EU-CHINA-AFRICA TRILATERAL RELATIONS IN A MULTIPOLAR WORLD

HIC SUNT DRACONES

Anna Katharina Stahl

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Anna Katharina Stahl

EU-China-Africa Trilateral Relations in a Multipolar World

Hic Sunt Dracones

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Printed on acid-free paper

For my family

In memory of Vincenzo Schioppa Narrante

FOREWORD

This book could not be more timely. With the return of geopolitics, economic convergence between East and West, and the emergence of a multipolar international order, academic studies on the relationships between different international players are of utmost importance. Traditionally, scholars of International Relations and development studies have focused their attention on bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Instead, this book takes an innovative approach by exploring the new trilateral relationship between the European Union (EU), China and Africa.

Until not long ago, the USA and Russia were the two superpowers dominating world affairs. This book shows that the current world order is undergoing a fundamental shift, moving away from a bilateral balance of power. Dr. Anna Katharina Stahl's research clearly highlights that as the EU, China and Africa are expanding their international influence and building new alliances, they are contributing to the establishment of a new multipolar world. Each of the three powers contributes in its own way to transforming the current international architecture.

For a long time, Africa has been considered the forgotten continent. It is now the home to six of the ten fastest growing economies and sometimes referred to as the world's new growth engine. African countries have made significant progress in meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that were formulated by the UN to replace the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). At the same time, China has witnessed an unprecedented economic progress over the past fifteen years. On the basis of its extraordinary economic growth, China is also seeking to play a more

assertive international role. As the main driver of the BRICS, China is beginning to put forward alternative proposals and ideas of global governance. China's recent Belt and Road Initiative (OBOR) clearly illustrates the ambitions of the Chinese leadership to move the world's major economic axis from the transatlantic alliance to a Eurasian one, while connecting South China and East Africa. This grand connectivity project will reveal whether infrastructure in the digital age can still have the same kind of geopolitical impact as Roman roads in Europe 2,000 years ago or railways in the USA that connected the Atlantic and Pacific coast. The establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB) are other examples of Chinese efforts to transform the current landscape of international organisations. The two international financial institutions (IFIs) reflect the dissatisfaction of China and other emerging countries with their share of voting rights within the established IFIs.

Alongside Africa and China, the EU has also become an increasingly important player on the global stage. International Relations scholars have often described the EU as a weak and incoherent international actor. Yet, with the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU has improved its institutional consistency and started to engage in a more effective foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty created a range of new European institutions specifically dedicated foreign policy making, namely the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS is the EU's diplomatic service and supports the EU High Representative in conducting EU foreign and security policy. It is responsible for the running of more than one hundred EU delegations around the world, which is a clear indication of the EU's growing global presence. Last year, the EU adopted a new Global Strategy for European Foreign and Security Policy. This important policy document provides the EU with a strategic vision and framework to face today's international challenges in a strong and coherent manner. Moreover, EU policymakers have formulated specific policies regarding China and Africa. They put forward a new strategy for China and are currently revising the EU's longstanding partnership with Africa.

Anyone seeking a deeper understanding of the transforming world order and unfolding trilateral relations between the EU, China and Africa will find this book fascinating. The three cases studies presented in this book offer a wide range of new empirical evidence, collected through

painstaking fieldwork in China and Africa. Stahl's original research shows that the emerging EU-China-Africa relationship will have to stand the test, whether the EU and China can move beyond accusations of paternalisms or neo-colonial behaviour. It also raises the question of how this trilateral relationship between unequal, yet unavoidable, partners can flourish against the background of major global tectonics shifts.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book is the result of a long and exciting research journey that allowed me to broaden my European perspective and to discover many different facets of the rapidly changing global order. During this journey, I encountered a variety of different individuals and institutions in Europe, China and Africa, and I am deeply grateful for their support.

I am indebted, in particular, to two institutions for their generous support. The Institute for European Studies (IES) of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) for giving me the opportunity to work as a doctoral researcher in a stimulating academic environment and the College of Europe for allowing me to contribute to the establishment of a new EU-China Research Centre and supporting me in the process of transforming my doctoral dissertation into this book. The completion of this book would not have been possible without the inspiration and intellectual input of a number of people. I would like to express my appreciation to my PhD supervisor Professor Gustaaf Geeraerts, as well as the members of my doctoral jury, Professor Chris Alden, Professor Jury Devuyst, Dr. Sven Grimm, Professor Eva Gross, Professor Sebastian Obertühr and Professor Stefaan Smis. I am also grateful for the support of Professor Sieglinde Gstöhl and Professor Simon Schunz, as well as Professor Katja Biedenkopf, Professor Joachim Koops and Professor Alexander Mattelaer.

The research project has benefitted from field research in China and Africa, as well as from interviews carried out in Europe. Each of the more than 100 interviews with European, Chinese and Africa experts has contributed to connecting the pieces of the research puzzle. I would like to

INTERVIEW CODES

In this book, a dual coding scheme is used for the data collected through interviews. The purpose of this coding technique is to ensure data confidentiality. The two categories of codes applied to the interview evidence are highlighted in the tables below. Code I refers to the location of the interview and code II to the nationality of the interviewee.

Code I	Location of the interview
B	Brussels (EU HQ)
P	Paris (OECD HQ)
A	Addis Ababa (AU HQ)
C	China (Beijing)
S	South Africa (Pretoria and Cape Town)
K	Korea (Seoul)
O	Other: other locations or phone interviews

Code II	Nationality
e	European
c	Chinese
a	African
i	International

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Abbreviations

ACP	Africa, Caribbean and Pacific group
AIIB	Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
APSA	African Peace and Security Architecture
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CARI	Johns Hopkins China-Africa Research Institute
CAITEC	Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU
COAFR	Council Working Group on Africa
COASI	Asia-Oceania Council Working Group
COREPER	Committee of Permanent Representatives
CSP	Comprehensive Strategic Partnership
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCD	Development Cooperation Directorate of the OECD
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DG	Directorate-General of the European Commission
DG DEV	Directorate-General for Development and Relations with ACP States
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid
DG RELEX	Directorate-General for External Relations
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EFP	EU Foreign Policy
EIB	European Investment Bank
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements

EU	European Union
EUSR	EU Special Representative
ESS	European Security Strategy
FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
FOCAC	Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council
GDP	Gross domestic product
GDPEC	Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation
GNI	Gross national income
HLF	High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness
HLM	DAC High-Level Meeting
HQ	Headquarter
IFIs	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IO	International Organisation
IPRCC	International Poverty Reduction Centre in China
IR	International Relations
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
LDCs	Least developed countries
LGOPAD	State Council Leading Group on Poverty Alleviating and Development
LICs	Low-income countries
LMICs	Lower middle-income countries
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MFA	Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs
MFF	Multiannual Financial Framework of the EU
MICs	Middle-income countries
MOFCOM	Chinese Ministry for Commerce
MOFTEC	Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation
NDB	New Development Bank
NDRC	National Developmental and Reform Commission of China
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NPCA	NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NPC	National People's Congress of China
NSC	North-South Cooperation
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OBOR	"One Belt, One Road" Initiative
ODA	Official Development Aid
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PRC	People's Republic of China
PSC	Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China
PLA	Chinese People's Liberation Army
RECs	African Regional Economic Communities
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
SLM	DAC Senior Level-Meeting
SSC	South-South Cooperation
TDC	Trilateral Development Cooperation
TEC	Treaty establishing the European Community
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
UK	United Kingdom
UMICs	Upper middle-income countries
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USA	United States of America
USAID	US Agency for International Development

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Introduction

As suggested by the subtitle "Hic Sunt Dracones", this book studies an original phenomenon that has not yet been fully grasped by scholars or policymakers. The Latin phrase "hic sunt dracones" – literally, "here are dragons"[1] – was used on ancient European maps to denote unexplored territories and as a warning of the potential dangers in these parts of the world. By placing a monstrous creature like a dragon on an uncharted territory, the drafters of the maps represented in symbols an artistic, albeit reasonable, justification for fearing and avoiding the territory in question, where in truth the one thing instinctively feared is what is unknown or what is beyond the current level of understanding.

The specific reference to a dragon can be explained by the fact that it was a recurring presence in the mythology and folklore of many European cultures, where it was depicted as a terrifying creature. At the same time, dragons were a recurring figure in ancient Chinese folklore and art. Whereas in the European imagination dragons are malevolent, in China dragons are generally perceived as benevolent animals. Nowadays, the dragon has become a widespread symbol of China throughout the world. Deborah Bräutigam's book *The Dragon's Gift*, which is considered to be one of the standard works related to China's contemporary Africa policy, is a prominent example (Bräutigam 2009). It is also important to note that the use of the expression "hic sunt dracones" by medieval cartographers followed what is said to be a Roman practice to denote

dangerous territories on maps with "hic sunt leones", literally, "here are lions". Whereas the dragon has become a symbol for China, the lion is commonly associated with Africa.

While it is generally assumed that Europeans first explored the world, there is new historical evidence[2] questioning this assertion of European supremacy. According to several sources, Chinese travellers were the first to travel to unexplored parts of the world, including Africa (Snow 1988; Menzies 2002). In the early fifteenth century, navigator Zheng He – who is considered the "Chinese Columbus" – commanded several maritime expeditions to unexplored regions, ranging as far as the coast of East Africa (Snow 1988). These early voyages under the Ming dynasty went down in history as China's original encounter with Africa. The first Chinese explorers behaved quite differently from the Europeans, who arrived in Africa seventy years later (Snow 1988, 29). Unlike the European powers, the Chinese explorers did not have any intention to colonise land beyond the Middle Kingdom and, therefore, had no interest in the African continent itself. Instead, Admiral Zheng He came to Africa "to fill his ships with animals (including lions), spices and tokens of allegiance" and therefore "had no reason to stay" (Snow 1988, 32). Thus, the early Chinese explorers were perceived as less aggressive, leaving "little visible mark on Africa" (Snow 1988, 29,32).

After the collapse of the Ming dynasty, China isolated itself from the world and China's initial presence in Africa would have probably been forgotten if it hadn't reappeared on the continent in the 1950s and 1970s. During the decolonisation period, China supported several African leaders in liberating themselves from European rule (Larkin 1971).

Already in the 1980s, Philip Snow wrote in his well-known book *The Star Raft* that China's reappearance in Africa "must be considered an important chapter in the history of our times" as "it is a reminder that we in the West can no longer always expect to occupy the centre-stage" (Snow 1988, xv). Moreover, he foresaw that "Africa may not always be weak" and "as African countries slowly become more stable and more prosperous, their leaders can be expected to grow increasingly impatient with the continent's unhappy state of disunity and dependence on Western funds and advice" (Snow 1988, xv).

As predicted by Philip Snow, since the turn of the century we have witnessed a re-emergence of China on the international scene and a more prosperous African continent. From the point of view of the European Union (EU) this is a major challenge as it implies a transition towards a

new, unknown international system. Initially, the European response to China's current engagement in Africa was characterised by the same "exaggerated fears" over China's interaction with African countries in the 1950s and 1960s (Snow 1988, xiv). This European apprehension can be explained by the fact that China's interests in Africa and African sympathy with China are generally seen as "an implicit threat to the West's supremacy" (Snow 1988, xiv). Yet, this assumption is slowly changing and there are growing calls for engaging China as a "partner" or "responsible stakeholder" in Africa's development and security (Bräutigam 2009; Raine 2009). The development of trilateral relations between the EU, China and Africa provides a prominent example of the new trend of engagement with emerging powers. Although they have remained largely unnoticed, EU-China-Africa trilateral relations are an important illustration of how traditional players like the EU are responding to the changing global world through efforts of building new strategic partnerships with rising powers.

This research project has been motivated by the need to better understand the elements driving the transformation of the current world order. In order to provide a more detailed analysis of the current transformation of the international system, this book examines the uncharted territory of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations as a new trend in international politics of the twenty-first century. Moving beyond the consideration of the direct consequences of China's presence for Africa's political and socio-economic development, this book looks at the broader implications of growing Sino-African relations and the rise of emerging powers. In particular, it focuses on the role of the EU in the emerging multipolar world order and its efforts to engage rising powers. Considering the lack of thorough research of the process of engagement with emerging powers, this book provides a detailed examination of the EU's foreign policy in the context of the emerging multipolar world order. By adopting a European research perspective, it sheds light on the difficulties faced by the EU in engaging China and Africa.

1.1   The EU and the Emerging Multipolar World

The twenty-first century is characterised by an unprecedented shift in global power, which could potentially lead to the formation of a new, so-called multipolar world order. Since the end of the Cold War, and in particular after the turn of the century, a shift in the centre of gravity of the

international system can be identified. In International Relations (IR) scholarship this is reflected in the literature on the distribution of power, which relies on the concept of polarity to express the distribution of power (Mansfield 1993). IR literature refers to the current power transition as a shift from a "unipolar" system with the USA as the only superpower (Wohlforth 2009; Wohlforth 1999; Krauthammer 1990/1991; Waltz 1964; Monteiro 2014; Jervis 2009) or a "bipolar" world with the USA and the EU as two global powers (Moravcsik 2010, 172) to a new system of multiple poles. This tectonic shift from the past is described as a system "multipolarity". The concept of multipolarity describes a world order, which is characterised by multiple centres of power or poles and where no single dominates (Herolf 2011, 6; Haass 2008). In recent years, the expression of a "multipolar world" has become widely used to reflect a global rebalancing of economic and political forces (Geeraerts 2011; De Vasconcelos 2008; Wade 2011). Due to the presence of a set of new international players, American and European economic and political dominance in the world is declining.

A key challenge related to multipolarity concerns the classification of the different "centres of power" or "poles". In fact, the identification of the different factors determining the "rise and fall of great powers" has been a key concern among IR scholars (Kennedy 1987). Since the turn of the century, academics and policymakers have entered into a lively debate to identify the new "poles" of the current world order (Missiroli and O'Sullivan 2013). In 2001, the chairman of Goldman Sachs Jim O'Neill made an important contribution to the debate by introducing the concept of "BRIC". BRIC stands as an acronym for Brazil, Russia, India and China, which O'Neil identified as emerging economic global powerhouses that would fundamentally change the nature of the world economy (O'Neill 2001). Over the years, the shorthand BRIC and now BRICS (including South Africa) has become a commonly used analytical category in IR research (Armijo 2007; Gross 2013; Cooper 2016; Laïdi 2011). At the same time, IR literature also proposes alternative concepts, most importantly the notions of "emerging countries" or "rising powers" (Alexandroff and Cooper 2010; Hart and Jones 2011; Kahler 2013; Ikenberry and Wright 2008; Nel 2010; Patrick 2010). Although widely used by academics and policymakers, the two concepts still lack a clear meaning and are often regarded as synonyms. Moreover, within the

broader IR literature on rising powers a variety of other concepts[3] have emerged (Scholvin 2010; Nel and Nolte 2010).

This research uses the terminology of emerging countries or rising powers to describe a group of countries comprised by China, India, Brazil and South Africa. These four countries have two main characteristics in common. On one hand, they have witnessed exceptional economic development. Figure 1.1 shows that since the 1990s China, India, Brazil and South Africa have achieved a considerable expansion of their economies, especially in comparison to the slow growth rates of the USA and the EU. Due to their extraordinary economic growth these four rising powers have also gained significant political influence, at both the regional and the global level.

A second distinguishing feature of all four emerging countries is the fact that in spite of their recent economic and political rise they consider themselves to be developing countries from the South. The four emerging countries stress that membership to the "developing world" is based on their shared colonial history. Through the political rhetoric centred on a common identity as members of the "South", the four emerging countries distinguish themselves from traditional international players like the USA and the EU, which are commonly referred to as the "West" or the "North".

Despite these two important commonalities of emerging countries, China represents a particular case. Due to its size – in terms of geography, population and economy – China is considerably different from the other three rising powers (Shambaugh 2014; Christensen 2015; Ikenberry 2008). As outlined by Figure 1.1, China's GDP grew considerably more than that of the other three emerging countries. This is not surprising considering that China witnessed a double-digit growth rate for several years (OECD 2015).

China's rapid economic growth dates back to 1978, when China initiated an "opening up" programme, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping. Through the "opening up" programme, China gradually reformed its model of a centrally planned economy by introducing capitalist market principles (Morrison 2015). Following these reforms China witnessed rapid economic growth, characterised by a decrease in poverty and a rise of China's GDP share of the world total.

China's economic performance has also translated into a greater role in international politics. Today, China plays a key role in the transition

Fig. 1.1 GDP index for Brazil, China, India, South Africa, the USA and the EU, 1990–2015 (US$ billion, constant prices, 1990 = 100)

Source: Compiled by the author based on World Economic Outlook Database from the International Monetary Fund, April 2016

Note: For each country the GDP was normalised to 100 in 1990

towards a multipolar world order. For this reasons, China was the first among the four emerging countries to be lifted to the status of a bilateral "strategic partner" by the EU in 2003. China's predominant international role is also reflected in the academic literature. Much of recent IR scholarship has been steered towards understanding the causes and consequence of China's rise (Beckley 2011; Goldstein 2001; Ikenberry 2008; Legro 2007; Shambaugh 1996).

So far, significant attention has been devoted to understand how emerging powers and the current shift to multipolarity is affecting the global stance of the USA (Foot and Walter 2011; Wang 2005; Shambaugh 2005; Ikenberry 2008; Vezirgiannidou 2013; Johnston and Ross 1999). Yet, the advancement of a multipolar world also creates opportunities, as well as poses challenges, for the EU. Far fewer studies have, however, investigated the role of the EU in the ongoing transition to a multipolar world (Geeraerts 2011; Kappel 2011; Husar et al. 2010; Keukeleire and Bruyninckx 2011; Mayer 2008; Smith 2013; Renard and Biscop 2012; Laïdi 2008). The marginal focus attributed to the EU can be explained by the underlying understanding of multipolarity as an international system with equal distribution of power among "poles" which are commonly defined in terms of nation-states (Herolf 2011; Haass 2008). Some scholars are therefore proposing alternative concepts such as "nonpolarity" to emphasise that in today's world "nation-states have lost their monopoly on power" (Haass 2008). According to the notion of "nonpolarity", the contemporary international system is "characterised by numerous centres with meaningful power" and where "quite a few of these poles are not nation-states" (Haass 2008). Contrary to the idea of "nonpolarity", this research departs from the assumption that the EU – although it is not a nation-state – meets all the requirements to constitute a "pole" or "centre of power" in the evolving multipolar system (Moravcsik 2010). There is ample literature highlighting that the EU is perceived as a unit by others and behaves as an "international actor" in the global system (Bretheron and Vogler 1999; Ginsberg 2001; Ginsberg 1999; Jupille and Caporaso 1998; Sjöstedt 1977).

Taking into account existing research, this book offers a contribution to the analysis of the new empirical reality of an emerging multipolar world. It draws attention to the role of the EU in the context of shifting global politics and the current power transition towards a multipolar world order. In particular, it promises to make an innovative contribution to the study of the EU's foreign policy response with regards to the rise of China and Africa.

1.2   CHINA'S GLOBAL RISE AND THE PROGRESS OF SINO-AFRICA RELATIONS

China's growing international presence has been particularly visible on the African continent. Since 2006, which was proclaimed "Year of Africa" by the Chinese government, China's engagement in Africa has gained important visibility (He 2007). Yet, rather than looking at China's relations with Africa as an entirely new phenomenon, it is important to situate China's current engagement in Africa in the broader historical context of Sino-African relations. Although China does not share the same historical legacy with Africa as most EU member states, it is not a completely "new" player in the region (Snow 1988; Shinn and Eisenmann 2012; Taylor 2006; Yu 1988). During the Cold War period, the Chinese leader Mao Zedong actively supported national independent movements in Africa through development and technical assistance (Mawdsley 2007). An important symbol of China's presence in Africa during this period was the construction of the Tazara or TanZam railway, linking Zambia to the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania and thereby eliminating Zambia's economic dependence on the apartheid regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia.[4] However, with the end of the Cold War, Chinese leaders adopted a less ideologically driven foreign policy and concentrated mostly on China's domestic development. This led to China's retreat from Africa. Following its exceptional economic development, we are now witnessing China's return to Africa.

Unlike in the past, China's current engagement in Africa has become more diverse, covering a variety of different areas, in particular economic relations, diplomatic and security relations, and development cooperation.[5] China's economic presence in Africa has been signified by a considerable increase in trade and investments relations since the turn of the century. This was reflected in the publication of a first White Paper specifically on China-Africa Trade and Economic Cooperation in 2010 (Chinese State Council 2010), which was followed by another in 2013 (Chinese State Council 2013). This trend can be explained by domestic reforms related to China's economic model.[6] Following the initial economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping – known as the "bringing in" or "welcoming in" strategy – that were steered towards attracting foreign direct investments (FDIs) to China,[7] the Chinese leadership shifted towards a so-called Go-Out or Going Global strategy (Wang and Zheng 2013, 492). The "Go-Out" policy was formulated in the late 1990s to move away from a centrally planned economy and to provide China with new market and investment opportunities abroad. In order to promote

Fig. 1.2 Total value of Africa's exports and imports with major trade partners in 2000 and 2014 (US$ billion)

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the OECD (OECD 2016a, 28)

Note: Each column represents the sum of the value in US$ billion of exports to and imports from Africa for selected trading partners

Chinese FDIs aboard, the "Go-Out" strategy largely depended on China's ability to improve its economic ties with other countries. Initially, China's economic relations were mostly concentrated on Asia. Yet, in view of a desire for diversification, Chinese leaders started rediscovering the African continent in the context of its "Going Out" strategy (Sun 2014).

Figure 1.2 shows that China's trade with Africa has increased remarkably over the last ten years. While at the start of the decade China represented less than 5 per cent of Africa's trade (exports and imports), this tripled to nearly 16 per cent by 2014 (OECD 2011a, 98). In 2009, China surpassed the USA as Africa's first single trading partner (Chinese State Council 2013). Yet, in 2014, the EU as a whole (data refers to 25 EU member states) remains

Africa's first trading partner: it is Africa's primary source of imports with around 34 per cent of share and Africa's main export market with a share of around 37 per cent. Moreover, Figure 1.2 shows that the total value of exports and imports to and from Africa has risen dramatically since 2000, reflecting the economic growth of the continent.

The increase of Sino-Africa trade can be explained by two elements. First, China has discovered Africa's market potential, as Africa is particularly well suited to boost the exports of China's cheap products. Moreover, Africa represents an important provider of natural resources that are needed to fuel China's economic growth. China has therefore established itself as a major investor in Africa.

Figure 1.3 highlights the increase of Chinese FDI to Africa over the last ten years. According to recent data from the Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Institute (CARI), China's investment in Africa grew from

Fig. 1.3   FDI flows from the EU, USA and China to Africa, 2003–2012 (US$ million)

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from UNCTAD, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and the Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Institute (CARI)

around US$74 million in 2003 to US$3.2 billion in 2014. This growth trend was disrupted by the international financial crisis in 2009. As outlined by Figure 1.3, FDI of China and the EU decreased drastically between 2008 and 2009, while USA FDI increased. Overall, the EU and the USA remain the largest investors in Africa (OECD 2016a). In 2012, FDI from the EU accounted to around US$12 billion, while China invested only US$2.5 billion in Africa in the same year.

In particular, Africa's resource-rich countries have benefited from greater demand for commodities from China. This has contributed to an increase in commodity prices. Although Chinese FDI in Africa was originally mainly directed at resource-rich countries, China has started to diversify its investments to non-resource-rich African countries (Pigato and Tang 2015). In addition to the extractive industry sector, infrastructure and consumer-oriented industries are the main attractors for Chinese investments in Africa (OECD 2016a, 54).

Besides economic cooperation, China has also strengthened its diplomatic and security ties with Africa over the past years. China maintains diplomatic relations with almost all 54 African states. Due to its "One-China policy", the People's Republic of China (PRC)[8] does not engage in diplomatic relations with countries that have recognised Taiwan. In Africa, two countries[9] maintain official diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This can change, however, as the examples of São Tomé and Príncipe and Gambia show. Both African countries decided to resume diplomatic relations with the PRC at the expense of Taiwan in 2016.

China's bilateral cooperation with Africa is coordinated through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) (Taylor 2011). The FOCAC was established in 2000 to provide an institutional framework for promoting multilevel cooperation between China and the different African states (Grimm 2012a). It is primarily based on the mechanism of ministerial conferences. The FOCAC ministerial conferences are held every three years and are open to ministers of foreign affairs, international cooperation and financial and economic affairs (Li et al. 2012). In addition to these ministerial conferences, FOCAC summits at the level of heads of state and government are held, alternating between China and Africa. Another important symbol of China's efforts to create closer diplomatic ties with Africa was the creation of the position of Chinese Special Envoy for Africa. China's Special Envoy for Africa is a senior Chinese diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), who is exclusively dedicated to African affairs (Interviews 35Cc, 102Bc). China's first Special Envoy

was Liu Guijin, who was succeeded by Zhong Jianhua in February 2012 (Grimm 2012b).

Alongside setting up special institutional structures, the Chinese government has also formulated official documents outlining its diplomatic strategy in Africa. The first Policy Paper on China's Africa policy was released after the initial FOCAC summit in Beijing in 2006 (Chinese State Council 2006). Nearly ten years later, at the occasion of the FOCAC summit in Johannesburg in 2015, the Chinese government issued a second Policy Paper on Africa (Chinese State Council 2015). The publication of the first Policy Paper on China's Africa Policy in 2006 was a sign of increasing transparency by the Chinese government in response to criticism by the international community of China's engagement in Africa. Instead, the second policy document is primarily directed towards African stakeholders and draws on the lessons that China learnt from its engagement in Africa over the past fifteen years, since the establishment of the FOCAC. One of the key lessons concerns China's growing disposition to become involved in African peace and security matters. Whereas the first paper already underlined the importance of cooperation in the area of security, as well as the role of the African Union (AU), the second paper puts particular emphasis on non-traditional security threats such as piracy and terrorism. This greater importance attributed to Sino-Africa security cooperation is also reflected in the recent establishment of a specific diplomatic mission to the AU in Addis Ababa, as well as the signature of a ten-year leasing agreement with Djibouti in view of setting up the first Chinese military base in Africa. Moreover, when Ambassador Xu Jinghu succeeded Ambassador Zhong Jianhua in 2016 as new Special Representative of the Chinese Government on African Affairs, she specifically highlighted China's commitment to fostering peace in Africa.

China's increasing economic and diplomatic interest in Africa has been accompanied by a significant raise in Chinese development aid to the region. Yet, since China is only a so-called emerging donor in Africa, it is difficult to measure the exact amount of Chinese aid. The lack of reliable data regarding Chinese development assistance can also be explained by the fact that China is not a member of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) and therefore does not follow the same reporting mechanism as traditional donors (OECD 2016a, 69). Unlike traditional development cooperation, China's aid is not reported according to the

criteria of Official Development Assistance (ODA),[10] as defined by the OECD's DAC. Instead, China refers to its development cooperation with Africa as so-called South-South Cooperation (SSC) between developing countries. However, the Chinese government has started to publish specific policy documents on its foreign aid, thereby increasing transparency over its aid activities in Africa (Castillejo 2013; Grimm et al. 2011). China's first White Paper on China's Foreign Aid was published in 2011 (Chinese State Council 2011). More recently, the State Council released a second White Paper on Foreign Aid that provides an update of Chinese development assistance for the period 2010–2012 (Chinese State Council 2014b).

Despite the publication of the official documents on China's foreign aid activities, uncertainties regarding the scope of Chinese aid to Africa remain. In order to get a comprehensive understanding of China's development cooperation with Africa the official Chinese data therefore needs to be cross-checked with other sources on Chinese aid. The data provided by the Johns Hopkins CARI, the AidData set, as well as the estimates of the OECD DAC and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) constitute important additional sources. Although estimates of Chinese foreign aid vary, it is commonly agreed that around 50 per cent of Chinese aid goes to Africa. Figure 1.4 shows that in the period between 2010 and 2012, Asia accounted for nearly one-third of China's aid, while more than half of Chinese aid was distributed to Africa.

As outlined in Figure 1.5, recent data from the Johns Hopkins CARI[11] and JICA[12] confirms the important increase in Chinese aid to Africa over the past ten years.

In terms of development cooperation instruments, Chinese foreign assistance commonly takes the form of grants, loans (interest-free and concessional[13]), as well as debt relief, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (Bräutigam 2011a; 114; Chinese State Council 2011; Guérin 2008). Moreover, China also provides some in-kind aid (Lum et al. 2009, 7). In addition to the different instruments, Chinese aid to Africa covers a variety of different areas, including infrastructure, natural resources, industry, health, agriculture and education (Bräutigam 2009; Bräutigam 2011b; Hong 2012; Kitano and Harada 2014; Lancaster 2007; Lum et al. 2009). Current research confirms that most of China's development finance goes to the infrastructure sector (Stahl 2016a). So far, China has signed infrastructure finance agreements with more than 30 African countries (Foster et al. 2008).

Fig. 1.4 Geographical distribution of Chinese aid, 2010–2012 (in percentage)

Source: Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) (Chinese State Council 2014b)

Empirical evidence shows that "most Chinese government-funded projects in Sub-Saharan Africa are ultimately aimed at securing a flow of Sub-Saharan Africa's natural resources for export to China" (Foster et al. 2008, 64). These so-called infrastructure-for-resources deals show that China's development cooperation is closely intertwined with its economic interests (Alves 2013). Chinese aid to Africa therefore contrasts with the definition of ODA, which excludes commercial arrangements by private actors. Instead, the China's "South-South Cooperation" with Africa is characterised by a mutually beneficial business-orient cooperation (Bräutigam 2011b). Hence, unlike the traditional development approach of the USA and the EU, grant-based aid only represents a small part of China's foreign aid to SSA (Asche and Schüller 2008; Bräutigam 2009). For this reason, controversy over the exact volume of Chinese aid remains.

China's recent policy documents also outline the core principles guiding China's foreign aid to Africa. These principles were formulated during the 1950s and are therefore inspired by China's historical relations with Africa. There are two sets of principles guiding China's development cooperation with Africa: the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence"[14]

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
CARI data 2016	275	285	300	315	365	455	515	735	935	975	1000	1230	1325	1600	0
JICA data 2016	0	363	388	405	468	576	717	1118	1232	1578	1871	2301	2614	2710	2464

■CARI data 2016   ■JICA data 2016

Fig. 1.5   Chinese aid to Africa, 2000–2014 (million US$)

Source: Compiled by the author based on 2016 data from the Johns Hopkins China-Africa Research Institute (CARI) and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA).

Note: It was assumed that 50 per cent of China's total aid is distributed to Africa

from 1954 and the "Eight Principles of Foreign Aid"[15] from 1963. Whereas the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence were formulated by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai as general guidelines in view of China's participation in the Bandung Conference in 1955, the Eight Principles of Foreign Aid correspond to a specific set of principles that govern China's foreign aid. Among these principles, Chinese leaders have put particular emphasis on the principle of sovereignty and of non-interference.

1.3   Research Puzzle: Assessing EU Engagement with China and Africa

Against the specific backdrop of the intensification of Sino-Africa relations, this book explores how the EU is adapting to the emerging multipolar world order. In recent years, the EU has begun formulating a foreign policy of engagement with rising powers in view of establishing a new type of partnership with China and Africa. Yet, despite the EU's foreign policy of engagement, the multifaceted EU-China-Africa trilateral relationship has remained limited. The objective of this book is to solve this research puzzle and to provide an explanation for the failure of the EU's engagement with China and Africa.

The growing trilateral relations between the EU, China and Africa are characterised by various forms of interaction. In order to provide a comprehensive mapping of this new empirical trend, this research focuses specifically on three levels of the multifaceted EU-China-Africa trilateral relations. As outlined in Figure 1.6, the three levels correspond to different settings or venues in which the three actors encounter one another. They take the form of bilateral, multilateral and trilateral dialogues.

The research puzzle reflects the fact that this book approaches EU foreign policy as a moving target, which is changing over time and adapting to international policy shifts. Hence, this research project was designed as an enquiry of ongoing policy processes, rather than an analysis of concrete policy results or outputs. In terms of the time frame, this research project examines EU foreign policy[16] and the progress of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations in the period from 2005 to 2012.[17] 2005 was chosen as the beginning of the research period because it marked the beginning of a pro-active foreign policy response by the EU to the increase of Sino-African relations. This is reflected in the adoption of several European policy initiatives specifically targeted at China's presence in

Fig. 1.6   Overview of EU, China and Africa trilateral relations

Source: Compiled by the author

Africa. In order to make this research project feasible, it was decided to examine a seven-year period, lasting until the Chinese leadership transition in 2012 and the handing over of power to the new Chinese President Xi Jinping.

1.4   LITERATURE REVIEW AND ANALYTICAL CONCEPTS

In addition to offering empirical insights into the emerging phenomenon of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations, this book also makes a contribution to the academic literature on EU foreign policy. On one hand, it fosters a new research field on EU-China-Africa trilateral relations (Alden and Sidiropoulos 2009; Alden and Barber 2015; Wu 2012; Barton and

Bellefroid 2015; Wouters et al. 2015; Bello and Gebrewold 2010; Men and Barton 2011) that combines existing academic accounts on EU-China relations (Wouters et al. 2012; Pan 2012; Geeraerts 2013; Casarini 2009; Crossick and Reuter 2008; Fox and Godement 2009; Vogt 2012; Stumbaum 2009; Brown 2015; Shambaugh et al. 2007; Harst and Swieringa 2012; Men and Balducci 2010; Wang and Song 2016) with the literature on EU-Africa relations (Sicurelli 2010a; Adebajo and Whiteman 2012; Faber and Orbie 2009; Carbone 2013; Delputte and Söderbaum 2012; Bach 2010; Mangala 2013; Haastrup 2013). On the other hand, this book builds on the EU foreign policy scholarship (EFP) and its recent scholarly endeavours to adjust existing theories to better reflect current multipolar dynamics (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014; Hill and Smith 2005; Smith 2008; Jorgensen et al. 2015; Bretheron and Vogler 1999; Carlnaes et al. 2004; Nuttall 2000; White 2001; Tonra and Christiansen 2004).

Since the EU is a moving target, the study of EU foreign policy is required to continuously adapt to new policy developments affecting the EU, as well as the international system in general. Today's unprecedented global power shifts present a particular challenge to EFP research. Over the past years, a variety of new theoretical approaches to the study of EU foreign policy have been formulated in response to current international shifts. In particular, three major EFP research agendas provide new insights regarding EU foreign policy in the emerging multipolar international order: the literature on the EU's external perceptions, the scholarship on EU strategic partnerships and broader contributions on the EU's international role in the context of global governance, emerging countries and multipolarity.

Originally, EFP scholarship has primarily focused on the EU's external identity and its effectiveness or impact in international affairs (Ginsberg 2001; Whitman 1997). By doing so, EFP literature has traditionally adopted a rather inward-looking research approach, giving an emphasis to the EU's domestic institutional and ideational characteristics. Yet, in the same way than the field of IR is increasingly chastised for its Western-centric research angle (Waever 1998), there is growing criticism regarding the strong Eurocentric bias of EFP scholarship (Lucarelli 2007; Shambaugh 2008). Consequently, several EFP scholars have started adopting a more outward-looking research perspective. This recent trend has translated into a new strand of EFP literature on external perceptions of the EU (Chaban and Holland 2008; Chaban et al. 2009; Fioramonti 2012; Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010; Geeraerts and Gross 2011; Ortega 2004; Shambaugh 2008; Torney 2013; Bello 2010). Scholars studying

the external perceptions of the EU are interested in explaining how the perceptions of the EU's partners impact on the formation of the EU's identity. Departing from the concept of identity, the scholarly literature on the EU's external perceptions is therefore largely influenced by role theory (Lucarelli 2007, 256). Some academic contributions have specifically studied Chinese perceptions of the EU (Geeraerts 2007; Gross and Jian 2012; Men 2006; Morini et al. 2010; Pan 2012; Peruzzi et al. 2007; Stumbaum and Wei 2012). Apart from the geographic focus on Asia and China in particular, academic contributions on EU external perceptions can also be categorised according to different policy areas such as environment, trade or development cooperation (Stumbaum 2012a; Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010). For instance, scholars have examined China's perceptions of the EU in different issue areas (Bingran and Shuangquan 2007).

Alongside the literature on EU external perceptions, a second strand of adjustment in EFP literature has emerged known as the literature on EU strategic partnerships (Gratius 2011a; Gratius 2011b; Grevi 2012; Grevi and Khandekar 2011; Renard 2010; Renard 2012; Stumbaum 2012b; Sautenet 2012; Schmidt 2010; Balfour 2010). Unlike the scholarship on the EU's external perceptions and the broader academic contributions on the EU's international role in a multipolar world order, the literature on EU strategic partnerships has mostly been the result of a new EU policy discourse, rather than that of a predefined research agenda. Hence, this emerging research area is primarily concerned with conceptualising the ambiguous policy notion of EU strategic partnerships. Since the 1990s, EU policy documents referred to so-called international partnerships (European Parliament, 2012). Yet, it was only after the turn of the century that European policymakers started expressing their intentions to forge new "partnerships" with various international actors in a more customary fashion. Following this trend, several official EU policy papers started specifically drawing on the concept of partnership. These policy documents used different adjectives, such as "maturing", "comprehensive" and "reciprocal", to describe this novel type of international cooperation. In 2003, the notion of "strategic partnership" was spelled out for the first time in an EU foreign policy document. Although the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) – one of the key foreign policy documents of the EU – explicitly expressed the EU's ambitions to build strategic partnerships with Canada, China, India, Japan, Russia and the USA, it did not provide a definition of this new instrument (Council of the EU 2003). Apart from the 2003 ESS, other EU foreign policy documents also

describe the EU's diplomatic relations with a number of third countries in terms of strategic partnerships (European Commission 2004b; European Commission 2004a; European Commission 2006b). In particular, the Lisbon Treaty has contributed to nurturing the EU's strategic partnership agenda. Article 21 paragraph 1 of the Treaty on European Union states that the EU "shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations". In the context of the new EU policy discourse on strategic partnerships, a variety of scholarly contributions have emerged aimed at providing substance to this novel expression (Bendiek and Kramer 2010; Balfour 2010; De Vasconcelos 2010; Renard 2012; Schmidt 2010). Yet, despite the development of a specific academic literature on EU strategic partnerships, scholars have followed different approaches in order to account for this concept (Smith and Xie 2010).

Finally, a third new subfield of EU foreign policy has emerged through the study of the EU's international position in the shifting international system and its particular relations with emerging countries. For instance, in 2011 Hans Bruynickx and Stephan Keukeleire made one of the first attempts to assess the overall role of the EU in the changing world order and its foreign policy towards emerging countries (Keukeleire and Bruyninckx 2011). Other contributions have either focused only on the EU's evolving international position in a growing multipolar system (Herolf 2011; Mayer 2008; Smith 2008; Debaere 2015) or, more specifically, on the EU's relations with emerging countries (Renard and Biscop 2012; Wouters et al. 2012; Hess 2012; Wang and Song 2016).

Although the three groups of academic studies present first attempts at engaging in a more theoretical evaluation of the EU's current foreign policy, all three research strands face major limitations and none of them have been able to propose a clear theoretical foundation for the study of EU foreign policy in a changing world. Instead, most of the recent EFP contributions are largely driven by empirical observation.

