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THE LABOUR PARTY IN SCOTLAND

Religion, the Union, and
the Irish Dimension

Graham Walker



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PREFACE

Writing in the aftermath of the Scottish Independence Referendum of 2014, the political journalist Iain Macwhirter asserted that the patriotism of the Scottish working class had long been held in check by a combination of the Labour Party and the Orange Order.¹ This comment gestured to the significance of religious identity and of Irish influences in Scottish life, and to the feat on the part of the Labour Party in achieving support across ethno-religious lines for many decades on the basis of an appeal to class interest. This achievement strengthened Scotland's position within a broader British political context and within the Union itself. As the historian Alvin Jackson has put it: 'Class politics were essentially unionist politics; and Labour's appeal to class effectively created a unionism in Scotland which transcended the endemic religious rivalries of the West [of the country].'²

Macwhirter was also hinting that the political mould was breaking up, and the electoral triumph of the Scottish National Party (SNP) in the general election of 2015 duly confirmed that this was the case. Analysis of the Referendum voting has revealed that some 57% of Catholics voted 'Yes', while the corresponding figure among Church of Scotland Protestants was 41%. Although these figures are open to interpretation in various ways, this disparity in terms of the link between religious identity and support for independence requires investigation and explanation. Furthermore, it appears from the 2015 election evidence that the Catholic working class, long the backbone of Labour support in Scotland, has departed from its traditional allegiance perhaps never to return. On the other side of the religious divide, there is a section of the Protestant community, mostly

working class, that fears the growth of the SNP and the continuing threat to the Union, and laments the loss of pride in Britishness. Their alienation seems in some important ways to mirror that of the Protestant/Loyalist working class in Northern Ireland with whom they have had an intimate historical and cultural relationship. Scotland is in the throes of profound political transformation and social restlessness, and Labour's dilemmas surrounding its traditional bases of support and its capacity to contain sectarian divisions have been exposed.

This study is intended as an intervention in the discussion over Scotland's current political ferment and its uncertain constitutional future. It is an examination of Labour's historical development in Scotland and its management of sectarian tensions in Scottish society. It sheds light on the ambiguous relationship between politics and religious identity in Scotland, and explores the way religion has shaped the country's politics, and its social and cultural profile. It is concerned with the recent intense debate over sectarianism in Scotland and with the lack of attention paid by contributors of all kinds to this debate to the crucial role played by Irish influences in Scottish life, and, in particular, Scotland's close relationship with Northern Ireland. The book assesses the impact of the new political circumstances of devolution from the end of last century, and the unpicking of what had become a traditional pattern of class-based politics. It is also a study which aims to feed into discussion of the extent to which religion is part of a broader 'identity politics'³ in contemporary Scotland.

NOTES

1. *Sunday Herald*, 28 December 2014.
2. A. Jackson, *The Two Unions. Ireland, Scotland, and the Survival of the United Kingdom, 1707–2007*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 280.
3. There are many ways to define this concept. This study proceeds on an understanding of it that involves a strong sense of group commitment, clear identity markers, and a collective sense of relative deprivation. All such characteristics sustain a sense of political motivation and a desire for recognition. See discussion in S. Kettell, 'The Militant Strain: An Analysis of Anti-secular Discourse in Britain', *Political Studies*, Vol. 63, No. 3 (2015), 512–528.

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A Century of Labour in Scotland: Struggles and Achievements

Abstract This chapter is concerned with the historical development of the Labour Party in Scotland and its relative degree of success in securing the working-class vote across religious lines. It highlights the importance of the party to the Catholic community of Irish descent in Scotland, and it examines the relationship between the party and the Catholic Church and the way that certain sensitive moral questions were played down, and other issues like education left unchallenged, to avoid any confrontation between church and party. The chapter also assesses the appeal of the party to Protestants: the extent to which it could embody a sense of Presbyterian virtue and equity, and the extent to which it could even pitch for the ‘Orange vote’.

1

The relationship between social class and religious and ethnic identity in Scotland is long and tangled. Labour politics has had to overcome divisions of the latter kind within the working-class, and indeed—as the party became dominant in Scotland—society more broadly. Divisions between Protestants and Catholics were shaped by Irish immigration, of both religious persuasions, during the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, although the nation’s Presbyterian character following the Reformation had disposed it unfavourably to ‘Popery’ long before this. Moreover, Irish influences and connections remained a pertinent theme, particularly in the industrialised west of Scotland.

