

Societies and Political Orders in Transition

Nadezhda Lebedeva
Radosveta Dimitrova
John Berry *Editors*

Changing Values and Identities in the Post-Communist World

 Springer

Societies and Political Orders in Transition

Series editors

Alexander Chepureno

Higher School of Economics, National Research University, Moscow, Russia

Stein Ugelvik Larsen

University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway

William Reisinger

Department of Political Science, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, USA

Managing editors

Ekim Arbatli

Higher School of Economics, National Research University, Moscow, Russia

Dina Rosenberg

Higher School of Economics, National Research University, Moscow, Russia

Aigul Mavletova

Higher School of Economics, National Research University, Moscow, Russia

This book series presents scientific and scholarly studies focusing on societies and political orders in transition, for example in Central and Eastern Europe but also elsewhere in the world. By comparing established societies, characterized by well-established market economies and well-functioning democracies, with post-socialist societies, often characterized by emerging markets and fragile political systems, the series identifies and analyzes factors influencing change and continuity in societies and political orders. These factors include state capacity to establish formal and informal rules, democratic institutions, forms of social structuration, political regimes, levels of corruption, specificity of political cultures, as well as types and orientation of political and economic elites.

This series welcomes monographs and edited volumes from a variety of disciplines and approaches, such as political and social sciences and economics, which are accessible to both academics and interested general readers.

Topics may include, but are not limited to, democratization, regime change, changing social norms, migration, etc.

More information about this series at <http://www.springer.com/series/15626>

International Advisory Board:

Bluhm, Katharina; Freie Universität Berlin, Germany

Buckley, Cynthia; University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Sociological Research, USA

Cox, Terry; Central and East European Studies, University of Glasgow, UK

Fish, Steve; Berkeley University, USA

Ilyin, Michail; National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia

Melville, Andrei; National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia

Radaev, Vadim; National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russia

Nadezhda Lebedeva • Radosveta Dimitrova •
John Berry
Editors

Changing Values and Identities in the Post-Communist World

 Springer

Editors

Nadezhda Lebedeva
National Research University
Higher School of Economics
Moscow, Russia

Radosveta Dimitrova
Stockholm University
Stockholm, Sweden

John Berry
Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario,
Canada

National Research University
Higher School of Economics
Moscow, Russia

ISSN 2511-2201 ISSN 2511-221X (electronic)
Societies and Political Orders in Transition
ISBN 978-3-319-72615-1 ISBN 978-3-319-72616-8 (eBook)
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72616-8>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018936507

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.

The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

Printed on acid-free paper

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer International Publishing AG part of Springer Nature.

The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

The work by Nadezhda Lebedeva, John Berry, Klaus Boehnke, Ekaterina Bushina, Tatiana Ryabichenko, Victoria Galyapina, Zarina Lepshokova, Alexander Tatarko, Dmitrii Dubrov, and Maria Kozlova was prepared within the framework of the basic research program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics (HSE) and supported within the framework of a subsidy by the Russian Academic Excellence Project '5-100'. The editors appreciate the assistance in editing of the manuscript provided by Kristina Velkova (HSE, Russia).

Radosveta Dimitrova, Pasquale Musso, Iva Polackova Solcova, Delia Stefenel, Fitim Uka, Skerdi Zahaj, Peter Tavel, Venzislav Jordanov, and Evgeni Jordanov would like to acknowledge the support by a COFAS FORTE (Swedish Research Council for Health, Working Life and Welfare) Marie Curie Grant (Forte Projekt 2013-2669) and Japan Society for Promotion of Science Grant (JSPS PE 15763) to the first author. We are extremely grateful to the following organizations and people for their help in carrying out the study in Albania (Dajana Bejko, Jona Kajtazi, and Ola Minxhozi), Bulgaria (Eva Jecheva and the National Agency for Child Protection, all schools, students, and teachers and particularly Neli Filipova, Ivanina Noncheva, Radka Kostandinova, Albena Damianova, Stoyka Jekova, Svetla Atanasova, Neli Kiuchukova, Ani Angelova, Lilia Stoyanova, and Tianka Kardjilova), the Czech Republic (the Olomouc University Social Health Institute [OUSHI], in particular Zuzana Puzova, Katerina Hamplova, and Helena Pipova, all schools and institutions across the country and the Czech Academy of Sciences RVO 6808174 created as part of Strategy AV21), Romania (all teachers, colleagues, and especially Simona Steluta Marti, Iuliana Ilie, Ionut Cojan, Alina Manescu, and Luiza Bratu), and Kosovo (Genc Rexhepi, Argjend Abazi, Kastriot Hasaj, Enteela Kamberi, Erduana Dermaku, Miran Xhelili, Alma Sherifi, Hillari Alidema, Elina Morina, and Blerton Jakupi).

The research of Zoran Pavlović was supported in part by grant 47010 from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

Oleg Y. Khukhlaev, Valeria A. Shorohova, Elena A. Grishina, and Olga S. Pavlova acknowledge the financial support from the Russian State Science Foundation through grant (project No 15-06-10843).

The work by Oana Negru-Subtirica and Lavinia E. Damian was supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research and Innovation, CNCS—UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-RU-TE-2014-4-1061. Authors thank Eleonora Ioana Pop for her thoughtful comments on the manuscript.

The study of Martina Klicperova-Baker and Jaroslav Kostal was supported by the Czech Science Foundation (Grant Agency of the Czech Republic #15-11062S Psychosocial analysis of non-democratic character in a post-communist society: Empirical assessment of negative passivity and the so-called “bad mood”) and by the Czech Academy of Sciences (by RVO 68081740 as a part of research program Strategy AV21).

Skerdi Zahaj and Radosveta Dimitrova (the authors of the chapter “The Influence of Identity Styles on Adolescents Psychological Problems in Post-Communist Albania”) would like to thank all school personnel and students for their help in carrying out the study.

Contents

Introduction	1
Nadezhda Lebedeva, Radosveta Dimitrova, John W. Berry, and Klaus Boehnke	
Part I Value Changes Across Countries and Generations	
Democratic Values in the Post-Communist Region: The Incidence of Traditionalists, Skeptics, Democrats, and Radicals	27
Martina Klicperova-Baker and Jaroslav Kostal	
Emancipative Values in a Post-Communist Society: The Case of Serbia . . .	53
Zoran Pavlović	
Changes in Value Structure Among Estonian Majority and Russian-Speaking Minority in Post-Socialist Estonia	67
Laur Lilleoja and Maaris Raudsepp	
Intergenerational Value Differences in Latvia and Azerbaijan	85
Ekaterina Bushina and Tatiana Ryabichenko	
The Values and Social Identity of Russian Muslims	99
Olga Pavlova	
Intergenerational Transmission of Values in Urban and Rural Areas of Russia: The Role of Perceived Psychological Closeness	117
Dmitrii Dubrov and Alexander Tatarko	
Parenting Values and Practices Across Post-Communist Societies in Youth Identity Formation: A Literature Review	131
Oriola Hamzallari	

Values of Ethnic Russian Minority Members in North Caucasus Republics of the Russian Federation: An Inter- and Intragenerational Comparison	157
Victoria Galyapina, Nadezhda Lebedeva, Zarina Lepshokova, and Klaus Boehnke	
Values and Religious Identity of Russian Students from Different Religions	175
Oleg Y. Khukhlaev, Valeria A. Shorokhova, Elena A. Grishina, and Olga S. Pavlova	
Value Similarity with Mothers and Peers and Family Climate as Predictors of Well-Being of Russian Youth in Latvia	191
Tatiana Ryabichenko, Nadezhda Lebedeva, and Irina Plotka	
Generational Belonging and Historical Ruptures: Continuity or Discontinuity of Values and Attitudes in Post-Communist Romania	207
Dana Gavreliuc and Alin Gavreliuc	
Part II Social Identities Changes in Comparative Perspective	
Multiple Social Identities in Relation to Self-Esteem of Adolescents in Post-communist Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Kosovo, and Romania	225
Radosveta Dimitrova, Pasquale Musso, Iva Polackova Solcova, Delia Stefanel, Fitim Uka, Skerdi Zahaj, Peter Tavel, Venzislav Jordanov, and Evgeni Jordanov	
Probing the Relationship Between Group Identities of Russians and Ossetians in the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania: Intergenerational Analysis	243
Victoria Galyapina and Nadezhda Lebedeva	
Ethnic Identity and Cultural Value Orientations of Moldavian Youth in Transitional Society	259
Irina Caunenco	
The Influence of Identity Styles on Adolescents' Psychological Problems in Postcommunist Albania	281
Skerdi Zahaj and Radosveta Dimitrova	
The Kaleidoscope of Language, Ethnicity, and Identity in Uzbekistan	295
Kamila Isaeva, Byron G. Adams, and Fons J. R. van de Vijver	
The Role of Social Disidentification in Acculturation Preferences of Ethnic Majority and Minority Members in Kabardino-Balkar Republic	313
Zarina Lepshokova and Nadezhda Lebedeva	

The Great Escape: Linking Youth Identity Development to Growing Up in Post-Communist Romania 333
Oana Negru-Subtirica and Lavinia E. Damian

Negotiating Identity and Belonging After Regime Change: Hungarian Society and Roma in Post-Communist Hungary 349
Jekatyerina Dunajeva

Cultural Identification Among Immigrants from the Former USSR: Insights from Comparative Research with Five Groups in Germany and Israel 365
Katharina Sonnenberg, Peter F. Titzmann, and Rainer K. Silbereisen

Value Changes in Adolescents' Anticipation of Possible Career Selves in Slovenia and Serbia 383
Alenka Gril, Nada Polovina, Ivana Jakšić, Sabina Autor, and Mladen Radulović

Identity and Work Ethic of Peasants in the Context of the Post-Soviet Socio-economic Transformation 405
Maria Kozlova and Olga Simonova

Conclusion 421
Nadezhda Lebedeva and John W. Berry

Introduction



**Nadezhda Lebedeva, Radosveta Dimitrova, John W. Berry,
and Klaus Boehnke**

A quarter of a century has passed since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. A whole generation has been raised during this time in all the states belonging to the former USSR or the Eastern European ‘real socialist’ bloc.¹ Tremendous social change has taken place in economic systems and in political governance in these states. The daily lives of ordinary people have changed rapidly in these countries during this period. We consider that individuals have changed psychologically in response to these social and cultural changes (Berry, 1980). In particular, we can assume that the values and identities of individuals in these countries have changed dramatically during this period.

¹The term ‘real socialism’ or “actually existing socialism” was introduced during the Brezhnev era to label the political system in the Soviet sphere. It was chosen to describe the current forms of governance in the Soviet sphere, implicitly acknowledging that there are sizable but legitimate differences between the socialist rule that actually exists and utopian socialist or communist models of society. Throughout this chapter, the term ‘real socialist’ will be enclosed in single quotes to signal that the term is not meant to imply anything like “true socialism.”

N. Lebedeva (✉)

National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: nlebedeva@hse.ru

R. Dimitrova

Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

J. W. Berry

National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
Queen’s University, Kingston, ON, Canada

K. Boehnke

National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

Jacobs University Bremen, Bremen, Germany

e-mail: k.boehnke@jacobs-university.de

The balance between stability and change in values and identities across generations is an important issue for societies. Values and identities formed during the socialization period need to be relatively stable in order to provide continuity in the way of life of a society; too much or too rapid change may lead to social disintegration. At the same time, changes in values and identities are also important in order to adapt successfully to increasing contact with other cultures. These contacts bring challenges that need to be addressed by flexibility and a certain degree of modification in the current ways of living. Adaptation to these challenges is equally important in order to avoid social disintegration.

Ways of changing values and identities vary across generations because individuals were socialized at different periods during these social and political changes. Older persons (above the age of 50) were socialized into a society dominated by one political and economic system, while younger persons have been socialized during a period of rapid and inconsistent change. Cohort analysis comparing the values and identities of different generations can show that we are witnessing a generational change linked to a socioeconomic and political development of post-Communist countries.

While a general pattern may exist in which social and psychological changes are linked over time, there are also variations across different regions and countries. Some countries were fully incorporated into the USSR as Soviet Republics, while others had the status of “satellites.” In addition to these original differences, since the dissolution of the USSR, there have been different trajectories of social and political changes across countries. For example, there has been a rise of nationalist sentiment in many post-Communist countries, ethno-cultural republics within the Russian Federation, as well as among ethnic Russians. In addition, the identity of Russians living in new independent states and ethno-cultural republics within Russia is being transformed as they become aware of themselves as an ethnic minority. In other countries, visions of a new society rooted in historical memories have come to the fore, creating differing trajectories, some based on religion, some on ethnicity, and some on a process of westernization.

Although the dissolution of the Soviet Union occurred in 1991, the way of life established there may continue to affect the lives of people residing in former Soviet satellite countries. There clearly seems to be what Ogburn (1966) called a “cultural lag,” meaning that sociocultural change always tends to lag behind technological change and change in systems of governance.

For example, in many families, parent-adolescent conflict often emerged around the freedoms that young people were enjoying, but to which their parents were not able to relate. More or less, the relatively recent independence of the former post-Communist countries suggests that these nations may be developing their identities at the same time as young people residing there are addressing identity issues.

In this book, we seek to trace similarities and differences in changes in values and identities across societies and generations, which have experienced social, political, and economic changes in various ways and to different extents.

Since 1917–2017: What Has Happened?

The year 2017 is the centenary of the socialist October Revolution (which according to the—current day—Gregorian calendar actually took place in St. Petersburg in November 1917), when the Bolsheviks headed by Vladimir I. Lenin seized power in Russia. This event radically changed the lives of Russia's citizens and was accompanied by civil war, economic ruin, and destruction of many social classes, a struggle with religion and mass repression and deportations of dissenters. However, despite these consequences the Communist dream was very powerful among the working class around the globe in the first decades of the twentieth century. The victory of the USSR in a bloody war with Nazi Germany, which claimed the lives of 20 million Soviet citizens, and the liberation of Eastern Europe gained sympathy for the Soviet Union and its way of life. This victory allowed the Soviet Union to create in Eastern Europe a so-called Eastern “real socialist bloc” that included Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Hungary, Poland, and Romania, with Yugoslavia and Albania being more detached members for a certain time.

The beginning of “building socialism” in these countries led to rapid economic growth, which lasted until the mid-1960s. The motor of this economic growth was industrialization. Industry growth here was without equal, despite the economic boom on the West. Even such traditionally agrarian countries like Bulgaria and Romania confidently embarked on the path of industrial development. However, the pace of economic growth and standard of living of Eastern Europe already began to lag behind the West in the 1960s. The inefficiency of the Soviet economic model adopted by its European allies has become one of the causes of crises in the socialist countries.

Dramatic changes occurred in the foreign policy of the countries of Eastern Europe. From the “cordon sanitaire” as regarded by Western nations against the Soviet Union, they became its satellites. The Soviet Union had achieved the monolithic unity and demanded the complete subordination of domestic and foreign policy of Eastern European countries in the course of the Soviet leadership. Any defiance of Moscow caused a severe reaction. Thus, around 1947–1948, authoritarian socialism that dominated the governance structure of the USSR was also established in the countries of Eastern Europe, with the only difference that—unlike in Russia some 30 years before—it was not accompanied by a civil war: The social and political systems in these countries were radically transformed.

The death of Stalin in 1953 led to major changes in the USSR and in Eastern Europe. Liberation from the oppressive fear of him exposed deep contradictions of socialism as it existed and widespread discontent and even resistance to it. The economic situation in the countries of Eastern Europe in the late 1970s and the early 1980s ultimately led to the emergence of many social problems. The crisis of socialist one-party rule evolved not only as an economic one but as a social, political, and moral one as well. The so-called perestroika (transformation) that began in 1985 in the Soviet Union and that influenced the countries of Eastern Europe was the impetus for a resolution of this crisis.

Exhausted by their own economic, political, and social problems, and stuck in a useless war in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union did not prevent the changes in the former satellite countries. Gorbachev said in the late 1980s that Eastern Europe is no longer strategically necessary territory, being an expensive economic burden and a key of political inconvenience, and there is no universal model of development for all countries (Crampton, 1994, pp. 407–408). This speech showed all peoples of Eastern Europe that force would not be used against them, and they can now choose their own path of development (Dawisha, 1990, p. 38).

Between 1989 and 1991, the world witnessed a unique phenomenon that swept over the countries of Central and Southeastern Europe: an avalanche of revolutionary change in peacetime that led to the decomposition of the entire empire. The authoritarian-bureaucratic regimes that were established in the postwar decades collapsed. The events developed not only with great rapidity but also differed in the radical nature of the outcome. They dragged into its orbit Poland and Hungary, the GDR and Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria and Romania. If we take into account that Yugoslavia and Albania also entered a period of revolutionary change, it is possible to calculate that the processes of change included 7 countries with a total population of about 150 million people. This change created a qualitatively new political landscape in these countries: They changed the balance of power on the European continent, affected the “bloc system” of relations on the world stage, put the German question on the agenda, had an impact on restructuring processes in the Soviet Union, and influenced the state of affairs in the Communist movement worldwide. All this gives grounds to put the 1989 revolutions in these countries on a par with the biggest events of the twentieth century.

It is a too short period to comprehensively assess what has happened. Revolution in Eastern Europe in itself is unique; never before in history had a transition from socialism to capitalism been carried out. Changing “the truth” is a painful process. This is because it was not just words but the whole system of meanings, values, and motivations that became different. However, the processes of change are still ongoing; some vestiges of the past still have not outlived itself. But hardly anybody will deny that the changes were inevitable, as the fall of all empires built on tyranny were inevitable throughout history.

Thus, 40 years of the socialist system failed to win the hearts and minds of people. The hope that socialism, with its dominance of public ownership of the means of production, would become a society of social justice that would lead to the destruction of exploitation of man by man and to prosperity did not materialize. In practice, the elimination of private ownership and absolute domination of state ownership meant that people lost interest in the results of their labor. State property belonged to bureaucratic structures, which appropriated the results of the work of the people. Monopoly power of the Communist parties led to the creation of an undemocratic political system, which deprived the masses of their right to express their opinion and elect the ruling structures. In this situation the system calling itself the “real socialist camp” could not continue to exist forever. In any case, the 40-year history of socialist one-party rule in Eastern Europe ended. The collapse of ‘real socialism’ created a unique situation in Europe. It became transformed into a unified political,

legal, and civil space, founded on a recognition of a social market economy, the rule of law, liberal democracy, and the idea of a united Europe.

Nevertheless, this process was not direct and easy. Since the collapse of ‘real socialism,’ a burgeoning literature on transition attempted to explain various aspects of the transition of the region. Against the high hopes, “exporting democracy” (e.g., Glenn, 2009) and introducing market economy to replace the command economy in Eastern Europe have not lived up to the original expectations (Kymlicka & Opalski, 2002). The regime change was clearly a transformative period: Economic liberalization and the process of democratization all brought about major changes in how nationhood was conceptualized and how minorities were defined. The changes did not benefit everyone, however. Political elites largely represented the core nation, and the new state [came to be] seen as having the right, indeed the responsibility to protect and promote the cultural, economic, demographic, and political vitality of the core nation (Brubaker, 2009). According to Brubaker (2011), “at a moment when Western Europe seemed to be moving beyond the nation-state, Eastern Europe and Eurasia appeared to be moving back to the nation-state, entering not a post-national but a post-multinational era” (pp. 1785–1786).

As a consequence, the ethnodemographic landscape changed dramatically. In each and every country, census data documented a nationalizing trend, with the titular share of the population increasing sharply and the Russian (and Russophone) share declining even more sharply (reducing to 22% in Latvia, 26% in Estonia, and 28% in Kazakhstan). This is not a novelty in history: Migration leading to ethnic de-mixing has often followed the reconfiguration of political space along national lines. For example, previously dominant ethnonational groups (such as Germans in the eastern provinces of Prussia or Hungarians in Transylvania) found themselves transformed into national minorities in nationalizing successor states (such as interwar Poland and Romania). The post-Soviet pattern has been similar (Brubaker, 2011). For instance, strongly nationalizing discourses and policies encouraged many Russians to leave Estonia and Latvia soon after independence. Russian-speaking immigrants were routinely characterized as unwanted and even illegal “occupiers” or “colonists,” and mainstream politicians, reflecting titular public opinion, made no secret of their desire to see them emigrate (Laitin, 1998). However, the emigration wave peaked in the early 1990s and tapered off rapidly thereafter. Russophones have not felt welcome in Estonia and Latvia, but they have felt secure; they could see a more promising future there (or perhaps in “Europe” more broadly) than in Russia (Laitin, 1998).

Another problem was that the collapse of ‘real socialism,’ with its paternalistic system, signaled the end of state-provided security, which then led to homelessness, re-ghettoization, and tumbling standards of living (Stewart, 2001; also see European Union Agency of Fundamental Rights, 2012). The incomplete transition manifests in the political, economic, as well as social sphere. This unfinished transition and expanded political domain laid the ground for xenophobic and far-right ideologies to (re)emerge on the post-Communist space, with political parties and movements rallying around far-right nationalism and exclusion of minorities (Dunajeva, chapter “Negotiating Identity and Belonging After Regime Change: Hungarian Society and Roma in Post-Communist Hungary” in this book).

How Psychological Changes Are Linked to Sociopolitical Changes

The field of cross-cultural psychology seeks to show that the cultural contexts in which individuals develop have a profound influence on the behaviors that they exhibit (Berry, Poortinga, Breugelsmans, Chasiotis, & Sam, 2011). In this field, it is assumed that as members of one species, we all share the same basic processes and needs, but that cultural influences shape the development and expression of them. All aspects of behavior are shaped by cultural context, including perception, cognition, personality, emotion, and social behaviors. And all of these are candidates for change when the context changes. In this book, we focus on two categories of changing behavior: values and identities. These two are considered to be fundamental and universal features of human existence; they can be observed among individuals in all societies and serve to meet the basic needs of goal seeking and belonging. Because they are universal in the sense used here (i.e., that they are common to our human species but are shaped and variably expressed across cultures), they may be examined across populations using a common set of concepts and assessed using a common set of tools. This in turn allows their comparison across the cultural contexts and across changing contexts and generations being examined in this book.

In the formulation of Berry (1980), social and cultural changes have five major components. First is the *locus* of change, which can take place at three levels: the societal/sociocultural level, the institutional/structural level, and the individual/psychological level. Second is the *source* of the changes: It can arise from external sources, as in the case of acculturation (see Sam & Berry, 2016) and globalization (Berry, 2008); and it can also arise from internal impetus (such as widespread dissatisfaction in the population). Third is the *direction* of change: It can be toward some desired future goals (as in modernity theory) or be a return to previous arrangements (as in revitalization of nationalist movements). Fourth are the *dynamics* of change, distinguishing between the processes with which change may take place (such as revolution) and the end state (such as democratic institutions and values). Fifth is the *sequence* of change, in which psychological features of the population (such as personal level of education and media exposure) precede societal changes; these in turn spur on more widespread psychological changes in the population.

In concrete terms, we note that all five aspects of social change are addressed in the chapters of this book. First, most of the chapters present information at the national population level (including the history, demography, etc.) which establishes the broad context within which other changes take place; the institutions of governance and economic activity are described; and at the psychological level, the focus is on values and identities of individuals in changing society and its institutions. Second, each chapter considers the source of change, both in terms of the internal failure of the economic and governance system to meet the needs of the population and the social, political, and economic systems that are available in the outside world as models for change. Third, chapters consider whether the changes are all going in one direction (toward democracy, capitalism, and tolerance) or whether there is

retrenchment toward socialism, autocracy, and intolerance. Fourth, the processes of change (such as changes that are the result of democratic elections and the rise of oligarchies) are usually distinguished from the outcomes of change (such as representative democracy and income inequality). Finally, the questions of what came first are addressed in most chapters: Did changing values and identities spur the societal- and institutional-level changes, or did these psychological changes derive from changes in the group as a whole?

Recent work in thinking and research in the psychology of social change (see, e.g., Greenfield, 2009, 2016) identifies changing features at the societal level as influencing psychological feature of the population. Greenfield (2009) notes that “sociodemographic ecologies alter cultural values and learning environments and thereby shift developmental pathways” (p. 401). She focuses particularly on the general change (at both the collective and individual levels) away from a concern with community toward more individualistic way of thinking and living. She illustrates this general pattern of change based on her work in China, Mexico, and the USA, citing the changes from rural to urban, agriculture to commerce, less to more education, lesser to greater wealth, and larger to smaller families.

Taken together using these elements as a framework, we can observe features of cultural systems (and changes in them), observe features of human behavior (and changes in them), and then attempt to relate these two levels of change to each other. Either by cross-sectional or longitudinal (panel) research, we can link (perhaps causally) social change at the group level and psychological change at the individual level.

Value Change in Post-Communist World

When the general public discusses questions of value change, it focuses on major events that are indicative of such change. On the occasion of the centenary of the February Revolution in Petrograd, the *New York Times* published an article “What’s left of Communism” (Priestland, 2017) that discussed value change in contrast to the “values of 1917.” The article sketches value change as exemplified by a chain of historic events marking culmination points of changing value preferences. In essence, value change is portrayed as dialectically related to political change and becoming evident in historic events.

In psychology, sociology, and political science, value change is looked upon from a different angle. Without extensively having focused on values and value change himself, the most influential theorist in these academic disciplines is one of the godfathers of humanistic psychology: Abraham Maslow. His theory about the hierarchy of needs (Maslow, 1962) set the stage for the most influential value change theory, namely, the theoretical approach of Ronald Inglehart. Inglehart (1977, 1997) relied on Maslow when claiming that value preferences of human beings are formed by levels of scarcity in need fulfillment: If there is a lack of fulfillment of physiological needs (like having enough to eat), individuals will cherish values that promise the fulfillment of these needs. If there is a lack in the fulfillment of safety needs (like

having a roof over your head), people will cherish safety-related values. In the case when these lower-level needs are fulfilled, people will turn to values that promise the fulfillment of self-actualization needs. Inglehart (1977) originally labeled these values “postmaterialist” values. After a revision of his theoretical approach (see, e.g., Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), the broader term “self-expression values” became more common. Yet more recently, Welzel (2013) coined the term “emancipative values” to refer to them.

Inglehart’s (1977) value change theory is, however, not only based on the *scarcity hypothesis* (people value highly what they lack). Its important second component is the *socialization hypothesis*. According to Inglehart (1977), people do not cherish values determined by their *current* degree of need fulfillment, but what they experienced during their childhood and adolescent years, which lays the ground for their current value orientations. In simplistic terms, people who did not have enough to eat and did not enjoy the existence of safe shelter in their early years are prone to entertain what Inglehart (1977) originally called “materialist” values throughout their lives. In newer accounts materialist values have been relabeled as “survival values.” The socialization hypothesis implies that values can essentially only change from generation to generation.

An analysis of value change based on the most influential individual-level value theory, the approach developed by Shalom Schwartz (1992), has a partly different point of commencement. He sees values arising from people’s ways of coping with three basic requirements of human life. According to Schwartz (2015), these requirements are (a) the needs of individuals as biological organisms, (b) the adequate coordination of social interaction, and (c) survival and welfare needs of groups. One can see coping with requirements (a) and possibly (c) as mirroring what Inglehart (1977) has proposed, but coping with requirement (b) is not covered in Inglehart’s approach; Inglehart, the political scientist, is here arguing more person-centered than Schwartz, the social psychologist. To offer an example, in Inglehart’s reasoning people who cherish security/survival values are people who did not have their safety needs fulfilled in their formative years. In Schwartz’s reasoning people can *also* cherish security values, because security is needed as the basis for a healthy coexistence of different groups in a society. Furthermore, Schwartz (1992) does not subscribe in full to either the scarcity hypothesis or the socialization hypothesis. According to his argumentation, scarcity is only one source of value priorities, namely, for values that indeed have their basis in need fulfillment. He, however, suggests that for certain other values, people upgrade values in line with what they have and downgrade values they have a hard time to attain. For example, it would be highly likely in the immediate aftermath of ‘real socialism’ that people cherish social security and downgrade freedom of speech. According to Schwartz (1992), value change will occur whenever societal circumstances change drastically *in the here and now*. In such situations, values are assumed to change in concurrence with pre-existing value preferences of individuals. Persons who cherish conservation values at the time of societal change will resist the forces of change, whereas people who cherish openness values will welcome change.

In comparison to Schwartz's (1992) approach, Inglehart's (1977) value change theory appears more static and slow-paced. It is prone to detect short-term stability and resistance to change by suggesting that value change will only occur if the socialization circumstances of consecutive generations differ sufficiently strongly with regard to need fulfillment. Only if circumstances of how people grow up and are enabled to fulfill their needs differ substantially, a value change can become effective. The question then arises: Was growing up in the 'real socialist' world sufficiently different from growing up now, so that value preferences of older and younger cohorts really differ? To answer this question, one has to analyze value preferences in relation to life circumstances during the real socialist era and the present: Do the value orientations of individuals who lived through their formative years in real socialist times indeed differ from the value orientation of individuals who grow in the post-Communist era? Addressing this question for different societies of the post-Communist world is one of the core tasks of the current volume.

For social, political, and developmental psychologists, a mere comparison of value preferences of members of different generations in a given region of the world would, however, still have shortcomings. Three topics are clearly underspecified in Inglehart's (1977) value change theory, namely, (a) individual value development across the life-span, (b) intergenerational and peer-to-peer transmission of value orientations, and (c) the impact of societal specifics, such as governance systems or demographic characteristics or the prevalence of religious denominations. Schwartz's (1992) work has focused on aspects (b) and to some degree (c) but has also neglected aspect (a).

People seem to become more conservative with age (Tilley & Evans, 2014). People who had all their basic needs fulfilled in their formative years will have developed postmaterialist or self-expression values, but across the life-span, they would progress toward increasingly conservative value preferences that resemble the value preferences of people who did not experience high levels of need fulfillment in their formative years. This paradox cannot really be solved within the framework of Inglehart's (1977) value change theory. Inglehart (1977) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005) do not pay all that much attention to age, cohort, and period effects that have been the focus of attention of developmental psychologists for quite some time (Baltes, 1968). To our knowledge, Schwartz (1992) has not addressed the question at all. Are value preferences impacted predominantly by one's age? Are value preferences impacted predominantly by when a person is born? Or are the period specifics of life circumstances and the societal value climate in a given context and time most important for people's value preferences? Studies of value change in the post-Communist world, as described in the present volume, can certainly not answer all these questions simultaneously. They do, however, offer empirical evidence that is helpful for shedding light on the question of age, cohort, and period effects by reporting studies that encompass samples from different cohorts and age ranges from different parts of the post-Communist world in and outside the former Soviet Union.

The second topic mentioned above (namely, the impact value transmission has on individual value preferences) is also not one that has been dealt with in any great detail in the framework of Inglehart's (1977) value change theory. Work on value transmission and value socialization has its starting point in the assumption that the

people around you take a more or less active influence on your value preferences: Parents want their offspring to grow up in accordance with parents' own value preferences. They typically engage in parenting styles that covary positively with their value preferences. Thereby parents set out to (and do in fact) rear their offspring's value preferences to a certain degree (Martínez & García, 2007). But how are value transmission and value change related to each other? Within the framework of Inglehart's (1977) value change theory, this is not specified. It is evident that the more successful parents are in transmitting their cherished values to their children, the less value change a society will experience. Were parents able to instill their own value preferences in their children to 100%, there would—logically—never be value change on the societal level. However, intergenerational value transmission is clearly not a unidirectional process. Children can also affect the value preferences of their parents (Pinquart & Silbereisen, 2004). In particular, this is the case for values related to innovation; this effect is stronger in families where parents exhibit an authoritative parenting style, i.e., when “parents are receptive and supportive” (Pinquart & Silbereisen, 2004, p. 83). One is probably right to assume that intergenerational value transmission can be expected to slow down societal-level value change, as parents are likely to have a certain degree of success in perpetuating their own value preferences. At the same time, this slowing-down effect is likely to be unsystematic, because not all values are transmitted equally strongly. Also, there certainly is not only intergenerational value transmission but also horizontal transmission. In the family, siblings influence each other. In societal institutions, like schools, peers influence each other. The media exert a certain impact on how “new” (or for that matter “old”) values spread in society; they foster a certain “zeitgeist.” Obviously, there is a lot of unconquered ground for research on the import of value transmission when addressing the question of societal-level value change in the post-Communist world. The present volume documents several studies on the intergenerational transmission of value preferences. Given the ambivalent conceptual role that value transmission plays in the analysis of value change, they serve a highly valuable exploratory purpose.

These routes for value and identity transmission and change have been conceptualized by Berry et al. (2011) in their framework that distinguishes between three forms of cultural transmission (*vertical*, *oblique*, and *horizontal*). These routes may take place both from within one's own cultural community and from sources outside their community. This framework is presented in Fig. 1. Cultural transmission from parents to their offspring is termed *vertical transmission*, since it involves the descent of cultural and psychological characteristics from one generation to the next. However, while vertical descent is the only possible form of biological transmission, there are two other forms of cultural transmission, *horizontal transmission* (from peers) and *oblique transmission* (from others of the parental generation in society, such as institutions).

These forms of transmission can be from within a person's own cultural group and from contact and influence from another cultural group. These three forms of cultural transmission from within a person's own group involve two processes: *enculturation* and *socialization*. Enculturation takes place through the general “enfolding” of individuals in the context of their culture, leading to the incorporation




Fig. 1 Cultural transmission and acculturation: Vertical, oblique, and horizontal routes

of culture-appropriate behaviors into their repertoire. Socialization takes place by more specific instruction and training, again leading to the acquisition of culture-appropriate behavior.

In vertical transmission parents transmit cultural values, skills, beliefs, etc. to their offspring. In this case, it is difficult to distinguish between cultural and biological transmission, since one typically learns from the people who were responsible for one’s conception; that is, biological parents and cultural parents are very often the same. In horizontal cultural transmission, one learns from one’s peers in day-to-day interactions during the course of development from birth to adulthood; in this case, there is no confounding between biological and cultural transmission (Boehneke & Schiefer, 2016). And in oblique cultural transmission, one learns from other adults and institutions (e.g., in formal schooling, social clubs), either in one’s own culture or from other cultures.

If these three processes derive from contact with another culture, the term *acculturation* is employed (shown on the right side of Fig. 1). This latter term refers to the form of transmission experienced by an individual that results from contact with, and influence from, persons and institutions belonging to cultures other than one’s own. It is a form of later, or secondary, enculturation and socialization.

These forms of transmission are shown in Fig. 1 with arrows flowing both toward the developing individual and other individuals and groups in the framework. These reciprocal influences are particularly important among peers but also in parent-child relationships. Thus, the double-headed arrows, representing interaction and mutual influence, represent what takes place during cultural transmission and acculturation.

In the various chapters in this book, all these routes of value and identity transmission and change can be found. Studies of parents, families, institutions, and cohorts within a society are examined, as well as parallel influences from outside the region.

As mentioned earlier, the impact of cultural specifics on value change is an underspecified aspect in Inglehart's (1977) value change theory. Just like Schwartz's (1992) theory that speaks about a universal structure of value preferences (the Schwartz value circumplex), Inglehart also makes a universalist claim: Whenever need fulfillment improves in a society value preferences will—in that society—change from materialist, survival values to postmaterialist, self-expression, or emancipative values. In its basic form, the theory knows no cultural, ethnic, or religious moderators. However, after having gathered impressive data on his value change theory for some 20 years after the publication of his seminal *Silent Revolution*, Inglehart (Inglehart & Baker, 2000) augmented his value theory by including a second dimension: Analyses of value preferences on the societal level had made it obvious that in order to explain variations in country-level value preferences, differentiating countries along the dimension of survival vs. self-expression values only would be insufficient. A second dimension proved helpful, namely, the dimension of traditional vs. secular-rational values. To incorporate this dimension into the analysis of value change did, however, turn out to be less parsimonious than basing value change assumptions on Maslow's (1962) hierarchy of needs. While assuming progression from survival to self-expression values is of a quasi-teleological, in a certain way automatic character, progression from traditional to secular-rational values is clearly less easy to predict. Looking at ultra-long-term development (say from the early middle ages to the present), a trend from traditional toward secular-rational values seems apparent. However, shorter-term value change on this dimension is much more unpredictable. The post-Communist world clearly is, on the one hand, a world region dominated by secular-rational values. However, at the same time, traditional values have gained ground since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in Russia, Bulgaria, and Belarus, while during the same time, value preferences have become dominated more by secular-rational values in (former) East Germany, Poland, and Hungary (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). These mixed findings pose a challenge for empirical research on value change in the post-Communist world, while at the same time opening opportunities for cross-cultural, interethnic, and trans-religious research on value preferences, value change, and value transmission. The present volume is very much "feeding" on analyzing the impact of cultural specifics of value change.

Identity Changes in Post-Communist World

A core developmental task for youth and young people is to develop multiple social identities in a variety of contexts. Theory and research from developmental and social psychology perspectives have investigated social identity and its relevance in young people's lives. These perspectives identify contextual, environmental, and cultural factors that explain changes and differences in social identification. Developmental theories focus on identity formation (Phinney, 1989) with identity achievement (firm commitment after identity exploration) and identity diffusion (neither engagement in exploration nor commitment) proposed as polar outcomes of this formation (Erikson,

1968; Marcia, 1980). Social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and self-categorization theories (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) acknowledge the importance of societal context for identity formation. Therefore, the notion of identity is a multidimensional one (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), in that social group memberships are important to the self-concept of individuals and particularly relevant to the developing self-concept of youth. All these theoretical perspectives see identity as a multifaceted construct (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004). By drawing on these views of identity, the present volume offers unique and novel empirical insight into such multidimensional identity processes among culturally diverse populations in countries of the real socialist bloc—mostly newly developed nations following the collapse of ‘real socialism’ in the late 1980s in Europe.

In so doing, the volume also subscribes to the multidimensionality of identity domains: *ethnic identity*, the process of maintaining positive/negative attitudes and feelings of ethnic group belonging (Erikson, 1968; Phinney & Ong, 2007); *national identity*, the degree of identification with the (host) culture of settlement, including feelings of belonging and commitment to the host society (Phinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997); *religious identity*, the sense of group membership to a religion or set of religious convictions and their importance for individual identity (Nesbitt & Arweck, 2010); *familial identity*, the degree of identification with the familial group, the sense of familial group membership (Lopez, Huynh, & Fuligni, 2011); and *identity style*, problem-solving strategies that individuals use during the process of constructing and revising their sense of identity (Berzonsky, 2003, 2004). Based on these theoretical premises, this volume investigates multiple identity resources underlying psychological adaptation, well-being, and optimal outcomes among various young populations in Eastern Europe. The findings and implications of this volume are relevant both to understanding identity and to advance our knowledge of these processes related to the well-being of culturally diverse groups across Eastern Europe. Despite the political past and the social transformations experienced, what emerges is that a coherent sense of identity relates to better well-being. This finding has also been corroborated in a recently published study on the relationships between identity and well-being in a sample of 1860 youth in Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Kosovo, and Romania (Dimitrova et al., 2017). In a similar vein, this volume adds to previous literature that is based on predominantly Western European populations confirming that a coherent identity acts as a protective factor for a positive adaptation and improved well-being in understudied samples from post-Communist Eastern European countries.

The countries included in the present volume represent particularly fertile and innovative ground to study identity for several reasons. First, they occupy an intermediate space between the Central and Western parts of the European continent. Second, since the collapse of the ‘real socialist’ bloc in the late 1980s, these post-Communist countries have seen intense transformation in freedom, human rights, economy, democracy, and living conditions for their citizens (Roháč, 2013). Third, after a decade of intense transformations, some countries (as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, as well as Slovenia) have made significant progress in different social processes such as democratization, economic development, life conditions, and European Union (EU) accession; East Germany, being yet another

case, has even become an integral part of united Germany. Other countries like Bulgaria, Romania, Albania, and the states that formerly comprised Yugoslavia have made far less progress (Kopstein & Reilly, 2000). Although there are some differences in the level of democratization, economic development, and EU accession among these countries, they commonly have experienced significant political, economic, and social instability (Light, 2000). The young generation of these countries has mutually shared experiences, as they have a largely common real socialist past and are facing new democratic transitions. These social transformations have been sparked by transitions in the economic regime (from a planned economy to a market economy) and the formation of new states. Particularly the latter has led to challenges in the process of defining their own national identity when they became part or candidates for EU membership. These transformative processes are likely to have profound implications for identity formation and well-being among the new generations (Bălțătescu, 2009). Young people in these contexts not only face the complex process of establishing and developing a sense of self but also must negotiate the emergence of many new facets of social identity due to the democratic changes in post-Communist Europe.

The new generations are an important group to study because of their exposure to such transformations in this part of Europe. No comprehensive transformation research seems to exist for much of the former ‘real socialist’ bloc outside of Germany (e.g., Boehnke, Hefler, & Merckens, 1996). This volume adds to the scarce literature on the joint influence of social identity components in various ethnic groups in line with a growing recognition of the need to examine multiple identity facets simultaneously and to conduct research on the psychological consequences of complex social identities (Sagiv, Roccas, & Hazan, 2012).

There are yet fewer studies devoted to changes of identities in the post-Soviet space even in comparison with studies in post-Communist Eastern Europe. However, Russians and Russian-speakers in the post-Soviet republics are facing a radical crisis of identity. On a daily basis, they face a set of questions about who they are and what they may become. Should they “return” to a homeland many of them have never seen or become loyal citizens of the new republics while maintaining their cultural and linguistic identity (Laitin, 1998)? Processes of inclusive identity changes, the development of new dual and hybrid identities, identity incompatibilities, and disidentification in the post-Soviet space are presented in several studies in this volume. Whereas these identity processes have after all been examined in several individual countries (Aydinli & Dimitrova, 2015; Dimitrova, Chasiotis, Bender, & van de Vijver, 2014; Dimitrova & Jordanov, 2015), comparative intergenerational research of identities in post-Communist countries is limited but after all emerging.

Eighteen countries are featured in this book: Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Germany, Kosovo, Latvia, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and two ethno-cultural republics within the Russian Federation, Kabardino-Balkar Republic and North Ossetia-Alania. Israel is also included, because it is a major destination of emigration from the former Soviet Union. The book consists of two main sections, one devoted to values and the other to identity transformation. Chapters will focus on values and/or identity changes in one or

more of these countries. The various chapters will use different methods (both qualitative and quantitative), will address different types of identities (ethnic, national, regional, religious, and others), and will focus on different predictor and outcome variables.

Outline of the Book

As mentioned above, the present volume consists of two main parts, the first is devoted to changes in values and the second to identity (trans-)formation.

Part I, named “Value Changes Across Countries and Generations,” consists of 11 chapters.

In second chapter, *Martina Klicperova-Baker* and *Jaroslav Kostal* analyze *Democratic Values in the Post-Communist Region: The Incidence of Traditionalists, Skeptics, Democrats, and Radicals*. Using data from the European Values Study for a comparison of post-Soviet core countries (Russia, Moldova, Ukraine), the Baltics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), and the “Visegrad” countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), they identify five democracy-related mentalities. Secular as well as religious democrats exist in all post-Communist countries (among the elites and among the young) but are in the minority everywhere. Intolerant traditionalists are most typical for the post-Soviet core countries, while passive skeptics constitute the majority in post-Communist Central Europe and a plurality in the Baltics. The authors claim that passive skepticism can be seen as an enduring “post-Communist syndrome.”

In third chapter, *Zoran Pavlović* reports a study on *Emancipative Values in a Post-Communist Society: The Case of Serbia*. In it he analyzes Serbian data from three waves of the World Values Survey (1996, 2001, and 2006) and shows a pronounced change in the prevalence of emancipative values. Substantially more—predominantly younger, well-educated, and economically advantaged—citizens of Serbia support emancipative values in 2006 than did 10 years before. Consequences of this trend are discussed.

In fourth chapter, *Laur Lilleoja* and *Maaris Raudsepp* address *Changes in Value Structure Among the Estonian Majority and the Russian-Speaking Minority in Post-Socialist Estonia*. Based on data from the European Social Survey (2004–2014), they shed light on trends in value dynamics among different birth cohorts in ethnic majority and minority groups. Their study allows new insights into the dynamics of post-socialist development in Estonia; it makes clear that value change from generation to generation takes different forms among the majority and the minority population, thereby once again emphasizing that the immediate lifeworld (Schütz, 1967) of people matters when analyzing value change.

Ekaterina Bushina and *Tatiana Ryabichenko* address the question of *Intergenerational Value Differences in Latvia and Azerbaijan* in fifth chapter. Based on data obtained with Schwartz’s Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ) in its revised 57-item version, they compare parent and offspring value preferences from both ethnic Russians and the local majorities in both countries. Their findings point to largely different value change trajectories and value transmission characteristics in both countries, emphasizing that value change can hardly be understood

without diligently focusing on the cultural specifics of the immediate life contexts of study participants.

In sixth chapter, *Olga Pavlova* focuses on *Values and Social Identity of Russian Muslims*. Her study reports on cultural value orientations, ethnic identity, and ethnic affiliations of a large sample of Muslim residents of the North Caucasus. The individualism-collectivism approach to culture-level values is utilized to analyze patterns of value preferences in Muslim societies of the region. The chapter emphasizes that age of respondents is an important predictor of value priorities as well as ethnic, religious, and civil features of social identity.

Working within the Schwartz value theory framework, *Dmitrii Dubrov* and *Alexander Tatarko's* study on *Intergenerational Transmission of Values in Urban and Rural Areas of Russia: The Role of Perceived Psychological Closeness*, presented in seventh chapter, offers rare insights into the characteristics of value transmission in rural as opposed to urban areas. The study shows that the strength of intergenerational value congruence is affected by the life context (conservation values more strongly transmitted in the rural, the other three higher-order Schwartz value types in urban Russian context) and by (adolescent-perceived) parent-child closeness, which forges higher intergenerational similarity.

In eighth chapter, *Oriola Hamzallari* focuses on *Parenting Values and Practices Across Post-Communist Societies in Youth Identity Formation: A Literature Review*. She reviews available studies on whether and how the post-Communist transition has altered parenting values and parenting practices and how these changes have impacted identity formation among the young. Conceptually framed by the individualism-collectivism approach to value preferences, it points out the linkage between societal-level value change and the consequences this change has for individual youth development.

Obtained once again with Schwartz's PVQ, *Victoria Galyapina*, *Nadezhda Lebedeva*, *Zarina Lepshokova*, and *Klaus Boehnke* report highly unusual data in ninth chapter on *Values of the Russian Ethnic Minority Members in North Caucasian Republics: An Intra- and Intergenerational Comparison*. They examine value congruence among two generations of ethnic Russian minority members in two North Caucasus republics of the Russian Federation in comparison to (majority) Russians in the Central Federal District and to indigenous residents of the North Caucasian. They found stronger intergenerational value differences among majority Russians in the Central District than among minority Russians in the North Caucasus. Value preferences of Russian North Caucasus residents were in general more similar to values of the local majority than they were to Russians from the Central District, once more emphasizing that the immediate cultural context strongly impacts both value preferences and value change trajectories.

The tenth chapter *Values and Religious Identity of Russian Students from Different Religions* authored by *Oleg Y. Khukhlaev*, *Valeria A. Shorohova*, *Elena A. Grishina*, and *Olga S. Pavlova* deals with an empirical study of religious identity and value orientations among Russian young adults based on Van Camp's Individual/Social Religious Identity Measure and Schwartz's Portrait Value Questionnaire. The study results lead to the

conclusion that in the Russian sample, the four-factor religious identity model is applicable to the Muslim and Orthodox Christian groups only.

Value Similarity with Mothers and Peers and Family Climate as Predictors of Well-Being of Russian Youth in Latvia is the title of 11th chapter, authored by *Tatiana Ryabichenko, Nadezhda Lebedeva, and Irina Plotka*. Among Russian youth, their mothers, and their Russian and Latvian peers, they assessed to which degree closeness with their mothers as well as value congruence of adolescents and their mothers and their Russian and Latvian peers impacted their well-being. Perceived psychological closeness to their mothers predicted psychological well-being of Russian youth best. Youth-peer value congruence predicted psychological well-being of Russian youth only for self-enhancement values and only when peers were fellow Russians.

The 12th chapter concluding the first part of the current volume is authored by *Dana Gavreliuc and Alin Gavreliuc* and bears the title *Generational Belonging and Historical Ruptures: Continuity and Discontinuity of Values and Attitudes in Post-Communist Romania*. The chapter reports a population-representative study of the values and attitudes of three cohorts of Romanians (mean ages around 30, 45, and 60, resp.). The most surprising overall finding of the study was that in spite of the fact that the collapse of ‘real socialism’ brought about major changes in many spheres of the everyday lives of the study participants, few intergenerational differences were uncovered in profound mental structures (attitudes and, especially, values).

All contributions to the first section of this volume are united in their emphasis on culture specifics. At first sight, changes in levels of need fulfillment govern people’s value preferences only to a lesser degree, with immediate culture specifics being much more important. However, the game might not be called yet. While countries like Moldova and Ukraine stay very much on the pole of high preferences of survival values, countries like Poland and what used to be the German Democratic Republic (now part of the united Germany) have moved substantially toward the self-expression value pole of Inglehart and Welzel (2005) world map of value preferences. Could it be that we have to wait until the first post-Communist generation becomes the generation that fills most political and cultural leadership positions in the countries under scrutiny, to talk about overall trends of value change in the former “Second World”?

Part II “Social Identities Changes in Comparative Perspective” contains 11 chapters.

In 13th chapter, *Multiple Social Identities in Relation to Self-Esteem of Adolescents in Post-Communist Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Kosovo, and Romania*, its authors *Radosveta Dimitrova, Pasquale Musso, Iva Polackova Solcova, Delia Stefanel, Fitim Uka, Skerdi Zahaj, Peter Tavel, Venzislav Jordanov, and Evgeni Jordanov* test a model linking ethnic, familial, and religious identity to self-esteem among youth in Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Kosovo, and Romania. In all countries, youth with stronger multiple identities reported higher self-esteem. These results are particularly valuable in addressing the scope of the proposed book by providing new knowledge on multiple social identities in underresearched samples from post-Communist countries in Europe, faced with dynamic societal changes. They also mirror increasing attention on

multiple, inclusive, and intersectional identities as psychological assets for young generations.

Fourteenth chapter, *Probing the Relationship Between Group Identities of Russians and Ossetians in the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania: Intergenerational Analysis*, authored by *Victoria Galyapina* and *Nadezhda Lebedeva* examines the relationship between five group identities (ethnic, religious, republican, regional, and national) in three generations of Russians and Ossetians, living in the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania (RNO-A), Russian Federation. The pattern of correlations between the five group identities suggested two bases of identification for both ethnicities: national (Russian) and regional (North Caucasian). Among three generations of Russians, the republican identity (identification with the Ossetian host society) served as something like a bridge between national identity and regional identity. Among Ossetian grandparents and parents, these two identifications were also linked, namely, through ethnic and religious identities. Among Ossetian adolescents these identity facets were, however, separated. Intergenerational differences in group identity structures covaried strongly with changes in the sociocultural context of North Ossetia during the last 70 years (a three-generation period of socialization).

Fifteenth chapter, *Ethnic Identity and Cultural Value Orientations of Moldavian Youth in Transitional Society*, authored by *Irina Caunenco*, explores ethnic identity and cultural values of Moldovan youth in a new social reality, i.e., in the Republic of Moldova as an independent state. The study shows a positive ethnic identity among Moldovan youth, a positive ethnic self-stereotype, and a positive hetero-stereotype of Russians. Similarities between self-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes of Russians are likely to have been forged by a lasting peaceful coexistence of Moldovans with other ethnic groups in the Republic of Moldova. As for cultural value orientations of the young Moldovans, the study reveals a high importance of egalitarianism (equity) and mastery, with hierarchy being less important.

In 16th chapter, titled *The Influence of Identity Styles on Adolescents Psychological Problems in Post-Communist Albania*, *Skerdi Zahaj* and *Radosveta Dimitrova* examine relationships between identity development and “core” psychological problems among young people in post-Communist Albania. In this chapter, identification styles, understood as identity processing orientations of adolescents, are seen as predictors of “core” psychological problems as lack of well-being, clinical symptoms, lack of functioning, and risk harming self and others. Path models confirm that identity processing styles are predictors of adolescents’ core psychological problems. Findings are explained in the specific context of youths in post-Communist Albania.

In 17th chapter, *The Kaleidoscope of Language, Ethnicity, and Identity in Uzbekistan*, *Kamila Isaeva*, *Byron G. Adams*, and *Fons J. R. van de Vijver* focus on three groups of Uzbeks: ethnically Uzbek Uzbek-speakers, ethnically Russian Russian-speakers, and ethnically Uzbek Russian-speakers. The authors explore how national, ethnic, ethnolinguistic, and religious identities are associated with interethnic friendship and romantic relationships in these three groups. Identities that are more inclusive (national and ethnolinguistic) were associated with more positive interethnic attitudes and practices, while the opposite was found for ethnic

identity. National, ethnic, ethnolinguistic, and religious identities were strongest for Uzbek-speaking Uzbeks and weakest for the Russian-speaking Russians. The study demonstrates the relevance of a profound knowledge of the local history and context to understand the role of the various social identities for the groups in Uzbekistan.

Eighteenth chapter, *The Role of Social Disidentification in Acculturation Preferences of Ethnic Majority and Minority Members in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic*, authored by *Zarina Lepshokova* and *Nadezhda Lebedeva*, is devoted to studying the role of social disidentification in acculturation preferences of ethnic minority and majority group members. It is shown that not only social identities affect the acculturation preferences but also social disidentification. Republican disidentification of ethnic Russians in the KBR covaries positively with their separation and marginalization acculturation strategies and negatively with their integration strategy. Regional disidentification of ethnic Russians in the KBR is related negatively to their assimilation strategy and positively to their marginalization strategy. The national (belonging to the Russian Federation) disidentification of ethnic majority group members (Kabardians and Balkars) is positively related to their expectations of the segregation, assimilation, and exclusion of ethnic Russians and negatively related to their integration in the republic. In general, the study shows specific patterns of relationships between different types of social disidentification and acculturation preferences of majority and minority group members.

In 19th chapter, *The Great Escape: Linking Youth Identity Development to Growing Up in Post-Communist Romania*, *Oana Negru-Subtirica* and *Lavinia E. Damian* analyze identity development trajectories in different life domains (e.g., education, work) of young people who grew up in post-Communist Romania. They critically analyze existing psychological research on identity development of Romanian youth. By detailing possible pathways of identity development, they also focus on possible positive and negative outcomes, cross-cultural similarities and differences, and policy implications of these specific identity trajectories for facilitating positive social integration of Romanian youth.

In 20th chapter, *Negotiating Identity and Belonging After Regime Change: Hungarian Society and Roma in Post-Communist Hungary*, *Jekatyerina Dunajeva* analyzes the situation of Roma in Hungary and reveals that post-Communist Hungary, similar to other countries in the region, is an increasingly “nationalizing state”—an environment highly conducive to nationalism—where series of economic hardships have “deepened a racialization process.” The author investigates how the changing political and economic context—namely, the fusion of economic concerns and nationalist claims in contemporary Hungary—has significantly affected the identity and value system of the Roma minority, necessitating new coping mechanisms.

Twenty-first chapter, *Cultural Identification Among Immigrants from the Former USSR: Insights from Comparative Research with Five Groups in Germany and Israel*, by *Katharina Sonnenberg*, *Peter F. Titzmann*, and *Rainer K. Silbereisen*, presents a comparative study on immigrants’ cultural identification with the majority in their country of settlement and with their own minority background. The authors focus on

Diaspora migrants who left the former USSR after the end of CPSU² rule and emigrated either to Germany or to Israel and compared them with Russian Jewish refugees in Germany, Turks in Germany, and the Arab minority in Israel. Results point to considerable group differences in majority and minority identification that seemed to be due to country of settlement, groups' (legal) status, and distance to the cultural mainstream in terms of religion. Taken together, results suggest that contextual factors play a major role in the adaptation process of former USSR emigrants.

Twenty-second chapter, *Value Changes in Adolescents' Anticipation of Possible Career Selves in Slovenia and Serbia*, authored by *Alenka Gril, Nada Polovina, Ivana Jakšić, Sabina Autor, and Mladen Radulović*, presents a study on adolescents' visions of the future, regarding most important goals for themselves and plans for their accomplishment. The authors focus on "career" as the central topic of adolescents' visions about future selves, which is assumed as conditional for identity achievement in other domains and can be accomplished mainly due to individual efforts and flexible adaptation to environmental opportunities. Individual efforts as well as flexibility in adaptation differ between the two countries, which have experienced different pathways of transition to a market economy since the early 1990s when they were both still part of one state, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As hypothesized, differential societal changes were reflected in the adolescents' visions about their future career.

Maria Kozlova and Olga Simonova's 23rd chapter, *Identity and Work Ethic of Peasants in the Context of the Post-Soviet Socioeconomic Transformation*, analyzes transformations of identity and work ethic among peasants through the lens of moral emotions based on data from thirty semi-structured interviews collected in villages of an agricultural region of Russia. The authors outline the phenomenon of "contempt for rural/physical labor" from both the immediate surrounding environment and wider society in more general terms. This emotional backdrop brings with it negative effects such as shame and envy that, in turn, corrodes self-esteem among peasants, leading even to withdrawal from active employment on the land and the weakening of social ties.

By adopting an interdisciplinary, qualitative, and quantitative approach, the present volume provides a set of unique contributions that indicate valuable implications for future research and practice on values and identity in societies characterized by rather rapid transitional processes. The findings reported in the volume highlight the importance of contextual factors in studying changing values and multifaceted identities. The volume offers a highly relevant venue for practitioners and policy makers to influence policy for young people in Europe. Future policy and practice need to capitalize on youth's values and multifaceted identities in the local context as to promote optimal adaptation and well-being.

²CPSU: English abbreviation for Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

References

- Ashmore, R. D., Deaux, K., & McLaughlin-Volpe, T. (2004). An organizing framework for collective identity: Articulation and significance of multidimensionality. *Psychological Bulletin*, *130*, 80–114. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.130.1.80>
- Aydinli, A., & Dimitrova, R. (2015). The dark side of multiple identities among Turkish-Bulgarian and Turkish-German adolescents. *Special Issue, Journal of Adolescence*. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2015.09.010>
- Bălăţescu, S. (2009). National identity and happiness: A quantitative study with Romanian data. In V. Boari & S. Gherghina (Eds.), *Weighting the difference: Romanian identity in the wider European context* (pp. 184–209). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars.
- Baltes, P. B. (1968). Longitudinal and cross-sectional sequences in the study of age and generation effects. *Human Development*, *11*, 145–171.
- Berry, J. W. (1980). Social and cultural change. In H. C. Triandis & R. Brislin (Eds.), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology, Social psychology* (Vol. 5, pp. 211–279). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Berry, J. W. (2008). Globalisation and acculturation. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, *32*, 328–336.
- Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Breugelsmans, S., Chasiotis, A., & Sam, D. L. (2011). *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berzonsky, M. D. (2003). Identity style and well-being: Does commitment matter? *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, *3*, 131–142. <https://doi.org/10.1207/S1532706XID030203>
- Berzonsky, M. D. (2004). Identity processing style, self construction, and personal epistemic assumptions: A social-cognitive perspective. *European Journal of Developmental Psychology*, *1*, 303–315. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17405620444000120>
- Boehnke, K., Hefler, G., & Merckens, H. (1996). “Ich bin ein Berliner”: Zur Entwicklung von Ortsidentität(en) bei Ost- und Westberliner Jugendlichen [“Ich bin ein Berliner”: On the development of place identity/identities among East and West Berlin adolescents]. *Unterrichtswissenschaft—Zeitschrift für Lernforschung*, *24*, 160–176.
- Boehnke, K., & Schiefer, D. (2016). Horizontal transmission of value orientations in adolescence. In C. Timmerman, N. Clycq, M. McAndrew, A. Balde, L. Braeckmans, & S. Mels (Eds.), *Youth in education: The necessity of valuing ethnocultural diversity* (pp. 27–44). London: Routledge.
- Brubaker, R. (2009). National homogenization and ethnic reproduction on the European periphery. In M. Barbagli & H. Ferguson (Eds.), *La teoria sociologica e lo stato moderno: Saggi in onore di Gianfranco Poggi* (pp. 201–221). Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Brubaker, R. (2011). Nationalizing states revisited: Projects and processes of nationalization in post-Soviet states. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *34*(11), 1785–1814.
- Crampton, R. (1994). *Eastern Europe in the twentieth century*. London: Routledge.
- Dawisha, K. (1990). *Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and reform: The great challenge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dimitrova, R., Buzea, C., Taušová, J., Uka, F., Zakaj, S., & Crocetti, E. (2017). Relationships between identity domains and life satisfaction in minority and majority youth in Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Kosovo, and Romania. *European Journal of Developmental Psychology*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17405629.2017.1336997>
- Dimitrova, R., Chasiotis, A., Bender, M., & van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2014). Collective identity of Roma youth and their mothers. *Journal for Youth and Adolescence. Special Issue on Challenges and Resilience of Indigenous Adolescents for Positive Youth Development*, *43*, 375–386. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-013-0043-1>
- Dimitrova, R., & Jordanov, V. (2015). Do family ethnic pressure and national identity enhance psychological well-being among Roma youth in Bulgaria? *Special Issue on Roma Youth, The Journal of the International Network for Prevention in Child Maltreatment*, 23–35.
- Erikson, E. (1968). *Identity: Youth and crisis*. New York: Norton.

- European Union Agency of Fundamental Rights. (2012). Roma housing projects in small communities, Slovakia. In A. Pusca (Ed.), *Eastern European Roma: Mobility, discrimination, solutions* (pp. 155–183). Brussels: International Debate Education Association.
- Glenn, J. K. (2009). *The myth of “exporting” democracy: Lessons from Eastern Europe after 1989*. The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Strengthening Transatlantic Cooperation. Washington, DC: Foreign Policy Program.
- Greenfield, P. M. (2009). Linking social change and developmental change: Shifting pathways of human development. *Developmental Psychology, 45*, 401–418.
- Greenfield, P. M. (2016). Social change, cultural evolution and human development. *Current Opinion in Psychology, 8*, 84–92.
- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The silent revolution: Changing values and political styles among Western publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values. *American Sociological Review, 65*(1), 19–51. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2657288>
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kopstein, S. J., & Reilly, A. D. (2000). Geographic diffusion and the transformation of the postcommunist world. *World Politics, 53*, 1–37. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887100009369>
- Kymlicka, W., & Opalski, M. (2002). *Can liberal pluralism be exported? Western political theory and ethnic relations in Eastern Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Laitin, D. D. (1998). *Identity in formation: The Russian-speaking populations in the near abroad*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Light, D. (2000). Gazing on communism: Heritage tourism and post-communist identities in Germany, Hungary and Romania. *Tourism Geographies, 2*, 157–176. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616680050027879>
- Lopez, A. B., Huynh, V. W., & Fuligni, A. J. (2011). A longitudinal study of religious identity and participation during adolescence. *Child Development, 82*, 1297–1309.
- Marcia, J. E. (1980). Identity in adolescence. In J. Adelson (Ed.), *Handbook of adolescent psychology* (pp. 159–187). New York: Wiley.
- Martínez, I., & García, J. F. (2007). Impact of parenting styles on adolescents’ self-esteem and internalization of values in Spain. *The Spanish Journal of Psychology, 10*(2), 338–348.
- Maslow, A. H. (1962). *Toward a psychology of being*. Princeton: Van Nostrand.
- Nesbitt, E., & Arweck, E. (2010). Issues arising from an ethnographic investigation of the religious identity formation of young people in mixed-faith families. *Fieldwork in Religion, 5*, 7–30.
- Ogburn, W. F. (1966). *Social change: With respect to cultural and original nature*. Oxford: Delta Books.
- Phinney, J. S. (1989). Stages of ethnic identity development in minority group adolescents. *Journal of Early Adolescence, 9*, 34–49.
- Phinney, J. S., & Devich-Navarro, S. M. (1997). Variations in bicultural identification among African American and Mexican American adolescents. *Journal of Research on Adolescence, 7*, 3–32.
- Phinney, J. S., & Ong, A. D. (2007). Conceptualization and measurement of ethnic identity: Current status and future directions. *Journal of Counseling Psychology, 54*, 271–281.
- Pinquart, M., & Silbereisen, R. K. (2004). Transmission of values from adolescents to their parents: The role of value content and authoritative parenting. *Adolescence, 39*(153), 83–100.
- Priestland, D. (2017, February 24). What’s left of communism? A hundred years after the Russian revolution, can a phoenix rise from the ash heap of history? *The New York Times*, Sunday Review. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/24/opinion/sunday/whats-left-of-communism.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=opinion-c-col-right-region®ion=opinion-c-col-right-region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right-region&r=0>
- Roháč, D. (2013). What are the lessons from post-communist transition? *Economic Affairs, 33*, 65–77. <https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12006>

- Sagiv, L., Roccas, S., & Hazan, O. (2012). Identification with groups: The role of personality and context. *Journal of Personality, 80*, 345–374.
- Sam, D. L., & Berry, J. W. (Eds.). (2016). *The Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schütz, A. (1967). *The phenomenology of the social world*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press.
- Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 25*, 1–66.
- Schwartz, S. H. (2015). Basic individual values: Sources and consequences. In D. Sander & T. Brosch (Eds.), *Handbook of value* (pp. 63–84). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stewart, M. (2001). Communist Roma policy, 1945–89 as seen through a Hungarian case. In W. Guy (Ed.), *Between past and future: The Roma of central and eastern Europe* (pp. 71–92). Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Tilley, J., & Evans, G. (2014). Ageing and generational effects on vote choice: Combining cross-sectional and panel data to estimate APC effects. *Electoral Studies, 33*(1), 19–27. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2013.06.007>
- Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Welzel, C. (2013). *Freedom rising: Human empowerment and the quest for emancipation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nadezhda Lebedeva (Ph.D., Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences) is Professor in the Department of Psychology and Head of the International Laboratory for Sociocultural Research at The National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. She is Academic Director of double degree Master Program on Applied Social Psychology of HSE, Russia, and Tilburg University, the Netherlands. She is a member of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP) and the International Academy for Intercultural Research (IAIR). She is the author/editor of 26 books and over 250 articles and book chapters on social and cross-cultural psychology. Her research interests are values, value transmission, identity, intercultural relations, acculturation, creativity and innovations, and social and cultural change.

Radosveta Dimitrova is a docent (associate professor) at the Department of Psychology at Stockholm University, Sweden. She holds a Ph.D. in Developmental Psychology (University of Trieste, Italy, awarded the 2009 Best Doctoral Thesis by the Italian Association of Psychologists), and a Ph.D. in Cross-Cultural Psychology (Tilburg University, the Netherlands, awarded the 2012 Student and Early Career Council Dissertation Award of the Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD). She was the recipient of the 2016 Young Scientist Award of the International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development, ISSBD, for distinguished theoretical contribution, research, and dissemination of developmental science. Her research interests regard social identity, well-being, migration, positive youth development, ethnic minority groups (Roma), and adaptation of instruments in different cultures.

John W. Berry (Ph.D. University of Edinburgh) is professor emeritus of psychology at Queen's University, Canada, and research professor, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. He received honorary doctorates from the University of Athens, and Université de Geneve (in 2001). He has published over 30 books in the areas of cross-cultural, intercultural, social, and cognitive psychology with various colleagues. These include *Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications* (3rd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2011); *Handbook of Acculturation Psychology* (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2016); *Families Across Cultures*

(Cambridge University Press, 2006); *Immigrant Youth in Cultural Transition* (LEA, 2006); *Mutual Intercultural Relations* (Cambridge, 2017); and *Ecology, Culture and Human Development* (Sage, 2017). He is a fellow of the Canadian Psychological Association, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology, and the International Academy for Intercultural Research. He received the Hebb Award for Contributions to Psychology as a Science in 1999, and the award for Contributions to the Advancement of International Psychology in 2012 (from CPA), the Interamerican Psychology Prize, from the Sociedad Interamericana de Psicología (in 2001), and the Lifetime Contribution Award from IAIR (in 2005). His main research interests are in the role of ecology and culture in human development and in acculturation and intercultural relations, with an emphasis on applications to immigration, multiculturalism, and educational and health policy.

Klaus Boehnke is full professor of Social Science Methodology at Jacobs University Bremen and chair of the methods center of the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS—www.bigsss-bremen.de). Since 2017, he is also deputy head of the International Laboratory for Sociocultural Research at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow (<https://scr.hse.ru/en>). He received his Ph.D. in Psychology from Berlin University of Technology in 1985 and held assistant and associate professorships at the Free University of Berlin. In 1993, he became full professor of Socialization Research and Empirical Social Research at the Department of Sociology of Chemnitz University of Technology, from where he moved to Jacobs in 2002. He was secretary general of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP) from 2000 to 2008 and president of the Division of Political Psychology of the International Association of Applied Psychology (IAAP) from 2004 to 2010; he is now president-elect of IACCP (www.iaccp.org). Klaus Boehnke published some 400 academic pieces. His most heavily cited paper is one with Shalom Schwartz on a confirmatory factor analysis of Schwartz's value circumplex. Recently, he was part of an author team that published on the tightness vs. looseness of cultures in *Science* (lead author: Gelfand). His main research interest is political socialization. Klaus Boehnke is PI of the longest-running longitudinal study of peace movement activists that saw its first of meanwhile ten waves of measurement in 1985. He was a founding member of the Committee for the Psychological Study of Peace (CPSP) in 1988 and has been its senior advisor since 1999; he also was president of the German Peace Psychology Association from 2005 to 2013.

Part I
Value Changes Across Countries and
Generations

Democratic Values in the Post-Communist Region: The Incidence of Traditionalists, Skeptics, Democrats, and Radicals



Martina Klicperova-Baker and Jaroslav Kostal

The democratic revolutions in 1989 succeeded by virtue of an overwhelming mass support. The resolute popular toppling of authoritarian communism earned the year a nickname of *Annus mirabilis*. The movement became an apex of the third major democratization wave of the twentieth century (Huntington, 1990). Citizens of the newly liberated countries were euphoric and eager to catch up with the “first world.” Indeed, countries rapidly developed their democratic institutions and economies were swiftly transformed to liberal capitalism, in many cases pushed by so-called shock therapy with all its adjacent problems (cf. Marangos, 2005). In some respects, the democratic transitions were experienced with “unbearable lightness” (this term borrowed from the novelist Milan Kundera). For example, Leonidas (2015) wrote about “the unbearable lightness of change,” Voszka (1990) referred to “the unbearable lightness of non-cathartic transition,” and Mungiu-Pippidi (2004) described “the unbearable lightness of democracy.” However, one generation later, despite a general progress, the post-communist democracies still have not fully caught up. They are not being rated on a par with the model democracies. In fact, the Economist Intelligence Unit (2016) rates all the post-communist regimes from the 1989 wave at best as imperfect, i.e., “flawed democracies.” That is the case (in the descending order) of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Croatia, Hungary, Serbia, Romania, Moldova, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Montenegro. Democracy in the rest of the post-communist and post-soviet region is rated even worse—Ukraine and Georgia has been labeled as a “hybrid regime” and Russia along with Belarus, Azerbaijan, and post-soviet republics of Central Asia as “authoritarian regimes.” While the authoritarian and hybrid systems have an obvious democratic lag, the differences among the so-called flawed democracies of Europe appear to be subtler. To what degree do the overall country ratings

M. Klicperova-Baker (✉) · J. Kostal
Institute of Psychology, Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic
e-mail: klicperovabaker@gmail.com

correspond to values and value-loaded attitudes expressed by individual citizens? Is post-communism in any way reflected in mentalities of the citizens?

Post-Communist Syndrome

While democratic institutions were soon in place, many scholars, writers, and politicians kept pointing out a peculiar psychological phenomenon: various forms of post-totalitarian mentality seemed to have prevailed with a surprising momentum. From all around the post-communist region, there were reports about citizens psychologically “stuck” in the past. Writers as well as social scientists came to a concord that there must be something as post-communist psychology.

Perhaps the most descriptive testimonies came from the Central European region. For example, Polish scholars wrote among others about “Homo Sovieticus” (Tischner, 1992), a socialist mentality (Koralewicz & Ziolkowski, 1990), or civilizational incompetence (Sztompka, 1993). With regard to Russia, Boym (1995) wrote about post-communist nostalgia; others focused on the phenomenon of the post-soviet mentality, e.g., pollster Yury Levada (see an interview with Shapoval, 2000) or Tishkov (1997, p. 152) who pointed out the one-dimensional perception of reality typical for the post-soviet mentality. Czech-American scholars wrote about the totalitarian mind (Marlin, 1992) and post-totalitarian mentality (Klicperova, Feierabend, & Hofstetter, 1997).

We have approached the post-communist mind from a semi-clinical angle, i.e., as a complex syndrome, which is constituted by axiological/moral, emotional, cognitive, conative, etc. symptoms. Among the most prominent are a distinct dysphoria (negativity) and passivity. We describe the post-communist syndrome in more detail elsewhere (Klicperova et al., 1997); here in Table 1, we just briefly sum up the main symptoms, which the syndrome consists of.

To what degree do citizens’ attitudes correspond to the mostly anecdotal characterizations of post-communist mentality, as we found them in various literary sources and as we know them from our own reminiscence? And is there some general correspondence between the values and attitudes of citizens of the post-communist region with the ratings of democracy by the Economist Intelligence Unit rating?

Democratic Mentality

The post-communist syndrome is in a sharp contrast with the concept of democratic mentality (democratic character) which personifies the democratic values and the ideal of common good. A democratic personality can be characterized by distinct prodemocratic values and morality; cognitive, emotional, and conative processes; and their integration which are in contrast to the post-communist syndrome described earlier.

Table 1 Main symptoms constituting the post-communist syndrome

	Individual level	Interpersonal level	Institutional level	Societal level
Values and morality	Lack of moral values and integrity	Disrespect, prejudice, dishonesty	Legitimization of immorality	Lack of civic virtues, avoidance of responsibility
Self	Suppressed individuality	Conformity, feeling of inferiority	Provincial loss in the system or its clever abuse	“Us” and “them” perspective
Cognitions	Rigidity, defensive mechanisms	Distrust, prejudice	Ignorance or shrewdness	Black/white thinking
Emotions	Anxiety, depression	Envy, fear, xenophobia, hatred	Distrust, apathy	Resentment, nostalgia
Actions	Passivity, learned helplessness	Rudeness, cunning utilitarianism	Lack of initiative, opportunism	Alienation and parasitism

A rich body of literature attempts to define the main features of democratic character (mainly, Barbu, 1956; Binford, 1983; Durio, 1976; Greenstein, 1965; Gross, 1992; Inglehart & Welzel, 2007; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Laswell, 1951). There is a considerable agreement among these scholars, whether they approach the subject from a perspective of political science, sociology, or psychology. Among others, the democratic personality is characterized by both ideational and social openness, by emotional security, and by cognitive development. A democrat combines political interest and knowledge with democratic creed, moral decision-making, and activism.

Derived from the goals of the French revolution (liberty, equality, fraternity), democratic character calls for a capacity to identify broadly and positively with others and calls for nonviolence, tolerance, benevolence, and warmth. On the psychological level, democratic character is linked to a harmoniously integrated self, healthy ego strength, cognitive independence, tolerance of ambiguity, and critical judgment in concord with flexibility and adaptability. This cognitive capacity projects also to the axiological sphere, to the capacity to focus on multiple values although they may not be necessarily congruent with one another and to professing of universalizable moral principles.

Durio (1976) suggests that “democratic behavior is a conscious commitment to a value structure requiring individual action” (p. 212). Assessment of value orientations is challenging and a subject to many methodological obstacles. Yet, there are respected international projects focused on rigorous assessment of values in an international context, such as World Values Study, European Values Study, or European Social Survey—cf. the systematic work of Abramson and Inglehart (1995), Inglehart and Welzel (2007), or a recent study by Sack (2017). The research thus focuses on study of *democratic value orientations* which are understood as a “pattern of different value orientations towards democracy” (Sack, 2017, pp. 445–446). For our purpose of

comparing values in the post-communist Europe, we utilized the European Values Study (EVS) database with an intention to further analyze the data in order to reveal axiological discrepancies and congruities in the Central and Eastern European post-communist region.

The core concept we focused on is (democratic or nondemocratic) mentality. Mentalities can be defined and operationalized as naturally occurring constellations of meaningful and relatively stable values, attitudes, and behavioral tendencies. Mentalities are not subject to radical fluctuations (more typical of unstable opinions). In the literature, the term “mentality” is usually used in reference to a social group, i.e., mentality representative of a certain nationality, class, or historical period. As a methodological approach, the empirical comparisons of mentalities are innovative and praised, for example, in the extensive review by Havelka (2002) and in empirical works by Černý (2002) who used them to study attitudes across nations, generations, and education groups. The mentality approach appears as particularly suitable for our purpose.

Aims of the Study and Hypotheses

Our aim was to utilize the data from the EVS study for secondary analysis (cluster analysis; see also Klicperova-Baker & Kostal, 2015, 2016) and to assess the prevalence of democratic value orientations (and, by extension, democrats) in the post-communist world.

We hypothesized that in the post-communist regions:

Hypothesis 1 In the whole region, less democratic value orientations (“political mentalities”) would be prevalent over democratic (secular or religious) mentalities.

Hypothesis 2 The ex-soviet Baltic region will be represented by more democratic value orientations than the post-soviet core region but by less democratic orientations than the four “Visegrad” countries of post-communist Central Europe.

Method

Data

We performed secondary analysis of the most recent European Values Study data set (EVS, 2011; publicly available). The EVS survey involves representative national samples across Europe (44 European countries with $N = 63,281$ respondents) obtained with solid methodology-based internationally comparable questionnaires and random multistage stratified sampling. The EVS engaged all countries we were interested in.

Variables

The EVS survey questionnaire contains a wide array of questions from which we can infer differences in political mentalities or personalities among the respondents. We employed most of the available data (73 variables) in cluster analysis; we left out especially items pertaining to personal details about the participants' partner, marriage, and parents. The original questions had various format; in order to correct for the variety of scales used, all data were normalized.

For sake of comparing democratic value orientations in the post-communist region, we focused especially on the following variables which were also tested for invariance using recent Muthén-Asparouhov (Asparouhov & Muthén, 2014) method:

Preference for Nondemocratic Regimes Preference for nondemocratic regimes (military rule or a strong leader) versus democratic spirit and appreciation of democracy: e.g., "Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government."

Acceptance of Democratic Institutions Acceptance of democratic institutions and attitudes to political parties: e.g., "How much confidence you have in political parties."

Tolerance of Diversity Tolerance of diversity and willingness to coexist with people of various ethnic and racial backgrounds: e.g., "Because of the number of immigrants in this country, I sometimes feel like a stranger."

Tolerance of Modernity and Alternative Lifestyles Tolerance of modernity and alternative lifestyles such as divorce, abortions, prostitution, women rights, or gay rights: e.g., "Please tell me whether you think divorce can be justified. . ."

Political and Social Activism Interest and active engagement in politics (voting, petitions, boycotts, demonstrations, strikes) and membership in associations and volunteering: e.g., "Have you actually signed a petition, you might or under any circumstance you would never do it?"

Religiousness Religiosity, belief in God and in life after death or hell, praying, and separation of religion and politics: e.g., "How important is God in your life?"

Work Ethic For example, "Work should come first even if it means less spare time."

Cluster analysis employed also additional variables, such as:

Trust in Other People Trust in other people (including strangers and foreigners) and belief in their benevolence and honesty: e.g., "Do you think that most people would try to take an advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?"

Civility Civility, concern for others (including the unfortunate), and desirable qualities in children and honesty: e.g., "Please tell me whether you think cheating on tax if you have a chance can be justified. . ."

Paternalism *Paternalism* vs. individualism and private enterprise: How would you place your views on scale from “Private ownership of business and industry should be increased” to “Government ownership of business and industry should be increased”?

Subjective Well-being Subjective well-being, health, happiness, and satisfaction: e.g., “Taking all things together, would you say you are very happy, quite happy, not very happy, not at all happy?”

Materialism and Post-Materialism Importance of order, low prices, freedom of speech, and giving people more say in important government decisions.

Procedure

The data of 73 variables for 63,281 respondents from 44 European countries were subjected to cluster analysis, a multivariate method particularly suitable to identify what unites and what differentiates large populations. We used k-means SPSS Quick Cluster procedure. To prevent imbalance in contents of some of the extensive scales, we used factor analysis to create complex indicators; data were also normalized to control for various ranges of scales used. Additional variables were used ex-post for correlation and variance analysis of clusters obtained; these included basic sociodemographic variables such as age, family income, residence (larger or smaller towns), and gender. Besides cluster and factor analysis, we used ANOVA, post hoc tests, and bivariate tests for contingency tables and series of multinomial regressions to confirm the outcome of the bivariate testing. More complete description of the procedure and data on all variables can be found in our earlier works (Klicperova-Baker & Kostal, 2015, 2016).

For our study of post-communism, we selected the following culturally, historically, politically, and geographically contrasting regions:

- (a) The post-soviet core countries—Russia, Moldova, and Ukraine
- (b) The ex-soviet Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
- (c) The Central and Eastern European post-communist countries, the so-called Visegrad four, consisting of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary

First, we assessed the incidence of individual clusters (mentalities) in respective post-soviet and post-communist regions. Then we continued the analysis to establish further relationships between clusters and selected variables. We used ANOVA, CHI^2 , and post hoc Tukey tests to reveal:

- (a) Which particular aspects of (non)democratic mentalities were prevalent in respective regional and political groups (such as trust, benevolence, and activism—see Tables 3 and 4).
- (b) How regional mentalities relate to respondents’ education (i.e., education of the primary, lower secondary, higher secondary, or university level).

- (c) What age groups are typical for respective regional mentalities.
- (d) What degree respective (non)democratic mentalities are typical for elites and non-elites defined by the international ISCOR categorization. In this definition, elites were defined by the International Standard Classification of Occupations as ISCO 1000-2460 codes which include higher management and professionals.

The strength of the relations was established by Cramer's V, and the significance of the relationships was assessed by the sign test.

Results

Democratic Value Orientations in Europe: "Political Mentalities"

Cluster analysis classified all 63,281 respondents according to their answers to 73 value-related questions to five clusters—the most typical constellations of European political psychology mentalities. The obtained clusters had high stability (reordered stability = 0.913 and split-half stability = 0.902). Not just one but two clusters were distinctly democratic (labeled as secular democrats and religious democrats); the other three types were considered less suitable for democratic regimes.

Table 2 illustrates these 5 main clusters along with representative items of the 73 variables which contributed to the clustering. Table 2 is only illustrative; interested readers can find an exhaustive list of all 73 variables (with their average scores for the 5 clusters) as well as additional methodological details in the studies by Klicperova-Baker and Kostal (2015, 2016).

The clusters were characterized and labeled as follows:

Secular Democrats Secular democrats (21% respondents) stand out by their interest in politics, the strongest democratic spirit and least authoritarianism; they are politically most active (they vote and participate but tend to stay short of unofficial power actions such as strikes or occupations). They are the most tolerant group toward modern and alternative lifestyles and vices, as well as to diverse groups (e.g., the gays). These respondents generally relate well with others, even very diverse and distant people. They are most secular type; only 38% claim they believe in God. They are also most affluent and educated; they feel most healthy and generally quite satisfied. This kind of mentality is prevalent Scandinavia, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway (each has 50% or more respondents in this category); conversely, secular democrats are rare in Turkey, Kosovo, Moldavia, and Romania.

Religious Democrats Religious democrats (27% respondents) are defined by religiosity (96% trust in God and 74% in afterlife), yet that does not undermine their generally benevolent and relatively tolerant attitudes. This positivity encompasses also their personal situation (general well-being), satisfaction with democracy, as

Table 2 European mentalities

	Clusters					Total mean	Eta
	Democrats		Nondemocrats		Anti-democrats		
	Secular democrats	Religious democrats	Nondemocratic skeptics	Intolerant economically challenged traditionalists	Anti-democratic authoritarian radicals		
Exemplary questionnaire items							
Democratic spirit: Having a democratic political system is good	3.62 a	3.48 b	3.00 e	3.17 d	3.21 c	3.29	0.309
Tolerance: Divorce is justifiable	8.01 a	5.18 c	6.07 b	3.55 e	4.72 d	5.35	0.489
Religiousness: Importance of religion in your life	1.77 d	3.02 b	1.86 c	3.35 a	3.03 b	2.65	0.637
Political activism: Have you attended lawful/peaceful demonstration?	2.35 a	1.74 c	1.46 d	1.30 e	2.31 b	1.73	0.558
Political activism: Have you joined an unofficial strike?	1.65 b	1.12 c	1.13 c	1.03 d	1.95 a	1.29	0.596
Authoritarianism: Preference of having a strong leader	1.56 d	1.91 c	2.25 b	2.56 a	2.52 a	2.17	0.357

Note: Significance of differences is marked by upper indices; letters a, b, c, d, and e denote significantly different rank order of means confirmed by post hoc Scheffe tests ($p = 0.05$) from a = the highest to e = the lowest mean value

Five types extracted by cluster analysis from the EVS database with exemplary variables (of the 73 questionnaire items of the EVS used for clustering). Differences between clusters were established by ANOVA tests; the highest scores are highlighted by bold; the lowest scores are italicized

well as a generally positive view of other people and willingness to perform unpaid voluntary work. They are fairly affluent and educated, often socially organized (59%, second after Secular Democrats), although due to the higher age, they are less often active and employed. They personify most citizens of Ireland and Northern Ireland.

Nondemocratic Skeptics Nondemocratic skeptics (18% respondents) stand out by their ostentatious skepticism or even cynicism, especially their disenchanting attitude to democracy (they manifest the least interest in politics of all groups, the least interest in voting and also a lesser ability to find a party of their liking). At the same time, they also express the highest skepticism regarding life after death. They show little concern about people in their neighborhood, the sick and disabled, or concern about humanity in general. They do not organize much in civil society, and they are unlikely to participate in political action or in voluntary work. They tend to be materialistic and also ambivalent about religion (46% of them report some religious denomination; 56% believe in God). They tend to be tolerant of modern vices, particularly of divorce, abortion, and prostitution, and relatively tolerant socially (more of gays, much less of Roma); however, their tolerance may be more a result of passive disinterest rather than active embrace; it is also possible that their tolerance suggests some of their own vices. Demographically, they tend to be average with respect to economic means, education, and age. Manifested mostly in the post-communist region, they represent over 50% of citizens in Hungary, the Czech Republic, Estonia, and Latvia. Their negativity and passivity suggest there is a certain fit between their sociopsychological and the above-described post-communist syndrome.

Intolerant Economically Challenged Traditionalists Intolerant economically challenged traditionalists (23% respondents) stand out by their bigotry and distrust to people they do not know. They tend to be socially passive (with very low political participation, although generally not as low as the nondemocratic skeptics). Overall, they have little appreciation of democracy, and they are inclined to authoritarianism (accepting army rule and strong leadership). They believe in work ethic although not for unpaid volunteering for anonymous others. Although extremely suspicious of strangers, they are most concerned about their immediate neighborhood and most empathetic of sick and disabled. After all, they themselves report the worst health, least happiness, and least life satisfaction. They also report the lowest household income; they are least educated, the oldest, and most often (as many as 70%) not employed. They are also most religious (99% believe in God), showing the least tolerance to modernist lifestyles and vices and the most xenophobia of diverse populations. Most respondents from Turkey, Romania, Moldova, Cyprus, and Northern Cyprus fit this category.

Anti-democratic Authoritarian Radicals Anti-democratic authoritarian radicals (11% respondents) are politically very active, ready to vote, and not shy of taking part in unlawful actions (strikes and occupations of buildings). They are overwhelmingly (96%) religious and strongly prejudiced against diversity, with little tolerance

for modern vices and ways of life (although they are relatively more open-minded than bigoted intolerant traditionalists). They are skeptical of benevolence of unknown others. Dissatisfied with the way democracy developed in their country, they tend to be anti-democratic (with the highest preference for army rule and strong leaders instead of democracy). Demographically, they tend to be relatively young, relatively educated, but less affluent. This orientation is most representative of countries of former Yugoslavia—Macedonia (over 48% respondents), Kosovo, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Serbia, and Croatia.

Prevalence of the Democratic Value Orientations (Political Mentalities) in the Post-Communist Regions

For the sake of our analysis, we chose three contrasting regions with countries which have distinctly different political heritage, various history of integration to the soviet empire, level of integration to the European Union, and geographic situation:

- (a) The post-soviet core countries—Russia, Moldova, and Ukraine
- (b) The ex-soviet Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania
- (c) The post-communist countries of Central/Eastern Europe, so-called Visegrad four consisting of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary

Figure 1 illustrates the incidence of the five value orientations across the three post-communist regions (post-soviet core, ex-soviet Baltics, and post-communist Central Europe). It is symptomatic that democrats in the post-communist countries are in minority; on top of that, when they emerge, they are of religious rather than secular character. (With one exception: the Czech Republic is a famously secular country where secular democrats lead religious democrats at the ratio of two to one.)

The results suggest the following inferences:

- (a) *Each of the five mentalities is significantly represented in every country in the study.*
- (b) *The value orientations in the post-communist regions suggest prevalence of nondemocratic tendencies.* The dominant mentality in Central Europe and Baltics appears to be passive indifferent skepticism, while intolerant traditionalism stands out as the dominant mentality of the post-soviet core countries. Overall, as well as in each of the three post-communist regions individually, democratic mentalities are in minority, and the less democratic value orientations prevail in the region (whether they are anti-democratic or nondemocratic). *This finding supports Hypothesis 1*, and it is also in agreement with the notion of an imperfection of the post-communist democracies (the Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016).

In contrast to these results, all over Western countries, there was a prominence of outspoken secular and religious democrats. They usually constituted a majority (e.g., 95% in Denmark, 90% in Norway, 88% in Iceland, 82% in




Fig. 1 Political mentalities extracted from the European Values Study by cluster analysis and their estimated incidence in three post-communist regions. For comparison, in the Western democracies, democrats (both secular and religious) are in majority

Switzerland, 81% in Sweden, 80% in Netherlands. . . even France had majority of 62%, Germany 60%, Great Britain 57%, and Austria 54% of democrats). Scandinavian Northwestern Europe was prevalently secular, while, e.g., in Ireland, Switzerland, and Austria, religious democrats were more numerous. (For more detailed results on individual countries, see Klicperova-Baker & Kostal, 2015.)

- (c) The three post-communist regions in the study differ by occurrence of respective mentalities. H2 hypothesized that “the ex-soviet Baltic region will be represented by more democratic value orientations than the post-soviet core region but by less democratic orientations than the ‘Visegrad four’ countries of post-communist Central Europe.”

Secular and religious democrats in the post-communist region appear in low numbers of 10%, 20%, or 25%, respectively, for the post-soviet core, ex-soviet Baltic states, and post-communist Central Europe, i.e., in the predicted order. To establish statistical significance of the differences of all five mentalities, we used

CHI² (Cramer's $V = 0.226$), student's sign test, and t-test of percentages with the following results (expected results are underlined):

For secular democrats

8.6% Sec Dems_{Central Europe} & 5.8% Sec Dems_{Baltics} > 1.5% Sec Dems_{Post-soviet core}

For religious democrats

16.9% Rel Dems_{Central Europe} > 12.7% Rel Dems_{Baltics} > 7.5% Rel Dems_{Post-soviet core}

For traditionalists

49.2% Tradit_{Post-soviet core} > 26.5% Tradit_{Central Europe} > 20.8% Tradit_{Baltics}

For skeptics

50.3% Skeptics_{Baltics} > 39.4% Skeptics_{Central Europe} > 20.8% Skeptics_{Post-soviet core}

For radicals

14.4% Radicals_{Post-soviet core} > 10.3 Radicals_{Baltics} & 8.6% Radicals_{Central Europe}

To summarize, Hypothesis 2 predicted most relationships that were found. The predictions were fully confirmed for the incidence of religious democrats and radicals. The hypothesis was almost confirmed for secular democrats: Central European secular democrats were most numerous as predicted but stayed short of the statistically significant threshold. The hypothesis was disproved in two cases of nondemocratic mentality (traditionalism and skepticism), but the error was in favor of another nondemocratic mentality and thus qualitatively not that much off: There were fewer traditionalists in the Baltics than anticipated, and there were much fewer skeptics in the post-soviet core countries than anticipated.

Dimensions of Democratic Values and Respective Regions

In order to compare democratic value orientations in the post-communist region, we particularly focused on dimensions which assess democratic spirit, acceptance of democratic institutions, political participation, tolerance, and also religiousness and work ethics as measures of modernity. We made sure the dimensions passed the test of invariance (confirmatory factor analysis) based on Asparouhov and Muthén (2014) method of alignment. All these dimensions were scalar invariant across the post-communist countries as also illustrated by Table 3.

Table 4 depicts principal democratic and anti-democratic value orientations, such as (non)democratic spirit, (in)tolerance, and political activism as they follow from the data of the EVS study. The results suggest significant differences across the three post-communist geographic areas (post-soviet core, ex-soviet Baltic region, and post-communist Central Europe—Visegrad four) as well as across the main (non)democratic mentalities which were obtained by cluster analysis (secular and religious democrats, traditionalists, skeptics, and radicals). Thus, for example, the highest preference for nondemocratic regimes (and thus the lowest levels of democratic spirit) was expressed by both the traditionalists and by the radicals from the post-soviet core (their percentage of maximum score is 47 and 48%, respectively). On the other hand, the strongest level of

Table 3 Factor means for main value dimensions: approximate scalar invariance (alignment fixed, estimator MLR) analysis

	Intolerance of diversity	Tolerance of modernity	Preference for nondemocratic regimes	Political and social activism	Religiousness and work ethics	Acceptance of democratic institutions and immigrants
Czech Republic	0.431	0.074	0.672	0.249	-1.187	-0.557
Hungary	0.113	-0.439	1.384	-0.396	-0.447	-0.926
Poland	0.282	0.043	0.931	0.235	-0.468	-0.182
Slovakia	0.430	-0.247	0.764	-0.184	-0.415	0.035
Subtotal	0.314	-0.142	0.940	-0.024	-0.629	-0.408
Estonia	0.603	0.435	1.066	-0.097	-0.785	-0.286
Latvia	0.308	0.013	1.260	0.045	-0.729	-0.592
Lithuania	1.071	0.421	0.917	-0.023	-0.338	-0.800
Subtotal	0.661	0.290	1.089	-0.025	-0.617	-0.559
Belarus	0.787	0.324	0.771	-0.288	-0.602	0.223
Moldova	0.837	-0.454	1.031	0.046	0.468	-0.242
Russian Federation	0.665	0.176	1.684	-0.159	-0.279	-0.229
Ukraine	0.744	-0.027	1.800	-0.076	0.269	-0.944
Subtotal	0.758	0.005	1.322	-0.119	-0.036	-0.298
Reference (0) group	Montenegro	Croatia	Switzerland	Albania	Portugal	Turkey
Trustworthiness	51.2	33.6	29.1	35.5	39.0	34.6
LL H0	-323,221.212	-1,019,278.2	-922,287.368	-988,298.808	-1,013,988.3	-1,270,505.51
LL H0 Scaling correction Factor for MLR	2.7797	1.9174	1.1494	1.2961	1.2323	1.1768
AIC	647,670.424	2,041,546.36	1,846,700.736	1,980,291.616	2,030,702.662	2,544,705.024
BIC	653,114.883	2,054,912	1,856,049.444	1,996,804.244	2,042,887.923	2,561,344.939
Sample size adj. BIC	651,163.581	2,050,160.86	1,852,671.216	1,990,934.444	2,038,556.284	2,555,475.135
N	52,428	56,400	48,759	56,401	56,389	60,425

Table 4 Democratic value orientations and their incidence in respective regions

	Intolerance of diversity (0 = none, 1 = high)	Tolerance of modernity (0 = none, 1 = high)	Preference for nondemocratic regimes (0 = none, 1 = high)	Political and social activism (0 = none, 1 = high)	Religiousness and work ethics (0 = none, 1 = high)	Acceptance of democratic institutions and immigrants (0 = none, 1 = high)
Secular democrats: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	0.29 ⁷	0.57	0.32 ⁵	0.43 ²	0.49 ⁷	0.47
Secular democrats: Post-soviet core	0.3 ⁷	0.58	0.38	0.49 ¹	0.45 ⁸	0.45 ³
Secular democrats: Ex-soviet Baltic region	0.36 ⁶	0.61 ¹	0.36 ³	0.43 ²	0.49 ⁷	0.51 ¹
Traditionalists: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	0.5 ⁴	0.46 ⁷	0.43 ²	0.3 ⁶	0.69 ¹	0.38
Traditionalists: Post-soviet core	0.59 ¹	0.48 ⁶	0.47 ¹	0.35 ⁵	0.68 ¹	0.38 ⁵
Traditionalists: Ex-soviet Baltic region	0.62	0.49	0.43 ²	0.32	0.68 ¹	0.38
Radicals: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	0.46 ⁵	0.48	0.44 ²	0.44 ²	0.61 ³	0.41
Radicals: Post-soviet core	0.54 ⁴	0.49	0.48 ¹	0.49 ¹	0.64	0.39
Radicals: Ex-soviet Baltic region	0.56 ²	0.52	0.43 ²	0.41	0.62 ²	0.39 ⁴
Skeptics: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	0.41 ⁶	0.5 ⁵	0.41 ²	0.28 ⁸	0.55 ⁵	0.38
Skeptics: Post-soviet core	0.53 ³	0.51 ⁴	0.43 ²	0.29 ⁷	0.52 ⁶	0.37 ⁶

Skeptics: Ex-soviet Baltic region	0.51 ⁴	0.54 ³	0.43 ²	0.28	0.54 ⁵	0.40
Religious democrats: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	0.29 ⁷	0.56 ²	0.34 ⁴	0.37 ⁴	0.63	0.46 ²
Religious democrats: Post-soviet core	0.41 ⁶	0.57	0.37	0.39 ³	0.6 ⁴	0.47
Religious democrats: Ex-soviet Baltic region	0.4 ⁶	0.6 ¹	0.36	0.39	0.64	0.48
Total	0.48	0.51	0.42	0.34	0.60	0.40
<i>N</i>	16,939	16,891	16,311	16,821	16,737	16,713
Percent (%)	26.8	26.7	25.8	26.6	26.4	26.4
<i>F</i>	150.801	107.944	80.201	332.284	326.251	111.733
Sig. <i>F</i>	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Eta	0.333	0.287	0.254	0.466	0.463	0.293

Note. The values represent the percentage of maximum score. Differences were tested by ANOVA and post hoc Tukey b tests

democratic spirit was expressed by secular democrats from the post-communist Central Europe (their preference for nondemocratic regime was at 32%).

As could be expected, religiousness was highest in traditionalists and lowest in secular democrats across the regions. Intolerance of diversity was highest in post-soviet core traditionalists and highest among secular and religious democrats across various regions (intolerance of modernity manifested a similar pattern).

The mean values of the main democratic dimensions generally support Hypothesis 2 since the democratic values tend to attain the highest levels by the respondents from Central European Visegrad countries, then for Baltic countries, with the ex-Soviet core suggesting most of the democratic deficit. Conversely, the anti-democratic tendencies tend to be at their highest in the ex-Soviet core, followed by Baltic and, finally, the Visegrad countries of Central Europe.

Still, there are some interesting diversions from Hypothesis 2: The strongest political activism was manifested in the post-soviet core region, in equal intensity by secular democrats and radicals; the least activism was manifested by apolitical Central European skeptics. That can be logically explained by different frustrations and aspirations in the respective regions. The result for acceptance of democratic institutions is also somewhat surprising: Secular democrats from the Baltics have the highest mean, and post-soviet core secular democrats have the third highest mean. This suggests that (a) political mentality may be stronger than the regional belonging and (b) illusions may be stronger than disappointed reality (higher values may reflect unfulfilled hopes and aspirations; decreased values may reflect disillusion from democratic reality).

(Non)democratic Mentalities and Age

Although we do not have a direct opportunity to witness developmental shifts in the constellations of mentalities, we can still observe age differences among respective mentalities and regions. Table 5 shows results of the ANOVA post hoc tests with the Tukey b method of contrasting averages. The test revealed a moderate strength ($\eta^2 = 0.297$) of the relationship between age and groups. (The groups were created by combination of three geopolitical regions and the five mentalities.) This relationship was also confirmed by multivariate techniques.¹ In concord with the expectation, secular democrats are the youngest, i.e., they represent the attitudes and values of the youngest generation. That is particularly obvious in the Baltics but also apparent in the other two regions. In contrast, the oldest generation tends to voice attitudes of intolerant traditionalists. It remains to be seen whether the youngest age

¹Multinomial regressions confirm and specify the relationships. They show that the younger age (up to 56 years) characterizes secular democrats and higher age the traditionalists. Further, according to odds ratios, (a) secular democrats in the Baltics are 1.7 times more frequent, while (b) Baltic traditionalists are approximately half of the number of religious democrats.

Table 5 Relationship between (non)democratic mentalities, regions, and average ages

Combination of political mentality with European country group	N	Age—subset for alpha = 0.05					
		15–24	25–34	35–44	45–54	55–64	65+
Secular democrats: Ex-soviet Baltic region	264	37.10					
Secular democrats: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	538		40.87				
Secular democrats: Post-soviet core	69		41.14				
Religious democrats: Post-soviet core	340		42.24	42.24			
Radicals: Post-soviet core	654		42.57	42.57	42.57		
Skeptics: Post-soviet core	1245		42.74	42.74	42.74		
Radicals: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	543		44.45	44.45	44.45		
Religious democrats: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	1063		44.58	44.58	44.58		
Skeptics: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	2476			45.11	45.11		
Skeptics: Ex-soviet Baltic region	2276			45.35	45.35		
Religious democrats: Ex-soviet Baltic region	575			45.84	45.84		
Radicals: Ex-soviet Baltic region	465				46.16		
Traditionalists: Post-soviet core	2240					50.41	
Traditionalists: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	1674						57.19
Traditionalists: Ex-soviet Baltic region	943						58.97

Note. The average ages were designated by post hoc tests as differentiating between respective regions and mentalities (Tukey b post hoc test, alpha = 0.05 with Eta = 0.297). Bold print cells show differences across the board (i.e., the Baltic secular democrats turned out to be the youngest of all groups, and traditionalists were significantly older than other mentalities; traditionalists outside the post-soviet core being the most senior); cells without bold print indicate partial differences

cohort will be defined by the secular democratic spirit even later as it will age or whether along with their aging they will grow into the less tolerant ideologies of the older cohorts.

(Non)democratic Mentalities and Education

The relationship between mentalities and education was analyzed by bivariate tests and verified by multinomial regressions. Table 6 illustrates that *Traditionalists* tend to have the lowest level of education across all regions and to a lesser degree also a relationship between traditionalism and a lower secondary education. On the other

Table 6 Relationship between (non)democratic mentalities, regions, and education (row percentages)

Political heritage	Respondent's highest education			
	Primary (%)	Lower secondary (%)	Higher secondary (%)	University, college
Secular democrats: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	0.2	4.6	67.6***	27.6*
Secular democrats: Ex-soviet Baltic region	0.4	14.8	45.5	39.4***
Secular democrats: Post-soviet core	0.0	0.0	42.0	58.0***
Religious democrats Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	2.4	7.1	67.4***	23.0
Religious democrats Ex-soviet Baltic region	1.2	17.8	34.6	46.4***
Religious democrats Post-soviet core	2.1	6.8	41.8	49.3***
Radicals: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	2.9	8.2	73.7***	15.1
Radicals: Ex-soviet Baltic region	2.2	19.7	41.3	36.9***
Radicals: Post-soviet core	2.1	7.3	53.4	37.2***
Skeptics: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	2.0	13.5	72.2***	12.2
Skeptics: Ex-soviet Baltic region	1.9	27.7***	45.8	24.5
Skeptics: Post-soviet core	1.3	8.8	53.4	36.6***
Traditionalists: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	11.4***	21.7***	59.2*	7.7
Traditionalists: Ex-soviet Baltic region	11.7***	30.2***	38.4	19.7
Traditionalists: Post-soviet core	9.4***	15.5	52.7	22.4

Note: Sign test at the significance level * <0.05 , ** <0.01 , and *** <0.001

Association between political heritage and education was tested by CHI^2 (2324.8, $\text{df} = 42$, $p < 0.001$). The intensity of the relationship was measured by Cramer's $V = 0.224$

hand, the college/university education coincides with secular democracy and to a lesser degree also with religious democracy in the post-soviet areas. In Central/Eastern Europe, there was a link between democratic mentalities and both upper secondary and university education. Interestingly, in the post-soviet regions, authoritarian radicalism (and not democratic ideologies) appears to be a domain of those who have the highest education. As if the soviet heritage for lack of democratic role models inspires to violent actions and makes even the best educated believe that radicalism is a fair solution to the societal problems. Radicalism in Central Europe is more likely an ideology of middle-educated strata. Finally, it should be noted that correlation with skepticism seems to be region-specific: Thus, once again, skepticism appears to be an attribute of the highest education in the post-soviet core region, and of upper middle education in Central Europe, and finally of lower secondary education in the Baltics.

The Democratic Elites in the Post-Communist World

Our final analysis (results are summed up in Table 7) was devoted to the elite status (managers and professionals classified by ISCOR scores) and its relationship with the (non)democratic mentalities. We observed a consistent relationship between secular democrats and the elite status. In other words, elites showed a tendency to lean toward the philosophy of secular democratism, and secular democrats often held the elite status.

A significant relationship was also detected between the elite status and religious democrats across the post-soviet region but not in Central Europe. Apparently, religious democrats in some of the more secular countries of Central Europe do not advance to the elite status as strongly as is the case in the post-soviet societies.

In the post-communist region overall, non-elites stand out by their skepticism or traditionalism. Elites in the post-soviet area (whether the post-soviet core or Baltics) are often associated with radicalism. That is in concord with our finding that post-soviet highest-educated people also tend to be radical.

Discussion

Our study focused on democratic value orientations in the post-communist regions. We used the mentality approach and cluster analysis to extract prevalent constellations of attitudes from the EVS database. As hypothesized by our first hypothesis, the mentalities in the post-communist regions had more often a nondemocratic than democratic character. This was in particular contrast with the incidence of mentalities in the Western democracies where secular and religious democrats are in majority. This confirms that the post-communist countries still manifest certain democratic deficit, which carries resemblance with the post-communist syndrome.

The second hypothesis was for the most part confirmed as well, since the mentalities identified in the ex-soviet Baltic region were generally found to be less democratic than those in the post-communist central Europe (“Visegrad four”) but more democratic than mentalities identified in the post-soviet core countries. We performed additional analyses, finding a) differences in dimensions of (non)democratic value orientations among regional mentalities, b) age differences among the regional mentalities, c) education differences among the regional mentalities, and, finally, d) demonstrating more frequent incidence of democratic mentalities among the elites of all regions.

Limitations of the Study Cluster analysis involves generalization; the interpretation of clusters and their labels needs to be taken with a grain of salt, even more so the estimates of incidence of respective mentalities across the regions. The labels serve as ideal approximations, not as accurate descriptions of all members of the class. Also, the data are based on questionnaire surveys with all its shortcomings, primarily, social desirability. Still, the findings show considerable consistency and

Table 7 Relationship between psycho-political mentalities, regions, and elite status—row percentages

Political heritage	Others (%)	Elites (%)
Secular democrats: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	70.6	29.4***
Secular democrats: Post-soviet core	46.0	54.0***
Secular democrats: Ex-soviet Baltic region	59.4	40.6***
Religious democrats Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	77.1	22.9
Religious democrats Post-soviet core	55.8	44.2***
Religious democrats Ex-soviet Baltic region	57.4	42.6***
Radicals: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	82.1	17.9
Radicals: Post-soviet core	69.2	30.8***
Radicals: Ex-soviet Baltic region	73.5	26.5**
Skeptics: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	87.5***	12.5
Skeptics: Post-soviet core	76.5	23.5*
Skeptics: Ex-soviet Baltic region	79.0	21.0
Traditionalists: Post-communist Central Europe (Visegrad)	92.0***	8.0
Traditionalists: Post-soviet core	80.5	19.5
Traditionalists: Ex-soviet Baltic region	83.3**	16.7
Total	79.2	20.8

Note: Sign test at the significance level * <0.05 , ** <0.01 , and *** <0.001

Association between political heritage and education was tested by CHI^2 (674.408, $df = 14$, $p < 0.001$). The intensity of the relationship was measured by Cramer's $V = 0.222$

logic. Although the results of our study are based on opinions of individual respondents, they seem to well reflect the democracy ratings which the countries receive from the Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, or Transparency International.

Political Diversity The findings show a considerable political and psychological diversity in all three post-communist regions. As noted earlier, all mentalities were identified in all countries, although with various frequencies. In any case, individual plurality or majority views should never be generalized on the whole populace, neglecting important political minorities. We identified significant numbers of democrats even in countries which are generally considered authoritarian societies.

Democratic Minority Admittedly, the democrats (who are citizens with solid prodemocratic orientations such as the secularized and religious democratic clusters) turned out to be in the post-communist regions substantially outnumbered by other ideologies (in comparison to stable democracies). While democrats in the European Northwest not only formed plurality, they were in the majority (e.g., in Denmark secular democrats characterized as many as 90% of inhabitants), democrats in Russia were assessed at approximately 13%, and the numbers for Moldova and Ukraine appeared even lower.

The Significance of Democratic Minorities Despite lower numbers, or because of them, the democrats in the post-soviet regions deserve particular attention and

respect as their position is particularly challenging and important (cf., Devlin, 1995; Fish, 1995; or Lukin, 2000). In some cases, political mentalities proved to be more significant and more prominent than geographic regions. This suggests that *region is only relatively deterministic for political mentality and democratic or nondemocratic character*.

Nondemocratic Mentalities as a Heritage of a Recent or Distant Past Graph 1 suggests that each of the regions under study can be characterized by a prevalent mentality of either intolerant traditionalism (in the post-soviet core region with substantial rural areas and strong conservative values) or skepticism (prevalent in Baltics and Central Europe). These two types represent very distinct characters with different roots.

Intolerant traditionalism is characterized to a great degree by conservatism, suspiciousness, intolerance, and distancing from politics. This profile appears to resonate with the parochial political culture (Almond & Verba, 1963). Parochialism generally predates Communism² and thus can hardly be labeled as post-communist. Parochials have little knowledge of the large scale of politics and their role in it. Parochialism naturally contrasts with universalism and globalism. Parochials are naturally xenophobic; their xenophobia is based on the fear of the new.

Although we cannot blame this mentality on communist upbringing, still, communism may have played a role in preserving this primitive form of political culture either directly (by mismanaging progress and by practicing prejudiced isolationism) or indirectly: Traditionalism and religious faith worked as the most effective defensive strategy against authoritarian communism. Poland serves as the best example of the use of the Church to resist the soviet invasion and communist infiltration (Borowik, 2002; Taras, 2005), yet it is also a country which, curiously, misses a significant religious democratic movement (Bale & Szczerbiak, 2008). Intolerant traditionalism appears to be a staple in the post-soviet core region, but it is also significant in the traditionalistic countries of Central Europe, particularly Poland and Slovakia (Klicperova-Baker & Kostal, 2016).

The second pervasive nondemocratic character is passive indifferent skepticism. It can be viewed either (a) as a heritage of communist dictatorship and learned helplessness of the citizenry or (b) a result of defects in democratic transitions, especially rampant corruption and pauperization of the former middle class. Disenchanted citizens come to a conclusion that democratization brings no hope; they become skeptical, cynical, and alienated (e.g., Vogt, 2005).

Passive indifferent skepticism with its negativism and passivity appears to be an empirical personification of what we have earlier labeled as the post-totalitarian or post-communist syndrome (Klicperova et al., 1997) and an empirical illustration of its lasting prevalence. This post-communist syndrome appears to be widespread throughout the Baltics and the Central European regions.

²A historical Central European exception may be Yugoslavia, a country which turned back to its parochial ethnic roots and identities during a post-communist break up (Vasovic, 1999, p. 50).

Almond and Verba (1963) have not expanded their typology to modernistic disenchanting alienation, but we have. Specifically, Klicperová-Baker et al. (2007) extended the developmental paradigm to the fourth skeptical phase; thus political culture matures from parochial through subject and participative and then can fall back into alienation.

Relatively recent history is undoubtedly a powerful factor; this is illustrated by many clinical studies and also, e.g., by comparative analyses of attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany—most recently see Sack, 2017). Still, a question prevails to what degree current attitudes reflect general tendencies which may be rooted in more ubiquitous cultural patterns.

Worries The high prevalence of nondemocratic tendencies is disturbing. All intolerant mentalities pose a challenge for democracy. Anti-democratic radicalism, although usually less widespread than other mentalities, poses threat by its violent substance. It is worrisome, as our results indicate that in the post-soviet regions, anti-democratic radicalism and even skepticism are especially attractive for the (educated) elites and to some degree to younger rather than the older generation. Some precursors of this phenomenon may be traced to the intellectual tradition of Russian nihilism, fatalism, and radicalism (e.g., Avrich, 1972; Berdyayev, 1959; Goodwin & Allen, 2000).

Intolerant traditionalism, although widespread, tends to characterize older rather passive populations. However, their intolerance can be radicalized by their priests who may use effective tactics of directing wrath, hate, and fear for political purposes (the current situation in Poland is a particularly good example of that phenomenon; see Heinen & Portet, 2010).

Passive indifferent skepticism, so typical for post-communist mentality (but also for underprivileged masses in other regions), is an impersonation of passivity; yet even these negativistic citizens can be occasionally radicalized by populist leaders. Agenda of immigrants and foreigners, for example, was successfully used to mobilize skeptics all around the globe, including Western Europe and the USA.

The democratic system may be challenged by either passivity or anti-democratic radicalism. In Central Europe and the Baltic region, the challenge is from passive skepticism. The challenge for democracy in the post-soviet core region seems to be dual: (a) intolerant traditionalism (compare it to attitudes of religious democrats who are also religious and traditionalistic yet at the same time benevolent and relatively trusting others) and (b) radicalism—not only it tends to be elevated; it also seems to engage more educated and better positioned citizens than in other countries.

Hopes What is hopeful and promising in our study? It is imperative to stress that *in all regions and in all countries under study, we identified significant numbers of democrats*. Furthermore, *the incidence of secular or religious democrats is generally higher among elites* than non-elites. This was proven in all 44 surveyed countries, even those with prevalently authoritarian regimes (Klicperova-Baker & Kostal, 2016). In fact, the countries which were less democratic (with low incidence of Democrats) had twice to five times higher incidence of democrats among the elites.

The developmental trends appear to be skewed in favor of democracy. The results indicate that *the youngest generation is profoundly democratic*; see Table 5 showing a clear affinity of the youth to secular democracy and, conversely, seniority toward intolerant traditionalism. The question is, of course, to what degree the process of aging itself alters the democratic and progressive youthful characters into conservatives (in the sense of a classic saying assigned to Churchill). To what degree youthful “democratism” may be a sign of a hopeful generational replacement or just a passing period within a life cycle is also an enduring question.

We can assume that systematic struggle against corruption and fostering of the middle class along with education and cultivation of democratic citizenship will change the ratio of citizen mentalities to favor democracy.

References

- Abramson, P., & Inglehart, R. F. (1995). *Value change in global perspective*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1963). *Civic culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Asparouhov, T., & Muthén, B. (2014). Multiple-group factor analysis alignment. *Structural Equation Modeling, 21*, 1–14. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10705511.2014.919210>
- Avrich, P. (1972). *Russian rebels 1600–1800*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Bale, T., & Szczerbiak, A. (2008). Why is there no Christian democracy in Poland—And why should we care? *Party Politics, 14*(4), 479–500.
- Barbu, Z. (2002 [1956]). *Democracy and dictatorship: Their psychology and patterns of life*. London: Routledge.
- Berdyayev, N. (1959). *The origin of Russian communism*. Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks, University of Michigan Press.
- Binford, M. B. (1983). The democratic political personality: Functions of attitudes and styles of reasoning. *Political Psychology, 4*(4), 663–684.
- Borowik, I. (2002). The Roman Catholic Church in the process of democratic transformation: The case of Poland. *Social Compass, 49*(2), 239–252.
- Boym, S. (1995). From the Russian soul to post-communist nostalgia. *Representations, 49*(Winter), 133–166.
- Černý, J. (2002). Vliv skupinových mentalit na postoje k manželství [The influence of group mentalities on attitudes to matrimony—in Czech]. In J. Havelka, M. Tuček, J. Černý, J. Česal, & M. Hudema (Eds.), *Skupinové mentality [Group mentalities]* (pp. 51–64). Praha: Institute of Sociology.
- Devlin, J. (1995). *The rise of Russian democrats: The causes and consequences of the Elite revolution*. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
- Durio, H. F. (1976). A taxonomy of democratic development. A theoretical interpretation of the internalizing of democratic principles. *Human Development, 19*, 197–218. <https://doi.org/10.1159/000271529>
- Economist Intelligence Unit. (2016). *Democracy Index 2015: Democracy in an age of anxiety*. http://www.eiu.com/public/topical_report.aspx?campaignid=DemocracyIndex2015
- EVS. (2011). *European values study 1981–2008 longitudinal data file*. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne, Germany, ZA4804 Data File Version 1.0.0 (2011-04-30). <https://doi.org/10.4232/1.4804>
- Fish, M. S. (1995). *Democracy from scratch. Opposition and regime in the New Russian revolution*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Goodwin, R., & Allen, P. (2000). Democracy and fatalism in the former Soviet Union. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30*, 2558–2574. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1559-1816.2000.tb02450.x>
- Greenstein, F. I. (1965). Personality and political socialization: The theories of authoritarian and democratic character. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 361* (Sep), 81–95.
- Gross, M. L. (1992). Democratic character and democratic education: A cognitive and rational reappraisal. *Educational Theory, 42*(3), 331–349.
- Havelka, M. (2002). Historické a systematické předpoklady tematizace problému mentalit v sociologii [Historical and systematic prerequisites of thematization of mentalities in sociology—in Czech]. In J. Havelka, M. Tuček, J. Černý, J. Česal, & M. Hudema (Eds.), *Skupinové mentality [Group mentalities]* (pp. 10–33). Praha: Institute of Sociology.
- Heinen, J., & Portet, S. (2010). Reproductive rights in Poland reproductive rights in Poland: When politicians fear the wrath of the Church. *Third World Quarterly, 31*(6), 1007–1021.
- Huntington, S. P. (1990). Democracy's third wave. *Journal of Democracy, 2*(Spring), 12–34.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2007). *Modernization, cultural change, and democracy: The human development sequence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., et al. (2003). Political conservatism as motivated social cognition. *Psychological Bulletin, 129*(3), 339–375.
- Klicperova, M., Feierabend, I. K., & Hofstetter, C. R. (1997). In the search for a post-communist syndrome: A theoretical framework and empirical assessment. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 7*(1), 39–52.
- Klicperová-Baker, M., Feierabend, I. K., Kovacheva, S., Titarenko, L., Košťál, J., & Hofstetter, C. R. (2007). *Demokratická kultura v České republice: Občanská kultura, ethos a patriotismus ze srovnávacího pohledu [Democratic culture in the Czech Republic: Civic culture, ethos and patriotism in a comparative perspective]*. Praha: Academia.
- Klicperova-Baker, M., & Kostal, J. (2015). European sociopolitical mentalities: Identifying pro/ and antidemocratic tendencies. Part I—Individual citizens' perspective. *European Societies, 17* (3), 301–332.
- Klicperova-Baker, M., & Kostal, J. (2016). Toward empirical assessment of the European demos and public sphere: Comparing democratic value orientations of citizens and elites. In H. Sicakkan (Ed.), *Integration, diversity and the making of a European public sphere* (pp. 183–208). Northampton, Ma: Edward Elgar.
- Koralewicz, J., & Ziolkowski, M. (1990). *Mentalnosc Polakow*. Poznan: Nakom.
- Laswell, H. D. (1951). Democratic character. In *The political writings of Harold D. Lasswell* (pp. 465–525). Glencoe: Free Press.
- Leonidas, D. (2015). *The unbearable lightness of change*. Saarbrücken: Lambert Academic. ISBN-13: 978-3-330-08028-7.
- Lukin, A. (2000). *The political culture of the Russian democrats*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Marangos, J. (2005). Shock therapy and its consequences in transition economies. *Dialogue, 205, 48*(2), 70–78.
- Marlin, O. (1992). Psychoanalyticky rozbor totalitní mentality [Psychanalytic analysis of totalitarian mentality]. *Ceskoslovenska psychologie, 36*, 5432–5448.
- Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2004). The unbearable lightness of democracy: Poland and Romania after communism. *Current History, 103*(676), 383–388.
- Sack, B. C. (2017). Regime change and the convergence of democratic value orientations through socialization. Evidence from reunited Germany. *Democratization, 24*(3), 444–462. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1220940>
- Shapoval, S. (2000). Pollster Levada: Soviet mentality is still with us. *Current Digest of Post-Soviet Press, 52*(19), 12–13.
- Sztompka, P. (1993). Civilizational incompetence: The trap of post-communist societies. *Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 22*(2), 85–95.

- Taras, R. (2005). Poland's transition to a democratic republic. Taming of the sacred. In W. Safran (Ed.), *The secular and the sacred* (pp. 130–146). London: Frank Cass.
- Tischner, J. (1992). *Etyka solidarnosci oraz Homo Sovieticus*. Krakow: Znak.
- Tishkov, V. (1997). *Ethnicity nationalism and conflict in and after the Soviet Union*. London: Sage.
- Vasovic, M. (1999). Shifting identity in postcommunism. In Z. Golubovic & G. F. McLean (Eds.), *Models of identities in postcommunist societies. Yugoslav philosophical studies I* (pp. 41–54). Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
- Vogt, H. (2005). *Between Utopia and disillusionment. A narrative of the political transformation in eastern Europe. Contemporary European history (Book 1)*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Voszka, E. (1990). A katarzis nélküli nélküli átmenetelviselhetetlen könnözősege [The unbearable lightness of non-cathartic transition—in Hungarian]. *Közgazdasági Szemle, June*, 687–701.

Martina Klicperova-Baker (Ph.D., Institute of Psychology, Czech Academy of Sciences and San Diego State University) is a research scholar specialized in political psychology. She was a lecturer at Arizona State University, Stanford University, San Diego State University, and Charles University in Prague. She has been elected to serve as a member of the Executive Committee of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS); she is also a long-standing member of the International Society of Political Psychology (ISPP) where she served in the Governing Council. Her main interests are and she is mostly publishing in the area of psychology of democracy, democratization, and cross-cultural psychological differences.

Jaroslav Kostal (Ph.D., Institute of Psychology, Czech Academy of Sciences) is a research scholar in the Department of Psychology of Personality and Social Psychology with a vast experience in opinion polling. He is the author and co-author of articles, book chapters, and a book dealing with political psychology, psychiatry, sociology, criminology, and statistical methods. He is a member of Political Psychology division of the Czech-Moravian Psychological Society. His main focus is methodology and advanced analytic techniques, including SEM and other multivariate procedures.

Emancipative Values in a Post-Communist Society: The Case of Serbia



Zoran Pavlović

The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 symbolically marked the end of the communist era in Eastern Europe. The issue that has been a subject of intense debate ever since is whether the effects of socialization in an authoritarian state pose a major obstacle in the democratization of Eastern Europe, as some strongly argue (Klingemann, Fuchs, & Zielonka, 2006), or people can update their value priorities based on current experiences and embrace democracy, as others claim (Jackman & Miller, 1996; Mishler & Pollack, 2003). Sudden institutional rearrangements in former communist countries provided a fertile ground for analysing the relationship between long-term factors (values) and short-term factors (societal changes) and other related theoretical issues as well. It is therefore of great importance to study the changes of values in post-communist countries, which is the subject of this chapter.

This chapter is aimed at analysing the sources, consequences and changes in emancipative values. The concept of emancipative values has recently been systematically elaborated (Welzel, 2013) and described as the valuing of universal freedoms, comprising of two broad orientations—a liberating and an egalitarian one. They cover an emphasis on autonomy, freedom of choice, equality and voice of people (Welzel, 2013). As such, they are closely related to, and conducive to, democracy (Welzel, 2013; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009; Welzel & Moreno Alvarez, 2014). The study was conducted in Serbia, a post-communist country which lagged behind the majority of other Eastern European countries in terms of democratic transition. It started its journey to democracy in 2000, after a prolonged period of an authoritarian and totalitarian rule. A democratic regime was introduced “overnight”, and the issue of consequent changes in values conducive to democracy thus became relevant both theoretically and practically.

Z. Pavlović (✉)
University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: zoran.pavlovic@f.bg.ac.rs

In addressing this issue, we proceed as following. The two influential models have been used to explain the value change under the changed institutional context: the political culture model and the institutionalist model. These models will be described first. The Serbian context will then be described in more detail. After the description of the study design, survey results will be presented. Their implications are then going to be discussed in terms of the two theoretical models.