Considering the lack of a consistent theory to explain current EU foreign policy, this book proposes a novel analytical framework for the study of EU foreign policy in a multipolar world in the making. As outlined in Chapter 2, the novel theoretical framework is centred on the following three analytical concepts: EU foreign policy strategy, EU foreign policy instruments and the response by the EU's partners. The concepts will guide the empirical analysis in Chapters 3–6 by analysing both the EU's foreign policy instruments of engagement and the Chinese

and African policy responses, this book provides an explanation for the limitations of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations.

1.5   Research Methods

As this book is intended to explain the growing dynamics between the EU, China and Africa and provide an explanation for the limited magnitude of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations, a qualitative research design was chosen. In contrast to a purely quantitative research approach, qualitative research generally relies on an inductive process. It therefore provides greater flexibility and is better suited for the analysis of social phenomena.

In light of the qualitative research design, different research techniques have been applied. This section will briefly outline the data-gathering techniques and focus in particular on the technique of in-depth expert interviews. Moreover, it will explain how the case study design contributed to the overall research findings.

1.5.1   Data-Gathering Techniques

Due to the fact that this book focuses on a very topical research question, the collection of reliable data has been a key challenge. There are a variety of techniques for collecting qualitative research data. In order to ensure the validity and reliability of a research project, it was important to combine multiple sources of evidence. Consequently, three main data-gathering techniques were used, namely document and textual analysis, field research and in-depth expert interviews.

In terms of textual analysis, four types of written material were examined. Open access official policy documents represented the primary source. They covered policy documents issued by EU institutions (e.g. Commission communications, Council conclusions, reports of the European Parliament) and individual EU member states, as well as government publications published by the Chinese authorities in English (e.g. White Papers, official government statements, speeches) and policy papers issued by the AU and single African states. The open access policy documents were complemented through restricted archival or organisational records. Through research in the libraries and archives of the EU in Brussels, the AU in Addis Ababa and the OECD in Paris, restricted organisational records from these three organisations could be accessed. In terms of the overall balance between European, Chinese and

African written material, it is crucial to point out that European sources are significantly more abundant than those from China and Africa. The imbalance in favour of European policy documents is related to the EU-centred research focus of the research project. The particular scarcity of African written sources results from the fact that this research project primarily adopts an institutional perspective and most African countries, as well as pan-African organisations like the AU, generally lack an institutional memory (Interviews 56Sa, 57Sa, 75Aa, 78Ae).

Academic literature by European, Chinese and African scholars and think tanks constituted the third source. This source was further complemented with media contributions and newspaper articles (e.g. from *Agence Europe, Europolitics, European Voice, China Daily, People's Daily, Global Times* and various African newspapers).

In addition to document and textual analysis, qualitative data was also collected through field research or direct observation. Due to the topical nature of the research subject and the relative lack of primary written documentation, field research played a particularly important role. In contrast to political sciences and IR, field research is more commonly used in ethnography, anthropology (Dresch et al. 2000) and development research (Bevan 2009), as it involves "going where the action is and observing it" (Babbie 1992, 9). In general, field research or fieldwork can be defined as a "social research method that involves the direct observation of social phenomena in their natural settings" (Babbie 1992, 309). It therefore allows researchers to be closely connected to the reality they are studying. Field research represents a theory-generating activity as it implies that the researcher has to "make sense out of an on-going process that cannot be predicted in advance" (Babbie 1992, 285). Hence, field research can bring added value to research endeavours following an inductive research approach. Within the broad area of field research, different methods can be applied. For this book, field research was conducted on three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa (and in six locations). In Europe, field research was conducted at the headquarters of the EU in Brussels and at the secretariat of the OECD in Paris. Additionally, fieldwork was carried out in Asia and Africa. In Asia, field research was undertaken in the Chinese capital Beijing and in the Korean capital Seoul. For fieldwork in Africa, South Africa and the headquarters of the AU in Addis Ababa were chosen. The field visits presented an excellent opportunity to observe policymakers in their natural environment, by participating in meetings and other side activities. Moreover, it allowed access to the archives of various institutions

such as the EU and the OECD. Engaging in field research on three different continents was particularly challenging as the cultural and political realities in the field were extremely varied. As scholars have pointed out, Western researchers doing field research in China (Heimer and Thogersen 2006) have to adapt to very different realities as compared to those engaging in field research in Africa (Werthmann 2004).

Among the three techniques for gathering evidence, in-depth expert interviews have played a crucial role. In-depth expert interviews are generally used in combination with field research (Babbie 1992, 109). In-depth interviews are "the most widely used interviewing format for qualitative research and can occur either with an individual or in groups" (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006, 315). The importance attributed to the technique of in-depth interviews can be explained by the fact that this research project generally adopted an empirical approach and in-depth interviews present an ideal tool to collect first-hand information from key informants (Mack et al. 2005, 29). These informants are considered as "experts" with a specific expertise in the area of research (Bogner et al. 2009).

For this research project, 105 in-depth expert interviews were conducted over a period of six years, between December 2007 and June 2013. In addition to the in-depth interviews, informal or off-the-record side discussions were held with experts and policymakers at the occasion of international conferences and other events, bringing together scholars and policymakers.

An important condition for in-depth interviews is the identification of relevant "experts" or the selection of the interviewees (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree 2006, 317; Whiting 2008, 36). As a research project situated in the field of political science, the in-depth interviews were conducted with members of the political elite, who are "people who exercise disproportionately high influence on the outcome of events or policies" (Pierce 2008, 119). The selection of adequate interviewees was undertaken on the basis of snowball sampling, a method through which an ever-increasing set of sample observations is developed (Babbie 1992, 309). This means that the researcher asks "one participant in the event under study to recommend others for interviewing, and each of the subsequently interviewed participants is asked for further recommendations" (Berg 2001, 33). The interviewees corresponded to relevant policy actors who were, in one way or another, involved in international and national policymaking in Europe, Asia and Africa.

As Table 1.1 shows, the interviewees of the political elite can be classified into five broad categories: ambassadors, policy officers,

Table 1.1   Functions of interviewees

Function	Number of interviewees
Ambassadors	9
Policy officers	60
Development practitioners	8
Academics	25
Journalists	2
Total	104

Source: Compiled by the author

development practitioners, academics and journalists. Among the inter-
viewees a majority were policy officers, including EU officials, national
civil servants from EU member states, African and Asian diplomats, offi-
cials working for international organisations such as the OECD or the UN
and for regional organisations like the AU. By contrast, only two journal-
ists were interviewed due to the fact that they generally act as observers of
political processes and are not directly involved in policymaking. Another
important category of interview partners was academics. The high number
of academics can be explained on the basis of specificities of the Chinese
political system, in which scholars – especially those working for official
think tanks – exercise important influence over policy outcomes. In fact,
they act as informal policymakers by providing guidance to ministries and
other governmental bodies.

Most commonly, in-depth interviews are carried out as direct face-to-
face interviews (Kvales 1996). This was also the case in this research
project. However, due to the geographic distance involved in this
research, some interviews made use of telecommunication tools and
took the form of indirect phone or Skype interviews. Face-to-face ques-
tioning usually involves a small number of interviewees. For the purpose of
this research, the majority of in-depth interviews were carried out with a
single interviewee (Whiting 2008). Only in rare instances were interviews
conducted with a group of two interviewees, usually from the same
organisation and with overlapping responsibilities. Although the nation-
ality of the interviewees varied, the common interview language was
English. In general, the face-to-face, in-depth interviews lasted for
approximately one hour.

A specific written guide was developed as part of the interview prepara-
tions, clarifying the topic under discussion. This written guide or broad
questionnaire was sent to each interviewee prior to the interview, together
with explanations related to the purpose of the interview. The question-
naire encompassed a list of broad themes and open-ended questions.
Hence, the interviews were set-up as semi-structured interviews in which
the overall direction was determined by the broad questionnaire but the
interviewee was given genuine flexibility in regards to the sequence of
questions and provided with the opportunity to explore new areas. Hence,
the use of semi-structured interviews allowed for the production of com-
parable data while at the same time checking for alternative explanations
not foreseen by the questionnaire. In this context, it is important to stress
that the questionnaire was adapted slightly in response to the different
locations/groups of interviewees. Consequently, six different models of
the questionnaires were prepared.

Ideally, interviews should be audio-recorded and transcribed into text
(Pierce 2008, 130). This was, however, not possible in the context of this
research project, as the interviewees were members of the political elite
and are generally reluctant to divulgating information. Moreover, most
interviewees interpreted the research topic as being particularly politically
sensitive. Hence, it was not possible to produce a permanent record of the
interview data or to transcribe the interviews verbatim. Instead, general
transcripts of each interview were produced on the basis of notes taken
during the interview. Through a Code of Conduct – specifically elaborated
for the purpose of this research project – the interviewees were assured that
the interviews would not be recorded and that the interview transcripts
would not be divulged.

In order to accurately analyse the evidence gathered through the
104 interviewees, while at the same time insuring the confidentially
commitment laid down in the Code of Conduct, this book relies on
the technique of coding. The coding of collected data is a widely used
method of qualitative research and an essential tool for content analysis
(Babbie 1992, 317). This research project is based on a dual coding
scheme. The two categories of codes applied to the interview data are
exposed in the beginning of the book. Code I refers to the location of
the interviews, whereas code II is based on the nationality of the
interviewees. The six locations of code I encompass both cities and
countries. The three cities (Brussels, Paris and Addis Ababa) were
chosen because they represent the headquarters of specific international

organisations such as the EU, the OECD and the AU. The last category "O" refers to interviews conducted in other locations, as well as phone interviews.

1.5.2   Data Analysis: Evidence Gathered from Field Research and Expert Interviews

The dual coding scheme introduced to process the data collected through field research and the in-depth expert interviews reflects the research focus. Table 1.2 provides an ovreview of the data summarised under code II. It reveals that a majority of 59 interviews were conducted with European nationals.

Table 1.2   Breakdown of interviews according to code II

Code II	Number of interviewees
e	59
c	22
a	17
i	6
Total	104

Source: Compiled by the author

Table 1.3   Breakdown of interviews according to code I

Code I	Number of interviewees
B	30
P	9
A	16
C	26
S	14
K	3
O	6
Total	104

Source: Compiled by the author

Table 1.4   Breakdown of interviews according to function and code I

Function/nationality	European (e)	Chinese (c)	Africans (a)	International (i)
Ambassador	6	1	2	–
Policy officers	38	6	10	5
Development practitioners	7	1	–	–
Academics	6	14	5	1
Journalists/media	2	–	–	–
Total	59	22	17	6

Source: Compiled by the author

Like Table 1.2, Table 1.3 reflects the EU-centred research approach adopted in this study. It shows that most of the interviews were carried out at the headquarters of the EU in Brussels. In terms of Chinese and African informants, there is a slight preponderance of Chinese interviewees. While 26 interviews were conducted in Beijing (the location of the Chinese government), 30 interviews were carried out on the African continent (in South Africa and Ethiopia). Overall, there was a balance between the interviews carried out at the headquarters of the EU in Brussels and those in the field in China and Africa.[18]

Table 1.4 provides some further interesting findings by matching code II to the five functions of the interviewees. It reveals that most of the interviewees with a higher professional position (namely, ambassadors and policy officers) had European citizenship. This shows again that this research is mostly aimed at examining EU foreign policymaking. In terms of academics interviewed, the majority were from China. This serves as another indication for the fact that unlike European scholars Chinese academics are more closely involved in the foreign policymaking process and where therefore identified as important informants for this research.

1.5.3   Case Study Design

Alongside the research techniques outlined earlier, case study design is another common method of qualitative research (Yin 2009; Byrne and Ragain 2009; George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2004). In general, a case study can be defined as "a research strategy based on

the in-depth empirical investigation of one, or a small number of phenomena", "conceptualised and analysed empirically as a manifestation of a broader class of phenomena or events" (Vennesson 2008, 226). Hence, a case study corresponds to "an intensive study of a single unit with an aim to generalise across a larger set of units" (Gerring 2004, 341). This research project was designed as a comparative analysis of three case studies, namely the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa, the multilateral EU-China dialogue within OECD DAC and the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue. The three case studies are outlined in Chapters 3–5, and they each examine a different level of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations.

1.6   Overview of the Book

The book is composed of seven chapters. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 introduces the novel conceptual framework that guides this research project. The research puzzle will be tested in three empirical case studies, which are presented in Chapters 3–5. These three chapters constitute the core of this book and largely follow the same three-step structure. First, they provide some background information relevant for the case study. Then, they scrutinise the type of EU foreign policy instrument of engagement. Finally, they make an assessment of the bilateral, multilateral or trilateral EU foreign policy. Subsequently, Chapter 6 studies the response of the Chinese and African partners to each of the three case studies. Lastly, Chapter 7 undertakes a comparison of the three empirical case studies in order to draw out the broader research results and to provide an explanation of EU engagement with China and Africa.

Reconceptualising EU Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World

The study of contemporary EU foreign policy in the context of the changing global order represents a challenging endeavour. As outlined in the introduction, scholars of IR and EU studies have developed different theories to analyse the EU's international role and EU foreign policy more specifically. Yet, academic contributions on current power shifts and, in particular, on the role of the EU in the changing international environment are still rather scarce. Moreover, the theoretical approaches offered by EFP literature are largely ill suited for explaining the changing international role of the EU and a single theoretical lens for the study of EU foreign policy in an emerging multipolar world is largely missing. Considering the insufficient state of theoretical development and the lack of adequate theories to be tested, a reconceptualisation of EU foreign policy is indispensable.

A key contribution of this book lies in the formulation of an original analytical framework for the analysis of EU foreign policy in a multipolar world in the making. This chapter develops the main components of the novel analytical framework[19] and thereby lays the foundation for the empirical part of this book. Drawing on the existing theoretical literature on EU foreign policy, the conceptual framework put forward in this chapter is based on the following three main elements: EU foreign policy strategy of comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP), EU foreign policy instruments of engagement and responses to EU engagement. Together

these notions correspond to a conceptual toolbox that can be applied to the broader study of EU foreign policy in the context of current shifts in global power. For the purpose of this research, the analytical framework will be applied to the trilateral relations between the EU, China and Africa.

On the basis of the analytical concepts outlined in this chapter, a systematic analysis of EU foreign policy towards China and Africa will be conducted in chapters 3, 4 and 5. This will allow answering the research puzzle of why only limited EU, China and Africa trilateral relations have emerged, despite the EU's recent efforts of reaching out to China and Africa.

This chapter is divided into six main sections that will clarify the three components of the analytical framework and introduce further conceptual elements defining them. Section 2.1 starts by introducing the EU as the main unit of analysis of this research and gives a brief overview of the EU's institutional set-up. On this basis, Section 2.2 provides a broad definition of the notion of EU foreign policy that will serve as the groundwork for the novel analytical framework. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 expose the constituting features of EU foreign policy strategy and introduce the notion of EU foreign policy instruments. Whereas Section 2.3 defines the strategy of CSP, Section 2.4 makes a distinction between two types of instruments: transformative EU engagement and reciprocal EU engagement. Later, Section 2.5 focuses on the responses of the Chinese and African partners to EU engagement. Finally, Section 2.6 offers a brief summary of the main elements of the original analytical framework.

2.1   Opening the Black Box of the EU

This section starts by defining the object of the study itself and provides an overview of the EU. Most research on the EU departs from its institutional structure and studies the features and characteristics of the different EU institutions[20] (Smith 2008; Vanhoonacker 2005; Hill and Smith 2005; Smith 2003; Cini and Borragan 2013; Jorgensen et al. 2015). This has sparked an academic debate about whether the EU's distinctive institutional features result in a unique kind of policy process. The treatment of the EU as *sui generis* is particularly relevant for the study of EU foreign policy as it makes a comparative approach with international organisations or nation states impossible and explains the difficulties in finding a common ground for the research agenda of EFP scholarship (Bretheron and Vogler 1999).

In line with the institutional analysis of the EU, this analytical framework considers the EU in terms of the policy initiatives carried out by three key EU institutions, namely the European Commission (Commission), the Council of the EU (Council) and the European Parliament. The European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament represent the three main law-making institutions and form the so-called institutional triangle of the EU. They are also involved in the formulation and implementation of EU foreign policy (Algieri 2008). While the European Commission represents the EU's executive organ and embodies the EU's interest as a whole, the Council of the EU is a collective forum in which the governments of the individual member states are represented. The European Parliament represents the interests of European citizens.

The European Commission is designed as both the secretariat and the executive of the EU (Szapiro 2013). It is an autonomous institution, representing the EU's common interests. The Commission is headed by a president and can propose different policies. Yet, its powers vary depending on the specific policy field, as member states have only transferred executive powers to the Commission in certain policy areas (Sabathil et al. 2008). In the form of so-called communications, the Commission makes policy proposals to the Council of the EU and European Parliament. In terms of its internal organisation, the European Commission is divided into different departments, so-called Directorates-General (DGs).[21] In addition to the officials based in the Commission's headquarters in Brussels, the Commission also has officers located in its delegations in third countries, responsible for the implementation of EU foreign policy (Austermann 2014). The network of Commission delegations was officially institutionalised with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. Yet, as member states were concerned with maintaining competences over their diplomatic relations, delegations were initially only entitled to represent the Commission (Cornelli and Matarazzo 2011).

The Council of the EU is the EU's central decision-making body, which approves the proposals originating from the Commission. The Council is not a single entity, but brings together representatives from different EU member states with different specialisations and political seniority (Lewis 2013, 154). Unlike the Commission, which contributes to the formation of collective EU objectives, the Council represents the sum of the national interests of the different European member states. Over the years – in particular after the adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht

in 1992, which laid the foundations for the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) – the Council of the EU has made a growing contribution to the EU's foreign policy. The Council's General Secretariat, headed by the Secretary-General of the Council (SG), played a particular role in the emerging CFSP. The role of the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU in the formulation of EU Foreign Policy was further strengthened with the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and the creation of the post of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy – which was placed within the General Secretariat of the Council of the EU. From 1999 to 2009 the post of High Representative for the CFSP was occupied by the former Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javier Solana. By holding the dual position of both High Representative for the CFSP and SG, Javier Solana could rely on the support of the staff of the General Secretariat of the Council. The Council Secretariat did not only support the HR for the administrative organisation of his meetings, but also developed a considerable level of expertise in relation to foreign policy (Juncos and Pomorska 2011).

Under the coordination of the Council's General Secretariat, the work of the Council of the EU is organised around three layers: the Council of Ministers, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) I and II, and the Council working groups (Cameron 2007). The Council of Ministers is at the top of the hierarchy. As its name indicates, it is composed of the Ministers of the EU member states. There are different Council configurations, most importantly the General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC), which is composed of Foreign Affairs Ministers or European Affairs Ministers and is in charge of cross-cutting issues and external relations. Below the Council of Ministers is the COREPER,[22] which is composed of the member states' ambassadors to the EU based in Brussels (so-called EU permanent representatives). The COREPER is responsible for preparing the agenda for the Council meetings and convenes at least weekly. It is divided into two groups: COREPER I and II. While COREPER I deals with technical issues such as environment or transport, COREPER II primarily prepares the monthly GAERC meetings (Lewis 2013). The third layer of the work of the Council is undertaken by more than 150 working groups.[23]

Together with the European Commission and the Council of the EU, the European Parliament represents the legislative branch of the EU. Unlike the other two EU institutions, the EP is directly elected on a basis of proportional representation from across EU member states.

The Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are organised around political groups. Whereas the European Parliament's role in the EU's overall policy process has grown substantially over the past years, it still plays a marginal role with respect to the EU's external relations (Crum 2006). It is mostly through the work of its specialised committees[24] that the EP has started influencing the EU's foreign policy. A key task of these committees is to produce different types of reports, as well as draft legislative resolutions.

With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the EU's institutional structures underwent significant changes. The Lisbon Treaty amended the two treaties forming the constitutional basis of the EU: the Treaty on European Union (TEU) – known as the Maastricht Treaty – and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC)[25] – known as the Treaty of Rome. As a consequence, it abolished the three-pillar structure introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and gave the EU a legal personality. As part of the institutional reforms introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the European Council received the official status of an EU institution, headed by a newly established permanent President of the European Council. Herman Van Rompuy became the first President of the European Council. In the field of EU foreign policy, the Lisbon Treaty created the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy. Ms Catherine Ashton was appointed as the first HR. She did not only take over the tasks of the former High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana but also gained new responsibilities. In addition to acting as Vice-President of the Commission, the new HR heads the European External Action Service (EEAS). The EEAS represents a new EU institution, established following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. It serves as a foreign ministry of the EU and was formed through a merger of departments of the European Commission (namely Directorate-General for External Relations (DG RELEX) and Directorate-General for Development and Relations with ACP States (DG DEV) and of the Council Secretariat (Bátora and Spence 2015). In addition to the Commission staff transferred, the EEAS is also composed of diplomatic staff from EU member states. The EEAS counts different geographic departments, including one for Asia and the Pacific and one for Africa.

The establishment of the EEAS resulted in the restructuring of existing EU institutions, in particular the European Commission. DG RELEX and DG DEV of the Commission were dissolved and a new DG for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DG DEVCO) was established (Interview 14Be). The creation of the EEAS not only led to a

reorganisation of the Commission's headquarters in Brussels, but also affected the role of the delegations in the field (Interviews 7Se, 52Ce, 82Ae). With the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty the status of the delegations changed from Commission delegations into EU delegations (Austermann 2012a). As the EU delegations became an integral part of the EEAS, they are now entitled to represent the EU in its entirety. Whereas in the past Commission delegations had only limited competences related to the management of technical and financial development programmes, the new EU delegations now have a fully fleshed political section (Cornelli and Matarazzo 2011, 3) (Interviews 52Ce; 82A, 84Be, 90Be). Nevertheless, despite the existence of the EEAS, EU member states still remain in charge of their foreign policy and uphold their national embassies abroad, working alongside EU delegations.

Due to the variety of different actors involved in EU foreign policy-making consistency or coherence is a major concern (Gaspers 2008; Portela and Raube 2012). In the EFP literature the two principles of consistency and coherence are generally used as synonyms to refer to a foreign policy free of contradictions. Within the broader research strand on European foreign policy consistency (Duke 1999; Nuttall 2005), institutional consistency in the EU's foreign policymaking has been the subject of particular attention. The specific concept of institutional consistency was first put forward by Simon Nuttall to draw attention to the contradictions arising from the fact that EU institutions follow different sets of procedures (Nuttall 2001). Departing from the Nuttall's understanding of institutional consistency, the novel analytical framework developed in this chapter provides specific attention to the interaction between the Commission and the Council in EU foreign policymaking.

2.2   Multifaceted and Multilevel EU Foreign Policy

The novel conceptual framework developed in this book builds on the notion of EU foreign policy and EFP scholarship.[26] In order to reconceptualise EU foreign policy in a multipolar world in the making, the analytical framework departs from the concepts of *multifaceted* and *multilevel* EU foreign policy, developed by Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014).

The adjective "multifaceted" suggests an understanding of that EU Foreign Policy that goes beyond the narrow focus on the CFSP.[27] Instead, it relies on the broad understanding of EU foreign policy as

"the area of European policies that is directed at the external environment with the objective of influencing that environment and the behaviour of other actors within it, in order to pursue interests, values and goals" (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 1). EU Foreign Policy therefore covers EU external relations as a whole[28] and not only what is traditionally referred to as EU diplomacy. In particular, the creation of the EEAS and the growing role of EU delegations abroad are prominent examples for the development of EU diplomacy (Koops and Macaj 2015; Bátora and Spence 2015). Traditionally, the notion of diplomacy refers to certain tools or methods used by states to pursue their foreign policy (Carta 2011; Hocking 2004). Thus, the analytical framework of EU Foreign Policy outlined here conceives diplomacy as a specific tool in the pursuit of a broader EU foreign policy. Another important element to understand the notion of multifaceted EU foreign policy is the distinction between EU foreign policy and European foreign policy. European foreign policy can be defined as "the attempt of the European Union and its members states to ensure that their many and various external relations present as coherent a face as possible to the outside world" (Andreatta 2011). Instead, EU foreign policy encompasses national foreign policies only "in so far as these are developed through a certain interaction with the EU" (Andreatta 2011, 13). Unlike the concept of EU foreign policy, European foreign policy therefore considers the interaction between the EU's external relations and the foreign policies of the 28 member states of the EU (Carlnaes et al. 2004, 252). On the basis of the notion of EU foreign policy, the analytical framework exposed here primarily concentrates on the role played by the different European institutions in foreign policymaking and does not explicitly consider the influence of single member states.

In addition to the interaction between different actors, EU foreign policy also comprises different levels. According to Keukeleire and Delreux, multilevel EU foreign policy encompasses three main levels: the national, European and international levels (Keukeleire and Delreux 2014, 11). The multilevel nature of EU foreign policy reflects the fact that the EU is embedded in a complex international environment, characterised by various levels of international relations. The area of global diplomacy can serve as a good example for the increasing complexity and adaptation of international structures and venues (Cooper et al. 2013; Hocking et al. 2012; Langenhove 2010). Traditionally, diplomacy has been generally associated with bilateral diplomatic relations. Yet, during the nineteenth

and twentieth centuries, there was a growth of multilateral diplomacy. With the emerging multipolar world order, some scholars have argued that the twenty-first century is shaped by a plurilateral diplomatic environment, comprising a multitude of different levels through which a limited number of actors discuss rather specific international issues (Bjola 2013; Hoffmeister 2015).

In line with the notion of multilevel EU foreign policy, the analytical framework distinguishes between three different levels. These levels correspond to "different international settings or venues" for conducting EU foreign policy (Stahl 2015b, 17). As outlined by Table 2.1, the three levels correspond to bilateralism, multilateralism and trilateralism.

Bilateralism corresponds to the traditional level of international relations, involving two international actors (Stein 1990, 13). Although IR literature generally refers to bilateralism as the international exchange between two nation states, the literature on EU foreign policy uses the concept to describe the EU's international relations with third countries and international or regional organisations (Gratius 2011b; Jorgensen et al. 2015; Hassan 2010).

Multilateralism is considered as the counterpart to bilateralism (Bouchard and Peterson 2011; Martin 1992). According to the definition offered by John Ruggie, multilateralism is "an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct" (Ruggie 1992, 564). On this basis, multilateral institutions are international organisations that "seek to establish global consensus around certain ideas they see as important for their policy purpose" (Boas and McNeill 2004, 2). The UN and the Bretton Woods institutions are the most prominent examples of international

Table 2.1   Three levels of EU foreign policy

Multilevel EU foreign policy		
Bilateralism	*Multilateralism*	*Trilateralism*
• Institutionalised diplomatic relations with third countries • Institutionalised diplomatic relations with regional organisations	• International organisations, e.g. UN, WTO, OECD • Other international forums, e.g. G8, G20	• Definition of TDC exposed in Chapter 5

Source: Compiled by the author

organisations advancing multilateralism. Similar to the case of bilateralism, scholars have applied the concept of multilateralism to the specific case of the EU. Within European foreign policy literature, a specific understanding of multilateralism has emerged, known as effective multilateralism (Kissack 2010). The notion of effective multilateralism finds its origins in the EU's policy discourse, and in particular in the 2003 European Security Strategy (Council of the EU 2003). Considering that the ESS does not provide a precise definition of the notion, EFP research has provided an important number of different interpretations of EU effective multilateralism (Koops 2011; Biscop 2004; Grevi and De Vasconcelos 2008). The most widely used definition is that put forward by Sven Biscop, defining effective multilateralism as "the development of a stronger international society, well functioning *international institutions* and a *rule-based* international order" (Biscop 2004, 27). Effective multilateralism therefore encompasses two key features: the EU's efforts to cooperate with other international organisations and the EU's contribution to international rules and principles. The EU's commitment to effective multilateralism is primarily reflected in its support for the UN system and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Gratius 2011a; Renard and Hooijmaaijers 2011). Alongside the EU's involvement in traditional international organisations, it is also involved in new, more informal international structures and networks. In particular, the EU plays a role in the G20, the G8 and the G7 (Debaere 2015). The analytical framework refers to these innovative international venues as the trilateral level of EU foreign policy.

While bilateralism and multilateralism correspond to fundamental analytical concepts of IR and EFP theory (Caporaso 1992; Keohane 1990; Ruggie 1993; Ruggie 1992) *trilateralism* is not clearly defined (Alden and Vieira 2005; Gill 1986; Ulman 1976). Drawing on the notion of plurilateral diplomacy, in the analytical framework trilateralism describes international relations that take place among a more restricted number of international players and/or a limited number of actors, and on the basis of a more exclusive policy agenda.[29] Chapter 5 of this book will provide a more detailed definition of the concept of triangular or trilateral development cooperation (TDC).

In sum, the analytical framework presented in this chapter departs from a multifaceted and multilevel understanding of EU foreign policy, involving different EU institutions and levels. On this basis, the analytical framework is built on three main elements. First, the formulation of an EU foreign policy strategy; second, the choice of EU foreign policy

Fig. 2.1   EU foreign policy strategy and instruments

Source: Compiled by the author

instruments; and finally, the response of the EU's partners to the policy instruments chosen. The first two components are summarised in Figure 2.1 and will be further outlined in the next sections.

2.3   EFP Strategy: Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

After having outlined the general contours of EU foreign policy, this section defines a key element of the novel analytical framework: the EU foreign policy strategy of CSP. The concept can be disaggregated into two parts: EU foreign policy strategy and comprehensive strategic partnership.

EU foreign policy strategy finds it origins in the notion of strategy.[30] Strategy serves as a conceptual tool in different disciplines, including security or military studies and economics. In IR, the concept of strategy was introduced by economists belonging to the school of game theory in the 1980s (Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1984; Lipson 1984; Snidal 1985; Stein 1982). Theoretical considerations related to the specific concept of EU foreign policy strategy emerged in the field of EFP following the adoption of the ESS in 2003 and the subsequent Report on the Implementation of the ESS adopted in 2008 (Council of the EU 2003; Council of the EU 2008b). In view of providing strategic substance to

European foreign policy, EFP scholars have identified a set of guiding principles and long-term priority areas that should drive EU external action (Bendiek and Kramer 2010; Biscop 2009; De Vasconcelos 2010; Renard and Biscop 2010; Goldmann et al. 2013; Biscop 2012; Drent and Landman 2012; Lundin 2012). More recently, academic debates over EU foreign policy strategy have remerged (Biscop 2015; Missiroli 2015). They have surfaced in the recent process,[31] leading to the adoption of the EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016). In view of preparing this the new Global Strategy for the EU, the High Representative Federica Mogherini presented in 2015 a strategic assessment to the Council of the EU, arguing that "in a more connected, contested and complex world", the EU needs to agree on its priorities, goals and the means to achieve them (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2015).

Against this background, this analytical framework refers to EU foreign policy strategy as a general plan of action designed to achieve an overall foreign policy aim. More precisely, EU foreign policy strategy consists of the overall foreign policy objectives EU policymakers want to reach. IR literature distinguishes between different ways of managing powers transitions, such as balancing, containment and bandwagoning (Waltz 1979; Wright 1942; Mearsheimer 2001; Johnston and Ross 1999). In the context of the ongoing shifts in the international system, the EU has therefore the choice between different EU foreign policy strategies. According to the analytical framework presented here, that EU is responding to the current power transition through a foreign policy strategy of CSP. By defining CSP as the overall objective of its foreign policy, the EU identifies the opportunities, rather than the threats, arising from the emerging multipolar world order.

The notion of comprehensive strategic partnership introduced by this analytical framework derives from traditional IR theories. It is closely linked to the core ideas of neoliberal institutionalism. From a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, partnerships are indispensible for managing the current power transition by maintaining a certain global balance and avoiding military conflict (O'Neill et al. 2004). Neoliberal institutionalist scholars therefore argue that "the cooperation[32] of all major powers is required to address systemic challenges at the global or inter-regional level" (Grevi 2009, 23). In addition to this rationalist element, CSP is also related to reflectivism and can be defined through a constructivist

theoretical lens (Fearon and Wendt 2002) (Zürn and Checkel 2005). From a constructivist point of view, the CSP corresponds to a process of norms and policy diffusion between different international actors.

Consequently, the analytical tool of CSP can be defined as a "foreign policy strategy aimed at reaching out to a variety of international actors in order to minimise potential disruptive behaviour" (Stahl 2015b, 8). It thereby follows a cooperative agenda with the objective of "solving concrete, common global challenges and diffusing European norms and good practices in a variety of policy areas" (Stahl 2015b, 8). Furthermore, the concept of CSP is closely related to the notion of comprehensive strategic relations that describe the broader international interaction between the EU and other international players in a variety of different policy fields. The CSP can be implemented at three different levels, through bilateralism, multilateralism and trilateralism.

2.4   EFP Instruments: EU Engagement

EU foreign policy instruments represent the second key element of the novel analytical framework. While the formulation of a foreign policy strategy represents an important step in the EU's foreign policymaking process, the EU needs to employ specific instruments for the implementation of a CSP. In view of establishing a CSP with its Chinese and African partners, the EU has a wide range of different policy instruments at its disposal. Policy instruments "commonly describe specific techniques, tools or methods used by policymakers to achieve certain policy objectives" (Stahl 2015b, 9). EU foreign policy instruments are therefore "specific foreign policy tools used by EU policymakers to implement the overall EU foreign policy strategy" (Stahl 2015b).

According to this analytical framework, the policy instruments necessary to implement a CSP are broadly referred to as tools of EU engagement. The meaning of engagement can be derived from the verb "engage", which expresses the action of getting involved or becoming interlocked. In IR literature, engagement describes a foreign policy instrument associated with a cooperative foreign policy strategy (Edelstein 2002; Lynch 2002; Paulson Jr. 2008; Resnick 2011; Shambaugh 1996). In addition to IR scholarship, the notion of engagement is also widely used in the European foreign policy literature (Vogt 2012; Youngs 2005; Grimm and Hackenesch 2012; Witzleb et al. 2015). EFP scholars generally associate engagement with the EU's foreign policy attempts at

forging partnerships with international actors (Casarini 2006; Fox and Godement 2009). On this basis, this framework suggests that EU engagement represents the overarching policy instrument for the achievement of the EU foreign policy strategy of CSP.

Within the broad category of EU engagement, a distinction between more specific types of policy instruments is usually made. EFP scholars refer to these in terms of "instrumental engagement" (Youngs 2005), "unconditional" or "reciprocal engagement" (Fox and Godement 2009). These different types of engagement embody alternative ways of reaching the EU's overall foreign policy goal of CSP. The selection of one type of policy instrument over another within the implementation of the broader strategy represents the essence of EU foreign policymaking. The analytical framework proposes a typology of two types of EU engagement: transformative EU engagement and reciprocal EU engagement. The two types of policy instrument provide EU policymakers with the choice between two possible ways for achieving the overall objective of a CSP. As outlined in Table 2.2, the two types of EU engagement are driven by different underlying assessments of how the EU can best build a CSP with its Chinese and African partners.

2.4.1 Transformative EU Engagement

Transformative engagement corresponds to an "EU foreign policy instrument aimed at building a CSP between the EU and its partners on the

Table 2.2 Two types of EU engagement

Typology of EU foreign policy instruments	
Transformative engagement	*Reciprocal engagement*
EU → Strategic partners (one-way process)	EU ←→ Strategic partners (two-way process)
• The EU pursues a set of predetermined interests and norms	• The EU is ready to change its initial interests and norms
• Unilateral adaptation of the strategic partners to the EU	• Mutual adaptation of both the EU and strategic partners
• The EU as "norm/policymaker" and strategic partner as "norm/policy-taker"	

Source: Compiled by the author

basis of norms and interests which are defined by the EU as international standards" (Stahl 2015b, 10). Through transformative engagement, EU policymakers try to modify the behaviour and interests of its partners and to make them more similar to the EU. The concept is closely related to the notion of the EU's "transformative power", developed by scholars such as Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (Börzel and Risse 2009; Grabbe 2006). According to the school of Europeanization, transformative power expresses the EU's ability to diffuse certain norms and procedures to other parts of the world and thereby change them. The idea of EU transformative power is therefore linked to the analytical model of "Normative Power Europe" (Manners 2002). EFP scholars of the Normative Power Europe school argue that unlike other international actors the EU possess the unique ability to export its own fundamental values of human rights, democracy and good governance to other regions or countries (Balducci 2010; Youngs 2001; Mattlin 2010). In this light, EU transformative engagement represents a process of unilateral policy adaptation or norm transfer initiated by the EU. The process is characterised by the fact the EU acts as the "norm-maker" and the strategic partners as the "norm-takers".

2.4.2   *Reciprocal EU Engagement*

Overall, reciprocity encompasses the idea of "equivalence" or "mutuality". In IR literature, reciprocity is defined as "exchanges of roughly equivalent values in which the actions of each party are contingent on the prior actions of the other" (Keohane 2009, 8). IR scholars have given different interpretations of reciprocal engagement depending on which of the strategic partners should be treated on equivalent or mutual grounds. Some have adopted an EU-centric understanding, defining reciprocity as a policy instrument which should allow the EU to be treated as a more equal partner by other international players and thereby contribute to a "new interest-based" EU foreign policy (Fox and Godement 2009, 52). In contrast to this, a second group of IR scholars has interpreted the notion of reciprocity in terms of a growing equality of emerging powers in relation to traditional Western players. According to this interpretation, reciprocity describes the formulation of new international rules, standards and objectives on the basis of "mutual adaptation efforts", by both "old" or "traditional" global players like the EU and "new stakeholders" (Stanzel 2008, 256). In this context, the concept of "reciprocal

socialisation" has been introduced, emphasising that socialisation cannot be perceived as a "one-way process" driven solely by Western players, but should be seen in terms of an interaction between equivalent players (Terhalle 2011). In line with this argument, scholars have highlighted that socialisation implies a "two-way process", in which current international norms are increasingly reshaped under the growing influence of emerging countries (Xiaoyun 2012).

In accordance with the second interpretation of reciprocity, the analytical framework defines reciprocal engagement as an EU foreign policy instrument directed at forming a CSP between the EU and strategic partners on the basis of common norms and interests. In contrast to transformative engagement, which is conceived as a one-way process driven exclusively by the EU, reciprocal engagement is characterised by a mutual adaptation of both the EU and strategic partners.

Table 2.2 shows that the analytical framework classifies EU foreign policy instruments of engagement into one of the two types of engagement: transformative EU engagement and reciprocal EU engagement. This typology consists of two ideal types of EU engagement. However, EU foreign policy instruments only rarely correspond to either one or the other of the two ideal types. Instead, EU foreign policy instruments tend rather to reflect a certain degree of reciprocal or transformative engagement. Traditionally, EU foreign policy takes the form of transformative engagement, while reciprocal engagement corresponds to a relatively novel EU foreign policy instrument.

2.5   RESPONSES TO EU ENGAGEMENT

Although the novel analytical framework presented in this chapter departs from the EU as the main subject of inquiry, it supports the current shift in IR towards a more pluralistic and less Western-dominated research approach. Traditionally IR scholarship has been rooted in a particular historical experience and environment and largely failed to include "non-Western" sources of knowledge (Waever 1998). Yet, in the context of the current transition towards a multipolar order, characterised by the emergence of a more diversified set of international actors, IR scholars have undertaken increasing efforts to reconsider the "I" in IR and to attribute more attention to non-Western scholarly work (Jones 2003; Waever and Tickner 2009). In particular scholars adopting a constructivist research agenda have argued that a deeper insight into the conceptual divide

between Western countries and emerging countries is needed in order "to develop a better understanding of the development of their relationship" (Geeraerts 2012, xii).

