon.co.uk/pax010.htm> (last visited March 9, 2003).
25. Besides the pressure that the Government of Sudan was facing from the other states, it had also conceded defeat at the hands of the SPLM/A at several fronts and was keen to have a cease-fire. On April 21, 1997, the government signed a peace agreement with three rebel factions.
26. Interview with Ambassador Mboya, IGAD Special Envoy, Sudan Peace Secretariat, Nairobi, June 2001. Ambassador Mboya has since been replaced by Lazarus Sumbeiywo.

27. A good overview of regional relations during this period can be found in, Lionel Cliffe, "Regional Dimensions of Conflict in the Horn of Africa," *Third World Quarterly*, vol. 20, no. 1 (1999), pp. 89–111.
28. The National Assembly of Sudan passed the Islamic constitution in March 1998. By this act, *Sharia* law became the supreme law in Sudan.
29. Al Turabi was arrested on February 21, 2001. See IRIN, "Irin Focus on Turabi Arrest: 'A Relationship Gone Sour,'" February 22, 2001; IRIN, "Turabi Faces Charges of Sedition and Incitement," March 16, 2001.
30. Egypt is particularly concerned that a divided Sudan might threaten the Nile water treaty.
31. It is assumed that this treaty will generate trade worth some US\$1million annually.
32. At a consultation on a new approach to peace in the Sudan, organized by the United States Institute for Peace in March 2001, participants were in agreement that in spite of its shortcomings, IGAD should remain the core unit for the Sudan peace process. This position is shared by a number of commentators on the Sudan as well as by the SPLA. See e.g., Prunier, *Identity Crises and the Weak State*. For the SPLM/A, IGAD provides a necessary platform to articulate its position. Interview with Stephen Wondu, April 12, 2002.
33. IRIN, "Sudan-Kenya: Moi calls for 'acceptable' autonomy," April 3, 2001.
34. See Alex de Waal, "The Road to Peace in Sudan: Prospects for Pluralism in Northern Sudan," in *A New Approach to Peace in Sudan* (Washington DC: USIP, 1999).
35. Abdul Mohamed, "The Road to Peace in Sudan: Bringing the IGAD process to a Conclusion," in *ibid*.
36. Concluded in 1995, the Asmara agreement was signed between the SPLM/A and the major opposition parties in the North. Signatories resolved to work together to remove the government through political and military means, create a new constitution, establish an interim government based on equality and administer a referendum on unity or independence for the South. See, *Asmara Agreement*, 1995.
37. Mohamed, "The Road to Peace in Sudan."
38. *Ibid*.
39. More than any other single Sudanese, Hassan al-Turabi has wielded enormous power within several Sudanese regimes. He served in Jaafar al-Numeiry's government as attorney general between 1979 and 1982 and remained the presidential adviser on legal and foreign affairs until he was imprisoned in 1985. In 1988, the National Islamic Front (which he founded) and later renamed the National Congress, joined the government of Sadiq al-Mahdi, in which he served as attorney general, minister of justice and minister of foreign affairs. When Omar al-Bashir took over, Turabi served as the speaker of parliament until 1999, and later as the secretary-general of the National Congress Party. More significantly, he has served as the most influential Islamic ideologue, and advocated a hard-line stance against the SPLA. Dubbed in the past by Western media as the "pope of

Terrorism,” Turabi is known to have mocked America’s attempts to pursue Osama Bin Laden following the terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. In mid-2000, following disagreements with Bashir and owing to international pressure, the government sidelined him. Al-Turabi responded by resigning from the ruling party and founding his party: the Popular National Congress. Following a widening rift between him and al-Bashir, he reportedly signed a “memorandum of understanding” with the SPLA in February 2001, sparking an air of uncertainty within the government, which citing threat to its national security, arrested him a week later. Since then he has been under house arrest and government surveillance.

40. Attempts to reconcile Al Turabi and Bashir have so far failed.
41. Interview with *Radio France Internationale*, monitored by BBC January 27, 2001.
42. Alex De Waal, “The Road to Peace in Sudan.”
43. The accord is available online at: <http://members.tripod.com/SudanInfonet/LiliirPeace.htm> (last visited March 9, 2003).
44. See A.Y. Atem, “The Current Status of the Civil–Military Relations: the Case of the SPLA,” paper presented at the *Conference on Civil–Military Relations*, Nairobi, April 1999.
45. Adar, *Sudan: The Internal and External Contexts of Conflict*, p. 10
46. John Prendergast, “Senator Danforth’s Sudan Challenge: Building a Bridge to Peace,” CSIS, *Africa Notes*, no. 5 (January 2002).
47. The text of the declaration is available at: <http://www.sudan.net/news/press/postedr/66.shtml> (last visited March 9, 2003).
48. This arrangement is the first of its kind in Africa and remains useful in terms of ensuring sustained pressure on governments both within the region and internationally to focus on the Sudan conflict, among other issues in the IGAD region. Although the impact of the IPF is not quantifiable, there is no doubt that it has made a considerable contribution in ensuring that the Sudan does not fade from the international agenda, as happens with most issues affecting Africa.
49. Since then, Egypt has expressed interest in co-chairing the Sudan peace process with Kenya. Interview with Stephen Wondu, SPLM/A Representative to Washington DC, in Nairobi, April 12, 2002.
50. For a landscape on the security architecture in Africa see, Monica K. Juma and A. Mengistu, *The Infrastructure of Peace in Africa: Assessing the Peace Building Capacity of African Institutions*, IPA Report to Ford Foundation, 2001.
51. See Berman and Sams, chapter 3, in this volume.
52. OLS is coordinated from Nairobi and operated from Lokichoggio on the border of Kenya and the Sudan.
53. Among the ardent critics is Van Veen, “Who Has the Will for Peace?” For an overview see, Larry Minear, T.A. Abuom, *Humanitarianism Under Siege: A Critical Review of Operation Lifeline Sudan* (Trenton NJ: Red Sea Press, 1991).

54. For more on this, see e.g., Human Rights Watch, *Sudan: How Human Rights Abuses Caused the Disaster*, HRW Background Paper on the 1998 Famine in Bahr el Ghazal, Sudan, 1998, available online at: <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/sudan98/> (last visited on March 9, 2003).
55. Security Council Resolution 1044, January 31, 1996; Security Council Resolution 1054, April 26, 1996; Security Council Resolution 1070, August 16, 1996. Even then, comprehensive sanctions were never put into force. In September 2001, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1372 lifting the sanctions detailed in the earlier resolutions. Security Council Resolution 1372, September 28, 2001.
56. The UN mission in East Timor and Kosovo are examples of models that can be adapted for such a framework.
57. General Assembly Resolution 50/197, December 22, 1995. The resolution “Urges the Government of the Sudan to investigate without delay the cases of slavery, servitude, slave trade, forced labour and similar practices brought to its attention and to take all appropriate measures to put an immediate end to these practices.”
58. See e.g., Washington Office on Africa, *Slavery, War and Peace in Sudan* (Washington DC, November 1999), available at: www.woafrica.org (last visited March 9, 2003).
59. Adar, *Sudan: The Internal and External Contexts of Conflict*.
60. Interview with Lydia Abuya, IGAD Rapporteur, Political Affairs, Nairobi, June 2001.
61. Deng, paper at the IAS Workshop, April 2001, p. 23.

CHAPTER 8

Burundi

Gilbert M. Khadiagala

Introduction

The UN's engagement of African regional organizations in conflict management constitutes one of the dominant trends in the post-Cold War era. Captured in the dual conceptual lenses of multilateralism and regionalism, this engagement is often couched in the functionalist terms of partnership where regional organizations become the fulcrums for conflict prevention, peace building, and peacekeeping while the UN assumes the essential role of mobilization of global resources and leverage. Partnership proceeds from the assumption of African ownership of local problems as major players in the UN Security Council reduce their roles in these conflicts.¹

Yet as regional organizations shoulder more responsibilities, there have been tensions between ownership and partnership. These tensions stem from two factors. First, since ownership is a question of resources and responsibilities, regional actors have to continually grapple with the transformation of conflict management roles into credible processes. Second, UN partnership with regional organizations requires the presence of predictable patterns of institutions, norms, and leadership, key questions inextricably tied to the formidable challenge of constructing sturdy institutions for regionalism in Africa. Balancing the ideals of ownership and partnership becomes difficult where regional institutions are still new and untested in peacemaking and conflict resolution tasks. It is for this reason that effective engagement of African organizations in conflict resolution confronts problems of

coordination between the UN and its agencies, and the wide array of other actors converging about these conflicts.

This chapter examines the interaction of regional actors and the UN in dealing with the civil war in Burundi since the assassination of elected President Melchior Ndadaye in October 1993. The first section of the chapter provides a brief overview of the background to the crisis. In the second section I focus on the diplomatic initiatives conducted by UN Secretary-General's Special Envoy, former Mauritanian foreign minister, Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, between November 1993 and October 1995. I examine the intervention of regional states in sustaining a peace process through the mediation initiative of former Tanzanian president, Julius Nyerere, in the third section of the chapter. This section also addresses the contentious role of regional sanctions against the military government of Pierre Buyoya in the face of a stalled mediation effort. Finally, I analyze pertinent issues relating to the resumption of peace talks in 1998 and the signing of an agreement in August 2000 against the backdrop of a transition in mediation roles from Nyerere to former South African president, Nelson Mandela. The conclusion reflects on issues for regional and international efforts arising from this experience and draws lessons from what remains an unresolved conflict.

Origins of the Crisis

The civil war in Burundi, in which almost half a million people have died since October 1993, stems from conflicts over political participation and resource scarcity, compounded by regional imbalances and the militarization of society. After decades of Tutsi military and political dominance, President Buyoya and his Union for National Progress Party (UPRONA), under international pressure for democratization, launched constitutional reforms that led, in June 1993, to multiparty elections.²

Melchior Ndadaye and his Hutu-dominated party won the presidential election, and the Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) won the parliamentary elections. Although Ndadaye captured 65 percent of the presidential vote and FRODEBU won 80 percent of parliamentary seats, Ndadaye included some Tutsis in the cabinet.³ This gesture of national reconciliation did not alter the sense of loss of power on the part of the Tutsi military. Shortly after assuming power, the new government confronted competing pressures from Tutsis seeking to retain their military and economic power and Hutus clamoring for the benefits of majority rule. When President Ndadaye embarked on reforms to redress ethnic power imbalances

in the military and economic realms, the military launched a coup in October 1993 that resulted in Ndadaye's assassination. This assassination plunged the country into a brutal wave of communal violence, in which up to 50,000 people were killed and 150,000 people displaced. Neighboring Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zaire (the DRC) bore the brunt of the mostly Hutu refugees fleeing from the conflict.⁴



Map No. 3753 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS
January 2001

Department of Public Information
Cartographic Section

Map 8.1 Burundi.

The Pressure for Intervention

Ndadaye's assassination and the reversal of the democratic experiment galvanized international pressure for external intervention to check the tide of ethnic annihilation and restore constitutional order. But external actors faced significant obstacles due to severe conflicts within Burundi about the nature of outside involvement. The Burundi military, nominally out of power, sought to ward off external interveners while Hutu civilian parties, seeking to prevent the progressive erosion of their democratic gains, were anxious to invite outsiders into the conflict. This internal contest was decisive in shaping the extent of subsequent intervention efforts.

Following Ndadaye's assassination and the resulting interethnic massacres, UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (with the support of France), proposed an international military intervention force to restore stability. In a statement on October 25, 1993, the UN Security Council condemned the military act "against the democratically elected Government of Burundi," and demanded that its perpetrators desist from any action that would "exacerbate the tension and plunge the country into more violence and bloodshed, which would have serious implications for peace and security in the region." The council demanded the immediate reinstatement of democracy and constitutional rule in Burundi, noting that the "perpetrators of the putsch should lay down their arms and return to their barracks."⁵ From the outset, however, a majority of the members of the UN Security Council, smarting from the botched intervention in Somalia, were reluctant to consider military intervention. Instead, the Security Council dispatched UN under secretary-general, James Jonah, on a fact-finding mission to Bujumbura in late October 1993. During the mission, Jonah proposed a settlement plan that would have entailed the withdrawal of the military from politics and the reconstitution of civilian institutions. But he explicitly ruled out UN intervention "because of the costs and dangers to member states." In response to Prime Minister Sylvie Kinigi's call for UN military intervention, Jonah appealed to Africa to use the mechanism newly created by the OAU (now the AU) on conflict prevention to intervene in the conflict.⁶

The Organization of African Unity's Role

The Security Council's reluctance to take direct action forced the regional states most affected by the influx of refugees to coalesce around an OAU initiative. In late October 1993, leaders from Rwanda, Tanzania, and Zaire, spearheaded calls for an OAU-led intervention force. As a result, the OAU proposed a Mission for Protection and Restoration of Trust in Burundi

(MIPROBU), consisting of about 180 soldiers and 20 civilians, to restore order and mediate the selection of a new president and the military's withdrawal from power. The proposed force elicited acrimonious internal debate between the Tutsi military and civilian parties who saw MIPROBU as regional interference, while FRODEBU and its allies continued to press for a larger force to provide confidence in civilian institutions. Burundi's foreign minister, Paul Munyembari, observed:

The number is small but the OAU told us that they feared that a bigger force would not be acceptable to the Burundi army... The OAU peace-keeping force would not be deployed in Burundi to fight the army, but to protect the government that no longer trusts the army, so that a process of meaningful dialogue can begin. An army that turns on its commander-in-chief [Ndadaye] cannot be trusted. The Burundi army is one that is feared by the nationals. We hope the presence of a token external force will shame them into loyalty to a democratically-elected government.⁷

In an attempt to mollify domestic opponents of the force, OAU secretary general, Salim A. Salim noted: "We don't think the OAU mission will cause any problems as the opposition thinks. Burundi has an estimated 15,000-men in the army. How can 180 OAU soldiers cause a threat? We are going to talk to the opposition to ensure the mission goes there to restore peace and harmony. The refusal by the opposition will not be in the interest of the people of Burundi, the OAU and the region."⁸ In November 1993, the OAU succeeded in convincing the military to allow the deployment of 70 observers, but when the MIPROBU finally deployed in February 1994, it had a team of only 18.⁹

The United Nations in the Lead Mediation Role, 1993–1995

The November concession on the OAU mission coincided with the UN Security Council's approval of a small mediation team led by former Mauritanian foreign minister Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah as the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The mediation had four goals:

- to restore the democratic institutions overthrown by the abortive coup of October 21;
- to facilitate dialogue between the parties;
- to establish a commission of inquiry into the events of October and the ensuing massacres;
- and to work in close collaboration with the OAU.¹⁰

Ould-Abdallah has reflected on the state of the debate about external intervention at the start of his mission:

Some FRODEBU leaders were calling for foreign troops, no fewer than 5,000 men—an idea strongly opposed by members of UPRONA... One unfortunate misapprehension was the conviction held by the Burundian government that its “cause” was the first item on international agenda. Time and again, government officials asserted that “troops will arrive to protect and nurture this new-born democracy.” They became prisoners of their own speeches, much to the delight of extremist Tutsis who were better informed and more realistic about international affairs and the priorities of the international community.¹¹

As the secretary-general’s Special Representative, Ould-Abdallah epitomized the emerging relationship between the UN and regional actors in conflict resolution, drawing on dual African and UN experiences. He forged a relationship with OAU representative Papa Louis Fall, sharing information and holding joint meetings with Burundian parties. This relationship was solidified in late 1994 with the expansion of the OAU mission to 70 military and 12 civilian officers. Through these collaborative efforts, Ould-Abdallah, engaged the parties in a process of confidence building to restore public institutions, producing a collective agreement in January 1994. In this agreement, the National Assembly selected a Hutu President Cyprien Ntaryamira, who then appointed a Tutsi Prime Minister to lead a multiparty cabinet government in which the Tutsi gained 40 percent of the seats.¹²

The January 1994 power-sharing agreement produced only a lull in the crisis. Violent clashes between the military and armed civilian groups gripped Bujumbura in March 1994. In response some Hutu leaders renewed their appeals for an enhanced international military force that would put an end to ethnic clashes, disarm the Burundian army, and help establish a new national army.¹³

But all of these moves were interrupted when President Ntaryamira died in a plane that was carrying Rwanda’s President Juvenal Habyarimana from Arusha to Kigali in April 1994. International attention shifted from Burundi to the unfolding genocide in Rwanda. Ould-Abdallah began frantic preventive diplomacy with major leaders in Burundi to contain the impact of Ntaryamira’s death and Rwanda’s collapse. Ould-Abdallah’s presence in Bujumbura prevented a deterioration of the political situation in Burundi but the convulsion in Rwanda had a decisive influence on Burundi’s power-sharing negotiations during summer and fall 1994.

This next phase of negotiations on a new power-sharing arrangement was dominated by the Burundi military's determination to use Rwanda's genocide to further curtail the political power of Hutus. The National Assembly chose FRODEBU's Sylvester Ntibantunganya as the interim president in May 1994. In July 1994, the talks deadlocked over opposition proposals for the creation of an unelected National Security Council that would curb presidential power. President Ntibantunganya described these proposals as a contravention of the will of the majority, but opposition groups prevailed through the use of strikes, street demonstrations, and violence.¹⁴ In August 1994, the political parties reached a delicate power-sharing agreement that replaced the 1992 constitution with a Convention of Government, giving 55 percent of cabinet positions to Hutus and 45 percent to Tutsis. The power to approve all government decisions was bestowed on the National Security Council. On September 14, 1994, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali welcomed the signing of the Convention of Government and described it as a "significant breakthrough."¹⁵

The major task of the Convention of Government was to initiate a formal national debate on peaceful coexistence and draft a new constitution that would ensure the rights of the two ethnic communities. Although slated to last until elections in 1998, the Convention of Government was paralyzed from the beginning. As Zacarias notes, the main result of the Convention was to create an unmanageable coalition of enemies, "allowing the military to continue to call the shots."¹⁶ By superseding the 1992 constitution and nullifying FRODEBU's power, the Convention of Government invariably contributed to the rapid growth of Hutu militancy and rebellion.

By spring 1995, the instability of the governing coalition and the escalating insurgency raised doubts about the future of UN-mediation efforts. These doubts materialized when Ould-Abdallah resigned as the SRSG on September 6, 1995, a month after the secretary-general appointed Jesus Maria of Cape Verde as his Special Representative for the Great Lakes region. In a retrospective appraisal of his mission, Ould-Abdallah attributes his resignation to Boutros-Ghali's appointment of another envoy for the Great Lakes region.

For my part, I feared that the appointment of yet another mediator would weaken the coherence of the ongoing preventive effort and present Burundi's extremists with another opportunity to divide the international community. During the Secretary-General's visit to Bujumbura on July 16 and 17... I told him of the serious risks of confusion inherent in the presence within the same region of many representatives of similar

mandates. Already there was a special envoy for Burundi and another one for Rwanda: What responsibilities would an envoy for the entire region be given? . . . Boutros-Ghali, however, was campaigning very hard for his reelection. One of his primary goals was to secure the uncontested, unanimous backing for his candidacy from the OAU leadership . . . In August 1995, he appointed Jesus Maria of Cape Verde as a new special envoy for the Great Lakes Region . . . I remained convinced that Boutros-Ghali's actions, even if well intentioned, were threatening to further destabilize the entire region, including Tanzania and Zaire.¹⁷

Ould-Abdallah's problems, however, hinged largely on his incapacity to marginalize the extremists, a task that he had defined as central to the UN mission. For example, Evans has cited Western diplomats who contend that despite his "best fire-fighting" abilities, "he was not able to take his mandate beyond fire-fighting, because he made the entire Burundian elite dependent on him."¹⁸

Subregional Intervention

The UN-led mediation initiatives created a collaborative infrastructure with the OAU aimed at building confidence and restoring a modicum of civility to Burundi. Throughout the Ould-Abdallah mediation, the OAU observer mission of civilians and military contingents played a complementary, albeit limited, role in defusing generalized ethnic warfare. In their dual presence as mediators and peace observers, the UN and the OAU served to heighten international concern about the plight of Burundi. Equally important, in sustaining an engagement that was essentially preventive, this presence postponed difficult decisions about military intervention that few external actors were willing to countenance.

Even before Ould-Abdallah's departure, regional and international actors began contemplating alternative strategies to deal with the escalation of the guerrilla war and the government's inability to contain it. In the midst of domestic violence, FRODEBU justified its call for international intervention on account of Burundi's inability to maintain stability.

The Burundi government should admit to the Burundi people and the international community that the Burundi state is no longer capable of providing security for all citizens and foreigners, and consequently it should ask for immediate help from the international community in the field of security to avoid disaster . . . those pretending that all of Burundi's problems must be solved by Burundians themselves . . . are among the sponsors of the current massacres [who] would like to continue working in secrecy.¹⁹

As the beleaguered Hutu parties pleaded for military intervention, regional actors became more assertive in forging a new direction in the conflict. Regional pressure for intervention emerged in April 1995 after the Burundian army clashed with rebels on the Burundi–Tanzania border, provoking a mass exodus of Hutus into Tanzania. At first, Tanzania sealed its border with Burundi to check the refugee influx, but as the insecurity continued, Tanzania threatened to invade Burundi to stop the massacre of civilians.²⁰ A Tanzanian foreign ministry official warned: “We can’t stay as spectators. We will act strongly if the army continues to kill the people. Tanzania urges the Burundi government to ensure such murders are stopped immediately. The killings of innocent people in Burundi could not be seen as the internal affairs of Burundi. This is genocide and against human rights. As a neighbor, we will not stay and see such murders continue. We can’t just stand and see people being killed.”²¹ Similarly, on a visit to Bujumbura in April 1995, the OAU Secretary General Salim, raised the possibility of military intervention, threatening OAU action if the massacres continued.²²

The Carter Center launched a subregional diplomatic initiative in fall 1995. The initiative arose as a result of a joint invitation by Uganda President Yoweri Museveni, Zaire’s Mobutu Seso Seko, and Tanzania’s Ali Hassan Mwinyi to former U.S. president, Jimmy Carter, to assist in the quest for peace and security in the Great Lakes region. Among the participants in the Carter initiatives were African elder statesmen including former Malian president, Ahmadou Toure, South African archbishop, Desmond Tutu and the former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere. During Carter’s first conference in Cairo in November 1995, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and Zaire sought to resolve the issue of refugee repatriation and cross-border raids and arms trafficking by militia groups in refugee camps in Zaire and Tanzania. During the second Great Lakes summit in Tunis in March 1996, the Burundi delegation reiterated its pledge to end insecurity by starting a debate on a democratic constitution, national reconciliation, and reforms in the security forces.²³

The Carter intervention did not lessen the cycle of regional violence, but it inaugurated a regional consultative relationship for conflict resolution in the Great Lakes region. Although falling short of the structures of regionalism, this mechanism found institutional expression in routine regional summits on Burundi, yielding a collaborative framework for articulating positions and one of the primary access channels for UN and external intervention. Where previously the OAU had to strive to coordinate roles with the moribund Mobutu-led Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries of Burundi, Rwanda, and Zaire, now the locus of coordination

was more comprehensive and certain. In a significant contribution, at the Tunis meeting in March 1996, the Carter process designated Nyerere as the mediator in Burundi, charging him with helping the parties to a national debate on power sharing.

