DOING QUALITATIVE RESEARCH IN POLITICS

INTEGRATING THEORY BUILDING AND POLICY RELEVANCE

EDITED BY ANGELA KACHUYEVSKI AND LISA M. SAMUEL

Doing Qualitative Research in Politics

Angela Kachuyevski
Lisa M. Samuel
Editors

Doing Qualitative Research in Politics

Integrating Theory Building and Policy Relevance

Editors
Angela Kachuyevski
Arcadia University
Glenside, PA, USA

Lisa M. Samuel
New York University
New York, NY, USA

Cover image by Carol Crichton: "Looking for the Perfect Frame" (detail) 1998, acrylic/canvas, four panels.
Cover design by Henry Petrides

Printed on acid-free paper

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Contents

Notes on Contributors

Taehyung Ahn is a senior research fellow at the Institute for Korean Peninsula Future Strategies. His research centers on US foreign policy, international relations in East Asia, and politics and international relations on the Korean Peninsula. His recent publications appear in *One Korea: Visions of Korean Unification* (2016) and *North Korea and Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia* (2014). He has been a visiting scholar at the University of California, Irvine.

Christopher M. Brown is a faculty member of the Department of Political Science and International Studies at Georgia Southern University. His primary research agenda addresses normative issues of democratization and democracy theory, particularly with regard to representation and policy implementation. He has recently served as a grant reviewer for the National Endowment for the Humanities and is a member of the International Studies Association and the American Political Science Association.

Serena Cruz is a visiting research scholar at the University of Amsterdam. She is jointly hosted by the research group Health, Care and the Body (HCB) and the Amsterdam Research Center on Gender & Sexuality (ARC-GS). Prior to joining HCB and ARC-GS, she spent 19 months (2015–2017) as a research fellow in the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'. Her work emphasizes the importance of social networks in relation to how individuals manage daily risks associated with HIV, criminalization, and sex work.

She is devoted to exploring 'risk', 'vulnerability', and 'coping' through ethnographic means that delve into the intersocial dimensions of survival.

Monalisa Gangopadhyay's areas of research are gender, feminist theory, Indian religious nationalism, gendered violence and globalization. Her dissertation examines the impact of Hindu nationalism and globalization on urban middle-class Indian women working in the corporate media world.

Angela Kachuyevski is Associate Professor of Political Science at Arcadia University in suburban Philadelphia. Her research falls in the fields of conflict resolution and critical security studies, and focuses on divided societies, particularly conflicts involving Russian-speaking minorities in Ukraine, the Baltic States and Moldova. Recent publications analyze the "Russian World" concept and the securitization of national identity in Latvia, OSCE efforts from 1994 to 2012 to manage conflict between Russia and Ukraine over the status of Crimea and the status of the Russian language in Ukraine, and identity boundaries in divided societies.

Mita Saksena teaches courses on international relations and global health at Rutgers and Seton Hall universities in New Jersey. Her research interests are in global health governance, women's health, and international relations of South Asia. She has recently presented her research on evolution of human rights in global governance of infectious diseases and on analyzing India's relationship with China using rule-based constructivism at the American Public Health Annual Convention and at the International Studies Association conference in 2017.

Lisa M. Samuel is Academic Director and Clinical Assistant Professor at New York University's School of Professional Studies, Division of Applied Undergraduate Studies. Her research focuses on questions of justice in situations of difference in the global trade regime and the utilization of research methods that challenge disciplinary norms for knowledge production. Her recent publications center on vulnerabilities impacting the positioning of small developing states in the multilateral trading system and on policy proposals for more efficient working mechanisms between the government and the private sector in the Commonwealth Caribbean regarding the negotiation of free-trade agreements.

Amy Widestrom is Associate Professor and Program Director of Political Science at Arcadia University in suburban Philadelphia. Her forthcoming works include "Building Civic Environments to Empower Citizens," in *PS: Political Science and Politics*, and a co-authored article "The Effect of Political Parties on the Distribution of Income in the American States: 1917–2011," in *Social Science Quarterly* (with Hays and Dennis). Her chapter "How Ideas Shape Urban Political Development" is under contract with the University of Pennsylvania Press as part of *Ideas, Interests, Institutions, and Urban Political Development*, edited by Dilworth and Weaver. Her book *Displacing Democracy: Economic Segregation in America* was published by the University of Pennsylvania Press in 2015.

LIST OF FIGURES

LIST OF TABLES

Introduction: Doing Qualitative Research in Politics: Building Theory and Formulating Policy

Angela Kachuyevski and Lisa M. Samuel

This book began as a series of conversations among colleagues about the dearth of good resources to illustrate how theory building and policy-relevant research is done in political science, particularly using qualitative methods. We noted the negative impact on theory building in policy-oriented fields. We discussed the all-too-frequent divide between scholarship and policy. We lamented the lack of relevance of many of the primarily quantitative methods prevalent in the discipline to the sorts of research projects many researchers do. Then we began to plan this book.

We thus strive to address three pressing needs. First, we engage with the debate in the field over the validity of qualitative methods, illustrating throughout the chapters how various approaches can not only be methodologically rigorous, but also contribute to deeper, richer, and more nuanced understanding of important political phenomena. Second, we

A. Kachuyevski (✉)
Arcadia University, Glenside, PA, USA

L. M. Samuel
New York University, New York, NY, USA

directly address how various qualitative and transdisciplinary methods can be particularly useful for theory building and policy-relevant research because they provide detail-rich explanations conducive to both. Finally, we focus on "the doing" part of research, namely exactly *how* particular methods were applied in specific research contexts. We assert, through our work presented here, that qualitative political research produces valid results that are opportune to building and refining theory and informing practice. In so doing, we weigh in on a robust epistemological debate within the social sciences over how the study of social phenomena should be conducted in order to build empirical understanding and theoretical knowledge. In political science, there is a tendency to prefer quantitative analysis, including large-*n* studies and formal models, given their purported relative strength in external validity. Qualitative researchers have been counseled to approximate the "scientific" approach, defined as following the conventions of quantitative models as closely as possible (King et al. 1994). Yet, many questions within the field are not conducive to quantitative analysis. We demonstrate here that, structured appropriately, qualitative studies of such phenomena can build theory and inform policy through empirical study, and in so doing add to our understanding of important international events.

We, therefore, contribute to the ongoing, larger discussion that is taking place in political science pertaining to the formulation of so-called appropriate methods. We expose how qualitatively oriented political science scholars actually *do* their work, in order to clarify our procedures, and be frontal with our methodological considerations and choices with the aim of illustrating the methodological rigor at the foundation of this type of research. One of the advantages of this work is that it not only demonstrates a range of alternative methods for *doing* political research, but it also explains the utility of these particular methods in order to answer key questions in the discipline. In addition, we begin to answer the call for qualitative researchers to be more explicit in how we conduct our work. Indeed, scholars have noted that criticism of qualitative research can in part be a response to the fact that "researchers have not been as clear about their methods" as they could have been (Yanow 2003, 11).

This has led to debate in the field on data access and research transparency (DA-RT). Amid urgent calls from the Council of the American Political Science Association, qualitative scholars in particular are being enjoined to address at length how their data is generated and how they draw inferences on the basis of such data. Indeed, it has been spelled out that "DA-RT allows qualitative scholars to demonstrate the power of their

inquiry, offering an opportunity to address a central paradox: that scholars who value close engagement with the social world and generate rich, thick data rarely…detail how they generated and deployed those data" (Elman and Kapiszewski 2014, 46). While we do not agree with all aspects of the debate,[1] and resulting policy positions, we do agree that greater reflection and transparency on how research is conducted can contribute to greater systematicity and rigor.

In debates regarding the validity of qualitative methods, disagreements between qualitative and quantitative researchers are commonly referred to as the quantitative-qualitative divide, so wide is the chasm between these two approaches to the study of politics. Although our point of departure herein is that qualitative research methods can, and do, contribute to the generation and refinement of theories, within political science, researchers working in this tradition tend to be sidelined, their work being viewed as lacking rigor, generalizability, objectivity, replicability, and a systematic approach. This view of qualitative research is usually held up in sharp contrast to quantitative research that tends to be viewed in a much more "positive" light, bringing "rigor to the logical structure of theories and the assessment of evidence for and against those theories. This rigor aims at making the creation and analysis of data and the elaboration of theory more visible to the scientific community" (McLaughlin Mitchell et al. 2012, xiii). Before elucidating how qualitative research contributes to theory building, we lay the foundation for our assertion by looking briefly at these two broad approaches to knowledge production—the quantitative approach and the qualitative approach.

As political science researchers, one key question we should ask of ourselves is: what is the purpose of political and other kinds of social research? As researchers, we are producing and making claims to knowledge. Correspondingly, there is a politics of knowledge[2] that at least, in part, asks the question: how do we come by this knowledge? Put simply, how do we know what we know? What are the acceptable methods within the political and other social sciences for acquiring this knowledge? For quantitative political scientists whose work is grounded in a positivist epistemology, the path to knowledge is often viewed as being linear, value-free, neutral, and testable. On this basis, there is an objective reality to be studied, understood, and explained, and scientists can grasp this objective reality because any subjectivity which they may take with them to collecting and explaining their data can be "controlled for" by strictly abiding by neutral procedures for systematic experiments and logical deductions. This is typically delineated as the theory-testing approach.

It usually begins with a review of the relevant literature in the researcher's field in which the aim is to pull the key concepts related to their project and utilize them to formulate or restate their research question; this will consist of different theoretical hypotheses that suggest different relationships between the concepts (Ackerly and True 2010). This may be referred to as the theoretical argument of the question. Thereafter, this set of hypotheses is tested empirically to answer the research question, as well as to arrive at a deeper understanding of the subject at hand. However, in order to test the theoretical argument, its composite concepts and the relationship between them must be approximated by measurable real-world proxies. This is, then, a literature-based approach to developing theory and testing hypotheses, which follows the path of formulating a theoretical argument of the question before formulating a research plan. The logic of this approach to research emphasizes: the collection of data using standardized approaches to a range of variables; the search for patterns of causal relationships between these variables; and the testing of a given theory by confirming or denying precise hypotheses (Henn et al. 2009). Also of note, in this approach the researcher and the researched are seen as being on "different planes." It involves a hierarchical positioning in which the researcher is privileged as the only knower (Hesse-Biber and Leavy 2011, 8). There is no agency on the part of the researched.

In contrast, for qualitative researchers, the central logic is not to test given theories; it is, instead, to seek theories (Ackerly and True 2010) or to build theories (Henn et al. 2009). In this approach, there is no linear course such as that seen in quantitative research. In following the theory-seeking path, qualitative researchers work to understand and interpret a particular phenomenon utilizing conceptual tools that are formulated in the process of reflecting upon the phenomenon in question. As such, this is an explicitly non-linear path to theorizing (Ackerly and True 2010). It is accepted practice that qualitative research does not begin with a formal hypothesis which is then tested against findings in the field. These researchers tend to begin their research projects with hunches, or puzzles, that are based on relevant research literature and, typically, on prior knowledge of the study setting (Agar 2010; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2002; Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2014). Furthermore, understandings and concepts are expected to emerge from data as the research project advances, which may ultimately lead to the generation of theory (Yanow 2003, 10).

This is typically referred to as theory-seeking research. It speaks to the ways in which "researchers derive theory endogenously from within empirical

research" (Ackerly and True 2010, 81). Unlike the theory-testing researcher, here the researcher usually does not begin with any precise initial specification of research concepts or issues.[3] Indeed, the focus of the research may change during the course of data collection as certain issues become apparent and as ideas develop (Henn et al. 2009). Instead of researchers testing theoretical hypotheses, they generate them. Theoretical ideas emanate from initial data collection, and then influence subsequent data collection. This is conducive to the emergence of theory from the data. However, the malleability of such research design has led to criticisms that these methods are not systematic, and they lack rigor. Yet, such criticisms might in fact ignore the attention to detail paid to selection of research sites, arrangements for access to subject-participants, and the care taken in choosing appropriate modes to gather data, leading qualitative research to its own systematicity and rigor (Yanow 2003, 10), a position we seek to bolster in this volume, through detailed discussion of precisely how we conducted our research.

While the main debate seems to reflect a division between quantitative and qualitative approaches to political research, we should note the ongoing debate among non-quantitative researchers over whether or not there is a clear distinction between qualitative and interpretive research. Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2014) take the view that the term "qualitative" fails to take into account the full range of non-quantitative methods. In earlier work, Yanow (2003, 8) posits that underlying epistemological and ontological presuppositions divide qualitative approaches into positivist and interpretive camps. Thus, "qualitative" research is distinct from "interpretive" research since pressure to adhere to certain procedures has led many researchers to use large-n tools to engage in small-n studies (Yanow 2003, 10). Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2014) therefore argue "what we are increasingly looking at these days methodologically is…a tripartite division among quantitative, positivist-qualitative, and traditional qualitative methods" (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2014, xx) with the latter being termed "interpretive" methods more often than not.

Interpretivists are contextual analysts. They "derive meaning by looking at the context of an action or event, its connection to a surrounding set of actions, events, and interpretations" (Gerring 2003, 2). Thus, while all political scientists engage in interpreting their data, interpretivists "offer us interpretations of interpretations; they concentrate on meanings, beliefs, languages, discourses and signs" (Bevir and Rhodes 2006, 18). Interpretive researchers "are aware of the extent to which their research formulations, choice of observational sites and persons interviewed, analytic frame, and

writing all constitute the subject of study, rather than objectively reflecting it" (Yanow 2003, 11).

Many scholars argue that this distinction is more one of epistemology than of method (Gerring 2003, 3; Laitin 2003, 7; Dessler 2003, 22). In this view, "there are no distinctive positivist methods, or interpretive methods, or constructivist methods, and so on, though there are quite clearly feminist research *projects*, positivist *projects*, and the like" (Dessler 2003, 23). Indeed, distinguishing between how data is gathered and how it is analyzed "highlights the fact that qualitative methods may be used in keeping either with positivist or interpretive presuppositions" (Yanow 2003, 12). Thus, in this collective work, we present research projects that employ positivist and interpretive approaches and qualitative methods to the study of important political phenomena.

We further seek to demonstrate how qualitative methods are uniquely situated to inform policy through situated, rigorous empirical study. Policy analyses and prescriptions are often presented in a top-down discourse that ignores or sidelines the views of those affected by such policies, and, as such, they fail to account for how they experience it. Our contextual analyses, then, serve as important correctives to universalizing approaches to policy analysis and prescriptions. In so doing, we bring forth yet another of our main arguments: that qualitative and mixed methods offer rich empirical detail and valuable insights into the concerns of the people being studied, and that research should be conducted in such a manner that it seeks to utilize these concerns to better and more directly inform policy making.

Jentleson and Ratner define policy-relevant scholarship as problem-driven "research, analysis, writing and related activities that advance knowledge with an explicit priority of addressing policy questions" (Jentleson and Ratner 2011, 8). Scholarly policy-relevant work thus encompasses a range of academic pursuits, including work that "focuses on building knowledge about particular puzzles and cases, in effect using and adapting general theory to explain specific types of behavior" and also work that "tends to ask questions from the perspective of policy makers and offers direct information that bears on policy choices" (Bennett, 651–2). Done well, policy-relevant research can provide diagnostic value to policy makers by assisting them to discern patterns and detect causal connections, prescriptive value that aids in constructing strategy, and lesson-drawing value that can help policy makers draw valid lessons from experience (Jentleson and Ratner 2011, 9).

Yet, a gap between the theory and practice of politics exists (George 1993) due in part to differing intellectual orientations, whereby "the academic ethic is to offer elegant theoretical answers to general questions while the policy maker seeks definite answers to particular questions" (Nye 2008, 597–8). That is, the academy fears that the search for policy relevance "will lead theorists to forgo levels of abstraction and elegance that may sometimes be essential to academic progress. From this perspective, the isolation of the ivory tower serves as a buffer" against the temptation to engage in issue-driven analysis (Nye 2008, 595). Further, in the academy, there is a distinct preference for a specific methodological orientation, discussed above, that values a narrow, mathematical definition of "scientific" research above other, presumably less rigorous, approaches (Avey and Desch 2014, 227).

Nonetheless, both scholars and practitioners agree that there is a significant and critical connection between theory and policy. Indeed, "policy makers must try to figure out which events merit attention and which items or issues can be ignored, and they must select objectives and choose policy instruments that will achieve them. Whether correct or not, they do this on the basis of some sort of theory" (Walt 2005, 28). Survey results, further, show that policy makers have an interest in drawing upon scholarly expertise, and the majority of both scholars and practitioners "clamor for a bridge" to cross the divide (Avey and Desch 2014, 243). Scholarship can directly impact policy through informing both theory and practice (Babbitt and Hampson 2011; Kelman 2003). This leads to the argument "not for driving theory out but bringing policy relevance in," rendering theory both rigorous and relevant to real-world policy challenges (Jentleson and Ratner 2011, 8).

We argue that qualitative methods that meet rigorous standards are well suited to meet this standard because highly specialized theory and sophisticated methods do not result in research findings that policy makers find useful. Indeed, "the gulf between scholars and policy makers may be getting wider as the links between theoretical research and policy problems grow weaker" (Walt 2005, 40). The growing disconnect is due to a number of factors, but most clearly to the "increasing scientific methodological orientation" of political science (Nye 2008, 598), and a turn toward theoretical models that may or may not offer insight helpful to practitioners. The "validity and elegance of the models have become the focus, rather than whether those models can be used to understand real-world situations" (Gallucci 2012, A60). Further, this orientation is geared

toward advanced, highly technical research methods that produce research results that "are difficult for policy makers and citizens to understand" (Bennett and Ikenberry 2006, 653).

Rich, contextual research, on the other hand, provides actionable knowledge that can be applied to specific policy challenges. Hence, policy makers see case studies, area studies, and policy analysis as "very useful," while formal models and other quantitative and purely theoretical approaches are seen as not useful (Avey and Desch 2014, 231). Policy-relevant research should thus engage in "scenario-based analyses with their ways of applying, testing, and developing theories" (Jentleson and Ratner 2011, 9). Scholarly research can play an important role in framing policy challenges, mapping out policy options, and identifying questions that current empirical and theoretical knowledge cannot answer (Nye 2008, 596).

There is a general consensus that the main impediment to greater engagement between scholarship and policy is, in fact, the academic community itself, which through hiring practices and professional advancement actively discourages policy-relevant work (Gallucci 2012, A60; Jentleson and Ratner 2011, 7). Yet "a conscious effort to alter the prevailing norms" could mitigate this theory-policy divide since "the scholarly community gets to decide what it values, and there is no reason why policy relevance cannot be elevated in our collective estimation, along with the traditional criteria of creativity, rigor and empirical validity" (Walt 2005, 41–42). Thus, it appears that the academic community itself can help bridge the theory-policy divide by accepting and promoting the validity of approaches that engage in rigorous empirical research in ways that are relevant to policy. The chapters of this volume seek to take up this challenge.

Christopher M. Brown illustrates the efficacy of the heuristic case study method in facilitating theory construction. His chapter investigates the failures of democracy in Venezuela and outlines those conditions in which democracies might fail through democratic means. He argues that the use of a heuristic case study method in this case yields a deeper explanation for democratic breakdowns than that which currently exists in the literature on comparative democratization, thus providing for the establishment of broader theoretical claims regarding democratic stability. Ultimately, this study reveals that democratic regimes maintain a fundamental internal dynamic that can be identified as key to the survival of these regimes. Moreover, modeling this dynamic provides a policy-friendly framework for constructing and deepening democracy in a given political system.

In his chapter, Taehyung Ahn explores how the relations between the executive and the legislative branches and, more specifically, different government types—unified government and divided government—have affected US policy toward North Korea during the Clinton and Bush administrations (1993–2008). His qualitative case study method reveals the existing gap between traditional approaches toward understanding inter-branch foreign policy formulation and the intermestic sphere of two-level games through a crucial case study employed in a historical context. Using the North Korean case, the findings challenge earlier studies on the role of Congress in US foreign policy that claim presidential power has significantly eclipsed Congressional authority. While there are too few data points to statistically test hypotheses on US non-proliferation policy and "rogue" states, such studies yield crucial insight and information that is critical to understanding an important aspect of US foreign and national security policies.

Angela Kachuyevski's chapter notes that, while large statistical studies are able to identify the variables that are at play in the evaluation of the impact of third parties on conflict dynamics, they do less well in exploring how and explaining why they are influential. Her chapter seeks to illustrate how "focused, structured comparison" can, through in-depth case studies, identify areas of current policy frameworks that require refinement and additional study. A comparison of conflict prevention efforts in Estonia, Ukraine, and Moldova, three cases very similar in characteristics but very different in outcome, makes a persuasive case that existing frameworks are essentially one-dimensional and state-centric; they focus almost entirely on the intervening party and the target state. They do not adequately consider or account for the actions of sub-state actors such as minority groups, despite the fact that the minority is clearly a stakeholder. These findings allow for a re-conceptualization of conflict-prevention policies and a shift toward a focus on what Kachuyevski terms "multidimensional prevention."

Amy Widestrom employs a mixed methods approach, combining both quantitative and qualitative methods, to examine the political and civic consequences of economic segregation, a spatial and residential symptom of rising levels of economic inequality. Unlike most investigations of civic and political behavior in American politics, she uses a wide variety of data and primary source material in a comparative case study to see how economic segregation affects civic life in America, including a dataset containing socio-economic, demographic, and segregation indicators from 1970 to 2000 for every census tract in the United States, archived city records,

newspaper articles, local voter turnout records from eight neighborhoods across four case study cities, and interviews from civic and political leaders from each case study neighborhood and city. Her core findings are that economic segregation, on the rise since 1970, has contributed to low levels of voter participation in segregated low-income neighborhoods and that voter participation in segregated affluent neighborhoods has remained high or has increased in recent decades. An important source of these trends is that the presence and capabilities of mobilizing institutions—voluntary associations, churches, and political campaigns—in highly segregated impoverished neighborhoods have declined, while mobilizing institutions in prosperous neighborhoods have remained active. In other words, while scholars have typically conceived of voting as an individual act, Widestrom argues that we live in civic environments—defined by the residential spaces we occupy—that shape us as citizens, and that we are civically activated or deactivated by the institutions in and civic life of our communities.

Mita Saksena seeks to demonstrate how content analysis of newspaper reports can be an accessible, objective, and powerful research method to systematically study policy debates on transnational issues over an extended time period. The United States has been increasingly concerned with the transnational threat posed by infectious diseases. Effective policy implementation to contain the spread of these diseases requires active engagement and support of the American public. The mass media is the primary arena in which these issues come to the attention of the public, interest groups, and policy makers. She engages in content analysis of news reports about transnational infectious diseases such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), avian flu, and HIV/AIDS, published in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* between 1999 and 2007. Her findings highlighted an evolving debate and framed infectious diseases as security threats, human rights disasters, economic risks, and medical dangers. The results of this study can be a useful guide for future policy makers and health professionals as they grapple with new, emerging infectious diseases.

Lisa Samuel's chapter takes as its point of departure that World Trade Organization negotiations involve asymmetrical parties. This has led to issues of justice and power being raised at various stages of the negotiations. Yet, the voices of the small, developing, less powerful states in this context remain severely understudied. Samuel demonstrates that feminist-informed multi-sited ethnography allows for the uncovering and analysis of the viewpoints of elites from these marginalized states responsible for framing trade negotiation strategy and policy. This methodological approach elucidates the metaphor around which such policies and

strategies are formulated: that of "justice" as involving global economic governance processes that allow for the development of state capacities for autonomous decision-making, and which involve inclusive democratic processes that acknowledge differences between states and the significance of such differences in the context of international trade. This reformulation of justice allows for more effective policy responses and yields guidance for policy makers and researchers as to how to reference and implement this particular conceptualization of justice to improve the effectiveness of international trade negotiations and their outcomes.

Monalisa Gangopadhyay's chapter on Hindu urban media women studies marginalized and excluded women within the globalizing Indian nation-state. Recognizing that feminist methodology embraces women as "products" of diverse experiences, and of contextual differences, she acknowledges such differences so as to destabilize the category of "woman"—specifically, the Indian urban media woman as she experiences the clash between the *Hindutva* brand of religious nationalism and globalization. Her research utilizes three separate perspectives, or "gazes": the gaze of the researched, the gaze of the researcher, and finally, the gaze of gendered state/economy to examine the oppositional impact of these two strong ideologies on the women as they navigate through domestic, professional, and public spaces. Using non-hierarchical feminist methods to break down multiple power relations between the three gazes, the research generates knowledge that empowers the researched, while clearly acknowledging the influence of the researcher and gendered powerbrokers. The chapter also brings to the fore the voices of these women—who are often silenced by the agents of the state and the economy—as they express the urgent need for their lived experiences to inform policy making and law. Such application in the policy and legal arena would address the absence of protection for those women who variously experience entrenched masculinized ideologies of *Hindutva* and globalization within the Indian state.

Serena Cruz's chapter presents ethnographic research that seeks to understand commercial sex workers' experiences with clients and high-risk sex, and conducts and transcribes in-depth and semi-structured interviews. Her explicit commitment is to make visible these marginalized sex workers and their experiences with gender-based violence (GBV) and its linkages to HIV risk. Uganda maintains a punitive policy toward prostitution. Commercial sex work is criminalized, and the country's HIV prevention efforts primarily target the general public through an "ABC" approach (i.e. abstain, be faithful, or use a condom as the last resort). Uganda's approach

for combating HIV has garnered international attention and consistent international funding. Yet, next to this praise and support is the presence of an ongoing HIV crisis among Kampala's commercial sex workers. In seeking to understand how women practicing sex work in Kampala City manage their HIV risk, a grounded approach in conjunction with findings and analysis of the complexities of HIV risk management among commercial sex workers, juxtaposed against national, as well as international, donor approaches to combating HIV offers a clearer understanding of the strengths or weaknesses of HIV risk interventions for sub populations in an African setting.

These chapters offer three main contributions. First, we illustrate that qualitative methods offer valuable insights into the situational contexts being studied, and that they often produce findings that would not have emerged using different methods. Second, we illustrate how research can be conducted in a manner that offers rich context to better and more directly inform policy making. Finally, we do so in an applied manner designed to illustrate and clarify the methodological principles in practice, contributing to greater understanding among students and scholars alike.

NOTES

1. Given the scope of this work, while we make this acknowledgment we do not engage with this debate.
2. We use the term "politics of knowledge" to refer not simply to the so-called quantitative/qualitative divide, but also to the politics associated with the use by researchers of one approach versus the other, and the corresponding effect this may have on their advancing in academe. As Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2006) quite rightly note, for junior faculty who conduct qualitative research, there are problems of publication and tenure and promotion; for all faculty, problems may arise in the form of contentions with departmental colleagues who do not value qualitative research and who are resistant to hiring new faculty with qualitative orientations. However, given the parameters of this project, we will not engage with this latter aspect of the politics of knowledge.
3. Indeed, feminists using this approach have been inspired to do so when they seek to get away from existing theoretical accounts of the matter at hand. In so doing, they work within a broad, non-specific theoretical framework that may include influences from postpositivist, critical, and/or queer theories, among others (Ackerly and True 2010).

References

Ackerly, Brooke A., and Jacqui True. 2010. *Doing Feminist Research in Political and Social Science*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Agar, Michael H. 2010. On the Ethnographic Part of the Mix: A Multi-Genre Tale of the Field. *Organizational Research Methods* 13(2): 286–303.

Avey, Paul, and Michael C. Desch. 2014. What Do Policymakers Want from Us? Results of a Survey of Current and Former Senior National Security Decision Makers. *International Studies Quarterly* 58(2): 227–246.

Babbitt, Eileen, and Fen Osler Hampson. 2011. Conflict Resolution as a Field of Inquiry: Practice Informing Theory. *International Studies Review* 13(1): 46–57.

Bennett, Andrew, and G. John Ikenberry. 2006. The *Review*'s Evolving Relevance for U.S. Foreign Policy, 1906–2006. *American Political Science Review* 100(4): 651–658.

Bevir, Mark, and R.A.W. Rhodes. 2006. *Governance Stories*. New York: Routledge.

Dessler, David. 2003. The Positivist-Interpretivist Controversy. *Qualitative Methods* 1(2): 21–24.

Elman, Colin, and Diana Kapiszewski. 2014. Data Access and Research Transparency in the Qualitative Tradition. *PS: Political Science & Politics* 47(1): 43–47.

Gallucci, Robert. 2012. How Scholars Can Improve International Relations. *The Chronicle of Higher Education* 59(14): A60.

George, Alexander L. 1993. *Bridging the Gap: Theory and Practice in Foreign Policy*. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Gerring, John. 2003. Interpretations of Interpretivism. *Qualitative Methods* 1(2): 2–5.

Henn, Matt, Mark Weinstein, and Nick Foard. 2009. *A Critical Introduction to Social Research*. London: Sage Publications.

Hesse-Biber, Sharlene, and Patricia Leavy. 2011. *The Practice of Qualitative Research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Jentleson, Bruce W., and Ely Ratner. 2011. Bridging the Beltway-Ivory Tower Gap. *International Studies Review* 13(1): 6–11.

Kelman, Herbert. 2003. The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution. *International Studies Perspectives* 1(3): 273–287.

King, Gary, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Laitin, David D. 2003. Interpretation. *Qualitative Methods* 1(2): 6–9.

McLaughlin Mitchell, Sara, Paul F. Diehl, and D. James, Hrsg. 2012. *Guide to the Scientific Study of International Processes*. West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

Nye, Joseph. 2008. Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Policy. *Political Psychology* 29(4): 593–603.

Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine, and Dvora Yanow. 2002. 'Reading' 'Methods' 'Texts': How Research Methods Texts Construct Political Science. *Political Research Quarterly* 55: 457–486.

Walt, Stephen M. 2005. The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science* 8(1): 23–48.

Yanow, Dvora. 2003. Interpretive Empirical Political Science: What Makes This Not a Subfield of Qualitative Methods. *Qualitative Methods* 1(2): 9–13.

Yanow, Dvora, and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, Hrsg. 2006. *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Yanow, Dvora, and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, Hrsg. 2014. *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*. Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.

Case-Driven Theory-Building in Comparative Democratization: The Heuristics of Venezuela's "Democratic Purgatory"

Christopher M. Brown

The purpose of this chapter is to outline the logic and utility for engaging in heuristic case study research in the discipline of comparative politics, with a particular emphasis on democratic theory as well as democratization as the set of policy objectives. The broad research question addressed in *Democratic Purgatory: The Failure of Democracy in Venezuela* (Brown 2009) was, "Under what conditions might democracies fail through democratic means?" The question illuminated cases of democratic breakdown in advanced democracies that were replaced through democratic mechanisms. In short, the larger agenda sought to address how democratic systems could be overthrown through constitutional processes. The basis for the present chapter establishes the research design necessary for satisfying this inquiry with the more modest question addressed herein being how can heuristic case studies be used to inform research in comparative democratization.

DEMOCRATIC PURGATORY

The primary purpose of this research is to explain those factors that have led to the breakdown of democratic political systems, in order to identify a pattern of democratic collapse that can act as a "model" of democratic

C. M. Brown (✉)
Georgia Southern University, Statesboro, GA, USA

15

failure. This work continues the tradition of looking beyond the categorization of regime types as being either democratic or non-democratic. In doing so, it allows for a deeper classification of democratic regime types that focuses on the quality of democratic political regimes. The institutional design of a political system is critical to establishing the rules by which political representation operates for a democratic regime to function effectively. This study can help to provide an explanation for the decline of democratic quality in a real-world context. To these ends, Venezuela has been selected as an illustrative case study.

This is not a novel endeavor: the study of democratic breakdowns is one that has gained considerable attention in the discipline of the political sciences. As such, initial efforts to explain the breakdown of democracy reside in the comfortable milieu of political science. However, existing explanations provided by the literature on democratic breakdowns assume that democracies fail through the efforts of non-democratic forces that are capable of overthrowing the people's representatives by force of arms. In short, democratic breakdown is an act of violence that is committed by a non-democratic opposition that is able to put itself into power at the cost of the existing democracy. This research addresses the breakdown of consolidated democratic systems through a heuristic study of an existing case of a constitutional overthrow. The scope of this investigation is to study a consolidated democratic political system that has undergone a democratic breakdown through "democratic means." The implications of the present research on democratic purgatory have real-world application for those political systems that are currently transitioning and/or consolidating their democracies as well. The key lesson for democratization is the need for the promotion of regime adaptability, and not simply regime stability.

Deploying the Heuristic Case Study

Case studies are essential tools for developing theoretical explanations for understanding real-world phenomena. In their most common application, case studies are often employed as elements for theoretical proof (or disproof). Often simply used as anecdotal support, case studies reveal an important descriptive role; however, when deployed as the basis for a systematic methodological approach, they can serve as solid foundations for making analytical claims that can claim external validity.

Eckstein (1992) defines a case study as "the study of individuals" wherein the individual (or "case") can only be dispelled by looking not at

concrete entities but at the relationships that exist between the individual and the wider population (Eckstein 1992, 123–124). In other words, cases explain not the "concrete entity" or the item that is observed (i.e., properly labeled the "observation") per se but the "measure made of them." Cases are fundamentally about relationships or *how* those individuals (be they cases or observations) are used or studied (Eckstein 1992, 123–124). International relations provides fertile ground for comparative case studies, and yet the discipline seems to struggle with traditional incomprehensibilities between knowledge claims from those who value the general versus the specific. Some of this confusion rests on the use of the term "case" in social science.

Cases are not monolithic. Because what is normally thought of as the study of a particular case involves the collection and organization of a vast amount of information in the form of variables, units of analysis, and data points (often informally thought of as observations), it becomes necessary to recognize that a case study despite being comprised of a single individual, within the case itself there are a lot of composite parts (King et al. 1994, 52). Consequently, there is a good deal of confusion as to what separates the case from the any of its observations. Whereas Eckstein claims a case "technically as a phenomenon for which we report and interpret only a single measure on any pertinent variable" (Eckstein 1992, 124), social scientists "have continued to use the word 'case' to refer to a full case study … and reserve the word 'observation' to refer to *measures* of one or more variables on exactly one unit" (King et al. 1994, 52–53). Interpreted broadly, Hammersley and Gomm (2000, 2) contend that "all research is case study: There is always some unit, or set of units, in relations to which data are collected and/or analyzed." This is one of the more pressing concerns in social science research and generates general suspicion regarding confidence in case-based research. Nevertheless, the concept of case-based research is central to the logic of analysis (Ragin 1992a, b, 1).

Ragin (1992a, b, 3) claims that "a case may be theoretical or empirical or both; it may be a relatively bounded object or a process and it may be generic and universal or specific in some way. [As such, simply asking] 'what is a case?' questions many different aspects of empirical social science." Gerring (2001, 35) argues that work in the social sciences in particular is about concept formation and that "work on a subject necessarily involves *re*conceptualization of that subject." He echoes Alvesson and

Sköldberg's (2000, 25) concern that scholars should be aware that they "make lexical and semantic choices as they write and thus participate, wittingly or unwittingly, in an on-going interpretative battle. This is so because language is the tool kit with which we conduct our work." Despite its resistance to obvious designation, it is in this way that the case study exists as its own method. Case study research should be thought of as "an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding a larger class of (similar) units" (Gerring 2004, 342). In this way, case study methodology not only is descriptive but also allows for some degree of expected representativeness to phenomena in the larger world (i.e., external validity).

Generalizability

Cases should have *within-case* value (i.e., conclusions gained from the study itself have validity in the context in which the study was done). However, can findings from case studies lead to generalizable hypotheses that are valid when taken outside of the context in which they were discovered? Empirical generalization "involves drawing inferences about features of a larger but finite population of cases from the study of a sample drawn from that population" (Gomm et al. 2000, 103). If relevant characteristics of the case can be identified and then compared to similar characteristics in a more general population, then generalizations derived from case studies can gain a greater degree of confidence in establishing external validity (Gomm et al. 2000, 105). Comparative democratization, by definition, seeks to understand the relationships between the processes of building and promoting democratic regimes. What better way to understand those relationships than by studying them in context and identifying relevant elements that might lend themselves to comparison? What do scholars of comparative democratization know that other sub-fields ignore about the utility of case generalizability?

In practice, the question of generalizability is usually one of *degree*. Some scholars undertake case studies to "draw … conclusions about some general type of phenomenon or about members of a wider population of cases" and others find that case studies need only to have intrinsic value and need not provide a basis for supra-context generalization (Hammersley and Gomm 2000, 5). Robert E. Stake (1978) presents a complementary compromise between these two positions in what he calls "naturalistic generalization." Stake maintains that case studies are a preferred method

of knowledge acquisition "because they may be epistemologically in har-mony with the reader's experience and thus to that person a natural basis for generalization" (Stake 2000, 19). Despite being particular in content, case studies establish the basic elements that lend themselves to facilitating a wider social understanding: "naturalistic generalization [is] arrived at by recognizing the similarities of objects and issues in and out of context and by sensing the natural covariations of happenings. To generalize this way is to be both intuitive and empirical" (Stake 2000, 22). Since all cases are situated within wider social contexts that "constitute a panoply of *ceteris paribus* conditions which the analyst will need to allow for in some way" (Mitchell 2000, 170). It is for this reason that Mitchell (2000) suggests thinking of case study research as a "detailed examination of an event (or series of related events) which *the analyst believes* exhibits (or exhibit) the operation of some identified general theoretical principle" (Mitchell 2000, 170). This means that all case study work is "essentially *heuristic* [because,] it reflects in the events portrayed, features which may be construed as a manifestation of some general, abstract theoretical principle" (Mitchell 2000, 170, *italics* added).

So, how are cases employed to build theory? Following Eckstein's work, there are five types of case studies, and each one depends on its rela-tion to theory. They are the configurative-idiographic study, the disciplined-configurative study, the heuristic case study, the plausibility probe, and the crucial-case study. In this order, there is a sliding scale of generalizability. On one end, the initial objective places the priority on the intrinsic authenticity of the self-contained case itself (configurative). The other end begins with the goal of the case as indicative of theory (crucial case). While each of these categories should be thought of in terms of "ideal types," the illustrative point is that case and theory are not in oppo-sition to one another, but can be represented by different methods based on the objective of the researcher. In other words, the significance afforded to a case can be found in the intentions of the researcher who crafts the research design. Each of the types of cases has, at their core, particular research agenda that is unique.

Types of Case Study Methods

The configurative-idiographic study is "configurative" because an attempt is made to demonstrate a near-total picture of the case itself. It is consid-ered "idiographic" either because the case presentation was done in such

a way as to "allow facts to speak for themselves or bring out their significance by largely intuitive interpretation" (Eckstein 1992, 143–144). Kaarbo and Beasley (1999) insist that the idiographic label attached to this category reflects the emphasis of *case over theory*: "the use of the term idiographic (as contrasted with *nomothetic*)[1] quite directly indicates that the case will not be generalizable or that the case study will not seek to establish general rules of behavior" (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999, 372). Deploying cases in this manner allows for the greatest possibility of authenticity and the least amount of generalizability. It is by design that the researcher's objective is to understand the case itself and not an attempt at broader generalization. This case study method is expressly not theory-driven; theory does not provide the context for the investigation, nor is the case study intended to generate theoretical propositions (Lijphart 1971, 691–692).

The next type—one that is still primarily case-focused, but that does give theory a larger role—is the disciplined-configurative case study. However, theory does not take an *active* part in the disciplined-configurative case study. It acts as a sort of mirror to which the case may be held so that the researcher might best see it. Theory is mainly used as "the bases for case interpretation … such interpretations can be sound only to the extent that their bases are in fact valid as general laws" (Eckstein 1992, 139). The case is analyzed through the use of general variables that are part of available hypotheses to explain some outcome (George and Bennett 2005, 51). The disciplined-configurative study begins with the goal of examining a case as a bounded system where theory plays a role within that system. These cases are thought to be "interpretive" case studies in Lijphart's classification (Lijphart 1971, 691–692). The cases are selected primarily for the value of the case itself (hence little generalization is anticipated), but their use of theory provides for a greater connectedness to the wider social world.

An intermediate type that is highlighted by Lijphart consists of those types of case studies that begin with a notion of proving or disproving existing generalizations. These are the "theory-confirming" and the "theory-infirming" case study methods. Their goal is to strengthen or weaken the existing theoretical claims, and not to generate new claims.[2] Deviant cases may also fit into this type. Deviant cases are those in which it is demonstrated that whatever phenomenon is discovered deviates significantly from the existing generalization that is expected to explain that phenomenon. Lijphart gives greater theoretical value to deviant cases

because "they weaken the original proposition, but suggest a modified proposition that may be stronger" (Lijphart 1971, 692). I would argue that deviant cases have essentially two types of case study research—the first task of the case study consists of identifying and/or explaining the deviation from the standard expectations. A second case study interpretation is then required to offer a new modified proposition. So, essentially, a deviant case consists of a "theory-infirming" method, followed by a "hypothesis-generating" method (see below). Lijphart appears amenable to this duality since he concedes, "The validity of the proposition in its modified form [as suggested by the deviation] must be established by further comparative analysis" (Lijphart 1971, 692). The critical point is that the value of the case in relation to theory rests upon the objective of the researcher. With deviant cases, multiple intentions signify multiple methods.

The keystone of the case-theory typology is the heuristic case study. Heuristic case studies are both case-focused and theory-minded. Eckstein tells us that where "disciplined-configurative study assumes that 'general laws' are available," it stops well short of making any attempt at theory-building (Eckstein 1992, 143). This is what separates it from those that are more overtly case-centric. The goal of the researcher is to utilize the case as a means to identify themes or concepts that may be helpful outside of the case itself. While in-case hypotheses are possible in the specifically case-centric types, heuristic case studies make it an explicit research plan to tease out mechanisms that exist in a particular case study that might survive in other situations. Eckstein declares that the heuristic case study "means 'serving to find out'" (Eckstein 1992, 143).

The fourth type of case study in Eckstein's typology is the plausibility probe. Plausibility probes work in a similar manner to the "disciplined-configurative" case, but theory and case switch places with each other in the primary focus of study. Instead of interpreting the case through a particular theory, plausibility probes serve to measure whether a case will work within a particular theoretical construct. In the case of a plausibility probe, a smaller "test case" is employed to see whether the theory is, in fact, capable of holding up under the conditions of the smaller and/or less costly test prior to embarking on a much larger research plan. The plausibility probe may consist of minimal attempts to "establish that a theoretical construct is worth considering at all" or it may take the form of modestly complex comparative studies (Eckstein 1992, 148–149). The

plausibility probe employs the case as a "test case" of sorts, with the main objective centering on a testing of the theory, not so much of the case.

The final category is the "crucial" case study. Crucial cases are ones that fit the theory being tested and cannot be explained by any other theory, that is, the case "must-fit" the theory (Eckstein 1992, 158). King et al. (1994) provide a succinct rejection of the possibility of the crucial-case study and any claim to a one-to-one causation assigned to it. They correctly observe, "[V]ery few explanations depend upon only one causal variable; to evaluate the impact of more than one explanatory variable, the investigation needs more than one implication observed" (King et al. 1994, 210). Since chance exists in all endeavors, even if the most cogent argument of causation could be established, there is no guaranteeing that the soundest argument is true.

Heuristic Case-Driven Theory-Building

Cases are selected based upon the objective of the researcher, and similarly, the method chosen by the researcher rests firmly on their goals. In short, generalizability (external validity) begins with the intended aspiration of the researcher. The heuristic case should be utilized for case-based research that intends to lend that case for the construction of case-derived explanations with broader application, wherein "the analyst examines a specific set of concepts in order to develop generalizable theory from particular instances" (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999, 374–375). The heuristic case study requires fewer specifics than those cases that are more case-specific since the goal is really to discover a phenomenon that can ultimately be found that supersedes the case itself (Kaarbo and Beasley 1999, 375). The heuristic case study is "an opportunity to learn more about the complexity of the problem studied, to develop further the existing explanatory framework, and to refine and elaborate the initially available theory employed by the investigator in order to provide an explanation of the particular case examined" (George and Bennett 2005, 51–52). However, its primary value lies in its ability to be "used as a means of stimulating the imagination in order to discern important new general problems, identify possible theoretical solutions, and formulate potentially generalizable relations that were not previously apparent" (George and Bennett 2005, 51).

The important point regarding whether the case is considered a heuristic is the degree to which the case hinges on being "instructive for theory, and subject to rigorous inquiry, [and] can be identified" (Eckstein 1992, 146).

Although most scholars recognize the importance of historical lessons, George (1979) observes that people do disagree over not only what those lessons are but also to what extent they might be applied to any present or future situation (George and Bennett 2005, 43). So as to give history a more "universal" meaning, George contends that lessons of social reality must be stated "in a systematic and differentiated way from a broader range of experience … in other words … into a comprehensive theory that encompasses the complexity of the phenomenon or activity in question" (George and Bennett 2005, 43). It is possible for historical case studies to offer up lessons primarily through the development of "scientific generalizations and general laws of at least a probabilistic character" (George and Bennett 2005, 45). To overcome the critique that cases are by nature too particular, thus eluding generalization, George claims that cases can and should be compared based not on their contextual particularities, but by formulating "the idiosyncratic aspects of the explanation for each case in terms of general variables" (George and Bennett 2005, 46). These general variables would be embedded in a "theoretical framework of independent, intervening and dependent variables" (George and Bennett 2005, 47). In this way, the cases could be made comparable through the construction of like criteria that exist beyond any particular context.

The significance of this type of research strategy is that the researcher must be reflexive—just as that reality is changing, so is the researcher's perspective on that reality. Research is not a "one-and-done" operation, but an ongoing engagement with an elusive truth. In each of the above options, new data force the researcher to reflect upon his/her background knowledge in a way that forces a corresponding action within their own research. Put more simply, the expert still has much to learn, and each new piece of data offers the researcher another opportunity to learn something that may or may not be useful in helping to explain social reality. Knowledge or the illusive pursuit of truth in this regard is like a feedback loop, albeit limited by the attention and interest of each researcher.