Political Culture Versus the Institutional Model of Value Change

It almost goes without saying that shared values are a kind of a functional prerequisite of any community (Aberle, Cohen, Davis, Levy, & Sutton, 1950). Each society makes tremendous efforts in maintaining the established normative order and cultural practices in each succeeding generation, ensuring they uphold the norms and standards embodied in the society's major institutions. Similarly, few would disagree that in order to be stable and effective, a political system needs to be accompanied by compatible values embraced by citizens. Since values are, by definition, relatively stable (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 2007) and societies, on the other hand, change and develop gradually, the values predominant in a society change rather slowly. This process of maintaining and preserving the compatibility of institutional arrangements and values goes rather smoothly in societies lacking any dramatic or revolutionary social changes (Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). However, when these dramatic changes occur, as they did in Eastern Europe recently, they present a strong impetus to re-create the previously established normative order and provide an incentive for people to accommodate their value priorities to their changed life circumstances. In theorizing about the possibility of value change as a consequence of institutional rearrangements, two broad explanatory frameworks have been developed.

Culturalist Model

One school of thought originated in the seminal work of Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba on civic culture and democracy half a century ago (Almond & Verba, 1963) and has remained highly influential ever since. According to this view, also known as the culturalist model (Eckstein, 1988), different political systems have different cultural preconditions (Almond & Verba, 1963, 1980). People embrace those political and economic institutions which are consonant with their stable cultural orientations and political values. Those are, on the other hand, the result of the normative convergence created during the socialization process. The predominant values, at the population level, change through generation replacement only as a society modernizes, the social

complexity increases and the socialization context changes accordingly (Almond & Verba, 1963; Eckstein, 1988; Huntington, 1991; Inglehart, 1988, 1990; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Lipset, 1959). More or less explicit in these views is an insistence on the formative period in developing politically relevant attitudes, beliefs and values and their relative stability in later life (Eckstein, 1988; Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009). In more general terms, values represent an expression of socio-political and economic circumstances in early youth, which is also known as the socialization hypothesis (Inglehart, 1990; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), or, more specifically, an expression of basic needs gratification during the formative period (Inglehart, 1971, 1990; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Welzel, 2013).

In terms of the recent wave of democratization in Eastern Europe, this model gives rather pessimistic predictions. Since values are stable and at the population level change through generational replacement, societal changes then inevitably have delayed effects (Inglehart, 1990; Klingemann et al., 2006). Due to the prolonged period of the authoritarian rule under which numerous generations of citizens have been socialized, the values dominant in those societies diverge from the normative prerequisites of functional democracy (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Klingemann et al., 2006). Studies, for example, show that support for democracy (Klingemann et al., 2006), political tolerance (Gibson, 1998; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003) or political activism (Dekker, Ester, & Vinken, 2003) are more prominent in the citizens of Western countries than in their Eastern counterparts. Others show that there are specific value patterns differentiating the states of communist and non-communist Europe, the latter being less inclined to embrace the value syndromes of autonomy (Arts & Halman, 2004; Hagenaars, Halman, & Moors, 2003; Schwartz, 2004; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997), self-expression (Inglehart, 2006; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) or emancipative values (Welzel, 2013; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009). For these reasons, it will take a long time for democracy to become consolidated in a previously nondemocratic country (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Klingemann et al., 2006).

Institutionalist Model

However, democratization may have a far more important role in value change than the described culturalist model gives it credit for. Numerous studies have called into question the primacy of the culture assumption. Several concepts treated as cultural preconditions of effective democracy are often described as endogenous to democracy and caused by it. Some studies have found no proof that self-expression values influence democratic development (Hadenius & Teorell, 2005). Others have reported that democratization increases the importance of pro-democratic values, such as autonomy (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000) or civic culture attitudes (Muller & Seligson, 1994). Quite contrary to the assumption of a unidirectional “flow” from emancipative values to democracy (Welzel, 2013), a recent study (Spaiser, Ranganathan, Mann, & Sumpter, 2014) has shown that human rights-based democratization precedes the increase of emancipative values rather than the other way round.

These and similar findings can very well be accounted for by the alternative and competing models of value change. “Institutional learning” (Jackman & Miller, 1998; Rustow, 1970), rational choice (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Whitefield & Evans, 1999) or lifetime-learning model (Mishler & Pollack, 2003) all give much more weight to individual rationality, post-adolescent and later-life experiences and current context. Early instilled beliefs and values are not unimportant but are constantly being updated and accommodated in later life, depending on whether those early “lessons” are being reinforced or challenged by later experiences (Mishler & Pollack, 2003; Mishler & Rose, 1997). Personal experiences with system performances, in economic and political terms, are far more important for shaping value priorities and political attitudes than early socialization (Jackman & Miller, 1996; Mishler & Pollack, 2003; Mishler & Rose, 2002; Muller & Seligson, 1994).

This reasoning has a huge implication for social changes in Eastern Europe. If democratic institutions are introduced in a previously authoritarian society, people can and must learn to be “democrats”. But the experiences with the democratic political process and the social context that promotes pluralism have a decisive role (Dalton, 1994; Fleron, 1996; Mishler & Pollack, 2003; Niemi & Hepburn, 1995). When freedoms and rights are guaranteed, citizens have more opportunities to apply, practise and evaluate democratic norms, such as tolerance (Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003), and learn to appraise their value. The evaluation of system performances and accumulation of such experiences breed commitment to democratic institutions, processes and norms (Gibson, 2002; Mishler & Rose, 2002). In other words, “democrats” are a very plausible outcome of democracy that has proven worthy of trust (Fleron, 1996). People embrace norms that are embodied in society’s institutions, so civic orientations grow when civic entitlements are well established and institutionalized (Jackman & Miller, 1998; Muller & Seligson, 1994; Rustow, 1970; Seligson, 2002). Since Serbian society has recently undergone a major shift and rise in the civic entitlement rise, it represents a prototypical case for further addressing of these reconsiderations.

Serbian Context and This Chapter

Similar to other Eastern European countries, Serbia started treading the road to democracy in the last decade of the twentieth century. After almost 50 years of communist rule, multiparty system was introduced at that time, but it was soon followed by a decade of the authoritarian rule of Slobodan Milosevic and was marked by some of the most horrible events in Serbian modern history (civil wars, UN sanctions, NATO bombing, extreme poverty, etc.). Milosevic’s rule was officially overthrown, and the so-called democratic changes occurred on October 5th 2000 after the mass protests in the Serbian capital city, Belgrade.

The Serbian regime was changed “overnight”, which yielded some kind of a natural experiment in the study of value change. According to the proponents of the culturalist model, a long period of authoritarian rule with poor economic performances would make the intrinsic support for democracy and valuing the rights and

freedoms highly improbable. Serbian citizens did, however, ask and fight for democracy, and mass democratic demands eventually ended the authoritarian rule. Bearing in mind the ample evidence showing the importance of opportunities that democratization brings (Schwartz & Sagie, 2000; Spaiser et al., 2014), the study of democracy-consonant values in Serbia is of particular importance. At least some of the registered value and attitudes patterns in Serbia and other Eastern European countries after the fall of Communism can be satisfactorily explained under the life-learning model or the individual rationality framework (Mishler & Rose, 1997; Pavlović, 2009, 2014, 2015; Whitefield & Evans, 1999). Studying changes in values in a society which underwent revolutionary changes is a fertile ground for additional debating on the adequacy of the dominant culturalist/institutionalist paradigms.

To test these competing models, we focus on a recently proposed *human empowerment model* and its main concept of emancipative values (Welzel, 2006, 2013; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009). It has been developed under the culturalist paradigm and based on its main assumptions. Emancipative values are described as an essence of the universal human quest for freedom and life free from domination and represent the valuation of independence and equal opportunities (Welzel, 2006, 2013; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009). They grow as a consequence of society's modernization, which grants ordinary people high availability and control over resources (intellectual, connective and material). More advanced societies and more privileged individuals within the society (e.g. wealthier or more educated) are indeed higher on emancipative values (Welzel, 2013). Emancipative values nurture greater trust and humanism and encourage social movement activity and a more liberal understanding of democracy (Welzel, 2006, 2013; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009; Welzel & Moreno Alvarez, 2014). When they are on the rise, social pressures to institutionalize freedoms (if there were no such pre-existing guarantees) or to make them more effective (if guarantees are already granted) become prominent (Welzel, 2013). This leads to institutional empowerment—the introduction or strengthening of personal autonomy and political participation rights and guarantees to exercise universal freedoms (Welzel, 2013; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009).

Nonetheless, if freedoms grow, “they grow in chain of order from utilities to values to guarantees” (Welzel, 2013, p. xiv). Institutional guarantees of freedoms (i.e. democracy) are a response to increased values of freedoms (i.e. emancipative values) and not vice versa. As evidenced (Welzel, 2013), rising civic entitlements do not enhance the rise in emancipative values, quite the contrary. Aggregate measures of emancipative values highly correlate with various indices of the quality of country's democracy (Welzel, 2013; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009) and predict subsequent changes in civic entitlements rather than being predicted by them (Welzel, 2013). In the post-Soviet societies in which major shift in civic entitlements occurred, no significant increase in emancipative values was registered (Welzel, 2013). Hence, it is argued that emancipative values rise as a consequence of more control over resources and through generational replacement. Due to spending their formative years in more and more abundance, younger cohorts in the majority of societies throughout the world are especially prone to emancipative values (Welzel, 2013). Similarly, more pronounced inter-cohort differences are registered in those

societies that have experienced a significant and prolonged socio-economic development (Welzel, 2013). Studying emancipative values in a society which grants relatively poor control over resources for the majority of citizens but has experienced a shift in civic entitlements is thus of special relevance.

The aims of this chapter are the following: (1) to analyse the proposed civiness of emancipative values, i.e. its relationship with the measures at the core of the democratic political outlook (social tolerance, political activism and support for democracy), (2) to determine possible sources of emancipative values at the individual level in terms of the proposed action resource model and (3) to analyse the changes in emancipative values in the 10-year period (1996–2006) during which the major socio-political changes occurred.

Method

Participants

The data used in the analysis were collected during the Third, Fourth and Fifth Wave of the WVS (WVSA, 2015), which were conducted in Serbia in 1996 ($N = 1280$), 2001 ($N = 1200$) and 2006 ($N = 1220$), respectively. Data were collected by face-to-face interviews with nationally representative samples of voting age citizens of Serbia. Sample structures are given in Table 1. Data were weighted during analysis, to correct samples for population parameters.

Data and Measures

Emancipative Values According to the original model (Welzel, 2013), emancipative values are defined as an orientation covering an emphasis on autonomy, choice, equality and voice. Using the pre-existing variables from the WVS data set (World Values Survey Association, 2015), four subindices of emancipative values were created first (for a more detailed description, see Welzel, 2013). People's emphasis on *autonomy* was operationalized as a preference for independence and imagination versus the preference of obedience as a quality that children should be encouraged to learn at home. Valuing *freedom of choice* was measured by the level of acceptance of divorce, abortion and homosexuality, expressed on a 10-point scale (1, *never justifiable*/10, *always justifiable*). Valuing *gender equality* was measured by three questions probing for the acceptance of education, job and politics gender discrimination, expressed on a 4-point scale (1, *strongly agree* to 4, *strongly disagree*). Finally, valuing *the voice of people* as a source of influence in their society was measured using the well-known (post)materialism battery (Inglehart, 1971). As in the original procedure, all of the items used for calculating the subindices measures were rescaled to minimum 0 and maximum 1 and averaged over the

Table 1 Individual characteristics as a percentage of the samples

Characteristic	Year of survey			Total (<i>N</i> = 3700)
	1996 (<i>n</i> = 1280)	2001 (<i>n</i> = 1200)	2006 (<i>n</i> = 1220)	
Gender				
Male	49.2	47.8	50.7	49.2
Female	50.8	52.2	49.3	50.8
Age				
15–29 years	20.8	19.0	25.5	21.8
30–49 years	38.5	38.5	41.4	39.4
50 and more years	40.7	42.5	33.1	38.8
Education				
Lower	43.4	31.7	25.7	33.8
Middle	35.6	28.6	45.0	36.4
Upper	21.0	39.7	29.2	29.8

items comprising each subindex. The overall index of emancipative values was the average over the four subindices, ranging from 0 to 1 (higher values imply more prominent emancipative values). The four subindices were significantly and positively correlated. The multidimensionality of the proposed measure of emancipative values and formative logic of its constructions has been stressed in the original model, implying that the homogeneity of emancipative values is not to be expected (in the current analysis $\alpha = 0.60$). Factor analysis (no rotation, eigenvalues > 1 criterion) yielded one factor solution (36.4% explained variance) with measures of autonomy, choice, equality and voice positively loaded on it.

Social Tolerance The level of acceptance of minority and marginalized groups was operationalized by three questions (yes/no response format) probing for the willingness to accept homosexuals, people with AIDS and people of different race as neighbours. Higher scores imply more tolerance.

Political Activism Participation in various forms of political behaviour was measured by participation in a peaceful demonstration, signing a petition and joining a boycott. The scores from three questions (1, have done; 2, might do; 3, would never do) were recoded and summed up in a measure of political activism (higher scores imply more intense activism).

Support for Democracy A relative measure of support for democracy was used. Since it is well established that people from around the world express almost uniform preference for and praise in the name of democracy, a measure of preference for democracy versus strong leader preference was calculated. Respondents were asked (on a 4-point scale) whether it was a very good, good, bad or a very bad thing to have alternative forms of political system, democratic and authoritarian. The scores for strong leader preference were subtracted from the scores for democracy preference gaining and index ranging from -3 (strong authoritarian preference) to $+3$ (strong democratic preference). A similar measure was used in previous analyses (Klingemann et al., 2006; Pavlović, 2014).

Socio-demographic Variables Several socio-demographic variables were used in the analysis as well: *age* (in years), *education* (primary/secondary/higher) and *income level* (11-point scale based on household monthly incomes). *Year of survey/wave* of WVS, as a sort of time variable, was also included in the analysis. It was coded so that higher values indicate a more recent point in time (1, 1996; 2, 2001; 3, 2006).

Results

In determining the significant predictors and correlates of emancipative values in Serbia, correlation analysis was performed. Emancipative values scores were correlated with the socio-demographic variables (age, education and income) as well as with the measures of support for democracy, social tolerance and political activism. The significance of changes in emancipative values in the 10-year period was tested by analysis of variance. Additionally, to take into account both inter- and intra-cohort effects in analysing the changes in emancipative values, hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed, with education and income as controls in the first step, age as predictor in the second step, the wave of survey in the third step and interaction term year of survey \times age in the last step.

The correlations between the variables included in the analysis are presented in Table 2. The measures of emancipative values are significantly and positively correlated with the measures of social tolerance, political activism and support for democracy. Those who embrace emancipative values more intensely are more tolerant of society's minority and marginalized groups and more supportive of democracy. Political activism is nurtured by emancipative values as well. Similarly,

Table 2 Summary of intercorrelations, means and standard deviations for the variables included in the analysis

Measures	1	2	3	4	5	6	M	SD
1. Emancipative values							0.43	0.15
2. Political activism	0.26**						5.21	2.01
3. Support for democracy	0.24**	0.10**					1.40	1.44
4. Social tolerance	0.30**	0.14**	0.23**				1.63	0.98
5. Age	-0.27**	-0.25**	-0.06**	-0.15**			44.54	15.83
6. Education level	0.36**	0.34**	0.20**	0.22**	-0.29**		1.96	0.79
7. Income level	0.17**	0.18**	0.19**	0.12**	-0.22**	0.35**	4.91	2.55

** $p < 0.01$

Table 3 Hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting emancipative values from education, income, age and year of survey

Predictor	Emancipative values	
	ΔR^2	β
Step 1	0.13**	
Education		0.33**
Income level		0.06**
Step 2	0.03**	
Age		-0.17**
Step 3	0.02**	
Year of survey		0.14**
Step 4	0.01**	
Age \times year of survey		0.24**
Total R^2	0.18**	

Note. Standardized regression coefficients

** $p < 0.01$

emancipative values are significantly correlated with age, education and income. Younger, more educated and well-off respondents are more inclined towards embracing emancipative values.

The level of emancipative values in three WVS waves in Serbia is significantly different, $F(2, 3331) = 60.918, p < .01, \eta^2 = 0.04$. Emancipative values slightly rise from 1996 ($M = 0.40, SD = 0.16, SE = 0.004$) to 2001 ($M = 0.42, SD = 0.15, SE = 0.004$) and more intensely to 2006 ($M = 0.47, SD = 0.13, SE = 0.004$). Post hoc tests revealed that all of the paired comparisons are significant ($p < 0.01$). As time goes by, there is a population shift towards greater emancipation.

The results of the hierarchical multiple regression analysis predicting emancipative values from education, income, age and year of survey are shown in Table 3. The regression of emancipative values on education and income yielded $R^2 = 0.13, F(2, 3056) = 220.23, p < 0.01$. Both predictors proved to be significantly related to emancipative values. Higher education and higher income were associated with increasing emancipative values. The regression of emancipative values on age in the second step, after controlling for education and income, showed that age was still significantly and negatively related to emancipative values, $R^2 = 0.15, F(3, 3055) = 180.89$ and $p < 0.01$. The regression of emancipative values on the year of survey yielded $R^2 = 0.17, F(4, 3054) = 156.85$ and $p < 0.01$. Other predictors controlled for (including age), there seems to be a rise in emancipative values with time. Finally, the interaction term year of survey \times age was also significant, $R^2 = 0.18, F(5, 3053) = 130.23$ and $p < 0.01$.

To obtain a better insight into the nature of this interaction, cohort differences in emancipative values by year of survey are graphed, as shown in Fig. 1. In each wave, there is a decrease in emancipative values with age. Younger cohorts embrace emancipative values more than the older ones. However, with the passage of time, almost all cohorts “move upwards”—they become more emancipated. The emancipative shift is still more prominent in older cohorts, making the Serbian citizens more “homogenous” in terms of values over time.




Fig. 1 Cohort differences in emancipative values by year of survey. The average scores of emancipative values are broken down by 10-year cohort groups and the year of survey. In each wave, younger cohorts embrace emancipative values more than the older cohorts, but all cohorts become more emancipated, especially the older ones

Discussion

The purpose of the study reported in this chapter was threefold. The first aim was to analyse the civic quality of emancipative values in a post-communist society. The data showed that those higher on emancipative values are at the same time more inclined to accept the essential democratic norms of tolerance and activism, as well as to support the democracy itself. This confirms the notion of emancipative values as a very important element of democratic political culture and an expression of intrinsic strivings towards the basic democratic norms (Welzel, 2006, 2013; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009). It follows that in order to make transitional democracy more effective, creating opportunities for emancipative values to grow is of utmost importance.

The second aim of the chapter was to analyse the sources of emancipative values. As proposed by the human empowerment model (Welzel, 2013), emancipative values are indeed more intensely held by younger, more educated and more affluent Serbian citizens. This finding partly supports the suggested resource-based sources of emancipative values, although it seems that material resources play a minor role,

while the role of education seems to be of special relevance. Education is usually considered as one of the most important variables in the study of democratic attitudes and behaviours in general. In terms of the human empowerment model, due to high levels of cognitive complexity and awareness, education increases “both actual and perceived utility of freedoms” (Welzel, 2013, p. 108). It has been shown elsewhere that education contributes to the propagation of human rights as an ideal (McFarland & Mathews, 2005) or support for democratic rights and liberties (Gibson, Duch, & Tedin, 1992). Almond and Verba (1963), in their classic work, went as far as to say that education, in a new democracy, was the best substitute for time. New democracies do not have time to slowly and gradually develop civic culture, and education promotes civic culture equally well. The bottom line is if education figures as a very important predictor of emancipation, this has probably much more to do with the acquired skills, knowledge and beliefs, than with the early socialization.

Still, Serbian data showed that younger people, even after controlling for intellectual and material resources, were still more emancipative. This is exactly what could be predicted by the proposed model and quite in line with the global pattern—emancipative values decrease with age (Welzel, 2013). Yet, the causes of cohort differences can hardly be explained by differences in control over resources. If the emancipative values shift is expected only if a younger cohort spent their formative years in rising affluence, then the emancipative shift and generational differences in Serbia are not to be expected at all. The youngest cohorts in each wave of the survey consisted of individuals who had reached their political maturity during the 1980s or 1990s, characterized by nothing but insecurity and scarcity. They should hence be less prone to emancipative values. However, the presented data suggest quite the opposite. Two possible explanations could be offered here. One possibility is that a more emancipative outlook of younger people is some sort of an expression of the well-known phenomenon of youthful idealism or life cycle effects, which have been discredited in the original model (Welzel, 2013). The second is related to the prominent role of the connective resources in the emancipative value model. The penetration of (informational) technology into the society is seen as a very important drive in the development of emancipative values (Welzel, 2013). Rising interconnectedness brings about easier values diffusion from one social context to the other, a different cultural model transfer, fewer communication barriers between “brothers-in-values” in different countries and, more importantly, the redistribution of political power within the community. Younger people are more “connected”, and this could have influenced their more emancipative look. Further research should address this issue in more detail.

Finally, the data presented in relation to the third aim of this chapter offer additional insights into the role of cohort differences. There is a significant population shift in emancipative values in the observed 10-year period. As time goes by, Serbian citizens become more emancipatory. More precisely, each cohort in every consecutive wave of survey is higher on emancipative values. Bearing in mind that the observed time span is too short for the registered value shift to be attributed to generational replacement, it seems that the significant shift in emancipative values is rather a consequence of the intra-cohort changes than the inter-cohort differences.

This brings us back to the ongoing debates and the possibility of resocialization and “institutional learning” effects. People adapt their value priorities to life circumstances (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). They upgrade the importance of the newly institutionalized norms and values and downgrade the importance of those values that are no longer functional or reinforced (Mishler & Pollack, 2003; Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). These changes are generally slow as most societies develop at a slow pace. Still, dramatic social changes could possibly cause a more prominent value shift, as in the case of Serbia.

These effects, on the other hand, are rather enhanced by rising civic entitlements, i.e. democratization, than the rising control over resources. Although there were no dramatic improvements of living conditions afterwards, Serbia, by the Freedom House criteria, passed the road from “not free” (1996) to “partly free” (2001) and “free” country (2006). One might call this a rise in the opportunities to exercise freedoms or making the social context more autonomy supportive. Growing opportunities to exercise freedoms could have, for example, enabled a growing satisfaction of the need for autonomy, which consequently could have led to higher valuing of emancipative goals, as the self-determination theory assumes (Ryan & Deci, 2010) and studies confirm (Spaiser, Ranganathan, Mann, & Sumpter, 2014). People attempt to integrate socially endorsed regulations and values when the conditions are “good enough”; they are more fully integrated to the extent that they are transmitted in an autonomy supportive way and that they are not antithetical to basic need fulfilment (Ryan & Deci, 2010). The introduction of democracy could have provided just that.

In more general terms, the findings call into question the view of emancipative values as rooted in the individual and social past, a sort of retrospective and egocentric rationale (Pavlović, 2015). A more accurate description seems to be what others call a “thin” culture model (Mishler & Pollack, 2003)—values as context sensitive, dynamic, rationally based and reciprocally related to institutions. Mass demands for democracy in Serbia back in 1990 were more an expression of the *perceived* utility of freedoms than the consequence of being free from existential pressures. Positive pay-offs of those pressures to institutionalize freedoms, substantial or not but instantly felt, backwardly influenced value priorities, pushing them towards more and more liberty aspirations. This further challenged the newly established institutions to be more accountable and effective. Once set in motion, the dyad of values and institutions has mutually reinforced one another and has changed accordingly and interdependently.

References

- Aberle, D. F., Cohen, A. K., Davis, A., Levy, M., & Sutton, F. X. (1950). Functional prerequisites of society. *Ethics*, 60, 100–111.
- Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1963). *The civic culture*. London: Sage.
- Almond, G., & Verba, S. (Eds.). (1980). *The civic culture revisited*. Boston: Little Brown and Company.

- Arts, W., & Halman, L. (Eds.). (2004). *European values at the turn of the millennium*. Leiden-Boston: Brill.
- Dalton, R. (1994). Communist and democrats: Democratic attitudes in the two Germanies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 24, 469–493.
- Dekker, P., Ester, P., & Vincken, H. (2003). Civil society, social trust, and democratic involvement. In W. Arts, L. Halman, & J. Hagenaars (Eds.), *The cultural diversity of European unity* (pp. 217–254). Leiden-Boston: Brill.
- Eckstein, H. (1988). A culturalist theory of political change. *American Political Science Review*, 82, 789–804.
- Fleron, F. (1996). Post-soviet political culture in Russia: An assessment of recent empirical investigation. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 48, 225–260.
- Gibson, J. (1998). Putting up with fellow Russians: An analysis of political tolerance in the fledgling Russian democracy. *Political Research Quarterly*, 51, 37–68.
- Gibson, J. (2002). Becoming tolerant? Short-term changes in Russian political culture. *British Journal of Political Science*, 32, 309–333.
- Gibson, J., Duch, R. M., & Tedin, K. L. (1992). Democratic values and the transformation of the Soviet Union. *The Journal of Politics*, 54, 329–371.
- Hadenius, A., & Teorell, J. (2005). Cultural and economic prerequisites of democracy: Reassessing recent evidence. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 39, 87–106.
- Hagenaars, J., Halman, L., & Moors, G. (2003). Exploring Europe's basic value maps. In U. W. Arts, J. Hagenaars, & L. Halman (Eds.), *The cultural diversity of European unity* (pp. 23–58). Leiden-Boston: Brill.
- Huntington, S. (1991). Democracy's third wave. *Journal of Democracy*, 2, 12–34.
- Inglehart, R. (1971). The silent revolution in Europe: Intergenerational change in post-industrial societies. *American Political Science Review*, 65, 991–1017.
- Inglehart, R. (1988). The renaissance of political culture. *American Political Science Review*, 82, 1203–1230.
- Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture shift in advanced industrial societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (2006). East European value system in global perspective. In H. D. Klingemann, D. Fuchs, & J. Zielonka (Eds.), *Democracy and political culture in Eastern Europe* (pp. 67–84). London: Routledge.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, culture change, and democracy—The human development sequence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jackman, R., & Miller, R. (1996). A renaissance of political culture. *American Journal of Political Science*, 40, 632–659.
- Jackman, R. W., & Miller, R. A. (1998). Social capital and politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 1(1), 47–73.
- Klingemann, H. D., Fuchs, D., & Zielonka, J. (Eds.). (2006). *Democracy and political culture in Eastern Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Lipset, S. M. (1959). Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy. *American Political Science Review*, 53, 69–105.
- McFarland, S., & Mathews, M. (2005). Who cares about human rights? *Political Psychology*, 26, 365–385.
- Mishler, W., & Pollack, D. (2003). On culture, thick and thin: Toward a neo-cultural synthesis. In D. Pollack, J. Jacobs, O. Muller, & G. Pickel (Eds.), *Political culture in post-Communist Europe: Attitudes in new democracies* (pp. 237–256). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (1997). Trust, distrust and scepticism: Popular evaluations of civil and political institutions in post-communist societies. *The Journal of Politics*, 59, 418–451.
- Mishler, W., & Rose, R. (2002). Learning and re-learning regime support: The dynamics of post-communist regimes. *European Journal of Political Research*, 41, 5–36.
- Muller, E. N., & Seligson, M. A. (1994). Civic culture and democracy: The question of causal relationships. *American Political Science Review*, 88, 635–652.

- Niemi, R. G., & Hepburn, M. A. (1995). The rebirth of political socialization. *Perspectives on Political Science*, 24, 7–16.
- Pavlović, Z. (2009). Is there a sociodemographic model of acceptance of postmaterialist values? The case of Serbia. *Sociologija*, 51, 177–188.
- Pavlović, Z. (2014). Intrinsic or instrumental support for democracy in a post-communist society. The case of Serbia. *European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities*, 3, 31–42.
- Pavlović, Z. (2015). Individual and country determinants of (post)materialist values in Eastern Europe. *European Quarterly of Political Attitudes and Mentalities*, 4, 1–11.
- Peffley, M., & Rohrschneider, R. (2003). Democratization and political tolerance in seventeen countries: A multi-level model for democratic learning. *Political Research Quarterly*, 56, 243–257.
- Rokeach, M. (1973). *The nature of human values*. New York: The Free Press.
- Rustow, D. A. (1970). Transitions to democracy. *Comparative Politics*, 2, 337–363.
- Ryan, R., & Deci, E. (2010). A self-determination theory perspective on social, institutional, cultural, and economic supports for autonomy and their importance for well-being. In V. Chirkov, R. Ryan, & K. Sheldon (Eds.), *Human autonomy in cross-cultural context* (pp. 45–64). Springer.
- Schwartz, S. H. (2004). Mapping and interpreting cultural differences around the world. In H. Vinken, J. Soeters, & P. Ester (Eds.), *Comparing cultures—Dimensions of culture in comparative perspective* (pp. 43–73). Boston: Brill.
- Schwartz, S. H. (2007). A theory of cultural value orientations: Explication and applications. In Y. Esmer & T. Pettersson (Eds.), *Measuring and mapping cultures: 25 years of comparative value surveys* (pp. 33–78). Leiden-Boston: Brill.
- Schwartz, S. H., & Bardi, A. (1997). Influences of adaptation to communist rule on value priorities in Eastern Europe. *Political Psychology*, 18, 385–410.
- Schwartz, S. H., & Sagie, S. (2000). Value consensus and importance: A cross-national study. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 31, 465–497.
- Seligson, M. (2002). The renaissance of political culture or the renaissance of the ecological fallacy. *Comparative Politics*, 34, 273–292.
- Spaiser, V., Ranganathan, S., Mann, R. P., & Sumpter, D. J. (2014). The dynamics of democracy, development and cultural values. *PLoS One*, 9(6), e97856.
- Welzel, C. (2006). Democratization as an emancipative process: The neglected role of mass motivations. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45, 871–896.
- Welzel, C. (2013). *Freedom rising: Human empowerment and the quest for emancipation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Welzel, C., & Inglehart, R. (2009). Political culture, mass beliefs and value change. In C. Haerpfer, P. Bernhagen, R. Inglehart, & C. Welzel (Eds.), *Democratization* (pp. 126–144). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Welzel, C., & Moreno Alvarez, A. (2014). Enlightening people: The spark of emancipative values. In C. Welzel & R. Dalton (Eds.), *The civic culture transformed—From allegiant to assertive citizens* (pp. 59–90). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Whitefield, S., & Evans, G. (1999). Political culture versus rational choice: Explaining responses to transition in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. *British Journal of Political Science*, 29, 129–154.
- World Values Survey Association. (2015). *World values survey 1981–2014 longitudinal aggregate v.20150418* [Data set]. Retrieved from <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSDocumentationWVL.jsp>

Changes in Value Structure Among Estonian Majority and Russian-Speaking Minority in Post-Socialist Estonia



Laur Lilleoja and Maaris Raudsepp

In this chapter we characterize and compare Estonian generation cohorts through the prism of basic values, which are measured using Schwartz value questionnaire (Schwartz, 1992). Basic values can be dealt with as a psychosocial link between individuals and society, being an aspect of both cultural and personality systems (Schwartz, 2009) and functioning as generalized regulators both at the personal lifeworld and at the societal/cultural or institutional levels. They orient individuals and groups towards meaningful goals and to socially acceptable means of attaining these goals. In times of collapse of the established order in the political and social sphere, personal values act as a source of order inside the individual (Szakolczai & Füstös, 1998). Thus, as value preferences reflect societal reality, they allow us to study interactions at both individual and group levels, at the same time allowing us to describe social change. According to modernization theory, economic development, cultural change and political change go together in a coherent and predictable manner (Inglehart, 1997). Changes in value priorities accompany and reflect major sociocultural changes; therefore individual values can be used as markers of macrosocial trends and ruptures.

Our article focuses on the change of value priorities of different generations in the Estonian post-socialist context. First we discuss some theoretical models useful in studying the relations of values and generations, and then we describe Estonia's position in cross-national comparisons in the framework of Schwartz's value surveys. Thereafter we will present results of a new analysis of the European Social Survey (ESS) data, comparing the different birth cohorts of ethnic Estonians and Russians living in Estonia.

L. Lilleoja (✉) · M. Raudsepp
Tallinn University, Tallinn, Estonia
e-mail: laur@tlu.ee; maaris@tlu.ee

Background

Despite the fact that the population of Estonia (1.3 million) is smaller than that of hundreds of world metropolises, its society is rather diverse, with very different social groups living side by side. One of the most significant social segmentation goes along the native language: approximately 69% of Estonian population are native Estonians (whose mother tongue is Estonian), and for the rest the home language is Russian (forming the so-called Russian-speaking population). During the twentieth century, Estonia experienced many social disruptions, meaning that the attitudes and perceptions of distinctive birth cohorts can be quite different due to different socialization circumstances. The ‘generational markers’ are events in recent Estonian history that impacted all members of a generation in a similar way; these include societal ruptures like wars, political changes after WWI and WWII and population displacements, as well as rapid cultural and technological change.

We focus on the change of value patterns in Estonia over the period from 2004 to 2014. This period is the continuation of systemic societal changes (see Lauristin, Vihalemm, Rosengren, & Weibull, 1997). During the post-socialist years, tremendous changes have occurred in the Estonian society in multiple dimensions. On the institutional dimension, Estonia evolved from a country under a Soviet regime to an independent democratic nation state and EU member (in 2004). On the socio-economic dimension, transition from socialist planned economy to liberal market economy took place, accompanied by marketization of social relations and domination of consumerist lifestyle, essential changes in labour relations and employment as well as in increasing socio-economic differentiation (Saar, 2011). Within the cultural dimension, openness to global influences has grown, and many regulative ideas, which organize societal life, have been replaced. Beside similarities to development of all former socialist East European countries, Estonia’s specificity is cultural heterogeneity: one third of its population consists of Soviet period immigrants who have different cultural roots from the native Estonians. Their integration into the Estonian society has remained an issue (e.g. Kruusvall, Vetik, & Berry, 2009; Kus-Harbord & Ward, 2015).

Estonia has a long tradition of sociological surveys, started already in the 1960s. Since 1978 periodical sociological surveys embracing the adult population of Estonia have been carried out. There are data on value patterns among the whole Estonian population (including both Estonian-speaking ethnic majority and mainly Russian-speaking minority) from the socialist period, throughout the years of transition until the new social stabilization. Several regular international surveys enable one to trace the dynamics of value preferences and make cross-national comparisons: Balticom, European Social Survey (Estonia has participated since 2004) and European Values Study (Estonia has participated since the 1990s). Value changes according to one stream of value measurements among the whole Estonian population—values as life orientations—carried out by a team of researchers in the Institute

of International and Social Studies (at the Academy of Sciences of the ESSR and Tallinn University) over the period from late socialism (1985) to the first decade of early liberal capitalism (2008) have been analysed elsewhere (Raudsepp, Tart, & Heinla, 2013a, b).

Schwartz's Theory of Basic Human Values

Schwartz (1992) has defined values as desirable, trans-situational goals, varying in importance in serving as guiding principles in people's lives. According to his original theory, every individual value in any culture can be located under ten universal, motivationally distinct basic values—*hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, security, universalism, benevolence, conformity, tradition, power and achievement*—all of which form, based on their interrelationships, a universal circular structure. More similar value types are close to each other, and conflicting values appear on opposite sides of the circle. Pursuing one type of value will always result in conflict with oppositional types of values (Schwartz, 1994). Based on this opposition, value types also form two bipolar contrasting higher-order dimensions: *self-enhancement* versus *self-transcendence* and *openness to change* versus *conservation* value types (Schwartz, 1992, 1994). The dimension of *self-enhancement* includes the values of *power* and *achievement*; *self-transcendence* includes *universalism* and *benevolence*; *openness to change* includes *hedonism, stimulation* and *self-direction*; and *conservation* includes values of *conformity, tradition* and *security*. Schwartz et al. (2012) have recently advanced the value theory with refined value structure and a new value scale (PVQ-R), but as the data used in this study is based on older value scale PVQ-21, we will remain the original value structure when comparing the preferences across societal groups.

Changes in the Estonian Value Structure in the Post-Socialist Period

The earliest studies with the Schwartz value instrument in Estonia were conducted during the decline of socialism in the 1990s (e.g. Schwartz & Bardi, 1997). Cross-national comparisons of Estonian teacher and student samples demonstrated similarities to other Eastern European matched samples and differences from Western European samples in terms of the low priority of mastery and affective autonomy values and the high importance of conservative values. As these studies include only teacher and student samples, their results cannot be generalized for the whole population, but they still give a good reference with comparable samples in other

countries and describe well the value preferences of young people and their teachers, who have an important role in shaping youth values.

Based on Eastern European studies, people socialized under socialism put less emphasis on getting ahead through active self-assertion by changing and mastering the natural and social environments. They placed a lower priority on an individual's independent pursuit of affectively positive experience (enjoying life, an exciting life, pleasure, a varied life). On the other hand, compared to people socialized in Western democracies, they put more emphasis on the status quo, propriety and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidarity of the group or the traditional order (cleanliness, devotion, family, security, forgiveness, honouring of parents, national security, obedience, politeness, reciprocation of favours, respect of tradition, self-discipline, social order). People in Eastern European countries were high on utilitarian involvement, conservatism and the acceptance of a paternalistic hierarchical system of ascribed roles, as opposed to an emphasis on individual rights and responsibilities. Basic value priorities prevalent in Eastern Europe were conservatism and hierarchy. Least important were egalitarian, mastery and autonomy values. The results of several empirical studies (Niit, 2002; Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000; Spini, 1997; Verkasalo, Daun, & Niit, 1994) indicate that in the 1990s people faced with a post-socialist reality devalued former socialist (rhetorical) ideals (fraternity, solidarity, equality, etc.) and adopted a more individualistic value pattern that better suited adaptation to the harsh reality of early capitalism.

A comparison of value patterns in Estonia and Sweden in 1991–1995 showed a systematic decline in the importance of universalistic values and an increasing hedonistic and individualistic orientation among Estonians (Lauristin et al., 1997). More changes were observed among the Estonian Russian speakers, with values changing in different directions among older and younger Russian respondents in contrast to other more similar changes among different generations of Estonian speakers. Kalmus and Vihalemm (2004) made a remark on the general value change in the period 1991–2003, stating that more importance had been given to values related to hedonism, close interpersonal relations and self-assertion, or indicators of individual emancipation from previous normative pressures. Individualistic-emancipatory values dominated over collectivistic and universalistic values among young and affluent groups (the 'winners' of the transition), while older respondents emphasize more highly collectivistic and universalistic values. Thus the transition from the Soviet world to the Western world has entailed a fundamental shift in value structures of people living in Estonia, although the change is not identical for all social groups—people who have different ethnolinguistic backgrounds or who were socialized under different micro-circumstances adapt to the changes differently. In addition to the differences in the value structures of Estonian speakers and Russian speakers in Estonia (Lilleoja & Tart, 2011; Masso & Vihalemm, 2003; Rudnev, 2009; Tulviste, Konstabel, & Tulviste, 2014), there also seems to be a clear differentiation based on gender (Kalmus, 2010; Rämmer, 2006) and education (Lilleoja & Tart, 2011; Shalom, 2006).

Age and Cohort Group Differences in Value Priorities

In Estonia and in the world, the most significant factor predicting value preferences is age (Kalmus & Vihalemm, 2004; Niit, 2002; Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005), which is expressed through the universal tendency of the young being more individualistic and the old more collectivistic. Tart (2011) notes that the relationship between value priorities and age is relatively linear. The generally accepted trend is that an increase in age results in a higher appreciation of altruism and the preservation of the status quo, whereas younger respondents appreciate values expressing individualism more highly.

Age group differences in life values reflect different underlying processes related to socialization and life cycle. Birth cohorts (generations) as units of socialization are important factors of value change in society (Inglehart, 1990). Hypothetically, value priorities that are formed during early socialization are most stable; generational collective memory retains these value patterns during later changes, forming the basis of generational collective identity. The most sensitive period for stabilization of personal value hierarchies is the primary socialization of the first decades of life. Societal and family context during this period has the greatest influence on individual value systems. Generations growing up in stability and affluence have different value priorities compared to generations who grow during wars and social upheavals, which promote feelings of existential insecurity (De Graaf & Evans, 1996). Therefore, the resulting value patterns reflect a relatively stable component of early socialization and changing components of continuous adaptation to the changing societal context.

A general cultural shift occurs through the mechanism of generation replacement. World Value Survey results indicate that throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the younger generations place markedly greater emphasis on self-expression values than do the older generations. In the long run, the process of intergenerational population replacement is working to make these values more widespread. Their progress will be greatly enhanced insofar as economic recovery and political stability are attained (Inglehart, 2006).

In Estonia, the individual and intra-cohort stability of value hierarchies has been recorded in longitudinal studies (e.g. Titma, 1999, 2001; Titma, Kenkmann, Saar, & Uueküla, 1990). A notable inter-cohort value change in the direction of pragmatism and individualism was recorded in the 1980s (Saarniit, 1995). Studies using Schwartz's value survey data have noted an intergenerational gap because of the increasing individualism of younger people (a hedonistic, consumeristic and self-assertive orientation) and the increasing collectivism of older people (Kalmus & Vihalemm, 2004). Lilleoja (2012), analysing inter-cohort value differences based on the European Value Survey 2004–2010, recorded a value shift towards greater individualism (greater importance of self-direction, hedonism, stimulation, achievement) in the cohort born in the 1980s, which was socialized during the sharp societal system change. All studies using Estonian data and comparing broader age groups

have identified clear distinctions between young and old respondents (Lilleoja & Tart, 2011; Tulviste, Kall, & Rämmer, 2017; Vihalemm & Kalmus, 2009).

While most value studies have confirmed the age differences mentioned through value preferences, there are only few studies concentrating on generational differences. Yet it is known that age differences in value orientations are not purely the effect of life circle; there are also significant cohort effects (Hellevik, 2002; Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004). The main difference between the age group and the cohort is that age groups are formed according to respondents' ages during the survey, while generations and birth cohorts integrate people born at the same time and living under the same historical circumstances. Generations and birth cohorts therefore form more meaningful bases for comparisons.

Lilleoja and Raudsepp (2016) have recently tried to fill this research gap by analysing empirically the generational differentiation in Estonian value structure. They have shown that due to the turbulent history of Estonia, nearly all twentieth century decades have provided unique societal circumstances to shape several generation cohorts with distinct value priorities. And as a large Russian-speaking immigrant population exists in Estonia, the cohorts differ on the basis of ethnicity. Further analyses revealed that based on their value structures, the Estonian generational cohorts form three discrete cohort groups within both ethnic groups—(1) the oldest cohort includes individuals born before the 1960s; (2) the middle cohort group gathers respondents born in the 1960s and 1970s; and (3) the youngest cohort group includes respondents born in the 1980s or later.

Method

Respondents

This study is based on Estonian data from the European Social Survey, which is the representative of the Estonian population from age 15. The data was collected in the years 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012 and 2014. Dataset includes 7949 Estonian speakers (70.2%) and 3379 Russian speakers [29.8% of all respondents; their proportion in the respective population was 30.6%, in 2014 (Statistics Estonia¹)].

In addition to cultural groups, the analyses will also focus on three larger cohort groups within both ethnic groups—(1) respondents born before the 1960s, (2) respondents born in the 1960s and 1970s and (3) respondents born in the 1980s or later. Table 1 includes the total number and relative proportion of different cohort groups among Estonian- and Russian-speaking respondents.

¹<http://www.stat.ee/en>

Table 1 Sample distribution of different age cohorts, for Estonian speakers and Russian speakers

	Birth years	Born before the 1960s	1960–1979	1980–1999	Total
Estonian speakers	No. of respondents	3734	2388	1822	7944
	Percentage	47	30.1	22.9	100
Russian speakers	No. of respondents	1688	983	705	3376
	Percentage	50	29.1	20.9	100

Measurement of Values

ESS incorporates a short version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ-21; Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz et al., 2001), which includes 21 items measuring the 10 basic values. Respondents have to evaluate their similarity to people described implicitly in terms of their values. Two items measure each value, except universalism that is measured with three because of its broad content. For each portrait, respondents report how similar the person is to them using a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very much like me) to 6 (not like me at all).

The meaningful cross-cultural comparison requires respondents to understand and interpret questions in the same manner and to use the measurement instruments in the same way (Saris & Gallhofer, 2014). The latter is usually evaluated through the multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFAs; Jöreskog, 1971), which enables to test for three levels of measurement equivalence. Less restricted model tests for configural equivalence, which identifies if the factor structures are the same across the groups. In model testing for the metric equivalence, the factor loadings are fixed to be the same across the groups, which is presumption for meaningful comparison of relationships. The most restrictive model tests the scalar equivalence—fixing also the intercepts across the groups allows identifying if the means of latent constructs are comparable (Horn & McArdle, 1992; Steenkamp & Baumgartner, 1998).

Unfortunately, the PVQ-21 scale suffers under severe validity problems, whereas based on many cross-cultural studies, the 10 value-type model does not demonstrate equivalence even on configural level (Davidov, 2008; Davidov & Schmidt, 2007; Davidov et al., 2008; Knoppen & Saris, 2009), which seriously questions the comparability of relationships and means of 10 value types. Although the simpler value structure, with four higher-order values, is usually more robust (Cieciuch & Davidov, 2012; Davidov, 2010; Davidov & Schmidt, 2007), the means of these factors are in most cases comparable (models holding full or partial scalar invariance).

Another methodological challenge for comparisons of relationships and means is a potential response bias (usually referred as common metric variance; CMV) due to different response styles, the effect of social desirability and different method effects. CMV expresses itself a positive correlation among all value items, and




Fig. 1 Measurement model

it's usually addressed by centring the answers within-person (Schwartz, 2005; Schwartz et al., 2012). This latter transformation tends to turn the linkages between values and attitudes, behaviour and background variables into consistently more logical and meaningful theoretically (e.g. Bardi, Buchanan, Goodwin, Slabu, & Robinson, 2014), but it controls only for a part of the CMV. It has been shown that the most adequate way for equivalence testing and means comparison is through the structural equation modelling (SEM), which concurrently allows controlling for random errors and including a method factor to control for the CMV (Lilleoja, Dobewall, Aavik, Strack, & Verkasalo, 2016). Technically it means that each item has two loadings—one freely estimated loading from the general factor (which in our analysis is higher-order value) and other loading from the method factor, which is fixed to be equal for all items. This model, as described in Fig. 1, is a base for the subsequent analyses.

As it has been shown that the commonly used evaluation procedures for SEM models (global fit indices) cannot be always trusted (Saris, Satorra, & Van der Veld, 2009), we will additionally use a programme called JRULE (Pornprasertmanit, 2014, for R; Van der Veld, Saris, & Satorra, 2009), which determines whether misspecifications are present in the specified model or not, while taking into account the power of the test (Saris et al., 2009). We aim to detect standardized deviations of 0.1 in the loadings and of 0.2 in the intercepts of the observed variables. Moreover, to test if the means of value dimensions were comparable across cultural and cohort groups, a MGCFA was conducted, using the measurement model described in Fig. 1.

Based on global fit indices, the fit of the model testing for configural equivalence (identifying if the theoretical value structure holds for both groups) across Estonian and Russian speakers was relatively low ($\chi^2 = 7201$; RMSEA = 0.061; CFI = 0.875). This was also supported by JRULE, which identified 44 possible

misspecifications across the 2 groups. For both groups, there was one item *ipmodst*, which behaved especially poorly. As the conservation factor had six items, removing one problematic item should not harm the model; therefore we excluded *ipmodst* from subsequent analyses. The model fit increased significantly ($\text{Chi}^2 = 5567$; RMSEA = 0.057; CFI = 0.898), but JRULE identified still several extra correlations between items. As they all appeared between error terms of items for the same value types (e.g. hedonism items *impfun* and *ipgdtim*), it made theoretically sense to allow these correlated errors in the model. After this change, the model became acceptable ($\text{Chi}^2 = 4022$; RMSEA = 0.049; CFI = 0.875). As JRULE did not identify additional misspecifications, there exists configural invariance between Estonian and Russian speakers for the higher-order factor model excluding one item. When testing the metric and scalar equivalence, the model fit decreased expectedly (metric, $\text{Chi}^2 = 4568$; RMSEA = 0.049; CFI = 0.918; scalar, $\text{Chi}^2 = 4568$; RMSEA = 0.055; CFI = 0.895), but as JRULE did not identify any misspecified loadings or intercepts, it can be concluded that there exists also a scalar invariance, which means that the relationships and means are comparable across Estonian speakers and Russian speakers. When using the same model to test for scalar equivalence across Estonian-speaking and Russian-speaking cohort groups, the model fit increased substantially due to larger number of groups ($\text{Chi}^2 = 7615$; RMSEA = 0.055; CFI = 0.860), but as JRULE did not identify any misspecified loadings or intercepts, the latent means were also comparable across cohort groups.

After obtaining the latent means for each higher-order value, we finally calculated two variables for the bipolar conservation—openness to change (*opendim*) and self-enhancement/self-transcendence (*selfdim*) dimensions—following Schwartz et al. (2012) suggestions. To calculate a score for openness versus conservation dimensions, the conservation score was subtracted from the openness score. To get a score for a self-transcendence versus self-enhancement dimension, the self-transcendence score was subtracted from the self-enhancement score. The scales of both dimensions ranged from -5 to 5 .

Changes in Estonian Value Structure

Estonian-Speaking Majority and Russian-Speaking Minority

Figure 2 shows changes in the two higher-order dimensions across cultural groups (Estonian majority and Russian-speaking minority) from 2004 to 2014. Visible culture-based differences emerge for both, the structure and the change. On the one hand, Estonian-speaking majority tends to be generally more opened to the change and more directed to the self-transcendence than the Russian speakers. For Estonians, the overall value change has been modest across the observed period, but there is still a visible trend towards the self-transcendence and conservation. On the other hand, for the Russian speakers, the decade has been much more turbulent—in each measurement point, there is a turn to a different direction. To find specific




Fig. 2 Latent means of Estonian speakers and Russian speakers on two higher-order value dimensions from 2004 to 2014

reasoning for these transformations, the next paragraph will map the change within smaller societal groups.

Age and Cohort Groups

It has been repeatedly shown that the strongest predictor for the value priorities is the age (Schwartz, 1994; Schwartz & Rubel, 2005). Based on the general trend, the youth are always more egoistic (directed to self-enhancement) and more open to change, which means that individuals' value structures transform over the lifespan, but not necessarily in the same way. One important factor is the societal context where the person has grown up. Based on the Estonian turbulent history, it is reasonable to expect that different cohorts have different value structures.

To test this assumption, we compared the group means of different cohorts appearing in different age groups, following the recommendations of Realo and Dobewall (2011). As we have data for 10-year period, the respondents from each cohort groups appear in three or four age groups, as seen in Figs. 3 and 4. Figure 3 compares latent means of Estonian and Russian speakers on bipolar dimension of




Fig. 3 Intra-cohort trajectories of conservation versus openness to change across lifespan




Fig. 4 Intra-cohort trajectories of self-enhancement versus self-transcendence across lifespan

conservation versus openness and Fig. 4 on bipolar dimension of self-transcendence (altruism) versus self-enhancement (egoism).

Both figures confirm that in addition to value priority differences across age, substantive differentiation across cohort groups also exists. For both, Estonian speakers and Russian speakers, within the same age group, the respondents from older cohort group tend to be more directed to conservation and more directed to self-transcendence, which refers to process of intergenerational individualization.

Value Change Within Cohort Groups

When analysing the transition of value structures in Estonian society from the perspective of cohort groups, a more diverse picture emerges (Fig. 5). The differentiation between cohort groups from both cultural subsamples is still apparent, but the change patterns within groups are different.

The trend towards the conservation exists within all cohort groups, but it's most evident among the youngest respondents. The overall shift on self-enhancement/self-transcendence dimension was proportionally more or less similar for all the groups. Whereas during the first period (2004–2006), Estonian speakers' and Russian speakers' value scores changed in the opposite direction, during the second period




Fig. 5 Latent means of Estonian speakers and Russian speakers on two higher-order value dimensions from 2004 to 2014

(2006–2008), the difference decreased, followed by a change in the same direction (2008–2010). The last two periods (2010–2012 and 2012–2014) brought another shift towards the conservation, which was again modest among the Estonian speakers and more significant among Russian speakers.

For both subsamples, the value scores have changed less among the middle cohort group (respondents born in the 1960s and 1970s). As they gained most from the post-socialist transformation, they have also been considered as the generation of winners (Masso & Vihalemm, 2003); and it seems that their more stable societal position also tends to stabilize their value structures.

When comparing different cohort groups cross-culturally, the youngest cohorts tend to be more similar than the older ones. Such observation is more or less expected, as unlike their parents, almost all the younger Russian speakers have been born in Estonia, and so they have socialized in much more similar environment to the environment where their Estonian peers were socialized.

Earlier studies (Lilleoja, 2012; Tart, Sõmer, & Lilleoja, 2012; Tulviste et al., 2014) have associated the fluctuation of Russian speakers' value preferences during the first periods of the analyses (2004–2006 and 2006–2008) with certain societal tensions. Different adaptations to the new reality in the beginning of the 1990s led to general increase of social stratification, which was combined with an unsuccessful attempt of integrating the Russian-speaking ethnic minority. While the difficulties during the 1990s focused the attention more on the survival values, the increasing welfare during the 2000s economic boom functioned paradoxically as an amplifier of the ethnical split in Estonian society. In 2007 following the removal of the Soviet war monument 'Bronze Soldier'² the ethnic tensions turned even into two nights of rioting in the streets of the country's capital city Tallinn. Since then, the internal situation has slightly improved, but Estonia is still sharing relatively chilly relationship with its neighbour Russia. Latter fit with value patterns—the steep shift towards the conservation and self-enhancement among Russian speakers between 2004 and 2006—was a sign for the following events. By 2008 (a year after 'Bronze Soldier' incident), the value structures had been stabilized, which means that at least a part of the tension was released.

Since 2008, a general shift towards the conservation has taken place, and in most of the cohort groups, it exceeds the expected change sizes. It seems to relate with a larger process on European level, the outcome of which is increasing the popularity of different nationalistic movements, expanding their popularity in Estonia over the last few years.

²The Bronze Soldier (originally named 'Monument to the Liberators of Tallinn') is a Soviet World War II memorial in Tallinn, Estonia, built at the site of several war graves, located in a public park in the city center and relocated to the Tallinn Military Cemetery in the margins in 2007. The action triggered two nights of massive looting and destruction in the downtown of Tallinn. This change from prominence to the marginality meant that it was considered by Russian speakers as serious loss of their place in Tallinn.

Conclusion

In this chapter we tried to characterize the changes in Estonian value structure between 2004 and 2014 on the level of higher-order value dimensions. In order to unfold the societal complexity, the changes were mapped across Estonian-speaking majority and Russian-speaking minority. Additionally three aggregated cohort groups were used, which allowed us to demonstrate that along with age effects, systematic cohort effect on value preferences also exists.

Based on previous studies, the differentiation of value structures across the mentioned societal groups was largely expected, but it came apparent that there were also significant differences in the patterns and extent of the change. Within all cohort groups, the value preferences of the Russian-speaking minority have been much more exposed to the societal changes than Estonians' ones. During the period from 2004 to 2014, we observed a shift towards prioritizing the values belonging to the conservation dimension, which emphasizes the preservation of the status quo (vs. accepting change, risk and unpredictability), as well as a shift towards prioritizing the values belonging to self-transcendence dimension, which embraces the welfare of others (vs. one's own interests). As this general tendency was evident in all subgroups, it may be an indicator for the stabilization of society after the early post-socialist turbulent years.

References

- Bardi, A., Buchanan, K. E., Goodwin, R., Slabu, L., & Robinson, M. (2014). Value stability and change during self-chosen life transitions: Self-selection versus socialization effects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *106*, 131–147.
- Cieciuch, J., & Davidov, E. (2012). A comparison of the invariance properties of the PVQ-40 and the PVQ-21 to measure human values across German and Polish samples. *Survey Research Methods*, *6*(1), 37–48.
- Davidov, E. (2008). A cross-country and cross-time comparison of the human values measurements with the second round of the European social survey. *Survey Research Methods*, *2*(1), 33–46.
- Davidov, E. (2010). Testing for comparability of human values across countries and time with the third round of the European Social Survey. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, *51*(3), 171–191.
- Davidov, E., & Schmidt, P. (2007). Are values in the Benelux countries comparable? Testing for equivalence with the European social survey. In M. Swyngedouw, B. Cambré, & G. Loosveldt (Eds.), *Measuring meaningful data in social research* (pp. 373–386). Leuven: Acco.
- Davidov, E., Schmidt, P., & Schwartz, S. H. (2008). Bringing values back in: The adequacy of the European social survey to measure values in 20 countries. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, *72*(3), 420–445.
- De Graaf, N. D., & Evans, G. (1996). Why are the young more postmaterialist? A cross-national analysis of individual and contextual influences on postmaterial values. *Comparative Political Studies*, *28*(4), 608–635.

- Hellevik, O. (2002). Age differences in value orientation—Life cycle or cohort effect? *International Journal of Public Opinion Research*, 14(3), 286–302.
- Hitlin, S., & Piliavin, J. A. (2004). Values: Reviving a dormant concept. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 30, 359–393.
- Horn, J. L., & McArdle, J. J. (1992). A practical and theoretical guide to measurement invariance in aging research. *Experimental aging research*, 18(3), 117–144.
- Inglehart, R. (1990). *Culture shift in advanced industrial society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic, and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (2006). East European value systems in global perspective. In H.-D. Klingemann, D. Fuchs, & J. Zielonka (Eds.), *Democracy and political culture in Eastern Europe, Routledge research in comparative politics* (pp. 67–84). New York: Routledge.
- Jöreskog, K. G. (1971). Simultaneous factor analysis in several populations. *Psychometrika*, 36(4), 409–426.
- Kalmus, V. (2010). The value patterns of the Estonian population. In M. Lauristin (Ed.), *Estonian human development report 2009* (pp. 114–116). Tallinn: Estonian Cooperation Assembly.
- Kalmus, V., & Vihalemm, T. (2004). Eesti siirdekultuuri väärtused (Values of Estonian transitional culture). In V. Kalmus, M. Lauristin, & P. Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt (Eds.), *Eesti elavik 21. sajandi algul: ülevaade uurimuse Mina. Maailm. Meedia tulemustest (Estonian life-world in the beginning of 21st century)* (pp. 31–43). Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus.
- Knoppen, D., & Saris, W. E. (2009). Do we have to combine values in the Schwartz human values scale? A comment on the Davidov studies. *Survey Research Methods*, 3(2), 91–103.
- Kruusvall, J., Vetik, R., & Berry, J. W. (2009). The strategies of inter-ethnic adaptation of Estonian Russians. *Studies of Transition States and Societies*, 1(1), 3–24.
- Kus-Harbord, L., & Ward, C. (2015). Ethnic Russians in post-Soviet Estonia: Perceived devaluation, acculturation, wellbeing, and ethnic attitudes. *International Perspectives in Psychology: Research, Practice, Consultation*, 4(1), 66–81.
- Lauristin, M., Vihalemm, P., Rosengren, K. E., & Weibull, L. (Eds.). (1997). *Return to the Western world: Cultural and political perspectives on the Estonian post-communist transition*. Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Lilleoja, L. (2012). Basic human values in Estonia 2004–2008: Change and particularities. In L. Prudký (Ed.), *Values, stratification, transformation* (pp. 405–422). Vydavatelství a nakladatelství Alesh Cenek: Praha.
- Lilleoja, L., Dobewall, H., Aavik, T., Strack, M., & Verkasalo, M. (2016). Measurement equivalence of Schwartz's refined value structure across countries and modes of data collection: New evidence from Estonia, Finland, and Ethiopia. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 102, 204–210. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.07.009>
- Lilleoja, L., & Raudsepp, M. (2016). Cohort-specific value patterns during the new millennium. In R. Nugin, A. Kannike, & M. Raudsepp (Eds.), *Generations in Estonia: Contemporary perspectives on turbulent times* (pp. 36–69). Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Lilleoja, L., & Tart, I. (2011). Estonian basic value structures. In I. Tart (Ed.), *Basic human values in Estonia and Baltic Sea countries* (pp. 39–62). Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Masso, A., & Vihalemm, T. (2003). Eesti sidusus ja killustatus väärtuste peeglis (Estonian cohesion and fragmentation in the mirror of values). In R. Vetik (Ed.), *Eesti Inimarengu Aruanne 2003: Inimarengu trendid ja ühiskondliku kokkuleppe vajadus (Estonian human development report 2003: Trends of human development and the need for social agreement)* (pp. 68–72). Tallinn: TPÜ Kirjastus.
- Niit, K.-K. (2002). Eesti tudengite väärtused 1990. aastatel (Values of Estonian students in the 1990s). In A. Valk (Ed.), *Eesti ja eestlased võrdlevas perspektiivis: kultuuridevahelisi uurimusi 20. sajandi lõpust (Estonia and Estonians in a comparative perspective: Cross-cultural studies from the end of the 20th century)* (pp. 42–59). Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus.

- Pornprasertmanit, S. (2014). *Modification indices and their power approach for model fit evaluation*. Retrieved from <http://rpackages.ianhowson.com/cran/semTools/man/miPowerFit.html>
- Rämmer, A. (2006). Naiste võim tulekul? *Haridus*, 5–6, 9–12.
- Raudsepp, M., Tart, I., & Heinla, E. (2013a). Post-socialist dynamics of value patterns in Estonia. *Studies of Transition States and Societies*, 5(2), 35–51.
- Raudsepp, M., Tart, I., & Heinla, E. (2013b). Continuity and change of value profiles in 1985–2008. In A.-A. Allaste (Ed.), *Back in the west: Changes and continuities of lifestyles in transition societies* (pp. 53–74). Frankfurt: Peter Lang Publishers House.
- Realo, A., & Dobewall, H. (2011). Does life satisfaction change with age? A comparison of Estonia, Finland, Latvia, and Sweden. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 45, 297–308.
- Rudnev, M. (2009). Vliyanie vnutristranovyh etnicheskikh razlichiy na zhiznennye tsennosti naseleniya Estonii (The impact of within-country ethnical differences on life values of the Estonian population). In M. K. Горшкова (Ed.), *Социологические этюды: сборник статей аспирантов (Sociological essays)* (Выпуск 2, pp. 113–123). Москва: Институт социологии РАН (Moscow: Institute of Sociology of Russian Academy of Sciences).
- Saar, E. (Ed.). (2011). *Towards a normal stratification order: Actual and perceived social stratification in post-socialist Estonia*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
- Saarniit, J. (1995). Changes in the value orientations in youth and their social context. In L. Tomasi (Ed.), *Values and post-Soviet youth. The problem of transition* (pp. 141–153). Milano: Franco Angeli.
- Sagiv, L., & Schwartz, S. H. (2000). Value priorities and subjective well-being: direct relations and congruity effects. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 30(2), 177–198.
- Saris, W. E., & Gallhofer, I. N. (2014). *Design, evaluation, and analysis of questionnaires for survey research* (2nd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Saris, W. E., Satorra, A., & Van der Veld, W. (2009). Testing structural equation models or detection of misspecifications? *Structural Equation Modeling*, 16, 561–582.
- Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 25, 1–65.
- Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values? *Journal of Social Issues*, 50(4), 19–45.
- Schwartz, S. H. (2003). A proposal for measuring value orientations across nations. Chapter 7 in the questionnaire development package of the European social survey. Accessed September 1, 2015, from https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/docs/methodology/core_ess_questionnaire/ESS_core_questionnaire_human_values.pdf
- Schwartz, S. H. (2005). Robustness and fruitfulness of a theory of universals in individual human values. In A. Tamayo & J. Porto (Eds.), *Valores e trabalho [values and work]* (pp. 56–95). Brasilia: Editora Universidade de Brasilia.
- Schwartz, S. H. (2009). Basic values: How they motivate and inhibit prosocial behavior. In M. Mikulincer & P. R. Shaver (Eds.), *Prosocial motives, emotions, and behavior: The better angels of our nature* (pp. 221–241). Washington: American Psychological Association.
- Schwartz, S. H., & Bardi, A. (1997). Influences of adaptation to communist rule on value priorities in Eastern Europe. *Political Psychology*, 18(2), 385–410.
- Schwartz, S. H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchione, M., Davidov, E., Fischer, R., & Beierlein, C. (2012). Refining the theory of basic individual values. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 103, 663–688.
- Schwartz, S. H., Melech, G., Lehmann, A., Burgess, S., & Harris, M. (2001). Extending the cross-cultural validity of the theory of basic human values with a different method of measurement. *Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology*, 32(5), 519–542.
- Schwartz, S. H., & Rubel, T. (2005). Sex differences in value priorities: Cross-cultural and multi-method studies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 89(6), 1010–1028.
- Shalom, S. H. (2006). Les valeurs de base de la personne : theorie, mesures et applications. *Revue française de sociologie*, 47(4), 929.

- Spini, D. (1997). *Valeurs et représentations sociales des droits de l'homme: Une approche structurale*. Doctoral thesis, Université de Genève, Faculté de Psychologie et des Sciences.
- Steenkamp, J. B. E., & Baumgartner, H. (1998). Assessing measurement invariance in cross-national consumer research. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 25(1), 78–90.
- Szakolczai, A., & Füstös, L. (1998). Value systems in axial moments: A comparative analysis of 24 European countries. *European Sociological Review*, 14(3), 211–229.
- Tart, I. (2011). Introduction: Basic human values: Social psychology, sociology, culture and the units of cultural communities. In I. Tart (Ed.), *Basic human values in Estonia and Baltic Sea countries* (pp. 5–8). Tartu: Tartu University Press.
- Tart, I., Sömer, M., & Lilleoja, L. (2012). Alusväärtused Eestis teise laine perioodil (Basic values in Estonia during the second wave). In A. Aareleid-Tart & A. Kannike (Eds.), *Nullindate kultuur I: teise laine tulemine (Culture of the 00s I: Arrival of the second wave)* (pp. 44–70). Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus (Tartu University Press).
- Titma, M. (1999). *Kolmekümneaastaste põlvkonna sotsiaalne portree (Social portrait of a generation in their 30ies)*. Tallinn: Eesti Teaduste Akadeemia Kirjastus (Estonian Academy of Sciences Press).
- Titma, M. (Ed.). (2001). *Sõjajärgse põlvkonna elutee ja seda kujundanud faktorid (Life-path of a post-war generation and factors that influence it)*. Tartu: Tartu Ülikooli Kirjastus (Tartu University Press).
- Titma, M., Kenkmann, P., Saar, E., & Uueküla, J. (1990). *Ühe põlvkonna elutee (Life path of a generation)*. Tallinn: Olion.
- Tulviste, T., Kall, K., & Rämmer, A. (2017). Value priorities of younger and older adults in seven European countries. *Social Indicators Research*, 133(3), 931–942.
- Tulviste, T., Konstabel, K., & Tulviste, P. (2014). Stability and change in value consensus of ethnic Estonians and Russian-speaking minority. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 39, 93–102.
- Van der Veld, W., Saris, W. E., & Satorra, A. (2009). *Jrule 2.0, judgement aid rule for structural equation models: User manual*.
- Verkasalo, M., Daun, Å., & Niit, T. (1994). Universal values in Estonia, Finland and Sweden. *Ethnologia Europaea*, 24, 101–117.
- Vihalemm, T., & Kalmus, V. (2009). Cultural differentiation of the Russian minority. *Journal of Baltic Studies*, 40(1), 95–119.

Laur Lilleoja (Ph.D., the School of Governance, Law and Society, Tallinn University) is Estonian sociologist. He has developed himself at Pompeu Fabra University and the Autonomous University of Barcelona. He is a member of the European Survey research Association (ESRA) and author of more than 20 articles and book chapters on social psychology and survey methodology. His primary research interests are basic values and, more broadly, the development of methodology for studying values.

Maaris Raudsepp (PhD) is a senior researcher at the Institute of International and Social Studies in the School of Governance, Law and Society of Tallinn University, Estonia. Her research interests include value change and social psychology of intergroup relations. She has publications on the regulative role of values, forms of group identity, representations of ethnic outgroups in the media, relations between ethnic self-esteem and attitudes towards the outgroup, social representations of human rights and equal treatment, promotion of intergroup trust, processes of acculturation, as well as on autobiographical memory and personal meaning construction.

Intergenerational Value Differences in Latvia and Azerbaijan



Ekaterina Bushina and Tatiana Ryabichenko

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 led to the fact that a young generation of citizens in the new independent states grow up in conditions that substantially differed from their parents' period of socialization. A large number of ethnic Russians, who previously lived in one state, now live in different countries outside Russia. The sociopolitical status of Russians changed dramatically: they became an ethnic minority and faced the challenge of adapting to their new life status. The existence of cultural, social, and political differences in the post-Soviet countries led to different changes in values, beliefs, attitudes, and intergroup relations in changed contexts. This study focuses on a comparison of values of ethnic minorities and majorities in countries with different trajectories of post-Soviet development from a cross-national and intergenerational perspective.

Intergenerational Value Differences

Age sets the pace of value changes. The value system of the young generation is more flexible and sensitive, while that of the older generation tends to be more stable and rigid and less influenced by contextual factors. There are three approaches summarizing the effects of age on values (Schwartz, 2006). The first (cohort) approach focuses on the influence of different historical events, such as wars or economic depression, on value priorities. For example, one study conducted in the Czech Republic found that openness to change values increased in post-communist period among younger generation (Danis, Liu, & Vacek, 2011). In another study, an increase of security and wealth in Western Europe countries led to the choice of

E. Bushina (✉) · T. Ryabichenko
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: evbushina@hse.ru; tryabichenko@hse.ru

hedonism, stimulation, self-direction among youth, and less importance of values of security, tradition, and conformity (Schwartz, 2006). The second approach is related to the decline of physical abilities with age. Physical aging therefore increases the importance of security and related values and at the same time makes hedonism and achievement less important. The third approach concerns the influence of different life stages of value priorities. Young adults meet different life challenges and demonstrate different risk-taking behaviors; thus, values of achievement and stimulation are more preferable among them. Adults tend to take care of family and children; this pre-retirement stage can be characterized by the importance of security, stability, and tradition (Schwartz, 2006). These three main types of age characteristics show the existence of age-graded systematic differences in value structure between generations.

Intergenerational Value Differences of the Ethnic Majority and Minority

Intergenerational similarity of values is an important basis for the stability of society, which supports communication between different generations and preserves cultural-specific knowledge and beliefs (Schönpflug, 2001). However, the intergenerational transmission of values is not always conducive to adaptation, as in the course of social change, the young generation increasingly faces new challenges and tasks that do not correspond to the “old” solutions (Albert, Trommsdorff, & Wisnubrata, 2009). Thus, it remains a question whether the result of value transmission depends on the cultural environment or to what extent parents transfer their value systems to subsequent generations and whether this process is different in different cultures. In cultures whose members choose independence, children are exposed to many different factors outside the family and have the opportunity to choose among a variety of values (Albert et al., 2009).

The “broader societal context” (defined as the link between social/macro and individual/micro levels; Rindfuss, Liao, & Tsuya, 1992, p. 821) serves as a powerful force affecting the values of parents and children. This force acts as an agent to increase the similarity in value preferences of both generations. Unfortunately, there is still no agreement on how to measure the impact of the “broader societal context” (Boehnke, Hadjar, & Baier, 2007). Boehnke and his colleagues (2007) conceptualized such context as a *Zeitgeist*, “modal value climate in a given society at a given time” (p. 778), and showed that the influence of a *Zeitgeist* on individual values and on parent-child value similarity is measurable.

Every culture offers a specific niche of development and methods of socialization for the transmission of values. Socialization methods vary depending on cultural values and the ways of development that can be characterized by culturally specific conceptions of independence and interdependence (Arnett, 1995; Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003; Rothbaum, Pott, Azuma, Miyake, & Weisz, 2000;

Whitbeck & Gecas, 1988). A study of intergenerational transmission of values in different cultural environments (Germany and Indonesia) showed that the intergenerational transmission of collectivistic values between adjacent generations is higher than individualistic values in both the German and the Indonesian samples, but the transmission of individualistic values (values that are not typical for the culture) is higher in the Indonesian sample (Albert et al., 2009). Generally, the study showed that the cultural context itself does not contribute to and does not hinder intergenerational transmission of values. However, the content of transmitted values depends precisely on the cultural environment. Moreover, the significant similarity of values of parents and children in majority families mostly indicates the successful assimilation of values of the society, while a considerable similarity of values of parents and children in migrant or ethnic minority families may partly indicate a lack of social integration in the host society.

In ethnic minority families, both the parents and children are involved in the acculturation process; they do not always acquire the same experience and do not always have the same reference group, so the level of similarity of parents' and children's values differs from that level in groups of the majority (Vedder, Berry, Sabatier, & Sam, 2009). The objectives of migrant parents and migrant children may differ. However, age features are such that parents are more interested in maintaining traditional values, while children, especially teenagers, often seek to merge with the majority.

The younger generation from the ethnic minority group first socializes in their families, imbuing themselves with the culture of their parents' origin, and then socializes into the culture of the host society (Kwast-Welfel, Boski, & Rovers, 2008). This suggests that teenagers from the minority in some cases face rather difficult problems, as they have to cope with the influence of sometimes conflicting cultural values and, at the same time, to continue the transition to adulthood (Chiu, Feldman, & Rosenthal, 1992). Other studies show that adolescent immigrants usually adapt to the values of a new society faster compared to their parents (Rick & Forward, 1992; Szapocznik & Kurtines, 1993). Consequently, additional differences in values may occur among teenage migrants and their parents, in addition to those deriving from the imperfection of the socialization process (Phinney, Ong, & Madden, 2000). These arguments suggest that the level of value similarity among parents and children is higher in the families of majority groups than in the families of migrants and ethnic minorities. Contradictory results were found in the study of Hadjar et al. (2012) which showed that the degree of value similarity depends on the country, even in the majority group. The country effect, belonging to different ethnic groups, length of the stay in the country, and the place of birth should be also taken into account in comparing value similarity in majority and minority groups (Portes & Rumbaut, 1990; Schoeni, McCarthy, & Vernez, 1996).

Current Study

Based on previous research, we can assume that the difference in values between parents and children is not necessarily connected with the migration experience and may reflect an almost universal trend in modern society, according to which the parental generation supports existing norms and expectations, while offspring are questioning the duties they are expected to fulfill (Kwast-Welfel et al., 2008; Steinberg, 1990; Yau & Smetana, 1996).

Despite the abundance of research conducted in the field of intergenerational changes of values in ethnic minorities and the majority, there are no clear answers to the following questions: does a relative group status (minority or majority) have an impact on the intergenerational values similarity? Are there any differences in values within generations between countries? Who are young people closer to in their values: to their ethnic group or to the majority? Therefore, in our research, we seek answers to these questions, using the refined Schwartz's theory of basic individual values, which includes 19 universal values (Schwartz et al., 2012).

In accordance with these issues, the following research questions are raised:

1. Do the values of the young generation differ from the generation of their parents?
2. Do these differences depend on majority and minority status, country, or ethnic identification?
3. What is the impact of local cultural context on values in Latvia and Azerbaijan?

The Sociocultural Contexts of Latvia and Azerbaijan

The post-Soviet period is characterized by forming new national identities in the former USSR republics. The main groups that led this reformation in the newly independent states were the ethnic majority elites. One of the main reasons why exactly these groups drove this process is that they concentrated power in their hands. Ethnic majorities viewed independence as an opportunity to right a wrong, while ethnic minorities (Russians) viewed it with anxiety (Fierman, 2012). Due to their world regional location and cultural closeness, Latvia was more focused on Western European development (Schmid, 2008), while Azerbaijan became closer to Turkey and the Islamic world (Luscombe & Kazdal, 2014; Musabekov & Shulman, 2010).

Changes in identities influenced both the majority and minority groups. The majorities are concerned about national rebirth, while the minorities focused on the achieving balance between preservation of their ethnic culture and accommodation to new challenges.

Russians in Latvia The population of Latvia in 2013 was about 2 million people, with 26% being ethnic Russians (Statistical Yearbook of Latvia, 2014). A general inflow of Russians to Latvia took place after World War II. After that the percentage of ethnic Latvians decreased from 76–75% to 51% from 1935 to 1989 (Cara, 2010;

Ivlevs, 2013). In the 1990s Latvia proclaimed an ethnic minority integration policy. However, this policy to a large extent emphasized cultural and linguistic assimilation (Muižnieks, Rozenvalds, & Birka, 2013). At the beginning of the new Latvian state formation, ethnic Russians faced the problems of obtaining citizenship. In 2005, only 50% of ethnic Russians had Latvian citizenship (Cara, 2006). However the situation changed after Latvia joined EU in 2004. Besides the problems of citizenship, Russians faced the problem of using Russian language. In Soviet times, Latvian and Russian languages were both official languages in Latvia. During the Soviet era, Russian language dominated the economic and social spheres and international communication (Ivlevs, 2013). Before the 1990s there were so-called Latvian and Russian schools in Latvia with lessons in Latvian and Russian, respectively. In independent Latvia, Latvian became the only official language. We can expect, on the one hand, the priorities of “Western European” values in modern Latvia, such as openness to change and self-transcendence. On the other hand, it is accompanied with moving to ethnic and cultural past recognition (tradition values), less openness, and self-isolation of the Latvian population in comparison with non-Latvians in this country (Groys, 2008; Schmid, 2008; Zepa et al., 2005).

Russians in Azerbaijan Azerbaijan is the largest post-Soviet state in the South Caucasus. In 1989, 83% of the population was Azerbaijanis, and the main minorities were Russians, Armenians, and Lezgins. The 1978 Constitution proclaimed Azerbaijani as the official language, but in fact Russian language dominated, especially in the capital of the country, the city of Baku. Since Azerbaijan’s independence, the Azerbaijani language has replaced Russian as the language of education and official government functions. Russian has been demoted to Russian-medium sectors within Azerbaijani-medium schools, and in many schools it has been relegated to an elective, as English has become the required foreign language (Fierman, 2012; Luscombe & Kazdal, 2014). The late 1980s to early 1990s were marked by a strong wave of migration of Russians from Azerbaijan caused by the economic crisis and political changes in the country (Yunusov, 2001). From this time the Russian population lost its position as the largest ethnic and privileged minority in the country and become detached from political life (Musabekov, 2009).

This complex period of transformation in both countries could lead to a value gap between generations and ethnic groups. The generation of the 1970s witnessed the change of epochs and the beginning of the formation of a new state ideology and identity. While their offspring were socialized inside of these ideologies, their values, beliefs, and attitudes were formed in their families but at the same time in the broader social context of newly independent states. Similarities and differences observed between and within countries may depend on belonging to a particular cohort and the majority or minority status of the group.

Table 1 Sample characteristics

	N	Gender characteristics		Age characteristics			
		Male (%)	Female (%)	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD
Azerbaijani Russians							
Younger generation	95	48.1	51.9	15	27	20.72	3.13
Middle generation	102	20.6	79.4	35	68	47.32	8.20
Azerbaijanis							
Younger generation	94	58.5	41.5	15	26	21.23	3.29
Middle generation	106	29.2	70.8	33	69	47.54	6.71
Latvian Russians							
Younger generation	112	32.1	67.9	16	24	17.63	1.56
Middle generation	112	5.5	95.5	33	59	43.61	5.59
Latvians							
Younger generation	120	37.0	63.0	16	19	17.12	1.14
Middle generation	120	0	100	36	68	44.1	4.24

Method

Sample

The study was conducted in 2014–2015 in Latvia and Azerbaijan. To identify value similarities and differences of values of ethnic majorities (Latvians and Azerbaijanis) and minorities (Russians in Latvia and Azerbaijan), we compared two generations of the same families. Our study included 197 ethnic Russians in Azerbaijan, 200 Azerbaijanis, 224 Russians in Latvia, and 240 Latvians. Sample characteristics are presented in Table 1.

Measures

In this study we used the Refined Values Theory Schwartz, which categorizes 19 individual values into four higher-order values: openness to change (includes values of self-direction thought, self-direction action, stimulation, hedonism), conservation (security personal, security societal, tradition, conformity rules, conformity interpersonal), self-enhancement (achievement, power dominance, power resources, face), and self-transcendence (humility, benevolence dependability, benevolence care, universalism concern, universalism nature, universalism tolerance) (Schwartz et al., 2012). We used the 57-item Portrait Values Questionnaire-Revised (PVQ-R) to measure individual values. A Russian version of questionnaire was translated and adapted by Schwartz, Butenko, Sedova, and Lipatova (2012). PVQ-R includes the 19 value types that are measured with three items each. Each item describes a person in terms of a goal that is important to him/her answering the question “To which extent this person is like you?” Responses range from “not like me at all” (1) to “very

much like me” (6) using a 6-point Likert-type scale. An example of hedonism item is “Enjoying life’s pleasures is important to him.” An example of benevolence-dependability item is “He goes out of his way to be a dependable and trustworthy friend.” Cronbach’s alphas for openness to change ranged from 0.64 to 0.81 in Latvia and from 0.50 to 0.73 in Azerbaijan. Cronbach’s alphas for conservation ranged from 0.71 to 0.75 in Latvia and from 0.66 to 0.78 in Azerbaijan. Cronbach’s alphas for self-enhancement ranged from 0.70 to 0.77 in Latvia and from 0.57 to 0.75 in Azerbaijan. Cronbach’s alphas for self-transcendence ranged from 0.68 to 0.80 in Latvia and from 0.65 to 0.87 in Azerbaijan. Additionally, we asked the participants about their age, gender, level of education, and ethnicity.

For data processing we used SPSS 22.0 statistical package. Besides, we used paired samples t-test and multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) for groups’ comparison.

Results

Descriptive statistics, including means and standard deviations, are presented in Tables 2 and 3.

First, we compared the values of the two generations of ethnic Russians and Latvians in Latvia. There were significant differences in values between the two generations of Russians in Latvia. Scores in openness to change and self-enhancement values were higher among the younger generation of Russians in Latvia. The value of conservation was significantly lower in youth compared with parents. Russian youth and parents in Latvia did not differ in self-transcendence values. We also found intergenerational differences for higher-order values among Latvians. The results of the value comparison between the two generations of Latvians showed that openness to change values were higher and conservation values were lower among Latvian youth. However, self-transcendence and self-enhancement values between generations did not differ.

The intergenerational analysis of values of the two generations of Russians in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis revealed significant differences between youth and parents. Table 3 indicates the results of group comparisons of means between the two generations of Russians in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis. Our results revealed that the younger generation of Russians in Azerbaijan had significantly higher scores in openness to change and self-enhancement values and lower in conservation and self-transcendence values than their parents. The preference for openness to change values statistically was significantly higher among Azerbaijani youth than among their parents.

To summarize, the generation gap between youth and their parents in openness to change values is observed in both the ethnic majority and minority groups in Azerbaijan. In the ethnic majority group studied, the two generations are much closer in their value priorities than in the minority group.

Table 2 Means, standard deviations, and t-tests for parents and youth of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Latvians

	M (SD)				t-test, <i>p</i>	
	Young LR	Middle LR	Young L	Middle L	Young-Middle LR	Young-Middle L
Openness to change	4.38 (0.47)	4.14 (0.44)	4.43 (0.32)	3.91 (0.28)	4.18***	13.79***
Self-enhancement	3.79 (0.63)	3.50 (0.57)	3.74 (0.51)	3.70 (0.35)	4.49***	0.70
Conservation	3.73 (0.43)	4.02 (0.41)	3.83 (0.37)	4.22 (0.23)	-6.38***	-10.22***
Self-transcendence	4.14 (0.39)	4.22 (0.36)	4.02 (0.30)	4.07 (0.20)	-1.65	-1.69

Note: LR Latvian Russians, L Latvians

****p* < 0.001

Table 3 Means, standard deviations, and t-tests for the parents and youth of Russians in Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis

	M (SD)				t-test, <i>p</i>	
	Young AR	Middle AR	Young Az	Middle Az	Young-middle AR	Young-middle Az
Openness to change	4.44 (0.50)	3.88 (0.45)	4.10 (0.47)	3.96 (0.31)	9.25***	2.54**
Self-enhancement	3.62 (0.58)	3.38 (0.64)	3.74 (0.48)	3.64 (0.49)	3.59**	1.46
Conservation	3.91 (0.35)	4.27 (0.34)	4.11 (0.44)	4.18 (0.37)	-7.86***	-1.15
Self-transcendence	4.08 (0.39)	4.27 (0.41)	4.09 (0.31)	4.12 (0.32)	-4.03**	-0.81

Note: AR Azerbaijani Russians, Az Azerbaijanis

p* < 0.01; *p* < 0.001

Further, we also compared the values within each of the two generations between countries to reveal cross-national differences using multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). The results of the comparison of the younger generation among Russians in Latvia, Latvians, Russians in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijanis are presented in Table 4, Wilks’s $\Lambda = .69$, $F(12,1119) = 14.23$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .12$. Post hoc tests also revealed value differences between the countries involved in the study ($p < .05$).

Openness to change values were lower in Azerbaijanis youth compared to the other three groups but did not differ in ethnic Latvian and the two ethnic Russian youth groups. Conservation values of young Azerbaijanis were higher than in the other three groups. Russian groups in Latvia and Azerbaijan differed in conservation values—they were higher among Russians in Azerbaijan. Self-transcendence values were higher among Russians in Latvia than among Latvians, but did not differ between the other groups. Self-enhancement values did not differ in all four groups.

Table 4 Means and standard deviations of values in groups of Russians in Latvia, Latvians, Russians in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijanis among youth

Values	Younger generation of Latvian Russians	Younger generation of Latvians	Younger generation of Azerbaijani Russians	Younger generation of Azerbaijanis	F (3,426)	Partial η^2
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)		
Openness to change	4.38 (0.47) _a	4.43 (0.32) _a	4.44 (0.50) _a	4.10 (0.47) _b	13.20	0.09
Self-enhancement	3.79 (0.63) _a	3.74 (0.51) _a	3.62 (.58) _a	3.74 (0.48) _a	1.89	0.01
Conservation	3.73 (0.43) _a	3.83 (0.37) _{ab}	3.91(0.35) _b	4.11 (0.44) _c	17.44	0.11
Self-transcendence	4.15 (0.39) _a	4.02 (0.30) _b	4.08 (0.39) _{ab}	4.09 (0.31) _{ab}	2.57	0.02

Note: Means sharing the same subscript are not significantly different from each other (Tukey’s HSD, $p < 0.05$)

The results of the comparison of the parental generation among Russians in Latvia, Latvians, Russians in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijanis are presented in Table 5, Wilks’s $\Lambda = .83$, $F(12, 1145) = 7.08$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .06$. Post hoc tests revealed value differences between the countries ($p < .05$). As we can see, the parental generation in all four groups replicated the same pattern in openness to change values as the youth. Conservation values were lower among the parental generation of ethnic Russians in Latvia compared to the other groups and did not differ among the parental generations of Latvians, Russians in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijanis. Self-transcendence and self-enhancement values did not differ between Russians in Latvia and Azerbaijan and between the two ethnic majority groups.

Finally, we compared the mean values’ scores of the families of ethnic Russians in Latvia, Latvians, Russians in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijanis. The results are presented in Table 6. There were differences in mean family value scores based on group belonging, $F(12, 1082) = 12.48$, $p < .001$; Wilks’s $\Lambda = .71$, partial $\eta^2 = .11$. Post hoc tests revealed group differences ($p < .05$).

Table 6 demonstrates that the families of Azerbaijanis had the lowest scores in openness to change and the highest scores in conservation values. There were no differences in openness to change values between Russian and Latvian families. In Azerbaijan there were no differences in conservation values among majority and minority groups, but Latvian families scored higher than Russians in Latvia on these values. Self-transcendence values did not differ between minority groups as well as between majorities. These values were higher among Russian minorities. Self-enhancement values differed only among Latvian and Azerbaijani Russian families.

Table 5 Means and standard deviations of values in groups of Russians in Latvia, Latvians, Russians in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijanis among parents

Values	Middle generation of Latvian Russians	Middle generation of Latvians	Middle generation of Azerbaijani Russians	Middle generation of Azerbaijanis	F (3,436)	Partial η^2
	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)	Mean (SD)		
Openness to change	4.14 (0.44) _a	3.91 (0.28) _b	3.88(0.45) _b	3.96(0.31) _b	10.98	0.07
Self-enhancement	3.50 (0.57) _{ac}	3.70 (0.35) _b	3.38(0.64) _c	3.64(0.49) _{ab}	8.43	0.06
Conservation	4.02 (0.41) _a	4.22 (0.23) _b	4.27(0.34) _b	4.18(0.37) _b	10.50	0.07
Self-transcendence	4.22 (0.36) _{ac}	4.07 (0.20) _b	4.28(0.41) _a	4.12(0.32) _{bc}	8.26	0.05

Note: Means sharing the same subscript are not significantly different from each other (Tukey’s HSD, $p < 0.05$)

Table 6 Means and standard deviations of values in families of Russians in Latvia, Latvians, Russians in Azerbaijan, and Azerbaijanis

	Latvian Russians	Latvians	Azerbaijani Russians	Azerbaijanis	F (3,412)	Partial η^2
Openness to change	4.26 (0.40) _a	4.17 (0.22) _a	4.16 (0.36) _a	4.01 (0.30) _b	10.34	0.07
Self-enhancement	3.65 (0.49) _a	3.72 (0.32) _{ab}	3.50 (0.50) _{ac}	3.66 (0.38) _a	5.26	0.04
Conservation	3.88 (0.34) _a	4.03 (0.22) _{bc}	4.09 (0.25) _{bc}	4.17 (0.34) _c	18.71	0.12
Self-transcendence	4.18 (0.29) _a	4.05 (0.17) _b	4.17 (0.31) _a	4.12 (0.24) _{ab}	6.74	0.05

Note: Means sharing the same subscript are not significantly different from each other (Tukey’s HSD, $p < 0.05$)

Discussion and Conclusion

In this study we follow the trajectories of value comparisons between two generations within countries in minority and majority groups (1), within generations between countries (2), and a cross-country comparison of families (3). The results of the intergenerational comparison of openness to change and conservation values show repeated common trends. Younger generations demonstrated higher scores on openness to change and lower scores on conservation than their parents. We found that these results are common in the two countries and do not relate to the status of the group. Our findings are in line with the results of previous studies and reflect participants’ age peculiarities (Schwartz, 2006).

Self-enhancement and self-transcendence values do not differ in ethnic majority groups in the two generations, while in the Russian minority groups, we found a

generation gap in self-enhancement values; the youth demonstrated higher scores on these values than their parents. Additionally, there is a gap between the young and parental generations in self-transcendence values; they are higher in the parental generation. We suggest that such results reflect the impact of group status. Self-enhancement values are more important for minority youth. We suppose that this is their reaction to anxiety increase and a reflection of worries about their status and striving for social mobility and success. Self-transcendence values do not differ between generations within countries.

The younger generation of Azerbaijanis demonstrated the lowest scores on openness to change and the highest scores on conservation values. We suppose that this is the result of the country's drift toward a society that is more traditional and more typical for a Muslim country. Nevertheless both majority groups had higher conservation values than minority groups among youth. We think that in the case of Latvia, the recognition of country's cultural past may have caused such trend after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Groys, 2008). It is surprising that self-enhancement values are equally important to all young generations regardless of the context, group status, and ethnic differences. These results indicate that youth in all of the studied groups value competitiveness and desire to perform better than others and be successful in all areas of life to the same extent. Such tendencies are widespread in modern industrial societies (Boehnke et al., 2007).

We can see that parental generation of Russians in Latvia has the highest scores on openness to change and the lowest on conservation values. Latvia is a Western-oriented country, and Russians, as an ethnic minority, follow this stream, while for Latvians state independence meant the revival of traditions, which was necessary for the construction of the national state. The Russian minority neither had no possibilities nor did not aim to behave in such way.

The parental generation of ethnic Russians in Latvia and Azerbaijan is higher in self-transcendence and lower in self-enhancement values than the majority groups. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russians as the ethnic minority tended to adapt to the new requirements and maintain a group harmony. The ethnic majorities were concerned about setting their own rules in the newly independent countries as dominant groups.

The cross-country comparison of mean family values revealed that Russian families in Latvia have the lowest scores in conservation, while families of Azerbaijanis have the lowest scores in openness to change values. These value differences on the family level might reflect the two different trajectories of post-Soviet development (toward Western Europe versus toward Islamic world) that these two countries chose. On the self-enhancement-self-transcendence axis, we found less consistent results. Thus, we can suppose that the value gap along the axe "openness to change-conservation" between the populations of these two post-Soviet counties will grow with the new generations.

Limitations

The main limitation of our study is that small sample sizes were used. Secondly, we used purposeful samples. In our future studies, it will be useful to compare the results of intergenerational value comparison obtained on the family level with the results of other studies with big representative samples in a wider range of post-communist countries.

References

- Albert, I., Trommsdorff, G., & Wisnubrata, L. (2009). Intergenerational transmission of values in different cultural contexts: A study in Germany and Indonesia. In A. Gari & K. Mylonas (Eds.), *Quod erat demonstrandum: From Herodotus' ethnographic journeys to cross-cultural research* (pp. 221–230). Athens: Pedio Books.
- Arnett, J. J. (1995). Broad and narrow socialization: The family in the context of a cultural theory. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 57, 617–628. <https://doi.org/10.2307/353917>
- Boehnke, K., Hadjar, A., & Baier, D. (2007). Parent-child value similarity: The role of Zeitgeist. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 69, 778–792. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2007.00405.x>
- Cara, O. (2006). The acculturation modes of the Russian-speaking adolescents in Latvia: Perceived discrimination and knowledge of the Latvian language. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 58, 751–773. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130600732100>
- Cara, O. (2010). The acculturation of Russian-speaking adolescents in Latvia: Language issues three years after the 2004 education reform. *European Education*, 42(1), 8–36.
- Chiu, M. L., Feldman, S. S., & Rosenthal, D. A. (1992). The influence of immigration on parental behaviour and adolescent distress in Chinese families residing in two Western nations. *Journal of Research on Adolescence*, 2(3), 205–239. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327795jra0203_2
- Danis, W., Liu, L. A., & Vacek, J. (2011). Values and upward influence strategies in transition: Evidence from the Czech Republic. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 42(2), 288–306. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022110396924>
- Fierman, W. (2012). Russian in Post-Soviet Central Asia: A comparison with the states of the Baltic and South Caucasus. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 64(6), 1077–1100. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2012.691722>
- Greenfield, P. M., Keller, H., Fuligni, A., & Maynard, A. E. (2003). Culture and cognitive development. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 54, 461–490. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145221>
- Groys, B. (2008). Beyond diversity: Cultural studies and its post-communist other. In B. Groys (Ed.), *Art power* (pp. 149–164). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Hadjar, A., Boehnke, K., Knafo, A., Daniel, E., Musiol, A.-L., Schiefer, D., et al. (2012). Parent-child value similarity and subjective well-being in the context of migration: An exploration. *Family Science*, 3, 55–63. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19424620.2011.671502>
- Ivlevs, A. (2013). Minorities on the move? Assessing post-enlargement emigration intentions of Latvia's Russian speaking minority. *The Annals of Regional Science*, 51, 33–52. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s00168-012-0534-0>
- Kwast-Welfel, J., Boski, P., & Rovers, M. (2008). Intergenerational value similarity in Polish immigrant families in Canada in comparison to intergenerational value similarity in Polish and Canadian non-immigrant families. In G. Zheng, K. Leung, & J. G. Adair (Hrsg.), *Perspectives and progress in contemporary cross-cultural psychology* (S. 193–209). Online-Edition. IACCP.

- Luscombe, L., & Kazdal, V. (2014). Language and identity in a post-Soviet world: Language of education and linguistic identity among Azerbaijani students. *Nationalities Papers*, 42(6), 1015–1033. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2014.938034>
- Muižnieks, N., Rozenvalds, J., & Birka, I. (2013). Ethnicity and social cohesion in the post-Soviet Baltic states. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 47(3), 288–308. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2013.812349>
- Musabekov, R. (2009). Stanovlenie Azerbajdzhanskogo gosudarstva i jetnicheskie men'shinstva [The formation of the Azerbaijani state and ethnic minorities]. *Azerbajdzhan i Azerbajdzhancy v Mire [Azerbaijan and Azerbaijanis in the World]*, 2, 41–42.
- Musabekov, R., & Shulman, R. (2010). *Azerbajdzhan v 2006–2010 godah. Sociologicheskij monitoring. Sravnitel'nyj analiz dannyh sociologicheskikh issledovanij, provedennyh v respublike v 2006–2010 godah* [Azerbaijan in the period 2006–2010. Sociological monitoring. Comparative analysis of data of sociological research conducted in the Republic in 2006–2010]. Baku: Puls-R.
- Phinney, J. S., Ong, A., & Madden, T. (2000). Cultural values and intergenerational value discrepancies in immigrant and non-immigrant families. *Child Development*, 71, 528–539. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00162>
- Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. (1990). *Immigrant American: A portrait*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Rick, K., & Forward, J. (1992). Acculturation and perceived intergenerational differences among youth. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 23, 85–94. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022192231006>
- Rindfuss, R. L., Liao, T. F., & Tsuya, N. O. (1992). Contact with parents in Japan: Effects on opinions towards gender and intergenerational roles. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 54, 812–822. <https://doi.org/10.2307/353163>
- Rothbaum, F., Pott, M., Azuma, H., Miyake, H., & Weisz, J. (2000). The development of close relationships in Japan and the U.S.: Paths of symbiotic harmony and generative tension. *Child Development*, 71, 1121–1142. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.00214>
- Schmid, C. (2008). Ethnicity and language tensions in Latvia. *Language Policy*, 7(1), 3–19. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10993-007-9068-1>
- Schoeni, R., McCarthy, K., & Vernez, G. (1996). *The mixed economic prospects of immigrants*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND-Center for Research and Immigration Policy.
- Schönpflug, U. (2001). Intergenerational transmission of values: The role of transmission belts. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 32, 174–185. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022101032002005>
- Schwartz, S. H. (2006). *Basic human values: An overview*. Retrieved from <http://segr-did2.fmag.unict.it/Allegati/convegno%207-8-10-05/Schwartzpaper.pdf>
- Schwartz, S. H., Butenko, T. P., Sedova, D. S., & Lipatova, A. S. (2012). Utochnennaja teorija bazovyh individual'nyh cennostej: primeneniye v Rossii [Refined theory of basic human values: Validation in Russia]. *Psihologija. Zhurnal Vysshej shkoly jekonomiki [Psychology. Journal of Higher school of Economics]*, 9(2), 63–70 (in Russian).
- Schwartz, S. H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchione, M., Davidov, E., Fischer, R., Beierlein, C., et al. (2012). Refining the theory of basic individual values. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 103, 663–688. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029393>
- Statistical Yearbook of Latvia. (2014). *Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia*. Riga.
- Steinberg, L. (1990). Autonomy, conflict, and harmony in the family relationship. In S. Feldman & G. Elliot (Eds.), *At the threshold: The developing adolescent* (pp. 255–276). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Szapocznik, J., & Kurtines, W. M. (1993). Family psychology and cultural diversity: Opportunities for theory, research, and application. *American Psychologist*, 48, 400–407. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.48.4.400>
- Vedder, P., Berry, J., Sabatier, C., & Sam, D. (2009). The intergenerational transmission of values in national and immigrant families: The role of Zeitgeist. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 38, 642–653. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-008-9375-7>
- Whitbeck, L. B., & Gecas, V. (1988). Value attributions and value transmission between parents and children. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 50, 829–840. <https://doi.org/10.2307/352651>

- Yau, J., & Smetana, J. (1996). Adolescent–parent conflict among Chinese adolescents in Hong Kong. *Child Development*, *67*, 1262–1275. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1131891>
- Yunusov, A. (2001). *Jemicheskiy sostav Azerbajdzhana (po perepisi 1999 goda). Set' jetnologicheskogo monitoringa i rannego preduprezhdenija konfliktov* [The ethnic composition of Azerbaijan (according to 1999 Census). Network of ethnological monitoring and early conflict prevention]. Retrieved from http://old.iea.ras.ru/topic/census/mon/yunus_mon2001.htm
- Zepa, B., Supule, I., Klave, E., Krastina, L., Krisane, J., & Tomsone, I. (2005). *Ethnopolitical tension in Latvia: Looking for the conflict solution*. Riga: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences.

Bushina, Ekaterina (Ph.D., Higher School of Economics) is senior researcher and manager in the International Laboratory for Socio-cultural Research and associate professor in the Department of Psychology at The National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. She is the author of 8 articles on social and cross-cultural psychology. Her research interests are values, value transmission, intercultural relations, interethnic marriages, creativity and innovations, social and cultural change, and psychological well-being.

Ryabichenko, Tatiana is a research fellow at the International Laboratory for Sociocultural Research and a lecturer at the Department of Psychology (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russian Federation). She obtained Master's degree in Psychology in 2013. She is involved in several research projects of the Laboratory granted by The Higher School of Economics and the Russian Science Foundation. She is a member of International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP). Her research interests focus on intercultural relations, adaptation of migrants and ethnic minorities, cultural continuity, value transmission in ethnic minority and ethnic majority families, comparative studies on individual values, and acculturation.

The Values and Social Identity of Russian Muslims



Olga Pavlova

Russian Muslims: A General Overview

Today's Russia is multiethnic and multireligious with a population represented by different Christian denominations (in particular Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Protestantism), Islam, Buddhism, Judaism, and other religions. Modern Russian Islam is represented by a variety of ethnic groups. According to recent estimates, Muslims in Russia form 5 to 11% of the total population (Mchedlova, 2015; Zorin, 2016). Populations in the Volga region and in the Urals (Tatars, Bashkirs, and others) and the Northern Caucasus (Chechens, Ingush, peoples of Dagestan, Karachay, Kabardin, and others) include Muslim populations. Muslims are the majority of migrants in Russia including the Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Kyrgyz.

The North Caucasus is the most densely populated region of Russia, with a population of about 15 million people. According to the 2010 Census, there are more than 80 ethnic groups, most of whom are Muslims. Chechens comprise the largest population group in the North Caucasus numbering 1,431,000 (Federal State Statistics Service, 2010). Most Chechens (1,268,000) live in the Chechen Republic. Because of the armed conflict, a part of the Chechens appeared to be outside their historic homeland as they migrated to other regions. Chechens live in different regions of Russia and abroad, in particular in Kazakhstan, where they were forcibly placed during their deportation in 1944, along with the Ingush, Karachay, Balkars, and many other ethnic groups.

O. Pavlova (✉)

Moscow State University of Psychology and Education, Moscow, Russia

The Ingush is the name of a Russian ethnos,¹ which arose from the name of the old Ingush settlements Angusht (now Tarskoe, the Republic of North Ossetia). In Russia there are 444,833 Ingush (Federal State Statistics Service, 2010), the majority of whom live in the Republic of Ingushetia and also inhabit the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia, Chechnya, Moscow, and other Russian cities. In this chapter, for convenience, they are referred to as *Vainakh* because they belong to the Nakh language group and have much in common in their historical development, language, and culture. Karachay and Balkars are the same populations residing mostly in the territory of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia, where they represent the “titular”² ethnic groups. According to the 2010 Census, 218,403 people identified themselves as Karachay and 112,924 as Balkars (Federal State Statistics Service, 2010). Thus, the total number of the Karachay-Balkar ethnic group currently stands at 331,327 people (Federal State Statistics Service, 2010). In addition, the Circassians (*Adyghe* is the self-ethnonym, while the exonym is *Circassians*) belong to the Abkhaz-Adyghe language family. According to the 2010 Census, the number of Circassians in Russia is about 714,845 people (Adyghe, 124,835 people; Kabardians, 516,826 people; Circassians, 73,184 people) (Federal State Statistics Service, 2010). They live mainly in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachaevo-Cherkessia, the Republic of Adygea, and the Krasnodar Territory. All of these ethnic groups belong to Muslim Sunni.

Value Orientations

The value orientations of members of an ethnic group are the foundation for their community. These values are involved in all aspects of people’s lives. Ethnic values that express social ideals are at the basis of human behavior; they form the core of one’s personality and the source of one’s motivation. A great deal of research has been devoted to the study of values and value orientations in psychology. The study of values started with the work of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961) and was later developed by Rokeach (1973), whose approach defined the basic trends in the study of values. Thus, the understanding of values as guidelines for human life belongs to Rokeach (1973). Additional core models in the study of cultural values and their impact on various spheres of people’s lives are represented in the work on cultural syndromes by Triandis (2010), culture dimension by Hofstede (1980), values database by Inglehart (1997), and social axioms proposed by Bond et al. (2004).

¹Most often the term “ethnos” refers to a historically constituted, stable population of people with common objective or subjective features, including origin, a common language, culture, economy, the area of residence, identity, appearance, mentality, etc. From the point of view of social psychology, ethnos is seen as a sustainable group of people who identify themselves as the group members based on criteria perceived as ethno-differentiating (Stefanenko, 2006).

²Names of titular ethnic groups are used in the formation of names of the corresponding republics.

One of the most widespread approaches to the study of value orientations in a cultural perspective is that of Schwartz (2008), which has been used in many studies in different countries. Studying cultural values on the group level, Schwartz proposed bipolar axes of embeddedness-autonomy, hierarchy-egalitarianism, and mastery-harmony (Karandashev, 2004). As Schwartz puts it, the autonomy-embeddedness axis reflects the extent to which members of a society are autonomous or dependent. The egalitarianism-hierarchy axis describes societies in terms of whether their members have equal rights and status, or authorities, roles, and resources are unequally distributed. The harmony-mastery axis shows a society in terms of accepting the social and natural world or the urge to change it.

Social Identity

Identity is one of the central topics in psychology, sociology, and other social sciences. The structure of social identity and its changes, hierarchy, and compatibility among different identity categories are recurrent topics of major scientific and public discourse (Devos, Comby, & Deschamps, 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). In that sense, the issue of the compatibility among public-civil, ethnic, and religious identities becomes particularly important and highly relevant in modern societies as well as for Russian nation-state building. In fact, eminent Russian scientists have been long occupied with concepts of state, civil, and national identity, in an attempt to understand contradictions among these concepts (Arutyunova, 2007; Drobizheva, 2009, 2010, 2012; Gudkov, 2004; Holodkovskii, 2012; Semenenko, 2012; Tishkov, 2010).

State-civil or *national civil identity* is defined in terms of “identification with the citizens of the country, having a solid image of this community, responsibility for it, understanding of its interests, as well as experiencing feelings in connection with this (pride, resentment, frustration or enthusiasm and readiness for reflection)” (Drobizheva, 2010, p. 50). Additionally, Semenenko (2012) suggests that a sense of community with the civic nation and emotional experience of this community is the basis for the formation of civic identity. In relation to these notions, recent polls show that 95% of respondents in Russia identify themselves as citizens of Russia (Drobizheva, 2010), although the data is based on a nationwide majority sample of Russians. Recent surveys show that 95% of respondents in the Russian Federation identify themselves as citizens of Russia. By the year 2011, the Russian identity had become dominant over ethnic ones. At the same time, these results vary by region; for example, in the North Caucasus only 25% of respondents identified themselves as Russians.

Ethnic identity refers to one’s membership of a particular ethnic group (Stefanenko, 2006). Similar to the international work in social psychology, Russian scholars allocate cognitive and affective components to the structure of ethnic identity (Stefanenko, 2006) as well as the existence of an emotionally depicted image of “we” and ethnic interests that determine social behaviors (Drobizheva, 2012). In a similar vein, ethnic identity has been related to the concept of culture, as an ethnic

group is a relatively isolated community that shares common values and traditions such as religious beliefs and rituals, language, sense of historical continuity, the overall affinity (ethno-cultural unity), and the place of origin (in the case of migration) (De Vos, 1982). Ethnic identity has a sense of continuity and an inextricable link with the past, which is an essential part of self-determination of the individual (De Vos, 1982). Ethnic identity plays an important role in maintaining psychological stability, giving meaning to one's existence, and ensuring the implementation of a sense of belonging and attachment (communication needs with a close circle of people). The origin of cultural or ethnic identity has also been referred to the affective-replacement connection to a culture and the image of the motherland (Belik, 2009). Measuring the cognitive and affective components of ethnic identity was proposed by Phinney (1992).

Religious identity has been often discussed in public discourse in Russia and internationally in recent decades (Allport & Ross, 1967; Beit-Hallahmi, 1991; Park, 2007). Consideration of religious identity takes place in the context of individual identity as “the acquisition of their own existential experience through the religion” (Krylov, 2012, p. 27) and in the context of social identity as belonging to a particular community (e.g. the Muslim Ummah). Religion acts as both the content and a tool for the identification process. Religious identity has been conceived as a result of self-identification of the individual or community with reference to a specific religious doctrine or a part of it (Mchedlova, 2012). In keeping with this, the most current question becomes that of Islamic identity, and much research has been devoted to it. In particular, Islamic identity is associated with the fact that Islam is “not only a religion but a secular social system” (Kudrjashova, 2012, p. 158). “Islam is institutionalized almost in all spheres of human life and society, so we can say that “Islam is a way of life” (Albakova, 2009, p. 37).

The study of the specifics of the religious (Islamic) identity is associated primarily with issues of the last decades that have arisen in the North Caucasus such as the two military campaigns in Chechnya, acts of terrorism (in part based on religious reasons), and opposing representatives of various Islamic movements and groups. “Islam in the North Caucasus is one of the factors that shape the local identity influencing the outlook of individual ethnic society” (Malashenko, 2001, p. 61). Research conducted in the various republics of the North Caucasus region reveals a strong Islamic identity, especially among Chechens, Ingush, Dagestan, and Karachay (Malashenko, 2001).

Russian followers of Islam have much in common, due to the specifics of their religion, but at the same time, it is impossible to see the Muslims of Russia as a unified society. In each region inhabited by Muslims, their communities have developed their own specific religious practices. In addition, the degree of involvement of Muslims in their religion varies considerably. For example, members of the Russian Muslim ethnic groups may shape values differently, as well as develop relationships in the structure of social identity, in particular in the context of relations between ethnic and religious identity. In the republics of the North-Eastern Caucasus (Chechnya, Ingushetia, Dagestan), the role of the religious factor is significant; religious identity is a prescribed identity for the representatives of the people living

here (e.g. it is impossible to be a Chechen and not to be a Muslim). At the same time, in the regions of North-West Caucasus (Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Adygea) the role of the religious (Islamic) factor has been greatly reduced. There are persons among the Circassians, and occasionally among the Balkars, who do not identify themselves with the Muslim Ummah. A differentiated analysis of the values and identity of Russian Muslims belonging to various ethnic groups, as well as the study of their age dynamics, has not been researched adequately yet. In this regard, the main goals in the empirical study reported in this chapter are concerned with answering the questions of the specificity of ethnic and age values and the social identity of Russian Muslims in the North Caucasus (as further explained in the following section).

The Current Study

The problems of cross-cultural analysis of cultural values and the structure of the social identity of Russian Muslims that belong to various ethnic groups, as well as the study of their age characteristics seem to us to be inadequately researched and in need of urgent exploration. In this regard, the main research question put forward to be tested by this empirical research is to find an answer to the following: what is the ethnic and age specificity of cultural values and the social identity of Russian Muslims living in the North Caucasus?

The main objectives of the study were:

1. To examine the rank structure of the most and least preferred cultural values using the method developed by Schwartz (1992), as well as the structure of the social identity of representatives of the peoples of the North Caucasus (Chechens, the Ingush, the Circassians, Karachay, and Balkars)
2. To carry out a cross-cultural comparative analysis of the rank structure of the cultural values and social identity
3. To examine age differences of the rank structure of cultural values and social identity in a sample of the Chechens and Ingush represented by two age groups: up to 25 years old and over 25 years old
4. To study the structure of the ethnic identity of respondents and its cognitive and affective components and to conduct their cross-cultural and age analyses

There were two hypotheses in the study:

1. The value systems of Muslims in the North Caucasus are characterized by collectivism and conservatism; these are perceived as highly significant.
2. The specificity of social identity structure is characterized by the categories of ethnic and religious identity highly revealed in it (the categories are most pronounced among the Chechens and Ingush). The religious identity is most pronounced in the Vainakh and Karachay youth.

The scientific novelty and significance of the study is that for the first time, a comparative cross-cultural analysis of cultural values and the structure of social identity has been presented using samples of North-West Caucasus Muslims (Circassians, Karachay, and Balkars) and North-East Caucasus Muslims (Chechens and Ingush). In addition, the sample of the Chechens and Ingush has been first used to compare cultural values and the structure of social identity of two age groups [young people (under 25 years) and middle age (25–55 years)].

Method

Sample

The study was conducted in 2010–2015 using a total sample of 1713 respondents (see Table 1). Of these, there were 508 Chechens, 478 Ingush, 470 Circassians (of these, 435 respondents identified themselves as Kabardians and 35 as Circassians), 132 Karachay, and 125 Balkars. For the purpose of cross-cultural analysis of the values and structure of social identity, we conducted a comparative analysis of the results of all groups of respondents (which were young people up to 25 years old and those from 25 to 55 years old). The study was conducted in the North Caucasus. The respondents under 25 years were university students of the Chechen Republic, the Republic of Ingushetia, and the Republic of Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia. The group of older respondents was comprised of trainees of the Chechen Institute for Teacher Retraining and of the younger respondents' parents. Both groups of respondents took part in the study in their spare time at their universities. The students' parents filled the questionnaires at home and returned them to the university teachers who were helping to conduct the research. The age comparison was made on a sample of Vainakh represented by two groups of respondents: there were respondents of 18–25 years (311 Chechens and 296 Ingush) and respondents older than 25 years (197 Chechens and 182 Ingush). The sample composition is given in Table 1.

Table 1 Sample composition

Ethnic group <i>n</i>	Age categories					
	Young people			Adults		
	Under 25 years		Average age	Age 25–55		Average age
	Male	Female		Male	Female	
Chechens (<i>n</i> = 508)	108	203	19.8	87	110	36.2
Ingush (<i>n</i> = 478)	112	184	19.5	76	106	35.6
Circassians (<i>n</i> = 470)	81	385	21.2	–	–	–
Karachays (<i>n</i> = 132)	55	77	21.8	–	–	–
Balkarians (<i>n</i> = 125)	33	92	22.0	–	–	–
Total	1334		20.86	379		35.9

Measures

The following methods were used as tools:

Schwartz Social Values Survey Respondents were asked to assess the degree of importance of each of the 57 values: the protection of their family, health, true friendship, intelligence, loyalty, etc. After that, average scores were calculated for each value in the sample, and a rank structure of the values that were of the most and least importance to the respondents was constructed. Further a score was calculated using the key for each of the seven blocks of values described by Schwartz (1992): embeddedness, hierarchy, harmony, egalitarianism, intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy, and mastery.

The “Who Am I?” Test Respondents were asked to give answers as many as possible (within 20) to the question “Who am I?” (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). Then a rank structure of identities was designed (from the most significant to the least significant to the respondents). The identities ranked from 1 to 3 in the rank structure are of the greatest importance in the structure of the respondents' social identity.

Ethnic Identity Various components of the ethnic identity were assessed (Phinney, 1992). Respondents were offered to answer questions related to their ethnic identity, their ethnic group, and their attitude to it by putting any mark in the appropriate box (from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”). Examples of the items are as follows: *I have spent a lot of time trying to learn as much as possible about my ethnic group, its history, traditions, and customs; I am an active participant of organizations or social groups, which consist mainly of members from my ethnic group; and I am glad that I belong to my ethnic group.* The significance of affective and cognitive components of ethnic identity of the respondent was calculated in accordance with the key.

Data Processing

The hypotheses were tested using the following statistical methods, implemented in the program SPSS for Windows Version 18.0: data ranking, the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U-Test.

Results

Referring to the results obtained in the first stage of analysis in the study, the most preferred values of respondents have been identified (Table 2).

Table 2 Rank structure of the most preferred values

Ranks	Chechen	Ingush	Circassians	Karachay	Balkar
1	Family protection	Family protection	Respect for parents	Family protection	Respect for elders
2	Respect for elders	Respect for elders	Family protection	Respect for elders	Family protection
3	World peace	National security	World peace	Self-respect	Social order
4	Respect for traditions	World peace	Loyalty	Health	Health
5	National security	Respect for traditions	Health	The meaning of life	Self-discipline
6	True friendship	Social order	True friendship	True friendship	World peace
7	Honesty	True friendship	Self-respect	World peace	Respect for traditions
8	Self-respect	Piety	Cleanliness	Honesty	Cleanliness
9	Politeness	Politeness	The meaning of life	Loyalty	Self-respect
10	Social order	Loyalty	Honesty	Politeness	True friendship

In the top ten most preferred values of all groups of respondents, first was the value of *embeddedness* (protection of the family, respect for elders). For the representatives of the North-Eastern Caucasus (Chechens, Ingush) the following values were also important: *national security*, *politeness*, and *respect for traditions* (this value was also one of the most preferred among Balkars). For the representatives of the North-West Caucasus (Circassians, Karachay, Balkars), the top value was *health*. In addition, all groups of respondents named *world at peace* and *true friendship* in the top ten values.

We examined the changes in the value structure depending on the age of respondents by comparing the answers of the respondents of two age groups of the Ingush and Chechens—up to 25 years old and older than 25 years.

The analysis of Table 3 showed greater similarity of preferences of the respondents, by age rather than by their ethnicity. For the younger generation of both groups of respondents, the top ten values include *true friendship* and *politeness*, whereas for persons over 25 years old, the most important values are *health* and *piety* (note that young Ingush put *piety* at the bottom of the top ten values, whereas older persons (both the Chechens and Ingush) ranked it fifth). Chechens over 25 years old did not include in their top ten priorities of values such important qualities as the value of *respect for traditions* and *social justice* (the 12th and 15th places, respectively), giving preference to *health* and *piety* and *self-respect* and *loyalty* (the moral qualities that are so valued in the Chechen culture).

The analysis of the least preferred values has shown that all the ethnic groups named values such as *power*, *influence*, and *authority* as the least preferred. In addition, among the least preferred values, the values of affective autonomy stood

Table 3 Rank structure of the most preferred values depending on age

Ranks	Chechen		Ingush	
	Under 25 years old	Older than 25 years old	Under 25 years old	Older than 25 years old
1	Family protection	Family protection	Family protection	Family protection
2	Respect for elders	World at peace	Respect for elders	World at peace
3	Respect for traditions	Respect for elders	National security	Respect for elders
4	World at peace	National security	Social justice	Respect for traditions
5	National security	Piety	True friendship	Piety
6	True friendship	Self-respect	World at peace	Health
7	Honesty	Honesty	Respect for traditions	Responsibility
8	Social justice	Loyalty	Politeness	Social justice
9	Politeness	Health	Loyalty	Honesty
10	Meaning of life	Piety	Piety	National security

Table 4 Rank structure of the least preferred values depending on age

Ranks	Chechen		Ingush	
	Under 25 years old	Older than 25 years old	Under 25 years old	Older than 25 years old
1	Power	Power	Power	Power
2	Influence	Courage	Courage	Indulging yourself
3	Temperance	Influence	Pleasure	Influence
4	Indulging yourself	Pleasure	Influence	Pleasure
5	Courage	Authority	Indulging yourself	Courage
6	Diversity of life	Diversity of life	Authority	Life enjoyment
7	Pleasure	Indulging yourself	Diversity of life	Diversity of life
8	Life enjoyment	Interesting life	Life enjoyment	Authority
9	Modesty	Life enjoyment	Unity with nature	Unity with nature
10	Authority	Privacy	Mature love	Interesting life

out (*pleasure, enjoyment of life, courage, diversity of life, indulging oneself*). The age-related comparison of the least preferred values can be seen in Table 4.

Tables 3 and 4 show the results of the study of age-related features of a rank structure of the most and least preferred cultural values of Chechen and Ingush respondents. Among the least significant values, young Chechens named such values as *moderation* and *modesty*. For older Chechens *interesting life* and *privacy* are not significant. All Ingush respondents named *unity with nature* among the insignificant values, while the young Ingush respondents placed the value of *mature love* here too.

A comparative analysis of the blocks of values was conducted, using the rank structure of values. The analysis of the medium blocks of values showed the priority of such blocks as **embeddedness** (*respect for elders, respect for tradition, family safety, discipline, politeness, mutual helpfulness, national security, maintaining one's public image, commitment, piety, cleanliness*), **egalitarianism** (*equality, social justice, loyalty, honesty, responsibility*), and **harmony** (*world at peace, world of beauty, environmental protection*) for all groups of respondents (differences were not significant). The analysis showed all respondents to have an almost completely identical structure of the blocks of values.

Comparative analysis of average numbers for blocks of values according to age showed that there were no significant differences in the Ingush group, whereas Chechens had significant differences in all blocks of values. Average scores received by the blocks of values among young Chechens were significantly higher than those among the respondents older than 25, which reflects the desire of the Chechen youth to give a maximum evaluation for everything that was subjected to our analysis (i.e., "response bias"). In general, it can be said that the trends in changing the importance of values depending on the age of the respondents are insignificant.

At the second stage of the analysis, features of the structure of social identity of the respondents were considered. Ethnic and religious identities were often pointed out in the first and second places (respectively) by the Chechens and Ingush. The representatives of the people of the North-West Caucasus, on the contrary, put such categories as human and positive personality characteristics (*intelligent, kind, sociable, honest, modest, proud*, etc.) on the first places, i.e., into the categories of personal, not social identity. However, it should be clarified that the greatest religiosity among the peoples of the North-West Caucasus is demonstrated by Karachay, who in response to the test "Who am I" put religious identity in the second place after the "human" category. It is also even higher than ethnic identity, which is on the fourth place. For a variety of identity categories, all Caucasian respondents showed the same results: gender category (fifth place), occupation (sixth place), and civic identity (tenth place). In Table 5 age comparison of certain categories of Vainakh identity is presented.

As it can be seen in Table 6, the frequency of the use of the category of ethnic identity depends on the age of the Ingush: the most actualized ethnic identity is among Ingush aged over 25 years old. Absolutely different age characteristics are demonstrated by Vainakh religious identity: The Ingush over 25 show the highest level of religious identity among the entire sample of the Ingush, whereas Chechens over 25 are characterized by the lowest level of religious identity among the entire Chechen sample. Civic identity results differ among Ingush of different age: among the older generation, that identity category was indicated by more than 22% of respondents, while among young people it is typical only for 7%.

The study of ethnic identity structure and its components (cognitive and affective) by the test "an expression of ethnic identity" has shown that the affective component of ethnic identity is expressed more among all the groups of respondents. The measurement results of the components of the ethnic identity presented in Table 7

Table 5 Mean values for blocks of cultural values of the Chechens and Ingushetians depending on age

Blocks of values	Age group							
	Chechen				Ingush			
	Under 25 years old	Rank	Older than 25 years old	Rank	Under 25 years old	Rank	Older than 25 years old	Rank
Embeddedness	5.02 ^a	2	3.79 ^a	1	4.88	1	5.08	2
Hierarchy	3.26 ^c	7	2.10 ^c	7	3.29	7	3.34	6
Harmony	4.52 ^a	3	3.45 ^a	3	4.37	3	4.60	3
Egalitarianism	5.13 ^b	1	3.70 ^b	2	4.86	2	5.15	1
Intellectual autonomy	4.13 ^b	5	2.85 ^b	5	4.00	5	4.38	5
Affective autonomy	3.48 ^c	6	2.17 ^c	6	3.39	6	3.14	7
Mastery	4.25 ^c	4	2.86 ^c	4	4.13	4	4.41	4

^aDifferences are valid at the level 0.05

^bDifferences are valid at the level 0.01

^cDifferences are valid at the level 0.001 based on Mann-Whitney U-test

Table 6 Frequency of specified categories identification among Ingush and Chechens of different age (%)

Identity category	Under 25 years old	Older than 25 years old
Ingush		
Ethnic	64.4	80.0
Religious	57.7	66.7
State-civil	7.2	22.2
Chechen		
Ethnic	68.3	41.8
Religious	52.3	27.3
State-civil	11.6	12.7

Table 7 Intensity of ethnic identity components depending on age^a

	Ingush		Chechens	
	Cognitive component	Affective component	Cognitive component	Affective component
Under 25 years old	3.0	3.2	2.5	2.9
Older 25 years old	2.7	3.3	1.7	2.1
Significance <i>p</i>	0.424	0.032	0.001	0.001

^aCognitive component depends on the age group among both the Ingush and Chechens as statistically significant differences were found. In the group of Chechens the affective component also found to be dependent on age, because statistically significant differences were found

suggest that the affective component of ethnic identity dominates in different age groups of respondents.

