


**CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN
POLITICAL ECONOMY**

AFRICAN
FOREIGN POLICIES
IN INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS



**EDITED BY
JASON WARNER
& TIMOTHY M. SHAW**



Contemporary African Political Economy

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“This rich collection of essays by an impressive group of diverse African and Western scholars is a substantial contribution to a much understudied field, and deserves to be widely read by scholars and practitioners.”

—Dr. Adekeye Adebajo, *Director, Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation, University of Johannesburg*

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“Shaw and Warner have studiously assembled a remarkable collection: well-conceived, impeccably executed, and all-encompassing in its breadth, depth, and significance. The book provides valuable insights from diverse perspectives on how African states conduct their foreign policies within international organizations, demonstrating how international organizations matter in a globalized world, and how African states can use them at sub-regional, continental, and global levels to advance their foreign policy objectives. This work will truly be acclaimed as a seminal contribution to our knowledge of the relationships between African states and international organizations.”

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“It no longer makes sense to talk of uniquely ‘African’ foreign policies nor to write off the impact of international organizations on the continent's politics. Instead, this book's case studies usefully illustrate the symbiotic relationship between African states and international organizations in the formulation and implementation of their foreign policies. They reveal how African heads of state increasingly have to compete with other actors to determine their country's foreign policies and the considerable variety of foreign policy strategies African states now adopt towards their peers and relevant international organizations.”

—Dr. Paul D. Williams, *Associate Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University*

This book is dedicated to Jim Hentz, a scholar, friend, and mentor.

FOREWORD

Conventionally, foreign policy is a set of strategies and actions conceived by a state or group of states to advance national, regional or global interests in interaction with other states and international organizations regarding any areas of human endeavor, including political, military, economic, social, cultural and environmental. Shaped by the relevant social forces determining it and in whose interest it is adopted, foreign policy is ultimately a reflection of the power dynamics in the national, regional, or global arenas. Thus, to speak of African foreign policy in international institutions, both African and global, is to interrogate its determinants, objectives, and beneficiaries. Through this volume of well-researched papers by both young and established scholars, Jason Warner and Timothy Shaw have done an excellent job in addressing these three issues with respect to the conduct of African foreign policies in and towards international organizations.

With respect to the determinants of foreign policy, I wholeheartedly endorse the volume's argument that "observers should understand African states to make foreign policy along broadly similar logics as do other non-African states." For a long time, Western scholars have had the tendency of treating Africa as a unique, if not abnormal, case in world politics. Our leaders were always portrayed as patrimonial and corrupt, as though patrimonialism, nepotism and corruption were unknown in other parts of the world, including the developed Western democracies. Foreign policy in African countries was usually portrayed as being

determined by the ruler's obsession with self-enrichment and regime security rather than national welfare and human security.

What this radical dichotomy between personal and national interests seemed to ignore is that regime security was in many cases threatened by foreign powers who did everything to keep in power those authoritarian and corrupt incumbents they liked, while they sought to overthrow leaders who were determined to use their countries' natural resources to improve the living conditions of their peoples. Examples of the latter case include the Suez crisis of 1956 and Western hostility to Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser; Western-backed military coups d'état against radical leaders like Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana) and Modibo Keita (Mali); and the assassinations of visionary leaders such as Félix Moumié (Cameroon), Patrice Lumumba (DRC), Louis Rwagasore (Burundi), Amílcar Cabral (Guinea-Bissau/Cape Verde), Thomas Sankara (Burkina Faso), and Chris Hani (South Africa).

In addition to advancing regime and national interests, African foreign policy objectives do include peace and security as well as economic cooperation and integration at the sub-regional and continental levels. Several of the contributions to the volume deal with these issues, including the role of the African Union (AU) through its Peace and Security Council (PSC) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in conflict prevention and peacekeeping, and the AU involvement in developing a continental foreign economic policy. Except for the East African Community (EAC) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the RECs seem to be more involved in peace and security matters than in economic integration and development. In both areas, a major weakness is their dependence on external funding, instead of mobilizing their own resources domestically.

The challenges facing the continent in both areas of peace and security and development include the fight against terrorism and improving the quality of life of ordinary people through developmental regionalism. The limits of the RECs in putting an end to terrorism and trans-border crimes such as drug and human trafficking have been exposed in both west Africa and the Horn of Africa. On the one hand, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), despite its positive contribution in ending civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, is currently unable to cope with the proliferation of terrorist groups in the sub-region and the staying power of drug traffickers in Guinea-Bissau and in the Sahel. On the other hand, the Intergovernmental Authority for

Development (IGAD) is incapable of coping with the Al Shabab insurgency, piracy and banditry in Somalia and Kenya. New sub-regional groups or arrangements are being created to deal with terrorism, particularly in ungoverned spaces such as the Liptako-Gourma border region between Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. These three countries, along with Mauritania and Chad, have established the G5 Sahel group to fight Jihadists and other criminal groups active within their borders.

One way of defeating the Jihadists and other transnational threats to security is to transform African economies so they could cease being dependent on the export of primary commodities and begin producing manufactured goods and thus generate more jobs. As outlined in the Lagos Plan of Action, such a strategy can best be achieved through economic cooperation and integration sub-regionally and regionally. At the present, the best strategy for attaining the goal of economic transformation in Africa is the 5 major priorities of the African Development Bank, which call for (1) electrifying Africa, (2) feeding Africa, (3) industrializing Africa, (4) integrating Africa, and (5) improving the well-being of Africans. The ADB is already involved in the funding of the Grand Inga project for the biggest hydroelectric dam in the world. If completed, it will have the capacity to generate 40,000 MW, or twice the power of the Three Gorges Dam in China, and furnish 40% of Africa's electricity. With its arable land, 80% of Africa's fresh water and other assets, Central Africa can feed the entire African continent. But, as Samir Amin has argued in most of his writings on Africa, the industrialization of African agriculture is the *sine qua non* of development and the amelioration of the standard of living of Africans.

Finally, with respect to the beneficiaries of African foreign policy, it is important to point out that African leaders, however self-centered or corrupt they might have been, did not consider foreign policy as designed exclusively for their own narrow interests. The most important achievement of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) was its unswerving opposition to colonialism and white minority rule. The organization provided moral and material support to liberation movements against Portuguese Fascism and white racism in southern Africa, and succeeded in ostracizing apartheid South Africa and having it excluded from many international organizations, including the Olympic Games. Detractors of the OAU must remember that despite its weaknesses, it succeeded in promoting peace and stability through the principle of the inviolability of the colonially-inherited borders and that of the

peaceful settlement of all interstate disputes by negotiations, mediation, conciliation, or arbitration. When it became evident that internal conflicts were the major issue, the OAU adopted in 1993 the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, which is the precursor to the AU's PSC.

It is also significant to note that African leaders betrayed their pan-African principles at the UN World Conference Against Racism (or Durban I) in 2001 by siding with their Western donors or "development partners" in refusing to endorse the demand for reparations for slavery by their brothers and sisters from the Diaspora. In this act, as in the lack of commitment to pan-African solidarity with victims of armed conflict or gross violations of human rights on the continent (Uganda under Idi Amin, Central African Republic under Bokassa, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, etc.), the OAU and the AU are not that much different from one another. The AU does in principle have beautiful documents on human rights, democracy, elections and governance, in addition to an increased role in internal conflicts as part of what former AU Chairperson Alpha Oumar Konaré once referred to as "the pan-African right of intervention in domestic conflicts" in cases of gross violations of human rights, but there are severe limits to its ability to do so. Like the OAU, it is still dependent on external funding for most of its programs.

Most of the issues raised in this foreword are discussed in detail in the chapters of this book. Readers will find it very thought-provoking and informative on African foreign policy in international institutions.

Chapel Hill, NC, US

Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja
University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill

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Introduction

African Foreign Policies and International Organizations: The View from the Twenty-First Century

Jason Warner

Beginning with Hegelian tropes describing Africa as a “land of childhood” and “enveloped in the dark mantle of night,” even the more ostensibly inclusive post-World War II Western academy found Africa as a generally an inadmissible, or at least, uninteresting, topic of study for a specialist of international relations (IR). This trend was squarely bucked in the post-Cold War era, with Christopher Clapham’s (1996) *Africa and the International System*, which remains the standard-bearer for rigorous analysis of African international relations. And, while no analogous single-authored works have approached the topic of African international relations as broadly, sundry edited volumes (Harbeson and Rothchild 2000; Dunn and Shaw 2001; Brown and Harmon 2013; Murithi 2014; Bischoff et al. 2015) have worked to bring African states into the mainstream of the study of IR. More narrowly, another series of excellent edited volumes—though

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now decades old—(Mazrui 1969; Shaw and Aluko 1984; Wright 1998; Khadiagala and Lyons 2001a) worked to interrogate the nature of African foreign policies more acutely. Concurrently, editions too numerous to be named individually have investigated the nature of foreign policy processes of larger African states, especially South Africa and Nigeria. While various factors account for the general aversion to the study of African foreign policies, – including problems associated with data collection, the difficulty of locating a purely “foreign” policy in many African states, and an apathy of Western scholars toward African foreign policy generally (Wright 1998: 1) – scant focus has been given to African foreign policies in the past several decades; nor have many of the sub-topics related thereto been investigated with rigor.

To that end, this volume addresses one of the most auspicious omissions of the still seemingly inchoate study of African international relations: how African states conduct their foreign policies in international organizations and international institutions. Thus, the contributors to this volume were presented with the following motivating questions: How do African states conduct their foreign policies within international institutions and organizations? What strategic utility do states attach to these institutions? In short, how do we understand the relationships between African states and international institutions and organizations at the sub-regional, pan-African, global, and non-governmental levels of analysis? More broadly, are there particular analytics, expectations, or logics that undergird the enactment of foreign policies in Africa? If so, in what ways might we apply insights from African experiences of statehood and statecraft to better understand the dynamics of foreign policies and international organizations in the world more broadly?

As an entry point to this edited volume, this introduction argues that while at one point in time, it might have been rightfully argued that there existed a uniquely “African” approach to the construction and effectuation of foreign policy—undergirded by what this piece refers to as the “Omnipotent African Executive” approach—the rise of a multiplicity of geopolitical actors over the past two decades has lessened the power of African executives, thus leading to more variegated African approaches to foreign policy—or what this chapter terms as the “Decentered Inputs” model of African foreign policy enactment. Precisely because of the contemporary diversity of inputs informing African foreign policy creation and effectuation, this introduction asserts that it is analytically unhelpful to attempt to corral under one

rubric the interpretation of a singular, monolithic “African” approach to foreign policymaking.

HISTORIC VIEWS OF AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES AND IOs: THE “OMNIPOTENT AFRICAN EXECUTIVE” MODEL

The prevailing orthodoxy in the limited study of African foreign policy-making over the past 30 years has been an assumption of the outstripped role of the executive, African head of state, in the creation of foreign policies. Or, as this chapter refers to the phenomenon, there has been a reliance on the “Omnipotent African Executive” model of foreign policy analysis. In brief, this paradigm for the study of African foreign policy understands that foreign policy has historically been made by African heads of state, who, wielding inordinate and often unchecked influence over the states and statist apparatuses over which they preside (generally due to a lack of democracy and/or an inordinate control of the military), could effectuate foreign policy decisions for their own personal benefit, rather than for the benefit of their country and its citizens. Indeed, an analysis of leadership by heads of state shows the long-held intuition of this model. Among others, the Omnipotent African Executive paradigm has been exemplified by broad and deep control of foreign policy by executives like Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire; Jean-Bédél Bokassa in the Central African Republic; Sani Abacha in Nigeria; Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea; Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe; Ali Omar Bongo of Gabon; Isaias Afiwerki of Eritrea; and, until January 2017, Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia. Given the above, the Omnipotent African Executive model has been an unsurprisingly salient way to think about the origins of African foreign policy, and one that understands African heads of state to be inextricably linked to African foreign policy construction and effectuation, and the primary reapers of its spoils, be they financial, reputational, or security related.

The Omnipotent African Executive trope of African foreign policy analysis is directly linked to the broader question of what constitutes “foreign policy” at all. A foundational—if not somewhat pedantic—statement at this point is the recognition that the construction and effectuation of “foreign policy” is an activity that is intrinsically undertaken by states themselves. Thus, though it might seem obvious, to understand what sorts of foreign policies have been produced on the African continent, one must inherently look at the nature of states and statist

apparatuses that create foreign policies. To that end, our discussion on African foreign policymaking—in international institutions or otherwise—must inherently begin at the emergence of the African state in the late 1950s and early 1960s and the sorts of playing fields that such sovereignties offered to African leaders as they ascended to power. More acutely, then, the Omnipotent African Executive mode of analysis is premised upon the notion that to the extent that a somewhat unique genre of “African” foreign policymaking exists, it is derived from the fact that Africa’s post-colonial states shared common features that were more or less unique to them, to include: late entry into the global system of states; independence by legal fiat of decolonization that required no exertion of Weberian control over territory; and a general lack of Lockean social contract between government and citizens. Put otherwise, the nature of the emergence of African states has had a direct bearing upon the nature of foreign policies that the leaders of these states have elected to pursue.

For his part, Clapham (1996) has offered one of the most thorough discussions of how the nature of the post-colonial African state engendered specific tendencies for foreign policy creation, centered on the whims of the leader. Once assuming the top executive office, African leaders, he argues, worked assiduously to command as much presence over the state and its institutions as possible, a process he refers to as the pursuit of “monopoly statehood” undertaken in the service of protecting newfound positions of power. Controlling new states’ foreign policymaking portfolios was especially valuable, given early African leaders’ omnipresent threat environment, which included rival politicians and their followers, elements of the national military, non-co-ethnic groups within the country, belligerent neighboring states, and imperialist global states. Thus, the protection of *individual* interests of leaders, most typically tied to regime security—and not broader *state* interests of geopolitical power maximization—became the desired ends that determined African foreign policymaking processes. Calculations about the utility of managing nascent states’ foreign relations meant that once assuming executive offices, African leaders realized:

[T]hey could use their role in the diplomatic game together with their internal resources, in order to help keep themselves in power, to extend their control over the national territory and to extract resources from their domestic environment with which to strike further bargains on the international scene. They could well have general moral goals such as the economic development and national unity of their states, or the achievement

of independence or majority rule for territories still under colonial or minority control, which their foreign and domestic economic policies were intended to achieve. They almost certainly had personal goals, such as glory or perhaps merely self-enrichment. But all of these depended on their ability to keep themselves going through the effective management of their external as well as their domestic environment. This was what foreign policy in African (and indeed most other) states was all about (Clapham 1996: 23).

Put in yet more explicit terms, Khadiagala and Lyons (2001b: 5) describe that:

African foreign policy decision making has always been the province of leading personalities. Foreign policy as the prerogative of presidents and prime ministers has dovetailed with post-colonial patterns of domestic power consolidation...The charismatic leader became the source, site, and embodiment of foreign policy... From this perspective, foreign policymaking emerged as a tool for leaders to both disarm their political opponents and compensate for unpopular domestic beliefs.

The Omnipotent African Executive Model: African Foreign Policies and IOs

Assuming that the Omnipotent African Executive paradigm of foreign policy analysis is true, we can also expect to derive useful sets of expectations about how African states will formulate foreign policies toward international organizations. If it is true that African foreign policies are primarily derived from leaders whose primary goals are regime security, then we can expect that: a) when African states create IOs, these IOs will hold as their primary goal to ensure regime security; b) that if many African leaders across the continent feel both insecure and can control foreign policy apparatuses, they might work together to protect mutual regime security via IOs and; c) given the primacy of regime security over statecraft, African foreign policy goals toward IOs will be rather narrow in scope.

Given these predictions of the Omnipotent African Executive model, do we see these played out in reality? Yes: the historical record indicates the profound saliency of this model in the analysis of early African foreign policy action, wherein African states understood IOs to be primarily useful for the protection of incumbent regimes. To that end, a review of the creation of African IOs—especially the Organization of

African Unity (OAU) in 1963—gives tremendous credence to the Omnipotent African Executive model of foreign policy analysis. While space does not permit a thorough elucidation of the history of organization, its founding Charter (OAU 1963) vaunted, above all, non-interference, non-intervention, the respect and inviolability of colonial borders, and non-critique of member regimes. In the decades following its inception, the OAU's constituent decision to remain “ingloriously silent” (Haggis 2009) led it, and the broader intra-African community, to bear silent witness when state leaders such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Idi Amin of Uganda, Moussa Traouré of Mali, Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Jean-Bédél Bokassa of the Central African Republic, and Omar al-Bashir of Sudan ravaged their populations of wealth, security, and representative governance, only rarely challenging the right of these leaders to rule. In no uncertain terms, the OAU served to ossify the privileged positions of African heads of state: perhaps no wonder then that it was often ignominiously referred to as “African Dictator’s Club.”

CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN FOREIGN POLICIES AND IOs: THE RISE OF THE DECENTERED INPUTS MODEL

While the Omnipotent African Executive paradigm of African foreign policy analysis has been shown to have had merits during a certain era, the general dearth of academic studies attempting to understand African foreign policies over the decades has meant that the literature has not moved much beyond this trope. Although it accurately described the period of African foreign policy creation and effectuation for a certain period of post-colonial history, it is here argued that this no longer the case.

Instead, the more appropriate way to think about the ways that African states now formulate their policies toward IOs and otherwise is via what this chapter calls the “Decentered Inputs” model of African foreign policymaking. In contrast to the Omnipotent African Executive Model, this chapter proposes this paradigm to accurately account for the sundry forces of globalization that have, in essence, “flattened” the capacity of some (though not all) African leaders to unilaterally commandeer the foreign policies of their states for their exclusive benefits. The Decentered Inputs approach therefore argues that African foreign policies in the twenty-first century are more rightly characterized by a proliferation of inputs—described presently—which, when combined with the still

unconsolidated nature of some states, render the logics and expectations of African foreign policymaking to be underwritten by diverse objectives and varied inputs, and thus to be non-monolithic in character.

If we propose to move away from the understanding of foreign policy as determined primarily African leaders for the purposes of regime security, what inputs should we then turn towards? This chapter suggests that a combination of the emergence of new actors, on one hand, and shifts in the geopolitical landscape, on the other, were collectively responsible for the inauguration of the new “Decentered Inputs” era of African foreign policy creation. First, the emergence of new – and sometimes newly powerful – actors has been one catalyst in taking away some foreign policymaking power from executives. Among others, these new and newly powerful actors include African bureaucracies and ministries (foreign affairs, economics, national planning, public health); national militaries; national and local civil society groups (related to economic development, gender, and education); global diasporas; think tanks; media; and universities. Simultaneously, parallel forms of traditional, pre-colonial governance continue to challenge the validity of the African state, while the rise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) fill in for the state, and multinational corporations (MNCs) operate with budgets that can easily overwhelm the state. Moreover, the rise of conservative religious movements to include Pentecostalism in the Christian tradition and Salafism in the Islamic tradition and new insurgencies of both religious and secular bent all work in tandem to further flatten the foreign policymaking space, wresting certain amounts of agency away from leaders who historically had profound control. (For more on the increasingly disperse inputs into African foreign policy formation, see: Shaw in Chapter 25 of this volume).

Second, shifts in the post-colonial geopolitical environment have also worked to weaken African executive authority over foreign policymaking processes. Among others, we might rightly cite the rise of fiscal interventions by the international financial institutions (IFIs) in African states in the early 1980s as some of the most powerful catalysts in reducing the unilateral foreign policymaking power of African executives. Through the IFIs’ introduction of structural adjustment policies (SAPs)—which demanded of privatization of state-run enterprises and reduction of state bureaucracies—they served to weakened African leaders’ networks for patrimonial relations. The end of the Cold War also hastened the weakening of the omnipotence of the African executive in foreign policymaking, with the departure of the superpowers reducing capacities for clientelistic rents,

while the normative pressures engendered by the global Third Wave of Democratization in the 1990s began to call into question the viability of authoritarian tendencies. Nearly two decades into the 21st century, the rise of the internet has engendered new forms of civil society capability to challenge the omnipotence of governments, while the emergence of new non-African actors—especially China, but also Brazil, India, and Turkey—has diversified foreign policy options, all while populist politics in the US, the U.K., and France seem determined to rattle the foundations of the post-World War II liberal global order.

Taken together, this combination of new actors and geopolitical shifts have led to a “flattening” of authority as concerns African foreign policymaking, in IOs and otherwise. The result has been far less predictable African foreign policies. In short, given the broader array of inputs into foreign policy decision-making processes, the expectation that an African state’s foreign policy (in IOs or otherwise) is intended to primarily protect its leader is no longer accurate. Indeed, this flattening of the African foreign policy to space to “de-center” African executives means that it has thus become more difficult to talk about a particularly “African” foreign policy analytic or tendency at all.

The Decentered Inputs Model: African Foreign Policies and IOs

Moving forward, given this assertion that the interpretation of the contemporary study of African foreign policy is best understood through the Decentered Inputs model, what does this suggest about the foreign policymaking tendencies of African states toward IOs? In the simplest terms, it can be argued that, for decades, we have seen a decline in the pursuit of primarily individualist goals in the context of IOs, to include a diversity of other aspirations. For one, there has been a greater push for certain liberal pursuits within African IOs, which oftentimes impinge upon the protection of African sovereigns that once stood as these IOs’ core purpose. Perhaps most emblematic of the disbanding of an interpretation of IOs as protecting regimes is the nature of the African Union (AU), which replaced the OAU in 2001. Most acutely, the AU has fundamentally challenged the historical notions of the primacy of African regime security in three important ways. First, the transmutation from the OAU to the AU was accompanied by an ideological shift in the very meaning of “security.” Thus, the AU abandoned the OAU’s definition of “security” as being defined by state (i.e. regime-centered) security to security as defined in

terms of human (i.e. citizen-centered) security. Second, haunted by its failures in relation to the 1994 Rwandan genocide that killed 800,000, the AU secondarily challenged the historical notion of regime protection by creating a dense web of collective security institutions called the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), many of which are discussed in other chapters. Most innovative in this regard was the AU's Constitutive Act (2001), and its much-discussed Article 4(h), which—in contrast to the historical dictates of non-intervention espoused by the OAU—allows for AU intervention into a member state, in the event of “grave circumstances, including war crimes, genocide, or crimes against humanity.” Third, and outside of the traditional realm of collective security, the AU's creation of institutions to promote and monitor democratization—including the African Governance Architecture (AGA) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)—signaled a profound departure—at least nominally—from the days of the “African Dictator's Club.”

In the 21st century African states have also been shown to think about IOs as being useful for more traditional, statist power-maximization purposes, which extend beyond the interests of the individual leader. Thus, the impact of these variegated inputs into African foreign policies means that African international organizations are no longer simply perceived of as empty organizational shells into which African bureaucrats and emissaries file aimlessly, but rather, African IOs are increasingly the sites of foreign policy contestation and state power pursuits. Within the AU, for instance, one sees African power players like Algeria exerting a *de facto* hegemony on the role of the Commissioner for the African Union's Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), while, flouting rules that suggest it must rotate, Nigeria has secured a *de facto* permanent seat on the Peace and Security Council. The contentious 2012 election of South African Nkosazana-Dlamini Zuma to serve as the Chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC) broke a precedent of non-competition for the post, which reached an even greater apex in the 2016 and 2017 elections, which were so competitive that the AU required two rounds of voting after no successful candidate emerged in the first round. So too are regional organizations the sites of *realpolitik* wrangling, with pursuits of state power coming from South Africa in the management of SADC; Nigerian hegemony in ECOWAS; and Ethiopian management of IGAD. Concurrently, other regional mid-level states within these sub-regional hierarchies have also sought to challenge these traditionally neorealist, power maximization proclivities, with Zimbabwe challenging

South Africa; Senegal and Ghana challenging Nigeria; and Eritrea and Sudan often challenging Ethiopia.

THE SECOND IMAGE REVERSED: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS' IMPACTS ON AFRICAN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES

At this point, it also bears the explicit statement that observers should no longer interpret African IOs—especially the AU—as but a sum of its member states' interests, but indeed, as organizations that can impact the very contours of African states' domestic politics themselves, or in the analogy of Gourevitch (1978), the “second image reversed.” For instance, we have seen ECOWAS work to delegitimize unconstitutional changes of government in Burkina Faso (2014) and most notably, lead the ECOMIG military force to oust long-time Gambian leader Yahya Jammeh in early 2017; simultaneously, it has assiduously worked on a security sector reform program within its member state of Guinea-Bissau. SADC's intervention into member state Lesotho (1998), as well as the leading (if not utterly failed) role of IGAD in mediating the South Sudan peace process have been evidence of such attempts by African IOs to inform their member states' domestic politics. Indeed, a feedback loop exists where in African domestic politics engender specific foreign policies toward IOs, which in turn create policies that bear upon the domestic and foreign policies of African states themselves.

For their part, the capacity of global international organizations to fundamentally alter both the foreign policies and domestic politics of African countries cannot be overstated. Though not entirely unknown, it has only been in rare instances that African states have succeeded individually or collectively to determine the actions and policies of global IOs. African states' general exclusion from centers of power of global IOs is institutionally mandated in mechanisms such as the structure of the UN Security Council (UNSC), the nature of donor influence in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the perceptions of being targets rather than informers of the International Criminal Court's (ICC) version of justice. Indeed, even the casual observer of international politics can recognize how the International Monetary Fund's late twentieth-century structural adjustment policies fundamentally informed—if not underwrote—African foreign policies by altering domestic contours of

relationships between states and civil societies; advocating for export-oriented development strategies; compelling African states to adopt generally neoliberal strategies of governance and human rights; and more broadly, urging institutionalization of similar regional organizations to accomplish such global IOs' goals within the continent.

INTERROGATING IO TO IO RELATIONSHIPS

Finally, observers should also move beyond thinking simply about the relationship between African states' foreign policies and IOs—and vice versa—to also consider how IO to IO relationships on and off the continent display forms of dynamism, innovation, and at times, dysfunction. On the continent, for instance, we see the process of learning and mimicry occurring between IOs. The most notable example, for instance, is the ways in which the AU has learned from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) at various points in its incarnation. Most notably, ECOWAS is credited for having created the first truly robust interstate collective security regime on the continent with the institution of its 1990 intervention in Liberia, an approach to peacekeeping and intervention that the newly-formed AU has adopted as its centerpiece. More recently, the AU has also borrowed from ECOWAS on fiscal matters, with the ECOWAS community levy being adopted in 2016's so-called Kaberuka Plan for the self-financing of the AU. More broadly, the capacity of African IOs to learn from one another has led to the proliferation of African IOs at the subregional level, where processes of standard setting and path dependence have led to regionalized IOs (also known as the RECs), which are generally expected to contain security and economic functions, and have an innate relationship with the AU. Outside of the continent, the AU has also learned from the UN, modeling its 15-member Peace and Security Council off of the UN Security Council.

Beyond IOs learning from one another, it is also important to bring to the fore the fact that collectivities of African states often wage foreign policy battles and forge foreign policy alliances against and within global IOs through African IOs. For instance, African desires to reform the UN Security Council come in the form of the AU-led Ezulwini Consensus (2005), while certain African antipathies for the International Criminal Court have come through collectivizing efforts of the AU.

SYNTHESIS

To recall then, this brief introduction has shown that despite the historic prevalence and (one-time) accuracy of the Omnipotent African Executive paradigm of the analysis of African foreign policy, a combination of newly powerful actors and geopolitical shifts over the past three decades have worked to “de-center” foreign policymaking to other poles of power within society beyond simply the executive. As such, in the current moment, African foreign policymaking (towards IOs and otherwise) should be understood to exist in a new era of “Decentered Inputs.” What then are the implications of this shift for our understanding of the broader processes of African foreign policymaking, especially in IOs?

Most acutely, this volume emphasizes that observers can no longer rightly talk of a monolithic “African vision” of foreign policymaking. Thus, the current volume makes the point that there is nothing inherently “unique” about African states and, therefore, the foreign policies that they produce. Indeed, by categorizing African states as somehow outside of the purview of the post-World War II geo-historical moment, we reify their existence as anomalous, insufficient, or engaged in a process of hopeless mimicry. Instead, this chapter argues that we understand African states to make foreign policy along broadly similar logics as do other non-African states. Like non-African polities, African states pursue similar goals of neorealist power maximization, institutionalist (or neoliberal institutionalist) cooperation, or intersubjective constructivist interactions. Foreign policymaking in the contemporary moment, it is assumed, has no innately “African incarnation.”

To the end of normalizing the ways that observers understand the processes and logics underwriting African foreign policymaking, chapters contained in this volume make ardent cases for the banality of African foreign policy approaches to both African and global institutions. For instance, Obi makes the case for Nigeria’s pursuit of its neo-realist hegemonic pursuits in ECOWAS, Murithi does the same for the role of South Africa in SADC, and Bereketeab and Woldemariam make similar claims in the case of Ethiopia and IGAD.

And yet, despite these claims of African foreign policymaking non-exceptionalism, this is not to suggest that African states are worth being overlooked as having nothing to reveal about foreign policies or IOs. Instead, chapter authors bring to the fore other innovative African state

foreign policy behavior. Writing on Djibouti, Le Gouriellec underlines the country's innovative approach to African IOs, using them as a means to small power-diplomacy in balancing relations with major states, on one hand, and pursuing Bayartian processes of extraversion, on the other. Malaquias presents a novel thesis on Angola's policy of "strategic distancing" from African IOs, while Bodian and Kelly interrogate how various Senegalese administrations have sought to capitalize on the country's credentials of soft power, a phenomenon rarely examined in African contexts. For her part, Lockwood shows how even a "middle" state within a region, Zimbabwe, is able to extract concessions from its regional IO, while Peters and Mbida Mbida show how a regional middle state like Cameroon has used global institutions like the International Court of Justice to constrain regional power Nigeria. For their parts, Clark and Palmateer succeed in demonstrating how even weak states in the arguably non-coherent Central African region leverage IOs for their benefits.

LAYOUT

This edited collection proceeds in three main sections. The first section retains an acute focus on the nature of African foreign policymaking toward *African* international organizations, namely the AU and African regional economic communities. Therein, the first three chapters focus exclusively on the AU, with chapters on the nexuses of: foreign policymaking and security concerns in the AU (Okeke); foreign policymaking and economic development (Akonor); and foreign policymaking and democratization in the AU (Landsberg). Before moving to an exclusive focus on the RECs, two chapters look at foreign policymaking at the nexus between the AU and RECs, including how states understand comparative strategic benefits between the AU and RECs (Warner) and the role of the RECs in governments of national unity (Noyes). The next four chapters focus acutely on RECs, and how their members understand the strategic utility (or inutility) of these organizations when they attempt to pursue their foreign policy goals. Chapters include those on the Economic Community of West African States or ECOWAS (Momodu); the Intergovernmental Authority on Development or IGAD (Bereketeab); the Economic Community of Central African States or ECCAS (Clark and Palmateer); and the Southern African Development Community or SADC (Murithi).

The second section of the volume moves beyond African IOs to look at how African states undertake their foreign policy pursuits with *global*

IOs. Chapters in this section investigate African state interactions with the United Nations, especially in the protection of peace and security (Stewart and Andersen); African states' newfound agency vis-a-vis the World Bank (Samuda); Africa's relationship with the International Criminal Court, using the case of South Africa (Du Plessis and Gevers); and the little-understood interactions between the International Labor Organization and African states, particularly in Kenya (Bernards). So as not to exclude the important role of non-governmental international organizations and African foreign policymaking processes, we focus on the interactions between Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and South Africa (Anderson).

The third section is the longest, and the most straightforward: herein, we leverage the expertise of country specialists to not only describe, but also to theorize and analyze individual African states' foreign policy relations with IOs. Moving around the continent, we begin in southern Africa with a chapter on South Africa (Akokpari) followed by investigations of Zimbabwe (Lockwood) and Angola (Malaquias). Next, we head to the Democratic Republic of Congo (Gallo), then to west Africa, with studies on Nigeria (Obi), Senegal (Bodian and Kelly), and finally, Cameroon (Peter and Mbida). Finally, we conclude in Ethiopia (Woldemariam) and Djibouti (Le Gouriellec). To conclude, one of the progenitors of the study of African foreign policy (Shaw) offers suggestions about the future of African foreign policies vis-a-vis international organizations.

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PART I

African Foreign Policies in African
International Institutions



CHAPTER 2

An Ambivalence to the Norm Cycle: The African Union’s “New” Approach to Continental Peace and Security

Jide Martyns Okeke

Since its establishment, the African Union (AU) has often been described as a regional organization embedded with a “new” pan-African vision of collective security: The new outlook it has on sovereignty and collective responsibility to protect renders it a so-called “normative entrepreneur.” Based on the concept of “sovereignty as responsibility,” which is anchored on a shift of focus from state security to human security, the AU stands as a stark departure, at least conceptually, from its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Particularly, observers have cited the AU’s new normative and institutional frameworks as evidence of the continental body’s privileging of human security over state security, to include: Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act; the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA); the African Governance Architecture (AGA); and the recently espoused Agenda 2063 and its immediate goal of “silencing the guns” by 2020. Moreover, the AU’s

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actions in the field of peace and security suggest a similar newfound commitment. For instance, from 2013 to 2017, the African Union's Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) has mandated the deployment of more than 80,000 uniformed and civilian personnel to theaters of operation including Somalia, Mali, Burundi, Central African Republic, and Western Sahara, and the AU has also undertaken various mediation efforts in countries like Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), South Sudan, and Sudan aimed at finding lasting political solutions to these crisis-affected countries. While all of these measures seem to validate the credibility, prominence, and recognition of the AU as a central player in peace and security in Africa, as well as a norm entrepreneur, how accurate is this interpretation? Does the AU actually offer a new model for the pursuit of collective security?

Despite the laudable and sometimes watershed decisions that the AU has taken to address continental security challenges, this chapter argues that in fact, the AU has been constrained in its ability to encourage members to fully internalize the norms of "sovereignty as responsibility" and the prioritization of human security over regime security. In the main, this chapter assesses the degree of transformation of the norm cycle from the OAU to the AU. It argues that even though the AU has embraced certain legal and normative instruments focusing on a "people-centered" collective security (seemingly indicative of a normative change) its members policies have, in practice, been fundamentally implemented based on the pursuit of national self-interest (suggesting that such a transformation is incomplete). To show this, the first section provides an overview of the three stages of the norm cycle. The second section gives a historical perspective on the transition of the norms from the OAU to the AU. The third section provides a case study of the implementation of the norm cycle in the crisis in Burundi. A final section concludes.

THE NORM CYCLE: A CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW

Norms have assumed a central role in understanding the effectiveness of international and regional organizations like the AU. Historically, the discourse around norms has always been relevant in the study of international politics but remained either contested in definition by those who study them, or, conversely, discounted entirely as being unimportant by realist scholars. However, the importance of normative interests in the study of international institutions has been established in various

empirical and theoretical postulations since the close of World War II (Martin and Simmons 1998). The study of norms—defined broadly as formal or informal standards of appropriate behavior for entities within specific systems—as applied to international organizations, was popularized by social constructivists like Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), who argued that the emergence and adoption of norms in international organizations could be understood as occurring in three stages: norm emergence, norm cascade, and norm internationalization. The first stage consists of the “emergence” of the norm, achieved through the leadership of norm entrepreneurs. Within the context of an international or regional organization, the leadership of specific individuals or states—“norm entrepreneurs”—with diverse sets of motivations, may inspire others of the need to embrace the adoption and promotion of particular norms. For example, the history of genocide and internecine violent conflicts in Africa may have inspired some of its leaders to push for the transformation from the OAU to a more robust African Union capable of preventing and effectively responding to future crisis situations.

The second stage of the norm cycle is “cascading,” where states begin to undertake peer learning or a “dynamic of imitation” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 895), as some of the norm entrepreneurs attempt to promulgate the adoption and implementation of these norms. In the case of AU, it can be argued that African governments decided to adopt a robust Constitutive Act in recognition of the need to promote “a stable, peaceful, and prosperous” continent through a collective responsibility aimed at primarily resolving crisis situations through African leadership. As Finnemore and Sikkink argue, a “combination of pressure for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire for state leaders to enhance their self-esteem” may facilitate norm cascades (1998: 895). The final stage of the norm cycle is the “internalization” of the behavior or sets of standards. This refers to the completion of the norm cycle, where actors no longer discuss the appropriateness or viability of a norm, but rather, the norm is consensually adopted and comes to form part of the expected standards of behavior.

Of course, the significance of norms in international politics as articulated by social constructivists has not received universal acceptance. Realist scholars continue to emphasize the relevance and necessity for the inclusion of the pursuit of state interests as the main drivers for understanding the promulgation and implementation of norms in international organizations (Morgenthau 1946; Guzzini 1998; Krasner 1995).

Yet, norms have remained a useful analytic for providing an understanding of order (Dunne 1998) and transnational relations (Risse-Kappen 1995) in international society. For the purposes of this chapter, the discourse of norms provides a useful analytical framework through which to understand the socialization at process by the AU member states in the promotion of norms aimed at embracing sovereignty as responsibility and human security in order to achieve regional security and stability. The next section provides a historical overview of the evolution of these norms through the transformation of the OAU to the AU.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE OAU TO THE AU: FROM STATE SOVEREIGNTY TO SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY

The establishment of the OAU in 1963 was an affirmation of the need to safeguard African state sovereignty. At the dawn of post-colonial independence, there was a move—mostly led by new heads of state—to enshrine a statist conception of continental unity within African international organizations. It was the protection of sovereignty irrespective of the domestic political structures of individual African states that made the establishment of the OAU possible (Clapham 1996). Contrary to any pretension of conceding state sovereignty to the supranational organization, Article 3(2) of the OAU Charter explicitly stipulates the “non-interference in the internal affairs of States” and the “respect of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence” (OAU 1963). The OAU’s enshrining of a profound respect for state sovereignty and a commitment to the inviolability of borders sought to both forestall aggressive border disputes between African states while also protecting their sovereignty from potentially neo-imperial non-African states.

With the OAU setting standards for behavior, post-colonial Africa did indeed enjoy a general adherence to the principle of absolute sovereignty and the concomitant non-interference of OAU members in the domestic affairs of other member states. However, there were a few exceptions to this rule. For example, in 1979, Tanzania invaded Uganda to facilitate the overthrow of Idi Amin. Not only did Julius Nyerere, one of Africa’s most articulate and respected leaders, flout the principle of non-interference, but he defended his actions in terms of guaranteeing the security

of his border (Wheeler 2000). Overall, the principle of non-interference trumped intervention in the domestic affairs of African states by the OAU during the immediate post-colonial and Cold War eras.

The role of extra-African actors remained an important dimension in the root causes of instability in crisis-affected post-colonial states. Contrary to the “peace dividend” that was expected to accompany the end of the Cold War, the immediate post-Cold War era saw an increase in violent conflicts in Africa (Adedeji 1999). Hitherto rare interstate conflicts emerged in the cases of Nigeria–Cameroon over the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula (1996); Ethiopia–Eritrea (1998–2000) over contested areas near Badme; and potential territorial disputes between Namibia and Botswana. There was also a renewal of previous inactive internal conflicts and the escalation of new violent conflicts (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1997), some of which rapidly assumed an intractable regional dimension. For example, neighboring countries are allegedly involved in the ongoing civil war in the DRC, often referred to as “Africa’s First World War.” Other patterns of regional conflicts sometimes involved the role of individual states in ongoing civil wars. For instance, states like Ethiopia, Uganda, Eritrea, Libya, and Chad were involved in the civil wars in Sudan, traditionally assumed to be fought primarily between the Sudanese government and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (Woodward 2003). Some of these neighboring states—especially Chad, Eritrea, and Libya—have continued to influence the conflict dynamics in the ongoing crisis in Darfur (Marchal 2007).

Despite the OAU’s commitment to non-intervention, post-colonial patterns of violent conflict nevertheless began to prompt regional and international interventions. The most notable example of a regional intervention was the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) peacekeeping missions in Liberia in 1990 and Sierra Leone in 1997. While such intra-African interventions indeed flout state sovereignty, African states soon proved to be more receptive to intervention by other African states than the prospect of intervention from outside the continent (Adebajo and Landsberg 2001; Mazrui 1967). These moves by African international organizations nevertheless did not prevent varying forms of outside intervention from occurring on the continent, including direct military engagements like the USA’s 1993 incursion in Somalia and British intervention in Sierra Leone in 1997.

The proliferation of violent conflicts in the immediate post-Cold War era, followed by interventions from within and outside the continent, impacted the development of the OAU in two significant ways. First, the OAU's Commission for Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration, putatively suited for such addressing disputes, could not adequately address the challenges that emanated from intrastate conflicts. Not only was its framework never intended for the management of intrastate conflicts, but the Commission was never even fully activated, and thus, was generally considered to have been moribund (Adebajo and Landsberg 2001; Clapham 1996). This failure of the OAU's Commission for Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration informed the establishment of the OAU's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, which emerged in 1993. But again, apart from its bias toward *prevention* of conflicts as opposed to peacekeeping in the *aftermath* of conflicts, the OAU conflict maintenance system experienced severe shortcomings. These were related to financial and logistical constraints and the lack of cooperation from internal parties in the case of intrastate conflicts (Adebajo and Landsberg 2001; Clapham 1996). Second, the OAU's purportedly strict non-interference principle was repeatedly breached—as discussed in the case of Tanzania's intervention into Uganda and the ECOMOG intervention forces in west Africa—thus leading some African leaders to begin to rethink both the underlying notion of traditional sovereignty and the institutional significance of the OAU as a whole.

With a view towards rectifying the past insufficiencies of the OAU, on July 9, 2002, fifty-three African leaders inaugurated the AU in Durban, South Africa as a continental substitute to the OAU. This was in accordance with the March 2001 meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU in Sirte, Libya, where the establishment of a new pan-African body, the African Union, was declared. Importantly, a major constitutional change inherent in the adoption of the AU Constitutive Act was a doctrinal shift in the traditional principle of non-interference to a “right to intervene” among African states. Specifically, Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act empowered African states, in accordance with decision of the Assembly, with the right to intervene “in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (AU Constitutive Act 2002). Accordingly, the AUPSC was established to replace the almost moribund OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. The AUPSC is “a collective security and early-warning

arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in Africa” (African Union 2002). Composed of fifteen member states (of which ten are elected to serve for two years and five are elected to serve for three years), the PSC makes recommendations to the African Union Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the highest organ of the AU.

The transition from the OAU to the AU and its attendant constitutional and institutional re-arrangement appear to have significantly—but not wholly—altered how states think about sovereignty and non-interference. Within the framework of the norm cycle, the birth of the AU has led to a conceptual transition of traditional norms to an emergence of norms associated with sovereignty as responsibility and non-indifference. In practice, the norm cycle appears to demonstrate that even though these norms have “cascaded,” especially in the ability of the AU to respond to crises through the deployment of peace support operations, AU member states have not “internalized” these norms. Instead, their implementation remains welded to the dictates of state sovereignty, which may be attributable to several factors, including the lack of influential norm entrepreneurs. The ambivalence of the norm cycle associated with the promotion of sovereignty as responsibility and the principle of non-indifference will be covered in the next section.

ANALYSIS OF NORM CYCLE THROUGH THE LENS OF THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS

The emergence, cascading, and possible internalization of the AU’s normative posture of sovereignty as responsibility and non-indifference can be assessed (although not exclusively), through the practice of AU peace support operations. In this area, the AU has been internationally recognized as an important actor, especially in the promotion of continental peace and security. In a 2015 report by the UN Secretary General on the recommendations of the High-Level Panel on Peace Operations, the importance of the AU as a key regional partner was re-iterated. The AU’s partnership with the UN is underpinned by “consultative decision-making and appropriate common strategies for an integrated response to conflict based on comparative advantage, transparency, accountability and respect for international norms and standards” (UN 2015: 20). Indeed, one of the most widely recognized roles of the AU in the promotion of continental peace and security is in the area of peace

operations in general, and specifically, in the deployment of high-intensity peace support operations as a first responder to crisis situations. However, as this section will highlight, the AU has not been fully capable of facilitating the full internalization of these norms within its individual members.

Before highlighting the extent of its insufficiencies, we must reiterate that the AU and APSA have indeed demonstrated laudable willingness to deploy to crisis situations in Africa. The Peace and Security Council, which is the AU's primary decision-making organ when it comes to peace and security, has mandated or authorized ten peace missions in Africa since 2003 (as illustrated in the Table 2.1). In this respect, the AU has mandated or authorized the deployment of more than 80,000 uniformed and civilian personnel in various crisis situations on the continent. The AU has also demonstrated its commitment to develop institutions that allow for more predictable responses to imminent or actual violations of human rights, including the full operational readiness of the African Standby Force. In addition, the Assembly of Heads of States and Government decided, in 2013, to establish the African Capacity for the Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC). It was created as a transitional arrangement pending the establishment of the African Standby Force rapid deployment capability (ASF-RDC). Accordingly, the ACIRC has also been operationalized through the conduct of a Command Post Exercise and participation, at the tactical level, in the AMANI Africa II Field Training Exercise in 2015. Both the ASF-RDC and the ACIRC represent attempts by the AU to respond to crisis situations across the continent, including through the robust use of force. They further suggest that the AU may have moved from the norm of traditional sovereignty and non-intervention to sovereignty as responsibility and non-indifference as the foundation for regional security and stability.

The African Union as a Norm Entrepreneur: Inconsistencies in Burundi

Despite the progress made by the AU in promoting these norms promoting sovereignty as responsibility, empirical evidence seems to suggest that the implementation of people-centered security and non-indifference to violations of human rights has not been fully internalized by

Table 2.1 AU Mandated or Authorized Peace Support Operations

<i>SER</i>	<i>Mission</i>	<i>Duration</i>	<i>Mandate</i>
1	African Union Mission in Burundi	April 2003 to June 2004	Supervise, observe, monitor and verify implementation of ceasefire agreement
2	African Union Mission in Sudan	October 2004 to December 2007	Contribute to the general security, delivery of humanitarian relief in Darfur; monitoring ceasefire and peace agreements
3	African Union Mission for Support to the Elections in Comoros	March 2006 to June 2006	Provide secure environment for the 2006 elections in Comoros
4	African Union Mission in Somalia	January 2007 to Date	To support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia; protection of federal institutions and civilians; security for key infrastructure
5	African Union Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros	May 2007 to October 2008	Support secure environment and monitoring of election process
6	United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur	July 2007 to Date	Contribute to security situation and humanitarian relief
7	Regional Task Force of the African Union led Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA)	March 2012 to Date	Conduct counter-LRA operations and protect civilians
8	African-led International Support Mission to Mali	January 2013 to June 2013	Support restoration of state authority and protect civilians
9	African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic	December 2013 to September 2014	Support restoration of state authority and protect civilians
10	Multinational Joint Task force of the Lake Chad Basin Commission against Boko Haram	January 2015 to Date	Conduct operations aimed at preventing the expansion of Boko Haram

Adapted from De Coning et al. (2016)

member states. In short, beyond the repeated expression of concerns by the PSC during a growing crisis within an AU member state, and the suspension of a member state from the AU, the implementation of the decisions by the PSC to deploy a peace support operation within a country have been dependent on the consent of the host state. Put otherwise, the AU has not proven capable of actually upholding the norms it purports to espouse. In other words, the AU responses to crisis have been largely based on Article 4(j) of the Constitutive Act, where there is a *request by the state* authorities to address a crisis. The evocation of Article 4(h) principle of *unilateral intervention* without the consent of the target state, in the rare attempt that it has occurred, proved difficult to implement overwhelming because of the unwillingness of the target state.

As an example of the AU's incomplete progress through the norm cycle, one need only refer to its approach to the recent crisis in Burundi. Following President Pierre Nkurunziza's April 2015 decision to run for a third-term despite limits against doing so, protests erupted in the country leading to standoffs between government and civil society, which generated an estimated 200,000 refugees and created a culture of instability in the country. In December 2015, the AUPSC issued a communiqué on the crisis in Burundi. This communiqué was regarded as ground breaking in at least three respects: First, the PSC decided to deploy the African Prevention and Protection Mission in Burundi (MAPROBU), with an anticipation of consent from the Government of Burundi. In previous AU mandated peace support operations, the application of Article 4(j) has often been done following consultations with and at the invitation of the host government. Rather, the PSC based its decision on the preparatory work undertaken within the framework of the contingency planning carried out by the AU Commission and the degeneration of the security situation, especially the growing levels of violence against civilian populations protesting Nkurunziza's proposed third term. The second unique feature of the Communiqué was that it took an unprecedented step to impose a timeline, within which the Government of Burundi had to consent to the deployment of MAPROBU. In this respect, the Communiqué urged the "Government of Burundi to confirm, within 96 hours following the adoption of this Communiqué, its acceptance of the deployment of MAPROBU and to cooperate fully with the Mission..." Again, this represented a bold step

by the PSC following guidance from the AU Commission to initiate measures that were consistent with the normative and legal provisions of the AU Constitutive Act, but was at odds with the respect for traditional sovereignty of an AU member state.

The third unique feature of the Communiqué was that it opened the possibility for the first ever-unilateral intervention by the AU in order to prevent and respond to gross violations of human rights, under Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act. Specifically, the Council decided that, “in the event of non-acceptance of the deployment of MAPROBU, to recommend to the Assembly of the Union, in accordance with the powers which are conferred to Council, jointly with the Chairperson of the Commission, under Article 7(e) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC, the implementation of Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act relating to intervention in a Member State in certain serious circumstances.” This Communiqué on Burundi was a watershed because of the symbolism in demonstrating the role of the AU as a norm entrepreneur guided by its commitment to advancing the promotion of sovereignty as responsibility and non-indifference. This is despite the widespread belief that the implementation of the Article 4(h) provision of the AU Constitutive Act will always be different due to various political, legal, and procedural constraints (Williams 2015, 2016).

Despite the innovation of this proposal, however, the AU ultimately did not actually deploy MAPROBU. For a combination of reasons—related to lobbying from Gambia’s Yaya Jammeh and the harsh realities of dealing with member states’ interests—in January 2016, the AU’s member states ultimately decided not to deploy the intervention.

Challenges in the Implementation of the AU’s Norm of Non-Indifference

Having seen in the case of Burundi the incomplete internalization of the norm cycle, what factors can account for this situation?

While numerous issues could be detailed to explain the limited political will to implement sovereignty as responsibility, one of most perennial problems is the financing of peace support operations through AU member states’ assessed contributions. The resources required for the implementation of PSC decisions rest with the utilization of the Peace Fund.

As a supporting structure of the APSA, the Peace Fund is expected to facilitate the timely response to crisis situations on the continent. Yet, this component remains the only mechanism that has not been operationalized by AU member states in over a decade since the establishment of the APSA, amid ongoing efforts to do so. In 2012, the AU Heads of State and Government constituted a team of experts led by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo to develop options for sustainable and predictable funding for the AU. Among the options that were proposed were a \$10 levy on plane tickets to Africa and a \$2 levy on hotel accommodations. These options were not implemented due to the lack of political will of AU member states.

The recent appointment of Donald Kaberuka as the AU High Representative for the Peace Fund offers an opportunity to address this shortcoming. The recent decision by the AU Heads of State and Government to institute and implement a 0.2% levy on all eligible goods into the continent to finance the AU operational programs and peace support operations budgets starting from 2017 represents a potential turning point for the political leadership required to promote the resourcing of norm implementation. Unfortunately, the continued dependence on external voluntary support for the implementation of PSC decisions on peace support operations does not provide a compelling case that the AU is willing to politically embrace the effective implementation of the principles of sovereignty as responsibility and non-indifference.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has sought to provide an evidence-based analysis of the implementation of the norm cycle through a historical analysis of the evolution of the doctrinal shift associated with the establishment of the AU, anchored on the principles of “sovereignty as responsibility” and “sovereignty as non-indifference.” While these norms have significantly legitimized the decisions made by the AU through the PSC in the deployment of peace support operations, there is clear evidence that the promotion and implementation of the notion of “sovereignty as responsibility” has been heavily influenced and governed by the consent of the state into which potential intervention might occur. Hence, rather than indicating a radical break from the past and serving as an effective norm entrepreneur, the AU represents continuity in its state-centric approach

to collective security. It is unlikely that this current configuration may change in the near future. Recent attempts to evoke Article 4(h) during the crisis in Burundi and the politics of funding these operations suggest the reluctance for AU member states to move from the emergence of these norms to their full internalization. Indeed, while the AU has taken certain steps in its commitments toward protecting civilian populations affected by crises, it has also demonstrated that state sovereignty will continue to define the AU's practice of collective security provision, leading it to be a less revolutionary organization than has otherwise been suggested.

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The AU and Continental Foreign Economic Policymaking in Africa: Institutions and Dialectics on Integration in the Global Economy

Kwame Akonor

This chapter tackles the collective efforts of African countries as embodied in their economic institutions to integrate at the *global* and *intra-African* levels of analysis to provide sustainable development and autonomous progress to its peoples. It shows that Africa's continent-wide economic institutions, namely the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), the African Development Bank (ADB), and the African Union (AU) New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), have faced numerous challenges, which, despite showing progress, have nevertheless been troubled. Since the continent gained independence around sixty years ago, the AU has little to show for its economic performance, due to its incohesive foreign economic policy. At the heart of this phenomenon, is the tense dialectic between

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the extent of economic integration that African states on one hand, and their institutions, on the other, should seek to adopt within the global political economy.

The first section describes the African international institutions that have been created in order to help the continent engage in global economic markets, and the challenges and successes associated with such efforts. The second section describes the African international institutions that have been created in order to help the continent engage in intra-African economic markets, and the challenges and successes associated with such efforts. A final section concludes.

THE CRUX OF THE PROBLEM: TO ENGAGE OR NOT TO ENGAGE GLOBAL MARKETS?

The Constitutive Act creating the AU went into effect on May 26, 2001, (Packer and Rukare 2002), and its existence was formalized on July 9, 2002, at a gathering of 53 of the continent's heads of state in Durban, South Africa. The AU, superseding the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) and taking over many of its institutions and functions, promised to meet three broad goals: to unify Africa's many subregional institutions and accords under a larger pan-African economic and social vision; to create conditions that would make cooperative economic relations less likely to be disrupted by war; and to put Africa onto a more equitable footing in its financial transactions and negotiations with the world (Magliveras and Naldi 2002). Founding Chairman and then-South African President Thabo Mbeki declared at the time that it was necessary to balance the "right and duty to protest against an unjust world order with the need practically to engage our development partners" (Mbeki 2002). In so saying, Mbeki echoed the sentiments, and to a very large extent the dilemma, that many leaders and thinkers have expressed before and since about the need for Africa to become integrated into the global economy without sacrificing its economic independence to the dictates of international organizations and institutions. The question of how effectively the AU and the states and institutions under it would accomplish this goal loomed large at its founding and continues to do so now.

The OAU and the AU both articulated ambitious goals, though the two international organizations were founded under very different

circumstances. For its part, the OAU was founded in 1963. The OAU's founding occurred as the emancipation of European-held colonies was just beginning, apartheid in South Africa was still going strong, and the Cold War was in its incipient stages. Much of the OAU's activity in the 1970s and 1980s centered on fighting apartheid; it was ineffective at preventing war or keeping foreign intervention at bay, and in its latter years, gained the image of a "dictators' club." Even so, some key pan-African agreements were made and institutions crafted during the OAU's 38 years of life. As nations gained their independence, groups of states formed Regional Economic Communities (RECs) with reciprocal free trade among themselves. In tandem with the ECA, the OAU drew up the Lagos Plan, which set a goal of creating an economic community and merging those RECs into a continent-wide market. Consistent with that plan, in 1994, OAU countries ratified the Abuja Treaty creating the African Economic Community (AEC), with a more precise timetable culminating in a continent-wide common market by 2034 (see Box 3.1).

Founded in 2001, the AU, then, represents ambitious ideals for pan-African integration, sustainable development, and African solutions for African problems. While its Constitutive Act did not embrace then-Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi's call for a "United States of Africa," it did emphatically call for "greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of Africa" (Edo and Olanrewaju 2012: 55). Implicit in its founding was the sense that it must repudiate vestiges of neocolonialism where the OAU had failed to. Implicit in its founding was the sense that it must repudiate vestiges of neocolonialism where the OAU had failed.

However, rather than breaking away from the practices of the past, much of the policymaking that has occurred under the AU's auspices, has carried the organization forward like old wine in new bottles. The fact that the AU arguably represents more of a continuation than a break with the past is attributable to the dominance of an organ called NEPAD, which lies at the heart of its economic policymaking. NEPAD based in Midrand, South Africa, was created in 2001 as an independent agency and later absorbed into the AU as the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency (NPCA) in 2010. Since the AU's founding, NEPAD has been the driving force behind most economic behavior under the AU and its umbrella organs. As Mbeki famously remarked, "The AU is the mother, NEPAD is her baby" (Mbeki 2003: 44).

The main difference between the AU's NEPAD and the OAU's approach to economic integration is their orientation toward the international political economy: Whereas the latter viewed integration into the international political economy to be dangerous, the former views it as necessary. Put otherwise, while the spirit of the AU, as represented by the goals of the ECA, is ostensibly to unify the African countries with each other and to break out of the cycle of dependency and disadvantage created by decades of colonialism, the priority of the AU's NEPAD agenda has been more the integration of African economies with the global economy. Indeed, the framers of NEPAD did not see any incompatibility between reliance on trade linkages among African states and buildup of the continent's geopolitical strength, on the one hand, and participation in interdependent economic relations in the global arena under neoliberal hegemony on the other (Edozie and Gottschalk 2014: 170–171). Through this strategy, NEPAD projected that Africa would enjoy an annual growth rate of 7%, attract US\$64 billion a year in foreign investment over a span of 15 years, and develop the continent's human resources, thereby greatly reducing poverty, reducing the gap that separates African countries from the world's industrial powers, and integrating Africa more fully into the global economy (Lombaerde and Lakshmi 2009: 54). As of 2015, Africa's collective GDP stood at US\$2.4 trillion, growth rates average 5.6% and official development aid averages US \$48 billion per year (Mwiti 2016).

At first blush, these figures look encouraging, even if they fall short of the specific targets for overall growth and foreign investment envisaged under NEPAD. But beneath this veneer of economic performance lies the undeniable reality that growing income inequalities, high youth unemployment, burgeoning debt, as well as hunger and poverty remain the common lot of Africans. Recent economic estimates drive home this point. According to the World Bank, the portion of the African population in extreme poverty increased by more than 100 million between 1990 and 2012 (Beegle et al. 2016). Furthermore, efforts at integrating Africa into the global economy have yielded poor results. Africa's share in global exports has decreased from 4.9% in 1970 to 3.3% in 2013 (ECA 2015: xix). Part of the explanation for this trend is that the global trading architecture with which NEPAD seeks to engage has deep structural flaws, such as unfair governance structures, that disadvantage the African economy which is bereft of a strong industrial base and thus remains fragile and susceptible to shocks. The recent failure of WTO

negotiations in Kenya is testament to the limitations of the NEPAD model of global integration through commodity exports (New York Times 2016).

Consistent with NEPAD's emphasis on globalization, a number of state leaders have signed Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) with western countries. For instance, Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and Senegal all have BITs with the United States. Each of these treaties obligates the African signatory to pursue market-oriented, non-statist economic policies that will benefit the investors (Jones 2010: 26). Also consistent with this direction are agreements between African trade zones and their western counterparts. In July 2014, one of Africa's RECs, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), signed an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU), granting the EU 75% access to the ECOWAS markets in exchange for full access to the European markets, except for exports of rice and sugar (Rowden 2014).

But not all African leaders and economic thinkers are on board with such deals. Indeed, the ECOWAS/EPA deal drew intense opposition while it was being negotiated, and was signed under a fair amount of duress. Many, including former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan who now heads the Africa Progress Panel, view the orthodoxy of global free-market economics as doing nothing but keeping Africa trapped in the role of exporter of raw materials and importer of finished goods, with little increase in skilled job opportunities and little decrease in economic inequality (Rowden 2014). Mr. Annan's take on BITs is quite interesting in that he was the UN Secretary-General and an initial supporter of NEPAD when it was inaugurated.

There is, then, a rising backlash against orthodox neoliberalism, not only in Africa but also in the rest of the developing world. In February 2015, Nigeria launched two decidedly state-centered programs aimed at building up the country's industrial capacity, and South Africa is observing a three-year moratorium on bilateral free trade treaties with non-African states. While much of the continent's policymaking is still in line with the dictates of the IMF, there are voices at bankers' conferences and in halls of government calling for subsidies, state investments, currency manipulation, and other measures to boost the continent's productive capacity without relying on the invisible hand of the market (Rowden 2014).

BEYOND GLOBAL MARKETS: BOOSTING INTRA-AFRICAN TRADE THROUGH INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Critics of orthodox global policies also argue that what Africa needs is not free trade with the rest of the world, but rather, more cross-border trade within the continent itself. At present, only 10% of Africa's trade is intra-continental, an aberration as intra-continental trading schemes go (Akonor 2013). So while still focused on its policy of development through trade, the AU/NEPAD is not only relying on international markets but also trying simultaneously to promote intra-African trade. After all, the direction of Africa's trade, in terms of the destination of its exports and the source of its imports, has not changed much since the end of formal colonial rule, so it makes economic sense for Africa to concentrate on harmonizing its trade relationships within the continent, with RECs at the helm, in order to generate economies of scale and become more competitive on the global level. Moreover, this strategy, while not a panacea for development, could weed out inefficient productive processes and reorient them to meet the immediate needs of the population. Thus, while a coordinating—if not a leading—role for the African RECs should be welcomed, the problem is that there are too many RECs and economic integration schemes on the continent to be coherent. To date, the AU has formally recognized eight RECs, but the 14 current ones undoubtedly lead to major implementation problems and policy incoherence stemming from overlapping memberships.

The Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (TFTA)

Despite the confusing bevy of African RECs—or because of it—African governments and the AU are pressing ahead with larger and more ambitious integration mechanisms in hopes of an eventual AEC as agreed to in the Abuja Treaty. On June 10, 2015, the Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (TFTA) among the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was signed by its 26 member states. If ratified, TFTA will create the largest free trade zone in the continent's history, with a population of 565 million (about half of its population), an area of 17.3 million square kilometers (roughly the size of Russia), total trade of US\$1.2 trillion (half of Africa's GDP), and 60% of continental output (Disparte and Bugnacki 2015).

If implemented, TFTA due to its sheer size and scope, could have a galvanizing effect of overall development for the continent. Of particular importance, given its emphasis on industrial development, is the fact that South Africa and Egypt, two of Africa's biggest economies in terms of manufacturing and services, are the key drivers of TFTA (though at the time of writing South Africa had not yet signed the agreement).

Despite its promise, the TFTA is not a done deal. Major hurdles will have to be overcome before it can become truly operational. One sticking point that may make undecided countries dither on the TFTA is its tariff-focused nature. Placing a premium on market integration via the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade rather than on infrastructure-related barriers is akin to putting the proverbial cart before the horse. For intra-continental trade to be meaningful, regional infrastructure needs to improve before tariff barriers are eliminated, not the other way around. As explained earlier, the AU/NEPAD thinking which informs much of the current approach to integration favors a prominent role for markets over an active role for the state in development. The logic, from the TFTA viewpoint, is that, when the markets are liberated or liberalized through reduction in tariffs, investment will flow and eventually bear the cost for infrastructural development. But will the private sector and other actors fund the quantity and quality of infrastructural needs required by Africa?

To its credit, the ADB, which is the leading NEPAD agency for infrastructure development, sees the logic of tackling infrastructural projects head on. The ADB is pushing African leaders and its key stakeholders to bridge the continent's infrastructural gap through its US\$360 billion (from 2011 through 2040) Program for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA). The program prioritizes regional and continental infrastructure in transportation, energy, trans-boundary water, and information communications technology. The ADB makes a convincing case: According to the organization, Africa's road access rate is only 34%, compared with 50% in other developing regions. Only 30% of Africans have access to electricity, compared to 70–90% in other developing countries. Only 4% of water resources have been developed: In fact, only about 18% of the continent's irrigation potential is being exploited. The Internet penetration rate of 10% compares poorly with an average of 40% elsewhere (African Union 2010).

In addition to issues of sequencing and prioritizing, the TFTA (like all treaties) faces what one might call the sovereignty test. The signing

of the TFTA in Egypt was only an indication of intent and commitment. Actual implementation requires two-thirds of the 26 member states to ratify the TFTA through their parliamentary or legislative bodies for it to become operational. Because the agreement is not a fiat, some national governments, especially those with smaller and/or weaker economies, may equivocate once they read the fine print of the terms. To allay the concerns of member states and bring doubters on board, the TFTA has agreed to incorporate, among others, two major trading principles: a “variable geometry” which would allow different countries to move forward with their integration efforts at different speeds and the principle of “acquis” which would validate any preexisting preferential terms of trade between countries within each of the three regional blocs that make up the TFTA (Gathii 2011: 36–64).

The Continental Free Trade Agreement (CFTA)

Just five days after the TFTA was unveiled (on June 15, 2015), African leaders at another AU meeting in Johannesburg, South Africa, signed an agreement to expand TFTA to other regions on the continent. The newly launched Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) aims to establish a single intra-continental market by 2017. The CFTA is a key component of the AU’s new development platform, Agenda 2063, which was agreed upon by the AU during its golden jubilee of May 2013 to lay out a “people-driven” vision and action during the next five decades—a whole century since the OAU’s founding. The ECA projects that the CFTA, when successfully operationalized, could lead to a 52% (US\$35 billion) increase in intra-continental trade by 2022. Making 2017 the baseline date for finalization of the CFTA negotiation appears to be a move to get the AU back on track with the key benchmarks of the Abuja Treaty.

Like the TFTA, the CFTA is a laudable idea, especially since it seeks the inclusion and merger of other RECs in continental economic integration. The addition of ECOWAS, the oldest African REC, could prove beneficial to the CFTA given the former’s experience with integration issues since its founding in 1975. But the CFTA initiative raises more questions than it offers answers. For instance, how realistic is the two-year timeframe set for the conclusion of negotiations? If it took the TFTA several years of intense negotiations to get the 26 member states and three RECs to the point of ratification, then the CFTA’s ambitious integration agreement, set to be concluded within a shorter timeframe

and covering 54 countries and eight RECs, seems to be a herculean undertaking. Also, if the race for a CFTA deal is to make up time lost for the Abuja Treaty benchmarks, then why does the AU not just renegotiate the terms of the Abuja Treaty, which technically is legally binding on African states? Then, there is this larger question: If the Abuja Treaty targets have not been met, what does the CFTA propose to do differently this time around that would make it realize its objectives which are similar to those of the Abuja Treaty? These questions are extremely pertinent, given that an independent audit commissioned by the AU found that fewer than 10% of the decisions taken by the African Union are fully implemented, with the situation getting even worse and impacting the organization's credibility.

Even so, the AU's Agenda 2063, the continent's new long-term vision for the next 50 years (referenced earlier), seeks more rather than fewer unification projects across Africa, including an ambitious 10-year implementation plan (2014–2023) which calls for the establishment of an integrated high-speed train network, the African passport and free movement of people, unification of African air space, and the Grand Inga Dam project, among others (see Box 3.2). Based on the picture sketched above, the AU's aspiration for a vibrant and empowering supranational economic entity spanning the entire continent would prove to be complex, complicated, and nearly impossible unless the AU rethinks the integration template it is pursuing and realigns it to the realities of the continent's political economy.

The Case of ECOWAS

A very brief review of the ECOWAS helps to illustrate the constraints and challenges that the AU's integration efforts must address. The 15-member West African economic bloc is important because at 40 years, it is the oldest REC in Africa. Tasked with the mandate to eliminate barriers to the "four freedoms" of goods, services, capital, and labor among its members, ECOWAS has nevertheless delivered very few tangible results in this regard. While there seems to be some traction on the issue of labor mobility, this is slow and often subject to the country-level prerogatives. To accelerate the free movement of labor and citizens of member countries, ECOWAS in June 2007 introduced Vision 2020 to transform the bloc from an "ECOWAS of states" to become an "ECOWAS of people." With this initiative, ECOWAS hopes that

by 2020 it will be a borderless economic zone with a single regional passport, much like Europe's Schengen zone. As an economic bloc, ECOWAS has not succeeded in providing a common market and shared currency as the 1975 Treaty establishing it stipulated. The ECOWAS treaty had aimed for the establishment of a common market in fifteen years (by 1990), but this did not materialize. Trade between ECOWAS members makes up a mere 10% of those countries' overall trade, making ECOWAS a marginal organization as far as economic activity in the region is concerned.

The lackluster performance of ECOWAS and the other African RECs can be attributed to a myriad of problems, too many to list here. But if there is one issue that stands out as a barrier to African RECs' effectiveness, it is the lack of political will of its members. Because the highest authority of African RECs (and the AU) is the heads of governments, and there are no strong supranational institutions to ensure strict compliance and no enforcement mechanisms to sanction refractory or non-compliant states, politics trumps economics for the most part when it comes to treaty implementation in the context of many African economic institutional arrangements.

CONCLUSION

In reflecting on the role of international institutions in African economic foreign policymaking, a few final conclusions should be made. First, if Africa is to overcome its status as the world's poorest inhabited continent and become a key partner in the global arena, it will have to undergo a paradigm shift in development strategies and priorities toward a more comprehensive structural overhaul of its economies through an industrial policy that stresses changes in productive capabilities (Chang 2010). The ECA's assessment that Africa's "recent growth has had no impact on the underlying structural design of these economies and to diversify its economies, the continent must reverse its dependence on merchandise exports dominated by raw and unprocessed commodities" should be heeded (ECA 2015: xvi). Embarking on this route would require the AU to take a more proactive role for its development rather than being shackled by its leaders' sense of need to keep in the good graces of international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, which demand that the African states not take a strong role in fostering industrial growth through such measures as protective

tariffs and subsidies, and in protecting the interests of the vulnerable sectors through currency expansions and stringent labor standards. It is worth pointing out that advanced industrialized countries did not abide by free-market maxims until their domestic industries were competitive enough to enter world markets (Chang 2002). The AU then ought to make a concerted effort to pursue an endogenous development platform based on industrialization if any talk of partnership with advanced countries is to become affable and one between equals. But pursuing a mixed economy model with an eye toward building higher industrial capabilities, which would undoubtedly lead to greater economic autonomy and sustainable development, is seen by NEPAD supporters as a counterproductive, “lazy and expensive option of disengagement” (Mbeki 2002).

Second, the absence of political will by African countries to a continent-wide foreign economic agenda is exacerbated by the fact that the AU model uses geography, and not common-core values and principles, as a default line for integration. It should be noted that even the EU, which the AU uses as an organizational reference point, does not have automatic membership. The EU Treaty sets out the conditions and principles (accession criteria) to which any country wishing to become an EU member must adhere. In any event, the political realities that confront the borderless continental European economies should make the EU and its current situation more of a cautionary tale for the AU than a model to look up to. The Schengen system currently faces grave threats as the influx of refugees and the threat of terrorism cause more countries to reestablish border controls and checkpoints to regulate migration flows. Ultimately, what the continent of Africa needs is a combination of nations with a common, singular purpose. That purpose, consistent with ideals that have been articulated and rehearsed for years, must include autonomy of economic policy from dictates and constraints imposed by non-African powers, integration of multiple states’ economic systems, buildup of the continent’s productive capacity, and accountability of the elites to the populations whom it is their job to serve rather than be served by.

Box 3.1: Phases and Goals of the African Economic Community

First phase, 1994–99. Strengthen regional economic communities and establishing them where they do not exist.

Second phase, 1999–2007. Freeze tariffs, nontariff barriers, customs duties, and internal taxes at their May 1994 levels and gradually

harmonize policies and implement multinational program in all economic sectors—particularly agriculture, industry, transport, communications, and energy.

Third phase, 2007–17. Consolidate free trade zones and customs unions through progressive elimination of tariffs, nontariff barriers, and other restrictions to trade, and adopting common external tariffs.

Fourth phase, 2017–19. Finalize coordination and harmonization of policies and programs in trade and other sectors as a precursor to full realization of the African Common Market and African Economic Community, with all regional economic communities. This phase should result in the free movement of people, with rights of residence and establishment among the regional economic communities.

Fifth phase, 2019–23. Consolidate the continent wide African Common Market resulting from the fourth phase.

Sixth phase, 2023–28. Realize the vision of the African Economic Community, with complete economic, political, social, and cultural integration and with common structures, facilities, and functions, including a single African central bank, a single African currency, a pan-African parliament, and a pan-African economic and monetary union.

Source The African Economic Community Treaty, 1991.

Box 3.2: Highlights of AU Fast Track Projects/Initiatives

- Integrated High Speed Train Network: Connecting all African capitals and commercial centres through an African High Speed Train to facilitate movement of goods, factor services and people, reduce transport costs and relieve congestion of current and future systems.
- An African Virtual and E-University. Increasing access to tertiary and continuing education in Africa by reaching large numbers of students and professionals in multiple sites simultaneously and developing relevant and high quality Open, Distance and eLearning (ODEL) resources to offer the prospective student a guaranteed access to the University from anywhere in the world and anytime (24 hours a day, 7 days a week).
- Formulation of a commodities strategy. Enabling African countries to add value, extract higher rents from their commodities, integrate into the global value chains, and promote vertical and horizontal diversification anchored in value addition and local content development.

- Establishment of an annual African forum. Designed to bring together, once a year, the African political leadership, the private sector, academia and civil society to discuss developments and constraints as well as measures to be taken to realize the aspirations and goals of Agenda 2063.
- Establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area by 2017. To significantly accelerate growth of intra-African trade and use trade more effectively as an engine of growth and sustainable development, through doubling of intra-Africa trade by 2022, strengthen Africa's common voice and policy space in global trade negotiations and establish the financial institutions within agreed upon timeframes: African Investment Bank and Pan African Stock Exchange (2016); the African Monetary Fund (2018); and the African Central Bank (2028/34).
- The African Passport and free movement of people. Transforming Africa's laws, which remain generally restrictive on movement of people despite political commitments to bring down borders with the view to promoting the issuance of visas by Member States enhance free movement of all African citizens in all African countries by 2018.
- Implementation of the Grand Inga Dam Project. The optimal development of the Inga Dam will generate 43,200 MW of power (PIDA) to support current regional power pools and their combined service to transform Africa from traditional to modern sources of energy and ensure access of all Africans to clean and affordable electricity.
- The pan-African E-Network. This involves a wide range of stakeholders and envisages putting in place policies and strategies that will lead to transformative e-applications and services in Africa, especially the intra-African broad band terrestrial infrastructure and cyber security, making the information revolution the basis for service delivery in the bio and nanotechnology industries and ultimately transform Africa into an e-Society.
- Silencing the guns by 2020. Ending all wars, civil conflicts, gender based violence and violent conflicts and prevent genocide. Monitor progress through the establishment and operationalization of an African Human Security Index (AHSI).
- Africa Outer Space Strategy. Aims to strengthen Africa's use of outer space to bolster its development. Outer space is of critical importance to the development of Africa in all fields: agriculture,

disaster management, remote sensing, climate forecast, banking and finance, as well as defense and security. Africa's access to space technology products is no longer a matter of luxury and there is a need to speed up access to these technologies and products. New developments in satellite technologies make these very accessible to African countries. The Brazzaville meeting on aerial space technologies underlines the need for appropriate policies and strategies in order to develop regional market for space products in Africa.

Source African Union, Agenda 2063, First Ten-Year Implementation Plan, May 2015.

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CHAPTER 4

The Troubled Socialising Agent: Democratic Governance and the African Union's Quest to Become an Independent Foreign Policy Actor

Chris Landsberg

When it comes democratisation in Africa, a number of works portend, but do not explicitly claim, that the African Union (AU) might serve as an independent “socializing” foreign policy actor: that is, an agent capable of disseminating norms, customs, values, and ideologies such that it can convince its members to undertake actions that they would not normally otherwise. Indeed, sixteen years after its inception, the AU Commission has called on member states to sign on as participants to a number of normative instruments related to the promotion of democracy on the continent, including the adoption of a Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance, the signing of the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the creation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and participation in the pan-African Parliament (PAP). In short, a norms revolution regarding governance has

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occurred in Africa, ostensibly led by the AU and its member states. What remains perplexing, however, is that despite the adoption of these varied democratisation instruments, as of 2017, the balance sheet on the AU's capacity to serve as an independent force for African democratisation—*in practice*—has been minimal.

In the service of interrogating the notion of the AU as an independent “socializing” foreign policy actor, this chapter is motivated by the following question: Why is it that when the AU makes democratisation policies for the continent and member states as a purportedly independent foreign policy actor, it finds that member states typically undermine such measures at continental, regional, and national levels, even when such states originally gave the AU the right to do so?

This chapter argues that despite the fact that member states have theoretically given the AU the right to act as an independent foreign policy actor to support democratisation efforts—especially as a foreign policy “socializing agent”—they have consistently ignored its demands. The central theme of this chapter is that the AU is seeking to assert its authority as an independent socialising actor capable of superseding African states' individual actions, but has struggled to achieve tangible outcomes in this regard due to an “implementation gap.” At the heart of this “implementation gap” is the tendency for members of the AU to undermine the authority of the AU and its organs to pursue self-interested foreign policies, which has resulted in the AU's generally unsuccessful attempts to fight for relevance and authority.