Labour's progress in Scotland does not correspond to any simplistic 'forward march' narrative. In fact, its political record of achievements up until the Second World War is somewhat patchy. High points, such as the 1922 general election victories that returned ten Clydeside Labour MPs to Westminster, have to be viewed alongside the party's struggles to re-build in the economically depressed 1930s following the split with the Independent Labour Party (ILP). The latter party had indeed done much to build a popular culture of socialist activism in lowland Scotland following its formation in 1893, and historians have tended to the view that Labour politics in Scotland took a significant turn away from idealism to pragmatism in the wake of the ILP decision throughout Britain to disaffiliate from the Labour Party in 1932.¹

The ILP, and the Scottish Labour Party founded by Keir Hardie in 1888, drew support largely from better-off Protestant skilled workers who were also likely to be committed trade unionists. The early Scottish Labour movement tapped into a tradition of Presbyterian democracy that had also influenced Liberal politics in Victorian Scotland, and pursued with a degree of evangelical fervour causes such as temperance.² Egalitarian values were espoused and privilege and exploitation excoriated. Land reform was an early priority, and there was much rural radicalism in the Highlands and the Western Isles that united crofters both Calvinist and Catholic, and provided links with similar Irish movements. However, the profile of this issue was to dip within the predominantly urban British political context of the post-war era.³

Early Labour leadership figures were aware of tensions between working-class Protestants and Catholics, particularly in Glasgow and surrounding industrial towns and villages, yet trusted to education and to better living standards to resolve them. Tom Johnston, founder in 1906 and first editor of the 'Forward' newspaper, besides seeing progressive potential in Scotland's Protestant heritage, supported the efforts of John Wheatley who had set up the Catholic Socialist Society (CSS) in the same year to convince Catholic workers that their religious beliefs were not, as the Church insisted, incompatible with socialism.⁴ Wheatley belonged to the immigrant Irish Catholic community and was the key figure in directing it towards Labour politics at a time when the Catholic allegiance was habitually given to the Liberals on account of their championing of Irish Home Rule, and when the United Irish League (UIL) was impressively organised in Scotland.⁵ The importance of able leadership figures such as Hardie, Johnston, and Wheatley with their propaganda, speaking, and

organisational skills, needs to be stressed. There were many others at a more local level such as John S. Taylor in Govan,⁶ and the miners' champion in Larkhall, Bob Smilie, who was a Protestant migrant from Belfast.⁷ Labour's growth, although not much reflected in electoral success before the First World War, was nonetheless strong enough to contain religious sectarian friction even as the Irish Home Rule controversy occasioned by the Liberal Government's Bill of 1912 raised the political temperature in the years leading up to the outbreak of war. Glasgow did not replicate Belfast for all the occasional despairing reports in the Labour press about 'Carsonism' in certain districts of the city.⁸

Labour historians have emphasised the importance of the factor of class consciousness and identity in countering sectarianism.⁹ Crucial changes in the workplace gradually blurred occupational hierarchies, and the experience, or threat, of unemployment was a great leveller. Protestant-dominated occupational sectors such as engineering and boilermaking were sites of the most bitter labour disputes of the early twentieth century,¹⁰ and paternalistic employer-worker relations enjoyed decidedly limited success on Clydeside. The eruption of the industrial trouble on the Clyde during the First World War that so panicked the Government may have been motivated by considerations of craft self-protection rather than proletarian solidarity¹¹; nevertheless, its disruptive impact reflected the non-compliant temper of the workers that had developed through earlier struggles, and stubborn anti-authority sentiment that responded readily to the rousing rhetoric of yet more gifted tribunes of the people such as Maxton, Shinwell, MacLean, and Gallacher. Again, the working class did not lack leaders or persuasive advocates.¹²

The early twentieth century also saw the Presbyterian churches orientate themselves towards social problems, and the radical politicisation of some ministers.¹³ Even if the motivation behind this was actually to combat the spread of socialism among the working class, the result was concern over the condition of the poor regardless of creed or ethnicity. Many of the poor and disadvantaged were Catholic and although the Catholic Church strove to keep its flock away from socialist influences, especially in the light of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia, recent scholarship has revised the notion of an enclosed Catholic community tamed by its priests; rather it has been argued that here was greater Catholic participation in Scottish public life than has hitherto been appreciated.¹⁴ Certainly, this is true of the Labour and trade union movement, and it should not be assumed that Catholic political energies were entirely consumed by Irish

issues however much the latter impinged on the wider British scene and however much the Catholic–UIL–Liberal alliance mattered in Scotland before the First World War. In short, there was considerable interaction between Protestants and Catholics around class politics and labour organisation even before the franchise extensions of 1918 gave formal clout to many unskilled, disproportionately Catholic, workers.¹⁵