The Region Takes the Lead: The Nyerere Mediation and Sanctions

The UN Security Council

Vital to the initial phase of Nyerere's mediation was Western and UN preventive diplomacy that sought to isolate Burundi's extremists by supporting moderates along the lines envisaged in the mission by UN envoy Ould-Abdallah. There was more willingness by the international community to threaten the use of force, a policy to which Boutros-Ghali gave impetus when he proposed that the UN undertake contingency planning for the deployment of an international force to prevent genocide. On December 29, 1995, he warned the Security Council of the "real danger of the situation in Burundi degenerating to the point where it might explode into ethnic violence on a massive scale."²⁴ In a February 1996 report to the Security Council, the secretary-general reiterated proposals he had made in 1994 for establishing a military presence in Zaire that would be capable of rapid intervention into Burundi should the situation there deteriorate. The plan envisaged that in case of threats of genocide, the UN would dispatch a force, possibly as large as 25,000, "to deter massacres, to provide security to refugees, displaced persons, and civilians at risk, and to protect key economic installations."²⁵ Although the secretary-general was only proposing contingency planning at this stage, and although the intervention force would have "a strictly humanitarian purpose" he was convinced that existing measures to foster political dialogue, if complemented by "a credible threat to use force" would "improve the chances of convincing the parties in Burundi to show more flexibility, thereby obviating the need for more direct military involvement by the international community."²⁶

Although there were mixed reactions to Boutros-Ghali's proposals in the Security Council, France and the United States showed a willingness to support a limited operation composed of a "coalition of the willing" with core units from Africa. The then U.S. ambassador to the UN, Madeline Albright, signaled American support when visiting Bujumbura in January 1996, warning Burundian leaders against committing national suicide: "The United States will not support, recognize, or provide assistance to any government that comes to power by force in Burundi. Indeed, the U.S. would lead an

effort to isolate such a regime. The United States urges the leaders of Burundi to isolate the extremists and seek a lasting peace. There must not be genocide in Burundi.”²⁷

Through spring and early summer 1996, the UN Security Council continued to support the Nyerere-led political dialogue while emphasizing contingency plans for intervention.²⁸ On March 5, 1996, the Security Council passed a resolution calling on “all concerned in Burundi to engage as a matter of urgency, in serious negotiations and mutual accommodation . . . and to increase efforts toward national reconciliation.”²⁹ The resolution also encouraged the secretary-general to continue his consultations on contingency planning “for a rapid humanitarian response.” But as an indication of continued opposition to external intervention, the Burundian UN representative responded that his army was “completely prepared to confront any expeditionary corps, regardless of its humanitarian or military label.”³⁰

The Nyerere Initiatives

In preliminary talks in Mwanza, Tanzania, in March and April 1996, Nyerere tried to establish a wide-ranging dialogue with all the parties including the armed rebels, the National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD). Bridging the gap between the principal coalition parties in the Convention of Government, FRODEBU and UPRONA, proved the main obstacle to Nyerere’s mediation. Although the Carter talks had committed both parties to national dialogue, there were disagreements between them about the participation of the CNDD and other Hutu-armed movements. The military and UPRONA refused to negotiate with armed groups, but some factions within FRODEBU, called for their inclusion. In mid-June 1996, the Mwanza talks collapsed when UPRONA accused FRODEBU of complicity in the CNDD’s violent campaigns. Furthermore, UPRONA claimed that the negotiations would obliterate the Convention of Government, and accused Nyerere of being partial to Hutus.³¹

Nyerere blamed the army and UPRONA for bringing about the collapse of the Mwanza talks. As a result, he threatened the use of force, a strategy that hinged on galvanizing considerable regional action and resources.³² By summer 1996, Boutros-Ghali’s Chapter VII contingency force had become academic for lack of U.S. leadership³³ and the momentum for UN contingency planning had diminished significantly, consigned to “consultations” among members of the UN Security Council. Nonetheless, Nyerere and his regional partners began to appropriate the language of “peace enforcement” in their arsenal against Burundian parties determined to stave off foreign

intervention. The dilemma for regional states, however, was whether they would translate what were thus far inchoate international yearnings into a realistic policy on the ground.

In an effort to salvage Nyerere's mediation process, a regional summit meeting was held in Arusha in late June 1996. This was the first of what was to become a series of regional summits on Burundi.³⁴ At the summit, the leaders deplored the widespread militarization of Burundian society, urged an immediate cessation of violence, and restated the need for all-party negotiations. In a decision that was to reignite domestic debates on military intervention, the Burundian president and prime minister "requested the countries of the region to provide security assistance" that would prevent ethnic violence, restore security, and complement Nyerere's mediation.³⁵

The Arusha summit established an International Technical Committee, headed by Tanzania, to explore ways to implement an intervention plan.³⁶ Both President Ntibantunganya and Prime Minister Antonie Nduwayo hid behind the vagueness of the phrase "security assistance" to deflect concerns about the dangers to sovereignty. But when they faced strident denunciation at home as traitors, they soon distanced themselves from the plan even before the Technical Committee began its work.³⁷ Confronting street protests organized by hard-line Tutsi factions, President Ntibantunganya proposed that the regional force be under Burundian command, eliciting Nyerere's rebuttal: "The African force cannot be under the control of the Burundian army nor can it be under the control of the government of Burundi, but it can work in cooperation with the government."³⁸ He again warned of regional "peace enforcement" if the situation degenerated: "Burundian leaders have to stick to the Arusha initiative. If they don't then we will be talking about a peace enforcement mission and we don't want to do that yet. The best decision that the government of Burundi has made is to go to the neighboring countries and say that they need help and I would encourage them to keep to that decision."³⁹

Without more concerted regional action, however, Nyerere's threat lost credibility. The Burundian military's steadfastness in the face of external pressure was motivated by the fear that the intervention would reverse the gains of the Convention of Government. As Braeckman noted with uncanny prescience in June 1996: "Burundian political and military extremists would like nothing better than for the international community to leave so that they can deliver their final death blows and complete their overthrow of the nation's last vestiges of democratic rule. The many mediators rushing to Burundi's bedside want to impose a negotiation with the CNDD and also oblige the army to reform by including members of the guerrillas into its ranks."⁴⁰

On July 24, 1996, a military coup against the government brought Pierre Buyoya of the UPRONA party to power as president. After the coup, Buyoya cited the Arusha plan as one of the motives for the coup: "the idea of intervention alone has caused the fall of whatever government was left."⁴¹ Years later, Buyoya was more explicit about the coup: "My arrival in power hampered certain well-advanced plans for intervention in Burundi, which was in total chaos... It is no secret that Tanzania had a peace plan for Burundi that was very different from mine."⁴² Buyoya suspended the constitution and the National Assembly, replacing them with a cabinet comprised largely of UPRONA members. On peace talks, Buyoya promised to open a national dialogue with all groups, including rebels, as long as they renounced violence and genocide.⁴³

Regional Sanctions

Regional states criticized the coup as an affront to peace and stability, a defiance of regional will. Convinced that regional states had to take more forceful measures to shore up his sagging credibility, Nyerere convened a regional summit in Arusha at the end of July 1996 that imposed economic sanctions to restore constitutional order and legitimacy.⁴⁴ The centerpiece of the sanctions was a blockade of Burundi's vital transport links through neighboring countries. The sanctioning states advanced three conditions for lifting the sanctions: restoration of the National Assembly, legalization of political parties, and unconditional negotiations with all the parties to the conflict under the framework of the Mwanza peace process.⁴⁵ Around these conditions there converged a cautious, yet novel regional solidarity about forestalling military seizures of power. As Tanzanian President Benjamin Mkapa put it: "Sanctions signify the region's newly-found determination to stop the militarization of politics. What we are pressing for is restoration of democracy and constitutional rule, through an unconditional negotiated settlement under the Mwanza peace process brokered by Mwalimu Julius Nyerere."⁴⁶

The overriding regional consensus for sanctions was that given Burundi's geopolitical vulnerability, the weight of the economic embargo would force the government to resume negotiations. According to a Tanzanian official, the premise was that economic sanctions as the alternative to Nyerere's "peace enforcement," offered the best "mechanism of diplomacy that could be used in a way that moved the parties toward the desired outcome. That is, first, to get them to the negotiating table. Second, once they were at the negotiating table, to ensure that they conclude an agreement."⁴⁷

Sanctions are a universally contested instrument of political change, dependent for efficacy on a constellation of constituencies and

circumstances. Sanctioning states require political capacity, will, and organization to sustain a sanction regime whose impact on target states is often long term, protracted, and ambiguous. In their dual nature, sanctions inflict economic pain, but they might also elicit the defiance of critical constituencies in target states, thus nullifying their force and effect. The quandary of sanctions is that their implementation and effectiveness require time, but time affords target states sufficient latitude for evasion.⁴⁸

For Eastern Africa states, sanctions were innovative and untried tools of foreign policy. Two problems arose in the implementation of sanctions. First, sanctions engendered economic groups ready to take advantage of the inability of these states to control their borders. Since regional states had predicated sanctions on speedy outcomes, the longer the economic sanctions lasted, the less effective they became. Over time, the persistence of sanctions wrought regional fatigue and a wide array of sanctions-busting activities.

Second, there were severe limits to implementing regional sanctions without global political and economic support. Despite the UN Security Council's condemnation of the coup,⁴⁹ there was only lukewarm international backing for the regional sanctions, an attitude that soon turned to derision and condemnation by Western countries. In a campaign to deligitimate regional sanctions, the Buyoya government frequently invoked the argument that sanctions lacked the authority of the UN Security Council, the only body "competent" to impose sanctions.⁵⁰ Closely related to weak international support was the fact that regional states found it difficult to coordinate the implementation of sanctions with multiple parties, notably UN agencies and NGOs, involved in diverse relief and humanitarian work in Burundi. NGOs subsequently conducted a powerful campaign that led to the collapse of the sanctions regime.⁵¹

In the first few months, sanctions had a deleterious impact on Burundi's economy. In October 1996, Foreign Minister Rukingama estimated the total value of losses for the economy at \$127 million: a 30 percent decline in the national production of food crops, a 10 percent decline of industrial crop production, and a 30 percent decline in the industrial sector. In addition, the economy faced an inflation rate of 40 percent and a loss of 25 billion Burundi francs in the balance-of-payments.⁵² Although these effects prompted Buyoya to reinstate the National Assembly and repeal the ban on political parties in September 1996, they did not return the government to the negotiating table.⁵³

Emboldened by the weakening of the sanctions, Buyoya used these limited political reforms to portray Burundi as the victim of one-sided sanctions that rewarded extremism and sought to bankrupt the economy. As part of

this strategy, Buyoya held up his credentials as a moderate struggling against Hutu and Tutsi extremists.⁵⁴ This argument resonated with Western countries, NGOs, and UN agencies that were dubious of the salience of sanctions. For instance, France and the United States, erstwhile proponents of military pressure on Burundi, commenced advocacy of an evenhanded policy that departed from the prevailing regional position on sanctions and collective pressure. U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher articulated the policy of evenhandedness in Arusha in October 1996. Christopher reiterated American support for regional sanctions and Nyerere's mediation, but he proposed a review of sanctions in light of Buyoya's concessions:

The United States calls on both sides in the conflict to suspend their hostilities and to begin all-party negotiations . . . Our responsibility is to press both sides to reach an agreement that allows all the people of Burundi to live together in a secure and democratic country. When we see progress, we must be ready to recognize it. Both sides have expressed a willingness to negotiate. Mr. Buyoya's decision to reopen the National Assembly and to lift the ban on political parties is encouraging. The rebel groups must know that we expect them to choose dialogue as well. It is time for all sides to stop the killing and to start talking. With good faith on all sides and the continued engagement of a united region, we believe a peaceful settlement is attainable.⁵⁵

These pleas opened the floodgate of international demands to lift the sanctions. For instance, a Franco-African summit in Congo Brazzaville in December 1996 described the sanctions as "counterproductive" and called for their removal given the "steps taken by the Burundian government toward reestablishing democracy."⁵⁶ In due course, international efforts to nudge the region away from economic pressure helped to discredit sanctions, weakened regional solidarity for sanctions, and stifled the international anchor of Nyerere's initiatives.

In addition to Western moderation toward Buyoya, changes in the balance-of-power in the DRC resulted in the overthrow of President Mobutu in May 1997. This added a new layer of complexity to the regional context of the Burundi conflict. The UN and regional actors paid far more attention to the Congo war than the Burundi stalemate, underscoring the propensity of more weighty regional events to distract from conflict resolution. Of far-reaching consequence was the exodus of Burundian refugees from eastern Congo to Tanzania. In December 1996, the UN estimated that there were at least 160,000 Burundian refugees in camps in western Tanzania, with 60,000

of them returnees from eastern Congo.⁵⁷ The refugees were to become a major source of bilateral tension between Tanzania and Burundi, compromising Nyerere's regional standing and, more important, undercutting some of the international support for his mediation.⁵⁸

The loss of regional momentum on the Burundi peace initiative and Buyoya's success in breaking out of international isolation, further weakened regional sanctions. Buyoya's emphasis on the deleterious impact of sanctions on Burundi's poor was increasingly adopted by NGOs and relief agencies. Despite exemptions geared to relief efforts, the embargo limited most of the work of international humanitarian organizations, making them major players in the anti-sanctions campaign. As the head of the World Food Program (WFP) in Burundi noted: "We don't see any positive political consequences of the sanctions. Thousands of people are jobless. Agriculture has decreased, and industrial production is down. But the government has managed to do what it wanted to do with or without sanctions."⁵⁹

Reports of sanctions-busting and clandestine smuggling of commodities through Rwanda, Zaire, Tanzania, and Zambia borders, diminished the effect of sanctions. As breaches in the embargo wall widened, sanctioning states became lax in enforcement, transforming seepages into floodgates.⁶⁰ A review of sanctions by the UN's Department of Humanitarian Affairs concluded that sanctions had failed to block the flow of goods and had compounded the need for humanitarian work. In a scathing indictment of Nyerere, the report concluded: "The sanctions regime has now become impractical. It is maintained only to sustain the influence of Mr. Nyerere. Unless there is a new scheme for the peace process in Burundi under which effective pressure could be imposed on Burundi for an effective result, the sanctions will continue to dilute themselves until regional parties have the courage of lifting the sanctions."⁶¹

Throughout 1997, devoid of the international arm that had buttressed and legitimized regional initiatives, Nyerere and his colleagues seemed to lose the coherence and determination that had previously marked their intervention. This, in turn, enabled Buyoya to consolidate his domestic position by rebuilding the army and, in a counterinsurgency strategy, herding villagers in "regroupement" camps.⁶² These measures put the government in a strong position to marginalize Nyerere in two respects. First, the government launched a national debate on national reconciliation in January 1997, by inviting all political parties, except the CNDD, to a round-table discussion to explore ways out of the political stalemate. Internal negotiations, Buyoya claimed, "would show the world that Burundi could solve its own problems without external interference and would help convince neighboring

countries to remove sanctions.”⁶³

Second, through the assistance of Western countries, Buyoya embarked on secret negotiations with the CNDD in Rome under the mediation of the Italian Catholic lay community, Sant'Egidio. The Sant'Egidio talks were conceived to circumvent sanctions and discredit Nyerere's mediation. Western sponsors of the Sant'Egidio talks brought considerable pressure on the region to relax sanctions, and on Nyerere to delay his search for all-party negotiations.⁶⁴ Between October 1996 and March 1997, the two sides met and agreed to a seven-point agenda, but the talks broke down when the negotiations became public.⁶⁵

In April 1997, the Fourth Regional Summit on Burundi decided to ease some of the economic sanctions by extending the range of goods exempted from the embargo to food, agricultural inputs, educational materials, medicines, and construction material. Although a majority of regional states favored the total lifting of sanctions, Tanzania and Uganda opposed that idea until Buyoya accepted Nyerere's mediation.⁶⁶ The easing of sanctions was almost nullified by the worsening bilateral relations between Tanzania and Burundi, marked by armed clashes along the border in mid-1997.⁶⁷ Tanzania also allowed the CNDD to take over the Burundian embassy in Dar-es-Salaam, a move that put further pressure on the government in Bujumbura, but also led to accusations about Nyerere's partisanship and concerns about his proximity to the conflict.⁶⁸

The deterioration in relations between Tanzania and Burundi inevitably compromised Nyerere's stature. Where previously the international and regional standing had afforded Nyerere broad leverage to traverse the delicate peacemaking horizon, his identification with a “draconian” Tanzania furnished ammunition to opponents of his intervention. As the Tanzania–Burundi conflict overshadowed Nyerere's mediation, Buyoya and his allies derided him as a carrier of specifically Tanzanian interests cloaked in “a regional consensus.” Soon they embarked on a campaign to replace him and to shift the mediation to a different venue. This campaign gathered momentum after an abortive Arusha all-party peace conference at the end of August 1997. These talks collapsed when the Buyoya government pulled out at the last minute, citing a lack of confidence in Nyerere's mediation and fear for the security of its delegation. Instead, Burundi proposed a new venue for future talks and requested the enlargement of the mediation to include personalities from other countries. As a government spokesman asserted: “Jimmy Carter, Ahmadou Toumani Toure from Mali, President Mandela,

Omar Bongo, these are all competent mediators around the world and in Africa who can help Burundi to find a solution to its crisis. Nyerere has no solution to offer the people of Burundi because Tanzania is pursuing the same policy which is at the root of the continuing instability in Burundi.”⁶⁹

With the mediation under siege, Nyerere offered to resign if regional states decided that his efforts were impeding the process. A consultative meeting of regional heads of state and Western representatives in Dar-es-Salaam in early September 1997 contemplated Nyerere’s offer to withdraw from the mediation. Having legitimized Nyerere’s mediation, regional leaders agonized over whether to pull the rug under his feet and placate Buyoya or continue to support his efforts. Since the weakness in implementing sanctions and the Tanzania–Burundi conflict had considerably whittled the mediator’s organizational room, jettisoning the mediator would have ruptured the precarious consensus underpinning regional intervention. In the end, regional leaders reaffirmed Nyerere’s mandate and Arusha as the venue.⁷⁰

Breaking the Stalemate

Regional tenacity in the face of attempts to sideline Nyerere underscored the capacity of regional actors to remain essential in the peace process. For Buyoya, the quest for a “neutral” mediator and venue outside the region had been futile; instead, it seemed to exacerbate the strained relations with the region. Although the effect of sanctions had declined, paradoxically their maintenance stood as the most powerful symbol of Burundi’s isolation. The long stalemate could only be broken by judicious compromises on both sides of the conflict divide. For regional states, exhaustion from summitry and concern about the erosion of international goodwill seemed to force a renewed emphasis on dialogue. Likewise, the renewed agitation against sanctions spearheaded by international actors and regional commercial groups, lent urgency to the resumption of the talks.⁷¹

Significant changes in the internal Burundian power structure also contributed to the new stirrings for peace. In particular, splits within both Hutu opponents of Buyoya, the CNDD, and FRODEBU, strengthened the government’s position. In a further split, one of the commanders of the CNDD’s armed forces, Jean-Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, broke away in May 1998 to form a new faction, the CNDD-FDD (Forces for the Defense of Democracy). Taking advantage of these divisions, Buyoya and the FRODEBU signed a power-sharing agreement that legitimated his government.⁷² With the consolidation of Buyoya’s domestic position, foreign donors, who were providing the bulk of the funding for the Nyerere

initiatives, put pressure on regional states to resume negotiations. On a visit to the region in May 1998, Secretary-General Kofi Annan prodded the parties to return to the negotiating table.⁷³

The confluence of these pressures forced a compromise that allowed both the region and Buyoya to save face. The Arusha talks resumed on June 15, 1998 with 19 parties participating. Despite pleas by the government to lift economic sanctions, Tanzanian President Mkapa affirmed that “sanctions cannot, and must not, be lifted prematurely. We do not want to take the wind out of the negotiating process. I believe the sanctions regime contributed quite significantly to ensuring that these peace talks are relaunched.”⁷⁴

Resumption of Peace Talks

Dealing with Western Envoys

Since 1996, two Western envoys had been at the forefront of coordinating international policy efforts on Burundi. Their roles were intended to supplement, but oftentimes conflicted with those of the regional actors. The regional hard-line stance on sanctions caused friction between Nyerere and the Western envoys, led by U.S. Special Envoy Howard Wolpe, and the EU Envoy Aldo Ajello. At a meeting between Nyerere and Western envoys, on June 18, 1998, the Western envoys pressed for the suspension of sanctions and suggested their reimposition in the event that the talks failed to make marked progress. When Nyerere accused the Western envoys of launching a campaign for lifting sanctions to undermine the region’s leverage on Buyoya, the envoys raised questions about Tanzania’s leadership of the negotiations. An EU report characterized the acrimony:

The acrimonious exchange between the Special Envoys/representatives and the facilitator on the issue of sanctions also raises a more general question on the relationship between the facilitator and Special Envoys/representatives of the international community and the support of the international community for the Arusha process. At the meeting of 18 June, the Special Envoys/representatives had the clear impression that any divergence of opinion with the facilitator was immediately imbued with the connotations of a North–South confrontation.⁷⁵

In response, the Nyerere team contended:

In view of the political interests and diplomatic style [of Western Envoys] as well as their potential for disrupting and undermining the Arusha Peace

Process, it was thought necessary that the relationship of the envoys to the Facilitator's team and peace process be defined. It was further noted that it is not always productive to strategize with them considering that they have their own interests. Being representatives of large countries, they have a tendency to want to dominate and control the process... It was suggested that the Nyerere Foundation begin to seek funds from the sub-regional countries and other countries in Africa including the OAU so as to minimize the potential for disruptive influence from external donors.⁷⁶

Despite disagreements, Nyerere and the Western envoys agreed on two changes to the structure of the negotiations and mediation. First, given the multiplicity of parties in Arusha, five committees were created to focus on major elements of the conflict and, second, the envoys agreed to appoint eminent international personalities to chair the committees.⁷⁷ The formation of the committees fragmented the intricate issues along manageable lines and enabled the parties to proceed sequentially as they built mutual trust and improved communication.

Adding an international dimension to the mediation was the UN secretary-general's appointment of Ayite Jean-Claude Kpakpo of Benin to be a senior advisor to the Burundi peace process. The appointment of these international personalities made the mediation more professional, and neutralized the critics' claim of Tanzanian dominance of the mediation. As the EU observed:

The dominance of Tanzanian nationals in the facilitator's staff, a factor that is now also of concern to representatives of other countries of the region present at Arusha, does not help to dispel this impression. The unanimous view of the Special Envoys/representatives present in Arusha was that it would be useful for international partners, and particularly those who have funded the process up to now, to go into the next round with a clearer understanding among themselves of the kinds of benchmarks to the facilitator, both in political terms and in terms of organization of the talks, particularly the identification of Chairmen of working committees.⁷⁸

In January 1999, UN and Western efforts finally succeeded in convincing the Regional Summit on Burundi to suspend sanctions following the decision by donors to provide US\$17.2 million in development assistance to Burundi.⁷⁹ Similarly, on the initiative of the UN Department of Political Affairs and the United Nations Development Program, the UN announced an "extended humanitarian aid" strategy embracing first, the rehabilitation of

schools, houses, water system and health, and second, the resettlement of the displaced and returning refugees.⁸⁰

The easing of the embargo provided relief to Burundi, and further boosted Buyoya's domestic and international legitimacy. Suspending sanctions, however, did not hasten the talks as Nyerere and his team had anticipated. By the end of the fourth round in January 1999, while the negotiations had deliberated on the broader facets of Burundi's conflict, none of the committees had made any progress on concrete proposals. Nyerere warned that donors, who had already paid more than \$1.5 million to fund the talks, did not have the patience or bottomless pockets to fund "an open-ended exercise that will go into the 21st century . . . If you want to drag the process and take longer to reach the conclusion, that is up to you, but you are going to fund the talks with beans and not real money . . . If we are serious we should come up with a solution by June."⁸¹

Nyerere died in October 1999. At the time, most of the committees had presented drafts of agreements on issues including democracy, the future electoral systems, and a national truth and reconciliation commission. Left pending, however, was the issue of the participation of the CNDD-FDD. Throughout the negotiations, Nyerere had adamantly refused to seat the rebel faction, in favor of the CNDD leader. But as the CNDD-FDD's military campaign intensified, Buyoya advocated its inclusion in the peace talks. Nyerere's unwillingness to include the CNDD-FDD crippled meaningful negotiations on a cease-fire, subjecting him to further criticisms from Western envoys. Toward the end of September 1999, the Nyerere mediation team began to find modalities of engaging the FDD in resolving the thorny issues of a cease-fire and the composition of a future security force.⁸²

Enter Mandela

Nyerere's stewardship of the Burundian mediation occurred against the backdrop of unresolved animosity between regional states and the Buyoya government, a relationship that persisted beyond the suspension of sanctions. Equally significant, mutual suspicion characterized regional relations with the Western envoys, who had become the most visible symbol of international involvement in the Burundi peace process. Nyerere's stature and imprimatur promised, at first, to bridge the tenuous links between regional and international action. But when the region took a tough position toward Buyoya, winning broad-based international support became difficult. The fundamental problem that Nyerere faced was that although elder statesmen-as-mediators are central in the division of labor between regional and international organizations, their roles still need to be defined and

refined. In spanning the informal and formal diplomatic domains and sitting uneasily between regional and international structures of power, mediators draw strengths and weaknesses from both.