This chapter proceeds in three parts. It starts by unpacking the AU as an independent, “socializing” foreign policy actor. It then proceeds to consider the efforts by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the AU to put the issue of democratisation firmly on the continental agenda, before moving on to examine the efforts of the AU on this front. Lastly the chapter unpacks some of the key democratisation instruments and programs of the AU, including its Constitutive Act; the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; the NEPAD; the APRM; and the PAP. The final section concludes.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND AFRICAN CONTEXTS

International Organizations as Socialising Agents

The AU is Africa's premier international or interstate organization and is by extension a foreign policy actor in its own right. When we refer to

foreign policy “actor-ness” here, we have in mind an actor that pursues a set of goals vis-à-vis other states, non-state actors, and international organizations with regards to economics, politics, and peace and security, among other topical issue areas. Political science literature teaches us that the essential goal of international organizations is to engender cooperation to bring about a more stable world order. Such literature borrows heavily from functionalism which focuses on bringing states actively together (Mitrany, quoted in Mingst 2008: 164). Functionalists believe that economic deprivation and disparity are the root causes of war, and functionalists promote building on and expanding the habits of cooperation nurtured by groups of technical experts, outside of formal state channels (Mingst 2008: 164).

Intergovernmental organizations (or IGOs), such as the AU, can play key roles at each level of analysis, and can work to socialise actors in a variety of ways. According to Kegley (2007: 170), IGOs are “institutions created and joined by states’ governments, which give them the authority to make collective decisions to manage particular problems on the global agenda.” In the international system, IGOs contribute to habits of cooperation; states become socialised through regular interactions. Sometimes, IGOs develop procedures to make rules, settle disputes, and punish those who fail to follow the rules; other times, IGOs play key roles in international bargaining, serving as arenas for negotiation and developing coalitions. They facilitate the formation of transformational and transnational networks composed of both sub-national and non-governmental actors (Mingst 2008: 167–187).

From the Organization of African Unity to the African Union

The AU, as already noted, has attempted to play a vital role as a socialising agent in developing procedures, making rules, settling disputes and encouraging African states to follow and abide by demands of its institutions, as it seeks to build a Union of African states. What led the AU to this role?

Before grappling with the issue of the AU and democracy promotion, we should delve into some historical context and contrast the role of the AU with that of its predecessor organization, the OAU, as attempts were made to socialise the conduct of African states to abide by continental norms. The Charter of the OAU was adopted at the first Summit Conference of Heads of State and Government of Independent African

States, held in Addis Ababa in May 1963. The 31 national leaders present were understandably preoccupied with consolidating their states' independence and completing the decolonisation of the continent, including ridding the continent of apartheid and white minority domination.

The first three principles of the new continental organization (Article 3) related to the sovereign equality of all member states, non-interference in their internal affairs, and "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State and for its inalienable right to independent existence." The anti-colonial thrust of the Charter was evident in the preamble's affirmation of "the inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny."

Following the end of the Cold War and the fall of apartheid in South Africa, Africans felt the need to show their own agency and to articulate their own continental regime on peace and security, development, and democratisation. Some Africans decided to design a new continental organization to replace the OAU and adopted the Constitutive Act of the AU in July 2000, the new body put democracy and democratisation at the apex of its priorities. The Constitutive Act of the AU, adopted in July 2000 (and taking effect in 2002 when the AU was formally established), empowered the new continental body with foreign policy powers, and the AU put democratisation squarely on the continental agenda (AU Constitutive Act [2002](#)).

The African Union as a Foreign Policy Actor

Whereas the OAU came about during the height of the African independence movement and the Cold War when democracy and democratisation were scarcely on the agenda, the AU had a different genesis. Emerging in the aftermath of the Berlin Wall's dramatic fall in 1989, the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the end of the Cold War and thaw in the relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries (Adebajo and Landsberg [2001](#)), it can be argued that the end of the Cold War led to the AU's adoption of new, robust thinking on the role of democratisation within its member states. Moreover, in the wake of these tumultuous global events, the Western powers felt triumphant and put democracy promotion squarely on the agenda of world political affairs. The introduction of the "good governance" agenda by Western aid donors was a major push factor for the embracing of democratisation by African states and institutions.

Fast forwarding a decade, the AU was established in 2002, taking over from the OAU as the primary IGO in Africa. At its core, the AU was intended to be a foreign policy socialising agent, premised upon the idea that it could and should cajole and nudge states in the direction of acceptable conduct by forwarding sets of objectives that would allow the collective to become a presumptive “union of states.” Put otherwise, the AU relies mainly on normative frameworks as instruments of socialisation in order to get African states to amend their conduct in the direction of greater democracy and accountability to their citizens. To that end, the AU adopted a number of important pro-democracy instruments as it sought to alter states’ behaviour and conduct in line with pro-democracy provisions (Adebajo and Landsberg 2001). These included the AU Constitutive Act; the NEPAD; the APRM; the PAP; and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance. For their part, African states signed on to these new pro-democracy mechanisms, thus theoretically giving the new AU the right to serve as an independent foreign policy actor, capable of pushing them towards greater democratisation.

Unlike the OAU Charter, the AU’s founding document contained far-reaching provisions on the domestic governance of its member states and gave the AU the right to enforce these provisions. Already in the preamble, the signatories recorded their determination “to promote and protect human and people’s rights” and “consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law.” A similar commitment features among the objectives of the AU, with “respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law, and good governance” appearing among the principles. Other innovations, compared with the OAU Charter, are the Constitutive Act’s “condemnation and rejection” of impunity and of unconstitutional changes of government (under principles, Article 4) (Constitutive Act 2001).

Since its 2002 founding, the AU has often been uncompromising in its rejection of unconstitutional changes of government. This was manifest as the AU sanctioned members for unconstitutional changes in government in: São Tomé and Príncipe in 2003; Mauritania and Guinea in 2008; Guinea-Bissau and Madagascar in 2009; Niger in 2009 and 2010; Côte d’Ivoire in 2010; Mali in 2012; and the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2013. By 2016, Madagascar and Guinea-Bissau continued to be under sanctions (UNECA, AU and UNDP 2013: 56). On the issue of unconstitutional changes of government, the AU showed a willingness

to take seriously some of its own provisions derived from its normative frameworks, and that it was not only a socialising agent that tried to change the behaviour of African states through coaxing and inducing them in the direction of democratic conduct, but an actor with the willingness to act decisively. The AU has shown a remarkable degree of consistency in its concern about unconstitutional changes of government [read: coups d'état] in line with its broader commitment to the promotion of democracy.

The Sources of AU's Foreign Policymaking Agency

The AU derives its powers and authority—including its authority and power to act as a foreign policy actor—from the Constitutive Act of 2000, which was adopted at the 36th Annual OAU Summit in Lome, Togo, on 11 July 2000 (OAU Constitutive Act 2001). The Constitutive Act, which is effectively the “constitution” of the union of states of Africa, implores the AU to prioritise international cooperation by taking account of the UN Charter, prioritising the promotion of peace, security, and stability on the continent, and establishing conditions for Africa to assume its rightful place in the international order by promoting sustainable development at the economic, social, and cultural levels (AU Audit Report 2007: 29).

The Constitutive Act clearly spells out the AU's foreign policy goals. Importantly, it suggests members' desire to see the AU act as an independent actor which encourages the AU to prioritise the reversal of Africa's position of “marginalisation” and to “project Africa's interests” on the global stage (AU Audit 2007: 32). Article 4 of the Constitutive Act outlines 16 principles that should guide African states, and the putative “Union of African States,” which include among others: sovereign equality and interdependence among member states; peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states; respect of borders existing on achievement of independence; rejection of unconstitutional changes of government; and central to our study here, respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance. For instance, the AU appropriated for itself direct foreign policy authority and powers when it adopted the doctrine of moving away from a posture of “non-interference” to a doctrine of “non-indifference” (see: Okeke in Chap. 2 of this volume). In short, the AU made promotion of peace and security, on the one hand, and democracy and good governance, on the other

hand, central tenets of its quest to be an independent socialising agent to encourage states to conform to new values and norms.

THE AFRICAN UNION'S MECHANISMS FOR DEMOCRACY PROMOTION

The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the AU's Promotion of Democracy

Having received the AU's genesis as a foreign policy actor, just what institutes does it possess to promote democracy and good governance? The AU and its member states crafted the NEPAD as they sought to introduce elements of democratisation into the African continental polity. The Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic, and Corporate Governance, approved at the AU's inaugural summit in 2002, gives further expression to the belief in democracy and should be viewed as an example of the capacity of the AU to serve—in theory—as an independent foreign policy actor. African states undertake to uphold the rule of law; the equality of all citizens before the law; individual and collective freedoms; equality of opportunity; individual participation in democratic political processes; periodic elections of leaders for fixed terms of office; the separation of powers; and good governance.

The NEPAD, the African development plan as proposed by South Africa's Thabo Mbeki, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Abul Aziz Bouteflika from Algeria, and others, made an explicit link between peace and democratization and argued that it was impossible without the other. NEPAD placed an “emphasis on Africa's ownership of its development path and exhorts external donors for genuine partnerships premised on mutual accountability” (UNECA, AU and UNDP 2013: 33). NEPAD thus makes an explicit link between democracy and governance, on the one hand, and peace and security, on the other. NEPAD recognised that “development is not achievable on a sustainable basis without democracy, human rights, and peace and vice versa” (UNECA, AU and UNDP 2013: 34), and thus, “it may not be feasible to entrench a culture of democracy and peace without sustainable, inclusive and equitable development” (UNECA, AU and UNDP 2013: 34).

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the AU's Promotion of Democracy

With the APRM, the governance program of NEPAD, also established in 2002, Africa was shedding the past and embarking on a new course as it became the first international institution to craft such an ambitious system of partner evaluation of national governance. The primary purpose of the APRM is to encourage good democratic behaviour and to foster the adoption of policies and practices leading to “political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and continental economic integration.”

Operationally, member states sign up to the APRM with the view to “foster the adoption of policies, standards and practices that lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated regional and continental economic integration through sharing of experiences and enforcement of successful and best practices, including identification of deficiencies and assessing the needs for capacity building” (APRM Base document 2003). Although participation is voluntary, the peer review process is highly intrusive as it probes both the structures and functioning of a participating state’s entire political system. What is more, a state refusing to rectify “shortcomings” identified in a peer review, can be subjected to unspecified “appropriate measures” by its peers. But by and large, the APRM does not undertake such measures, only ultimately encouraging states to become more democratic (Gruzd 2007: 54–55).

A major handicap of the APRM is its voluntary nature: since its inception in 2002, only 30 of the AU’s 54 member states have joined the program. African countries most in need of improving their standards of governance and their human rights records are least likely to join the mechanism and submit themselves to a peer review. Where country reviews have been done by the APRM (more than a dozen to date), national implementation of APRM recommendations for improving aspects of governance has been hugely uneven. By making participation in the APRM compulsory for all AU members and improving the APRM’s capacity to monitor state implementation of its proposals, the AU would be advancing the cause of sovereignty as responsibility. But the chances of that happening, given member-states’ obsession with sovereignty, are remote. Thus, the APRM is no punitive device, but an AU socialising instrument.

*The African Charter for Democracy, Elections and Governance
(ACDEG)*

The AU further sought to entrench its foreign policy “actor-ness” and agency with the adoption of a key democracy promotion instrument in the 2007 African Charter for Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). This Charter seeks to “entrench in the Continent a political culture of change of power” based on regular, free, and fair elections conducted by electoral agencies that are independent and competent (ACDEG 2007). It should be noted that ACDEG espouses democratisation far beyond mere electoral democracy. It should therefore not be assumed that ACDEG equates democracy with elections and vice versa.

The ACDEG came into force in 2012 and is one of the more crucial documents in the promotion of constitutional democracy. The Charter serves as a framework encouraging African states and governments to adhere and live up to values and principles of democracy, good governance, human rights, and development (ACDEG 2007). There are 13 key objectives enshrined in the Charter. Article 2 calls for the adherence by each state party, “to the universal values and principles of democracy and respect for human rights” (African Governance Newsletter 2011: 29).

The perennial implementation crisis has been shown to rear its head when a number of coups took place in Burundi, the CAR, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali in spite of the adoption of ACDEG. The continent has recently witnessed a dramatic disregard of AU continental norms and provisions when, in 2017, the leader of the Gambia, Yahya Jammeh, refused to accept the legitimate electoral outcome, and the president of Burundi, Pierre Nkurunziza, refused to accept stipulated term limits in 2016. This is not counting instances that took place prior to 2012 in São Tomé and Príncipe, Madagascar, Seychelles, and others (EISA 2016: 27). The successive recurrence of these instances suggests that constitutional democracy is not consolidating fast enough on the continent.

To be sure, the AU has suspended memberships and sanctioned a number of countries for flouting its democratic norms, including Burkina Faso in 2015; Côte d’Ivoire in 2010; Guinea in 2008; and the CAR in 2003 (EISA 2016: 27). But the AU has struggled to promote ACDEG and its key elements vigorously as member states tended to pay lip service to the document and its key democratic stipulations. In short, as emblematic of its larger implementation gap, the AU has not been able

to replace individualistic, nationalistic political orders and regimes with belief in and support for an overarching, continental governance and democratic architecture.

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP)

Another pillar of Africa's new system of continental democracy promotion and pan-African governance is the PAP, which established an organ in the AU in 2004. Within the PAP, each member state is represented by five members, reflecting the diversity of opinions in each national legislature and indicative of an ongoing debate about finding a suitable African alternative to liberal democracy. A novel institution for the continent, the Parliament's objectives include the strengthening of constitutional and parliamentary democracy, promotion of human rights and democracy in Africa, and the encouragement of good governance in member states.

While the original goal of the PAP was that it would eventually exert full legislative powers in the AU, 14 years since its establishment, this has not been the case. Since its founding, the protocol establishing the PAP has only been ratified by one member state, leaving it as little more than a consultative and advisory organ within the AU (Kagame 2017: 15). In the PAP the lack of action is indicative of the pervasive culture of non-implementation and non-compliance by AU member states, thereby rendering the AU's potential to act as an autonomous foreign policy actor feeble.

CHALLENGES TO THE AU'S SOCIALIZING EFFORTS IN DEMOCRACY

Having shown the AU's democratization instruments and highlighted some of the shortcomings, just what accounts for the AU's "implementation gap?" When it comes to enforcement of its socialisation efforts by the AU, several challenges arise. One is that member states do not ordinarily display the requisite political will to act together. African states do not speak with one voice and even undermine the foreign policy actorship of the AU and its continental institutions and bodies. The AU is further weakened by the failure of member states to pay their dues and assessed contributions. Some 70% of the budget of the AU comes from external states and international organizations such as the EU, and this weakens the AU's ability to act as an autonomous actor. The Kagame report of 29 January 2017 says that "in 2014, the AU budget was

US\$308 million, more than half which was funded by donors. In 2015, it rose by 30% to US\$393 million, 63% of which was funded by donors.” These are huge contributions by donors, calling into question the seriousness and commitment of African member states to pay for their own institutions. The Kagame report went further and reminded us that “in 2016 donors contributed 60% of the US\$417 million budget. In 2017, member states are expected to contribute 26% of the proposed US\$439 million budget, while donors are expected to contribute the remaining 74%.” This overreliance and dependence of external funding poses a direct and real threat to the AU’s foreign policy agency and gives foreign powers great influence over the AU’s external affairs.

A second problem is that the IGO comprises 54 countries that, while desperately trying to propagate common foreign policy positions, instead often act on the basis of their own unadulterated self-interests. As a 2016 Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) state, “since the AU is an intergovernmental organization, the political inclinations of its members have a strong effect on decision-making and interventions. These inclinations are at times to the detriment of attempts by the AU to fulfil its obligations” (EISA 2016: 30). Moreover, the fact that the AU is a loose intergovernmental body, and not a supranational organization, also makes it difficult to act as an independent foreign policy agent.

A third issue is that states also typically fail to provide the AU with necessary logistical support and military hardware for peacekeeping operations, and the AU tends to rely on the largesse of external actors. These hurdles hamper the prospects of the AU to act as a serious and independent foreign policy agent. While the AU and sub-regional actors and RECs such as Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in west Africa and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) are supposed to cooperate with each other, there is a need to strengthen the cooperation culture (Sarkin 2010: 283–286).

CONCLUSION

Fifteen years after the inception of the AU, the AU as socialising agent—or disseminator of norms and values—promoting democratic governance has faced a major hurdle, or what this piece calls its “implementation gap:” that is, its 54 member states do not readily abide by the provisions contained in African Governance Architecture instruments. It is perhaps

worth stating the obvious that the AU is only as strong as its 54 members allow it to be: if the pervasive culture to ignore the decisions of the AU and its AGA provisions continues, then the AU will remain a timid socialising agent, struggling to promote and defend democratic governance and remaining incapable of transforming the conduct of member states.

If Africa is to become serious about the continent's progress and mitigation of humanitarian crises to task, it will have to take instruments like the African Charter on Democracy more seriously and should start by taking continental sovereignty as seriously as it states takes "national" sovereignty. There is no gainsaying that the AU has a number of instruments and structures in place to deal with human rights violations and to advance democratic good governance. But the AU certainly faces an accession crisis with states signing up to purported "shared values" without translating these into lived values.

As a final conclusion point: beyond to declarations, protocols and treaties, the AU does not appear to have a foreign policy, but rather policies *on*, and responses *to*, issues. It is typically reactive about international continental issues. There is not a strategic and systematic approach to decision-making and planning, and decisions are often arrived at through haphazard, *ad hoc*, and rushed and messy processes. It has a culture of exerting itself on issues, both verbally and on paper, but is yet to find a formula that would help it to translate policies and stated positions into tangible practical operational matters. As a socialising agent, therefore, the AU has limited reach and traction, and its agency would be greatly enhanced if only it could get greater buy-in and cooperation from the very member states that have brought it about. For now though, the AU looks likely to suffer from an implementation gap for the coming years.

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Beyond the Collective: The Comparative Strategic Utility of the African Union and RECs in Individual National Security Pursuits

Jason Warner

Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of the intra-African international relations landscape is African states' embeddedness within a dense array of African international organizations (IOs). African states' IO memberships exist at two levels of analysis: the pan-African African Union (AU), and a series of eight officially recognized regional economic communities, or (RECs). Though exceptions exist within a limited number of the RECs, organizations at both levels of analysis have some sort of institutional mandate for the protection of collective security, among other tasks.

When analyzing the security-centric benefits that African IOs can offer to member states—or what this chapter refers to as IOs' “strategic utility”—the prevailing tendency within the academic literature has been to focus on the ways in which these institutions abet *collective*

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security outcomes (Akokpari and Ancas 2014; Franke 2009; Hailu 2008; Makinda and Okumu 2008), a tendency that marks the literature on IOs and membership benefits of IOs more broadly (Simmons and Martin 2008; Kupchan and Kupchan 1995; Kupchan and Kupchan 1991). Indeed, because supranational IOs with collective security mandates operate on the premise that an attack on one member is to be considered an attack on all members, a logical lens of collectivism in understanding the benefits of IOs' roles in ensuring security is intuitive. Yet, this scholarly commitment to understanding the *collective* benefits offered by African IOs has come at the expense of understanding what are arguably their most important strategic uses for their members: that is, how such IOs can serve to help *individual* states to pursue their national security-related foreign policy goals.

It is the combination of these two facets—(a) African states' membership in two sets of security-focused IOs, the AU and the RECs, and (b) the lack of attention to these IOs' roles in promoting *individual* states' national security interests—that serves as a puzzle for interrogation for this piece. Thus, leaving aside the goals of the *collective*, this chapter asks: How do African states understand the comparative strategic benefits, or “strategic utility,” of the AU and their RECs in their pursuits of their own, *self-interested* national security aims? What policymaking logic underlies why states would elect to pursue some national security-related foreign policy goals interest in the context of the AU, on the one hand, or, in the context of a regional IO, or REC, on the other?

Drawing on nine months of fieldwork interviewing personnel working in and in proximity to the AU between 2014 and 2015, this chapter argues that despite the fact that the AU tends to receive the lion's share of attention when it comes to IOs in Africa, in *general terms*, African states tend to find greater strategic utility in their RECs than the AU, for reasons which will be detailed presently. Nevertheless, the AU does, this chapter argues, still present certain strategic benefits that the RECs cannot.

This chapter proceeds in two parts. The first section focuses on just why African states tend to find the RECs more strategically useful than the AU for the pursuit of their individual, national security-related foreign policy pursuits. The second section emphasizes that despite the AU's generally inferior position to the RECs in this regard, nevertheless,

in certain instances, member states do view it to be more strategically useful for national security-related foreign policy pursuits than the RECs.

THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC COMMUNITIES (RECs)

When considering the relative strategic benefits of the African IOs of which they are members, the overwhelming consensus among those working in and around the AU and the RECs was that states almost universally find more strategic benefit in working through their RECs than through the AU (IS7/2 2015; IS8 2015; IS9 2015; IS10 2015; IS11 2015; IS13 2015; IS14 2015; IS16 2015; Maru 2014). Following are the three most commonly forwarded articulations for why this is the case: the fact that RECs are more localized and thus manageable than the AU; the fact that the RECs are more capable of being used as tools for state power projection than the AU; and the fact that the RECs are simply more reliable in their actions than the AU.

RECs Are More Manageable Than AU

Foundationally, interviewees were clear that the RECs were more strategically useful than the AU because of their smaller, more manageable sizes, and proximity to localized issues. First, and most bluntly, member states' nearness to their RECs (in both physical and political terms) means member states have confidence in their abilities to influence the political, military, and economic decisions of the RECs, exerting a degree of agency that they lack in the context of the much larger, and for the most, physically more distant, AU.

Numerous respondents made this point clearly. For instance, IS38 (2015) relays that "Because of the proximity of states to RECs, the impact of their influence is felt most strongly in relation to the region" while IS24 (2015) asserts that "since RECs are closer to home, those issues are going to be closer to [member states'] hearts." In emphasizing the tendency for states to try and localize their foreign and security policy pursuits first and foremost within their regions, IS37 (2015) has admonished that African states, "Don't do giraffe neck diplomacy: you don't have your neck here [in the region] and then try to eat over there [in the African Union]."

Second, another salient insight regarding the perception of the RECs as being more manageable (and thus strategically useful) than the AU is that numbers matter: nearly all states, but especially the smallest ones, tend to view the AU (and its predecessor, the OAU) as having too many members with too many varying interests, and thus, being simply too big to get anything accomplished. Writing in 1996, Clapham (116) had begun to articulate the logistical problems posed by attempting to pursue individual interests in the context of the then-Organization of African Unity (OAU):

One evident problem of the OAU was that an organization with over fifty members was too large and diverse to be able to meet many of the needs of its individual states. In practice, much African diplomacy was therefore conducted within the much more manageable framework of groups of neighboring states which had some affinity with one another.

This trend persists today, and is a centrally highlighted feature of the AU's general lack of strategic importance for most African states. Comparing the RECs directly to the AU, one respondent emphasized its unwieldy size as an impediment to states placing strategic importance on the AU: "Member countries prefer to rely on the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) because the AU is too big" (IS7/2 2015), while another said: "You cannot have a meaningful conversation with 54 people together. But, when you have just fifteen [in a REC, like ECOWAS] it is a different story. With smaller groups, they get to know each other, they meet more frequently, they have more contact, and they talk about the same things" (IS24 2015). One Western diplomat who has spent considerable time in AU negotiations relayed: "My sense was that the states felt that they have more leverage within the REC because RECs are smaller; this was particularly true if the state was the regional hegemon. For instance, Nigeria basically determines the direction of ECOWAS...In ECCAS you have a couple of countries that have a heavy hand [in regional security affairs], because they know that their influence will be diluted once the AU comes in" (IS7/2 2015).

Third, the RECs are understood to be more manageable (and thus more strategically useful for individual security-related foreign policy pursuits) than the AU because of often long-standing relationships between REC leaders, which allow RECs to react more nimbly than the AU (IS7/1 2014; IS7/2 2015). For reasons related to greater

interaction and shared interests in common regional affairs, heads of state within African regions tend to know each other far more intimately than they know others outside of their regions. Indeed, whereas heads of state do not always attend the meetings of the AU, heads of state are far more frequently in attendance at meetings of the RECs, where they meet often, informally, and quickly make decisions. Conversely, because heads of state typically tend *not* to go to AU meetings—instead being represented by envoys—the creation of policy on the spot within the semi-annual AU summits is retarded by the fact that delegates must often check in with the capital prior to taking any meaningful policy decisions within the organization. As one diplomat said, “In the RECs, because it’s a smaller group and a manageable size, with the leadership of heads of state all in one room, they can really get together and make serious, impactful decisions” (IS7/2 2015). As the interviewee relayed further:

African states know the importance of AU and RECs in their lives, but they think about them differently. The difference between the mood in the AU and ECOWAS is stark: the mood in ECOWAS is very close-knit. For example, in relation to [the 2012 crisis in] Mali, West African heads of state held a conference at the airport, so that heads of state could fly in, meet, and then just fly out, because the issue was so important to them. This is quite different than states’ commitment to the AU, which is really pretty light. It shows the level of commitment to the RECs over the AU (IS7/2 2015).

RECs Can Be Used as Tools for State Power Projection

Another way that RECs are viewed to be more strategically useful than the AU relates to their ability to be effectively leveraged for individual states’ interests in international power projection. In line with neo-realist interpretations of IOs as simply being reflections of the wishes of the organizations’ most powerful members, played out institutionally (Mearsheimer 1994), respondents were clear to note that especially for regionally hegemonic states, RECs are profoundly more important for the pursuits of national security interests. While other chapters in this work articulate these dynamics more fully, suffice it say, the capacity of states like Nigeria in ECOWAS, South Africa in the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and Ethiopia in the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) to create, lead, and to an extent, leverage for self interested gains their RECs, was a recurring trope. As IS16 (2015) articulates:

Nigeria and South Africa use the RECs as their tools. And it is easier to use these RECs as their tools than to use the AU, since the AU requires greater coalition building. In the RECs, they can just call the shots.

While the RECs have historically served as ideal fora in which relatively powerful African states can pursue aims of state power maximization, the AU is not conceived of as being commandeered similarly. At the heart of this perception is the fact that the AU simply has too many members, at 54, to make its manipulation by any one set of state interests conceivable. More specifically, the AU is profoundly multipolar, to the point of arguably being a non-polar institution (Warner 2016). Though the so-called Big Five members—South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt—have historically paid the brunt of the AU’s budget, even the presence of five countries “at the top” of the AU’s membership hierarchy precludes the possibility for manipulation by any one nation. Beyond the Big Five, however, there are also numerous “second tier” countries in the AU: that is, states that have slightly less—though still considerable—political capital in the organization, which can work to pursue their own interests, or work to stop what they see as undue influence by any one of the Big Five. These include countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Ghana, and Senegal, and to a lesser extent Tanzania, Gambia, and Botswana. In short, given the deeply multipolar nature of state leadership within the AU, the capacity for the outright manipulation of the organization for any one state’s national security interests is viewed as nearly impossible.

Apart from the AU’s multipolar/non-polar internal dynamics, the AU lacks any real institutional mechanism whereby such unilateral manipulation could conceivably be effectuated. While studies of IOs’ capacities to be manipulated for individual statist interests have focused on the veto power of the P-5 in the UN Security Council (UNSC), an analogous prerogative does not exist in the AU. While the AU does have a Peace and Security Council (PSC)—modeled on the UNSC and with 15 members like the UNSC—the African Union’s PSC does not provide for a veto power. Thus, no country, or group of countries, can reasonably expect to dictate the ideological contours of the organization, especially around security outcomes, as the P-5 do in the UNSC.

Finally, in addition to these technical institutional impediments to AU manipulation, there also appear to be normative impediments, at least in the case of the PSC, that prohibit the pursuit of individual

interests. As one Western diplomat (IS4 2015) who has worked with the AU extensively relayed:

I got the sense that there was a sort of code of conduct that the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) would not be a place to pursue self-interests: efforts at self-interest were carefully masked behind the greater good. So, in the PSC, self-interest was mostly in the form of preventing action as opposed to taking action. Examples of these blocking tendencies included preventing intervention, mediators, election observers, and discussion of certain [sensitive] topics.

Numerous interlocutors expressed this logic of African states' perception of RECs as being prioritized for realist pursuits over the AU. As IS10 (2015) relays: "I can't think of a given country trying to manipulate the AU. It's actually pretty impossible to really manipulate the entire organization because of its size, but countries do work to try to put their citizens within priority positions within the organization." And, as IS12 (2015) relays: "The decisions made in both the AU and the RECs are determined by the amount of money given; so, small states still really don't have much of a say, particularly when they aren't willing and able to commit money and troops. Since most member states are small states, and don't contribute much money, very few players in the AU actually have any say."

RECs Are More Are More Reliable Than the AU

A third way in which RECs are deemed to be more strategically useful than the AU is that their responses to insecurity are perceived to be more reliable than the AU's. In short, respondents explained that the AU has a troubled role in states' national security strategies precisely because of the deeply unpredictable ways that it responds to issues of insecurity. To be sure, this recognition is not suggestive that members of all African states viewed their RECs to be reliably *robust* responders to insecurity, simply reliable *in their action or inaction*. More tangibly, while ECOWAS is perceived to likely engage in some degree of peace support operations in the event of insecurity, regional organizations like the Arab Maghreb Union, for instance, were reliably expected to do nothing. Nevertheless, these expectations of either *action* by certain RECs (in the case of ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD, and increasingly, ECCAS) versus the predicted

inertia of the AMU stand in contrast to the AU's generally unreliable responses to collective security threats, which range from robust (in the example of the 2014 Ebola outbreak) to lackluster (such as the collapse of Mali in 2012). In short, African states seem to view the AU as a wild card when it comes to responding to insecurity, which renders its strategic benefits limited in scope.

What lies at the crux of the AU's generally unpredictable approaches to addressing insecurity? While numerous phenomena can be cited, four main ones were often discussed by respondents. First, the AU is only beginning to reach an institutionalized culture of responses to insecurity: Instead the AU remains dependent on the informal, *ad hoc* relationships between heads of state, and its responses to insecurity are contingent upon member state interests (Gandois 2009: 113; IS4 2015; IS8 2015). Indeed, the AU still only "moves" to respond to insecurity when member states with resources or interests have the desire to do so. As IS17 (2015) expounds:

When it comes to actual [AU peace support] deployments, the necessity of the movement into the situation still comes down to what countries have an interest to want to become involved. Therefore, there is still a realist element involved [in the AU's] collective security initiatives. Since most of the missions that African countries might need to be involved in are stabilization and peacekeeping, it's very serious. It's a very big consideration because it's dangerous and costly. Therefore, only the countries that have a very big stake will actually go in.

Second, and most glaring, the AU continues to suffer from a lack of self-financing for peace support activities from member states: Indeed, as of late 2016, approximately 93% of the AU's Peace Fund budget came from non-African actors, including the UN, the European Union, and international partners. Thus, its capacity to consistently and quickly respond to insecurity is constrained by its ability to finance such operations. Third, the AU's approach to deploying peace support operations has evolved since its 2002 creation to adopt a profoundly *ad hoc* mandating culture, typified, for instance, by the fact that its ostensible rapid deployment capability, the African Standby Force (in development since 2001), has yet to deploy to conflict zones ranging from Somalia to South Sudan to the Central African Republic to the Lake Chad Basin, while other *ad hoc* coalitions have. As such, member states

can scarcely rely on any predictable response from the AU in the event that they or their neighboring states are confronted with a national security threat.

Thus, in summing up African states' perceptions of the comparative strategic utility of the RECs versus the AU, IS39/1 (2015) explains that, "For long-term sustainable issues, you use your REC. For the AU, you're too far away to consider the organization to be reliable," and as IS7/2 (2015) continues:

You get the impression that most countries are more committed to the RECS than the AU. [Leaders] would rather come to the summit of the RECs than the AU....A lot of leaders come to the AU summit because citizens want to see their leaders there, but the leaders are somewhat indifferent. They don't really care. There is a level of trust in the RECs that doesn't exist in the AU.

Somewhat dismissive of the AU as a location in which meaningful policies are pursued at all, IS21 (2015) has articulated, "I really don't think that most African governments really think about their participation in the AU as intending to actually achieve anything tangible. It's really just about participating in the international sphere."

THE STRATEGIC UTILITY OF THE AFRICAN UNION

Though this chapter's thesis is that African states tend to find their RECs to be more strategically useful than the AU in the pursuit of their individual security-related foreign policy interests, it should not be interpreted to be the case that they find no strategic utility in the AU at all. To the contrary, the AU does have some unique security-related strategic functions that the RECs do not, including serving as a pan-African collective security coordination mechanism; facilitating security-related issue-enabling to global organizations; and serving as a forum for reputational improvement of states and leaders.

African Union as an Important Collective Security Coordinating Mechanism

In the vein of institutionalist understandings of on collective security, member states do tend to find strategic utility in the AU as a coordinating

mechanism for the promotion of collective security on the continent, which has an inherent bearing upon individual states' national security pursuits. The most intuitive coordinating role that the AU plays is via its formal institutional mechanisms for the promotion of collective security, especially within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and the sundry institutions contained therein. Beyond technical measures, the AU also fulfills more neoliberalist functions to promote collective (and thus individual) security, to include: encouraging repeated interactions among African leaders (via its semi-annual summits, usually in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia); facilitating issue linkages (for instance, bridging gender equity outcomes to counterterrorism); serving as a forum for information sharing (both within formal AU institutions like the Continental Early Warning System and informally, via summits, meetings, and retreats); enabling the formation and dissemination of a normative code of intra-African conduct (for instance, around unconstitutional changes of government and conceptions of sovereignty and intervention); and generating specific identities which can then be leveraged for the promotion of security-related ends (Brigety 2016; Franke 2009; Makinda and Okumu 2008; Murithi 2012). Despite the AU's shortcomings in some of the aforementioned areas, counterfactually, most African states understand that in the AU's total absence, they would face far more national security threats than they do presently (CR3 2016).

More concretely, to the extent that the AU is considered strategically useful for the pursuit of certain individual state security considerations, it is currently engaged in peace support operations around the continent, all of which bear upon individual member states' national security priorities. These operations include the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), engaged in ousting Islamic extremist group al-Shabaab from the country, a national security priority for Ethiopia, Kenya, and Djibouti; the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA), attempting to neutralize the LRA in working in the national security interests of Uganda, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Chad; and the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which the AU has mandated—though does not officially participate in—to fight Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin states of Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. Outside of these insurgency-focused operations, the AU's unprecedented decision to send “health-keepers” to Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia in light of the 2014

Ebola outbreak—in conjunction with Doctors Without Borders and the World Health Organization—underscores the extent to which the AU provides resources, leverage, and visibility for the promotion of collective security that could not be achieved by the RECs alone.

African Union's Ability to Issue Enable to Global Level

Another strategic function that the AU offers to member states for pursuits of individual national security is its utility in “issue enabling” or bringing important political issues from within Africa (either domestically, regionally, or continentally) to global IOs like the United Nations, the International Criminal Court (ICC), or the World Trade Organization (WTO). Given most individual African states’ locations at the bottom of geopolitical hierarchies, the AU’s ability to aggregate and articulate African states’ national security concerns at global levels of analysis means that the AU plays a unique role as mouthpiece for individual states. In short, while African states use the RECs to “get politics done” in their regions, the AU is viewed as an intuitive stepping block for collectives of African states to “get the ear” of the international community.

Extrapolating further, conversations with those working in and around the AU described a strategy wherein the RECs were the international organizations most useful to encourage security outcomes *within* Africa, whereas the AU was primarily strategically useful for the pursuit of goals *external to* Africa, especially in galvanizing and articulating pan-African opinions in the extra-African, or global international community (Brigety 2016; IS4 2015; IS5 2015; IS8 2015; IS16 2015). As a REC representative to the AU has relayed of this phenomenon, in no uncertain terms: “Whatever you want to achieve outside of Africa, you use the AU, and whatever you want to do regionally, you always try to accomplish through the REC” (IS6 2015). As another person (IS4 2015) working in a similar capacity at the AU has relayed:

Though you see that most of the time countries would prefer to go to the RECs, there are certain issues that states think should be come to the AU. These issues include [dealing with] the International Criminal Court; the Ezulwini Consensus; climate change; and Ebola...States bring issues that truly are collective like these to the AU, but most other issues serve them more to go to the RECs.

States' tendencies to use the AU to issue enable are replete. African states have leveraged the AU to serve as a global mouthpiece in UN Security Council reform (to include a permanent African member) through the 2005 AU Ezulwini Consensus, while in 2003, the AU served as a platform to articulate a common position in the Cancun Round of WTO negotiations.

Though these instances focus as much on collective as opposed to individual national security interests, individual states—especially Sudan and Kenya—have leveraged the AU to voice their displeasure with the ICC. Founded in 1998, all nine of the ICC's current, active investigations boast African defendants. The most high-profile indictments of African leaders have been Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir (for alleged crimes against humanity in the western Darfur region of Sudan in the 2000s) and the President of Kenya, Uhuru Kenyatta and the so-called Ocampo-6 in Kenya (for alleged incitement of violence in Kenya's 2007–2008 elections, in which some 1,200 died). These leaders have successfully brought an anti-ICC agenda to the AU, arguing that the ICC is “anti-African” and that African leaders should therefore withdraw from the Court: To that end, by mid-2017, South Africa, Gambia, and Burundi had all begun the process of removing themselves as signatories to the Rome Statute. (For more, see: Du Plessis and Gevers in Chapter 13). To be sure, when taking on perceived geopolitical injustice, the AU presents strategic benefits unrivaled by the RECS.

African Union as a Platform for Reputational Improvement of States and Leaders

Another strategic security-related foreign policy benefit of the AU cited by respondents was its capacity to help bolster reputations of both states and individual leaders. Whereas the RECS are viewed as more useful for practical matters, they do not offer the same pan-African and global visibility as the AU. From a statist perspective, the AU is seen as an ideal forum to enhance states' reputations in the intra- and extra-African international communities. Former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo was noted for his leadership in the transformation of the OAU to the AU, not least to help improve the battered Nigerian reputation in the aftermath of years of military dictatorships, but also to enhance his own self-image (Tieku 2004). More contemporarily, South Africa invested heavily in the candidacy of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to become AU

Commission Chairperson in 2012, effectively cementing a South African stamp on the organization for four years. For its part, another one of the Big Five funders, Algeria, has enjoyed a monopoly on the position of Commissioner for Peace and Security, held by Algerians Ramtane Lamamra (2008–2013) and Smaïl Chergui (2013 to present). To the degree that countries attempt to use the AU as a ground for reputational improvement, the organization itself also views its reputation as potentially being threatened by small members: Insiders have suggested that AU members were partially opposed to Equatorial Guinea’s Agapito Mba Mokuy’s bid to become the new AU Commission Chairperson because members deemed it embarrassing to potentially have the top position at the AU held by one of Africa’s smallest—though wealthiest—countries.

Beyond statist reputations, assuming positions of leadership in the AU is viewed as strategically useful to help individual leaders avoid international isolation. Notable examples include the late Muammar Gaddafi, who attempted to encourage continental economic and political integration in the form of a radicalized “United States of Africa,” before his death in 2011, both for personal prestige and as a counterweight to his international isolation. Other leaders with poor reputations globally who have had high profiles in the AU include Teodoro Obiang Nguema of Equatorial Guinea (the longest serving president in the world) who served as AU Chairperson from 2011 to 2012, and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (long accused of intimidation of political opponents) who served in the position between 2015 and 2016. In short, given the AU’s global prominence, securing leadership positions within it can help both states and leaders avoid isolation and improve their reputations in ways that RECs cannot.

CONCLUSION

The following chapter has shown how African states think about the relative strategic utility of the two sets of African IOs of which they are members, as they pursue their individual, national security-related foreign policy goals. In the main, it has emphasized that for sundry reasons, African states tend to find more strategic utility in the RECs than the AU, though the chapter is clear to note that in certain foreign policy pursuits, the AU is actually viewed to be preferential to the RECs. Whether this remains the case as the twenty-first-century progresses is yet to be seen.

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The Role of African Regional Organizations in Post-Election Governments of National Unity

Alexander Noyes

Post-conflict power-sharing arrangements have proliferated across the globe over the last two decades. While international and regional organizations (IOs and ROs) use power sharing as a tool to end conflict on a global scale—from Honduras to Bosnia to Afghanistan—the practice has recently become particularly concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa. From 1999 to 2010, twenty countries in Africa inked power-sharing pacts, also known as governments of national unity (GNUs), in an effort to resolve violent conflict (Mehler 2009).¹ Traditionally used as a mechanism to end high-intensity civil wars, inclusive governments have increasingly been used to terminate an array of lower-intensity violent conflicts in Africa, as seen in the semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar in 2010 and Madagascar in 2009, as well as the high-visibility cases of electoral violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008. Although garnering less attention, the precedent for this trend of settling electoral disputes through

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power sharing was set by Lesotho in 1999 and Zanzibar in 1999 (and 2001) and followed by Togo in 2006 (Bekoe 2012: 118–119).

ROs in Africa, also described as “RECs”—have often played a central role in both the political negotiations that lead to post-election GNUs and the subsequent monitoring of power-sharing arrangements. For instance, in southern Africa, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), headed by then South African President Thabo Mbeki, took the lead on power-sharing talks and the implementation of the GNU in Zimbabwe in 2008. In west Africa, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), under the leadership of Blaise Compaoré, then president of Burkina Faso, headed the GNU talks and monitoring efforts in Togo in 2006. In east Africa, after Kenya’s post-election crisis and violence in 2008, the African Union (AU), led by former United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Kofi Annan, took the lead in mediating the power-sharing talks and monitoring the GNU.

Despite an extensive literature on power sharing in contexts of civil war (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007; Walter 2002), scholars have not yet paid sufficient attention to the dynamics and outcomes of the model in lower-intensity, non-civil war cases like post-election violence, with a few notable exceptions (for instance, see: Cheeseman and Tendi 2010; Leván 2011; Bekoe 2012). There is a particular lack of comparative work investigating the role of ROs in the creation and practice of post-election GNUs. This chapter aims to fill this gap by demonstrating that ROs play a fundamental role in post-election GNUs in Africa.

This chapter explains how variations in the conflict management norms of ROs—particularly, the manner in which the bodies negotiate, monitor, and enforce power-sharing accords—impact the design of the accord along with the internal reform dynamics and outcomes of post-election GNUs. This chapter also illustrates how ROs play a critical “gatekeeping” (Williams 2015) function during GNUs, conditioning the leverage and involvement of other external actors, including IOs and donor countries. In doing so, this chapter helps to answer one of the key research questions of this volume: How do the norms and practices of ROs—or RECs—inform policy dynamics and outcomes at the domestic level of African States? The main arguments of this chapter are illustrated by the cases of SADC in Zimbabwe (2008–2013), ECOWAS in Togo (2006–2010), and the interplay between the AU and the UN in Kenya (2008–2013).

Power-sharing arrangements can be broadly defined as “formal institutions that distribute decision-making rights within the state and define

decision-making procedures” among the relevant parties to the conflict (Rothchild and Roeder 2005: 30). This chapter employs George and Bennett’s method of “structured, focused comparison” (George and Bennett 2005: 30), as well as within case process tracing, to demonstrate how ROs shape the design and reform dynamics of post-election GNUs in Africa.

Elite interviews were used as the primary tool for data collection. The author conducted over 100 interviews with key decision-makers in the three case countries—including former prime ministers, cabinet ministers, top political party leaders, and officials from ROs and IOs. The cases of Zimbabwe (SADC), Togo (ECOWAS), and Kenya (AU) were chosen because they allow for a comparison of the conflict management norms of three discrete regions of Africa. The cases are also well suited to examine the interplay between the AU, the regional economic communities (RECs), and the UN.

This chapter consists of three main parts. First, it provides a brief overview of the broad array of ROs in Africa. Second, it demonstrates how ROs influenced the creation, dynamics, and reform outcomes of post-election GNUs in Zimbabwe, Togo, and Kenya. Finally, in conclusion, it reiterates the findings and contributions of the study and considers the main theoretical and policy implications of the research.

THE RO LANDSCAPE IN AFRICA

A broad assortment of ROs are scattered across the African continent, with a great deal of variation in their respective (and often overlapping) memberships, mandates, and levels of institutional development. According to Thonke and Spliid, there are a total of 17 ROs in Africa (2012: 45). These bodies range from the continent-wide AU to a variety of RECs, which recently have broadened their scope beyond the economic realm to take a leading role in security affairs, to more *ad hoc* bodies that are not recognized by the AU.

In terms of conflict management, the AU formally recognizes eight RECs, which are intended to be the “building blocks” of the AU’s African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) (Williams 2011: 6). At the AU level, the APSA comprises a number of institutions overseen by the AU’s Peace and Security Council, including the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force, and the Peace Fund. The eight AU-recognized RECs consist of

the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community for Central African States (ECCAS), ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and SADC. ROs that are not formally recognized by the AU include the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries (CEPGL), the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA), the Indian Ocean Commission (COI), the Liptako–Gourma Authority (LGA), and the Mano River Union (MRU) (Thonke and Spliid 2012: 65).

In theory, the AU–REC relationship on peace and security issues is meant to be “hierarchical but mutually reinforcing,” with the AU coordinating the operations of the RECs regarding conflict prevention and management (Williams 2011: 6). In 2008, the AU and the RECs signed a memorandum of understanding in the area of peace and security, which was intended to establish clear channels of communication and increase coordination and information sharing (Noyes and Yarwood 2013: 252). Liaison officers from the RECs were installed at AU headquarters to help facilitate this process. In practice, however, the AU–REC relationship has been hamstrung by a variety of coordination, capacity, and competition issues (Vines 2013).

Stemming from South Africa’s relatively successful experience with a transitional unity government in the early 1990s (Ayangafac and Cilliers 2011: 134), the AU and many other ROs in Africa have, broadly speaking, come to favor the power-sharing approach, as evidenced by the widespread use of the model on the African continent. Mainly due to the lack of a viable alternative, the model has remained attractive despite its considerable drawbacks. Such costs include constrained democratic competition, bloated cabinets, and, in the case of post-election power sharing, the potential to incentivize incumbents to foment violence and refuse to leave power after losing an election in the hope of remaining in office through an externally brokered accord (LeVan 2011).

Each region has approached the power-sharing question in differing ways, depending on their prevailing conflict management norms and “security cultures” (Williams and Haacke 2011: 63–65). For instance, SADC, with a history of deep-seated norm of protecting state sovereignty and advocating non-intervention, has taken a largely closed-door “quiet diplomacy” approach to post-election power sharing, with very limited participation from IOs and other international actors. On the other hand, the

AU and ECOWAS, with a cohesive mandate to uphold democratic principles and norms that are relatively open to regional and international intervention, have taken a more collaborative approach to post-election GNUs, with considerable external participation and oversight.

SADC AND THE GPA IN ZIMBABWE (2008–2013)

Zimbabwe is a landlocked, low-income country with a population of 15 million located in southern Africa. President Robert Mugabe has been in power since Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980. The country is semi-authoritarian, with strong executive institutions and a long history of political and electoral violence. Zimbabwe's 2008 elections pitted Mugabe, of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), against opposition challenger Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). After a month delay, it was announced that Mugabe had narrowly lost the presidential contest to Tsvangirai (43% to 47%), but because neither candidate allegedly won the necessary 50%, a second round was necessary.

In the run-up to the second round, ZANU-PF structures and the country's powerful security sector unleashed a campaign of violence that left over 200 dead, more than 5,000 beaten or tortured, 36,000 displaced, and scores others missing or jailed (Human Rights Watch 2011: 26). Tsvangirai withdrew amidst the violence, and Mugabe secured an illegitimate victory, leading to power-sharing negotiations chaired by South African Thabo Mbeki under the auspices of SADC and, to a lesser extent, the AU. A two-month negotiation led to the signing of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) power-sharing deal in September 2008. Under the agreement, Mugabe retained the presidency, while Tsvangirai assumed the new prime minister position. Cabinet positions and ministries were split between ZANU-PF and the opposition.

Regional politics in southern Africa profoundly shaped the design and practice of Zimbabwe's GNU. Mugabe and ZANU-PF shared strong relations and common ideologies with many of Zimbabwe's neighbors, which can be traced back to their shared experiences wrought during the region's fight for independence from white settler colonialism, spanning the 1960s through the 1990s (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011: 3). Because of this shared history, Chris Mutsvangwa, a former ZANU-PF minister of war veterans, told me that the region has developed a cohesive, cross-border "collective political consciousness" (Mutsvangwa 2015).

While Mugabe and ZANU–PF had many long-standing regional allies, the most important external player for Zimbabwe has always been South Africa, the regional economic and political hegemon. Mbeki played a pivotal role in the Zimbabwe crisis, acting as both an informal and formal mediator between ZANU–PF and the opposition all the way back to the early 2000s. Driven by his mantra of “African solutions to African problems,” antipathy toward Western policies in Africa, and distrust of Zimbabwe’s opposition, Mbeki developed a policy of “quiet diplomacy” toward Zimbabwe and shunned any other outside efforts at intervention (Moore 2010).

According to members of Zimbabwe’s opposition, Mbeki showed an acute bias against the opposition during the 2008 power-sharing negotiations. Welshman Ncube, the MDC-M (smaller MDC faction) negotiator, told me: “to the extent that you can say he [Mbeki] was biased, he would react, in sadness, in anger, in disappointment, to what he perceived to be Tsvangirai’s un-African-ness” and reliance on Western leaders for support and advice (Ncube 2014).

When the MDC and international actors attempted to bypass the SADC process in Zimbabwe in 2008 and use alternative channels to reach the AU, they made little to no headway because of the AU’s deference to SADC on the Zimbabwe question. A senior Zimbabwean official, who worked closely with the ZANU–PF and MDC negotiation teams, told me that SADC is particularly sensitive on this issue of outside intervention, saying, “SADC jealously guards its area.” So when Zimbabwe was discussed at AU meetings in 2008, AU officials “could not dissent” from the SADC position (Anonymous 2015). Tsvangirai underscored this point, telling me: “South Africa was given the task as the facilitator. So any slap in the face of South Africa would not have been considered by the AU...The region would not accept, the AU would not accept” (Tsvangirai 2014).

The SADC’s solidarity politics, combined with the MDC’s inexperience and questionable strategic choices, led to a relatively weak and opaque power-sharing agreement, with limited provisions for third-party monitoring and enforcement. For instance, the key question of how to reform Zimbabwe’s politicized security sector barely received any mention. Tendai Biti, the opposition’s main negotiator, told me that the party had put little thought into how to deal with the military question during negotiations, referring to security reform as a “grey area” for the party (Biti 2015).

With a largely toothless internal body and SADC in charge of implementing the agreement, Mugabe and ZANU–PF quickly discovered they could renege and stall on any real institutional reform efforts, with few consequences. As such, the polarized status quo politics quickly returned to Zimbabwe under the GNU. Outside of some late movement on a new constitution, these conditions prevented any genuine reforms from moving forward under the GPA, particularly in the security realm. Tsvangirai nicely summed up how the lack of a strong agreement and outside enforcement hurt the prospects for reform: “What was absent in the agreement was an enforcement mechanism. And that undermined us, to a great extent” (Tsvangirai 2014).

ECOWAS AND THE APG IN TOGO (2006–2010)

Togo is a small, low-income country with a population of 7 million located in west Africa. Togo is also a semi-authoritarian country, with a strong executive and an extended history of militarized rule, an ethnically based north–south divide, and widespread electoral violence. President Gnassingbé Eyadéma, who came to power via a military coup in 1967, survived the country’s move toward multi-party democracy in the 1990s and ruled until his death in 2005. Upon his passing, Eyadéma’s son, Faure Gnassingbé, was installed as “acting president” by the top echelons of the military and hardliners within the ruling *Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais* (Togolese People’s Rally) party. After the AU and ECOWAS suspended and levied sanctions on Togo, Gnassingbé agreed to step down and hold presidential elections in April 2005 (Seely 2006).

In the 2005 poll, Gnassingbé was declared the winner, despite allegations of vote manipulation by the military. The main opposition party, the *Union des Forces de Changement* (UFC—the Union of Forces for Change), led in exile by Gilchrist Olympio, claimed fraud and called for demonstrations. Clashes erupted between the protesters and security forces, leaving up to 800 dead (*IOL* 2005). After a mediation process headed by Compaoré, the RPT, five opposition parties, and two civil society groups signed the *Accord Politique Global* (APG, Comprehensive Political Accord) agreement in August 2006. Under the agreement, Gnassingbé would retain the presidency, while an opposition candidate would serve as prime minister.

Akin to Zimbabwe, regional politics in west Africa played a critical role in shaping the design and dynamics of Togo's experiment with post-election power sharing. With backing from the European Union (EU) and the regional hegemon, Nigeria, ECOWAS wielded considerable leverage during the power-sharing period. In stark contrast to SADC, ECOWAS had norms that were open to both international and regional intervention, and a relatively cohesive mandate to uphold democratic principals.

Founded in 1975, in 1978 ECOWAS passed a non-aggression protocol, reflecting the Cold War thinking on non-intervention. In the early 1990s, however, regional norms began to shift toward interventionism and the promotion of good governance and democracy (Iwilade and Agbo 2012: 363). In 1999, ECOWAS formally enshrined its right to humanitarian intervention with the adoption of a protocol on conflict prevention, and in 2001, adopted a protocol on democracy and good governance. Although ECOWAS has a mixed record of upholding democratic principals, it has acted decisively on a number of occasions. Hartmann maintains that the "Nigerian-backed ECOWAS action in Sierra Leone in 1998 was the first African military intervention for the restoration of democracy" (Hartmann 2016: 11).

Since its deployment to Liberia in 1990, ECOWAS has worked in close coordination with the international community, the UN and AU in particular (Adibe 1997). Indeed, the 1999 protocol allows for international intervention by the AU or UN, if invited. This burden sharing on regional peace and security issues with international actors upped ECOWAS' status on the international stage (Wilen 2012: 184). In Togo, this regional security culture meant that Western countries, led by the EU, were not at loggerheads with ECOWAS during the power-sharing period, and as such, both ECOWAS and the EU were able to wield their considerable leverage effectively. As ECOWAS' and Western donors' goals and norms on intervention were largely aligned, the two worked in a generally coordinated and unified manner during the APG negotiations and power-sharing period. Major opposition figures also told me that Compaoré served as a relatively fair and unbiased mediator (Olympio 2015).

These regional and international dynamics played a large role in shaping the strong agreement design and third-party enforcement of the APG. The APG, which built on a framework initially outlined in 2004 talks with the EU, was a wide-ranging document, calling for, in addition

to a GNU, a revamped electoral commission, a new National Assembly based on transparent legislative elections, reconciliation processes, and constitutional, justice, and security reforms, among other provisions. A monitoring committee (*Comité de Suivi*), to be chaired by Compaoré and comprised of all signatories of the APG, including representatives from the EU and ECOWAS, was tasked with monitoring and implementing the power-sharing agreement.

The specificity and strong external enforcement of the accord, despite a volatile reform process that included several notable setbacks—particularly in the realm of constitutional reform—helped to push a moderate degree of reforms forward under power sharing in Togo. In particular, the APG was able to deliver a few key electoral and security reforms, including a revamped electoral commission and the standing up of special election security forces in the run-up to the relatively peaceful legislative elections in 2007 and 2010 presidential elections. Although polarization between the ruling party and the opposition persisted under the APG period, these gains helped Togo to largely overcome its dark past of hyper-militarized rule and electoral violence. Indeed, writing in 2015, Okonofua asserted that since 2007, “there has been a dramatic improvement in the conduct of elections in Togo” (Okonofua 2015: 90).

THE AU, UN, AND THE NATIONAL ACCORD IN KENYA (2008–2013)

Kenya is a lower middle-income country with a population of 44 million located in east Africa. Kenya is also a semi-authoritarian country, with a strong executive, a history of ephemeral party coalitions, and ethnically driven electoral violence. In the 2007 elections, President Mwai Kibaki’s Party of National Unity (PNU) faced off against Raila Odinga’s Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The poll was exceptionally close. Despite the opposition claiming widespread electoral fraud, the PNU declared victory and Kibaki was hurriedly sworn in. The disputed elections sparked ethnically based violence between supporters of the government and opposition, carried out by political militias and gangs. The police were also deeply involved in the violence. Over 1,100 were killed and 600,000 displaced in the post-election violence (Global Post 2013).

The signing of the National Accord power-sharing deal in February 2008, brokered by Annan under the banner of the AU's Panel of Eminent African Personalities and the UN, finally brought the crisis to an end. As stipulated by the accord, Kibaki retained the powerful presidency, while Odinga assumed the freshly created post of prime minister. Other cabinet posts were divided between the two parties. The GNU came to be known as the Grand Coalition Government (GCG).

Akin to the two above cases, regional dynamics played a significant role in shaping the design of the agreement and the practice of Kenya's GNU. Regional institutions in east Africa were relatively weak and under-institutionalized, with a dearth of strong gatekeeping ROs that were opposed to international intervention. East Africa has two primary ROs: the EAC, consisting of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, and the IGAD, made up of Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea, Uganda, Sudan, and South Sudan. Both are relatively new institutions, with the EAC founded in 1999 and IGAD in 1986. Overall, the two bodies lacked a strong collective identity, with weak leadership, secretariats, and conflict management norms.

Indeed, Khadiagala argues that "East Africa remains relatively constrained by weak regionalism that remains rhetorical." He notes that the EAC and IGAD do "not have the collective clout and voice" of other ROs, such as SADC or ECOWAS (Khadiagala 2009: 434). Hartmann also makes this point, arguing that, the EAC is weakened by rivalries between Kenya and Ethiopia and that IGAD has "no competencies to monitor regime dynamics in member states" (Hartmann 2016: 89). These weaknesses and lack of a collective regional security culture hampered the ability of the two ROs to wield any real influence in the region during the 2008 negotiations and the period of power sharing in Kenya. As such, the AU, led by Annan and supported by the UN system, stepped into the void.

From the time the AU was stood up, it embraced a break from its predecessor's stance of "non-interference" in member states toward a position of "non-indifference." Indeed, the AU included a provision on humanitarian intervention (Article 4(h)) in its founding document (Williams 2011: 1). While the AU took the lead in Kenya, Annan also drew heavily on support from donors and the international community, which held considerable diplomatic and economic leverage. On the international stage, the intervention was couched in terms of the emerging "responsibility to protect" doctrine, which was endorsed by the UN

General Assembly in 2005 in an effort to prevent mass atrocities. After years of often conflicting messaging and actions on Kenya, in 2008, the donor community acted in a generally cohesive and coordinated fashion, lining up behind Annan and the AU and wielding its substantial leverage with one voice (Brown 2009).

These external dynamics, combined with Annan's considerable negotiating experience, led to a well-designed power-sharing accord, with detailed and broad-ranging institutional reforms, ambitious timelines, and strong external monitoring and enforcement. The parties agreed that the Panel of Eminent African Personalities would set up a Coordination and Liaison Office (CLO), with support from the UN, to monitor and implement the National Accord (African Union 2014: 51). South Consulting, a Kenya-based consultancy, was selected by the AU team to assist in monitoring and implementation, adding to a robust domestic civil society effort to push the reform agenda forward. Annan also personally remained involved, often flying back to Kenya and making public statements to nudge the reform process along.

Vigorous regional, international, and domestic monitoring, combined with Kibaki's relatively pro-reform stance, helped to push some meaningful, if halting and fragile, reforms forward under the GCG. After more than two decades of failed attempts at constitutional reform, Kenya passed a new constitution in 2010, which included a variety of institutional and security reforms (particularly in the oversight and management of the notoriously politicized and corrupt police service) (Noyes 2013). Despite some reform successes, there were also significant shortcomings, most notably the GCG's failure to hold any high-level suspects accountable for the post-election violence. Additionally, the reforms that were passed remained susceptible to reversals after the GCG left office (the familiar "problem of actor discontinuity" (Pierson 2004: 120–122)). Indeed, Uhuru Kenyatta's subsequent government, which came to power in 2013, moved to rollback and dilute several of reforms passed by the GCG.

Some within Kenya's ruling party resented the decisive role that external actors played during the power-sharing period. Peter Kagwanja, an advisor to Kibaki and the PNU, told me that, "there was an overwhelming influence of the external players." He even went so far as to say that, "For us [PNU] he [Annan] was the prime mover; Raila [Odinga] is the stooge" (Kagwanja 2015).

CONCLUSION

Despite the many costs and imperfections of post-election GNUs, the persistence of violent elections in Africa and a lack of a viable conflict resolution alternative mean that the post-election power-sharing model will likely continue to be popular and remain in the toolkits of regional and international mediators. Looking at the cases of Zimbabwe, Togo, and Kenya, this chapter has demonstrated the key role that African ROs play in post-election GNUs, showing how the norms and practices of African ROs impact political dynamics and outcomes at the domestic level.

This chapter explained how variation in the security cultures and conflict management approaches of ROs—particularly how the bodies negotiate, monitor, and enforce power-sharing pacts—shapes the design, practice, and reform outcomes of post-election GNUs. Additionally, this chapter illustrated how ROs in Africa can play a critical “gatekeeping” function during the negotiation phase and subsequent operation of GNUs, accelerating or blocking the leverage and degree of involvement of other external actors. This chapter has also shown how the character and disposition of the mediator impact power-sharing accords and GNU outcomes.

This study helps to fill the gap in the literature on the role of ROs in the standing up and practice of post-election GNUs, and also helps to contribute to the nascent but emerging literature examining the power-sharing trend in non-civil war contexts. The main theoretical contribution of the study is to show that—while certainly not discounting the fundamental import of domestic factors—regional and international involvement and influence are crucial in shaping the design and outcomes of post-election power sharing in semi-authoritarian countries. Indeed, the cases of Kenya and Togo demonstrate that a high degree of leverage and coordination from regional and international actors can help to spur a degree of reforms even under some of the most inauspicious conditions. These findings align with a recent stream in the political science literature that argues for the importance of international and regional factors in democratization processes (Levitsky and Way 2010; Hartmann 2016).²

The major policy implications of the findings are threefold. First, if regional and international actors are interested in successfully pushing institutional and democratic reforms in cases of post-election power sharing, this research suggests that mediators should be unbiased and

open to close coordination with international actors. Second, outside actors would be wise to push for well-designed power-sharing accords that include specific reform processes, timelines, and strong external enforcement mechanisms. Additionally, to help avoid the model's real costs to political competition, post-election power-sharing arrangements should only be temporary, transitional mechanisms.³ Finally, the above findings suggest that regional and international actors should play a more coordinated and active role in the actual monitoring and enforcement of post-election power-sharing accords.

NOTES

1. Mehler identified 17 agreements from 1999 to 2009; I have updated his findings to include Zanzibar (2010), as well as Togo (2006) and Lesotho (1999), which were not included in his count.
2. For an overview of studies arguing for the importance of international factors, see Levitsky and Way (2010: 38). On the role of regional influences, see Hartmann (2016).
3. The important question of whether the post-election power-sharing model is conducive or constraining to democratization in the long run is beyond the scope of this chapter.

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Nationalism Underpinned by Pan-Regionalism: African Foreign Policies in ECOWAS in An Era of Anti-Globalization

Rabeemat Momodu

The recent Donald Trump victory in the USA in November 2016, and the culmination of Brexit (Britain voting to leave the European Union) in July 2016 demonstrated the seeming global shift from collective multilateralism to self-interested nationalism. While these two landmark events in 2016 marked what is perhaps the beginning of the reversal of integration in Europe and worldwide globalization more broadly, in Africa, these events will most likely have other impacts. Indeed, where the USA and Britain might be moving away from global engagement, the election of Mr. Trump and the process of Brexit are likely to inspire more regional and continental integration on the African continent. Because most countries now realize that the future of Africa lies in more and higher quality integration, this realization of anti-globalization movements will likely be translated into a more profound spirit of pan-African solidarity, a force that has more or less influenced

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and shaped the foreign policies of many African countries since their independence.

Since its founding in 1975, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has spearheaded and registered a number of remarkable accomplishments in regional integration. To date, some of ECOWAS' notable achievements include: the Free Movement of Persons, Goods, and Services (and citizens' right of residence and establishment); the Community Passport (abolishing national visas in place of an ECOWAS-wide visa); the Community Biometric Identity Card (which abolished the need for a residency permit among member states); the Community Levy for financing regional integration; the self-financing and deployment of ECOMOG (ECOWAS Monitoring Group) since 1990 and the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) to Liberia, Sierra Leone, Mali, and currently Guinea-Bissau; the development of many sectoral community policies and plans; and harmonized regional development policies, all of which are evidence of commendable progress in regional integration. In short, the 'ECOWAS value' to the west African region includes the international organization's ability to exert collective continental and global influence, facilitate collective bargaining and negotiation, encourage economic expansion, increase intra-regional trade, expand regional job creation, promote interdependency in political and social stability, and anchor a collective ECOWAS and west African identity. Yet, despite the aforementioned benefits that ECOWAS offers, its member states have and will always grapple with the constant and uneasy tension between pursuing immediate national interests on the one hand, against long-term and broader regional and continental interests, on the other hand.

Bringing to the fore this tension between the pursuit of self-interest and Community-based development, this chapter argues that the conduct of Member States' foreign policies in ECOWAS reflects a pan-regionalist outlook, underpinned by self-interested nationalism. Despite the current challenges of anti-globalization, there is ample evidence of members' high level of commitment to West African regionalism, which demonstrates that ECOWAS Member States substantially conduct their foreign policies through the prism of regional integration and solidarity, which even the new waves of anti-globalization sentiment will not be able to derail.

THE INSTITUTIONS OF ECOWAS

The ECOWAS was established on May 28th, 1975, in Lagos (the former capital of Nigeria), through the Treaty of Lagos. While its broader aims were to encourage economic integration among West African countries, more specifically, it sought to:

Promote co-operation and development in all fields of economic activity particularly in the fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions, and in social and cultural matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and maintaining economic stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and of contribution to the progress and development of the African continent (The Treaty of Lagos 1975: Article 2).

The principle of separation of power at the regional level also contributes to the effective management and Member States' confidence in the regional integration process. The Executive (the Commission), the Judiciary (Community Court of Justice), and the Legislature (the ECOWAS Parliament) operate independently, albeit with inputs from civil society and the private sector, though not as much as they should. Each of these three main ECOWAS institutions is detailed below.

The Executive Branch: The ECOWAS Commission

The ECOWAS Commission, the executive arm of the ECOWAS Community governance architecture, under the charge of a President, is the central coordination institution and most pivotal in engaging with Member States in the conduct of their foreign policies in the IO. The President of the Commission is nominated for a non-renewable term of 4-years by a member state and presented for adoption by the Heads of States of the other fourteen member states based on rotational allocation to different countries except Nigeria. On a "gentleman's agreement," Nigeria had agreed not to occupy the position of ECOWAS President in demonstration of good faith and to further allay fears of domination. This was until 2012 when it was made formal that no member state should head the community institution it was hosting (Article 1, Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the Supplementary Act A/SP 14/02/12 of 17

February 2012). First, as in national governance, the ECOWAS executive primarily plays an implementing and executing role as concerns the IO's affairs, but it is also inherently involved in initiating, directing, driving, agenda setting, and projecting regional integration roles. Second, ECOWAS' robust and effective engagement in conflict management over the years is also heavily dependent on the competence, influence, and direction of the Commission.

Third, the ECOWAS Commission also assists in building consensus among member states by playing an interlocutor's role, providing information for clarification and preserving and articulating the institutional memory of past decisions in the case of divergent views. Indeed, the principle and practice of consensus building helps to allay the fears and accommodate the views of all member states, thus safeguarding and balancing their national and regional interests. Fourth, the ECOWAS Commission and other Community Institutions are the driving force in the Community's relations with other strategic and development partners including the UN, EU, USA, China, India, Brazil, and others. The Commission's role in this regard does not compromise the member states' national interests, but rather complements and influences them positively as it indeed plays a facilitating and a 'vigilante' or 'watchdog' role in the member states' collective regional interests. Rather than undermining ECOWAS members' foreign policies, the IO should be thought of as an extension of their national foreign policies.

An important date in history of the ECOWAS Commission was 2007, when the former ECOWAS Secretariat was transformed into today's ECOWAS Commission. This transformation was not just cosmetic: it gave the IO more supranational powers, and was accompanied by the addition of a new cadre of highly-qualified professional and technical staff to drive the new phase of regional integration. In short, the IO gained more power vis-à-vis its member states. And yet, while the Commission's orientation, direction, and actions gained more independence, it was careful not to become too radical for its member states, again, emphasizing the tension that it must address between supranationalism and the promotion of individual member states' national interests. Nevertheless, in some cases, the Commission has convinced the member states to take decisions and actions in the best collective interest of the region.

One example of the IOs' commitment to community values was ECOWAS' impressive resolution to Gambia's 2016 post-electoral impasse involving the 22-year dictator Yahya Jammeh. The ECOWAS

Authority of Heads of State and Government under the leadership of President of Liberia, Madam Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (immediate past Chair), and with the President of Nigeria (Mohammadu Buhari) and former President of Ghana (John Mahama Dramani) as mediator and co-mediator, acted proactively and rapidly, deploying a cocktail of interventions including enforcement mediation, shuttle diplomacy, and credible and demonstrated threat of use of force (with the proactive and preemptive deployment of ECOMIG) to resolve an otherwise potentially volatile situation. The Commission, being the engine room of all community interventions, had begun to engage with Yahya Jammeh well before the election and was actively seized with the challenges and violations during the entire electoral process. This early and robust engagement led to the Commission's decision not to deploy an ECOWAS election observation team as a stand against the electoral process fraught with many violations.

Impressively, with the transformation of the ECOWAS Secretariat into a Commission in 2007 came an additional fundamental shift: the adoption of a new legal regime for Community Acts (ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/06/06 Amending The Revised Treaty (2006)-ECOWAS Official Journal, Vol 49, June 2006-New Article 9). Prior to that date, the obligations of member states were captured principally in protocols and conventions, which are subject to lengthy national parliamentary ratification processes. These processes delayed the entry into force of legal texts, thereby often paralyzing the integration process. In the context of the Commission, the Authority of Heads of State and Government now passes Supplementary Acts to complement the Treaty, all of which are binding on member states and the institutions of the Community. It implies the elimination of lengthy national parliamentary ratification processes of ECOWAS Community Acts and this truly shows that member states see regional integration as being in their best national interest in the long run. It equally demonstrates member states' growing commitment to sharing their sovereignty within a supranational organization for the sake of regional integration that ultimately benefits and further secures their national economic growth and development.

The Legislative Branch: The ECOWAS Parliament

The recent adoption of the Supplementary Act Relating to the Enhancement of the Powers of the ECOWAS Parliament by the Authority

of Heads of State and Government at their 50th Ordinary Session on December 17, 2016, in Abuja, demonstrates the quest to deepen integration and make it more people- and regionally-driven. The ECOWAS Parliament is the representative assembly of the people of the Community, and members are known as ‘Representatives of the ECOWAS Parliament.’ Representatives are elected by indirect universal suffrage from national parliaments of Member States. The Parliament is composed of one hundred and fifteen (115) seats with each Member having a guaranteed minimum of five (5) seats and the remaining forty (40) seats shared on the basis of population. The life span of the legislature is four (4) years from the date of its inauguration by the Chairman of the Authority.

Its objectives are to: contribute to the efficient and effective implementation of objectives and policies of the Community; strengthen representative democracy in the Community; ensure the right of scrutiny and involvement of the west African population in the process of integration of the region; promote the practice of representative accountability to the citizens of the Community; legislate pursuant to the goals of the Community and in areas defined in the Supplementary Act; and cooperate with national and regional parliaments and similar bodies within and outside west Africa, as well as with civil societies with a view to promoting regional integration.

The Judicial Branch: ECOWAS Community Court of Justice

As the principal legal organ of the ECOWAS Community, the primary responsibility of the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice is to ensure the interpretation and application of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty, and the annexed protocols, conventions, and other Community texts. However, the Court has four clear distinct mandates: as a community court; as an administrative court; as a human rights court; and as an arbitration tribunal.

The Court is composed of seven independent judges who are jurists of high moral character and who are appointed by Heads of State and Government of the Community for a 4-year non-renewal term. The first set of judges were sworn-in on January 30, 2001, in Bamako, Mali. The President of the Court heads the institution and the bureau which comprises the President, the Vice President, and the Dean of the Court who occupies that position in his capacity as the oldest and longest serving member of the Court, whereas the positions of the President and the

Vice President are elected. The Court has issued many landmark judgments against Member State Governments, especially under its human rights jurisdiction, which has become its defining mandate. However, the challenge remains that the Court does not possess powers for enforcement of its judgments.

Other ECOWAS Institutions

Beyond these three main institutions, ECOWAS has also created other institutions to promote West African regional integration. These include the ECOWAS Bank of Investment and Development (EBID); the West African Health Organization (WAHO); The Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA); among other specialized agencies covering many areas of integration. ECOWAS has also facilitated the establishment of Ecobank (a pan-Regional and African bank) and ASKY (a regional airline) among other regional private sector organizations. These achievements aptly demonstrate an increased level of pooled sovereignty, which implies ECOWAS' substantial regional influences in the conduct of both domestic and foreign policy of member states.

One of ECOWAS' most important and innovative institutions is its Community Levy. Adopted in 2001, member states agreed to give up 0.5% of import duty revenue from third countries (non-ECOWAS countries) in the service of financing ECOWAS. Despite the operational problems to render the Community Levy functional, and lingering challenges with full compliance by member states, the resources from the Community Levy have proven to be the main sustenance of integration and have set ECOWAS apart from other African IOs. ECOWAS remains the only African IO that funds its activities almost entirely from its own resources. Indeed, to the extent that the ECOWAS Community Levy is regarded as one of the most innovative and sustainable sources of inter-governmental integration financing, the AU has taken a page from ECOWAS: During the AU's 2016 summit in July in Kigali, Rwanda, African Union members followed ECOWAS' suit, adopting a 0.2% import duty from third countries to finance all operational costs of the African Union Commission's budget, as well as 75% of its programming costs.

ECOWAS member states' conviction that the Community Levy is the soul of ECOWAS integration was put to the test during the region's Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations with the EU, when the EU insisted on the scrapping of the Community Levy as one of the

conditions. Without exception, all ECOWAS member states refused. That the money (the 0.5% import duty) could have been used for financing national development but instead is used for regional integration, underlines ECOWAS members' strong faith in the ECOWAS project as a way to project and accomplish their foreign policy goals. The benefits of the progress in regional integration thus far provides compelling reasons for many of its member states to want to invest more in regional integration as a means to pursue their foreign policies, rather than interpreting ECOWAS as a force that impedes them in the pursuit of their foreign policies.

At a national level, there is an ECOWAS National Office in charge of ECOWAS affairs in each member state. Established in 1982 to serve as the focal point between ECOWAS and member states on all ECOWAS activities, they serve as the intermediary between ECOWAS and sectoral departments and all other stakeholders involved in the integration process of member states. Their activities include the coordination, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of regional programs in member states, in addition to promoting the participation of the private sector and civil society in regional integration activities (Recommendation C/REC.1/11/82). In order to ensure the sustainability and effective operation of the National Offices, member states retain 4.5% of Community Levy profits to fund their activities. National offices are staffed by a Head (rank of Director), Deputy Head include the Head (rank of Director), Deputy Head, two officers in charge of sectoral programs, and one Communication, Documentation, Accountant, and Bilingual Secretary each (Official Journal of ECOWAS Vol 58-March 2011).

DOMESTIC INPUTS TO MEMBERS' FOREIGN POLICY CREATION IN ECOWAS

Having given an overview of the structure of ECOWAS, what then are the main drivers that impact the ways that ECOWAS member states conduct their foreign policies within the organization?

Domestic Institutions: Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Ministries of Defense, and Others

Generally, the formulation and conduct of west African states' foreign policies towards ECOWAS is primarily driven by the members' Ministries of Foreign or External Affairs. Notably, all ECOWAS countries have

created specific structures for ECOWAS/regional integration within their Ministries of Foreign/External Relations, which contribute to the formulation and conduct of their national foreign policies in ECOWAS. This customization and domestication of their foreign policy for regional integration has meant the broadening of the space, scope, and increasing stakeholder involvement in the formulation and execution of their foreign policy in ECOWAS. Intuitively, national-level diplomats, bureaucrats, lawyers, and other civil servants often assist with the formulation and conduct of national foreign policies as well as drafting and developing many of ECOWAS progressive protocols and policies.

Given the statutory requirement for the engagement of all line ministries in the decision-making process of ECOWAS, the traditional dominant role of the Foreign Ministry in the conduct of foreign policy is shared with other line ministers, including Ministries of Defense, Trade, and Investment, National Planning, with countries' national institutes of international affairs also providing substantial input. For its part, the Ministry of Defense is critical to the formulation and conduct of foreign policies of ECOWAS member countries, due to the imperative nexus of peace and stability to national economic development and regional integration.

