

RETHINKING PEACE AND
CONFLICT STUDIES

Series Editor: Oliver P. Richmond

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**ALTERNATIVE
APPROACHES
IN CONFLICT
RESOLUTION**

Edited by
Martin Leiner
Christine Schliesser



Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies

Series editor
Oliver P. Richmond
University of Manchester
Manchester, UK

“This volume comes at the right time. Conflict resolution and reconciliation are some of the most urgent challenges we face in a time in which the world seems to fall back into patterns of hate and violence that we had hoped to have overcome after the end of the cold war. The editors have assembled an impressive number and variety of authors which represent different contexts and can help us to understand ways to overcome violence. May this book inspire many to find new trust that a different world is possible!”

—Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, *Chair of the Council of the Protestant Church in Germany*

“Expertly edited by Christine Schliesser and Martin Leiner, this comprehensive and well-structured volume collects a number of very useful contributions to the ‘general theme’ of peace-making and conflict resolution. The overall impact of these uniformly excellent chapters is to change our perception on what is the right thing to do before, in, and after conflicts. Highly recommended to anyone with an interest in this topic, including students, scholars, and practitioners.”

—Jeffrey Haynes, *London Metropolitan University, UK*

“This timely publication is a gift to societies all over the world. Building upon insights from different contexts, a diversity of disciplines, and various spheres of society, this book develops a constructive approach to the terrain of conflict resolution studies, that does not only seek to understand conflict and violence, but that seeks ways of building peace, reconciliation and justice in a world of violence and conflict. It is demonstrated how reconciling justice, and justice-seeking reconciliation in all walks of life advance the quest for an ethos and culture of peace. The constructive and innovative approach is also demonstrated in the exploration of the role of various forms of art in the advancement of peace.”

—Nico Koopman, *Vice-rector for Social Impact, Transformation and Personnel, Stellenbosch University, South Africa*

This agenda-setting series of research monographs, now more than a decade old, provides an interdisciplinary forum aimed at advancing innovative new agendas for approaches to, and understandings of, peace and conflict studies and International Relations. Many of the critical volumes the series has so far hosted have contributed to new avenues of analysis directly or indirectly related to the search for positive, emancipatory, and hybrid forms of peace. New perspectives on peacemaking in practice and in theory, their implications for the international peace architecture, and different conflict-affected regions around the world, remain crucial. This series' contributions offers both theoretical and empirical insights into many of the world's most intractable conflicts and any subsequent attempts to build a new and more sustainable peace, responsive to the needs and norms of those who are its subjects.

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“Is there a way to overcome deadlock in peace negotiations, or keep security from being derailed by suspicion, basic services disrupted, development truncated by competing interests, collective memory captured by trauma or guilt, and justice construed only as a vehicle for revenge? In *Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution* the authors portray the need for a deep reconciliation process as the essential glue that can repair a torn social fabric or facilitate ripeness rather than wait for it as a diplomatic prerequisite. Their analysis and illuminating case studies provide a window into the re-emergence of people-to-people peace-building roles that non-traditional actors can play, raising awareness of foundational values, providing trusted channels for truth-telling and healing, facilitating the process of bonding, and building a social contract to meet the needs of all.”

—David Steele, *Consultant in Conflict Transformation and Adjunct Faculty, Brandeis University, USA*

“Alternative approaches to resolving violent conflicts are urgently needed in the opening decades of a century which has already exposed the limitations of top down state and legal interventions. This superb volume reflects the paradigm shift within the study and practice of conflict resolution that recognizes the importance of neglected local cultural and religious factors. It is to be welcomed by all scholars and practitioners who are seeking a fresh understanding of the role of negotiation, religion and gender, reconciliation, and the arts in peace building on the ground.”

—William Storrar, *Center of Theological Inquiry in Princeton, USA*

“This collection opens-ups and interrogates two of most important areas of current debate on peace and reconciliation. It suggests how, and why, the role of gender and the role of religion are an unavoidable part of any serious conversation about current conflict and conflict transformation.”

—David Tombs, *Centre for Theology and Public Issues, University of Otago, New Zealand*

Martin Leiner · Christine Schliesser
Editors

Alternative
Approaches in Conflict
Resolution

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Editors

Martin Leiner
Jena University
Jena, Germany

Christine Schliesser
University of Zürich
Zürich, Switzerland

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Gus am bris an la agus an teich na sgailean.

Für Nadia, Yasmine und Eric
Martin Leiner

*To Benny, love of my life,
and our children Naemi Joy, Chira Jael,
and Noel Benjamin, source of joy, hope, and inspiration*
Christine Schliesser

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The book you are holding in your hands has its own history to tell and is the result of the joint endeavor of a number of people. The idea for it was born not least out of a deep frustration while watching the drama of every day's evening news unfold. Despite its seemingly endless creativity and curiosity in other walks of life, humankind still seems dumbfounded when confronted with conflict. On a large scale, war, military, or other kind of violent interventions still seem to be the option of choice for most. Violent conflict—violent response. This mechanism has become as natural to us as breathing in and breathing out.

Yet we know that there are alternative and innovative approaches to conflict resolution. We know that they are out there, they exist and, even better, they work. They are successful in ending conflict and in achieving sustainable peace. They even cost usually a lot less than conventional, more violent forms of intervention. These alternative forms of conflict resolution are at home in all different contexts, countries, peoples, disciplines. And we can learn from all of them.

So our idea started to take shape. We would bring at least some of these protagonists together. We would listen, discuss, learn from each other. We would have different voices from different parts of the world—academics and practitioners, political scientists, philosophers, psychologists, theologians, sociologists, and artists. We would hear of their struggles and of their victories, joined in the quest for a more peaceful world. We met in Zurich, in November 2015. While we convened, we

were reminded of the urgency of our endeavors by both the attacks in Paris that cost 130 people their lives and by France's call for war as her way of response to violent conflict.

Through this volume that arose out of our gathering, we would like to invite you to be part of our ongoing discussion as we seek to better understand not only conflicts but different and alternative ways of solving them. We would like to thank each one of our wonderful contributors who has enriched and challenged our thinking and our acting. We would also like to thank again our generous sponsors who have made all this possible, the Center for Ethics of Zurich University (Prof. Dr. Markus Huppenbauer and the University Research Priority Program for Ethics), the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), the Catholic Church of the Canton Zurich, the Alumni Association of Zurich University (ZUNIV), the Association for the Academic Mid-Level Staff of Zurich University (VAUZ), and swisspeace. In its content, the book also profited from the project "Hearts of Flesh-not Stone" funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). And we thank Dr. Lace Williams-Tinajero for her amazing and unfaltering help in the editorial phase of this book. She helped to resolve conflicts before they arose.

Jena, Germany
Zürich, Switzerland
Spring 2017

Martin Leiner
Christine Schliesser

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EDITORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

About the Editors

Martin Leiner is Chair of Systematic Theology and Ethics at Jena University, Germany, and Associate Professor at the Faculty of Theology of Stellenbosch University, South Africa. He is the Founder and Director of the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies. His research focuses on reconciliation studies, media ethics, and history of ethics.

Christine Schliesser is Academic Associate at the Institute for Social Ethics at Zurich University, Switzerland, and Junior Research Fellow at the Center for Religion, Economics and Politics at Basel University, Switzerland. Schliesser's research interests include conflict and reconciliation studies, the theology/ethics of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and the religious factor in development studies.

Contributors

Djane Dit Fatogoma Adou is a research associate at the Swiss Centre of Scientific Research, Côte d'Ivoire, and swisspeace, Switzerland. With a doctorate in sociology from the University of Abidjan Cocody, Côte d'Ivoire, his expertise includes governance, transitional justice, statehood, peacebuilding, humanitarian-actions studies, and politics of environment and health.

Julie Bernath is Senior Researcher and Program Officer in the ‘Dealing with the Past Program’ at swisspeace, an associate research institute of the University of Basel, Switzerland. Bernath’s research specialties include the politics of transitional justice, victim participation in transitional justice processes, and dealing with the past in Cambodia.

Bruce Clarke is a visual artist and photographer. He studied Fine Arts at Leeds University, Great Britain, and was an important figure in the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa. His visual artwork has been exhibited in Europe, Africa, and the United States. Clarke lives in Paris.

Richard Friedli is Professor Emeritus in comparative sociology of religions at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. He was in charge of the ‘religion’ unit at the World Peace Academy, Advanced Study Centre, University of Basel (2009–2013). Currently, Friedli is a visiting lecturer on networks that focus on inter-religious issues (Kinshasa, Jerusalem, Geneva Center for Security Policy, Geneva).

Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela is a clinical psychologist and Senior Research Professor at the University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa. She served on the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission as the coordinator of victims’ public hearings in the Western Cape. She researches trauma, forgiveness, and empathy development in victim–perpetrator dialogue.

David P. Gushee is Distinguished Professor of Christian Ethics and Director of the Center for Theology and Public Life at Mercer University, USA. He is President-Elect of the American Academy of Religion and President of the Society of Christian Ethics. Gushee authored and/or edited 21 books as well as hundreds of articles.

Briony Jones is Assistant Professor in International Development at the University of Warwick, Coventry, England, and Associate Researcher of swisspeace and the Centre for Criminology at the University of Oxford. Jones’ research focuses on reconciliation, citizenship, peacebuilding, transitional justice, political agency, and societies affected by massive human rights violations.

Carolina Rehrmann is research assistant at the Institute of Political Science and coordinator at the Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies at Jena University, Germany. She is concluding her Ph.D. on discourse theory, emotions and identities in the Cyprus Conflict. Her research areas include intractable conflicts, nationalism, collective memory and socio-emotional reconciliation.

Rudolf Schussler is Chair of Philosophy II at the University of Bayreuth, Germany, a member of Processes of International Negotiation Group, and Associate Researcher at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Schüssler's fields of research include the interface between ethics, rationality, negotiation practice, and using focal points in negotiations.

Christo Thesnaar is Senior Lecturer of Practical Theology and Pastoral care and counselling at Stellenbosch University, South Africa. He is a founding member and current board member of 'The Institute for the Healing of Memories' in South Africa. Thesnaar researches memory, reconciliation, justice, trauma, and healing in social-political contexts.

Mary Zournazi is Senior Lecturer of Sociology at the University of New South Wales, Australia. She is an Australian author, philosopher, and filmmaker. Her work *Inventing Peace* is co-written with the German filmmaker Wim Wenders. Zournazi's film *Dogs of Democracy* (2016) captures the humanitarian crisis in Athens, Greece.

Cesare Zucconi is Secretary General of the Community of Sant'Egidio. He serves on the advisory board on International Relations, Conflict Prevention, and Conflict Resolution. He is delegate for Western Europe and the Middle East, and serves on the Board for Inter-religious and Inter-cultural dialogue.

ABBREVIATIONS

BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
DFG	<i>Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft</i> (German Research Foundation)
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EHR	Evangelicals for Human Rights
EU	European Union
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army
Frelimo	Mozambique Liberation Front
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHI	Global Hunger Index
ICC	International Criminal Court
IR	International Relations
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IS	Islamic State
JCRS	Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies
LGBTQ	Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer or Questioning
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NURC	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
PDCI-RDA	Party of Côte d’Ivoire African Democratic Rally
PIN	Processes in International Negotiations
Renamo	Mozambican National Resistance
RF	Restitution Foundation
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SACC	South African Council of Churches
SNSF	Swiss National Science Foundation

TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
US	United States
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
WiB	Women in Black
WILPF	Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

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Introduction

Martin Leiner and Christine Schliesser

Abstract Persistent and newly emerging conflicts around the world make the search for successful and sustainable conflict-resolution methods imperative. With traditional military interventions leading to the transformation of entire regions into zones of ongoing instability and violence (e.g., Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan), the study of alternative and less violent approaches to conflict resolution is gaining momentum. This volume, edited by Martin Leiner and Christine Schliesser, originates from the observation witnessed currently regarding the development and implementation of significant and successfully tried and tested, and cost-effective, alternative approaches to conflict resolution. Alternative approaches have the potential to change perceptions on what is the right thing to do before, in, and after conflicts. The individual contributions focus on initiatives from four distinct areas: negotiation, gender and religion, reconciliation and forgiveness, and the arts.

M. Leiner (✉)
Jena University, Jena, Germany
e-mail: martin.leiner@uni-jena.de

C. Schliesser
University of Zürich, Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: christine.schliesser@sozethik.uzh.ch

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Persistent and newly emerging conflicts around the world have made the search for successful and sustainable conflict resolution imperative. With traditional military intervention repeatedly leading to the transformation of entire regions into zones of instability and violence (e.g., Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan), the study of alternative and less violent approaches to conflict resolution has gained momentum.

To this very day, we know much more about the nature of violent conflicts and wars than about ways to end the violence and to bring former enemies together. Dating back to the times of Herodotus and Thucydides, there has been a myriad of works written by historians and cultural or social scientists that attempt to explain why violent conflicts have broken out, what the precise reasons were for each party, how the conflicts evolved, how it was possible that ordinary people were motivated to kill other people, and which side was victorious. Military experts, secret services, and national security-related services and enterprises accumulate a lot of knowledge to be up-to-date on how to create security, how to weaken and eliminate potential and real enemies, how to prepare a war, and how to win it. The media and our entire culture seem to be fascinated with violence.¹

In a time of global interdependence and weapons of mass destruction capable of eradicating human life on earth within mere hours, a different set of questions *and* answers is needed. We need insights into how to prevent violent conflicts, into how to find ways for peace and reconciliation already in the midst of conflict, and into how to deal with former enemies—with both victims and perpetrators after the first cease fire has taken effect. The work in this field started only in the twentieth century with a small number of peace research programs.² Since the 1970s, an increasing number of institutions have started to work on topics such as ‘peace studies,’ ‘conflict resolution/transformation,’ ‘transitional justice,’ and ‘reconciliation.’ Now we count over one hundred of these institutions in the United States (US) alone, with urgently needed expertise as well as an increasing number of highly significant emerging studies. Their theoretical grounding and their practical impact have benefited from the study of different reconciliation processes as the

ones in Northern Ireland, South Africa and—though more contested—in the Balkans, in different countries in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Rwanda.³ For yet another case of successful reconciliation, we might point to the example of post-war Germany and its relationship with France, Israel, and Poland (Gardner Feldman 2013).

The academic research in this field is still both new and diverse concerning the disciplines involved, the paradigms and methods employed, and the results reached. There is no agreement yet even on the exact name for the research area in question with four different labels being used simultaneously: peace studies, conflict resolution/transformation, transitional justice, and reconciliation. Furthermore, there are approaches that focus exclusively on specific disciplines such as theology, psychology, law, economics, political science, or on the experiences of practitioners. Both a comprehensive overview and a synthesis of these approaches from a transdisciplinary perspective are still lacking.⁴ Practitioners today thus work with a heterogeneous set of measures from different disciplines to foster peace and reconciliation, which they adapt to the current situation. The sheer dynamics of this new field account for some of the difficulties for innovations and paradigm changes to gain a foothold.

This volume is based on the observation that we are currently witnessing the development and implementation of significant, and successfully tried and tested alternative approaches in conflict resolution. They have the potential to change our perception on what is the right thing to do before, in, and after conflicts.

In November 2015, some of the protagonists of these innovative approaches gathered at an international and interdisciplinary conference on ‘Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution’ in Zurich, Switzerland. The present volume is the fruit of this conference, directed by the principle not to simply reproduce the presentations but to provide the reader with a concise and useful summary of some of the most innovative and effective ideas of the past years in conflict resolution theory and practice. The contributions focus on initiatives from four different areas: negotiation, gender and religion, reconciliation and forgiveness, and the arts.

What is it that makes these approaches ‘alternative’? The approaches we have chosen are not only alternative in the sense that they propose nonviolent or less-violent solutions for conflicts. They are alternative also in the sense that they reflect new developments in actual research on reconciliation. In comparison with former approaches, a transition in

favor of cultural and social processes has taken place. This transition is mainly the result of the unsatisfactory outcomes of reconciliation processes that have relied strongly on top-down projects, sometimes being even implemented from outside the conflict by ‘interventionist peace-making.’ Take, for example, the peace processes in the Balkans after the wars in the 1990s. These peace processes had been focussed on international law, integration in the European Union (EU), and economic incentives. While these were certainly significant factors, the peace process failed to sufficiently address both the culture of memory and positive encounters between former enemies. The years following have revealed the inherent problems of such a deficient peace process and have led to a critical rethinking of peacebuilding.⁵

Similar reflections have come from many parts of the world. Regarding the peace process between Israel and Egypt, Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov wrote in 2004: “Reconciliation is probably the most important condition for shifting the current peace toward stable peace. Only reconciliation can build mutual trust and provide mutual assurances for maintaining peace” in the Middle East (p. 237). Paradoxically, “part of the fragility of peace processes is that reconciliation is professionalized [...] and not taken ownership of by society at large” (Brewer 2010, p. 3).

Researchers recognized that forming a culture of peace would be the key to achieving a stable peace. Karina Korostelina took up these issues in her work, *Forming a Culture of Peace*, including the long-neglected aspects of public and private communication, narratives, and history education (2012). We view our book also as a continuation of Korostelina’s approach. We focus on four different fields where dynamic new developments have taken place, thus indicating a paradigm shift in the study and practice of conflict resolution and reconciliation. In the field of *negotiation*, it is now a commonly agreed upon conviction that no conflict partner should be excluded, not even on so-called ‘moral grounds,’ if they are ready to talk. That change is particularly effective because diplomacy has become a much more flexible instrument for peacemaking, including Track One, Track One-and-a-Half, and Track Two Diplomacy.

Another key feature of this changing landscape is a new and strong focus on the positive role of formerly neglected actors in conflict. This includes *women and religious actors* in particular. Research in past years has shown both women and religious actors as constructive and active role players in striving to end conflicts. The Jena Center for Reconciliation

Studies (JCRS) in Jena, Germany, has introduced the ‘Hölderlin perspective’ that focuses on groups as well as individuals and their experiences of reconciliation and normality even in the middle of a conflict (Leiner and Flämig 2012, pp. 7–20). Their research has shown women and religious actors to be ‘turning factors’ in conflicts. The Liberian experience with Leymah Gbowee leading an interreligious women’s movement to end more than a decade of civil war is a case in point.

A third aspect indicating the comprehensiveness of the present change can be cast in conceptual terms. For years, the concept of transitional justice had been the overarching framework that included subordinated aspects such as reconciliation, forgiveness, truth and reconciliation commissions, etc. Now, *reconciliation* is emerging as the overarching concept encompassing transitional justice, but at the same time going beyond it by providing a transformative framework for the problem-laden transitional justice approach. Nevin Aiken points out “that transitional justice interventions will contribute to reconciliation to the degree that they are able to serve as crucial catalysts for social and psychological processes of ‘social learning’ between former enemies” (2013).

Finally, recent years have seen a number of cultural turns that have expressed a renewed interest in peace and reconciliation research. Peace studies have become integrated within different fields of the cultural landscape such as *the arts*. The arts’ impact as aesthetical and ‘moral imagination’ has greatly developed during recent years (Lederach 2005). Our media culture is prone to violence not least due to the fact that violence is much easier to depict and envision. Peace, on the other hand, is much more challenging to perceive and to portray. Artists are discovering ways to “transform our habitual way of looking” by a new dialogue on perception, thereby opening up new spaces for envisioning a culture of peace (Wenders and Zournazi 2013, p. 12).

The study and practice of conflict resolution and reconciliation presents a dynamic field. The four alternative approaches in conflict resolution discussed in this volume—negotiation, gender and religion, reconciliation, and the arts—are therefore by no means comprehensive. Rather, multiple ways of supplementation can be envisioned that take place as we write this, such as recent developments in economics, in restorative justice, or in connection with new technologies. Yet as for now, we hope to give an overview of the recent developments by introducing the four areas mentioned.

NEGOTIATION

A first fundamental change took place in the field of negotiation. Whereas before the focus was on the preconditions for negotiations, today many practitioners and researchers argue that negotiations should be conducted (1) already in the middle of a conflict, (2) even if the highest level of representatives are not (yet) willing to participate, and (3) also with, if necessary, persons who are morally problematic (Powell 2014, pp. 25–30). Furthermore, private-led Track Two Diplomacy is increasingly employed to supplement the traditional government-led Track One Diplomacy.

The following contributors take up various aspects of changing perspectives in negotiations. In his contribution “Justice in Negotiations and Conflict Resolution,” Rudolf Schuessler, professor of philosophy at Bayreuth University and the German representative for the international non-governmental organization (NGO) Processes in International Negotiations (PIN), examines the role of justice in negotiation processes and conflict resolution. While it is widely accepted that justice does matter in these processes, the pluralism of moral opinions and concepts of justice also introduces a new set of problems. His chapter shows that considerations of procedural justice and meta-justice generally fail to offer a safe way out of this impasse, because they too are subject to a pluralism of approaches. It follows that a guiding view of justice in negotiations and conflict resolution also needs to be negotiated. This puts particular emphasis on the responsibility and conflict-mitigating attitudes of the negotiating parties and on norms of mutual respect that support a shared quest for mutually acceptable views on justice.

Cesare Zucconi, a member of the community of Sant’Egidio in Rome, examines Track Two Diplomacy in close detail from his own experience in his chapter, “Beyond Official Negotiations: The Experience of the Community of Sant’Egidio.” Sant’Egidio has won international acclaim for successfully hosting and facilitating peace negotiations in Mozambique in 1992. They took place in the middle of an ongoing civil war and were guided by new approaches to negotiations focusing on building trust and an awareness for common concerns. According to Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Sant’Egidio provided “a new mixture between institutional and non-institutional work” (Zucconi 2012, p. 304), the ‘Italian formula’ which successfully combines Track Two with Track One Diplomacy, secret and public talks, and bottom-up and top-down

approaches.⁶ Track Two Diplomacy does not replace official international relations nor interaction at an institutional level, yet it does offer what the institutions seem to be lacking in our times: a flexible, informal, and personalized approach.

The joint contribution of Canadian political scientist Julie Bernath, Adou Djane Dit Fatogoma, sociologist from Côte d'Ivoire, and British development studies expert Briony Jones gives insights into the work of swisspeace, a practice-oriented Swiss foundation devoted to the research of peace and conflict transformation. In their chapter "Understanding 'Resistance' to Transitional Justice," the authors ask what we can learn if we truly engage with resistance-to-transitional-justice processes as an object of enquiry. Embedded in critical transitional justice scholarship and critical peace studies, it conceives of transitional justice as a political process of negotiation between different actors. Resistance thus becomes a necessary element in the empirical unfolding of transitional justice processes. The authors present conceptual and methodological approaches and discussions of a 3-year, multi-country research project on "Resisting Transitional Justice? Alternative Understandings of Peace and Justice" of swisspeace and the University of Basel (2012–2015). It focuses on findings from the case study of Côte d'Ivoire to illustrate key insights, but also the challenges of adopting a critical research agenda on resistance to transitional justice.

GENDER AND RELIGION

Other innovative approaches focus on the importance of the role of gender, women in particular, in conflict resolution. Often victims, women carry much of the burden of violent conflicts yet they rarely function as combatants themselves. During the last decades in Northern Ireland, the Balkans, and most prominently in Liberia, women were able to contribute significantly to ending violent conflicts. Recently, the hypothesis became stronger holding that women refuse the strict separation between the military/political/public sphere and the private sphere. Killed children are still killed children even if they wear uniforms (McAleese 1999). From antiquity onwards, women are known to find creative solutions, such as building effective networks or starting sex boycotts as in Liberia 2003, Mindanao 2011, or Togo 2012.⁷

Religion often appears as a factor promoting or contributing to violence in conflicts. A closer view, however, reveals religion's ambivalence.

The same religion can foster violence and nonviolence, conflict and reconciliation (Appleby 2000, pp. 81–166). Recent research therefore asks *how* religion is socially effective regarding violence and/or peace. What distinguishes pro-peace interpretations of religion from interpretations legitimating and fostering war? What are the respective roles of religious factors and nonreligious factors such as the economic and political situations or historical experiences within a given cultural context? The following contributions take up these and other questions.

In her chapter “Made for Goodness? Women, Ethnic Conflict, and Reconciliation,” German political scientist Carolina Rehrmann draws on basic concepts of gender studies as she traces the potential of women and women’s associations for conflict transformation and reconciliation. Rehrmann begins with a critical review of what has been criticized as a ‘masculinist bias’ in traditional approaches to conflict resolution that disregard gender in its potential to explain and resolve conflict. She argues that seeing male and female roles in a dialectic reference to one another, tracing and acknowledging their common impact on all levels of social and political life, first, is crucial for a comprehensive understanding of conflict risk and conflict structures, and second, illuminates the specific potential of women’s engagement for transethnic and crossethnic dialogue, trauma reprocessing, and reconciliation. In a second part, Rehrmann focuses on case studies of women’s activism in (post) conflict settings with a particular focus on Cyprus, illustrating common achievements of challenging traditional patriarchal structures, seemingly natural nationalist affiliations, and related gender roles.

In his contribution “Religious Dimensions in Conflict Transformation,” Swiss religion sociologist Richard Friedli, University of Fribourg, develops a tentative approach toward a reconciliation methodology. Each concrete political context manifests, according to Friedli, an overlapping reality where religions are key components. Islamic or Christian traditions are therein involved as well as Hindu or Buddhist communities. Therefore, in view of realistic reconciliation dynamics, a precondition is the analysis of the theoretical and practical dimensions of religion-based violent phenomena: manifest and latent, personnel and structural, economic and cultural. In doing so, three major dimensions need to be considered: the fundamental narratives, the socially accepted norms, and the collective memories. These factors are often used to legitimate destructive and/or segregational practices. Yet embedded in the same deep culture configuration are also potentials for reconciliation.

This contribution illustrates two case studies of conflicts wherein both the destructive—even genocidal—as well as the constructive religious dynamics are involved: (1) the discussion surrounding the Islamic veil, and (2) the *ubuntu* philosophy in Rwanda.

With the contribution of Friedli presenting a perspective *on* religion, David P. Gushee, Mercer University, presents a perspective from *within* a religious faith, namely the Christian (Baptist) tradition. In his contribution “A Critical Realist Engagement with Glen Stassen’s ‘Just Peacemaking’ Approach,” theologian and ethicist Gushee critically examines just peacemaking theory as pioneered by Glen Stassen of Fuller Theological Seminary (Pasadena, California). Stassen, from a Mennonite-Baptist tradition himself who represented a distinctly religious voice in American public debate, developed ten practices that were meant to prevent or solve violent conflict based on New Testament principles. After an exploration of the personal and intellectual origins of Stassen’s just peacemaking theory, the paper describes and critiques its ten practices, which include nonviolent direct action, independent initiatives, acknowledgment of responsibility, and cooperative conflict resolution. The essay concludes that despite its weaknesses and limits, just peacemaking theory or practice has a substantial contribution to make to contemporary global peacemaking efforts.

RECONCILIATION AND FORGIVENESS

The topics of reconciliation and forgiveness have emerged as a major *idée-force* within the last two decades (Bar-Siman-Tov 2004). Reconciliation has become a leading term in political discourse, often used and misused. One of the warring parties in the second Liberian civil war, for instance, had called itself Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), a name hardly befitting a party that became infamous for its ruthless use of child soldiers turned against the country’s civilian population. Yet to talk about reconciliation usually implies the desire to go beyond the technical resolution of a conflict by legal, economic, and political measures. Reconciliation also encompasses dealing with narratives, with trauma, with guilt and forgiveness, with stereotypes, as well as with encounters between former enemies.

Reconciliation tends to be more of a process than a result. This is due to the fact that severe violent conflicts hardly ever find complete closure; rather, they remain as bitter memories while they also face the constant

threat of being reignited. Because reconciliation often does not go very deep, scholars have developed a broader concept of reconciliation that is sometimes called ‘instrumental’ or ‘thin’ reconciliation. Nevertheless, recent results have shown the effectiveness and productivity of different elements of reconciliation. One example is forgiveness and its benefits for the victim. Empirical research points to the fact that victims who forgive experience freedom from remaining tied to the past and have a better chance of dealing successfully with the present and the future. While the value of forgiveness has long been recognized in the private realm, such as in interpersonal psychotherapeutic contexts, its positive effects become increasingly significant for political contexts as well (Tutu and Tutu 2014; Cantacuzino 2016).⁸ Forgiveness, however, can never be demanded by the perpetrator. It always remains the original right of the victim.

The issue of human capacity for forgiveness after traumatic experiences is taken up by South African psychologist Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela in her chapter “Forgiveness is ‘the Wrong Word’: Empathic Repair and the Potential for Human Connection in the Aftermath of Historical Trauma.” Drawing from her own experience as a psychologist for South Africa’s great experiment in national healing, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela argues that forgiveness is the wrong word to describe what takes place in victim–perpetrator encounters. Rather, she suggests it is “the emergence of the unexpected” that arises from witnessing each other’s pain that includes emphatic care and repair. This position goes beyond forgiveness and serves two possible functions. First, it seeks to ‘restore’ the image of the lost loved one who was murdered by the perpetrator. Second, by showing the kind of caring and containment that can help prevent disintegration in the perpetrator, the victim creates a new relational experience with him or her, which reconstitutes the memory of the loss as a positive narrative. Firsthand experiences and interviews serve to illustrate Gobodo-Madikizela’s position.

Complementing Gobodo-Madikizela’s perspective from a theological outlook, Christo Thesnaar, professor of pastoral care and counseling at Stellenbosch University, looks critically at the failures and omissions that have accompanied South Africa’s reconciliation policies. In his chapter “Alternative and Innovative Approaches to Reconciliation: A South African Perspective,” Thesnaar describes how 20 years after the transition in South Africa, the violence of the current student protests resembles

that of a ticking ‘time bomb’ on the brink of explosion. In an attempt to understand this complex reality, the author assesses briefly the role of the TRC process during this time. According to Thesnaar, throughout the post-TRC period the faith communities were predominantly absent in terms of their calling to reconcile the people of South Africa. This contribution argues that they should indeed play a more proactive role when it comes to healing and reconciling the nation. In seeking to find suitable ways to accomplish this challenge, Thesnaar engages critically with two alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation and healing, namely the re-enactment of the TRC faith hearings and the approach adopted by the Restitution Foundation (RF).

Christine Schliesser, theologian and ethicist at the Center for Ethics at Zurich University, Switzerland, complements the focus on reconciliation in South Africa by a closer look at the current politics of reconciliation in post-genocide Rwanda, where the fastest genocide in recent history in 1994 left up to 1,000,000 people dead. In her contribution “The Politics of Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda,” Schliesser provides a critical reading of Rwanda’s current politics of reconciliation as a specific way of dealing with the past, indicating both the strengths as well as the weaknesses of these politics. After a brief sketch of the context, she delineates the different components of Rwanda’s politics of reconciliation such as the Gacaca courts. In a third step, Schliesser draws the connection between reconciliation and remembrance, arguing that both are inseparably connected. Due to their connectedness, problematic aspects in one area will have negative effects on the other area.

THE ARTS

Religions contain worldviews. They invite us to view the world through the eyes of a believer, that is through the eyes of somebody touched by revelation. This specific point of view, this *blick* (Hare 1962), also plays a pivotal role in the arts. Art makes possible and reveals new ways of seeing the world, which accounts for its tremendous potential for conflict resolution. In our own perception of reality, we tend to focus on dangers and obstacles, provoking both fear and anger within us. This in turn serves to reinforce our perception of reality, leaving ever less space for peace. What is needed is a change in the ways we look at problems and conflicts, a change of perception. Another significant factor surfaces when we give attention to the fact that the realm of the arts reaches beyond the realm

of words. What might be impossible to express via spoken language can be conveyed through different means such as music, dance, or visual arts.

Politically engaged artist Bruce Clarke, Paris, France, in his essay “Genocide, Memory, and the Arts: Memorial Projects in Rwanda of ‘Upright Men’ and ‘The Garden of Memory,’” explores questions of how to “depict the undepictable, of how to remember that which cannot be remembered.”⁹ Clarke discusses the realization and philosophy of his commemorative and memorial projects ‘Upright Men’ and ‘The Garden of Memory’ produced in Rwanda in the years following the Tutsi genocide. They are part of a longer reflection on the role art can play in a commemorative historical process, with the condition that it is based on an informed position. As well as producing memorial spaces, the intention is to redefine art’s role as a historical discipline and to place the genocide in Rwanda into the public arena at home and elsewhere in the world so that it cannot be ignored. Clarke argues that art can be a tool to raise consciousness around this major historical episode often misrepresented in the West and at times subject to denial theories.

A different approach is taken up by creative writer and philosopher Mary Zournazi, from the University of New South Wales, Australia, who argues for the need for a different perspective on peace in her contribution “A Notebook on Peace: Reflections on Cinema and Perception.” Her chapter looks at questions of violence and the urgent need to invent a visual and moral language for peace. It examines various filmmakers who provide alternative means to violence and who provide a framework for considering the conditions for peace. Zournazi discusses her own film *Dogs of Democracy* (2016), in which she captures the care and concern people have for the street animals in Athens—a city facing social and economic crises. Art most often, and cinema in this case, can allow a space to approach and respond with sincerity to violent situations rather than reacting in retaliation with the same force or violence. It is some of these techniques and skills that are explored and offered as Zournazi supports her claim that we need to learn how to form a new perception. In other words, we need to ‘invent peace.’

Inventing peace involves a genuine dialogue with the world and ourselves so that we can transform our habitual ways of looking at it. Economic, legal and political actions to prevent war and to protect human rights are fundamental to any quest for peace, yet at the same time, if we do not invent new ways of looking at these questions, we remain locked in habitual political patterns of power and resistance (Wenders and Zournazi 2013, p. 12) .