Discussion

This study was conducted on the cultural value orientations following Schwartz's theory. We showed that among all groups of respondents, the values of **embeddedness**, **egalitarianism**, and **harmony** dominate. This means that the studied ethnic groups are characterized by strong group solidarity, collectivistic patterns of behavior, close group communication, mutual help, and the need to care for each other, as well as the acceptance of the present world as it is, with a lack of desire to change and improve it. In addition, the focus on these polls says that in the modern North Caucasus society personality development and self-improvement are complicated; there is a strong dependence of people on one another along with failure of unequal role obligations. Using the data analysis presented in the research by Lebedeva and Tatarko (2007), the relationship between the importance of values on the cultural level and the attitudes to the economic development and the level of psychological well-being of an individual can be traced. The high importance of **embeddedness** values sets on economic paternalism, political authoritarianism approval, and a positive attitude to existing policies. At the same time, the value of *embeddedness* does not promote psychological well-being and a higher subjective socioeconomic status. Besides, it does not contribute to a favorable forecast of one's financial situation.

The high importance of **egalitarianism** values indicates a high overall level of confidence setting the economic paternalism, orientation to social equality, and negative attitudes to discrimination. It does not promote a positive attitude toward cultural diversity and long-term planning of one's life. In addition, the values of egalitarianism lead to short-term planning of people's lives.

The high significance of **harmony** values facilitates focus on economic paternalism, high level of confidence, and focus on social equality and does not contribute to the optimistic forecast of one's financial position and positive attitude to existing policies. Thus the study of cultural values of Muslims of the North Caucasus has shown that the values most significant for them (those of egalitarianism, embeddedness (conservatism), and harmony) prove the respondents' setting toward economic paternalism that has a negative impact on economic growth and industrial development in the region.

Empirical research has demonstrated little value of *courage* among the respondents. The low-risk appetite is due to the situation of social instability in the North Caucasus, in general, as well as the effects of the two Chechen military campaigns; among the factors "that make the risk more noticeable are the following: greater sensitivity to threats and hazards (disappearance of magical and religious justifications and rationalization); greater awareness of the threats (increasing the educational level)" (Freik, 2002, p. 33; Sztompka, 1999). Analysis of the structure and of

the individual components of social identity showed that both ethnic and religious identities were usually put on the first and second places (respectively) by Chechens and Ingush, indicating, firstly, their high importance for the Vainakh and, secondly, a well-pronounced collectivistic nature of the culture of these people, as religious and ethnic identity are categories of social identity. In most answers by Chechens and Ingush, the ethnic and religious identities are merged into one: “I am Chechen, Muslim”; “I am a Muslim Ingush woman” (Pavlova, 2013, pp. 123–124). This is supported by research: “Ethnicity and religion for the Chechens are closely related, complementary inseparable components of identity” (Zhemchuraeva, 2010, p. 12). For the Ingush “religion is a powerful marker of identity: it is impossible to be Ingush and not to be a Muslim” (Matveeva & Savin, 2012, p. 105). This tendency was hardly found among the representatives of the North-West Caucasus (its features were traced among Karachay but expressed in only about 10% of the cases). A weak degree of religious identity of the people of North-West Caucasus has been widely described in recent studies. In particular, based on the opinion of I. Maremsaova, “with a total fear of God, the assignment of Karachay-Balkars to a particular denomination is secondary” (Maremsaova, 2002, p. 212).

In terms used by De Vos and Romanucci-Ross (1982), ethnic identity reflects the essence of the “forms of identification, facing the past, and embodied in the cultural traditions of a particular individual or group” (p. 363). Exploring the problem of the orientation of the “I” in the historical dynamics, De Vos defines three types of orientation: at the moment, as a citizen of the state and as an individual having a specific socioeconomic status; in the future, as a supporter of any ideology in a secular or a religious form; and in the past, that is, commitment to ethnic identity. The “I” orientation for the future is ideological and is committed to the ideal of the future development, taking into account the individual’s religious affiliation. Answering the question of the relationship orientation of the “I” for the past with a focus on the present and the future, De Vos (1982) argues that “without realizing the past, the present does not make sense.” “In the ideological orientations, in both religious and secular forms, the construction of the ideal future is based on the images of the past era” (De Vos & Romanucci-Ross, 1982, p. 363). Thus, based on the concept of De Vos, it can be concluded that the highly expressed ethnic identity suggests a close connection of the Chechens, Ingush, and Karachay with the past, with their culture, and their traditions. Actualization of religious identity reveals the image of the future based on the ideology of Islam. A low degree of importance of civic identity for all groups of the respondents indicates a low actualization of the present. The low level of civic identity can be explained by a complex and dramatic history of the North Caucasian people within the Russian/Soviet state: the Caucasian War in the era of the Tsarist Russia; Soviet deportations of Chechens, Ingush, Karachay, and Balkars; and two Chechen wars—all this has led to dozens of deaths³

³For example, for the Chechen republic, “the losses incurred in the course of two wars, comparable in relative terms with the losses of the Soviet Union during the Second World War.” Cit. Po: Severnyj Kavkaz: slozhnosti integracii (I), jetnichnost’ i konflikt. Doklad № 220 (Evropa)—19

and sufferings, which are still relevant. Thus, in the Chechen society, memories of the wars are still “alive” in people’s minds and affect their physical and mental condition. The consequences of stressful situations are fear, pessimism, depression, self-doubt, aggression, and negative attitude to certain categories of people. The negative image of Chechens, which was formed in the public consciousness, aggravated the state of frustration of the Chechen society even more. After the problem of ethnic and religious tensions has become global, in today’s world it acquires its own specificity in the Chechen society. The younger generation is faced with a deficit of dialogue with other cultures, as Chechnya and Ingushetia today are actually mono-ethnic regions. The population of the Chechen Republic is represented mainly by Chechens (93.5%); in the Republic of Ingushetia, it consists mainly of Ingush (93.5%). It means that currently those are in fact mono-ethnic regions; hence the problem of lacking the experience of interethnic relations occurs. This makes it impossible to study and appreciate cultural diversity and to value this diversity, and it also affects the formation of ethno-national units, stereotypes, multicultural competence, and negative impact on the formation of civic identity.

The dominance of the affective component of ethnic identity over the cognitive one in our respondents indicates a high importance of belonging to their ethnic group. According to Stefanenko (2006), the “affective component of ethnic identity to a greater extent reflects the significance for an individual of his/her belonging to a particular ethnic group, the degree of ethnic identity influence on the self-person, on the expression of this identity within its overall self-concept” (p. 54).

Conclusions

The study of values’ structure and social identity of the representatives of Muslim people of North Caucasus leads to the following conclusions:

1. The value structure of the Muslims of North Caucasus is characterized by the importance of such value blocks as embeddedness (*conservatism*), egalitarianism, and harmony. For the Circassians, Balkars, Ingush, Karachay, and Chechens, the most important values are the values of embeddedness (*respect for elders, respect for traditions, family safety, discipline, courtesy, national security, maintaining one’s public image, commitment, devotion, cleanliness*), egalitarianism (*equality, social justice, loyalty, honesty, usefulness, responsibility*), and harmony (*world at peace, world of beauty, environment protection*).
2. The study of age-related features of the blocks of cultural values typical for Chechens and the Ingush has shown that the value structure of Vainakh, as a whole, does not depend on age, but on certain values. There is a tendency to an

increase in the importance of hedonism and hierarchy among the respondents under the age of 25.

3. Analysis of the structure of the social identity of all groups of respondents showed a special significance of the categories of ethnic and religious identity among the Chechens and the Ingush, as well as a low actualization of civic identity for all groups of respondents.
4. Age-related comparison of the social identity structure of Vainakh has shown significant differences in the level of religious and civic identity: the Ingush over 25 years old have the highest level of religious identity among the entire Ingush sample, whereas the Chechens over 25 years old have the lowest level of religious identity among the entire Chechen sample. The significance of civic identity is much higher in the Ingush older than 25 years. Civic identity results differ among Ingush of different ages: among the older generation that category of identity was indicated among more than 22% of respondents, while among young people it was indicated among only 7%.
5. The study of cognitive and affective components of ethnic identity showed that all groups of the respondents strongly express the affective component of ethnic identity.

Thus, the cross-cultural and age-related analysis showed that the cultural value orientations of Muslims of the North Caucasus have much in common and are minimally dependent on age. The study of the social identity structure of the respondents revealed quite significant age and ethnic characteristics of ethnic, religious, and civic components of the structure.

References

- Albakova, F. J. (2009). Kanony social'no-ekonomicheskoy dejatel'nosti v islame [Canons of socio-economic activities in Islam]. In S. V. Pirogova (Ed.), *Cennostnye orientiry v ekonomicheskoi srede islamskogo mira: Sbornik statei [Values as guidelines in the economic environment of the Islamic world: A collection of papers]* (pp. 37–41). Moscow: MAKSS Press. (in Russian).
- Allport, G., & Ross, M. J. (1967). Personal religious orientation and prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 5(4), 432–443.
- Arutyunova, E. M. (2007). Rossiiskaya identichnost' v predstavlenii moskovskikh studentov [Russian identity as seen by Moscow students]. *Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniia*, 8. Retrieved from <http://www.isras.ru/files/File/Socis/2007-08/arutyunova.pdf> (in Russian).
- Beit-Hallahmi, B. (1991). Religion and identity: Concepts, data, questions. *Social Science Information*, 30, 81–95.
- Belik, A. A. (2009). *Kul'turnaya (social'naya) antropologiya [Cultural (social) anthropology]*. Moscow: Russian State University for the Humanities. (in Russian).
- Bond, M. H., Leung, K., Au, A., Tong, K. K., Reimel de Carrasquel, S., Murakami, F., et al. (2004). Culture-level dimensions of social axioms and their correlates across 41 cultures. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 35(5), 548–570.
- De Vos, G. (1982). Ethnic pluralism: Conflict and accommodation. In G. A. De Vos & L. - Romanucci-Ross (Eds.), *Ethnic identity: Cultural continuities and change* (pp. 5–41). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

- De Vos, G., & Romanucci-Ross, L. (1982). Ethnicity: Vessel of meaning and emblem of contrast. In G. A. De Vos & L. Romanucci-Ross (Eds.), *Ethnic identity: Cultural continuities and change* (pp. 363–390). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Devos, T., Comby, L., & Deschamps, J.-C. (1996). Asymmetries in judgements of ingroup and outgroup variability. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 7, 95–144.
- Drobizheva, L. M. (2009). Rossiiskaya identichnost' v massovom soznanii [Russian identity in the mass consciousness]. *Vestnik Rossiiskoi Natsii*, 3(1), 135–144. Retrieved from <http://www.valerytishkov.ru/engine/documents/document1223.doc> (in Russian).
- Drobizheva, L. M. (2010). Identity and ethnic attitudes of Russians in the own/other ethnic medium. *Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya*, 12, 49–58. Retrieved from <http://www.isras.ru/files/File/Socis/2010-12/Drobizheva.pdf> (in Russian).
- Drobizheva, L. M. (2012). Etnicheskaya identichnost' [Ethnic identity]. In I. S. Semenenko (Ed.), *Politicheskaya identichnost' i politika identichnosti [Political identity and the identity policy]* (Vol. 1, p. 130). Moscow: ROSSPEN. (in Russian).
- Federal State Statistics Service. (2010). Retrieved from http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/Documents/Vol4/pub-04-01.pdf
- Freik, N. (2002). Petr Shtompka. Doverie: sotsiologicheskaya teoriya [Piotr Sztompka. Trust: A sociological theory]. *The Russian Sociological Review*, 2(3), 30–41. (in Russian).
- Gudkov, L. D. (2004). *Negativnaya identichnost'. Stat'i 1997–2002 godov [Negative identity. Papers published in 1997–2002]*. Moscow: Novoye literaturnoye obozrenie/VTsIOM-A. (in Russian).
- Hofstede, G. (1980). *Culture's consequences: International differences in work-related values*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Holodkovskii, K. G. (2012). Problemy i protivorechiya rossiiskoi identichnosti [Problems and contradictions of Russian identity]. In I. S. Semenenko (Ed.), *Politicheskaya identichnost' i politika identichnosti [Political identity and the identity policy]* (Vol. 2, pp. 232–258). Moscow: ROSSPEN. (in Russian).
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and postmodernization: Cultural, economic and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Karandashev, V. N. (2004). *Metodika Schwarz'a dlya izucheniya cennostey lichnosti: koncepciya i metodicheskoe rukovodstvo [Schwarz's methodology of studying personal values: Concepts and methods]*. Saint Petersburg: Rech'. (in Russian).
- Kluckhohn, C., & Strodtbeck, F. L. (1961). *Variations in value orientations*. Evanston, IL: Row Peterson.
- Krylov, A. N. (2012). *Religioznaya identichnost'. Individual'noe i kollektivnoe samosoznanie v postindustrial'nom prostranstve [Religious identity. Individual and collective identity in post-industrial space]* (2nd ed.). Moscow: IKAR. (in Russian).
- Kudrjashova, I. V. (2012). Politicheskie izmeneniya i transformaciya identichnosti v stranah musul'manskogo Vostoka [Political changes and the transformation of identity in the Muslim East]. In I. S. Semenenko (Ed.), *Politicheskaya identichnost' i politika identichnosti [Political identity and the identity policy]* (Vol. 2, pp. 155–184). Moscow: ROSSPEN. (in Russian).
- Kuhn, M. H., & McPartland, T. S. (1954). An empirical investigation of self-attitudes. *American Sociological Review*, 19(1), 68–76.
- Lebedeva, N. M., & Tataro, A. N. (2007). *Cennosti kultury i razvitie obshchestva [Cultural values and the development of society]*. Moscow: HSE Publishing House. (in Russian).
- Malashenko, A. V. (2001). *Islamskie orientiry Severnogo Kavkaza [Islamic landmarks of the North Caucasus]*. Moscow: Gendalf.
- Maremshaova, I. I. (2002). *Evol'yutsiya etnicheskogo soznaniya karachaevo-balkarskogo naroda [The evolution of ethnic consciousness in the Karachay-Balkar people]* (Doctoral dissertation, Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography, Dagestan Russian Academy of Sciences Scientific Center, Makhachkala).
- Matveeva, A., & Savin, I. (2012). Ingushetiya: vystraivaya identichnost', preodolevaya konflikt [Ingushetia: building the identity, overcoming conflicts]. In A. G. Matveeva, S. A. Ju, & I. S. Savin (Eds.), *Severnyi Kavkaz: Vzglyad iznutri. Vyzovy i problemy social'no-politicheskogo razvitiya [The North Caucasus: the view from the inside. Challenges and problems of social and*

- political development*] (pp. 105–110). Moscow/London: Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences/Saferworld. (in Russian).
- Mchedlova, M. M. (2012). Religioznaya identichnost' [Religious identity]. In I. S. Semenenko (Ed.), *Politicheskaya identichnost' i politika identichnosti [Political identity and the identity policy]* (Vol. 1, pp. 123–127). Moscow: ROSSPEN. (in Russian).
- Mchedlova, M. M. (2015). Islam and the unity of the Russian society: Modernity and historical experience. *Islam in the Modern World*, 11(1), 93–102. <https://doi.org/10.20536/2074-1529-2015-11-1-93-102>. (in Russian).
- Park, C. L. (2007). Religiousness/spirituality and health: A meaning systems perspective. *Journal of Behavioral Medicine*, 30(4), 319–328.
- Pavlova, O. S. (2013). Etnicheskaya, religioznaya i gosudarstvenno-grazhdanskaya identichnost' chechencev i ingushei: sodержanie i problemy sootnosheniya [Ethnic, religious and civil identity of Chechens and the Ingush: The content and problems of the balance]. *Sotsial'naya Psihologiya i Obshchestvo*, 2, 123–124. (in Russian).
- Phinney, J. (1992). The multigroup ethnic identity measure: A new scale for use with diverse groups. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 7, 156–176.
- Rokeach, M. (1973). *The nature of human values*. New York, NY: Free Press.
- Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theory and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 25, pp. 1–65). New York, NY: Academic Press.
- Schwartz, S. (2008). Cultural value orientations: Nature and implications of national differences. *Psychology. Journal of Higher School of Economics*, 5(2), 37–67. (in Russian).
- Semenenko, I. S. (2012). Grazhdanskaya identichnost' [Civil identity]. In I. S. Semenenko (Ed.), *Politicheskaya identichnost' i politika identichnosti [Political identity and the identity policy]* (Vol. 1, pp. 77–80). Moscow: ROSSPEN. (in Russian).
- Stefanenko, T. G. (2006). *Etnopsihologiya [Ethnopsychology]*. Moscow: Aspekt Press. (in Russian).
- Sztompka, P. (1999). *Trust: A sociological theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In *Psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 149–178). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Tishkov, V. A. (2010). *Rossiyskii narod: kniga dlya uchitelya [The Russian people: A book for teachers]*. Moscow: Prosveshchenie. (in Russian).
- Triandis, H. K. (2010). *Kultura i socialnoe povedenie: uchebnoe posobie [Culture and social behavior: a tutorial]*. Moscow: Forum. (Translation of *Culture and social behavior*, by H. K. Triandis, 2005, Urbana-Champaign, IL: McGraw-Hill) (in Russian).
- Zhemchuraeva, S. Sh. (2010). *Teoretiko-metodologicheskie aspekty sociologicheskoi diagnostiki identichnosti chechencev v polietnicheskoy srede [Theoretical and methodological aspects of sociological diagnosis of the Chechen identity in a multiethnic environment]* (Ph.D. dissertation, Saratov Chernyshevsky State University, Saratov, Russian Federation) (in Russian).
- Zorin, V. U. (2016). Musul'mane Rossii: realii formirovaniya grazhdanskoi identichnosti [Muslims of Russia: Realities of forming a civil identity]. *Islam in the Modern World*, 12(3), 117–126. (in Russian).

Pavlova, Olga (Ph.D. in Pedagogy, Moscow State University) is an Associate Professor at the Department of Cross-Cultural Psychology and Psychological Problems of Multicultural Education, Moscow State University of Psychology and Education. She is a Member of the Russian Society for Religious Studies and the author of 4 monographs and 90 articles on the issues of cross-cultural psychology. Her research interests are focused on the study of the socio-psychological features of ethnic groups in the North Caucasus and the psychology of Islam and the religious identity of Muslims.

Intergenerational Transmission of Values in Urban and Rural Areas of Russia: The Role of Perceived Psychological Closeness



Dmitrii Dubrov and Alexander Tatarko

In recent years, intergenerational transmission of values in families has been attracting increasing interest (Barni, 2009). Another term for this phenomenon can often be encountered in the literature: cultural transmission. Since values are directly related to the culture, these concepts can be viewed as synonyms (Schwartz, 2014). As noted by researchers, cultural transmission is important for continuity in the society, as it maintains the relationship between members of different generations and allows saving knowledge about the culture and cultural traditions (Schönpflug, 2001; Trommsdorff, 2009). Currently, due to socioeconomic changes, a value gap between generations, as well as the heterogeneity in the value orientations of people, is observed in different sociocultural contexts (e.g., urban and rural) (Fuligni & Zhang, 2004; Swader, 2013).

Adolescence is a very important stage of internalization of values. Adolescent children are extremely susceptible to messages that transmit values, more than in any other period preceding childhood (Padilla-Walker, 2007), especially from peers (Steca, Monzan, Greco, & D'Addario, 2012). Therefore, intergenerational transmission of values should be studied on the sample of adolescents and their parents. The nature of relationships between parents and children plays a significant role for value transmission process [e.g., emotional bonding (Roest, Dubas, & Gerris, 2010) that brings us to the idea of the necessity to study the psychological closeness between parents and children while studying of the transmission of values (Lee & Gillath, 2016)]. Unfortunately, studies that compare the socialization environment in relation to the transmission of values are still few in number and mainly concern immigrants in different cultural environments, comparing their values with the ones in the native culture (Phalet & Schönpflug, 2001). Thus, the question arises whether the process of transmission of values changes from one generation to another, depending on the

D. Dubrov (✉) · A. Tatarko
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: ddubrov@hse.ru; atatarko@hse.ru

social context (type of settlement—urban or rural) and the perceived psychological closeness between parents and adolescents.

This issue is not so fully studied, and we expect to expand knowledge in this research area. Moreover, our results will be useful for parents as well as educators and psychologists working with families and children.

The Essence of Value Transmission Between Generations

There are several definitions of the concept “intergenerational transmission of values” (Barni, 2009; Schönplflug, 2001; Trommsdorff, 2009). We define it as the transfer of values from one generation to another within the process of an individual’s socialization. Initially, the process of socialization was understood as the process of adaptation of an individual to a society which, in turn, shapes each of its members in accordance with the existing culture. Thus, society acts as the subject of the action and the individual as the object at which this action is aimed. In accordance with this approach, there is a distinction between “narrow socialization” and “broad socialization” (Arnett, 1995). “Narrow socialization” presumes obedience and submission to parental and social values and disapproves deviation from cultural expectations. “Broad socialization” presumes individualism, independence, and self-expression of children. This second form of socialization is based on the view that not only do individuals adapt to the society, but they also influence their life circumstances and themselves. The essence of socialization is the combination of adaptation and isolation within a particular society. In this second approach, an individual takes an active role in the socialization process.

Despite these differences, the transmission of values is present in all cultures (Boehnke, 2001; Knafo & Schwartz, 2003; Phalet & Schönplflug, 2001). As mentioned, the transmission of values between generations is an important task of socialization and is essential for the functioning of society (Fulgini & Zhang, 2004; Schönplflug, 2001). This succession is dependent on the efficiency of the transmission processes. Not all values are transmitted to the same extent, and not all have the same degree of influence. It is believed that collectivist values are transmitted better than individualistic ones (Knafo & Schwartz, 2001).

Currently the process of transmission of values is defined as an interactive process in which it is assumed that parents and children act as both subjects and objects in the process of socialization. (Kuczynski & Navara, 2006; Roest et al., 2010). Since the transmission is interactive in nature, it may serve as a reason for both the differences between generations and the similarities between them: The differences are not necessarily a mistake, but rather a possible result. In the literature, this version of the transmission of values is called vertical, i.e., the transmission of values from parents to children (Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis, & Sam, 2011).

Steca et al. (2012) found a similarity of value orientations in the self-enhancement and self-transcendence value meta-values among parents, adolescents, and their peers at the level of means and correlations. As a result, at the

level of means, the similarity in the value orientations of adolescents was higher with their peers than with parents. After conducting the correlation analysis, a similarity was observed between male adolescents and their parents in the self-transcendence values and in the self-enhancement values—both with parents and peers. At the same time, girls showed a similarity in the self-enhancement values only with parents. The authors refer such results as the so-called generational effect, the essence of which lies in the fact that the younger generation tends to take the values of the self-enhancement block rather than ones of the self-transcendence (Buzzi, Cavalli, & de Lillo, 1997). In addition, it is known that the main activity of adolescents is communication with peers. Here we see the phenomenon of “perceived similarity,” the essence of which lies in the fact that adolescents are convinced that they are similar to their friends and strive to be like them. But this phenomenon is only possible when there is mutual sympathy and friendship between individuals (Steca et al., 2012). So here, as we have seen, attraction plays a large role.

In addition to parents, children themselves and their peers are involved in the process of transmission of values. In the literature, this version of the transmission is referred to as “horizontal,” i.e., the value orientation of children is affected by fellow peers (Berry et al., 2011; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981). We can conclude that during adolescence, the influence of peer values is more important than the influence of parents’ ones. However, it remains unclear whether this is true for adolescents living in different sociocultural contexts (e.g., urban and rural).

The Impact of the Place of Living and Family on the Transmission of Values

Along with the influence listed above (family, peers, friends, and their relationships), values of parents and adolescents are affected also by the sociocultural context in which these relationships occur (Trommsdorff, 2009). Fuligni and Zhang (2004) studied the attitudes toward family responsibilities of adolescents living in the urban and rural societies of modern China. China has only recently switched to market economy, so the study checked what changes have occurred in the values of the younger generation and the extent to which they are affected by their place of residence. They found that a positive attitude to family responsibilities was less characteristic of male adolescents living in the city. This can refer to the fact that the birth rate is strictly regulated in the city, so almost all of the respondents were only children, and this, according to some researchers, promotes the development of individualism. In rural areas the social security system is less developed, so all family members have to devote more time to caring for loved ones. In addition, they found that such attitudes are manifested most in families with close, warm, trusting relationships. The authors suggest that this factor is universal for all countries (Fuligni & Zhang, 2004).

In general, the family has a great importance for adolescents, despite the individualistic tendencies among male adolescents living in the city. Evidently, in the urban environment, the values of adolescents are more individualistic. For what reason? And how is the urban environment different from the nonurban one in terms of socialization? Zharova (2010) pointed out that the main difference of the urban environment from the rural one in terms of socialization is the nature of contacts between individuals. In the rural environment, contacts are fewer but more stable, while in the urban environment, they are numerous but less stable. Therefore in the rural environment, the social control of compliance with social norms and rules is higher than in urban environments, where the “rules and regulations are less stringent, and subjects of interaction are less judgmental about deviations in behavior, so everything “new” is much easier to digest than in a less urbanized environment” (Zharova, 2010, pp. 3–4).

Sociologists point out that rural society has elements of a “traditional neighborhood community”: a permanent population, close kinship, and neighborly relations (Fadeeva, 2007; Vinogradskii, 1998). The way of life of many families living in villages is agricultural, and adolescents have to help parents in the household. In rural areas in modern Russia, infrastructure for sport and leisure activities is less developed than in cities; thus adolescents have to spend more time at home.

These are some of the specific conditions for socialization in the urban and rural environments. In rural areas, socialization is directed more toward collectivism and social control than in the city. Therefore, we expect that the values of adolescents and their parents in the urban environment will be different from those of adolescents and their parents living in rural areas.

The process of the transmission of values is not only affected by the value orientation of parents, children, and their peers but also by the sociocultural context, i.e., the type of settlement.

Therefore, we hypothesize that the social context (urban-rural) affect the values of adolescents and their parents (Barni, 2009; Fadeeva, 2007; Fuligni & Zhang, 2004; Vinogradskii, 1998; Zharova, 2010).

H1 Horizontal value transmission will prevail over vertical transmission, resulting in larger similarity between value profiles of adolescents and the value profiles of their peers than with the value profiles of their parents in both urban and rural areas.

H2a The significance of transmission of “openness to change” values and “self-enhancement” values is higher in families living in the city than in the families living in the rural area.

H2b The significance of transmission of “conservation” values and “self-transcendence” values is higher in families living in the village than in the families living in the urban area.

The differences between generations may be attributable to the choice that parents make as to which values they are going to transmit and the choice that children make as to the adoption or rejection of these values. In other words, the transmission is defined as a two-step process: At the first step, children perceive the values that their parents would like them to accept; at the second step, children can choose to either

accept or reject the values they perceive. It remains unclear as to what determines the acceptance of values by adolescents.

According to Barni and her colleagues' (2011) follow-up study of the intergenerational transmission of values, a moderate acceptance may be because of the low conformity of parental values, distance in the relationship between the child and the parent, or the parent's inability to legitimize the autonomy of the child. Low conformity and distanced relationship may make it harder for a child to identify themselves with their parents, because the parents are perceived as distant to each other and to their child. However, if the parents demand obedience from the child, do not give them an opportunity to choose or do not recognize their separate identity, the child can see this as a threat to their autonomy. It is therefore very important to have a positive psychological climate in the family and warm and trusting relationships between parents and children (Barni et al., 2011). It is therefore very important to have a positive psychological climate in the family, warm and trusting relationship between parents and children (Albert & Ferring, 2012; Fuligni & Zhang, 2004; Schönplflug, 2001).

In this regard Schönplflug (2001) pointed out such term as "transmission belts," that is, "conditions favorable for transmission in a particular socioeconomic and cultural context. . ." (p. 175). According to this and some other studies, emotions and emotional bonding within a family create such "transmission belts" (Roest et al., 2010; Schönplflug, 2001). Meanwhile emotions comprise perceived psychological closeness (Lee & Gillath, 2016). Thus, we can assume that the perceived psychological closeness between parents and children affects the adoption of values by the adolescents. However, we expect values which adolescents accept due to perceived psychological closeness to be different in urban and rural areas. According to studies that we reviewed for the previous hypothesis, we suppose that in rural area, adolescents will accept values of social focus (conservation, self-transcendence) and adolescents from urban area will accept values from personal focus (openness to change, self-enhancement).

H3a Perceived psychological closeness between parents and adolescents predicts intergenerational transmission of social focus values in rural area.

H3b Perceived psychological closeness between parents and adolescents predicts intergenerational transmission of personal focus values in urban area.

Thus, the *main objective* of the study is the empirical testing of influence of social context (urban or rural living) on the similarities and differences between the values of parents and children.

Method

Participants

To determine the similarities and differences of values of adolescents and parents in different social context, we interviewed representatives of two generations (parents,

Table 1 Demographic characteristics of the samples of the study

	<i>N</i>	% males	% females	<i>M</i> age (s)
Families living in urban area				
Adolescents	90	40	60	17.6 (1.71)
Parents	90	22.2	77.8	43.3 (5.71)
Families living in rural area				
Adolescents	62	53.2	46.8	15.6 (1.75)
Parents	62	21	79	41.7 (5.39)
Total	304	33.8	66.2	

adolescents), living in Moscow (180 people) and in the villages of Yaroslavl, Tver, and Ivanovo regions in Russia (124 people). We interviewed parents and children from 90 families in Moscow and 62 families living in villages distant from cities. In these villages people live mostly agricultural lives.

The average age of adolescents in the urban sample was 17 and of parents was 43. The average age of adolescents in the rural sample was 15 and of parents was 41 (Table 1).

Materials and Procedure

For empirical study of similarities and differences of the values of parents and adolescents in urban and rural area, we used Portrait Value Questionnaire—Revised (PVQ-R) (Schwartz, Butenko, Sedova, & Lipatova, 2012). We used the Russian version, adapted by Sh. Schwarz in our lab within 2 years of research in several stages on samples of a total of more than 2500 respondents. The questionnaire designed for the study includes 19 values, which are combined in four meta-values scales:

Conservation (security-personal, security-societal, tradition, conformity-rules, conformity-interpersonal)

Self-transcendence (humility, benevolence-caring, benevolence-dependability, universalism-concern, universalism-nature, universalism-tolerance)

Openness to change (self-direction-thought, self-direction-action, stimulation, hedonism)

Self-enhancement (achievement, power-dominance, power-resources, face)

Participants were given 57 descriptions of a person, and they had to assess how much they are similar to that person on 6-point scale: from 1 (*not similar at all*) to 6 (*very similar*).

Psychological closeness. We asked our participants to assess their psychological closeness with other family members on 5-point scale: from 1 (*very far*) to 5 (*very close*). For example: “Please, assess the level of psychological closeness between you and members of your family on 5-point scale: from 1 (*very far*) to 5 (*very close*).”

We conducted the survey at schools in Moscow (urban area) and rural settlements in Yaroslavl, Ivanovo, and Tver regions. Adolescents were given one copy of questionnaire that they filled in either in school or at home and another copy for parents to fill in. Completion of the questionnaire took about 40 minutes.

To test our hypotheses, we compared intra-class correlation [two-way mixed model with measures of consistency (Nichols, 1998)] mean profiles within dyads [adolescents-parents and adolescents-peers (means of all adolescents)] within each family on all values with SPSS version 21 (Knafo & Schwartz, 2003). This allows value similarities between parents and adolescents on family and general levels to be evaluated. We used Fisher transformation, multiple analyses of variance to determine significant differences between rural and urban samples on these indicators. Regression models were constructed to determine the impact of perceived psychological closeness on similarity between value profiles of parents and adolescents.

Results

First we computed means and Cronbach's alphas on meta-values within urban and rural samples (see Table 2).

For testing the hypothesis that values of adolescents in urban society are more similar to the values of peers than parents (H1), we used value profiles of urban and rural adolescents by computing intra-class correlations between the values of adolescents and their parents in each family and between the values of adolescents and the values of their peers. Then we used Fisher transformation to determine the significance of differences between rural and urban samples. The value profile of adolescents is closer to that of their peers than that of their parents in urban and rural samples. Moreover, the urban and rural samples do not significantly differ in these indicators (see Table 3). However, we distinguished significant differences between value profiles of adolescents-parents and adolescents-peers ($z = -1.34$; $p < .01$ in urban area; $z = -1.05$; $p < .01$ in rural area) using the Fisher transformation. This greater similarity of the value profiles of adolescents and peers than to the value profile of the parents is a common trend, independent of the influence of the place of

Table 2 Means and Cronbach's alphas on meta-values within urban and rural samples

Meta-values	Adolescents (urban)			Parents (urban)			Adolescents (rural)			Parents (rural)		
	M	SD	α	M	SD	α	M	SD	α	M	SD	α
Openness to change	4.61	.46	.76	4.03	.63	.79	4.36	.64	.82	3.99	.64	.78
Self-enhancement	3.93	.74	.85	3.59	.77	.85	3.77	.78	.84	3.46	.68	.80
Conservation	3.99	.63	.84	4.50	.66	.78	4.08	.67	.84	4.45	.57	.84
Self-transcendence	4.33	.64	.89	4.44	.60	.87	4.28	.54	.84	4.45	.56	.86

Table 3 Comparison of similarities of values between adolescents and parents in urban and rural areas

Value profiles	Urban		Rural		z	p
	M (r)	SD	M (r)	SD		
Adolescents-parents	.36	.28	.34	.32	.17	.86
Adolescents-peers	.53	.14	.50	.23	.23	.82

Note: M (r) intra-class correlation mean

residence (urban or rural). The hypothesis was partially confirmed. The values of adolescents are more similar to the values of peers than to the values of the parents, in both urban and rural society.

For testing hypotheses that similarity in value profiles between adolescents and their parents in “openness to change” values and “self-enhancement” values is higher in the families living in urban area than in the families living in rural area (H2a) and value similarity between value profiles of adolescents and their parents in “conservation” values and “self-transcendence” values is higher in the families living in rural area than in the families living in urban area (H2b), we used intra-class correlations between parents and adolescents’ values in each family. Then we used multiple analysis of variance (MANOVA) to determine the significance of differences between urban and rural sample. For this kind of analysis, we used Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. To obtain more accurate data, we used a centered means, which are free from error of style of response to questions by the participants. Dependent variables in the study were the four meta-values (conservation, openness to change, self-enhancement, self-transcendence). The independent variable was place of residence (city-village).

We found dependence of meta-values on the place of residence (city-village), Wilks’s $\Lambda = .931$; $F(4, 147.000) = 2.73$; $p = .031$; $\eta^2 = .069$. The preferences of “self-transcendence” meta-value are most different between rural and urban samples. Place of residence explains 6.9% of variance in value profile similarity between adolescents and their parents ($\eta^2 = .069$). In addition, we can notice similarity in the meta-values “openness to changes” and “self-enhancement” is higher in urban families, but the differences were not statistically significant. Meta-values “conservation” (security-personal, security-societal, tradition, conformity-rules, conformity-interpersonal) are better transmitted in the families living in the village, but the differences were not statistically significant again (see Table 4).

Unexpected was that the similarity in profiles in the meta-value “self-transcendence” is significantly higher in the families living in the city than in the village. Therefore, our hypotheses were partially confirmed; the meta-value “self-enhancement” is transmitted better in the urban sample.

To test the hypothesis that perceived psychological closeness between parents and adolescents predicts value transmission (H3), we used regression analysis. In regression model independent variable was perceived psychological closeness between parents and adolescents, and dependent variables were meta-values. Consistent with our predictions, similarity between value profiles in self-transcendence values and overall scores of all values (transmission of these type of values) positively predicted perceived psychological closeness of adolescents to parents in rural sample ($\beta = .377$, $p < .01$; $\beta = .474$, $p < .001$; see Table 5). Therefore, the

Table 4 Comparison of similarities of values between adolescents and parents in urban and rural areas

Value block	Urban	Rural	F	η^2
	M (r)	M (r)		
Conservation	.30	.32	.12	.001
Openness to change	.23	.13	1.50	.010
Self-enhancement	.46	.44	.11	.001
Self-transcendence	.53	.36	9.25*	.058

Note: * $p < .05$. M (r) intra-class correlation mean

Table 5 Standardized regression coefficients predicting similarity on values in rural area: parents/ adolescents

Similarities in meta-values	PPC Parents to adolescents			PPC Adolescents to parents			R^2	F
	B	SE	β	B	SE	β		
Conservation	-.09	.10	-.15	.04	.08	.08	.12	.37
Openness to change	.11	.15	.13	-.15	.12	-.20	.03	.74
Self-enhancement	-.19	.12	-.26	.16	.10	.27	.06	1.59
Self-transcendence	.00	.09	.00	.19	.08	.38**	.14	3.90**
Overall scores of all values	-.03	.06	-.08	.15	.05	.47***	.19	5.42***

Note: PPC perceived psychological closeness; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

Table 6 Standardized regression coefficients predicting similarity on values in urban area: parents/ adolescents

Similarities in meta-values	PPC parents to adolescents			PPC adolescents to parents			R^2	F
	B	SE	β	B	SE	β		
Conservation	-.02	.08	-.03	-.04	.06	-.08	.01	.32
Openness to change	-.19	.10	-.25*	-.05	.07	.09	.05	1.19
Self-enhancement	.02	.08	.04	.00	.06	.01	.00	.06
Self-transcendence	-.01	.07	-.02	.01	.05	.03	.00	.04
Overall scores of all values	-.02	.03	-.07	.04	.02	.21	.04	1.40

Note: PPC perceived psychological closeness; * $p < .05$

closer adolescents perceive their parents, the better value transmission, especially of self-transcendence values in the rural area.

We ran the same analysis on the urban sample. Consistent with our predictions, similarity of profiles in openness to change values (transmission of these type of values) is negatively predicted by perceived psychological closeness of parents to adolescents in rural sample ($\beta = -.250, p < .05$; see Table 6). As β is negative, the farther parents perceive their children, the better openness to change values are transmitted in urban area.

Discussion

The lack of significant differences between the levels of intra-class correlation of the values of families and peers who live in the city and village can be explained by the shared value climate, prevailing in the society (the *zeitgeist*), which Boehnke and other researchers proposed in their studies (Boehnke, 2001; Vedder, Berry, Sabatier, & Sam, 2009).

The same effect took place in the sample of adolescents who live in the city. Their values were more similar to the values of their peers than the ones of their parents. Hence, our hypothesis that horizontal value transmission will prevail over vertical transmission, resulting in larger similarity between value profiles of adolescents and the value profiles of their peers than with the value profiles of their parents in urban and rural areas, was confirmed. Similar results were obtained by Steca and her colleagues (Steca et al., 2012).

In addition, as already noted, adolescence is the most important age for the formation of individual values, and adolescents are extremely susceptible to the messages that transmit values (Padilla-Walker, 2007). Since the main activity at this age is communication with peers, the adolescent value profile in both samples is closer to the profile of their peers than to that of their parents. In our opinion, youth subcultures, which also act as the agents of socialization, play no small part. Here we see a “horizontal” transmission of values, i.e., the value orientation of children is affected by their peers.

According to obtained data, our hypotheses (H2a, H2b) were confirmed partially as the significance of transmission “self-transcendence” values is higher in the families living in the urban area (see Table 4). This can refer to the fact that the meta-value self-transcendence includes values “universalism-tolerance” and “universalism-nature.” What is the reason for this?

As we have already noted, in villages, the level of social control is higher than in the city (Zharova, 2010), therefore any deviation from accepted norms is not approved. The means for the “universalism-tolerance” value are lower in the village than in the city (adolescents, 4.05; parents, 4.13 in urban sample; adolescents, 4.03; parents, 4.11 in rural sample). This can also be explained by higher scores and similarities in the meta-value value conservation (conformity, tradition, security) in the village (see Tables 2 and 4).

As for the universalism value in our view, the environment aspect plays an important role here. People living in cities have already faced problems of ecology, so taking care of nature has moved into the category of “external status values,” which is the most significant one (Yadov, 1975), while environmental problems are less relevant in rural areas, so taking care of nature for the villagers, according to the Yadov hierarchical model of values, is the value of average or below-average status, i.e., less significant (Yadov, 1975). This is why the parents living in the village do not seek to transmit this value to their children. Means on this value were the following: adolescents 3.84 and parents 3.94 in urban sample; adolescents 3.51 and parents 3.75 in rural sample. As we can see, in this case, a “vertical” version of the transmission of values takes place, i.e., from parents to children.

Barni (2009) pointed out that, according to adolescents, their parents mainly try to nurture in them conservation values (tradition, security, conformity), while themselves they are more open to new experiences and challenges. For that reason adolescents refuse to accept these values. They explore and develop their autonomy and independent identity. Openness to change values, which contribute to the achievement of independence, are the most effective for this motivation (Barni, 2009).

The influence of the social context (place of residence) on this process is confirmed not only by our data but also by other studies. (Fulgini & Zhang, 2004; Zharova, 2010). Moreover, according to the data obtained, the hypothesis that perceived psychological closeness between parents and adolescents predicts value transmission was confirmed in both samples. However, we distinguished some peculiarities in it. In the rural sample, perceived psychological closeness between parents and adolescents (in adolescents' perception) positively predicts overall value profile similarity especially in self-transcendence values (humility, benevolence-caring, benevolence-dependability, universalism-concern, universalism-nature, universalism-tolerance). We have already mentioned that collectivistic values (conservation, self-transcendence) are transmitted better than individualistic (openness to change, self-enhancement) ones (Knafo & Schwartz, 2001). And we stated that in rural environment, way of living of many families is mostly agricultural, and adolescents have to help parents about the household. If adolescents perceive their parents psychologically close, such values as benevolence-caring, benevolence-dependability, and universalism-concern from self-transcendence block are transmitted according to this way of life. Members of such families usually help, support, and trust each other. Such relationships form social capital within the family that is defined as a set of resources (trust, mutual support, mutual assistance, attention to the needs of each other) and is mediated by relations between subjects within a particular social unit (e.g., the family) (Carr, Cole, Ring, & Blettner, 2011; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Pearson, Carr, & Shaw, 2008). And vice versa, if members of a family perceive each other far (in our case parents' perception of psychological closeness with their children in urban sample), and the level of social capital is low, such values as self-direction-thought, self-direction-action, stimulation, and hedonism from openness to changes meta-values are transmitted. In sum, all this can explain the results obtained for this hypothesis.

There are some limitations of this study. Firstly, most of our respondents among parents and adolescents in urban sample are women and are men in rural one. Therefore, we controlled for it in MANOVA (in covariance) and regression analysis, and it did not influence our results. Secondly, the sample size is not large, and it would be better to retest our hypotheses on a bigger sample. Thirdly, we explained impact of perceived psychological closeness between parents and adolescents on value transmission by social capital within the family, but actually we did not measure it. We measured only one component of it—psychological closeness. Consequently, our next study of intergenerational transmission of values will be conducted measuring social capital within the family measurement.

Conclusions

Our research allowed us to draw the following conclusions:

1. All values of adolescents are more similar to the values of peers than to parents, in both urban and rural contexts. That is, horizontal transmission of adolescents impacts the values of their fellow peers. Consequently, for adolescents the horizontal transmission of values is more significant than vertical transmission of parents to adolescents.
2. The similarity in the meta-values “openness to change,” “self-enhancement,” and “self-transcendence” between profiles of parents and adolescents is somewhat higher in the families living in the city than in the families living in the village. The significance of transmission of these values is higher in urban context. The similarity between profiles in the meta-value conservation is higher in the families living in the village, i.e., the significance of transmission of these values is higher in more traditional, rural context.
3. The higher adolescents assess perceived closeness with their parents, the better self-transcendence values are transmitted in rural area. The lower parents assess perceived closeness with their children, the better openness to change values are transmitted in urban area. In general, perceived psychological closeness between parents and adolescents (in adolescents’ perception) predicts value transmission in urban and rural contexts.

Summarizing the results of the study, we can say that both forms of cultural transmission of values (horizontal and vertical) are observed in urban and rural contexts. But vertical transmission does not allow transmitting all the values from parents to children. In the urban context, from parents to children primarily self-transcendence values are transmitted and in rural—conservation values. In the horizontal variant of value transmission, there is the influence of friends, peers, and sociocultural context (place of residence) on adolescents’ values from all value meta-values.

References

- Albert, I., & Ferring, D. (2012). Intergenerational value transmission within the family and the role of emotional relationship quality. *Family Science*, 3(1), 4–12. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19424620.2011.671496>
- Arnett, J. (1995). Broad and narrow socialization: The family in the context of a cultural theory. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 57, 617–628. <https://doi.org/10.2307/353917>
- Barni, D. (2009). *Trasmettere valori. Tre generazioni familiari a confronto [Transmittig values. A comparison between three family generations]*. Milano: Unicopli (in Italian).
- Barni, D., Ranieri, S., Scabini, E., & Rosnati, R. (2011). Value transmission in the family: Do adolescents accept the values their parents want to transmit? *Journal of Moral Education*, 40(1), 105–121. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2011.553797>

- Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Breugelmans, S. M., Chasiotis, A., & Sam, D. L. (2011). *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications* (3rd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boehnke, K. (2001). Parent-offspring value transmission in a societal context: Suggestions for a utopian research design with empirical underpinnings. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 32, 241–255. <https://doi.org/10.1177/002202210103200210>
- Buzzi, C., Cavalli, A., & de Lillo, A. (1997). *Giovani verso il duemila [Young people toward two thousand]*. Il Mulino: Bologna (in Italian).
- Carr, J. C., Cole, M. S., Ring, J. K., & Blettner, D. P. (2011). A measure of variations in internal social capital among family firms. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 35, 1207–1227. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2011.00499.x>
- Cavalli-Sforza, L. L., & Feldman, M. W. (1981). *Cultural transmission and evolution: A quantitative approach*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fadeeva, O. P. (2007). Khozyaistvennye układy v sovremennom rossiiskom sele [Economic set-ups in the contemporary Russian village]. *Sotsiologicheskie Issledovaniya*, 11, 64–69 (in Russian).
- Fulgini, A., & Zhang, W. (2004). Attitudes toward family obligations among adolescents in contemporary urban and rural China. *Child Development*, 74, 180–192. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00662.x>
- Knafo, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2001). Value socialization in families of Israeli-born and Soviet-born adolescents in Israel. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 32(2), 213–228. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022101032002008>
- Knafo, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2003). Parenting and accuracy of perception of parental values by adolescents. *Child Development*, 73, 595–611. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.7402018>
- Kuczynski, L., & Navara, G. S. (2006). Sources of innovation and change in socialization, internalization and acculturation. In M. Killen & J. G. Smetana (Eds.), *Handbook of moral development* (pp. 299–327). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Lee, J., & Gillath, O. (2016). Perceived closeness to multiple social connections and attachment style: A longitudinal examination. *Social Psychological and Personality Science*, 7(7), 680–689. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550616644963>
- Nahapiet, J., & Ghoshal, S. (1998). Social capital, intellectual capital, and the organizational advantage. *Academy of Management Review*, 23, 242–266.
- Nichols, D. P. (1998). *Choosing an intraclass correlation coefficient*. UCLA, Statistical Consulting Group.
- Padilla-Walker, L. (2007). Characteristics of mother-child interactions related to adolescents' positive values and behaviors. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 69(3), 675–686. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2007.00399.x>
- Pearson, A., Carr, J., & Shaw, J. (2008). Toward a theory of familiness: A social capital perspective. *Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice*, 32, 949–969. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2008.00265.x>
- Phalet, K., & Schönplflug, U. (2001). Intergenerational transmission in Turkish immigrant families: Parental collectivism, achievement values and gender differences. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 32(4), 489.
- Roest, A. M. C., Dubas, J. S., & Gerris, J. R. M. (2010). Value transmissions between parents and children: Gender and developmental phase as transmission belts. *Journal of Adolescence*, 33(1), 21–31. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2009.05.017>
- Schönplflug, U. (2001). Intergenerational transmission of values: The role of transmission belts. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 32, 174–185. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022101032002005>
- Schwartz, S. H. (2014). National culture as value orientations: Consequences of value differences and cultural Distance. In V. A. Ginsburgh & D. Throsby (Eds.), *Handbook of the economics of art and culture* (Vol. 2, pp. 547–586). Amsterdam: Elsevier. <https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-0-444-53776-8.00020-9>
- Schwartz, S., Butenko, T. P., Sedova, D. S., & Lipatova, A. S. (2012). A refined theory of basic personal values: Validation in Russia. *Psychology. Journal of Higher School of Economics*, 9(2), 43–70 (in Russian).

- Steca, P., Monzan, D., Greco, A., & D'Addario, M. (2012). Similarity in self-enhancement and self-transcendence values between young adults and their parents and friends. *Family Science, 3*(1), 34–45. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19424620.2011.704772>
- Swader, C. S. (2013). *The capitalist personality: Face-to-face sociality and economic change in the post-communist world*. New York: Routledge.
- Trommsdorff, G. (2009). Intergenerational relations and cultural transmission. In U. Schonpflug (Ed.), *Cultural transmission. Psychological, developmental, social, and methodological aspects* (pp. 126–160). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Vedder, P., Berry, J., Sabatier, C., & Sam, D. (2009). The intergenerational transmission of values in national and immigrant families: The role of zeitgeist. *Journal of Youth Adolescence, 38*, 642–653. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-008-9375-7>
- Vinogradskii, V. G. (1998). Krest'yanskii semeinye khroniki [Peasant family chronicles]. *Sotsiologicheskii Zhurnal, 1*(2), 130–144 (in Russian).
- Yadov, V. A. (1975). O dispozitsionnoi regulyatsii sotsial'nogo povedeniya lichnosti [On dispositional regulation of social behavior of personality]. In *Metodologicheskie problemy sotsial'noi psikhologii [Methodological problems of social psychology]* (pp. 89–106). Moscow: Nauka (in Russian).
- Zharova, E. N. (2010). *Sravnitel'nyi analiz individualisticheskikh i kollektivisticheskikh tsennostnykh orientatsii kak sotsial'no-psikhologicheskikh kharakteristik molodezhi (na primere urbanizirovannoi i neurbanizirovannoi sredy) [Comparative analysis of individualistic and collectivistic value orientations as socio-psychological characteristics of young people (in urban and rural area)]* (Extended abstract of Ph.D. dissertation, Moscow State University of Psychology & Education, Moscow) (in Russian).

Dmitrii I. Dubrov (M.A., Faculty of Social Sciences, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia) is a junior research fellow at the International Laboratory for Socio-cultural Research at The National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. Currently, he is 3rd-year Ph.D. student. He was involved in several projects devoted to studying socio-psychological consequences of economic and cultural change in Russia. He is a member of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP). His main research interests are intercultural relations and social capital with an emphasis on its impact on intergenerational value transmission.

Alexander N. Tatarko (Ph.D., Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences) is Professor and Leading Research Fellow at the International Laboratory for Socio-cultural Research at The National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. He has published 8 books and over 100 articles (in Russian and English) in the areas of cross-cultural and social psychology with various colleagues. He is a member of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP) and International Academy of Intercultural Relations (IAIR). He was the coordinator of several projects devoted to cross-cultural aspects of social capital in Russia. He participated in the implementation of the training of intercultural relations and ethnic tolerance in the North Caucasus of Russia. His main research interests are intercultural relations and social capital with an emphasis on its peculiarities in multicultural society.

Parenting Values and Practices Across Post-Communist Societies in Youth Identity Formation: A Literature Review



Oriola Hamzallari

For the past decades, many changes have taken place in European societies. The fall of communism in many EU countries, and then the perplexing transitions of these societies followed by the global economic crisis of 2008, has been challenging many of our past and present values. This chapter reviews empirical and comparative qualitative, cross-sectional and longitudinal studies conducted in post-communist societies that investigated parental values, parental practices, and identity formation in youth.

Most parents of youth in post-communist countries have experienced their own identity formation in the communism system and also have faced the fall of that system. Youth in these countries have experienced the rapid transitional changes of their society, including globalization. Still, little is known about how such societal change is reflected in socialization values (Tulviste, Mizera, & De Geer, 2012). Are parenting values and practices contradictory with their children's ones? How are the parental models of values and practices serving identity formation in youth in post-communist countries?

Three main questions guided this review: (1) Are there changes in parental socialization values and practices in post-communist societies in Europe; (2) if so, how are these changes reflected in youth identity formation; (3) how do these changes in identity formation relate to youth psychological adjustment?

O. Hamzallari (✉)
Aleksander Moisiu University, Durrës, Albania
e-mail: oriolahamzallari@gmail.com

Theoretical Framework for Parental Socialization Values and Practices

In the review of Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, and Maynard (2003), socialization of values basically follows two pathways: socialization toward independence (e.g., emphasis on self-expression, self-confidence) and socialization toward interdependence (e.g., emphasis on conformity, respect for elders, social obligations). Yet, independence and interdependence are compatible during socialization of children (Tamis-LeMonda et al., 2008).

Kağıtçıbaşı (1996, 2007) proposed the family model of psychological interdependence in regard to socialization of values. This model has found support in several studies conducted in non-Western collectivistic societies or in immigrant families living in individualistic-oriented societies. The model suggests that relatedness and autonomy are compatible universal human needs which combined together develop emotional interdependence (Kağıtçıbaşı, 2007); children are socialized to be self-directed, but not separate from others (see Raeff, 2010).

In support of the above models, studies carried out in Portugal suggest that the transmission of individualist values across families with adolescent children is a pathway to maintenance of family cohesion by reinforcing collectivist values (Prioste, Narciso, Gonçalves, & Pereira, 2016). Parents in Portugal by being preoccupied about their children's well-being and individualist values create a family source for promoting collectivism (Prioste, Narciso, Gonçalves, & Pereira, 2015).

Still, there is limited knowledge related to how cultural changes are reflected in identity formation of youth. Also, few empirical comparative studies have been conducted on this issue, and little attention has been paid to similarities and differences of socialization values held by members of different cultural groups (see Tulviste et al., 2012), specifically in EU post-communist countries. Thus, an important aim of this review is to explore studies carried out in post-communist EU countries that measure parental values and children values of individualism, collectivism, independence, and interdependence by comparing parents' values with their children's ones in the stage of adolescence and young adulthood. Parenting practices and behaviors give input to what extent their parental socialization values are reflected on the interaction with their children. Specifically, in the study of Friedlmeier and Friedlmeier (2012), it was concluded that parenting dimension influences adolescent's values rather than parental values themselves. Hence, the focus of investigation should be on parenting dimension and practices as well. A second aim of this review is to explore studies that measure parenting practices, specifically in two dimensions of parenting: (1) parental warmth and support (e.g., nurture, bonding) and (2) parental behavioral and psychological control (e.g., discipline, communication of expectations, guilt, or shame inducement) (Janssens et al., 2015).

Based on the reviewed literature, it is expected that parental values (in regard to independence and interdependence) and parental practices (in regard to support and parental control) will show different trends in post-communist EU countries. It is expected that parents that show a coexistence of autonomy and relatedness values

will also be supportive to their children and the children's challenges toward identity formation. It is also supposed that a dominance of parental values on individualism (independence) or collectivism (dependence) will have a hindering effect on the children's identity formation. Also, it is expected that parental practices toward high levels of behavioral and psychological control will have a counteractive effect toward supporting the identity formation of their children.

Theoretical Frameworks for Youth Identity Formation

Identity formation is a basic developmental task for youth. Warm and supportive parent-and-child relationships promote a stable sense of identity in youth (Crocetti, Branje, Rubini, Koot, & Meeus, 2017). Also, the extent to which adolescents consolidate a stable sense of identity is strongly intertwined with their psychosocial functioning and well-being (Crocetti, 2017).

Several theoretical models of identity formation have been developed (Berzonsky, 1989; Crocetti, Rubini, & Meuus, 2008; Erikson, 1950, 1968; Luyckx et al., 2008; Marcia, 1966). According to Erikson (1968), identity formation is a major developmental task in which adolescents resolve by making commitments creating a sense of direction in their life or fail to achieve identity by remaining in a state of confusion.

Marcia's (1966) identity status paradigm suggested four status of identity based on two dimensions: exploration/crisis (actively reflecting and weighing alternatives) and commitment (taking decisions and being active in carrying through them). According to this paradigm, four identity statuses emerge based on the presence or absence of exploration and commitment: achievement status (high exploration and high commitment), foreclosure (low exploration/high commitment), moratorium (high exploration/low commitment), and diffusion (low exploration/low commitment) (Marcia, 1980).

In addition, Berzonsky (1989) suggested that the four identity statuses may reflect outcomes of different processes by which personal decisions are made and problems are solved. Specifically, Berzonsky (1989) proposed three styles of identity that characterize the personal problem-solving and decision-making of adolescents: information-oriented style (actively exploring and evaluating personally relevant information and open to revise information inconsistent with their sense of self), normative style (focus on internalized conventions, standards, and expectations of authority figures such as parents), and diffuse-avoidant style (procrastination and avoidance of dealing with identity issues until it is demanded or dictated that they do so). In Western studies, the informational (closely related to achievement and moratorium) and normative styles (closely related to foreclosure) are linked with commitment and well-being, whereas the diffuse-avoidant (closely related to diffusion) style is linked with avoiding making decisions and poor well-being (see Schwartz, Luyckx, & Crocetti, 2014, for a review).

Further, the process-oriented identity model proposed by Luyckx and colleagues (2008) distinguished between commitment making (how confident we are in making choices) and identification with commitment (emerges when individuals experience their choices as consistent with their core self). Also, Luyckx and colleagues (2008) distinguished between three different levels of exploration: exploration in breadth (precedes the formation of commitments), exploration in depth (occurs after commitments have been enacted), and ruminative exploration (occurs when individuals have difficulty settling on satisfying choices by feeling incompetent and uncertain) (see also Luyckx, Schwartz, Rassart, & Klimstra, 2016). Both exploration in breadth and exploration in depth are positively linked to commitment making and identification with commitment, whereas ruminative exploration links negatively with the formation of and identification with commitments (Luyckx et al., 2008). In addition, five identity statuses have been identified: (1) the achieved status (high commitment/high exploration in breadth and in depth/low ruminative exploration), (2) the foreclosure status (high commitment/low levels of exploration in general), (3) the searching moratorium (high levels of the three exploration types/moderate to high levels of commitment), (4) the troubled diffusion status (low in commitment/high on ruminative exploration/moderate to high on exploration in breadth) and (5) the carefree diffusion (low commitment/low exploration in general) (Luyckx, Soenens, Goossens, Beckx, & Wouters, 2008).

The three-dimensional identity model is another process-oriented model developed by Crocetti et al. (2008). In this model, three dynamic processes are involved in identity development: (1) commitment (enduring various choices which develop self-confidence), (2) in-depth exploration (extent to which individuals think about their commitments), and (3) reconsideration of commitment (present commitments no longer satisfactory) (Crocetti et al., 2008). Contrary to the five-factor model in which two forms of diffusion are differentiated (diffused diffusion and carefree diffusion), in the three-factor model, two forms of moratorium statuses are differentiated: (a) moratorium (low commitment/low moderate in-depth exploration/high reconsideration of commitment) and (b) searching moratorium (high commitment/high in-depth exploration/high reconsideration of commitment) (Crocetti, 2017). However, the three-factor model and the five-dimensional model offer similar identity conceptualizations (Crocetti, 2017). In Western studies, reconsideration of commitment is a sign of identity uncertainty and only ruminative exploration is a risk factor for healthy identity development (see the review Crocetti, Beyers, & Çok, 2016).

Overall, these models offer a broader view of conceptualizing identity formation in adolescence. In this review, these several models are examined in EU post-Soviet countries. In this regard, the post-Soviet bloc is a particularly understudied area of the world where rapid social changes has resulted in increased uncertainty in the future (Macek, Jezek, & Vazsonyi, 2013; Skhirtladze, Javakhishvili, Scwartz, Beyers, & Luyckx, 2016). Based on these premises, the aim of this review is to fill existing literature gaps by reviewing empirical studies that explore parenting values and practices, and how parenting dimensions relate to the identity formation of adolescents and young people in post-communist EU countries, and identifying adaptive and maladaptive patterns of parenting and identity processes that promote or hinder well-being and functioning of youth.

Method

An integrative literature review was conducted related to parenting values and practices and identity formation in youth in post-communist EU countries. Based on Whittemore and Knafelz (2005) integrative approach framework, inclusion of studies using a variety of research designs was used (e.g., qualitative and quantitative research) in order to understand more fully the associations between parenting values and dimension and identity youth formation in these countries. This methodological review consists of five stages (problem identification, literature search, data evaluation, data analysis, and presentation). The empirical studies on parenting values and practices and identity formation in EU post-Soviet countries were summarized and analyzed based on these stages to draw conclusions about the patterns of parenting and identity formation in youth in post-communist countries.

Problem Identification Stage

The focus of this review was to provide information on parenting values and practices and identity formation in EU post-communist countries in order to identify factors and characteristics of parents and young people that overall promote or hinder the functioning and well-being of youth in these transitional societies. The following research questions guided this review:

1. Are there changes in parental socialization values and parental practices in post-communist societies?
2. If so how are these changes reflected in the identity formation of the youth in these societies?
3. How do these changes in identity formation relate to youth psychological adjustment and well-being?

Literature Search

During this stage, searches were conducted using Google Scholar electronic database. Key search terms were “parenting values,” “parenting styles,” “parenting dimensions,” “parenting practices,” “identity styles,” “identity statuses,” “identity processes,” “identity formation,” “post-communist,” “adolescents,” “youth,” “connectedness,” “autonomy,” “separation,” “individuation,” “names of each post-communist EU country,” “Eastern Europe,” and “Central Europe.” Publications were included if (a) the topic addressed parenting values and practices or identity formation in EU post-communist countries, (b) participants in the studies were parents, adolescents, or young adults in their early to late twenties living in a EU post-communist country, (c) the design was either qualitative or quantitative, (d) language was English, and (e) the articles were published in peer-reviewed

journals. All the studies were published between 2000 and 2017. Publications were excluded if (a) they were not published (e.g., dissertations), (b) participants (parents, adolescents, or young people) were not living in a EU post-communist countries, (c) studies were carried out with immigrants from EU post-communist countries, and (d) they were not empirical studies (e.g., review papers).

Abstracts were reviewed to determine if the publication met the inclusion criteria. Most studies investigated identity categorization (e.g., ethnic or religious identity) in youth. Also, other studies on parenting values and practices focused on attachment and child-rearing experiences in the early years. Thus, only a few studies met our criteria. In total, 16 articles were included in the review.

Evaluation Stage

In this stage, the articles were evaluated based on the quality of the primary sources (Whittemore & Knafl, 2005). Review criteria for quantitative studies included study aims, design, measurement, results, conclusions, and implications. Also, review criteria for qualitative studies included the purpose of the research, the data analysis, results, conclusions, and implications. Further, the final studies included in this review had a comparative approach to the findings, specifically in these studies there was a comparing of the results to other research findings carried out in Western countries. In this way, the focus would be on similar or different trends of parenting and identity development of youth in post-communist countries with those in Western countries.

Analysis and Presentation Stage

Data analysis of the included articles was carried out by taking into consideration categorization, summary, and conclusions about the research problem (Whittemore & Knafl, 2005). In this review, this process was conducted by considering (a) the population being studied, (b) contributing factors of parental changes in values and practices in EU post-communist countries, (c) contributing factors of identity styles or identity formation in adolescents and young people in EU post-communist countries, (d) factors in parenting that promote or hinder identity formation in youth in transitional societies, (e) factors in youth that promote or hinder identity formation in transitional societies, and (f) patterns of parenting and identity youth processes that promote or hinder functioning and well-being of the youth in transitional societies. Results of the empirical studies are synthesized in the form of a table organized with the following subheadings: country, author, sample population, age, and findings (see Table 1).

Table 1 Description of studies

Country/author	Design	Sample (n)	Age M (SD)	Findings
Czech Republic				
Šerek et al. (2014)	Cross-sectional	Post-totalitarian generation (1127) Current young generation (976)	14 and 17 years old	Parent-adolescent emotional relationship remains the same. Parents emphasize self-reliance in the current generation Parental value transmission has greater influence nowadays than before
Estonia				
Tulviste et al. (2012)	Cross-sectional	Estonian mothers (142) Estonian Russian mothers (65) Swedish mothers (150)	12.12 (1.01)	Less emphasis on traditional values in Estonian/Russian Estonian mothers when describing children Swedish mothers stressed self-confidence/self-direction Estonian/Russian Estonian mothers stressed self-direction, hard work, and achievement (interdependence)
Tulviste et al. (2003)	Mixed (observational)	Estonians living in Estonia (17) Finnish living in Finland (18) Swedish living in Sweden (19) Finnish living in Sweden (18) Estonian Living in Sweden (18)	10.93 (1.08) (early adolescents)	Estonian mothers in Estonia showed the highest level of behavior control Estonian mothers had the highest scores in control attitudes Estonian mothers living in Sweden scored higher only on attitudes (attitudes more persistent than behaviors)
Georgia				
Skhirtladze et al. (2018)	Cross-sectional	Georgian emerging adults (650)	23.4 (2.95)	Normative and diffuse-avoidant styles are less adaptive and not associated with commitment Parental support and behavioral control associated with information-oriented style Paternal psychological control was negatively associated with the information-oriented style Parental psychological control associated with normative and diffuse-avoidant style

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Country/author	Design	Sample (n)	Age M (SD)	Findings
Skhirtladze et al. (2016)	Cross-sectional	Georgian (295)	22.3 (3.2)	In Georgian context, evidence for a six-dimension model of identity formation Reflective exploration in depth and reconsideration of commitments defined instead of exploration in depth Exploration in breadth associated with ruminative exploration (contrary to Western studies) Achieved status was most adaptive (low depression/high life satisfaction), followed by foreclosed status The carefree diffused status showed moderate level of adaptiveness (but not adaptive in other contexts, e.g., the USA) The troubled diffusion status was high in exploration in breadth and most vulnerable to distress The searching moratorium cluster appeared to be in line with Western European and American results
Latvia				
Tuiviste (2004)	Mixed (observational)	Latvian monocultural families (20) Estonian monocultural families (17) Finnish monocultural families (18) Swedish monocultural families (19) Finnish living in Sweden families (18) Estonian living in Sweden families (18)	9–13 years old (pre- and early-adolescent children)	Latvian and Estonian mothers scored high on control attitudes, differing in this respect from all others Estonian mothers in Estonia showed the most behavior control toward their children More data needed to draw conclusions on Latvian mothers' low controlling behavior
Lithuania				
Kaniušonytė and Žukauskienė (2017)	Longitudinal	Study 1 Lithuanian (153) Study 2 Lithuanian (254)	Emerging adults	Autonomy-supportive mothering positively predicted the information-oriented style Fathering did not reveal any significant associations with identity styles The information-oriented style positively predicts contribution to self, family, and community Emotional warmth and trust predicted autonomy-supportive parenting

Rageliene and Justickis (2016)	Cross-sectional	Lithuanian adolescents (804)	15.79 (0.93)	The democratic parenting style positively predicts differentiation of self for boys Authoritarian parenting style negatively predicts differentiation of self for both genders
Žukauskienė et al. (2017)	Longitudinal	Lithuanians adolescents (468)	15.12 (0.45)	Individual preferences for the three identity styles are more defined in adolescent girls than in boys Boys showed greater use of normative and diffuse-avoidant styles than girls Over time, boys decreased the use of the informational style
Poland				
Dwairy and Achoui (2010)	Cross-sectional	Algeria Arab Argentinean French Indian Israel Jordan Kuwait Polish In total 2884	Adolescents	No differences between Polish adolescents and Western adolescents in regard to connectedness Distinctive differences in all three types of connectedness: emotional, financial, and functional between Western countries and Eastern countries
Wejnert and Djumabaeva (2004)	Qualitative	Polish (106)Kyrgyz (200)	35–60-year-old parents	There is a movement toward Western democratic values (e.g., egalitarianism and small nuclear families) Still, an important role in shaping parenting styles may be traditionalism
Romania				
Friedlmeier and Friedlmeier (2012)	Cross-sectional	Romanian families (100)	15.5 (1.1)	Parents had higher interdependent and lower independent self-construal compared to adolescents (in line with western studies) Paternal control has a different meaning for the two genders (less anxiety for boys but more for girls) There is a positive link between control and collectivism (more transmitted by fathers, in contrast with results from Western countries)

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Country/author	Design	Sample (<i>n</i>)	Age M (SD)	Findings
Friedlmeier and Trommsdorff (2011)	Cross-sectional	American mother-adolescent dyads (337) Romanian mother-adolescent dyads (100)	16.32 (1.41) 15.5 (1.1)	Parenting was more relevant for adolescents' values than parental values themselves Adolescents of both cultures who perceived their mothers as accepting emphasized traditional values (similar in both cultures) Adolescent in the USA who perceived their mothers as controlling reported stronger individualistic values than Romanian ones Stronger value similarities were found within biological dyads compared to randomly assigned dyads or within the peer group
Negru-Subitrica et al. (2017)	Longitudinal	Romanian adolescents (1151)	16.45 (1.40)	Informational style related over time with educational in-depth exploration and commitment, whereas the diffuse-avoidant style was related with reconsideration of commitment Educational commitment positively related with informational and normative styles Educational commitment and in-depth exploration lead to increases in the use of adaptive identity styles Reconsideration of commitment increasing the use of the maladaptive diffuse-avoidant style
Slovakia Bobakova et al. (2015)	Cross-sectional	Slovakian (1380)	15 years old	Parental knowledge was a protective factor in regard to truancy (skipping school) in youth subcultures (e.g., hip-hop, metal, church community, metal) Parental bonding did not play an important role in this regard
Slovenia Kuhar and Reiter (2012)	Cross-sectional (Review of Descriptive Data)		Youth in emerging adulthood	Youth transition is frozen in regard to employment (limited labor market), to independent housing (lack of affordable flats), to parenthood and marriage (lack of material security)

Results

Descriptive Overview of the Studies

The studies included in this review represent nine European post-Soviet countries (see Table 1). Even though Georgia is not included in the Central/Eastern Europe countries, in this review empirical studies from Georgia country are included. Based on its history (see country description below), Georgia has many similarities with the EU post-Soviet countries. Also, its geographical position is located at the crossroads of Eastern Europe and Western Asia. Findings from Georgia country in regard to parenting dimension and identity formation extend the literature review in regard to these processes.

In total, in this review there are ten cross-sectional studies, three longitudinal studies, two mixed studies, and one qualitative study. In this review, there are eight studies exploring parenting values and parenting practices in EU post-communist countries (Bobakova, Geckova, Klein, van Dijk, & Reijneveld, 2015; Friedlmeier & Friedlmeier, 2012; Friedlmeier & Trommsdorff, 2011; Šerek, Macek, Ježek, Lacinová, 2014; Tulviste, 2004; Tulviste et al., 2012; Tulviste, Mizera, De Geer, & Tryggyason, 2003; Wejnert & Djumabaeva, 2004), five studies exploring identity formation and transition to adulthood (Dwairy & Achoui, 2010; Kuhar & Reiter, 2012; Negru-Subtirica, Pop, & Crocetti, 2017; Skhirtladze et al., 2016; Žukauskienė, Truskauskaite-Kuneviciene, Kaniušonytė, & Crocetti, 2017), and three studies exploring parenting dimension and identity formation in youth (Kaniušonytė & Žukauskienė, 2017; Rageliene & Justickis, 2016; Skhirtladze, Javakhishvili, Schwartz, Beyers, & Luyckx, 2018). All studies refer to changes in parenting values, and/or parenting practices, and/or identity formation and/or transition to adulthood.

Demographic characteristic including ethnicity and age varied among studies. In regard to ethnicity, six papers explore parental values and practices by comparing different ethnic groups. Specifically, in the Estonian studies, the researchers compare Estonian mothers with Estonian Russian mothers (living in Estonia) and with Swedish mothers (Tulviste et al., 2012). Also, the researchers compare Estonian mothers (living in Estonia) with Finnish mothers (living in Finland or Sweden), Swedish mothers (living in Sweden), and Estonian mothers (living in Sweden). Further, in the Latvian study, the researcher compares Latvian mothers (living in Latvia) with Estonian, Finnish, Swedish mothers (see Tulviste, 2004). Further, in the studies of Poland, one cross-cultural study compares Polish adolescents with other adolescents from different ethnic groups (living in Algeria, Arabia, Argentina, France, India, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait) in regard to connectedness/separation with parents (Dwairy & Achoui, 2010); another study compares Polish parents with Kyrgyz parents in regard to values of individualism and collectivism when raising their children (Wejnert & Djumabaeva, 2004). Whereas in the Romanian context, in one of the studies of Friedlmeier and Trommsdorff (2011), Romanian mother-adolescent dyads are compared with American mother-adolescent dyads in terms of transmission of parental values of individualism and collectivism.

In regard to age, in the majority of the studies, age was reported. Only in three studies, age range or mean of age was not reported. Only the period of development was reported: emerging adults (Kaniušonytė & Žukauskienė, 2017), adolescents (Dwairy & Achoui, 2010), and youth in adulthood (Kuhar & Reiter, 2012). In another study only the age range of the parents was reported (Wejnert & Djumabaeva, 2004). There were three studies exploring parenting values and dimension in preadolescence and early adolescence (Tulviste, 2004; Tulviste, Mizera, De Geer, & Tryggyason, 2003, 2012). On the other hand, there were four studies exploring transition to adulthood (emerging adulthood) with an age range of 18–30 (Kaniušonytė & Žukauskienė, 2017; Kuhar & Reiter, 2012; Skhirtladze et al., 2016, 2018). Emerging adulthood is a prolonged period of exploration and identity formation in the late teens and twenties (Arnett, 2000). In agreement with this concept, all the studies above, investigating transition to adulthood, were included. All the remaining studies reported mean age or age range related to middle-late adolescence.

Countries Descriptions

The Czech Republic The Czech Republic lies in Central Europe and borders Germany, Austria, Slovakia, and Poland. Nowadays, the country population is closely 10.5 million inhabitants (Worldometers, 2017a). During communism, Czechoslovakia was a sovereign state established in 1948 and which in 1993 dissolved peacefully in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In 2004, the Czech Republic joined the EU. The current generation of Czech adolescents grew up in a changing society where they have experienced many new opportunities but also a high level of social uncertainty (Macek, Bejček, & Vaníčková, 2007). Recent data also reveal that Czech adolescents at the turn of the twenty-first century are more similar to their Western European peers than they are to the former post-totalitarian Czech generation (Šerek et al., 2014). Czechs have had a history of skepticism toward Catholicism. However, 76.4% of Czech people consider themselves Catholic. According to data from 2008, only about 18% of them consider themselves religious (see Willard & Cingl, 2017).

Estonia Estonia is a post-communist country positioned in the Baltic region. It borders with Finland, Latvia, Sweden, and Russia. The country population is approximately 1.3 million inhabitants (Worldometers, 2017b). Estonia was occupied by the Soviet Union during 1940–1941 and 1944 until 1991, when the country gained its independence. The incorporation of Estonia as a Soviet Socialist Republic was unrecognized by many Western countries. During communism, Estonia was characterized by a rather repressive and non-nationalist Communist Party (Bennich-Björkman, 2007). After the fall of communism, the country faced economic uncertainty but overall had a successful transition (Bennich-Björkman, 2007). Estonia joined the EU in 2004, and this event was seen as an important factor in raising

economy and reentering the Western democracy sphere of influence (see Tulviste & Mizera, 2012). In regard to religious beliefs, Estonia is considered one of the most secular countries in Europe, where 14% of Estonian had a Lutheran identity, whereas 65% had no religion affiliations (see Rimmel, 2017).

Georgia Georgia is a post-Soviet country, located near the Caucasus Mountains. It borders Russia, Turkey, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The country population is nearly 3.9 million people (Worldometers, 2017c). The period of communism lasted from 1921 to 1922 (as independent country) and 1936 (Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic) until 1991 when the country gained its independence. The consolidation with the Soviet Union was not welcomed and represented a threat to Georgian national identity (see Toft, 2001). Georgia experienced an economic crisis for most of the 1990s. Since 2000, social, political, and economic reforms have begun. However, the country remains in a transitional period. Job-market options providing substantive financial safety are quite limited (see Skhirtladze, et al., 2018). Today, in Georgia nearly 85% of the country's population belongs to Orthodox Christianity (see Metreveli & Timothy, 2010).

Latvia Latvia is part of the Nordic cultural region. It borders Estonia, Lithuania, Russia, Belarus, and Sweden. The population of the country is around 1.9 million people (Worldometers, 2017d). Like Estonia, Latvia was occupied by the Soviet Union during 1940–1941 and 1944 until 1991, when independence was achieved. Also, the incorporation of Latvia as a Soviet Socialist Republic was unrecognized by many Western countries. Latvian Communist Party was one of the most repressive in the entire Soviet Union (see Bennich-Björkman, 2007; Bennich-Björkman & Johansson, 2012). Latvia joined EU in 2004. The country reestablished historical, cultural relationships with their neighboring countries but also underwent rapid political, societal, economical transformations (Tulviste, 2004). In terms of religion beliefs, Latvia is a secular society, where the predominant religion is Protestantism, followed by Catholicism and Orthodox Christianity (see Taivans, 2013).

Lithuania Lithuania is located in the Baltic region and has been an independent republic since 1991. Lithuania borders Sweden, Denmark, Latvia, Belarus, Poland, and Russia. The country population is approximately 2.8 million people (Worldometers, 2017e). Like Estonia and Latvia, Lithuania was occupied by the Soviet Union during 1940–1941 and 1944 until 1991, when the country achieved independence. Also, the incorporation of Lithuania in the USSR was not recognized by many Western countries. However, the Communist Party in Lithuania was the least repressive compared to Estonia and Latvia. In addition, it played an active role in helping shape the transition period (see Clark & Pranevičiūtė, 2008). Along with other Baltic post-Soviet countries, Lithuania joined EU in 2004. The country has experienced rapid changes after the fall of communism. Such changes had broader implications for the mentality of Lithuanian citizens making this setting very interesting for exploration of parenting, identity issues, and adjustment in emerging adulthood (see Žukauskienė et al., 2017). Catholicism is the predominant religion belief among Lithuanians (see Cruz, 2014).

Poland Poland is situated in Central Europe and shares borders with Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania, and Russia and to the north is bordered by the Baltic Sea. The country population is approximately 38 million people (Worldometers, 2017f). Poland was the first country to leave communism peacefully in 1989 (Kemp-Welch, 2008); the country joined EU in 2004. Throughout its history, Polish men were killed, imprisoned, or sent to Siberia, while women were left to raise children and maintain cultural traditions (see Wejnert & Djumabaeva, 2004). These historical circumstances eventually led to the emergence of a model of “Matka Polka” (the Polish Mother who was a strong and self-sacrificing woman). Overall, in communist Poland, parent-child relationships were dominated almost solely by the care that mothers provided (see Wejnert & Djumabaeva, 2004). The predominant religion belief in the country is Catholic (see Ramet, 2017).

Romania Romania is located in the Southeastern Europe and shares borders with Republic of Moldova, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Serbia, and Hungary. Romania’s population is approximately 19.2 million inhabitants (Worldometers, 2017g). The Soviet Union occupied Romanian from 1947 until the fall of communism in 1989 which ended in a violent revolution. The communist regime in Romania was extremely repressive and inflexible (Ciobanu, 2010). The country joined the EU in 2007. Romania remains essentially a traditional society; however, the country is dealing with tremendous social, political, and economic changes after the breakdown of communism. Nowadays, one of the most salient characteristics of Romania is the shift from collectivist forms of social organizations toward individualist forms (see Friedlmeier & Trommsdorff, 2011; Negru-Subtirica et al., 2017). Romania is a secular country, even though the predominant religion belief is Orthodox Christianity (see Simut & Buitendag, 2015).

Slovakia Slovakia and the Czech Republic were the same country (Czechoslovakia) during the communist period until 1993 when they peaceably split in two separate republics. Nowadays, Slovakia has been an EU country since 2004 and shares borders with five countries: Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Ukraine. The country population is 5.4 million people (Worldometers, 2017h). Slovak society is traditionally rural, but urbanization has taken place especially under socialism. After the fall of communism, Slovakia underwent slow reforms toward the free market and was characterized by a centralized economy, contrary to the Czech Republic which was characterized by a movement toward the free market and democracy (Carpenter, 1997). In Slovakia as in Poland, the Roman Catholic Church served as a symbol of opposition against the oppressing regime. Subcultures in Slovakia after the fall of communism were a form of escape from the formal disciplinary authority (Bobakova et al., 2015)

Slovenia Slovenia is situated in Southern Central Europe and shares borders with Austria, Croatia, Hungary, and Italy. The country population is slightly above 2 million inhabitants (Worldometers, 2017i). In 1945 Slovenia was part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia until the country gained independence in

1991 and later in 2004 joined EU. Like Lithuania, in Slovenia the Communist Party was less repressive, and the country had a smooth transition toward democratization (Bebler, 2002). Ever since the early 1990s, the period of youth continued to be extended, and the patterns of transition to adulthood proliferated in comparison with the mid-1980s generation in Slovenia (see Kuhar & Reiter, 2012). In regard to religion beliefs, Slovenian trust in Catholic Church and religious participation has dropped markedly over the recent years (see Smrke, 2016). Slovenia is reflecting a trend toward secularization (Smrke, 2016).

Parenting Values and Parenting Practices

Regardless of the rapid changes that have occurred in EU post-Soviet countries, family context is the primary environment for values' socialization. Findings in Poland suggest that there is a movement toward Western democratic parental values (e.g., egalitarianism), but still an important role in parenting styles may be oriented toward traditional values (Wejnert & Djumabaeva, 2004). In the Czech study, the effect of the family on young people's value orientation is more evident especially in the current generation compared to the post-totalitarian generation and self-reliance parenting positively predicted materialistic value orientations (Šerek et al., 2014). Also, in Romania stronger value similarities were found within the biological family members than in other contexts (Friedlmeier & Trommsdorff, 2011).

Further evidence from Romanian context is in line with other Western studies: parents have higher interdependent values compared to adolescents. According to the authors, it may be the case that the developmental stage has more influence on which values are considered important, much more than changes that are taking place in society (Friedlmeier & Trommsdorff, 2011). However, some cultural differences emerge when comparing parenting dimensions, and especially paternal parenting dimensions; specifically high paternal control is linked with high collectivism particularly in the sons (Friedlmeier & Friedlmeier, 2012). The results showed that parenting dimension is more relevant for adolescent's values than parental values themselves (Friedlmeier & Friedlmeier, 2012). In regard to the role of parenting in transmission of values, perceived maternal control moderated the relationship between collectivism of mothers and that of adolescents similarly across the two cultural contexts, not supporting the hypothesis for culture-specific impact of control on value transmission (least controlling/similar values in mother-child dyad). However, American adolescents who perceived their mothers high in control reported stronger individualistic values compared to Romanian group (Friedlmeier & Trommsdorff, 2011).

Evidence of inconsistency between parental values and parenting practices have been reported in other EU post-soviet studies. Specifically, in the studies of Tulviste and colleagues (2004, 2012), with mothers and pre- and early-adolescent dyads, there were some interesting findings in regard to parenting values and parenting practices. First, when comparing Western mothers (Finnish and Swedish) with

Estonian and Russian Estonian mothers, Western mothers valued self-direction and self-confidence but not conformity, while Estonian and Russian mothers valued self-direction, conformity, and hard work by reflecting the coexistence of individualistic and collectivistic values and evidencing that maternal socialization was rather context-sensitive (Tulviste et al., 2012). Also, in the comparison between Western mothers with Estonian mothers living in Estonia and Estonian mothers living in Western countries, interesting findings resulted: Estonian mothers in Estonia and Estonian mothers living in Western countries scored high in control items, but only Estonian mothers living in Estonia controlled their children's behaviors the most (Tulviste et al., 2003).

Another comparison between Estonian mothers living in Estonia, Estonian mothers living in Western countries, Latvian mothers living in Latvia, and Western mothers reported that mothers from Latvian and Estonian samples scored similarly high on control attitudes, differing in this respect from all others, but only Estonian mothers living in Estonia exhibited high control in their real-life interactions with their children (Tulviste, 2004). These results from the empirical papers suggest that researchers need to be very careful when drawing conclusions only on value/attitudinal measures while making assumptions about parental behavior (Tulviste et al., 2003).

In regard to parenting support and control, there is a contradictory result in the study of Bobakova et al. (2015), where parental bonding (warmth/support) did not play an important role in truancy (absences in school), but parental control (in this study parental knowledge of the child's whereabouts) did play a protective factor.

Identity Formation and Youth Transition

In regard to identity formation, there are similarities and differences among EU post-communist and Western countries. For example, in a study comparing the Western world with Eastern world, Polish adolescents were similar to their Western counterparts in terms of developing connectedness and separation toward parents (Dwairy & Achoui, 2010). In this study, distinctive differences emerged in connectedness (emotional, financial, and functional) between Western and Eastern world; specifically in the East low or moderate levels of connectedness are associated with high levels of psychological disorders, whereas the contrary is for the Western countries in this study (Dwairy & Achoui, 2010). Contrary to the Polish context, youth in Slovenia has a difficult transition toward independence, and youth is facing a frozen transition (Kuhar & Reiter, 2012). Young adults are faced with unemployment, lack of affordable flats, and lack of material security which tremendously influence living independently and committing to roles in adulthood (Kuhar & Reiter, 2012).

Similarities and differences in regard to the development of identity styles and processes emerged in EU post-Soviet countries compared to existing research findings from Western countries. Specifically, in the longitudinal study by Negru-Subtirica et al. (2017) conducted in Romania, in line with Western research, there

was a positive link between the informational style and educational in-depth exploration and a positive link between diffuse-avoidant style and reconsideration of educational commitments. Further educational commitment and in-depth exploration led to increases in the use of adaptive styles, whereas reconsideration of commitment increased the use of the maladaptive diffuse-avoidant style. Also, in line with the Western cultural context, in a Lithuanian longitudinal study, boys reported stronger use of the normative and diffuse-avoidant identity styles, whereas girls were more active in evaluating self-relevant information (Žukauskienė et al., 2017).

Contrary to the Romanian and Lithuanian context, in Georgia, a cross-sectional study carried out by Skhirtladze et al. (2016) showed that exploration in depth was defined by two aspects: “reflective exploration in depth” and “reconsideration of commitments.” While reflective exploration in depth was positively correlated with commitment making and identification with commitment, reconsideration of commitment correlated positively with exploration in breadth and ruminative exploration. Contrary to Western studies and to Romanian and the Lithuanian contexts, exploration in breadth did not correlate positively with commitment, but was strongly associated with ruminative exploration. On the other hand, the achieved cluster was the most adaptive for adolescents, characterized with low depression and high life satisfaction, but with moderate exploration in breadth levels. Also, foreclosed Georgian adults had similar level of adjustment as those in the achievement cluster but lower exploration in breadth, and carefree diffused cluster had moderate level of adaptiveness compared to Western contexts where this cluster in adolescents is not adaptive. Further, the troubled diffused cluster was high in exploration breadth and was characterized by high levels of internalizing symptoms. The searching moratorium cluster appeared to be in line with Western results in Georgian adolescents, characterized by high activity in identity work and elevated levels of anxiety (Skhirtladze et al., 2016).

Parenting Dimensions and Identity Formation

From the 16 studies, only 3 studies investigated the link between parenting dimensions and identity formation in EU post-Soviet youth. These studies were carried out in the Lithuanian and Georgian contexts. Again, the results of the studies highlight important similarities and differences among countries and compared to existing Western studies. Specifically, in the Lithuanian context, autonomy-supportive parenting was positively associated with positive identity formation outcomes, and emotional warmth and trust predicted autonomy-supportive parenting, and also parental encouragement of autonomy played a crucial positive role in the beginning of emerging adulthood (Kaniušonytė & Žukauskienė, 2017). Further, only the information-oriented identity style significantly and positively mediated the association between autonomy-supportive mothering and identity formation. The findings from the Lithuanian cultural and familial contexts are in line with the Western

countries where exploration and autonomous decision-making are encouraged (Kaniušonytė & Žukauskienė, 2017). Correspondingly, the study of Rageliene and Justickis (2016) is complementary with the above findings in the Lithuanian context; particularly democratic parenting style positively predicts differentiation of self for boys and positive identity formation, whereas authoritarian parenting style negatively predicts differentiation of self for both genders.

Contrary to the Lithuanian context and to the studies in Western cultures, the Georgian context presents a rather different pattern of parenting dimension and identity formation. In the study of Skhirtladze et al. (2018), there was no correlation between the information-oriented and normative styles, but a high positive correlation between the diffuse-avoidant and normative styles. However, the information-oriented identity style was positively related to identity commitment (Skhirtladze et al., 2018). In regard to parenting dimension and identity formation, maternal and paternal support was negatively related to psychological control, and the normative identity style was positively linked with psychological control from both parents and with paternal behavior control (Skhirtladze et al., 2018). Still, some differences between mothering and fathering emerged between countries. Specifically, differences between the role of mothers and fathers were reported in the empirical studies carried out in Georgia, Romania, and Lithuania. In the Georgian context, only paternal psychological control (not maternal) was negatively associated with information-oriented style, whereas in the Romanian context, only paternal control was associated with more transmitted values of collectivism in children (Friedlmeier & Friedlmeier, 2012; Skhirtladze et al., 2018). Also, in the Romanian context, father control was perceived differently among adolescent boys and girls. Specifically, high paternal control was associated with less anxiety for boys but more for girls (Friedlmeier & Friedlmeier, 2012). Contrary to the Georgian and Romanian contexts, where paternal control has more dominant effect in adolescents' identity formation than mothering control, in the Lithuanian context, autonomy-supportive mothering positively predicted the information-oriented style, whereas fathering did not reveal any association with identity styles (Kaniušonytė & Žukauskienė, 2017). These results suggest that mothering and fathering support and control have different effects in the identity formation of youth in different EU post-Soviet countries.

Limitations

There were several limitations to the studies in this review. First, a small number of studies were analyzed, and several of them had limited samples used to generalize the findings. For example, in the study of Tulviste (2004), the data for the Latvian mothers were limited to generalize the findings. Second, the participants in the studies reviewed were adolescents and young adults mostly living in urban areas. There was a lack of information in regard to youth living in rural areas and/or the youth population living in disadvantaged contexts. Third, even though there were three longitudinal studies which presented rich information to our review, most of

the studies were self-reports and cross-sectional studies carried out with convenient samples of the population. In future studies, longitudinal, multi-informant studies using narrative and observational measurement are recommended in order to understand the cultural perspective and developmental trajectories of the constructs measured (Negru-Subtirica et al., 2017; Skhirtladze et al., 2018; Tulviste et al., 2003). Fourth, this review is limited by the databases accessed and the phrases used for searching the literature.

Conclusions

Many comparative studies on parenting and youth identity formation focus mostly on the contradiction between Western world and the Eastern world. Particularly, countries in the Western world are presented by the studies in the USA and EU Western countries, while the countries in Eastern world are presented as similar to Asian context, especially by China. Also, other studies are carried out by recruiting immigrants coming mostly from Central/Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia to the Western countries. However, a few studies are carried out in the EU post-Soviet countries. In this review, some findings were reported, which help in shedding light on patterns of parenting values and practices and identity formation (styles) in adolescents and youth. Similarities and differences were evidenced among EU post-Soviet countries and compared to Western studies.

In regard to parental value transmission, findings suggest that there is a gradual change toward more democratic values (Wejnert & Djumabaeva, 2004) and the coexistence of collectivistic and individualistic values (see Tulviste et al., 2003, 2012). But parents in Western countries have higher interdependent values compared to adolescents, and this might be related to the different developmental stages that parents and adolescent are going through (Friedlmeier & Trommsdorff, 2011). Interestingly, findings reported that parenting practices and dimensions had much greater influence on children's behaviors (Friedlmeier & Friedlmeier, 2012; Tulviste et al., 2003, 2012). Furthermore, differences between EU post-Soviet countries emerged in the analysis when comparing results on parenting in Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and Slovakia. In Estonia, mothers showed the most behavioral control compared to the other countries. Whereas in Slovakia parental knowledge is a protective factor compared to parental bonding in children's academic success. These findings give a glimpse of possible similarities and differences between countries and suggest that more research is needed in terms of how parenting, especially parental controlling behavior and warmth, influences the transmission of values and identity development in adolescents and youth. Also, the concepts of control and acceptance are culturally sensitive and more observational, and mixed methodology studies need to be carried out to further investigate the differences (Skhirtladze et al., 2018; Tulviste, 2004).

Further similarities and differences were observed among EU post-Soviet countries and between Western countries related to identity formation (and styles) and

youth transition. Polish, Romanian, and Lithuanian adolescents and youth had much similar identity development and transition to youth in Western countries, compared to Slovenia (difficult transition to adulthood) and Georgia (different patterns of exploration). In Georgia, exploration in breadth had counteractive effects with commitment; and in general adolescents and young people had moderate to low levels of exploration in breadth. The foreclosed style in identity formation of young Georgian adults was adaptive (Skhirtladze et al., 2016). In the sociopolitical and socioeconomic context of Georgia, making a commitment without exploration may also be an autonomous decision and an adaptive one for identity development (Skhirtladze et al., 2016). Further studies in diverse EU post-Soviet countries need to be conducted to investigate more in-depth the different patterns of identity formation in young adults.

In regard to parenting dimension and identity formation, a few studies were carried out in these countries. However, some findings were complementary in regard to parenting support and control. In the Lithuanian context, autonomy-supportive parenting encourages positive identity formation in youth (Kaniušonytė & Žukauskienė, 2017; Rageliene & Justickis, 2016). Also in Georgia, parenting support was positively associated with positive identity formation. However, contrary to the Lithuanian context, parental psychological control was positively linked to the normative identity style which in turn showed similarities with the diffuse-avoidant style (Skhirtladze et al., 2018). In the Western studies, the information-oriented style and normative style are adaptive styles that help adolescents in developing their identity. In the Georgian context, normative identity style might be closely related primary to parental external pressure toward making commitments and to the pressure of acting in accordance with societal norms and standards (Skhirtladze et al., 2018).

In summary, parental values, parental practices, and identity formation show both similarities and differences between EU post-Soviet countries and Western countries. In general, there is a trend EU post-Soviet bloc parents to be oriented toward more democratic values. However, parenting practices are more resistant to change than parental values, and further studies are needed to explore this link.

In regard to parenting dimensions, on the one hand, parenting practices that are supportive toward the need of autonomy of young people promote positive identity formation, whereas parenting practices high in psychological control hinder the development of children's identity. However, the effects of parental behavior and psychological control vary between fathers and mothers particularly in the three countries analyzed in this review. On the other hand, for youth in Slovakia, parental warmth (a very important aspect of parental support) had counteractive effects toward youth truancy compared to parental knowledge (related with behavior control aspects). Also, Estonian mothers showed high behavioral control compared to Latvian mothers or Estonian mothers living in Western countries. These differences in parental support and behavioral and psychological control need to be investigated further in other EU post-Soviet countries to understand in depth how these changes in parenting practices are reflected in youth identity formation. Anyways, in regard to youth identity formation, there are similarities and differences

among EU post-Soviet countries and between them and Western countries that emerged in this review. On one hand, there is a trend of youth identity formation similar to the Western countries (Polish, Romanian, and Lithuanian youth); on the other hand, there is a different trend of youth identity formation (Georgia and Slovenia). Overall, achievement of identity was the most adaptive style, and the diffuse-avoidant style was the most maladaptive. Still, exploration in breadth had counteractive effects with commitment and was significantly associated with ruminative exploration. In general adolescents and young people had moderate to low levels of exploration in breadth, whereas the foreclosed style was adaptive in identity formation but not the normative style (Skhirtladze et al., 2016). Also, in the Georgian context, the normative style of identity formation was the most significantly associated with both parental behavior and psychological control; and adolescents with this style showed similarities with diffuse-avoidant style (Skhirtladze et al., 2018). According to Skhirtladze et al. (2016, 2018), the unstable transition along with cultural values might contribute to anxiety for young people who explore in breadth, and normative style might be most related with parental external pressure toward making commitments.

The gaps in the existing literature in EU post-Soviet countries, in regard to parenting and identity formation processes, pose an immediate need to investigate these countries in order to understand more in depth the patterns of parenting and identity formation in different sociopolitical, socioeconomic, and cultural contexts. By gaining this knowledge, we can understand the risk and protective factors in parenting and in young people, based on a cultural-sensitive approach in order to provide intervention programs that are in line with the needs of parents and young people and provide positive strategies toward improvements (see also Negru-Subtirica et al., 2017; Skhirtladze et al., 2016, 2018). Also, policy intervention in the EU can be developed in regard to youth positive identity development and based on the countries' sociopolitical, economic, cultural needs and transitional needs.

References

- Arnett, J. J. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through the twenties. *American Psychologist*, 55, 469–480. <https://doi.org/10.1037//0003-066X.55.5.469>
- Bebler, A. (2002). Slovenia's smooth transition. *Journal of Democracy*, 13, 127–140. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0001>
- Bennich-Björkman, L. (2007). The cultural roots of Estonia's successful transition: How historical legacies shaped the 1990s. *East European Politics and Societies*, 21, 316–347. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325407299785>
- Bennich-Björkman, L., & Johansson, K. M. (2012). Explaining moderation in nationalism: Divergent trajectories of national conservative parties in Estonia and Latvia. *Comparative European Politics*, 10, 585–607. <https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2011.28>
- Berzonsky, M. D. (1989). Identity style: Conceptualization and measurement. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 4, 268–282. <https://doi.org/10.1177/074355488943002>

- Bobakova, D., Geckova, A. M., Klein, D., van Dijk, J. P., & Reijneveld, S. A. (2015). Fighting, truancy and low academic achievement in youth subcultures. *Young Consumers*, 23, 357–372. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1103308815596905>
- Carpenter, M. (1997). Slovakia and the triumph of nationalist populism. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 30, 205–219. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-067X\(97\)00005-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0967-067X(97)00005-6)
- Ciobanu, M. (2010). Communist regimes, legitimacy and the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe. *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 38, 3–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00905990903394490>
- Clark, T. D., & Pranevičiūtė, J. (2008). Perspectives on communist successor parties: The case of Lithuania. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 41(4), 443–464. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2008.09.003>
- Crocetti, E., Rubini, M., & Meeus, W. (2008). Capturing the dynamics of identity formation in various ethnic groups: Development and validation of a three-dimensional model. *Journal of Adolescence*, 31, 207–222. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2007.09.002>
- Crocetti, E. (2017). Identity formation in adolescence: The dynamic of forming and consolidating identity commitments. *Child Development Perspective*, 11, 145–150. <https://doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12226>
- Crocetti, E., Beyers, W., & Çok, F. (2016). Shedding light on the dark side of identity: Introduction to the special issue. *Journal of Adolescence*, 47, 104–108. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2016.01.002>
- Crocetti, E., Branje, S., Rubini, M., Koot, H. M., & Meeus, W. (2017). Identity processes and parent–child and sibling relationships in adolescence: A five-wave multi-informant longitudinal study. *Child Development*, 88, 210–228. <https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12547>
- Cruz, M. Z. (2014). The role of Catholicism in the development of Lithuanian national identity. *Church History and Religious Culture*, 94, 479–504. <https://doi.org/10.1163/18712428-09404003>
- Dwairy, M., & Achoui, M. (2010). Adolescents-family connectedness: A first cross-cultural research on parenting and psychological adjustment of children. *Journal of Child and Family Studies*, 19, 8–15. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10826-009-9335-1>
- Erikson, E. (1950). *Childhood and society*. New York, NY: Norton.
- Erikson, E. (1968). *Identity, youth and crisis*. New York, NY: Norton.
- Friedlmeier, M., & Friedlmeier, W. (2012). Relative contribution of mothers and fathers to adolescents' values in Romanian families. *Cognition, Brain, Behavior: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 16, 239–264.
- Friedlmeier, M., & Trommsdorff, G. (2011). Are mother-child similarities in value orientations related to mothers' parenting? A comparative study of American and Romanian mothers and their adolescent children. *European Journal of Developmental Psychology*, 8, 661–680. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17405629.2011.590649>
- Greenfield, P. M., Keller, H., Fuligni, A., & Maynard, A. (2003). Cultural pathways through universal development. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 54, 461–490. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145221>
- Janssens, A., Goossens, L., Van Den Noortgate, W., Colpin, H., Verschueren, K., & Van Leeuwen, K. (2015). Parents' and adolescents' perspectives on parenting: Evaluating conceptual structure, measurement invariance, and criterion validity. *Assessment*, 22, 473–489. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191114550477>
- Kağıtçıbaşı, Ç. (1996). *Family and human development across cultures: A view from the other side*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Kağıtçıbaşı, Ç. (2007). *Family, self, and human development across cultures: Theory and applications* (2nd ed.). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Kaniūšonytė, G., & Žukauskienė, R. (2017). Relationships with parents, identity styles, and positive youth development during the transition from adolescence to emerging adulthood. *Emerging Adulthood, (Special Issue)*, 1–11. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2167696817690978>

- Kemp-Welch, A. (2008). *Poland under communism: A cold war history*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Kuhar, M., & Reiter, H. (2012). Frozen transitions to adulthood of young people in Slovenia. *Sociologija*, 54, 211–226. <https://doi.org/10.2298/soc1202211k>
- Luyckx, K., Schwartz, S. J., Berzonsky, M. D., Soenens, B., Vansteenkiste, M., & Smits, I. (2008). Capturing ruminative exploration: Extending the four-dimensional model of identity formation in late adolescence. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 42, 58–82. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2007.04.004>
- Luyckx, K., Schwartz, S. J., Rassart, J., & Klimstra, T. A. (2016). Intergenerational associations linking identity styles and processes in adolescents and their parents. *European Journal of Developmental Psychology*, 13, 67–83. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17405629.2015.1066668>
- Luyckx, K., Soenens, B., Goossens, L., Beckx, K., & Wouters, S. (2008). Identity exploration and commitment in late adolescence: Correlates of perfectionism and mediating mechanisms on the pathway to well-being. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 27, 333–361. <https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.2008.27.4.336>
- Macek, P., Bejček, J., & Vaníčková, J. (2007). Contemporary Czech emerging adults: Generation growing up in the period of social changes. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 22, 444–475.
- Macek, P., Jezek, S., & Vazsonyi, A. T. (2013). Adolescents during and after times of social change: The case of the Czech Republic. *Journal of Early Adolescence*, 33, 1029–1047. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0272431613507758>
- Marcia, J. E. (1966). Development and validation of ego-identity status. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 3, 551–558. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0023281>
- Marcia, J. E. (1980). Identity in adolescence. In J. Adelson (Ed.), *Handbook of adolescent psychology* (pp. 159–187). New York: Wiley.
- Metreveli, M., & Timothy, D. J. (2010). Religious heritage and emerging tourism in the Republic of Georgia. *Journal of Heritage Tourism*, 5, 237–244. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1743873X.2010.515310>
- Negru-Subtirica, O., Pop, E. I., & Crocetti, E. (2017). A longitudinal integration of identity styles and educational identity processes in adolescence. *Developmental Psychology*, 53, 2127–2138. <https://doi.org/10.1037/dev0000325>
- Prioste, A., Narciso, I., Gonçalves, M. M., & Pereira, C. R. (2015). Family relationships and parenting practices: A pathway to adolescents' collectivist and individualist values? *Journal of Child and Family Studies*, 24, 3258–3267. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10826-015-0129-3>
- Prioste, A., Narciso, I., Gonçalves, M. M., & Pereira, C. R. (2016). Values' family flow: Associations between grandparents, parents and adolescent children. *Journal of Family Studies*, 23, 98–117. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13229400.2016.1187659>
- Raeff, C. (2010). Independence and interdependence in children's developmental experiences. *Child Development Perspectives*, 4, 31–36. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1750-8606.2009.00113.x>
- Rageliene, T., & Justickis, V. (2016). Interrelations of adolescent's identity development, differentiation of self and parenting styles. *Psichologija*, 53, 24–43.
- Ramet, S. P. (2017). Controversies in the social and political engagement of the Catholic Church in Poland since 1988. In S. Ramet & I. Borowik (Eds.), *Religion, politics, and values in Poland* (pp. 19–40). New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-43751-8_2
- Rommel, A. (2017). Religion, interrupted? Observations on religious indifference in Estonia. In J. Quack & C. Schuh (Eds.), *Religious indifferences: New perspectives from studies on secularisation and nonreligion* (pp. 128–147). Wiesbaden: Springer.
- Schwartz, S. J., Luyckx, K., & Crocetti, E. (2014). What have we learned since Schwartz (2001)? A reappraisal of the field of identity development. In K. C. McLean & M. Syed (Eds.), *Oxford handbook of identity development* (pp. 539–561). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Šerek, J., Macek, P., Jezek, S., & Lacinová, L. (2014). Twenty years after the velvet revolution: Shifts in Czech adolescents' perceptions of family, school, and society. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, 29, 738–764. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0743558414538315>

- Simuț, C. C., & Buitendag, J. (2015). Promoting ancestry as ecodomy in Romanian Eastern Orthodox Christianity. The role of ancestors in contemporary Romanian Orthodox rhetoric. *The Expository Times*, 126, 475–487. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0014524615571245>
- Skhirtladze, N., Javakhishvili, N., Schwartz, S. J., Beyers, W., & Luyckx, K. (2016). Identity processes and statuses in post-Soviet Georgia: Exploration processes operate differently. *Journal of Adolescence*, 47, 197–209. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2015.08.006>
- Skhirtladze, N., Javakhishvili, N., Schwartz, J. S., & Luyckx, K. (2018). Identity styles in Georgian context and their association to parenting dimensions. *European Journal of Developmental Psychology*, 15, 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17405629.2017.1334549>
- Smrke, M. (2016). The decapitation of Slovenia's Catholic Church: Social factors and consequences. *Religion, State & Society*, 44, 152–171. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2016.1194009>
- Taivans, L. (2013). Latvia: Culture as a new religious movement. In J. Priede (Ed.), *Oriental studies between East and West: Cultural and religious dialogue before, during and after the totalitarian rule* (Vol. 793 of Scholarly Papers of University of Latvia, pp. 46–52). Riga: University of Latvia.
- Tamis-LeMonda, C. S., Way, N., Hughes, D., Yoshikawa, H., Kalman, R. K., & Niwa, E. Y. (2008). Parents' goals for children: The dynamic coexistence of individualism and collectivism in cultures and individuals. *Social development*, 17, 183–209. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9507.2007.00419.x>
- Toft, M. D. (2001). Multinationality, regions and state-building: The failed transition in Georgia. *Regional & Federal Studies*, 11, 123–142. <https://doi.org/10.1080/714004709>
- Tulviste, T. (2004). Sociocultural variation in mothers' control over children's behavior. *Ethos*, 32, 34–50.
- Tulviste, T., & Mizera, L. (2012). A comparison of Estonian senior high school students' value priorities in 2000 and 2009. *Trames*, 16, 145–156. <https://doi.org/10.3176/tr.2012.2.03>
- Tulviste, T., Mizera, L., & De Geer, B. (2012). Socialization values in stable and changing societies: A comparative study of Estonian, Swedish, and Russian Estonian mothers. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 43, 480–497. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022111401393>
- Tulviste, T., Mizera, L., De Geer, B., & Tryggvason, M.-T. (2003). A comparison of Estonian, Swedish, and Finnish mothers' controlling attitudes and behaviour. *International Journal of Psychology*, 38, 46–53. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00207590244000278>
- Wejnert, B., & Djumabaeva, A. (2004). From patriarchy to egalitarianism: Parenting roles in democratizing Poland and Kyrgyzstan. *Marriage & Family Review*, 36, 147–171.
- Whittemore, R., & Knafl, K. (2005). The integrative review: Updated methodology. *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 52, 546–553. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2648.2005.03621.x>
- Willard, A. K., & Cingl, L. (2017). Testing theories of secularization and religious belief in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, 38, 604–615. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2017.01.002>
- Worldometers. (2017a). *Population of Czech Republic*. Retrieved from <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/czech-republic-population/>
- Worldometers. (2017b). *Population of Estonia*. Retrieved from <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/estonia-population/>
- Worldometers. (2017c). *Population of Georgia*. Retrieved from <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/georgia-population/>
- Worldometers. (2017d). *Population of Latvia*. Retrieved from <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/latvia-population/>
- Worldometers. (2017e). *Population of Lithuania*. Retrieved from <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/lithuania-population/>
- Worldometers. (2017f). *Population of Poland*. Retrieved from <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/poland-population/>
- Worldometers. (2017g). *Population of Romania*. Retrieved from <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/Romania-population/>
- Worldometers. (2017h). *Population of Slovakia*. Retrieved from <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/slovakia-population/>

Worldometers. (2017i). *Population of Slovenia*. Retrieved from <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/slovenia-population/>

Žukauskienė, R., Truskauskaitė-Kunevičienė, I., Kaniušonytė, G., & Crocetti, E. (2017). How do Lithuanian adolescents address identity questions? A four-wave longitudinal study on change and stability in identity styles. *European Journal of Developmental Psychology, 15*, 41–60. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17405629.2017.1285762>

Hamzallari, Oriola (Ph.D., University of Tirana) is a lecturer in the Department of Psychology at Aleksander Moisiu University, Durrës, Albania. She is a Fulbright Research Visiting Scholar in Northern Illinois University for the 2017–2018 academic year. She is a member of the European Association for Developmental Psychology (EADP) and International Society for the Study of Behavioural Development (ISSBD). Her research interests are parenting values, parenting practices, parenting self-regulation, child self-regulation, and identity development.

Values of Ethnic Russian Minority Members in North Caucasus Republics of the Russian Federation: An Inter- and Intragenerational Comparison



**Victoria Galyapina, Nadezhda Lebedeva, Zarina Lepshokova,
and Klaus Boehnke**

After the collapse of the USSR, ethnic Russians who earlier had been the political and intellectual elite in the North Caucasus republics (Ataev, 2013) became an ethnic minority of lesser significance, despite being the ethnic majority in the Russian Federation as a whole. It turns out that ethnopolitical conditions for the socialization of the younger generation of Russians living in the North Caucasus are significantly different from the conditions of their parents' socialization. In this changed reality, parents are faced with the question: Which values do they need to transmit to their growing children? And children are faced with the question: Which values do they need to adopt from their parents and which values from the mainstream society?

In our study, we focus on the intergenerational value similarities and differences among two generations of ethnic Russians living in North Caucasus in comparison to values of two generations of Russians in Central Russia and indigenous families in the North Caucasus republics. Inter- and intragenerational analyses will allow us to reveal which values continue to be important and which values change in their importance among the Russian ethnic minority living in North Caucasus republics and in which direction do changes occur. Are the values of Russians living in the North Caucasus republics more similar to the values of the mainstream Russian culture in residential areas of the Russian Federation (where Russians are the ethnic majority) or to those held by members of the mainstream culture of the North

V. Galyapina (✉) · N. Lebedeva · Z. Lepshokova
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: vgalyapina@hse.ru; nlebedeva@hse.ru; lepshokova@hse.ru

K. Boehnke
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
Jacobs University Bremen, Bremen, Germany
e-mail: k.boehnke@jacobs-university.de

Caucasus republics? Are there any intergenerational differences in these similarities and differences?

Value Transmission Among Members of Ethnic Minorities

Transmission of values is observed in all cultures (Boehnke, 2001; Knafo & Schwartz, 2003; Phalet & Schönplflug, 2001). A number of authors point at a great similarity between the values of children and their parents (Vollebergh, Iedema, & Raaijmakers, 2001), while others indicate substantial differences (Roest, Dubas, Gerris, & Engels, 2009; Whitbeck & Gecas, 1988). Research suggests that the quality of family relationships (Lepshokova, Galyapina, & Lebedeva, 2016; Roest et al., 2009; Schönplflug, 2001), ethnic and religious affiliations (Lepshokova et al., 2016; Rick & Forward, 1992; Szapocznik & Kurtines, 1993), and the immediate and wider sociocultural context (Boehnke, Hadjar, & Baier, 2007; Kuczynski & Parkin, 2007; Vedder, Berry, Sabatier, & Sam, 2009) may be the reasons of such different findings.

The family is an important source of intergenerational value continuity (Grusec & Davidov, 2007). However, intrafamilial processes do not take place in an isolated family-only environment, so, theoretically, the similarity between the values of parents and children is likely to differ in families of ethnic minorities and ethnic majorities. Parents and children from ethnic minorities are involved in the process of acculturation (Vedder et al., 2009), but they do not always gain the same experience and not always interact with the same reference groups. Parents are more strongly interested in maintaining customary values, whereas children, especially adolescents, are more eager to become part of the majority culture (Vedder et al., 2009). Adolescents tend to be most susceptible to influence from the larger society, given that they are in a novel cultural and language environment (Maliapaard & Lubbers, 2013) that is not the environment in which their parents grew up. This influence can be an important factor of cultural continuity/discontinuity contributing to parent-child value similarity/dissimilarity.

A study conducted by Hadjar et al. (2012) among representatives of ethnic majorities and minorities in Israel and Germany found that parent-child value similarity was higher in families of majority groups than in families of ethnic minorities. In contrast, in a study of Canadian families in Canada and Polish families in Canada and Poland, the authors did not discover significant differences in the values of parents and children among families of Polish migrants, compared to representatives of the ethnic majority in Poland and Canada (Kwast-Welfel, Boski, & Rovers, 2008). Sam and Virta (2003) obtained similar results by studying families from ethnic minorities (Pakistanis, Turks, and Vietnamese) and the ethnic majority in Norway and Sweden. The authors explain the uniformity of intergenerational discrepancies in the values of parents and children as dictated by the necessities of individuation in adolescence as a developmental phase.

Other authors found that values that are most significant for one's own ethnic culture are successfully transferred in families of migrants and ethnic minorities (Kamo & Zhou, 1994; Sung, 1995). For example, in the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean families living in the United States, the transmission of values associated with the respect of the elders and filial piety is the most successfully accomplished transmission (Kamo & Zhou, 1994; Sung, 1995). Takaki (1989) noted that the commitment to traditional cultural values by Asian North Americans was associated with their educational and professional success.

The general social-value climate (Roest et al., 2009) or "Zeitgeist" (Boehnke et al., 2007; Vedder et al., 2009) affects similarities and differences in value orientations of children and parents. The ethnic "Zeitgeist" was the most important among migrants, and both the ethnic "Zeitgeist" and the "Zeitgeist" of society as a whole, including the compatriots, and the immigrants were important among the adolescents of the host society (Boehnke, 2001; Vedder et al., 2009).

In our study of parent-child value similarity in the North Caucasus republics of the Russian Federation, we found that children play a more important role compared to parents in the process of intergenerational transmission of values in an Islamic religious context, whereas parents play a more important role in a Christian religious environment (Lepshokova et al., 2016).

This review suggests that discrepancies in values between parents and children relate to an almost universal trend in modern society in which the parent generation supports existing norms and expectations, while adolescents question them (Steinberg, 1990; Yau & Smetana, 1996), and such divergence is further impacted by migration experience, ethnic status, religious affiliation, and the general societal climate.

Ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus

The North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD) is the only district of Russia where ethnic Russians are an ethnic minority. Russians began to settle in the North Caucasus more than 200 years ago (Chernous, 2005). The largest number of ethnic Russians lived in the North Caucasus between 1940 and 1970. Ethnic Russians actively participated in the implementation of engineering, technical, agricultural, and cultural programs in this region, especially during the Soviet period. The integration of Russian and Caucasian cultures occurred during this period (Chernous, 2005).

The collapse of the USSR, processes of indigenization, ethno-religious revival, and armed conflicts in the republics of the North Caucasus contributed to an intensive outflow of ethnic Russians from the region (Belozеров, 2001). In addition, the identity of Russians living in the North Caucasus is being transformed as they become aware of themselves as an ethnic minority (Soldatova, 1998; Vorobyov, 2001), although they continue to be the vast ethnic majority in the Russian Federation as a whole.

We study values of late adolescents and their parents in two North Caucasus Republics—North Ossetia-Alania (RNO-A) and Kabardino-Balkaria (KBR). These republics have similarities: both are multicultural, with the share of the dominant ethnic groups at more than 60% and the share of the Russian population at about 20%. The share of Russians has, however, declined by 10–20% in these republics between 2002 and 2010 (Rosstata, 2004; Rosstata, 2012; Vsesoyuznaya perepis', 2015).

There are, however, also differences between these republics. First, there is the composition of the dominant ethnic groups: in RNO-A there is one dominant ethnic group (Ossetians, 64.5%), and in KBR there are two culturally dominant ethnic groups (Kabardians, 57.2%, and Balkars, 12.7%) (Rosstata, 2004; Rosstata, 2012; Vsesoyuznaya perepis', 2015). The second difference lies in the religious affiliation: in KBR 72.0% of the population are Muslims, whereas 27.8% of the population are Orthodox Christians. In RNO-A only 8.7% of the population are Muslims, whereas 91.2% are Orthodox Christians (Foundation for Advanced Studies, 2012). A third difference lies in interethnic attitudes: in RNO-A both the dominant ethnic group and the ethnic Russian minority prefer equal-status interaction (Gutsunaeva, 2010), whereas in KBR members of dominant ethnic groups prefer contacts with co-ethnics, and ethnic Russians prefer intercultural contacts (Sklyarova, 2008). A fourth difference lies in intercultural relations: 63% of ethnic Russians are satisfied with the interethnic relations in RNO-A, whereas only 40% of ethnic Russians are satisfied with the interethnic relations in KBR (Denisova & Ulanov, 2003).

In the current study, we are interested in intergenerational similarities and differences in the values of Russian ethnic minority members in two North Caucasus republics in comparison with Russians as a dominant group in Central Russia as well as with Ossetians, Kabardians, and Balkars as dominant groups in these two republics. Our research questions are: (1) What are the intergenerational similarities and differences in values of parents and offspring of ethnic Russian minorities in the republics of North Caucasus in comparison with Russians in Central Russia and members of dominant ethnic groups in these republics? (2) What are the intragenerational similarities and differences in values of adolescents and parents from ethnic Russian minorities in the republics of North Caucasus in comparison with their peers among Russians in Central Russia and members of the dominant ethnic groups in these republics?

We conducted two types of analyses to answer these research questions: intergenerational as well as the intragenerational, cross-regional comparisons of the values of adolescents and their parents from the ethnic Russian minority in the republics of the North Caucasus, ethnic Russians from Central Federal District of Russia (CFD), and the dominant ethnic groups from North Caucasus republics (KBR and RNO-A) were conducted.

Table 1 Gender and age characteristics of the sample

	<i>N</i>	Male (%)	Min.	Max.	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Russians from RNO-A						
Children	109	32	15	25	18.5	2.80
Parents	109	27	36	61	44.6	6.31
Russians from KBR						
Children	100	50	14	26	17.8	2.35
Parents	100	34	35	59	42.3	6.83
Ossetians from RNO-A						
Children	106	47	15	25	17.6	2.39
Parents	106	21	36	60	43.8	5.92
Kabardians and Balkars from KBR						
Children	97	34	14	26	17.6	2.22
Parents	97	32	36	59	44.5	6.65
Russians from Central Federal District						
Children	151	45	15	21	16.8	1.99
Parents	151	22	35	60	42.6	5.61

Note: The sample description includes all participants regardless of whether missing data were incurred or not. Subsequent analyses may include fewer participants due to missing data on single variables

Method

Participants

We gathered data in the two North Caucasus republics, KBR ($N = 100$ parent-child dyads from ethnic Russian families and $N = 97$ parent-child dyads from Kabardian and Balkar families) and RNO-A ($N = 109$ parent-child dyads from ethnic Russian families and $N = 106$ parent-child dyads from Ossetian families). Additionally, we gathered data in the Central Federal District of the Russian Federation ($N = 151$ parent-child dyads from ethnic Russian families). The total sample's size is 1126 respondents. Table 1 provides the basic characteristics of the samples.

Procedure

The adolescents were recruited from schools and universities in CFD, KBR, and RNO-A. Parents of school students filled out the questionnaires at parental meetings at the schools. University students distributed questionnaires among their parents. Completed questionnaires were returned to the researcher who administrated the survey. Respondents were not remunerated. From a sampling point of view, our participants constitute a well-educated convenience sample.

Measures

Values were measured using the Russian version of the PVQ-R, the Revised Portrait Values Questionnaire (Schwartz, Butenko, Sedova, & Lipatova, 2012). The PVQ-R contains 57 short verbal portraits that describe a person's goals, aspirations, or wishes. The questionnaire is based on the refined theory of values of Shalom Schwartz (Schwartz et al., 2012) and uses 19 values with three items for every single value. In order to measure values, respondents choose an answer indicating, "How much is this person like you?" An example of an item is "He/she thinks it is important to do things the way he/she learned from his/her family." As its response format, the PVQ uses a Likert scale, ranging from "1" = "not like me at all" to "6" = "very much like me." The 19 values of Schwartz's refined theory of basic individual values can be combined into four higher-order values: Openness to Change (all α s > .82), Self-Enhancement (all α s > .76), Conservation of the Status Quo (all α s > .86), and Self-Transcendence (all α s > .81); sociodemographic data were self-reported (gender, age, educational attainment, ethnicity, religion affiliation).

Statistical Analyses

To analyze our data, we used the statistical package SPSS 24.0 and employed the procedures FREQUENCIES (to document descriptive statistical coefficients), RELIABILITY (to determine Cronbach's α), and MANOVA (to conduct the pertinent analyses of variance).

Results

Intergenerational Similarities and Differences

To answer our first research question about intergenerational similarities and differences in values of ethnic Russian minority members in the North Caucasus, we compared means of higher-order values—Openness to Change, Self-Enhancement, Conservation, and Self-Transcendence—between two generations of Russians from RNO-A, KBR, dominant ethnic groups from RNO-A and KBR, and Russians from CFD, employing five separate MANOVAs. We modelled the generation factor as a repeated-measures factor (see Table 2).

The intergenerational MANOVA with generation as a within-subject independent variable and higher-order values—Openness to Change, Self-Enhancement, Conservation, and Self-Transcendence—as multivariate dependent variables showed that the higher-order values' means of Russian youth and the representatives of the

Table 2 Intergenerational comparison of value preferences among Russians from RNO-A, KBR, CFD, Ossetians from RNO-A, and Kabardians and Balkars from KBR (max. 6 points)

Higher-order values	Adolescents		Parents		Partial η^2
	M (SD)	Rank	M (SD)	Rank	
Russians from RNO-A					
Openness to change	4.15 (.49) _a	1	3.86 (.42) _b	3	.185***
Self-enhancement	3.67 (.64) _a	4	3.52 (.60) _a	4	.038
Conservation	4.00 (.43) _a	3	4.25 (.38) _b	1	.202***
Self-transcendence	4.14 (.40) _a	2	4.21 (.31) _a	2	.023
Russians from KBR					
Openness to change	4.04 (.30) _a	2	3.91 (.34) _b	3	.078**
Self-enhancement	3.83 (.58) _a	4	3.66 (.58) _b	4	.067*
Conservation	4.04 (.28) _a	3	4.14 (.28) _b	2	.067*
Self-transcendence	4.09 (.35) _a	1	4.16 (.36) _a	1	.026
Ossetians from RNO-A					
Openness to change	4.11 (.50) _a	2	3.94 (.40) _b	3	.084**
Self-enhancement	3.75 (.62) _a	4	3.65 (.58) _a	4	.017
Conservation	4.01 (.42) _a	3	4.17 (.35) _b	2	.112***
Self-transcendence	4.14 (.37) _a	1	4.19 (.33) _a	1	.013
Kabardians and Balkars from KBR					
Openness to change	4.00 (.37) _a	3	3.86 (.54) _b	3	.041*
Self-enhancement	3.82 (.49) _a	4	3.66 (.48) _b	4	.060*
Conservation	4.04 (.32) _a	2	4.13 (.30) _b	2	.052*
Self-transcendence	4.14 (.28) _a	1	4.20 (.34) _a	1	.033
Russians from CFD					
Openness to change	4.33 (.43) _a	1	3.85 (.42) _b	3	.416***
Self-enhancement	3.68 (.66) _a	4	3.36 (.60) _b	4	.137***
Conservation	3.85 (.37) _a	3	4.30 (.36) _b	1	.435***
Self-transcendence	4.14 (.40) _a	2	4.28 (.35) _b	2	.075***

Note: Significance levels * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$
 Identical letter indices show nonsignificant differences of means

older generation from RNO-A exhibited significant differences: Wilks' $\Lambda = .720$, $F(4, 89) = 8.64$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .280$. Subsequent univariate ANOVAs showed that Openness to Change value preferences were significantly higher and Conservation value preferences were significantly lower among adolescents compared with their parents (all $p < .001$). Intergenerational differences in Self-Enhancement and Self-Transcendence values were insignificant ($p > .05$). Thus, for the Russian ethnic minority in RNO-A, we found intergenerational gaps only in Openness and Conservation values.

In KBR there also were multivariately significant adolescent-parent value differences: Wilks' $\Lambda = .689$, $F(4; 91) = 10.25$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .311$. Here subsequent univariate ANOVAs showed that mean preferences of Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement values were significantly higher among youth than among their parents. In contrast, the preference of Conservation values was significantly lower

among the younger generation. Mean preferences of Self-Transcendence values did not differ between the two generations. Thus, among the Russian ethnic minority in KBR, we found intergenerational gaps in Openness, Self-Enhancement, and Conservation values.