Taking into account the general trend of a more pluralistic IR research agenda, it has become evident that the study of EU foreign policy in an emerging multipolar world order needs to move away from an introspective and Eurocentric research approach to include a careful appraisal of the position of the strategic partners of the EU. The idiomatic expression "it takes two to tango" can serve as a good description of the need to take into account the perspectives of rising actors like China and Africa. Similarly to tango, EU foreign policy in an emerging multipolar world corresponds to a situation in which several partners are by definition understood to be essential. On the basis of the research strand on the EU's external perceptions (Torney 2013; Stumbaum 2012a; Shambaugh 2008; Ortega 2004; Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2010; Geeraerts and Gross 2011; Fioramonti 2012; Chaban et al. 2009; Chaban and Holland 2008; Bello 2010), EFP scholars have started acknowledging that the views and principles of the EU's strategic partners on international affairs differ from those promoted by the EU and that the differences need to be taken into account in the assessment of EU foreign policy (Gratius 2011b; Bello 2010). Consequently, recent empirical research has focused more on the interrelationship between the EU and its external partners, putting particular emphasis on the response of the EU's partners (Allison 2015; Bello and Gebrewold 2010; Torney 2015).

This analytical framework follows the recent trend in EFP research and provides more attention to the perceptions and policy positions adopted by the strategic partners in response to the EU's foreign policy strategy and instruments. As the EU foreign policy strategy is aimed at the formation of a CSP, it cannot be assessed on the exclusive basis of the viewpoint of the EU. Chapter 6 is therefore exclusively dedicated to the study of the policy responses of China and Africa.

The responses of EU's strategic partners are examined on the basis of two broad IR theoretical schools: rationalism and reflectivism. In the field of IR, rationalism refers "to formal and informal applications of rational choice theory to IR questions, to any work drawing on the traditional of microeconomic theory (. . .), or most broadly to any 'positivist' exercise in explaining foreign policy by reference to goal-seeking behaviour" (Fearon and Wendt 2002, 54). In general, rational IR theory is concerned with material preferences or interests and assumes that states adopt a

goal-seeking behaviour. Unlike rationalism, reflectivist theorists adopt a so-called post-positivist epistemological approach. They reject the idea that social sciences can adopt the empiricist observational strategy of the natural sciences and emphasise the importance of intersubjectivity of international relations (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 764). In the context of the school of reflectivism, constructivism emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s as an alternative movement to conventional rationalist IR theories by paying more attention to ideational or socially constructed facts (Searle 1995; Wendt 1999).

The analytical framework presented in this chapter contributes to efforts to building bridges between the rationalist and constructivist IR research agenda (Fearon and Wendt 2002, 53; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 888; Zürn and Checkel 2005). Experts have highlighted that "the nature of the interaction between international agents is not the result merely of (. . .) objective, material aspects as the balance of trade and the make-up of domestic institutions (. . .); (it is) also shaped significantly by subjective factors such as the concepts and beliefs that make the agents involved interpret events and data in specific ways" (Geeraerts 2012, xi). This analytical framework therefore relies on both theoretical approaches as two complementary accounts of current power shifts.

In view of combining rationalism and constructivism, the analytical framework examines two specific elements, characterising the responses of the EU's strategic partners: the domestic institutions and material interests, as well as the norms and values. According to rationalist IR theories, interests are closely linked to the economic concept of utility calculation and based on the consideration of foreign policy as a goal-seeking process (Fearon and Wendt 2002, 54). In addition to interests, constructivist scholars have highlighted the importance of norms as "a standard of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 891).

On the basis of the analytical framework exposed here, Chapter 6 will adopt both a rationalist and a constructivist point of view to explain China's and Africa's policy responses to EU engagement. One on hand, it examines the different domestic institutions and interests that are driving Chinese and African foreign policy towards the EU. This will show that China and Africa are not monolithic blocs. Instead, a variety of different actors with different priorities are shaping the Chinese and African policy responses to EU engagement. On the other hand, Chapter 6 follows a constructive perspective with the aim of going beyond observable material facts. Consequently,

it pays attention to how certain norms and values have influenced the Chinese and African approach to EU engagement and thereby reveals how China's and Africa's identity is shaping their foreign policy.

2.6   SUMMARY OF THE ANALYTICAL TOOLBOX

In sum, this chapter has introduced a novel analytical toolbox to conceptualise EU foreign policy in a changing global context. It started by providing a broad definition of multifaceted and multilevel EU foreign policy. Later, it introduced the three main components of the framework: EU foreign policy strategy, EU foreign policy instruments and the response by the EU's partners. According to the framework, the EU's foreign policy strategy is aimed at establishing a CSP. The implementation of the CSP is based on the choice between two different foreign policy instruments. They correspond to two different types of EU engagement: transformative and reciprocal engagement. Alongside the EU foreign policy strategy and instruments, the responses of the EU's strategic partners correspond to the third element of the framework.

The novel analytical framework analytical framework will guide the empirical evidence exposed in the subsequent chapters of this book. The three elements of the analytical framework will structure the analysis for the three case studies, exposed in Chapters 3–5. In particular, Chapters 3–5 will be guided by the concept of EU engagement. Subsequently, Chapter 6 will explore the response by China and Africa to EU engagement.

The Bilateral EU-China Dialogue on Africa

In response to China's growing expansion into Africa, the EU adopted a foreign policy strategy aimed at the formation of a CSP with China and Africa. In this context, EU policymakers in the mid-2000s started to initiate a specific EU-China dialogue on Africa. The EU-China bilateral institutional framework[33] – commonly referred to as the EU-China Strategic Partnership[34] – was identified as the most adequate setting for establishing such a dialogue on Africa. This chapter examines the EU's bilateral engagement with China on Africa and the process of the formation of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa.

This chapter is structured around four main sections. The first section provides an overview of the formation and overall architecture of the bilateral EU-China Strategic Partnership. It is followed by a section situating the EU-China dialogue on Africa within the broader institutional framework of the bilateral EU-China relationship. Against this background, the third section examines the EU's bilateral engagement with China on Africa, focusing specifically on the policy instruments employed by the EU in the process of the formulation of the bilateral EU-China dialogue. This allows for drawing conclusions on the type of bilateral EU engagement with China on Africa that are outlined in the last section.

3.1   THE BILATERAL EU-CHINA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

The analytical framework formulated in Chapter 2 defines bilateralism as the relationship between two international players. In the case of the EU, bilateralism therefore refers to the institutional framework of diplomatic relations between the EU and a third country or regional organisation.

The year 2015 marked the 40th anniversary of the establishment of bilateral cooperation between the EU and China. The EU-China bilateral relationship emerged in the 1970s and has witnessed significant changes over the past years. Overall, bilateral relations between the EU and China have moved from a predominantly economy-oriented relationship to a growing and complex form of political cooperation (Casarini 2006, 25). This shift was symbolised by the proclamation of the EU-China Strategic Partnership in 2003 (Council of the EU 2003). By branding its structured bilateral relationship with China as a so-called strategic partnership, the EU has expressed its ambitions to foster cooperation in a variety of different policy fields (Council of the EU 2003). Similarly, the Chinese leadership has also been keen in expanding the scope of its bilateral relationship with the EU beyond purely economic and trade-oriented exchanges (Chinese State Council 2003; Chinese State Council 2014a). To emphasise the fact that China's bilateral relations with the EU cover a wide range of areas, Chinese officials generally use the adjective "comprehensive" to qualify the EU-China Strategic Partnership (Interviews 11Bc, 20Cc, 52Ce). In November 2013, the EU and China adopted the "EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation". This joint policy document reflects the EU's and China's intention to cooperate on a variety of different topics. More specifically, it sketches out EU-China relations until 2020 in four main areas: peace, prosperity, sustainable development and people-to-people exchanges (Council of the EU 2013).

Figure 3.1 shows that the EU-China Strategic Partnership is structured around three main pillars: the High-Level Strategic Dialogue/Political Dialogue and the High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue/Economic and Sectoral dialogue, the High-Level People-to-People Dialogue. These three pillars feed into the annual EU-China summit, which is held at the level of the heads of state or government and serves as an overarching platform. The first EU-China bilateral summit was held in London in 1998 and is alternatively organised in Europe and China. Since 2009, the EU has been represented at the EU-China summit by the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission, assisted by the European High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy.[35]

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                         EU-China summit                              │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
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Pillar I Political dialogue	Pillar II Economic and sectoral dialogue	Pillar III People-to-people dialogue
High-level strategic dialogue	High-level economic and trade dialogue	High-level people-to people dialogue

Security and defence dialogue	Human rights dialogue	Dialogue on customs cooperation	Dialogue on competition policy	Policy dialogue on higher education and vocational training	Policy dialogue on cultural affairs
Political dialogue on Africa	Political dialogue on Asia	Dialogue on energy	Dialogue on environment	Policy dialogue on youth	
Political dialogue on Latin America	Non-proliferation and disarmament dialogue	*Dialogue on development*	Dialogue on regional policy		
Cyber security task force		Dialogue on space technology cooperation	Dialogue on health		
		Urbanisation partnership	Innovation cooperation dialogue		

Fig. 3.1   Architecture of the bilateral EU-China Strategic Partnership

Source: Compiled by the author based on information available on the EEAS website
Note: There are more than 50 sectoral dialogues. The figure is not exhaustive, as the scope and number of dialogues are subject to continuous change

Initially, the EU-China Strategic Partnership was based on only two pillars: the Political Dialogue and the Economic and Sectoral Dialogue (Algieri 2008; Stumbaum 2009, 100). The People-to-People Dialogue was only introduced in 2012 as the third pillar.

The EU-China Political Dialogue was formally established in 1994 with the objective to allow European and Chinese representatives to express common positions related to broader international events, as well as specific issues of concern (Devuyst and Men 2012, 184). The Political Dialogue was therefore conceived as a mechanism for fostering mutual understanding through regular exchanges at various levels. At the eighth EU-China summit in 2005, the EU and China agreed to launch a specific mechanism to discuss international and regional issues of strategic importance, referred to as the Strategic Dialogue (Council of the EU 2005c). The first EU-China Strategic Dialogue was held on the 20th of December 2005 in London. With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2010, the EU-China Strategic Dialogue[36] was upgraded to a High-Level Strategic Dialogue, which has become the key element of the EU-China Political Dialogue. The High-Level Strategic Dialogue takes the form of an annual meeting between the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Chinese counterpart in the State Council, the Chinese State Councillor for Foreign Affairs. The first EU-China High-Level Strategic Dialogue took place in China in September 2010. In addition to the High-Level Strategic Dialogue, other regular exchanges between European and Chinese policymakers take place in the framework of the EU-China Political Dialogue, such as dialogues between EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Chinese Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence. Additionally, biannual meetings are organised in Beijing between the EU Ambassador/head of the EU delegation in Beijing and the Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister, as well as between the EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy and the Ambassador of China to the European Union. Moreover, lower ranking meetings between EU and Chinese counterparts at the level of political directors and geographic directors in charge of the Asia Pacific region are regularly held (Stumbaum 2009, 102). Finally, the EU-China Political Dialogue is also characterised by regular expert-level meetings on specific topics such as non-proliferation, migration or cyber security.

Alongside the EU-China Political Dialogue, the institutional framework for EU-China bilateral cooperation also includes an Economic and Sectoral Dialogue. This second pillar provides a forum to discuss

economic and trade matters, as well as a number of specific issues addressed through so-called sectoral dialogues. In recent years the dialogue has been upgraded to a High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue, reflecting the growing economic interdependence between the EU and China and the need to find joint responses to global economic challenges. At the High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue held in Beijing in September 2015, China announced its commitment to contribute to the Investment Plan for Europe, as well as to join the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). At the same time, the EU affirmed its support for China's initiative of establishing the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Alongside the High-Level Economic and Trade Dialogue a large variety of sectoral dialogues have emerged over the past years. These dialogues were initiated in order to address sector-specific topics and reflect the growing diversification of the bilateral EU-China relationship (Algieri 2008, 72). Today, sectoral dialogues covering more than different 50 areas exist within the broader bilateral EU-China Strategic Partnership (Interviews 11Bc, 52Ce, 58Ce, 61Be). The structure of the sectoral dialogues is rather flexible and there is no clear institutional hierarchy for the different sectoral dialogues. Due to constant structural changes it is difficult to provide a complete list of all EU-China sectoral dialogues (Interviews 14Be, 52Ce, 61Be). Furthermore, the relationship between the different sectoral dialogues and the two pillars of the EU-China Strategic Partnership remains rather ambiguous. While most sectoral dialogues were placed within the second pillar, some sectoral dialogues were established in the context of the EU-China political dialogue. The lack of a clear institutional hierarchy of the sectoral dialogues can be explained by disagreements between European and Chinese officials concerning the political relevance of each sectoral dialogue. The EU-China human rights dialogue, which has been held twice a year since 1998, is a good example of diverging Sino-European political priorities. While EU policymakers consider the human rights dialogue as one of the most important sectoral dialogues and have therefore placed it under the second pillar of the bilateral EU-China Strategic Partnership, Chinese authorities have attributed less significance to it and insist in its strict separation from general EU-China political relations (Devuyst and Men 2012) (Interviews 11Bc, 52Ce 99Cc).

Traditionally, the Council of the EU and the Commission have played a central role in the implementation of the bilateral EU-China Strategic Partnership. While the Council has taken the lead in setting the agenda

and organising the EU-China summits, the Commission has contributed to the bilateral EU-China political dialogue at the level of the expert meetings and sectoral dialogues. Apart from the Council and the Commission, the European Parliament is also involved in the EU-China Strategic Partnership (Algieri 2008, 66). Since the 1980s, the European Parliament has participated in regular inter-parliamentarian meetings with China's National People's Congress (NPC) (Stumbaum 2009, 102). Alongside the MEP's delegation for relations with China, MEPs of the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development have also regularly engaged in dialogue with China, for instance through the publication of specific reports and resolutions (Interviews 22Bc, 76Be).

Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the EEAS has also become a key actor in the bilateral EU-China Strategic Partnership (Bátora and Spence 2015) (Interviews 22Bc, 43 Be, 52Ce). Recently, it has taken the lead in the formulation of the new EU strategy on China (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016a).

Overall, the growing institutionalisation of bilateral EU-China relations is a sign of the EU's recognition of China's economic development and increased international influence, which requires more intensive Sino-European cooperation on common global challenges (Stanzel 2008). However, the expansion of the EU-China Strategic Partnership also bears the risk of overstretching the EU's institutional architecture. Some experts have therefore cautioned that the EU-China bilateral relationship should put less emphasis on the quantity of Sino-European interaction and rather focus on the quality of these exchanges (Algieri 2008) (Interview 23Oe, 50Cc).

3.2   SITUATING THE EU-CHINA DIALOGUE ON AFRICA

Following the overview of the core features of the EU-China Strategic Partnership, this section situates the EU-China dialogue on Africa within the broader institutional architecture of bilateral EU-China relations. There is a certain vagueness characterising the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa. Different EU policy documents can serve as an indicator for the unclear nature of the dialogue. While early policy documents on the EU-China Strategic Partnership published by the Commission[37] did not mention the dialogue on Africa at all, other Commission sources from 2007 listed the EU-China dialogue on Africa as a specific sectoral dialogue

within the second pillar, the Economic and Sectoral Dialogue (Stumbaum 2009, 101). By contrast, the most recent organisation chart of the EU-China Strategic Partnership released by the EEAS in 2015 places the EU-China dialogue on Africa within the first pillar, the High-Level Strategic Dialogue/Political Dialogue (see Figure 3.1).

The ambiguity characterising the EU-China dialogue on Africa stems from the fact that unlike other sectoral dialogues addressing more technical issues, the EU-China dialogue on Africa is considered a politically sensitive topic by European officials, and in particular, by Chinese policymakers. Moreover, the difficulty of attributing the EU-China dialogue on Africa to one of the pillars of the EU-China Strategic Partnership can also be explained by the lack of a clearly defined policy agenda (Interviews 11Bc, 14Be, 95Be). In fact, a great deal of confusion remains regarding the precise content of the EU-China Africa dialogue. A key question is whether the dialogue should serve as a forum to discuss broader political and security related challenges in Africa or whether it should be targeted at Africa's economic development. While some EU policy documents refer to a general "dialogue on Africa" (Council of the EU 2006b, 4), others specifically mention a "structured dialogue on Africa's peace, stability and sustainable development" (European Commission 2006a, 6).

Originally, the EU-China dialogue on Africa mainly served as a forum to discuss Africa's economic development. Scholars have highlighted that whereas in the past the EU-China Strategic Partnership has been mostly targeted towards China's domestic development, European and Chinese policymakers have recently started to engage in talks on international development cooperation (Köppinger 2006). In this context, the EU-China dialogue on Africa emerged within the second pillar of the EU-China institutional framework. Despite the original emphasis on development by the EU-China dialogue on Africa, European and Chinese representatives have increasingly used the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa to addresses broader diplomatic and security issues related to Africa. Moreover, Sino-European exchanges on international development cooperation have moved away from a sole focus on Africa to include other geographical regions such as Asia and Latin America (Castillejo 2013). This has led to the establishment of a separate EU-China dialogue on development[38] within the second pillar, as outlined in Figure 3.1.

In fact, the practice of specific development dialogues between the EU and its external partners is not new. The EU holds a development dialogue with countries like the USA, Canada or Japan (Gaus and Hoxtell 2013)

(Interviews 14Be, 95Be). These countries act – similarly to the EU – as so-called traditional donors and are therefore considered "like-minded" development partners. Since recently, EU policymakers also started to exchange with so-called emerging donors on international development issues (Castillejo 2013). Along with China, EU policymakers have integrated provisions for joint development activities in its bilateral Strategic Partnerships with other emerging countries like Brazil, South Africa and India (Grimm and Hackenesch 2012, 216).

In sum, the ambiguity surrounding the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa can be explained by the changing nature of its policy agenda. Due to the expansion of the content of the EU-China dialogue on Africa from development issues to broader political and security-related discussions, the dialogue has moved from the second pillar to the first pillar of the EU-China Strategic Partnership.

3.3   BILATERAL EU ENGAGEMENT WITH CHINA ON AFRICA

This section examines in more detail the process leading to the establishment of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa. Several EU actors have been involved in the formulation of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa, namely the European Commission, the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. Using the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2, this section studies the role played by the three EU institutions in order to identify the EU's choice of foreign policy instrument, namely transformative EU engagement or reciprocal EU engagement.

The European Commission largely acted as an agenda setter regarding the bilateral EU engagement with China on Africa (Interviews 3Oe, 14Be, 22Be; 54Be). Within the Commission, several DGs have traditionally been involved in the formulation of EU foreign policy towards China, including the DG RELEX, the DG DEV, Directorate-General for Trade (DG TRADE), Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and the EuropeAid Cooperation Office (AIDCO). The formulation of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa was primarily driven by the DG RELEX as it was assigned the lead for the bilateral EU-China Strategic Partnership in general and for the bilateral EU-China Political Dialogue in particular (Interviews 54Be, 95Be). Yet, the idea of a bilateral EU-China dialogue specifically on Africa was not welcomed by all officials within DG RELEX. Although DG RELEX officers were "naturally" in favour of a cooperative approach with China, some officers were concerned that adding another

topic to the bilateral EU-China agenda – especially such a sensitive one like Africa – would harm the overall bilateral EU-China Political Dialogue (Carbone 2011, 212) (Interviews 14Be, 22Be). In addition to the Commission's DG RELEX, DG DEV also contributed to the formation of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa (Interviews 91Be, 95Be, 99Be). The contribution of DG DEV was justified by its particular expertise on development issues in general and Africa in particular. Although at first DG DEV officials were suspicious about China's intentions in Africa and saw China rather as a competitor of the EU than as a possible partner, they changed their opinion and started seeing the bilateral dialogue as an opportunity to influence Chinese practices in Africa and make them converge more with European development standards, such as good governance (Interviews 14Be, 22Be, 43Be, 54 Be).

On the basis of joint efforts by DG RELEX and DG DEV, initial informal bilateral talks between Commission and Chinese officials in charge of Africa were held in 2005 (Berger and Wissenbach 2007, 4; Xu 2011). Subsequent to these preliminary contacts, in 2006 the Commission published the communication entitled "EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities", which laid down the foundations for the structured bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa and underlined the Commission's intentions to explore "opportunities for practical bilateral cooperation on the ground" in African countries (European Commission 2006a, 6). This policy document clearly shows that the Commission chose the policy instrument of transformative EU engagement as the foundation for the formulation of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa. The 2006 Commission communication on EU-China relations puts particular emphasis on the need for closer EU-China cooperation in Africa in the area of development cooperation. Yet, instead of being open to the development practices of China, the Commission takes existing international standards as the main benchmark for such Sino-European cooperation on African development. In this context, the Commission stresses the need for "China's integration into international efforts to improve aid efficiency" (European Commission 2006a, 6). As will be further outlined in Chapter 4, the notion of aid efficiency refers to certain international development standards formulated by the OECD's DAC and outlined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. The second empirical case study will show that whereas the EU has been a strong supporter of the multilateral development framework of aid effectiveness, China has been rather reluctant to apply the OECD DAC principles of aid effectiveness to

its development cooperation with Africa. Hence, the Commission has tried to convince China to adhere to European donor principles by stressing their legitimacy as internationally recognised standards. Moreover, the communication underlines the importance of Sino-European "support regional efforts to improve governance in Africa" (European Commission 2006a, 6). This could be seen as an attempt at promoting the EU's normative agenda of democracy, human rights and good governance. In addition to the area of aid, the communication proposes closer Sino-Europe exchanges on African peace and security challenges. According to the Commission, this new type of collaboration should be in line with multilateral standards and in particular those set out by non-proliferation agreements.

Following the publication of the Commission's EU-China communication, 2007 represented a culmination of European efforts at bilateral engagement with China on Africa. During this year several official visits by high-ranking EU representatives to China were specifically organised with the objective of fostering the bilateral policy exchanges on Africa. In January 2007, the Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, travelled to Beijing to meet with high-ranking Chinese government representatives. In her exchange with China's Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing she specifically addressed the Commission's desire to strengthen the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa (European Commission 2007d).

As the Commission's exchanges with China have been traditionally based on development cooperation, this policy area has served as an entry point for talks with China on Africa. A content analysis of the official European policy documents on the EU's development cooperation with China (so-called Country Strategy Papers and the Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes) reveals that the Commission has relied on the policy instrument of transformative engagement. The EU's China Strategy Paper for the period 2007–2013 draws attention to China's increasing development cooperation with Africa and makes particular reference to the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa. The document lists joint Sino-European development activities and China's integration into international efforts to foster aid coordination as one of the main objectives of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa (European Commission 2007b, 3). However, the document neither mentions how this objective should be reached nor proposes particular projects. The lack of proposals of EU-China development projects in Africa is also reflected in the Multi-Annual Indicative Programme for China for 2007–2010. The document only highlights the

fact that EU member states and national development agencies remain confused on how to deal with China's growing aid programmes in Africa (European Commission 2007a, 15). As a follow-up to the 2007–2012 China Strategy Paper, a mid-term Review National Indicative Programme was published for the period 2011–2013. The document stresses China's dual role as developing country and growing international player and stresses in particular China's role as an emerging donor in Africa (European Commission 2007a). Bearing in mind that the Chinese authorities are generally associated in the drafting of the Country Strategy Papers and the Multi-Annual Indicative Programmes, it seems that the EU has used the drafting process to convince Chinese policymakers that they should apply the same development standards used by the EU in its bilateral development cooperation with China to China's aid activities in Africa. However, as the EU has largely terminated its bilateral development assistance to China over the past years, it could no longer serve as the Commission's policy instrument of transformative engagement.

Alongside the Commission, the Council has also played a role in the EU's bilateral engagement with China on Africa. Due to the fact that most EU member states either did not pay any attention to the growing geopolitical role of China in Africa or could not agree on the appropriate foreign policy response to adopt (Carbone 2011), the Council of the EU and the High Representative for CFSP/Secretary General of the Council initially only played a minor role in the formulation of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa (Interviews 47Be, 91Be). The Council's limited involvement can be explained by the particular institutional structure of this European institution, which acts as collective forum for individual European member states (Vanhoonacker 2005). Due to the fact that single EU member states only attributed a low priority to China's increasing influence in Africa, they did not put the topic on the Council's policy agenda. Similar to the Council, the High Representative for CFSP did not at first identify China's outreach to Africa as an EU foreign policy priority (Interview 3Oe, 91Be). Javier Solana's lack of concern for China's growing involvement in Africa is particularly surprising considering that the Council General Secretariat which assisted him in his work was composed of regional experts for China and Africa (located in DG E and in the Policy Unit). However, compared to the number of staff of the Commission, the Council Secretariat was much smaller, which explains why most of the expertise on China and Africa issues was primarily located within the Commission (namely, in DG RELEX and DG DEV).

Over time however, the Council and the High Representative for CFSP gradually realised the importance of Chinese activities in Africa and started collaborating with the Commission in the formulation of a broader EU foreign policy strategy of CSP with China and Africa. Within the Council, it was mostly the Asia Working Group (COASI) that supported the establishment of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa (Interviews 47Be, 69Be, 79Be).

The shift in the Council's approach was largely driven by the growing interest of single EU member states in the topic of increasing Sino-African cooperation. According to experts, the organisation of the third ministerial conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in November 2006 in Beijing presented a "wake-up call" for many European states, making them aware of the new reality of China's growing presence in Africa (Tywuschik 2007).

France, Germany and the UK were the first among the EU member states to start identifying China's outreach to Africa as a new foreign policy priority. As former colonial powers, with close political and economic links to the African continent, France and the UK were increasingly confronted with the presence of China as a new actor in Africa. Moreover, Germany – an important donor and trading partner of Africa – also started becoming aware of China's growing economic, energy-related and political interests in Africa. Hence, around 2006 French, German and British decision-makers began reaching out to China by establishing ad hoc exchanges with Chinese policymakers, academics and think tanks on Africa (Interviews 20Ce, 27Cc, 49Cc, 60Ce, 78Oe). Following these early informal contacts, more formalised political dialogues emerged. Today both France and the UK hold a formal political dialogue with China on Africa (Castillejo 2013; Grimm and Hackenesch 2012). These bilateral dialogues provide the opportunity for "Africa" officers from the French and British foreign affairs ministry to exchange with Chinese counterparts. Alike to France and the UK, Germany has also established a bilateral forum for discussing African issues with Chinese policymakers. Yet, unlike the French and the British dialogue, the Sino-German bilateral dialogue is not specifically targeted at the political situation in Africa, but is rather centred on broader development issues (Interviews 4Ce, 6Ce, 78Oe). In parallel to their own bilateral policy dialogues with China, the "big three" EU member states started supporting common European foreign policy strategy. It is against this growing awareness by EU member states that the Council and the High Representative for CFSP began contributing to the Commission's initiative of a bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa.

Following the policy agenda of the three big EU member states, the Council primarily chose the policy instrument of transformative engagement with China on Africa. The declaration of the ninth EU-China Summit, held in September 2006, can serve as an example for the Council's use of transformative engagement. The 2006 summit declaration was the first time Africa was mentioned in a joint EU-China policy document (Carbone 2011; Huliaras and Magliveras 2008). Despite being jointly adopted by Chinese and European policymakers, the declaration was largely based on a draft by the Council. This explains why the final summit outcome document put particular emphasis on the fact that the EU-China dialogue on Africa should respect European norms, such as the principles of good governance and human rights (Council of the EU 2006b).

The ninth EU-China summit can serve as an initial sign of growing commitment by EU member states and the Council to the formation of a bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa. It was however only at the meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council in December 2006 that the Council expressed its official support for the establishment of structured bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa, proposed by the Commission a few months early in the communication "EU-China: Closer partners, growing responsibilities" (European Commission 2006a, 6). The GAERC conclusions can serve as another example for the Council's preference for the foreign policy mechanism of transformative engagement. Whereas the policy document outlines the Council's intention of "increased cooperation together with China to create new positive realities on the ground (in Africa)", it highlights that according to the Council cooperation with China should be driven by "the common interest and Africa's own commitment to poverty reduction and sustainable development underpinned by peace and security, human rights, good governance, democracy and sound economic management" (General Affairs and External Relations Council 2006). The policy document therefore illustrates the Council's objective of fostering the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa on the basis of the EU's core values of human rights, good governance and democracy.

In support of the work of the Council, the High Representative for CFSP also started contributing to the formation of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa. In order to convince Chinese policymakers to enter into bilateral talks with the EU on Africa, Javier Solana published – in February 2007 – an article in one of the main Chinese newspapers. In his article, the High Representative for CFSP underlined the benefits of the

bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa. In line with the 2006 Commission communication on EU-China relations, the article by Javier Solana focused on China's role as provider of aid to African countries and expressed the EU's aim to support the "effective integration of China into the international donor community", as well to work together with Chinese policymakers in line with international donors standards outlined by the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)[39] and the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness – adopted by the OECD's DAC (Solana 2007). Hence, Javier Solana's article sent a clear a message to the Chinese leadership, stating that Beijing should commit to the development norms and principles formulated by international organisations such as the UN and the OECD DAC.

In addition to the policy area of development aid, the High Representative for CFSP placed particular emphasis on the policy field of peace and security. The proposal of a bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa's peace and stability was also expressed in the 2007 Council conclusions on "a EU response to situations of fragility" (General Affairs and External Relations Council 2007), which argued for the inclusion of issues concerning fragility into the EU's bilateral dialogues with emerging donors. Moreover, the Council has relied on the mechanism of the EU-China High-Level Strategic Dialogue to address security related issues in Africa with high-level Chinese policymakers. Finally, the Council's particular interests in fostering a bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa's peace and security was reflected in the decision to task the Joint Situation Centre to issue a specific report devoted to the topic of "ESDP on Africa: Chinese presence in Africa", which was published in 2007 (Interview 47Be). The Council's emphasis on issues of peace and security contrasted with the initial agenda of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa proposed by the Commission. In fact, the Commission's communication from 2006 only attributed marginal attention to cooperation with China in the area of peacekeeping in Africa (European Commission 2006a, 11). This lack of attention by the Commission to security issues can be explained by the fact that the Commission has no competences in the field of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), which represents the EU's main tool for peacekeeping and conflict resolution in Africa (Interviews 47Be, 90Be).

Both the declarations of the 10th EU-China summit held in November 2007 (Council of the EU 2007c) and the 12th EU-China summit held in November 2009 (Council of the EU 2009b) further confirm the Council's choice for transformative engagement with China on Africa.

The declaration of the 12th EU-China summit highlighted the importance of international standards and in particular the MDGs. Moreover, the 2009 summit document put particular emphasis on joint Sino-European efforts of to support "Africa's sustainable development and early economic recovery" (Council of the EU 2009b). On this basis, the 16th EU-China Summit in November 2013 adopted the EU-China 2020 Agenda for Cooperation, which calls for strengthening consultations between the EU and China on Africa (Council of the EU 2013).

Finally, next to the Commission and the Council, the European Parliament was also involved in the formation of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa. The participation of the European Parliament in the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa can be explained against its overall involvement in the bilateral EU-China Strategic Partnership and its particular contribution to the EU's cooperation with Africa. In fact, the European Parliament – through the instrument of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly – is shaping the EU's political relations with Africa to a considerable extent. It is therefore not surprising that in the context of its regular exchanges with Africa policymakers the European Parliament was confronted with China's increasing relations with the African continent. Hence, around the same time as the Commission, MEPs started identifying China's presence in Africa as a key European foreign policy issue.

Overall, the European Parliament largely agreed with the cooperative foreign policy strategy proposed by the European Commission. However, unlike many Commission officials, most MEPs perceived China only in terms of a competitor that was undermining European efforts of fostering human rights, democracy and good governance in Africa (Interview 76Be). Against the lack of EU foreign policy instruments that could effectively contain China's negative influence in Africa, the European Parliament followed the Commission and the Council in the adoption of the foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement. In fact, most MEPs supported the bilateral EU-China on Africa because they saw it as the only viable possibility to make Chinese policymakers commit to European development norms and standards.

In 2006, the Foreign Affairs Committee adopted a resolution on EU-China relations, in which the European Parliament, for the first time, took note of the increasing Chinese influence in Africa and urged "the Chinese leadership to uphold China's responsibilities as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and to promote good governance,

democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and conflict prevention in its relations with African states" (European Parliament 2006). The resolution can serve as a clear indication for the European Parliament's preference for the foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement. However, it was through the adoption of the specific resolution on "China's policy and its effects on Africa" in April 2008 that the European Parliament contributed to the developing EU-China dialogue on Africa (European Parliament 2008c). The 2008 resolution was the outcome of a yearlong process which was initiated by the publication of a report on "China's policy and its effects on Africa" by the Development Committee in March 2007 (European Parliament 2007). The Portuguese MEP Ana Gomes was chosen as rapporteur for the report. In February 2008, both International Trade Committee and the Foreign Affairs Committee adopted an opinion related to the draft report proposed by the Development Committee (European Parliament 2008a; European Parliament 2008b). On the basis of the report of the Development Committee and the opinions of the other two Committees, a specific resolution on "China's policy and its effects on Africa" was adopted in the plenary session of the European Parliament on the 23rd of April 2008 (European Parliament 2008c). In contrast to the initial policy document proposed by the Development Committee, the final resolution adopted by the European Parliament – which corresponded to a consensus of the views the Development, the International Trade and the Foreign Affairs Committees – provided a more negative assessment of China's Africa policy. According to the interpretation of several scholars, the key message of the European Parliament's resolution was that the dangers of China's Africa policy – in particular regarding human rights, democracy and good governance – are outweighing its potential advantages (Austermann 2012b; Carbone 2011; Liu 2011). Thus, the resolution largely reflects the European Parliament's choice for the foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement.

The European Parliament's preference for transformative rather than reciprocal engagement has to be seen against its overall relationship with China. As the only European institution with a democratic mandate, the European Parliament is faced with a dilemma when engaging with China, which is characterised as an undemocratic regime. From the perceptive of most MEPs, the EU's bilateral Strategic Partnership with China should serve the sole purpose of inducing Chinese policymakers to European democracy and human rights standards.

3.4   ASSESSING BILATERAL EU FOREIGN POLICY

This chapter has demonstrated that the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa emerged against the background of a broader EU foreign policy strategy aimed at forming a CSP with China and Africa. In the process leading to the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa, the EU has opted for transformative engagement as the primary foreign policy instrument. The choice by the EU for purely transformative engagement, rather than a reciprocal engagement with China, shows that EU policymakers originally conceived the bilateral dialogue with China on Africa as a unilateral process aimed at the adaptation of China's Africa policy. Thus, for the EU the primary objective of the structured dialogue was to demonstrate to its Chinese counterparts the benefits of the EU's development approach in Africa, as well as to familiarise Chinese policymakers with supposed international aid standards.

Since 2009 there have been growing signs for the limitations of the EU's choice for transformative bilateral engagement with China, characterised by growing resistance from Chinese policymakers to comply with European demands (Chinese Government 2011; Council of the EU 2012). The outbreak of the financial crisis, which later contributed to the Euro crisis and a major economic downturn in Europe, can serve as an explanation for China's growing political leverage in the EU-China Strategic Partnership (Interviews 26Be, 66Be).[40]

Three EU institutions have been involved in the establishment of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa. Initially, the EU-China dialogue on Africa was based on an initiative by EU policymakers from the European Commission. Subsequently, the dialogue received backing by the Council and partial support from the European Parliament. Despite the general observance of a transformative type of bilateral EU engagement with China on Africa, there has been some divergence in the approaches adopted by the three EU institutions towards China. Whereas the Commission has been more open to Chinese demands, the European Parliament adopted a very strict stance and positioned itself as the guarantor of European norms and values. This created some tensions between the two institutions. In particular, the European Parliament's strict adherence to a normative European agenda was not well received by the Commission officials, who saw in the European Parliament's firm stance on human rights and good governance a potential obstacle for establishing the bilateral dialogue with China on Africa (Interviews 87Be, 95Be). In contrast, the Council embraced an intermediate

position: it initially defended a rather one-sided EU policy position but in the course of the discussions became more conciliatory regarding the Chinese positions. Thus, the bilateral EU engagement with China on Africa has suffered from institutional inconsistency, leading to misunderstandings with the Chinese partners and creating difficulties in the formulation of a specific policy agenda for the new dialogue on Africa (Interview 11Bc).

The Multilateral EU-China Dialogue on Africa within the OECD

Following the establishment of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa, the EU also reached out to China at the multilateral level. According to the analytical framework guiding this book, multilateralism is understood as an institutional form of exchange between at least three international actors on the basis of common norms or principles of conduct. The EU is involved in various international organisations that seek to establish a multilateral system based on global rules (Jorgensen and Laatikainen 2013). EU policymakers have identified the Organisation for Economic Development and Cooperation and its Development Assistance Committee as the most promising forum for engaging in a multilateral dialogue with China on Africa.

The EU's choice for the OECD might seem surprising at first sight. Despite the fact that the OECD celebrated in 2011 its 50th anniversary, it remains a rather inconspicuous international organisation. In comparison to other multilateral organisations like the UN, the WTO or the World Bank, the OECD has attracted little consideration by the international community. This is however starting to change. While the OECD's 50th anniversary has moved the organisation to the centre of attention, it is mostly its unprecedented reform, characterised by an outreach to emerging countries, which has led to a growing scholarly interest in the organisation (Carroll and Kellow 2011; Clifton and Diaz-Fuentes 2011a; Clifton and Diez-Fuentes 2011c; Mahbubani 2012; Mahon and McBride 2008; Woodward 2011).

The OECD was set up in the post-war context and shaped by Cold War dynamics. Since its establishment in 1961, the OECD's membership has grown from 20 [41] to 34 member states.[42] The OECD represents a unique international body and differs from other multilateral organisations for two main reasons. First, the OECD lacks a universal membership. Unlike UN institutions, the OECD is mostly composed of Western countries and largely lacks members from the global South. Out of the 34 OECD members, only 2 (Mexico and Chile) belong to the global "South" (Mahon and McBride 2008). Most OECD members are industrialised countries from Europe or Northern America. The restricted OECD membership reflects the historical origins of the organisation. As a successor of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the OECD was the result of efforts by the USA to promote economic recovery and political integration in Western Europe. Second, unlike other international organisations, the OECD operates through a consensus-building process. The OECD possesses "only modest legal or financial instruments with which it can enforce or implement policies in its member states" (Martens and Jakobi 2010a, 2). For this reason it mostly relies on a system of mutual assessment, based on non-binding soft law (Carroll and Kellow 2011; Paulo and Reisen 2010) or soft governance tools (Clifton and Diez-Fuentes 2011c). These include peer learning, peer reviews and peer pressure. Hence, the uniqueness of the organisation therefore lies in the fact "most of the cooperative proceedings at the OECD are of consultative and deliberative nature and only in rare occasions the OECD enshrines agreements in formal legal text" (Woodward 2009, 6). The OECD provides a multilateral forum in which actors can consult each other, share experiences and develop common guidelines and principles which may later provide the building blocks of formal treaties and other binding international agreements (OECD 1960). It is therefore based on the idea of policy convergence or diffusion among OECD members (Martens and Jakobi 2010b) and labelled as an "international think tank" (Mahon and McBride 2008, 3) or an "international body pooling statistical information and economic expertise" (Ruckert 2008, 97).