In the concluding chapter, Martin Leiner, founder and director of JCRS at the University of Jena, brings together the different aspects presented in this volume. While these aspects differ in approach, outlook, and context, they are united by the fact that they all constitute alternatives in conflict resolution. Furthermore, all are tied to concrete contexts and have proven their effectiveness and productivity in the laboratory of history. In his “Conclusion: From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation,” Leiner argues that reconciliation ought to be conceived as an overarching approach to conflict resolution with a focus on rebuilding relationships. Its goal is to create ‘normal,’ ‘trustful,’ and if possible ‘good’ and ‘peaceful’ relationships. Leiner defends reconciliation as an alternative approach to conflict resolution against four criticisms. These points of critique include debates on the sources of reconciliation, on whether reconciliation might be more appropriately considered a mechanism or an approach, on whether reconciliation is an idealistic goal or a process, and on the right timing for reconciliation processes to begin. Leiner concludes by showing how reconciliation as a long-term project can in fact work. He names justice, truth, and resilience as fundamental components of reconciliation processes.

Combining the knowledge and insights of experts from academia and NGOs, civil society and politics alike, it is our hope that this book builds bridges to connect these distinct areas. With its different contributions containing an abundance of current, constructive, and valuable information, we like to think of it as a toolbox for academics and practitioners alike in our joint quest for a more peaceful world. Peace, we learn from German pastor and theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer who was killed for his resistance against the Nazi regime, cannot be reached along the way of safety. It must be dared.¹⁰

NOTES

1. Cf. the contribution of Mary Zournazi in Chap. 16 of this volume as well as Wenders and Zournazi (2013).
2. The first peace-studies program was established at Manchester College in Indiana in 1948. The college was run by the Church of the Brethren. For some of their insights they relied on previous work dating back to antiquity.
3. For an overview of the different regions of the world concerning reconciliation processes, such as in Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, or Asia Pacific, see Leiner and Flämig (2012).

4. This is evident even in handbooks that seek to provide a global overview with significant research and insights, yet fail to provide an integration of the different relevant disciplines. Cf. Lederach and Moomaw Jenner (2002) (for a practitioners' approach); Collier et al. (2003) (for an economical approach); Nadler et al. (2008) and Malley-Morrison et al. (2013) (for a psychological approach).
5. Two transitional justice measures were dramatically unsuccessful. A right to return was given to all, that is at least 2.2 million displaced persons in the conflict, yet only a bit more than half a million accepted to live in their former homes (cf. Ther 2016). The process against Slobodan Milošević in the international court was transmitted by television in Serbia. It demonstrated clearly that by his speeches, Milošević could find a platform for successful propaganda for his narratives.
6. See Dambach (2010) for an account on how his contribution as a non-politician helped facilitate peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea and within the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
7. Research indicates that the importance of education, emotions, and human needs is intuitively more obvious to women (cf. Avruch and Mitchell 2013).
8. For various spiritual and psychotherapeutic contexts, see Kornfeld (2008); Meyer (2012); Tipping (2004).
9. For more information, visit www.bruce-clarke.com.
10. Cf. Bonhoeffer (1994), p. 300.

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PART I

Alternative Approaches—Negotiation

Introduction to Negotiation

Martin Leiner

Abstract The three chapters in Part I by Rudolf Schuessler, Cesare Zucconi, and Julie Bernath et al. touch on negotiation for conflict resolution. Recent decades have brought two fundamental shifts to negotiation theory and its application in conflict resolution. First, fields of potential negotiation partners and arenas are broadening beyond those of conventional interstate diplomacy. Second, communication with non-state adversaries prove effective in many circumstances. With the emergence of alternative approaches engaging partners who are not official government representatives (e.g., diplomats or politicians) known as Track Two Diplomacy, such interactions build trust and humanize out-group adversaries. This creative conceptual expansion continues to develop, providing insights into the interdependence and relevance of many nonpolitical entities involved in and/or impacted by conflict.

Keywords Rudolf Schuessler · Cesare Zucconi · Julie Bernath et al.
Negotiation · Conflict resolution · Track Two Diplomacy

M. Leiner (✉)
Jena University, Jena, Germany
e-mail: martin.leiner@uni-jena.de

Recent decades brought two fundamental shifts to negotiation theory and its application in conflict resolution. First, fields of potential negotiation partners and arenas have been broadened significantly beyond those of conventional interstate diplomacy. Second, communication with non-state adversaries has proven effective in many circumstances.

The first shift began with the emergence of alternative approaches engaging partners who were not official government representatives, such as diplomats or politicians. Labeled as ‘Track Two Diplomacy’ by William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville (1981–1982), the original conception for Track Two included activities in the fields of culture and science. Such interactions build trust and humanize the out-group adversaries. This creative conceptual expansion continued to develop ever since, providing insights into the interdependence and relevance of many nonpolitical entities involved in and/or impacted by conflict.¹

Multi-Track Diplomacy was well established by 1991 as outlined in Louise Diamond’s and John McDonald’s system of tracks one through nine, with a goal of comprehensively accounting for groups involved in the conflict (1991).² Their approach includes business, religion, funding, media, government (Track One); private citizens, peace activists, research (training and education) and professional conflict-resolution mediators (Track Two). Other scholars and practitioners have, in addition to that system, focused on cultural diplomacy, for example, through music and sports or on special phenomena such as emergency aid. Together with the insights gained since these early developments is a concurrent reframing of conflict-resolution interventions confined not so much to ‘diplomacy’ but rather peacebuilding and fostering reconciliation. And these activities are guided by mediators and facilitators specifically trained to do so.

The second shift is more recent and controversial. Non-state conflict adversaries, often labeled ‘terrorists,’ proved a quagmire for governments and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). How do you negotiate with groups when that negotiation itself provides the adversary with the victory of recognition? In 1990, the Community of Sant’Egidio based in Rome started peace talks with the Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) rebels known for their cruelties as ‘Black Khmer’ and the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) government known for massacres of civilians. The contribution in this volume by Cesare Zucconi, Secretary-General of Sant’Egidio (Chap. 4), gives some insights into those negotiations. To the surprise of many, they succeeded in

negotiating a peace that has proven sustainable for almost two decades now.

Other examples include diplomatic exchanges with North Korea, the British government deciding to negotiate with Irish Republican Army (IRA) leaders, Nelson Mandela negotiating with Constand Viljoen, and in 2016, Colombia concluding a peace treaty with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC) guerrilla group thereby ending the world’s longest-running civil war. These and more negotiation experiences support the conviction not to exclude groups from talks regardless of violent pasts. Jonathan Powell’s book, *Talking to Terrorists* (2014), demonstrates that entering negotiations changes terrorist groups and opens chances to overcome violence. Refusing communication is a high-risk strategy. In 2004, for example, Vladimir Putin refused to talk with violent groups during the Beslan school attack where 330 hostages were killed. More recently, the European and the United States (US) officials refused to negotiate with autocratic leaders and radical groups in Libya and Syria, where there has been a great subsequent loss of life.

These two innovative shifts described above form the basis of a present broadening of negotiation understanding. The phrase ‘alternative approaches’ for this volume, we as editors believe, is being built on that broadening. Many contexts continue to resist such insights despite recent accomplishments.³ Thus the continuing goal is to document, investigate, and develop theory to learn from new experiences—successes and failures—and thereby provide well-structured foundations regarding processes and tracks of negotiation.

Chapter 3, “Justice in Negotiations and Conflict Resolution,” by the German philosopher Rudolf Schuessler, is a contribution on giving more structure to the negotiation process. It addresses the difficulty of negotiation with people not committed to truth. In 2016, such questions become more important than ever given the situation that post-factual argumentation has been successful in winning elections. Schuessler distinguishes between ‘simulation’ (make-believe of what is not the case) and ‘dissimulation’ (create disbelief of what is the case), which are traditionally seen as normal and sometimes necessary aspects of politics on the one hand,⁴ yet a complete untruthfulness about basic values and overall goals. Silencing, ambiguity, and sometimes telling a lie in a concrete situation might be part of political life. However, if it is impossible to discern what the strategic goals and truth are, then no successful negotiations can take place.

The other topic Schuessler discusses is justice. He shows that justice matters in negotiations because most partners in a discussion claim their position to be just. In most cases, people's justice claims appeal to universal rules of justice and are self-biased in that people choose the theory of justice which is most profitable for them. Given the fact that there are many different theories of justice, the art of negotiation is to find a point of reconciliation between them. Schuessler combines classical philosophical positions such as Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and Jürgen Habermas with game theory and the political debate between realists and idealists. By reflecting on the importance of truth and justice, Schuessler not only clarifies concepts but shows how negotiations can be more effective. Even people who do not believe in the ultimate importance of truth or justice need to respect them as realities relevant to the conflict.

Chapter 4, by Cesare Zucconi, Secretary-General of Sant'Egidio Community in Rome, provides a look through the keyhole into a very special and innovative way of negotiation. His contribution is part of the more detailed investigation into the lessons learned from Track Two Diplomacy. Four innovative insights from his paper deserve special attention: (1) all parties impacted by a conflict must be addressed in the reconciliation process, but peace talks require intimate interaction among a small group of main actors, (2) advantage is gained by creating safe spaces for conflict partners to develop their approaches to peace. This allows them ownership of the process. Pressure to create peace is provided by reality, casualties in their own group, populations asking for peace, lack of resources, and a general degradation of conditions of their lives. Thus, sustainable peace may require avoiding additional pressure on the conflicting parties in negotiations, (3) mediators can help by treating all parties with respect. The community hosting the Renamo and Frelimo representatives made it possible to develop respect for the other group, and (4) written commitments provide crucial moments. Even if they are not ultimate peace agreements, written commitments that remain at the negotiation table unless a settlement is achieved can be productive signs of good will and also stop some violent activities.

Chapter 5, written by swisspeace researchers Julie Bernath, Adou Djane Dit Fatogoma, and Briony Jones, deals with 'transitional justice' and presents results of a research project funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) to understand resistance against transitional justice. After a strong expansion of transitional justice since the 1990s, today this approach is in crisis because transitional justice has

been considered too top-down and imperialistic. For example, the central parts of transitional justice in the work of the International Criminal Court (ICC) accused African leaders more than European or American leaders. Unfortunately, countries like the US, Russia, China, or Israel did not ratify the statute of Rome and thus undermined the ICC that they had cooperated to bring into being, and then African countries quit the ICC. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the authors also show that opposition against a 'Truth Commission' may be the result of opposition against top-down policies of a local government. They argue that opponents should not be considered as 'spoilers.' This contribution shows the urgency to reorganize peacebuilding today. As Schuessler shows, each conception of justice must compromise and be reconciled with other concepts of justice; otherwise, it becomes egocentric and imperialistic. Scientifically speaking, the bulimia of transitional justice—which integrates everything including reconciliation under a certain understanding of justice—is the wrong conception.⁵ The englobing perspective can only be reconciliation, and transitional justice is one possible autonomous part within that approach. From that basis, and because of its very important contribution, transitional justice can and must be saved and defended against the decline that it is about to undergo.

NOTES

1. This last development culminates in the concept of Track One-and-a-Half Diplomacy, advocated by some researchers linked to the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) to elaborate better the links between Track One Diplomacy and Track Two Diplomacy.
2. Cf. also the summary on the website for the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy at <http://imtd.org/multi-track-diplomacy> (accessed on January 3, 2017).
3. A typical case is Israel who officially refuses to negotiate with the Hamas government in Gaza, leaving many questions unresolved. Making negotiations official would help both sides work for a peaceful solution.
4. The Latin quote is: *Qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare*.
5. An englobing definition of transitional justice was given by the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General: Transitional justice is “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses in order to ensure accountability, serve justice, and achieve reconciliation” (2004).

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Justice in Negotiations and Conflict Resolution

Rudolf Schuessler

Abstract It is widely recognized that justice matters for negotiation and conflict resolution. However, the pluralism of moral opinions and concepts of justice also introduces new fields of conflict. Rudolf Schuessler shows that considerations of procedural justice and meta-justice generally fail to offer a safe way out of this impasse, because they too are subject to a pluralism of approaches. It follows that justice in negotiations and conflict resolution needs itself to be negotiated. The guiding view of justice for a process of negotiation is to be established by negotiation in this process. This puts particular emphasis on the responsibility and conflict-mitigating attitudes of the negotiating parties and on norms of mutual respect that support a shared quest for mutually acceptable views on justice.

Keywords Rudolf Schuessler · Justice · Negotiation
Conflict resolution · Responsibility

R. Schuessler (✉)
University of Bayreuth, Bayreuth, Germany
e-mail: rudolf.schuessler@uni-bayreuth.de

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Justice matters. At least, that is the message of empirical findings on negotiations and conflict resolution in many fields of human conduct. Experimental studies in economics and psychology, and not to forget plain common sense, corroborate this as well (Albin 2001; Lange et al. 2010). Human beings resent being treated in ways they consider unjust, and agreements involving perceived injustice tend to be less stable than agreements where this is not the case. The question, however, is what to do with this insight. The recommendation to strive for justice is ‘easier said than done.’ Most people who advocate justice have (at least) two experiences, with the fields of negotiation and conflict resolution not being an exception. They learn that their views on justice are often not shared by those who have a stake in the problem. Justice is a notoriously pluralistic concept (Roemer 1996). Several alternative ‘just’ agendas or solutions can be conceived for most practical purposes, and the parties to a conflict or negotiation often differ with respect to the potentially just outcome they prefer, or the outcome they consider most just. Take, for instance, climate negotiations. Developing countries perceive it to be just to hold industrialized countries responsible for their ‘historical’ pre-1990 (roughly the year of the first climate negotiations) greenhouse gas emissions. Industrialized countries, on the other hand, have reservations about the validity of any demands of historical climate justice for the period before 1990. Instead, they make a case for the justness of limited benchmarking of emission reductions to existing emission levels (i.e., ‘grandfathering’). Needless to say, developing-country representatives consider grandfathering to be unjust (Schuessler 2011; Bovens 2011).

The example of climate negotiations shows that calling for justice as such often fails to resolve conflicts, because the parties’ divergent views on justice also tend to conflict. Moreover, where narrow-minded moralists, who are dogmatic about the purity and rightness of their own views and actions, have the say, disagreements over justice take on the appearance of religious strife. Wars of justice then become the secularized successors of religious wars. Let us assume that people who come together at the negotiating table or seek conflict resolution want to avoid this outcome. What attitude should they develop toward justice?

THE ROLE OF THEORIES OF JUSTICE

One option is to assume that deeper reflection will limit the pluralism of potentially just outcomes, perhaps relying on moral philosophers and theories of justice for guidance. This is what most theorists of justice

aspire to. They usually claim that their intricate arguments demonstrate that a given just solution is better than any other discussed solution. Unfortunately, a multitude of such theorists exists and their conclusions and arguments differ. The pluralism of moral opinions will therefore in no way be reduced for an agent who is not yet aligned to any of the competing theories or academic gurus. Even if a theorist's arguments sound convincing to the agent, she must reckon with the possibility that other agents will be swayed by the theorist's opponents.

Admittedly, this conclusion is not universally valid. Reasonable persons will agree on a moral assessment in certain fields of ethics. For instance, most people agree that freedom, justice, and well-being are good and valuable. That is, reasonable persons share certain values. However, they usually disagree over the relative weight of those shared values, with some cherishing freedom more than justice, and others vice versa. Since most practical moral problems entail the weighing of values and reasons, an agreement on basic values does not contribute much to the solution of such problems. This reasoning can also be reversed: Action-relevant moral problems arise only if people weigh values and reasons differently; otherwise they would agree on a solution from the outset, and there would hence be no problem to contemplate.

Nevertheless, however restrictedly, the diffusion of shared concepts of justice might mitigate moral problems. Taking this step seems to be mandatory in peace-loving and conflict-resolving societies. John Rawls' influential call for a broadening of the 'overlapping consensus' between different moral paradigms is an example in point (1987). However, a pluralism of moral views and notions of justice is the natural result of a free and open public moral discourse. Outside the natural sciences and mathematics, the ordinary progression of academic discourses, which are guided by arguments alone, indicates that different reasonable persons will be won over by different arguments and consequently arrive at different conclusions.¹ This is not just a predicament of modern liberal societies, whose pluralism might be considered exaggerated by some observers. Delving into the history of moral thought, we find that the problem of a barely manageable multiplicity of moral opinions has already been addressed by medieval thinkers (Schuessler 2014). It already troubled their neither modern nor liberal societies. The Inquisition did not succeed in suppressing the practical pluralism of moral views—this was only achieved by the far bloodier policies of modern totalitarianism. We should therefore use caution when calling for the reduction of moral pluralism in our societies. There is nothing wrong

with inculcating democratic and ecological values, for example, but as soon as their relative weight with respect to other values is to be fixed authoritatively, we should begin to worry. Yet unless the relative weight of values is fixed, there will be no widespread moral agreement on solutions for practical problems.

This conclusion seems hard to swallow. To many who work in the field of negotiation analysis and conflict resolution, bringing the moral views of conflicting parties closer together is worthwhile. Actually, I do not question the reasonableness of this aim, but call for it to be correctly understood. Moral agreement on practical matters is usually not the result of ethical reflection, truth-directed reasoning, and logical argumentation. These ideals instead produce disagreement if they are pursued single-mindedly.² Ideal rational discourse breeds disagreement, because reasonable persons may weigh reasons differently and have no reason to refrain from doing so in ideal discourses, which are not inhibited by power differences, lack of resources, or time restrictions. Jürgen Habermas, the leading theorist of discourse ethics, got it wrong in this respect, at least in my opinion (Habermas 1988). He believes that ideal rational discourse is driven by a consensus of all reasonable persons. On the contrary, consensus on practical problems and the rapprochement of moral positions is usually a result of circumstantial reasons and pressures. We agree to agree if it is in our interest, or if we grow tired of further discussions, or if we want to end a conflict for reasons of the common good. Approaches to negotiation or conflict resolution strive (and should strive) to work with such motivations. They can thereby, among other things, partially overcome disagreements on justice, but not for the reasons traditionally offered by theories of justice.

GOING PROCEDURAL

The role of circumstantial factors, such as fatigue, hurting stalemate, or impatience, for coming to terms in situations of conflict indicates how much the negotiating process (or the process of conflict resolution) matters for such endeavors. Usually, the parties need to compromise, that is, neither attain the outcome they deem best or most fair. Since the compromise is not optimal according to the normative standards of either side, particularly when taken on its own, other standards need to be incorporated to determine whether a compromise is foul or fair. This standard will often be one of fair process, that is, a compromise will

be judged by how it is brought about. If all parties feel fairly treated in the process of negotiating the compromise, they will tend to accept it as fair, although the material outcome will not fully comply with any party's standards of justice. This point helps to understand the apparently unduly exaggerated role of etiquette in diplomatic practice. At first glance, diplomatic etiquette is utterly irrelevant in comparison to the material outcome of a negotiation. At best, it pleases a few pampered civil servants, whereas the latter may seriously affect the lives of millions. Hence, rational agents should not be overly preoccupied with diplomatic etiquette. Yet perceptions of the justice of an outcome will usually differ and a compromise between rival views must be sought. Etiquette is a signal that all sides are being fairly treated in the process of finding a compromise, and as the deadlock of outcomes puts a premium on fair processes, this signal gains disproportionately in importance. Hence, it was no accident that the less powerful participants in the 'Concert of Europe' after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 received disproportionate procedural attention by the great powers of Europe of the time (Schroeder 1999; Siemann 2016). What they could call for in this temporarily (several decades, after all) successful attempt at collective security management was fair procedural respect, which they more or less got.

Principles of procedural justice would, of course, serve the outlined purpose even better than mere rules of diplomatic etiquette. However, as you might have guessed by now, moral pluralism does not stop short of procedural justice. Principles and rules of procedural justice are no less subject to moral disagreement than the material results of distributive justice. Take bargaining theory, for instance. Bargaining theory is a branch of game theory, which assumes conditions ('axioms') that limit the bargaining process between economically rational agents. These axioms can be understood as rationality conditions, but some are explicitly defended as standards of fairness (Thomson 1994).³ Some bargaining theorists, for instance, consider it fair for all players to profit from all benefits generated in a bargaining process (one that 'enlarges the cake'). Other bargaining theorists consider it fair if only those players profit whose options are expanded. These alternative assumptions lead to different bargaining solutions. Such alternatives generally exist for most guidelines of procedural justice, and reasonable persons can thus disagree on just procedural regulations for the solution of conflicts or for finding agreements. Established rules of etiquette are therefore often a remedy of last resort to demonstrate that all sides respect each other and want

to treat each other justly. Moreover, if there are no established rules of etiquette to comply with, it is usually helpful to introduce them for the reasons outlined above.

Moral disagreement on procedural justice offers a glimpse of the depth of the disagreement problem in ethics. Disagreement on a first level of moral consideration would be less virulent if we could agree on a ‘second-order ethics,’ that is, an ethics of dealing with ethical disagreements. One aspect of Immanuel Kant’s work offers precisely such a second-order ethics. His ‘Categorical Imperative’ was designed to overcome the disagreements that arose in the ordinary ethics of Kant’s day with respect to happiness or virtue. Against such disagreements, Kant claimed to derive universal duties on which all reasonable beings could agree. Personally, I am in favor of solving problems of disagreement using the method of moral self-legislation, but a large number of moral philosophers, in fact, disagree.⁴ Moving to a second (or ‘meta’) level of consideration only leads to new disagreements. We, therefore, face a predicament that could be described as a ‘layered’ or ‘nested disagreement.’ Disagreements on one level of moral consideration stabilize and are in turn stabilized by disagreements on further levels. This renders the problem of moral disagreement in ethics next to intractable, and places particular emphasis on circumstantially driven, pragmatic remedies.

NEGOTIATING THE JUSTICE OF NEGOTIATIONS

So far, the upshot of my analysis is that the study of negotiations or conflict resolution cannot simply look to ethics for guidance on what *the* just outcome or just procedural regulation of a case would be. At best, theories of justice can offer a menu of just solutions from which the parties to a negotiation or conflict may choose, or on the basis of which they can develop a compromise. It follows that justice in negotiations must itself be negotiated. Negotiations are not subject to rules of justice, because these rules need to be negotiated to begin with—or the parties need to at least negotiate a shared perspective on justice, however minimal. This seems to imply that no prior ethics of negotiations can exist, and that the many textbooks on this subject are moot. Let me comment on this issue. A plurality of notions and procedures of justice, and a requirement to negotiate a course between them, does not imply the nonexistence of duties of conduct in negotiations. Similarly, the lack of a

universal second-order ethics for dealing with moral disagreement does not imply that anything goes. Some restrictions may apply, or at least, we can test them for acceptability. If they remain undisputed among practitioners and addressees of negotiation analysis and conflict resolution, we may confidently use them in an ethics of negotiation or conflict resolution. If they are rejected by the parties, who display no apparent parochial self-serving bias, there is no basis for imposing them as universal moral guidelines. In sum, the old philosopher's dream of finding guidelines that are both reasonably justifiable as well as applicable need not be entirely abandoned, but should be subject to skeptical and critical testing—and needs to be considerably downscaled. That said, let us look at an example.

NORMS OF VERACITY

Many moral philosophers assume that veracity and truthfulness can be demanded of negotiators (Menkel-Meadow and Wheeler 2004, pt. 2; Thompson 2001, Chap. 7). As such, veracity is not an issue of justice, but here we are primarily interested in veracity with respect to revealing one's perspective of justice. This particular kind of veracity is the key to finding just compromises, and therefore deserves to be discussed in the context of justice.

At a very general level, many ethicists demand that negotiators should not only refrain from outright lying, but also from disseminating misleading messages or from withholding crucial information. At first glance, such norms appear blue-eyed and overly moralistic. If political realism is considered an acceptable doctrine for international political negotiations, a willingness to share strategically important information with an opponent certainly does *not* belong to its list of virtues (Donnelly 2008). We need not invoke Machiavelli as a patron saint of political realism to underline this point. Traditionally, skillful simulation (make-believe of what is not the case) and dissimulation (create disbelief of what is the case) belong to the toolbox of any successful ruler or politician (in the original Latin: *Qui nescit dissimulare, nescit regnare*).⁵ Note that this does not include outright lying. Simulation and dissimulation instead work with ambiguity and withholding of information, so that an opponent is misled without ever being outrightly lied to (i.e., deceived by the conscious statement of an assumed falsehood). Christian ethics has strictly prohibited lying since the time of Augustine, but has

permitted the use of other means of deception in case of necessity. Kant propagates similar practical standards, when taking the fine print of his lectures on ethics into account.⁶ His unbending prohibition of lying does not include a prohibition of all ways of informational manipulation. It would otherwise be unintelligible how Kant could have become a favored philosopher of political realists ranging from Metternich to Kissinger (Siemann 2016, pp. 80, 95; Ferguson 2015).

An ethics of negotiation that does not try to be more moralistic than Kant will therefore not ban all sorts of manipulative communication. It will at best prohibit outright lies. Yet even this might seem overly moralistic, because a lie (e.g., with respect to the declared intentions of a guarantee power) might help reach a peace deal in a horrendous war. Is it not better to end the slaughter of thousands of people than to remain pure at heart and refrain from giving guarantees one definitely does not intend to keep?⁷ Moral philosophers will disagree on this question, most likely along the lines of consequentialist and deontological ethics. Such disagreements demonstrate that a rigid prohibition of lying cannot be part of a universally valid ethics of negotiation. It is a rule followed by moralists—or what political realists call idealists—but within the confines of reasonable moral pluralism, agents are entitled to decide for themselves how moralistic they want to be.

So much for veracity as a general norm. Yet, its generality conceals the fact that we are dealing with a special case in light of the foregoing considerations on justice in negotiations. The question is whether veracity is required when we negotiate justice. The parties to a negotiation must seek agreement in a way perceived to be sufficiently just by them. In exchanging their views on justice and fairness, the parties can be more or less veracious. They can deceive opponents not only about their actual views on justice, but also about how morally acceptable they find their opponents' views.

Again, extreme cases may justify deception, at least from some reasonably defensible moral perspectives. Imagine that a democracy enters into a coalition with an evil dictator in a war against an even more evil dictator (forming an alliance with Stalin against Hitler comes to mind, except that Stalin refuses to budge in the following case). The leaders of the democracy call on the dictator to refrain from human rights violations, referring to moral principles. What they do not reveal is that they would be willing to sacrifice these principles to achieve the coalition. Given that the dictator needs the coalition more urgently than the democratic

leaders, he might give in—and that would probably justify the lie regarding the democratic leaders' moral rigidity. However, it seems that lying about moral principles and views on justice are not on par with, say, lying about one's reservation price or the strength of one's troops in a negotiation. We half expect opponents to be dishonest in the latter cases, and are not truly surprised when a person, who intently looked us in the eye and quipped 'Last offer!', ends up making a better offer after sustained haggling. However, with respect to lies about moral positions, most will feel betrayed if they have been denied a benefit due to an allegedly unassailable moral principle and realize that this principle was waived in negotiations with another person. Moral honesty seems to be more important than honesty in general.

Why should this be the case? One of the better (albeit insufficient) reasons behind Kant's rigid prohibition of lying is that lying prevents cognitive progress. We cannot learn as quickly and as effectively from people who might deal us misinformation than from those who are one-hundred-percent veracious. This is particularly true in terms of morals, because other persons are the only source from which we can learn morally. We cannot make moral progress by studying nature.⁸ Widespread lying about moral positions will, therefore, impede moral progress in society. It will thwart the discursive search for a better morality, which in turn might help improve society. In Kant's metaphor, it will bias our moral compass, and this is worse than spreading some factual error about the material world. Moreover, remember that justice in negotiations itself has to be negotiated. There is thus no independent route by which clever philosophers might procure moral progress and limit the effects of moral dishonesty in negotiations. What precisely moral progress signifies with respect to practical justice can only be judged on the basis of practically negotiated just results. Derailing this process is a direct onslaught against the idea of moral progress.

This is a reason to react more strongly to moral deception in negotiations than against deception *per se*, which is not to say, of course, that our strong emotional responses in cases of being morally duped occur for this reason. However, even those who do not care about moral progress should be aware of the risk of strong counter-reactions against moral deception. It might well be the case that revealed moral deception destroys the trust between the parties, which is crucial for arriving at an agreement, even more so than more mundane forms of deception. However, it would require empirical studies to vindicate this assumption.

In any case, it seems reasonable to reserve moral deception, if used at all, for the most challenging of hard cases. A look at the practice of hard-nosed, successful political realists confirms this recommendation. Realists from Richelieu to Metternich and Kissinger did not lie about the normative principles they held. They did not promote idealist principles, and this reduced their need to betray their own principles in case of emergency (above all in the eyes of others),⁹ but they were quite candid as to the normative principles they held.

CONCLUSION

The present paper acknowledges that justice in negotiations and conflict resolution matters. In both fields, however, moral pluralism forestalls the straightforward guidance of universal norms as suggested by theories of justice or an ethics of negotiation and conflict resolution. Layered disagreements in ethics render it necessary to negotiate justice itself. At first glance, this seems to indicate that anything goes with respect to morality if aptly negotiated, but this conclusion would be rash. The example of veracity with reference to normative discussions in negotiations shows that a minimal ethics of negotiating justice might exist, which has so far only been insufficiently investigated.

NOTES

1. In fact, there is a debate to the extent that reasonable disagreement can exist in the natural sciences and mathematics. Since I do not want to address this field here, it is excluded from our discussion for the sake of the argument.
2. On the relevance of principled disagreements in philosophy and politics, see McMahon (2009) and Christensen (2009).
3. The outlined assumptions distinguish the Kalai–Smorodinsky and the egalitarian bargaining solutions.
4. The case for and against self-legislation as a core element of ethics is too complex to be pursued here. As an example of how self-legislation can be employed in applied ethics, see Schuessler (2015).
5. On simulation and dissimulation in early modern thought, see Zagorin (1990).
6. For Christianity, see Dorszynski (1948); for Kant, see Schuessler (2013).
7. The example is not merely academic because it was common for states in the eighteenth century to give assurances that were not kept in cases of emergency (see Schroeder 1999, p. 11).

8. Proponents of evolutionary ethics will disagree, but evolution can at best tell us how Stone Age morality might have emerged. This hardly gives us a clue as to what is usually conceived as moral progress, namely a morality that goes beyond its Stone Age variety.
9. The paradigmatic idealist who betrayed his principles in the eyes of others, notably in the 1919 negotiations in Versailles, was Woodrow Wilson (see MacMillan 2002).

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Beyond Official Negotiations: The Experience of the Community of Sant'Egidio

Cesare Zucconi

Abstract In a world where not only economy is privatized but wars increasingly as well, alternative approaches to conflict resolution are needed that go beyond official negotiations. Cesare Zucconi's contribution draws on the experience of the peace for Mozambique negotiated by the Community of Sant'Egidio with the support of the Italian government between 1990 and 1992 as one of the first experiences of Track Two Diplomacy. Track Two Diplomacy does not replace official international relations nor interaction at an institutional level, yet it does offer what the institutions seem to be lacking today: a flexible, informal, and personalized approach. Zucconi makes the case that peace is always possible and that mediation is a promising path towards it.

Keywords Cesare Zucconi · Negotiation · Conflict resolution
Mozambique · Sant'Egidio · Track Two Diplomacy · Mediation

C. Zucconi (✉)

Community of Sant'Egidio, Rome, Italy

e-mail: cesarezucconi62@gmail.com

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PEACE IN A WORLD WITH NO PEACE AND MUCH DESPAIR

Nowadays peace is threatened. We are all very anxious, if only for the new terrorist threat. The threat of a 'caliphate' to European countries is becoming a global challenge with its iconic and media messages of terror. After 1989, with the end of Communism, my generation expected a steady peace. Conditions were there for a long peaceful season. But in the 90s, the opportunity of the fall of Communism to build a peace order was not seized. So many national and nationalist passions have risen; many hatreds were fanned; they laid the foundations for new conflicts. Violence broke out in the name of religion. The horror of World War II was forgotten with time passing, the 6 million dead Jews in the Shoah, so many civilians killed, and the use of the atomic bomb.

Nowadays, war is rehabilitated as a method to solve conflicts. We forgot history. Without history, we are imprisoned by short-term passions. Violence and terrorism are often the ways chosen to assert rights and to manifest a presence. Mafia organizations now have military power, and even though with no face, they control entire countries. In the countries of despair, states are desegregated. When statehood is missing, order and safety end. A lack of state is an additional poverty for the poor. Poverty is interconnected with a deep anger in too many countries, which is a breeding ground for new violence. Some parts of the world's population sectors, including the young and very young, live in violence. The case of child or teenager soldiers, or the Central American 'Maras,' illustrates this condition. War makes the rich poor and destroys the poor: it is the mother of all poverty, as Andrea Riccardi, founder of Sant'Egidio, says.

AFTER ALL, WHAT CAN WE DO?

It is an alarming scene. Many have chosen not to think about it. Yet on the contrary, it is very timely to reflect on what we can do for peace, also by bringing together the experiences of those involved in conflict prevention and resolution. Being faced with the scene I described above, what can we do? How can we affirm peace in a time of war? These are urgent questions. Pope Francis speaks of a condition of generalized war: a third world war, even though in pieces, in chapters! What can we do? The answer is not easy. We feel little relevance from decisions for war or peace made elsewhere, often in countries that are not our countries. At times we are taken by powerlessness and pessimism.