Former Presidents and Foreign Affairs Ministers

Importantly, strong national figures and personalities from ECOWAS Member States—notably former Presidents and Foreign Affairs ministers—often influence foreign policy formulation as well as its conduct. A cursory interrogation of the historical trajectory of most member states' foreign policy formulation and conduct shows how Heads of State in the region have epitomized, articulated, and indeed projected their individual beliefs, values, style, approach, orientation, and commitment to regional and continental foreign policy engagement. A classic example is the Olusegun Obasanjo/Abdoulaye Wade NEPAD duo, as both former Presidents of Nigeria and Senegal, respectively, left indelible footprints in regional and continental integration with their co-creation and push for the New Partnership for Africa's Development (the NEPAD) which encapsulated their passion and belief in pan-Africanism and African renaissance. Even the birth of ECOWAS was relentlessly driven principally by Dr. Yakubu Gowon (former military Head of State of Nigeria) and the late Gnassingbé Eyadema (former President of Togo) based on their personal conviction of the benefits of regional integration.

WHY WORK WITHIN ECOWAS?

In general, ECOWAS Member States find strategic utility in ECOWAS membership to pursue two primary foreign policy interests: economic growth and peace and security. This section investigates each, as well as how the two issue areas compare to one another.

Pursuing Economic Concerns

In the main, economic considerations are the main drivers of ECOWAS member states' conduct of foreign policy and behavior, which aligns with the institution's *raison d'être*. In essence, the majority of ECOWAS member states conduct their foreign economic policy with the understanding that their economic interests are better served as members of a regional bloc (ECOWAS) first, and then, by the continental (AU) bloc, rather than being simply pursued individually. Not even Nigeria, the biggest economy and market in Africa, risks thinking otherwise. The tendency for ECOWAS members to collectively negotiate—with the AU toward the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) and with the EU toward the EPA—speaks volumes about member states' interpreted value of conducting economic diplomacy through ECOWAS.

Pursuing Security Concerns

Beyond its economic benefits to member states, ECOWAS is generally acclaimed to be relatively successful in the area of peace and security. It has an ever-growing and impressive history of conflict management and resolution successes dating back to the 1990s. Perhaps the finest moment in the impressive security-related history of ECOWAS was the establishment and self-financing of the deployment of ECOMOG (ECOWAS States Monitoring Group) in 1990 in Liberia. Against all expectations, the international community with mostly disbelief and some degree of condescension, watched ECOWAS deploy the first African sub-regional peacekeeping force into Liberia. ECOMOG's first deployment represents many milestones, including the fact that it was much more than a typical peacekeeping or even peace support operation, but was actually enforcing peace among different warring sides and rebel groups. ECOWAS also deployed ECOMOG in 1997 to Sierra Leone to stop the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebellion, and

to Guinea-Bissau in 1999 to end the Guinea-Bissau civil war. In 2003, ECOWAS again deployed ECOMIL (ECOWAS Mission in Liberia) to check rebel forces' occupation of Monrovia, and to facilitate and secure the peace process during the Second Liberian Civil War.

In recent times, the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), which is the successor of ECOMOG and the West African contingent for the African Standby Force, has deployed as the military and police force of AFISMA (African-Led International Support Mission in Mali) in January 2013. It was re-hatted to a UN Mission in July 2013. Moreover, the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) has been in that country since 2012, while the ECOWAS Mission to Gambia (ECOMIG) has been in that country since 2017.

Expectedly, given the above, member states share a growing confidence that ECOWAS is capable, willing, ready, and reasonably well-resourced to act collectively, further bolstering member states' commitment to shared responsibility for political stability in the region. This achievement in turn motivates the member states closer to accept the growing influence and confidence in ECOWAS supranationality which invariably influences the direction and conduct of their foreign policy.

Comparing ECOWAS' Economic and Security Functions

Despite the primacy of economic interests in engaging in ECOWAS, given how active ECOWAS has been in conflict management especially since its involvement in the Liberia and Sierra Leone conflicts in 1990 to date, many observers have often wondered if ECOWAS' primary focus is still economic integration. The reason for this perception is perhaps because ECOWAS' efforts at managing conflicts within its region always attract significant international media and intergovernmental attention. Unfortunately, the same level of attention and visibility is not accorded to other areas of integration or international relations.

Nevertheless, a closer look reveals that ECOWAS' economic integration agenda still takes precedence over its peace and security functions. First, there are at least seven departments at the ECOWAS Commission focused on economic integration: Macroeconomic Policy and Economic Research; Energy and Mines; Infrastructure, Agriculture, Environment and Water Resources; Industry and Private Sector Promotion; Trade, Customs, and Free Movement; and Telecommunications and Information Technology. In addition, there are at least two specialized

agencies on economic integration, including the West African Monetary Agency (WAMA) and West African Monetary Institute (WAMI). In contrast, only ECOWAS' Department of Political Affairs and Peace and Security deals with conflict management. Second, in spite of the fact that ECOWAS expends a lot of its own and external resources in conflict management, an analysis of the annual ECOWAS budgets shows that many more resources are targeted at economic integration than managing conflicts. For instance, an analysis of 2014 to 2016 annual budgets show that only 11.33%, 0.64%, and 5.36% were budgeted for peace and security interventions in the years 2014, 2015, and 2016, respectively. Third, there are at least 25 regional legal texts and normative frameworks in the areas of economic integration, compared to only four on peace and security. These latter four include the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (1991); the Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance (2001 and revised in 2015); the Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and other Related Materials 92006); and the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF-2008).

CHALLENGES TO ECOWAS' INTEGRATION EFFORTS

We now turn to the crux of our discussion: understanding how ECOWAS members mediate between their commitments to the pursuit of national foreign policies on the one hand, versus pan-regionalist policies on the other. Following are several issues that impede ECOWAS' integration efforts, almost all of which are centered on the tensions that exist between the clash of national interests and pan-regional integration.

Troubled History of Pan-Regionalism and Pan-Africanism

To be sure, the notion of pan-Africanism has shaped and influenced the foreign policy direction of many African countries, including member states of the ECOWAS. This is evidenced in the many continental agendas from the Lagos Plan of Action (1980), the Abuja Treaty (1991) establishing the African Economic Community, and the latest, Agenda 2063. Moreover, Africa was the only continent/region that presented a common position for inclusion in the UN Sustainable Development

Goals (SDGs). However, it does not mean that the conduct of foreign policy is the same in all the 55 African countries. Even though some have argued that the spirit of pan-Africanism and African solidarity—or pan-regionalism and regional solidarity—may have diminished over the years, it is incontestable that the African Union (AU) and indeed the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) on the continent are essentially sustained by them. The spirit of pan-Africanism may have been diluted in rhetoric, but it has truly been demonstrated and diffused in the conduct of African countries' foreign policies at the continental, regional, and even sub-regional organizations, to different degrees.

*Different Levels and Selective Compliance of ECOWAS Policies
by Member States*

One issue that impedes regional integration is that sometimes, ECOWAS member states show different levels of implementation and selective compliance with ECOWAS regional policies and decisions. Though at times this is caused by a lack of political will, this may not always be the case. Weak implementation can be attributed to numerous causes, including resource constraints, corruption, weak capacity of government bureaucracies, weak bureaucratic will, ignorance of government officials to implement, and lack of will of people to insist on implementation of decisions taken and signed by their leaders. Weak and selective implementation of ECOWAS regional texts is evidenced, for instance, when countries implement protectionist domestic economic policies, which may be at odds with ECOWAS' regional agreements and policies. A notable example is the fact that so many years after the passage of the ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol, free movement by land is still fraught with many obstacles at almost every border post in the Community, mostly because of corruption of government officials, and sometimes enforcement of national policies that undermines free movement of persons, goods, and services. A most recent example of non-compliance was when Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, and Liberia at different times closed their land borders at the height of the Ebola epidemic in 2014. However, to address this issue of weak compliance and boost cross-border movement of persons and trade, ECOWAS is constructing Joint Border Posts at all its borders to simplify and harmonize border administration and movement.

Weak Domestic Structures of ECOWAS Member States

Impediments to ECOWAS integration at the domestic member level include political instability and insecurity in some member states, which have debilitating effects on their pursuit of coherent foreign policies both within and outside of ECOWAS. There is also the fact that all the member states are still undergoing nation building with weak political and governance institutions and systems which influence their behavior in making and conducting their foreign policy in ECOWAS. Consequently, some ECOWAS member states are not very structured and systematic in the conduct of foreign policy generally, and are instead more concerned and pre-occupied with building their national institutions. Thus, they may have challenges simultaneously dealing with ECOWAS regional governance structures, and their own domestic structure. These impediments are exacerbated by these countries' often weak economies—characterized by mono-product production, primary commodity production, and import dependency—which make them very vulnerable and susceptible to external political and economic pressures. Such external pressures invariably influence the conduct of both their domestic and foreign policies, sometimes against collective regional interests within ECOWAS.

One should not overlook the role of weak capacity (human and financial) of government bureaucracies to implement regional protocols and policies due to resource constraints and bureaucratic politics. Many of the member states' bureaucracies are themselves grappling with effective implementation and delivery of basic and routine national dividends of governance and so having to deliver on regional obligations simultaneously could overstretch their capacities and resources. This may manifest itself as a lack of political and bureaucratic will, which translates into non-compliance with ECOWAS policies.

Power Differentials Between ECOWAS Members

The uneven size of the populations and economies of ECOWAS' member states has at times caused mutual suspicion between members. Most notably, ECOWAS' smaller countries and economies sometimes feel that bigger countries and economies may undermine their economic growth if they grant complete access to their markets. This fear is heightened when it comes to the prospect of labor migration and the flooding of

local markets with low manufacturing capacity. Instructively, the fact that all member states have equal say and stake in decision-making—and are not sanctioned for non-compliance but encouraged to comply—has managed so far to ally such fear and suspicions.

A recent example of equal stake and access was the fact that in spite of Nigeria's serious and consistent objection to ECOWAS signing the EPA with EU, the majority of thirteen of the fifteen members had their way. In a similar vein, Nigeria has persistently and vehemently opposed the increase of ECOWAS Commissioners from nine to fifteen, but again, the majority had their way with the increase effected in 2014. ECOWAS has shown many times that even small members can work to constrain the Community's largest members, including Nigeria. Particularly, the consensual decision-making processes and inclusive structures at the regional level also mean that all member states have relatively high confidence and trust in the joint decisions, even between very powerful and very weak members.

The evidence above is contrary to the perception of some observers that given the significant differences in size of economy and population among ECOWAS members, equality of access and stake may be more textual than actual. The fact that the ECOWAS Community recognizes equality of members—irrespective of size of population, economy, membership contribution, and political stability—has helped to allay members' fears over domination by the regional hegemon, Nigeria.

Ethnolinguistic Divisions

There is no denying that ethnolinguistic divisions have existed within ECOWAS since its founding, all of which have shaped member states' foreign policy approaches to engagement with ECOWAS. Perhaps the most well-known tensions within the ECOWAS Community have been between the linguistic blocs of Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone members, as derived from their colonial histories. Indeed, these ethnolinguistic divisions have often served as the *de facto* alliances in ECOWAS.

Ethno-linguistic and colonial tensions began in the 1960s, as Nigeria was perceived by France as its major rival in west Africa. During the Nigerian civil war (1967–1970), France and its francophone ally, Côte d'Ivoire, supported the Biafran independence movement, worsening

the strained relations between Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire for several years after the war (Adebajo 2002, 2008). Moreover, the establishment of Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine or West African Economic and Monetary Union (UMEOA) in 1994 with membership of Burkina Faso, Mali, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Benin, Niger, and Guinea-Bissau (who joined in 1997) and expansion of its operations beyond its original aim of monetary union, has also been a potential source of division among ECOWAS member states, primarily along colonially-derived linguistic lines.

Moreover, the seeming rivalry for leadership between Nigeria and Ghana is also worth mentioning, but over the years, relations between the two countries have been mostly cordial. And yet, even within linguistic blocs within ECOWAS, divisions exist. While the role of France in west Africa has seemingly shaped the action and reaction of the most powerful Francophone countries in west Africa—particularly Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire—other francophone countries like Benin and Togo have also been seen as allies with Nigeria given their active role in the establishment of ECOWAS.

CONCLUSION

As has been evidenced in the case of ECOWAS, tensions created between regional supranationality and individual states' sovereignty will always influence countries' conduct of domestic and foreign policies. Yet, while the USA and Europe seem to be moving toward more populist and nationalist outlooks on foreign policy, in west Africa, the ECOWAS project—despite its challenges over the past 42 years—is promoting an ever-more integrationist outlook. Having reviewed the history of ECOWAS, it should be clear that mutual suspicion between member states and vigilance against vulnerabilities of reduced national sovereignty will always be an issue. But, the fact that successive governments in member states have never wavered, threatened to exit, expressed serious apprehension, or taken actions which may lead to reversal of gains of regional integration, speaks volumes for the ever-deepening level of integration ECOWAS has brought about. Indeed, the fact that ECOWAS member states anchor the conduct of their foreign policies on ECOWAS' vision of regional integration may not be explicit in their foreign policy texts, but obvious through their ever-growing engagement with ECOWAS institutions, policies, and operations.

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CHAPTER 8

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development: Internal Culture of Foreign Policymaking and Sources of Weaknesses

Redie Bereketeab

The eight members of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) celebrated the organization's 30th anniversary in January 2016. Originally comprising six states—Uganda, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti (excluding present members Eritrea and South Sudan)—and bearing a different name—then the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD)—the organization was launched in January 1986, becoming its new iteration, IGAD, in 1996. In that time, the organization has undergone significant changes, beyond just its name, to include the addition of new members, the adoption of new issues areas, and an arguable increased degree of importance. Nevertheless, thirty years after its founding, IGAD still faces formidable challenges. Today, it struggles with its role in bringing an end to instability in both Somalia and South Sudan, in addition to forestalling other conflicts

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in the tenuous Horn of Africa. In addition to these challenges, the conventional view is that IGAD is a relatively weak international organization, even as compared to other Regional Economic Communities (RECs).

Since its inception thirty years ago, what has been the performance of IGAD? Has IGAD managed to fulfil its mandates? If not, what are the reasons why? Is it true that IGAD is a weaker REC than others on the continent, and if so, what accounts for this weakness? This chapter argues that it is indeed the case that IGAD is weaker than other RECs; this weakness, it asserts, is caused by three interrelated factors: the internal structure of IGAD, the over-reliance on foreign funds, and Ethiopia's domination of the organization.

To show how these three factors interplay to render IGAD one of the weakest international organizations (IOs) in Africa, this chapter proceeds as follows. The first section offers a brief overview of IGAD's history. The second section delves into just how member states understand the role of IGAD in their foreign policy outlooks and logics that undergird the IO's internal culture. The third section works to directly address the motivating question: just why is IGAD arguably one of the weakest IOs in Africa? A fourth and final section concludes.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF IGAD

The original impetus behind the launching of IGAD was to fight environmental degradation: namely drought, desertification, and deforestation (IGAD 1996; Bereketeab 2012: 173). The idea to establish a regional organization came from the United Nations (UN), as reflected in the UN General Assembly Resolution 35/90 of December 1980 (El-Affendi 2001: 582; Woodward 2013a). Further, the work of establishing the regional organization was brought closer when the UN General Assembly endorsed Resolution 38/216 on 20 December 1983 (Ameyo 2010: 5). In January 1986, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government met in Djibouti and signed an agreement that formally declared the formation of IGADD (Bereketeab 2012: 74). The UN encouraged the states of the region to establish IGADD in order to mobilise resources and capacity to combat the menace of environmental degradation—desertification, drought, and deforestation—thereby addressing the most pressing problems of the region, which included food insecurity and famine. Thus, despite its current functions, the original goals of IGAD were environmental, agricultural, and related to human security (IGAD 2007b).

Five years after its founding, the year 1991 was a watershed moment in a number of aspects in the Horn of Africa. The post-Cold War era ushered in an American dominated unipolar order, which saw it necessary to create a hierarchically structured world system. According to this system, Africa was to be reorganised in RECs that followed a broader pattern of regionalization throughout the world. Therefore, there emerged at least five RECs (IGAD, SADC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, and AMU) representing five regions of Africa (Moss 2007: 189–200). Subsequently, these RECs were being subsumed in the overall African Union (AU) structure: the RECs were then given functions as representatives of the African Union at a regional level. In other words, in the post-Cold War order, RECs became component units of the AU, which itself constitutes an informal component unit of the global organization, the UN.

To that end, the end of the Cold War impacted how IGAD conducted its business in several ways. First, the end of the Cold War ushered in a new operational environment with new actors and predispositions, which had indelible impacts on IGAD. The region's belligerent leaders—General Mohammad Siad Barre in Somalia and Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam in Ethiopia—were both deposed. Chaos and mayhem followed in Somalia, while the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) took over power, effectively in May 1991, in Ethiopia. Just two years later, in 1993, Eritrea became independent. These political upheavals—the toppling of the governments of two of IGAD's member states and the addition of a new member—brought new challenges for the organization to address, but also brought in new actors that arguably galvanised the organization to be more ambitious than it had been in years past.

To meet the new situation and address new issues, the restructuring of IGAD's mandate was required. The process of restructuring was boosted by the emergence of two energetic governments with common ambition and vision, the EPRDF and Eritrean People's Liberation Front, the new governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea, respectively (El-Affendi 2001: 582; Mengisteab and Yohannes 2005: 230), both of which undoubtedly played decisive roles in thrusting the restructuring work forward. On 18 April 1995, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government summoned an extraordinary meeting in Addis Ababa and declared its intention to extend the mandate and enhance cooperation among member states (IGAD 1996). The following year, in March, the Assembly signed a Letter of

Instrument to Amend the IGADD Agreement establishing the revitalised IGADD with a new name, The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (IGAD 1996). The Assembly convened again on 25 November 1996 in Djibouti and proclaimed the launching of re-tooled a IGADD, under the new name, IGAD. The re-launched IGAD was created with the new mandates of conflict prevention and resolution, economic cooperation, and regional integration (IGAD 2007a, 2010).

Since its creation, the two most important mechanisms of IGAD have been the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) and Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT). CEWARN, which serves to offer advance warning of potential conflicts, has had only limited successes and only then in cross-border pastoralist conflicts and not large scale interstate wars (Mengisteab 2014: 198).

INTER-STATE DYNAMICS AND FOREIGN POLICY LOGICS WITHIN IGAD

The nature of the IGAD region itself—and the myriad challenges it faces—is at the core of understanding how states formulate foreign policies towards the organization. The IGAD region suffers from multiple interconnected pathologies including interstate conflicts, internal state crises, environmental degradation, droughts and famine, international intervention, and underdevelopment, with all member states being among the least developed countries (LDC). Together, these pathologies feed into each other to make the Horn of Africa region the most conflict-ridden in the African continent, and arguably, the world (Woodward 2013b; Cliffe 1999; de Klerk 2007; Mengisteab 2014). Making IGAD's role particularly difficult is that the organization has been tasked with resolving conflicts touching virtually all member states. These included insurgencies *within countries*—Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and Somalia—and conflicts *between countries*—Somalia vs. Ethiopia, Sudan vs. Ethiopia, Sudan vs. Uganda, Sudan vs. South Sudan, Ethiopia vs. Eritrea, and Eritrea vs. Djibouti. Despite some degree of effort, in most of the conflicts, IGAD's responses have never been adequate, balanced, impartial, comprehensive, or holistic.

Importantly, the alliances and enmities within the IGAD family change consistently depending on contemporary politics as well as dynamics internal to member states themselves: unsurprisingly, the inconsistency of member state alignment has often taken a political toll as regards to the stability and functioning of IGAD. At one point in time, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Djibouti constituted an informal group which coordinated its strategies in opposition to other members (El-Affendi 2001: 583). Not long after, however, a different reconfiguration reflecting different political realities took shape. The second Eritrea-Ethiopia war shook existing alliances and brought a new constellation of “inner circle” leaders within IGAD. Eritrea was thrown out of the alliance while Sudan stood on the fringes: instead, Djibouti, Kenya, and Ethiopia constituted the new inner circle. Eritrea suspended its membership in 2007 due to an objection to Ethiopia’s invasion of Somalia in 2006 (Andemariam 2015; Woodward 2013b). With the outbreak of South Sudan’s war in December 2013, tensions rose between Ethiopia and Uganda (de Waal 2015: 106–107). Uganda began to challenge Ethiopia’s hegemonic dominance because it considered South Sudan as its backyard. Moreover, Sudan and Uganda have always been at odds because of South Sudan: Uganda perceives South Sudan as closer to it than to Sudan and therefore has supported unreservedly the quest of South Sudan for self-determination. Uganda’s behavior was perceived by Khartoum as irresponsible and dangerous to Sudan’s security and integrity, and Sudan therefore showed willingness to support Ugandan rebels against the Ugandan State (Young 2007). Indeed, the differing positions that Sudan and Uganda held regarding the war in South Sudan rendered IGAD’s mediation efforts impotent.

Today, there are two sorts of ‘natural’ alignments within the IGAD setting. One consists of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda and another consists of Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. The first group is considered allies of the West and trusted partners in the global war on terror. This group, along with its Western allies, sees the second group as weak links in the global war on terror. For its part, the second group also faces serious problems that make its alliance precarious. Somalia has no proper functioning state: somewhat ironically, the government of the Somali Federal State is dependent for its survival on the first group, and therefore, for tactical reasons and survival reasons, cannot actually challenge the dominance of Ethiopia. Djibouti is completely controlled by

Ethiopia and Western powers since the country finds itself the sole outlet to the sea of Ethiopia. Because of its troubled relations with the West, particularly the USA, Sudan sees Ethiopia as a conduit to its relations with the West and therefore is in no position to antagonise Ethiopia. Ethiopia has already succeeded in neutralizing Eritrea, effectively barring it from IGAD, and placing it under UN sanctions and diplomatic isolation. The civil war in South Sudan has created serious rifts between Ethiopia and Uganda, where Uganda has begun to seriously challenge Ethiopia's dominance. The government of Salva Kiir perceives Ethiopia as siding with opposition led by Riek Machar, which puts a wedge in the relations between South Sudan and Ethiopia.

Therefore, it might be said that one of the primary rationales by which states make foreign policies in IGAD might be described as the adage that 'my enemy's enemy is my friend,' which dictates the unprincipled and constant shifts in interstate relations of IGAD's members. In short, states' foreign policies towards IGAD and with each other have been shown to be able to be quickly torn asunder with a shift in one pair of dyadic relations. For instance, the severance of Eritrea–Sudan relations in 1994 led, unintentionally, to the severance of relations between Sudan and Uganda in 1995 (El-Affendi 2001: 586). Diplomatic relations between Sudan and Ethiopia were downgraded. One of the reasons for the deterioration of relations was Sudan's ambition to expand its version of political Islam throughout the region. The three states, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea, with the support of the USA, formed the Frontline States against the government of Sudan with the aim of unseating it. The involvement of the USA in the formation of the Frontline States is a clear indication of how external actors shape the policy of the region. More broadly, as will be described below, the entrance of great powers into the region has encouraged the creation of ideological divisions within IGAD, where certain of its members are predisposed to the West and, especially the USA (like Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and Uganda), while other members are more prone to alliances with global spoilers like Iran and Russia.

THE WEAKNESS OF IGAD: THREE CHARACTERISTICS

Compared with other RECs, IGAD is often seen as weak. At least three factors are presumed to account for this weakness. Each of these phenomena is investigated below.

IGAD's Troubled Structure

IGAD displays dysfunctional characteristics that adversely affect the organization's flexibility, performance, and efficiency, all of which have allowed for manipulation of the organization. The main structural components of IGAD are the following, presented in hierarchical order of importance:

- Assembly of Heads of State and Government
- Council of Ministers
- Committee of Ambassadors
- The IGAD Secretariat

Except—perhaps ironically—the last, the first three are political organs that strongly influence IGAD's efficiency and performance. The strong inclination to allot absolute power to national political leaders (in the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, and the Committee of Ambassadors) explains the frequent paralysis from which IGAD suffers.

This hierarchically structured organizational formation endows the Assembly of Heads of State and Government unproportioned absolute power, which arguably has advantages and disadvantages. In terms of advantages, it enables IGAD to engage with the global order of states: the imperatives of the global order of states demand the interaction and engagement of state figures. However, the disadvantages are many.

First, many describe IGAD as a club of heads of state. The perception of IGAD is that it is not an inclusive organization (Bereketeab 2012; Mengisteab 2014; Apuuli 2015). The impact of this disproportionate power within the overall structure of IGAD is that the organization is only as strong as the leaders of its member states allow it to be. For instance, it is to be involved in peace mediation in member states only where the member states were willing. Evidence of this is how Ethiopia blocked IGAD from engaging in the Eritrea–Ethiopia conflict.

Second, IGAD's structure is such that it has no real contact with civil society. The impact of this lack is vividly manifested in participation, representation, and accommodation of citizens' interests and wishes: there are no avenues through which citizens—civil societies, communities, policymakers, youth, women, and the like—can express and enforce their views, wishes, and interests. The fact that IGAD is not accessible to ordinary people renders it a stranger to the majority of the citizens of its member states. Indeed, common people in the street know very little

about IGAD. Those who know about it also simply rebuke it, claiming that it is not concerned with the daily needs of the people. This lack of popular support renders regional integration very precarious, because it is not founded on citizens' interests, hopes, and aspirations, but instead, on the nature of relations between heads of states whose wishes are not always deemed as legitimate by citizens. Put otherwise, the perception of IGAD is that is an organization founded on interstate relations, not on intersocietal relations.

A remediation of these structural malfunctionalities would be to devolve power away from the member state officials represented in the first three organs, to the apolitical IGAD secretariat, the fourth organ. Precisely because the secretariat is a technocratic and bureaucratic organ, it is not burdened by politics that define relations between heads of state and government. While some have been suggested that more powers should be conferred to the secretariat (Bereketeab 2012), in reality, the Assembly would extremely be reluctant to allow this, precisely because of the loss of power that this would entail.

IGAD's Dependency on External Funding

The second source of weakness of IGAD is its dependency on external funding. In 1994, an international donor group called The Friends of IGADD that included Italy, Canada, UK, the Netherlands, Norway, and USA was formed to enhance the international profile of IGADD. The Friends of IGADD pledged to contribute to promoting IGADD's efforts in peacemaking and regional integration, though in a mostly informal way (El-Affendi 2001: 583). Following the restructuring of IGADD into IGAD, The Friends of IGADD group was morphed into IGAD Partners Forum (IPF) assuming more formal roles (El-Affendi 2001: 584). The strong presence of IPF in the commemoration of the 30th anniversary of IGAD is a clear indication of the influence of external actors. Indeed, since its very beginning, IGAD has been a regional organization whose operation has been to one degree or another beholden to the wishes of more powerful international players: as such, IGAD has rarely been able to formulate its own independent peace and security policies (Mengisteab 2014).

This dependency has several implications. Firstly, IGAD suffers from a lack of ownership and agency. It is not rare that when donors and funders give money to organizations, donors may dictate the conditions

of projects, the nature of policies, and how IOs' activities are set and implemented. However, it is arguably the case that external donors do more than simply *inform* the activities of IGAD: some argue that IGAD has simply become the *effectuator* of the foreign policy wishes of its funders. As Mengisteab (2014: 147) relays: "In large part, due to its excessive dependence on external financing of its operations, IGAD has largely become a conduit for external influence on the region rather than an agent for sheltering the region from external meddling" (Mengisteab 2014: 147). This over-involvement of external actors deprives the regional organization of the legitimacy that it crucially needs.

Indeed, so reliant is IGAD on outside funding that external intervention from non-IGAD members has also become an embedded part of the peace and security topography of the IGAD region. External intervention plays a significant role both in generating insecurity and forestalling peace building. The context of insecurity and military intervention, from Cold War superpower rivalry (Yordanov 2016) to the global war on terror and piracy, has very much shaped the security features of the region. The inability of IGAD to resolve the various conflicts, terrorism, extremism, piracy, drought, and famine has attracted military forces from all over the world. This military diplomacy has thrown the future of the region into uncertainty. For example, IGAD's peace mediation in Somalia, Sudan, and recently in South Sudan is very much driven by external involvement (El-Affendi 2001). There is a common consensus that the USA was behind the secession of South Sudan, while regional states with the support of Western powers—the USA in particular—are playing an active role in Somalia and South Sudan. Geo-strategic dictates of more powerful countries have also trickled down to IGAD's regional members, where we see the intervention of regional states in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries on behalf of more powerful interests. This could be illustrated by Kenya and Ethiopia's invasion of Somalia and Uganda's involvement in South Sudan civil war, all of which were supported by the USA.

Ethiopian Dominance

There is a widespread perception among the people of the IGAD region that Ethiopia has systematically exploited the organization for its narrow national interests. Ethiopia is the powerhouse in the Greater Horn. Its power derives from its population size, military power, and economy.

In terms of military power, Ethiopia has one of the strongest armies in Sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia also hosts the headquarters of the AU and the UN Economic Commission for Africa, in addition to other international organizations with significant diplomatic representation in Addis Ababa.

In addition to its own attributes, Ethiopia is an important ally of the West. It is a strong ally of the USA in the global war on terror. This strategic importance of Ethiopia to the West has given it an extraordinary leeway to act with impunity in the region as well in its own domestic affairs, and to dictate its own wishes and interests in IGAD. Internal rights within Ethiopia are violated with impunity. The ruling EPRDF that has been in power since the demise of the military regime in 1991 has won every election unchallenged. In the election of May 2015, for instance, it won one hundred percent of the votes. This flagrant abuse of electoral system did not evoke meaningful criticism from the outside world. To the contrary, praises reigned. When President Obama visited Ethiopia in 2015, he praised it for carrying out democratic elections earlier that year, ignoring that a popular uprising that began in November 2015 in the Oromo region took the lives of 400 unarmed demonstrating youth. Nevertheless, the Ethiopian government's suppression of the popular movement did not generate strong protest from the democratic world.

Several phenomena underline Ethiopia's dominance in IGAD. First, since 2008, in contravention of its statute, Ethiopia holds the position of chairmanship of IGAD. Ethiopia has been able to hold the position of the chairmanship through holding only extraordinary meetings. Convening ordinary meetings would have set the agenda of the meeting differently in which Ethiopia would have been compelled to surrender not only the chairmanship to the next country in line, but also the reactivation of Eritrea's membership might have found a resolution.¹ Since 2011, Eritrea has been trying to reactivate its membership but it has been blocked (Andemariam 2015: 1) by Ethiopia. One of the mechanisms employed in the blockade is precluding ordinary sessions. The second example of Ethiopian dominance in IGAD relates to its policy in Somalia. In December 2006, Ethiopia invaded Somalia and vanquished the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). Ethiopia retroactively convinced IGAD to legitimise its invasion. To many Somalis, this invasion was simply a continuation of the perennial Ethiopian hostility intended to weaken Somalia (Samatar 2013). This action certainly eroded the trust of IGAD,

not least among Somalis. The invasion was also the reason for Eritrea to suspend its membership in IGAD. Third, IGAD's utter failure even to take up the Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict, and its ability to defy UN sanctions on ceding contested land to Eritrea, are final indications of how the Ethiopian grip on the organization is absolute (UN News Centre 2011).

To be sure, while the existence of a hegemonic regional anchor state—in the form of Ethiopia—could theoretically play a positive role in promoting peace, stability, development, and regional integration, this presupposes Ethiopian selflessness, and an overriding region-centred public goods and public interest orientation. Instead, Ethiopia has not been able to perform this vital role due to focus on its narrow nationalist interest. This narrow nationalist interest has plunged it into perpetual conflict with no less than half of the IGAD member states, particularly Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, and Eritrea.

This absolute dominance of IGAD by Ethiopia is taking its toll on the organization. The unity of IGAD is adversely affected. According to staff, except for Ethiopia and Kenya, others have ceased paying their membership dues. According to sources I spoke to, the reason other members are not paying fees is because they feel that the organization is serving Ethiopia's interest, and therefore, an overrepresentation of Ethiopians in IGAD staff. In 2011, when I was collecting data for another chapter, an expatriate who worked for IGAD for several years said to me 'IGAD is Ethiopia, Ethiopia is Meles [Zenawi, former Ethiopian Prime Minister, 2005–2012] and if Meles wants something what he needs to do is call Kibaki [of Kenya] and Museveni, [of Uganda] and there you have IGAD.'²

CONCLUSION

Commonly, IGAD is depicted as a weak REC, especially compared with other regional organizations. This chapter set out to examine the history, operational cultural, and sources of the weakness of IGAD. After presenting the first two sections, it then identified three sources of weakness: the structure of IGAD; its dependence on external funding; and Ethiopian dominance. Beyond these factors, IGAD has not been able to develop robust institutions and protocols that govern interstate and intersocietal relations. Further, IGAD lacks provision for the involvement of actors and stakeholders beyond the national leaders: there is no avenue for citizens, civil society, youth and women, media, and other

stakeholders to participate in the affairs of the region. The view of the common man and woman in the street is not positive: this is why IGAD is thought of as a club of heads of state. In short, IGAD has not been able to tap into available assets such as indigenous institutions, knowledge, mechanisms, and authorities that would have augmented its legitimacy.

For IGAD to meet its pronounced mandates and work effectively as a democratic and representative organization, it needs to address the above-mentioned challenges it faces. Tackling the multifaceted pathologies besetting the region requires holistic, regional approaches. The challenges ahead for IGAD are formidable, but its future potential is strong.

NOTES

1. Interview with IGAD Staff in February 2016, Djibouti.
2. Interview with Western scholar in 2011, Djibouti.

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The Uses (and Abuses) of the Economic Community of Central African States: The Hidden Functions of Regional Economic Community Membership for African Regimes

Graham Palmateer and John F. Clark

This chapter examines the “hidden” functions of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) for its member regimes. These eleven members include: Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe. While the organization has had extremely limited success in pursuing its economic and security agendas, we argue that membership in ECCAS provides central African regimes with a range of benefits that lie outside that which is outlined in its founding documents and subsequent protocols. These are the “hidden” functions of ECCAS. For one, membership in ECCAS has provided savvy regimes with another avenue

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through which they can access donor funding. Through ECCAS, member regimes have acquired funding, security training, and materiel, each of which can be utilized to reinforce their domestic positions. Second, membership in ECCAS has allowed some regimes to utilize the organization as a vehicle for exerting power in neighboring states (this is particularly true for Gabon and Chad). Third, membership in ECCAS also aids regimes in their continual efforts to build domestic and international legitimacy. Central African regimes are quite wary of potential domestic challengers. They are therefore often on the lookout for opportunities to reinforce both domestic and international perceptions of their legitimacy. ECCAS is an organization through which that can be achieved. In general, we argue that ECCAS's promotion of "collective security" tends not to be so much a genuine expression of communal efforts at peace-building, but more of a reflection of its members' domestic insecurity and narrow regime interests. In this sense, membership in ECCAS serves what Söderbaum (2004) calls a "sovereignty-boosting" function for central African regimes. That is, participation in an international organization serves reinforces a regime's claim to sovereignty and legitimacy. We stress that ECCAS's token regionalism obscures the organization's deeply domestic functions for its member regimes.

THE FOUNDATION OF ECCAS AND ITS NOMINAL GOALS

First conceptualized as part of the 1980 OAU-backed Lagos Action Plan for the Economic Development of Africa, ECCAS was founded in October 1983. It was launched two years later with the goal of facilitating regional development and greater economic integration among member states (Meyer 2015). Its membership grew out of two existing economic unions, the Union Douanière et Économique de l'Afrique Centrale (UDEAC)¹ and the Communauté Économique des Pays des Grand Lacs (CEPGL),² and also included Angola and the island state of São Tomé and Príncipe.³ ECCAS's founding charter called on its signatories to foster "harmonious cooperation" among members and promote progress in the areas of industry, transportation, communication, commerce, and monetary policy. Although its founding documents also called for cooperation in more ambiguous areas, like science, technology, and education and culture, ECCAS was an organization initially focused on economic matters.⁴ Nominally, the ultimate aim was to bring

about economic integration and prepare for the eventual creation of an African Common Market. Tariffs were to be lowered or eliminated, customs regulations were to be harmonized, and states were to take “progressive” steps to ensure the free movement of goods and people (Meyer 2011: 10–11). This was the standard fare of regional integration, embraced to varying degrees by states elsewhere in Africa and around the world.

However, in the short and medium term, these goals have proven to be far too ambitious for ECCAS. In its first fifteen years in existence, the young organization claimed few achievements. Widespread violence and elite disinterest throughout the 1990s precluded any forward progress on matters relating to regional integration. ECCAS lay virtually moribund until 1998 when its members revived and repurposed the organization to serve as a regional security body, very much in line with the African Union’s still-evolving plans to build an African Standby Force (ASF) (Warner 2015). ECCAS has by no means disavowed its founding principles or abandoned its economic mandate, but its post-revival emphasis on security is a significant pivot in its basic orientation. Still, as will be argued, ECCAS’s burgeoning security capabilities leave something to be desired, as does its economic program, which remains unrealized.⁵ Overall, in the nearly two decades since its relaunch (and over thirty years since its inception), ECCAS has still not managed to surmount the considerable political, economic, and geographic barriers to regional integration. Indeed, ECCAS now ranks among Africa’s poorest performing regional economic communities (RECs).⁶ The following section investigates these hurdles.

ACCOUNTING FOR ECCAS’S FAILURE

Throughout the 1980s and much of the 1990s, trade flows to and from central Africa were a reflection of the region’s historical relationship with the West. Generally speaking, central African states were tied primarily to Europe (usually the former colonial power) or to the USA (ICG 2011). Intraregional trade was minimal, save for informal cross-border trade in low-value foodstuffs and textiles.⁷ Exports from the region were destined for industrialized states of the continent and these exports were typically limited to raw materials. Indeed, the economies of many states in central Africa were reliant on the export of *one specific* raw material,

often oil.⁸ Described as the “resource curse” (or “oil curse” in the case of petroleum exporters), this dependency on a single commodity fueled the region’s rentier economies and the illegitimate kleptocracies that rule central African states (Coorey and Akitoby 2013: v; Yates 2012: 1).

Sadly, this dismal economic arrangement remains very much in place today. If there is one conspicuous change in the region’s economic orientation over the last decade or so, it is the arrival of China, which has supplanted old colonial partnerships and overtaken the USA in many respects (Zafar 2007). Yet China’s emergence has not dramatically altered the state of economic affairs in central Africa. Generally speaking, states are still heavily reliant on the export of mineral resources, and these states are still typically headed by highly corrupt and personalized leadership. As Englebert (2009) observes of Sub-Saharan Africa more generally, the state remains a highly predatory economic actor, and this is especially true of central Africa. This is not a disposition that is compatible with economic integration. Consequently, central African regimes have, for the most part, displayed little interest in ECCAS’s economic mandate (ICG 2011).

It is thus unsurprising that ECCAS has proven to be an organization incapable of affecting regional economic change in the 34 years since its inception. A host of other political and geographic factors has contributed to its failure. First, recurrent political crises in central Africa throughout the 1990s precluded any efforts to pursue the goals outlined in ECCAS’s founding documents. When ECCAS was founded, Angola was still in the final stages of a long civil war that would not end (temporarily, it proved) until 1991.⁹ Destructive civil wars also consumed Burundi, both Congos, and Rwanda during the 1990s. Meanwhile, Chad and the Central African Republic were hamstrung by successive political crises associated with their failed attempts to move from one-party states to stable multiparty democracies (Clark and Gardinier 1997). Most significantly, beginning in 1996, the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaïre) played host to a devastating regional conflict in which several ECCAS members were deeply implicated. In the first Congolese war, ECCAS states were either neutral or intervening against the ailing Mobutu regime. In the much longer second war, however, the regimes governing ECCAS states were divided for and against the new regime of Laurent Kabila (Prunier 2009; Reyntjens 2009). Suffice it to say, in such a turbulent political context, and with so little interest on the

part of the region's governing regimes, the prospects for the organization to promote regional integration were dismal.

Second, there were (and still are) significant geographic impediments to regional integration in central Africa. With regard to infrastructure, the region is woefully underdeveloped. As the World Bank has observed, central Africa ranks far below other African regions in virtually all aggregate indicators of transportation efficiency (Ranganathan and Foster 2011). Paved road density is very low, and overland transportation is slow and expensive due to poor road and rail quality. Commerce is further hampered by the "cartelization" of the trucking industry and administrative hurdles at border crossings and other "informal check-points" (Ranganathan and Foster 2011: vi). The poor state of road infrastructure also creates a cycle of underinvestment: Since traffic volume on regional road networks is low, so too is the interest of ruling regimes in investing significantly in infrastructure. The situation puts landlocked ECCAS states at a severe disadvantage in this regard, as their neighbors with access to waterways tend to forgo costly road development in their own hinterlands. Still, even sea corridors remain underutilized and, like the region's roads, central Africa's railway systems remain poorly networked (Ranganathan and Foster 2011).

The sorry state of the region's infrastructure has ensured that ECCAS is among the least economically cohesive regional groupings on the African continent, with most regional commerce concentrated in isolated pockets (Ranganathan and Foster 2011). Between 1995 and 2010, intra-regional exports accounted for less than 1 percent of ECCAS member states' total exports. Such figures place ECCAS far below Sub-Saharan Africa's other RECs, notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), whose respective intraregional exports in the same period were roughly ten and twenty times greater proportionally speaking.¹⁰ See Table 9.1 for a comparison.

As is typical of African regional studies, some observers note that there is certainly *potential* for growth in intraregional trade and economic performance more generally (Avom and Nijkam 2015). Indeed, the African Development Bank (ADB) has observed a modest improvement in macroeconomic performance across central Africa between 1999 and 2009. Yet this economic growth is primarily a consequence of rising prices for the oil exported from the region, not a result of

Table 9.1 Intraregional trade as a percentage of total trade (%)

<i>Regional Trading Agreements</i>	<i>1996–2000</i>	<i>2001–2006</i>	<i>2007–2011</i>
CEN-SAD	6.9	6.9	6.6
COMESA	5.1	5.8	6.4
EAC	13.8	13.1	12
ECCAS	1.7	1.5	1.9
ECOWAS	10.4	10.9	9.4
IGAD	9.3	7.7	5.8
SADC	32.3	13.8	12.9

Source UNCTAD (2013: 17)

meaningful economic integration between ECCAS member states (African Development Bank 2011).

Member commitment also limits ECCAS's effectiveness and the prospects for regional integration, a problem which also afflicts Africa's other RECs to varying degrees. Simply put, states often belong to more than one REC, and they tend to privilege membership in the RECs which perform better. As the World Bank laments, this confused arrangement—which it describes as a “spaghetti bowl” of overlapping agreements—creates a host of legal and logistical difficulties for those crafting economic policy (US Embassy, Pretoria, November 18, 2004). For an organization like ECCAS, whose record is questionable, it means that its member states often prefer to formulate economic policy within other groupings (African Development Bank 2005). This is quite clearly the case with its *Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale* (CEMAC) member states,¹¹ who share a common currency and have taken other steps toward integration (World Trade Organization 2013). Other ECCAS members also exhibit preference for other RECs: Cameroon can easily look to west Africa for linkages; Angola tends to privilege its membership in SADC; and Rwanda and Burundi favor their membership in the EAC (ICG 2011). The DRC, meanwhile, has sought out membership in just about every regional grouping that would take it, including SADC, COMESA, CEGPL, and ICGLR (US Embassy, Kinshasa, December 7, 2009). This is all to suggest that ECCAS' capabilities in forging economic policy are seriously circumscribed, considering that many of its members are more committed to pursuing those ends through other organizations.

To summarize, a host of political, geographic and structural barriers impose significant limits on what ECCAS has been able to accomplish: Its members' territories cover a vast area with poor infrastructure; regional exports tend to be limited to commodities destined for markets off continent; and ECCAS states tend to be headed by weak, illegitimate, and highly personalized regimes. Thus, at ECCAS's inception, the region was ill-suited for economic integration. Add to this, the range of violent crises which struck central Africa in the 1990s and it is clear why ECCAS's launch proved to be a false start.

THE REBIRTH AND THE SECURITY RE-ORIENTATION OF ECCAS

In 1998, ECCAS emerged from its virtual "hibernation" with a new set of priorities. The original economic mandate remained in place, but protocols were added that called on ECCAS to begin to develop the capacity to manage the region's security affairs. To this end, four bodies were established. The Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX) was the primary organ tasked with overseeing peace and security matters in the region. It was to be advised by the Commission for Defense and Security (CDS), a council of senior defense officials who could provide technical advice on security matters. Plans for an early warning system (MARAC) were also drawn up, but it was not until 2007 that the system showed any signs of life and, even since then it has been far from functional.¹² Finally, the Force Multinationale en Centrafrique (FOMUC or sometimes FOMAC) was established to serve as the "stick" for ECCAS's foray into peace and security management (Elowson and Wiklund 2011).

What drove this pivot to security? Two main factors stand out. First, there was a significant push from international organizations and external donors. As Meyer (2008) observes, efforts to build ECCAS's security capacity occurred in tandem with the African Union's initiatives to shift the burden of the continent's security management to Africa's RECs. Western donors were also supportive of such efforts, as their collective appetites for peacekeeping deployments on the continent had been spoiled in the 1990s in Rwanda and Somalia. "African solutions to African problems" by this point was no mere slogan, but instead an integral component of western states' foreign policies toward Africa. This was particularly true for France and the USA, both of which undertook

extensive security capacity building operations on the continent (and continue to do so today) (Franke 2006). Thus, after 1998, following cues from international organizations and donor states, ECCAS began laying the groundwork for what was intended to become the standby force for central Africa.

A second explanation centers on ECCAS members' own insecurity. Put simply, ECCAS member regimes are keenly aware that power can be fleeting. In fact, many secured power themselves through violent, undemocratic means. They therefore realize that the institutions which they have inherited (or haphazardly erected) are weak and that their capacity to govern beyond the capital is sometimes severely limited. Since such regimes rest on shaky foundations and they are often unable to provide basic public goods, the threat from aggrieved domestic adversaries—be they rival political parties or armed groups on the periphery—always looms large (Meyer 2009). ECCAS members thus have an incentive to promote (however inconsistently) an organization that might one day be deployed in their defense should potential challengers appear. An ECCAS brigade might prove to be just what an unsteady regime needs as it attempts to disperse challengers assembling at the gates, as the later discussion of ECCAS's mission to the Central African Republic (CAR) shows. Moreover, an ECCAS peacekeeping deployment to a troubled neighbor's territory might also prevent the destabilizing forces from affecting one's own domestic security, as the CAR case also demonstrates. We argue that this is a powerful concern for regimes which recognize their own vulnerability. Indeed, US officials recognized as much in their assessment of ECCAS's developing security capacities. The US embassy in Libreville could therefore observe that ECCAS members' concerns over instability were a powerful motivator in the organization's newfound pursuit of security capacity, suggesting that "It is their recognition of the costs of conflict, more than statesmanship or high-minded commitment to regional cooperation, that has created the modest momentum that [ECCAS] now enjoys" (US Embassy, Libreville, August 20, 2008).

THE NATURE OF DONOR SUPPORT

As stated, donor contributions have been—and remain—critical for ECCAS. This is in part not only because its mandate far outstrips its members' financial means, but also because the organization has

consistently had difficulty collecting dues from its member states (African Development Bank 2005). For instance, in 2011, member arrears amounted to \$8.9 million compared to the \$29.9 million actually contributed by member states (foreign contributions to ECCAS that same year were in excess of \$56 million) (ICG 2011). Gabon and the Republic of Congo are among the most reliable contributors, with other states often paying late, after much prodding.¹³ The European Union has emerged as ECCAS's main donor, followed by France and the USA. EU funding is distributed through the African Union, a channel which has been criticized as inefficient, and also through the Peace and Security Program (PAPS), an initiative of the European Development Fund (EDF) (ICG 2011). Because of the concerns of ECCAS malfeasance, the EU maintains a small permanent staff in Libreville tasked with overseeing disbursements and conducting quarterly audits (US Embassy, Libreville, August 20, 2008).

The nature of French support is more complex. France provided roughly 30 percent of the funding for ECCAS's mission to the CAR, MICOPAX (compared to 50 percent for the EU) (Elowson and Wiklund 2011), but it also provided critical material and logistical support for the mission that is not easy to account for. Indeed, as a senior military French official told the US embassy in Libreville, prior to 2008, France did not actually have a direct military agreement with ECCAS (US Embassy, Libreville, December 1, 2008), although the organization had been the focus of France's 2006 iteration of its Reinforcement of African Capacity to Maintain Peace (RECAMP) program, the French security capacity building initiative for Africa (US Embassy, Addis Ababa, March 6, 2007). Until at least 2008, French support for ECCAS was channeled through Gabon by the way of what a senior French military official called a bilateral "ghost agreement" with the Gabonese government (US Embassy, Libreville, December 1, 2008). In contrast to the EU's funding of ECCAS, French support, as described by US officials, appears "less formalized—and confidential" (US Embassy, Libreville, August 20, 2008). France has also emerged as a strong advocate of ECCAS in the international arena, lobbying its allies on ECCAS's behalf (ICG 2011).

The USA did not provide support for ECCAS directly until late 2009. Before then, US support was limited primarily to general verbal support for its initiatives.¹⁴ Privately, US assessment of ECCAS's capabilities was prudent. US officials described the FOMUC-MICOPAX transition in CAR (discussed at greater length below) as a "milestone" for the

ECCAS, but still noted that there were “tough challenges ahead” for the “still-evolving organization” (USA Embassy, Libreville, August 20, 2008). By 2009, after over a decade had passed since its relaunch, US officials in Gabon characterized ECCAS security infrastructure as still “at best skeletal” (US Embassy, Libreville, January 23, 2009). Indeed, some of the most pressing difficulties were very basic, and ECCAS remained heavily reliant on Western support in conducting its day-to-day affairs. As Guy-Pierre Garcia, the Congolese head of the military staff of ECCAS in Libreville, candidly admitted to US officials, his staff even lacked reliable means of communicating with MICOPAX officers in the field.¹⁵ He and his Libreville staff were dependent on French technical assistance and suffered a poor Internet connection, a situation he was eager to have the Americans help correct (US Embassy, Libreville, August 20, 2008; US Embassy, Libreville, January 23, 2009). American officials were sympathetic, yet insistent that the USA could not provide technical assistance to ECCAS until after a formal review process had been completed and a presidential authorization signed (US Embassy, Libreville, January 23, 2009). That came several months later, in September 2009, when President Obama authorized material and logistical assistance to ECCAS (Department of State, Washington, October 21, 2009).

THE USES (AND ABUSES) OF ECCAS

While interest in ECCAS’s economic mandate remains quite limited, we argue that membership in ECCAS provides regimes with an opportunity to use the organization as a means for asserting regional power and for reinforcing regime security at home. Chadian President Idriss Déby and the late President Omar Bongo of Gabon stand out as two leaders who have utilized ECCAS in this regard. Indeed, before his death in 2009, Bongo utilized ECCAS for his own purposes to a degree that has thus far been unmatched. He was a key actor during ECCAS’s formation and, according to one account, favored the establishment of ECCAS because he wanted to create a wider economic union to diminish Cameroonian President Paul Biya’s disproportionate influence within the UDEAC, the predecessor of CEMAC (ICG 2011). Bongo’s interest in seeing ECCAS succeed as an REC also appears to be genuine, as he was often irritated at the disposition of other regional leaders and their poor attendance record at the organization’s infrequent summits (US Embassy, Kinshasa, June 15, 2005).

Along with Denis Sassou-Nguesso, who was interested in improving his image after re-taking power in 1997, Bongo was a driving force in the ECCAS revival in 1998, and he vigorously supported its subsequent securitization (ICG 2011). Some regard the CAR deployments undertaken by FOMUC and MICOPAX as expressions of Bongo's desire to assert Gabonese regional power. In the case of the FOMUC deployment, Bongo reportedly viewed it as an opportunity to degrade the influence of Muammar Gaddafi in the CAR (ICG 2011). With this in mind, we suggest that it is no accident that Gabonese military officials have routinely found themselves appointed to top positions in both FOMUC and MICOPAX. One Gabonese officer's interpretation of his nation's influence bordered on hubris, allowing him to boast to the US officials in 2009 that Gabon was holding the CAR together (US Embassy, Libreville, January 23, 2009).

ECCAS has also provided Gabon with a vehicle for courting the USA. Gabonese efforts to improve security in the Gulf of Guinea aligned nicely with American strategic interests in the region and, of course, the funds that accompany them (US Senate 2013).¹⁶ In the wake of the death of his father (President Omar Bongo), Ali Bongo has sought even closer relations with the USA and has expressed interest in continuing to cooperate on security matters, particularly in the area of maritime security (US Embassy, Libreville, January 14, 2010). Gabonese officials have also expressed keen interest in hosting an AFRICOM deployment (US Embassy, Libreville, October 9, 2007). The USA has been receptive to these advances and complimentary of Gabon's participation in peacekeeping in the CAR, indicating that such endeavors can in part be taken to curry favor with donor states (US Embassy, Kinshasa, June 15, 2005). The appearance of close collaboration with the USA also serves to demoralize the domestic political opposition to Bongo and enhance his international reputation. For Ali Bongo, ECCAS is an avenue for achieving those ends, making his domestic position more secure.

Chadian President Idriss Déby has also found the organization to be a useful tool (US Embassy, N'Djamena, December 22, 2009). At the outset of his chairmanship, it was suggested by US observers that the position would provide Déby with an opportunity to improve Chad's regional standing and demonstrate his own political prowess (or lack thereof), an assessment shared by the Security Council (US Embassy, N'Djamena, November 6, 2009). But Déby's uses of ECCAS have transcended simple image-building. The Chadian leader has found ECCAS

to be a particularly useful vehicle for asserting influence in neighboring CAR, first under the aegis of FOMUC, and later, through MICOPAX.

FOMUC's first operation actually began under the purview of the CEMAC states in 2002 in CAR, as ECCAS's security mechanisms were still under construction at the time. The mission followed two other international deployments (MISAB and MINURCA) and was launched to aid the tottering regime of then-President, Ange-Félix Patassé. Patassé's subsequent removal from power prompted a change in the mission's mandate and, until its 2008 transfer to ECCAS control, FOMUC had engaged in a host of activities, including the facilitation of peace talks, the oversight of elections, and efforts to disarm rebels. Its overall performance, Meyer (2009: 162) suggests, was "rather disappointing."

Indeed, Meyer poses not only questions about FOMUC's efficacy, but also about the underlying motivations for its CAR venture itself. Specifically, she presents evidence that the Chadians, despite providing troops for the FOMUC mission, had little interest in seeing the Patassé regime survive. Chad-CAR relations after 2002 were very poor, with both governments accusing the other of providing safe havens for each other's dissidents, the most prominent being General François Bozizé, who would go on to oust Patassé with Chadian backing in March 2003. During this whole ordeal, the FOMUC contingent—about a third of whom were Chadians—reportedly allowed the coup to proceed. According to the ICG, the CEMAC states favored Patassé's removal and thus instructed FOMUC to stand down. As Meyer suggests, it is noteworthy that the CEMAC states quickly lobbied for AU recognition of the Bozizé junta, and neither Cameroonian President Paul Biya nor Gabon's Omar Bongo offered refuge to the ousted Patassé. As we argue and as Meyer (2009) points out, it is evident that bodies like FOMUC can be utilized by ruling regimes as instruments of *realpolitik*, and that such machinations are quite often divorced from the officially stated reasons for intervention.

Questions about the long-term prospects for stability in the CAR notwithstanding, Déby (along with Sassou) emerged as clear "arbiters of the transition" in early 2013, reportedly continuing to exert considerable influence over political events (ICG 2013). The troubles in CAR were of great concern to Déby, who feared that violence might spill over into Chadian territory (US Embassy, Libreville, January 23, 2009). Containment of the CAR conflict was thus deemed a national security priority, and Déby did his best to affect political change amenable to his

regime's interests (Welz 2016). However, Déby's maneuvering—and ECCAS's handling of the CAR crisis more generally—did provoke some criticism from important actors. Officials at the AU sometimes clashed with ECCAS officials over who should lead the international security effort, with the AU ultimately prevailing, taking the reins of the mission in 2013 (Welz 2014). During its time in CAR, ECCAS also earned criticism from the Europeans and the Americans. As one official put it, ECCAS had “earned the money” to undertake security building operations in CAR, “but did nothing” (Welz 2014).¹⁷ Indeed, MICOPAX's 2012 draw down was in large part a consequence of the EU's decision to decrease funding to the mission (Welz 2014). And this was not the first time, the relations between ECCAS and its donors appeared frayed. For instance, despite France's consistent support of ECCAS, the French were (and are) still closest with ECCAS's CEMAC states. This preference was on display prior to ECCAS's takeover of the FOMUC mission, when the French were hoping to reduce their deployment in the CAR. Some French officials reportedly pushed for an expansion of the FOMUC mandate rather than the transfer of oversight to MICOPAX, a clear indication that at least some French officials preferred CEMAC remain the overseeing organ. This was in part not only because France had a much stronger relationship with the CEMAC states, but also because of the poor state of relations between France and Rwanda in the months leading up to the ECCAS handover (US Embassy, Paris, April 24, 2007). This discord, however, appears to have amounted to little, at least as far as ECCAS was concerned, and the transition proceeded as planned. A senior French officer could thus offer his US counterpart a mostly favorable assessment of ECCAS' capabilities, suggesting that ECCAS was effectively functioning as central Africa's regional standby force, adding that, despite some hiccups, “it is good for African people to manage these operations” (USA Embassy, Libreville, December 1, 2008).

The matter of Rwandese–French tensions is another story entirely.¹⁸ In October 2006, Rwanda had broken off its diplomatic relations with France over a French judicial investigation into the 1994 assassination of Juvénal Habyarimana.¹⁹ The following June, Rwanda announced its withdrawal from ECCAS, just months before the MICOPAX mission—with heavy French assistance—was to deploy to the CAR. In explaining their decision to leave ECCAS, Rwandan officials cited conflicting commitments to the East African Community (EAC), which Rwanda had recently joined.²⁰ However, US diplomatic cables reveal that it

is more probable that the poor state of relations between Rwanda and France, and its francophone central African allies played more of a role in Rwanda's decision to leave than any concerns with overlapping REC membership (US Embassy, Libreville, August 20, 2008). Indeed, in 2009, Rwandan President Paul Kagame indicated privately to US officials that Rwanda saw no issue with belonging to multiple RECs (US Embassy, Kigali, September 18, 2009). Kagame even remarked that he thought that membership in both ECCAS and the EAC could potentially serve Rwanda well in its efforts to become a regional economic hub, even if ECCAS appeared rather French dominated (US Embassy, Kigali, April 14, 2009). By 2013, Rwanda had overcome its initial "apprehension" toward overlapping membership in RECs, and petitioned for re-entry into ECCAS, which was granted in 2015.²¹

While Rwanda's exit from ECCAS can be explained as a political decision resulting from its bitter relations with France, its re-entry into the organization signals that Kagame and the RPF have a re-newed interest in the benefits that membership in ECCAS can accrue. Rwanda's two major forays into the DRC and regular meddling in the eastern peripheries of that country notwithstanding, Kagame recognizes that Rwanda's economic well-being is in many ways contingent on wider regional stability. As Kagame remarked to US officials in 2009, Rwanda's post-genocide economic successes and development plans would not be sustainable if Rwanda were to remain "an island amidst chaos." He suggested that continued growth would necessitate positive engagement with Rwanda's neighbors, particularly immediate ones, like the DRC (US Embassy, Kigali, September 18, 2009).

During Rwanda's absence from ECCAS, a significant political hurdle to those ends was cleared (or, at the very least, lowered). The giant stumbling block to DRC–Rwandan cooperation that was the M23 rebellion—for which Rwanda faced international censure for supporting²²—finally dissolved (Arieff 2014; ICG 2012). Observers have since noted that Kagame and Joseph Kabila appeared to have "buried the hatchet" and that relations between the two states seemed to be on the mend more generally.²³ Indeed, there were reports that Kabila was seeking support from Kagame—and also from Yoweri Museveni—for his controversial decision to extend term limits in DRC, a political move which now appears quite fashionable in central Africa, as Sassou Nguesso and Pierre Nkurunziza have also demonstrated.²⁴ Rwanda has also exhibited

a desire to cultivate better relations with other ECCAS members. For instance, Chad and Rwanda have recently established diplomatic relations and Angola, as of 2015, hosted its first Rwandan envoy. Rwanda has pursued individual bilateral agreements with the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon.²⁵ In addition, while peacekeeping in CAR is no longer managed by ECCAS, Rwanda now contributes a small force to the mission.²⁶

Since Rwanda's re-entry into the fold, ECCAS has thus provided Rwanda with another avenue through which Kagame and the RPF can pursue their developmental agenda. For other regional regimes, ECCAS has served other purposes. For both elder and junior Bongo, it has provided Gabon with a means for asserting regional power. Sassou and Déby have used ECCAS for similar ends in their attempts to influence political affairs in CAR. Indeed, as the CAR episode demonstrates, ECCAS could be utilized as a tool for propping up—or removing, as the MICOPAX episode shows—a vulnerable regime. Still, one should not overstate ECCAS's utility in this regard or assume that all member regimes are willing and capable of utilizing the organization for such nefarious purposes. For most regimes, ECCAS is simply another international organization of which they are a member, and it is a weak one at that. ECCAS can serve as a low-cost avenue for diplomatic engagement and a venue for (imperfect) security cooperation, but it is not an organization vital to economic and political affairs in central Africa. Nor has ECCAS yet demonstrated the capacity to advance regional integration in any meaningful way, largely due to regional leaders' indifference toward its economic mandate.

Yet ECCAS provides regimes with something they cherish deeply and rely on for maintaining power: legitimacy. This is precisely what Söderbaum (2004) refers to as a “sovereignty-boosting” function of regional governance. Simply put, ECCAS gives its member regimes more domestic and international legitimacy because it is viewed as a legitimate international organization. It is recognized as an REC by the AU, supported by the EU, a host of international development agencies, and powerful state actors like France and the USA. ECCAS certainly remains a weak organization, but for central Africa's regimes that is beside the point. As Söderbaum (2004) observes of African regionalism more generally, efficacy in international organizations is not the thing regimes covet most. Above all, regimes aspire to maintain power, a good measure

of which is gained through domestic and international perceptions of legitimacy. Membership in ECCAS provides that even if the organization remains feeble.

CENTRAL AFRICA'S WEAK STATES AND ECCAS'S DIM PROSPECTS

ECCAS's prognosis is uncertain, but certainly not bright. Central African regimes continue to display an overall ambivalence toward the organization, regardless of the benefits that can be derived from membership. Indeed, even though donors have proved quite willing to devote considerable resources to building ECCAS's capabilities, not all central African leaders have shown enthusiasm for such efforts. In fact, some regimes view its security mandate with the same disinterest that characterized their view of its earlier economic-focused mandate. As the ICG has noted, leaders have largely committed "half-heartedly" to ECCAS's security endeavors and continued to display a preference for "old and trusted bilateral relations to mitigate their security concerns" (ICG 2011: i).

We suspect that such ambivalence will continue to characterize elite interest in ECCAS. States in central Africa remain weak and the self-interested regimes that govern (or misgovern) them are fully cognizant of their vulnerabilities. Further, despite some genuine steps toward integration in select areas of francophone central Africa, "community" would be a charitable description of the central African region at large. As Meyer (2011) observes, weak states—and we would stress weak *regimes*—tend not to be willing to contribute to the "community" when it is at the expense of their own sovereignty. Thus, the day-to-day operation of regional organizations tends to reflect the narrow interests of its member regimes. We argue that this is certainly the case with ECCAS. Its economic achievements are very limited, and its security capabilities—still very much in development—remain largely untested. After all, its securitization was not undertaken with the intent of promoting "harmonious cooperation" among member states, but instead occurred at a moment when motivated actors realized that they could take advantage materially and monetarily of donors' attempts to find "African solutions to African problems." We argue that rhetoric about "community" and "regional peacebuilding" conceals the thoroughly domestic calculations of ECCAS member regimes.

In general, the weakness and dim prospects for ECCAS reflect the weakness and illegitimacy of its member states. This observation is somewhat paradoxical: One might think that a regional organization would be able to exercise a greater influence over a set of weak members than over a set of independent, well-institutionalized member states. But this is not the case. Almost all of the state members of ECCAS are fragile. Most have suffered civil wars in recent years, and Cameroon's stability is now threatened by Boko Haram. The Democratic Republic of Congo and Burundi are each wracked by political violence associated with their leaders' attempts to extend term limits. The ECCAS members that have been stable historically or have recently re-gained stability—Angola, the Republic of Congo, Gabon, and Rwanda—have brought their stability at the expense of legitimacy. The regimes governing these states are more fragile than they appear, since the sources of their legitimacy have evaporated along with the constitutional mandates of their rulers. Accordingly, none of them are likely to relinquish any of their sovereign prerogatives to an equally fragile regional organization. Rather, they will use ECCAS when it is useful to them to shore up their tenuous grasps of power. Ironically, only when (if ever) central African states become more stable, institutionalized, and legitimate will the prospects for regional integration improve. In fact, the relatively higher levels of institutionalization in other African regions explains why the likes of ECOWAS, the EAC, and SADC have so far outpaced ECCAS.

NOTES

1. The UDEAC was formed between five former French colonies which hoped to maintain economic cooperation after independence. The organization had some early successes in economic policy convergence (and its states still share a monetary unit, the CFA franc), but by the 1980s it had effectively ceased functioning. Between 1994 and 1999, its members re-launched the organization, re-branding it the *Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l'Afrique Centrale* (CEMAC). See Meyer (2011).
2. The CEPGL was created in 1976 by Zaire, Rwanda and Burundi to serve as a customs union for the Great Lakes region. Because of ongoing political dysfunction in that region, it has accomplished little. See ICG (2011) and Meyer (2011).
3. See ICG, 2011. At the time of writing, ECCAS has 11 member states. Angola (full member since 1999), Burundi, Cameroon, Central African

- Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda, and São Tomé and Príncipe.
4. See ECCAS's "Traite Instituant la Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale", http://www.ceeac-eccas.org/images/traites/trt_eccas.pdf (Accessed July, 2016).
 5. While the African Development Bank offers a cautiously optimistic tone in its executive summary, the ICG offers a sobering summary of ECCAS' record. See African Development Bank (2011) and ICG (2011).
 6. The UNCTAD observes that each of Africa's RECs has contributed to fostering intraregional trade in their respective zones *except* for ECCAS. See UNCTAD (2013). The Africa Regional Integration Index (2016) ranks ECCAS ahead of only CEN-SAD and COMESA.
 7. For an examination of informal cross-border trade in Sub-Saharan Africa, see Lesser and Moisé-Leeman (2009).
 8. For Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo, copper, cobalt, coltan, and diamonds played an equivalent economic role.
 9. Angola was admitted as full member of ECCAS in 1999; it had previously held observer status. See (ICG 2011).
 10. Such figures are drawn from Avom and Njikam (2015) pp. 73–75. The African Development Bank offers slightly different figures, suggesting that ECCAS intraregional trade accounts for 1.9% of total regional trade versus a continental average of 6.8%. See African Development Bank Report (2005) p. v.
 11. See note #2, above.
 12. For a summary of MARAC's day-to-day operations, see Meyer (2015).
 13. ECCAS has a mechanism to sanction non-paying states, but it is not utilized. See ICG (2011).
 14. Of course, the USA had bilateral security agreements with specific ECCAS member states.
 15. Interestingly, Garcia was tried (and acquitted) by a Congolese court for war crimes and crimes against humanity in 2005 on charges stemming from his role in a massacre in Congo in 1999. He was never tried outside Congo for these crimes. His implication in this nefarious massacre seems not to have bothered either Congolese officials or international donors, although US diplomatic officials were cognizant of his "checkered past" (US Embassy, Libreville, January 23, 2009).
 16. For a somewhat favorable assessment of ECCAS's security efforts in the Gulf of Guinea, see Ukeje and Ela (2013).
 17. Individual MICOPAX units displayed a similar entrepreneurial spirit, contracting out their security services during the turmoil in Bangui. See ICG (2013).

18. Vallin (2015) provides an overview of the decline of French–Rwandan relations and elaborates on the apprehension the French feel toward their declining influence in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.
19. “Rwanda Breaks Diplomatic Relations with France”, *New York Times*, October 24, 2006.
20. Rwandan media reported that this departure was supported by the African Union, which hoped that states would avoid overlapping membership in RECs. See “Why Rwanda Sought to Rejoin ECCAS,” *The New Times*, May 25, 2015.
21. “Why Rwanda Sought to Rejoin ECCAS,” *The New Times*, May 25, 2015.
22. Rwanda consistently denied that it supported the M23 rebellion.
23. Ivan R. Mushiga, “Central Africa: Rwanda Back to Central Africa Bloc, 10 Years On,” *The East African*, August 20, 2016
24. “DR Congo’s Kabila counts on Rwanda, Uganda backing to retain power,” *The East African*, August 21, 2016.
25. *Ibid.*
26. “Central Africa: CAR President Hails Rwanda Peacekeepers” *The New Times*, August, 22, 2016.

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The Instrumentalisation of SADC to Achieve Foreign Policy Agendas

Tim Murithi

Foreign policy analysis (FPA) seeks to understand states' international actions by interrogating the agency of leaders, political parties, electorates, and the security sector, among other domestic phenomena. Indeed, whereas international relations (IR) generally focuses on phenomena *external* to the state, FPA primarily focuses on *internal* state processes and outcomes, in order to understand how states behave.

When it comes to southern Africa, as elsewhere in the world, the FPA paradigm has significant salience, given that foreign policymaking can—and often has—become subject to the vicissitudes of autocratic political leaders (Wright 1999), or what I refer to as the ‘cult of personality.’ In southern Africa, the cult of personality is understood as emerging when an individual co-opts the apparatus of the state and deploys popular media and other propaganda techniques to construct a heroic and infallible self-image. Through the cult of the personality, the interests of the autocratic ruler, who exerts total dominance over his political party, become identified as the interests of the state. Foreign

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policymaking—which is primarily driven through state institutions and political parties—can therefore be effortlessly co-opted into the sphere of influence created by the cult of personality. In effect, foreign policymaking and implementation become captured and hostage to the executive whims of the head of state or government (See: Warner's Introduction in Chapter 1). In other words, the cult of personality can impinge upon open and transparent processes when it comes to foreign policymaking processes orientation, which in turn has had an impact on how it is instrumentalised within regional organizations. This phenomenon of the 'cult of personality' is prevalent in the history of foreign policymaking and implementation in the southern African region.

This chapter will adopt a broad overview approach to the issue of the foreign policy of southern African countries towards their sub-regional and continental institutions, namely, the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU). Utilising the prism of leaders and governments, and thinking through the dynamics of 'the cult of personality,' it shows how regional institutions have been instrumentalised to achieve the self-interested foreign policy objectives of their member states broadly, and particular leaders specifically. In the main, it argues that the foreign policies of individual states in southern Africa have been driven by the cult of personality. Consequently, these personality cult-oriented foreign policies towards international institutions have historically vacillated between national self-interest and pan-African regime solidarity, fuelled by anti-imperialist rhetoric to conceal what are imperfect democratic transitions domestically. In short, the cult of personality has impinged upon open and transparent foreign policymaking, which in turn has had an impact on how foreign policies themselves are instrumentalised within SADC.

The chapter proceeds as follows. At the outset, the chapter gives a brief overview of the emergence and institutional shifts within SADC. Next, the chapter explores the key thematic drivers that influence and orient the behaviour of states within regional institutions in the southern African region. This is followed by an assessment of how the trajectory of southern African foreign policymaking evolved from the colonial to the post-colonial and post-apartheid periods. South Africa's SADC-sanctioned intervention in Lesotho, will be assessed as a particular instance of the prevalence of national self-interest and the instrumentalisation of foreign policy through regional institutions. A final section concludes.

SOUTHERN AFRICAN STATES IN AFRICAN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: UNDERSTANDING
APPROACHES TO SADC AND THE AU

*South African States in SADC: An Uneasy Path Towards Foreign
Policy Coherence*

On 1 April 1980, the foreign policy of nine countries of the region coalesced through the establishment of the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC), in Lusaka, Zambia. These countries were: Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. SADCC's mandate was ostensibly to advance socio-economic transformation for the countries in the region. It also doubled as an mitigating instrument for convening and coordinating foreign policies targeted at the human rights violations and destabilising effects of the then-apartheid regime in South Africa. In effect, the SADCC member states projected their desire to achieve a common foreign policy outcome of sub-regional development and the eradication of apartheid.

On 17 August 1992, the SADCC was transformed into the SADC. Headquartered in Gaborone, Botswana, SADC's new Treaty was explicit about its socio-economic agenda as well as its intention to foster political and security cooperation. Initially, efforts to pursue a collective regional security policy were undermined primarily by weak institutional structures and the reluctance of national governments to cede authority to the body, in addition to worries from the Frontline States (FLS)—those which were working to fight against the apartheid regime in South Africa—which had endured recurring subterfuge conducted by the then-South African apartheid regime and the West, which maintained extensive economic interests in the region. In 1990, Namibia became the 11th member; in 1994, South Africa became 12th; while Mauritius, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Seychelles and Madagascar joined in 1995, 1998, 1998, and 2005, respectively. However, by 14 August 2001, SADC amended its founding Treaty to further advance the need for foreign policy coherence, specifically with respect to political and security cooperation. The amended Treaty established a SADC Organ for Politics, Defence, and Security with the intention of advancing the region's key foreign policy objective of promoting peacemaking, peacebuilding, and consolidating democratic governance in the region.

While the initial 2001 amendment signalled an aspiration towards achieving a coherent regional foreign policy—and countries continue to affiliate themselves to regional institutions as a means of collectively advancing these interests—there is nevertheless a regular breakdown of common positions and internal policy coherence within SADC. Namely, this foreign policy breakdown in SADC occurs particularly when the normative stance of the regional body diverges from the national interest of specific member states. In addition, there is occasionally tension between SADC and the AU on specific foreign policy interventions.

*Southern African States in the AU: Foreign Policy
Norm Entrepreneurs*

SADC, and by extension the AU, have continued to play their sub-regional and continental roles as norm entrepreneurs. A norm entrepreneur in this instance is understood as a normative leader who encourages others to uphold a range of norms for the improvement of the livelihood of people who are subject to their jurisdiction or authority (For more on “norm entrepreneurs,” see: Okeke in Chapter 2 of this volume). However, these institutions do not acquire these normative aspirations in a vacuum, which means that the role of leaders in influencing institutions is vital, thus emphasising the role of the ‘cult of personality’ perspective introduced above. For instance, South Africa’s Nelson Mandela was a staunch pan-Africanist and has publicly acknowledged the key role that FLS in the southern Africa region—as well as elsewhere across the continent—played in the anti-apartheid movement. Subsequently, former South African President Thabo Mbeki’s advocacy for an ‘African renaissance’ informed his government’s foreign policy agenda in terms of influencing both SADC and the AU as norm entrepreneurs and harbingers for a better future in Africa (Gevisser and Mbeki 2007). Consequently, the efforts of Mbeki and other sub-regional leaders like Mozambique’s former Presidents Augustino Neto and Joaquim Chissano, Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda, and Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, all of whom were strong advocates of the importance of normative standards within institutions, contributed towards orienting SADC and the AU to advance norms related to peace and stability and to function as a collective security regime. In July 2002, Mbeki presided over the formal launch of the AU, in Durban, South Africa, with its regional economic communities (such as SADC) as building blocks for continental integration. This was an indicator of Mbeki’s and the South African government’s

commitment towards emphasising the importance of pan-African solidarity as a key thematic driver of foreign policy to achieve socio-economic and political transformation across the continent.

South Africa, among other countries in SADC, was a strong advocate of entrenching Article 4(h) within the AU Constitutive Act, the right of the Union to intervene and its responsibility to protect in situations of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. In terms of norms and foreign policy, this means that African countries have to agree to pool their sovereignty to enable the AU to act as the continental guarantor and protector of the security, rights, and well-being of the African people. The African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established as a legal institution of the Union through the *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union*, in 2002. The AU has, therefore, undoubtedly over the last fourteen years led in promoting the norms of peace and security on the continent. Currently, the AU is implicated in operationalising these norms with AU personnel supporting its peace operations in the southern African region through the AU Electoral and Security Assistance Mission to the Comoros (AU-MAES), launched in 2008, among other interventions around the continent in Somalia, Darfur, Sudan, Central African Republic (CAR), and Mali.

THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN REGION: INFLUENCES ON FOREIGN POLICYMAKING

The trajectory of southern African foreign policymaking can be viewed as evolving from the colonial to the post-colonial and post-apartheid periods. The dimensions of how foreign policymaking evolved in southern Africa are investigated below.

Colonialism as a Prism for Foreign Policymaking in Southern Africa

Colonialism, which was particularly severe in southern Africa, interrupted and disrupted the history of the region and continent as a whole. Beyond undermining existing economies, it also marginalised and erased the social and cultural structures of society, brainwashing Africans into accepting the status of inferior members of their own land. One could even go so far as to argue that with regard to Africa, the reason for so much internalised aggression, violence, and hatred of self (more

specifically hatred of ‘others’ who look like ‘self’) is due to having been dominated for so long without any relief or reparation for past wrongs. This condition of oppression and internalised harm triggers a struggle to overcome one’s sense of inferiority, which manifests as a drive to dominate others. Africans turning upon other Africans to work out the latent sense of oppression which has accumulated over time from the colonial period is a recurring feature of the politics of the southern African region.