In addition, we compared the values of the dominant ethnic groups of RNO-A and KBR: Ossetians in RNO-A and Kabardians and Balkars in KBR. Analyses of the same kind as reported for ethnic Russians in the two republics showed that differences of higher-order values of Ossetian youth and parents were multivariately significant: Wilks' $\Lambda = .874$, $F(4, 95) = 3.42$, $p = .012$, $\eta_p^2 = .126$. Univariate ANOVAs on the single measures were significant for Openness to Change value preferences (significantly higher among youth, $p = .003$) and for Conservation values (significantly lower among youth compared with their parents, $p = .001$). We did not find intergenerational differences for Self-Enhancement and Self-Transcendence values. Overall, the results were identical with the results obtained for the sample of Russians in RNO-A.

In KBR the intergenerational analysis showed that preferences of higher-order values among Kabardians and Balkars also exhibited multivariately significant differences: Wilks' $\Lambda = .775$, $F(4; 93) = 6.74$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .225$. In the subsequent univariate ANOVAs, we found significant differences for Openness to Change, Conservation, and Self-Enhancement values: Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement value preferences were higher among youth, whereas the values of Conservation were higher among their parents. For Self-Transcendence value preferences, no significant differences between generations were found. Thus, intergenerational gaps were obtained for three higher-order values (Openness, Self-Enhancement, and Conservation). These results were identical to the results obtained in the sample of Russians in KBR.

In Central Russia (CFD), the analysis showed that value differences of Russian younger and older generations were multivariately significant and sizable: Wilks' $\Lambda = .470$, $F(4, 143) = 40.25$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .530$. Univariate ANOVAs for the single measures were significant as well for all four higher-order values. Youth's value preferences for Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement were significantly higher than values of their parents (all $p < .001$). In contrast, the values of Conservation and Self-Transcendence were significantly higher among the older generation (all $p < .001$). In general, the analysis showed that there were intergenerational gaps for all higher-order values in Central Russia.

Overall, we see that the patterns of intergenerational similarities and differences in value preferences were very similar among ethnic Russian minorities and the dominant ethnic groups of the two Caucasus republics (the Ossetians in RNO-A, and the Kabardians and Balkars in KBR), differing somewhat from the pattern of value preferences among the ethnic Russian majority in the CFD. In Central Russia the intergenerational gap in value preferences was more sizable than in the Caucasus republics.

Intragenerational Similarities and Differences

To answer our second research question about intragenerational similarities and differences, we compared the means of higher-order value preferences among parents and among adolescents separately, simultaneously including all groups (Russians from RNO-A, KBR, CFD, Ossetians from RNO-A, and Kabardians and Balkars from KBR). A MANOVA with majority-minority status and region as separate independent variables and the higher-order value preferences—Openness to Change, Self-Enhancement, Conservation, and Self-Transcendence—as multivariate dependent variables showed a significant multivariate main effect for region among adolescents: Wilks' $\Lambda = .959$, $F(8, 1114) = 2.97$, $p = .003$, $\eta_p^2 = .021$. For majority-minority status, neither the main effect nor the interaction effect with region was multivariately significant.¹ Univariate ANOVAs on the single measures were significant for the main effect region for Openness to Change and for Conservation value preferences. Preferences for Openness to Change values differed between Central Russia and the Caucasus republics (CFD > RNO-A > KBR). Conservation value preferences differed between Central Russia and the Caucasus republics, but not between RNO-A and KBR (CFD < RNO-A = KBR); Conservation values were more highly endorsed in the Caucasus Republics (see Table 3).

Among parents, the MANOVA with majority-minority status and region as independent variables and the higher-order values—Openness to Change, Self-Enhancement, Conservation and Self-Transcendence—as multivariate dependent variables showed a significant multivariate main effect for region: Wilks' $\Lambda = .934$, $F(8, 1112) = 4.81$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .033$. The multivariate status main effect and the interaction term were insignificant. Univariate ANOVAs for the single measures were insignificant for all value preferences. However, single comparisons (Scheffé) showed significant differences between for Self-Enhancement, Conservation, and Self-Transcendence value preferences; preferences for Self-Enhancement was lower in the CFD than in the Caucasus Republics (CFD < RNO-A = KBR). Conservation value preferences surprisingly were highest in Central Russia (CFD = RNO-A > RNO-A = KBR).² Self-Transcendence values also were the highest in Central Russia and followed the same pattern as Conservation values (CFD = RNO-A > RNO-A = KBR).

In sum total, one can say that intergenerational trends of value change are stronger for Openness as opposed to Conservation values, the former gaining ground over the latter. A lesser value change trend is incurred for Self-Enhancement vs. Self-Transcendence values. If there are intergenerational differences at all, the younger generation is more Self-Enhancement-prone than the older generation, whereas for Self-Transcendence values there rarely is an intergenerational difference. If at all (in the CFD), elders are more inclined to endorse Self-Transcendence values than

¹In the CFD there were a few participants with an ethnicity other than Russian (but not Ossetian, Kabardian, or Balkar), so that the interaction term was also testable.

²This means that scores differ only between CFD and KBR.

Table 3 Intragenerational comparisons: analysis of variance results (parents/adolescents)

Source of variation	Wilks' Λ	F	Hypothesis df ^a	p	Partial η^2
Multivariate test					
Region	.934/.959	4.81/2.97	8	<.001/.003 ^b	.033/.021
Majority/minority	.986/.999	1.95/.20	4	.101/.938	.014/.001
Region X Majority/minority	.975/.995	1.77/.35	8	.078/.945	.013/.003
Source of variation	Dependent variable	F	Hypothesis df	p	Partial η^2
Univariate test					
Region	Openness to change	.12/8.02	2	.891/<.001	.000/.028
	Self-enhancement	2.19/2.21	2	.113/.110	.008/.008
	Conservation	2.15/3.78	2	.117/.023	.008/.013
	Self-transcendence	1.27/.34	2	.283/.714	.005/.001
Majority/minority	Openness to change	.05/.54	1	.822/.464	.000/.001
	Self-enhancement	.24/.19	1	.623/.667	.000/.000
	Conservation	.07/.58	1	.798/.445	.000/.001
	Self-transcendence	.26/.22	1	.610/.641	.000/.000
Region X Majority/minority	Openness to Change	1.07/.08	2	.346/.923	.004/.000
	Self-Enhancement	.83/.67	2	.438/.515	.003/.002
	Conservation	1.74/.52	2	.177/.594	.006/.002
	Self-transcendence	.47/.22	2	.625/.805	.002/.001

^aHypothesis degrees of freedom are obviously identical for parents and adolescents. Error degrees of freedom are omitted, because they are determined by the sample size ($N = 563$), varying between 556 and 560 due to missing data

^bSignificant effects are set in bold

are youth. As for cultural differences within the Russian Federation, they are more substantial for the comparison of center (CFD) vs. periphery (RNO-A, KBR) than when comparing groups with regard to their status as majority vs. minority. Looking at both generations simultaneously, cultural differences seem to be slightly more pronounced for the Openness vs. Conservation dimension of the Schwartz value circumplex than they are for the Self-Enhancement vs. Self-Transcendence dimension.

Discussion and Conclusions

This study investigated value similarities and differences between two generations of ethnic Russians living in North Caucasus compared with those of ethnic Russians living in CFD and the dominant groups from RNO-A (Ossetians) and KBR (Kabardians and Balkars). Results for the intergenerational comparison revealed that preferences for values of Openness to Change were significantly higher among adolescents than among their parents everywhere, and that, conversely, preferences for Conservation values were significantly higher among parents than among youth. These results demonstrate classical cohort differences or the “generation gap” (Eisenstadt, 1956). Studies on the transmission of values almost always have shown that preferences of Conservation values are higher among the parent than among the offspring generation (Boehnke & Welzel, 2006; Caprara, Caprara, & Steca, 2003; Caprara & Steca, 2007; Knafo & Schwartz, 2001; Schwartz, 2007).

Among the ethnic Russian minority in KBR, in addition to the differences noted above, we found that Self-Enhancement values were more highly endorsed among the younger generation than among the older one. However, among the ethnic Russian minority in RNO-A, these values did not exhibit significant intergeneration differences. In addition, among the ethnic Russian minorities in both RNO-A and KBR, we did not find an intergenerational gap in the values of Self-Transcendence. This may show that these values are transmitted rather successfully between generations among ethnic Russians in the within-country Diaspora.

We found similar patterns of intergenerational value differences and similarities among the dominant ethnic groups of RNO-A and KBR. Kabardians and Balkars, as well as Russians from KBR, exhibited intergenerational gaps for the values of Openness to Change, Self-Enhancement, and Conservation (personal focus values were higher, and social focus values were lower among adolescents compared with their parents). Preferences for values of Self-Transcendence did not differ among Kabardian and Balkar adolescents and parents. In RNO-A, Ossetians, as well as Russians, exhibited intergenerational gaps for the values of Openness to Change (higher preferences among adolescents than their parents) and Conservation (higher preferences among parents than their offspring) and did not exhibit differences for values of Self-Enhancement and Self-Transcendence.

We also identified value similarities and differences of representatives of two generations of Russians from the CFD (the ethnic majority). The results revealed intergenerational gaps for all higher-order values. These data were consistent with findings by Postnikova (2010): preferences for values of Openness to Change and Self-Enhancement were significantly higher among younger generation than the older generation in Russia in that study, whereas preferences for values of Self-Transcendence and of Conservation were stronger among the older than the younger generation.

In our intragenerational analysis, we compared the values of parents and adolescents of minority as opposed to majority status from RNO-A and KBR as well as Central Russia.

Among the older generation of ethnic Russian minorities in two republics of the North Caucasus, we found that their Openness to Change and Self-Transcendence values (Growth and Anxiety-Free values) showed no significant differences compared with values of their peers from the dominant ethnic groups of the republics and their Russian peers from Central Russia. These results might be explained by their common past. The parents' mean age was 42–44 years, and the period of their socialization and values' formation (late 1980s/early 1990s) coincided with the period of cardinal sociopolitical changes in Russia, democratic reforms, and the collapse of the USSR. Old (communist) values tended to be rejected, and (the then) young people sought for new values, having the freedom to choose them at that time (Lisovskiy, 2000; Vishnevskiy & Shapko, 2006). Such processes of value change and transformation took place in all regions of Russia and might be the main reason for sweeping parental value similarities across all studied samples.

If at all, differences in the value preference profile of parents in the interregional comparison emerged between CFD parents and parents in KBR, regardless of whether they were minority or majority members. Religious "otherness" of KBR, where most people are Muslims, may play a role in explaining this finding, but given that differences emerged only in post hoc single comparisons and not even in regular ANOVA F tests³ makes it obvious that effects are not overly strong.

Our study showed that the values of Russian minority youth from RNO-A and KBR were closer to the values of their peers from the dominant ethnic groups of these republics than to the values of their Russian peers from Central Russia. In addition, our study revealed that preferences of Openness to Change values were significantly lower and the values of Conservation were significantly higher among the younger generation of the ethnic Russians and dominant ethnic groups of North Caucasus compared with their Russian peers from Central Russia. The fact that regional differences in value preferences and in intergenerational value differences were more pronounced for the interregional comparison (CFD vs. North Caucasus republics) than interethnic differences or majority-minority status differences suggests that sociological modernization theory may serve as an interpretational framework for the present study. Even without looking into economic indicators in much detail, it is evident that the CFD is a more "modern" region of the Russian Federation. In light of modernization theory (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), it thus does not come as a big surprise that a higher pace of value change (as manifested in greater intergenerational differences in value preferences in the CFD than in the North Caucasus) emerged for Central Russia. It also is in line with modernization theory that value change affects the dimension of Openness to Change vs. Conservation more than the Self-Enhancement vs. Self-Transcendence dimension. Modernity requires people to react flexibly to new societal demands and, therefore, fosters Openness to Change values. At the same time, modernization

³Having the overall F -test retain the null hypothesis and the single comparison test (here the Scheffé test) reject it has its root in the mathematical statistical properties of the two tests, which have different "rejection regions" (Boehnke, 1983).

may sometimes surpass the capacities of individuals who are still in their formative years (adolescents of the present study), thereby creating a climate that is prone to stir anxieties. A plausible reaction to this challenge then is to turn to values that seem to promise an improved coping with these new anxieties: Self-Enhancement values. This trend becomes most evident in the CFD and is highly significant there. In the periphery of the Russian Federation, forces of modernization are likely to be weaker, so that—intergenerational—change trends are less powerful.

Limitations

The main limitations of this study are small sample sizes and its cross-sectional design. Taking into account the long-term nature of intergenerational transmission, longitudinal studies are needed to clarify psychological mechanisms involved into the process of transmission. Based on our findings, we cannot clearly answer the question whether and how value preferences of the ethnic Russian minority are transmitted in the families between generations in the republics of the North Caucasus. Previous research showed that the family relationships and family climate (Roest et al., 2009; Schönflug, 2001) affect the parent-child value similarity and transmission. The same is true for the overall zeitgeist at the time of data gathering. Future research might clarify the relative contributions of different factors in intergenerational value transmission. Multilevel modelling that includes society-level indicators in its analyses is another path to take in an attempt to better understand the present results and to put our modernization hypothesis at an empirical test. For that, however, more than just three society-level units would have to be included in the analysis.

References

- Ataev, A. (2013, September). Status i perspektivy russkogo naseleniya na Severnom Kavkaze [Status and prospects of the Russian population in the North Caucasus]. *Kamerton*. Retrieved from <http://webkamerton.ru/2013/09/status-i-perspektivy-russkogo-naseleniya-na-severnom-kavkaze>
- Belozеров, V. S. (2001). Russkiye na Kavkaze: evolyutsiya rasseleniya [Russians in the Caucasus: Evolution of settlement]. In V. V. Chernous (Ed.), *Russkiye na Severnom Kavkaze: vyzovy XXI veka. Sbornik nauchnykh statey* (pp. 27–45). Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation: North-Caucasian Scientific Centre of Higher School.
- Boehnke, K. (1983). *Der Einfluß verschiedener Stichprobencharakteristika auf die Effizienz der parametrischen und nichtparametrischen Varianzanalyse [The influence of various sample characteristics on the efficiency of parametric and non-parametric ANOVA]*. Berlin: Springer.
- Boehnke, K. (2001). Parent-offspring value transmission in a societal context: Suggestions for a utopian research design with empirical underpinnings. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 32, 241–255. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022101032002010>

- Boehnke, K., Hadjar, A., & Baier, D. (2007). Parent-child value similarity: The role of zeitgeist. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 69, 778–792. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2007.00405.x>
- Boehnke, K., & Welzel, C. (2006). Wertetransmission und Wertewandel – Eine explorative Drei-Generationen-Studie [Value transmission and value change – An exploratory three-generation study]. *Zeitschrift für Soziologie der Erziehung und Sozialisation*, 26(4), 341–360.
- Caprara, G. V., Caprara, M., & Steca, P. (2003). Personality's correlates of adult development and aging. *European Psychologist*, 8, 131–147. <https://doi.org/10.1027//1016-9040.8.3.131>
- Caprara, G. V., & Steca, P. (2007). Prosocial agency: The contribution of values and self-efficacy beliefs to prosocial behavior across ages. *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 26, 218–239. <https://doi.org/10.1521/jscp.2007.26.2.218>
- Chernous, V. V. (Ed.). (2005). *Slavyanskiye narody na Severnom Kavkaze: sovremennyye demograficheskiye protsessy* [Slavic peoples in the North Caucasus: Modern demographic processes]. Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation: North-Caucasian Scientific Centre of Higher School.
- Denisova, G. S., & Ulanov, V. P. (2003). *Russkiye na Severnom Kavkaze: analiz transformatsii sotsiokul'urnogo statusa* [Russian North Caucasus: An analysis of the transformation of the socio-cultural status]. Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation: Publishing House of the Rostov State Pedagogical University.
- Eisenstadt, S. N. (1956). *From generation to generation*. Glencoe, IL: Free Press.
- Foundation for Advanced Studies. (2012). *Demograficheskiye i etnicheskiye problemy Severnogo Kavkaza i puti ikh resheniya* [Demographic and ethnic problems of the North Caucasus and ways of solving them]. Moscow: Bastion.
- Grusec, J. E., & Davidov, M. (2007). Socialization in the family: The roles of parents. In J. E. Grusec & P. D. Hastings (Eds.), *Handbook of socialization: Theory and research* (pp. 284–308). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Gutsunaeva, S.V. (2010). *Strategii mezhetnicheskogo vzaimodeystviya osetin i russkikh, prozhivayushchikh v respublike Severnaya Osetiya – Alaniya* [Strategy of interethnic interaction and Russians and Ossetians living in the republic of North Ossetia – Alania]. Candidate Dissertation. University of St. Petersburg, St. Petersburg, Russian Federation.
- Hadjar, A., Boehnke, K., Knafo, A., Daniel, E., Musiol, A., Schiefer, D., et al. (2012). Parent-child value similarity and subjective well being in the context of migration: An exploration. *Family Science*, 3, 55–63. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19424620.2011.671502>
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change and democracy: The human development sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Kamo, Y., & Zhou, M. (1994). Living arrangements of elderly Chinese and Japanese in the united states. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 56, 544–558. <https://doi.org/10.2307/352866>
- Knafo, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2001). Value socialization in families of Israeli-born and Soviet-born adolescents in Israel. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 32, 213–228.
- Knafo, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2003). Parenting and adolescents' accuracy in perceiving parental values. *Child Development*, 74, 595–611.
- Kuczynski, L., & Parkin, C. M. (2007). Agency and bidirectionality in socialization. Interactions, transactions and relational dialectics. In J. E. Grusec & P. D. Hastings (Eds.), *Handbook of socialization: Theory and research* (pp. 259–283). New York, NY: Guilford Press.
- Kwast-Welfel, J., Boski, P., & Rovers, M. (2008). Intergenerational value similarity in Polish immigrant families in Canada in comparison to intergenerational value similarity in Polish and Canadian non-immigrant families. In G. Zheng, K. Leung, & J. G. Adair (Eds.), *Perspectives and progress in contemporary cross-cultural psychology* (pp. 193–209). Ottawa: University of Ottawa.
- Lepshokova, Z., Galyapina, V., & Lebedeva, N. (2016). The impact of religious identity and perceived psychological closeness on parent-child value similarity in different religious contexts. *Psychology. Journal of the Higher School of Economics*, 13, 223–239.

- Lisovskiy, V. T. (2000). *Tsennosti zhizni i kul'tury sovremennoy molodezhi (sotsiologicheskoye issledovaniye)* [The values of life and culture of modern youth (sociological research)]. Retrieved from http://multi-kultura.ru/kultura-razgovora/mysl01_09.html
- Maliapaard, M., & Lubbers, M. (2013). Parental religious transmission after migration: The case of Dutch Muslims. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 39, 425–442. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183x.2013.733862>
- Phalet, K., & Schönplflug, U. (2001). Intergenerational transmission in Turkish immigrant families: Parental collectivism, achievement values and gender differences. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 32, 489–504.
- Postnikova, M. I. (2010). *Psikhologiya otnosheniy mezhdru pokoleniyami: teoretiko-metodologicheskii aspekt* [Psychology of intergenerational relations: The theoretical and methodological aspect. Monograph. Arkhangelsk. Pomor University]. Monografiya. Arkhangel'sk, Russian Federation: Pomorskiy Universitet.
- Rick, K., & Forward, J. (1992). Acculturation and perceived intergenerational differences among youth. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 23, 85–94.
- Roest, A. M. C., Dubas, J. S., Gerris, J. R. M., & Engels, R. C. M. E. (2009). Value similarities among fathers, mothers, and adolescents and the role of a cultural stereotype: Different measurement strategies reconsidered. *Journal of Research on Adolescence*, 19, 812–833. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7795.2009.00621.x>
- Rosstata. (2004). *Itogi Vserossiyskoy perepisi naseleniya 2002 goda [The results of the National Population Census of 2002]* (Vol. 4). Moscow, Russian Federation: IPC 'Statistics of Russia'.
- Rosstata. (2012). *T. 11. Svodnyye itogi Vserossiyskoy perepisi naseleniya 2010 goda* [The results of the National Population Census of 2010. Vol. 11. Summary results of the national census in 2010]. Retrieved from http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/vol11pdf-m.html
- Sam, D. L., & Virta, E. (2003). Intergenerational value discrepancies in immigrant and host-national families and their impact on psychological adaptation. *Journal of Adolescence*, 26, 213–231.
- Schönplflug, U. (2001). Intergenerational transmission of values: The role of transmission belts. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 32, 174–185. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022101032002005>
- Schwartz, S. (2007). Value orientations: Measurement, antecedents and consequences across nations. In R. Jowell, C. Roberts, R. Fitzgerald, & G. Eva (Eds.), *Measuring attitudes cross-nationally. Lessons from the European Social Survey* (pp. 169–203). London: Sage.
- Schwartz, S., Butenko, T. P., Sedova, D. S., & Lipatova, A. S. (2012). Refined theory of basic individual values: Use in Russia. *Psychology. Journal of Higher School of Economics*, 9, 43–70.
- Sklyarova, D. V. (2008). *Osobennosti etnicheskoy identichnosti studencheskoy molodezhi kabardinskoy, balkarskoy i russkoy etnograpp* [Features of ethnic identity of student's youth Kabardian, Balkar and Russian ethnic groups]. Candidate Dissertation. University of Rostov on Don. Rostov-on-Don, Russian Federation: North-Caucasian Scientific Centre of Higher School.
- Soldatova, G. U. (1998). *Psikhologiya mezhetnicheskoy napryazhennosti. [Psychology of interethnic tension]*. Moscow, Russian Federation: Smysl.
- Steinberg, L. (1990). Autonomy, conflict, and harmony in the family relationship. In S. Feldman & G. Elliott (Eds.), *At the threshold: The developing adolescent* (pp. 225–276). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Sung, K. (1995). Measures and dimensions of filial piety in Korea. *The Gerontologist*, 35, 240–247.
- Szapocznik, J., & Kurtines, W. (1993). Family psychology and cultural diversity. *American Psychologist*, 48, 400–407.
- Takaki, R. (1989). *Strangers from a different shore*. New York, NY: Penguin.
- Vedder, P., Berry, J., Sabatier, C., & Sam, D. (2009). The intergenerational transmission of values in national and immigrant families: The role of zeitgeist. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 38, 642–653. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-008-9375-7>
- Vishnevskiy, Y. R., & Shapko, V. T. (2006). *Paradoksal'nyy molodoy chelovek* [The paradox young man]. Retrieved from http://ecsocman.hse.ru/data/870/792/1219/004_vishnevskij.pdf

- Vollebergh, W. A. M., Iedema, J., & Raaijmakers, Q. A. W. (2001). Intergenerational transmission and the formation of cultural orientations in adolescence and young adulthood. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 63, 1185–1198.
- Vorobyov, S. M. (2001). *Etnopoliticheskiye protsessy na Severnom Kavkaze v postsovetskiy period* [Ethnopolitical processes in the North Caucasus in the post-Soviet period]. Candidate Dissertation. University of Stavropol, Stavropol, Russian Federation.
- Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1939 goda, 1959 goda, 1970 goda, 1979 goda, 1989 goda. Natsional'nyy sostav naseleniya po regionam Rossii. (2015). [All Union Population Census of 1939, 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989. National composition of the population in the Russian regions]. *Demoscope Weekly* (pp. 651–652). Retrieved from http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_nac_70.php?reg=50
- Whitbeck, L. B., & Gecas, V. (1988). Value attributions and value transmission between parents and children. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 50, 829–840.
- Yau, J., & Smetana, J. (1996). Adolescent-parent conflict among Chinese adolescents in Hong Kong. *Child Development*, 67, 1262–1275.

Galyapina, Victoria (Ph.D. in Social Psychology, Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow) is currently a leading researcher of the International Laboratory for Socio-Cultural Research and associate professor in the Department of Psychology at The National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. She is a member of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP). She has published more than 70 journal articles and book chapters in Russian and English. She has an extensive practical experience in improving intercultural relations. From 2004 to 2013, she implemented the scientific and practical projects on the psychological support of victims of armed conflicts and terrorist attacks' in the North Caucasus. Her research interests focus on problems of intercultural relationships, mutual acculturation of ethnic minorities and the majorities, intergenerational transmission of values, and social identity.

Lebedeva, Nadezhda (Ph.D., Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences) is Professor in the Department of Psychology and Head of the International Laboratory for Socio-cultural Research at The National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. She is Academic Director of double degree Master Program on Applied Social Psychology of HSE, Russia, and Tilburg University, the Netherlands. She is a member of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP) and the International Academy for Intercultural Research (IAIR). She is the author/editor of 26 books and over 250 articles and book chapters on social and cross-cultural psychology. Her research interests are values, value transmission, identity, intercultural relations, acculturation, creativity and innovations, and social and cultural change.

Lepshokova, Zarina (Ph.D. in General Psychology, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia) is currently a senior researcher of the International Laboratory for Socio-Cultural Research and associate professor in the Department of Psychology at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. She is a Member of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP). She has published a monograph "Adaptation Strategies of Migrants and their Psychological well-being (the cases of Moscow and the North Caucasus)" and over 30 articles in the areas of acculturation and cross-cultural, intercultural, and social psychology with various colleagues. Her research interests focus on problems of intercultural relationships, mutual acculturation of ethnic minorities and majorities, multiple identities and their perceived incompatibility, social disidentification, and intergenerational transmission of values and social identity.

Boehnke, Klaus is full professor of Social Science Methodology at Jacobs University Bremen and chair of the methods center of the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences (BIGSSS—www.bigsss-bremen.de). Since 2017, he is also deputy head of the International Laboratory for Sociocultural Research at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow (<https://scr.hse.ru/en>). He received his Ph.D. in Psychology from Berlin University of Technology in 1985 and held assistant and associate professorships at the Free University of Berlin. In 1993, he became full professor of Socialization Research and Empirical Social Research at the Department of Sociology of Chemnitz University of Technology, from where he moved to Jacobs in 2002. He was secretary general of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP) from 2000 to 2008 and president of the Division of Political Psychology of the International Association of Applied Psychology (IAAP) from 2004 to 2010; he is now president-elect of IACCP (www.iaccp.org). Klaus Boehnke published some 400 academic pieces. His most heavily cited paper is one with Shalom Schwartz on a confirmatory factor analysis of Schwartz's value circumplex. Recently, he was part of an author team that published on the tightness vs. looseness of cultures in *Science* (lead author: Gelfand). His main research interest is political socialization. Klaus Boehnke is PI of the longest-running longitudinal study of peace movement activists that saw its first of meanwhile ten waves of measurement in 1985. He was a founding member of the Committee for the Psychological Study of Peace (CPSP) in 1988 and has been its senior advisor since 1999; he also was president of the German Peace Psychology Association from 2005 to 2013.

Values and Religious Identity of Russian Students from Different Religions



Oleg Y. Khukhlaev, Valeria A. Shorokhova, Elena A. Grishina,
and Olga S. Pavlova

Religion and Religious Identity in Modern Russia

In today's mass media and specialized literature, social changes are often associated with the secularization process, i.e., with the decreased role of religion in daily life. Along with this we cannot fail to notice that religion and religious identity make one of the most significant factors directly related to and affecting major cultural and social processes such as value transformation, ethnic conflicts, international terrorism, etc.

The last decade of the twentieth century saw the emergence of a new situation, revealing multiple choices of social and cultural identity in post-Communist Russia (Agadjanian, 2000). Religious identification was one of the most powerful among them. According to the data from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP),¹ during the period from 1991 to 2008, the share of Russia's population that did not identify with any religion dropped from 61 to 18%. As stated by the public opinion polls, more Russians started to rely on God in their lives in the past 25 years, and their share increased from 49% in 1991 to 67% in 2016. Thus, today's Russia is a multi-confessional country where religion plays an important role. Orthodox Christianity is predominant in Russia (69% of Russians are Orthodox) by the number of adherents (Mchedlova, 2015). After the introduction of Christianity in Russia in 988, Orthodoxy became the major religion for the Russian population with a great impact on various aspects of life, such as spiritual and material culture, social and family life, mentality,

¹The International Social Survey Programme Data Catalogue. Retrieved from <http://www.issp.org>

O. Y. Khukhlaev (✉) · V. A. Shorokhova · O. S. Pavlova
Moscow State University of Psychology and Education, Moscow, Russian Federation
e-mail: huhlaevoe@mgppu.ru; shorohovava@mgppu.ru

E. A. Grishina
Moscow State Linguistic University, Moscow, Russian Federation

and consciousness. Along with the Russian, other ethnic groups in Russia that profess Orthodox Christianity are the Chuvash, Georgian, Karelian, and Udmurt.

Buddhism in Russia is confessed mainly by the Kalmyk, Buryat, and Tuvian people. This world religion was brought into Russia in the seventeenth to eighteenth centuries by nomadic Mongol tribes, who migrated to the lower reaches of the Volga. Currently, the number of Buddhists in Russia is about 1% of the total population (around 1.5 million people). Nevertheless, Buddhism has quite a significant influence on the Russian culture due to the general interest in Asian and Eastern philosophy.

According to different estimates, Islam is the religion of 5–11% of the Russian population, i.e., about 15 million people (Mchedlova, 2015). These are the ethnic groups in the North Caucasus (Chechen, Ingush, Dagestani, Karachay, Kabardian), the Volga region, and the Urals (Tatar, Bashkir). Further to these settled groups, the majority of migrants in Russia are Muslims from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and other countries. Islam started to spread on the territory of modern Russia in the seventh century from the Caucasus (Derbent), whereas Volgian Bulgaria was an official Muslim state at the beginning of the tenth century. Islam has a great impact on the culture of the ethnic groups who profess it. Besides, Islam is important for Russia's current foreign and domestic policy. As the President Vladimir Putin stated in 2013, "Islam has become a significant factor in the social and political life and made an invaluable contribution into the spiritual and cultural development of our society."²

Values and Religiosity

As noted above, in the past 25 years, religious belonging has become significant for the majority of the Russian population. The most obvious reason for this was that persecution of Church stopped and freedom of religion was truly provided in post-Soviet Russia (as distinct from the USSR). However, it is important that religion, traditionally associated with conservative values (Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004), has grown in significance amid democratic transition of the society and its increased openness to new experience and social changes. This contradiction makes us reflect on the relatedness of religiosity and values in contemporary Russia. Are these trends typical of other cultures as well or do we deal a culture-specific pattern? To what extent are these processes common for most popular religious groups of modern Russia (Orthodox, Buddhist, Muslim)? The research of relation between values and religiosity is mainly based on the value theory by S. Schwartz. According to Schwartz and Bilsky (1987), value orientations are closely related to human behavior and are important ideas and beliefs about possible and desirable

²Transcript of Russian President's meeting with the mufti of the Spiritual Board of Muslims of Russia 22.10.2013. Internet resource "Russian President." Retrieved from <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/19474>

consequences of behavior which (a) go beyond particular situations, the choice of behavioral strategy, and current event assessment and (b) can be ordered by importance relative to one another. Schwartz's model of universal content and structure of values has so far been the most comprehensive conception of value orientations. This conception has been revised and refined lately and is currently presented as a circular motivational continuum containing 19 values (Schwartz, Butenko, Sedova, & Lipatova, 2012).

Schwartz and Huisman (1995) considered two ways in which values and religiosity may become associated. First, religious socialization might inculcate values. Van Herk and Poortinga (2012) found out that across European regions, religion had a significant impact on the explained variance in Schwartz's value dimensions. Second, it can be people's active choices rather than their enculturation. According to S. Schwartz (2012), religiosity index of religious adolescents from major Western religious groups (Roman Catholics, Protestants, Eastern Orthodox, Muslims, Jews from ESS samples) positively correlated with tradition and conformity values (conservation group). Saroglou et al. (2004) in their meta-analysis reviewing studies on 21 samples from 15 countries state that "religiosity was associated with high importance attributed to Conservation values, mainly Tradition and Conformity; similarly, religiosity was related to low Self-Direction" (p. 721). If the religiosity situation in post-Soviet Russia does not differ from the worldwide trends, we can suggest that values of conservation will show the close relatedness to religious identity in all religious groups.

Religiosity and Religious Identity

Research of the relation between religion and values most frequently regards religiosity as a single-dimension construct. Such approach is sometimes quite justified. However, research of the specifics of associations between values and religiosity in different religious groups requires approaching religion as a multidimensional construct. Otherwise there is risk that a specific trend (relation of a value with a specific aspect of religiosity) may be labeled as universal.

One of the most recognized approaches to differentiating between various aspects of religiosity was suggested by Allport, who distinguished between intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientations (Allport & Ross, 1967). Allport introduced the notion of religious orientation to refer to the process that controls and organizes the behavior of those individuals who consider themselves religious. According to this theory, for an intrinsically motivated religious person, their religion is a primary life motive and an internalized value, while an extrinsically motivated person uses religion purely instrumentally. So, extrinsic religious orientation is the instrumental in nature, whereby a person uses his/her religiousness to achieve extra-religious (psychological and social) goals. In intrinsic religious orientation, the motive for religiousness would be autonomous, and a person considers religion as an ultimate end in itself, and religious beliefs and values are internalized "without reservation."

Extrinsic religious orientation correlates strongly and positively with prejudice and derogations, while intrinsic orientation either correlates negatively with prejudice or has no significant correlations at all (Donahue, 1985). “The intrinsic/extrinsic distinction has been dominant in the scientific study of religion for the last five decades” (Van Camp, Barden, & Sloan, 2016, p. 23).

The other line of differentiating between various aspects of religiosity is related to the movement toward a more social focusing on examining religion as a social identity and collective process. This approach is connected to the tradition of differentiating between individual and social aspects of religiosity (Cohen, Hall, Koenig, & Meador, 2005; Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989; Greenfield & Marks, 2007; Worthington et al., 2003). It regards religiosity in the context of social identity theory as belonging to a particular social group.

On the whole there is no contradiction between the two approaches. “Consideration of religion’s dual function as a social identity and a belief system may facilitate greater understanding of the variability in its importance across individuals and groups” (Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010, p. 60). One of the ways to integrate both approaches was proposed by Van Camp (2010). The intersection of two bipolar dimensions—personal-social and intrinsic-extrinsic—results in a four-component structure of religious identity.

1. Individual faith identity (individual relation to God and associated feelings, as well as the importance of spiritual component in the structure of religious identity and specifics of praying and following religious practices)—intrinsic and individual component
2. Religious group identity (including issues related to experiencing one’s relationship with a religious group, the place and importance of the given group membership for one’s self-concept)—intrinsic and social component
3. Personal benefits of religion (i.e., “purposeful religiosity”, motivation to gain some personal and inner benefits, like inner comfort and meaningfulness of life)—extrinsic and individual component
4. Social benefits of religion (frequently attending worship places and institutions like churches to satisfy need in social contacts and friendship)—extrinsic and social component

Current Study

The main goal of our empirical study was to find out whether there is a relation between different components of religious identity and value orientations of adolescents belonging to different religious groups. We hypothesized that conservation values correlate with all components of religious identity among adolescents from all three religious groups (Buddhists, Muslims, Orthodox Christians). We also suggested that correlations between other values and religious identity would vary for the Buddhist, Muslim, and Orthodox Christian religious groups.

Method

Participants

The study was carried out with three religious groups from different Russian Federation regions. The Orthodox Christian sample was from Smolensk (145 participants; mean age, 15.5). Smolensk is an administrative center in the European part of Russia, where the most popular religion is Orthodox Christianity. The Muslim sample was from the city of Grozny, the capital of the Chechen Republic with Islam as the prevalent religion (210 participants; mean age, 16.2). The Buddhist sample was from the city of Aginskoe, an administrative center in Buryat Republic, one of the so-called Buddhist republics in Russia, where Buddhism is the most widespread (176 participants; mean age, 15.6). The total sample contained 531 high school students (mean age, 16.0) and presented in the Table 1.

Measures

Individual and Social Religious Identity Measure is a 32-item questionnaire developed by Van Camp (2010). The measure was translated into Russian and adapted to the Russia's context by means of an expert poll. The measure is intended to research religious identity, which is seen as a four-component structure obtained by the intersection of two bipolar dimensions, personal-social and internal-external. The four components are individual faith identity (sample questionnaire statements—"What God thinks about me is important for what I think about myself" or "I believe that private and personal relationship with God is more important than religious practice"), religious group identity (sample statement—"Being a member of my religious group is very important to me"), personal benefits of religion (sample statement—"My religion is a source of comfort to me"), and, finally, social benefits of religion (sample statement—"I go to the place of worship because it broadens my communication"). However, obtained empirical data demonstrated a factor structure somewhat different from the original model. More detail (including the values of Cronbach's alphas and CFA results) will follow in the "Results" section.

The Portrait Values Questionnaire by Schwartz (PVQ-R, 2012) was translated into Russian and adapted for Russia by members of the International Laboratory for Socio-Cultural Research with the National Research University "Higher School of Economics" in Moscow, Russia, under the supervision of S. Schwartz (Schwartz et al., 2012). This measure is based upon the refined theory which includes 19 values listed in Table 2 along with their descriptions. The questionnaire contains 57 statements to be assessed by respondents according to the degree each statement is close to them. A sample statement is "It is important for her to be rich. She wants to have a lot of money and expensive things." (dimension "power-resources"). Nineteen values described in Schwartz's refined theory of basic individual values can be

Table 1 Sample description

Sample descriptives	Total sample	Buddhist	Muslims	Orthodox
N	531	176	210	145
Age-mean (SD)	16.1 (.84)	16.4 (.68)	16.2 (.74)	15.5 (.78)
Gender, % Girls	57	62	53	55

Table 2 The 19 values in the refined theory, each defined in terms of its motivational goal

Value	Conceptual definitions in terms of motivational goals
Self-direction-thought	Freedom to cultivate one's own ideas and abilities
Self-direction-action	Freedom to determine one's own actions
Stimulation	Excitement, novelty, and change
Hedonism	Pleasure and sensuous gratification
Achievement	Success according to social standards
Power-dominance	Power through exercising control over people
Power-resources	Power through control of material and social resources
Face	Maintaining one's public image and avoiding humiliation
Security-personal	Safety in one's immediate environment
Security-societal	Safety and stability in the wider society
Tradition	Maintaining and preserving cultural, family, or religious traditions
Conformity-rules	Compliance with rules, laws, and formal obligations
Conformity-interpersonal	Avoidance of upsetting or harming other people
Humility	Recognizing one's insignificance in the larger scheme of things
Benevolence-dependability	Being a reliable and trustworthy member of the in-group
Benevolence-caring	Devotion to the welfare of in-group members
Universalism-concern	Commitment to equality, justice, and protection for all people
Universalism-nature	Preservation of the natural environment
Universalism-tolerance	Acceptance and understanding of those who are different from oneself

Note: From Schwartz et al. (2012)

combined into four higher-order values: self-transcendence, openness to change, self-enhancement, and conservation. Cronbach's alphas for each of the values are as follows: self-direction-thought ($\alpha = .63$), self-direction-action ($\alpha = .72$), stimulation ($\alpha = .48$), hedonism ($\alpha = .62$), achievement ($\alpha = .61$), power-dominance ($\alpha = .76$), power-resources ($\alpha = .80$), face ($\alpha = .69$), security-personal ($\alpha = .65$), security-societal ($\alpha = .75$), tradition ($\alpha = .65$), conformity-rules ($\alpha = .72$), conformity-interpersonal ($\alpha = .71$), humility ($\alpha = .55$), benevolence-dependability ($\alpha = .76$), benevolence-caring ($\alpha = .74$), universalism-concern ($\alpha = .69$), universalism-nature ($\alpha = .73$), and universalism-tolerance ($\alpha = .51$).

Religiosity scale developed by M. Efremova (2010) includes seven items describing subjective religiosity, formal aspects of religious life (for instance, attending the place of worship), and inner attitude toward religion. The value of Cronbach's alpha for this measure in our study is .08. A sample item is: "The

frequency of attending service of worship,” answers: 1, never; 2, seldom; 3, sometimes (several times a year); 4, quite often (once a month and more), and 5, often.

Methods of Data Processing

Exploratory factor analysis was conducted to analyze the structure of religious identity. Confirmatory factor analysis was applied to confirm that proposed models adequately fit the sample covariance matrices. We calculated mean values and standard deviation for the four components of religious identity across the three religious groups. The regression analysis (forward stepwise method) was used to analyze the associations between the components of religious identity and value orientations. The analysis was performed by means of SPSS 22.0 and SPSS AMOS 22.0 (for CFA).

Procedure

The study was carried out on typical (nonreligious) high school students (9–10th grades). Students in classrooms were asked to complete printed questionnaires. It is important that on this stage the participants were treated as a single sample without division into religious groups. The results were then sorted by religion: Buddhists in Aginskoe, Muslims in Grozny, and Orthodox Christians in Smolensk. Students’ religiosity level was measured with the *religiosity scale* (from 1, “Adamant atheist,” to 5, “I believe and follow the rituals of my religion”) and the data from the participants with low religiosity level (1–2) was excluded from processing. The final sample consisted of the participants who identified themselves as belonging to one of the three religious groups and whose religiosity level was 3 (“I assume the existence of higher forces”) or higher.

Results

In the first phase of the study, we analyzed religious identity structure by means of exploratory factor analysis (principal component analysis, Oblimin rotation). Based on the scree plot test (Cattell, 1966), we revealed that within the Russian sample, the four-factor model is relevant for Muslim and Orthodox Christian groups only, while the Buddhist group had three factors (Table 3). Factor “religious group identity” ($M = 2.87$; sample statement—“Belonging to my religion is important to me”) appeared to be the most significant component of religious identity for the Buddhists. Second most significant factor—“individual faith identity”—was nearly

Table 3 Descriptive statistics and Cronbach coefficients of individual and social religious identity measure

Scale	Religion	Mean	SD	α
Religious group identity	Buddhists	2.87	.99	.87
	Muslim	3.34	.68	.70
	Orthodox Christian	2.25	.99	.70
Individual faith identity	Buddhists	2.06	.79	.73
	Muslim	3.91	.25	.67
	Orthodox Christian	2.28	.99	.80
Social benefits of religion	Buddhists	1.49	.92	.86
	Muslim	1.94	.10	.78
	Orthodox Christian	1.08	.83	.90
Personal benefits of religion	Buddhists			
	Muslim	3.93	.21	.65
	Orthodox Christian	2.05	1.15	.93

congruent with its prototype from Van Camp's original measure ($M = 2.06$; sample statement—"Personal relationship with God is more important to me than following religious practices"). Finally, the least significant factor for the Buddhists was "social benefits of religion" ($M = 1.49$; sample statement—"My religion helps me feel connected to other people in the community"). The fourth component from the original measure—"personal benefits of religion"—was not identified as a separate religious identity factor among the Buddhist group, but it is worth noting that the statements describing this component in the original measure were almost entirely included into the factor "religious group identity."

For the Muslim group, the most significant factor of the religious identity structure was "personal benefits of religion" ($M = 3.93$) followed by "individual faith identity" ($M = 3.91$). The third factor, "religious group identity" ($M = 3.34$), was nearly the same as its prototype in Van Camp's measure. Fourth and the least significant factor was "social benefits of religion" ($M = 1.94$).

For the Orthodox Christian group, the most important factors of religious identity structure were "individual faith identity" ($M = 2.2$) and "religious group identity" ($M = 2.28$). "Personal benefits of religion" held the third place ($M = 2.05$) and "social benefits of religion" was the least important factor ($M = 1.08$).

According to the results of the confirmatory factor analysis, the three-factor model for the Buddhists yielded fit indices ($\chi^2(24) = 1.25$, RMSEA = 0.04 (HI90 = 0.07), CFI = 0.99, GFI = 0.97, AGFI = 0.94). Four-factor models for Muslim and Orthodox groups yielded fit the indices ($\chi^2(59) = 1.26/1.19$, RMSEA = 0.03/0.04 (HI90 = 0.06/0.06), CFI = 0.98/0.99, GFI = 0.95/0.94, AGFI = 0.93/0.90). All indices confirm that proposed models adequately fit the sample covariance matrices.

In the second phase of the study, we analyzed the correlations between religious identity components of adolescents from different religious groups and their value orientations as predictors of the former. The regression analysis (forward stepwise

Table 4 Regression analyses of values predicting religious identity (Buddhist sample)

Predictors	Religious identity components		
	Social benefits of religion	Religious group identity	Individual faith identity
Tradition	0.19*	0.64**	No significant connections
Self-direction-thought		-0.22**	
<i>R</i>	0.19	0.59	
<i>R</i> ²	0.04	0.34	
Adj. <i>R</i> ²	0.03	0.34	
<i>F</i>	6.42*	44.38**	

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.001$

method) data are presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6 and include final regression models. The models represent values with statistically proven level of correlation significance ($p \leq 0.05$) only.

The analysis across all three samples revealed positive high significance correlations between “tradition” values and “religious group identity”: $\beta = 0.64, p \leq 0.001$ for Buddhists; $\beta = 0.45, p \leq 0.001$ for Muslims; and $-\beta = 0.22, p \leq 0.05$ for Orthodox Christians. Besides, “tradition” values correlated positively with “personal benefits of religion” for Muslims ($\beta = 0.31, p \leq 0.001$) and the Orthodox ($\beta = 0.50, p \leq 0.001$) and “social benefits of religion” for Buddhists ($\beta = 0.19, p \leq 0.05$).

For Orthodox Christians, the values “conformity-rules” and “security-societal” have positive correlations with external components “social benefits of religion” ($\beta = 0.31, p \leq 0.01$) and “personal benefits of religion” ($\beta = 0.27, p \leq 0.01$). Such correlations were not found for the Muslim and Buddhist groups; thus they can be considered special for Orthodox Christians.

“Self-direction-thought” value correlated negatively with “personal benefits of religion” for the Orthodox sample ($\beta = -0.31, p \leq 0.001$) and with “religious group identity” for the Buddhist sample ($\beta = -0.22, p \leq 0.001$).

“Universalism-concern” value correlated negatively with “religious group identity” ($\beta = -0.27, p \leq 0.01$) for Muslims, while the opposite value “benevolence-dependability” had positive correlation with “individual faith identity” ($\beta = 0.37, p \leq 0.001$) for Orthodox Christians.

Finally, there was a positive significant correlation between “power-resources” value and “social benefits of religion” ($\beta = 0.32, p \leq 0.001$) found for the Muslim group.

Table 5 Regression analyses predicting religious identity components from values by S. Schwartz (Muslim sample)

Predictors	Religious identity components			
	Personal benefits of religion	Social benefits of religion	Religious group identity	Individual faith identity
Power-resources		.32***		No significant connections
Universalism-concern			-.27**	
Tradition	.31***		.45***	
<i>R</i>	.31	.32	.35	
<i>R</i> ²	.09	.11	.13	
Adj. <i>R</i> ²	.09	.10	.12	
<i>F</i>	11.73***	12.38***	13.46***	

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

Table 6 Regression analyses predicting religious identity components from values by S. Schwartz (Orthodox sample)

Predictors	Religious identity components			
	Personal benefits of religion	Social benefits of religion	Religious group identity	Individual faith identity
Self-direction-thought	-.31***			
Security-societal	.27**			
Tradition	.50***		.22*	
Conformity-rules		.31**		
Benevolence-dependability				.37***
<i>R</i>	.60	.31	.22	.37
<i>R</i> ²	.36	.10	.05	.14
Adj. <i>R</i> ²	.34	.09	.04	.13
<i>F</i>	21.88***	9.55**	4.57*	14.17***

Note: * $p \leq 0.05$; ** $p \leq 0.01$; *** $p \leq 0.001$

Discussion

Intrinsic religious identity components (“religious group identity” and “individual faith identity”) were the most important both for the Buddhist and Orthodox Christian groups. For the Muslim group, “personal benefits of religion” (extrinsic component) comes first, though there is no significant difference between this component and “individual faith identity” (intrinsic religious identity component). Thus we revealed high significance of intrinsic religious identity components for the Buddhist and Orthodox Christian groups as distinct from Muslims, who put nearly equal importance on the intrinsic and extrinsic components.

According to Allport and Ross (1967), “persons with extrinsic orientation are disposed to use religion for their own ends. Persons with this orientation may find religion useful in a variety of ways—to provide security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-justification. . .” (p. 434). Islam is a religion that, compared to Christianity and Buddhism, provides young people with more distinct answers to many questions regarding the arrangement of personal life (Toğuşlu, 2015). It structures one’s daily life and results in “personal benefits of religion” being significant in the life of an adolescent Muslim. Most probably, Islam is a more efficient means of finding inner comfort compared to the other religions we studied. For Buddhist and Orthodox adolescents, religious identity is to a greater extent related to the importance of belonging to a religious group and individual religious experience.

At the same time, adolescents across all the religious groups under study are less inclined toward gaining social benefits from religion. Satisfying social and friendship needs through religion does not seem important to Russian adolescents.

Values constituting “conservation” group (tradition, “conformity-rules,” and “security-societal”) are related to three religious identity components across all the religious groups. Conservation values determine different aspects of religiosity but not Individual faith identity. Individual’s deep relationship with God (individual and intrinsic motivation) is not predicted by values that emphasize order, self-restriction, preservation of the past, and resistance to change. Why? Most probably, this aspect of religiosity is associated with special motives not reflected in Schwartz’s value theory, like the “need for meaning” (Park, Edmondson, & Hale-Smith, 2013).

“Self-direction-thought” (“openness-to-change” value group) correlated negatively with intrinsic components of religious identity for Buddhists and extrinsic ones for Orthodox Christians. These results are quite similar to Saroglou’s meta-analysis review data who concluded “that religious people tend: to favor values that promote conservation of social and individual order (Tradition, Conformity, and to a lesser extent, Security) and, conversely, to dislike values that promote openness to change and autonomy (Stimulation, Self-Direction)” (Saroglou et al., 2004, p. 721).

According to Schwartz (2012), religiosity correlates positively with conservation values and negatively with openness values in different religious groups. “Adolescents who strongly value meeting social expectations and preserving the status quo (conservation values) are more comfortable adopting the relatively conservative ideas and life styles promulgated by religions” (Schwartz, 2012, p. 108). Higher conservative religiosity leads to the higher intensity of all religious identity components except individual and intrinsic.

“Adolescents for whom it is especially important to pursue their own ideas and life styles (Openness to Change values) are likely to find religion constraining and therefore less attractive” (Schwartz, 2012, p. 108). According to our results, Buddhist adolescents motivated by freedom to cultivate one’s own ideas and abilities are less attracted by their religion, while Orthodox Christian adolescents with the same value preferences tend not to use religiosity as a means to receive any personal psychological benefits.

The correlation found between conservation values of contemporary Russian youth and the significance of their religious belonging reflects universal trends

found in international research. Still, regarding these results in sociocultural perspective prevents us from interpreting them unambiguously. On the one hand, young Russians themselves consider believers frequently as representatives of the older generation.³ On the other hand, they are less committed to conservation values compared to older generations and are less behind their European counterparts in their commitment to the opposite openness to change values (Magun & Rudnev, 2012; Rudnev & Magun, 2014). Most probably, for the big part of the Russian youth, religiosity is not purely value-bound. We may suggest that we deal with religious belonging as a result of religious enculturation defined by extrinsic criteria, ethnical above all. Thus, contemporary Orthodox identity is primarily ethnocultural identity (Ryzhova, 2011), and researchers do not find any special foundational belief characteristics for the Orthodox that distinguish them from average Russian citizens.

Special for the Orthodox Christian adolescents is the positive correlation between “benevolence-dependability” and “individual faith identity.” According to Saroglou et al. (2004), religious people tend to favor values that allow for a limited self-transcendence (benevolence, but not universalism). For the Orthodox Christians, the importance of individual’s spiritual and noninstitutional components of religious identity is closely related to motivation to be reliable and trustworthy in-group members.

The Muslim group data revealed a specific association between religious identity and the opposite poles of the dimension “self-enhancement” vs. “self-transcendence.” This dimension captures the conflict between values expressing concern for the welfare and interests of others, on the one hand, and pursuit of one’s own interests and relative success and dominance over others, on the other hand. Muslim adolescents motivated by power through control of material and social resources tend to use religion to facilitate social contacts and interpersonal relationship, while motivation by commitment to equality, justice, and protection for all people decreases the significance of religious group membership.

Conclusion

This article highlights three main issues. First is the internal structure of religious identity for adolescents from different religious groups (Buddhist, Muslims, and Orthodox Christians). We revealed that for the Russian sample, the four-factor model is relevant to the Muslim and Orthodox Christian groups only. “Personal benefits of religion” was not identified as a separate factor for the religious identity of the Buddhist sample. We discovered high significance of the intrinsic religious identity components for the Buddhist and Orthodox Christian groups as distinct from the Muslims.

³Levada-Center Survey “Church and Government.” 12–15.02.2016. Retrieved from <http://levada.ru/2016/02/19/tserkov-i-gosudarstvo-2/>

Second, the hypothesis that adolescents' conservation values correlate with their religious identity was partly confirmed. Values related to the conservation group correlated with all components of religious identity except individual faith identity. Values related to the openness-to-change group correlated negatively with intrinsic components of religious identity for Buddhists and extrinsic ones for Orthodox Christians.

Third, the hypothesis that correlations between values and religious identity vary for the Buddhist, Muslim, and Orthodox Christian was confirmed. Muslims demonstrated a specific association between religious identity and the opposite poles of the dimension "self-enhancement" vs. "self-transcendence." The data of the Orthodox Christians revealed that the importance of "individual faith identity" is closely connected to the "benevolence-dependability" value.

We can conclude that religious revival in post-Communist Russia is determined rather by changing identities than changing values. Nevertheless, individual value priorities impact specific aspects of religious identity across Buddhist, Muslim, and Orthodox Christian youth.

References

- Agadjanian, A. (2000). Religious pluralism and national identity in Russia. *International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS)*, 2, 97–125.
- Allport, G., & Ross, M. J. (1967). Personal religious orientation and prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 5, 432–443.
- Cattell, R. B. (1966). The scree test for the number of factors. *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, 1, 245–276.
- Cohen, A. B., Hall, D. E., Koenig, H. G., & Meador, K. G. (2005). Social versus individual motivation: Implications for normative definitions of religious orientation. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 9(1), 48–61.
- Donahue, M. J. (1985). Intrinsic and extrinsic religiousness: Review and meta-analysis. *Journal of Personality & Social Psychology*, 48, 400–419.
- Efremova, M. V. (2010). *Vzaimosvyaz' grazhdanskoi i religioznoi identichnosti s ekonomicheskimi ustanovkami i pred stavleniyami*. [The connection between civil and religious identity and economic attitudes] (PhD thesis). Retrieved from Russian State Library (01004601632).
- Gorsuch, R., & McPherson, S. E. (1989). Intrinsic/extrinsic measurement: I/E-revised and single-item scales. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 28, 348–354.
- Greenfield, E. A., & Marks, N. F. (2007). Religious social identity as an explanatory factor for associations between more frequent formal religious participation and psychological well-being. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 17, 245–259.
- Magun, V. S., & Rudnev, M. G. (2012). Bazovye cennosti dvuh pokolenij rossiyan i dinamika ih social'noj determinacii [The basic values of the two generations of Russians and the dynamics of their social determination]. In *XII Mezhdunarodnaya nauchnaya konferenciya po problemam razvitiya ehkonomiki i obshchestva [XII international scientific conference on problems of development of economy and society]* (Vol. 3, pp. 87–97). Moscow: NRU HSE.
- Mchedlova, M. M. (2015). Islam i edinstvo rossiyskogo obshchestva: sovremennost i istoricheskii opyt [Islam and the unity of Russian society: Modern and historical experience]. *Islam in the Modern World*, 11(1), 93–102. <https://doi.org/10.20536/20741529201511193102>
- Park, C. L., Edmondson, D., & Hale-Smith, A. (2013). Why religion? Meaning as motivation. In *APA handbook of psychology, religion, and spirituality: Context, theory, and research* (pp. 157–171). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

- Rudnev, M. G., & Magun, V. S. (2014). Mezhpokolennaya dinamika bazovykh cennostej: postsocialisticheskie strany v sravnenii so stranami Zapadnoj i Severnoj Evropy [Intergenerational dynamics of basic values: Post-socialist countries in comparison with countries of Western and Northern Europe]. In *XIV Aprel'skaya mezhdunarodnaya nauchnaya konferenciya po problemam razvitiya ehkonomiki i obshchestva [XIV April international academic conference on problems of development of economy and society]* (Vol. 3, pp. 537–548). Moscow: NRU HSE.
- Ryzhova, S. V. (2011). *Etnicheskaya identichnost' v kontekste tolerantnosti [Ethnic identity in the context of tolerance]*. Moscow: Alfa-M.
- Saroglou, V., Delpierre, V., & Dernelle, R. (2004). Values and religiosity: A meta-analysis of studies using Schwartz's model. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 37(4), 721–734.
- Schwartz, S. H. (2012). Values and religion in adolescent development: Cross-national and comparative evidence. In G. Tromsdorff & X. Chen (Eds.), *Values, religion, and culture in adolescent development* (pp. 97–122). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Schwartz, S. H., & Bilsky, W. (1987). Toward a universal psychological structure of human values. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 53, 550–562.
- Schwartz, S., Butenko, T. P., Sedova, D. S., & Lipatova, A. S. (2012). Utochnennaya teoriya bazovykh individual'nykh tsennoستي: primeneniye v Rossii. [A refined theory of basic personal Values: Validation in Russia]. *Psychology. Journal of Higher School of Economics*, 9(2), 43–70.
- Schwartz, S. H., & Huisman, S. (1995). Value priorities and religiosity in four Western religions. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 58, 88–107.
- Toğuşlu, E. (2015). *Everyday life practices of Muslims in Europe: Aulularia and other Inversions of Plautus*. Leuven: Leuven University Press. Retrieved from Project MUSE database. <https://muse.jhu.edu/book/42682>
- Van Camp, D. (2010). *Religious identity: Individual or social? Exploring the components and consequences of religious identity*. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from ProQuest Dissertation and Theses (3412579).
- Van Camp, D., Barden, J., & Sloan, L. (2016). Social and individual religious orientations exist within both intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. *Archive for the Psychology of Religion*, 38(1), 22–46.
- Van Herk, H., & Poortinga, Y. (2012). Current and historical antecedents of individual value differences across 195 regions in Europe. *Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology*, 43(8), 1229–1248.
- Worthington, E. L., Wade, N. G., Hight, T. L., Ripley, J. S., McCullough, M. E., Berry, J. W., et al. (2003). The religious commitment inventory-10: Development, refinement, and validation of a brief scale for research and counseling. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, 50, 84–96.
- Ysseldyk, R., Matheson, K., & Anisman, H. (2010). Religiosity as identity: Toward an understanding of religion from a social identity perspective. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14, 60–71.

Oleg Y. Khukhlaev (Ph.D., Moscow State University of Education) is Professor and Head of chair of Cross-cultural psychology and Psychological Problems of multicultural education at the Moscow State University of Psychology and Education (MSUPE). He is an Academic Director of Master Program on Applied Cross-cultural Psychology of MSUPE, Russia. He is a member of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP). He is a member of the editorial Board of the international journals “Cultural-Historical Psychology” and “Social psychology and Society”. He is the author/editor of 4 books and over 100 articles and book chapters on social and cross-cultural psychology. His research interests are psychology of intergroup relations, psychology of migration, religiosity, and cognitive social psychology.

Valeria A. Shorokhova is a senior lecturer, Ph.D. student, and specialist in educational and methodical work at the chair of Cross-cultural psychology and Psychological Problems of multicultural education, Moscow State University of Psychology and Education (MSUPE), Russia. She was a coordinator and research officer of “Monitoring of ethnic conflict risks in Moscow

educational institutions” and a member of the scientific team in Russian Humanitarian Scientific Found grant project “Religious identity: risks and recourses.” She has 19 publications in the field of cross-cultural psychology and is a regular participant in different international conferences. Her scientific interests are connected with cross-cultural psychology, social psychology, psychology of religion, cultural and personal values, and social and religious identity.

Elena Grishina (Ph.D., Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences) is an assistant professor with the Department of Psychology and Pedagogical Anthropology at the Moscow State Linguistic University, Moscow, Russia. Academic and research interests include intercultural communication, cross-cultural adaptation, cross-cultural psychological counseling, and psychotherapy. She is author of 30 articles and students’ manuals. Practicing counselor qualified in psychological counseling, psychodrama, sandplay therapy, and child analysis. Currently, she is studying Jungian analysis and is a member of the Professional Community of Analytical Psychologists (PCAP).

Olga Pavlova (Ph.D. in Pedagogy, Moscow State University) is an assistant professor at the chair of Cross-cultural psychology and Psychological Problems of multicultural education, Moscow State University of Psychology and Education. She is a member of the Russian Society for Religious Studies and the author of 4 monographs and 19 articles on the issues of cross-cultural psychology. Her research interests are focused on the study of the socio-psychological features of ethnic groups in the North Caucasus and the psychology of Islam and the religious identity of Muslims.

Value Similarity with Mothers and Peers and Family Climate as Predictors of Well-Being of Russian Youth in Latvia



Tatiana Ryabichenko, Nadezhda Lebedeva, and Irina Plotka

In a broad sense, the concept of cultural transmission includes a wide range of interaction models between individuals belonging to different generations within a family and within a society as a whole (Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis, & Sam, 2011). The conceptual schema outlining the different sources of cultural transmission on an individual is presented in Fig. 1.

There are three sources of influence: the individual's parents (*vertical transmission*), other adult members of the same society (*oblique transmission* from other adults and institutions in the society), and other individuals of the same age (*horizontal transmission* from peers). In adolescent acculturation there are two additional sources of influence: adult members of the larger (national) society (*oblique transmission*) and other individuals of the same age from the larger society (*horizontal transmission* from national peers) (Berry et al., 2011).

In the context of family lives, transmission refers to the transfer of elements of culture, such as beliefs, norms, values, attitudes, behaviors, and social, religious, and ethnocultural practices, and the content of family roles from generation to generation (Martin-Matthews & Kobayashi, 2003).

In our study, we focused on vertical and horizontal value transmission, both with the own group (enculturation route) and with members of the larger national society (acculturation route). According to Schwartz' basic human values theory, values reflect desirable goals and serve as guiding principles in people's life, as criteria for the selection of actions and the evaluation of events (Schwartz, 1992). Values could predict behaviors and behavior intentions (Knafo & Schwartz, 2003).

T. Ryabichenko (✉) · N. Lebedeva
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: tryabichenko@hse.ru; nlebedeva@hse.ru

I. Plotka
Baltic International Academy, Riga, Latvia
e-mail: irinaplotka@inbox.lv




Fig. 1 Vertical, horizontal, and oblique forms of cultural transmission and acculturation (Berry et al., 2011)

Moreover the value similarity of the individual and the prevailing value environment may contribute to the subjective well-being of the individual (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000), and a congruence between own values and those of one's reference groups promotes life satisfaction (Khaptsova & Schwartz, 2016).

Additionally in migrant and ethnic minority families, parent-child value transmission may be seen as a source of culture maintenance. However, the effectiveness of transmission might be less obvious, and a host country environment might influence its cultural and psychological consequences such as psychological well-being. Parent-child value similarity as well as child-peers value similarity and the content of transmitted values might contribute to the psychological well-being of children in different ways. Thus we decided to find out how parent-child similarity in particular values, family climate (perceived psychological closeness between child and parent), and value similarity of children and their peers can become a resource for the psychological well-being of children in ethnic minority families.

Value Transmission in the Family

Although the value transmission process within family is bidirectional, it occurs mainly in the direction from parents to children due to the fact that parental values are more stable and have been shaped for longer. In adolescence and youth, the potential for value change is higher due to the lower stability of values of younger generations (Vollebergh, Iedema, & Raaijmakers, 2001).

The content of the transmitted values and the efficiency of transmission are important for culture maintenance over generations. Continuity of values is considered as a prerequisite for the functioning of society and as an important goal of the socialization of future generations (Fuligni & Zhang, 2004; Schönplflug, 2001). Despite the cultural universality of the phenomenon of transmission (Albert, Trommsdorff, & Wisnubrata, 2009; Boehnke, 2001; Knafo & Schwartz, 2003; Phalet & Schönplflug, 2001), not all basic values are transmitted to the same extent in different cultures. Independence and autonomy are preferred in individualistic cultures. In collectivistic cultures more attention is paid to family relations, parental control, and duties of children. Deviation from cultural norms and expectations is not encouraged (Arnett, 1995).

Values that reflect cultural specificity and are more important for the family as a whole as well as for all its members are transmitted more accurately. The personal values of parents and the values they transmitted to their children often correlate, and the more values are important for parents, the more accurately they are perceived by children (Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003; Knafo & Schwartz, 2001). However, the expectations of children and parents related to the transmission of values can be different. Parents are concerned about the continuity of values; children try to establish independence from parents, focusing on the differences between the values of two generations (Bengtson & Kuypers, 1971). Additionally parents could distinguish between what is good for them and what may be good for their children. In turn, children could make a choice about accepting or rejecting the values that parents want to transmit. Intergenerational differences may come from these choices (Barni, Ranieri, Scabini, & Rosnati, 2011). Moreover, in migrant families the transmission of the culture of origin may impede adaptation (Schönplflug, 2001); therefore horizontal value transmission from conational peers and oblique transmission from adults and institutions of the dominant culture could become a very important source of socialization and acculturation in a larger society.

The so-called transmission belts having different natures, and depending on the education of the parents, the phase of adolescent development, the context of transmission, parenting styles, and the quality of family relationships could enhance the intergenerational transmission of values (Schönplflug, 2001). If parents demand obedience and do not recognize the independence of their children, the latter may perceive this requirement as a threat to their personal autonomy. That is why a positive psychological family climate, close relationships between parents and children, and warmth and responsiveness of parents are important “transmission belts” for value transmission (Barni et al., 2011; Fuligni & Zhang, 2004; Knafo & Schwartz, 2003).

Rossi (1993) highlighted the importance of gender differences in the intergenerational transmission of values in families. Comparing the role of men and women in the transmission of values, the author noted two main “resource reasons” for the greater influence of women on the process and the result of the value transmission from parents to children. First, women play the role of caregivers, which starts in the early stages of a child’s life and is saved for later in their life.

Second, usually the mother, in accordance with the traditional understanding of gender roles, becomes the guardian of the “family home,” which largely involves not only the implementation of practices related to the livelihood of family members but has symbolic value as well (Rossi, 1993). The gender specifics of vertical value transmission still need further investigations.

Social Context and Transmission

Apart from the family, there are agents of socialization and sources of oblique transmission (such as schools, teachers, the media), which also affect the values of the younger generations (Albert et al., 2009; Arnett, 1995). Horizontal transmission outside the family comes from peers, and the psychosocial adjustment of adolescents is crucial. Steca, Monzani, Greco, and D’Addario (2012) found that young adults were more similar to their friends than to their parents in their values.

The “Zeitgeist” (defined as the current modal value climate of a society) also affects the values of children independently from the value transmission from parents. Empirically, Zeitgeist is the mean of the preferences for a certain social value in a given society at a given time. It is common for all people in a society, although people may perceive the Zeitgeist differently and may accept it to different degrees (Boehnke, 2001; Boehnke, Hadjar, & Baier, 2007). Vedder, Berry, Sabatier, and Sam (2009) explored the role of both the broad societal Zeitgeist including national and immigrant samples and the Zeitgeist based on a particular ethnic group. The main idea was that if Zeitgeist from their own ethnic group only influences the values of minority parents and adolescents, this might reflect a limited participation in the larger society and a lack of mutual acceptance. On the other hand, if the broad societal Zeitgeist (from a majority group) also influences values of parents and adolescents from a minority group, this might be an indicator of better acculturation (Hadjar et al., 2012; Vedder et al., 2009).

Value Similarity and Subjective Well-Being

The value congruence of an individual and the prevailing value environment may contribute to the subjective well-being of the individual (Sagiv & Schwartz, 2000). Positive relationships were found between adolescent value congruence with peers and their life satisfaction (Musiol & Boehnke, 2013). The study of Khaptsova and Schwartz (2016) revealed that value congruence of individuals and their important reference groups was positively related to their life satisfaction, even if a group was constructed only because of common sociodemographic characteristics of its members rather than being a specific reference group.

A comparative study conducted in Germany and Israel showed that intergenerational value similarity predicted life satisfaction among both majority

and minority groups. However, it was found that being a member of ethnic minority group might reduce the strength of the link between parent-child value similarity and subjective well-being (Hadjar et al., 2012). In the case of migrants and ethnic minorities, it is important to consider that both parents and children are involved in the process of acculturation. During this process, they do not always have the same experiences, and their reference group may not coincide as well (Vedder et al., 2009). These can result in differences in the relationships between value similarity of children with their parents (or peers) and subjective well-being of children.

Current Study

Russians in Latvia

Russians are the largest ethnic minority group in Latvia. According to statistics, in 2015 the population of Latvia was nearly 2 million, and 25.8% of them were ethnic Russians (Statistical Yearbook of Latvia, 2015, 2016). Most of the Russians living in Latvia are descendants of people who migrated within the borders of the USSR and settled in Latvia after World War II. After the collapse of the USSR, the sociopolitical and psychological status of the Russians in Latvia has changed because they became an ethnic minority. Many of them have not obtained Latvian citizenship after Latvia regained independence in the 1990s. Despite the fact that the status of noncitizens has a number of serious disadvantages relative to citizen status (Ivlevs & King, 2012), only about 50% of Russians were citizens of Latvia in 2005 (Cara, 2006), and about 62% of Russians were citizens in 2016 (Population of Latvia by ethnicity and nationality, 2016). The percentage of Russians to whom Latvian citizenship was granted increased due to a softening of the citizenship policy as well as a desire of noncitizens to obtain citizenship in order to access the possibilities of European labor mobility after Latvia joined the EU (Ivlevs & King, 2012). The second sensitive issue for Latvian Russians is Russian language usage. Before the 1990s Latvian and Russian were the two official languages. In independent Latvia, the only Latvian became an official language, and Russians had to adapt linguistically (Cara, 2010). In 2004 the “60/40” law was passed stipulating that 60% of instruction at schools with Russian language of instruction must take place in Latvia (Ivlevs & King, 2014; Schmid, 2008). The attitudes of Russian speakers toward the school reform have been quite negative due to the perceived threat of assimilation and concerns about the deterioration of the quality of education in schools with Russian language of instruction. Positive results of the reform did not become so apparent: Latvian language proficiency slightly increased; however pupils’ sense of belonging to Latvia declined (Ivlevs & King, 2014). Surveys showed that despite the positive attitude of Russian speakers toward learning the Latvian language, many of them have reported fears of assimilation. The assimilationist tendencies of such integration policy affected the sense of belonging in minorities as well as the perception of cultural threat in both Latvian and Russian communities (Muiznieks,

Rozenvalds, & Birka, 2013). However, the interest of the Russian population to preserve their native language not only in private life but also in the public space of Latvia has been intensified since the middle of the first decade of the 2000s in comparison with the previous period. For example, if in the 1990s the number of first-graders in schools with Russian language of tuition decreased from 30,000 to 14,000, but in the 2000s there was an increase in this indicator to more than 18,000. It is a reflection of the fact that Latvian Russians perceive Russian language as the most important factor for maintaining and developing their ethnic identity. At the same time, the commitment of the ethnic Russian minority to the strengthening of their ethnolinguistic identity does not threaten the positions of the Latvian language as the state language at all (Volkov, 2013). In this regard, intergenerational value transmission for Russians in Latvia may be considered as a means of preserving their culture; it is thus crucial to investigate how it is related to the well-being of younger generations.

Our current study aims to contribute to the current understanding of the roles and effectiveness of vertical and horizontal value transmission, family psychological climate, and psychological well-being of youth from ethnic minority families. We expect perceived psychological closeness with parents to contribute to higher psychological well-being of late adolescents/youth. Value similarity with ethnic peers (ethnic *Zeitgeist*) is also expected to be positively related to youth psychological well-being. However, the questions about patterns of the relationship between parent-child value similarity as well as the value similarity with national peers and the psychological well-being of minority's youth remain open, and we hope to shed some light on these underestimated relations. The special focus of the current study is on a mother-child value transmission and its effects that helped us to make deeper and more detailed investigation of this relationship. The tested model is presented in Fig. 2.

The model explains whether the mother-child value similarity, family climate (psychological closeness with the mother perceived by the child), and similarity of values of children and their peers could become resources for the psychological well-being for the younger generation of Russians in Latvia.




Fig. 2 The tested model. Note: The model has been tested for value similarity with Russian and Latvian peers separately

Hypotheses

1. Perceived psychological closeness with the mother is positively related to the psychological well-being of the adolescent.
2. Value similarity of adolescents with peers is positively related to their psychological well-being.
3. Mother-child value similarity is positively related to the psychological well-being of the adolescent.

Method

Sample

The study was conducted in the capital of Latvia, Riga, among ethnic Russians, as a part of the project of the Higher School of Economics' International laboratory for Socio-Cultural Research "Social and psychological consequences of economic and cultural change: cross-cultural analysis" in 2014. We used a research design that included representatives of two generations of the same family (mother and late adolescents). Interviewers (student—psychologists) surveyed participants in small groups (classes) or in families. Additionally we used the data of late adolescents/youth from families of ethnic Latvians. The final sample for our study included 107 mothers (age 35–59, mean = 43.37, SD = 5.48) and their children, 107 late adolescents (age 16–24, mean = 17.67, SD = 1.58, 34 (31.8%) males) from ethnic Russian families, and ethnic Latvian youth [$N = 120$, age 16–19, mean = 17.12, SD = 1.14, 44 (36.7%) males]. Despite the fact that the younger generation was represented by late adolescents/youth, sometimes we use the term "children," and in this case it means their family role, not their age.

Measures

Values To measure the 19 individual values, respondents completed the Russian version of Portrait Values Questionnaire-Revised (PVQ-R) (Schwartz et al., 2012; Schwartz, Butenko, Sedova, & Lipatova, 2012). This questionnaire includes 57 items measuring 19 basic values. Items were designed as one-sentence verbal portraits of people. For each portrait, respondents indicate how similar the person is to themselves using a 6-point Likert scale from 1, not like me at all, to 6, very much like me. Respondents' own values were inferred from the values of the people they described as similar to themselves. For example, "Being wealthy is important to him" describes a person for whom power resources values are important; "Protecting his public image is important to him" describes a person for whom face values are important. The refined values theory allows the possibility to combine 19 values into

four higher-order values: Conservation, Openness to Change, Self-Enhancement, and Self-Transcendence. Cronbach's alphas for Conservation values are 0.72, 0.71, and 0.71; for Openness to Change, 0.81, 0.72, and 0.64; for Self-Enhancement, 0.76, 0.73, and 0.71; and for Self-Transcendence, 0.79, 0.66, and 0.68 in the samples of Russian children, their parents, and Latvian peers, respectively.

Perceived Psychological Closeness Perceived psychological closeness with family members was accessed by item "Please rate the extent of your psychological closeness with the people listed below on a 5-point scale from 1 (not at all close) to 5 (very close): my father, my mother, my son, my daughter." For our study, we used children's ratings of psychological closeness with their mother.

Self-esteem We used four items from Rosenberg's Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965). For example, "I am able to do things as well as most other people." Cronbach's alpha is 0.87 for Russian youth.

Life Satisfaction The scale consisted of four items from Satisfaction with Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). For example, "So far I have got the important things I want in life." Cronbach's alpha is 0.80 for Russian youth.

Ethnicity Ethnicity was measured with the item "What is your ethnic background?"

Demographic Measures The demographic measures used were age and sex.

Data Processing We computed mother-child difference scores for each value by subtracting the mother's score from the child's one. We used the absolute value of the difference in mother-child value scores and converted them to absolute similarities by subtracting each one from 6. Absolute similarity of higher-order values is the mean score of the absolute similarities of lower-order values. We computed the absolute value similarity with peers in each of four higher-order values in a same way, using mean scores of Russian and Latvian peers that we subtracted from the children's scores. Moreover, we used mean scores of self-esteem and life satisfaction as indicators of a latent variable *psychological well-being*. To test the predicted model, we followed a structural equation modelling (SEM) approach (Kline, 1998) and used path analyses with AMOS version 20 (Arbuckle, 2011).

Results

We performed four distinct one-way ANOVAs to compare children's, mothers', Russian peer's, and Latvian peers' scores on each higher-order value. The means and standard deviations of higher-order values of children and their mothers and the scores of the absolute value similarity with mothers and two groups of peers are presented in Table 1.

As seen in Table 1, the absolute value similarity scores between the children in Russian families and their Russian peers were the highest in all higher-order values. Youth values scores were higher in Openness to Change, $F(2, 331) = 15.37$,

Table 1 Means and standard deviations of higher-order values and absolute value similarity scores

	Values of Russian youth	Values of mothers	Values of Latvian youth	Similarity with mothers	Similarity with Russian peers	Similarity with Latvian peers
	<i>M</i> (SD)	<i>M</i> (SD)	<i>M</i> (SD)	<i>M</i> (SD)	<i>M</i> (SD)	<i>M</i> (SD)
Openness to change	4.39 ^a (.47)	4.13 ^b (.44)	4.42 ^a (.34)	4.83 (.42)	5.02 (.35)	4.64 (.38)
Conservation	3.73 ^a (.43)	4.04 ^b (.41)	3.81 ^a (.42)	4.73 (.50)	4.91 (.44)	4.83 (.40)
Self-transcendence	4.12 ^{ab} (.48)	4.23 ^b (.46)	4.05 ^a (.43)	4.86 (.43)	4.99 (.40)	4.76 (.36)
Self-enhancement	3.79 ^a (.62)	3.48 ^b (.58)	3.72 ^a (.52)	4.63 (.45)	4.86 (.40)	4.67 (.39)

Note: Means of higher-order values with differing superscripts within rows are significantly different at the $p < .05$ based on Tukey’s HSD post hoc paired comparisons

$p < 0.001$, and Self-Enhancement, $F(2, 331) = 8.98, p < 0.001$, and lower in Conservation, $F(2, 331) = 15.92, p < 0.001$, compared to the scores of their mothers. Between-group differences were found for Self-Transcendence values, $F(2, 331) = 5.76, p < 0.01$. However, post hoc comparisons showed that for Russian children Self-Transcendence values are as important as for their mothers. Additionally, the mean score of children’s life satisfaction was 3.24 (SD = 0.85), and the mean score of children’s self-esteem was 4.10 (SD = 0.81).

Then we tested models of the relationships of mother-child value similarity, value similarity with Russian and Latvian peers, perceived psychological closeness, and psychological well-being of children from Russian families for each of the four higher-order values. The models which included value similarity with Russian and Latvian peers were tested separately due to multicollinearity between the similarities with peers’ scores in these two groups. Standardized regression coefficients are presented in Table 2.

Model fit indices were χ^2/df relative chi-square, CFI comparative fit index, RMSEA root mean square error of approximation, SRMR standardized root mean square residual, and PCLOSE p of close fit. Model fit indices for the tested models showed $\chi^2/df = 1.33, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .05, SRMR = .04, PCLOSE = .35, p = .26$ ($\chi^2/df = 1.08, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .03, SRMR = .04, PCLOSE = .43, p = .34$) for Openness to change; $\chi^2/df = .52, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .03, PCLOSE = .67, p = .59$ ($\chi^2/df = .48, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .02, PCLOSE = .69, p = .62$) for Conservation; $\chi^2/df = 2.57, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .12, SRMR = .03, PCLOSE = .13, p = .08$ ($\chi^2/df = 2.17, CFI = .97, RMSEA = .10, SRMR = .03, PCLOSE = .18, p = .14$) for Self-Transcendence; and $\chi^2/df = .58, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .03, PCLOSE = .64, p = .56$ ($\chi^2/df = .58, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .00, SRMR = .02, PCLOSE = .64, p = .56$) for Self-Enhancement. Fit indices for the models that compare value similarity with Latvian peers are presented in the parentheses. Consequently, fit measures indicate

Table 2 Standardized regression coefficients of the relationships between perceived psychological closeness, value similarity and psychological well-being of children

	Openness to change model		Conservation model		Self-transcendence model		Self-enhancement model	
	RP	LP	RP	LP	RP	LP	RP	LP
Perceived psychological closeness	.46***	.45***	.45***	.45***	.48***	.44***	.47***	.47***
Value similarity with mothers	-.12	-.09	-.06	-.01	-.12	.05	-.13	-.06
Value similarity with peers	.23	-.10	.15	.19	.24	.01	.31*	.16
R^2	.27	.22	.23	.23	.27	.20	.28	.23

Note: RP means models that included similarity with Russian peers; LP means models that included similarity with Latvian peers
* $p < .05$, *** $p < .001$

that path models have a good model fit. Exceptions are RMSEA indices for models that included similarity in Self-Transcendence values.

Perceived psychological closeness with mothers was positively related to psychological well-being among Russian youth. In these models β coefficients vary from 0.44 to 0.47. The relationships between value similarity with mothers and psychological well-being of children were not found for all of the four higher-order values. Similar results obtained for value similarity with Latvian peers. Value similarity with Russian peers in Self-Enhancement values positively related to the psychological well-being of Russian youth ($\beta = 0.31$).

Discussion and Conclusion

In our study, we expected that the Russian minority youths' perceived psychological closeness with their mothers would positively relate to their psychological well-being. The results fully confirmed this prediction. We can conclude that a positive psychological climate within a family (psychological closeness of youth with their mothers) is a strong predictor of the well-being of Russian youth in Latvia. However, for mother-child value similarity, such relationships with the child's psychological well-being were not found. These results do not coincide with the results of the study in Germany and Israel, which showed positive associations between intergenerational value similarity and adolescents' subjective well-being (Hadjar et al., 2012). However, it is impossible to compare the results directly because of the different measures of values and well-being used.

We expected that the similarity of values with peers, who are a reference group for Russian youth, also contributes to their psychological well-being. However, it should be taken into consideration that groups of ethnic and national peers might be evaluated differently by the ethnic minority youth. Therefore, value similarity conditioned by age similarities only may be insufficient to ensure the well-being of the younger generation. Our results indicate that the absolute value similarity scores of Russian youth with their Russian peers are the highest in all the higher-order values compared to value similarity of Russian youth with their mothers and Latvian peers.

The positive relationship between the value similarity of Russian youth with Russian peers and psychological well-being of Russian youth was found only for similarity in Self-Enhancement values. For other values the patterns of the relationships were similar; however they did not reach the level of significance. Nevertheless, we can conclude that the Self-Enhancement value similarity with Russian peers contributes to the higher psychological well-being of Russian youth in Latvia. The latter result is in line with the results of the research in this direction, which showed that value congruence with the group of peers (this group might be seen as a reference group) contributes to life satisfaction (Khaptsova & Schwartz, 2016; Musiol & Boehnke, 2013). However, the similarity with Latvian peers did not relate to the psychological well-being of Russian youth. This might be either a sign of

problems with mutual adaptation (Vedder et al., 2009) or a consequence of the noncongruence of values of Russian youth with their national peers, because value system of youth is more sensitive to the societal changes (Tulviste, Konstabel, & Tulviste, 2014) that might be perceived differently by majority and minority youth. A good example of such different perception and evaluation is the school reform in Latvia, reducing the usage of Russian language in education settings that not only had positive results but also negative effects (Ivlevs & King, 2014). Moreover the mutual perception of cultural threat in both Russian and Latvian communities impedes horizontal value transmission between Russian and Latvian youth making intercultural contacts difficult and psychologically unsecure, which inhibits the integration of Russians in Latvia (Lebedeva, Tatarko, & Berry, 2016). Therefore, we can conclude that our first hypothesis, suggesting a positive relationship between the adolescent-mother psychological closeness and psychological well-being of the adolescent, was fully confirmed. Nevertheless, we did not find confirmation of such vertical value transmission from Russian mother to Russian youth in Latvia; hence the results do not support our third hypothesis. Our second hypothesis proposing a positive relationship between peers-adolescent value similarity and their psychological well-being was partly supported by the similarity in Self-Enhancement values with co-ethnic peers.

We also can conclude that value transmission of ethnic minority youth serves not only as a tool for culture maintenance and well-being but also as a tool for acculturation at the individual, family, and group levels. Late adolescence and youth is a time for seeking for personal autonomy and identity building. Psychological closeness with the mother and family support provide secure and smooth grounds for personal growth and identity building. Value similarity with mothers does not provide growth of autonomy and independence and does not contribute to the psychological well-being of minority youth. At the same time, the similarity with co-ethnic peers in the values of Self-Enhancement that promote striving for personal success and vertical mobility is probably one of the tools for successful acculturation for minority youth as well as a mechanism of cultural maintenance and group solidarity in a larger society, resulting in a sense of psychological well-being. Our study showed that similarity in values contributes to the well-being of Russian minority youth when such values promote better adaptation in the changing environment and are shared with a reference group. The processes of individual and family acculturation are closely related to the processes of group's culture maintenance and transmission in different directions, and the most sensitive indicator of such complex interplay is youth' psychological well-being.

Limitations and Future Directions

The main limitation of our study is the relatively small sample size: the study included 107 mother-child dyads from Russian families and 120 Latvians. The second limitation is the absence of comparison with native Latvian families. The

roles of fathers and older family members were not considered in the study as well. Nevertheless, these gaps open new possibilities for future studies in this field.

References

- Albert, I., Trommsdorff, G., & Wisnubrata, L. (2009). Intergenerational transmission of values in different cultural contexts: A study in Germany and Indonesia. In A. Gari & K. Mylonas (Eds.), *Quod erat demonstrandum: From Herodotus ethnographic journeys to cross-cultural research* (pp. 221–230). Athens: Pedio.
- Arbuckle, J. L. (2011). Amos (Version 20.0) [Computer Program]. Chicago: SPSS.
- Arnett, J. (1995). Broad and narrow socialization: The family in the context of a cultural theory. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, *57*, 617–628. <https://doi.org/10.2307/353917>
- Barni, D., Ranieri, S., Scabini, E., & Rosnati, R. (2011). Value transmission in the family: Do adolescents accept the values their parents want to transmit? *Journal of Moral Education*, *40*(1), 105–121. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03057240.2011.553797>
- Basic facts about citizenship and language policy of Latvia and some sensitive history-related issues*. Retrieved from <http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/policy/society-integration/citizenship-in-latvia/citizenship-policy-in-latvia/basic-facts-about-citizenship-and-language-policy-of-latvia-and-some-sensitive-history-related-issues>
- Bengtson, V. L., & Kuypers, J. A. (1971). Generational differences and the developmental stake. *International Journal of Aging and Human Development*, *2*, 249–260. <https://doi.org/10.2190/AG.2.4.b>
- Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Breugelmans, S. M., Chasiotis, A., & Sam, D. (2011). *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications* (3rd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Boehnke, K. (2001). Parent-offspring value transmission in a societal context: Suggestions for a utopian research design with empirical underpinnings. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *32*, 241–255. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022101032002010>
- Boehnke, K., Hadjar, A., & Baier, A. (2007). Parent-child value similarity: The role of Zeitgeist. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, *69*(3), 778–792. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2007.00405.x>
- Cara, O. (2006). The acculturation modes of the Russian-speaking adolescents in Latvia: Perceived discrimination and knowledge of the Latvian language. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *58*(5), 751–773. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130600732100>
- Cara, O. (2010). The acculturation of Russian-speaking adolescents in Latvia: Language issues three years after the 2004 education reform. *European Education*, *42*(1), 8–36. <https://doi.org/10.2753/EUE1056-4934420101>
- Diener, E., Emmons, R. A., Larsen, R. J., & Griffin, S. (1985). The satisfaction with life scale. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *49*, 71–75. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa4901_13
- Fulgini, A., & Zhang, W. (2004). Attitudes toward family obligations among adolescents in contemporary urban and rural China. *Child Development*, *74*, 180–192. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2004.00662.x>
- Greenfield, P. M., Keller, H., Fulgini, A., & Maynard, A. E. (2003). Culture and cognitive development. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *54*, 461–490. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.145221>
- Hadjar, A., Boehnke, K., Knafo, A., Daniel, E., Musiol, A., & Schiefer, D. (2012). Parent-child value similarity and subjective well being in the context of migration: An exploration. *Family Science*, *3*(1), 55–63. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19424620.2011.671502>
- Ivlevs, A., & King, R. (2012). From immigrants to (non-)citizens: Political economy of naturalizations in Latvia. *IZA Journal of Migration*, *1*, 14.

- Ivlevs, A., & King, R. M. (2014). 2004 minority education reform and pupil performance in Latvia. *Economics of Education Review*, 38, 151–166. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2013.08.010>
- Khaptsova, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2016). Life satisfaction and value congruence. Moderators and extension to constructed socio-demographic groups in a Russian national sample. *Social Psychology*, 47, 163–173. <https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000268>
- Kline, R. B. (1998). *Principles and practice of structural equation modeling*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Knafo, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2001). Value socialization in families of Israeli-born and Soviet-born adolescents in Israel. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 32(2), 213–228.
- Knafo, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2003). Parenting and accuracy of perception of parental values by adolescents. *Child Development*, 73, 595–611. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8624.7402018>
- Lebedeva, N., Tatarko, A., & Berry, J. (2016). Intercultural relations in Russia and Latvia: The relationship between contact and cultural security. *Psychology in Russia: State of the Art*, 9(1), 39–54. <https://doi.org/10.11621/pir.2016.0103>
- Martin-Matthews, A., & Kobayashi, K. M. (2003). Intergenerational transmission. In J. Ponzetti (Ed.), *International encyclopedia of marriage and family relationships* (2nd ed., pp. 922–927). New York: Macmillan Reference USA.
- Muiznieks, N., Rozenvalds, J., & Birka, I. (2013). Ethnicity and social cohesion in the post-Soviet Baltic states. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 47(3), 288–308. <https://doi.org/10.1080/0031322X.2013.812349>
- Musiol, A.-L., & Boehnke, K. (2013). Person-environment value congruence and satisfaction with life. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 3, 57–65.
- Phalet, K., & Schönplflug, U. (2001). Intergenerational transmission in Turkish immigrant families: Parental collectivism, achievement values and gender differences. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 32(4), 489–504. Retrieved from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41603774>
- Population of Latvia by ethnicity and nationality. (2016). *Office of citizenship and migration affairs 2016*. Retrieved from http://www.pmlp.gov.lv/lv/assets/documents/statistika/IRD2016/ISVN_Latvija_pec_TTB_VPD.pdf
- Rosenberg, M. (1965). *Society and the adolescent self-image*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400876136>
- Rossi, A. (1993). Intergenerational relations: Gender, norms, and behavior. In V. Bengtson & W. A. Achenbaum (Eds.), *The changing contract across generations* (pp. 191–211). New York: Aldine de Gruyter.
- Sagiv, L., & Schwartz, S. H. (2000). Value priorities and subjective well-being: Direct relations and congruence effects. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 30, 177–198. [https://doi.org/10.1002/\(sici\)1099-0992\(200003/04\)30:2<177::aid-ejsp982>3.0.co;2-z](https://doi.org/10.1002/(sici)1099-0992(200003/04)30:2<177::aid-ejsp982>3.0.co;2-z)
- Schmid, C. (2008). Ethnicity and language tensions in Latvia. *Language Policy*, 7(1), 3–19. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10993-007-9068-1>
- Schönplflug, U. (2001). Intergenerational transmission of values: The role of transmission belts. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 32, 174–185. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022101032002005>
- Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theory and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 25, pp. 1–65). New York: Academic Press.
- Schwartz, S. H., Butenko, T. P., Sedova, D. S., & Lipatova, A. S. (2012). Utochnennaja teorija bazovyh individual'nyh cennostej: primenenie v Rossii [Refined theory of basic individual values: Application in Russia]. *Psihologija. Zhurnal Vysshej shkoly ekonomiki*, 9(2), 43–70.
- Schwartz, S. H., Cieciuch, J., Vecchione, M., Davidov, E., Fischer, R., & Beierlein, C. (2012). Refining the theory of basic individual values. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 103, 663–688. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0029393>
- Statistical Yearbook of Latvia 2015. (2016). *Central statistical bureau of Latvia*, 588 p. Retrieved from http://www.csb.gov.lv/sites/default/files/nr_01_latvijas_statistikas_gadagramata_2015_statistical_yearbook_of_latvia_15_00_lv_en_0.pdf

- Steca, P., Monzani, D., Greco, A., & D'Addario, M. (2012). Similarity in self-enhancement and self-transcendence values between young adults and their parents and friend. *Family Science, 3* (1), 34–45. <https://doi.org/10.1080/19424620.2011.704772>
- Tulviste, T., Konstabel, K., & Tulviste, P. (2014). Stability and change in value consensus of ethnic Estonians and Russian-speaking minority. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 39* (1), 93–102. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2013.10.003>
- Vedder, P., Berry, J., Sabatier, C., & Sam, D. (2009). The intergenerational transmission of values in national and immigrant families: The role of Zeitgeist. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 38*, 642–653. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-008-9375-7>
- Volkov, V. V. (2013). Demografija ruskogo naselenija Latvii v XX–XXI vekah [Demography of Russian population of Latvia in XX–XXI centuries]. In V. V. Poleshchuk & V. V. Stepanov (Eds.), *Etnicheskaja politika v stranah Baltii [Ethnic Policies in the Baltic States]* (pp. 177–195). Moscow: Nauka.
- Vollebergh, W. A. M., Iedema, J., & Raaijmakers, Q. A. W. (2001). Intergenerational transmission and the formation of cultural orientations in adolescence and young adulthood. *Journal of Marriage and Family, 63*(4), 1185–1198. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2001.01185.x>

Ryabichenko, Tatiana is a research fellow at the International Laboratory for Sociocultural Research and a lecturer at the Department of Psychology (National Research University Higher School of Economics, Russian Federation). She obtained Master's degree in Psychology in 2013. She is involved in several research projects of the Laboratory granted by The Higher School of Economics and the Russian Science Foundation. She is a member of International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP). Her research interests focus on intercultural relations, adaptation of migrants and ethnic minorities, cultural continuity, value transmission in ethnic minority and ethnic majority families, comparative studies on individual values, and acculturation.

Lebedeva, Nadezhda (Ph.D., Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences) is Professor in the Department of Psychology and Head of the International Laboratory for Socio-cultural Research at The National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. She is Academic Director of double degree Master Program on Applied Social Psychology of HSE, Russia, and Tilburg University, the Netherlands. She is a member of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP) and the International Academy for Intercultural Research (IAIR). She is the author/editor of 26 books and over 250 articles and book chapters on social and cross-cultural psychology. Her research interests are values, value transmission, identity, intercultural relations, acculturation, creativity and innovations, and social and cultural change.

Plotka, Irina (Ph.D., Baltic International Academy) is professor, head of the Department of Psychology, and director of Professional Master Program of Psychology in Riga, Latvia. She is a member of the American Psychological Association (APA) and member of Latvian Psychological Society. She is the author of 5 books and over 130 articles on social and cross-cultural psychology. Her research interests are experimental psychology, social psychology (implicit social cognition), and its applied branches—cross-cultural psychology and occupational psychology. Her research interests are implicit attitudes and its measurements, identity, and intercultural relations.

Generational Belonging and Historical Ruptures: Continuity or Discontinuity of Values and Attitudes in Post-Communist Romania



Dana Gavreliuc and Alin Gavreliuc

Historical Societal Rupture and the Subjective Change in Post-Communist Romania

The major area of our own research over the last decade concerns the process of the intergenerational transfer of values and attitudes in post-communist Romania, confronting the profiles of different generational strata with radical historical cleavages (Gavreliuc, 2012, 2016). The purpose of this investigation was to examine whether a historical great rupture, like the Romanian Revolution of 1989, has changed the Romanian's values/attitudes. Two theoretical frameworks are at the basis of this study. The first theory takes on a social psychology perspective and maintains the idea of flexibility concerning the structure of values and attitudes (Aronson, 1988; Loewenstein, 2007; McGuire, 1985). The second theory is rooted in the frame of mentalities and social representations which illustrates the changing character of profound mental structures and values (Braudel, 1996; Moscovici, 1988). Thus, the hypothesis of value and attitudinal change ('changing the world') will confront the hypothesis regarding the persistence of attitudes and values (*la longue durée*, assuming Fernand Braudel's syntagma) (Braudel, 1996). Several measures were used in this study examining fundamental attitudes: independence/interdependence (IND-INT), self-esteem (SE), locus of control (LC) and self-determination (SD). Along with the attitudinal register, the value orientation register was also explored by using the Schwartz Values Survey (SVS).

The main importance and novelty of this current research is our attempt to change the usual approaches from international comparisons to intranational comparisons while preserving the methodology of the previous similar cross-cultural studies and

D. Gavreliuc (✉) · A. Gavreliuc
West University of Timisoara, Timisoara, Romania
e-mail: dana.gavreliuc@e-uvt.ro; alin.gavreliuc@e-uvt.ro

selecting a different generational stratum as units of comparison. Thus, the dynamics of these portraits were analysed through representative samples for each generational stratum, and not only for convenience samples. As the exposure to socialization processes was significantly different for these distinct cohorts, the research examined the impact of the (post)communist period on the generational strata.

Attitudes, Values and Societal Change

The assessment of social and political changes that have a major impact on the basic human values has constituted a controversy in social sciences. Firstly, there is some (limited) evidence suggesting significant changes in human values, especially in the post-communist area (Bardi, Buchanan, Goodwin, Slabu, & Robinson, 2015; Bardi & Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz, Bardi, & Bianchi, 2000). Secondly, the classical studies of Inkeles and Smith (1974) as well as Inglehart (1997, 2016) conducted on different post-war generational cohorts have shown relevant mutations in the configuration of values, qualified as a *silent revolution*. These second results come mainly from advanced industrial societies. Other comparative studies between countries with a consolidated democracy and those with a more modest experience with democracy (such as those from Central and Eastern Europe) have illustrated that values are related to the political system of that society (van den Broek & de Moor, 1994).

Values may be perceived as the core of a culture (Hofstede, 1980; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010; Schwartz, 1994, 2014). Culture is defined as a manifestation of practices, symbols which are assumed and evaluated at a community level. These evaluations represent the basic values, described as what people think is 'good or bad', 'what could be done' and 'what should be avoided' and what is 'desirable' or 'undesirable' at the societal level (Schwartz, 1992, 2014). Cultural values, such as freedom, order, prosperity, security, etc., are the basis of social norms that describe social behaviours. Using sociological methods, Inglehart and colleagues (Inglehart, 1997, 2016; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) conducted a broad research project on cultural values carried out worldwide, the World Values Surveys (WVS). The fundamental profile of attitudinal and value patterns can be divided into the following dimensions: *rational secular values vs. traditional values*, as well as *self-expression values vs. survival values*. Thus, throughout the world, national cultures are distributed according to a given implicit existential pattern (to survive/ to become). On the one hand, in secular-rational cultures from the Anglo-Saxon cluster countries and Protestant and Catholic Europe, there is an emphasis on self-expression values. On the other hand, countries located in Africa, South Asia and Eastern Europe (including Romania) have cultures that maintain survival and traditional values (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

According to this global map provided by R. Inglehart and his colleagues, certain societies have experienced a shift from materialistic to post-materialistic values. This change can be explained by the way young generations have grown in unprecedented social, economic and political security conditions. Individuals in these societies

emphasize a subjective state of well-being, tolerance, trust, social functionality and moderation. It is no surprise that societies who receive a higher ranking on self-expression values tend to prioritize interpersonal and inter-institutional trust as a significant social resource. Thus, a culture of trust and tolerance arises, a culture where humans rank first values such as individual freedom and political activism. These are specific to civic-participative political cultures (Almond & Verba, 1963). At the same time, as in Hofstede's (1980) and Schwartz' studies (e.g. Schwartz, 2014), a relative homogeneity of values inside national cultures and a tendency to conserve its axiological pattern profile were found.

Voicu and colleagues (Voicu, 2005; Voicu & Voicu, 2007) researched the dynamic of the Romanian social values, using the WVS methodology (Inglehart, 1997). These studies (e.g. Voicu & Voicu, 2007) revealed that Romania is a case of less change in terms of value orientation compared with other national cultures. This attests an absence of significant changes in the last decade as well as a persistence of a high average score on traditionalism for over a decade. We argue that two distinct processes may be responsible for the changes in the basic values under the pressure of a constraining socio-political environment. The first process is linked to the assimilation phenomenon of the Communist ideology through socialization (e.g. education, mass media, institutional practices) based on what might be called the *indoctrination* phenomenon. However, not much evidence exists demonstrating the efficacy of this process. Bardi and Schwartz (1996) reported little success in the process of indoctrination in areas that were formerly under Soviet domination, the values proposed by the communist propaganda being internalized rather superficially. At the same time, van den Broek and de Moor (1994) showed in their comparative research between countries from Eastern and Western Europe that part of the values related to politics, religion and basic human relationships are similar in the two areas of the European continent, although individuals had such distinct historical experiences. However, there are significant differences as well, such as low initiative, achievement and responsibility among Eastern Europeans, especially regarding work ethic. All of these trends relativize the indoctrination effects; this suggests that other processes may be involved here.

A second thesis in a review of the literature is that values change as a result of adapting to new life circumstances, following the *reinforcement principle* (Inkeles & Smith, 1974; Rokeach, 1973; Sheldon, 2005). Thus, confronted with a hostile socio-political environment, people learn 'naturally' adaptive responses by strengthening those values that are socially functional and discrediting those values that obstruct this adaptive process (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004; Hofmann-Towfigh, 2007). For example, studies have shown that for people who live in a culture that encourages freedom of choice, the importance of self-direction values increases in comparison to conformity values (Kohn & Schooler, 1983; van den Broek & de Moor, 1994). Deprivation of the basic needs described by Maslow (1970) enables a compensation mechanism (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994). In short, under conditions of precarious socioeconomic conditions, the values of survival are more strongly emphasized than self-expression values; additionally, traditional values are higher than rational-legal values (Inglehart, 1997, 2016; Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005).

Table 1 Definitions of value types and the single items used to index them inside of the theory of culture-level values (Schwartz, 1994, 2014)

Crt. no.	Axiological types	Definition of the value types and the single items used to index them
1	<i>Embeddedness (conservatism)</i> Emphasis on status quo, maintaining group solidarity and traditional order	Clean, devout, family security, forgiving, honouring parents and elders, moderate, national security, obedient, politeness, protecting public image, reciprocation of favours, respect for tradition, self-discipline, social order, wisdom
2	<i>Intellectual autonomy</i> Emphasis on promoting ideas and individual's rights in order to achieve his/her objectives	Creativity, curious, broad-minded
3	<i>Affective autonomy</i> Emphasis on promoting the individual's independent pursuit of an affective positive experience	Enjoying life, exciting life, pleasure, varied life
4	Hierarchy Emphasis on the legitimacy of hierarchical allocation of fixed roles and of resources	Authority, humble, influential, social power, wealth
5	<i>Egalitarianism</i> Emphasis on transcendence of selfish interests in favour of a voluntary commitment to promote the welfare of others	Equality, freedom, helpful, honest, loyal, responsible, social justice, world of peace
6	<i>Harmony</i> Emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the environment	Protecting the environment, unity with nature, the world of beauty
7	<i>Mastery</i> Emphasis on getting ahead through active self-assertion, through changing and mastering the natural and social environment	Ambitious, capable, choosing one's goals, daring, independent, successful

The assessment of human basic values in different societies was carried out using the theory of culture-level values developed by Schwartz (1994, 2014), this set of values being considered more appropriate for comparing national samples. The testing of the theory demonstrated the existence of seven types of values, considered as being fundamental problems that society faces in order to optimize human activity: embeddedness (conservatism), intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy, hierarchy, egalitarianism, harmony and mastery (Schwartz, 2014). See Table 1 for definitions of these values.

The hypothesis of value adaptation to the socio-political environment was tested in a series of cross-cultural studies coordinated by Schwartz (Schwartz, 2014; Schwartz et al., 2000) starting from the analogy proposed by Kohak (1992), who describes the assimilation value process in a similar manner to the adaptation of long-term incarcerated prisoners. Inmates develop a range of skills and attitudes that

allow them to survive in conditions of constraint that produce effects in the attitudinal register, generating detachment of responsibilities, dependency, retractability and fatalism. Starting from this explanatory mechanism and by operationalizing this portrait in terms of attitudinal patterns, it is expected that the subjects who went through such an experience be characterized by external attribution (as an expression of avoiding responsibility), high interdependence and modest independence (as an expression of dependency on power networks), low self-esteem (because of constant failure) and low self-determination (as a subjective qualification of a defective 'control' over life).

At the value level, Eastern Europeans attribute greater importance to conservatism and hierarchy values. They also place less importance on affective and intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism and mastery values (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz et al., 2000). As it has led to a true 'cultural trauma', combined with a lack of predictability in the social environment, the communist experience has generated an adaptive reconversion in values (Cichocka & Jost, 2014; Sztompka, 2000). For instance, the atmosphere of supervision and reclusion, the rules with ideological content and the anxiety state that inhibited the spirit of competition and the capacity for innovation altered autonomy values (Kohn & Schooler, 1983; Schooler, Mulatu, & Oates, 1999). Thus, returning to Schwartz's model (Schwartz, 2014), the affective autonomy values were strongly undermined, as well as the corresponding values, such as enjoying life and experiencing excitement and pleasure. Also, intellectual autonomy values were intensely discredited due to the ideological control, with little focus on creativity and curiosity, as well as mastery values (such as ambition and daring).

In a socio-political environment characterized by authoritarian patterns, values like self-discipline, moderation, social order and obedience gained a functional role, helping people to integrate in a world in which the formal authority imposes the rules. Moreover, in Romania, the atmosphere of suspicion, anxiety, arbitrary victimization and continued surveillance—which became atrocious in the last years of *Securitate* (the secret police of the Ceaușescu's regime)—has considerably diminished aspects such as interpersonal trust (Antoși, 1999; Marody, 1988; Michelson & Michelson, 1993; Sandu, 2003). In a climate of suspicion and relational distrust, the registry of egalitarianism values was strongly undermined, because these values involved community engagement in the name of a common good. In a world characterized by inequity and social abuse, social autism and community abandonment, values such as social justice, honesty, equality and freedom are considerably discredited because their affirmation could generate substantial damage to the people who assume them (Cichocka & Jost, 2014; Michelson & Michelson, 1993).

In Romania, due to the fact that the state has been the main agent of modernization throughout the last two centuries, no matter the nature of the political regime (Hitchins, 1994), individual involvement was confronted with a paternalistic dimension that emphasized passivity, public indifference, civic disengagement and statism. These characteristics contributed to the maintenance of a status quo, perceived as implacable, which consolidated conservatism values (Cernat, 2010).

In a country where public opinion, in the post-communist period, indicates responses at around 15% when it comes to work as a success predictor and responses at around 85% when it comes to factors such as connections and luck, we see once more that the promotion in social networks is not acquired through meritocratic routes but by ‘exploiting’ the relational capital and institutional opportunism, on the basis of a pattern inherited from the communist period (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010). Thus, it is expected that the interdependent patterns of self-construal will dominate the independent ones and that the attribution patterns will be predominantly focused on dependency. Also, arbitrariness and the appreciation of mediocrity generate a depreciation of mastery and intellectual autonomy values.

These theoretical frames underline the change of values and attitudes under the pressure of social and political context; the only aspect that remains in question is the *rhythm* of the change (Bardi, Lee, Towfigh, & Soutar, 2009). Theories in social psychology claim that radical change in the social context is accompanied by an immediate and significant change in human attitudes and values (Albarracín, 2011; Aronson, 1988; Loewenstein, 2007; McGuire, 1985). Equally, at the other extreme, the school of history of mentalities and the school of social representations defend the power of the inertia principle (Braudel, 1996; Gorshkov, 2010; Kollontai, 1999; Moscovici, 1988). The last perspective proves the multigenerational dimension of the profound mental structures, among them the value orientations and attitudinal patterns form the most consistent core; they are situated in the long historical time (*la longue durée*), in the register of modulation that happens over the course of several centuries (Braudel, 1996; Le Goff, 1988). Furthermore, it has been proven that the fundamental social representations of a shared community have a residual character over the course of at least three generations (Flament, 1995).

Based on the theoretical outline presented above, three predictions were made:

Hypothesis 1 At the level of attitudinal structures, it is expected that the profile will indicate high scores for interdependence, low scores for independence, moderate self-esteem, high externalism and low self-determination patterns.

Hypothesis 2 At the basic values level, it is expected that high importance will be given to conservatism and hierarchy, and low importance will be given to intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy, mastery and egalitarianism.

Hypothesis 3 Two competing hypotheses were tested; the *value and attitude change hypothesis* (h3.1) predicts that the ‘older generation’, who had a more consistent socialization experience in the period of communism, is structured differently (i.e. more conservative, externalist, interdependent) from the ‘young generation’, who had not been so intensively exposed to the socialization patterns of communism. The difference between the two strata is more pronounced as the intergenerational gap is greater. The *value and attitude conservation hypothesis* (h3.2) predicts that, despite different generational socialization experiences, cohorts have rather similar attitudinal and values profile.

A Brief Description of the Methodological Design

The present quantitative study has been carried out by the Psychology Department of the West University of Timisoara. The target population was represented by the inhabitants of the West Development Region in Romania (Timiș, Caraș-Severin, Arad, Deva counties).

The membership in a generational stratum was decided based on the participant's age. In order to be included in the study, the difference between the participant's age and the average age of the generational strata could not be greater than 2 years (± 2 y.o.). Within each generational stratum (conventionally called cohorts), a random sampling was made sampling step and on quotas. The field operators had the following indication of inclusion in the study sample: age, gender and the type of residence (rural/urban). Participants were randomly selected from the electoral lists provided by the counties' city halls, using a sampling fixed step established for all operators.

Target selection for each cohort was around 500 participants, with an estimated sampling error of about 4.4% at a confidence level of 95%. Global response rate was relatively high (57%).

The total sample consisted of 1481 participants, being divided into three cohorts as follows—G30, $n = 472$ with $M = 30.34$ years; G45, $n = 529$ with $M = 44.92$ years; and G60, $n = 480$ with $M = 60.27$ years.

The main instruments used were:

- *The Self-Construal Scale* (Singelis, 1994). The version with 13 items is intended to measure the attitude toward self-construal. The reliability for independence is $\alpha = 0.72$ and $\alpha = 0.74$ for interdependence.
- *The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale* (Rosenberg, 1965) evaluates the explicit positive and negative attitudes toward self. The scale consists of ten items and has very good internal consistency, $\alpha = .90$.
- *The Locus of Control Scale* (Rotter, 1966) evaluates the type of attribution (internalist/externalist) and consists of 29 items, of which 23 are active items and 6 items are neutral. In this sample, Cronbach's alpha coefficient is $\alpha = 0.77$.
- *The Self-Determination Scale* (Sheldon, Ryan, & Reis, 1996) measures the overall attitude toward 'owning one's life'. It is composed of two subscales, each of it with five items: awareness of self and perceived choice. The two subscales can be used separately or combined in order to give an overall score of self-determination. In the present study, the overall score of self-determination was used. The reliability coefficient obtained for the global scale is $\alpha = 0.72$.
- *Schwartz Values Survey Questionnaire—SVS* (Schwartz, 1994, 2014) includes 56 single values which subjects need to rate according to their importance ('as the guiding principle in my life'). This set of individual values is listed in Table 1. The SVS questionnaire fits with the conceptual definition of value types, and the empirical coherence in analyses conducted at a cultural level has been demonstrated (Bardi & Goodwin, 2011; Schwartz, 2014). In the present study, an average score for all value types was calculated for each cohort.

Results of the Intergenerational Analysis

Hypothesis 1 predicted that, across all cohorts, participants will show high scores for interdependence, low scores for independence, moderate self-esteem, high externalism and low self-determination patterns. The results confirmed this hypothesis with the exception of self-esteem, for which high scores were found (see Table 2).

One-way ANOVAs found statistically significant intergenerational differences regarding interdependence, $F(2, 1478) = 2.46, p < 0.05$. Bonferroni post hoc comparisons of the three groups indicated that the cohort 30 (G30) is more interdependent than cohort 45 (G45) and cohort 60 (G60) (see Table 2). Intergenerational differences were found for locus of control, $F(2, 1478) = 2.12, p < 0.05$, which reveals that the younger generation (G30) is more externalist than the middle generation (G45). For self-determination, significant differences were found, $F(2, 1478) = 3.56, p < 0.01$; further analyses showed that G30 has the lowest self-determination level, lower than G45 and G60 (see Table 2). No significant differences between generations were found for independence and self-esteem.

To summarize, significant intergenerational differences were found for three dimensions, namely, interdependence, locus of control and self-determination. No differences were found for independence and self-esteem. These findings provide only partial support for the attitude stability Hypothesis 3 (h3.2).

With regard to the SVS scales, following the structure of the scales from SVS and the average of each scale (see Table 3), it was found that only conservatism values were significantly higher than the average scale, following the study prediction. Thus, in the value register, Hypothesis 2 has been only partially confirmed. Pair comparisons showed that statistically significant differences appear between cohort G60 and cohort G45: G45 has higher scores for conservatism and hierarchical values than G60, whereas G60 has more pronounced scores for egalitarianism and

Table 2 Intergenerational comparison of attitudes (one-way ANOVAs)

	Generation			F-values
	G50 M (SD)	G35 M (SD)	G20 M (SD)	
Independence	2.22 (0.32)	2.10 (0.29)	2.18 (0.34)	1.48
Interdependence	2.90 ^a (0.39)	2.94 ^a (0.42)	3.13 ^b (0.44)	2.46*
Self-esteem	30.18 (4.98)	28.16 (4.79)	31.15 (5.11)	1.67
Locus of control	14.15 ^{ab} (4.11)	12.05 ^a (3.98)	14.85 ^b (4.26)	2.12*
Self-determination	22.04 ^b (4.23)	20.97 ^b (4.07)	17.70 ^a (3.93)	3.56**

Notes: $df = 2, 1478$. Means with same letters do not differ significantly

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Table 3 Intergenerational comparisons of values (one-way ANOVAs)

Value type	Generation			F-values
	G50 M (SD)	G35 M (SD)	G20 M (SD)	
Embeddedness (conservatism)	4.06 ^a (0.15)	4.68 ^b (0.23)	4.21 ^a (0.18)	2.89*
Hierarchy	2.12 ^a (0.23)	2.97 ^b (0.31)	2.29 ^{ab} (0.21)	3.32**
Harmony	4.19 (0.34)	4.17 (0.29)	4.08 (0.26)	1.75
Egalitarianism	4.62 ^b (0.22)	4.23 ^a (0.19)	4.46 ^{ab} (0.20)	2.69*
Intellectual autonomy	4.78 ^b (0.41)	4.12 ^a (0.44)	4.43 ^{ab} (0.38)	2.93*
Affective autonomy	3.56 ^{ab} (0.40)	3.21 ^a (0.29)	3.81 ^b (0.33)	2.54*
Mastery	3.96 (0.12)	3.77 (0.17)	3.82 (0.20)	1.57

Notes: $df = 2, 1478$. Means with same letters do not differ significantly

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

intellectual autonomy than G45. In terms of harmony, affective autonomy and mastery, no significant differences between the two cohorts were found (see Table 3).

When comparing G45 to G30, it was found that they are significantly different on the conservatism value type: individuals from the 'middle generation' are more conservative. Individuals belonging to G45 have lower affective autonomy than those from G30. No significant differences between G30 and G45 were found for hierarchy, harmony, egalitarianism, intellectual autonomy and mastery value types. Comparisons between cohorts G60 and G30 showed no significant differences in the registry of values.

Across all results for the Schwartz values, there is more evidence for value stability (h3.2) than value change (h3.1). Combining the findings for both attitudes and values, it can be concluded that this study invalidates the hypothesis of changing attitudes and values under the burden of social pressure and confirms the conservation of attitudes and values hypothesis (h3.2).

Confirming the Hypothesis of Continuity

In the current study, three generations of Romanians were compared with regard to various attitudes and values. The older generations (G60) consisted of participants who went through powerful communist socialization and were deeply integrated into the old social and political order; generation 45 consisted of participants who had a secondary consistent socialization during communism but who lived the second part

of their life in post-communism and democracy; generation 30 consisted of participants with almost exclusive socialization in post-communism and democracy. By comparing these three different generations, we learn more about changes in attitudes and values as a consequence of the dramatic changes in the society after the breakdown of communism. It started from the premise that these representative samples integrated the attitudinal and value tendencies of the population associated with the specific cohorts. It has also been questioned which generational stratum was more strongly influenced by post-communism.

It is evident that the collapse of communism brought major changes at a social, political and behavioural level; however, little changes occurred in the profound mental structures (attitudes, especially values), as shown in this study. The current study focused on values which play an important role in society, as being consistent predictors of attitudinal and behavioural structures (Boehnke, 2008; Homer, 1993; Scott, 2000).

The results support the 'incarceration' model explanation, building a picture dominated by high interdependence (INT) for all the cohorts. This illustrates that in a confrontation with the discretionary social and political environment, the capital relational resources are very important in contouring an adaptive strategy. It is important to highlight that in the present study there are some results contradictory with other classical studies that focused on the independence and interdependence dimensions (Singelis, 1994; Singelis, Bond, Sharkey, & Lai, 1999; Singelis & Brown, 1995). In short, studies that operate with these dimensions in relation with the age variable have noticed that youth is a predictor of a high level of independence. Likewise, the late adulthood period is accompanied by a more pronounced level of dependence, because of the increasing need for assistance. While individualism and collectivism were considered extremes of a continuum by cross-cultural psychology studies (Hofstede, 1980), Singelis (1994) argues that independence and interdependence can coexist in one person; independence is the personal correspondent of articulated individualism at the cultural and societal level, whereas interdependence is the correspondent of collectivism.

In our research, the scores for independence (IND) were modest for all the three cohorts, and no significant differences were found across cohorts. This suggests for all three cohorts as an adaptive response to the social and political environment characterized by disengagement and social dispersion. Likewise, the tendency regarding interdependence contradicts results from other studies (e.g. Singelis, 1994; Singelis et al., 1999): we found that younger participants are more interdependent. Once again, the responsible, involved youngster stereotype is not confirmed in Romania, although behavioural changes between diverse generational strata were registered (Gavreliuc, 2016; Voicu, 2005; Voicu & Voicu, 2007).

Several previous researches (Miroiu, 1999; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010; Sandu, 2010) suggest that in post-communist Romania, an atmosphere of institutional mistrust, paternalism, corruption, insecurity and arbitrariness has persisted since the communist period. These trends attest that in Romania, similar to other post-communist countries, many of these pathological circumstances still exist (Kopecky, Doorenspleet, & Mudde, 2008; Lewis, 1997; Roskin, 2001). The fact that only a

‘façade democracy’ (Pasti, Miroiu, & Codiță, 1996) characterizes Romania is an expression of the transgenerational nature of the individual attitudinal pattern.

A similar trend is remarked on the locus of control dimension, highlighting the dominance of an externalist attribution pattern, which proves the existence of an *increased helplessness* in the young generation (Gherasim, 2011). The locus of control theory (Rotter, 1966) emphasizes the role of social learning in the activation of a specific attribution mechanism. Favouring one of the externalism-internalism poles over the other is anticipated by the subjects’ ability to routinely control the context around them. Thus, the subjects who cannot control the context tend to become helpless and inert (hence the syntagma *learned helplessness*), failing constantly in tasks that require effort. These people often invoke being unlucky (‘lack of chance’) in life (Roesch & Amirkham, 1997). Failing constantly at different tasks, having no credible alternative success, results in an *attributional alibi* that inhibits taking charge of their own behaviour. This trend is more pronounced in the young generation and less present in the middle generation, suggesting once again that young people have a high inclination toward detaching from responsibility, which underlines the power of the post-communist context.

All cohorts presented high scores of self-esteem, and no differences across generations were found. This tendency is surprising as we deal here with groups of participants who faced precarious material and aspirational experiences specific to modest social capital societies with a reduced GDP/capita and limited opportunities for success (Inglehart, 2016; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). However, such results are not an exception in social psychology and attest the presence of a deficiency in the way people relate to relevant standards. The tendency is similar to that observed in education, where it was revealed that students from marginal high schools have a higher self-esteem than pupils from elite schools (Bachman & O’Malley, 1986). Thus, students from marginal schools feel an important psychological comfort when compared to colleagues in their modest local environment than if the same comparison is made in a fierce, competitive environment, with high-performance students. Not having a balanced point of comparison, students feed on the illusion that they are ‘very good and gifted’ and their self-esteem is strengthened (Bachman & O’Malley, 1986). Returning to the current study, the standard relativization (the formula ‘it could be even worse’ has already become routine in the Romanian public discourse) and everyday expertise of failure have produced this adaptive solution. The fact could be explained by the great migration process, especially after Romania joined the European Union in 2007, when over 2 million Romanians have decided to work in countries with developed economies. As a result, they achieved new patterns of attitudes and values which contaminated the entire Romanian society, remodelling in a more demanding way the comparative self-image standards (Sandu, 2010).

The intergenerational analysis of self-determination revealed differences in a counterintuitive way, showing that young people were more modestly self-determined than the elderly, contrary to the studies conducted in Western cultures (Deci & Ryan, 2000). This fact can be explained through a generalized transgenerational fatalistic trait characteristic for the Romanian society (Antohi, 1999), which encourages the formation of a precariously self-determined and

frightened individual (Miroiu, 1999). When it comes to the value register, high scores for conservatism can be noticed, supporting the theoretical model that emphasized the adaptation to the circumstances of a socio-political environment.

The middle generation (G45), often labelled as the generation of ‘decree’ (the Ceausescu’s Decree No. 770/1966 for interdiction of abortion), is a distinct social stratum, one that may have internalized a dramatic social destiny: the generation who decisively contributed to the breakdown of the communist regime in Romania. When drawing the portrait of this particular generation, its instability, ambivalence and vulnerability are evidently sustained (the most pronounced conservatism, favouring the most intense hierarchy, lower average scores for egalitarianism, but especially the most modest average scores for intellectual and affective autonomy across the three cohorts, suggesting internalization of generational insecurity). The results also indicate an achievement in terms of sociohistorical traumas, with deep implications in people’s identity profile, this vulnerability being reported in other similar studies regarding the ‘legacy of trauma’ (de Mendelssohn, 2008; Kellermann, 2001). If the middle generation were taken out of the picture, no significant differences in value orientations would be observed between ‘parents’ (G60) and ‘their children’ (G30). Therefore, it can be argued that *intergenerational value transfer* persists, despite radical socio-political changes. Operating with generational representative samples, the sets of attitudes and social values can be considered as ‘transgenerational’, a term used in previous studies (Boehnke, 2008; Boehnke, Hadjar, & Baier, 2007; Homer, 1993; Scott, 2000).

Taking into account the scores of Western Europe as a reference, when comparing the present study to other studies that used a similar instrument, it can be observed that conservatism and hierarchy values are more prevalent for the Romanian sample. Harmony values, intellectual autonomy, affective autonomy and egalitarianism are less predominant for Romania than for the West European countries (Schwartz, 2014; Schwartz et al., 2000). These results appeared without any substantial differences regarding the mastery value type between scores of Romania and those of the Western European countries. However, these scores should be read with caution, because the present comparison is not legitimate from a statistical point of view—a test of significance has not been made, not having any access to the European database of cited studies. The samples were also built differently (convenience sample consisting of teachers and students in European studies vs. regional generational representative samples in the Romanian study).

Having been ruled by communist regimes for half a century, Central and Southern European countries (including Romania) activated adaptive strategies that boosted conservatism and hierarchy values, reducing the importance attributed to intellectual and affective autonomy, egalitarianism and mastery values (Bardi & Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz et al., 2000). Furthermore, studies in other cultural areas proved the existence of an extremely slow process of value change, in spite of political, social and economic radical transformations (Moghaddam, 2008; Moghaddam & Crystal, 1997; Putnam, 1993; Schwartz et al., 2000).

Conclusions. The Consequences of the Confirmation of the Conservation Hypothesis

The conservation hypothesis was confirmed, as the investigated social strata were characterized by a series of transgenerational patterns. Thus, high interdependence, modest independence, high self-esteem, dominant externalism and low self-determination were highlighted at the attitudinal level, whereas conservatism and low affective and intellectual autonomy values were noted at an axiological level. Young Romanians seem to be the most vulnerable, dependent and less willing to take their life in their own hands, when compared to the other cohorts. Additionally, young people structure their implicitly assumed values and attitudes in the same way as the older generation, 'their parents', even if children these days sometimes condemn their parents for complicity and 'shameful disposals' in the communist times. Such narrative recurrences appear frequently in the oral interviews with individuals who are part of the young cohorts, despite the persistence of transgenerational fatalistic attitudes (Gavreliuc, 2016). Nevertheless, the studies we conducted have some shortcomings. For example, the studies were limited to only one historical moment. Moreover, only one regional area from Romania was studied, with its own specificity (Sandu, 2003). A longitudinal research with representative samples could have tested the hypotheses more directly.