Our times seem not to be of big dreams, but rather times to keep inside our homes sheltered by our institutions or communities. Retreating within our worlds (either small or big) is quite common. We retreat in our communities becoming almost estranged in a too-big world where little can be done. That is true: there are many problems to be solved where we are, with no need of going out and searching for problems. Management requires energy. We may quarrel, discuss within communities, but this does not change history. I question myself, who wants to change history today? So many displaced persons who are coming to our continent in these months tell us that war is at hand and that it has something to do with us. Protecting oneself behind a wall in our small worlds is an illusion.

Still much has to be changed, to be healed, to be helped. Thanks to media globalization we can see everything, much sorrow even from far away. But this also increases our responsibilities! These images of sorrow are questions. But what can I do, being faced with what I see? Often nothing. It is powerlessness that makes us pessimistic. In this way we become used to living with no dreams or hope of changing. In the end we accept reality: even war, as an unavoidable companion of human history. At best, we try to keep away. What can be done?

THE EXPERIENCE OF THE COMMUNITY OF SANT'EGIDIO

As mentioned above, many people today have the chance and means to wage wars. Since the end of the twentieth century, states no longer possess the monopoly of violence. The 9/11 terrorist attacks on New York showed the world that a relatively small group of terrorists, resolute and well prepared, can challenge a superpower. The same can be said about the Islamic State (IS) issue. States today seem weaker than in the past, and this does reflect the overarching mentality of the last part of the past century: economy is privatized, why shouldn't wars be? However, it is equally true, that many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and institutional actors today can work for peace. It is an idea that was formed in the international civil society about 20 years ago. The experience of the peace for Mozambique negotiated by the Community of Sant'Egidio with the support of the Italian government between 1990 and 1992 was one of the first experiences of Track Two Diplomacy.

Track Two Diplomacy stems from the awareness that this new international scenario calls for international relations not to be solely the

prerogative of a select few (official, or Track One Diplomacy): they are a field where citizens and private organizations can contribute with their efforts and work (e.g., churches and religious leaders, academics, NGOs, journalists, businesspeople, etc.). Track Two Diplomacy does not replace official international relations nor interaction at an institutional level, since it will never have access to similar resources. It does, however, offer what the institutions seem to be lacking in our times: a flexible, informal, and personalized approach. Political leaders invariably represent their constituency, and however willing they may be to take action in the internal crisis of another state, they must be sure of their constituents' support, even through failure. Institutional politics and official diplomacy are hindered by this internal rationale. Track Two Diplomacy, on the contrary, can scout ahead without being overly concerned about the impact. To commit prestige, resources, and time to actions that will develop into an uncertain outcome are perceived as inconvenient by institutions, so they rather turn their attention elsewhere.

The long story of mediation for Mozambique, fostered by the Community of Sant'Egidio for 27 months, is a clear example—even a model—in this respect. At the beginning of this process, the Western nations were convinced that there would be no solution in Mozambique without the end of apartheid in South Africa. But by observing the situation on the ground and by examining the real stakes of the war, Sant'Egidio understood that there were internal causes to the conflict that made it chronic. It decided to penetrate the complex and contradictory reality of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frelimo) and the opposing Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo). The initial goal was to understand the reasons why the two sides justified the conflict. The Afro-Marxists had found in Marxism the cement of their nationalism and the grammar of power. The rebels, called the Black Khmers in Western specialized reviews, were a mysterious movement without representatives abroad, who felt they embodied the people's discontent with the regime.

The warring parties were stuck in a 'pathology of memory,' like an ominous and overwhelming sense of rights and wrongs, especially among comrades who had fought together against the Portuguese. This is a crucial element of every crisis: the culture of war makes a lifestyle out of feelings of victimization. The first step was to rediscover the love both sides felt for their land and nation, weaving the awareness of a shared interest on both sides. This led to a higher level, that of believing in a

common destiny, in a possible future. In this regard, it is necessary to understand the psychology of the rebels, secluded for years in the bush, with no contacts with the outside world, full of an antagonistic rationale.

Sant'Egidio believed it was possible to shift the conflict from arms to politics, making men of war into politicians. This is where the human aspect comes in as absolutely essential, making it one of the strong points of Track Two Diplomacy. To reach these objectives, Sant'Egidio worked on a delicate process of mediation for 27 months, confidentially and without pressure from the outside. There was of course the problem of transposing the decisions into an adequate political document. Throughout the negotiations, Sant'Egidio was in touch with the diplomatic corps of all stake-holding countries, and toward the end, the official diplomacies joined the table.

Every political peace agreement needs guarantees and arbitration. United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined this synergy as "an original mix of institutional and noninstitutional diplomacy," an "Italian formula."¹ These experiences of dialogue by Sant'Egidio have multiplied in Africa. In the case of Burundi, for instance, Sant'Egidio led the 'Commission for Disarmament.' Sant'Egidio has also been active in many other countries, among them recently the Central African Republic, and Senegal as far as it concerns the issue of Casamance.²

A MODEL OF TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY

The first instance is the profile of the mediator. Noninstitutional mediators are seen as people who do not hold any stakes in the situation they mediate. They are 'weak,' devoid of the usual means of diplomacy. Apparently this may seem a drawback, but it is not: for the parties it is a guarantee that they can express themselves without any undue pressure.

This is important. Contrary to institutional mediators, noninstitutional organizations are characterized by greater freedom and by inspiring a greater degree of accountability in the parties involved in the conflict. Often institutional mediators tend to force themselves upon the parties, with a kind of 'threatening mediation' that may be useful at times, but is particularly dangerous at the beginning of a process. Track Two mediators, on the contrary, give the parties control in the peace process, which is important for the parties to acquire a sense of ownership over the process.

In some cases, the international community may decide to impose sanctions on one or both sides to press them into negotiating. It is of absolute essence that the mediators not be perceived as part of this decision, under penalty of losing their impartiality. ‘Punitive’ subjects cannot mediate.

The secret of a good mediation is to involve all the parties in feeling responsible for the process without forcing them to stop defending their stands. The parties must ‘own’ the process, especially in order for them to implement the agreement. Peace can never be completely forced upon people who do not want to hear of it.

Noninstitutional mediators are capable of being more faithful to the interlocutors: they are not interchangeable officers that may be shifted during the talks; they remain the same and may establish a relationship of trust with all sides.

Mediators must tune in with the reality of a conflict with how the people live and see it. It is not necessary to start with the fighters. In spite of the folly that is unleashed with war, many people wish for peace, especially the poor. Later, one will need to listen to the protagonists of the crisis, but never draw immediate conclusions. To be in tune does not mean to be partial; it means to try and touch the heart of a situation.

Mediating is not like playing a game of chess, moving inanimate objects on a known board with fixed rules. Mediating means to meet concrete human beings in their pains, frustrations, feelings of humiliation, and revenge.

To listen and communicate with perseverance is useful to help both sides enter a new world: a world where an agreement is possible. Even if both sides do accept to start a peace process, one should never forget that it is a risk for both sides, and skepticism rules at the beginning.

The mediators need to convince all sides that an agreement is an advantage for everyone, even if it means to yield to something. There are no easy shortcuts to this, not even the use of force. Mediators should always bear in mind that anyone who has taken up arms never did so lightheartedly. There are no ‘wild’ conflicts that seem impossible to understand compared to other more ‘civilized’ conflicts. War is always a tragedy with no coming back.

Mediators build bridges between people who ignore or despise each other, but even between themselves and the parties. They enter a situation devoid of shallow thoughts and endowed with a great deal of respect. This might seem trivial, but it is actually quite rare.

Then comes the time when precise commitments need to be written down—a stage all parties fear, because it defines their responsibilities. It is also a ‘magical’ moment though: it is the beginning of a solution. The written proposal is up to the mediator, but he or she must never reach this stage without having devoted a great deal of time to words before. Institutional mediations often start by supplying the parties with a written text of the agreement, generally drawn from previous experiences. Today there is a fashion of a certain technicality in drawing up agreements, and they all tend to look alike. This is actually a grave mistake.

Another characteristic of noninstitutional mediation is its flexibility. It means that the negotiating framework, however precise, can be bent to include whatever may help. Experts, institutions, governments, different organizations—anyone can be called to give his or her contribution. Institutional mediations are set in a limited framework of official operations and are incredibly hard to change even if things are going wrong.

Another quality of noninstitutional mediators is their control over time, and time is of essence in order to take an interlocutor seriously. Often it takes a great deal of shuttling from one side to the other. Sometimes it takes months just to organize the first meeting. Institutions do not have time, nor can they always be ready when the right moment arrives. Noninstitutional realities can afford this greater flexibility. But control over time is also a matter of patience. Patience and continuity are part of the essential baggage of any diplomat.

Another element essential to success is not to seek success at all costs. Often it is like a boomerang: it exposes oneself to blackmailing by the different parties. Since their reputation is at stake, institutional mediators are under such a pressure that they can lose sight of the effectiveness of the mediation process itself. Even noninstitutional mediators have reputations, but they are more free to attribute responsibility over the peace process to the parties.

One of the crucial stages of a peace process is the time of mutual recognition. At the beginning of a process, the parties do not recognize each other as interlocutors. In general, the government attributes the rebels a lesser—or irrelevant—status from a political point of view. On the contrary, the rebels use the negotiations to gain a higher status, possibly equal to the government. Institutional mediations generally tend to underestimate this crucial moment. It is necessary therefore to work for a rapprochement between the parties, and the mediators must obtain from the parties the acknowledgement of the other at the same level and on common ground.

Noninstitutional mediators are apparently weak. They cannot exert pressure or sign compensation checks. But they are not suspected of having a ‘hidden agenda.’ Their strength is that of ‘moral suasion,’ which breaks new ground by the force of its contents.

A further point we need to examine is the mediators’ professionalism. They need to know the key words and diplomatic and political tools available during the negotiation. Noninstitutional mediations tend to be less endowed with this quality, which is only partially replaced by their deeper understanding of the situation. However, if professionalism means the ‘making of mediation into a profession,’ it may be a drawback for civil-society organizations that give themselves the mandate to solve conflicts. Professional diplomats (and politicians), religious organizations *et similia*, have other occupations to attend to; freelance mediators likewise. They work on a voluntary basis. Track Two organizations that present themselves as ‘mediation professionals’ are undermined by the very limit of their mandate: their mediations need to be successful or else the organization or the person directing it will lose credibility. In this case, the faults of institutional and noninstitutional mediation pile up. Former politicians who take up conflict-resolution foundations are often prey to this underlying ambiguity.

Another important element in working for peace is the awareness that every situation is different from the other and it is not always possible to repeat a success by replicating the same actions that led to success in other circumstances. Even if the same approach is desirable and a common model can be traced, mere imitation is impossible.

One of the main difficulties of institutional mediations, besides the pressure they are subject to, is the choice of the parties that need to sit at the negotiating table, which is a very delicate issue. Wherever there is conflict, there are a number of parties that have something to say, not only the warring factions. The civil society of a country at war, third parties that have not taken up arms and traditional authorities that have stayed neutral or supported a peaceful option, can give excellent contributions. There is the danger, however, that this might open the process to exploitation. A table with too many actors of diverse importance and differing degrees of representation is exposed to the power and exploitation that the strong—the warring factions—can exert upon the weak. It is absolutely unadvisable to let too many parties sit at the table. It may seem morally just to let third parties in, but in the beginning the parties at war should be left alone with their responsibilities.

Another point that needs to be highlighted is the selection of a suitable place for negotiations to take place. Recent practice has it that a country neighboring the one at war is selected, because everyone should be capable of solving their own problems. In the case of Africa, this means ‘African solutions to African problems.’ Rather, this can become an easy alibi for non-commitment. The choice of a neighboring country often goes against common sense. Bordering countries are generally involved in the crisis, or at least they do not seem completely neutral to the parties. The location should be as impartial as possible, and it should inspire an interest for peace. The mediator (whether institutional or noninstitutional) should have complete control over the location of the mediation: to mediate while remaining close to the conflict means to be exposed to the pressure of the conflict itself.

CONCLUSIONS

In short, there is an approach, but there are no absolute rules. There is room for noninstitutional organizations, but the presence of institutions is a key to solving conflicts. The truth is that synergy between Track One and Track Two Diplomacy is crucial. There are times when the presence and commitment of governments and institutions is of essence in making sure the agreements are observed, implemented, and assessed. A number of agreements have failed the day after they were signed! It takes patience and hard work. A peace process never ends the day the talks are over. Conflict resolution requires a ‘long-term’ commitment and focus—constant efforts in terms of presence and the assessment of international, governmental, and non-governmental actors—in order to attain durable peace.

Every peace process is made of several stages: an approach, the search for valid interlocutors, patience during the first contacts, the establishment of trust, and selecting the location. This is the field where Track Two Diplomacy has the greatest chances of success. Then, official diplomacy should step in with guarantees and arbitration. Between the two moments, talks must continue and synergies should turn into action and collaboration with all stake-holding parties.

Every peace process is of course an opportunity for countries at war to shift toward democracy. Dialogue and negotiation are a form of apprenticeship to democracy. Mutual recognition, discussion, and the acceptance of pluralism—these are the elements for building coexistence and democracy,

even for people who have fought each other for decades. Every mediation can be the seed of new forms of coexistence, the rising of a new future for entire peoples. This is the crucial role that religions can play: religions can fuel conflicts, but they can also liberate energies of peace and contribute significantly to conflict resolution.

Dear friends, this world of ours needs no hopeless people. This Europe of ours, which has lost the sense of its mission, needs to find a mission in peace. Are we the ones? Can we do it? We people of Sant'Egidio are convinced that war is not an inescapable destiny. Peace is always possible, but it depends also on each one of us.

NOTES

1. This was Boutros-Ghali's message to the Seventh International Meeting for Peace of Sant'Egidio Community in Milan (1993). Boutros-Ghali is also quoted in Morozzo della Rocca (2003, p. 16).
2. Some of Sant'Egidio's peace processes are reported in Morozzo della Rocca (2013).

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Understanding ‘Resistance’ to Transitional Justice

*Julie Bernath, Djané Dit Fatogoma Adou
and Briony Jones*

Abstract This chapter asks what can be learned if people truly engage with resistance to transitional justice processes as an object of enquiry. Embedded in critical transitional justice scholarship and critical peace studies, it conceives of transitional justice as a political process of negotiation between different actors. Resistance thus becomes a necessary element in the empirical unfolding of transitional justice processes. This chapter presents conceptual and methodological approaches and discussions of a three-year, multicountry research project on “Resisting Transitional Justice? Alternative Understandings of Peace and Justice” of

J. Bernath (✉)

Swisspeace and the University of Basel, Bern and Basel, Switzerland
e-mail: julie.bernath@swisspeace.ch

D.D.F. Adou

Swiss Centre of Scientific Research, Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire
e-mail: djane.adou@swisspeace.ch

B. Jones

Swisspeace and University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
e-mail: B.Jones.5@warwick.ac.uk

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swisspeace and the University of Basel (2012–2015). It focuses on findings from the case study of Côte d’Ivoire to illustrate key insights, but also challenges, of adopting a critical research agenda on resistance to transitional justice.

Keywords Resistance · Actors · Transitional justice · Peace studies
Negotiation · Côte d’Ivoire

INTRODUCTION: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AS A POLITICAL PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION

The United Nations (UN) Secretary-General has defined transitional justice as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses in order to ensure accountability, serve justice, and achieve reconciliation” (2004). This definition illustrates the institutionalization, professionalization, and normalization of transitional justice (Rubli 2012). Today, transitional justice constitutes a specific package of internationally legitimized approaches for dealing with massive human rights violations of the past in societies engaged in multiple transitions from war to peace, and from authoritarianism to more democratic forms of government (Bell 2009).¹ While the notion of transitional justice emerged in the wake of the so-called ‘third wave of democratization’ through the interaction of a specific set of actors, that is, mainly human rights activists, lawyers and legal scholars, policymakers and comparative politics experts (Arthur 2009, p. 324), it has later been adopted by the peacebuilding community and is today an integral part of liberal peacebuilding (Sriram 2007).

In its analysis of the rapid consolidation of transitional justice as a field of policy, research, and practice, critical scholarship has increasingly illuminated the ways in which transitional justice constitutes a political process of negotiation between a diverse set of actors, including conflict parties, mediators, (donor) governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society. Any formal, state-sanctioned transitional justice process thus reflects choices and decisions taken by those actors in a position of power to ensure that their political priorities or values are perceived as more legitimate than others, or at least that these substantially define the adoption of a transitional justice process. Scholars have increasingly shown how power relations both shape transitional justice,

that is, how they define the institutional design and terms of transitional justice processes, and how power relations are being produced and redefined by these very same processes (Sriram 2012; Leebaw 2008; Sieff and Vinjamuri 1999). Recent scholarship and practice have also started to focus on questions of ownership, outreach, and participation in transitional justice processes, reflecting an increased engagement with the question of their legitimacy (Lundy and McGovern 2008; Lambourne 2012).

If we conceive of transitional justice as a political process of negotiation, which this paper does, we can then expect resistance to transitional justice to be a necessary element in the empirical unfolding of transitional justice processes. This speaks to recent work on resistance in critical peace scholarship, which conceives of resistance as a component in the interaction between local and international actors in the context of liberal peacebuilding interventions (Richmond 2010). These authors also argue that resistance should not be delegitimized beforehand as dangerous 'spoilerism' (Distler and Riese 2013) and requires scholars and practitioners to "reappraise notions of actors in war-torn regions as powerless, passive beneficiaries" (MacGinty 2011, p. 84).

Resistance and the empirics of how disagreements over transitional justice arise, however, have not been well researched in transitional justice scholarship.² Moreover, resistance to transitional justice has traditionally been framed in transitional justice scholarship and practice as necessarily problematic and deviant to the goals of transition (Jones et al. 2013). Such a conceptual approach stems from the underlying normative belief that transitional justice processes necessarily 'do good,' and the resulting expectation is that stakeholders, including victims, will automatically adhere to it. If actors, however, oppose such processes, they become cast as 'spoilors' who have to be 'sidelined or targeted for transformation' (Jones et al. 2013). Understandings of resistance are thus reduced to a dichotomy which opposes those who resist transitional justice per se, or particular aspects of its implementation, to those who are transitional justice advocates or 'entrepreneurs.'³

This paper proposes to address this gap in asking what we can learn if we truly engage with resistance to transitional justice processes as an object of enquiry. What power relations are illuminated? What voices are expressed? What alternatives are articulated? This paper proposes to explore these research questions in presenting insights from a three-year, three-country research project entitled "Resisting Transitional Justice? Alternative Visions of Peace and Justice." This research project, funded

by the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF), was carried out by a team at swisspeace, an Associate Institute of the University of Basel, from 2012 until 2015. While it examined resistance to transitional justice in the case studies of Côte d'Ivoire, Cambodia, and Burundi, this paper highlights findings from Côte d'Ivoire to illustrate key insights but also challenges of adopting a critical research agenda on resistance to transitional justice.

This paper is split into four sections. The first section presents the conceptual and methodological approach to resistance to transitional justice developed in our research project. The second section gives an overview of the context of transitional justice in Côte d'Ivoire. The third section discusses the findings on resistances to transitional justice in the case study of Côte d'Ivoire. The fourth section presents some overall reflections on the relevance of this project for some key questions in transitional justice research and practice.

RESEARCHING RESISTANCE TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

At first, mobilizing the concept of resistance in the study of transitional justice seems to be a vexing exercise, as resistance studies and transitional justice scholarship draw from opposite moral economies in their approaches to resistance (Bernath and Rubli 2016). On the one hand, the interdisciplinary field of research in social sciences which focuses on resistance as the main object of enquiry traditionally locates resistance with powerless and 'subaltern' actors engaged in progressive and emancipatory struggles against inequality (Knight 2012, p. 326; Fletcher 2001, p. 44). Moving away from the analysis of open, organized group action such as revolutions, these studies have increasingly focused on subtle and everyday forms of resistance as introduced by anthropologist James Scott (1985). On the other hand, transitional justice practice and scholarship associates resistance with specific actors: those who have something to lose in the political transition and are powerful enough to visibly block transitional justice processes. Resistance is mainly identified with the former political elite or the 'old-regime loyalists' previously involved in massive human rights violations, as well as the direct perpetrators of violence who enjoy access to power and resources in the new government (Subotić 2014, p. 135). Acts and actors of resistance are not perceived to be legitimate; rather, they result from strategies for self-preservation and avoidance of accountability mechanisms.

Conceptually, 'resistance' seems to imply different sets of acts and actors as well as distributions of power and resources, depending on the underlying normative positions and disciplinary perspectives. Rather than perceiving this as an insurmountable paradox, we have come to understand these diverging approaches to resistance as stemming from the subjectivity and interrelational aspect of resistance itself. In our research project, we draw mainly from recent geographies and anthropologies of resistance that show how resistance is inherently linked to processes of social labeling of certain acts as resistance, and is, therefore, always context-specific and produced in the interactions between different actors rather than being static and absolute. These reflections have led us to focus on asking 'what counts as resistance' to transitional justice rather than trying to find out what might 'objectively' constitute resistance in these contexts. Narrowing our focus on perceptions of intentions to resist implies an actor-oriented approach that attempts to uncover what different actors themselves would define as resistance, that is, whether they self-identify as resisting transitional justice or ascribe such a resistance to other actors. We thereby avoid the methodological pitfall of 'seeing resistance everywhere'; however, asking what counts as resistance also has its own challenges.

One challenge encountered during our research relates to the different uses of language, which goes beyond the multilingual setting of our multiple case studies. Many respondents do not use the term 'resistance' themselves, or they do so in different ways. Thus as researchers, we retain the burden of final interpretation of resistance to transitional justice. Based on the literature discussed above, we have developed a working definition of resistance, or an identification framework, which we have looked for in the interviewees' words. We define resistance as: a purposeful act intended by the actor to work against, prevent, or disrupt the intended or implemented formal transitional justice process (Jones et al. 2013). It can be organized or disorganized, an act of an individual or group, an act of the powerful or powerless, and is a subjective concept perceived differently from many vantage points. The key aspect is that it is purposeful (i.e., there is intentionality, and not all acts of contestation and negotiation will necessarily be resistance).

Another challenge relates to the normative dimension of research on resistance, which we cannot ultimately escape despite not predefining resistance and attempting to analyze perceptions of resistance instead. This necessarily entails reflecting upon the legitimacy of the perceptions

of resistance that we are analyzing and how it relates to normative concepts of justice and legitimate distributions of power. Nonetheless, these questions can be relegated to a second step, which allows us to first engage with interlocutors or forms of agency rather than readily dismissing them from the beginning. This allows us to engage with dissonant narratives on transitional justice and the politics of international intervention in such contexts while still requiring reflexivity and transparency on our positionality as researchers.

Following these reflections on the operationalization of our research question, we proceeded to the mapping of actors, processes, and points of contention as an initial step. Qualitative fieldwork was then conducted in Côte d'Ivoire, Cambodia, and Burundi. A key component of the research project has also been the collaboration with researchers from these three case studies.⁴

CASE STUDY: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CÔTE D'IVOIRE—THE TRAJECTORY OF A POLITICAL CONFLICT

The French colony of Côte d'Ivoire was formally proclaimed on March 10, 1893. This proclamation was followed by the policy of a brutal pacification of indigenous populations, most intense until 1930, which comprised “a set of coercive measures that are forced labor, the poll tax to be paid in money, the introduction of a code of rights of citizenship that relegates indigenous people in the state of matter without law, arbitrary penal system, etc.” (Fauré 1990, p. 120). It is in the context of this system that indigenous emancipation movements were born, the most important of which was the African agricultural union established on July 10, 1944, to ‘resist’ the brutality and inequality of colonial administration. That union transformed into the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA) in 1946, a political party led by Félix Houphouët-Boigny who was a leading figure in the anti-colonial struggle, leading ultimately to Côte d'Ivoire's independence in 1960.

After gaining independence, the political landscape was in fact characterized by a reproduction of the colonial system. This resulted in a strategy of restraint and control over freedom of expression throughout the 30 years of one-party rule until 1990. The PDCI-RDA either squeezed out or absorbed its rivals. This period was characterized by the absence of public liberties, the absence of a multiparty system and institutionalized

opposition, the absence of competitive elections, the monopoly of the State on the press and the media, control of the unions by the central authorities, and control of management structures through the annexes of the single-party organizations, students, youth, and women’s movements (Fauré 1990; Appiah 2008). As with the anti-colonial struggle, this environment also gave rise to informal mechanisms of resistance against the post-independence one-party system that lasted until 1990.

However, the return to multiparty politics in 1993 and the opening of associational space gave birth to a political landscape that retained and even enhanced the reflexes of the one-party political system. Civil society structures developed, which recreated those that had been in place during the one-party rule, closely aligned with the PDCI-RDA. In addition, civil society coalesced around the political opposition, representing in both cases a continued close alignment between political parties and civil society in Côte d’Ivoire, in a very tense environment.

Côte d’Ivoire has experienced decades of violent political conflict with flash points, such as the military coup in 1999, the armed rebellion from 2002 to 2010 that divided the country into two zones, and the post-election crisis of 2010–2011 with more than 3000 victims and massive human rights violations. This situation has led the country into a transitional justice process, which brings together international, regional, national, and local institutions, including the deployment of a UN operation since 2003. Significantly, the transitional justice process focuses on the acts of violence committed following the post-election crisis in 2010–2011, when Laurent Gbago refused to step down as president after Alassane Ouattara was declared the winner and supported by the African Union, Economic Community of West African States, and the UN.

RESISTANCES TO TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN CÔTE D’IVOIRE: A TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE PROCESS CAUGHT IN THE NETS OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE

Political competition in Côte d’Ivoire has existed in a very noticeable environment of violence and counter-violence since the return of the multiparty system in 1990. Claudine Vidal highlights the fact that “the violence which now pervades daily life in Côte d’Ivoire does not date from 2002, nor even from 1999. The brutalization of political power relations commenced, or more precisely recommenced, at the beginning

of the 1990s” (2003, p. 45). This situation was accentuated in the immediate post-conflict period from 2011 to 2014, and the current transitional justice process is being implemented in a tense political and military context. The result is that transitional justice policy-making and debates have unfolded through the prism of the continued political violence in Côte d’Ivoire, and must be understood with this context in mind.

Simultaneously, several bodies were set up or reactivated after Ouattara’s investiture as president on May 21, 2011. Regarding the judicial dimension of the process, the Special Inquiry and Investigation Unit on the post-electoral crisis was set up, the Rome Statute was ratified, the International Criminal Court began its proceedings, and the national courts were activated—in particular, the Military Tribunal and the courts of Assize. Regarding the non-judicial process of transitional justice, many institutions were established, including the Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the Ministry of Solidarity, Family, Women and Children and its war-victims department, and the National Program for Social Cohesion. With regards to the right to the guarantee of nonrecurrence, institutional reforms were announced, notably that of the judicial system, as well as Security Sector Reform and the reinstatement of the National Security Council. These bodies were set up almost simultaneously after April 11, 2011, at the end of the post-electoral crisis.

The government and its international partners were confronted with militia violence in the implementation and functioning of these official transitional justice mechanisms. This form of violence should be situated within the general context of political violence that has reigned in the country for several years. These acts of militia violence do not primarily target transitional justice institutions, but rather happen in parallel to the transitional justice process. They illustrate how the ongoing political violence is designed to target the political transition itself (i.e., the current regime and state, which forms the very basis of any transitional justice process).

In addition to such militia violence, resistance in this case also concerns the ways of doing things, of thinking, of taking actions, which disturb the transitional process in Côte d’Ivoire. Specifically, it involves in this context of political violence the boycott of the transitional process, the strategies of exclusions and self-exclusions from it, the withdrawal from the process and the use of the transitional mechanisms for self-serving political ends. However, by understanding the continuum of political violence as one of the contexts in which such resistance takes place, we

can analyze these acts not simply as the work of 'spoilers' but through the lens of the repressive apparatus of the state. The violent political context generates the conditions for acts of resistance which in turn can tell us something about the changing relationship between the state and citizens. Indeed, one might say that transitional justice is paying the price for the way in which the political system works in Côte d'Ivoire, independently of the current stakeholders.

REFLECTIONS ON INITIAL FINDINGS

With reference to the specific case study of Côte d'Ivoire, we can see that forms of resistance to the transitional justice process can be understood through the continuum of political violence and the broader political projects of those who resist. In our interviews with self-identified resisters of transitional justice, they understand themselves not merely as seeking to 'spoil' the process for means of self-preservation but as advancing specific political projects. Indeed, groups such as the organized diaspora or civil-society organizations active in Côte d'Ivoire would pose questions and outline concrete policies which are not, in fact, very distant from those being articulated by actors perceived to be more 'moderate' in their positionality: questions such as whether the process has been transparent; whether the military role played by former colonial power of France is indicative of a form of neocolonialism; and whether the transitional justice process is biased against supporters of former President Gbagbo.

Resistance in this case study, and indeed more generally in contexts of transitional justice, must be read in context and not dismissed only as, or indeed even primarily as, the act of spoilers. Resistances to transitional justice will have their own history. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire, we outlined briefly here the connections between anti-colonial struggle and contemporary forms of political struggle and opposition, but other histories will be pertinent for other cases. To usefully mobilize a concept such as 'resistance' as scholars working on transitional justice, we therefore must have a substantive understanding of context and a continuing reflection on what is illuminated and what is hidden. We can go some way toward achieving this if we ensure that we employ an ongoing reflexivity in terms of speaker positionality and burdens of interpretation.

This short paper began by identifying a gap in the literature on transitional justice, which to date has not dealt substantially with the concept

of ‘resistance,’ despite its relevance for many of the discussions regarding the politics and scope of transitional justice processes. The authors of this paper hope to have contributed to addressing this intellectual need by outlining some of the findings on Côte d’Ivoire from an in-depth study of resistance to transitional justice involving the case studies of Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, and Cambodia. There is certainly more work to be done, but it is argued here that engaging with resistance to transitional justice as an object of enquiry rather than as a ‘problem’ of implementation can illuminate the nuances of the contexts in which transitional justice advocates pursue a specific vision of ‘justice.’

NOTES

1. Transitional justice processes have, however, also been mobilized in democratic contexts (Winter 2014; Hansen 2014).
2. Exceptions include Thomson (2011) and Sriram (2012).
3. The phrase ‘transitional justice entrepreneur’ is borrowed from Madlingozi (2010).
4. The main output of this research project, a monograph on resistance and transitional justice, includes case-study chapters by the three researchers of this research project, as well as researchers from the three case studies.

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PART II

Alternative Approaches—Gender
and Religion

Introduction to Gender and Religion

David P. Gushee

Abstract The three chapters in Part II on gender and religion are linked in that each offers an alternative or out-of-the-mainstream approach to conflict transformation, though each takes a very different approach. Carolina Rehrmann's chapter focuses on gender. She explores the disproportionate role women play in initiating transformation and reconciliation efforts after horrific violence and war. The chapters by Richard Friedli and David P. Gushee focus on religion. Friedli addresses the religious dimensions in intergroup conflict and explores religious resources for reconciliation. Gushee's chapter explores the ethical contribution of the late Christian ethicist Glen Stassen's 'just peacemaking' theory, which distils ten peacemaking practices. Together the three chapters offer diverse alternative approaches to conflict transformation, drawing from different disciplines, contexts, and historical eras.

Keywords Carolina Rehrmann · Richard Friedli · David Gushee
Glen Stassen · Gender · Religion · Conflict transformation
Reconciliation · Just peacemaking

D.P. Gushee (✉)
Mercer University, Macon, USA
e-mail: GUSHEE_DP@mercer.edu

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The three essays in Part II are linked primarily in that each offers an alternative or out-of-the-mainstream approach to conflict transformation, though each essay takes a very different approach. The essay by Carolina Rehrmann focuses on gender, whereas the essays by Richard Friedli and myself focus on religion.

Rehrmann, in Chap. 7, explores the disproportionate role that women play in initiating transformation and reconciliation efforts after horrific violence and war. One explanation for this odd phenomenon, especially given women's relative disempowerment in most parts of the world, would be to offer an 'essentialist' interpretation, that is, women initiate conflict resolution and transformation because of some essential aspect of women's nature or temperament. However, Rehrmann offers three alternative explanations:

First, being at the so-to-speak neuralgic points of these male-dominated structures has equipped women with certain features favorable for initiating transformation. In other words, it is not only *despite* but very much *because* of the experience of structural violence, restriction, and exclusion that women have succeeded in challenging a prevalent conflict ethos and its self-reproducing structures. Second, women's experiences of marginalization and subordination favor their sensitivity in dealing with the consequences of violence and transcending communal or national demarcations. Third, role-related expectations vis-à-vis women may concede higher levels of credibility and acceptance of their engagement for rapprochement and reconciliation.

Rehrmann suggests that precisely because women are a subordinated group (and not because of some essentialist 'women's nature') that they "bond emotionally more easily, ... transcend communal boundaries more easily, and ... build up transnational identities"—all crucial to intergroup peacemaking after conflict. Rehrmann also notes that traditionalist expectations of women's emotional sensitivities and relationality give women a kind of social credibility that can enable them to be seen as trustworthy peacemakers in situations, where trust is scarce. Using examples especially from the still-divided island of Cyprus, Rehrmann illustrates her thesis compellingly.

In Chap. 8, Richard Friedli describes religious dimensions in intergroup conflict, but also explores religious resources for reconciliation. Two key definitions in his essay are worth highlighting here:

I understand the term ‘religion’ to imply *socially enacted desire for the ultimate, embodied in practices that have non-negotiable significances.*

Thus religion is about “the meaning of existence, an orientation towards action, and the formation of a social identity.” One can hardly imagine a more powerful force in human existence. Yet its power has an intrinsic ambivalence:

The social reality of religion is a resource of constructive as well as destructive energies. ... religious traditions can either bring members of a community together in a coherent ‘we’ or separate them from perceived ‘others.’