Notwithstanding the major input of the USA in the establishment of the organisation, the OECD is generally considered to be a European organisation and is largely associated with European integration. There are different explanations for the OECD's image as a "European" rather than an "international" organisation. To start with, the headquarters of the organisation is located in the French capital, Paris. The European location

of the organisation can be explained by the fact that the OECD originated from the OEEC, which was established in 1948 in order to facilitate the distribution of the Marshal Plan aid and to contribute to the reconstruction of Western Europe (Clifton and Diaz-Fuentes 2011b). Moreover, European states account for the majority of the OECD members[43] and are major contributors to the organisation's budget (Interview 74Pe).

Alongside individual European member states, the EU is represented in the OECD as a so-called full participant or special observer (Carroll and Kellow 2013). Although the EU is not a full member of the organisation, a Supplementary Protocol to Article 13 of the OECD Convention foresees that the EU can take part in most of the organisation's work (OECD 1960). In this context, it is important to stress that on the basis of its status as a full participant the EU has a more important say in the OECD as compared to the UN, International Monetary Fund (IMF) or World Bank, which only act as observers. The EU participates in various committees and working groups of the OECD (Verschaeve and Takacs 2013). Apart from two exceptions,[44] the EU therefore enjoys the same rights as single European member states in the OECD (Wolfe 2008, 32; Schricke 1989, 807).

The OECD is involved in a variety of different policy fields, including development cooperation. In fact, "development" is part of the organisation's name. The development activities of the different bodies of the OECD are coordinated through the OECD's Development Cluster (Manning 2008, 12). Alongside the Development Centre (DEV), the DAC leads the OECD's contributions to international development cooperation. Whereas the DEV is involved in research and policy analysis, the work of the DAC consists of making concrete policy recommendations (Interviews 86Pi, 77Pe). The DAC is one of the main committees of the OECD. As compared to other committees, the DAC holds a unique position within the overall institutional structures of the OECD (Interviews 21Pi, 24Pe, 57Pe, 77Pe, 103Pe). According to experts, it represents a quasi-autonomous body of the OECD (Carroll and Kellow 2013, 247). Founded in 1960 as a forum for consultation and cooperation between countries providing aid (so-called donors), the DAC mostly plays the role of a norm setter in international development cooperation (OECD 2006).

Considering the significant contribution of the OECD DAC to the formulation of international development cooperation standards, the EU has put particular effort in engaging China in the work of this multilateral

organisation. This chapter studies the EU's multilateral engagement with China on Africa in the context of the OECD DAC. As a donor organisation, the DAC only provides limited opportunities for the participation of Africa, which primarily counts developing countries receiving aid.[45] Due to Africa's rather marginal involvement in the DAC, this second case study – similarly to the first case study in Chapter 1 – is referred to as EU-China dialogue "on", rather than "with", Africa.

This chapter is divided into four main sections. Section 4.1 provides an overview of the OECD DAC and its place within the broader international development community. Subsequently, Section 4.2 looks specifically at the DAC's outreach to China as an emerging donor. Section 4.3 studies the EU's multilateral engagement with China on Africa within the DAC, taking the specific example of the multilateral negotiations leading to the adoption of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC) at the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan in 2011. On this basis, Section 4.4 provides a summary of the foreign policy instruments used by the EU at multilateral level.

4.1   The OECD DAC and the Multilateral Development System

As China's growing influence in Africa has been wieldy noticed in the area of development cooperation, the EU has particularly targeted international development organisations to establish a multilateral dialogue with China on Africa. In the area of international development cooperation, a number of different multilateral donor originations emerged in the period from the 1960s to the 1970s (Mehta and Nanda 2005; Kharas 2007). A multilateral donor is defined as an "international institution whose members are governments and which conducts all or a significant part of its activities in favour of development" (OECD 2009a, 21). The UN, the IMF and the World Bank are considered as traditional multilateral donor organisations. Due to the proliferation of multilateral development institutions with overlapping mandates, the different multilateral development organisations do not represent a coherent group and the international development architecture is a relatively complex system (Boas and McNeill 2004).

As a forum bringing together the world's largest development aid donors, the DAC occupies a unique position within the multilateral

development system. Despite the fact that the DAC is part of the OECD, it enjoys a semi-autonomy status vis-à-vis the OECD, as reflected in its membership. In fact, not all OECD members are also members of the DAC. The DAC currently counts 26 members,[46] including 2 countries from Asia (Japan and Korea). A majority of the DAC members – 16 states[47] – belong to the EU (Carroll and Kellow 2011). In addition to the official members, the World Bank, the IMF and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) participate in the DAC as observers (OECD 2012a). Apart from its membership, the DAC's funding scheme can serve as another indication for its distinctive position within the OECD. Unlike most bodies of the OECD, the DAC is financed outside of the regular OECD membership fee.

The DAC's predominant position among the different OECD committees is also reflected in its internal structure. Unlike most OECD committees, the DAC works under a full-time chair, who is elected for a mandate of two years and who has a permanent office in Paris (Interviews 57Pe, 40Pi, 103Pe). In January 2013, the Norwegian Erik Solheim replaced the American Brian Atwood as new DAC Chair. The DAC chair is assisted by the Development Cooperation Directorate (DCD), which acts as the DAC secretariat (Sauvat 2002). As Figure 4.1 shows, the DCD is organised around four main divisions[48] and counts around 30–70 staff members (Eyben 2011, 7). The DCD provides technical expertise and operational capacity to the DAC. The task of the DCD is not only to conduct research on particular topics but also consists of providing policy analysis on the basis of which DAC members can build a consensus and develop common guidelines and standards (Interviews 40Pi, 103Pe).

A major part of the work of the DAC is conducted through so-called subsidiary bodies (OECD 2012a). The eight DAC subsidiary bodies, which are listed in Table 4.1, can be divided into working parties or networks. Whereas working parties deal with broader issues, networks tackle more specific policy themes (Eyben 2011, 4). Among the eight DAC subsidiary bodies, the DAC Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF) has played a leading role in the DAC dialogue with China and other emerging donors. In addition to the meetings organised by the different DAC subsidiary bodies, two types of more formal gatherings take place within the DAC: DAC Senior-Level Meetings (SLM), which are attended by the directors-general of the development ministries and the heads of the development agencies and other senior experts of the DAC members, and an annual DAC High-Level Meeting (HLM), bringing

Fig. 4.1   Structure of the OECD DCD

Source: Compiled by the author based on information available on the DCD website and the internal OECD organisational chart

Table 4.1   DAC subsidiary bodies

DAC	Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF)
	Working Party on Development Finance Statistics (WP-STAT)
	Network on Development Evaluation (EVALNET)
	Network on Gender Equality (GENDERNET)
	Network on Environment and Development Cooperation (ENVIRONET)
	Network on Poverty Reduction (POVNET)
	Network on Governance (GOVNET)
	International Network on Conflict and Fragility (INCAF)

Source: Compiled by the author based on OECD 2010

together Ministers for Development Cooperation from the different DAC member countries. The DAC HLM discusses the implementation of the DAC work plan, previously approved by the DAC SLM.

The overall objective of the DAC is to foster donor cooperation. In addition, the DAC also contributes to the comparison and exchange of development policies, the collection of aid statistics, the establishment of good practices, the formulation of policy recommendations and the monitoring of its member's aid performance (Interviews 24Pe, 103Pe).

The role of the DAC differs significantly from that of other multilateral development organisations. There are three main elements explaining the different nature of the DAC as compared to traditional development organisations.

First, the DAC differs from other multilateral development institutions in terms of its membership. Unlike the UN, the IMF or the World Bank that are characterised by a universal membership, DAC is composed solely of donors of development aid and not of recipients, and therefore represents an exclusive "donor club" (Boas and McNeill 2004, 3). Another distinctiveness of the DAC is the fact it does not possess any budgetary power. Unlike the traditional development organisations, the DAC does not have an independent source of funds to dispense grants or provide loans to developing countries (Wolfe 2008). Thus, the DAC does not carry out projects or programmes in developing countries. Finally, the DAC does not have any sanctioning power.

The lack of universal membership, as well as budgetary and sanctioning competences, does not mean that the DAC is an irrelevant actor within the broader international aid system. Although the DAC of the OECD does not fund or implement concrete projects in developing countries, experts have argued that the DAC is a key contributor to the multilateral aid regime through the development of international development norms and principles (Eyben 2012). In comparison to more traditional development organisations, the DAC provides for a unique setting for the formation of common donor norms, procedures and guidelines on a variety of issues such as good governance, poverty reduction, gender and environmental standards (Stähle 2008, 135). Consequently, the comparative advantage of the DAC in relation to other multilateral aid organisations lies in its ability to formulate international donor norms and standards. For this reason, the DAC is often described as an "institutionalised global policy space" (Eyben 2011).

In order to perform its role as international development norm setter, the DAC relies on the instrument of peer review (Ashoff 2013). Through

peer reviews the DAC verifies the compliance of its members with the DAC principles. By joining the DAC, donors agree to be subject to regular peer reviews of their development aid programmes. DAC peer reviews are conducted by the DCD, which has a specific "Review, Evaluation and Engagement Division" (DCD/REED), as highlighted by Figure 4.1. DAC peer reviews follow the same approach as the general OECD peer review instrument.[49] In general, a peer review consists of "the systematic examination and assessment of the performance of a state by other states, with the ultimate goal of helping the reviewed state improve its policy-making, adopt best practices, and comply with established standards and principles" (Pagani 2002, 4). Experts have noted that the effectiveness of the peer review mechanism "relies on the influence and persuasion exercised by the peers during the process" (Pagani 2002, 5), which is commonly referred to as "peer pressure".

On the basis of the peer review mechanism, the DAC advances new ideas and develops international aid standards and guidelines (Boas and McNeill 2004, 3). One of the main DAC contributions in terms of international norm setting has been the formulation of the concept of Official Development Aid (Stähle 2008, 135; Abdel-Malek 2015, 14). The DAC first adopted the notion of ODA in 1969 as an indicator to measure aid. In 1972, the DAC decided to revise the initial ODA definition. According to the revised definition, financial flows qualify as ODA if (a) they are undertaken by official agencies, (b) with the aim of promoting economic development and welfare of developing countries and (c) have a concessional character. Hence, the measuring of ODA constitutes another central task of the DAC. This task has been delegated to the "Statistic and Monitoring Division of the DCD" (DCD/STAT) of DCD. Every three years, the DCD/STAT publishes a list of ODA recipients, which allows DAC donors to measure and classify their aid to developing countries.

In sum, the DAC has played a key role in the establishment of a multilateral development architecture. Yet, with the rise of a group of new and more diverse actors in recent years, the global aid system has witnessed significant changes (Abdel-Malek 2015, 14). The establishment of the AIIB as well as the foundation of the New Development Bank (NDB)[50] – a multilateral development bank operated by Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa – are prominent examples of the proliferation of new multilateral development institutions. In light of these fundamental shifts, some experts have argued that instead of referring to a well-ordered

international aid architecture one should rather talk about a "Multilateral Donor Non-System" (Bräutigam 2010).

4.2 THE DAC'S OUTREACH TO CHINA AS AN EMERGING DONOR

In contrast to the EU, China is neither a member of the OECD nor of the DAC. Due to the fact that the OECD, in general, and the DAC, in particular, are commonly considered to be an exclusive "club" of Western states, China and other emerging donors have been rather uncomfortable with joining either of the two multilateral bodies. So far, China and other emerging donors have been particularly resistant to efforts to draw them into the DAC's development structures (Reisen 2009). Yet, the OECD, in general, and the DAC, in particular, have undertaken specific efforts in reaching out to China and other emerging donors over the past years. Considering the fact that the multilateral dialogue between the DAC and China has primarily been driven by the EU and its member states and focused mostly on African development challenges, this section provides the necessary background information to understand the formation of an EU-China multilateral dialogue on Africa in the context of the Busan GPEDC, outlined in Section 4.3.

Against recent shifts in the world economic governance and in order to guarantee that the organisation will continue to stay a relevant actor in the changing international environment, the OECD has witnessed an unprecedented organisational reform, characterised by a comprehensive review of the organisation's place within the multilateral architecture (Castillejo 2013). The broadening of membership and increasing interactions with different parts of the world has been particularly high on the OECD's agenda since the election of Angel Gurría as new Secretary General in 2006. The decision to offer the former Foreign Minister of Mexico the position of OECD Secretary General clearly underlines the organisation's ambitions to move away from the image of a Western-dominated organisation towards a more inclusive, multilateral institution. The current Secretary-General has made the transformation of the OECD into "a more open and pluralistic organisation, sensitive to the complex challenges of middle-income and developing countries" one of his key priorities (Clifton and Diez-Fuentes 2011c).

As part of the OECD's overall reform, the organisation has started to establish privileged relationships with five specific non-member countries – a process labelled as "Enhanced Engagement" (Gurría 2011, 320). The

OECD's Enhanced Engagement was officially launched in 2007. At the occasion of the OECD Council meeting in May 2007, the Ministers of the OECD member countries invited "the Secretary General to strengthen OECD cooperation with Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa through Enhanced Engagement programmes" (Martens and Jakobi 2010b, xiv). The five Enhanced Engagement partners (EE5) were selected based on the criteria that their "engagement in the work of the OECD is particularly important for the fulfilment of the organisation's mandate to promote policy convergence and global economic development" (OECD 2007a). In May 2012, the OECD decided to replace the concept of Enhanced Engagement partners by the label of "key partners" (OECD 2007c, 13). This highlights the OECD's ambition to develop a more strategic cooperation with the five countries, centred on high-level political exchanges. The OECD's transformation into a more universal organisation is also reflected by the introduction of new governance structures. For instance, a specific department in charge of the OECD's global relations has been incorporated into the organisation's General Secretariat (Interview 74Pe). As one of the biggest departments of OECD's General Secretariat, the so-called Global Relations Secretariat falls under the direct authority of the Secretary General of the organisation.

Experts have noted that a major motivation driving the OECD's recent outreach process "was to enhance relations with China, unquestionably one of the most significant new players in the world economy" (OECD 2012d). Hence, among the five key partners of the OECD, China plays a particular role. Against the background of the OECD's attempt to expand its global relations, it started appointing special representatives in order to ensure a physical presence in the countries identified as key partners. It comes as no surprise that the first special OECD representative was appointed to China (Interviews 712 Pc, 4Pe).

Whereas the OECD's increasing relations with the five key partners is reflected in a variety of policy areas, they are particularly visible in the field of development cooperation. Already in 2008, G8 leaders called on the OECD to turn into "a platform for dialogue with the major emerging economies" and specifically identified "development in Africa" as an area of common interest (Ougaard 2010, 26). The OECD's aspiration to engage in a policy dialogue with China and other emerging countries in the area of development policy is also reflected in the 2012 OECD Strategy on Development, which expresses the organisation's intentions to work together with different development actors based on a variety of

development models (Wolfe 2008, 33). Moreover, as part of the organisation's structural reform, the different committees of the OECD were tasked to explore ways how to deepen relationships and ensure the active involvement of the five emerging countries in their work (OECD 2012c).

Unlike other OECD committees, the work of the DAC has always been characterised by a rather outward-looking approach. Considering the fact that the main task of the DAC is to support the development of countries beyond its membership, it comes as no surprise that as early as the 1970s the DAC started reaching out to non-members (OECD 2007b). Yet, it was only with the turn of the century and that DAC members started recognising the need for establishing a more genuine engagement strategy with donors beyond the circle of the Committees' membership. In the context of the broader transformation of the OECD, the DAC has therefore engaged in a process of critical self-assessment. Faced with a diversification of development actors and approaches, traditional DAC donors have realised the necessity to transform the DAC from a rather restricted club to a broader multilateral development forum. As part of this process, the DAC has attributed specific attention to a more intensive exchange with emerging donors and in particular China.

Initial dialogue efforts between the DAC and emerging non-DAC donors were initiated by the DAC chair Richard Manning around 2005 (OECD 2011d; Atwood 2012). In this context, Richard Manning delivered a well-noticed speech with the title "Will 'Emerging Donors' Change the Face of International Cooperation?" which was later published as an article (Stähle 2008, 153). In his speech, the former DAC chair argued that DAC needs to the rise of so-called emerging donors like China is changing the multilateral development architecture and that the DAC needs to adapt to this new reality. Following this argument, the members of the DAC agreed to mandate the DCD to study the role of non-DAC donors more closely and to look for possibilities to establish a dialogue (Manning 2006).

This process resulted in the adoption of the "DAC Outreach Strategy" in 2005 (Kragelund 2011b, 1). This policy document laid down the foundations of a DAC dialogue with non-DAC donors (OECD 2005a; Paulo and Reisen 2010). Not only did it identify different groups of outreach partners, but it also proposed a series of instruments. These instruments included, for instance, the participation of non-DAC donors in the official sessions of the DAC and its subsidiary bodies, the systematic tracing of aid flows of non-DAC donors or the occasional participation of

non-DAC donors as observers in DAC Peer Reviews (Xu 2012). In the framework of the OECD's overall Enhanced Engagement process, the DAC Outreach Strategy was revised in 2008, putting a specific focus on China, Brazil, India and South Africa as major emerging donors with which the DAC should engage in a more systematic development dialogue (Paulo and Reisen 2010, 546).

In the same year, a "Strategic Reflection Exercise" was launched by the DAC to explore avenues for increasing the relevance of the DAC in the changing development cooperation landscape (OECD 2008b). For this purpose a rather informal reflection group of 20 senior-level officials was nominated by the DAC members (OECD 2008e). The findings of the exercise were presented in a progress report in 2009. These include a greater "inclusion of key development stakeholders", including non-DAC donors, in the work of the DAC and its subsidiary bodies (OECD 2009b). In line with these recommendations, a key objective of the newly elected DAC chair Eckhard Deutscher was to continue the work of his predecessor and to find ways to bridge "the divide between the traditional aid system and development actors from emerging countries" (OECD 2009b).

Following the work engaged by his predecessors, Brian Atwood also made the engagement with non-DAC donors, one of the top priorities of his term as DAC chair (Interviews 12Pc, 21Pi, 40Pi, 57Pe, 74Pe). Hence, under his chairmanship the DAC adopted in 2011 a new "DAC Global Relations Strategy". This policy document clearly expressed the DAC's commitment "to stepping up its efforts to engage with actors beyond its membership" (Deutscher 2010).

It is important to stress that although the DAC initially tried to foster relations with all four emerging donors, it attributed particular importance to China (OECD 2011d) (Interviews 12 Pc, 21Pe, 40Pi, 74Pe). According to the former DAC chair Richard Manning, the DAC outreach process was dominated by China "because of the scale of its aid and other capital investments, and the sheer size of its economy" (Atwood 2012, 10). It therefore comes as no surprise that within the context of the overall DAC reform and opening up process two particular policy initiatives aimed at a growing dialogue between the DAC and China emerged: the China-DAC Study Group and the GPEDC.

The China-DAC Study Group was conceived as a forum of knowledge-sharing and mutual learning specifically targeted at China, with a specific focus on development practices in Africa (Manning 2008, 15). To date, no similar dialogue platforms exist between the DAC and other emerging

donors like Brazil, India or South Africa. First contact between the DAC and China took place in 2008. In February 2008, a joint workshop on the topic "Reducing Poverty and Promoting Pro-Poor Growth: China's Experience in Rural Poverty Reduction at Home and in Africa" took place in Paris, bringing together Chinese officials and DAC representatives for the first time. The fact that the workshop was attended by rather high-ranking representatives shows the importance attributed to the event by both partners. Whereas the DAC was represented at the workshop by the DAC chair and the chair of the DAC Network on Poverty Reduction (POVENT), China sent the deputy director of the State Council Leading Group of Poverty Alleviation and Development and deputy director of the International Poverty Reduction Centre in China (IPRCC) (Stahl 2013). During the workshop, suggestions for possible cooperation between China and the DAC were made and the idea of establishing a more regular dialogue between the DAC and China was discussed (OECD 2008f). Following the workshop, in July 2008, DAC chair Eckhard Deutscher travelled to Beijing to meet representatives of the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and the State Council Leading Group of Poverty Alleviation and Development. The visit marked the beginning of more concrete discussions for collaboration between China and the DAC (IPRCC and OECD 2009). Alongside the visit of DAC chair Eckhard Deutscher to China, other initiatives bringing together officials from the DAC secretariat and Chinese representatives took place throughout the year 2008 (Interviews 40Pi, 45Cc, 46Cc). On the basis of the growing exchange between the DAC and China, the idea of an institutionalised dialogue between the DAC and China was put forward in October 2008 (IPRCC and OECD 2011a).

As a result of these different encounters, the China-DAC Study Group officially saw the light in January 2009. In order to make it a joint platform, the Group relies on a joint institutional structure, composed of two honorary presidents and two co-chairs, one from China and one from the DAC (OECD 2008c). In addition to the co-presidents and the co-chairs, the group counts more than 10 members. In order to allow for a more intense and rather informal exchange it was decided to limit the size of the China-DAC Study Group (Interviews 40Pi, 78Oe, 44Cc). Due to the fact that the China-DAC Study Group was conceived as a rather flexible and informal platform of exchange, it does not possess a fully fleshed permanent secretariat. Instead, the day-to-day coordination of the Group's work is managed by a small joint China-DAC secretariat, composed of officers

based at the IPRCC in Beijing and officials from the OECD DCD based in Paris (Interviews 44Cc, 45Ce, 46Cc, 40Pi).

The IPRCC was founded in 2004 as a result of the international conference on "Scaling up Poverty Reduction" organised jointly by UNDP, the World Bank and the Chinese government in Beijing. The IPRCC was established with the objective of creating a China-based institution aimed at advancing SSC through knowledge building, advocacy and training activities (Interviews 45Cc, 46Cc).

The work of the China-DAC Study Group encompasses two main tasks: first, to study more thoroughly China's own development experience and its role as an emerging donor, and second, to draw common lessons from the Chinese and DAC aid practices to Africa (IPRCC and OECD 2009; IPRCC and OECD 2011a; IPRCC and OECD 2011b). In particular, on the basis of existing research and development practices, members of the Group try to formulate common policy-relevant recommendations.

In addition to the China-DAC Study Group, the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation can serve as another example for the DAC's outreach to China. The GPEDC emerged as a novel international policy initiative, focusing specifically on fostering collaboration between the DAC and emerging donors. In particular, it is aimed at finding synergies between the traditional DAC aid effectiveness agenda and new forms of South-South Cooperation. The GPEDC was endorsed at the occasion of the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-4), which took place in Busan from the 29th of November to the 1st of December 2011. It is therefore also referred to as the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation.

The HLF-4 in Busan has to be situated within the DAC's so-called aid effectiveness agenda. The DAC's work on aid effectiveness originated from the recognition by traditional DAC donors of the need to address major weaknesses in the functioning of international development aid. It presented an attempt to frame and consolidate a common, more effective international approach to aid delivery. As part of this process, a series of high-level meetings were organised, and these meetings laid the foundation of this new policy agenda and which contributed to making the DAC the focal point of the aid effectiveness agenda (OECD 2011e; Eyben 2011, 1). The aid effectiveness debate emerged in 2003, when traditional donor representatives gathered for the First High-Level Forum on Harmonisation, which was convened by the DAC in Rome (Abdel-Malek 2015; OECD 2003). The first HLF endorsed the Rome Declaration on Harmonisation, which

explicitly calls for efforts to improve the effectiveness of development assistance (Hayman 2009). However, it was only in 2005 with the Second High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-2) organised in Paris that the DAC aid effectiveness agenda truly emerged. On the occasion of the second HLF, the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was adopted (OECD 2005c). The declaration is considered the major reference document for the DAC aid effectiveness framework (Atwood 2012, 4). It lists five principles of aid effectiveness: *ownership* by partner countries; *alignment* with countries' strategies, systems and procedures; *harmonisation* of donor actions; *managing for results*; and *mutual accountability*.

In order to advance the aid effectiveness agenda and to measure the concrete progress in the implementation of the aid effectiveness commitments, the DAC established a specific Working Party on Aid Effectiveness (WP-EFF). Although the WP-EFF was originally set up as a subsidiary body of the DAC and its secretariat was located within the DCD, it quickly turned into what insiders have called "a very different animal" (Interviews 78Oe, 21Pi). The different nature of the WP-EFF as compared to the DAC can be explained by its membership of 80 members, which included non-DAC members. Due to the fact that developing countries, DAC donors as well as some emerging donors were participating in the WP-EFF, it was considered a more inclusive multi-stakeholder platform than the DAC. Yet, this inclusiveness came at the price of less efficiency in terms of the output delivered by the Working Party (Interviews 57Pe, 40Pi).

Initially, the aid effectiveness framework was used by DAC donors "as a means by which they could defend their interests against the competition from non-OEDC donors" (Atwood 2012, 6). In this context, it is important to stress that although the five emerging donors – China, Brazil, India and South Africa – signed the Paris Declaration, they did so in their capacity of recipients rather than as emerging donors (Eyben 2011, 14; Chahoud 2008). Hence, the Paris Declaration did not officially consider the increasing importance of emerging donors (John de Sousa 2010). Over time, DAC donors have started recognising the need to open up the DAC to non-DAC donors and in particular emerging countries, in order for the organisation to remain a relevant actor in the international aid architecture. Apart from setting up policy dialogues with emerging donors, the DAC has also explored possibility of supporting SSC. In this context, DAC donors were keen on involving a broader group of actors in the discussion of aid effectiveness. Particular attempts were undertaken in order to make the aid effectiveness agenda more inclusive towards

emerging donors and the concept of SSC (Eyben 2012). For instance, a first exchange between members of the WP-EFF and non-DAC donors took place in November 2007[51] (Hackenesch and Grimm 2011). Moreover, a specific Task Team on South-South Cooperation (TT-SSC) was launched within the DAC (JICA 2012). It was mostly around 2008 that the DAC aid effectiveness agenda seriously started taking into account the contributions of emerging donors. In the view of the preparation of the Third High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF-3) to be held in Accra in 2008, an informal working group on "Non-DAC Providers of Development Assistance and Aid Effectiveness" was established, adopting a background document exploring possibilities to foster synergies between the DAC aid effectiveness agenda and the activities of non-DAC donors (Davies 2008). The 2008 Accra High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness marked a further step in the opening up of the DAC aid effectiveness agenda to emerging donors. The explicit acknowledgement of the role played by emerging donors is reflected in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA), the final outcome document of the HLF-3 (Davies 2008). Article 19 of the AAA is devoted entirely to the role of emerging donors and growing forms of SSC. Article 19 paragraph b acknowledges "the contributions made by all development actors and in particular the role of middle-income countries as both providers and recipients of aid". Moreover, it recognises "the importance and particularities of South-South Cooperation" and acknowledges that DAC donors "can learn from the experience of developing countries" (OECD 2008a). Moreover, Article 14 paragraph b of the AAA foresees inclusive partnerships with emerging donors and recognises the need to promote SSC.

However, it is was the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in 2011 in Busan that represented the biggest step forward in terms of the collaboration between the DAC and emerging donors (Mawdsley et al. 2013). China received particular attention in this context (Hackenesch and Grimm 2011). On the occasion of the HLF-4 the Busan Outcome Document or Busan Partnership Agreement was adopted, laying the foundations for a new and more inclusive Global Partnership (OECD 2011b, 4, para.14).

The establishment of the GPEDC was the result of a yearlong process of intense multilateral negotiations (Mawdsley 2012b) (Interviews 16Ki, 103Pe). The drafting of the outcome document of the HLF-4 took place in advance of the actual meeting in Busan and the consultations related to the GPEDC mostly took place at the OECD DAC in Paris (Interviews 57Pe, 103Pe). For the purpose of efficiency and inclusiveness, the

negotiations over the GPEDC were not assigned to the DAC WP-EFF, as had been the case for the previous High-Level Fora. Instead, in order to allow for the broadest range of actors to take part in the HLF4, the Busan outcome document was discussed by smaller, more manageable groups of stakeholders, referred to as so-called sherpas (Interviews 57Pe, 103Pe). The composition of the 18 sherpas was decided on the basis of the different categories of stakeholders (e.g. partner countries, MICs, DAC donors, civil society) (Abdel-Malek 2015). On the basis of the preparatory negotiations, the HLF-4 in Busan adopted the GPEDC. The GPEDC sought to replace the rather restricted aid effectiveness framework of the DAC with a truly global partnership, incorporating the perspective of developing countries, as well as emerging donors (Li and Carey 2014) (Interviews 16Ki, 18K5).

The GPEDC manifests several major innovations as compared to previous DAC agreements and declarations. Most importantly, in contrast to the traditional aid effectiveness agenda, which was mostly driven by traditional DAC donors, the new Global Partnership is based on the wider participation of different development actors, in particular emerging donors like China (Janus et al. 2014; Abdel-Malek 2015). This is reflected in two important features of the GPEDC. First, it represents a shift in terms of its policy agenda by replacing the concept "aid effectiveness" with that of "development effectiveness". Unlike aid effectiveness, which framed aid in terms of concessional financial flows, the notion of development effectiveness – which was introduced by emerging donors – takes into account elements of SSC. Second, while the aid effectiveness framework emerged within the OECD DAC, the new partnership represents a joint OECD-UN instrument. The inclusion of the UN – of which emerging donors are members – can be explained by the fact that its broader international membership provides it with more international legitimacy as compared to the OECD (Interviews 16Ki, 103Pe). In order to implement this new policy instrument, new governance structures had to be established. Consequently, the DAC WP-EFF was dissolved and the implementation of the Global Partnership was put in the hands of a joint DAC-UNDP Secretariat.

The GPEDC is based on two-tier governance structure, including plenary sessions at the ministerial level to be held every 18–24 months, and a Steering Committee (Kharas 2012). The multi-stakeholder Steering Committee is the working body of the new partnership and prepares the ministerial-level meetings. It is composed of 18 members, including

3 co-chairs and 15 members representing various constituencies (Janus et al. 2014). On the basis of the commitment made to broaden the GPEDC's base, the three co-chairs[52] represent a DAC donor, a partner country and an emerging donor.

4.3   Multilateral EU Engagement with China in the Context of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation

The EU has actively supported the DAC's outreach to China and in particular the adoption of the GPEDC. Under this new Global Partnership, the EU attempted to develop a multilateral dialogue with China on Africa through a combination of different foreign policy instruments. This section assesses the EU's involvement in the multilateral negotiations leading to the Global Partnership and thereby proceeds with the concrete analysis of the multilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa within the context of the OECD DAC. Following the conceptual framework of this book, this section primarily focuses on the contribution of the European Commission and the Council of the EU.

The European Commission acts as the main representative of the EU within the OECD. Article 13 to the Supplementary Protocol of the OECD Convention provides the legal mandate for the European Commission to take part in the work of the OECD on behalf of the EU. Whereas the EU holds the position of a special observer within the broader OECD framework, it is a full member[53] of the DAC and participates in various DAC subsidiary bodies (Carroll and Kellow 2011, 207). As a full DAC member, the EU has the right to vote on DAC proposals, as well as to declare the EU's commitment to the implementation of DAC decisions and recommendations (Hoffmeister 2007, 49). Within the DAC the EU represents the third largest donor (OECD 2012b, 28). Like all other DAC members, the EU is therefore subject to regular DAC peer reviews. In this regard it is interesting to mention that the 1998 and 2002 DAC peer review reports were critical of the EU's development policy and provided the basis for significant reforms (Carroll and Kellow 2011). Similarly to the EU's participation in the OECD in general, the EU is represented in the DAC through the European Commission (Manning 2008, 14).

Alongside Commission staff in Brussels, the daily cooperation between the EU and the OECD is managed by the EU delegation to the OECD in

Paris (Schricke 1989). In the EU delegation in Paris, a permanent development delegate deals exclusively with the development issues discussed in the DAC (Interview 57Pe). With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, former Commission delegations have been transformed into EU delegations, which are now under the authority of the European External Action Service (Cornelli and Matarazzo 2011). Hence, the EU delegation to the OECD in Paris now also falls under the authority of the EEAS (Verschaeve and Takacs 2013). However, as the Commission possesses extensive expertise in the area of development cooperation and its input is needed in terms of the EU's multilateral development diplomacy, the officer in charge of development policy based in the EU delegation to OECD in Paris belongs to the Commission (DG DEVCO) and not to the EEAS.[54]

As the GPEDC emerged from the multilateral negotiations of the HLF-4 in Busan, the EU's contribution to the partnership was driven not only by the Commission but also by the Council of the EU. Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, Article 218 paragraph 3 of the TFEU provides the legal basis for EU multilateral diplomacy with international organisation. It highlights the fact that EU participation in multilateral negotiations is characterised by the complex interplay between the Council of the EU and the European Commission. In particular, it states that for the conclusion of international agreements between the EU and international organisations which relate exclusively or principally to the area of foreign and security policy, the Commission shall submit recommendations to the Council, which shall adopt a decision authorising the opening of negotiations and approve common EU guidelines to be followed within the negotiations of the international agreement. As regards the actual negotiation process, the Council nominates the EU negotiator, which in most cases is the Commission. Thus, the EU's involvement in the multilateral negotiations of the Global Partnership has been characterised by a complex interplay between the Council and the Commission.

Unlike in the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa, the European Parliament only played a marginal role in the multilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa within the DAC. This can be explained by the fact that the European Parliament possesses only limited competences in the area of EU multilateral diplomacy. Although the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty attributed new powers to the European Parliament for the conclusion of international agreements, the Parliament's new competences are limited to the right of consultation in the different stages of the international negotiations (see Article 218 paragraphs 6 and 10 TFEU).

As the European Commission traditionally participates in the activities of the DAC and its subsidiary bodies on behalf of the EU, it acted as a key player in the formation of the multilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa. Depending on the topic addressed by each DAC subsidiary body, different DGs of the Commission are involved. Traditionally, the DG DEV was given the coordinating role of the Commission's participation in the DAC (Carroll and Kellow 2013, 253). The participation of the Commission's DG DEV can be explained by the fact that the DAC represents a forum bringing together experts to allow for a technical exchange and the Commission is the EU institution with the most expertise in the area of EU development policy (Interviews 91Pe; 92Pe). As a consequence of the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission witnessed a major restructuring. In 2011, a new Director-General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid (DG DEVCO) was established, which replaced the former DG DEV. As such, DG DEVCO has taken the lead of the Commission's activities related to the DAC (Interviews 14Be, 57Pe) and spoke on behalf of the EU in the multilateral negotiations of the HLF-4 (Atwood 2012).

Under the lead of DG DEVCO, the Commission issued, in September 2011, a communication with recommendations for a common EU position for the HLF-4 (European Commission 2011d). Although the Commission's policy document does not mention China explicitly, it argued for the engagement with emerging donors and the establishment of an innovative "global development partnership" (European Commission 2011d, 2). Moreover, the communication dedicated a specific section to the role of emerging donors and SSC (European Commission 2011d, 7). This section recognised the "diverse experiences" and "interpretation of aid effectiveness principles" by the emerging donors. Furthermore, it stressed complementarities between North-South Cooperation and SSC and argues that "the increasing importance of non-DAC donors calls for their wider participation in the aid effectiveness agenda and in the Busan Forum" (European Commission 2011d, 7).

Against this backdrop, the Commission put particular emphasis on "knowledge-sharing on successful development experiences" between traditional DAC donors and providers of SSC (European Commission 2011d, 7). This can serve as a clear demonstration of the Commission's use of the of policy instrument of reciprocal engagement. The Commission's preference for *reciprocal engagement* is also reflected in the fact that the Commission policy document argues that the new global development partnership should be based on "shared principles and differentiated commitments" (European Commission 2011d). The issues of differentiated commitments were

particularly relevant for emerging donors like China that consider themselves as developing countries rather than donors, and therefore refuse to take over the same responsibilities as traditional DAC-donors like the EU (Atwood 2012), (Interviews 12Pc, 24Pe).

The Commission's preference for the policy instrument of reciprocal engagement is also reflected in an article, published by Commission officials from DG DEVCO in a thank tank magazine in 2011 (Craig-McQuaide et al. 2011). In the article, the authors argue that "Paris and Accra cannot be regarded as an 'acquis' that emerging partners have to sign up to". Instead, they stressed that "we need a mutual learning process, which requires both sides not only to recognise their comparative advantages but also their comparative disadvantages" (Craig-McQuaide et al. 2011, 3). This clearly shows that the Commission was less demanding on emerging donors regarding compliance with DAC donor standards and has started showing more readiness to adapt its own development practices as a consequence of the growing importance of emerging donors.

Both the 2011 Commission Communication and policy paper show that the Commission played a key role in the preparatory discussions of the HLF-4 by actively promoting the inclusion of emerging donors – China in particular – into the multilateral negotiations.

In addition to the Commission, the Council also took part in the formulation of the GPEDC. Based on recommendations submitted by the Commission (European Commission 2011d), the Council adopted, in November 2012, Council Conclusions laying out a "common EU position" to be followed during the HLF-4 (Council of the EU 2011). In line with the Commission's proposal, the guidelines adopted by the Council attributed a key priority to reaching out and broadening cooperation with emerging donors. Similar to the Commission communication, the common EU position devoted a specific section to the role of emerging economies and SSC.

Despite the fact that both the Commission and the Council policy document argued for the inclusion of emerging donors into the new Global Development Partnership, the Council policy document differed from the Commission's proposal over the preference of the foreign policy instrument. In contrast to the Commission, the Council generally favoured the traditional foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement. In fact, the Council Conclusions argue that emerging donors should comply with existing aid effectiveness standards rather than engaging in efforts at formulating new, shared principles. With this in mind, the Council

explicitly stated that "no new development indicators should be developed" (Council of the EU 2011, 10) and called on non-DAC donors to commit to the principle of aid transparency (Council of the EU 2011, 5). Considering the risk of watering down the principles of the aid effectiveness agenda, the Council was generally opposed to the Commission's idea of a GPEDC based on differentiated responsibilities. Instead, it argued that "it is important that all development partners including providers of South-South Cooperation (. . .) implement commitments agreed upon in Busan" (Council of the EU 2011, 2). In the same way that the Council opposed the formulation of new development principles, it also rejected the "establishment of new global governance structures", arguing that existing international forums were sufficient for strengthening a wider development partnership (Council of the EU 2011, 9).

Unlike the Commission communication, the policy document of the Council explicitly underlined the necessity to strengthen democracy, human rights and the rule of law. In particular, the Council called for the insertion of "democratic ownership" as a founding principle of the new GPEDC (Council of the EU 2011, 4). Although a clear definition of the notion of democratic ownership is missing, the concept is generally understood as broad participation, which goes beyond mere government ownership and requires the existence of well-functioning democratic processes. This shows that within the Council a majority of EU member states was in favour of the HLF-4 to concentrate on the core principles agreed in Paris and therefore followed a conservative and transformative EU engagement approach. In particular, Nordic countries like Finland stressed the need to uphold traditional DAC principles such as human rights (Fejerskov and Keijzer 2013, 33). On the other hand, Germany, the UK and France showed more willingness to broadening the aid effectiveness agenda to emerging donors (Keijzer 2011, 9) (Interviews 24Pe, 57Pe, 103Pe).

On the basis of the Council Conclusions and in accordance with the procedure outlined in article 218 TFEU, the Council provided the Commission with a mandate to act as the EU negotiator during the HLF-4 in Busan. Hence, during the negotiations the EU was represented through officials from DG DEVCO of the European Commission (Abdel-Malek 2015, 191). However, representatives of the Commission present at the table of negotiation were bound to follow the common EU guidelines adopted by the Council that advocated the policy instrument of transformative engagement.