There were other crucial social factors at play. While in certain industries provision of better quality housing for foremen and skilled craftsmen was a fact of life, there were, overall, important limits to residential segregation either on the grounds of skill or religion. Recent path-breaking research on Irish immigrants in late nineteenth century Govan and Kinning Park in Glasgow has demonstrated the extent to which both Protestants and Catholics lived in the same neighbourhood and mixed in the same workplaces.¹⁶ Residential segregation among Irish immigrants was more apparent in areas of Lanarkshire such as Monklands and here the factor of common workplace experience and trade union organisation was much weaker.¹⁷ In the cities, according to a leading Labour historian, ‘tenement living created solidarities among workers, regardless of ethnic origin, religious persuasion or position in the occupational hierarchy, which contributed to those formed in the workplace’.¹⁸ Such social conditions could lead to intermarriage between Protestants and Catholics, and, although not without problems and often carried out in the face of the disapproval of both sides, such unions played their part in moderating religious antagonisms over time. Certainly, in relation to residential segregation and intermarriage, Scotland bore little resemblance to nearby Ulster by the beginning of the twentieth century, and the contrast between the two places in these respects became more pronounced as the century progressed. Furthermore, a common working-class culture had by the twentieth century coalesced around patterns of consumption and leisure pursuits if to the distaste of temperance-minded and teacherly socialists such as Tom Johnston and John MacLean.

The unrest on Clydeside during the First World War encompassed rent strikes as well as industrial disputes; indeed, the former achieved the more clear-cut success in forcing government intervention to prevent landlords from raising rents in working-class areas. These protests led to increased demands for better housing, an issue that brought Protestants and Catholics together and was notable for enabling female Labour activists such as Helen Crawford and Mary Barbour to enter the forefront of public life.¹⁹ Indeed, housing agitation was a key component of the febrile

post-war climate of industrial Scotland that eventually saw Labour break through electorally in 1922 with the capture of ten seats in the central belt. In 1924, when Labour came to power for the first time at Westminster, albeit as a minority government, John Wheatley was appointed Minister of Health and given the responsibility for housing policy.

The 1922 election also saw the impact of the extension of the franchise of 1918. The substantial Irish vote in the west of Scotland swung behind Labour in the context of the Liberal Party divisions, the developing situation in Ireland, and Labour's willingness to support the Education Act of 1918 that provided for full State support for separate Catholic schools. By 1922, Labour had positioned itself as the main alternative to the Conservatives and British politics proceeded to settle into a two-party, left-right mould. For the socially disadvantaged Irish Catholic community this represented a straightforward choice, especially since the reason for its previous leanings towards the Liberals—support for Irish Home Rule—had lost relevance in the changed circumstances of the advance in Ireland of Sinn Fein, a party committed to an Irish Republic, and the War of Independence from 1919. The Education Act—passed by the wartime coalition government headed by Lloyd George—was seen as a huge gain for the Catholic community, yet a critical onslaught on it was brewing in Scotland and it required the political cover Labour was willing to supply. This more than any other factor brought the Church to an endorsement of Labour although it was always clear that this support was tentative and conditional. From another angle, however, it might be said that the Church could not afford to be out of step with its adherents whose political intentions seem to have been clear after the war irrespective of the Church's guidance. Rather, the Church sought—with significant success—to ensure that the Labour Party in Scotland did not adopt positions on moral issues such as divorce and contraception incompatible with Catholic teaching.

2

Labour thus looked poised to prosper as the 1920s got underway: the ILP still provided the crusading moral energy; the trade union movement the industrial muscle, and the newly enfranchised workers the crucial voting strength. However, the inter-war era as a whole was to prove troublesome: there were splits, setbacks, and, perhaps most damagingly, sectarianism of the religious variety.