Religion as such can be a force both for legitimizing intercommunal violence and for healing it. Toward the end of his essay, Friedli makes suggestions toward mobilizing that latent constructive or healing power of religion, for example, in reconstructing or reinterpreting foundational religious and cultural narratives, developing rituals and processes of reconciliation, and providing resources for transforming collective and individual memories of violence. Friedli uses examples related to the veiling of Muslim women and to the Rwandan genocide to illustrate his claims.

In Chap. 9, I explore the ethical contribution of the late Christian ethicist Glen Stassen’s ‘just peacemaking’ theory:

[Stassen] argued that humanity was in recent decades discovering, developing, and implementing war-preventive practices, which are absolutely essential given the destructive power of modern weaponry. These practices are becoming increasingly visible in interdisciplinary scholarly literature as well as in grassroots activist and protest efforts and in international diplomacy. ... As a Christian ethicist, Stassen further argued that many of these practices paralleled specific teachings of Jesus.

Just peacemaking theory distilled ten of the most important of these peacemaking practices as follows: supporting nonviolent direct action; taking independent peacemaking initiatives; using cooperative conflict resolution; acknowledging responsibility for past conflict and injustice; promoting democracy, human rights, and religious liberty; fostering just and sustainable economic development; leveraging emergent cooperative forces in the international system; strengthening the United Nations

(UN) and international organizations; reducing offensive weapons and weapons trade; and encouraging grassroots peacemaking groups.

My essay describes each of these ten peacemaking practices in some detail, gives examples of each working successfully in some particular conflict situation, and offers critical engagement related to the limits and dangers of each approach.

Together these three chapters by Rehrmann, Friedli, and myself offer illuminating and diverse alternative approaches to conflict transformation, drawing on quite different disciplines, contexts, and historical eras.

Made for Goodness? Women, Ethnic Conflict, and Reconciliation

Carolina Rehrmann

Abstract Drawing on basic concepts of gender studies, Carolina Rehrmann traces the potential of women and women's associations for conflict transformation and reconciliation. She starts with a critical review of the masculinist bias in traditional approaches to conflict resolution that disregard gender's potential to explain and resolve conflict. Seeing male and female roles in a dialectic reference to one another and tracing their impact on all levels of social and political life is (1) crucial for understanding conflict risk and conflict structures, and (2) illuminates the potential of women's engagement for transethnic and cross-ethnic dialogue, trauma reprocessing, and reconciliation. Rehrmann presents case studies of women's activism in (post) conflict settings—Cyprus in particular—illustrating success in challenging traditional patriarchal structures, nationalist affiliations, and 'natural' gender roles.

Keywords Carolina Rehrmann · Women · Women's activism
Ethnic conflict · Conflict transformation · Reconciliation
Cyprus · Gender roles

C. Rehrmann (✉)
Jena University, Jena, Germany
e-mail: carolina.rehrmann@uni-jena.de

Rather than being born with a natural inclination toward empathy, harmony, and social care, or a predisposition for emotional imbalance, it is first and foremost the socialization into specific gender roles that shapes women's self-conceptions and behaviour. This appears to be the consensus growing slowly beyond the discipline of gender studies. At the same time, there is a significant and strong—and at times disproportionate—social engagement of women in peace-building associated with exactly those emotional characteristics that are related to a traditional(ist) perspective of women's roles.

Both arguments, although they appear to be contradictory at first glance, are closely related: on the one hand, female-role prescriptions deriving from seemingly natural differences—in relation to gender or other concepts such as ethnicity or culture—point to related power structures and interests. Feminist movements in civil disobedience and political campaigns have unmasked the daily mechanisms of oppression and exclusion based on alleged natural sex differences, called attention to the underlying masculinist frames of these structures, and to the interrelation of both.

Three aspects seem important in this respect. First, being at the so-to-speak neuralgic points of these male-dominated structures has equipped women with certain features favorable for initiating transformation. In other words, it is not only *despite* but very much *because* of the experience of structural violence, restriction, and exclusion that women have succeeded in challenging a prevalent conflict ethos and its self-reproducing structures. Second, women's experiences of marginalization and subordination favor their sensitivity in dealing with the consequences of violence and transcending communal or national demarcations. Third, role-related expectations vis-à-vis women may concede higher levels of credibility and acceptance of their engagement for rapprochement and reconciliation.

To show both the mechanisms of subordination of women and their potential for promoting reconciliation, I will start with an outline of a gender-based, feminist critique on traditional approaches to conflict analysis, and illustrate the significance of gender as a catalyst for ethnic conflict *and* reconciliation. The analysis will be limited to women's engagement in the civil-society sphere and shall underline the importance of comprehensive bottom-up approaches to reconciliation. Examples taken from different conflict regions, with a closer look at the case of Cyprus, shall illuminate the respective concepts.

To understand the impact of gender, one must see it. As gender-sensitive approaches claim, there is still a good deal of traditionalist essentialism in social and scientific perceptions of gender roles, which also affects conflict analyses in what theorists call a prevalent, though implicit, masculinist bias. Particularly with a view to International Relations (IR), gender theorists have criticized a conceptual focus on high politics, rationality, coercive power, and physical violence as a reflection of masculine gender roles and political realities of male dominance. The critique seems even more legitimate in light of a broader, long-existing reluctance to deal with related concepts such as (socio) psychological dynamics or the role of identities and emotions as central elements of conflict structures (Sheff 1999, p. 335).

This general bias seems to have favored the popular and scientific misinterpretation of gender studies as studies *from* women *on* women, and discarding them as irrelevant for explaining and resolving conflict in the first place (significant exceptions include Buckley-Zistel and Stanley 2012; and the *Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation* 2016). Against this backdrop, gender approaches aim at showing the gendered nature of seemingly neutral concepts (such as violence or human security), demonstrate the dialectic reference of gender, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or questioning (LGBTQ) roles, and acknowledge their common impact on all levels of social and political life, on human rights, economic prosperity, and conflict risk. In doing so, they have succeeded in reframing concepts to adequately address women and to make ‘visible’ the multiple dependencies and discriminations of women in social and political life and determine strategies for their economic, political, and social empowerment (True 2010).

But initiatives will run the risk of mere harm reduction if the fundamental structures behind remain the same—that is, where constructivist approaches complement the political sphere by illuminating how gender influences sociopolitical structures and maintains them (Youngs 2008). They open the so-called ‘black box’ of societies to trace the links between traditionalist gender paradigms and their multifold impacts, ranging from family ties to attitudes toward trauma processing or forgiveness. In doing so, they have shifted the traditional focus of conflict analysis to an explicit plea for an interdisciplinary approach (Jenkins and Reardon 2007).

Showing the gendered nature of interethnic conflicts means illuminating the link between aggressive chauvinism, appeals to conformity, the

promotion of monolithic narratives, and intergroup polarization. Here, women often come to embody the nation's vulnerability and honor while masculine ideals lie at the core of primordial narratives of danger and struggle (Yuval-Davis 1997). Both roles come with narrow prescriptions of behavior and social sanctions for noncompliance. As J. Ann Tickner aptly states, "When we think about the definition of a patriot, we generally think of a man, often a soldier who defends his homeland, most especially his women and children, from dangerous outsiders" (1992, p. 3). The often strategic blaming of someone as 'unpatriotic' to demand his conformity or delegitimize critique looms large in ethnic conflicts.

In criticizing the premise of static 'given' human features or 'natural' group affiliations and hierarchies, gender theory blends in with theories of racism, nationalism, and colonialism. Each of them highlights the constructed character of social roles and puts a special focus on moments of crisis and transition. It shall become clear in the following that such a holistic understanding is particularly important in the analysis of ethnocentric conflicts, where group affiliations are deeply connected to gender roles and their socio-emotional significance.

Numerous examples ranging from Delacroix's 'Liberty Leading the People' to 'Mother Albania' depict women as glorious symbols for the nation in a context of (male-centered) bloody liberation struggles. These female images as symbols of an entire community explain why—especially when exclusive, primordial narratives come into play—sexualized war crimes against women, such as mass rapes, often have the strategic aim of, and are understood as, collective humiliation.

Cynthia Cockburn for Ex-Yugoslav, and Simona Sharoni for Israel and Palestine, illustrate how traditional gender roles lie at the heart of primordial perceptions of ethnic rivalry and allegedly unchangeable characteristics of one homogeneous nation as opposed to the other, where women's fertility and men's roles as protectors of the community play a pivotal role in national identity and related politics (Cockburn 2007; Sharoni 1995).

Challenging this static perception, Aleksandra S. Milicevic for instance, shows how creation and disintegration of socialist Yugoslavia was accompanied by respective changes of women's roles: while profiting from relative gender equality in the socialist period, they were later squeezed into the role of breeder and caretaker of the reborn image of the nation (2006, pp. 268–272). It seems safe to say that gender roles

were not simply a central element of ethno-national outburst in the Bosnian war of 1992–1995, but very much a *sine qua non*-condition.

Similarly, in Cyprus, women have come to signify the nation's (territorial) mutilation and humiliation by the enemy while functioning as an illustrative counter-image to male-dominated war images, complementing the official narratives of self-victimization. A poem taken from a Greek-Cypriot history text book designed to inspire nationalist spirit, is a case in point:

Her soul is genuine and full of grace!
 In the most of utmost humiliation
 Her heart grieves,
 Since borealis has blown away her dreams.
 And the Northern Neighbor
 Has brought sludge and blood
 And locked the door of her house.
 Her soul is genuine and full of grace.
 Resting in silent pain ...
 She commemorates Madonna's grief
 At the moment of her child
 (...)
 Planting a tree of patience
 Untiringly awaiting the halo and
 Lightening of Wonder
 (Papadopoulos 2001, p. 39).¹

A similar meaningful example are the Greek-Cypriot mothers of sons still missing since the island's violent division in 1974, who used to gather at the interior border accusingly holding up photographs of their sons. Their high media presence has been criticized as a strategic abuse of their pain with the aim of reinforcing a biased self-image of victimization. Moreover, their 'frozen pain' appears to be a convenient instrument for power-political interests to perpetuate the conflict. Similarly, Solomos Solomou, whose image is ubiquitous in Greek-Cypriot public memory, can be perceived as a victim of the dominant masculinist narratives. In 1996, in an outburst of indignation and nationalist sentiment, he broke through the internal Cypriot border to tear down the Turkish flag and was shot. Thus, institutional memory in Cyprus reveals how traditional gender images serve to sustain traditional narratives against external critique and internal opposition.

The bulk of feminist and women-oriented literature—from policy papers to gender analysis—have been concerned with women’s subordination. That has inspired inner-disciplinary critique based on the argument that the sensitization for women’s affairs and for their empowerment should not imply their essentialization as weak.

So, where lies the women’s strength? As shall be demonstrated in the following, in ethno-nationalist contexts it is often connected to the very structures and challenges that produce subordination. As numerous studies suggest, women (and other subordinated groups) have shown to bond emotionally more easily, to transcend communal boundaries more easily, and to build up transnational identities that challenge the status quo (Yablon 2009; Korac 2006). In this sense, it is without essentialism and without romanticizing or endorsing any specific form of gender reality that one can state: a range of features commonly associated with a traditionalist perception and role assignment of women can be also perceived as a decisive advantage. In this sense, women’s potential reflects a ‘virtue out of necessity’ that has in many conflict contexts led the way for first steps toward a profound shift of social gender paradigms—for three reasons: emotional, factual, and cognitive.

First, being raised and socialized to be more empathic, harmonious, or self-reflective than the respective masculine role prescribes grants a much larger scope of action. That is eminently relevant in (post) conflict contexts in terms of acknowledging emotions or engaging in dialogue with family and social surroundings—even with a potential opponent.

Second, when women in traditional contexts are closer to the social sphere than to politics and the military, they are more likely disentangled from questions of fault and political opposition. That underpins their capability for restructuring and healing social ties.

Third, as various transnational associations such as Women in Black (WiB) and Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) suggest, a common focus on women’s affairs, from daily life challenges to common political goals, appears to make it much easier for women to think and act in transnational and international dimensions, and embrace transnational, multiple, at times syncretic, and—above all—common identities.

The mentioned aspects appear to have an even greater significance in moments of crisis. As Martin Leiner’s ‘Hölderlin perspective’ suggests, reconciliation can exert a much greater influence if considered to be related to the very moment of conflict and pain (Leiner and Flämig 2012, pp. 16–17). The history of feminism and women’s struggles in

crisis-prone regions illustrate that it is often precisely the moments of social upheaval when women's movements gain momentum, because exceptional states have granted the chance to overtake roles formerly ascribed to men, and in the long run question traditional gender roles and related hierarchies. But, there is also an emotional dimension to the understanding of crisis as a chance for sustainable social transition. Emma Hutchison and Roland Bleiker aptly highlight the pivotal role of emotions for either perpetuating or resolving conflict:

Healing often becomes more about retribution and revenge, rather than a long-term project begetting peace, collaboration and emotional catharsis. The emotions triggered by trauma thus tend to perpetuate existing antagonisms, further entrenching the disingenuous perceptions of identity that may have created violence in the first place. (2008, p. 385)

It is easy to acknowledge the idealized gender stereotypes of aggressive impulse (male) as opposed to reflection and healing (female), illuminating the potential risk of spirals of violence motivated by (gendered) impulses of retribution. In this sense, counterstrikes appear as seemingly natural reactions resulting from fear, resentment, or humiliation, and can moreover be easily instrumentalized for political purposes (Hutchison and Bleiker 2008, p. 386). A gender dimension also resonates in the authors' positive definition of reconciliation. "Rather than presenting reconciliation as simply the management of fear, anger and resentment, one must appreciate how feelings such as empathy, compassion or even wonder may be part of experiencing trauma as well," they state (p. 386). As the following discussion of women's peace engagement in diverse conflict regions demonstrates, it is exactly these kinds of emotions that loom large in dialogues on the other's pain to promote understanding, rehumanization, and differentiation of the out-group.

Cockburn's analyses of women's encounters in Northern Ireland, the Middle East, and former Yugoslavia show how women negotiate 'the space between' their often uncomfortable and contradictory narratives, identities, and affiliations within and beyond their communities. She refers to the process of 'rooting and shifting' from one's comfort zone to finding common ground in transethnic questions, while highly sensitive issues are still unresolved (2007, pp. 8–10). Here, women as cause or consequence of their experiences, roles, and peace engagements exhibit ambiguity tolerance—a prerequisite for change.

That appears as particularly difficult in hot and asymmetric contexts of perceived mutually exclusive solidarities. As one Palestinian women states, “I can’t be so feminist when I see the checkpoints. ... I see it from a national perspective. We are suffering here, men and women both. How can I say those Israeli women soldier’s are my sisters?” (Cockburn 2007, p. 121). In defying ethnic, geographical, and symbolic boundaries and dominant policies, women’s groups tackle these challenges by creating space for mutual knowledge and empathy, and acting disloyal to gendered images of war. Cockburn resumes her broad field experience with the words:

Of course, these women were not negotiating sovereignty, drafting treaties or doing diplomacy. They were not among the important people, mainly men, who were simultaneously, elsewhere, sitting around negotiating tables making peace (or more accurately failing to make peace) for their various nations. But these were undeniably cross-national projects, well connected to an international feminist anti-war movement, developing detailed experience of handling ethno-political conflict and defying war machines. (1999, p. 7)

That seems also suitable to the Cyprus Conflict, where reconciliation is almost entirely limited to the civil society sphere. There many women are concerned with silenced narratives of pain that lie at the heart of the conflict’s intractability. As arguably in many other conflict regions, they not only act without support from the state, but very much in opposition to it. Maria Hadjipavlou and Sevgül Uludağ, co-founders of ‘Hands Across the Divide,’ are prominent cases in point. Their bicomunal women’s network aims at bringing together women from both sides of the divide. Both have met with fierce political opposition to their work, with harassment and threats, with accusations of being ‘unpatriotic,’ but also with considerable support. Talking to Hadjipavlou and Uludağ appears to reveal decisively more about self-perpetuating conflict structures than about analyses limited to the political sphere. Their struggles of targeting the troubled spots of the conflict, the frustration with the unresolved status quo, the hidden stories of pain, the lack of transitional justice, and their official obstruction in cross-border cooperating, appear as a direct transfer-picture of official politics, static rhetoric, and institutional practices of mutual non-recognition and blaming. As Hadjipavlou suggests, the regular encounters of women have come to create a sense of “collective ‘other’ to the male warrior” (2010, p. 43).

Here, journalist and peace activist Uludağ is exceptional in many respects. As a woman, Turkish Cypriot, and activist, she openly criticizes the political hierarchies of the regime in the northern part under Turkish occupation.² Within and beyond the bicomunal association ‘Together we can,’ she is engaged in revealing the face of the Cypriot missing by collecting untold stories from all communities of the island and publishing them in newspapers on both sides of the dividing line. In a context of mutually exclusive narratives, with no retributive justice and no acknowledgement for the victims of the other side, she digs into the omnipresent past, reaching out to people that have been and continue to live with the silent knowledge of atrocities as victims, witnesses, and perpetrators.

In her publications, at bicomunal events, and youth camps, Uludağ, along with other women and men, reach out to civil society to recollect, safeguard, and disseminate these invisible stories of pain, executions, rapes, expulsions, and agony of the victims’ relatives, as well as hidden stories of those who helped and saved each other in times of conflict. Due to her credibility and reputation based on her three decades-long voluntary engagement and her open critique of the political sphere, many Cypriots from both sides entrust Uludağ with stories they would not tell to the official government investigators and the United Nations (UN) representatives of the Committee on Missing Persons.³

Hadjipavlou’s and Uludağ’s activities, in this respect (as do other women’s activities in different regions of ethno-national conflicts) represent the power of engagement beyond and opposed to the official sphere, in touching and setting in motion what is suppressed and left out by male-dominated official discourses and practices. In this sense, it is safe to say: They are made for goodness. One can only hope for the moment when the Cypriot system is ripe for women like them to conquer the political sphere just like Ellen Johnson Sirleaf and Leymah Gbowee in Liberia. As a Turkish proverb goes: Patience is bitter, but it bears sweet fruit.

NOTES

1. English translations are by C. Rehrmann.
2. Stated in an interview on March 6, 2016.
3. Uludağ’s collected stories can be read in her daily blog at <http://sevgu-luludag.blogspot.de/>. Some of them have also been published in Uludağ (2005).

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Religious Dimensions in Conflict Transformation: A Tentative Approach Toward a Reconciliation Methodology

Richard Friedli

Abstract Every political context manifests an overlapping reality with religion as a key component. Islamic or Christian traditions are involved therein, as well as Hindu and Buddhist communities. In view of realistic reconciliation dynamics, a precondition is the analysis of the theoretical and practical dimensions of religion-based violent phenomena: manifest and latent, personal and structural, economic and cultural. In doing so, three major dimensions need consideration: fundamental narratives, socially accepted norms, and collective memories. These factors are often used to legitimate destructive and/or segregation practices. Yet embedded in these same deep-culture configurations is the potential for reconciliation. Richard Friedli illustrates two case studies of conflicts where both destructive—even genocidal—and constructive religious dynamics are involved: (1) the Islamic veil, and (2) the *ubuntu* philosophy in Rwanda.

Keywords Richard Friedli · Religion · Conflict transformation
Reconciliation · Islamic veil · *Ubuntu* · Rwanda

R. Friedli (✉)
University of Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland
e-mail: richard.friedli@unifr.ch

Some years ago—specifically since the events of 9/11 and the attack on the Twin Towers in New York in 2001—confrontation began between Western armies and militias with close ties to radicalized Islamic groups. These global conflicts can no longer be analyzed, interpreted, or managed without taking their ‘religion’ component into account. This does not signify a move toward an approach inspired by the now-infamous ‘clash of civilizations’ theory developed by the American political scientist Samuel P. Huntington 20 years ago. It is even less acceptable to designate the relationship between the West and Islam as a frontier stained by bloodshed. However, according to anthropologist Arjun Appadurai, a ‘religious’ understanding of the prevailing social and political realities can facilitate the drawing of a ‘geography of anger’ that encompasses the victims of *militia Christi* (Christian fundamentalism) in Latin America, the apartheid theologies of South Africa, the Buddhist nationalist movements in Myanmar and Sri Lanka, Hindu actions by the Army of Shiva in India, jihadist militias of the Islamic State, the Hezbollah (the Party of Allah) in Lebanon, and Mai-Mai groups, or The Lord Resistance Army in Central Africa (2006).

THE ‘RELIGION’ DIMENSION

Highlighting these kinds of correlations in the frame of a comparative sociology of religions is one thing; however, fully grasping the implications of the ‘religion’ factor at an operational level is another story (Werkner 2016). In order to do this, it is necessary to make a practical choice between the various theories and definitions proposed over the years by the science of religions. Among the dozens of approaches to the religion component in a given society—sociological, phenomenological, theological, ethical, psychoanalytical, cognitive, and atheist—I propose in this paper the functionalist approach from the constructivist tradition and the sociology of knowledge (Frazer and Friedli 2015, pp. 9, 11–15, 31).

I understand the term ‘religion’ to imply *socially enacted desire for the ultimate, embodied in practices that have non-negotiable significances*. In my opinion, with this multidimensional tool—the meaning of existence, an orientation toward action, and the formation of a social identity—it is possible to concretely envisage the transformation of conflicts.

In fact, such a definition for the factor of religion brings two of its conflicting components to light: on the one side, the ambivalence of its message; on the other side, its potential for interpersonal and sociopolitical polarization. So, the social reality of religion is a resource of

constructive as well as destructive energies. I understand the phrase ‘ambivalence of religion’ to imply that religious traditions can either bring members of a community together in a coherent ‘we’ or separate them from perceived ‘others.’

Therefore, religion functions at a socialpolitical level either as a social tie ‘to connect’ or as a source of separation ‘to divide,’ as a source of collective stability or as an instigator of prophetic change. In this way, although religions can guarantee social stability (attestation), they can also be used to promote a prophetic critique of political reality (contestation). These kinds of derivations are in accordance with the polarization between the fundamental message and the fundamentalist affirmation of a religious tradition.

This ebb and flow between the calm affirmation of a religious message and its belligerent radicalization is often connected with the prevailing economic or demographic environment. Nationalistic memories and the actions of charismatic leaders or collective psychologies that demonize the ‘others’ and reduce them to the level of animals are also possible triggers for the outbreak of conflict. As a consequence, the transformation of conflicts can be—or rather must be—based on the analysis of these kinds of external factors (Basedau 2016, pp. 237–254).

To sum up, my position is this: In a first urgent step, the conflict situation must be controlled, mitigated, and terminated by concentrated interventions of state, police, or even military forces. The result of such ‘hard’ logics can be labeled as a ‘negative peacestate’; but to contribute to a stabilized personal, social, and public environment, a complementary endeavour needs to be done in cultural changes. That is the logic of ‘soft’ sciences. Therein, religion has a key function.

TYPOLOGY OF ‘VIOLENCE’

In a similar way to what we saw with the definition of religion, it is of central importance in any efforts aimed at transforming conflicts that the parties in the conflict come to a preliminary agreement on what they mean by the term ‘violence.’ With regards to the common operational definition of religion, a precondition for any emotional de-escalation of aggressive or murderous opposition between individuals or groups is having the possibility to refer tactically to a jointly agreed understanding of what constitutes violence during the respective negotiation period.

Like when defining religion, there are many theoretical approaches that can be adopted to identify violence—for example, the theory that

establishes a link between frustration and aggression, or the theory that refers to basic human needs, or the theoretical approach that focuses on the impact that the recollection of humiliation can have in the history of an individual or the collective memory (Baberowski 2015). The analysis of violence that I will use in this paper is based on the explanatory tools introduced by Johan Galtung around 50 years ago in the discipline of peace studies (1975, pp. 7–31; cf. 1996; Galtung and MacQueen 2008).

The following is a brief overview of Galtung's definitional approach to violence, which at first glance appears to be relatively abstract: *All actions are considered 'violent' if they diminish the prevailing living conditions of a person or a group when compared with what should be concretely possible in a given historical context* (1975, pp. 9–13). In the first instance, this gap is only perceived in the form of 'direct/personal' violence in which the perpetrators of violence and their victims can be identified. However, 'structural' violence is the latent, underlying trigger that the visible actors of violence have interiorized. Moreover, in order to justify their violent actions, these perpetrators refer to some foundational narratives that are channeled through 'cultural' violence.

Galtung uses the French phrase *culture profonde* and the German term *Tiefenkultur* (deep culture) to refer to this legitimizing justification of violent actions by respective traditions. In academic debate, this foundational interpretation of violent reality is presented as moralizing and even spell-binding—a reference that gives everybody a bad conscience, but which does nothing to resolve the prevailing social practices or violent policies (Baberowski 2015, pp. 110–132). When seen in this way, the reference to deep culture is considered to function like some kind of essentialized 'fetish' (Bouthoul 1974, p. 101). In response to this suspicion, it is my proposal that the legitimatizing reference to cultural violence be better operationalized by understanding the term as a latent interface comprising: (a) the foundational narratives, (b) the given societal normative plausibilities, and (c) the collective or individual memory of the given perpetrators of violence.

By way of a summary, Fig. 8.1 gives a schematic representation of the intertwined nature of the mechanisms of direct/personal, structural, and cultural violence. This typology facilitates an operational methodology for the transformation of conflicts. Clearly, the diagram reduces the complexity of situations to their 'violent energy' component and a few simplistic explanatory references. However, the only objective in using the diagram is to increase the perceptibility of the peace research methodology proposed in my approach.




Fig. 8.1 A fundamentalistic perception

As with any schematic representation, however, reducing violent social situations down to three inputs alone is clearly not an exhaustive reference to the many specific cultural and religious dimensions of each given conflict context. In addition to the three aspects of direct/personal, structural, and cultural violence, influences that might contribute to the outbreak of violence include—to mention just a few of the various possible additional elements—mass media pressure, climatic influences, or psychological factors related to opinion leaders and the psychology of the masses.

To illustrate the way the methodological approach proposed functions, I will refer to two examples out of the many possible Buddhist, Hindu, Christian, Islamic, and African references mentioned in the opening paragraph: (1) the issue of the obligation to wear an Islamic veil in public places, which is often interpreted by Western observers as violence against women, and (2) the context of the genocide in Rwanda.

Again, the aim here is not to present the full spectrum of issues inherent in these two problem areas, but rather to illustrate—both at the meso and macro levels—how elements of the deep culture can be brought to bear in the negotiation, reconciliation, and sociopolitical processes related to the social conflict surrounding the Islamic veil and the genocidal tragedy in Rwanda.

The Islamic Veil as a Non-negotiable Norm

The ethical legitimization given for the obligatory wearing of a veil in public comes from the Quran, which emphasises a dress code that was in common use in rural Arab settings in the seventh century C.E.

And tell the believing women to lower their gaze and guard their chastity, and to display of their beauty and ornaments only that which is apparent and to draw their veils over their bosoms, and not display their ornaments except to their husbands, or their fathers, or the fathers of their husbands, or their sons, or the sons of their husbands, or their brothers, or the sons of their brothers, or the sons of their sisters, or Muslim women, or their slaves, or male servants with no sexual desire, or small boys who know nothing about the private parts of women. And let them not stamp their feet so as to reveal what they hide of their adornment. And turn unto Allah together, O believers, that you may be successful. (Surah An-Nur 24: 31)

This recommendation from the time of the Arabic origins of the revelation of the Quran is transferred—exacted as it is by the Salafist milieu and presented as an obligation that is still valid—in the Western reality of the twenty-first century. The actual reasonableness of this dress code is therefore ratified by the reference to the traditional customs and honor codes of the Arabic context of the Salafi companions of Mohammad. Any potential modern-day objections are then interpreted—for example, by the jihadist Boko Haram of north-eastern Nigeria—as a disastrous ‘Haram’ legacy of British colonization, which must be ruthlessly addressed as a ‘sin’ and serious ‘infidelity.’

The Genocide in Rwanda as a Glorified Event

An analysis of the genocide against the Batutsi inhabitants of Rwanda in 1994, using the Galtung methodology, reminds us that in order to justify the extermination of this aristocratic group—which had exploited

the Bahutu peasants under the feudal *Ubughake* serf system—an unconditional call was made to the so-called Ten Commandments of Bahutu of 1990 (Friedli 2013, pp. 227–229). Seemingly, the ethnic stratification of the social system was socially codified and politically ratified during the Belgian colonial period. In order to give religious legitimization to their ethnic hatred and genocidal crimes, the perpetrators of violence on the side of the Bahutus referred sometimes to the ‘Hamite’ theory, that is, the biblical story of the condemnation by Noah of his son Ham. In fact, this story, which presents the ‘table of nations’ (Gen. 9: 18–28), is used to legitimize *a contrario* the exploitation and genocidal extermination by the black Hamites of the noble and light-skinned Japhetites. It is a kind of reversed mythological revenge. In fact, along the biblical text reassumed by the ‘apartheid’ theology, Noah blessed Japheth for having covered up their drunken father’s nudity but cursed Ham who had made fun of his condition. And now during the genocide of 1994, the exploited Bahutu persons become the exploiter of the Batutsi.

TRANSFORMATION OF CONFLICTS

This triangular analysis of violence—namely, giving consideration to the direct/personal, structural, and cultural aspects—also facilitates the outlining of the interpersonal, structural, and cultural dynamics of reconciliation. These tools, found within the frame of the sociology of cultures and religions, are clearly not the only operational factors. Indeed, the sociological and anthropological traditions referred to in this chapter tend to be qualified as soft sciences (Galtung and MacQueen 2008, pp. 89–107). In an interdisciplinary and well-articulated context, they are nevertheless useful if they are combined with hard sciences like agriculture, medicine, imposed state family planning, as well as the legal and court system. From my experience on the ground, social and religious sciences that qualify as soft often become concrete hard tools in favor of social changes in order to guarantee the sustainability of interventions within reconciliation projects.

Figure 8.2 presents the deep-culture factor in the frame of the conditions that are necessary for structural reconciliation, and consequently for processes of interpersonal reconciliation.

The methodology proposed in support of the transformation of conflicts is based on a dynamic according to which the opponents—social adversaries, ethnic enemies, or militarized fighters—reach a point where




Fig. 8.2 An open space perception

they no longer consider each other as enemies that need to be annihilated, but rather as adversaries with whom they must enter into negotiations (Lederach 2005; Lederach and Lederach 2010; cf. Friedli 2012). These mediation processes, often labeled as ‘soft,’ are nevertheless complex (compare Fig. 8.1 with Fig. 8.2). They are, above all, interdependent with economic, political, and demographic factors. On the threshing floor of conflicts, they are often, as already mentioned, perceived as the only real hard factors. It is with these considerations in mind that we refer once again to the issues of the Islamic veil on the one hand and the Rwanda genocide on the other, while acknowledging that the related processes of material, social, and spiritual reconstruction can take years—the reconstruction of souls and wounded, destabilized identities in particular.

The Islamic Veil as a Personal Option

In Islamic contexts that rigidly impose the wearing of the veil and severely punish any attempts to refuse to conform to this traditional obligation,

the study and evaluation of the three components of the deep-culture interface becomes a necessary process. This step involves first identifying the foundational message and the verses used in the Quran to transmit it (Mernissi 1992; cf. Ramadan 2008, pp. 115–198, 267–301). However, well before the concrete exegesis of the few passages in the Quran that refer to the dress culture of women around the prophet Mohammad, it is necessary to reach an understanding of the historical context that inspired them, and the normative transcultural value of the Quranic revelation and Islamic practices undertaken by the Salafi companions of Mohammad.

Furthermore, in order to frame this kind of perspective, consideration must also be given to the prevailing normative, historical Arabic customs and related Islamic contexts—not to mention the need to grasp the related collective and regional memory. In fact, Europe’s colonial past and memories of the Christian crusades continue to deeply poison any attempts at dialogue. Indeed, at best there is an exchange of two polite monologues—not a real dialogue (Lindbeck 2009, pp. 16–31, 66–70; cf. Bitter 2003, pp. 292–302; Friedli 2013, pp. 226–227). More often than not, these dialogues are nothing more than a juxtaposition of monologues, in other words ‘duologues.’

Unless, that is, the whole issue of the veil is seen in the light of deeper layers of the Quranic tradition and Islamic spirituality. Here, we can refer—within this Islamic framework that needs to be updated beyond the established forms of structural violence—to different tractions in the biography of the prophet Mohammad himself and especially to the important roles played by his first wife Khadidja and his young wife Aicha as his trustful references for advice and counselling.

Furthermore, another approach that would be open to reasonable accommodations, while remaining within deep Islamic culture, is qualification of *rahman* and *rahim* (compassion) invoked through God at the *bismillah* (start) of each daily prayer. As suggested by the Moroccan sociologist Fatima Mernissi some years ago, this gesture of prayerful solidarity is, in Islam *Rahma*, another aspect of spiritual diapraxis (1992, pp. 115–120; cf. Rasmussen 2011; Bitter 2011; Frazer and Friedli 2015, pp. 22–23, 27). However, as the sociology of prejudice shows, it takes a long time to build the confidence needed to renegotiate the codes of the prevailing social structure because this is something that goes far beyond rational argumentation. In fact, we are referring precisely to an aspect of deep culture that has to be reconfigured in accordance with the needs of a new historical context (Nussbaum 2011).