In choosing Mandela to replace Nyerere, regional leaders hoped to reestablish the broad-based international attention to Burundi that had faded during the interminable debates about sanctions and the standing of Nyerere's mediation. At the same time, Mandela had sufficient regional legitimacy and leverage to sustain the continuity of an African process. Mandela's regional anchor was critical from the outset in light of the Burundian government's bid for South African mediation as a means to circumvent the region, particularly Tanzania. In seeking to enlist the UN to marginalize the influence of the region, Buyoya noted that South Africa had an "objective and constructive influence" in the Great Lakes region and would be "more sensitive" in the settlement of the Burundi conflict.⁸³

Mandela's candidacy was a compromise that retained Arusha as the venue (and the continued participation of Nyerere's mediation team). Both sides could claim victory. To Buyoya, Mandela was an outsider untainted by internecine Burundi feuds. Regional states could live with the continuation of Arusha as the venue since it placated Tanzania and ensured a modicum of regional control. For vociferous international critics of Nyerere such as the International Crisis Group, Mandela's mediation was an opportunity for external actors to assert more control over the mediation since: "Previously, the international community unquestioningly allowed Nyerere to handle the Burundi peace process and disregarded the Burundi government's reservations toward him."⁸⁴

From the outset, Mandela signaled a departure from Nyerere on the CNDD-FDD's participation in the negotiations: "We cannot sideline anybody who can create instability in the country and so we must find ways of accommodating them in these discussions either by inviting them to join or by addressing them separately... The process must be all-inclusive, otherwise there can be no guarantee that the decision of the 18 parties, even if it is unanimous, will be respected by the armed groups on the ground."⁸⁵ At the same time, with characteristic authority and candor, he berated Burundian parties for failing their people by lacking the commitment and urgency to end the war:

Please join the modern world. Why do you allow yourselves to be regarded as leaders without talent, leaders without vision? Why are you lagging behind? When people in the West hear about the daily killings and massacres they say "Africans are still barbarians no human being

could do what they are doing.” The fact that women, children and the aged are being slaughtered every day is an indictment against all of you.⁸⁶

Invoking the triple themes of inclusiveness, trust, and forgiveness, Mandela put his own imprint on the negotiations by offering broad suggestions about ways to overcome some of the stumbling blocs in the negotiations. First, amnesty, he noted, was “the key to security, an issue we must address heads on if we are going to succeed in peace and reconciliation . . . Let us forget the past, let us think of the present, let us think of the future.” Second, Hutu rebel fighters, “should be integrated into the army, rather than civil society, because we do not want the army to be drawn from one ethnic group, the Tutsis . . . The army must represent all the people of the country.” Third, elections should not be held until everything has been discussed and settled in Arusha.” Fourth, a transitional regime “should not remain in place for more than five years . . . Its leadership should be determined collectively, in the framework of the Arusha talks.” Lastly, the property rights of returning refugees “must be seriously considered.”⁸⁷

Mandela also used his international prestige to refocus international attention to Burundi, mobilizing international pressure to lend added weight to his efforts. On January 19, 2000, the UN Security Council held a special meeting on Burundi that reaffirmed its determination to support the Arusha peace process and underlined its concern about the worsening situation in Burundi.⁸⁸ The Security Council went on to pass a resolution that endorsed Mandela’s role, condemned the ongoing violence and called on the international community to provide increased assistance to the peace process.⁸⁹

As part of his efforts at international mobilization, Mandela invited world leaders to pay more attention to the Arusha talks. As a result U.S. President Bill Clinton made a televised address to the delegates at the start of the February 2000 plenary session. Also, at Mandela’s invitation, Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo warned Burundians of the dangers of military rule: “To put it bluntly, the longer the military are in power so long will the society lose its vital habit of thinking creatively and democratically and solving its problems accordingly. And come the day the military have to leave power, as they invariably must, the society will begin from scratch to imbibe democracy.”⁹⁰

The negotiations in spring and summer 2000, built on Mandela’s momentum, with most of the committees completing their deliberations. At the end of the spring negotiations Mandela formally submitted a 200-page draft agreement that synthesized the work of negotiating committees.⁹¹ Consistent with his approach of setting a strict set of rules and deadlines, Mandela forced the parties to a signing ceremony in Arusha on August 28,

2000 even though some of the parties still had not accepted key provisions in the draft agreement. With a tentative deal on the table he invited world leaders, including President Bill Clinton, to attend the ceremony, judging that neither side would ignore the international actors.⁹²

The Arusha Accord for Peace and Reconciliation⁹³ was a partial agreement designed to lock the sides into a framework from which real peace could gradually grow. The agreement provides for a three-year transition period, leading to a return to democracy. The transition government is to be responsible for overseeing judicial and institutional reforms, and reform of the military and police to bring about an ethnic balance. The constitution would be put to a referendum before holding of a general election. To help in the transition, the agreement envisages the deployment of international peacekeepers.⁹⁴ Following the signing of the peace agreement, international donors met in Paris in December 2001 under Mandela's chairmanship to put together an aid package to revive Burundi's economy.

Beyond the Arusha Agreement

With the signing of the agreement, Mandela continued to use the admixture of moral pressure, regional, and international influence to negotiate transitional institutions and a ceasefire. An important institution created by the Arusha agreement is the International Monitoring Committee (IMC) chaired by Berhanu Dinka, the SRSG in the Great Lakes region. Tasked with overseeing the Arusha Accord, the 29-member IMC is composed of representatives of the 19 Burundian signatories to the peace accord, six members of Burundian civil society, and one representative each from the OAU, the Great Lakes region, and the EU. Since its creation in November 2000, the IMC has helped establish commissions on political prisoners, refugee repatriation and reintegration, and launched "sensitization campaigns" to publicize the peace accord.⁹⁵ The early constitution of the IMC prior to start of implementation of the major provisions of the agreement signaled significant international commitment to the Burundian peace and assisted in building confidence among the parties.

Parallel to the IMC's role, Mandela led negotiations for transitional institutions. After six months of fruitless talks on transitional arrangements, at a regional summit of heads of state in February 2001, Mandela proposed a compromise that involved splitting the three-year transition: a Tutsi president and Hutu vice president in the first half, followed by a Hutu president and a Tutsi vice president in the second half. Similarly, in the face of deadlock among the parties over the candidates for these positions, Mandela

announced a compromise in July 2001 that retained Buyoya as president, and a Hutu, Domitien Ndayizeye, as vice president. As a price for this position, Mandela imposed eleven conditions on Buyoya:

- implement all the provisions of a peace agreement;
- include representatives of all the signatory parties in the transitional government;
- invite the international community and the region to provide troops and peacekeepers to strengthen security and protect the political leaders returning from exile;
- reform the Tutsi-dominated army by integrating armed groups and Hutus into it;
- cooperate fully with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees on the return of refugees to Burundi and the resettlement of internally displaced persons;
- offer full protection to all political leaders, especially those returning from exile;
- refrain from victimizing political opponents;
- release all political prisoners;
- cooperate fully with the IMC;
- promptly vacate office at the end of the 18-month period; and
- make these commitments before a regional summit.⁹⁶

In July 2001, Buyoya accepted these conditions before regional leaders who threatened sanctions if he violated them. “In the event that the president of the transitional government fails to fulfill the conditions agreed to, the regional leaders will take all necessary measures, including sanctions to ensure compliance. The region will also approach the United Nations Security Council and the international community at large to support the above measures.”⁹⁷ On July 25, 2001, the UN Security Council endorsed the announcement of the agreement on the transitional leadership in Burundi and supported the establishment of a transitional government.⁹⁸ When the Burundian parties were unable to set up a special army unit of Tutsis and Hutus to protect returning exiled leaders, Mandela prevailed on the South African government to provide a 700-man force. This was to be followed later by peacekeeping troops from Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal. This last agreement, reached at a regional summit in Pretoria in October 2001, paved the way for the inauguration of the transitional government on November 1, 2001.⁹⁹ The first contingent of South African troops arrived in Burundi in late October, just prior to the inauguration of the transitional government.

At that time the Security Council passed a resolution endorsing the plan for an “interim multinational security presence” to protect returning exiles.¹⁰⁰

Overshadowing the marked progress on transitional institutions was the inability of the regional and international actors to reach a cease-fire between the government and rebels. Cease-fire negotiations that began in January 2001 have dragged on inconclusively in South Africa, the DRC, and Gabon. Mandela, assisted by South African Deputy President Jacob Zuma, undertook several missions in a bid to induce the rebels to join a comprehensive cease-fire process. Although Buyoya held a meeting with the leader of the CNDD-FDD in January 2001, the rebels stepped up their attacks within Burundi, briefly occupying parts of Bujumbura in spring 2001.¹⁰¹ During a meeting in Pretoria in July 2001, Mandela, Zuma, and Gabonese president, Omar Bongo, mediated the establishment of technical committees between the Burundi government and the CNDD-FDD to cover the key aspects of a cease-fire. In yet another promising meeting in Pretoria in October 2001, two rebel movements, the CNDD-FDD and the Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), met for the first time with the Burundi government and all the political parties that signed the Arusha agreement.¹⁰²

Three problems have compounded the cease-fire talks. First, rebel leaders have played off English- and French-speaking mediators. The CNND-FDD has insisted on the appointment of Gabonese President Omar Bongo as a comediator of the Burundi peace process. Although he has hosted and participated in the negotiations, there has been a perception that some of the rebels want to pry the mediation away from South Africa. Second, the rebel movements are deeply divided over the negotiations. In May 2001, a faction of the FNL deposed its leader, Cossan Kabura, accusing him of negotiating without a mandate; similarly, in October 2001, dissident groups in the CNDD-FDD replaced their leader. Third, the deterioration of relations between Tanzania and Burundi stemming from accusations about Tanzania’s role in abetting the rebels worsened the atmosphere for negotiating a cease-fire.

After a visit to the region by a 12-member UN Security Council team in May 2001, the mission issued a report that warned of the risk of conflict along the border between Burundi and Tanzania. The mission noted that it was struck by the “complexity and intractability of the situation in Burundi and its serious potential for large-scale violence.” The Security Council mission stressed that it had “delivered a very strong message to all its Burundian interlocutors: there is no military solution to the conflict; peace can be achieved only through negotiations within the framework of the Arusha Agreement.”¹⁰³

After the formation of the transitional government on November 1, 2001, the International Monitoring Committee moved its operations from Arusha to Bujumbura. At the same time, there were hopes that the broad-based government that includes representatives of 15 political parties would have more legitimacy in the eyes of Hutu rebels and thus facilitate serious movement toward cease-fire agreement. On the regional front, Buyoya tried to mend fences with Tanzania. In February 2002, Tanzanian agreed to hold direct talks with two rebel groups to convince them to “meet the transitional government, to stop fighting and to talk peace.”¹⁰⁴ As of November 2002, the transitional government was holding, former political exiles were returning to Burundi but rebel groups continued their violence, and a cease-fire remained elusive.

Conclusion

African regional organizations remain critical entry points for the UN to supplement local conflict management initiatives. Partnership and ownership are not competitive goals because often neither external nor regional actors are able to intervene alone. But the perennial challenge is to structure these relations so that international actors, who have better organization and more resources, do not supplant and subvert regional initiatives. Moreover, heightened regional expectations about partnership usually face the stark reality of the UN as a manager of multiple and competitive interests. In dealing with African conflicts, proponents of UN partnership sometimes oversell their case, in particular where mobilization of resources confronts global disinterestedness. African ownership of conflict resolution processes is an inevitable outcome of the limits of partnership, but it ought to be read accurately as an ongoing puzzle in regional institution building for security. Ownership entails responsibilities that are difficult to muster in the face of clumsy regionalisms.

Burundi belongs to a rough neighborhood where regional actors face multiple obstacles in the mobilization of international attention. The contagious nature of regional conflicts burdens both regional and external actors as they struggle to structure choices and priorities. Besides, regional states are constrained in finding common positions on conflicts that affect them in different ways. More weighty conflicts such as the Rwanda's genocide and implosion in the Congo tend to distract attention and intrude on organizational efforts for conflict management.

Despite the obstacles, collaboration between the UN and regional actors worked relatively well in Burundi, enabling the UN to lead in the initial phases

of the conflict, gradually giving way to regional action. Ould-Abdallah's activism allowed a limited power-sharing agreement that reduced the escalation of the conflict, but the failure to induce long-term stability dramatized the flaws of UN efforts and legitimized the region's heavy-handedness toward the Buyoya government. Although the UN gave only a smattering of support to regional sanctions, their imposition testified to a regional assertiveness that contributed to the resumption of peace talks. Sanctions symbolized, in part, a search for meaningful ownership where regional actors perceived the inadequacies of moral suasion embedded in partnership. An interesting question to ponder in light of Ould-Abdallah's experience and the larger framework of UN special envoys is how they define and negotiate their mandates, whether they overreach these mandates, and their impact in facilitating or impeding subsequent initiatives. Ould-Abdallah's activism engendered UN involvement that was significant in the short term, but nonetheless partly constrained regional actors as they attempted novel approaches to the conflict.

As the attention shifts to implementation of the Arusha Accord, past regional mistakes might serve as preemptive lessons. In this respect, the botched Rwanda process alerted the world about the best implementation practices in societies that are deeply divided. Already the early constitution of IMC and donor funding of the transitional process underscore a sustained international engagement in Burundi. Yet without a comprehensive ceasefire that draws the rebels into the transitional institutions, the Burundi peace agreement will remain merely a halfway house toward durable stability. Ultimately, the sole obstacle to peace in conflict-prone societies is not the lack of supportive regional and international action, but rather the surfeit of local elites imbued with a national agenda.

Notes

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CHAPTER 9

The Democratic Republic of Congo, 1996–2002

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Introduction

The discourse of conflict resolution in recent years has shifted to the idea of “regional solutions for regional problems,” a shift largely driven by the dampening of an initial post–Cold War enthusiasm for greater UN action worldwide. Despite undeniable success in Mozambique, optimism for UN-led multilateral efforts began to wane following the UN’s ineffectiveness in Somalia in 1993, its inaction in Rwanda in 1994, and its sidelining by the overwhelming NATO interventions in the Balkans starting in 1995.

In Africa, the practice of devolving responsibility for conflict prevention, management, and resolution to the affected region has manifested itself in two trends. The first, the subcontracting of would-be UN operations to regional organizations, has resulted in a number of interventions in West and Central Africa, with mixed results. The second trend is the UN’s tacit approval to some groups of states, not necessarily from within the region, to intervene without obtaining UN Security Council authorization. This emerging international norm was underscored in UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s address to the UN General Assembly in September 1999, when he challenged those questioning interventions not sanctioned by the world body, and introduced the idea of a right to humanitarian intervention: “If, in those dark days and hours leading up to the genocide, a coalition of States had been prepared to act in defense of the Tutsi population, but did not

receive prompt Council authorization, should such a coalition have stood aside and allowed the horror to unfold?”¹ This very public approval of non-UN mandated interventions, coupled with the growing recognition, strongly emphasized in the Brahimi Report issued in August 2000² that the UN should not undertake peace missions unless it can mobilize the resources necessary to implement them, has given added impetus not only to regional subcontracting, but to the idea of “coalitions of the willing”—ad hoc coalitions of states formed to take action in response to a particular issue or security threat. This, despite the fact that the concept of “coalitions of the willing” has not been clearly defined and has, in fact, included a wide range of interventions—from NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia, to the alliance that overthrew Mobutu, to the Zimbabwean-led SADC intervention in the Congo, to the more recent operation “Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States. This ill-defined trend, put in even sharper relief since the events of September 11, is applied rather arbitrarily and can only serve to undermine the UN, as it allows some states to sidestep the Security Council selectively, thus leaving the UN vulnerable to yet more criticism of bending to major power pressure and adopting double standards.³

The notion that regional organizations are better placed and have a greater political will to respond to security threats in their own regions, although not new to the UN, has gained wide currency, and reflects both the reluctance of the major powers to intervene in conflicts far from home, and the removal of Cold War barriers to regional initiatives. Arguments favoring regionalism are based on the logic that local threats to peace are more promptly and more effectively dealt with by governments in the affected region—states in the region are themselves adversely impacted by the war and thus have a vested interest in regional stability, and regional groups’ familiarity with local crises and personal relations with local actors involved may make them better placed to mediate disputes. Moreover, regional interventions may be perceived as more legitimate by the region than would interventions undertaken by extra-regional actors. On the other hand, supporters of more universal approaches point to the complex interdependence of states and their interests; the frequently inadequate local resources to solve local problems; and partisan divisions in the region where the conflict is taking place, as evidence suggesting that regional organizations are not necessarily well placed to resolve local conflicts. We seek to examine responses to the wars in the DRC or “the Congo” in the context of this debate.

The Congo wars trace their roots to the Rwanda genocide of 1994, and have involved at least nine African countries as direct combatants and many

more as military, financial, and political supporters of those fighting. An analysis of the evolution of the wars and attempts to end them, leads us to posit the hypothesis that when an entire region is deeply divided by war, it cannot effectively enforce the peace, even if it has been successful in reaching a negotiated settlement. In other words, combatants cannot enforce the peace against themselves. They can participate in peacemaking, and ultimately must do so, but if there is to be peace enforcement, others will have to do it. We further suggest that in an interstate war of the magnitude and complexity of the Congo wars, building the peacekeeping capacity of regional organizations is unlikely to lead to successful peace enforcement.

While the closeness of regional and subregional groupings to local conflict areas gives them the vested interests to seek stability in their region, this close proximity is a double-edged sword. If Central Africa today is any example, regional leaders will back opposing interests in the war. Thus, we must not automatically assume that “backyard operations” will lead to peace; in the case of the Congo, they have prolonged and exacerbated the war. A discursive shift toward an un-nuanced regionalism that fails to take into account the distinction between multiple interlocking wars involving several states and armed groups, and simpler, interstate or intra-state wars, is doomed to fail in practice.

This chapter analyzes the responses and interactions of the UN,⁴ the AU, (previously the OAU), and the SADC to the three Congo wars since September 1996; and draws preliminary conclusions about the roles of universal and regional organizations in resolving conflicts that involve entire regions. It is largely organized chronologically. The first section of the chapter provides an overview of the origins of the current conflict in the Congo. The second and third sections examine international responses to the First and Second wars, including the signing of the Lusaka Agreement and the ongoing and growing violent conflict behind the cease-fire lines—the “Third War.” The concluding section then offers some thoughts about what this case study may suggest about multilateral approaches to regional wars.

Background to the Conflict

Operation Turquoise

The first event to transform an impoverished, yet comparatively nonviolent Congolese society into an arena of conflict and war was the genocide of the Rwandan Tutsi in 1994. For several years, the Rwandan Hutu-dominated government, led by President Habyarimana, and the RPF, a Tutsi-led rebel group, had been embroiled in a civil war. The genocide, which began in early

April 1994 and lasted for approximately three months, saw Hutu leaders mobilize almost the entire Hutu population in the organized mass murder of up to one million Tutsi and “moderate” Hutu. The failure of international interventions in Rwanda has been dealt with elsewhere.⁵ For the Congo, what is important is the effect of a variety of policy decisions by the UN in Rwanda that led to a Security Council cover for the French *Opération Turquoise*.

The loss of ten Belgian peacekeepers in early April 1994 and the deteriorating security situation in Rwanda prompted the UN, at the urging of the Belgian government, to withdraw most of its UNAMIR I forces two weeks into the genocide.⁶ As word of the massacres got out, France offered to lead a humanitarian mission to the region until the UN could mobilize support for a new operation with a mandate appropriate to the new situation on the ground. On June 22, 1994, UN Security Council Resolution 929 authorized a temporary French mission “for humanitarian purposes in Rwanda until UNAMIR is brought up to the necessary strength.”⁷ Its mandate was to use “all necessary means” to ensure the humanitarian objectives spelled out in the Security Council’s earlier Resolution 925 on UNAMIR⁸ though the resolution stressed “the strictly humanitarian character of this operation which shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion.”⁹

The first of the 2,500 heavily armed French troops of *Opération Turquoise* began arriving in Goma¹⁰ the following day. Although the Security Council authorized a multinational force under French command and control, it was de facto an exclusively French military intervention.¹¹ This was problematic, as the Rwandan Hutu-dominated government had received political and financial support as well as military training from the French since 1990. The arrival of French troops in the last weeks of the genocide, while the Habyarimana government was under heavy attack by the RPF, was seen by Rwandan government leaders as an intervention in their favor—so much so, that French soldiers were quoted saying they were “fed up of being cheered along by murderers!”¹² It is not surprising, therefore, that in the absence of adequate communication with the Rwandan rebels during the planning of the mission, and given the close ties between France and the Hutu-dominated regime in Rwanda, the RPF saw the French intervention as an attempt to shore up the weakening *génocidaire* government. These fears were not unfounded. News accounts widely reported that the Mitterrand government had, in fact, continued to ship arms to the Habyarimana government even after the massacres had started. And, according to one observer close to the mission, there were some in the French government and military who conceived of this mission as an effort to provide assistance to the failing Hutu government.¹³

Opération Turquoise established a so-called Safe Humanitarian Zone in southern Rwanda to which many Hutu leaders, Rwandan military, and civilians retreated. It is estimated that the French intervention did save some Tutsi,¹⁴ although it also jeopardized the lives of retreating UNAMIR I troops. Canadian Gen. Romeo Dallaire, commander of the UNAMIR I forces, recalls that the arrival of French troops led the RPF to retaliate against the UN by attacking the remaining UNAMIR troops left largely helpless with little heavy artillery and no communication with *Opération Turquoise* commanders.¹⁵

Opération Turquoise had two principal effects that were contrary to its mandate of protection and neutrality: first, it failed to stop the bulk of the massacres of civilians that were still occurring; and second, the operation did not disarm the Hutu militias, known as the Interahamwe, nor the defeated *Forces Armées Rwandaises* (FAR) units.¹⁶ Instead, it allowed them and their political leaders, along with masses of Rwandan Hutu civilians, to escape across the border into the Congo. These effects resulted in the profound destabilization of eastern Congo.

The Refugee Camps and the Destabilization of Eastern Congo

In mid-July 1994, when the RPF defeated the Hutu government in Rwanda and stopped the killings, approximately one million Hutu, amongst them many of the *génocidaires*, had moved into the Kivus, in eastern Congo. By August 1994, several UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) camps were established in the Congo near the Rwandan border. This influx of Rwandan refugees and the absence of UN control over the camps upset the delicate ethnic balance in the Kivus.¹⁷ The volume of these former Hutu army units and civilian refugees appears to have been such, and the limits on resources so great, that the UN allowed—or at least did not protect against—the reestablishment, in the camps, of the political and military structures and leadership that were responsible for the genocide in Rwanda.¹⁸ The camps soon replicated the highly organized, hierarchical, and disciplined Rwandan Hutu political and military systems under the *génocidaires*, so that camp residents were led by the same communal authorities they had lived under when in Rwanda. These camps were subsequently used as staging grounds from which these Interahamwe/ex-FAR regrouped and launched offensives against the new Tutsi-dominated government in Rwanda.