This psychosis is manifest in southern Africa’s post-colonial states, especially when it comes to orienting their foreign policies. For one, it manifests through the inability of African governments to effectively finance the regional institutions which they create. This is evident in the fact that both SADC and the AU are predominantly financed by external donors (Kabureka 2016; Kagame 2017). It is this self-denigration that is manifesting in the form of subservience and as the ingratiation, prostration, supplication to modern day foreign and economic paymasters. This significantly problematises the issue of whether foreign policy in the southern African region is the unadulterated expression of the aspiration of the citizens of its constituent countries. It raises the spectre of the probability that foreign policy can in some instances be distorted by the cult of personality and the ambitions of so-called leaders who surreptitiously are serving the interests of external actors. These insights suggest that in order to understand the thematic underpinnings of continental and sub-regional foreign policies, one must include a nuanced analysis of the concomitant collusion between foreign elements and corrupt African elites in terms of sourcing arms, for perpetual wars on the continent, and through the illicit extraction of the continent’s natural resources.

Pan-African Solidarity and Self-determination

On 24 May 1963, while addressing the African Heads of State Summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Kwame Nkrumah observed that

there is hardly any African state without a frontier problem with its adjacent neighbours ... but let me suggest that this fatal relic of colonialism will drive us to war against one another ... unless we succeed in arresting the danger through mutual understanding on fundamental issues and through African unity... we shall have fought in vain for independence.

Nkrumah's core message was that pan-Africanism has to be predicated on a recognition of the fragmented nature of the existence of African people, and their marginalisation and alienation whether in their own continent or in the Diaspora. Pan-Africanism seeks to respond to Africa's underdevelopment and the vestiges of the colonial legacy. Pan-Africanism calls upon Africans to draw from their own strength and capacities and become self-reliant. Pan-Africanism is a recognition that the only way out of their existential, social, political crisis is by promoting greater solidarity among Africans. If we know the purpose of pan-Africanism, then the steps to achieve its goals, in terms of foreign and domestic policies, become clearer to understand. In short, following decolonisation, pan-Africanism framed and continues to frame foreign policy development in the southern African region, and it infused the political deliberations that led to the emergence of the SADC and inception of the AU, from its predecessor, the Organization of African Unity.

All of the countries in the southern African region, as with the rest of the continent, were plagued and scarred by the vestiges of brutal and inhumane colonial regimes. The colonial incursion of the African continent, and southern Africa in particular, encouraged pan-African solidarity to pursue its eradication. In effect, the foreign policy of independent African states, and those still under the yoke of colonialism, was overtly committed to the notion of pan-Africanism, particularly as pursued by specific leaders eager to gain adherents through the 'cult of personality.' Mozambique's prescient freedom fighter and dynamic leader, Samora Machel, deployed the theme of pan-African solidarity to solicit and sustain support for his cause of liberation from Portuguese colonialism. Machel's rallying cry was "solidarity is not an act of charity, but an act of unity." This informed his approach to orienting the external relations of Machel's political party, The Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), towards the FLS formation which emerged as a means to coordinate the overall foreign, political, diplomatic, and military policy of countries in the region, against colonialism broadly, and subsequently the persistent apartheid regime.

The Cold War and Southern Africa

During the Cold War, nation states across the African continent became sanctuaries and fortresses for despotic regimes. There were opportunistic African politicians during the Cold War who believed they could 'make it on their own' without their neighbours, as long as they remained loyal

servants of the Western or the Eastern superpowers. These opportunistic politicians fostered and nurtured the cult of personality to secure their territorial fiefdoms and reign over their disenfranchised citizens. For example, Angola was a site for East–West contestation marked by opposing political parties and armed militias, notably Augustino Neto’s and Eduardo dos Santos’ Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and Jonas Savimbi’s National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), siding with either of ideological superpowers. Historically, it was the tacit, covert, or overt support by the Eastern Soviet bloc and client states for MPLA and the West’s reciprocal support for armed militia leaders, such as Savimbi in Angola and Afonso Dhlakama, the RENAMO political party, in Mozambique, which were supported by the USA, UK, West Germany, and the white supremacists regimes in the former Rhodesia and South Africa, that led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Africans.

Ideological promiscuity and the tendency to switch between the former Soviet Union and the USA’s spheres of influence was a strategy deployed by many African heads of state. By nurturing a cult of personality, these heads of state were able to mould and co-opt their countries’ foreign policies in order to shore up the security of their individualised regimes. The legacy of this ideological promiscuity still lingers in the mindset of several African leaders such as Dos Santos of Angola and Mugabe of Zimbabwe, and the propensity to concoct a cult of personality around them is still as prevalent as ever. This is witnessed in their continuing subservience and diffidence, evident through the extent to which governments and leaders are beholden to the foreign policies of their economic masters in Europe and North America. A notable example in this regard is Madagascar and its symbiotic link to France, which continues to assert its hegemonic ideology of ‘*francafrique*’ predicated on its economic dominance, in terms of the key utilities and industries in the island country. More specifically, the French daily *Le Monde* published an investigative report on the role that France played in the 2009 coup d’état in Madagascar, which undermined sub-regional peace efforts in the country (*Le Monde Diplomatique*, 2012).

Peacemaking, Peacebuilding, and Reconciliation in Southern Africa

The colonial, Cold War, and apartheid legacies loom large in the legacy of the southern African region, most notably in the fractured societies

that have been left to pick up the pieces of violent conflict and rebuild communities. For example, in Angola, the protracted colonial and post-independence conflict led refugees to flow into Namibia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) which had a destabilising impact. Similarly, conflict in Mozambique in late 1980s and early 1990s fuelled refugee flows into neighbouring countries such as Botswana and South Africa. More recently, the failure to engage with the deep divisions within Mozambican society and to promote sustainable post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding has led to a re-escalation of the tension between Dhlakama's RENAMO and the incumbent governing FRELIMO party in the country. In 2015, Dhlakama's convoy was attacked by unknown assailants, which suggests that the project of national reconciliation is far from complete in the country. In addition to violence being conducted on a sub-regional stage, the effects of these conflict systems are to make the lives of refugees and internally displaced peoples in the sub-region very difficult. The foreign and security policies of individual countries are designed to protect the interests of leaders and the political elites who serve them; this is evident, for example, in the crisis in the eastern DRC, where President Kabila's agenda to contain the eastern provinces is undermining the livelihoods of the country's citizens, and perpetuating internal displacement and refugee flows. Individual countries have foreign policy interests in addressing challenges such as the refugee flux, and consequently, they directly engage with SADC to orient and develop coherent approaches towards dealing with these transnational and sub-regional conflict systems.

South Africa's Negotiated Transition: An Epochal Moment

The apartheid era in South Africa has also loomed large as a prism through which foreign policy in the southern African region has been articulated and instrumentalised. As Graham notes, an epochal moment in the evolution of foreign policy in the southern African region was South Africa's negotiated transition from apartheid to democracy in 1994 (Graham 2015). The struggle by the post-colonial Frontline States to assert their foreign policy was often impinged upon by how they related and dealt with the apartheid regime in South Africa (James and Barratt 1990). The debilitating effects of the apartheid reality in distorting regional states foreign policy priorities still reverberate across the southern African region. South Africa emerged from its tragic history

with noble intentions to advance a human rights-based foreign policy, driven by Mandela's normative agenda (Mandela et al. 1993). However, this gradually gave way to pragmatism and *realpolitik* when it confronted these practices among the rest of the countries around the world (For more on this, see: Akokpari in Chapter 16).

THE INSTRUMENTALISATION OF SADC TO ADDRESS REGIONAL CRISIS: THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA AND LESOTHO

There are a number of instances in which SADC has been instrumentalised to project foreign policy objectives of its member states. Historically, the regional crises in Mozambique, the DRC, Zimbabwe, Lesotho, and Madagascar were addressed through SADC interventions, often with mixed results. However, the analysis will be limited to SADC's intervention in Lesotho, led by South Africa, which this chapter instrumentalised the organization for its own policy goals.

Lesotho a SADC Foreign Policy Challenge

Lesotho's territory is enclosed within South Africa's landmass, which has intuitively focused Pretoria's gaze on the political developments within the country. South Africa also has hegemonic economic interests in Lesotho linked to accessing water from the mountainous kingdom (Solomon 1997). In 1966, following independence, Lesotho emerged as a sovereign country through the machinations of the British colonial administrators, despite the fact that the Sesotho people inhabit the neighbouring regions within South Africa.

Shortly after independence, political challenges began to afflict the landlocked country. In 1970, the Basotho National Party (BNP), which had governed from independence, was defeated by the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP) in the inaugural post-independence general elections. The BNP leader and at the time Prime Minister of Lesotho, Leabua Jonathan, refused to cede defeat to the BCP. This drove key actors within the BCP to form an armed resistance and political opposition. This fateful decision by Leabua set the scene for the litany of tragic political developments in the country. Leabua governed Lesotho through to 1986, when he was deposed by a military coup which installed a Military Transitional Council. The Military Transitional

Council in turn installed King Moshoeshoe II as an executive monarch, which was a departure from his previous ceremonial role. However, Moshoeshoe II sought to assign more sovereign powers to himself through a Royal Memorandum, which was rebuffed by the Military Transitional Council, which sought the same powers for itself. In 1987, Moshoeshoe II was deposed and replaced by his son King Letsie III, who acquiesced to the Military Transitional Council's demands.

In 1991, a change of leadership within the military leadership paved the way for a political transition which culminated in elections, in 1993, and the victory of the BCP as the governing party. In August 1994, King Letsie III orchestrated a military coup and removed the BCP from government, under the guise of reinstating his father Moshoeshoe II as the king, which precipitated SADC's first intervention in the country, ostensibly to restore constitutional governance. In 1995, through SADC-led negotiations, the BCP government resumed its governance of the country, with Letsie III abdicating to cede the monarchy to his father Moshoeshoe II. In 1996, Moshoeshoe II died as a result of a car accident that remains under a cloud of suspicion. In 1997, the BCP fragmented and spawned an off-shoot political party known as Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), led by the Prime Minister Ntsu Mokhele. In 1998, the LCD won the elections under the leadership of Mokhele's successor Pakalitha Mosisili. However, the opposition parties rejected the electoral outcome and peaceful protests morphed into widespread rioting.

The 1998 political crisis in Lesotho precipitated a SADC intervention through a decision of the Inter-State Defence Committee, and an intervention led by South Africa. South Africa, which had both political and economic interests in Lesotho, was a key driver in ensuring that this decision was adopted by the SADC Inter-State Defence Committee, illustrating how countries can leverage regional institutions to pursue their foreign policy agendas. SADC's decision to intervene enabled the South African National Defence Force and the Botswana Defence Force to militarily intervene in Lesotho. This foray resembled a muscular-militaristic foreign policy on the part of the intervening countries, and in the case of South Africa, it represented a departure from the human rights-based approach to international relations which Mandela's rhetoric championed (Malan 1998). South Africa's presence was met with suspicion and tensions were fraught between its troops and the local Lesotho population. Ultimately, the South African-led SADC troops withdrew from

Lesotho, amid allegations among some analysts that the intervention was ill-thought through and even illegal (Southall 2001).

In the meantime, Lesotho remained beset by political tensions, and on 30 August 2014, there was an attempted coup, which compelled the Prime Minister to flee to South Africa. The 2014 Lesotho crisis, which demonstrated a continuity from the 1998 saga, was once again dealt with through the SADC framework. And again, South African played a leading role, instrumentalizing the regional institution to advance its foreign policy agenda. More specifically, the appointment of a SADC Facilitator, Cyril Ramaphosa, the Deputy President of South Africa, demonstrated the continuing instrumentalisation of the regional body by one of its member states. In addition, a SADC Commission of Inquiry, led by Botswanan judge Mphaphi Phumaphi, was convened to inquire into the Lesotho crisis and in particular, the killing of Lieutenant General Maaparankoe Mahao on 25 June 2015 by soldiers of the Lesotho Defence Forces (LDF). Mahao was accused of allegedly plotting to take part in a mutiny against the government of Lesotho. The crisis was still unresolved at the time of going to print and SADC took the unprecedented step of suspending its Lesotho-related activities due to the kingdom's failure to engage positively with the SADC Commission of Inquiry. This was a significant departure for SADC, which, in the past, was not in the practice of sanctioning its member states for their myriad transgressions.

The Limits of the Instrumentalisation of SADC for Foreign Policy

SADC interventionism in Lesotho was an example of how regional institutions can be leveraged by their members, in this case through a South African-led initiative, to try and address foreign policy challenges. The quasi-legalist intervention through the establishment of a SADC Commission of Inquiry into the deteriorating situation within Lesotho was an illustration of the extent to which regional institutions have carved out an oversight function for themselves. This trend is likely to continue going forward, albeit with some important caveats and limits. In particular, Lesotho's experiences demonstrated that intransigent countries are able to undermine or frustrate the instrumentalization of regional institutions as a foreign policy vehicle for its neighbours, by

resorting to the sovereignty and territorial integrity argument and withdrawing compliance from the sub-regional body. SADC's engagement with Lesotho is an important prism through which to assess the issue of the instrumentalization of regional institutions as foreign policy vehicles, and the mountain kingdom will invariably continue to fall under the purview of the regional body.

CONCLUSION

Mapping the foreign policy orientation of members of SADC is complicated by the phenomenon of "the cult of personality" of African leaders, which is itself oriented toward state capture and the co-optation of government institutions for personal benefit. This chapter has traced the evolution of the foreign policy of SADC countries by identifying the thematic drivers of governmental decision-making. In addition, the chapter has identified the key imperatives which SADC countries have adopted as their priority issues. The chapter also traced the trajectory of regional institutions through the era of colonialism, the Cold War, and into the contemporary period of post-apartheid globalisation. Ultimately, foreign policy in the SADC region has vacillated between national self-interest and a variant of pan-African solidarity. This was demonstrated, for example, through South Africa's instrumentalization of SADC to address the political and constitutional crisis in Lesotho.

The predominance of national self-interest, driven by the cult of personality, means that SADC has not maximised its full potential. Sub-regional integration should be premised and driven by a shift in the mindset and a recognition that no African country is an island unto itself. This is not the prevailing reality on the African continent at this time, and the challenge of reorienting foreign policy mindsets persists. In the absence of such a mindset shift, the instrumentalization of foreign policy to advance continental integration, which is necessary in order to overcome the exploitation by external forces, will continue to remain elusive. In the long run, foreign policy strategies and processes in the southern African region need to be oriented towards enhancing the livelihood and well-being of citizens in the region through a combination of genuine democratic governance and continental integration.

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PART II

African Foreign Policies in Global
International Institutions



Partnering for Peace: United Nations and African Union Cooperation in Peace and Security

Colin Stewart and Line Holmung Andersen

Since its establishment in 2001, the African Union (AU) has played an increasingly important role in addressing challenges to peace and security on the African continent and in strengthening the voice of African states on the international scene. While the United Nations (UN) holds primary responsibility for international peace and security, the AU and subregional organizations in Africa are today recognized as invaluable parts of the global security architecture. In the words of former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, the AU is now “the key regional partner of the United Nations” (2015).

In this chapter, we review how the creation of the AU, with its “non-indifference” doctrine, was a major step forward in addressing one of the key foreign policy concerns of African states: peace and security on the continent. We argue that, by partnering with the UN, the AU has taken the effort another important step forward, but that the success of the partnership—and achieving the AU’s goal of “silencing the guns”—depends upon African states devoting energy

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to the resolution of some significant challenges. Key among these are the need to strengthen consensus and political will at the AU and the UN and to ensure implementation of AU decisions; to harmonize and streamline decision-making processes, and align strategies where possible, between the UN and the AU on the one hand and the AU and its subregional organizations on the other; to address the gaps in the ability of the AU to deliver on the ground, not least to follow through on the question of funding for AU Peace Support Operations; and to address incompatibilities between UN and AU doctrines for peace operations. Along the way, we demonstrate that the increased role of African states and the AU has already strengthened Africa's voice in global governance.

THE UN'S PROBLEM AND THE AU'S ARRIVAL ON THE SCENE

Since the first formalized cooperation between the UN and a subregional organization in Africa—the 1993 collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States to address the crisis in Liberia¹—the UN has increasingly recognized the role of African continental bodies, in the words of former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to “lighten the burden of the council (and contribute to) a deeper sense of participation, consensus and democratization in international affairs” (1992). The growth of this cooperation accelerated with the creation of the AU in 2001, to the point where, in late 2016, the UN Security Council (UNSC) issued its first-ever resolution specifically on the UN–AU partnership in Peace and Security (RES 2320). Both the UNSC and the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) have reiterated the importance of strengthening the partnership (AUPSC 2016).

The increasing role of the AU in peace and security should first and foremost be seen against the changing pattern of threats to peace and security and the challenges faced by the UN, particularly UN peacekeeping, in effectively addressing them. The fundamental changes to the nature of conflicts in Africa—in particular the shift from interstate to intrastate conflicts since the end of the Cold War and the more recent proliferation of asymmetrical threats by non-state actors since the 1990s—have been well documented (World Peace Foundation 2016). The UNSC has the primary responsibility for resolving such

conflicts, but its primary means of intervening—UN peacekeeping—is ill-equipped for these new threats. Although peacekeeping has adapted from its origins as a purely military cease-fire monitoring operation—and today’s multidimensional operations are designed to address the much more complex challenges of stabilizing post-conflict states—for both practical and normative reasons, the UN has not been able to mount an effective response to these robust contemporary threats.

For one thing, the sheer number and magnitude of conflicts have severely overstretched the capacity of UN peacekeeping, especially in the context of ongoing funding constraints. Since January 2004, the number of uniformed personnel (troops, police, and military experts) deployed by the UN has more than doubled to over 100,000, and the costs of these deployments have about tripled (DPKO 2016a).² The vast preponderance of the global peacekeeping load is in Africa: Eighty-three percent of these personnel are deployed in Africa in ten³ missions—including the five largest UN peacekeeping missions in the world—which account for 86%⁴ of the \$7.9 billion global peacekeeping budget (DPKO 2016a). Identifying and deploying the necessary troops for these missions have been major issues for the UN.

Furthermore many conflicts in Africa are very different from the type of conflict UN peacekeeping was designed to tackle. They have become highly complex and dangerous, and pose significant and asymmetrical threats to a peacekeeping mission that are difficult to manage, with combatants hard to identify, and hostilities often stretching across borders. Typically, there is no “peace to keep.” Addressing them requires a mobile, proactive, and strategic use of force, rather than the static, defensive, and tactical posture of traditional peacekeeping. And such missions require completely different support structures: a static peacekeeping force nicely settled into a benign environment consumes fewer resources and is far easier to resupply and service than a mobile force in hostile territory actively engaged in combat and suffering regular losses to both personnel and equipment.

In this new context, the core principles of UN peacekeeping—requiring consent of the parties, impartial troops, and the non-use of force except in self-defense (and, more recently, in defense of the mandate)—render it quite impotent. Peacekeeping missions cannot go on

the offensive—effectively becoming a party to the conflict—and remain impartial, or seek the consent of the spoilers they are attempting to neutralize. In the case of violent extremists, for example, consent—not to mention the hope of a negotiated settlement—is hardly realistic. Moreover, in order to ensure impartiality, the UN has traditionally pursued peacekeeping “by strangers,”⁵ i.e., drawing troop contributions from faraway countries that do not have a strategic interest in the conflict at hand. This raises another practical problem: without a strategic interest, such troop-contributing countries are disinclined to put their soldiers in any significant danger. Hence the complaint that UN peacekeeping is often not “robust” enough.

The other major constraint on UN peacekeeping is normative: even if the UN could adapt to address these new challenges effectively, engaging in what amounts to proactive combat operations, many argue that it must not (e.g., HIPPO 2015: 31). They point out that this would undermine the UN’s traditional role of “honest broker,” striving to maintain the confidence of all parties in order to facilitate a peace agreement or deliver humanitarian assistance—both fundamental objectives for the UN. It would be untenable for the UN, the global standard-bearer for human rights and humanitarian assistance, to put civilians at risk in this way.

UN peacekeeping has therefore found itself inadequately “fit for purpose,” yet unable to adapt without violating its core principles and abandoning its fundamental *raison-d’être*. At the same time, however, the UN cannot simply stand idly by when lives are imperiled. This other side of the normative argument is why the issue of “robust” peacekeeping is still such a hotly debated topic at the UN, and the divergent views of the permanent members (P-5) of the Security Council make any resolution of the issue unlikely in the near future (Darkwa 2016). At the least, some entity needs to be available to create space for humanitarians to help. Since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, strict respect for state sovereignty has given way to the notion of a state’s (and, failing that, the international community’s) “responsibility to protect” its citizens and a peacekeeping mission’s responsibility for the “protection of civilians” (A/Res/60/1 2005). Therefore, the UN is under strong pressure to intervene even as it has limited means to do so. As a result, partnerships with regional organizations have become an indispensable way for the UN to fill the gap.

While the UN was struggling to deal with the conflicts in Africa, African states, motivated in large part by the international failure to

respond to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, in 2002 traded the “non-interference” and defense of sovereignty of the Organization of African Unity for the “non-indifference” of the new AU, where sovereignty comes with responsibility. To deliver on this political commitment, African states have, through the AU, introduced a comprehensive institutional setup: the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which includes a AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), an African Standby Force (ASF), a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), a Panel of the Wise, and a Peace Fund. With such a proactive normative principle as a foundation, Africans have gone on to demonstrate their willingness in practice: since its establishment in 2002, the AU has authorized or deployed peace operations in response to conflicts in the Comoros, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Mali, Somalia, and Sudan; new threats such as the outbreak of Ebola in west Africa; violent extremism in the Lake Chad Basin; and electoral crises and unconstitutional changes of government. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is today the largest peace operation in the world in terms of troops, with an authorized strength of more than 22,000 uniformed personnel drawn entirely from African countries (RES 2297 2016).⁶

Not only have African states made great strides in bringing “African solutions to African problems” through the AU, but they have also become major players in the international peace and security effort. Africa is now the largest regional contributor of troops to United Nations Peace Operations, providing fully half of the current 101,557 uniformed personnel serving around the world (DPKO 2016b). Six of the top ten troop—and police-contributing countries are African (Ibid). By taking on such an important role in international operations, African states are stepping up to the plate in addressing the conflicts on their own continent, while at the same time strengthening their collective voice in global governance—a key goal for the organization (AU 2000: Article 3).

The changing nature of conflicts in Africa, the unshrinking scale of the problem, and the evolution of international priorities in peace and security have led most observers to agree that no single organization or entity can alone solve these problems (S/2015/446). The need for the UN and the AU to combine their respective strengths in a more systematic partnership, therefore, was obvious. Both organizations were under pressure to apply preventive measures to address the root causes of conflict, not just respond once a conflict had surfaced. So cooperation

on prevention had to be strengthened, and to begin earlier. It was also recognized that operational collaboration had to begin at the planning phase, well before both organizations had deployed to the field. In April 2017, a more systematic, ongoing, comprehensive, and strategic collaboration across the full span of conflict, from early warning and conflict prevention, through peace operations, to post-conflict peace building, was institutionalized in a Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security cosigned by the new United Nations Secretary-General, António Guterres, and the new African Union Commission Chairperson, Moussa Faki Mahamat, bringing the relationship closer than it has ever been (AU–UN 2017).

THE INDISPENSABLE ROLE OF THE AFRICAN UNION

While the UN carries the primary responsibility for international peace and security, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter grants regional and sub-regional organizations a complementary role, provided that their actions are “consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN,” and, in the case of “enforcement action” (as opposed to the “pacific settlement of disputes”), that they have the authorization of the Security Council (Article 53(1)). This requirement, and the international legitimacy the Council confers, makes cooperation with the UN necessary for regional organizations, as recognized in the foundation documents of the AU (2002). Cooperation with the UN also provides access to significant resources, both financial and technical, as well as an entry point for a greater role in global governance.

The AU’s value as a partner for the UN is just as crucial. First of all, as mentioned above, the AU Constitutive Act sets out an explicit “right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of Grave Circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity” (AU 2000: Article 4(h)). This gives the AU a clear and robust doctrine for so-called humanitarian intervention when necessary, unlike Chapter VII of the UN Charter.⁷ In contrast with the UN, the AU has shown itself willing to engage in peace enforcement, i.e., robust combat operations to address situations with no peace to keep, as has been well demonstrated by the AMISOM. To the UN, which has no such ability, this is an indispensable asset.

Furthermore, in purely practical terms, the AU has shown itself able to respond more rapidly to crises. A large part of the reason for

this is that an AU mission is much leaner, essentially a military deployment without a large civilian component, and often forgoing much of the training, preparation, equipment, supplies, or force enablers that a UN mission would need to have in place before deployment. There is of course a trade-off between speed and comprehensiveness of deployment. Finally, as an African organization created by Africans, the AU has a unique capacity for direct political suasion over its membership, which, under the banner of “African solutions to African problems” it can and does bring to bear in conflict resolution and troop generation for AU peace operations.

As a result of these advantages, the AU and the African subregional organizations are increasingly looked to as “first responders” for the UN, capable of deploying troops rapidly to stabilize a situation before transitioning to a UN peacekeeping mission, as seen in the cases of Burundi, the Central African Republic, and Mali. To strengthen and institutionalize this “transition model,” joint benchmarking and lessons learned exercises between the UN and AU have been held regarding actual or potential transitions in Somali, Mali, and CAR (S/2015/3), and work is underway to establish generic benchmarks and a “toolbox” for AU–UN transitions.

CHALLENGES FOR THE UNITED NATIONS AND AFRICAN UNION

While the development of the UN–AU partnership has been quite rapid in recent years, there are nonetheless a number of enduring challenges both for the two organizations and for the member states to resolve.

The transitions from AU to UN Missions in Mali (2013) and the Central African Republic (2014) clearly highlighted the need for greater strategic and operational harmonization between the two organizations (S/2015/3). This may seem like a basic requirement, but there has been a tendency, particularly at the UN, to emphasize “comparative advantage” and “division of labor” as ways of ensuring clarity of roles (and keeping the UN at “arm’s length” from the reputational risks of peace enforcement). Unfortunately, emphasizing the separation of roles and independence, rather than interdependence, of responsibilities goes counter to harmonization and undermines the realization of an effective partnership. The reality is that the partnership between the UN and AU is not symmetrical and does not lend itself to a neat division of roles: for the foreseeable future, the AU can only deploy its first responders rapidly

if there is logistical and material support from other partners, particularly the UN. This implies maximum collaboration—not separation—at every stage of an operation and shared responsibility for getting the job done: together, they must develop a common understanding of the problem and its context, develop shared strategies for addressing it, undertake collaborative planning, and identify resource and capacity gaps, and work together to fill them. Division of labor of course has a place in implementation, but only once all the planning and problem solving have been done together.

The second challenge for the transition model is that it presupposes a linear, sequential model of deployment. In reality, an increasing number of cases call for multiple interventions operating simultaneously, as seen in the case of Somalia. There, the AMISOM is still busy trying to reduce the threat from al-Shabaab, and there is no transition in sight (at least not to a UN mission), yet the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNSN) is already on the ground lending its support to political reforms. Mali and CAR were both early and rudimentary examples of transitions, but to this day the UN missions there work side-by-side with third-party peace enforcers. Notwithstanding the UN's practical and normative obstacles to peace enforcement, UN missions are increasingly being given "robust" mandates to address violent extremism and terrorism and incorporate offensive operations—such as the Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo—or to support the AU in undertaking combat operations, as with the UN Support Mission in Somalia (UNSM) or the Multinational Joint Task Force against Boko Haram (MNJTF) (S/2016/809). The many peace operations in Africa, tasked with multifaceted mandates involving offensive operations, stabilization, protection of civilians, and state-building, have, in reality, blurred the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

A related dilemma for the UN-AU partnership is the protection of civilians. Peace enforcement operations, by definition, present a greater risk to civilians than peacekeeping and, due to the nature of their activities and environment, are harder to monitor and hold accountable. For these reasons, the UN is still ambivalent about providing direct support to such operations, even when they may have authorized them (S/2016/809). At the same time, the AU has, due to the nature of the operations as well as financial and human resource constraints, struggled to uphold all aspects of international humanitarian law and deliver on the protection of civilians. Strengthening the human rights component will continue to be vital

for the credibility and legitimacy of AU operations, and in this regard, an AU Aide Memoire on Protection of Civilians was adopted in 2013 and a Protection of Civilian mandate, as well as mission-level strategies and mechanisms to implement it, was introduced in AMISOM. Most recently, at the AU Summit in July 2016, AU Member States agreed to put in place a Human Rights and Code of Conduct Compliance Framework for African Union Peace Support Operations (AU Assembly 2016).

A further issue is the still-growing capacity of the AU to plan, deploy, and manage peace operations, especially difficult peace enforcement operations. This is a hindrance not only to the self-sufficiency of the organization, but also to the ability of the AU and UN to implement a balanced partnership. The AU is a young organization, still in the process of building the tools and procedures it needs to effectively deliver peace operations on the ground. The UN has been committed to supporting the AU in the development of its capacity since 2006 (A/61/630), alongside other partners, notably the European Union. But the diversity and complexity of threats to peace and security today call for even more specialized capacities, for example, in counter-terrorism—which is the *forte* of neither the UN nor the AU. No single actor can currently deliver the full range of necessary capabilities; hence, it is important that multiple options, including third parties, remain available (e.g., contractors for logistical support) (S/2016/809). Today, a multitude of partners, traditional and new, bilateral and multilateral, play an ever-increasing role in peace and security in Africa. The geopolitical “renaissance” of Africa and the effects of African conflicts and state fragility on the rest of the world, not least in the form of migration, have brought Africa to the forefront of international attention. Ensuring that everyone is pushing in the same direction is the goal of strategic partnerships.

Both the UN and AU have realized the need to strengthen and institutionalize their partnership at both the strategic and operational level. Whereas the UN originally approached the collaboration through a capacity building lens, under the Framework for the Ten-Year Capacity Building Programme launched in 2006, the two organizations today refer to their cooperation as a “strategic partnership” and actively strive to deliver consultative decision-making and joint planning of peace operations, as set out in the Report of the Secretary-General on the Future of UN Peace Operations and in the AU’s Common African Position (S/2015/682; 502nd AUPSC).

In the field, the importance of early joint planning and coordination as well as cooperation on force generation to strengthen mandate delivery and interoperability has been increasingly taken on board by both organizations in the form of joint assessment missions, benchmarking exercises, cooperation on “concepts of operations” for new missions, and synchronized deployments. To ensure political coherence and harmonization of strategies, the two organizations have introduced a series of coordination mechanisms, such as biannual consultations between the UNSC and AUPSC, an AU–UN Joint Task Force on Peace and Security at the under-secretary-general-level and working-level consultations (“Desk-to-Desk” meetings) to strengthen coordination between the two secretariats. In 2010, the UN established the UN Office to the AU to strengthen the strategic engagement between the UN and AU, and to support the AU in its ongoing operations and institution-building (S/64/288 2010). The AU has for its part set out as a key priority to realign and enhance the capacity its Permanent Observer Mission in New York.

CHALLENGES FOR THE AFRICAN STATES

In trying to bring peace and security to the continent, AU Member States, through their foreign policies with respect to the AU and UN, play a vital role in addressing a number of critical political and strategic issues confronting the two organizations and their partnership.

The overarching challenge in trying to address these issues is simply to find consensus among AU member states to ensure a common African position—a key goal of the AU—and to rally the political will to see that consensus implemented. This is not an easy task. The 15 members of the UNSC, too, often have great difficulty reaching consensus, and this has, at crucial times, hobbled the work of the Council, as in the case of Rwanda and, more recently, Syria. For the members of the AUPSC, pursuing a common front, rather than simply defending a national position, is key to ensuring the political leverage of the AU. Otherwise the organization will find itself no more able to respond to the next Rwanda than the UN was the last time, and miss the opportunity to fully exert its influence internationally. Once they find internal consensus, the next step for PSC members is to seek common ground with the 15 members of the Security Council, in order for the various problems outlined in this chapter to be successfully managed.

As part of this effort, African member states have shown concern over the historical lack of consistency between the positions taken by the three African members serving on the Security Council (the “A3”) on the one hand, and those taken by the AU, on the other. Since there is no provision for A3 members to hold concurrent seats in the AU Peace and Security Council, there is no formal mechanism for such coordination.⁸ As demonstrated in the cases of AU–UN transitions in CAR and Mali, the A3 has a vital role to play in the level of coordination between the two councils. To respond to this problem, the AU Peace and Security Council in 2014 formally endorsed the establishment of the A3 as a vehicle for AU positions and took steps to systematize communications. They have continuously reiterated the importance of the A3 as a vehicle to champion African common positions in the Security Council (628th AUPSC 2016: 8).

Relationships between the AU and its subregional organizations, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the Regional Mechanisms (RMs), have also been a hurdle for the continental body, and this has affected the triangular relationship with the UN, especially when all three are involved in peace operations, as they were in Mali and CAR. It has also been a key obstacle to the operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture, where, for example, the African Standby Force, with its five regional brigades, requires the resolution of key issues such as mandating powers. Likewise, while the composition of the AUPSC is based on regional representation, the degree of political consensus-building at the subregional level varies widely. To ensure the political and operational leverage of the AU, there is an urgent need to revisit the meaning of “subsidiarity” and “complementarity,” as set out in the AU-REC/RM 2008 Memorandum of Understanding.

Similarly, the member states of the AU need to have a hard look at the organization’s record of upholding and implementing its own collective decisions. This is crucial, not only for Africans to translate the ideals of the AU Constitutive Act into reality, but also for a fruitful peace and security collaboration with the UN. Objectives and principles fundamental to the AU, such as human rights, good governance, and rule of law, if they are not implemented, can become root causes of conflict and undermine the credibility of the AU as a guardian of peace and security on the African continent (AU 2002: Art. 3, 4). While the Council has actively tackled thorny issues regarding unconstitutional changes of government, there has been greater reluctance to critically scrutinize the

human rights records of African states. Some argue that this is related to the fact that the criteria for membership of the AU Peace and Security Council, including respect for constitutional governance, human rights, and the rule of law, are not enforced, which allows poor performers to defend their interests on the Council and impedes its ability to respond effectively to challenges that involve questions of “good governance” (Williams and Dersso 2015: 14; World Peace Foundation 2016: 5).

One of the most serious political problems in the field of African peace and security is the funding of AU peace operations. The Peace Fund, established in 1993 as the principal financing instrument for the peace and security activities of the then Organization of African Unity, now the African Union, remains virtually empty (AUPSC Protocol 2002: Article 21). AU peace and security initiatives are currently 98% funded by external partners, which has implications for both political ownership by African States and mandate delivery on the ground (AU 2016; World Peace Foundation 2016: 4).

Previous agreements to finance peace and security have gone unimplemented, but in 2016, a strong new effort was made by High Representative for the AU Peace Fund Donald Kaberuka, on behalf of the AUC Chairperson, to forge a new consensus and deliver on the 2015 commitment of African Heads of State of Government to fund 25% of AU activities in peace and security by 2020 (AU Assembly 2015). His report, which proposes a mechanism for AU member states to fund the 25% (estimated to be USD 235 million/year) through a 0.2% import levy, and to reinvigorate the Fund through proper governance mechanisms complemented by a human rights framework, was endorsed by AU Heads of State in July 2016 (AU Assembly 2016). Following through is now in the hands of the member states.

But it is also accepted that Africa will not anytime soon become self-sufficient in peace and security. Nor, many have argued, should it. In line with the principle of subsidiarity, the AU has long argued that its missions, all endorsed by the UNSC, are in fact undertaken “on behalf of the UN” (i.e., if the AU did not step in, the UN would have to) and that the UN therefore has a duty to provide financial support to these missions through UN assessed contributions.⁹ This argument found support from the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, which, referencing a 2008 report by the “Prodi Panel,” argued that AU access to UN assessed contributions to AU Peace Operations authorized by the Security Council should be provided on a “case-by-case basis” (2015:

65). It is certainly in the UN's interest to see AU missions succeed, and both organizations have agreed that access to UN assessed contributions provides the most reliable, predictable, and sustainable means of financing support requirements for Peace Operations (S/2016/809).

AU member states must also come to grips with some of the dilemmas involved in mandating peace enforcement missions. As mentioned above, the UN, to preserve the impartiality of peacekeeping troops, does not favor the involvement of peacekeepers from neighboring states, who, by nature of their proximity, have a strategic interest in the conflict. But countries motivated by strategic interest are typically the only ones willing to go into combat. The AU, to take on the difficult role of first responder where there is no peace to keep, must rely on precisely those member states who are motivated by a strategic interest. This poses a couple of problems. First, the government of a neighboring state may be primarily motivated by a national agenda. Even if there is only a perception of partiality toward certain political groups in the host country, this poses a risk to the legitimacy and reputation of the mission and can create a problem for re-hatting such troops into an eventual UN Mission. Second, troop-contributing countries who have their own interests in a conflict are extremely difficult for an international organization to manage (managing "impartial" TCCs in a UN peacekeeping mission is hard enough), and the role of the strategic and mission headquarters is severely weakened, as we have seen with the AU's experience in directing AMISOM.

Another unresolved doctrinal issue is the primacy of the UNSC in matter of peace and security. Some have argued that the AU's explicit right to intervene in the case of mass atrocity crimes granted in Article 4(h) is to date the most serious challenge to the prerogative of the UNSC to authorize the use of force, offering a more expanded scope for the use of force than traditionally catered for under international law (Allan 2003; Darkwa 2016). While the AU has, from the outset, acknowledged the primacy of the Security Council—and even emphasized it in making the case for its own subsidiary role—the PSC Protocol (2002) is silent on how to proceed with an Article 4(h) intervention when endorsement to intervene from the Security Council is not forthcoming, as happened to NATO in its 1999 intervention in Kosovo. The question is especially pertinent for the AU given that it was founded largely in reaction to the failure of the UN and Organization of African Unity to respond to the mass atrocities of the 1990s. It remains theoretical for now, however, as the scope of Article 4(h) has never been tested:

The AU has so far only authorized Peace Operations with the consent of the host government and endorsement of the UNSC.¹⁰

Finally, while enforcement action is provided for in the Constitutive Act of the AU, the AU did not envision its peace operations primarily as enforcement operations. In fact, the doctrine for the African Standby Force lays out different scenarios which, aside from the mass atrocity crimes scenario, largely correspond to the role and principles of UN Peacekeeping. While the call for “complementarity” with the UN is challenging given that UN Peacekeeping is in a state of flux, it will be important for the AU to revisit its role in peace operations in light of evolving challenges and for the UN and AU to reconcile doctrinal differences.¹¹

CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF MULTILATERAL FOREIGN POLICY

Addressing Africa’s weighty peace and security challenges and securing a stronger voice in global governance are foreign policy priorities for all African states—priorities they can best exercise through the collective security mechanisms of the AU and the UN. Combining the strengths of the two organizations promises to greatly improve the effectiveness of the overall effort, and therefore provides an important opportunity for African states, as members of both organizations, to advance peace and security by ensuring that the partnership is a success. As outlined in this chapter, African states can play a key role in ensuring closer coordination and harmonization of political positions between the UN, AU, and RECs, as well as in strengthening the ability of the AU to deliver on the ground, not least by delivering on recent commitments to address the pressing issue of funding.

Of all the foreign policy issues African states will confront, none can be more important than encouraging, through the power of multilateralism, domestic policies throughout the continent which will eliminate the root causes of instability and thereby prevent conflict. The UN–AU partnership is oriented in this same direction and is poised to have considerable impact if it can benefit from the support of its member states. The political will of these member states to respond to evolving conflicts and to governance challenges will likely be a decisive factor in how successful the partnership, and therefore the collective peace and security effort, will be going forward.

NOTES

1. The Security Council established the UN Observer Mission in Liberia in 1993 to work closely with the Ceasefire Monitoring Group deployed by the Economic Community of West African States (UN Security Council RES 866).
2. See UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2005–2016. *Note* 2004 is the first year for which peacekeeping statistics are publicly available.
3. Including UNSOS, which uses UN peacekeeping funds to support AMISOM.
4. Includes a prorating of headquarters costs (the “Support Account”).
5. Williams and Derso (2015), among others, have used the term “peacekeeping by strangers.”
6. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was first deployed by the African Union Peace and Security Council, with endorsement from the Security Council, in 2007. Security Council Resolution 2297 (2016) extended the current mandate until May 2017. Troop-contributing countries are Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.
7. While Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides for the UNSC to authorize the use force when necessary, 70 years of experience demonstrate that its application is entirely dependent upon interpretation by the Council members.
8. As of December 2016, Egypt is the only country serving on both the UN Security Council and AU Peace and Security Council.
9. Article 17(1) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the AU Peace and Security Council cites Chapter VIII as the basis of the AU relationship with the UN and states that “Where necessary, recourse will be made to the UN to provide the necessary financial, logistical and military support for the AU’s activities in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, in keeping with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.”
10. Article 4(h) has been invoked only once by the AUPSC in response to the case of Burundi (December 2015). The decision was, however, not endorsed by the AU Assembly.
11. The five-year “Maputo” work plan (2016–2020) for the African Standby Force likewise calls for a review of the ASF Doctrine. At the time of writing, the AU Commission has initiated preliminary discussions on the review.

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African Agency and the World Bank in the Twenty-First Century

Karelle Samuda

The field of International Relations (IR) continues to grapple with its treatment of Sub-Saharan Africa. The continent and its individual countries are often characterized as peripheral actors in global politics (Dunn 2001) and the established theories—particularly classical realism, neo-realism, and neoliberalism—evidence a disproportionate bias toward Western hegemony while marginalizing African countries. Indeed, Africa’s marginalized status serves as the ideal antithesis to the dominant IR theories in which the West is core (Dunn 2001: 3).

IR scholars are now challenging these theoretical biases. They contend that these theories are not universal in nature, nor do they accurately reflect the different ways in which actors navigate and exert influence in global governance and politics. The “African agency” theory positions Africa and African actors as active agents in global politics. The empirical evidence presents various ways in which African countries are core to many global issues such as migration, climate change, development, human security, and International Financial Institutions (Blaauw

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2016). This chapter expands on theories of African agency theory as a counterpoint to the marginalization of Africa in established IR theory. Specifically, this chapter analyzes the emergence of African agency by examining the relationship between Africa and the World Bank.

The focus on the World Bank is because this institution is viewed as the leading international development institution, given that it provides project and program financing, technical assistance, and significantly contributes to knowledge creation on issues related to development. The Foucauldian (Foucault 1982) and Gramscian (Gramsci 1971) concepts of discourse and hegemony respectively, when applied to the World Bank, suggest that “the evolving hegemonic discourse that it prescribes to has been institutionalised through its projects and programmes to appear as scientific fact” (Bazbauers 2014: 93). The World Bank, as the most prominent multilateral institution in development, exercises power and influence by “shaping and modifying the behavior of others” (Bazbauers 2014: 93).

The relationship between the World Bank and Africa often evokes mixed reactions. Critiques of World Bank involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa often frame this relationship as one of being neo-colonial, given the levels of conditionalities that often accompany Bank loans; of not actually contributing to poverty reduction, and at times, exacerbating poverty; and of foisting a “Western-led” style of development upon countries with little acknowledgment of country context. The African agency paradigm provides an opportunity to ask: “How far, and in what ways [are] African political actors...impacting on, and operating within, the international system?” (Brown and Harman 2013: 1).

This chapter argues that the prevailing notion of the World Bank’s hegemonic influence over African countries is in flux. There is a shift in the global configuration of power, and while there is still emerging debate on what this “new” configuration might entail, there is increased consensus that this new configuration entails a “diffusion of power” (Mangala 2010: ix). This begs the question of how this diffusion of power impacts the World Bank–Africa relationship?

This chapter utilizes the “African agency” paradigm to discuss three broad factors that are shaping and will continue to shape the nature of African foreign policymaking toward the World Bank: (i) the voice and accountability imbalance within the World Bank’s governance structure; (ii) the changing development financing landscape; and (iii) the changing economic and social development prospects in Sub-Saharan Africa.

This chapter first reviews the main theoretical frameworks used to analyze Africa as a player in global governance and economic systems. The second section chronicles the evolution of the relationship between the World Bank and Africa. The third section discusses the three factors that give credence to the application of the “African agency” paradigm in the scholarship of Africa in global politics.

PERIPHERAL? THE THEORETICAL FRAMING OF AFRICA IN IR

Established IR theories generally accord primacy to the states and actors of the “West,” often relegating non-Western actors to the periphery (Acharya and Buzan 2007; Dunn and Shaw 2001). Realism, as one of the mainstream IR theories, argues that the actions of international organizations and other global governance and politics players simply reflect the imperatives of power politics and balances of power (Waltz 1979). For realists, global governance and politics as administered by international organizations are based on the interests of these organizations’ most powerful member or coalition of members. As Waltz (1979) notes, “[A] general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers” (pp. 72–73). The realist argument predicts that institutions such as the World Bank and their largest donors will act in their own interest of continuing to exert hegemonic influence on the development discourse and the operational and governance arrangements that keep them at the core. This centrality of power in the realist paradigm often means that African countries are not treated as primary units of analysis and are instead analyzed within the context of the decisions of the core, or powerful, actors.

Liberal theories of IR note that international institutions and global governance play a key role in achieving cooperation among states. International institutions enable states to pursue their own self-interested goals, but in a manner that allows for cooperation. However, as Acharya and Buzan (2007) note, the dominance of Western theories like liberalism means, “it has acquired a Gramscian hegemonic status that operates largely unconsciously in the minds of others” (p. 294). The liberal principles that served as the basis for the creation of many of today’s international institutions are also still used to fuel the continued domination of these said institutions by Western powers.

While theoretically, African countries are peripheral in IR, the empirical research on Africa’s agency in international negotiations suggests that this marginalization of African countries in global politics is misplaced,

and in some cases, simply inaccurate (Lee 2013; Zondi 2013). The call for situating African countries as active agents in IR is core to the African agency theory (Blaauw 2016). While, as Blaauw (2016) notes, Africa's economic weakness is often used as an argument for the continent's marginalization in the global political economy, African actors have nevertheless asserted themselves in various global spaces. This has occurred, for example, in multilateral trade negotiations (Lee 2013).

The argument for new theoretical constructs that do not always place African countries in the periphery is not the same as claiming that contemporary IR theory is irrelevant in explaining any aspect of IR and Africa, or that there is a strict binary between "Western" and "African." Instead, the argument is that African countries' influence, experience, insights, and ideas benefit knowledge production within the IR discipline and contribute to established theories becoming more universal (see: Warner's Introduction in Chapter 1). Or, as (Salem 2016) notes,

[e]nriched by African epistemologies, and African critiquing of their conceptual foundations, international relations theories will not only become truly universal but also account for international politics in Africa and elsewhere more powerfully. (p. 36)

This chapter asks whether there is a change in the relationship between the World Bank and Africa, and secondly, what does this change, if anything, mean for African agency? It argues that there are three distinct factors shaping contemporary World Bank-Africa relations in which the factors present interesting points from the established paradigms for interpreting Africa's role in global international relations.

THE WORLD BANK AND AFRICA: THEN

In 1944 at the end of World War II, the victors created the Bretton Woods financial system consisting of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The IBRD, along with five other organizations—the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), and the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID)—constitute the World Bank Group. IBRD provides loans, guarantees, and technical assistances for development projects to




Fig. 12.1 IBRD commitments (by region) 2012–2016. *Source* World Bank, 2016

its borrowing members. For the last four years, African countries have received the least amount of IBRD financing (Fig. 12.1). Moreover, IDA provides concessional loans (or credits) and grants to the world's poorest countries—the African region is one of IDA's largest recipients of assistance (Fig. 12.2).

Yet, Africa was not always a major recipient of Bank financing and assistance. A decade after the Bank was created, only two of its sixty member countries were from Sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopia was the first Sub-Saharan country granted a loan by the Bank, in 1950.¹ For its first twenty-five years, the Bank's presence in Sub-Saharan Africa was minimal for a number of reasons including: (i) the better equipped and greater presence of bilateral agencies of the formal colonial powers in the region; (ii) the late membership of African countries; and (iii) Bank's focus on Asia and Latin America (Kapur et al. 1997). Some sixty years later, the Bank's profile in Sub-Saharan Africa is radically different. In 2015, Bank engagement in the region was approximately \$11.6 billion committed for 103 projects (World Bank 2015a).




Fig. 12.2 IDA commitments (by region) 2012–2016

As with many other regions and countries, the World Bank’s interaction with Africa is informed by the politics and economics of the period (Madavo 1997; Bazbauers 2014). From an IR perspective, the pre- and post-Cold War periods serve as significant markers in this relationship. During the Cold War era, there is ample evidence that countries, including some in Africa, that were allied with the “West,” were favored by the World Bank (Callaghy 1983, 2009). From a policy agenda perspective, various shifts have occurred regarding what was considered to be significant to development. These shifts range from investments in infrastructure (in the 1950s and 1960s), social spending and poverty alleviation in the 1970s, structural adjustment lending in the 1980s to mid-1990s, to the current expansion and continued emphasis on good governance, poverty reduction, and new forms of neoliberal, market-focused initiatives such as “Doing Business” from the 1990s to present day.

The primacy given to power as an important lever in IR and global politics also means that the evolution of the Bank cannot be addressed without noting the influence of hegemonic powers in shaping the Bank’s discourse on what constitutes development (see: Babb 2009; Bazbauers 2014; Stein 2008; Wade 2011, 2002; Woods 2003). What

is characteristic of the Bank's engagement to present day is, to use the Foucauldian and Gramscian perspectives, the institution's (and that of its "Western" member countries) hegemonic discourse on development. This hegemonic influence on the discourse on and practice of development from the neorealist and neoliberal perspective places African countries at the periphery.

Yet, this hegemonic influence by the World Bank on the discourse on and practice of development is currently being challenged. Ironically, the eleventh president of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, alluded to this challenge during a 2010 speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, when he declared that: "[T]he outdated categorizations of First and Third Worlds, donor and supplicant, leader and led, no longer fit" (Zoellick 2010). This chapter argues that the 2000s signaled a new period in Africa's agency with respect to its relationship with the Bank.

THE WORLD BANK AND AFRICA: NOW

The twenty-first century has ushered in a new period of African countries' engagement with the World Bank, one in which African countries are able to exert more influence in the global political space. As Brown and Harman (2013) note, "[a] key factor in the opening up of greater space in the international arena for African states' activism has been the tectonic shifts in power at the international system level" (pp. 7–8). This section focuses on three factors based on this shift in power at the global level that will shape Africa's agency vis-à-vis the World Bank: (i) World Bank governance; (ii) the heterogeneity of development financing; and (iii) the discourse and realities of the "Africa rising" narrative.

World Bank Governance: Voice and Accountability Imbalance

Contributions from wealthy donor countries continue to be a mainstay of Bank funding, particularly for IDA. However, the emerging economic strength of the Global South raises questions about representation and voice within the Bank.

Following the global financial crisis, the G20 focused on reforming the governance structure of the Bank to better reflect the economic influence of emerging countries in the world economic system. One such reform was a commitment to shift approximately 3% of voting

power from developed countries to developing countries and to take into account countries' share of world GDP as a determinant of voting shares (Development Committee, World Bank, and IMF 2009, 2010). These new commitments serve as a significant entrée into how African countries can further integrate their voices in the World Bank system. Under this system, African countries themselves could have more voting shares, and, moreover, African countries could utilize the emerging countries with increased voting shares to amplify their voice on various policies.

However in reality, voting reforms have not delivered on their promises. In fact, contrary to promises made by the World Bank (Development Committee, World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund 2010), developed countries have not witnessed a collective decline in their voting power relative to GDP, and for many developing countries, their voting shares have actually declined (Vestergaard and Wade 2014). African countries, in particular Nigeria and South Africa, were among the biggest losers (Avril 2010; Green 2010).

The issue of voice and accountability is also evident in the selection process of the World Bank president. Currently, the president is selected by a simple majority of the Board of Directors. To date, the presidency is always American. In the 2012 World Bank president election process, the former Nigerian Minister of Finance, Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, was a candidate who was highly regarded and favored by many development practitioners and African member countries (Africa Research Bulletin 2012; Rushe 2012; The Economist 2012). Yet, as has always been the case, the position was given to the American candidate: in this instance, that was Jim Yong Kim.

The visibility of African nationals in high ranking positions at the World Bank continues to be an issue pushed by African member countries as another means of expanding the countries' agency in the Bank. There are currently six Sub-Saharan African nationals who occupy management leadership positions in the World Bank, representing approximately 19% of the total number of such positions (World Bank 2016). According to a 2015 report by the World Bank human resources department, the number of Sub-Saharan African nationals who were active full-time staff stood at 1818 in 2015; this is an increase from 1292 in 2000. Relative to the total active full-time staff, this was a 0.62 percentage point increase (from 14.5% of the total active full-time staff in 2000 to 15.13% in 2015). The percentage of Sub-Saharan African staff members at Grades GF and above was 11.6% in 2015, a 2.1 percentage point increase since 2000 (World Bank 2015b).²

The issue of voice not only has implications for African foreign policymaking in the Bank, but also relates to the political legitimacy of the World Bank itself as a multilateral institution. The credibility of the World Bank will be severely undermined if its governance structure does not adapt to the current reality of the global system in which the presence (both demographically and economically) of developing countries, including African countries, is increasingly being felt.

The Changing Development Financing Landscape

Severino and Ray (2009) describe the new development financing environment as having undergone the “triple revolution” (p. 1) in goals, actors, and tools. New actors such as India, China, and Brazil are emerging and increasingly responding to the financial needs of developing countries. The growing role of the private sector, wealthy philanthropists, and technology has also prompted the use of new tools such as public–private partnerships to fund development initiatives.

Official development assistance (ODA) is no longer the primary source of financial flows to developing countries, including Sub-Saharan countries. One estimate notes that in 1990, the composition of financial flows to Sub-Saharan Africa was heavily skewed toward ODA at 62% of all financial flows to the region, while flows from the private sector accounted for 31% and remittances 7%. In 2012, the share of ODA declined to approximately 22% of external financial flows to Sub-Saharan Africa, while remittances increased to 24%, and gross capital flows to 54% (Sy and Rakontondrazaka 2015).

This expansion of alternative sources of development finance beyond ODA signals the ability of African countries to establish an agenda that is less aid-dependent and more reflective of the homegrown strategies of these countries. It also connotes the emergence of African countries as “legitimate” players in the world economic system and not as a set of countries solely in need of rescuing. An important caveat is that while one can suggest that the emergence of multiple sources of development financing can enhance Africa’s agency, many African countries still view the World Bank’s knowledge capacity and many of its assessment tools as important inputs in their policy agenda-setting and reform design according to the 2015 *Market Reforms Survey* (Parks et al. 2015).

The growth of South-South cooperation as evidenced by increased investments made by developing countries in other developing countries,

and the establishment of South-led development institutions such as the New Development Bank (formerly, the “BRICS” bank), are important markers in the ability of Sub-Saharan African countries to pursue their foreign policy agendas through other avenues. While there is no guarantee that the National Development Bank will inherently operate differently than other development banks, at the very least, its presence offers an opportunity for African governments to craft development policies and priorities that are independent of the conditionalities of the World Bank.

There is little secret that China and other emerging markets are playing an increasingly important role in development financing. For example, aid flows from the so-called BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) are said to have grown to an estimated 9% of ODA in 2009 (albeit from a small starting base). At the December 2015 *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation*, China pledged US\$60 million towards development projects and investments to Africa, triple the amount pledged at the last forum in 2012 (Onishi 2015). Additionally, emerging research challenges the oft-cited narrative of China’s aid to Africa going to corrupt and authoritarian governments and serving as a means of securing access to the continent’s natural resources (Dreher et al. 2015). The implication is that China and other “non-traditional” development financiers to Sub-Saharan Africa are able to “compete” with other donors, including the Bank, and are able to signal to the world economic system which traditionally viewed Sub-Saharan Africa as one in need of saving, that these countries are active agents in the global economic system.

The changing development finance landscape challenges one area in which the World Bank has (or, had) considerable comparative advantage: capital. One can argue that the pinnacle of the Bank’s relative power to shape and influence policy in Africa took place during the period of structural adjustment when there was a lack of alternative sources of funding other than bilateral and multilateral aid. The Bank had substantial amounts of bargaining power over a country’s financial and policy health at that time. However, the heterogeneity of the development financing landscape suggests this comparative advantage is diminishing.

Africa Rising?

In a 2000 article, *The Economist* labeled Africa as “hopeless,” as a continent with countries “deluged by floods” and “government-sponsored thuggery,” and one where “poverty and pestilence continue unabated”

(The Economist 2000). Eleven years later, another article by *The Economist* used the phrases “Africa rising,” “strong economic performance,” and “increasing resilience to shocks” to describe the same continent (Mozambique-IMF Conference 2014; The Economist 2011). Between 2002 and 2012, the Sub-Saharan African countries averaged 5.8% growth rates per year; this period of economic growth served as the cornerstone of the “Africa rising” narrative. Given the fact that most of Africa’s militaries are too weak to assert any kind of influence in the global space, an increase in economic heft proves to be one attractive alternative to assert influence. Indeed, Africa’s economic growth has served as a primary factor in its assertion of its global agency.

Of course, the contemporary “Africa rising” narrative greatly disguises the heterogeneity of economic and social performance in the region, the region’s volatility to the world economic system, and hence, individual countries’ relationships with the World Bank. For instance, Africa’s GDP fell to 3.7% in 2015, the lowest since 2009. Lower revenues, particularly among oil producers, has increased fiscal deficits. Debt, of which a large portion is accrued from non-concessional loans, is also rising among some countries, including Ghana and Zambia. Moreover, social tensions in countries such as Burundi and slower growth in China and in other major trading partners all place the African region in an economically vulnerable position (World Bank 2015c). Additionally, while the share of the African population in extreme poverty did decline from 57% in 1990 to 43% in 2012, the number of people living in extreme poverty still increased by more than 100 million due to the rapid expansion of the population during that time (Beegle et al. 2016). For many African countries, this means engaging with the World Bank to either access financial products at below market rates or technical assistance to develop policy buffers to these shocks (Donnan 2016).

The implication is that while African countries have made strides in the global economic system, their social and economic vulnerabilities continue to shape their relationship with the World Bank. As such, this complexity of Africa’s economic and social growth serves as a source of and inhibitor to Africa’s agency.

CONCLUSION

African foreign policymaking toward the World Bank in the twenty-first century will not be marked with African countries being viewed as the “other” or “on the periphery,” as has been typical of the continent’s

treatment in IR discourse. As this chapter highlights, the World Bank–Africa relationship will need to be reconfigured to reflect current realities: (i) a more visible Global South in the world economic system; (ii) growing heterogeneity in the development financing landscape; and (iii) an emerging Sub-Saharan Africa where strong economic and social development are no longer anomalies.

For the World Bank, these realities mean continuing to vigorously address the voice and accountability imbalances that currently exist in its governance structure. In order to remain politically legitimate, and relevant to a growing Global South, the Bank has to better reflect the current configuration of the global economic system.

The changing development financing landscape presents an opportunity for the World Bank to offer new products that reflect Africa’s changing economic and social landscape. On the other hand, it is incumbent upon African governments to develop the institutional capacity to analyze the various lending instruments available to them, and to properly assess which kinds of instruments are most prudent. Utilizing private capital and other sources of financing sends a political statement that a country does not have to solely rely on institutions such as the World Bank. This is important given the fact that institutions such as the World Bank are still viewed as being colonial in nature.

The Africa–World Bank relationship of the twenty-first century will be characterized as one of rebalancing, where African country clients are accorded more autonomy and agency in determining the types of World Bank products they need. The World Bank will have to structure its way of doing business to recognize it is now one of many players in this development financing space.

NOTES

1. At the time, there were three continental African country members: Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Africa (Kapur et al. 1997).
2. However, these figures also include Caribbean nationals.

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South Africa's Foreign Policy and the International Criminal Court: Of African Lessons, Security Council Reform, and Possibilities for an Improved ICC

Max Du Plessis and Christopher Gevers

South Africa's early support for the idea of a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) is well known. In particular, its influence at Rome in 1998, where states came together to draft the Statute for the ICC, has been chronicled widely and admired deservedly. It was thus to be expected that South Africa would become a party to the Court's Statute and scheme. On 17 July 1998, South Africa signed and ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC. And in order to give effect to its obligations under the Rome Statute, South Africa passed in its domestic law the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC Act 27 of 2002 ('*ICC Act*'). The ICC, based in The Hague, and dedicated to the

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prosecution of crimes against humanity, genocide and war crimes, has now been operating for nearly 15 years. Despite its early support for the ICC, in October 2016 South Africa decided to withdraw from the Statute and repeal the ICC Act. The withdrawal has been successfully challenged in the South African courts (see the Judgment of the High Court of South Africa in *Democratic Alliance v Minister of International Relations and Cooperation and Others (Council for the Advancement of the South African Constitution Intervening)* ('the Judgment').¹ And so—for now—South Africa remains a party to the ICC. But the attempted withdrawal by South Africa (alongside Burundi and The Gambia—who took their own steps to withdraw) has sent shockwaves through the court and its member states. For Africa, the rejection of the ICC by one of its core members was a clear expression of the continent's concerns with the court. It has forced others, not always with innocent motives, to reconsider their own position towards the court and to evaluate how important their membership was and whether to remain accorded with their own political calculus.

For scholars of international law, the story begins promisingly with the adoption of the South African Constitution in 1996, and ratification of the Rome Statute in 2000 and the adoption by South Africa of the ICC Act in 2002 (the first ICC 'implementing legislation' adopted by an African state). The storm begins in 2008, when the ICC issued an arrest warrant for President al-Bashir of Sudan, which the African (AU) (and South Africa with it) immediately opposed, and conditions only worsened with the arrest warrants for Libya's Muammar Gaddafi and high-profile Kenyan Uhuru Kenyatta (later the President and Deputy President). Through this journey, South Africa has gradually loosened its commitment to international law and ultimately sought to repudiate it through its efforts to withdraw from the Rome Statute, in essence, seeking to leave the ICC.² For international relations scholars, the focus of this chapter is not only on the ICC as an international organization with which African states conduct foreign policies. Instead, it tracks South Africa's approach to the ICC from the idealism of President Mandela to the realism of Presidents Mbeki and Zuma (if not cynicism, at least as regards Zuma's conduct).

In the main, we argue that South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy commitment to the dual foreign policy pillars of human rights multilateralism has been complicated in the case of its relationship with the ICC for three reasons, mostly caused by shifts in the global legal

environment: the shift to criminal law in global human rights discourse; the ICC's creeping cosmopolitanism; and the perpetual ignoring of African exclusion from the UNSC. The chapter proceeds in three main parts. First, we offer an overview of how South Africa's foreign policy developed in the aftermath of the end of apartheid in 1994, with ideals that would have ostensibly supported a strong, long-term commitment to the ICC. Second, we detail the three phenomena that we believe were at the heart of the abandonment of South Africa's foreign policy principles, leading to the contemporary impasse we see today. A final conclusion section ends with four policy suggestions that we believe will bring the ICC–South Africa relationship back from the brink.

SOUTH AFRICA'S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND 'SOFT POWER'

In a much-celebrated article in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993, Nelson Mandela declared that “[h]uman rights will be the light that guides our foreign affairs” (Mandela 1993). Within international relations scholarship, this is often highlighted as the opening chapter in the story of South Africa's commitment to human rights in its foreign policy and subsequent decline, from Mandela's idealism to Mbeki's realism (continued under Zuma). However, a more complex account of South Africa's policy choices is required, one that goes beyond the hagiography of Mandela. To be sure, this widely shared narrative suffers two complications. First, Mandela didn't write the 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article, which was written by a group of academics (Graham 2012). Second, South Africa's foreign policy under Mandela was not solely idealist, and it contained a fair amount of realism (e.g. in its relations with Cuba or China) (Spence 1996). Similarly, Mbeki was an idealist in many senses (Lipton 2009). To these, one might add that the *Foreign Affairs* article was about more than just idealist ‘human rights’ and called for reforms to the UN (and the Security Council in particular—a call which would be of particular salience years later in respect of the ICC's work in Africa) and the global trade regime.

What is clear is that South Africa's ‘soft power’ after the demise of apartheid was the result of a number of factors, chief amongst them the international status and influence of Nelson Mandela, South Africa's struggle history, its ‘miracle’ transition, and the values enshrined in [the] Constitution (Smith 2012). South Africa was readmitted to the international system. The ‘political miracle’ experienced by the country gave it special status in

the eyes of the international community. As such it was able, under the leadership of President Mandela, to ‘punch above its weight’ in diplomatic relations (Graham 2008).

The foreign policy advantage, and the ideals of the new democratic government, would have ostensibly supported a strong, long-term commitment to the ICC. But not just any ICC. As already the Mandela *Foreign Affairs* article suggested in 1993, South Africa’s concern was to use its influence to ensure an improved and more equal international system that served the interests of the Global South.

REVOLUTIONARY MULTILATERALISM

After some initial stumbles, South Africa’s foreign policy is said to have taken a ‘multilateralist turn’ around the same time that the Rome Statute of the ICC was adopted (Van Wyk 2012). In this regard, the ICC heralded a globally important moment, of states coming together to form a permanent criminal court to prosecute those—including heads of state and other senior officials—who committed the world’s worst crimes. With its own history of oppression and human rights violations, and ‘apartheid’ listed as one of the crimes the court could prosecute, a new democratic South Africa would eagerly join those who championed the work of the ICC.

In substance, South Africa’s multilateralism was ambitious and took two forms. The first was a *global* multilateralism, which saw South Africa take leading roles in the United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Group of 77 and China, and the Commonwealth (Monyae 2012). This was characterized by a reform agenda from the outset, aiming—in the words of President Mandela—to “enable the developing countries to put on the world agenda the issues of concern to our peoples and to participate more effectively in fashioning the new world order.”³

The second was a *regional* multilateralism, where South Africa took up its ‘African destiny,’ a ‘neat coincidence of sentiment and interest (Spence 1996).’ This too had a reformist agenda from the outset. What began as a project of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) reform quickly turned into a continent-wide institutional revolution to transform the existing African continental institutions—the outmoded Organization of African Unity—into the significantly more ambitious AU, revitalized Southern African Development Community (SADC), and institutionalized NEPAD (the latter being Mbeki’s ‘pet project’, the New Partnership for African Development). If South Africa could not act alone, it was going to make sure

it took the lead in acting together and took a key role in the design, funding, operationalization and agenda-setting at the new AU. Underpinning this regional multilateralism was the idea of an 'African renaissance.'

These two projects began to coincide when, encouraged by a global turn to regionalism, the project of reforming the universal soon became about replacing them at a regional level. The most appropriate of this was the project to supplement (and now, given South Africa's attempted withdrawal from the ICC—replace) the ICC with a regional international criminal wing of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (Du Plessis 2012).

The point of reviewing South Africa's early commitment to multilateralism is twofold: the first is to underscore that South Africa's multilateralism was both regional and revolutionary from the outset, and necessary. The second is to demonstrate how the conditions that gave rise to this commitment were both defensive and offensive. It was defensive in that it was as much about allaying fears relating to the past—of apartheid interventionism and Eurocentricism—and its possible 'Big Brother' status on the continent. It was offensive in that increasingly, along with its iconic human rights status, South Africa's soft power became less about its international 'miracle' story of transition and more about its role as a bridge to the rest of the world, first the global North but more recently the 'emerging powers' of the global South. In this regard, Smith notes that 'South Africa's power has come to be from 'the image of South Africa as a champion of the causes of Africa and the developing world' and 'its bridge-building role between North and South (Smith 2012).'

THE ICC AND SOUTH AFRICA TODAY: IT'S COMPLICATED

Even with these 'complications' of South Africa's foreign policy after 1994, its decision to support the establishment of the ICC in 1998 remains unsurprising. The fine contours of South Africa's human rights and multilateralism agenda—the two pillars of its foreign policy, including to IOs—can be seen in the short opening address by the head of its diplomatic delegation, Minister of Justice Dullah Omar, to the Plenary. After acknowledging that the ICC's establishment would not only combat human rights violations but also contribute towards the attainment of international peace, he was quick to make the link between South Africa's recent past and the court's work, noting that the crime of apartheid demanded a 'clear message' from the international community that 'gross human rights violations would not go unpunished' (the ongoing

Truth and Reconciliation Process (TRC) notwithstanding).⁴ He proceeded to highlight the need for an ‘independent and impartial body’ (unfettered by the Security Council), with ‘inherent jurisdiction’ over international crimes, that would ‘complement...national criminal justice systems.’ Moreover, he ‘reiterated the basic principle that the court should contribute to furthering the integrity of states generally, as well as the equality of states within the general principles of international law.’ In an early triumph of multilateralism, he made these remarks ‘on behalf of the SADC.’

Already in that opening statement then, we can foresee the seeds for South Africa’s disillusionment with the ICC of today. The distance between then and now is the result of three developments at the international level. The first is a shift in human rights generally, where the ICC was both a protagonist and beneficiary. This shift might be noted as a criminal turn from ‘peace versus justice’ to ‘no peace without justice’ or (accommodating, mediating) transitional justice to (absolutist) anti-impunity. The second is a move from a moderate compromise to a supranational cosmopolitanism. These two developments are related to a third, which is to turn a blind eye to the urgent need for reform of global institutions like the Security Council. Each of these three *international* facets, which help to explain South Africa’s departure from the ICC, is detailed below. In doing so, we do not discount a very important *domestic* factor, which at least in part may have fuelled the departure. That domestic factor is President Zuma himself—a compromised man who has reason to fear accountability mechanisms. President Jacob Zuma is under extraordinary domestic pressure following multiple corruption scandals, widespread social unrest and a historically poor performance by the ANC in recent local elections. Thus, seasoned political commentators at the time of the withdrawal noted that the motivation therefore was probably political rather than legal, being inextricably linked to the president’s own domestic issues. As Allison and Du Plessis write, perceptively⁵:

‘Zuma wants to shift the national narrative away from his own controversies. These include (but are not limited to) the public protector’s investigation into undue influence wielded by a prominent business family, the Guptas, over functions of the state; the turf war between the finance minister, the revenue collection agency and the president for control of the treasury; and the nationwide student protests in support of free tertiary education.’

Zuma's domestic, political, reasons for abjuring the ICC must thus be understood alongside the international factors we now consider. Those international drivers are important to consider, but in doing so repeatedly the question must be asked: to what extent are they a useful foil for Zuma's, and hence South Africa's, real reasons for withdrawing from the ICC?

THE 'CRIMINAL TURN' IN HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSE: INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AS A TRUMP TO AFRICAN PEACE AND AMNESTIES?

In the contemporary human rights community, the obligation to prosecute atrocities is regarded as or trumpeted as absolute, (Engle 2015) and 'the correspondence between criminal prosecution and human rights has become so ingrained that expressing opposition to any particular international prosecution is sometimes seen as anti-human rights (Engle 2015).'

The human rights community's 'turn to criminal law'⁷—which might be told as the move from the TRC to the ICC⁶—can be criticized on legal and policy grounds,⁷ but the point is that in 1998 the situation was different. Back then, as South Africa was struggling to emerge from its apartheid past, there was a 'not uncommon understanding at the time that criminal prosecutions were in conflict with goals of truth and peace, as well as forgiveness (Engle 2015).'

This was exemplified by the TRC which was not only tolerated but also celebrated. Moreover, this was expressly acknowledged at Rome on account of the efforts by the South African delegation to include an amnesty exception for the court, where 'some regarded it as representative of an instance where the ICC should refrain from prosecution (Engle 2015).'

In 1998, Kofi Annan declared⁸:

The purpose of the [complementarity] clause in the Statute is to ensure that mass-murderers and other arch-criminals cannot shelter behind a state run by themselves or their cronies, or take advantage of a general breakdown of law and order. *No one should imagine that it would apply to a case like South Africa's*, where the regime and the conflict which caused the crimes have come to an end, and the victims have inherited power. It is inconceivable that, in such a case, the court would seek to substitute its judgement for that of a whole nation which is seeking the best way to put a traumatic past behind it and build a better future.

Two years later, in 2000, South Africa's Minister of Education, Kadar Asmal (in a lecture given to the 'American Society of International Law') reflected on transitional justice and the difficulties of judicial intervention 'by [a] national or supranational judicial authority' can pose 'for those societies that have undergone political transition and in so doing have enacted amnesty arrangements that foreclose the possibility of prosecutions.'⁹ He placed these debates squarely within the context of the recently adopted Rome Statute. While acknowledging the role of the international community to intervene individually or collectively when a state 'is itself unable to prosecute' international crimes, he noted that states and international bodies should defer to a state's wishes when it 'declines to prosecute past despots as a result of a democratic, conscious, public decision widely seen as fundamental to the implementation of democracy (Asmal 2000).' He proceeded to set out requirements such deferrals should take place, drawing on the Rome Statute¹⁰ (to articulate a reading that would permit amnesty).¹¹ He ended with a rebuke of sorts, noting that 'those who advocate the prosecution of human rights abusers in all contexts as an absolute rule misstate the actual requirements of international law (Asmal 2000).'

From today's perspective, Asmal's comments will be seen by some as conservative, and in his conclusion that '[d]eference should be accorded the domestic society's transitional arrangements, on the basis...of the principle of national sovereignty' as an unfortunate precursor to South Africa's 'fall from [idealist] grace.'¹² However, Asmal's intervention came at a time when 'human rights activists and international legal scholars [still] actively disagreed over whether justice (meaning criminal justice) should take priority over truth and peace, primarily in the context of transitional regimes (Engle 2015).'

As Engle points out, such debates—between 'peace' (and truth) and 'justice'¹³—have since been largely forgotten, giving way to the hard-line 'no peace without justice' moniker that predominates today (Engle 2015). In the process, the arguments for peace first, and Asmal's cautions, have largely been displaced. But within Africa, and particularly for states (and their officials) that are themselves seeking to displace (or undermine) the work of the ICC, there is a renewed insistence on peace processes. For example, and while distinguishable from the South African experience to varying degrees, arguments of this sort have been raised by the AU in respect of both the ICC's proceedings in Sudan¹⁴ and Kenya—with little to no purchase, and exacerbating tensions between

the ICC and the AU. And notable too is that South Africa, in advancing its reasons for withdrawing from the ICC, has reclaimed the argument that the ICC's strict insistence on ignoring the immunities that ordinarily shield heads of state from prosecution frustrates South Africa's efforts as a facilitator of peace processes on the continent.

THE ICC'S 'CREEPING COSMOPOLITANISM': CREEPING TOWARDS CONFLICT WITH AFRICAN STATES

The global human rights discourse's prioritizing of prosecutions over peace processes and amnesties, as detailed above, overlapped with and arguably accelerated the increased attention to and faith in criminal justice systems, particularly the ICC (Engle 2015). Thus emboldened, since 1998 the ICC gradually adopted a more ambitious construction of its relationship with states than that agreed to in Rome: from a 'watchdog' role rooted in state consent and according primacy to a state's domestic views regarding criminal prosecutions, to the court encouraging an understanding of its primacy over the states and their national jurisdictions, with, if necessary, a concomitant power and authority to intervene in the domain of domestic affairs (McAuliffe 2014). While these policy shifts on the part of the court remain debatable (from a legal and policy perspective), the more immediate point is that they represent a 'conscious choice' (McAuliffe 2014) by the ICC and its supporters to move away from the delicate balance struck at Rome between traditional statism and cosmopolitan supranationalism (McAuliffe 2014).

Amongst the 'sovereignty-conscious states' was South Africa. As Dullah Omar noted in his opening speech on behalf of South Africa and SADC, the support for the ICC was not only predicated on a 'complementary' relationship with 'national criminal justice systems', but it was desired so that the 'court should contribute to furthering the integrity of states generally, as well as the equality of states within the general principles of international law.' As we shall now see, the ICC's work, particularly in the shadow of the Security Council, has been perceived in Africa—and at least portrayed by the AU—as deeply divisive. It has given certain African states, including South Africa, the opportunity to highlight how the international community continues to operate on the basis of an *inequality* of states. And concomitantly, it is *the ICC* that has been accused of lacking in integrity and by the AU attacked as an institution with compromised legitimacy.

THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND ITS POWERS IN THE ICC: A PERENNIAL AFRICAN CONCERN BROUGHT HOME

While the ICC has made strides towards transcending its statist limitations, it has done little to resist the ‘Great Power’ politics that were incorporated into the Rome Statute in the form of the Security Council’s power of referral and deferral of cases to the ICC. Indeed, the problems of the Security Council have been brought acutely home to the African continent through the work of the ICC, confirming for African states the skewed nature of power distribution within the UNSC. The Council is empowered under the Rome Statute to refer atrocities to the court for prosecution, even in respect of situations involving states that are not a party to the ICC. Because of the Council’s legitimacy deficit, many African and other developing countries see its work as ‘a cynical exercise of authority by great powers’, (Schabas 2010) in particular, the P-5. The Council’s engagement with the ICC since the Rome Statute that created the court became operative has exacerbated rather than softened those impressions (Schabas 2010)—with the P-5 referring the situations in Sudan and Libya to the court for investigation and prosecution, but using their power to avoid referrals of other deserving cases, including in Syria and Palestine. The result is that the uneven political landscape of the post-World War II collective security regime has infected the work of the ICC, some contend fatally.