The Reconciliation Process in Rwanda for a Rebuilt Community

Similar prejudice-based deadlocks are often seen in post-genocide approaches in the context of Rwanda (Hatzfeld 2000, 2015; cf. Friedli 2013, pp. 227–232). Radically opposed narratives that justify and interpret the murderous, criminal, and genocidal events that occurred between April and July 1994 collide with one another in discussions between families, among humanitarian organizations, and in the heart of the churches. Twenty years after the events, there are still numerous perspectives on why the widespread massacres occurred: the ‘Hamite’ hypothesis, Belgian colonial style, the role of Catholic missionaries, global geopolitics, hesitations within the United Nations (UN) system between the Western and communist blocks, the drop in the price of coffee, the urban–rural divide, the demographic explosion, to mention just a few of the theories discussed (Friedli 2013, pp. 227–228). Therefore, in this post-genocide context, there are still many monologues, suspicions, and mutual accusations.

Nevertheless, in this second example which I introduced to illustrate the ‘Religious Dimensions in Conflict Transformation’ approach, it is again at the level of the values within the Rwandan deep culture that the reconstruction of social structures and responsible cohabitation will have to take place. I am thinking here of the key black-African value of *ubuntu* that Bishop Desmond Tutu gave prominence to during the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission initiative (1993–1995). In fact, the term *ubuntu* refers to encompassed solidarity and reciprocal kindness between *abantu* (human beings).

It is with good reason that the Rwandan Government, in its project to encourage a process of widespread interethnic reconciliation, established the grassroots gacaca courts (1996–2012), combining modern transitional justice methodology with elements taken from the traditional Rwandan gacaca method of conflict resolution by renegotiating the harmony between neighbors (Friedli 2016). In fact, there was extensive national and international coverage—oftentimes critical—of the establishment, implementation, and outcomes of this unique experience of civil reconciliation, but in my opinion the traditional gacaca system remains an exemplary initiative for refocusing and reconfiguring—after the horrors of a genocide—the drivers of reconciliation within Rwandan deep culture (Rutayisire 2012; Clark 2010; Friedli 2013, pp. 228–232; Weingardt 2014, pp. 42–48).

THE WAY FORWARD FOR FUTURE TRANSFORMATION OF CONFLICTS

The overview of the cultural and religious processes that need to be uncovered and are instrumental at the level of deep culture is still preliminary in nature. Further enquiries into the methodology (of the shift from Figs. 8.1 to 8.2) and corresponding processes—social-political, interethnic, religious, migratory, military, and terrorist—are needed to transform contexts of structural and interpersonal violence into sustainable reconciliation dynamics.

I would put the following issues on any future agenda related to methodologies in conflict transformation:

Rituals of Reconciliation

A careful elaboration of sociopolitical ‘rites of passage’ that are capable of rounding off the phase of conflict transformation and rooting the process of cohabitation between reconciled parties is not yet well developed. In fact, conflicts profoundly disturb and disorganize the daily routines of people, groups, and even entire populations (Friedli 2012). Earlier we referred to two situations that could benefit from rites of passage at the social level: the end of the controversies over the Islamic veil in the Western context; and, at the level of community policies, the radical reorganization of the community in Rwanda following the events related to the genocide. When referring to rituals, the intention is not to advocate for any kind of emotional ceremony for forgiveness, but rather to provide a channel through which the events of the past can be consciously accepted and the risks inherent in a new and reconciled future anticipated.

In both contexts, the communities still find themselves in the transition phase toward civil reconciliation that the anthropologist Victor Turner has designated with the term ‘liminality’—on the threshold of transition towards the resumption of a ‘normal’ existential routine (1969). As with transitions at the personal and societal level that are marked with rites of passage from the moment of birth right up to the death of a person or family, it is necessary to create, at the macrosociological level, rites of social healing and community responsibility, which allow members of a society to close the door on their violent past and renew their sense of mutual trust so that they can lay the foundations of

a renewed future together (Bleeker 2012; Friedli 2016). This opens up the whole research field of Faith-Based Diplomacy (Cox 2015), examples of which include the inter-religious rites of reconciliation in the conflict context of Kashmir (Cox 2015, pp. 146–263; cf. Frazer and Friedli 2015, pp. 19–21) or the interethnic celebrations aimed at facilitating the reintegration of child soldiers within their families and communities in Liberia (Lederach and Lederach 2010, pp. 28–40).

Intercultural Comparative Ethics

In the field of social and political intercultural ethics, more operationalized approaches would be useful in order to facilitate responsible choices on the part of social actors in the public sphere (Appadurai 2013). In addition to the formulation of ‘ideal’ approaches at the level of the ethics of conscience, criteria are needed for the elaboration of models and procedures related to ethical choice in relation to emergency situations and humanitarian catastrophes (Weingardt 2014).

This kind of ‘transcultural’ ethics would take into consideration a situation-specific moral approach, in which the unconditional respect for the individual person as well as for the social community is emphasized, the binding nature of the state of law as well as the need for compassion, the legitimacy of monotheistic traditions as well as polytheistic approaches to the Divine, the call to religion as well as the atheistic perspective. The ethical challenge of respecting Western, African, Asian, and Latin American ethical traditions is a key task that remains to be accomplished (Friedli 1974). It would necessitate the drawing up not only of criteria for an ethics of conscience and for an ethics of responsibility, but also the parameters for lucid compromises, and for an ethics of emergency as Dietrich Bonhoeffer was in search for (cf. Schliesser 2008, pp. 175–205). The vision for such intercultural ethics, or even transcultural ethics, can perhaps be indicated by such values as ‘deep democracy,’ ‘every human being as stranger in the world,’ or ‘human security.’

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A Critical Realist Engagement with Glen Stassen's 'Just Peacemaking' Approach

David P. Gushee

Abstract David P. Gushee critically examines 'just peacemaking theory' as pioneered by the late Glen Stassen, a Christian ethicist from Fuller Theological Seminary, Pasadena, California. After an exploration of the personal and intellectual origins of Stassen's just peacemaking theory, Gushee describes and critiques each of the theory's ten practices, which involve nonviolent direct action, independent initiatives, acknowledgment of responsibility, and cooperative conflict resolution. According to Stassen, many of these practices parallel specific teachings of Jesus. Despite the weaknesses and limitations of Stassen's theory of just peacemaking or practice, Gushee concludes that it has a substantial contribution to make in contemporary global peacemaking efforts.

Keywords David Gushee · Glen Stassen · Just peacemaking theory
Nonviolent action · Responsibility · Conflict resolution · Peacemaking

D.P. Gushee (✉)
Mercer University, Macon, USA
e-mail: GUSHEE_DP@mercer.edu

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Glen Harold Stassen pioneered ‘just peacemaking’ in the 1980s.

Just peacemaking proposes that the central norm of the ethics of peace and war should be the building of just civil and international peace through the implementation of ten specific practices of proven effectiveness.

Eventually Stassen produced three books by the same title (*Just Peacemaking*), named his center at Fuller Seminary the Just Peacemaking Institute, and offered countless speeches and essays on just peacemaking all around the world (Stassen 1992, 1998, 2008). It became a central paradigm in the discussion of peace and war in our jointly authored work, *Kingdom Ethics* (Stassen and Gushee 2003). This essay offers a bit of background to Stassen’s version of just peacemaking, elucidates the ten practices of just peacemaking, and includes my own critical engagement.

JUST PEACEMAKING AND ITS INTELLECTUAL UNDERPINNINGS

Just Peacemaking was not exactly a ‘theory.’ Stassen did not prefer the term. He instead argued that humanity was in recent decades discovering, developing, and implementing war-preventive practices, which are absolutely essential given the destructive power of modern weaponry. These practices are becoming increasingly visible in interdisciplinary scholarly literature as well as in grassroots activist and protest efforts and in international diplomacy. Stassen delighted in offering examples of such effectiveness—validation in the real world was very important for his ethics, and he believed such validation was readily available for just peacemaking.

As a Christian ethicist, Stassen further argued that many of these practices paralleled specific teachings of Jesus. For example, Jesus taught in Matthew 5 to drop what we are doing and take the initiative to make peace with an enemy, rather than either retaliating or simply accepting a broken relationship. Stassen therefore named one of the just peacemaking practices ‘independent initiatives’—one side takes a surprising step to ease tensions, build confidence, and facilitate reconciliation with an enemy. Stassen was not surprised that Jesus’ teachings paralleled successful human peacemaking practices, because he read Jesus as the ultimate realist about human nature and human relations. This understanding of Jesus made a huge contribution to Stassen’s original version of just peacemaking, though the approach has been embraced by others who do not share his faith.

Stassen never said that just peacemaking had trumped pacifism or just war theory, as if they could now just go away. He did say that just peacemaking reflected the deepest aspirations of both pacifism and just war theory. It fulfilled pacifism's fond hope for a world without violence by providing practical means to make peace. It fulfilled just war theory's last resort criterion by providing concrete steps each side must take before war can be viewed plausibly as a last resort. In this sense just peacemaking revived and made more relevant the insights of both just war theory and pacifism.

Stassen never offered public support for any war. Whenever a conflict situation arose he always attempted a just peacemaking analysis, which yielded some kind of proposal to resolve said conflict short of war. He left it to others to conclude that, alas, in this case, war might be necessary or justifiable.

This approach tended to inflect Stassen's presentation of the ten just peacemaking practices. His tendency was to state flatly that these ten practices prevent war, then to give examples of such prevention. He never gave examples of times when the ten practices had failed to prevent war. This can be seen as a fault. Perhaps I can correct it a bit here.

AN ANNOTATED CRITICAL RENDERING OF THE TEN JUST PEACEMAKING PRACTICES

What follows is my rendering of Stassen's standard articulation of the ten just peacemaking practices, then a few critical comments.

Support Nonviolent Direct Action

Stassen: Nonviolent direct action as practiced effectively by Mohandas Gandhi in India and Martin Luther King Jr. in the United States (US) has spread around the world. Practitioners helped end dictatorship in the Philippines, bring about nonviolent anti-Communist revolutions in Poland, East Germany, and Central Europe, and spur democratic change in Latin America, South Africa and many other regions.

Nonviolent direct action occurs when citizens confront injustice through peaceful public protests and other resistance strategies including boycotts and strategic noncooperation. Effective nonviolent direct action campaigns often force recalcitrant governments (and sometimes other powers, like corporate entities) to enter into dialogue with those victimized by injustice and eventually to change unjust policies. They do so

without a resort to force that might tempt the state or the faction holding a majority of firepower to gun down dissenters.

Comment: Nonviolent direct action does not always prevail. Consider Tiananmen Square in 1989, or the lengthy protests in Hong Kong, or various efforts in Vladimir Putin's Russia. Even when their goals are not achieved, though, by remaining nonviolent, these movements rob governments of any legitimate reason to use violence against their own protesting citizens. Governments sometimes do kill nonviolent resisters. But these martyrs, as in Selma in 1965, contribute by their very bloodshed to just peacemaking by highlighting this grotesque new governmental injustice and further delegitimizing unjust regimes, at least in the long run. They give surviving resisters the moral high ground that can be used to make gains for justice and peace.

Take Independent Initiatives to Reduce Threat

Stassen: Independent initiatives are unilateral measures taken by one side of a conflict situation, designed to decrease the threat and distrust that undermine support for negotiated solutions. They (1) are visible and verifiable actions, not mere promises, (2) are accompanied by an announcement that their purpose is to decrease threat and distrust, and to invite reciprocation, (3) do not leave the initiator weak but strong because the initiator is perceived by onlookers as holding the moral and strategic high ground, (4) do not wait for the slow process of negotiations, (5) have a timing announced in advance that is carried out regardless of the other side's bluster or response, and (6) come in a series: if the other side fails to reciprocate, small initiatives continue in order to keep inviting reciprocation.

For example, the strategy of independent initiatives freed Austria from Soviet domination in the 1950s; produced the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty of 1963 after Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy halted atmospheric testing unilaterally; achieved dramatic reductions in nuclear weapons via the series of initiatives by Soviet President Gorbachev and the US Congress, and then President George H.W. Bush; and led to breakthroughs by adversaries in Northern Ireland, eventually leading to the end of decades of guerrilla war there.

Comment: Independent initiatives are effective when both sides are, at some level, willing to make peace. They function as a first step. Of course, there are situations in which one side is not willing

to make peace, and in which an independent initiative is received as a sign of weakness, with any gains simply pocketed by the other side. Unwillingness to make peace can be driven by various factors, including ideology, anger, or fear. Adolf Hitler is the proverbial but legitimate example of a leader who had no interest in peace. In practical politics, government leaders often hesitate to take an independent initiative because their political enemies will accuse them of being 'weak' or making the country look weak, however unfair such claims might be.

Use Cooperative Conflict Resolution

Stassen: The idea of cooperative conflict resolution is that the sides together cooperate to resolve a conflict in a manner at least reasonably satisfactory to the parties involved. The realism is that if either party is dissatisfied, then both parties suffer because the conflict will fester.

Stassen saw cooperative conflict resolution in President Jimmy Carter's achieving a lasting peace in the Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel (1979). It has borne good fruit in numerous other disputes both domestic and international. Stassen was impressed, for example, by the use of cooperative conflict resolution in legal settings, such as in resolving domestic and marital disputes.

Cooperative conflict resolution trains adversaries to see each other as human beings with dignity and legitimate needs rather than as sub-humans whose every negotiating demand is illegitimate just because of how evil they are. The goal is to find win-win solutions and to end the scorched-earth tactics so often characteristic of those in heated conflict with each other. A key test of the seriousness of governments' (or anyone's) claims to be seeking peace is whether they initiate negotiations or refuse them, and whether they develop imaginative solutions that show they understand their adversary's humanity, perspectives, and legitimate needs.

Comment: Cooperative conflict resolution is a dramatic advance in understanding how to address human conflicts. But of course, not every adversary is open to cooperative conflict resolution. These strategies often do win breakthroughs but only in cases in which both sides at the same time decide they prefer peace to more fighting. There is a dimension to human nature in which adversaries actually seem to revel in hatred and unresolved conflict.

*Acknowledge Responsibility for Conflict and Injustice;
Seek Repentance and Forgiveness*

Stassen: This practice seeks to end fruitless finger-pointing in situations of conflict by initiating honest acknowledgment of *one's own side's responsibility* for what has gone wrong. Certainly Dietrich Bonhoeffer did this in Nazi Germany in some of his late writings; though he was murdered by the regime, he helped inspire surviving leaders and churches to eventually confess the sin of support for or complicity with Hitler. Since then, many governments have lanced the boil of festering historical injustices by acknowledging responsibility, and directly asking forgiveness, of an adversary or former adversary for prior wrongs done. It can be an immensely powerful and transformative practice.

Comment: It is amazing how often the relations between individuals or nations are held hostage to the inability of one or both sides to acknowledge responsibility for their contribution to their joint problems, let alone to repent and ask for forgiveness. Proud failure to ever acknowledge wrongdoing, accompanied by constant blaming of others for their wrong, has stymied peacemaking in many venues. Reasons for failure to acknowledge responsibility are manifold, but often include nationalist constituencies that punish politicians who ever reach the vicinity of an acknowledgment of responsibility for wrongdoing. The opposition's false claim that US President Barack Obama spent his entire presidency 'apologizing for America' is a great example.

Promote Democracy, Human Rights and Religious Liberty

Stassen: Spreading human rights, religious liberty, and democracy contributes to building peace. People whose rights are respected, whose freedoms are protected, and who have a voice in self-government, do not need to rebel using force—this applies both across nations and within them. Work by churches and human rights groups to press for human rights has helped convert authoritarian and dictatorial regimes in Latin America, such as in El Salvador, to democracies or democracies-in-process, and the trend continues elsewhere. Spreading peace is done by networks of persons advancing human rights and creating the conditions for a sustainable just peace.

Comment: This is not to say that the best way to advance democracy is at the point of a gun. Democracies, under the rule of law, honoring

minority rights, and protecting human liberties, must be nurtured and must develop a democratic ethos over time. When rights-honoring democracy takes root, it is a huge advance for just peacemaking and a less violent world—but of course it does not always take root. Consider the billions of dollars and thousands of lives the US has invested in encouraging democracy and human rights (after violating democracy and human rights) in Iraq and Afghanistan. Indeed, the devolution of US governance since World War II raises interesting questions about the erosion of democracy in formerly (and formally) democratic lands. Many American observers are convinced that the US is less democratic and less a defender of human rights than ever before. It should also be noted that unlike the first four practices, this one is a long-term rather than short-term or one time strategy.

Foster Just and Sustainable Economic Development

Stassen: Hungry people—or people on the bottom of wealthy societies whose wealth they have no share of—easily become desperate and violent, and, when they rebel, their need is at least temporarily exacerbated.¹ A just peace requires at least relatively equitable global and domestic economies in which extreme inequalities in wealth, power, and participation are progressively overcome.

Comment: There is no question that shared prosperity and other aspects of just and sustainable economic development contribute to a more peaceful world. Civil conflict in particular is deeply connected to grotesque economic injustices. International conflict has certainly been triggered by economic motives, including mercantilist competition among nations. Greater economic justice and greater success in meeting everyone's human needs are important aspects of developing a more peaceful world. But it is hard to describe these goals as making for an immediately implementable just peacemaking practice. The ten just peacemaking practices do not all function at the same level. Some are immediate and concrete steps while others are longer term and less concrete.

Work with Emerging Cooperative Forces in the International System

Stassen: Networks of international communication, travel and migration, church missions, and business are stitching nations together into an international society in which former or potential enemies are brought

into continuous constructive interaction. It stands to reason that the more nations are involved in these webs of interaction, the less likely they are to make war. This is partly because there is too much to lose for all involved, and partly because there is a web of human connections that create loyalties transcending state boundaries. War between the US and China seems unthinkable, in part for this reason.

Comment: There is much truth to these claims. But it is also clear that international terrorist networks draw upon the same forces of globalization to transit ideas, money, weapons, strategies, and people into and out of various conflict zones or target areas. Further, we learned in studying the 9/11 terrorists that many of them had become radicalized as minority Muslims in contemporary secular Europe. Stassen rightly identified the increasingly cosmopolitan, global, and interconnected world in which we all now live, and its possibilities for wiring us together in community. But he did not name the possibility that this would not always be a constructive force in international relations. Globalization without genuine integration, recognition, and ‘feeling at home’ may exacerbate rather than alleviate intergroup conflicts.

Strengthen the United Nations and International Organizations

Stassen: Acting alone, states cannot solve most of their economic, environmental, and security problems. The problems are international. Therefore, the practice of supporting cooperative action via the United Nations (UN) and all relevant global and regional organizations is crucial. These organizations, at their best, resolve conflicts, monitor and enforce truces, and replace violent conflict with the beginnings of cooperation. They also reinforce international legal norms and reduce the role of raw power in international relations.

Comment: True enough: but it is not coincidental that in recent decades the US, the most powerful nation on earth by most measures, has often refused to cooperate with international institutions that might check its power. Stassen knew this and protested it vigorously. International institutions are part of statecraft, but are affected by power dynamics in international life. Stassen believed in the original design of the UN as an institution of collective security sharply constraining unilateral action on the part of governments. This has not worked out very well in practice, as the relative power of various states has often determined their relationship to international institutions or compliance with

their occasional mandates. The UN needs systemic reform. A place to begin is with the structure and functioning of the Security Council.

Reduce Offensive Weapons and Weapons Trade

Stassen: Nations and people that can hardly afford to feed themselves never seem to be short of highly destructive weaponry. The weapons trade is a multi-billion-dollar industry awash in blood, as Pope Francis reminded Americans during his 2015 visit (Harrison 2015). Even so-called ‘conventional’ weapons have become so destructive that war is usually horrific and in the end not worth the price.

The issue of offensive versus defensive weapons became especially important during the nuclear weapons buildup of the Cold War. Strategists often debated which various types of weapons would be classified as offensive versus defensive. One goal was to create disincentives for the major nations to load up on offensive weapons and thus be tempted to wipe out the other side with a surprise nuclear strike. Reducing offensive weapons and shifting toward defensive force structures strengthened security in this regard.

The ex-Yugoslavia wars of Serbia against Bosnia, and Croatia and Kosovo, in the 1990s, are the counter-examples that prove the rule: Serbians controlled the former Yugoslavian army and its weapons. They had the offensive weapons to make war without expecting a destructive counterattack, until (after genocidal assaults, with UN representatives standing by) world revulsion finally ended their onslaughts, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervened, and peace agreements were finally reached.

As nations turn toward democracy and human rights, their governments no longer need large militaries to keep them in power. They can reduce military spending and devote their economies to meeting basic human needs.

Comment: The profit motive drives much of the weapons trade, and no one has yet found a magic wand that can wave it away. It is one thing to ask for a reduction in the weapons trade but quite another to address its economic motivations. Also, threatened regimes (and tribes, and individuals) often arm themselves in fear of their enemies. Sometimes the best that can be done in such situations is to assure a rough balance of both fear and of weaponry, so that everyone concludes it is in everyone’s best interests to leave well enough alone. Such balances of power and fear are, themselves, deeply vulnerable to being upset.

Encourage Grassroots Peacemaking Groups and Voluntary Associations

Stassen: Everybody needs somebody looking over their shoulders to keep them in check. In the political and international arenas, governments need citizen groups to do this for them, and these groups themselves need training in just peacemaking and its practices.

The impressive array of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working on human rights, civil society, and peacemaking around the world exist precisely to help both governments and their citizens create a more just and peaceful world. The growing worldwide people's movement of peacemaker groups constitutes a historical force that empowers just peacemaking. A transnational network of groups can transcend captivity to narrow national or ideological perspectives. They can help to initiate, foster, and support transforming initiatives that take risks to break out of cycles that perpetuate violence and injustice.

Comment: But grassroots groups start off at an enormous disadvantage in relation to regimes making war. We activists working as Evangelicals for Human Rights (EHR) discovered this in working on the torture problem in the US after 9/11. Government secrecy meant citizen groups were always a few steps behind the government, which made every possible effort to block our access to the information needed to hold our own government accountable to constitutional principles. (Eventually we did make a difference, however. We contributed to pressure on the Bush Administration which helped expose and force modification of its policies after 2006.) Grassroots groups are important not only when they succeed but when they fail. They can nurture the qualities that sustain courage when just peacemaking is unpopular, that create hope when despair and cynicism are tempting, and that foster grace and forgiveness when just peacemaking fails.

CONCLUSION

Just peacemaking is a critically important contribution to thinking about war and peace. No presentation of (Christian or other) ethics on this subject is adequate without consideration of just peacemaking. My effort at respectful dialogue with just peacemaking theory/practice intends to move this strand of thought in the direction of greater realism about those people, movements, and regimes (sometimes our own) bent on war, closed to peacemaking, enraged by grievance, fueled by ideology,

coldly willing to kill civilians, calculating about its selective deployment of the ‘international community’ and its norms, alienated by globalization, driven by economic interests, or otherwise unwilling to make a just peace. Just peacemaking strategies will not always work in our violent world. The decision as to whether to support military engagement will eventually fall upon many of the world’s leaders and people. Just peacemaking theory is best served by realism about the tragic reality that in many cases its counsels and practices will be ignored—even as we commend these practices using every available means.

NOTE

1. Consider the 2015 Global Hunger Index (GHI) with its conclusion that violent conflicts are the single biggest force behind hunger.

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PART III

Alternative Approaches—Reconciliation
and Forgiveness

Introduction to Reconciliation and Forgiveness

Christine Schliesser

Abstract The topics of reconciliation and forgiveness have emerged as a major *idée-force* within the last two decades in conflict resolution studies. The issue of human capacity for forgiveness after traumatic experiences is taken up by South African psychologist Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela in her chapter “Forgiveness is ‘the Wrong Word’: Empathic Repair and the Potential for Human Connection in the Aftermath of Historical Trauma.” South African Theologian Christo Thesnaar looks critically at the failures and omissions that have accompanied South Africa’s reconciliation policies in his chapter “Alternative and Innovative Approaches to Reconciliation: A South African Perspective,” while Swiss theologian and ethicist Christine Schliesser provides a critical reading of Rwanda’s current politics of reconciliation in her contribution “The Politics of Reconciliation in Post-Genocide Rwanda.”

Keywords Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela · Christo Thesnaar
Christine Schliesser · Forgiveness · Conflict resolution · Empathic repair
South Africa · Politics of reconciliation · Rwanda · Genocide

C. Schliesser (✉)
Zurich University, Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: christine.schliesser@sozethik.uzh.ch

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How do survivors of these atrocities and their descendants live in the same country as neighbors with perpetrators and their families, and achieve the kind of ‘reconciliation,’ mutual trust, or peaceful coexistence that is necessary for sharing a common future?

This question not only constitutes the starting point of South African psychologist Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela’s contribution in Chap. 11, but serves to guide the reflections in this entire section on reconciliation and forgiveness.

Once primarily found in religious contexts, reconciliation has long since become an established concept in political and historical discourses as well, albeit an increasingly disputed term. Some hail its transformative potential even after experiences of massive human rights violations such as civil war or racial injustice where the aim “is not only to come to terms with the past, but rather to establish just relationships and conditions as the prerequisite for sustainable peace in the sense of reconciliation” (Enns 2013, p. 33). Others point to reconciliation’s potential ambiguity, for instance, when it is used to reinforce existing patterns of societal inequalities and caution, “If reconciliation is the answer, are we asking the right questions?” (Jansen 2013, p. 236).

This section aims to take up some of the questions surrounding the disputed terms of reconciliation and forgiveness, as they have already shone through previous contributions. How we view reconciliation and forgiveness is intrinsically connected to how we view human beings and human nature. As such, the questions surrounding reconciliation and forgiveness are fundamental in nature, touching at the very core of what it means to be human. At the same time, these questions quickly become very concrete and practical when they are set in specific contexts such as post-apartheid South Africa and Rwanda after the genocide. These two very different African countries not only share histories of violence and gross injustice, but also face similar challenges in their current quest for stability, economic progress, and reconciliation. Both countries experienced a turning point in 1994 that will forever mark their countries. For South Africa, the year 1994 brought the end of the apartheid regime and their first free elections. For Rwanda, the year 1994 brought a genocide as end and culmination of a civil war. For both countries, the questions surrounding reconciliation and forgiveness are as virulent now as ever before.

Growing up in a black township in South Africa and serving as a psychologist on this country’s great experiment in reconciliation and healing, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC),

Gobodo-Madikizela draws on her own experiences of decades of searching for that which can heal people, relationships and entire nations broken apart by mass atrocities. She suggests that ‘forgiveness’ is the wrong word for describing the experiences of victims and perpetrators. Forgiveness, according to Gobodo-Madikizela, suggests closure, coming to an end in order to move on. What is taking place in victim–perpetrator encounters should rather be described as “the emergence of the unexpected” that arises from witnessing each other’s pains and includes a sense of empathic care for the other. Empathic care and repair go beyond forgiveness. They draw on imagination¹ and reconciliation in the sense of a transformational experience that leaves space for the complicated, the muddy, the unpredicted. By bringing in interviews and firsthand experiences, for instance, with apartheid government’s chief assassin nicknamed ‘Prime Evil’, Eugene de Kock, Gobodo-Madikizela makes the case that the human capacity for empathic repair and connection between victims and perpetrators virtually knows no limit.

The South African perspective is further deepened in Chap. 12 by Christo Thesnaar, theologian and pastoral counseling expert. Referring to Nigerian poet Akinwande Oluwole ‘Wole’ Babatunde Soyinka, Thesnaar likens the South African way of dealing with reconciliation to a ‘time bomb’ that can explode any time due to his home country’s refusal to address the root problems. Similar to Gobodo-Madikizela, Thesnaar appreciates the process initiated by the TRC, yet points to a number of serious limitations such as the TRC’s limited time frame and scope or the lack of assistance to both victims and perpetrators in the process of healing. These problems were left largely unattended, according to Thesnaar, and thus contribute to the ticking time bomb. Thesnaar points to the lasting influence of faith communities in South Africa and calls on them to assume more proactive roles in facilitating healing and reconciliation in society, in particular by listening to and giving voice to the younger generation and by supplementing top-down processes with bottom-up processes. By utilizing two recent examples of reconciliation endeavors—the reenactment of the TRC faith hearings and the approach of the Restitution Foundation (RF)—Thesnaar illustrates his argument and examines the strengths and weaknesses of each of these alternative approaches to conflict resolution.

In Chap. 13, shifting the focus from South Africa to Rwanda, my own contribution from the perspective of a Swiss theologian and ethicist seeks to analyze Rwanda’s current national politics of reconciliation.²

Rwanda's history is marked by decades of structural and often violent injustice between the minority of the Tutsi and the majority of the Hutu. Civil war starting in 1990 culminated in the fastest genocide of recent history when between April and July 1994, up to 1,000,000 people (mostly members of the Tutsi-minority) were killed. I explore central features of the reconciliation process initiated by Rwanda's current President Paul Kagame, such as the *gacaca* courts. This traditional and alternative practice of justice relies on a transformational understanding of justice, rather than on a 'Western' sense of retributive justice, and aims for reconciliation and social healing. In my contribution, I furthermore point to the relationship between reconciliation and remembrance. Relying on the work of cultural scientist Aleida Assmann, I argue that the formation of both individual and collective memory—whose stories we remember and how, and whose stories are being forgotten and why—is crucial for reconciliation processes. I examine critically Rwanda's official politics of remembrance that give a clear preference to Tutsi narratives while the stories of countless murdered Hutu oftentimes fall prey to 'active forgetting' (Assmann 2008) and the deliberate destruction of memories.

These three different voices set to explore the manifold questions surrounding reconciliation and forgiveness are united in that they view reconciliation and forgiveness not primarily as results but rather as ongoing processes. These processes do not follow a clear-cut path but rather create a path on their way, facing obstacles and setbacks, yet being driven by the inevitable necessity of facing up to the question of "How do survivors of these atrocities and their descendants live in the same country as neighbors with perpetrators and their families, and achieve the kind of 'reconciliation,' mutual trust, or peaceful coexistence that is necessary for sharing a common future?"

NOTES

1. For the role of imagination in conflict resolution, see Mary Zournazi's contribution in Chap. 16 of this book, "A Notebook on Peace: Reflections on Cinema and Perception."
2. For further reflections on the reconciliation process in Rwanda see Bruce Clarke's contribution in Chap. 15 of this book, "Genocide, Memory, and the Arts: Memorial Projects in Rwanda of 'Upright Men' and 'The Garden of Memory.'"

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Forgiveness is ‘the wrong word’: Empathic Repair and the Potential for Human Connection in the Aftermath of Historical Trauma

Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela

Abstract Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela argues that much of what happens in dialogue encounters between victims and perpetrators remains implicit. She contends that the word ‘forgiveness,’ which is used by victims themselves to describe their change of heart toward perpetrators, falls short of adequately capturing the complex and multi-layered process that unfolds when victims—and perpetrators—experience a change of heart toward each other. Taking a relational and intersubjective perspective, she argues that empathy is at the heart of the shifts that unfold in the victim-perpetrator dialogue, and that the phrase ‘empathic repair’ more accurately defines the response that emerges than forgiveness does. First-hand experiences and interviews serve to illustrate Gobodo-Madikizela’s position.

P. Gobodo-Madikizela (✉)
Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch, South Africa
e-mail: pumlagml@gmail.com

Keywords Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela · Truth and reconciliation commission · Forgiveness · Empathy · Empathic repair · Victim Perpetrator · Memory · Ubuntu

How do people from different sides of history live together in the aftermath of massive political violence, genocide, and other forms of gross human rights violations? How do survivors of these atrocities and their descendants live in the same country as neighbors with perpetrators and their families, and achieve the kind of ‘reconciliation,’ mutual trust, or peaceful coexistence that is necessary for sharing a common future? These questions, and others that concern issues of memory, responsibility, and accountability for the past in relation to countries emerging from violent political conflict, have increasingly become major topics of global public debate, especially in countries that are haunted by the past. The number of books, articles, testimonials, public conversations, films, and other forms of artistic representation that portray the traumatic memory of historical trauma and its repercussions across generations have increased in the past few years. It does not matter how far back the tragic histories of violent conflict and oppression go; their memory lives on in descendants of both victims and perpetrators. As a recent example of this living memory, the films dedicated to the enslavement of Americans of African descent have increased, connecting this memory not only to centuries past when slavery was still legal, but also to contemporary America, where movements like ‘Black Lives Matter’ have found their expression in stories that hearken back to past racial oppression. The question is: Does the emotional power of these films resolve the problem of a past that is somehow still felt as disturbingly present?

The insidious and transgenerational impact of traumatic memories that result from devastating political oppression and massive violations of human rights is probably one of the most urgent questions of the twenty-first century. Few topics stake a more compelling claim on humanities research than the legacies of historical trauma—the impact of genocide and mass atrocities not only on individuals and groups that experienced the violence directly, but also across multiple generations of the descendants of survivors. From American slavery, to the genocide of the Armenians, the Anglo-Boer War in South Africa,

the Holocaust, the Rwandan genocide and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to apartheid oppression—many societies across the world are haunted by the ghosts of past atrocities. In post-conflict regions where victims and perpetrators live in the same country, and sometimes as neighbors, truth commissions have emerged as a strategy of choice for peacebuilding.

This essay considers the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as a response to apartheid-era atrocities. Its main premise is that by opening up a space of public testimony, the TRC not only introduced a new vocabulary of re-humanization in the aftermath of mass trauma and violence; it also created sites for listening, for moral reflection, and for initiating the difficult process of dialogue at community and individual levels.