A well-publicized cholera epidemic in the UNHCR camps in Goma in July 1994 is estimated to have killed between 20,000 and 50,000 camp residents.¹⁹ News reports of the epidemic shifted international public sympathy from the largely Tutsi victims of the genocide to the Hutus in the camps,

many of whom had had a substantial part in committing the killings in Rwanda. The latter were now increasingly seen as victims of disease rather than perpetrators of mass murder. By early 1996, however, the Hutu had become a dominant force in some parts of the Kivus, those from Rwanda having benefited from the cover of the UNHCR refugee camps and growing international sympathy. They proceeded to isolate and attack Congolese Tutsi—attacks that found moral and, eventually, military support from the Congolese (then Zairian) army, as well as from some Kivu politicians. The new Rwandan leaders saw the refugee camps as a serious security threat and complained that international humanitarian assistance aimed at alleviating the suffering of refugees was helping instead to rebuild the Hutu army.²⁰ As early as December 6, 1994, in an interview with *Radio France Internationale*, Rwandan then vice president, Paul Kagame, warned that unless the international community regained political and military control of the camps, Hutu leaders in exile in these camps would continue to prepare for war. Kagame repeatedly asked the UN to disarm the Hutu militias, and to identify the former Rwandan Hutu authorities in the camps and separate them from civilian refugees.²¹

UN control over the refugee camps deteriorated to such an extent that it prompted humanitarian nongovernmental organizations operating within them to issue strong protests. Some, like *Médecins Sans Frontières*, eventually withdrew from the camps. UNHCR had neither the mandate nor the capacity to disarm tens of thousands of camp residents, nor the ability to block the flow of arms into the camps. Therefore, not only did the UN not respond to the Rwandan demands that it separate military and civilian camp residents, it also did not disarm the Interahamwe/ex-FAR operating out of the refugee camps.²² From the point of view of the new Rwandan government, this was the second major failing of the UN, the first being UNAMIR's withdrawal in the face of anti-Tutsi genocide in 1994. Thus, it should not have been a surprise that in the absence of international action to disarm the militias in the camps, Rwanda eventually acted on its own.

The Start of the First Congo War

Almost completely untouched by these developments, in the mid-1990s Kivu leaders stirred up anti-Tutsi feelings both in north and south Kivu, aimed primarily at Congolese Tutsi whose nationality rights were challenged as part of this campaign. In 1993, local government leaders led a quasi-ethnic cleansing campaign against the Congolese Tutsi in north Kivu, especially in the Masisi area. Then, in mid-1996, growing pressure developed against the Banyamulenge in south Kivu (these are the ethnic Tutsi of south Kivu, and one of the oldest Tutsi communities in the Congo)²³ when local

politicians and administrators, in cooperation with elements of the Mobutu regime, planned an ethnic-cleansing campaign aimed against them.²⁴ In September 1996, a report issued by the Commission on Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons of the Zairian parliament reflected the growing suspicion in Kinshasa of an alleged Tutsi plot. The so-called Vangu report claimed to settle, once and for all, the thorny citizenship question of all Rwandophone peoples in the Congo. It concluded that there was evidence that Burundi and Rwanda had forged an alliance to create a *Tutsiland*—a new geographical entity that would cover not only Rwanda and Burundi, but part of Uganda and eastern Zaire, as well—and thus recommended the unconditional expulsion of all Rwandophone peoples from the Congo.²⁵ Well prior to this synchronized attack, a number of Banyamulenge had joined the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan opposition in its struggle against the Hutu-dominated regime in Rwanda, and had been armed and trained by the RPF.²⁶ As a consequence, the Banyamulenge became the target of the Mobutu regime that had supported the now defeated Habyarimana government in Rwanda. In fall 1996, there was, therefore, a coincidence of interests between the new Tutsi-led Rwandan government and the Congolese Tutsi.

In September 1996, given one week to come down from the high plateau and leave the Congo or face military action and presumably mass expulsion by the Zairian authorities, the Banyamulenge undertook a preemptive strike against the Zairian army (*Forces Armées Zairoises* or FAZ) and the now two-year-old Hutu refugee camps in the Kivus. Although it is as yet unclear exactly when the Banyamulenge and the Rwandan government coordinated strategy to neutralize the Interahamwe/ex-FAR in the camps, as soon as the Banyamulenge attacks against the camps began, Rwandan government forces crossed the border and joined the offensive. The anticipated Zairian-Interahamwe/ex-FAR attacks against the Banyamulenge gave the Rwandans the long sought-after opportunity to pursue their security objectives: to eliminate the Interahamwe/ex-FAR threat operating out of the camps, and strike a blow against the Hutu-sympathizing Mobutu regime. This joint assault on the camps in September 1996 broke the hold that the former Hutu military and political leadership had over the camps, enabling the vast majority of Hutu refugees in the camps to flee over the border back into Rwanda. It also marked the beginning of the First Congo War.

The president of Uganda, Yoweri Museveni, immediately joined the Rwandan effort for similar, although less pressing security reasons. Anti-Museveni insurrection movements for years operated out of bases in the Congo.²⁷ Both in the Rwandan and Ugandan case there was reason to believe that the Mobutu government, or at least some of Mobutu's generals,

supported these movements, in part due to the substantial material benefits that reportedly accrued to them in this relationship. Several months later, Angola joined the alliance against the Mobutu government. Its principal adversary, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), not only had bases in the Congo, but had received substantial support from Mobutu, since the United States channeled military and financial aid to UNITA via Zaire throughout the Cold War. Therefore, Angola, Uganda, and Rwanda coalesced around a common goal—to cripple the insurgency movements challenging their governments from bases in the Congo.

In order that their actions not be seen as a straightforward act of aggression against a sovereign state, these invading states sought to establish an indigenous, anti-Mobutu revolution. In this, they faced a major obstacle. There were, indeed, a large number of opponents to the Mobutu regime in what was then Zaire, but they were led by a coalition of leaders who were committed to a nonviolent, nonmilitary strategy. This so-called nonviolent opposition showed no inclination for joining a militarized attack on their government, so other Congolese had to be found to give the campaign revolutionary legitimacy. To achieve this goal, the Rwandan and Ugandan governments helped create an alliance of obscure and profoundly weak exiled Congolese who had for some time been willing to opt for a violent struggle against Mobutu.²⁸ Four Congolese revolutionary parties with virtually no following joined together in what became known as the *Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo* (AFDL). A few months later, Angola allowed—or induced—the so-called *Katanga Tigers*, a group of exiles composed mainly of aging Katangese soldiers and their sons, to join the fight against Mobutu. These forces had participated in the attempted Katanga secession of 1960 under the leadership of Moïse Tshombe, and had fled to Angola after their defeat by UN forces in 1962.

Among the leaders of the AFDL, there was only one who was at all known beyond the confines of Central Africa, and that was Laurent Kabila. He had been a zone commander in the Congo rebellions of the mid-1960s, a Lumumbist, and for over 20 years, the leader of a small revolutionary redoubt in south Kivu where Che Guevara and a few hundred Cubans joined the Congo rebellion in 1964. Kabila emerged as the principal spokesperson of the AFDL and became the *protégé* of the coalition's foreign sponsors. Despite the attempt to give a Congolese revolutionary character to this conflict, and the fact that many Congolese wanted to rid themselves of Mobutu's regime, there is little doubt that the overwhelming military force employed in this war, on both sides, was foreign.

International Responses to the First War: September 1996–May 1997

The Mobutu regime tried to convince the world that what was happening was a foreign invasion of the Congo, but to little avail. Neither the UN nor the OAU condemned the invading forces, an indication of a general feeling worldwide that Mobutu had to go. The notion that what was happening was largely a revolution against the Mobutu regime gained wide currency in the Western press, which from the start of the war referred to it as a civil war or rebellion. Many Congolese shared this view, even though it was widely known that there were foreign troops fighting in the anti-Mobutu alliance.²⁹ A young, unemployed Congolese lining up to join the allied rebel forces offered a journalist a sentiment echoed throughout the country: “When it started, we thought Rwanda was the one attacking Zaire. Later, we found out it was a Zairian struggle. I personally believe in the revolution because it’s a revolution that is sustained by everyone.”³⁰

The Congolese community in the diaspora also played a role in convincing the international community to shift its support from Mobutu to the new “rebellion.” One such example is the All North American Conference on Zaire, an organization consisting mostly of Congolese intellectuals and political exiles in the United States, initially established as a virtual chat group to discuss the devastating effects of Mobutu’s rule. This organization advocated international support for Kabila as early as December 1996,³¹ and helped influence how the war was portrayed in the international media through letter campaigns and other lobbying efforts.

Mobutu failed to obtain any serious military support from abroad, although later U.S. intelligence reports indicated that France had conducted a covert operation to aid Mobutu in the hopes of retaining their influence over the third largest country in Africa,³² fearing what it no doubt perceived to be a growing American and anglophone hegemony in Africa.³³ The French government reportedly supplied Mobutu with three combat aircraft from Yugoslavia, along with crews and about 80 mercenaries, mostly Serbians, at the cost of \$5 million and in clear violation of an agreement between France, Belgium, and the United States not to sell arms to the Zairian government.³⁴

The forces that did the bulk of the fighting for the Mobutu regime were the Interahamwe/ex-FAR, Serbian mercenaries, and UNITA rebel forces. By the end of 1996, Mobutu’s army was being routed and was in full retreat, looting, raping, and killing Congolese civilians along the way. This conduct,

on top of years of scarcity and neglect under Mobutu's dictatorship, helps explain why the Congolese people soon welcomed the anti-Mobutu alliance and allowed its young men to be recruited into its ranks. By mid-February 1997, Kabila was showing off more than 10,000 new recruits sporting AK-47s and new uniforms in parades in cities along the eastern border, as more young recruits queued up for hours to enlist.³⁵

International Preoccupation with Humanitarian Issues

In late 1996 and early 1997, anti-Mobutu alliance forces marched largely unchallenged across the country toward Kinshasa. During this military campaign, the international community was more focused on humanitarian concerns and what it perceived to be a new refugee crisis unfolding in the Congo, than on the presence of foreign troops on Congolese soil whose aim was to overthrow the Zairian government. The anti-Mobutu forces operating in the Congo appeared to have made little distinction between civilians and militias, or between women, children, and men; and the Interahamwe/ex-FAR themselves were accused of having used these civilians as human shields. So while international sentiment saw the retreating Hutu as refugees under fire by advancing rebel forces and thus in need of international protection, the Rwandan troops saw them as the hard-core perpetrators of the genocide who had not given up on controlling Rwanda, or even on finishing the genocide.

Concerned about the growing insecurity in the region, on October 18, 1996, the UN and the OAU issued a joint call for an international conference on security in the region. On November 5, 1996, the OAU brought together leaders from Uganda, Zambia, Rwanda, Eritrea, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Cameroon in Nairobi for a regional summit to address the war in the Congo. They called for an immediate cease-fire and reaffirmed their commitment to the OAU principle of respecting the territorial integrity of member-states—in this case, the Congo.³⁶ Although Rwanda joined in these declarations, its new president, Pasteur Bizimungu, had some days earlier made reference to a “Berlin II,” suggesting that Congolese borders were not, in fact, sacrosanct.³⁷

Meanwhile, Western newspaper and television reports continued to focus on the plight of the “refugees,” and on the state of hundreds of lost or orphaned children among them. Calls for an international humanitarian intervention to assist and repatriate these Hutu “refugees” intensified and came not only from the UN and international humanitarian organizations, but also from the OAU. On November 9, 1996, in what appears to have been a compromise between those in favor of a UN intervention and those

opposed to it, Security Council resolution 1078 called on the UN secretary-general to “draw up a concept of operations and framework for a humanitarian task force, with military assistance if necessary.”³⁸ The resolution stopped short of authorizing a humanitarian intervention, but asked the UN secretary-general to formulate a plan for one. It also asked the OAU and the states in the region “to examine ways in which to contribute to and to complement efforts undertaken by the United Nations to defuse tension in the region, in particular in eastern Zaire.”

On November 11, 1996, the Central Organ of the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, held its Fourth Extraordinary Session at the level of ministers in Addis Ababa. Statements from that meeting, as well as an OAU communiqué transmitted to the Security Council on November 13, emphasized the urgent need for the provision of humanitarian assistance to the “refugees” in the Congo and for their voluntary repatriation to Rwanda.

The Idea of a Multinational Force

In early November 1996, with pressure mounting for international community action, the Clinton administration began probing the Canadian government for possible interest in leading a mission to the Congo, suggesting that the United States would be willing to support a Canadian-led, but not a “blue-helmet” intervention.³⁹ Once Canada and the United States reached a minimum agreement over American participation in the mission, on November 15, 1996, Security Council resolution 1080 authorized a Canadian-led “... temporary multinational force to facilitate the immediate return of humanitarian organizations and the effective delivery by civilian relief organizations of humanitarian aid to alleviate the immediate suffering of displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in eastern Zaire, and to facilitate the voluntary, orderly repatriation of refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as well as the voluntary return of displaced persons...” As part of the resolution the Security Council noted that these efforts were also requested by regional leaders at the Nairobi Summit on November 5, 1996, and that the Security Council intended “to respond positively on an urgent basis to those requests.” The multinational force was not authorized, however, to disarm the Interahamwe/ex-FAR in the Congo. Neither Canada nor the United States wanted to assume responsibility for disarming combatants that were not likely to give up their weapons voluntarily.⁴⁰

At the Security Council discussions on the resolution, the representative of the Zairian government, Lukabu Khabouji N’Zaji, expressed dismay at

what he saw to be the Security Council's unresponsiveness to a foreign act of aggression perpetrated against his state by the invading forces of Rwanda and Uganda. He complained about a Security Council double standard in the application of international law, and noted that since it had responded forcefully to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, he could not understand "the Council's reluctance to defend Zaire against a similar aggression."⁴¹ Nevertheless, Canada announced that already 20 countries had committed over 10,000 troops for the mission; and Madeleine Albright reminded the council of the "shock and horror" of the genocide in Rwanda two years earlier, adding that the international community was now prepared to assist "those most in need."⁴²

In spite of the many pronouncements in favor of the mission and mounting pressure from the region, the authorized Canadian-led multinational force was never deployed. By the time the resolution was adopted, the situation on the ground had changed dramatically. As soon as the attacks on the camps started in September 1996, hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees began marching back across the border into Rwanda.⁴³ It did not take much for the United States, already reluctant to intervene, to seize upon these events as reason enough for not deploying the multinational force.⁴⁴ These two resolutions, 1078 and 1080, adopted within days of each other less than eight weeks into the First Congo War, were the only Security Council actions in 1996 that dealt with the conflict in the Congo. The emphasis of both resolutions was the humanitarian needs of the Hutu "refugee" population; neither one dealt with the presence of foreign troops in the Congo.

The United Nations and the Organization of African Unity

On February 18, 1997, five months into the anti-Mobutu military campaign and three months before Mobutu relinquished power, the Security Council adopted a five-point peace plan for eastern Zaire. The plan called for the immediate cessation of hostilities; the withdrawal of all external forces, including mercenaries; respect for the national sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Zaire, and other states of the Great Lakes region; the protection of all refugees and the facilitation of humanitarian assistance; and the peaceful settlement of the conflict through dialogue, elections, and the convening of an international conference.⁴⁵ Although this resolution recognized, for the first time, the presence of foreign forces in the Congo and called for their withdrawal, the Security Council stopped short of identifying any one force as the aggressor. An internationally recognized government, albeit an unpopular one, was claiming invasion, yet the UN and the OAU were united in not

responding substantively to a clear violation of international law and the UN Charter. The general sentiment seemed to be that a handful of states in the region were doing everyone a favor by assuming the responsibility of ridding Africa of one of its more embarrassing and enduring dictators who had, over several years, hosted insurgency movements aimed at overthrowing the governments of its neighbors.

International action during this period took the form of weak declaratory UN resolutions on the war and intense international and regional diplomatic efforts to negotiate Mobutu's exit. In January 1997, signaling his close cooperation with the OAU on this issue, the UN secretary-general appointed Ambassador Mohamed Sahnoun of Algeria to serve as a joint UN-OAU Special Representative for the Great Lakes region. Although there was no real institutional involvement by the SADC yet, individual southern African leaders took the lead in efforts to mediate a negotiated settlement. South African President Nelson Mandela, one of the most senior African leaders and seen by many as the least self-interested, emerged as the principal mediator in this First War. The first meeting between Mobutu's government and the rebels, which took place in Cape Town on February 20, 1997, was brokered largely by the United States, which wanted to ensure a soft landing in Kinshasa, and South Africa.⁴⁶ These talks collapsed, however, and subsequent talks failed to reach an agreement, even on an agenda for discussion.⁴⁷

In mid-March 1997, Mobutu was hospitalized in Monte Carlo with advanced prostate cancer. By that time, the anti-Mobutu alliance had captured Kisangani, a key city 770 miles east of Kinshasa. By early April, the anti-Mobutu alliance had taken the southern town and military base of Kamina—a strategic supply center for the FAZ—as well as other towns in the east and south. Meanwhile, reports out of the Congo claimed that rebel forces were systematically rounding up and executing retreating Hutu, and international press reports began referring to the anti-Mobutu alliance as a “clean-up” operation aimed at eliminating the remaining perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide.⁴⁸

A preliminary report presented to the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva on April 8, 1997 by the UN's Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Zaire, Roberto Garretón, listed more than three dozen mass grave sites in the Congo that he said were the graves of mass killings of Hutu refugees by the anti-Mobutu alliance, and called on the UN to set up a commission to investigate these killings and other possible human rights violations perpetrated by the rebels during the war.⁵⁰ A strong statement by the president of the Security Council in the third week of April 1997 underscored the UN's growing frustration with the rebels' treatment of retreating

Hutu, and the refusal of the anti-Mobutu alliance to cooperate with UN relief efforts, and called on the alliance to ensure unrestricted and safe access by all humanitarian relief agencies and to guarantee their safety, as well as to cooperate with the newly established human rights investigative team.⁵¹ As the tension between the anti-Mobutu alliance and the UN over humanitarian assistance to the retreating Rwandan Hutu in the Congo continued to escalate, Kabila demanded an apology from UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan for accusing the alliance of the “slow extermination” of refugees, and gave the UN an ultimatum of 60 days for removing the retreating Hutu out of the Congo, warning that “. . . if it is not completed, we will do it ourselves.”⁵² Meanwhile, the United States stepped up its diplomatic efforts to speed up Mobutu’s departure and avoid a battle for Kinshasa, which could well have produced a massive bloodbath. The United States also put pressure on Kabila to resolve the problem of the Hutu “refugees” by stressing the importance—in terms of international aid to his future government—of claiming victory with as little damage to his international reputation as possible. The U.S. ambassador to the UN, Bill Richardson, was dispatched to the Congo on a high-profile mission to break the impasse and was able to get Kabila to lift the 60-day deadline, but left Sahnoun and Mandela—representing the UN and the region—to continue their efforts to broker a transition. In spite of promises to cooperate with UN investigators, Kabila continued to block UN personnel from suspected massacre sites.

It should be noted that Mandela’s mediation efforts, meant to ensure a smooth transition through a negotiated exit for Mobutu, did not include the so-called nonviolent opposition, local NGOs, or church groups, all of which had considerable public support in the struggle to end the Mobutu dictatorship. While Kabila’s and Mobutu’s representatives were at the negotiating table in South Africa, Etienne Tshisekedi, the leader of the unarmed opposition in Kinshasa, was defying Mobutu’s state of emergency and leading a civilian disobedience campaign against him in the capital. In March 1997, Tshisekedi tried to end the war—and Mobutu’s rule—by inviting the anti-Mobutu alliance to stop fighting and join his cabinet. Kabila refused the offer, charging Tshisekedi with being Mobutu’s ally and part of the old guard that needed changing.

By excluding Congolese opposition parties from negotiations for a transitional government, mediation efforts in the First War effectively marginalized the political leaders who had gained much popularity over the years. Participation in these negotiations was limited to the forces with guns. By treating the AFDL as the only opposition to Mobutu’s rule, these international and regional actions bestowed a considerable degree of legitimacy

on Kabila and the alliance. This no doubt encouraged Kabila, once in power, to ignore later calls by the UN and donor countries for multiparty politics.

On May 17, 1997, after a failed last-minute effort by Mandela and Sahnoun to produce agreement for another round of talks, and facing certain military defeat, Mobutu left the Congo for the last time, and the anti-Mobutu alliance marched into Kinshasa without opposition. This ended the First War.

In spite of the damage to Kabila's image abroad caused by the Hutu crisis, and his lack of cooperation with UN investigators, the Security Council gave his new government the imprimatur of legitimacy. On May 29, it issued a statement expressing its support for the Congolese people "as they begin a new period in their history..." adding that it "welcomes the end of the fighting and expresses its satisfaction that stability has begun to return to the country."⁵³ The UN followed the lead of a region that chose to ignore the principle of nonintervention when a regional coalition willing to overthrow the Mobutu dictatorship emerged. Diplomatic efforts in this eight-month period and Kabila's early dictatorial tendencies suggest that the paramount objective of the OAU and the UN in the Congo was not a transition from dictatorship to popular rule in the Congo, but rather regional stability through a quick, peaceful resolution to the war.

International Responses to the Second Congo War

The First 15 Months of the Laurent Kabila Regime

Although Kabila had a relatively short postwar honeymoon, he did make some initial domestic changes that were welcomed by the Congolese people. Foremost among these was the real improvement in personal and property security that resulted from the elimination of arbitrary and capricious roadblocks and arrests by unpaid soldiers and police officers, a daily phenomenon during the latter years of Mobutu's rule. This change was less appreciated by the elites, however, as many not only experienced a direct loss of access and influence, but also experienced property seizures with the changing of the guard.⁵⁴ In a symbolic gesture aimed to eliminate all traces of the Mobutu regime, Kabila renamed the country the *Democratic Republic of Congo*, changed the flag, national anthem, and national currency, and renamed streets, towns, and the national football team, mostly reverting to the names used at independence.

Kabila rejected all power-sharing arrangements with the numerous political parties that had been established during the last few years of the Mobutu regime, prohibited all party activity, and refused to cooperate with

NGOs.⁵⁵ These became increasingly critical of his authoritarian rule, and encouraged the massacre investigation by helping to keep the issue of human rights violations in the news. In a show of strength, about 250 NGO representatives met in Kinshasa between June 16 and 20, 1997, to reaffirm their commitment to democracy and to the respect for human rights. This conference, financed largely by Belgium and Japan and supported by several international human rights groups, sought to demonstrate to the new rulers the strength of local NGOs, their international support, and their capacity to organize. Kabila's response was to crack down both on opposition parties and NGO activities.⁵⁶

Although Kabila's relationship with the UN and Western donors in this period was overshadowed by the UN massacre investigation, the Congolese people's growing disillusionment with the new regime did not help his standing internationally. Public opinion polls two months after Kabila assumed the presidency revealed that an overwhelming majority of Congolese, at least in the capital, believed that the massacres had taken place, and well over half of the respondents put the blame on Kabila and his allies.⁵⁷ Special Investigator Garretón was denied access to the eastern Congo by the Rwandan government when he first arrived in Kigali on May 4, 1997, and for the next 15 months Kabila repeatedly denied them access to suspected massacre sites in Goma and elsewhere. There is some question, however, whether Kabila had the power to permit the massacre investigation. On April 26, 1997, Aldo Ajello, the EU's Special Representative, met Kabila in Kisangani to discuss the modalities for the repatriation of a group of Rwandan refugees from three camps located on the road from Kisangani to Ubundo. One of these camps had been attacked and dismantled, reportedly resulting in the deaths of a large number of refugees. Denying any wrongdoing on the part of his and Rwandan forces, Kabila authorized Ajello to visit all the camps up to Ubundo to verify that nobody had been killed. Members of UNHCR, the Red Cross, other UN organizations, and local and international media, as well as the governor of Upper-Congo and the mayor of Kisangani who were asked by Kabila to accompany the delegation in order to facilitate the visit, accompanied Ajello. Ajello's account of what he saw is unambiguous:

We reached the main camp (approximately 30 km from Kisangani) and we could see a few terrorized people who had been pushed back by the soldiers to the camp that same day. The largest part of the camp was empty and devastated. The signs of the aggression were evident everywhere. The holes of the bullets were visible in the tents. The poor belongings of the refugees were spread over the camp. Six dead bodies were lying

in the bush a few meters from the camp. We were able to approach some of the refugees and the stories they told us were always the same. They had been attacked during the night by a few civilians supported by a large number of soldiers who started shooting blindly at the tents. Some of them had been able to run away but many had been killed.

What we had seen was sufficient to sustain the allegations that a huge massacre had taken place there, but we decided to proceed in the direction of Ubundo. Unfortunately, we were stopped a few hundred meters from the camp, at a Rwandan checkpoint. Supported by the governor and the mayor, we informed the officer in charge that we had Kabila's authorization to go up to Ubundo, but we were refused permission to proceed. After a short discussion with the officer, the governor, visibly shaken, quickly suggested that we return immediately to Kisangani. It was evident that the area was under direct Rwandan control and that Kabila's authority was neither recognized nor respected. I came away with the clear impression that the camps on the road to Ubundo were a clear example of a more generalized situation.⁵⁸

Kabila's reasons for blocking the massacre investigation were two-fold. First, he needed to maintain his claim to a "revolutionary" victory in order to shore up his rapidly deteriorating domestic power base. Allowing the investigation would have revealed that the campaign that brought him to power was largely composed of foreign troops, thus confirming the growing popular perception that Rwanda, not Kabila, was, in fact, in charge in the Congo.