The ICC (and in particular its Prosecutors) did little to allay these concerns. When they complained about the effects of the proceedings against al-Bashir on the peace process in Sudan, the (then) Prosecutor ‘told them that was not really his problem’ and told them to approach the Security Council (where the USA had already threatened to veto their request) (Schabas 2010). Schabas notes:

Now the wheel had turned, and the court’s work was being shackled to the priorities of the Security Council, with all that this entails, including the veto. The dream of a new institution that would be independent of the old system, in which all states would play an equal role, and whose work would be directed by a genuinely independent and impartial prosecutor, seemed to be going sour. This was looking increasingly like a case of “same old, same old (Schabas 2010).”

Moreover, Schabas argues that ‘the ICC has now become far too deferential to the established order,’ noting¹⁵:

Mostly it does not operate under a direct mandate from the Security Council, but that may be more illusory than real, because it never strays from the comfort zone of the permanent members. Despite the Rome Statute, the court marches in lock step with the permanent members.

Supporters of the ICC might well respond to the ‘turn to criminal law’ and its ‘creeping cosmopolitanism’ as a good thing, while diminishing the objections to the court’s relationship with the Security Council as a ‘necessary evil.’ Truth be told, advocates of the ICC are notoriously impervious to criticism.¹⁶ However, the simple point is that all three represent conscious policy decisions on the part of the court and its supporters, and that collectively they have been used by South Africa to contend that the conditions under which its support for the ICC in 1998 made policy sense have been undermined.

CONCLUSION

So much for how we got to this point, for those who support the ICC’s work *in principle* (which, it must be remembered, South Africa did enthusiastically at one point), the pressing question is, *pace* Lenin: “What is to be done?”

The attempted withdrawal from the ICC by South Africa has brought South African and African foreign policy concerns to the fore and highlighted unresolved tensions and fault-lines between the global South and the Security Council and its permanent members. For Africa, the rejection of the court by one of its core members was a clear expression of the continent’s concerns with the court, particularly the sticky issue of the court’s selectivity and the question of immunities for senior officials.

But most importantly, South Africa’s attempt to remove itself from the ICC system was a squandered opportunity to show leadership and to use its influence within the court to help assuage concerns about the work of the ICC and to help build a stronger, more credible and more universal sort of court. Since South Africa’s withdrawal from the ICC has been set aside by the South African High Court, there remains a chance for South Africa to continue working to improve the ICC from within and to help set the agenda of that institution—particularly under new leadership once President Zuma’s term ends.

There are several options available, which have been written about elsewhere, which are not mutually exclusive (Du Plessis 2017). The first

is to engage with other states Parties to reform the referral process by which the ICC is given competence by the UNSC over certain situations, in particular those pertaining to non-states Parties. The fear of politicized and opportunistic referrals by the Council as well as the financial burden placed upon the court that result from these referrals should be carefully considered by the court and its organs to ensure that it is not doing anyone else's business but its own. In Africa alone, 34 countries have ratified the Rome Statute; if coordinated, their joint effort would represent the most powerful bloc within the treaty system. Others might join with similar concerns.

The second line of work for a re-motivated South African Government would be to help the court dispel a sense—justified in part—that the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has been overly selective in the cases that it was willing to entertain. The known argument of the OTP, that it is also concerned with non-African situations which are under preliminary examination, cannot fool one for long. Preliminary examinations are not an end in themselves. Nor should situations remain in that state of limbo (read: Colombia; Palestine; Afghanistan) as advocacy tools for the OTP to explain away its clear African focus when it comes to prosecutions. Again, South Africa could lead the pack of states that genuinely want a court that is liberated of its political shackles and which puts its resources where its mouth is: towards prosecuting suspected war criminals regardless of nationality and political friendships.

The third worthy line of efforts should focus on the issue of immunities. South Africa (and others) will have to accept that immunities provide no defence or no bar to jurisdiction before the court. At the same time, the ICC will have to accept that the outstanding legal uncertainties surrounding Head of state immunity should be resolved, perhaps by referring the dispute to a third-party institution, such as the International Court of Justice for resolution, or by an interpretative declaration acceptable by states and the ICC, probably best achieved through the Assembly of States Parties.

The fourth proposed course of action for South Africa is one that would see it and others take on the UNSC. First, it should insist that where the Council intends to remove immunities from state officials as part of a referral, it should do so unambiguously. That has not been done thus far, which has greatly contributed to the lack of clarity around the issue before the ICC. When dealing with Africa, the Council must also improve its consultation process with African states and the AU in

relation to ICC matters. South Africa is ideally suited to contribute to this process of reform and to serve as a bridgehead. This would also provide a worthy entry point to another important South African endeavour: UNSC reform. Unless the Council is reformed to build impartiality and neutrality in its referral practice, it will continue to contribute to a view that referrals by the Security Council are sinister political ploys rather than part of an effort at achieving universal accountability for mass atrocities.

These are difficult questions that also have a bearing on governance and South Africa's foreign policy direction, because of the tension between its international and regional commitments and goals. In the light of the al-Bashir saga and the acute tensions that have arisen in regard thereto, their answers can no longer be stalled. That is because of a simple but profound point that should be clear to both international lawyers and international relations theorists, which is this: how the final chapter in South Africa's foreign affairs and ICC Odyssey is written is not only of importance to South Africa. The legal, policy and institutional questions and answers implicate and affect African states and non-African states alike, the ICC, the Security Council, and the AU. They too will be acting in and watching as the chapter finally unfolds.

NOTES

1. (83145/2016) [2017] ZAGPPHC 53 (22 February 2017). See <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2017/53.html>.
2. On 19 October 2016, the Government deposited a formal Notice with the Secretary General of the United Nations to withdraw South Africa from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. This followed the government's rebuke by its courts for its failure to arrest President al-Bashir of Sudan (the subject of an ICC Arrest Warrant) when he attended a summit in Johannesburg in June 2015. See *Southern Africa Litigation Centre v Minister of Justice And Constitutional Development and Others* and *Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others v Southern African Litigation Centre and Others* 2016 (3) SA 317 (SCA).
3. 'Report by the president of the ANC Nelson Mandela (1997)'. The 1997 ANC Discussion Document also listed, as 'a key challenge and practical task', the need to 'contest established power relations in a range of international forums' and (more specifically) 'prioritising the

- democratisation and expansion of membership of the United Nations Security Council’.
4. Records, Volume II, p. 65.
 5. ‘ICC withdrawal: a new low in Zuma’s rule’, Simon Allison and Anton du Plessis, available at <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/icc-withdrawal-a-new-low-in-zumas-rule>.
 6. The ‘no (lasting) peace without justice’ position was formerly endorsed at the ICC’s 2010 Review Conference. See Kampala Declaration, RC/Decl.1, pmbl. (1 June 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Decl.1-ENG.pdf.
 7. Engle, for example, questions the ‘unsupported or even unstated assumption that the turn to criminal prosecution is a clear success for the human rights movement’, arguing that it leads to individualization and decontextualization of conflicts, undermines efforts at economic restructuring and redress, aligns them with the state (the traditional antagonist of human rights organizations) and produces incomplete histories of conflict (Karen Engle 2015).
 8. Kofi Annan, Speech at the Witwatersrand University Graduation Ceremony (1 September 1998).
 9. He (Kadar Asmal 2000) cautioned that ‘our human rights experience should be the starting point of all discussions, whether in relation to Africa or beyond’, and aimed to ‘situate the South African experience within...[the] global context’. Ibid.
 10. These were (1) ‘the crimes for which conviction is sought reach a certain threshold’, (2) ‘victims of the atrocities [should] support outside measures to prosecute and punish’, (3) ‘the state in which the atrocities occurred must be seen to have no credible plans to prosecute and punish those responsible for the human rights abuses’ and (4) ‘prosecution must stand a real chance of working, that is, of delivering justice (Kadar Asmal 2000)’.
 11. Noting that the ICC should defer to national authorities when ‘other arrangements are in place for addressing the crimes of the past (Kadar Asmal 2000)’.
 12. Asmal was quick to add that he was not referring to ‘outdated’ statist notions of sovereignty, but a ‘reconfigured’ version based on ‘people’s right to self-determination (Kadar Asmal 2000)’.
 13. For his part, Asmal argued for an expanded understanding of ‘justice’ that went beyond ‘the staging of formalistic practices of prosecution and punishment’, and would embrace ‘conditional amnesties (Kadar Asmal 2000)’.
 14. In its press release following the 3 July 2009 decision in Sirte, the AU explained that its decision ‘bears testimony to the glaring reality that the

situation in Darfur is too serious and complex an issue to be resolved without recourse to an harmonized approach to justice and peace, neither of which should be pursued at the expense of the other’.

15. He (William A. Schabas 2013) adds: ‘That large rich states seem to tire of international justice should not be the primary preoccupation....The real concern should be with the loss of enthusiasm for the court in Africa and elsewhere in the South.’
16. Shortly after its establishment, Megret complained that ‘[p]roponents of a strong ICC often seem to join arguments with the moral fervour of the neophyte, at times providing no better reason as to why the ICC might come into being than the fact that it should (Frederic Megret 2001)’.

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The International Labor Organization and African States: Internationalizing States and Dispersed Foreign Policy

Nick Bernards

The International Labour Organization (ILO) is probably the international organization with the longest history of activity in Sub-Saharan Africa, dating to debates in the 1920s about forced labour in colonial territories (Maul 2012; Daughton 2013). That the ILO would hold this distinction is, on the surface, rather odd. The ILO and the longer running project of international labour regulation, out of which the ILO emerged, are primarily directed towards the problems of ‘social peace’ in industrial economies. The ILO’s earliest ideas about ‘development,’ moreover, were developed in close conjunction with colonial authorities, particularly in the British Colonial Office (see: Maul 2012).

It is something of a puzzle, then, that the ILO’s activities in Africa have persisted throughout the post-colonial period despite frequent misalignments between its objectives and those of African states. The ILO has largely failed to reflect the priorities of African states, so we should expect to see it largely marginalized. Yet, the organization’s practical

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activity in Sub-Saharan Africa persists. The ILO's African operations are even expanding. African countries have signed on to the ILO's 'Decent Work Country Programmes' (DWCPs, discussed below) in large numbers, and the ILO continues to operate development projects in the region across a growing range of policy areas (see: Bernards 2016; Kpessa and Beland 2012).

In order to explain this puzzle, I draw on a critical reading of Robert Cox's (1987) conception of the 'internationalizing of the state,' highlighting the interpenetration of state institutions with international agencies in response to shifting balances of internal and external political forces. I argue that the corollary of this 'internationalizing' is that 'foreign policy,' as such, is often a dispersed and diffuse phenomenon. African states' relations with IOs are carried out on an everyday basis by a variety of agencies and in pursuit of a complex set of objectives that are often dictated by 'internal' political struggles. I refer to this set of dynamics as 'dispersed foreign policy.' In order to support this argument, I draw on an analysis of African engagements with two relatively high-profile ILO initiatives: Kenya's interaction with the World Employment Programme (WEP) in the 1970s, and South Africa's 'tripartite' institutions under the Decent Work Agenda (DWA) from 1999-present. These are, of course, very different cases. However, the fact that some common dynamics are evident between Kenya in the 1970s and contemporary South Africa suggests that they should be more widely applicable as well (or, at the very least, are worth exploring).

INTERNATIONALIZING STATES, AFRICAN AGENCY, AND DISPERSED FOREIGN POLICY

Thirty years ago, Robert Cox made note of a process he described as the 'internationalizing of the state'—by which he meant the 'reshaping of specific state structures in accordance with the overall international political structure.' Cox argued that this process was 'brought about by a combination of external pressures... and realignments of internal power relations among domestic social groups' (1987: 253). Part of this process, Cox argued, involved the formation of increasingly close articulations between the institutional structures of 'national' states and 'international' agencies. I argue here that this concept of the 'internationalizing state' is valuable insofar as it calls attention to (1) the diffuse interpenetration of state structures with 'international' agencies and

(2) the close connection between such state forms and political struggles over broader structures of production and accumulation. Cox also usefully highlights the contested nature of the ‘internationalizing’ state, noting that ‘the further it advances, the more it provokes counter-tendencies sustained by domestic social groups that have been disadvantaged’ (1987: 253).

Cox’s account suffers from three related shortcomings. First, his conception of the ‘internationalizing state’ overemphasizes the disciplinary power of international regimes over individual states, at the expense of the agency of African and other developing states. Third World states, he suggested, were compelled by foreign exchange or debt crises to adopt policy frameworks conducive to global structures of accumulation and production—a process that ‘also determined internal political structures’ because these frameworks could only be carried through ‘by regimes willing and able to use force to carry through unpopular economic policies’ (1987: 264). As Bayart (2000) notes, however, African elites have long engaged in ‘strategies of extraversion’ that have aimed to structure relations to the ‘external’ world in ways that reinforce power relations in ‘internal’ political economies. Second, and relatedly, if in the theory Cox assigns relatively equal weight to ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors in shaping the particular state forms emerging out of the process of ‘internationalizing,’ in practice he gives much more emphasis to the latter—particularly when it comes to ‘Third World’ states. Finally, Cox probably overstates the coherence of the external political forces facing national states. In many instances, developing country governments in particular are faced with a highly plural landscape of international institutions and potential donors. Opportunities to pick and choose resources from different organizations are quite common. The upshot of all three of these weaknesses is that Cox’s approach is not always sufficiently attentive to the particular struggles through which ‘internationalizing’ states act.

Still, if we take seriously the idea of the ‘internationalizing’ state, it has important methodological implications for the study of foreign policy towards IOs. Most importantly, it forces us to pay attention to (1) the diverse, everyday relations between (African) states and IOs and (2) the ways in which these interactions are shaped by power struggles between social forces ‘internal’ to African states. International institutions, in short, are entwined with the everyday life of the state—indeed, often with ministries that have little to do with ‘foreign policy’ in the

conventional sense (especially ministries of labour in the case of the ILO). Important functions are often carried out in conjunction with international agencies, and IOs often have particularly close involvement in particular ministries or committees. Moreover, the ‘foreign policy’ of states towards IOs in such settings is often dictated by a diversity of concerns driven by the alignments of ‘internal’ political and economic forces. Cox’s framework is particularly useful in this respect insofar as it calls attention to the entwinement of state structures with broader structures of production and accumulation.

The internationalizing state, in short, can be expected to carry out a kind of ‘dispersed foreign policy.’ African states have consistently sought to turn their interactions with the ILO to support strategic goals that have been dictated by ‘internal’ political alignments. These engagements have largely been carried out by a range of government and quasi-state agencies with a little connection to conventional foreign policy. These dynamics, I argue, explain why the ILO’s role in Sub-Saharan Africa has persisted despite its seeming disconnect from African foreign policy concerns. I flesh out this argument with a pair of brief case studies. The first examines Kenya’s interactions with the ILO’s WEP in the 1970s, and the second examines contemporary South Africa’s engagements with ‘Decent Work.’

KENYA AND THE WORLD EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME

Many ILO officials locate the genesis of WEP in the ‘discovery’ that without widespread employment, economic growth did not necessarily lead to ‘development’ in the sense of greater human well-being (see: Saith 2005: 1168; Bangasser 2000: 5; Morse 1968: 519–520). The value of promoting ‘employment’ is hard to dispute. So is the basic fact that rapid economic growth in the decade following decolonization had produced little in the way of ‘development’ for most Africans. But the *how* of employment promotion can have serious distributional implications. Public infrastructure projects are radically different in their implications, for instance, from efforts to create employment in low-skill, low-wage sectors by downgrading labour standards. ‘Employment,’ as such, is a vague objective that can mask a good deal of potential conflict.

Kenya in the early 1970s seemed to exemplify very clearly the problem of ‘employment’ that WEP had identified. Kenya had managed to achieve rapid rates of growth in the decade following its independence from Britain,

but it was not at all clear that the benefits of this growth were reaching the vast majority of the population. In practice though, sorting through the implicit political struggles in Kenya involved a series of complex and ongoing entwinements between the Kenyan government and the ILO.

The mission took place in a context where the state sought increasing control over economic decision-making and where the ILO sought to avoid ‘politicizing’ the issue of employment. This point may be underlined by tracing in more detail the ways in which the report fits into debates in Kenya about labour and development. Kenya’s Central Organization of Trade Unions (COTU) had been formed in 1965 after the government dissolved the Kenya Federation of Labour (KFL) and the rival Kenyan African Workers’ Congress. The KFL had split over a combination of personal disagreements among the leadership of the KFL and interlinked questions of international affiliation and the ‘political’ independence of trade unions. Amsden, writing in 1971, noted that “it is clear that Kenya’s trade union movement is no longer free to participate in opposition politics. With this avenue of activity blocked, COTU’s new administration has taken the path of least resistance” (1971: 118). Trade unions, indeed, were identified as a major source of unemployment in the 1970 report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Unemployment in 1970—high levels of wage disparity between urban and rural areas, partly “as a result of the trade union activities” were blamed for excessive rural–urban migration and the resort of capital to labour-saving technologies (Republic of Kenya 1970: 3). The report recommended wage-restraint policies in urban areas (1970: 8). The broader point is that the basic problem facing the WEP mission was how to address inequality in a ‘non-political’ manner, relying on policy reforms managed by the state rather than driven by trade unions or other independent political organizations.

The concept of the ‘informal,’ though not the invention of the ILO, did the job brilliantly. The mission’s employment plan for Kenya highlighted the ‘exclusion’ of most of the population from the ‘modern’ economy (recast as the ‘formal sector’) and put its primary emphasis on ‘linking’ the formal and informal sectors:

Our strategy of a redistribution from growth aims at *establishing links that are at present absent* between the formal and informal sectors... The various policies which we recommend... are intended to reduce risk and uncertainty on the part of those employed in the informal sector and to

ensure a dynamic growth of this large segment of the Kenyan economy (ILO 1972: 7, emphasis added).

Emphasizing the ‘creation’ of linkages ‘that are at present absent’ obscured the relational aspects of poverty and the power dynamics involved. The idea that the ‘informal’ was central to the creation of employment also closed down the active role allotted to workers in the development process. Indeed, while the report did briefly discuss the role of trade unions in agriculture (ILO 1972: 259), it had little or nothing to say about the possibility of organizing workers in the informal economy to have any kind of voice in policymaking, whether into existing union structures or independently. WEP, then, not only depoliticized urban poverty, but also contributed to the marginalization of labour as an oppositional political voice.

The usefulness of this particular framing of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ work in the context of ongoing struggles over the political organization of labour, much more so than any specific policies proposed by the WEP mission, explains the report’s impact in Kenya. Partly in response to the WEP report, the Kenyan government did undertake some limited reforms. The Kenyan government published Sessional Paper 10 on employment in 1973, addressing the report (Republic of Kenya 1973). While most of the report was accepted ‘in principle,’ few of the ILO’s specific recommendations were actually implemented. The Kenyan government’s commitment to equality between formal and informal workers seems particularly questionable in the light of some of the recommended reforms that were *not* pursued: e.g. a progressive land tax and limits on individual landholding; the ending of demolition of slum housing (and consequently of informal business premises); redistributive incomes policy; and an end to harassment of informal traders (Godfrey 1978). This latter failure was notable indeed, in spite of the Sessional Paper’s assertion that:

The Government acknowledges that there is much counterproductive harassment of the so-called informal sector. This harassment will cease and more realistic standards and controls will be applied. The Government has already taken initial steps to ensure that the informal sector is provided with sufficient credit and management and technical services (Republic of Kenya 1973: 27).

As Sandbrook observes, the Kenyan government’s ‘action fell well short of its rhetoric, insofar as the government shied away from structural reform’ (1983: 238; Cf. Leys 1973).

We might well note at this point that the Kenya mission report and the concept of the ‘informal’ more broadly were problematic because they were relatively superficial reforms that were implemented only half-way. And, insofar as we are concerned with the effectiveness of WEP in reshaping the political economy of labour and development, this is an entirely accurate assessment. However, to stop here would overlook the utility of *the report itself*, and the ways in which it was deployed by the Kenyan government as a means of legitimizing its own relatively thin ‘development’ strategy. The report’s utility in this sense was *enhanced* by precisely the things Leys, Sandbrook, and others correctly note prevented it having much actual impact on poverty. In short, the fact that the ‘informal/formal’ dichotomy occluded the structural dimensions of urban poverty; the constriction of space for trade union input, the ‘technical’ and ‘non-political’ nature of the report; the fact that the report came with a set of ambiguous policy recommendations; and the limited ability to follow-up on the part of the ILO; all enabled the Kenyan government to use the report in efforts to legitimize an economic policy framework that rhetorically placed the government at the centre of employment promotion (to the exclusion of opposition parties or trade unions) while claiming the approval of the ILO. This occurred despite the fact that many of the ILO’s actual recommendations were either rejected or watered down.

Two points are important to underline here. First, we can best understand the particular shape of interactions between Kenya and the ILO with reference to the struggle over the political organization of labour that had been ongoing since the 1960s. Second, the Kenyan government’s ‘foreign policy’ towards the ILO in this respect took the shape less as a coherent strategic agenda or a set of diplomatic tools and more as a set of iterative engagements between documents produced and circulated by the ILO and the Kenyan government.

SOCIAL DIALOGUE AND DECENT WORK IN SOUTH AFRICA

The ILO’s contemporary landmark programme, since 1999, has been the ‘Decent Work Agenda’ (DWA). In response to concerns about the relevance of the organization in the face of structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and the erosion of social democratic or corporatist forms of labour relations in the Global North since the 1970s (see: Cox 1977; Vosko 2002; Standing 2008), the ILO announced a new ‘Decent Work Agenda’

with four main objectives: promoting employment, promoting rights at work, promoting social protections, and promoting ‘social dialogue’ (ILO 1999). As critics have pointed out, the DWA significantly narrows the scope of international labour regulation. It emphasizes a set of technical ‘employment creation’ issues and protections against the worst abuses—child labour, forced labour, and the persecution of unionists—to the detriment of empowering independent political mobilization (Vosko 2002; Caraway 2006; Standing 2008; Selwyn 2013). ‘Social dialogue’ is effectively a warmed-over version of the ILO’s long-standing advocacy of tripartite institutions for labour relations, with marginally more attention to the participation of civil society organizations other than organized labour. Tripartism remains ill-suited to the realities of work and poverty in Africa in the twenty-first century (see: Dibben et al. 2015). At the same time, African governments face an increasingly pluralistic matrix of potential donors, including increasingly prominent regional organizations, emerging markets, and private philanthropic foundations (For more on the increased role of private actors, capital, and philanthropic organizations in African foreign policies, see: Shaw, Chapter 25 in this volume).

In a parallel with WEP, the ILO’s activities in Africa under the DWA have been more persistent and pervasive than we might expect. According to the most recent figures, nearly half (40 of 85) of active DWCPs (currently being drafted or already approved) are in Sub-Saharan Africa, as are 29 of 47 currently active approved plans (ILO 2016). Subregional Decent Work plans for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the East African Community (EAC) have also recently been approved. As with the WEP, then, there is a puzzle here.

The best explanation is also similar to the WEP case discussed above. Namely, ‘Decent Work’ is an attractive (but rather vague) slogan and requires very little serious commitment to action. Once again, it is hard to imagine anyone objecting to ‘decent’ work, but thorny political questions lurk in the ‘how?’ Moreover, as with the WEP, African governments typically engage with the ILO through a relatively dispersed set of contacts and with an eye towards ‘domestic’ political challenges rather than grand strategic concerns.

The rather tortured trajectory of the ILO’s activities in South Africa is an important example in this respect. South Africa is increasingly a key terrain for the ILO in the region (see: Bernards 2017). The National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) comes closer to the ideal institutional set-up promoted by the ILO than any other country in the region. Indeed, the significance of NEDLAC for the ILO

extends well beyond South Africa itself—the ILO has even arranged study visits to NEDLAC for trade unions in Zimbabwe and Swaziland. South Africa’s tripartite institutions are, in short, quite literally models of the kind of institutional structures that the ILO seeks to promote.

However, in practice, it is hard to escape the conclusion that NEDLAC is in trouble. South Africa’s corporatist institutions have been challenged by employers seeking greater flexibility, and democratization more broadly has not always delivered “on expectations of more and better jobs and employers were bypassing the new labour laws” (Webster 2013: 210). The close ties between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions—on which the political viability of NEDLAC in this context depends to a considerable extent—are also increasingly problematic, with growing concerns that the interests of rank and file workers are not represented (see: Beresford 2012; Bassett and Clarke 2008). Indeed, as formal labour markets in the country have become increasingly precarious, conventional trade union politics seem to be of declining relevance for the survival strategies of everyday South Africans (Scully 2016). The point, in short, is that the political legitimacy of South Africa’s tripartite labour relations institutions is very much under threat because they seem incapable of adapting to the problems of persistent high unemployment and precarious work. Here again, then, the ILO’s vision would seem to be well out of step with the challenges facing labour relations in South Africa. The ILO’s officials themselves have become increasingly frustrated with the relatively hollow character of tripartism in practice in South Africa, but they tend to diagnose the problem as a failure to commit to making tripartite institutions work:

In SA, they’ve almost moved away from [tripartism], and that’s been their downfall I believe in the Marikana, and all sorts of the challenges they’re having around social dialogue... And countries that do take it up – and you just need to look at the Swedish and Scandinavian models, even though they’re developed economies – you’ll see how entrenched social dialogue is in their societies, which helps them get through difficult times (ILO Official, October 2014).

Yet, the concept of ‘decent work’ itself is still deployed in South African politics.

Part of the explanation for the ILO’s persistence is precisely that the ILO has developed close institutional links with the South African government, particularly through NEDLAC. The country’s most recent

DWCP, announced in 2010, was negotiated through NEDLAC (albeit somewhat torturously), and includes strengthening NEDLAC as a priority (ILO 2010: 23). The more important explanation, though, is the flexibility of South African government officials in adapting the concept of ‘Decent Work’ for political purposes. President Jacob Zuma declared 2011 the ‘year of job creation’ in his state of the nation address and in 2012 at the ILO’s African Regional Conference insisted on the necessity of “speed[ing] up growth and transform[ing] the economy to create decent work and sustainable livelihoods” (ILO 2011). All of this coming after the negotiation of the country’s DWCP.

Perhaps most concretely, the ‘New Growth Path’ (NGP) announced in late 2011 by the Economic Development Department (EDD, established in 2009 for the purposes of formulating and implementing the NGP) makes ‘decent work’ into a central objective—in fact, it explicitly describes the ILO’s DWA as a framework for its objectives (EDD 2011: 11). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the policy package actually laid out in the NGP is somewhat inconsistent in this respect—it includes progressive priorities like the expansion of social grants for poor communities and major investments in infrastructure, but also calls for fiscal restraint and for moderating wage increases for workers earning between R3000 and R20000 per month (roughly USD300–2000) in order to limit inflation (EDD 2011: 58). That asking for ‘sacrifices’ from established workers might be politically troublesome is acknowledged in the report itself, which suggests that the NGP “must ensure that economic and social policies demonstrably reward any sacrifice by members with real gains for the working class as a whole” (EDD 2011: 63). As Fine (2012) notes, the actual likelihood of these gains materializing is minimal in the absence of more fundamental changes addressing some of the structural drivers of unemployment in post-apartheid South Africa—most notably the continued dominance of mineral extraction and financial services in the economy as a whole and the persistence of capital flight, all of which are largely absent from the NGP. In short, despite its incorporation of the language of ‘Decent Work,’ the NGP appears mainly to threaten to downgrade existing ‘decent’ jobs while doing little to create them for currently marginalized segments of the population. The parallels to Kenya’s Sessional Paper 10 on employment—which similarly invoked the imperatives of ‘employment’ largely to justify existing policy (and indeed similarly called for wage restraint) without addressing the fundamental roots of unemployment, all while drawing on the ILO for legitimation—are clear enough.

South Africa has always been an exceptional case in Sub-Saharan Africa. Still, these examples show how ‘Decent Work’—rather like ‘employment’ or the ‘informal’ under WEP—has proven useful to African governments as a slogan. The South African case also makes clear that interactions with the ILO have been carried out primarily through line ministries, like the EDD, and quasi-governmental bodies, like NEDLAC. ‘Foreign policies,’ as such, towards the ILO have tended to be diffuse and multiple.

CONCLUSION

By way of conclusion, I want to emphasize three points. First, policy towards IOs is often a diffuse, complex, and contested matter. Broader conceptions of state interests in the international sphere do not always translate readily into dispersed ‘everyday’ interactions between African states and IOs. This is both because these interactions touch on areas that have much more to do with the ‘internal’ political legitimacy of the state than its relations to regional or global powers—as in employment or social protection in the case of the ILO—and also because they are often carried out by officials in line ministries whose mandates are often only loosely linked to the broader strategic objectives pursued at high-level international events. These dynamics are important in understanding why African states continue to interact with the ILO on an everyday level despite the fact that the latter has often been at best vaguely relevant to the broader visions of development and international order articulated individually and collectively by African governments. Indeed, many of these interactions are somewhat indirect—the Kenyan government’s response to unemployment in the 1970s cycled through the Select Committee Report, WEP report, and Sessional Paper; South Africa adopted the concept of ‘Decent Work’ into the NGP without necessarily any direct involvement on the part of the ILO (although links between NEDLAC, the Ministry of Labour, and the ILO were common). The circulation of key documents and concepts between government agencies and IOs, then, is a significant site in which dispersed foreign policies take place.

Second, African state agency has historically played a major role in shaping the activities of the ILO in the region. We can observe crucial disjunctures between the ILO’s agenda and actual outcomes under the WEP in Kenya and the DWA in South Africa. Many of the WEP report’s

recommendations were never implemented, and the language of ‘Decent Work’ in the NGP is deployed in the service of policy proposals that diverge considerably from the ILO’s objectives. We can best understand these divergences, I argue, if we take into account the strategic challenges faced by states in securing authority internally—particularly, in both cases highlighted above, the challenges posed by labour issues to the authority of the governing regime. The practice of WEP is easier to understand if we take into account the political economy of labour organizing in post-colonial Africa. Similarly, the real or potential political challenges posed by the growth of precarious labour and unemployment for the post-apartheid political coalition are crucial to our ability to understand the contemporary uses of ‘Decent Work’ in South Africa. It is here that Cox’s (1987) conception of the ‘internationalizing of the state,’ driven by a complex mix of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ power relations, is particularly useful.

Finally, the broader point here is that the present chapter points to a need for a more expansive conception of ‘foreign policy’ that can account for the diffuse, everyday intersections between African states and international institutions. This is particularly salient in the context of contemporary global governance because these day-to-day interactions are becoming more complex with the emergence of new development agencies and the increasingly close relations emerging between IOs, NGOs, and states in the practice of governance. These more mundane interactions make up no small part of African states’ interactions with IOs, and indeed can have profound influences on the practical outcomes of IO policies.

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Global Humanitarian Organizations and African Goals: The Case of Médecins Sans Frontières in South Africa

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How do international institutions, and in particular global humanitarian organizations, help or hinder African foreign policy goals? Contemporary International Relations (IR) scholarship is hard pressed to answer this question. To date, it has paid little attention to how global humanitarian organizations interface with African governments and civil societies. This is in large part because it was an uphill battle for IR scholars to assert that international non-governmental (INGOs) have an independent effect in world politics *at all* (Barnett and Finnemore 1999; Barnett and Finnemore 2004). Indeed, the Realist tradition in IR continues to assert that INGOs are epiphenomenal and a proxy for state power (Mearsheimer 1994; Krasner 1983). In order to make the case for INGOs' causal influence on the world, existing work has typically focused on the top-down effects of these organizations.

Much less is known about the interaction between INGOs and the states they work within. This analytical oversight does a disservice to understanding the agency of African states. After all, INGOs do not

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operate in a vacuum: They deliver resources and services inside, and based on negotiations with, sovereign states. These states have their own domestic and foreign policy goals, and civil society institutions with their own mandates and aspirations. As this chapter will argue, African states engage in varying tactics to resist, leverage, negotiate, or otherwise benefit from the resources and services of INGOs (Autesserre 2014; Harrell-Bond 1999; Kibreab 1993 among others).

The IR literature on organizations pays short shrift to African states' behavior is particularly pronounced in the case of global humanitarian aid. Nearly half of global humanitarian assistance—currently over 20 billion dollars per year—is directed to African countries¹ and yet IR rarely addresses how African governments manage or negotiate that aid. Compared to other issue areas in global governance, humanitarian aid is especially intimate. Global humanitarian organizations operate on the ground, in consistent involvement and engagement with state and civil society actors. Both budgets and the range of substantive areas humanitarian organizations address have increased rapidly since the end of the Cold War, further and further intertwining humanitarian organizations with the state governments and civil societies with which they interact (Ramulingam 2013: 5).

It should not be surprising in such a context that the history of aid is rife with unintended consequences and unmet aims. Resources fail to map neatly on to the intended effects of those in charge of humanitarian INGOs (Finnemore and Goldstein 2013). INGOs, in short, do not always get what they want. This reality is a far cry from the conventional wisdom that aid arrives from on high and global humanitarian organizations can do as they wish. This disconnect suggests that more and rigorous analysis is needed on the agency of recipient states in how they engage with humanitarian assistance. In particular, the relationship between global humanitarian organizations, on the one hand, and African states and civil societies, on the other, is seldom explored. This chapter offers nascent analysis on this relationship and the landscape of tactics that African states employ in their relationship with global humanitarian organizations. In doing so, it makes the point that global humanitarian organizations do not in fact plow through the world with unrestrained force, carrying out their affairs. Instead, they confront states and domestic actors with their own advocacy agendas, interests, and aspirations, who can stop, or at least stymie, INGOs' efforts.

This chapter offers a look at how global humanitarian organizations interact with the South African government and South African civil

society. It first discusses the analytical importance of global humanitarian organizations and the existing literature on INGOs and recipient states. It then outlines several ways African states and civil societies contest and negotiate their interactions with humanitarian organizations.² Next, it describes these strategies through the case of *Médecins Sans Frontières* (MSF) in South Africa from 1999 to 2014. This case demonstrates a range of ways that global humanitarian actors can help or hinder African states' national goals, and how African states can assert their agency in their interaction with these organizations.

WHY GLOBAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS?

Global humanitarian organizations are a unique set of actors in global governance. The aim of humanitarian assistance is to save lives and alleviate human suffering. The recipients of humanitarian assistance primarily include refugees, the war-affected, and victims of natural disaster and famine. The humanitarian sector is rooted in centuries-old faith-based forms of charity, but was largely formalized in the aftermath of WWII with the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (Barnett and Weiss 2008; Rieff 2002; Maxwell and Walker 2009). Two years later, the groundbreaking Refugee Convention defined the concept of a refugee, refugee rights, and state obligations to them. The rapid institutionalization of the sector followed, with the founding of major institutions like CARE, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and *Médecins Sans Frontières*. Other institutions like Save the Children, the International Rescue Committee, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) predated WWII but nonetheless expanded and bureaucratized rapidly in the post-WWII period.

Global humanitarian organizations are distinct from other kinds of international institutions in global governance for two key reasons. First, global humanitarian organizations operate “on-the-ground.” They interact on a daily basis with the states they work within. They are typically highly decentralized institutions that engage with state and civil society actors through many different country offices, satellite offices, programs, and interventions. Their interface with African states (at all levels of government and civil society) is direct, frequent, and depends on access from the African state itself.

Second, humanitarian organizations seek to abide by international humanitarian law (IHL) in their mission statements and mandates.

They adhere to a set of humanitarian principles with the chief aim to prevent and alleviate human suffering (Mackintosh 2000). While the other core elements of humanitarianism—impartiality, neutrality, and consent—vary in interpretation, they have implications for who is considered a legitimate humanitarian organization (Mackintosh 2000).³ Impartiality means that aid is provided based on need alone and “without discrimination of any kind” (Mackintosh 2000). Neutrality means that humanitarian organizations do not align themselves with one side of the conflict (Parke 2009). These principles strongly inform and at times hamstring the behavior of global humanitarian organizations.

This combination—on-the-ground action and adherence to humanitarian principles—renders humanitarian organizations in ambiguous relation to African states and civil societies. On the one hand, they are certainly in a position to exert influence over African states. This is the conventional take on how these humanitarian organizations operate. However, in other moments, humanitarian organizations and states and civil societies operate in tandem, agreeing on the goals of aid.

Of particular interest for this chapter is that humanitarian organizations, states, and civil societies are often fractured in their goals. African states and civil societies at times seek alliances with global humanitarian organizations to further their goals, or pursue national goals by manipulating global humanitarian organizations. They can have competing goals that they seek to fulfill in relation to global humanitarian organizations, and they can also have goals that evolve over time. Contrary to mainstream IR belief, global humanitarians are not able to simply sweep into a country and carry out their desires. Humanitarian organizations themselves need the blessing of a given African government in order to provide aid. And African state actors instead leverage a constellation of different alliances and tactics in their relationship with global humanitarian organizations in order to further their aims. This range of behavior is commonly noted by practitioners but is poorly integrated into contemporary IR scholarship.

CURRENT SCHOLARSHIP

Early work on the effects of INGOs sought to demonstrate that INGOs exert influence and authority beyond the interests of states (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 2004). Subsequent literature emphasizes the top-down effects of INGOs on states and local peoples (Ferguson 1994;

De Waal 1997; Pouligny 2006; Easterly 2013; Autesserre 2010; 2014; among many others), and a subset of this literature focuses on humanitarian organizations in particular (De Waal 1997; Harrell-Bond 1999; Anderson 1999; among others). However, this early scholarship focuses on the causal effects of INGOs to the detriment of analyzing recipient states as agents, or analyzing the interaction between recipient states and INGOs.

The most relevant literature that evaluates the causal role of host states and civil societies with respect to INGOs is Keck and Sikkink's (1998) well-known work on transnational advocacy networks (TANs). In their *boomerang model*, a domestic campaign that cannot gain traction in their issue area will appeal to a transnational advocacy network (including other states, NGOs, and intergovernmental organizations). With the support and pressure of a transnational advocacy network, the domestic NGO can effectively pressure their government. The idea is that a blockage exists between the domestic NGO and their government, and an outside entity is needed to help break through this blockage.

The boomerang model usefully analyzes how civil society leverages INGOs to further their domestic goals vis-à-vis their government. However, existing work does not adequately account for other behaviors and goals of civil society organizations, or the behavior and goals of state government. Scholarship is needed that steps beyond the boomerang model and examines the tactics of both African states and civil societies to further their goals in relation to INGOs. IR lacks a framework for understanding how INGOs and recipient states interact more broadly, and how African states interact with global humanitarian organizations to pursue their own goals.

MÉDECINS SANS FRONTIÈRES (MSF)

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) is a humanitarian organization mandated to “deliver emergency aid to people affected by armed conflict, epidemics, healthcare exclusion and natural or man-made disasters” (MSF Online 2017). MSF received the Nobel Prize in 1999 for its work and is famous for speaking out against the actors to blame for human suffering. The willingness to speak out is not an easy decision, and it reflects one of the most fraught aspects of humanitarian action.

Neutrality and impartiality present moral dilemmas for global humanitarian organizations in practice. The International Committee of the

Red Cross (ICRC) remained silent against atrocious regime activity during the Nigeria-Biafra war in order to maintain access to suffering civilians. Médecins Sans Frontières was founded in protest to this decision to remain silent in the face of rights violations and civilian atrocities perpetrated by governments. On the one hand, preserving neutrality enables, for instance, ICRC's continued access to prisoners and the ability to provide those in need with necessary care. On the other hand, MSF believes that global humanitarian actors must maintain their independence from governments. They should speak out against rights violations and violent regimes when necessary. It is for this reason that MSF vocally pulled out of the recent World Humanitarian Summit, which they argue softened criticisms of the regimes most responsible for humanitarian crises.

In comparison with humanitarian organizations that closely abide by the principle of neutrality and prioritize access to those in need above all else, MSF routinely speaks out against the dangers of impunity for governments when providing humanitarian assistance. Doing so will make those governments more likely to also be culpable in the future (Brauman 1987). At the same time, if they are never allowed into a country to deliver aid, their organizations serve little purpose. As a result, MSF—like all humanitarian organizations—operates through a series of iterative steps and activities within the countries where they work. Since MSF operates both on the ground and in accordance with humanitarian principles, its activities are the “product of repeated transactions with local and international political and military forces” (Magone et al. 2012: 3). MSF must weigh its interests in adhering to humanitarian principles and reducing the suffering of these in need, with its dual interest to remain in the country they are working in. MSF appreciates that it will have both mutual but at other times divergent interests from the political actors it confronts.

According to official policy, MSF expects that it and state authorities have a shared interest in the way a population is governed. MSF does not question the legitimacy of state governments or the interests they serve, but instead focuses on “the modalities and effects of their management” (Magone et al. 2012: 9). In doing so, MSF seeks to avoid threatening the state while remaining true to its goals and principles. This fine line is the chronic negotiation that MSF and other global humanitarian organizations confront in their work and which places them in consistent contact with state and civil society actors. MSF chose to be an organization

that is willing to take a stand and risk losing access, but they nonetheless still need to reach those in need as much as possible.

MSF IN SOUTH AFRICA (1999–2014)

The case of Médecins Sans Frontières in South Africa over the past fifteen years demonstrates how state and civil society's (often competing) goals lead to complex interactions with global humanitarian organizations. Instead of viewing global humanitarian organizations as the object of interest, this chapter examines MSF from a South African perspective. It highlights the strategic interests, tactics, and behaviors of South African authorities and civil society as MSF carries out its activities in the country. It traces how the South African state and civil society institutions regarded and engaged with MSF over time and across issue areas.

ARV Access

Beginning in the late 1980s and 1990s, South Africa confronted an HIV epidemic that remains unprecedented across the globe. HIV prevalence in the country is almost 20% among adults, and South Africa holds claim to the greatest number of HIV positive people in the world.

In response to the growing HIV/AIDS crisis and government inaction, Zackie Achmat founded the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) in 1998. The now-famous civil society organization was formed by former anti-apartheid activists who were highly skilled in organizing and were now pivoting their attention to new social justice issues. TAC argued that the unaffordability of antiretroviral (ARV) treatment was a human rights violation and advocated for broad access across the country (Treatment Action Campaign 2010). Achmat met with MSF when they entered South Africa for the first time in 1999 to establish a "Prevention of Mother-To-Child Transmission" (PMTCT) project, which was then launched in 2000. Achmat encouraged MSF to operate in Khayelitsha, a township in the Western Cape province that was under control of the Democratic Alliance (DA), the opposition party in South Africa, at the time (Neuman in Magone et al. 2012).⁴ The DA-backed local authorities who were interested in working with TAC and MSF in hopes of using the lack of government response to HIV treatment as a platform to criticize the ANC (Neuman in Magone et al. 2012: 164). Meanwhile,

MSF hoped that they would have greater latitude in an area that was not under ANC scrutiny. This political moment allowed MSF and TAC to jointly establish their PMTCT program in 2000 and to begin pressuring the South African authorities to provide ARVs.

TAC and MSF together blamed the South African government for failing to provide HIV treatment to its citizens. Meanwhile, the South African government pursued a policy of denialism against the severity of the AIDS epidemic and the need for access to drug treatment (Neuman in Magone et al. 2012). They also decried the high cost of ARV therapy. The South African government and leadership were wary of international pharmaceutical companies after a legacy of challenging, top-down involvement from these firms. South Africa was sued by 39 pharmaceutical companies for violating intellectual property by using generic drugs that were exponentially cheaper, but identical to name brand drugs (Hamel 2004). Authorities said they believed that international actors, states, and pharmaceutical companies alike were bullying them into accepting foreign influence over domestic affairs.

The South African government's policy of denialism was rooted in a deep skepticism of the international pharmaceutical industry and the desire for autonomy and national pride in response to a crisis. In response to this mistrust of international companies and the desire for autonomy, the South African government ended up denying that AIDS was a problem and promoting "natural" remedies. At this time, health minister Manto Tshabalala-Msimang notoriously recommended the use of garlic and other natural remedies in lieu of ARV treatment (Cullinan et al. 2009). President Thabo Mbeki further decried the necessity of drugs or the link between HIV and AIDS. Pharmaceutical companies dropped their intellectual property lawsuit in 2001, which meant that South Africa could move forward with providing generic ARVs. And yet, and in the face of mounting international pressure, the South African government nonetheless wanted to develop a South African response to HIV/AIDS and along their own timeline.

During this time, the South African government began to accuse MSF of political interference. Authorities highlighted how MSF was importing its ARV drugs from Brazil and other countries. They sought to delegitimize MSF's work and highlight its identity as a white, Northern organization in the context of a post-apartheid South Africa. The government leveraged MSF's identity to delegitimize its efforts and, as a result, the efforts of its partners as well.

MSF subsequently became quieter in its involvement on access to ARVs in South Africa. They collaborated with another civil society organization, the Nelson Mandela Foundation, in 2003 on another HIV project in the Eastern Cape province as their relationship with TAC became considerably less overt (Neuman in Magone et al. 2012). This allowed TAC to fight vociferously through civil disobedience, protests, and legal battles largely on its own. TAC ultimately succeeded in establishing national AIDS response and PMTCT programs, but the public presence of its early partner MSF had waned considerably.

In contrast to the boomerang model, TAC engaged MSF as a partner on their own terms, and not because they were incapable of engaging South African authorities on their own. MSF and TAC allowed the DA to leverage the PMTCT program for their own political aspirations. Meanwhile, South African authorities effectively leveraged MSF's identity in order to restrain its activity and to pursue state objectives by doing so. While TAC's efforts ultimately won out over the interests of South African authorities at the time, they did this with minimal support from MSF. South African civil society and local political parties were able to leverage the presence and identity of MSF. Meanwhile, South African authorities pursued tactics to discredit MSF, and to assert itself as a strong, independent South African state that does not need international assistance. MSF's work in South Africa on access to ARVs is lauded as a grand success story in the humanitarian field, but these engagements with local authorities and civil society institutions largely fall out of the story.

Migrant Rights

Beginning in 2006, up to three million Zimbabwean migrants entered South Africa (UNHCR 2011). From 2006 to 2012, South Africa proceeded to receive more asylum seekers than any other country in the world. During this time (2007), MSF opened a permanent office in South Africa for the first time. The office became a testing ground for "just how activist [MSF] should be" (Magone et al. 2012: 167). The new MSF South Africa office reported to Brussels but became embedded in South African civil society. It quickly became involved in migrant rights issues in the aftermath of Zimbabwe's political crisis and inflow of migrants to South Africa.

In particular, over 60 foreign nationals were killed and thousands injured and displaced from their homes in a nationwide spree of

xenophobic violence in May 2008 (Hassim et al. 2008). MSF began providing medical assistance and basic goods throughout the displacement camps set up after the attacks. MSF stated publicly that they were not in the displacement camps as a substitute for the responsibility of the government, but rather to fill any gaps that the government could not address itself. They further argued that many foreigners were afraid of South African authorities and did not trust the aid they might bring. This suited the South African government, which then publicly stated the attacks were criminal activity rather than xenophobic violence. They sought to downplay the violence and avoid publicly addressing their immigration policies and xenophobic tensions in the country (Misago et al. 2010). The South African authorities were able to leverage MSF's willingness to provide care in the displacement camps after the 2008 violence while also minimizing their involvement in responding to the attacks.

As international organizations like MSF and domestic allies like Lawyers for Human Rights, the Consortium for the Rights of Migrants in South Africa (CoRMSA), and the AIDS Law Project began their advocacy for migrant rights, it became clear that South Africa's response to the migrant crisis was complex. In particular, South Africa's immigration policy reflected a set of dual and competing aspirations. On the one hand, post-apartheid South Africa seeks to cast itself as a model liberal state with open-minded policies like the most progressive laws around asylum on the continent.⁵ These policies are extremely generous to refugees and asylum seekers, and reflect South Africa's desire for regional and international prestige as a strong liberal state. However, these asylum policies are paired with a highly restrictive immigration regime. And Zimbabweans who experienced political persecution and qualify for asylum nonetheless routinely have their asylum claims dismissed. Asylum seekers have their claims dismissed because officials suspect they are simply migrants trying to slip into the country through the asylum system.⁶

This inconsistent behavior is known as "organized hypocrisy" (Brunsson 1989; Weaver 2008; Meyer and Rowan 1977). In this case, the South African state talks (e.g., "We welcome refugees!") in one way but acts (e.g., status determination decision-making) in another. It serves as a "way of handling conflicting values simultaneously" (Brunsson 1989: xiii). South Africa has a strategic interest in the international prestige of being viewed as a liberal democracy. It also has a strategic interest in maintaining control of its borders, and responding to citizen needs.

At this time, xenophobic attitudes among the South African citizenry simmered across the country. In a context of 40% unemployment and dissatisfaction with the lack of economic opportunities in the post-apartheid era, South African citizens were deeply wary of foreigners (Landau 2008; Misago et al. 2010; Vearey 2010). The South African state responded to both its desire for international approval as well as the demands of its citizens and its own ability to bureaucratically process such massive flows of displaced people. As a result, and in response to the campaigns of MSF and its allies, the South African state routinely pointed to its progressive policies on asylum while masking its unfair status determination decisions or otherwise ignoring the needs of vulnerable migrants (Amit 2011, 2016).

Shortly after the May 2008 attacks, MSF South Africa wanted to support the “Declaration Concerning the Resolution of the Refugee Crisis” alongside a coalition of South African civil society actors. The declaration condemned Zimbabwe’s President Mugabe and advocated for the rights of Zimbabweans. However, and for the first time, the Brussels MSF office stepped in and asserted that, in their view, signing the declaration would harm their work in Zimbabwe (Magone et al. 2012). MSF’s identity as a global humanitarian organization above all else hamstrung its own interests in South Africa and led to disappointment among its civil society partners. MSF’s identity as a *global* humanitarian organization meant that they could not become more politically engaged. While the MSF South Africa office wanted to be more vocal and support civil society, they ultimately fell in line with the decision from the Brussels office.

In contrast to the boomerang model, Lawyers for Human Rights and a range of other civil society organizations engaged MSF as a partner, but not because they were incapable of engaging South African authorities on their own. MSF and these organizations fought for migrant rights together in some instances, but civil society fought on its own in others. MSF’s identity as a global humanitarian organization can hinder its own goals. Meanwhile, South African authorities pushed off MSF’s work on migrant rights by engaging in “organized hypocrisy.” They also leveraged MSF by embracing its willingness to provide care in the displacement camps after the 2008 violence. MSF’s meaningful involvement in migrant rights was limited to its life-saving aid in the 2008 displacement camps. The competition between local authorities and civil society institutions played a much more important role.

CONCLUSION

MSF's work in South Africa is revelatory for understanding how African governments and global humanitarian organizations interact. The strategies that South African governments and civil societies adopt in relation to MSF are manifold. For instance, as seen in the movement for access to ARVs, African states can decry the political interference of global humanitarian organizations as a means of reflecting their interests (e.g., in national pride) and as a tactic for delegitimizing global humanitarian organizations. The South African state can also engage in "organized hypocrisy" by engaging in rhetoric alongside one set of interests while in fact acting in another way. In the case of immigration policy and the rights of refugees, South Africa sought to negotiate its desire for control over its borders and popular support with desires for international approval.

Meanwhile, in each of these issue areas, civil society organizations step well beyond the classic boomerang model in how they interact with global humanitarian organizations. At times, they work in lockstep with MSF, and then at other times, they are disappointed with their partner's absence. Civil society organizations learn to leverage global humanitarian organizations just as they leverage the range of actors and resource to which they have access.

It becomes clear that global humanitarian organizations do not always get what they want. They engage in a series of negotiations and transactions in the African states they work within. Some of these negotiations allow them to further their goals, while other negotiations lead them to take a step backward. New theories and modes of thinking are needed to better account for this reality.

Existing scholarship is, at best, incomplete once one is able to more clearly parse the dynamics of the relationship between humanitarian organizations on the one hand and African states and civil society on the other. IR scholarship is very concerned with issues of authority and state power in global governance, and yet, the behavior of global humanitarian organizations within African states appears to overturn "some of our basic notions about states' own roles and how state power works" (Finnemore and Goldstein 2013). While INGOs certainly create effects in the world, these effects are modulated, if not hamstrung, by the behavior of African states. African states and civil societies pursue their own goals as they work alongside, in quiet resistance to, or against the plans and advocacy of global humanitarian organizations.

As this chapter demonstrates, African states and civil societies have their own national goals and aspirations from which they then engage in varying tactics to resist, leverage, discredit, negotiate, or otherwise benefit from INGOs. This analytical oversight does a disservice to the agency of African states and the reality of how INGOs operate in the world today.

Scholarly attention is needed on the interaction between INGOs and the states they work within. Failing to do so not only leads to bad or at least unbalanced scholarship, it also can translate into policy options and decision-making. There is considerable variation in when global humanitarian organizations achieve their goals and partner successfully with domestic institutions. Similarly, there is variation in the conditions under which domestic institutions can most effectively leverage the access, power, and resources of global humanitarian organizations. Understanding this variation can promote more precise policies, strategic decisions, and academic theories.

NOTES

1. Humanitarian assistance funding information is updated annually online by institutions like the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and Global Humanitarian Assistance (GHA).
2. This chapter particularly focuses on behaviors to discredit, pacify, partner with, gain resources, or otherwise benefit from global humanitarian organizations.
3. Impartiality refers to providing assistance based on need alone. This includes not discriminating against potential recipients, providing aid in direct proportion to need, and not making decisions subjectively. Neutrality is defined as the non-participation in hostilities, direct or indirect. Consent refers to the right of a state to refuse access to humanitarian organizations (Mackintosh 2000).
4. The African National Congress (ANC) is the ruling party in South Africa.
5. In many other African states, refugees are sent to camps where they can remain for decades on end. Once a displaced person in South Africa reaches a refugee reception office, they can apply for asylum. Asylum seekers enjoy the right to live and work in South Africa while they await their status determination. They also have the right to eventually apply for citizenship after prolonged displacement (Hassim et al. 2008; Landau 2010).
6. Zimbabwean applications are denied without fair consideration of their case, under the assumption that any Zimbabwean is an economic migrant and not a refugee. Refugees—defined by the Refugee Convention as

those fleeing home with “a well-founded fear of persecution”—have specific rights and states have specific obligations to them. Migrants have no special protections and are at the mercy of the particular immigration regime in each state. With a highly restrictive immigration regime, there are no real options for Zimbabweans to legally migrate to South Africa. In response, Zimbabwean economic migrants flock to the refugee reception offices and overburden the asylum system.

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PART III

Country Case Studies of African Foreign
Policies in International Institutions



Consistency in Inconsistency: South Africa's Foreign Policies in International Organizations

John Akokpari

South Africa formally joined most international organizations after 1994, following the historic demise of the apartheid system. Prior to that, Pretoria remained a pariah state, excluded from international and regional organizations, including the now-transformed Organization of African Unity (OAU). Against a background of the traumatic international experience under apartheid, South Africa sought to reform its post-apartheid foreign policies in both content and orientation. It sought, in particular, to rebrand itself from the tarnished image as a pariah state to a crusader for democracy, human rights, and peace (Le Pere 2015: 251). By the close of 1994, South Africa had joined various regional and international organizations, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the OAU and the United Nations (UN). In August 2010, South Africa joined the tripartite IBSA (India, Brazil, and South Africa) and the new elite body of emerging markets—Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRICS)—in December of

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the same year. However, since the exit of Nelson Mandela, South Africa's first democratically elected president, from the presidency in 1999, Pretoria has followed foreign policies that departed from the country's declared values.

This chapter thus argues that Pretoria's post-apartheid foreign policies, including those in international organizations, have been inconsistent and often contradictory. The chapter notes that while South Africa has been consistent in professing a foreign policy informed by new post-apartheid values—such as human rights, democracy, peace, and equality—it has been inconsistent in the practical application of these values (Nathan 2005; Smith 2015). It notes moreover that the steaming contradictions in South Africa's foreign policies have been palpable not just in SADC and the African Union where it is perceived as a “big brother,” but also in global institutions such as the UN, where it can only exercise soft power through which it pursues foreign policy by non-coercive means (Nye 1990, 2012). It is argued further that South Africa's inconsistent and contradictory foreign policy postures have been largely dictated by a desire to promote its national interest. Before developing these arguments further and substantiating the propositions, it is imperative to make reference, even if cursorily, to the debate on South Africa's status as a leader in Africa.

The question of whether South Africa is a hegemon is a perennial one. While by virtue of its economic size, democratic stability, and adherence to the rule of law, some see it as a regional hegemon (Daniels et al. 2008; Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan 1998; Dlamini 2013), others hold the view that internal constraints and the inability of Pretoria to translate its economic and political attributes into putative preponderance vitiate its credentials as a hegemon (Alden and Schoeman 2015). In this sense, Adebajo's (2008: 14) depiction of Nigeria's weak dominance in west Africa as “hegemony on a shoestring” is apt for South Africa as a leader in SADC and Africa. Adebajo notes that a hegemon must have “the military and economic resources as well as the international political support to act as an effective hegemon. Hegemony essentially requires both *capacity* and *legitimacy* as well as the *ability* to provide leadership to convince other states to follow the hegemon willingly” (Adebajo's 2008: 14 italics in the original). Post-apartheid South Africa hardly demonstrates these three qualities. Indeed, Pretoria has been hesitant to be assertive, fearing bringing back memories of its destabilisation campaign of the 1980s (Nathan 2005: 366). To that effect, South Africa, like Nigeria, may be

described as “an aspiring, rather than an effective hegemon” (Adebajo’s 2008: 14). Notwithstanding the debate on its status, certain principles can be discerned in Pretoria’s foreign policies, an issue to which this chapter now turns.

SOUTH AFRICA’S FOREIGN POLICY OVERVIEW

A key principle of post-apartheid South Africa foreign policy has been to “right the wrongs” of the apartheid state, characterised by brutality, detentions, and destabilisation of the Frontline States (FLS)—Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. The peaceful conduct of foreign policy undergirded by negotiation as a tool for conflict management also became a guiding principle of foreign policy. Accordingly, in 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) adopted a seven-point document prepared by Nelson Mandela in 1993, to serve as the cornerstone of the country’s foreign policy (Le Pere and van Nieuwkerk, 1999: 198). The document advanced seven key principles, including beliefs in human rights, democracy, international law and justice, peace, and the sovereign equality of states. These served as South Africa’s new foreign policy values, which the country’s officials have repeatedly trumpeted. In a public lecture at the South African Institute of International Affairs in 2013, the Deputy Minister of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), Ebrahim Rasool, stated that “Our foreign policy is informed by the fundamental values and principles enshrined in our constitution, including human dignity; the achievement of equity; the advancement of human rights and freedom; non-racialism, non-sexism; democracy; and the respect for the rule of law” (Rasool 2013).

In practice, however, South Africa’s policy makers were acutely aware of the limits to which these values could be pushed. South Africa lacks the attributes of a state capable of exercising hard power which, according to Nye (1990, 2012), involves the capacity to pursue foreign policy using coercive means. And, having recently emerged from apartheid with the assistance of African states, Pretoria was careful not to alienate African neighbours, most of whom were either victims of apartheid or assisted in the demise of White minority rule. Nelson Mandela learnt this hard truth just one year into his presidency—that African leaders admire human rights but do not necessarily uphold them. Further, a large proportion of South Africa’s population remains impoverished

and economically disempowered. Inequality among social classes is rife, while unemployment and crime are on the rise. Deep racial fault lines exist, and in recent times, the scourge of xenophobia has compounded the many and seemingly insurmountable internal challenges facing South Africa. Together, these realities imposed limits on South Africa's foreign policies, notwithstanding its status as an economic giant in the region. South Africa could not afford a foreign policy that diverted substantial resources away from the mitigation of its many internal challenges. Despite these realities, South Africa remained a viable democracy. Accordingly, Pretoria is largely held in high esteem by African countries. Commentators maintain that there is a functional relation between a country's domestic values and the orientation of its foreign policies. Francis Pym, a former UK Foreign Secretary, underscored this link in noting that "foreign policy is the extension abroad of domestic policy" (Pym 1982). The critical question is: Has South Africa been consistent in projecting its domestic values through its foreign policies in SADC, the AU, and UN? Before grappling with this question, this chapter first addresses an equally pertinent question on the author(s) of foreign policy in South Africa.

WHO MAKES FOREIGN POLICY IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH AFRICA?

It is conventionally believed that a pluralistic approach to foreign policy-making was the norm in a democracy. Typically, in a pluralistic society, major policies are assumed to emanate from bargaining and compromise among competing groups (Mahler 1995: 143). The state is seen as neutral, acting as a referee, which intervenes only when the rules of fair competition are flouted and need to be restored. In the democratic dispensation of post-apartheid South Africa, foreign policy was expected to be democratised to reflect the interests of competing groups and constituencies. In practice, however, this is far from the reality. Rather, foreign policymaking has not only been elitist, but has also been concentrated in the presidency and often personalised. Writing on African foreign policies, Khadiagala and Lyons (2001: 5) note that:

African foreign policy making has always been the province of leading personalities. Foreign policy as the prerogative of presidents and prime ministers dovetailed with the post-colonial patterns of domestic power consideration. In environments where the structures of participation and

contestation particularly political parties and legislatures declined appreciably, the charismatic leader became the source, site and embodiment of foreign policy.

Indeed, over three decades ago, Aluko (1977: 10) noted that African foreign ministries, which were thought to be key initiators of foreign policy, were actually emissaries of the president (For a competing view, see: Warner Chapter 1 in this volume).

The oligarchic approach to foreign policymaking is valid in South Africa under the presidencies of Nelson Mandela, Thabo Mbeki, and Jacob Zuma. While Mandela did not set out to concentrate authority in the presidency or become a dictator, his global iconic status and the reverence he enjoyed within South Africa almost certainly ensured that his opinion, even prescriptions, carried considerable weight in foreign policy decisions. Mandela was perceived by South Africans as the father of the nation, a heaven-sent messiah to redeem the country from the yoke of apartheid. Consequently, Mandela enjoyed considerable freedom in dictating foreign policy decisions. Mandela's decision to chastise Sani Abacha, the Nigerian strongman, in 1995, over the latter's human rights abuses (Block 1995), was never debated by either the South African cabinet or parliament. Neither was South Africa's decision to sign international agreements approved by parliament. By and large, Mandela remained the main architect of foreign policy with the parliament and cabinet merely following his lead (Berber 2004).

Mandela's successors hardly departed from the elitist, if not individualised, approach to foreign policymaking. Like his predecessor, Thabo Mbeki, who also became leader of the ANC, concentrated foreign policymaking in the presidency (Alden and Le Pere 2003). In the wake of reforms introduced by Mbeki to reposition the ANC in the context of contemporary politics—a move that generated ideological opposition—Gumede (2007: 156), a South African political commentator, observed that:

Mbeki's modernisation proposals [were] often criticized – not necessarily because ANC members opposed them, but because they want to flex their muscles and teach Mbeki and the ANC leadership a lesson: that they should respect internal democracy and consult them more. That, at least, [was] how Mbeki and his trusted reformers view(ed) the situation, but there can be no doubt that most ANC members [were] suspicious of an over-concentration of power in the presidency.

The perception of creeping centralisation of power and foreign policy decision-making in the presidency was subsequently used as a pretext by some ANC members and the party's alliance partners to recall Thabo Mbeki as president in September 2008 (*The Socialist Worker* 25 September 2008).

Jacob Zuma, the successor to Thabo Mbeki, did little to change the perception of the presidency as the main locus of foreign policy decisions. In February 2015, opposition members of South Africa's parliament bemoaned the conclusion of a nuclear deal between the government and Russia. Although had it damning implications for the sovereignty of the country, the deal was never discussed, let alone approved, by parliament. The agreement was signed by South Africa's Energy Minister, Tina Joemat-Pettersson, three weeks after President Zuma held talks with Russian president Vladimir Putin in Moscow (Faull 2015).

Moreover, in April 2015, a wave of xenophobic violence led to the death of foreigners, including a Nigerian. In reaction, Nigeria recalled its High Commissioner to South Africa, Martin Cobham, and its Consul-General, Uche Ajulu-Okeke. A spokesperson of DIRCO, Mr. Clayson Monyela, expressed shock at Nigeria's action. However, a day later, Jeff Radebe, Minister in the Presidency, distanced the government from the comments of the DIRCO spokesperson, claiming what the latter said was not the official position of the South African government (ENCA 2015). Not only did this particular incident highlight a lack of synergy between the presidency and DIRCO, but it also underscored the subordinated role of the latter in foreign policy decision-making. DIRCO, like foreign ministries across the world, performs a messengerial role, serving only as an implementing institution of executive-crafted foreign policies. In the next section, this chapter assesses the behaviour and conduct of South Africa foreign policy in SADC, the AU, and the UN.

SOUTH AFRICA'S FOREIGN POLICIES IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

Sub-Regional Organizations—The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

In addition to its broader foreign policy objectives, three aims have been discernible in South Africa's foreign policy in SADC. First is the desire to strengthen the sub-regional body by providing leadership. Politically

stable and accounting for about 70% of the region's GDP, South Africa was well placed to provide not just economic leadership but also political direction to the organization. Pretoria has, however, declined to publically present itself as a regional leader, expectedly for fear of bringing back dreadful memories of its brutal destabilisation campaign under apartheid. South Africa recognised that its economic prosperity rested, to a large extent, on a stable and economically viable SADC. This thinking was logical as southern Africa serves as Pretoria's main market in Africa, with Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Mozambique as the largest trading partners in 2013 (Alence 2015: 289). Trade and commerce thus provide a context for South Africa's foreign policies in SADC. South Africa has also demonstrated its economic dominance in the region by offering financial assistance to its financially crippled neighbours Swaziland and Zimbabwe (England 2011; Donnelly 2012).

Second, although South Africa under Mandela initially opposed the inclusion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in SADC, it has subsequently sought to benefit from Kinshasa's membership. True to the position of South Africa, it is problematic to have the DRC as a SADC member if a region is defined strictly in terms of geographical proximity (Palmer 1991: 6; Blij and Muller 2009) given the former's distance from southern Africa. Tanzania, a member of SADC, which is also geographically remote from southern Africa, is a different case. Tanzania, along with Zambia, supported the liberation struggle of the ANC, providing sanctuary and training bases for its exiled members (Sellstrom 2002: 585). It therefore made considerable sense that having identified with liberation movements in southern Africa, Tanzania would be part of SADC. This could not be said of the DRC, which lacked such historical links with southern Africa. Pretoria's subsequent acceptance of the DRC in SADC in 1998 lends credence to claims that the former wanted to create a better context for the resolution of the conflict in that country. Since then, however, South Africa's economic interest in the DRC has grown. In perspective, DRC is one of the most richly endowed countries in Africa in terms of natural resources. With a population of over 75 million, DRC is an economically strategic market for South Africa. Today, South Africa is one of the biggest investors in the DRC. Pretoria is also presently the biggest supplier of goods and services to the DRC. In 2013, Pretoria alone accounted for more than 21% of DRC's total imports. In that same year, the value of South Africa's exports to the DRC amounted to R12.3 billion, while imports amounted to R100 million (South African Government News, 9 September 2014).

Third, Pretoria's foreign policy in SADC is aimed at projecting itself as a peacemaker by promoting regional peace and security. This was imperative to rid Pretoria of its negative regional image as a destabiliser. It did not take too long for South Africa to demonstrate this. In 1998, South Africa led a tripartite force, including Botswana and Zimbabwe, to contain disruptive opposition protests against the government of Prime Minister Mosisili and the Lesotho Congress for Democracy—LCD (Neethling 1999; Likoti 2007). Pretoria also led SADC efforts to resolve the 2015 political impasses in Lesotho.

As well, Pretoria was central in SADC's efforts to resolve the political impasse in Zimbabwe between Robert Mugabe and ZANU–PF on the one hand and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) on the other. The Zimbabwean political crisis was precipitated by the country's massive economic meltdown, which led to the adoption of drastic economic measures, including the controversial land redistribution policy. Human rights violations became grotesque and widespread as the government moved to brutally suppress opposition protests against its policies. A mix of economic crisis and human rights violations spawned a massive outflow of Zimbabweans into South Africa. Consistent with Pretoria's post-apartheid policy of using negotiations rather than force in conflict resolution, South Africa resisted pressures from the West to adopt more ruthless measures, including the use of military force, to topple Robert Mugabe. Rather, Pretoria's approach to the Zimbabwean crisis was the use of the (in)famous policy of quiet diplomacy, which one observer describes as South Africa's "most prominent inconsistency between [its] actions and its declared commitment to democracy and respect for human rights" (Nathan 2005: 367). Although criticised for allowing leniency on Mugabe (Taylor 2002), quiet diplomacy nevertheless led to the formation of a unity government, albeit fragile, between ZANU–PF and MDC in February 2009.

Similarly, South Africa brokered peace among the warring factions in the DRC between 2002 and 2004. In addition, South Africa, along with Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal, and Libya, was instrumental in the transformation of the OAU to the AU in 2002 and the establishment of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture, at the center of which is the African Peace and Security Council. In 2005, SADC controversially intervened in the DRC conflict, but only Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe of the 15-member body participated (Akokpari 2016: 150). Pretoria was active in the Africa Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) between 2003 and

2005, providing the bulk of the mission's finances. Further, it led SADC initiatives to resolve the political crisis in Madagascar in 2009, while South Africa and Mbeki played key roles in the independence of South Sudan in 2011.

Yet, South Africa's seemingly impressive foreign policy pursuits in SADC have not been without controversy. In addition to undermining its claims as a crusader of human rights, perennial xenophobic violence against African immigrants has marred South Africa's credentials as a genuine regional "big brother." The lethargic response of government to the two most popularised xenophobic instances of violence—in 2008 and 2015—during which African immigrants from mostly SADC countries were killed, heightened suspicions of South Africa as a true regional leader. The violence, moreover, contradicted Pretoria's highly coveted African renaissance agenda. To be sure, the xenophobic violence became a major source of embarrassment to South Africa, which prided itself as a model of democracy and an apostle of human dignity. The use of quiet diplomacy on the errant Mugabe regime in the face of continuing human rights violations by Harare (HRW 2006) further revealed Pretoria's cosmetic support for human rights promotion abroad. Similarly, South Africa's silence on the restrictions and closed political space in Swaziland during the post-Mandela era raises serious questions about its claims as a genuine advocate of democracy in the region. Indeed, notwithstanding the continued rhetoric, post-Mandela South Africa has seen a decline in its adherence to human rights and democracy as cornerstones of its foreign policy in SADC. This development is, to a large extent, also evident in Pretoria's foreign policies in regional organizations especially, the African Union.

Regional Organizations—The African Union (AU)

South Africa has demonstrated rather erratic, hardly consistent, foreign policy in the OAU/AU, since it became a member in 1994. With a stronger economy and a model of democracy, South Africa quickly asserted itself as an influential, if not a leading, member of the body. In turn, the AU accorded South Africa the respect befitting a regional hegemon. Against a background of the long period of isolation under apartheid, one of Pretoria's inclinations was establishing its African identity (Le Pere 2015: 251). The crafting of the "African renaissance" idea by Mandela and making it a continental project was a step in projecting

South Africa as a true and leading African state. Indeed, the notion of the “African renaissance” aimed at rebranding Africa as a continent of hope, democracy and human rights from its popular image as a place of conflict, disease, and death. Subsequently, South Africa branded the FIFA Soccer World Cup, which it hosted in 2010, as an “African World Cup.” Mandela, however, failed to garner the support of members of the OAU in projecting the continent as a respecter of human rights and the rule of law. This became evident in November 1995, when Nigeria’s Sani Abacha defied international opinion and executed eight environmentalists, including Ken Saro-Wiwa. Mandela’s bid to mobilise African sentiments against Abacha was unsuccessful. To be sure, Mandela made more African foes than friends in his bid to bring African pressure on the Nigerian leader. Betrayed and alone, Pretoria could only sever diplomatic relations with Abuja.

Determined to reverse the tide and to make more friends than foes in Africa, Thabo Mbeki reoriented Pretoria’s African foreign policy away from emphasizing human rights to instead emphasizing economic development. Unlike Mandela, who was blunt in his condemnation of errant regimes, Mbeki embraced, wined, and dined with Africa’s notorious human rights abusers, including Robert Mugabe and Omar al-Bashir. Largely as a result of this new foreign policy direction, South Africa became an influential member of the OAU, reflected in a number of important ways. First, South Africa joined Nigeria, Algeria, Libya, and Egypt as leading financial contributor to the cash-strapped organization. These five countries contributed \$15 million annually towards the organization’s budget, far in excess of the contribution of other member states, which ranged between \$160,000 and \$20,000 (*The Economist* 27 January 2011). Moreover, consistent with promoting regional peace and security, South Africa led the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in 2003, and bore the bulk of the financial cost (Akokpari 2011a). Similarly, Pretoria was involved in conflict resolution efforts in Ivory Coast and the Central African Republic (CAR). Pretoria presently remains a central part of the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) and its peacemaking and peacekeeping architecture.

Second, South Africa, along with Algeria, Egypt, Libya, and Senegal, engineered the transformation of the 39-year-old OAU to the AU in July 2002. Primarily concerned with accelerating Africa’s decolonisation process, the OAU became anachronistic in a post-Cold War era characterised by globalisation, democratisation, and regionalisation.

South Africa's development programme—the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery (MAP)—crafted by Thabo Mbeki to address Africa's debt, served as one of the three core documents culminating in the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism. The other two documents were the OMEGA plan, developed by President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal to promote infrastructure development in French Africa, and the Global Compact for Africa Recovery, prepared by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), based in Addis Ababa (Akopari 2004: 246). To date, NEPAD remains the AU's blueprint document for development. South Africa's influence in the AU was further demonstrated by the election of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, its former Foreign and Home Affairs Minister, as the Chair of the AU Commission in July 2012, albeit under controversial circumstances.

However, South Africa's foreign policies in the AU were frequently marred by inconsistency and, sometimes, contradictions of broader AU policy. A few incidents are noted here. First, in the heat of the protest against Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, the West sought to protect civilians by imposing a “no-fly zone” over Libya. As a regional body, the AU decided not to support the resolution, but instead to follow its crafted road map to peace in Libya. However, on 17 March 2011, South Africa and the other two African non-permanent members of the Security Council—Gabon and Nigeria—controversially voted in support of the resolution. Pretoria, no doubt, wanted to ingratiate itself to the West and to project itself as promoting western values. Accordingly, South Africa justified its support for the resolution on grounds of protecting civilians (Smith 2015: 273). It was apparent that NATO used the protection of defenceless civilians as a pretext to effect regime change in Libya. Second, Pretoria breached a long-standing convention—not to have a candidate from the leading AU members as Chair of the AU Commission—when it presented Dlamini-Zuma who was elected in July 2012 after an inconclusive vote earlier in January (*The Guardian* 16 July 2012). Here, too, South Africa wanted to assert itself as a dominant force in the AU by having its candidate at the helm of the continental body. Third, South Africa controversially supported defeated candidate Laurent Gbagbo in the Ivory Coast's disputed November 2010 presidential election. Gbagbo lost the polls but refused to concede to his victorious rival, Alassane Ouattara. While ECOWAS and the AU were unanimous on the exit of Gbagbo, South Africa maintained that the polls

were inconclusive. As the impasse deepened and clashes between supporters of the two politicians escalated, Pretoria dispatched a naval frigate, the SAS Drakensberg, which docked off the coast of Ivory Coast in January 2011. Pretoria's antics and tactics emboldened the beleaguered Gbagbo who remained defiant to calls for his surrender. Importantly, South Africa's position contradicted the AU's official stance on Ivory Coast's electoral outcome (Lynch 2011). It was not exactly clear why South Africa maintained a contradictory stance. However, it may be that Pretoria wanted to use the crisis to assert itself in west Africa. This would have been possible had South Africa succeeded in retaining Gbagbo as president.

South African "exceptionalism"—the tendency for South Africans to perceive themselves as better than fellow Africans from the continent—has not helped the consistency in South Africa's foreign policy in the AU. On the contrary, this has seriously damaged Pretoria's African identity rhetoric. Worryingly, too, South Africa's exceptionalism and self-exaltation have been expressed in official circles. For example, in persuading South Africans about the merits of the highly unpopular e-tolls (a levy on motorists for using designated highways), President Jacob Zuma on 22 October 2013 admonished South African not to think like Africans. In his words: "We can't think like Africans in Africa generally. We're in Johannesburg... This is not some national road in Malawi" (cited in Padya 2015). It is suspected that such derogatory, if not demeaning, comments by the head of state inspired hatred for, and xenophobic violence against, African immigrants in the country. Such comments were incompatible with South Africa's quest for African unity and solidarity. The familiar pattern of inconsistency and contradiction was palpable in Pretoria's foreign policy in the UN—an issue to which this chapter now turns.

Global Organizations—The United Nations (UN)

South Africa was expelled from the UN in 1974 as a result of its apartheid policy. However, it was readmitted into the world body in 1994. The UN system was immediately used by South Africa to integrate itself into the larger international community of nations, following many years of international isolation. As a member of the UN, South Africa committed to upholding the principles of the organization. Twice in 2007–2008 and 2011–2012, South Africa served as one of the ten non-permanent

members of the UN Security Council. Consistent with its post-apartheid foreign policy principles, South Africa projected itself as a champion of global peace and security. In line with this stance, Mandela successfully mediated between Libya and the West over the Lockerbie incident in 1999, publically condemned what he considered US unilateral aggression against Iraq in 2003, and attempted, albeit with limited success, to mediate in the long-standing Israel and Palestinian dispute (DIRCO 2002). Characteristically, South Africa remained opposed to the use of military force in resolving international disputes and showed strong inclination towards multilateralism as an approach to resolving international conflicts.