The first part of this essay is a brief discussion of some of the elements that were central in the work of the TRC. In the second part of the essay, I consider the process of dialogue between victims and perpetrators, and argue that in contrast to the adversarial stance of the criminal justice system, the TRC's invitational approach encouraged perpetrators to face, rather than to eschew guilt. This in turn opened up the possibility for expression of remorse. I try to show why 'empathic repair,' rather than forgiveness, more appropriately defines the victim's response to the perpetrator's expression of remorse. The third section of this essay is a discussion of the human capacity for imagination and the role that imagination plays in the development of empathy between former adversaries. In the final section of the essay, I introduce the concept of *ubuntu* and show how it is closely aligned with both empathic repair and love. The main point of this discussion is to show that love, empathy, and *ubuntu* are expressions that create pathways to caring for the 'other' as a fellow human being, and that the power of these emotions lies in their capacity to suspend negative sentiments such as feelings of revenge, which so often lead to repetition of old scripts of hatred and violence.

The starting point in all my work is that if the level of depravity that has been captured most compellingly with Hannah Arendt's phrase 'the banality of evil' (1963) is fostered in an environment in which inhumanity against others thrives, then it should be possible for relationships that foster thoughtfulness and a sense of being human reproduce themselves in our relational world.

THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION: A NEW NORM OF RECOGNITION

The TRC expanded the horizon of what is possible in human relationships by spearheading, as part of the political negotiations, a process of dialogue. This was aimed at fostering a capacity for connecting with former enemies in order to confront and heal a past characterized by moral corruption and widespread violations of human rights. This essay reflects on this unique dimension of the South African story. It seeks to examine the empathic movement that draws victim and villain toward a shared vision of a world in which the ‘other’ matters, and to explore the foundational role of empathy in this movement toward the other.

By its very nature, and as a quasi-judicial process, the TRC was a dialogic space with the potential to produce emergent forms of subjectivity that opened up the possibility of transformation. The TRC transformed the silence of trauma—the wordless speech of trauma—and restored victims’ sense of agency by providing an environment in which victims were able to break their silence in front of a national audience. Being recognized leads to the experience of healthy subjectivity. In a society emerging from political conflict, where the rules of recognition were written into the laws of a repressive state, black people’s subject position was bound up with norms of subordination and misrecognition.

In contrast, the norms of recognition established by the TRC were based on a new set of principles that restored victims’ sense of agency, and bestowed on them a *sense* of justice. These included, among others, acknowledgment and validation of their suffering, which is so crucial to victims of trauma, and testifying from the standpoint of their own authorship in the presence of a community in which perpetrators were required to give full public disclosure and to confess their crimes. By making their wounds public, recording the atrocities visited on them, and identifying the perpetrators, victims’ testimonies helped both to assert and restore their sense of agency.

THE CAPACITY FOR EMPATHY: VICTIMS’ INTERSUBJECTIVE ENCOUNTERS WITH PERPETRATORS

The TRC approach was unique in that, by adopting an invitational stance rather than an adversarial one, perpetrators were asked to ‘give full disclosure’ of the crimes they committed in exchange for amnesty.¹

Without the threat of punishment, perpetrators were inspired to admit guilt rather than disown it. Thus, it was possible to face and, for some at least, to *feel* their guilt. This is an important distinction because one can simply 'face up' to what one has done, acknowledging it at an intellectual level, without taking responsibility for the horrific deeds committed and instead externalizing blame. It is this deep sense of guilt—a feeling of brokenness at one's inner core of humanness—that makes remorse, an emotion that makes perpetrators quintessentially human, possible. Remorse can be a painful affect because it involves facing the past and its uncomfortable and internally unsettling truths. Remorse is also an important moment of recognition of the pain that the perpetrator's actions have caused the victim. It is, in other words, an expression of the perpetrator's empathic response to the victim's pain.²

The psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut defined empathy as 'the capacity to think and feel oneself into the inner life of another person' (1984). Other definitions of empathy are aligned with this view of empathic responsiveness, for example Daniel N. Stern's 'affect attunement' (2004). The essence of empathy is the capacity to feel with and to participate in shared reflective engagement with the other's inner life. Most scholars recognize some form of identification with the other at a deeper internal level as central to the capacity for empathy. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, for example, defined empathy as 'the intertwining of our lives with those of others' (1968). For David Black, empathy involves a process of imagination. It is 'a sophisticated act of the imagination, a 'trial identification' done by someone who is consciously relating to another's mental state' (2004).

An aspect of empathy that has received scant scholarly attention is the component of care for the other that sometimes emerges in the context of empathic responsiveness. Caring goes beyond 'mirroring' or feeling into the mental state of another. It arises from the moment-by-moment negotiation of the intersubjective relationship between actors as well as from introspection and ongoing mutual reflection, and it involves making sense of the intersubjective experience of empathic resonance. In this desire-to-care-for-the-other aspect of empathy, the empathic response of the victim is imbued with a quality of wishing to 'rescue' the remorseful perpetrator, as if to affirm his identity as a member of the human community (instead of a 'monster' or 'evil one'). This desire to rescue the perpetrator, I argue, constitutes the fundamental moment, a pivotal point in the intersubjective context in which forgiving feelings emerge.

The word ‘forgiveness’ is the wrong word for describing what unfolds in these victim–perpetrator encounters. Forgiveness seems to suggest a fixed position or a coming to an end—‘I offer you forgiveness so that I can have closure and move on.’ There is a subtext here that seems to signify an act of leaving something behind, moving on without looking back. This is evocative of the notion of ‘letting go’ in the stages theory of forgiveness advocated by Robert D. Enright and his colleagues (1998). Forgiveness should be seen as a transition; as a working through of the pain, suffering, and loss caused by trauma on the part of victims; and the response of remorse by perpetrators as a working through of a range of losses along with the emotions that emerge after confronting one’s guilt and shame. Accordingly, a characteristic of this process of ‘working through’ is the integration of disparate aspects of one’s self, which are then owned as part of the self. In other words, the loss that brought about the rupture must be mourned, a process of working through the transition that leads to connecting with another human being. Something else grows in the place of whatever it was that prevented connection to the other—anger, resentment, desire for revenge, and so on. ‘Letting go’ does not capture this subtlety.

Perhaps what takes place in victim–perpetrator encounters is ‘the emergence of the unexpected’ (Gobodo-Madikizela 2016). A certain degree of caring for the other evolves from being witnesses to each other’s pain—the ‘witnessing dance’ that brings survivor and perpetrator into step with each other, into the spiral movement of a new intersubjective context that edges them toward the center of possibility and then upward toward the apex of transformation (Gobodo-Madikizela 2008b). The new intersubjective context that emerges allows for integration and containment rather than ‘letting go.’ Acknowledgment that bears responsibility, that conveys compassion and care, and that is prepared to enter the pain of the other: This is what is crucial for this transformative process.

An example that illustrates this idea of expression of care beyond empathic resonance is the response of Linda and Peter Biehl to their daughter Amy’s killers after their appearance at the TRC Amnesty hearings.³ Amy Biehl was a Stanford University student on a Fulbright scholarship in South Africa. She was stabbed to death when, as part of her work with a nonprofit organization, she visited a black township in Cape Town with her colleagues from the nonprofit. Her killers’ remorseful submission to the TRC led Linda and Peter Biehl to support their amnesty application. When the TRC granted amnesty to the men, Peter

and Linda Biehl arranged skills training for them and offered them positions in the Amy Biehl Foundation, which they had established in their daughter's memory. 'I have no hatred in my heart,' Linda said in an interview I conducted with her and her husband. "All I am concerned about is how these young men can re-enter their community and rebuild their lives."⁴

A perpetrator's remorse is an expression of a desire for readmission into the world of shared moral humanity. Peter and Linda Biehl's attitude toward their daughter's killers illustrates a deep sense of caring, and perhaps even a sense of responsibility to 'protect' them. This sense of responsibility toward perpetrators is a position that goes beyond forgiveness, and it serves two possible functions. First, it seeks to 'restore' the survival of the lost loved one who was murdered by the perpetrator through a paradoxical process that transforms the experience of the perpetrator as killer, to one of him as fellow human being. Second, this kind of caring and the containment it provides creates a new relational experience with the perpetrator that can help prevent disintegration in him, because of the burden of the memory of his horrific actions.

The 'caring-for' element in empathy is the result of a deeper level of imagination and understanding of the other's experience. This takes 'feeling into' the mental state of the other to another level and asks the question: What should I do about it? Thus, rather than empathy considered simply as 'resonance,' as suggested by neuroscientific insights, the notion of 'empathic repair' might usefully be applied to capture the transformation and potential for healing that emerge from dialogic encounters between survivors and perpetrators (Gobodo-Madikizela 2008a). The perpetrator's transformation stands as a symbol of the victim's capacity (and, more generally, of the human capacity) for imagination and understanding, and of the power of empathic care that is inherent—always a potentiality (Young-Bruehl 2006, pp. 4–5)—in dialogic encounters between victims and perpetrators.

THE ROLE OF IMAGINATION IN VICTIM–PERPETRATOR DIALOGUE

In considering the possibility of victims' empathy in these post-conflict encounters, it seems that the human capacity for imagination plays a role because imagination suggests constant reflection, co-construction of meaning, and dialogue with self and with the other through language

and other subtler forms of communication. The idea that empathy might involve imagination is perhaps best captured by Kohut's notion of 'experience-near,' which suggests an attempt to experience as closely as possible what the other person is experiencing—their pain, their sufferings (1984, p. 187). It is an attempt to grasp an experience not one's own in order to understand what the other is going through. In other words, the act of imagining is not only an approximation of the other's experience, it is also an ethical stance of mutual recognition and a capacity for moral imagination that emerges and develops from the intersubjective engagement that allows the parties in dialogue to be open to one another.

In an earlier section of this essay, I suggested that forgiveness may be described as 'the emergence of the unexpected.' In other words, the emotional encounter with the other opens up a new path that generates something completely new and unexpected. To illustrate this point, I want to share a South African story drawn from an encounter between a young woman, Marcia Khoza, and her mother's killer, the apartheid government's chief assassin Eugene de Kock, who was nicknamed 'Prime Evil.' After visiting de Kock in prison, where he was serving two life terms for some of his crimes for which he was denied amnesty by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Marcia Khoza supported de Kock's application for parole, and spoke publicly about forgiving him.

'I had this deep void of emptiness,' Khoza said. "I carried so much anger to protect myself from falling into the abyss." Empowered by de Kock's acknowledgement and knowing the details of her mother's killing, and finally finding what she described as 'the missing puzzle in the jigsaw of my life,' Marcia Khoza was able to establish human connection with de Kock across the lines that divided them. In recounting the story of her meeting with de Kock, she spoke about how meeting him enabled her to empathize with him and his longing for his sons, whom he told her he had not seen for more than 20 years.⁵

I asked her what was most memorable about the meeting with de Kock. She described a moment toward the end of her visit when she became conscious of her knees touching de Kock's under the narrow table across which they sat from each other in the prison. She was drawing closer and closer to him with each response he gave to her many questions, listening to the words yet also listening to his 'inner voice,' trying to work out (to imagine) how he was feeling. At one point, she said, 'I realized that our noses were almost touching, and that we were breathing the same air.'

Breathing the same air—the statement brings into focus the emergent possibilities that are at the heart of these dialogic processes of restorative justice. As a metaphor, the notion of ‘breathing the same air’ challenges the very concept of forgiveness. What is perhaps necessary is shifting the lens from a focus on forgiveness and reconciliation (concepts that imply a goal) to ‘experience’ (complicated, enigmatic, muddy, elusive, and unpredictable). I think that much of what happens in these encounters remains implicit, and the word ‘forgiveness’ falls short of adequately capturing this complexity.

EMPATHIC REPAIR AND THE SPIRIT OF *UBUNTU*

The need to build a world in which both self and other matter is at the heart of my exploration in this essay. The trauma induced by years of violence need not lead to repetition of violence, where victims and their descendants become perpetrators of new forms of violence that play out in endless cycles of repetition. The pattern can be broken, the violence transformed, and the trauma transcended. The work of the TRC of South Africa reminds us that while it may not be possible to erase traumatic memory—when ‘closure’ after such violence and injustice is not possible—trauma’s power of repetition can be broken.

In the aftermath of crimes against humanity, individuals and communities of survivors—as well as perpetrators who dare to face their shame and their guilt and transcend it—are searching for ways of being human in order to repair the damage done to communal bonds. Victims and their descendants seek affirmation of their right as fellow human beings worthy of recognition and inclusion as beneficiaries of the privileges that come with a new democracy.

I have suggested that ‘empathic repair’ might be used to describe the transformative outcomes of victim–perpetrator dialogue. The notion of empathic repair calls to mind—demands—a broader perspective of responsibility that goes beyond the other, and extends to one’s community. It reminds the parties in dialogue of their responsibility to participate in rebuilding their society and to share in the vision of a more humane society (Gobodo-Madikizela 2008a). The TRC, the Rwandan *gacaca* process, and similar restorative justice processes are all strategies established to create a space for testimony, a space for confrontation and listening, for moral reflection and for initiating the difficult process of restoration of human bonds, and reestablish community

ties and social relationships in a previously divided society (Clark 2010).

These sites of testimony, of mutual recognition and shared experience, provide points of identification, entryways into the experience of others, which enable comparison across critical registers of difference. Appeal to the familiar and the familial creates a context in which it is possible to engage empathetic questions, such as “How old was your daughter/son when...?” By grounding themselves in what is shared, they create mutual intelligibility. The shared experience of loss, for example, cuts across the distinction of black or white, Tutsi or Hutu, Protestant or Catholic, Israeli or Palestinian. On the terrain of a horrific past, certain statements resonate deeply: “My son was eighteen years old when he was conscripted into the South African Defence Force during apartheid; he was brought back in a body bag and I wasn’t allowed to see him.” “My son was eighteen when he joined the antiapartheid struggle. He was abducted, tortured, and killed by apartheid security police.”

It is ironic that the same factors that can ignite and perpetuate animosity, fear, and hatred—the love for those killed or maimed by the other—might also suspend those negative sentiments. By providing a way into the experience of the ‘enemy,’ love and loss may provide a way out of violence. Ultimately, love and loss are what are common and thus in a sense are shared. Love and loss enable healing that opens new possibilities in the aftermath of violence.

At the center of this ‘love’ is *ubuntu*—a deep sense of caring for the other that is embedded in most traditional African societies (see next two paragraphs for description of *ubuntu*). It is worth noting that the post-amble of the South African Interim Constitution of 1993, which outlined the guidelines for the establishment of the TRC, included a reference to ‘the need for *ubuntu*.’ This clearly conveyed a particular orientation for the work of the TRC, one that was specific to the South African cultural context.

The concept of *ubuntu* is an ethic based on the understanding that one’s subjectivity is inextricably intertwined with that of others in one’s community. From the perspective of *ubuntu*, all people are valued as part of the human community and worthy of being so recognized. This entails not blind acceptance of others, no matter what they do, but rather an orientation of openness to others and a reciprocal caring that fosters a sense of solidarity. *Ubuntu* is often associated with the concept

of self 'I am because we are,' which stands in contrast to the Cartesian 'I think, therefore I am.' While recognizing the role of the individual, *ubuntu* values a sense of solidarity with others—the individual always in relation—rather than individual autonomy.

It seems to me, however, that the meaning of *ubuntu* is best captured in the isiXhosa expression '*Umntu ngumntu ngabanye abantu.*' Literally translated, this means, 'A person is a person through being witnessed by, and engaging in reciprocal witnessing of other persons,' or 'A person becomes a human being through the multiplicity of relationships with others.' The meaning conveyed by the expression is twofold. First, subjectivity depends on being witnessed; the richness of subjectivity flows from interconnectedness with the wider community, and from the reciprocal caring and complementarity of human relationships. Second, the phrase conveys the kind of reciprocity that calls on people to be ethical subjects. Mutual recognition is fundamental to being a fellow human being, a relational subject in the context of community. A person with *ubuntu* "is open and available to others, is affirming to others.... My humanity caught up, is inextricably bound up, in yours" (Tutu 1999).

CONCLUSION

While the precept that one should respect and care for human beings as human beings is true, it has had little sway in curtailing atrocities or waves of vengeance following atrocities. It is as though 'human being'—the face of the other—is too much of an abstraction (and, as the twentieth century has shown, too pliable a notion). What is called for is a movement from the abstract and the generalizable, toward the particular and tangible—despite the fact that recognition of the particular does not necessarily guarantee compassion and empathy.

The work of psychoanalysts writing on the destructive effects of trauma on the development of victims' capacity for empathy provides poignant support for the suggestion that victims may become so dehumanized that they lose the capacity for empathy (Laub and Auerhahn 1989). Yet, it also helps us to see that such a loss need not be permanent. Processes such as the TRC create the ethical space for the reconstitution of empathic sensibilities that may have been damaged by violence, both between individuals and within communities, making empathic human connection with former enemies possible.

NOTES

1. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, para. (a), subsec. (3), sec. 20.
2. For a comprehensive discussion of remorse, see Gobodo-Madikizela (2015).
3. Truth and Reconciliation Commission Amnesty Hearing, Cape Town, July 8, 1997.
4. Linda Biehl, interview by Gobodo-Madikizela (research interview, Cape Town, April 1998).
5. Marcia Khoza, interview by Gobodo-Madikizela (public dialogue event, Bloemfontein, December 2013).

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Alternative and Innovative Approaches to Reconciliation: A South African Perspective

Christo Thesnaar

Abstract Twenty years after the transition in South Africa, the violence of today's student protests resembles that of a ticking 'time bomb' on the brink of explosion. To understand this complex reality, Christo Thesnaar assesses the role of the Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) process during this time. Although throughout the post-TRC period faith communities have been predominantly absent in their calling to reconcile the people of South Africa, this contribution argues that they must take a more proactive role in healing and reconciling the nation. In seeking to find suitable ways to overcome this challenge, Thesnaar's contribution engages critically with two alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation and healing: the reenactment of the TRC faith hearing, and the approach adopted by the Restitution Foundation (RF).

C. Thesnaar (✉)
Department of Practical Theology and Missiology,
University of Stellenbosch, Stellenbosch, South Africa
e-mail: cht@sun.ac.za

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 Violence · Truth and reconciliation commission · Reenactment
 Faith communities · Restitution foundation

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 1990s, South Africa has experienced rapid transition at every level of society. Owing to recent events that have transpired across the nation, for instance the latest service delivery protests,¹ the current “#FeesMustFall” and the “#EndOutsourcing campaign” at our universities, accompanied by intense outbursts of anger, violence, and frustration, many have begun to question the extent to which liberation, transition, and the outcomes of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) process have taken place in our country. A number of contemporary artists and academic scholars have referred to this sullen situation as a ‘time bomb’ with telltale signs of an imminent explosion.

In his lyrics, Stef Bos (2010), a Dutch singer–composer likens the present-day situation in South Africa to that of a *tydbom* (time bomb). He describes the growing gap between the rich and poor, the lack of housing, the unfulfilled promises, and the violence experienced by the majority of people within the country as a time bomb. Kenyan theologian, Julius Gathogo echoes similar sentiments when he refers to a comment made by Nigerian poet Akinwande Oluwole ‘Wole’ Babatunde Soyinka, who describes the South African way of dealing with reconciliation as a time bomb that can explode at any given moment because the root cause of the problem has not been adequately addressed (2012, p. 81). Within the above-mentioned context, Ranjeni Munusamy’s newspaper article headline reads as follows: “#FeesMustFall: Political failure triggers ticking time bomb” (2015). The metaphor also forms part of the urgent warning from the political economist, Moeletsi Mbeki, when he states, “South Africa is a bomb waiting to explode, all it needs is a little match to spark it and it will go up in flames” (2015). Trust Matsilele describes the bomb as an ‘economic bomb’ when he refers to Mbeki warning that a 40% unemployment rate among black South Africans and a 30% unemployment rate among ‘Coloured’² people are bound to cause some “tensions, political and social instability with locals venting their anger and frustrations on foreigners” (2015).

It is in this context that theologians are required to engage hermeneutically with this reality in order to fully understand and interpret the situation. In light of the aforementioned, this contribution seeks to reflect on the following significant points: First, the limitations of the TRC process

so as to determine whether there is a connection between the current reality, the limitations of the TRC process, and the apathy of the faith communities toward the process of healing and reconciliation after the TRC ended. Second, the role the faith communities should play to facilitate healing and reconciliation in our society; and last, two innovative and alternative approaches to reconciliation within the South African context.

LIMITATIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRC PROCESS

At the time, the TRC was considered to be one of the most alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation. The major role it played in assisting victims to publicly voice their pain caused by discrimination and injustice is undisputed. However, considering the challenges facing our nation today it is imperative to reflect honestly on the task and process of the TRC in order to identify its connection to the current reality. In this regard, the following limitations are indicated:

First, from the outset the TRC was limited due to the fact that the whole process formed part of a negotiated settlement within the framework of the transition from the apartheid past to a democratic South Africa. Even though the TRC had legal status and was supported by legislation, it was from the beginning limited by its temporary existence.

Second, due to its limited time frame (initially 2 years) it was estimated that approximately twenty thousand out of roughly 50 million victims would appear before the Commission during its existence. Although there is an argument to be made in favor of the TRC as a structured process within this particular transition period of our history emphasizing the symbolic nature of the process, it nevertheless overlooks the lack of a healing process for those who did not have the opportunity to be part of the TRC process. The specific limitation was that there was no official or particular process to assist both victims and perpetrators of apartheid with the process of healing.

Third, very few perpetrators participated in the TRC process, applied for amnesty, or made full disclosure. As a result, a large part of the white community did not attend the TRC hearings. They either remained completely disinterested or were predominantly absent in the process that followed the conclusion of the TRC.

Fourth, upon completion the TRC made some noteworthy recommendations to the government, civil society, and the faith communities, but these were largely disregarded.³ During the TRC faith community hearing in East London, the faith communities in particular made specific

commitments to heal and reconcile the nation after the conclusion of the TRC. Unfortunately, very few of these commitments were upheld.

THE FAITH COMMUNITY AS A ROLE PLAYER

As indicated above, after the completion of the TRC the faith communities did not manifest as a key role player with the same vigor as they did to end apartheid. It is thus imperative to be honest and realistic about the proficiency of the faith communities to develop alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation and healing, especially after the termination of the TRC. This complexity was again confirmed during the reenactment of the TRC faith hearing in 2014.⁴ Although the faith communities remain deficient in their ability to be a significant role player in the process of healing and reconciliation, they need to reclaim their ability to understand hermeneutically and interpret the current context (time bomb) in order to contribute to the healing and reconciliation of our nation. Thus, to keep from repeating the same mistakes of the past, or to fall into the trap of developing cheap approaches to reconciliation, the faith communities need to reestablish their theological identity as a key role player in this regard. With this in mind, I offer the following suggestions for faith communities to take note of if they want to reestablish their theological identity in the process of seeking alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation.

First, the faith communities should neither underestimate nor hesitate to be a role player in seeking alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation, since they are still rated the highest trusted organization in our society at 67% (Wale 2013, p. 24).

Second, in their endeavor to develop alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation, they will need to develop the ability to engage and contribute in a transdisciplinary space.⁵ Thus, the faith communities need to realize that the current challenges facing our society are too enormous to resolve on their own. The quest is for various disciplines, for instance, theology, religion, psychology, sociology and history, to journey together (this includes doing empirical research together) with no predetermined approach or solution in place.

Third, for theology and religion to have a voice it needs to become public, which necessitates active engagement with society. In this regard, H. Russel Botman, a public theologian, pleads for a critical relationship with society (2011, p. 601). Furthermore, he understands this to be an ethical task of the church. This emphasizes the necessity for faith communities not to engage for the sake of engaging but to be truly committed to

the cause, and with their theological knowledge participate in developing alternative and innovative approaches to healing and reconciliation.

Fourth, the faith communities should endeavor to develop an advocacy agenda for the broader transformation of our society. Thus, they should not view reconciliation as a mere relational process, but instead engage with the contents of reconciliation such as confession, remorse, forgiveness, justice, reparation, and restitution. In a paper on the theology of Botman, Dirk Smit indicated that Botman would frequently, and varyingly, emphasize the need for deep transformation to ensure the restoration of the dignity of all who are struggling in this country (2015, p. 622). Basically, it is about taking responsibility for transformation and being accountable for it (Smit 2015, p. 608).

Fifth, the focus of the church should be on forthcoming generations. When we think of alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation that will have an impact on the next generation, it will have to focus on human dignity, justice, and unity. In this regard, Botman emphasizes that his own generation has brought division, and therefore our obligation is to serve the dignity of people, the dignity of future generations, and the integrity of the environment (2011). This implies “a world of greater opportunities, a greener world, where wealth is shared, where we do not fight each other at every opportunity, and it must be a world where we learn to deal with conflicts and disputes in ways other than litigation and warfare” (Botman 2011, p. 605).

However, we have to be cognizant of the fact that the present generation has grown exceedingly weary of listening to unfulfilled promises, and as a result, have become more and more frustrated, angry, and violent in the absence of change. They do not trust our current leaders and they demand respect and to be treated as equals. Furthermore, more than ever, they want to be heard and listened to, and taken seriously.

It is precisely because of the lack of attentiveness, listening, and understanding that Bishop Kevin Dowling from the Roman Catholic Church pleaded for a theology from below (2014, p. 77).⁶ It is all about having our feet firmly entrenched on the ground, and listening to the needs of people situated at the grassroots of our society. It is these “stories of the poor [that] are written on their bodies, inscribed in souls and captured in the histories of dispossession and humiliation,” that the church needs to listen to, says Tinyiko Maluleke (2011, p. 89). Sadly, the church has lost her ability to listen to the coming generation. There is a significant lack of understanding and awareness among the leaders of the current generation

regarding the needs of the next generation. In this regard, R. Ruard Ganzevoort agrees with Dowling when he proposes the need to develop a theology from below that has the ability to acknowledge the perspectives of those who are marginalized and to develop a theological discourse and resources that support their emancipation (2009, p. 13).

EXAMPLES OF ALTERNATIVE AND INNOVATIVE APPROACHES

Based on what has been stated thus far, I want to argue that there appears to be a connection between the existing challenges South African society is facing, the limitations of the TRC, and the failure of the faith communities (as one of the main constituencies) to continue as well as commit themselves to the process of reconciliation and healing started by the TRC. Moreover, it is evident from the discussion so far that the faith communities are more than capable, and therefore should contribute to the creation of alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation.

Based on the above reasoning, I want to comment on two recent ‘examples’ of alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation within the South African context, namely, the reenactment of the TRC faith hearing and the approach adopted by the Restitution Foundation (RF).

THE REENACTMENT OF THE TRC FAITH HEARINGS

In an attempt to alert the faith communities to the role they need to play in a post-TRC context, a consultation on the reenactment of the TRC faith hearing was recently held, serving as an example of an alternative and innovative approach to reconciliation.⁷ The aims of the reenactment were to place the process of reconciliation back on the main agenda of all faith communities, to contribute to reconciliation and national unity, and for faith communities to engage with responsible and realistic reconciliation strategies.

Although the reenactment was in many ways a profound and meaningful experience, it is noteworthy to comment on the reenactment from the premise of reestablishing its identity as a key role player in the process of healing and reconciliation, as argued earlier.

First, most of those representing the faith communities at the reenactment were predominantly older men, representing the exclusive gender profile of the leaders of the faith communities. This meant that the voices and narratives of the present generation, especially women, were primarily absent or silent.

The second observation is that there is a clear difference between the content of reconciliation during the time of the transition and the TRC as to what was communicated during the reenactment. During the reenactment there was a more prominent attempt to grapple with the issues that are central to the content of reconciliation such as restoration, economic justice, restitution, transformative justice, socioeconomic freedom, and transformation. Although these issues were identified, it still lacked advocacy and a clear attempt to engage with these concerns in a transdisciplinary way.

Third, the consultation was a typical exposition of a top-down event, as was the TRC faith hearing where the emphasis was placed on the leaders of faith communities and the official ecumenical bodies, such as the South African Council of Churches (SACC). In this case, it would have been helpful to also invite people, groups, and community organizations that would exemplify a bottom-up representation.

Fourth, the leaders of faith communities and official faith organizations failed to take responsibility for the limited role they played since the TRC to complete its mandate. Instead, they continued to idealize the significant role they played to liberate this country from its apartheid past. There was a clear absence of taking responsibility for the current challenges as well as a firm commitment to participate as public theologians to develop innovative and alternative approaches to healing and reconciliation for subsequent generations.

Could the reenactment consultation be a true example of an alternative and innovative approach to reconciliation 20 years after the transition in South Africa? Although the reenactment was of monumental importance in seeking to understand the faith communities' failure to contribute to the development of such approaches, the answer to the above question remains 'No.'

APPROACH BY THE RESTITUTION FOUNDATION (RF)

Director of the RF, Deon Snyman, recently described the approach to reconciliation (which includes conflict resolution) by the RF as a community-led reconciliation approach that was developed within a local context, namely, the town of Worcester in the Western Cape (2014).⁸

The mission of the RF is to serve as a catalyst for restitution that would lead to healing in South Africa. To reach this goal they initially decided to use the leaders of church denominations and ecumenical bodies as the

vehicle for the process. Snyman explained that the initial strategy was a top-down model for the development of a draft restitution plan for South Africa (that included a just economy, housing, education, land reform, employment, etc.). Soon afterwards, they realized that there were limitations that needed to be overcome if they were to reach this goal. One of the limitations was that the ecumenical movement was in dire straits, and across the country there seemed to be little energy geared toward ecumenical work over the last decade. Another limitation was that many of the post-apartheid church leaders did not have the charisma of the apartheid era church leaders, such as Beyers Naudé, Desmond Tutu, Allan Boesak, and Dennis Hurley to provide the impetus and momentum for such a process. In addition, they recognized the need to refocus, and develop a new strategy and approach. Although the mission stayed the same, the vehicle became regular church members or ordinary grassroots people. There was a clear shift from a top-down structure to a bottom-up structure.

This developed into a new approach and strategy called the community-led restitution process, which encompassed two elements: (1) trauma recovery (all of South Africans traumatized by apartheid and colonialism), and (2) socioeconomic justice. To support this approach and strategy they developed a ‘restitution toolkit’ to assist people to understand what restitution entails (Snyman 2013). Time was also spent on developing a restitution theory to indicate the difference between restitution and charity, why black consciousness is important within this process, and what the key concepts in the discourse on restitution should be (Hills 2014).

In 2010, the RF became involved with the Worcester community, who was still carrying the scars of the 1996 Christmas Eve bombing at a shopping center (the so-called ‘black Christmas’), which left four people dead and 70 injured—mostly black and colored. It was a racially motivated attack by four fanatical right-wing, white inhabitants of the town. As they all pleaded guilty in the ensuing court case, no opportunity was given to the community to really understand why this act was even perpetrated. One of the accused was a 17-year-old boy, Stefaans Coetzee, from a dysfunctional family who received a 40-year prison sentence. Through the restorative justice program, Coetzee indicated that he wanted to meet the survivors of the bombing and explain the reasons for his actions. He repented and asked for forgiveness. As he could not offer any financial restitution, Coetzee hoped that his story might serve as a kind of restitution for the rest of South Africa.

This story became the primary metaphor used to engage all the survivors of the bombing—those affected by it, the perpetrator, and the whole community—within the frame of a restitution project. What was evident from this project was that the white, colored, and black communities in Worcester worked together to make it possible for the survivors to meet the perpetrator and start the process of forgiveness. Coetzee met with more than a thousand people to help them experience healing by admitting his mistake, telling them what had happened, and explaining the reasons for his actions. In 2011, this mobilization increased with local doctors and psychologists suddenly offering to make their services available to survivors for free (most survivors had no counseling after the attack). The Koinoniaproject was established (sharing a meal at different homes, and hosts showing their photo albums to their guests). This was followed by a series of healing-of-memories workshops, as well as an annual commemoration day for reconciliation. Although the focus was initially on relational issues, it soon extended to socioeconomic issues—restitution financing (2009)—by which money was raised for new businesses for victims with the capacity to be successful but without access to collateral to extend their business.

From the above-mentioned, it is evident that the methodology of the RF can be described as an alternative and innovative approach that works well within a local context. In short, the focus of this approach includes: the participation of partners from all levels and generations in the process; listening to all voices; the presence of all faith communities and all sectors of society; the offenders and victims; actively engaging and facing the core issues of reconciliation such as transformation, restorative justice, reparation, restitution, socioeconomic freedom, sustainable development, etc. It is therefore a community restitution project with a broader focus than the individual.

CONCLUSION

This contribution sought to understand the contemporary South African context, as illustrated by the metaphor of a ‘time bomb.’ It also sought to establish whether there is a connection between the current challenges and the limitations of the TRC as well as the inability of the faith communities to continue with the healing and reconciliation task after the completion of the TRC. However, given this connection and the ongoing challenges experienced in our current South African context (time

bomb), this contribution advocates for faith communities to put forth active public theologians, with a clear mandate to contribute to the process of healing and reconciliation.

Furthermore, to illustrate the role of faith communities, this contribution reflected on two alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation within the South African context. I argued in favor of the approach adopted by the RF, as it demonstrates how faith communities can cooperate with other role players in society. The main challenge is to ensure that all generations are involved in this process, that subsequent generations are heard, and that their needs are recognized—socioeconomic justice, restitution, and transformation—forming part of the broader process of reconciliation. My conviction is that faith communities in South Africa have the ability to develop alternative and innovative approaches to reconciliation such as those discussed above. It is the responsibility of theologians to act on this responsibility as they seek to defuse the issues related to the time bomb for our subsequent generations.