Furthermore, it is important to take into account the link between the current tendencies and other structural and individual factors that have proven to be relevant, such as the economic level (Inglehart, 2016; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), previous types of political regime and dominant economic and social structures (Rupnik, 1988) or religiosity (Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten, Corveleyn, & Hutsebaut, 2005; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). Lastly, a qualitative approach would complement the current study.

References

- Albarracín, D. M. (2011). The time for doing is not the time for change: Effects of general action and inaction goals on attitude retrieval and attitude change. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 100, 983–998.
- Almond, G., & Verba, S. (1963). *The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Antoși, S. (1999). *Civitas imaginalis. Istorie și utopie în cultura română*. Iași, Romania: Polirom.
- Aronson, E. (1988). *The social animal*. San Francisco, CA: Freeman.
- Bachman, J. G., & O'Malley, P. M. (1986). Self-concepts, self-esteem and educational experiences: The frog pond revisited. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 50, 35–46.
- Bardi, A., Buchanan, K. E., Goodwin, R., Slabu, L., & Robinson, M. (2015). Value stability and change during self-chosen life transition: Self-selection versus socialization effects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 106(1), 131–147.
- Bardi, A., & Goodwin, R. (2011). The dual route to value change: Individual processes and cultural moderators. *Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology*, 42, 271–287.

- Bardi, A., Lee, J. A., Towfigh, N., & Soutar, G. (2009). The structure of intraindividual value change. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *97*, 913–929.
- Bardi, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (1996). Relations among socio-political values in Eastern Europe: Effects of the communist experience? *Political Psychology*, *17*, 525–549.
- Bardi, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2003). Values and behavior: Strength and structure of relations. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *29*, 1207–1220.
- Bilsky, W., & Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Values and personality. *European Journal of Personality*, *8*, 163–181.
- Boehnke, K. (2008). Design – with empirical underpinnings parent-offspring value transmission in a societal context: Suggestions for a utopian research. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *32*, 241–255.
- Boehnke, K., Hadjar, A., & Baier, D. (2007). Parent-child value similarity: The role of Zeitgeist. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, *69*, 778–792.
- Braudel, F. (1996). Histoire et sciences sociales. La longue durée. In F. Braudel (Ed.), *Ecrits sur l'histoire* (4th ed., pp. 41–84). Paris, France: Flammarion.
- Cernat, V. (2010). Socio-economic status and political support in post-communist Romania. *Communist and Post-communist Studies*, *43*, 43–50.
- Cichocka, A., & Jost, J. T. (2014). Stripped of illusions? Exploring system justification processes in capitalist and post-communist societies. *International Journal of Psychology*, *49*(1), 6–29.
- de Mendelssohn, F. (2008). Transgenerational transmission of trauma: Guilt, shame, and the “heroic dilemma”. *International Journal of Group Psychotherapy*, *58*, 389–401.
- Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The “what” and “why” of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. *Psychological Inquiry*, *11*, 227–268.
- Flament, C. (1995). Structura, dinamica și transformarea reprezentărilor sociale. In A. Neculau (Ed.), *Psihologia câmpului social. Reprezentările sociale* (pp. 155–176). București, Romania: Știință și Tehnică SA.
- Fontaine, J. R. J., Duriez, B., Luyten, P., Corveleyn, J., & Hutsebaut, D. (2005). Consequences of a multi-dimensional approach to religion for the relationship between religiosity and value priorities. *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, *15*, 123–143.
- Gavreliuc, A. (2012). Continuity and change of values and attitudes in generational cohorts of post-communist Romania. *Cognition, Brain, Behaviour. An Interdisciplinary Journal*, *14*(2), 191–212.
- Gavreliuc, D. (Ed.). (2016). *Education, culture and identity. Diagnosis of societal and personal changes in post-communist Romania*. Timișoara: Editura de Vest.
- Gherasim, R. L. (2011). *Neajutoarea învățată. Concept șo aplicații*. Iași, Romania: Editura Universității “Al. I. Cuza”.
- Gorshkov, M. K. (2010). The sociological measurement of the Russian mentality. *Russian Social Science Review*, *51*, 32–57.
- Hitchins, K. (1994). *România. 1866-1947*. București, Romania: Humanitas.
- Hitlin, S., & Piliavin, J. A. (2004). Values: Reviving a dormant concept. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *30*, 359–393.
- Hofmann-Towfigh, N. (2007). Do students’ values change in different types of schools? *Journal of Moral Education*, *36*, 453–473.
- Hofstede, G. (1980). *Culture’s consequences: International differences in work-related values*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). *Cultures and organizations: Software for the mind* (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Homer, P. (1993). Transmission of human values: A cross-cultural investigation of generational and reciprocal. *Genetic, Social and General Psychology Monographs*, *119*, 345–359.
- Inglehart, R. (1997). *Modernization and postmodernization. Cultural, economic and political change in 43 societies*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Inglehart, R. (2016). After postmaterialism: An essay on China, Russia and the United States. A comment. *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, *41*(2), 213–222.

- Inglehart, R., & Baker, W. E. (2000). Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values. *American Sociological Review*, *65*, 19–51.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change and democracy: The human development sequence*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Inkeles, A., & Smith, D. H. (1974). *Becoming modern*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Kellermann, N. P. (2001). Transmission of holocaust trauma – an integrative view. *Psychiatry*, *64*, 256–267.
- Kohak, E. (1992). Ashes, Ashes... Central Europe after forty years. *Daedalus*, *121*, 197–216.
- Kohn, M., & Schooler, C. (1983). *Work and personality: An inquiry into the impact of social stratification*. Norwood, NJ: Albex.
- Kollontai, V. (1999). Social transformations in Russia. *International Social Science Journal*, *51*, 103–106.
- Kopecky, P., Doorenspleet, R., & Mudde, C. E. (2008). *Deviant democracies: Democratization against the odds*. London: Taylor & Francis.
- Le Goff, J. (1988). *Histoire et mémoire*. Paris, France: Gallimard.
- Lewis, P. G. (1997). Theories of democratization and patterns of regime change in Eastern Europe. *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transitional Politics*, *13*, 4–26.
- Loewenstein, G. (2007). Affect regulation and affective forecasting. In J. J. Gross (Ed.), *Handbook of emotion regulation* (pp. 180–203). New York: Guilford.
- Marody, M. (1988). Antinomies of collective subconsciousness. *Social Research*, *55*, 97–110.
- Maslow, A. H. (1970). *Motivation and personality* (2nd ed.). New York: Harper and Row.
- McGuire, W. J. (1985). Attitudes and attitude change. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 233–346). Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Michelson, P. E. & Michelson, J. T. (1993, May). *The dysfunctional society syndrome and ethnicity in contemporary Romania*. Paper presented at the Midwest Slavic Conference at Michigan State University, Lansing.
- Miroiu, M. (1999). *România retro*. București, Romania: Editura Trei.
- Moghaddam, F. M. (2008). The psychological citizen and the two concepts of social contract: A preliminary analysis. *Political Psychology*, *29*, 881–901.
- Moghaddam, F. M., & Crystal, D. S. (1997). Revolutions, samurai, and reductions: The paradoxes of change and continuity in Iran and Japan. *Political Psychology*, *18*, 355–384.
- Moscovici, S. (1988). Notes towards a description of social representations. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *18*, 211–250.
- Mungiu-Pippidi, A. (2010). The other transition. *Journal of Democracy*, *21*(1), 120–127.
- Pasti, V., Miroiu, M., & Codiță, C. (1996). *România. Starea de fapt*. Bucuresti, Romania: Nemira.
- Putnam, R. (1993). *Making democracy work*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Roesch, S. C., & Amirgham, J. H. (1997). Boundary conditions for self-serving attributions: Another look at the sports pages. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *27*, 245–261.
- Rokeach, M. (1973). *The nature of human values*. New-York: Free Press.
- Rosenberg, M. (1965). *Society and the adolescent self-image*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Roskin, M. G. (2001). *The rebirth of East Europe* (4th ed.). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
- Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized: Expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. *Psychological Monographs*, *80*, 526–541.
- Rupnik, J. (1988). *The other Europe*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
- Sandu, D. (2003). *Sociabilitatea în spațiul dezvoltării*. Iași, Romania: Polirom.
- Sandu, D. (2010). *Lumile sociale ale migrației românești*. Iași, Romania: Polirom.
- Schooler, C., Mulatu, M. S., & Oates, G. (1999). The continuing effects of substantively complex work on the intellectual functioning of older workers. *Psychology and Aging*, *14*, 483–506.
- Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theory and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (Vol. 25, pp. 1–65). New York: Academic Press.

- Schwartz, S. H. (1994). Beyond individualism/collectivism: New cultural dimensions of values. In U. Kim, H.C. Triandis, C. Kagitcibasi, S-C. Choi, G. Yoon (Eds.), *Individualism and collectivism: Theory, method and applications* (pp. 85-119). Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Schwartz, S. H. (2014). Rethinking the concept and measurement of societal culture in light of empirical findings. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *45*(1), 5–13.
- Schwartz, S., Bardi, A., & Bianchi, G. (2000). Value adaptation to the imposition and collapse of Communist regimes in East-Central Europe. In S. Renshon & J. Dukitt (Eds.), *Political psychology* (pp. 217–236). New York: Macmillan.
- Schwartz, S. H., & Huisman, S. (1995). Value priorities and religiosity in four western religions. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *58*, 88–107.
- Scott, J. (2000). Is it a different world to when you were growing up? Generational effects on social representations and child-rearing values. *British Journal of Sociology*, *51*, 355–377.
- Sheldon, K. M. (2005). Positive value change during college: Normative trends and individual differences. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *39*, 209–223.
- Sheldon, K. M., Ryan, R. M., & Reis, H. (1996). What makes for a good day? Competence and autonomy in the day and in the person. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *22*, 1270–1279.
- Singelis, T. M. (1994). The measurement of independent and interdependent self-construal. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *20*, 580–591.
- Singelis, T. M., Bond, M. H., Sharkey, W. F., & Lai, C. S. (1999). Unpackaging culture's influence on self-esteem and embarrassment: The role of self-construal. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *30*, 315–341.
- Singelis, T. M., & Brown, W. J. (1995). Culture, self and collectivist communication: Linking culture to individual behavior. *Human Communication Research*, *21*, 354–389.
- Sztompka, P. (2000). Cultural trauma. The other face of social change. *European Journal of Social Theory*, *3*, 449–466.
- van den Broek, A., & de Moor, R. (1994). Eastern Europe after 1989. In P. Ester, L. Halman, & R. de Moor (Eds.), *The individualizing society: Value change in Europe and North America* (pp. 197–228). Tilburg, The Netherlands: Tilburg University Press.
- Voicu, B. (2005). *Penuria post-modernă a postcomunismului românesc*. Iași, Romania: Expert Projects.
- Voicu, B., & Voicu, M. (Eds.). (2007). *Valori ale românilor (1993-2006)*. Iași, Romania: Institutul European.

Dana Gavreliuc (Ph.D. in Psychology at the “Babes-Bolyai” University from Cluj-Napoca with a thesis focused on social axioms and cultural dimensions in the Romanian educational environment) is associate professor at the Department for Teacher Training, West University of Timisoara. She has been involved in 5 national grants of research and she has published 3 books as a single/first author and over 20 articles/book chapters in the area of Educational Psychology, Cross-Cultural Psychology, and Social Psychology. Her research interests are value transmission, social axioms, and diagnosis of educational environment.

Alin Gavreliuc (Ph.D. in Social Psychology at the University of Bucharest and Habilitation in Psychology at the “Babes-Bolyai” University from Cluj-Napoca) is professor at the Department of Psychology, Faculty of Sociology and Psychology, West University of Timisoara, and director of the Centre for Social Diagnosis from the same university. He has coordinated 10 national and international grants of research, and he has published seven books as a single/first author and more than 50 articles in representative scientific journals in the area of Social Psychology, Cross-Cultural Psychology and Ethno-Psychology. He is a member of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP). His research interests are intergenerational transmission of values and attitudes in contemporary Romania, self-construals in cross-cultural contexts, social and cultural changes, and ethnic identity.

Part II
Social Identities Changes in Comparative
Perspective

Multiple Social Identities in Relation to Self-Esteem of Adolescents in Post-communist Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Kosovo, and Romania



Radosveta Dimitrova, Pasquale Musso, Iva Polackova Solcova, Delia Stefanel, Fitim Uka, Skerdi Zahaj, Peter Tavel, Venzislav Jordanov, and Evgeni Jordanov

R. Dimitrova (✉)

Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden

e-mail: radosveta.dimitrova@psychology.su.se; dimitrova.radosveta@gmail.com

P. Musso

University of Palermo, Palermo PA, Italy

e-mail: muspasq@gmail.com

I. P. Solcova

The Czech Academy of Sciences, Prague, Czech Republic

e-mail: ywa@email.cz

D. Stefanel

Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu, Sibiu, Romania

e-mail: deliaste@yahoo.com

F. Uka

College "Heimerer" and University of Prishtina "Hasan Prishtina", Pristina, Kosovo

e-mail: fitim.u@gmail.com

S. Zahaj

University of Tirana, Tirana, Albania

e-mail: skerdi_zahaj@hotmail.com

P. Tavel

Palacky University, Olomouc, Czech Republic

e-mail: peter.tavel@gmail.com

V. Jordanov

University of World and National Economy (UWNE), Sofia, Bulgaria

e-mail: venzislavjordanov@gmail.com

E. Jordanov

Ivan Rilski University, Sofia, Bulgaria

e-mail: khmgu@abv.bg

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

N. Lebedeva et al. (eds.), *Changing Values and Identities in the Post-Communist World*, Societies and Political Orders in Transition,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72616-8_13

This chapter investigates multiple social identities and their relationship to self-esteem of adolescents in Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Kosovo, and Romania. Due to economic and political changes, the young generation of these countries has to negotiate the past communist history and democratic transition in complex processes of establishing and developing a sense of self and the emergence of multiple social identities. In addressing these processes, we study ethnic identity (e.g., the degree of identification with the own culture and society, including feelings of belonging and commitment to that society; Phinney & Devich-Navarro, 1997), familial identity (e.g., identification with the familial group; Lopez, Huynh, & Fuligni, 2011), religious identity (e.g., sense of group membership to a religion or set of religious convictions; Nesbitt & Arweck, 2010), and their relationship to self-esteem of youth. We therefore tackle multiple identities through a strength-based perspective of adolescence to outline identities that promote optimal psychological functioning. In so doing, we focus on identity strengths of young people with the aim of better equipping them for the transition to adulthood. Relatedly, in line with increasingly relevant positive psychology approach, it is crucial to advance knowledge that can be translated into applicable interventions. The premise of this chapter is therefore to provide the reader with a better understanding of the contextual conditions which foster optimal identity assets for youth in a multicounty cross-cultural perspective as to advance knowledge on identity resources underlying positive adaptation in youth in Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Kosovo, and Romania.

Multiple Social Identities in Adolescence

Establishing a clear sense of identity has been shown to represent a major developmental task for adolescents (Erikson, 1968). Theory and research from developmental and social psychology have investigated social identity and its relevance in young people's lives. These perspectives identify contextual, environmental, and cultural factors that explain changes and differences in social identifications. Developmental theories focus on identity formation with achievement (firm commitment after identity exploration) and diffusion (neither engagement in exploration nor commitment) as core identity development processes (Erikson, 1968; Marcia, 1980). Social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and self-categorization theories (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) acknowledge the importance of societal context for identity formation. Hence, these theoretical perspectives see identity as a multifaceted construct (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004). By drawing on these frameworks, we investigate multiple identifications relevant to the study of identity of youth across five different cultural contexts in Eastern Europe. We were particularly interested to undercover domains of ethnic, familial, and religious identity and their relationships to self-esteem of youth.

Ethnic identity concerns the process of maintaining positive or negative attitudes and feelings of ethnic group belonging (Erikson, 1968; Phinney & Ong, 2007) and

has been consistently found to positively relate to psychological well-being and self-esteem (Rivas-Drake et al., 2014; Smith & Silva, 2011). *Familial identity* represents the degree of identification with the familial group, the sense of familial group membership (Lopez et al., 2011). Strong family ties and family attachment are particularly salient for youth and associated with positive adjustment as these ties act as a resource for youth to buffer developmental challenges characterizing this age period (Dimitrova, Chasiotis, Bender, & van de Vijver, 2014). *Religious identity* concerns the sense of group membership to a religion or set of religious convictions and their importance for individual identity (Nesbitt & Arweck, 2010). Findings with regard to religious identity of youth show a weak religious identity among them in Eastern and Central Europe possibly due to anti-religion policies during the communism era (Dimitrova, Chasiotis, Bender, & van de Vijver, 2013; Dimitrova, Chasiotis, et al., 2014). Yet, overall stronger religious identity has been traditionally shown to act as important source of identification and enhances self-esteem and well-being (Nesbitt & Arweck, 2010). All these empirical findings and frameworks provide the necessary theoretical setup for this chapter as to investigate complex interactions between multiple social identities and optimal well-being among youth. We were interested in differences and relationships among these identities in the specific contextual conditions of five Eastern European countries.

Self-Esteem in Adolescence

Self-esteem is the positive and negative orientation toward the self (Rosenberg, 1979) as an indicator of individuals' personal feelings of worth (James, 1890; Rosenberg, 1979). Self-esteem is particularly salient in adolescence due to important physical, cognitive, and social changes in this developmental stage (Marsh, 1996). Self-esteem is a relevant factor affecting new experiences and social demands that may influence psychological well-being in adolescence. In fact, developmental theory and research have traditionally used self-esteem as an indicator for adolescents' psychological adjustment (Phinney, 1989, 1991), psychological well-being (Benjet & Hernandez-Guzman, 2001), and positive mental health (Rosenberg, 1979). Conceivably, self-esteem has been one of the most widely studied psychological well-being aspects related to identity. Extant theory and research have consistently found a positive relationship between various social identity domains and self-esteem (Martinez & Dukes, 1997; Phinney, 1992). For instance, positive relationship has been documented between high self-esteem and high ethnic identity of youth (Martinez & Dukes, 1997; Phinney, 1992; Phinney & Alipuria, 1996). However, as in this example, most of the research has studied the association of separate identities with self-esteem.

Actually, a recent study carried out by Jetten and colleagues (2015) has shown that having multiple identities is associated with higher well-being. Specifically, when people have important relationships with diverse social groups and have internalized the group memberships as a relevant part of self, then the deriving identities provide

psychological resources and enhance personal self-esteem. This argument suggests the idea that the relationship between multiple social identities and self-esteem will be boosted by a “more the merrier effect” (Jetten et al., 2015, p. 4), such that the more social identities a person has, the greater their self-esteem. These findings and theorizing are further sustained by evidence from the field of intercultural relations. Specifically, the *integration hypothesis* formulated by Berry (2017) proposes that when individuals in plural societies identify with both the heritage cultural group and the majority group, they will be more likely to show higher well-being than if they connect to one or the other group. This hypothesis has received support in a number of different countries as well as both in adults and adolescents (Berry, 2017; Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006). Taken together, this research literature encourages considering a more comprehensive examination when studying the relationships of social identities with self-esteem.

We follow this line of research in examining self-esteem as a positive appraisal of the description that youth attach to their self and its relationships to multiple social identities (King, 1997). Yet, previous work has been limited with respect to several methodological gaps. This chapter sought to improve upon previous work in several ways. First, we adopt a multidimensional approach to social identity, whereas most work has treated separate identities in adolescence. Second, participants were surveyed while in high school in order to capture their present-day attitudes and perceptions of their identity and self-esteem. Next, differences among subgroups in each country were examined in order to explore contextual influences on identity. Finally, this study utilized a large sample of young populations in five European countries, which have been underrepresented in research due to their post-communist context and until recently difficult to access settings. In summary, this chapter sought to fill in gaps in existing identity research and relationships of multiple social identities that promote self-esteem in adolescents. By testing existing models in the prevalently US- and Western European-based literature, we provide evidence for generalizable findings in this area of research applicable to Eastern European post-communist countries.

Study Context: Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Kosovo, and Romania

The countries included in this chapter are post-communist societies situated in Central and Eastern Europe. All countries experienced transition from socialist to democratic state with intense transformations not only in terms of freedom, human rights, economy, democracy, and living conditions for their citizens (Roháč, 2013) but also of renewed identifications and values. Although these former communist nations have shared significant political, economic, and social changes after the collapse of communism in the late 1980s, there are some differences in their social identity processes that are briefly addressed in the following paragraphs.

Albania has 2.8 million inhabitants and a relatively young population (26% are under 19 years) (Albanian Institute of Statistics, 2016) with a society oriented toward a patriarchal family structure (Bardhoshi, 2012; Doll, 2003; Kaser, 2000). The country has well-established tradition of tolerance and harmony among various religious faiths, yet, religion does not play an important role in the individual and social life of contemporary Albanians (De Waal, 2005), also as a result of the communist era. Indeed, during this period, adolescents and young adults were not free to explore identity issues except for those strictly related to the communist propaganda (Vehbiu, 2007). After the collapse of the communist regime between 1990 and 1992, Albania faced dramatic socioeconomic changes. Large numbers of people immigrated, and until recently, the country was among the poorest countries in Europe (United Nations Development Programme & Malik, 2014). Nowadays, the transition to a democratic society is offering unique opportunity to redefine the national, ethnic, and multiple social identities of Albanian youth.

Bulgaria has 7.3 million inhabitants and a youth population of about 20% (Bulgarian National Statistical Institute, 2011). Throughout its history, family life remained one of the most important values in the Bulgarian society. Although the Constitution of Bulgaria designates Orthodox Christianity as the traditional religion (59.4% declared this affiliation in the last census of 2011), the free exercise of religion is assured, and the religious communities coexist peacefully. The communist regime in Bulgaria was greatly repressive, and national and ethnic identities were vastly interconnected with the communist identity reflecting socialist values and unity (Verdery, 1991). Similar to other Eastern European post-communist societies, Bulgaria has endured deep political and economic instability along the transition from communist- to capitalist-based economy (Fishkin, 2007). In 2007 Bulgaria joined the European Union facing new social and economic perspectives where youth are constructing multiple facets of social identity by articulating a revised image of ethnic religious and familial identifications.

The Czech Republic has 10.5 million inhabitants and a youth population of about 20% (Czech Statistical Office, 2016). Unlike other Eastern European countries, historically the Czech society was consistently connected with the Western European world, presenting a specific set of standards and family values related to Catholicism (Panasenko, 2013). The family was always very important for the Czechs during the communist period. Nowadays, Czech family is very close to the Western family pattern as a consequence of political, economic, social, and cultural changes associated with the process of Europeanization. Although generally Catholic, few Czechs strongly identify with Catholicism or any other religion, but almost everyone identifies as Czech. This reference to the Czech ethnic identity has received much attention after the democratic transition from communism (Klicperová, Feierabend, & Hofstetter, 1997), posing intriguing challenges to the new Czech generations and their multiple identities.

Kosovo has 1.8 million inhabitants (Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2011) and a high youth population (about 36%). About 92% of Kosovo's population is ethnically Albanian sharing much of the familial and religious orientations (95.6% are Muslims) of the people living in Albania. However, the two countries differ in terms of

peculiarities and communist history. Kosovo was subjected to the communist regime as part of the former Yugoslavia, was separated from Serbia in 1999 after severe ethnic tensions and the civil war, and declared independence in 2008. This transition entailed major social transformations, affecting positively the quality of life and especially the education system, although Kosovo is still classified as the poorest country in Europe (UNICEF Kosovo, 2011). In this context, youth are in the full process of redefinition of their social identifications.

Romania has 20.1 million inhabitants (National Institute of Statistics Romania, 2011) and a youth population of about 21%. Family and religion have important role in the Romanian society. The nuclear family is dominant, and strong family relations are usually maintained (Mihai & Butiu, 2012). The Orthodox Church rituals (e.g., for marriage) are relevant for the Romanian population (86.5% declare this religion affiliation). After the fall of the oppressive communist regime in 1989, along with a revival of the national/ethnic identity, Romania experienced multiple waves of migration (Oteanu, 2007) due to harsh socioeconomic conditions. However, life satisfaction and social status seem to have been enhanced once Romania became European Union member state in 2007. A mix of traditional features, historical events, and new opportunities is characterizing the Romanian youth's lives and their social identities.

Overall, all these societies are engaged in complex processes of redefining their historical past and constructing new post-communist identities based on democracy and pluralism. As such, they provide a unique opportunity to explore if and how relevant societal transitions may have implications for the formation and the mutual relationships of social identities as well as for the links between these identities and well-being, especially in the new generations of young people. However, in terms of differences, the Czech Republic seems to show a more rapid assimilation to the Western European countries' values, favored by stable connections with these nations also during the communist regime. The salience of religious identity appears quite low in Albania, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic, while the familial identity emerges as an important aspect in all societies under consideration in this chapter.

The Current Chapter

This chapter addresses two main goals as to examine the salience of multiple social identities and their relationships with self-esteem of youth. In relation to the first goal, we expected mean level differences in multiple social identities in that ethnic identity would be more endorsed by youth depending on the historical features of the country (e.g., the Czech Republic versus the other countries), and the presence of explicit nationalistic policies (e.g., in Bulgaria and Romania as documented in prior work by Dimitrova, Buzea, Ljubic, & Jordanov, 2015) (Hypothesis 1a) and that religious identity would be less endorsed by youth in countries with strong history of anti-religious policies (e.g., Albania, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic) (Hypothesis 1b). We do not advance specific hypothesis with regard to differences in familial

identity as this is an identity domain equally relevant for all youth independently of the contextual circumstances they live in. In relation to the second goal and in line with previous findings (Dimitrova et al., 2017), we expected a positive relation of multiple social identities with positive self-esteem for youth (Hypothesis 2).

Method

Participants and Procedure

Data for this chapter were drawn from a larger multinational study designed to examine contextual predictors of well-being among youth across European countries. Participants were 880 adolescents (mean age = 15.93 years, $SD = 1.40$) with Albanian ($n = 209$), Bulgarian ($n = 146$), Czech ($n = 306$), Kosovan ($n = 116$), and Romanian ($n = 103$) background who filled in ethnic, familial, and religious identity scales and self-esteem scale (see Table 1). Participants were recruited from public schools in major towns in Albania (Tirana, Durrës, and Elbasan), Bulgaria (Sofia, Simeonovgrad), the Czech Republic (Ostrava, Brno), Kosovo (Pristina), and Romania (Sibiu, Hunedoara, and Prahova). Prior to data collection, local school authorities, families, and students were contacted and informed about the purpose and methods of the study to acquire their consent. Upon agreement and parental-signed consent, adolescents filled out the questionnaire during regular school hours.

Measures

Sociodemographics Participants in all countries provided information on their ethnicity, age, and gender.

Ethnic identity was measured with Ethnic Identity Scale (Dimitrova et al., 2017) to investigate ethnic identity with ten items, such as “I see myself as Bulgarian/Czech/Albanian/Romanian,” “I feel strongly connected to Bulgarian/Czech/Albanian/Romanian people,” and “I am proud to be a member of the Bulgarian/Czech/Albanian/Romanian community.” The answers were given on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (*completely disagree*) to 5 (*completely agree*). Items were scored so that higher scores indicated greater levels of ethnic identity endorsement. The scale had excellent internal consistencies with values (Cronbach’s α) between 0.95 and 0.97 across samples.

Familial and religious identity were measured with two scales adapted from the Utrecht Management of Identity Commitment Scales (U-MICS; Crocetti, Schwartz, Fermani, & Meeus, 2010; Dimitrova, Crocetti, et al., 2014). Participants were asked to rate the applicability of each item on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (*completely untrue*) to 5 (*completely true*). Exemplary items are “My religion/family makes me feel sure of myself” or “My religion/family allows me to face the future with

Table 1 Means and standard deviations for adolescents across countries

	Albania <i>n</i> = 209	Bulgaria <i>n</i> = 146	Czech Republic <i>n</i> = 306	Kosovo <i>n</i> = 116	Romania <i>n</i> = 103	<i>F</i> (1, 879)
Age, mean (SD)	16.13 (1.15)	15.94 (1.01)	14.53 (1.59)	15.53 (1.48)	16.72 (1.51)	
Gender, %						
Female	61	56	53	53	51	
Male	39	44	44	47	49	
Variables, mean (SD)						
Identity						
Ethnic	4.25 (.76) ^a	4.21 (.68) ^a	3.47 (.90) ^b	4.17 (.72) ^a	4.08 (.76) ^a	37.80***
Familial	4.44 (.69)	4.20 (.74)	3.89 (.83)	4.33 (.57)	4.03 (.77)	ns
Religious	3.11 (1.35) ^a	2.70 (1.21) ^b	2.01 (1.28) ^c	4.33 (.73) ^a	4.00 (.95) ^a	87.18***
Self-esteem	3.35 (.53) ^a	3.21 (.60) ^a	3.95 (.52) ^a	3.20 (.50) ^a	3.31 (.57) ^a	14.21***

Note. Mean scores in the same row which do not share superscript letters differ significantly from one another

****p* < .001; ns not significant

optimism.” Cronbach’s α for both scales were in the range of 0.87 to 0.97 across samples.

Self-esteem was measured with the Rosenberg’s Self-Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1979, 1989) composed of five positive items rated on a 4-point Likert scale of 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 4 (*strongly agree*). The items (e.g., “On the whole, I am satisfied with myself”; “I feel that I have a number of good qualities”) are positively scored so that higher scores indicated greater levels of positive self-esteem. This scale has been widely used with culturally diverse populations and has obtained high Cronbach’s α coefficient value (Lorenzo-Hernandez & Ouellette, 1998; Martinez & Dukes, 1997). For the groups examined in this study, Cronbach’s α ranged from 0.70 to 0.85.

Results

Preliminary analyses tested for cross-cultural equivalence across groups. Structural equivalence was evaluated with Tucker’s phi (above .90 as acceptable and above .95 as excellent) (van de Vijver & Leung, 1997) and checked through comparing each group factor solution. The values of Tucker’s phi across groups ranged from .95 to 1.00 for social identities and from .99 to 1.00 for self-esteem. We can conclude that all groups showed very good structural equivalence and therefore can be compared.

The first set of hypotheses (i.e., mean level difference in social identities across samples) was tested via MANCOVA with four dependent variables (ethnic, familial, and religious identity and self-esteem), five independent variables (Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Kosovo, and Romania), age and gender as covariates. Results showed significant country effect for social identity domains. Ethnic identity was weaker for adolescents in the Czech Republic compared to all other countries, $F(1, 879) = 37.80, p < .001$. The same pattern was found for religious identity which has the lowest scores for youth in the Czech Republic, $F(1, 879) = 87.18, p < .001$, followed by youth in Bulgaria and all other countries. Results also showed that self-esteem was highest for youth in the Czech Republic, $F(1, 879) = 14.21, p < .001$, compared to all other countries. Age effects emerged for ethnic, $F(1, 879) = 7.59, p < .001$, and familiar identity, $F(1, 879) = 3.74, p < .05$, indicating an age increase in social identity domains for older youth. No significant effects emerged with regard to gender.

The second hypothesis (associations between identities and self-esteem across groups) was tested by bivariate Pearson correlations and path model using Structural Equations Modelling (SEM). Table 2 presents bivariate correlations among all study variables for youth in each country.

As can be seen there, ethnic identity was positively and significantly related to self-esteem for youth in all countries except Bulgaria and Kosovo. Familial identity was positively associated to self-esteem in all countries. Religious identity was positively related to self-esteem in Albania and Romania only. Next, relationships of identity variables on self-esteem were tested in a SEM model. We evaluated

Table 2 Correlations among all study variables for adolescents across countries

	Albania				Bulgaria				Czech Republic				Kosovo				Romania				
	1.	2.	3.	4.	1.	2.	3.	4.	1.	2.	3.	4.	1.	2.	3.	4.	1.	2.	3.	4.	
1. EID	–				–				–				–				–				
2. FID	.29***	–			.19*	–			.42***	–			.00	–			.56***	–			
3. RID	.20***	.08	–		.21*	.25**	–		.01	.00	–		.16	.07	–		.63***	.44***	–		
4. SE	.21***	.17*	.14*	–	.10	.21***	.16	–	.21***	.36***	.09	–	.12	.39***	.15	–	.42***	.41***	.43***	–	

EID ethnic identity, FID familial identity, RID religious identity, SE self-esteem
 * $p < .05$; ** $p < .001$




Fig. 1 Model test of multiple social identities and self-esteem. *AL* Albania, *BG* Bulgaria, *CZ* the Czech Republic, *KV* Kosovo, *RO* Romania. *** $p < .001$

model fit through the Chi-Square Test (χ^2), the Comparative Fit Index (CFI), and the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). The nonsignificant p values of χ^2 indicate good fit supplemented by values of the CFI higher than .90 (acceptable fit) and higher than .95 (excellent fit); values of the RMSEA equaling .08 indicate an acceptable fit, and values less than .08 represent a very good fit (Byrne, 2009). We adopted these criteria to test a model with one latent social identity factor and its relationships to self-esteem (Fig. 1).

A solution of a multigroup path model with each cultural group was considered. The results indicated that the measurement weight model fitted the data well, $\chi^2(1, N = 880) = 10.01, p = .27, CFI = .993, RMSEA = .017 (.000-.045)$. As can be seen in Fig. 1, self-esteem was consistently associated with social identities. Moreover, as expected, familial identity showed positive and significant loadings in all countries that were higher than those for the other social identity domains. As we suggested in the introduction, familial identity is the closest affiliative identity domain with a significant weight in relation to other social identities of youth.

Discussion

The objective of this chapter was to shed light into relationships among social identities and self-esteem of adolescents in Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Kosovo, and Romania. We were able to show differences in identity endorsement that arguably reflect differences in local contexts of these countries, as potential contextual factors affecting identity of these youth.

Identity research in these countries is rare, especially comparative work with multinational samples. We add new knowledge to existing research in countries where there was a recent need for people to search for a new identity (Macek, Bejček, & Vaníčková, 2007). This provides unique context for studying identity processes following the transition from communism to democracy.

With regard to our first goal, we found that youth in the Czech Republic showed lowest endorsement of all social identity domains. Specifically, ethnic and religious identities were scored significantly lower for youth in the Czech Republic compared to their peers in Albania, Bulgaria, Kosovo, and Romania. A possible explanation may be due to specific contextual features shown by the Czech Republic as illustrated in the context section. Also, as predicted, religious identity was quite low in Albania and Bulgaria. This set of findings serves to remind us that context is critical when studying multiple social identities. This holds true when exploring the experiences of youth and young adults, as identity is particularly volatile and unstable during this stage (Arnett, 2003).

With regard to our second goal, we explored specific associations among social identities and self-esteem for all youth. We observed a significant association between all identity domains and self-esteem suggesting that these domains may be a source of optimal adaptation for youth. Our findings regarding the model test using SEM approach showed that in all countries, self-esteem was consistently associated with high ethnic, familial and religious identity. Consistently with identity studies conducted in Western Europe and North America, the exploration and endorsement of multiple identity alternatives were shown to be the “optimal” way to develop a sense of identity (Dimitrova et al., 2017; Schwartz, Zamboanga, Meca, & Ritchie, 2012). Moreover, our results are in line with the literature suggesting that the more social identities a person has, the greater their self-esteem (Berry, 2017; Berry et al., 2006; Jetten et al., 2015). Indeed, we found that when considering simultaneously our studied identities (ethnic, familial, and religious) in the context of structural equation model, the association between the multiple social identity latent factor and self-esteem appears clear and strong regardless of the country context than if these identities are considered in a separate way, as in the case of simple bivariate correlations. A potential explanation is that if social identity may be a psychological resource, then multiple social identities should enrich this resource such that every important social identity will contribute to increment one’s self-esteem. This mechanism is the potential result of mere identification with social groups as well as of support from the social groups in which individuals are engaged. Examining the distinctive role of both processes will be an important issue for future research.

Caveats and Conclusions

This chapter adds novel and unique knowledge to previous literature based on predominantly Western European populations by confirming that multiple social identities act as protective factors for good well-being in largely neglected samples

in five Eastern European countries. Yet, some limitations need to be considered. First, the findings apply to school populations rather than university students, emerging adults, or students that do not attend school. Future studies are needed to test whether our results apply also to other groups, such as youth who are at university, in the job market, or do not attend school. Replication of the current findings with emerging adults or other age groups would represent an important future step to shed further light on relevant developmental stages in addition to middle and late adolescence (Arnett, 2000). Further, the sole reliance on self-reports may lead to overestimation of some of the correlations among variables due to shared method variance (Podsakoff, McKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). Next, using qualitative tools such as in-depth questionnaires and interviews on identity might help to overcome the limitations of quantitative measurement. Relatedly, given that identity is volatile and unstable during adolescence as youth develop identity choices, longitudinal research is needed to better understand the impact of the sociohistorical context on both the relationships between ethnic, familial, and religious identity and the meanings of those identities.

In conclusion, this chapter adds novel contribution to the literature on identity by providing unique data from youth in five Eastern European post-communist countries, hardly investigated in past research. In doing so, it highlights the complexity and salience of contextual conditions in each country by advancing new knowledge about how social identities are related to self-esteem. The implications of these findings portray relevant venue to better understand identity dynamics among adolescents and their relationship to optimal psychological functioning of such relevant regions in Europe.

References

- Albanian Institute of Statistics. (2016). *Population of Albania 1 January 2016*. Retrieved from http://www.instat.gov.al/media/322941/press_release_population_of_albania_1_january_2016.pdf
- Arnett, J. J. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through the twenties. *American Psychologist*, *55*, 469–480.
- Arnett, J. J. (2003). Conceptions of the transition to adulthood among emerging adults in American ethnic groups. *New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development*, *100*, 63–76.
- Ashmore, R. D., Deaux, K., & McLaughlin-Volpe, T. (2004). An organizing framework for collective identity: Articulation and significance of multidimensionality. *Psychological Bulletin*, *130*, 80–114.
- Bardhoshi, N. (2012). Family property in Albanian customary law. In A. Hemming, G. Kera, & E. Pandejmoni (Eds.), *Albania: Family, society and culture in the 20th century* (pp. 67–78). Berlin: Lit Verlag.
- Benjet, C., & Hernandez-Guzman, L. (2001). Gender differences in psychological well-being of Mexican early adolescents. *Adolescence*, *36*, 47–65.
- Berry, J. W. (2017). *Mutual intercultural relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Berry, J. W., Phinney, J. S., Sam, D. L., & Vedder, P. (2006). Immigrant youth: Acculturation, identity and adaptation. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, *55*, 303–332.
- Bulgarian National Statistical Institute. (2011). *The 2011 population census in the Republic of Bulgaria*. Retrieved from http://www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf

- Byrne, B. M. (2009). *Structural equation modeling with AMOS: Basic concepts, applications, and programming* (2nd ed.). New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Crocetti, E., Schwartz, S. J., Fermani, A., & Meeus, W. (2010). The Utrecht-management of identity commitments scale (U-MICS): Italian validation and cross-national comparisons. *European Journal of Psychological Assessment*, 26, 172–186.
- Crocetti, E., Fermani, A., Pojaghi, B., & Meeus, W. (2011). Identity formation in adolescents from Italian, mixed, and migrant families. *Child and Youth Care Forum*, 40, 7–23.
- Crocetti, E., Cieciuch, J., Gao, C.-H., Klimstra, T. A., Lin, C.-L., Matos, P. M., et al. (2015). National and gender measurement invariance of the Utrecht management of identity commitments scale (U-MICS): A 10-nation study with university students. *Assessment*, 1, 2–16.
- Czech Statistical Office. (2016). *Population by sex and age as at 31.12.2015*. Retrieved from https://vdb.czso.cz/vdbvo2/faces/en/index.jsf?page=vystupobjekt&pvo=DEMD001&z=T&f=TABULKA&katalog=30845&str=v4&c=v3~2__RP2015MP12DP31
- De Waal, C. (2005). *Albania today: A portrait of a post-communist turbulence*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Dimitrova, R., Buzea, C., Ljujic, V., & Jordanov, V. (2015). Nationalistic attitudes and perceived threat determine Romaphobia among Bulgarian and Romanian youth. *Revista de Asistență Socială – Social Work Review*, 3, 33–47. Retrieved from https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Radosveta_Dimitrova/publication/281063720_Nationalistic_Attitudes_and_Perceived_Threat_Determine_Romaphobia_among_Bulgarian_and_Romanian_Youth/links/55d3133508ae0a3417225b7a.pdf
- Dimitrova, R., Chasiotis, A., Bender, M., & van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2013). Collective identity and well-being of Roma adolescents in Bulgaria. *International Journal of Psychology*, 48, 502–513.
- Dimitrova, R., Chasiotis, A., Bender, M., & van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2014). Collective identity of Roma youth and their mothers. *Journal for Youth and Adolescence. Special Issue on Challenges and Resilience of Indigenous Adolescents for Positive Youth Development*, 43, 375–386.
- Dimitrova, R., Crocetti, E., Buzea, C., Jordanov, V., Kasic, M., Tair, E., et al. (2014). The Utrecht-management of identity commitments scale (U-MICS): Measurement invariance and cross-national comparisons of youth from seven European countries. *European Journal of Psychological Assessment*, 32, 119–127.
- Dimitrova, R., van de Vijver, F. J. R., Taušová, J., Chasiotis, A., Bender, M., Buzea, C., et al. (2017). Ethnic, familial, and religious identity of Roma adolescents in Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Kosovo, and Romania in relation to their level of well-being. *Child Development. Special Issue on Race and Ethnicity*, 88, 693–709.
- Doll, B. (2003). The relationship between the clan system and other institutions in the Northern Albania. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 3, 147–162.
- Erikson, E. (1968). *Identity: Youth and crisis*. New York: Norton.
- Fishkin, J. (2007). *Policies toward the Roma in Bulgaria*. Retrieved from <http://cdd.stanford.edu/2007/national-deliberative-poll-policies-toward-the-roma-in-bulgaria/>
- James, W. (1890). *The principles of psychology*. New York: Dover.
- Jetten, J., Branscombe, N. R., Haslam, S. A., Haslam, C., Cruwys, T., Jones, J. M., et al. (2015). Having a lot of a good thing: Multiple important group memberships as a source of self-esteem. *PLoS One*, 10, e0124609. <https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0124609>
- Kaser, K. (2000). The history of the family in Albania in the 20th century: A first profile. *Ethnologia Balkanica*, 4, 45–57.
- King, K. A. (1997). Self-concept and self-esteem: A clarification of terms. *Journal of School Health*, 67, 68–73.
- Klicperová, M., Feierabend, I. K., & Hofstetter, C. R. (1997). In the search for a post-communist syndrome: A theoretical framework and empirical assessment. *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*, 7, 39–52.
- Kosovo Agency of Statistics. (2011). *Kosovo population and housing census 2011. Final results. Main data*. Retrieved from <https://ask.rks-gov.net/en/census-2011?download=15:final-results-of-census-2014>
- Lopez, A. B., Huynh, V. W., & Fuligni, A. J. (2011). A longitudinal study of religious identity and participation during adolescence. *Child Development*, 82, 1297–1309.

- Lorenzo-Hernandez, J., & Ouellette, S. C. (1998). Ethnic identity, self-esteem, and values in Dominicans, Puerto Ricans, and African Americans. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 28*, 2007–2024.
- Macek, P., Bejček, J., & Vaníčková, J. (2007). Contemporary Czech emerging adults: Generation growing up in a period of social change. *Journal of Adolescent Research, 22*, 444–475.
- Marcia, J. E. (1980). Identity in adolescence. In J. Adelson (Ed.), *Handbook of adolescent psychology* (pp. 159–187). New York: Wiley.
- Marsh, H. W. (1996). Positive and negative global self-esteem: A substantively meaningful distinction or artifacts? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70*, 810–819.
- Martinez, R. O., & Dukes, R. L. (1997). The effects of ethnic identity, ethnicity, and gender on adolescent well-being. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 26*, 503–516.
- Mihai, A., & Butiu, O. (2012). The family in Romania: Cultural and economic context and implications for treatment. *International Review of Psychiatry, 24*, 139–143.
- National Institute of Statistics Romania. (2011). *The 2011 population and housing census*. Retrieved from http://www.recensamantromania.ro/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/REZULTATE-DEFINITIVE-RPL_2011.pdf
- Nesbitt, E., & Arweck, E. (2010). Issues arising from an ethnographic investigation of the religious identity formation of young people in mixed-faith families. *Fieldwork in Religion, 5*, 7–30.
- Oteanu, A. M. (2007). International circulatory migration as a local developing factor: The Romanian example. *Anthropological Notebooks, 13*, 33–44.
- Panasenko, N. (2013). Czech and Slovak family patterns and family values in historical, social and cultural context. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 44*, 79–98.
- Phinney, J. S. (1989). Stages of ethnic identity development in minority group adolescents. *Journal of Early Adolescence, 9*, 34–49.
- Phinney, J. S. (1991). Ethnic identity and self-esteem: A review and integration. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Science, 13*, 193–208.
- Phinney, J. S. (1992). The multigroup ethnic identity measure: A new scale for use with diverse groups. *Journal of Adolescent Research, 7*, 156–176.
- Phinney, J. S., & Alipuria, L. L. (1996). At the interface of cultures: Multiethnic/multiracial high school and college students. *Journal of Social Psychology, 136*, 139–158.
- Phinney, J. S., & Devich-Navarro, S. M. (1997). Variations in bicultural identification among African American and Mexican American adolescents. *Journal of Research on Adolescence, 7*, 3–32.
- Phinney, J. S., & Ong, A. D. (2007). Conceptualization and measurement of ethnic identity: Current status and future directions. *Journal of Counseling Psychology, 54*, 271–281.
- Podsakoff, P., McKenzie, S., Lee, J., & Podsakoff, N. (2003). Common method variance in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 88*, 879–903.
- Rivas-Drake, D., Syed, M., Umaña-Taylor, A. J., Markstrom, C., French, S., Schwartz, S., et al. (2014). Feeling good, happy, and proud: A meta-analysis of positive ethnic-racial affect and adjustment. *Child Development, 85*, 77–102.
- Roháč, D. (2013). What are the lessons from post-communist transition? *Economic Affairs, 33*, 65–77.
- Rosenberg, M. (1979). *Conceiving the self*. New York: Basic Books.
- Rosenberg, M. (1989). *Society and the adolescent self-image* (Revised ed.). Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.
- Schwartz, S. J., Zamboanga, B. L., Meca, A., & Ritchie, R. A. (2012). Identity around the world: An overview. *New Directions for Child and Adolescent Development, 138*, 1–18.
- Smith, T. B., & Silva, L. (2011). Ethnic identity and personal well-being of people of color: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Counseling Psychology, 58*, 42–60.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- UNICEF Kosovo. (2011). *Education in emergencies and post-crisis transition*. Retrieved from http://www.educationandtransition.org/wp-content/uploads/2007/04/Kosovo_EEPCT_2010_Report.pdf
- United Nations Development Programme, & Malik, K. (2014). *Development report 2014 – Sustaining human progress: Reducing vulnerabilities and building resilience*. Retrieved from <http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/corporate/HDR/2014HDR/HDR-2014-English.pdf>
- van de Vijver, F. J. R., & Leung, K. (1997). *Methods and data analysis for cross-cultural research*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Vehbiu, A. (2007). *The totalitarian Albanian language: Features of the public discourse in Albania, 1945-1990*. Tirana: Çabej.
- Verdery, K. (1991). *National ideology under socialism: Identity and cultural politics in Ceausescu's Romania*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Radosveta Dimitrova holds a Ph.D. in Developmental Psychology (University of Trieste, Italy, awarded the 2009 Best Doctoral Thesis by the Italian Association of Psychologists), and a Ph.D. in Cross-Cultural Psychology (Tilburg University, the Netherlands, awarded the 2012 Student and Early Career Council Dissertation Award of the Society for Research in Child Development (SRCD)). She was the recipient of the 2016 Young Scientist Award of the International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development, ISSBD, for distinguished theoretical contribution, research, and dissemination of developmental science. Her research interests regard social identity, well-being, migration, positive youth development, ethnic minority groups (Roma), and adaptation of instruments in different cultures.

Pasquale Musso is a research fellow and teaching assistant at the University of Palermo, Italy. He obtained his Master's degree in Developmental and Educational Psychology in 2005 and Ph.D. in Public Relations in 2011 at the University of Palermo, Italy. He has ongoing participations in different research projects in European and non-European countries. His research interests focus on issues in developmental psychology, as related to the social development of adolescents and emerging adults, especially to their positive development, acculturation processes and socio-psychological adaptation, and the development of mutual intercultural relations.

Iva Polackova Solcova received her Ph.D. in Charles University in Prague, the Czech Republic. Her research interests include emotion and emotion regulation development, adult development, and aging across cultures. She focuses on stories, extreme life episodes, and qualitative research. She works in the Institute of Psychology, the Czech Academy of Sciences.

Delia Stefanel Ph.D., works as associate teaching assistant at "Lucian Blaga" University of Sibiu, Romania, Department of Social and Human Sciences. She also worked as university teaching assistant in two public Hellenic universities, at the Department of Balkan Studies of the Western Macedonia University and at the Department of Languages, Philology and Culture of the Black Sea Countries of the Democritus University of Thrace. To date her research has produced empirical papers, published in domestic and international journals, books and proceedings, or invited talks to many conferences and meetings. Among her main research interests are: psychological youth development, identity issues, migrants' acculturation, cross-cultural communication, social entrepreneurship, regional/national policies, and ethnic entrepreneurship.

Fitim Uka is a young psychologist from Kosovo. He obtained his Ph.D. in Psychology in 2017 at University of Freiburg. He is currently the vice-rector for Research and Quality Management at College "Heimerer" and secretary at University of Prishtina in Kosovo. Uka is involved in several research projects regarding the Positive Youth Development.

Skerdi Zahaj (Ph.D., Department of Psychology and Education, Faculty of Social Science, University of Tirana) is a full member of Department of Psychology and Education at University

of Tirana. He also works as psychotherapist treating adolescents and adults suffering from emotional problems and personality disorders. He is member of European Association of Developmental Psychology and European Association for Behavioural and Cognitive Therapies and elected member of Albanian Order of Psychologist. His research interests are concerned generally with identity development during adolescence; the effects of chronic health conditions on psychological development; the impact of psychological trauma on children and adolescents, and validation of clinical measurements.

Peter Tavel is a professor of psychology and the dean of Sts Cyril and Methodius Faculty of Theology, Palacký University in Olomouc, the Czech Republic. His main interests are aging, social inequalities in health, health research, and spirituality. His other interests include palliative care and charity.

Venzislav Jordanov (Ph.D., National Sports Academy) is a Professor in the Department of Physical Education and Sport of University of National and World Economy in Sofia, Bulgaria. His research interests are in psychology in basketball, the influence of mountain environment and hiking on young people, and cross-cultural psychology.

Evgeni Jordanov works in the Department of Physical Education and Sport at Mining and Geology University in Sofia. His research interests are in the fields of hockey and cross-cultural psychology.

Probing the Relationship Between Group Identities of Russians and Ossetians in the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania: Intergenerational Analysis



Victoria Galyapina and Nadezhda Lebedeva

Studying identity is very important in multicultural societies because individuals can identify themselves with multiple groups. Identity is a very dynamic phenomenon and can cause following rapid changes in the sociocultural environment during the process of socialization and acculturation. It is important to investigate the structure and patterns of the relationships between group identities of ethnic group members and intergenerational differences in identity structure and relationships.

In this study, we examined five kinds of group identities and their relationships. In both Russians and Ossetians, these are ethnic identity (identification with own ethnic group), national identity (identification with the Russian Federation), religious identity (identification with Orthodox Christianity), republic identity (identification with the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania), and regional identity (identification with the North Caucasus).

Previous studies revealed relationships between ethnic, national, and religious identities in two generations of migrants or ethnic minority members (Dimitrova, Chasiotis, Bender, & van de Vijver, 2014; Gong, 2007; Maliepaard, Lubbers, & Gijsberts, 2010; Oetting & Beauvais, 1991; Phalet, Gijsberts, & Hagendoorn, 2008; Saroglou & Hanique, 2006; Verkuyten, Thijs, & Stevens, 2012). Very little research has been devoted to the relationships of identities in ethnic majorities (Nandi & Platt, 2015).

Our research identifies similarities and differences in the relationships between group identities among representatives of three generations of Russians (ethnic minority) and Ossetians (ethnic majority) living in multicultural region—RNO-A.

V. Galyapina (✉) · N. Lebedeva
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: vgalyapina@hse.ru; nlebedeva@hse.ru

Theoretical Frameworks

Group Identities

The group identity is established during early adolescence and under specific historical, cultural, and ideological conditions (Tajfel, 1981). Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) studied ethnic, cultural, national, and religious identities. Many scholars defined different types of identifications with the majority group (Gong, 2007), host national identity (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2013), dual identity (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Saguy, 2007; Hong, Benet-Martinez, Chiu, & Morris, 2003), hybrid identities (Sarkar & Allen, 2007), intercultural and multicultural identities (Bauera, Loomisa, & Akkaria, 2013), bicultural and marginal identities (Ting-Toomey et al., 2000), bicultural and bilingual identities (Tong, 2014), provincial identity (Berry & Kalin, 1995), and place identity (Gui, Zheng, & Berry, 2012; Rico & Jennings, 2012). In the process of acculturation, according to Flannery, Reise, and Yu (2001), even a new ethnic identity can be constructed (e.g., “Chicanos” in America).

The construction of multiple identities and changing identity structure are important not only in themselves but also for understanding the relationships between various identities: Are they in harmony or in conflict? There are some studies of the relationship between different types of identities (Saroglou & Hanique, 2006; Verkuyten et al., 2012). Saroglou and Hanique (2006), for instance, examine the relationship between Jewish identity and other collective identities (national and transnational) among Jewish adolescents in Belgium.

Relationships of Identities

Research shows that the question of combining subgroup identities with commitments to the nation-state is highly important for immigrants and ethnic minorities. Deaux (2006) found that an identity associated with the country of origin confronts the possibilities of a different national identity. Other cross-national researches have found negative associations, or incompatibility, between ethnic identification and national identification in nonimmigrant, European countries but not in immigrant countries such as Canada and the USA (Phinney, Berry, Vedder, & Liebkind, 2006).

Some research has examined the relationship between ethnic identity and identification with the majority group and the larger society (Gong, 2007; Oetting & Beauvais, 1991). Gong (2007) studied Asian American and African American students in the USA and did not find any relationship between ethnic identity and identification with White Americans among Asian Americans but has found a small negative correlation among African Americans. However, ethnic identity of Asian American and African American students in the USA positively related to national identity (identification with the larger society).

Far less research attention has been paid to the relationships between religious, national, and ethnic identities of the members of ethnic minority groups (Hopkins, 2011; Ng Tseung-Wong & Verkuyten, 2013). Hopkins studied relationships between national and religious identities among minority members (Muslims in the UK) using qualitative methods. He combined their superordinate and subgroup identities in such way as to assert a commonality with British non-Muslims while asserting their religious subgroup's distinctiveness (Hopkins, 2011).

Ng Tseung-Wong and Verkuyten (2013) studied adolescents from three religious groups in Mauritius (Hindu, Muslim, and Christian) and found that adolescents from minority groups had a higher level of religious identity than civil one. The relationship between religious and civil identities was positive, and this relationship was higher among the religious majority group (Hindus) members.

There are studies conducted in the states of the South Caucasus that focused on regional identity (so-called Caucasian) through the prism of ethnic, civil, and religious identities (Kolbaya, 2010; Radzhabov, 2010; Radzhabova, 2010). Furthermore, some studies considered intergenerational differences in relationships between collective identities. For example, studies in the Netherlands among members of first and second generations of Muslim minorities have shown that religious and ethnic identity become increasingly related in the second generation (Maliepaard et al., 2010; Phalet et al., 2008). In addition, Verkuyten et al. (2012) found that Moroccan-Dutch Muslim adolescents have a higher level of national identity than their parents do, but a lower level of religious and ethnic identities. They revealed a positive correlation between religious and ethnic identities and a negative correlation between religious and national (Dutch) identities among adolescents and their parents.

The study by Dimitrova et al. (2014) examined the structure of the collective identity of Roma adolescents and their mothers, including Gypsy, family, religious, and Bulgarian identities. The authors found that the transmission of collective identity has positive impacts on the psychological well-being of Roma adolescents in Bulgaria.

There are studies of the relationships between ethnic identity and identity with the majority (national identity) among migrant groups having different ages of migration. Ying, Lee, and Tsai (2004) examined Chinese identity and American identity among Chinese American college students (American-born, immigration age no greater than 12, and immigration age greater than 12). American-born Chinese showed no correlation between the two identities, whereas first-generation Chinese Americans showed small to moderate negative correlations between the two. The three groups of Chinese American respondents did not differ in their orientation to the Chinese culture, but the group who immigrated after the age of 12 reported weaker orientation to the American culture. However, majority identification is a crucial part of the context for minorities: the extent to which minority groups' identity claims are accepted by the host society may affect the degree to which minority groups feel able to claim their identity (Crul & Schneider, 2010).

At the same time, shifts in the meaning of national identity resulting from changing national composition may be implicated in the extent to which the majority themselves identify with an overarching polity (Gong, 2007).

Sociocultural Context of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania

Ossetia joined the Russian Empire in 1774 after the signing of Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca between Russia and Turkey. Now RNO-A is one of the seven republics of the North Caucasus; it is included in the North Caucasus Federal District of the Russian Federation. It is a multicultural republic; representatives of more than 100 ethnic groups live there: the dominant group (Ossetians) account for 64.5% of the population, and Russians hold a 20.6% share. More than 80% of Ossetians are Orthodox Christians (Itogi vserossiyskoy perepisi, 2012; Migratsiya russkikh, 2013).

Russians have been living in RNO-A since the early nineteenth century. The migration of Russians to Ossetia reached its highest levels from the 1920s to 1930s. Russians played the most important role in the socioeconomic development of RNO-A during the Soviet period (Denisova & Ulanov, 2003).

The analysis of changes in the ethnic composition of the population of RNO-A suggests that there is an intensive outflow of Russian population (Itogi, 2004, 2012; Vsesoyuznaya, 2015). Russians constituted around 50% of the population in the period 1940–1970, about 30% in the period 1970–1990, and 20% in 2010 in North Ossetia.

The reasons for migration of Russians from North Ossetia are the increase of separatist sentiments among ethnic Ossetians; the Ossetian-Ingush conflict; changes in the ethno-political situation in the republic, associated with mass inflow of refugees from Georgia and South Ossetia; and the socioeconomic crisis (Belozerov, 2001; Dzadziev, 2008; Soldatova, 1998).

Some studies have shown (Denisova & Ulanov, 2003; Migratsiya, 2013) that attitudes toward the Russian minority in RNO-A are not discriminatory, and the RNO-A is the most favorable place for Russians in the North Caucasus, due to common Orthodox Christianity. However, due to the hierarchical structure of Ossetian society (Dzadziev, 2008), the incorporation of Russians into the regional political and business elites is difficult. Social stratification contributes to the formation of various sectors of society along ethnic borders. For example, ethnic Ossetians constitute the majority in the parliament of RNO-A (Dzadziev, 2008).

An analysis of the studies of Ossetian and Russian identities in RNO-A makes it possible to distinguish three historical periods with different types of identity building. During the first period, 1940–1990, a positive image of interethnic relations in North Ossetia prevailed (Gateev, 2006), and a supra-ethnic identity “Soviet people” (serving as national identity in the Soviet period) was formed, combining members of all ethnic groups (Balikoev, Koybaev, & Balikoev, 2015; Gateev, 2006). The second period starts from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Interethnic tension in RNO-A caused by the Ossetian-Ingush conflict and large flows of refugees from South Ossetia and Georgia led to the growing significance of ethnic identity among Ossetians and Russians in RNO-A (Soldatova, 1998). However, ethnic identity is more significant for Ossetians than for Russians, and this tendency grows (Gurieva, 1997, 2010; Kobakhidze, 2005; Vereshchagina, 2010). Russians are more likely to identify themselves with the Russian Federation as a whole: more than 50% Russians and 13% of Ossetians living in RNO-A consider themselves to be primarily Russian citizens (Gurieva, 1997, 2010; Kobakhidze, 2005; Kolosov & O'loughlin, 2008; Soldatova, 1998; Vereshchagina, 2010). At the same time, Russians had a higher republican identity than Ossetians did. In addition, religious identity was significant for more than half of the Russians and for 16.5% of Ossetians (Soldatova, 1998). The identity transformation of Russians living in RNO-A began in this period; Russians started to recognize themselves as an ethnic minority (Belozerov, 2001; Soldatova, 1998; Vorobyov, 2001), although they were the majority in Russia as a whole.

The third period is associated with the stabilization of interethnic relations in North Ossetia. About 70% of the respondents of North Ossetia's capital evaluated interethnic relations as calm (Balikoev et al., 2015); members of ethnic groups prefer integration and participated in activities of ethno-cultural associations in the 2000s (Balikoev et al., 2015; Gurieva, 2010).

At the same time "Caucasian" identity was actively being built among residents of the North Caucasus (Gadzhiev, 2010; Shadzhe & Kukva, 2012). Researchers defined it as a regional identity similar to "European" identity (Shadzhe & Gadzhiev, 2010; Zolyan, 2010) and described the main characteristics of this identity: Caucasian traditions, customs and lifestyle, common values, and norms. There are ethnographic studies in the republic of the South Caucasus, which analyzed the relations of regional (Caucasian), ethnic, civil, and religious identities (Radzhabov, 2010) and the combination of traditions, history, and culture in the Caucasian identity (Kolbaya, 2010).

Based on these data, we assumed that the Russians living in RNO-A might develop both republican and regional identities that bring them closer to the Ossetian culture. Ossetians also identify themselves with the Russian culture and Orthodox Christianity due to their common religious background and Russian citizenship. Nevertheless the relative significance and combinations of these complementary identities (ethnic, religious, republican, regional, and national) may differ among the Russians and the Ossetians in RNO-A. Moreover, group identities might have not only intergroup but intergenerational differences as well due to the changing cultural and sociopolitical surroundings during the last 70 years (a period of socialization and acculturation of three generations).

We are interested in differences of group identities structures in three generations of Ossetians and Russians. The main research question of our study is what are the similarities and differences in the relationships between five group identities (ethnic, religious, republican, regional, and national) among representatives of three generations of Russians and Ossetians living in RNO-A?

Table 1 Gender and age characteristics of the sample

Respondents	N	Gender characteristics		Age characteristics			
		Male (N, %)	Female (N, %)	Min.	Max.	Mean	SD
Russians							
Adolescents	109	34 (32%)	74 (68%)	15	25	18.5	2.80
Parents	109	29 (27%)	79 (73%)	36	61	44.6	6.31
Grandparents	109	25 (25%)	75 (75%)	54	91	69.8	8.90
Ossetians							
Adolescents	106	50 (47%)	56 (53%)	15	25	17.6	2.39
Parents	106	22 (21%)	84 (79%)	36	60	43.8	5.92
Grandparents	106	20 (20%)	81 (80)	55	87	71.4	7.63

Method

Participants

One hundred and nine grandparent-parent-adolescent triads from ethnic Russian families and 106 triads from ethnic Ossetian families (total $N = 645$) participated in the study conducted in RNO-A in 2014. Table 1 provides the basic characteristics of these samples.

Procedure

The adolescent participants were recruited from schools and universities in RNO-A. Parents of school students filled out the questionnaires at parental meetings at the schools, and then they were asked to distribute the questionnaires to their parents (grandparents). We asked university students to distribute questionnaires among their parents and grandparents. Completed questionnaires were returned to the researcher who administrated the survey. Respondents were not remunerated.

Measures

The study used scales from the Mutual Intercultural Relations in Plural Societies (MIRIPS) questionnaire (<http://www.victoria.ac.nz/cacr/research/mirips>), translated into Russian and adapted for use in Russia (Lebedeva, 2009):

Ethnic Identity (6 items, e.g., “I am proud to be Russian/Ossetian,” all $R^2_{\text{first factor}} > 67.26$; all $\alpha > .89$).

National Identity (6 items, e.g., “I feel that I am part of the Russian Federation (national),” all $R^2_{\text{first factor}} > 63.17$; all $\alpha > .87$).

In addition, we used the following scales:

Religious Identity (5 items, e.g., “My religious identity is an important part of me” (Verkuyten, 2007; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007), all $R^2_{\text{first factor}} > 69.27$; all $\alpha > .81$).

Republican Identity (4 items, e.g., “I feel like a representative/resident of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania” (developed by members of the HSE International Laboratory for Socio-Cultural Research) all $R^2_{\text{first factor}} > 74.11$; all $\alpha > .78$).

Regional (North-Caucasian) Identity (4 items, e.g., “I feel like a part of the Caucasian culture” (developed by members of the HSE International Laboratory for Socio-Cultural Research) all $R^2_{\text{first factor}} > 82.76$; all $\alpha > .93$).

SocioDemographic Data We asked our participants about their gender, age, education, and ethnicity.

Data Processing We used the following methods of data processing: descriptive statistics, Cronbach’s α , exploratory factor analysis, multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), multigroup analysis, and correlation analysis (partial correlations) in SPSS 22.0.

Results

First, we tested the invariance of the scales and measured five group identities which we included in a latent construct “collective identity.” We used the multigroup (adolescents, parents, grandparents) confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA) for Russians and Ossetians separately. Table 2 shows fit indices of the results of MGCFA.

Table 2 shows that the model has configural, metric ($\Delta\text{CFI} < 0.01$), and scalar ($\Delta\text{CFI} = 0.01$) invariance. This allowed us to compare the means of ethnic, national, religious, republican, and regional (North-Caucasian) identities in different generations of Russians and Ossetians. Next, we compared the means of various types of group identities among three generations of Russians and Ossetians, using MANOVA (Table 3). The analysis showed that the differences of the means of collective identities of Russian adolescents, parents, and grandparents were insignificant: Wilks’ $\Lambda = .982$, $F(10; 642) = .583$, $p = .829$, and $\eta^2 = .009$. In addition, the results showed that the most significant identity for all three generations of Russians was national identity, followed by ethnic identity. The regional (North-Caucasian) identity was the least preferred one.

The analysis showed that the differences of the means of group identities of Ossetian adolescents, parents, and grandparents were significant: Wilks’ $\Lambda = .936$, $F(10; 624) = 2.082$, $p = .024$, and $\eta^2 = .032$. Significant differences in levels of ethnic, national, republican, and regional (North-Caucasian) identities between the parents and grandparents were revealed ($p = .005$, $p = .034$, $p = .032$, $p = .017$, respectively; all indicators are higher in parents). The level of religious identity was

Table 2 Fit indices of “collective identity” combined ethnic, national, religious, republican, and regional identities for three generations of Russians and Ossetians

Model of invariance	χ^2 (df)	$\Delta\chi^2$ (Δ df)	CFI	Δ CFI	RMSEA	Δ RMSEA
Russians						
Configural	30.57 (12)	–	.974	–	.059	–
Metric	34.26 (20)	3.69 (8)	.980	.006	.047	.012
Scalar	34.80(22)	.54 (2)	.982	.002	.042	.005
Ossetians						
Configural	28.23(12)	–	.982	–	.065	–
Metric	36.15 (20)	7.92(8)	.981	.001	.051	.014
Scalar	48.47 (22)	12.32(2)	.971	.010	.062	.011

CF comparative fit index

Table 3 Comparison of the means of group identities of three generations of Russians and Ossetians (max. 5 points)

Group identities	Grandparents	Parents	Adolescents	F (2;324)	Partial η
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)		
Russians					
Ethnic	4.09 (.96) ^a	4.00 (.90) ^a	3.98 (.86) ^a	.47	.003
National	4.25 (.88) ^a	4.25 (.81) ^a	4.17 (.85) ^a	.33	.002
Religious	3.96 (1.03) ^a	3.85 (.99) ^a	3.88 (1.06) ^a	.31	.002
Republican	3.86 (.98) ^a	3.77 (1.00) ^a	3.87 (.95) ^a	.45	.003
Regional (North-Caucasian)	3.64 (1.09) ^a	3.60 (1.06) ^a	3.61 (.99) ^a	.16	.001
Ossetians					
Group identities	Grandparents	Parents	Adolescents	F (2;314)	Partial η
	M (SD)	M (SD)	M (SD)		
Ethnic	4.40 (.73) ^a	3.99 (1.00) ^b	4.19 (1.00) ^{ab}	4.98	.031
National	4.21 (.72) ^a	3.91 (.96) ^b	4.08 (.84) ^{ab}	3.26	.020
Religious	4.05 (.79) ^b	3.76 (1.00) ^{ab}	3.64 (1.20) ^a	4.17	.026
Republican	4.30 (.76) ^a	3.96 (.94) ^b	4.07 (1.10) ^{ab}	3.44	.021
Regional (North-Caucasian)	4.23 (.83) ^a	3.85 (1.09) ^b	4.08 (1.12) ^{ab}	3.95	.024

Note. All effects are significant at the level $p < .05$

Identical letters indices show insignificant differences of means

significantly higher among grandparents compared to adolescents ($p = .016$). However, regional (North-Caucasian) identity was significantly higher in adolescents compared to their parents. In addition, the results showed ethnic identity to be the highest for all three generations of Ossetians, followed by republican identity in parents and grandparents and by regional and national identities in adolescents. The religious identity was the least preferred by representatives of all three generations of Ossetians.

Next, we conducted correlation analysis (partial correlations) of the relationship between different identities of three generations of Russians and Ossetians (see Fig. 1).




Fig. 1 Correlations between group identities in three generations of Russians and Ossetians in RNO-A: (a) Russian grandparents, (b) Russian parents, (c) Russian adolescents, (d) Ossetian grandparents, (e) Ossetian parents, (f) Ossetian adolescents. Note. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$; dark double headed arrow, significant relationship; light double headed arrow, nonsignificant relationship

The results showed that the ethnic identity of Russian grandparents significantly and positively correlated with their national and republic identities and negatively associated with regional (North-Caucasian) identity. Grandparental national identity significantly and positively correlated with their religious and republican identity; the religious identity was positively associated with their regional (North-Caucasian) identity; the republican identity positively correlated with the regional (North-Caucasian) identity. The ethnic identity of Russian parents positively associated with their national identity; the national identity in its turn positively correlated with religious and republican identities; the religious identity positively associated with the regional (North-Caucasian) identity; the republican identity positively correlated with regional (North-Caucasian) identity. Russian adolescent ethnic identity positively associated with their national identity, which in turn positively correlated with religious and republican identities; the republican identity was positively associated with their regional (North-Caucasian) identity.

The results of three generations of Russians in RNO-A shed light on intergenerational similarities and differences in the relationships of various collective identities. Intergenerational similarities in the group identities' relationships among Russians are that national identity positively associates with ethnic, religious, and republican identities and republican identity positively relates to the regional (North-Caucasian) identity among all three generations.

We found intergenerational differences of identity structures of Russians: a significant positive relationship between ethnic and republican identities and a significant negative relationship between ethnic and regional (North-Caucasian) identities among Russian grandparents, in contrast to the parents and adolescents. In addition, we revealed a significant positive relationship between religious and regional (North-Caucasian) identities in Russian grandparents and parents, in contrast to the adolescents.

The study of the relationships between identities of the three generations of Ossetians showed that ethnic identity of Ossetian grandparents positively associated with their religious, republican, and regional (North-Caucasian) identities. Their national identity positively correlated with their religious identity; and their republican identity positively associated with their regional (North-Caucasian) identity.

Ethnic identity of Ossetian parents positively associated with their republican identity and with their regional identity, while their national identity positively correlated with their religious identity and negatively correlated with their regional identity. The religious identity of Ossetian parents positively associated with their republican identity, which in turn positively related to their regional identity.

The results also showed that ethnic identity of Ossetian adolescents positively associated with their national, republican, and regional (North-Caucasian) identities. Their national identity positively correlated with their religious identity; and their republican identity positively related to their regional identity.

The results showed intergenerational similarities of Ossetian group identity structures: ethnic, republican, and regional (North-Caucasian) identities positively associated with each other; national identity positively associated with religious identity among all three generations of Ossetians.

As to intergenerational differences in the identity structures of Ossetians, there was a positive relationship between ethnic and religious identities among grandparents, in contrast to the parents and adolescents. Among Ossetian parents, there were positive relationships between ethnic and national identities and between religious and republican identities but a negative relationship between national and regional (North-Caucasian) identities in contrast to grandparents and adolescents, for whom these relationships were insignificant.

Discussion and Conclusion

Our study shows that national identity (identification with the Russian Federation) is the most significant identity for Russians in RNO-A, and regional (North-Caucasian) identity is less significant. These results were similar in all three generations. These data confirm the results obtained earlier in RNO-A by Soldatova (1998) and in North Caucasus as a whole by Kolosov and O'loughlin (2008) who noted that Russian national identity was most significant among the Russians in North Ossetia. National identity has a central position in the structure of Russian group identities; it associates with ethnic, religious, and republican identities among all three generations of

Russians. We might suggest that national identity provides security and protection for the Russians as an ethnic minority in North Ossetia.

The less preferred regional (North-Caucasian) identity was associated only with republican identity among all three generations of Russians. We suggest that republican identity serves as “a bridge” between national and regional (North-Caucasian) identities for all three generations of Russians. This pattern of relationship of group identities was found in all three generations. Nevertheless, we found intergenerational differences as well. There was a significant positive relationship between ethnic and republican identities among Russian grandparents, while for parents and adolescents, this relationship was nonsignificant. We suppose that in the period of Russian grandparents’ socialization in North Ossetia, when ethnic Russians accounted about 40% of the republic’s population, they had higher socio-economic and political positions and perceived this republic as their “own” (Dzadziev, 2008).

In contrast, we reveal a significant negative correlation between ethnic and regional (North-Caucasian) identities among Russian grandparents. This relationship was also negative but nonsignificant in parents and adolescents. The younger generations of Russians do not perceive their ethnic (Russian) and regional (North-Caucasian) identities as opposite or incompatible. Probably the long-term stay of Russians in the region, multiple cultural borrowings between Russians and the ethnic groups of the North Caucasus, and the modernization processes in the North Caucasus have contributed to the decrease of the perceived cultural distance, and younger Russians regard the North Caucasus as closer than their ancestors.

Further, we reveal a significant positive relationship between religious and regional (North-Caucasian) identities in grandparents and parents; however this relationship was not significant in adolescents. We suppose that, in the period of adolescent socialization, the number of Christians had decreased dramatically due to their migration from the North Caucasus (Migratsiya russkikh, 2013), and therefore adolescents did not associate the North-Caucasian region with Christianity.

The analysis of identity structures of Ossetians showed that ethnic identity was the most significant and religious identity was the least important in all three generations of Ossetians. Our results are consistent with data obtained by Kolosov and O’loughlin (2008), Soldatova (1998), Kobakhidze (2005), Vereshchagina (2010), and Gurieva (1997, 2010), who found ethnic identity the most important and religious identity the least important among Ossetians. However, the significance of group identities varies among different generations of Ossetians: ethnic, national, and regional (North-Caucasian) identities were more important among grandparents than parents; the religious identity was more important among grandparents than adolescents; and the regional (North-Caucasian) identity was more preferred by adolescents than their parents.

An intergenerational analysis of the relationships between group identities of Ossetians showed that ethnic, republican, and regional identities are positively associated with each other, while national identity is positively associated with religious identity. This pattern of correlations among three generations of Ossetians suggests two bases for identification: a North-Caucasian background, based on

ethnic, regional, and republican identities, and a national Russian background, based on national and religious identities. These two identification bases are interconnected in grandparents and parents, but in adolescents, they are separate and independent from each other.

In addition, we found differences between generations: ethnic identity positively associates with religious identity among grandparents as opposed to parents and adolescents. We can suggest that religious identity interconnects ethnic (Ossetian) and national (Russian) identities among grandparents, bringing together Russians and Ossetians. Partly similar results were obtained by Verkuyten et al. (2012), who found a positive correlation between religious (Muslim) and ethnic identities among Moroccan-Dutch Muslim adolescents and their parents.

In the Ossetian parents, their ethnic identity positively correlates with their national identity. We also found a positive relationship between religious and republican identities. Probably it was conditioned by the specifics of the sociocultural context in the 1980–1990s in the North Caucasus. The separatist sentiments in “Muslim” republics bordering RNO-A raised concerns among Orthodox Ossetians, and identification with Russia increased their perceived security (Balikoev et al., 2015). In addition, the outflow of Christians from Muslim North Caucasus republics contributed to the perception of North Ossetia as the only Christian republic (Migratsiya russkikh, 2013) in North Caucasus which enforces the relationship between national and religious identities in the parental generation of Ossetians.

At the same time, we reveal a negative relationship between national and regional (North-Caucasian) identities among Ossetian parents. These relationships were insignificant in grandparents and adolescents. We suppose that it also associates with features of the parental socialization: the separatism in the North Caucasus and negative attitudes toward people from Caucasus in central Russia contributed to the perception of North Caucasus as a “non-Russian” region. These data are consistent with the results of a qualitative study carried out in central Russia and in North Caucasus: ethnic Russian described migrants from the North Caucasus as “aliens” (Galyapina, 2015).

In our study, we examine the relationships of five group identities in the three generations of an ethnic minority and majority in the same society which have never been studied before. The pattern of correlations between group identities among three generations of Russians suggests two bases for identification: national Russian background and North-Caucasian background. Republican identity (identity with the host society) serves as “a bridge” between the two largest inclusive identities: national identity and regional identity among three generations of Russians.

The pattern of correlations between group identities among three generations of Ossetians also suggests the same two bases for identification: regional (North-Caucasian) background and national Russian background. However, if for grandparents and parents these two backgrounds were linked through ethnic and religious identities, for adolescents such “a bridge” was not revealed. We suppose that the process of identity building continues in adolescence and a necessary link connecting group identities in a unified and consistent structure will appear in the process of the formation and development of multiple identities of a personality. In

addition, we can conclude that intergenerational differences in group identity structures are largely caused by changes in the sociocultural context of North Ossetia in the last 70 years (a three-generation period of socialization and mutual acculturation).

References

- Balikoev, T. M., Koybaev, B. G., & Balikoev, A. T. (2015) *Mezhnatsional'nyye otnosheniya v Severnoy Osetii: mekhanizmy regulirovaniya [Interethnic relations in North Ossetia: Regulatory mechanisms]*. Vladikavkaz.
- Bauera, S., Loomisa, C., & Akkaria, A. (2013). Intercultural immigrant youth identities in contexts of family, friends, and school. *Journal of Youth Studies*, 16(1), 54–69. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13676261.2012.693593>
- Belozеров, V. S. (2001). Russkiye na Kavkaze: evolyutsiya rasseleniya [Russians in the Caucasus: Evolution of settlement]. In V. V. Chernous (Ed.), *Russkiye na Severnom Kavkaze: vyzovy XXI veka Sbornik nauchnykh statey [Russians in the North Caucasus: The challenges of the XXI century, the Collection of scientific articles.]*. Rostov-na-donu: SKNC VSH.
- Berry, J. W., & Kalin, R. (1995). Multicultural and ethnic attitudes in Canada: An overview of the 1991 National Survey. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science*, 27, 301–320. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0008-400X.27.3.301>
- Crul, M., & Schneider, J. (2010). Comparative integration context theory: Participation and belonging in new diverse European cities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 33(4), 1249–1268. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419871003624068>
- Deaux, K. (2006). *To be an immigrant*. New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Denisova, G. S., & Ulanov, V. P. (2003). *Russkiye na Severnom Kavkaze: analiz transformatsii sotsiokul'turnogo statusa [Russian North Caucasus: An analysis of the transformation of the socio-cultural status]*. Rostov-on-Don: Publishing House of the Rostov State Pedagogical University.
- Dimitrova, R., Chasiotis, A., Bender, M., & van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2014). Collective identity and well-being of Bulgarian Roma adolescents and their mothers. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 43, 375–386. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-013-0043-1>
- Dovidio, J. F., Gaertner, S. L., & Saguy, T. (2007). Another view of ‘we’: Majority and minority group perspectives on a common ingroup identity. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 18, 296–330. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280701726132>
- Dzadziev, A. B. (2008). *Russkoye naseleniye respublik Severnogo Kavkaza: faktory vynuuzhdennoy migratsii Severnyy Kavkaz: profilaktika konfliktov [Russian population of the North Caucasus republics: factors of forced migration North Caucasus: The prevention of conflicts]*. Moscow: Publishing House of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of Russian Academy of Sciences.
- Flannery, W. P., Reise, S. P., & Yu, J. (2001). An empirical comparison of acculturation models. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27, 1035–1045. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167201278010>
- Gadzhiev, K. (2010) *Etnonatsional'naya i geopoliticheskaya identichnost' Kavkaza [The ethnic and geopolitical identity Caucasus]*. Retrieved from <http://www.promreview.net/moskva/etnonatsionalnaya-i-geopoliticheskaya-identichnost-kavkaza?page=0,11>
- Galyapina, V. N. (2015). Ot sootchestvennika k ‘chuzhomu’: obraz etnicheskogo migranta v vospriyatii moskvichey (Po rezul'tatam fokus-gruppovykh diskussiy) [From national to the ‘stranger’: the image of ethnic migrants in the perception of Muscovites (Based on the results of focus group discussions)]. *Obshchestvennyye nauki i sovremennost'*, 2, 72–83.

- Gateev, V. M. (2006) Mezhnatsional'nyye protivorechiya na Severnom Kavkaze i poiski variantov ikh resheniya [Inter-ethnic conflicts in the North Caucasus and the search for options for their solutions] *Daryal*, 1. Retrieved from http://www.darial-online.ru/2006_1/gateev.shtml
- Gong, L. (2007). Ethnic identity and identification with the majority group: Relations with national identity and self-esteem. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 31, 503–523. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2007.03.002>
- Gui, Y., Zheng, Y., & Berry, J. W. (2012). Migrant worker acculturation in China. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 36, 598–610.
- Gurieva, S. D. (1997). *Etносotsial'naya ustanovka v mezhnatsional'nykh otnosheniyyakh*. [Ethnosocial setting in international relations]. Authoref. cand. diss. . psychol. sciences. St. Pb.
- Gurieva, S. D. (2010). *Psikhologiya mezhnatsional'nykh otnosheniy* [Psychology of interethnic relations], St. Pb, Publ. VVM, p. 276.
- Hong, Y., Benet-Martinez, V., Chiu, C., & Morris, M. W. (2003). Boundaries of cultural influence: Construct activation as a mechanism for cultural differences in social perception. *Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology*, 34(4), 453–464. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022103034004005>
- Hopkins, N. (2011). Dual identities and their recognition: Minority group members' perspectives. *Political Psychology*, 32(2). doi:<https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022103034004005>
- Itogi Vserossiyskoy perepisi naseleniya 2002 goda*. (2004). [The results of the National Population Census of 2002]. V.4. Book 1. Moscow: IPC 'Statistics of Russia'.
- Itogi vserossiyskoy perepisi naseleniya 2010 g. v 11 T.* (2012) T. 11. Svodnyye itogi Vserossiyskoy perepisi naseleniya 2010 goda [The results of the National Population Census of 2010. The 11 V. V. 11. Summary results of the national census in 2010]. Retrieved from http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/new_site/perepis2010/croc/vol11pdf-m.html
- Kobakhidze, E. I. (2005). Integratsionnyye i dezintegratsionnyye protsessy v mezhnatsional'nykh otnosheniyyakh na Severnom Kavkaze (na primere RSO-A i KBR) [Integration and disintegration processes in interethnic relations in the North Caucasus (the example of North Ossetia and the CBD)]. *SOCIS*, 2, 66–74.
- Kolbaya, V. (2010). Sovremennyy mir i protsess identifikatsii – Kavkazskaya identichnost'. Sootnosheniya: natsiya, natsional'nyy kharakter, natsional'nyye traditsii, istoricheskaya i kul'turnaya identichnosti [The modern world and the process of identification – The Caucasian identity. Relationships: nation, national character, national traditions, historical and cultural identity]. *Istoriya i identichnost': Yuzhnyy Kavkaz i drugie regiony, nakhodyashchiesya v perekhodnom periode*. [History and identity: South Caucasus and other regions that are in a transition period] (pp. 108–116). Yerevan: Edit Print.
- Kolosov, V. A., & O'Loughlin J. (2008). *Sotsial'no-territorial'naya dinamika i etnicheskiye otnosheniya na Severnom Kavkaze* [Socio-territorial dynamics and ethnic relations in the North Caucasus]. Retrieved from http://www.civisbook.ru/files/File/Kolosov_2008_4.pdf
- Lebedeva, N. M. (2009). Teoreticheskiye podkhody k issledovaniyu vzaimnykh ustanovok i strategiy mezhkul'turnogo vzaimodeystviya migrantov i naseleniya Rossii [Theoretical approaches to the study of the mutual attitudes and strategies of intercultural interaction of migrants and the population of Russia]. In N. M. Lebedeva & A. N. Tatarko (Eds.), *Strategii mezhkul'turnogo vzaimodeystviya migrantov i naseleniya Rossii: Sbornik nauchnykh statey* [Strategy intercultural migrants and the population of Russia: Collection of scientific articles] (pp. 10–63).
- Maliapaard, M., Lubbers, M., & Gijsberts, M. (2010). Generational differences in ethnic and religious attachment and their interrelation: A study among Muslim minorities in the Netherlands. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 33(3), 451–472. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870903318169>
- Martinovic, B., & Verkuyten, M. (2013). Host national and religious group identification of Turkish Muslims in Western Europe: The role of ingroup and outgroup threats and value incompatibility. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 42, 893–903.

- Migratsiya russkikh: Prichiny ottoka s Severnogo Kavkaza: Opisanie problemy, aktual'naya situatsiya (1950-2013)*. (2013). [Migration of Russian Causes outflow from the North Caucasus: Description of the problem, the current situation (1950-2013)]. Retrieved from file:///C:/Users/Ace/Downloads/migratsiyarusskihdoklad.pdf
- Nandi, A., & Platt, L. (2015). Patterns of minority and majority identification in a multicultural society. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 38(15), 2615–2634. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.1077986>
- Ng Tseung-Wong, C., & Verkuyten, M. (2013). Religious and national group identification in adolescence: A study among three religious groups in Mauritius. *International Journal of Psychology*, 48, 846–857. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00207594.2012.701748>
- Oetting, E. R., & Beauvais, F. (1991). Orthogonal cultural identification theory: The cultural identification of minority adolescents. *The International Journal of the Addictions*, 25, 655–685. <https://doi.org/10.3109/10826089109077265>
- Phalet, K., Gijsberts, M., & Hagendoorn, L. (2008). Migration and religion: Testing the limits of secularisation thesis among Turkish and Moroccan Dutch Muslims 1998-2005. *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 48, 412–436.
- Phinney, J., Berry, J. W., Vedder, P., & Liebkind, K. (2006). The acculturation experience: Attitudes, identities, and behavior of immigrant youth. In J. W. Berry, J. Phinney, D. L. Sam, & P. Vedder (Eds.), *Immigrant youth in transition: Acculturation, identity, and adaptation across national contexts* (pp. 71–116). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Radzhabov, R. (2010). Kavkazskaya identichnost': svoboda, ravenstvo i spravedlivost' (sootnosheniye etnicheskoy, grazhdanskoy i religioznoy identichnostey) [Caucasian identity: freedom, equality, and justice (the ratio of ethnic, civil and religious identities)] *Istoriya i identichnost': Yuzhnyy Kavkaz i drugiye regiony, nakhodyashchiesya v perekhodnom periode. [History and Identity: South Caucasus and other regions that are in a transition period]* (pp. 117–129). Yerevan: Edit Print.
- Radzhabova, F. (2010). Problema vzaimodeystviya gosudarstvennoy, grazhdanskoy i etnicheskoy identichnostey [The problem of interaction of state, civil and ethnic identities.] *Istoriya i identichnost': Yuzhnyy Kavkaz i drugiye regiony, nakhodyashchiesya v perekhodnom periode. [History and Identity: South Caucasus and other regions that are in a transition period]* (pp. 153–169). Yerevan: Edit Print.
- Rico, G., & Jennings, M. K. (2012). The intergenerational transmission of contending place identities. *Political Psychology*, 33(5), 723–742. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00894.x>
- Sarkar, M., & Allen, D. (2007). Hybrid identities in Quebec hip-hop: Language, territory, and ethnicity in the mix. *Journal of Language, Identity and Education*, 6(2), 117–130. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15348450701341253>
- Saroglou, V., & Hanique, B. (2006). Jewish identity, values, and religion in a globalized world A study of late adolescents. *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, 6, 231–249.
- Shadzhe, A. Y., & Kukva, E. S. (2012). Moderniziruyushchiysya Severnyy Kavkaz: parametry identichnosti. [Upgrade the North Caucasus: the parameters of identity]. *Vestnik MGOU. Ser. Filosofskiyey nauki*, 2, 31–37.
- Soldatova, G. U. (1998). *Psikhologiya mezhetnicheskoy napryazhennosti. [Psychology ethnic tensions]*. Moscow.
- Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human groups and social categories*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ting-Toomey, S., Yee-Jung, K., Shapiro, R., Garcia, W., Wright, T., & Oetzel, J. (2000). Ethnic/cultural identity salience and conflict styles in four U.S. ethnic groups. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 24, 47–81. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0147-1767\(99\)00023-1](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0147-1767(99)00023-1)
- Tong, V. M. (2014). Understanding the acculturation experience of Chinese adolescent students: Sociocultural adaptation strategies and a positive bicultural and bilingual identity. *Bilingual Research Journal*, 37, 83–100. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15235882.2014.893462>

- Vereshchagina, M. V. (2010). *Etnicheskaya identichnost' i etnicheskaya tolerantnost' russkikh i osetinskih studentov*. [Ethnic identity and ethnic tolerance Russian and Ossetian students]. Autoref. cand. diss. . . psychol. sciences. St. Pb.
- Verkuyten, M. (2007). Religious group identification and inter-religious relations: A study among Turkish-Dutch Muslims. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 10, 341–357. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430207078695>
- Verkuyten, M., Thijs, J., & Stevens, G. (2012). Multiple identities and religious transmission: A study among Moroccan-Dutch Muslim adolescents and their parents. *Child Development*, 83, 1471–1476. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8624.2012.01794>
- Verkuyten, M., & Yildiz, A. A. (2007). National (dis)identification, and ethnic and religious identity: A study among Turkish-Dutch Muslims. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33, 1448–1462. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167207304276>
- Vorobyov, S. M. (2001). *Etnopoliticheskiye protsessy na Severnom Kavkaze v postsovetskiy period*. [Ethnopolitical processes in the North Caucasus in the post-Soviet period]. Cand. diss. . . polit. sciences. Stavropol.
- Vsesoyuznaya perepis' naseleniya 1939 goda, 1959 goda, 1970 goda, 1979 goda, 1989 goda. *Natsional'nyy sostav naseleniya po regionam Rossii* (2015). [All Union Population Census of 1939, 1959, 1970, 1979, 1989. National composition of the population in the Russian regions]. *Demoscope Weekly*, pp. 651–652. Retrieved from http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_nac_70.php?reg=50
- Ying, Y., Lee, P. A., & Tsai, J. L. (2004). Psychometric properties of the intergenerational congruence in immigrant families: Child scale in Chinese Americans. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies*, 35, 91–103. <https://doi.org/10.1093/swr/28.1.56>
- Zolyan, M. (2010) Kavkaz i «kavkaztsy»: kul'turnoye konstruirovaniye regiona i regional'naya identichnost'... [Caucasus and “Caucasians”: the cultural construction of the region and regional identity ...]. *Istoriya i identichnost': Yuzhnyy Kavkaz i drugiy regiony, nakhodyashchiesya v perekhodnom periode*. [History and Identity: South Caucasus and other regions that are in a transition period] (pp. 129–137). Yerevan: Edit Print.

Victoria Galyapina (PhD in Social Psychology, Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow) is currently a Leading Researcher of the International Laboratory for Socio-Cultural Research and Associate Professor in the Department of Psychology at The National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. She is a Member of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP). She has published more than 70 journal articles and book chapters in Russian and English. She has an extensive practical experience in improving intercultural relations. From 2004 to 2013 she implemented the scientific and practical projects on the psychological support of victims of armed conflicts and terrorist attacks' in the North Caucasus. Her research interests focus on problems of intercultural relationships, mutual acculturation of ethnic minorities and the majorities, intergenerational transmission of values and social identity.

Nadezhda Lebedeva (PhD, Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences) is Professor in the Department of Psychology and Head of the International Laboratory for Socio-cultural Research at The National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. She is Academic Director of double degree Master Program on Applied Social Psychology of HSE, Russia and Tilburg University, The Netherlands. She is a member of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP), and the International Academy for Intercultural Research (IAIR). She is the author/editor of 26 books, and over 250 articles and book chapters on social and cross-cultural psychology. Her research interests are values, value transmission, identity, intercultural relations, acculturation, creativity and innovations, social and cultural change.

Ethnic Identity and Cultural Value Orientations of Moldavian Youth in Transitional Society



Irina Caunenco

In the Republic of Moldova, the problem of ethnic self-determination on both group and personal levels is still an important issue for all age groups. It is generated by highly dynamic systemic changes taking place in the society, as well as by the contradictory ethnocultural orientation of the region. After the Soviet Union breakdown in 1991, the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic transformed into an independent state—the Republic of Moldova. The Soviet nation consequently ceased to exist and the newly independent states started to form new political nations. Moldovans became a nation-forming ethnic group in the Republic of Moldova.

At present, a search of a new ethnic and cultural identification that is adequate to the current reality is in progress among the representatives of both the group of majority and of minorities. In our research we used ethnic identity conception of Stefanenko (1999), conception of acculturation of Berry (Berry, 1997; Lebedeva, 1997a), and conception of interethnic tension of Soldatova (1998).

The problem of identity of the ethnic majority group and ethnic minorities is reflected in a significant number of studies in the fields of ethnology and ethnography on post-Soviet space (Caunenco & Ivanova, 2015; Ivanova, 2012; Kozuhar', 2012a; Nikoglo, 2015; Raceeva, 2009; Stepanov, 2008, 2010; Zaikovskaya, 2010) and history (Galushenko, 2016; Kozuhar', 2012b; Papcova, 2016) and only in a few psychological studies (Caunenco & Gashper, 2013; Kaunova, 2014; Racu, 2008; Rusnac, 1995).

The ethnic identity research in a situation of systemic social transformation has both scientific and practical interest. Our goals were to study the ethnic identity of the majority group in a new social reality and to understand the strategy of ethnic majority group perception of ethnic minorities and their cultural value orientations.

I. Caunenco (✉)

Academy of Sciences of Moldova, Chisinau, Republic of Moldova

e-mail: caunenco@mail.ru

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

N. Lebedeva et al. (eds.), *Changing Values and Identities in the Post-Communist*

World, Societies and Political Orders in Transition,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72616-8_15

259

In our opinion, cultural value orientations contribute to directions of ethnic self-determination process.

Theoretical Framework

We used the definition of ethnic identity as a product of individual's cognitive-emotional self-identification process related to many ethnic groups in a social space as the basic concept in our empirical study. In other words, it is an *experience* of how the self is related to an ethnic environment: one's identity associated with one or more communities as opposed to some other communities. We define ethnic identity as a category, actively constructed by an individual, following an ascriptive ethnicity preset by society, however not being reduced to it.

One's *ethnic identity* is developed within a certain *culture* and during *interethnic interaction*, yet quite independent of both (Stefanenko, 1999). The British anthropologist R. Jenkins (1997) proposed to make difference between nominal and virtual identities, binding a nominal one with a simple ethnic self-categorization and a virtual one—with identity, which affects life of its bearers.

The structure of ethnic identity includes two components: the cognitive and the affective one. The cognitive component includes self-identification (use of ethnic "label"—ethnonym), distinctive essential elements of ethnic identity, content of self- and hetero-stereotypes, and concepts about peculiar features of one's own group. Elements of the affective component are the feeling of belonging to an ethnic community, severity of ethnocentrism expressed through vectors of ethnic attitudes and ethnic stereotypes, and importance of belonging to one's own ethnic group. A positive image of one's own group with a positive attitude to the values of other ethnic groups correlates in the structure of a positive ethnic identity (Soldatova, 1998). Positive ethnic identity is a premise for ethnic tolerance and integration strategy of intergroup interaction (Lebedeva, 1997a; Lebedeva & Tatarko, 2004).

The American anthropologist G. De Vos (2001) marks as an important function of ethnic identity its "sense of survival." Ethnicity includes understanding of individual survival as a part of historical continuity of group existence, group survival being guarantee of survival of its individual member, even if not in a strictly personal sense (De Vos, 2001). As example De Vos describes how the third-generation children of migrants seek possibility to return the feeling of ethnic identity, which their parents failed to transfer. The young people whose parents lost their ethnic bundle in chase of vertical mobility feel the lack of expressed emotional satisfaction of their ethnic belonging (De Vos, 2001).

We used ethnic stereotypes, affiliation, hierarchy of ethnic preferences, and cultural distance to study ethnic identity. Examining *ethnic stereotypes* is a key element to study ethnic identity. The definition of *ethnic stereotype* as a generalized and emotionally intense concept about an ethnic group or its representatives, consolidated during historical practice of interethnic relations, is a key definition in this study (Soldatova, 1998). Ethnic stereotypes shape the substantive core of ethnic

identity, and one of their most important functions is to ensure positive differentiation of values of one's own group and *maintenance of a positive group identity*.

Ethnic affiliation is an important compound of ethnic identity. Affiliation is regarded as a tendency toward psychological association with a group, i.e., a will to follow the norms and the rules of a group. How strong the need to belong to an ethnic group is determined by the desire of an individual to maintain membership in his/her group and by the level of intergroup loyalty and satisfaction from participation in the group. Triandis (2007) distinguished two types of personalities: the allocentric type, which requires belonging to and support of a group to a greater extent, and the idiocentric type, which focuses on its own forces and independence from the group. These types of personality differ from each other by the degree of subordination of individual purposes to the group ones, identification with one's ethnic group, one's perception as part of a group, and one's group as a continuation of oneself (Soldatova, 1998). The allocentrism-idiocentrism distinction is regarded by Triandis (2007) as dimensions of sociocultural measure of "collectivism-individualism" expressed at personal level.

To understand intercultural relations and special aspects of ethnic identity formation, we count for research works of John W. Berry (2005), Canadian psychologist, and, namely, for his model of intercultural relations from the perspective of interaction between dominant and nondominant groups. According to his results, psychological well-being of the young people from the minority group and their level of sociocultural competency depend on the level of their identification with both in-group and the group of majority. In other words, the strategy of integration is the most effective for intercultural relations between the groups of minority and majority (Berry, 2005).

In the beginning of the 1990s, the American political scientist David Laitin (1998) carried out a research of a new identity of Russian-speaking population in post-Soviet Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Estonia, and Latvia. One of the most important results of his research was that conglomerate identity development is an alternative strategy to assimilation, rights assertion, violent confrontation, and exodus (Laitin, 1998).

Ethnic markers are an important element of ethnic identity showing ways to objectify the identity. As Stefanenko (1999) argues, the importance and the role of such markers vary as perceived by the members of an ethnic community and are matters of a particular historical situation, the degree of ethnic consolidation, and the peculiar ethnic environment. Triandis (2007) supports the idea demonstrated by some studies that when someone perceives others as resembling himself/herself, there is an emotional rapport. The cultural distance concerns a probability that others could be perceived as culturally close or distant. If one wants to understand why members of different cultures address or interact with each other in a certain way, it is necessary to look into the history of these relations and the acculturation model applied by one group to the other. Thus, for instance, in case of integration, a person acquires elements of both cultures (Triandis, 2007).

Cultural distance attracts special attention because it is a "social-psychological building mechanism" of new identities to match some new sociocultural and

political situation (Lebedeva, 1997a, p. 302). An absolutely new function of the social-perceptive concept of cultural distance was revealed, i.e., that of building new self-identities to adapt to rapid changes in the ethnocultural context (Lebedeva, 1997b). On the premise that one can understand ethnic self-determination of both groups and individuals only through the cultural and historic interrelations and comparison with the other groups, it is important to study hierarchy of ethnic preferences. A study of ethnic preferences among the young people offers an opportunity to understand their particular perceptions of the hierarchic ethnocultural space, comparison and identity, sympathies and antipathies, and subjective status of ethnic groups. Generally, ethnic identity is the result of comparing one's own group with other ethnic communities (groups).

In the period of quick social changes, the values reflect and assign the "conceptual field" of the identification processes. Values, dominating in the society, are the main cultural element, as the individual priorities are implemented in the basic models of behavior. Main cultural values are a powerful concept-forming and motivating construct (Yasin & Lebedeva, 2009). That is why we included cultural value orientation research in our study of young Moldovans' ethnic identity in a transforming society. We assumed that young people adopt values through one's identification with his/her in-group.

Our empirical research of the young Moldovans was based on studies of Moldovan psychologists, anthropologists, and ethnologists. Gashper (2008) in her research of ethnic identity of senior schoolchildren of the majority (Moldovan) group and ethnic minorities (Russians, Bulgarians, Gagauz, Ukrainians) showed that Moldovan schoolchildren clearly identify themselves with their in-group. When comparing self-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes, the hierarchy of ethnic preferences and prevalence of ethno-affiliating trends was revealed.

The identity of Gagauz, Bulgarians, and Ukrainians appeared as bicultural identity. The study revealed the proximity of their self-stereotype with the hetero-stereotype of Russians. The Bulgarian and Ukrainian schoolchildren also showed proximity with the group of Russians on the personal level (the image of "self"). Gashper (2008) defines the ethnic identity of Russians as disharmonic, because of slightly negative valence of the hetero-stereotype of Moldovans. The image of "self" is close to the self-stereotype in Russian, Bulgarian, and Ukrainian schoolchildren. The author identifies three levels of biculturalism in senior schoolchildren with the group of Russians. *High level* is identified in Bulgarians and includes proximity on both personal and group level with out-group priority (Russians). *Medium level* is observed in Ukrainians with the priority of the in-group on the personal level and proximity with Russian out-group on the group level. *Low level* which includes proximity with Russian out-group on personal level was found in Gagauz.

Ethnic identity study of young Moldovans, Russians, Bulgarians, Ukrainians, and Gagauz carried out by Caunenco (2007, 2013) showed the dynamics of ethnic identity transformation (Caunenco, 2015). All investigated ethnic groups have a positive ethnic self-identification; the image of Moldovans in the groups of Gagauz and Bulgarians changed from slightly negative to positive, providing an argument to consider their identity as positive and harmonic. The significance of the ethnic

composition on a personal level and the slightly negative hetero-stereotype of Moldovans are identified in Russian and Ukrainian youth describing a disharmonic and actualized ethnic identity.

A study of group value orientations of the youth within the psychological universals “individualism-collectivism” showed that in all researched groups the value orientation typical for collectivist cultures is prevailing, though each group has its own cultural niche on the continuum of collectivism (Caunenco, 2015). The groups of Bulgarians and Gagauz appeared as the most collectivist, followed by the groups of Russians and Ukrainians, which are close to each other by the value structures. Moldovans, on the one hand, are the only group (as per the sample of 2013) oriented to the weak social control and thus ready for self-organization; on the other hand, they demonstrate a reduction in openness to changes. The author argues that there are two components that shall be distinguished in the ethnic matrix of Moldova—the ethnic majority (Moldovans) and the ethnic minorities (Bulgarians, Gagauz, and Ukrainians), which are bicultural with the group of Russians. Ethnic identity of Russians is actualized and disharmonic.

Rusnac (1995) studied the interethnic perception in multicultural regions. The study was conducted within the framework of the social representation approach proposed by Moscovici (1984) and aimed to investigate perception specifics in relation to the social environment’s characteristics, age, and gender. The images of Russians and Romanians on each other were studied among schoolchildren and university students. Thus, the typical features of the majority group in their self-perception are diligence, hospitality, and obedience; in author’s view such features are more characteristic of rural residents. Russians are defined as sociable and optimistic. The sample selected in Chisinau consisted of university students with a higher cultural and intellectual level, higher autonomy, and less dependence on the social context; therefore their image of “other” was different/specific. They view Russians as selfish, wild, and sociable (Rusnac, 1995). Rusnac (1995) argues that the image of an ethnic group is stereotyped and results from the qualities’ classification derived from modifications of collective representations.

Kaunova’s research (2012, 2014) is focused on Roma group, in particular on their image, attitudes toward them, and the social representations of them. This group presents an interest for understanding the specifics of the intergroup perception and the ethnic identity of an extremely closed marginalized group. The empiric research contributes to understanding the particularities of prejudice formation. The study of the image of Roma in the perception of senior schoolchildren showed that “the content of stereotyped image of Roma has both negative and positive assessments and includes such features as ‘cunning’, ‘persistent’, ‘proud’, ‘pushy’, ‘sociable’ and ‘active’” (Kaunova, 2012, p. 77). The attitudes of senior schoolchildren toward Roma are marked by a significant ambiguity, weak positive orientation, and weak manifestation. Their cultural values are closer to the collectivist pole. The study reveals that “schoolchildren tend to diminish the manifestation of qualities in Roma oriented to interaction. Attributing to Roma the readiness to ‘reject interaction’ entails conflict and discord initiation during interactions, and represents an obstacle in developing normal relations, thus indicating the existence of a huge social

distance” (Kaunova, 2012, p. 77). Unfortunately, suchlike studies of Roma ethnic group in Moldova are so far unique.

The ethnopsychological research of Stepanova is of interest for understanding the genesis of interethnic relations in Moldova. The results of her research signal to the interethnic relations’ dynamics at that time from the psychological perspective. The author shows that tolerance and hospitality were always typical for the ethnic majority with respect to “foreigners and travelers” (Stepanova, 1993). She analyzes the sociocultural factors influencing, in her view, the interethnic relations in Moldova: high percentage of cross marriages (Moldova was ranked third after Kazakhstan and Latvia), growth in personal connections between majority and other ethnic groups, positive international attitudes, and proximity of value systems (Stepanova, 1993). The differences between Moldovans and Russians identified at that time were marked as well: compared to Russians, Moldovans manifest a stronger tendency to traditional types of spiritual culture.

For a long period of time, the Republic of Moldova is a labor resources donor country, and the process of labor migration involves different age groups. Horozova (2012) studies the impact of labor migration on the ethnic identity of Bulgarian and Gagauz youth. The author hypothesized that labor migration influences the structure and the content of ethnic identity depending on the level of identification with the in-group and the attitude toward the labor migration (readiness to engage in it) (Horozova, 2012). The results showed that the process of labor migration influences the ethnic identity of those young people, who were not determined whether to engage in labor migration or not (“undetermined”). Regional factor is gaining significant importance in the identification process of this group.

The studies of Ivanova (2012) deal with the problem of ethnic identity formation in children and adolescents who are being taught in Russian. Territorial, civil, and ethnic identities are priorities by the end of the primary school age (9 years). European and religious identities start to play their role at the adolescent age. “Moldovan” is a trans-ethnic term for many children. The research results showed that ethnic identity gets a middle position in the social matrix of the subjects; it is prominent only in representatives of numerically small groups of ethnic minorities and depends in general on the sociopolitical situation. The urban multicultural environment facilitates the high variability and combinability of ethnic identity components. The Ukrainian adolescents demonstrate a more prominent ethnic identification in comparison with the Russian ones, who showed a slightly “vague/diffuse” identity, which confirms the influence of the social context on the process of ethnic identity formation. In this particular case, it refers to the historical aspects of Russians’ and Ukrainians’ settlement on the territory of the actual state (the Republic of Moldova), the long period of Russian language’s use as language of communication, and the mother tongue instruction (i.e., in Russian).

Currently, Ivanova studies the representations of the Moldovan youth about their country and its symbolic space (Ivanova, 2015). The sample included university students of five ethnic groups—Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and Gagauz. The comparison of images of the “motherland” and Moldova within an

empirical research showed their practically full opposition: the image of motherland is emotionally charged, individual, and positive, associated with home and family, whereas the image of the real country of residence is associated, primarily, with the negative problems of the current political, social, and economic situation. These results are pointing to the existing problem of an underdeveloped civil identity and high probability of leaving the country.

Based on the theoretical and empirical ethnic identity studies of Moldovan and foreign researchers, we defined the goal, hypothesis, and tasks of the empiric study of the young Moldovans. In ethnic identity research, we rely on the principles of social identity theory of Tajfel and Turner (1986), which stated that individuals tend to maintain or promote a positive social identity; not all the group parameters take part in the process of differentiation and estimating comparison but qualities and characteristics of values; social identity may be positive or negative according to those groups' estimations, which belong to the social identity of the individual. In the conceptualization of ethnic groups' acculturation of Lebedeva (1997a), the most important principle for us was that positive ethnic identity maintenance is a social-psychological mechanism of preservation of this ethnic group in general. In the ethnic identity conception of Stefanenko (1999), we considered the principle that ethnic identity forms within a certain culture in a process of intercultural interaction, though relatively independently; ethnic identity's characteristics depend not only on time but on the place of their study as well. Soldatova (1998) in her conception of interethnic tension argued that ethnic identity in the situation of social instability in a multiethnic state represents a crisis form of personality self-identification. She also specifies that strengthening the ethnic compound in identity structure turns ethnic identity into a basis for the group's integrity.

The goal is to study ethnic identity of Moldovan youth in a society that undergoes transformations. We expect that ethnic identity of Moldovan youth in a transforming society will be defined by the new sociopolitical status on the state level; it will be positive and actualized. In particular we aim to investigate:

1. Ethnic stereotypes, ethnic affiliation, and cultural distance of the young Moldovans
2. Hierarchy of ethnic preferences and cultural distance of the young Moldovans
3. Cultural value orientations of the young Moldovans

Method

Sample

This study was carried out in Chisinau. Two hundred students (92 males, 108 females) aged from 18 to 25 years ($M = 20.5$; $SD = 1.19$) from the ethnic group of Moldovans took part in this research. Participants were recruited from the universities of Chisinau. The period of study was October 2009–April 2010.

Procedure

The participants had to fill a questionnaire, which included a number of methods for estimation of ethnic stereotypes, ethnic affiliation tendencies, cultural distance, and ethnic preferences for hierarchy. Two experts, native speakers of Romanian language, carried out a forward and back translation of the methods. Gashper (2008) in her earlier research approved the ethnic stereotypes, ethnic affiliation, and ethnic preferences for hierarchy research methods on the ethnic group of Moldovans (school students). The study was carried out in Romanian. Filling the questionnaire took approximately 40–60 minutes. The testing was made in groups of 10–25 people and individually.

Measures

Ethnic Stereotypes For the ethnic stereotypes' research, we used the diagnostic test of relations of Soldatova (1998), widely used among psychologists for the study of ethnic identity and interethnic relations (Boronoev & Pavlenko, 1994; Gashper, 2008). The test is based on the idea that differentiation of perception of the ethnic groups on the scale "like-dislike" leads to the fact that the same qualities, ascribed to in- and out-group, may be interpreted differently. The test allows measuring the following ethnic stereotypes' parameters: ambivalence, expression, and orientation. We used the parameter of orientation (diagnostic coefficient of a stereotype). The diagnostic coefficient of a stereotype (D) defines the character and the value of the general emotional orientation of the subject toward the object; it is sensitive to the stereotype's character change and is calculated using a formula. The value of the diagnostic coefficient distributes on a continuum from -1 to 1 , where the left border means a negative relation and the right one a positive relation (Soldatova, 1998). Respondents had to estimate themselves, an "ideal," a "typical representative of their ethnic group," and Russians, using the proposed characteristics. The qualities were estimated according to the 4-grade scale from 1 (this quality is absent) to 4 (this quality is fully expressed).

Studying ethnic stereotypes, we compared:

- Moldovan young people's stereotypes with the "self"-image to reveal the meaning of ethnic compound on the *personal* level
- "Self"-image with the hetero-stereotype about Russians (another group relevancy on the *personal* level)
- Moldovans' auto-stereotype and hetero-stereotype about Russians to reveal *proximity on the group* level

Mean score of assessments on all 24 qualities of the test was calculated. The qualities, which gained the highest score (more than 3), were considered stereotypes. To assess the dominating vector of stereotypes by the DTR method, we used

Wilcoxon's T-criterion. This criterion was preferred because distribution parameters of dependent variables differed from parameters of normal distribution. We used statistic software SPSS 12.0 and Excel to process the data.

Ethnic Affiliation To study ethnic affiliation, we used the procedural elaboration "ethnic affiliation" of Soldatova and Ryzhova (Soldatova, 1998). It included nine pairs of axiological assertions, based on the principle of opposition of orientation on group and on personality. Respondents had to indicate their agreement with the given assertions—"agree," "don't agree," and "I don't know." In the process of data elaboration, we calculated the indicators, reflecting a high need in ethnic membership (ethnic affiliation tendency) and a low need in ethnic membership (anti-affiliation tendency). We defined a group of "ambivalent" respondents with equally expressed indicators of both affiliation and anti-affiliation tendencies. The percentage rating of the groups with ethnic affiliation and anti-affiliation tendencies and of the ambivalents was calculated.

Ethnic Preference Hierarchy To study the ethnic preferences for hierarchy, we used color test of relations in modification of Boronoev and Pavlenko (1994). The test is carried out individually and includes three stages. On the first stage, a number of Lüscher colored cards are presented to the respondent, which have to be correlated with the cards of each ethnic group (in our case Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, Poles, Gypsies). During the second stage, the respondent has to distribute the Lüscher colored cards according to his/her preferences. During the third stage, the respondent has to range the cards with ethnic groups' names according to his/her preferences. The results are fixed in the protocol. The data interpretation is based on the idea that a person has a proclaimed system of ethnic preferences and a real one, which defines his/her behavior in this domain. They may coincide in case of an adequate awareness of the respondent of his/her true ethnic relation hierarchy, as well as differ significantly because of different reasons. The system of color preferences is the mediator in the given test. The third stage data are interpreted as the system of ethnic preferences.

In the process of data elaboration, at first we trace connection between the ethnic group with the highest (first) rank in the proclaimed system and the color of its association: the rank of this color in the color preference system indicates the rank of this ethnic group in the real hierarchy of ethnic relations. The same procedure is carried out for the second ethnic group and so on. Finally, there is a reconstructed real system of ethnic preferences. Then this system has to be correlated with a proclaimed one and a comparative analysis on each ethnic group to be made. The calculated rank difference between the two hierarchies shows the adequacy of the respondent's attitude toward the given ethnic group.

Cultural Distance Cultural distance and ethnic markers were studied on the base of "cultural distance scale," elaborated at the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Respondents had to mark one or more indicators, which make them akin to an ethnic group (Moldovans, Russians, Ukrainians, Gagauz, Bulgarians, Jews, Romanians). These indicators included the

common residence area, common history, language, religion, traditions, rites, visual appearance, behavior, character traits, and others. As a measure of cultural proximity, we used a number of indicators, marked by a respondent for this ethnic group. Calculations were made for each ethnic group and each indicator: calculation of the sum of choices for each indicator in general for all ethnic groups, their ranging, each indicator's rate, confidence interval, weight, and rate of choices for the own and other ethnic groups.

Cultural Value Orientations The study of cultural value orientations was based on the Schwartz questionnaire (Karandashev, 2004, 2009); it was carried out as a pilot study. Today, Schwartz's theory of cultural values is one of the best developed theoretical and methodological approaches to study values. He developed two approaches to study the values: individual and cultural. We analyzed the data at the cultural level of values shared by the young Moldovans. To analyze values at the level of social cultures, we need to take social groups as units of analysis. These studies can characterize social culture of a society or a community, i.e., what is commonly shared by all representatives of the studied culture. We will first briefly describe the cultural level of values. Culture is regarded by Schwartz as a wide complex of meanings, beliefs, symbols, norms, and values dominating among the members of a society, which motivate their everyday behavior. Schwartz distinguished three main dimensions of cultural values and identified seven values that can be found, to some extent, in any culture of the world.

Autonomy-Embeddedness This dimension characterizes the psychological nature of borders between the individual and the group, i.e., to what extent people are autonomous from or "embedded" in groups.

Egalitarianism-Hierarchy The biggest challenge of the society is to ensure socially responsible behavior and to motivate people to respect others' well-being and coordinate one's activities with the others. Egalitarianism as a value presumes that people must regard others as some morally equal human individuals with the same basic needs. Hierarchy reflects hierarchic systems of assigned roles that can ensure a responsible behavior. It presumes that unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources is logical and reasonable.

Harmony-Mastery This value characterizes the way people regulate their relations with the world of nature and society. Harmony focuses on the need to be in peace with other people and physical environment. Mastery presumes the opposite view of the society on this problem. Self-affirmation aimed at mastery of the natural and social environment is strongly encouraged (Lebedeva & Tatarko, 2009).

Schwartz distinguished these dimensions by considering three major issues challenging any society.

The Nature of Relations Between a Person and a Group Schwartz called the extremities of this dimension autonomy vs. embeddedness (earlier—conservatism). Schwartz distinguishes two types of autonomy: intellectual autonomy (broad views, curiosity, creation) and affective autonomy (pleasure, diversity). In cultures based on

embeddedness values, individuals are regarded as belonging to groups. Important values of such cultures are social order, respect for traditions, security, duty, and wisdom.

Ensuring Socially Responsible Behavior Extremities of this dimension are egalitarianism vs. hierarchy. Egalitarianism requires to recognizing moral equality of all people. Important values are equality, social fairness, responsibility, assistance, and honesty. The other extremity, hierarchy, is based on a hierarchic system of role requirements to ensure socially responsible behavior. It regards the unequal distribution of power, roles, and resources legitimate, correct, and legal. Values are social power, authority, subordination, and richness.

Regulation of People's Attitude to Their Natural and Social Environment The cultural solution to this—harmony—demands that the world is accepted as it is, trying to understand and assess it, rather than change it. The most important values in such cultures are peace in the world, being one whole with the nature and environment protection. On the opposite end, we find values of mastery. Such cultures encourage active self-affirmation, changing one's natural and social environment. Values are ambitions, success, audacity, and competency.

We defined the most preferred values of the young Moldovans and analyzed the blocks of values.

Results

We started our analysis of the findings of our empirical study with ethnic stereotypes. Generally, we found that the sampled young Moldovans had positive ethnic stereotypes: auto-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes (see Table 1).

The results of comparison of these types of assessment are presented in Table 2. Comparing auto-stereotype with the “self”-image revealed some significant statistical differences ($W = 2508.50$, $p = 0.0001$). This means that, for the young Moldovans, their ethnic identity is not significant on the personal level, and there is a differentiation between the “self”-image and the auto-stereotype. There are no statistically significant differences between the hetero-stereotype of Russians and the auto-stereotype of Moldovans ($W = 5975.50$, $p = 0.241$). The auto-stereotype of young Moldovans is close to the hetero-stereotype of the Russians. There are significant differences between self-assessment and “ideal” ($W = 150037.50$, $p = 0.0001$) and self-assessment and hetero-stereotype of the Russians ($W = 997.50$, $p = 0.0001$).

Table 1 Medium value of stereotype diagnostic coefficient for young Moldovans

Type of assessment	<i>D</i>
Self-assessment	0.203
Assessment ideal	0.292
Auto-stereotype	0.087
Hetero-stereotype about the Russians	0.076

Table 2 Results of comparison of auto- and hetero-stereotypes, self-assessment, and the ideal reference among the young Moldovans, using Wilcoxon's T-criterion at the level of significance $\alpha = 0.01$

Type of assessment	<i>T</i>	<i>Z</i>	
1. Self-assessment and the ideal	15037.50	9.023	0.0001
2. Auto-stereotype and self-assessment	2508.50	-8.236	0.0001
3. Self-assessment and hetero-stereotype about the Russians	997.50	-9.470	0.0001
4. Auto-stereotype and the ideal	526.50	-10.921	0.0001
5. The ideal and hetero-stereotype about the Russians	49.00	-11.061	0.0001
6. Auto-stereotype and hetero-stereotype about the Russians	5975.50	-1.172	0.241

Ethnic identity actualization was not revealed to be present among the young Moldovans but a differentiation between the “self”-image and the in-group stereotype. If we are to compare the findings of this research of ethnic stereotypes among the young Moldovans with empirical studies of ethnic stereotypes among the ethnic minorities, then the young Russians and Ukrainians show importance of the ethnic component at personal level and a slightly negative hetero-stereotype of the Moldovans (Caunenco, 2015).

Frequency analysis of ethnic stereotypes has shown that most of the respondents have a well-developed positive ethnic stereotype, i.e., a positive auto-stereotype and a positive hetero-stereotype (the Russians)—41%. As well, we identified groups of young Moldovans with a negative ethnic stereotype—9% (negative auto-stereotype and hetero-stereotype); a conflicting stereotype (hyperidentity) was revealed in 11% of the respondents (a positive auto-stereotype and a negative hetero-stereotype), and 12% of respondents showed an assimilation type [a negative auto-stereotype and a positive hetero-stereotype (the Russians)]. We also distinguished three more groups, which we titled as ambivalent: positive auto-stereotype and zero hetero-stereotype, negative auto-stereotype and zero hetero-stereotype, zero self- and hetero-stereotype, and zero auto-stereotype and positive hetero-stereotype. Overall, positive ethnic stereotypes prevail among the young Moldovans. The noticed broad variation of stereotypes, however, suggests dynamic and complex ethnic self-identification process among the young Moldovans.

The analysis of ethnic stereotypes' contents showed that for the young Moldovans the following qualities are significant: proud (3.09) and sociable (2.98). Less typical for their own ethnic group are such qualities as pedantic (1.94) and characterless (1.97). Russians are viewed as proud (3.21), diplomatic (3.09), and sociable (3.02). In the “self”-image of the young Moldovans, the highest priority has such qualities as neat (3.59), sociable (3.16), active (3.15), and smart (3.00). Less valuable are such qualities as hypocritical (1.43), greedy (1.58), characterless (1.71), pedantic (1.75), coward (1.86), arrogant (1.86), aggressive (1.88), and intrusive (1.97). In the image of the “ideal,” the most stereotypic qualities for the young Moldovans are neat (3.79), sociable (3.60), active (3.59), smart (3.51), diplomatic (3.37), economic (3.33), careful (2.59), witty (3.24), and temperamental (3.23). Less typical for the “ideal” are such qualities as hypocritical (1.27), coward (1.35), greedy

(1.41), aggressive (1.55), characterless (1.57), arrogant (1.73), intrusive (1.73), pedantic (1.81), and stubborn (1.88). As we can see here, the most reflected is the image of the “ideal.” The most frequently expressed stereotypical quality for the image of the “ideal,” “self”-image, auto- and hetero-stereotype (Russians) is “sociable.” Communication is apparently an important factor for world understanding and widening of the notional space for the young Moldovans on both group and personal levels.

Then, we proceeded to analyze the affiliative motives among the young Moldovans. We distinguished three groups of respondents during the process of studying the ethnic affiliation: the first group included respondents with prevailing ethno-affiliative motives (allocentrics); the second group included respondents with dominating self-focused motives (idiocentrics); the third group included the “fluctuating” (uncertain) ones, who have both ethno-affiliative and anti-ethno-affiliative motives expressed equally.

The analyses of affiliative trends among the young Moldovans revealed a significant prevalence of affiliative motives (75%), compared to anti-affiliative (10%) and uncertain ones (“fluctuating” 15%). The study of ethnic preferences for hierarchy of the young Moldovans showed an overlap of ethnic preferences in the choices on both real and proclaimed levels, which proves the presence of an adequate perception of one’s relation to his own ethnic group. Young Moldovans assign the highest first rank to their in-group (see Table 3). Second rank on the both real and proclaimed levels has the group of Russians and the third one—Ukrainians. A full overlap of real and proclaimed levels is revealed for the groups of Russians and Ukrainians—fact that testifies persistence of the ethnic preference hierarchy and absence of conflict in it. In other groups, there are differences between the declared and actual hierarchy of ethnic preferences. For instance, the young *Moldovans* place the Bulgarians on the fourth place, while they are actually on the seventh place shared with the Gagauz. As one can see, the biggest discrepancy of actual and declared preferences is in the Jewish, Roma, Polish, Bulgarian, and Gagauz groups. Thus, for instance, declaratively, the young *Moldovans* rank the Jews at the fifth place, while in reality they take the fourth; in other words, the Jews are declared lower than in reality. The Russians and the Ukrainians are the closest groups for the young *Moldovans*, while

Table 3 Hierarchy of ethnic preferences of the young Moldovans

Ethnic group	Real		Declared	
	Sum of election	Rank	Sum of election	Rank
Moldavians	154	1	195	1
Russians	101	2	178	2
Ukrainians	91	3	159	3
Jews	72	4	17	5
Bulgarians	40	7.5	23	4
Poles	53	5	14	6
Gagauz	40	7.5	8	7
Roma	49	6	6	8

the youth of the ethnic minorities place the Moldovans on the third place (Caunenco, 2015). Therefore, by hierarchy of ethnic preferences, the young Moldovans rank their own group the highest (first rank), both consciously and preconsciously. The Russians and the Ukrainians are thought to be the closest ethnic groups.