Eckstein advocates for several justifications for the use of heuristic case studies. Initially, he establishes that "theories do not come from a vacuum, or fully and directly from data … they come from the theorist's imagination, logical ability and ability to discern general problems and patterns in particular observations" (Eckstein 1992, 144–145). The imagination does not derive theories from the air, but it is given impetus and support from data and other types of knowledge (Eckstein 1992, 144–145). He says, "[t]he track record of case studies as stimulants of the

theoretical imagination is good" (Eckstein 1992, 145). And lastly, because case studies achieve a greater degree of intimacy with the subject and have few restrictions on variable testing, relations that are discovered have a higher probability of being critical and a lower possibility of superficiality (Eckstein 1992, 144–145). This is precisely why Lijphart referred to them as "hypothesis-generating" case studies.

The heuristic lends itself to generalization beyond the original case specifically because "the subject supplies a background model by analogy." The "feedback loop" of "hypothesis-new data-decision regarding old hypothesis-options-new hypothesis" yields information that helps to construct background knowledge that becomes the (provisionally) known. The known case and the unknown case may share some similarities that warrant further investigation. This is what Diesing refers to as the "representative heuristic" (Diesing 1991). These working hypotheses can be tested through the inclusion of new data introduced from the new case, with the same feedback process at work. In addition, with noted similarities will come differences; an application of the hypothesis into new areas can serve to strengthen the claims, produce variants, or make it irrelevant. Even if the hypothesis fails to be replicated in the new scenario, it still produces knowledge.

A Case Study in Democratic Decline

The heuristic case study method approaches the case as both having a within-case cohesion and providing for comparison beyond the individual case under study. So, a detailed case study is undertaken with an eye toward understanding causation within the particular case. Through an investigation of what is gleaned from a deep understanding of the case, particular elements can be drawn out as the basis for comparative engagement. Each case, when employed through a heuristic, will yield questions that lend toward externality. In the case of the heuristics of Venezuela's democratic decline, three primary questions emerged that lent themselves to greater generalizability. First, how does the institutional design of democratic regimes affect political stability? The contextual material of the actual case itself demonstrates that the elements in society that act as direct participants in the establishment of a democratic political system are able to maintain their position in the new order largely through an expansion of their ability to meet popular demands through corporatist

arrangements. To the extent that these powerful groups can continue to deliver on political demands, their positions remain relatively stable. While this institutional structure of democratic governance is less than fully representative, the effectiveness of employing corporatist arrangements to meet demands obscures the underlying crisis of legitimacy within the structure. The effectiveness of the regime may lead to the consolidation of a democratic political system that is fundamentally "non-democratic" in character. While corporatist groups may serve to facilitate social mobilization during the establishment of democratic regimes, they do so only insofar as they can maintain social control of in-group membership without fully providing for representative democracy. Once institutionalized, corporatist arrangements provide for a type of unstable "democratic purgatory": democracy is not fully representative, yet it is not completely unresponsive to the demands of the electorate. Human knowledge begins with a sense of wonder; researching the case offers an answer to those inquiries. And yet, each question provides answers which lend themselves to additional questions.

Discovery of this phenomenon in the Venezuelan case leads the researcher to the second question: what are the conditions that facilitate this "democratic purgatory," and how is this form of "non-democratic" democracy consolidated? Once the salient features of the Venezuelan case have been identified, it will then be possible to apply the lessons from Venezuela to a broader set of democratic states in the spirit of a "controlled comparison" to make the shift to comparative case studies of other states with similar structural constraints on democracy (George 1979, 49–52). It is important to note that while political stability acts as the dependent variable for this study, the social stressors that have affected political stability provide the basis upon which a controlled comparison can be made. One is able to draw conclusions based upon the Venezuelan case that leads to the generation of hypotheses that beg broader testing: provided that regime effectiveness is maintained and the conditions for democratic purgatory persist, the stability of these regimes allows for "democratic consolidation," despite the undemocratic basis of legitimacy. Democratic purgatory produces a paradox whereby democracy can be undemocratic under certain conditions. Furthermore, these undemocratic democracies can undergo democratic consolidation as a result of their stability due to regime effectiveness. However, this condition is not stable: either these regimes must establish an endogenous basis of political legitimacy (one that is not simply a function of regime effectiveness) or the

democracy will suffer a qualitative decline that may result in a democratic breakdown. Drawing upon the within-case understanding, a unique phenomenon is unearthed. This phenomenon is contextualized, then theorized. The next step is to test our case-derived hypothesis by examining its validity beyond the original case.

Returning to the main research question requires the researcher to outline some criteria that can be measured that lend themselves to comparison. Our third question asks what lessons can be drawn from our case to help us understand the case in a broader social context. Venezuela's democratic decline is indeed instructive. So, under what conditions might democracies fail through democratic means? In states with strong support for democracy, the legitimacy of the political system rests on its effectiveness to meet the demands of its electorate as well as a function of the political society's value consensus and the expectations placed upon a given political regime. Lacking the ability to respond to the demands of the electorate, political instability arises as a consequent loss of legitimacy. It is in this context that alternatives to the political structure arise. It is only when the demands of the electorate cannot be met (loss of effectiveness) that the corporatist structure reveals its non-democratic character (loss of legitimacy). The heuristic case study method was designed to identify hypotheses based upon the specifics of the case, and as a result, Venezuela provides illustrative and real-world evidence of the social phenomena by design. The heuristic case study begins like other case studies that seek to describe the historical trajectory of the political system as it has evolved over time. Internal validity supported by thick case description and analysis allows for greater confidence in the results of our study. Instead of seeing cases as unique only to themselves, the heuristic grants each case its local significance, but goes beyond the specifics to draw out more pivotal elements upon which the configurative elements have hinged. By identifying these structural components of the Venezuelan case, they can provide a benchmark for examining cases that may appear to have similar structural markers.

Research begins with a question that begs to be answered. Understanding Venezuela's democratic decline began with a deep case study, examining the trajectory of the political system as it has evolved over the entire course of the country's existence, including the colonial and possibly pre-colonial socio-cultural context. Since people construct their identities through their socialization and co-constitution with their environment, understanding the social forces that serve as a basis for

understanding the parameters for political identity is critical. It may not be necessary in every case to address all potential elements for identity creation; however, only by conducting a broad case study investigation does it become apparent which socio-cultural forces have meaningfully conditioned the contemporary context. History matters for many people, and so it is important to know what role it plays in forming political allegiances, values, and aspirations.

Once the case study is complete and a socio-political history has been outlined, it should be possible to glean certain key factors that have served as the basis for understanding the research question under investigation. In Venezuela, the functional arrangements made to establish modern socio-political systems have also served to institutionalize the particular interests present at its foundation. In lieu of democracy as an instrument of the people through representative interests, existing democracy has institutionalized particular interests (often in the form of political parties) as the dominant structure governing the will of the citizenry. As a result of the political system being co-opted through the dominance of political parties whose interests were institutionalized as the basis for the creation of the democratic structure, alternative perspectives for policy positions have been subverted. In the Venezuelan example, the establishment of democracy by political and military elites has created a democratic system whereby full political participation is discouraged by the unwillingness of those in power to accept or incorporate new political actors.

Once the underlying structural conditions were discovered and analyzed, the larger theoretical underpinnings of democratic decline could be outlined and labeled. The structural relationships gleaned from the Venezuelan case have revealed a phenomenon that shows that the type of consolidation that a regime undergoes is often directly linked to those forces that serve to provide the basis for democracy during the period of transition. As a result of the legitimacy and effectiveness afforded to democratic regimes, it is possible that consolidated democracy can exhibit a paradox now known as "democratic purgatory." Democratic purgatory arises as a consequence of consolidation whereby the conditions upon which the regime rests remain inflexible to change. In pursuing stability over flexibility, democratic consolidation tends to suffer a system-wide loss of representation over time. It is a direct consequence of the lack of adaptability in democratic purgatorial regimes that provides the conditions under which democracy can break down through democratic means.

Once the structural element surrounding single case study research is outlined, the methodological focus shifts from a question of reliability (the prize characteristic of the configurative case study) to one of *utility*. The next step toward expanding the utility of democratic purgatory as a concept can be found through a type of comparative methodology. Employing Eckstein's "building block" technique offers an even greater degree of confidence in the hypotheses gleaned from a limited number of cases (Eckstein 1992, 143–144). George (1979) argues that the "building block" approach of performing a series of heuristic case studies or a comparison of two or more is an excellent means to develop theory because it allows the researcher to move beyond a single case and to analyze cases using the method of "controlled comparison" (Eckstein 1992, 143–144). As a means to establish a higher degree of confidence in one's theoretical propositions, multiple cases can be considered and the theory could be built *seriatim*:

> One studies a case in order to arrive at a preliminary theoretical construct. That construct, based on a single case, is unlikely to constitute more than a slim clue to a valid general model. One therefore confronts it with another case that may suggest ways of amending and improving the construct to achieve better case interpretation; and this process is continued until the construct seems sufficiently refined to require no further major amendment or at least to warrant testing by large-scale comparative study. Each step beyond the first can be considered a kind of disciplined-configurative study. (Eckstein 1992, 144)

In an attempt to understand under which conditions democracies might fail through democratic means, the larger work has successfully drawn out the concept of democratic purgatory from the experience of Venezuela's political history. The widest avenue for future research entails investigations of other political regimes that appear to have similarly brittle and inertly stable democratic regimes. The other regimes may not have gone as far as Venezuela in dismantling their democracy, but the social forces embedded in these systems will not be able to bend too far without breakdown. With the inclusion of more cases, democratic purgatory can be better understood.

Findings

Democratic failures, even "breakdowns," are easy to distinguish when they occur at the hands of non-democratic forces that are all too willing to reject legal means to acquiring power. This is particularly true given that we can recognize their occurrence on account of their violent and stark contrast from what once was. What seems more unlikely is that forces that reject an existing regime as illegitimate would participate in the constitutional acquisition of power provided by the regime that they openly decry as being illegitimate. In essence, this is exactly what occurred in Venezuela. Democracy was overthrown through democratic means. The heuristic case study facilitates a deeper case-level investigation, lending itself to internal validity of an idiographic nature; however, outlining the case alone is insufficient for the comparativist. The case study is deployed for the purposes of identifying critical elements that may lend themselves to comparative study. It is critical to know your case before confidently discussing it in terms of lessons that can be illuminating for other similar cases. The similarities between cases are identified by the heuristic approach.

The stability of a given political regime is contingent upon the degree of legitimacy that is afforded by those who are in control of that particular political regime. Intrinsically, political regimes remain stable because of the degree of legitimacy that the stakeholders of that regime afford to them. In the course of normal democratic politics, citizens will participate in elections to promote a candidate who will best represent their interests and policy preferences. Political parties and other political entities provide the usual conduit through which citizen interest is aggregated and translated into policy preference. By way of their participation in the political regime, these groups work together to reinforce a dual-sense of legitimacy for the regime. The regime is given legitimacy by interest groups and political parties that participate in the politics of the regime. Thus, it is the regime's participants that give legitimacy to the regime, which in turn bestows legitimacy on those groups to participate in that regime. Participation rests upon to the degree in which those groups find the regime to be legitimate. The same is true for the membership of those groups; citizens participate as group members with the expectation that doing so will offer some sort of reward (or at least provide escape from sanctions that might arise from non-membership).

In the course of increased democratization, the demands of the electorate, translated through representative political organizations, will be met so as to ensure continued participation in the political regime. This demonstrates the utility of effectiveness in the stability of a particular regime. It is important, however, to recognize that electoral demands are far from static. As a political system develops over time, the political regime must be responsive to shifting demands. Democratic viability rests upon both legitimacy and/or effectiveness; what is critical is not stability per se, but adaptability. In modern democracies, popular sovereignty is expressed through the structure of representation that exists in a given political regime. Therefore, the viability of a democratic political regime rests upon the adaptability of the regime's structure of representation.

Venezuela provides an ideal heuristic case for what happens when the democratic consolidation is heavily conditioned by a structure of representation that is rendered inflexible during the transition. Democratic purgatory regimes are consolidated democracies that have, as their core constituency, a set of corporatist elements that facilitate consolidation, but of a particular type. Venezuelan democracy was inclusive and yet maintained an appropriate structure of representation only for those forces that existed at the transition to democracy. In the course of seeking an answer to this political enigma, it was revealed that despite the operational definitions employed by the literature on democratization, Venezuela's political development yielded what appeared to be a unique phenomenon: the breakdown of democracy through democratic means. To best capture this phenomenon and to fill the gap in the existing literature, this methodological approach found that Venezuela was in the grip of a syndrome labeled "democratic purgatory" by identifying the key elements that provided the past foundation for democratic legitimacy. While it was alluded to the conditions that define democratic purgatory, the conditions that presage democratic breakdown are not unique to Venezuela. Addressing cases via the heuristic case study method serves to establish policy choices over the course of time that serve to undermine the basis for democratic rule and the citizenry's expectations of effective governance. In doing so, heuristic case study methodology is useful in identifying a particular gap in the existing theory through an intimate exposition of the case itself, but it also provided for a model of democratic purgatory that lends itself to comparative study of political regimes that exhibit similar characteristics.

Conclusions

This chapter sought to outline the utility of heuristic case studies as a particular type of case study research. The importance of case studies was revealed through a discussion of their diversity and the suitability for each type based on the perspective of the researcher and his/her own research goals (as articulated in part by their research question and their subjective interests). In seeking to explain the breakdown of a consolidated democracy though constitutional democratic procedures, I employed the Venezuelan breakdown that led to a regime change ushered by Hugo Chavez in 1999, as a heuristic case study by illustrating the structural factors found in Venezuela that helped to explain the breakdown. The conditions for democratic purgatory are not unique to Venezuela, however, and these same structural factors can presage a democratic breakdown wherever they can be found.

Case studies have always suffered the critique of having limited external validity; that is to say that anything learned from a single case is often marked as "case-specific knowledge." Heuristic case study methodology appreciates the depth of the individual case by examining the specific case with due diligence. It does so to gain an understanding of the richness of the single case, but with the expanded goal of redeploying the benefits of case study research toward broader theoretical application. Structural conditions discovered through an in-depth case can be used as guides for rendition when examining other cases that may share similar conditions without sacrificing the vibrancy of the single case. Instead of focusing on differences, heuristic case studies choose to explore and celebrate similarities between or among cases. In the case of Venezuela's political development and democratic breakdown, the heuristic case study has been useful in identifying a particular gap in the existing theory, but it also provides a model of democratic purgatory that allows for a basis for comparison with other political regimes that exhibit similar characteristics.

Notes

1. Lincoln and Guba (1979) state that the terms "nomothetic" (meaning "based on law") and "idiographic" (meaning "based on the particular individual") come to the sciences from the German philosopher Wilhelm Windelband in an attempt to distinguish the natural sciences ("nomothetic") from the social sciences ("idiographic"). The spirit of this binary opposite still operates in the background of people's understanding of what

is meant by the idea of the "sciences" as discussed above. In Yvonna S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba, "The Only Generalization Is: There Is No Generalization," in *Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts*, eds. Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster (London: Sage, 2000), 33.

2. A strong case could be made that any new confirmation (and/or "infirmation") does, in fact, create new claims by advancing knowledge. However, since new claims are not expressly the objective of these case study methods, they should be placed closer to the configurative end than the "crucial" end.

REFERENCES

Alvesson, Mats, and Kaj Sköldberg. 2000. *Reflexive Methodology: New Vistas for Qualitative Research*. London: Sage.

Brown, Christopher M. 2009. *Democratic Purgatory and the Breakdown of Democracy in Venezuela*. PhD diss., Florida International University.

Diesing, Paul. 1991. *How Does Social Science Work? Reflections on Practice*. Pittsburg: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Eckstein, Harry. 1992. *Regarding Politics: Essays on Political Theory, Stability, and Change*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

George, Alexander L. 1979. Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison. In *Diplomacy: New Approaches in History, Theory, and Policy*, ed. Paul Lauren, 43–68. New York: Free Press.

George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Gerring, John. 2001. *Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2004. What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for? *American Political Science Review* 98 (2): 341–354.

Gomm, Roger, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster. 2000. Case Study and Generalization. In *Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts*, ed. Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster, 98–115. London: Sage.

Hammersley, Martyn, and Roger Gomm. 2000. Introduction. In *Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts*, ed. Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster, 1–15. London: Sage.

Kaarbo, Juliet, and Ryan K. Beasley. 1999. A Practical Guide to the Comparative Case Study Method in Political Psychology. *Political Psychology* 20 (June): 369–391.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1971. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. *American Political Science Review* 65 (3): 682–693.

Lincoln, Yvonna S., and Egon G. Guba. 2000. The Only Generalization Is: There Is No Generalization. In *Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts*, ed. Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster, 27–44. London: Sage.

Mitchell, Clyde J. 2000. Case and Situation Analysis. In *Case Study Method: Key Issues, Key Texts*, ed. Roger Gomm, Martyn Hammersley, and Peter Foster, 165–186. London: Sage.

Ragin, Charles C. 1992a. Casing and the Process of Social Inquiry. In *What Is a Case?: Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry*, ed. Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker, 217–226. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 1992b. Introduction: Cases of 'What Is a Case?'. In *What Is a Case?: Exploring the Foundations of Social Inquiry*, ed. Charles C. Ragin and Howard S. Becker, 1–17. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stake, Robert E. 1978. The Case Study Method in Social Inquiry. *Educational Researcher* 7 (2): 5–8. https://doi.org/10.3102/0013189X007002005.

The Return of the Qualitative Case Study: The Impact of the Presidency and Congress on US Policy Toward North Korea

Taehyung Ahn

This chapter examines the case study as an essential research method for political science and international relations, with particular regard to a qualitative case study of foreign policy decision-making. By taking research on US policy toward North Korea as an example, it also presents when and how to use a qualitative case study effectively. In doing so, it aims to become a practical guide—especially for advanced undergraduate students and graduate students—for using case studies for political science and international relations research agendas. To examine the impact of the presidency and Congress on US policy toward North Korea is both opportune and instructive in the sense that due to the failures of US policy to prevent a nuclear North Korea, it has become a serious and imminent security threat to the region, the United States, and the world. Thus, it is imperative to review how relations between the executive and the legislative branches have affected the failures of US foreign policy to prevent a nuclear North Korea.

A quantitative turn in the fields of political science and international relations took place in the early 1970s, which included such methods as

T. Ahn (✉)
Korean Unification Strategies Research Council, Los Angeles, CA, USA

quantitative analyses, statistical methods, and formal methods. Since then, the researches using these methods have dramatically increased, whereas the portion of researches using case studies has precipitously declined. Furthermore, political scientists in particular and social scientists in general have regarded case studies as a relatively weak method compared to quantitative methods or experimentation. According to champions of quantitative methods, strong tests are certainly better than weak tests and large-n methods and experimentation generally produce stronger tests and more accurate predictions (King et al. 1994). As a consequence, it appears that there is a crisis of the case study as a major method in the fields of political science and international relations.

Contrary to mounting concerns—or the fears of some case study researchers—regarding the ascendancy of these quantitative methods, however, such methodological diversity has not weakened, but enriched the fields of political science and international relations. According to Bennett (2004, 19), "research programs advance more effectively through the iterative or collaborative use of different research methods than through the use of any one method alone."[1] Sayer (2000, 19) also pointed out that "ethnographic and quantitative approaches are radically different but each can be appropriate for different and legitimate tasks – the former perhaps for researching, say, a group's norms and customs, the latter for researching world trade flows."

Swimming against the tide, some investigators have persistently embraced methodological pluralism and steadfastly selected methods that allow the strongest tests. They claim that the most successful method has not necessarily been statistical or quantitative, and methods have been subject to research questions. In this manner, despite the decline in case study research, the case study remains one of the most popular research methods in the fields of political science and international relations.[2] According to a recent survey, furthermore, while 60 percent of policy makers responded that contemporary case studies are "very useful," 54 percent of them believe that historical case studies are "very useful." International relations scholars also concurred that these types of research are "very useful" to policy makers (Avey et al. 2012).

This chapter seeks to show how a case study can be a vital research method for key political and international relations issues, especially by presenting a specific case study to analyze and explain the US foreign policy decision-making process toward North Korea during the Clinton and Bush administrations. It, however, does not expect "The Return of the King," which

means that the qualitative case study should once again have the privileged and domineering power as a research method in political science and international relations that it had long had until the advent of diverse research methods such as quantitative methods, statistical methods, formal methods, and experimental methods. No research method is perfect or ideal in and of itself and all different research methods have their own strengths and drawbacks. The qualitative case study is not the exception. It simply argues that in order to improve our knowledge and understanding of political science and international relations, we must make the most of all the accessible research methods. The war between the qualitative method and the quantitative method must end, because they are not incompatible, but complementary to each other. Again, it needs to be emphasized that a research method selection should be subject to research topics and questions.

US Policy to Prevent a Nuclear North Korea

Despite the expansion of the use of quantitative methods in political and international relations, there is no one-size-fits-all method, and as a consequence, a case study can still be an effective method. Consider a study of US foreign policy toward North Korea as an example of successful use of the case study method in international relations. Examining how US policy to prevent a nuclear North Korea has failed is especially vital, if we still believe that the international nuclear non-proliferation regime should be preserved for the peace and security of the world. In this sense, to verify how the relations between the executive and legislative branches and, more specifically, different government types—the unified and divided governments—have affected US policy toward North Korea during the Clinton and Bush administrations (1993–2008) is imperative and informative, and a qualitative case study is the best-matched method to conduct the research on the topic.

The reason that a case study is the fittest method for this kind of study is, in part, that it is practically impossible to employ a large-n analysis, a statistical method, or experimentation to test the hypotheses inferred from the research. However, it is also because US policies toward rogue states or nuclear non-proliferation do not have enough data points (King et al. 1994, 67–69). More importantly, a qualitative case study has its own merits, which cannot be subsumed under a statistical or quantitative method (McKeown 1999; George and Bennett 2005, 19–22). When employed appropriately, a qualitative case study can test hypotheses better than—or at least as good as—any other method and contribute to strengthening or

weakening earlier theories. Finally, different methodological approaches will enrich the fields of political science and international relations with their complementary comparative advantages.

In a study of the role of inter-branch relationship between the presidency and Congress in US policy toward North Korea, two hypotheses are proposed: (1) a divided US government produces more passive policies toward North Korea, while a unified US government produces more active policies; and (2) a unified US government with a democratic president produces more conciliatory policies toward North Korea, whereas a unified US government with a republican president produces more aggressive policies toward North Korea.

To test these two hypotheses, data are gathered from a variety of sources including books, academic journals, newspaper articles, government documents, reports to Congress, and congressional hearings. In particular, Congressional Quarterly (CQ) data such as the *CQ Weekly* and the *CQ Almanac* are meticulously examined and analyzed. The CQ reports speeches and presidential requests, and also calculates the percentage of issues in which the president is largely successful in order to measure presidential success in dealing with Congress.

The findings in this study will extend those of other studies on the role of different US government types in US foreign policy. Typically, these studies argue that divided governments have played pivotal roles and that different government types produce different policy choices and approaches. These studies also argue that partisan politics plays a crucial role. At the same time, the findings of this study challenge those of earlier studies on the role of Congress in US foreign policy, which argue that presidential power has significantly grown over the past century, whereas congressional power has declined considerably. The findings also dispute the notion that Congress is "all talk," and that members of Congress are more interested in paying lip service to their audience than in producing substantial policies. Conclusively, this study will show that, as in US domestic policy, Congress has clearly played a pivotal role in US foreign policy.

My research aims to explore the key domestic factors of US foreign policy toward North Korea during the Clinton and Bush administrations. For analytic purposes, the domestic sources of US foreign policy can be divided into three categories: societal factors, institutional factors, and individual factors. Societal influences on US foreign policy include political culture, elite and public opinion, political parties, the media, and interest groups. Institutional factors involve the executive and legislative

branches of government and the executive departments and other agencies dealing with foreign policy issues. Finally, individual factors include the personal characteristics of individuals and the roles and responsibilities of foreign policy decision-makers (Wittkopf and McCormick 2008; see also Scott and Crothers 1998, 2–13).

Among these three domestic sources of foreign policy, however, this study focuses primarily on the institutional factors. This is not because the other sources are not relevant, but because institutional factors are the most persistent influences on foreign policy. Societal and individual factors seem to be more changeable. Secondly, different institutional settings react differently to foreign affairs. In the United States, the struggle for control over foreign policy making between Congress and the president is most evident in a divided government. Thirdly, societal factors are less influential than institutional factors because there is no strong interest group in the United States to publicly represent North Korea. Lastly, although individual factors could have played a decisive role, they do not explain the phenomenon in which this study is interested. Individual factors explain neither the changes in Clinton's North Korea policy nor the differences in Bush's North Korea policy during their terms, respectively. In other words, institutional factors "have more effects on foreign policy, they tend to influence actors more than actors influence them, and their impact is independent of the regime type or the decision making actors" (Carter and Scott 2010, Web).

With respect to US policy toward North Korea, inter-branch relations between Congress and the president during the Clinton and Bush administrations have become more salient than before. The North Korean nuclear crisis began in earnest in 1993 during the Clinton administration, and North Korea conducted its first nuclear test in 2006 during the Bush administration. Thus, this study limits its time period to the Clinton and Bush administrations (1993–2008). Moreover, these two administrations provide a nice paired comparison with every permutation of divided and unified party control.

Theory and Method: The Two-Level Game, Case Studies, and US Foreign Policy

In order to contribute to theoretical development in the field of international relations, Robert Putnam's two-level game theory (1988) is employed to examine why the Clinton administration and the Bush administration

chose different policy options toward North Korea despite their common policy goal of the denuclearization of Pyongyang. According to the two-level game model, it is wrong to ignore or underestimate the role of Congress in the foreign policy making process in the United States, because many foreign policy outcomes occur as a result of the interaction between international factors and domestic factors and, among many domestic factors, the inter-branch relationship plays the most significant role. Robert Putnam (1988) suggests two-level games as a model for domestic-international interactions to make sense of the process and outcome of international bargaining. Putnam (1988) notes that:

> At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Central decision-makers can ignore neither of the two games, so long as their countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign. (434)

Many agree that in order to understand international negotiation, one should consider both the international and intra-national factors. Bruckman (1977) argued that a negotiator has dual responsiveness or boundary-role conflict (BRC) with bargaining and representation, described as two-track negotiating—that is, negotiating simultaneously with the bureaucracy and the other side. Negotiators as bargainers respond to their counterparts; negotiators as representatives respond to their own constituents. Whereas the former emphasizes international interactions, the latter focuses on intra-national interactions. However, these two types of activities together constitute international negotiation.

Smith (1998) also argued, "when forming foreign policies, leaders simultaneously balance these internal and external constraints. Hence, international events and domestic political survival are intrinsically linked, not through a simple unidirectional causal pathway, but via a series of strategic interactions at both the international and the domestic level" (633). Moravcsik (1999) also held that the most distinctive feature of the two-level game model from other theories is that "the statesman's strategies reflect a simultaneous 'double-edged,' calculation of constraints and opportunities on both the domestic and international boards" (17).

In the two-level game model, the size of the win-sets, which are defined as "the set of all possible agreements that would win" (Putnam 1988, 437), is crucial for an international negotiation to reach a mutual agreement. To examine the size of the win-sets, Putnam divided the negotiation process into two stages, Level I and Level II, with bargaining between the negotiators and separate discussions within each group of constituents. To understand Level I negotiations, it is essential to recognize the implications of the Level II win-sets, the necessary majority among the constituents when simply voted up or down (Putnam 1988, 437). The size of the win-set depends on many factors such as the distribution of power, preferences, and possible coalitions among Level II constituents, the Level II political institutions or ratification procedures, and the strategies of the Level I negotiators.[3]

For chief negotiators, there are two ways to help reach an agreement in international negotiations. One way is to expand the win-set range in Level I, because the more the win-sets overlap, the more easily agreements can be reached. Another is to expand the domestic constituents' win-sets in Level II as agreements in Level I still need to be ratified or approved in Level II. In two-level bargaining, however, the chief negotiator will particularly be perceptive and careful with the domestic constituents' constraints and demands.[4] In the case of the United States, presidents as chief negotiators cannot ignore or underestimate the pressures from Congress, both because they also have to function as politicians acquiring, maintaining, and strengthening their own political authority and because Congress is the most powerful domestic political organization mandated by the American Constitution to share powers on foreign policy with the president.

Regarding US negotiations with North Korea on the nuclear issue, Washington had an extremely limited win-set at Level I as a result of Pyongyang's uncompromising attitudes that offered few or no concessions. It also failed to expand the win-sets at Level II, not least because of its domestic partisan politics. As a result, "the United States has had a frequent mismatch between what was negotiable internationally and what could be suitably ratified domestically with respect to North Korea" (Morgan 2007, 29).

To better understand why the negotiation with Pyongyang failed, therefore, it is imperative to examine the role that Congress played in negotiations with North Korea and the role the different types of government—the unified government and the divided government—played in

US foreign policy making toward the North. In this regard, the two-level game model and the theory of political survival have significant implications. For this purpose, the inter-branch relations between the presidency and Congress and the intensified partisanship between the Republican Party and the Democratic Party during the Clinton and Bush administrations are closely scrutinized through a case study on the US foreign policy making process.

There are two different types of case studies: single case studies and comparative case studies (a small number of case studies).[5] Single case studies primarily test a single event either to confirm or infirm theories. For a single case study to contribute to theory building or theory development, it is necessary to select crucial cases—"a most likely case" or "a least likely case"—that cause a severe test of theory. "A most likely case is one that is almost certain to fit a theory if the theory is true for any cases at all," while "a least likely case is a tough test for a theory because it is a case in which the theory is least likely to hold true." A deviant or outlier case can also be selected because "research on deviant cases can help inductively identify variables and hypotheses that have been left out of existing theories" (Bennett 2004, 29–30).

A comparative case study is one that compares a small number of different cases to find causal inferences. Two well-known modes of case comparisons are the method of agreement and method of difference presented by John Stuart Mill. In the method of agreement, the researcher looks for the causal conditions that are the same between two cases that have the same outcome. If the researcher succeeds in finding them, then we might infer that those are the independent variables common to the two cases. Table 3.1 shows Mill's method of agreement. In the method of difference, the researcher looks for antecedent conditions that differ in two cases that have different outcomes. If the researcher succeeds in finding them, we might conclude that those are the independent variables that produce different outcomes. Table 3.2 shows Mill's method of difference (Bennett 2004, 30–31).[6]

Table 3.1 Mill's method of agreement

	Independent variables	Dependent variables
Case 1	A, B, C, D	X
Case 2	A, E, F, G	X

Table 3.2 Mill's method of difference

	Independent variables	*Dependent variables*
Case 3	H, I, J, K	Y
Case 4	~H, I, J, K	~Y

Note: "~H" represents "not H"

A single case study has limitations in proving or disproving a theory decisively, but there are efficient ways for a single case study to do so. The best way to confirm a theory is to select an extreme case (or a crucial case) that is highly unlikely to confirm it, and to find that even this case does so. On the other hand, the best way to refute a theory is to select the most powerful single case to show that even the case unusually favorable for the theory is disconfirmed. The former is called the least-likely case study while the latter is called the most-likely case study (Odell 2004, 62–63).[7] Meanwhile, comparability can also be determined by a single case study when it is analyzed diachronically (Lijphart 1971, 689). Charles E. Frye's (1965) analysis of the empirical relationships among the party system, the interest group system, and political stability in Germany under the Weimar and Bonn Republics, and James N. Rosenau's (1968) study of the relative influence of individual variables and role variables on the behavior of US senators during the "Acheson era" and the "Dulles era" are excellent examples.

There are also five research design tasks when conducting case studies, many of which are also common to quantitative methods and large-n methods. First, the researcher must define the research objective. Second, the researcher must specify the independent, dependent, and intervening variables. Third, the researcher must select the cases to be studied. Fourth, the researcher must consider how to best describe variance in the independent and dependent variables. Finally, the researcher must identify the structured questions to be asked (Bennett 2004, 26). Case studies serve five main purposes: testing theories, creating theories, identifying antecedent conditions, testing the importance of these antecedent conditions, and explaining cases of intrinsic importance (Van Evera 1997, 55).[8]

Nevertheless, many social scientists including political scientists and international relations scholars have considered case studies the weakest research method for reasons such as selection bias, operationalization of variables,

endogeneity, and generalization, among others. First, selection bias is particularly common and seems to be difficult to avoid especially when conducting a single case study or a small number of case studies. Selection bias might misrepresent causal inferences by focusing only on some cases and discounting others.[9] Second, it is more difficult to control the impact of omitted variables in case studies than with quantitative methods. Third, a case study might have a problem of endogeneity, where "the values our explanatory variables take on are sometimes a consequence, rather than a cause, of our dependent variable" (King et al. 1994, 185). Last, due to their limited explanatory range, validity, and reliability, case study findings are difficult to theorize or generalize. It is not guaranteed in case studies that the same results will be found when they are integrated into larger case studies.

However, quantitative methods are not impeccable, and quantitative methods such as formal models and statistical methods have their own comparative strengths and weaknesses. More importantly, despite the inherent limitations of case studies such as danger of selection bias, difficulty in controlling variables, problems of endogeneity, and limitation of generalizations, case study methods have their own merits.[10] According to Bennett (2004),

> The comparative advantages of case study methods include identifying new or omitted variables and hypotheses, examining intervening variables in individual cases to make inferences on which causal mechanisms may have been at work, developing historical explanations of particular cases, attaining high levels of construct validity, and using contingent generalizations to model complex relationships such as path dependency and multiple interactions effects. Particularly noteworthy is the ability to identify new hypotheses, which case studies can do through a combination of deduction and induction. (19)

Taking all these discussions about the promises and perils of the qualitative case studies into consideration, the next section will present how effectively and productively a case study can be used to explain one of the main reasons of the US policy failure under the Clinton and Bush administrations to prevent North Korea from going nuclear.

DIVIDED GOVERNMENTS, UNIFIED GOVERNMENTS, AND US FOREIGN POLICY

The government types during the Clinton and Bush administrations can be classified into four different stages: united government under the presidency of Clinton (1993–1994), divided government under the presidency of Clinton (1995–2000), united government under the presidency of Bush (2001–2006), and divided government under the presidency of Bush (2007–2008). Although this study deals with all four stages, it will focus more on the period of the divided government under Clinton from 1995 through 2000 and the period of the unified government under Bush from 2001 through 2006, because they clearly represent how different government types resulted in different US policies toward North Korea, which led ultimately to a nuclear North Korea.

First, the definition of "divided government" should be clarified, since there are two separate uses of the term. The first refers to "the absence of simultaneous same-party majorities in the executive and legislative branches of government" (Elgie 2001, 2). In this sense, the concept is understood in an arithmetic sense and is especially valid for the United States' two-party system. The second usage concerns a certain type of political behavior: "Divided government corresponds to the situation where there is conflict between the executive and legislative branches of government" (Elgie 2001, 7). In this sense, divided government can occur even when there is unified government in an arithmetical sense. However, there are problems with adopting the behavioral interpretation of the term. Most notably, it makes the criteria for identifying the various periods of unified government and divided government far more subjective. Thus, the following discussion adopts the arithmetical definition of divided government as a situation where "the executive fails to enjoy majority support in at least one working house of legislature" (Elgie 2001, 11).

In this study, partisan politics or partisanship will be used interchangeably, and defined as political behavior of members of Congress "motivated to protect or advance the collective interests of their party organizations" (Lee 2009, 24). Partisan politics or partisanship "rests, fundamentally, on partisans' widespread and willing cooperation in pursuit of collective goals and on the inherent zero-sum conflicts between the two parties' political interests as they seek to win elections and wield political power" (Lee 2009, 18). Political opposition stems not only from different individual ideologies, but also from collective party interests.[11] Table 3.3 shows four

Table 3.3 Types of the US government, 1993–2008[a]

United government	Divided government
Democratic President/ Democratic Congress (1993–1994)	Democratic President/ Republican Congress (1995–2000)
Republican President/ Republican Congress (2001–2006)	Republican President/ Democratic Congress (2007–2008)

[a]Note: The Senate of the 107th Congress (2001–2002) started with Republicans in control with Vice President Dick Cheney's tie-breaking vote over the even split of 50 Republicans and 50 Democrats. The defection of Senator James M. Jeffords (R-VT) turned the control of the Senate over to the Democrats with 50 Democrats, 49 Republicans, and one independent. With the 2002 mid-term elections, however, the Republicans recaptured the Senate

differently categorized types of US government between 1993 and 2008 according to the arithmetical definition of divided government.

The hypothesized relationship between government type and the United States' North Korea policy during the Clinton and Bush administrations are stated more formally as follows:

Hypothesis 1 A divided US government produces more passive policies toward North Korea than a unified US government.

It is expected that because of partisan politics, a president in a divided government is hard-pressed to get strong support from Congress when making more aggressive policies or more conciliatory policies. Conversely, should the president embrace a more adventurous foreign policy in a unified government, congressional support is available.

Hypothesis 2 A unified US government with a democratic president produces more conciliatory policies toward North Korea, whereas a unified US government with a republican president produces more aggressive policies toward North Korea.

It is expected that because of partisan politics, a democratic president in a unified government finds it easier to get strong support from Congress when advocating more conciliatory policies. This is also a matter of party ideology. And for the same reasons, a republican president in a unified government will find it easier to get strong support from Congress when

Table 3.4 Government types and North Korea policy outcomes, 1993–2008

Presidency	Government type	
	United	Divided
Republican	Aggressive confrontation/ Deadlock	Passive engagement/ Status quo
Democratic	Conciliatory engagement/ Negotiated settlement	Passive engagement/ Status quo

taking an aggressive stand. Thus, the main argument of my study can be summarized as follows:

$$\text{Different Government Types} + \text{Party Politics} = \text{Different Policy Choices}$$
$$(\text{or Policy Inconsistency})$$

Table 3.4 shows the relations between US government types—divided government and unified government—and the hypothesized outcomes of the United States' North Korea policy during the Clinton administration (1993–2000) and the Bush administration (2001–2008).

Findings

My research shows that domestic politics in the United States are central to any convincing explanation of the advances and retreats in the US relationship with North Korea during the Clinton and Bush administrations. It also shows that the inter-branch relationship between the presidency and Congress in the United States fetches a different character in periods of unified government than in periods of divided government. Under a divided government, furthermore, ideological differences and partisan politics can easily escalate into institutional warfare between the president and Congress. Divided government converts intrinsic partisan tension into more overt conflict. During the Clinton and Bush administrations, the routinization of partisanship, the politicization of foreign policy, and the intensification of inter-branch rivalry became the rule rather than the exception. Politics did not stop at the water's edge and, as a consequence, different government types significantly affected the United States' North Korea policy during the Clinton and Bush administrations.

Whereas divided governments produced more passive policies and fewer upheavals in US-North Korea relations, unified governments produced more radical changes. The findings in this study extend those of other studies on the role of different US government types in US foreign policy that different government types produce different policy choices and approaches. At the same time, the findings in this chapter challenge those of earlier studies on the role of Congress in US foreign policy that presidential power has significantly grown over the past century, whereas congressional power has considerably declined. The findings also dispute the notion that Congress is "all talk," and that members of Congress are much more interested in paying lip service to their audience than in producing substantial policies. As in US domestic policy, Congress has clearly played an important role in US foreign policy.

Conclusions

This chapter mainly discussed when and how to use a qualitative case study in international relations research with particular regard to foreign policy decision-making. It also specifically showed how a qualitative case study can be used to examine the role of the inter-branch relationship or different government types in US policy toward North Korea during the Clinton and Bush administrations. However, this does not mean that this study will be methodologically perfect in every respect. It was presented as an example to show how methodological choices are made. In the study of US policy toward North Korea, a case study was selected as a central method for the following reasons: first, it is practically impossible to employ a large-n method or experimentation to test my hypotheses. Second, a case study has its own merits compared to other methods. Last, diverse methodological approaches will ultimately enrich the fields of political science and international relations. Furthermore, US policy toward North Korea is a hard case, not only because there are members of Congress from both parties, but also presidents from both parties, who share similar critical perceptions of North Korea. In this regard, it is a least-likely case study.

A qualitative case study significantly contributed to finding out that the institutional factors, more specifically the inter-branch relationship between the presidency and Congress, played a pivotal role in US policy toward North Korea and that divided governments have played pivotal roles and that different government types produce different policy choices and approaches. As a case study has a limitation of generalization, however,

further studies are required to determine whether the conclusions of my study can be applied to other cases. First, it must be determined whether the same pattern exists in US policy toward other so-called rogue states such as Iran, Syria, and Cuba. Second, one must ask whether the pattern identified in my study will persist in future administrations' policy toward North Korea. Comparative studies of such cases would put my findings in a broader context and contribute to generalizing the conclusions established in my case study.

Notes

1. In addition, different methods can be used together in a single study or sequentially. For more details, see Bennett (2002).
2. The case study method is defined in this chapter as "the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events" (George and Bennett 2005, 5). For more details on the definitions of case studies, see George and Bennett (2005, 17–19).
3. "Ratification" may entail a formal voting procedure at Level II, such as the constitutionally required two-thirds vote of the United States. In his study, however, the term generally refers to any decision process at Level II that is required to endorse or implement a Level I agreement, whether formally or informally (Putnam 1988, 436).
4. Expectation effects are also remarkably significant in this sequential decomposition into a negotiation phase and a ratification phase, because there are likely to be prior consultations to hammer out an initial position for negotiations. In fact, the need for Level II ratifications seriously influences the Level I bargaining. Furthermore, expectations of rejection at Level II may abort negotiations at Level I even without any formal action at Level II before the Level I negotiations. More often than not, the constituents' views may themselves evolve in the course of the negotiations (Putnam 1988, 436).
5. For a classical study on a single case study, see Eckstein (1975); for a classical study on a comparative case study, see Lijphart (1971).
6. However, Mill himself warned that his methods could not be applied in the social sciences because sufficiently similar cases are impossible or difficult to find. See Lijphart (1971, 688), Mill (2011, Book III, chapter 10, and Book VI, chapter 7).
7. However, it is evident that although both the least-likely case study and the most-likely case study help reduce the effects of the problem of representativeness, large-n methods provide more convincing tests and support (Odell 2004, 69).

8. For more details, see Van Evera (1997, 55–75); according to Lijphart, meanwhile, there are six ideal types of single case studies: atheoretical case studies, interpretative case studies, hypotheses-generating case studies, theory-confirming case studies, theory-infirming case studies, and deviant case studies. For more details, see Lijphart (1971, 691–693).
9. Although selection bias in case studies can be partially overcome by large-n studies, it is common to all different kinds of methods, and quantitative analyses are not immune to self-selection problems. See Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias (2004, 368–369).
10. For more details, see Part II and Part III in Sprinz and Wolinsky-Nahmias. Many scholars agree with the view that the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the respective methods "allow the strengths of one method to compensate for the weaknesses of another" (Bennett 2004, 48; see also Odell 2004, 60). According to Van Evera, while "large-n methods tell us more about whether hypotheses hold than why they hold, case studies say more about why they hold" (Van Evera 1997, 55).
11. See Carl Schmitt (2007) for a philosophical discussion on the origins of partisan politics based on the "friend-enemy" distinction.

REFERENCES

Avey, Paul C., Michael C. Desch, Daniel Maliniak, James D. Long, Susan Peterson, and Michael J. Tierney. 2012. The Beltway vs. Ivory Tower: Why Academics and Policymakers Don't Get Along. *Foreign Policy* (Jan/Feb). PAGES

Bennett, Andrew. 2002. *Where the Model Frequently Meets the Road: Combining Statistical, Formal, and Case Study Methods.* Paper Presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Conference, Boston.

———. 2004. Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages. In *Models, Numbers & Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*, ed. Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, 9–55. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan.

Bruckman, Daniel. 1977. Boundary Role Conflict: Negotiation as Dual Responsiveness. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 21 (4): 639–661.

Carter, Ralph G., and James M. Scott. 2010. Institutional Actors in Foreign Policy Analysis. In *The International Studies Encyclopedia*, ed. Robert A. Denemark, 3688–3709. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.

Eckstein, Harry. 1975. Case Study and Theory in Political Science. In *Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, 79–138. Reading: Addison-Wesley Press.

Elgie, Robert, ed. 2001. *Divided Government in Comparative Perspective*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Frye, Charles E. 1965. Parties and Pressure Groups in Weimar and Bonn. *World Politics* 17 (4): 635–665.

George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lee, Frances E. 2009. *Beyond Ideology: Politics, Principles, and Partisanship in the U.S. Senate*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1971. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. *The American Political Science Review* 65 (3): 682–693.

McKeown, Timothy J. 1999. Case Studies and the Statistical Worldview: Review of King, Keohane, and Verba's Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. *International Organization* 53 (1): 161–190.

Mill, John S. 2011. *A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive*. Toronto: University of Toronto Libraries.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1999. Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining. In *International Bargaining and Domestic Politics: Double-Edged Diplomacy*, ed. Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, 1–42. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Morgan, Patrick M. 2007. The Role of the United States in the North Korean Nuclear Crisis. In *Korean Security in a Changing East Asia*, ed. Terence Roehrig, Jungmin Seo, and Uk Heo, 13–32. Westport: Praeger Security International.

Odell, John S. 2004. Case Study Methods in International Political Economy. In *Models, Numbers & Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations*, ed. Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, 56–80. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Putnam, Robert. 1988. Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games. *International Organization* 42 (3): 427–460.

Rosenau, James N. 1968. Private Preferences and Political Responsibilities: The Relative Potency of Individual and Role Variables in the Behavior of U.S. Senators. In *Quantitative International Politics: Insights and Evidence*, ed. J. David Singer, 17–50. New York: Free Press.

Sayer, Andrew. 2000. *Realism and Social Science*. London: Sage.

Schmitt, Carl. 2007. *The Concept of the Political*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Scott, James M., and A. Lane Crothers. 1998. Out of the Cold: The Post-Cold War Context of U.S. Foreign Policy. In *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. James M. Scott, 1–28. Durham: Duke University Press.

Smith, Alastair. 1998. International Crises and Domestic Politics. *The American Political Science Review* 92 (3): 623–638.

Sprinz, Detlef F., and Yael Wolinsky-Nahmias, eds. 2004. *Models, Numbers & Cases: Methods for Studying International Relations.* Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science.* Ithaca: The Cornell University Press.