Labour's sweep of the Catholic vote produced a Protestant backlash that seems to have been fuelled mainly by the 1918 Education Act. As Bruce has contended, this legislation gave 'No Popery' agitators, whether in the Orange Order or the Protestant Churches or in other organisations and political movements of the period, much in the way of ammunition.²⁰ At local government level and in elections for Local Education Authorities, militant Protestant candidates—many representing the recently founded Scottish Protestant League (SPL) and Protestant Action (PA) parties²¹—made the 1918 Act their 'cause célèbre' with the slogan 'Rome on the Rates'. To sections of Protestant opinion, it appeared that special treatment had been accorded to Catholics and that the Catholic Church had been given too much power over education at a time when the Protestant Churches were in the process of handing their influence in this sphere over to the State, a process that indeed was concluded by 1929.²² Such is the symbolic significance of education in matters of Scottish history and national pride, and in the Presbyterian conception of Scotland's progress and global renown, that the controversy over segregated schooling on religious grounds has remained a source of tension ever since. The issue will feature prominently in the next chapter.

The Act was designed to facilitate the assimilation of the Catholic community into wider Scottish society and its integrative effects have indeed been notable across the decades. From another perspective, however, the effect of separate schools has been to perpetuate the sense of a Catholic community protecting and prioritising its own interests. Certainly, the pressures there have been towards the scrapping of the 1918 Act have invariably been viewed by the Catholic Church as motivated by anti-Catholic bigotry, and they have been countered vigorously. As a distinguished historian of the Catholic minority put it: 'The feeling that the 1918 Act had brought the by now largely Scoto-Irish Catholic community into the life of the nation while preserving its ethos lies behind its defensive reactions in the twentieth century to any proposals to change what is seen as something of a constitutional symbol.'²³ It might be added that the sectarian aggression that marked the inter-war period was not all one-way; Catholic propagandists waged their own campaign against Protestantism, and the Catholic Church's separatist outlook extended to various social and cultural areas.²⁴ The Church's rigid stance on mixed marriages—established through the 'Ne Temere' decree of 1908—aroused much resentment. None of the churches in Scotland looked with favour upon intermarriage but the Catholic insistence on such unions taking place in a Catholic Church and

the children of the marriage being brought up as Catholics could cause bitterness to fester. Furthermore, Labour candidates at elections in this period came under pressure from the Church to commit themselves to particular stances over matters like birth control and Catholic schools²⁵; similarly, many Labour spokespersons were inhibited from expressing support for the Republican side in the Spanish Civil War on account of the Church's strident stance in support of Franco's rebels.²⁶

The Education Act, perhaps coupled with the course taken by political events in Ireland, was the catalyst for the outpouring of anti-Irish Catholic intolerance during the 1920s and 1930s, the best known example of which was the Report submitted to the Church of Scotland General Assembly in 1923 complaining about the threat posed by an 'alien race' to Scottish society. Such developments reflected a conservative turn in the Presbyterian Churches away from the 'social gospel' of the pre-war period, and much angst about the extent to which the experience of war and the loss of so many young lives had set the country back.²⁷ Baleful perspectives such as this were shaped significantly by the unprecedentedly high levels of emigration during the 1920s when some 400,000 mostly young and skilled people left for destinations such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the USA.²⁸ Against a background of emigration, an economic downturn that affected Scottish export industries, and a culture of mourning for the war dead, many took the easy option of scapegoating the most visible minority in their midst even although immigration from Ireland had slowed markedly after the war. The concentration of the bulk of Catholic Irish in the industrial west of the country where the economic recession and unemployment of the inter-war years hit hardest, constituted a challenge for a Labour movement desperate to maintain the class unity that had been forged so spectacularly in the pre and immediate post-war period. In a memorandum on the issue in 1931, a Scottish civil servant made the point: 'Under normal conditions an annual accession of about 2000 immigrants from Ireland would be immaterial but with trade and industry heavily depressed, as it has been during the past ten years, even that number must have had an effect in aggravating an otherwise difficult situation.'²⁹ Certainly, the conditions exacerbated the practice of discrimination against Catholics in certain occupational sectors: the father of Thomas (later to become Cardinal) Winning was serially rebuffed for employment in 1930s Motherwell the effect of which according to his son was to build 'harshness, and so you always side with other Catholics.'³⁰