Prior to the actual gathering in Busan five different draft outcome documents were issued and discussed among the different sherpas (Atwood 2012; Abdel-Malek 2015). The final draft outcome document was presented on the 23rd of November 2011, five days before the start of the HLF in Busan (OECD 2011e). As part of the process of the formulation of the Busan outcome document, the Commission submitted written input on behalf of the EU. The written proposal submitted by the Commission for the third draft Busan outcome document can serve as a good example of the EU's choice of the foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement (OECD 2011c, 16–17). The EU's proposal requests that the Busan outcome document should explicitly mention that all signatories should commit to the principle of transparency of development resources. Moreover, the EU also expressed its opposition to "the establishment of new global governance structures" and proposed instead to rely on existing institutions (OECD 2011c, 17, para. 16). Finally, the EU also expressed its wish for a systematic reference to the principle of democratic ownership in the outcome document.

Despite the intensive discussions among the different sherpas on a draft declaration to be adopted by the HLF-4, the outcome document was only finalised during the actual gathering in Busan. In contrast to the preliminary discussions, the Commission shifted its negotiation position during the final stage of the negotiations taking place in Busan, giving priority to the foreign policy instrument of reciprocal EU engagement. Several observers pointed out that it made considerable concessions to emerging donors in order to guarantee their support for the adoption of GPEDC (Freitas and Mah 2012, 9). Certain development NGOs even criticised the EU's negotiation strategy for putting too much emphasis on the participation of emerging donors and thereby compromising aid effectiveness principles such as human rights and democracy (CONCORD and AidWatch 2011).

Several observers have noticed that the negotiations of the HLF-4 were mostly directed towards China, as China's endorsement of the Busan outcome document was identified as a precondition for the success of the novel GPEDC (Atwood 2012; Birdsall 2011; CONCORD and AidWatch 2012, 18) (Interviews 24Pe, 103Pe). Following China's last-minute withdrawal from the negotiating table in Busan, the Commission adopted a deliberately consensual or what some have referred to as a "weak" diplomatic stance (Fejerskov and Keijzer 2013, 33; Birdsall 2011). The Commission's shift towards a more reciprocal EU engagement with China was largely supported by the three "big" EU member

states. In fact, the UK played a decisive role in finding a compromise between China's and the EU's position. It was largely due to a meeting between the British International Development Secretary and the Chinese Minister of Commerce in Beijing prior to the start of the negotiations in Busan that a compromise could be found and China could be brought back to the negotiating table (Atwood 2012; DFID 2012).

The Busan Partnership document, adopted at the HLF-4, can serve as a clear indication of the EU's preference for the foreign policy instrument of reciprocal engagement (OECD 2011b). The formulation of the document reflects the fact that the EU was willing to respond to Chinese demands to give less weight to the DAC and its aid principles and to establish new development governance structures, as well as formulate a new set of development norms (Birdsall 2011). Experts have noted that the EU's position contrasted with that of other traditional donors, underlying that "when China balked, the Europeans were ready to make it easy for China to join the club without committing to the standards (. . .). It was the Americans, the Australians and the Canadians who pressed for more clarity from China that it was endorsing the fundamental principles" (Birdsall 2011).

Articles 2 of the Busan outcome document symbolises the EU's choice for reciprocal engagement with China. It was introduced in the Busan declaration as the result of the joint efforts by the UK and the EU and states that "*the nature, modalities and responsibilities that apply to South-South Cooperation differ from those that apply to North-South Cooperation. At the same time, we recognise that we are all part of a development agenda in which we participate on the basis of common goals and shared principles. In this context, we encourage increased efforts to support effective cooperation based on our specific country situations. The principles, commitments and actions agreed in the outcome document in Busan shall be the reference for South-South partners on a voluntary basis*". Hence, Article 2 provides for differentiated responsibilities for China and other emerging donors as compared to the EU and other traditional DAC donors. Moreover, Article 28 reflects the shift from the concept of "aid effectiveness" to "development effectiveness". Although there is no consensus on what "development effectiveness" exactly implies, it generally refers to a broader set of development actors and sources of development financing (Carbone 2015). It thereby reflects that EU's openness to engage with China and other emerging donors in a discussion on financing of development beyond ODA and considering other sources (Sabathil 2014, 5).

In sum, during the multilateral negotiations of the GPEDC the EU adopted primarily the foreign policy instrument of reciprocal engagement. This is the result of the fact that the Commission relied on some independent bargaining power, within the limits set by the negotiation mandate decided upon by the Council (Elgström and Strömvik 2003). It would therefore be misleading to assume that the procedure of Article 218 TFEU would attribute sole EU leadership in multilateral negotiations to the Council. By contrast, the HLF-4 negotiations have revealed that since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty the Commission's mandate as the EU's negotiator has been broadened (Kaczynski 2010).

4.4   Assessing Multilateral EU Foreign Policy

On the basis of the EU's foreign policy strategy of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, the EU did engage with China on Africa not only bilaterally but also in a multilateral context. The OECD DAC has provided the suitable fora for the EU to establish a multilateral dialogue with China on Africa. Overall, the EU has mostly opted for the policy instrument of reciprocal engagement in the context of the multilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa in the OECD DAC. This contrasts with the case of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa discussed in Chapter 3, which has been characterised by transformative EU engagement.

Nevertheless, a more detailed examination of the multilateral negotiations of GDPEC the HLF-4 in Busan reveals a more mixed picture. During the multilateral negotiations the EU did not adopt a uniform position. On the contrary, EU multilateral engagement with China on Africa has been driven by a combination of both types of foreign policy instruments. This can be explained by the involvement of different EU institutions and the lack of institutional consistency. While the Commission has guided the overall DAC outreach to China, the EU's involvement in the GPEDC has been the result of interplay between Commission and Council. Although the Commission showed a preference for the policy instrument of reciprocal engagement, the Council adopted a more conservative position and advocated for transformative engagement with China. During the initial stage of the negotiations, the EU negotiators from the Commission strictly followed the negotiation mandate of the Council, largely based on the foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement. Yet, in the course of the actual multilateral negotiations the Commission acquired greater bargaining power and put greater emphasis on the foreign policy instrument of reciprocal engagement.

Thus, most experts have provided a negative assessment on the EU's participation in HLF-4. According to them, "the general perception among participants in the summit was that traditional donors, including the EU, had agreed to water down their commitments on aid effectiveness to include new donors and push through a global partnership". Especially, civil society organisations have stated that the EU was "side lined in Busan" (CONCORD 2012). According to this standpoint, the institutional inconsistency between the Commission and the Council had a negative impact on the EU's leadership. Yet, describing the EU's participation in the HLF-4 only in terms of a missed opportunity would be inadequate. Indeed, the Busan HLF showed that "the geo-politics of aid had changed" and the EU was no longer one of the "key protagonists" in the HLF (Carbone 2015). Yet, the flexibility in the EU's negotiation approach allowed it to adapt to the changing negotiation environment (e.g. unforeseen withdrawal of China) and to take into account the demands of the partners, necessary for the adoption of an agreement. As pointed out by some scholars, in the emerging multipolar world order the crux of the matter is not necessarily EU leadership, but rather about the EU's ability to adapt to the changing environment (Torney 2015).

The Attempted Trilateral EU, China, Africa Development Dialogue

Following the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa, the EU also made attempts to establish a novel form of trilateral dialogue with China and Africa. As outlined in the analytical chapter of this book, the notion of trilateralism – unlike the more traditional concepts of bilateralism and multilateralism – lacks a clear definition. This chapter primarily refers to trilateralism in terms of international interactions taking place among three players. The EU's efforts of launching a trilateral EU, China, Africa dialogue emerged against the background of two major transformations: the reform of the EU's development policy and a reorientation of its foreign policy towards Africa.

In terms of the first change, the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue serves as an example of the establishment of a new instrument of development cooperation, known as trilateral or triangular development cooperation. The growing popularity of TDC can be explained against the impact of the current shift towards multipolarity in the area of development policy and the rise of a set of so-called emerging donors. Due to their remarkable economic development, emerging countries have gone through a transition from the status of developing countries "to becoming more industrialised and/or more regionally and globally integrated through trade and investment" (Mawdsley 2012b, 4). As part of their increasing global influence, emerging countries like China, India, Brazil and South Africa have started expanding

their relations with developing countries and are now distributing a growing amount of aid to countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia. On the basis of these new forms of SSC, emerging donors are playing a more important role.

Another factor behind the formation of the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue has been the EU's attempt to formulate a more comprehensive foreign policy directed towards the whole African continent and to establish a new type of bilateral region-to-region partnership between Europe and Africa. In contrast to the two previous case studies of this book, which concentrated primarily on the EU's engagement with China, this chapter therefore gives particular consideration to Africa as a third actor in the trilateral dialogue. In the context of the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue, the AU was identified by the EU as its African counterpart (Wissenbach 2009). The choice for the AU can be explained by the fact that it is a pan-African organisation that pursues an agenda of political unity and regional integration among the countries of the African continent. Similar to the EU, the AU has also started to voice common African interests at the international level. Moreover, the EU's growing interaction with the AU has been accompanied by a changing policy agenda, shifting from a development focus to broader cooperation in foreign and security policy.

The shift in the EU's collaboration with Africa away from a primary focus on poverty reduction to broader foreign policy matters was largely influenced by the rise of China in Africa. In contrast to the EU's model of development assistance that has been characterised by a discourse of supporting the economic development of the recipient country, emerging donors generally do not make a distinction between development cooperation and their economic and geopolitical interests (Power and Mohan 2011). Regarding the particular case of China, experts have stressed that "China's contemporary vision of development does not envisage a domain completely separate from foreign policy concerns and actively mobilises historical discourses of geopolitics (…)" (Power and Mohan 2011, 60). Hence, the rise of emerging countries considerably changes the patterns of international development cooperation and leads to growing synergies between development policy and foreign policy. This explains why, as a consequence of the growing influence of China in Africa, the boundaries between the EU's foreign aid and geopolitical considerations in Africa are also vanishing, leading to increasing interdependence between EU development cooperation and foreign policy.

This chapter is structured around four main sections. Section 5.1 starts by providing a summary of the recent changes in the EU's development cooperation with China and Africa and sheds light on the policy practice of TDC. Section 5.2 focuses on the other major shift, namely the transformation of the EU's bilateral relations with Africa. Later, Section 5.3 examines the process of the EU's trilateral engagement with China and Africa. Finally, Section 5.4 summarises the EU's trilateral foreign policy and the choice of its foreign policy instrument.

5.1   THE TREND OF TRILATERAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION

The formation of the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue has to be situated within the broader changing development landscape and the growing practice of trilateral or triangular development cooperation. This section further clarifies the concept of TDC and thereby helps to understand the recent reform of EU development cooperation that will be further outlined in the next section.

A great deal of uncertainty remains over the concept of TDC (Langendorf et al. 2012; McEwan and Mawdsley 2012). As highlighted by Figure 5.1, TDC is closely related to the notions of SSC and North-South Cooperation (Li and Bonschab 2012; Tortora 2011). Traditionally, bilateral development cooperation has taken place between an industrialised country – acting as a donor – and a recipient from the South. It is therefore commonly labelled as the so-called North-South Cooperation (Jules and Silva 2008). Yet, ongoing shifts in international development cooperation point towards the growing complexity that is characterising what used to be considered as the "South" or the "developing world". Against this background, alternative terms such as "emerging donors", "development partners" and "South-South Cooperation" are more frequently used (Mawdsley 2012a; Woods 2008; Berger and Grimm 2010). Overall, SSC refers to a form of development cooperation between emerging countries and/or developing countries. Within this broad characterisation, two specific definitions of the SSC can be found. First, a technical definition of SSC that refers to the exchange and transfer of expertise, best practices, resources and technology between developing countries (Chahoud 2007; Mehta and Nanda 2005; Morais 2005; Rosseel et al. 2009; Tortora 2011). In addition, a more political or ideological

Fig. 5.1   Trilateral Development Cooperation (TDC)
Source: Compiled by the author

definition of SSC exists that is drawing particular attention to the historical origins of SSC. According to this definition, SSC is not a new phenomenon, but embedded in historical relations going back to the 1950s (Mawdsley 2012b). In fact, the emergence of SSC is closely associated with the end of colonialism. Most importantly, at the 1955 Bandung conference, leaders from Africa and Asia came together for the first time to express the common voice of the "South" (Kragelund 2011a). The origins of SSC are therefore related to efforts by countries of the "global South" to formulating a common political agenda. SSC was primarily an ideological expression of developing countries aimed at countering the hegemony of industrialised countries belonging to the Western and Eastern bloc (Alden and Vieira 2005).

Similarly to NSC, most forms of SSC between developing and/or emerging countries are generally conducted through bilateral channels. By contrast, TDC requires more than two partners and involves a more diverse set of actors. Thus, it corresponds to a so-called "North-South-South partnership" (Berger and Grimm 2010; Pollet et al. 2011; Rosseel et al. 2009). The concept of TDC therefore reflects "a shift from traditional forms of development cooperation towards new formats of international cooperation" (Langendorf 2012, 22). Since the

turn of the century, TDC has been rediscovered as an original tool of development cooperation that underscores the complementarities between NSC and SSC. In particular, multilateral organisations like the UN (UN 2012; Alden and Vieira 2005), the United Nations Economic and Social Council (2008), the World Bank (Ashoff 2010) and the OECD DAC have started to formulate policy proposals to set-up new forms of TDC (OECD 2009c). This has raised the question about the boundaries between TDC and forms of multilateral development cooperation (Stahl 2012). Most academic contributions do not make any distinction between the two forms of development cooperation (McEwan and Mawdsley 2012; Nijinkeu 2009; Rampa and Bilal 2011). For instance, Deborah Bräutigam uses the notion of "tripartite cooperation" to describe agriculture projects in Africa, which are jointly carried out by China and UN agencies, such as the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) (Bräutigam 2009, 65; Bräutigam 2010, 39; Bräutigam and Xiaoyang 2009). In this book, TDC is defined as a new development instrument that significantly differs from multilateral development cooperation in two important aspects. First, it involves fewer actors than multilateral initiatives and is centred on more concrete, small-scale, ad hoc projects. Second, whereas multilateral development cooperation is conducted in the framework of international organisations like the UN or the World Bank and commonly involves exchanges at the *policy level*, TDC encompasses more practical and concrete cooperation at the *project level*.

5.2   The Reform of EU Development Cooperation and Its Implications for China and Africa

Taking the example of the EU's attempts of TDC with China and Africa, this section sheds light on the broader transformation of European development cooperation that started around 2010. Since its establishment, the EU has played a key role in the area of international development cooperation (Mold 2007). Over the years, the EU's development activities have been continuously expanding, making it the second largest world donor. Development policy represents a so-called shared EU competence, which implies that both EU institutions and single EU member states act in parallel as donors to third countries. In terms of EU institutions, EU aid is primarily managed by the European Commission, which is responsible

Table 5.1 Global donor ranking 2015

Top five donors of net ODA in 2015	
Donor	*ODA in US$ billion*
1. USA	31.1
2. UK	18.7
3. EU institutions	13.8
4. Germany	17.8
5. Japan	9.3
6. France	9.2

Source: Compiled by the author based on preliminary data from the OECD DAC (OECD 2016b)

both for designing EU development policies and for implementing aid projects and programmes in developing countries through its delegations (Carbone 2007, 12).

Table 5.1 shows that in 2015 the overall development assistance distributed by EU institutions (henceforth referred to as EU aid) ranked third after that of the USA and the UK. Together, the EU and its 27 member states[55] is the largest donor, accounting for more than half of worldwide aid (OECD 2016b; Carbone 2007; Holland and Doidge 2012, 216). Table 5.1 highlights that in 2015 the ODA distributed by the EU, together with that of the three big member states – the UK, Germany and France – reached around US$60 billion, which was almost double of the aid from the USA.

EU development cooperation is funded through two separate sources: the EU budget and the EDF. Development assistance accounts for around 9 per cent of the total annual EU budget (European Commission 2009a, 28). The EU budget is based on the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) agreed between the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. The MFF is a multi-annual spending plan that translates the EU's policy priorities for at least five years into financial terms. It sets annual maximum amounts for EU expenditure as a whole and for the main categories of expenditure (so-called headings). In terms of development aid, the MMF foresees a number of specific financing instruments. The previous MMF for the period 2007–2013 established, under the budget heading "The EU as a global partner", a set of geographic[56] and thematic[57] financial instruments (DAC 2012, 59).

In terms of the institutions, EU development cooperation is primarily formulated and implemented by the European Commission. Originally, both DG DEV and DG RELEX were involved in EU development policy. While DG DEV was responsible for aid to Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, DG RELEX managed development cooperation with Asia, Latin America, the Middle East, South Africa and the Neighbourhood countries (Gavas and Maxell 2009). In addition, a separate aid implementation office, AIDCO, was created in 2001. Alongside AIDCO, the European Community ECHO acts a separate administration of the European Commission responsible for emergency and humanitarian aid. Moreover, the EU delegations ensure the management and implementation of the aid projects in the specific countries.

Figure 5.2 shows that Africa tops the list of EU aid per region. In 2013, around 38 per cent of the EU's development assistance went to Africa. This share has remained relatively stable since the 1990s and the majority[58] has traditionally been dedicated to sub-Saharan Africa. The EU's particular geographic focus on sub-Saharan Africa can be due to the fact that most of the founding member states of the EU have colonial ties with the African continent (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al. 2007). EU

Fig. 5.2 Geographical distribution of EU aid in 2013 (in percentage)

Source: Compiled by the author based on EU statistics (European Commission 2014, 12)

Note: 16 per cent of the share of EU aid in 2013 was not allocated to any specific region. Instead, it was allocated through thematic financial instruments

development cooperation with sub-Saharan Africa is funded through a specific financial instrument, the EDF, which is dedicated to African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (known as the ACP group). Unlike other financial instruments, the EDF is located outside of the EU budget and based on direct contributions by EU member states[59] (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al. 2007, 33).

Alongside Africa, the EU has also traditionally provided development assistance to China. Most of the EU's aid to China stems from the geographic financial instrument known as the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI). The DCI was launched in 2007 as part of the general budget of the EU. Through the DCI, the EU supports development programmes in Latin America, Asia, the Gulf region and South Africa. In addition to the DCI, China also received assistance coming from thematic financial instruments.

The EU's development policy is based on a number of policy documents. The "European Consensus on Development" represents one of the key development policy documents (European Parliament, Council and Commission 2005). It was jointly adopted by the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament in December 2005. The European Consensus for Development can be seen as a blueprint for a common European development policy, supported both by EU institutions and individual EU member states (Carbone 2007, 55).[60] Through the adoption of different policy documents, the EU has put forward a set of principles and values, which should guide its development policy (Holland and Doidge 2012, 107). Good governance represents one of the most fundamental norms of EU development policy. Since 1990s, the EU has placed particular emphasis on the notion of good governance, together with human rights, rule of law and democracy (Crawford 2007; Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet et al. 2007, 48). In order to ensure that the recipient countries respect these principles, the EU relies on the instrument of aid conditionality (Holland and Doidge 2012, 190). Aid conditionality consists of "the donor setting the development cooperation objectives, goals or methodology, which a recipient government would not otherwise have agreed to if not pressured by the donor (. . .) with threats of the latter terminating or reducing development assistance (. . .) if the set objective, goal or methodology is not compiled with" (Ling 2010, 6). Aid conditionality can either take the form of political or economic conditionality (Holland and Doidge 2012, 192). Political conditionality means that the donor attaches political conditions such as human rights to the delivery of its aid.

In addition to its own development principles, the EU also follows a set of international development standards, in particular those formulated by the OECD DAC (Interview 91Pe). Most of the EU's development assistance is delivered in terms of Official Development Assistance (Holland and Doidge 2012, 215). According to the OECD DAC, not all financial resources from industrialised countries to developing countries qualify as aid. Instead, only financial support aimed at promoting the economic development and welfare of developing countries can be considered as ODA. In order to be considered as ODA, financial flows need to have a concessional character and convey a grant element of at least 25 per cent (OECD 2008d). A majority of EU development assistance is grant-based and complies with the OEDC DAC definition of ODA.

Alongside the concept of ODA, the OECD DAC has also elaborated a number of other specific principles, in particular related to social and environmental standards. In accordance with these norms, EU development aid focuses primarily on support for social infrastructure, in areas like education and health, as well as economic infrastructure, centred on transport and energy (European Commission 2009a, 28). Moreover, the EU also provides direct budget support to developing countries, which means that the aid is given directly to the government of the recipient country (Interviews 76Ae; 69Be).

In 2010, the EU started to initiate an important reform of its development policy. In this process China and Africa played a crucial role (interview). As part of the restructuring of EU development cooperation, bilateral development aid to China was phased out in favour of countries in Africa.

The shift in the EU's development cooperation with China must be seen against China's impressive economic performance over the last three decades and its shift to the status of a middle-income country (MIC).[61] Recently, China has even outperformed other MICs and moved from the status of a lower middle-income country (LMIC) to an upper middle-income country (UMIC) (OECD 2014).[62] China's unprecedented economic development has sparked an intense debate over the necessity of continuing development assistance in terms of ODA to China. Although China still accounts for the second largest number of poor in the world (after India), and poverty reduction remains a fundamental challenge, it has been argued that as a UMIC China generates sufficient resources for its own domestic development and therefore does not need any further development assistance. Against this background, Figure 5.3 shows that ODA from DAC donor

Fig. 5.3 ODA by DAC countries to China, 2000–2014 (US$ million)

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the OECD Creditor Reporting System 2016

Note: The figure only represents the ODA from DAC donor countries, namely France, Germany, the UK and the USA. It does not take into account the ODA distributed by EU institutions to China

countries to China has been declining, in particular since 2007, with a marked plunge of more than 45 per cent between 2007 and 2014.

After extensive consultations on the future of the EU's development policy, the Commission presented a policy proposal in 2011 entitled "Increasing the Impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change" known as the "Agenda for Change" (European Commission 2011a). The new EU development strategy recommended a number of major modifications, including a so-called differentiated EU development approach and a concentration of EU aid where it is most needed (Herbert 2012). According to this new approach, traditional EU grant aid to MICs should be phased out in favour of least developed countries (LDCs), in particular in Africa. In view of implementing the new EU Agenda for Change, the Commission also proposed to reform the rules of the DCI (European Commission 2011c). According to the revised DCI criteria, MICs, starting from 2014, are no longer eligible for traditional bilateral

development aid under DCI. The EU's new development strategy and the reform of DCI have primarily been targeted at emerging donors and China more specifically (Interview 105Be) (Freitas and Mah 2012). The Commission's initial proposal for new governing rules of the DCI has therefore explicitly mentioned China as one of the 19 countries that will no longer be eligible for bilateral aid under the DCI (European Commission 2011c).

The EU's recent decision to terminate traditional bilateral aid to China was not only driven by the argument that China now has enough resources for its domestic development, but also by China's increasing role as provider of aid to Africa. Figure 5.4 shows that while China has

Fig. 5.4   Total aid received and granted by China, 2000–2013 (US$ million)

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the OECD Creditor Reporting System 2016

Note: The figure only represents the ODA from DAC donor countries, namely France, Germany, UK and the USA. It does not take into account the ODA distributed by EU institutions to China

long been one of the largest recipients of international development assistance, it has recently become a so-called emerging donor. From 2010 to 2011 China shifted from a net recipient to a net donor of aid (Chin 2012, 599). As outlined by Fig. 5.4, in 2010, China was, for the first time, a net ODA donor by around US$800 million.

Figure 5.5 shows that over the past 13 years there has been a dramatic increase of total net aid distributed by China to developing countries. At the same time, it highlights that in comparison to DAC donors China is still a rather small supplier of finance to developing countries. This is not only true in comparison to traditional donors like the EU and USA, but also regarding Japan. In 2013, EU institutions and EU DAC members accounted for around US$70 billion in aid, the USA for US$28 billion and Japan for US $21 billion. Instead, China granted only around US$3.2 billion in aid.

Figure 5.6 shows that, similar to the broader development landscape, China remains a rather small development partner with Africa, as compared to other donors. In 2014, the EU and its member states was Africa's first donor. Instead, China – depending on the exact estimates – was only Africa's sixth or seventh largest provider of aid (Kitano 2016).

Fig. 5.5 Total net aid granted by China, the EU and USA, 2000–2013 (US$ million, 2013 prices)

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System and the Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Institute (CARI) 2016

Fig. 5.6   Aid to Africa in 2014 by major DAC donors and China (US$ million)

Source: Compiled by the author based on data from the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System and the Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Institute (CARI) 2016

Figure 5.6 shows that aid from the EU, together with that of France, Germany and the UK, represented around 44 per cent of total aid to Africa in 2013. Among the EU DAC donors, France and the UK were the largest donors to Africa in 2013. While most of the bilateral ODA from France and the UK goes to sub-Saharan Africa, Germany focuses more on South and Central Asia (OECD 2016b).

A comparison between the EU's development assistance to Africa with China's foreign aid to Africa reveals that EU development cooperation is

driven by fundamentally different objectives and principles than that of China. This difference can be explained by the diverging historical relations of both actors with Africa, as well as by the level of domestic development of China and European countries. Regardless of the key differences, it would however be misleading to consider the EU and Chinese aid to Africa in terms of two competing models. Instead of framing EU and Chinese aid in terms of two competing development models – "Beijing Consensus"[63] versus a "European Consensus"[64] – emphasis should be attributed to the comparative advantages of each approach to development cooperation. There are indeed sings pointing to the fact that European and Chinese development assistance to Africa can complement each other. TDC could serve as tool to foster the synergies between the EU's NSC and China's SSC.

In the context of the recent reform of the EU's development policy, the instrument of TDC has become a key priority. Several EU policy documents refer to the tool of TDC (Abdel-Malek 2015; Reisen 2011). In particular, the 2010 EU development strategy reveals the EU's interest in exploring TDC with emerging donors (European Commission 2011a, 10). The EU does take into account TDC not only in the formulation of its new development policy but also in the implementation process. The current MFF for the period 2014–2020 – under the EU's external relations budget – therefore introduces new external financing instruments. These new financial instruments include the Partnership Instrument (PI) (European Commission 2011b). This 955 million Euro financing instrument represents a major innovation as it provides the basis for a new type of "differentiated development partnership" between the EU and MICs like China. The PI is aimed at addressing global challenges beyond traditional development cooperation and is particularly targeted at MICs. Through this new instrument countries like China that graduated from traditional bilateral ODA could still receive EU funding. In contrast to forms of traditional development aid, the new partnerships between the EU and emerging countries are primarily based on loans and technical cooperation, rather than grants (European Commission 2011a). Most importantly, the PI could also serve as a financing tool for TDC between the EU and MICs like China (Herbert 2012).

5.3   THE BILATERAL EU-AFRICA STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

The efforts of establishing a trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue can not only be explained against the background of the reform of EU development cooperation, but also as a result of the bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership.

According to experts, the proposal of a trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue largely arose in the context of EU efforts of establishing a bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership (Carbone 2011, 211). As part of the bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, EU policymakers started undertaking efforts to encourage African policymakers – through the African Union – to engage in trilateral cooperation with China. Hence, this section summarised the process leading to the bilateral strategic partnership between the EU and the AU and provides the foundation for the analysis of the EU's trilateral engagement with China and Africa outlined in Section 5.3.

Since the turn of the century, the EU's bilateral relations with Africa have changed fundamentally. This shift has been favoured by policy developments in Africa. In particular, the adoption of the Constitutive Act of the AU in 2000 laying the ground for the establishment of a continental intergovernmental organisation bringing together most states[65] of the African continent. On the basis of its own experience, the EU has been a key supporter of Africa's regional integration process (Interviews 6Oe; 5Be; 101Ba; 103Ba) (Farrell 2010).

In this context, EU policymakers have started reconsidering the EU's relations with Africa. Traditionally, the EU's external relations with Africa have been governed by three policy frameworks, dividing the African continent into three different geographical areas (Bretheron and Vogler 1999; Carbone 2007; Holland 2002). First, the EU sustains a particular structure for cooperation with countries of sub-Saharan Africa, the so-called African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group. The Cotonou Agreement, which was adopted in 2000, presents the legal basis for the ACP group. It foresees a specific institutional framework,[66] including a permanent ACP secretariat based in Brussels (Holland 2002, 49). The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and, in particular, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, presents a second policy framework that guides the EU's relations with North Africa. Finally, the Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA) and the 2006 EU-

South Africa Strategic Partnership (European Commission 2006b) serve as guides for the EU's relations with South Africa.

In the view of providing a more coherent overall policy framework, European policymakers proposed the creation of a broader EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, centred on the AU (Interviews 1Be; 5Be; 13Be; 16Be; 70Bea; 78Ae; 102Be). The structural similarities and the common rational of regional integration between the AU and the EU can serve as an explanatory factor of the bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership. Experts have highlighted that the different organs of the AU largely resemble those of the EU, which served as a model for the AU (Adebajo 2012; Bach 2011, 36). The EU-Africa Strategic Partnership differs from other bilateral strategic partnerships of the EU in that it is centred on a regional organisation and not a single country (European Commission 2010, 3). While some experts have argued that the EU's bilateral strategic partnership with the AU does not enjoy the same status as the other EU strategic partnerships with single countries (Interview 102Be), this section however shows that similar to other bilateral strategic partnerships of the EU the bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership represents an institutionalised framework of bilateral diplomatic relations.

Like the bilateral EU-China Strategic Partnership, the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership is based on regular EU-Africa summits, bringing together high-level representatives from the EU and the AU, as well as European and African heads of states and government. The first EU-Africa summit was held in 2000. In addition to the exchanges at the level of heads of states and government, there are several actors on the side of the EU and the AU involved in the bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership. Most importantly, the EU-AU Strategic Partnership is driven by regular Commission-to-Commission meetings between the European Commission and the African Union Commission (AUC) (Adebajo 2012, 61; Bach 2011, 41). The AUC acts as a permanent secretariat of the organisation and is based in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. It is headed by a chairperson, who is elected for a four-year term. In October 2012, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma took over the position of AUC chairperson from Jean Ping, who held the position since 2008. The AU chairperson is supported by a deputy chairperson. Similarly to the European Commission, the AUC has several Commissioners in charge of specific thematic portfolios. In particular, the AU Permanent Mission to the EU in Brussels plays an important role in fostering the daily collaboration between the AUC and the European Commission. In fact, the AU's predecessor – Organisation of

African Unity – had already opened, in the 1970s, a Representational Office in Brussels, which was later upgraded to the rank AU Permanent Mission (European Commission 2009b, 11). Instead, the EU waited until 2007 to open a special EU delegation to AU at the headquarters of the AU in Addis Ababa (Council of the EU 2007b).

In terms of its policy agenda, the bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership is structured around eight thematic partnerships in the areas of energy, climate change, migration, mobility and employment, democratic governance, peace and security, trade, regional integration and infrastructures, MDGs, science, information society and space (European Commission 2007c; European Commission 2008c).

The bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership was, for the most part, initiated by the European Commission. Starting in 2005, the Commission began reviewing the EU's external relations with Africa. Within the European Commission, it was the DG DEV that was in charge of the formulation of the EU's bilateral strategic partnership with Africa. There are two factors explaining the lead of DG DEV in the establishment EU's strategic partnership with Africa. First, in the context of the European Commission's internal structure in the period from 2004 to 2009, DG DEV did not hold competences related to development cooperation, but was also the only Commission DG with specific geographical expertise on Africa. While DG RELEX was in charge of the EU's diplomatic relations with most parts of the world, it has only limited know-how related to the African continent. Second, Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Louis Michel was keen on fostering the European Commission's political mandate and providing it with a political mandate that would go beyond technical expertise in the area of development cooperation (Carbone 2011, 212) (Interviews 1Be, 3Be; 5Be, 19Ke, 90Be). In this context, he thought that the establishment of the EU's bilateral strategic partnership with Africa would allow the Commission to adopt a more diplomatic role and provide DG DEV with greater autonomy within the Commission, in particular vis-à-vis DG RELEX, which was in charge of the other EU strategic partnerships.

As part of the Commission's reforms of its relations with Africa, DG DEV proposed two major innovations. First, it started exploring ways to move away from particular relations with countries of sub-Saharan Africa – through the ACP group – and to develop a continental approach directed towards the African continent as a whole. For this purpose the Commission started providing particular support to the newly established

AU, which was considered as Africa's "natural partner" to the EU. Second, the Commission reconsidered the purely development-oriented EU-Africa agenda and started including boarder political issues into its diplomatic discussion with the AU and individual African countries (Bach 2011; Grimm and Kielwein 2005). In 2005 and 2007, the Commission published two communications (European Commission 2005; European Commission 2007c). Together with policy documents issued by the Council, the two Commission communications laid the foundations for the establishment of the bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership.

In its 2005 communication the Commission called for the adoption of a single "EU Africa Strategy" (European Commission 2005). The policy documents suggested that only through the adoption of a common "EU Africa policy" could the EU strengthen its global role and maintain its privileged relations with this region of the world. In terms of the content of this novel EU policy, the Commission document highlighted that the EU Africa policy should be directed towards the whole African continent and go beyond traditional development cooperation, mainly by putting more emphasis on a political EU-Africa dialogue (Kingah 2006).

On the basis of the communication issued by the European Commission, in November 2005 the GAERC adopted "Conclusions on an EU Strategy for Africa" (Council of the EU 2005a). In line with the Commission's proposal, the Council Conclusions reflected a preference for the foreign policy instrument of a transformative EU engagement with Africa. In contrast to the Commission's proposal, the Council policy document put more emphasis on principles of human rights and good governance. This clearly reveals that the Council supported transformative engagement. Following the GAERC Council Conclusions, European heads of state and government officially endorsed the "EU Strategy for Africa" on the 12th of December 2005.

Subsequent to the adoption of the EU Africa Strategy, the Council and the Commission started exploring the idea of a bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership. In May 2005, the General Secretariat of the Council issued a Non-Paper putting forward the proposal of a bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership for the first time (Council of the EU 2005b). The Non-Paper was followed by a draft report entitled "The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership – The Way Forward and Key Achievements in 2006", which was released by the Council in December 2006 (Council of the EU 2006a). In line with the work of the Council, in 2007 the Commission published a communication

supporting the idea of a bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership (European Commission 2007c). The policy document indicates a shift in the EU's perspective on Africa. In contrast to previous Commission documents referring to "a strategy for Africa", the 2007 communication calls for "a political partnership with Africa" (European Commission 2007c, 3). Unlike in the past, when the EU considered African countries primarily in terms of "recipients of aid", the EU has started looking at the AU as a "strategic partner". In line with the EU's changing perspective on Africa, the Commission proposed the establishment of several thematic partnerships as the foundation for the bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership. These specific partnerships would go beyond development cooperation to include areas such as energy, climate change, migration, mobility and employment.

On the basis of the different policy documents issued by the Commission and the Council, the bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership was officially endorsed by both European and African leaders at the second EU-Africa Summit held in Lisbon in December 2007 and enshrined in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) (Council of the EU 2007a).

The EU's initiative of forming a bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership has to be considered against China's growing influence in Africa (Carbone 2011, 211; Kingah 2006; Schmidt 2008; Vetter 2007). In the process of strengthening bilateral EU-Africa diplomatic relations, EU policymakers were confronted with the presence of new actors in Africa, most notably that of China (Stahl 2011a). The issue of Sino-African relations therefore proposed itself as a major geopolitical topic on the agenda of the nascent bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership (Kingah 2006; Schmidt 2008; Vetter 2007). The second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon can serve as a clear indication of China's impact on the bilateral EU-Africa relationship. Several EU member states were threatening to boycott the summit due to a disagreement with African leaders on human rights issues (Carbone 2011). In particular, the UK called on other EU member states not to attend the summit because of the participation of the president of Zimbabwe Robert Mugabe, on whom the EU had imposed a travel ban due to his responsibility for flagrant human rights violations. Faced with the resistance of some EU member states, the General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission put particular emphasis on convincing European heads of

states and governments of the importance of the summit. The eagerness of EU officials to hold the second EU-Africa summit against the will of some EU member states can be explained by the successful organisation of China's ministerial meeting of the FOCAC in Beijing in 2006 (Bach 2011, 40) (Interviews 6Oe; 65Be).

The second EU-Africa Summit shows that China's increasing engagement with Africa has prompted the EU policymakers to take another look at their relationship with Africa. It is therefore not surprising that the 2007 Commission communication recognised the fact that the EU is no longer Africa's only partner. In particular, it stated that as a consequence of Africa's growing relations with China the EU "must be willing to reinforce, and in some areas reinvent" its current relationship with Africa (European Commission 2007c, 3). Moreover, the formation of the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership has been accompanied by a new European policy discourse towards Africa, centred on "partnership" and "African ownership" (Interview 69Be; 90Be; 102Be). This shift in the EU's approach towards Africa can be partly attributed to China's growing relations with Africa, providing Africa with greater international leverage (Interviews 70Ba; 80Aa; 81Aa; 85Aa; 103Ba).

In sum, this section has revealed that the bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership was largely driven by the EU's intention to build a new framework for diplomatic relations with the whole African continent through the AU, and involved a broader set of topics beyond development cooperation.

5.4   Trilateral EU Engagement with Africa and China

Against the background of the reform of EU development cooperation and the establishment of the bilateral EU-Africa Partnership, this section analyses in more detail the EU's attempt to launch a trilateral dialogue with China and Africa. The European Commission and the Council of the EU have been the primary forces behind this process. Unlike in the case of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa, the European Parliament did not contribute to the EU's trilateral engagement with China and Africa. There are two major reasons explaining the absence of the European Parliament regarding the EU, China and Africa trilateral dialogue initiative. First, unlike the Commission, the European Parliament has no competences to carry out development projects. Second, although the European Parliament – mostly through its Development Committee – is

involved in the formulation of EU development policy, it did not identify TDC as a relevant topic. On the contrary, as outlined by the first empirical case study in Chapter 3, most of the MEPs have been rather sceptical regarding the idea of trilateral cooperation with China and Africa. The draft report on "China's policy and its effects on Africa" (European Parliament 2007) and a resolution on China's policy and its effects on Africa (European Parliament 2008c) clearly indicated the critical stance of the European Parliament regarding a trilateral dialogue with China and Africa.

In 2007, EU policymakers started exploring the idea of a trilateral cooperation with Africa and China. Similar to the first case study of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa, the Commission acted as an agenda setter in the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue. The trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue has been driven by institutional rivalries between different DGs of the Commission. As outlined in Chapter 3, the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa was driven by DG RELEX of the Commission. Although the process of the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue cannot be dissociated from developments in the bilateral EU-China Strategic Partnership, the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue was primarily initiated by DG DEV. In fact, DG DEV proposed in 2007 a separate trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue as a specific response to the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa established by DG RELEX some years earlier.