Wittkopf, Eugene R., and James M. McCormick, eds. 2008. *The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence.* Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Ethnic Conflict Management in Eastern Europe: Structured, Focused Comparison and the Case for Multidimensional Prevention

Angela Kachuyevski

This chapter illustrates how comparative case studies using qualitative methods of inquiry can contribute to the process of improving theoretical and policy frameworks by identifying, through in-depth case analysis, aspects of existing models that require further refinement. While small-n comparative studies may be "invaluable in concept formation and in formulating explanatory ideas", the approach can be criticized as "much weaker as a basis for causal inference" (Brady and Collier 2010, 10). This does not weaken, however, the utility of such studies if the researcher is able to reconcile the requirements of scientific reliability with the rich detail that is so important to policy-relevant research. This chapter illustrates how comparative case studies using qualitative methods can contribute to the process of improving theoretical and policy frameworks by identifying, through in-depth case analysis, aspects of existing models that require further refinement. Following the model of "structured" and "focused" comparison, articulated by Alexander George, this chapter

A. Kachuyevski (✉)
Arcadia University, Glenside, PA, USA

53

demonstrates how small-n in-depth comparative case studies can formulate explanatory ideas that help identify areas requiring further study in order to refine theory and improve the practice of preventive diplomacy in Eastern Europe.[1]

Preventing Ethnic Conflict

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community has struggled to effectively prevent, contain and resolve a number of devastating internal conflicts with only mixed success. Increasing integration and interdependence, coupled with the rise in importance of non-state actors, makes clear that even remote conflicts once considered peripheral have a major impact upon international peace and security. The demand for international involvement, however, seriously exceeds the resources available. Conflict prevention has emerged as an attractive alternative to costly military intervention and lengthy exercises in nation-building. Although conflict prevention is an umbrella term that covers a wide variety of diplomatic and economic development activities, it generally refers to action taken by a third party to prevent the outbreak of violence between disputing parties. This may encompass long-term activities that seek to eradicate the root causes of conflict, or a more immediate intervention to contain an escalating crisis, action often referred to as preventive diplomacy.

Conflict prevention can take on a variety of forms that cover a range of activities, often carried out by multilateral organizations, especially the United Nations. Indeed, engaging in prevention activities is one of the fundamental tasks of the United Nations as defined in its Charter. Other regional organizations also possess mechanisms to engage in preventive action, with some organizations possessing robust mechanisms for substantive intervention. These mechanisms, both at the regional and the global level, were crafted by the organizations' participating states in order to prevent, to the greatest extent possible, future destruction resulting from major wars. In Eastern Europe, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) has been particularly active in managing ethnic tensions in an effort to prevent violent conflict.

Although conflict prevention as a concept appears very promising, in practice it has had mixed results. The need for greater understanding is particularly acute and pressing in the case of violent internal conflict since internal wars cause tremendous suffering, weaken state capacity and create enormous costs for the international community. Nevertheless, they are

also the very type of conflict for which our international and regional organizations, created to manage inter-state relations on the basis of sovereign equality, are least prepared. Rectifying this is a major goal of the United Nations, as laid out in the debate on how to strengthen the UN's capacity to meet the challenges of the twenty-first century (Annan 2005). Institutional reform is crucial in order to further our abilities to effectively prevent violent conflict. Yet, we must first begin to understand why some efforts to contain the escalation of violent conflict succeed and others fail in order to understand what reforms are most needed. Are our regional and international institutions properly structured to effectively conduct preventive diplomacy?

The Method of Structured, Focused Comparison

George (Bennett and George 2005) recognizes that intensive study of a small number of cases yields the sort of rich detail that is most fruitful for policy-relevant work. Yet, researchers engaged in such studies face the difficulty of having many more variables to consider than cases included in the study. This makes it difficult for the researcher to control for the range of variables that could influence the outcome under study, and therefore could weaken the basis for causal inference. The structured and focused approach minimizes the negative aspects of having a small set of cases involved in the comparison by ensuring that the data retrieved from each of the case studies is indeed comparable by articulating a set of general questions that are to be applied to each case. In this way, the answers to these questions can be reliably compared. Ensuring that the questions asked of each case are conceptually grounded helps ensure that the answers contribute to a further refining and development of the theoretical or policy framework employed. This method divides a study into three phases. Phase one is devoted to research design, which involves five distinct steps. The first is to specify the objectives of the study and the puzzle to be addressed, as well as to identify the existing literature and the gaps in the literature that the study hopes to fill. The second step identifies the dependent, independent and intervening variables to be studied, and offers a preliminary evaluation of how they are pieced together. The third step involves the selection of cases that are appropriate for a controlled comparison study. Cases should have fundamental similarities, but should differ from each other in potentially important ways. Examining these differences may allow the researcher to uncover important aspects of the case that are relevant for theory and practice,

even as they may not be captured in existing frameworks. The fourth step involves operationalization and measurement of the variables identified in step two. This step determines what indicators should be analyzed, and how they might be accurately measured. Finally, step five formulates general questions to be asked in each case. The questions should be designed to incorporate the variables under examination, in order to link the theoretical framework with the research objectives of the study.

The second phase involves a small number of in-depth case studies. To ensure that the rich detail of the cases is comparable, each case is structured in the same way, and the analysis focuses upon addressing the general questions articulated in the research design. Phase three draws upon the results of the case studies. Through comparative analysis, phase three seeks to identify implications for theory and/or practice. Researchers may, based upon these findings, articulate new questions to be addressed in future research, or may seek to develop new or refined theoretical or policy models. This constitutes the main scholarly contribution of these studies. Table 4.1 illustrates how researchers should approach applying this method to their study.

Understanding Conflict Management Through "Structured, Focused Comparison"

Using this method, I studied an interesting phenomenon: why strikingly similar cases of newly emergent states with contested boundaries and shifting balances of ethnic power, within the context of state collapse and dramatic economic pressure, experienced both war and peace. I explored the role of third-party actors in three cases and was able to uncover a pattern that made two main contributions to better inform the policy and practice of preventive diplomacy. First, I was able to uncover surprising gaps in our understanding of how preventive diplomacy works and thus identified areas requiring further research. Second, I was able to make preliminary suggestions as to how policy might be modified to address the shortcomings in the practice of preventive diplomacy uncovered in my analysis.

Phase One: Identifying the Research Problem

The literature on conflict prevention focuses on how to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict in divided societies. The literature is broad, and

Table 4.1 Structured, focused comparison

Phase One: Research Design
1. Identify the research problem and objectives of the study; identify the existing literature and the shortcomings that the study addresses
What is your question? What do you seek to explain? What have others had to say about this? How do you contribute to the conversation?
2. Specify the dependent, independent and intervening variables; offer a preliminary assessment as to how they fit together
What are the factors at play? How do they interact? Most importantly, how do they answer your question?
3. Select cases that are comparable, but that vary
Can you control for most factors the literature identifies as relevant? Do the cases all vary on the same variable?
4. Determine how to measure variables
Drawing upon the literature, specify how the relevant variables are to be interpreted, either in quantitative or qualitative form.
5. Formulate general questions to be asked of each case
Examine how the relevant variables impact your cases by designing questions that incorporate the variables and test hypothesized relationships.
Phase Two: Case Studies
1. Use standard procedures
Make sure you adhere to the same logic and structure in each case; ask the same set of questions.
2. Consider alternatives
Is your explanation more consistent with the facts than alternatives? Is it consistent with what is generally known about the phenomenon you study?
Phase Three: Theoretical Implications
What have you uncovered that can help refine existing theoretical and policy frameworks?

includes topics as diverse as what tools are available to practitioners, how to improve monitoring and early warning mechanisms, and the challenge of prioritizing prevention over reaction, that is the creation of a "culture of prevention".[2] In addition, the literature includes longer term "structural prevention" strategies that focus on underlying causes, such as poverty, and more immediate "operational prevention" steps taken in response to a specific threat of violence (Carnegie Commission 1997).

In one of the best known and widely respected works on the prevention of violent conflict, Michael Lund defines preventive diplomacy as "action taken in vulnerable places and times to avoid the threat or use of armed force and related forms of coercion by states or groups to settle the political disputes that can arise from the destabilizing effects of economic, social, political and international change" (Lund 1996, 37). Recognizing

that this still allows for a wide range of threats as well as policy responses, he further divides preventive diplomacy into three distinct subtypes: *pre-conflict peace-building* that focuses on building the institutions and norms that form the basis of stable peace; *preemptive engagement* where third parties directly engage with conflict parties to halt escalating tensions and prevent further escalation; and *crisis prevention*, where third parties quickly respond to low levels of violence and take decisive measures to contain and de-escalate the conflict. By identifying the importance of very early action, and distinguishing what types of activities are most likely to be effective at what times, Lund provides a useful framework for thinking about conflict prevention.

Because of what Bruce Jentleson calls the "Rubicon Problem", it is critical to intervene as early as possible: "as difficult as preventive diplomacy is, the onset of mass violence transforms the nature of a conflict. A 'Rubicon' gets crossed, on the other side of which resolution and even limitation of the conflict become much more difficult" (Jentleson 2000, 330). In addition to early action, he finds that successful preventive action requires both effective deterrence and positive inducements to encourage cooperation.

The literature clarifies the scope of the conflict prevention field, and identifies how the wide range of preventive action works together. Yet, our understanding of how specifically preventive diplomacy can be effectively used to quell escalating tensions in divided societies is lacking. Many conflicts have erupted in relatively prosperous societies, challenging the premises of structural prevention that focus on human rights and development as a way to prevent violent conflict. Further, some early, robust prevention efforts fail and some seeming prevention success stories later collapse into conflict despite earlier efforts, as we have seen in Crimea. Better understanding of these conflicts, and the potential for prevention, is especially pressing given that our international capacity to manage internal conflicts is limited, yet these conflicts produce enormous humanitarian and material costs. We need to have better articulated policy options to deal with these challenges. Why do some efforts to prevent violence succeed while others fail?

Phase One: Identification of Variables and Definitions

This literature identifies several factors that contribute to the likelihood of prevention success:

Timing: Early and robust third-party intervention, before the positions of the parties have hardened and tensions have escalated.

Leadership: Moderate national leadership willing to work with the international community; involvement and commitment of major international parties.

Leverage: Capacity of the third party to provide rewards and offer credible threats sufficient to ensure compliance.

Multifaceted Action: The action taken addresses the range of variables contributing to the escalation of conflict.

Phase One: Case Selection

The breakup of the Soviet Union provides ample material for the study of conflict escalation and management. Many millions of Russians were left living outside of Russia's borders after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and thus were affected by the "nationalization" of the Soviet republics. Many did not support the independence of their country of residence from the USSR, and most did not support the subjugation of Russian language and culture that followed the Soviet collapse. This led to organized opposition to the new state, and the potential for violent confrontation in several cases. Occurring in the same time frame, in roughly the same geopolitical space, with many of the same demographic and sociopolitical characteristics, the many internal conflicts that erupted after the Soviet collapse nonetheless vary dramatically in outcome. In some cases, resistance to the newly dominant ethnic group escalated to the outbreak of civil war while other conflicts were successfully contained. Focusing only on these cases that share the major factors that lead to violence, yet differ in outcome, allows us to explore the impact of third-party action on whether these conflicts were contained or erupted into violence.

In determining which cases to include in this study, I began by considering all of the cases in the former Soviet Union in which a resident Russian-speaking minority was in conflict with the government of the newly independent state. The focus is on conflicts involving large Russian-speaking populations for two reasons. First, the literature on ethnic conflict indicates that large neighboring states can sometimes play an important role in the emergence of conflict, especially if their co-ethnics are a party to the conflict and the interests of their own country may be at stake. Michael Brown refers to these conflicts as springing from "bad neighbors" (Brown 1997, 330). Russia has asserted a special role in neighboring states with respect to their resident ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking populations.

Focusing only on those conflicts in Soviet successor states that involve large Russian-speaking populations allows us to control for this often-important variable. Second, Russian-speakers were transformed from a majority group to a minority in several republics following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Their loss of status and the subjugation of the Russian language and Russian culture contribute to the incentives for resistance to the new state. In most cases, Russian-speakers suffered increased economic insecurity through increased discrimination in places of employment and the loss of important elite positions in government, business and higher education. These conflicts, therefore, had great potential for escalation and violent rebellion.

All the cases considered for inclusion in this study exhibit to some degree the relevant variables identified in the literature (Lake and Rothshild 1998; Brown 1997; Kaufman 1996; Brass 1991; Gurr 1993; Horowitz 1985; Sisk 1996; Snyder 1993; de Nevers 1993; Collier 2000; Ballentine and Sherman 2003) as increasing the likelihood of violent conflict. Estonia, Ukraine and Moldova were selected for further study as they share important characteristics: a concentrated Russian-speaking population that, fearing negative consequences associated with being a minority group in a newly independent post-Soviet state, decided to organize resistance to the new government. The resulting conflict between the political elite of the new state and the Russian-speaking minority occurred within the same time frame of 1990–1995, when the central authority of the new state was weak and the borders were in dispute, and amid economic and political turmoil associated with the downfall of communism and the dissolution of the USSR. All looked to Russia for support, both moral and material. Finally, each of the three attempted to establish their independence and began the process of state building during the time of the conflict. Although there are striking similarities between the three cases, there is substantial variation in the level of violent conflict. These three cases were selected for further study to explore what, how and if third-party efforts at conflict prevention might account for the differing outcomes.

Phase One: Assigning Values to the Variables

The variables derived from the conflict prevention literature are timing, leadership, leverage and multifaceted action. According to the theoretical literature, early, multifaceted intervention that enjoys strong leadership and possesses salient leverage is associated with success, while the absence of these variables is associated with failure (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2 Preventive diplomacy variables

	LOW	HIGH
Timing	▪ third party intervention after positions have already hardened and tensions have escalated ▪ third party actions not beyond normal diplomatic activity	▪ third party intervention before positions have hardened and tensions have escalated ▪ robust third party actions, going beyond normal diplomatic activity
Leadership	▪ major international players not involved or committed to the intervention. ▪ belligerent national leadership in the targeted country	▪ major international players involved and committed to the intervention ▪ moderate national leadership in the targeted country
Leverage	▪ third party not able to offer credible threats ▪ third party with no ability to offer attractive incentives	▪ third party with the capacity to provide rewards sufficient to ensure compliance ▪ third party with the capacity to offer credible threats sufficient to ensure compliance
Multi-faceted Action	▪ *limited action taken* ▪ action does not address the range of factors contributing to the conflict	▪ *multi-faceted action taken* ▪ action taken addresses the range of factors contributing to conflict escalation

(LOW ← → HIGH indicated by arrow at top of table)

Phase One: Formulation of Questions

A general set of questions will incorporate the above variables and explore their impact in each case, leading to an assessment of the overall success or failure of the intervention:

Timing: Is the third-party intervention robust and early, before the positions of the parties have hardened and tensions have escalated? Or, does the third party intervene after violence has broken out?

Leadership: Is the national leadership willing to work with the international community? Does the intervention have the involvement and

commitment of major international parties? Or, is the third party insufficiently committed or lacking in appropriate power?

Leverage: Does the third party have the capacity to provide rewards and offer credible threats sufficient to ensure compliance? Or, is the third party lacking in ability to offer attractive incentives for compliance and effective threats to prevent non-compliance?

Multifaceted Action: Does the action taken address the range of variables contributing to the escalation of conflict? Or, is the action taken mismatched to the needs of the parties?

Phase Two: Case Studies

The three selected cases were studied in depth, using the above questions to analyze efforts to prevent or de-escalate violent conflict in the 1990s in an effort to better understand the role of third parties. The objective is to identify areas further requiring study, and hopefully to uncover dynamics as well within these cases that can help shape analyses of current and ongoing events given the continuing conflict in the region, even decades later. Due to space constraints, the empirical findings of the cases will not be presented in detail, rather will be organized in the form of answers to each of the questions articulated above.

Estonia: Robust and Timely Intervention?

Estonia was incorporated into the Russian Empire in the early 1700s and remained so until the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, after which it enjoyed independent statehood for 19 years until it was retaken by Soviet forces in 1939. Estonian independence was restored in 1991, when the USSR collapsed, and the Estonian government decided to restrict citizenship of the new state to those who could trace their roots to pre-Soviet Estonia. This effectively excluded Russian-speakers, nearly a third of the overall population given demographic changes during the Soviet period, from participating in a political and legislative process that established the legal basis of Estonian statehood. This led to a major conflict between the new Estonian government and the Russian-speaking minority. At the height of the crisis, Russian-speakers in the northeast of the country organized a referendum on autonomy. The new government in Tallinn saw this as a threat to their authority.

Timing: Is the third-party intervention robust and early, before the positions of the parties have hardened and tensions have escalated? Or, does the third party intervene after violence has broken out?

The OSCE intervened first through the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM), who sought to ease escalating tensions between the Russian-speakers in the northeast of Estonia and the government in Tallinn (Edwards 1996, 44). The potential for conflict was quite real, particularly as the Russian Federation took on an active role in supporting the ethnic Russians and even Russian-speakers of other ethnicity (such as Ukrainians and Jews). HCNM van der Stoel undertook early, substantive and active mediation in an effort to de-escalate tensions, and worked directly with the parties to prevent future conflicts (Huber 1994, 26).

Timing in this case was critical to the overall success of the mission, but had much more influence over developments with the government than with the Russian-speaking minority. HCNM van der Stoel was able to establish a relationship with both sides at a time when tensions were very high. This early action made it possible for each side to accept a political solution. The timing was less decisive, however, in the calculations of the regional governments in the northeast. While they agreed to abide by the decision of the Estonian Constitutional Court on their proposed referendum on autonomy (Kemp 2001, 144), it seems doubtful they did so because HCNM van der Stoel persuaded them at a very early stage, but rather they did so due to their lack of alternatives. Particularly early in the conflict, Russia sought to pursue a reasonable solution via regional organizations such as the OSCE, and was not enthusiastic about direct support for any secessionist movement in Estonia. Further, the former Soviet, and then Russian, troops stationed in Estonia were not based in the areas populated by a majority of the Russian-speakers that were considering autonomy or secession. Unlike in Moldova's Dniester region, these troops were not tied to the local population. Given these two factors, the regional leadership in the northeast of Estonia had few alternatives to the process proposed by the OSCE, even as many of their leaders and activists decried the injustice being done to Russian-speakers, and even as they failed through the negotiation process to achieve their fundamental aim of political and cultural equality.

Leadership: Is the national leadership willing to work with the international community? Does the intervention have the involvement and commitment of major international parties? Or, is the third party insufficiently committed or lacking in appropriate power?

International engagement was, in this case, highly conducive to success. All major regional actors were substantially involved through diplomatic, political and economic support. This involvement was important for two reasons. First, the commitment of major European players, as well as the United States, further increased the leverage available to the OSCE to induce cooperation on the part of the Estonian government. With all of Estonia's supporters and potential allies involved in creating a political solution to the conflict, there were strong incentives for the Estonian government to work with these international actors. Second, the intense interest and commitment of the United States and major Western European powers strongly affected Russia's calculations of how to most effectively pursue a resolution of the conflict. Russia itself was interested, at this point in time, in pursuing a close partnership with the West in an effort to integrate as much as possible into the European mainstream. And, the major Western powers, in particular the United States, were committed not only to Estonia's territorial integrity and the peaceful withdrawal of former Soviet forces from Estonian territory, but also to supporting reform and democratization in Russia (Hurlburt 2000, 98). Russia's moderate leadership, especially given their increasing economic dependence upon the West, was best served by pursuing a political resolution.

While the international engagement offered positive incentives for the Estonian government to cooperate, and created a politically viable forum for the Russians to pursue domestically important priorities such as protection of Russian-speakers' rights in the "near abroad", the impact on the Baltic Russian-speakers seems somewhat different. For them, international engagement did not so much offer them a political alternative as it removed from them potential direct Russian support for rebellion and/or secession. In this sense, engagement did create a political forum, but that forum failed to meet basic Baltic Russian-speakers' aims. Thus, in this case, leadership seems to have served to remove more overt and direct external support for any alternatives to the course created by the OSCE, impacting the government and the minority in very different ways.

> *Leverage: Does the third party have the capacity to provide rewards and offer credible threats sufficient to ensure compliance? Or, is the third party lacking in ability to offer attractive incentives for compliance and effective threats to prevent non-compliance?*

The leverage available to the OSCE in this case was uniquely powerful. Estonia's core national security strategy and its core program of national revival both were built on the foundation of a "return to Europe". Full integration into European security, economic, political and social institutions was a matter of vital national interest, and a matter of consensus among conservative nationalists and more moderate pragmatists. Admission to these institutions, however, is conditional. Domestic stability, a commitment to human rights and an absence of grievances with neighboring states are considered the minimum criteria for consideration for admission. In an effort to prevent conflict escalation, therefore, Estonian membership in Western organizations was "conditioned on Baltic adoption of liberal citizenship laws and residence procedures for residents belonging to other ethnic groups" (Hurlburt 2000, 93). Consequently, the Estonian government faced incredibly powerful incentives to cooperate with the OSCE to resolve its domestic unrest as well as its complicated relations with Russia.

Leverage against the regional governments in the northeast, however, was minimal at best. In exchange for their agreement to abide by the decision of the Estonian Constitutional Court as to the legality of their proposed referendum on autonomy, HCNM van der Stoel was only able to deliver a "categorical statement that the Government had no intention of expelling Russians from Estonia, [and] an assurance to improve the economic situation in Northeastern Estonia" (Kemp 2001, 144). It seems doubtful that, to Russian-speakers in Narva in early 1993, promises not to be deported would be sufficient to overcome the insecurity created by the language laws, through which the government would have the right to dismiss any workers who could not meet language requirements. Further, given that the Baltic Russian-speakers had no political rights and no representation in the Estonian government, "assurances" seem fragile at best.

> *Multifaceted Action: Does the action taken address the range of variables contributing to the escalation of conflict? Or, is the action taken mismatched to the needs of the parties?*

The action taken in this case was multifaceted and carefully targeted to match the needs of the conflict. The OSCE was able to mitigate the structural factors contributing to conflict in this case, compensating for the weaknesses of the central government by providing assistance on legislation and institution building. The OSCE was also able to legitimize the

Estonian borders, increasing the government's confidence in the process. Further, since cooperation with the OSCE was seen as part of the process of European integration, the third party was able to hold out the promise of economic growth and prosperity as an incentive, and was able to secure immediate economic aid from North America and Western Europe.

These steps, however, seem to have benefited the Estonian government rather than both parties. Winning acceptance of the legitimacy of their borders, support for their economic and political development, and a "ticket to Europe" clearly benefited the government. The Baltic Russian-speakers, in contrast, received essentially nothing for their cooperation. Although the OSCE tried to overcome the exclusionary nature of Estonian political institutions, and was able to win some improvement in the daily lives of Baltic Russian-speakers, the ultimate ability of Estonia to refuse citizenship, and thus political rights, to nearly a third of its resident population was not challenged by the international community. Consequently, while some modest improvements were realized, the Russian-speakers in this case did not achieve anything close to what they were seeking in 1993—political and cultural equality.

Moldova: Too Little, Too Late?
Until 1940, the territory of present-day Moldova was divided between the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) and Romania. The area east of the Dniester River, the left bank, constituted an autonomous area within Ukraine, and the area west of the Dniester, the right bank, was part of Romania. The Moldovan SSR was formed as a constituent republic of the USSR after World War II, following the Soviet annexation of the right bank of current-day Moldova. This territory was united with the Moldovan autonomous region of Ukraine, forming the current borders of Moldova. The conflict in Moldova began in the waning days of the Soviet Union when the republican government began moving toward independence. Soviet citizens living in the territories east of the Dniester River, primarily ethnic Russians and Ukrainians, established an autonomous region, which they proclaimed as the Dniester Moldovan SSR, and organized political forces on the left bank refusing to recognize the authority of the government of Moldova. Armed clashes began in 1990, and increasing tensions led to intense fighting in late 1991–1992. With support from the Russian 14th Army, the Dniester forces were able to establish de facto statehood, albeit unrecognized by the international community.

Timing: Is the third-party intervention robust and early, before the positions of the parties have hardened and tensions have escalated? Or, does the third party intervene after violence has broken out?

The timing of third-party intervention in Moldova simply could not have been worse. No external party crafted a substantial intervention until after military hostilities had ceased. Thus, there was no sustained or serious effort to resolve the crisis until fighting had already ended, essentially with a victory for Transdniestria. Given that the rebelling group on the left bank achieved many of their aims on the battlefield, the failure to intervene before fighting broke out was critical. A third party such as the OSCE could have been effective in managing the response of the Moldovan government to developments in Dniester on several occasions. For example, the OSCE fact-finding mission organized before the onset of widespread military hostilities warned of the potential for violence (Neukirch 2003, 238). Had the Chairman-in-Office taken more decisive and direct action at that time, it is possible that negotiations could have begun much earlier.

Nonetheless, even if a serious effort had been made to prevent the military clashes, it is not at all clear that intervening early on would have made much of a difference. Although it might have been possible to impact the calculations of the Moldovan government, and therefore convince them not to respond to Dniester provocations with force, it seems unlikely that intervening earlier would have influenced the Dniester authorities. Given that "troops from the Soviet Ministry of the Interior protected the congress in Tiraspol that declared the independence of the PMR" (Neukirch 2003, 234) in September 1990, more than a year before the Soviet collapse and subsequent independence of Moldova, and the fact that "at the same time Soviet paramilitaries were supplying Dniester volunteers with weapons" (Neukirch 2003, 234), their commitment to self-rule and willingness to use force was well established from the very onset of the crisis. Thus, as in Estonia, the timing of the intervention did influence the government, but had little impact on the minority.

Leadership: Is the national leadership willing to work with the international community? Does the intervention have the involvement and commitment of major international parties? Or, is the third party insufficiently committed or lacking in appropriate power?

In contrast to poor timing, international leadership was, in principle, conducive to success in this case. Major regional powers, including Ukraine and Romania, were committed to a political solution. Their engagement, however, came at a point where the escalation of conflict required a much more robust response than they were willing, or able, to offer. Substantial international interest was able to moderate Russian actions, but insufficient to compel members of the Russian 14th Army to refrain from direct involvement given the personal interest of so many of the officers and enlisted men who were local residents "and therefore not outside actors but part of the society in which the conflict had emerged" (Neukirch 2003, 235). Further, while the national leadership was somewhat moderate and willing to cooperate with an external third party, the Dniester leadership had no interest whatsoever in cooperation. Again, since they were able to achieve most of their aims through military action, and had succeeded in gaining full control over the left bank and setting up a de facto independent state, they were unenthusiastic about participating in negotiations to resolve the future status of Transdniestria. They were only willing to enter talks where potential outcomes would be conducive to their interests. Indeed, even as the national leadership of Moldova could be described as moderate, the regional leadership was clearly belligerent, outweighing the positive influence of leadership in managing this conflict.

Leverage: Does the third party have the capacity to provide rewards and offer credible threats sufficient to ensure compliance? Or, is the third party lacking in ability to offer attractive incentives for compliance and effective threats to prevent non-compliance?

Before active hostilities broke out, the main actors involved were the central Soviet government headed by Mikhail Gorbachev (Decree 1990, 24), and the quadripartite group comprising of Ukraine, Moldova, Russia and Romania. Leverage against the government was weak, but it was virtually non-existent against the Dniester authorities. Economic aid and political support did afford international actors some influence over the Moldovan government, but there were no potential benefits available that were more attractive to the Dniester authorities than the self-rule they were confident in achieving through military means. Likewise, any threats against the Dniester authorities were not credible, given the presence of the 14th Army and the tacit political support they received from Russia

(Socor 1992). Had there been an earlier effort to apply the available leverage to the greatest extent possible against the Moldovan government, it might have been possible to persuade them to both respond to Dniester provocations with measured moderation and to consider adapting the language laws to reflect the interests of non-Moldovan speakers. This might have avoided bloodshed, but would not likely have made any difference in the ultimate division of the country as third parties simply did not possess adequate leverage against the Dniester authorities to prevent their takeover of the left bank.

> *Multifaceted Action: Does the action taken address the range of variables contributing to the escalation of conflict? Or, is the action taken mismatched to the needs of the parties?*

The action taken by the third parties in this case was helpful in alleviating many of the underlying causes of conflict, but in ways that were more beneficial to the Moldovan government than to the Dniester authorities. For example, cooperation with outside parties resulted in political support and economic aid, helping to alleviate the weak economy and increase the legitimacy and stature of the Moldovan government. The factors most salient to the Dniester authorities, however, were not addressed by third-party involvement: the nationality or ethnic-based identity of the state and the relationship between the central and regional governmental powers. Their desire to maintain a Soviet identity, including ensuring the dominance of the Russian language, and the creation of a federal system that would allow for self-government in most local affairs was not acceptable to the Moldovan government. Yet, without a resolution of these two factors, it is unlikely that the Dniester authorities would have been willing to pursue a political solution. Now that they have achieved de facto, albeit unrecognized, independence, resolution of these factors may no longer be sufficient to persuade the Dniester authorities to seek a final, political solution to the conflict in Moldova.

Ukraine: Crisis Averted?

Crimea is a peninsula off the southern Black Sea coast of Ukraine that was transferred in 1954 from the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) to the Ukrainian SSR as a gesture commemorating 300 years of Russian-Ukrainian unity. During the Soviet period, this transfer was

essentially an administrative issue, but as Ukraine moved in 1991 toward independence from Moscow, the political elite in Crimea faced the real possibility of separation from Russia. From 1991 to 1995, a concerted separatist movement led by the regional elite in Crimea's capital of Simferopol threatened regional security.[3] The HCNM of the OSCE[4] worked closely with the parties to resolve the crisis through a constitutional solution, albeit a temporary one as the 2014 crisis makes clear.

> *Timing: Is the third-party intervention robust and early, before the positions of the parties have hardened and tensions have escalated? Or, does the third party intervene after violence has broken out?*

The HCNM of the OSCE intervened in this case after tensions had significantly escalated, but about a year before the most acute phase of the conflict. The timing of his intervention was, therefore, conducive to success, as he was able to establish a relationship with both sides before the March 1995 showdown between Kyiv and Simferopol. His early intervention was most successful in establishing a relationship with the central government in Kyiv. As he took the territorial integrity of Ukraine as an official starting point, he had the full support of the government in Kyiv. His official view that economic aid for Crimea be tied to Ukrainian territorial integrity (Kemp 2001, 219) further underscores the importance he placed on this issue.

By creating a process through which Crimean interests could be served while Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity were preserved, van der Stoel was committed to only a few of the most basic Crimean interests: economic and cultural autonomy. Their more substantial interests in greater independence, weaker relations with Kyiv and closer relations with Russia were not consistent with the principle of territorial integrity and, thus, were not seriously considered in negotiations. Early intervention, therefore, was helpful in creating a political process through which relations between Kyiv and Simferopol could be negotiated, but this achievement benefited the central government much more than the regional government in Crimea.

> *Leadership: Is the national leadership willing to work with the international community? Does the intervention have the involvement and commitment of major international parties? Or, is the third party insufficiently committed or lacking in appropriate power?*

Leadership was conducive to success in this case as well. Major powers such as Germany, Poland and the United States viewed a democratic, independent and secure Ukraine as in their vital interests. Making sure the crisis in Crimea was resolved peacefully was critical to the overall management of Ukraine's relations with Russia and, thus, stability in the region. The United States and major European allies had a strong interest, therefore, in a peaceful resolution of the crisis between Kyiv and Simferopol, as well as an interest to avoid direct confrontation between Kyiv and Moscow. This created a solid base of support for Ukrainian efforts to manage the crisis in Crimea. Major power commitment to Ukraine was critical to success in this case as it offered Ukraine the support necessary to allow some autonomy for Crimea without fear as to the viability of the Ukrainian state. The central government's willingness to engage with the international community and to cooperate with the OSCE also contributed heavily to success in this case.

The Crimean authorities, in contrast, were openly belligerent at important points during the confrontation. Persons in positions of power in Crimea openly rallied for severing ties with Kyiv and either establishing independence or reunifying with Russia (Svetova and Solchanyk 1994, 29). The engagement of the international community, and their commitment to support the political process of conflict management, did not serve the interests of these pro-independence forces and, therefore, probably did not influence their actions.

> *Leverage: Does the third party have the c*apacity to provide rewards and offer credible threats sufficient to ensure compliance*? Or, is the third party lacking in ability to offer attractive incentives for compliance and effective threats to prevent non-compliance*?

The OSCE had a good deal of leverage at its disposal in this case, but this leverage, again, was more salient for the central government than for the Crimean leadership. Cooperation with the OSCE brought significant benefits to Ukraine. As Ukraine's highest priority at this point in time was the consolidation of its independence, international support for Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity was a matter of vital interest. Working with the HCNM to peacefully resolve the crisis in Crimea made it possible for Ukraine to achieve both goals at the same time: resolving Crimea's status would strengthen the power and legitimacy of the central government; and resolving the crisis in a manner sanctioned by the OSCE would

ensure international and regional support for the process and for Ukrainian sovereignty. In contrast, the OSCE did not have any real incentives to offer, or sanctions with which to threaten the Crimean leadership. Leverage, therefore, against the Crimean leadership was very limited even as it may have contributed to the central government in Kyiv's decision to cooperate with the OSCE.

> *Multifaceted Action: Does the action taken address the range of variables contributing to the escalation of conflict? Or, is the action taken mismatched to the needs of the parties?*

The OSCE took multifaceted action appropriately tailored to effectively alleviate the factors contributing to the conflict between Crimea and the central government in Kyiv by legitimizing Ukraine's post-Soviet borders, assisting the central government in Kyiv with some of its governing functions, articulating an autonomy arrangement for Crimea and clearing the way for Western economic aid and political support. This action served the interests of the central government in Kyiv, however, to a much greater extent than the interests of the Crimean leadership. Since the negotiations began with the baseline of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and the legitimacy of Kyiv's rule over Crimea, the Crimean leadership had limited expectations of the political process sponsored by the OSCE. Their willingness to cooperate was less a function of their sincere engagement in the process than a reflection of their lack of alternatives.

This is clearly demonstrated by the continued appeal for Russian support that the Crimean leadership made at the same time as the OSCE process was underway. For example, the pro-Russian Chairman of the Crimean Supreme Soviet Sergei Tsekov spoke on April 14, 1995, at a plenary meeting of the Russian Federation State Duma, where he pleaded for Russia's help and support for Crimea's drive for greater autonomy (Zhuravlyov 1995, 21). Help was not, however, forthcoming. Rather, a Russian governmental official "described Crimea as Ukraine's 'internal affair'—for which the Russian government was thanked by [Ukrainian President] Kuchma" (Lieven 1999, 118). Whatever the reasons for Russia's decision not to become directly involved, it is clear that the lack of support for the pro-Russian, pro-independence Crimean leadership was a major factor pushing Crimea to the negotiating table. No longer able to pursue their objectives outside of the political process created by the OSCE, they had no choice but to get the best deal possible. The solution,

however, was dependent upon Russia's acceptance and therefore was not ultimately self-sustaining as the 2014 crisis illustrates.

Findings: The Case for Multidimensional Prevention

Phase Three: Theoretical Implications

This review of minority group action in each of the three case studies supports the argument that successful prevention in these cases was dependent upon *both* the creation of a political process as an alternative to violent resistance, *and* the removal of opportunities to reject that process and pursue objectives through alternate means. In each of these cases, current thinking about preventive diplomacy does a good job explaining the motivations and actions of the government in the country concerned, but cannot account for the motivations and actions of the rebelling group seeking autonomy or secession. Indeed, in all three cases, timing, leverage, leadership and action taken all impacted the government in very different ways than they impacted the minority. It would seem, therefore, that existing theoretical frameworks are better suited to explain the actions, calculations and motivations of recognized states. It was Russia's willingness, or lack thereof, to support their ethnic counterparts that determined success or failure in all three cases, despite the diplomatic initiative's effectiveness in shaping official government behavior. Thus, these existing frameworks do not, based upon the findings of the case studies, always explain how or why minority groups decide to take up arms or, alternatively, decide to settle for whatever political solution they are able to achieve. They do not, therefore, adequately address how to prevent minority group violence in internal conflict.

Based upon the results of the case studies, it does not seem possible to deter or induce the cooperation of rebelling separatist groups if the political process cannot achieve the results they are seeking, *and* if the group has other options. This may be true because, in the course of negotiations, it is not always possible to give the minority group what they want, while at the same time supporting and protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, as most clearly illustrated by the Ukraine/Crimea case. Since regional and international multilateral institutions of international security are based solidly upon respect and protection of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, existing conflict management frameworks may not be well suited to the management of internal conflicts.

This method asks researchers to suggest refinements to existing frameworks and to pose questions to direct future research agendas, based upon the results of the comparative study and the resulting findings. Based upon my finding that existing frameworks are too state-centric, and that minority groups often follow a different logic, whereby they rebel if they have sufficient support and resources, I developed a model that I call multidimensional prevention. This model is based both upon the creation of a political process as an alternative to violent resistance, *and* the removal of opportunities to reject that process and pursue objectives through alternate means. In this conceptualization, early intervention will focus not just upon persuading the central government to engage in dialogue, but will also seek to deter outside actors from supporting any potential rebellion by the mobilizing minority. Such a strategy will encompass deterrent and coercive as well as cooperative and inducement measures as it seeks to impact the decision-making of both the central government and the disaffected minority. By expanding the existing preventive diplomacy framework to examine these two related, yet distinct, parallel processes, multidimensional prevention improves our understanding of how and why some efforts to prevent the escalation of internal conflict succeed and others fail. It also provides the basis for a richer range of policy prescriptions that, through their incorporation of both alternative processes and removal of opportunities to reject those processes, are much more likely to result in successful interventions.

Drawing up the work of Lund (1996), I illustrate how institutions could adapt their approach to preventive diplomacy to incorporate the multidimensional approach. He envisions preventive diplomacy operating during a period of unstable peace where a potential or actual conflict is materializing or escalating, but no widespread violence has yet occurred. He divides this somewhat broad phase into three subtypes: pre-conflict peace-building, which operates at the lowest level of tension and seeks to reduce the sources of conflict; preemptive engagement, which operates at low levels of conflict where tensions are rising, and focuses on engaging the parties and addressing the specific issues at hand and crisis prevention, which seeks to block potential violent acts as a conflict is beginning to spiral out of control (Lund 1996, 46–47).

I build upon Lund's work by taking his conceptual framework of the subtypes of preventive diplomacy to construct a model that illustrates how institutions could improve their capacity for successful preventive

interventions. I first illustrate how the current approach to prevention reflects the common conflict management paradigm that focuses on cooperative means at lower levels of tension, and on more coercive means as the conflict develops into a crisis. In other words, it relies more heavily upon "carrots" or incentives at lower levels of conflict, and more heavily upon "sticks" or sanctions at higher levels of conflict. Figure 4.1 illustrates this approach to conflict management.

This approach focuses on voluntary cooperation, and primarily on the process of creating alternatives to the use of force. As tensions escalate toward crisis, the third party can raise the costs of choosing violence by incorporating deterrence and coercive diplomacy into the diplomatic response. Focusing primarily upon incentives at low levels of tension and on sanctions at higher levels of tension is the most common approach to conflict management. The findings of the above three case studies suggest that it is flawed, however, since the rebelling group in each of the three

Fig. 4.1 Cooperative and coercive measures in preventive diplomacy

cases was only marginally affected by the diplomatic efforts made by the third party. A much more important factor in their decision to refrain from violent protest, or to take up arms, was their relative ability to access the resources to fuel their secession.

Multidimensional prevention provides an alternative framework that accommodates two parallel and interconnected processes. First, the current paradigm is expanded to consider both measures that focus on cooperation, or inducement as tensions rise, and on deterrence, or coercion as tensions rise. This will increase the scope of policy prescriptions for all varieties of internal conflict. Second, while keeping the current focus on creating alternatives to the use of force, an additional process is added to the current framework: removing opportunities to reject those alternatives. In each of the cases studied here, the disaffected minority was most affected by the opportunity, or lack thereof, to use force to pursue their aims. Including both processes, therefore, in a single framework will more effectively influence both official governments and mobilized minorities. Figure 4.2 illustrates how a multidimensional preventive framework would expand the scope of policy prescriptions in preventive diplomacy.

By expanding upon the current preventive diplomacy paradigm to include cooperative and inducement measures as well as deterrent and coercive measures throughout, multidimensional prevention answers the call of several important analyses in the conflict prevention literature that call for such "mixed strategies". Notably, Jentleson argues, "the tendency in much of the preventive diplomacy literature to focus more on the inducement-cooperation dimension than on the coercive-deterrence one is the mirror image of the over emphasis on the latter and often the exclusion of the former in the Cold War-era deterrence literature" (Jentleson 2000, 13). Just as the deterrence literature has been greatly enriched through greater consideration of the power of positive inducements to positively impact the adversary's behavior (George and Smoke 1974), and thus ultimately contribute to successful deterrence, the preventive diplomacy literature needs to incorporate greater consideration of deterrence and potential coercion. Jentleson proposes a combination of coercive elements sufficient to craft a credible deterrent and inducements sufficiently attractive to create incentives for cooperation. Multidimensional prevention answers this challenge by detailing how such elements can be effectively combined at various stages to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict.

	INDUCEMENT/ COOPERATION	**COERCION/ DETERRENCE**
Crisis Prevention	**Providing Alternatives:** decisive diplomacy on the part of major regional actors to offer a viable political solution	**Providing Alternatives:** regional actors offer a credible threat to deter rejection of the political process
	Removing Opportunities: introduce preventive peacekeeping forces	**Removing Opportunities:** arms embargo, deterrence and coercive diplomacy aimed at all relevant parties, including regional actors
Preemptive Engagement	**Providing Alternatives:** offer a political forum for negotiations, create incentives for adhering to established norms	**Providing Alternatives:** conditional aid, conditional membership in regional political and economic institutions
	Removing Opportunities: engage regional actors, particularly neighboring states, and create incentive structure to support the political process and refrain from military intervention or support	**Removing Opportunities:** create sanction structure to punish military action, intervention or support
Pre-conflict Peacebuilding	**Providing Alternatives:** building capacity in political institutions, human rights standards, articulation of regional norms	**Providing Alternatives:** outline standards for participation in regional political and economic institutions
	Removing Opportunities: arms control regimes	**Removing Opportunities:** create demilitarized zones, limit weapons stockpiling

TENSION (with upward arrow)

Fig. 4.2 Multidimensional prevention

Conclusions

This study has sought to illustrate how, through in-depth case studies, "focused, structured comparison" can identify areas of current theory or policy frameworks that require refinement and additional study. The three cases here, very similar in characteristics but very different in outcome, make a persuasive case that existing frameworks are essentially one-dimensional and state-centric; they focus almost entirely on the intervening

party and the target state. They do not adequately consider or account for the actions of sub-state actors such as minority groups, despite the fact that the minority is clearly a stakeholder. Thus, while this method cannot establish *what* drove minority behavior in these cases, it can alert us to the fact that current frameworks do not tell us all we want to know, and thus do not provide a solid basis for effective policy.

In doing so, this method opens the door to future theory building by establishing new research questions that are likely to yield findings that are important to both theory and practice. Further, the rich detail of the cases allows researchers to propose concrete steps to modify or refine current models or frameworks. This opens an additional area of potential future study and also the opportunity to inform future policy. In short, a structured, focused comparative study of a small number of cases can yield extremely valuable contributions to the study of international politics by expanding areas of inquiry and providing the basis for sharper theoretical and policy frameworks.

Notes

1. Portions of this chapter are reproduced, with permission from Sage, from Angela Kachuyevski, "Structured, Focused Comparison: An In-Depth Case Study of Ethnic Conflict Prevention" in *Sage Research Methods Cases*, 2014.
2. See especially the work and publications of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict; available from http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/frpub.htm.
3. For a detailed analysis of the conflict in Crimea, see Gwendolyn Sasse, *The Crimea Question: Identity, Transition, and Conflict,* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
4. For a detailed discussion of the work of the HCNM in Ukraine and Crimea, see Angela Kachuyevski, "The Possibilities and Limitations of Preventive Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities in Ukraine," *International Negotiation: A Journal of Theory and Practice* 17, issue 3, December 2012.

References

Annan, Kofi. 2005. *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All.* New York: United Nations Publications.

Ballentine, Karen, and Jake Sherman. 2003. *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Bennett, Andrew, and Alexander L. George. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Brady, Henry E., and David Collier, eds. 2010. *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Brass, Paul R. 1991. *Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Brown, Michael E. 1997. The Causes of Internal Conflict. In *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown, 3–25. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. 1997. *Final Report*. New York: Carnegie Corporation.

Collier, Paul. 2000. Doing Well Out of War. In *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*, ed. Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, 91–113. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

de Nevers, Renee. 1993. Democratization and Ethnic Conflict. In *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown, 61–78. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

"Decree of the President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: On Measures to Normalize the Situation in the Moldovan SSR" (complete text). 1990. In *Pravda* and *Izvestia* 23 December 1990, p. 1. Translation *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 42, no 51. 23 January 1991, p. 24.

Edwards, G.E. 1996. Early Warning and Preventive Diplomacy: The Role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. *RUSI Journal* 141 (5): 42–46.

George, Alexander, and Richard Smoke. 1974. *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Gurr, Ted Robert. 1993. *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopolitical Conflicts*. Washington: US Institute for Peace.

Horowitz, Donald L. 1985. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Huber, Konrad. 1994. The CSCE's New Role in the East: Conflict Prevention. *RFE/RL Research Report* 3 (31): 23–30.

Hurlburt, Heather F. 2000. Preventive Diplomacy: Success in the Baltics. In *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. Bruce W. Jentleson, 91–107. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Jentleson, Bruce W. 2000. Preventive Diplomacy: Analytical Conclusions and Policy Lessons. In *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. Bruce W. Jentleson, 319–348. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Kaufman, Stuart J. 1996. Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War. *International Security* 21 (2): 108–138.

Kemp, Walter A., ed. 2001. *Quiet Diplomacy in Action: The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities*. Boston: Kluwer Law International.

Lake, David A., and Donald Rothchild. 1998. Spreading Fear: The Genesis of Transnational Ethnic Conflict. In *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion and Escalation*, ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Lieven, Anatol. 1999. *Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry*. Washington, DC: US Institute for Peace Press.