Studying the cultural distance between the young Moldovans and their own group and other ethnic groups has shown the following most important markers for the majority group: common residence area; rites, customs, and traditions; religion; common history; and language. The young Moldovans prefer their own group, which is demonstrated by the number of chosen ethnic markers, which is a norm in fact (240 of choices) (see Table 4). The second group by cultural distance is the Romanians, where the most important markers are common history, common residence area, language, religion, and rites, customs, and traditions (157 of choices). The biggest number of choices had such markers as common history (31) and language (30). Cultural proximity of Moldovans to Romanians is unsurprising, for they are akin. In the educational institutions, Romanian language and culture and history of Romanians are studied. The third closest group is the Russians, with the following most important markers: common history, religion, and appearance (124 of choices). Ukrainians are close for religion, appearance, and common residence area (84 of choices). The most important markers of cultural distance with the Gagauz are common residence area and common history and with the Bulgarians common residence area and religion (55 of choices). The ethnic marker analysis of the young Moldovans relating their own and other ethnic groups showed that the highest ranks got the markers religion, common residence area, and common history. These markers have the biggest rate of choices in all the assessed ethnic groups.

Regarding the preliminary study results on cultural values, we distinguished the most important values for the young Moldovans (see Table 5). The most important values are connected with security and community, such as respectful to one's parents and elder persons, politeness, and neat. These values pertain to the embeddedness group (conservatism). Among other priorities, there are such values as exploration of and changing the environment, i.e., individualistic values: capable and freedom (according to Schwartz, these are values of intellectual autonomy and mastery).

In studying values by groups (see Table 6), the most preferred values belong to the following groups: egalitarianism (equality), mastery, intellectual autonomy, and affective autonomy. The least important group of values belongs to hierarchy. If we compare cultural variations by Schwartz, we need to note that almost all bipolar values are balanced. The only exception is the dimension hierarchy—egalitarianism, where egalitarianism values are preferred. This means that priority is given to values demanding fairness and striving to enhance personal autonomy. Other cultural dimensions showed almost identical results: embeddedness (conservatism)-autonomy and mastery-harmony. This ambiguous expression of cultural priorities among the youth may be caused by a long-term uncertainty of future vectors of sociocultural development. Values of the young people, who are the most active social group, reflect the cultural values of the society. We would qualify this situation as being at the crossroads.

Table 4 Cultural distance between the young Moldovans and other ethnic groups

Indication of communality with ethnos:	Ethnos										For whole sampling				
	Moldovans	Russians	Ukrainians	Gagauz	Bulgarians	Jews	Romanians	Sum of election	Range of indication	Share of election	95% CI		Target weight		
Common habitation	42	13	12	18	12	9	14	120	2	0.161	Lower	Upper	0.12		
Common history	29	23	10	10	9	7	31	119	3	0.160	0.133	0.186	0.18		
Language	34	15	4	1	3	2	30	89	5	0.119	0.096	0.143	0.16		
Religion	35	27	22	4	12	4	24	128	1	0.172	0.145	0.199	0.13		
Customs, rites, and traditions	37	10	5	3	4	1	24	84	6	0.113	0.090	0.135	0.16		
Appearance	29	18	15	8	6	7	15	98	4	0.131	0.107	0.156	0.10		
Behavior, personality, traits	28	14	8	2	3	5	13	73	7	0.098	0.077	0.119	0.14		
Others	6	4	5	4	6	4	6	35	8	0.047	0.032	0.062	0.01		
On sampling	240	124	81	50	55	39	157	746		1.000			1.01		

CI confidence interval

Table 5 The most preferred values of the young Moldovans

Values	<i>M</i> (average)
The family safety	6.38
Sense of life	6.16
Piece in the world	6.13
Respect for the parents and elders	6.10
Health	6.10
Neat	6.08
Freedom	6.07
True friendship	6.03
Politeness	5.88
Self-respect	5.88
Capable	5.87

Table 6 Groups of values shared by the young Moldovans

Groups of values	<i>M</i> (average)
Embeddedness (conservatism)	4.18
Hierarchy	3.17
Mastery	4.28
Affective autonomy	4.16
Intellectual autonomy	4.26
Egalitarianism	4.42
Harmony	4.01

Discussion

Our study deals with ethnic identity and values of young Moldovans in a society that undergoes transformations. We supposed that the ethnic identity of young Moldovans as ethnic majority will be positive, monoethnic, and actualized. We linked the ethnic identity actualization to the processes of fervent Moldovan culture revival and development and ethnocultural status change of Moldovans as a majority and nation-forming group on the state level. At present time, we see a continuous search process of a new, adequate to reality identification of majority and ethnic minorities.

In our study, we based our assumptions on the idea that ethnic identity of an individual is developed within a certain culture and during interethnic interaction, yet quite independent of both (Stefanenko, 1999). A positive image of one's own group and a positive attitude to the values of other ethnic groups correlate in the structure of a positive ethnic identity. Positive ethnic identity is a premise for ethnic tolerance (Lebedeva, 1997a) and integration strategies of interaction (Lebedeva, Tatarko, & Berry, 2016). We also used ethnic stereotypes, affiliation, and hierarchy of ethnic preferences and cultural distance to study ethnic identity. We used as a basis the idea that ethnic stereotypes shape the substantive core of ethnic identity, and one of their most important functions is to ensure positive differentiation of one's own group and maintenance of a positive group identity. Summarizing the

research results, we can note the following. First, young Moldovans in general have positive auto-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes about the Russians. Comparing auto-stereotype of young Moldovans with hetero-stereotype about the Russians revealed their proximity. It can be explained by a long historical experience of Moldovans in living in a multicultural, multiethnic environment, which developed strategies of a tolerant attitude toward other ethnic groups. We carried out a frequency analysis of ethnic stereotypes of young Moldovans, which showed that the majority of respondents have a positive auto-stereotype and hetero-stereotype about the Russians. However, the process of ethnic self-determination of the ethnic majority group has different variations. Subgroups with negative auto-stereotypes and hetero-stereotypes, a positive auto-stereotype and a negative hetero-stereotype, and a negative auto-stereotype and a positive hetero-stereotype were revealed. The given subgroups have to become object of a special study, since the system institutional and ethnocultural changes in a society suppose ambiguity of the ethnic identity formation process of the ethnic majority. In our research, we tried to answer the question “What is the ethnic identity of the young Moldovans (ethnic majority)?” who have been living in a new social system—Republic of Moldova—from their childhood. Our study shows that the process of ethnic self-determination of the majority group is variable and requires a special extended research, namely, study of ethnic identity of young Moldovans, involved in labor migration, and interconnection of ethnic and regional, civil, and other identities. Studying the ethnic stereotypes’ contents showed that the qualities “proud” and “sociable” are the ones which are mostly stereotyped. As we can see, the image of their own ethnic group satisfies the young Moldovans’ need for self-esteem and recognition. The quality “sociability” is significant for interaction with other ethnic groups and for understanding of the world around. The most important qualities in the image of Russians are sociable, proud, and diplomatic. Studies of hetero-stereotypes of the other ethnic minorities are of a big importance.

Second, a study of ethnic affiliation of the young Moldovans revealed a significant prevalence of affiliative motives. Domination of ethnic affiliation motives was also revealed among the young people from the following ethnic minorities: Russians, Bulgarians, and Gagauz. Only the young Ukrainians show equal expression of both affiliative and anti-affiliative trends (Caunenco, 2015). A quantitative analysis of ethnosocial assertions of the young Moldovans is not included in this essay.

Third, a study of ethnic preferences among the young Moldovans revealed a coincidence of choices of their own ethnic group at real and declared levels. Their own ethnic group is ranked the highest, taking the first place, and it is a norm. This result attests a high level of perception of the young Moldovans of their ethnic preferences. The same results were obtained about the groups of Russians and Ukrainians. As for the other groups (Gagauz, Jews, Bulgarians, Roma), there is either undervaluation (Jews) or overestimation (Bulgarians). These empirical results attest a need to study the majority group perception of different ethnic minority groups for a possibility to predict the ethnic self-determination vector in the period of systemic social transformations.

Fourth, cultural distance study of the young Moldovans showed that they share the closest cultural distance with the group of Romanians. The cultural distance proximity was assessed by the sum of choices of the common markers. After Romanians, the next closest cultural distances are with the Russians and Ukrainians. The most significant ethnic markers for their own ethnic group are common residence area; rites, customs, and traditions; religion; common history; and language. With the other ethnic group, the following markers are significant: religion, common residence area, and common history. These ethnic markers may and should become grounds for consolidation of Moldovan society and interethnic tolerance formation. The research did not include study of semantic “filling” of the ethnic markers. This is a challenge for the future research.

Fifth, the preliminary study of cultural value orientation of the young Moldovans showed their orientation toward both group and personality. Poles of all the Schwartz’s bipolar axis are equally expressed: autonomy-embeddedness and mastery-harmony with the exception of hierarchy-egalitarianism axis, where the values of egalitarianism prevail. This ambiguous expression of cultural priorities among the youth apparently reflects a long-term uncertainty of future vectors of sociocultural development of our region.

Conclusion

The young Moldovans show a positive self-identification, positive ethnic auto-stereotype, and positive concept of the other (Russians). The auto-stereotype is close to the hetero-stereotype about the Russians, due to a long-term peaceful coexistence of Moldovans with different ethnic groups in a multicultural region, such as the Republic of Moldova. The young Moldovans have ethno-affiliative trends prevailing. At present there continues the process of self-determination of the group of majority resulting from its status change—to a nation-forming on the level of the state. It can be seen through variability of the ethnic stereotypes.

The ethnic preferences among the young Moldovans showed a high level of perception of their ethnic preference regarding their own group and the groups of Russians and Ukrainians. The young Moldovans have a close cultural distance to the Romanian, Russian, and Ukrainian groups. The important ethnic markers shared by the young Moldovans, thus bringing them close to the other ethnic groups, are common history, religion, and residence area. The cultural value orientations of the young Moldovans distinguished a high importance of the following groups of values—egalitarianism (equity) and mastery and low importance of hierarchy. Almost all groups of values range almost equally in terms of their importance, which indicates a long-term period of uncertainty about the future sociocultural development of society and difficulties in prioritizing and scope setting. We can conclude that it is important to think about the ethnic matrix of the Republic of Moldova, as ethnic groups can contribute to the building of common future, once they achieve a consensus.

References

- Berry, J. W. (1997). Immigration, acculturation and adaptation. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 46, 5–68.
- Berry, J. W. (2005). Kak myi budem zhit vse vmeste? Alternativnoe videnie mezhkulturnykh otноsheniy. *Kross-kulturnaya psihologiya: Aktualnyie problemy (How shall we all live together? Alternative view of intercultural relations. Cross-cultural psychology: Topical issues)*. Saint Petersburg, pp. 6–25.
- Boronoev, A., & Pavlenko, V. (1994). *Etnicheskaya Psihologiya (Ethnic psychology)*. Sankt-Petersburg: SPGU.
- Caunenco, I. (2007). Problemy etnicheskoi identichnosti ili Svoi put' (The problems of ethnic identity or The way of our own). *Perekrestki (Crossroads)*, 3–4, 123–151.
- Caunenco, I. (2013). Osobennosti etnicheskikh stereotipov molodezhi v transformiruyushemsya obshchestve (na primere Respubliki Moldova). *Na perekrestke migracii: ot teoreticheskikh modelei k prakticheskim resheniyam. Sbornik materialov chetvertoi Vserossiiskoi nauchno-prakticheskoi konferencii «Prakticheskaya etnopsihologiya: aktual'nye problemy i perspektivy razvitiya»*, 25–26 oktyabrya 2013 g.- M.: GBOU VPO MGPPU, 29–30.
- Caunenco, I. (2015). Empiricheskoe issledovanie etnicheskoi identichnosti molodezhi (Empiric research of ethnic identity of youth). In I. Caunenco, N. Kaunova, & N. Ivanova (Eds.), *Identichnost' v sisteme etnopsihologicheskogo i etnologicheskogo znaniya v Respublike Moldova (Identity in the system of ethnopsychological and ethnological knowledge in the Republic of Moldova)* (pp. 80–139). Kishinev: Elan Poligraf.
- Caunenco, I., & Gashper, L. (2013). Procesele de identificare etnicr din Republica Moldova ei problemele de integrare on sparioul Euroregional (The processes of ethnic identification in the Republic of Moldova and problems of entering European regional space). *Rolul Euroregiunilor on dezvoltarea durabilz on contextul crizei mondial. Exemplu: Euroregiunea Siret-Prut-Nistru (The role of European regions in a steady development in the context of world crisis. Example: European region Siret-Prut-Nistru)*, pp. 100–105.
- Caunenco, I., & Ivanova, N. (2015). The perception of ethnic and cultural transformations in the Moldovan society among young people. *Revista de Etnologie ei Culturologie (Journal of Ethnology and Culturology)*, 18, 104–107.
- De Vos, G. (2001) Etnicheskii plyuralizm: konflikt i adaptaciya. *Lichnost', kul'tura, etnos: Sovremennaya psihologicheskaya antropologiya (Ethnic pluralism: Conflict and adaptation. Personality, culture, ethnics: The modern psychological anthropology)*. Pod obshei red. A.A. Belika. Moscow.: Smysl. sp. 229–276.
- Galushenko, O. (2016). Polozhenie evreiskogo naseleniya Moldavskoi ASSR v seredine 20-h godov XX veka (The status of Jewish population of Moldavian ASSR in the middle of 1920s). *Institut iudaiki. Sbornik nauchnykh trudov Instituta iudaiki (Collection of research papers, Institute of Jewish Studies)*, 6, 92–102.
- Gashper, L. (2008). *Particularitziiole psihologice ale identitziioii emice la adolescentoi (Psychologic special features of ethnic identity at adolescents)*. Chieinru.
- Horozova, L. (2012). Vliyanie trudovoi migracii na etnicheskuyu identichnost' molodezhi Gagauzii (The influence of labor migration upon ethnic identity of Gagauz youth). *Problemy teorii i praktiki etnopsihologii i etnologii (Theoretical and practical problems of ethnic psychology and ethnology)*. Kishinev, pp. 79–93.
- Ivanova, N. (2012). *Etnicheskaya identichnost' i ee formirovanie u detei i podrostkov shkol mun. Kishineva s russkim yazykom obucheniya (Ethnic identity and its formation at children and adolescents of Chisinau schools with Russian as teaching language)*. Kishinev.
- Ivanova, N. (2015). Etnosocial'nye predstavleniya molodezhi Respubliki Moldova o svoei strane i ee simvolah (Ethnosocial representations of youth of the Republic of Moldova about their country and its symbols). In I. Caunenco, N. Kaunova, & N. Ivanova (Eds.), *Identichnost' v sisteme etnopsihologicheskogo i etnologicheskogo znaniya v Respublike Moldova (Identity in*

- the system of ethnopsychological and ethnological knowledge in the Republic of Moldova* (pp. 140–190). Kishinev: Elan Poligraf.
- Jenkins, R. (1997). *Rethinking ethnicity: Arguments and explorations* (p. 194). London: SAGE.
- Karandashev, V. (2004). Metodika Shvarca dlya izucheniya cennostei lichnosti: koncepciya i metodicheskoe rukovodstvo. SPB.: Rech', s. 70.
- Karandashev, V. (2009). Koncepciya cennostei kul'tury Sh. Shvarca (The Sh. Schwartz theory of cultural values). *Voprosy psihologii*, 1, 81–96.
- Kaunova, N. (2012). Etnicheskii obraz gruppy romov na sovremennom etape (Ethnic image of Roma group in modern times). *Problemy teorii i praktiki etnopsihologii i etnologii (Theoretical and practical problems of ethnic psychology and ethnology)*, Kishinev, pp. 64–79.
- Kaunova, N. (2014). K probleme izucheniya etnoidentifikatsionnykh processov molodogo pokoleniya cygan Respubliki Moldova (To the problem of research of ethnic identification processes of the young Roma from the Republic of Moldova). *Teoreticheskie problemy etnicheskoi i kross-kul'turnoi psihologii: Materialy Chetvertoi Mezhdunarodnoi nauchnoi konferencii 30–31 maya 2014g. V 2 t. 1*, pp. 101–103. Smolensk: Smolenskii Gumanitarnyi Universitet. (Theoretical problems of ethnic and cross-cultural psychology: Proceedings to the 4th international scientific conference, May 30–31, 2014, Vol. II, pp. 101–103).
- Kozhuhar', E. (2012a). Yazykovaya i etnicheskaya identifikatsiya ukraincev Respubliki Moldova (Language and ethnic identification of Ukrainians of the Republic of Moldova). *Zhurnal etnologii i kul'turologii (Journal of Ethnology and Culturology)*, 11–12, 82–87.
- Kozhuhar', V. (2012b). Struktura nacional'nogo samosoznaniya (The structure of national self-consciousness). *Zhurnal etnologii i kul'turologii (Journal of Ethnology and Culturology)*, 11–12, 31–34.
- Laitin, D. (1998). *Identity in formation: The Russian-speaking population in the near Abroad* (p. 263). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Lebedeva, N. (1997a). *Novaya russkaya diaspora: Social'no-psihologicheskii analiz (New Russian diaspora: Socio-psychological analysis)*. Moscow.
- Lebedeva, N. (1997b). «Sindrom navyazannoi etnichnosti» i sposoby ego preodoleniya ("The syndrome of imposed ethnicity" and ways of its overcoming). *Etnicheskaya psihologiya i obshchestvo (Ethnic psychology and society)*. Moscow: Staryi sad, pp. 104–115.
- Lebedeva, N., & Tatarko, A. (2004). Etnicheskaya identichnost', status gruppy i tip rasseleniya kak faktory mezhhruppovoi intolerantnosti (Ethnic identity, group status and type of settlement as predictors of intergroup intolerance). *Psihologicheskii zhurnal (Psychological Journal)*, 36(3), 51–64.
- Lebedeva, N., & Tatarko, A. (2009). *Kul'tura kak faktor obshchestvennogo progressa (Culture as factor of social progress)*. Moscow: ZAO "Yusticinform".
- Lebedeva, N., Tatarko, A., & Berry, J. (2016). Social'no-psihologicheskii osnovy mul'tikul'turalizma: Proverka gipotez o mezhkul'turnom vzaimodeistvii v Rossiiskom kontekste (Social and psychological basis of multiculturalism: Testing of intercultural interaction hypotheses in the Russian context). *Psihologicheskii zhurnal (Psychological Journal)*, 43(2), 92–104.
- Yasin, N., & Lebedeva, E. (2009). Kul'tura i innovatsii: k postanovke problemy (Culture and innovation: Approach to the problem). *Foresight-Russia*, 3(2), 16–26.
- Moscovici, S. (1984). The phenomenon of social representations. In M. Farr & S. Moscovici (Eds.), *Social representations* (pp. 3–69). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nikoglo, D. (2015). Chehi sela Goluboe v Respublike Moldova: Konservativnost' tradicii v inoetnichnoi srede (The Czechs of Goluboe village from the Republic of Moldova: Tradition preservation in a foreign ethnic environment). *Nauka. Obrazovanie. Kul'tura. Mezhdunarodnaya nauchno-prakticheskaya konferenciya: Posvyashennaya 24-oi godovshine obrazovaniya Komratskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 11 fevralya 2015 g.*, 2, 299–302. (Science. Education. Culture. International scientific-practical conference dedicated to the 24 anniversary of Comrat state University, February 11, 2015, pp. 299–302).

- Papcova, A. (2016). Tendencii evolyucii sistemy identichnosti u gagauzov (Trends of evolution of identity system at Gagauz). *Identitziõi naõionale on dialog intercultural: Unitate prin diversitate (National identities in intercultural dialogue: Unity through diversity)*. Kishinev: Bons Offices, pp. 219–236.
- Raceeva, E. (2009). *Problema sohraneniya i razvitiya etnicheskoi identichnosti podrastayushhego pokoleniya bolgar Respubliki Moldova na sovremennom etape (The problem of ethnic identity maintenance and development at Bulgarians of the Republic of Moldova in modern times)*. Kishinev.
- Racu, J. (2008). Psihogeneza limbajului on medii de comunicare mixtr (Psychogenesis of language in media with mixed communication). Kishinev.
- Rusnac, S. (1995). *Perceptiõia reciprocã ontre etnii on comunitziõile mixte (Mutual perception of ethnic groups in mixed communities)*. Iashi.
- Soldatova, G. (1998). *Psihologiya mezhetnicheskoi napryazhennosti (Psychology of interethnic tension)*. Moskow: Smysl.
- Stefanenko, T. (1999). Social'naya psihologiya etnicheskoi identichnosti (Social psychology of ethnic identity). Moskow.
- Stepanov, V. (2008). *Ukraincy Moldovy: Dinamika etnicheskoi i grazhdanskoi identichnosti (1989-2005) (Ukrainians of Moldova: Ethnic and civil identity dynamics (1989-2005))*. Kishinev.
- Stepanov, V. (2010). Grani identichnosti: Etnograzhdanskie processy v srede nacional'nyh men'shinstv Respubliki Moldova na primere ukrainskogo naseleniya (1989-2009) (Identity facets: Ethnocivic processes among national minorities of the Republic of Moldova on example of Ukrainian population (1989–2009)). Kishinev: Elan Inc SRL.
- Stepanova, G. (1993). Social'no-psihologicheskie aspekty mezhnacional'nyh otnoshenii v SSR Moldova. In P. N. Shihirev (Red.), *Social'no-psihologicheskie issledovaniya mezhnacional'nyh otnoshenii (sbornik nauchnyh trudov)* (p. 287). Moskva: Institut psihologii RAN.
- Triandis, H. C. (2007). *Kul'tura i social'noe povedenie: Uchebnoe posobie (Culture and social behavior)*. Moskow: FORUM.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of inter-group behavior. In S. Worchel & L. W. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Zaikovskaya, T. (2010). Issledovanie problem lingvokul'turologii i mezhkul'turnoi kommunikacii v Respublike Moldova (Lingvoculturology and intercultural communication research in the Republic of Moldova). *Etnosociologicheskie i etnopsihologicheskie praktiki: (Ucheb.-metod. posobie dlya vyssh. Shk.) (Ethnosociological and ethnopsychological practices: Teaching guide for univ.)*. Kishinev-Komrat: Ptimex-Com SRL, pp. 92–128.

Irina Caunenco (Ph.D., Center for Family and Childhood, Institute of personality development, Russian Academy of Education, Moscow, Russian Federation). Chief researcher at the Center for Ethnology of the Institute of Cultural Heritage; associate professor, and head of interethnic relations division at the Center for Ethnology of the Institute of Cultural Heritage, Academy of Sciences of Moldova. She is the author of 90 articles, book chapters in two multi-author books in the field of interethnic relations. Her research interests are interethnic relations, ethnic identity genesis, and sociocultural changes perception of different ethnic groups in a transforming society.

The Influence of Identity Styles on Adolescents' Psychological Problems in Postcommunist Albania



Skerdi Zahaj and Radosveta Dimitrova

All adolescents are involved in the process of identity development (Erikson, 1950, 1968). One of the essential functions of ego during adolescence is to maintain early identifications and explore new alternatives for developing a coherent sense of identity. Based on a psychosocial model, identity is developed in a constructive relationship within the social reality (Kroger & Marcia, 2011). Thus, personal identity development is affected by changing identities and values in the society where the adolescent lives. Yet, the majority of identity research is conducted in the United States, Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and Western Europe, and there is a dearth of empirical studies in Eastern Europe and especially in postcommunist countries. Many adolescents and young adults that were born after the collapse of the communist regime are in the process of identity development.

The formation of a firm sense of identity gives a sense of agency and guides decision-making, whereas lack of identity formation interferes with decision-making process, leaving the adolescents uninterested, disorganized, and ambivalent when faced with important life choices (Kroger & Marcia, 2011). Based on the psychosocial theory of identity development (Erikson, 1950, 1968), Adams and Marshall (1996) proposed five important functions of identity development: identity provides a sense of structure, a sense of harmony, a future orientation, “goals” and direction, and a sense of personal control (Adams & Marshall, 1996). Hence, identity development is related to psychological and interpersonal functioning during adolescence. Extant research shows that identity development is related to well-being (Berzonsky, 2011; Kroger & Marcia, 2011), while avoiding or delaying identity issues relates

S. Zahaj (✉)
University of Tirana, Tirana, Albania
e-mail: skerdi_zahaj@hotmail.com

R. Dimitrova
Stockholm University, Stockholm, Sweden
e-mail: dimitrova.radosveta@gmail.com; radosveta.dimitrova@psychology.su.se

negatively to well-being and self-esteem and positively to anxiety, depression, drug use, and alcohol abuse (Berzonsky, 2003, 2011).

Existing research also shows that psychological problems of adolescents in Albania are systematically found to be higher than in any other Western countries (Bodinaku, Gramo, & Pokorny, 2014). Based on the psychosocial theory (Erikson, 1968) and on the identity function model (Adams & Marshall, 1996), the primary purpose of this study was to examine associations between identity development and adolescents' "core" domains of psychological problems in a postcommunist Albania. Specifically, we studied connections between identity-processing styles and adolescents' psychological problems such as lack of subjective well-being, lack of life functioning, psychological symptoms, and risk to harm self and others. In this chapter, identity styles reflect three different stylistic approaches to dealing with identity crises: an open, informed approach utilizing formal reasoning strategies, an avoiding or delaying orientation, and an inflexible closed approach that relies on conformity (Berzonsky, 2003, 2011).

Identity Development During Adolescence

Erikson (1950, 1968) in his psychosocial lifespan theory highlighted identity formation as the central developmental task which is critical for adolescents' psychological health and well-being. During psychoanalytic treatment of World War II veterans, Erikson (1950, 1968) was faced with man's psychobiographical loss and named it ego identity confusion. On the other hand, ego identity development reflects ego continuity and integrates most significant, basic, and personal beliefs about inner self. In all his writings, Erikson (1950, 1968) emphasized the crucial role of identity development during adolescence as protective factor from psychological suffering. Erikson (1968) conceptualized identity as conscious sense of individuality and as a continuity of personal character which is related with psychological variables of well-being and functioning. Jespersen, Kroger, and Martinussen (2013) examined Erikson's psychosocial theory (Erikson, 1950, 1968) through meta-analytic techniques and found significant positive correlation between identity development and other developmental variables such as ego development, moral reasoning, and locus of control. Therefore, sound evidence confirms the notion that identity development is important for adolescent functioning and well-being. Although Erikson's psychosocial theory represents a seminal contribution to identity field (Bosma & Kunnen, 2001), there were many limitations for scholars to examine it through the lens of empirical approach (Kroger & Marcia, 2011; Schwartz, 2001).

In order to go beyond limitations of Erikson's (1950, 1968) psychosocial theory, Marcia (1966) proposed identity status paradigm. Marcia (1966, 1993) conceptualized identity development as process of self-exploration and commitment. Based on this approach (Marcia, 1966, 1993), exploration refers to looking actively for information about oneself or one's environment, while commitment represents the

loyalty of chosen goals, values, and beliefs. Based on adolescent's levels of exploration and commitment, Marcia (1966, 1993) described four different identity statuses: *identity achievement*, *moratorium*, *foreclosure*, and *identity diffusion*.

These four identity statuses are defined as follows. Identity-achieved adolescents have made a commitment in identity domains following a period of self-exploration; in the moratorium status, individuals are engaged in the process of exploring identity domains without making commitments; foreclosed adolescents have made commitments with little or no prior self-exploration; lastly, identity-diffused adolescents have not been engaged neither in the process of self-exploration or commitment to different identity domains (Kroger & Marcia, 2011; Marcia, 1966, 1993). This fourfold identity status paradigm (Marcia, 1966, 1993) has inspired many scholars, and over the past four decades, most identity research is based on this model.

Empirical research consistently indicates that identity-achieved adolescents function well under stress, are satisfied with the way they are, perform better in psychological terms, and are involved in deep interpersonal relationships (Craig-Bray, Adams, & Dobson, 1988; Makros & McCabe, 2001). On the other hand, identity-diffused adolescents are at risk for academic problems (Berzonsky, 1985), drug use (Jones, 1988), poor interpersonal skills (Jackson, Dunham, & Kidwell, 1990), and high levels of depression (Marcia, 1993). During the last four decades, research examining the influence of identity statuses on psychological problems has found that identity-achieved adolescents have less "core" psychological problems, while identity-diffused adolescents have more "core" psychological problems than those in other statuses.

Although the identity status paradigm (Marcia, 1966) is the most important empirical elaboration of psychosocial theory (Erikson, 1950, 1968), many identity researchers have worked in extending and expanding this model (Schwartz, 2001). Berzonsky (1989) formulated a process model of personal identity development extending Marcia's categorical model. This social-cognitive model (Berzonsky, 1989) assumes that Marcia's identity statuses reflected three different styles of dealing with identity crises: *informational style*, *normative style*, and *diffuse-avoidant style*. Identity styles are conceptualized as problem-solving strategies that individuals use during the process of constructing and revising a sense of identity (Berzonsky, 1989, 2003, 2004). The informative style represents an informed approach using formal reasoning strategies; the diffuse-avoidant style represents an avoiding and/or delaying approach; and the normative style represents an inflexible closed approach that relies on conformity with other significant persons. Following the development of the social-cognitive model of identity, there has been a growing body of literature on the relation between identity statuses (Marcia, 1966) and identity styles (Berzonsky, 1989). Berzonsky (2011) has proposed links between the three identity styles and three of the identity statuses: the informational style is characteristic of individuals classified in Marcia's (1966) achieved or moratorium identity statuses; the diffuse-avoidant style is characteristic of individuals categorized as having a diffused identity status; and the normative style is related with a foreclosed identity status and consists of change-resistant self-constructs.

Identity Styles and Adolescent's "Core" Psychological Problems

Based on the social-cognitive model, identity is seen as a cognitive structure that encodes, organizes, and informs life experiences and self-relevant information during adolescent development. Identity provides a personal frame to find the meaning and purpose in life, guides decision-making, and gives a sense of agency (Berzonsky, 1989, 2011). The social-cognitive model of identity development conceptualizes identity not only as personal construct but also as self-process that governs the resources of adolescents' to cope with "core" psychological problems (Berzonsky, 2011). Identity development as a process can be differentiated based on social-cognitive orientations that adolescents choose to deal with identity conflicts named identity styles (Berzonsky, 2011). These identity styles differ from each other based on how adolescents deal with identity crises, psychological problems, life experiences, and personal choices (for a review, see Berzonsky, 2011).

Empirical research has found that informational identity-processing orientation is related with problem-focused coping strategies, openness to different ideas, values, functional behaviors, self-reflection, and subjective well-being (Berzonsky, 2003, 2011). Normative identity style is associated with firm goals, a confident sense of purpose, low tolerance for uncertainty, and a high need for structure (Berzonsky, 2003, 2011). Conversely, diffuse-avoidant identity style is positively related with self-handicapping behaviors, neuroticism, depressive reactions, limited commitment, and external locus of control (Berzonsky, 2003, 2011). In conclusion, prior research shows that identity-processing styles during adolescence are related with psychological health and interpersonal problems.

Identity Development of Adolescents in Postcommunist Albania

Albania is located in the Balkans with a population of 2.8 million (49% are women) and a relatively young population (27% are under 19) (INSTAT, 2016). During the communist regime (1945–1990), adolescents and young adults were not free to explore identity issues except national identity that was evaluated in the light of communist values (Vehbiu, 2007). Adolescents and young adults were not allowed to practice religion, travel abroad, explore their occupation choices, read "decadent" Western literature, or question the values of their society (Abrahams, 2015). In addition, the communist regime did not allow developing religious identity for adolescents and young adults by banning all religions in loyalty to the doctrine of state atheism (Anderse, 2005). The familial identity was replaced with communitarian identity, and the mother figure was projected in "mother communist party" (for a review, see Peshkopia, Zahaj, & Hysi, 2014). All the communist philosophy was aimed at the annihilation of individuality and at the building of structured tyranny

(Peshkopia, 2010). Hence, the ultimate aim of the communist regime was the triumph of social structure over personal agency.

Following the collapse of the communism, Albania offers a vivid history of a dramatic change where cafés, national and international companies, and national and international newspapers were opened, and churches and mosques and private universities were reopened (Abrahams, 2015). During the social transition, large numbers of people migrated from rural regions to cities, and many others immigrated to Western countries (INSTAT, 2004). In this reality, social and psychological problems were very common in children and adolescents. Therefore, it is very important to study psychological challenges of adolescents posed by the current socioeconomic situation in the country. Recent studies show that psychological problems of adolescents in Albania are found to be systematically higher than in any other Western country (Bodinaku et al., 2014).

Nowadays, Albanian adolescents are faced with a newly emerged social reality. Those born after the collapse of the communist regime offer a novel and underexplored setting to study personal identity development. Orgocka and Jovanovic (2006) emphasize the importance of looking at adolescents' identity exploration and identity commitment in the context of what the new Albanian social structure offers to them. They have grown up in families that have inherited the communist identity and are now exploring new alternatives in a democratic society. This unique psychological situation may lead adolescents to change attitudes and behaviors, influenced by changed values and identities in society. Based on the Adams and Marshall (1996) approach, changing values and identities during adolescence are associated with the change of psychological problems. Hence, identity development styles of Albanian adolescents may be linked with psychological functioning.

The Current Study

We used a cross-sectional study design to explore the role of identity styles on adolescent's clinical problems. Firstly, we explored the most frequent style of identity during adolescence in postcommunist Albania. Secondly, we compared gender differences in identity development of Albanian adolescents and young adults. Thirdly, based on Berzonsky's (1989) social-cognitive model of identity and identity function model (Adams & Marshall, 1996), we tested a model on connections between identity styles and adolescent's clinical "core" problems such as lack of subjective well-being, symptoms, risk to harm self and others, and lack of life functioning. We predicted that informational identity style, the most adaptive style that uses formal reasoning strategies, would be associated with increased subjective well-being, low psychological symptoms, low risk to harm self and others, and high life functioning (Berzonsky, 1989, 2003, 2010). Also, we predicted that diffuse-avoidant identity style, the most problematic identity style that uses avoiding and/or delaying strategies, would be associated with decreased subjective well-being, high symptoms, high risk to harm self and others, and low life functioning.

Methods

Participants and Procedure

A total of 840 adolescents aged 15–23 years old (M age = 16.85 years, $SD = 1.88$) completed the study measures as an anonymous self-report questionnaire at their high schools (65.6%) and university (34.4%). Within each classroom a probability sampling method was used to select participants. The participants were recruited from seven Albanian cities. The group was comprised of 66% females and 44% males. The overall participation rate was 93%. No compensation was given for participation.

Measures

The measures used in this study were translated from English based on the Guidelines for Translating and Adapting Tests (International Test Commission, ITC, 2010). Both identity style and clinical core problem instruments were previously used in research with adolescents in different countries.

Revised Identity Style Inventory (ISI-5) We employed the Revised Identity Style Inventory (ISI-5) which measures three different identity styles and a commitment scale (Berzonsky, 2013). The inventory consists of 36 items rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging from (1 *not at all like me*) to (5 *very much like me*). The internal reliability coefficients in this sample were acceptable, and their values were $\alpha = .60$ for normative style (nine items), $\alpha = .70$ for diffuse-avoidant style (nine items), $\alpha = .78$ for informative style (nine items), and $\alpha = .75$ for strength of commitment (nine items).

Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluation Outcome Measure (CORE-OM; Evans et al., 2002). It measures lack of subjective well-being, lack of life functioning, symptoms, and risk to harm self and others. This measure includes 34 items rated on a five-point Likert scale ranging from (1 *not at all*) to (5 *most or all the time*). The CORE-OM is a standardized measure in Albania (Bodinaku, 2014) and had a very good general internal consistency $\alpha = .92$. Lyne, Barrett, Evans, and Barkham (2006) claim that CORE-OM has a complex factor structure and may be best scored as 2 scales for risk and psychological distress. The internal reliability coefficients in this sample were acceptable: $\alpha = .64$ for lack of subjective well-being (four items), $\alpha = .76$ for risk to harm self and others (six items), $\alpha = .79$ for life functioning (12 items), and $\alpha = .88$ for symptoms (12 items).

Statistical Analysis

We examined the relationships between identity styles and adolescent's clinical "core" symptoms in several steps. First, we analyzed descriptive statistics and

correlations using SPSS software. Second, a measurement model was conducted using structural equation modeling with AMOS software. The hypothesized model was tested using several recommended goodness-of-fit measures (e.g., chi-square, comparative fit index [CFI], root-mean-square error of approximation [RMSEA]) to evaluate how well the hypothesized model fits the observed data. The chi-square, which assesses the magnitude of the discrepancy between the fitted model and the sample covariance matrix, is a better fit if nonsignificant, though chi-square is usually significant with large samples. The CFI indicates the relative fit between the hypothesized model and a baseline model that supposes no relationships among the variables; the CFI range is from 0 to 1.00, and values closer to 1.00 indicate a better fit. The standardized RMSEA needs to be .08 or less in a well-fitting model.

Results

Descriptive Statistics, Sex Differences, and Correlations

Results showed that 33% of adolescents were using informational style, 26% were using normative style, and 41% were using diffuse-avoidant style. Girls were using more informational-oriented strategies than boys ($t(825) = 3.77, p < .001$) with no gender difference regarding the other identity styles. Adolescent girls reported more psychological problems ($t(825) = 6.00, p < .001$) and lack of subjective well-being in comparison to boys, $t(825) = 2.93, p < .05$. On the other hand, boys were more at risk to harm self and others, $t(825) = -2.93, p < .05$. All descriptive statistics for comparison analyses are presented in Table 1. Correlational analysis showed that the informational style was negatively related with all “core” clinical problems such as lack of well-being, lack of life functioning, and risk to harm self and others, whereas diffuse-avoidant style was positively related with all clinical variables of adolescents’ functioning and well-being. All correlation statistics for interaction analyses are presented in Table 2.

Table 1 Gender differences for identity styles, identity commitment, and “core” psychological problems for Albanian adolescents

	Mean		Boys		Girls		<i>t</i> (825)	<i>p</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		
1. Informational style	3.64	.74	3.50	.79	3.72	.71	3.778	.000
2. Normative style	3.17	.63	3.16	.67	3.17	.62	.240	.811
3. Diffuse-avoidant style	2.49	.72	2.54	.69	2.46	.73	-1.520	.129
4. Strength of commitment	3.70	.76	3.64	.74	3.73	.76	1.551	.121
5. Lack of well-being	1.34	.80	1.22	.78	1.40	.81	2.939	.003
6. Lack of life functioning	1.30	.62	1.23	.61	1.33	.63	1.947	.052
7. Symptoms	1.40	.63	1.18	.69	1.51	.75	6.000	.000
8. Risk to harm self and others	.44	.62	.53	.67	.39	.59	-2.935	.003

Note: Independent simple *t*-test is done only for comparing boys’ and girls’ study variables

Table 2 Intercorrelations for age, identity styles, identity commitment, and "core" psychological problems

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
1. Adolescents' age	–								
2. Informational style	.083*	–							
3. Normative style	.020	.493**	–						
4. Diffuse-avoidant style	–.09*	–.162**	.163**	–					
5. Strength of commitment	.129*	.510**	.294**	–.469**	–				
6. Lack of well-being	.077*	–.167**	–.089*	.224**	–.373**	–			
7. Lack of life functioning	.010	–.269**	–.164**	.286**	–.482**	.750**	–		
8. Symptoms	.122**	–.033	.219**	.219**	–.269**	.759**	.646**	–	
9. Risk to harm self and others	–.059	–.329**	.226**	.226**	–.376**	.421**	.521**	.405**	–

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Relations Between Identity Styles and Adolescent's Clinical Core Symptoms

The results of the implemented path model showed very good fit, $\chi^2(11) = .43$, $p = .836$, CFI = 1.000, and RMSEA = .000. Standardized path model of relationship between identity styles and outcomes is reported in Fig. 1.

As can be seen, informative identity style was significantly and negatively associated with symptoms (anxiety and depression) but associated positively with lack of social functioning and risk. Both normative and diffuse-avoidant identity styles were significantly and positively associated with lack of subjective well-being, symptoms, and risk to harm self and others. The diffuse-avoidant style, the most problematic identity style that uses avoiding and/or delaying strategies, is the most significant and positively associated with risk to harm self and others. We provide a tentative explanation of these unique findings in the specific context of Albanian youth in the discussion.




Fig. 1 Model test of identity styles and youth outcomes. Note: * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

Discussion and Conclusions

Previous empirical research has related identity styles with adolescent's well-being and functioning (Berzonsky, 2003, 2010). This is the first study in Albania and one of the few studies in postcommunist countries that examines the relationships between adolescent's identity development and adolescent's clinical "core" problems. Although identity processes have been examined within some individual countries such as Romania, Bulgaria, and Lithuania (Aydinli & Dimitrova, 2016; Crocetti, Erentaitė, & Žukauskienė, 2014; Dimitrova, Chasiotis, Bender, & van de Vijver, 2014; Dimitrova & Jordanov, 2015), comparative intergenerational research of identities in postcommunist countries is limited and emerging. In the study reported in this chapter, it was hypothesized that clinical problems during adolescence are related especially with identity style development. Hence, adolescents that have a clear sense of identity would report less psychological problems than adolescents that have difficulty in developing their identity.

The results of this study show that 41% of Albanian adolescents were categorized in diffuse-avoidant identity style. Therefore, more than one-third of Albanian adolescents are not in the process of exploring possible life alternatives or following personal goals. These results show that the postcommunist Albania does not offer many possibilities for adolescents' identification and personal development. La Cava and Nanetti (2000) found that first postcommunist generation has led Albania's adolescents and youth to develop a negative approach toward education. In the same vein, Dudwick and Shariari (2000) found that Albanian adolescents and young adults do not perceive education as an important factor for personal development and getting security for their future. In addition, Albanian adolescents have a strong aspiration to work, and yet, there are few or not many opportunities (European Community, 1995). Therefore, the changes in the education system and labor market have affected adolescents' habits and values toward occupational domain of identity development.

The role of family and society is essential in the process of identity development during adolescence (Kroger, 2004). Family, school, religion, organizations, and job policies may play an important role in helping Albanian adolescents developing their identity. Based on the roots of the communist tradition, family members, teachers, educators, and clerics, when challenged by diffuse-avoidant adolescents, take the role of life mentor for adolescents' life choices. This directive approach does not lead to successful results on the process of identity development. Kroger (2004) proposed that society should not provide fixed roles for adolescents but, in contrast, should support their choices in order for them to construct their personal identity. In addition, the social systems should not consider adolescents' experimentation as the final stage of identity development. Therefore, the postcommunist social reality in Albania does not provide many opportunities for adolescents' identity development leaving them using a diffusion and/or avoidance style.

The results also showed that Albanian girls use healthier social-cognitive strategies dealing with identity development than boys. Erikson (1968) was the first to emphasize that identity development trajectories of girls were different from

these for boys. The results of this study confirm that girls use more informational identity style than boys. Similar results are found in many other studies (Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992; Berzonsky & Luyckx, 2008; Berzonsky & Kinney, 2008). Kroger (1997) explained the identity development of girls with their physical maturation. Hence, the physical maturation of girls occurs earlier, and they will deal earlier with identity issues. On the other hand, Berzonsky and Kinney (2008) suggested that gender differences in identity development should be explained by gender role stereotypes and gender differences in parental processes from childhood to adolescence. Based on parental processes in Albania, girls are raised with a focus on understanding the inner self, while boys are educated with the focus on understanding the outside world.

Identity development is a psychological process of developing the inner self in relationship with the outside world (Erikson, 1968). If the inner self is not in congruence with the outside world, it would affect the psychological health of adolescents (Erikson, 1950). Based on "functions" of identity model (Serafini & Adams, 2002), identity development provides a sense of personal control and free will that enables active self-regulation in the process of setting and achieving goals. As a result, successful identity development is related with better psychological health and well-functioning sense of self. On the other hand, lack of identity development is related with poor psychological health during adolescence. Based on the World Health Organization report (2011), the proportion of Albanians under the age of 18 years is 29%, and many of them suffer from mental health problems. Bodinaku et al. (2014) claimed that the mean of all dysfunctional scales of psychological health in the capital Tirana was considerably and systematically higher than in any Western countries. This study confirms that identity styles were significant predictors of adolescent's "core" clinical problems. The results confirmed that the informative style was negatively associated with clinical symptoms of anxiety and depression during adolescence. However, the informational style was also positively associated with lack of subjective well-being and lack of life functioning. For a better understanding of the relationship between the informational style, well-being, and life functioning, identity commitment should be taken into account. Berzonsky (2003) and Vleioras and Bosma (2005) showed that commitment does matter in explaining the relationship between identity styles and well-being.

The diffuse-avoidant style, the most problematic identity style, was highly related with risk to harm to self and others and to a lack of subjective well-being. Vleioras and Bosma (2005) also replicated the same results that diffuse-avoidant orientation was a very good predictor of low well-being during adolescence. As a result of cultural conditions and developmental deficits, many adolescents are unable to make a firm sense of identity and therefore be categorized as identity diffusion (Kroger, 2004). After the collapse of the communist regime in 1991, Albania was faced with dramatic social and economic changes and was considered the poorest country in Europe (Schmidt, 1998). A large percentage of Albanian adolescents (40.9%) were classified in the diffuse-avoidant style which is highly related with lack of subjective well-being and risk to harm self and others. Possibly, the postcommunist Albania does not provide many viable identity options leaving adolescents unsatisfied and in risk for psychological problems.

These findings should be considered in light of some limitations. We used a cross-sectional design to collect the data, and participants of the study were limited to university students. Future analyses would benefit from longitudinal data with bigger and more representative samples. The sample was not national and gender stratified. In addition, the identity style inventory (ISI-5) was not standardized for Albanian culture, and CORE-OM is a measure used mainly for “core” psychological problems in clinical settings. We recommend that future studies on psychological health of adolescents can apply standardized instruments with more focus on interpersonal functioning. Despite these limitations, this study confirmed that identity styles are important predictors for adolescents’ clinical “core” psychological symptoms and well-being. Identity development of Albanian adolescents can play an important role in psychological health. Therefore, the “core” psychological problems of adolescents’ in postcommunist Albania are related with identity development which is affected by social changes.

References

- Abrahams, F. C. (2015). *Modern Albania: From dictatorship to democracy*. New York: NYU Press.
- Adams, G. R., & Marshall, S. K. (1996). A developmental social psychology of identity: Understanding the person-in-context. *Journal of Adolescence*, *19*, 429–442. <https://doi.org/10.1006/jado.1996.0041>
- Anderse, B. (2005). *The constitution of the people’s socialist Republic of Albania*. Retrieved from <http://bjoerna.dk/dokumentation/Albanian-Constitution-1976.htm#C.%20Education,%20Science,%20Culture>
- Aydinli, K. A., & Dimitrova, R. (2016). When does identity lead to negative affective experiences? A comparison of Turkish-Bulgarian and Turkish-German adolescents. *Journal of Adolescence*, *47*, 125–130. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2015.09.010>
- Berzonsky, M. D. (1985). Diffusion within Marcia’s identity-status paradigm: Does it foreshadow academic problems? *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, *14*, 527–538. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02139525>
- Berzonsky, M. D. (1989). Identity style: Conceptualization and measurement. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, *4*, 268–282. <https://doi.org/10.1177/074355488943002>
- Berzonsky, M. D. (2003). Identity style and well-being: Does commitment matter? *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, *3*, 131–142. <https://doi.org/10.1207/S1532706XID030203>
- Berzonsky, M. D. (2004). Identity processing style, self-construction, and personal epistemic assumptions: A social-cognitive perspective. *European Journal of Developmental Psychology*, *1*, 303–315. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17405620444000120>
- Berzonsky, M. D. (2011). A social-cognitive perspective on identity construction. In S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & V. L. Vignoles (Eds.), *Handbook of identity theory and research* (pp. 55–76). New York: Springer.
- Berzonsky, M. D., & Kinney, A. (2008). Identity processing style and defense mechanisms. *Polish Psychological Bulletin*, *39*, 111–117.
- Berzonsky, M. D., & Luyckx, K. (2008). Identity styles, self-reflective cognition, and identity processes: A study of adaptive and maladaptive dimensions of selfanalysis. *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, *8*, 205–219.

- Berzonsky, M. D., & Sullivan, C. (1992). Social-cognitive aspects of identity style: Need for cognition, experiential openness, and introspection. *Journal of Adolescent Research, 7*, 140–155.
- Bodinaku, B. (2014). *Translation, validation and standardization of the Albanian version of the SCL-90-R (Symptom Checklist-90-Revised) and CORE-OM (Clinical Outcomes in Routine Evaluations – Outcome Measure)*. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. Sigmund Freud Private University, Vienna.
- Bodinaku, B., Gramo, A., & Pokorný, D. (2014). *Introducing screening instruments to Albania: Impact of the history and challenge for the future. 45th International Annual Meeting* (pp. 154–155). Copenhagen, Denmark: Society for Psychotherapy Research.
- Bosma, H. A., & Kunnen, E. S. (2001). Determinants and mechanisms in ego identity development: A review and synthesis. *Developmental Review, 21*, 39–66. <https://doi.org/10.1006/drev.2000.0514>
- Craig-Bray, L., Adams, G. R., & Dobson, W. R. (1988). Identity formation and social relations during late adolescence. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 17*, 173–187. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01537966>
- Crocetti, E., Erentaitė, R., & Žukauskienė, R. (2014). Identity styles, positive youth development, and civic engagement in adolescence. *J Youth Adolescence, 43*, 1818. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-014-0100-4>
- Dimitrova, R., Chasiotis, A., Bender, M., & van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2014). Collective identity and well-being of Bulgarian adolescents. *Cross Cultural Research, 48*, 1–30.
- Dimitrova, R., & Jordanov, V. (2015). Do family ethnic pressure and national identity enhance psychological well-being among Roma youth in Bulgaria? Special Issue on Roma youth. *The Journal of the International Network for Prevention in Child Maltreatment, 23–35*.
- Erikson, E. H. (1950). *Childhood and society*. New York: Norton.
- Erikson, E. H. (1968). *Identity: Youth and crises*. New York: Norton.
- European Community. (1995). *Të rinjtë shqiptarë dhe shpresat e tyre në një shoqëri në tranzicion [Albanian youths and their expectations in a society in transition]*. Tirana, Albania: Author.
- Evans, C., Connell, J., Barkham, M., Margison, F., Mcgrath, G., Mellor-Clark, J., et al. (2002). Towards a standardized brief outcome measure: Psychometric properties and utility of the CORE—OM. *The British Journal of Psychiatry, 180*, 51–60. <https://doi.org/10.1192/bjp.180.1.51>
- INSTAT. (2004). Retrieved from <http://www.instat.gov.al>
- INSTAT. (2016). *Statistics institute report*. Retrieved from <http://www.instat.gov.al/home.aspx>
- International Test Commission, ITC. (2010). Retrieved from <https://www.intestcom.org/>
- Jackson, E. P., Dunham, R. M., & Kidwell, J. S. (1990). The effect of family cohesion and adaptability on identity status. *Journal of Adolescent Research, 5*, 161–174.
- Jespersen, K., Kroger, J., & Martinussen, M. (2013). Identity status and ego development: A meta-analysis. *Identity, 13*(3), 228–241.
- Jones, M. H. (1988). Ego identity: Developmental differences and experimental substance use among adolescents. *Journal of Adolescence, 11*(4), 347–360.
- Kroger, J. (1997). Gender and identity: The intersection of structure, content and context. *Sex Roles, 36*, 747–770.
- Kroger, J. (2004). *Identity in adolescence: The balance between self and other* (3rd ed.). New York: Routledge.
- Kroger, J., & Marcia, J. E. (2011). The identity statuses: Origins, meanings, and interpretations. In S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & V. L. Vignoles (Eds.), *Handbook of identity theory and research* (pp. 31–54). New York: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4419-7988-9_2
- La Cava, G., & Nanetti, R. Y. (2000). *Albania: Filling the vulnerability gap*. Europe and Central Asia Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development Series. World Bank Technical Paper 460. Washington, DC: The World Bank.
- Lyne, K. J., Barrett, P., Evans, C., & Barkham, M. (2006). Dimensions of variation on the CORE-OM. *British Journal of Clinical Psychology, 45*, 185–203. <https://doi.org/10.1348/014466505X39106>

- Makros, J., & McCabe, M. P. (2001). Relationships between identity and self-representations during adolescence. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, *30*, 623–639. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010404822585>
- Marcia, J. E. (1966). Development and validation of ego-identity status. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *3*, 551–558. <https://doi.org/10.1037/h0023281>
- Marcia, J. E. (1993). The ego identity status approach to ego identity. In J. E. Marcia, A. S. Waterman, D. R. Matteson, S. L. Archer, & J. L. Orlofsky (Eds.), *Ego identity: A handbook for psychosocial research* (pp. 1–21). New York: Springer.
- Orgocka, A., & Jovanovic, J. (2006). Identity exploration and commitment of Albanian youth as a function of social opportunity structure. *European Psychologist*, *11*, 268–276. <https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040.11.4.268>
- Peshkopia, R. (2010). A ghost from the future: The postsocialist myth of capitalism and the ideological suspension of postmodernity. *Theoria*, *57*, 23–53. <https://doi.org/10.3167/th.2010.5712402>
- Peshkopia, R., Zahaj, S., & Hysi, G. (2014). The myth of Enver Hoxha in the Albanian cinema of socialist realism: An inquiry into the psychoanalytical features of the myth, framework. *The Journal of Cinema and Media*, *44*, 66–82.
- Schmidt, F. (1998). Upheaval in Albania. *Current History*, *617*, 127–131.
- Schwartz, S. J. (2001). The evolution of Eriksonian and neo-Eriksonian identity theory and research: A review and integration. *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, *1*, 7–58. <https://doi.org/10.1207/S1532706XSCHWARTZ>
- Serafini, T. E., & Adams, G. R. (2002). Functions of identity: Scale construction and validation. *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, *2*, 361–389. https://doi.org/10.1207/S1532706XID0204_05
- Vehbiu, A. (2007). *The totalitarian Albanian language: Features of the public discourse in Albania, 1945–1990*. Tirana: Çabej.
- Vleioras, G., & Bosma, H. A. (2005). Are identity styles important for psychological well-being? *Journal of Adolescence*, *28*, 397–409. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.adolescence.2004.09.001>
- World Health Organization. (2011). *Mental health atlas 2011*. Geneva: World Health Organization.

Skerdi Zahaj (Ph.D., Department of Psychology and Education, Faculty of Social Science, University of Tirana) is a full member of Department of Psychology and Education at University of Tirana. He also works as psychotherapist treating adolescents and adults suffering from emotional problems and personality disorders. He is member of European Association of Developmental Psychology and European Association for Behavioural and Cognitive Therapies and elected member of Albanian Order of Psychologist. His research interests are concerned generally with identity development during adolescence; the effects of chronic health conditions on psychological development; the impact of psychological trauma on children and adolescents, and validation of clinical measurements.

Radosveta Dimitrova is a docent (associate professor) at the Department of Psychology at Stockholm University, Sweden. She holds a Ph.D. in Developmental Psychology (University of Trieste, Italy, awarded the 2009 Best Doctoral Thesis by the Italian Association of Psychologists), and a Ph.D. in Cross-Cultural Psychology (Tilburg University, the Netherlands, awarded the 2012 Student and Early Career Council Dissertation Award of the [Society for Research in Child Development \(SRCD\)](#)). She was the recipient of the 2016 Young Scientist Award of the International Society for the Study of Behavioral Development, ISSBD, for distinguished theoretical contribution, research, and dissemination of developmental science. Her research interests regard social identity, well-being, migration, positive youth development, ethnic minority groups (Roma), and adaptation of instruments in different cultures.

The Kaleidoscope of Language, Ethnicity, and Identity in Uzbekistan



Kamila Isaeva, Byron G. Adams, and Fons J. R. van de Vijver

The collapse of the former Soviet Union meant that in many states that were previously part of the Soviet Union, there were monolingual and bilingual Russian speakers who were no longer in the same nation-state as the Russian speakers in Russia. This unique context is interesting to study language-related and other social identities. Nowadays the Russian language can be considered as the core element for not only Russian identity but of the so-called Russophone identity (referring here to people from a different ethnic background with Russian as the first language). In this post-Soviet context, the case of Uzbekistan with its ethnic and religious diversity is of particular interest, because unlike the other countries in the Central Asian region, Uzbekistan did not give any official or legal status to the Russian language after the collapse of the former Soviet Union although Russian is still used for intercultural communication.

The Russian-speaking minority has been studied in the Baltic States (Brown, 2013; Cheskin, 2013, 2015; Ehala & Vedernikova, 2015; Ehala & Zabrodskaia,

K. Isaeva (✉)
Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: kamishaisaeva@gmail.com

B. G. Adams
University of Tilburg, Tilburg, The Netherlands
University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa
e-mail: bgadams22@gmail.com

F. J. R. van de Vijver
Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
University of Tilburg, Tilburg, The Netherlands
North-West University, Potchefstroom, South Africa
University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
e-mail: fons.vandevijver@uvt.nl

2014; Zabrodskaia, 2015) but not in Central Asia. Russian-speaking minorities in countries of the former Soviet Union are often monolingual (Khalikov, 2006), which is rather uncommon in acculturative contexts (Bourgeois, Busseri, & Rose-Krasnor, 2009; Clément & Noels, 1992). We examined identities that arise in such a unique cultural context, such as Uzbekistan, and how these are related to interethnic friendship and attitudes toward interethnic marriages and romances.

Multiple Identities

There are two main frameworks to study multiple identities: The first is social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and related theories and models, such as the optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991; Grewal, 2009; Ha & Jang, 2015), the model of social identity complexity (Roccas & Brewer, 2002), and the model of social identity inclusiveness and social identity structure (Dommelen, Schmid, Hewstone, Gonsalkorale, & Brewer, 2015). The second is related to acculturation and identity, such as ethnic identity theory (Phinney, 1990), bicultural theory (Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002), ethnolinguistic theory (Bourgeois et al., 2009), and the polycultural approach to acculturation (Morris, Chiu, & Liu, 2015; Van de Vijver, 2015).

First, we focus on the perspectives within social identity theory. In her optimal distinctiveness theory, Brewer (1991) described two main motives for social identification: the need for inclusion and differentiation. Perceived threat and prejudice can actualize the need of positive distinctiveness, and it can make the identity more exclusive (Grewal, 2009; Ha & Jang, 2015). Within the same theoretical framework of social identity theory, Roccas and Brewer (2002) proposed the model of social identity complexity which refers to an individual perception of identities as similar (similarity of prototypes) and overlapping (groups' boundaries). High levels of social identity complexity are associated with positive attitudes toward out-groups and cross-ethnic friendship (Knifsend & Juvonen, 2014). Dommelen et al. (2015) extended this model and describe the concept of social identity inclusiveness (people a person share identity with) and social identity structure (contents of a person's in-group).

National Identity National identity has been viewed in different ways. The first approach assumes the existence of two types of national identity which are called nationalism and patriotism (Grigoryan, 2013; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989) or ethnic and civil national identity (Jones & Smith, 2001; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999; Yogeewaran & Dasgupta, 2014). The other perspective is to consider national identity as a conglomerate of underlying concepts, such as combinations of national and subnational identities (Billiet, Maddens, & Beerten, 2003), or to explore multiple markers of national identity (Bond, 2006). In the present study we adopted the first approach to national identity, as we focused on the concept of national identity as an inclusive identity (Yogeewaran & Dasgupta, 2014), involving a sense of belonging to the civil community of a country.

Ethnic Identity Another well-known type of social identity is ethnic identity. It can be defined as a “subjective self-ascribed sense of oneself as a member of an ethnic group” (Schwartz et al., 2014, p. 59), as a “process of maintaining positive distinctiveness, attitudes, and feelings that accompany a sense of group belonging” (Dimitrova, Chasiotis, Bender, & Van de Vijver, 2014, p. 342), as an “involvement in the life of an ethnic group” (Saylor & Aries, 1999, p. 549), or as a sense of belonging to a certain ethnic group (Dimitrova, 2014); the latter definition is used here. There are three general frameworks to study ethnic identity: social identity theory, the developmental approach, and acculturation theory. In the first framework, ethnic group is considered as a social group used by members to create a sense of belonging and uniqueness (Saylor & Aries, 1999; Semela, 2012). The developmental framework builds on Erikson’s theory of identity formation (Umana-Taylor, Yazedjian, & Bámaca-Gómez, 2004). In the acculturative approach, ethnic identity is part of maintaining ties with the culture of descent (Phinney, 1990).

Considering ethnic identity as a type of social identity has a long tradition. Ethnic and racial identities are socially constructed and affected by such social factors as rejection and affiliation (Semela, 2012). The developmental framework usually focuses on the stages of identity formation. One of the models is Phinney’s three-stage model of ethnic identity (1990), with three stages: unexamined, moratorium, and resolution. In a related perspective, Umana-Taylor et al. (2004) also describe components of ethnic identity: exploration, resolution (what does the identity mean?), and affect (positive or negative) (Umana-Taylor et al., 2004). Within the acculturative perspective, we can find two-factorial models including affirmation/belonging (positive sense of belonging) and exploration (process of learning about an ethnicity) (Roberts et al., 1999). We know from earlier work that the exploration component is psychologically less consequential than the belongingness component (e.g., Dimitrova, 2014).

Ethnolinguistic Identity Ethnolinguistic identity is a concept that is relevant in situations of ethnic minorities with a salient linguistic identity. It can be defined as the identity derived from being a speaker of a certain language (Bourgeois et al., 2009) or as a positive feeling of association with one’s ethnolinguistic group (Aboud & Sankar, 2007). Ethnolinguistic theory pays attention to language shifts, multilingualism, language attitudes, and media use (Giles & Johnson, 1987). Most work on this topic was done in Canada (Bourgeois et al., 2009; Clément & Noels, 1992; Landry, Allard, & Deveau, 2007; Noels & Clément, 1996) and in the Baltic States (Cheskin, 2015).

The studies of (monolingual) Russian speakers in the Baltic States are closer to our context, and there is evidence that the Russian-speaking groups in this region can be considered as a group with a shared ethnolinguistic identity (Cheskin, 2013). Cheskin (2013) used the term Russophones to describe the culturally heterogenous, yet linguistically homogeneous group of Russian speakers in the Baltic States. Not all these Russian speakers are bilingual. We follow this work by treating ethnolinguistic identity as a distinct identity that does not necessarily overlap with ethnic identity. We adopted the definition of Bourgeois et al. (2009) by considering

ethnolinguistic identity as a sense of being a speaker of a certain language. We apply the term Russophones to the Russian-speaking community of Uzbekistan.

Religious Identity Religion is usually considered as a system of beliefs and rituals that provides a sense of meaningfulness and belongingness to people; religious identity can be or become particularly salient in an immigrant context (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Affiliation with a certain religious community can become a salient social identity, notably if there is a religious threat (Cila & Lalonde, 2013; Grewal, 2009; Ysseldyk, Matheson, & Anisman, 2010). If we refer to religion as an identity, we refer to “a process in which individuals explore and commit to a set of religious beliefs and/or practices” (Balkin, Schlosser, & Levitt, 2009, p. 420) or as a reflection of the salience of religious convictions for the individual self-concept (Dimitrova et al., 2014; Furrow, King, & White, 2004).

Religion has a dual function as it is a system of beliefs and a social identity at the same time, relevant for the self-concept (Ysseldyk et al., 2010). Within the social identity framework, the formation of religious identity is considered as a dynamic and ongoing process (Peek, 2005). We adopted the following definition of religious identity: religious identity is a process of commitment with religious beliefs which reflects the salience of the religion for individual self-definition (Balkin et al., 2009; Dimitrova et al., 2014; Furrow et al., 2004).

Interethnic Relationships as the Outcomes of Social Identities

Intercultural communication, encounters, and interethnic friendship and marital relationships are important in multicultural societies. We focus on personal domains and try to find the link between different social identities and two types of interrelationships: interethnic friendship and marriages.

Interethnic Friendship Pettigrew (1998) indicated that friendship includes all the necessary conditions for optimal intergroup contacts. Aberson, Shoemaker, and Tomolillo (2004) demonstrated that interethnic friendship can indeed reduce implicit bias.

National Identity and Interethnic Friendship A strong civil national identity is generally considered as an inclusive identity, notably in diverse countries. Supporting this idea, Agirdag, Van Houtte, and Van Avermaet (2011) noted that school ethnic composition is associated with the strength of both national (Belgian) and regional (Flemish) identities and that this link is mediated by cross-ethnic friendships. For majority groups, the concentration of ethnic minorities at school was associated with stronger national identity, which Agirdag and colleagues explained by referring to group theory claiming that nonnatives consider natives as their reference group. Moreover interethnic friendship has a positive effect on national identification of nonnative pupils and may decrease the salience of the ethnic identity of members of the dominant group.

Ethnic Identity and Interethnic Friendship Studies on the link between ethnic identity and interethnic friendship have been mainly conducted in the Anglo-

Saxon countries, dealing with Black-White friendships. The literature suggests that factors that separate groups tend to decrease the likelihood of interethnic friendships (Fong & Isajiw, 2000). These factors can involve contextual conditions, such as the ethnic composition of neighborhoods, but also psychological factors, such as ethnic identity. Individuals with a stronger ethnic identity are less likely to be involved in interethnic friendships.

Ethnolinguistic Identity and Interethnic Friendship It is obvious that monolingualism can be a barrier for interrelationships between people with different linguistic backgrounds (Semela, 2012). Most work in this field was done within the school context where such communication barriers are unlikely (Aboud, Friedmann, & Smith, 2015; Aboud & Sankar, 2007). The main findings are that the language of instructions and the language status are very important factors for interlinguistic friendship (Aboud & Sankar, 2007). Moreover, if people from different ethnic groups share the same ethnolinguistic identity, it is easier for them to become friends especially in the context of being a linguistic minority (Korts, 2009). This latter situation (a similar language in different ethnic groups) applies to Russian speakers in Uzbekistan. Therefore, we expect that, at least in the Russian-speaking group, a stronger ethnolinguistic identity is associated with more interethnic friendships.

Religiosity and Interethnic Friendship Few studies addressed the role of religiosity and religious identity in interethnic friendships. The existing research suggests that religiosity is negatively associated with intercultural friendships (Park, 2012; Semela, 2012).

Interethnic Marriages An interethnic marriage refers to a marriage between spouses of two different religions, ethnic groups, or nationalities (Cretser, 1999). Usually, the endorsement of interracial and interethnic marriages can be considered as an indicator of a small social distance between the groups (Herman & Campbell, 2012). In Central Asia, intermarriages were considered as the symbol of gender equality, women emancipation, and modernity (Edgar, 2007).

National Identity and Interethnic Marriage In interethnic couples, national or supranational identities can become the factor uniting the couple. Data from interethnic couples in the Netherlands suggest that European identity which is more inclusive than national identity is more salient for such spouses (Van Mol, De Valk, & Van Wissen, 2015). However, when national identity is more inclusive (as is the case in many diverse societies), it positively relates to interethnic marriages. For instance, a strong relation to Canadian mainstream culture affects the openness toward interfaith and interethnic marriages and dating among young Canadian Muslims (Cila & Lalonde, 2013). The same pattern can be found in interracial marriages in the USA (Kibria, 1997; Qian, 2005).

Ethnic Identity and Interethnic Marriage There is some evidence from the USA that individuals with a stronger ethnic identity are less likely to engage in interethnic marriages (Qian, Blair, & Ruf, 2001).

Ethnolinguistic Identity and Interethnic Marriage Most research on interethnic marriages of couples from different linguistic backgrounds was focused on the

language choice and shifts and not on the attitudes toward such kind of marriages (Pavlenko, Blackledge, Piller, & Teutsch-Dwyer, 2001). In the USA, linguistic homogeneity plays an important role for interethnic marriages, and language of origin becomes not as important as education (Stevens & Schoen, 1988). The English language “helps” people from different ethnic origin to create strong relationships.

Religious Identity and Interethnic Marriage Religious differences can affect the engagement into cross-ethnic relationships. Examining Muslims and Christians in Australia, Yahya and Boag (2014) found that Christians are more open to interfaith marriages than Muslims. Moreover, strong religious identification is associated with less openness to interfaith marriage (Cila & Lalonde, 2013).

Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1: National identity is positively associated with interethnic friendship and with interethnic romantic relationships.

Hypothesis 2: Ethnic identity is negatively associated with interethnic friendship and interethnic romantic relationships.

Hypothesis 3: Ethnolinguistic identity is positively associated with interethnic friendship and interethnic romantic relationships among Russophones.

Hypothesis 4: Religious identity is negatively associated with interethnic friendship and with interethnic romantic relationships.

Method

Participants

The overall sample comprised 484 participants (55.8% females, $M_{\text{age}} = 34.00$ years, $SD = 13.26$) (see Table 1). Among them are 184 ethnic Uzbeks (who answered in Uzbek). The Russian-speaking sample consisted of 300 participants (192 ethnic Russians and 108 ethnic Uzbeks).

Measures

Socioeconomic Information The survey asked about participants' age, gender, socioeconomic status (education and income), and religion. The differences in age were tested using ANOVA, which indicated that there are no differences in age among the groups, $F(2, 481) = 0.190, p = 0.827$. A chi-square test indicated

Table 1 Sample descriptives

	Uzbek-speaking Uzbeks	Russian-speaking Russians	Russian-speaking Uzbeks
Sample size	184	192	108
Mean age (years)	34.32	34.06	33.34
(SD)	(13.23)	(13.42)	(13.13)
Gender (female %)	47.28	63.02	57.40
SES			
Low	4.89	7.29	2.77
Medium	52.71	62.50	51.85
High	42.39	30.20	54.37
Religion (%)			
Islam	92.39	5.20	75.92
Christianity	0.54	58.33	4.62
Without religion	6.52	32.29	15.74
Other	0.54	4.16	3.70

significantly more males in the sample of Uzbeks who responded in Uzbek, $\chi^2(2, N = 484) = 9.58, p < 0.01$. There are significantly more people with high level of socioeconomic status only among Uzbeks who responded in Russian, $\chi^2(8, N = 484) = 10.36, p < 0.01$. Analysis of differences in religion indicated that there are significantly more Muslims among Uzbeks who reported both in Uzbek and Russian, more Christians among ethnic Russians, and more people without religion among Russians, $\chi^2(8, N = 428) = 334.08, p < 0.001$.

National Identity To measure *national identity*, we modified items from the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP-2003, questionnaire in Russian) and from Phinney’s ethnic identity scale. The scale consisted of 11 statements regarding affirmation and belonging to the society of Uzbekistan and the pride of the country. The official term of the nation (Uzbeks) was replaced by an unofficial one (Uzbekistani) to be sure that people do not confuse ethnic group and nation. For example, participants had to indicate their level of agreement using 5-point Likert scale from *Strongly Disagree* (1) to *Strongly Agree* (5) with such items as “I see myself as an Uzbekistani,” “I feel a strong sense of connection with other Uzbekistani,” and “I am proud of the history of Uzbekistan.” Internal consistencies ranged from 0.89 to 0.92 across the groups.

Ethnic Identity To measure *ethnic identity*, we used the revised version of Phinney’s (1992) ethnic identity scale. The questionnaire consists of six statements about ethnic identity, and a participant needed to report the level of agreeing with each of them using 5-point Likert scale from *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*. For example, the statements were like “I feel that I belong to my ethnic group” and “I know what my ethnic group membership means to me.” Internal consistencies ranged from 0.87 to 0.89.

Ethnolinguistic Identity *Ethnolinguistic identity* was measured by a scale that consisted of seven items modified from Phinney's ethnic identity scale. Participants reported whether they agree or not with the statement using 5-point Likert scale from *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*. The statements were the same, but we used different names of the group according to the language. In Uzbek version we used the term Uzbek speakers ("I feel that I am a part of the Uzbek-speaking community") and in Russian, the term Russian speakers ("I know what it means to be a Russian speaker"). Internal consistencies ranged from 0.78 to 0.91.

Religious Identity To measure *religious identity*, we used religious identity scale from Dimitrova et al. (2014). It comprised six statements (e.g., "I have a clear view of how my religion influences my lifestyle"). Respondents reported to what extent they agree with each of the statement using 5-point Likert scale from *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*. Internal consistencies ranged from 0.87 to 0.92.

Interethnic Friendship We used questions about the number of friends from different ethnic groups and the frequency of meetings with them from the MIRIPS questionnaire (Berry, 2010), adapted for Russian (Lebedeva & Tatarko, 2009, 2013). We used the following ethnic groups in the questionnaire, Uzbeks, Russians, Tatars, Koreans, Tajiks, and Karakalpaks, and the option to report other ethnicities of the friends; moreover, we had a question regarding co-ethnic friends. Respondents reported the number of friends from the list of ethnic groups using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = *No friends* and 5 = *More than 5*) and the frequency of meetings using a 6-point scale (from *Never* to *Daily*). To compute the mean number of friends from other ethnic groups and the frequency of meetings with them, we calculated the mean and the frequency combining all the groups that are not co-ethnics for each ethnic group separately. Internal consistencies ranged from 0.82 to 0.85.

Interethnic Romantic Relationships To measure the attitudes toward interethnic romantic relationships, we modified the measurement used by Herman and Campbell (2012). Participants used a 3-point scale to evaluate their approval of the cases of interethnic and co-ethnic marriages. The cases were specified according to the context, listing marriages between a respondent's own ethnic group and groups such as Jews, Russians, Uzbeks, Koreans, Armenians, Tatars, Karakalpaks, and Tajiks. Based on the reported ethnicity, we chose the cases of interethnic marriages for each of the ethnic group presented in this scale. Internal consistencies ranged from 0.85 to 0.92.

Personal Openness to Interethnic Marriages We adapted a scale from Cila and Lalonde (2013) to measure *personal openness to interethnic marriages*. The scale consists of eight statements about marrying people from other ethnic groups. Respondents reported the extent of their agreement with each of the statements using a 5-point Likert scale from *Strongly Disagree* to *Strongly Agree*. Internal consistencies ranged from 0.75 to 0.94.

Procedure

Participants started by reading the informed consent form describing the general idea of the study and instructions. Sociodemographic data (age, gender, education, religion, ethnicity, income) were collected first, followed by the identity questionnaires. Then they reported about close friends from different ethnic groups, their attitudes toward romantic relationships with different ethnic groups, and openness toward interethnic marriages. Finally, participants were debriefed and presented with the description of the study and contact details.

Results

We conducted two analyses. Firstly, we were interested in the links between identity and friendships (regression analysis, explained in more detail below). Secondly, we compared the mean identity scores across the three ethnic groups. Prior to these analyses, we clustered the outcome variables. Attitudes toward interethnic friendship preferences, attitudes toward interethnic romantic relationships, the number of interethnic friends, and frequency of encounters with interethnic friends were assumed to represent two different factors (one dealing with friendships and one with partners). Exploratory factor analysis of the four variables mentioned revealed the presence of the two expected components, explaining 43.35 and 36.23% of the variance, respectively. Factor scores were used as observed variables in the subsequent analyses.

Relationships Between Identities and Ethnic Relationships

A multigroup regression analysis was conducted in which the identities were the exogenous variables that predicted the two relationship scores (the factor scores described above; see Fig. 1).

The error terms of the two output variables were allowed to correlate (to allow for positive correlations due to close semantic similarity of the factors); the correlation was positive and significant in each group ($p < 0.05$). The most parsimonious model with an acceptable fit was the structural weight model, as can be seen in Table 2. So, we found support for a model in which the link between identities and interethnic relationships is identical across the three groups, whereas (at least some of) the correlations of the identities are different across groups.

The standardized regression coefficients of this solution are presented in Table 3. National identity, taken to be an inclusive identity given the diversity of Uzbekistan, was positively associated with interethnic friendship and romance only for Russians, thereby supporting the first hypothesis. Ethnic identity was negatively associated




Fig. 1 Predictors and outcomes of the multigroup regression model

with both output variables, although only the coefficient of interethnic marriage was significant (providing some support for the second hypothesis). Ethnolinguistic identity was positively associated with both outcome variables, although again, the association was only significant for interethnic marriage.

This finding is in line with the third hypothesis. Interestingly, the positive association was predicted only for Russophones, but was also found among Uzbek speakers. More specifically, the correlation of ethnolinguistic identity with interethnic friendship was 0.18 ($p < 0.05$), while the correlation with interethnic marriage was not significant ($r(184) = -0.07, ns$). All in all, there was some support for the third hypothesis. Finally, the expected negative link between religious identity and the outcome variables was only found for interethnic marriages, thereby providing partial support for the fourth hypothesis. It can be concluded that the hypotheses were completely confirmed for interethnic marriages, but not for interethnic friendships. It may well be that choosing a marriage partner is a more critical measure of inclusiveness than interethnic friendships that are much more common in (diverse) Uzbekistan.

The correlations of the identity measures are presented in Table 4. It can be easily seen why we did not find support for a model in which these correlations are assumed to be identical in all groups. The correlations were positive, significant, and strongest among the Uzbek-speaking Uzbeks, suggesting that all identities go together and make up their Uzbek social identity, comprising national, ethnic, ethnolinguistic, and religious identity. The same, yet slightly weaker pattern was found in the Russian-speaking Russian group. The pattern in the Russian-speaking Uzbeks showed both similarities and differences. The main difference was in the correlations of ethnolinguistic identity that was unrelated to any other identity in this group, whereas correlations of the other identities were the same as in the other groups. It can be concluded that identities were coherent (i.e., they showed positive correlations), with the exception of the ethnolinguistic identity of Russian-speaking

Table 2 Fit indexes of multigroup regression analysis

Model	χ^2/df	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	ΔCFI	RMSEA
<i>Structural weights</i>	2.865***			0.963		0.062
Structural covariances	11.143***	355.298***	20	0.549	0.414	0.145
Structural residuals	10.212***	27.741***	6	0.523	0.026	0.138

Note. Unconstrained model could not be tested due to identifiability issues; most restrictive with a good fit in italics. *** $p < 0.001$

Table 3 Standardized regression coefficients of identities predicting interethnic relationships

Identity	Interethnic marriage	Interethnic friendship
National	0.122**	0.128***
Ethnic	-0.181***	-0.055
Ethnolinguistic	0.184**	0.076
Religious	-0.175***	0.039
<i>Variance explained</i>	<i>0.027***</i>	<i>0.030***</i>

** $p < 0.01$. *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4 Correlations between social identities across the groups

Identities	Ethnic group		
	Uzbek-speaking Uzbeks	Russian-speaking Russians	Russian-speaking Uzbeks
Ethnolinguistic-ethnic	0.29***	0.18***	-0.01
Ethnolinguistic-religious	0.28***	0.09**	0.02
Ethnolinguistic-national	0.25***	0.08*	0.00
Ethnic-religious	0.26***	0.25***	0.19***
Religious-national	0.24***	0.19***	0.20***
Ethnic-national	0.26***	0.22***	0.21***

* $p < 0.05$. ** $p < 0.01$. *** $p < 0.001$

Uzbeks, which has some uniqueness and is clearly not a combination of their national and ethnic identity.

Comparison of Mean Scores

Finally, we were interested in comparing the means of the identity scores across the three groups. Before presenting the results, a caveat is needed. A comparison of means requires scalar invariance. We therefore tested invariance and found that for each scale measurement weights (metric) the invariance was supported (with CFI values close to 0.95) but that CFI values dropped to values between 0.85 and 0.90

when invariance of measurement intercepts (scalar invariance) was tested. As a consequence, no means could be compared. A closer inspection did not reveal any patterning in the bias. In similar cases of lack of scalar invariance, we found that further item removal does not tend to have an impact on the size of the means (e.g., Van de Vijver & He, 2017). Therefore, rather than refraining from any comparison, we proceeded by comparing the means, yet with the caveat that the comparisons may be challenged by unidentified bias at item level.

The means were compared in a MANOVA with ethnic group as independent variable and the four social identities as dependent variables. Gender was initially also included as predictor but was eventually omitted as it did not show any main effect or interaction. The multivariate effect of ethnicity was highly significant, Wilks' $\Lambda = 0.540$, $F(8, 956) = 43.137$, $p < 0.001$, (partial) $\eta^2 = .265$, with all univariate effects of ethnic groups also reaching significance; effect size of national identity was 0.216, ethnic identity 0.038, ethnolinguistic identity 0.156, and religious identity 0.165. A radar plot of the means is presented in Fig. 2.

The figure shows a clear patterning: Uzbek-speaking Uzbeks tended to show the highest scores (meaning that they had the strongest identities in all domains except for ethnolinguistic identity), and the Russian-speaking Uzbeks had less strong identities in all domains. The pattern of the Russian-speaking Russians was different; they had the weakest national and religious identity, and their ethnic identity was not very different from the other groups, but their ethnolinguistic identity was the strongest of all groups. These data could imply that the Russian-speaking Russians have a strong orientation toward Russia and that their ethnolinguistic identity, which is the only unique identity in this group, is strongly developed.

Discussion

Uzbekistan is an interesting context to study identity as the country harbors multiple ethnic groups and languages. We were interested in diversity-related social identities (i.e., national, ethnic, ethnolinguistic, and religious) in this context and in their association with interethnic attitudes and practices. We found that identities that are more inclusive (national and ethnolinguistic) are positively associated with interethnic attitudes and practices, while the opposite was found for ethnic identity. This pattern suggests that social identities can be used to include and exclude others. Moreover, we found that the social identities tended to be positively correlated; for example, for Uzbek-speaking Uzbeks, language, ethnicity, nationality, and religiosity are all related. Remarkably, the pattern for the Russian-speaking Uzbek group was different; their ethnolinguistic identity was unrelated to their other identities. The social identities were strongest for Uzbek-speaking Uzbeks and weakest for the Russian-speaking Russians. Such strong ties with either Uzbekistan as a nation (found among Uzbek-speaking Uzbeks) or with the larger community of Russian speakers (found among Russian-speaking Russians) were not reported by Russian-speaking Uzbeks.




Fig. 2 Radar plot of the mean scores of the social identities per ethnic group

Clearly, the Russian-speaking population in Uzbekistan is culturally diverse, and more research is needed to understand the differences between Russian-speaking ethnic groups. Many studies on Russian minorities measure Russian ethnic identity in groups of Soviet migrants (Jasinskaja-Lahti & Liebkind, 1998; Remennick, 2005) or define Russian ethnicity in linguistic terms (Pisarenko, 2006). We demonstrated that such approaches are inadequate for Uzbekistan where Russian-speaking groups are different from each other in many dimensions. The studies of diverse groups of Russian speakers may require the focus on language, ethnicity, and religion and not only on the ethnicity or ethnolinguistic identity.

We conclude from our study that a profound knowledge of the cultural context is needed to understand the complex patterning of identities and interethnic habits and preferences. The Uzbek context illustrates how structural variables of a society (such as the nature and history of linguistic diversity and the power differential of the ethnic groups) can influence individual and group identities and interethnic habits and preferences.

References

- Aberson, C. L., Shoemaker, C., & Tomolillo, C. (2004). Implicit bias and contact: The role of interethnic friendships. *The Journal of Social Psychology, 144*, 335–347. <https://doi.org/10.3200/SOCP.144.3.335-347>
- About, F. E., Friedmann, J., & Smith, S. (2015). Direct and indirect friends in cross-ethnolinguistic peer relations. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science/Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement, 47*, 68–79. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0037590>
- About, F. E., & Sankar, J. (2007). Friendship and identity in a language-integrated school. *International Journal of Behavioral Development, 31*, 445–453. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0165025407081469>
- Agirdag, O., Van Houtte, M., & Van Avermaet, P. (2011). Ethnic school context and the national and sub-national identifications of pupils. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 34*, 357–378. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2010.510198>
- Balkin, R. S., Schlosser, L. Z., & Levitt, D. H. (2009). Religious identity and cultural diversity: Exploring the relationships between religious identity, sexism, homophobia, and multicultural competence. *Journal of Counseling & Development, 87*, 420–427. <https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1556-6678.2009.tb00126.x>
- Benet-Martínez, V., Leu, J., Lee, F., & Morris, M. W. (2002). Negotiating biculturalism cultural frame switching in biculturals with oppositional versus compatible cultural identities. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 33*, 492–516. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022102033005005>
- Berry, J. W. (2010). *Mutual intercultural relations in plural societies (MIRIPS) questionnaire*. Retrieved from <http://cacr.victoria.ac.nz/projects/researchprojects/mirips>
- Billiet, J., Maddens, B., & Beerten, R. (2003). National identity and attitude toward foreigners in a multinational state: A replication. *Political Psychology, 24*, 241–257. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00327>
- Bond, R. (2006). Belonging and becoming: National identity and exclusion. *Sociology, 40*, 609–626. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038506065149>
- Bourgeois, D. Y., Busseri, M. A., & Rose-Krasnor, L. (2009). Ethnolinguistic identity and youth activity involvement in a sample of minority Canadian Francophone youth. *International Journal of Theory and Research, 9*, 116–144. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15283480802669879>
- Brewer, M. B. (1991). The social self: On being the same and different at the same time. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 1*, 475–482. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167291175001>
- Brown, K. D. (2013). Language policy and education: Space and place in multilingual post-Soviet states. *Annual Review of Applied Linguistics, 33*, 238–257. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0267190513000093>
- Cheskin, A. (2013). Exploring Russian-speaking identity from below: The case of Latvia. *Journal of Baltic Studies, 44*, 287–312. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2012.685062>
- Cheskin, A. (2015). Identity and integration of Russian speakers in the Baltic states: A framework for analysis. *Ethnopolitics, 14*, 72–93. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2014.933051>
- Cila, J., & Lalonde, R. N. (2013). Personal openness toward interfaith dating and marriage among Muslim young adults: The role of religiosity, cultural identity, and family connectedness. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 17*, 357–370. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430213502561>
- Clément, R., & Noels, K. A. (1992). Towards a situated approach to ethnolinguistic identity: The effects of status on individuals and groups. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology, 11*, 203–232. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X92114002>
- Cretser, G. A. (1999). Cross-national marriage in Sweden: Immigration and assimilation 1971–1993. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies, 30*, 363–380.
- Dimitrova, R. (2014). Acculturation outcomes of Italian immigrant children and parents. In *Acculturation: Psychology, processes and global perspectives* (pp. 153–166). New York, NY: Nova Science Publishers.

- Dimitrova, R., Chasiotis, A., Bender, M., & Van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2014). From a collection of identities to collective identity. Evidence from mainstream and minority adolescents in Bulgaria. *Cross-Cultural Research, 48*, 339–367. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1069397114523922>
- Dommelen, A., Schmid, K., Hewstone, M., Gonsalkorale, K., & Brewer, M. (2015). Construing multiple in-groups: Assessing social identity inclusiveness and structure in ethnic and religious minority group members. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 45*, 386–399. <https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2095>
- Edgar, A. L. (2007). Marriage, modernity, and the ‘friendship of nations’: Interethnic intimacy in post-war Central Asia in comparative perspective. *Central Asian Survey, 26*, 581–599. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02634930802018489>
- Ehala, M., & Vedernikova, E. (2015). Subjective vitality and patterns of acculturation: Four cases. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 36*, 711–728. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01434632.2015.1015541>
- Ehala, M., & Zabrodskaia, A. (2014). Hot and cold ethnicities in the Baltic states. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development, 35*, 76–95. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01434632.2013.845199>
- Fong, E., & Isajiw, W. W. (2000). Determinants of friendship choices in multiethnic society. *Sociological Forum, 15*, 249–271. <https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1007569424332>
- Furrow, J. L., King, P. E., & White, K. (2004). Religion and positive youth development: Identity, meaning, and prosocial concerns. *Applied Developmental Science, 8*, 17–26. https://doi.org/10.1207/S1532480XADS0801_3
- Giles, H., & Johnson, P. (1987). Ethnolinguistic identity theory: A social psychological approach to language maintenance. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 68*, 69–99. <https://doi.org/10.1515/ijsl.1987.68.69>
- Grewal, Z. A. (2009). Marriage in colour: Race, religion and spouse selection in four American mosques. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 32*, 323–345. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870801961490>
- Grigoryan, L. K. (2013). Patriotism and nationalism in Russia: Influence on economic independence. *Cultural-Historical Psychology, 3*, 22–31.
- Ha, S. E., & Jang, S. J. (2015). Immigration, threat perception, and national identity: Evidence from South Korea. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 44*, 53–62. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2014.12.001>
- Herman, M. R., & Campbell, M. E. (2012). I wouldn’t, but you can: Attitudes toward interracial relationships. *Social Science Research, 41*, 343–358. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ssresearch.2011.11.007>
- Jasinskaja-Lahti, I., & Liebkind, K. (1998). Content and predictors of the ethnic identity of Russian-speaking immigrant adolescents in Finland. *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 39*, 209–219. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9450.00081>
- Jones, F. L., & Smith, P. (2001). Individual and societal bases of national identity. A comparative multi-level analysis. *European Sociological Review, 17*, 103–118. <https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/17.2.103>
- Khalikov, Y. (2006). *Uzbekistan’s Russian-language conundrum*. Eurasianet.org, 18.
- Kibria, N. (1997). The construction of ‘Asian American’: Reflections on intermarriage and ethnic identity among second-generation Chinese and Korean Americans. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 20*, 523–544. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.1997.9993973>
- Knifsend, C. A., & Juvonen, J. (2014). Social identity complexity, cross-ethnic friendships, and intergroup attitudes in urban middle schools. *Child Development, 85*, 709–721. <https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12157>
- Korts, K. (2009). Inter-ethnic attitudes and contacts between ethnic groups in Estonia. *Journal of Baltic Studies, 40*, 121–137. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01629770902722286>
- Kosterman, R., & Feshbach, S. (1989). Toward a measure of patriotic and nationalistic attitudes. *Political Psychology, 10*, 257–274. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3791647>
- Landry, R., Allard, R., & Deveau, K. (2007). A macroscopic intergroup approach to the study of ethnolinguistic development. *International Journal of the Sociology of Language, 185*, 225–253. <https://doi.org/10.1515/IJSL.2007.032>

- Lebedeva, N., & Tatarko, A. (2009). *Strategies of intercultural relations of migrants and Russian residents*. Moscow, Russian Federation: PFUR.
- Lebedeva, N., & Tatarko, A. (2013). Immigration and Intercultural integrations strategies in Post-Soviet Russia. In E. Tartakovsky (Ed.), *Immigration: Policies, challenges and impact* (pp. 179–194). Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science.
- Morris, M. W., Chiu, C. Y., & Liu, Z. (2015). Polycultural psychology. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *66*, 631–659. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010814-015001>
- Noels, K. A., & Clément, R. (1996). Language, identity and adjustment: the role of linguistic self-confidence in the acculturation processes. *Journal of Language and Social Psychology*, *15*, 246–264. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0261927X960153003>
- Park, J. J. (2012). When race and religion collide: The effect of religion on interracial friendship during college. *Journal of Diversity in Higher Education*, *5*, 8–21. <https://doi.org/10.1037/a0026960>
- Pavlenko, A., Blackledge, A., Piller, I., & Teutsch-Dwyer, M. (Eds.). (2001). *Multilingualism, second language learning, and gender* (Vol. 6). Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110889406>
- Peek, L. (2005). Becoming Muslim: The development of a religious identity. *Sociology of Religion*, *66*, 215–242. <https://doi.org/10.2307/4153097>
- Pettigrew, T. F. (1998). Intergroup contact theory. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *49*, 65–85. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.49.1.65>
- Phinney, J. S. (1990). Ethnic identity in adolescents and adults: Review of research. *Psychological Bulletin*, *108*, 499–514. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.108.3.499>
- Phinney, J. S. (1992). The multigroup ethnic identity measure: A news scale for use with diverse groups. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, *7*, 156–176. <https://doi.org/10.1177/074355489272003>
- Pisarenko, O. (2006). The acculturation modes of Russian speaking adolescents in Latvia: Perceived discrimination and knowledge of the Latvian language. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *58*, 751–773. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130600732100>
- Qian, Z. (2005). Breaking the last taboo: Interracial marriage in America. *Contexts*, *4*(4), 33–37. <https://doi.org/10.1525/ctx.2005.4.4.33>
- Qian, Z., Blair, S. L., & Ruf, S. D. (2001). Asian American interracial and interethnic marriages: Differences by education and nativity. *International Migration Review*, *35*, 557–586. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2001.tb00029.x>
- Remennick, L. (2005). Cross-cultural dating patterns on an Israeli campus: Why are Russian immigrant women more popular than men? *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, *22*, 435–454. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0265407505052445>
- Roberts, R. E., Phinney, J. S., Masse, L. C., Chen, Y. R., Roberts, C. R., & Romero, A. (1999). The structure of ethnic identity of young adolescents from diverse ethnocultural groups. *The Journal of Early Adolescence*, *19*, 301–322. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0272431699019003001>
- Roccas, S., & Brewer, M. B. (2002). Social identity complexity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *6*, 88–106. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327957PSPR0602_01
- Saylor, E. S., & Aries, A. (1999). Ethnic identity and change in social context. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, *139*, 549–566. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00224549909598416>
- Schatz, R. T., Staub, E., & Lavine, H. (1999). On the varieties of national attachment: Blind versus constructive patriotism. *Political Psychology*, *20*, 151–174. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00140>
- Schwartz, S. J., Syed, M., Yip, T., Knight, G. P., Umaña-Taylor, A. J., & Rivas-Drake, D. (2014). Methodological issues in ethnic and racial identity research with ethnic minority populations: Theoretical precision, measurement issues, and research designs. *Child Development*, *85*, 58–76. <https://doi.org/10.1111/cdev.12201>
- Semela, T. (2012). Intergroup relations among the Ethiopian youth effects of ethnicity, language, and religious background. *Journal of Developing Societies*, *28*, 323–354. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0169796X12453782>

- Stevens, G., & Schoen, R. (1988). Linguistic intermarriage in the United States. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 50, 267–279. <https://doi.org/10.2307/352445>
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, C. (1986). *The social identity theory of intergroup behavior*. *Psychology of intergroup relations* (2nd ed., pp. 7–24). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.
- Umana-Taylor, A. J., Yazedjian, A., & Bámaca-Gómez, M. (2004). Developing the ethnic identity scale using Eriksonian and social identity perspectives. *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, 4, 9–38. https://doi.org/10.1207/S1532706XID0401_2
- Van de Vijver, F. J. R. (2015). Dimensions in acculturation: One, two, or many? *Psihologia Resurseor Umame*, 13, 32–38.
- Van de Vijver, F. J. R., & He, J. (2017). Bias and equivalence in personality research. In A. T. Church (Ed.), *Personality across cultures* (pp. 251–277). Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO.
- Van Mol, C., De Valk, H. A., & Van Wissen, L. (2015). Falling in love with (in) Europe: European bi-national love relationships, European identification and transnational solidarity. *European Union Politics*, 16, 469–489. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116515588621>
- Verkuyten, M., & Yildiz, A. A. (2007). National (dis)identification and ethnic and religious identity: A study among Turkish-Dutch Muslims. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33, 1448–1462. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167207304276>
- Yahya, S., & Boag, S. (2014). Till faith do us part...: Relation between religious affiliation and attitudes toward cross-cultural and interfaith dating and marriage. *Marriage & Family Review*, 50, 480–504. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01494929.2014.909376>
- Yogeewaran, K., & Dasgupta, N. (2014). Conceptions of national identity in a globalised world: Antecedents and consequences. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 25, 189–227. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2014.972081>
- Ysseldyk, R., Matheson, K., & Anisman, H. (2010). Religiosity as identity: Toward an understanding of religion from a social identity perspective. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 14, 60–71. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868309349693>
- Zabrodsckaja, A. (2015). ‘What is my country to me?’ Identity construction by Russian-speakers in the Baltic countries. *Sociolinguistic Studies*, 9, 217–242. <https://doi.org/10.1558/sols.v9i2.26885>

Kamila Isaeva is a social psychologist from Tashkent, Uzbekistan. She has M.Sc. in Applied social psychology from Tilburg University, The Netherlands, and National Research University “Higher School of Economics,” Russian Federation. Her main research interests are social identities (national, ethnic, ethno-linguistic, religious) in Uzbekistan.

Byron G. Adams is an Industrial Psychologist from Johannesburg, South Africa. He holds a Ph.D. from Tilburg University, the Netherlands. He is currently an Assistant Professor of Work and Organizational Psychology at Tilburg University, the Netherlands, and a Senior Research Associate at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. His research interests include the study of identity across different groups (i.e., cultural, gender, and national groups), life stages (i.e., adolescents and emerging adults), and life domains (i.e., school and work). He currently serves on the Governing Council for the Society of Emerging Adulthood.

Fons van de Vijver holds a chair in cross-cultural psychology at Tilburg University, the Netherlands, and an extraordinary chair at North-West University, South Africa, and the University of Queensland, Australia. He has (co-)authored more than 500 publications, mainly in the domain of cross-cultural psychology. The main topics in his research involve bias and equivalence, psychological acculturation and multiculturalism, cognitive similarities and differences, response styles, translations, and adaptations. He is the former editor of the *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*. He is a former president of Division 2 (Assessment and Evaluation) of the *International Association of Applied Psychology*, the *European Association of Psychological Assessment* and President of the *International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology*. He is the 2013 recipient of the International Award of the American Psychological Association (for his contributions to international cooperation and to the advancement of knowledge of psychology).

The Role of Social Disidentification in Acculturation Preferences of Ethnic Majority and Minority Members in Kabardino-Balkar Republic



Zarina Lepshokova and Nadezhda Lebedeva

This study identifies the role of national, regional, and republican disidentification in the process of mutual acculturation of different ethnic group members in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic (KBR) of North Caucasus, Russian Federation. A low level of identification with a group is often defined as social disidentification; however, these are not the same concepts. When having a low level of identification, persons connect poorly with some aspects of group identity, but do not separate themselves from the group; this is still a form of social identification. In contrast, social disidentification refers to the active rejection and distancing oneself from a particular group (Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004). This seems more likely when the content of a person's identity is considered contradictory to the content of their other identity (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). Disidentification is not merely the weak identification with a group; it is rather a reactive or oppositional identity (Ogbu, 1993; Portes & Zhou, 1993). Individuals can disidentify themselves only from groups they are members of, and, despite the decision to disidentify in a particular instance or situation, the individual remains a member of that social group (Yip, 2016).

As some studies have shown, perceived social rejection and devaluation might not only result in increased minority group identification but also in decreased identification and increased disidentification with the national category (Portes & Zhou, 1993). National group identification can be resisted or actively rejected, making it more difficult to create or sustain a sense of solidarity across subordinate group lines. Furthermore, studies in organizational contexts have shown that disidentification is a different psychological state than identification (e.g., Elsbach & Bhattacharya, 2001; Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004). Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) in their research among Turkish-Dutch Muslim participants empirically examined the distinction between national identification and disidentification. However, there were no studies focused

Z. Lepshokova (✉) · N. Lebedeva
National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
e-mail: zlepshokova@hse.ru; nlebedeva@hse.ru

on disidentification with different types of inclusive socially or territorially based categories such as republic and region.

Previous studies have examined only the roles of ethnic and national identities in acculturation preferences of ethnic minority and majority group members (Berry, 1997; Jasinskaja-lahti, Liebkind, & Solheim, 2009; Lebedeva & Tatarko, 2009; Lepshokova, 2012; Schwartz, Zamboanga, Rodriguez, & Wang, 2007; Ward, 2006). We suppose that research conducted in the North Caucasus has to take into account not only national and ethnic identities but also religious (Orthodox Christian/Muslim), national (Russian Federation), regional (Caucasian), and republican (KBR) identities. Lepshokova and Lebedeva (2016) have noted that members of ethnic groups of the North Caucasian republics might perceive some of these types of identities as incompatible, and this incompatibility might predict their acculturation preferences. For example, if ethnic Russians living in KBR perceive their ethnic Russian and regional Caucasian identities as incompatible, they prefer separation and marginalization strategies in their intercultural relations in the republic. Also it is important that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, national identity ceased to be dominant in the hierarchy of identities among ethnic majorities and indigenous people of North Caucasian republics (Jade, Kukva, Lyausheva, & Shadzhe, 2010).

In our current study, we examined the role of ethnic, religious, republican, regional, and national identities as well as republican, regional, and national disidentification in the acculturation preferences of ethnic Russians, living in KBR, and acculturation expectations of ethnic majority group members (Kabardians and Balkars) in KBR.

Social Identities of Ethnic Minority and Majority Group Members in Kabardino-Balkar Republic

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, ethnic Russians in all North Caucasian republics, except Adygea, became an ethnic minority, losing the position of the political, scientific, and creative majority (Atayev, 2013). In the Muslim republics of the North Caucasus (Kabardino-Balkaria, Chechnya, Dagestan, Ingushetia, Karachaevo-Cherkessia), ethnic Russians became a religious minority as well. The ethnic majority group members of these republics are Muslims, whereas the ethnic Russians are Orthodox Christians. At the same time, ethnic Russians are the ethnic and religious majority in the whole country (Russian Federation). In this regard, the interplay of ethnic, religious, regional, republican, and national identities has its own unique specificity among ethnic Russians living in KBR, as well as among members of the ethnic majority groups of KBR.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was an intensive growth of the significance of ethnic and religious identities of indigenous ethnic group members of the North Caucasian republics. The results of the research in KBR (Kobakhidze, 2005) revealed a high significance of the ethnic identity among members of the

majority groups of the republic and low significance of the ethnic identity among ethnic Russians. Kobakhidze (2005) explains this high significance as a result of “retraditionalization.” Retraditionalization is the revival of traditional mechanisms of social self-regulation and the increased significance of social relationships based on traditional social rules. This retraditionalization was accepted and incorporated in everyday life by the North Caucasian ethnic group members after the collapse of the Soviet Union. This tendency toward traditionalism is a source of ethnic maintenance and leads to the enhancement of the ethnic component in the structure of group social identity.

The significance of religious identity among ethnic majority members of KBR has increased also. The rapid revival of religious Muslim traditions and customs among the Kabardians and Balkars in the KBR took place in the past two decades (Akkieva, 2009). The level of religiosity of the Orthodox Christian population of KBR (mostly ethnic Russians) is also quite high compared to other North Caucasian republics (Andreanova, 2015). Probably, this is the result of the growth of religious identity of minority group members in a different religious environment where the maintenance of religion plays a significant role in the maintenance of culture.

National identity is higher among ethnic Russians of KBR than among members of ethnic majority groups (Lepshokova, 2012). Furthermore, ethnic Russian identity and national Russian identity are closely interconnected in the consciousness of ethnic Russians (Galyapina & Lebedeva, 2015; Lepshokova, 2012), whereas ethnic, regional Caucasian, and republican identities are closely interconnected in the consciousness of the ethnic majority group members of the North Caucasian republics (Arslanbekova, 2012).

Regional Caucasian identity occupies a special place in the structure of social identity of all ethnic group members living in the North Caucasus (Shadzhe, 2011). Caucasian identity is revealed as “the ability of the Caucasian people to realize their socio-cultural unity, their belonging to a common world and the whole Caucasus” (Shadzhe, 2011 p. 69). In the post-Soviet period in Russia, people from the North Caucasus were negatively associated with the term “persons of Caucasian nationality” (Gadzhiev, 2010). This has a certain effect on those who associated themselves with the North Caucasus and identified themselves with this regional community. Republican identity is very significant among the ethnic majorities of the North Caucasian republics as well (Turovskij, 1999).

Researchers point out that the national Russian identity did not become dominant in the structure of social identity among nonethnic Russian groups of the North Caucasus (Jade et al., 2010). The assumption that the norms and values of the ethnic Russian minority in the North Caucasian republics came into conflict and became incompatible with those of the dominant North Caucasian culture was increasingly discussed in Russia’s public discourse (Atayev, 2013).

Based on these features of the social identity of the ethnic minority and majority of KBR, we might suggest that national Russian disidentification can take place among members of ethnic majority groups of KBR; and republican as well as regional disidentification can take place among ethnic Russians in KBR.

Taking into account that social disidentification is an independent process, and not only a manifestation of a low level of social identity, allows us to raise a question about the role of social disidentification in the acculturation preferences of the groups in contact in KBR.

Social Identity, Disidentification, and Processes of Mutual Acculturation

In the acculturation model of Berry (1997), there are two fundamental, orthogonal dimensions of acculturation—cultural maintenance (the wish to preserve cultural identity and the characteristics of one's cultural heritage) and contact and participation in the life of the larger society (the wish to interact with members of other groups). Crossing these two dimensions produces four distinct ways of acculturation: integration (participating in both cultures), assimilation (participating in the dominant society without maintenance of heritage culture), separation (maintaining the heritage culture but not participating in dominant society), and marginalization (lack of interest or participation in either culture).

These ways use different terminologies, depending on whether dominant or non-dominant is considered. When four ways of acculturation pertain to non-dominant ethnocultural group contacting with a dominant group, they are known as the acculturation strategies (Berry, 1997). Since acculturation is a process involving two groups in contact, it takes place in both groups. When the dominant group's views about how a non-dominant group should acculturate, the four ways of acculturating are known as the acculturation expectations of the dominant group members: multiculturalism (cf. integration), melting pot (cf. assimilation), segregation (cf. separation), and exclusion (cf. marginalization).

As noted, the role of identification with various groups in the process of mutual acculturation is very important for members of non-dominant groups as well as of dominant groups. Moreover, the nature of the relationship between identity and acculturation preferences depends on what type of identity is studied.

In acculturation studies of ethnic minorities, the high importance of ethnic identity was found to be positively associated with a separation strategy and negatively associated with an assimilation strategy. The high importance of national identity has been positively associated with integration and assimilation strategies and negatively associated with separation strategy (Berry, 1997; Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006; Jasinskaja-lahti et al., 2009; Schwartz et al., 2007; Ward, 2006).

Previous studies of the ethnic majority in KBR (see Lepshokova, 2012) have shown that the importance of ethnic identity was positively associated with the assimilation expectation of ethnic Russians, whereas a positive valence of ethnic identity was positively associated with their integration expectation and negatively associated with their segregation and exclusion expectations. The importance of

national identity was negatively associated with the expectation of exclusion of ethnic Russians, whereas a positive valence of national identity was negatively associated with the expectations of segregation and assimilation of ethnic Russians in KBR (Lepshokova, 2012).

As noted, previous studies have focused on the role of ethnic and national identities in shaping acculturation preferences of ethnic minorities and majorities. The role of such types of social identity as religious, regional, and republican, as well as the role of social disidentification, has not been taken into account in previous acculturation studies. Recently, researchers have increasingly pointed to the importance of filling this gap in the understanding of acculturation. For example, Verkuyten in his studies of Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands raises the question of the importance of studying the role of religious identity in shaping the national Dutch identity, feelings toward the religious in-group, and endorsement of Islamic group rights (Martinovic & Verkuyten, 2016; Verkuyten, 2007). Dimitrova raises the question of the role of religious identity in acculturation orientations of the Turks in Germany and Bulgaria (Dimitrova & Aydinli-Karakulak, 2016).

Less is known about the role of the disidentification processes, although there is empirical evidence that national identity and national disidentification are associated with the ethnic and religious identity of ethnic and religious minority group members. For example, Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007) conducted a study in the Netherlands to examine the distinction between national identification and disidentification among Turkish-Dutch Muslims. A study in Finland found evidence of national disidentification among immigrants from the former Soviet Union who had experienced a high level of discrimination in the past (Jasinskaja-lahti et al., 2009).

We mentioned above that the importance of ethnic, religious (Muslim), republican, and regional (Caucasian) identities has increased, and the importance of national (Russian Federation) identity has been decreased and sometimes questioned or rejected among ethnic majorities in the North Caucasian republics after the collapse of the USSR. At the same time the importance of national, ethnic, religious (Orthodox Christian) identities also has been increased among ethnic Russians in the North Caucasus, while their republican and regional (Caucasian) identities have not become significant in the structure of their social identity. Therefore, we propose that there might be national (Russian Federation) disidentification among ethnic majority members as well as republican and regional (Caucasian) disidentification among ethnic minority (ethnic Russians).

In this study, we examined:

1. Whether the ethnic, religious, republican, regional, and national identities of ethnic Russians, living in KBR as well as their republican, regional, and national disidentification have similar or different relationships with their integration, separation, assimilation, and marginalization acculturation strategies and
2. Whether the ethnic, religious, republican, regional, and national identities of Kabardians and Balkars as well as their national disidentification have similar or different relationships with their integration, segregation, assimilation, and exclusion expectations

Method

Participants

The sample included 249 ethnic Russians aged between 15 and 89 years ($M = 42.2$, 66% female) and 285 ethnic majority group members (Kabardians and Balkars) aging between 15 and 88 years ($M = 43$, 59% female). All participants were born and live in KBR.

Procedure

The participants were recruited in the capital of KBR, Nalchik, through local contacts and associations using a snowball sampling procedure. Participants were surveyed using a self-report questionnaire. All participants were informed that participation was voluntary and that their responses were anonymous. The average time for filling in the questionnaire was about 20 minutes. The questionnaire was in Russian.

Measures

The questionnaire includes the following measures:

Ethnic identity was assessed by asking participants to respond to five items (5-point Likert scales), for example, “I feel I belong to the ethnic Russians” and “I see myself as a part of the Kabardian/Balkarian culture” (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). The items were averaged to form a single ethnic identity score. A higher score indicates stronger ethnic identity.

Religious identity was assessed by asking participants to respond to five items (5-point Likert scales), for example, “I feel a strong attachment to my religion” and “My religious affiliation is a very important part of how I see myself” (Verkuyten, 2007; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). The items were averaged to form a single religious identity score. A higher score indicates stronger religious identity.

National (Russian Federation) identity was assessed by asking participants to respond to five items (5-point Likert scales), for example, “I identify with the Russians” and “I feel I am a Russian” (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). The items were averaged to form a single national identity score. A higher score indicates stronger national identity.

Republican (KBR) identity was assessed by asking participants to respond to four items (5-point Likert scales), for example, “I feel I am a representative of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic” and “I am glad to be an inhabitant of the Kabardino-Balkar Republic” (developed by the members of International Laboratory for Socio-Cultural Research).

The items were averaged to form a single republican identity score. A higher score indicates stronger republican identity.

Regional (Caucasian) identity was assessed by asking participants to respond to four items (5-point Likert scales), for example, “I identify with the Caucasians” and “I feel myself as a part of the Caucasian culture” (developed by the members of International Laboratory for Socio-Cultural Research). The items were averaged to form a single regional identity score. A higher score indicates stronger regional identity.

Republican (KBR) disidentification was assessed by asking participants to respond to five items (5-point Likert scales), used in the group of ethnic Russians only, for example, “I would never say ‘We are people of Kabardino-Balkaria’” and “I always have the tendency to distance myself from the people of Kabardino-Balkaria.” The items were averaged to form a single republican disidentification score. A higher score indicates stronger republican disidentification.

Regional (Caucasian) disidentification was assessed by asking participants to respond to five items (5-point Likert scales), used in the group of ethnic Russians only, for example, “I would never say: ‘We are Caucasians’” and “I always have the tendency to distance myself from Caucasians.” The items were averaged to form a single regional disidentification score. A higher score indicates stronger regional disidentification.

National (Russian Federation) disidentification was assessed by asking participants to respond to five items (5-point Likert scales), for example, “I would never say: ‘We are Russians’” and “When people say something about Russia and the Russians, I never associate myself with it.” The items were averaged to form a single national disidentification score. A higher score indicates stronger national disidentification.

Scales of republican, regional, and national disidentification are based on the scale of “Dutch disidentification” (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007).

Acculturation Strategies of Ethnic Russians and Acculturation Expectations of Kabardians and Balkars The study used scales from the MIRIPS questionnaire (<http://www.victoria.ac.nz/cacr/research/mirips>), translated into Russian and adapted for use in Russia (Lebedeva & Tatarko, 2009). The integration strategy of ethnic Russians and the integration expectation of Kabardians and Balkars were assessed with four items (5-point Likert scales) (e.g., “I feel that ethnic Russians, living in KBR, should maintain our/their own cultural traditions but also adopt those of Kabardians and Balkars”).

The assimilation strategy of ethnic Russians and the respective assimilation expectation of Kabardians and Balkars were also assessed with four parallel items (5-point Likert scales) (e.g., “I feel that ethnic Russians, living in KBR, should adopt Kabardian and Balkarian cultural traditions and not maintain our/their own”).

The separation strategy of ethnic Russians and the respective segregation expectation of Kabardians and Balkars were also assessed with four parallel items (5-point Likert scales) (e.g., “I feel that ethnic Russians, living in KBR, should maintain our/their own cultural traditions and not adopt Kabardian and Balkarian”).

The marginalization strategy of ethnic Russians and the exclusion expectation of Kabardians and Balkars were also assessed with four parallel items (5-point Likert scales) (e.g., “I feel that ethnic Russians, living in KBR, should not maintain our/their own cultural traditions and not adopt Kabardian and Balkarian”).

Demographic Variables Questions about respondents’ backgrounds, such as gender, age, and level of education, were included. We used these questions with both samples.

Data Processing We compared means using Student’s *t*-test. To examine the associations, a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted to predict acculturation strategies and expectations by different kinds of identities and disidentifications. The data was analyzed using SPSS 22 Statistics and AMOS (Version 22).

Results

The descriptive statistics and reliability of the scales are shown in Table 1. The high rates of α -Cronbach for all scales ($\alpha > 0.70$) demonstrated their reliability.

We found significant differences in the ethnic identity of the representatives of the two groups. The ethnic, religious, republican, and regional identities were significantly higher in the group of Kabardians and Balkars than in the group of ethnic Russians living in KBR. The national identity was significantly higher in the group of ethnic Russians living in KBR than in the group of Kabardians and Balkars.

The mean of republican, regional, and national disidentifications scores among ethnic Russians was around or lower than the scale midpoint. The mean of the national disidentification score among Kabardians and Balkars was around or lower than the scale midpoint.

The integration and separation strategies were significantly higher in the group of ethnic Russians living in KBR than integration and segregation expectations in the group of Kabardians and Balkars. At the same time the assimilation and exclusion expectations were significantly higher in the group of Kabardians and Balkars than the assimilation and marginalization strategies in the group of ethnic Russians living in KBR.

The next presentation of the results consists of two parts: the first part presents the results of the hierarchical regression analysis that was conducted to predict acculturation strategies of ethnic Russians living in KBR (Table 2).

The second section contains the results of the hierarchical regression analysis of Kabardians and Balkars’ acculturation expectations’ predictions (Table 3).

In predicting integration, separation, assimilation, and marginalization strategies, the effects of age, gender, and education were entered in Step 1. Ethnic identity, religious identity, republic identity, regional identity, and national identity were entered in Step 2. Republican disidentification, regional disidentification, and national disidentification were entered in Step 3.

Table 1 Means, standard deviations, coefficients of Cronbach’s alpha, and results of the *t*-test for the samples of ethnic Russians (*N* = 249) and Kabardians and Balkars (*N* = 285)

Variables	Ethnic Russians living in KBR			Kabardians and Balkars living in KBR			<i>t</i> , <i>p</i>	Cohen’s <i>d</i>
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	α	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	α		
Ethnic identity	4.19	.68	.92	4.36	.78	.87	-2.42*	-0.23
Religious identity	3.93	.86	.85	4.12	.90	.83	-2.35*	-0.22
Republican identity	3.98	.79	.90	4.31	.78	.90	-4.56***	-0.42
Regional identity	3.65	.99	.96	4.41	.79	.93	-9.33***	-0.85
National identity	4.24	.77	.92	4.00	.91	.85	3.29***	0.28
Republican disidentification	2.00	.94	.94	-	-	-	-	-
Regional disidentification	2.15	.95	.94	-	-	-	-	-
National disidentification	1.89	.96	.78	1.95	1.11	.94	-.67	-0.06
Integration/multiculturalism	3.65	.77	.80	3.41	.76	.70	3.78***	0.31
Separation/segregation	3.04	.82	.76	2.83	.87	.71	3.15**	0.25
Assimilation/melting pot	1.90	.92	.92	2.29	1.15	.70	-4.40***	-0.37
Marginalization/exclusion	2.27	.77	.79	2.61	.94	.71	-4.60***	-0.40

p* < .05, *p* < .01, ****p* < .001

Integration As shown in Table 2, the first model explained 4% of the variance in the integration strategy. Age and education were not significant predictors. However, women indicated a stronger integration strategy than men. The addition of the measures in Step 2 significantly increased the explained variance (17%). Gender remained a significant predictor. Regional and national identities were positively related to the integration strategy. The addition of the measures in Step 3 significantly increased the explained variance (24%). High levels of regional and national identities remained significant predictors. Republican disidentification of ethnic Russians living in KBR negatively predicted their integration strategy.

Separation As shown in Table 2, the first model explained 2% of the variance in the separation strategy. Age, gender, and education were not significant predictors. The addition of the identity measures in Step 2 significantly increased the explained variance (12%). Men indicated stronger separation strategy than women. Ethnic identity was related positively, and republican identity was related negatively to separation strategy. The addition of the measures of disidentifications in Step 3 significantly increased the explained variance (21%). Ethnic identity remained a significant predictor. Republican disidentification was positively related to separation strategy.

Assimilation As shown in Table 2, the first model explained 6% of the variance in the assimilation strategy. Gender and education were not significant predictors. However, older participants indicated stronger assimilation strategy than younger participants. The addition of the identity measures in Step 2 significantly increased the explained variance (14%). Age remained a significant predictor. Regional identity was related positively, and national identity was related negatively to the

Table 2 The results of the hierarchical regression analysis predicting acculturation strategies of ethnic Russians living in KBR

Independent variables	Dependent variables								
	Acculturation strategies			Separation			Marginalization		
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Age	.02	.00	-.01	.03	.04	.02	.03	.04	.02
Gender	.16*	.13*	.11	-.11	-.14*	-.13*	-.11	-.14*	-.13*
Education	.05	.05	.06	-.06	-.05	-.05	-.06	-.05	-.05
Ethnic identity		-.15	-.15		.24*	.22*		.24*	.22*
Religious identity		.02	.04		.05	.02		.05	.02
Republican identity		-.05	-.04		-.22*	-.16		-.22*	-.16
Regional identity		.20*	.22*		-.13	-.07		-.13	-.07
National identity		.37***	.26*		-.09	-.04		-.09	-.04
Republican disidentification			-.32**			.27*			.27*
Regional disidentification			-.22			.09			.09
National disidentification			-.15			-.06			-.06
R ² change	.04	.14	.07	.02	.11	.09	.02	.11	.09
F change	3.02*	7.57***	7.05***	1.35	5.73***	8.34***	1.35	5.73***	8.34***
R ²	.04	.17	.24	.02	.12	.21	.02	.12	.21
ΔR^2	.13	.13	.07		.10	.09		.10	.09
F	2.73*	5.81***	6.49***	1.33	4.12***	5.60***	1.33	4.12***	5.60***
Independent variables	Acculturation strategies								
	Assimilation			Separation			Marginalization		
Age	.23***	.20**	.22***	.05	.04	.05	.05	.04	.05
Gender	-.10	-.06	-.05	-.09	-.05	-.03	-.09	-.05	-.03
Education	.01	-.01	-.03	.15*	.14*	.12*	.15*	.14*	.12*

Table 3 Results of the hierarchical regression analysis predicting acculturation expectations of Kabardians and Balkars living in KBR

Dependent variables		Acculturation expectations					
		Integration			Segregation		
Independent variables		Step1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Age		-.05	-.02	-.03	.18**	.19**	.14*
Gender		-.09	-.06	-.05	-.08	-.07	-.04
Education		.13	.11	.14*	-.15*	-.09	-.06
Ethnic identity			-.01	.03		-.02	.08
Religious identity			.07	.04		.17*	.09
Republican identity			-.03	-.05		.13	.08
Regional identity			.08	.07		-.13	-.14
National identity			.20**	.28***		-.08	.04
National disidentification				-.26***			.45***
R ² change		.02	.07	.06	.04	.04	.18
F change		1.36	3.38**	14.84***	3.35*	1.68	51.64***
Δ R ²			.07	.06		.04	.18
R ²		.02	.09	.15	.04	.08	.26
F		1.91	2.98**	3.66***	3.35*	2.33*	8.29***
Independent variables		Acculturation expectations					
		Assimilation			Exclusion		
Independent variables		Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3
Age		.20**	.20**	.14*	.13*	.14*	.11*
Gender		-.13*	-.12*	-.09	-.10	-.10	-.07
Education		-.09	-.04	.00	-.13*	-.10	-.06
Ethnic identity			-.11	.00		-.20*	-.10
Religious identity			.30***	.23***		.26***	.21**
Republican identity			-.03	-.08		.06	.06

Regional identity		-.18	-.20*			-.06	-.08
National identity		.00	-.14*			.01	-.10
National disidentification			.51***				.42***
R ² change	.05	.09	.23	.05		.06	.18
F change	3.78*	4.32**	78.95***	3.86*		3.14**	53.79***
Δ R ²		.09	.23			.06	.18
R ²	.05	.14	.37	.05		.11	.29
F	3.78*	4.22***	13.87***	3.86**		3.48***	9.82***

Note. Standardized regression coefficients (β) were reported in the table *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001

assimilation strategy of ethnic Russians in KBR. The addition of the measures of disidentifications in Step 3 significantly increased the explained variance (27%). Age remained a significant predictor. Republican and regional disidentifications were negatively related while national disidentification was positively related to the assimilation strategy of Russians.

Marginalization As shown in the Table 2, the first model explained 4% of the variance in the marginalization strategy. Age and gender were not significant predictors. However, educational level was a significant predictor of the marginalization strategy. The addition of the identity measures in Step 2 significantly increased the explained variance (12%). Educational level remained a significant predictor. National identity was negatively related to the marginalization strategy. The addition of the measures of disidentifications in Step 3 significantly increased the explained variance (36%). Educational level remained a significant predictor. Republican, regional, and national disidentifications were positively related to the marginalization strategy of the Russians in KBR.

Integration As shown in Table 3, the first model explained 2% of the variance in the integration expectation. Age, gender, and education were not significant predictors. The addition of the identity measures in Step 2 significantly increased the explained variance (9%). National identity was positively related to the integration expectation. The addition of the measures of disidentifications in Step 3 significantly increased the explained variance (15%). Educational level became a significant predictor. National identity remained a significant predictor. National disidentification was negatively related to the expectation of integration of the Russians in KBR.

Segregation As shown in Table 3, the first model explained 4% of the variance in the segregation expectation. Gender was not a significant predictor. However, age was a significant positive predictor, and education was a significant negative predictor of the segregation expectation. The addition of the identity measures in Step 2 increased the explained variance (8%). Age remained a significant predictor. Religious identity was positively related to the segregation expectation. The addition of the measures of disidentifications in Step 3 significantly increased the explained variance (26%). Age remained a significant predictor. National disidentification was positively related to the expectation of segregation of the Russians in KBR.

Assimilation As shown in Table 3, the first model explained 5% of the variance in the assimilation expectation. Educational level was not a significant predictor. However, older participants and men indicated a stronger assimilation expectation than younger participants and women. The addition of the identity measures in Step 2 significantly increased the explained variance (14%). Religious identity was positively related to the assimilation expectation. The addition of the measures of disidentifications in Step 3 significantly increased the explained variance (37%). Age and religious identity remained significant predictors. National disidentification was positively related to assimilation expectation.

Exclusion As shown in the Table 3, the first model explained 5% of the variance in the exclusion expectation. Gender was not a significant predictor. However, age was a significant positive predictor, and educational level was a significant negative predictor of exclusion expectation. The addition of the identity measures in Step 2 significantly increased the explained variance (11%). Age remained a significant predictor. Religious identity was related positively and ethnic identity was related negatively to the exclusion expectation. The addition of the measures of disidentifications in Step 3 significantly increased the explained variance (29%). Age and religious identity remained significant predictors. National disidentification was positively related to the expectation of the exclusion of Russians in KBR.

Discussion

In acculturation studies, much attention has been paid to the role of social identification in the acculturation of ethnic minority and majority group members (Berry, 1997; Jasinskaja-lahti et al., 2009; Lebedeva & Tatarko, 2009; Lepshokova, 2012; Schwartz et al., 2007). However, these studies did not analyze the role of social disidentification in these processes. As noted in the introduction, studies in organizational contexts have shown that disidentification is a different psychological phenomenon compared to identification (e.g., Elsbach & Bhattacharya, 2001; Kreiner & Ashforth, 2004). Disidentification refers to the active rejection and distancing of a particular group, and this seems more likely when the content of one identity is considered contradictory to that of the other (Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007). In the current study, we examined (a) whether ethnic, religious, republican, regional, and national identities of ethnic Russians living in KBR as well as republican, regional, and national disidentifications have similar or different relationships with integration, separation, assimilation, and marginalization strategies.