Within DG DEV the proposal for a trilateral dialogue with Africa and China was initially put forward by the management of DG DEV, namely the Commissioner for Development and Humanitarian Aid Louis Michel and the Director-General of DG DEV. They saw the trilateral dialogue as an opportunity for DG DEV to increase its political profile with regards to Africa and gain greater political autonomy within the Commission, in particular in relation to DG RELEX (Interviews 1Be, 14Be, 15Be, 24Ce; 67Be; 90Be). According to the institutional structure of the first Barroso Commission from 2004 to 2009, only DG RELEX was officially attributed competences related to Asia and China. Yet, through the formulation of the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue, DG DEV acquired de facto expertise on China. For the drafting of the 2008 communication "The EU, Africa and China: Towards trilateral dialogue and cooperation" (European Commission 2008b), DG DEV relied on one of its own officials with particular expertise on China. Hence, DG DEV saw the trilateral dialogue as a tool to expand its area of expertise beyond

development issues in Africa, and to broaden diplomatic discussions with other partners, in particular emerging donors like China. The formulation of the trilateral dialogue allowed DG DEV to establish a parallel level of "China expertise" – although very limited – to that of DG RELEX.

Although the policy proposal of a trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue mainly emanated from the management of DG DEV, it was subsequently also supported by most officials within DG DEV (Carbone 2011). The interest by DG DEV officials for trilateral cooperation with China and Africa has to be seen against the background of the EU's multilateral engagement with China on Africa and in particular the Commission's involvement in the OECD DAC. Although Chapter 4 of this book has shown that the multilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa within the DAC evolved only around 2008/2009, it nevertheless contributed to strengthening the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue. Through the participation in the activities of the DAC, Commission officials from DG DEV familiarised themselves with the practice of TDC (Interviews 1Be; 15Be). In particular, the Commission's contribution to the China-DAC Study Group allowed officers from DG DEV to establish more regular contact with their Chinese counterparts. This shows that the notion of TDC was mostly brought into the European policy discourse through the EU's involvement in multilateral development cooperation in the OECD DAC. As part of the EU's contribution to the work of the DAC on SSC, the Council of the EU also adopted several Council conclusions requesting the Commission to further explore the prospects of TDC (Council of the EU 2009a; Council of the EU 2010; Reisen 2011).

Despite the fact that DG DEV took responsibility for the overall coordination of the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue, it also collaborated with other Commission DGs, in particular with the DG AIDCO. Due to the fact that – as compared to the multilateral development cooperation – concrete projects represent a key element of TDC, the collaboration between DG DEV and DG AIDCO was crucial for the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue (Interviews 1Be; 15Be; 67Be; 90Be).

The organisation of a conference entitled "Partners in competition? The EU, Africa and China" on the 28th of June 2007 marked the beginning of the Commission's efforts to forge a trilateral dialogue with Africa and China (Wissenbach 2007). The event brought together more than 150 participants, including government officials, diplomats, academics, as well as civil society and business representatives (Centre for Chinese

Studies 2007). The daylong event was conceived by the Commission as an initial informal encounter between European Commission officials from DG DEV officials with Chinese and African stakeholders to explore the prospects of trilateral cooperation (Wissenbach 2007).

As regards non-EU participants, most representatives came from Africa rather than from China. However, African countries only sent low-ranking officials from their embassies in Brussels. Apart from the vice-president of the African Development Bank, senior African representatives from regional African institutions were largely missing. It is particularly striking that no representative from the AU attended the event. A possible explanation for the lack of high-ranking African participants could be linked to the choice of the conference location. Due to the fact that the conference was organised at EU's headquarters in Brussels, it was more difficult for African representatives to attend the event. In contrast to the African participants, the Commission was successful in attracting several high-ranking Chinese officials, such as the then Ambassador of the Chinese Mission to the EU Guan Chengyuan (Guan 2007). Most importantly, the opening speech of the conference was delivered by the then Special Representative of the Chinese Government for African Affairs, Ambassador Liu Guijin (Falletti 2007a; Liu 2007).

Although the objective of the gathering was to allow for an open exchange between European, African and Chinese stakeholders, the conference agenda was primarily set by the Commission. This points towards the fact that the Commission largely conceived the conference as a foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement and explains why the discussions were largely centred on topics of concern for the EU. In fact, the conference was centred on presentations by Commission officials on different European development instruments in the area of infrastructures, natural resources and regional integration. Through these presentations, Commission officials tried to demonstrate to African participants the benefits of European development standards and practices. In particular, EU officials tried to convince African representatives of the necessity of entering into a trilateral dialogue on the basis of the objective advantages of EU development procedures and the need for China to learn from the European experience, which would only be possible in a trilateral setting.

Moreover, the conference served the purpose of presenting to Chinese policymakers the EU's positive experience in development cooperation with Africa (Interviews 1Be; 4Be; 15Be; 25Cc). From the perspective of the Commission, the conference therefore also presented an informal

forum to familiarise Chinese policymakers with European development norms and practices, as well as with international aid standards. This explains why, in his opening speech, Commissioner Michel stressed the fact that TDC between the EU, China and Africa should consider existing international development standards, even though they were formulated in the absence of China (Michel 2007). The Commissioner's emphasis on the formulation of a trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue in the context of existing international development frameworks, rather than on the basis of new arrangements developed jointly with China, serves as an indication of the Commission's choice for the policy instrument of transformative engagement.

Following the organisation of this first trilateral EU, China and Africa event, the Commission started considering the publication of a specific policy document – in form of a communication – to lay out the basis for TDC with China and Africa. In the view of this trilateral communication, the Commission launched – from April to June 2008 – an official public consultation requesting written input from European, Chinese and African representatives (Interviews 1Be; 15Be). For the purpose of the public consultation, DG DEV elaborated a specific questionnaire on the prospects of TDC between the EU, China and Africa. The questionnaire was driven by two specific objectives of the Commission. On one hand, the Commission wanted to get a better understanding of the general perspective of European, Chinese and Africa stakeholders regarding the idea of a trilateral dialogue; on the other hand, it was keen on receiving concrete proposals for trilateral projects (European Commission 2008e, 2). Hence, the questionnaire asked questions about possible areas of cooperation, the implementation of the trilateral dialogue and the actors to be involved in the trilateral cooperation between the EU, China and Africa (European Commission 2008d). It was disseminated in English and French through the website of the EU delegations in Beijing and in different African countries (Interviews 90Be, 95Be). As a result of the consultation, the Commission received 47 replies. DG DEV analysed these answers and published a detailed summary report (European Commission 2008e). According to the Commission, the consultation provided encouraging results for TDC between the EU, China and Africa. In fact, the summary report of the consultation highlights that "a large majority of respondents were positive about the potential trilateral cooperation" (European Commission 2008e, 6).

The Commission's public consultation exercise largely served as a foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement with African and China. The questionnaire elaborated by the Commission in the context of the public consultation was composed of a majority of questions with predetermined multiple-choice answers and therefore offered only little possibility for Chinese and African stakeholders to provide new input to the trilateral policy agenda proposed by the Commission. Thus, instead of providing African and Chinese stakeholders with an opportunity to influence the content of the communication, the public consultation served as a "rubber stamp" for an existing trilateral policy agenda elaborated by DG DEV (Interviews 2Be; 103Ba). This might also explain why – as part of the public consultation – the Commission received the majority of responses from European rather than from African and Chinese representatives (European Commission 2008e, 2).

As a result of the public consultation, DG DEV issued a draft communication entitled "The EU, Africa and China: Towards Trilateral Dialogue and Cooperation on Peace, Stability and Sustainable Development" (Interviews 1Be; 15Be; 65Be). By mentioning Africa directly after the EU and before China in the title of the draft communication, DG DEV wanted to put particular emphasis on Africa's role in the trilateral dialogue. In this context, the AU was identified as the main African partner for the trilateral dialogue. For this reason, the draft policy document particularly emphasised the benefits of TDC in the field of peace and security as the main area of expertise of the AU.

Overall, the public consultation process played only a minor role in the formulation of the trilateral agenda. Instead, the actual content of the trilateral dialogue was mostly decided through informal political discussions between the EU and its African and Chinese partners.

In regard to Africa, the Commission largely failed to enter into discussions with diplomatic representatives. In fact, only limited exchanges between Commission officials and African diplomats took place in Brussels (Interviews 103Ba; 70Ba). This is even more surprising considering Africa's strong diplomatic presence in Brussels. In addition to the Permanent Mission of the AU to the EU, the permanent secretariat of the ACP group is also based in Brussels and could have served as another forum for exchange with African representatives. Yet, no indication can be found that the Commission discussed the proposal of a trilateral dialogue with either of these two bodies.

As the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue primarily originated from the headquarters in Brussels (Interviews 90Be; 69Be; 65Be; 53Se; 76Ae), the Commission also tried to reach out to African partners by consulting its field delegations in Africa (Interviews 69Be; 53Se; 76Ae; 27Ce). However, the EU delegations in Africa only provided a limited input to the process (Interviews 82Ae 84Be, 88Se). This can be explained by the fact that prior to the Lisbon Treaty EU delegations in Africa played only a marginal political role and were mostly in charge of the technical implementation EU development projects (Interviews 76Ae; 53Se; 69Be). Due to the fact that the AU was identified as the main African partner in the trilateral dialogue, the EU delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa was the most involved EU delegation in Africa in the formulation of the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue (Interviews 5Be; 78Ae; 102Be). Commission officials in Brussels tasked the EU delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa to informally sound out the AU and its member states on the EU's trilateral proposal (House of Lords 2009, 257) (Interviews 75Ae, 78Ae; 102Be). Despite this attempt of the EU to reach out to its African partners through the delegation to the AU, there is no indication that Commission representatives made specific attempts to travel to Africa to discuss the proposal of a trilateral dialogue with officials from the AU and African heads of state or government (Interviews 70Ba; 75Ae; 87Aa). This can serve as an indication for the Commission's use of the foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement. Rather than investing time to take into account the opinions of African stakeholders, the Commission was excepting its African "partners" to take over its trilateral dialogue proposal without any questions.

The lack of personal exchange between the Commission and African representatives contrasts greatly with the Commission's intense interaction with China. Indeed, during the 2007 conference Commissioner Louis Michel officially announced that he intended to travel to Beijing to directly exchange with Chinese officials about the establishment of the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue (Michel 2007). As a follow-up to the conference, regular meetings between the Commission and Chinese diplomats based at the Chinese Permanent Representation to the EU in Brussels took place (Carbone 2011, 121) (Interviews 1Be; 15Be), and DG DEV also established direct contacts to Chinese government officials in Beijing. These contacts were largely facilitated by the EU delegation in Beijing (Interviews 1Be; 12Bc; 27Ce). Overall, Commissioner Louis Michel travelled to Beijing several times to discuss personally with

Chinese government officials about the prospects of an EU, China and Africa trilateral dialogue (Interviews 3Be; 15Be; 66Be; 67Be; 90Be). The first direct meeting between Commissioner Louis Michel and Chinese government representatives took place in Beijing in August 2007 as a follow-up to the earlier discussions held at the conference organised by the Commission in Brussels two months earlier (Carbone 2011, 212; Michel 2007; Tywuschik 2007). Following this initial encounter in Beijing, the Commission made attempts to organise a second meeting between the EU Development Commissioner and Chinese policymakers in Beijing, with an eye towards exploring more concrete prospects of TDC between the EU, China and Africa. A second visit by Commissioner Michel to Beijing was scheduled for October 2007. This second trip was, however, cancelled due to the failure by the Chinese authorities to identify relevant policymakers for discussing the agenda of a trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue (Falletti 2007b). In April 2008, the president of the Commission, together with a delegation of several Commissioners, travelled to Beijing. Commissioner Louis Michel joined the Commission delegation and used the occasion to lobby for the proposal of a trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue (Falletti 2008a; Ying 2008). The second visit of Commissioner Louis Michel to Beijing provided the basis for a third trip to Beijing a few months later (Carbone 2011, 212; Falletti 2008b).

The intense exchange of views between high-level officials from the Commission and China reveals an important shift in the Commission's trilateral engagement with China. In contrast to its initial preference for transformative engagement, the Commission increasingly used the policy instrument of reciprocal trilateral engagement with China. There are two major reasons that can explain why the Commission decided to put greater emphasis on the policy instrument of reciprocal engagement with China.

First, within the Commission, DG DEV faced growing opposition related to its proposal of a trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue (Carbone 2011, 213). The inter-service consultation among different Commission DGs, which took place in preparation of the trilateral communication, revealed internal resistance within the Commission and expressed growing doubts on the usefulness of a trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue (Carbone 2011, 214). DG DEV was faced with resistance from the cabinet of president of the Commission José Manuel Barroso, which feared that the trilateral dialogue would damage the

Commission's relationship with both Africa and China (Interviews 1Be, 65Be; 67Be; 90Be) (Falletti 2008b). Moreover, DG RELEX was concerned that the trilateral dialogue would undermine the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa (Carbone 2011, 213; Falletti 2008b) (Interviews 14Be; 24Ce). As a consequence of the internal resistance within the Commission, DG DEV had to rely even more on China's support for the formation of a trilateral dialogue. Against this background, DG DEV became more open to the use of reciprocal engagement with China.

A second reason explaining the shift in the Commission's trilateral approach towards China is linked to the growing diplomatic experience of DG DEV officials with China. DG DEV officials drew lessons from the obstacles their colleagues from DG RELEX encountered when proposing that China enter into a bilateral dialogue on Africa in 2005 and therefore closely integrated Chinese policymakers into the formulation of the trilateral dialogue from the very beginning. Moreover, growing exchanges with Chinese policymakers made DG DEV officials become aware of the fact that – due to China's particular economic and political role – China did not rely on European aid in the same way as most African countries and the Commission therefore had to look for alternative foreign policy instruments than the traditional transformative engagement.

In particular, Commissioner Louis Michel's third visit to Beijing in August 2008 can be considered as a clear indication for the Commission's shifts to reciprocal engagement with China. On the occasion of his visit to China, the Commissioner published an article in the Chinese newspaper *China Daily*. In this article, he explained that the aim of his third visit to China was the implementation of the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue (Michel 2008). The newspaper article shows the EU's eagerness to acquire a better understanding of the Chinese policy in Africa, which can be seen as a clear indication for the Commission's choice for reciprocal engagement. Furthermore, Commissioner Louis Michel argued that "developing a triangular partnership with China and Africa is the opportunity of this century to tackle more effectively global challenges that affect us all" (Michel 2008). This shows that, as part of its choice for the policy instrument of reciprocal engagement, DG DEV shifted its attention from a trilateral dialogue centred on development procedures and standards to put more emphasis on concrete solutions through trilateral cooperation efforts with China.

The final text of the trilateral communication serves as a clear illustration of the Commission's preference for a more reciprocal type of engagement with China. Against the background of the consultations between the Commission and the Chinese leadership, DG DEV substantially revised the Commission's draft policy document on trilateral cooperation with China and Africa (Interviews 3Be; 65Be, 66Be; 15Be; 90Be) and published the communication "The EU, Africa and China: Towards Trilateral Dialogue and Cooperation" only in October 2008 (European Commission 2008b). Most importantly, the initial title of the communication was changed from "The EU, Africa and China: Towards Trilateral Dialogue and Cooperation on Peace, Stability and Sustainable Development" (European Commission 2008e) to the more generic title of "The EU, Africa and China: Towards Trilateral Dialogue and Cooperation" (European Commission 2008b). This shows that the Commission took Chinese demands on board, asking to withdraw the specific reference to trilateral cooperation in the area of peace and security in the title.

The Commission's communication represents a relatively short policy document of eight pages. It proposes the following four sectors for trilateral cooperation with Africa and China: (1) Peace and security, (2) infrastructures, (3) environment and sustainable management of natural resources and (4) agriculture and food security. The publication of the Communication was accompanied by a Commission Staff Working Document (European Commission 2008a). The Commission Staff Working Document is longer than the actual communication and contains a number of annexes, outlining more concrete trilateral projects in the four sectors (European Commission 2008a).

Overall, the policy document puts the EU and China "on an equal footing" and does not depict the EU as "the more experienced partner" in Africa as compared to China (Austermann 2012b, 27). Instead, experts have noted that the Commission's trilateral communication "eagerly stresses the EU's and China's commonalities regarding their Africa policy" (Austermann 2012b, 27).

Another indication for the Commission's choice for the policy instrument of reciprocal engagement with China is the fact that the four areas of trilateral cooperation proposed by the trilateral policy document reflect both Chinese and European policy priorities. In particular, the 2008 communication shows that the Commission was receptive to

China's request of including the topic of natural resources and infrastructures into the trilateral dialogue (Interviews 2Be; 15Be; 12Bc). This comes as no surprise considering that the identification of these four sectors was the outcome of successful consultations between the Commission and Chinese policymakers (House of Lords 2009). Finally, the Commission's choice for a more reciprocal engagement with China is also mirrored by the guiding principles outlined by the communication. The communication proposes the following four guiding principles for the EU, China and Africa trilateral cooperation: pragmatic, progressive, shared approach and effective aid.

In contrast to China, the text of the communication reveals the Commission's choice for a foreign policy based on transformative engagement with Africa. For instance, the first three sectors for trilateral cooperation – (1) peace and security, (2) infrastructures and (3) environment and sustainable management of natural resources – largely corresponded to the EU's priorities and did not include issues of relevance to Africa (European Commission 2008e). The fourth sector of TDC – agriculture and food security – was only added at a later stage (Interviews 1Be; 3Be, 15Be). The founding document of the NEPAD shows the priority attributed by African policymakers to the topic of agriculture and food security (NEPAD 2001). In this context, experts noted that the 2005 EU Africa strategy had already failed to respond to African demands of putting more focus on the topic of agriculture (Sohet 2007, 3).

Whereas the Commission's proposal for a trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue derived quite naturally from its attempts at reforming its development cooperation and building a bilateral strategic partnership with Africa, the Council was initially more cautious regarding the idea of a trilateral development dialogue with Africa and China.

The Council's initially hesitant stance can be explained by the fact that single EU member states took more time to comprehend the geostrategic implications of the growing Sino-Africa relationship for the EU's role in Africa (Alden and Sidiropoulos 2009). Experts have stressed the "feeling of superiority" of some EU member states, which were convinced that their "pre-eminent position" on the African continent could not be "seriously undermined in the near future by a newcomer such as China" (Huliaras and Magliveras 2008, 411). This was confirmed by Commission officials, who explained that during meetings of the Committee of Permanent Representatives they struggled to make member states' ambassadors understand the importance of China's strategic

interaction with Africa and the need for the EU to adapt its policy to this geopolitical shift (Interviews 1Be; 90Be; 15Be).

The lack of a clear response by the Council to the emergence of China in Africa is largely reflected in the 2005 Council Conclusions on the EU Strategy for Africa (Council of the EU 2005a). Whereas the initial Commission communication proposing an EU Africa Strategy explicitly referred to Africa's changing geopolitical position and China's growing presence in Africa (European Commission 2005, 10), the policy document adopted by the Council did not mention China (Huliaras and Magliveras 2008, 410). It only called for improved international coordination with "other donors", such as the UN, International financial institutions and "rapidly developing economies" (Council of the EU 2005a, 3).

Yet, on the basis of the work undertaken by the Commission, the General Secretariat of the Council began to realise the need for the EU to review its diplomatic relations with Africa and to take China's growing geopolitical influence into account. Hence, Council officials carried out a series of policy initiatives to raise awareness among EU member states about the need to adapt the EU's Africa policy and possible benefits of entering into a trilateral dialogue with China and Africa (Interviews 5Be; 7Be). This eventually led to a shift in the Council's position, which was reflected in the policy document on the "EU-Africa Strategic Partnership", adopted in December 2006 (Council of the EU 2006a). The Council policy document called for the formation of a trilateral dialogue with China and Africa in order to support "Africa's own commitment to poverty reduction and sustainable development underpinned by peace and security, human rights, good governance, democracy and sound economic management" (Council of the EU 2006a). The fact that the Council called for TDC with Africa and China as a tool to promote of human rights, good governance and democracy in Africa shows the Council's preference for the foreign policy instrument of transformative trilateral engagement with China and Africa.

Within the Council, the three "big" EU member states were most supportive of the Commission's proposal of a trilateral dialogue with Africa and China (Interviews 13Be; 16Be; 15Be; 65Be; 23Ce). The support by Germany, France and the UK can be explained on the basis of their economic interests in Africa. Government representatives of the "big three" identified the trilateral dialogue with Africa and China as a suitable response to the growing economic presence of China in Africa and a tool

for defending European economic interests in Africa. Germany – which held the EU Council presidency in the first half of 2007 and was involved in the preparations for the second EU-Africa Summit organised under the Portuguese Council presidency in December 2007 – first publicly raised the issue of economic competition between Europe and China in Africa. In November 2006, the German chancellor Angela Merkel openly mentioned the EU's strategic interests in Africa in the area of trade and natural resource and how they are increasingly being challenged by the Chinese presence on the continent (Merkel 2006). Following the same line of thought, France – a former colonial power with strong economic ties to Africa – also realised the added value of a European response to China's economic competition in Africa. Holding the Council presidency in the second half of 2008, France largely facilitated the adoption of the trilateral dialogue by the Council (Carbone 2011, 214) (Interviews 7Be; 15Be; 24Ce).

On the basis of the support by Germany, France and the UK, the Council started undertaking more concrete efforts at entering into a trilateral dialogue with Africa and China. It is interesting to note that within the Council, the Commission's trilateral communication was primarily addressed by the Council Working Group for Africa and not by the Asia Council Working Group (Interviews 5Be; 7Be; 13Be; 16Be). The lack of involvement of the COASI Working Group can be explained by the fact that the policy proposal was elaborated under the lead of the Commission's DG DEV, which formally only had competences related to Africa and not to Asia/China. Following a draft document proposed by the COAFR Working Group, the General Affairs Council adopted on the 10th of November 2008 Council Conclusions on a trilateral dialogue between the EU, China and Africa (Council of the EU 2008a).

The Council Conclusions largely supported the Commission's proposal of establishing a trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue (Council of the EU 2008a). Regarding the policy instruments proposed, the document shows the Council's preference for transformative trilateral engagement with Africa. This is, for instance, reflected by the fact that the Council Conclusions highlight that the trilateral dialogue "will support the efforts undertaken by Africa and by the international community to promote democratisation, political and economic integration, good governance and respect for human rights" (Council of the EU 2008a).

As regards trilateral engagement with China, the Council Conclusions suggest a different policy instrument than that proposed by the

Commission. Experts have explained this by the fact that the Council has been "less optimistic towards China in Africa than the Commission" (Austermann 2012b, 29). In contrast to the Commission's communication, the Council Conclusions on the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue (Council of the EU 2008a) called for the policy instrument of transformative engagement with China. This shows that most EU member states saw trilateral cooperation as a tool to bring China closer to EU and international development practices. On several occasions, the Council policy document stresses that the trilateral dialogue should "be developed progressively through existing fora" and be "based on existing plans and programmes" (Council of the EU 2008a). In this context, EU member states included an explicit reference to the OECD DAC concepts of Official Development Assistance and aid effectiveness into the Council document. Another sign of the Council's preference for transformative engagement is the fact that the Council argued in favour of a trilateral dialogue centred on peace and security. The Council Conclusions stressed that "particular attention should be given to cooperation in the area of peace and security, where the European Union and China can both contribute to the stability of the African countries and to strengthening African crisis management capabilities" (Council of the EU 2008a). This contrasts with the final text of the Commission's communication that, in response to Chinese concerns related to the principle of non-interference, only put a more subtle emphasis on TDC in the area of peace and security.

Interestingly, mostly smaller EU member states advocated for the policy instrument of transformative trilateral engagement with China, arguing that the EU should not compromise its international development norms and standards (Interviews 5Be; 7Be; 65Be). Instead, Germany, France and the UK supported a more reciprocal type of trilateral EU engagement with China states (Interviews 5Be; 7Be; 13Be; 16Be). This can be explained by the fact that Germany, France and the UK saw the trilateral dialogue as a pragmatic policy instrument, centred on concrete efforts (House of Lords 2009, 161,256). Thus – in parallel to the EU's efforts – Germany, France and the UK had also approached Chinese policymakers for setting up trilateral development projects (Carbone 2011, 214; Craig-McQuaide et al. 2011; Rosengren et al. 2013; Stahl 2012) (Interviews 39Ce; 36Ce; 34Ce; 33Ce; 28Ce; 17Oc).

Overall, this section illustrated that both the Commission and the Council were involved in the efforts of establishing a trilateral dialogue with China and Africa. While both institutions adopted the same policy instrument

regarding Africa, they expressed some differences on how to approach China. The Commission and the Council both opted for transformative trilateral engagement as the main foreign policy instrument with Africa. This explains why the AU and African representatives were provided with only limited opportunities to influence the substance of the EU's trilateral proposal. Contrariwise, the Commission expressed a preference for the policy instrument of reciprocal engagement with China. As the Commission became conscious about the fact that Chinese policymakers would only be willing to enter into concrete trilateral cooperation endeavours on the basis of a jointly formulated policy agenda, it changed its original approach towards China and started relying on reciprocal engagement. However, this policy instrument was not supported by all EU member states, which explains why the Council advocated for a transformative trilateral engagement with China.

5.5   Assessing Trilateral EU Foreign Policy

The EU's efforts of establishing a specific a trilateral dialogue with China and Africa emerged in parallel to the EU-China multilateral dialogue on Africa, as discussed in Chapter 4. Yet, unlike the bilateral and the multilateral case study, which were primarily targeted at China, the process of a trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue was driven by EU engagement with both China and Africa. Another important difference between this last case study as compared to the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa and the multilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa is the fact that the EU was unsuccessful in establishing a fully fleshed trilateral dialogue with China and Africa. Instead, the EU's trilateral efforts only resulted in minor ad hoc exchanges with China and the AU. Thus, so far the trilateral endeavour by the EU has remained at a purely experimental stage.

The EU's trilateral initiative was characterised by a combination of the two foreign policy instruments of transformative and reciprocal engagement. This can be explained by the fact that the EU adopted a different approach towards its Chinese and African partners. While the trilateral EU engagement with Africa was primarily based on the traditional foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement, the EU's trilateral engagement with China was characterised by a more reciprocal type of engagement.

One of the main reasons for the low level of trilateral EU, China and Africa interaction is the limited involvement of the African partners. It is clear that – despite the fact that the EU's trilateral efforts primarily

emerged in the context of the nascent bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership – the EU saw the trilateral dialogue mostly as a means to strengthen its cooperation with China.

Similar to the other two case studies, the EU's trilateral engagement with China was characterised by some institutional inconsistency. While the Commission was the main driver behind the EU's more reciprocal trilateral approach towards China, the Council relied on the traditional foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement. This discrepancy between the positions of the two EU institutions provoked confusion on the side of the Chinese partners and can serve as another explanation for the failure of the trilateral EU, China, Africa dialogue.

Overall this chapter has highlighted the fact that the new practice of trilateral or triangular development cooperation is surrounded by a great deal of uncertainty. Besides the EU's confusion over tripartite forms of engagement, a general international policy discourse on TDC is missing and international development actors have adopted different understandings of what TDC consists of.

Chinese and African Responses

In view of providing a sound examination of the EU's foreign policy strategy of CSP, the policy responses of the EU's strategic partners need to be taken into account. Unlike the previous chapters of this book that have adopted the point of view of the EU, this chapter provides an outsider's perspective on EU foreign policy and sheds light on the policy responses by African and Chinese partners to the EU's engagement.

As Chapters 3–5 have shown, the extent to which each of the two partners has been involved in the three engagement initiatives of the EU has varied considerably. In particular, the role of Africa has been rather marginal. As the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa corresponds to exchanges between Brussels and Beijing on issues concerning Africa, it is referred to as the bilateral EU-China dialogue "on" Africa, rather than "with" Africa. Similarly, Africa's presence in the multilateral context of the OECD DAC has been minimal in comparison to that of China. Yet, unlike the first and the second case studies, the trilateral dialogue has put more emphasis on Africa. Against this background, this chapter examines China's and Africa's foreign policy in general and their responses to the EU's trilateral engagement more specifically. This will help explain why the EU, China, Africa trilateral relations have been so limited.

In line with the analytical framework outlined in Chapter 2, this chapter will look at China's and Africa's policy responses from two different perspectives: that of rationalism and constructivism. While the rationalist

viewpoint will focus on the different institutions and interests shaping Chinese and African foreign policy, the constructivist evaluation will draw attention to the norms and values characterising the Chinese and African foreign policy discourse. Moreover, this chapter provides new insights into understanding the concept of trilateral development cooperation introduced in Chapter 5.

This chapter is divided into three sections. Section 6.1 provides a better understanding of Chinese foreign policy. It is followed by a section looking at the role of Africa in international affairs, paying particular attention to the AU. Finally, Section 6.3 examines the Chinese and African policy responses to the EU's trilateral engagement and thereby complements the third case study discussed in Chapter 5.

6.1   CHINESE FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

Although China – because of its political system – is commonly depicted as a monolithic unitary actor, Chinese foreign policy has become increasingly complex over the past years (Interviews 20Cc, 25Cc, 49Cc). Due to China's economic development and growing global outreach, Chinese foreign policy is characterised by the interaction of an increasing number of institutions with diverging interests and objectives (Interviews 51Cc, 92Ce, 95Cc). Overall, Chinese foreign policymaking reflects the country's tripolar political system, which is centred around the Chinese state, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) (Harris 2005).

The CCP is at the core of Chinese decision-making. It is mostly structured around the Party Congress, which meets every five years. When not in session, decisions are taken by the Standing Committee of the Politburo (PSC). The Politburo represents the highest decision-making body. As it is too large to meet regularly, the formulation of foreign policy is made by the nine-member PSC (Lai 2010, 138; Rana 2007, 21). The Party Secretary also acts as China's President and chair of the Central Military Commission (CMC). This shows that the Party and the State bureaucracy are closely intertwined. None of the members of the PSC has an exclusive responsibility in the field of foreign policy. Instead, there are so-called Leading Small Groups (LSGs), which directly advise the PSC on different topics (Miller 2008; Lai 2010). The most important foreign policy decisions are taken by the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group (FALSG). The FALSG is headed by the Party Secretary and key members include the State

Councillor for Foreign Affairs, as well as the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Commerce (Jakobson and Wood 2012). Despite the fact that China is a party-state, which means that the Chinese government and the structure of the CCP are very closely connected (Lanteigne 2009), they have separate decision-making structures. This explains some of the difficulties related to the formulation of a comprehensive Chinese foreign policy agenda (Jakobson and Knox 2010).

Within the Chinese government, the State Council is the central executive body. It is headed by the Chinese Premier, who is assisted by Vice Premiers, State Councillors, Ministers and heads of other organisations falling under the authority of the State Council. It is important to stress that in terms of foreign policy decisions the State Councillor for Foreign Affairs usually outranks the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Moreover, whereas most senior members of the State Council take part in the FALSG, the Chinese Premier is not a member, which implies that foreign policy is a key competence of the President.

The State Council has authority over a variety of ministries and other governmental bodies. The implementation of China's foreign policy lies primarily within the Chinese Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA), which has expanded noticeably over the past years (Lai 2010, 145). At the same time, the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) also plays a significant role in the areas of foreign trade, investments and aid (Kerr et al. 2008, 156). Other governmental institutions, such as the National Developmental and Reform Commission (NDRC), the Ministry of Education or the Ministry of Science and Technology, also contribute to China's foreign relations. The fact that most Chinese ministries have their own international departments, which cooperate directly with the European and African counterparts, explains why the MFA has difficulties coordinating all activities falling within China's foreign policy (Interviews 93Sc, 96Cc, 99Cc).

Similar to the foreign ministries of other countries, the Chinese MFA is divided into geographical and thematic departments (Chinese Government 2012). In the area of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations, the departments of European Affairs and Africa department have taken the lead (Interviews 101Cc, 102Cc). Yet, the Chinese officials from the Africa department reacted differently to the EU's engagement than their colleagues from the European affairs department. Whereas the officials from the European affairs department were generally open to a dialogue with the EU, Chinese officials in charge of African affairs were much more reluctant to share information with their European

counterparts. In fact, they had difficulties understanding the growing European interest in China's relations with Africa. This can be explained by the fact that – in contrast to the EU's view – Chinese diplomats did not perceive China's Africa policy as a novelty but as the continuation of historical relations (Zhongping 2008).

The MOFCOM – which was originally named Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade (MOFTEC) – is responsible for both trade and foreign investments, and development aid. This shows that China does not make a clear distinction between development cooperation and commercial arrangements (Bräutigam 2009). On the basis of its competences in the area of trade, MOFCOM represents China at the multilateral level, by negotiating international trade agreements and representing China in international organisations such as the WTO and the OECD.

While MOFCOM has a coordinating role in terms of development cooperation, a wide range of other bodies are involved in the formulation and implementation of China's foreign aid policy (Castillejo 2013). These include the MFA, the Ministry of Finance and 28 ministries or agencies, whose works are relevant for foreign aid (Hong 2012; Lancaster 2007). In addition to the actors mentioned earlier, China's Export-Import Bank (EXIM) plays a leading role in China's foreign aid (Corkin 2012). The EXIM Bank was set up in 1994. It is owned by the Chinese government and reports directly to the State Council. Chinese foreign aid policy is largely influenced by China's own development experience. It is therefore not surprising that Chinese external assistance tends to focuses on physical infrastructures (Foster et al. 2008; Lum et al. 2009; UNCTAD 2010). In general, Chinese aid projects consist of the Chinese government providing concessional loans directly to Chinese companies to build infrastructure projects such as roads and hospitals in developing countries (Bräutigam 2009). In conjunction with the department of Foreign Aid of the MOFCOM, the EXIM Bank is responsible for the distribution of concessional loans. It administers the concessional loans according to diplomatic and business objectives and therefore plays a "policy-oriented development financing role" (Corkin 2012, 71). Due to the complex coordination among the different bodies and the growing rivalries between the MOFCOM and other institutions (Interviews 48Cc, 55Cc, 96Cc), discussions over the establishment of an independent Chinese development agency have emerged (Interviews 9Oi, 44Cc, 45Cc, 55Cc).

As China is both a donor and a recipient of development assistance, MOFCOM is in charge of both Chinese foreign aid to Africa and incoming aid from Europe. Within the MOFCOM, two specific departments are responsible for aid: the Department of Foreign Aid and the Department of Economic Cooperation. While the first department is responsible for outgoing aid, the second one is in charge of incoming aid to China. In the area of foreign aid, the primarily role of the MOFCOM is to manage aid grants and zero-interest loans according to diplomatic objectives (Bräutigam 2011a). To do so, it can rely on the expertise of the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation (CAITEC), which acts as MOFCOM's official think tank (Interviews 6Ce, 32Oc, 55Cc). In recent years, a China-Africa Research Centre was created within CAITEC, which collects data and formulates policy proposals specifically related to Chinese aid activities Africa (CAITEC 2011).

Following the examination of the different institutions involved in China's relations with the EU and Africa, the following paragraphs will turn to the core principles and norms that guide Chinese foreign policy. Recent policy documents drafted by the MFA and the MOFCOM provide a good indication for the key norms and values driving Chinese foreign policy. Whereas the MFA released two Policy Papers on the EU and two Policy Papers on Africa, MOFCOM took the lead in the formulation of two more recent Policy Papers on Foreign Aid.

In 2003, the MFA formulated China's first Policy Paper on the EU, which was followed by a second one in 2014 (Chinese State Council 2003; Chinese State Council 2014a). According to experts, China's 2003 EU Policy Paper is unique in the sense that it was the first time that the Chinese leadership formalised its relations with an international partner through the publication of an official policy document (Dejean de la Batie 2003; Taneja 2010). The 2003 policy documents refer to the EU as "a major force in the world". At the same time, the paper highlights the idea that China will pursue its independent foreign policy in order to establish a "new international political and economic order that is fair and equitable, and based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence". China's second EU Policy Paper was adopted after the visit of China's new President Xi Jinping to Europe in 2014 and it recalls the importance attributed by the new leadership to China's relations with the EU (Chinese State Council 2014a). The title "Deepen the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation" underlines the objective of the Chinese MFA to give a new framework to China's diplomatic relations

with the EU. Originally, Chinese policy documents mostly referred to the USA and Russia in terms of China's strategic partners (Chinese Government 2012). Instead, Chinese leaders remained relatively cautious in using the adjective "strategic" to describe their bilateral diplomatic relations with the EU (Goldstein 2001). Yet, over time Chinese policy-makers started using the expression "comprehensive strategic partner-ship"[67] to describe China's relationship with the EU.

In parallel to the two policy documents on the EU, the MFA also drafted two specific White Papers on Africa over the past ten years. China's 2006 African Policy Paper puts forward, for the first time, general principles and objectives guiding China's foreign policy towards Africa. In the same line, the 2015 White Paper on Africa highlights the fact that China's Africa policy operates under the framework of SSC based on the principles of equality, reciprocity and common benefits (Benabdallah 2015; Wu 2012).

Alongside the policy documents on the EU and Africa published by the MFA, the MOFCOM worked on two White Papers on Foreign Aid (Chinese State Council 2011; Chinese State Council 2014b). The first Chinese White Paper on Foreign Aid was published by MOFCOM in 2011 as a response to considerable international criticism. Experts have underlined that China's first White Paper on Foreign Aid was a sign of the willingness of the Chinese government to be more transparent regarding its development cooperation (Grimm et al. 2011). In light of the impor-tant increase of Chinese aid to Africa in recent years, MOFCOM drafted a second White Paper. The 2014 White Paper on Foreign Aid provides an update of data provided by the 2011 White Paper. In addition to provid-ing more precise data on Chinese aid programmes, the two White Papers lay down the fundamental principles of China's development assistance. They accentuate the fact that China's development aid to Africa is guided by principles set forth by Chinese leaders during the 1950s and 1960s. These norms include in particular the "Eight Principles for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries". They were adopted in 1964 and encompass principles such as equality and mutual benefits, as well as the respect of the sovereignty of the recipient countries.

A comparison between the six different Chinese policy documents will help identify the core principles guiding Chinese foreign policy. These fundamental principles include the notions of political security and regime survival, as well as the respect of national sovereignty and territorial integ-rity (Duchâtel et al. 2014). In particular, the MFA and the MOFCOM

stress that China's relations with the EU and Africa are based on the key value of non-interference in domestic political affairs. These paradigms are at the heart of China's long-standing foreign policy doctrine of the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" that were formulated by the Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai in the wake of the Afro-Asian conference in Bandung in 1955 (Hempson-Jones 2005).

The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence have considerably shaped China's foreign policy towards the EU and Africa. Yet, in recent years, the Chinese leadership has started to adopt a more pragmatic foreign policy, conditioned by strategic interests rather than by ideological principles. At the same time, new Chinese foreign policy paradigms have emerged. This shift in China's foreign policy is reflected in the more recent policy documents of the MFA and MOFCOM.

While the 2003 White Paper on the EU mostly reflects China's greater emphasis on economic interest, China's second White Paper on the EU shows efforts by the MFA to foster broader diplomatic relations with the EU beyond the economic realm. Experts have highlighted the notion that, in the context of Beijing's efforts to adopt a more pragmatic foreign policy strategy, the Chinese leadership put specific emphasis on the concept of multipolarity and identified the EU as a key partner in fostering a multipolar world order (Dejean de la Batie 2003; Zhang 2012). China's second Policy Paper on the EU therefore attributed major importance to the concept of multipolarity in EU-China cooperation and states that the China and the EU share the common objective of "building a multipolar world" (Chinese State Council 2014a).