Lund, Michael S. 1996. *Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington: US Institute of Peace.

Neukirch, Claus. 2003. Russia and the OSCE: The Influence of Interested Third and Disinterested Fourth Parties on the Conflicts in Estonia and Moldova. In *National Integration and Violent Conflict in Post-Soviet Societies: The Cases of Estonia and Moldova*, ed. Pal Kolsto. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

Sisk, Timothy D. 1996. *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts*. Washington: USIP Press.

Snyder, Jack. 1993. Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State. In *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Socor, Vladimir. 1992. Russia's 14th Army and the Insurgency in Eastern Moldova. *RFE/RL Research Report* 1 (3): 41–48.

Svetova, Svetlana, and Roman Solchanyk. 1994. Chronology of Events in Crimea. *RFE/RL Research Report* 3 (19): 27–33.

Zhuravlyov, Pyotr. 1995. In *Sevodnya* (condensed text) 15 April, p. 1. Trans. *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press* 47 (15): 21.

Combating Modeling "at the Expense of Relevance": Moving the Study of Political Behavior Past Large-*n* Survey Analysis in American Politics

Amy Widestrom

Recent debates in American politics have begun focusing on economic inequality in American society, reflecting much heralded research over the past two decades or so documenting rising trends in income and wealth inequality in the United States (e.g., Bartels 2008; Burtless 1999; Western et al. 2008; Wolff 2002). More recent studies suggest that conditions of economic inequality have introduced a radical imbalance in representation within our political system (e.g., Pierson and Hacker 2010). These findings indicate that the phenomenon of economic inequality is more complex than the oft-cited, and overly reductive, comparison of CEO salaries to working-class wages. Indeed, there are many facets to economic inequality that remain underexamined but that have long-term civic and political consequences.

A. Widestrom (✉)
Arcadia University, Glenside, PA, USA

A key aspect of economic inequality is the deeper, associated problem of economic segregation that has emerged as a result and that introduced systematic neglect of certain communities across the country; low-income urban residents, often African American although not exclusively so, have been neglected by city officials and planners in increasingly impoverished and blighted neighborhoods across the United States (Jargowsky 1997; Kneebone et al. 2011; Massey and Denton 1993; Widestrom 2015). The reason for neglect by city officials is typically attributed to individual political apathy or disempowerment among certain citizens. Low-income residents in impoverished communities do not advocate on their own behalf, vote, contact their elected officials, or donate money at sufficient rates to attract the kind of attention needed to address community concerns (Verba et al. 1995).

Moreover, political scientists typically understand this low level of civic engagement among the least advantaged citizens to be a function of individual resources (Verba et al. 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980); indeed, those who examine political behavior in the United States tend to argue that most civic and political engagement is a function of individual resources, time, ability, and disposition. These individual-level explanations for civic and political engagement are often the result of the methodological approach scholars take to investigating these phenomena, specifically an over-reliance on large surveys of individuals. When an approach to answering a question relies on individual-level data, it is hardly surprising that individual-level attributes are highlighted as the cause of a particular political and/or civic outcome of interest.

And yet, in my own investigation of the civic and political consequences of economic segregation, I find a different explanation, one that has not been sufficiently explored by scholars. The historical evolution of isolated high-poverty neighborhoods demonstrates more than just the movement and concentration of individuals and their individual resources; it highlights a pattern of residential segregation defined by income rather than by race alone—sorting between the middle and upper-middle classes and low-income citizens—or what we can call *economic* segregation. This phenomenon produces community environments that do or do not have the resources and capabilities to advocate for, or fight policies that harm, individual neighborhoods. From this perspective, declining civic engagement among low-income citizens does not cause neglect by elected officials and the creation of policies that perpetuate and exacerbate the problems of persistent poverty. Rather, public policies create low-income

neighborhoods, producing *civic environments* that diminish civic engagement among the least advantaged in society, thereby reducing the capacity of entire communities to advocate on their own behalf. I am able to reach this conclusion because I use a mixed-methods approach that allows me to understand the nature, scope, and context of civic and political behavior, rather than simply documenting trends in behavior, as is typical in the analysis of civic and political engagement in America.

Ultimately, then, my core findings were that economic segregation, on the rise since 1970, has contributed to low levels of voter participation in segregated low-income neighborhoods and that voter participation in segregated affluent neighborhoods has remained high or has increased in recent decades. An important source of these trends, I found, is that the presence and capabilities of mobilizing institutions—voluntary associations, churches, and political campaigns/parties—in highly segregated impoverished neighborhoods have declined, while mobilizing institutions in prosperous neighborhoods have remained active. In other words, while scholars have typically conceived of voting as an individual act, I argue that we live in civic environments—defined by the residential spaces we occupy—that shape us as citizens, and that our inclination (or disinclination) to participate in civic life is shaped in part by the civic environments in which we live, especially by the presence or absence of key organizations and institutions within these environments. Without using both quantitative and qualitative methods in the course of this study, I could not have been able to articulate the problem—economic segregation affects civic and political behavior—*and also* identify the mechanisms—historical trends, community context, and changing local mobilization efforts—that combine to produce the problem. It was the historical records and the interviews that really allowed me to provide the thick description of civic environments within different types of neighborhoods.

The Politics of Economic Segregation

Using ordinary least squares regression analysis, and controlling for a variety of factors, I do find that economic segregation depresses voter turnout generally. This depressive effect is strong and statistically significant in counties where households earn less than $32,000, on average (for more on this see Widestrom 2015, specifically the introductory chapter). Typical scholars studying political participation would try to understand this political behavior in one of three ways: as the result of individual resources,

legal-institutional arrangements, or mobilization efforts. These studies have taught us that citizens with greater individual resources, greater understanding of the electoral process, and greater access to civic and political institutions are more likely to participate at higher rates (Putnam 2000; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba et al. 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980).

A small group of scholars have explored how neighborhood context affects political behavior by looking at social networks or levels of economic or political homogeneity or heterogeneity across the urban/suburban divide (Campbell 2006; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987, 1992; Oliver 1999). The few scholars who attempt to understand how neighborhood effects might shape political behavior have shown that neighborhood or community context matters for civic engagement: heterogeneous and homogeneous contexts shape civic engagement, though the extent to which they do and the nature of the effect depend on the phenomenon being evaluated.

Studies examining the "racial threat hypothesis" also prove helpful when thinking about how context matters for political behavior. Key's seminal work, *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (1949), has generated decades of research on how racial context—where and with whom one lives—affects political attitudes and behaviors. The basic arguments of these studies are that the political attitudes of whites are in part determined by the size of other racial and/or ethnic populations in their community: whites exhibit higher levels of racial hostility when they live among larger minority populations, presumably because of perceived threat to their economic and political interests (Glaser 1994; Hood and Morris 2000; Oliver and Wong 2003; Sigelman and Welch 1993; Taylor 1998).

And yet, studies of civic engagement and political behavior tend not to focus on economic segregation specifically, despite the fact that economic segregation has increased substantially over the past several decades. While many urban cores and suburbs remain racially segregated, a most striking trend in recent years is the rising levels of economic segregation within urban centers and between urban and suburban areas (Watson 2006; Wilson 1987; Schneider and Phelan 1993). A primary factor in this trend is the continued migration of non-poor African Americans, Hispanics, and Asians out of moderately poor and high-poverty neighborhoods (Quillian 1999). Moreover, "[a]fter declining in the 1990s, the population in extreme-poverty neighborhoods—where at least 40 percent of individuals

live below the poverty line—rose by one-third from 2000 to 2005–09" (Kneebone et al. 2011, 1).

Trends in income and wealth inequality have also contributed to a rise in economic segregation. According to Watson, "[i]nequality at the bottom of the distribution is related to the residential isolation of the poor, while inequality at the top is associated with the segregation of the rich" (2009, 821). Thus, inequality affects economic quintiles—the top and bottom—differently, and though levels of racial segregation are still higher than economic segregation, economic segregation is increasing while racial segregation has begun to decline. This suggests the need to focus on economic segregation specifically, using methods that allow scholars to see not just that economic segregation matters for civic and political outcomes, but *how* and *why* it matters.

My work considers economic segregation as a possible independent factor shaping civic engagement. A focus on economic segregation makes sense because economic status and segregation carry with them an arrangement of resources, such as money, education, employment, and free time, within a community that could be leveraged for political mobilization and participation, while race, alone, does not. Despite the lack of focus on the relationship between economic segregation and civic and political engagement, all of these previous examinations help lay the groundwork for a theory of economic segregation and civic and political engagement.

Methodology and Political Behavior in Context

Understanding the extent to which levels of civic and political engagement may have changed over time as a result of trends in economic segregation is vital for deepening our understanding of the consequences of income inequality in the United States, as well as the nature of citizen participation in American civic life. Political scientists know a great deal about national trends in voter participation and civic engagement, and about the factors that contribute to an individual person's sense of political efficacy, but our understanding of how local context—the neighborhoods where people spend a great deal of their day-to-day lives—contributes to the development of political dispositions and, consequently, levels of civic and political participation remains incomplete. In order to understand this, we need a research approach that draws out the historical evolution of neighborhoods and focuses on civic and political engagement at the neighborhood level. A historical and mixed-methods approach appreciates how

neighborhoods change over time and how public policies and local circumstances can shape and reshape civic environments and the behavior of citizens within those environments. Studies of mass political participation, typical of studies focusing on political behavior in American politics, typically do not take this kind of local, historical, and/or mixed-methods approach, in part because of a reliance on large survey and cross-sectional data. But such data-driven studies cannot tell us about all the ways in which local context contributes to citizen engagement; in order to do that, we need to pay closer attention to specific neighborhoods.

The focus of my work is on urban neighborhoods, which are important because while scholars have meticulously documented the challenges facing cities in the post-World War II era, as of the year 2000, 68 percent of people still lived in urbanized areas, with 58 percent living in urbanized areas with a total population of 200,000 or more, and another 10 percent living in urbanized areas with 50,000–199,999 people. The number of urban dwellers actually increased to 71.2 percent in 2010 (Beauregard 2003; U.S. Department of Transportation 2000). In other words, despite the conventional wisdom that suggests deindustrialization and urban decay have decimated American cities, a significant number of Americans still live in, around, or in close proximity to urban areas. Using cities as case studies for unraveling civic engagement and demobilization thus makes sense because any relationship between local circumstances and civic life that can be demonstrated in an urban context necessarily affects tens of millions of citizens.

The specific neighborhoods used in my study were identified by using the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB) to assess nationwide trends in economic segregation.[1] This database includes variables from the 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 censuses aggregated to and/or averaged at the census tract (CT) level, allowing for an examination of how neighborhood environments changed over this 30-year period. The NCDB data can be organized into a dataset that provides economic, educational, residential, and employment data at the CT level for every tract in the United States from 1970 to 2000; crucially, this also makes it possible to calculate indicators of economic segregation. Another important feature of the database is that the data have been "normalized," allowing for the comparison of CTs over time.

To be sure, when considering neighborhoods in American cities, the word "segregation" is immediately problematic because of the long history of geographic isolation of peoples of different races and ethnicities (Anderson 1992; Darden 1987; Dawson 1995; Frazier et al. 2003; Sugrue

2005/1996; Tolnay et al. 2002). Recognizing that the dynamics of race and economics are often intertwined, it is important here to try and focus on segregation along economic lines as separate and independent. Moreover, segregation has to be appreciated as a phenomenon with multiple interrelated yet independent dimensions that combine to create specific types of segregated neighborhoods and communities.

Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, in their important article "The Dimensions of Residential Segregation," extensively examined the literature on residential segregation, including 20 separate indicators of segregation, and concluded that the dissimilarity and isolation indexes, used to measure the dimensions of evenness and exposure, respectively, capture useful and distinct aspect of segregation. Therefore, I used both the dissimilarity and isolation indexes to select economically segregated case-study counties and within those counties increasingly impoverished and prosperous neighborhoods, which served two purposes. First, relying on the well-known and widely used indexes helps this study contribute to consistency across studies of segregation. Second, using two distinct measures of segregation to select cases from among the most segregated counties in the country ensured that the cases selected are not anomalous. In other words, if neighborhoods within case-study counties/cities are considered segregated on two different dimensions—evenness and exposure—then it is likely that the populations living within those neighborhoods are truly spatially separate from one another.[2]

The dissimilarity index, which measures evenness, is the proportion of a minority group within a specific area that would have to change their residence in order to create an even distribution of their group across that area (Massey and Denton 1988, 284). The dissimilarity index is calculated using the following formula:

$$D = \Sigma \left[t_i \, | \, (p_i - P) | \right] / 2TP(1 - P)$$

where t_i and p_i are the total population and the low-income population, respectively, of area unit i, and T and P are the total population size and minority proportion of a county, which is subdivided into areal units. The minority population in my calculation is the number of people living below the federally determined poverty line, and the areal unit employed is the CT. The dissimilarity index is calculated at the county level and then multiplied by 100 in order to state the percentage of people who would have to move from their CT to another in a county in order to produce an

even distribution of those living below the poverty line. A score of zero means that no low-income residents would have to move to achieve an even distribution of low-income residents (no segregation), while a score of 100 means that all low-income people would have to move to achieve evenness (complete segregation).

Examining trends in the dissimilarity index, I find that the 1970s and the 1980s were the most segregated and that, while the 1990s were better, the levels of dissimilarity in 2000 were still quite high. In 1970, over 70 percent of US counties housed residents that were unevenly distributed. For example, 20–40 percent of low-income residents in nearly 69 percent of all counties in the United States in 1970 would have had to change neighborhoods in order to achieve an even distribution of poor residents throughout their county. This number drops substantially by 2000, but even then in 30 percent of all counties, 20–40 percent of low-income county residents would have had to relocate to a different neighborhood to produce an even distribution of low-income residents within the county. In other words, the data show that poor people were, generally speaking, very unevenly distributed throughout counties in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s, and while the situation improved somewhat in the 1990s, residential segregation along economic lines as measured by evenness remained significant in 2000.

The isolation index "measures the extent to which members of a particular group are *exposed*, in their neighborhoods, only to members of their group. In particular, for the poorer in any metropolitan area, the isolation index indicates how poor (e.g. 25, 50, 75 percent) the neighborhood of the average poor person is" (Abramson et al. 1995). In other words, the isolation index measures the degree to which individuals live in neighborhoods with other individuals like them. The isolation index for poverty is calculated with the following formula:

$$I_P = 100^* \, \text{Sum}\left(\left(p_i \, / \, P\right) * \left(p_i \, / \, t_i\right)\right)$$

where p_i is the number of low-income residents and t_i is the total population of area unit i, which in this case is a CT. P is the total number of low-income citizens in the county. The low-income population in this calculation is the number of people living below the federally determined poverty line in a given areal unit.[3] The number resulting from this calculation is multiplied by 100 to express the isolation index as a percentage; a

score of zero indicates no segregation and a score of 100 indicates complete segregation.

In 1970, 21 percent of counties had isolation indexes between 20 and 40, which means that in 1970 low-income residents in one out of five counties in the United States lived in neighborhoods where 20–40 percent of the *other* residents of their neighborhood were *also* living below the poverty line. Most striking, though, is that by 1990 one-third of all US counties housed low-income residents in neighborhoods where 20–40 percent of their neighbors were also poor (see Widestrom 2015 for more information, specifically the introductory chapter). This number may seem small, but when considering the people affected by these trends, this increase is quite devastating for the millions of low-income residents throughout the United States who have been increasingly concentrated in these high-poverty areas. Looking at Milwaukee, Wisconsin, as an example, in 1970 there were 381 poor people per CT living in neighborhoods where 20–40 percent of other residents were poor. This number increased to 745 per tract by 1990 (Jargowsky 1997).

The purpose of my study was motivated by a desire to understand the consequences of these trends for people living in these neighborhoods. Because the aim was to understand the civic consequences of residential economic segregation of poverty and comparative prosperity, the case-study selection process began by first identifying neighborhoods that have become deeply economically distressed within highly segregated counties between 1970 and 2000. From here, I also identified prosperous neighborhoods within each county in order to compare with their impoverished counterpart so that I could explore how economic segregation affects the civic lives of citizens living in different economic contexts. I did this by determining the neighborhoods that had become among the most impoverished neighborhoods in the nation by rank-ordering neighborhoods by their change in poverty rate from 1970 to 2000.[4] Once these neighborhoods were identified, their level of segregation was determined by looking at the position they occupied in the rank ordering of the most segregated counties in the nation. In other words, I first identified very poor neighborhoods and then selected neighborhoods from this list that were also located in some of the most segregated counties in the nation, as measured by both the dissimilarity and isolation indexes. This allowed for the selection of highly segregated impoverished and prosperous case-study communities.

One way to confirm the segregated nature of these counties was to look beyond their position in the rankings and the values of their dissimilarity

and isolation indexes and to calculate the absolute difference between the dissimilarity and isolation indexes for the counties home to the poorest neighborhoods. If the difference is high it would mean that the county is segregated along one dimension but not the other, whereas counties with high levels of dissimilarity and isolation but low absolute difference between these two indicators are segregated across two dimensions. Table 5.1 shows the top 25 neighborhoods that meet these criteria. (The

Table 5.1 Neighborhoods ranked by poverty rate, dissimilarity, and isolation

Rank by ↑ in Poverty Rate	Census Tract[1]	County	State	Net ↑ in PR[2]	D Rank, 2000	I Rank, 2000	|Diff| D vs I
1	11001007308	Washington, D.C.	DC	90	198	39	159
2	06037222700	San Diego	CA	80	171	52	119
3	48441012100	Taylor	TX	66	182	138	44
4	36029006202	Erie	NY	66	12	72	60
5	34031223900	Passaic	NJ	62	37	118	81
6	25025150100	Suffolk	MA	62	287	81	206
7	17031290600	Cook	IL	52	48	66	18
8	17031270500	Cook	IL	51	48	66	18
9	17031690100	Cook	IL	50	48	66	18
10	34007608204	Camden	NJ	47	25	103	78
11	36005023702	Bronx	NY	46	227	2	225
12	17031283000	Cook	IL	46	48	66	18
13	13121007100	Fulton	GA	45	17	27	10
14	17031381500	Cook	IL	45	48	66	18
15	17031381700	Cook	IL	44	48	66	18
16	55079001200	Milwaukee	WI	44	19	38	19
17	17031290500	Cook	IL	44	48	66	18
18	17031292000	Cook	IL	42	48	66	18
19	29095003502	Jackson	MO	42	72	130	58
20	13121006400	Fulton	GA	42	17	27	10
21	17031600100	Cook	IL	41	48	66	18
22	36055001500	Monroe	NY	41	4	73	69
23	36085002900	Richmond	NY	41	145	216	71
24	36047053300	Kings	NY	41	317	14	303
25	42077000900	Lehigh	PA	40	39	181	142

[a]This number is the census geocode assigned to the census tract; the first two numbers are the state code, the next three numbers are the county code, which means that the first five numbers represent a unique county code for each county in the nation. The next four numbers represent the first part of the census tract identifier, and the last two numbers are the second part of the tract identifier. For example, tract number 29095003502 is in Missouri (state code 29), Jackson County (county code 095), and is tract 35.02 (003502)

[b]The numbers in this column represent the increase of poverty rate in percentage points from 1970 to 2000

neighborhoods shaded in gray are the impoverished case-study neighborhoods chosen for this study.) As can be seen, there is some variance in the dissimilarity and isolation indexes, but the absolute differences between the two indicators in the chosen case studies are among the lowest.[5]

A final factor considered was the presence of an urban area with stable CT boundaries from 1970 to 2000, which necessitated excluding many cities in the west and southwest because of boundary instability.[6] These decision rules produced impoverished case-study neighborhoods in Atlanta, Fulton County, Georgia (CT 13121); Kansas City in Jackson County, Missouri (CT 29095); Milwaukee in Milwaukee County, Wisconsin (CT 55079); and Rochester in Monroe County, New York (CT 36055). The neighborhood selected in Fulton County, Georgia, for example, experienced a dramatic increase in poverty between 1970 and 2000—from almost 9 percent to 54 percent, a 45-point increase. Further, in 2000, Fulton County was the 17th most segregated county in the nation when measured by the dissimilarity index, with nearly 45 percent of impoverished residents needing to move to create an even distribution of the low-income population, and 27th most segregated when measured by isolation, with 29 percent of low-income residents living in low-income communities, a difference of only 10 points. Thus, the neighborhood became increasingly economically distressed within a context of substantial economic segregation. The prosperous neighborhood counterparts in each city were identified by determining neighborhoods that experienced increasing wealth within these counties between 1970 and 2000, as measured by average family income.[7]

These case studies are suitable for comparison because they represent mid-size cities in the United States that are geographically and historically diverse. It is important to note, though, that these counties are not exactly the same. This is in many ways unavoidable and in some ways by design; it is nearly impossible to find census tracts with the same levels of poverty and wealth within counties that have the same levels of segregation. So along these metrics the case studies naturally vary.[8] In other ways, though, it was important for contextual factors to vary. Including Fulton County as a case study, for instance, allows for comparison with an urban case in the South, a region of the United States with a particular history and culture that is distinct from elsewhere in the country, as well as a region that has become much more populated in the late twentieth century. Moreover, the case-study neighborhoods in Fulton County are both nearly 100 per-

cent African American, while the others in my study are more racially diverse.[9] This is important because it is difficult, possibly impossible, to talk about residential segregation in the United States and not grapple with the tortured and complicated history of race and racism that have certainly affected the lives of millions of residents in American cities. Allowing variance in racial composition among the case studies allowed me to isolate the effects of economic segregation in important ways.

Thus, what makes this puzzle—the relationship between economic segregation and turnout—challenging is that it is possible that some of the other factors sufficient for affecting voter turnout may also be shaped by economic segregation. To account for this dynamic, then, case studies *had to* represent economic segregation, within which I could investigate the various factors that shape voter turnout. A case-study analysis designed to investigate civic and political engagement within communities within the context of economic segregation can tell us *how* and *why* a trend or relationship between economic segregation and turnout exists. While a quick quantitative assessment can show that there is a relationship, a case-study analysis using qualitative research methods, focusing on specific instances of economic segregation, can show us the nature of this relationship.

As has been demonstrated, my research employed some quantitative analysis but fundamentally was grounded in qualitative, case-study research. Unlike quantitative research, which typically relies on mathematical tools associated with statistics and probability theory, this type of qualitative research project is based on set theory and logic (Goertz and Mahoney 2012).[10] For this reason, it is not necessary to identify a less segregated county, and two mixed-income neighborhoods, to compare with the highly segregated ones, as some may suggest. The purpose here is to examine what happens to the civic lives of communities when economic segregation is allowed to develop and flourish, not to attempt to compare what happens in highly segregated areas with what happens in minimally segregated areas. It also seems worth mentioning that, for numerous reasons, such mixed-income counties and neighborhoods are difficult to find within the United States.

But even if mixed-income case studies were available, including them in this study is beside the point. Because this is a qualitative study, there are two ways to think about case-study selection and analysis, and the cases selected here. The first way requires us to think about key concepts of interest as categories in which our cases have membership and then to

hypothesize associations between concepts relying on logical constructions of necessity and sufficiency (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 18). In my analysis, I was interested in explaining civic engagement and, ultimately, voter turnout trends in segregated communities. Using the language of quantitative research, as is typical in studies of American civic engagement and political behavior, the dependent variable is voter turnout and the independent variable is economic segregation. Given the findings presented in the introduction, which showed that the effect of economic segregation on voter turnout varies by context, we could refine this further and offer two hypotheses: one, segregated poverty produces lower rates of voter turnout, and two, segregated prosperity produces higher rates of voter turnout.

To frame these propositions in the language of necessity and sufficiency, rather than in the language of probability, it helps to visualize these conditions. In the first image (Fig. 5.1), being a member of X group is necessary to be in the Y group, but is not sufficient because there are a lot of cases in the X group that are not Y. In the second image (Fig. 5.2), X is sufficient but not necessary to be in the Y group; X will be in Y, but there are other ways to fall into the Y group (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 20). Applying this formulation to the hypotheses I offer here, I suggest that segregated poverty is sufficient, but not necessary, for promoting low civic engagement and voter turnout and that segregated prosperity is sufficient, but not necessary, for promoting higher levels of engagement. Put another way, there are other factors that also promote turnout (Y), but it is possible that economic segregation (X) is one of them.

To recast this formulation visually, Figs. 5.3 and 5.4 show that economic segregation cannot be a necessary condition of voter turnout because being in a context of economic segregation is not necessary to produce an increase or decrease in voter turnout (Fig. 5.3)—this can happen for any number of reasons—but that it can be sufficient for affecting voter turnout; even if it is not the sole factor, economic segregation might increase or decrease engagement (Fig. 5.4). In short, and removing the probabilistic reasoning of quantitative analysis, the premise here is that economic segregation is sufficient, but not necessary, for shaping civic engagement and political behavior.

This suggests a second way to think about case-study selection and analysis. In statistical analysis, "[t]he most damaging consequences [of selection bias] arise from selecting only cases whose independent *and*

Fig. 5.1 Necessary conditions

Fig. 5.2 Sufficient conditions

Fig. 5.3 Economic segre-gation as a necessary condi-tion of voter turnout

Fig. 5.4 Economic segrega-tion as a sufficient condition of voter turnout

dependent variables vary as the favored hypothesis suggests, ignoring cases that appear to contradict the theory" (George and Bennett 2005, 24).[11] And yet, moving away from the logic of quantitative analysis and toward logic of necessity and sufficiency, "[c]ase studies are much stron-ger at identifying the scope of conditions of theories and assessing argu-ments about causal necessity and sufficiency in particular cases" (George and Bennett 2005, 25). In this light, there are several roles that case-study analysis can play: atheoretical configurative, disciplined configura-tive, heuristic, theory-testing, and plausibility probes (George and

Bennett 2005, 75). The case-study analysis in my book provides both heuristic and theory-testing/building leverage. These case studies are a tool of heuristic analysis because they help determine the causal mechanisms and paths through which economic segregation affects civic and political mobilization and voter turnout. They offer theory-testing/building heft because they contribute to a theory of civic engagement by identifying a previously overlooked variable: economic segregation. Unlike an examination of a mixed-income county with mixed-income neighborhoods, the case studies used here provide this type of analysis by focusing on what happens when economic segregation is allowed to develop.

All of this said, some variance within these case studies is important; within the case studies there should be some variance along other factors that also contribute to voter turnout, such as income and race. If there is variance in these other factors across case-study counties and neighborhoods, and we still see similar levels of voter turnout, and trends in voter turnout over time, in all similar case-study neighborhoods we can reasonably conclude that this may be the result of economic segregation because this is the one common feature across all cases. In this sense, these cases represent "strong tests": "It is often argued that one should select cases that are representative or typical of the universe of cases. The "extreme value on the IV [independent variable]" method of case selection argues the opposite: cases that are atypical in their endowment with the independent variable teach us the most" (van Evera 1997, 19).

This understanding of case-study selection works only if we move from a quantitative logic of probability to a qualitative logic of necessity and sufficiency, and understand that some of the core strengths of case-study analysis are heuristic causal mapping and theory-building. Using this logic, the selection of four highly segregated counties that offer variance on income—segregated impoverished and segregated prosperous neighborhoods across the four counties—and race—both Atlanta neighborhoods are 99 percent African American while there is great variance across the other six—will help to determine *how* and *why* economic segregation affects voter turnout and indeed civic engagement more broadly in urban America.

Understanding Economic Segregation, Civic Engagement, and Political Behavior

As a first step toward understanding the nature of civic and political engagement within the context of economic segregation, I needed to gather local voter turnout data. Unfortunately, there is no central repository for neighborhood-level turnout data, which means that the only way to understand local voting patterns is to rely on local records and sources. This presented challenges in terms of correlating CT boundaries, which define where people live, to locally determined electoral districts, which define where people vote. This required locating ward and election district (ED) maps from 1970 to 2000 within the maze of city-level bureaucracies—a difficult task given that most cities do not require these records be kept for any period of time and many have no archival system for these records.[12] With the appropriate maps, I compared and reconciled ED boundaries, as best as possible, with CT boundaries. In this process, local boards of elections, local and state archives, and local public libraries proved invaluable in helping to locate ED/ward voter boundary maps and voter turnout records. In the end, this boundary matching process allowed me to determine the number of votes in any given election from each case-study neighborhood.

A reliance on local records presents two additional obstacles for scholars when matching ED boundaries to those of CTs. The first is the fact that while at one time most board of election officials used the CT boundaries as guidelines for EDs, the process of redistricting over time has produced EDs that in the majority of cases do not follow CT boundaries. The second is that while most redistricting occurs following the decennial census, this is not always the case. In three of the four case-study cities—Atlanta, Rochester, and Milwaukee—there were at least two changes to local ED boundaries in at least one of the decades studied here. In order to determine accurate voter turnout, this redistricting had to be accounted for in all of the elections occurred between 1970 and 2000.[13] ED maps in each city for each iteration of redistricting proved to be the only way to reasonably determine what percentage of the appropriate EDs covered the case-study CTs used to approximate neighborhoods in this study.[14]

For example, one of the high-poverty neighborhoods studied was CT 12 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, most of which falls in Aldermanic District 9 for all years included in this study, while a small portion lies in District 10. Analyzing voter turnout data from 1970 meant using recorded voter turn-

out for all of ED 9 and 10 percent of ED 10 (later renumbered), determined by calculating the percentage of blocks in CT 12 that are included in ED 10. Following 1983, the city of Milwaukee issued a new ED boundary map that spanned only two election years, 1984 and 1985—during which time there was a mayoral and presidential election, both in 1984—and issued a new map in 1986, whose boundaries held through 1992. This change in 1986 did not affect the EDs covering CT 12. Accordingly, it was possible to analyze voter turnout in CT 12 for 1983 through 1992, using ED 172 and half of ED 173, again determined by calculating the percentage of blocks in CT 12 that fall within the boundaries of ED 173. Finally, from 1993 to 2000, CT 12 was covered by one-third of ED 166 and all of ED 167.

Taking a percentage of an electoral district and attributing it to a particular CT presents an ecological inference problem, because to do so infers knowledge about individual voter behavior based on observations of aggregate data from an area in which a voter may or may not actually reside. This is not an ideal solution, but due to the fact that neither boards of elections nor any other city department(s) collects or keeps voting data at the CT level, which would address this problem, this method is the only way to approximate voter turnout at the neighborhood level. This said, every effort was made to ensure that the voter turnout data corresponded as closely as possible with the CT boundaries in a given electoral year.[15] Moreover, given the nature of record-keeping, this is the only way that we can hope to understand what turnout looks like on the local, neighborhood level over a period of decades. The resulting data, while perhaps less than perfect, are nonetheless more than reasonable to use as the basis for drawing conclusions, and because the results of this study seem to indicate that economic segregation does indeed shape civic environments and civic engagement, it is my hope that future research will be able to improve upon data-gathering and continue to strengthen the conclusions reached here.

The second step in determining local patterns of voter turnout was to calculate voter turnout itself. Traditionally, voter turnout is calculated using the total number of ballots cast divided by the voting-age population (VAP). This is usually the case because it is often difficult to determine the voting-eligible population (VEP), which requires calculating the number of ineligible voters—non-citizens, the incarcerated or institutionalized, and convicted felons who reside in states where they cannot vote—and subtracting their numbers from the VAP, with any accuracy (Teixeira

1992).[16] Even among those scholars who argue that the difference between the VAP and VEP is significant and that VAP includes too many potential voters thereby deflating actual turnout rates, calculating the VEP remains a major challenge at certain levels of governance (Holbrook and Heidbreder 2010, 160).[17] At present, most methods for calculating the VEP with any reasonable level of certainty can only be done with large units of analysis: the data required to calculate ineligible voters for small units of analysis, such as CTs, are simply not available. VAP is, for our purposes, a useful approximation of the number of people who could vote in any given election.[18]

The resulting quantitative analysis of voter turnout across all eight case-study neighborhoods illustrated a larger phenomenon concerning voter participation and economic segregation in urban America. The case-study cities, and neighborhoods within those cities, are in different regions of the country and have different racial and ethnic compositions, and each has its own history of civic life and participation. And yet I found that all of the case studies demonstrated a similar trend in voter participation within segregated impoverished and prosperous communities, suggesting that economic segregation is an important factor that can help to explain these results. The next step was to determine *why* this is the case. My case-study approach relying on neighborhoods helps to reveal these mechanisms, which ultimately helps us better understand how economic segregation affects civic engagement and political participation at the local level. Therefore, my next step was to examine the history and vibrancy of civic life in these communities, requiring that I conduct archival research, gather data on the number and types of organizations within these neighborhoods, and speak to people living and working in these neighborhoods.

This was an important step because citizens learn and practice some of the important building blocks for political participation by way of their involvement with local voluntary associations (e.g., neighborhood associations, Parent Teacher/Home and School Associations, and churches). Civic engagement in these types of organizations provides people with social networks and helps them develop civic skills necessary for political mobilization and participation in electoral politics (e.g., Putnam 2000). Thus, we know that participation in these types of civic organizations is crucial for promoting civic engagement.

To determine how civic organizations and political operatives worked within my case-study cities and neighborhoods in order to foster civic

engagement and political participation, I collected information on the number and types of organizations in the case-study neighborhoods and interviewed more than five dozen local and elected leaders across my case-study cities and neighborhoods. Open-ended interviews with elected officials, city representatives and staff, and neighborhood leaders begin to tell the story, while archival records and newspaper accounts of urban planning efforts, campaigns/elections, and other important political moments over the past half-century help to provide further details and context. Ultimately, I was able to develop a narrative of how these cities became so segregated, identify the civic consequences of within neighborhoods, and demonstrate the political consequences of economic segregation.

Findings

In my investigation I found that economic segregation affects voter turnout, negatively in segregated impoverished communities and positively in segregated prosperous neighborhoods, which by itself is an important contribution to our understanding of civic engagement in American politics. However, while the data revealed the phenomenon, it did little to reveal the nature of the relationship between economic segregation and political participation or the mechanisms through which economic segregation affects turnout. Drawing on archival research in my four case-study cities—Atlanta; Kansas City, Missouri; Milwaukee; and Rochester, New York—I was able to map how three distinct urban renewal policies, specifically housing, transportation, and economic revitalization, reshaped the residential landscape of these cities, isolating the poor in impoverished communities and the wealthy in prosperous ones. The post-World War II "urban crisis" in each city manifested itself in similar but distinct ways, and the redevelopment strategies to confront the crisis were likewise similar but not identical. However, the consequences of housing, transportation, and urban redevelopment policies undertaken in Atlanta, Kansas City, Milwaukee, and Rochester were the same: increased residential segregation along economic lines. In each instance, and very likely in many other cities across America, these policies had dramatic effects on the spatial arrangement and residential patterns of citizens along class lines.

This helps to contextualize my findings regarding voter turnout: one possible explanation for low turnout within low-income communities is simply that a lot of poor folks live there and low-income citizens vote at lower rates. However, this still suggests an individual-level explanation of

voter turnout and political behavior. To investigate whether this does indeed explain political behavior in these communities, I conducted a series of open-ended interviews with civic and political leaders within segregated impoverished and prosperous neighborhoods in each of the four case-study cities.

The results of these interviews show that the rising economic segregation deeply affects the ability of voluntary associations and churches to recruit and mobilize neighborhood residents around civic and political activity. These findings revealed one part of the explanation for why the class gap in participation has increased in American politics, as well as why civic and political engagement may be so low among low-income citizens and so high among prosperous ones. As income inequality has risen dramatically since the 1970s and the wealthy have been able to increasingly isolate themselves in segregated communities, the prosperous seem also to be benefiting civically: economic segregation isolates and concentrates resources derived from high levels of education, employment, and stability, promoting vibrant civic environments and organizations that can magnify the voice of the wealthy. A similar negative cycle emerges in impoverished communities, with economic segregation isolating and concentrating formally uneducated, low-skill, and low-income populations, thereby weakening civic organizations and muting the voice of the impoverished.

Three specific features of neighborhoods are particularly important in understanding *how* economic segregation shapes civic environments, active civic engagement, and ultimately political behavior. In other words, in addition to individual resources, an analysis of the civic environments of these neighborhoods shows that the presence of voluntary associations, alone, may not be enough to mobilize neighborhood residents to participate in civic and political affairs, as other scholars have suggested (see Putnam 2000). Instead, the evidence indicates that specific neighborhood attributes are necessary to support and maintain the organizational and mobilizing capacity of voluntary associations within neighborhoods.

First, as capable and willing as the young and the aged may be, nontraditional families often lack the economic and social resources that promote *stable families and communities*. This lack of resources and residential mobility in impoverished communities destabilized entire neighborhoods. Demographic changes and deindustrialization have undermined *social and economic assets* within segregated impoverished communities, and these changes further undermine stable families, social networks, and strong

economic ties, which are vital for maintaining vibrant civic environments and active organizational mobilization. Finally, *safe neighborhood spaces* are important for fostering feelings of security, so that neighborhood residents are willing to attend neighborhood meetings or social events, and feelings of social trust, so that neighbors are not afraid to talk with one another.

Without some combination of all three elements, civic environments that foster the social capital and trust necessary for promoting the associationalism required for civic engagement cannot develop. Put another way, while research shows that associationalism promotes the creation of social trust and social capital, some level of stability and trust must exist within communities for associations to grow and thrive in the first place, and this is affected by residential economic segregation. The three conditions identified here create a neighborhood's civic environment and support (or hinder) strong voluntary associations and promote (or suppress) mobilization.

Further, I found that the relationship between the capacity of civic organizations and citizens within neighborhoods complicates the traditional understanding of on-the-ground political mobilization by candidates and other operatives. The economic segregation of wealth has made it easier and less costly for political operatives to target neighborhoods with stronger civic environments—specifically, robust social networks, active voluntary associations, and higher levels of education and income. In other words, because voluntary organizations (e.g., civic groups and churches) are often the conduits through which candidates and other political operatives communicate with constituents, when these are weak or non-existent it is harder to foster communication. This alters the composition of and interest representation by the dominant governing regime, effectively organizing out the voices and interests of low-income citizens who live in less vibrant civic environment.

The relationship this produces between the representative and the constituents suggests, at least for wealthy citizens, an example of "home-style" politics in local jurisdictions and elections; there is a clear, positive reciprocal relationship between residents living in segregated prosperity and their representatives, while a much weaker, less positive relationship exists between residents living in segregated poverty and their representatives (Fenno 1978). This augments political calculations and the nature of governing coalitions and the reciprocal relationship between elected representatives and constituents, producing demonstrable political consequences in the form of lower voter turnout in segregated impoverished communi-

ties and higher voter turnout in segregated prosperous ones. This translates into more responsive elected officials and therefore more representation in the halls of city government for those in segregated prosperous communities and less representation for those in segregated impoverished communities. In this way, urban renewal policies created these patterns of economic segregation and have been perpetuated by a vicious cycle of political quiescence in communities of segregated poverty and a virtuous cycle of civic engagement in segregated prosperous ones.

These case studies present examples that seem to add an additional layer of complexity to the common understanding of who votes and why. The standard theory of political participation promotes the idea that individual motivation and resources drive civic and political engagement, but a key flaw in this position is that it does not take into account the civic environments in which civic and political mobilization and engagement occur and how these vary depending on the economic context in which one lives (e.g., Blackwell 1976).[19] Proponents of the mobilization theory of political participation regularly argue that citizens participate in politics when they are asked to do so (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). If political engagement is promoted by contact and context, the evidence offered in my study suggests that political disengagement among low-income citizens has been brought about by a lack of civic and political mobilization due to neighborhood context and weakened civic environments. Put simply, there are certain neighborhood conditions necessary to promote associationalism and civic mobilization, which in turn affects political mobilization and ultimately voter turnout. This has produced an urban political landscape heavily skewed toward representing the interests of the prosperous over the impoverished.

Thus, the mixed-methods, and specifically the case study, approach I used in *Displacing Democracy: Economic Segregation in America* (Widestrom 2015) adds to our knowledge about civic engagement in the United States in several important ways. First, economic segregation has received little scholarly attention among political scientists, allowing this book to fill a void in the extant scholarly research on neighborhood effects, civic engagement, political behavior, and economic stratification in the United States. Second, very few studies of civic engagement and political behavior rely on a mixed-methods approach, as my examination does, instead relying on large-*n* quantitative analyses. This shift allowed me not only to document the effect of economic segregation on civic and political engagement but also to demonstrate *how* and *why* these effects emerged.

Finally, the unit of analysis in my book is the neighborhood, which is particularly unusual in studies of American political behavior because civic engagement metrics and voter turnout data at the neighborhood level are not collected in any systematic way. This required me to hunt down, gather, and make sense of records that are typically ignored by scholars of civic and political engagement. The quantitative, qualitative, and historical data I collected across eight case-study neighborhoods in four cities provide unique insight into civic engagement and political behavior at the local level. I hope that future studies continue to refine the methods scholars use to study how local context shapes civic and political dispositions and behavior, and further refine our understanding of what helps and hinders citizen participation in American democratic processes.

Notes

1. This database, originally developed as the Urban Underclass Database by the Urban Institute, has been updated to the year 2000 and is now distributed by GeoLytics, Inc. See Urban Institute, and GeoLytics, *Neighborhood Change Database*, CensusCD neighborhood change database (NCDB) (electronic resource): 1970–2000 tract data: selected variables for US CTs for 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000. Using CTs as a proxy for "neighborhoods" is an imperfect but necessary accommodation for a couple of reasons. While certainly a neighborhood is more than a geographic boundary—it is a sense of community, a physical space, a place that residents identify psychologically and emotionally—this complex notion is difficult to systematically operationalize. It is common, therefore, in studies of neighborhoods to use CTs as proxies for neighborhoods because CTs are "small, relatively permanent statistical subdivisions of a county," usually having between 1000 and 8000 residents, though 4000 is considered optimal, and, when first drawn, are designed to be relatively stable and homogeneous regarding population characteristics, income status, and living conditions (U.S. Census Bureau 2001). This initial, and often contemporary homogeneity, captures some of the qualitative elements of neighborhood we are seeking to explore here, and given few other options, CTs offer the best way to proceed in any neighborhood-level study. Therefore, in the examination here, we will use "neighborhood" and "census tract" interchangeably.
2. The case-study neighborhoods selected here are within large urban areas, but the calculation of the isolation and dissimilarity indexes is at the county level.

3. The number of people below the poverty line for each neighborhood is calculated in the NCDB. The Urban Institute and GeoLytics calculated this by summing the total number of individuals and individuals in families below the poverty line. The federal poverty lines for families of four in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 were $3968, $8414, $13,359, and $17,604, respectively. The federal poverty lines for individuals in 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 were $1954, $4190, $6652, and $8791, respectively. Each dollar amount is adjusted from 1959 dollars to reflect its value in that year.

4. The average poverty rate in the average US CT was 11 percent in 1970 and 1980, and 13 percent in 1990 and 2000. Throughout the text a "high-poverty" CT is defined as one that has a poverty rate of 40 percent or higher, as is common in the literature (see Jargowsky 1997).

5. This excludes the consideration of Cook County, which is home to Chicago. I deliberately chose not to use Chicago as a case study because of the complexity of racial and economic segregation in the city and the fact that it is such a high-profile city that warrants a deeper analysis of this case in light of the findings here. In short, the complexity and prominence of Chicago make it difficult to compare with other cases. The same is true of other potential options for case-study cities, including Los Angeles, CA, and Washington, DC.

6. In all analyses, and in the case-study selection process, I only used census tracts that had been established in 1970 or before, that had either not changed or had changed in name only, and that had populations of 200 or more in 2000. Table 5.1 contains other interesting case-study options for analysis: Chicago (Cook County), Washington, DC, and Boston (Suffolk County). San Diego or even Los Angeles would have been reasonable choices as well. However, in many ways the politics of these cities have been well covered and in some cases the scope (San Diego or Los Angeles) or the politics (Washington, DC) of the city might complicate the research design. My aim here was to identify the best case studies allowing for geographic and racial variance. However, these other cases could be used in a confirmatory analysis of the findings offered here.

7. The terms "impoverished" and "prosperous" are used here not only to evoke the economic consequences of increasing poverty or wealth within a neighborhood but to draw attention to broader political and social consequences as well.

8. It is important to note that this means that the explanatory variables of interest do vary to some degree; this is a challenge of doing this type of qualitative work. However, carefully structuring interviews and reviewing similar types of historical and archived documents within each case allow for the researcher to see when variation emerges and incorporate that variance into the type of thick description on which this kind of study relies.

Additionally, quantitative data that would provide some control for variance across these cases simply do not exist.

9. As said, in Atlanta, both the prosperous and impoverished neighborhoods are nearly 100 percent African American in 2000, while in Rochester, the impoverished community was 66 percent African American and 33 percent Hispanic in 2000 and just 6 percent African American or Hispanic in the prosperous counterpart. This means that if similar civic and political trends emerge across similar economic contexts, whatever the racial or ethnic composition, we can say something specific about the effects of economic contexts separate and distinct from racial context. This is not to suggest that race is entirely removed as a factor that contributes to the shaping of a civic environment, but to note that if similarities in civic and political mobilization and voting behavior can be determined across the case studies presented here, it seems as though economic factors may be more important than previously appreciated by scholars.

10. The real added value of Goertz and Mahoney's work is to clearly articulate the different "cultures" of quantitative and qualitative research, and to try to facilitate communication between these two camps, who are often disdainful of the other's work; quantitative scholars see qualitative scholars as lacking rigor, while qualitative scholars see quantitative scholars as bean counters with little say about the processes and/or contexts that drive their results. In *A Tale of Two Cultures*, Goertz and Mahoney are trying further understanding of each type of research highlighting that the difference between these two approaches to research is simply about data—it is not that quantitative scholars use hard data and qualitative scholars use case studies, interviews, archival research, and so on. Rather, the difference between these two approaches rests on a fundamental logic of research. Fundamentally, the authors "reject the assumption that a single logic of inference founded on statistical norms guides both quantitative and qualitative research." Instead, the authors argue that "the two traditions are best understood as drawing in alternative mathematical foundations: quantitative research is grounded in interferential statistics (i.e. probability and statistical theory), whereas qualitative research is (often implicitly) rooted in logic and set theory" (Goertz and Mahoney 2012, 2.).