During the inter-war era there were regular claims about the ‘peaceful penetration’ of Scotland by the Catholic minority of Irish descent made by the Orange Order, an organisation that was itself the product of Irish immigration.³¹ The Order’s base was the industrial heartland of Lanarkshire, Ayrshire, Renfrewshire, and the Lothians, and the city of Glasgow, and it boasted strong familial and cultural connections with Protestant Ulster. The Order saw its membership surge after the war,³² partly a product of the Education Act, but also its success in appealing to those alarmed by the violent turn of events in Ireland and the growth of Republican separatism, its linking of the upheaval in Ireland to that in Russia, and its exploitation of the concerns over Irish Republican Army (IRA) activity in Glasgow and the West of Scotland in the 1920–1922 period.³³ The Order had played a meaningful role since the late nineteenth century in Conservative and Unionist politics in Scotland, particularly in relation to its capacity to mobilise support for Ulster Unionism; it was indeed an effective vehicle for directing some Protestant working-class votes towards the Conservatives on the grounds of patriotic loyalism and antagonism towards the perceived designs of the Catholic Church. From 1912, with the merger of the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists, there was a form of Popular Unionist politics in Scotland that would cause considerable difficulties for Labour in the inter-war era.³⁴ The merged party became known as the ‘Unionists’ and the Union referred to was that of Britain and Ireland, or, in the wake of the setting up of the Irish Free State in 1922, Northern Ireland, the latter place becoming the UK’s first example of devolution. During the inter-war period there were distinct echoes in Scotland of the ethnic political culture of Northern Ireland; and the Irish conflict came to be mirrored in popular cultural phenomena such as the ‘Old Firm’ football rivalry between Scotland’s most successful teams—Rangers and Celtic—which intensified in this period.³⁵ On the other hand, there were important limits to the success of sectarian politics as will be discussed below.

Labour’s position on Ireland had been pro-Home Rule from the time of the formation of Hardie’s party in 1888—indeed, it also supported Home Rule for Scotland. Support for Sinn Féin in Scottish Labour ranks grew after its landslide election victory of 1918, although it was the outrages of the ‘Black and Tans’ during the War of Independence more than ideological sympathy that lay behind it, and Labour was happy to see the Irish problem apparently settled in 1922, notwithstanding the subsequent civil war in the South and the partition of the island. For pragmatic reasons,

Labour did not wish the Irish question to rumble on with its potential for discord in the ranks of Scottish workers. The party continued to stand candidates with links to the Ancient Order of Hibernians (AOH),³⁶ a Catholic mirror image of the Orange Order which had been part of the old Irish Home Rule movement, but it was to keep in check any Irish republican and anti-partitionist lobby from the early 1920s onwards. This coincided with Labour's role in constructing the two-party British-wide politics that would characterise the twentieth century, and its decisive pursuit of the parliamentary road to social change. By 1932, after much internal friction, the ILP disaffiliated from the Labour Party and the latter was left to follow the pragmatic form of politics that would eventually see it attain unfettered power at the end of the Second World War. With the departure of the ILP 'purists'³⁷ there was more scope for Labour to attend to practicalities; yet the movement in Scotland lost much of its radical edge and the ethical dimension that could appeal to those of a quasi-religious cast of mind.³⁸ The Labour Party in the 1930s, argues one leading historian of the period, was very different to the party at the end of the war: 'In some ways it was now much closer to the very poor and to the hitherto excluded Irish community and far more involved in detailed social amelioration. But it was no longer a party which challenged the social system.'³⁹

Sectarian friction and a bleak economic climate took its toll on idealism. Nevertheless, much in the way of class identity survived to impose limits on the fissiparous pressures of the period. The electoral impact of the Protestant parties was short-lived; indeed, the most far-reaching political consequence of the Glasgow-based SPL was its splitting of the right-wing vote to enable Labour to take control of the City Council in 1933. No separate Catholic party emerged despite the threat of one in the early 1930s.⁴⁰ The Labour Party continued to prove itself an effective avenue for Catholic participation in public life; epitomising this was the example of Patrick Dollan, the son of poor Irish immigrants raised in the same part of Glasgow as John Wheatley, who became the first Lord Provost from such a background in 1938. Dollan, a mastermind of the 'machine politics' that could deliver a block vote, was the crucial Labour figure in the marshalling of Catholic support in the 1920s and 1930s. In 1939 on a visit to New York, he told a local newspaper, apropos the religious divide in his home city, that 'we've had a long feud but we're getting to understand one another now', and that he had personally 'devoted his life to creating such an understanding among Catholics and Presbyterians in the working class.'⁴¹ Certainly, the Catholics of the West of Scotland found in Labour

an outlet for political energies and a plausible vehicle for their advancement that their co-religionists in nearby Northern Ireland could not.⁴²