In addition to the emphasis on the concept of multipolarity by the MFA, the MOFCOM has become more confident with multilateralism, in particular in the area of trade policy. China's accession to the WTO in 2001 represents an important landmark in this regard. In addition to the WTO, China has increased its participation in other multilateral institutions (Zhao 2004, 64; Christensen 2015). Considering the tacit agreement that only WTO members can aspire to join the OECD, since 2001 China has also participated in a growing number of its activities of the OECD as an observer (Interviews 12Pc, 74Pe). First informal consultations between officials from China's MOFTEC and OECD member countries were held in Beijing in 2001 (OECD 2002, 54). During the same year, China's Vice-Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Long Yongtu visited the OECD's headquarters in Paris three times. On the basis of these initial high-level political exchanges,

the OECD published a landmark report entitled "China in the World Economy: Domestic Policy Challenges" (OECD 2002). Moreover, on the 4th of May 2005 the then Chinese Minister of Commerce Bo Xilai singed a Joint China-OECD Statement in Paris and attended the trade session of the annual OECD Ministerial Council meeting, which was the first time a Chinese minister participated in such an event (Langer 2005; OECD 2005b, Annex 1). This can serve as a symbol for the growing importance attached by the Chinese leadership to the OECD. The most important development in the relations between China and the OECD took place in 2007 when the OECD identified China as one of the five "Enhanced Engagement" countries. Although the Enhanced Engagement process was a unilateral political endeavour by the OECD, it strengthened the dialogue between the organisation and the four emerging countries.

The re-evaluation of some of China's foreign policy principles did not only impact on China's relations with the EU and multilateral organisations like the OECD, but also influenced China's Africa policy. China's growing engagement in Africa has led to tensions between its traditional interpretation of the principle of non-interference and its increasing economic role and diplomatic leverage on the continent. The expansion of Chinese economic interests and the need to protect a growing number of Chinese nationals in conflict zones in Africa have underlined the limits of China's traditional approach. At the same time, Chinas policy of non-interference has tarnished its international reputation. In 2005, Robert Zoellick, then Deputy Secretary of State, urged China to act as a "responsible stakeholder" in international affairs, implying that China has a growing responsibility to strengthen the international system (Zoellick 2005). Against this background, the Chinese leadership proposed "Peaceful Development" and building a "Harmonious World" as new principles to guide China's foreign policy for the twenty-first century. These new concepts were first formulated in the White Paper on China's Peaceful Development Road (Chinese State Council 2005). They were put forward to reassure the international community about the Chinese rise in global power and to express China's intentions to act as a responsible international actor. Moreover, a debate on the necessity to move from the traditional principle of "non-interference" to so-called constructive involvement has emerged within the Chinese foreign policy community (Zugui 2008). This is reflected in China's most recent Policy Paper on Africa that highlights that "China will play a constructive role in maintaining

and promoting peace and security in Africa. It will explore means and ways with Chinese characteristics to constructively participate in resolving hot-button issues in Africa and exert a unique impact on and make greater contributions to African peace and security" (Chinese State Council 2015).

Despite the changes in China's foreign policy discourse, there is no indication that China is completely abandoning the fundamental foreign policy principle of non-interference. Experts noted that because the principle of non-interference remains crucial for Chinese core interests "a more dramatic shift towards an interventionist policy is highly unlikely" (Duchâtel et al. 2014). As the Chinese leadership remains attached to the principle of non-interference, it has expressed some reservation concerning the EU's foreign policy strategy of CSP.

In sum, Chinese foreign policy is characterised by a multiplicity of institutions and interests, as well as a set of core norms and principles. Yet, despite this pluralisation of China's foreign policy bureaucracy, there is no real inter-agency coordination to manage the internal differences emerging from the different actors (Rozman 2012; Kerr et al. 2008; Rana 2007). China is therefore confronted with similar difficulties in articulating a coordinated foreign policy as the EU. At the same time, China is faced with the specific challenge of being a relatively new international actor. Despite the existence of core foreign policy paradigms, some of China's foreign policy principles have been subject to change and reinterpretation in recent years. This reveals not only China's conflicting identities but also efforts of the current leadership to give priority to strategic interests rather than ideological principles.

6.2   AFRICA'S GROWING ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Over the past years, the position of Africa in the international sphere has started to change (Murithi 2013). While Africa has long been a region primarily under the external influence of foreign powers (Engel and Olsen 2005; Taylor 2010; Bischoff et al. 2016), there are several signs pointing towards the fact that the emergence of a more multipolar global system is strengthening African agency (Brown and Harman 2013; Dietz et al. 2011; Mohan and Lampert 2013). In particular, there are two elements assisting Africa to assume a more independent role in world politics. Since the turn of the century, the African continent has witnessed an important increase in economic growth.[68]

South Africa has been among the best performing African economies. In its position an as emerging economy, South Africa has gained greater access to the international scene and is thereby contributing to strengthening Africa's presence in different international forums and negotiations (Alden and Soko 2005; Alden and Schoeman 2015). South Africa has used its membership in different international bodies to direct global attention to challenges specific to the African continent. For instance, South Africa has been pushing for an African development agenda in the G20 (Fues and Wolff 2010) (Interviews 15Sa, 7Se, 71Sa). Second, the foundation of the AU as a regional organisation has allowed African countries to begin speaking with a single voice on the world stage and to start formulating a common foreign policy towards its external partners (Interviews 101Ba, 64Aa).

In terms of African institutions, this section focuses primarily on the policy stance adopted by the AU. The AU was established in 2002 as a successor of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (Akokpari et al. 2009). The AU is a pan-African organisation that brings together 53 states of the African continent. Morocco is the only state from the African continent that is not a member of the AU. The AU pursues an agenda of political unity and regional integration among the countries of the African continent. Moreover, the AU has also started to voice common African interests at the international level. It is based on eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs)[69] – which group together African countries of particular sub-regions – that serve as the so-called building blocks of the AU. The AU is composed of different organs, some of which it inherited from the OAU (Akokpari et al. 2009). These organs include the AU Assembly of the heads of state and government, the AU Executive Council, the AU Commission (AUC), the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the Court of Justice of the AU, the Permanent Representatives Committee, specialised technical Committees; the Economic, Social and Cultural Council, Financial Institutions and the Peace and Security Council (PSC). Experts have highlighted that the bodies of the AU largely resemble those of the EU, arguing that the EU served as a model for the AU (Adebajo 2012). (Bach 2011). This is particularly true for the AUC, which – like the European Commission – acts as a permanent secretariat of the organisation. The AUC is based in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa and is headed by a chairperson, who is elected for a four-year term. The AU chairperson is supported by a deputy chairperson. Similarly to the European Commission, the AUC counts several Commissioners in charge of specific thematic portfolios.

In addition to the overall objective of political integration between countries of the African continent, the AU's main contribution lies in the field of peace and security (Makinda et al. 2015). Unlike the charter of the OAU, article 4 of the AU Constitutive Act provides the AU with "the right to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity". In order to provide efficient responses to African conflicts and crisis situations, the AU – in cooperation with the RECs – has set up a so-called African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The PSC, which was only established in 2003, is at the centre of the APSA. It is responsible for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts in Africa and at the core of the APSA.

Together with establishment of the AU as an institutional structure for African regional integration and peace, there have been attempts to formulate a set of common African norms and values. They have reflected initiatives such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). The APRM is a voluntary, self-monitoring instrument to encourage member states of the AU to promote political and economic governance standards. The APRM is closely linked to NEPAD. On the basis of a mandate by the OAU, the leaders of five African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa), prepared the NEPAD strategic framework document, which was adopted by the OAU summit in Lusaka in 2011 (Karbo 2013). The NEPAD spells out a comprehensive and integrated development plan for Africa. In its beginnings, the NEPAD was supported by a small secretariat, located at the Development Bank of Southern Africa in Midrand. With the transformation of the OAU into the AU in 2002, NEPAD was incorporated within the AU and provided the AU with a normative framework to foster African development. Accordingly, the NEPAD secretariat was transformed into the NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency in February 2010. The NPCA serves as the AU's development agency and is responsible for the technical projects and regional programmes. Together with the AUC, the NPCA also represented Africa in the negotiations of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (Interviews 15Sa, 71Sa). For this purpose, a common African position on the future global aid agenda was formulated ahead of the HLF-4 in Busan (African Union and NEPAD 2011; Keijzer 2011). The so-called African Consensus and Position on Development Effectiveness represents the first continent-wide African position to be

adopted for an international negotiation. It also laid the groundwork for the Agenda 2063, adopted by the AU in 2015 (African Union 2015). The Agenda 2063 is the first African development plan aimed at fostering African ownership and will be implemented by the NPCA.

One of the key member states of the AU is South Africa. Over the past years, South Africa started expanding its international engagement both at the continental level and internationally. In 2010, South Africa and China agreed on a bilateral strategic partnership (Stahl 2012; Alden and Wu 2014). In addition to expanding its cooperation with other emerging countries, South Africa also collaborates with more traditional partners like the EU and the OECD. On the basis of the TDCA, the EU and South Africa adopted a bilateral strategic partnership in 2007 (Holland 2002; Bretheron and Vogler 1999; Carbone 2007). By conducting a more intensive foreign policy, South Africa has helped to draw attention to African concerns at the international level. South Africa is the only African member of the BRICS, which it joined upon the invitation of China in 2010. In this context, South Africa has contributed to the establishment of the New Development Bank, which will set up an African Regional Centre in Johannesburg. Moreover, South Africa represents Africa in the G20 and acts as a co-chair of the G20 Working Group on Development. As a member of OECD's Enhanced Engagement partners (EE5) of OECD (OECD 2007a), South Africa was also involved in the negotiations of the HLF-4 in Busan (Interviews 71Sa, 89Ca).

Alongside its international cooperation, South Africa has traditionally maintained a leadership role on the African continent. South Africa's White Paper on Foreign Policy lists "African Renaissance" and "Pan Africanism" as guiding principles (Government of the Republic of South Africa 2011). By fostering continental institutions, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), NEPAD and the AU, South Africa aims to contribute to Africa's regional integration, development and peace. In its White Paper, South Africa expressed its commitment to supporting the AU and underlines that it has played an integral role in the formation of the AU's institutions, policies and procedures. South Africa's close relations with the AU are also reflected in the fact that since October 2012 the former South African Minister of Home Affairs Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma has assumed the role of chairperson of the AUC. Ms Dlamini-Zuma took over the position from Jean Ping, who held the position since 2008. South Africa is not only a supporter of APSA and one of the biggest African contributors to AU peacekeeping operations,

but also a founding member of the NEPAD and a provider of development aid to other African countries (Alden and Soko 2005; Grimm 2011b). South Africa is currently in the process of establishing a new development agency, the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) (Besharati 2013). Yet, South Africa's leadership position on the African continent is challenged by other African countries, and it faces considerable structural problems and material weakness as well (Alden and Schoeman 2015).

The development of new African institutions and norms has considerably influenced Africa's relations with external partners, notably the EU. As outlined in Chapter 5, the EU is considered the AU's traditional partner and model of regional integration. Through the bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, the EU has not only significantly influenced the AU's institutional structure, but also its norms and procedures (Sicurelli 2010b). Yet, over the years the AU and its member states have expressed growing dissatisfaction with the underlying normative agenda of the bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership. The AU is based on the fundamental principles of "African ownership" and "African solutions should be found for African problems". Unfortunately, African leaders suspect the EU of building a bilateral strategic partnership according to European standards, rather than adapting to African policy priorities. The tensions between Africa and the EU over the principles of ownership became particularly visible at the second EU-Africa summit held in Lisbon in December 2007 (Böhler et al. 2007; Wadle 2007). It revealed disagreements between the AU and the EU in the area of human rights and democracy, as well as in the economic field. According to experts, the 2007 EU-Africa summit marked the fundamental discord between the EU and the AU in the field of human rights, democracy and good governance. Although the NEPAD strategic framework document makes reference to "democracy and political governance" (NEPAD 2001, 17), the AU and the EU have adopted rather different approaches on the matter. In this context, Africa leaders have expressed discontent with what they perceived as a "sort of obsession" by the EU over issues of good governance and human rights (Carbone 2011). The case of Zimbabwe is commonly mentioned as an example for this. In the context of the second EU-Africa summit, European leaders tried to exclude the Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe from the gathering. This caused a major conflict with African leaders, which went as far as the AU overtly opposing the EU's decision (Huliaras and Magliveras 2008; Kotsopoulos 2007).

The chairman of the AUC argued that as president of Zimbabwe, a member state of the AU, the EU was obliged to invite Robert Mugabe to the second EU-Africa summit. He further added that the AU would not let itself be pressured by the EU regarding who should attend the summit (Fioramonti 2009).

Apart from important differences on how to tackle human rights violations in Africa, major disagreements between the AU and the EU also emerged on economic issues. At the occasion of the second EU-Africa summit, the AU and its member states expressed their opposition to EU efforts to concluded reciprocal trade agreements, known as the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). The EPAs were already foreseen by the Cotonou Agreement as mechanisms to liberalise trade between the EU and ACP countries (Faber and Orbie 2009). Most African countries were reluctant to conclude EPAs with the EU, fearing that they would lead to potential trade distortions. In particular, they were concerned that the industrial and the agricultural sector of African countries would be "put under severe strain by competition from cheap European imports" (Adebajo 2012, 225). In his intervention at the Lisbon summit, the Senegalese president Abdoulay Wade expressed Africa's rejection of the EPAs and warned that these agreements would lead to a rupture between the EU and Africa, thereby making China a more attractive economic partner for Africa (Riccardi 2007).

On the basis of the AU's growing dissatisfaction with the EU, the AU engaged in efforts to form new strategic partnerships with particular countries, regions or organisations.[70] As part of the AU's diversification strategy, the AUC put particular emphasis on increasing diplomatic relations with emerging countries. In 2006, the AU established a specific "Task Force on Africa's Strategic Partnerships with Emerging Powers of the South", which is composed of African experts from the private and public sectors, as well as research institutes (African Union 2006). The Task Force elaborated a framework document with policy recommendations for the implementation of the AU's strategic partnerships with China, India and Brazil (Interviews 5Ae, 8Ba, 13Aa, 39Aa, 65Aa)

In the framework of the AU's process of expanding its collaboration with emerging countries, the AUC has specifically concentrated on reaching out to China (African Union Commission 2006; Ikome 2010). In 2001, the first foreign policy consultations between the AU and China took place (Chinese Government 2012, 356). More recently, the AU has also become involved in the Forum on China-Africa

Cooperation. During the eighth ordinary session of the Assembly of the AU in January 2007, African leaders decided that the AUC should coordinate Africa's preparation in the FOCAC and follow-up of implementation of decisions made at the FOCAC summits. Initially, the AUC was only given the status of an observer within the FOCAC. There were two reasons for the limited role played by the AUC within the FOCAC: one from the side of China and one from the side of the AU. First, several African states – members of the AU – hold diplomatic relations with Taiwan, which explains the reluctance of Beijing to grant the AUC a more important role in the FOCAC (Wissenbach 2011). Second, Morocco – as the only African country which is not a member of the AU – and other African countries – which act as regional players – were opposed to the idea of giving the AUC a more prominent role in the FOCAC (Taylor 2011) (Interviews 59Oa, 89Ca). Notwithstanding these two obstacles, the AUC was admitted in October 2011 as a full member into FOCAC (Grimm 2012a). The growing cooperation between the AU and China is also symbolised by the new AU Conference Centre and Office. This new headquarter of the AUC in Addis Ababa was built by China in 2011 and represented at that time the largest Chinese foreign aid project in Africa. Following the recognition of the AUC as an official member of the FOCAC, China also established a specific diplomatic mission to the AU in Addis Ababa and there have been discussions over a prospective opening of an AU representational office in Beijing, in the same fashion as the AU Mission to the EU in Brussels (Interviews 80Aa; 75Aa). In addition, China has started increasing its support to the AU's activities in the field of peace and security. For instance, in May 2011 the fourth AU-China Strategic Dialogue was held at the AU headquarters in Beijing, under the co-chairmanship of the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhai Jun and the then AU Chairperson Jean Ping (Chinese Government 2012, 44). Moreover, there have been a growing number of exchanges between the AU Peace and Security Council and Chinese policymakers, on the basis of which the AUC and China signed, in November 2012, an agreement and a protocol aimed at strengthening their cooperation in the area of peace and security (African Union 2012). Most importantly, the AUC and China are currently engaged in talks regarding the establishment of a Chinese Peace Facility, modelled on the EU's African Peace Facility (Interviews 97Ac, 37Aa).

Despite the AU's diversification strategy and its growing collaboration with China, it still faces major challenges in terms of its role as

international actor. Most importantly, the AU is faced with a lack of capacity, as seen in the fact that most of the organisation's budget comes from international partners (in particular the EU), rather than its member states (Interviews 5Ae, 8Ba, 39Aa). This undermines one of the AU's core principles, ownership. Another obstacle to the AU's international role is the lack of a coherent strategy towards its partners. According to a report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), one of the main challenges for Africa in dealing with emerging countries is that "while the latter have a well-defined strategy of engagement with the region, Africa has not articulated a coherent regional approach to harness and managing these partnerships for its benefit" (UNCTAD 2010, 26). In fact, over the past years, different organs of the AU have started establishing ad hoc partnerships with a variety of different partners, making it increasingly difficult for the organisation to track them. Consequently, the AUC started formulating an overall policy framework to guide the AU's strategic partnerships (Interviews 64Aa, 65Aa). In 2009, the AUC engaged in a "Global Review of Africa's Strategic Partnerships" with the objective of adopting a coherent and overall strategic approach (African Union 2009). As an initial step, the Economic Affairs Department of the AUC was designated to act as the focal point for the AU's partnerships (Interview 39Aa). This was followed by a more thorough structural reform of the organisation, leading to the creation of the "Partnerships Management and Coordination Division" (PMCD) – a special division within the AUC and placed under the direct control of the AUC chairperson. Initially, the PMCD counted around eight staff members, who were in charge of specific geographic regions (Interviews 39Aa, 65Aa). In sum, recent developments have shown that Africa plays an ambiguous international role, torn between a region subject to European and Chinese influence, and growing international agency.

6.3   COMPARING CHINESE AND AFRICA REPONSES TO TRILATERAL EU ENGAGEMENT

Following the depiction of China's and Africa's emergence as international players, this last section focuses specifically on their involvement in the endeavour of an EU, China and Africa trilateral development dialogue.

In particular, it outlines how Chinese and African policymakers have responded to the EU's foreign policy instruments of transformative and reciprocal engagement. Although the trilateral dialogue initiative was based on EU engagement with both China and Africa, Chapter 5 has revealed that the EU made a difference in the choice of EU foreign policy instrument directed towards China as compared to Africa. While the EU's trilateral engagement with China was characterised by a more reciprocal type of engagement, EU policymakers used the traditional foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement with Africa. This section will therefore start by examining how China has reacted to the EU's reciprocal engagement. Later, it will look at the African policy responses towards the EU's transformative engagement.

6.3.1 China's Ambivalent Role

The Chinese government did not adopt any official statement in response to the EU's trilateral policy proposal. China's missing official endorsement reflects its ambivalent role in the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue initiative. Initially, Beijing did not show much interest in trilateral development cooperation with the EU and Africa. China's indifference to the EU's trilateral offer can be explained by its position as a so-called emerging donor with only little experience in the area of development cooperation. China's inexperience in international development cooperation has translated into two particular challenges for trilateral cooperation with the EU and Africa, namely a lack of adequate institutions and development expertise.

The first challenge, explaining China's cautious reaction, has been the institutional structures for carrying out trilateral development cooperation with the EU and Africa. Unlike the EU and other traditional donors, China does not have a specific institution in charge of China's development activities. The Chinese leadership was therefore faced with the difficulty of having to designate competences for trilateral cooperation with the EU and Africa to a specific governmental body or institution (Interviews 27Cc, 32Oc). Experts have thus noted that the EU lacked a Chinese partner for trilateral cooperation (Grimm and Hackenesch 2012). Overall, MOFCOM is in charge of both Chinese foreign aid to Africa and incoming aid to from Europe. While the first is managed by the Department of Foreign Aid, the latter falls under the authority of the Department of Economic Cooperation. So far, the Chinese leadership has

not provided competences related to trilateral development cooperation to any of the two bodies and both departments have adopted rather opposed views on the matter (Interviews 4Ce, 30Ce, 55Cc, 98Ce). While officials from MOFCOM's Department of Foreign Aid have been rather conservative and resistant to exchanges with the broader international community, officials from MOFCOM's Department of Economic Cooperation – due to their extensive experience in managing incoming aid from traditional donors – are more open to the idea of trilateral development cooperation (Interviews 48Cc, 100Cc). Whereas trilateral development cooperation would logically fall within the competences of the Department of Foreign Aid, scholars have, however, pointed out that the Department of Foreign Aid would "not have a clear incentive for cooperating with the EU, unless African governments ask for it" (Grimm and Hackenesch 2012, 226).

The absence of a competent Chinese authority for the formulation of a trilateral policy agenda presents a major challenge in the process of the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue. The repeated attempts by the European Commissioner Louis Michel to travel to Beijing to exchange with Chinese policymakers on the idea of trilateral development cooperation with Africa clearly showed the difficulties of the Chinese government in designating competences for trilateral development to a specific governmental body (Falletti 2007b), (Interview 101Cc). In addition, due to the lack of a designated Chinese governmental body responsible for the formulation and coordination of a trilateral development policy, China also lacks suitable actors on the ground to carry out the implementation of trilateral projects in Africa. Because of its centralised Chinese political system, Chinese embassies in Africa have little autonomous decision-making powers (Grimm and Hackenesch 2012). According to European representatives based in Africa, the limited autonomy of the Chinese actors on the ground was another obstacle for setting up trilateral projects, which generally emerge on an ad hoc basis. Whereas MOFCOM sends Economic and Commercial Counsellor to most African countries to charge of the implement development projects, the Economic and Commercial Counsellor offices on the ground have to conform strictly to the instructions coming from the Department of Foreign Aid in Beijing (Interviews 93Sc, 97Ac).

The second reason for China's cautious stance regarding the EU's trilateral proposal was related to the fact that China does not possess a development community composed of development experts and

practitioners, and therefore lacked the necessary expertise to draw upon for the formulation of a trilateral policy agenda. Due to China's lack of experience in international development cooperation, Chinese policymakers and academics had particular difficulties to comprehend the EU's offer of trilateral development cooperation with Africa (Interviews 99Cc, 101Cc, 102Cc). This was, for instance, evidenced by China's low participation in the publication consultation organised by the European Commission in 2008. Out of the 47 written responses received by the Commission, only 3 were provided by Chinese nationals (European Commission 2008e). Only recently Chinese universities and ministries have established specific institutes and think tanks to carry out research on development-related issues (Interview 25Cc, 23Oc, 99Cc). Against this background, the Chinese government began formulating a specific development or foreign aid policy. The publication of the White Paper on Foreign Aid in 2011 marked an important step in this process (Chinese State Council 2011). The input for this policy document was largely provided by the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation.

Despite these two impediments, China has become increasingly receptive of the idea of trilateral development cooperation in general and with European and African partners in particular. As a response to the EU's choice for the policy instrument of reciprocal engagement, showing the EU's readiness to provide China with a greater influence on the trilateral EU, China and Africa agenda, Chinese leaders have become more open to the particular case of trilateral development cooperation. The 2007 trilateral conference held in Brussels can serve as an example for China's positive response to the idea of a joint trilateral development dialogue. At this occasion, the Chinese Special Representative for African Affairs, Ambassador Liu Guijin, stated that "it is in the three parties interest to have fruitful interaction and win-win cooperation based on mutual respect and consultation on an equal footing" and that "China is ready to play a constructive role to this end". On the same line, the then head of the Chinese Mission to the EU, Guan Chengyuan, saw potential for trilateral cooperation between with the EU and Africa and reaffirmed China's "open and positive attitude" in this regard (Guan 2007). China's positive assessment of trilateral development cooperation with the EU and Africa was further confirmed in 2009. Despite the fact that China did not adopt any official document in response to the trilateral policy documents issued by the Commission and the Council in 2008, Chinese leaders officially welcomed "the trilateral dialogue between the EU, China and Africa"

at the occasion of the 12th EU-China summit in November 2009 and agreed "to explore appropriate areas for cooperation" (Council of the EU 2009b).

Alongside China's growing openness to the specific trilateral dialogue with EU and Africa, the Chinese policymakers have also been more receptive to the instrument of trilateral development cooperation in general. This can be explained by the fact in order to response to the negative international image regarding China's growing relations with Africa, the Chinese leaderships engaged in transparency efforts. Over the past years, Beijing uncovered some of its activities in Africa to the wider international community, and reached out to traditional donors (Interviews 31Oi, 35Cc). In particular, China has expanded its participation in multilateral development organisations (Interviews 12Pc, 35Cc). It has not only joined existing multilateral bodies like the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBDR), but it has also contributed to the establishment of new organisations, such as the AIIB and the NDB. These two new international development institutions are based in China and bring together only BRICS countries.

China's growing multilateral cooperation has contributed to putting trilateral development on the Chinese policy agenda. In the past years, several high-ranking government representatives, such as the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Yang Jiechi and the Director-General of the Department of African Affairs of the Chinese MFA Lu Shaye, have expressed China's willingness to engage in trilateral development cooperation with traditional donors (Chinese Government 2011; Li 2012; Steiger and Rudyak 2012). According to Yang Jiechi, China has "taken experimental steps to work with some developed countries in helping a third country, in particular developing countries. Be it tripartite cooperation or four-party or five-party cooperation, I believe such cooperation must first get the consent and support of the host country" (Chinese Government 2011). In parallel to the interest of Chinese policymakers in trilateral development cooperation, Chinese academics have also started to focus on this novel development instrument (Interviews 32Oc, 44Cc, 51Oc, 99Cc). Among the various Chinese scholars, Li Xiaoyun, Li Anshan and Xu Weizhong have argued in favour of China's participation in new forms of trilateral development cooperation with traditional donors (Li 2011; Xu 2011; Li and Bonschab 2012). Subsequent to the growing interest for tripartite collaboration by the Chinese academic community a specific Chinese policy discourse on trilateral development cooperation has started

to emerge. Most importantly, the 2011 Chinese Aid White Paper devotes a special section to "International Cooperation in Foreign Aid", which explicitly underlines China's commitment to engage in trilateral development cooperation (Chinese State Council 2011).

Despite recent attention of Chinese policymakers and academics for trilateral development cooperation, China's participation in trilateral projects has not gone beyond the experimental stage (Interviews 44Cc, 81Aa, 83Aa, 93Sc, 94Se, 99Cc). According to several experts, China has not yet participated in any major trilateral project (Grimm 2011a; Pollet et al. 2011; Steiger and Rudyak 2012). This can serve as an indication for China's ambivalent stance regarding this new form of international cooperation between emerging powers and traditional donors. Recent Chinese policy documents show that Chinese leadership still has not formulated any clear policy strategy regarding the instrument of TDC. For instance, the Chinese White Paper on Foreign Aid stresses that "in addition to developing bilateral aid, China gets involved in trilateral and regional cooperation with some multilateral organisations and countries in capacity building, training and infrastructure construction that give full play to the advantages of all participants" (Chinese State Council 2011). This reveals some confusion between China's support for multilateral development organisations and Chinese involvement in trilateral development cooperation. Moreover, Chinese policymakers and scholars argue that certain preconditions need to be met before China can take part in TDC (Interviews 93Sc, 97Ac, 99Cc).

6.3.2 Africa's Rejection

Like China, there has not been any official response from Africa regarding the EU's trilateral development initiative. The lack of an official AU policy document on trilateral cooperation with the EU and China does not, however, mean that the EU's policy proposal was not debated among the AUC and the AU member states. In contrast to the case of China, the fact that the AU refrained from any formal reaction to the EU's trilateral policy dialogue proposal was a sign of protest. Following an informal request by the European Commission – through the EU delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa – the AUC organised a series of meetings bringing together policymakers of different African member states to discuss the EU's trilateral initiative (Interviews 5Ae, 8Ba, 10Be). During these meetings, most AU member states, as well as the AUC, expressed a very negative

assessment of the EU's policy document and showed serious scepticism regarding the idea of TDC with the EU and China (Carbone 2011; Grimm and Hackenesch 2012) (Interviews 13Aa, 37Aa, 38Ae, 39A).

The rejection by the AU and its member states caught the EU by surprise. In particular, because it contradicted the results of the written public consultation carried out by the European Commission in April/June 2008. This might also be a reason why EU policymakers did not publicise the informal consultation undertaken by the AUC. The diverging results between the consultation of the AUC and that of the European Commission could be explained by the fact that the EU's consultation exercise was primarily targeted at civil society actors, while the AU consultation involved governmental representatives. Additionally, as indicated earlier, doubts about the validity of the results of the Commission's consultation can be raised. It could be argued that the Commission's consultation was biased due to the fact the majority of African civil society groups that responded to the written questionnaire were primarily funded by the EU (Interviews 59Oa, 87Be).

There are two main explanations for Africa's refusal to engage in a trilateral development dialogue with the EU and China. While the first reason concerns the EU's interaction with Africa, the second one is related to the specific nature of the AU.

An important reason behind the AU's rejection of the EU's trilateral proposal was the overall state of the diplomatic relations between Africa and the EU. The tensions in bilateral EU-Africa Strategic Partnership were exacerbated by the fact that – unlike in the case of China – EU policymakers opted for the policy instrument of transformative engagement. The EU's preference for transformative trilateral engagement with Africa explains why the EU largely neglected Africa in the process of the EU-China-Africa trilateral dialogue. In contrast to China, the EU involved the AU only in the final stage of the formulation of the trilateral dialogue. It was shortly prior to the publication of its trilateral communication that the European Commission informally approached the AU (House of Lords 2009, 257). This gave the AU and its member states only little time for formulating a possible common position. Hence, EU policymakers provided very little opportunity for the AUC and individual African countries to influence the agenda of the potential trilateral policy initiative. This lack of real opportunity by the AU to influence the content of the EU's policy proposal largely explains why the AU did not adopt any official policy statement regarding the EU's proposal of TDC. Moreover, the EU also

made no particular effort to discuss the trilateral dialogue initiative with single African states. Although, during the drafting of the trilateral communication, Commission officials based in Brussels asked for input from their colleagues in the EU delegations in the different African countries, this consultation of EU delegations in Africa was actually designed as an internal Commission procedure rather than an exchange with African government representatives (Carbone 2011, 215) (Interviews 82Ae, 83Ae, 88Se). Hence, in most African countries EU officials did not engage in direct discussions with the competent government authorities on the idea of trilateral cooperation (Interviews 42Se, 75Sa, 82Ae). In some African countries this led to the paradox situation in which government authorities first heard of the EU's trilateral proposal through their Chinese counterparts, rather than through EU officials (Interview 75Sa).

The EU's choice for transformative engagement raised suspicions among the AU and its member states about the real intentions behind the EU's trilateral offer (Rampa and Bilal 2011). Most African representatives perceived the EU's proposal of TDC as an attempt of big power collusion over Africa or Western interference into African affairs (Castillejo 2013). Hence, from the perspective of the AUC the EU's trilateral policy initiative was another Eurocentric venture, solely driven by European interests and opposed to Africa's own policy priorities (Interviews 8Ba, 39Aa). In particular, African officials saw TDC as a European attempt to interfere in the AU's policy agenda and undermined the AU's efforts at forging new strategic partnerships with emerging countries (Interviews 14Be, 37Aa). They failed to see the added value of TDC as compared to existing bilateral forms of cooperation and were convinced that through the tool of TDC the EU was trying dictate how the AU should interact with its partners and impose its own standards on the AU's evolving bilateral cooperation with China (Tywuschik 2007; Carbone 2011) (Interviews 53Ba, 87Be). A diplomatic cable released by Wikileaks exposed the extent to which African heads of state and government were angered by the fact that the EU policymakers ignored them when proposing a TDC with China (Wikileaks 2010). The lack of any official response by the AU to the EU's trilateral proposal can therefore be seen as a sign of protest by the AUC, as well as most African states (Interview 39Aa).

The second cause for Africa's missing support for TDC with the EU and China is related to the very nature of the AU as a regional organisation. The EU's trilateral initiative exposed deficiencies of the AU both in

terms of its leadership role and its competences in the area of development cooperation. Despite recent efforts of to formulate a common "African position" and forming strategic partnerships between the whole African continent and particular countries, regions or organisations, the leadership of the AUC is still rather weak. Not only does it suffer from limited human and financial resources, most importantly it lacks political leadership in relation to the AU member states. While the AUC has been quite successful in formulating a common African position within the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership, a common African negotiation position regarding China is still missing. As mentioned, the AUC only recently started participating in the FOCAC. This reflects opposing assessments of China's role in Africa among AU member states (Taylor 2011). Depending on the individual geopolitical importance and reserves of natural resources of each country, African leaders are either very positive or very negative about China's growing presence on the continent (Interviews 13Sa, 65Aa, 68Se, 72Ae, 81Aa, 85Aa). These opposing views make it difficult for the AUC to embrace a common "African" diplomacy towards China. The trilateral conference organised by the Commission in Brussels in June 2007 clearly showed the lack of a common African position. Unlike Chinese officials, which clearly expressed China's preferences (Guan 2007; Liu 2007), African representatives were not able to defend a common standpoint and thereby missed the opportunity to influence the emerging trilateral agenda (Interviews 15Sa, 65Aa). In the context of the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue, EU policymakers recognised that they had overestimated the capacity of the AUC to represent a common African position (Interviews 5Ae, Be43, Be90, Be95). Similarly, Chinese diplomats raised concerns over the lack of political leadership by the AU. Hence, the AU is not yet in the position to act as a strong African partner at the international level, which is an essential prerequisite for TDC (Grimm and Hackenesch 2012, 226).

In addition to the weakness of the AUC, the AU's lack of support for TDC is also related to the fact that the AU holds limited competences in the field of development cooperation (Interviews 8Ba, 39Aa). Traditionally, the activities of the AU have mostly focused on peace and security, which explains why AU officials had difficulties relating to the concept of TDC. With the election of Ms Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as the new AUC chairperson in October 2012, the focus of the AU's work is starting to shift. In her inauguration speech Ms Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma stressed that

she would attribute a higher priority to strengthening the AU's contribution to Africa's economic development (Dlamini-Zuma 2013).

To conclude, the comparison of Chinese and African policy response to the EU's trilateral dialogue initiative shows that both partners have not been entirely receptive EU's foreign policy strategy of CSP. The specific example of the EU's trilateral development dialogue, however, shows that African and Chinese leaders have adopted a rather different stance regarding the EU's engagement. While policymakers from Africa have expressed fierce resistance to the EU's trilateral engagement, China has adopted a more ambivalent position. Over the past years, China has become more open to the concept of TDC in general and a trilateral dialogue with the EU and Africa mores specifically. Instead, a strong African advocate for TDC is missing (Alden and Sidiropoulos 2009). So far, neither the AU and its member states, nor individual African civil society actors have seen any benefits in entering into a trilateral policy dialogue or establishing development projects with the EU and China (Interviews 7Se, 94Se, 104Sa). Thus, despite the EU's recent engagement with Chinese and African partners, overall trilateral relations between the EU, China and Africa have remained limited.

Conclusion

EU foreign policy is undergoing a fundamental transformation, as European policymakers are forced to adapt to the rise of new international players and unparalleled global power shifts. The EU has responded to the emerging multipolar world order by conducting a proactive foreign policy of engagement with rising powers. The different dialogue initiatives with China and Africa and the broader development of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations are indicators of this new trend in EU foreign policy. Despite the EU's recent outreach to emerging powers, the empirical analysis exposed in this book reveals that similar to ancient times, European policymakers still lack a profound understanding of other parts of the world, and that this lack has played a significant role in preventing the EU from fully engaging with China and Africa. As implied by the title "hic sunt dracones", EU foreign policy continues to follow the same underlying logic as that of ancient maps. It approaches international politics primarily through a European viewpoint and is driven by concerns over the emergence of a new, multipolar world.

This last chapter summarises the main findings of this book and solves the research puzzle formulated in the introduction. A cross-case comparison of the bilateral, multilateral and trilateral dialogues exposed in Chapters 3–5 will help answer the overarching research question of the failure of the EU's foreign policy of engagement with emerging powers. This chapter is

structured around three sections. To begin with, Section 7.1 outlines the main research findings of this book and provides an answer to the research question over the failure of EU engagement with China and Africa. Subsequently, Section 7.2 examines more recent policy changes within the EU and their implications for this research project. Finally, Section 7.3 identifies several pathways for further research to consolidate the new research field of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations.

7.1   Assessing EU Foreign Policy a Multipolar World

This book provides an analysis of the EU's foreign policy in the period between 2005 and 2012. During this period, the EU started to respond to the transition towards a multipolar world order through a foreign policy of engagement with new strategic partners, namely China and Africa.

Table 7.1 shows that in the context of its foreign policy of engagement the EU initiated three different policy dialogues with China and Africa, leading to the development of broader EU-China-Africa trilateral relations.

Two main research findings can be drawn from the study of the three policy dialogues. First, against the background of the current transformation of the international system, EU foreign policy has become more complex. As Table 7.1 highlights, EU foreign policy in a multipolar world is not only carried out by an increasing number of actors (involving both EU institutions and the EU's strategic partners), but it is also implemented simultaneously in different fora or at different levels (e.g. in a bilateral,

Table 7.1   Overview of the three case studies

	Case study I: *the bilateral EU-* *China dialogue* *on Africa*	*Case study II:* *the multilateral EU-China* *dialogue on Africa within* *context of the DAC*	*Case study III:* *the trilateral EU,* *China and Africa* *dialogue*
Level	Bilateral	Multilateral	Trilateral
Actors	EU and China	EU and China (only limited African participation in the DAC)	EU, AU and China
EU Institutions	Commission, Council, European Parliament	Commission and Council	Commission and Council

Source: Compiled by the author

multilateral and trilateral setting). Second, despite attempts by the EU to engage with China and Africa as strategic partners, the overall scope of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations has remained limited.

In view of providing further evidence for the second research discovery and explaining the failure of EU engagement with China and Africa, this section undertakes a cross-case comparison. To do so, it is important to keep in mind the conceptual tool box developed in Chapter 2, which introduces the concepts of EU foreign policy strategy of CSP and foreign policy instruments of engagement. In particular, the analytical framework distinguishes between two ideal types of engagement, namely transformative engagement and reciprocal engagement. Transformative engagement represents the EU's traditional foreign policy instrument. Through transformative engagement EU policymakers try to influence the policies of its strategic partners in order to build a CSP based on the EU's predefined interests, norms and standards. Contrariwise, reciprocal engagement presents a more innovative foreign policy instrument. While transformative engagement is characterised by an EU-centred, unilateral approach, reciprocal engagement intends to build a CSP through a process of mutual adaptation between the EU and its strategic partners. Moreover, the conceptual framework highlights the importance of the Chinese and African policy responses to explain the failure of the EU's foreign policy of engagement.

In the first case study of the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa, the EU relied on the foreign policy instrument that corresponds to a pure form of transformative engagement. In contrast, the EU opted for a mixture of transformative and reciprocal foreign policy instruments in the second and the third case studies. This difference can be explained by the two factors. On one hand, the multilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa in the context of the OECD DAC emerged later than the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa and was aimed at the formulation of new policy norms and standards. On the other hand, unlike the first case study, the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue represented a novel type of dialogue, centred on the implementation of concrete projects.