The integration strategy was higher among ethnic Russians with high level of regional and national identities. In other words, ethnic Russians with high level of inclusive identities prefer the integration strategy. The integration strategy was higher among ethnic Russians with a low level of republican (Kabardino-Balkarian) disidentification. This suggests that not only high levels of regional and national identities but also the low level of desire to distance oneself from the people of Kabardino-Balkaria promote endorsement of the integration strategy among the ethnic Russians in KBR.

The separation strategy was higher among ethnic Russians with high levels of ethnic identity and republican disidentification. This suggests that it is not only high level of ethnic identity, as indicated in other studies (Berry, 1997; Jasinskaja-lahti et al., 2009; Schwartz et al., 2007), but also the desire to distance themselves from the ethnic majority of Kabardino-Balkaria that makes the endorsement of the separation strategy higher among ethnic Russians in KBR.

The assimilation strategy was higher among ethnic Russians with low levels of republican and regional disidentification but also with a high level of national

disidentification. Probably, the basis of assimilation of ethnic Russians in the KBR is their desire to distance themselves from Russia. It is important to understand that ethnic Russian identity and national Russian identity are closely intertwined in the consciousness of ethnic Russians (Galyapina & Lebedeva, 2015; Lepshokova, 2012). Therefore, national disidentification partly indicates ethnic disidentification or a low level of ethnic identity, which eventually leads to the assimilation of ethnic Russians in KBR. Older participants indicated a stronger assimilation strategy than younger participants. Perhaps this is due to their longer length of residence in KBR.

The marginalization strategy was higher among the ethnic Russians with high levels of republican, regional, and national disidentifications. The more ethnic Russians distance themselves from the ethnic majority of KBR, from the North Caucasus region and Russia, the more they tend to be marginalized in the process of intercultural interaction. The preference of marginalization is more important for people with higher level of education. This may indicate that marginalization is a kind of individualization strategy. Such “individualists” reject group ascription *per se* and prefer to treat others as individuals rather than members of group categories (Bourhis et al., 1997). In a recent study of ethnic Russians in KBR, it was found that the marginalization strategy was positively associated with psychological autonomy (Lepshokova, 2012).

In the current study, we also examined whether ethnic, religious, republican, regional, and national identities of KBR ethnic majority group members, as well as their national disidentification, have similar or different relationships with integration, segregation, assimilation, and exclusion expectations.

National identity was a significant positive predictor of the integration expectation of ethnic majority group members. The results are partly consistent with the results of a previous study of ethnic majority members in KBR that found a positive valence of ethnic identity to be positively associated with an integration expectation (Lepshokova, 2012). National disidentification was a significant negative predictor of the integration expectation of ethnic majority group members of KBR.

Segregation expectation was predicted by a high level of national disidentification. Older participants indicated stronger segregation expectation than younger participants.

The more the members of ethnic majority groups of KBR distance themselves from Russia, the more they wish the Russians living in KBR to assimilate. This is typical for the older generation, who has a well-defined religious identity and a low level of inclusive identities, such as regional and national ones.

The more the members of ethnic majority groups of KBR distance themselves from Russia, the more they wish the ethnic Russians in KBR to be excluded. This is also typical for the older generation, who has a well-defined religious identity. Moreover, the higher the national disidentification among the members of the ethnic majority groups of KBR, the more they wish the Russians in KBR to be assimilated, segregated, or excluded.

Conclusion

During the Soviet period, so-called “soviet” identity was the most inclusive social identity uniting all citizens of the former USSR regardless their ethnic or religious identification. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this identity lost its importance and was replaced by other different inclusive identities: national, representing a residence in the Russian Federation, religious, regional, republican, local or place identity, etc. On the one hand, however, the level of their inclusiveness has been sharply reduced: for instance, the non-Russian population of the country perceived Russian national identity (“Russian citizens”) as almost “ethnic Russian identity” that led sometimes toward a disidentification with it. On the other hand, regional identity, for example, the Caucasian one, became very important for the indigenous population of this region, but not for ethnic Russians or representatives of other ethnic groups who migrated there from other regions of Russian Federation. The same is true for republican identities within the Russian Federation. Therefore, global sociopolitical changes followed by changes in social categories might result in building new identifications as well as processes of disidentification with some categories perceived by some groups as irrelevant or “alien.”

Based on the results of our research, we can say that social disidentification makes a significant contribution to the explanation of acculturation preferences of both minority and majority group members. The effect of social disidentification occurs along with the effects of social identification and does not contradict to it. In addition, the study shows that there are specific effects of different types of social disidentification and different kinds of social identity depending on whether people belong to the majority or minority group. The study revealed the important role of national disidentification in the acculturation expectations of members of the ethnic majority group of KBR. The distancing of the ethnic majority groups of KBR from Russia as a state leads to intolerant attitudes toward ethnic Russians living in KBR. However, it would be wrong to conclude that our participants from both ethnic majority and ethnic minority groups feel themselves entirely disconnected from the superordinate (national, regional, republican) groups. The level of national disidentification among ethnic majority group members, as well as the levels of the national, regional, and republican disidentification among ethnic Russians in KBR, is extremely low, and mutual acculturation attitudes are largely positive. Nevertheless, our research shed light on the distractive power of possible disidentification for peaceful intercultural coexistence and mutual successful acculturation in rapidly changing social-political contexts.

References

- Akkieva, S. I. (2009). *Islam v Kabardino-Balkarskoj Respublike [Islam in the Kabardino-Balkar Republic]*. Moscow, Russia: Logos.

- Andreanova, Z. B. (2015). *Struktura i osobennosti formirovanija konfessional'nogo prostranstva Severnogo Kavkaza [Structure and features of formation of confessional space of the North Caucasus]*. Candidate dissertation, Severo-Kavkazskij Federal'nyj Universitet, Stavropol. Retrieved from http://www.ncfu.ru/uploads/doc/disser_andreanova.pdf
- Arslanbekova, Z. B. (2012). *Mnogourovnevaja identichnost' narodov Dagestana [Multi-level identity of the peoples of Dagestan]*. Retrieved September 30, 2016, from <http://www.gumilev-center.ru/mnogourovnevaya-identichnost-narodov-dagestana/>
- Atayev, A. V. (2013). Status i perspektivy russkogo naselenija na Severnom Kavkaze [Status and Perspectives of the Russian population in the North Caucasus]. *Zhurnal russkoj kul'tury*, 9, 147–159.
- Berry, J. W. (1997). Immigration, acculturation and adaptation. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 46(1), 5–68. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.1997.tb01087.x>
- Berry, J. W., Phinney, J. S., Sam, D. L., & Vedder, P. (2006). Immigrant youth: Acculturation, identity, and adaptation. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 55(3), 303–332. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.2006.00256.x>
- Bourhis, R. Y., Moïse, L. C., Perreault, S., & Senécal, S. (1997). Towards an interactive acculturation model: A social-psychological approach. *International Journal of Psychology*, 32(6), 369–386.
- Dimitrova, R., & Aydinli-Karakulak, A. (2016). Acculturation orientations mediate the link between religious identity and adjustment of Turkish-Bulgarian and Turkish-German adolescents. *Springer Plus*, 5, 1024. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s40064-016-2688-1>
- Elsbach, K. D., & Bhattacharya, C. B. (2001). Defining who you are by what you're not: Organizational disidentification and the National Rifle Association. *Organization Science*, 12, 393–413. <https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.12.4.393.10638>
- Gadzhiyev, K. (2010). Jetnonacional'naja i geopoliticheskaja identichnost' Kavkaza [Ethnonational and geopolitical identity of Caucasus]. *Mirovaja jekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otshosenija*, 2, 64–74.
- Galyapina, V. N., & Lebedeva, N. M. (2015). *The relationship between social identities and acculturation strategies of the ethnic minority and majority in the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania: An intergenerational analysis*. *NRU Higher School of Economics. Series PSY "Psychology"*. no. WP BRP 43/PSY/2015.
- Jade, Z., Kukva, E., Lyausheva, S., & Shadzhe, A. (2010). *Rossijskaja identichnost' na Severnom Kavkaze [Russian identity in the North Caucasus]*. Majkop: OOO «Kachestvo».
- Jasinskaja-lahti, I., Liebkind, K., & Solheim, E. (2009). To identify or not to identify? National disidentification as an alternative reaction to perceived ethnic discrimination. *Applied Psychology*, 58(1), 105–128. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.2008.00384.x>
- Kobakhidze, E. I. (2005). Integracionnye i dezintegracionnye processy v mezhdzhetnicheskom vzaimodejstvii na Severnom Kavkaze (na primere Respubliki Severnoj Osetii-Alanii i Kabardino-Balkarskoj Respublike) [Integration and disintegration processes in inter-ethnic cooperation in the North Caucasus (the case of the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania and Kabardino-Balkar Republic)]. *SOCIS*, 2, 66–74.
- Kreiner, G. E., & Ashforth, B. E. (2004). Evidence toward an expanded model of organizational identification. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 25, 1–27. <https://doi.org/10.1002/job.234>
- Lebedeva, N. M., & Tatarok, A. N. (2009). Sravnitel'nyj analiz strategij vzaimodejstvija migrantov i naselenija Rossii v Moskve i Stavropol'skom krae [Comparative analysis of intercultural strategies of migrants and Russian population in Moscow and Stavropol Territory]. In N. M. Lebedeva, & A. N. Tatarok (Eds.), *Strategii mezhdkul'turnogo vzaimodejstvija migrantov i naselenija Rossii: Sbornik nauchnykh statej [Strategy intercultural migrants and the population of Russia: Collection of scientific articles]* (pp. 334–374).
- Lepshokova, Z. K. (2012). *Strategii adaptacii migrantov i ih psihologicheskoe blagopoluchie (na primere Moskvy i Severnogo Kavkaza) [Adaptation strategies of migrants and their psychological well-being (the case of Moscow and the North Caucasus)]*. Moscow: Grifon.
- Lepshokova, Z. K., & Lebedeva, N. M. (2016). Vosprinimaemaja diskriminacija i akkul'turacija russkikh na Severnom Kavkaze: rol' nesovmestimosti jetnicheskoj i regional'noj identichnostej [Perceived

- discrimination and acculturation of Russians in the North Caucasus: The role of ethnic and regional identity incompatibility]. *Obshchestvennye nauki i sovremennost'*, 6, 125–138.
- Martinovic, B., & Verkuyten, M. (2016). Inter-religious feelings of Sunni and Alevi Muslim minorities: The role of religious commitment and host national identification. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 52, 1–12. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2016.02.005>
- Ogbu, J. (1993). Differences in cultural frame of reference. *International Journal of Behavioral Development*, 16, 483–506.
- Portes, A., & Zhou, M. (1993). The new second generation: Segmented assimilation and its variants. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 53, 74–97.
- Schwartz, S. J., Zamboanga, B. L., Rodriguez, L., & Wang, S. C. (2007). The structure of cultural identity in an ethnically diverse sample of emerging adults. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 29 (2), 159–173. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01973530701332229>
- Shadzhe, A. Ju. (2011). Pereosmyslivaja severokavkazskoe obshhestvo v novoj paradigme [Rethinking the North Caucasian society in the new paradigm]. In A. Ju. Shadzhe (Ed.), *Severnyj Kavkaz v fokuse rossijskoj identichnosti [North Caucasus in focus of Russian identity]* (pp. 58–83).
- Turovskij, R. F. (1999). Regional'naja identichnost' v sovremennoj Rossii [Regional identity in modern Russia]. In R. F. Turovskij (Eds.), *Rossijskoe obshhestvo: stanovlenie demokraticeskikh cennostej [Russian society: the formation of democratic values]* (pp. 87–136).
- Verkuyten, M. (2007). Religious group identification and inter-religious relations: A study among Turkish-Dutch Muslims. *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 10, 341–357. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430207078695>
- Verkuyten, M., & Yildiz, A. (2007). National (dis)identification and ethnic and religious identity: A study among Turkish-Dutch Muslims. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 33, 1148–1462. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167207304276>
- Ward, C. (2006). Acculturation, identity and adaptation in dual heritage adolescents. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 30(2), 243–259. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijintrel.2005.09.001>
- Yip, T. (2016). To be or not to be: How ethnic/racial stereotypes influence ethnic/racial disidentification and psychological mood. *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology*, 22(1), 38–46. <https://doi.org/10.1037/cdp0000046>

Zarina Lepshokova (Ph.D. in General Psychology, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia) is currently a senior researcher of the International Laboratory for Socio-Cultural Research and associate professor in the Department of Psychology at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. She is a Member of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP). She has published a monograph “Adaptation Strategies of Migrants and their Psychological well-being (the cases of Moscow and the North Caucasus)” and over 30 articles in the areas of acculturation and cross-cultural, intercultural, and social psychology with various colleagues. Her research interests focus on problems of intercultural relationships, mutual acculturation of ethnic minorities and majorities, multiple identities and their perceived incompatibility, social disidentification, and intergenerational transmission of values and social identity.

Nadezhda Lebedeva (Ph.D., Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences) is Professor in the Department of Psychology and Head of the International Laboratory for Socio-cultural Research at The National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. She is Academic Director of double degree Master Program on Applied Social Psychology of HSE, Russia, and Tilburg University, the Netherlands. She is a member of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP) and the International Academy for Intercultural Research (IAIR). She is the author/editor of 26 books and over 250 articles and book chapters on social and cross-cultural psychology. Her research interests are values, value transmission, identity, intercultural relations, acculturation, creativity and innovations, and social and cultural change.

The Great Escape: Linking Youth Identity Development to Growing Up in Post-Communist Romania



Oana Negru-Subtirica and Lavinia E. Damian

The concept of identity has its roots in theories of the self that highlight the role of intentionality and agency in human development, viewing life as being organized around the personal goals that individuals set and then pursue (Erikson, 1968, 1975). Erikson (1968, 1975) viewed identity development as the answer to the question “Who am I?” in different life domains (e.g., education, work, religion). Identity development is a core component of self-development in adolescence and emerging adulthood, with personal identity encompassing the coherent integration of personally relevant goals, beliefs, and values (Erikson, 1968, 1975; Schwartz et al., 2011). A coherent personal identity has a strong dimension of continuity across time and contexts, and it is associated with positive outcomes (e.g., life purpose, Schwartz, Côté, & Arnett, 2005).

A very interesting question arises when using this lens to analyze human development. How does identity development work in cultures where intentionality is an imported construct and where history has repeatedly confirmed that the context (e.g., political regimes, foreign occupations, wars) decides what the individual does? What happens when parents have been socialized in the manner that the context rules over their development (e.g., strict prescriptions of the communist regime), while their children have been socialized in the manner that they themselves rule over their own destiny?

Post-communist Romania is one such culture where over half a century of communism (i.e., from 1945 to 1989) and many centuries of foreign occupation before communism have crafted a stance on self-development and identity development that favored external attributions of success and failure (Djuvara, 2002). In many respects, the revolution of 1989 was a great escape that brought Romania the neoliberal discourse of self-determination and responsibility of the self for identity

O. Negru-Subtirica (✉) · L. E. Damian
Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
e-mail: ooanegru@psychology.ro; laviniamdamian@psychology.ro

development (Amable, 2011). This discourse has been highly present in the media, in school books, or in the personal development programs that were imported from other cultures (Carey, 2004; Fenton, 2011), bringing forward complex acculturation processes linked to globalization (Berry, 2008). When taking into account these antecedents of identity development in the Romanian culture, more in-depth analyses are needed to better understand how identity development works in today's Romanian youth and how their families contribute to identity development processes.

In this endeavor, the present chapter analyzes existing research on identity development in Romanian youth and integrates these findings into the post-communist cultural and socioeconomic context. First, we critically discuss processes of identity development in Romanian youth (i.e., identity commitment, identity exploration, identity reconsideration of commitment) for two ideological domains: education and vocation. Second, we investigate how the family context may influence the development of offspring's identity, by analyzing divergent (or convergent) parent-child perceptions of life success, academic success, and parenting strategies. Third, building on the previous analyses, we tackle possible trajectories of identity development in Romanian youth, looking at the bright and dark sides of growing up in Romania after the great escape from communism.

The Way We Are Now: Identity Development in Romanian Youth

The concept of personal identity and most research on identity development stem from North American (e.g., Erikson, 1968; Marcia, 1966) and West-European cultures, which have both an explicit and an implicit focus on individual intentionality and goal orientation (Berry, 1997). Stemming from the early work of Erikson and Marcia, recent models of personal identity have reorganized the identity discourse from the more fixed identity statuses (i.e., achievement, moratorium, foreclosure, diffusion) to the more dynamic identity processes, which can more accurately tap into intra- and interindividual differences in identity development (Phinney & Ong, 2007). The model proposed by Crocetti, Rubini, and Meeus (2008) distinguishes among three identity processes: *commitment* (i.e., stable and self-affirming choices that individuals make in various developmental domains), *in-depth exploration* (i.e., active monitoring of and reflection upon present commitments), and *reconsideration of commitment* (i.e., comparison of unsatisfactory current commitments with other possible alternatives, aimed at changing or optimizing these commitments). The model developed by Luyckx, Goossens, Soenens, and Beyers (2006) differentiates between two types of commitment (i.e., *commitment making* as the adherence to specific beliefs and *identification with commitment* as the internalization of these beliefs) and three processes of exploration (i.e., *exploration in breadth* of multiple identity choices, *exploration in depth* of a specific identity choice, and *ruminative*

exploration as doubts over making mistakes regarding identity choices). Porfeli, Lee, Vondracek, and Weigold (2011) drew on these leading identity process models and proposed a vocational identity model that encompasses three dimensions, each grouped into two processes: *vocational commitment* (i.e., vocational commitment making and vocational identification with commitment), *vocational exploration* (i.e., in-breadth and in-depth exploration), and *reconsideration of vocational commitments* (i.e., self-doubt and career flexibility).

Most longitudinal research on these identity processes indicates that as adolescents grow, they make more stable identity commitments that encompass the adherence to and the pursuit of personal goals that contribute to coherent self-development (Meeus, 2011). These strong commitments are the most adaptive when they are also backed up by extensive, diverse, and self-relevant exploration processes that lead to stronger and more flexible commitments or to the reconsideration of present commitments.

In Romania, the Transylvania Identity Development Study (TRAIDES, Negru-Subtirica, Pop, & Crocetti, 2015) is the first longitudinal study that investigated the development of adolescent identity through a three-wave design that spanned over one academic year. This study investigated identity processes pertaining to global future plans (Negru-Subtirica, Pop, Luyckx, Dezutter, & Steger, 2016) but also to specific identity domains such as education (Pop, Negru-Subtirica, Crocetti, Opre, & Meeus, 2016) and vocation (Negru-Subtirica et al., 2015). The sample ($N = 1151$) was balanced in terms of gender, type of school (university-bound schools versus work-bound schools), and age group (early-to-middle adolescents versus middle-to-late adolescents). Participants were of Romanian ethnicity. This study further nuanced and brought depth to existing cross-sectional research on identity development in youth of Romanian ethnicity (e.g., Negru, Pop, Damian, & Moraru, 2011; Negru, Pop, & Opre, 2013; Negru, Subțirică, & Opre, 2011). We will next analyze the results of this longitudinal study based on the identity processes that we previously detailed, further interpreting the findings through comparisons with other studies on identity development with Romanian youth.

Identity commitment processes decreased during one academic year in Romanian adolescents, both educational commitment (Pop et al., 2016) and identification with vocational commitments (Negru-Subtirica et al., 2015). Commitment making in the vocational domain remained stable across the school year. Regarding global future plans, commitment making and identification with commitment declined during the school year (Negru-Subtirica et al., 2016). These findings tend to highlight that the Romanian academic context does not provide a nurturing environment for the development of strong commitments regarding education, vocation, and global future plans. This can be linked to the very rigid structure of the Romanian high school system, as adolescents have very few curricular opportunities to choose school subjects based on their interests and personal goals (Musset, 2014). Additionally, they cannot change academic tracks very easily (e.g., from a university-bound track to a work-bound track). Therefore, it is very difficult for Romanian adolescents to internalize their educational and vocational commitments, as these commitments may remain externally guided choices throughout their schooling. More specifically, their

educational and vocational commitments may be guided by their parents, by the rigid curricular structure of their educational track, and by the manner in which they envision their educational and vocational future (Negru-Subtirica & Pop, 2016; Pop, Negru-Subtirica, & Opre, 2015).

Identity exploration processes declined during an academic year in terms of both educational in-depth exploration (Pop et al., 2016) and vocational in-depth exploration, while vocational in-breadth exploration remained stable across the school year (Negru-Subtirica et al., 2015). Interestingly, global future plans exploration in breadth declined longitudinally; ruminative exploration had a sharp increase, while exploration in depth remained stable across time (Negru-Subtirica et al., 2016). As exploration processes are key components of the development of stable yet flexible identities (Meeus, 2011), these findings bring forward a major developmental shortcoming of Romanian youth: A very limited focus on the investigation of personal goals in different life domains. As previously contended, the Romanian culture has had only a brief exercise in the affirmation of individual intentionality. In this respect, identity exploration processes are perhaps the most intentional and time-consuming endeavors in the context of identity development. They require extensive analyses of possible choices, active reflection upon these choices, hypothesis testing behaviors, to name but a few components (Meeus, 2011). The Romanian educational system is not centered on promoting individual choice and agency, as the promotion from one educational cycle to the next is mostly linked to the grades an adolescent has previously acquired and to the automatic, computerized distribution to specific schools, based on these grades (Damian, Negru-Subtirica, Pop, & Baban, 2016; Negru-Subtirica et al., 2015). Hence, the decline in educational and vocational in-depth exploration across a school year may be linked to the external attribution system that adolescents may have developed during their schooling (e.g., “somebody else decides what will happen to me next”). This is very problematic, because the school year is the best time for educational and vocational in-depth exploration, as it can be best facilitated by domain-specific information provided by academic subjects (e.g., Mathematics, Chemistry, foreign languages).

The reconsideration of identity commitments increased in both the educational and the vocational domains (Negru-Subtirica et al., 2015; Pop et al., 2016). In the career domain, vocational self-doubt (i.e., the anxiety and uncertainty adolescents experience in the face of career decision-making) and also career flexibility (i.e., openness to and readiness for future changes in occupational preferences and choices) intensified during the school year. Reconsideration of commitment increased, for educational and vocational identity especially in boys and in adolescents attending work-bound schools. These findings can be directly linked to the longitudinal dynamics of commitment and exploration processes. More specifically, weak commitments and decreasing exploration promote the questioning of the correctness of one’s choices. This trend is problematic when taking into account the important life decisions that adolescents have to make as they approach the end of high school (e.g., choice of a university). As the school year progressed, the increase in reconsideration of educational and vocational choices may indicate dissatisfaction with the educational system and also a lack of resources provided by the schools to accommodate developmental

doubts (e.g., “Is this the right educational track for me? Why do we really learn all these things in school?”). As a matter of fact, the results of the PISA study indicate that Romanian adolescents have very low levels of instrumental motivation to study, meaning that they do not comprehend how curricular contents help them in their education and career (OECD, 2013).

To conclude, for Romanian adolescents the span of one academic year encompassed a weakening of educational and vocational identity commitment and exploration processes and an increase in the reconsideration of educational and vocational commitments. These trends may influence or be influenced by the level of perceived personal agency that Romanian adolescents acquire developmentally. In turn, they may then craft dysfunctional developmental trajectories throughout emerging adulthood.

The Roots of a New Personal Identity: Collectivistic Parents Versus Individualistic Children

Personal identity is deeply rooted in the context in which it develops and parents are a central source of influence in the development of their offspring in post-communist Romania. In this segment we analyze the family context in which youth identity develops in Romania, using a cultural and socioeconomic framework of analysis.

The Romanian culture is mostly collectivistic, characterized by high power distance, avoidance of uncertainty, and low individualism (Hofstede, 2001; Hofstede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010). In this type of society, family is highly valued, and consequently people are very committed and loyal to their family, which has a great influence on individuals’ educational and vocational decisions and development. In Romania, children’s educational development and general well-being are the most important goals of parents (Negovan, Glăveanu, & Stănculescu, 2016; Robila, 2004a, 2004b). To this goal, Romanian parents offer a great amount of financial and emotional support and invest a lot in their children’s education (Bădescu, Comșa, Sandu, & Stănculescu, 2007; Negru, Haragâș, & Mustea, 2014). In addition, children also report having a close relationship with their parents (Negovan et al., 2016). However, it is known that adolescents from post-communist countries are adopting more individualistic values than their collectivistic parents, which creates a gap between the two generations (Friedlmeier & Gavreliuc, 2013). This is reflected in the way that the two generations conceptualize success in different life domains, indirectly influencing the development of youth identity development. We will next analyze three important aspects pertaining to the family context where youth personal identity develops: (1) parental conceptualizations of life success that integrate the central role of luck and fate, (2) the role of academic success in Romanian families, and (3) parental behaviors and attitudes that play an important role in the development of Romanian youth’s autonomy.

First, we focus on the integration of *luck and fate in the conceptualization of life success* (i.e., external attributions for success). In a qualitative study with Romanian emerging adults (born post-communism) and their parents (born and raised during communism), researchers asked both sides what they think are the key ingredients of having financial success (Negru-Subtirica, Damian, & Friedlmeier, 2015). Preliminary results indicated that emerging adults answered that the key ingredients of financial success were personal traits (62.9%) (e.g., perseverance, honesty, courage, trust, ambition, patience, devotion, charisma) and personal goals and behaviors (37.1%) (e.g., finishing school and finding a well-paid job that you like, spending within your budget, appreciating what you have, but also trying to do better, by saving money every once in a while). Parents' view was that the key ingredients of financial success were personal traits plus luck/chance (61.6%) (e.g., wisdom, will, stubbornness, positive thinking, honesty, intelligence, and a little bit of luck) and personal goals and behaviors plus luck/chance (38.4%) (e.g., identifying and using opportunities at the right moment, and sometimes taking risks, knowing beforehand the sum of money you can spend after you paid all your bills and your debts). Beliefs and values on what it takes to be financially successful differed in parents and their children in proportion of 53.3%. These results bring a very interesting perspective on the clash of life values between parents and children in post-communist Romania. Parents viewed financial success by integrating the component of luck or chance in their appraisals, while their children focused solely on personality traits and personal goals. Interdisciplinary analyses of the Romanian culture highlighted that generations born and raised under communism have a high tendency to attribute their failure/success to fate, which is often conceptualized as an inexorable force that decides a person's future (Nedelcea, Ciorbea, Ciorbea, Iliescu, & Minulescu, 2014). The fact that these external attributions were present solely in parental descriptions of financial success is an example of divergence in terms of values and beliefs between collectivistic parents and more individualistic children. Additionally, it brings into focus a possible mechanism that operates in families in the process of personal identity construction in Romanian youth. Namely, parents may not adequately equip their offspring with the skills and beliefs mandatory for living in a capitalist society (e.g., a strong focus on the role of personal goals and actions), as they may believe that fate is a stronger force in deciding their children's future.

Second, we discuss the *role of academic success* in Romanian families. Parents of current-day Romanian adolescents and emerging adults grew up during communism, when higher education was very difficult to access because of the low number of students permitted by the state. University studies offered a very high socioeconomic status back then (cf. Damian et al., 2016). Consequently, current-day parents are doing their best at offering their children what they did not have or did not obtain easily: university education (Muller & Kogan, 2010; Robila, 2004b). This context created greater academic competition especially in domains that offer a high socioeconomic status (cf. Damian et al., 2016). On the one hand, some parents offered academic support for their children to succeed. Romanian adolescents who perceived high academic support from their parents also perceived that they enjoy family activities, that they have a good family life, that their parents monitor them, and that they have a

good bonding with them (Negru, Damian, & Băban, 2010). On the other hand, the high academic competition and the high importance that Romanian parents attributed to academic success may have resulted in higher parental pressure for academic performance. This pressure that parents exerted on their adolescent children contributed to the development of socially prescribed perfectionism in Romanian adolescents (i.e., perceiving that other people expect them to be perfect and will accept them only if they meet these expectations) (Damian, Stoeber, Negru, & Băban, 2013). Preliminary findings from another two-wave study conducted with Romanian adolescents showed that perceived parental psychological control predicted increases whereas perceived parental responsiveness and autonomy support predicted decreases in adolescents' socially prescribed perfectionism and in perfectionistic self-presentation (i.e., trying to create a perfect image of oneself in front of others) (Damian, Negru-Subtirica, Stoeber, & Pop, 2016). Moreover, Romanian adolescents' high academic success came with the cost of developing perfectionistic strivings and concerns (Damian, Stoeber, Negru-Subtirica, & Băban, 2016). But high perfectionistic strivings in Romanian adolescents led, in turn, to higher cognitive school engagement (Damian, Stoeber, Negru-Subtirica, & Băban, 2017). In addition, Romanian adolescents' high academic achievement was associated with a mastery avoidance orientation. Namely, Romanian adolescents who achieved high grades at school also had higher levels of goal orientations directed at avoiding the loss of competence, learning, and mastery of a task (Damian, Stoeber, Negru, & Băban, 2014). Because of the unstable socioeconomic context in current-day Romania, parents not only offer academic support but also financial support for their children throughout their studies and sometimes even after graduation (Damian et al., 2016). Hence, Romanian youth become autonomous and financially independent of their parents very late in life in comparison with other countries (Negru, 2012; Nelson, 2009).

Third, we analyze *parental behaviors and attitudes that play an important role in the development of Romanian youth's autonomy*. One key element of being an autonomous adult is financial independence. Parents are the most important agents of financial socialization in their children and also play a key role in providing financial support for their children's education (Shim, Serido, Tang, & Card, 2015). As Romanian university students have reduced work opportunities and experiences, their parents provide full financial support in the majority of cases (Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency—P9 Eurydice, 2012; Muller & Kogan, 2010). Preliminary results of a study with Romanian emerging adults (i.e., first-year university students, post-communism born children) and their parents (i.e., born and raised during communism) showed that parental autonomy support predicts children's financial knowledge and healthy financial behaviors. Conversely, low parental psychological control predicted healthy financial behaviors. In addition, high parental behavioral control predicted high financial control in emerging adults (Damian, Negru-Subtirica, & Friedlmeier, 2015). Interestingly, the majority of Romanian emerging adults participating in the study thought that their parents have the obligation to financially support children's university education. Even more interestingly, Romanian emerging adults who planned to work during studies saved money for a specific goal, perceived their parents as having healthier financial behaviors, and had

parents who report higher psychological control (but not as perceived by children), independent of their socioeconomic status. However, emerging adults who were financially supported by their parents perceived their parents as exerting more psychological control and less autonomy support which was agreed upon by the parents who also reported less healthy financial behaviors in their children, independent of their socioeconomic status (Damian et al., 2015).

Summing up, we first highlighted that Romanian parental conceptualizations of life success (i.e., financial success) integrate the pervasive role of luck and fate, while their children do not incorporate these dimensions in their representations of financial success. This finding may be an indicator of life value differences between the two generations. Second, we analyzed the role of academic success in Romanian families, bringing forward that high levels of academic success and extensive schooling are core components of youth development in Romania. Third, in terms of parental behaviors and attitudes that facilitate youth's autonomy, we underscored that Romanian emerging adults perceive that parental behavioral control helps them manage their money better, that is, helps them be more autonomous.

The Great Escape: Where Do We Go from Here?

Socioeconomic changes are inevitable. But some socioeconomic changes may slowly create peculiar tracks of development, which need to be more carefully analyzed in the specific context where they occur, in order to find the best way to comb out the "good" (adaptive) peculiarities from the "bad" (maladaptive) peculiarities. Romania has come a long way from the isolated communist country of the 1989 revolution. The avalanche of changes, in terms of consumerist values, individualistic orientations, and the import of "best practices" in all life fields, from education, to work, and lifestyle, have created disorientation in younger generations. Hence, a question that arises from all these changes is: What next?

What Next for the Educational Identity of Romanian Youth?

The Romanian educational system has encountered multiple and sometimes contradictory changes in the past decades. The numerous changes of ministers of education (i.e., 14 ministers of education between 1989 and 2016) have led to numerous transformations of the school curriculum and of educational outcome priorities (e.g., low dropout rate, high grades, more school subjects). These changes referred to the types of examinations students have to take during a school year, to the characteristics of graduation exams, and to graduation requirements at the end of an educational cycle (e.g., primary school, middle school, and high school). Additionally, the increasing role of middle school grades for high school admittance and then high school grades for university admittance have created a vicious cycle which led

to grade inflation through escalating pressure on school teachers to give students very good grades. This somewhat dysfunctional context influenced the development of adolescents' educational identity. As a recent longitudinal study indicated (Pop et al., 2016), academic achievement drives adolescents' educational identity, with boys and vocational school students being at risk for higher levels of reconsideration of educational commitments due to lower academic achievement.

In the near future, Romanian adolescents' educational identity will most probably remain closely linked to their academic achievement, as the type and quality of the next educational level they can access will mostly depend on the grades they receive in their current educational level. At personal level, educational commitments will become stronger especially for adolescents who perform well in school (Damian et al., 2016; Pop et al., 2015). A problematic aspect, which should be more actively integrated in school counseling policies, refers to the level of educational in-depth exploration of current educational choices. Identity theory and research have extensively highlighted that the most adaptive identity status is achievement, which is characterized by high levels of commitment, reinforced by high levels of exploration (see Meeus, 2011 for a review). Strong commitments that are not supported by ongoing exploratory strivings will become more rigid in the future and will not successfully face changing socioeconomic contexts or personal failure experiences. For instance, an adolescent who is strongly committed to studying biology and who focuses exclusively on this school subject, but does not thoroughly explore how biology can be integrated in an occupation, will not be prepared for the unstable Romanian labor market. Therefore, this adolescent's strong commitment to this academic field will most likely clash with the unstructured nature of the Romanian labor market for this occupational field and with the very limited number of job vacancies. In this respect, strong educational commitments throughout adolescence will remain valuable and adaptive throughout emerging adulthood and adulthood when they are gradually crafted and calibrated through educational in-depth exploration. This pursuit is necessary in order to guide adolescents toward stronger commitments or toward reconsideration of current educational commitments.

In Romania, few adolescents change the educational path they previously embarked on, in a voluntary and personally driven manner, due to high rigidity of the educational system (Musset, 2014). Hence, it would appear that the culturally accepted educational identity development path in adolescence does not include reconsideration of educational commitments. This would imply that adolescents who want to change the school they attend or their school profile (e.g., from science-focused profile to foreign languages profile) may be viewed as outsiders or even ostracized for their decision to reconsider their educational commitment (Musset, 2014). This maladaptive link between the freedom of personal choice regarding one's educational path and the inflexibility of the Romanian educational system may lead to a thwarted path of educational development, where the desire to change an educational path may be interpreted as being indicative of personal weaknesses.

At a relational level, it may be that families and peers will provide differential support to adolescents who will remain in the educational system throughout their emerging adulthood, as university students, compared to the ones who will leave the

educational system and will find employment in order to gain financial independence. The former category will be supported by their family and friends to maintain strong educational commitments, while the latter will gradually become more detached from this life domain (i.e., education), as work will become the primary life domain (Karaś, Ciecuch, Negru, & Crocetti, 2015). Again, the interplay between educational in-depth exploration and reconsideration of current educational commitments is very important for both developmental trajectories. On the one hand, for adolescents who prepare for university studies, this choice would be strengthened by in-depth analyses of implications and requirements of university education. As in Romania parents offer the primary guidance throughout the educational development of their offspring, their role is central in this endeavor, also because they can facilitate access to professionals working in a specific field or to universities (European Commission, Special EUROBAROMETER 369, 2011). On the other hand, for adolescents who will become workers after the end of high school, the same in-depth analyses supported by families and friends could help them better understand how their education can help them gain occupational qualifications that are recognized in the European Union and in other parts of the world for better flexibility and adaptability.

What Next for the Vocational Identity of Romanian Youth?

In the twenty-first century, labor markets will become more flexible and unstable, due to factors such as labor migration, automatization of labor, externalization of low-qualified work, and changes of work characteristics due to increased use of computer-mediated communication (Blustein, 2008). These changes influence the development of youth vocational identity in a differential manner, depending on the level of country affluence, the characteristics of the community where youth live, the socioeconomic level of their families, and the type of school they attend. These systems dynamically influence each other, creating a unique context which supports or inhibits the development of youth vocational identity (Patton & McMahon, 2014).

In the case of Romania, as existing longitudinal studies pointed out, processes of reconsideration of vocational commitments increase across a school year (i.e., vocational flexibility, vocational self-doubt), doubled by a decrease of identification with current occupational commitments and also a decline of occupational in-depth exploration (Negru-Subtirica et al., 2015). When analyzed in the socioeconomic context of Romania, these findings are a bit troubling, as it appears that an academic year does not strengthen occupational commitments, but it weakens them, especially in boys, vocational school students, and middle-to-late adolescents. Due to the structure of the Romanian educational system, adolescents have few to no work experiences during their schooling and are financially dependent on their families (Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency—P9 Eurydice, 2012; Muller & Kogan, 2010). In turn, their parents consider that their offspring's main duty is to study and to get a good education (Robila, 2004a, 2004b). While a strong

focus on academic development is important for academic success, the development of adolescents' vocational identity cannot organically occur without active exploration of and reflection upon different occupations, occupational requirements, and occupational paths (Skorikov & Vondracek, 2011).

Work is a prospective life domain for many adolescents. The worker role remains a life role that adolescents know that they will tackle in a rather distant future, without understanding exactly what the implications of choosing one occupation over another may be. Therefore, many Romanian adolescents make vocational commitments not so much based on personal experiences (e.g., one chooses to become a carpenter because he/she worked as a carpenter during summer holidays) but based on the experiences of role models (e.g., parents, siblings, relatives) or based on occupational portrayals in the media (e.g., lawyers from various sitcoms). For instance, the Eurobarometer survey on the topic of vocational and educational development pointed out that 66% of Romanian youth that participated in the survey ($N = 1075$) indicated that their family is their main source of educational advice (European Commission, Special Eurobarometer 369, 2011). This reduced direct occupational exploration may weaken occupational commitments longitudinally, especially when youth will face new and complex learning tasks. For instance, a law school student who chose this occupational path because of the advice of his/her family will face many difficulties in adjusting his/her learning style to the intense requirements of learning for exams during university studies. Hence, his/her occupational commitment will probably be weakened due to the limited occupational exploration during adolescence, and he/she may reconsider this occupational choice.

In this bleak context, Romanian school counseling programs could focus on facilitating vocational learning experiences for middle school and high school students. In this respect, existing programs developed by Romanian universities (e.g., the Junior Summer University organized by Babes-Bolyai University: <http://jsu.osubb.ro/>) offer high school students access to academic learning experiences in an open context, where they can ask questions regarding occupational prospects for different lines of study. Additionally, programs that aim at actively involving parents of adolescents in an open process of vocational decision-making are much needed in Romania. As existing studies indicate, parents play a key role in the vocational and financial development of their offspring (e.g., Damian et al., 2015, 2016; Negru-Subtirica et al., 2015). In many respects, the intergenerational transmission of occupational and financial values is unidirectional in Romanian families, from parents to children. This can make adolescents and then emerging adults more vulnerable to sudden changes in occupational dynamics (e.g., an occupational field is weakened due to new European Union labor regulations) or to changes in personal life circumstances (e.g., an emerging adult decides to enter labor migration in order to achieve financial independence and suddenly drops out of university). Parents generally play a key role in the vocational development of their offspring (Whiston & Keller, 2004). Still, the generation gap between Romanian parents raised and socialized during communism and Romanian children raised and socialized in capitalism may bring forward many conflicting attitudes regarding what represents "a great job" or what role education plays in vocational and work development.

Conclusion

In this chapter we outlined the mutual interdetermination between the socioeconomic context of post-communist Romania and the development of educational and vocational identity of Romanian youth. First, we analyzed the development of identity processes in Romanian adolescents, highlighting that, across a school year, educational, vocational, and future goal commitments show a decreasing trend, doubled by declines in identity exploration processes, and increases in reconsideration of commitment processes. Second, based on existing cross-sectional and longitudinal studies on Romanian youth, we underscored the domineering role of external (e.g., parenting, structure of academic institutions) factors that shape young people's educational and vocational identities. Last, we proposed potential paths of identity development in these two life domains, focusing on the points of vulnerability, but also on the strengths that Romanian youth can capitalize on, in order to gradually become "the best of whatever they are."

Acknowledgments This work was partially supported by a grant of the Romanian National Authority for Scientific Research and Innovation, CNCS—UEFISCDI, project number PN-II-RU-TE-2014-4-1061. We thank Eleonara Ioana Pop for her thoughtful comments on the manuscript.

References

- Amable, B. (2011). Morals and politics in the ideology of neo-liberalism. *Socio-Economic Review*, 9, 3–30.
- Bădescu, G., Comșa, M., Sandu, D., & Stănculescu, M. (2007). *Barometrul de Opinie Publică 1998–2007 [Barometer for Public Opinion 1998–2007]*. Bucharest: SOROS Foundation.
- Berry, J. (1997). Immigration, acculturation and adaptation. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 46, 5–68.
- Berry, J. W. (2008). Globalisation and acculturation. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 32, 328–336.
- Blustein, D. L. (2008). The role of work in psychological health and well-being: A conceptual, historical, and public policy perspective. *American Psychologist*, 63, 228–240.
- Carey, H. F. (2004). *Romania since 1989: Politics, economics, and society*. Oxford: Lexington Books.
- Crocetti, E., Rubini, M., & Meeus, W. (2008). Capturing the dynamics of identity formation in various ethnic groups: Development and validation of a three dimensional model. *Journal of Adolescence*, 31, 207–222.
- Damian, L. E., Negru-Subtirica, O., & Friedlmeier, M. (2015, October). *Financial knowledge, control, and behaviors in emerging adults: The role of parents*. Paper session presented at the 7th Conference on Emerging Adulthood, Miami, FL, USA.
- Damian, L. E., Negru-Subtirica, O., Pop, E. I., & Baban, A. (2016). The costs of being the best: Consequences of academic achievement on students' identity, perfectionism, and vocational development. In A. Montgomery & I. Kehoe (Eds.), *Reimagining the purpose of schools and educational organisations: Developing critical thinking, agency, beliefs in schools and educational organisations* (pp. 173–188). New York: Springer.

- Damian, L. E., Negru-Subtirica, O., Stoeber, J., & Pop, E. I. (2016, July). *On the development of perfectionism and perfectionistic self-presentation in adolescents: The role of parental behaviors*. Paper session presented at the Perfectionism Network Meeting, Canterbury, UK.
- Damian, L., Stoeber, J., Negru, O., & Băban, A. (2013). On the development of perfectionism in adolescence: Perceived parental expectations predict longitudinal increases in socially prescribed perfectionism. *Personality and Individual Differences, 55*, 688–693.
- Damian, L. E., Stoeber, J., Negru, O., & Băban, A. (2014). Perfectionism and achievement goal orientations in adolescent school students. *Psychology in the Schools, 51*, 960–971.
- Damian, L. E., Stoeber, J., Negru-Subtirica, O., & Băban, A. (2016). On the development of perfectionism: The longitudinal role of academic achievement and academic efficacy. *Journal of Personality, 85*(4), 565–577.
- Damian, L. E., Stoeber, J., Negru-Subtirica, O., & Băban, A. (2017). Perfectionism and school engagement: A three-wave longitudinal study. *Personality and Individual Differences, 105*, 179–184.
- Djuvara, N. M. (2002). *O scurtă istorie a românilor: Povestită celor tineri [A brief history of the Romanians: Told to the young]*. București: Humanitas.
- Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency—P9 Eurydice. (2012). *Key data on education in Europe 2012*. Available from http://eacea.ec.europa.eu/education/eurydice/documents/key_data_series/134EN.pdf
- Erikson, E. H. (1968). *Identity: Youth and crisis*. New York: Norton.
- Erikson, E. H. (1975). *Life history and the historical moment*. New York: Norton.
- European Commission, Special EUROBAROMETER 369. (2011). *TNS opinion and social: Attitudes towards vocational education and training*. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_369_sum_en.pdf
- Fenton, N. (2011). Deregulation or democracy? New media, news, neoliberalism and the public interest. *Continuum, 25*, 63–72.
- Friedlmeier, M., & Gavreliuc, A. (2013). Value orientations and perception of social change in postcommunist Romania. In I. Albert & D. Ferring (Eds.), *Intergenerational relationships in society and family: European perspectives* (pp. 119–130). Bristol: Policy Press.
- Hofstede, G. (2001). *Culture's consequences: Comparing values, behaviors, institutions, and organizations across nations* (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Hofstede, G., Hofstede, G. J., & Minkov, M. (2010). *Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind. Revised and expanded* (3rd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Karaš, D., Ciecuch, J., Negru, O., & Crocetti, E. (2015). Relationships between identity and well-being in Italian, Polish, and Romanian emerging adults. *Social Indicators Research, 121*, 727–743.
- Luyckx, K., Goossens, L., Soenens, B., & Beyers, W. (2006). Unpacking commitment and exploration: Preliminary validation of an integrative model of late adolescent identity formation. *Journal of Adolescence, 29*, 361–378.
- Marcia, J. E. (1966). Development and validation of ego-identity status. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 3*, 551–558.
- Meeus, W. (2011). The study of adolescent identity formation 2000–2010. A review of longitudinal and narrative research. *Journal of Research on Adolescence, 21*, 75–94.
- Muller, W., & Kogan, I. (2010). Education. In S. Immerfall & G. Therborn (Eds.), *Handbook of European societies: Social transformations in the 21st century* (pp. 217–290). New York: Springer.
- Musset, P. (2014). A skills beyond school commentary on Romania. *OECD reviews of vocational education and training*. Available from <https://search.oecd.org/countries/romania/ASkillsBeyondSchoolCommentaryOnRomania.pdf>
- Nedelcea, C., Ciorbea, I., Ciorbea, V., Iliescu, D., & Minulescu, M. (2014). Resilience and personality. Orientation to failure as personality trait of Romanian people viewed from a historical perspective. In S. Ionescu, M. Tomiță, & S. Căce (Eds.), *From person to society* (pp. 747–752). Bologna, Italy: Medimond.

- Negovan, V., Glăveanu, V. P., & Stănculescu, E. (2016). Mapping psychological well-being: The case of children and adolescents in Romania. In B. K. Nastasi & A. P. Borja (Eds.), *International handbook of psychological well-being in children and adolescents* (pp. 151–170). New York: Springer.
- Negru, O. (2012). The time of your life: Emerging adulthood characteristics in a sample of Romanian high-school and university students. *Cognition, Brain, Behavior. An Interdisciplinary Journal*, *16*, 357–367.
- Negru, O., Damian, L., & Băban, A. (2010). Parents and children in Romania: The influence of family culture dimensions on parental involvement in children's academic life. *Journal of Child and Adolescent Psychology*, *1*, 31–49.
- Negru, O., Haragăș, C., & Mustea, A. (2014). How private is the relation with God? Religiosity and family religious socialization in Romanian emerging adults. *Journal of Adolescent Research*, *29*, 380–406.
- Negru, O., Pop, I. E., Damian, L., & Moraru, C. (2011). Aspirations and identity processes in the meaningful development of future teachers. *Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences*, *11*, 102–106.
- Negru, O., Pop, E. I., & Opre, A. (2013). Foreshadowing identities: The relation between achievement goals and educational identity in a sample of Romanian emerging adults. *Cognition, Brain, Behavior. An Interdisciplinary Journal*, *17*, 1–13.
- Negru, O., Subțirică, A., & Opre, A. (2011). The dynamics of aspirations in emerging adulthood. *Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences*, *12*, 205–210.
- Negru-Subtirica, O., Damian, L. E., & Friedlmeier, M. (2015, October). *What does it take to be financially successful? Views of emerging adults versus their parents*. Paper session presented at the 7th Conference on Emerging Adulthood, Miami, FL, USA.
- Negru-Subtirica, O., & Pop, E. I. (2016). Longitudinal links between career adaptability and academic achievement in adolescence. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, *93*, 163–170.
- Negru-Subtirica, O., Pop, E. I., & Crocetti, E. (2015). Developmental trajectories and reciprocal associations between career adaptability and vocational identity: A three-wave longitudinal study with adolescents. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, *88*, 131–142.
- Negru-Subtirica, O., Pop, E. I., Luyckx, K., Dezutter, J., & Steger, M. F. (2016). The meaningful identity: A longitudinal look at the interplay between identity and meaning in life in adolescence. *Developmental Psychology*, *52*, 1926–1936.
- Nelson, L. J. (2009). An examination of emerging adulthood in Romanian college students. *International Journal of Behavioral Development*, *33*, 402–411.
- OECD. (2013). *PISA 2012 results: Ready to learn: Students' engagement, drive, and self-beliefs* (Vol. III). PISA: OECD Publishing.
- Patton, W., & McMahon, M. (2014). *Career development and systems theory: Connecting theory and practice* (3rd ed.). Rotterdam: Sense.
- Phinney, J. S., & Ong, A. D. (2007). Conceptualization and measurement of ethnic identity: Current status and future directions. *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, *54*, 271–281.
- Pop, E. I., Negru-Subtirica, O., Crocetti, E., Opre, A., & Meeus, W. (2016). On the interplay between academic achievement and educational identity: A longitudinal study. *Journal of Adolescence*, *47*, 135–144.
- Pop, E. I., Negru-Subtirica, O., & Opre, A. (2015). Challenging or conserving your beliefs: A person-centered approach of pre-service teachers' educational identity. *Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences*, *187*, 147–152.
- Porfeli, E. J., Lee, B., Vondracek, F. W., & Weigold, I. K. (2011). A multi-dimensional measure of vocational identity status. *Journal of Adolescence*, *34*, 853–871.
- Robila, M. (2004a). Families in Eastern Europe: Context, trends and variations. In M. Robila (Ed.), *Families in Eastern Europe* (pp. 1–14). New York: Elsevier.
- Robila, M. (2004b). Child development and family functioning within Romanian context. In M. Robila (Ed.), *Families in Eastern Europe* (pp. 141–154). New York: Elsevier.

- Schwartz, S. J., Côté, J. E., & Arnett, J. J. (2005). Identity and agency in emerging adulthood two developmental routes in the individualization process. *Youth & Society, 37*, 201–229.
- Schwartz, S. J., Klimstra, T. A., Luyckx, K., Hale, W. W., Frijns, T., Oosterwegel, A., et al. (2011). Daily dynamics of personal identity and self-concept clarity. *European Journal of Personality, 25*, 373–385.
- Shim, S., Serido, J., Tang, C., & Card, N. (2015). Socialization processes and pathways to healthy financial development for emerging young adults. *Journal of Applied Developmental Psychology, 38*, 29–38.
- Skorikov, V. B., & Vondracek, F. W. (2011). Occupational identity. In S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, & V. L. Vignoles (Eds.), *Handbook of identity theory and research* (pp. 693–714). New York: Springer.
- Whiston, S. C., & Keller, B. K. (2004). The influences of the family of origin on career development a review and analysis. *The Counseling Psychologist, 32*, 493–568.

Oana Negru-Subtirica (Ph.D.) is a senior lecturer at the Department of Psychology, Babes-Bolyai University, Romania. Her research investigates structures and processes involved in the development of intentionality and agency in adolescence and emerging adulthood, from the perspective of identity formation, motivation, and goals. She coordinated and worked as a member in over 20 national and international projects. She is a founding member of the Society for the Study of Emerging Adulthood and national representative in the European Association for Research on Adolescence. She authored over 38 scientific articles of which 18 are in WOS-indexed journals, 16 books and book chapters, and has coordinated 5 fully funded grants.

Lavinia E. Damian (Ph.D.) is an assistant professor at the Department of Psychology, Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences, Babes-Bolyai University, teaching school psychology, vocational counseling, and mental health promotion in children and adolescents. Starting 2010, her research is focused on the development and consequences of perfectionism in adolescents. Some of her research has been published in prestigious international journals and has been the first to show the role of academic achievement in the development of perfectionism and the role of perfectionism in the development of anxiety symptoms in adolescents. She coauthored 12 scientific papers, 5 book chapters, 3 books, and published one book as single author.

Negotiating Identity and Belonging After Regime Change: Hungarian Society and Roma in Post-Communist Hungary



Jekatyerina Dunajeva

“What makes a Hungarian a true Hungarian? That he considers Hungary his home and does something about it! [. . .] We don’t need parasites and leeches! [. . .] The person is worth as much as he contributes to the society. Gypsies are useless individuals if they just have to be supported.”

Non-Roma teacher

“Despite my [Roma] ethnic origin, I have a clean and respectful job! They [gaje] see that I am a Gypsy, but I work. . .and that’s why they respect me!”

61-year-old Roma woman

“The only problem is that there are no jobs. . . Hungarians have hard time finding employment nowadays, let alone Gypsies. As a Gypsy. . . you have to work three times as hard.”

Roma man

Introduction

Many countries in the post-socialist region are currently undergoing a new phase of nation building and can be categorized as “nationalizing states” (Brubaker, 1996, 2009, 2011).¹ In this environment conducive to nationalism, the recent economic crisis also greatly contributed to redefining collective identity, leading to exclusionary attitudes and “deepen[ing] a racialization process” (Huub van Baar, quoted in

¹Brubaker defines nationalizing states as “states that are conceived by their dominant elites as nation-states, as states of and for particular nations, yet as ‘incomplete’ or ‘unrealized’ nation-states, as insufficiently ‘national in a variety of senses’” (Brubaker, 1996, p. 411).

J. Dunajeva (✉)

Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Budapest, Hungary

Annicchiarico, 2013, para. 3). Indicative of this change is the rise of extreme right parties' popularity across the continent (e.g., Calance, 2012; Friedman, 2006; Ward, 2011); the Euro Crisis further strengthened far-right parties, "leading many frustrated by a stagnant economy to embrace xenophobia and social conservatism" (Houskeeper, Stocker, & Zuckerman, 2015).

This chapter² examines how the changing political and economic context—namely, the fusion of economic concerns and nationalist claims in contemporary Hungary—has transformed the attitudes toward Roma, consequently changing the value system of Roma minority and necessitating new coping mechanisms. Based on fieldwork observations, three themes emerged as the most pressing for Roma: economic inequality, the ambiguous role of education, and growing xenophobia especially in relation to the growing anti-Western sentiments in the country as well as the popularity of far-right ideologies.

More precisely, in order to unpack the narrative on *collective belonging* after regime change in Hungary, the chapter discusses (1) the economic transformation after regime change and its effects on Roma; (2) xenophobia, increasingly characteristic of the Hungarian society; and (3) coping mechanisms that Roma developed in the context of growing racism and economic hardships. The chapter proceeds in the following way: In order to understand the antecedent factors of regime change, I first describe how nationhood and belonging was perceived during Socialism. I assess the hardships of Roma brought about with the regime change and supplement this section with fieldwork observations revealing common nostalgic feelings about Socialist times. Many Roma lamented and were longing for the "old times" when most had jobs and felt as useful members of society. Today's high unemployment led large segments of the Roma community feeling isolated, inadequate, and ostracized. Second, I look at how regime change and the crisis of 2008 resulted in rising xenophobia and anti-Gypsyism in the region. There are deep historical roots of anti-Gypsyism and institutionalized racist practices in Hungary. The last section examines how Roma respond to the evolving conditions of xenophobia. Based on fieldwork observations, I suggest that Roma can either (1) benefit from various educational initiatives, which may result in a disconnect from their communities, (2) internalize stereotypes, or (3) assimilate.

Theoretical Background

This chapter relies on theories of nationhood and nation building in order to unpack how the sense of belonging was shaped over time, which groups were excluded, what were the mechanisms of exclusion, and how coping mechanisms were

²This paper was originally written for the *Summer School on Citizens Resilience in Times of Crisis*, in Florence, Italy, in July 2015, and later presented during the Annual Meeting of Gypsy Lore Society in Chisinau, Moldova, in September 2015.

developed by those deemed as the “outsiders.” Nation building is an ideological process, which embraces a certain definition of nation and belonging. “Emerging nation-states developed grand narratives of collective belonging in order to connect cultural distinctiveness with territory,” writes Ilcan (2002, p. 4). Importantly, the process of nation building is ongoing, and the accompanying narratives are not static but change over time, and “involve the mobilization of categories for generating cultural portrayals of homeland [and citizens]” (Ilcan, 2002, p. 5).

Nationhood and belonging are rooted in dominant political ideologies; consequently, times of profound political and economic upheavals allow for reconceptualization of nationhood, redefining which groups belong and which do not. In Hungary, regime change was clearly a transformative period: economic liberalization and the process of democratization all brought about major changes in how nationhood was conceptualized and how minorities were defined. The changes did not benefit everyone, however.

Arguably, democracy has a hostile side, especially toward outsiders; Roma are a prime example of the uncertainties of democracy, when “paranoia has perforated debates on admission to citizenship, on migration, and on social policy... This appears in a zigzag treatment of people who are neither inside nor outside the polity” (Gunsteren, 1998, p. 43). In order to uphold democratic values, citizens must learn how to “deal with emotions and emotion-steered practices that come with experience and processing of this kind of plurality” (Gunsteren, 1998, pp. 43–44).

After regime change, Hungary became a “nationalizing state,” or a “state that [is] conceived by their dominant elites as nation-states, as states of and for particular nations, yet as ‘incomplete’ or ‘unrealized’ nation-states, as insufficiently ‘national in a variety of senses” (Brubaker, 1996, p. 411). Regime change left an ideological vacuum—as countries in the region embarked anew on state and nation building, and these processes often evoked strong nationalism and in the case of Hungary even stronger irredentism. While the political elite largely represented the core nation, and “the new state [came to be] seen as having the right, indeed the responsibility to protect and promote the cultural, economic, demographic and political vitality of the core nation” (Brubaker, 1996, p. 432; Brubaker, 2009, p. 203), the Roma seemed to have fallen out of the “core nation” category, forming a peculiar “underclass” (Ladányi & Széleányi, 2006). In Hungary, the nationalist discourse often draws on primordial conceptualization of nation, accompanied by revisionist claims and defensive guarding of Hungarian national values.

Method

This research is primarily based on fieldwork observations, conducted in 2012–2013, secondary literature, examination of media sources, and analysis of the most recent events and policies that target Roma communities in Hungary. Fieldwork data collection mainly involved semi-structured and open-ended interviews, content analysis of media sources, discourse analysis, as well as participant

observation primarily in educational institutions. Schools, in fact, proved to be fruitful sites to study identity and belonging. Indeed, historically nation building was linked by mass education (e.g., Boli et al., 1985; Boli, 1989; Meyer et al., 1979). Schools are embedded in and reflect national cultures, sense of belonging, and practices of exclusion as well.

Ethnographic research was conducted in a Roma settlement near the capital, which had a rapidly increasing population of about 500 at the time of fieldwork. According to the data compiled by a local charity, the average age in the community was approximately 20 years, indicating high birth rates and poor health standards. Only a sixth of all households had running water inside their homes. The population was rather diverse, and conflicts rested on a generational divide, interethnic tensions, and anxiety between newcomers and established residents.

Besides detailed field notes, I have recorded over 50 interviews with teachers, directors, and community leaders, as well as over 30 interviews with Roma parents and young adults. I also have voluminous recordings from roundtables, public events, and public local gatherings pertaining to Roma education. Fieldwork observations in this chapter are all anonymized.

Socialism and Regime Change in Hungary: Roma Identity and Belonging

Roma During State Socialism and Regime Change

Following the underlying economic and political belief system in Socialist Hungary, which called for a homogenous working class imbued with Marxist-Leninist ideology, the attitude toward Roma was characterized by fierce assimilation: To transform the entire society, what was needed is collectivization, industrialization, and a cultural revolution, which would replace the “antiquated customs” with “scientific ideology” (Slezkine, 1994, p. 219).³ Backwardness was a “swamp,” and “one drop of backwardness was enough to poison the barrelful of modernity” (Slezkine, 1994, pp. 220–223). As Zoltan Barany (2000) put it, “by the mid-1950s ‘what to do with the troublesome Gypsies?’ became an important question across Eastern Europe. The main goal (assimilation) was the same [across countries in the region]” (p. 424).

Systematic assimilationist campaigns were directed at Roma across the Communist bloc, which were intended to correct for legacies of a capitalist past that left this group marginalized, poor, and consequently unproductive—this was a popular belief at the time (Stewart, 1997). According to the Hungarian Communist Party, in “policies towards the Gypsy population we must start from the principle that despite certain ethnographic specificities they do not form a ‘national minority’” (quoted in

³Slezkine’s work is in the context of the Soviet Union, but the same ideology was later applied in Eastern Europe.

Stewart, 2001, p. 83). The need to bridge the gap between Roma and non-Roma was acknowledged, but solutions were seen in complete assimilation and abandonment of a lifestyle that “causes” these conditions. Even under the Kádár era (1965–1988), whose rule was popularly called “goulash communism,” Roma attempts at developing ethnic identities were not tolerated (Fehér, Cartner, & Whitman, 1993).

The Socialist politics created a paternalistic system, where the poor, disproportionately represented by the Roma, heavily relied on the state (Ladányi & Szelényi, 2006). In addition, a 1961 resolution included the elimination of *cigánytelepek* (Gypsy settlements), while the housing provided to Roma was poor, inadequately small, and often in shortage (The Save the Children Fund, 2001), and the housing program in 1964 envisioned the liquidation of 2500 Roma settlements (Marushiakova & Popov, 2011). Roma families received apartments in cramped and poorly constructed housing projects (labeled as *csökkent értékű* or reduced value in Hungarian), expecting them to “destroy the available amenities in any case” (Barany, 2002, p. 131). Often Roma families moved back to ghettos (and their old apartments). Consequently, segregation by the 1960s increased and was more concentrated (Barany, 2002).

Socialism, in sum, institutionalized discriminatory practices and reinforced stereotypes: Roma were branded as “untrustworthy citizens” (Stewart, 2001, p. 74) or people who needed “special attention” or “social cases” (Siklova & Miklusakova, 1998, p. 58), and data collected by state officials allowed the authorities to publish racialized criminal statistics, leading to specialized police units responsible for the elimination of “Gypsy crime.” At the same time, Roma were employed, albeit in low-paid sectors. Whereas during Socialism Roma filled the ranks of uneducated workforce, after transition, they simply fell out of the workforce. For instance, in 1984 male employment almost equaled between Roma and the national average (while a considerable gap still existed for women), but the difference in employment rate multiplied after regime change (Kertesi & Kézdi, 2011).

The collapse of Socialism, with its paternalistic system, represented the end of state-provided security, which then led to homelessness, re-ghettoization, and tumbling living standards (Stewart, 2001; also see European Union of Fundamental Rights, 2012; Fehér et al., 1993; Wagner, 1987). Today, it is a widely accepted fact that the Roma constitute the biggest losers of political and economic liberalization (e.g., Barany, 2002; Goldman, 1997; Koulish, 2005; Ladányi & Szelényi, 2006; Szalai, 1999).

Since the collapse of Socialism, a burgeoning literature on transition attempted to explain various aspects of the transition of the region.⁴ Against high hopes, “exporting democracy” (e.g., Glenn, 2009, p. 1) and the introduction of market

⁴For example, see Gale Stokes’s *The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe* (Oxford University Press, 1993), Constantine C. Menges’ *Transitions from Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe* (University Press of America, 1993), Barbara Wejner’s *Transition to Democracy in Eastern Europe and Russia: Impact on Politics, Economy and Culture* (Praeger, 2002), Edward P. Lazear’s *Economic Transition in Eastern Europe and Russia: Realities of Reform* (Hoover Institution Press, 1995), and many others.

economy to replace the command economy in Eastern Europe have not lived up to expectations. As a pinnacle of democratic corrosion in the country, the current Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, publicly called for “illiberal democracy” as the most appropriate path of development for Hungary.

The incomplete transition manifests in political, economic, as well as social spheres. Barany and Volgyes (1995) calls it the “reminiscent of Stalinism”—for political reasons there is still “denunciations and the abandonment of old friends” in countries such as Hungary (p. 192). The increasing intolerance of diversity, antagonism toward the old, questioning the past, and the “disparagement of the labors of generations,” as Barany and Volgyes (1995) calls it, are all signs of “unhealthy moral transition” (p. 192). This unfinished transition and expanded political domain laid the groundwork for xenophobic and far-right ideologies to (re)emerge in the country, with political parties and movements rallying around far-right nationalism and the exclusion of minorities, such as the Roma. Today’s hostile climate toward Roma is documented in several surveys and polls: a 2014 report by FXB Center for Health and Human Rights reported about the alarming rate of anti-Roma violence in Hungary (FXB, 2014), a 2016 poll by TARKI (opinion research institute in Hungary) showed record high xenophobia in the country (TARKI, 2016; see also Deutsche Welle, 2015), and the Council of Europe’s expert group on racism and intolerance in its 2015 report warned against open anti-Roma sentiments in the country (Council of Europe, 2015), to name a few.

Fieldwork Observations I: Roma After Regime Change (Nostalgia for the Past)

While it was popularly assumed that transformation from a planned to a market economy was going to bring about improved living conditions, it was not the case for the Roma. During fieldwork, nostalgic memories about the Socialist past were often juxtaposed with hopelessness and despair of today’s situation. Nicolae Gheorghe (1997), himself an educated Roma and one of the most known Roma rights activists, suggested that:

Many of us [members of a small Gypsy bourgeoisie, an important group of people, educated and articulate, and sometimes integrated within the surrounding society], are part of [an] establishment *created by socialist or communist parties* which did have a discourse with the poor, the disadvantaged and those who suffered from the fascist regimes. . . [I]t opened the doors of schools and social mobility for different ethnic groups including some Roma individuals who were promoted to levels of political bureaucracy and administration. (pp. 157–158, emphasis mine)

Similar feelings were expressed during fieldwork. Below is a quote from a senior member of a mixed Roma community near the capital. The woman is raising her grandchildren alone; the family lives in a small room, with one corner serving as the kitchen and a few mattresses on the floor at the other end of the room. The elderly woman (I), perhaps in her 60s, had a big bin of tobacco and a wide ashtray: She was

rolling cigarettes as we were talking, periodically smoking one. Her voice was deep from years of smoking, her skin deeply wrinkled from her age and hard work, and she gnashed her remaining teeth when the topic of conversation angered her:

E [Roma woman]: You lived during and before the transition. What is your experience?

I [Roma elderly woman]: The situation is a lot worse! I would bring back those times without a second thought, believe me! You could live on your salary, go to work; there were jobs, there were opportunities to work. People didn't have to wait and beg for these alms [social support] (...) Nobody looked at whether you were a Gypsy or not, even with a low [quality] work, one could make a living and support their family! And now we get these packages with flour, sugar and other goods; I know many families who sell it for cheaper, they need money! We don't want assistance packages, we don't want social support, but we need jobs! It doesn't matter if one completed elementary education or not! If one wants to work, they need to get a chance! (...)

E: They think that many young [Roma] are comfortable receiving state support; how can one make it with just that?

I: You can't!

The elderly woman counted her income: 29600 HUF family support for the two children per month, 25000 HUF for L's "orphan support," and 42000 HUF "widow support," which amounts to 96600 HUF or approximately USD344, for the entire family each month. After rent, bills, groceries, and other necessities, she often borrows money from someone (usury is a true problem in such poor neighborhoods). To the question whether the situation will change in the future, she expressed the same pessimism that was characteristic of most settlements I visited: "No, it will only get worse! There won't be any jobs and if there will be, not for us [Gypsies]." As the woman got increasingly agitated about the topic, she insisted on sharing an example, about her family member who is a qualified butcher and yet does not have a job, although applied many times. "If you are a Gypsy, the job is filled," she complained, "even if you want to work." As the only non-Roma in the room, she addressed her last grievance to me, with her voice raised, furrowing her eyebrows:

I don't know what the future brings... Of course Gypsies are to blame as well, but let's consider the example of criminality: if I steal a chicken, I get 5 years in prison. If you embezzle 5 million forints, you get what? Maybe you get suspended. But you stole as well! And here is where there is the biggest difference between us [Roma and non-Roma]!

Indeed, those who remember the times of Socialism had very similar feelings. The elderly Roma woman's words, "We don't want assistance packages, we don't want social support, but we need jobs," was echoed by the overwhelming majority of Roma that I talked to. Most experienced no improvement in life and saw deteriorating conditions since regime change. Other members of Roma community, old enough to remember the "old days," commented to the question how the situation changed since 1989: "We did not see such high prices then as now! People are different, too! Everybody is looking after their own private gain; it has been much worse since regime change," said an 83-year-old Roma widow. "Everything changed a lot. People are just looking at how to make some profit; there are scams and lies," shared a Roma man, who worked as a mechanic and carpenter. "Back then

it wasn't a problem that I am a Gypsy... back then all Magyars [non-Roma Hungarians] loved us," complained a 71-year-old Roma woman.

In villages where agriculture was the main source of employment, mills and granaries stand deserted, and Roma are occasionally hired as day laborers or to pick fruits, flowers, and vegetables to sell it by the road or in nearby towns. There are no stable jobs and no stable income, and an entire generation has grown up surrounded by a culture of unemployment. The disconnect is apparent: while Roma are wrongly seen as "leeches" on society, benefitting from resources increasingly scarce during times of austerity and economic crisis, fieldwork clearly revealed the opposite—Roma are longing for jobs and respect that comes with merited employment. They want to feel as full members of society and be treated as such.

Rising Xenophobia and Anti-Gypsyism in the Context of Economic Crisis and Nationalism: Nationalism and Xenophobia in Hungary

With transition came economic hardships, which affected most people, and race was increasingly deployed to make sense of economic and political changes; Roma were used as scapegoats across many countries (Lemon, 2000). Social tensions grew as a "self-selected cadre of communists-turned-capitalists enriched themselves at the expense of the wider population [, and] the poorest sections of society, such as the Roma, were hit worst" (The Economist, 2011, para. 7).

The post-communist Hungarian political elite can be divided into two camps: those concerned with "progress" and the "national camp," where the "national camp":

Feels that a national revival is in order. The focus of some 'national' elites on reasserting Hungarian national identity as Christian is wrapped into a broader campaign across the 'national' camp to achieve adequate nationhood as part of the transition from communism. . . . Hungary's 'national' camp can be placed alongside nation and state builders in newer and more ethnically heterogeneous post-communist states. (Fowler, 2004, p. 77)

National revival is undoubtedly attempted by the "national camp" with Viktor Orbán's leadership in Hungary. However, Jobbik, Hungary's far-right xenophobic party, capitalized even more on anti-Roma sentiments, has been gaining unprecedented support.⁵ Indeed, "radical right ideologies [. . .] flourish on the soil of rapid changes and growing anxieties," while fears and social tensions "have paved the way

⁵Disturbingly, while one of Jobbik's platform is describing Roma as a group who "strive for neither integration nor employment nor education" in addition to public discussion of "Gypsy crime" (Bendavid, 2014), threats of closing Roma in ghettos, and warning Roma "to conform or to leave," they recently won their first independent seat during a by-election in the town of Tapolca. Far-right ideology resurfaced after regime change, which undoubtedly planted the seeds of Jobbik's current popularity (Dunai, 2014).

for a new wave of identity politics and scapegoat ideologies” (Halasz, 2009, p. 490). The European extreme right-wing parties have “accepted the rules of the liberal system [, and it] is in the rejection of the cultural pluralism of the liberal political system, the reaction to the system’s tolerance towards national minorities and the adoption of an exclusionary perception of citizenship, where lies the ideological essence of right wing extremism” (Anastasakis, 2000, p. 16).

In this context, belonging to the Hungarian nation is increasingly defined in ethnic *and* economic terms. This exclusionary vision of who is Hungarian has been gaining discursive and institutional legitimacy. In one of the speeches, Orbán (Orban, 2014) argued for including “[ethnic] Hungarians living throughout the world [as] part of the Hungarian nation” and, in the same speech, he coined his infamous “illiberal national state” concept as the best protector of Hungarian national interests speech 7, para. 2. The illiberal national state, according to Orbán (Orban, 2014), is based on “national foundations” and follows the example of countries such as Russia, Turkey, and China. On the economic angle, the wide-ranging “public works program,” extensively criticized as a measure targeting Roma (Matkovich, 2011; Roma Sajtóközpont, 2012), was implemented in 2011, and meant to eliminate unemployment (and decrease welfare support) by 2018, offer public work opportunities, and create a “workfare society” (Simon, 2014). Orbán claimed that Roma are a “hidden resource, back-up for the Hungarian economy,” rather than a problem, and since the Roma community is not sufficiently competitive in the labor market, there needs to be some “assistance” (*réssegítő eszköz*) (Amerikai Nepszava Online, 2013, para. 1; Ministry of Human Resources of Hungary, 2013, para. 1). This logic is contrary to many European countries, where social spending has increased to counter poverty, whereas in Hungary social spending has been drastically cut (Field, 2014; Nolan, 2014). The unequivocal goal is to build a work-based society (Fidesz, 2012; Harangozó, 2014; Tallián, 2014). Roma were singled out during Orbán’s speeches, justifying the program with the alleged “57 thousand Roma families [who] began to work for the first time” (Origo, 2014, para. 2).

Fieldwork Observations II: Case Study of Social Discrimination (Discriminating Roma Under Economic Pressure)

Such conceptualization of belonging—ethnically and economically defined—was observable during fieldwork: economic hardships were fused with xenophobia, and Roma were seen as beneficiaries in a country with little resources. Assistance for Roma was seen at the expense of the well-being of non-Roma, especially those who were the most destitute. Indeed, teachers were deeply affected by the recession and hit hard by the austerity measures implemented after 2008 (Balogh, 2012). The monthly salary of elementary school teachers in Hungary is well below the median income (Origo, 2012; Világgazdaság, 2010), and their salaries are among the lowest

in Europe and OECD countries (OECD, 2012). Several accounts demonstrate the unbearable conditions and low salaries of teachers (Hegedűs, 2012).

During conversations with teachers, many were acutely aware of what they perceived as unjustly high spending on the Roma minority, and every benefit to the Roma was commonly seen as going against their own well-being. Anti-Gypsyism was visibly stronger as scarcity was felt personally. One teacher lamented:

Nowadays I have so little money that I can't eat. . . when I feel terrible, I go to ask for some soup [at the school canteen] but even then I have to be humiliated. . .but of course the family of S. [Roma family], they get everything they ask for! I went outside and saw a cookie on the floor, someone stepped on it. . . of course, that is normal, but when I ask for lunch that is absurd, right?! [. . .] Money flows only one way here. . .

And money was flowing in the direction of Roma students, who were the “trouble-makers,” “undeserved favorites,” and “useless members of society,” as commonly seen by many teachers.

The far-right parties' populist rhetoric, in this atmosphere, seemed rather comforting to many. Jobbik, which describes itself as a “principled, conservative and radically patriotic Christian party” whose “fundamental purpose is protecting Hungarian values and interests” (Thorpe, 2015, para. 2–3), is particularly popular among those who “feel the ground is slipping away from them” (Halasz, 2009, p. 493). Jobbik is seen in their eyes as the daring party that does not shy away from naming the problems that have been silenced “in the name of political correctness”: political corruption, the Jewish conspiracy, foreign interests taking over national ones, Gypsy crime, and Gypsy overpopulation (Halasz, 2009, p. 493).

These sentiments are clearly echoed in the views of a senior teacher:

The Hungarian nation has a weak (*meggyengített*) culture; after the USSR's humiliation we tried to search for national values and that is what is important. . .What makes a Hungarian - Hungarian? That he or she considers Hungary their home and does something about it! The ‘does something about it’ is important here! We don't need parasites and leeches! If one has an accent but is not a parasite, that person is Hungarian! [. . .] The school gave [Roma] an example of self-restraint and discipline. . .Their parents often can't take responsibility for themselves, let alone their own children. . . But the person is worth as much as it contributes to the society. The Gypsies are useless individuals if they just have to be supported. . .It's like: ‘don't plant anything in saline soil.’

And this description of the Roma encompasses both themes: Roma do not contribute economically and refuse to conform to the norms of Hungarian society. This, according to the logic, makes them the ultimate “other” and the pariah of Hungarian society.

Roma Coping Mechanisms and Negotiating Identity

In sum, as a consequence of two waves of political and economic shocks—regime change and the recent economic crisis—Roma marginalization and impoverishment grew into a critical and urgent problem, and at the same time, far-right ideologies

have been alarmingly growing in popularity. State policies, while still maintaining a racist discourse, prioritize employment projects as necessary components of belonging. To cope, especially in the context of explicitly and implicitly incorporated messages of inferiority, Roma may take advantage of the educational projects, or, based on fieldwork observations, the following “mechanisms” might be at play: benefitting educational projects, assimilation and rejection of Roma/Gypsy identity, internalization of stereotypes, and the performance of Gypsiness.

Only a few have the opportunity to take advantage of the *educational projects* and scholarships, often targeting poor Roma youth. While education is popularly seen⁶ as a powerful way to uplift the Roma community and help Roma cope with discrimination, the outcomes have remained grim. Even though there are more Roma students in universities today⁷ and the number of self-identifying Roma intellectuals and professionals is increasing,⁸ it nevertheless did not immediately translate into either successful representation of their impoverished ethnic kin, neither led to significant changes in living standards and marginalization. For instance, one young Roma woman described how having completed high school she was regarded as “less of a Roma,” many of her peers could no longer relate to her, and Roma men her age refused to date her.

It is a common occurrence that “ties to local Romani communities are weakened in the process of becoming a self-identifying Romani intellectual and/or professional” (Friedman & Garaz, 2013, p. 154). The manager of a local charity for Roma explained: “A uniqueness about the Roma here is that they assimilate once they become more educated, they turn ‘whiter’ (*kiféhérednek*.)” A very small layer of Roma continues to identify with their ethnic kin after schooling, the manager complained, because their “identity of misery” (*nyomorult identitástudat*) precludes the existence of an educated class. The same issue is discussed by other scholars as well: Koulish (2005) shows that because of the socially constructed negative image of the Roma, self-identification declines as economic status, educational achievements, and income rise (pp. 316–317); Ladányi and Szelényi (2006) suggest that the “embourgeoisement process among the Roma [after liberalization]” resulted in a very small segment of the group moving upward and joining the middle and upper classes of the society (p. 9); Gheorghe (1997) calls this phenomenon a “crisis of legitimacy” of the Romani identity, when the educated upper- and middle-class

⁶George Soros, the founder of the Open Society Foundations and the most critical player in the movement, stated himself that “the key to success is the education of a new generation of Roma who do not seek to assimilate into the general population, but deliberately retain their identity as Roma. Educated, successful Roma will shatter the prevailing negative stereotypes by their very existence” (Soros, 2010).

⁷In 1996/7, 0.22% university students were Roma, in 2001/2002 the number grew to 0.6%, later in 2010 to approximately 1.3–1.5%, and with this increase by 2020, there might be 2.1–2.5% university students who are Roma (Polónyi, 2004, p. 20).

⁸It is hard to have an estimate of self-identifying Roma intellectuals, but several reports indicate that with “increase in numbers of young, educated Roma, we are observing a qualitative change in Roma civil society” (Mirga, 2014).

Romas' identity and ethnicity are often questioned because they "no longer live in traditional conditions" (p. 157).

Assimilation was another coping mechanism to reject the negative stigma. Some Roma families' stories are illustrative: A 41-year-old mother explained that her Roma children pretend to be Magyars. She continued: "They know that they are Gypsies, but they grow up denying this and I allow them to do this. . . Sometimes one can't tell I'm a Gypsy also, my skin is rather light." Another Roma woman complained: "You can't have any goals in life, if you are a Gypsy. You don't gain anything from being a Gypsy." This woman's daughter had lighter skin and often said that she might "pass as a tan Hungarian." Skin color, rather than education or social status, was seen by many as a possibility to shed the "bad Gypsy" image. In the settlement when I inquired about their ethnicity, skin color was immediately brought up: "I am so black, I could never deny I'm a Gypsy."

Internalization of stereotypes and "performance of Gypsiness" was the most common response. In poor settlements most Roma residents defined their ethnic identity in terms of lacking education, deficient discipline and uncleanness, poverty, and skin color. It was evident that there is a certain set of expectations—the essentialized "bad Gypsy" image—which was the context of all daily activities, hopes, and future expectations. This set of expectations was debilitating. When discussing their everyday lives, respondents often said that "*despite* being a Gypsy, I do work/I am educated," and others saw poverty as an important constituent of their identity, claiming that they were happy living poor and dying poor and would never want to be Magyars and live rich. Teachers and non-Roma parents complained about Hungarian students being "Gypsified" and so "develop backward" or, in other words, pick up behavioral patterns, dressing, and speaking style from Roma classmates. The Roma, in turn, internalized these stereotypes and incorporated those in their behavior and discourse, "don't act Gypsy," "don't be a Gypsy," and "don't talk like a Gypsy," were typical disciplining methods among Roma themselves.

Conclusion and Way Forward

In conclusion, this chapter showed that the two political and economic crises are critical in understanding the marginalization and coping mechanisms of Roma today. I argued that while Socialist era social engineering had lasting legacies and the Roma ethnic identity was denied, the employment level was high for Roma, albeit most were hired as non-skilled labor. Regime change ended a paternalistic system, cut off state benefits from recipients, and economic as well as political change brought with it major social adjustments. Roma were disproportionately hit by the transition, and their conditions deteriorated with the recent economic crisis as well.

In the context of growing nationalism, I showed that according to the official discourse, belonging is increasingly defined in ethnic and economic terms.

Consequently, while discrimination continues, state policies are aimed at job creation and cutting benefits. Meanwhile, xenophobia and nationalism have created a fertile ground for far-right ideologies to materialize. Roma coping mechanisms range from a few breaking out of poverty and benefitting from educational projects, to most reserving to assimilation or internalization of stereotypes.

As a long-term solution, building community ties and promoting solidarity among Roma is the most fruitful way forward.⁹ It is imperative to include Roma as active citizens in the Hungarian society, first and foremost, and at times of economic and political crisis, the sense of belonging to the nation is the absolute precondition for any constructive coping mechanisms to evolve. As an established Roma intellectual, Choli Daróczy József (Choli Daróczy, 2013) suggested in a personal interview:

The biggest tragedy... is the loss of belief in community. You hang in the air... you have no ground... you don't know who you are and you don't know what it's like to belong to a community... you have no idea where you are coming from. (...) There is a wall that surrounds you. Why? Because you are surrounded by values of another culture, where you cannot open up. (...) How can we make a proper, good Hungarian citizen from such distorted identity?

References

- Amerikai Nepszava Online. (2013, May 7). *A zsidók után a romákat is megvédi Orbán (After the Jews, Orban is protecting the Roma)*. Retrieved January 8, 2016, from <http://nepszava.com/2013/05/magyarország/a-zsidok-utan-a-romakat-is-megvedi-orban.html>
- Anastasakis, O. (2000). *Extreme right in Europe: A comparative study of recent trends, The Hellenic Observatory, the European Institute*. London: London School of Economics & Political Science.
- Annicchiarico, F. (2013, November 10). Europe's right turn. *Harvard Political Review*.
- Balogh, E. S. (2012, October 6). Hungary's balancing act. Retrieved December 5, 2015, from *Hungarian Spectrum*: <http://hungarianspectrum.org/2012/10/06/hungarys-balancing-act-an-austerity-program-that-is-called-something-else/>
- Barany, Z. (2000). Politics and the Roma in state-socialist eastern Europe. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 33, 421–437.
- Barany, Z. (2002). *The east European Gypsies: Regime change, marginality, and ethnopolitics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Barany, Z., & Volgyes, I. (Eds.). (1995). *The legacies of communism in eastern Europe*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Bendavid, N. (2014, April 22). Jobbik takes aim at Roma. *The Wall Street Journal*. Retrieved December 10, 2015, from <https://www.wsj.com/articles/jobbik-takes-aim-at-roma-1398220763?tesla=y>
- Boli, J. (1989). *New citizens for a new society: The institutional origins of mass schooling in Sweden*. Oxford: Pergamon.
- Boli, J., Ramirez, F. O., & Meyer, J. W. (1985). Explaining the origins and expansion of mass education. *Comparative Education Review*, 29(2), 145–170.

⁹For critical importance of social networks to form viable civil society, active civil engagement, and functioning democracies, see Putnam's classic "Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital" Putnam (1995), but also Fukuyama (2001), Hooghe and Stolle (2003), and Edwards, Foley, and Dian (2001), among others.

- Brubaker, R. (1996). Nationalizing states in the old 'new Europe' – and the new. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 19(2), 411–437.
- Brubaker, R. (2009). National homogenization and ethnic reproduction on the European periphery. In M. Barbagli, H. Ferguson, & G. Poggi (Eds.), *La teoria sociologica e lo stato moderno: Saggi in onore di Gianfranco Poggi* (pp. 201–221). Bologna: Il Mulino.
- Brubaker, R. (2011). Nationalizing states revisited: Projects and processes of nationalization in post-Soviet states. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 34(11), 1785–1814.
- Calance, M. (2012). *The resurgence of nationalism in the European Union*. CES Workign Papers, 4 (1).
- Choli Daróczy, J. (2013). (J. Dunajeva, Interviewer) Budapest.
- Council of Europe. (2015). *ECRI Report on Hungary*. Strasbourg.
- Deutsche Welle. (2015, May 13). Hungary heads to the right. *Deutsche Welle*.
- Dunai, M. (2014, Oct 13). *Hungarian far-right tells town's Roma minority – conform or leave town*. Retrieved December 19, 2015, from Reuters: <http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-hungary-farright-municipal-idUKKCN0I21WA20141013>
- Edwards, B., Foley, M. W., & Dian, M. (2001). *Beyond Tocqueville: Civil society and the social capital debate in comparative perspective*. Hanover: University Press of New England.
- European Union Agency of Fundamental Rights. (2012). Roma housing projects in small communities, Slovakia. In A. Pusca (Ed.), *Eastern European Roma: Mobility, discrimination, solutions* (pp. 155–183). Brussels: International Debate Education Association.
- Fehér, G., Cartner, H., & Whitman, L. (1993). *The Gypsies of Hungary*. New York: Human Rights Watch (Helsinki Watch).
- Fidesz. (2012, October 19). *Orbán: Nem jóléti állam, hanem munka alapú társadalom épül (Orban: we are building a work-based society, not a welfare state)*. Retrieved January 7, 2016, from <http://www.fidesz.hu/hirek/2012-10-19/orban-nem-joleti-allam-hanem-munka-alapu-tarsadalom-epul-kepek/>
- Field, R. (2014, November 14). *Work or starve: Hungary to phase out unemployment assistance by 2018*. Retrieved January 6, 2016, from Budapest Beacon: <http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/work-or-starve-hungary-to-phase-out-unemployment-assistance-by-2018>
- Fowler, B. (2004). Nation, state, Europe and national revival in Hungarian party politics: The case of the millennial commemorations. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 56(1), 57–83.
- François-Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights. (2014). *Accelerating patterns of anti-Roma violence in Hungary*. Boston: Harvard School of Public Health and Harvard University.
- Friedman, B. M. (2006, January/February). The moral consequences of economic growth. *Society*, 15–22.
- Friedman, E., & Garaz, S. (2013). Support for Roma in tertiary education and social cohesion. In M. Miskovic (Ed.), *Roma education in Europe: Practices, policies and politics* (pp. 149–167). New York: Routledge.
- Fukuyama, F. (2001). Social capital, civil society and development. *Third World Quarterly*, 22(1), 7–20.
- Gheorghe, N. (1997). Chapter 11: The social construction of Romani identity. In T. Acton (Ed.), *Gypsy politics and traveller identity* (pp. 153–172). Hatfield: Hertfordshire Press.
- Glenn, J. K. (2009). *The myth of "exporting" democracy: Lessons from eastern Europe after 1989, The German Marshall fund of the United States, strengthening transatlantic cooperation*. Washington, DC: Foreign Policy Program.
- Goldman, M. F. (1997). *Revolution and change in central and eastern Europe: Political, economic, and social challenges*. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.
- Gunsteren, H. R. (1998). *A theory of citizenship: Organizing principle in contemporary democracies*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Halasz, K. (2009). The rise of the radical right in Europe and the case of Hungary: 'Gypsy crime' defines national identity? *Development*, 52(4), 490–494.

- Harangozó, T. (2014, September 15). *Az orbáni munkaalapú társadalom (Orban's work-based society)*. Retrieved January 8, 2016, from Nepszabadság: <http://nol.hu/velemeny/az-orbani-munkaalapu-tarsadalom-1486299>
- Hegedűs, Z. (2012, October 5). *Halasztják a tanárok bérének emelését - A pedagógusok mélyen felháborodtak (Postponing the raise for teachers - the teachers are deeply disappointed)*. Retrieved January 9, 2016, from Heti Válasz: <http://valasz.hu/itthon/tobbszor-is-megigertek-a-beremelest-55481>
- Hoogbe, M., & Stolle, D. (2003). *Generating social capital: Civil society and institutions in comparative perspective*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Houskeeper, S., Stocker, A., & Zuckerman, V. (2015). *Right-wing resurgence haunts Europe*. Retrieved May 22, 2015, from Politics & Policy: <http://politicsandpolicy.org/article/right-wing-resurgence-haunts-europe>
- Ilan, S. (2002). *Longing and belonging: The cultural politics of settlement*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Kertesi, G., & Kézdi, G. (2011). Roma employment in Hungary after the post-communist transition. *Economics of Transition*, 19(3), 563–610.
- Koulish, R. (2005). Hungarian Roma attitudes on minority rights: The symbolic violence of ethnic identification. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 57(2), 311–326.
- Ladányi, J., & Szelényi, I. (2006). *Patterns of exclusion: Constructing Gypsy ethnicity and the making of an underclass*. Boulder: East European Monographs.
- Lemon, A. (2000). *Between two fires: Gypsy performance and romani memory from Pushkin to postsocialism*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Marushnikova, E., & Popov, V. (2011). Between exoticization and marginalization. Current problems of Gypsy studies. *Behemoth. A Journal on Civilisation*, 1, 51–68.
- Matkovich, I. (2011, Aug 25). Elindult a közmunka-mintaprogram (The public works program began). *Magyar Narancs*. Retrieved December 15, 2015, from http://magyarnarancs.hu/belpol/elindult_a_kozmunka-mintaprogram_-_harcos_beke-76771#
- Meyer, J. W., Tyack, D., Nagel, J., & Gordon, A. (1979). Public education as nation-building in America: Enrollments and bureaucratization in the American states, 1870–1930. *American Journal of Sociology*, 85(3), 591–613.
- Ministry of Human Resources of Hungary. (2013, May 8). *Orbán: a kormány rejtett erőforrásként tekint a cigányságra (Orban: the government considers Roma a hidden resource)*. Retrieved October 15, 2015, from <http://romagov.kormany.hu/orban-a-kormany-rejtett-eroforraskent-tekint-a-ciganysagra>
- Mirga, A. (2014). Roma: In search of a balanced image. *Open Society Foundation*.
- Nolan, D. (2014, July 11). Politicians, sociologists discuss public work and poverty in Hungary. Retrieved January 6, 2016, from *Budapest Beacon*: <http://budapestbeacon.com/public-policy/public-work-poverty-hungary>
- OECD. (2012). *Education at a glance 2012*. OECD Indicators. Retrieved January 6, 2016, from http://www.oecd.org/edu/EAG%202012_e-book_EN_200912.pdf
- Orban, V. (2014, July 30). Prime minister Viktor Orbán's speech at the 25th Bálványos summer free university and student camp. Retrieved November 26, 2015, from *The Prime Minister's Speeches*: <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/prime-minister-viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-25th-balvanyos-summer-free-university-and-student-camp>
- Origo (2012, Oct 20). *Százézer forintból tengődnek a magyar tanárok (Hungarian teachers are getting by with one hundred thousand forints)*. Retrieved January 9, 2016, from <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20121020-szazezer-forintbol-tengodnek-a-magyar-tanarok.html>
- Origo (2014, Oct 13). *Orbán Viktor gesztusa a baloldali szavazóknak (The gesture of Orban Viktor to the left-leaning voters)*. Retrieved January 7, 2016, from <http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20141013-orban-viktor-tovabb-epiti-a-munkaalapu-tarsadalmat.html>
- Polónyi, I. (2004). *A hazai felsőoktatás demográfiai összefüggései a 21. század elején [Demographic connections in higher education in Hungary in the 21st century]*. Retrieved from Institute for Higher Educational Research. Budapest: www.hier.iif.hu/hu/letoltes.php?fid=kutatas_kozben/293

- Putnam, R. D. (1995). Bowling alone: America's declining social capital. *Journal of Democracy*, 6(1), 65–78.
- Roma Sajtóközpont (2012, February 28). *Rájuk vár a közmunka: szegény és cigány gyerekek oktatása* (The public works program awaits them: the education of poor and Roma). Retrieved October 12, 2015, from SoSiNet: <http://www.sosinet.hu/2012/02/28/rajuk-var-a-kozmunka-szegeny-es-cigany-gyerekek-oktatasa/>
- Save the Children. (2001). *Denied a future? The right to education of Roma/Gypsy & traveller children in Europe*. Vol. 1: South-Eastern Europe. London: Save the Children.
- Siklova, J., & Miklusakova, M. (1998). Denying citizenship to the Czech Roma. *East European Constitutional Review*, 7(2), 58–64.
- Simon, Z. (2014, July 28). *Bloomberg*. Retrieved November 10, 2015, from <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-28/orban-says-he-seeks-to-end-liberal-democracy-in-hungary>
- Slezkine, Y. (1994). *Arctic mirrors: Russia and the same peoples of the north*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Soros, G. (2010, January 25). Europe needs educated Roma. Retrieved November 4, 2015, from *Interethnic Relations*: <http://khp.org/en/index.php?id=1264438273>
- Stewart, M. (1997). *The time of the Gypsies*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Stewart, M. (2001). Communist Roma policy, 1945–89 as seen through a Hungarian case. In W. Guy (Ed.), *Between past and future: The Roma of central and eastern Europe* (pp. 71–92). Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press.
- Szalai, J. (1999). *Poverty in transition and transition in poverty: Recent developments in Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, Russia, Mongolia*. London: UNESCO.
- Tallián, M. (2014, July 28). *Orbán-beszéd: semmi sem úgy van* (Nothing is like it is). Retrieved January 7, 2016, from HVG: <http://kapitalizmus.hvg.hu/2014/07/28/orban-beszed-semmi-sem-ugy-van/>
- TARKI (2016). *Csúcsot döntött az idegenellenesség, és elfogyott az idegenbarátság* (Record high xenophobia and the end of foreign-friendly attitudes). Budapest.
- The Economist. (2011, April 8). *Hungary's plan for the Roma*. Retrieved January 7, 2016, from https://www.economist.com/blogs/easternapproaches/2011/04/europes_roma
- Thorpe, N. (2015, April 13). *Hungary's nationalist Jobbik party woos centrist voters*. Retrieved January 8, 2016, from BBC: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32248965>
- Világgazdaság. (2010, June 22). *Pedagógusok méltánytalan helyzete – Mennyit visznek haza?* (Teachers' inequitable situation – how much to they take home?). Retrieved November 24, 2015, from <http://www.vg.hu/gazdasag/gazdasagpolitika/pedagogusok-meltanytalan-helyzete-mennyit-visznek-haza-319674>
- Wagner, F. S. (1987). The Gypsy problem in postwar Hungary. *Hungarian Studies Review*, 14(1), 33–43.
- Ward, B. (2011). *Europe's own human rights crisis*. New York: Human Rights Watch.

Dunajeva, Jekatyerina (Ph.D.) is currently an assistant professor at the Institute of International Studies and Political Science at Pazmany Peter Catholic University in Budapest, Hungary. She defended her dissertation at the University of Oregon, USA, analyzing Roma identity formation over time in Hungary and Russia. Since then, she has been an active member of the scholarly community focusing on Roma, identity politics, education policy, state and nation building, youth policy and youth empowerment, language policy, and most recently ethnographic field research. Besides her scholarly endeavors, she is also engaged in the professional field as a consultant, researcher, and analyst.

Cultural Identification Among Immigrants from the Former USSR: Insights from Comparative Research with Five Groups in Germany and Israel



Katharina Sonnenberg, Peter F. Titzmann, and Rainer K. Silbereisen

According to the United Nations (2016), the number of international migrants has continued to grow rapidly. The Russian federation is characterized by a large number of Russian persons living outside its territory (so-called diaspora populations; UN 2016) but also by large emigration waves of diaspora groups who after the fall of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia started to leave the former USSR and return to their ancient “homelands.” Diaspora migrants differ substantially from other immigrant groups: They live(d) in a diaspora “where, over lengthy time periods, they maintained their own distinct communities and dreamed of one-day returning to their ancient home” (Weingrod & Levy, 2006, p. 691). Accordingly, they share ethnic, cultural, or religious roots with the immigration country even before immigration has taken place. Often, they profit from beneficial immigration conditions when returning to their homeland and do not differ in physical appearance (e.g., skin color) from the mainstream. Despite their high numbers, research with diaspora immigrants is still scarce (for an overview, see Titzmann & Stoessel, 2014), and accordingly it is still an open question whether they undergo similar processes of adaptation as other immigrant groups.

This chapter deals with two groups of diaspora migrants who left the former USSR to live in two Western countries: ethnic Germans returning to Germany and Russian Jews immigrating to Israel. Our research studied cultural identification

K. Sonnenberg (✉)
FernUniversität, Hagen, Germany
e-mail: katharina.sonnenberg@fernuni-hagen.de

P. F. Titzmann
Leibniz University, Hannover, Germany
e-mail: titzmann@psychologie.uni-hannover.de

R. K. Silbereisen
University of Jena, Jena, Germany
e-mail: rainer.silbereisen@uni-jena.de

among these two groups as identification is a vital component in the adaptation process of immigrants (e.g., Ward & Geerart, 2016). Typically, cultural identification with the cultural majority in the country of settlement (i.e., majority identification) is differentiated from cultural identification with the minority background (i.e., minority identification), as immigrants and cultural minority members belong to both cultural groups simultaneously and identifications with these cultural groups represent two independent dimensions (e.g., Berry, Phinney, Sam, & Vedder, 2006).

In our study, we focused on majority and minority identification among ethnic German immigrants living in Germany and Russian Jewish immigrants in Israel. These groups represent an interesting case for studying immigrants' cultural identification. First, majority and minority identification among diaspora immigrants can be a rather complex issue: Ethnic German adolescents were often called "Nazis" in the former USSR and "Russians" in Germany (Titzmann, 2005). Second, ethnic Germans in Germany and Russian Jews in Israel partly share their premigration situation as they have a history of living as cultural minorities in the former USSR for generations, resulting in a significant Russian cultural imprint. Moreover, after the breakdown of the communist bloc, both groups emigrated from the former USSR at the same time. Although they differ in some premigration characteristics (e.g., religion), their commonalities before immigration accompanied by differences after immigration (i.e., immigration to different countries with different living conditions) offer the unique opportunity to examine whether these groups today are similar or different with respect to cultural identification. Similarities would point to long-term influences of the former USSR culture these immigrants emigrated from some 20 years ago.

However, comparisons with other groups are also of interest. Comparative studies help to deepen our understanding of how immigrants' acculturation processes are influenced by contextual factors, avoid an overgeneralization of research findings, and tackle the specific needs that may differ across countries and groups. Practical constraints often limit the focus of studies so that only individual countries or groups are studied. Studies comparing groups and/or countries, however, help to capture the ecological context in which acculturation takes place. The context comprises characteristics of the heritage culture, the culture of settlement, and the cultural distance between the two (Ward & Geeraert, 2016). In our study the ecological context was represented by groups' differences in heritage country (i.e., former USSR or not), in country of settlement (i.e., Germany or Israel), and in groups' cultural distance in terms of religion (i.e., sharing religious denomination with the cultural mainstream or not). In addition, the groups varied in legal status (i.e., privileged status as being a diaspora immigrant or not) and in access to education, finances, and social networks (i.e., lower versus higher access to such assets).

Russian Jewish immigrants in Germany, our first comparison group, share the Russian cultural imprint and the emigration from the former USSR. However, they did not return to their ancient homeland and thus do not represent a diaspora immigrant group. In addition, we added Turks in Germany and Arabs in Israel to our analyses. Arabs did not immigrate to Israel but settled there before their territory was incorporated into a larger nation-state. Turks, however, immigrated voluntarily

to Germany as part of large-scale waves of labor migration starting in the 1960s (Verdugo & Mueller, 2008). Similarities between Arabs in Israel and Turks in Germany result from their current situation: Both groups are characterized by their large number, by a comparably large cultural distance to the mainstream culture, by forming well-established communities that are not fully embedded in the respective majority society, and by a strong underrepresentation in societal institutions (Kamm, 2003; Verdugo & Mueller, 2008). Both groups are of considerable importance for their respective countries of settlement, which is also due to the considerable size of their communities.

Taken together, our study focused on majority and minority identification in two groups of diaspora immigrants from the former USSR either to Germany or to Israel. As comparison groups, Russian Jews and Turks in Germany as well as Arabs in Israel participated. Thus, our study took advantage of the fact that Germany and Israel host several cultural groups that are characterized by considerable differences. Comparisons of minority and majority identification across groups allow insights into the complexity of contemporary societies that host large numbers of cultural groups with increasingly different backgrounds. Similar patterns of majority and minority identification across the five groups in Germany and Israel would point out similar processes that are rather independent of factors such as country and living conditions, whereas substantial differences would emphasize arguments for more group-specific acculturation research.

In this chapter, we address the following questions: Do diaspora immigrants identify with the culture of the former USSR? How strongly do they identify with the countries they are living in today? Does cultural identification varies across diaspora and comparison groups? In addition, the chapter aims to predict cultural identification: Does the strength of identification varies depending on the country of settlement and immigrants' living conditions? Finally, we investigated whether the identification with the majority and minority culture relates to positive engagement with members of these cultural groups and test whether heritage country also matters.

Study Outline

Our research took place within a larger research consortium on "Migration and societal integration." Our project "Regulation of developmental transitions in second-generation immigrants in Germany and Israel" focused on the development of immigrant families and their children. Data collection took place between autumn 2007 and spring 2008. Both in Germany and Israel, we sampled families based on children's age and parents' immigrant or cultural minority status. In Germany, we used registry data to identify target families and drew random samples from these populations. This was with the exception of Russian Jewish immigrants, who were contacted via snowball sampling. In Israel, families were sampled via random digit dialing. Participants were interviewed by specially trained bilingual interviewers, fluent in German or Hebrew,

and the language of the respective immigrant/cultural minority group, using standardized face-to-face interviews. More details on the consortium and the project can be found elsewhere (Silbereisen, Titzmann, & Shavit, 2014).

For our analyses, we focused exclusively on mothers who had not only been interviewed about the development of their children but also about their own acculturation experiences. The focus on mothers was chosen as mothers can be deemed being particularly influential for their offspring's development: For example, mothers are more involved in and more knowledgeable about their children's social contacts (e.g., Updegraff, McHale, Crouter, & Kupanoff, 2001), and the child-parent relationship with the mother is usually closer and more stable (e.g., Rodríguez, Perez-Brena, Updegraff, & Umaña-Taylor, 2014) as compared to that of fathers and their children. Thus, immigrant mothers have substantial impact on the cultural adaptation of future generations.

Participants were included in analyses if they had valid entries on all variables relevant to the respective research question. Analyses included at least $N_{\text{total}} = 1221$ individuals who were identified as being members in one of the following groups: ethnic German immigrants to Germany ("Aussiedler") defined by being born in the former USSR and now holding German citizenship ($n_{\text{min}} = 226$), Russian Jewish immigrants to Germany defined by being born in the former USSR and holding refugee status in Germany ($n_{\text{min}} = 169$), and Turkish immigrants defined by being born in Turkey but now living in Germany ($n_{\text{min}} = 318$). Russian Jewish immigrants to Israel were defined by being born in the former USSR and having immigrated to Israel from 1989 onward ($n_{\text{min}} = 222$) and members of the Arab minority in Israel by being ethnically Arab and living in Israel ($n_{\text{min}} = 286$). As we only considered female participants, gender was stable across groups. On average, participants were $M = 36$ years old ($SD = 7$) and had lived for $M = 20$ years ($SD = 12$) in the respective country.

Cultural Identification Across Groups

The central variable of our analyses was *cultural identification*. Participants indicated on a 6-point scale how much they agreed or disagreed with the statement "I see myself as [...]" (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995). The first item referred to *majority identification* by asking for identification as being "German" or "Israeli," depending on country. The second item referred to *minority identification* by asking for identification as being "ethnic German," "Russian Jew," or "Turk" in Germany and "Russian" or "Arab" in Israel.

In Fig. 1, a graphical representation of cultural identification across groups is given. Two points seem immediately obvious. First, groups differed considerably in strength of cultural identification. The majority identification of Russian Jews in Germany was, for example, much lower than that of Russian Jews in Israel. To test this observation statistically, we conducted a MANOVA with group as between subject factor and the two types of cultural identification as dependent variables. This analysis yielded




Fig. 1 Majority identification and minority identification by immigrant/cultural minority group

significant effects both for majority identification, $F(4, 1216) = 311.96, p < .001, \eta^2 = .506$, and for minority identification, $F(4, 1216) = 100.85, p < .001, \eta^2 = .249$. Post hoc comparisons revealed that mean levels of majority identification were highest among Russian Jews in Israel and Arabs (all $ps < .001$), who did not differ from one another ($p = .772$). Their scores were followed by those of ethnic Germans (all $ps < .001$). Lowest levels of majority identification were found among Turks and among Russian Jews in Germany, who did not differ from one another ($p = .931$; all other $ps < .001$). Post hoc comparisons with regard to minority identification revealed highest levels for Turks and Arabs ($ps < .001$), who did not differ from one another ($p = .580$). Ethnic German immigrants and Russian Jewish immigrants to Germany scored significantly lower (all $ps < .001$) and were similar to each other ($p = .349$). Russian Jewish immigrants to Israel did not differ significantly from Russian Jewish immigrants in Germany ($p = .147$) but reported a significantly lower minority identification than all other groups ($p < .05$).

Second, there were substantial differences in how minority and majority identification were combined. The two groups in Israel, for example, seemed to combine high minority and high majority identification, whereas the groups in Germany predominantly identified with the minority culture. Analyses using multigroup models within a structural equation modeling methodology indeed revealed significant differences: A positive correlation between minority and majority identification was found for Arabs ($r = .18, p < .01, 95\% \text{--} \text{CI}: .071, .295$) but a negative correlation for Turks ($r = -.21, p < .001, 95\% \text{--} \text{CI}: -.315, -.105$) and for Russian Jews in Israel ($r = -.19, p < .01, 95\% \text{--} \text{CI}: -.319, -.065$). For ethnic Germans ($r = .05, p = .44, 95\% \text{--} \text{CI}: -.078, .182$) and Russian Jews in Germany ($r = .04, p = .65, 95\% \text{--} \text{CI}: -.116, .185$), we found no significant correlations. These results suggest group differences in the success of integrating bonds to minority and majority culture.

Predicting Cultural Identification

The considerable group differences in the strength of majority and minority identification seen in Fig. 1 may stem from differences in contextual factors that form a prominent part of acculturative frameworks (e.g., Berry, 1997; Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Senécal, 1997; Ward & Geeraert, 2016). By studying cultural identification across five different groups settling in two different countries and facing different living conditions, we now aim at uncovering contextual variations that are mainly situated in the country of settlement. Thus, we predicted cultural identification by country of settlement, (legal) status, cultural distance in terms of religion, and access to assets in terms of education, finances, and social networks in the country of settlement.

Maybe the most obvious difference of the five groups under study concerns the countries they are settling in today. At first glance, Germany and Israel share central characteristics like being an immigration country and following an “ethnist” ideology (Bourhis et al., 1997) by defining citizenship on a primarily ethnical or religious basis and by comparatively strong expectations for immigrants’ assimilation (see also Berry et al., 2006). However, the two countries differ in other aspects: In Germany, for example, strong anti-immigration movements can be observed (Thran & Boehnke, 2015), and immigrants are underrepresented in societal and political institutions (Donovan, 2007). In Israel, the Zionist ideology and legal regulations explicitly offer people of Jewish origin the freedom to immigrate to Israel at any time, so most Jewish individuals living in Israel have an immigration background (Ohliger & Münz, 2003; Silbereisen et al., 2014). Thus, the official sociopolitical climate is more inclusive and receptive in Israel as its mainstream culture is explicitly defined by immigration and cultural diversity. However, groups in Israel are known to be highly segregated, so that some minorities have been referred to as caste-like minorities (Shavit, 1990). In our analyses, *country* was coded on the group level by a dichotomous variable (0 = Germany, 1 = Israel).

In terms of living conditions, a striking difference refers to group status that in part is legally defined: Ethnic German immigrants to Germany and Russian Jewish immigrants to Israel both have the status of diaspora immigrants (Titzmann & Stoessel, 2014). Their immigration was actively supported by the country of settlement in terms of immediate citizenship and of social security and material support, thus providing them with a privileged legal status (Ohliger & Münz, 2003; Silbereisen et al., 2014). In contrast, Russian Jewish immigrants to Germany hold refugee status. Turks and Arabs are characterized by a long history of settlement in their respective countries and by forming strong cultural minority groups. In our analyses, group membership was represented on the group level by two dichotomous indicators: *diaspora immigrant* for ethnic German immigrants in Germany or Russian Jewish immigrants to Israel (1 = yes, 0 = no) and *cultural minority member* for Turks or Arabs (1 = yes, 0 = no). The remaining group, Russian Jewish refugees in Germany, served as reference group.

The groups also differ with respect to their distance to the cultural majority. One indicator for cultural distance is religion, because a religious denomination is associated with central values and norms. The greater the cultural distance between groups, the more difficulties concerning acculturation and adaptation can be expected (Berry, 1997). In our study, ethnic German immigrants in Germany and Russian Jewish immigrants in Israel share their religion with the Christian and Jewish mainstream in Germany and Israel, respectively, and, thus, should face comparatively low cultural distance in this regard. However, Russian Jewish immigrants in Germany (Jewish denomination) and Turks (Muslim denomination) differ from the Christian mainstream culture in Germany. Arabs in Israel (who typically have a Muslim or a Christian denomination) differ from the Jewish mainstream culture. For the measurement of *religion*, participants were presented a list of several Christian, Jewish, Muslim, and other religious denominations. We recoded participants' answer into a dichotomous variable (0 = religious denomination similar to the majority culture; 1 = religion differed from the majority), resulting in an individual-level variable. The effect of cultural distance due to religion can be expected to be more pronounced if individuals place high importance on their religious denomination in terms of their religiosity. Participants reported on their *religiosity* by answering the item "How religious are you?" (6-point scale; "not at all religious" to "very religious").

Finally, we used assets in terms of access to education, finances, and high-status social networks for describing current living conditions. These assets have been described as cultural, economic, and social capital (Bourdieu, 1986) and are known to relate to a wide array of cognitive and socio-emotional outcomes across the life span, including the development of the next generation (for a review, see Bradley & Corwyn, 2002). From earlier research, we know that the groups studied differ considerably in access to these assets (Stoessel, Titzmann, & Silbereisen, 2011). *Education* was measured by the highest educational level participants had achieved (1 = primary education and lower; 5 = tertiary education and higher; adjustment for differences of educational systems in heritage countries by using the International Standard Classification of Education, United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1997). *Finances* were indexed by a family's affluence (Mammey & Sattig, 2002; 1 = "it's nowhere near enough" to 5 = "the family is able to afford everything"). *Social network* was captured by providing participants with a list of occupations of different social prestige (from unskilled laborer to physician) and asking them whether they knew people in these occupations well enough to ask them informally for advice. The score was calculated as the mean of the prestige (International Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status; Ganzeboom, de Graaf, & Treiman, 1992) of all occupations in which the participant knew someone (see van der Gaag, Snijders, & Flap, 2008). Higher scores represent a higher social status of participants' social networks.

For testing whether cultural identification can be predicted by these factors, we set up two hierarchical regression models with either majority identification or minority identification as dependent variables. In Step 1 we introduced country and status of group as predictors, in Step 2 we added religion and religiosity as well as their




Fig. 2 Religion, religiosity, and their interaction as predictors of (a) majority identification and (b) minority identification (results of hierarchical regression analyses, Table 1, Model 2)

interaction, and in Step 3 we added education, finances, and social network (for results, see Table 1). We found significantly higher *majority* identification in Israel, among diaspora immigrants, among those having the same religious denomination as the mainstream culture, among more religious persons under the condition that they had the same religious denomination as the mainstream culture (see Fig. 2), and among those having better access to finances and to high-status networks. We found significantly higher *minority* identification in Germany, among diaspora immigrants and cultural minority members and among those indicating another religious denomination than the cultural majority. The interaction of religion and religiosity failed to reach significance ($p = .057$). As this was just over the conventional p -level of .05, we still plotted the interaction effect in Fig. 2: Under the condition of belonging to a religion

Table 1 Predicting majority identification and minority identification (results of two hierarchical regression analyses: standardized regression coefficients and explained variance)

Predictors	Outcomes											
	Majority identification						Minority identification					
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	β	<i>p</i>	β	<i>p</i>	β	<i>p</i>	β	<i>p</i>	β	<i>p</i>	β	<i>p</i>
Country (0 = Germany, 1 = Israel)	.65	***	.69	***	.67	***	-.06	*	-.09	**	-.07	*
Diaspora migrant (0 = no, 1 = yes)	.21	***	.10	*	.13	**	.02		.23	***	.22	***
Cultural minority (0 = no, 1 = yes)	.06		.08	*	.08		.51	***	.37	***	.35	***
Cultural distance: religion (0 = similar, 1 = different)			-.19	***	-.18	***			.36	***	.36	***
Religiosity			.14	***	.15	***			.03		.03	
Religion*religiosity			-.10	*	-.10	*			.09		.08	
Education					-.01						-.03	
Finances					.04	*					.01	
Social network					.07	**					-.01	
ΔR^2	.49	***	.02	***	.01	**	.25	***	.04	***	.00	

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

Note. $N_{total} = 1221$. $n_{EthnicGermans} = 226$. $n_{RussianJewsGermany} = 169$. $n_{Turks} = 318$. $n_{RussianJewsIsrael} = 222$. $n_{Arabs} = 286$

other than the mainstream one, higher religiosity was significantly related to higher minority identification ($p < .001$). Summing up, country and status of group turned out to be strong predictors for differences in cultural identification. Religion and religiosity added significantly to the prediction of cultural identification. Access to individual assets related to majority identification, but not to minority identification.

Engagement with Majority and Minority Culture

After having examined possible sources for the considerable variation in majority and minority identification across groups (see Fig. 1), we looked at the possible consequences of high versus low levels of cultural identification and asked whether identification relates to engagement with the majority and the minority culture. It is assumed that self-ascribed membership in social groups guides individuals' cognitions, attitudes, and behaviors toward this group and its members (Social Identity Theory, Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and extensive research conducted in various contexts provides sound support for this idea (for a review, see Brown, 2000). Accordingly, higher majority identification should be associated with higher engagement with the majority culture, whereas higher minority identification should relate to higher engagement with the minority culture (see Stoessel, Titzmann, & Silbereisen, 2012, for longitudinal associations). In the context of our comparative study, we investigated whether these associations can be found across groups, although differing in country of settlement and living conditions. Moreover, we were interested in the question of differences and similarities across the three groups sharing their background in the former USSR, as heritage culture is a prominent contextual factor that is assumed to influence the acculturation process and its outcomes (e.g., Ward & Geeraert, 2016).

Engagement with majority and minority culture was represented by language, attitudes, and peer contacts. *Language knowledge* included four items on understanding, reading, speaking, and writing in the language of the cultural majority (German or Hebrew, respectively) and, independently, in the language of respondents' minority group (based on Hazuda, Stern, & Haffner, 1988; 4-point scale, "not at all" to "very well"; Cronbach's $\alpha = .85$ to $.98$). *Language usage* was measured by four items referring to the frequency of using the language of the participant's cultural group in everyday life versus speaking the language of the cultural majority (e.g., with the participant's child, partner, relatives, and friends; Hazuda et al., 1988). Higher scores represent more frequent usage of the majority language (3-point scale; $\alpha = .68$ to $.88$). *Language of media consumption* was captured by two items on the participant's language usage while watching TV and films (Hazuda et al., 1988) referring to the majority language and, independently, to the respective minority language (4-point scale; "never" to "daily"; $\alpha = .57$ to $.87$). *Acculturation attitudes* included four items such as "I enjoy social activities with [...]" (Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000) and referred to members of the cultural majority ("Germans" or "Israelis," respectively) and, independently, to the respective minority group

(6-point scale; $\alpha = .72$ to $.89$). We measured peer contacts in terms of *homophily* by calculating the proportion of contacts in a participant's social network stemming from the same minority group. We used the social network measure presented earlier, but this time coded whether a contact of a participant belonged to the same cultural group (0 = no, 1 = yes). After that, we averaged across the maximum of 12 dichotomous indicators.

We calculated paths models for each group separately: In a first model, majority identification predicted engagement with the majority culture; in a second model, minority identification predicted minority culture engagement (for results, see Table 2). In general, higher majority identification is related to better knowledge of the German or Hebrew language, to more frequent usage of this majority language both with respect to everyday communication and to media consumption, to more positive attitudes toward natives, and to less homophily in social networks. Higher minority identification is related to better knowledge of the minority language, to its more frequent usage in everyday communication and media consumption, to more positive attitudes toward contact with members of the respondent's own cultural group, and to more homophily in social networks. However, all these findings were with the exception of one or more groups, suggesting group differences in associations.

Keeping in mind the possibility for group variation, we tested for differences and similarities across groups sharing their background in the former USSR in order to test for effects of heritage country. We constrained regression paths between majority and minority identification and the respective indicators for majority and minority engagement to be equal for ethnic Germans in Germany, Russian Jews in Germany, and Russian Jews in Israel. The associations were freely estimated for Turks and Arabs as they do not share the former USSR background. With regard to majority identification, the model did not fit the empirical data well ($\chi^2(10, N = 1355) = 32.80, p < .001, CFI = .906, RMSEA = .092$), suggesting that the three former USSR groups functioned differently with respect to their engagement in the majority culture. However, with regard to minority identification, results were rather similar for groups sharing the former USSR background ($\chi^2(10, N = 1354) = 18.90, p = .04, CFI = .935, RMSEA = .057$).

Summary and Conclusion

Our study dealt with those diaspora immigrants who after the breakdown of the communist bloc in Europe left the former USSR in the direction of Germany or Israel. According to our results, ethnic Germans in Germany and Russian Jews in Israel showed considerable differences. With respect to the strength of their cultural identification, Russian Jews in Israel reported stronger bonds to the majority mainstream and placed more importance on majority as compared to minority identification (which ethnic Germans did not). We also found that the two dimensions of cultural identification, majority and minority identification, were negatively related

Table 2 Predicting engagement with majority and minority culture by cultural identification (results of path models; standardized regression coefficients)

Predictors	Outcomes	Germany			Israel					
		Ethnic Germans	Russian Jews	Turks	Russian Jews	Arabs				
		β	p	β	p	β	p			
Majority identification	Language knowledge: majority	.30	***	.25	***	.33	***	.35	***	.11
	Language usage: minority, majority	.51	***	.39	***	.40	***	.25	***	.03
	Media consumption: majority	.05		.11	**	.16	**	.29	***	.02
	Acculturation attitude: majority	.14	*	.10		.27	***	.36	***	.15
	Homophily	-.27	***	-.31	***	-.23	***	-.01		-.10
Minority identification	Language knowledge: minority	.18	**	-.06		.17	**	-.04		.20
	Language usage: minority, majority	-.19	**	-.06		-.29	***	-.07		-.26
	Media consumption: minority	.12		.00		.26	***	.19	**	.07
	Acculturation attitude: minority	.14	*	-.07		.43	***	.14	*	.39
	Homophily	.11		.05		.16	**	.07		.02

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

Note. $N_{total} = 1355$. $n_{EthnicGermans} = 251$. $n_{RussianJewsGermany} = 234$. $n_{Turks} = 332$. $n_{RussianJewsIsrael} = 240$. $n_{Arabs} = 298$

among Russian Jews in Israel, but not among ethnic Germans. The latter finding suggests that Russian Jews in Israel either placed high importance on their background in the former USSR or on the majority culture in Israel instead of combining both. We know from earlier research that integrating bonds to majority and minority culture is more promising with respect to immigrants' successful psychological adaptation as compared to favoring only one dimension (e.g., Berry et al., 2006). Whether this finding from research on interindividual differences within a cultural group can also be found in research comparing groups remains a question for future research.

One interesting question is whether such group differences are rooted in differences in country of settlement and in current living conditions. As this is impossible to answer when comparing just two groups, we addressed this issue by a comparative design including three more groups: Russian Jewish refugees in Germany, Turks in Germany, and the Arab minority in Israel. According to our findings, country of settlement mattered: We found considerably higher identification with the majority culture in Israel and higher identification with the respective minority culture in Germany. Independently from such country differences, groups' (legal) status contributed to differences in cultural identification: diaspora immigrants were successful in developing strong bonds to the majority culture and showed relatively strong bonds to their minority culture. This was found in contrast with another immigrant group that emigrated at the same time from the same country (i.e., the former USSR) to the same country (i.e., Germany) but without returning to their homeland: Russian Jewish refugees in Germany (who represented the comparison group in our analysis). Thus, differences found between ethnic Germans and Russian Jews in Germany are probably due to diaspora immigrants' shared history with the majority culture and their privileged legal status: They belonged to the country of settlement even before immigration had taken place and were strongly supported by that country, which should have facilitated majority identification. Their privileged situation may also have reduced the assimilative pressure to reduce their bonds to the minority culture. Cultural minority members, in turn, showed strong bonds to their minority culture, which is probably due to their big and rather segregated communities that enable cultural retention.

Additionally, religion turned out to be a significant predictor for immigrants' cultural identification, both with respect to majority and to minority identification. Sharing the religious denomination with the majority and thus sharing their central values and norms seemed to support majority identification but to weaken bonds to the minority culture. This effect was more pronounced if participants placed importance on their religion and thus on its core values and norms. Moreover, we found effects for having better access to finances and to high-status social networks. Better access to these types of assets should enhance immigrants' opportunities for equal participation and thus for success within the majority culture, which in turn seemed to support their identification with it.

Most importantly for both immigrants and host countries, differences in cultural identification are related to differences in positive engagement with minority and majority culture. The more immigrants identified with the respective majority

culture, the better they knew the majority language, the more they used this language in everyday communication and while consuming media, the more they had positive attitudes about natives, and the more they were in close contact with native peers. Comparable associations were found with respect to identification and engagement with the minority culture. Additionally, our results suggest that the former USSR background may have a long-term reach: Former USSR immigrants functioned similarly with respect to their minority identification and their engagement with the minority culture. This was despite the fact that immigrants left the former USSR more than 20 years ago for different countries and different living conditions.

According to a sound body of research on social identity (e.g., Brown, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), it is plausible to assume that cultural identification precedes and predicts positive engagement with minority and majority culture. However, we would like to underscore that bidirectional effects are also plausible. For example, better knowledge of the majority language may ease communication with the majority population, which may reduce feelings of exclusion and facilitate increasing majority identification, which in turn may encourage further acquisition of the majority language.

Despite the strengths of our research, among them the comparative design including five groups and two countries, some limitations need to be mentioned. First, we only considered mothers with children of kindergarten age or school age as respondents as mothers are especially important for the development of their children and thus for the adaptation of future generations. It remains an empirical question whether our findings are also applicable to fathers and to females and males without children. Second, the data collection took place a few years ago, and it may be questioned whether or not our results are still valid. However, we are convinced that our results are timely, because majority-minority relations in Israel and Germany are still a matter of public debate and the groups studied remain formative for both countries. The research is also relevant for other countries, as diaspora migration is a growing phenomenon worldwide (Tsuda, 2009) and we provide one of the few comparative studies dealing with this specific group of immigrants. Third, our analyses were based on rather small samples as we divided the total sample into five different subgroups. Fourth, our measure of majority and minority identification was limited to single indicators which focused on the cognitive component of social group membership. Fifth, larger studies including considerably more groups and countries may apply more sophisticated methods of data analysis such as multilevel modeling.

Taken together, our results underscore that country and group differences may have powerful effects during the acculturation process and should be regarded by applying comparative research designs (e.g., Berry, 1997; Bourhis et al., 1997; Ward & Geeraert, 2016): Country and group status together explained an impressive amount of variance in cultural identification (49% and 25%, respectively). Although majority of countries' sociopolitical climate, groups' (legal) status, and participants' religious denomination and access to assets like finances and high-status networks cannot be altered easily, results nevertheless have implications. We assume that some of the effects are the result of rather rigid societies that immigrants or

minorities may fit or may not fit into. Societies need to become more flexible in accommodating this cultural, ethnic, and/or religious diversity. Gay (2010), for example, provides a framework for how schools can better accommodate the diversity in multicultural societies. She suggests that teachers need more cultural knowledge, should develop material that is appropriate for all students, and create intercultural collaborative communication—to name just a few. Many of her suggestions may not just be applied to schools, but to societies as a whole, and may reduce some of the disadvantages of immigrant and cultural minority groups.