NOTES

1. Chen et al. describe ‘service delivery’ as follows: “‘Service delivery’ is a common phrase in South Africa used to describe the distribution of basic resources citizens depend on like water, electricity, sanitation infrastructure, land, and housing. Unfortunately, the government’s delivery and upkeep of these resources is unreliable—greatly inconveniencing or endangering whole communities” (2014). In recent years, the number of ‘service delivery protests’ has increased and has become more and more violent.
2. In South Africa, the term ‘Coloured’ is a name given by the apartheid government to an ethnic race group composed primarily of persons of mixed race.
3. Cf. “Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report,” (2003, 6:589ff.).
4. Cf. “The re-enactment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC) faith hearing consultation - with a specific focus on reconciliation in a post TRC South Africa” as indicated by Thesnaar (2014, p. 1).
5. Cf. “The transdisciplinary scientific research approach to reconciliation with an emphasis on the Hölderlin-perspective,” as indicated by Leiner and Flämig (2012, p. 13).
6. Cf. the contribution from the Catholic Church by Bishop Kevin Dowling during the reenactment of the TRC’s faith hearing consultation—with a specific focus on reconciliation in a post-TRC South Africa (2014, p. 77).

7. This consultation was arranged by the Beyers Naudé Centre for Public Theology at the Faculty of Theology, Stellenbosch University, in collaboration with the Desmond and Leah Tutu Legacy Foundation, October 8–9, 2014.
8. RF is a non-governmental organization (NGO) based in Cape Town.

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The Politics of Reconciliation in Post-genocide Rwanda

Christine Schliesser

Abstract In 1994, the fastest genocide in recent history left up to 1,000,000 people dead in the small African country of Rwanda. Christine Schliesser provides a critical reading of Rwanda's current politics of reconciliation as a specific way of dealing with the past, indicating both the strengths as well as the weaknesses of these politics. After a brief sketch of the context, Schliesser's contribution delineates the different components of Rwanda's politics of reconciliation such as the gacaca courts. In a third step, she draws the connection between reconciliation and remembrance, arguing that both are inseparably connected. Due to their connectedness, problematic aspects in one area produces negative effects on the other.

Keywords Christine Schliesser · Reconciliation
Politics of reconciliation · Rwanda · Genocide · Gacaca courts
Remembrance

C. Schliesser (✉)
University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: christine.schliesser@sozethik.uzh.ch

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INTRODUCTION

Josephine is a five year-old girl with a dazzling smile. It lights up her face even on the photograph. Her hair is done into two neat braids. The captions beneath the picture tell us more details about Josephine: How she loves to sing and dance. That her favorite food is chicken with fried potatoes. And that her eyes were gouged out and her skull crushed with a machete. Her picture hangs on the wall amid countless other pictures of children in a room called ‘Tomorrow lost’ at the National Genocide Memorial in Rwanda’s capital, Kigali.

In 1994, violence exploded this small country in central Africa called Rwanda. Before the eyes of the world community standing by, up to 1,000,000 children, women, and men were brought to death (Dallaire 2004).¹ Most of the victims were members of the Tutsi minority (about 15% of the population), yet countless moderate Hutu who refused to take part in the slaughter were murdered as well. Here, it is important to point out that Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa (a small minority of 1%) are not considered conventional ethnic descriptions; rather, they share one language and one culture. Hutu and Tutsi used to be terms of ‘wealth’ or ‘profession’: those with more than ten heads of cattle were considered Tutsi and herdsman, the others were Hutu and farmers. It was the colonial powers—first Germany, and after World War I, Belgium—that cemented the ethnic distinctions with their politics of *divide-et-impera*. Religion sociologist Richard Friedli thus speaks rightly of a “historical responsibility of Europe” with regards to Africa’s ethnopolitical conflicts (2000, p. 138ff.).²

In the following, I will provide a critical reading of Rwanda’s current politics of reconciliation as a specific way of dealing with the past, indicating both the strengths as well as the weaknesses of these politics. After first sketching out the context, I will briefly delineate the different components of Rwanda’s politics of reconciliation such as the gacaca courts. In the third step, I will draw the connection between reconciliation and remembrance, arguing that both are inseparably connected. Due to their connectedness, problematic aspects in one area will have negative effects on the other.

THE CONTEXT: RWANDA AND THE GENOCIDE

The “fastest genocide in recent history” (Scheen 2014) does not only distinguish itself by its brevity, its thorough preparation, its intensity, and its preventability—still on the eve of the genocide, commander-in-chief

Roméo Dallaire desperately called his superior Kofi Annan for reinforcement of his meager United Nations (UN) troops stationed in Rwanda, in vain—but also by its brutality. Many victims were hacked to pieces with machetes and thrown into latrines to die. Due to the excesses in the Rwandan genocide, sexual violence and mutilation have since become considered and punishable as a genocidal crime (‘Akayesu ruling’ of 1998). Another characteristic of this genocide is the fact that many of the victims and the perpetrators knew each other as neighbors, friends, or even family.

Rwanda is a small country, about half the size of Switzerland. At the same time, it is one of the most densely populated countries in Africa. This means survivors and perpetrators cannot avoid each other. In this, the situation differs from, for instance, Europe after World War II, with its clear-cut borders that separated the former enemies. In addition, life in Rwanda cannot be lived by oneself, at least not in the rural areas, where most of the population still lives today. Everyday life depends on the help and support of family or village structures, even for seemingly simple tasks such as fetching water. Most often it is the survivors, weakened in body and soul, impoverished materially and socially, who are most dependent on assistance. “The material distress increases the deep psychological misery even more, for here we are faced with people that have been grossly mutilated both bodily and emotionally” (Friedli 2000, p. 144). A United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) report of 1998 points out that 96% of the surviving children were affected actively or passively by the massacres, and 84% had lost their parents or siblings, of which about half had directly witnessed the brutal murders (Gupta 1998). Experiences like these leave their mark. Now is the time, more than 20 years after the genocide, that even long-term sentences of major genocidal crimes draw to an end. Perpetrators are released to go home. Oftentimes, their home is the place of their crimes and the home of the survivors. And the place where feelings of fear and suffering, hatred and revenge unite.

Rwanda is a country of low human development, according to the UN Human Development Index. The current index ranks Rwanda 163 of 188. Yet recent years have seen a remarkable progress in terms of economic advance. Current President Paul Kagame has an ambitious goal: to turn Rwanda into nothing less than the ‘Singapore of Africa.’ And Rwanda is well on her way. Throughout the world, business, bankers, and investors have started to pay attention to this country. Credit Suisse,

one of Switzerland's most renowned banks, has enthusiastically praised Rwanda's "economic miracle" and excellent opportunities for investment (Ammann 2015, p. 31). Kagame—whose change of constitution in 2015 allows him to stay in power until 2034—is aware of the crucial importance of peace and stability for economic growth and prosperity. Given his country's violent and divisive history, he turned reconciliation into a political target and thus declared a 'National Politics of Reconciliation.'³

RWANDA'S POLITICS OF RECONCILIATION

Reconciliation, once primarily at home in religious contexts, has long found its way into historical and political discourse. Societies-in-transition employ this term to express their quest for a new beginning, for stability, and a new order after often violent conflict. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) after the end of the apartheid regime is the most well-known example. With its 'National Politics of Reconciliation,' the current government in Rwanda pushes reconciliation on several different levels. On a national level, the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC) was founded that offers different projects throughout the country. For the twentieth commemoration of the genocide in 2014, for instance, journalists from all over the world were invited to visit so-called 'reconciliation villages' to witness how perpetrators and victims work and live side by side. Furthermore, the designations 'Tutsi' and 'Hutu' were banned and a new, common identity forged, expressed in the motto 'We are all Rwandan.'

On a judicial level, the so-called gacaca courts were established. After the genocide, the judicial system was demolished. Most of the judges had been killed, and prisons were overcrowded with up to 120,000 prisoners. Contrary to post-apartheid South Africa, Rwanda had deliberately decided against a policy of amnesty, but insisted on bringing to trial every person involved in the genocide. Yet this would have taken more than 100 years if standard legal procedures were followed. In her search for a solution, Rwanda turned to her own traditional system of alternative justice: gacaca.⁴

Until their official termination in 2012, about 11,000 gacaca courts were spread throughout the country, with respected lay people presiding. Crimes were classified into three different categories with the first category referring to the planners and organizers of the genocide. They were not tried before the gacacas but transferred to the International Criminal

Tribunal for Rwanda, established in Arusha in 1994. The second category included those who had killed and those who had helped them. Here, the *gacacas* could impose penalties of up to 30 years. The third category referred to those who had committed property offenses, with the penalties usually consisting in reparation payments.⁵

The *gacacas*, with their traditional and alternative method of administering justice, have attracted international attention. Their foundation consists less in a retributive understanding of justice as is prevalent in the Western judicial system. Instead, the *gacacas* come close to what sociologist Howard Zehr describes as ‘transformative justice.’ Here, the basis is formed by a relational understanding of crime. “Crime is a violation of people and relationships. It creates obligation to make things right. Justice involves the victim, the offender and the community in a joint search for solutions which promote repair, reconciliation, and reassurance” (2005, p. 37). Healing and the reestablishment of community are among its main goals. This also includes punishment and reparation, but in the end, transformative justice is about reconciliation and renewed relationships.

While the transformative approach must not be overestimated, ethicist Fernando Enns points to its productivity, particularly in the context of civil war or racial injustice. There the aim “is not only to come to terms with the past, but rather to establish just relationships and conditions as the prerequisite for sustainable peace in the sense of reconciliation” (2013, p. 33).

RECONCILIATION AND REMEMBRANCE

There is one more element that needs to be considered in the context of reconciliation: remembrance. What may seem somewhat cloudy and vague at first glance has real and powerful consequences. An inscription at the National Genocide Memorial in Kigali, the final resting place of more than 250,000 children, women, and men, reads: “Forgetting the past is impossible. Remembering the past is infinitely painful.” Here, it is made clear that memories are not only part of the past. What is remembered, what is *not* remembered, and *how* it is remembered have a decisive impact on both the present and the future. For any thought of reconciliation is preceded by the memory of the injustice suffered. “Without memory we cannot travel the painful road to reconciliation and hope.”⁶

Cultural scientist Aleida Assmann shows how memory—individual and collective—is a dynamic construct, formed by multiple active and

passive processes of remembering and forgetting (2008, pp. 274–280). For the formation of the culture of remembrance that we can currently witness in Rwanda’s reconciliation process, two elements are of particular significance: First, ‘active remembering,’ that is, the deliberate selection of memories; second, ‘active forgetting,’ that is, the deliberate destruction of memories. And Assmann points us to yet another relevant aspect in this context: power. “The items that have entered the canon have undergone complex operations of contestation, selection and ascription of value in the context of power struggles” (2008, p. 281ff.). This means that memory is always in danger of being manipulated or misused. It is only a short step from a culture of remembrance to a politics of remembrance. George Orwell illustrates this link in his *1984*, where the ‘ministry of truth’ follows the motto: “Whoever controls the past controls the future. And whoever controls the present controls the past.”

Paul Ricœur refers here to the innate connection between remembrance and identity. It is due to the “fragility of identity” that there is continual “opportunity for the manipulation of memory” (2004, p. 448). Ricœur mentions different ways of how memory can be manipulated. First, there is what Ricœur calls ‘thwarted memory,’ which finds expression in forgetting and pseudo-memories. In Rwanda, one finds thwarted memories when considering what political scientist René Lemarchand calls the “many blind spots in Rwanda’s official memory” (2009, p. 102). One of them is the neglect of the commemoration of those commonly referred to as the ‘Hutu moderates’ who did not agree with the genocidal policies, protected Tutsi, and many times paid for their stance with their lives. Second, ‘manipulated memory’ consists of strategically selected and ideological tinted memories. When in 1996 and 1997, for instance, tens of thousands of Hutu refugees were killed by Kagame’s troops in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, then Zaire), they were all simply declared *génocidaires*—which they still remain in Rwanda’s official telling of the story.⁷ Third, there is ‘enforced memory.’ Here, we find that the ethnicity decree not only bans the use of the terms ‘Hutu’ and ‘Tutsi’ but also public expressions of ethnic memory. ‘Enforced forgetting’ is the sister of ‘enforced memory,’ with equally problematic consequences for reconciliation. “Enforced ethnic amnesia is the most formidable obstacle to reconciliation, because it rules out the process of reckoning by which each community must confront its past and come to terms with its share of responsibility for the horrors of 1994” (Lemarchand 2009, p. 106). Ricœur mentions yet another form

of exploiting memory: its ritualization, resulting in static, fixed memories.⁸ Ceremonies such as the official rituals of the annual genocide commemoration serve to solidify the canon selected for public memory.

It has been seen that the power of remembrance for the formation of the present and the future can hardly be overestimated. All too often, this force is a destructive one when individual and collective identities are formed through the remembrance of atrocities committed by one group against the other. Identities thus become ‘identities-in-enmity’ (Falconer 1996, p. 472). Here, stereotypes play a significant, though often underestimated role. Stereotypes are value and emotion-laden ascriptions to a group of people. They are resistant to both experience and rational criticisms and can easily be turned into political tools. Stereotypes also constitute a relevant component in the formation of our identity. This is due to the fact that one’s own self-perception or ‘autostereotype’ is constituted also through the perception of the other known as ‘heterostereotype’ (Hahn 2013). The success of a reconciliation process therefore depends on the willingness of *all* participants to critically question their own stereotypes, that is, both their heterostereotypes and autostereotypes. “There are no victories and no defeats in reconciliation processes. While these processes do include success and failure, their result always pertains to both sides in the same way. If this is not the case, all we are left with is camouflage directed at enforcing specific interests and thus an exploitation of the rhetoric of reconciliation” (Hahn 2013, p. 71).

OUTLOOK

Rwanda has come a long way, no doubt about it. And Rwanda has surpassed all expectations and achieved remarkable results, particularly with regards to economic success. Yet Rwanda’s current politics of reconciliation begs the question if perhaps its success is measured too closely based on the continuing rise of the gross domestic product (GDP). It hardly bears thinking what the consequence would be if the economic miracle were to suffer setbacks and scapegoats were needed. It is especially the following two aspects that should concern us.

First, there is Rwanda’s official politics of suppressing any authentic ethnicity discourse under the guise of a seeming unity. By doing so, this policy neglects the fact that sustainable reconciliation processes also depend on the critical examination of one’s own stereotypes. A brief look into Rwanda’s history demonstrates the very urgency of

such an endeavor: After independence in 1962, repeated massacres between Hutu and Tutsi claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands victims, culminating eventually in the 1994 genocide. Stereotypes on both sides run deep and—if left unaddressed—will further fuel “anger, hatred, desire for revenge, hostile images and distrust in the cultural deeper layers of collective memory that has been laden with prejudices for decades” (Friedli 2000, p. 142). If left unattended, stereotypes and prejudices fester and can be activated and turned into political tools at any given time. Rwanda’s official policy to suppress ethnic identities by decree—“as if one could change society by decree!” (Lemarchand 2009, p. 106)—therefore does not only seem counterproductive, but dangerous. For it burdens Rwanda’s fragile presence and future with an incalculable potential for conflict. While the fear to upset the current equilibrium by an open ethnicity discourse is understandable, the price paid for not addressing the past might turn out in the future to be (too) high.⁹

Second, there is Rwanda’s problematic official culture of remembrance. Political correctness only allows for commemorating the ‘Genocide against the Tutsi.’ Both countless murdered moderate Hutu and the atrocities committed by the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) army in 1994 fall prey to what Assmann calls ‘active forgetting,’ that is, the deliberate destruction of memory. Here, we encounter what Ricoeur calls “the prime danger” for remembrance, “the handling of authorized, imposed, celebrated, commemorated history—of official history” (2004, p. 448, cf. Hankel 2016). In view of Rwanda, Lemarchand puts it pointedly, “the selectivity of public memory helps nurture ethnic enmities” (2009, p. 105). What is thus missing is a place that allows for the polyphony of memory that provides continuing support for any victim, regardless of ethnicity. Here, a comparison with South Africa and its emphasis on the healing of memories might prove beneficial.¹⁰

Today, Josephine would be 28 years old. It is to be hoped that what can be found written on some of the houses in Kigali will come true: “The future will be kind to us because we will create it.”

NOTES

1. Roméo Dallaire recounts in this book his experiences during the genocide and points to the failure of the world community, which could have stopped the killings.
2. Unless indicated otherwise, English translations are by C. Schliesser.

3. For a detailed treatment of the politics of societal reconciliation in Rwanda, cf. Friese (2010).
4. Gacaca [ga'tʃatʃa] means 'grass' and refers to the place in the village where court is held.
5. For a detailed discussion of the gacaca courts, cf. Friese (2010, pp. 53–86).
6. Robert Vosloo speaks to the reconciliation process in post-apartheid South Africa (2001, p. 34). For South African perspectives, see the contributions by Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela and Christo Thesnaar in Part III of this volume.
7. In his Congolese history, Stephen Smith estimates the number of Hutu killed in these two years alone at 200,000 (2003, p. 95). With regards to the current use of the concept of collective guilt cf. the critical analysis of Hankel (2016, p. 450f.).
8. Referring to Jacques Derrida, Ricœur states: “But the simulacrum, the automatic ritual, the hypocrisy, the calculation have often joined in and invited themselves along as parasites to this guilt” (2004, p. 469).
9. This is the argument I have heard repeatedly: “Let us not disturb the current stability and prosperity by criticizing the government’s manipulation of collective memory or its lack of attention to basic human rights such as freedom of press or freedom of speech, not to mention the lack of political opposition.” Viewed against the background of the extreme violence and chaos of the genocide, this argument does carry considerable force. Yet one cannot escape the worry that a past that is not addressed in an adequate manner is bound to repeat itself in some way. For an assesement of the current problematic human rights situation cf. Thomson 2015.
10. Cf. Thesnaar’s contribution in Part III of this book, titled “Alternative and Innovative Approaches to Reconciliation: A South African Perspective.”

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PART IV

Alternative Approaches—The Arts

Introduction to the Arts

Mary Zournazi

One comes not into a world but into a question.
Emmanuel Levinas

Abstract What can art bring to situations of violence? How does it provide an alternative means to our usual habits of mind and memory? In this introduction to Part IV, Mary Zournazi discusses how art can serve as a place holder to understand and reflect on violence without reproducing it. She discusses how art is a means for social healing reflecting on Bruce Clarke's chapter on the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and its legacies; and how art provides a way to address the 'unthinkable' in our cultures. In her chapter, Zournazi reflects on how cinema can allow a space to approach and respond with sincerity to tragic events, and through her film *Dogs of Democracy* (2016) she provides an alternative response to the humanitarian crisis in Greece.

Keywords Bruce Clarke · Mary Zournazi · The arts · Art · Violence
Rwanda · Genocide · Memory · Cinema · Imagination · Greece · *Dogs of Democracy*

M. Zournazi (✉)
University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
e-mail: m.zournazi@unsw.edu.au

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How might art be a way to respond to the cultural habits of violence? This brief introduction will help to situate what I would regard as the positive necessity for art in providing alternatives to violence, and how we might consider the need for it in our everyday lives.

In November 2015, I was among the authors in this collection invited to participate in the ‘Alternative Approaches in Conflict Resolution’ conference in Zurich. The conference was organized during a critical time in Europe: with the extreme situation in Syria and the refugee crisis that ensued, and the various social and economic crises experienced across Europe. After a fruitful second day of the conference, I went back to my hotel room and went straight to sleep unaware of what was happening in the world. The next morning, Bruce Clarke, an artist and a conference participant, told me about the coordinated bomb attacks that had happened in Paris during the previous night. Clarke, who is based in Paris, had been up most of the night closely monitoring the events from Zurich.

I was shocked. But at the time, what also surprised me was the level of retaliation in the air mostly presented by the media but also people’s everyday mood and reaction. It seemed that there was no alternative or possibility to comprehend the events: France had called a state of emergency and then shortly thereafter launched air strikes on Syria. There had also been a separate attack in Beirut, although there was less reportage about this attack in Europe and in other global media outlets. Given all of this, there is no doubt that the attacks were tragic and violent. At the same time, a response to violence must *not* create or recreate new forms of animosity and fear. What might be the alternatives to violence?

The following day, I gave my paper at the conference on the cultural habits of violence and how to consider the conditions for peace. As it turned out, Clarke asked the first question. For me, it was serious reflection on the events that had happened in France. He asked: What if people did not respond to the violence? What if people paused? Where might that lead us?

In our book *Inventing Peace* (2013), Wim Wenders and I discussed this idea: What would it mean to pause in response to tragic events? How might that change the direction of people’s anger and mourning at an individual as well as political level? Our book in many ways was a response to 9/11, and we considered the need to work toward a moral and visual language for peace. Because in our view, the over-saturation of

information and images around the globe does not offer people the time to understand the effects of violence and war. A critical vocabulary for peace requires time and patience.

What can art bring to situations of violence? How does it provide an alternative means to our usual habits of mind and memory? In my view, art invites a different kind of embodiment and catharsis of experience. It can invite moments of grace, moments of reflection, moments of forgiveness. In this way, art is like a place holder to understand and reflect on violence without reproducing it. In the following two chapters, we consider how art can provide alternative possibilities and justice for people in two very different contexts and situations.

In Chap. 15, “Genocide, Memory, and the Arts,” Clarke brings to light how art is a means for social healing, and how art is a tool for communities to restore dignity and to bring back value and meaning to people’s lives. His work is a direct engagement with the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and its legacies. The two primary artworks discussed—‘Upright Men’ and ‘The Garden of Memory’—engage with “the role of art in a commemorative historical process” and how we remember and mourn tragedy. Both works represent through a visual means what might be considered as an ‘unrepresentable’ tragedy. In other words, how do you provide a visual means for the anguish and loss of people? Through his artistic response to post-genocide Rwanda, the artworks create a space for memory and mourning in which the immediate effects of violence and retaliation can never allow: the artworks become a ‘visual’ ground for social justice, the evocation of memory as a ‘duty,’ and the space for healing in people’s lives. Of course, we can never fully comprehend people’s experience of genocide, nor the violence that produced it, but we can respond in ways that may generate healing practices and understanding so that violent acts are *never* repeated.

For me, art provides a means to bring the ‘unthinkable’ and the unrepresentable into our lives and cultures. As I sketch in Chap. 16, “A Notebook on Peace,” art most often, and in my case cinema in particular, can allow a space to approach and respond with sincerity to events rather than reacting in retaliation with the same force or violence. Specifically, I look at the humanitarian crisis in Greece through my film *Dogs of Democracy* (2016), and the ways people respond to situations of crisis. And as I discuss in my chapter, to give the ‘correct value’ to people’s lives and to restore their dignity are basic conditions for peace.

This echoes Simone Weil's beautiful words on justice: harm inflicted on people requires that we learn to truly listen and understand the suffering and anguish experienced. She writes:

Justice consists in seeing that no harm is done to men. Whenever a man cries inwardly: 'Why I am being hurt?' harm is being done to him. He is often mistaken when he tries to define the harm, and why and by whom it is being inflicted on him. But the cry itself is infallible. The other cry, which we hear so often: 'Why has somebody else got more than I have?', refers to rights. We must learn to distinguish between the two cries and to do all that is possible, as gently as possible, to hush the second one, with the help of a code of justice, regular tribunals, and the police. Minds capable of solving problems of this can be formed in a law school. But the cry, 'Why am I being hurt?' raises quite different problems, for which the spirit of truth, justice, and love is indispensable... (2005, p. 93)

It is this cry that defies any logical reasoning and requires another emotional and reflective space. Art as a *teckne* (skill) in the Greek sense of the word can help to sharpen our vision of the world, and it can help to restore justice through the recognition and reflection on human suffering and the cultural affects of violence.

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Genocide, Memory, and the Arts: Memorial Projects in Rwanda of ‘Upright Men’ and ‘The Garden of Memory’

Bruce Clarke

Abstract Politically-engaged artist Bruce Clarke discusses his commemorative and memorial projects ‘Upright Men’ and ‘The Garden of Memory.’ Produced in Rwanda in the years following the Tutsi genocide, they are part of a long reflection on the role art can play in a commemorative historical process, with the condition that it arises from an informed position. Along with producing memorial spaces, the intention is to redefine the role of art as a historical discipline by situating the genocide in Rwanda into the public arena, both at home and around the world, so that it cannot be ignored. For Clarke, art is a tool for raising consciousness around this major historical event so often misrepresented in the West and at times subjected to denial theories.

Keywords Bruce Clarke · Tutsi Genocide · Memory · The arts
Memorial projects · Rwanda · Upright men · The garden of memory

B. Clarke (✉)
Independant visual artist, Paris, France
e-mail: bruce.clarke3@gmail.com

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The artistic and commemorative project ‘Upright Men’ is part of a long reflection on the role of art in a commemorative historical process. The project was born from the desire to produce work-related memorial art forms to be presented during the twentieth commemorative ceremonies of the Tutsi genocide committed in Rwanda in 1994. The ceremonies traditionally take place during what is called the week of mourning from the seventh of April onwards. Particular importance was given to the twentieth ceremony in 2014 since 20 years is a landmark in human memory and a pretext to take stock of how Rwanda is coping in the healing process, psychologically and materially.

The last genocide of the twentieth century began in this small country in the heart of Africa on April 7, 1994. In less than 100 days, around 1 million men, women, and children were killed in the indifference of the international community.¹ Looking at such horrors we cannot remain impassive. Memory becomes a duty. Duty to render justice—in a judicial sense—but also through assisting in the crystallisation of lived memory into written or artistically represented ‘history,’ what could be called subjective justice owed to the victims (Ricoeur 2000). The intention is of course to assist in understanding the mechanisms and underlying historical complicities and complexities in the events, but on a more subjective level it is also to assist the individual survivor in continuing to live by placing traumatic experiences into context and within a collective healing process.

As well as producing memorial spaces, the objective of the project was also to place this traumatic event into the public arena so that it cannot be ignored; raising consciousness around this major historical episode so interlinked to European colonial history and simultaneously so often misrepresented in the West. ‘Genocide’ is generally defined as the will to exterminate part of a population for religious, ethnic, or social reasons and was theorized (even though the word did not exist) from the mid-nineteenth century in Europe and experimented in Namibia (German South-West Africa) for the first time against the Herero population by the colonial authorities in 1903. It is now commonly accepted that it can only be perpetrated by a state structure with the organizational, administrative, and military means that the state can mobilize (Lindqvist 1992).²

In the particular case of Rwanda, much of the ideology that fed the genocidal state came directly from Europe through the vanguard of the colonizers represented by members of religious congregations such as the White Fathers imposing a biblical reading of what they saw in Rwanda—the Tutsis were a lost tribe of Israel, descending from

Abyssinia, guardians of the source of the Nile, etc. The notion of ‘ethnic groups’ had been introduced and codified in 1931 by the Belgian administration, who created ethnic identity cards. This ethnic classification served as the basis in post-independence Rwanda for persecution of the Tutsi population and ultimately its elimination in 1994. André Perraudin, Archbishop of Kabgayi, published a pastoral letter in 1959 that reinforced the racist theory that the Hutu supremacists were developing (Perraudin 1997). Perraudin had previously advised his private secretary, Grégoire Kayibanda, in his writing of the ‘Hutu Manifesto’ in 1957—the ‘bible’ of Hutu Power. Kayibanda, with the benediction of the Belgian authorities, became the first post-independence president. With such ideological support from respected institutions, the first massacres in Rwanda against the Tutsi population in 1959—defined in racial terms as foreign exploiters by the archbishop—were perpetrated with impunity and even encouragement (Carney 2013). The slogans of genocide in 1994 often incited the Hutus to send the Tutsis back to where they came from via the Nile.

Misrepresentation, describing genocide in Rwanda as tribal or ancestral hatred between two communities, has hints of residual racism rather than scientific rigor.

This crime against humanity, long planned and mostly organized under the command of the extremist ‘Hutu Power,’ took place with the international community remaining largely indifferent in a context of hegemonic games between Western countries in the African Great Lakes region. Some of these countries, the United States (US) in 1998, Belgium in 2000, and the United Nations (UN) have partly recognized their responsibilities in the genocide of the Tutsis.³ Yet, few concrete actions have been undertaken in favor of the survivors who continue to face the material and psychological consequences, as well as revisionist theories or discourses trivializing the crime. Among the most important and obstinate revisionist writers in France, we can cite Pierre Péan and Stephen Smith.⁴ Other forms of genocide denial or revisionism are more insidious: writers who talk of a ‘double genocide’ (the UN recognizes that genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda is a fact which cannot be disputed. There was no genocide against any other section of the population), or dispute the figures to minimize the events. We can discuss the figures, but the intention and the planning of the genocide are irrefutable. A documentary shown by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “Rwanda’s Untold Story,” largely discredited by historians and scholars, nevertheless permeates into the public awareness.⁵ Of course

revisionism exists for all historic events, but the difference concerning Rwanda is the blurring of the line. Laws in Europe and the US are enforced against racism and revisionism; when talking of Rwanda, revisionism is often seen as an 'opinion' and not a crime.

The simple fact that so much effort is deployed to discredit the victims and their history indicates the stakes that have been set to rewrite history. It becomes imperative to affirm the memory of the victims in order to remind humanity that despite the expression of good will of 'never again' that followed the genocide of Armenians, Gypsies, and Jews, another genocide took place and we remained silent.

But how could we tell the story of an event of such horror executed with such efficiency? What role could art play in the process of commemoration? In general, visual representation is limited to the field of what is representable. Often, images lack decency and respect for the victims and their families. They also contribute to a trivialization of the horrific and ultimately of the horror itself. Is 'Art' able to touch the conscience and help the victims, inducing reverence, respect, and a human sense of the memory of the inhumane? A different type of artistic and perhaps therapeutic 're-presentation' could diminish the unbearable memories repressed in personal souvenirs. For the artist, an artwork aims to question the spectator, not to give ready-made answers. Art possesses this ability to provoke curiosity and make one think. This is perhaps the best remedy against amnesia. Artwork is not the same as scientific historic work, but artistic representations can be a weapon against forgetfulness and play a complementary role to that of historians.

In August 1994, I travelled to Rwanda to make a photographic report on the problems of post-genocide reconstruction. Later, as a professional visual artist attempting to come to grips with contemporary history, I engaged in various art-related, citizen-based projects. In collaboration with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the Rwandan authorities, and civil society associations, I conceived the project the 'The Garden of Memory'—a collective memorial work, currently in progress. Covering an area of 1 km², this garden is a place recalling the memory of the victims of genocide, and participates simultaneously in the mourning process of an entire nation. Rwandans are invited to pose a stone during ritual commemoration ceremonies each marked with the name or a mark remembering a missing person.

Confronted with the enormity of what the genocide was, we, as artists, were obliged to rethink the responses concerning forms of art or

‘social therapy,’ which might have been proposed in other circumstances—other circumstances, by definition, incomparable—genocide goes beyond everything. No science is adequate when faced with the scale of the social fracture existing in Rwanda after such an event. Art, some will say, is even less adequate.

However, the refusal to attempt to deal with the events through art could have been interpreted as ignoring or forgetting them, erasing them from history, indirectly giving weight to revisionist theories.

There was thus a multiple challenge facing us. How would it be possible that a memorial, a ‘work of art,’ render justice to the enormity of the event: genocide committed against a part of the Rwandan people? Second, how could the form of the ‘memorial sculpture’ be dignified and yet communicate the immensity of the event to as many people as possible?

Last, would we be able to integrate into its very creation a commemorative ceremony, a cathartic and pedagogic process involving as many people as possible? And could that process help to heal wounds?

PHILOSOPHY OF ‘THE GARDEN OF MEMORY’

It was necessary to design a ‘sculpture’ that took account of the following elements:

- the number of victims (approximately 1 million);
- the space and volume represented by this number;
- popular perceptions of what art is. A work of art is often seen as elitist, individualist, and could be interpreted as contrary to the sensibilities of a wounded community;
- the importance of community participation in the construction of the memorial. We wanted the construction to be cathartic and help rebuild the social tissue;
- the importance of implicating Rwandan and foreign artists and intellectuals. First, because artistic expertise is essential in the creation of memorials and monuments; second, even if the notion seems outdated, there is a moral duty of commitment. A genocide concerns the whole of humanity not just those who have the nationality or the religion of the victims. Since we are part of this humanity, we indirectly negate our own humanity if we refuse actions of recognition and memory by ‘leaving it to others.’

THE GARDEN

1 million stones, each bearing the name or a distinctive sign of a victim, were to be posed on a site of approximately 1 km². The stones posed from a central point gradually opening out toward the periphery, as the ‘Garden’ becomes larger. In this way, after posing the first stones, more and more people were able to participate in the ceremony without hindering each other. As the stones were placed, the design of the memorial took on a form representing the terraced hills of Rwanda.

The stones were placed by members or friends of the victim’s family in the course of commemorative ceremonies conducted by individuals or by members of survivors’ associations. The ceremony is a long-term, ongoing process. In the months or years following the institutional ceremonies in April each year, individuals are able to come and place a stone in memory. The garden thus grows on its initial site even after its official inauguration.

Anonymous stones are given the identity of the victims, a marker for memory—individual and collective remembrance of victims (Fig. 15.1).



Fig. 15.1 ‘The Garden of Memory’

THE 'UPRIGHT MEN' PROJECT

The 'Upright Men' project proposed to complement the work already in place at the massacre and memorial sites of the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, and to give this work an artistic and international significance. It followed 'The Garden of Memory' and was designed specifically for the twentieth commemoration in 2014, even though it has been developed and continued since.