11. One of the main concerns about case-study selection is "selection bias," which is generally understood to occur when the investigator selects cases based on the dependent variable (i.e., in studying revolutions, the researchers select cases in which only revolutions occur), which leads to underestimating the effects of the independent variables. What George and Bennett are arguing here is that there are actually much greater risk and more dire consequences of a researcher selecting based on both the dependent and independent variables, which could lead to *either* understating or overstat-

ing relationships. This is why the authors articulate six types of theory-building research and urge researchers to clearly identify which will be the guiding logic of their case-study selection.

12. Remember, the CTs I chose for this study have not changed their boundaries from 1970 to the present, so I did not need to account for changes in the CTs examined here. One critique of this choice might be that it introduces bias into the findings presented because this selection criterion may favor finding increased segregation of poverty because older CTs may be more likely to be located in urban centers, have aging housing stock, and so on. This, however, is not the case. As the maps in my work showed, and the wealthy case-study neighborhoods exemplify, most cities have very wealthy neighborhoods characterized by stable CT boundaries, but none of the urban blight plaguing other parts of the city. As a result, selecting CTs that have not changed simply provides a way to control neighborhood boundaries over time and nothing more.

13. In many cases, this interdecade redistricting did not alter the way in which I calculated voter turnout because it was minimal enough or did not affect the specific EDs analyzed. However, I did locate all maps in order to determine what, if any, changes had been made to the EDs of interest.

14. In some cases, boundaries followed CTs closely enough that percentages of EDs were not required to calculate turnout.

15. Refer to Appendix A in *Displacing Democracy* (Widestrom 2015) for border/CT calculations and more information on the ways I sought to address this problem.

16. When thinking about voter turnout, it is important to keep in mind that the US Constitution leaves the regulation of voting and elections largely to the states, which means that individual states decide voter eligibility. For example, only 2 states have unrestricted voting rights for convicted felons, whereas 12 states have laws that could result in permanent loss of voting rights depending on the felony conviction. Moreover, while there are no states that allow non-citizens to vote, the number of non-citizens within each state varies greatly. This means that the population eligible to vote in any given election can vary widely from state to state, which is why the traditional measure of VAP tends to be biased toward lower turnout rates; the denominator is bigger than it should be when calculating turnout. "In the case of the states, this bias is much greater for those states with harsher felon disenfranchisement laws and with large non-citizen populations" (see Holbrook and Heidbreder 2010).

17. These scholars argue that VAP and VEP are substantially different because the VEP includes only those eligible to vote, removing from the equation non-citizens, convicted felons, and the like. This lowers the total population able to vote when compared to the VAP, or all people over the age of

18, thereby increasing turnout rates; the percentage of the VEP that votes is higher than the percentage of the VAP that votes, 54.2 percent to 50 percent, respectively, in 2000, for example. See McDonald and Popkin 2001, 963; Michal McDonald, http://elections.gmu.edu/voter_turnout.htm, accessed on July 24, 2013.

18. To calculate VAP, I used population data from the *Census of Population and Housing: Population and Housing Characteristics for Census Tracts and Block Numbering Areas* from 1970, 1980, and 1990 for each of the case-study CTs. For the year 2000, I used the American FactFinder application, available through the website of the US Census Bureau. These data provided the total population for each CT from which I subtracted the population under 21 for years prior to 1972 and under 18 for 1972 and later. I used linear interpolation to calculate the VAP for the intercensus years.

19. Blackwell wrote about the anticipated low turnout of low-income citizens in the 1976 elections in which he cited Eddie N. Williams, the then president of the Joint Center for Political Studies (now the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies). In this article, Williams is quoted as saying, "[t]hey are casting doubt on their continuing commitment to self-determination and to use every available means, including politics, to achieve their goals and aspirations … To practice political abstinence is to commit political suicide."

References

Abramson, Alan J., Mitchell S. Tobin, and Matthew R. VanderGoot. 1995. The Changing Geography of Metropolitan Opportunity: The Segregation of the Poor in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 1970–1990. *Housing Policy Debate* 6 (1): 24–72.

Anderson, Elijah. 1992. *Streetwise: Race, Class, and Change in an Urban Community*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Bartels, Larry M. 2008. *Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Beauregard, Robert A. 2003. *Voices of Decline: The Postwar Fate of U.S. Cities*. New York: Routledge.

Blackwell, Edward. 1976. In the Inner City. *The Milwaukee Journal*, November 2.

Burtless, Gary. 1999. Growing American Inequality: Sources and Remedies. In *Setting National Priorities: The 2000 Election and Beyond*, ed. Henry J. Aaron and Robert D. Reischauer, 137–166. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Campbell, David E. 2006. *Why We Vote: How Schools and Communities Shaper Our Civic Life*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Darden, Joe T. 1987. *Detroit: Race and Uneven Development.* Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Dawson, Michael C. 1995. *Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African-American Politics.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fenno, Richard F. 1978. *Home Style: House Members and Their Districts.* Boston: Little, Brown and Company.

Frazier, John W., Florence M. Margai, and Eugene Tettey-Fio. 2003. *Race and Place: Equity Issues in Urban America.* Boulder: Westview Press.

George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. 2005. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Glaser, James M. 1994. Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Attitudes in the South. *The Journal of Politics* 56 (1): 21–41.

Goertz, Gary, and James Mahoney. 2012. *A Tale of Two Cultures: Qualitative and Quantitative Research in the Social Sciences.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Holbrook, Thomas, and Brianne Heidbreder. 2010. Does Measurement Matter? The Case of VAP and VEP in Models of Voter Turnout in the United States. *State Politics & Policy* 10 (2): 157–179.

Hood, M.V., III, and Irwin L. Morris. 2000. Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Racial/Ethnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187. *Social Science Quarterly* 81 (1): 194–210.

Huckfeldt, Robert H., and John Sprague. 1987. Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political Information. *The American Political Science Review* 81 (4): 1197–1216.

———. 1992. Political Parties and Electoral Mobilization: Political Structure, Social Structure, and the Party Canvass. *The American Political Science Review* 86 (1): 70–86.

Jargowsky, Paul. 1997. *Poverty and Place: Ghettos, Barrios, and the American City.* New York: The Russell Sage Foundation.

Key, V.O. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation.* Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.

Kneebone, Elizabeth, Carey Nadeau, and Alan Berube. 2011. *The Re-emergence of Concentrated Poverty: Metropolitan Trends in the 2000s, The Metropolitan Opportunity Series.* Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Massey, Douglas S., and Nancy A. Denton. 1988. The Dimensions of Residential Segregation. *Social Forces* 67 (2): 281–315.

———. 1993. *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

McDonald, Michael P., and Samuel L. Popkin. 2001. The Myth of the Vanishing Voter. *The American Political Science Review* 95 (4): 963–974.

Oliver, J. Eric. 1999. The Effects of Metropolitan Economic Segregation on Local Civic Participation. *American Journal of Political Science* 43 (1): 186–212.

Oliver, J. Eric, and Janelle Wong. 2003. Intergroup Prejudice in Multiethnic Settings. *American Journal of Political Science* 47 (4): 567–582.

Pierson, Paul, and Jacob S. Hacker. 2010. *Winner-Take-All-Politics: How Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the Middle Class*. New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks.

Putnam, Robert. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

Quillian, Lincoln. 1999. Migration Patterns and the Growth of High-Poverty Neighborhoods, 1970–1990. *The American Journal of Sociology* 105 (1): 1–37.

Rosenstone, Steven J., and John M. Hansen. 1993. *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*. New York: Macmillan.

Schneider, Mark, and Thomas Phelan. 1993. Black Suburbanization in the 1980s. *Demography* 30 (2): 269–279.

Sigelman, Lee, and S. Welch. 1993. The Contact Hypothesis Revisited: Interracial Contact and Positive Racial Attitudes. *Social Forces* 71 (3): 781–795.

Sugrue, Thomas J. 2005. *The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in Postwar Detroit*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Taylor, Marylee C. 1998. How White Attitudes Vary with the Racial Composition of Local Populations: Numbers Count. *American Sociological Review* 63: 512–535.

Teixeira, Ruy. 1992. *The Disappearing American Voter*. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.

Tolnay, Stewart E., Robert M. Adelman, and Kyle D. Crowder. 2002. Race, Regional Origin, and Residence in Northern Cities at the Beginning of the Great Migration. *American Sociological Review* 67: 456–457.

U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration Office of Planning, Environment & Reality. 2000. *Census 2000 Population Statistics*.

United States Census Bureau. 2001. Census Bureau Touts New Data Delivery System, press release.

Van Evera, Stephen. 1997. *Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science*. Ithica: Cornell University Press.

Verba, Sidney, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. 1995. *Voice and Equality*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Watson, Tara. 2006. Metropolitan Growth, Inequality, and Neighborhood Segregation by Income. In *Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs: 2006*, ed. Gary Burtless and Janet Rothenberg Pack, 1–52. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

———. 2009. Inequality and the Measurement of Residential Segregation by Income in American Neighborhoods. *Review of Income and Wealth* 55 (3): 820–844.

Western, Bruce, Deirdre Bloome, and Christine Percheski. 2008. Inequality Among American Families with Children, 1975 to 2005. *American Sociological Review* 73: 903–920.

Widestrom, Amy. 2015. *Displacing Democracy: Economic Segregation in America*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Wilson, William Julius. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Wolff, Edward N. 2002. *Top Heavy: The Increasing Inequality of Wealth and What We Can Do About It*. New York: The New Press.

Wolfinger, Raymond E., and Steven J. Rosenstone. 1980. *Who Votes?* New Haven: Yale University Press.

Framing Infectious Diseases: Effective Policy Implementation and United States Public Opinion

Mita Saksena

This study uses both qualitative and quantitative research methods—content analysis[1] and analysis of opinion surveys—to investigate public support for domestic and foreign policies on transnational infectious diseases in the post-Cold war era. The United States has been increasingly concerned with the transnational threat posed by infectious diseases. Infectious diseases and epidemics are not new, but incidence has increased (Centers for Disease Control 1994). Infectious diseases are specified as "those caused by pathogenic microorganisms, such as bacteria, viruses, parasites, or fungi; the diseases can be spread, directly or indirectly, from one person to another" (World Health Organization 2011). Effective policy implementation to contain the spread of these diseases requires active engagement and support of the American public. Public support, compliance, and trust are crucial for the effectiveness of policies on naturally occurring infectious disease and the threat of a bioterrorist attack on the country. In the case of an epidemic or a bioterrorist attack, national governments may have to enforce inconvenient measures such as quarantine

M. Saksena (✉)
Rutgers University, Newark, NJ, USA

111

and increased domestic surveillance. These actions might invite the wrath of civil rights activists or other people unwilling to comply. For these reasons, it is important to know what kind of media messages or frames appeal most to the public.

To influence American public opinion and enlist support for related domestic and foreign policies, both domestic agencies and international organizations have framed infectious diseases as security threats, human rights disasters, economic risks, and as medical dangers. The mass media is the primary arena in which these issue frames come to the attention of the public, interest groups, and policy makers. Some earlier studies have focused on framing of infectious diseases and understanding public attitudes toward infectious diseases (Luther and Zhou 2005; Tian and Stewart 2005; Shih et al. 2008; Dahistrom et al. 2012; Bardhan 2001; Clark 2006; DeMotts and Markowitz 2004). Most of these studies are descriptive in that they examine variations in media coverage of infectious diseases. None of the existing studies evaluated the impact of infectious disease framing on public opinion. In this research design, use of content analysis of news media frames helped me understand the ways media conceptualized and presented these frames. Analysis of public opinion polls at the same time helped me estimate framing effects (measured by changes in responses to survey responses) when respondents were exposed to multiple frames over a corresponding period and identify which frames were the most compelling or effective in influencing public opinion about infectious diseases and why. Unlike many previous experimental studies of framing effects in which respondents were exposed to opposing frames in measured quantities, this study sought to understand framing effects when respondents were exposed to multiple frames in real-world conditions.[2]

This research method which combines both qualitative (study of media content in three case studies) and quantitative studies (correlation between changes in media content and impact on public opinion) also had several advantages over other methods like study of focus groups, interviews, experimental studies, and participant observation in helping me answer my research questions. These qualitative methods of data collection could provide close access to views, beliefs, and attitudes of people, yet when doing a study at the macro level may present problems of data collection, experiment management, of accessibility to people for personal interviews (Harrell and Bradley 2009).

If the focus of my study was on a particular region or community, the above-mentioned methods like interviews and focus groups might have

been more relevant. Collecting data from secondary datasets like media reports and public opinion surveys in an attempt to do national-level study made my project much easier in terms of costs, avoiding extensive monetary, staffing, protocol issues, and technical resources needed to conduct and design interviews and focus group studies (Harrell and Bradley 2009). Additionally, methods like experimental studies, participant observation, interviews, and focus group studies require several kinds of approvals from Institutional Review Boards and other agencies when conducting studies of human populations (Harrell and Bradley 2009). I also received approval from the Institutional Review Board at my university since I was conducting research on human participants, but several other agency approvals are needed when doing field research.

US Public Opinion and Infectious Disease Policy

While the focus of this work is the public response to framing infectious diseases, this study also adds to the larger debate regarding domestic public opinion as a factor that affects the national and foreign policy decisions of governments in an increasingly interconnected world (Fearon 1998; Powlick 1995; Risse Kappen 1991; Beuno de Mesquita 2002; Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). A body of scholarly work has debated the role of public opinion in foreign policy decision-making in democratic societies. The discussions have centered on the role of the public in foreign policy decision-making, that is, whether public opinion follows, determines, or sets some limits on leaders who avoid making policies that might later evoke "public retribution" (Price 2009). Much of the early literature of the two decades after the Second World War, as represented by the works of Walter Lippmann, Hans Morgenthau, and Gabriel Almond, posits a rather pessimistic view of public opinion on domestic and foreign policy issues (Lippman 1922; Morgenthau 1956; Almond 1956). Studies on public opinion on foreign policy issues were concerned mainly with matters such as war, military intervention abroad, nuclear arms policy, international trade, defense spending, and foreign aid. Policy makers perceived these issues to be far removed from peoples' lives, and the public was disinterested in these issues. Added to this was the belief that some of the foreign policy issues required secrecy, speed, and flexibility in the use of classified information (Holsti 1992). Decision makers, therefore, felt that there was little need to engage public opinion, which they considered to be erratic, unstable, emotional, and volatile (Almond 1956).

The Vietnam War was a turning point at which policy makers began to understand that public opinion was necessary. Subsequent studies by liberal theorists, including Richard Aldrich, Benjamin Page, Robert Shapiro, Ore Holsti, John Mueller, and Bruce Jentleson, suggested that the public did have stable views and can address serious foreign policy issues (Sullivan and Borgida 1989; Page et al. 1987; Mueller 1973). In the post-Cold War era, researchers such as Richard Sobel, James Larson, Bruce Jentleson, Rebecca Britton, Eugene Wiittkoph, Miroslav Nincic, Bruce Russett, Ronald Hinckley, Peter Feaver, Christopher Gelpi, and Richard Eichenberg studied issues like public tolerance of war casualties, international trade, and military involvement (Jentleson 1992). Although no consensus exists among these scholars as to what determines people's attitudes toward these problems, most scholars assume that the public is both reasonable and reasoned (Gelpi 2010; Aldrich et al. 2006).

The literature, however, is limited to an understanding of traditional security issues. This study investigates public attitudes on a non-traditional security and foreign policy issue—infectious disease—that has a significant impact on the daily lives of people (Williams 2003). With the increased importance of issues such as immigration, infectious diseases, and the environment, the policy-making elite increasingly feels the pressure to consider and respond to domestic public opinion and popular preferences (Berstein 1998).

On this issue, the relationship between public opinion and foreign policy in the United States takes on increased significance (Holsti 2004). First, although scholars agreed that while some issues, such as military conflicts and resulting domestic costs and war casualties, attracted intense public attention, public opinion was, in general, considered to be important only in so far it had electoral implications (Potter and Baum 2010; Price and Zaller 1993). The public was assumed to be more easily manipulated on issues of wars and military crises abroad than on domestic issues, which affected them directly (Domke et al. 2006). The need for speed and secrecy in issues of war and military confrontation were often used as justification by policy makers for denying public engagement in foreign policy decision-making. The same rationale, however, cannot be used for policy making on an issue such as infectious diseases. On the contrary, on this issue policy makers consider an active, informed, and engaged public to be important, and public cooperation is actively sought. Infectious diseases are a major source of concern to people and government alike. They are potentially transferable from one person to the other and can cause

death and disability, impose high health care costs, lead to loss of productivity, and thereby cause social and economic disruption (World Health Organization 2004). Due to the transmissibility of infectious diseases and their direct impact on people, any public health intervention, support for surveillance, or policy decisions regarding funding, prevention, and control of global infectious diseases requires the active engagement of the American public. Secondly, on issues of war and military crisis, local actors, including the executive branch of the government, members of the Congress, interest groups, media, and often academia, have traditionally dominated the elite discourse.[3]

Challenges arising out of the spread of infectious diseases, however, have put the focus on actors beyond the national states. Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations, the World Health Organization, and the World Bank have become increasingly prominent. Many organizations that transcend national boundaries, including multinational corporations, pharmaceutical companies, epistemic communities, and civic society organizations (e.g., Health Action International), have also enriched and participated in the debate on global and national health policies (Walt et al. 2004; Loewenson 2011). To influence public opinion and enlist support for their proposed policies these organizations emphasize different dimensions of infectious diseases (e.g., human rights and economic and biomedical issues) and frame issues in ways that strategically emphasize their political positions (Nisbet and Lewenstein 2002). On this issue, therefore, the public is exposed to frames espoused by domestic, transnational, and international organizations.

Within the context of this persistent debate, there was agreement among scholars of public opinion and foreign policy about the sources of information about international events and foreign policy issues and the accessibility of this information to the public. Because many ordinary citizens were inattentive to international affairs and foreign news, public opinion about foreign policy issues often was activated through elite discourse (e.g., policy-making elite and opinion leaders) and by the media (Page 1996). Extensive research has shown that the media is most able to activate opinion when these elite debates are presented as "frames" to which people are particularly receptive and which seem to have an impact on people's lives (Powlick and Katz 1998). The concept of "framing" and "framing effects" has been studied widely in the social sciences (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007; Scheufele 2006). Studies of agenda setting and framing as developed in research on social movements, communication,

and foreign policy all suggest that public opinion may be shaped by the way in which an issue is framed (Gamson and Modigliani 1987). Framing may be seen as an attempt by leaders and other actors to insert into the policy debate-organizing themes that will affect how the public and other actors such as the media will perceive an issue.[4] Framing effects occur when the media's decision to highlight or emphasize only certain aspects of an issue causes individuals to base their views and opinions on these salient aspects (Gamson and Modigliani 1987).

A review of the existing literature on framing effects reveals there is no consensus among scholars about which frames will appeal most to the public (Iyengar 1990; Feldman and Zaller 1992; Coy and Woehrle 1996; Benford 1993; Druckman 2001; Brewer and Gross 2005) and why some frames are more successful in persuading audiences when presented as part of multiple frames (Coy and Woehrle 1996; Benford 1993; Druckman 2001; Lupia 2000; Miller and Krosnick 2000; Mondak 1993). Scholars also have shown that frames may not necessarily be oppositional in nature and that audiences may adopt only a portion of frames (Gross and Ambrosio 2004). In other words, they might embrace mixed frames. There is no consensus among scholars about which frames will appeal most to the public and why some frames are more successful in persuading audiences when presented as part of multiple frames (Payne 2001). The above review indicates there is no consensus among scholars if any frame is effective in all situations, and some feel that only an "operational approach of asking people directly to evaluate the relative strength of various frames" will allow assessment of frame strength (Chong and Druckman 2007). Hence it becomes relevant to use a research method that gives an understanding of evolving frames that are issue-based or content frames and assess their impact on public opinion (Scheufele 2006; Entman 2003; Baumgartner and Leech 2001).

RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN

Content analysis combined with surveys of public opinion has several advantages over research methods that have been chosen to study framing effects. Many previous studies conducted to understand framing effects had several flaws. Most of these studies were conducted as laboratory experiments, although some involved focus groups (Chong et al. 2001). First, when conducted as laboratory experiments, they lacked external validity (Barabas and Jerit 2010). Since the study was done under strictly

controlled conditions it was very difficult to generalize the result in out-side settings and to general populations (Campbell and Stanley 1996). Second, in most of these studies, subjects were exposed to single frames. In simple laboratory experiments the researcher strictly controlled the experiments and randomly assigned participants to these groups (Shanto and Kinder 1987). Participants were exposed to contrasting frames one after the other, and then their opinion was recorded. The researchers could gauge which frame was most influential in changing opinion of par-ticipants (Nelson et al. 1997). This kind of study had two limitations. One, the experimenters were not able to determine what kinds of reac-tions would be evoked if subjects were exposed to dual or multiple frames at the same time, as usually happens in the real world. Second, these stud-ies in the absence of a control group failed to gauge the impact of either frames when experimenters did not expose them to contrasting frames that run in opposite directions (Druckman 2011). These studies, there-fore, were also unable to establish which kinds of frames were more pow-erful or influential in determining public preference for one frame over the other (Chong and Druckman 2010). In response to this concern, scholars (Sniderman and Theriault 2004; Aldrich et al. 2006) studied framing in competitive environments in which individuals were exposed to dual frames in equal quantities in controlled laboratory experiments. These scholars set out to prove that exposure to more than one frame would neutralize or cancel the effect of the other frame (Sniderman and Thériault 2004). These studies, however, failed to explain why in some cases one frame could be more influential than another. The studies also were con-ducted as laboratory experiments and thus were subject to the same criti-cisms of external validity. They failed to capture the effects of the manifold, complex, and variegated framing environments that citizens face in the real world (Kinder 2007). In more recent studies, subjects were exposed to multiple frames in varying quantities at the same time.[5] These studies were conducted either in an experimental setting or in a non-experimental setting like focus groups or by combining content analysis of news reports with survey research to understand the effects of framing on public atti-tudes (Wise and Brewer 2010; Mira 2003). Other studies showed that in such a competitive environment, some frames were more persuasive than others and not all frames were successful in changing public opinion (Druckman 2010). These findings, however, indicated that in a very com-petitive environment, framing results were not as powerful as they were when subjects were exposed to single frames in laboratory settings.

Third, most of these experiments were performed in single sessions, making it impossible to assess changes over a long period; however, the temporal component is important, as the same messages may not hold as much sway as they did when they were first exposed to frames (Chong and Druckman 2010).

Fourth, in most of these studies, students were used and several scholars have questioned if students as samples of study are representatives of the most general populations (Brewer and Gross 2010). Scholars have questioned the use of this "narrow data base" (Sears 1986). However, several scholars have defended the use of students in laboratory experiments claiming they are equally good to gauge framing effects as are many nationally representative population-based surveys (Mullinix et al. 2015).

The research method I chose addressed some of the above-mentioned limitations and offered several advantages over the existing methods. Content analysis of newspaper reports about infectious diseases was used to determine which frame was more prevalent at different times. Qualitative content analysis of health frames and a brief historical discussion of the resulting public opinion supplement this analysis. Public opinion poll data are used to present a measure of the public reaction to these frames. This research method not only addressed limitations of past studies, but it also was the best method that could help me understand evolution of frames and framing effects on respondents. By relying on content analysis and public opinion data, I could address some of the above-mentioned limitations of past studies on framing effects that involved participant observation, interviews, focus groups (Chong 1993), and laboratory studies (Kinder 2007). There were several other benefits of using this research method of combining content analysis of media frames and studying survey opinions.

First, content analysis of media frames allowed me to research new reports on infectious diseases over a long time. I could capture an evolving debate on policies and discussions around transnational infectious diseases from 2001 to 2007 and analyze a large amount of data. Second, compared to other research methods like participant observation, controlled laboratory experiments, focus group studies, and interviews, conducting content analysis was an unobtrusive method (Blackstone 2012). Unobtrusive methods are those where the data collector does not interfere in any way with the participants and respondents of the study (Krippendorff 2013). This prevents a bias on the part of the researcher and results obtained are fair and truly acknowledge the role of media

frames. Third, it was an inexpensive method and solved my problem, like many other researchers who are unable to leave homes and travel to gather research data. I used Lexis Nexis Academic database to retrieve content. While students and researchers need to be trained in the use of the database, it is still a very inexpensive research method. Most universities and research institutions provide this database and research can be conducted without requiring extensive funding for fieldwork and conducting experiments and interviews. Polling data for the study including public opinion polls was also easily accessible, and available (Krippendorff 2013).

Though content analysis is considered mainly as a quantitative method, it can adequately encapsulate qualitative content as well (Stempel 1989). More specifically studies using content analysis usually involve the following six steps: (1) formulation of the research question or objectives; (2) selection of communication content and sample; (3) developing content categories; (4) finalizing units of analysis; (5) preparing a coding schedule, pilot testing, and checking inter-coder reliabilities; and (6) analyzing the collected data (Prasad 2008).

Impact of Media Frames on Public Perception of Infectious Diseases

In my study, the influence of media frames on public perception of infectious diseases is examined through content analysis of newspaper reports. Stories on severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), avian flu, and HIV/AIDS were sampled from coverage in *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* between 1999 and 2007. These newspapers were chosen as sources for three main reasons. First, newspapers are still a primary source of information for millions of people in the United States (Chaffee and Stacey 1996). Second, these newspapers devote substantial resources to coverage of national and international affairs and have a large reporting staff with expertise in science, technology, and medical issues (Nisbet and Huge 2006). Third, some national news sources like *The New York Times* and *The Washington Post* are considered the "gatekeeper" or "elite" sources of news, in that they influence news coverage made in other national and regional newspapers (Paletz 2002; Jamieson and Campbell 2001). Analysis of these two newspapers indicates reporting trends likely to be followed by other news reports.

These three diseases—HIV/AIDS, SARS, and avian flu—were chosen as case studies for two primary reasons: They have greatly affected the

United States, and they have their origins outside the United States. These infectious diseases have spread from countries in Africa and China to the United States and have raised pressing biomedical, human rights, economic, and security concerns in the United States. Public health officials, international organizations, government agencies, and many non-governmental groups have drawn attention to the impact of infectious diseases on human rights and the economic development of countries, and they have urged global collaboration and pooling of resources to fight the increased threat of epidemics.

Statistical analysis tests the relationship between media framing of diseases and changes in public opinion. I wanted to research that frame was the most powerful in shaping public attitudes, and many studies agree that only an "operational approach of asking people directly to evaluate the relative strength of various frames" will allow assessment of frame strength (Chong and Druckman 2007). I posed the following research questions. Does it matter if the framing of infectious diseases stresses medical dangers, economic costs, human rights infringement, or strategic threats? If it does, which issue frame is the most compelling or persuasive in influencing public perception of threat and concern over the disease? Public opinion poll data are used to present a measure of the public reaction to these frames.

Previous research indicates that two factors may considerably enhance the impact of a frame. First, repeated exposure to a frame may magnify its accessibility and make it more persuasive. Second, perceived relevance of an issue frame may also increase its influence. Frames that are more directly related to the United States, for example, may have the effect of increasing public anxiety. Consistent with this, and building on previous research, the following hypotheses were tested:

Hypothesis 1 Frames represented prominently in the media will tend to mobilize public support for policies associated with those frames. Increased repetition of the frame will enhance its effect. Frequent exposure to the frame will increase the accessibility and thereby the relevance of the issue and people will pay more attention to considerations underlying the problem. This claim relies on the accessibility and memory-based model of public opinion formation.

Hypothesis 2 When the medical and economic frames dominate media coverage, which is the most common scenario, people will be worried about the disease. They will be likely to support potentially inconvenient policies intended to address the dangers of the disease. On the other hand, when security and human rights frames dominate, which should be less often, people will be less worried and concerned about the spread of disease. In this case, people would be less likely to support inconvenient public policies because they will view these frames as less personally relevant.

In testing these hypotheses, a content analysis of newspaper reports about infectious diseases was used to determine which frame was more prevalent at different times. Qualitative content analysis of health frames and a brief historical discussion of the resulting public opinion supplement this analysis.

The most prominent frames identified in the articles were the biomedical, economic, security, and human rights frames. In fact, the choice of these four frames emerges, in part, from pre-test content analysis showing that they are the most prominent infectious disease frames. Other frames, such as entertainment, political, and humanitarian, were not as common in news stories. A fellow student was given 10 percent of the stories (randomly selected) to code, and she recorded the data on a separate coding sheet. This test of inter-coder reliability showed an overall level of 86 percent agreement between me and the other student. Such reliability figures are acceptable by most communications scholars (Daniel et al. 2005).

The following themes were considered when coding for the biomedical frame: transmission and epidemiology of the disease; the possibility of it taking the form of an epidemic or pandemic; focus on different strains of viruses that caused these infectious diseases; diagnosis and symptoms of disease; cure, rehabilitation, and biophysical issues surrounding the disease; treatment/medication related to the disease; and employment of quarantine and isolation as intervention strategies to contain the disease. With regard to HIV/AIDS, debates about prevention and treatment (i.e., needle exchange, use of condoms, abstinence only, and blood transfusion) were considered. The roles of the World Health Organization, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Institutes of Health, doctors, health care professionals, virologists, and scientists in relation to the disease were also indicators of the biomedical frame.

To measure the security frame, news reports were coded for mention of threat to the state's capacity (i.e., its military and peacekeeping forces, a threat to state borders, and public institutions) due to the pandemic of HIV/AIDS, SARS, or avian flu. Mention of deliberate use of microbes to inflict bioterrorism was also included in the security frame.

The following themes defined the economic frame: indications that the spread of disease caused financial losses, decline in investments, investments, decline of gross domestic product, loss of exports, losses to manufacturing units, loss of trade and commerce, and decline in tourism; references to absenteeism at work, loss of skilled workers, and health insurance payments as a result of the disease; and mention of costs and expenses to the federal and state governments or global funds to fight the disease and financial costs of vaccine research and production incurred by pharmaceutical industries. Economic factors leading to the spread of disease were also coded, including: smuggling of uninspected meat/chicken to avoid custom duties; prostitution or forced sex on women; poverty causing people to sell blood infected with HIV in poor countries where blood often is not screened for infection; slums, squalor, urbanization, and nutritional deficiencies leading to the spread of infectious diseases; and changes in land use or economic development associated with disease transmission. Finally, stories about economic activities such as human encroachment on forests, which can bring people into closer contact with insects and animals carrying disease, and stories that mentioned lack of infrastructure (e.g., roads) and higher tariffs (if they are a hurdle in the shipment and transfer of medicine to poorer countries) were also coded for the economic frame.

The key words in the human rights frame for HIV/AIDS were stigmatization and discrimination against people infected with the disease. Also coded were stories about protests by the homosexual population of the United States against mandatory screening of blood when donating blood; and, protests against the "partner notification program" in the case of HIV/AIDS.

Demands for freedom of the press and against censorship by countries (like China) that censored news about the outbreak of disease in their country were voiced. Human rights groups protested mandatory quarantine and isolation in some countries as infringement of peoples' civil and political rights. In the case of avian flu, the issue of compensation to farmers whose poultry was culled was raised by many private and international organizations.

Each news article was coded at the sentence level. Each frame was a variable and was assigned a numerical value based on the number of times the frame was mentioned in each given news article. This numerical score was then converted into a weighted measure for each frame, which is defined as the ratio of the number of times a given frame is mentioned in the news article and the total number of sentences in the news article. The weighted measure was used primarily for two reasons: (1) to normalize the measure so that it is comparable across news articles of varying lengths; and (2) to allow comparison of the relative scores across frames in each news article. The stories also were coded as follows for the region or country that was the focus of the story: United States, countries other than the United States, global impact, or geographic region not mentioned. The changes in media coverage in terms of the number of articles published (including ratios of the four frames) were summarized using monthly and weekly intervals over the course of the outbreak period to examine the trends at a much more detailed level. The timeline of key events for each of these diseases was also plotted in the graph to show the key events that triggered a change in media coverage. A brief historical discussion of the evolution of frames supplemented the analysis.

The public opinion surveys were drawn from a secondary database corresponding to the period in which these news stories were published. Public opinion data were collected mainly from the I Poll data bank, Polling the Nation, and the Health Poll Search of the Kaiser Family Foundation. All survey results are based on representative national samples of adults aged 18 or older. With very few exceptions, the sample sizes of these studies were at least 1000 respondents. Shifts in public opinion toward infectious diseases were assessed by considering exact and similarly worded questions about issues related to avian flu, HIV/AIDS, and SARS (Ho et al. 2007). Specifically, these questions measured the following: (a) willingness to support harsh public health measures such as quarantine to curb the spread of disease; (b) precautionary steps taken and behavioral changes made in personal lives due to fear of the disease; and (c) concerns about the spread and likelihood of contracting the disease. Positive responses to these questions would indicate a higher level of awareness and concern about the disease in response to media coverage of these diseases. Further correlation analyses were conducted to understand the relationship between changes in media coverage of infectious diseases and changes in public opinion.

Findings

This study used a research design that studied framing effects (measured by changes in responses to survey responses) when respondents were exposed to multiple frames in the corresponding period. Unlike many previous experimental studies of framing effects in which respondents were exposed to opposing frames in measured quantities, this study sought to understand framing effects when respondents were exposed to multiple frames in real-world conditions.

Case studies of three infectious diseases explored variations in framing regarding the number of articles published and the ratios of the four frames at quarterly, monthly, and weekly intervals. Results indicate that no one frame was persuasive across all diseases. The economic frame had a significant effect on public opinion about SARS, as did the biomedical frame in the case of avian flu. Both the security and human rights frames affected opinion and increased public support for policies intended to prevent or treat HIV/AIDS. My analysis produced three major findings. First, the biomedical frame was the dominant frame in all three case studies, and the economic frame was the second most represented frame. The human rights and security frames were less prominent in all the three case studies. Second, framing effects were present, although the degree of the respondents' opinion changes was not particularly extensive. Finally, different frames seemed to evoke a differing pattern of responses about the three distinct infectious diseases.

As hypothesized, some frames seemed to invoke more worry and concern over the disease than others. Increased prominence (frequency) of some frames also increased public anxiety. This finding supports Shanto Iyengar's observation that repeated exposure to a frame, such as frequently hearing a news story emphasizing economic losses, increases the accessibility of the frame and enhances its effect (Iyengar 1990). When any concept is recently or frequently repeated, it comes quickly to one's mind when making judgments on policy (Fiske and Taylor 2008; Liberman et al. 2007). Other frames, even if they did not appear most frequently, apparently prompted concern over the disease because they were perceived to be more relevant or stronger frames. In this fashion, the economic frame may have increased public anxiety about SARS when coverage pertained specifically to the United States. The findings of this study are generally consistent with those of Paul Brewer, David Wise, Paul Sniderman, and Sean Theriault, who posited that framing results are not as robust when respondents are exposed to dual or multiple frames, compared with

single frames (Wise and Brewer 2010; Sniderman and Theriault 2004). On the other hand, this study of infectious disease framing does not support the claim that exposure to competing frames necessarily mitigates the impact of any one frame. As Rodger Payne puts it:

> No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded and it would be virtually impossible to know in advance if an apparently compelling frame in one situation would also prove persuasive when applied to an analogous case. (Payne 2001)

There are some significant implications of this research for the development of international relations theory, and for policy makers and researchers involved in communications research and study of public opinion and foreign policy. The study of public opinion on a transnational issue like infectious diseases also contributes to the existing debates in international relations theory. In a world faced with pressing non-military issues and with domestic and transnational actors linked to these concerns, international behavior could be the result of a "multiplicity of motives, not merely the imperative of systemic power balances" (Holsti 2004). Issue framing is likely to be relevant to international agreements about surveillance, border controls, immigration issues, and distribution of vaccines and antiviral drugs to control transnational diseases.

Conclusions and Implications

My research design combined content analysis of news reports of three case studies with nationally representative surveys about infectious diseases retrieved from survey data banks. This method is very beneficial to all researchers and policy analysts who seek to analyze large data on implications of policy issues. As many scholars who have used this method have pointed out, readers who analyze the text can understand the content and themes and can make inferences and assess effects of these messages (Krippendorff 2013).

The strength of this research (content analysis) is that it is a systematic and methodological tool to analyze texts and as far as it involves reading of the text and assigning categories to it, the distinction between qualitative and quantitative content analysis may not be that significant (Krippendorff 2013). Media content analysis is a part of the broader study of content analysis that studies texts of many kinds. Combining content analysis with survey opinions, this investigation helps us in understanding

public opinion and public response to health communication. This method may also be useful to researchers in many fields—policy research, organization scholars, health research, social movements, and health communication studies.

NOTES

1. Some of the earliest and most important works on content analysis were by Harold Laswell (1949), Abraham Kaplan (1943), Bernard Berelson (1952), Riffe et al. (2005), Klaus Krippendorff (1980). It is an analysis of both data collection and data analysis and has wide application in many fields and disciplines.
2. Experimental studies have the built-in advantage of controlling the environment in which media effects take place and making sure no other factor leads to changes in media effects.
3. A growing body of research documents how public support for military intervention increases if the public feels that the action had the approval of international organizations. See Joseph M. Grieco, Christopher Gelpi, Jason Reifler, and Peter D. Feaver, "Let's Get a Second Opinion: International Institutions and American Public Support for War," *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 2 (2011): 563–83.
4. Communication scholars categorize framing effects as either "equivalency" framing effects or "emphasis" framing effects: see Alex Mintz and Steven B. Redd, "Framing Effects in International Relations," *Synthese* 135, no. 2 (1997): 193–213; James N. Druckman, "The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence," *Political Behavior* 23, no. 3 (2001): 225–48.
5. Some recent studies have added control groups in their experiments. See, Dennis Chong and James N. Druckman, "Dynamic Public Opinion: Communication Effects Over Time," *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 4 (2010): 663–80.

REFERENCES

Aldrich, John H., Christopher Gelpi, Peter Feaver, Jason Reifler, and Kristin Thompson Sharp. 2006. Foreign Policy and the Electoral Connection. *Annual Review of Political Science* 9: 477–502.

Almond, Gabriel A. 1956. Public Opinion and National Security. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 20 (2): 371–378.

Barabas, Jason, and Jennifer Jerit. 2010. Are Survey Experiments Externally Valid? *American Political Science Review* 104 (2): 226–242.

Bardhan, Nilanjana. 2001. Transnational AIDS-HIV News Narratives: A Critical Exploration of Overarching Frames. *Mass Communication and Society* 4 (3): 283–309.

Baumgartner, Frank R., and Beth L. Leech. 2001. Interest Niches and Policy Bandwagons: Patterns of Interest Group Involvement in National Politics. *The Journal of Politics* 63 (4): 1191–1213.

Benford, Robert D. 1993. You Could Be the Hundredth Monkey: Collective Action Frames and Vocabularies of Motive Within the Nuclear Disarmament Movement. *Sociological Quarterly* 34 (2): 195–216.

Berelson, Bernard. 1952. *Content Analysis in Communications Research*. Glencoe: Free Press.

Berstein, Paul. 1998. Bringing the Public Back In: Should Sociologists Consider the Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy? *Social Forces* 77 (1): 27–62.

Beuno de Mesquita, Bruno. 2002. Domestic Politics and International Relations. *International Studies Quarterly* 46 (1): 1–9.

Blackstone, Amy. 2012. *Principles of Sociological Inquiry: Qualitative and Quantitative Methods*. Washington: Saylor Foundation.

Brewer, Paul R., and Kimberly Gross. 2005. Values, Framing and Citizens' Thoughts About Policy Issues: Effects on Content and Quantity. *Political Psychology* 26 (6): 929–948.

———. 2010. Studying the Effects of Issue Framing in Public Opinion About Policy Issues. In *News Framing Analysis: Experimental and Theoretical Perspectives*, ed. Paul D'. Angelo and Jim A. Kuypers, 159–186. New York: Routledge.

Campbell, D.T., and J.C. Stanley. 1996. *Experimental and Quasi Experimental Designs*. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 1994. *Addressing Emerging Infectious Disease Threats: A Prevention Strategy for the United States*. Atlanta: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service.

Chaffee, Steven, and Frank Stacey. 1996. How Americans Get Political Information: Print Versus Broadcast News. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 546 (1): 48–58.

Chong, Dennis. 1993. How People Think, Reason, and Feel About Rights and Liberties. *American Journal of Political Science* 37: 867–899.

Chong, Dennis, and James N. Druckman. 2007. A Theory of Framing and Opinion Formation in Competitive Elite Environments. *Journal of Communication* 57 (1): 99–118.

———. 2010. Dynamic Public Opinion: Communication Effects over Time. *American Political Science Review* 104 (4): 663–680.

Chong, Dennis, Citrin Jack, and Conley Patricia. 2001. When Self Interests Matter. *Political Psychology* 22 (3): 540–571.

Clark, Jude. 2006. The Role of Language and Gender in the Naming and Framing of HIV/AIDS in the South African Context. *Southern African Linguistics and Applied Language Studies* 24 (4): 461–471.

Coy, Patrick G., and Lynne M. Woehrle. 1996. Constructing Identity and Oppositional Knowledge: The Framing Practices of Peace Movement Organizations During the Persian Gulf War. *Sociological Spectrum* 16 (3): 287–327.

Dahlstrom, Michael F., Anthony Dudo, and Dominique Brossard. 2012. Precision of Information, Sensational Information, and Self-Efficacy Information as Message-Level Variables Affecting Risk Perceptions. *Risk Analysis* 32 (1): 155–166.

Daniel, Riffe, Lacy Stephen, and Fico G. Frederick. 2005. *Analyzing Media Messages: Using Quantitative Analysis in Research*. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

DeMotts, Rachel B., and Lawrence P. Markowitz. 2004. Framing the Epidemic: The Case of UNAIDS. Paper presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2–5.

Domke, David, Erica S. Graham, Kevin Coe, Sue Lockett John, and Ted Coopman. 2006. Going Public as Political Strategy: The Bush Administration, an Echoing Press, and Passage of the Patriot Act. *Political Communication* 23 (3): 291–312.

Druckman, James N. 2001. On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can Frame? *The Journal of Politics* 63 (4): 1041–1066.

———. 2010. Competing Frames in a Political Campaign. In *Winning with Words: The Origins and Impact of Framing*, ed. Brian F. Schaffner and Patrick J. Sellers. New York: Routledge.

———. 2011. What's It All About? Framing in Political Science. In *Perspectives in Framing*, ed. Gideon Keren, 279–302. New York: Taylor and Francis.

Entman, Robert M. 2003. Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm. *Journal of Communication* 43 (4): 51–58.

Fearon, James D. 1998. Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations. *Annual Review of Political Science* 1 (1): 289–313.

Feldman, Stanley, and John Zaller. 1992. The Political Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the Welfare State. *American Journal of Political Science* 31: 268–307.

Fiske, Susan T., and Shelley E. Taylor. 2008. *Social Cognition, from Brains to Culture*. Boston: McGraw Hill Higher Education.

Gamson, William A., and Andre Modigliani. 1987. The Changing Culture of Affirmative Action. *Research in Political Sociology* 3: 137–177.

Gelpi, Christopher. 2010. Performing on Cue? The Formation of Public Opinion Towards War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54 (1): 88–116.

Gross, Kimberly, and Lisa D. Ambrosio. 2004. Framing Emotional Response. *Political Psychology* 25 (1): 1–29.

Harrell, Margaret C., and Melissa A. Bradley. 2009. *Data Collection Methods: Semi Structured Interviews and Focus Groups*. Santa Monica: RAND.

Ho, Shirley, Dominique Brossard, and Dietram A. Scheufele. 2007. The Polls—Trends Public Reactions to Global Health Threats and Infectious Diseases. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 71 (4): 671–692.

Holsti, Ole R. 1992. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy. *International Studies Quarterly* 36: 439–466.

———. 2004. *Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy*. Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Iyengar, Shanto. 1990. The Accessibility Bias in Politics: Television News and Public Opinion. *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 2 (1): 1–15.

Jacobs, Lawrence R., and Robert Y. Shapiro. 2000. *Politicians Don't Pander: Political Manipulation and the Loss of Democratic Responsiveness*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jamieson, Kathleen H., and Karlyn K. Campbell. 2001. *The Interplay of Influence: News, Advertising, Politics and the Mass Media*. Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing.

Jentleson, Bruce W. 1992. The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of Military Force. *International Studies Quarterly* 36 (1): 49–74.

Kinder, Donald R. 2007. Curmudgeonly Advice. *Journal of Communication* 57 (1): 155–162.

Krippendorff, Klaus. 1980. Validity in Content Analysis. In *Computerstrategien für die kommunikationsanalyse*, ed. E. Mochmann, 69–112. Frankfurt: Campus.

———. 2013. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*. Los Angeles: Sage.

Liberman, Nira, Jens Forster, and Tory E. Higgins. 2007. Completed vs. Interrupted Priming: Reduced Accessibility from Post-fulfillment Inhibition. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 43 (2): 258–264.

Lippman, Walter. 1922. *Public Opinion*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co.

Loewenson, Rene. 2011. *Civil Society Influence on Global Health Policy*. Zimbabwe: World Health Organization, Training and Research Support Center.

Lupia, Arthur. 2000. Who Can Persuade Whom? Implications from the Nexus of Psychology and Rational Choice Theory. In *Political Psychology*, ed. James H. Kuklinski. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Luther, Catherine A., and Xiang Zhou. 2005. News Framing of SARS in China and the United States. *Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly* 82 (4): 857–872.

Miller, Joanne M., and Jon A. Krosnick. 2000. News Media Impact on the Ingredients of Presidential Evaluations: Politically Knowledgeable Citizens Are Guided by a Trusted Source. *American Journal of Political Science* 44: 295–309.

Mira, Sitrovic. 2003. Effects of Media Use on Audience Framing and Support for Welfare. *Mass Communication and Society* 3 (2): 269–296.

Mondak, Jeffrey J. 1993. Source Cues and Policy Approval: The Cognitive Dynamics of Public Support for the Reagan Agenda. *American Journal of Political Science* 37: 186–212.

Morgenthau, H.G. 1956. *Politics Among Nations*. New York: A. A. Knopf.

Mueller, John E. 1973. *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion*. New York: Wiley.