Second, the investigation was strenuously opposed by the Rwandans who feared being exposed as the authors of retaliatory massacres of Hutu refugees, knowing it would mean certain international condemnation. Although it was widely accepted that it was the Rwandan forces that were responsible for the massacres, crossing the Rwandans would have been dangerous for Kabila since they held key positions in Kinshasa during this period. A report issued by Garretón on July 11, 1997 on the Hutu massacres during Kabila's eight-month push, concluded that most of the killings had been perpetrated by anti-Mobutu alliance forces, the majority of which were foreign troops.⁵⁹ Since the international community knew who was ultimately responsible for the massacres, the choice to blame Kabila therefore, was not made out of ignorance, but more likely out of collective guilt for its failure to act against the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda. Thus, the pressure of the UN on Kabila to allow the massacre investigations to go forward was largely pointless, and in fact, hurt the world body's image in the Congo. Congolese people began questioning the UN's emphasis on Rwandan Hutu deaths in the absence of

attention to Congolese internally displaced peoples (IDPs) and the country's need for post-conflict aid. It was not uncommon to hear Congolese wonder whether the international community cared more about the dead than it did about the living.

In these short 15 months, Kabila managed not only to antagonize the UN and Western donors, but also his domestic opposition and his foreign sponsors in the First War. By early 1998 it became increasingly clear that the leaders who had been most responsible for putting Kabila into power were dissatisfied with his performance. His presidency had not produced the results they wanted. Kabila had not succeeded in ending the problem of border insecurity by neutralizing the insurgency groups threatening Uganda, Rwanda, and Angola from the Congo—the principal factor that motivated their intervention in the first place. However, Kabila was not entirely to blame for these continued insurgency attacks, as Rwandan and Ugandan troops controlled—to the extent there was any control—the Congolese areas along their borders. In fact, Kabila had allowed Uganda to place a couple of battalions inside the Congo to ensure the security of Uganda on its Western border with the DRC; Rwanda had full control over the Congolese army as well as free rein in eastern Congo. Nevertheless, there were rumors suggesting that as early as January 1998, eight months into his rule, the intelligence chiefs of Angola, Rwanda, and Uganda were holding discussions about finding an alternative leader for the Congo.⁶⁰ The antagonism deepened when Rwandan President Kagame publicly claimed credit for the overthrow of Mobutu in a *Washington Post* interview in July 1997,⁶¹ as it undermined Kabila's efforts at revolutionary legitimacy at home.

The Second Congo War

During June and July 1998, a number of events indicated that relations between Kabila and the Rwandan Tutsi-dominated government had not only seriously deteriorated but had reached a breaking point. Some of Kabila's collaborators reportedly concluded that a Tutsi officer was about to assassinate Kabila during the Independence Day festivities on June 30.⁶² James Kabarebe, a Rwandan Tutsi officer and Kabila's chief of staff, was suspected and replaced within days, and Kabila, in his new nationalist posture, openly encouraged anti-Tutsi sentiment in Kinshasa. In a sign of the momentous split of the alliance that was taking place, Kabila traveled abroad during these days, visiting Namibia and Cuba, presumably to seek new backing. By the end of July, Kabila had terminated the Rwandan Mission of Cooperation, and asked the Rwandan military to leave the country. It is not

an exaggeration to say that the next 20 days profoundly changed the history of Africa and plunged it into the second phase of the “First African Continental War,”⁶³ which has produced one of the greatest humanitarian disasters in the world today.⁶⁴

On August 2, 1998, two of the best and largest units in the new Congolese army, first the 10th Brigade stationed in Goma, followed by the 12th brigade stationed in Bukavu, declared that they were deserting the Kabila regime. Rwandan army troops crossed the border to support them. These units had been stationed in Kivu to help fight the Mai Mai and the Interahamwe/ex-FAR, which had organized guerilla operations in eastern Congo. These brigades, soon joined by others, had previously worked in close cooperation with the Rwandan military. In Kinshasa, Congolese Tutsi soldiers who had refused to be disarmed clashed with Kabila’s FAC, and most were killed. Two days later, in a spectacular cross-continental airlift, a hijacked plane full of Rwandan and Ugandan soldiers, led by James Kabarebe, landed at Kitona army base in the Lower Congo where some 10,000–15,000 former Mobutu soldiers were being “reeducated.” These ex-FAZ soldiers joined the Rwandan and Ugandan forces, and within days the “rebellion” captured a number of towns and most importantly, the Inga hydroelectric dam, which enabled them to cut off electricity to Kinshasa and Katanga. This had a devastating effect on the people of Kinshasa who found themselves without running water or electricity. Within two weeks, and with the Kabila regime facing almost certain military defeat, a group of Congolese politicians ranging from former anti-Mobutu alliance leaders to former Mobutists, united in Goma to form the political wing of the anti-Kabila movement, the RCD. In Kinshasa and in other Congolese cities under Kabila’s control, people were called to arms by the government. Anti-Kabila rebels who were caught were massacred on the spot, and a real pogrom against all Tutsi took hold.

In striking contrast to its actions in the First Congo War, on August 23, 1998, Angola broke with its former allies and intervened on behalf of Kabila. It attacked the Rwanda–Uganda–RCD⁶⁵ positions in the Lower Congo from its bases in Cabinda and defeated them. Although this attempt to overthrow Kabila failed as a result of Angola’s intervention, the “rebellion” was able to achieve military control over eastern Congo. This Second War would no doubt have ended in two weeks if it had not been for the Angolan about-face, even if Kabila’s ally, President Mugabe of Zimbabwe, had opted to support him militarily, as eventually he did; in all likelihood, Kinshasa would have fallen before such aid could reach it.

Angola’s decision to change its earlier alliances with Rwanda and Uganda had a profound impact on the war and on politics in the region, and there

has been much speculation about why Angola switched sides.⁶⁶ Since this intervention to help a neighbor meant diverting substantial resources away from the government's long-standing struggle with UNITA at home, the most plausible reason for Angola's decision is that it believed that the anti-Kabila alliance had struck a deal with UNITA. This view is supported by the reported presence of UNITA leaders in Kigali and Kampala, the recruitment of former Mobutist generals and politicians—long-standing supporters of UNITA—into the anti-Kabila alliance, and the relative ease with which the “rebellion's” troops were able to land and operate in Lower Congo, previously a UNITA stronghold from which it had launched attacks against the Angolan government.

Another possible interpretation is that the UNITA factor entered later, when the Ugandans and Rwandans solicited UNITA's aid to extract the remainder of the Kitona operation from an Angolan airbase controlled by UNITA. Aldo Ajello, however, notes that Angola's President Eduardo dos Santos “could not accept the launching of a military operation of this scope without his being consulted . . . could not tolerate the presence of foreign troops in a region of vital interest for Angola . . . without his authorization . . . [and finally,] he was not ready to accept the launching of a military operation to get rid of a president . . . if there is no credible alternative coming from the Congolese people.”⁶⁷ In fact, Ajello states that “for the Angolans, a power vacuum in the DRC was much more serious than a president who did not entirely satisfy them.”⁶⁸

At present, support for the “rebellion,” which has since split into at least three competing factions, is limited to Rwanda, Uganda, and to a lesser extent, Burundi, with the Congolese army defectors mentioned earlier and the politicians who created the RCD.⁶⁹ However, support for the Kinshasa government under both Kabila regimes has been very wide. Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Chad sent substantial military contingents, Sudan gave advanced military training and air support to the Kabila offensives in northern Congo, and Libya allegedly gave financial support. Joseph Kabila also successfully rearmed and mobilized the Interahamwe/ex-FAR, known today as the *Alliance pour la Libération du Rwanda* (ALiR).⁷⁰ In addition, he created an alliance with the Mai Mai rebels in the Kivus, who are quite effective Congolese guerilla fighters against the “rebellion” forces in North and South Kivu. Internationally, Laurent Kabila, and later his successor and son Joseph, was recognized as the legitimate president of the Congo, and was welcomed by his African counterparts, giving the Kinshasa government great legitimacy both with regional organizations and with the UN.



Map 9.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Region Responds

The UN was largely prevented from taking a more active role in resolving the conflict due to the reluctance of the major powers, especially the United States, to intervene in such a large-scale and complex regional conflict before a peace agreement was reached. This inaction created a space for a number of local initiatives. Between the outbreak of the war in August 1998 and the signing of the Lusaka peace agreement in August 1999, there were 23 failed SADC- or OAU-sponsored meetings at the ministerial or presidential level aimed at brokering an end to the war, as well as numerous other unsuccessful efforts by individual leaders in the region. One of the first regional responses was a decision by Zimbabwe, Angola, and Namibia to invoke Kinshasa's recent SADC membership⁷¹ as a reason to launch a SADC military intervention to defend the Kabila government from foreign aggression. Zimbabwe's President Mugabe held the chairmanship of SADC's Organ on Politics, Defense and Security co-operation during this time, and used his position to secure a SADC umbrella for Zimbabwe's, Angola's, and Namibia's military intervention to end the war in Kabila's favor. The three countries also justified their actions as an application of the principle of individual and collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, a justification later affirmed by the Security Council.⁷²

This intervention, which neither sought nor received UN Security Council authorization, is what South African analyst Cedric de Coning calls SADC "neo-interventionism"—operations undertaken by subregional groups that intervene not as peacemakers, but as allies of one of the belligerents in the conflict with the aim of influencing the outcome of the war.⁷³ It deeply divided the subregional organization, as there were members, most notably South Africa, who strongly opposed it. South African leaders felt that Mugabe had hijacked SADC to give a Zimbabwean intervention greater legitimacy. The Organ's decision to intervene militarily was challenged by Mandela, then chair of the SADC Summit. Mandela argued that such decisions should rest with the Summit, as that is the institutional body that represents all community members at the level of head of state. In what appears to have been a power struggle between Mugabe and Mandela for regional dominance, South Africa's preference for nonintervention and SADC neutrality was not heeded. In spite of subsequent attempts to clarify where the final decision-making authority lies on security issues, there still is no consensus among SADC members about which of the organization's decision-making bodies has the ultimate authority in such matters.

A draft cease-fire agreement prepared by UN and OAU representatives for a summit of regional defense ministers held at Victoria Falls on August 18,

1998, demonstrated the problem that would plague the region in mediating a negotiated settlement: how to define the nature of the conflict. Each party to the war interpreted the conflict differently, and consequently, could not agree on who the belligerents were. This draft agreement identified the governments of Angola, the DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe as the belligerents. However, Rwanda and Uganda had not yet publicly declared their military presence in the Congo, and protested the exclusion of any of the Congolese rebel groups from the proposed list of signatories by walking out of the meeting.⁷⁴ In his continuing efforts to present the war exclusively as a case of foreign aggression by Rwanda and Uganda, Kabila initially denied the existence of an internal rebellion and refused to recognize the RCD as a belligerent. Of course, the RCD defined this war as a revolution against a dictatorial regime, and argued that the only two belligerents were the RCD and the Kabila regime, each with their foreign supporters.

At its 18th Summit meeting in Mauritius on September 13–14, 1998, SADC appointed Zambian President Frederick Chiluba to lead the peace effort, and during the last few months of 1998, a number of regional and extra-regional actors joined his efforts. The EU sent Aldo Ajello as its Special Envoy, and the United States dispatched Ambassador Thomas Pickering, then Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and Howard Wolpe as Special Envoy. Indeed, both Wolpe and Ajello were deeply involved in the negotiations. According to Ajello, they were in regular contact, shared information, and even engaged in task-sharing.⁷⁵

By early 1999, the war had acquired an even greater complexity, as there were now three rebel groups operating in the Congo, collectively controlling over half the country. The RCD had split into two movements as a result of internal disagreements: the RCD-ML (*Mouvement de Libération*), backed by Uganda, and the RCD-Goma, backed by Rwanda. The *Mouvement pour la libération du Congo* (MLC), another anti-Kabila armed group, was established with Ugandan support in the northern Equateur Province some months after the founding of the RCD.

A meeting with Kabila and Museveni hosted by Libya's Muammar Kadhafi on April 18, 1999, resulted in the signing of an initial peace agreement. The Sirte Accord called for the deployment of a peacekeeping force, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Congolese soil, and a national dialogue, but resulted only in the withdrawal of Chadian troops from the Congo, as neither the RCD nor its sponsor, Rwanda, were parties to the agreement. Although SADC, the OAU, and other regional powerbrokers continued their efforts to mediate a negotiated settlement during these months, what ultimately brought the warring parties to the negotiating table was a stalemate in the war.

The Lusaka Agreement

After delays, and considerable pressure from the Security Council, the United States, the EU, and regional powers, the Lusaka Agreement for a Cease-Fire in the DRC was signed by all but two belligerents on July 10, 1999 in Lusaka.⁷⁶ The remaining two, the MLC and the RCD, signed in August.⁷⁷ South Africa under Mandela and then Mbeki, as well as Tanzania, were instrumental in pressuring Uganda and Rwanda to acknowledge their military involvement in the Congo and to accept the terms of the agreement. To a lesser extent, non-African actors also applied pressure. The United States and other international donors tied aid to all state actors involved to the achievement of a negotiated settlement; and international financial institutions made lending to those with troops in the Congo conditional on making public their costs of war.⁷⁸

Although the Lusaka process was encouraged by the international community and has been supported by UN resolutions, it is a document negotiated by the region. The genius of the Lusaka Agreement is that it covers the minimal demands of all the principal combatants in the conflict. It is founded on two basic principles: the sovereignty of the Congolese state, and the territorial integrity of the Congo's present borders. The agreement calls for the immediate cessation of hostilities within 24 hours of its signing. "Hostile action" means not only military attacks and reinforcements, but all hostile propaganda as well—an important emphasis in a region where "hate speech" has incited violence with devastating consequences. The agreement specifically calls for disarming foreign militia groups in the Congo, the withdrawal of all foreign forces from the country, and the exchange of hostages and prisoners of war. It also calls for the establishment of a JMC composed of representatives of the belligerents, each armed with veto power. The agreement provides for the JMC to be headed by a neutral chair appointed by the OAU, and the JMC is charged with ensuring, along with UN and OAU observers, compliance with the cease-fire until the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force.

The agreement also provides for an all-inclusive process, the "Inter-Congolese Dialogue," that is to produce a new political order for the Congo, and mandates a "neutral facilitator" to organize this process. The former president of Botswana, Sir Ketumile Masire, was appointed as that facilitator in December 1999. An important provision is that all parties to the internal dispute, whether armed or not, are to participate in this dialogue as equals. The inclusion of the nonviolent political opposition and of civil society groups is a positive element, and is in sharp contrast to the previous exclusion of these groups from international negotiations. However, Congolese

armed groups in eastern Congo were neither represented at the peace negotiations in Lusaka, nor are they mentioned as participants in the internal dialogue. The Mai Mai are diverse armed Congolese groups in the Kivus fighting the RCD and the presence of Rwandan and Ugandan troops on Congolese soil. The Mai Mai were given material and moral support by Kinshasa and indeed, declared to be a part of the new Congolese army.⁷⁹ The omission of the Mai Mai from the agreement is particularly serious, since they continue to fight and in no respect have been affected by the cease-fire agreement, despite their close relationship with Kinshasa.

Another important flaw, in addition to the exclusion of the Mai Mai, is that the agreement puts the responsibility for disarming the foreign insurgency “armed groups” on the political–military administrations, which dominate the areas where such groups are active. This raises several problems. In some instances, these political–military administrations are closely allied to these groups, while in other cases they are at war with these groups.

Finally, the agreement sets the terms for UN engagement by calling for “an appropriate” Chapter VII peacekeeping force to “ensure the implementation of the agreement” (Article III.II.a). The signatories of the agreement asked that this mission have both a peacekeeping and a peace enforcement mandate. The peacekeeping responsibilities are to “monitor the cessation of hostilities... investigate violations... supervise disengagement of forces... provide and maintain humanitarian assistance... keep the Parties to the Cease-Fire Agreement informed... collect weapons from civilians... schedule and supervise the withdrawal of all foreign forces... [and] verify all information...” (Annex A, Chapter 8). They also asked that on “account of the peculiar situation of the DRC,” the mission be given enforcement authority for “tracking down and disarming Armed Groups... screening mass killers... handing over ‘*génocidaires*’ to the International Crimes Tribunal for Rwanda... [and] repatriation” (Article III.II.a and Annex A, Chapter 8.2.2). Moreover, the agreement explicitly asked the UN to use coercive force, if necessary, to achieve these objectives—it tasks the UN with “[w]orking out such measures (persuasive or coercive) as are appropriate for the attainment of the objectives of disarming, assembling, repatriation and reintegration into society of members of Armed Groups” (Annex A, chapter 8.2.2.e).

The regional powerbrokers who mediated the agreement recognized the limitations of a divided region in undertaking its implementation. During pre-Lusaka discussions about an OAU-led, inter-African peacekeeping force for the Congo, OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim acknowledged that his organization lacked the capacity to successfully undertake such an operation.⁸⁰ The OAU’s weaknesses in conflict management are well

documented⁸¹ and are primarily due to two factors: fiscal constraints and institutional weaknesses. Member-states, some of the poorest in the world, are frequently in arrears with their dues, and the organization lack coercive power.⁸² Its members' strict adherence to the principle of nonintervention often resulted in paralysis out of fear of setting unwanted precedents of intervention. Although the organization's transformation from the OAU to the AU in 2002 has included changes to its conflict-related mechanisms, it is not yet evident that these changes will mean significant changes in institutional capabilities or practice. In addition to these obstacles, members of the OAU supported widely divergent policies in the Congo wars; some supported Kinshasa, some the rebels, and some opted for neutrality. Therefore, it was virtually impossible to obtain agreement on a common policy, leaving aside the absence of capacity and means.

For SADC there were similar concerns about resources and capacity. South Africa, the region's dominant economy, made it clear that it had no intention of carrying the financial burden of a regional peacekeeping force. "I think there is a growing consensus that any DRC mission should not be just a SADC affair. We want other western countries to join in. We know if it is just SADC then South Africa will be left to underwrite the whole deployment. We do not want the DRC buck to stop here."⁸³

The dual UN mandate requested by the Lusaka Agreement would have presented difficulties for any UN mission. Peacekeepers do not make good peace enforcers, as the former implies a perception of impartiality and usually requires local consent, while the latter demands coercive action against one or more of the belligerents. However, the failure of the UN to authorize a more substantial force, either for peacekeeping or peace enforcement, is not due to a flaw in the Lusaka Agreement, but rather to the lack of political will of the major powers in the UN Security Council to act decisively with a large intervention in the Congo.

The United Nations Responds

There were encouraging signs for substantive UN involvement in Central Africa coming out of the Security Council in late 1998 and early 1999. UN Security Council statements soon after the war broke out commended the region's diplomatic efforts for a peaceful settlement, and called for the withdrawal of all foreign forces in the Congo.⁸⁴ The Security Council President's statement of December 11, 1998 said that the Security Council was "prepared to consider, in the light of efforts towards peaceful resolution of the conflict, the active involvement of the United Nations, in coordination with

the OAU, including through concrete, sustainable and effective measures, to assist in the implementation of an effective ceasefire agreement and in an agreed process for a political settlement of the conflict.”⁸⁵ There were other signs that could have been interpreted by the region as a greater willingness of the UN to help enforce peace agreements negotiated by the region. Security Council Resolution 1208, on the plight of refugees in African conflicts, adopted a month earlier on November 19, 1998, called on African states to develop procedures to separate refugees from “other persons who do not qualify for international protection afforded refugees or otherwise do not require international protection . . .” and urged African states to “seek international assistance, as appropriate,” to do this. UN Resolution 1234, adopted on April 9, 1999, supported SADC’s regional mediation efforts by name, and for the first time since the Second War began, made a clear distinction between invited and non-invited forces in the Congo. This was in contrast to the Lusaka Agreement, which made no such distinction.

Once the agreement was signed in Lusaka, UN Security Council Resolution 1258 on August 6, 1999 welcomed the agreement and authorized an observer mission to the Congo. However, the Security Council did not grant this mission the enforcement mandate requested by the signatories to the Lusaka Agreement, nor did it authorize the force size they expected. The UN deployed 90 military liaison officers to the headquarters of the belligerents for three months to assist the JMC in the peace process, and to determine when there might be sufficient security guarantees to deploy a larger UN force. In defending this preliminary action against critics who argued it was insufficient, a UN spokesperson noted that although small in number, “these [military liaison officers] MLOs will contribute to confidence-building among the parties and represent the vanguard of further UN involvement.”⁸⁶ The Congolese mission at the UN pushed hard for this resolution, and even embarked on a successful campaign to lobby African members of the Security Council and other non-permanent members through the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) caucus. The Congo viewed a UN intervention as being very much in its interest, both because Kinshasa recognized that it would not easily defeat the Rwandan military, but also because as long as Rwanda claimed that it had security concerns, it would generate international sympathy. It was, therefore, hoped that a UN intervention would help eliminate the principal justification for Rwanda’s presence in the Congo.⁸⁷

Once this small technical assessment team was deployed, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1279 on November 30, 1999 authorizing MONUC. MONUC would be constituted by the earlier deployment of

military liaison personnel and increased by an additional 500 military observers.⁸⁸ Its mandate included that of the earlier technical assessment team, the “observation of the ceasefire and the disengagement of forces,” (paragraph 5d) and “to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance . . .” (paragraph 5e). The deployment of the force was to occur in three phases, conditional on the security situation on the ground. Phase I, the deployment of military liaison officers to the headquarters of all the signatories to the agreement to help coordination, had already been launched under Resolution 1258. The deployment of military observers inside the Congo, authorized by Resolution 1279, to monitor compliance with the peace agreement constituted phase II.

In January 2000, the warring parties met in New York under the auspices of the UN Security Council during “Africa month”—an initiative of U.S. Ambassador Richard Holbrooke who held the Security Council presidency during that month.⁸⁹ This was a public relations victory for Kabila. The Security Council accorded him all of the trimmings reserved for a head of state, while the rebel leaders or their representatives sat in the gallery. On February 24, 2000, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1291 extending MONUC’s mandate for another six months and expanded the force to 5,537 military personnel, including 500 observers and appropriate civilian staff. The resolution gave the mission the authority, under Chapter VII, “to take the necessary action . . . to protect United Nations personnel . . . ensure the security of and freedom of movement of its personnel, and protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.” Kabila, demonstrating his long-standing suspicion of Westerners, supported the resolution only on the condition that the UN force be composed solely of troops from the South, preferably from Africa, and reserved the right to reject any of the contributions. The size of the force authorized was criticized again as far too small to effectively monitor a peace agreement with multiple belligerents in a country with little infrastructure. Canadian Ambassador Robert Fowler said, “We do not believe that the number of 5,537 is magic. We would have liked to see a more capable observation mission. We do not believe that the mission, as currently planned, has the capacity to ensure or even verify compliance with relevant provisions of international human rights and humanitarian law.”⁹⁰ Fowler also noted that the deployment for the Congo was half that of Sierra Leone’s, even though the size of the Congo is ten times that of Sierra Leone. It is not clear how the number of 5,537 personnel was arrived at, but some reports suggest that it was the result of American opposition to a larger, more expensive force⁹¹ and of the insistence of the U.S. delegation to first seek congressional approval for the mission before supporting the

resolution or determining the size of the mission.⁹² Fowler initially threatened to vote against the resolution but agreed to it on the condition that the authorized force would constitute only a second phase, with a larger force deployed in a subsequent phase.⁹³ Frequent cease-fire violations and Kinshasa's continued refusal to allow the UN unfettered access made deployment of phase II difficult and the monitoring of the disengagement of forces nearly impossible. Because of these difficulties, the OAU deployed 30 "neutral verification teams" inside the Congo in November 1999 for a year to help monitor the cease-fire pending the deployment of MONUC observers.⁹⁴ President Kabila assured a Security Council mission to the Congo, led by Ambassador Holbrooke between May 4 and 8, 2000, and the first of a series, that Kinshasa would fully cooperate with MONUC, while criticizing the UN for "failing to condemn the presence of uninvited troops" in the Congo.⁹⁵ Disagreements over where to co-locate the JMC and MONUC, and the MLC's refusal to withdraw its forces as mandated by phase II further delayed deployment.⁹⁶

A devastating clash between Ugandan and Rwandan troops in Kisangani that began on June 5, 2000 resulted in thousands of civilian casualties and neither inspired confidence at the UN that there would soon be any peace to keep, nor favored calls for a more robust UN force in the Congo. A strongly worded resolution adopted by the Security Council on June 16 expressed "outrage" at the fighting, called for the immediate demilitarization of Kisangani and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the country, and, for the first time, directly accused Uganda and Rwanda of violating "the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo..."⁹⁷ Discussions with American and other officials lead to the conclusion that this resolution was driven primarily by French animus toward Rwanda. The American position was that this resolution would severely undermine the Lusaka process in two ways. First, because it gave primacy to the withdrawal of foreign forces over the promotion of the internal dialogue and the disarmament of armed groups, and thus would only serve to harden the resistance of the Kinshasa hard-liners to disarming ALiR (Interahamwe/ex-FAR). Second, because it privileged the foreign forces supporting Kinshasa, therefore undoing the balance reflected in the Lusaka Agreement's failure to distinguish between Kinshasa's foreign allies and the foreign allies of the rebel groups. Since the adoption of this resolution, the Kinshasa government has repeatedly emphasized the specific reference to Rwanda and Uganda, making progress on foreign troop withdrawal more difficult. Today, Ugandan and Rwandan troops have left Kisangani, but the RCD-Goma continues to maintain a presence there despite repeated UN calls to demilitarize the city.