There was, indeed, a salient contrast between the separate political culture of Northern Ireland with its one-issue focus on the constitutional position, and Scotland's participation in the broader context of British politics. The latter arena restricted the capacity of sectarian or ethnic politics to thrive: the politics of the state divided fundamentally on the lines of social class. While the Unionists in Scotland could make local appeals to Protestant voters of a sectarian nature and be glad of the popular strength of the Orange Order in certain constituencies, the party did not wish to be religiously pigeonholed. It was indeed inclined to identify with the Catholic Church's warnings about socialism, and it was more than aware of the possible benefits of according due recognition to the Catholic contribution to Scottish life.⁴³ If there were sectarian impulses at local party level in Scotland, they were reined in by the wider British Conservative interest, and they could command in any case little of the populist influence of the Unionists in Northern Ireland where the separate devolved structures afforded greater opportunities for patronage and for rewarding supporters on the basis of religious designation.⁴⁴

Neither should Orange enthusiasms be assumed to have produced straightforward political benefits for the Unionists in Scotland. The Orange Order leadership's dire warnings about bolshevism could not prevent Labour and trade union involvement on the part of many who were either members of the Order or who shared in the popular culture around it of parades and social activities. Recent research has indicated that disciplinary action taken against members of the Order in the inter-war period was often in response to 'socialist' political activity.⁴⁵ Attempts by the Order to depict Labour as 'disloyal' rapidly lost credibility following the party's spells in Government in 1924 and 1929–1931, and its performance as 'His Majesty's Loyal Opposition'.

The Order could not roll back the tide of class consciousness or defuse the level of antagonism between bosses and workers. As Foster has suggested, even the forces of Protestant and Orange politics dealt in the 'class rhetoric' of the time: 'Even though Orange politics split the working class, their proponents now had to use anti-middle class rhetoric to do so.'⁴⁶ This was particularly true of Alexander Ratcliffe, the demagogic leader of the SPL who even contributed to the Labour paper, 'Forward'. There is also evidence that Orange Order members and followers simply ignored the political message of the leadership and openly pursued Labour and working-class objectives.

Contained in one of the oral testimonies relating to the Hunger Marches of the 1930s is the following vivid recollection: ‘We had Orangemen and Catholics in the N.U.W.M [National Unemployed Workers Movement]. They were a’ unemployed whether they were Orange or Catholic. And it was great how they a’ mingled up, ye know, especially if ye were goin’ on a demonstration tae the sheriff court or the Town Council or somethin’...it was funny tae see Murphy and a’ the mad Orangemen and the mad Catholics a’ at night, ye know, if ye were in a wee dance or a sing-song...the NUWM brought them thegither.’⁴⁷ It should be remembered that the NUWM was led and directed by Communists and that Catholics defied the wishes of their Church by their involvement just as Orangemen defied their ‘Grand Master’.

If Labour looked after its Catholic constituency through the organising expertise of figures like Dollan and was careful not to offend religious sensitivities around certain moral matters, then it can also be said that the party did not distance itself from Protestant voters on account of the prevalence of anti-Catholic prejudice. Tom Johnston’s ‘Forward’ newspaper made regular appeals to this sort of voter, and local ILP and Labour Party branches met in Orange Halls in certain constituencies well into the 1930s.⁴⁸ The regular recourse on the part of Labour leaders like Johnston to the memory of the Covenanters could serve neatly to combine appeals to both radical political instincts and a Protestant sense of persecution and defiance.⁴⁹ It was also notable that Johnston, and indeed Wheatley, saw in the British Empire potential for social progress and international co-operation, and were cognisant of the importance of Empire to Scotland’s historical development and self-image; there was stress on Scottish contributions to struggles for social justice in far-flung continents.⁵⁰