Mullinix, Kevin J., Thomas J. Leeper, James N. Druckman, and Jeremy Freese. 2015. The Generalizability of Survey Experiments. *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 2 (2): 109–138.

Nelson, Thomas E., Zoe M. Oxley, and Rosalee A. Clawson. 1997. Towards a Psychology of Framing Effects. *Political Behavior* 19 (3): 221–246.

Nisbet, Matthew C., and Mike Huge. 2006. Attention Cycles and Frames in the Plant Biotechnology Debate. *Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics* 11 (2): 2–40.

Nisbet, Matthew C., and Bruce V. Lewenstein. 2002. Biotechnology and the American Media: The Policy Process and the Elite Press 1970–99. *Science Communication* 23 (4): 359–391.

Page, Benjamin I. 1996. *Who Deliberates? Mass Media in American Society*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Page, Benjamin I., Robert Y. Shapiro, and Glenn R. Dempsey. 1987. What Moves Public Opinion? *The American Political Science Review* 81 (1): 23–44.

Paletz, David L. 2002. *The Media in American Politics; Contents and Consequences*. New York: Longman.

Payne, Rodger A. 2001. Persuasion, Norms and Frame Construction. *European Journal of International Relations* 7 (1): 37–61.

Potter Philip, B.K., and Matthew A. Baum. 2010. Democratic Peace, Democratic Audience Costs and Political Communication. *Political Communication* 27 (4): 453–470.

Powlick, Philip J. 1995. The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials. *International Studies Quarterly* 39 (4): 427–451.

Powlick, Philip J., and Andrew Z. Katz. 1998. Defining the American Public Opinion/Foreign Policy Nexus. *Mershon International Studies Review* 42 (1): 29–61.

Prasad, B.D. 2008. Content Analysis: A Method in Social Science Research. In *Research Methods for Social Work*, ed. D.K. Lal Das and V. Bhaskaran, 173–193. New Delhi: Rawat.

Price, Vincent, and John Zaller. 1993. Who Gets the News: Alternative Measures of News Reception and Their Implication for Research. *Public Opinion Quarterly* 57 (2): 133–164.

Risse Kappen, Thomas. 1991. Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies. *World Politics* 43 (4): 479–512.

Scheufele, Bertram. 2006. Framing-Effects Approach: A Theoretical and Methodological Critique. *Communications* 29 (4): 401–428.

Scheufele, Dietram A., and David Tewksbury. 2007. Framing, Agenda Setting and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models. *Journal of Communication* 57 (1): 9–20.

Sears, David O. 1986. College Sophomores in the Laboratory: Influence of a Narrow Data Base on Social Psychology's View of Human Nature. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 51 (3): 515–530.

Shanto, Iyenger, and Kinder Donald. 1987. *News that Matters: Television and American Public Opinion*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Shih, Tsung-Jen, Rosalyna Wijaya, and Dominique Brossard. 2008. Media Coverage of Public Health Epidemics: Linking Framing and Issue Attention Cycle Toward an Integrated Theory of Print News Coverage of Epidemics. *Mass Communication and Society* 11 (2): 141–160.

Sniderman, Paul M., and Sean M. Theriault. 2004. The Structure of Political Argument and the Logic of Issue Framing. In *Studies in Public Opinion: Attitudes, Non-attitudes, Measurement Error and Change*, ed. Willem E. Saris and Paul M. Sniderman, 337–358. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Stempel, G.H. 1989. Content Analysis. In *Research Methods in Mass Communications*, ed. G.H. Stempel and B.H. Westley, 119–131. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.

Sullivan, John L., and Eugene Borgida. 1989. Foreign Affairs and Issue Voting: Do Presidential Candidates Waltz Before a Blind Audience? *American Political Science Review* 83 (1): 123–141.

Tian, Yan, and Concetta M. Stewart. 2005. Framing the SARS Crisis: A Computer-Assisted Text Analysis of CNN and BBC Online News Reports of SARS. *Asian Journal of Communication* 15 (3): 289–301.

Walt, Gill, Louisiana Lush, and Jessica Ogden. 2004. International Organizations in Transfer of Infectious Diseases: Iterative Loops of Adoption, Adaptation, and Marketing. *Governance* 17 (2): 189–210.

Williams, Michael C. 2003. Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics. *International Studies Quarterly* 47 (4): 511–531.

Wise, David, and Paul R. Brewer. 2010. Competing Frames for a Public Health Issue and Their Effects. *Mass Communication and Society* 13 (4): 435–457.

World Health Organization. 2004. *WHO Global Burden of Disease: 2004 Update*. Geneva: World Health Organization.

———. 2011. *Health Topics: Infectious Diseases*. Geneva: World Health Organization.

Searching for Justice in International Trade Negotiations: A Feminist-Informed Multi-Sited Ethnographic Study of the Commonwealth Caribbean

Lisa M. Samuel

World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations involve asymmetrical parties. To a great extent, the rules, processes, and outcomes of these negotiations fail to take into full consideration the profound effects the institution has on the domestic policy space of national societies. The WTO directly shapes the global economy in which national economies and societies are embedded; the rules, processes, and outcomes by which it operates, and which it produces, by extension also shape these national economies and societies themselves. This includes how they regulate their currencies, their tax systems, foreign trade, and investments; how they organize health care, education, and nutrition; and how they govern themselves (Pogge and Moellendorf 2008, xxi).

Justice assessments of global institutional arrangements have important implications for the conduct of international organizations, states, governments, and other collective actors. Indeed, as long as transnational

L. M. Samuel (✉)
New York University, New York, NY, USA

133

arrangements are deemed unjust, their participants have reasons—moral and otherwise—to seek their reform (Carmody et al. 2012; Pogge and Moellendorf 2008). It is in this context that issues of justice are vigorously debated at various stages of the WTO negotiations. Yet the voices of the small, developing, less powerful states—a distinct group directly impacted—remain understudied. In this chapter, I demonstrate that feminist-informed multi-sited ethnography allows for the uncovering and analysis of the viewpoints of elites from these states responsible for framing trade-negotiating strategy and policy as to what "justice" would mean in international trade negotiations.

Multi-sited ethnography with participant-observation allowed me to track understandings of justice held by these negotiators themselves situated in spatially dispersed locales. It also allowed me to understand the ways in which policies pertaining to trade negotiations and outcomes were formulated in the domestic policy arena, due to my direct dialogue and interactions with those charged with making and implementing such policies. And because I (as the ethnographer) both participated in encounters in which negotiating strategy was considered and formulated, and I also observed such encounters, my presence as the ethnographer was a way to actively co-produce knowledge with my subject-participants.

A feminist research ethic informed the co-production of knowledge by my subject-participants and me. This ethic encouraged me to conceptualize my research question from the perspective of lived, concrete, and located experiences of the marginalized, in this case the marginalized elites responsible for the framing and implementing of trade-negotiating policy in the Commonwealth Caribbean which I selected for my case study.[1] This ethic also embraced the production of emancipatory knowledge, that is, knowledge that is useful for changing the world. In addition, it opened the door to recognition of the socially constructed nature of the world, and that it is necessary to interpret and analyze data in its particular context. The expression of what is needed to provide justice in such circumstances is often neglected in research, if such expressions emanate from less powerful voices. Yet their perspective is vital if we seek to understand why they ask for certain "concessions" in trade negotiations. Indeed, they challenge and complicate more powerful Western analyses and expressions within the same context, thereby demonstrating that other stories can be told—ones that emphasize differences instead of similarities (Nagar et al. 2002). This resonates with calls from feminist theorists who work against the erasure of accounts from women, minorities, and the South (Ackerly et al. 2006).

I suggest that this combination of methods allows for the uncovering and analysis of the viewpoints of these marginalized elites, thus elucidating the metaphor around which their negotiation strategies are formulated: that of "justice" as involving global economic governance processes which allow for the development of state capacities for autonomous decision-making, and which involves inclusive democratic processes that acknowledge differences between states and the significance of such differences in the context of international trade.

Doha: The Long Goodbye

"Doha Delivers." So noted the *Economist* in its December 9, 2013, blog. Further noted was that despite the deal to be reached in the very early hours of December 6, 2013, much remained to be done and, in fact, that this "first fruit to be borne of the long-barren Doha round of international trade talks…leaves the future of global talks cloudier than might have been hoped." Some history is in order.

The Doha Round of trade talks, begun in 2001, had a spectacular, heavily publicized collapse in July 2008.[2] This was followed by a similarly publicized deadlock in April 2011. In both instances, then WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, suggested that this occurred because "members have simply not been able to bridge their differences" (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development). On the face of it, there is no profundity in Lamy's statement; one might use it in everyday parlance to express frustration over any negotiation process that has failed to yield concrete results. But if this is indeed the case, what are these "differences?"

Developing states have long expressed that because of the stark disparities in terms of their levels of development vis-à-vis the developed countries, bridging differences cannot take place if it is not accepted that such differences constrain their involvement in the GATT/WTO[3] negotiating process as it now exists, fundamentally based as it is upon the core concepts of non-discrimination and reciprocity. They acknowledge the existence of Special and Differential Treatment (SDT) which emerged in the early days of the GATT and which ostensibly calls for their interests to be provided with special consideration. However, such states argue that the provisions thereof are inadequate as most of them are not legally enforceable but are "best endeavor" provisions, and many provide transitional periods which allow these countries time to "adjust their situation and

start complying with trade rules. These transition periods often come to an end before the prevailing conditions for which they are granted can be improved…" (Kaushik and Mukiibi 2011, 195). In addition, those states that form the subset of small developing states have noted that they are slated to be treated more as equal players in the neoliberal multilateral trading system[4] with erosions of the present SDT. This is problematic, given that small size is an additional constraint which distinguishes small developing states[5] from the grouping of developing states as a whole (Bernal 2006) along with location and limited governance capacity, and also given the insensitivities of neoliberal policies to actually existing distinct anthropological, geographical, and political conditions, among others (Harvey 2009).

Debates therefore rage as to whether the phasing-out of certain aspects of SDT for these states at the urging of the larger, more powerful states will benefit the former. In these debates, such small states both explicitly and implicitly appeal to justice to advance arguments as to how trade rules should be re-formulated. But what do negotiators representing these small developing states mean when they appeal to "justice?" This research project sought to address this question by probing the meaning of justice that informs the arguments of these negotiators specifically from the perspective of such states. The aim, then, was to tease out the context in which this understanding emerges, and to set forth precisely what this understanding is.

While there is some literature regarding what justice in international trade might mean (such as that found in Albin 2001; Brown and Stern 2007; Franck 1995; Kapstein 2006; Risse 2015), few scholars have spent any significant time—if any time at all—interacting with such negotiators to seek to understand their perspective on the matter. Perhaps such scholars could not gain access to these persons; perhaps they did not see this as being necessary to theory-building, or perhaps this is because it has become commonplace to conceptualize justice in the context of international trade primarily in terms of equality of treatment in the application of common rules, reciprocity and equal obligations, and/or distribution (as noted by Young 1990, 2000). Yet I take issue with this equivalence. I argue that such equivalence is particularly problematic from the perspective of small developing states. Vulnerabilities associated with size, location, and governance capacity[6] circumscribe the way in which these states can participate: they are not equal players—they are different. I suggest that what is lacking is an analysis of this issue from the perspective of the

states involved in WTO negotiations, particularly the less powerful, small developing states. To find out what their perspective is, I argue that researchers must interact and speak with their negotiators in their own social contexts. With this as my point of departure, I seek to add my voice in support of those who are marginalized in WTO negotiations by challenging dominant frameworks and methods and, by so doing, bring into play the voices of those in the international trade regime that are typically sidelined.

METHOD

How Shall I Conduct My Study? In the Beginning...

As the contours of this project took shape, it became clear to me that the object of the study—understandings of justice in international trade negotiations from the perspective of the less powerful, small developing states—was present in multiple, diverse locales. Put differently, it was multi-sited. This was because I was seeking the viewpoint of the elites responsible for framing the trade-negotiating strategy and policy of the Commonwealth Caribbean, and the object appeared in various locations: nationally, regionally, and internationally.

In the national and regional contexts, it appeared in individual countries in the Commonwealth Caribbean in the offices of high-level government officials with trade, finance, security, and development portfolios; in meetings involving these officials as well as those who actually participated in WTO negotiations; and in regional conferences attended by economists and policy makers. It also appeared in the back yards and front verandahs of some of these officials when formal work was over for the day and people had gathered to simply socialize. Similarly, it turned up in bars and restaurants after formal dinner meetings were coming to a close and some stayed behind to chat. In the international context, it appeared in Trade Missions in Brussels and Geneva, and in international organizations headquartered in New York, London, and Geneva.

Apart from the object of my study being mobile and spatially dispersed, I encountered another major consideration in my methodological planning: the high-level officials with whom I would interact in the course of the study may have been viewed as "high-level" in the context of their work within the region of study (the Commonwealth Caribbean), but with the region being part of that grouping of small developing states in the WTO came the actuality that these officials were usually paid scant

regard on the international stage. Because bargaining power in the WTO is directly co-related to "the capacity to open or close a market" (Barton et al. 2006, 10–11), and the Commonwealth Caribbean could lay claim to neither growing internal markets nor export-oriented economies, their market size meant that they lacked a major bargaining advantage. This translated into trade negotiators with little or no leverage, bargaining power, or agenda-setting capability. This in turn meant that they had practically no voice in the international trade regime. Shortly put, they were marginalized.

Yet these trade negotiators had reasons for their positioning in the trade regime—significant reasons, to my mind, most of which could not be changed, such as size and location. Thus, for them to be concerned with the (in)justice of the multilateral trade regime was, it seemed to me, of tremendous significance. But, as was indicated to me by three of my subject-participants—themselves being trade negotiators for the region—their situation was being comprehended in a superficial manner; suggestions were being made that "internal corruption," "ideological differences," and a "handout mentality" were the real sources of their problems.

I was thus dealing with an object of study which was multi-sited, and subject-participants who were marginalized. Power, or the lack thereof, was a central consideration. I was, and am, motivated to make visible and heard those who are marginalized. I needed to be attentive to the ways in which political, social, and economic interests make states and their people invisible and silent. I needed to focus on the significance of the WTO as an international organization in which the notion of justice being advanced by my subject-participants would either be heard and acted upon or be silenced. And, at the end of the day, I wanted this study to speak to policy formation and theory-building, and to contribute to the advocacy agenda of my subject-participants in international trade negotiations.

Methods and Methodologies: The Stage Is Set

I entered legal practice in 1991 and was immediately thrust into a world of negotiations and agreements. There were joint venture agreements, lease agreements, refueling agreements, mining agreements, shareholder agreements, and agreements for the international distribution of goods and for the international supply of services. There were agreements too numerous to name here. And there were the negotiations that led up to the conclusion

of these agreements. I quickly learned that there was more of an art to the matter of negotiating than a science. At least that was how I experienced it. I also learned—very quickly—that all these negotiations involved asymmetrical parties. Consequently, as disparate as the content of some of these agreements might have been, there was one constant in the negotiations: all involved issues of justice being raised at various stages of the negotiations as the parties wrestled with how much power they had, and how much of that power could be brought to bear on the negotiating rules, processes, and outcomes.

At first, it seemed to me, the term justice was frequently being used to mean equality of treatment in the application of common rules. On some occasions, it meant equal obligations. On yet other occasions, either reciprocity or impartiality seemed to be the focus. Sometimes it appeared that justice meant a combination of some or all of these notions. However, whenever the negotiations involved international trade and the small developing states of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, justice was specifically associated by these states with the notion of difference. This notion of difference was being used to refer to their different characteristics of size, location, and limited governance capacity which, from their perspective, combined to constrain them from participating to their fullest capacity in both the trade negotiations and international trade relations (Bernal 2006, 2013; Garcia 2003).

As my professional life developed and meandered, I continued to participate in negotiations involving international trade, and to encounter this formulation of justice as encompassing positional difference. When I entered academia, I remained preoccupied with this. When I reflected on my preoccupation, I realized that my engagement with this particular subject matter emerged directly from my previous professional experience as a practicing attorney-at-law. Having been part of various teams responsible for legal and political negotiations leading to the establishment of some of the export-processing zones in the Caribbean, I witnessed firsthand the sometimes debilitating, yet sometimes enlivening, impact of the neoliberal trading regime on human development in small developing states. Ultimately, this experience led me to question a multilateral trade regime that did not appear to sufficiently account for the particular position of small developing states, and for the regime's impact on human development. My legal background also led me to question international relations (IR) scholarship that failed to account for difference, that is, difference between states in the inter-state arena in general, and in particular

in the multilateral trade regime. My own concerns for, and reflections on, a politics of positional difference in the global economic arena were ignited by my observations within this context, as well as my participation therein. Thus I claim in this study to be neither disinterested nor comprehensive. My standpoint, then, is that of one with the interests of small developing states in the context of the multilateral trade regime in mind.

Within the context of academia, I felt compelled to take up the question of what small developing-state trade negotiators mean when they appeal to justice. This narrative chapter is a compilation of the reflections on the methodological choices I made while carrying out the study.

Which Method(s) to Use, Then?

As I wrestled with identifying appropriate methods, I found myself in an interdisciplinary dilemma. Trained as an attorney-at-law under the British system of education meant that I was trained as both barrister and solicitor.[7] I received rigorous and intense training in litigation, and legal research and writing, as well as regarding the logic of the law—the skill of applying seemingly general laws to specific cases. In addition, I learned that human beliefs and meaning-making are constitutive of human actions. All this stood me in excellent intellectual stead for this study. However, I found to be of particular value my training as an attorney-negotiator: studying the *art* of negotiation—as opposed to the more positivist-oriented *science* of negotiation—taught me well how to listen to, and study, silences. It taught me, too, to be keenly aware of suggestions and hints at areas of concern for the person speaking that may not have been explicitly stated. Practicing as an attorney in the international business arena for ten years taught me how to quickly identify the sources of different types of power, how to manage the exercise of that power when it was not in my clients' best interests, and how to exercise power when it resided in my clients' camp.

Additionally, there was the strong belief I had that in order to really understand the intricacies of a situation, one of the strongest ways to do so was to go to the situation, be present in it, as far as possible experience it, speak with persons involved in it, and try to see the situation as they saw it. In other words, as suggested by Geertz (1988, 4–5), I would get to know and understand the situation well by being there.

Ethnography, with its emphasis on participant-observation, appealed to me given that I had insider status with, and access to, the majority of my subject-participants as I had worked with some of them, and was

introduced to those I did not already know by those I had known for a long time.[8] Since ethnography "…typically involves going out and getting close to the activities and experiences of other people, observing and interacting with informants preferably over a longer period" (Lie 2013, 204), it seemed to me to hold the potential for allowing me to get close to/become involved in/participate in the professional lives and concerns of the elites whose views on justice I wished to study. Additionally, with participant-observation, I believed that I could gain a more nuanced understanding of their world, as seen and understood through their eyes, instead of solely from my perspective.

Thus, as an IR researcher, I found myself drawing from legal scholarship and practice, and from anthropology, to uncover and analyze the viewpoints of elites from small developing states responsible for framing trade-negotiating strategy and policy on the issue of "what is justice?" I read voraciously. I spent several hours speaking with experienced IR researchers about their own methodological choices. I took extensive notes. I reflected on what I had been told, what I had observed, what I had done, and what I had read. And one afternoon, as I began to read Ackerly et al. (2006), I came across a chapter on multi-sited ethnography as carried out by Carol Cohn in her study of US national security discourse (2006, 93). Cohn relies on George Marcus' work on multi-sited ethnography for the mapping of her multiply situated object of study as occurring on a "fractured, discontinuous plane of movement and discovery among sites" (Marcus 1995, 102). Further research on my part led me to the understanding that multi-sited ethnography provided an opportunity, and the means, to conduct research in the globalized context, thus allowing me to move around without the strictures of the "bounded" field-site originally associated with ethnography (Rajak 2011).

The Methods Conundrum Solved?

In taking stock of my disciplinary background(s) along with my position as an IR researcher, I set out to identify a way to fuse the methodological concerns I had. That is, I searched out methods that would allow me to draw from my legal training and experiences, from feminist concerns with methods and methodologies, along with the anthropological concerns associated with marginalization.

Despite my enthusiasm for ethnography as a potential method for my research, I was given pause by the fact that political science as a discipline,

with IR as a sub-field thereof, typically views ethnography with great sus-picion.[9] The discipline tends to be dominated by quantitative methods, formal modeling, and other non-fieldwork, non-qualitative ways of study-ing politics (Shehata 2006, 261). Indeed, there is, and has been, a robust epistemological debate as to how the study of social phenomena should be conducted so as to build empirical understanding and theoretical knowl-edge. In spite of the assertion by Rajak that "…since the 'emergence of multi-sited ethnography' just over a decade ago (Marcus 1995), the multi-sited approach has proven to be a crucial strategy in attempting to con-front the transnational dynamics of corporate capitalism and global governance – subjects conventionally seen as the purview of International Relations – from an anthropological perspective" (Rajak 2011, 107), within IR there is a tendency toward quantitative analysis, including large-n studies and formal models, given their purported relative strength in external validity. Reflective qualitative researchers have been counseled to approximate the "scientific" approach, defined as following the conven-tions of quantitative models as closely as possible. In addition, positivist political scientists have tended to criticize those who utilize ethnographic methods as utilizing methods that lack rigor and objectivity, are not repli-cable, and are not systematic. Simply put, the criticism is that such work is not serious scholarship.

To my mind, then, the next challenge was to be clear in my work pre-cisely *how* I conducted my fieldwork, and *why* I did as I did. I have, there-fore, sought to make my methods explicit and situated within relevant philosophical contexts. But there are charges to be specifically addressed. I first direct my attention to that which asserts that interpretive research lacks rigor; Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2006) explicate this criticism at length. Examples are frequently given to the effect that traditional qualita-tive methods do not follow a prescribed step-by-step approach, commenc-ing with a formal hypothesis, which is then "tested" against findings in the field. I do not seek to deny this. Instead I embrace the position advanced by Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2006), worth repeating at length, that:

> Traditional qualitative methods require a flexible response 'in the moment' to observational (including participational) and interviewing circumstances, and so they are not 'rigorous' in the literal sense of that word – they do not follow a stepwise course in the way that quantitative studies are described as doing…The requisite flexibility also means that the research design often changes in the face of research-site realities that the researcher could not anticipate in advance of beginning the research. For this reason, it is accepted

interpretive methodological practice not to begin such a study with a formal hypothesis, which is then 'tested' against field 'realities.' Researchers in interpretive modes more commonly begin their work with what might be called informed 'hunches' or puzzles or a sense of tension between expectations and prior observations, grounded in the research literature and, not atypically, in some prior knowledge of the research setting. Understanding and concepts are allowed (indeed, expected) to emerge from the data as the research progresses. (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006, xvi)

So it was that I began my research on seeking to understand the meaning of justice used by trade negotiators for weaker, small developing states in the context of the multilateral trade regime. I had some advance familiarity with at least some parts of the relevant research settings; I had hunches regarding what I thought I would learn during the course of the research project; when I went out into the field, I was steeped in the research literature; I was consciously flexible in terms of being open to any changes in my research design that might be necessary once I entered the field; and I was receptive to acquiring whichever understandings of justice that would emerge in the course of the research.

Naturally, then, charges concerning the absence of a systematized approach flowed from the charges regarding the absence of rigor. The typical suggestion from positivist IR researchers is that traditional qualitative research methods are "all over the place" and that they "lack discipline" in terms of preparation before the fieldwork phase of the research project.[10] But this ignores the systematic nature of the advance preparations which must be done prior to entering the field including, inter alia, the attention to detail that is paid to selection of research sites, advance contact with subject-participants (especially if they are elites and access is problematic), and the choice of which modes of gathering data may be applicable. In short, though this may not be considered systematic in the context of positivist-oriented field research, interpretive research has its own procedures that are no less rigorous and systematic (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea 2006).

There is also the charge that qualitative fieldwork such as the subject of this work is not replicable, thus weakening the data gathered. Preferences are expressed for adherence to explicit, codified, public procedures, which are seen to produce knowledge claims, which can then be re-generated by any researcher who follows the same procedures (Yanow 2006, 82–83). I draw on Wedeen (2010, 265) who answers the charge relating to replicability in this way:

…Because meanings are 'cultural or socially available,' they are replicable – in the sense that some political scientists care about replication. Subsequent researchers can go to the field, and even if they do not talk to the same people, they can nevertheless be made aware of the range of meanings relevant to a particular phenomenon under study, because meanings are socially, not simply individually, accessible.[11]

Finally, there was the charge of the absence of objectivity, which tends to be rolled into the charges of a lack of rigor and of replicability. This charge is based on the notion that in the absence of clearly enunciated hypotheses and measurable variables, the research is not objective or rigorous or replicable, and that because of this, procedures cannot be replicated by another researcher. This is accompanied by the notion that researchers must, somehow, separate themselves from this observable phenomenon, which exists independently of themselves, "out there." If not, concerns regarding the personal bias of the researcher rise to the fore, the conclusion being that the subject of study is presented as being seen through prejudicial eyes, for instance, by reason of class, gender, political ideology, thus "resulting in analytic findings that cannot be relied upon as the basis for subsequent research or action (such as policy or administrative actions)" (Yanow 2006, 77). Like Iris Young (1990, 2000), however, my point of departure is that there is no "view from nowhere,"[12] no "non-perspectival perspective." One cannot make sense of, and produce knowledge from, a position that is outside of, and separate from, the subject of study. The prior knowledge and life experiences brought by the researcher to the process of research themselves mediate in the production of knowledge. And all research activities generate data that are partial—"partial" in the sense of them being inclined to bias—and this is because any method employed by the researcher will, of necessity, reflect her social, historical, and political standpoints. This is a position echoed by feminist standpoint theorists, such as Hartsock (1987) and Hawkesworth (1989). Tying this specifically to ethnography, I am as one with Shehata (2006, 260–1) when he asserts that all researchers are implicated in the knowledge they produce.

Feminist Methodological Considerations

As noted above, the primary impetus for this research came from my concerns that the voices of the small, developing, less powerful states in the

context of WTO trade negotiations remain severely understudied. A main concern among feminist scholars and researchers is the study of power and its effects (Ackerly and True 2010). Feminist-informed research seemed to me to address some of the methodological considerations I had, in that it is, in the words of Ackerly and True, "…self-reflective, critical, political, and versed in multiple frameworks in order to enable the researcher to 'see' those people and processes lost in gaps, silences, margins, and peripheries" (2010, 22). My consequent commitment to a feminist-informed research ethic meant, and means, that I was and am dedicated to interrogating what are considered to be the appropriate and reliable ways of seeing, knowing, and understanding the world, especially from the standpoint of different individuals and groups (Ackerly and True 2010, 25). The pertinent question here, though, is how does a feminist research ethic assist with adapting typical analytical techniques while meeting the ethical commitments to: take heed of the power of epistemology and of boundaries that exclude and/or marginalize; be reflective about one's own positionality and the effects we may have on our locations of research; focus on the context of relationships, particularly that between the researcher and her subject-participant. The feminist contribution in this instance is the "*developed practice of theoretically informed and experientially informed research that attends to power dynamics, boundaries, and the situatedness of the researcher*" (Ackerly and True 2010, 163, emphasis in original).

At the same time, however, I acknowledge that there are significant overlaps between feminist-informed methods and the interpretive approaches I utilize in this project. As indicated by Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2006, 211), "the overlaps…appear in an orientation toward interviewing that is conversational, in which the researcher is revealing of herself; in writing, in which, similarly, the author is present and reflective; and in the refusal to treat the knowing 'subject' and the knowledge he generates as somehow objective and universal." With these overlaps, however, I did not believe that I would be duplicating my efforts in the research process; rather, my thinking was that my awareness of these methods could only enrich my scholarship.

I want to foreground here the significance of the power of epistemology, as this is one area where the overlaps with interpretive approaches are, perhaps, not quite so stark. An epistemology is, in essence, an account of how we know things (Harding 1993). This aspect of feminist-informed analysis pointed me toward the need to utilize an epistemology which embraced the intricacies of the experiences of my subject-participants as

they understood and lived them. I needed to ensure that in this process, their voices were brought to the fore even as I engaged with pertinent theoretical voices. This, together with my previous professional experience as a practicing attorney-at-law, led me to be very careful about being reflexive of those aspects of my prior professional experience which might, at the time in question, predispose me to being placed in a particular relation with my subject-participants and the conceptualizations of "power" and "justice" I would be bringing to the table. In addition, I became acutely aware that a feminist epistemology, in part, speaks to the belief that knowledge is produced, not simply found, and the conditions under which it is produced should be interrogated and critiqued. Among others, standpoint epistemology seemed instructive here.

Standpoint Epistemology

Standpoint epistemology was particularly appealing to me, as it focuses on the epistemological benefits of considering situations and questions from the perspective of marginalized groups. Particularly for the purposes of my project, it should be emphasized that standpoints are the perspectives of groups—not of individuals. The focus, then, is not on individual distinctions, but on issues that inform the perspective of a group. Further, standpoints are agendas, not completed policies or theories; they provide us with issues and questions. They suggest that issues exist which concerns all the members of the group (Harding 1993).

Standpoint theorists emphasize the import of the position of subordinate or oppressed groups. As noted by Weldon (2006, 65), "Viewing social relations from the position of the oppressed does not just add another set of experiences to existing accounts; it forces revision of the dominant accounts, since it reveals them as partial and limited." Standpoint epistemology, therefore, serves as an important corrective to the partial views emanating from these dominant accounts. This allows for entry points into the transformation of dominant paradigms.

These points demonstrate that there are analytic advantages of marginalized standpoints. Given my interest in theory-building and policy-driven research, I found this approach to be particularly facilitative for this project.

Making It Happen

Having intellectually wrestled with how to carry out this research project, and having come to the point of being satisfied that I was on the best path with feminist-informed multi-sited ethnography, I was now ready to take the next steps in the process of research. Given that I had been—directly and indirectly—following justice through the multi-sited terrain of multilateral trade negotiations, my choice of locations to study this notion of justice in trade was mostly quite deliberate. I was limited by the following factors: paucity of funds for travel and research purposes; intense and sometimes unpredictable travel schedules of the elites I wished to speak with; and confidentiality issues associated with the conduct of most of the negotiation strategy-planning meetings. In actually carrying out my investigations at the sites I could gain access to, my research practices varied according to the people I met with, the physical location of the meetings, and just how close I was permitted to get to the object of inquiry at each location. Indeed, as Marcus (1995, 100) notes, it was clear that "not all sites are treated by a uniform set of fieldwork practices of the same intensity. Multi-sited ethnographies inevitably are the product of knowledge bases of varying intensities and qualities."

My formal, planned research practices between 2007 and 2012 included participant-observation, semi-structured interviews, formal in-depth interviews, taping and transcribing interviews, taking extensive field notes, contextualization, and textual analysis. Participant-observation formed the core of my field research method and in this regard, my involvement took place in myriad ways. At this juncture, I set forth what I have seen to be the value of participant-observation for my research.

Participant-Observation

I take as the goal of participant-observation to be the attaining of a "more nuanced understanding of the world" from the perspective of a defined group of people instead of from the perspective of the researcher alone; to understand the ways in which people classify their worlds; and to understand the significance of these perspectives and classifications for the ways in which people come to learn what they see as their place in society and how they express their worldviews in their political and social worlds (Pader 2006, 163). Put differently, as the researcher, one is required to step away from oneself and consciously place reliance on another's way of

understanding a situation and dealing with it. The researcher also must seek to make sense of the underlying reasons held by another for approaching the particular situation in the way she does. In addition, the researcher must situate these underlying reasons within the others' broader understanding of their world. Thus, as Pader (2006, 165) counsels, in the course of participant-observation, the researcher must not only understand how someone else interprets the matter at hand, but also have the tools needed to analyze those persons' understanding and interpretation of the matter at hand.

At Meetings

In actually carrying out my participant-observation, then, I was able to attend one semi-formal strategy-planning meeting hosted by a high-level member of the diplomatic corps of Jamaica; there, the formulation of arguments pertaining to the maintenance of certain tariffs were discussed and hammered out. This meeting was specifically in preparation for the attendance by one trade negotiator who was present at the meeting at a negotiation to be held at the headquarters of the WTO in Geneva, in the following week. During the meeting, I asked questions, my input was solicited, and I wrote detailed notes about what was discussed. I was also permitted to record this meeting upon the condition of confidentiality.

In addition to this meeting, I attended countless informal spur-of-the-moment meetings. These took place in hallways outside of people's offices, as small huddled groups inside of very senior officials' offices, over lunch with senior officials, and after formal meetings were held and those who attended came back to share details with those of us who had not done so. These also took place at the homes of some of my subject-participants when formal work was over for the day and people gathered to relax and socialize. Having been accepted as an insider, I was invited to be part of these encounters, and I was included in all the discussions going back-and-forth. Indeed, common phrases I heard repeatedly as prefaces to a serious question soliciting my input were "… since you've been doing this research, and with your background experience in these settings, how do you see…? What do you think about …? And what sense did you get when [so-and-so] said…? We keep trying to make the point that…but we're experiencing some serious push-back…" I made notes after all such occasions. At the end of a day of such encounters, I completed extensive

reviews of the day's experiences and of my already-completed field notes. I would then make further jottings to add detail to these notes.

In total, over the course of 2007–2012 I conducted 41 semi-structured interviews and formal in-depth interviews, and I had countless chats. Most took place in person, others by telephone. My interviews lasted between two and six hours. I made notes during all of them. All were taped and transcribed. At the end of each day's field work, I completed extensive notes with additional observations I had made during the day. I read all notes and transcriptions repeatedly, and thereafter was able to conduct follow-up interviews in 11 cases.

Special Hospitality of Subject-Participants

I was also particularly grateful to be invited to the homes of some of my subject-participants on weekends. They explicitly did so as a "follow up" to encounters we had begun during the week, indicating that they wanted the conversations between us to continue and that during the upcoming workweeks, their time would be limited. In other instances, when such invitations were issued to me, my subject-participant made it clear that it was because he/she wished to speak with me without the possibility of there being any "audience one might encounter in the formal work setting." Such "disturbance" (as it was often called) was explicitly not desired when the person wanted to get particular points across to me with the belief that they were "too sensitive" to chance being discussed elsewhere. The information gleaned in such settings was, without exception, invaluable. Indeed, these settings provided me with insights which I gained in no others. It was in this context that I learned about upcoming negotiations of a sensitive nature, and about some of the key issues that would be raised there by my subject-participants and their colleagues. Indeed, it was on one of these occasions that I first learned that the understandings of justice held by small developing-state trade negotiators were more complex than I had imagined when I entered the field.

Getting It Right

One of the major concerns raised by positivist researchers with regard to interpretive research practice has to do with the question: how does the researcher know she has gotten it right? Answers lie in both interpretive research practices and feminist-informed methodology. As has been argued

by Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2006), reflexivity assists with "informant feedback" and "member checks." Here the researcher is doing a serious stock-taking of self, of how she is located in the results of the research, and, indeed, how it is that she implicated in the production of knowledge.

I set out to assess whether or not I had "gotten it" via different means. I presented my findings at conferences and sought feedback from my panel members, my discussants, and the audience. I received extensive feedback on all occasions. I made notes of this feedback as soon as I could. Each year when I returned to the field, I gave briefings to people in the communities I wrote about. Again, I received feedback, and I took notes of this feedback as soon as possible. Additionally, I had conversations with individuals I encountered at my talks, and took notes as soon as it was feasible. I also relied on trusted insiders in the community I wrote about to review my work and provide feedback.

Challenges Faced: Not All Sweetness and Light? The Elephant in the Room: Me

But where was I in the midst of all this? As Cohn (2006, 96–97) has noted so eloquently, there "was an 'I' who asked the questions, and inevitably, who I am shaped not only what I noticed and was able to hear. But also what people would say *to* me and *in front of* me." In other words, my identity, my self-presentation, and others' perception of me were central to the data that emerged. In interacting with me my subject-participants were not interacting with a non-entity. They were interacting with a woman, a relatively young woman, a brown-skinned Jamaican woman (in some arenas in the Caribbean and Latin America, the perceived color of one's skin is indicative to some people that the person is to be treated with "kid gloves" and told only the "good" parts of any story (Hillman and D'Agostino 2009)). This would be compounded by the fact of the researcher being a "lawyer lady"' and, in some instances, a woman who was known to them either personally or via one of their friends or colleagues. I, as a researcher, was present first and foremost as a person, a human being—and thus not as an abstract 'scientist' who was researching something outside of the realm of what mattered in my subject-participants' lives. I, then, learned about the views of trade negotiators on the issue of justice in the world of WTO negotiations in part through my identity. Thus I had to have a keen awareness of the role of the self in the research

project. For me, reflexivity—viewed as the explicit attention to the role of the ethnographer in ethnography (Pachirat 2009, 144)—is tied to the fact that the ethnographer is the principal instrument of ethnographic research. Indeed, as so powerfully noted by Shehata (2006), "in ethnography, the ethnographer's self becomes a conduit of research and a primary vehicle of knowledge production."

Who Do You Say That I Am? Age and Access

But my subject-participants had their own views of me, too. I recall some key points. First, although I did not personally know all of my subject-participants, I knew many of them—some of them for as long as a decade or more. In these instances, I knew them professionally and/or in a personal family or friendly context. Second, I had worked closely with seven of my subject-participants when I was a practicing attorney. Consequently, they were very comfortable in interacting with me, and they already respected my knowledge of, and expertise in, the subject matter. They were happy to refer me to other potential subject-participants because of this. Consequently, any hurdles I might have had as a relatively young woman in a male-dominated world of trade diplomacy were already passed with these subject-participants. In fact, I already had to prove myself as a "mature," "serious," "willing to learn," "quick study," "demonstrably knowledgeable" woman in the legal and diplomatic world. My earlier acceptance was especially helpful at this stage of the research project as I have been told repeatedly that my "youthful appearance" was sometimes "something of a hindrance" because people in the legal and diplomatic fields did not take me seriously upon first meeting me and seeing me. And I needed to be taken seriously. Otherwise, I simply would not have been granted the access necessary for my study.

Already Known by Key Insiders: Accepted by Their Colleagues?

For some entry points into my spatially dispersed field, then, I was an insider from the commencement. There I was treated as a professional equal whose opinion was sought and valued. In others, this status did not happen quickly or easily. Approximately 80% of my subject-participants were men in positions of significant power. These were people who made decisions as to how to represent concerns of small developing states in the WTO. They influenced implementation. They effected policy changes.

Many were, perhaps, one and a half to two decades older than I am. Some acted in a paternalistic manner toward me, and initially tended to allow me to see just the contours of their concerns. However, when these subject-participants were together with those who already saw me as an insider, the signals from the former group changed to indicate that they, too, now accepted me as an insider. These "signals" included invitations to both formal and informal meetings and gatherings, and a definitely increased willingness to share solid information with me as to the reasons prompting the explicit use of justice in international trade negotiations.

Gender + Acceptance

About 20% of my remaining subject-participants were women who held high-level diplomatic posts. This led me to question why there were so few women in these positions. It fed into my curiosity as to how gender might/might not play a role in the context of international trade negotiations. As women representing relatively powerless, small developing states on the world stage, were they at a double disadvantage? But that was a question I had to set aside then, due to lack of time. What struck me, though, was the immediate and obvious willingness of all these women but one, to meet with me, to share their experiences of negotiating trade with me, to include me in meetings they had with key insiders, and to be available for follow-up discussions if I expressed an interest in that. Although I had not met these women before, they told me that they saw me as "one of them," as an equal—in part because they had known of me from the time I was practicing law, and in part because they had had to struggle to get to the higher positions in the government they now held and so could identify with similar struggles I might have had. They verbally expressed all this to me. They also expressed to me how they saw my research: as being useful to help promote the interests of small developing states in the international trade arena, and as being a different and interesting theoretical approach to the issue of justice in international trade. They were also very encouraging to me, in the sense that they told me to ignore any potential subject-participants who might be dismissive of me, and to find another means of communicating with them if necessary.

Feminist-Informed Multi-Sited Ethnographic Field Research: Lessons Learned

I had set out to understand what small developing-state trade negotiators mean when they appeal to justice in the context of international trade negotiations. My point of departure was the sometimes negative experience with movements toward free trade of small developing states in the Commonwealth Caribbean and their anticipated further loss of trade preferences. I wanted to uncover and analyze the viewpoints of these marginalized elites, and understand the metaphor of "justice" around which their negotiation strategies are formulated. As I embarked on this project, I realized that this notion of justice in the context of my study existed in different sites. I knew that the best way to capture the understandings that I sought and to discover the motivations behind the actions of these trade negotiators and policy makers was to engage with them in their own social contexts. In so doing, I was clear from the outset that I would do my utmost to facilitate a joint effort of meaning-making between myself and those with whom I wished to meet and speak. I needed to interrogate myself to make myself explicitly conscious of not only affecting the research site in certain ways, but also as one who would characterize it in partial and biased ways. I needed to be clear as to how my own preoccupations affected my research, and how they would ultimately affect the production of knowledge. I sought to ensure that my subject-participants would themselves produce accounts of their world. I took as a source of knowledge their own experiences in the context of international trade negotiations.

Yet I cannot claim to have represented their voices with total exactness—and this even though I made sure to take steps to ascertain whether or not I was "getting it." The trade negotiators, policy makers, researchers, and economists I had spent time with, whom I had observed and participated with in encounters at the core of my research, and with whom I had had conversations/interviews were marginalized, and they had been spoken for too often by those who presumed to be the voices of authority on their lived experiences and who sought to diminish them in the multilateral trade arena as being "lazy," "corrupt," and "unable to shake the shackles of a long-gone colonialism." Indeed, they had been painted with broad brushstrokes. My intent was to move away from generalities and to drill down to specifics. I wanted to understand the nuances of their arguments.

Because I was so strongly committed to doing so, I knew that my voice and perspective would also be present in the research process.

My feminist-interpretive methodology consciously included my own subjectivity, which both facilitated and impeded the knowledge I received from my subject-participants, and which shaped the knowledge I produced. I would insert my own understandings of the resulting data based on my own situatedness. My subject-participants and I are kaleidoscopic; our different characteristics enabled common membership and inclusion within particular groups, and exclusion from other groups. These concerns and understandings on my part, and the questionings I had as I sought to ascertain the most appropriate research method, led me to decide that my research would best be formulated as multi-sited ethnography.

A feminist methodology guided how I interpreted the data I collected. This foregrounded situated knowledge, a focus on experiences in specific locales, and the knowledge created in the course of these experiences (Ackerly et al. 2006). I argue from the perspective that knowledge is never value-free; my scholarship, then, is more objective when in it I self-consciously take the standpoint of a group. And the standard for justifying knowledge generated in this way is not whether it captures an abstract truth, but whether it is useful for changing the world. I believe that creating a space to bring forth an understanding of justice in the context of international trade relations will—at least to some extent, and in conjunction with other works—help to force revision of the dominant accounts, revealing them as partial and limited, thus leading to SDT responsive to the constant constraints experienced by small developing states in the WTO.

With specific regard to theory-building, I consciously chose to conduct theory-seeking research; that is, I sought to derive theory endogenously from within the empirical research I carried out. In so doing, I was moving away from the existing accounts of justice in international trade negotiations (as noted above) and seeking to understand specifically what trade negotiators from small developing states in their own situated contexts meant by justice in international trade negotiations. It included the following components—global political and economic governance processes: that allow for the development of their capacity for autonomous decision-making; which involve democratic processes of deliberation that allow them to develop and exercise their capacities; and which enable them to participate in a process of international trade rule-making that

acknowledges the different characteristics of such states which combine to constrain their participation in the international trading system. Based on this, they seek new entrenched SDT rules in the multilateral trade regime that are sensitive to such different characteristics, that is, recognition of particularity versus the universalism implicit in neoliberal trade, with a focus on agency, domestic policy space, and difference.

Regarding the import of this research for policy formation, research was able to pinpoint the embedded perspectives of those small developing states impacted by WTO disciplines, thus revealing their quest for domestic policy autonomy, or policy space. By policy space, I mean "the flexibility under trade rules that provides nation states with adequate room to maneuver to deploy effective policies to spur economic development" (Gallagher 2008, 63). They have deemed this necessary to be able to pursue the kinds of trade and industrial policies, which were successfully utilized in the past by developed countries as well as by some developing countries.[13] Thus the request for appropriate "policy space" is associated with the realization that if these small states were to adhere strictly to WTO disciplines, that would, to some extent, limit their room for policy maneuver—and this despite the fact that such states recognize the potential gains from trade liberalization. Indeed, as Garcia (2003) has noted, where development needs point to a deviation from trade orthodoxy, then a development-oriented WTO regime would restore the necessary policy space.

Conclusions

This research led me to a critical reconceptualization of justice in international trade negotiations—one emphasizing agency, domestic policy autonomy, the significance of difference, and the ways and means to achieve such inclusion through difference.

From a policy perspective, my contextual analysis of justice in international trade negotiations serves as an important corrective to prior understandings located in decontextualized and universalizing approaches. I suggest that my feminist-informed multi-sited ethnographic approach offers valuable insights into the specific concerns of subject-participants—insights that can usefully be utilized to inform policy making. Indeed, the innovative conceptualizations and approaches as presented in this project give new voice in advocating for opportunities for marginalized groups within the context of the global economy.

Notes

1. The Commonwealth Caribbean provides an interesting case study for the positioning of small developing states in the multilateral trade arena. These states exhibit the different characteristics associated with size, location, and governance capacity to which I have referred.

2. On June 24, 2009, Reuters reported that the Brazil's then Foreign Minister, Ceslo Amorim, noted difficulties faced by all WTO member states in reaching a deal. He condemned a call by then United States Trade Representative, Ron Kirk who stated that large emerging countries should open up their markets more to secure a deal. Amorim's response was that "…this pre-selection of some countries to make some concessions is totally unfair."

3. GATT meaning the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which preceded the WTO and which was enfolded into the WTO in 1995.

4. I use the term "neoliberal" to refer to the notion of universalism, which may be associated with the core GATT/WTO principles of non-discrimination and reciprocity. In this neoclassical approach, all economies are seen to obey certain universal laws of economics; policies, which are seen to guarantee economic success, are essentially the same from country to country. That economic processes are embedded in specific and diverse local social contexts is not a factor given sufficient currency in corresponding analysis. See Beneria 2003; Girvan 2000; and Harvey 2009.