Laurent Kabila's assassination on January 16, 2001 removed some of the obstacles to further MONUC deployment, as his 29-year-old son and successor, Joseph Kabila, soon consented to the full deployment of UN forces. On February 22, 2001, Security Council Resolution 1341 demanded that "Ugandan and Rwandan forces and all other foreign forces withdraw" from the Congo, and asked that a timetable for that withdrawal be prepared within the next three months.

On April 26, 2001, six workers with the International Committee of the Red Cross were killed by armed groups near Bunia, leading then Security Council president U.K. Ambassador Sir Jeremy Greenstock to note that the incident "made us not just worry about the safety of humanitarian and other UN international workers, but also for the peace process in the Congo."⁹⁸ Moreover, Uganda's anger at the accusations made against Ugandan officials in the April 2001 UN Report on Resource Exploitation in the DRC led Museveni to declare Uganda's unilateral withdrawal from the Congo and from the Lusaka Agreement. But as Kamel Morjane, the UN's Special Representative for the Congo noted, Uganda's withdrawal would not threaten the peace process: "If the government decides to withdraw its forces from the Congo, it's always favorable. This is in line with the Lusaka Agreement."⁹⁹ Museveni did not follow through on his threat until later.

It was in this climate that the Security Council, this time led by French Ambassador Jean-David Levitte, visited the Central African region in mid-May 2001 to assess efforts to implement the peace plan. On the day the delegation was due to arrive in Kinshasa, Kabila repealed Decree 194, imposed by his father to restrict political party activity. This high-level delegation determined that "the cease-fire is holding and the parties to the conflict, with one exception, have disengaged their forces in accordance with the agreement they have signed."¹⁰⁰ The Security Council delegation took the opportunity of MONUC's imminent receipt of two fast patrol boats to announce that MONUC was reopening the vast Congolese river network. What the delegation failed to mention was that there was a third war emerging in eastern Congo. On the basis of the Security Council mission's report, the Security Council decided that disengagement was nearly complete, and on June 15, 2001, adopted Resolution 1355 authorizing preparations for the deployment of phase III including plans for the voluntary disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, reintegration, and resettlement (DDRRR) of all armed groups in the Congo. The role of the UN in this process, as spelled out in a joint communiqué signed by all the parties at the conclusion of the Security Council's visit to the region in May 2001, is that of an "impartial arbiter."¹⁰¹ The UN is responsible for coordinating all aspects of the

DDRRR process for Foreign armed groups while international humanitarian agencies are responsible for the screening of *génocidaires* and war criminals and turning them over to the international tribunal investigating the Rwanda genocide.¹⁰² The role of the UN and the OAU, therefore, is one of coordination and monitoring. The rest is conditional on the voluntary compliance of the armed groups. In other words, the foreign armed militia fighters in the Congo are asked to voluntarily give up their arms and demobilize, and to voluntarily return to their countries of origin. Enforced compliance is not in the mandate established by the UN or the OAU. The problem with voluntary compliance is that many of these armed groups went underground to avoid giving up their weapons, a fact noted by the UN as early as June 2001.¹⁰³ MONUC's original Chapter VII mandate was, therefore, much more a Chapter "6 1/2" mandate.¹⁰⁴ Its enforcement capability was limited to the protection of its own personnel, that of humanitarian relief workers, and some Congolese civilians. The reference to Chapter VII, however, raised expectations in the country of what the UN was prepared and able to do.

MONUC troops have gradually been deployed in previously blocked areas, and as of December 31, 2002, 4,420 out of the authorized 5,537 uniformed personnel had been deployed.¹⁰⁵ Despite its relatively small numbers, MONUC has established a noticeable presence in some key cities in the country. Its riverboat units patrol some of the country's waterways, thus encouraging the movement of people and goods, and it provided over \$700,000 worth of relief support, mostly in the form of air transport for relief workers, after the devastation caused by the eruption of Mount Nyiragongo in Goma on January 17, 2002. However, MONUC's greatest failure to date is in its response to the Third Congo War.

The Third Congo War

Since the signing of the Lusaka Agreement, there has been relatively little violence or combat along the cease-fire lines between Kinshasa-controlled and rebel-controlled regions. Large-scale violence and the accompanying humanitarian disaster has been largely due to the Kinshasa-supported violent, popular rebellion against the Rwandan occupation and the RCD-Goma rebels by the Mai Mai alliance with ALiR (Interahamwe/ex-FAR), the Burundian Hutu insurgents, and the Burundian FDD.¹⁰⁶

At the time that the agreement was signed, there were ALiR (Interahamwe/ex-FAR) forces in the territory controlled by Kinshasa and also RCD-Goma, although the majority were in Kinshasa-controlled territory and formed the most dynamic and best units of the new Kinshasa army.

There were also ALiR (Interahamwe/ex-FAR) guerilla units in the Kivus where they were increasingly allied to the Mai Mai and the FDD. During most of the time in question, Kinshasa not only did not disarm those under its control, but in every conceivable way, supported those in the Kinshasa and RCD-controlled areas. In spring 2001, with the change of regime in Kinshasa, and with the actual emplacement of MONUC, the Kinshasa government came to the conclusion that this relationship with the ALiR (Interahamwe/ex-FAR) had to be modified. With the Kinshasa government's cooperation, the majority of these Rwandan Hutu troops (estimated at 7,000–10,000) managed to concentrate in the Kivus, thereby probably doubling the military and guerilla ALiR (Interahamwe/ex-FAR) forces fighting in eastern Congo.¹⁰⁷

MONUC has consistently refused to monitor this fighting or to recognize it as a cease-fire violation, despite the intimate relationship between the Kinshasa government and the Mai Mai and ALiR (Interahamwe/ex-FAR) forces.¹⁰⁸ MONUC, under its terms of reference and under the overriding principles of the Lusaka Agreement, could have, and could in the future, mitigate this struggle, even as it occurs behind the cease-fire lines. The Lusaka Agreement asks the JMC, in anticipation of UN involvement, to verify the disarmament and quartering of all foreign armed groups, as well as to verify the disarmament of all Congolese civilians illegally armed, thereby opening the door for the JMC and MONUC to deal both with the ALiR (Interahamwe/ex-FAR)-FDD forces ("foreign armed groups") and the Mai Mai ("Congolese civilians illegally armed").

Moreover, the fact that these armed groups have been given material and moral support by Kinshasa should have been condemned by MONUC as a cease-fire violation. MONUC's failure to do so, and its rigid adherence to a more conservative interpretation of the cease-fire agreement, was a missed opportunity, which fell within its mandate, to mitigate the conflict.

A bilateral agreement signed between Kinshasa and Kigali in Pretoria on July 30, 2002 has resulted, as of this writing, in the complete withdrawal of Rwandan forces in return for Kinshasa's promise to dismantle the Hutu militias and hand over *génocidaire* leaders to Rwanda. A similar cease-fire agreement with Kampala in Luanda on September 6, 2002 has resulted in the withdrawal of most Ugandan troops. The withdrawal of foreign troops, however, has created a power vacuum in the east and contributed to the significant increase in the violent, anarchic conflict between ever smaller groups that no major actor effectively controls. Clashes between the Mai Mai allied forces and Rwanda's unpopular Congolese proxy, the RCD, has resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of civilians, and virtually nothing has

been done by the Kinshasa government or by MONUC to provide protection for these Congolese people. This failure to respond early and adequately to the Third War, and its continuing impact on the peace process, constitutes probably the greatest weakness in the entire attempt by the UN to bring about peace in the Congo.

Perceptions of the United Nations

Predictably, perceptions of the UN in the region are mixed. There is an extraordinary—and unfortunate—coincidence in the negative experience that three of the major actors in the Central African drama have had with the UN. The most recent is that of the Rwandan Tutsi who believe that not only were they abandoned to their genocidal fate by the UN and the major powers, but that the UN subsequently protected the retreating *génocidaires* and allowed them to rearm. As Collette Braeckman notes, “The UN has yet to live down the abandonment of Rwanda in 1994, and its reputation has been further damaged by the continued presence of Rwandan Hutu refugee camps in Tanzania and Kivu province, which has perpetuated the effects of the war and sown the seeds of further conflict.”¹⁰⁹ Two other actors are the Katangans and the Lumumbists in the Congo, the two most prominent forces in both Kabila regimes whose mistrust of the UN dates back to the 1960s. Lumumbists still harbor the belief that the democratically elected Lumumba lost power as a result of UN connivance, which also resulted in his assassination; and they blame the West, which they see as dominating the world organization, for defeating the Congo rebellions of 1963–1965. The Katangans, of course, still remember the UN’s role in defeating their secession attempts of 1960–1962, sending many of them into exile in Angola. The more recent performance of the UN in the country, such as MONUC’s failure to protect against the massacres committed by RCD-Goma in Kinsangani in May 2002, has only deepened these suspicions and widened the Congolese population’s disappointment in the UN. Despite the perception that the UN has failed the Congolese and Rwandan peoples, all the parties in the war see the UN as the only actor able to enforce the regionally brokered peace. The Lusaka Agreement’s call for a UN-led Chapter VII force, in tandem with a national dialogue, represents an inherent recognition by the belligerents and signatories to the Lusaka Agreement that a region that is itself divided and at war cannot enforce a peace agreement.

National Dialogue

The Lusaka Agreement envisioned a six-week-long national dialogue with armed and unarmed Congolese groups about the future institutions and

interim government of the Congo as a parallel process to the disarming of armed groups and the departure of foreign armies. Until his assassination, Laurent Kabila repeatedly refused to cooperate not only with the UN, but also with the dialogue's neutral facilitator, former Botswana president, Ketumile Masire. Kabila never accepted the agreement's provision that all parties, including the government, would enjoy the same status in the inter-Congolese dialogue. He quarreled with Masire over the start date of the negotiations and eventually shut down Masire's office in Kinshasa. Kabila also tried to exploit anglophone–francophone rivalries in Africa by accusing Masire, an anglophone, of being biased in favor of Uganda and Rwanda, and demanded that another facilitator—a francophone—be appointed.

Joseph Kabila, once in power in January 2001, initially took steps to revive the Lusaka process, and UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan voiced optimism: "I think there are hopeful signs coming out of the Congo," he said. "We went through a gloomy patch, but since January with the change in leadership, President Joseph Kabila is determined to work with his compatriots to end the conflict and is working much more effectively with former President Masire."¹¹⁰

On May 4, 2001, two weeks before the Security Council's visit to the region, the Lusaka Agreement signatories met in Lusaka and signed a Declaration on the Fundamental Principles. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue finally got started with a preparatory meeting in Gaborone during August 20–24, 2001, which was attended by representatives of all signatories to the Lusaka Agreement and the Congolese nonviolent political opposition and civil society, as well as observers from the UN, the OAU, SADC, the EU, and the JMC. After some disagreements over who would participate in the talks and on their venue, they agreed that the national dialogue would be held in Addis Ababa for a period of six weeks beginning on October 15, 2001.

The talks opened as planned at the UN Economic Commission for Africa conference hall in Addis Ababa. The OAU handled much of the logistic planning for the meeting by establishing a task force with representatives and staff from the OAU Secretariat, Masire's office, the UN, the Ethiopian government, and the ECA, and also contributed \$200,000.¹¹¹ According to Masire's office, financial constraints limited the participation to only 80 representatives rather than the original 330 agreed upon in Gaborone.¹¹² After just three days into peace talks, the Kinshasa government walked out of the meetings arguing that there was no point in going ahead with the talks if all the parties were not represented. Kinshasa was insisting that the Mai Mai be included in the talks, a proposal strongly opposed by the Congolese rebel groups who argued that only parties included in the Lusaka Agreement

should be invited to participate in the dialogue.¹¹³ The remaining participants decided to postpone the peace talks until early 2002, after South Africa offered to host them in South Africa's gambling capital, Sun City, and to pick up 50 percent of the cost.

Since then, there have been a number of regional efforts and international diplomatic efforts to calm the region's several conflicts and revive the peace process but they have continued to be troubled by problems relating to the inclusiveness of the process. On October 29, 2001, ten days after the inter-Congolese dialogue collapsed in Addis Ababa, the Ugandan and Rwandan defense ministers met in southwestern Uganda and laid the groundwork for a face-to-face meeting between their leaders that was held in London in November and hosted by the United Kingdom. On December 6, 2001, Nigeria hosted a preparatory meeting for the internal Congolese dialogue, under UN auspices. This Abuja meeting resulted in a compromise on the Mai Mai question, with agreement to give the Congolese militia six of the 300 plus seats at the national dialogue. Another round of UN-sponsored informal talks aimed at confidence building among the interlocutors in preparation for Sun City, was held in Geneva during February 4–7, 2002. This time, the RCD walked out of the talks, calling the meeting “a total failure.” At issue, again, was the Mai Mai question. The RCD accused Kinshasa of violating the Lusaka cease-fire agreement by continuing to support the fighting of the Mai Mai militias. “We cannot talk about transition and elections when fighting is still going on, if there is no respect for the cease-fire,” declared RCD-Goma's secretary-general, Azarias Ruberwa.¹¹⁴

The national dialogue opened in Sun City on February 25, 2002 initially without the participation of one of the principal actors, the MLC, which complained that the government had stacked the deck in its favor by sending bogus civilian opposition parties. Eventually, all of the actors participated in the talks that lasted for a total of 52 days. In spite of numerous efforts by South Africa, the dialogue failed to achieve even a general agreement between the key actors. The government and the MLC signed an agreement for a transitional power-sharing arrangement in which Joseph Kabila would remain president and MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba would be named prime minister, but this was rejected by the Rwanda-backed RCD-Goma, and by the nonmilitarized political opposition. On leaving Sun City, the dialogue's facilitator, Ketumile Masire, acknowledged, “we are leaving Sun City without fully realizing all our goals.”¹¹⁵ The Sun City agreement failed because the inclusiveness achieved by the Lusaka Agreement was ignored, as was the ongoing Third War and its devastating consequences. And once it became clear that national unification under its domination was not forthcoming,

the pact ceased to have any interest for Kinshasa. The government walked away from it, choosing, instead, to enter into bilateral agreements with Rwanda and Uganda, and to marginalize the rebel movements opposing it.

A more proactive mediation role by the UN under the leadership of Mustapha Nyasse has led to the signing of a power-sharing agreement by all the major Congolese parties to the conflict. The so-called Pretoria Agreement, brokered largely by Thabo Mbeki and Mustapha Nyasse, and signed in South Africa on December 16, 2002, is the latest effort to end the war. It aims to form an inclusive, transitional government with Kabila as president and four vice presidents drawn from rebel and civil society leadership. As of this writing, the Congo is poised on the verge of a possible transition to peace and eventual democratic rule. As the political struggle over the implementation of the Pretoria Agreement is fought in Kinshasa and in Western capitals, however, the violent struggle in the east persists unabated.

Conclusion

The similarities and differences between the first two post–Cold War wars in the Congo are striking. First, in both wars, Rwanda and Uganda, seeking to stop insurgency movements against their governments from using the Congo as a base of operations, helped launch Congolese rebel groups who sought to overthrow the Kinshasa regime. Second, in both cases, the Kinshasa authorities appealed to the UN Security Council and the OAU to condemn the “aggression” but obtained limited results. In the First War, the UN and regional organizations did not send troops to help end the conflict. Third, in both wars, foreign forces did most of the fighting, importing massive violence into a country that, since the mid-1960s, had experienced little such violence. Finally, all three wars represent complicated conflicts involving numerous transboundary actors with overlapping transnational financial and security interests.¹¹⁶

The differences between the wars are more telling than the similarities. In the First War, the Kinshasa government was singularly unsuccessful in gaining any real foreign support and its army was rapidly defeated, whereas in the Second War, the new Kinshasa government was very successful in obtaining foreign military and diplomatic support. In the First War, the foreign armies that actually did the fighting and defeated Mobutu were Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola, whereas that alliance split in the Second War with Angola actively supporting Kinshasa. In the First War, the notion that the war was a “revolution” or a “war of liberation,” coupled with a generalized antagonism toward Mobutu, resulted in mobilizing considerable Congolese and foreign

support for the so-called rebel forces. In the Second War, much of the Congolese population was convinced that this was an invasion by the Rwandans, Ugandans, and for some, simply the Tutsi; with the exception of the MLC in Equateur Province, there was very little popular support for the new rebels.¹¹⁷ The paradox here is that although there were more Congolese troops fighting (on both sides) in the Second War than in the First War, the second one generally was viewed as an invasion and the first one as a genuine revolution. In the First War, there was a coincidence of interest between the region, the UN, and the major powers not to act once the war had started. But in the Second War, when the region demanded UN action to enforce the peace agreement, the UN chose not to.

The recent history of the Congo has witnessed an extraordinary number of attempts by regional actors—individuals, states, and institutions—to resolve the largest war that Africa has seen since independence. The conflict, however, persists, and at an enormous cost of the people of Central Africa. The most that these attempts have achieved are several partially respected cease-fire agreements. They have failed to end the conflict, or to reestablish central government authority throughout the DRC. We have suggested that the reason for this is the inability of regional organizations to resolve region-wide conflicts in which large and important portions of that region are themselves participants in the conflict. It is not due, as is commonly assumed, to a lack of institutional capacity.

The region's recognition of its limited capacity in conflict management has led to a number of capacity-building efforts over the years.¹¹⁸ Virtually all of them, however, are focused on traditional peacekeeping—they do not build capacity for enforcement missions. These efforts may contribute to the region's capacity to mediate peace agreements, and perhaps even to monitor them, but add little to the region's ability to enforce those agreements. In any case, it is doubtful that such capacity-building efforts can overcome the fundamental problem of broad regional antagonisms.¹¹⁹ It is our contention that even if these weaknesses in capacity did not exist, in a war of this magnitude, regional organizations would not be the appropriate instruments for peace enforcement if, as is the case in the Congo wars, the principal members are divided and opposed to each other. In the Second Congo War, for example, Zimbabwe insisted on the legitimacy of the Kinshasa government and on Zimbabwe's right, as an invited force, to maintain a presence in the Congo. Rwanda and Uganda, on the other hand, have emphasized the legitimacy of their support of "revolutionary" movements challenging the Kinshasa regime. Such contradictions in a war of this magnitude would stymie even the most well-equipped regional organization. The growing willingness on

the part of African organizations, especially those in the subregion, to assume a greater responsibility for peace in the region will not alter the constraints they face in ending conflicts that engulf entire regions. It is, however, an important and potentially positive development for smaller conflicts in which capacity-building efforts can make the difference between success and failure.

The Congo wars also suggest that there are multiple dangers in subcontracting UN responsibilities to actors not under UN command and control, and in sanctioning the actions of coalitions of the willing not authorized by the Security Council. The discrepancy between the “neutral” and “strictly humanitarian” mandate of *Opération Turquoise* in Rwanda and what the mission accomplished on the ground is a glaring illustration of how some subcontractors may use the opportunity to cloak themselves in “UN blue” to pursue their own national agendas. And coalitions of the willing, when there are powerful, willing participants on opposing sides, simply translate into bigger wars, not peace enforcement.

There are two new variables in the Congo wars that further complicate the region’s ability to enforce peace agreements. The first, as noted earlier, is the size of the war. We have not answered the question of how large a conflict has to be before the ability of regional institutions to end the conflict is clearly compromised. In principle, it is possible for regional organizations to deal effectively with small-scale, or internal conflicts, if the institutional resources are there. Although we make no claim to know where the demarcation line is between “small” and “too large,” there appears to be a point in a conflict when the number of state combatants reaches a critical mass and there are insufficient “independent” regional actors who can end the conflict.

The second new variable is the networked dimension of these interconnected wars. The dynamics of state–non-state, public–private, and international–domestic networks in these wars further complicate peace efforts accustomed to approaching conflicts simply as inter- or intra-state. Approaches to conflict resolution must begin to address the increasingly important and war-sustaining economic networks of these wars. Foreign and domestic political leaders and military forces have gained enormous economic benefits from their presence in the Congo wars, even if their initial engagement was not financially driven. This in turn has become an incentive not to abandon their “investments” and is today yet another obstacle on the road to peace. The Congo’s elaborate joint commercial ventures with Zimbabwe, justified as a reimbursement for Zimbabwe’s costs of war, but which benefit President Mugabe and his associates, is but one example. Rwanda and Uganda’s use of their military presence in the Congo to extract

Congolese national resources for their own national export is another. These complicated transnational webs of overlapping financial and security interests involve transboundary actors, interests, and capital, and make it unlikely that the region itself will have the power—or the incentive—to dismantle what are largely uninvestigated and often illicit networks with global ties. Moreover, the demobilization and reintegration of combatants into civilian life, whether through coercive or persuasive means, cannot be divorced from national economic recovery efforts, as these combatants need local economies in which to be reintegrated. In resource-scarce environments, this requires a coordinated approach with international organizations and financial institutions.

The paramount responsibility of the UN, according to the Charter, is the maintenance of international peace and security. It does not say, as Ibrahim Gambari reminds us, “except when it comes to Africa.”¹²⁰ The reality in the Congo wars is that the UN failed to act in the one area in which it has the sole advantage—the ability to mobilize more resources than some regions are able to, for peace enforcement. This failure is due to the unwillingness of the major powers on the Security Council—the United States in particular—to bear the enormous costs required to finance such combat missions and risk the political fallout that may result from their own war casualties, in order to contain conflicts in which they do not have overriding interests.

Thus, the role of the UN in these wars has largely been to monitor and verify cease-fire agreements, coordinate relief efforts, and advocate for human rights. Consequently, by demonstrating a consistent unwillingness to use coercive force to disarm armed militias, the UN missed some critical opportunities along the way to contain the conflict even when it was obvious that only a preponderance of extra-regional force might achieve this. First, *Opération Turquoise* not only failed to stop the massacres underway in Rwanda, but also allowed the *génocidaires* to escape into eastern Zaire with much of their political and military infrastructure intact. This in turn, resulted in the conflict spilling over into eastern Congo and, two years later, igniting the First Congo War. Second, although it was widely known that between 1994 and 1996, the UNHCR camps in eastern Congo housed both armed Hutu as well as unarmed civilian refugees, the UN chose not to disarm the camps. The insecurity felt by Rwanda, and much of the violence in eastern Congo, is a direct consequence of that missed opportunity, as the ALiR (Interahamwe/ex-FAR) have regrouped, rearmed, and have been fighting the Rwandan government from bases in the Congo ever since.¹²¹ The UN missed yet another opportunity to disarm the ALiR (Interahamwe/ex-FAR) when the Canadian-led multinational force authorized by the Security

Council in 1996 was not given that mandate, and then was never deployed. MONUC, the UN observer mission authorized by the Security Council in 1999 following the signing of the Lusaka Agreement, is another missed opportunity in that its size and mandate are inadequate to achieve the goals set by the agreement, or to address all of the realities on the ground. All of this represents the UN Security Council's reluctance to act with the force and commitment required, even after incredible loss of life and pressure from the region to do so.