Against a background of a successful and highly publicised reconciliation process, coupled with a stable democracy, South Africa projected itself as a leader not only in Africa but also in the developing world. It spoke on behalf of developing countries, especially Africa, in international fora, and particularly at the WTO, and presented itself as a champion of Western values. To be sure, Western countries expected South Africa to play a leadership role in the Third World, and Africa, in particular, in both spreading and entrenching democracy, human rights, as well as promoting regional peace and security. South Africa used this global expectation as both context and pretext for gaining a permanent seat in the UN Security Council (Le Pere 2015: 253). Accordingly, it joined India and Brazil in advocating for reforms in the UN Security Council to address what it perceived as “gross imbalances of power” in the UN system (BBC 2005). This stance was in consonance with Pretoria’s ambition to help construct an egalitarian international system devoid of inequality and injustice.

In pursuit of this, and also to compensate for its isolation under apartheid, South Africa sought to make extra-African friends. It struck trade and other commercial deals with the EU, China, India, Brazil, and Russia, often establishing stronger commercial ties with extra-African actors than with African states. South Africa’s commitment to the establishment of global peace and security was also demonstrated by its active participation in various anti-nuclear weapons regimes. Accordingly, it participated in such important regimes as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty five-year review conferences; the African Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (ANWFZ); and the Barack Obama Nuclear Security initiative—all of which were aimed at creating a world free of nuclear threats.

Often, however, South Africa's global foreign policies have been inconsistent—even sometimes contradictory—to the very principles it claims to defend. South Africa fiercely opposed apartheid, which oppressed and denied basic rights to Black Africans. Yet, paradoxically, Pretoria twice denied the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader of Tibet, who is part of the campaign for the territory's emancipation and autonomy from China, a visa to visit the country. Pretoria's refusal to allow the Dalai Lama into South Africa was widely thought to be at the behest of China (Akokpari 2011a: 61). It was contradictory for South Africa to repeatedly condemn Israel's human rights abuses in Palestine, while condoning China's repression of Tibetan aspiration. Moreover, in the UN Security Council, South Africa was "the only real democracy to vote against a resolution demanding that the Burmese junta stop ethnic cleansing and free jailed dissident Aung San Suu Kyi" (Cited in Smith 2008: 277). South Africa is part of the BRICS and did not want to risk any diplomatic confrontation with China, an influential member of the organization. Further, while a non-permanent member of the Security Council, South Africa showed indecision and vacillation in position on the Syria conflict. Smith (2015: 273) notes that Pretoria initially supported a "resolution drafted in February 2012, calling for Bashar al-Assad to step down (which was vetoed by Russia) but then backtracked by calling for the Syrian people to be allowed to decide their own fate." Similarly, South Africa showed inconsistency in pushing a human rights agenda at the global level in being silent, even protective of good governance-threatening regimes in Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (Smith 2015: 278), while claiming to be a champion of liberal values.

Yet, if Pretoria has been inconsistent or indecisive in upholding human rights at the global level, its adherence to international law and the principles of the UN is even more suspect. A signatory of the 1998 Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC), South Africa reneged on its international obligation to arrest and detain indicted Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir when the latter visited the country in June 2015 for an AU heads of states' summit. In this episode, moreover, Pretoria ignored a 15 June ruling of a North Gauteng High Court for the detention of the Sudanese leader. Thus, not only did South Africa breach its basic international obligation, but also disrespected a judgement of its own constitutionally established court of law. Even more disappointingly, on Friday 21 October 2016, South Africa's Justice Minister, Michael Masutha, officially announced the

country's intention to withdraw from the ICC (For more, see: Du Plessis and Gevers in Chapter 13). DIRCO has since officially communicated Pretoria's position to the UN Secretary General, Mr. Ban Ki-moon (Chan and Simons 2016). Opposition parties and various human rights groups criticised Pretoria's move as evidence of its renegeing on its claimed responsibility to be a continental protector of human rights.

CONCLUSION

Once a pariah state, in 1994, South Africa joined the community of states and became an active player in the international scene. South Africa tried, with a large degree of success, to shed its apartheid baggage and to rebrand itself as a human rights, democracy, and peace-loving state. These virtues, along with the belief in the sovereign equality of states, multilateralism, and international peace and security, served as the pillars of South Africa's post-apartheid foreign policy. South Africa remains a respectable member of SADC and the AU, where it exerts influence on account of its financial muscle and contribution to regional peace and security. Moreover, the size and buoyancy of its economy (in comparison with the fragile and unstable economies of most African states), along with the relative stability of its democracy, have given South Africa an edge over other African states in asserting its foreign policies.

The record of South Africa in international organizations has, however, been far from impressive as far as consistency in foreign policy positions were concerned. Contradictions were marked features of South Africa's foreign policy. While professing to ground human rights and democracy, and undertaking to push these as key pillars of foreign policy, the practical adherence to these pillars has, at best, been *ad hoc* and erratic. South Africa became selective in the application of human rights in foreign policy situations, especially during the post-Mandela era. Neither Thabo Mbeki nor Jacob Zuma showed the commitment and courage exhibited by Nelson Mandela in insisting on the respect for human rights in other African states. To be sure, Mbeki and Zuma promoted South Africa's economic and political interests by "playing it safe" and seeking not to alienate African states while at the same time endearing South Africa to powerful members of the Security Council. In following this path, however, South Africa only succeeded in earning for itself the enviable accolade as the master of contradictions in foreign policy postures, in international institutions and otherwise.

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Leverage in a Tight Space: Zimbabwean Foreign Policy in International Organizations

Sarah J. Lockwood

For decades, Robert Mugabe has thumbed his nose at the world. The long-time dictator has ruled Zimbabwe with an iron fist, repeatedly insulted foreign dignitaries, ignored regional and international agreements to which he was a signatory, and isolated the country from any legitimate international economic or political engagement (Bennett 2013).

So begins a 2013 article in *Foreign Policy*, written by Zimbabwean politician Roy Bennett, a member of the opposition party the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). The article goes on to call Mugabe a “laughing stock around the world,” and argues that he has “spent decades disrespecting and defying regional and international institutions,” resulting in Zimbabwe becoming a “pariah” in the international community (Bennett 2013).

Putting aside the clear political agenda of the article’s author for a moment, the idea that Mugabe has become an international pariah is certainly not limited to members of the main opposition party (Alden

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2010: 1; Koinange 2005; Mlambo 2014: 5–6; Sparrow 2002; Youde 2007: 9). What such arguments often fail to note, however, is that while the violence and political activities of Mugabe’s regime may be widely criticized in Europe and North America, he remains extremely popular in many other countries—hailed for his liberation credentials, his land reform program, and his strong stance against imperialism and the global domination of the West (Alden 2002: 9–15; Bourne 2011: 176; Murithi and Mawadza 2011: 17; Townsend and Copson 2005: 11–16). While Mugabe’s actions and anti-West rhetoric have made him a pariah to some, therefore, the same actions have been interpreted very differently elsewhere, raising the possibility that Mugabe and the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) party may actually have a much more nuanced approach to foreign policy than is often claimed.¹

So what does drive Zimbabwe’s foreign policy? This chapter argues that three things are crucial in determining the international activities of the Mugabe regime. First, the domestic goals of government—increasingly focused on the survival of the current set of elites—are key to deciding the foreign policy objectives. Second, the international relations lessons learnt by Mugabe and ZANU–PF during the liberation war are central to how these goals are pursued. And finally, the limited number of things Zimbabwe has to offer potential international partners (aside from some access to raw materials and a small domestic market) helps to determine the strategies used by the government in pursuit of its goals.

The chapter will proceed as follows. The next section will present a very brief history of the IR of ZANU–PF during the liberation struggle and draw out a number of key foreign policy lessons the party learned over this period. Following this, the remainder of the chapter will focus on three contemporary foreign policy goals pursued by the Mugabe administration as part of its quest to remain in power, with a particular focus on Zimbabwe’s use of international organizations (IOs) in this regard.² The final section will conclude.

LESSONS FROM THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

We have fought for our land, we have fought for our sovereignty, small as we are we have won our independence and we are prepared to shed our blood.... So, Blair keep your England, and let me keep my Zimbabwe.

– President Robert Mugabe, 2002 (Battersby and Grice (2002)

It is often assumed that Zimbabwe had to develop an entirely new foreign policy approach upon independence in 1980—completely rethinking its relations with the outside world and developing new administrative capacities (Aluko 1977: 1; Chimankire 2003: 179; Patel 1987: 7). While it is certainly true, of course, that independence required substantial changes in the *official* foreign policy of Zimbabwe, this does not mean that the new ruling party had to develop its international relations approach entirely from scratch. By 1980, ZANU–PF had almost two decades of international relations experience, and events during this period have critically shaped the country’s foreign policy in the years since. To fully understand contemporary Zimbabwe’s foreign policy approach, therefore, it is necessary to at least briefly explore the pre-independence international relations of its ruling party, especially as they relate to the IOs of the time.³

From the moment of its founding in 1963, as a splinter party from Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) was forced to build IR in order to survive.⁴ Forced into exile in 1964, ZANU relied heavily on neighboring countries such as Zambia for bases from which to operate, and the international community more broadly for funds and support. Initially, however, ZAPU dominated the international arena, severely limiting ZANU’s ability to gain international recognition and backing. Key funders of liberation struggles across the region, including the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the Pan-African Freedom Movement for East, Central, and Southern Africa (PAFMECSA), and the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization (AAPSO), funneled most of their funding to the better known and officially recognized ZAPU, leaving little more than scraps for the newly formed group.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, the Sino-Soviet split allowed ZANU to court crucial support from China, in opposition to the Soviet-supported ZAPU. ZANU now had more funding, but it still lacked real international recognition—especially among the Soviet Bloc—which continued to limit its ability to challenge both ZAPU and the Ian Smith regime. This eventually changed with the creation of the Frontline States (FLS) in 1975, which was determined to avoid an escalation of the situation in Zimbabwe, and wanted unity among the liberation movements to both strengthen their negotiating position and to avoid civil war (Bhebe 2015; Reed 1993: 43; Stedman 1991: 64). To achieve this, the FLS, and later the OAU and OAU Liberation Committee, decided to recognize only an expanded African National

Congress (ANC), which incorporated both ZANU and ZAPU (Yousuf 1985: 64). ZANU now had formal recognition and a seat at the table, but it was still constrained by the regional insistence that it act only as part of a larger umbrella movement (Stedman 1991: 52–54). Indeed, it was not until the late 1970s, after several rounds of negotiations had broken down, that ZANU was finally able to establish itself as not only a legitimate actor, but as the key player in the transition to independence (Reed 1993: 45).

Brief as it is, this history suggests four important lessons that Mugabe and ZANU–PF learned during this period—lessons that continue to guide the foreign policy of Zimbabwe today. The first was the importance of IOs and the international community in helping to determine the relative positions of domestic players. As Reed makes clear, external support was what really allowed ZANU to challenge the sovereignty of the Zimbabwean state, but it was also key in determining the power of ZANU relative to ZAPU and the other groups at the negotiating table (Reed 1993). Dominating the international arena increased the bargaining power of ZANU vis-à-vis both the government of Ian Smith and the other liberation movements, and ultimately paved the way for the victory of the party in the 1980 elections. In addition to the importance of the international community in domestic power battles, the pre-independence period also taught ZANU the importance of formal international recognition in obtaining support and aid. Without the support and recognition of the international community in the 1960s, ZANU struggled to attract funding and establish itself as anything more than a splinter group from a better-known movement, and it was only once key organizations such as the OAU and the FLS finally recognized it as a legitimate contender for power that it really saw a change in its fortunes. The third lesson learned by Mugabe and his party was the importance of regional support, over and above the support of the broader international community. “While shifts in international political alliances did permit ZANU to develop new alliances,” Reed notes, “the structure of global politics did not limit ZANU’s maneuverability nearly as much as shifting interests at the regional level” (Reed 1993: 54). For as long as the FLS wanted negotiations and not guerilla warfare in Zimbabwe, for example, ZANU was limited in terms of what it felt able to do domestically, and as long as the regional bodies withheld their recognition and legitimacy, ZANU was unable to take the front line in the negotiating process—regardless of the strength of support it had within the country and outside the region.

Finally, the pre-independence period also showed the current government the strength that the developing world could have against powerful countries, such as Britain, if they worked together as a group. A good example of this can be seen in the late 1970s, when pressure from the FLS and developing countries within the Commonwealth successfully convinced Margaret Thatcher, the newly elected British Prime Minister, to continue constitutional negotiations with ZANU, despite her concerns about their position at the table (Africa Contemporary Record 1979/1980; Reed 1993: 50–53; Stedman 1991: 168, 203–204). Despite Britain’s wealth and power, therefore, ZANU learned that support from a large enough group of developing nations could influence the decisions made—a lesson Zimbabwe continues to make good use of today.

ZIMBABWE’S FOREIGN POLICY TODAY

Blair, Blair, who was he? Just the prime minister of Britain. I’m president of Zimbabwe.

– President Robert Mugabe, 2015 (Smith 2015)

Having briefly outlined the lessons learned from the liberation struggle, we turn now to the present, and the argument that the desire for regime survival is central to understanding the Zimbabwean government’s contemporary foreign policy objectives. This does not, of course, mean that regime survival is the only thing driving Zimbabwe’s foreign policy goals—it is not, and strong arguments can and have been made for the importance of other factors, including ideology and geography (Chan and Patel 2006: 176–180; Chimanikire 2003: 180–181; Mudyanadzo 2011: 3–17; Nkiwane 1999: 204–205).⁵ As the ruling party faces an increasingly precarious position at home, however, the desire to remain in power has increased in importance in their foreign policy activities, as the government has been forced to use every domestic and international opportunity to “consolidate [its] grip on power” (Alao 2012: xi).⁶

Starting from this point—that the survival of the current regime is a crucial determinate of Zimbabwe’s international affairs—the rest of this chapter will explore three important foreign policy goals developed by Mugabe and ZANU–PF in pursuit of this. These are (1) accessing foreign aid and investment; (2) limiting international criticism; and (3) reducing the opposition threat.

ACCESSING AID AND INVESTMENT

We have turned east, where the sun rises, and given our back to the west,
where the sun sets.

– President Robert Mugabe, 2005 (Meldrum 2005)

Over the last two decades, the economy of Zimbabwe has been brought to a precarious position (African Progress Panel 2014; “The Introduction of New Coins” 2015). Much of this is due to economic mismanagement, but drought, global pressures, the HIV/AIDS crisis, attempts by the USA and UK to limit Zimbabwe’s access to global financial institutions, and the enormous extent of the changes needed and expected to overcome the colonial legacy have all also played a part. Affecting all Zimbabweans, the deteriorating economic situation has put significant pressures on the security of the governing regime, directly threatening ZANU–PF’s hold on power. Strikes over wages, unemployment, and food shortages have become common—often tied to discontent with the governing regime—while growing unhappiness with the government’s handling of the economy has facilitated the rise of opposition parties such as the MDC (Moyo 2014; Porter 2007). Even those who have traditionally supported the regime—the so-called war veterans—have become increasingly vocal in their demands, putting huge pressure on the government to find enough money to appease its patronage networks (Alao 2012: 96–97). With the domestic economy in ruins, foreign aid and investment have become crucial lifelines for the government, and as a result, significant foreign policy energy is spent trying to access these (Chan and Patel 2006: 178; Engel 1994: 307 and 328; Kachiga 2013; Townsend and Copson 2005; Youde 2007: 11).

In some cases—such as with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans arranged in 1992 and 2009—funds have been sought and obtained directly from an IO (Dreher et al. 2009: 743). As Mugabe’s reputation in the West has deteriorated in recent years, however, many international financial institutions have been reluctant to provide funds directly to the government or have imposed strict conditions that would significantly limit the government’s ability to use this money to maintain its grip on power (Smith 2009; Thornycroft 2014).

The importance of IOs to Zimbabwe’s pursuit of aid and investment goes much further than the direct provision of funds from financial institutions, however. Mugabe’s own position in other IOs—particularly

regional ones—has been crucial to his pursuit of foreign aid, as it gives him something to offer in return for financial help and support. In the case of Zimbabwe’s Look East Policy, for example, China has recently shown itself to be less willing to simply provide funds in exchange for access to minerals, but as a key player in both the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), Mugabe is also able to offer China his continental influence as well as access to other key players in the region (Eisenman 2005; Wekesa 2014). In addition, although Mugabe may have less overall influence in global organizations such as the United Nations (UN), in 2004 China and Zimbabwe were able to cooperate together to fend off condemnatory resolutions in the UN Commission on Human Rights, while Dreher et al (2009) provide convincing evidence that Zimbabwe was also able to use its two-year position on the UN Security Council (and the votes that this involved) to gain access to an IMF loan (Dreher et al. 2009: 742–743; Eisenman 2005; Kachiga 2013). For a country with limited things to offer potential partners, therefore, IOs provide Mugabe with crucial bargaining chips—making it possible for Zimbabwe to access financial resources it would otherwise have struggled to obtain.

Finally, a third way in which IOs have helped the Zimbabwean government to access the money it so desperately needs is by providing support and legitimacy to some of Mugabe’s other money-seeking activities. For example, in August 1998, when Mugabe wanted to intervene in the war in the Congo—at least in part for financial gain—he was able to use his position within the SADC to help legitimize his intervention and to mobilize regional support behind it (Alden 2002: 13; Alao 2012: 154–155; Chimankire 2003: 187–191). Unfortunately for Mugabe, the result of his intervention in the Congo was ultimately to worsen Zimbabwe’s economic crisis and to threaten his hold on power still further, but this does not negate the way in which he was able to use his position within an IO to help him pursue what he believed would be access to much-needed funds (Alao 2012: 157–158).

LIMITING INTERNATIONAL CRITICISM

I am termed dictator because I have rejected this supremacist view and frustrated the neo-colonialists.

– President Robert Mugabe, 2007 (Mugabe 2007)

Given Mugabe's appalling international reputation in much of the Anglo-American world today, it is, perhaps, surprising to argue that one of Zimbabwe's key foreign policy objectives is to limit international criticism. A close examination of the facts, however, shows this to be a clear, acknowledged and critical part of the government's activity in the international arena (Chimanikire 2003: 194; Government of Zimbabwe 1999). There are several reasons for this. First, as ZANU–PF learned during the liberation struggle, at least some semblance of international legitimacy is essential to access much of the foreign aid available around the world. Second, international criticism is often accompanied by financial sanctions, which create additional economic pressures. And finally, as will be discussed in the next section, the public support of other international leaders—particularly in Africa—is crucial to ZANU–PF's pursuit of domestic legitimacy and its ability to limit internal threats to its power. While criticism of Mugabe from some countries may be heavy, therefore, Mugabe and other ZANU–PF elites can be seen working hard in the international arena to limit this criticism—or at least to ensure that its consequences are minimal.

The Zimbabwean government uses two primary tactics in this regard—fiery rhetoric to gain support from other developing countries, and, when that fails, trying to ensure that responsibility for dealing with the “Zimbabwe situation” is delegated to those IOs it has the most influence in. Turning to rhetoric first, as Phimister and Raftopolous (2004) argue, by defining the Zimbabwean crisis as one of anti-colonial redress and highlighting the continued need to guard against the threat posed by coloniality (the survival of colonial-like relations after independence), “Mugabe has very skillfully set the parameters of the subsequent debate,” dividing opinion around the world and ensuring he remains a hero to many for his fight against the pressures and domination of the West (386). This in turn has made it difficult for many IOs—such as the UN—to seriously criticize the Mugabe regime and has helped to limit the sanctions the country has faced around the world (Alao 2012: 196). Perhaps more importantly, however, Mugabe's fiery rhetoric has also helped the government to effectively eliminate any serious criticism or pressures for change at the regional level (a level ZANU–PF knows is key in domestic power struggles), as Mugabe's positioning of himself as a liberation hero, fighting against the continued domination of Britain and the West, has made both the AU and the SADC extremely reluctant to criticize him for fear of being accused of betraying the African cause (Alao 2012: 204).

Of course, rhetoric alone does not always work, and on those relatively rare occasions where Zimbabwe has been unable to successfully stave off strong criticism from an IO, Mugabe has either encouraged the delegation of the issue to an organization he feels he has more influence in (usually the SADC)⁷ or—as in the case of the Commonwealth—he has withdrawn from the organization altogether (MacAskill and Meldrum 2003; Murithi and Mawadza 2011: 290–293; Prendergast and Jafari 2004: 107; “What’s the Commonwealth for?” 2003). While limiting international criticism is undoubtedly a key foreign policy goal of Zimbabwe, therefore, it is clear that the ruling party is not usually willing to actually change its domestic activities in order to achieve this. Rather it prefers to rely on a mix of rhetoric, pressure, and strategic withdrawal, to limit the criticism to more manageable levels.

REDUCING THE OPPOSITION THREAT

Only God who appointed me will remove me – not the MDC, not the British.

– President Robert Mugabe, 2008⁸

As well as seeking foreign aid to support the ruling regime and using foreign policy to limit international criticism, the Zimbabwean government also uses foreign policy to strengthen its domestic legitimacy and to reduce internal threats.

Rhetoric, again, is key here, and Mugabe’s language around race and anti-imperialism in the international arena is aimed as much at silencing domestic criticism as it is at splitting international opinion (Phimister and Raftopolous 2004: 385). Emphasizing ZANU–PF’s liberation credentials, framing the problems faced by the country as colonial in origin, rejecting all criticism as imperial and racist, and accusing all opposition parties of being “puppets” of a continually interfering West make it difficult for domestic groups to criticize Mugabe, and for opposition parties like the MDC to gain any real traction (Alao 2012: 62 and 223; Bourne 2011: 170–173; Mlambo 2014: 231–249; Phimister and Raftopoulos 2004: 394–395; Youde 2007: 15).

When, despite Mugabe’s skillful use of rhetoric, domestic criticism increases, however, Mugabe often turns directly to IOs to help him strengthen his grip on power. For example, for many years now, Mugabe has used the power he has within the SADC to limit the ability

of the MDC to gain recognition as a legitimate party, and through this to reduce the domestic threat it poses (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2011: 16). Similarly, following the heavily contested elections of 2008, Mugabe turned to the AU to strengthen his suddenly weakened domestic position. Flying up to the AU summit in Sharm el-Sheikh almost immediately after being sworn back in as president, Mugabe strongly reprimanded AU attempts at criticism of the recent Zimbabwean elections, and skillfully used the problematic legitimacy of other African leaders to limit opposition (Abwao and Cowell 2008; Welz 2013: 42). More importantly, however, he also used his participation at the AU summit to demonstrate his continued position as the leader of Zimbabwe, despite the fact the recent elections had been almost universally condemned. The AU's granting of at least some external recognition and legitimacy during this summit, albeit along with some significant criticism, made it much harder for the MDC to subsequently challenge the election results, and significantly limited the threat Mugabe's regime faced (Abwao and Cowell 2008; "Saving Zimbabwe" 2008; Welz 2013: 40–42).

As was the case during the liberation struggle, however, the benefits of IOs in this regard have not all flowed one way, and IOs have also forced Mugabe to the domestic negotiating table when he would rather have avoided it altogether. The 2008 elections again provide a case in point, as both AU and SADC pressures, although they never threatened to remove Mugabe from power, did force him to negotiate with opposition parties, and eventually accept the formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) (Bratton 2014: 123; Mlambo 2014: 248)⁹ (For more on GNUs, see: Noyes in Chapter 6 of this volume). IOs both helped and hindered Mugabe's foreign and domestic goals over this period, therefore, showing once again the importance of a careful foreign policy approach.

CONCLUSION

Thank you for the publicity you have given me, those of you who have focused on me as a real dictator.

– President Robert Mugabe, April 2015 (Smith 2015)

This chapter has argued that the foreign policy of Zimbabwe is, in reality, much more nuanced and complex than often assumed. Far from thumbing his nose at the world and leaving Zimbabwe an isolated pariah, as Roy Bennett claims, Mugabe and ZANU–PF actually work with great

skill in the international arena to access financial aid, limit international criticism, and reduce internal threats—all in pursuit of their key domestic goal of remaining in power.

Of course, it could be argued that Mugabe and ZANU–PF would not have to work so hard to access financial aid and limit international criticism if they were not so rhetorically bullish on the international stage in the first place, but such an argument ignores the reality of coloniality, and the fact that the anti-colonial rhetoric also helps Mugabe and his government to increase their domestic and regional legitimacy—both of which are key to their grip on power. In addition, their rhetoric only really isolates Zimbabwe from Europe and North America—two big powers in the world for sure, but powers whose aid often comes with undesirable conditions that would limit Mugabe’s domestic maneuverability, and whose reach has, thus far at least, been largely controllable through Mugabe’s regional support.

So what role do IOs play in all of this? And have they generally hindered or helped the ZANU–PF regime in its pursuit of its goals? On the one hand, some IOs have clearly helped—by providing access to support and funds, making it difficult for opposition groups to challenge the status quo, and helping Mugabe to limit international criticism. On the other hand, however, IOs—both pre- and post-independence—have also forced Mugabe to the negotiating table when he would rather have avoided it, and the dominance of countries such as Britain and the USA within many IOs has also helped to develop and spread Zimbabwe’s reputation as a pariah state. Despite the occasional problems IOs undoubtedly cause him, however, Mugabe has shown himself to be skilled at using rhetoric and the leverage he has to both push his agenda within them and to use them against each other to fend off threats to his rule.

Of course, no leader—no matter how skilled—can monopolize power forever, and recent events in Zimbabwe show Mugabe and ZANU–PF to be in an increasingly tight spot. Acute drought, a worsening economic crisis, and rising protests have all put pressure on the current regime, which desperately needs to increase its access to foreign funds in order to tackle these new challenges. As the need for foreign funds increases, however, access to these funds has become increasingly difficult. China, the IMF, World Bank, and African Development Bank are all currently refusing to make new funds available until existing debts are serviced, and there are also rumors that at least some of them are trying to impose political conditions on any future loans that would force Mugabe to step down (Matisonn 2016; Thornycroft 2016).

Never easily deterred, however, Mugabe and the Zimbabwean government continue to seek funds from other banks and international institutions all over the globe, and to use what influence and rhetoric they can to limit the international and domestic criticism that challenges their hold on power. Even as the space gets tighter, therefore, it is clear that IOs continue to be key to Mugabe's pursuit of his domestic goals, and it seems likely that the strategies outlined above will continue to be central to his attempt to remain in power going forward.

NOTES

1. Although it is undoubtedly true that individuals and groups outside of Mugabe and the ZANU–PF elite have some influence on Zimbabwe's foreign policy, I follow Alao (2012), Chimanikire (2003), and Mudyadzo (2011) here in focusing primarily on Mugabe in this regard. The importance of Mugabe to Zimbabwe's foreign policy can also be seen in a speech to Parliament by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Witness Mangwende, in which he said: "The Head of Government is the center of gravity in the conduct of international relations. He defines the policies to be pursued and establishes the context, tone and the actual pace at which the goals are to be pursued" (Mudyadzo 2011: 17).
2. This focus on the Zimbabwean government's use of IOs is in no way meant to imply that IOs are passive actors with no interests or strategies of their own. That is clearly not the case. Building on a growing literature on African agency in IR (including Beswick and Hammerstad (2013), Brown (2012), Brown and Harman (2013), and Mohan and Lampeter (2013)), however, this chapter is interested primarily in the ways in which Mugabe and his government work to try and advance their own interests in the international arena, exerting their agency within existing structural constraints, and with an awareness of the competing incentives and interests of others.
3. A brief note on terminology: Although Zimbabwe was variously known as Southern Rhodesia, Rhodesia and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia during the pre-independence period, I will refer to it as Zimbabwe throughout for the sake of simplicity. I will also use ZANU–PF to refer exclusively to the post-independence ruling party led by Robert Mugabe, and ZANU to refer to the liberation movement from which it developed. ZAPU will be used to refer to the liberation movement led by Joshua Nkomo. This, of course, ignores many of the complex name changes that occurred in both groups over the period, and interested readers are referred to Alao (2012) for a more detailed discussion of these.

4. This historical section draws heavily on: Bourne (2011), Dorman (2016), Mlambo (2014), Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009), and Reed (1993).
5. For interested readers, a useful discussion of the content of Zimbabwe's foreign policy associated with some of these other goals can be found in Chimani (2003): 180–181, Engel (1994), and Patel (1987).
6. For a more theoretical discussion of this phenomenon see Clapham (1977a).
7. For example, when Mugabe was unable to fully quash the increasing criticism coming from the AU in 2008, he encouraged the continued delegation of the issue to the SADC—a sub-regional body he knew he would have a better chance of influencing (“Mugabe Upbeat” 2008; Murithi and Mawadza 2011, 290–293).
8. “Mugabe condemns opposition lies” (2008).
9. For a more detailed discussion of SADC's role in the Zimbabwe crisis, interested readers are referred to: Alao (2012), Alden (2010), Bratton (2014), and Bourne (2011).

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Angola's Measured Distance from International Organizations

Assis Malaquias

Angola's foreign policy can be divided into two distinct periods: "the war years," from independence in 1975 until 2002, and "the postwar years," from 2002 to today. The first period was dominated by an incessant quest for state security which consumed both the governing elite's imagination and the Angolan state's resources to the point of exhaustion (Malaquias 2000). This search was largely unsuccessful due to the complexity of the security challenges facing the post-colonial state, in the sense that it was unable to fully manage the array of factors—military, political, and economic—that seriously endangered the regime, to say nothing of the average citizen's ability to survive. The nature, scale, and complexity of the challenges facing Angola since independence have consistently overwhelmed the limited domestic capacity that the new state inherited from the colonial power, Portugal. The nature of these challenges confounded the post-colonial leadership because they invariably presented themselves as combinations of two or more factors, such as internal vs. external; military vs. political vs. economic; ideological vs. ethnic vs. racial vs. regional.

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Lacking the domestic capacity to solve the myriad threats and challenges that confronted it immediately after independence, the leadership of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA)¹—the nationalist movement that took over after independence—eschewed state security for a narrower focus on regime security. The means of MPLA’s survival strategy were obtained externally by cultivating strong relationships with friendly *states*, not through the various *international organizations* to which it belonged: the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), the Organization of Africa Unity (OAU), the African Union (AU), and the United Nations (UN). The same approach has been used in the post-civil war period to address a different set of survival challenges. China, rather than international organizations, is seen by the MPLA being able to offer tangible immediate benefits to the regime. The main exception has been the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).²

This chapter focuses on Angola’s international relations, paying particular attention to the choices taken by MPLA to survive. It argues that the governing MPLA made a calculated choice *not* to focus on international organizations because it expected low, intangible, benefits from such engagement. Instead, it preferred to invest in developing strong relations with friendly states because such relationships produced high, tangible, benefits to the regime, primarily focused on regime security.

RELATIONS WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DURING THE WAR OF LIBERATION

Angola’s key political actors have historically sought to resolve domestic issues by engaging external actors. Even before independence, the external, international sphere offered ample opportunities for domestic actors within Angola to seek solutions to their challenges. Although various nationalist movements emerged to fight against colonialism, their regional origins, ideological differences, and external relations within the Cold War context created conditions for vicious rivalries among the armed nationalist groups. The liberation movements gained some international support, especially in Africa, where newly independent states were firmly on the side of liberation. But African states, either acting alone or collectively within the OAU, proved unable to help unite Angola’s liberation movements because the OAU itself was

deeply divided on issues about Angola. Within the Cold War context, many African states took sides. There were pro-Western OAU members and pro-Soviet OAU members. Each group showed preference to the Angolan liberation movement with similar ideological orientation. Pro-Western African states like Congo-Kinshasa supported the Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA)³ while pro-Soviet states like Congo-Brazzaville supported the MPLA.

For the MPLA as well as the other liberation movements in Angola—the FNLA and the União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola (UNITA)⁴—external support was critical to survival. Each movement established external channels that enabled them to conduct the anti-colonial armed struggle inside Angola. Thus, Zaire became FNLA's main territorial base of support, MPLA was based in Congo-Brazzaville, and UNITA was able to establish important bases in Zambia. Close relations with these countries enabled the Angolan liberation movements to use them as bases for engaging the rest of the continent and the wider international community. It was from Brazzaville that MPLA was able to develop ties with the Soviet bloc and left-of-center parties in the Western world. Likewise, with the direct support of the Zairean government, FNLA was able to establish strong relationships elsewhere in Africa and key links around the world, including with China and the USA. Although the liberation movements also sought assistance from the OAU, this organization could not deliver effective support because of its internal divisions. The lack of unity within the Angolan nationalist movement also created divisions within the OAU on the Angola issue.

The external alliances established throughout the 1960s and early 1970s played a critical role at the internal level when Angola entered a complex and violent period of transitions marked by the collapse of the colonial regime in 1974. The key enabler in MPLA's successful takeover was the set of external relationships with African states like Congo-Brazzaville and more distant states like the former Soviet Union and Cuba (Klinghoffer 1980; Shubin and Tokarev 2001; Gleijeses 2002; Saney 2006; Shubin 2008). The other two liberation movements' external backers also intervened (Steenkamp 1989; Minter 1994), albeit unsuccessfully (Guimarães 1998; Brittain 1998). To be sure, the OAU was impotent in preventing the start of Angola's civil war, or its subsequent internationalization. For these reasons, among others, the organization would continue to have little relevance in Angola's overall foreign policy calculations.

THE VARIOUS FAILURES OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN ANGOLAN HISTORY

What factors prevented international organizations—especially the OAU—from doing more to prevent Angola’s civil war? International organizations could not realistically have been expected to play a more effective role because of their own divisions on the Angola issue. At the continental level, the OAU had sought to take concrete steps to accelerate decolonization by moving to recognize the *Governo Revolucionário de Angola no Exílio* (GRAE)⁵ as early as August 1964 (Khapoya 1976; James III 2011; Guimaraes 1998; Wallerstein 2005)—only three months after the organization was created. The OAU’s engagement, though, ultimately failed to bring the liberation movements together and prevent the civil war a decade later mainly because member states could not agree on how best to support the struggle for Angola’s independence. Specifically, there was profound disagreement on which liberation movement should receive the organization’s support.

In the process of assisting the liberation of Angola, the OAU also failed to be an honest broker. It took sides by supporting FNLA’s GRAE when it appeared that this structure was on the ascent and MPLA was heading toward extinction, only to reverse itself when MPLA appeared stronger and FNLA looked to be a spent force. But the OAU’s decisions to grant support to one liberation movement over the other were based on superficial assessments. Since both movements were highly dependent on the support of their hosts, much of their military exploits and political accomplishments in Angola as well as diplomatic successes on the continental and world stages were a direct reflection of the levels of support provided to FNLA/GRAE by Zaire and to MPLA by Congo-Brazzaville. Importantly, it was through these countries that international assistance to the liberation movements was channeled. In other words, the OAU’s support to the liberation movements—and the associated legitimacy it conferred—did not take into account how these movements performed inside Angola; it only captured the external dimensions of their struggle. Tragically, by taking sides, the OAU missed an opportunity to play a constructive role in Angola. In fact, it can be argued that the OAU made matters worse by becoming a factor in the competition that defined intranationalist dynamics in the critical years before independence. To recognize one and not the other liberation movement meant that the OAU was extremely limited in the role it could play when the

movements were unable to find common ground in the transition to independence. It had lost leverage and, with it, the ability to persuade. This is one of the key factors in explaining Angola's calculated distance from the OAU and, subsequently, the AU. These organizations were never regarded as having played a key positive role in the survival of the MPLA during the liberation struggle.

The Angola issue was just as divisive at the UN as it was at the OAU. Consequently, the world body was also not in a position to play a major role in the years leading up to independence in Angola. Although there was strong agreement about the need to eradicate colonialism, as expressed in UN Resolution 1514 (1960) on the "Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," the dynamics of international politics for much of the 1960s and 1970s were such that independence for Angola was not unproblematic. UN Resolution 1514 served as the basis for UN Resolution 1742 (1962) which reaffirmed the "inalienable right of the Angolan people to self-determination and independence," urged the government of Portugal to "transfer power to the people of Angola," and requested UN member States to use their influence to "secure the compliance of Portugal." But Portugal was a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member with allies, including the USA, in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Within the context of the Cold War, expecting that Western allies would put sufficient pressure on Portugal to accept the UN resolution was, at best, unrealistic. Instead, most of the pressure came from non-Western countries ideologically aligned with the former Soviet Union and with close connections with MPLA.

With MPLA proclaiming independence in Luanda—and while FNLA and UNITA set up a rival government in Huambo—several countries quickly moved to recognize the new state (Bridgland 1988). Thenceforth, the OAU's principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of independent states was used as a convenient cover, especially by African countries, to stay away from Angola—even when this new county was under attack by foreign forces. Similarly, the non-interference stance also led most African countries whose governing parties aligned with MPLA to either support or remain silent when Cuban troops intervened to assist MPLA to defend the capital and ultimately evict FNLA and UNITA from the city.

Predictably, however, evicting FNLA and UNITA from Luanda ensured that the regime survived its first major crisis but it did not end

the cycle of violence. Rather, it forced it into a new level of destruction as both evicted movements retreated into their regions of origin/support from where they continued armed opposition against the new government. Although FNLA was a spent military force by 1978 (Valetta 1978) and the following decades struggling to avoid extinction, UNITA's fortunes took a markedly different path. UNITA retreated into the central highlands and as the new government gained control of major urban centers, the rebels retreated further south and established their central base in the southeastern corner of the country. From his new headquarters at Jamba, Savimbi transformed his defeated guerrillas into a powerful military force with the help of South Africa and, later, the USA (Potgieter 2000). Could the OAU have helped to prevent this? Certainly, Savimbi could not have built his guerrilla force into a powerful semi-conventional army without support from African states. Had the OAU been united on Angola, it could have found ways to pressure all its member states to really abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of Angola. Deep divisions within this organization again prevented it from playing a positive role in Angola.

In the 1980s, UNITA quickly expanded its military operations and effectively prevented the MPLA from governing much of the country. It was in the context of a quickly deteriorating security environment that the Angolan government accepted American proposals linking peace in Angola and independence for Namibia. Peace in Angola would involve withdrawal of the Cuban troops that had played a vital role in securing the regime, a negotiated end to the civil war, and multiparty elections. The fact that American proposals guided peace efforts in Angola further highlights the OAU's marginal role. It did not have sufficient leverage to encourage either MPLA or UNITA to settle their disputes peacefully. Its member states did not share a common understanding of the nature of the Angola conflict and how best to end it. Besides, the Angolan government consistently portrayed the civil war as an internal matter and argued that African states should stop assisting UNITA. Mentions of "imperialist interference" and "apartheid aggression" were used to highlight Angola's plight. They were not used to seek direct OAU involvement. To help bring the civil war to an end, Angola again preferred to deal with a state—the USA—because it understood that it was US assistance, transiting through Zaire, that sustained UNITA. Although the OAU could conceivably have pressured Zaire to stop supporting UNITA, Angola deemed it more effective to bypass the OAU completely

and negotiate directly with the USA. Since neither UNITA nor Zaire could ignore US pressure, the rebels quickly accepted the conditions to settling the conflict.

Angola's first attempt to achieve peace did not last because UNITA found alternative resources to pursue its goals. By exploring diamonds within areas it controlled, UNITA was able to continue the war for another decade. Could the OAU have played a role in preventing, or at least shortening, the post-electoral phase of the war? It could not, alas. Neither MPLA nor UNITA saw the OAU as an important player in Angola; as it lacked resources and leverage. The only players that really counted were MPLA and UNITA at the national level and the USA at the international level. This explains why it was the killing of Savimbi on the battlefield that brought the conflict to an end, not the engagement of international organizations.

Savimbi's demise meant that MPLA had survived all direct threats to its survival and could now turn to broader objectives, including satisfying some of the population's development aspirations. Given its economic and military weight within SADC, ECCAS, and in the Gulf of Guinea Commission,⁶ instead Angola could have anchored its development plans regionally. This was not the case. Angola pragmatically focuses on developing closer relationships with states like China that could deliver immediate tangible benefits.

POST-CIVIL WAR RELATIONS: SAVED BY CHINA

China played a critical role in helping the Angolan regime overcome difficult challenges associated with MPLA's promise to rebuild the country and firmly place it on the path to development once the war ended. But MPLA had neither the human nor financial resources to do so. China effectively saved the MPLA regime by offering generous lines of credit to finance one of the most ambitious postwar reconstruction projects in Africa. It also provided Angola with hundreds of thousands of skilled and unskilled workers to work in those projects. In what became popularly known as the "Angola model," China earned access to Angola's natural resources—mainly oil and, more recently, land—in exchange for capital and labor (Davies 2010; Corkin 2011).

Nevertheless, a decade into the Sino-Angola relationship, major cracks have appeared. Some of the infrastructure built with Chinese funding and labor is crumbling. Roads and railroads have not survived the first

few rainy seasons. Hospitals, schools, and hotels conspicuously display cracks, and some of the massive housing projects built throughout the country are no longer viewed as a wise investment. Even as the relationship with China goes through a difficult time, it is unlikely that Angola will shift its foreign policy focus to international organizations because they simply cannot offer what the regime most urgently needs to continue surviving. In the past, the regime urgently needed military means to survive. States like Cuba and the former Soviet Union came to its rescue. Today, MPLA requires financial and technical capacity to address development issues. China has responded generously. But challenges remain. A rapidly expanding economy, before it decelerated as a result of the drastic fall in oil prices, was becoming a magnet for illegal migrants from other parts of Africa, including those fleeing conflict areas in the Great Lakes region. This largely explains Angola's robust involvement in the ICGLR, the only international organization it views to have much relevance for its foreign policy pursuits.

SEARCHING FOR SECURITY IN THE GREAT LAKES

Regime security concerns have led MPLA to focus on the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)—formerly Zaire—as a potential source of insecurity. In fact, it was this search for security that prompted MPLA to participate in the First Congo War of 1996–1997 on the side of rebel forces led by Laurent Kabila to oust Zairean President Mobutu Sesse Seko. With Kabila in power, Angola was, for the first time since independence, surrounded by friendly countries. It was during this new favorable status quo that Angola intervened again during the Second Congo War (1998–2003) to prevent Kabila from being overthrown after a falling out between the DRC leader and the Rwandan government—one of its main backers in Mobutu's overthrow.

In recent years, in addition to supporting the friendly regime in the DRC, Angola has played an increasingly important role in the larger Great Lakes region as a leading member of the ICGLR—a regional organization whose membership also includes Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, DRC, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.

Angola's activism in the Great Lakes has been motivated by two key security-related factors. With the end of the civil war, Angola's main security concern is now related to regional instability and how this can

impact Angola through, for example, the movement of displaced populations from conflict areas to the north. In response, Angola has responded preemptively by deploying both security and diplomatic tools to address this perceived threat. Thus, the Angolan armed forces have mounted operations along its northern borders even though those attempting to enter the country illegally do so in search of economic opportunities, particularly in informal diamond mining in the northeastern part of the country, not safety from conflict. Similarly, Angola has been very aggressive on the diplomatic front in efforts to prevent simmering tensions, both intrastate and interstate, from boiling into conflict. To this end, Angola has been very active as president of the ICGLR. President dos Santos of Angola has personally managed the diplomatic efforts to bring peace to eastern DRC and prevent the situation in Burundi from spiraling out of control. Similarly, Angola takes an active role in the search for stability in the Central African Republic. The strategic benefits to Angola are straightforward and are still very much connected to regime security in the sense that large inflows of illegal migrants—many potentially carrying weapons—might destabilize precarious internal equilibria.

There is also a more international dimension to Angola's involvement in the Great Lakes region. This active engagement has been encouraged and recognized internationally. The USA, for example, sees Angola—a country with a sizable and capable security sector—as a key player in the region. Therefore, it has consistently encouraged Angola to play an even more robust role by leading, or at least participating more actively in, regional peacekeeping operations. A more active involvement by Angola in regional peacekeeping missions would go a long way in enabling the USA to advance peace and security in the region and thus achieve one of the key goals of its Sub-Saharan Africa strategy which specifically directs American efforts to “prevent conflict and, where necessary, mitigate mass atrocities and hold perpetrators accountable.”

But Angola has consistently avoided active involvement in peacekeeping operations, including through international organizations. Although the international community believes that Angola's security sector capacity and capability could play a decisive role in the search for peace and stability in the region, the Angolan government's hesitation to commit troops abroad for peacekeeping missions reflects domestic security concerns. The idea of relatively large contingents of its security sector deployed far away from home under foreign command has never quite sat well with the ruling MPLA party. Consequently, in practice, Angola

has not gone as far as it could to help achieve peace and security in the Great Lakes region. Still, it is this engagement, however, incommensurate with state capabilities, that has been rewarded with Angola's membership to the UNSC as a non-permanent member. Unsurprisingly, when Angola assumed the month-long rotating presidency of the Security Council in March 2016, it placed security in the Great Lakes region on the top of the Council's agenda and co-chaired with France and the USA a UN mission to seek a political solution to the crisis in Burundi.

Angola's approach to post-civil war international relations can also be seen in how it has engaged with the two regional economic communities (RECs) to which it belongs—the ECCAS and the SADC. Within ECCAS, Angola's role in efforts to achieve maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea supports this argument. Likewise, within SADC, the complex relationship with the South Africa has left it unable to shine in the shadow of the regional heavyweight—leading Angola to opt for tepid engagement within the Southern African REC.

Maritime Security

In recent years, maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea—from Senegal to Angola—has emerged as a major issue involving not just ECCAS but also the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Several significant threats and challenges—including piracy and armed robbery at sea; illicit trafficking in humans, weapons, and narcotics; illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing; oil theft; and marine pollution—have risen to the top of the security agendas in many countries in the region. Given the transnational and transregional nature of the threats and the paucity of resources at the national level, Gulf of Guinea countries are putting in place a multilayered top-down maritime security architecture. First, at the inter-REC level, ECCAS and ECOWAS have developed a collaborative framework (the Yaoundé Code of Conduct) that brings together strategic, operational, and tactical-level engagement. Second, each REC has established a coordination mechanism for maritime security. Third, within the RECs, several maritime zones have been established to group countries for the purpose of pooling resources and sharing information. Fourth, at the national level, each country is expected to develop a national maritime strategy and establish a maritime coordination center.

Angola, within ECCAS, and Nigeria, within ECOWAS, are the natural regional maritime leaders. Unlike Nigeria, however, Angola has been reluctant to show leadership within the maritime security domain that is commensurate with its national capacity. While Nigeria has been very active regionally at all levels—from the strategic to the operational—Angola's engagement has been tepid, at best. For example, in addition to being a key supporter of the Yaoundé Process, Nigeria played a key role in the development of the ECOWAS Integrated Maritime Strategy and acted decisively—leading Operation Prosperity, a naval effort to jointly patrol the waters of Nigeria, Togo, and Benin; successfully conducting various anti-piracy operations in the region; and strongly supporting the operationalization of ECOWAS maritime zone E, comprising the aforementioned states—to address maritime threats and challenges in the Gulf of Guinea. Angola, on the other hand, played a negligible role in the Yaoundé Process. Likewise, its role in the development of the ECCAS maritime strategy has been peripheral.

Missed Opportunities in SADC

Within SADC, Angola is yet to fulfill its potential. Although South Africa is the undisputed regional leader due to its economic clout and once-dominant stature in other spheres, Angola was expected to play a key role in SADC, especially given its role as a major international energy producer. In fact, there were hopes that a post-apartheid South Africa and a post-civil war Angola would forge a tight regional alliance grounded in a long history of Angola's support for the liberation struggle in South Africa—for which Angola paid a massive price in terms of lives lost and infrastructure destroyed as a result of the apartheid regime's regular incursions into Angola.

The anticipated Angola–South Africa partnership failed to bloom mainly because Angola felt that it never received the gratitude it deserved from South Africa for its pain and suffering. Secondly, the relationships at the highest levels of both governments were not always warm, especially under the Thabo Mbeki administration—the result of Angolan intelligence services' alleged involvement in Mbeki's mistreatment while in exile in Angola. Relations warmed up considerably under the administration of Jacob Zuma. However, by the time Zuma came to power, Angola had missed an opportunity to play a more constructive

role in subregional international relations. For example, it could have, with Botswana, attempted to influence a more positive trajectory in Zimbabwe. Within SADC, Angola has failed to fully translate its considerable economic and military weight into political or diplomatic leverage. Consequently, it has not been a major player in engaging with the government of Zimbabwe in efforts to put this country on a path that does not lead to further political and economic instability.

CONCLUSION

The ruling MPLA of Angola has kept a measured distance from international organizations because they have not been considered central to regime survival. These organizations are viewed by MPLA as powerless and unreliable because they have often been divided on Angola. During Angola's liberation war, the OAU was not always helpful to MPLA. Deep divisions among member states on who, between the two main liberation movements, was the legitimate representative of the Angolan people and, therefore, deserving of OAU support, effectively prevented this organization from playing a relevant role in the process of liberation. Because those divisions within OAU remained unresolved, the organization was unable to play a significant role in Angola's difficult transition to independence and the long civil war that followed. The peace processes, likewise, did not feature the OAU or, for that matter, international organizations like SADC and ECCAS of which Angola is a member.

To survive, the MPLA has consistently and almost exclusively relied on strong relationships with powerful states. Thus, during the critical period in the months just before independence—when its continuing existence was at stake—it sought and received decisive assistance from Cuba. This support lasted for much of the civil war years and enabled MPLA to survive both the internal threat posed by UNITA and the regional threats posed by apartheid South Africa and Zaire and, at the international level, the threat posed by the USA within the context of the Cold War where Angola was seen as an important battleground. Likewise, after the end of the civil war, Angola has preferred to engage with powerful states, especially China. In short, Angola has never viewed international organizations as particularly useful, and has instead kept them at a strategic distance as it has pursued its foreign policy objectives.

NOTES

1. People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola.
2. This regional organization includes Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo, DR Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia as members.
3. National Front for the Liberation of Angola.
4. National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.
5. Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile.
6. The Gulf of Guinea Commission (Angola, Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, and São Tomé and Príncipe) is based in Luanda.

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Decolonizing International Relations: Insights from the International Financial Institutions in the Congo During the Cold War

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In the discipline of international relations (IR), discussions about the interventions of the international financial institutions (IFIs)—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank—take place within a discursive framework of “development.” These discussions often address the role of politics in these institutions and the power dynamics embedded in them, and this is particularly the case with more critical strands of IR. While the field has become more methodologically and theoretically diverse, the classical IR perspectives of (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism still dominate introductory texts, and they continue to influence policy in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) like the IFIs to a much greater degree than critical approaches.¹

This chapter will argue that the history of classical IR discourse with regard to the construct of development continues to frame many

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scholars' and policy-makers' perceptions of African states and societies. In the 1950s, during decolonization, "the notion of 'development' replaced that of 'civilisation'" (Harrison 2004, 12).² In order to explore some of these issues, this chapter will look at how the Congolese government³ and Western governments⁴—particularly the USA—pursued their geopolitical aims toward each other through the IFIs during the Cold War.

This is not just about the politics of IFIs determining which countries get money and resources for development, however. The chapter will begin with a brief discussion of development categories themselves and the way they justify certain kinds of intervention. Development categories may have changed in their substantive content since the colonial era, but classical IR still splits the world up according to these categories, and "development" is understood as a universal good. With regard to the Congo during the Cold War, we shall see how IR scholarship has critiqued the way the IFIs became anti-communist (for the West) and neopatrimonial (for the Congo) political tools. But this chapter will also show how development categories inadvertently justified this intervention in the first place, and that this, for the West, was not only in the interest of maintaining an anti-communist ally, but also in the interest of promoting a liberal economic ideology.

The chapter will conclude by suggesting that IR step up efforts to decolonize the discipline by becoming more inclusive, routinely questioning its own assumptions, and putting its critical approaches at the center of theory. This is important because without critical self-reflection, IR analyses will continue to reproduce discourse whose paternalistic overtones influence how ideas are put into practice.

DEVELOPMENT CATEGORIES

We are meaning-making creatures. Our institutions, our policies, our language, our ceremonies are human creations, not objects independent of us. And so a human (or social) science needs to be able to address what is meaningful to people in the social situation under study (Yanow 2015: 9).

—Dvora Yanow, "Thinking Interpretively"

Categories are important for the way we as humans see and make sense of the world (Lakoff 1987). Along with metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) and "common sense" (Geertz 1975), categories help us construct

and navigate our reality and understand the terms for interacting with each other.⁵ But they are social constructs, and as such, they carry particular meanings in particular social contexts. Even a set of categories as seemingly “natural” as color is constructed by the brain, and linguists, anthropologists, and cognitive scientists have debated for over a century about whether or not color categories are in fact culturally relative (Jraissati 2012).⁶

So if something as seemingly organic as color perception provokes such debate, what about more complex concepts like race; ethnicity; tribe; and nation? Such as states, and statehood; of war, conflict, and peace? Although it’s been established that these are social constructs, at least in fields like anthropology, sociology, and biology, in classical IR literature they are rarely defined. Their meaning is generally taken for granted, and the categories are seen as more or less empirical.⁷ In order to decolonize IR, its categories must be dissected.

Much of the knowledge production in IR in the early and mid-twentieth century, when the discipline emerged, was concerned with the preservation of white hegemony and “race subjugation” (Vitalis 2015: 1). The genealogy of development discourse can be traced to Enlightenment thinkers who believed that the changes of “modernization” that were taking place in Europe were universally applicable. “Civilization” and “advancement” looked a certain way, and Europeans happened to be at the top of this hierarchy. This led to a disciplining discourse that determined norms and knowledge about states and societies that justified the foreign intervention of colonial (or “Western”) powers in “Other” places.

Modernization came to embody such ideals as industrialization, rationality, secularism, liberalism, and free-market capitalism as they emerged in Europe; a “developed” country was supposed to possess these characteristics. The content of these categories has changed over time—at times intersecting or being mapped onto the politics of the era, as “First World” and “Third World” during the Cold War—but the essential dichotomies, particularly with reference to Africa, have remained relatively stable (see: Hinton 2002).

These are the Eurocentric origins of the development ideology, if one thinks of ideology as a kind of knowledge which is “embedded in particular social and historical circumstances that its purveyors falsely, if sincerely, believe to be universal” (Oren 2002: 16). As development frameworks informed the work of colonial “modernizing bureaucrats”

(Cooper 1997: 64) and the expansion of the bureaucratic power of the colonial state, these ideations would contribute to the foundational principles of the IFIs at Bretton Woods in 1944.

IR CRITIQUES OF IFI INTERVENTION IN THE CONGO

Congo's foreign policy goals during the Cold War were concerned with cultivating diplomatic relationships with Western countries, and particularly the USA. The democratically elected prime minister at independence in 1960, Patrice Lumumba, sought the support of the USA against the destabilizing military presence of Belgium, which was backing a secession in the mineral-rich province of Katanga (Gondola 2002). But the Eisenhower administration (1953–1961) shared Belgium's negative view of the prime minister. The US Ambassador said Lumumba was untrustworthy and "did not hesitate to arouse antiwhite sentiment" (Gibbs 1991: 92). Many others in the administration found Lumumba's stirring anticolonial speech off-putting or believed he was a communist, and so the USA supported Belgium's position.

Belgium's support for the Katangan secession ended up pitting Belgian forces against a United Nation mission, ONUC. This mission, however, was not authorized to engage the Belgians,⁸ and since Lumumba was unable to secure the kind of substantial support he wanted from Western powers to put down the rebellion and eject the Belgians, he finally did turn to the Soviets for assistance (see: De Witte 2001). This effectively alienated him from the West for good. In 1961, Lumumba was tortured and executed by Katangan soldiers under Belgian command and with the tacit approval of the USA (Gondola 2002; Meredith 2005).

Joseph Mobutu (see: Mobutu Sese Seko), Chief of Staff of the Army under Lumumba, on the other hand, was a favorite of the USA and Belgium. In 1959, he went on the CIA's payroll and remained on it after becoming president in 1965. He was also a police informant for the Belgians in the 1950s (Gondola 2002; Meredith 2005). Western companies wanted access to Congo's resources and Western countries wanted ideological allegiance; when he became president, Mobutu was willing to provide both in exchange for financial and military aid. The IFIs, ostensibly inadvertently, provided Mobutu with the resources and opportunities to consolidate his political power and authoritarian hold on the country. Western countries pursued their foreign policy aims through the IFIs as well.

In addition to bilateral political and military support, the USA leveraged its power within the IFIs to channel financial resources and loans to the Mobutu government.

Mobutu worked to appeal to the sensibilities of the USA by fashioning himself as an “authentic” and forward-looking “African” leader, and by and large, that strategy worked (Dunn 2003). He navigated the shifting alliances of external forces to ensure the continued flow of aid (Kasfir 1984). Although Mobutu was reliant on external aid and support, he was able to resist pressure to reform (Callaghy 1986; Kasfir 1984). The international lending institutions provided foreign exchange, a valuable liquid resource, which Mobutu used to finance his neopatrimonial networks (see: Van de Walle 2001). In the meantime, the country itself accumulated massive amounts of foreign debt (Honey 2004).

The way the USA and Congo pursued their aims toward each other through the IFIs was about more than Cold War politics. It was also about a development discourse that justified intervention by a “developed” country in a “developing” one. Development categories make it discursively logical, though not always explicit, that if “development” is the aim that “developing” countries are working toward, and “developed” countries have achieved it, then the latter must have some valuable knowledge and expertise to help the former. The effect this discourse has had in reality is to prompt the IFIs to designate certain characteristics to countries that are supposed to be developing even if that designation is inaccurate (see: Ferguson 1994) and to serve power by advancing neoliberal economics and further integrating those countries labeled as “developing” into the capitalist world system (see: Harrison 2004). This can be seen in the struggle over Congo’s economy during the independence transition.

The transition to independence in the Congo was relatively sudden, but power was not simply handed over. The Katangan state, whose independence movement was supported by Belgium, was already structured to protect European interests, and Belgian mining companies continued to operate without interruption throughout the Congo Crisis of the 1960s (Gibbs 1991). All over the continent, colonial powers scrambled to maintain control and influence over the politics and economies of their ex-colonies, which was often cast in light of fighting Communism but was also about retaining some level of the status quo. The postwar establishment of an international development industry “provided a means by which imperial powers could reconcile themselves to their loss

of power, while maintaining a connection with their ex-colonies and a continued sense of their mission in shaping their future” (Cooper and Packard 1997: 7). For the USA, too, preventing the alignment of African states with the USSR was not just about preventing a feared spread of Communism, it was also in the interest of continued political and economic access to those countries.

To the extent that the Congo ostensibly gained political independence in 1960, the same could not be said for the economy: “The colonial government granted huge concessions to the big mining and plantation companies, as well as an unusual degree of support for obtaining land and labor. The multinational companies entrenched in this period still [in the early 1990s] dominate Zaire’s economy.” Even after independence, “ownership of the economy remained in the hands of the big foreign mining and plantation companies” (MacGaffey 1991: 27).

When the Cold War ended, so did support for Mobutu. He thus became vulnerable to domestic and regional opposition and was forced to flee when a Rwandan-backed rebel movement (allegedly with the approval of the USA, which had previously supported and trained the Rwandan Patriotic Front) invaded and took the capital in 1997. After Mobutu was ousted, the USA and other Western powers shifted policy to champion a “new generation of African leaders” who they viewed as being more “enlightened” forces that embrace neoliberal reforms, such as Museveni in Uganda and Kagame in Rwanda (Kennes 2005: 147; Marysse 2003: 95).⁹ After the attacks on the USA on September 11, 2001, the development paradigm and the “war on poverty” became linked to the War on Terror, exacerbating stereotypes and reproducing the notion that poverty is a cause of terrorism (Easterly 2016). Although the discourse and the content of the categories changed, the concern with access and influence in the region continued to drive neoliberal ideology.

When the USA and European countries began to support these new African allies, the IFIs largely followed suit. Programs of administrative reform for African governments carried out by the World Bank “work to produce governance truly as a political project” and the Bank’s “‘institutional ontology’ as an agency steeped in liberalism means that its actions necessarily promote the expansion of liberal capitalism throughout the world” (Harrison 2004: 7, 44). The categorization of countries according to the levels of “development”—and the assumption in classical IR that these categories are objectively observable and politically

neutral—leads to the creation of hierarchies of knowledge and power: “Yet development is fundamentally about changing how people conduct their lives, and the very claim to technical knowledge is itself a political act” (Cooper and Packard 1997: 18–19).

The discursive constructs of abnormal or inadequate states as a category (“developing”) lead to the definition and knowledge of what it is to be a normal, competent, or ideal state. What, exactly, are “developing” countries developing *into*? There persists a “mistaken belief that all states, regardless of time and geographical region, are expected to exhibit similar characteristics” (Makinda 2003: 310). Yet despite the content of these norms, even if one were to accept them as neutral criteria, politicized analyses are often perceived as apolitical. The World Bank may fudge data (Harrison 2004) or misrepresent empirical reality (Ferguson 1994) to make countries that are supposed to be “developing” countries fit preconceived notions, and inconsistent methodologies lead to inexplicable contradictions in theoretically impartial indices like the Failed State Index (see: Ross 2012).

The gradual shift from a story of bringing “civilization” to “backward” societies to a story of bringing “development” to “underdeveloped” countries (see: Hinton 2002) marked the transition from the colonial era to the Cold War. It roughly coincided with the transition from the era of European colonialism to the era of independent African states that, from one point of view, were now able to participate in IR with other states. This is why the stories of African states within classical IR generally start with independence.

Starting the story with independence, however, functions to minimize the extent to which the contemporary state in Africa is built on what came before it; an apparatus designed to keep the domestic population “pacified” and to extract resources—slaves, then ivory, then rubber, then timber and minerals—to profit from the companies and governments exploiting them: “True, there is a state collapse, but it is just not any state that is collapsing; it is specifically what remains of the colonial state in Africa that is collapsing” (Kabamba 2012; see also Niemann 2007). By the same token, starting the story of the IFIs with Bretton Woods in 1944 functions to minimize the extent to which these institutions emerged out of European history and liberal ideology that work—intentionally or not—to incorporate the Congo into the capitalist world system (see: Harrison 2004).

CONCLUSION: TOWARD NEW DISCURSIVE CONSTRUCTS

Development categories and what they are supposed to represent are not necessarily useless or wrong. They function to frame and explain the world in particular ways and in doing so determine what priorities and actions are available and acceptable and which are not, within the ontology of “development.” However, quite often, even when used altruistically to pursue goals of improving the quality of life and lifting people out of poverty, development categories frame the world in such a way as to value particular kinds of knowledge over others so that, for example, IFIs have economic expertise and therefore the authority to intervene in “developing” countries (see: Easterly 2013). The very discourse around poverty functions to depoliticize it even though the continued existence of poverty is political (Brewer 2015).

The way the “Congo” is discursively constructed—as a chaotic and vicious “heart of darkness”—compounds the effects of development categories as being applied to “Africa” in general (see: Autesserre 2012). These discursive constructs make intervention, and “saving” Africa, almost a moral issue. Mobutu exploited this as well, presenting himself as an authentic African leader who would bring order to Congo’s chaos (see: Dunn 2003). “Africa” is also constructed as being vastly poverty stricken, war-torn, and in a state of “permanent crisis” (see: Van de Walle 2001). In turn, the “notion of an African crisis enables a raft of external interventions by donors and creditors” (Harrison 2004: 16), and so international institutions controlled largely by powerful global capitalist forces are perceived as being *obliged* to help “developing” countries (see: Kabamba 2012).

None of this can be properly understood without investigating the politics and history of the international development ontology. IR and Area Studies grew out of efforts of the “West” to better understand “Them,” largely as part of colonial or postwar projects.¹⁰ Therefore, it should come as no surprise that, for example, a journal dedicated to the study of Somalia might not have any Somali editors: In the colonial era, “knowledge was something only Europeans were capable of, while Somalis were objects to be known, understood, and explained” (Aidid 2015). The effects of this can also be seen in the field of development economics, where the most influential and high-profile conferences and journals are dominated almost entirely by white Westerners (see: Chelwa 2015). Representation and participation are thus another challenge in terms of decolonizing IR, but it goes beyond mere tokenism (see: Aidid 2015). Lack of diversity in perspectives and approaches to IR and

to academia can contribute to epistemological violence (Teo 2010; see also Nordling 2017), when theories, scholarship, or policy objectify the Other as a problem or an inferior when in fact the available data can be interpreted in other ways.

One way to decolonize IR would be to center critical approaches, including constructivism and critical theory; feminism; post-colonial theory; critical race theory; the English School; and others as more integral aspects of basic theory in the discipline.¹¹ An indication of the effect this can have can be seen with the example of feminist IR scholarship and its proclivity to emphasize “notions of security that move beyond state security (of paramount importance to Realists) to notions of human security. In such a perspective the effects of war, for example, reach far beyond the battlefield to family life and other aspects of social relations” (Slaughter 2011). The concept of human security in feminist IR led to the emergence of new discursive constructs, which opened possibilities for different kinds of policies and actions, and it is now a significant aspect of the work in many UN agencies.¹²

Such a shift could also change the way we think about development and poverty—if we talk about poverty not as an unfortunate circumstance that people “fall into,” almost as though it is a naturally occurring phenomenon, and instead understand poverty as being a human creation, then we are presented with a different set of questions and a different set of actions that would make sense within such a framework (Brewer 2015). Both of these examples illustrate the power of IR discourse.

If discursive constructs enable some actions and restrict others, then with different approaches and new constructs come new and different ways of seeing—and new possibilities. Being cognizant of discursive constructs and categories that would otherwise be taken for granted would allow us to construct our own categories, deliberately, with a view toward understanding the world in a more equitable and less Eurocentric way. The new, decolonized IR has its work cut out for it.

NOTES

1. In Spiegel et al. (2004), the introductory text used in my graduate program at NYU, 14 pages describe realism and the prisoner’s dilemma; two paragraphs describe liberalism; and critical theory, constructivism, and postmodernism are described in a four-paragraph box as though they are a footnote to the “real” theory. The box (p. 51) claims that as the

- latter three are “relatively new approaches to understanding international affairs, their potential contributions are not yet clear.”
2. See also Cooper and Packard (1997), Gallo (2012), Gilman (2007), Grove (2016), Harrison (2004), Hinton (2002), Layton (1997), Losurdo (2014), Oren (2002), Scott (1999), Shannon (1996).
 3. At independence in 1960, the Belgian Congo became the Republic of Congo. It was renamed Zaire in 1971 and renamed again in 1997 to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). For ease of reading and continuity, I will refer to the country as “the Congo” (not to be confused with its neighbor, the Republic of Congo).
 4. I use the term “Western” here specifically as defined by and used in the context of the Cold War. See Appiah (2016) for a critique of the social construct of “Western civilization.”
 5. For more on how categories operate to have an effect on the production of knowledge, see Engerman (2007), Foucault (1966), Lakoff (1987), Rudolph (2005), Scott (1999).
 6. See also Hardin and Maffi (1997), Purves et al. (2002), Roberson et al. (2005), Sacks (1995).
 7. For literature that deals with these categories critically, see ADEPAE et al. (2011), Gallo (2012), Harrison (2004), Mamdani (2009), Sabaratnam (2013).
 8. Eventually, in 1963, ONUC helped Mobutu quell Katangan rebels and keep Congo united. See Kennes and Larmer (2016).
 9. When Museveni framed his fight against the Lord’s Resistance Army in terms of terrorism, it increased aid, much of which he channeled into the military (Branch 2011), and Rwanda has been a political and economic player obtaining support from France and then the USA for some time (Uvin 1998).
 10. This phenomenon persisted into the twenty-first century, as the USA recruited anthropologists “to provide ‘cultural knowledge’ for the purpose of more effective counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan” (Forte 2011, 149). See also Grove (2016).
 11. Several books in the Palgrave MacMillan IPE series take such approaches in more specialized areas. See Breen, *The Politics of IMF Lending*; Ling, *Postcolonial International Relations*; Elias, *The Global Political Economy of the Household in Asia*; Beeson, *Competing Capitalisms*; and Hope, *Time, Communication and Global Capitalism* on the series’ webpage at <http://www.palgrave.com/br/series/13996>.
 12. For more, see the website of the United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security at <http://www.un.org/humansecurity/>.

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Nigeria's Foreign Policy in Relation to the Economic Community of West African States

Cyril Obi

This chapter explores how Nigeria conducts its foreign policy toward west Africa, drawing on the case of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which, as its name suggests, is the regional economic community of west Africa's fifteen states. Nigeria's foreign policy towards ECOWAS serves as an exemplar of its broader foreign policy behavior toward the sub-region to which it belongs: in this regard, looking at how Nigeria has sought to leverage ECOWAS for its foreign policy-related goals offers insight into the rest of the country's Afrocentric foreign policy.

At least three phenomena explain why Nigeria views ECOWAS as being important to its foreign policy pursuits. The first phenomenon is the centrality of two specific challenges that lay in the heart of Nigeria's foreign policy: its need to protect national security and power, on one hand, and a 'manifest destiny' to act as a regional power and an African leader, on the other (Obi 2012: 192). The second phenomenon that lies

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at the heart of Nigeria's interpretation of the importance of ECOWAS to its foreign policy pursuits is its quest to redefine itself within the transforming regional and global "orders" in west Africa, Africa, and the broader world in the post-Cold War-era (Ibid). The third phenomenon that explains Nigeria's interpreted utility of ECOWAS is that Nigeria hopes that the organization will help it to project a well-coordinated and cohesive policy in pursuing its interests in the rest of the sub-region.

However, any interrogation of Nigeria's *foreign* policy toward ECOWAS also requires an understanding of challenges at the *domestic level*, which includes a recognition of the increased presence and activities of non-state transnational actors in west Africa. As this chapter will argue, looking at the domestic realities of Nigerian political life lies at the center of the perennial debate between those who argue that Nigeria remains west Africa's undisputed hegemon and pivotal state—and therefore central to ECOWAS' continued relevance and success (Adebajo 2004, 2015)—and others who argue that the country's external projection in ECOWAS and beyond is predicated upon a weak domestic base resulting an ineffective foreign policy toward its immediate sub-region (Gebrewold 2014; Warner 2016; Adebajo and Mustapha 2008). While the former point to Nigeria's huge financial contribution to ECOWAS (estimated at 70%), including regional peace and security operations in the sub-region, the latter note that Nigeria has largely failed to translate its immense contributions to ECOWAS member states into any real sub-regional influence or clout.

In the main, this chapter argues that although Nigeria has historically viewed ECOWAS as an imperative vehicle for the pursuit of its foreign policy interests in west Africa and beyond, it has been unable to translate its huge funding to the international organization into actual influence within west Africa, due to its fractured domestic politics. In short, although Nigeria should intuitively be able to successfully leverage ECOWAS, it does so less effectively than might otherwise be expected.

In setting about the task of exploring Nigeria's foreign policy toward ECOWAS, this chapter is organized into four sections. The first provides a context for understanding Nigeria's behavior toward the organization. This is followed by an analysis of Nigeria's position in west Africa, including the role of historical and other factors in shaping its foreign policy, while the third section provides an analysis of Nigeria's role in ECOWAS, particularly its diplomacy as a pivotal state, as well as its

response to transnational crimes. This is followed by a final section that explores the future of Nigeria–ECOWAS relations.

NIGERIA IN WEST AFRICA: PERSPECTIVES ON RELATIONS WITH ECOWAS

Understanding Nigeria's behavior toward ECOWAS requires paying close attention to how the country responds to developments and changes in its domestic, regional, and global contexts. An important point is the country's status as a regional demographic giant, with a population of over 180 million people, and west Africa's largest economy. As noted elsewhere, "no other country in the sub-region, and very few in Africa as a whole, can compare with Nigeria in terms of economic and military capabilities" (Adetula 2014).

Given Nigeria's status as west Africa's "power-house," it is logical that the country aspires to a leadership role and perceives ECOWAS as a legitimate platform and framework for the pursuit of shared national and regional interests. Although Nigeria's attributes of power place it in a position of influence and leadership, it also exposes the country to certain vulnerabilities, not unless the demands of certain domestic constituencies and threats from within its immediate neighborhood. There is also the real danger of potentially high costs of the loss of influence to other hegemonic powers or competitors from either within or outside the sub-region. Examples of such hegemonies are established or emerging powers such as France, UK, the USA, and China. Preventing the possible loss of influence to such (competing) hegemonies therefore depends on Nigeria's capacity to organize the resources and leadership necessary to project its influence within the region, as a legitimate leader of neighboring countries based on trust and shared interests.

A better appreciation of Nigeria's position in west Africa can also be gleaned from a historical perspective. Before the imposition of colonial borders, the peoples of modern-day Nigeria had evolved long-standing historical, political, and economic relations with people from across west Africa and beyond, before Africa was balkanized by European powers in the later part of the nineteenth century (Adetula 2015: 6). Given the open terrain of the Sahara desert, as well as the Savannah and Sahelian belts of the sub-region and shared identities and cultures, migratory and trade routes established have survived till today, defying "imposed"

national boundaries. This has partly meant that cross-border relations and affinities have continued to thrive in defiance of official policies and controls. The gaps between the regional integration of *states*—including via formal international organizations like ECOWAS—and those of *peoples* partly suggest that outside of official circles, Nigeria's foreign policy toward the region largely remains an abstract notion to its own citizens and others in the region.

Closely related to the foregoing are the lingering ambiguities in the relationship between Nigeria and its immediate neighbors. One of the lessons the military-led Nigerian foreign policy elite learnt during the Nigerian civil war (1967–1970) was the strategic role neighboring countries played in its national security. Given alleged French support for secessionist Biafra during the Nigerian civil war, and the fact that Nigeria is surrounded by Francophone countries, the military-political elite, recognized French influence in its former colonies, set out to deliberately court those West African countries in the bid to stave off the possibility of neighboring countries being used as bridgeheads for undermining Nigeria's national security. Apart from the suspicion that France was working against Nigeria's interests during the war, the initial refusal of the UK to sell arms to the Nigerian government also fueled speculations about Western non-support, hence the decision to turn to the Eastern bloc for arms (Obi 2012). This further reinforced the view within Nigeria of the need to embrace a policy of good neighborliness alongside reduced dependence on external powers.

Thus, after the Biafran war, Nigeria sought much closer relations with neighboring countries, while diversifying its relations with non-African powers. As such, it put its weight and resources behind the formation of ECOWAS in 1975, hosting the organization's headquarters in the country's capital city, initially in Lagos, before moving it to the new capital in Abuja. Nigeria believed that regional integration would drive self-reliant development within west Africa, both to reduce economic dependence on external powers and to bind the countries of the sub-region closer together, with attendant security benefits. However, ECOWAS was initially bogged down by divisions between Anglophone and Francophone West African member states, including the existence of a rival Francophone West African Community, amid suspicion of Nigeria's regional ambitions. It was not until the 1990s that developments within the region provided Nigeria with an opportunity to lead an ECOWAS peace initiative following the invasion of Liberia by rebels.

When civil war broke out in Liberia after Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front (NPFL) rebel army invaded the country from neighboring Cote d'Ivoire in 1989, Nigeria provided the leadership for regional mediation in the conflict at the summit of ECOWAS heads of state in May 1990. This eventually culminated in the decision to send in an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) to Liberia as a regional peace interventionist force, which was largely made of Nigerian troops and mainly funded by Nigeria itself (Obi 2009: 121–122; Adebajo 2004).

Although some argue that Nigeria's role was in part driven by then-military president Ibrahim Babangida's personal interests in Liberia, and later on, the interests of certain Nigerian generals, there is no doubt that Nigeria made significant contributions toward ending the Liberian civil war. More importantly, by linking the instability in Liberia (and later in Sierra Leone) to Nigeria's and west Africa's security, Nigeria acted upon its interest in leveraging ECOWAS "home-grown" solutions to West African security challenges. This was partly a strategy of building sub-regional self-reliance, while reducing dependence on external powers. It was also driven by the belief that peace and security were necessary preconditions for regional economic development.

The immense sacrifice made in terms of men and materiel underscores the point that Nigeria sees ECOWAS as being integral to its national security and territorial integrity. Closely related to this is another lesson from the war, namely the recognition of the importance of peace to economic prosperity. In this regard, the Nigerian foreign policy elite, no doubt buoyed by the wealth that came with the post-Biafra-war oil boom, was keen to bolster and catalyze national economic development by integrating it into regional economic development as a strategy for ensuring autonomous African economic growth that was free of external domination. In this regard, ECOWAS became another vehicle of a foreign policy vision framed around asserting Nigeria's independence and reinforcing its claims to African leadership.

Thirdly, Nigeria's policy engagement with ECOWAS from its inception acted as a bridge toward realizing its pan-Africanist leadership vision. With roots in the nationalist struggle and the immediate post-independence period, Nigeria's leaders have always seen the country's natural and demographic endowments as the basis of aspiring to continental leadership. The oil boom years between the 1970s and mid-1990s marked the "golden age" of Nigeria's foreign policy toward west Africa,

when Nigeria played a key role in the evolution of ECOWAS' rather sophisticated mediation, peace, and security institutions, and deployed huge resources in boosting its influence within Africa, including restoring peace to war-torn Sierra Leone and Liberia. However, following the fall in national oil revenues alongside rising domestic demands on resources, the country appeared to have embraced a "less-activist" role in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Nigeria's contemporary emphasis in ECOWAS, therefore, is on balancing its domestic priorities against external commitments, while seeking to rally neighboring countries around a united front against transnational threats to national and regional security.