5. This study centers on small developing states, in particular those of the Commonwealth Caribbean, and not on the grouping of developing states as a whole or on the least developed countries (LDCs).

6. See Samuel (2015) for a full analysis as to the significance of these characteristics.

7. With the passage of the Legal Profession Act in Jamaica in 1972, the profession was fused and barristers and solicitors became attorneys-at-law, with the same training and rights.

8. Because of my prior contacts with my subject-participants, I rarely faced the methodological issues associated with interviewing elites, such as securing access, building trust, and establishing rapport. For a good overview of the issues typically associated with this, see Mikecz (2012).

9. It should be noted that MacKay and Levin (2015) and Wedeen (2010) suggest that the use of ethnographic methods is presently on the increase in international relations.

10. Of interest, this was an accusation thrust at me during the International Studies Association 2014 Annual Convention as I presented a paper on the use of ethnographic methods in IR research. The gentleman began his

reproach with the comment that "I'm sure I speak on behalf of all *serious* international relations researchers…" (emphasis mine).

11. At the same time, however, I note that Perlmutter (2015, B2) embraces the notion of the "lack of replicability inherent in ethnography," and suggests that this may be a good thing as it contributes to the reliability of the data.

12. From Nagel's book by the same name (1986), the suggestion is that people cannot view the world in a detached manner, bringing nothing of themselves to the task of research.

13. See for example Chang, Ha-Joon (2002) in which it is argued that developed economies pursued aggressive industrial policy strategies—including infant industry and export subsidy measures—for their own development purposes instead of the free trade ideology they now espouse.

References

Ackerly, Brooke A., and Jacqui True. 2010. *Doing Feminist Research in Political and Social Science*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ackerly, Brooke A., Maria A. Stern, and Jacqui True, eds. 2006. *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Albin, Cecilia. 2001. *Justice and Fairness in International Negotiation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Barton, John H., Judith L. Goldstein, Timothy E. Josling, and Richard H. Steinberg. 2006. *The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and the WTO*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Beneria, Lourdes. 2003. *Gender, Development, and Globalization: Economics as if All People Mattered*. London: Routledge.

Bernal, Richard. 2006. Special and Differential Treatment for Small Developing Economies. In *WTO at the Margins: Small States and the Multilateral Trading System*, ed. Roman Grynberg, 309–355. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

———. 2013. *Globalization, Trade, and Economic Development: The CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

Brown, Andrew G., and Robert M. Stern. 2007. Concepts of Fairness in the Global Trading System. *Pacific Economic Review* 12 (3): 293–318.

Carmody, Chios, Frank J. Garcia, and John Linarelli. 2012. *Global Justice and International Economic Law: Opportunities and Prospects*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Chang, Ha-Joon. 2002. *Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective*. London: Anthem Press.

Cohn, Carol. 2006. Motive and Methods: Using Multi-Sited Ethnography to Study US National Security Discourses. In *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations*, ed. Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria A. Stern, and Jacqui True, 91–107. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Franck, Thomas M. 1995. *Fairness in International Law and Institutions*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gallagher, Kevin P. 2008. Understanding Developing Country Resistance to the Doha Round. *Review of International Political Economy* 15 (1): 62–85.

Garcia, Frank J. 2003. *Trade, Inequality, and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade*. New York: Transnational Publishers.

Geertz, Clifford. 1988. *Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Girvan, Norman. 2000. Globalisation and Counter-Globalisation: The Caribbean in the Context of the South. In *Globalisation: A Calculus of Inequality—Perspectives from the South*, ed. Denis Benn and Kenneth Hall, 65–87. Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers.

Harding, Sandra. 1993. Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What Is 'Strong Objectivity'? In *Feminist Epistemologies*, ed. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter, 49–82. New York: Routledge.

Hartsock, Nancy C.M. 1987. The Feminist Standpoint. In *Feminism and Methodology*, ed. Sandra Harding, 157–180. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Harvey, David. 2009. *Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Hawkesworth, M.E. 1989. Knowers, Knowing, Known. In *Feminist Theory in Practice and Process*, ed. Micheline Malson, Jean O'Barr, Sandra Westphal-Wihl, and Mary Wyer, 327–351. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Hillman, Richard S., and Thomas J. D'Agostino. 2009. *Understanding the Contemporary Caribbean*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Kapstein, Ethan B. 2006. *Economic Justice in an Unfair World: Toward a Level Playing Field*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Kaushik, Atul, and Julian Mukiibi. 2011. LDC Priorities for Improved Global Trade Governance. In *Making Global Trade Governance Work for Development*, ed. Carolyn Deere Birkbeck, 181–203. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lie, Jon Harald Sande. 2013. Challenging Anthropology: Anthropological Reflections on the Ethnographic Turn in International Relations. *Millennium-Journal of International Studies* 41 (2): 201–220.

MacKay, Joseph, and Jamie Levin. 2015. Hanging Out in International Politics: Two Kinds of Explanatory Political Ethnography. *International Studies Review* 17 (2): 163–188.

Marcus, George. 1995. Ethnography in/of the World System: The Emergence of Multi-Sited Ethnography. *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24 (1): 95–117.

Mikecz, Robert. 2012. Interviewing Elites: Addressing Methodological Issues. *Qualitative Inquiry* 18 (6): 482–493.

Nagar, R., V. Lawson, L. McDowell, and S. Hanson. 2002. Locating Globalization: Feminist (Re)readings of the Subjects and Spaces of Globalization. *Economic Geography* 78 (3): 257–284.

Nagel, Thomas. 1986. *The View from Nowhere*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pachirat, Timothy. 2009. The Political in Political Ethnography: Dispatches from the Kill Floor. In *Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power*, ed. Edward Schatz, 143–162. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Pader, Ellen. 2006. Seeing with an Ethnographic Sensibility. In *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, ed. Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, 161–175. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.

Perlmutter, David D. 2015. In Defense of Ethnography. *The Chronicle of Higher Education*.

Pogge, Thomas, and Darrel Moellendorf. 2008. *Global Justice: Seminal Essays*. Minnesota: Paragon House.

Rajak, Dinah. 2011. From Boardrooms to Mineshafts: In Pursuit of Global Corporate Citizenship. In *Multi-Sited Ethnography: Problems and Possibilities in the Translocation of Research Methods*, ed. Simon Coleman and Pauline von Hellermann, 106–123. New York: Routledge.

Risse, Mathias. 2015. *On Global Justice*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Samuel, Lisa. 2015. When Negotiating Trade Means Negotiating Difference: WTO Insights. *Social and Economic Studies* 64 (2): 91–125.

Schwartz-Shea, Peregrine, and Dvora Yanow. 2006. 'Reading' 'Methods' Texts': How Research Methods Texts Construct Political Science. *Political Research Quarterly* 55: 457–486.

Shehata, Sameer. 2006. Ethnography, Identity, and the Production of Knowledge. In *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn*, ed. Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, 209–227. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.

Wedeen, Lisa. 2010. Reflections on Ethnographic Work in Political Science. *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 255–272.

Weldon, S. Laurel. 2006. Inclusion and Understanding: A Collective Methodology for Feminist International Relations. In *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations*, ed. Brooke A. Ackerly, Maria A. Stern, and Jacqui True, 62–87. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Yanow, Dvora. 2006. Neither Rigorous Nor Objective? Interrogating Criteria for Knowledge Claims in Interpretive Science. In *Interpretation and Method:*

Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn, ed. Dvora Yanow and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, 67–88. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.

Yanow, Dvora, and Peregrine Schwartz-Shea, eds. 2006. *Interpretation and Method: Empirical Research Methods and the Interpretive Turn.* Armonk: M. E. Sharpe.

Young, Iris Marion. 1990. *Justice and the Politics of Difference.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

———. 2000. *Inclusion and Democracy.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Negotiating Local Cultural Space in a Global World: Joint Efforts at Meaning-Making and the Reconfiguration of Normative Womanhood in India

Monalisa Gangopadhyay

This project examines how Hindu urban middle-class media (HUMM) women experience and are impacted by the clash between two seemingly oppositional ideologies of conservative religious nationalism, specifically, *Hindutva*, and globalization. The tensions between the two ideologies are increasingly manifesting themselves through acts of resistance against everyday moral policing and gendered violence against women who are seen to be threats to idealized notions of Indian womanhood. It is a conundrum faced by a country that has largely embraced economic changes in the form of globalization but continues to grapple with its socio-cultural impact on established gender roles, personal and professional relationships and expectations at home and at work.

My research method uses critical feminist methodology to examine the impact of this clash on HUMM women in the context of social relations, the surveillance and maintenance of borders (national and personal), as well as the disciplining of practices and persons, in public and private spaces.

M. Gangopadhyay (✉)
Davie, FL, USA

Keeping a historic context as a constant background and focusing on their spoken words, my study investigates the public, professional and domestic lives of HUMM women who reside in Delhi (India's national capital region) and work in corporate media, both print and electronic, as they confront the fallout from these tensions, through the following questions: how do HUMM women employed by transnational corporations define Indian womanhood? How are the homogenizing images of Indian womanhood—that expect academic and professional excellence while demanding docility/purity/modesty/obedience from their bodies and behaviors—interpreted, accepted and deflected by HUMM women? What does security mean to HUMM women who are actively a part of the global economy? How do they measure security? How do HUMM women negotiate space: domestic, professional and public as sexed bodies? Have the bargaining tactics changed over time?

One of the first HUMM women I interviewed asked me, "Why this research? What is the point of asking about feminisms? What do you mean by a feminist project?" As I answered the questions raised by the "questioned," the conversation brought forth the complexity of defining a feminist project, delineating a feminist methodology. While debates continue to generate new ideas and directions (Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002; Harding 2004; Hawkesworth 2006), the central powerful tenet of feminist methodology rests in its flexibility, its dynamism. There is no one distinctly feminist methodology. Instead, different theoretical positions, defined by various ontological and epistemological footings, determine the methodological path chosen by the researcher. Irrespective of the form, feminist methodology is geared toward understanding and deconstructing "a gendered and sexed social world…[and] should be flexible enough to adapt to the range of objects in that world, guiding investigations of how gender and sex categories infuse our norms and expectations, our thoughts and fantasies, our practices and performances, our books and films, and our architecture and language" (Jones et al. 1997). For me, creating a feminist project meant collecting, collating and analyzing data while engaging with the politics of power and knowledge, all the while keeping the HUMM women and their words at its center.

Having investigated different methodological approaches, I chose qualitative feminist methodology as my toolbox of research. My particular feminist toolbox was stacked with the following "implements": open-ended, semi-structured interviews to collect primary data; feminist research resources (oral narratives, historical geographies etc.) for

supporting secondary data; and finally, feminist critical discourse analysis of a "gaze triad" consisting of their own gaze (HUMM women), the gaze of authority institutions and the researcher's gaze.

I chose this toolbox because simply put, my research is an attempt to understand how Hindu nationalism and globalization, two seemingly oppositional ideologies were controlling the lives of HUMM women, silencing some narratives while redefining others, many times without the consent of the women themselves. That is why qualitative feminist methodology—with its distinct goals of attaining gender justice and social change to improve women's lives—was my toolbox of choice.

Using qualitative research methods privileges women's narratives and gives them a safe space to express their thoughts, making their input central to the research. These methods of collecting and analyzing data also pushed me, the researcher, to acknowledge the power inequality between the participants and me (Deutsch 2004). This led me to be self-aware while interacting with the HUMM women, as well as while writing about them. According to Reinharz (1992, 175), "the purpose of feminist research must be to create new relationships, better laws, and improved institutions." This is my attempt to do that as I walk in their shoes and watch the HUMM women negotiate with stories, salaries and society in their daily lives of struggle and achievement.

The Stories as I Was Told

On January 24, 2009, a group of 40 activists of the *Shri Ram Sene*, a Hindu right-wing political group, barged into a pub in Mangalore (a city in the state of Karnataka in South India), dragged out a group of young people and beat them up, claiming that the women were violating traditional Indian values by wearing Western clothes and drinking alcohol with their male friends. The video of the incident became fodder for national and international media, establishing itself as a focal point for national condemnation and denouncement. While most Indian citizenry seemed angered and embarrassed by the violence, going as far as warning against Hindu Talibanization of India, many prominent politicians and even the National Commission for Women (NCW) condemned "the loosening of moral standards amongst young women" and called for controls on pub licenses and alcohol consumption in public (Mahajan 2009, 134).

As this moral policing was being thrust upon a largely outraged Indian citizenry, a group of women, mostly activists-journalists going by the

name, The Consortium of Pub-going, Loose and Forward Women, started the Pink *Chaddi* Campaign (Pink Underwear Campaign) to protest the acts of the *Sene* (Sen 2009). Kicked off on February 5, 2009, the campaign became an iconic example of how a grassroots initiative coalesced into a successful mainstream collaboration through social media tools. Using Facebook and blogs, the group urged women to send in new or old pink underwear to Pramod Muthalik, the chief of the organization, in order to shame him and the *Sene*. The group decided to use "chaddi" as the movement emblem because the khaki-shorts-wearing Hindu rightwing cadres are often derisively called "chaddi wallahs" (underwear people) (author interview with Nisha Susan, correspondent, *Tehelka*, *Chaddi* Campaign organizer).

As rhetoric from both groups filled the airwaves, the underlying angst stemmed from the question, "What is appropriate behavior for an ideal Indian woman of modern India?" My research project considers the implications of this loaded yet common question that unquestioningly homogenizes the diversity of Indian womanhood, by examining the encounters between religious nationalism—which rests largely on the body of the middle-class Indian woman—with neoliberal globalization. I argue that these urban encounters, which are manifested in the lives of the HUMM women through particular anxieties and processes, lead to a continual reconfiguration of gender hierarchies within the globalizing modern Indian nation-state.

Even as the tug-of-war between the two ideologies influence the lived realities of all individuals, I look specifically at the impact on HUMM women, because they are constantly being presented as Indian ambassadors of globalization, the first run of beneficiaries of the processes of neoliberal economic policies. These bodies are the platform on which politics of identity and nationalism are played out. These are the lives that are marked by political and religious interplay between the nationalism of traditional Mother India and economic globalization of India, Inc. Specifically, I find that these unexpected synchronies between globalization and *Hindutva* continue to expose women to demands marked by gender, class and patriarchal familial expectations. Since women outside the domestic sphere are seen as being disruptive to nationalist patriarchy that places women within the inner sanctum—the spiritual residence of the nation—the woman's body in public "was stabilized and rationalized through a construction of middle-class women who could traverse the nationalist public if they carried their 'essential femininity' with them. This essential

femininity, a gendered bodily habitus, variously identified as 'respectability' and 'modesty,' involved the creation of appropriate dress, activity" (Lukose 2005, 919). In other words, the HUMM women and others like them were given agency, albeit loosely leashed, as long as they toed the lines set in place by patriarchal power institutions.

The purpose of my research is to understand how HUMM women are living their lives as individual Indian citizens while confronting the socio-political changes that mark all aspects of their lives. Their challenges come largely from ideas that lean heavily on a strongly etched homogenized middle-class female identity that insists on complementary balance between traditional homemaking and global professionalism. This idealized Indian womanhood is continuously being re-molded for patriarchal consumption: by nationalists reworking the borders/security of *Bharat* and by corporations trying to sell the skills-products of India. This research is an attempt to understand how the female-gendered bodies continue to be defined in terms of their sexuality: the contained-traditional being safe, while the exposed-aberrant risking violation, despite the progress made by middle-class women in terms of personal-professional achievements.

As I venture into an arena that is a space of overlapping physical, religious, socio-economic and sexual identities, the enormity of this diversity is overwhelming. That is why the exercise of understanding the production and reproduction of a homogenized Indian womanhood through reinforcing values, attitudes and ethics of the enormously complex Indian society and the gendered hierarchy within, requires me to focus on one particular group of women: corporate media professionals of Delhi, India. Even as this "stereotyping" goes against the very grain of my feminist understanding, I present strong reasons (in the following sections) for my choice as I walk with the women on the public streets of Delhi, and talk with them in their private living rooms.

Method: The Why and How of Research

Harding defines methodology as "a theory and analysis of how research does or should proceed" (Harding 1987, 3). According to Harding (1987), feminist methodology uses techniques of data collection and analysis to understand women's experiences and life stories from women's points of view so as to provide alternative approaches to the study of social life, and a different understanding of reality.

I use a qualitative feminist methodology to investigate the public, professional and domestic lives of HUMM women who reside in Delhi (national capital region) and work in corporate media, both print and electronic, to get an insight into the teeming tensions that mark the complicated symbiotic relationship between globalization and nationalism that simultaneously thrusts forward and throttles the lives of women in India.

Theorizing the Indian Woman's Identity, Body and Space

Given my focus on specific markers that shape identity, I train feminist methodological lenses on religious nationalism and globalization as they act on "securing" the female body, its functions and "appropriate" roles in a straitjacket of paternalistic desires/demands. I use qualitative feminist theory to examine the processes of identity-esteem formation of these "privileged women," who are seen as being path-breaking modern women, the newly enhanced face of India, Inc.

Mapping the Nation

Feminist scholars like Sunder Rajan (1993), Ahmed-Ghosh (2003) and Oza (2007) have used a theoretical framework of masculine domination to examine the identity of the Indian woman as the site of contestation and inscription, for the definition of citizenship, morality and nationalism. Feminist theory asserts that women's bodies became the "material and discursive sites where nation was performed, values were contested, and borders and boundaries were policed and controlled" (Oza 2006).

Feminist theory also tackles the issue of putative categorization of women into homogenous groups of actors that react, adopt and adapt to policies, identities and structures in a uniform manner. As globalization and nationalism clash, it is essentially referred to as a battle between tradition and modernity usually sited in a woman's body and its disciplining, where ideological notions are asserted and contested (Puri 1999).

In brief, feminist theory links women's bodies and sexualities to nationalism in two ways: centrality of women of various classes, religions and races in the articulation of nationalism; and the emergence of nationalism in gendered, sexualized and racialized forms (Puri 1999). It is important to understand that the otherwise diverse Indian cultural system becomes a homogenous India when it comes to the disciplining of women, shaped by centuries-old gendered family structures. Yet these supposedly immutable structures of Indianness are being significantly eroded, specifically in the

urban middle-class strata by globalizing transnational cultural flows causing great anxiety and confusion within powerbrokers like the *Hindutva* brigade.

Another important theoretical aspect that influences my research is borrowed from feminist geographers who have theorized about spatialization and its division into sexed and gendered societal constructs and realities (Massey 1994). It is important to remember that the male-dominated society has deemed that women experience and negotiate space and spatial mobility differently. Following Foucaldian thinking that the control of mobility is central to discipline, Young (1990) finds that feminine existence lives space as enclosed or confining. According to Massey (1994) and Grosz (2001), space and place are not just the outcome of societal practices; spatial organization informs these social practices such as job access, racialized suburbia, and so on. This knowledge of sexed spaces is important while choosing methods for research. This awareness is especially important in my research because Indian women while experiencing space as explained above also find the home, which in Western understanding is largely seen as the realm of the woman, as being the space of her incarceration (Rajan 2004).

Securing Insecure Identities

Focusing on the issue of security within the paradigmatic clash between globalization and religious nationalism, I examine the theoretical constructs of the notions of security. Traditional definitions of security have been questioned by feminist scholars as they argue that the realist position of domestic-international divide puts the political actors and citizens, largely Western men, in the arena of policy making and research, while relegating women to the domestic space, outside politics (Grant and Newland 1991). This exclusion of women is largely attributed to essentialized gender roles that construct women to be the "natural" keepers of hearth and home (though not finances) and bearers-nurturers of children-future citizens (Yuval-Davis 1997).

Scholars like D'Cruze and Rao (2005) and Peterson (1992) argue against the public-private divide, wherein unregulated violence makes women "the objects of masculinist social control not only through direct violence but also through ideological constructs, such as 'women's work' and the cult of motherhood, that justify structural violence—inadequate health care, sexual harassment, and sex-segregated wages, rights and resources" (Peterson 1992, 46). When women break the norms that are

regularly used to define them, within their private as well as public domains, they are confronted by physical, emotional and psychological violence that aim to rein in the pace of their progress, and keep them restricted to acceptable paths of movement, both physical and cultural.

In summary, women's security becomes dependent on how closely they toe the societal line. While security within the private is provided, or withheld by the family, public safety is determined by general perceptions of piety/purity or lack thereof.

Walking with Scholars

Before elucidating on the "in the trenches" section of my research, I am proud to have experienced and learned from "feminist dilemmas in fieldwork" (Wolf 1996). As I grappled with power relations, preconceived notions and conscious attempts to be non-judgmental, non-expressive and poker-faced, I realized how all my scholarship—the reading, writing and listening—are a product of my experiences. Words like epistemology and ontology took on more than just academic significance.

As I embarked on my research, I walked with the works of feminist scholars, including Mohanty (1991) and Chakravorty-Spivak (1983) among others who are reflective of how the personal background of the researcher matters, and the politics of location matters. I now understand firsthand the need for self-reflexivity and the need to recognize and guard against biases and assumptions. With feminist research treating women's lives as a scientific resource (Harding 1987), the reciprocal sharing of knowing between researcher and researched has hopefully resulted in a project of collaboration.

Our life experiences shape our identity, and therefore have political and theoretical implications with which we must engage. Hence following Mohanty's (1991) example, I have attempted to place experience and life stories at the heart of my scholarship and activism. My identity as a secular, educated woman in India is now marked with being a woman researcher of color in the United States, which constantly informs my scholarship and political inclinations.

Having briefly explained my theoretical framework, it is inherently important to explain my choice of feminist methodology. Such methodology is ultimately a complete rejection of a positivist stance that places fact over value. The positivist stand prefers "rationality" and cultivates "objectivity," which silences women by denying their presence and the presence of masculine dominance (Hanson and Monk 1982). Feminist methodology

embraces the reality of women as "products" of diverse experiences, by committing to the anti-essentialism of "women" and "cultures" (Narayan 2000, 80–100). My research seeks to distinguish and extricate feminist projects that recognize differences among women.

In choosing a feminist methodology, my objective is to create new thresholds of enquiry (Jones et al. 1997), which are effectively attempting to destabilize the category of "woman" while rejecting two claims of positivism: first, the claim to objectivity and second, the claim that a researcher can distance "himself" from the research process and those researched. These notions are contradictory to the very foundation of feminist methodology that acknowledges the importance of experience, the legitimacy of subjectivity hence rejecting the levels-of-analysis approach used by realist thinkers (Blanchard 2003). For these reasons, I am drawn to scholars such as Jones et al. (1997) who make researchers aware of the partiality in knowledge production, of power relations that define "facts." This self-awareness is the concrete that holds together the building blocks of feminist methodology: openness to a diverse range of methods, the importance of situated knowledge and an emancipatory goal for research outcomes (Jones et al. 1997).

Even as theoretical stances and methodology are co-constituted, my biggest defense for choosing a feminist position is encapsulated in the pages of *Thresholds in Feminist Geography: Difference, Methodology and Representation* (Jones et al. 1997). Feminist methodology acknowledges that the world and theorizing about it are not exclusive, and that this social world is gendered/sexed. It recognizes that all forms of representations, "including those we produce as researchers, merely represent rather than mirror reality" (Jones et al. 1997, xxii). Besides this, feminist methodology is flexible and allows a non-hierarchical method to break down power relations between researchers and researched, hence empowering the subject. Therefore, knowledge gained is the product of the researcher and the researched.

In the Trenches: Doing Fieldwork
As I negotiate my way through the halls, streets and minds of the HUMM women, I repeatedly borrow from the toolbox of feminist research. Using methods of enquiry that have been tried and tested, I also attempt to understand my basis for borrowing established research tools and thought processes.

Because personal experiences are central to my research, I understand that oral narratives as well as historical geographies are powerful methods in the feminist toolbox. The analysis of these narratives is an effective way of examining multiple juxtaposed social identities, their connectedness to social spaces and institutions (Nagar et al. 2002), and deconstructing "established" knowledge bases (Domosh and Seager 2001). Inserting oneself within existing masculine-dominated structures to question them is a powerful form of resistance to prevailing means of acquiring and codifying knowledge, of contesting essentializing categories of gender and race. Toward collecting such materials, I have used open-ended semistructured interviews. Interviewees were contacted using personal references via telephone and e-mail. The interviews were conducted in my residence in New Delhi or within a space of their choosing. In India, this choice is of utmost importance, since the home is not always a "safe space." The interviews were taped and, if required, translated by the researcher.

I used government data as well as data collected from Indian women's organizations to examine crimes against women statistics (rape, dowry deaths, domestic violence). I also used employment-related statistics (number of women within organizations, number of women occupying senior positions, sexual harassment data) to observe trends or patterns, starting from 1991 (the year the structural adjustment plans were initiated in India) to the present.

I examined contemporary television program and print material to illuminate current patterns of understanding and expectations on gendered identity and specifically women's roles in society: both in domestic and professional spaces.

The Group

In choosing my research project, I was strongly aware that one of the biggest challenges of researching Indian identity is the very diversity that defines the country. Therefore, the question of who to interview and why was of utmost importance. Borrowing from Inkson, Khapova and Parker (2007), who argue that studying individual careers is flawed unless they are also understood from a wider perspective, I examined the HUMM women, not so much as a homogenized group (which they are not) but as a group that is socially constructed as homogenous, as part of a much larger nationalism and globalization agenda. As a feminist scholar, I have attempted to embed my analysis in an ontology where individuals are part

of and are changed by social relations as opposed to state-centered "traditionalists" who see actors as singular, independent and rational (Locher and Prügl 2001).

Middle-class Hindu women have been the site of ideal Indian womanhood (Sangari and Vaid 1990) encapsulating morality, boundaries and tradition. They have been historically constructed as guardians of (Hindu) tradition, transmitters of culture and the reproducers of community, who therefore need to be pure, their bodies protected from the foreign (Ahmed-Ghosh 2003). It is upon this class, this constructed identity that most social phenomena, whether nationalism or globalization, are enacted. It is this class that the majority underclass of India's billion-plus population aspires to reach. Therefore, I group them, not to homogenize their lived experiences but on the facts of demographics: religion, class, occupation and location.

Having lived in Delhi for 20 years, I am marked by and aware of, consciously and unconsciously, the strong tenets of politics and intense patriarchal codes that are almost unquestioningly associated with the city. My reasons for choosing Delhi were multifold: my intimate knowledge of the city, familiarity with the local cultural nuances/body language; being conversant in Hindi (the primary language of Delhi) and English (the primary language of the HUMM women) and finally, Delhi is a city of migrants that reflects the diversity of India's identity.

The interviewees were selected on inclusion criteria of being female, and belonging to a specific age bracket, religion, socio-economic bracket as well as urban location. They are between the ages of 18 and 60 and reside in middle and upper-middle socio-economic conditions in New Delhi. They are employed in transnational corporate organizations, a space that makes them part of the global economy.

The sites for the interview were determined by the subjects and included private residences, offices as well as public spaces such as restaurants or parks. I used the following criteria while identifying an interview space: participant comfort, privacy and easy access.

The Structure

The core of my research method rested squarely on what I term "a gaze triad." The first corner of this triad generated data collected in open-ended, semi-structured interviews that provided insights into HUMM women's perception(s) of their bodies as they experience disciplining and restrictions, which is "the gaze of the researched." The data collected

from national archives, government bodies and Indian feminist research organizations was used as indicators of how the state, the economy and the nation collaborate or compete as gendered powerbrokers, and formed the second corner: "the gaze of authority." The third corner of this method triangle is my gaze, "the gaze of the researcher," as I extracted patterns and trends from collected data and through participant observation.

The data collected from the various sources contributed toward understanding how women perceive their own bodies and their disciplining/restrictions/advantages, which ultimately shape their sense of self. I analyzed the interviews and other secondary sources (with a hopefully self-aware and reflexive eye) to understand how the sexed-female HUMM women's bodies are the pawns of the "new and improved" forms of various masculine dominances.

The Stages

As is required in most forms of research, my work was divided into planned stages. I began with data gathering in New Delhi, India (May–August 2008 and September–December 2009). Using personal as well as professional contacts (university affiliations, newspaper organizations etc.), I scheduled semi-structured, open-ended interviews with the HUMM women. The women were interviewed in locations of their own choice. Each interview lasted between one hour and three hours. Some of the interview locations allowed me participant observation of women's groups in media houses' cafeteria, newsrooms of television networks, as well as office spaces of TV and print media houses.

I also interviewed members of *Hindutva*-based national political party, the *Bharatiya Janata Party* (BJP) at their party headquarters, as well as members of the *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS) at their main office, both in New Delhi. The RSS is a Hindu nationalist, all-volunteer organization. During my stay, I also procured archival data from government archives/census bureau as well as statistics collected by New Delhi-based women's group *Jagori*, the NCW and the RSS. I collected "gray" papers, literature from nationalist organizations, as well as papers from Indian scholars that have not been published in the West.

The second stage consisted of ongoing data collection and analysis in Miami, United States. As I transcribed my interviews, I maintained correspondence with my interviewees via e-mail and telephone calls to get further clarification on arising questions and socio-political events in India.

I also continued archival data gathering via online resources such as newspaper archives (recent editions are available), academic websites (Jawaharlal Nehru University), and so on.

The final stage consisted of continuing synthesis through analysis, and the writing up of the project. I analyzed the text of the interviews to understand trends and identity markers such as notions about being Indian, being a woman/mother/wife, and so on. I juxtaposed the different gazes to understand the processes and motivations that demand the delineation of specific stereotypes as generated by the media.

Having collected data from different sources/sites, I engaged in a critical feminist discourse analysis of the material to engender patterns of consumption/rejection of globalization and *Hindutva*. Given that feminist discourse analysis is an approach that focuses on relationships between language, ideology, society and gender, I use nuanced analyses to understand the workings of power and ideology structures that borrow Foucaldian discursive formation, employing signs, language and multimedia among others to maintain hierarchically gendered social orders.

As the Indian populace struggles with rapid changes within their lives, discourse analysis becomes very pertinent as it recognizes that operations of gender ideology and institutionalized power asymmetries are being sustained using particular ideas of gender appropriateness, safety, boundaries and identity. Therefore, focusing on this study of two ideologies, I use critical analysis to see how gendered identities are constructed in various texts and situations.

Further, I use archival data to create a historical context to ground these patterns and discourses. The interviews, oral narratives and historical geographies were extensively sieved for content such as repetitive use of certain themes, which result in disempowering generalities/stereotyping of Indian women into groups such as *adarsh Bharatiya nari* (ideal Indian woman), "independent global citizen-consumer" and so on.

Hidden Barriers and Hurdles of Fieldwork

As is evident, my fieldwork was done in private homes, professional offices and public spaces of HUMM women in Delhi, India, while most of my pre- and post-fieldwork research and writing was done in the United States. This geographical-physical schism between the "trenches" and the writing/analyzing space raised questions about my level of involvement in the field, wherein I, the researcher, had to be much more self-aware of my role as a participant-observer-notetaker.

One of the biggest hurdles I faced as a feminist researcher was to be self-aware, in terms of not only how to question the participants but also how to follow up with their responses. Borrowing from Ackerly and True (2010), I created my own personal feminist research ethic, a methodological commitment that reflected on the power of boundaries, relationships and the impact of the researcher's location during the research process.

This was very important because I realized that I "thought and processed" incidents, conversations and connotations differently, and was treated specifically, depending on where I was. In India, I was seen as an "outsider," a non-resident Indian (NRI), who was separated from the everyday "realities of living in Delhi." The participants of my research were wary of my resident status, especially at the beginning of my interactions with them. They were more prone to be suspicious of any questions that they deemed as being critical of India, irrespective of my intent. During my conversations, I also realized that I felt a certain level of surprise and annoyance at being treated as an "other" in my country of birth.

Another major barrier I faced was during my interviews with members of the BJP and the RSS, both Hindu nationalist parties. During our conversations, there was a strong element of dismissal of my questions. I was repeatedly told that I was imagining things, that there was no gender-based discrimination in India, that embracing liberal thoughts was not Indian and so on. While I felt no physical threat, the frequent brush-off was indicative of deeply entrenched notions of gendering in India that has been normalized over decades of institutionalization.

RESEARCH FINDINGS: THE WHAT, THE WHY, THE WHO AND THE HOW

Irrespective of the different interview sites, whether a living room, a restaurant, an office or a car, I noted two common variables of behavior among the HUMM women. First, the need for privacy while remaining within a crowded (therefore, safe) space, and second, certain wariness about being the interviewee instead of the interviewer. Gracious without exception, the HUMM women did not shed their professional role through the interviews, asking me questions about my beliefs and understandings. As I closely observed the HUMM women, I noticed that there was a strong awareness of the surroundings, a constant sweeping of the eyes and cocking of heads. Being in close proximity allowed me to observe

and interpret their words and their varied body language, and I saw emerging patterns of behavior/actions that were continuously being impacted by their need for security and empowerment.

Collating the summaries from each point of the gaze triad, my research delineated the following trends: there is a constant reiteration of varied versions of masculine control over women's bodies and its relationship with security. Even though globalization has increasingly presented opportunities for women to be part of the mainstream economy and the *Hindutva* brigade has borrowed a progressive attitude toward incorporating women in the public, the safety-security of the woman remains tied to toeing invisible lines of acceptable "Indian" behavior. Through my interviews, I heard women reject certain societal expectations and cultural restraints, while chafing at the lack of implementation of laws and policies that would empower them in their individual fights against gendered violence, inequality and injustice in the work place, at home and in public spaces.

There is a strong majority antipathy to the concept of feminism and the title of a feminist within the HUMM women. While they associate emerging socio-economic opportunities—whether employment or measured freedoms of movement and mind-set—with globalization, many of them reject feminism as being abrasive, homogenizing and foreign, a by-product of globalization. They largely embrace the new definition of Indian womanhood, developed by the tenets of globalization—which aggressively flatten differences in identities—as the face of modern India.

Even as they reject Hindu nationalism and the specific form of masculine domination associated with it, there is little effort to actually problematize and tackle this form of masculine domination by this group of privileged, empowered women with the tools to reach the vast Indian populace. They see their relative power and dominance within society as individually earned, through strategic pirouetting within existing systems defined by masculine expectations and control. In this specific form of agency, the HUMM women see their roles as social actors of resistance in terms of individual projects of contestations and negotiations. There is very low expectation from existing political, business and social institutions that could empower the women through policy changes that challenge existing norms and institutions, and therein emerges a new form of agency that is individualized, unique and malleable. However, since this form of agency is highly individualized and its success dependent on personal connections, it does not impugn the existing inequalities of

patriarchal power structures, and does little to topple them for the larger good of all Indian women.

Similarly, safety-security issues are tackled at the individual level through careful planning of movements and disciplined timing. There are unspoken guidelines in this unwritten manual of safety, which allow women to traverse zones of danger, with few expectations of support from legal or professional institutions. The HUMM women attributed their professionalism to a mixed ball of globalization standards and civilizational advantages. While the women showed great tenacity in establishing their credentials and professional abilities, there appears modified agency when the women are discriminated against in "personal" issues of maternity leave, pay rise and so on. Some of the women who were mothers spoke of laws on the books but minimal implementation of said laws, unless there existed a personal relationship with the powerbrokers within the organization, largely men. This issue that emerged within this context is the lack of application and implementation of policies in place, and the inability of the women to rely on these laws. The fear of challenging the status quo was writ large, as the HUMM women talked about other colleagues who had faced punitive measures when they had ignored unspoken rules and sought legal recourse.

Finally, there is a distinct sense of class separation awareness, especially when it came to the impact of globalization. The HUMM women acknowledged they had reaped enormous advantages from its processes and that globalization had emphasized class barriers.

This research is an attempt to understand the street-level reality of gendering, empowerment and change/difference that is continuously occurring within the urban spaces of India, a space that is marked by diversity of populations, ideas and cultures. I sought out this group of media women because they are unquestioningly assumed to be located in privilege, embodying empowerment and modernity. They are seen as members of a normative group, middle-class Hindu women, who define the face of India and Bharat. They are deemed the norm, the ideal.

My chosen subjects, the HUMM women and their bodies are the stage where the question, "What is appropriate behavior for the ideal Indian woman of modern India?" are played out. My particular method of enquiry using interviews allowed me access and a unique perspective into the lives of these women of relative privilege. The feminist analyses of the stories of this group of women helped me understand the mutating chameleon-like nature of masculine domination in "their cultural,

class-specific, and temporal concreteness…[while] reveal[ing] how men and women resist, accommodate, adapt, and conflict with each other over resources, rights and responsibilities" (Kandiyoti 1988, 285).

The ideal Hindu middle-class woman's identity is regularly defined in terms of "cherished but remote icons" (Sarkar and Sarkar 2008, 206–207) that are "simple, home-loving and compromising" (Puri 1999, 22). In a country that is marked with diversities, the "traditional characteristics" as well as "feminine characteristics" that are used to define Indian womanhood, not only constrict women but these imaginaries are also used to homogenize their private and public personas. At the same times, these constructs are used to further national, political and defense policies. As Das finds, such "imageries" guided by the religious/cultural lenses of *Hindutva* enables the Hindu right to justify a nuclear agenda by extending Hindu women's insecurities from the "familial to extra/non-familial" sphere (Das 2002, 80). In such homogenization lies the suppression of alternative femininities to maintain the hegemony of conventional forms of femininity (Cheng 1999). And conventional forms of femininity that center on subordination to specific threads of masculine domination is an "emphasized femininity, a kind of gender performance that accommodates hegemonic masculine interests and desires while preventing other femininities from gaining cultural articulation" (Connell 1987, 183).

But my research finds that such conventional forms of femininities are not accepted or rejected in their entirety by the HUMM women. While Nanda's (2010) work finds a burgeoning acceptance of religiosity within the Hindu middle class who she claims are embracing homogenized Hindu religious signs, symbols and traditional social order, the HUMM women actively distance themselves from such "traditional" ideology as being archaic and out of step. The HUMM women invoke Althusser's (1970) understanding of society and ideology as they blame age-old rooted notions of Hindustan and *Bharatiya nari* (traditional Indian woman) for the continuation of male domination and male advantageous structures.

At the same time, the extremely confident and outspoken HUMM women are very aware of deeply rooted gendered constructs of the political-judicial system. They see the implications of traditional expectations within their globalized workspace, and are constantly negotiating with, absorbing from and rejecting such gendered hierarchies. My research indicates that the degree of the fallout from challenging the system influences how the women negotiate with hurdles within their lived spaces. For

instance, sexual harassment within the office, home or public space was dealt with in a hushed manner. Institutional authority, whether the police or anti-harassment work policies, is rarely activated, invoking images of docile women (Foucault 1980). Instead, the women chose to bargain at individual levels, gaining strength from their personal alliances with the hierarchy (Kandiyoti 1988).

While these bargains help the HUMM women at an individual level, their method of individualized agency also underscores the strength of patriarchal control and cultural constraints within India. While these "ambassadors of India, Inc." are allowed certain measures of equality and opportunity, these privileges are not equally extended in terms of laws or policies that can be applied to all women of India, irrespective of socio-economic-religious identity.

I found that the women saw religious nationalism as being the backbone that supports structures of masculine domination within their homes, offices and public space, where specific roles and responsibilities are predetermined because it was unquestionably "natural." Collectively, the women reject forced gendered roles and instead embrace the concepts of modernity and progressiveness as tools to slowly and strategically dismantle structures of male domination. As a group, the women show an unfettered acceptance of globalization, both economic and cultural, claiming that India's entrance into the global economy had expanded their professional choices.

It appears that different approaches toward personal and professional confrontations within the HUMM women lie in how ideological messages have shaped "their gendered subjectivity, since they permeate the context of their early socialization, as well as their adult cultural milieu" (Kandiyoti 1988: 285). At the personal level, there remains an ingrained sense of passivity and fear of repercussions, while at the professional level, the HUMM women interpret and use the text of globalization that has provided them with career opportunities in terms of empowerment and agency. The respondents largely agree that application of the policies varies at an individual level and is dependent on the relationship with the boss. These different forms of negotiating and strategizing with gendered hierarchies, what Kandiyoti (1988) calls patriarchal bargains, are largely embraced by the HUMM women as being more effective as tools of balance as opposed to direct confrontation.

My analysis also finds a marked difference in perceptions about gendered institutions within the interviewed group, with the older women

being more aware and willing to accept such presence within their work and home spaces/choices. The younger women while acceding to such presence and its impact on their lives were less willing to give gendering as much import, placing it as individual encounters and circumstances rather than a structural inherent presence. Irrespective of depth of acceptance, it is obvious that lack of transparency and equal application makes the HUMM women vulnerable to harassment and unfair practices.

Such distancing from deeply entrenched and applied gendering by the younger women translates into such structures not being challenged at the policy level. If women do not see the need to deconstruct and reject the presence of such institutions of control, the status quo remains, forcing those who are faced with unfair practices to fight individual battles in silos of hushed negotiations. Such individual negotiations remain private and cannot influence changes in policy and law that would protect women, especially those who are without the relative privileges of the HUMM women.

The pervasiveness of gendered violence and the minimal expectation of repercussions against such rights abuse are demonstrated by the tired acceptance of daily violence encountered by women. The normalization of regularly encountered violence by this relatively privileged group that largely travels in personal cars and rarely in public or semi-public transportation (buses, auto rickshaws) and a strong pattern of under-reporting of workplace harassment within the media strongly indicate that being safe is seen as an individual endeavor. Poor conviction rates in cases of rape, domestic violence and other gendered offenses, the fear of societal ostracization of the woman and her family, and victim blaming force women, including the HUMM women, to remain silent. Simply put, the cycle of violence becomes never-ending because victimized women are seen as being outside the norm of ideal Indian womanhood, one who is besmirched and therefore, incapable of representing India and Indianness. Becoming a victim of violence is seen as a personal weakness, bad planning or bad timing rather than a failure of the state-society structure.

Such messages are constantly reiterated by the mass media, wherein the preoccupation is with the construction and dispersal of knowledge that privileges and normalizes specific representations of gender, womanhood and malehood (Hall 1980). With the media pushing certain dominant ideologies,

the delivery of idealized womanhood strengthens gendered expectations within the viewing population.

The media professionals are strongly aware of the gendered content and presentation of both news programming and entertainment products. Despite admitting the influence of patriarchal cultural norms on their lives, the HUMM women, ironically, sharply distance themselves from any homogenized rendering of "woman as victim," "woman as servile" or "woman as less," even if they were complicit in its production. They strongly demonstrate Hall's (1973) margin of understanding wherein the HUMM women squarely rest the production of homogenized women-unfriendly material as inherently separate from their own location as empowered women. Instead, they see it as being professional and following orders from largely male editorial boards that are chasing Television Rating Point (TRPs) and advertising revenue. Having embraced the text of globalization, they are in the powerful position of replicating the message, becoming encoders, "being made" into champions of the global media. They see themselves as empowered women who seek high TRPs, advertising revenues and delivering breaking news at any cost.

According to the HUMM women, the women professionals in the position of seniority are to be admired because they had used the system to enhance their careers. But the HUMM women accede that there is distinct tokenism within male-dominated institutions wherein political, religious and financial organizations use a handful of women as iconic female presence. Yet such women rarely stray from the delineated path of power brokering while creating hurdles for progress of all women. Whether it is mothers-in-law who remained uneducated because of societal demands, women politicians who herald motherhood as the ultimate feminine identity or powerful media women who maintain the status quo to retain their own position, such authority figures that use patriarchal bargains become the perfect peons of existing gendered hierarchies.

The in-depth, intimate conversations with the HUMM women allowed me a unique perspective into the lives of this diverse group and underscored the need for nuanced, qualitative research methods. Even as the need for cohesive understanding of the material required me to merge their words into a set of findings, the differences in their thought processes, their tactical strategies of dealing with their life issues and the myriad results of their similar struggles are telling examples of the value of women's lived experiences. While statistics and measurements have their place in research, the information that can be gathered through

well-structured and thoughtful interviews, oral histories and researcher observations has a rich value that cannot be set aside as being subjective and non-factual.

Conclusion

As I collected data and then analyzed the different narratives using qualitative feminist methodology, there emerged a collage that represents the HUMM women in a confusing, distracting hodgepodge of identities. The women define themselves largely as empowered individuals who are the conduits of news and entertainment dispersal, and not as vessels of change or deconstruction of structural discrimination and insecurity. Whether they are managing their homes, instructing their children, drinking a margarita in a smoky bar, driving home at night or stalking a newsworthy individual for a story, the HUMM women continue to operate against a backdrop of heterosexist male-led family structures that rest firmly on keeping women, their bodies/wombs and labor circumscribed. Even as small groups of Indian women build admirable careers, control their bank accounts and become owners of their lives, it is apparent that mutating structures of domination will not be dismantled without constant and, sometimes, violent confrontation.

In conclusion, I strongly believe that qualitative feminist methods offer a plethora of resources, opportunities and combinations of methods that allow researchers to challenge the status quo and question established norms in the political space. It is necessary to privilege women's voices and narratives in the political arena because that is where power operates and rests. Using qualitative feminist methods give researchers the power, not only to be the megaphone/platform through which women's voices/presence can be heard/seen but the core necessity for self-reflexivity within the feminist method pushes researchers to be aware of intersectionality and personal biases.

My research method allowed me to listen to the stories of the HUMM women as they embrace the tenets of modernity in their technology, dress and worldview. Yet the strong roots of gendered hierarchies continue to anchor their lives as they maneuver through public and private domains. While this juxtaposition of modernity versus tradition is hardly a new theory, what is most interesting is the perception of these women who are aspiring to new frontiers of professional and personal achievements, who see the shackles of masculine domination resting solely in tradition while

the key to empowerment rests on embracing globalization, Indian-style. Therefore, gendered spaces are being transformed by globalization, and these changes are being actively countered by the ideologies of Hindu nationalism. The HUMM women who not only occupy these gendered spaces but also work within the media institution that largely operate to disperse such dominant representations are engaged in daily exercises of negotiation/creating and countering these ideologies.

References

Ackerly, Brooke, and Jacqui True. 2010. *Doing Feminist Research in Political and Social Science*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Ahmed-Ghosh, Huma. 2003. Writing the Nation on the Beauty Queen's Body: Implications for a 'Hindu' Nation. *Meridians: Feminism, Race, Transnationalism* 4 (1): 205–227.