The OAU's and now the AU's limitations in conflict management generally, and peace enforcement in particular, have meant that the organization's principal roles in the wars in the Congo have been limited to those of legitimizers of UN action, intermediary between extra- and subregional organizations, and "moral guarantor" of the peace agreement. Cooperative arrangements such as the joint UN-OAU regional representatives and special envoys not only serve the functional purpose of coordination and information sharing, but also give regional legitimacy to UN actions. In the Second War, the OAU acted as an intermediary between the UN and SADC, the subregional organization most directly involved in this conflict.¹²² Although regional leaders were in regular contact with non-regional powers regarding the ongoing mediation efforts, the established institutional links of cooperation between the UN and the OAU served as the formal channels of communication for the projection of regional needs onto the world stage. Such institutional links do not yet exist between the UN and subregional organizations in Africa although, informally, SADC became an effective lobbyist at the UN in favor of UN engagement. Finally, the OAU, as a signatory of the Lusaka Agreement, was designated its "moral guarantor." The OAU accepted the responsibility, on behalf of the region, of nudging, cajoling, and otherwise pressuring the parties involved in the conflict to adhere to the peace settlement. In practical terms, this means that AU staff is present at all meetings between belligerents to observe and monitor the peace process, and on occasion is used by regional leaders to exert pressure on the parties through declarative statements or the convening of meetings.

In Central and Southern Africa, as in West Africa, subregional organizations are increasingly filling the vacuum left by the AU's limitations and the UN's reluctance to act in conflict management. Although largely absent as an institutional force from the First War, SADC responded in a significant way to the later wars in the Congo. That response has taken three forms: mediation, military intervention, and advocacy with the international community. Many of the efforts to mediate a peaceful settlement during the Second Congo War were SADC-driven. Much of the mediation in both wars

was undertaken by leaders in the SADC region. Mandela was especially instrumental in the Mobutu–Kabila negotiations in 1996–1997, and Chiluba led regional efforts to pressure the parties into signing a cease-fire agreement. While some SADC powerbrokers were, from the beginning, deeply committed to achieving a cease-fire, clearly others were motivated by the belief that military victory was unlikely or would be too expensive. All of the regional organizations and individual states involved actively sought UN engagement, presumably because they realized that they were too divided to enforce the peace agreement. The pressure from these organizations had an important impact on the UN's acceptance of the limited responsibilities it finally did assume. SADC's advocacy role has been the most interesting and perhaps the most significant indicator of what subregional organizations in Africa can realistically do in response to continent-wide conflicts. SADC ambassadors actively lobbied at the UN for the world body's acceptance of the responsibilities outlined for it in the cease-fire agreement. Although SADC itself was deeply split on how to respond to the war, there was enough consensus within the organization to lobby in favor of a UN intervention. Working through the nonaligned caucus in the Security Council, and with other states from the South in the General Assembly, UN representatives of SADC member-states succeeded in persuading key members in the Security Council to elaborate a UN engagement in the Congo. This modest engagement would have been even more limited if it had not been for this lobbying and for certain individuals such as U.S. Ambassador Holbrooke. Thus, the UN did not accept all of the responsibilities asked of it by the region, its eventual level of engagement was to a considerable degree due to the region's advocacy. Following this "success," regional or subregional organizations may be inspired to develop more effective lobbying activities for their region at the UN. It is ironic that the supposed beneficiaries of the UN's all too generous transfer of responsibility for peace and security to regional actors have become the advocates for returning the ball.

The lesson we draw from the Congo wars is that at least in the case of region-wide wars, the UN is the only international institution which can hope, through early intervention, to end the violence. Indeed, there is a parallel between the inability, as we see it, of regional organizations to succeed in peace enforcement and the reason for the UN veto. In effect, the framers of the UN Charter realized that if the major powers were to fight each other, the organization would be incapable of peace enforcement. One of the functions of the veto was to avoid involving the UN in such a futile and impossible task. If the UN cannot act in a World War, it is logical that a regional organization cannot act when much of the region is involved in an intra-regional war.

Notes

1. "Two Concepts of Sovereignty," UN Secretary-General Address to the 54th session of the United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 20, 1999.
2. "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations," A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 23, 2000.
3. For a recent effort to set parameters and guidelines for such interventions, see *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (Ottawa: IDRC, 2001).
4. When referring to the UN, one must always be aware that there are, conceptually, two UNs: the UN secretariat, i.e. the international civil service, and UN member-states. In other words, the UN is both an independent actor and an instrument for state interests. For more on this distinction, see Louis Emmerij, Richard Jolly, and Thomas G. Weiss, *Ahead of the Curve? UN Ideas and Global Challenges* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001). In this chapter, the discussion of UN activity in the Congo is limited to the UN Security Council, i.e. member-states, and the UN Secretariat, and unless we specify otherwise, UN action refers to member-states' decisions at the Security Council. The activities of specialized UN agencies such as the UN Development Program are not addressed here.
5. See Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide* (New York: Zed Books, 2000); J. Matthew Vaccaro, "The Politics of Genocide: Peacekeeping and Disaster Relief in Rwanda," in William J. Durch, ed., *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), pp. 367–407; Philip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1998); Scott Peterson, *Me Against My Brother: At War in Somalia, Sudan, and Rwanda* (New York: Routledge, 2000); Bruce D. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001); UN, "UN Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nation During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda," December 15, 1999.
6. UNAMIR forces were mandated to help implement a cease-fire agreement and transitional arrangements. On April 21, 1994, the UN Security Council voted to reduce its UNAMIR forces by 90% to 270 troops. France voted in favor of the withdrawal.
7. Six weeks earlier, on May 6, Security Council Resolution 918 authorized UNAMIR II, a redeployment of 5,500 UN troops with a Chapter VII humanitarian mandate, and imposed an arms embargo on Rwanda. However, delays in contributions meant that UNAMIR II was not deployed until August, three months later, just as *Opération Turquoise* was withdrawing its forces.

8. Security Council Resolution 925 was adopted on June 8, 1994 to extend UNAMIR's mandate for another six months, until December 9, 1994. Its mandate required UNAMIR to protect IDPs, refugees, and civilians by establishing "secure humanitarian areas," and "provide security and support for the distribution of relief supplies and humanitarian relief operations."
9. Security Council Resolution 929, June 22, 1994.
10. Goma is in eastern Congo, across the Congo–Rwanda border.
11. Within days, in what was a *quid pro quo* for each power, the Security Council authorized similar operations for the United States in Haiti and for Russia in Georgia.
12. Patrick de Saint-Exupery, "Rwanda. Les assassins racontent leurs massacres," *Le Figaro*, June 29, 1994. Quoted in Prunier, p. 292.
13. See Prunier's account of *Opération Turquoise* in Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, pp. 281–311. Prunier was a member of the French Crisis Unit that supported the operation.
14. Jones, *Peacemaking in Rwanda*, p. 123.
15. Romeo A. Dallaire, "The End of Innocence: Rwanda 1994," in Jonathan Moore, ed., *Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), pp. 71–86.
16. Once out of power, known as "the ex-FAR."
17. "Inter-ethnic relations in the Kivus had long been more problematic than in other parts of the Congo, largely due to the coexistence of pastoralists and sedentary farmers in that area; a higher population density than is found in other parts of the country; and to a cultural divide between the original sons of the land and Kinyarwanda-speaking immigrants—both Hutu and Tutsi—who have been migrating westward in several waves from Rwanda and Burundi, some going back many generations." Herbert Weiss, "War and Peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo," *Current African Issues*, no. 22 (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2000).
18. UNHCR estimates by mid-November 1994 put refugee figures at: Goma, 850,000; Bukavu, 332,000; Uvira, 62,000; with another 800,000 in Burundi, Tanzania, and Uganda, for a total of 2.1 million.
19. UN, "Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Rwanda Submitted By Mr. René Deqni-Séqni, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Under Paragraph 20 of Resolution S-3/1 of May 25, 1994," E/CN.4/1995/12, August 12, 1994, para. 16.
20. Prunier notes that the former Rwandan leaders "monopolized the distribution of humanitarian aid and inflated the numbers of people actually registered to get more than what was needed." Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, p. 314. Indeed, it was widely alleged that part of this aid was used to purchase arms, and that Zairian army officers were involved in this commerce.
21. Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis*, pp. 315–316. According to Prunier, the incursions into Rwanda by this army in exile were confirmed by Major Plante, a

- spokesperson for UNAMIR, as early as September 1994. The French were evidently so confident that the former Rwandan authorities regrouping in the refugee camps would soon regain power in Rwanda, that they anticipated not having to invite the Tutsi government to the next Franco-African summit.
22. See the recent report by The Lawyers' Committee on Human Rights, *Refugees, Rebels and the Quest for Justice* (London: 2002).
 23. Although there is no consensus on exact dates, the age of this Banyamulenge community is estimated at 200 years. Also, there is some controversy over their exact numbers, which have been claimed to range from 25,000 to 400,000. See *Info-Zaire*, "Feuilleton d'information produit par la Table de Concertation sur les Droits Humains au Zaïre," no. 119 (September 30, 1996).
 24. Throughout that year, Amnesty International repeatedly accused Zairian soldiers of committing atrocities against the Banyamulenge. Amnesty International Press Release, June 14, 1996; *ZAIRE: Hidden from Scrutiny: Human Rights Abuses in Eastern Zaire*, Amnesty International, December 19, 1996.
 25. Table de Concertation sur les Droits Humains au Zaïre, *Communiqué*, September 6, 1996.
 26. This is probably true although the numbers involved are very difficult to establish.
 27. Some of these insurrection movements included the Lord's Resistance Army, the West Nile Bank Front, and the Allied Democratic Forces.
 28. From this point forward, this coalition of Congolese, Rwandan, Ugandan, and later, Angolan forces will be referred to as "the anti-Mobutu alliance."
 29. In fact, the principal pro-democracy nongovernmental organization in the Congo, the Comité national des organisations non-gouvernementales au développement, issued a statement shortly after the war started, confirming the presence of Rwandan and Ugandan troops fighting alongside the Banyamulenge in the Congo. *Info-Zaire* newsletter, "Feuilleton d'information produit par la Table de Concertation sur les Droits Humains au Zaïre," no. 121 (November 26, 1996).
 30. James C. McKinley, Jr., "Zaire's Rebels Win New Converts," *New York Times*, February 26, 2001.
 31. Josh Friedman, "Zaire's Grassroots in U.S.: Exiled Scholars Now Kabila Aides," *Newsday* May 22, 1997.
 32. For a discussion of French fear of U.S. dominance in Africa, see Howard W. French, "France Fear U.S. Advance in Africa," *New York Times*, April 4, 1997, and Gérard Prunier, "Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape from a Political Dead End," in Howard Adelman, Astri Suhrke, eds., *The Path of a Genocide* (Rutgers, NJ: Transaction Books, 1999) pp. 281–306.
 33. "France Linked to Defense of Mobutu," *New York Times*, May 2, 1997.
 34. Yugoslav government officials and Geolink, a Paris-based telecommunications company, allegedly ran the French covert operation. "France Linked to Defense of Mobutu," *New York Times*, May 2, 1997.
 35. "Zaire's Rebels Win New Converts," *New York Times*, February 21, 2001.

36. Press Statement by the Regional Summit on the Crisis in Eastern Zaire, November 5, 1996. Reprinted by United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN).
37. *Info-Zaire* newsletter, November 26, 1996.
38. Under the resolution, the objectives of the task force include “short-term humanitarian assistance and shelter to refugees and displaced persons in eastern Zaire, assisting UNHCR with the protection and voluntary repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and establishing humanitarian corridors for the delivery of humanitarian assistance.”
39. For an account of the process that led to the decision to authorize the Canadian operation, including the debates within the Canadian government and between Canada and the United States, see John B. Hay, “Conditions of Influence: An Exploratory Study of the Canadian Government’s Effect on U.S. Policy in the Case of Intervention in Eastern Zaire,” Unpublished M.A. thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, May 1998. Also see, James Appathurai and Ralph Lyshysyn, “Lessons Learned from the Zaire Mission,” *Canadian Foreign Policy*, vol. 5, no. 2 (Winter 1998).
40. Although Rwanda eventually went along with the proposed intervention, it objected to any efforts to repatriate Hutu refugees that were not authorized to disarm them first. Humanitarian NGOs were also insisting upon disarmament as a necessary condition for humanitarian relief efforts.
41. SC/6291, November 15, 1996.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Those Rwandan Hutu who remained in the Congo were probably largely made up of Interahamwe/ex-FAR, their families, and some ordinary civilians who had either been forced or volunteered to withdraw westward to escape the advancing forces of the anti-Mobutu alliance.
44. The mission was abandoned in spite of arguments by UNHCR and humanitarian relief organizations questioning the numbers of refugees actually returning to Rwanda, *Info-Zaire* newsletter November 26, 1996.
45. Security Council Resolution 1097, February 18, 1997.
46. Steven Lee Meyers, “Zaire and Rebels Warily Begin Indirect Talks,” *New York Times*, February 21, 1997.
47. Both sides sent high-level envoys to these indirect talks, which were attended also by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, George E. Moose, President Clinton’s then special assistant on Africa, Susan Rice, and South African Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad. Mobutu was represented by his nephew and security adviser, Ngbanda Nzambo ko Ayumba, and Kabila by Bizima Karaha, who would later become the DRC’s minister of foreign affairs, with close ties to Rwanda.
48. Howard W. French, “Zaire Rebels Blocking Aid, UN Says,” *New York Times*, April 23, 1997.

49. Paul Lewis, "UN Says Zaire Rebels Block Aid for Ailing Rwandan Refugees," *New York Times*, April 3, 1997.
50. Integrated Regional Information Network report April 8, 1997. Paul Lewis, "UN report accuses Zaire Rebels of Mass Killings," *New York Times*, April 9, 1997.
51. S/PRST/1922/22, April 24, 1997. The UN was still focused on repatriating the "refugees," despite the fact that at least the armed Hutus in the Congo had no interest in being returned to Rwanda where they faced a very uncertain future. (As in the UNHCR camps, the Hutu military and remaining civilians tended to move together, so that it was difficult to distinguish military operations from civilian massacres.) As a result, the UN had been strongly denouncing the alliance for impeding UN access to key cities like Kisangani, now under rebel control, that had the necessary transport infrastructure from which to mount refugee relief operations. See Paul Lewis, "UN Says Zaire Rebels Block Aid for Ailing Rwandan Refugees," *New York Times*, April 3, 1997.
52. Howard W. French, "Zairian Rebel Takes Defiant Stance on Refugees," *New York Times*, April 28, 1997.
53. S/PRST/1997/31, May 29, 1997.
54. Weiss, *War and Peace*, pp. 6–7.
55. For example, the country's new name was not that previously chosen unanimously by the Sovereign National Conference—*Federal Republic of Congo*—a name that reflected the Conference's intention for decentralized power and which was to be put to a national referendum.
56. The behavior of Rwandan soldiers in Kinshasa added to the alienation of the population from the AFDL. Many began to see the Rwandan troops in the capital as an army of occupation rather than an army of liberation. Moreover, there was a growing resentment over Kabila's efforts to stack his inner circle with members of his own ethnic group, the Katanga Luba.
57. "Les 100 jours de Kabila: changement, ordre, et justice," *BERCI* (July–August 1997).
58. Interview with Aldo Ajello by the authors, April 16, 2002.
59. UN, "Report of the Joint Mission Charged with Investigating Allegations of Massacres and Other Human Rights Violations Occurring in Eastern Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo) since September 1996," A/51/942, July 2, 1997.
60. Weiss, *War and Peace*, p. 13.
61. John Pomfret, "Rwandans Led Revolt in Congo," *Washington Post*, July 9, 1997. Mahmood Mamdani, "Why Rwanda Trumpeted Its Zaire Role," *Mail and Guardian*, August 8, 1997.
62. Weiss, *War and Peace*, p. 13.
63. The more commonly heard name for this war is Madeleine Albright's "First African World War." However, this is somewhat of a misnomer since, unlike World Wars I and II, which involved European, Asian, American, and colonial

troops, the forces fighting in this war have been exclusively African, with the exception of some undetermined number of American and European mercenaries. Of course, arms have been provided by non-African actors, but the actual combatants—the belligerents—are African armies from a number of countries, and African militias; hence, the more accurate term, the “First African Continental War.”

64. A mortality study on the DRC released by the International Rescue Committee on May 8, 2001 estimates that 2.5 million people have died since the outbreak of this war in August 1998. Of that estimate, the study notes that only 350,000 deaths were directly caused by combat. The rest were caused by the starvation and disease that so often accompanies war and displacement. One out of eight households surveyed by the IRC had lost at least one family member to violence, and in eastern Congo, where an insurrection by the Congolese Mai Mai violently challenged RCD/Rwanda rule, 75% of infants born during the war had died, or would die, before reaching two years. Recent UNHCR estimates suggest that there are currently nearly three million internally displaced persons in the country, one of the highest rates of displacement in Africa.
65. Henceforth referred to as *the anti-Kabila alliance* or the “*rebellion*.”
66. See Weiss, *War and Peace*, p. 16; Colette Braeckman, *L'Enjeu Congolais* (Paris: Fayard, 1999), p. 395; Jean-Claude Williams, *L'Odyssée Kabila* (Paris: Karthala, 1999), p. 225.
67. Aldo Ajello, *Cavalier de la paix: quelle politique Européenne commune pour l'Afrique?* (Brussels: GRIP, 2000), pp. 102–103 [translation authors].
68. Ajello, *Cavalier de la paix*, p. 103.
69. Ethiopia and Eritrea were among Kabila's foreign patrons during the First War.
70. In recent years, the Interhamwe/ex-FAR have recruited Rwandan Hutu from abroad, and in some cases, Congolese, into what has now become the ALiR. Many of the new recruits have no ties to the genocide as they simply were too young or not in Rwanda during the genocide. Therefore, the membership of the ALiR is assumed not to be limited to the génocidaires or Rwandan Hutu.
71. The DRC became a member of SADC on February 28, 1998.
72. Security Council Resolution 1234, April 9, 1999.
73. Cedric de Coning, “Neo-Interventionism: An African Response to Failed Internationalism,” *South African Yearbook of International Affairs*, 1999–2000, quoted in Denis Kadima and Claude Kabemba, eds., *Whither Regional Peace and Security? The DRC after the War* (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2000), pp. 15–16.
74. See International Crisis Group, *Africa's Seven Nation War* (DRC Report no. 4, May 21, 1999).
75. Ajello, *Cavalier de la paix*, p. 126.
76. The text of the agreement is available on the United States Institute of Peace website at http://www.usip.org/library/pa/index/pa_drc.html (last visited March 8, 2003).

77. A leadership quarrel within the RCD held up its signature since neither faction's leaders could agree on who should sign for the movement. Eventually, that disagreement was overcome by having all 50 founding members of the RCD become signatories.
78. International Crisis Group, *Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace* (DRC Report no. 5, August 20, 1999), pp. 2–8.
79. Although subsequently, Kinshasa transformed this claim by indicating that the Mai Mai are Forces d'Auto-défense Populaires (FAP).
80. International Crisis Group, *Africa's Seven Nation War*, p. 8.
81. See, e.g., Sam G. Amoo, "Role of the OAU: Past, Present, and Future," in David R. Smock, ed., *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa* (Washington, DC: USIP, 1993), pp. 239–262; William J. Foltz, "The OAU and the Resolution of Africa's Conflicts," in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman, eds., *Conflict Resolution in Africa* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1991), pp. 347–366; Edward J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1996). Also see Berman and Sams, chapter 2 in this volume.
82. The AU has no provisions for sanctions against deviant states. It is also prohibited from expelling a member-state from the organization.
83. A South African defense official, quoted in Integrated Regional Information Network, "Military Apprehensive Ahead of DRC Peacekeeping," August 27, 1999.
84. See S/PRST/1998/26, August 31, 1998 and S/PRST/1998/36, December 11, 1998.
85. S/PRST/1998/36, December 11, 1998.
86. Integrated Regional Information Network, "UN Military Officers Prepare for Deployment," September 9, 1999.
87. Interview with André Kapanga, Congolese ambassador to the UN under Laurent Kabila, and the authors, April 4, 2002.
88. South Africa's Institute for Security Studies has correctly noted that MONUC is "[a]rguably the most complicated and ambitious post-Cold War experiment in the creation of peace from chaos with fairly modest resources." Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, *Peacekeeping in the DRC: MONUC and the Road to Peace*, monograph no. 66 (Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies, October 2001), Executive Summary, p. 3. Given the size of the country and the number of different combatants, domestic and foreign, one could well amend "fairly modest" to "inadequate"—both in terms of its mandate and size.
89. During this "Africa Month," the Security Council also discussed the problem of the AIDS pandemic in Africa, an unprecedented step that moved the council closer to a broader conceptualization of security. In an equally unusual development, Holbrooke invited U.S. Vice President Al Gore to address the council on the issue of AIDS.

90. Steven Edwards, "Inadequate Congo Mission Doomed, Canada Tells UN," *National Post Online*, May 18, 2000.
91. *Ibid.*, The United States is bearing two-thirds of the estimated initial cost of \$41 million.
92. Interview with André Kapanga and the authors, April 4, 2002.
93. Interview with André Kapanga and the authors, March 14, 2002.
94. *Entrepreneur* (October 18–24, 2001), p. 4.
95. *S/2000/416*, May 11, 2000.
96. MLC leader Jean-Pierre Bemba, fearing a power vacuum in Equateur Province, insisted that he would not withdraw unless the UN deployed a force large enough to guarantee the security of over 100,000 people in villages that the MLC forces had "liberated." "I think this UN and the international community only cares about my army withdrawing, but do not care if the black Congolese are massacred by the Interahamwe and government forces." Jean-Pierre Bemba, quoted in Integrated Regional Information Network report, May 2, 2001. The reason he mentions the Interahamwe—usually associated with the conflict in the Kivu—is that Kabila had deployed Hutu battalions in the FAC to the Equateur front where they were considered by the MLC as being Kinshasa's best soldiers. These Rwandan Hutu soldiers were mobilized by the Kabila regime, largely from UNHCR camps, both in the Congo and Congo–Brazzaville shortly after the Second Congo War started.
97. Security Council Resolution 1304, June 16, 2000. The Security Council also asked the secretary-general "to submit an assessment of the damage as a basis for such reparations" and asked Uganda and Rwanda "to pay reparations for the loss of life and the property damage they have inflicted on the civilian population in Kisangani."
98. Integrated Regional Information Network report, April 30, 2001.
99. "Uganda Pulls Out of Peace Pact Intended to End Congo Civil War," *New York Times*, April 30, 2001.
100. The exception was Bemba's Front de libération congolais, the now defunct and short-lived Museveni-initiated alliance between the MLC and the RCD-ML in north Kivu. *S/2001/521/Add.1*, May 30, 2001, Annex I, para. 4.
101. *Ibid.*, Annex III, para. 11.
102. This process would be facilitated by a radio and print media information campaign undertaken by "the UN, the OAU and the signatories..." (para. 16) on the incentive packages for those with arms to give them up.
103. *S/2001/572*, June 8, 2001, para. 106.
104. Chapter 6 1/2 is a poetic term used to describe traditional peacekeeping operations not envisaged in the Charter, and that lie between Chapter VI peace efforts and Chapter VII enforcement operations.
105. On December 4, 2002, Security Council Resolution 1445 conditionally expanded the number of troops authorized to 8,700.
106. The FDD is the military wing of the Burundian Hutu party Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie.