TRENDS IN NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD WEST AFRICA: BETWEEN DOMESTIC PRIORITIES AND TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES

Several factors tend to dominate Nigeria's foreign policy in recent times. These include pragmatism, continuity, and economic diplomacy. Pragmatism has largely come to play an important role in the face of shrinking national revenues and pressing national priorities: socio-economic stability and security. The growing population and shrinking economy has meant that fewer resources are available for foreign intervention and programs. Also, the rise of internal security challenges including attacks on oil infrastructure leading to reduced oil production and exports and the outbreak of extremist violence in the country's northeast region has led to more resources being devoted to internal security. In that regard, Nigeria has found it expedient to reduce its direct involvement in international peace operations, except where the UN and other external funders come in with logistical and other forms of support. Pragmatism has led to a new emphasis on mediation and dialogue in addressing west Africa's trouble spots.

However, in spite of toning down its tendencies towards external intervention and regional peacekeeping, there are still strong elements of continuity in Nigeria's policy toward ECOWAS. These include Nigeria's continued financial commitment to the organization, support for its programs and activities, and the emphasis on working with ECOWAS to address common regional security challenges, including transnational crimes. It is clear that Nigeria continues to see and treat ECOWAS as a

key factor in the country's Afrocentric foreign policy. Also relevant are the personal styles of Nigeria's successive presidents till date, particularly in relation to ECOWAS. Thus, when Nigeria returned to civil rule in 1999 following decades of military rule, under the presidency of a former military head of state, Olusegun Obasanjo, personality played an important role. Obasanjo, based on his prominent international profile as an African statesman, played up the card of using his profile to push an agenda of Nigeria's regional leadership as well as representing the African "presence" at global forums. President Obasanjo paid attention to Nigeria's neighborhood, helping in restoring peace to Sierra Leone and Liberia, even though the country no longer had the resources for any large-scale regional peacekeeping efforts. After Obasanjo left power in 2007, his successors, Umaru Yar'Adua (2007–2010), Goodluck Jonathan (2010–2015), and Muhammadu Buhari (2015), pursued a relatively low-key foreign policy. Yar'Adua's administration introduced the policy of "citizen diplomacy" which sought to emphasize a people-centered approach to foreign policy. However, the controversy that attended the 2007 elections, internal challenges posed by the rising insurgency in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, the escalation of insurgent violence of the extremist Boko Haram militia in northern Nigeria, as well as the president's poor state of health, adversely affected the country's foreign policy. Thus, its diplomacy operated largely on an *ad hoc* and routine manner, until Yar'Adua's passing in 2010.

President Jonathan largely continued along the path of continuity in Nigeria's foreign policy toward west Africa. He reached out to Nigeria's neighbors: Chad, Cameroon, Nigeria, and Benin at a meeting held in France to form a united front against Boko Haram insurgents (Irish and Pineau 2014). He also participated in talks at an extraordinary summit of ECOWAS hosted by Ghana's President John Mahama aimed toward discussing an ECOWAS response to threats posed by extremist Islamic separatists in Mali and Boko Haram in northeast Nigeria. Nigeria's strategy was aimed at building a regional response by ECOWAS to the menace posed by insurgent extremist groups. In a sense, it represented continuity in Nigeria's post-civil war foreign policy thrust of linking its national to regional security, with ECOWAS as its institutional anchor.

As Chairman of ECOWAS, Jonathan used the position to support upholding the ECOWAS policy of zero tolerance for unconstitutional changes of government in the sub-region as laid down in ECOWAS'

(2001) Protocol A/SP1/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance, Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. The prioritization of a regionalized agenda by ECOWAS saw the organization play an important role in the restoration of democratic governance in Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Like the Obasanjo regime, the Jonathan administration could not afford to fund any extensive peace support operations and therefore limited its role to mediation, peace-making, electoral, and democracy support. The support for democracy as a bulwark for regional peace and security was a central plank of Nigeria's foreign policy toward ECOWAS during the Jonathan presidency. It was therefore hardly surprising that after Jonathan conceded defeat to Muhammadu Buhari in the keenly contested Nigerian 2015 elections, ECOWAS leaders commended him at the summit of heads of state held in May 2015.

The pragmatic shift in Nigeria's foreign policy toward ECOWAS away from lavish spending on aid, extensive peace intervention, and support operations, to contributing ideas on institutional reform for deepening democratic norms, regional peace, and security and cooperation in addressing transnational threats, reflects both the domestic and regional constraints on Nigeria's projections of its influence and aspirations to leadership. While not going as far as claiming that Nigeria's status as a regional power and robust player in ECOWAS has been diminishing over time, there is no doubt that emerging evidence suggests the choice of greater pragmatism in engaging with West African states.

The emergence of Muhammadu Buhari, another former military head of state and "born again democrat" as Nigeria's President on May 29, 2015, provided new leadership at the helm of Nigeria's foreign policy. Having won the election on the basis of promises to address the security conundrum in the country, fight corruption which had only grown under the previous administration, and create employment among others, Buhari has kept faith with Nigeria's Afrocentric policy. Early in the life of his administration, he made the point of embarking on shuttle diplomacy visiting Nigeria's immediate neighbors: Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Benin to drum up support for a joint effort to rout Boko Haram insurgents operating in the northeast.

Echoing the "manifest destiny" theme that has consistently run through Nigerian foreign policy, he was quoted thus: "Our neighbors in

the sub-region and our African brethren should rest assured that Nigeria under our administration will be ready to play any leadership role that Africa expects of it” (Buhari 2015). At another forum, he zeroed in on how much Nigeria values its relations with ECOWAS, noting, “Nigeria, by its size and resources, has no alternative than to back ECOWAS to the hilt...we are a part of ECOWAS. Indeed, we are at the very heart of it, so will continue to play our role” (cited in NAN 2016). In a report on the 48th ordinary session of the ECOWAS summit, Buhari articulated Nigeria’s policy toward the promotion of regional security. In his words, “security challenges persist in our region as we continue to be confronted with the daunting scourge of transnational organized crime including arms trafficking, drug trafficking, as well as piracy and criminality at sea. Equally worrying is the rising scourge of violent extremism and terrorism.” In his view, such “threats to peace and security in the region require...urgent and concerted actions” (quoted in PANA Press 2015). This pronouncement, like others, goes to confirm continuity in Nigeria’s West African policy, but raises questions regarding the level of Nigeria’s preparedness and capacity to provide the required leadership.

THE BLURRED DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONTEXTS OF NIGERIA’S FOREIGN POLICYMAKING TOWARD ECOWAS

Although Nigeria possesses all the potential resources and power, as well as institutional architecture to project a vibrant foreign policy in relation to ECOWAS, it is yet to fully actualize its leadership role (Warner 2016). If anything, the gap between the potential represented by Nigeria’s natural endowments and its actual performance as a regional leadership poses a conundrum in Nigeria’s foreign policy. Below, we describe the troubled domestic and international contexts that lead Nigeria to insufficiently leverage ECOWAS for its foreign policy pursuits.

The Problematic Domestic Context of Nigerian Foreign Policymaking Toward ECOWAS

Nigeria’s pursuit of its foreign policy goals—in ECOWAS and beyond—is problematic for several reasons, including the contradictions and cleavages within the Nigerian ruling class, gaps within the foreign policy formulation process, and the impact of globalization in the form

of the “blurring of boundaries” between the local, national, regional, and global levels. This contributes to a situation where separating the boundaries between each level and the other begins and ends, and how it renders coordination across national, regional, and global levels both problematic and challenging.

The seeming delinking of the “national” and “social” from the rather centralized Nigerian policymaking structure places so much influence in the hands of the president and his close advisers, and makes it difficult for ordinary citizens to relate to, or have their views represented in, its decisions or agenda. This suggests that relations toward ECOWAS tend to reflect the personal idiosyncrasies of each Nigerian leader, against the background of a rather static reading of the country’s Afrocentric external projection.

This situation is further compounded by the relative detachment of the relevant state agencies from the foreign policy formulation and execution processes. Alli (2012: 74) alludes to this issue, noting, “the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been largely lukewarm in sub-regional matters dominated by the Ministry of Defense and the military establishment.” This observation draws upon the view that regional security policy matters have not benefited from the deep insights and expertise of diplomats in the ministry, depriving the policymaking process of strategic insights and fresh thinking capable of integrating new ideas into a radical reading of the transforming security landscape, beyond rather narrow militaristic and tactical perspectives.

It is therefore not difficult to fathom the nature of the gaps between the rhetoric of Nigerian leaders and the diminishing scope of actions aimed toward empowering ECOWAS to achieve its goals of regional security. Commenting on the situation, Alli (2012: 75) is of the view that “the lack of a coherent and comprehensive security policy is a major obstacle to Nigeria’s effectiveness and leadership in ECOWAS security policy.” The pertinent question to ask is: why does Nigeria appear to lack an integrated and holistic regional security strategy in its foreign policy towards ECOWAS?

While many observers will attribute this shortcoming to a “lack of political will,” the reasons are more complex and may not lie completely within Nigeria. The challenge partly lies in institutional decay with some government agencies, including inter-agency rivalry and capacity deficits in certain departments. Referring specifically to certain

government-funded think tanks and agencies, Alli (2012: 76) correctly observes that “think-tanks like the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, The Nigerian Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, and the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution have not been able to build the needed capacity to support civil authority leadership in the area of sub-regional security and foreign policy.” Although the reasons for such capacity gaps in think tanks capable of feeding into the foreign policy agencies are not within the immediate scope of this chapter, their impact on Nigeria’s capacity to formulate effective policies toward ECOWAS should not be lost to most observers of the country’s diplomacy.

The Troubled International Context of Nigerian Foreign Policymaking Toward ECOWAS

While the foregoing focuses on some of the domestic constraints, it is apposite to focus on how the changing regional and global contexts impact Nigeria’s foreign policy toward ECOWAS. The changing West African regional context, marked in part by the increased presence and activities of non-state actors challenging the legitimacy of states across west Africa, and the increased presence of transnational actors and networks, including the proliferation of fighters, arms, and extremist groups, particularly following the violent collapse of the Ghaddafi regime in Libya in 2011, have placed great pressure on Nigerian resources and existing capacities. It can be argued that the dynamics of transnational threats in west Africa are changing faster than the rate of response by Nigeria’s foreign policy actors.

As noted earlier, Nigeria faces stiff competition for influence in west Africa from the world’s established and emerging powers—particularly France and the USA—seeking access to resources, markets, spheres of influence, and strategic partnerships. In the face of growing intrastate, transnational, and terrorist threats, the West African space has been opened up to the world’s powers seeking to protect their strategic and security interests. Of note is France, which seeks to maintain a strong influence in west Africa, where it has its largest concentration of ex-colonies on the continent, and where, since 9/11, it has become the Western power of choice in dealing with terrorist threats or political instability in Francophone countries. French troops are to be found in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, ostensibly to help in the fight against extremist Islamic

insurgents and al-Qaeda or ISIS-affiliated militias terrorizing the West African Sahel. Also, the USA, through its Africa Command (AFRICOM) and bilateral military agreements through either established military bases or joint military training exercises in many West African countries, including Senegal, Ghana, Niger Republic, and Burkina Faso, is a major actor in the sub-region. US military advisers have also offered assistance to Nigerian troops fighting Boko Haram insurgents.

The situation in the region is further compounded by the “new scramble for resources” in Africa by the world’s established and emerging powers, particularly China and India, seeking access to newly discovered oil fields in the Gulf of Guinea, emerging markets as well as minerals and natural resources across the sub-region. The presence of these powers as either security or economic actors represents formidable competition for Nigeria, which also claims leadership over the region, but currently lacks the clout to back such claims or garner the dividends that can accrue from them.

Moreover, the nature of perceptions by Nigeria’s neighbors also impacts its foreign policy pursuits in ECOWAS. These perceptions are driven by either “suspicions ... about Nigeria’s real intentions” (Alli 2012: 77) or the existing cleavages between Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone countries. Thus, while some countries are wary of the antics of a Nigerian hegemon in their backyards, many in Nigeria do not see the point in their government expending resources on neighboring countries, while their own country faces serious internal political, security, and economic challenges. Therefore, the foregoing dimensions define a context that poses serious challenges for Nigeria’s foreign policy toward ECOWAS, even if it does not completely foreclose possibilities for change.

POSSIBILITIES AND PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE OF NIGERIA– ECOWAS RELATIONS

In the forty years of the existence of ECOWAS, Nigeria’s foreign policy has prioritized its support for the organization as a sub-regional platform for realizing its developmental and security goals. However, the trajectory of Nigeria’s engagement with the organization has been a mix of hits and misses. When Nigeria, buoyed by an oil boom invested

massively in good neighborliness, including bankrolling ECOMOG peace intervention in several war-affected West African countries, it did so, sometimes at the expense of its own domestic priorities, and against the protest of many Nigerians. However, the symbolic value of such contributions was that it set a precedent for African-led initiatives aimed at ending conflicts and restoring peace to the continent, particularly at a time where international attention was focused elsewhere.

The point, however, was that though the policy thrust was well intentioned, it could neither be sustained over the long run, nor was there any strategy for building on the sacrifices in ways that could benefit Nigeria further down the road. Nigeria did not lay down roots for bonds of deep friendship or economic cooperation that would reinforce the country's influence or legitimacy within the sub-region. This partly explains why Nigeria's level of engagement within ECOWAS appears to be frozen over time within the same broad principles that obtained at the inception of the organization four decades ago, without any fundamental changes in spite of the leadership turnover at the national level. Rather, Nigeria's leadership claims as well as its engagement with ECOWAS have come under immense pressures domestically and regionally, with new actors challenging the legitimacy of the state and transnational threats piling pressure from the outside.

The presidency of Muhammadu Buhari may open the door to new possibilities for re-engaging ECOWAS and moving claims to leadership at the sub-regional level beyond rhetoric. This will require a radical rethinking of Nigeria's foreign policy, including a major transformation of its decision-making and implementation apparatus. It also means opening up the policy space to innovative knowledge-based strategies and ideas, and feeding these into a coordinated and impactful manner in projecting Nigeria's interests and influence into its immediate neighborhood and beyond.

However, the transformation of Nigeria's foreign policy cannot take place in a vacuum. The prospects for change will have to be connected to the resolution of Nigeria's complex challenges and domestic contradictions through an inclusive and transformative democratic project. This will need to be led by a cohesive ruling elite committed to the well-being of all Nigerians, and their capacity to connect this project to the transformation of the rest of the continent, whether through ECOWAS or otherwise.

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Senegalese Foreign Policy: Leadership Through Soft Power from Senghor to Sall

Mamadou Bodian and Catherine Lena Kelly

The retired diplomat Amadou Diop, who served under Presidents Senghor, Diouf, and Wade, has aptly described Senegal's strengths and weaknesses in international affairs: "When we look at Saudi Arabia, its people have wealth based largely upon petrol, China has human capital, the US has financial capital. In Senegal, we lack these fortunes, but we have our diplomacy" (Seneweb 2006).

Since independence in 1960, Senegal has sought to maintain a comparative advantage as a "soft power" with normative authority in west Africa and across the continent because it has political and sociological characteristics that the Western democracies in the international community value. First, Senegal is a largely peaceful electoral democracy. Senegal shifted from a single-party regime (1960–1974) to a limited multiparty system (1974–1981) and became a full multiparty system (1981–present) over a decade earlier than many other African countries.¹ Senegal

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has had three peaceful transfers of presidential power and two changes in the ruling party. Second, Senegal has a rare post-independence history of uninterrupted civilian rule. The military is professional and refrains from direct intervention in politics. Third, Senegal is a majority-Muslim society whose citizens largely live peacefully within the framework of a secular state, practice religious tolerance, and have historically eschewed reformist Islam. Fourth, Senegal is a prominent representative of the francophone community. It was the cornerstone of colonial French west Africa, whose leaders have maintained close personal and political ties to France.

Presenting Senegal through the lens of foreign policy analysis, this chapter employs comparative analysis from the times of President Senghor to those of President Sall to demonstrate that even in arguably unipolar regions like west Africa, cultural and normative capital have been useful tools for certain countries to advance their national material interests. Recognition of these traits has enabled Senegalese foreign policymakers not only to project an image of their country as a cultural, intellectual, and normative authority, but also to use this reputation to achieve material goals. Because diplomacy is often viewed as Senegal's comparative advantage over neighbors like Nigeria, the regional hegemon, Senegalese actors have tended to focus on creating and maintaining organizations through which Senegal can attempt to exercise soft power. This ideational and institutional influence also provides opportunities for Senegal to attract financial resources, encourage actors with greater economic and military capacity to address issues of mutual interest, and encourage the coordination of collective responses.

This chapter tracks continuity and change in Senegalese foreign policymaking across the presidencies of Leopold Senghor (1960–1981), Abdou Diouf (1981–2000), Abdoulaye Wade (2000–2012), and Macky Sall (2012–present). It builds upon extant scholarship that follows Senghor's way of thinking about Senegalese foreign policy as a network of "concentric circles," with larger circles representing countries with more cultural distance from Senegal, which was at the center of Senghor's mental model of foreign policy (Schraeder 1997). The four sets of countries that Senghor focused on, ordered from closest to farthest in terms of cultural (as opposed to geographic) proximity, were (1) immediate neighbors; (2) the remainder of Africa; (3) the Arab world and other Muslim countries; and (4) the Western democracies. Applying the concept of concentric circles to the Wade and Sall presidencies as

well as expanding upon previous accounts of the circles under Senghor and Diouf, this chapter links change and continuity in Senegalese foreign policy to different presidents' strategies for projecting soft power through international organizations.

Research on the Wade era presents the president's political style and his institutional choices as the drivers of foreign policy (Sall 2013), while analysts of Senghor and Diouf point to factors like "the French colonial past, initial elite acceptance of socialist ideology, the impact of traditional Wolof culture, economic stagnation and decline, the role of Islam, and a proud democratic tradition that has never experienced military rule" (Schraeder 1997: 507).

In the post-9/11 world, the democratic and moderate Sufi dimensions of Senegal's state and society have gained global strategic importance and have created new foreign policymaking opportunities for Wade and Sall. These developments raise two questions: How have Senegal's concentric circles solidified or shifted over time, and what have been the implications of these changes for Senegal's ability to channel soft power through the creation (and curation) of its image as a normative authority?

We argue that changes and continuity in Senegalese foreign policy are largely driven by domestic factors. On the one hand, Senegal's overall foreign policy goals have remained relatively stable, focused on securing partnerships for economic growth and investment as well as promoting regional conflict mitigation. Another constant has been the tools available to Senegal to pursue these goals. Whether by choice or by circumstance, the primary tools have been cultural capital, intellectual leadership, and a history of participation in the formation and development of international organizations. On the other hand, there is variation in *how* the Senegalese foreign policy community has leveraged its cultural and normative authority as it has sought to achieve particular goals. These choices depend on the type of concentric circle concerned as well as various presidents' domestic constraints, opportunities, and preferences.

Aspects of the international system are important, but less influential overall. "Soft powers" like Senegal seek to invent opportunities for themselves to exercise diplomatic power by founding and fortifying international organizations that cannot be sustained through military and financial might alone. The gradual spread of this kind of ideational and normative authority across multiple international organizations has

helped Senegal meet national financial and economic needs that the state cannot address by itself.

The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section one, “The Domestic and International Architecture of Senegalese Foreign Policy” examines the domestic and international institutional structures influencing the size and shape of Senegal’s concentric foreign policy circles over time. Section two, “Continuity and Change in Senegal’s “Cercles Concentriques”” compares Senegalese foreign policy across the Senghor, Diouf, Wade, and Sall presidencies, highlighting changes in the importance of different concentric circles as relevant conduits for the strategic advancement of Senegal’s moral authority in the service of national development. Section three, “Conclusion” summarizes the theoretical implications of the Senegalese case.

THE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL ARCHITECTURE OF SENEGALESE FOREIGN POLICY

The domestic institutional structure shaping Senegalese foreign policy is based on a strong executive branch and a stable, non-partisan foreign affairs bureaucracy. As chief executive, the president makes foreign policy decisions with the assistance of cabinet ministers, diplomats, and non-governmental “opinion leaders” like the heads of Sufi brotherhoods. The legislature, while democratically elected, plays little role in foreign policy. Presidential control over ministerial structure has meant that the institutional instruments of Senegalese diplomacy have changed slightly over time. Under Senghor and Diouf, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) implemented the foreign policy of Senegal. In 1993, the MFA expanded its purview to include Senegalese living abroad, partially in hope of attracting diaspora financing for economic development (Sall 2013; Schraeder 1997: 500).

Wade broke with tradition by diluting the responsibilities of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A Ministry of African Integration (MAI) was created to direct diplomatic attention to the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and other sub-regional integration organizations, despite overlap with an existing department in the MFA (Sall 2013: 6). Sall reduced the number of ministers and abolished certain state structures, including the MAI, as part of an overarching effort to trim government bureaucracy.

Foreign policy is executed by diplomats trained at the *Ecole Nationale d'Administration* in Dakar. This high-quality training originally “focused exclusively on wider questions of state sovereignty,” but now also covers subjects like “environment, multilateral economic negotiations, and sub-regional integration” (Sall 2013: 7). The stability and professionalism of the diplomatic corps have assured that its procedures and attitudes toward authority have undergone limited change across presidential administrations, even though particular diplomats have at times expressed concern about certain aspects of foreign policy (Sall 2013: 17).

Grounded in these domestic systems, Senegalese foreign policy has consistently reflected an ambition to create and pursue leadership within international organizations promoting regional integration, African unity, and global cooperation. For instance, Senegal helped to establish and legitimize the AU (and its predecessor organization, the Organization of African Unity), ECOWAS, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and the International Organization of Francophonie (OIF).

Senegal under Senghor was a founding member of the OAU. Diouf’s OAU Chairmanship in 1985–1986 improved confidence in the institution, then particularly troubled by Anglophone-Francophone rivalries. Wade and Sall have been thought leaders in particular institutional domains. As the primary architect of the Omega Plan for the long-term regional financing of development initiatives, Wade helped to found the AU’s New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD).² Sall also supported AU innovation by establishing the Extraordinary African Chambers in Senegal to try Chadian ex-dictator Hissène Habré for crimes against humanity and torture.

Senegal was also a founding member of ECOWAS, established in 1975 to promote regional economic integration. ECOWAS has since taken on conflict management and peacebuilding functions. Diouf’s Chairmanship in 1991–1993, along with Senegal’s troop contributions to the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) military interventions in Liberia and Guinea-Bissau, fostered logistical cooperation across regional linguistic divides (Mortimer 1996). Wade later oversaw a ceasefire and ECOWAS-sponsored peace negotiations in Ivory Coast as Chairman from 2002 to 2003. Sall, too, took on economic and conflict resolution functions as Chairman in 2015–2016.

Senegal also co-created the OIC, which seeks to “promote tolerance and moderation, modernize in all spheres including science and

technology, education, and commerce, and insists on both good governance and the promotion of human rights in the Muslim world, especially those of children, women, and the elderly, as well as Islamic family values” (OIC 2016). Amadou Karim Gaye, who had served as Foreign Minister under Senghor, became OIC’s third secretary-general in 1976–1979, succeeding colleagues from Malaysia and Egypt. OIC summits were held in Dakar in 1991 and 2008, making Senegal the first Sub-Saharan African country to host twice.

As president and the first black member of the French Academy, Senghor and the leaders of Tunisia, Niger, and Cambodia created the first incarnation of the OIF in 1970. It began as an organization of countries “using French in service of solidarity, development, and rapprochement of peoples through a permanent dialogue of civilizations” (OIF 2016b). The OIF now has 80 member states that “account for a population of over 890 million people, including 220 million French speakers” (OIF 2016a). Senegal hosted the OIF’s 1989 and 2014 summits, and Abdou Diouf was secretary-general in 2003–2014. The OIF has also been a useful tool for French diplomats interested in promoting continued ties with former colonies and territories.

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN SENEGAL’S “CERCLES CONCENTRIQUES”

Through participation in the development of these organizations, Senegal has established multiple arenas for exercising normative and cultural leadership in its foreign policy, thereby potentially galvanizing actions to meet domestic economic and security needs. Each president’s foreign policy has had a similar principal focus, which suggests that the definition of Senegal’s moral and material interests has been relatively stable. However, there is variation in *how* foreign policy actors have chosen to advance those interests within international organizations. The configuration of Senegal’s concentric circles during each presidency has shaped the organizations with which Senegalese foreign policymakers have most deeply engaged in hopes of wielding soft power and achieving national goals.

Senegalese foreign policy was initially based on preserving and strengthening the greater French-speaking community of states. Senghor adopted a fairly traditional approach, using the Senegalese state and strong ties with France to manage economic and security issues among

francophone West African neighbors. Although these trends continued after Senghor, Diouf expanded Senegal's focus to more fully encompass the OAU, ECOWAS, and the Arab world. Foreign policy under Wade was more personalistic (Sall 2013). An experienced mediator and architect of NEPAD, Wade exercised international leadership roles that reinforced Senegal's status as an exemplar of peace, tolerance, and dialogue. As good governance and respect for civil liberties declined during his presidency, Wade diversified his country's diplomatic alliances to reduce Senegalese reliance on Western powers. Sall, too, has prioritized "economic diplomacy" (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères du Sénégal 2016). More so than Wade, Sall has leveraged Senegal's democratic image within a variety of international organizations to increase Senegal's visibility to other democracies as it seeks economic resources.

Circle 1: Immediate Neighbors

Senegal's foreign policy toward immediate neighbors is largely driven by the government's attempts to avoid political instability along its porous national borders (Diop 1994). The Senegalese government has set out to use international organizations strategically—but only occasionally—to pursue Senegalese national interests with neighbors; Senegal has relied more heavily on this circle than in others on military force as a potential tool. Neighborhood leadership through "soft power" has not been as useful as realist maneuvering when faced with the political instability or idiosyncrasy of the states most proximate to the Casamance separatists, The Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau.

In the Senghor era, Senegal enjoyed continuous diplomatic relations with all of its neighbors except Guinea and Mali, whose Marxist regimes had tense relations with Senegal based on Cold War ideological differences. After Senegal's withdrawal from the short-lived Federation of Mali in 1960, Mali cut off diplomatic relations with Senegal and did not restore them until 1963 (Thiouf 1994: 96). Senegal also had an unstable relationship with Guinea, with a break in relations from 1973 to 1978 (Gellar 1995; Jessup 2000).

Since the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance* (MFDC) started waging an armed separatist campaign in 1982, Senegalese authorities have combined diplomacy and military action toward The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, neighbors accused of sheltering and/or supporting MFDC rebels (Schraeder 1997: 499; Diop 2006: 109). Initial tensions

with The Gambia developed under Diouf for security reasons. When Gambian leftists attempted a coup against President Dawda Diawara in July 1981, just after Diouf became president, Senegal helped put down the insurrection and restore Diawara to power. This resulted in the Senegambia Federation, a union based on a mutual security interest that was dissolved in 1989 after renewed tensions (Diop 2006: 106; Schraeder 1997: 502).

Relations became strained with Mauritania when Senegal hosted leaders of a movement of black Mauritanian dissidents accused of attempting a coup in Nouakchott in 1987 (Marty 2005). Tensions culminated in a conflict in 1989, when a dispute about land rights on the shared border led to “ethnically-based forced expulsions from Mauritania into Senegal” (Arieff 2012: 9; Vandermotten 2004). Diplomatic relations resumed in 1992, but the issue of Mauritanian refugees in Senegal remained unsettled until 2008 when the UN refugee agency launched a repatriation program for up to 24,000 Mauritanian refugees in northern Senegal (Pouilly 2008).

Following a 1980 maritime border dispute with Guinea-Bissau, Senegal signed a formal protocol in June 1995, despite the fact that the ICJ had favored Senegal in its arbitration and such a protocol was not theoretically required (Okafor-Yarwood 2015: 286; ICJ 1995). The “primary reason for Senegalese generosity was an unstated linkage that, in return for a portion of the oil profits [in the disputed area], the Guinea-Bissau government would take a much more active role in denying the Casamance insurgents both access to illegally transhipped weapons and safe havens” (Schraeder 1997: 503). Political instability complicated these diplomatic efforts, however. In 1998, Guinea-Bissau’s former Brigadier-General Ansumane Mané attempted a coup against President João Bernardo Vieira, an ally of the Senegalese government, after Vieira fired Mané for allegedly smuggling arms to Casamance separatists. Attempting to protect its ally in the fight against the MFDC, Senegal sent approximately 2000 troops to Guinea-Bissau to rescue Vieira “on the basis of bilateral defense pacts and...without the initial blessing of the full ECOWAS Authority,” which had authorized an ECOWAS Monitoring Group (Adebajo 2002; Tavares 2011: 153). This was also a rare example of Senegalese direct military cooperation with Guinea, which deployed 400 troops.

Seeking to end the Casamance conflict in his first hundred days, Wade’s first state visit abroad was to Guinea-Bissau. The visit happened

in April, soon after new-elected governments took over in both countries. As an opposition politician, Wade “had described [Senegal’s] 1998 intervention into Guinea-Bissau as a mistake, and during his visit to Bissau asked for forgiveness for Diouf’s actions” (Adebajo 2002: 129). This led to roughly six years of cooperation between Bissau and Dakar against MFDC faction leader Salif Sadio. Yet when Vieira was killed by his own military chief of staff in 2009, Senegal lost its ally in the crack-down as Angola and Nigeria jockeyed for influence in Bissau. Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Junior subsequently welcomed Angolan influence in Bissau and rejected the ECOWAS intervention favored by Wade, President Malam Bachai Sanha, and the Nigerian authorities who likely would have been involved in such an intervention (Foucher 2013).

Senegal-Gambia relations during the Wade presidency were similarly tumultuous. In 1998, the two governments began exploring the construction of a Trans-Gambian bridge that would reduce transport costs and travel times within Senegal and ECOWAS. However, construction stalled and Gambian authorities increased ferry prices for Senegalese vehicles in 2005, sparking a border closure (Saine 2009: 62). Senegal-Gambia relations also suffered in 2007 when Senegal refused to hand over several former Gambian military leaders allegedly involved in plotting a coup (Cissé 2007). Regional security controversies also abounded. For instance, in 2010, Nigeria intercepted a disguised Iranian arms shipment to The Gambia that Senegalese authorities alleged were for the MFDC. When Senegal reported this to the UN, the Gambian head of the civil service gave “an unprecedented undiplomatic speech against Senegal, Wade, and Wade’s administration” (Saine 2012: 35).

Sall also sought a quick diplomatic victory in Casamance and selected The Gambia as the site of his first state visit in an effort to build relationships with neighbors interacting with MFDC factions (RFI 2012). However, soon after Sall’s state visit, President Jammeh executed nine death row inmates, including two Senegalese, despite Sall’s attempt to intervene. Sall also renewed efforts on the Trans-Gambian bridge, which he considers integral to the peace process because of what the African Development Fund describes as its potential to improve “land, air, and water accessibility of the [Casamance] region” (African Development Fund 2011). The Gambian government acted as it had under Wade by increasing the prices for trucks to cross into The Gambia. The border closed again in 2016, to the dismay of Senegalese truckers and merchants.

At the same time, in certain cases, Senegal has attempted to employ its multilateral connections to further peace in Casamance. When Sall took office, Guinea-Bissau was led by Prime Minister Gomes, who was friendly to Angolan influence and rejected that of its francophone neighbors (and Nigeria). When the Bissau military deposed Gomes in 2013, Senegal worked with the Bissau military, which accepted the deployment of an ECOWAS force (including Senegalese troops) into mid-2016 (Foucher 2013: 21). In addition, starting in 2013, Senegal deployed troops in an African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA)—a military mission organized by ECOWAS to support the Malian government against the Islamists and rebels in the north of the country (Bodian 2014). Foreign Minister Mankeur Ndiaye justified Senegal’s troop contributions by arguing that the crisis in Mali had direct national security implications for Senegal. He declared that “helping Mali recover its territorial integrity by undermining terrorist groups prevents a danger that imperils our borders, defends our own peace and security, and protects Senegal and its people” (Ndiaye 2013).

Circle 2: Other African Nations

This concentric circle has grown in both size and importance for Senegal’s attempts to project its cultural and normative leadership. While foreign policy under Senghor and Diouf focused most concretely on carving out a leadership role for Senegal within west Africa, Wade’s personal influence on AU economic development initiatives helped Senegal gain access to leadership roles within an organization often dominated by rivalries among regional powers like South Africa, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. Sall has had the opportunity to increase Senegal’s importance within both ECOWAS and the AU as these international organizations have strengthened and become more ambitious over time.

Senghor’s early effort to achieve African economic and political integration was limited by the Anglophone-Francophone divide. Initiating Senegal’s involvement in the OAU and ECOWAS, Senghor also maintained close relationships with France and francophone countries. Senegal was involved in regional economic integration efforts throughout the 1970s, but the Senghor administration maintained fairly distant relationships with Anglophone and Lusophone countries.

The Diouf administration expanded these relationships, especially during Diouf’s tenure as OAU Chairman (1985–1986) and ECOWAS

President (1991–1992). Rapprochement with the Anglophone countries, especially Nigeria, and with francophone rivals such as Guinea, occurred after Charles Taylor's invasion of Liberia in 1989. During the ensuing civil war, ECOWAS engaged in its first military intervention, which included Senegalese troops. Diouf, who had become ECOWAS chairman just before the July 1991 intervention, advanced Senegal's institutional leadership by fashioning a multilateral intervention that cut across linguistic lines and responded to demands for more direct francophone involvement in regional peacemaking (Mutwol 2009: 76).

Wade and Sall intensified the use of conflict mediation to project Senegal's normative power, while also increasing Senegal's contributions to intellectual leadership on economic issues. In 2001, Wade presented the Omega Plan during the OAU's founding discussions about the content of NEPAD. The integration of the Omega Plan into NEPAD put Senegal on the Steering Committee with South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, and Egypt. This facilitated summit diplomacy with the advanced industrial democracies (Wade 2006: 284). Although Wade attacked NEPAD's failure to implement the partnership effectively, he continued to back pan-African development work, including the Great Green Wall across the Sahara Desert (Wade 2009). On both the Omega Plan and the Great Green Wall, Wade sought to work with regional leaders, particularly Libya's Gaddafi, to advance his development agenda.

Wade's foreign policy was focused more on defusing political crises than on supporting electoral changes of power and greater democratic consolidation in Africa. Wade's continent-wide reputation as a staunch opposition figure for thirty years made him an attractive mediator of election-related disputes. For instance, when Madagascar's 2002 presidential election led to vote-counting disputes between President Didier Ratsiraka and opponent Marc Ravalomanana, Wade invited the two rivals to the NEPAD summit in Dakar. Talks sponsored by the OAU and the UN yielded the Dakar Agreement, which recommended a vote recount, but ultimately failed to enforce an election-based change in power (Cornwell 2003). During his ECOWAS Chairmanship in 2002, Wade also mediated in Ivory Coast's civil war, sending Foreign Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio to broker a ceasefire after the ECOWAS Contact Group was unsuccessful. The ceasefire took effect in October 2002, allowing for ECOWAS-sponsored peace negotiations (albeit under Burkina Faso's President Blaise Compaoré, who was less constrained by democratic norms) and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force (Tavares 2011: 157).

Wade continued to mediate after his ECOWAS Chairmanship, but had a mixed record in standing up for democratic solutions. He initially voiced support for Captain Moussa Dadis Camara when he mounted a coup in Guinea in 2008 (Marut 2010: 336). After Mauritania experienced a military coup before multiparty elections in 2009, Wade opposed Mauritania's expulsion from the AU and OIF, whose charters call for suspending the membership of states that have undergone a non-constitutional change of power. The Wade administration brokered a deal resulting in flawed elections legitimating the coup leader, General Mohamed Ould Aziz (BBC 2009). The Mauritanian opposition denounced the Senegalese mediation as biased before those elections. Nonetheless, Wade's unwavering commitment to mediation—which he continued for ECOWAS in Niger in 2010—constitutes another attempt to advance Senegal's regional leadership.

Sall has also pursued pan-African leadership roles in an effort to further Senegal's economic development, but has thus far been more successful than Wade ultimately was in solidifying Senegal's reputation for democracy and human rights in the process.³ Sall's simultaneous leadership of several organizations has allowed for a diversification of focus. During his ECOWAS Chairmanship in 2015, Sall worked with several Heads of State in an initial attempt to negotiate the restoration of the civilian regime in Burkina Faso.⁴ He also oversaw the extension of the ECOWAS mission in neighboring Guinea-Bissau (RFI 2015). At the same time, as Chairperson of the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Orientation Committee from 2013 to 2016, Sall prioritized "the reinforcement of economic integration," which harmonized with ECOWAS' "rapprochement with international organizations like the G7, G20, and African Union" (Présidence de la République 2016). As NEPAD Chairperson, he also convened the Dakar Financing Summit of the Africa Global Partnership Forum in 2014 to launch an additional partnership mechanism between NEPAD members and their donors in order to "build and strengthen innovative synergies between public and private sectors for implementing 16 priority projects" (NEPAD 2015). Meanwhile, Sall reinforced international justice and human rights by promoting the innovation of new AU institutions, namely the Extraordinary African Chambers (EAC) established in Dakar in February 2013 to try Hissène Habré, a resident of Senegal accused of crimes against humanity, war crimes, and torture during his presidency of Chad. Under Wade, the ECOWAS Court and the AU Assembly debated the modalities of a

potential Habré trial. Implementation stalled until Sall took power and presented human rights as a key component of his foreign policy, collaborating with the AU to pass domestic legislation to create the EAC, arrest Habré, and hold the trial (Williams 2013: 1144).

Circle 3: The Arab World

In its relations with the Muslim and Arab world, Senegal has consistently promoted its moderate brand of Islam, attempting to use its cultural capital to attract economic assistance—though this policy has also generated the potential for Senegal’s cultural penetration by more orthodox actors and radical Islamic ideas. Wade and Sall emphasized this concentric circle of foreign policy more centrally than Senghor and Diouf. However, certain bilateral relationships—like those with Libya and Iran—have been on-again, off-again across all administrations.

Building upon Senegal’s identity as “a Muslim country at the crossroads of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East,” Senghor sought to make Senegal a bridge between these two worlds. Although best known for its strong ties to France, the Senghor administration also sought the Gulf States’ financial help during the oil crisis of the 1970s (Schraeder 1997: 494). However, Senghor was also willing to stand against rich Arab states that threatened stability at home. For instance, the president severed diplomatic relations with Libya in July 1980, accusing Gaddafi’s government of subversive acts aimed at toppling President Senghor’s regime (Westerlund and Svanberg 1999: 92).

Foreign policy under Diouf deepened Senegalese relationships with the Middle East. Senegal’s dealings “with the so-called ‘radical’ Arab states, including Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and the Sudan” fluctuated dramatically, often because they created “security concerns—mostly associated with the rise of reformist Islam” within Senegal (Schraeder 1997: 505). Senegal’s relationships with countries like Saudi Arabia and Morocco were less volatile. Throughout Diouf’s presidency, Saudi Arabia was an important provider of foreign assistance, and Senegalese troops joined Saudi Arabia in an American-led coalition during the 1991 Gulf War (Gellar 1995). Senegal “achieved the sad distinction of losing the greatest number of troops on the Allied side (93 soldiers died in a tragic plane crash at the cessation of hostilities)” (Schraeder 1997: 495).

Morocco also had privileged links with Senegal, partially “due to that country’s unique position as the birthplace of Senegal’s politically

powerful Tijaniyya brotherhood” (Schraeder 1997: 504). In 1985, King Hassan II and Abdou Diouf established the League of Ulema (Islamic scholars) of Morocco and Senegal. This organization, sponsored by both countries but financed mainly by Morocco, functions as the religious wing of “soft” Senegalese-Moroccan cooperation (Sambe 2010: 847). These social and diplomatic ties withstood the death of Hassan II in 1999 and Diouf’s defeat in the 2000 elections.

Senegalese economic diplomacy in the Arab World intensified under Wade, who prioritized building ties to such countries in order to diversify Senegal’s sources of economic aid and investment. In North Africa, the Wade family—especially the President’s son, Karim—entertained warm personal relationships with King Mohammed VI of Morocco. Wade increased Senegal’s diplomatic prominence in the Middle East by gaining approval to host the eleventh OIC Summit in 2008. Financing for Summit-related infrastructure projects came from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Islamic Development Bank, while investments not directly linked to the Summit also came from Morocco and the United Arab Emirates (Chafer 2013; Coulibaly 2009; Sall 2013). Similarly, Senegal responded to Iranian economic diplomacy by initially positioning itself as a gateway for Iranian investment and outreach in Africa, but broke off diplomatic relations again in 2010 after the discovery of an Iranian weapons shipment to The Gambia, supposedly destined for the MFDC (Arieff 2012: 8; Sall 2013). Ties were restored in 2013.

Wade also used the OIC to highlight to his colleagues conflict resolution opportunities in Muslim Africa. In 2007, Foreign Minister Gadio emphasized Senegalese troop contributions to the UN–AU Mission in Darfur and praised the OIC’s endorsement of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement and the plans for multiparty elections in Ivory Coast. Gadio simultaneously emphasized Senegal’s moderate version of Islam by showcasing Wade’s Christian–Muslim dialogue and pressing his foreign colleagues to “present the real face of Islam as a universal religion that forbids violence, extremism, and intolerance and demands moderation, toleration, and respect for others” (OIC 2007a: 5, 2007b).

Senegal’s interest in engaging with other Muslim countries as economic development partners has not changed significantly under Sall. In courting these states for economic support, Senegal has continued to justify diplomacy toward the Arab World in terms of shared religious and cultural interests. When Sall was OIC Acting President in 2012, he pushed for member state contributions to the Islamic Solidarity Fund

for Development, while also advancing neighborhood security interests by arguing (unsuccessfully) for OIC intervention in Mali (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères du Sénégal 2012).

Bilaterally, too, Senegal under Sall provided diplomatic support to wealthy Arab partners in need of multilateral legitimation. In terms of military cooperation, Senegal pledged to contribute 2,100 troops to Saudi-led military operations in Yemen in 2015, although the troops never deployed. Senegal has also benefitted from Morocco's recent strategic diplomacy to garner support for its proposal to join the AU, which Morocco plans to use to advocate from within the AU for the expulsion of the independence-seeking Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (Wainscott 2016). Sall has a less personal relationship than Wade with King Mohammed VI. However, even as Sall's administration was investigating Karim Wade for corruption, the King visited Senegal and signed thirteen cooperative agreements in 2015 (Abinader 2015).

Circle 4: Western Democracies

Building good relationships with a variety of the Western democracies has been a central component of Senegalese foreign policy across all administrations. However, Senegal has changed its focus within this concentric circle over time, eventually investing less in its special relationship with France and more into relationships with the US, EU, G8, and G20. While Senghor and Diouf tried to use former colonial ties to France to pursue Senegalese national interests within this circle, Wade instead relied on economic thought leadership, and Sall has used emphasis on democracy and human rights along with an economic focus.

Senghor was a socialist and promoted pan-Africanism, but he was also a renowned, French-educated poet and philosopher who cultivated strong ties with France (Skurnik 1972: 204). Senghor's role in establishing the OIF in 1970 and Senegal's participation in Franco-African Summits as of 1973 reinforced the special relationship (Chafer 2003). France's defense agreements with Senegal were driven by French interests in bolstering its sphere of influence in Africa and containing the influence of radical, anti-French anti-colonialism during the Cold War. In this way, there was continuity in Franco-Senegalese relations from Senghor to Diouf. However, one major break in economic ties between France and its former colonies under Diouf occurred as a result of the January 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc, which placed new strains on West African economies (Marchal 1998).

While retaining relationships with France, Wade steered Senegal more squarely into the orbit of non-Western powers like the BRICS (especially China) and the Gulf States (Jain 2013: 80). Rifts occurred after French President Jacques Chirac was absent from Senghor's funeral in 2001 and after September 11, when Senegal "refused to support France in opposing the US-led invasion of Iraq" but also remained outside of the US's "coalition of the willing" (Chafer 2003: 164). France nevertheless retained a military base in Dakar until 2010 and is still one of Senegal's main trading partners (Chafer 2013: 10–11).

Senegalese foreign relations with the USA were reinforced by the Wade administration's support for the 2003 Iraq War and participation in the US Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative/Partnership. However, Wade's relationship with the US government grew tense toward the end of his second term, amid increasingly public US criticism of Wade's democratic backsliding. The Senegalese government qualified for Millennium Challenge Corporation funding and was invited to negotiate a compact in 2004, but did not complete negotiations and sign on until 2009. Wade also balked after a compact was signed, the US progressed slowly on the disbursement of funds due to renewed concerns about transparency, and the US Ambassador publicly reminded Wade that Senegal's scores on indices of good governance would affect the flow of funding (Arieff 2012; Bojang 2010; Wade 2006: 325).

Senegalese bilateral actions did not always correspond to principles of the international organizations to which it belonged. For instance, on the one hand, ex-President Abdou Diouf served as secretary-general of the OIF and gave Senegal visibility within an organization whose Bamako Declaration provides "the means to react vigorously to any interruption of the democratic process and to serious violations of human rights in the francophone space" (OIF 2000). On the other hand, Wade's foreign policy was not always in harmony with Diouf's application of OIF principles in his capacity as secretary-general. For example, the OIF condemned the 2008 coup in Guinea and suspended its membership until the restoration of a constitutionally legitimate government (OIF 2014a, 2009). However, Wade initially declined to condemn the coup (Arieff and Cook 2009: 11).

When Macky Sall became president, Senegal's international standing on human rights and governance improved—partly just because of Wade's defeat and the thwarting of his third-term ambitions. The Sall administration aspired to use its newfound clout to advance national

economic interests, regional security objectives, and pan-African development aspirations. Within the OIF, Senegalese actors promoted regional security by advocating political stability in Mali and Burkina Faso. Secretary General Diouf encouraged the cessation of hostilities and the re-establishment of a constitutional government in northern Mali in 2012, as well as the return to a constitutional government in Burkina Faso after the *coup d'état* by Lt. Colonel Isaac Zida in October 2014 (OIF 2012, 2014b). Sall also used the 2014 OIF Summit in Dakar to create the Economic Forum of Francophonie and convene its first meeting (Forum Economique de la Francophonie 2014).

Relations with the US have improved under Sall as well. President Obama visited Senegal in 2013 because Senegal had “made tremendous strides in improving democratic governance and empowering citizens.” In a press conference with Obama, Sall asserted that the US and Senegal “have a common vision of fundamental values: freedom, democracy, peaceful coexistence of cultures and religions, and good governance” (The White House 2013). As Chairperson of the NEPAD Orientation Committee, President Sall also used Obama’s state visit to attempt to promote regional economic interests. Senegal furthered alliances with the US after the visit by hosting US Operation Flintlock training in 2016 for African security forces fighting terrorism in the Sahel.

Under Sall, Senegal also held a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in 2016–2017. To win the UNSC delegate votes needed to take the seat, Senegal emphasized its commitments to ensuring peace and security, fighting against terrorism and drug trafficking, and supporting the ICC.⁵ Indeed, Senegal had been the first UN Member State to ratify the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court (ICC), in 2002 (United Nations 2002). Several prominent Senegalese statesmen have been appointed UN Special Representatives, as well, including Moustapha Niasse as the Special Envoy for the Peace Process in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ibrahima Fall as the Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region, and Abdoulaye Bathily as the Special Representative for Central Africa. Furthermore, Senegal emphasized its deployment of over 25,000 troops to over 20 UN peacekeeping operations since independence, which made it the seventh largest troop contributor as of March 2015 (Présidence de la République, n.d.). Sall called the bid “a historic opportunity ... to pursue on the international level the ideals in which we believe: peace, security, liberty, democracy, protection of human rights

and dialogue between cultures and civilizations with respect for their diversities” (Présidence de la République 2015).

CONCLUSION

Since independence, Senegal has worked to build regional power and diplomatic leadership largely based on cultural and normative capital rather than military action. Unlike regional hegemony like Nigeria and South Africa, Senegal does not have a comparative advantage in economic and military capabilities. At times, contentious situations at Senegal’s borders, often related to the long-lasting conflict in Casamance, posed threats to Senegalese national security and territorial integrity and prompted Senegal to intervene militarily in Guinea-Bissau and The Gambia. Overall, however, Senegal has wielded more considerable ideational and normative power, which it has developed based on its reputation as a peaceful electoral democracy, a stable civilian regime with a professional military, a bastion of francophone culture, and a tolerant Muslim society. These domestic characteristics have shaped Senegal’s foreign policy approach, leading many Senegalese authorities to fortify the international organizational architecture of which it is part in hopes of building an ideational and normative authority that can position Senegal to use its “soft” power to satisfy some of the country’s “harder” economic and security needs through cross-country cooperation.

Aspects of the international system also create enabling or disabling conditions for Senegalese foreign policy formulation and implementation. Four changes from the international system deserve particular attention. The first was Senegal’s independence from France in 1960. Senegal then became part of the Cold War battleground, allied with and influenced by France. The second pivotal moment was the fall of the Berlin Wall, which created economic incentives for the diversification of diplomatic relationships. This coincided with the rise of a new generation of Senegalese political elites concerned with enhancing economic growth and regional integration. Further turning points were the new security challenges emerging after 9/11 and the collapse of the Malian state in 2012. These contexts have shifted Senegal’s dominant focus to regional security cooperation.

However, continuities and changes in Senegalese foreign policy are more directly a function of presidential leadership. In terms of continuities, all four presidents of Senegal maintained similar definitions of Senegal’s moral

and material interests that emphasize cultural and normative and intellectual leadership as well as the pursuit of alliances that stimulate the national economy. Since the Casamance rebellion began in 1982, the Senegalese government's desire to quell—or at least contain—the separatist conflict has defined Senegal's relationship with its immediate neighbors. However, perhaps the most important element of continuity enabling Senegal to aspire to exercise a regional leadership position has been its constant pursuit of regional integration and development.

There is also significant variation in how Senegalese foreign policy actors have used each of the four concentric circles to advance the rather stably defined national interest. Over time, Senegal has come to rely less centrally upon its relationship with France to achieve economic goals and to rely more upon increasingly strong multilateral institutions like the UN, AU, and ECOWAS to manage conflicts. With the increasing threat of radical Islam in the Sahel, Senegal's democratic and moderate Sufi dimensions have gained strategic importance, creating opportunities for Senegal to engage on an ideational basis in the concentric circles of the Arab countries and the Western democracies.

Overall, the range of institutional avenues available to Senegal to promote its interests abroad has expanded over time; President Sall has a choice of more organizational avenues for pursuing national interests than Senghor did fifty years ago or Diouf twenty years ago. Sall's current multiplicity of avenues for promoting Senegal as a normative power is the result of a long-term process of organizational creation and fortification that Senegalese foreign policymakers invested in after independence. Only because Senegal played key founding roles in these organizations, and worked over decades to improve their capacities, were Senegalese foreign policymakers able to gradually develop them into usable (and sometimes even effective) instruments of diplomacy.

NOTES

1. In 1974, President Senghor ended single-party rule by allowing the Senegalese Democratic Party to be a “party of contribution” to the ruling Socialist Party. Three ideologically distinct parties were legalized in 1976 and a fourth was added in 1978. In 1981, President Diouf passed a law allowing for an unlimited number of parties.
2. The “Omega Plan” that Wade proposed to his African peers suggested a framework for the long-term financing of priority projects at

regional and continental levels, and advocated for a newfound partnership with the rest of the world. At a summit in Sirte, Libya in March 2001, the OAU recommended the creation of a New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), which merged the Omega plan with the Millennium Partnership for the Revival of Africa (MAP) led by Former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria.

3. Wade fostered similar hopes on the part of the international community that he would advance human rights and democracy during the first few years of his first presidential term.
4. Sall and ECOWAS proposed somewhat controversial terms for this restoration: amnesty for the coup leader, General Diendéré, and eligibility of all ex-Compaoré allies for future elected offices. These were not the rules that ended up governing Burkina's *de facto* transition back to civilian rule. See Bonkougou and Penney (2015).
5. Senegal was the first country to sign the Rome Statute in 1999 and has spoken out against the withdrawal of African countries from the ICC in 2016. See United Nations (1999) and Chan and Simmons (2016).

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International Organizations as Shields in Cameroonian Foreign Policy

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Cameroon's recent participation in the Lake Chad Basin's region-wide Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to oust jihadist group Boko Haram shows that Cameroon is ready to turn the historical page of timidity and begin to embrace a proactive role in solving its problems through regional and international organizations (Vircoulon 2015). This is, at least, the argument of Thierry Vircoulon, whose 2015 article on the potential for a Cameroonian foreign policy "pivot" was published in the *World Policy Journal*. Vircoulon, the project director for Central Africa at the International Crisis Group (ICG) goes on to suggest that Cameroon has typically been perceived as a unassertive country with a sleepy regime, and that only recent security developments have given the government any reason to become more proactive in its foreign policy engagement with its regional neighbors. Vircoulon is not alone in his assessment; the idea that Cameroon is timid and resultantly weak,

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non-confrontational, and low-profile in its dealings with international organizations (IOs) is also popular in the media, the UN, and other human rights dialogues.

Not only does this popular view misunderstand Cameroonian foreign policy objectives, it also misstates Cameroon's history of proactivity internationally. While at a glance, it may appear that Cameroon only had the capacity to manage domestic issues until the bloodshed of Boko Haram reached its borders, the government has long endeavoured to cooperate with IOs on various international issues. This chapter will illustrate that under President Paul Biya, Cameroon has always had a proactive outlook—especially in conjunction with regional partners, particularly those in the Central African region—even before recent security developments related to Boko Haram led to its arguable foreign policy “pivot.” More specifically, this chapter argues that Cameroon has tended to use IOs as “shields” in its foreign policy in pursuing three different goals: shielding itself from isolationism, shielding itself from economic and security volatility, and shielding itself from international interference.

First, Cameroon's relationship with IOs shields Cameroon from its history of isolationism. Most specifically, any past and future relationships rely on the lessons that the country has learned from the implications and consequences of Cameroon's first President, Ahmadou Ahidjo. Ahidjo's rather confrontational rejection of proposals, doctrines, and the courses championed by Cameroon's key partners in IOs are central to understanding how Cameroon makes foreign policy today. Fearing the possibility of punishment, missed opportunities, or strained alliances, President Biya's foreign policies seek, above all, to use IOs to champion its bilateral relationships.

Secondly, Cameroonian foreign policy uses IOs to shield the nation from economic and security volatility. President Biya's longstanding reign has provided a constant political status quo in which IOs can be engaged, but only insofar as those engagements do not upset Cameroon's own stability. The duration of his tenure as President has allowed him to set immutable foreign policy objectives and relationships for his country as it has become economically secure. Similarly, Biya has navigated the advantages and disadvantages of Cameroon's strategic geographical straddling of two broadly-defined regions—central Africa and west Africa. Understanding the implications of his effort to keep one foot in each region can shed light on Cameroon's national security policy and dealings with IOs.

Lastly, Cameroonian foreign policy harnesses relationships with IOs to shield Cameroon from international interference in its internal affairs. Given Cameroon's storied history with colonialism, it is especially protective of its sovereignty, its ability to pursue its own national interests, and its aim of protecting its borders. With these three goals in interacting with IOs, Cameroon has established itself as far from timid or low-profile—it has managed to use IOs in various phases of foreign policy, and will only continue to build international credibility by responding to the ongoing terror in the region through the use of IOs.

IOs SHIELD CAMEROON FROM ISOLATIONISM

Cameroon's broader foreign policy trajectory can best be contextualized through the lens of its actions immediately following independence. During colonial rule, Cameroon was divided between Britain and France; initially, it was administered under the League of Nations as one of the "mandated territories." France received a mandate for so-called, "Cameroon," while Britain was allocated two discontinuous strips of land of about 90,000 km² along the Nigerian border: the strip to the north was called "British Northern Cameroons" and the strip to the south, "British Southern Cameroons" (Thompson 2008: 8). On the 1st of January 1960, French Cameroon gained independence from France. Nigeria was scheduled to receive its independence in the same year; this raised the question of what to do about the British-owned territory. As a result, the British Cameroons held a referendum to determine its future on the 11th of February 1961: either integrate with Nigeria or reunify with its former brother, French Cameroon. The Muslim-majority Northern area opted for union with Nigeria, and the Southern area voted to join Cameroon. Northern Cameroons became a region of Nigeria in May, while Southern Cameroons became part of Cameroon in October.

Resetting the History of Isolationism

In the early months after independence from British and French colonial rule, Cameroon's first President, Ahmadou Ahidjo, and Vice President, John Ngu Foncha, immediately made long-term alliances in the context of international institutions with one global superpower, but simultaneously destroyed the possibility for cooperation with another.

In 1960, Ahidjo and Foncha signed a joint communiqué rejecting Cameroon's participation as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In the that same year though, the leaders allowed Cameroon to enjoin themselves to *la Francophonie* by signing cooperation agreements with France (Kombi 1997). The decision to rebuff Great Britain while strengthening ties to France created immediate fault lines among Cameroon's already divided population. Such discord threatened the all-important national unity agenda, which sought to leave behind the animosity cultivated by two separate colonizing powers.

Cameroon's second and current President, Biya, recognized the strife caused by his predecessor Ahidjo's decision: political unrest, complaints of marginalization, and the threat of separation along colonial lines. As a result, in 1995, Cameroon joined the Commonwealth of Nations to manage such easily perceived segregation and to bolster its cherished national unity and independence. Cameroon's dread of a division is still clear from President Paul Biya's rhetoric to and about Cameroonian citizens. Specifically, in 2017, Biya boasted that "all Cameroonians without exception have embarked on building a united, inclusive and bilingual nation.... We would remain open to constructive ideas, to the exclusion, however, of things that would affect the form of our State" (Tankang 2017).

But Ahidjo had not only rejected the relationship with Great Britain: he had effectively alienated Cameroon from the international community. Before President Biya took over in 1986, the country had also rejected invitations from other international organizations, including the World Bank, the IMF, and the Commonwealth of Nations. As a result, Cameroon began to experience serious economic hardship. Between 1987 and 1988, the total state budget was reduced by 25%. The dire financial situation of the government was linked to the fall in the price of oil and other commodities that Cameroon had depended upon for revenue; the economy suffered due to its reliance on oil alone, the cost of isolationism.

Thus, following President Biya's rise to power, the government of Cameroon needed to reevaluate its stance on external support, especially from the international financial institutions (IFIs). At about the same time, the increased process of democratization in francophone Africa gave rise to internal agitation for reform, especially in the direction of multiparty democracy (Omitoogun 2003: 23). These two factors acting simultaneously impelled the regime of President Paul Biya to make

changes to satisfy both constituencies. The best solution was to use international organizations (IOs) to ensure that Cameroon was plugged into any global progress, and to provide latitude in its commitments to larger global powers. In many ways, IOs could shield Cameroon from its previous desire to refuse help, but could also shield Cameroon from a traditional neo-colonial relationship. By 1988, the government sought and accepted IMF and World Bank support to the economy.

Cameroon learned two important lessons from its initial refusal to engage with portions of the international community. First, the two incidents provided evidence that heeding the calls from IOs was an important component of ensuring its national unity and prosperity: as strong as Cameroon could be alone, it could be stronger with assistance. Without joining the Commonwealth of Nations or IFIs, which pulled Cameroon away from the verge of economic disaster, Cameroon struggled to safeguard its unity and enhance the survival and well-being of citizens in a free and secure nation.

Second, Cameroon's leadership additionally learned the importance of having a broad spectrum of foreign policy strategies, particularly to ensure that Cameroon could achieve its goals and leverage the assistance of IOs. Given its history, Cameroon's future will consistently involve consideration of the consequences of any given strategic choice to determine the cost of isolation or missed opportunities for common ground. President Biya's administration will likely shrink from the adoption a confrontational foreign policy which threatens Cameroon's social fabric, national unity, and peace among the population. Furthermore, contemporary Cameroon has and will continue to avoid any situation which could threaten its development or capacity to safeguard its economy. Instead, Cameroonian foreign policy privileges IOs' enhancement of the survival and well-being of its citizens in a free and secure nation.

Offsetting Historical Isolationism Through Bilateral Relationships

Even outside of international institutions, one way that Cameroon has achieved gains for its citizens internationally is through bilateral relationships. Cameroon's prosperity depends upon its investments in using IOs to further strengthen or maintain these strong bilateral relations, rather than to seek multilateral relationships from scratch. The most important associations in the near future will involve its African neighbors, but also rising global powers and superpowers like China, the United States, and

France. While all three countries have worked with Cameroon on economic and cultural agreements, bilateral relations, especially with France and the US, have been crucial in mitigating the setbacks suffered from Boko Haram, a jihadist armed group that poses an existential threat to Cameroon.

As part of Franco-Cameroonian military cooperation, which was most recently reinforced by the signature of a defense partnership agreement in May of 2009, France donates military hardware including tactical equipment to Cameroon, at various intervals. In one of the batches, France provided ten tactical vehicles and five transport trucks, equipped with weapons and transmission equipment. The vehicles were accompanied by precision rifles, helmets, and bulletproof vests, including an all-equipped sanitary unit. This particular donation is valued at over \$480 million, without including the training activities carried out throughout the year by the French military units in Gabon. In order to preserve its military strength and ability to protect its borders, Cameroon must continue to uphold its connection to France.

The same can be said for Cameroon's relationship with the United States, which assists Cameroon in preventing the illegal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Cameroon's bilateral agreements with the US covers curbing, detecting, and interrupting illegal traffic in nuclear and other radioactive materials. Stopping the smuggling of such materials is part of the mission of the NNSA, an organ of the US Department of Energy (US Embassy in Cameroon 2017). In a similar vein, the US offers tactical war equipment, high technology combat vehicles, and high power generators to support Cameroon's national security, and to bolster its counterterrorism efforts in its fight against Boko Haram. Bilateral relations with China have also been fruitful in achieving a number of military assistance, health, and infrastructure projects in Cameroon.

Through its relationships with global powers, Cameroon has managed longstanding relationships in the region and beyond. Despite the low officially reported trade flows between Nigeria and Cameroon, a substantial amount of reciprocal trade exists between the two countries. In a 2013 World Bank report (World Bank 2013: 28), non-oil imports from Nigeria to Cameroon (valued at \$769 million) and non-oil exports to Nigeria (valued at \$62 million) were estimated to be more strategically significant when compared to the exports and imports from the African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) region (World Bank 2013: 28). Similarly, Israel plays an important role in

Cameroon's domestic success; Israelis host Cameroonians in the Negev to receive training and education in agriculture, and Israeli soldiers train Cameroon's Rapid Reaction Force. It is no wonder, then, that Israeli Ambassador Ran Gidor describes Cameroon as Israel's best friend in Africa (Arbel 2013). Cameroon has also partnered with Asian countries to build its capacity for development. In 2012 alone, bilateral trade relations were substantial—Cameroonian exports to South Korea were worth \$54.5 million and Cameroon received \$10.7 million of imports from South Korea. Hence, going forward, Cameroon foreign policy strategies in IOs will prioritize its ability to maintain and maximize its bilateral relationships with these countries.

IOs SHIELD CAMEROON FROM INSTABILITY

President Biya has served Cameroon for over thirty years as President, since 1982. While critics of Cameroon call for new leadership and strong democratic reform, dismantling the priorities of such a long period of time is unwise. Opposition groups and parties have made several unsuccessful attempts to unite against the incumbent President Biya in the past few decades, but even if the 2018 elections were to produce a new ruler, Biya's economic vision and direction for Cameroon cannot be entirely discarded. Even with the emergence of terrorism in the region, Biya's foreign policy objectives have remained appropriately consistent, ensuring that his regime's relevance has increased in Cameroon's foreign policy activities. Many of these strategies, in fact, include his penchant for pursuing Cameroon's global financial interests through IOs. Therefore, Cameroonian past and future foreign policies draw lessons from the priorities of the Biya regime; specifically the priority to stimulate economic growth and regional integration, and the priority to promote peace and security. Through Biya's relationships with IOs, he has shielded Cameroon from economic crisis and national security threats.

Economic Stability

President Biya's rule has been dogged by a number of problems, but one of the most prominent was the severe economic crisis that began in 1984. As previously discussed, President Ahidjo's isolation and withdrawal from the international community were major factors in causing Cameroon's longest recession; in particular, because Cameroon could

not recover from the drop in commodity prices for its principal exports like petroleum, cocoa, coffee, and cotton. Following the market's shakiness in the mid-1980's, beginning in 1987, Cameroon's economy shrunk for nine consecutive years. The decline was mitigated, though not totally abated, even after President Biya began accepting loans from IMF in 1988 (given that the austerity demands were severe for the population). Real per capita income GDP fell by about 60% during this period. The rise in prices, trade deficits, and loss of government revenue had a devastating effect on Cameroonian citizens, which resulted in the aforementioned questioning of and pressure to change the policies of President Ahidjo.

President Biya's resultant interest in growth and regional integration through IOs served as the antidote to the previous policies of reliance upon domestic revenues for imports and exports. The new outward-looking approach elevated the importance of IOs in Cameroon's pursuits of economic growth and integration in several ways: IOs came to serve as good platforms to consolidate trade relations that provided high economic dividends for Cameroon, provided crucial avenues for the safe movement of goods and services, and were capable of being harnessed as tools for assessing the credibility and feasibility of information-sharing and reciprocity in economic engagements.

To consolidate bilateral trade relations, Biya sought to begin his relationships with IOs with a deferential, non-contentious attitude and enormous faith in the potential for economic viability. Although initially, Biya balked at the conditions (following suggestions for strict cuts laid out by the IMF) that France, Germany, and the United States set in order to help Cameroon through its deficit, he ultimately chose to accept the assistance of IOs. The country accepted the IMF aid package, a Structural Adjustment Policy (SAP) loan from the World Bank, and was then able to secure more loans from the African Development Bank, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Biya remains deferential, but much more open and optimistic dealing with global IOs today. Cameroon is embedded in numerous international financial organizations, and has one of Central Africa's strongest economies. Biya's choice at the beginning of his tenure as President has set a precedent for Cameroonian foreign policy from which the country cannot deviate. If it was to become either aggressive, or to withdraw from globalization (as it has attempted to do before), the results could be economically catastrophic.

While his relationships with global IOs rely on the leadership of superpowers or titans of industry, Biya has made Cameroon an active and powerful force within its regional economic communities. To improve the management of all economies and ease the movement of goods and services at the sub-regional level, Cameroon and five other countries (Gabon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Republic of Congo, and Equatorial Guinea) have proactively begun to use The Central African Economic Community (CEMAC) to give a new momentum to their regional economic integration.

The CEMAC represents another effort by central African regional communities to promote cooperation and exchange among members. Today, through this organization, Cameroon serves as an economic pivot in the sub-region. Ninety percent of goods destined for central Africa pass through Cameroon, and it acts as the engine of the CEMAC community with 44% of the community's GDP and 39% of its exports. Most recently, Cameroon hosted an extraordinary session of CEMAC Heads of States and Government. Given its estimated GDP growth of 5.6% at the end of December 2016 (World Bank, *Doing Business 2016*), Cameroon will continue to invest in CEMAC and to strengthen its leadership position in the organization.

A younger partnership, the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), was established in August 2016 between Cameroon, Central Africa, and the European Union (EU). This alliance will act as an infant opportunity for members to modernize their economies and adopt proactive economic policies, especially as governments focus on the industrial sector and its global competitiveness. The EPA has offered CEMAC countries, but particularly Cameroon, an opening to increase the country's share in the international market. But such labors will only bear fruit if Cameroon and other CEMAC countries are able to begin exporting quality products in competitive quantities. Though numerous factors have contributed to Cameroon's 5.6% financial growth and resilient economy, Biya's regime has set a precedent which has used a proactive foreign policy strategy with sub-regional IOs and a obsequious attitude with global IOs to achieve its economic and regional integration.

Finally, as concerns their ability to promote economic stability, international institutions at both regional and global levels have made reciprocity credible and feasible for Cameroon in the international trade system. Cameroon has been a member of the WTO since its birth in

1995 (World Trade Organization, Member Information 2017). In Cameroon, engagement with the World Trade Organization (WTO) has been providing information and expertise to governmental and financial institutions. At the first joint Trade Policy Review of CEMAC countries, the WTO facilitated each country's efforts to better understand each other's trade and trade-related policies and practices (World Trade Organization 2013). Shortly thereafter, in June 2015, the WTO upgraded its Reference Centre at the Ministry of Trade in Yaoundé, Cameroon, and subsequently held a four-day national workshop and notification seminar. During this workshop and seminar, WTO experts provided training for government officials on the use of WTO online resources, including the WTO website and databases, and provided guidance on notification procedures (World Trade Organization, World Trade Reference Centers 2015).

While President Biya must continually work to ensure that reciprocity does not equate to inequality in trade relations, Cameroon has benefited hugely from its relationship with the WTO. In totality, Cameroon's existing relationships and dealings with IOs cannot be erased or drastically altered by new leadership; given Cameroon's newfound economic viability, major divergence from the precedent set by President Biya's tenure could have long-lasting financial impacts on both Cameroon and the region as a whole.

Security Stability

Cameroon's economic interests, though, cannot exist without Cameroonian national security. In the same way that President Biya's global relationships have determined the course of financial policy, his engagements with regional and supranationalist organizations have blazed a trail for issues of Cameroonian national security. In particular, President Biyah has worked with IOs on three main stability and security concerns: promotion of pan-Africanism; promotion of regional peace; and protection of sovereignty.

Promoting Pan-Africanism

In the early years after the independence of Cameroon from British and French colonial rule, pan-Africanism was regarded as a top national security interest. Yet, President Adhijo did not embrace friendship with his neighbor states, much less the African continent. Under his tenure,

Ahidjo rejected demands of pan-Africanists like Nkrumah for a United States of Africa. Unsurprisingly, this led to a dearth of Cameroonian leadership in the region and more broadly—Ahidjo’s administration made Cameroon a frequent, but never pioneering, participant in institutions and special missions of African diplomacy.

But upon the election of President Biya, pan-Africanism became a higher priority, particularly in order to protect other African countries from further intimidation or humiliation. That priority has not eroded over time. The liberation of Africa from colonialism and racial discrimination continues to dominate Cameroonian rhetoric. During the period of apartheid in South Africa, Cameroon accepted plans to place economic sanctions on South Africa and ratified various instruments against racial discrimination in South Africa, such as the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination and the Repression of the Crime of Apartheid, and the International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports. Similarly, the Pan-African University Institute for Governance, Humanities, and Social Sciences (PAUGHSS), is hosted by the University of Yaoundé II in Cameroon. President Biya has made Cameroon a centerpiece of the cooperation of African states, and extrication from such a tangled web would be both challenging and detrimental to the security interests of Cameroonian citizens.

Promoting Regional Peace

Regional conflicts and vulnerable states contribute to Cameroon’s national security concerns. Cameroon’s strategic geographical location between two African regions, west Africa and central Africa, makes it susceptible to the threats of both areas. In particular, Cameroon has struggled to combat the growing power of Boko Haram, in addition to piracy and seaborne armed groups regularly attacking Doula, Limbe, and Bakassi. As security threats have become impossible to manage alone, President Biya has further invested in IOs globally and regionally, particularly the UN’s work with the Lake Chad Basin and collaborations with ECOWAS and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC). With these partnerships, Cameroon has newfound capacity to confront these aggressors, particularly piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, civil conflicts in the Central African Republic (CAR), and the regionalization of Boko Haram insurgencies.

In particular, the pirates off the Gulf of Guinea are a drain on Cameroon's oil economy. Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea is characterized by "attacks such as fuel bunkering, drug and human trafficking, illegal fishing, and hostage-taking of nearly 1,000 sailors, turning the region into a 'hellhole'" (Nforngwa 2013). To promote mutual efforts in maritime security, President Biya proactively organized (by UNSC Resolution 2039 in February 2012), the first-ever meeting between ECOWAS, GGC, and the Economic Community of Central African States ECCAS (Mbonjo 2013). The meeting had tremendous success—the summit produced a Memorandum of Understanding between ECCAS, ECOWAS, and GGC on Safety and Security in the Maritime Region of West and Central Africa to curb piracy in the central and west African regions. The groups also agreed to cooperate towards the creation of an inter-regional anti-piracy coordination centre in Yaoundé. Both agreements were key to establishing the first such transnational security system in the affected coastal Africa.

Similarly, Seleka rebels from the Central African Republic have occasionally launched attacks on Cameroonian soils. On November 18, 2013, Seleka rebels attacked a village near a main road leading from Cameroon into the Central African Republic. The activities of the group also caused an influx of an overwhelming 192,000 refugees to Cameroon. Through the African-led International Mission for the Stabilization of Central Africa (MISCA) which was later transformed into a UN-led mission (MINUSCA), President Biya took a leadership role in combating the violence. Cameroon continually contributed troops to the peacekeeping missions, in addition to the Economic Community of Central African States' (ECCAS) FOMUC force, deployed to help CAR's leadership, particularly François Bozize Yangouvonda, hold back a potential rebel advance to the capital from the Seleka rebels. While the capital was ultimately seized in 2013, Cameroonian cooperation with global IOs helped to protect regional and continental security.

Cameroon has faced worsening security threats from Boko Haram, a Nigerian-based terrorist organization which has aligned itself with the Islamic State. Within Cameroonian borders, Boko Haram kidnapped a French family of seven that was released only after ransom was paid. The group has also kidnapped the wife of the former Cameroonian Vice President, and mounted a guerilla operation to overtake the Kolofota military base. Recognizing the existential threat posed not only to Cameroonian citizens, but to the region, President Biya took decisive

action. Beginning in October 2014, Cameroon joined other countries bordering the Lake Chad Basin to fight against Boko Haram in the MNJTF, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. The Task Force was quickly endorsed by the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) on November 25, 2014 (African Union 2014). Though the force was initially only deployed by the AUPSC for 12 months, on January 14, 2016 (African Union, Communiqué OF 567th PSC Meeting on Boko Haram Terrorists Group 2016), the operation's mandate was renewed, at which time Cameroon pledged 2,650 troops (Swadogo 2017). Through this regional coordination of the countries in the region, President Biya remains resolute in his work with IOs to end Boko Haram's reign.

Promotion of Colonially Demarcated Sovereignty

It is also in Cameroon's national interest to protect its colonially demarcated borders. To achieve this, Cameroon uses IOs adopting the principle of *uti possidetis* to reaffirm and implement conventional instruments that protect Cameroon's boundaries, in addition to conventions which serve as a legal basis for the consolidation of its territorial space (Kombi 1997).

The Latin principle of *uti possidetis* stipulates that "territory and property remains with its possessor at the end of a conflict unless a treaty states otherwise." However, under President Adhijo, the preamble of Cameroon's constitution clearly stated the ambition to assist individuals living in territories separated from the motherland, and to return to them to live in fraternity in a united Cameroon. Shortly after the plebiscite reunifying West Cameroon to Cameroon and releasing North Cameroon to the Federal Republic of Nigeria, though, the territorial quest was abandoned as a result of the implicit will of Cameroon to comply with principle.

In 1963, the OAU (now the AU) adopted the principle of *uti possidetis* and passed a resolution stating that the principle of stability of borders—the key principle of *uti possidetis*—would be applied across Africa. Cameroon, as a member of the then-OAU, continued to rely heavily upon this principle to avoid skirmishes and settle border disputes. Cameroon continues to use the *uti possidetis* principle to enforce and protect colonially demarcated sovereignty granted by the following conventions of territorial integrity.

One area where *uti possidetis* became contentious, though, is the Bakassi Peninsula, which is a peninsula on the Gulf of Guinea. It lies between Nigeria's Cross River State estuary and Cameroon's Rio Del Ray estuary. Known to the Europeans as the "old Calabar in Nigeria," the oil-rich peninsula became a *de facto* part of Nigeria after Queen Victoria signed a treaty of Protection in 1884 with the Kings and Chiefs of Akwa Akpa, during the scramble for Africa. However, colonial documents released by Cameroon, Britain, and Germany indicate that the peninsula was under Cameroonian territory during the 1913 Anglo-German agreement. Under the Yaoundé II Declaration and the Maroua Declaration (both adopted in the late mid-1970's), the maritime boundaries between the two countries following independence implied Cameroonian ownership over Bakassi.

Thus, a dispute over the peninsula was long overdue for Nigeria and Cameroon. In 1981, the two countries nearly broke out in a war over the peninsula, and twelve years later, the dispute resurfaced after Nigerian troops attacked and occupied part of the Bakassi peninsula deep inside Cameroon's territory (Ngoh 1996). Rather than wage war with Nigeria, a pivotal trade partner, President Biya sought a peaceful settlement of this matter and worked in vain to leverage diplomatic means to solve the problem. Cameroon engaged both Togolese and French mediators to seek a non-violent resolution, and even initiated the involvement Security Council of the Conflict Prevention Mechanism of the OAU (Wembou 2000).