Significantly, the Scottish national question did not carry the same level of potential divisiveness among the working class as the Irish one. Scottish Labour MPs in the 1920s introduced bills for Scottish Home Rule without success, and the failure of such a measure in 1928 led to the establishment of a ‘National Party of Scotland’ on the part of radical political and cultural figures such as Roland Muirhead (a long-time ILP member and benefactor) and the poet Chris Grieve (‘Hugh MacDiarmid’) who were frustrated by the lack of progress. However, this party was soon subsumed into the Scottish National Party (SNP) which emerged in 1934 around an ‘independence within the Empire’ position and fundamentalists like Grieve were ousted. Scottish Nationalism, at this juncture, in fact bore some of the anti-Irish characteristics of the period with supporters such as the writer Andrew Dewar Gibb predicting similarly alarmist scenarios about the ‘take over’ of

the Irish as the Kirk had done in the early 1920s.⁵¹ In this way, anti-Catholic prejudice was diffused across both Unionism and Nationalism, rendering the Catholic minority deeply suspicious and fearful of both. Nationalism in Scotland might have attracted maverick intellectual figures such as the novelist and Catholic convert Compton Mackenzie, but it largely left the mass of the Catholic working-class cold. By the mid-1930s, the Labour Party in Scotland's re-building project following the ILP split allowed little scope for appeals to Scottish Nationalism or indeed meaningful support for Home Rule. The focus was on the Westminster Parliament and the municipal arenas at home where operators such as Dollan were able to weave the party into the fabric of Scottish life.

3

Labour's electoral apotheosis in Britain in 1945 heralded a new age of welfare provision and social reform and did much to consolidate the class divisions of the party system throughout the State. Labour's triumph, it is generally agreed, owed much to the sense of shared experience and sacrifice during the Second World War, and the leftwards drift of public opinion. There was also a deep collective sense of achievement in having defeated the Nazis and totalitarianism that contributed to the strengthening of British identity; indeed, the traditional tropes of patriotism were now combined with radical reforming intentions and a new progressivism. This 'Moment of British Nationalism' was to shape the experience of a generation.⁵²

Labour's gains in Scotland in the 1945 landslide victory were actually on a lesser scale than for the country as a whole, and a certain apprehension developed around the implications of the Attlee Government's programme of nationalisation and the prospect of considerably higher levels of London centralisation. The calls for greater Scottish autonomy to offset this saw Nationalists make common cause with some Unionists, as well as those in the Labour ranks who still valued the party's historic commitment to Home Rule. The outcome was the Scottish Convention movement led by the compelling figure of 'King' John MacCormick, and a Covenant demanding a Scottish legislature which acquired over two million signatures.⁵³ The Attlee government, however, was unimpressed; its post-war socio-economic priorities allowed for no constitutional tinkering. 'Labour Unionism' was in the ascendant, and Nationalism as an ideology had been deeply discredited by the developments in Europe that had led to war.

Nevertheless, the ‘unitariness’ of the Attlee government’s approach was imposed on a still essentially very diverse State in terms of national identities, and the seeds of future tension and discord were perhaps sown at the very hour of social democracy’s breakthrough and the construction of a fairer society.

The ambiguities do not stop there. The triumph of 1945 and the ‘New Jerusalem’ impulse that led to such comprehensive social reform were crucial in helping Labour build a secular unionism. As Jackson has observed, Labour in Scotland fashioned an appeal that transcended the religious aspects of British identity; it took a significant degree of sectarian bitterness out of the cause of the Union.⁵⁴ The importance of 1945 and afterwards was the credibility it provided for the notion that the Union was the most favourable context for the furtherance of working-class interests.

In effect, after the Second World War, support for the Union could objectively unite Protestants and Catholics in Scotland more than ever before, whatever the degree of enthusiasm—or lack of it—that might variously be subjectively held or expressed.⁵⁵ In the case of many Catholics still mindful of the treatment of Ireland, this was an overwhelmingly pragmatic and instrumentalist form of identification with the State, although it was still one with profound political consequences. Moreover, Catholic loyalty to Labour was far more about tribal identity within Scotland than broader concerns with the health of British parliamentary democracy. In the post-war era as the Catholic community began to make significant, if often gradual, advances in terms of employment and social mobility and higher educational attainment, the voting profile of the community stayed resolutely concentrated on the choice of Labour. By contrast, Protestants tended to distribute votes more evenly: there was a decided swing to the Unionists in the elections of 1950, 1951, and especially 1955 when the party won over half of the entire Scottish vote. In working-class terms this can partly be explained by the Conservatives’ impressive record of council house building⁵⁶; however, loyalist sentiment of a pro-British and Orange Protestant variety clearly still endured—the Order enjoyed another membership boom spanning 1941–1953⁵⁷—and there was also a remarkable revival in Church membership and Church-going that encompassed sections of the skilled working class in particular. Callum Brown, the leading historian of religion in Scotland, notes that by 1956 some 46% of Scots had a formal Church connection, only 5% lower than the all-time peak of 1905.⁵⁸