Despite the fact that both the second and the third case studies were characterised by a combination of transformative and reciprocal EU foreign policy instruments, overall it is clear that EU policymakers favoured the traditional foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement with China and Africa. Through the use of transformative engagement the EU wanted to build a CSP with China and Africa on the basis of its own predetermined norms and standards. Instead of adapting the EU's policies

to Chinese and African preferences, EU policymakers were trying to shape the behaviour of its two partners and to make them more similar to that of the EU.

In order to explain the failure of EU engagement with China and Africa, it is not only important to look at the choice of EU foreign policy instrument, but it is also crucial to take into account the reactions of the EU's partners. Only by considering the responses of China and Africa to EU engagement, the limitations of the EU's engagement with emerging powers can be explained. The analysis of Africa's policy response in the context of the trilateral EU, China and Africa development dialogue shows that the AU has rejected the EU's offer due to the fact that the EU opted for the instrument of transformative engagement aimed at implementing a predefined European policy agenda and norms. Similar to Africa's policy response, Chinese policymakers have been more reserved when EU policymakers relied on the instrument of transformative engagement, as it was the case for the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa. Instead, China has been more open in the context of the multilateral EU-China dialogue within the OECD DAC, largely because of the EU's willingness to engage in more reciprocal terms.

In sum, the failure of the EU's foreign policy of engagement with China and Africa can be explained by the fact that EU policymakers largely relied on the traditional foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement. This shows that the EU's engagement with emerging powers generally consisted of a novel foreign policy discourse rather than a genuine transformation of EU foreign policymaking. The lack of implementation of the EU's foreign policy of engagement with China and Africa can be explained by the fact that European policymakers are still reluctant to adjust European policy principles and standards to the changing international context. In none of the three policy dialogues, the EU was ready to approach China and Africa as equal partners, but rather expected them to comply with European demands.

Apart from the EU's choice for the foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement, this research project identifies two other reasons for the failure of EU engagement with rising powers and the limits of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations: the lack of consistency in EU foreign policymaking and the different treatment by the EU of its strategic partners.

As previously mentioned, EU foreign policy in a multipolar world has become more complex, involving a growing number of actors. In particular, the empirical evidence presented in this book shows that the EU's

engagement with China and Africa has been characterised by a lack of institutional consistency. Institutional consistency in the EU's foreign policy "denotes the coherence of the policymaking approaches of the different EU institutions, namely the Council and the Commission and of the different sub-structures within these two institutions towards the same issue" (Gaspers 2008, 21). Table 7.1 shows that the Commission, the Council and the European Parliament as well have been the key drivers of the EU's bilateral, multilateral and trilateral dialogues with China and Africa. Previous research has highlighted that the three EU institutions had a different assessment of China's growing influence in Africa policy (Austermann 2012b; Carbone 2011). This explains why the EU's foreign policy of engagement with China and Africa has suffered from lack of institutional consistency among the three EU institutions. The Commission – which favoured a constructive approach towards China – is at one end of the spectrum, while the European Parliament – which has been most critical of the growing Sino-Africa relations – can be placed at the other end of the spectrum. The Council adopted a middle position between that of the Commission and the European Parliament.

However, due to the fact the European Parliament was not involved in the second and the third case studies, particular attention has been attributed to the positions adopted by the Commission and the Council. The research findings have revealed that the Commission has acted as the main driver of the EU's engagement with China and Africa. Both the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa and the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue have been instigated by officials from the Commission, receiving support of the Council only at a later stage. Unlike the Commission, the Council adopted a more conservative position regarding EU engagement with China. The lack of initiative by the Council can be explained by the fact that in the period between 2005 and 2012 most EU member states did not know how to respond to the rise of emerging countries like China and were not yet aware of the new reality of Sino-African relations.

The institutional inconsistency resulting from diverging positions of the Commission and the Council has undermined the EU's efforts of engagement with China and Africa. Chapters 4 and 5 have revealed that whereas the Council favoured the traditional foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement, the Commission has been more open towards the novel foreign policy instrument of reciprocal engagement. Due to the different preferences of the Council and the Commission, it was not possible to formulate an overall EU foreign policy based on the novel

foreign policy instrument of reciprocal engagement. Moreover, the lack of consistency between the position of the Commission and the Council also affected the broader trilateral relations between EU, China and Africa, as the EU's confusing message caused irritations on the side of its Chinese and African partners. In particular, Chinese policymakers were confused by the contradicting signals sent by the different EU institutions (Carbone 2011, 217) (Interviews 11Bc, 35Cc).

In addition to the lack of institutional consistency, another obstacle to the EU's foreign policy of engagement has been the different treatment by the EU of its strategic partners. It is important to bear in mind that the extent to which each of the three actors (the EU, China and Africa) has been involved in the three dialogues varied considerably. Table 7.1 shows that in particular the role of Africa alters in the three case studies. Due to the choice to locate the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa in the overall framework of the bilateral EU-China Strategic Partnership, Africa only played an indirect role in the first bilateral case study. Similar to the first case study, Africa's presence in the second multilateral case study is also marginal in comparison to that of the EU and China. Unlike the EU, African countries are not members of the OECD DAC, which is an organisation bringing together donors of development aid. Africa, a region of aid recipients, is therefore only partly associated to the DAC activities. Hence, out of the three dialogue initiatives, only the trilateral EU, China and Africa dialogue was open to African participation. Instead, neither in the bilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa nor the multilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa were African policymakers provided the opportunity to take part.

The lack of opportunity for Africa to participate in the different policy dialogues shows that – despite the general EU foreign policy strategy steered towards a CSP with China and Africa – the EU interacted with its African and Chinese on different terms. This differentiated treatment is particularly visible in the case of the trilateral EU, China and Africa development dialogue. In this context, the EU put more emphasis on the exchange with China than with Africa, which explains why it opted for different foreign policy instruments with Africa as compared with China. While the EU's trilateral engagement with Africa corresponded to a pure form of transformative engagement, EU opted for reciprocal engagement with China. The reason why the EU adopted a different foreign policy instrument with China as compared to Africa can be explained by the fact that EU policymakers started realising that in order to receive support

from China, they had to change their traditional foreign policy of transformative engagement to adopt a novel, more reciprocal type of foreign policy instrument. Yet, at the same time, the EU continued relying on the traditional foreign policy instrument of transformative engagement with Africa. Hence, while EU policymakers were willing to adapt to Chinese demands, they ignored African protests and expected African policymakers to adapt to European interests and standards. This shows that despite the EU's overarching foreign policy discourse of CSP, it treated its strategic partners differently, which could imply that it gives priority to the engagement with some emerging powers over others. The EU's double standards have considerably undermined its foreign policy of engagement with emerging countries. In the case of the trilateral EU, China and Africa development dialogue, China has made its support conditional on the consent by the African partners. However, as the EU was less concerned with including African stakeholders, it compromised the whole policy dialogue.

7.2   Recent EU Policy Developments

This book has primarily focused on policy processes that took place before 2012. As the emerging multipolar world is characterised by rapid changes, this section will look at more recent policy trends within the EU and how they affect the research findings of this book. In particular, two policy developments will have major consequences in terms of EU foreign policy and trilateral EU-China-Africa relations.

The first one concerns the institutional and strategic shifts in EU foreign policymaking prompted by the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty. The reforms that have followed the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty have increased the complexity of the EU's institutional structures. As outlined in Chapter 2, two new institutions in the area of EU foreign policy were created with the Lisbon Treaty, namely the High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy and the EEAS. While the research project has mostly focused on the role of the Commission and Council, the EU's trilateral policy agenda with China and Africa is now increasingly set by the EEAS and the High Representative.

While the reforms initiated by the Lisbon Treaty might present a challenge in terms of institutional consistency in EU foreign policy, they also provide opportunities for the formulation of a broader EU foreign policy strategy. Under the leadership of the High Representative Federica

Mogherini, a new Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy (so-called EU Global Strategy) was launched in June 2016. This policy document was the result of a process of strategic reflection aimed at revising the European Security Strategy from 2003 (Biscop 2015). The process started in 2012 when several member states proposed the idea for a new global strategy for the EU (Lundin 2012). Following this first call, the High Representative Federica Mogherini was mandated by the European Council in June 2015 to engage in a process of strategic reflection and to draft a new strategy for EU foreign policy. While the final document formulates important principles and sets out new priorities in terms of EU foreign policy, the "process of reflection by a wide range of actors" was considered "as important as the end product of the exercise itself" (Missiroli 2015). In terms of the EU's relations with China and Africa, the new policy document foresees to "establish more effective partnerships with emerging players". In particular, the Global Strategy introduces the concept of "Cooperative Regional Orders" as voluntary forms of regional governance to respond to the new challenges of the twenty-first century. The EU will give specific priority to supporting Cooperative Regional Orders in Asia and Africa. Alongside Africa, the EU strategic document makes explicit reference to China. It calls on the EU to "deepen trade and investment with China" and to "engage China based on respect for rule of law, both domestically and internationally" (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016, 38).

Within the broader new EU foreign policy strategy, European policy-makers have also formulated more specific policies regarding China and Africa. In a joint effort, the High Representative and the Commission have worked on a policy document specifically targeted at the EU's foreign policy towards China. The proposal for a new EU strategy on China was released only shortly after the EU's Global Strategy and provides a "policy framework for EU engagement with China for the next five years" (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016a, 2). The policy documents identify a series of shared Sino-European interests. In particular, it draws attention to Africa as an area that "offers significant potential" for coop-eration between the EU and China (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016a, 12). The EU strategy on China highlights the notion that "Africa offers the best opportunity for EU-China security co-operation" (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs

and Security Policy 2016a, 13) and suggests joint projects around military assistance to the AU, counter-piracy and peacekeeping. Alongside security cooperation, the new EU strategy on China also stresses the importance of EU-China cooperation to foster African development, referring explicitly to the GPEDC.

In addition to updating its policy towards China, the EU is also in the process of reforming its diplomatic relations with Africa. The Cotonou Agreement, which was signed in 2000 and which provides the legal basis for the partnership between the EU and the ACP countries, will expire in 2020. In view of the expiration of the Partnership Agreement, the Commission and the EEAS have drafted a communication presenting possible future scenarios for continuing the EU's relationship with ACP countries (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016b). 2017 marks the 10th anniversary of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. For this occasion, the EU issued a communication for a renewed impetus of the Africa-EU Partnership (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2017). It expresses support for African policy initiatives such as the Agenda 2063 and provides the groundwork for the upcoming fifth EU-Africa summit.

Alongside the policy changes that have followed the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the research findings exposed in this book will also be affected by the potential withdrawal of the UK from the EU, commonly referred to as Brexit. Following the referendum of the 23rd of June 2016, during which 52 per cent of the population in the UK voted for the country to leave the EU, a complex process of withdrawal has been initiated. This will considerably affect EU foreign policy and trilateral EU-China-Africa relations. Although the novel analytical framework exposed in Chapter 2 of this book is related to EU foreign policy and this research project therefore primarily focused on the policy initiatives undertaken by the three main EU institutions (Commission, Council and European Parliament) towards China and Africa, the role played by EU member states in the foreign policymaking process cannot be completely ignored. According to European foreign policy research, the so-called big three – France, Germany and the UK – are the most influential in shaping the EU's foreign policy agenda (Algieri 2008; Gross 2009; Lehne 2012). The decisions by the Council of the EU are a visible expression of this. Hence, the withdrawal of the UK will have an impact on the EU's foreign policy in general and its relations with China and Africa more specifically.

Due to its particular economic, political, security and development attributes, the UK did not only contribute to the development of CFSP but also played an important role in the EU's foreign policy in general. In comparison to other smaller EU member states, the UK pursues a more sophisticated national foreign policy, relying on a vast network of embassies all over the world. As a former colonial power, the UK continues to have specific links to the African continent through the Commonwealth and has therefore supported the EU's cooperation with Africa. Moreover, in its role as an important trading nation, the UK has favoured the expansion of the EU's economic relations with China. As outlined in Chapters 3–5, the UK has contributed to recent efforts of EU engagement with China and Africa. The UK was among the first member states to initiate a bilateral diplomatic dialogue with China on Africa. Moreover, as a member of the OECD DAC, the UK – through its Department for International Development (DFID)[71] – supported the multilateral EU-China dialogue on Africa. As outlined in Chapter 4, it was thanks to the intervention of the UK that a compromise with China could be reached during the negotiations at the HLF-4 in Busan, opening the way for the GPEDC.

Against this background, Brexit will severely affect EU foreign policy, as well as EU-China-Africa trilateral relations. First and foremost, the departure of the UK from the EU will impact the EU's development and security policy (Mendez-Parra et al. 2016). As a major contributor to the EU budget, as well as the EDF, the withdrawal of the UK from the EU will have an impact on the EU's role as a donor and its development cooperation with China and Africa (Interviews 30Ce, 98Ce). The UK has initiated several trilateral development projects with China in Africa and has also promoted the topic of TDC at EU-level in the negotiations of the EU's budget for 2014–2020 (Interview 30Cc). As outlined in Chapter 5, the current Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020 has introduced several financial instruments for development cooperation. The UK supported the establishment of the new Partnership Instrument, which lays the foundation for a new development partnership between the EU and China. Hence, the withdrawal of the UK could have repercussion regarding the implementation of this new instrument. Moreover, Brexit could also negatively impact the EU's development cooperation with Africa, specifically, by reducing the budget of the EDF. In addition to development policy, the UK's withdrawal from the EU will also have implications for CSDP operations and the EU's ability as a security actor in Africa. For

instance, the UK contributes to the EU's maritime operation Atalanta off the Cost of Somalia, which has led to initial collaboration in the field of counter-piracy with China (Stahl 2011b) (Interviews 33Ce, 56Oe).

In sum, it is important to bear in mind that EU foreign policy is in a constant state of flux and that the overall transition towards a multipolar world order bears both opportunities and challenges for the EU. On one hand, the new Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy and the EU's new China strategy could provide the basis for a radical foreign policy overhaul and a more genuine engagement with rising powers. On the other hand, Brexit will pose an even bigger challenge in terms of the complexity of EU foreign policy.

7.3   WAYS FORWARD IN FUTURE RESEARCH

This book has laid the foundations for the establishment of an original research field on EU-China-Africa trilateral relations. Despite the progress achieved, further research needs to be conducted to consolidate this new strand of research. In particular, a more systematic consideration needs to be attributed to the work of Chinese and African scholars. So far, European researchers have carried out most of the academic work in this area (Hofmann et al. 2007; Barton and Bellefroid 2015; Wissenbach 2011; Hackenesch 2009). In order to reach a more balanced research agenda, European scholars should place more emphasis on the growing Chinese scholarly work on China-Africa relations (He 2007; Li 2008), as well as on African research on Sino-Africa relations (Manji and Marks 2007) (Harneit-Sievers et al. 2010). This would allow comparing the predominantly European discourse on trilateral EU, China and Africa relations with Chinese and Africa views and shed light on the major differences. For instance, it has been underlined that the European and Chinese research community have different interpretations of basic concepts such as sovereignty, governance and strategic partnerships (Gross and Jian 2012; Stumbaum and Wei 2012; Taneja 2010). The same conceptual gap applies to European and African research (Adebajo and Whiteman 2012; Cornelissen et al. 2012; Zondi 2013).

Trilateral research projects, bringing together scholars from Europe, China and Africa, could be a good starting point to formulating a more comprehensive approach to the study of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations. First endeavours have shown positive results by strengthening links between the European, Chinese and African research community, as well

as developing a common understanding of key analytical concepts (Pollet et al. 2011). In view of further consolidating the new research field of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations these initial trilateral research projects need to be expanded. In order to do so, this section makes suggestions for three future research pathways.

7.3.1   *China's Belt and Road Initiative*

In order to incorporate Chinese and African perspectives in the study of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations, future trilateral research projects should focus specifically on political and economic developments in China and Africa. China is known for its long-term policy planning. The Chinese leadership adopts Five-Year Plans (FYP) that set detailed social and economic development targets for the entire country. The current 13th FYP was published in March 2016 as China's primary planning document for the period from 2016 to 2020. It reflects the China's slowing growth over the past years, referred to as China's "New Normal". The slowdown of China's economy has been a key concern of the Chinese communist leadership, whose legitimacy stems from its ability to deliver continued economic growth. In order to balance the slowdown of the Chinese economy, the "One Belt, One Road" (OBOR) initiative was launched as a personal endeavour by President Xi Jinping end of 2013 (Rolland 2017b). Also known as China's "New Silk Road" initiative, OBOR is a perfect illustration of China's master planning and long-term strategic vision.

Originally driven by domestic economic and political imperatives, OBOR is also closely related to Chinese foreign policy (Rolland 2017b). Its overall objective is to improve China's connectivity with countries along the ancient Silk Road by building a massive new network linking Asia, Europe and Africa. China's new grand strategy consists of both a land and a maritime component: the Silk Economic Belt and the twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road. Since its formal endorsement at the Third Plenum of the 18th CCP Congress in November 2013, the Chinese government has dedicated considerable resources to the implementation of this new geopolitical strategy (Rolland 2017a, 128). In order to fund the major infrastructure projects to connect countries across Eurasia, the Chinese government has created specific financial institutions. Alongside the Asian Infrastructure Bank, a Silk Road Fund was established. The White Paper on China's New Silk Road Initiative, issued in

March 2015, highlights that the Economic Land Belt goes through the European continent, while Africa plays a prominent role in the Maritime Silk Road, which stretches from China to the Indian Ocean (Chinese Government 2015). Consequently, China's new grand foreign policy strategy will have major economic and geopolitical implications for both Africa and Europe. Many uncertainties remain over the actual implementation of OBOR, raising questions in terms of potential opportunities and challenges for African and European partners.

Regarding potential economic opportunities, African and European countries along the New Silk Road could benefit from Chinese financing for major infrastructure projects (Stahl 2015a). Some research suggests that through OBOR China's engagement in Africa would "shift away from a traditional focus on securing natural resources towards a more exploratory focus on opportunities for a manufacturing hub in the African region" (OECD 2016a, 26). At the same time, Europe could also benefit from China's OBOR initiative. As outlined in the New Global Strategy, the EU would however need to "pursue a coherent approach to China's connectivity drives westwards" in order to be able maximise the potential of the newly created EU-China Connectivity Platform (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2016, 38). In this context, the European Investment Bank (EIB)[72] has reached out to the AIIB to explore the possibility of jointly financing projects in countries where both institutions are active.

Despite these potential economic benefits, there are major concerns related to the actual implementation of what could be the largest overseas investment drive ever launched by a single country. Although China's OBOR strategy might look good on paper, it could bear important financial risks for countries that take part in the connectivity project. In particular in Africa, unprecedented expansion of Chinese loans accompanying OBOR could push countries into a debt trap. Also, in Europe there are worries about possible negative economic consequences of OBOR and the increase of Chinese FDI to Europe (Le Corre 2017). The EU and China have therefore established a joint Working Group to look at Sino-European investment relation.

In May 2017, the Chinese government hosted its first major OBOR summit in China. More than 80 countries gathered during China's flagship event in Beijing, highlighting the geopolitical importance of China's New Silk Road initiative. Despite considerable efforts from the Chinese leadership to dispel concerns related to its mega connectivity project, the

recent OBOR summit was not without controversy. According to experts, "the summit revealed profound disagreements between Europeans and Beijing on the shape of future cooperation under the Silk Road framework" (Stanzel 2017). Because of suspicions that OBOR serves as a vehicle for Chinese hegemony in Asia, regional powers such as India and Japan boycotted the summit. OBOR is increasingly seen as grand geopolitical strategy to bolster China's regional and global leadership ambitions, rather than a grand infrastructure project. This raises concerns over the political agenda behind OBOR and Chinese intentions to promote an alternative development model. Whereas several countries are supportive of reshaping the current international order, it remains unclear who would benefit from a grand connectivity project like OBOR that is primarily driven by domestic Chinese interests. The Chinese government has tried to address these suspicions by replacing the original OBOR label with the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) concept (Stanzel 2017). While OBOR suggests a single framework, the BRI label focuses on a variety of different networks and should thereby highlight the inclusive nature of China's grand strategy.

As there is little doubt that future Chinese foreign policy will be determined by OBOR, African and European partners need to come up with their own policy responses. Academic research could help European and African policymakers to make more informed foreign policy choices and formulate more long-term strategic policies. Trilateral research projects looking at the implications of China's OBOR initiative for Europe and Africa could be of particular value as they could allow for different perspectives.

7.3.2   USA's Reactions to China's Rise in Africa

Similarly to the EU, the USA has closely followed China's growing influence in Africa. US foreign policy towards China differs significantly from the EU's engagement with China (Gill and Murphy 2008; Gill and Small 2012; Ross et al. 2010). Unlike EU-China relations, US-China relations are generally framed in terms of "big powers relation" driven by strategic rivalry (Zhao 2015). Due to the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific region and the recent US strategic pivoting to Asia (Campbell 2016), competing economic and strategic interests between the USA and China mostly play out in Asia. As China's regional influence is growing, Chinese leaders are suspicious of a US containment policy. Additionally,

US engagement with Africa varies significantly from the EU's foreign policy towards the continent. In contrast to the EU, which has always accorded high priority to its neighbouring continent, Africa's strategic importance in US foreign policy largely eroded after the end of the Cold War (Shinn 2009, 142). While Africa was at the bottom of the US foreign policy agenda during the 1990s, this started to change around 2000. Under the presidency of George W. Bush greater US diplomatic efforts were directed towards countries in Africa (Cooke and Morrison 2009). In parallel to its growing engagement in Africa, the USA also started following China's rise in the region more closely. During his trip to Africa in 2008, President Bush explicitly acknowledged China's expanding role on the continent (Shinn 2016, 36). The US response to China's rise in Africa is driven by different government agencies, including the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, as well as the U.S. Trade Representative (Shinn 2016, 45).

Under the lead of its Africa Bureau, the State Department formulated in 2012 an interagency US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. The objective of the strategy is to make US Africa policy more coherent. Building on the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was signed into law in 2000, the US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa fosters synergies between US foreign and trade policy in Africa. The greater emphasis on US economic interests in Africa has to be seen against the background of China's growing economic influence in the region. The organisation of the first US-Africa Leaders Summit and the US-Africa Business Forum under President Barack Obama in 2014 can be seen as a direct response to the fact that China surpassed the USA as Africa's single most important trading partner (Stahl 2016a). Alongside the Africa Bureau, the State Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs has also shaped the US policy response to China's rise in Africa. With the support of the China Desk, a specific US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) was established in 2009. The S&ED was the result of US attempts to manage the big power competition with China through dialogue and engagement, rather than a containment policy (Christensen 2015). Although the S&ED originally focused mostly on economic relations, it was broadened to also include a "strategic track". In this context, US diplomats have also attributed attention to US engagement with China in Africa. Since some years, regular US-China bilateral consultations on African affairs with officials from the US

State Department and the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs are held (Sun 2016). These discussions have explored potential collaboration in different policy areas such as health (Stahl 2016a). For instance, the US and China joined forces to respond to the Ebola crisis in West Africa in 2014. Alongside the official dialogue between American and Chinese diplomats, more informal exchanges such as the "Africa-China-US Consultation for Peace", supported by the Carter Center and the US Institute of Peace (USIP), have also been held. These informal exchanges between different American, Chinese and African stakeholders have fostered greater coordination in the area of peace and security (Sun 2016; Chambas et al. 2017; Staats 2017). As China's presence in Africa is expanding, the Chinese leadership is increasingly under pressure to strike a balance between the traditional principle of "non-interference" into domestic affairs of other countries with the need to protect more actively China's economic interests abroad (Staats and Stahl 2017) and to act as a responsible member of the international community (He 2007). China's growing security engagement in Africa presents opportunities for collaboration with the USA and the EU. Diplomatic efforts to solve the Darfur crisis in Sudan and the international anti-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden can serve as an initial example of greater US/EU security coordination with China in Africa.

Alongside the State Department, USAID has started to reach out to China. In the past, there has been little interaction between USAID and China. This can be explained by the fact that, in contrast to the EU and European member states like Germany and France, the USA only distributes limited amounts of foreign aid to China (Lum 2014, 2). The limitations of US development funding to China are the result of legislative restrictions adopted by the Congress. Within the US political system, the US administration annually requests a foreign aid bill, known as foreign operations appropriations, which needs to be authorised by the Congress. For years, the Congress has included provisions restricting US foreign assistance to China in the foreign operations appropriations (Lum 2014). Because of these restrictions, the USA only provides very limited bilateral assistance to the Chinese government. Instead, most of the US foreign aid supports programmes implemented by non-governmental organisations to foster democracy in China. For this reason, contacts between USAID and the Chinese government have been very limited in the past. Yet, with the rise of Chinese aid to Africa, officials at USAID have begun to explore ways how to reach out to

China. Due to limited bilateral development relations with China, USAID has used the multilateral setting of the OECD DAC to establish contacts with China's Ministry of Commerce. As outlined in Chapter 5, the USA has been a key supporter of the China-DAC Study Group and USAID. At the same time, USAID has also started engaging in bilateral cooperation with China on global development challenges. To foster the collaboration between USAID and the Chinese government, the position of Development Counsellor at the US Embassy in Beijing was created. Moreover, USAID signed a specific Memorandum of Understanding with the Chinese Ministry of Commerce in 2015 to promote shared objectives in the area of global development and explore collaboration in third countries, namely in Africa.

Recent US policy initiatives to engage in a dialogue with China on Africa have also been accompanied by growing research on tripartite relations between the USA, China and Africa (Bräutigam 2008; Campbell 2008; Carmody and Owusu 2007; Gill et al. 2007; Kolbe and Ritterspach 2011; Pham 2006; Shinn 2009; Shinn 2016; Sun 2014; Sun 2016; Thompson 2007). Akin to the new research field of EU-China-Africa trilateral relations, initial US research on growing China-Africa relations lacks a clear conceptual framework and could benefit from a more systematic approach. Although the analytical framework presented in this book has been formulated for the specific case of the EU's foreign policy, some of its elements could help to gain a more systematic understanding of US policy response towards China's growing presence in Africa. Moreover, it could allow foster transatlantic research synergies. Building on initial research on American and European approaches regarding China's rise in Africa (Huliaras and Magliveras 2008; Belligoli 2011; Junbo and Zhimin 2008; Stahl 2016), future research should be directed towards a broader comparative study of US and EU Responses to China's rise in Africa.

7.3.3 TDC between the EU and Rising Powers

Already in the 1980s Philip Snow suggested in his book that researchers should "follow with some interest the expansion of contacts between all parts" of what he referred to as the "Third World" (Snow 1988, xvi). The conceptual framework for the study of EU foreign policy developed in this book could serve as basis for a broader study of EU's relations with other emerging countries, namely Brazil, India and South Africa. Apart from establishing new platforms and institutions such as IBSA[73] and the

New Development Bank, Brazil, India and South Africa are increasingly involved in Africa and start contributing to the international development agenda. The adoption of the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development by the UN in September 2015 can serve as a prominent example for Brazil's, India's and South Africa's growing role as development partners (Browne and Weiss 2014). At the centre of the so-called 2030 Agenda are the SDGs (UN 2015). They consist of a set of 17 global goals with specific targets. By replacing the MDGs, the SDGs reflect a changing approach to global development. While the MDGs were primarily aimed at measuring the performance of developing countries, the SDGs are a universal set of goals. They represent a framework for development policy to be applied to all countries around the world, including emerging countries. The EU's New Consensus on Development specifically underlines the role of emerging economies as providers of development cooperation (European Parliament, Council and Commission 2017, 53).

Among the emerging donors, China is by far the most important provider of aid. Although the amount of development assistance provided by other rising powers is not yet very significant, they are starting to establish specific development cooperation structures. South Africa's efforts to establish the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA), a specific development agency, highlight this trend. As 2016 marks the 10th anniversary of the EU-South Africa Strategic Partnership (European Commission 2006b), it could present a good opportunity for European policymakers to explore opportunities for TDC with South Africa. In order to advance this process, more detailed research would be necessary on how the EU could employ the novel policy tool of TDC with other emerging donors than China. The conceptual framework of this book could be applied to other strategic partners of the EU, such as South Africa, and thereby present a starting point for broader analytical work on TDC between the EU and emerging donors.

Notes

Chapter 1

1. On the Hunt–Lenox or Lenox Globe, dating from around 1510, the reference *"HIC SVNT DRACONES"* (i.e. hic sunt dracones/ "here are dragons") was placed on Southeast Asia.
2. In 2006, a recently discovered ancient map was unveiled in China and the UK. It provides new evidence for the voyages of exploration undertaken by the Chinese Ming Admiral Zheng He during the period between 1405 and 1435 (The Economist 2006).
3. Although the concept of rising/emerging powers is central to understanding IR, the theoretical literature remains contentious and authors refer to different notions such as "new drivers of global change", "emerging non-OECD countries" or "anchor countries".
4. The Republic of Rhodesia was an unrecognised state in southern Africa from 1965 to 1979, equivalent in territorial terms to present-day Zimbabwe. It was named after Cecil Rhodes, who was a British businessman and politician.
5. It is important to note that unlike the EU China doesn't make a clear distinction between development aid and economic relations. China's development aid to African countries is closely linked to Chinese economic interests and the Chinese leadership therefore refers to a "win-win cooperation".
6. China's current economic model is commonly referred to as a "socialist market economy". The concept was introduced by Deng Xiaoping.

Originally, the PRC's economic system was characterised by a centrally planned economy. Since the reforms introduced by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, China's economic model combines a dominant state-owned sector with an open market economy.

7. As part of Deng Xiaoping's economic reforms, so-called Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were established in Chinese coastal cities in the 1980s. Unlike in the rest of China, in the SEZs market-driven capitalist policies were implemented in order to entice foreign businesses to invest in China.

8. The PRC, commonly known as "China", was established in 1949, controlling mainland China and the two special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau.

9. Burking Faso and Swaziland remain Taiwan's only diplomatic allies in Africa.

10. According to the OECD DAC, financial flows qualify as ODA if (a) they are undertaken by official agencies, (b) with the aim of promoting economic development and welfare of developing countries and (c) have a concessional character.

11. See: http://www.sais-cari.org/data/

12. See: Kitano, N. (2016), "Estimating China's Foriegn Aid II: 2014 Update", JICA-RI Working Paper No. 131, June 2016, Tokyo: Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Research Institute.

13. These loans – also referred to as "preferential" or "soft" loans – are granted by the Chinese government on terms substantially more generous than market loans.

14. 1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty. 2. Mutual non-aggression. 3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs. 4. Equality and cooperation for mutual benefit. 5. Peaceful co-existence.

15. 1. Respect the principle of equality and mutual benefits. 2. Respect the sovereignty of recipient countries and never attach any conditions or ask for any privileges. 3. Provide economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extend the time limit for the repayment when necessary. 4. Help recipient countries embark step-by-step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development. 5. Help recipient countries complete projects which require less investment but yield quick results. 6. Provide the best quality equipment and materials manufactured by China at international market prices. 7. Ensure that the personnel of the recipient country fully master the technology being transferred. 8. Chinese experts will have the same standard of living as the experts of the recipient country.

16. Although the time frame of this research generally covers the period prior to 2009, this book also covers important changes of EU foreign policy following the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the 1st of December

2009. In particular, the second case study outlined in Chapter 4 addresses the post-Lisbon structures of EU foreign policy.

17. The exact starting and ending dates differ slightly in each of the three case studies examined in Chapters 4–6.

18. Only those interviews carried out in Korea can be considered as rather marginal. They were conducted in the context of the Fourth High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness held in Busan in November/December 2011. The evidence gathered in Korea largely contributed to the second case study, exposed in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 2

19. Certain parts of this chapter draw on elements developed in my Working Paper "A Novel Conceptual Framework for the Study of EU Foreign Policy in a Multipolar World: The Case of EU-China-Africa Relations", published by the Freie Univeristät Berlin, NFG Asian Perceptions of the EU, No. 14/2015.

20. EU institutions include the European Commission, Council of the EU, European Council, European Parliament, European Court of Justice, European Court of Auditors, European Economic and Social Committee, Committee of the Regions, European Investment Bank (EIB), European Central Bank (ECB).

21. Under José Manuel Barroso's first term as Commission President (2004–2009), the following two DGs were primarily involved in EU foreign policymaking: DG RELEX and DG DEV.

22. COREPER is an acronym made up of the initial letters of the French title for the Committee of Permanent Representatives: Comité des Représentants Permanents.

23. The working groups of the Council can be divided into *thematic* working groups – e.g. the Working Group on Development Cooperation (CODEV), the Working Group on Human Rights (COHOM) – and *geographic* working groups – e.g. the Working Group for Africa (COAFR) and the Asia-Oceania Working Group (COASI).

24. Committees of the European Parliament involved in EU foreign policy include the Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET), the Development Committee (DEVE) and the International Trade Committee (INTA).

25. The TEC was renamed the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

26. See Chapter 1, Section 1.4 for a brief review of EFP scholarship.

27. The CFSP was established by the Maastricht Treaty as the second pillar of the EU. It is based on intergovernmental decision-making between member

states. It only deals with a specific part of EU Foreign Policy and is mainly directed towards security and defence diplomacy and actions.

28. EU external relations include policy fields such as trade, development, enlargement, humanitarian assistance, as well as external environmental and migration policy as an inherent part of foreign policy.

29. For a more detailed explanation of the concept, see Chapter 5.

30. The notion of strategy has been used at various points in time and in different cultural settings, as well as variety of different individuals, such as military officers, policymakers or business representatives. Most well-known are *The Art of War* by Sun Tzu and *On War* by Carl von Clausewitz.

31. See Chapter 7, Section 7.2 of this book.

32. It is important to highlight that the concept of CSP does not completely rule out the possibility of competition. The rise of emerging economies leads to a shift in global investment and trade flows and therefore exposes the EU to growing competition. The EU foreign policy strategy of CSP presents a way of managing this economic competition without eliminating it.

CHAPTER 3

33. The EU also has a structured bilateral cooperation with Africa. As Chapter 5 will discuss in more detail the institutionalisation of the bilateral relationship between the EU and Africa – known as the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership – only emerged around 2007.

34. For the purpose of conceptual clarity, it is important to highlight that this book refers to the notion of Strategic Partnership as the institutional architecture of EU-China bilateral relations. This concept should, however, not be confused with the notion of CSP which entails a specific meaning outlined in Chapter 2.

35. Before the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU was represented at the annual EU-China summits by the country holding the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and the President of the European Commission.

36. The original EU-China Strategic Dialogue was held at the level of the Chinese vice Foreign Minister, who met with an EU delegation composed of the deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the country holding the EU presidency and representatives from the Council Secretariat and the European Commission (Stumbaum 2009, 102).

37. See the organisation chart of the bilateral EU-China architecture published by DG RELEX in 2005.

38. The EU-China development dialogue was agreed at the 16th EU-China summit and its first meeting took place in March 2014.

39. The MDGs represent eight international development goals that were established by the UN. The MDGs set concrete targets and indicators for poverty reduction. They were inspired by the UN Millennium Declaration, adopted at the Millennium Summit in 2000 (UN 2000).

40. In order to get Europe back on a growth path, the EU recently established an Investment Plan for Europe (so-called Juncker Plan) and the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI). China was the first non-EU country to support the Juncker Plan and to announce its support for the EFSI.

Chapter 4

41. These include European founding countries of the OEEC, the USA and Canada.

42. Current OECD member states include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK and the USA.

43. Out of the 34 OECD members, 21 belong to the EU: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK.

44. The two exceptions concern the vote in the formal adoption of acts of the OECD and the contribution to the general budget of the OECD. Unlike the UN and the World Bank, the EU does not contribute to the budget of the OECD. The EU does, however, provide financial support to a number of specific OECD programmes and projects, through non-compulsory budget contributions.

45. South Africa is one of the few exceptions as it also acts as a donor of aid to other African countries.

46. DAC members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, EU, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, New Zeeland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the USA. Korea is the last member that joined the DAC in 2010.

47. EU member states belonging to the DAC are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK.

48. The Policy Division (POL), the Aid Quality and Architecture Division (AQuA), The REED and the STAT.

49. OECD peer reviews are soft-law mechanisms, which were developed by the OECD's predecessor, the OEEC, as a tool to allocate funds under the Marshall Plan.
50. The NDB is also referred to as the BRICS Development Bank.
51. Special Session with Non-DAC Providers of Development Assistance of the Working Party on Aid Effectiveness, Paris, 27 November 2007.
52. Initially, the UK, Nigeria and Indonesia acted as role of co-chairs. They were followed by The Netherlands, Malawi and Mexico.
53. The EU's membership in the DAC is based on the European Development Fund (EDF), which is solely managed by the European Commission and runs in parallel to the aid programmes of individual EU member states (see Chapter).
54. The same applies for the EU delegation to the UN in New York.

CHAPTER 5

55. Croatia as the 28th EU member states is not taken into account as it joined the EU only in July 2013.
56. For example, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), the DCI and the EDF.
57. For example, the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the Instrument for Stability, the DIC environment and sustainable management of natural resources, DCI Non-State actors and local authorities in development and the DCI migration and asylum.
58. In 2013, 33 per cent of EU ODA went to sub-Saharan Africa and only 5 per cent to North Africa.
59. Germany, France and the UK are the largest contributors to the EDF.
60. In May 2017, the EU adopted a "New European Consensus on Development" (European Parliament, Council and Commission 2017). It sets out a new framework for development cooperation for the EU and its member states, and highlights the EU's support for the UN 2030 agenda for sustainable development and its strategy for reaching the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
61. The term MIC represents an income-based classification, measured according to the criteria of annual gross national income (GNI) Wang, G. and Y. Zheng (2013) "China: Development and Governance", Singapore: World Scientific. per capita. Different definitions of MIC exist. The two most prominent classification systems were developed by the OECD and the World Bank. For instance, the OECD DAC makes a distinction between four categories of aid recipients: LDCs, LICs, LMICs and UMICs.
62. See Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1 of this book.

63. The concept of "Beijing Consensus" was introduced by Joshua Cooper Ramo in 2004 to describe a supposedly alternative Chinese economic development model to the so-called Washington Consensus.
64. Reference to the "European Consensus on Development", which was adopted by the EU in December 2005.
65. Morocco is the only state from the African continent that is not a member of the AU.
66. The ACP framework is centred around three main institutions: the ACP-EU Council of Ministers, the ACP-EU Committee of Ambassadors and the ACP-EP Parliamentary Assembly.

Chapter 6

67. In addition to the strategic partnership with the EU, China has also established strategic partnerships with single EU member states, notably with France, the UK and Germany.
68. See Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1.
69. Africa's eight RECs are The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU/UMA), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CENSAD).
70. Alongside China, India and Brazil, the AU also engaged in discussions with Turkey, Japan, Korea, Iran, South America and the Gulf States for establishing Strategic Partnerships.

Chapter 7

71. The DFID is a department of the UK government responsible for administering development aid. It is known as the UK's Overseas Development Agency.
72. The EIB is the EU's long-term lending institution. It is an international financial institution, jointly owned by all EU member states. Although 90 per cent of the EIB's projects are based within the EU, it increasingly finances projects in other countries, namely in Eurasia and Africa.

73. The IBSA Dialogue Forum is a tripartite grouping bringing together India, Brazil and South Africa. It focuses on fostering SSC and greater understanding between developing countries from Africa, Asia and South America.

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