When diplomatic efforts failed, Cameroon went to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on March 29, 1994 to report the problem. Cameroon detailed in her complaint the illegal occupation of her territory by Nigeria, and argued vigorously that the Court trace the maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria in order to avoid future conflicts (Kombi 1997) and confirm her sovereignty over the peninsula. Eight years later, Cameroon emerged successful. On October 10, 2002, the ICJ, citing the same agreement of 1913 between Great Britain and Germany which spurred the Yaoundé II and Maroua Declaration, confirmed Cameroon's sovereignty over Bakassi (Ngandu 2008).

After the judgement, the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan arranged a further meeting between Presidents Paul Biya of Cameroon and Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria in Geneva, during which both countries agreed to establish a Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC). The CNMC would be overseen by the United Nations Office for

West Africa (UNOWA) and would “consider ways of following up on the ICJ ruling and moving the process forward” (United Nations Office for West Africa 2005). With the support of the UN, both countries worked closely together to peacefully implement the ICJ ruling. A genuine, peaceful turnover of the peninsula by Nigeria was completed on August 14, 2008 (State Department 2008).

Thus, through memberships in the international institutions like the International Court of Justice, Cameroon has managed to avoid further violence with its neighbor, while peacefully pursuing its own security priorities in the region. Under President Adhijo, such work with IOs may not have been possible, but President Biya has used IOs to ensure Cameroon’s long-lasting security stability.

IOs SHIELD CAMEROON FROM INTERNATIONAL INTERFERENCE

According to the OAU Charter, independence, sovereignty, and non-interference “are intangible principles” to which Cameroon must subscribe in order to ensure safe, friendly, and durable cooperation in Africa. Vaunting the principle of non-interference has provided grounds on which President Biya can legitimately frown upon even the most innocuous efforts of external actors to influence his country’s internal affairs. Protective of its independence and sovereignty, Cameroon has, and will continue, to use IOs to proactively reinforce its national independence and demand the respect of its sovereignty under the principle of non-interference (Biya, *Pour le Libéralisme communautaire* 1989).

Founding members of the OAU, including Cameroon, adopted non-interference and non-intervention as shields against imperialism and the diplomacy of domination by great powers. To avoid experiences of subjugation and humiliation (especially by European powers that underdeveloped Africa with colonialism), Cameroon, in the spirit of positive and constructive neutrality, uses IOs to underscore Cameroon’s respect for these principle of non-intervention and non-interference (Rodney 1973). The respect for these principles has been a main factor in President Biya’s efforts to join the international community. The proclamation, reaffirmation, and sacrosanctity of the obligation of non-interference have been further cemented in recent years by supranationalist organizations, in non-conventional acts such as the Resolution 2131 (XX) of the UNGA and Resolution 2625 (XXV).

These principles have inspired Cameroonian policymakers to engage in bilateral conventions that insist on the respect of the principles of sovereignty and national independence, non-interference into internal affairs of states, and equality in rights and advantages. The country is quick to sign different multilateral treaties and constitutive acts of international organizations that see the principle as one of the fundamental bases of contemporary inter-state relations.

CONCLUSIONS

In an age where Brexit, the election of Donald Trump, and surges of terrorism have made many country leaders turn inward, Cameroon will do just the opposite. The reality is that Cameroon's foreign policy is far from the weakness and incapacity that Vircoulon suggests: rather, Cameroon's tendencies to robustly engage with international organizations has boosted the country to success in a number of arenas. First, Cameroon has learned from its history, and has accordingly recognized that alienation from the international community will negatively impact the country's social fabric, and potential for success. Therefore, it has learned to leverage IOs to bolster bilateral relationships with global powers. In the same vein, Cameroon has learned that IOs can protect its economic and national security positioning. To continue its success in these arenas, Cameroon will need to recognize the role that President Biya's policies have played; it must continue the relationships he has carefully cultivated, and walk the line between overstepping and withdrawing. Lastly, Cameroon has learned to use IOs to create a defense mechanism, most specifically in order to shield Cameroon from international interference in Cameroon's internal affairs. The future of any given nation's foreign policy will not be easily traceable, as the world continues to fluctuate in leadership, morality, and stability. However, these tenets of the Cameroonian global outlook have, and will continue, to shape how Cameroon deals with IOs, and how they respond in kind.

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Regional Powers, Great Power Allies, and International Institutions: The Case of Ethiopia

Michael Woldemariam

What role do international institutions play in the character and conduct of Ethiopian foreign policy? Like most states in the international system, international institutions, at the global and regional levels, have been critical arenas through which the Ethiopian state and its ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) have sought to pursue their interests. This is particularly true in the domain of regional security, since the Horn of Africa region is home to a number of difficult security challenges of concern to Ethiopian policymakers, and key multilateral institutions—such as the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU)—which have emerged as critical stakeholders in the maintenance of regional peace and security in the post-Cold War era.

This chapter explores Ethiopia's engagement with the key international institutions mentioned above: the UN, and, to a lesser extent, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its offspring, the AU. It argues that Ethiopia's re-emergence as regional power in recent years

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largely frames this engagement in the contemporary era, providing it significant leverage within these bodies, and an ability to guarantee that the efforts of multilateral institutions in the region comport with the Ethiopian government's regional political interests. Throughout these interactions, the maintenance of Ethiopia's regional hegemony in a historically difficult neighborhood, and thus the security of the Ethiopian state and survival of the post-1991 EPRDF-led political order, have been central concerns of Ethiopian foreign policy (Clapham 1996). In many ways, this pattern of engagement harkens back to a much earlier era in Ethiopian diplomacy, beginning during the critical period of African decolonization and stretching up until the end of the Cold War. In effect, while the country's rulers have changed, the character and content of Ethiopia's engagement with international institutions have largely remained the same. An additional, but no less central thread of analysis is that the diplomatic backing Ethiopia has received from Great Powers such as the USA has been central to Ethiopia's pursuit of its regional objectives vis-à-vis these international institutions, particularly the UN.

This chapter begins by briefly describing how the Ethiopian state has historically conceived of its own security, and leveraged its status as a regional power to engage with key international institutions to further its regional security agenda. This status, both historically and in the present, has been underpinned by Ethiopia's obvious demographic and geographic advantages: it is far from the Horn of Africa's most populous country, and sits at the very center of the region. The chapter then turns to the EPRDF era and outlines the evolution of Ethiopia's regional security agenda in this period, with a special focus on the EPRDF's interlocking concerns of Eritrea and Somalia. In doing so, the chapter takes a decidedly "realist" approach, situating international institutions as "arenas for acting out power relationships," whose behaviors "largely mirror the distribution of power within the system" (Mearsheimer 1993: 13; Evans and Wilson 1992).¹ This is largely because, to use the words of Medhane Tadesse (2015: 332), "Successive Ethiopian regimes have followed a Metternichean realpolitik, carefully identifying their state security interests and resolutely pursuing them." In taking this somewhat functionalist view of how Ethiopian elites have sought to engage international institutions, this chapter shares much with the excellent analysis of Warner (2016), who has outlined the "strategic utility" of international institutions to the pursuit of Ethiopia's foreign policy ambitions.²

The major caveat to the following analysis is the quality of data upon which it is based. The deliberations of international institutions like the AU are notoriously opaque, and it is often difficult to discern the preferences, much less the behaviors, of member states. Analyzing the Ethiopian state's engagement with such institutions presents an added difficulty, since successive administrations have demonstrated a marked penchant for secrecy in the conduct of foreign policy. Nonetheless, this chapter uses available documents and secondary sources, complemented by conversations with a few key informants, to provide a useful, if somewhat tentative, assessment of Ethiopia's engagement with key international institutions.

INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND A REGIONAL POWER:
THE UN, THE OAU, AND ETHIOPIA DURING
THE COLD WAR (1945–1991)

Ethiopia, the United Nations, and the Process of State Consolidation

Ethiopia emerged from World War II as the Horn of Africa's preeminent regional political power. This was a position that in many ways it occupied by default. Sudan, Ethiopia's large neighbor, would not obtain its independence until 1956, and Somalia would not enter the international system until 1960, the critical year of African decolonization. This meant that as the world struggled to craft the new post-1945 political order, Ethiopia carried the somewhat fortuitous distinction of being the Horn's only recognized indigenous power, and joined Egypt and South Africa as Africa's only founding UN member states. In any case, Ethiopian advantages in territory and population virtually guaranteed that it would occupy a privileged position in the post-war regional political pecking order.

Ethiopia emerged from World War II intact and independent due much to the Imperial Ethiopian Government's (IEG) alignment with the Allied powers. This marriage was made possible by Italy's 1936 occupation of Ethiopia, and Mussolini's fateful decision to join the Axis camp in September 1940. Emperor Haile Selassie's bid to reconsolidate the monarchy's power after Britain routed the Italians during the 1941 east Africa campaign faced serious internal resistance that was only overcome through decisive British intervention in 1943.³ The British and other

colonial powers had their own designs on Ethiopia, but the anti-colonial consensus forged by Roosevelt at the 1941 Atlantic Conference made this possibility politically impossible.

The US-Ethiopian relationship was critical in the IEG's political fortunes in the years following the end of the war. As the specter of communist revolution began to emerge over much of the so-called Third World, Washington came to see Ethiopia's conservative Christian monarchy as a natural anti-communist bulwark in the Horn. The relationship was formalized between 1951 and 1953, when the USA and Ethiopia signed agreements on economic cooperation and mutual defense. This included an American commitment to training and supplying an Ethiopian military of roughly 40,000 strong, and the granting of basing rights to the USA in the newly federated territory of Eritrea under a 25-year lease agreement. Between 1953 and 1976, Ethiopia would be the largest recipient of US assistance in Africa, with military aid alone totaling 280 million dollars (De Waal 1991: 359–360; Lefebvre 1992; Metaferia 2008).

Beyond guaranteeing the monarchy's domestic political ascendancy, Haile Selassie's central political preoccupation as the era of decolonization approached was to expand the boundaries of the Ethiopian state. The IEG maintained designs on European administered territories of the Horn, in particular, the Italian colony of Eritrea and British and Italian Somaliland, which the monarchy argued had been integral parts of the historic Ethiopian state separated from the "motherland" via colonial conquest. These territorial claims and others were contestable on historic and legal grounds, and in reality, driven by security and economic considerations.⁴ The acquisition of these territories would guarantee Ethiopian access to the sea, and place the IEG in the control of real estate that had traditionally served as gateways for external invasions of Ethiopia.⁵

The UN was to be the mechanism through which the Emperor sought to realize his territorial ambitions. The UN became aware of Italy's colonial possessions in 1948, when spiraling geopolitical tensions led the Four Powers Commission—a body comprised of Britain, France, the USA, and Soviet Union designed to resolve the status of Italy's colonial possessions—to transfer responsibility to the world body. As the US-Ethiopia relationship blossomed, Washington began to more forthrightly support Ethiopia's territorial claims. Indeed, by the time the issue of Italy's colonial possessions had been transferred to the UN, Washington had already played a key diplomatic role in pressing the

British to return to the IEG parts of the Somali-populated region of the Ogaden, and in 1946–47, worked to scuttle the Bevin plan, which would have compelled Ethiopia to relinquish most of its claims to the Somali territories and created a united and formidable Somali state on Ethiopia's eastern flank (Lewis 2003).

By 1949, Ethiopia's claims to British and Italian Somaliland were no longer politically tenable, being beyond the remit of what the USA (and its European colonial allies) were willing to support. Yet the status of Eritrea, now under British military administration, and Ethiopian access to the sea, still hung in the balance. After serious diplomatic maneuvering at the UN's First Political Committee, the USA and its European allies proposed what became known as the Bevin-Sforza plan, which most critically to Ethiopia, would allow for the partition of Eritrea between Sudan and Ethiopia and deliver to the IEG Eritrea's two major ports of Massawa and Assab. Yet when the proposal made its way to the UN General Assembly's third session it was nixed through the united opposition of Arab and Asian countries, who were supported by the Socialist bloc. The position of Italy, who was keen to maintain the unity and integrity of its former colonial possession, and carried substantial sway with Latin American countries, also seemed to have played a decisive role (Yohannes 1991; Haile 1988).

The defeat of the Bevin-Sforza plan at the UN was a major diplomatic blow to the IEG, but the support of the US and the British at the UN would soon bear fruit. At the UN General Assembly's fourth session, the IEG and its Western allies successfully defeated a proposal, backed by the Arab-Asian-Socialist bloc, to confer independence to Eritrea. Instead, the General Assembly adopted by majority vote a resolution that would create a commission to determine the future status of the territory. This proposal seemed balanced enough, but it was the details that highlighted the strength of the US-backed Ethiopian position. While it was charged to take due consideration of the preferences of the Eritrean people, the commission was also tasked with weighing "the rights and claims of Ethiopia based on geographical, historical, ethnic or economic reasons including in particular Ethiopia's legitimate need for adequate access to the sea" (Yohannes 1991: 135). As Okbazghi Yohannes notes in his authoritative history of the period, the composition of the five-country commission was even more telling. Only Pakistan, and to a lesser extent Guatemala, had signaled support for the position of Eritrean independence in prior deliberations. Norway and apartheid South Africa were clearly amenable to the Ethiopian position. The fifth member of the

committee, Burma, had been all over the map and could be persuaded by Western powers to endorse the Ethiopian position when the chips were down. As Yohannes writes, “It was thus clear from the beginning that each member of the commission had been predisposed to certain perceptible notions, and it was not hard to predict what kinds of proposals would be produced by the commission” (Yohannes 1991: 136).

The UN commission would undertake a visit to Eritrea in the Spring of 1950, amidst significant, sometimes violent, contestation within the territory between pro-independence and unionist (pro-Ethiopia) blocs. As the commission’s work evolved, the muddled situation on the ground created increasing uncertainty about what its findings and recommendations would be, despite the best efforts of the US and British to sway its members toward the Ethiopian position. Seeking to hedge against the uncertainties of the commission’s deliberations and the voting process at the General Assembly, and forestall the possibility of Eritrean independence, Washington and London sponsored a series of talks designed to bridge the divide between the Ethiopian and Italian positions on Eritrea. The flurry of diplomatic activity, in which American and British pressure was to loom large, yielded a crucial compromise between the IEG and the Italians: an Eritrean-Ethiopian federation that maintained Eritrean autonomy and guaranteed Italian economic interests in Eritrea. American assistance to the Italian government, in combination with the promise of a full normalization of Italian-Ethiopian relations, further sweetened the deal for the Italian government (Yohannes 1991: 149–155).

With this somewhat shaky diplomatic consensus established, the action moved to UN General Assembly’s fifth session in 1950. True to form, Burma and South Africa supported an Eritrean-Ethiopian federation, while Norway advocated the unconditional union of Ethiopia and Eritrea. Pakistan and Guatemala outlined an alternative plan that would allow for UN trusteeship and eventual Eritrean independence. By early December 1950, these different views crystalized into two contending resolutions: one sponsored by the USA and Britain, called the “Fourteen Power Plan,” that federated Eritrea with Ethiopia, and a Socialist bloc plan, supported by the Arabs and Pakistan, that called for Eritrean independence. Despite serious opposition at the General Assembly, and last minute protestations from the Eritrea’s pro-independence coalition, the Anglo-American consensus carried the day. UN Resolution 390–A(V) laid out the basis for the Eritrean-Ethiopian Federation and constituted a major diplomatic victory for the IEG.

Yet if the UN sanctioned Eritrea-Ethiopia Federation demonstrated the effectiveness of the IEG's engagement with the UN, and value of its relationship with Washington within this most important of international institutions, the unraveling of the Federation was even more revealing. UN Resolution 390-A(V) provided for a UN High Commissioner for Eritrea—Bolivian Eduardo Anze Matienzo—who would draft an Eritrean constitution that carefully laid the basis for Eritrean autonomy within the new Federal arrangement. The Resolution also ensured that the Federal arrangement, as outlined in the constitution, “would not be amended or violated by any body other than the General Assembly,” effectively making the UN the guarantor of Eritrean autonomy (Haile 1988: 27). The IEG, which had no intention of respecting the Federal arrangement formalized in 1952, destroyed its provisions piece by piece. The *coup de grâce* was the 1962 abrogation of the Federation, when the monarchy formally incorporated Eritrea into Ethiopia as its 14th province. Throughout the 1950s, Eritrean nationalists petitioned UN bodies, apprising them of the IEG's wanton disregard for UN Resolution 390-A(V). Yet Eritrean nationalists found few friends, as the grudging diplomatic cover provided by the USA and the IEG's skillful diplomacy had reframed the Eritrean issue as an internal Ethiopian matter. The Eritrean controversy thus never reached the UN General Assembly's agenda after 1952.⁶ Through the UN, and Anglo-American diplomatic support, Ethiopia had forged a new international consensus on the Eritrea question.

*Ethiopia, the Organization of African Unity, and Dealing
with Eritrea and Somalia*

Ethiopian engagement with the OAU was also suggestive of its status as a regional power, although its influence was less dependent on Anglo-American support. To many African states, both conservative and radical alike, Haile Selassie's Ethiopia stood as a symbol of African resistance to European colonialism. In May 1963, the Emperor deployed this political capital and corralled Africa's independent states in Addis Ababa, where the OAU was formally established. Addis Ababa was selected as its headquarters, a momentous decision that has secured successive Ethiopian governments an unparalleled ability to informally influence the deliberations of OAU (and later, AU) bodies since the organizations' foundings.

Ethiopia's tortured relationship with Somalia over the Haud and Ogaden, and the Eritrea question, were to be two issues in which

Ethiopia's diplomatic clout at the OAU was obvious. On both issues, Ethiopia's position was arguably at odds with the OAU's core norms regarding the inviolability of colonial boundaries and the self-determination of colonial territories. Yet Eritrea never made it to the OAU's agenda, in part because Ethiopian diplomats had made sure that the annexation of Eritrea occurred before a crucial Cairo meeting of the OAU in 1964 where a significant resolution on the inviolability of colonial boundaries was passed. Ethiopia could thus argue that as far as the OAU was concerned, Eritrea was an internal Ethiopian matter, a claim that was reinforced by another OAU norm regarding the non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. Additionally, through its own rhetoric and skillful diplomacy, the IEG was able to frame the situation in Eritrea—which by the 1960s was in open rebellion against the monarchy—as one that had been instigated by Arab powers, an argument that appealed to the pan-African solidarities of most of the OAU's black African members (Bereketab 2014: 248).

On the Ogaden, the OAU studiously avoided taking sides. It became involved in the matter when it led to open hostilities between Ethiopia and Somalia in 1964 and again 1977, in the latter case holding emergency meetings at the behest of Ethiopia's newly installed Marxist regime, and in response to Washington's efforts to "Africanize" the problem and avoid Great Power involvement. Yet the OAU's seeming impartiality on the Ogaden issue was anything but, since it was effectively an endorsement of a status quo that was favorable to the Ethiopian state. Given that Ethiopia controlled the Ogaden, and would win both the 1964 and 1977 conflagrations with Somalia, the OAU position tended to suit Ethiopian diplomats just fine. In the final analysis, the OAU approach to the Ogaden was a tacit endorsement of Ethiopia's regional political power (Jackson 2010; Woodrooffe 2013; Yihun 2014).

LEVERAGING POWER IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: THE UN, THE AU, AND ETHIOPIA DURING THE EPRDF YEARS (1991 TO THE PRESENT)

Ethiopia "Re-Emerges": A Regional Power in the Post-Cold War Era

Ethiopia entered the post-Cold War era a diminished regional power. While it retained some of its geographic and demographic advantages, years of civil war, economic collapse, and general mismanagement by the

Marxist regime that replaced Haile Selassie had left the country in disarray. Thus, by 1991, Ethiopia's newly installed rebel group turned ruling party, the EPRDF, presided over a fragmented country that many believed might be torn apart by competing ethnic groups and their armed representatives (Markakis 2011).

Meanwhile, in Ethiopia's far north, Eritrea had achieved its formal independence through force of arms, rendering Ethiopia a landlocked country with increasingly questionable economic prospects. Although an ally of the EPRDF at this time, the state of Eritrea seemed to be emerging as a regional power in its own right, in part owing to the critical role its newly installed ruling party had played in the EPRDF's own rise within Ethiopia (Weldemichael 2014).

More centrally, the EPRDF found that in the post-Cold War era, it lacked the ability to leverage Great Power relationships in the pursuit of its regional foreign policy goals. The alliance with the USA that had borne fruit in an earlier era as the IEG sought to consolidate the boundaries of the Ethiopian state was no more: the Marxist regime had expelled the Americans from their Kagnev base in 1977 and embraced the Soviets; the EPRDF, with Marxist leanings itself, had never cultivated a close relationship with Washington during its years as a rebel front; and of course, the Soviets were no longer global players. More generally, during the 1990s, there was no compelling strategic rationale for the USA, as the world's sole remaining superpower, to build a tight political alliance with the Ethiopian state. Beyond the Clinton Administration's Sudan containment strategy, which involved both Uganda and Eritrea in addition to Ethiopia, Addis had little to offer US policy makers.

Yet by the turn of the millennium, the strategic fortunes of the EPRDF began to change. A major turning point was the Eritrean-Ethiopian War (1998–2000), which ruptured the alliance between political elites in Addis and Asmara, and clarified the regional balance of power in a decisive way. Ethiopia's Third Offensive of May 2000, where Ethiopian forces broke through Eritrean defenses in the western sector and occupied key Eritrean towns, was a particularly important moment, shattering many understandings within the international community about the distribution of power between the two countries, and signaling Ethiopia's regional ascendancy (Woldemariam 2015, 2016).

In the aftermath of the war, two other trends crystallized. First, Ethiopia's Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, consolidated control of the EPRDF, vanquishing his internal rivals in a 2001 intra-party dispute in

much the same way that the EPRDF had dealt with external challengers like the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) in the 1990s. The centralization of political power went hand in hand with a period of rapid economic growth, as Ethiopia emerged as one of the fastest growing economies in Africa throughout the 2000s. In fact, double-digit annual growth rates were routine in the years after 2003, as the EPRDF's "developmental" state, built on a model of heavy public investment, quickly emerged as a darling of the donor community (Markakis 2011).

In the midst of these important changes, it was again the Great Power alliances that were to be most central to Ethiopia's (re)-emergence as a regional power. The attacks of 9/11 reframed US policy toward Africa in general, and Ethiopia in particular. Africa emerged as a second front in the "Global War on Terror," and Ethiopia was to play a central role. Neighboring Somalia, whose central government had collapsed in 1991, came to be perceived by US policymakers as a critical safe haven for al-Qaeda-linked terrorists. The EPRDF shared this concern and had the tools to do something about it: It shared the longest land border with Somalia of any country in the region, an elaborate network of intelligence assets and a history of operations in the Somali theater, and had demonstrated the mettle of its military during the Eritrean-Ethiopian War. As a result, US-Ethiopian relations flourished (International Crisis Group 2005). The Bush administration's 2002 National Security Strategy dubbed Ethiopia as one of four continental "anchors" that required the USA's "focused attention," and as the pace of intelligence cooperation began to quicken, so to did the volume of security and development assistance to Ethiopia (White House 2002).⁷ The rise of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) in 2005, and later al-Shabaab, would guarantee that Washington's partnership with the EPRDF was to be sustained and comprehensive.⁸

As will be clear, Washington's diplomatic support was to be absolutely essential to the EPRDF as it pursued its regional security agenda in critical international institutions. Like in an earlier era, the EPRDF's main security concerns have revolved around two crucial issues: Eritrea and Somalia. Although the Ethiopian government's landmark 2002 white paper, titled the "Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy" provides a useful map to the EPRDF's thinking in these areas, it is both dated and at times not particularly candid in its depiction of the EPRDF's regional security ambitions.⁹

*Ethiopia, the United Nations, and the Eritrea-Ethiopia
Boundary Commission*

On Eritrea, the EPRDF's thinking has been framed by the impasse arising out of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) decision of April 2002. An arbitration body created at the conclusion of the 1998–2000 border war, the EEBC awarded the crucial border area of Badme—now occupied by Ethiopia and the border war's *casus belli*—to Eritrea. For the EPRDF, the decision created a difficult dilemma. First, the EPRDF simply did not want to relinquish Badme. It had earned the territory through force at high human cost, and its abandonment was thus unpalatable. It also made little strategic sense to Prime Minister Meles and other EPRDF strategists, who believed that “dialogue” and “normalization” between the two parties were required before such concessions were warranted. Effectively, the EPRDF wanted a *quid pro quo* before it would implement the EEBC decision. It simply did not trust that relinquishing Badme would change what it perceived as Asmara's aggressive strategic posture. The Eritreans, of course, rejected this position unequivocally.

The more pressing problem for the EPRDF in relation to the Badme issue was the legal question. The Algiers Agreement of December 2000—the internationally recognized peace agreement that had created the EEBC—had very clearly stipulated that the Commission's decision was to be “final and binding.”¹⁰ This meant that the EPRDF had no legal ground to demand a *quid pro quo* for handing over the contested territory. When the EEBC was unable to demarcate the border because of Ethiopian obstruction, it opted for “virtual demarcation,” which effectively created a situation where it could be legally argued Ethiopia was now occupying sovereign Eritrean territory (Woldemariam forthcoming).

EPRDF policymakers thus had two core objectives on the Eritrea issue. First, they needed to escape the diplomatic and legal ramifications of their non-compliance with the Algiers Agreement. Second, they needed to contain Eritrea and its ruling People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), and diplomatically isolate it, until Asmara changed its position on the border issue and its posture toward the EPRDF more generally.

The witnesses of the Algiers Agreement were the USA, the EU, Algeria, the UN, and OAU. Although the Algiers Agreement lacked an enforcement mechanism, these parties were under some obligation to respect the spirit of the agreement. Prior to 9/11 and the reconstitution of US-Ethiopia partnership, Washington had taken a fairly balanced approach

toward Eritrea and Ethiopia. Indeed, the very reason Ethiopia had agreed to final and binding arbitration was because of the pressure Washington had exerted on it.¹¹ Yet Washington's calculus was obviously going to change, as became obvious from what would transpire at the UN.

The UN was the logical place where the border impasse was to be resolved, since it had had a large peacekeeping presence on the Eritrean-Ethiopian frontier under the supervision of Special Representative appointed by the UN Secretary General.¹² The Eritrean expectation, and Ethiopian concern, was that the border issue would be referred to the UN Security Council (UNSC), where Ethiopia would come under pressure to comply with the EEBC ruling. Bilateral pressure from the witnesses was also potentially on the cards. Yet Washington would do four critical things that allowed the EPRDF to escape the consequences of its rejection of the EEBC decision at the UNSC. First, Washington publicly made clear that its regional counter-terrorism concerns prevented it from taking any punitive measures against the Ethiopian government.¹³ Second, in 2006, the USA removed the Eritrea-Ethiopia file from the UNSC and launched a mediation effort led by Assistant Secretary of State Jendayi Frazier, designed to resolve the impasse. In doing so, the USA introduced an alternative mechanism to the EEBC, creating the impression that the EEBC decision was, in fact, no longer "final and binding." Third, from 2006 onward, the USA sought to prevent the passage of any UNSC Resolution that placed any sort of specific, targeted blame on one or both of the parties for the impasse. This obviously was to Ethiopia's advantage, since it was the non-compliant party. Fourth, in 2006–2007, the USA heavily lobbied UNSC member states to avoid endorsing the idea of "virtual demarcation" as a legally binding method of demarcation.¹⁴ Throughout this diplomatic process at the UN, it is clear Washington was in close consultation with Prime Minister Meles. In frustration at the lack of progress, the UNSC—with the strong support of the USA—would disband the UN peacekeeping force in July 2008. While Addis was not pleased by the force's removal, in a practical sense, it meant that the UN was no longer a player on Eritrea-Ethiopia impasse. As a consequence, Ethiopia remains in the control of the Badme area and has largely avoided the consequences of its violation of the Algiers Agreement.

The EPRDF's second objective of diplomatically isolating the Eritrean government emerged in 2004, when Prime Minister Meles announced

his five-point peace proposal. The proposal, which acknowledged that Ethiopia recognized the EEBC decision “in principle,” committed the EPRDF to little, and instead was designed to undercut support for the Eritrean position on Badme by making Addis appear to have gone the extra-mile in resolving the impasse.¹⁵

However, this move did little to isolate Eritrea. Instead, it was Asmara’s own actions in support of Somalia’s Islamists, and a more general deterioration in Asmara’s relations with key Western allies, that would accomplish this task. Frustrated with Asmara’s behavior both bilaterally and in Somalia, and al-Shabaab’s meteoric rise in early 2009, Washington pushed through an Eritrea sanctions regime in December 2009 with UNSC Resolution 1907. While Ethiopia no doubt embraced this initiative, it was not necessarily of its making. Still, Ethiopian diplomats worked hard to seize the opportunity that Washington’s hardening attitude toward Asmara created, and there is no doubt that the USA and Ethiopian priorities on Eritrea at the UN reinforced one another. This is illustrated by a number of facts. The two-way arms embargo established by the UNSC Resolution 1907 had very specific security value to the EPRDF: it prevented Eritrea from arming its military and made any support it provided to the EPRDF’s armed opposition a violation of the UN sanctions regime. It is also telling that Uganda, an IGAD member state and key Ethiopian military ally in Somalia, cosponsored this very favorable (from Ethiopia’s perspective) resolution. This was part of an established pattern of behavior, in which Ethiopia leveraged regional allies to push through resolutions on Eritrea that it favored at the UN. For instance, since 2012, the Federal Government of Somalia and Djibouti, two actors closely aligned with the Ethiopian government’s regional agenda, have sponsored multiple resolutions at the UN Human Rights Council and UN General Assembly targeting the Eritrean government for its human rights abuses (Miles 2016). Eritrea, it should be said, did itself no favors, with an unending series of diplomatic mistakes that greatly enhanced the effectiveness of Addis Ababa’s diplomatic maneuvers at the UN.

*Ethiopia and Somalia: The Role of the United Nations
and the African Union*

On Somalia, the US-Ethiopia partnership has produced real dividends for the EPRDF at the UN. The EPRDF’s central goal has been to

oppose the emergence of government in Mogadishu with radical nationalist or Islamist sympathies that could create trouble for the EPRDF in the Ogaden or make common cause with the EPRDF's Eritrean foes. The most powerful illustration of this policy was Ethiopia's December 2006 intervention in south-central Somalia to oust the ICU.

Yet the 2006 intervention placed Ethiopia in an awkward position. The intervention was initially criticized by the Arab League and a number of powerful Arab states who were unwilling to endorse the invasion of a fellow Muslim country and Arab League member (Reuters 2007). The intervention also likely constituted a violation of UNSC arms embargo placed on Somalia back in 1993. Furthermore, Addis could not reasonably invoke UN Article 51 self-defense provisions as justification for its military action, although it is easy to understand why it regarded the ICU with some trepidation. And finally, discussions at the UN and AU on the creation of an IGAD force for Somalia—originally called IGASOM—had already made clear that there was a diplomatic consensus that frontline states should not be part of a military effort to stabilize Somalia. That Ethiopia did not face any scrutiny at the UNSC, then, is no doubt a reflection of the diplomatic cover provided by the USA, as the Bush administration publically backed Ethiopia's intervention after the fact, as well as Ethiopia's overall weight as a regional power.

Ethiopia's historic influence at the AU has largely reinforced the EPRDF's pursuit of its regional security agenda at the UN. The Eritrea-Ethiopia border impasse has never reached the official AU agenda, and the absence of disciplinary action against Addis compelled Asmara to recall its ambassador to the AU in November 2003, insisting that the body, "which is based in Addis Ababa" had been "silent" and was acting "irresponsibly" (IRIN 2003). The AU was mum on Ethiopia's intervention in Somalia in 2006, seemingly persuaded by Addis' claim that it had been invited to intervene militarily by the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia—an entity that would have objective difficulty claiming it was actually a government in most contexts. Ethiopian and IGAD pressure was also critical to pushing the AU's Peace and Security Council endorsement of the Eritrea sanctions regime in 2009, which put an "African face" on the resolution in a way that made it very difficult for China to exercise its veto power at the UNSC.¹⁶

CONCLUSIONS

With some historical perspective, it is easy to see that there is not much new in the EPRDF's engagement with the UN and AU. The Ethiopian state's interaction with these institutions has always been mediated by its status as a regional power. That status, in turn, has been given form, at the UN and in general terms, by Ethiopia's ever evolving security partnerships with Western allies.¹⁷ The ability of Ethiopian foreign policy to drive the UN and AU agendas on Eritrea and Somalia, reflect these core realities.

In comparative perspective, Ethiopia is certainly not unique in its strategy of leveraging of Great Power support in the pursuit of its regional security objectives within international fora. Yet it stands out as being highly successful in this regard. If the past is prologue, these patterns will persist, provided Ethiopia retains its status as the Horn's preeminent regional power.

NOTES

1. This is not to say that the analysis here adheres to all, or even most of the classic assumptions of the realist paradigm.
2. This chapter differs from Warner in that much of its focus is on Ethiopian engagement with the UN and does not include a discussion of Intergovernmental Authority on Development. In addition, the analytical focus on Ethiopia's engagement with Great Powers is somewhat different; it is important to note the ideational and normative basis of Ethiopian engagement with international institutions should not be ignored. See Belete Belachew Yihun (2014).
3. I refer here to the Woyane rebellion, put down by the monarchy with British air support. See Gebru Tareke (1991).
4. Awet Weldmichael (2013) in his excellent comparative study of Eritrea and East Timor argues that in this era, Ethiopia practiced a particular brand of he calls "third world colonialism." Awet Weldemichael, *Third World Colonialism and Strategies of Liberation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2013). Also see Sorenson (1993) for more on the theory and practice of Ethiopian territorial claims in the Horn of Africa.
5. For example, both Eritrea and Somalia had served as staging grounds for multiple Italian invasions of Ethiopia.
6. Other than Yohannes and Haile, the discussion of the deliberations over Eritrea at the UN has been informed by a number of additional sources: Ruth Iyob (1995), Habte Selassie (1980, 1989), and Negash (1997).

7. The White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC, 2002).
8. It should be noted that in recent years, a central pre-occupation of Washington in its policy toward Ethiopia has been to prevent China from emerging as Ethiopia's primary ally.
9. Ministry of Information, The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, *Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy* http://www.ethiopiaembassy.ru/pages/docs/Foreign_Police_English.pdf; Many interpret the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy as articulating a minimalist regional foreign policy agenda. The EPRDF's objective, in this view, is to prioritize Ethiopia's own economic development (Maru 2017, p. 5–7. I would argue that, for better or worse, the EPRDF's regional foreign policy has been far more activist.
10. To see the full text of the Algiers Agreement, go to http://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/ER%20ET_001212_AgreementEritreaEthiopia.pdf. Accessed May 14, 2016.
11. Author's conversation, a former Clinton era National Security Council staffer, May 2009, Washington, DC.
12. The peacekeeping force was called UNMEE–UN Mission for Eritrea and Ethiopia.
13. “Eritrea Qs and As: Ambassador-designate Ron McMullen,” *US Department of State*, July 1, 2007.
14. Any reasonable reading of Wikileaks State Department cables confirms these claims. For instance, see a summary of evidence on the US position on “virtual demarcation” at <https://stesfamariam.com/2013/11/29/eritrea-ethiopia-virtual-demarcation-is-legal-and-enforceable/>. Accessed April 8, 2017; also see Michael Woldemariam (forthcoming).
15. Author's interview, Former TPLF Politburo Member, May 6, 2015.
16. This was the first time in AU history that the body called for UNSC sanctions on a member state.
17. Due to length, this chapter has not mentioned the ways in which successive Ethiopian administrations, dating back to the Korean War, have leveraged peacekeeping contributions to enhance their strategic partnership with Washington. There is a real sense in which multilateral fora not only reflect the partnership between Ethiopia and the USA, but also have helped to constitute that partnership overtime. Another avenue not explored is the manner in which Ethiopian contributions to the UN and AU—and these contributions have come in many forms—have helped to constitute these international institutions as functioning entities capable of providing international public goods.

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Djibouti's Foreign Policy in International Institutions: The Big Diplomacy of a Small State

Sonia Le Gouriellec

With only 900,000 inhabitants and a mere 23,200 km² of area, the microstate of Djibouti—hemmed in between Ethiopia, Somalia, and Eritrea—would seem to be in a deeply precarious position as concerns the conduct of its foreign policy. Djibouti is hampered by the intrinsic handicaps of being a small state: like many small states, Djibouti is weak economically due to a lack of natural resources, with 80% of its GDP resting on services. It remains a net importer and has endemic unemployment and poverty.

Despite these challenges of being a small state, however, Djibouti has a trump card: its 314 km of coastline opens the tiny country to the world. Djibouti is located on the western border of the Bab-El-Mandeb Strait, which links the Mediterranean Sea, via the Red Sea, and the Suez Canal, to the Gulf of Aden, toward Asia and the Persian Gulf. This location serves as its primary resource in the conduct of its foreign policy.

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Djibouti's maritime location offers both economic and militarily benefits. Economically, 3.8 billion barrels of oil, 90% of Japan's exports, and 20% of global maritime exchanges circulate on this shipping route. Controlling this passage along the coastline of Djibouti serves, for several international actors, as a fundamental strategic issue. These include traditional European powers whose economies rely on Asian imports and Arab oil; newly industrialized countries (NICs) in Asia, as well as Japan, whose economies depend heavily on exports via the Bab-El-Mandeb Strait; and oil-exporting countries in the Middle East, which see the Strait as the third most important shipping lane after the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca.

In no uncertain terms, Djiboutian foreign policy has recently become premised upon taking advantage of its priceless strategic situation by turning itself into a regional shipping, communications, and commercial hub in the vein of Singapore. This ambition is based on three pillars: promoting its strategic position, encouraging the service industry, and seeking an even deeper regional integration and presence in the international arena. In 2014, the Djiboutian government published a document "Djibouti, Vision 2035," which listed the objectives and strategy meant to make Djibouti a "Red Sea lighthouse, commercial, and logistic hub of Africa."

Militarily, Djibouti's strategic location was precisely one of the reasons that France settled there in 1862 and has maintained a military presence until today. Contemporarily, the War on Terror and counter-piracy are the two resources offered by the international system that allow Djibouti to obtain new funds and build its status; we thus observe new bases and military facilities emerging in Djibouti, including those owned by the USA, Japan, Italy, China, and soon, Saudi Arabia.¹ These bases are worth millions of dollars to the Djiboutian state. Djibouti has also become the rear base of the various operations in the struggle against acts of piracy taking place in the Gulf of Aden. Last but not least, Djibouti is an island of stability in the unstable political environment of the Horn of Africa and its environs. Regional hotspots include Somalia and the consequences of its devastating 26-year civil war; Eritrea, a mercurial, isolated, and often belligerent neighbor; and nearby Yemen, with its own civil war. All of these national crises take place against the broader regional backdrop of Islamic terrorism, which somehow Djibouti has managed to escape, almost miraculously.² Indeed, precisely because of its strategic

location, the great powers have, in the past several years, signed several agreements to position troops and military equipment in Djibouti.

And yet, despite Djibouti's drive to leverage its geographic location for outsiders' economic and military purposes, logic suggests that being a small state still likely prevents Djibouti from charting its own course in foreign policy. To what extent is the microstate of Djibouti actually able to chart its own foreign policy course, and, more importantly, what is the role of international institutions in Djiboutian foreign policy?

This chapter's argument is that the international system allows the Djiboutian state to engage in a foreign policy strategy of "extraversion"—or the creation of intentional dependence on external actors—which allows it to balance its diplomatic activism with domestic priorities, while simultaneously diversifying its roles and positions of leadership in international organizations. In order to show the evolution of Djiboutian foreign policy broadly and toward IOs, this chapter contains two main sections. The first section details the three evolutionary phases of Djibouti's foreign policy, ranging from a dependence on France in the first, a move away from France and the adoption of what the regime describes as a "neutral" foreign policy in the second, and finally, a concerted effort to fully diversify partners in the third.³ The second section looks specifically at how international institutions have figured into Djibouti's foreign policy outlooks.

Throughout the chapter, our discussion is premised upon the notion that Djibouti faces a dilemma: it plays a political card of extreme dependency, though this very dependency remains rooted in an often-precarious state of international "positive neutrality." Djibouti tries to increase its power by diversifying its partners and by managing dependence through rents. Thus, for Djibouti, "dependence as a mode of action" (Bayart 2000: 218) is a major part of this compensatory strategy undertaken to deal with its vulnerability. Nevertheless, strengthening this dependency on an increasing number of actors calls into question the very neutrality on which that foreign policy is based. Hence, pursuing foreign policies in international institutions has been a way for small states—including those like Djibouti—to break free from their bilateral dependencies, even when these dependencies do offer them benefits. To show this, this chapter takes a qualitative approach based on interviews and direct observation that the author has conducted in Djibouti since 2010.

THE THREE PHASES OF DJIBOUTI'S FOREIGN POLICY

There are three key periods of Djiboutian foreign policy, during which time Djibouti has been gradually enlarging the field of its partners and has become a more active player in various international institutions. Each of these three phases is detailed below.

The First Period of Djiboutian Foreign Policy (1977–1991): Djibouti as a French Protectorate

The first phase of Djiboutian foreign policy history runs from independence in 1977 to the early 1990s, during which time Djibouti existed as a *de facto* French “protectorate,” in a fully dependent, though serene, relationship. Djibouti gained independence from France in the middle of the Cold War, when the Western and Soviet blocs were clashing indirectly in the Horn. For its part, France was afraid of losing Djibouti as a stopover point on the Eastern route, believing that if Djibouti were to become independent, it could not survive very long. In the few years following Djibouti's independence in 1977, the relationship with the former colonial power remained essential for the country, even though it was often fraught with tension. Indeed, even after Djibouti gained independence after the referendum, it was only ever a partially sovereign state, given that it remains very much under the protection of France in an “organic” neocolonial relationship. Yet, several incidents harmed the relationship between the two and temporarily served to lessen mutual trust. For instance, the French military was twice accused of disloyalty by Djiboutian officials. A Djiboutian official report about the conflict with Eritrea argues: “France, from the outset of the crisis, played an extremely negative role that damaged Djiboutian vital interests on the Ras Doumeira and the island of Doumeira. This inexplicable attitude of the French, a historically and supposed staunch supporter of the Republic of Djibouti in this type of situation, deeply disappointed the Djiboutian government and people and may have permanently affected the shared interests between the two countries.

Djibouti's reliance on France in the first period can be partially explained by the former's location in a precarious neighborhood, which has not lessened in danger since Djibouti's independence. For Djibouti, the core regional threat has been Ethiopia and Somalia's annexationist aims. In 1977, at the moment of independence, France deployed an unprecedented air-sea task force off the Djiboutian coast (called “The

French Territory of Afars and Issas” between 1967 and 1977) in order to ensure the integrity of the territory as it became independent in the context of Ethio-Somali rivalries, and amid the two countries’ expansionist plans involving the future new Djiboutian state (Suteau 2008: 189–211).⁴

In light of its existence as a small state in a dangerous neighborhood, Djibouti’s first president, Hassan Gouled Aptidon, decided to take a position of “positive neutrality,” a posture which has remained a thread in Djiboutian foreign policy until today. Such a policy is meant to guard strict Djiboutian neutrality in various political disagreements or land disputes in the region. Djibouti, a historical actor of the region’s construction and a pre-eminent mediator in the Somalian conflict, was for instance directly involved in the 1986 settlement of a quarrel between Somalia’s and Ethiopia’s presidents, Mohamed Siad Barré and Haile Mariam Mengistu, respectively. Moreover, it was also during this first phase of its foreign policy that, at Djibouti’s initiative, the international organization called the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was created in 1986. It was the president’s wish to make Djibouti a capital of regional diplomacy, and his successor inherited this project by offering his mediation assistance again and again. Djiboutian leaders consider their own country as a “nodal country” in the region: “Our situation in the neighborhood as a ‘nodal country’ gives us a perfect position to undertake pacific initiatives and communicate efficiently with the surrounding states, in the hope of putting an end to the conflicts undermining our development.” And yet, as will be discussed subsequently, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Djibouti’s ability to remain a fully neutral country remains questionable.

*The Second Period of Djiboutian Foreign Policy (1991–2002):
The Decline of French Affinity*

The Djiboutian civil war (which lasted from 1991 to 1994) marked a new phase in Djibouti’s foreign policy history. During this second period, good relations with the former colonizer crumbled, with the Djiboutian regime blaming the French government for its ambiguous behavior during Djibouti’s civil conflict. In 1991, a civil war broke out between the government People’s Rally for Progress (RPP), a predominantly ethnic Issa group, and the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy (FRUD), a mainly Afar rebel group. At the end of the

war, the Issa clan leaders remained convinced that, like it did during the period of independence, France had intentionally created rivalries between ethnic communities (Afar and Issa), supposedly in favor of the Afar clan (Bezabeh 2011: 587–606). Then, in 1995, the Borrel affair and its legal consequences, during the following years, convinced the new Djiboutian regime that France did not necessarily have Djibouti's best interests at heart and was willing to be duplicitous when doing so served its interests. To add insult to injury, in late 1998, the French government announced that it would be downsizing the number of French Forces in Djibouti (FFDJ) from 3,200 to 2,700 at a significant financial loss for Djibouti. By the time the War on Terror began in 2001, followed several years later by the beginning of the fight against piracy, Djibouti had decided that it wanted to rid itself of the privileged bilateral relationship with France and aspired to “internationalize” the country to take advantage of other, potentially more lucrative, relationships.

The Third Period of Djiboutian Foreign Policy (2002–2017): The Move to Diversify Partners

With tensions with France coming to a head during the end of the second period of Djibouti's foreign policy history, the country began a quest to redefine its foreign policy outlook based on the diversification of partners. The third period of Djibouti's foreign policy, running from approximately 2002 to 2017, is one in which it has made “multilateralism” or “multi-alignment” the basis of its foreign policy. Djibouti has tried to avoid being engulfed in a new form of colonialization through an over-reliance on just France, or potentially, the USA. It has thus worked to leverage partnerships with Ethiopia and China, in addition to some Gulf States. Trying to avoid predation, Djibouti now uses the diversification of its partners to its strategic advantage, making them compete with each other for the role of the “closest partner.”

Indeed, Djibouti wishes to overhaul its current reputation as being no more than a “garrison city” by implementing a new extraversion strategy based on diversifying not only partners but also services. In order to transform itself into an African Singapore that it aspires to be, Djibouti is completely dependent on partnerships and foreign investments. Making external actors compete with each other offers opportunities, but is perilous in that it is the country's only viable option. The next section gives a brief overview of Djibouti's relations with its various partners.

Understanding Djibouti's Current Foreign Partners

Various incidents in its relationship with France during the 1990s drove new Djiboutian President, Ismail Omar Guelleh, to diversify its partners. Ismail Omar Guelleh's speeches, both before and after his journey to Paris in February 2017 reveal this state of mind quite clearly: "The French left us ... France does not intend to help us any longer, and hence we turn to China, which believes in us and our possibilities." Since then, Djibouti's goal has been to drive France back as a partner.

One might think that the USA is the next intuitive Djiboutian partner, especially given the US military's leasing of the Lemonnier base outside of Djibouti City. However, Djibouti's behavior toward the USA is even more revealing of the tendency not to let its partnerships be defined by a Western axis. For instance, during his visit in 2015, Secretary of State John Kerry seemed to have cemented the privileged partnership with Djibouti—effectively convincing Djibouti to discard China in exchange for a substantial increase in the US rent for the military base. But just as the agreement was accepted, the Djiboutian President announced a strategic partnership with China to set up a permanent Chinese military base by 2017.

More acutely, Djibouti's grand strategy is to innovate by using a new generation of international actors and to capitalize on its historic attributes, namely its position as a trading port. Two actors prevail in Djibouti's diversification project: China and Ethiopia. When it comes to Ethiopia, Djibouti has taken advantage of Ethiopia's economic dynamism, which has it slated to become a middle-income country by 2025. Djibouti holds its ground in this project, given that it serves as Ethiopia's sole developed access point to the sea, a reality that Ethiopia was faced to endure when Eritrea became independent in 1991, leading Ethiopia to lose port access. To that end, in 2015, the deep sea port of Djibouti attracted 86% of Ethiopia's exports and especially imports.

As concerns China, Djibouti's approach is couched within its broader strategy to attract FDI. In 2001, a national agency for the promotion of investments was created in Djibouti, one of the first on the African continent. Perhaps not surprisingly, 2003 saw the massive entry of FDI (14 million dollars) from the Gulf States. Yet, the real benefit of this strategy began in 2012, just after the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), when the number of contracts between China and Djibouti increased considerably. In fact, between 2010 and 2012, out of 101

billion dollars of investments on the continent, China devoted nearly 1 billion dollars to Djibouti, an amount of money that can be compared to investments in the Democratic Republic of Congo or in Sudan, much larger countries, in every way. By the end of the year, China had become Djibouti's primary provider, investing around 14 billion dollars in a combination of investment and loans, in just several years.

Paradoxically, though, its newfound turn toward Ethiopia and China has gradually narrowed the scope of Djibouti's potential foreign policy actions. Indeed, the country's relationship with each is problematic in that they includes subjective and constructed elements, including limited room to manoeuvre and a *de facto* compromised sovereignty. By allowing China to be slightly too intrusive in the subtle game it tries to play, Djibouti risks disturbing the very delicate balance between partners in need of stability above anything else. If Djibouti's traditional partners grow tired and decide to leave it in an exclusive bilateral relationship with China, Djibouti will have no way of backtracking to free itself from that choice.

Finally, Djibouti has recently flirted with Middle Eastern countries as potential partners for diversification, but these relationships have been more ambiguous. Initially close to the United Arab Emirates, a crisis in the relationship, whose reasons remain unclear, led to a rupture in the relationship. This happened at the expense of Djibouti, as DP World obtained the renovation and management of the concurrent port of Berbera in Somaliland. Djibouti then turned to Saudi Arabia, which first considered the country as an appropriate area for the expansion of Wahhabism, before seeing it merely as a strategic position for military operations in Yemen.

DJIBOUTIAN FOREIGN POLICY DIVERSIFICATION AND THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Having retraced Djibouti's general foreign policy outlook through time, what then has been the strategic role of international institutions in its foreign policy outlooks? Small states such as Djibouti generally cannot meet their own security needs and are most frequently not able—even within a coalition—to challenge the action of major powers. Instead, as some international relations scholars like Kalher have pointed out, multilateral institutions have a “a strong levelling impulse:” that is, they are able to give disproportionate voice to smaller states like Djibouti.

Indeed, continental organizations, such as the African Union (AU), or sub-regional organizations such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), enable small states like Djibouti to leverage the principle of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference, imperative features for the protection of national security. As such, in theory, the practice of concerted regionalism provides small states with an opportunity to escape from the domination of others states (Charillon 2002: 401–402). Put simply, small states like Djibouti sign multilateral agreements in the context of international organizations in order to resolve their security dilemmas.

Djibouti in Regional International Organizations

The first step towards Djibouti's participation in regional cooperation took place on February 5, 1985, with a regional conference to fight drought and desertification. "We have to put an end to this feeling of fatality and commit to becoming more active by defining a new regional approach to the issue of drought and by leading mutual actions rather than isolated and intermittent operations," Djiboutian President Hassan Gouled Aptidon said. The Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was officially created after the Summit of Heads of States and Government held in Djibouti in January 1986. The institutionalization of regional cooperation was produced by necessity, and encouraged by the international community. After a decade of political upheavals, regional leaders decided, in a new Summit of Heads of States and Government of IGADD in Addis Ababa (18 April 1995), to restructure and revitalize the Authority. IGADD became IGAD, and its mandate was expanded. Moreover, the Authority has known difficulties in showing impartiality in conflicts in which most of its members were involved. Eritrea being absent, IGAD's political body became simply a way for Ethiopia to conduct its own regional foreign policy: To that end, despite the fact that the IGAD headquarters is in Djibouti City, Djibouti, its official meetings nearly always take place in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia or Nairobi, Kenya (For more on the creation of IGAD, see: Bereketeab in Chapter 8 of this volume).

However, participation in IGAD and the AU does not just bring benefits to Djibouti: by engaging in these organizations, Djibouti in fact undermines its own neutral position by contributing to collective interventions in Somalia. Djiboutian forces are part of the 22,000-person

African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) operation that is battling al-Shabaab Islamist militants in Somalia. By virtue of Djibouti's participation in AMISOM, it innately espouses its partners' self-interested and possibly aggressive policies in the country. And yet, even while participation in AMISOM undermines Djibouti's preferred policy of neutrality, its participation in the intervention was a necessity, as the pursuit of neutrality risked leading to defensive isolationist positions likely to trap Djibouti into marginalization.

Furthermore, the main Djiboutian resource in managing the Somali crisis is its sharing of an overarching Somali identity, given that some Djiboutian citizens are of the same ethnicity. Precisely because of shared ethnicity, the small state had previously claimed to be against the intervention, led by Ethiopia, in Somalia. Djibouti feels more legitimate than Ethiopia to lead negotiations in Somali and yet follows Ethiopian leadership in the region, because the regional power dominates IGAD. In Djibouti, public administration agents condemned Ethiopia's control of the sub-regional organization, supposedly meant to legitimate its external actions, particularly in South Sudan.⁵ In an attempt to play both sides of the game, Djiboutian officials would later justify their decision to intervene in Somalia with AMISOM by the need to "control and monitor Ethiopian actions in Somalia."⁶

Djibouti's Diplomatic Corps and International Institutions

Djiboutian leaders seem to be aware of their loss of regional influence, as we can see in their attempts to revitalize their diplomacy beyond the Horn of Africa. Indeed, Djiboutian internationalization goes hand in hand with a reinforcement of its entire diplomatic corps. Like every ministry in Djibouti, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MAECI) is highly centralized around the president of the country. Since independence, Djibouti has only known two presidents, with the president assuming the functions of Head of State, Head of Government, and leader of the majority party. Therefore, the country's foreign policy is certainly informed by the wishes of the executive. However, this is not specific to Djibouti: research on small states shows the domination of executive power and dispossession or disempowerment of other powers in a quasi-monarchic regime. The president defines the direction of the state's policy that the various ministers are to implement. Foreign policy is directly determined by the president. The Foreign Ministry headquarters has an important power, because diplomacy

emanates from Djibouti. Besides 21 foreign nations being represented in Djibouti, partners are not forced to meet Djiboutian representatives in foreign countries, but can deal directly in Djibouti.

Indeed, MAECI's structure reveals the priorities of Djiboutian diplomacy. The ministry is composed of nine "Directions," (or Bureaus), including: the Direction of International Cooperation; the Direction of Bilateral Relations (with three sub-Directions: Africa, Europe-America; Asia-Ocean); the Direction of Multilateral Relations (with three sub-directions: International Organizations, Regional Organizations, Non-Governmental Organizations); and the Direction of the Arabic and Islamic World. Interestingly, the Ministry's website positions relations with the Arabic world before the relations with the AU or IGAD. In 2017, Djibouti has around 45 diplomatic representations in foreign countries, an exceptional feature for a small state. Given that this activity requires a capable corps of civil servants, in 2014, the Djiboutian President inaugurated the "Diplomatic Studies Institute," located in front of MAECI, precisely aimed at training diplomats.

Djibouti's Participation in Global International Institutions

Another strategic objective of Djibouti is to obtain positions of leadership within African and global international institutions. Djibouti is a member of more than fifty non-African international institutions. It is significantly active in international negotiations and was among the first to sign the 2015 Paris climate change agreement. Today, the goal of the Djiboutian state is to improve its understanding of the mechanisms of international institutions in order to secure more positions in those bodies. And yet, despite its attempts to gain leadership positions in major international organizations, so far, the country has had to make do with middle-level positions in the United Nations Development Program, the African Development Bank, UNHCR, UNESCO, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), the World Food Program (WFP), and the Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA).

Other times, when it has failed to gain positions, it has blamed others. For instance, in January 2017, when Djibouti unsuccessfully proposed candidates for the posts of Vice President and Commissioner for Political Affairs of the African Union Commission, the president blamed South Africa for its loss: "President Zuma voted systematically against Djiboutian candidates in pan-African institutions to punish us for being supposedly pro-American, as if he was still pro-Soviet himself."

CONCLUSION

This chapter provides insight on how the small African state of Djibouti seeks to balance its foreign policy interests and threats. Faced with the necessity of circumventing traditional international hierarchies (Lake 2011) in the hopes of promoting its own interests, Djiboutian diplomacy has, in the recent past, elected to diversify its partners and services, while simultaneously diversifying its roles and positions of leadership in international organizations. Djibouti's experience thus contradicts the academic literature that systematically sees small states as simply "meager powers" (Maas 2009: 72). Opposed to this conception, Djibouti's foreign policy attempts to rid itself of these perceived weaknesses by building its influence in the international environment, both through strategies of extraversion with major powers and through participation in international institutions. Though the contours of its strategy are ever clearer, whether it will effectively be able to make good on these aspirations, or not, remains a question for the future.

NOTES

1. France maintains a contingent of 1350 service members and land and air capabilities in Djibouti. The USA opened a base in 2002 that houses 1800 personnel, air capabilities, and drones (it is the only US base in Africa). Since 2009, German and Spanish contingents have been stationed in Djibouti, but have no permanent base. Japan set up a base there in 2011, with 600 troops and maritime patrol capabilities. This was the first overseas deployment of the Japanese Self Defence Forces since 1945. They were followed by the Italians in 2012, who established a 150-troop strong training and regional cooperation base there. Since February 2016, China has been building a naval base which could ultimately house 10,000 troops. This is also the first permanent Chinese base overseas.
2. The one Islamist attack committed in Djibouti was a bomb attack at «La Chaumière» restaurant in the capital in May 2014. The attack killed 3 people and injured 20.
3. The right to neutrality is recognised in international law. Djibouti is not a neutral state within the meaning of international law like Switzerland.
4. Flashing forward briefly, in 2011, it is in a context of border conflicts with Eritrea that Djibouti negotiated the enforcement of the special security clause during the negotiations of the Treaty replacing the 1977 protocol. As Djibouti was and remains at the heart of territorial and ethnic regional issues, borders are still a source of conflict: Ethiopia/Eritrea in 1998,

Djibouti/Eritrea in 1998 and Somaliland/Puntland. These tensions contribute to create the atmosphere of insecurity and violence that keeps on characterizing the Horn of Africa (Clapham 2013).

5. Interviews, Officials of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Djibouti, January 2015 (anonymity is respected at the request of interlocutors).
6. Interviews, Official of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Djibouti, January and November 2015 (anonymity is respected at the request of interviewees). Furthermore, in the summer of 2015, Colonel Abdurahman Abdi Dhimbil, a Djiboutian officer commanding Amisom's so-called Sector Four in Somalia, accused Ethiopian troops in Somalia not to answer to AMISOM. Abdulkadir Khalif, "Djibouti denies Ethiopian troops in Somalia don't answer to Amisom," *Africa Review*, August 26, 2015, <http://www.africareview.com/News/Djibouti-denies-Ethiopia-Amisom-claims/-/979180/2846850/-/omu72v/-/index.html> (March 10, 2016).

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Conclusion

The Future Nexus of African Foreign Policies, International Institutions, and Developmental Regionalism

Timothy M. Shaw

Nearly two decades into the twenty-first century, as many in the academic study of international relations (IR) have sought to make their field more “global” and thus inclusive of states around the world (Bergamaschi et al. 2017), in the real-world practice of IR, two leading established Western governments—the US and the UK plus many “alt” right parties and movements in the EU—have taken the opposite turn, instead, turning inward. This conclusion argues that the diversion of the US, UK, and the EU away from global integration and toward internal self-focuses—in addition to sundry other contemporary geopolitical developments—may present under-considered benefits for Africa, in that they will encourage twenty-first century articulations of African agency (Brown and Harman 2013; Lorenz and Rempe 2013), particularly vis-à-vis the process of developmental regionalism (Adejumobi and Kreiter 2016), or the collectivization of international action by both statist and non-statist actors.

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Given this book's goal of illustrating the general inaccuracy of the now-outdated "Omnipotent African Executive Model" of African foreign policymaking described at the beginning of this volume, this chapter argues that the retreat of certain powerful Western actors from Africa will only deepen the diversification of inputs into African foreign policymaking, both within and outside international institutions. As an apparent anti-globalization wave sweeps across the world, African states and their institutions will proceed on the process of further regional and global integration by leveraging the private sector, civil societies, media, diasporas, middle classes, supply chains, technologies, universities, markets, and states, around the continent. In short, novel and networked non-statist factors will increasingly drive integration (Roger and Dauvergne 2016; Adem and Njogu 2017) especially as established—but increasingly dysfunctional and indeed ossified—interstate institutions lose their relevance.

This piece proceeds in three sections. In the next section, it briefly re-traces the history of African foreign policies and their connection to international institutions, from the "Omnipotent African Executive" model to today's "Decentered Inputs" form of African foreign policymaking. In so doing, it emphasizes that while African countries have adjusted their foreign policies to reflect decentered inputs, only by further leveraging or accepting the new range of diversified inputs can African leaders, via the process of developmental regionalism, best advance national and collective interests in a twenty-first century global context. As a means by which to harness this greater diversification of foreign policymaking inputs, the second section suggests that a process of developmental regionalism has the potential to both challenge and complement the activities and purposes of African foreign policymaking in international institutions (IMF 2016). The third section briefly offers examples of informal, non-statist modes of developmental regionalism, showing how cooperation in formalized institutions is being replaced by integrationist efforts led by actors other than states. A fourth concluding section offers challenges that developmental regionalism will face, as it closes the book.

FROM "OMNIPOTENT AFRICAN EXECUTIVE" TO "DECENTERED INPUTS MODEL" TO THE EMERGENCE OF "DEVELOPMENTAL REGIONALISM"

When just what constituted "African" foreign policy—especially in Sub-Saharan Africa—was first defined and articulated between the recapture of autonomy by Ethiopia at the end of World War II and the formal

declaration of independence for Ghana in 1957, early African statesmen understood the process of foreign policymaking and effectuation as being defined by assertions and formalities of sovereignty. These included ensuring that their nascent states looked and “felt” legitimate, through the standing up of armies, the attendance of international conferences in international organizations, and the creation of often wide-ranging government bureaucracies, including Ministries of Foreign Affairs. As has been described throughout this book, at independence, African international relations and foreign policy were largely monopolized by new, jealous, and often problematic “sovereigns,” whose often unilateral pull over foreign policies—within and outside of international institutions—were highlighted by the one-time salience of the “Omnipotent African Executive” model of African foreign policymaking.

Fast forward to the middle of the second decade of the twenty-first century, however, and the modern progenitors of African foreign policies have become all too conscious of the modesty of their statist foreign policies’ abilities to effectively respond to—let alone set the agenda for—international affairs (Shaw 2015). As argued in the introduction of this volume, the “Decentered Inputs” model of African foreign policymaking means that the variables informing the outcomes of African foreign policies are no longer found concentrated with one or several African heads of state, but rather, are increasingly found in the spheres of the private sector, civil society, education, the media, cosmopolitan diasporas, and even illegal transnational actors. Put otherwise, African states have not simply *lost* foreign policy leverage as compared to their non-state corollaries: indeed, they are, in certain sense *even weaker* than these non-state corollaries.

These non-state generators of *de facto* African foreign policies (Bishoff et al. 2016) are numerous. They include ubiquitous diasporas—Zimbabweans on the continent (Carrier 2015) and Ethiopians and Somalis off the continent—and the power of the formal and informal remittances that flow into the continent from them, serving as alternative sources of foreign policy and posing challenges to states themselves. This is not to mention the ideological challenges—around notions of democratization, development, gender, and state–civil society relations—that diasporas often infuse into their natal states from the outside. Concurrently, the presence of increasingly powerful digital communications companies (like DStv and MTN), multinational franchises (like Nandos or Protea/Marriott), non-governmental organizations (like Oxfam and World Vision), think tanks (like the Institute for Security

Studies), foundations (like Kofi Annan and Mo Ibrahim Foundations), and multinational corporations (like Dangote or De Beers) (Africa Investment Report 2016, 2017) have likewise challenged the one-time omnipotence of the African state to singularly direct foreign policies. To add to these, the importance of M-Pesa mobile finance, Nigeria's Nollywood film industry, and the successful integration of Star Alliance airline hubs (like Egyptair, Ethiopian, and South African Airways) further challenge states' one-time singular pulls. Concurrently, the aforementioned retreats of historically reliable partners like the US, the UK, and the EU, articulated at the beginning of this chapter, have recently begun to tear asunder the expectations of stability from historically reliable bilateral statist engagement. And, lamentably, in many instances, the latitude of illegal, non-statist actors—including insurgent groups like al-Shabaab in Somalia, Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin, and various cells of al-Qaeda in the Sahara (Feinstein 2012; Hirschfield 2015; Kabandula 2016)—likewise further “decenters” the capacity of the African state to make unilateral foreign policies, reinforcing African states' understanding of the modesty of their foreign policymaking agency. In short, the contrast between the foreign policies of developmental states like those in the so-called Global North and fragile states like those throughout the Global South is instructive: the statist foreign policies of the former are far more authoritative than the latter, in which informal, non-state foreign policy now often carries more weight than statist visions of it. How then can African governments hope to compete to oversee foreign policies over which they once presided so authoritatively?

This chapter argues that rather than fighting the wave of “decentering” of African foreign policy inputs—both in and outside of international institutions—African states can and should attempt to leverage the very forces that challenge them, particularly via the process of developmental regionalism. By embracing—rather than militating against—these forces that look to weaken statist and institutionalist attempts to guide global governance efforts, they can instead harness and indeed encourage them.

THE INTRODUCTION OF DEVELOPMENTAL REGIONALISM

This chapter argues that the loss of agency by African states to unilaterally create foreign policies has both occurred because of and is possible to be addressed through, a phenomenon known as developmental regionalism. Yet, just what is developmental regionalism?

Brought to the fore in 2011 and 2012 by the Lusaka office of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)—in particular by its Director, Said Adejumbi—developmental regionalism is the assumption that African states should *not only* pursue integrationist and developmental efforts within the context of formal international organizations and institutions (like the African Union, SADC, ECOWAS, and others) and via bilateral relations, but indeed, should also leverage the capacity for integration in a variety of *non-statist* fora, especially in the private sector, in higher education, across civil society, and in terms of human, social, and environmental development (ACBF 2014; Adejumbi and Kreiter 2016 Hanson 2015;). Put succinctly by one UNCTAD report, at the core of developmental regionalism is the notion that “strengthening the capacity of the private sector [and non-governmental sectors] in Africa [is] an important driver for expanding regional cooperation,” since to date in Africa, “governments have been the only active force for regional integration, while the private sector has remained a passive participant in the process” (UNCTAD 2013). Indeed:

Developmental regionalism encompasses cooperation among countries in a broader range of areas than just trade and trade facilitation, to include – for example – investment, research and development, as well as policies aimed at accelerating regional industrial development and regional infrastructure provision, such as the building of better networks of roads and railways (UNCTAD 2013).

Moreover, the process of developmental regionalism entails harmonizing national private sector development interests across regions, thereby creating new value chains, for instance, in the domains of cotton, textile, and apparel, on the one hand, and livestock, meat, and canned products, on the other (UNCTAD 2013). Implicit in the process of developmental regionalism is that similar forms of non-state-driven integration also occur to create “non-monetary” value chains, creating new networked approaches to transnational civil society cooperation, higher education cooperation, and media information-sharing, among others.

Put otherwise, developmental regionalism is a process whereby individual states can engender domestic development by collaborating with neighbor states, either through traditional formal international organizations but especially via informal modes of cooperation in a variety of sectors not exclusively presided over by the state or formal multilateral international

institutions. The opposite of developmental regionalism, then, is the pursuit of foreign policies through rigid (and at times reified) formal, state-led institutions (including some of the international organizations discussed in this volume) that do not account for the dynamism of new actors. As such, in thinking through the future of African foreign policies in international institutions, this chapter argues that African states can leverage their relationships with IOs to encourage developmental regionalism in both formal (international institutionalist) and informal (non-international institutionalist) ways. Indeed, the modalities by which African states conduct their foreign policies in IOs—somewhat ironically—have the capacity to allow them to more effectively engage with the proliferation of *non-statist* actors that characterize the contemporary moment of decentered inputs.

What then are the benefits of African states reorienting their foreign policies toward a schema of developmental regionalism? In short, developmental regionalism allows states and their constituent poles of power (global capital, civil society, think tanks, media, and the like) to pursue flexible modes of engagement and development that are capable of being tailored to their unique and dynamic circumstances. To that end, there is no coincidence that developmental regionalism as a new analytic genre of foreign policy emerged as the institutional salience of other institutionalized forms of regional integration, especially in the European Union (Dosenrode 2015), began to show their weaknesses (Doidge 2007), perhaps less in terms of security but certainly in terms of economics.

Second, the reorientation of African states to a foreign policy approach of developmental regionalism is further beneficial in that it places as central the importance of issue linkages. For developmental regionalism, the provision of peace and security is inextricably linked to economic, social, and human development, and vice versa. Such a holistic approach to integration has long been recognized as imperative.

Third, developmental regionalism is also beneficial given its ability to allow African states to define what constitutes a “region” in non-static and inherently mutable terms. Premised upon the notion that just as there exists no monolithic “Global South” (Bergamaschi et al. 2017; Modi 2011; van der Merwe et al. 2016), developmental regionalism emphasizes that neither should we assume the existence of stationary “African regions,” defined exclusively by statist boundaries. While African regions were formalized and institutionalized during the Cold War (Haastrup and Eun 2014) (now codified as the eight AU-recognized RECs), the number of African regions multiplies even

further if diversities of non-state, informal, and even illegal transnational “regions” are considered that extend beyond the confines of the traditional interstate organizations described in this volume (Fanta et al. 2013). Given that the very nature of what should be considered an African “region”—and what sorts of tangible institutions should rightly accompany regionalism—will perennially remain in flux, the notion of developmental regionalism offers inherent benefits in an increasingly dynamic and fluid geopolitical African space.

Fourth and finally, it should be noted that the pursuit of developmental regionalism need not necessarily undermine, *per se*, the efficacy of either the state or the multilateral IOs of which member states are part. That is, while developmental regionalism might superficially look to fundamentally undercut the institutions of the African state and its foreign policymaking apparatuses, it can indeed complement states and IOs as much as it diverts agency away from them. To the contrary, developmental regionalist policies can actually strengthen states and IOs, for instance, by freeing them of taking on burdensome tasks that other actors (like the free market, entrepreneurs, universities, the media, think tanks, or civil society) are more suited for, or, by generating new forms of income through the process of regional integration that benefit states and IOs themselves. For instance, the development of SADC has been advanced by compatible forms of sub-regionalism: The Maputo Corridor and cross-border peace parks between South Africa and its neighbors are clear cases in which formal institutionalist sub-regionalism has flourished alongside developmental regionalism.

THE PRACTICE OF DEVELOPMENTAL REGIONALISM

This said, what then does the process of developmental regionalism look like in practice? The following section investigates two areas of interest—security and economic integration—briefly tracing the ways in which traditional, formalized approaches (via the state and interstate institutions) have addressed the issue, and how new forms of developmental regionalism are challenging these.

Security Threats and Developmental Regionalism

In the twenty-first century, states and people across the African continent have been compelled to confront a growing range of unanticipated and

oftentimes unfamiliar security challenges (Hentz 2014). To date, the primary onus for addressing collective security threats in Africa has been fundamentally assumed to be most effectively pursued via traditional means of international organizations, especially in the African Union and RECs, and supported by global international institutions, like the United Nations. However, the contemporary nature of non-traditional security threats has complicated how foreign policies toward such actors are pursued.

As such, the multiplicity of non-traditional security threats opens possibilities for non-statist developmental regionalism to prosper. Even at the intra-IO level of analysis, one can reference the importance given to new formulations of developmental regionalism intended to engender security, to include the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC), and the G-5 Sahel, among others. Beyond interstate formulations, the process of ensuring security has been taken up by a variety of non-statist private security actors—formal and informal, legal and illegal—which have developed on the continent since the end of the twentieth century. Filling in for the role of often impotent African states—and their frequent non-exertion of Weberian monopolies of violence—these myriad actors are the free market’s stand-in for the lack of state capacity for organized violence. From ubiquitous security guards securing individuals’ private homes, privatized African expertise for security assurance has expanded into protecting everything from land and food to the more contemporary realms of banking, cyber-protection, security during migration, and remittances security. Moreover, non-governmental organizations have emerged as some of the most important players in the realm of African security. For instance, as drug supply chains have shifted away from Central America and the Caribbean to west Africa in response to the “war on drugs,” the Kofi Annan Foundation created a preemptive West African Commission on Drugs, another instance of African foreign policy beginning to react to burgeoning regional issues (Shaw 2015). Together, these led toward the UN global conference on drugs of April 2016, orchestrated by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the Open Society Foundation.

Economic Developmental Regionalism

Historically, African states have understood their formal international institutions to be the driving forces behind economic integration on the continent. For their parts, the RECs themselves were originally intended

explicitly—and for the most part, exclusively—for this purpose, while the African Union has gradually inherited similar responsibilities. Moreover, the institutionalization of economic foreign policy relations driven through bilateral institutional arrangements—especially the United States’ African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)—has been an important, if now not arguably outdated, form of formal regionalized institutionalism.

Increasingly, however, African economic foreign policies will increasingly operate via the process of developmental regionalism. In the coming years, there will undoubtedly be continued evolution in heterogeneous, hybrid, multistakeholder communities to incorporate state-owned enterprises, sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), pension funds, and exchange-traded funds (ETFs), especially from the BRICS and other emerging (Armijo 2014; Christensen and Xing 2016) and frontier markets (Besada and Kindornay 2013; Hale and Held 2012; Mukherjee-Reed et al. 2012; Sumner and Mallett 2012). Simultaneously, the continent needs to connect to the so-called “FANG” (Facebook, Apple, Netflix, and Google) network, as well as the sharing economy.

Another manifestation of African states’ potential to leverage developmental regionalism is through innovation. Africa has been notable for its accrual of benefits from the adoption of mobile technologies, extending its own technological innovations from cell phones to mobile finance such as M-Pesa, developed in Nairobi at its iHub. Other cases of African technological innovation include the repair of second-hand Japanese cars and trucks, especially mini-buses, and the use of transponders which now track African wildlife and monitor newly developed pipelines. Indeed, with the extreme proliferation of mobile technology around the continent, one wonders if some of the burdens to states of “ungoverned spaces” might be mitigated—or, conversely exacerbated. And, during its late-October 2016 southern Africa Partner Summit at the Huawei Innovation and Experience Centre in Johannesburg, Huawei signed music cooperation contracts with global and local music vendors. These served as indicators of African “soft power,” other examples of which include design, fashion, film, and foods. Combined, African innovation—both technological and cultural—indelibly helps to facilitate African developmental regionalism, offering African states foreign policy agency on the global stage and rendering them far more than simply providers of commodities (Hanson et al. 2014; Hicks 2015).

CONCLUSION

While this conclusion has sought to articulate the ways in which developmental regionalism might strengthen African foreign policies and African international institutions, this strategy can also inherently present certain challenges. What then are drawbacks of the continued reorientation of African states to a policy of developmental regionalism?

First, and most clearly, the pursuit of a strategy of developmental regionalism might well be understood to be deepening the process of loss of agency for African states. By riding the wave of “Decentered Inputs,” African states might be thought to be willingly relinquishing even more latitude over their foreign policy agency. However, as was suggested previously, it is only by harnessing the inevitability of developmental regionalism—rather than fighting against it—that African states will engender robust forms of regionalism. Second, and relatedly, if individual African states are challenged in their foreign policymaking by developmental regionalism, a logical corollary would suggest that African IOs would likewise lose agency, as decisions that they had previously spearheaded would be made by non-statist actors. Yet, as has also been noted, by embracing developmental regionalism, both states and IOs have the capacity to let other non-statist actors take on responsibilities (income generation, research, social service provision) that the latter are more capable at leading, allowing the former entities more time and capital to focus on sectors (such as security) in which they are uniquely qualified.

Third, a praxeological issue exists: The stark contrast between Africa’s high-functioning middle-income countries (like Botswana and Mauritius) on the one hand and very low-income and non-consolidated African states (like DRC and Somalia) on the other (Brock et al. 2012) poses difficulties for a singular approach to both the practice of foreign policy and their variegated relationships with IOs (Kararach et al. 2015; Taylor 2015). This issue is inevitable, though is by no means insurmountable. Fourth, as African states arguably aspire toward developmental regionalism, in arenas such as fair trade and organic certification (Hudson et al. 2013), even developmental regions do not authoritatively control burgeoning new sectors like mobile phones, broadband internet, and global ATMs. Yet again, though, it is precisely the potential to create new synergies between states and non-state actors that rests at the core of developmental regionalist paradigm. In sum, while this chapter makes the case for the future of developmental regionalism, it is also well aware of its potential pitfalls, none of which are insurmountable.

In closing this volume, this chapter has sought to offer some clarity on the future nexus of African foreign policies and international institutions. It suggests that embracing processes of informal, non-state-led “developmental regionalism” has the capacity to engender new forms of agency for states, their foreign policies, and the formal international organizations of which they are part. Far from suggesting that the future of African states’ foreign policies in Africa is dim, instead, it suggests that the future will be marked by new forms of innovation, the contours of which remain to be seen, both within and outside international institutions.

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