In Rwanda, the commemoration of the genocide is held every year in April. It plays an important part in the individual and collective grieving process and the perpetuation of the memory of the events of 1994, but is also a way to fight against renewed genocidal tendencies and other revisionist processes of a historical event. April 2014 marked the twentieth anniversary of the Tutsi genocide. Working with the Rwandan authorities and civil society organizations, the 'Upright Men' project played a role in the 2014 commemorations not only in Rwanda, but also in many cities across Europe.

The principal of 'Upright Men' is to represent in painted form men, women, and children on the outside of buildings, places of memory, and other sites of the 1994 massacres in Rwanda. The figures are larger than life, often 6–8 m high, silhouettes sketched with a strong affirmed presence. They are symbols of the dignity of human beings who lived and died in this barbarous genocide. Victims or survivors, these 'Upright Men' stand with dignity as testimonials to the painful history. The intention is to give presence to the victims, restoring their individuality, and reaffirming their status in the human community. The painted figures, every one different, will be emblems of the nobility of the men, women, and children engulfed by the violence, but who nevertheless, are still, from a spiritual point of view, upright and dignified. The genocidal project which began with the dehumanizing process of Rwandans themselves has failed: the survivors stand with dignity. The sites of massacres themselves will be marked by the symbolic presence so that no one can forget what took place in the buildings: schools, churches, and municipal buildings—all symbols of moral and political authority.

An international dimension was given to 'Upright Men.' As part of the twentieth commemorative ceremonies of the Tutsi genocide in 2014, it became the visual symbol around which commemorative ceremonies were held in Paris, Lausanne, Geneva, Brussels, and elsewhere. Fifteen



Fig. 15.2 'Upright Men'

cities in all hosted the project, as well as Kigali. The international community was able to pay homage in different ways with the backdrop of 'Upright Men,' remembering their own implication (or not) in the events that led to the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, reflecting on the mechanisms, complicity, and notions of justice for the victims. When there was no possibility to paint directly on buildings, other types of representation of 'Upright Men' were created: large scale printed images on cloth sheets hung in different places, or light projections of these same figures on building façades, for example, as was done on the Lausanne Cathedral or on historical buildings in Ouida (Fig. 15.2).

JUSTIFICATION

Artistic representations, in all eras or conditions of production, contribute to the construction of memory in such a way that in time, years later, they can become the only records of the event. Artwork has played a testimonial role in historic events throughout humanity relating to personal or collective memory often more than other media. "It is

Guernica [by Picasso] an artwork, which reminds us today, over [seventy] years after it happened, of the tragedy of the small Basque village, not the newspapers of the time or scholarly history textbooks” (Clair 1997).

‘Upright Men’ and ‘The Garden of Memory’ arose from what now seems an evident observation: a genocide can take place only when the cultural links that keep society together have been disintegrated. After the genocide, a work of cultural reconstruction, even if it seems futile or derisory, is essential. Beyond the act of making visible and intelligible symbols, culture plays a part together with other metaphorical and spiritual tools in repairing as well as in essential healing processes. It is important to restore cultural forms, *a fortiori*, by promoting the active involvement of people who become actors and supporters of the creative project.

Mural art is part of a long tradition—from the religious frescoes to contemporary graffiti. Western art has been dominated by murals, especially in the ecclesiastical context. They became a veritable institution in Mexico. Mural art is also used by many contemporary artists; for instance, Ernest Pignon-Ernest made a series of serigraphic images on the walls of churches in Naples, or the famous screen printings of the South African Pietà on the walls of Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban. Far from being iconoclastic, the project of ‘Upright Men’ belongs to a long tradition while commemorating a contemporary and historic event. These paintings will mark walls with the memory of the victims and the dignity of the Rwandan people.

Furthermore, this technique of public art makes art and history accessible to everyone, including people from outside Rwanda. The reproduction of ‘Upright Men’ on the facades of important places in the world created a symbolic bridge between the people of Rwanda and the international community; this is extremely important since our history is intimately linked with theirs. Genocide by definition is a crime against humanity; it therefore concerns everybody without exception. Moreover, certain responsibilities and complicities must be highlighted and recognized in order to collectively honor the victims and affirm the dignity of a people rising from its ashes.

The strength of the artwork comes from the fact that it has been reproduced in many sites. ‘Upright Men’ embodies the assertion of a people who remain standing and dignified. In Rwanda, these men, women, and children will say to the passersby that here lived and died people who we will not forget. Elsewhere, ‘Upright Men’ will help to make known the history of the Tutsi genocide and to question the

role of the international community by creating a bridge of solidarity between the Rwandans and the world.

NOTES

1. The UN figure of victims is around 800,000. The Rwandan government gives the figure of 1,074,017 dead (Republic of Rwanda, Minister of Local Administration, 2002). The real figure is unknown. ‘Ethnic’ quotas had been fixed by the post-independence governments, and the administration in pre-genocide Rwanda expressly underestimated the Tutsi population in order to limit the number of Tutsis in all walks of life.
2. Lindqvist’s work is extremely interesting for the fact that it was published 2 years before the genocide in Rwanda, but describes the mechanisms in place in other contexts that fit exactly into the Rwanda model.
3. Belgian Prime Minister, Guy Verhofstadt, in Rwanda (April 7, 1998): “I confirm that the international community as a whole carries a huge and heavy responsibility in the genocide. Here before you I assume the responsibility of my country, the Belgian political and military authorities.”
4. Pierre Péan, a leading French journalist close to the spheres of power and their ‘services,’ in his book *Noires fureurs, blancs menteurs* (*Black Fury, White Liars*), was accused of racism and genocide denial by human rights and anti-racist groups in court in France. Péan was found ‘not guilty’ because of technicalities. Stephen Smith was a journalist at *Libération* and then *Le Monde*. Against all evidence, Smith, proposes the Machiavelic theory that Paul Kagamé purposely shot down Habyarama’s plane knowing that the act would start a genocide and enable him to take power. His articles systematically try to undermine the government in place.
5. A group of 48 people, including former president of the International Committee of the Red Cross Cornelio Sommaruga, Bishop Ken Barham, and investigative journalist, author, and professor Linda Melvern, wrote to BBC’s Director-General Tony Hall to express concern over the documentary. Their letter claimed that the BBC had been “recklessly irresponsible” in airing the film, said it contained serious inaccuracies, and claimed part of its content promoted genocide denial (see Baird 2015).

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A Notebook on Peace: Reflections on Cinema and Perception

Mary Zournazi

Abstract Mary Zournazi looks at questions of violence and the urgent need to invent a visual and moral language for peace in her chapter, “A Notebook on Peace: Reflections on Cinema and Perception.” Her film *Dogs of Democracy* (2016) captures the care and concern people have for the street animals in Athens, a city facing social and economic crises. She touches on the problem of perception, namely that people’s perceptions of the world differ from the ways in which people live and experience it. Art most often—and cinema in Zournazi’s case—provides the space to approach and respond to violent situations with sincerity rather than reacting in retaliation with the same force or violence. She also reflects on filmmakers who respond to violence without reproducing it.

Keywords Mary Zournazi · Violence · Peace · Art · Cinema
Dogs of Democracy · Athens · Perception

M. Zournazi (✉)
University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia
e-mail: m.zournazi@unsw.edu.au

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In 2014, I took my first ever trip to Athens. I had arrived in the middle of the city and in the middle of a crisis. It was a tense time as the country was in the grips of austerity measures put forward by the European institutions, and the tension was palpable. But at the same time, I became fascinated by another layer of city life: the stray dogs of Athens and the people who take care of them. This relationship with the city and the diversity of its life became the focus and inspiration for my essay-style documentary, *Dogs of Democracy* (2016). In this film, I look at the care and concern people have for the street animals, and I became intrigued by the human capacity for kindness and care, and what this care might say about the ability to respond differently to social and economic crisis.

In many ways, *Dogs of Democracy* is a response to the conditions of violence in everyday life, and it sits within the framework of a larger project I have been involved in with German Film Director Wim Wenders, called *Inventing Peace* (2013). This book we co-authored is our response to the problem of how to deal with violence. We pose the question of *how we look at the world but do not see it*, when there is so much injustice, suffering, and violence? And following from this: what are the ethical and moral consequences of looking but not seeing, and most of all what has become of the notion of peace in all of this? We consider the urgent need to invent a visual and moral language for peace and how this language for peace is directly related to the question of perception.

In this chapter, I will sketch some issues around perception and the making of *Dogs of Democracy*, and I will reflect on filmmakers who respond to violence without reproducing it. Art most often, and cinema in this case, can allow a space to approach and respond with sincerity to violent situations rather than reacting in retaliation with the same force or violence. It is some of these techniques or skills that I will explore in this short notebook on peace.

A METHOD FOR PEACE

The problem of perception concerns how we ‘look’ at the world, which is often very different from the ways in which we live and experience it. This ‘looking’ became obvious to me in Greece, and I felt that there was a certain responsibility to provide alternative ways to understand the conditions of austerity and people’s everyday suffering. Very often we are struck by the violence or suffering of people and events, but we do not have the means or tools to respond to the suffering and violence. Rather,

we often see it as the legacy of the poor or the dispossessed, something that seems distant and remote to our usual lives. This is part of our cultural habits of violence and its representation.

In the early part of the twentieth century, the French philosopher Henri Bergson (1991) wrote about the problem of human habits and perception in response to the scientific thinking and philosophy of his time. Today, his writing gives us a method to consider the problem of suffering and the question of violence. For Bergson, the problem of perception in a philosophical as well as an ordinary sense is that of badly stated questions or problems: humans tend to pose questions that assume 'correct' answers or absolute truths. So while it is necessary to acknowledge the structures of violence that frame so much of our cultural habits and perceptions of peace rather than repeating these habits of mind and memory, we must pose new questions.

So how do we address the question of peace?

Bergson offers some clues. For Bergson, all creative enterprise, all forms of invention, rest in the power to decide, to constitute problems in themselves; that is, to invent what did not exist. For Bergson, there is a difference between inventing and discovery. Discovery is what might already exist, actually or virtually, so it will happen sooner or later. We might say then, as Bergson writes, to invent "gives being to what did not exist; it might never have happened" (1992, p. 51).

For Bergson, invention comes out of the creative potential of mind and memory. Essentially speaking, life itself is about energy and movement; the material world moves through a continual flow of time (duration), just as the mind inhabits the world of memory and imagination. In this view, our individual lives are quintessentially embodied time, the creative flows and energies that arise out of the *real* as it is lived and actualized. So, all worldly experience exists in the realm of time that is indivisible. We are immersed in time that coexists on different levels and planes of experience (i.e., memories, feelings, and habits), whether we perceive them or not.

Inventing, then, arises out of a different understanding of time and space. Cinema allows for the evocation of different layers of memory and experience. It makes us aware of the perceptions of time; each film is made up of different moments that altogether can transform the space and time of seeing. Seeing here involves all of our senses, memory, and technologies, since to look today is a combination of these factors, the methods or techniques in which we constitute ourselves, our ethical realm, and our encounters with each other. As the philosopher Gilles

Deleuze once noted, cinema is a kind of thinking in action.¹ It is this movement of thought that provides alternative truths and emotional realities, as cinema can change our perceptions toward events whether they be fact or fiction. In this regard, cinema opens the potential for modern ethics as it relates to how we see and how we can make sense of the world.

Let us consider some of these movements or moments of invention that can provide alternative means and conditions for peace.

TECHNIQUES FOR PEACE

While I was filming *Dogs of Democracy*, I spent months wandering around the city of Athens following dogs as they led me to different encounters and adventures, and I began to learn from the animals. The dogs provided me with a way of seeing the world that was substantially different to my usual habits and to my usual ways of seeing. It was in the observing and partaking in the dogs' reality that something different changed in mine. I began to crouch down and film them from their height, their eye level—and somehow in this stance I was able to inhabit the space of other (the dog in this case)—and in this stance a bond or relationship was formed. This relationship to the camera and my role as a filmmaker came almost intuitively after many years of respectful watching and learning from the Japanese filmmaker Yasujiro Ozu.

Ozu has a style of filming that allows a certain grace to enter into the cinematic space: most of Ozu's shots "are done from eye level of somebody sitting on a tatami floor. This is a very defenseless peaceful position" (Wenders and Zournazi 2013, pp. 95–96). From this seated position, a more peaceful and relaxed response to the film provides a certain intimacy and connection with Ozu's characters. Through our *being* with his characters rather than objectifying or judging them, we are invited to partake in a certain generosity and care toward them. For me, this 'caring look' involved the filming of the dogs that became part of a way to tell a story about a humanitarian and economic crisis in Greece. This look is also about the responsibility and respect to what is witnessed and experienced. The philosopher and theologian Martin Buber writes that genuine responsibility for what we see and encounter in this world exists only when there is real responding to each other, for what happens to one, for what is seen, felt and heard.

For Buber, genuine responsibility arises ‘between man and man,’ but this relationship is not limited to the traffic between humans; it is about *becoming aware* of all things, the world as we encounter it and its sacredness. As Buber writes:

It by no means needs to be a man of whom I become aware. It can be an animal, a plant, a stone. No kind of appearance or event is fundamentally excluded from the series of things through which from time to time something is said to me. Nothing can refuse to be the vessel for the Word. The limits of the possibility of dialogue are the limits of awareness. (2002, p. 12)

Buber’s account of becoming aware is to observe, and to observe has a special function in the sense of justice and equality, since to observe involves the whole of an experience, not just getting stuck in the fragments of what we see with our limited vision. Etymologically speaking, observe contains the word to ‘serve’; service in this light is not exploitation, but humility and respect. In the context of Greece, this *becoming aware* concerns the need to restore dignity and hope as well as the conditions for democracy. Since we are concerned with inventing peace, we might say this service to reality is the only true function of peace.

‘SINCERE WITNESS TO LIFE’

During my research and filming of the dogs in Athens, I encountered several different protests. I would most often film the protests as part of the documenting of the city and the conditions of austerity. I would witness people coming together, gathering in response to the austerity measures, often in joyful and peaceful ways. Toward the end of one particular protest, there was an orchestrated movement of protestors who started to throw petrol bombs, and this led to a clash with the riot police. Essentially what was a moment of the gathering of people in a peaceful way became the discombobulation of a crowd. Television crews and other photographic media moved straight toward the chaos in order to circulate the ‘dramatic’ event, which time after time we see only as riot police and tear gas at the anti-austerity rallies. What remains in most people’s memory is the violence of the situation rather than people’s active and often peaceful involvement, and the different layers of people’s memory and experience. This could be true of any event or crisis in the world.

To observe details of events and to give what we might call the ‘correct value’ to things, not as absolute truths, but the details that we might ordinarily refuse to see is a basic condition for peace. As the Russian filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky writes, “the cinema image ... is basically observation of life’s facts within time” (1986, p. 68). In Tarkovsky’s view, to be faithful to life’s encounters is what matters in spiritual and artistic enterprise; once events or encounters are ‘interpreted’ without respect for the encounter, there is a loss of the uniqueness of experience, there is no genuine dialogue with the event. He writes:

... one has to observe life at first hand, not to make do with banalities of a hollow counterfeit constructed for the sake of acting and of screen expressiveness. I think the truth of these remarks would be borne out if we were to ask our friends to tell us, for instance, of deaths which they themselves have witnessed: I’m sure we should be amazed by the details of those scenes, by the individual reactions of the people concerned, above all by the incongruity of it all – and, if I may use such an inappropriate term, by the expressiveness of those deaths ...

A group of soldiers is being lined up to be shot for treason in front of the ranks. They are waiting among the puddles by a hospital wall. It’s autumn. They are ordered to take off their coats and boots. One of them spends a long time walking about among the puddles, in his socks which are full of holes, looking for a dry place to put down the coat and boots which a minute later he will no longer need.

Again. A man is run over by a tram and has his leg cut off. They prop him up against the wall of a house and he sits there, under the shameless gaze of a gawping crowd, and waits for the ambulance to arrive. Suddenly he can’t bear it any longer, takes a handkerchief out of his pocket, and lays it over the stump of his leg.

Expressive, indeed.

Of course it’s not a question of collecting real incidents of that kind as it were against a rainy day. What we are talking about is being faithful to the truth of the characters and circumstances rather than to the superficial appeal of an interpretation in ‘images’. (1986, pp. 25–26)

When Tarkovsky speaks of in the incongruity of death and the examples of our response to the horrible and obscene, what he points to is a care and respect for what is witnessed. The sincerity or respect that

follows this kind of faithful observation can create the space for different voices to be heard. In some ways, this sensibility offers a way to respond to violence without violence.

Dogs of Democracy gave me the opportunity to bear witness to the dogs and the people of Athens, and in this witnessing I was able to tell a story about austerity and life on the streets. This became part of a telling a story about the tragedy of the loss of people's dignity and hope in the context of Greece, for it is in the space in which respect toward the difference of people's lives and how they are lived that we can be sincere witnesses for them. Italian filmmaker Federico Fellini once regarded cinema as a 'sincere witness' to people's lives.² It is the necessity of this sincere relationship to life, and the genuine responsibility to situations that can guide our practice and responses to them.

In this short notebook of reflections on cinema, perception, and peace, I have suggested that peace is a very concrete engagement with the world, and the conditions for it arise out of our genuine responsibility toward it. From this perspective, peace—rather than being a static idea—is a *continual* process of transformation and change. In the realm of art and its potential, it offers a way to move beyond violence—it can allow us to take the time to respond to events, and to register memory and meaning that we might otherwise refuse to see. And in many ways this capacity to *see* is only limited by our imaginations and our attitude toward how we take care and *look* at the world.

NOTES

1. See Deleuze's books on cinema for an interesting reworking of Bergson, and for his unique development of a cinematic language of analysis (1986, 1989).
2. See Fellini's autobiographical film, *Federico Fellini: Un autoritratto ritrovato*, 2000. In Fellini's case, his work involved a certain incongruity and magical realism between the detail of events and experience that helped to sharpen a vision about people's loves, lives, and tragedies (Fellini 2000).

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PART V

Alternative Approaches—Conclusion

Conclusion: From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation

Martin Leiner

Abstract Reconciliation should be conceived as an overarching approach to conflict resolution that focuses on processes of rebuilding relationships, states Martin Leiner. Its goal is to create ‘normal’ and trusting, and if possible, ‘good’ and peaceful relationships. Leiner defends reconciliation as an alternative approach to conflict resolution against four criticisms. These points of critique include debates on the sources of reconciliation, on whether reconciliation might be considered more appropriately as a mechanism or as an approach, on whether reconciliation is an idealistic goal or a process, and on the right timing for reconciliation processes to begin. Leiner outlines how reconciliation as a long-term project can in fact work by naming justice, truth, and resilience as fundamental components of reconciliation processes.

Keywords Martin Leiner · Reconciliation · Alternative approach
Conflict resolution · Relationships · Justice · Truth · Resilience

M. Leiner (✉)
Jena University, Jena, Germany
e-mail: martin.leiner@uni-jena.de

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In a general sense, reconciliation can be defined as the creation of ‘normal’ and, if possible, good relationships after grave violent incidents. The definition serves as a working definition to start. The claim that reconciliation is an alternative approach to ‘conflict resolution’ has been challenged by at least four different positions. In this chapter, I first sketch these four positions and present my arguments as to why I cannot espouse them. Then I provide a short description on how reconciliation can work as a new approach to conflict resolution.

THE SOURCES OF RECONCILIATION

Making the stance that reconciliation is an *alternative* approach to conflict resolution seems to imply that reconciliation is something new. The first criticism asks questions like: Has reconciliation not an old history starting with primates making peace with each other (De Waal 1989)?¹ Reconciliation is a goal of certain rituals of humankind that address three fundamental dimensions: (1) reconciliation with the transcendent religious otherness of God(s), spirits, or deaths, (2) reconciliation with other human beings, mainly with their own group, and (3) reconciliation with oneself, with the otherness inside ourselves. Already more than 2400 years ago in Greek comedy as well as in the Hebrew Bible, words played an important role that we translate today in English as ‘reconciliation’ or ‘atonement.’

However, in the literature about conflict resolution, reconciliation did not appear much before the 1990s. German foreign policy on reconciliation after World War II and the Holocaust seemed to be a particular phenomenon (Gardner Feldman 2012), so that in the groundbreaking book *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, Daniel Bar-Tal and Gemma H. Bennink state that “only over the past decade [i.e., since about 1994] has the study of reconciliation emerged as a defined area of interest in political science and political psychology.... It evolved out of the recognition that there is a need to go beyond the traditional focus on conflict resolution, to expand the study of peacemaking to a macrosocietal perspective” (2004, p. 11).² That description on the theoretical level reflects new experiences of the 1990s, namely with the reconciliation processes in South Africa, in Rwanda, and with similar processes around the world. Recent attention on reconciliation in science as well as the manifold experiences of reconciliation processes, their successes and failures, have changed our approaches to conflict resolution. Even if many

points remain controversial, a widespread consensus has been established that reconciliation is operative in conflict resolution to highlight proactive measures in order to change a culture of enmity into a culture of cooperation and amity (Assefa 2015, p. 237).³

RECONCILIATION: MECHANISM OR APPROACH?

During the last decade, several scholars have attempted to make the notion of reconciliation more succinct. Most of the attempts associate reconciliation closely with apology and forgiveness. However, that narrow definition cuts links with many other processes needed to create better relationships, especially when forgiveness cannot be translated into different cultures. If we accept the general working definition of reconciliation as a relationship-related instead, then we need to include many different steps and think about reconciliation as a long-term process. Therefore, because it benefits greatly both practice and theory, scholars claim that we should understand reconciliation as a comprehensive approach, not as a single mechanism.

As a general approach, reconciliation implies that in an ideal case everything which impacts on a relationship troubled by violence should bring in whatever may help to create normal and good relationships. Schoolbooks, city twinning, youth encounters, tourism, national celebrations, memorials, trade regulations, and many other activities can be designed in a way that they are able to foster reconciliation. Reconciliation as a general approach should determine the entire project, not just amend mechanisms, which by chance are already in place. That approach, however, should include a certain openness. Measures like ‘transitional justice’ can be seen as part of a reconciliation strategy, but the desire of reconciliation should not damage the independence of the possible motivations and the concrete procedures in transitional justice. Considering reconciliation as an overall approach also means that talking about reconciliation has far-reaching innovative potential.

Like every new approach in social sciences, reconciliation is a strongly evocative concept. In that understanding, reconciliation can be considered as an enlargement and reframing of traditional conflict resolution. “Reconciliation goes beyond the agenda of formal conflict resolution to changing the motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes and emotions of the great majority of the society members regarding the conflict, the nature of the relationship between the parties and the parties themselves”

(Gardner Feldman 2012, p. 7). It might open even wider perspectives to understand reconciliation as an overall perspective englobing conflict resolution and other topics such as social coherence or conflict prevention. Reconciliation, according to Hegel's 'Social Philosophy,' impacts the entire social life (Hardimon 1994).

RECONCILIATION AS AN IDEALISTIC GOAL OR AS AN UNMANAGEABLE PROCESS?

For some authors, "reconciliation is the 'holy grail' of conflict resolution, often seen as desirable but beyond reach" (Assefa 2015, p. 236). In one version, such criticism means that reconciliation just happens with time or by chance and cannot be a product of intentional conflict resolution measures. Another version of this criticism understands reconciliation as a goal beyond reach in real life. Reconciliation is based on freedom. People must decide freely whether they want to reconcile or not. Sometimes even if they wish to reconcile they cannot. But in any case, according to this criticism, something must happen that cannot be planned, organized, and forced to occur. Reconciliation happens through free will, through chance, or through grace, but it differs from conflict resolution, which includes clear mechanisms we can apply.

To answer that critic, we must argue on different levels. First of all, it should be clear that conflict resolution depends on human freedom, on chance and 'grace,' and the difference between conflict resolution and reconciliation on that point might only be one of a higher or lesser degree of that dependence and not a difference in category. Reconciliation as well as conflict resolution have specific means such as the prepared encounter between perpetrators and victims. Those means can be evaluated in terms of which factor is significantly fostering reconciliation over another.

On another level, it must be clarified whether we understand reconciliation as a process or as a goal, and if it is a goal, whether the goal can be considered an outcome or whether the goal is utopian. Scholars follow different approaches. Relatively common is a twofold definition of reconciliation as a process and as a goal or outcome. Bar-Tal and Bennink describe reconciliation first as an outcome: "Reconciliation as an outcome consists of mutual recognition and acceptance, invested interests and goals in developing peaceful relations, mutual trust, positive attitudes, as well as sensitivity and consideration for the other party's needs

and interests” (2004, p. 15). Later they state that “the concept of reconciliation is not only used in reference to an outcome, but also to connote a process. Genuine and stable relations are achieved through a long process of reconciliation, lasting many years. It encompasses psychological changes of motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes, and emotions, which are reflected in structural changes; these, in turn, facilitate the process of reconciliation” (2004, p. 22). John Paul Lederach, Johan Galtung, and other researchers, however, prefer the terminological distinction between the German terms *Versöhnung* (reconciliation) as a process on one side and *Versöhntheit* (peace or healed relationships) as an outcome on the other.⁴ David Bloomfield adds an interesting practical argument to that scientific choice: the resistance some people—mostly victims—have toward reconciliation has to do with the double definition, because they “suspect a process that might compel them into an end-state, they do not necessarily, or for now, want. They may be forced to make compromises and, in particular, to ‘forgive’ perpetrators without having first gained sufficient justice for their suffering” (2006, p. 7).

A definition of reconciliation should therefore underline the elements we have found: *Reconciliation can be defined as the overarching approach to conflicts which focuses on processes of rebuilding relationships. Its goal is to create ‘normal,’ ‘trustful,’ and if possible ‘good’ and ‘peaceful’ relationships.* Reconciliation addresses past violence and injustice, present reframing and encounter of the other, and future possibilities of cooperation, peace, and harmonious interaction. It considers individuals, groups, institutions, societies, states, associations of states, and humanity. Reconciliation has ethical, psychological, sociological, economical, communicational, historical, linguistic, medical, educational, legal, environmental, artistic, philosophical, and spiritual or religious aspects.

RECONCILIATION IN THE MIDDLE OF CONFLICT

One final criticism against the claim that reconciliation is an alternative approach to conflict resolution does not question reconciliation but conflict resolution. The main idea is there are no (or very few) conflicts that are really resolved and ended. What happens in most cases is a transformation of the conflict from a violent phase to a nonviolent or less violent one (Miall 2004). Given that this description is right, and as the German poet Friedrich Hölderlin said, reconciliation is always “in the middle of conflict.”⁵ Reconciliation always has to deal with the conflict; it can

prevent a conflict which might become a violent conflict; it can start in the middle of violence and atrocities; and it has also to deal with the conflict a long time after violence has stopped. As an alternative approach, reconciliation therefore opposes conceptions that put reconciliation only into a so-called ‘post-conflict’ phase and consider it as a limited mechanism within the overall framework of traditional conflict resolution or transitional justice.⁶ Reconciliation happens and evolves in the dynamics of conflicts and their contexts. To consider reconciliation as an approach to conflict resolution therefore implies that conflict resolution itself changes and becomes a long-term project within contexts of conflict.

HOW DOES IT WORK?

In the framework of this article, I can give only a very short sketch about how reconciliation as an alternative approach to conflict transformation works. When reconciliation is the overarching perspective, we can distinguish (1) preconditions of reconciliation, (2) a main phase where intensive activities for reconciliation are undertaken, and (3) long-term activities for reconciliation. The preconditions of reconciliation and even the main phase can start in the middle of a violent conflict. That was the case in the Colombian peace process, for example (Bouvier 2009). The main phase is full of public activities such as agreements, public apologies, Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, and the establishment of reparation regulations. The long-term activities require several decades and include prevention against the return of violence.

Preconditions of reconciliation can be described by the following principles:

Reconciliation Means that All Parties Concerned Must Be Integrated into the Process

One typical problem with agreements is that the nonintegrated parties act like spoilers. One classic example is the ‘Oslo Accords,’ attacked both by Hamas and by Israeli extremists. In every conflict there are groups who do not want the violent conflict. They may have very different reasons for that: women are often the best actors for peace because they do not want to lose their husbands and children; there are people with economic interests which require peace and stability; mixed families do not want to find themselves between the conflict lines.

Reconciliation Must Be Promoted Publicly

The easiest situation is when there are popular leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu to advocate reconciliation. Their leadership probably was a crucial factor for the success of South Africa's transition from apartheid to democracy. International support, involvement of popular artists, and a general supportive attitude of media have also proved to be helpful. Violence and the activity of spoilers against the reconciliation process must be addressed and overcome.

In 2016 with Colombia's referendum against the 'Havana Peace Treaty,' the paradox became salient when immediate victims and the regions where violence was mostly perpetrated supported reconciliation more so than populations living far away from the conflict. This paradox must be researched more. One possible explanation is that entire societies are 'third order victims' who feel threatened and aggressed by violence. Furthermore, entire societies have security needs and justice claims that must be respected.

Reconciliation Presupposes Inquiries into the Exact Needs of the Parties Concerned and Preparation Before Entering the Process

In research on conflict resolution, there is a large debate about the impact of human needs.⁷ In the process of reconciliation, people should be given the chance for dialogue within a protected space and asked questions such as (1) what would be indicators of an improvement of the relationships? (2) how would the reality they want look? (3) what are their deepest needs?

All parties must not necessarily come together at one table of negotiations from the beginning. On the contrary, the practice of Sant'Egidio as well as studies conducted in the *Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft* (DFG or German Research Foundation) 'Hearts of Flesh not Stone' project show that it is often helpful to take time working with a single group before involving the other parties.⁸

Reconciliation Requires Particular Attention to Language

Respectful and nonviolent, but sincere, communication of deeper feelings instead of superficial hostile stereotypes is a factor for the success of

reconciliation. In many cases it is crucial to use respectful language with all parties in the conflict. Metaphors shape our thoughts and feelings. Therefore, we should carefully reflect on the metaphors we use (Lakoff 2002). Since ‘reconciliation’ might be a problematic word for key actors in the process, it could be beneficial to substitute reconciliation with other words in scientific studies.

For the main phase of the process of reconciliation three other points come in:

Reconciliation is About Justice

One typical pitfall for reconciliation is that people could see an opposition between justice and reconciliation. In reality, there are always different justice claims coming from the different parties in the conflict. Reconciliation is about reconciling these different justice claims. A convincing reconciliation-of-justice-claim is possible when power asymmetries are more or less neutralized in the negotiation process and when justice is understood as restorative or transformative justice, not merely as retribution (Zehr 2015).

Reconciliation is About Truth

In almost all reconciliation processes, one important need of victims and of the society is truth. Victims and the society want to hear the truth about what happened. Often victims cannot end processes of mourning before they know what happened to their beloved one. Victims also often want to tell what happened to them. They need the public to listen and acknowledge their suffering. In traditional legal settings, perpetrators may strategically avoid telling the whole truth in order to get lesser punishment. If trauma or shame interferes, it is difficult to find one’s own voice. To give truth a chance requires careful preparation and reflection about the conditions that each person needs.

Reconciliation is About Building Resilience

Reconciliation should aim at changing the institutions involved in the conflict. It also should create new institutions like organizations for youth encounters, institutes working on the healing of memories, or making surveys like a reconciliation barometer. Reconciliation contains

economic projects of development for communities that have been affected most by the violence. All these instruments contribute to the creation of a new society and a culture of peace.

For later phases of reconciliation, the transmission to the next generations and the building up of social justice and cohesion are decisive. Social programs and revised schoolbooks that bring reconciliation into education not only account for the violence, they create a culture of commemoration that does not forget the atrocities of the past and convinces the next generations that reconciliation is the road to follow.

After having sketched some thoughts on reconciliation as an alternative approach to conflict resolution, it must be underlined that a plurality of concepts of reconciliation is actually needed, because reconciliation is an evocative concept that depends on new approaches.

NOTES

1. It can even be claimed that reconciliation is crucial for the evolutionary success of primates and humans, because without group and family cohesion the next generation will not receive the required protection.
2. For comparison, see Carol A.L. Prager who states, “The study of reconciliation per se is quite recent” (2003, p. 1). Prager also suggests starting with Martha Minow’s *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness* (1998).
3. Assefa considers reconciliation as an instrument for conflict resolution alongside adjudication, arbitration, negotiation, and mediation (2015).
4. For quotes from Lederach, Galtung, and others, see Bloomfield (2006).
5. For Hölderlin’s quote in his novel *Hyperion*, and the application of that concept in research on reconciliation, see Leiner and Flämig (2012), pp. 16–18.
6. The ‘Agenda for Peace’ of United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali placed reconciliation in the post-conflict phase. Many transitional-justice researchers have their ways of extending the concept of transitional justice to almost everything, arguing that it “covers the establishment of tribunals, truth commissions, lustration of state administrations, settlement on reparations, and also political and societal initiatives devoted to fact-finding, reconciliation and cultures of remembrance” (Fischer 2015, p. 325).
7. For a critical summary of the debate on conflict resolution, see Avruch and Mitchell (2013).
8. The DFG-funded project on the suffering of the other in Israel and Palestine had to deal with the situation that—against the original plan of the researchers—the political situation made it almost impossible for direct encounters with members of the opposite group. For a long period, they

worked separately within Israeli and Palestinian groups to study documents and discuss the suffering of the other group. Shifra Sagy and Michael Sternberg found out that this setting had significantly better results of empathy toward the other group than did direct encounters. Direct encounters often led to a situation where both groups felt that they had to defend their own nation.

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