Althusser, L. 1970. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. In *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, Trans. from French by Ben Brewster, 121–176. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Blanchard, Eric M. 2003. Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security Theory. *Signs* 28 (4): 1289–1312.

Cheng, Cliff. 1999. Marginalized Masculinities and Hegemonic Masculinity: An Introduction. *The Journal of Men's Studies* 7 (3): 295–395.

Connell, R.W. 1987. *Gender and Power: Society, The Person, and Sexual Politics*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Das, Runa. 2002. Engendering Post-colonial Nuclear Policies Through the Lens of Hindutva: Rethinking the Security Paradigm of India. *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 22 (1–2): 76–89.

D'Cruze, Shani, and Anupama Rao. 2005. *Violence, Vulnerability and Embodiment: Gender and History*. Oxford: Blackwell-Wiley.

Deutsch, Nancy L. 2004. Positionality and the Pen: Reflections on the Process of Becoming a Feminist Researcher and Writer. *Qualitative Inquiry* 10 (6): 885–902.

Domosh, Mona, and Joni Seager. 2001. *Putting Women in Place: Feminist Geographers Make Sense of the World*. New York: Guilford Publications.

Foucault, M. 1980. "Body/Power" and "Truth and Power.". In *Michel Foucault: Power/Knowledge*, ed. C. Gordon. Brighton: Harvester.

Grant, Rebecca, and Kathleen Newland. 1991. *Gender and International Relations*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Grosz, Elizabeth. 2001. *Architecture from the Outside: Essays on Virtual and Real Space*. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Hall, Stuart. 1973. Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse. *Media Series* 7: 1–19.

———. 1980. Introduction to Media Studies at the Centre. In Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. In *Culture, Media, Language: Working Papers in Cultural Studies, 1972–79*, ed. Stuart Hall, Doothy Hobson, Andrew Lowe, and Paul Willis, 117–121. London: Hutchinson.

Hanson, Susan, and Janice Monk. 1982. On Not Excluding Half of the Human in Human Geography. *The Professional Geographer* 34 (1): 11–23.

Harding, Sandra. 1987. Is There a Feminist Method? In *Feminism and Methodology*, ed. Sandra Harding, 1–14. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

———, ed. 2004. *The Feminist Standpoint Theory Reader: Intellectual and Political Controversies*. New York: Routledge.

Hawkesworth, Mary E. 2006. *Feminist Inquiry: From Political Conviction to Methodological Innovation*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Inkson, Kerr, Svetlana N. Khapova, and Polly Parker. 2007. Careers in Cross-Cultural Perspective. *Career Development International* 12 (1): 5–8.

Jones, John Paul, III, Heidi J. Nast, and Susan M. Roberts. 1997. *Thresholds in Feminist Geography: Difference, Methodology, Representation*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.

Kandiyoti, Deniz. 1988. Bargaining with Patriarchy. *Gender and Society* 2 (3): 274–290.

Locher, Birgit, and Elisabeth Prügl. 2001. Feminism and Constructivism: Worlds Apart or Sharing the Middle Ground? *International Studies Quarterly* 45 (1): 111–129.

Lukose, Ritty. 2005. Consuming Globalization: Youth and Gender in Kerala, India. *Journal of Social History* 38 (4): 129–136.

Mahajan, Preeti. 2009. Use of Social Networking in a Linguistically and Culturally Rich India. *The International Information and Library Review* 41 (3): 129–136.

Massey, Doreen. 1994. *Space, Place and Gender*. Malden: Polity Press.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 1991. Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarships and Colonial Discourses. In *Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism*, ed. Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Ann Russi, and Lourdes Torres, 51–81. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Nagar, Richa, Victoria Lawson, Linda McDowell, and Susan Hanson. 2002. Locating Globalization: Feminist (Re)readings of the Subjects and Spaces of Globalization. *Economic Geography* 78 (3): 257–284.

Nanda, Meera. 2010. *The God Market: How Globalization Made India More Hindu*. Gurgaon, India: Random House.

Narayan, Uma. 2000. Undoing the 'Package Picture' of Cultures. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 25 (4): 1083–1086.

Oza, Rupal. 2006. *The Making of Neoliberal India: Nationalism, Gender, and the Paradoxes of Globalization*. New York: Routledge.

———. 2007. The Geography of Hindu Right-Wing Violence in India. In *Violent Geographies: Fear, Terror and Political Violence*, ed. Derek Gregory and Allan Pred. New York: Routledge.

Peterson, V. Spike. 1992. *Gendered States: Feminist (Re) Visions of International Relations Theory*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Puri, Jyoti. 1999. *Woman, Body, Desire in Post-Colonial India*. New York: Routledge.

Rajan, Rajeswari Sunder. 2004. "Rethinking Law and Violence: The Domestic Violence (Prevention) Bill in India," 2002. *Gender & History* 16 (3): 769–793.

Ramazanoglu, Caroline, and Janet Holland. 2002. *Feminist Methodology: Challenges and Choices*. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

Reinharz, Shulamit. 1992. *Feminist Methods in Social Research*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sangari, Kumkum, and Sudesh Vaid. 1990. *Recasting Women: Essays in Indian Colonial History*. New Brunsiwck: Rutgers University Press.

Sarkar, Tanika, and Sumit Sarkar. 2008. *Women and Social Reform in Modern India: A Reader*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Sen, Swagata. 2009. The Moral Brigand. *India Today*, February 13, 2009.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1983. *In Other Worlds: Essay in Cultural Politics*. New York: Routledge.

Sunder Rajan, Rajeshwari. 1993. *Real and Imagined Women: Gender, Culture and Post-Colonialism*. New York: Routledge.

Wolf, Diane L. 1996. *Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldwork*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Young, Iris Marion. 1990. *Throwing Like a Girl and Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. *Gender & Nation*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.

Policy Embodied: An Ethnographic Pursuit of Everyday Risks in Kampala

Serena Cruz

Where It Began

This chapter discusses the challenges of pursuing ethnographically inspired policy-relevant research. In this case, it is about my pursuit of studying an aspect of the HIV epidemic in Uganda, but specifically HIV in relation to individuals who are overtly vulnerable to receiving or transmitting the virus. In my endeavor to take up this topic, I learned quickly from the existing data about HIV incidence and prevalence that women engaging in 'high-risk' sexual practices, such as commercial sex work (Sentumbwe 2010; Vandepitte et al. 2011), are incredibly vulnerable to both HIV and the policy responses that seek to address this illness. While specificity of the research focus developed over time, the gradual process coalesced around my interest in theorizing about 'vulnerability' and 'survival'. My focus on HIV, as well as circumstances surrounding a person's vulnerability to the virus, was juxtaposed to differing policy responses. Global policy analysis about HIV and AIDS brought the research focus to the African context, and history of the virus throughout the continent drew my attention to the complex story surrounding Uganda's HIV. Estimates and speculation about Uganda's epidemic allowed my interest to sharpen.

S. Cruz (✉)
Amsterdam Research Center for Gender & Sexuality (ARC-GS),
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands

185

Eventually I was compelled to explore the reality that a residual pool of infection continues to plague the country's efforts to combat the spread of HIV and treat those already infected. It was this chronic illness among those most at risk to infection—for example, men who have sex with men and female commercial sex workers—that allowed me to formulate my central concern: *how do women manage daily risks associated with sex work, criminalization, and HIV in Kampala, Uganda?*

A Case of Fluctuation

The story of Uganda's HIV is a compelling 'case of reversal'. From the peak of prevalence in the early 1990s, whereby it is estimated that just less than 15% of all adults in the general population were infected (UNAIDS/ WHO Working Group on HIV/AIDS 2009), Uganda managed to decrease its HIV rates, first and foremost, without large-scale help from the international donor community. How this was accomplished has not been irrefutably answered. However, the case of Uganda's HIV is not straightforward. When President Yoweri Museveni came to power, widespread conflict ceased (Epstein 2007; Pisani 2008; Thornton 2008). Under these less turbulent conditions it is argued that Ugandan society and the early Museveni regime mounted an indigenous response to the virus (Epstein 2007; Thornton 2008). Later, international policy arrangements, inclusive of aid for the country's HIV epidemic, contributed to a dominant perception that Uganda was a model state for how to manage and combat the HIV epidemic in the African context (WHO 2009).

The narrative that Uganda is 'proof possible' for showing that HIV prevalence and incidence rates in a country can fall and stay low is being challenged (Shafer et al. 2008). Clinical case studies from the general population show that trends are reversing (UNAIDS/WHO Working Group on HIV/AIDS 2009). Alongside reports concerning Uganda's rising HIV infections in the general population, there are those more concerned with pools of infection that show strong resistance to HIV interventions and efforts to stymie the rise of the virus (Shafer et al. 2008). In these cases, HIV remains a constant risk for those engaging in 'high-risk' sex. Yet few studies have explored how these 'high-risk' populations manage their HIV risk (Sentumbwe 2010; Vandepitte et al. 2011; Hladik et al. 2017). Scarcer still are ethnographically inspired policy-relevant explorations of these individuals' risk conditions and risk mitigation strategies (Gysels et al. 2002). It is this dearth of grounded knowledge that underpins the research described in this chapter.

STUDYING RISK MANAGEMENT AND CRIMINALIZATION AMONG SEX WORKERS

The Reading Ahead

Section one of this chapter explores the 'where to look' and the process of developing a grounded theoretical approach. A culmination of insights gleaned from literature and exploratory data collection processes serve as a basis to substantiate the feasibility of the study's 'in-the-field' research design. The second part of the chapter relays a personal accounting of 'how to look' once the data collection is under way. At its core this section describes the establishment of necessary connections with individuals, who were able to broker my initial encounters within sex work settings identified for the study. From there the third section of the chapter offers a description of getting inside these spaces. Here, the narrative shares a view from the ground and brings to the forefront the conditions in which women sell sex, as well as stresses the importance of working with a primary informant. Section four, titled 'Coming into Knowing', is divided into two parts. Here the chapter describes a series of events that the original research design was unable to accommodate. The first part shares the difficulties of working from an insecure and volatile position when juxtaposed to conditions that were unexpected. Part two relays how to ethnographically accommodate the 'unknown' by allowing the design to shift in order to continue capturing information about the structural, environmental, and interpersonal contexts where women sell sex. The last section of the chapter is a discussion of policy in relation to ethnography. This part reconfirms how an ethnographically inspired methodology is able to bring experiences of vulnerability toward a body of quantitative literature that more often inspires HIV policy-making (Epstein and Morris 2011; Government of Uganda 2010; Rekart 2005; Makgoba 2000; Karim et al. 1995).

From the Ground

In pursuing grounded research it is important to form a basis for 'where to look' (Charmaz 2014). This means having a sense of what will be studied. For simplicity sake, assuming it is known where and what will be studied, it is important to organize a design that is hospitable to 'an immersion' into the society that will be explored. As intuitive inquiry research designs, both ethnography and grounded theory are methods of knowledge

generation in which the techniques for gathering information and the methods used for scrutiny become inextricably linked, therefore making the data and the analysis as co-constructed processes (Ackerly et al. 2006). It is also vital to note that the research process for both is not linear. Rather than seeking a means to prove the existence of a priori knowledge, ethnography and grounded theory, in conjunction, require a tacit commitment to expecting the unexpected, to abandoning 'the plan' in pursuit of a larger goal, and for iteration in design so as to better identify and explore structures and patterns of social relations.

Ethnography, specifically, aims to study human experience and everyday life in context, and to co-produce a richly detailed account thereof (Bourgois 2003). Grounded theory complements an ethnographic study as it is a means of seeking to understand the empirical aspects of a complex problem (Glaser and Strauss 2012). These two methodologies, combined and intertwined in my study, thus allowed me to formulate a process of research guided by particular epistemological commitments. In this case, my capacity to explore how women confront and manage risks while engaging in commercial sex in Kampala was best supported by my ability to honor these women as sources of knowledge rather than relegate them to only objects of study. Moreover, because grounded theory is a form of structured inquiry useful for studying questions that may have been hidden by dominant discourses, pursuing a grounded research strategy that is ethnographically based allowed me to get at environments and stay inside spaces, where daily practices, born out of a need to survive, often inadvertently bring greater risk.

A Feminist Ethic

I would be remiss if I failed to conclude this discussion of grounded research without the most vital element: *a feminist ethics of care for those experiences and lives where knowledge is found* (Cruz 2015). It is this feminist research ethic that guided the process of my ethnographic and grounded research. In brief, a feminist research ethic calls for attentiveness to the power of knowledge and epistemology, the implications of both disciplinary and conceptual boundaries, and the situatedness of the relationship between the researcher and the researched (Scheper-Hughes 1995).

Thus guided by a feminist research ethic, I was attentive to the realities of those individuals that came to be part of my study—specifically, their reactions to what may be perceived as my willingness to superimpose a Western, white, and American worldview upon their own existences.

The Justification

Before reaching Uganda to explore *how women manage daily risks associated with sex work, criminalization, and HIV,* I turned to the 'hard data' about the epidemic facing women practicing high-risk sex in Kampala. Quantitative analyses of these women's epidemiological conditions are rare but informative (Vandepitte et al. 2011; Hladik et al. 2017). While these studies have the capacity to present a bleak scenario of HIV risk among this at-risk population, they do not account for 'how risk is being managed'. Rather only that it exists and is likely to remain part of daily habits connected to survivability. Quantitative studies report that as of 2017, Uganda's general epidemic hovers somewhere between 7.3% (Okiror and Summers 2017). But when the epidemic among sex workers is included, the national average moves upward to over 8% (Vandepitte et al. 2011). While the general population is experiencing a rise in HIV, there remains a residual epidemic among 'high-risk' women, engaging in 'sex for cash practices'.

Studies by Vandepitte et al. (2011) and Hladik et al. (2017) document that 37% of women selling sex in Kampala are HIV positive. This parallel epidemic demonstrates that at least one in three women who sell sex in the city has the virus. Yet this picture is incomplete. The data from these studies render a snapshot of risk and infection without the capacity to detail the interpersonal processes that underscore how the virus spreads and how women cope with this reality. It is this gap that my work addresses and why *I came to Kampala to study women—biological females identifying as women, who sell sex for cash in Kampala.* In knowing what I wanted to study and where I wanted to study it, I found exploring HIV risk among women in a context of criminalization and sex work is not so much about 'sex work' per se, but rather about *vulnerability* and *survival.* What ensues is a self-reflexive discussion about the process of studying vulnerability and survival among women in the sex trade of Kampala, Uganda.

Coming into Knowing

With the context of my study explained above, this section of the chapter relays a description of what it means to explore and understand the daily HIV risk and HIV risk management practices of a few women, whose lives offer up a deeper way to craft policy concerning HIV in the context of Uganda.

Ultimately, the development of my research study came about from passion for the subject of HIV risk. As this passion for the topic progressed and narrowed, specifically to women practicing commercial sex work in Kampala, it was important to simultaneously make connections with organizations and individuals working in the field of HIV and to develop knowledge through an extensive literature review process. Page after page being read coincided with opportunities to attend presentations. One presentation in particular, which was hosted by a Dutch foundation with extensive programming that targets women in resource-poor settings, generated the 'ultimate' contact point. The event was advertised as a panel presentation about sex work, rights, and rehabilitation, and highlighted a guest speaker I believed it was important to meet. This woman was a self-identifying commercial sex worker from Kampala, Uganda, who had recently co-founded a sex workers' rights organization in the city.

From this event began a relationship between the woman from Uganda, me, and, eventually, other staff from her local organization, where she was the executive director. The relationship lasted three years. In that time frame I engaged in Skype calls, exchanged emails, and volunteered for the local organization from the Netherlands and in Kampala, while I was in Uganda. The commitment being made toward the organization and its staff was an investment in research design. I believed that gaining access to the women would come about through this local non-governmental organization (NGO), whose mission was to address the health, social, and economic disparities of adult women engaging in high-risk commercial sex work in Uganda.

Looking back, I was lucky. Not only because I met the woman from Uganda, sure, but also because I was able to conceptualize how this connection would strengthen my capacity to pursue a grounded theoretical approach encompassing ethnography. In attempting grounded research, the premise is to engage in an intellectual pursuit that is inherently iterative. Knowing the iterative nature of the design, it was important to ground how I would 'make contact', which is a necessary first step that must be

carefully and preciously established, pursued, and maintained. The more sensitive the subject matter, the more important it is to make a connection with care and consideration, as the next step is about getting inside or what Berg calls 'gaining access' (Berg and Lune 2012). Thus, from a chance encounter in Amsterdam in 2009 to moving to Kampala in 2012, I had to design a way to make contact, as well as gain access, with women I believe are an integral part of the larger HIV context of Uganda's epidemic.

To the Field

Having made contact, the next step was for me to gain access, with the goal of becoming immersed in women's lives as part of the larger process of understanding the fabric of everyday life in the sex trade in Kampala. Ethnography's focus, as has been classically set forth by Geertz, is "suspended in webs of significance [the ethnographer] himself has spun … the analysis of it [is therefore not] an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning" (Geertz 1973: 5). Geertz called this undertaking an act in "thick description". The data-gathering process that leads to such thick description has generally consisted of immersion: describing and assessing a particular sociocultural context through direct and lengthy participant observation, and assessing data gathered thereby through interpretive methods. I utilized the immersive aspects of ethnography in order to gain entrée to sex worker communities and to arrive at such social proximity that their life experiences and day-to-day survival could be explored as deeply as possible.

Uganda: Round One

Before moving to Uganda in 2012 I had visited the country twice. The first time was in 2010, exactly one year after I first attended the event in Amsterdam. My first impressions were that the pace of life was hard and fast and that survival was an acute process of trying to live moment to moment. I had to acknowledge that fighting this pace could actually obscure the slowness that buzzes in the background like white noise. When I finally began to pause long enough, I could feel the slowness just beneath a deep sense of need that pervades most of the social encounters and professional tasks I encountered as I moved through the city. While for many life in Kampala is about making it to the next day, I found that

once resources became secure, life could slow to let in laughter, have a drink, grab a nibble, share a story, or just have a sit.

During this initial trip, I spent time volunteering at the local NGO's office. In exchange for helping I was allowed to travel several times a week, with staff, to do 'outreaches' in sex work areas throughout Kampala and Entebbe. An outreach consisted of going by car to an area in and around the city where women sold sex. While there, the staff would talk with the women, gather stories about their problems, and speak with them about 'human rights' and the idea of 'sex for sale' as legitimate work, as well as distribute male and female condoms, which the NGO received from international NGOs with offices in Kampala.

The areas I saw on this first trip in 2010 were informal settings with pirated access to electricity as well as poor water sanitation. Sex sold in these encampments was cheap. For example, women selling sex in these places discussed being lucky if they received at least 2000 Ugandan Shillings (at that time about 1 dollar) per sexual encounter. During outreaches, I sat with local NGO staff and listened, through the help of a translator, to the women describe what was happening to them on a daily and/or nightly basis: events like rape by police or clients, fighting with and being cut by broken bottles from fellow sex workers, having to run down dark dirt roads to escape police or thieves, feeling the pain of falling in love with a brothel manager and/or pimp only to find out he has other girlfriends, or becoming pregnant, again, and having to continue selling sex during the pregnancy. These stories were confirming information I gleaned from the literature I was reading, while also helping me form ideas concerning how these women were managing their HIV-prone existence. What I was seeing and hearing led me to believe, as I do now, that their existence is managed within a network of social and sexual relationships involving the women, their clients, police, brothel management, and private partners.

Reflecting upon my first round of data collection in Kampala, I came to recognize an intricate pattern of interdependence, as well as competition, among the women. It was this intersocial aspect of their daily lives that I needed to theorize and configure a methodology for the research. Essentially, I needed to consider the actions that would allow me to build rapport, gain trust, be allowed inside places where women sleep, sell sex, laugh with one another, steal from each other, bathe, eat, rest, and so on, *as well as* justify how being 'inside' could lend itself to analyzing their HIV risk and HIV risk management capacities. Ultimately, during the first trip

my access to these places was brokered by the local NGO. After this initial field experience I returned home to Amsterdam buoyed by the feasibility of my study. I believed access had been gained and I was in solid standing with a local organization, which I believed was implicitly trusted by the women I wanted to study.

Uganda: Round Two

It was just over a year when I had the opportunity to return to Kampala. In 12 months much had changed at the local NGO. My return, at the start of 2012, was a full five months before I was to move to Kampala in order to initiate the primary data collection period for the doctoral study. Arriving at the NGO I noticed that more staff had been hired, the woman I met in Amsterdam was away, and the second-tier management staff waiting to meet with me seemed uncertain about what to do with my presence.

During my first afternoon in the office I was told the sites I had selected in 2010 were no longer around. By 'around', I was told the local NGO was not conducting 'outreaches' in these areas. When I asked why, I was given a vague answer that seemed more to do with intra-office politics that I was unwilling and unable to explore. However, hearing the sites were no longer accessible I panicked. Indeed, panic—gut-wrenching, horrifying panic—basically sums up my reaction to the news. What now? How would the research continue if the sites described in the full-length funded proposal were no longer available to be studied? How would the central premise concerning social and sexual networks of interdependence and competition get explored in other sex work areas?

I didn't know the answers to any of these questions, but I retained confidence in the local NGO and their willingness to continue working with me so I could complete the data collection for my study. Thus, the remainder of this second trip was spent driving around Kampala to differing sex work areas and, once again, pursuing 'outreaches'. I steeped myself into the process of sex work interventions by observing the uniqueness of each place visited.

As the NGO staff and I moved between sex work sites, I began noticing that sex work operates in conjunction with the conditions women in the trade inhabit. For example, in Kampala there are areas where women come to stay for extended periods of time, a month, several months, and/or years. Only women who sell sex are allowed to rent a room (i.e., lodge).

The brothel itself is not attached to a bar or disco. Yet, in another area of Kampala there are places where women arrive after dark and stand alongside a dirt road, which is littered with one bar after another. Inside these bars men play pool, drink alcohol, smoke and chew drugs, game (i.e., gamble), and are seen as the primary targets for the women standing at the edge of the road. And still there are places where a one-room makeshift lodge, with one or two beds separated by a curtain, is where you will find sex for sale. These leaning edifices are erected in the middle of a vast informal settlement where it is possible to find young women locked inside one-room buildings. Kept inside these places with padlocks and/or the presence of large men at the doorway, these women can be viewed and spoken to through barred windows or via the man at the entrance. When pressed about these places, women in the business will say these 'locked-away' women are refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo and they are likely selling sex once they arrive in Kampala after traveling up country from the camps in southern Uganda.

Finally, you can find women selling sex in cramped squatter areas in the center of Kampala, amid vermin that crawl from every crevice. You name it, it is there poking out a whiskered noise beneath beady eyes, scuttling by on six legs, or dropping out of the walls onto the head, neck, chest, and food platters of the women, who barely notice these albino and brown roaches. As the women eat amid these conditions, ants crisscross along the cement floors and up and down any stools available for seating. Although the conditions in these places differ, sex work in each is mediated by a uniformity of the women's actions. An example of uniformity can be drawn from an observable rhythm. I observed places where women regularize their daily existence in time frames: sleep, eat, wash themselves and clothes, clean their rooms, smoke pipes to pray to ancestors for clients, and dress for work. In other areas there are virtually no women until sunset. These 'until dark' locations are slowly filled with women, who gather alongside the road as the darkness progresses. While these women can be found standing near each other, there is only sporadic conversation between them.

Depending on the location, women take up certain behaviors prevalent to the environment. For example, time frames for housekeeping and preparing for sex work, I believe, demonstrate an understanding of when it is 'safe' to begin selling. In this way women regulate their time and, ultimately, their actions. When probed about these behaviors, I came to learn that 'this is just the way of it' or 'not taking care' signifies 'not being

serious' about the business, 'not being professional'. Yet these observations were made possible by the grounded approach I had taken to gathering data. Through grounded research the objective is to explore this conjoining of 'time' and 'action'. With access, the hope is to observe women's preparation rituals, which may lead to further understanding the presence and effect of social ties in sex work areas. In describing these conditions I began to discern what I believe is an important aspect of women's daily risk management: their interconnectedness (i.e., social networks and social capital).

In order to seek out these nuances about where sex work takes place and how women engage with one another in these contexts required admittance. My passage through these locales came about through the local NGO. Yet, their roles in these communities were more than mere service providers. The local staff entered freely as a result of their own histories and ties to these sex work communities. For starters, they recruited sex workers to be on staff, and among the founders at least one was still practicing sex work. The woman who was still selling sex, while working at the local NGO, is a charismatic and inspiring individual. To hear her speak is to be moved toward believing in the agenda she sets forth 'for the rights of sex workers'. A talented, self-taught, multi-lingual, commercial sex worker, with a difficult and challenging background, is a rare person to know.

Daisy, as she likes to be called, was the primary informant that allowed the local NGO to gain access to these places. She had worked in two of them and was able to engage women from other areas in a way that eased aside barriers and quieted any concerns about being abused or misused— stories often circulate frequently in sex work areas about women who were experimented on by 'scientists' or who are photographed without consent only to find their faces and/or naked bodies on the covers of local newspapers. Daisy made it possible for us to get inside. Her confidence, compassion, and ability to speak multiple local languages, in addition to English, was key to any 'outreach' program and, more importantly, eventually to my research.

By the end of my second trip to Kampala, I hoped to return in five months and to push ahead exploring the ideas being developed, with specific emphasis on understanding how women's intersocial patterns have implications for HIV risk and HIV risk management for women in Kampala's sex trade.

Expecting the Unexpected (Most of the Time)

Part One: Being Allowed to Stay

I moved to Kampala City, Uganda, on 2 June 2012. I arrived at 22:22 at Entebbe International Airport. After negotiating with passport control about whether they planned to honor my six-month multi-entry visa, and eventually grabbing my bags, I made my way out of arrivals and was greeted by the driver from the lodge, where I would spend my first four nights in the city. The premise at that time was to proceed according to the research design relayed in my full-length, approved, and funded proposal. This means I would report to the local NGO on Monday morning ready to volunteer in their Outreach Program. The rationale in aligning myself with the local NGO on a permanent basis was to minimize costs associated with time and funds. For example, hiring an outside research assistant was likely to reduce my budget, which I preferred to conserve should the need arise to stay beyond my planned time frame. Also, working with the local NGO put me in regular contact with Daisy.

The plan was an aspiration, a wish, simply put, *or* a good intention, which ultimately unraveled. This unraveling is why the title of this subsection is called 'Being Allowed to Stay'. As of June 2012 I was 'inside', so to speak, that is, I was aware of the most common informal areas in and around Kampala, where sex work takes place, and I had access to a primary informant, Daisy, whom I believed would continue to provide a way into the research sites. What I did not have was a true sense of 'being allowed to stay'. This sense is difficult to describe. It is emotive and super-sensory, in that it comes down to knowing where and when you can or cannot go somewhere. There are spaces and places, criminal settings, for example, where one has to acquire an ability to decipher belonging from trespassing. I had yet to belong, and without the company of the local NGO staff and/or Daisy, I could easily be seen as trespassing by the women and men in the sex trade.

I think of trespassing as being like a bug under a microscope. In these sex work settings eyes are on me at all times. Women stand back and stare. When I asked about their watching me, it was relayed that they are attempting to measure the threat of my presence—most importantly, will I seek to compete with them for men? Men stare while configuring ways to approach me. Most often they seek me out with the intention of soliciting sex, but at times they do share a desire to 'be with me' as a boyfriend,

or there is the occasional invitation to have me 'make an "Obama baby"', as they call mixed race children.

In these locales there is nothing I can do to conceal myself or 'blend' into the background. My perceived whiteness (as a Latina) leads to questions about where I come from, and once I make it known, America, my privilege is *rightfully* insurmountable. These advantages in race, nationality, and, more importantly, economics demanded that I bridge the gaps in our sociopolitical positionality with my wits and personality. In the end it was strictly street smarts and bravado, heavily slathered atop steely determination to connect with the women I have learned and, believe, are at great risk of HIV and AIDS-related illnesses that gave me staying power in these spaces. Indeed, determination is a necessary ingredient for grounded research. It helps one stay the course through some of the worst forced revisions to any design. These revisions are often the only recourse in response to events that cannot be prepared for. In this case, there are no means to prepare for the American roommate beginning an affair with a pimp from the study and then attempting to move him into our home. There is no planning for these events other than remembering that to study illicit realities, which drive social problems, requires a research design that is flexible. While the design was moored to configuring how I would 'be allowed to stay' in these research sites, it was important to reflect that the condition of 'being welcome' is never settled in locations where people come and go frequently, illness is rampant, substance abuse seems to escalate perpetually, and 'the rule of law' is subjective and easily manipulated with resources like cash or smuggled and bootlegged goods.

In the first six months of my data collection, Uganda experienced five deadly viral outbreaks: Anthrax (1), Ebola (3), and Marburg (1). Amid these health events, I cut ties with the local NGO due to concerns related to questionable accounting practices, a failure to carry out 'outreaches' ethically, and, eventually, confirmed acts of theft by the executive director; I confronted a roommate whose presence in one of my research sites severed any direct ties I had with the women selling sex in the area, and what came to be the hardest, deepest loss was the termination of my connection to Daisy, who had decided to leave the local NGO along with me to become my full-time research assistant, only later on to end our relationship by stealing over 1000 dollars from me.

Throughout these first six months the design was reconfigured continuously. It had to change in order to meet the demands of these fluid and combustible environments. Yet even throughout the health and

personal concerns, perhaps the most outlandish and impactful 'research design' scenario came about just before the end of the year. Amid the chaos circling one of my research sites, where the American was having an affair with the pimp, and Daisy's erratic behavior escalated due to substance addiction, there was an ominous attempt by the local NGO to undermine the research. The reason had to do with learning that the executive director—yes, sadly the same woman I met in 2009—had committed theft and fraud with donor funds from organizations based in the Netherlands and the United States of America. In retaliation for being discovered, Daisy, the American roommate, and I began receiving emails riddled with pejoratives, which included claims that my presence in Uganda was questionable and potentially criminal (i.e., accusations that I was trafficking women into the sex trade). These threats ultimately resulted in me fleeing to the American Embassy and being advised to leave Uganda immediately. In response to this advice I departed Uganda, after only six months of data collection. Indeed, these first six months were rough and required keeping the chair of my dissertation committee informed, consulting with other PhD candidates in Uganda, and delving into literature concerning 'how to' research criminal activities and/or places (Campbell 2000, 2003). The data collection process was grueling, but in the end the design—that is, the 'how to do grounded research'—endured as an iterative process whereby with every two steps forward I had to accept the reality of easily sliding backward.

Part Two: Recovering from Part One

The decision to return to Kampala was easy, but organizing myself for the return was less so. To prepare for my return I needed to find a new full-time research assistant; I had to re-establish myself at one of my research sites (i.e., the one where the American roommate had engaged in an affair with a pimp from my study); and I needed to reconnect with the women from my second site, who I had ceased being able to communicate with toward the end of November, when Daisy had ended our relationship. The upside during this period of transition was that the US Embassy decided it was going to facilitate how I would return vis-à-vis requiring I procure a series of formal documents, as well as establish a solid professional presence with a recognizable institution. Being entrusted into the care of the US Embassy came about during the difficult period toward the end of 2012, which involved the executive director of the local NGO.

Throughout this debacle I was advised by the former Diplomat in Residence at my university to contact the US Embassy of Uganda. The succinct instructions were: "go immediately to the US Embassy and request to speak with a political affairs officer". Doing so led me down a path that brought stability to the research and allowed me to once again begin turning the wheels of my iterative design.

For starters, I was advised not to return to Uganda without a formal letter of invite as well as formal affiliation with an institution of repute, a student visa, or without registering for the US SMART Traveller Enrollment Program. The affiliation was accomplished through the Department of Women and Gender Studies (WGS) at Makerere University; my visa was successfully processed with a letter of invite from the dean of WGS and a letter of guarantee from my university, and registration for the SMART traveler program was re-confirmed. Finally back in Kampala, I spent my first month in the New Year (2013) rebuilding what had been demolished during the turbulent, but quite informative, first half of the data collection. Basically my first four weeks in Uganda were filled with securing two essential components for the research design: (1) hiring a full-time assistant and (2) securing reliable, safe, and affordable transport.

Taking stock of what I accomplished with Daisy, I can say I learned a lot about 'how to do' grounded research on a difficult subject from within risk-prone environments. For example, it is important to ensure that a local intermediary, Daisy in this case, is forthcoming about concerns, questions, and ideas, and is able to conduct research according to the parameters of the design. Upon returning to the research sites at the start of 2013, I came to learn that Daisy had implied to the women and men in one of the sites that when they speak with me they should 'have hope' about receiving money and resources. Unfortunately this 'participate-for-pay' approach is not in line with how I theorized engaging with the women apart from their practice of sex work, nor was it listed as part of the consent process in the approved internal review board protocols sanctioned by my university. The experience with Daisy demonstrated that 'business' is part of all relationships. More succinctly, *business is the thread that binds the vulnerable in order to survive*. It is with business that we see a 'good Samaritan' becomes a 'good swindler', or vice versa. Yet, among these hard lessons I managed to recognize that reliability and honesty may only trump 'in-depth' knowledge and/or 'primary informant' status once contact and access have been established.

It would be misleading to make a predictive claim about the results of the research design had I not worked with Daisy, initially. All I can relay is that I learned that the revisionary process associated with in-depth 'grounded research' is possible, but also painful. And mostly it is time consuming. The time I spent with Daisy in the early fall of 2012 to train her in ethnographic data collection was lost, and in the face of this loss, I needed to relive this training a second time with a new assistant. This meant once I found someone capable and willing (i.e., someone fluent in English and Lugandan and unconcerned with the stigma associated with speaking and being around sex workers), I had to train her or him how to do observation, note-taking, rapport-building, and unstructured theoretically driven interpersonal interviews, as well as how to practice an 'ethics of care' in pursuing research in sensitive and illicit places.

Thankfully, I managed to begin again with a second research assistant, Roz. Our time together proved productive, and while our relationship retained an entirely professional dimension (unlike mine and Daisy's), the insights we gleaned together proved salient in terms of how I ultimately came to answer the central question of the study: *how do women manage daily risks associated with sex work, criminalization, and HIV in Kampala?* From what Roz relayed in translation during our extended stints in both research sites, the answer to that question could be found in the same intersocial processes I had discerned 18 months prior to when I finally concluded my ethnography of HIV risk and risk management among women in the sex trade of Kampala, Uganda.

Ethnographically Inspired Policy-Relevant Research

In thinking about sex for cash it is important to note that selling sex is illegal in Uganda. It has been since 1930. While prostitution remains a criminal activity, Uganda continues to receive aid for its AIDS epidemic. The country is a beneficiary of the US President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Since its inception, PEPFAR has been funding programs throughout Africa. Beneficiaries of this AIDS-related aid have been required to sign a pledge agreeing not to support prostitution (PEPFAR Watch 2011). The language of the pledge is just vague enough to be confusing (Ditmore and Allman 2013). Local organizations, as I observed over the course of my research, in turn believe they have to *make a choice*: take the money and stop working with and/or for people who sell

sex, or continue, with the hope of securing funds from donors who do not require this commitment.

In this policy context women selling sex are pushed to the margins of programmatic interventions. What results, as I have observed, are limits to the ways in which they can safely and honestly disclose their status and/or their profession to health professionals and/or other women in the 'cash for sex' industry. Keeping silence and/or seeking to avoid attention from anyone other than men who want to buy sex, women in Kampala, who sell sex, exist in a 'policy limbo'. This limbo is a space of almost complete omission when it comes to accessing interventions that are not stigmatizing or presumptive about what 'they need' or 'should do' to be 'HIV risk free' (Tamale 2011).

Grounded research, which is ethnographically inspired, has relevance for policy. An ethnographically inspired approach brings any central research question downward, placing it at the feet of those most likely to be impacted by interstate decision-making. In this case, research focusing on HIV risk and HIV risk management concerning women who sell sex for cash comes back to accounting for how these women experience HIV policies in Uganda. It demands that we fundamentally inquire the following: are the policies in Uganda, which garner resources for programs that are designed to prevent HIV and/or treat AIDS, within reach for women who engage in a criminal activity that puts them at risk of contracting or spreading the virus? The route to understanding the implications of engaging in commercial sex work on a woman's HIV risk is not direct. It is a circuitous process that involves deeply connecting to these women about how they approach survival on a daily basis.

Getting inside to where and how these women live involves risks, but there are gains. These gains are about learning how a woman's survival shapes her decision-making in the face of intense vulnerability at the individual, environmental, and structural level. A prime example comes from a key informant who chooses to lie to medical staff at her designated HIV/AIDS hospital. During the course of the ethnography I became the medication companion to this woman and would travel with her to each of her HIV treatment appointments. In this role I observed her meager attempts to avoid stigma as well as stave off any threats of criminalization by the medical staff. The lie she came to tell is about how she earns her money. While she shares that she works at night, she claims her money comes from a food stall she operates. This one lie has implications for the type of medication the hospital staff prescribes. I would observe her being

given Nevirapine. The reason I came to hear was that 'the medication will have a stronger effect on boosting her immune system, sooner'. Never mind that Nevirapine is recommended for women with a CD4 cell count below 250 and my key informant has cell count just above 310. Her one lie is about making sure she is not found out for selling sex, but the ramifications put her at risk of further health concerns.

This one example is likely to be repeated by other women, whom I would value involving in post-doctoral research so as to accompany them, as I have done with my key informant, to their hospital appointments. Being allowed inside the community where women sell sex is only one part of a larger effort to explore how they manage HIV risk. Attending medical visits in order to observe their experiences involves a series of obstacles such as ensuring they leave for the hospital very early in the morning, securing affordable and timely transportation from the brothel to the clinic, striving to arrive early to the hospital, managing where they are asked to wait in the hospital, petitioning (and at times bribing) to be seen earlier by hospital staff, hustling to buy medication (that is programmatically supposed to be *free*), and eventually, racing to depart the hospital in order to arrive back to where they started—sometimes to a brothel or a home, where they then immediately have to ready themselves to stand at the side of a road—just to return to work in the evening after having no rest from the night before. Essentially, going without sleep is truly how they ensure having enough time to arrive at the hospital, so their wait never surpasses eight hours before receiving their medication.

Conclusions

Experiencing how women manage HIV risk, through a medical system that is primarily funded by donor-sponsored policies, such as PEPFAR, is about conducting policy research on the ground. A grounded approach to research is not about speaking broadly about the conditions of many. Rather it is about going deeply with a purposive sample of few, to describe, as accurately and authentically, a series of life events that demonstrate how policies involve people in addition to resources. Ethnographically inspired policy research starts at the ground but lands at the intersection where interstate ideas converge with programmatic ingenuity. Ideas about how 'developed' states should volunteer resources to address the HIV epidemic in Uganda come into being when government-supported institutions—like international non-governmental organizations(I-NGOs)—and local

actors—such as small-scale NGOs, churches, or community organizations—are enabled, through funds and capacity building, to administer interventions based on ideas about preventing and treating HIV. Yet, where all this matters begins when we are able to understand what this process means for a woman who is likely to be very close to the center of the epidemic in question. By taking this approach and committing to exploring policy from the ground up, scholarship becomes grounded and policy becomes interpersonal as well as capable of demonstrating that vulnerability and survival involve experiences that, when seen intimately, can demonstrate how *policy is always personal* (Farmer 2006).

Thus, here within I have offered a self-reflexive 'thick description' of everyday ethnographic making, which complements quantitative analyses concerning policy approaches to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the context of Uganda (UNAIDS 2010a, b; World Health Organization 2005; Sentumbwe 2010). Because grounded research is policy relevant, I believe it provides a much-needed (and deserved) complementarity with quantitative pursuits. In this way, ethnographically inspired research inverts the downward lens of policy and programmatic interventions. And this inversion requires a gaze that is 'up and outward' when it comes to understanding the implications of calls to make broad sweeping changes from epicenters of aid financing (Washington DC, New York, Brussels, London, Geneva, Stockholm, Kyoto, etc.). When we invert our policy lens and commit to the intent of understanding what becomes of policy on the ground, then we avail ourselves of the capacity to capture the perspectives of people for whom policies and programs are intended to assist. In the case of this chapter, it is from within communities where women sell sex that the research looks up and outward in order to account for how HIV risk is managed on a daily basis.

References

Ackerly, Brooke A., Maria Stern, and Jacqui True. 2006. *Feminist Methodologies for International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Berg, Bruce L., and Howard Lune, eds. 2012. *Qualitative Research Methods for the Social Sciences*. 8th ed. Boston: Pearson.

Bourgois, Philippe. 2003. *In Search of Respect: Selling Crack in El Bario*. San Francisco: University of California Press.

Campbell, Catherine. 2000. Selling Sex in the Time of AIDS: The Psycho-Social Context of Condom Use by Sex Workers on a Southern African Mine. *Social Science & Medicine* 50 (4): 479–494.

———. 2003. *'Letting Them Die': Why HIV/AIDS Prevention Programs Fail.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Charmaz, Kathy. 2014. *Constructing Grounded Theory.* Los Angeles: Sage.

Cruz, Serena. 2015. In Search of Safety, Negotiating Everyday Forms of Risk: Sex Work, Criminalization, and HIV/AIDS in the Slums of Kampala. FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 2293. http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/etd/2293.

Ditmore, Melissa Hope, and Dan Allman. 2013. An Analysis of the Implementation of PEPFAR's Anti-prostitution Pledge and Its Implications for Successful HIV Prevention Among Organizations Working with Sex Workers. *Journal of the International AIDS Society* 16 (1): 17354.

Epstein, Helen. 2007. *The Invisible Cure: Why We Are Losing the Fight Against AIDS in Africa.* New York: Picador.

Epstein, Helen, and Martina Morris. 2011. Concurrent Partnerships and HIV: An Inconvenient Truth. *Journal of the International AIDS Society* 14 (13): 1–11.

Farmer, Paul. 2006. *AIDS and Accusation: Haiti and the Geography of Blame.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Geertz, Clifford. 1973. *The Interpretation of Cultures.* 2000th ed. New York: Basic Books.

Glaser, B.G., and A.L. Strauss. 2012. *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research.* 4th ed. London: Aldine Transaction.

Government of Uganda. 2010. *UNGASS Country Progress Report: Uganda.* Kampala.

Gysels, Marjolein, Robert Pool, and Betty Nnalusiba. 2002. Women Who Sell Sex in a Ugandan Trading Town: Life Histories, Survival Strategies, and Risk. *Social Science & Medicine* 54 (2): 17–192.

Hladik, Wolfgang, Andrew L. Baughman, David Serwadda, Jordan W. Tappero, Rachel Kwezi, Namakula D. Nakato, and Joseph Barker. 2017. Burden and Characteristics of HIV Infection Among Female Sex Workers in Kampala, Uganda—A Respondent-Driven Sampling Survey. *BMC Public Health* 17 (1): 565.

Karim, Quarraisha Abdool, Salim S. Abdool Karim, Kate Soldan, and Martin Zondi. 1995. Reducing the Risk of HIV Infection Among South African Sex Workers: Socioeconomic and Gender Barriers. *American Journal of Public Health* 85 (11): 1521–1525.

Makgoba, M. William. 2000. Ethics of AIDS Research in a Developing Country: Balancing Power in Disguise. Speech Given at the *Plenary Session of AIDS 2000*, United Nations, New York.

Okiror, Samuel, and Hannah Summers. 2017. Why Are You Having Sex? Women Bear Brunt of Uganda's High HIV Rate. *The Guardian*, Wednesday August 23, 2017.

PEPFAR Watch. 2011. *Implications of U.S. Policy Restrictions for HIV Programs Aimed at Commercial Sex Workers*. Washington: PEPFAR Watch Global AIDS Relief Monitor.

Pisani, Elizabeth. 2008. *The Wisdom of Whores: Bureaucrats, Brothels, and the Business of AIDS*. London: GRANTA.

Rekart, Michael. 2005. Sex Work Harm Reduction. *The Lancet* 366 (9503): 2123–2134.

Scheper-Hughes, Nancy. 1995. The Primacy of the Ethical: Propositions for a Militant Anthropology. *Current Anthropology* 36 (3): 409–440.

Sentumbwe, Simon. 2010. *Correlates of STD and HIV/AIDS Infections Among Sex Workers in Uganda: A Stratified Adjusted Analysis*. Berlin: VDM.

Shafer, A.L., S. Biraro, J. Nakiyingi-Miiro, A. Kamali, D. Ssematimba, J. Ouma, A. Ojwiya, P. Hughes, L. Van der Paal, J. Whitworth, A. Opio, and H. Grosskurth. 2008. HIV Prevalence and Incidence Are No Longer Falling in South-West Uganda: Evidence from a Rural Population Cohort 1989–2005. *AIDS* 22: 1641–1649.

Tamale, Sylvia. 2011. Paradoxes of Sex Work and Sexuality in Modern-Day Uganda. In *African Sexualities: A Reader*, ed. Sylvia Tamale, 145–173. Nairobi: Pambazuka Press.

Thornton, Robert J. 2008. *Unimagined Community: Sex, Networks, and AIDS in Uganda and South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

UNAIDS. 2010a. *UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic*. Geneva.

———. 2010b. *Ugandan HIV Prevention Response and Modes of Transmission Analysis*. Geneva.

UNAIDS/WHO. 2009. Working Group on Global HIV/AIDS and STI Surveillance and Epidemiological "Fact Sheet on HIV and AIDS." *Core Data on Epidemiology and Response, Uganda*. Geneva: UNAIDS/WHO Working Group on Global HIV/AIDS and STI Surveillance.

Vandepitte, Judith, Justine Bukenya, Helen A. Weiss, Susan Nakubulwa, Suzanna C. Francis, Peter Hughes, Richard Hayes, and Heiner Grosskurth. 2011. HIV and Other Sexually Transmitted Infections in a Cohort of Women Involved in High-Risk Sexual Behavior in Kampala, Uganda. *Sexually Transmitted Diseases* 38 (4): 316–323.

World Health Organization. 2005. *Toolkit for Targeted HIV/AIDS Prevention and Care in Sex Work Settings*. Geneva: World Health Organization.

Index[1]

[1] Note: Page number followed by 'n' refer to notes.