References

- Berry, J. W. (1997). Immigration, acculturation, and adaptation. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 46(1), 5–34. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.1997.tb01087.x>
- Berry, J. W., Phinney, J. S., Sam, D. L., & Vedder, P. (2006). Immigrant youth: Acculturation, identity, and adaptation. *Applied Psychology*, 55, 303–332. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1464-0597.2006.00256.x>
- Berry, J. W., Westin, C., Virta, E., Vedder, P., Rooney, R., & Sang, D. (2006). Design of the study: Selecting societies of settlement and immigrant groups. In J. W. Berry, J. S. Phinney, D. L. Sam, & P. Vedder (Eds.), *Immigrant youth in cultural transition: Acculturation, identity, and adaptation across national contexts* (pp. 15–45). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education* (pp. 241–258). New York, NY: Greenwood.
- Bourhis, R. Y., Moïse, L. C., Perreault, S., & Sénécal, S. (1997). Towards an interactive acculturation model: A social psychological approach. *International Journal of Psychology*, 32(6), 369–386. <https://doi.org/10.1080/002075997400629>
- Bradley, R. H., & Corwyn, R. F. (2002). Socioeconomic status and child development. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 53, 371–399. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.53.100901.135233>
- Brown, R. (2000). Social identity theory: Past achievements, current problems and future challenges. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 30(6), 745–778. [https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-0992\(200011/12\)30:6<745::AID-EJSP24>3.0.CO;2-O](https://doi.org/10.1002/1099-0992(200011/12)30:6<745::AID-EJSP24>3.0.CO;2-O)
- Donovan, B. (2007). Minority representation in Germany. *German Politics*, 16(4), 455–480. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09644000701652482>
- Doosje, B., Ellemers, N., & Spears, R. (1995). Perceived intragroup variability as a function of group status and identification. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 31(5), 410–436. <https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.1995.1018>
- Ganzeboom, H. B. G., de Graaf, P. M., & Treiman, D. J. (1992). A standard international socioeconomic index of occupational status. *Social Science Research*, 21(1), 1–56.
- Gay, G. (2010). *Culturally responsive teaching theory, research, and practice* (2nd ed.). New York: Teachers College Press.
- Hazuda, H. P., Stern, M. P., & Haffner, S. M. (1988). Acculturation and assimilation among Mexican Americans: Scales and population-based data. *Social Science Quarterly*, 69(3), 687–706.
- Kamm, S. (2003). *The Arab minority in Israel. Implications for the Middle East conflict*. Working Paper No. 8. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Mammy, U., & Sattig, J. (2002). *Determinanten und Indikatoren der Integration der ausländischen Bevölkerung (Integrationsurvey). Projekt- und Materialdokumentation [Determinants and indicators for the integration of the foreign population (Survey on integration). Project and material documentation]*. Wiesbaden: Bundesinstitut für Bevölkerungsforschung.

- Ohliger, R., & Münz, R. (2003). Diaspora and ethnic migrants in twentieth-century Europe: A comparative perspective. In R. Münz & R. Ohliger (Eds.), *Diasporas and ethnic migrants. Germany, Israel and post-Soviet successor states in comparative perspective*. London: Frank Cass.
- Rodríguez, S. A., Perez-Brena, N. J., Updegraff, K. A., & Umaña-Taylor, A. J. (2014). Emotional closeness in Mexican-origin adolescents' relationships with mothers, fathers, and same-sex friends. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 43(12), 1953–1968. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-013-0004-8>
- Ryder, A. G., Alden, L. E., & Paulhus, D. L. (2000). Is acculturation unidimensional or bidimensional? A head-to-head comparison in the prediction of personality, self-identity, and adjustment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79(1), 49–65. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.1.49>
- Shavit, Y. (1990). Segregation, tracking, and the educational attainment of minorities: Arabs and Oriental Jews in Israel. *American Sociological Review*, 55(1), 115–126. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2095707>
- Silbereisen, R. K., Titzmann, P. F., & Shavit, Y. (Eds.). (2014). *The challenges of diaspora migration: Interdisciplinary perspectives on Israel and Germany*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Stoessel, K., Titzmann, P. F., & Silbereisen, R. K. (2011). Children's psychosocial development following the transitions to kindergarten and school: A comparison between natives and immigrants in Germany. *International Journal of Developmental Science*, 5(1–2), 41–55. <https://doi.org/10.3233/DEV-2011-11077>
- Stoessel, K., Titzmann, P. F., & Silbereisen, R. K. (2012). Young diaspora immigrants' attitude and behavior toward the host culture: The role of cultural identification. *European Psychologist*, 17(2), 143–157. <https://doi.org/10.1027/1016-9040/a000113>
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), *The psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 7–24). Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall.
- Thran, M., & Boehnke, L. (2015). The value-based nationalism of Pegida. *Journal for Deradicalization*, 3, 178–209.
- Titzmann, P. F. (2005). *Differences in processes of acculturation among adolescent immigrants in Israel and Germany*. Development and use of a new instrument to assess acculturative hassles (doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from http://www.db-thueringen.de/servlets/DerivateServlet/Derivate-8517/diss_publikation.pdf
- Titzmann, P. F., & Stoessel, K. (2014). Diaspora migration in Israel and Germany: Unique contexts or examples of a general phenomenon? In R. K. Silbereisen, P. F. Titzmann, & Y. Shavit (Eds.), *The challenges of diaspora migration: Interdisciplinary perspectives on Israel and Germany* (pp. 271–288). Farnham: Ashgate.
- Tsuda, T. (Ed.). (2009). *Diasporic homecomings: Ethnic return migration in comparative perspective*. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press.
- United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. (2016). *International Migration Report 2015: Highlights* (ST/ESA/SER.A/375).
- United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization. (1997). *International Standard Classification of Education: ISCED 1997*. Paris: UNESCO Institute for Statistics.
- Updegraff, K. A., McHale, S. M., Crouter, A. C., & Kupanoff, K. (2001). Parents' involvement in adolescents' peer relationships: A comparison of mothers' and fathers' roles. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 63(3), 655–668. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2001.00655.x>
- van der Gaag, M., Snijders, T. A. B., & Flap, H. (2008). Position generator measures and their relationship to other social capital measures. In N. Lin & B. H. Erickson (Eds.), *Social capital. An international research program* (pp. 27–48). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Verdugo, R. R., & Mueller, C. (2008). Education, social embeddedness, and the integration of the Turkish community in Germany. *European Education*, 40(4), 3–22. <https://doi.org/10.2753/EUE1056-4934400401>

- Ward, C., & Geeraert, N. (2016). Advancing acculturation theory and research: The acculturation process in its ecological context. *Current Opinion in Psychology*, 8, 98–104. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.09.021>
- Weingrod, A., & Levy, A. (2006). Social thought and commentary: Paradoxes of homecoming: The Jews and their diasporas. *Anthropological Quarterly*, 79(4), 691–716.

Katharina Sonnenberg is higher education planning consultant at the Institutional Research and Quality Monitoring Office of the FernUniversität in Hagen (Germany). Her research on higher education includes universities' diversity recruitment strategies, dropout risks of nontraditional students from distance education programs, and intervention programs aiming at fostering relationship building among distance students. A second line of her research focuses on migration-related adaptation among adolescents with immigrant background, especially on cultural identification among diaspora immigrants. Her often interdisciplinary and longitudinal work is published in edited volumes, book sections, and peer-reviewed journals, among them *Research in Higher Education* and *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*.

Peter F. Titzmann is professor of Developmental Psychology at the Leibniz University Hannover, Germany. During his academic career, he was research associate at the University of Jena, Germany; assistant professor of Life Course and Competence Development in Childhood and Adolescence at the Jacobs Center for Productive Youth Development, University of Zürich, Switzerland; and Professor of Psychology at the University of Education Weingarten, Germany. His general research interest relates to the interplay between normative development and migration-related adaptation among adolescents with immigrant background. He investigated this interplay in various developmental outcomes, such as experiences of stress, delinquent behaviour, victimization, friendships, autonomy development, and changes in the family hierarchy and interaction. His often interdisciplinary and longitudinal work is published in various edited volumes, book sections, and peer-reviewed journals, among them *Child Development*, *Developmental Psychology*, *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, and the *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*.

Rainer K. Silbereisen was chair of Developmental Psychology and director of the Center for Applied Developmental Science (CADS) at the University of Jena, Germany and is a member of the Board of Governors of the University of Haifa, Israel. His previous appointment was full professor at the Pennsylvania State University, USA. He is fellow of the American Psychological Association and the Association for Psychological Science, member of the European Academy of Sciences (London), past-president of the International Union of Psychological Science (IUPsyS), and past-editor of the *International Journal of Psychology*. A psychologist by training, he has been involved as principal investigator in interdisciplinary research on the role of social change in human development, acculturation among immigrants, psychological development of entrepreneurship, and prevention of adolescent problem behavior, often in a cross-national and longitudinal format. His achievements as researcher and mentor were honored by various awards. He has edited about 20 books and published about 300 scholarly research articles.

Value Changes in Adolescents' Anticipation of Possible Career Selves in Slovenia and Serbia



Alenka Gril, Nada Polovina, Ivana Jakšić, Sabina Autor,
and Mladen Radulović

Thinking about one's own future is particularly important in adolescents when their identity is developing. Adolescents' subjective images of the future relate to the anticipated goals that direct current behaviour and gradually construct personal identity (Boniwell & Zimbardo, 2004; Kauffman & Husman, 2004; Simons, Vansteenkiste, & Lens, 2004). In the present chapter, the term "visions of the future" has been used for exploring the adolescents' anticipations of future goals. In the cognitive form, the "visions" enable the construction of comprehensive (multiple domains), self-relevant, distant but time-limited (e.g. in 10 years) personal framework suitable for expression of important prospective identity domains. They include the essential aspects of three well-established psychological constructs of future thoughts—*future time perspective*, *future orientation*, and *possible self*—but they also contain some specific additional features. *Visions of the future* imply (a) cognitive representations and elaborations of the individual's needs expressed in different goals and plans for the future (as the *future time perspective*, Nuttin & Lens, 1985/2014); (b) consciously represented images of the future self that contain the emotionally important themes for a person (as the *future orientation*, Seginer & Mahajna, 2004); and (c) individual's perceptions and beliefs about what he/she wants and could become (as the *possible self*, Markus & Nurius, 1986). The additional features of the *vision of the future* stem from Strange and Munford's (2002) definition which considers it as a framework involving a set of idealized future goals as well as directions and coordination of activities relevant to future goal attainment. Thus, envisioning allows for extrapolating elements of actual situation "into the

A. Gril (✉) · S. Autor
Educational Research Institute, Ljubljana, Slovenia
e-mail: alenka.gril@pei.si; sabina.autor@pei.si

N. Polovina · I. Jakšić · M. Radulović
Institute for Educational Research, Belgrade, Serbia
e-mail: npolovina@ipi.ac.rs; ivanamjaksic@gmail.com; mladjaradulovic89@gmail.com

future while considering new occurrences; it offers a lens for systematically and creatively exploring complex yet possible future” (Tschakert et al., 2014, p. 1052). In the vision, an individual articulates personal values, purposes, and identity out of his/her experiences within a concrete social system (Strange & Munford, 2002).

The aim of the study was to grasp the complexity of adolescents’ anticipations of their future selves elaborated around abundant developmental tasks and expected life-course events during the transition to adulthood. In the core of adolescent’s imagining of the personal future are the common prospective life domains: (1) future education and occupation, (2) work and career, (3) romantic relations/marriage and parenthood, and (4) self-sufficiency based on material independence (Arnett, 2000; Nurmi, 1991; Seginer, 2009). Numerous research results from different countries reveal “unexpected similarity in adolescents’ interests across cultures: They all seem to be most interested in two main domains of their future life—work and education”, which play a crucial role in the expected life-span development in different cultures (Nurmi, 1991, p. 34). Further studies of variations related to gender and level of cultural emphasis on professional and academic accomplishments have been suggested by a number of authors (Iovu, 2014; Unemori, Omoregie, & Markus, 2004; Yowell, 2002).

Our study focuses on the cultural variations in adolescents’ visions of the future in the career domain (education and profession) in Slovenia and Serbia. Both countries were in the past a part of the Socialist Federal Republic Yugoslavia and shared a common political and socio-economic institutional order with similar declared values, but they were separated in the 1990s and later developed as two independent states. Today’s adolescents of the two states have grown up with limited contacts, but they share somewhat similar primary developmental context in the family due to their parents belonging to the same generation from the common country. The main research question was to find out how the socio-economic and political differences in broader developmental contexts in Slovenia and Serbia are reflected in the adolescents’ visions of the future.

Social Context and Identity Development

In his pioneering work, Erikson (1968/1976) defined identity as “conscious sense of individual uniqueness, unconscious struggle for the continuity of the experience of self and solidarity with the ideals of the group” (p. 177), pointing to the psychosocial nature of the identity development unfolding within a network of social contexts (family, peers, historical, economic, socio-cultural, ideological settings) with its cultural beliefs, values, and adult role expectations. Neo-Eriksonian theorists and researchers have enriched the field providing process-oriented models of identity development, starting from identity status paradigm (diffusion, foreclosure, moratorium, and achievement; Marcia, 1966) to new/extended models (Crocetti, Rubini, Luyckx, & Meeus, 2008; Luyckx, Goossens, Soenens, & Beyers, 2006; Meeus, 2011) that propose more complex dynamics of identity formation based on various

forms of exploration (active considerations/weighing of identity alternatives) and commitment (making more or less firm choices/goals about identity domains) with effects in terms of stability/instability of identity formation.

Process-oriented models assume that exploration and commitment operate within a set of identity domains that are empirically treated either separately or grouped as *ideological* (occupation, values, politics, religion, gender roles) and *interpersonal* (dating, friendships, and family) domains (Bartoszuk & Pittman, 2010; Schwartz et al., 2013). The research findings reveal that the differences do occur in terms of low/high exploration and/or low/high commitment in different domains. For example, Bartoszuk and Pittman (2010) have found among young adults low exploration in both ideological and interpersonal domains (ideological being the lower) compared to high and comparable levels of commitment in the two domains. They also found that in the ideological domain, the commitments appeared to be crystallizing without much exploration of alternatives; the older participants explored more than the younger; females more than males explore the interpersonal domain. The perspective that is put at the forefront of the different identity domains is relevant for this study because we focused on adolescents' visions of their possible selves in different areas of life.

Process-oriented models of identity development pay little attention to the role of context and interaction between person and context (Lannegrand-Willems & Bosma, 2006; Schwartz et al., 2013). The initial commitments that most adolescents internalized from parents were recognized as the basis of in-depth exploration and reconsideration of identity construction (Meeus, 1996). In addition, the influence of family/parents on their offspring's values, goals, aspirations, and self-concept is recognized as critical and stable (over the life course), particularly in the domain of education and career (Begston, Biblarz, & Roberts, 2002; Hitlin, 2006; Johnson, 2002).

The impact of both generational affiliation and changes in the broader social context on the formation of social and individual identity of young people needs to be mentioned. Young people share a common historical time (including the problems in the socioecological contexts) and the same cultural norms (the values embedded in the prevailing modes of living) with the generation that they belong to (O'Bannon, 2001; O'Connor & Raile, 2015). In more recent studies, the influence of globalization on identity development has been recognized, and the construct *bicultural identity* has been introduced to denote the part of a person's identity rooted in his/her local culture (local circumstances, environment, traditions) and "the part that stems from an awareness of a person's relation to the global culture" (including events, practices, styles, and information) (Arnett, 2002, p. 777).

Societal Context in Slovenia

The process of changes in the political and economic system in Slovenia formally started in 1991 with the declaration of independence from Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. In the first half of the 1990s, the transition brought about

a decline in the economy and an increase in the level of unemployment. The processes of disintegration of Yugoslavia and the war in the immediate surrounding had contributed to the expansion of nationalism. The period of apparent stability, marked by the joining the EU and NATO in 2004 and joining the Euro zone in 2007, was followed by the world financial crisis in 2008, which has once again brought a lot of uncertainty. The economic policy has blindly followed the neoliberal doctrine by weakening the welfare state, which has predictably intensified poverty (also in the middle class) and allowed the enrichment of elites. In the political sphere, the victory of the right-wing party in 2004, the first time since independence, and again after the financial recession in 2012, allowed for the expansion of populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism and open attacks on the rights of minorities and vulnerable groups.

The process of transition from a socialist to a capitalist system has been marked also by the changing priorities of values, specifically of freedom, prosperity, and justice. In 1991, the public perceived the capitalism as a system based on selfishness, inequality, and conflict but also as system which provides social well-being. But in 2009, after 20 years of “empirical validation” of capitalism, well-being and fairness were recognized as the attributes of socialism, while capitalism has lost its notion of prosperity and also its social legitimacy (Toš, 2009).

The young people’s values have also changed during the transition in Slovenia: The big values based on strong ideologies (politics, religion, nationality) which were reported in the 1980s were replaced by the individualistic values (material and social security, friendship and interpersonal relations, healthy environment, quality of everyday life) that emerged at the top, as revealed in the Youth 2000 survey (Nastran Ule, 2004). A reversal of values towards the individual self was noticed already in the 1990s (Nastran Ule, 1996). Namely, the young people’s problems have been considered as their own individual problems, not existing within the society as a framework for understanding and solving the problem. That was in sharp contrast with the views of the youth in the 1980s, who were highly socially engaged and persistently articulated their problems from the perspective of the ongoing social and political crisis.

The changes in the educational system at all levels since 1991 assumed: the introduction of 9 years elementary school¹ (the enrolment in primary school 1 year earlier, at 6 years of age, since 2004), a general and professional baccalaureate at the end of high school (in the 1990s)² and the Bologna reform of university studies (gradual introduction since 2005). In Slovenia 98.5% of young people (15–29 years of age) had finished at least elementary school before 2013.³ The proportion of

¹Elementary school encompasses primary and lower secondary level of education in nine grades.

²Gymnasium was reintroduced in the late 1980s, after the secondary school reform called “oriented education” in the 1980s (1981–1987) which unified all types of high schools and oriented them towards vocations. Today in Slovenia, there are three types of upper secondary schools: gymnasium, 4 years; professional, 4 years; and vocational, 3 or 2 years.

³In 2013 14.6% of the young people had university education, 54.9% had high-school education, 29% had elementary education, and the rest (1.5%) had lower vocational education, unfinished elementary education or without it (Statistical office of the Republic of Slovenia [SURs], 2014).

young school leavers in Slovenia is the lowest in the EU (4.3%; Lavrič, 2011). Slovenia has also the highest proportion of students enrolled in the tertiary education among EU countries, and this share still increases⁴; almost half of the population (47.7%) in the age of 20 to 24 years has studied at the university in 2014/2015 (SURs, 2016).

The level of unemployment has increased twice since 1991, first in the 1990s and then following the world financial crisis in 2008. The latter mostly affected the young people, aged 15–24 years; their level of work activity decreased the most in the whole population in 2008–2013 (IMAD, 2015).⁵ In 2013, the unemployment rate of young people was 19.1%. The long-term unemployment rate of youth has quadrupled since the crisis.⁶ The precarious forms of employment have also increased, especially among young people (Lavrič, 2011). All of these characteristics of labour market in Slovenia have increased the uncertainty especially among the young people and have set a negative emphasis on their prospective careers, as well as on current education.

Societal Context in Serbia

In the 1990s, after 45 years of being a socialist society (as part of Yugoslavia), Serbia started the process usually referred to as transition or post-socialist transformation (Cvejić, 2006). The Serbian society has followed a specific path towards establishing new system, since it has been burdened with pauperization, wars in Croatia and Bosnia and Hercegovina (ex-Yugoslavia republics), isolation, sanctions, and state regulation of economy that prevented the privatization. Transformation in Serbia has differed from most of other post-socialist countries, and it had two phases (Lazić, 2011). The first phase is called “blocked transformation”; during this phase multiparty system and market economy were introduced, but full implementation of market economy was delayed by the state interference. The second phase started in 2000 and is called “unblocked transformation”, which is characterized by the rapid introduction of market economy and its institutions.

Along with the relinquishment of the socialist mode of production, the socialist system of values was called into question. Consequently, some studies of value orientations indicate that there is no consistency among Serbian citizens (Lazić & Cvejić, 2004). Namely, traditional and authoritative values have been declining, while nationalism is still present; at the same time, liberal values have still not been accepted, and egalitarianism and paternalism are the preferred value orientations.

⁴In 2006 25% of Slovene population has tertiary education; in 2013 there were 40% (SURs, 2014).

⁵Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development of the Republic of Slovenia (IMAD).

⁶The long-term unemployment rate of young people was 8.3% in the second half of year 2014 (Ministry of labour, family, social affairs and equal opportunities of the Republic of Slovenia, 2016).

As mentioned, Serbia has had a specific and slow path towards the formation of a new system. During the 1990s, the GDP and the employment decreased (especially during 1999) due to the NATO bombing (Krstić & Corbanese, 2009). The collapse of economic sector had influenced the rise of unemployment which has led to an impoverishment of the population. After 2000, the economic system experienced stabilization, the inflation was stopped, and the economic exchange with other countries was established. These changes have led to the improvement of material standards and the increase of income for the majority of the population. Before the world financial crisis, Serbian economy estimated 4.8% annual economic growth (Radonjić, 2013). In recent years, the poverty increased due to the global financial recession, which led to the increase of unemployment rate (19.7% in January 2016)⁷ and the decrease of the income. Alongside with the development of capitalist economy, the social inequalities have increased as well. For the past 20 years, the educational inequalities have grown, so the people whose parents had higher levels of education were more likely to achieve high education degrees compared to those whose parents didn't have such an education level (Stanojević, 2013).⁸

These structural changes are affecting the lives of youth as well. The consequences of the new conditions on their lives are (a) blurring of value framework, simultaneous individualization, and re-traditionalization (Mojić, 2012); (b) difficult transition from education to labour, severe competition on labour market (Mojić, 2012)⁹; (c) more difficult transition towards independent housing due to the housing shortage (Petrović, 2004)¹⁰; (d) increase in the number of extended and multigenerational families (Miletić, 2005); and (e) postponement of marriage and having children. Consequently, young people often want to migrate to more developed countries. Namely, some studies show that almost half (45.7%) of youth population wants to emigrate (Mojić, 2012).

The Study on Adolescents' Visions of Their Future in Slovenia and Serbia

The aim of the study was to investigate how the different transitional pathways of the societal changes in Slovenia and Serbia are reflected in the visions of the future of today's generation of adolescents. Their visions of the future were investigated in

⁷Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia [RZS], 2016.

⁸For example, while people with less than 8 years of school make 13.6% of Serbian population (RZS, 2012, p. 22), they represent just 0.47% of parents of students (Equi-ed, 2012, p. 32), while people with high education make 10.6% of Serbian population and 22.6% of parents of students (Ibid.).

⁹According to Labor Force Survey from April 2009, the activity rate of overall population aged 15–64 was 60.8%, while the youth had activity rate of 28.3% (Mojić, 2012, p. 102).

¹⁰According to one study, more than half (56.4%) of young people (age 19–35) live with their parents and only 4% in apartment that they bought with their own money (Stanojević, 2012, p. 59).

four domains that are important for the identity development: career, interpersonal relations with family and friends, partnership and parenthood, and societal engagement. The present study is focused on the visions of career with an assumption that the career is the central domain in establishing one's own identity, and, also, its attainment is highly conditioned by the societal circumstances. The importance of several goals related to establishing a career was explored, such as finishing education, gaining a profession, becoming financially independent, having high income, and affording an autonomous living. Also, the perceived contribution of individual and social factors to the attainment of one's career was investigated. In order to find the similarities and differences in the adolescents' visions of future career in two countries, and possibly answer the main research question, the impact of socio-demographic characteristics was explored.

Method

Participants

The study was conducted using stratified random samples of adolescents in Slovenia and Serbia enrolled in the last grade of three educational programmes—fourth grade in gymnasium, fourth grade in professional schools, and third grade in vocational schools (Table 1). From each sampled high school in the different regions (six in Slovenia, three in Serbia), one class of students in the last grade participated. The mean ages of adolescents were 18.02 years (*SD* = .60) in Slovenia and 17.84 years (*SD* = .46) in Serbia. The Slovene and Serbian samples were both slightly gender biased. In both countries the majority of students have been enrolled in professional schools (more in Serbia than in Slovenia), about one third in a gymnasium (more in Slovenia), and the least of them in vocational schools (more in Slovenia). In both countries their parents had mostly high-school education (Slovenia, 49.9% mothers, 54.9% fathers; Serbia, 57.8% mothers, 55.3% fathers); about 10% of parents had only basic school education, while about one third of parents had university education (or higher), more in Slovenia (38.9% mothers, 33.2% fathers) than in Serbia (25% mothers, 27.3% fathers). Furthermore, the adolescents answered the

Table 1 Samples of adolescents in Slovenia and Serbia

Country		Total	High school			Sex	
			Gymnasium	Professional	Vocational	Girls	Boys
Slovenia	<i>N</i>	880	316	404	160	381	498
	%	30.9	35.9	45.9	18.2	43.3	56.7
Serbia	<i>N</i>	1969	412	1327	230	1030	935
	%	69.1	20.9	67.4	11.7	52.4	47.6
Total	<i>N</i>	2849	728	1731	390	1411	1433
	%	100	25.6	60.8	13.7	49.6	59.4

questionnaire on visions of the future collectively in the class, at the same time in both countries, in the autumn of 2015.

Measures

The questionnaire was constructed based on a preliminary qualitative study on adolescents' visions of the future (the descriptions of future goals and related factors of their achievement were used as items). For the present study, four measures were used from the questionnaire: (a) *the topics of thinking about the future*, (b) *the educational aspirations*, (c) *the importance of realizing career goals* in the 10-year timeline (education, profession, financial independence, high income, autonomous living) and (d) *the factors of achieving a profession*. The analyses of latent item structure (principal axes factoring method—PAF) of two measures (the topics of the future visions and the factors of achieving a profession) and their reliability analyses (Cronbach's alpha) have been performed in each sample separately. The composite measures were formed as the average of items converging on each factor, which present four topics of future visions and three factors of achieving a profession.

We further analysed the data to test our hypotheses. First, the centrality of career goals has been studied in two countries separately, based on the mean differences between the frequencies of thinking about four topics of future vision (using paired samples *t*-test). Second, the impact of different socio-demographic and educational factors on the future vision of career, several hierarchical linear regression analyses has been conducted. Country, sex, type of school, and parental education were used as predictors (for the first three categorical variables dummy variables were formed) and entered in a regression in separated blocks. As a dependent variable, the different elements of future career visions were selected for each of the regression analysis: (1) career topic, (2) educational aspirations, (3) importance of five career goals (achieving an education, a profession, financial independence, high income, autonomous living), and (4) three factors of achieving a profession (knowledge and abilities, social norms, societal circumstances). The descriptive statistics of measures of future visions about a career for total sample and each of the subgroups are presented in Table 2.

Results

The Future Career Goals

The adolescents' thinking about the 14 specific themes in relation to their near future (in 10-year timeline) was assessed on the 5-point scale from never (1) to always (5). PAF revealed four main topics of their visions of the future. A *career* topic consisted of four themes/items—education, profession, work, and financial situation (alphas

Table 2 Descriptive statistics of measures of adolescents' future visions about a career

	Total		Country						Sex						High school									
			Slovenia			Serbia			Girls			Boys			Gymnasium			Professional			Vocational			
			<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	
Career—topic	2778	3.97	.64	879	3.76	.61	1899	4.07	.64	1385	4.08	.58	1385	3.86	.68	720	4.00	.62	1679	3.99	.65	376	3.84	.64
Education aspiration	2541	2.62	.88	782	2.53	.94	1759	2.66	.86	1283	2.80	.79	1250	2.44	.94	664	3.15	.54	1544	2.61	.82	330	1.63	.85
Importance of achieving future goals on:																								
Education	2835	4.45	.79	880	4.38	.72	1955	4.48	.82	1405	4.60	.68	1422	4.31	.86	725	4.58	.65	1719	4.41	.83	387	4.39	.83
Profession	2826	4.57	.68	878	4.48	.66	1948	4.61	.68	1401	4.65	.61	1417	4.48	.73	726	4.58	.65	1711	4.58	.68	385	4.50	.74
Financial independence	2821	4.79	.56	878	4.78	.54	1943	4.80	.56	1402	4.84	.48	1412	4.75	.62	723	4.86	.44	1709	4.80	.54	385	4.64	.75
High income	2816	4.46	.75	877	4.36	.74	1939	4.50	.76	1401	4.47	.72	1406	4.45	.79	723	4.43	.72	1704	4.49	.73	385	4.36	.88
Autonomous living	2820	4.49	.94	878	4.62	.75	1942	4.44	1.01	1401	4.60	.85	1411	4.39	1.02	723	4.64	.76	1709	4.49	.96	384	4.26	1.11
Factors of achieving a profession:																								
External circumstances	2703	3.38	.80	865	3.37	.73	1838	3.38	.83	1347	3.41	.75	1348	3.34	.84	709	3.28	.73	1638	3.39	.83	352	3.49	.80
Personal competencies	2759	4.18	.61	869	4.12	.54	1890	4.20	.64	1376	4.26	.57	1376	4.10	.65	716	4.22	.53	1668	4.18	.63	371	4.08	.70
Social norms	2758	2.71	1.04	873	2.61	.92	1885	2.75	1.09	1379	2.59	.99	1371	2.82	1.07	720	2.39	.87	1668	2.76	1.06	366	3.10	1.06

Table 3 Mean differences in frequencies of adolescents' thinking about the topics of future visions (*t*-test scores)

Topic	1.	2.	3.	4.	M_{SLO}	SD_{SLO}
1. Career	–	8.74***	14.69***	25.16***	3.76	0.61
2. Social network	19.66***	–	6.39***	13.97***	3.51	0.77
3. My family	23.62***	7.25***	–	5.72***	3.27	0.99
4. Societal conditions	55.02***	32.51***	18.29***	–	3.04	0.84
M_{SRB}	4.07	3.69	3.49	2.96		
SD_{SRB}	0.63	0.77	1.03	0.87		
Slovenia—Serbia	–11.94***	–5.64***	–5.46***	2.3*		

Note: *t*-test scores for Slovene adolescents ($N = 878$) are presented above the diagonal, and *t*-test scores for Serbian adolescents ($N = 1871$) are presented below the diagonal

M_{SLO} = means for Slovene adolescents; SD_{SLO} = standard deviations for Slovene adolescents; M_{SRB} = means for Serbian adolescents; SD_{SRB} = standard deviations for Serbian adolescents

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

were .66 in Slovenia and .68 in Serbia). It was the most frequent thought in relation to the future of Slovene and Serbian adolescents. The second most frequent topic was their *social network*, consisting of relatives and friends (two items; alphas were .74 in Slovenia and .71 in Serbia). The third frequent topic was their *own future family*—romantic partner, spouse, and their own children (three items; alphas were .80 in Slovenia and .79 in Serbia). The least frequently was the adolescents thought about the future in relation to *the societal conditions*, which covered the situation in their own country and in the world, place, or country of their living in the future and their own social and political participation (four items; alphas were .72 in Slovenia and .73 in Serbia).

The career represents the central topic of their future visions. The adolescents in both countries thought about it more often than about the other three topics (Table 3). The Serbian adolescents think about their career, their social network, and their own future family more often, whereas the societal conditions are more frequently in minds of Slovene adolescents.

Socio-demographic factors explained little variance in career thoughts and indicate a small effect (Table 4). The career has been more frequently thought of in Serbian adolescents, among girls, and in those with highly educated fathers but less frequently among students in vocational schools than among those in professional schools and gymnasias.

The adolescents' goals about the education were measured as their educational aspirations. In the Slovene sample, 16.8% wanted to finish high school, 19.5% upper professional school, 41.5% university studies, and 11% postgraduate studies, and 10.8% didn't know yet (11.1% total missing). In the Serbian sample 13.7% wanted to finish the high school, 11.8% the upper professional school, 54.6% the university studies, and 9.1% postgraduate studies, and 9.5% didn't know yet (1.4% missing).

The socio-demographic factors explained about one third of variance in educational aspirations, which indicated a strong effect (Table 4). Higher educational aspirations were found in adolescents in Serbia, in girls, and in those with higher-

Table 4 Regression analyses of socio-demographic factors on the adolescents' future vision about a career

Predictor	Career—topic	Educational aspiration	Importance of realizing the future goals on...					Autonomous living
			Education	Profession	Financial independence	High income		
Constant	3.936	1.918	4.172	4.397	4.783	4.592	4.070	
Country SLO	-.208***	-.070***	-.062**	-.090***	-.013	-.082***	.100***	
Sex F	.149***	.137***	.177***	.112***	.064**	-.004	.116***	
School G	.019	.213***	.071**	-.018	.035	-.015	.011	
School V	-.040*	-.319***	.023	-.003	-.084***	-.046*	-.078***	
Edu mother	-.042	.068**	-.024	.029	.004	.009	.082***	
Edu father	.058*	.144***	.075**	.037	-.008	-.033	.011	
R ²	.079*	.305***	.047**	.022*	.014***	.008*	.038***	
n	2587	2373	2635	2628	2625	2619	2624	

Note: Standardized beta coefficients are presented for each predictor variable in regression models for different criteria. Dummy coded variables: country (0 = Serbia, 1 = Slovenia); sex (0 = males, 1 = females); school (0 = professional, 1 = vocational, 2 = gymnasium); all zero-coded dummy variables were selected as baseline variables in regression analyses. Country SLO = Slovenia; Sex F = female adolescents; School G = gymnasium; School V = vocational school; Edu mother = mother's level of education; Edu father = father's level of education; R² = adjusted total percentage of explained variance
 *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001




Fig. 1 The importance of realization of future goals in Slovene and Serbian adolescents (Asterisks indicate significant mean differences)

educated fathers and mothers. The students in gymnasium had higher educational aspirations than students in professional schools, while students in vocational schools had lower.

The importance of realization of specific goals (related to career and other domains) in 10-year period was assessed on the 5-point scale [from totally unimportant (1) to very important (5)]. All future goals were of great importance for adolescents in both countries (see Fig. 1). The financial independence was the most important goal for all adolescents. In the Slovene sample, autonomous living (away from parents) was the second most important goal, followed by achieving the desired profession, then the education and then a high income. In Serbian sample, achieving the desired profession was the second most important goal, followed by having a high income, then the education, and, lastly, the autonomous living. Realizing goals from the other domains in the future vision, as having children, partner, and residence, was the least important for Slovene and Serbian adolescents. The order of future goals by their importance for the adolescents shows the priority of career goals in both countries over the other goals related more to private life.

The differences in the importance of specific goals are found between two countries: Serbian adolescents value education, profession, high income, residence, and parenthood more, whereas the Slovenes value autonomous living more.¹¹

The socio-demographic factors explained little variance in the importance of realizing various career-related future goals and indicated small effects (Table 4).

¹¹Cross-country differences in the importance of specific goals: education ($F = 10.24$; $p = .001$; $\eta^2 = .004$), profession ($F = 23.341$; $p = .000$; $\eta^2 = .008$), high income ($F = 22.78$; $p = .000$; $\eta^2 = .008$), residence ($F = 26.93$; $p = .000$; $\eta^2 = .012$), parenthood ($F = 10.87$; $p = .001$; $\eta^2 = .004$), and autonomous living ($F = 23.10$; $p = .000$; $\eta^2 = .008$).

Higher importance of finishing education has been assigned by the adolescents in Serbia, girls, gymnasium students, and those with higher-educated fathers. Higher importance of achieving a profession has been assigned by the adolescents in Serbia and girls in general. The importance of becoming financially independent has been assigned as higher by the girls and as lower by the students in vocational schools. Having high income in the near future has been more important for the adolescents in Serbia and less important for the students in vocational schools. Achieving an autonomous living has been more important for the Slovene adolescents, girls, and those with higher-educated mothers, while less important for the students in vocational school than for those in professional school.

Factors of Achieving a Profession

The adolescents assessed the influence of 11 items on achieving their desired profession on 5-point scales, from none (1) to very much (5). PAF revealed three latent factors of perceived influence on achieving a profession: (1) *personal competencies* that refer to their own abilities, knowledge, and experience gained out of school, knowledge gained in the school, and effort and diligence (four items, alphas were .61 in Slovene and .68 in Serbian sample); (2) *external circumstances* that refer to employment possibilities, economic conditions in the country, financial capabilities of parents, parental connections and acquaintances, and luck (five items, alphas were .66 in Slovene and .70 in Serbian sample); and (3) *social norms*, in terms of the wishes and expectations of the adolescent's parents and the wishes and expectations of friends and schoolmates (two items, alphas were .79 in Slovene and .81 in Serbian sample). In general, the adolescents perceived personal competencies as the most influential, then the external circumstances, and the social norms as the least influential in achieving the desired profession.

The socio-demographic characteristics of the adolescents explained little variance in their perception of influence of the three factors on achieving a desired profession (Table 5). The *external circumstances* have been perceived as more influential by the girls and as less influential by the students in gymnasium than those in professional school. The *personal competencies* have been assigned as more influential among adolescents in Serbia, the girls, in those with university educational aspiration, and in those with less educated mothers. The *social norms* have been perceived as more influential in Serbia and among the boys. The students in vocational schools assigned the norms more influence than the students in professional schools, while the students in gymnasia assigned it less. Also, those with university educational aspirations assigned the norms less influence on the achievement of desired profession than the others with lower aspirations.

Table 5 Regression analyses of socio-demographic factors and educational aspirations on the perceived influence of three factors of achieving a desired profession

	Factors of achieving a profession		
	External circumstances	Personal competencies	Social norms
Constant	3.590	4.153	3.150
Country SLO	.000	-.041*	-.070***
Sex F	.048*	.090***	-.094***
School G	-.045*	-.001	-.097***
School V	.028	-.015	.090***
Edu mother	-.048	-.055*	-.049*
Edu father	-.033	.003	-.010
Edu Aspir Uni	-.025	.133***	-.062**
R ²	.013**	.033***	.059**
n	2509	2550	2553

Note: Standardized beta coefficients are presented for each predictor variable in regression models for different criteria. Dummy coded variables: country (0 = Serbia, 1 = Slovenia); sex (0 = males, 1 = females); school (0 = professional, 1 = vocational, 2 = gymnasium); educational aspiration (0 = professional; 1 = university); all zero-coded dummy variables were selected as baseline variables in regression analyses. Country SLO = Slovenia; Sex F = female adolescents; School G = gymnasium; School V = vocational school; Edu mother = mother's level of education; Edu father = father's level of education; Edu Aspir Uni = educational aspiration for university level studies; R² = adjusted total percentage of explained variance

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$

Discussion

This study approached the adolescents' identity formation process from the perspective of individual's elaboration of the visions of their future in which they define goals perceived as important for themselves in the future and the pathways towards realizing them. The comparative study was conducted in two countries, Slovenia and Serbia, which were part of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and have been followed by different pathways of post-socialistic to capitalistic transformation of societies since 1991. The social context substantially influenced the adolescents' definitions of identity with posting context-specific demands and opportunities as well as the appropriate ways for resolving developmental tasks (e.g. Seginer, 2009). Therefore the study searched for similarities and differences in adolescents' elaborations of future goals with a specific focus on the career domain.

The findings indicate that there are similarities between the two samples in defining the priorities of career-related goals over the goals in other domains, interpersonal and societal. In Slovenia and Serbia, adolescents thought about their future mostly in terms of career (education, profession, and finances) more than they thought about their friends, family, romantic partners, their own children or socio-political issues. Additionally, the most important goal they wanted to achieve in 10-year timeline was gaining financial independence. This is the core developmental task of transition to adulthood and also an important criterion of becoming an adult

person (e.g. Arnett, 2000). This goal was followed by the high importance of achieving a profession, finishing an education, having high income, and affording an autonomous living. The goals related to residency and establishing own family were less important. These results indicate the centrality of career goals in the visions of the future of Slovene and Serbian adolescents. This is in line with previous studies which showed that education, occupation, work, and career are the central topics of the adolescents' future thinking and imagining possible selves while defining their identity in different countries (e.g. Arnett, 2000; Iovu, 2014; Nurmi, 1991).

With respect to education, the majority of Slovene and Serbian adolescents tend to continue their studies at the university level, and only about one third would finish education at the high-school or upper professional school level. If we take this result in relation to the assigned importance of other future goals, it could be assumed that they value the education as a means to achieve a profession, which could allow them to get a job with high income, and therefore they could become financially independent and could afford an autonomous living out of the parental household and form their own family. These results are congruent with demographic and research findings about broad and globally present socio-economic changes that characterize contemporary conditions of young people's living (Eurostat, 2015). They imply a dramatic increase in educational and professional demands and possibilities for both sexes, with an effect on postponement of endeavours in the area of love relationships and entering a parental role (Arnett, 2000; Nurmi, 1991; Seginer, 2009; Tanner & Arnett, 2009). In that respect, explorations of identity issues in the area of education, profession, and work-career development become priorities for majority of today's young people.

An emphasis on the importance of education and individual's endeavours for achieving a profession for better payed jobs is reflected more in the adolescents from gymnasium and those with higher-educated parents in both countries. These sub-groups might infer better chances for their social mobility via education than their peers, e.g. enrolled in a vocational school. However, the same could be assumed as a collective representation of growing up in today's global society. This assumption is supported also by the other results in our study which show that the adolescents in both countries rated personal competencies as the most influential factor in achieving a profession. This means that they rely on their own knowledge and learning abilities more than on external circumstances or social norms expressed in the expectations of their important others. These results probably reflect the changing cultural values in both countries that have been transitioning into free market economy. The expressed values are a part of the neo-liberal ideology and thus put an emphasis on the individual endeavours over the societal responsibility and the respect of social norms.

The results of our study that point to the similarities with the global trends of young people's living conditions might cover the disparities in the specific societal contexts. The analyses of socio-demographic factors that could explain the variability in the adolescents' visions of their future career indicate two main predictors: country and sex. Adolescents in Serbia thought about their career more often than their Slovene peers and on average had higher educational aspirations. The Serbian

adolescents perceived as more important almost all of career-related goals: finishing an education, achieving a profession, and having high income. They assigned personal competencies more influence in achieving a profession, than Slovene peers. These results parallel the differences in the opportunities of young people in everyday living environments in the two countries. In that respect, living and developmental opportunities for young people are better in Slovenia (lower unemployment rates, higher general standard of living). Serbia has been facing long-lasting inferior economic conditions that provided very limited opportunities for financial and housing independence for young people (Stanojević, 2012). Higher importance of all of the career goals for Serbian adolescents might be seen as a sort of compensatory pursuit. They emphasize the importance of education as a way which increases their chances of getting job or going abroad, which is currently a very important issue in Serbia.

Although the differences could be associated with the different flows of post-socialist transformation of the two countries, one should not neglect the fact that Slovenia has entered the processes of transformation from a better economic position which gives a different framework of perception of existential questions of young people (in particular the issue of financial independence and separate living from the family of origin). Besides that, Slovenia has entered the processes of transition with less traditional cultural framework related to individual's private life issues which has given more open space for the impact of global culture in terms of openness to nonstandard living arrangements of young people, which could be realized in the transition from the family of origin to their own adult life. This context allows explaining the differences in higher importance of affording an autonomous living for Slovene than Serbian adolescents. Interestingly, a recent national survey has reported an unusually high proportion of young people in Slovenia, aged 25–29 years, living in the same household with their parents (45.4% in 2000 and 66.8% in 2010; Lavrič, 2011). Another indicator of a more traditional cultural context in Serbia found in our study is expressed through the higher rating of social norms in Serbian adolescents as influential in achieving desired profession. They refer more than Slovene adolescents to the expectations of their parents and also of their friends in their endeavours for appropriate profession.

The adolescents' visions of the future career also varied according to their gender in almost all of the related issues. Adolescent girls thought more about their career and had higher educational aspirations. Reaching the goals defined in education and professions, becoming financially independent and affording autonomous living away from parents' home were all more important for the girls than for the boys in both countries. Girls also relied more on personal competencies in achieving desired profession than boys, who were in that issue more inclined to comply with the social norms. It seems that the societal changes in Serbia and Slovenia towards a global market economy, which put an emphasis on individual's endeavours for taking advantage of opportunities for personal progress and well-being, are also creating a context for women emancipation and equal opportunities. Greater emphasis on career in adolescent girls in comparison to boys in our study might indicate the perceived lack of social support for girls in realizing the individual career pathways in the previous cultural environment.

Conclusion

Changes in global economy parallel with an increase in educational and professional demands and possibilities for both sexes, which is reflected also in the developmental tasks of today's generations of young people, specifically in the emphasized career issues that need to be solved during the process of identity formation. This assumption has been supported by the results of the present study conducted in adolescents in Slovenia and Serbia, where the career-related goals were given priority over the goals in interpersonal domain.

This kind of compliance to global culture is manifested through the changes in the national cultural milieus in the two countries formerly belonging to a common state of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The different socio-economic and cultural starting points of two newly formed independent states in the early 1990s, as well as the very different transitional pathways to the liberal market economy and changing social values where an emphasis is put on individual, have led to the different opportunities that the present generation of adolescents explores while defining their roles and goals in the future. Consequently, the Serbian adolescents emphasized more the education and attributed more importance to gaining a profession that could allow an access to better paid jobs, for which they were prepared to invest more in developing personal competences (knowledge and abilities); that is also expected and supported by the social norms in the close social network. Very similar differences were found between gender groups, with higher emphasis on the career issues in the adolescent girls. The same elements of this goal orientation were also shared in the group of gymnasium students and adolescents with higher-educated parents, in comparison to the students from vocational schools. It appears that the compliance to the values of individualized global culture is higher in those social contexts or social groups where the changes from previously shared values are bigger. Similarly, the compliance is higher in the individuals and groups that value more the opportunities for improving their social positions; e.g. by planning the individual career pathways and lifestyles that are different from what was expected.

References

- Arnett, J. J. (2000). Emerging adulthood: A theory of development from the late teens through the twenties. *American Psychologist*, *55*(5), 469–480. <https://doi.org/10.1037//0003-066X.55.5.469>
- Arnett, J. J. (2002). The psychology of globalization. *American Psychologist*, *57*(10), 774–783. <https://doi.org/10.1037//0003-066X.57.10.774>
- Bartoszuk, K., & Pittman, J. F. (2010). Profiles of identity exploration and commitment across domains. *Journal of Child and Family Studies*, *19*(4), 444–450. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10826-009-9315-5>
- Begston, V. L., Biblarz, T. J., & Roberts, R. E. L. (2002). *How families still matter: A longitudinal study of youth in two generations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University press.

- Boniwell, I., & Zimbardo, P. (2004). Balancing one's time perspective in pursuit of optimal functioning. In P. A. Linley & S. Joseph (Eds.), *Positive psychology in practice* (pp. 165–178). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Crocetti, E., Rubini, M., Luyckx, K., & Meeus, W. (2008). Identity formation in early and middle adolescents from various ethnic groups: From three dimensions to five statuses. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 37, 983–996. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10964-007-9222-2>
- Cvejić, S. (2006). *Korak u mestu; Društvena pokretljivost u Srbiji u procesu post-socijalističke transformacije* [Social mobility in Serbia in the process of post-socialist transformation]. Belgrade: Institut za sociološka istraživanja Filozofskog fakulteta.
- Equi-ed. (2012). *Socijalna dimenzija visokog obrazovanja u Srbiji* [The social dimension of higher education in Serbia]. Retrieved from http://projects.tempus.ac.rs/attachments/project_resource/1368/2975_studija_zatecenog_stanja.pdf
- Erikson, E. H. (1968/1976). *Omladina, kriza, identifikacija* (M. Rankov, Trans.). Titograd: NIP Pobjeda. (Translated from *Identity: Youth and crisis*, by E. H. Erikson, 1968, New York: Norton).
- Eurostat. (2015). *Being young in Europe today*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/malta/pdf/being_young_in_europe_today.pdf
- Hitlin, S. (2006). Parental influences on children's values and aspirations: Bridging two theories of social class and socialization. *Sociological Perspectives*, 49(1), 25–46.
- Institute for macroeconomic analysis and development of Republic of Slovenia [IMAD]. (2015). *Poročilo o razvoju 2015: Kazalniki razvoja Slovenije* [Report on development 2015: Indexes of development in Slovenia]. Retrieved from http://www.umar.gov.si/fileadmin/user_upload/publikacije/pr/2015/PoR_ang_2015.pdf
- Iovu, M. B. (2014). How do high school seniors see their future? Parental and peer influences on their personal and professional plans. *Social Change Review*, 12(1), 25–42. <https://doi.org/10.2478/scr-2014-0002>
- Johnson, M. (2002). Social origins, adolescent experiences, and work value trajectories during the transition to adulthood. *Social Forces*, 80(4), 1307–1341. <https://doi.org/10.1353/sof.2002.0028>
- Kauffman, D., & Husman, J. (2004). Effects of time perspective on student motivation: Introduction to a special issue. *Educational Psychology Review*, 16, 1–7. <https://doi.org/10.1023/B:EDPR.0000012342.37854.58>
- Krstić, G., & Corbanese, V. (2009). In search of more and better jobs for young people of Serbia. *Employment Policy Papers*, 2009/1. Geneva: ILO.
- Lannegrand-Willems, L., & Bosma, H. A. (2006). Identity development-in-context: The school as an important context for identity development. *Identity: An International Journal of Theory and Research*, 6(1), 85–113. https://doi.org/10.1207/s1532706xido601_6
- Lavrič, M. (Ed.) (2011). *Mladina 2010: Družbeni profil mladih v Sloveniji* [Youth 2010 survey: Social profile of young people in Slovenia]. Retrieved from <http://www.ursm.gov.si/fileadmin/ursm.gov.si/pageuploads/pdf/Mladina2010.pdf>
- Lazić, M. (2011). Postsocijalistička transformacija i restratifikacija u Srbiji [The post-socialist transformation and re-stratification in Serbia]. *Politička misao*, 48(3), 123–144.
- Lazić, M., & Cvejić, S. (2004). Promene društvene strukture u Srbiji: slučaj blokirane post-socijalističke transformacije [Changes in social structure in Serbia: The case of a blocked post-socialist transformation]. In A. Milić, et al., *Društvena transformacija i strategije društvenih grupa: Svakodnevica Srbije na početku trećeg milenijuma* [Social transformation and strategies of social groups: Everyday life of Serbia at the beginning of the third millennium] (pp. 39–70). Belgrade: Institut za sociološka istraživanja Filozofskog fakulteta.
- Luyckx, K., Goossens, L., Soenens, B., & Beyers, W. (2006). A developmental contextual perspective on identity construction in emerging adulthood: Change dynamics in commitment formation and commitment evaluation. *Developmental Psychology*, 42(2), 366–380. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.42.2.366>

- Marcia, J. E. (1966). Development and validation of ego-identity status. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 3(5), 551–558.
- Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. *American Psychologist*, 41(9), 954–969.
- Meeus, W. (1996). Studies on identity development in adolescence: An overview of research and some new data. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence*, 25(5), 569–598. <https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01537355>
- Meeus, W. (2011). The study of adolescent identity formation 2000–2010: A review of longitudinal research. *Journal of Research on Adolescence*, 21(1), 75–94. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1532-7795.2010.00716.x>
- Miletić, V. (2005). Strategies of management of gender/female risks in Serbia. In A. Milić (Ed.), *Transformation & strategies, everyday life in Serbia at the beginning of the 3rd millennium* (pp. 239–259). Belgrade: Institut za sociološka istraživanja Filozofskog fakulteta.
- Ministry of labour, family, social affairs and equal opportunities of Republic of Slovenia. (2016). *Socialni položaj v Sloveniji 2014–2015* [Social situation in Slovenia 2014–2015]. Retrieved from http://www.mddsz.gov.si/fileadmin/mddsz.gov.si/pageuploads/dokumenti__pdf/sociala/Dopolnjeno_koncno_porocilo_Socialni_položaj_v_Sloveniji_2014-2015-SPLET.pdf
- Mojić, D. (2012). *Između sela i grada, mladi u Srbiji u prvoj deceniji trećeg milenijuma* [Between village and city, young people in Serbia in the first decade of the third millennium]. Belgrade: Institut za sociološka istraživanja Filozofskog fakulteta.
- Nastran Ule, M. (Ed.) (1996). *Mladina v devetdesetih, analiza stanja v Sloveniji* [Youth in nineties; Analysis of the situation in Slovenia]. Ljubljana: Znanstveno in publicistično središče, Ministrstvo za šolstvo in šport Republike Slovenije, Urad Republike Slovenije za mladino.
- Nastran Ule, M. (2004). Nove vrednote za novo tisočletje; Spremembe življenjskih in vrednotnih orientacij mladih v Sloveniji [New values for a new millennium; The changes of life- and value orientation of young people in Slovenia]. *Teorija in praksa*, 41(1/2), 352–353.
- Nurmi, J. E. (1991). How do adolescents see their future? A review of the development of future orientation and planning. *Developmental Review*, 11(1), 1–59. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0273-2297\(91\)90002-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/0273-2297(91)90002-6)
- Nuttin, J., & Lens, W. (1985/2014). *Future time perspective and motivation: Theory and research method*. Leuven/Hillsdale, NJ: Leuven University Press/Erlbaum.
- O'Bannon, G. (2001). Managing our future: The generation X factor. *Public Personnel Management*, 30(1), 95–110. <https://doi.org/10.1177/009102600103000109>
- O'Connor, A., & Raile, A. N. W. (2015). Millennials' "get a 'real job'" exploring generational shifts in the colloquialism's characteristics and meanings. *Management Communication Quarterly*, 29(2), 276–290. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0893318915580153>
- Petrović, M. (2004). *Sociologija stanovanja* [Sociology of Housing]. Belgrade: Institut za sociološka istraživanja Filozofskog fakulteta.
- Radonjić, O. (2013). Još jedna dekada bespuća srpske privrede: uzroci i perspective [Another decade of hopelessness of Serbian economy: Causes and perspective]. In M. Lazić & S. Cvejić (Eds.), *Promene osnovnih struktura društva Srbije u periodu ubrzane transformacije* [Changes of the basic structures of Serbian society in the period of rapid transformation] (pp. 198–215). Belgrade: Čigoja štampa i Institut za sociološka istraživanja Univerziteta u Beogradu.
- Schwartz, S. J., Zamboanga, B. L., Luyckx, K., Meca, A., & Ritchie, R. A. (2013). Identity in emerging adulthood: Reviewing the field and looking forward. *Emerging Adulthood*, 1(2), 96–113. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2167696813479781>
- Seginer, R. (2009). *Future orientation: Developmental and ecological perspectives*. The springer series on human exceptionality. Berlin: Springer Science+Business Media, LLC.
- Seginer, R., & Mahajna, S. (2004). How the future orientation of traditional Israeli Palestinian girls links beliefs about women's roles and academic achievement. *Psychology of Women Quarterly*, 28(2), 122–135. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2004.00129.x>
- Simons, J., Vansteenkiste, M., & Lens, W. (2004). Placing motivation and future time perspective theory in a temporal perspective. *Educational Psychology Review*, 16(2), 121–139. <https://doi.org/10.1023/B:EDPR.0000026609.94841.2f>

- Stanojević, D. (2012). Obeležja društvenog položaja mladih [Characteristics of the social position of young people]. In S. Tomanović (Ed.), *Mladi-naša sadašnjost, Istraživanje socijalnih biografija mladih u Srbiji* [Youth – Our present, research of social biographies of young people in Serbia] (pp. 53–80). Retrieved from http://wbc-inco.net/object/news/11624/attach/Youth-Our_Present.pdf
- Stanojević, D. (2013). Međugeneracijska obrazovna pokretljivost u Srbiji u XX. veku [Intergenerational educational mobility in Serbia in XX century]. In M. Lazić, & S. Cvejić (Eds.), *Promene osnovnih struktura društva Srbije u period ubrzane transformacije* [Changes of the basic structures of Serbian society in the period of rapid transformation] (pp. 119–139). Belgrade: Institut za sociološka istraživanja Filozofskog fakulteta.
- Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia. (2012). *Demografska statistika u Republici Srbiji* [The demographic statistics in Serbia]. Belgrade: Author.
- Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia [RZS]. (2016). *Employment and earnings*. Retrieved from <http://www.stat.gov.rs/WebSite/Public/PageView.aspx?pKey=26>
- Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia [SURŠ]. (2014). *Mednarodni dan študentov 2014* [International students day 2014]. Retrieved from <http://www.stat.si/StatWeb/en/News/Index/4802>
- Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia [SURŠ]. (2016). *Višješolsko, visokošolsko izobraževanje* [Tertiary education]. Retrieved from <http://www.stat.si/StatWeb/en/Field/Index/9/111>
- Strange, J. M., & Munford, M. D. (2002). The origins of vision: Charismatic versus ideological leadership. *The Leadership Quarterly*, 13(4), 343–378. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843\(02\)00125-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S1048-9843(02)00125-X)
- Tanner, J. L., & Arnett, J. J. (2009). The emergence of ‘emerging adulthood’. In A. Furlong (Ed.), *Handbook of youth and young adulthood* (pp. 39–46). London: Routledge.
- Toš, N. (Ed.) (2009). *Vrednote v prehodu IV.: Slovensko javno mnenje 2004–2009* [Values in transition IV.: Slovene public opinion 2004–2009]. Ljubljana: Fakulteta za družbene vede, IDV – CJMMK.
- Tschakert, P., Dietrich, K., Tamminga, K., Prins, E., Shaffer, J., & Liwenga, E. (2014). Learning and envisioning under climatic uncertainty: An African experience. *Environment and Planning*, 46, 1049–1068. <https://doi.org/10.1068/a46257>
- Unemori, P., Omoregie, H., & Markus, H. R. (2004). Self-portraits: Possible selves in European-American, Chilean, Japanese and Japanese-American cultural contexts. *Self and Identity*, 3(4), 321–338. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13576500444000100>
- Yowell, C. M. (2002). Dreams of the future: The pursuit of education and career possible selves among ninth grade Latino youth. *Applied Developmental Science*, 6(2), 62–72. https://doi.org/10.1207/S1532480XADS0602_2

Alenka Gril (Ph.D., Faculty of Arts, Department of Psychology, University of Ljubljana) is a senior research associate at the Educational Research Institute in Ljubljana, Slovenia. She is an associate professor in developmental psychology at the Faculty of Arts, University of Maribor, Slovenia, and the Faculty of Education, University of Primorska, Slovenia. She is also a lecturer in teacher professional development programs in the field of social, civic, and intercultural competences. She is the author of five books and several scientific articles and book chapters on the adolescents’ social and political development in different social contexts. Her research interests are focused on the understanding of interpersonal relations and society, moral reasoning, civic engagement, intercultural relations in peer groups, social identities, value orientations, organizational culture of youth centres, social representations of knowledge, classroom climate, active classes, and career development.

Nada Polovina (Ph.D., Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Psychology, University of Belgrade) is a principal research fellow at the Institute for Educational Research in Belgrade, Serbia. Prior to this, she spent 10 years as a visiting professor at the University of Belgrade, Faculty of Political

Sciences, Department of Gender Studies, and 5 years at the University of Banja Luka, Faculty of Political Sciences, Department for Social Care. She is the author/editor of five books and over 60 articles and books chapters on family, parenting, and development of children and adolescents. Her research interests are psychosocial aspects of development of children and adolescents, family relations, education, future orientations, and identity issues.

Ivana Jakšić (M.Sc., Faculty of Philosophy, Department of Psychology, University of Belgrade) is a research associate at the Institute for Educational Research in Belgrade, Serbia. She is a member of the Educational Research Association of Serbia (DIOS) and a researcher at the Social cognition research lab at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade. She is the author of 15 articles and book chapters on social and educational psychology. Her research interests include attitudes and beliefs, academic gender socialization, and implicit attitudes as predictors of behaviour in educational context.

Sabina Autor (M.A., Faculty of Arts, Department of Philosophy, University of Ljubljana) is a research assistant at the Educational Research Institute in Ljubljana, Slovenia. She collaborated in several projects on young people's attitude towards knowledge and the visions of the future of the young people in Slovenia and Serbia. Her research interests are the enlightenment, tolerance, prejudices, knowledge, school, and youth.

Mladen Radulović (M.A. in sociology, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade) is currently a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Sociology at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, Serbia. He works as a research assistant at the Institute for Educational Research and is engaged in the organization of lectures at the Faculty of Philosophy on the subject sociology of education. Main interests are sociology of education, educational aspirations of pupils, and correlation between cultural capital and educational practices.

Identity and Work Ethic of Peasants in the Context of the Post-Soviet Socio-economic Transformation



Maria Kozlova and Olga Simonova

From the start of the 1990s, Russian villages have witnessed intense sociocultural transformations that were marked by extreme deterioration in the key demographic, social and economic indicators (Agrarian reform in Russia, 2000). One study, which was carried out in the early 2000s in the Belgorod region,¹ revealed that in conditions of low living standards for the vast majority of rural households, the population responded with meek resignation, retaining at best passive expectations that someone or something will appear and change everything for the better (Efendiev & Bolotina, 2002). The data obtained exposed the existence of a deep crisis in rural Russia, which manifested itself in a lack of aspiration among the peasants to improve their lives, a reluctance to expend extra effort to achieve goals and a general tendency to minimize all needs. Among the reasons cultural traditions were mentioned in their institutional (domination of ascriptive norms over achievement norms, disregard of the law, prevailing of unofficial connections) and psychological (meekness, lack of personal responsibility, fatalism and desire to live like everyone else) dimensions (Efendiev & Bolotina, 2002). The past decade has witnessed significant economic changes in the Russian village. Family ownership of farms has become a more significant part of the agrarian economy due to the 'utilization of the human potential of the village, which was often achieved in spite of state agricultural policies, with peasants taking up a fully independent position among other economic actors' (Velikiy, 2007, p. 233). It is this private sector that could have been central to the formation of a new work culture and ethic based around the

¹Located in the so-called Black Earth region of Russia, one of the few parts of the country with natural and climatic conditions amicable for the development of a wide range of agricultural activities.

M. Kozlova (✉) · O. Simonova (✉)

Higher School of Economics, National Research University, Moscow, Russia

e-mail: makozlova@yandex.ru; osimonova@hse.ru

market, which could have promoted important elements of personal responsibility and an aptitude for forecasting agricultural prices. However, a more recent study in 2013 presented a range of apparently contradictory and surprising phenomena (Efendiev, Sorokin, & Kozlova, 2014). It showed that residents of the villages of Belgorod region had enjoyed sharp rises in the level of their overall economic status but were all the same showing increasing discontent with their economic situation. Survey results from the study revealed positive changes among peasants in terms of an increased sense of responsibility for their own destiny. At the same time, however, they also showed a continuation of old notions such as minimalistic expectations and pessimistic assessments of the future, fatalism and negative assessments of the results of their work. The study showed a growth in respect for people engaged in private business, but alongside this there was a reduction in the number of villagers indicating a desire to follow such a path (Efendiev et al., 2014). In an attempt to resolve these contradictions, we have turned our attention to the transformation of identity and work ethic of the Russian villagers. The combination of these two concepts—self-identity and work ethics—into general research field is reasonable and caused by the very specifics of villagers' lifestyle where the agricultural labour covers all spheres of life. Thus the farming entirely determinates the social status, social ties, worldview and identity of rural habitants. We consider the identity of rural habitants though the emotions as indicators of an overall individual reaction to the social and psychological transformations. With that we emphasize the moral emotions, which reflect the condition of individual connection with social structure and culture of our society. Emotions usually signal the activation, violation or evolution of social norms (Turner & Stets, 2005). While being manifestation of self-identity, emotions reflect the status of identity and show what norms an individual is committed to. Inspiration for our study emerged from the observation of informants and the analysis of in-depth interview transcripts that were overflowing with negative concerns about life, including resentment, dissatisfaction and justifications of one's personal status. As such, the aim was to analyse the social conditions and factors behind the emergence of shame and envy, which also play a role in forming a new identity and work ethic of rural residents. We strived to propose the social-psychological approach to fix the changes in moral convictions, meanings and self-identity eliciting the contradictions in normative system and negative behavioural patterns. The changes in identity and work ethic in post-Soviet Russia (particularly of the peasants) should be discussed in comparison to Soviet values, which focused on the ideological glorification of physical labour (Magun, 1998) through the creation of iconic images of workers and peasants and by representing Soviet history as the narrative of working people throughout the ages. Distinctions and hierarchies between mental and physical labour were fixed ideologically; it was prestigious to be a worker or a peasant, and even those in leadership positions were keen to demonstrate pride in biographic origins that began with hard labour at 'a plough or a machine' (Ryvkina, 2001). The sociocultural changes that Russia experienced in the late twentieth century began to be perceived as a cultural trauma by the early 2000s. By this time it had become clear to those who had been 'Soviet people' that the old Soviet version of history had been totally devalued, with the Soviet identity falling into ruins in its wake. Over time, the basis of self-identity of

‘Soviet man’ was replaced with a new vision that excluded the necessity of physical labour, instead glorifying the formation of a consumer society that encouraged the consumption of goods and services and a shift in focus to education and leisure, and changes in attitudes to physical labour relations had already gained legitimacy in the post-Soviet era.

Any assessments of the socio-economic picture in the Russian countryside today must take into account this new cultural context. It has entailed new attitudes to success in life, which are heavily linked to positive views of urban life and accepting the values of a consumer society. We argue that one of the key factors in the changing attitudes was a common feeling that one’s efforts in work had been devalued. This can be expressed as ‘contempt for physical (agricultural labour)’, which, in turn, releases feelings of shame and envy. Such emotions sharpen and perhaps distort the processes behind developing a sense of self-consciousness and self-esteem. As such, the significance of these emotions will be discussed here as a factor bringing about transformations in the group and individual identities of a rural population already subject to changing socio-economic conditions and new work ethics. Before presenting the empirical data from interviews with residents, we will first consider the theoretical framework of the study and outline the current state of the sociology of emotions as related with identity theory.

Theoretical Frameworks

In our study we follow the idea of Bauman (1993) who argued that feelings and emotions are the key elements of postmodern ethics, the main drivers of our moral choice in pursuit to confirm one’s identity (Bauman, 1993). Proceeding from a general summary of sociological concepts, emotions can be defined as cognitive-affective complexes that possess a behavioural form and carry out certain social functions (Simonova, 2014a). Emotions are partially socially constructed and included within the social structures and practices that reproduce and maintain them (Barbalet, 1999). The research of emotions such as shame and envy (Scheff, 2014; Schoeck, 1970) can often reveal a great deal about interpersonal relationships, the identity design, the changing representations of individuals and groups and the composition of social norms. In sociological and psychological researches, shame and envy are defined in terms of social connectedness (Scheff, 2011). For example, shame is defined as ‘a signal of threat to the social bond, that is, lack of connectedness’ (Scheff, 2011, p. 353), which can be understood as assimilating the moral codes of culture and identifying deviations from these value regulating standards. The main function of shame is to call attention to those violating moral norms (Turner & Stets, 2005). Envy can be defined as hostile feelings emerging as a result of unfavourable comparisons with others. This leads to discontent over the prosperity of others, especially in a context where people are affected by issues relating to inequality, status, privilege, success, health and talent (Clanton, 2006). In this sense, both emotions are linked to morality. Both emotions are seen to be linked to self-awareness and can be called self-conscious emotions, given that they come from

evaluations of the self. In the case of shame, there is negative assessment of the self on its own (Scheff, 2002), while envy, on the other hand, arises from comparisons of the self with others (Salovey & Rothman, 1991). Both emotions can function in such a way as to maintain moral order. When, however, these emotions become chronic in nature, dysfunctional consequences, such as bitterness, passivity and breakdowns in relationships, can develop (Jo, 2013; Scheff, 2014).

Scheff (2002) has shed light on the social role of shame. He has concluded that chronic shame is typical among lower income groups and is an everyday occurrence at home, school and the workplace. This type of shame can contribute to the reproduction of inequality by causing passivity, self-incrimination and silence. Such feelings may result in resentment, rage and unprovoked aggression, which tend to be displayed in private rather than public settings (Scheff, 2002). Envy brings with it consequences such as inactivity, depression, helplessness, the refusal to compete with others, as well as promoting alienation and the dislocation of interpersonal relationships. If the above emotional states are recognized, individuals have the chance to realign their relationships with others and to retain solidarity with the group, and in doing so, they can restore their own pride and dignity (Scheff, 2000). According to Scheff (2000), however, modern society is dominated by unacknowledged and avoidable shame. As with its relative envy, shame is masked and disguised both consciously and unconsciously. When left unexpressed, it becomes chronic and induces negative consequences (Scheff & Retzinger, 1991).

Moral emotions, in particular shame and envy that actualize emotional aspects of personal identity, indicate the state of connection of an individual or a group of individuals (i.e. human selves with social structure and culture of a given society). We relied on the social-psychological theory of identity, which is based on the tradition of symbolic interactionism, where personal identity consists of a hierarchy of social identities that should be 'confirmed' by other participants of interaction (ref.: Burke, 1991; Burke & Stets, 2009; Shott, 1979; Stets & Carter, 2006, 2012; Stets, Carter, Harrod, Cerven, & Abrutyn, 2008; Stryker, 2004; Turner & Stets, 2005). According to this approach, personal identity includes notions of who is an individual, how others can and should react to him or herself and the corresponding emotions regarding the characteristics that others give to an individual's self in its different social roles (Stryker, 2004). The structure of personal identity is comprised of identities that are especially valuable for individual's environment and himself/herself. Here emotions play as signalling and guiding role: if the identity is confirmed by other interaction participants, people feel good and experience positive emotions; otherwise they experience negative feelings. Also emotions signal that identity is under threat, and it is necessary to take actions in order to bring it into compliance with social environment and acceptable content. In our case, shame and envy signalled about crisis of personal identity (inconsistency of personal identity to situation and acceptable standards) blocking of social relations and actions to correct the situation. In the context of sociocultural transformations, different identity aspects appear to be in crisis, and feeling of chronic moral emotions can be the evidence of disorientation and passivity in forming of new moral standards and new

personal identity. So the main goal of our research is to specify the orientation of transformations of identity of Russian rural habitants and their work ethics. We make an attempt to see these transformations through the peasants' eyes and through their emotional reactions to catch the traumatic and painful experience of social and psychological changes. We argue that finding out the (chronic) negative moral emotions (shame and envy in our case) leads to understanding of the changes in personal identity and labour attitudes of rural habitants under hard conditions of social transformations.

Method

The data used for this chapter were obtained during a research project entitled 'The Russian peasantry in an era of critical change: The analysis of social organization in the contemporary Russian village during economic transformation'.² The project studied the key lifestyle foundations and economic strategies of peasants in the Belgorod region. While issues linked to emotional aspects were not one of the aims of this research, the use of qualitative methods provided evidence as to how the villagers used a mass of emotional evaluations to describe both actual socio-cultural conditions and their own situation. The emotions expressed by informants in the form of both verbal and physical markers suggested that these emotions were being used as a way to explain social processes. The main research tools used were semi-structured interviews, which were conducted according to a pre-prepared guide.

Participants

Participants for the study were selected in accordance with random sampling. During October 2013 we collected 30 interviews. Eight of the informants (5 men, 3 women, $M_{\text{age}} = 46.6$ years, age range, 41–55 years) have a legal status of an individual entrepreneur (farmers)³; four informants were women of retirement age, terminated the formal labour activity no more than 2 years ago ($M_{\text{age}} = 63.6$ years, age range: 60–69 years); 18 informants—people of working age—engaged in paid employment

²The project 'The peasantry of the Belgorod region in 2000–2013: complex analysis of the development of economic activity and social organization of rural life' was carried out with the support of the Basic Research Program at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, under the direction of Professor A.G. Efendiev.

³Since the results of the survey showed that small agricultural entrepreneurs (farmers) do not differ from other peasants on the style and quality of life (Efendiev et al., 2014), we include in the analysis the results of interview of farmers.

and self-employment simultaneously (8 men, 10 women, $M_{\text{age}} = 40.7$ years, age range, 24–55 years).

Materials and Procedure

The fieldwork phase of the project was carried out from October to November 2013. Interviewing was carried out directly in the courtyards of the informants' households. The average duration of each interview was 68 minutes (from 43 to 97 minutes). The interviews were recorded on tape, with the informed consent of the informants, and transcribed later. The guide was compiled by the 'funnel principle': focusing questions from general to private, from the less personal to the more intimate (Belanovskiy, 2001). The guide touched upon the theme of the general economic situation in the village, the economic behaviour of informants, relations with other people (fellow villagers to family members) and prospects and plans for the future.

During the first stage of the analysis, we used open coding of sentences based on the principle of 'main idea'. During the second stage, we used selective coding and constructed the axes of core categories (Patton, 2002; Walker, 2006). The first stage explored the issue of social and personal identity of a peasant: identification of 'we' (peasants)/'they' (city dwellers), we in social hierarchy, we in temporal perspective and I in comparison to We. The second stage explored the issue of approach to labour: nature of working activities, difficulty of agricultural labour, general satisfaction with working activities, needs satisfied during the working activities, results of labour, desired and actual amount of labour, labour strategies and beliefs about approach to labour (individual, collective—on the part of peasants, 'others', society as a whole, government). The third axis examined the emotional component and involved registration of the verbal markers of moral emotions, first of all, shame and envy. We used the following verbal markers or verbal constructs, which indicated to emotions of shame and corresponding emotional states (sense of alienation, confusion, inadequacy, experiencing the contempt of others), rejected, dumped, deserted, blank, empty, hollow, foolish, silly, powerless, weak, insecure, uncomfortable and hurt (Antonova, 2007; Apresyan, 2004; Retzinger, 1995; Scheff, 2011), and envy and corresponding emotional states, blaming the others, stories about hostility and harm doings, statements about justice and injustice, envious comparisons which accompanied with humiliation, distress, depression, anger and rage (Beskova, 2013).

In fact, three code matrices, designated as 'identity', 'approach to labour' and 'emotions', were superimposed against each other. Therefore, around the central topic of 'emotions' we searched for subtopics that clarified the main topic and detected nature and basis of emotional reactions. The results of the study are presented below, and in the conclusion section, we will present exactly how we see the role of moral emotions in identity processes and in the construction and reinforcement of a new work ethic in the Russian village.

Results

Shame and Envy in the Transforming Labour Attitudes and Work Ethic of Peasants

During the course of the study, it became clear that there were contradictions between how peasants assessed their own material conditions. They included a positive assessment of their own material well-being alongside a high level of discontent about their economic situation and their prospects for future development. For peasants when assessing their situation in the state and their own lives, the key factor was the declining prestige of agricultural labour: ‘At least there used to be some kind of incentive.⁴ You get up, you’ve got work to do, there is something keeping you here . . . even if the work was pretty unprofitable, even the lowest of the low, people still made do and got by with it. In the village people thought it was alright. But now there is nothing here. Every other house is empty, people are leaving. . .’ (male labourer, 45).

In changing sociocultural and economic conditions, agricultural labour soon lost its previous modest levels of prestige and came to be seen as shameful and pointless: ‘As soon as my daughter came here from Voronezh (the regional urban centre) she was having a go at me saying, “Looks like you are still farting about in the fields!” and I tell her back: “It’s this ‘farting about’ that brings money in here!” So she says “Sure but money from cabbages won’t get me into college, I’d be better off doing real work”’ (woman, 43). When one’s work is so clearly undervalued by ones’ own children, this can only cause embarrassment and shame. ‘It’s a hard work. Young people don’t want it, the way they think of cattle rearing as . . .like, well. . . shit! From morning to night. And the smell. . .’ (female, farmer).

References to the laborious and unpleasant aspects of work in the village through words like ‘shit’ only underline the contempt felt for this work, a feeling that most informants believed was shared by other people and the society as a whole. Subjective assessments of agricultural labour as ‘hard’ and ‘bad for your health’ are combined with the sense of its low profitability, all of which is reflected in the use of the word ‘shit’; a reflection of both the self-denigration of peasants and the contempt of others towards them: ‘If you are broke then you are a shit. You should get satisfaction and money from your work. You should get back from the market, feel a bit worn out from carrying these potatoes all day but still have that pile of money you earned and a kind of pleasant tiredness. But what actually happens is you come back from your work all you have is loose change jingling in your pockets’ (male, 49). The interviewees used expressive verbs to describe their labour such as ‘hammer away’, with phrases such as ‘hammering away at it in the field’, in other

⁴This refers to both earlier periods, such as the Soviet era and, the current period, the post-Soviet era until the end of the 2000s, when collective ownership was dominant.

words doing monotonous, hard, everyday work. This term contains an emotional intonation, the work is hard, and it is not always produced the desired results. Furthermore, it is labour that is considered to be dirty and undervalued by society.

There is also the sense that the benefits of modern consumerism are unavailable: 'There are lots of new things available these days, things we didn't even know about back in the day. No surprise that all the young people love it and want to get their hands on it all' (male, 49). The inability to acquire these desired goods provides an additional source of humiliation and shame for peasants, reinforcing the sense that ordinary working people have no place in modern society. The feeling that they are not allowed to enjoy the fruits of this society causes resentment and a sense of injustice on the one hand and feelings of envy for those who can afford it on the other.

The hostility of peasants can be seen in the comments of a relatively well-to-do farmer:

People say, "Why don't you hire more? Look at all the drunken layabouts here; they'll sort out your cabbages for you!" I hired one last year. First of all he'd actually cut the ass (root) of the cabbage right off or hack at them with an axe. Then he'd start throwing them in the wheelbarrow, and they'd end up all bruised. . . . and of course when crops turn black, they are ruined, you can't sell them. But you need to be gentle like a woman in this kind of work. . . . you know, pick them all out carefully and take it nice and easy, all the way to the place of sale. But here they thought they could throw it everywhere in rush (male 45).

Envy from others can be expressed in wilful deceit (sabotage) and alienation in interpersonal relationships:

They tell me, 'even if you give us a thousand (Roubles) we don't want to work on your plot as laborers'. It's not that there aren't enough workers, they are around but just won't come here. It's not about money, it's the principle. They would say, "I'm not some sucker, I'm from around here too. I worked on the collective farm with him". They do come and ask me "Kolya, won't you give us a lift, Kolya won't you give us a hand on our plot?". And I am glad to help. But they still won't work for me, it's all "No Kolya, no way, I've got no time mate". I've cut back my sowing to the minimum, just enough for the family. There is just the two of us to do the plating, digging and transporting every week < . . . > I can't do anymore or it would just stay in the soil anyway. Even if I did they would just all say, "there's that bugger trying to get rich again!" . . . (male, 45).

The above quotation demonstrates a particularly sharply felt sense of insult, in the moral sense that arises when one is faced with injustice. This is partly a result of specific individual attitudes; the informant has spent his whole life in the village and identifies himself with the people of his native village. This example is of interest as it demonstrates that the level of involvement in a variety of working activities and the work ethic behind them are linked to the level of subjective well-being. Perceiving one's own labour as surplus to requirements and not worthy of respect ties in with the feeling that the individual is not up to the standards required to succeed in modern society. All of this deals a devastating blow to the formation of a positive identity among peasants.

Shame and Envy in a Transforming Identity

In these new conditions, various aspects of identity are under attack, with shame and envy at the centre, illuminating the following processes:

Civil Identity Older informants compare the current status of peasants to the Soviet period: ‘You know what was good? When we worked on the farm, it was a more respected line of work, like you get up in the morning and go off to work and you’ve got things to do, people look at you with some respect’ (woman, 60). This appeal to the past is probably defensive in nature; in conditions where rural labour is not respected, recollections of its former prestige function as an attempt to restore a lost sense of pride in one’s work.

Professional Identity ‘Agricultural products don’t feed people. It is just torture here. Everything is overgrown all around, not one bloody wooden structure is left standing. The village sweats its arse off working but there is no bloody point. They’ve always strangled the peasant that way, and they do it today too’ (male, 60). Here we witness the clear mechanism of attributing blame to the government and business, mostly due to their undervaluation of agricultural labour. It is of note that the situation is described with the verb to ‘strangle’ or ‘choke’, an action that often can be seen as the physiological response to shame and humiliation (Scheff, 2011).

Personal Identity Here the feeling of being insignificant is a key marker for shame: ‘What am I anyway? Just a bug or something’ (male, 45). As a result, there is nothing remaining for peasants to ‘latch on to’ and construct a new identity of some sort. ‘We don’t need anything because we can’t even breathe. Peasants were always on their knees and they always will be’ (woman, 40). Working life is, thus, deprived of its key roles in supporting the development of individual identity and a ‘public persona’ that could temper the destructive influences emerging from the low economic valuation of agricultural labour.

Destruction of identity leads to the deformation of the temporal perspective. Peasants paint the future in bleak, dark colours: ‘Things are only getting worse, just worse, even if things can’t possibly get worse. Nothing is clear, anything could happen’ (male, 45). Another informant claimed it was impossible to plan his own life: ‘You can’t hope for anything around here...’ (woman, 45). It should be emphasized here that the narrowing of the temporal perspective and the growth of pessimistic assessments of one’s prospects occurred gradually, with hopes of positive future developments only gradually giving way to a feeling of hopelessness: ‘We thought that with each year things would get better. We wanted to work like anyone else, grow some beets, sunflowers. Just to live like normal people. But it doesn’t work out that way, not here’ (female, 47).

The cause of such pessimistic sentiment can be linked to anxieties from experiences of failure and disappointment in a context of agricultural reform. This frustration has led to the emergence and growth of feelings regarding the low effectiveness of one's own activities and a sense of being unable to control what is happening around you: 'We don't matter around here' (female, 23). Another example of narrative about useless efforts to gain the economic well-being: 'You know what, I drive for the farmer here, I've got a vehicle and he has the land and he said to me 'It's like roulette, only in that game there is only one 'zero' pocket. But in our game we have a roulette that is full of zeros however you spin it and only one of the pockets will let you win something' (male truck driver, 46). It is in this way that a sense of the futility emerges towards working harder and being more enterprising:

Two years ago we planted cabbages with the kids, I ended up throwing 90 tonnes of it in the trash. Nobody needed it. So we planted in a new way, worked hard and built a storage site for them. The kids were watching this and you know, they think if you try hard then the result should come straight away. But it is hard on a person, when they have put the work in and they get nothing in return. It only upsets you... (male farmer, 47).

This low self-efficacy, in turn, leads to a narrowing of the temporal perspective to the point where the individual focuses on the problems of immediate survival, abandoning efforts to achieve more distant goals, such as long-term planning and the development of rational strategies of development. Working life acquires a chaotic nature, and its effectiveness is further reduced, with a sense of helplessness and loss of control over one's life growing more ever-present.

Discussion

Emotional markers reflect the negative consequences emerging from the falling prestige of agricultural labour. Unacknowledged shame (as mentioned previously) does not generate anger as much as depression, withdrawal from of active employment and breakdowns in interpersonal relationships; envy brings with it hopelessness and the tendency to accuse other people and real or abstract social structures for one's problems. Emotions of shame and envy expressed by informants (as intensifying self-consciousness and understanding of social situation) indicate deeply felt crises of personal and social identity, which result from sociocultural transformations and aggravate due to lack of possibilities for forming of new ethics and renewed identity in the current situation.

Low self-efficacy among peasants is a result of unrecognized shame and envy towards those able to manage the situation in a better way. These feelings are exacerbated by changes in economic structures and work ethic, with the latter already baring little resemblance to Soviet ideological collectivist conventions. In everyday interactions, informants interpret these ethical shifts and increasingly feel that others have 'contempt for our work'. At the same time, they see their labour as arduous but also 'righteous' and 'necessary', a thing that should be appreciated,

especially given that it results in the production of goods vital to society. Usually negative emotion of shame initiates the need to be proud of one's labour (or life and doings in general) as well as a search for means to organize one's identity in quite complicated social context, but in this case, another reaction was observed—despondency, anxiety, despair and reluctance to organize one's own renewed identity as a different possible result of feeling of shame (for social-psychological dynamics of pride and shame, see Scheff, 2002, 2014).

This background generates not only shame over one's position and occupation but also provokes envy (another emotion that intensifies negative evaluation of one's own identity in comparison with others) towards those close at hand, more successful farmers or urban residents whose working duties are considerably lighter. Negative emotions are usually not acknowledged but are projected and rationalized, with the blame for all of this placed at the feet of the state, business, rich people, urban residents and those who are visibly prospering in the surrounding region. Resentment, dissatisfaction and hopelessness emerge out of these emotions. There is also a loss of identity in this process, with either a negative evaluation of identity emerging or a weakening of the values behind one's identity occurring. In this case, labour remains, but it is no longer a source of pride. The ordinary working person does not have any value unless success is achieved in one's affairs. This is the origin of shame, and it is reinforced by the attitudes of one's children and the processes of urbanization, with rural work no longer being viewed as honourable labour. It appears obvious and predictable that passivity and low self-efficacy should emerge among peasants living in such conditions.

These failures, which occur quite unexpectedly from the point of view of the peasants, are not seen by the overwhelming majority of our informants to be a direct result of their own actions. Among those factors perceived to be beyond one's control are the arbitrary behaviour of established resellers in altering prices for agricultural products, changing weather conditions, the actions of local authorities and tax increases (Efendiev et al., 2014). Given that this is a case of learned helplessness, it is interesting that the negative experience acquired from the above scenarios can be gradually transferred to other situations, despite the fact that the actors have more control over events in these other cases. As a result, the farmer begins to look at risks that can be anticipated and considered in the medium- to short-term planning and views them as fundamentally unpredictable and uncontrollable. This, in turn, naturally leads to a curtailment of any independent economic activity or a shift in orientations towards economic paternalism and passivity.

At the same time, low self-efficacy is subjectively experienced in a very difficult way, leading to feelings of being oppressed and, in some cases, to depression. Given that these feelings are on a mass scale in the village, the group strives to restore the lost equilibrium and a special 'moral interpretation' to explain economic passivity emerges; the post-traumatic 'ethics of idleness'. Perhaps the best way to demonstrate the nature of work ethic in the contemporary Russian village is to repeat a phrase heard so often in the interviews that it is almost akin to a refrain—'Who needs to, will find a way to survive'. This phrase contains within it the willingness to 'work to exhaustion' and reflects the minimalistic nature of villagers' everyday needs. Many

informants pointed out that it was the ‘amount’ of work done that decided the moral quality of one’s work ethic. However, it is worth noting that many informants would not only condemn loafers and layabouts but also criticize those who ‘put in too much work to earn extra’. The ‘range’ of working activities deemed acceptable within this rural social morality system is quite narrow; work is regarded as a way to ‘survive’. If this ‘low’ goal is not achieved, the individual stands accused of being a sponger. If goals ‘higher’ than survival are achieved leading to a state of personal well-being, the individual is condemned as being incompatible with the welfare of the group. This activation of the ‘ethics of idleness’ comes as a consequence of losing control over one’s life, suffering a loss of ‘face’ and facing the destruction of rural identity in general.

We understand that qualitative research and a focus on verbal markers of moral emotions cannot provide a complete picture of developments even in these villages, which are, in many ways, typical for the Russian cultural context of the region. Future research avenues in this area would benefit from more detailed theoretical, historical and empirical analysis of the conditions highlighted in this chapter. However, the focus on moral emotions (that indicate to identity crisis and deprivation of new moral orientations) given in this study permits an understanding of the general picture of life in the Russian countryside and opens an exploration of the meaning behind the actions, life trajectory formation of the work ethic of these villagers.

Conclusion

The obtained empirical data in this study suggests the presence of dysfunctional features of social changes in the form of chronic worrying, hidden and unrecognized feelings of shame, envy and the emotions that accompany them, and relevant socio-psychological consequences: a reduction of temporal perspective, increasing feelings of helplessness, the refusal to compete with others, a reinterpretation of the situation and alienation through the disruption of social links, all of which is generally typical for lower income groups (Chase & Walker, 2013; Simonova, 2014b). Among the social reasons behind this, we can see the long experience of economic failures and the decreasing social significance of work ‘on the land’, both of which have gradually led to a significant reduction in feelings of self-efficacy among peasants. The dominant feelings in the economic attitudes of Russian peasantry centre on the futility of their efforts and the narrowing of their temporal perspective. As regards their views on work ethic, what is revealed is a clear relegation of labour’s role to that of merely satisfying the most basic needs (‘survival’) and the absence of any values promoting personal economic success, factors that are reinforced both by self-restraint (including self-denigration) and the moral values displayed by outsiders towards them (such as contempt for rural or physical labour).

Over the past decade, Russian society has undergone radical transformations that have brought about fundamental change in its economic, social and cultural life. The

impact of global processes on these changes in the political, economic and social spheres of the Russian state has resulted in a radical transformation of the normative value system in the country. Russia's peasants were not exempt from these processes. The *decline in the prestige of physical labour* has deprived peasants of the support that allowed them to maintain a relatively high level of subjective well-being and foster a positive identity in the past. Systematic deprivation and pressing social needs have activated a range of moral emotions: envy, resentment, shame and humiliation. All of these are self-conscious emotions that complicate the search for new foundations on which to build a new personal and collective identity.

References

- Agramnaya reforma v Rossii: kontseptsiya, opyt, perspektivy [Agrarian reform in Russia: conception, experience, perspectives]. (2000). Nauchnye trudy VIA-PI RASKhN [Scientific works of VIA-PI RASKhN], Moscow, *Entsiklopediya rossiyskikh dereven'*, 4 (in Russian).
- Antonova, L. E. (2007). Gruppy slov s semantikoy styda v sovremennom russkom yazyke [The word group with semantics of shame in modern Russian language]. *XXVI Mezhdunarodnaya Filologicheskaya Konferentsiya* [XXVI International Philological Conference], 19, 177–180 (in Russian).
- Apresyan, Y. D. (2004). Stydit'sya, stesnyat'sya, smushchat'sya, konfuzit'sya [Be ashamed, be embarrassed, be disconcerted]. *Novyy Ob'yasnitel'nyy Slovar' Sinonimov Russkogo Yazyka* [The new explanatory vocabulary of synonyms in Russian language]. Moscow: Yazyki slavyanskoy kul'tury: Venskiy slavisticheskii al'manakh [Languages of Slavic culture: Viennese Slavic Almanac] (in Russian).
- Barbalet, J. M. (1999). *Emotion, social theory and social structure: A macrosociological approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bauman, Z. (1993). *Postmodern ethics*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Belanovskiy, S. A. (2001). *Glubokoe interv'yu* [In-depth interview]. M.: Nikkolo – Media (in Russian).
- Beskova, T. V. (2013). Psikhologicheskie mekhanizmy formirovaniya zavisti i ee determinanty [Psychological mechanisms of envy formation and envy determinants]. *Vestnik Moskovskogo Gosudarstvennogo Oblastnogo Universiteta* [Journal of Moscow Region State University], 1, 18–33 (in Russian).
- Burke, P. J. (1991). Identity processes and social stress. *American Sociological Review*, 56(6), 836–849. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2096259>
- Burke, P. J., & Stets, J. E. (2009). *Identity theory*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chase, E., & Walker, R. (2013). The co-construction of shame in the context of poverty: Beyond a threat to the social bond. *Sociology*, 47(4), 739–754. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0038038512453796>
- Clanton, G. (2006). Jealousy and envy. In J. E. Stets & J. H. Turner (Eds.), *Handbook of the sociology of emotions* (pp. 410–440). New York: Springer.
- Efendiev, A. G., & Bolotina, I. A. (2002). Sovremennoe rossiyskoe selo: Na perelome epokh i reform. Opyt institutsional'nogo analiza [Modern Russian village: At turning point of century and reforms. Experience of institutional analysis]. *Mir Rossii* [The Universe of Russia], 11 (4), 83–125 (in Russian).
- Efendiev, A. G., Sorokin, P. S., & Kozlova, M. A. (2014). Transformations in the rural life in Russian Belgorod Region in 2000–2013 through “modernization” theoretical perspective: Increasing material well-being, growing individualism and persisting pessimism/Working

- papers by NRU Higher School of Economics. Series SOC "Sociology". No. WP BRP 56/SOC/2014.*
- Jo, N. Y. (2013). Psycho-social dimensions of poverty: When poverty becomes shameful. *Critical Social Policy*, 33(3), 514–531.
- Magun, V. S. (1998). Rossiyskie trudovye tsennosti: ideologiya i massovoe soznanie [Russian labor values: Ideology and mass consciousness]. *Mir Rossii* [The Universe of Russia], 7(4), 17–28 (in Russian).
- Patton, M. (2002). *Qualitative evaluation and research methods*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Retzinger, S. M. (1995). Identifying anger and shame in discourse. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 38(8), 1104–1113.
- Ryvkina, R.V. (2001). *Drama peremen* [Drama of social transformations]. Moscow: Delo (in Russian).
- Salovey, P., & Rothman, A. J. (1991). Envy and jealousy: Self and society. In P. Salovey (Ed.), *The psychology of jealousy and envy* (pp. 271–286). New York: Guilford.
- Scheff, T. J. (2000). Shame and the social bond: A sociological theory. *Sociological Theory*, 18(1), 92–112.
- Scheff, T. J. (2002). Working class emotions and relationships: Secondary analysis of Sennett, Cobb and Willis. In B. Phillips, H. Kincaid, & T. J. Scheff (Eds.), *Toward a sociological imagination: Bridging specialized fields* (pp. 263–292). Lanham: University Press of America.
- Scheff, T. J. (2011). Social-emotional world: Mapping a continent. *Current Sociology*, 59(3), 347–361.
- Scheff, T. J. (2014). The ubiquity of hidden shame in modernity. *Cultural Sociology*, 8(2), 129–141.
- Scheff, T. J., & Retzinger, S. M. (1991). *Violence and emotions: Shame and rage in destructive conflicts*. Lexington: Lexington Books.
- Schoeck, H. (1970). *Envy: A theory of social behavior*. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.
- Shott, S. (1979). Emotion and social life: A symbolic interactionist analysis. *American Journal of Sociology*, 84(6), 1317–1334.
- Simonova, O. A. (2014a). Sotsiologiya emotsiy i sotsiologiya morali: moral'nye emotsii v sovremennom obshchestve [Sociology of emotions and sociology of morality: Moral emotions in contemporary society]. *Sotsiologicheskij Ezhegodnik 2013–2014* [Sociological Yearbook 2013–2014], 148–187 (in Russian).
- Simonova, O. A. (2014b). Styd i bednost': posledstviya dlya sotsial'noy politiki [Shame and poverty: The consequences for social policy]. *Zhurnal Issledovaniy Sotsial'noy Politiki* [Journal of Social Policy Studies], 12(4), 539–554 (in Russian).
- Stets, J. E., & Carter, M. J. (2006). The moral identity: A principle level identity. In K. McClelland & T. J. Fararo (Eds.), *Purpose, meaning and action: Control systems theories in sociology* (pp. 293–310). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Stets, J. E., & Carter, M. J. (2012). A theory of the self for the sociology of morality. *American Sociological Review*, 7(1), 120–140. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122411433762>
- Stets, J. E., Carter, M. J., Harrod, M. M., Cerven, C., & Abrutyn, S. (2008). The moral identity, status, moral emotions and normative order. In J. Clay-Warner & D. T. Robinson (Eds.), *Social structure and emotion* (pp. 227–251). San Diego, CA: Elsevier.
- Stryker, S. (2004). Integrating emotion into identity theory. In J. H. Turner (Ed.), *Theory and research on human emotions* (pp. 1–23). Bingley: Emerald.
- Turner, J. H., & Stets, J. E. (2005). *The sociology of emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Velikiy, P. P. (2007). Sotsial'naya politika na sele: Novye vyzovy, starye ogranicheniya [Social policy in rural areas: New challenges, old restrictions]. *Zhurnal Issledovaniy Sotsial'noy Politiki* [Journal of Social Policy Studies], 5(2), 231–244 (in Russian).
- Walker, D. (2006). Grounded theory: An exploration of process and procedure. *Qualitative Health Research*, 16(4), 547–559. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1049732305285972>

Kozlova Maria (Ph.D. (candidate of sciences), Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences) is associate professor in the Department of General Sociology of the Faculty of Social Sciences at The National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. She is the author/editor of 12 books and over 250 articles and book chapters on social psychology and sociology. Her research interests are morality, cohesion, identity, intergroup relations, and social and cultural changes.

Olga Simonova (Ph.D. (candidate of sciences), Lomonosov Moscow State University) is associate professor in the Department of General Sociology (Deputy Department Head) of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the National Research University—Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. She is an associate member of American Sociological Association and International Society for Research on Emotion. She is the author of three books and over 100 articles and book chapters on sociology and social psychology. Her research interests are theoretical problems of sociology, history of sociology, emotions, morality, identity, socialization, and social and cultural changes.

Conclusion



Nadezhda Lebedeva and John W. Berry

This book presents reports of a set of research conducted in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe, the Russian Federation, and Uzbekistan after the collapse of USSR and so-called socialist bloc in Eastern Europe. Until now, there has been relatively little empirical research devoted to the changing values and identities across countries and generations in this region. This book has sought to make a valuable contribution to this understudied field.

In this concluding part of the book, we make some preliminary conclusions that are based on the various findings that highlight the common tendencies from the research conducted in these different countries. These reflect some trends and directions of changes in values and identities.

Value Changes

In the various studies of changing values, many studies demonstrated two opposite tendencies:

The first was the expected trends toward democratic, individualistic, and emancipative values. For example, Martina Klisperova and Jaroslav Kostal analyzed political values and attitudes in different parts of Europe in chapter “Democratic

N. Lebedeva (✉)

National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

e-mail: nlebedeva@hse.ru

J. W. Berry

Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada

National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

e-mail: elderberys@gmail.com

© Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018

N. Lebedeva et al. (eds.), *Changing Values and Identities in the Post-Communist World*, Societies and Political Orders in Transition,

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-72616-8_24

Values in the Post-communist Region: The Incidence of Traditionalists, Skeptics, Democrats, and Radicals.” They show that democrats are represented in every country, especially among elites and among the young. Authors even concluded that region is only relatively deterministic for political mentality and democratic or non-democratic character. Nevertheless, in all post-communist countries, democrats constitute only a minority. According to their results, such values and characteristics as conservatism, suspiciousness, intolerance, and distancing from politics are most typical for the post-Soviet core countries (Russia, Moldova, Ukraine), but they are also significant in the countries of Central Europe, particularly Poland and Slovakia.

In the second, there is an opposite trend in the presence of pervasive non-democratic values. These are called “passive skepticism” by Klicperova and Kostal. These can be viewed either as a heritage of communist dictatorship and learned helplessness of the citizenry or a result of defects in democratic transitions, especially rampant corruption and pauperization of the former middle class. These values mean a perception of democratization as bringing no hope, accompanied by skepticism, cynicism, and alienation (e.g., Vogt, 2005). Such a psychological profile was labeled as “the post-totalitarian or post-communist syndrome” (Klicperova, Feierabend, & Hofstetter, 1997). This post-communist syndrome appears to be widespread throughout the Baltic and the Central European regions.

These two main trends are demonstrated in other studies in this book as well. With respect to the emergence of democratic values, Zoran Pavlović in his research in Serbia (chapter “Emancipative Values in a Post-Communist Society - The Case of Serbia”) revealed that those higher on *emancipative values* (Welzel, 2006, 2013; Welzel & Inglehart, 2009) are at the same time more inclined to accept the essential democratic norms of tolerance and activism, as well as to support democracy itself. This confirms the notion of emancipative values as a very important element of democratic political culture and an expression of intrinsic strivings toward the basic democratic norms. In order to make transitional democracy more effective, creating opportunities for emancipative values to grow is of utmost importance. According to Pavlovich, emancipative values are indeed more intensely held by younger, more educated and more affluent Serbian citizens and education figures as a very important predictor of emancipation.

With respect to non-democratic values, Laur Lilleoja and Maaris Raudsepp (chapter “Changes in Value Structure Among the Estonian Majority and the Russian-Speaking Minority in Post-socialist Estonia”) revealed the second trend, with changes in values toward conservation and self-transcendence in post-communist Estonia; this is evident across the Estonian-speaking majority and the Russian-speaking minority. Within all cohort groups, the value preferences of the Russian-speaking minority have been much more sensitive to the societal changes than Estonian ones. During the period from 2004 to 2014, a shift toward prioritizing the values of conservation, emphasizing the preservation of the status quo (vs. accepting change, risk, and unpredictability), and a shift toward values of self-transcendence, embracing the welfare of others (vs. one’s own interests), were found. These authors regard this value shift as an indicator for the stabilization of society after the early post-socialist turbulent years.

Populations of different countries (and even of different regions) might express not only universal but also culture-specific value priorities reflecting different trajectories of post-communist development. For instance, Ekaterina Bushina and Tatiana Ryabichenko (chapter “Intergenerational Value Differences in Latvia and Azerbaijan”) in their cross-country comparison of mean family values revealed that Russian families in Latvia have the lowest scores in conservation, while families of Azerbaijanis have the lowest scores in Openness to change values. These value differences at the family level might reflect the two different trajectories of post-Soviet development and value change noted above: toward Western Europe for Latvia and toward Islamic world for Azerbaijan. These cultural shifts are especially visible among younger generations: the younger Azerbaijanis demonstrated the lowest scores on openness to change and the highest scores on conservation values. The authors suppose that this is the result of the country’s drift toward a more traditional (and more typical for a Muslim country) society. Nevertheless, younger Latvians had higher conservation values than Russian minority youth in Latvia. Probably in the case of Baltic states, the recognition of country’s cultural past may have caused such a trend after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Groys, 2008).

Age and generation variations also appeared. Many studies showed age differences and intergenerational gaps in values. The results of the intergenerational comparison of openness to change and conservation values in Latvia and Azerbaijan (chapter “Intergenerational Value Differences in Latvia and Azerbaijan”) show repeated common trends. Younger generations demonstrated higher scores on openness to change and lower scores on conservation than their parents. Self-enhancement and self-transcendence values do not differ in the ethnic majority groups in the two generations, while in the Russian minority groups, there is a generation gap in self-enhancement values (higher among youth) and in self-transcendence values (higher in the parental generation). It is interesting that self-enhancement values are equally important to all young generations regardless of the context, group status, and ethnic differences. These results indicate that youth in all of the studied groups value competitiveness, desire to perform better than others, and be successful in all areas of life to the same extent. Such tendencies are widespread in modern industrial societies (Boehnke, Hadjar, & Baier, 2007).

In another study of variations by generation, Victoria Galyapina, Nadezhda Lebedeva, Zarina Lepshokova, and Klaus Boehnke (chapter “Values of Ethnic Russian Minority Members in North Caucasus Republics of the Russian Federation: An Inter- and Intragenerational Comparison”) examined value similarities and differences among two generations of ethnic Russian minority members living in two North Caucasus republics (North Ossetia-Alania and Kabardino-Balkaria) in comparison with values of two generations of Russians in the Central Federal District of Russia (CFD) and values of indigenous people in these republics. Intergenerational gaps among the ethnic Russian minority in the North Caucasus republics were revealed only for openness to change and conservation values, whereas among Russians in the CFD, intergenerational gaps emerged for all higher-order values. Furthermore, the pattern of intergenerational similarities and differences in the Russian minority of RNO and KBR was closer to the patterns of

the dominant ethnic groups of these republics than to the pattern exhibited by Russians in the CFD. The fact that regional differences in value preferences and in intergenerational value differences were more pronounced for the interregional comparison (CFD vs. North Caucasus republics) than interethnic differences or majority-minority status differences suggests that sociological modernization theory may serve as an interpretational framework for this study. In line with modernization theory (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005), a higher pace of value change (as manifested in greater intergenerational differences in value preferences in the CFD than in the North Caucasus) emerged for Central Russia, and value change affects the dimension of openness to change vs. conservation more than the self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence dimension. Modernity requires people to react flexibly to new societal demands and, therefore, fosters openness to change values. At the same time, modernization may sometimes surpass the capacities of individuals who are still in their formative years (adolescents in the present study), thereby creating a climate that is prone to stir anxieties. A plausible reaction to this challenge then is to turn to values that seem to promise an improved coping with these new anxieties: self-enhancement values. This trend becomes most evident in the CFD and is highly significant there. In the periphery of the Russian Federation, forces of modernization are likely to be weaker, so that intergenerational change trends are less powerful.

Value transmission was also examined in some chapters. These focused on the analysis of the two main sources of value transmission: family and the broader social context. In the study of Dmitrii Dubrov and Alexander Tatarko, "Intergenerational Transmission of Values in Urban and Rural Areas of Russia: The Role of Perceived Psychological Closeness", the authors revealed both forms of cultural transmission of values (horizontal from context and vertical from family) in urban and rural contexts. The authors found evidence of the horizontal transmission of all four higher-order values from peers among adolescents regardless of the context, while vertical transmission (from parents to children) was limited by the transmission of self-transcendence values in urban area and by conservation values in rural environment.

Tatiana Ryabichenko, Nadezhda Lebedeva, and Irina Plotka in their chapter "Value Similarity with Mothers and Peers, and Family Climate as Predictors of Well-Being of Russian Youth in Latvia" highlighted the role of family climate and value transmission in the well-being of youth. A positive psychological climate within a family (psychological closeness of youth with their mothers) was a strong predictor of the well-being of Russian youth in Latvia. The results indicated that the absolute value similarity scores of Russian youth with their Russian peers are the highest in all the higher-order values compared to value similarity of Russian youth with their mothers and Latvian peers. The positive relationship between the value similarity of Russian youth with Russian peers and psychological well-being of Russian youth was found only for similarity in self-enhancement values. The latter result is in line with the results of related research that showed that value congruence with the group of peers (this group might be seen as a reference group) contributes to life satisfaction (Khaptsova & Schwartz, 2016; Musiol & Boehnke, 2013). An additional conclusion from this study is that value transmission of ethnic minority youth serves not only as a tool for culture maintenance and well-being but also as a tool for acculturation at the individual, family, and group levels.

Parental influence is very important in social contexts that are changing. This was discussed by Oriola Hamzallari in her chapter, “Parenting Values and Practices Across Post-communist Societies in Youth Identity Formation: A Literature Review”. With regard to parental value transmission, findings from post-Soviet studies suggest that there is a gradual change toward more democratic values (Wejnert & Djumabaeva, 2004) and also the coexistence of collectivistic and individualistic values (see Tulviste, Mizera, & De Geer, 2012; Tulviste, Mizera, De Geer, & Tryggvason, 2003). In summary, parental values, parental practices, and identity formation show both similarities and differences between post-Soviet countries and Western countries. In general, there is a trend for post-Soviet bloc parents to be oriented toward more democratic values. However, parenting practices are more resistant to change than parental values, and further studies are needed to explore this link.

Religion was also found to be an important factor in value change in some countries. Changes in values in different religious group are connected with contemporary religious revival that started after the collapse of the USSR. Olga Pavlova in her study, “The Values and Social Identity of Russian Muslims”, showed that the cultural value orientations of Muslims of the North Caucasus have much in common and are minimally dependent on age. The study of the social identity structure of the respondents revealed quite significant age and ethnic characteristics of ethnic, religious, and civic components of the identity structure. In another study, “Values and Religious Identity of Russian Students from Different Religions”, Oleg Khukhlaev, Valeria Shorokhova, Elena Grishina, and Olga Pavlova concluded that religious revival in post-communist Russia is determined rather by changing identities than changing values. Nevertheless, individual value priorities affect specific aspects of religious identity across Buddhist, Muslim, and Orthodox Christian youth.

Dana Gavreliuc and Alin Gavreliuc in their chapter, “Generational Belonging and Historical Ruptures: Continuity or Discontinuity of Values and Attitudes in Post-communist Romania”, showed young Romanians to be the most vulnerable, dependent, and less willing to take their life in their own hands, when compared to the other cohorts. Additionally, young people structure their implicitly assumed values and attitudes in the same way as the older generation (their parents), even if children these days sometimes condemn their parents for complicity in the communist times. Such narrative recurrences appear frequently in the oral interviews with individuals who are part of the young cohorts, despite the persistence of transgenerational fatalistic attitudes (Gavreliuc, 2016).

Identity Changes

Global sociopolitical changes are often followed by changes in social categories, which resulted in building new identifications as well as processes of disidentification with some categories that are perceived by some groups as irrelevant or “alien.” This process concerns especially inclusive identities in post-communist space, which

changed after the collapse of USSR and the restoring and emerging of independent states. For instance, during the Soviet period, the so-called “Soviet” identity was the most inclusive social identity uniting all citizens of the former USSR regardless of their ethnic or religious identification. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, this identity lost its importance and was replaced by other different inclusive identities: national (representing a residence in the Russian Federation), religious, regional, local, or place identity. In most cases, the level of their inclusiveness has been sharply reduced and is not shared by all members of the groups. Zarina Lepshokova and Nadezhda Lebedeva in chapter “The Role of Social Disidentification in Acculturation Preferences of Ethnic Majority and Minority Members in Kabardino-Balkar Republic,” demonstrated the important role of social disidentification with large inclusive categories in the acculturation preferences of ethnic majority and minority members in Kabardino-Balkar Republic in the Russian North Caucasus. According to their research, social disidentification (national for the Kabardino-Balkar majority and regional for ethnic Russian minority) makes a significant contribution to the explanation of acculturation preferences of both minority and majority group members. The distancing of the ethnic majority groups of KBR from Russia as a state leads to intolerant attitudes toward ethnic Russians living in KBR. However, the level of national disidentification among ethnic majority group members and the levels of the regional disidentification among ethnic Russians in KBR are extremely low, and mutual acculturation attitudes are largely positive. Nevertheless, this research shed light on the distractive power of possible disidentification for peaceful intercultural coexistence and mutual successful acculturation in rapidly changing sociopolitical contexts.

With respect to variations in identities across generations, Victoria Galyapina and Nadezhda Lebedeva in their research, “Probing the Relationship Between Group Identities of Russians and Ossetians in the Republic of North Ossetia-Alania: Intergenerational Analysis”, revealed changes in multiple identity structures among three generations of Ossetians and ethnic Russians, living in this republic. They showed that the patterns of correlations between group identities among three generations of Russians as well as Ossetians suggest two bases for identification: national Russian background and North Caucasian background. Republican identity serves as “a bridge” between the two largest inclusive identities (national identity and regional identity) among three generations of Russians as well as among Ossetians; its role is very important in this multicultural republic. However, the authors did not find such “a bridge” among Ossetian adolescents; they supposed that the process of identity building is continuing for them. The authors concluded that intergenerational differences in group identity structures are largely caused by changes in the sociocultural context of North Ossetia in the last 70 years (a three-generation period of socialization and mutual acculturation).

Kamila Isaeva, Byron G. Adams, and Fons J. R. van de Vijver in chapter “The Kaleidoscope of Language, Ethnicity, and Identity in Uzbekistan,” found that identities that are more inclusive (national and ethnolinguistic) are positively associated with interethnic attitudes and practices, while the opposite was found for ethnic identity. This pattern suggests that social identities can be used to include and exclude others. Because the Russian-speaking population in Uzbekistan is culturally

diverse, a profound knowledge of the cultural context is needed to understand the complex patterning of identities and interethnic habits and preferences. More research is needed to understand the differences between Russian-speaking ethnic groups. The Uzbek context illustrates how structural variables of a society (such as the nature and history of linguistic diversity and the power differential of the ethnic groups) can influence individual and group identities and interethnic habits and preferences.

In the chapter “Ethnic Identity and Cultural Value Orientations of Moldavian Youth in Transitional Society”, Irina Caunenco noted that the ongoing process of self-determination of the Moldavian majority is the result of its change in status to that of a nation-state. The young Moldovans have a close cultural distance to the Romanian, Russian, and Ukrainian groups. The important ethnic markers shared by the young Moldovans, which bring them close to the other ethnic groups, are a common history, religion, and region of residence. The author concluded that it is important to think about the ethnic matrix of the Republic of Moldova, as ethnic groups can contribute to the building of common future, once they achieve a consensus.

In the chapter “The Great Escape: Linking Youth Identity Development to Growing Up in Post-communist Romania”, Oana Negru-Subtirica and Lavinia Damian analyzed identity development trajectories in different life domains (e.g., education, work) of young people who grew up in post-communist Romania. Most young people in post-communist Romania have developed their identities guided by “imported” life goals, in terms of types of strivings that define a successful person. The authors critically analyzed existing psychological research on identity development of Romanian youth and outlined the mutual interdetermination between the socioeconomic context of post-communist Romania and the development of educational and vocational identity of Romanian youth.

In the period of identity formation, youth usually try to develop their possible career goals and paths. Alenka Gril, Nada Polovina, Ivana Ćirović, Sabina Autor, and Mladen Radulović in their chapter, “Value Changes in Adolescents’ Anticipation of Possible Career Selves in Slovenia and Serbia”, studied how the different socioeconomic and cultural conditions, as well as the very different transitional pathways to the liberal market economy, have led to the different opportunities that the adolescents explore while defining their roles and goals in the future. The Serbian adolescents emphasized more on the education and attributed more importance to gaining a profession that could allow access to better paid jobs, for which they were prepared to invest more in developing personal competences. This is also expected and supported by the social norms in the close social network. It appears that compliance with the values of individualized global culture is higher in those social contexts or social groups where the changes from previously shared values are larger. Similarly, compliance is higher in the individuals and groups that value more the opportunities for improving their social positions, for example, by planning their individual career pathways and lifestyles that are different from what was expected.

The processes of identification with a country of origin and a country of settlement among migrants from the former Soviet Union to Germany and Israel were studied by Katharina Sonnenberg, Peter Titzmann, and Rainer Silbereisen in the chapter “Cultural Identification Among Immigrants from the Former USSR: Insights

from Comparative Research with Five Groups in Germany and Israel". The results suggested that the background in the former USSR might have a long-term reach: former USSR immigrants functioned similarly with respect to their minority identification and their engagement with the minority culture despite the fact that immigrants left the former USSR more than 20 years ago, destined for different countries and different living conditions. Country and group status together explained an impressive amount of variance in cultural identification. Additionally, religion turned out to be a significant predictor for immigrants' cultural identification, both with respect to majority and to minority identification. The authors noted that some of the effects are the result of the rather rigid societies that immigrants or minorities may fit or may not fit into. Societies need to become more flexible in accommodating this cultural, ethnic, and/or religious diversity.

Some studies focused on the relationships between youth multiple identities and their psychological well-being and health. In the chapter "Multiple Social Identities in Relation to Self-Esteem of Adolescents in Post-communist Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Kosovo and Romania", Radosveta Dimitrova, Pasquale Musso, Iva Polackova Solcova, Delia Stefanel, Lucian Blaga, Fitim Uka, Skerdi Zahaj, Peter Tavel, Venzislav Jordanov, and Evgeni Jordanov tested a model linking ethnic, familial, and religious identity to self-esteem among youth in Albania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Kosovo, and Romania. A multigroup path model showed that ethnic, familial, and religious identities were positively related to a single underlying construct of social identities. In all countries, youth with stronger multiple identities reported higher self-esteem. These results provide new knowledge on multiple social identities among under-investigated samples from post-communist countries in Europe faced with dynamic societal changes.

Skerdi Zahaj and Radosveta Dimitrova studied how identity styles influence adolescents' psychological problems in post-communist Albania (chapter "The Influence of Identity Styles on Adolescents Psychological Problems in Post-Communist Albania"). According to Bodinaku, Gramo, and Pokorny (2014), the mean of all dysfunctional scales of psychological health in the capital Tirana was considerably and systematically higher than in any Western countries. After the collapse of the communist regime in 1991, Albania was faced with dramatic social and economic changes and was considered the poorest country in Europe (Schmidt, 1998). A large percentage of Albanian adolescents were classified in the diffuse-avoidant style which is highly related with lack of subjective well-being and risk to harm self and others. It is possible that post-communist Albania does not provide many viable identity options leaving adolescents unsatisfied and at risk for psychological problems. This study confirmed that identity styles were significant predictors of adolescent's "core" clinical problems and well-being. Identity development of Albanian adolescents can play an important role in psychological health. Therefore, the "core" psychological problems of adolescents in post-communist Albania are related to identity development, which is affected by social changes.

In the post-communist region, some ethnic and social groups underwent serious changes in their status and experienced some losses due to radical social changes.

Jekatyerina Dunajeva in her chapter, “Negotiating Identity and Belonging After Regime Change: Hungarian Society and Roma in Post-communist Hungary”, showed that the two political and economic crises are crucial for understanding the marginalization and coping mechanisms of Roma today. The author argued that while during the socialist era, the Roma ethnic identity was denied; nevertheless their employment level was high, albeit most were working as non-skilled labor. The regime change ended a paternalistic system and cut off state benefits from recipients, and economic and political change brought with it major social adjustments. The Roma were disproportionately hit by the transition, and their conditions were deteriorated with the recent economic crisis as well. As a long-term solution, building community ties and promoting solidarity among Roma is the most fruitful way forward. It is imperative to include Roma as active citizens in the Hungarian society, and at times of economic and political crisis, the sense of belonging to the nation is the absolute precondition for any constructive coping mechanisms to evolve.

Maria Kozlova and Olga Simonova in their chapter, “Identity and Work Ethic of Peasants in the Context of the Post-Soviet Socio-Economic Transformation”, noted that during the past decade, Russian society has undergone radical transformations that have brought about fundamental change in its economic, social, and cultural life. The impact of global processes on these changes in the political, economic, and social spheres of the Russian state has resulted in a radical transformation of the normative value system in the country. The decline in the prestige of physical labor has deprived peasants of the support that allowed them to maintain a relatively high level of subjective well-being and foster a positive identity in the past. Systematic deprivation and pressing social needs have activated a range of moral emotions: envy, resentment, shame, and humiliation. All of these are self-conscious emotions that complicate the search for new foundations on which to build a new personal and collective identity.

This monograph is unique collection of studies of changing values and identities that took place in at least two generations of residents of the former Soviet Union and so-called socialist bloc. When the cultural context of individuals changes (including the political, economic, and social aspects), so too we expect that there will be psychological changes in the population. This link between cultural and psychological changes has been well-established in the field of cross-cultural and acculturation psychology (Berry, 1980; Berry, Poortinga, Breugelmans, Chasiotis, & Sam, 2011; Sam & Berry, 2016). The studies in this volume shed light on some important contextual predictors of the observed psychological changes. In addition to the long-term changes over the past 25 years, relatively recent history is also a powerful factor; this is illustrated by many studies (such as by the comparative analyses of attitudes in Eastern and Western Germany by Sack, 2017).

Still, the question remains: to what degree do changes in the values and identities reported in this book reflect general, worldwide tendencies that may be rooted in more ubiquitous changes in global cultural patterns? Are they universal, or are they more intimately linked to the massive changes in the regions and societies examined in this volume? It is important to take into account the relations between the

observed changes in values and identities in specific populations and the widespread worldwide changes in economic level and degree of modernity (Inglehart, 2016; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). Other factors that may affect these value and identity changes are the previous types of political regime and dominant economic and social structures (Rupnik, 1988) and religiosity (Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten, Corveleyn, & Hutsebaut, 2005; Schwartz & Huisman, 1995). This means that we now need to develop a multilevel approach to study the multiple predictors and consequences of political, economic, cultural, group, and individual changes in order to understand the deep and long-term track of global social experiments.

References

- Berry, J. W. (1980). Social and cultural change. In H. C. Triandis & R. Brislin (Eds.), *Handbook of cross-cultural psychology, Social psychology* (Vol. 5, pp. 211–279). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Breugelmans, S. M., Chasiotis, A., & Sam, D. L. (2011). *Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications* (3rd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bodinaku, B., Gramo, A., & Pokorný, D. (2014). *Introducing screening instruments to Albania: Impact of the history and challenge for the future. 45th International Annual Meeting* (pp. 154–155). Copenhagen: Society for Psychotherapy Research.
- Boehnke, K., Hadjar, A., & Baier, D. (2007). Parent-child value similarity: The role of zeitgeist. *Journal of Marriage and Family*, 69, 778–792. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1741-3737.2007.00405.x>
- Fontaine, J. R. J., Duriez, B., Luyten, P., Corveleyn, J., & Hutsebaut, D. (2005). Consequences of a multi-dimensional approach to religion for the relationship between religiosity and value priorities. *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 15, 123–143.
- Gavreliuc, D. (Ed.). (2016). *Education, culture and identity. Diagnosis of societal and personal changes in post-communist Romania*. Timișoara: Editura de Vest.
- Groys, B. (2008). Beyond diversity: Cultural studies and its post-communist other. In B. Groys (Ed.), *Art power* (pp. 149–164). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Inglehart, R. (2016). After postmaterialism: An essay on China, Russia and the United States. A comment. *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, 41(2), 213–222.
- Inglehart, R., & Welzel, C. (2005). *Modernization, cultural change and democracy: The human development sequence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Khaptsova, A., & Schwartz, S. H. (2016). Life satisfaction and value congruence. Moderators and extension to constructed socio-demographic groups in a Russian national sample. *Social Psychology*, 47, 163–173. <https://doi.org/10.1027/1864-9335/a000268>
- Klicperova, M., Feierabend, I. K., & Hofstetter, C. R. (1997). In the search for a post-communist syndrome: A theoretical framework and empirical assessment. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology*, 7(1), 39–52.
- Musiol, A.-L., & Boehnke, K. (2013). Person-environment value congruence and satisfaction with life. *International Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 3, 57–65.
- Rupnik, J. (1988). *The other Europe*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson.
- Sack, B. C. (2017). Regime change and the convergence of democratic value orientations through socialization. Evidence from reunited Germany. *Democratization*, 24(3), 444–462. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2016.1220940>
- Sam, D. L., & Berry, J. W. (Eds.). (2016). *Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology* (2nd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Schmidt, F. (1998). Upheaval in Albania. *Current History*, 617, 127–131.

- Schwartz, S. H., & Huismans, S. (1995). Value priorities and religiosity in four western religions. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 58, 88–107.
- Tulviste, T., Mizera, L., & De Geer, B. (2012). Socialization values in stable and changing societies: A comparative study of Estonian, Swedish, and Russian Estonian mothers. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 43, 480–497. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022111401393>
- Tulviste, T., Mizera, L., De Geer, B., & Tryggvason, M.-T. (2003). A comparison of Estonian, Swedish, and Finnish mothers' controlling attitudes and behaviour. *International Journal of Psychology*, 38, 46–53. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00207590244000278>
- Vogt, H. (2005). *Between utopia and disillusionment. A narrative of the political transformation in Eastern Europe. Contemporary European history (Book 1)*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Wejnert, B., & Djumabaeva, A. (2004). From patriarchy to egalitarianism: Parenting roles in democratizing Poland and Kyrgyzstan. *Marriage & Family Review*, 36, 147–171.
- Welzel, C. (2006). Democratization as an emancipative process: The neglected role of mass motivations. *European Journal of Political Research*, 45, 871–896.
- Welzel, C. (2013). *Freedom rising: Human empowerment and the quest for emancipation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Welzel, C., & Inglehart, R. (2009). Political culture, mass beliefs and value change. In C. Haerpfer, P. Bernhagen, R. Inglehart, & C. Welzel (Eds.), *Democratization* (pp. 126–144). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nadezhda Lebedeva (Ph.D., Institute of Psychology, Russian Academy of Sciences) is Professor in the Department of Psychology and Head of the International Laboratory for Socio-cultural Research at The National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia. She is Academic Director of double degree Master Program on Applied Social Psychology of HSE, Russia, and Tilburg University, the Netherlands. She is a member of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (IACCP) and the International Academy for Intercultural Research (IAIR). She is the author/editor of 26 books and over 250 articles and book chapters on social and cross-cultural psychology. Her research interests are values, value transmission, identity, intercultural relations, acculturation, creativity and innovations, and social and cultural change.

John W. Berry (Ph.D. University of Edinburgh) is professor emeritus of psychology at Queen's University, Canada, and research professor, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. He received honorary doctorates from the University of Athens, and Université de Geneve (in 2001). He has published over 30 books in the areas of cross-cultural, intercultural, social, and cognitive psychology with various colleagues. These include *Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications* (3rd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2011); *Handbook of Acculturation Psychology* (2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 2016); *Families Across Cultures* (Cambridge University Press, 2006); *Immigrant Youth in Cultural Transition* (LEA, 2006); *Mutual Intercultural Relations* (Cambridge, 2017); and *Ecology, Culture and Human Development* (Sage, 2017). He is a fellow of the Canadian Psychological Association, the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study, the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology, and the International Academy for Intercultural Research. He received the Hebb Award for Contributions to Psychology as a Science in 1999, and the award for Contributions to the Advancement of International Psychology in 2012 (from CPA), the Interamerican Psychology Prize, from the Sociedad Interamericana de Psicología (in 2001), and the Lifetime Contribution Award from IAIR (in 2005). His main research interests are in the role of ecology and culture in human development and in acculturation and intercultural relations, with an emphasis on applications to immigration, multiculturalism, and educational and health policy.