107. Those Hutu troops (estimated at 1,500–2,000), which did not participate in this movement, were ultimately separated by the FAC, and without being disarmed, cantoned mainly in the Kamina military base where MONUC was given some access to them. They have since created a political party demanding negotiations between Hutu and Tutsi for institutionalized power-sharing, a position that is unlikely to be accepted by the Rwandan government.
108. This refusal is illustrated by the statement of the UN secretary-general's special representative for the DRC, Kamel Morjane's in June 2001, "For six months, we did not have any serious violation of the cease-fire." Kamel Morjane, "The Case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo," in *The Brahimi Report: Overcoming the North-South Divide* (6th International Workshop, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, June 29–30, 2001).
109. Colette Braeckman, "Congo: A War Without Victors," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, April 2001.
110. Integrated Regional Information Network report, April 25, 2001.
111. "Inter-Congolese Dialogue will Herald New Beginning for Congo," *The Ethiopian Herald*, October 16, 2001, p. 1.
112. Ethiopian newspapers widely reported that the neutral facilitator's office faced funding constraints, adding also that the Sheraton Hotel in Addis Ababa, where participants were being housed, had required Masire to pay a \$1 million cash security deposit. "It must have been, however, painful for the facilitators, who were decrying a low budget of only a little more than four million dollars, to block a quarter of it and live on the slender finance for the rest of the journey..." reported the Ethiopian daily, *Fortune* (October 21, 2001), p. 20. Some donors have expressed concern privately that the funding made available for the neutral facilitator's work although sufficient, has not been used effectively, although there have been no public accusations of wasteful spending by Masire's office.
113. Olivier Kamitatu, secretary-general of the MLC, spoke for all the rebels when he said, "The government wants to consolidate its power and position at the talks by bringing on board as many allies as it can, but this is not part of the Lusaka Agreement so we cannot allow it." "Troubled Inter-Congolese Dialogue May Cease for One Month," *Addis Tribune* (October 19, 2001), p. 20. The Kinshasa government gave assurances that "it is not pulling out, it is still in the process, but is asking the conditions to be completed..." "Inter-Congolese Dialogue to Resume Today," *The Ethiopian Herald*, October 21, 2001.
114. Kinshasa government spokesperson quoted in Integrated Regional Information Network report, February 11, 2001.
115. Integrated Regional Information Network report, April 22, 2002.
116. Mary Kaldor sees this type of war as representative of a new category of war. Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 2.

117. See Tatiana Carayannis, "Rebels with a Cause? The Mouvement de libération du Congo," paper delivered at the Annual African Studies Association Conference, December 6–8, 2002, Washington, DC.
118. See Berman and Sams, chapter 2 in this volume. One such effort was the 1991 Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa. Held in Kampala under the auspices of General Obasanjo's *Africa Leadership Forum* and the *UN Economic Commission for Africa*, it resulted in the adoption of provisions for new security arrangements for Africa modeled after Europe's Helsinki accords. The provisions of the so-called Kampala Document were seen by some as a way to correct the OAU's shortcomings in this area; however, they were never implemented. More recent and promising efforts include the creation of the Council of Elders, an attempt to institutionalize the mediation efforts of the region's elder statesmen and women. But it is not yet clear how the AU will improve the region's capacity for peace enforcement operations. Other efforts, such as ACRI launched by the United States in 1996, include building the capacities of individual African militaries to engage in peacekeeping operations.
119. In addition, there are the ongoing concerns about who will have the authority to deploy foreign-trained African rapid deployment peacekeeping forces. The OAU has expressed the concern that this could devolve into a modern-day "king's rifles," where African troops are deployed and commanded by extra-regional powers. See Brownson Dede, "ACRI seen from the OAU," in *Militaries, Democracies, and Security in Sub-Saharan Africa* (papers presented at a conference in Abuja, Nigeria, December 1–4, 1997).
120. Michael Fleshman, "Africa Needs 'a Different Approach,'" *Africa Recovery*, January 2001.
121. A similar situation has developed between the government of Burundi and the FDD militia operating against it from eastern Congo.
122. Shannon Field and Ibrahim Ibrahim, "Peace and Security in the DRC," in Denis Kadima and Claude Kabemba, eds., *Whither Regional Peace and Security? The DRC after the War* (Pretoria: Africa Institute of South Africa, 2000), p. 12.

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Conclusions

Jane Boulden

The purpose of this volume was to examine the nature of the relationship between the UN and regional organizations as they have sought to deal with conflict in Africa. This chapter offers conclusions based on the foregoing analysis by addressing first what has been learned about the role of the UN, second, what has been learned about the role of regional organizations, and then third, the nature of the relationship between them. The final section of the chapter offers some thoughts on the central issues raised by the study and what these issues may mean for the future.

The United Nations

The picture painted here contains a number of complex stories, many of them intertwined, with multiple actors carrying multiple loyalties. No conflict operates in isolation. The case studies indicate the extent to which there is a tremendous knock-on effect to unattended conflict in Africa. The international community's experience in Somalia directly contributed to its unwillingness to engage more directly in Rwanda. The lack of response to the Rwandan situation contributed to crises in Burundi and the DRC, the latter a conflict with tremendous repercussions for the continent as a whole. Similarly, the conflict in Sierra Leone is intimately connected with the lengthy conflict in its neighbor Liberia. Two points derive from this. The first is that the UN is often notable for its absence rather than its presence in these stories. The second is that that absence has an impact. Nonintervention can have just as significant an influence as intervention. As a result, the UN can sometimes be a contributor to the very type of situation it is designed to prevent.

The first point is perhaps slightly overstated, but only slightly. The pattern identified in the first chapter of a marked tendency on the part of the UN to sit things out until a peace agreement is achieved is borne out by the case studies. This focus on peace agreements or cease-fires is a reflection of the extent to which the UN chooses to deal with conflict in Africa as internal or intra-state conflicts, rather than interstate, with an accompanying response that is primarily peacekeeping in its nature and often focused on the humanitarian consequences of the conflict rather than on its causes. In some cases, such as Liberia, the UN simply monitored the regional actors doing the monitoring. Even when present, therefore, the result of the UN's approach is an implicit policy of deliberation and distance rather than one of action and engagement.

The effect of that distance is compounded by the fact that it is accompanied by an apparent lack of attention on the part of both the Security Council and regional organizations to adherence with the terms of the UN Charter. The fact that the very peace agreements that the Security Council uses as a foundation for its involvement may be products of a process that involves forcible regional intervention in the absence of a Security Council mandate (neither given nor sought) is an issue that receives no attention or comment at the UN. For an organizational entity invested with such a clear monopoly on decision-making and one whose existence depends on maintaining that monopoly, the Security Council has been remarkably *laissez-faire* about enforcing the rules. The answer to the question as to why is not within the scope of this work but is surely worth further study.

The second point is that nonintervention has implications not just for the specific conflict in question but also for neighboring states and the region as a whole. The spillover effects, at least in the conflicts studied here, are significant. Whether or not this is a particular feature of African conflicts or particular regions within Africa is a question of conflict analysis and beyond the scope of this study. The result, in any case, is a strong argument for dealing with conflict before it has the opportunity to spread or at least to stop it before it has spread too far. While no one is suggesting that the UN must or is even able to respond fully to each and every conflict, the implications of this study suggest that a greater and more nuanced awareness on the part of the Security Council of the potential consequences of noninvolvement, and a consequent willingness to act in a focused way at key moments would be a step forward.

There are a number of dangers inherent in the UN Security Council's approach. First, over the long term it risks undermining UN credibility because states believe that Security Council decisions are driven by, or at least

influenced by, an unwillingness of the major powers to commit the UN to dealing with African conflict. In that context, it is difficult to be convincing that the promotion of greater regional involvement is about anything other than a desire to disengage. Credibility is further undermined because the lack of resources committed to supporting the work of regional organizations, at precisely the time when they are being encouraged, even expected, to undertake the bulk of the riskiest and costliest work on the ground, stands in sharp contrast to the rhetoric of support and commitment within the council, and to their willingness to commit large-scale resources to conflicts elsewhere.

Second, these trends also affect perceptions of the legitimacy of the UN. The lack of concern or reaction to activities that stray from Charter requirements contributes to a wearing away of the inviolability of those provisions. The provisions in question are those governing the UN's relationship with regional organizations found in Chapter VIII of the Charter, and the articles relating to the use of force. The Charter's various prescriptions and prohibitions relating to the use of force are central to its *raison d'être* and any erosion of their power contributes to a weakening of the normative power of the Charter as a whole.

Third, the African experiences demonstrate that rather than representing an expansion of means, the greater involvement of regional organizations produces a dispersal of already scarce UN resources. As we have seen, African regional actors are not flush with assets. The UN Security Council recognizes this fact in its calls for member-states to give support to African regional organizations by contributing to capacity building. This means, however, that the UN is creating a situation in which a number of member-states must choose between contributing to UN missions or funds or to supporting African regional organizations, with the end result being that neither the UN nor African organizations are fully equipped to carry out conflict management tasks. In this sense, therefore, there is an inherent contradiction in the call for greater regional organization involvement when the UN itself continues to suffer a resource crisis.

And finally, this approach may encourage a greater independence of action in regional organizations that may ultimately be negative. In spite of all of the Security Council's voiced concerns about the need for liaison, communication and cooperation, the range and independence of action that it has allowed regional organizations, in combination with its own unwillingness to commit resources or undertake risks, may encourage (and certainly won't discourage) a sense within regional organizations that taking matters into their own hands, especially when a speedy response is perceived to be necessary, is a preferable and viable option. This was one of the lessons that

African countries took from the nonresponse of the Security Council during the Rwanda crisis, and the attitude of the Security Council since then simply works to reaffirm it.

One of the things that has happened in the midst of the debate about Africa and regional organizations is an obscuring of the distinction between ends and means. The foregoing is not meant to be an argument against greater involvement of regional organizations in conflict situations under the auspices of the UN. Nor is it an argument against this approach in Africa in particular. Regional organizations are one option in a spectrum of options or means available to the UN Security Council in dealing with issues of international peace and security. But in the debate about how to deal with conflict in Africa, the regional organization option has come to be seen as an end in itself rather than as the means to facilitate conflict management.

The combined effect of all of this, and not just in Africa, tends to threaten rather than strengthen the Organization. Such an outcome is not a given. It is a product of the *way* in which the UN has chosen to interact with African regional organizations and to deal with African conflict, not the fact that it has chosen to do so.

Regional Organizations

One of the interesting things revealed in this study is that in the absence of international involvement, regional actors move to fill the vacuum, even when no regional institutional mechanism exists. Thus in Burundi regional actors developed their own ad hoc regional meetings and mechanisms in response to the conflict. In the Sudan, IGAD, with little in the way of experience or resources to support it, took the initiative in starting a peace process. And the ECOWAS intervention in Liberia began while most of the international community was focused on the Iraq–Kuwait crisis. This confirms the argument that regional organizations are more likely to be able to generate the political will necessary to respond to conflict because of their proximity to the situation and the direct impact unattended conflict can have on neighboring states. In fact, the case studies suggest that it is not that regional organizations generate political will so much as circumstances force them to address conflict situations, whether or not they might otherwise choose to do so.

This fact partly explains why regional organizations or actors moved into the realm of conflict management regardless of their level of institutionalization or their capabilities. The cases indicate that the decision to become involved is generally not altered or deterred by concerns about the conflict management capabilities of the regional actors or by a lack of financial or

military resources. The perceived need or desire to take some form of action outweighs concerns about capability. In many respects this characteristic mirrors similar tendencies on the part of the UN. The UN's history is replete with examples of situations in which it intervened without sufficient capabilities or when initial estimates of what was required were overtaken by changes in the situation on the ground. It is difficult, therefore, to know to what extent this problem is a characteristic of multistate organizations generally or whether it relates to the nature of the conflicts in question. Regardless of the source of the tendency the point remains that regional organizations or entities have moved to respond to conflicts even when their ability to do so is limited.

Taken together, the overview provided by Berman and Sams and the individual examples in the case studies indicate the extent to which regional actors carry out these activities on the basis of remarkably limited military, political, and institutional resources. In this context, the UN's encouragement of regional efforts and their policy of staying out of the fray until a peace agreement is achieved means that they are leaving the highest risk and costliest tasks to the actors with the least resources available to carry them out. Luckily (or unluckily, depending on your perspective) we have seen that regional actors do not wait for full resources before intervening. There is a strong argument here for capacity building in regional organizations. Some states, such as France, Great Britain, and the United States, have developed their own programs in Africa with the express purpose of augmenting African capabilities. The Security Council consistently calls on member-states to support and facilitate conflict-related mechanisms and work in regional organizations, as does the secretary-general. The level of response to such calls has been quite limited. As this study indicates, much more could easily be done, and should be done if the current trends continue.

More should not be done, however, if it is at the cost of support for the UN. The UN itself has tremendous difficulty generating sufficient finances and troop contributions to carry out its own missions and is often doing so on far less resources than required for the job. To the extent that member-states have a finite ability to contribute to international efforts to deal with conflict, the UN's calls for support for regional organizations may sometimes be to its detriment.

The African Union

As mentioned in the introduction Africa presents some interesting issues when it comes to determining what constitutes a regional entity or even a region. In theory, as the most comprehensive regional organization (in that

it comprises all but one of the African states), the AU should take a lead role in dealing with conflict. In practice, the lead is taken by other regional organizations or entities, with the AU playing a more limited role, or in some cases no role at all. To some extent the limited role played by the AU is a reflection of the political baggage it carries. Until the changeover to the new AU, the OAU Charter contained a strict provision prohibiting intervention in the internal affairs of states, a provision assiduously upheld by member-states. In addition, the AU has limited resources available to it. Viewed in the light of the responses and actions of other regional organizations, however, this last factor must be seen as providing only a partial explanation. In transitioning from the OAU to the AU, member-states agreed to significant new provisions relating to conflict management. While these provisions are promising in that they eliminate the previous impediments to responding to conflict inherent in the OAU Charter, in the short term the organization is likely to remain hampered by limited resources, but more significantly by having been preceded in this field by smaller more regionally specific African regional organizations.

The experience in the studies included here reveal a rough division of labor among the regional organizations and the AU that corresponds to the former's regional specificity and the AU's continental comprehensiveness. Regional organizations such as ECOWAS, IGAD, and SADC took the initiative and in some cases became deeply involved in dealing with the conflict, while the AU played a more distant role. In some situations the AU acts as the intermediary with the UN, in others it acts jointly with the UN to provide observers or members of commissions relating to implementing peace agreements. Overall, the AU seems to occupy a middle ground where it is of the region (Africa) yet sufficiently apart from the specific region in conflict to play a role in which a degree of separateness from the specifics of the situation is required or useful.

Legitimacy and Partiality

Perceptions of legitimacy and impartiality matter at the regional level as much as they do at the international level. To some extent the AU's intermediary role reflects a certain level of legitimacy granted it as an internal actor. This is not consistently the case, however. For example, the Ethiopia–Eritrea case study indicates that the parties to the conflict did not view the OAU as a legitimate actor. After years of witnessing OAU activities by virtue of its location within their region, Ethiopia and Eritrea were unwilling to accept it as a valid interlocutor. And in Burundi, the government was unwilling to accept an OAU observer mission, forcing a long delay and a serious weakening of the ultimate mission.

One of the traditional concerns about involving regional organizations in conflict situations is that the very advantages associated with being of the region can also act as disadvantages. In each of the cases discussed here the question of alternative political motivations on the part of regional actors was a factor. In Liberia and Sierra Leone it was the dominance of Nigeria in ECOWAS and concerns about its objectives in the interventions. In Sudan and Ethiopia–Eritrea, the connection between members of IGAD and warring factions is a factor. In Burundi, a deterioration of relations with Tanzania led to the need for a different mediator from outside the region, though still from Africa. All of this suggests that the concern about the potential of regional actors to pursue politically motivated agendas under the guise of regional conflict management is a valid one, though not one that is impossible to overcome. It also reveals an inherent vulnerability in regional actors. Regardless of the nature of their motivation in becoming involved in conflict management, the very fact of their regional connections leaves them open to the accusation that they are pursuing their own political agenda. This means that when a party to the conflict desires to delay or undermine regional efforts the possibility of such accusations provides them with such an opening.

The Nature of the United Nations–Regional Organization Relationship

The foregoing has discussed the various issues that arose in considering the involvement of the UN and then regional organizations in the conflicts examined here. This section looks more specifically at the nature of the interaction between the two.

For all of the debate about cooperation between the UN and regional organizations, there has been little progress in developing any kind of framework to guide that interaction. The cases examined here provide mixed messages as to what the basic principles of such a framework should be. We have seen that both the UN and regional organizations have the potential to positively and negatively affect efforts to deal with conflict, and that those affects vary depending on the nature of the situation in question. Clement Adibe argues in favor of the UN playing a role in the later stages of the conflict with regional organizations playing the primary role in the early stages. He believes that by becoming a participant in the later stages, when a peace process is in motion or has produced a final agreement, the UN gives legitimacy to the process and to the implementation of the peace agreement. Similarly, Monica Juma suggests that, although it is arguably late in the game, the UN can and should enter into the Sudan process as a consolidator

and legitimizer of the regional peace process. This raises the question as to whether the UN has legitimacy to bring to the table. As 'Funmi Olonisakin indicates, the UN's late entry on the scene in Liberia had a negative impact on perceptions of the Organization's legitimacy when it arrived in the field. For those who had been involved in what Adibe calls the "dirty work" of enforcement that led to the peace agreement, the lateness of the UN's intervention generated resentment and anger. And as Carayannis and Weiss suggest, the UN's performance and response in other conflict situations also has a negative impact on perceptions of legitimacy in current operations in the Congo. The Rwandan government saw the UN as having abandoned the Tutsis to their fate during the genocide, and the vision of the UN held by one of the key rebel groups in the Congo reached back to the 1960s when, in their view, the UN failed to intervene to save Patrice Lumumba and refused to recognize the independence of Katanga.

These critical perceptions are reaffirmed and compounded by the fact that when the UN has decided to become involved, its commitment is often limited in nature and has been reduced or withdrawn when conditions deteriorate. The sense that member-states of the UN were unwilling to stay the course or accept the risks of involvement in Africa was imprinted on the continent with the UN's withdrawal from Somalia and its failure to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Experience since then has only served to drive home the point. Even in Sierra Leone, where the UN operation was of a significant size, the UN made it clear that its own operation was dependent on the continuation and support of the ECOWAS operation, and the UN mission avoided complete collapse only with the direct intervention of the British military. The overall image is not improved when these characteristics are compared to UN action elsewhere, and especially with the West's willingness, through NATO, to devote tremendous resources to dealing with the Kosovo conflict. The disparity between the West's political and resource commitment to Kosovo on the one hand and their commitment to Africa on the other was not lost on African states and regional actors. The concept of the UN as a third party with a valid and desirable role to play is not a given in the cases studied here.

The Need for Overall Coordination

One of the consistent themes in this study has been the proliferation of actors in these conflict situations. One of the best examples of the problems associated with too many actors is evidenced in the Burundi case. The secretary-general apparently undermined the UN's own efforts by appointing another special envoy to the region, and the international community,

including the UN, engaged in a campaign to devalue and undermine the sanctions regime agreed to by the region. This latter event seemed to represent a contradiction in the UN message, saying that regional efforts to deal with conflict are desirable and should be encouraged but only when the policies they pursue suit the UN approach. Regardless of the specifics of this and other situations the absence of clear coordination and cooperative mechanisms between the UN and regional actors is a problem that needs addressing. The existence of more than one organization in the conflict management process, by definition, leaves open the possibility that parties to the conflict can play the different entities against one another, buying time to pursue their own agendas. In the worst-case scenarios the existence of competing rather than complementary efforts contributes to a prolonging and deepening of the conflict.

While some progress has been made on the institutional front in this regard, the ad hoc nature of regional responses and the need to deal quickly with fluid, rapidly changing situations on the ground requires more substantive efforts than have been made to date. Given that the lack of coordination can create situations that prolong or worsen conflict situations, either the UN should take the lead in developing and implementing guidelines and mechanisms for dealing with these situations or they should cede the lead role to regional organizations, but the continued lack of coherent coordination is not a desirable outcome for any of the actors involved, except those who seek to prolong the conflict.

A related issue, and one that has received virtually no attention in the literature on the role of regional organizations, is coordination among the various regional organizations and actors themselves. The lack of coordination at this level carries with it all the problems attendant to the lack of coordination between the UN and regional organizations, with the added dynamic of competition between regional actors as well as with international actors. Logically, this is a situation in which the AU could play an important role. As the continental actor, the AU could act to guard against duplication of effort and the undercutting of progress that can result from competition. It could also ensure that conflicts arising in regions without regional arrangements are not left unattended. Such a role would allow the AU to consolidate its position as an intermediary between the UN and regional organizations, while also reclaiming some of the credibility it may have lost during previous years of inaction.

Central Issues and the Way Ahead

One of the conclusions that can be drawn from this study is that regional organizations have played a significant role in dealing with conflict in Africa,

and they have evolved and strengthened as institutions in the process. There are, however, some important caveats to this assertion. These are not regional entities with a strong history of cooperation and institution building on which to base their responses to conflict. Their unity is sometimes tenuous. They are vulnerable to being hijacked by a dominant power, and as a consequence their political motivations are sometimes suspect. They work on a shoestring, and sometimes less. And there are times, such as in the Congo conflict, when the sheer scale of the conflict exceeds the region's capabilities, and the regional players are themselves participants in the conflict, making regional involvement problematic, and international involvement absolutely necessary. In addition, not all regions in Africa have regional organizations available to them, and those regional organizations that do exist vary considerably in their capabilities and their objectives. For all of these reasons, any policy that advocates greater involvement of regional organizations in dealing with conflict must be a conditional one.

Gilbert Khadiagala points out that there is an inherent tension in the relationship between regional organizations and the UN that he characterizes as one between ownership and partnership. As he says, African ownership in the conflict process is the inevitable outcome of the limits of partnership between regional organizations and the UN. This study demonstrates that for all of the desire that it be otherwise, the UN's contribution to the partnership has been limited. This does not take away from the fact that the UN has made many positive contributions to dealing with conflict in Africa and has had some important successes, such as in Mozambique and Namibia and possibly now in Sierra Leone. Many member-states are strongly committed to dealing with conflict in Africa and have undertaken significant efforts, individually and through the UN to deal with conflict in a variety of ways and at a variety of levels. Devolution has not entirely been an excuse for disengagement. The nature and extent of the debate in the Security Council on African conflict and related issues reflects an important recognition of the seriousness of the situation. Nonetheless, the case studies make it difficult to escape the conclusion that the UN approach to conflict in Africa has been reactive and reflective of an ill-disguised unwillingness on the part of member-states to take on the high risks and costs associated with dealing with conflict in Africa.

Whatever the dynamic between ownership and partnership in this relationship, the missing element in the equation is leadership. One of the most consistent aspects of the studies presented here is the desire if not the absolute requirement for the UN to play a greater role in dealing with conflict in Africa. As Carayannis and Weiss point out, there is a certain irony

in the fact that “the supposed beneficiaries of the UN’s all too generous transfer of responsibility for peace and security to regional actors have become advocates for returning the ball.” Such advocacy comes not from an unwillingness to address and respond to conflict situations or to take greater control of their own situations. It reflects the fact that first, there is a specific role for the international community to play, and second that in certain situations there is only so much that can be achieved at the regional level.

The UN holds, as the Security Council continually reminded everyone during the debates on Africa, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. As Ibrahim Gambari correctly points out, the UN Charter does not grant this responsibility and then say “except when it comes to Africa.” While the goal of giving Africans greater control over their own fate is a laudable and important one, and while it is clear that regional organizations can and should play a significant role in dealing with conflict in Africa, the way in which this is occurring may ultimately undermine the ability of the UN to pursue its core objective of ensuring international peace and security, and not just in Africa.

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ANNEX 1

African Regional Organizations and their Membership

There are many African regional organizations. This list reflects the four major organizations dealt with in this volume.

The African Union (AU)

Initially formed as the Organization of African Unity on May 25, 1963. The Constitutive Act of the African Union was adopted on July 11, 2000, and the African Union came into existence in July 2002.

Membership: All African states (53) except Morocco.

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

Treaty signed May 28, 1975.

Membership: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo.

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

Formed. Initially formed as the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) in 1986. IGADD became IGAD on March 21, 1996.

Membership: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

Initially formed as the Southern Africa Development Co-ordinating Conference (SADCC) in July 1981. SADCC became SADC on August 17, 1992.

Membership: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

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