It should be noted that the Kirk had moved leftwards like most others during the war, and recent scholarship has revealed the vigour of its

industrial missions from wartime through to the late 1950s.⁵⁹ The Church also took a supportive line on the Scottish Convention and the campaign for a Parliament. There is indeed the impression of Presbyterian Scotland's political temper as more expansively nationalistic within the new social security and gradually increasing prosperity of post-war Britain⁶⁰: again, there may with hindsight be clues to the political dramas of the 1960s and beyond in the apparently stable 'Unionist Nationalism' and dual Scottish–British identity of the 1950s. Certainly, Unionist political identity in Scotland continued to be distinctive and continued to resist absorption into its broader British Conservative context.⁶¹ It was Labour that represented the most far-reaching integrative force, both politically and through the stronger trade union movement of the post-war era. Yet the Union's prospects were closely related to Labour delivering the material improvements to people's lives when in government, and championing convincingly the people's hopes and expectations in opposition.

The 1960s brought challenges to the UK State in the form of the surge of political Nationalism in Scotland and Wales, and the outbreak at the end of the decade of the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland. These phenomena indicated the limitations of an unqualified sense of British national identity; even the benign form of consensus politics of the post-war years—based as it was around State intervention and maintenance of the Welfare State—could not re-make the UK into a truly unitary project. The cultural climate and increasing secularisation of the second half of the 1960s encouraged a greater questioning of traditional institutions and authority in general, and a well-studied generational divide began to manifest itself in more fluid and unpredictable political behaviour. Increased living standards brought rising expectations. In Scotland, the vitality of the religious sphere was drained with remarkable suddenness: Brown actually dates this phenomenon to 1963 although Bruce has cautioned against too much being read into the apparent health of the churches in the late 1940s and 1950s.⁶² Certainly, the spread of youth culture around popular music, television, and alternative lifestyles during the 1960s undermined fatally the churches' influence in wider society, although it seems clear that the Protestant churches for a time felt the effects of this much more sharply than the Catholic Church.⁶³

Politically, Nationalism in Scotland thrived on the narcissism of small differences: unemployment was higher than the UK average although not substantially so; and new industries had not replaced older ones with the same degree of effectiveness as south of the border. Such differentials, when wedded to the cultural turbulence of the times and a re-stirring of deep-rooted perceptions of London's remoteness as a governing centre and of an

uncaring Establishment, provided the platform for the SNP finally to make electoral headway, most notably in the form of its by-election success in the safe Labour seat of Hamilton in the heart of industrial Lanarkshire in 1967.

This caused a profound shock to the Labour Party in Scotland which was settling in to enjoy its position as the dominant political force in the country as the Wilson Labour government consolidated its hold on power at Westminster after the general election of 1966. It was now in a struggle to hold on to its mass base of support, and in respect of the Catholic part of this it was to succeed: it has been clearly demonstrated that the SNP's rise in support during the late 1960s and early 1970s was an overwhelmingly Protestant—or nominally Protestant—development.⁶⁴ This might have reflected the extent to which Protestant Labour voting was less part of an overall communal identity than the Catholic–Labour alliance, and was more vulnerable to shifts in circumstances and social and economic alterations, although the signs were that in Hamilton and other parts of Lanarkshire it was more a case of disillusionment with the Conservatives that drove voters to the SNP in those years.⁶⁵ A point worth bearing in mind in this respect is the name change of the Unionists to Conservatives in Scotland in 1965, a development popularly viewed as having affected adversely the distinctive brand of the party in Scotland.⁶⁶ A former Chairman of the Labour Party in Scotland recalls that in his earliest involvement with the Party in Motherwell and Wishaw in the 1960s, there was a mixture of old ILP and temperance-inclined Presbyterians and Catholics of Irish descent: this would seem typical in terms of the mixing of Protestants and Catholics, but it might suggest a more elderly profile of the Protestant part of it.⁶⁷ It could also have been the case that the tighter grip held by the Catholic Church over its adherents down into the 1980s encouraged a pulling together around the traditional political vehicle of the community. As will be discussed below, there was also a readiness on the part of the Labour Party to warn Catholics about the possibility of facing discrimination under a government in Scotland whether in the context of devolution or of full independence; indeed, the Party raised the spectre of the Catholic experience in Northern Ireland being reproduced in Scotland.

4

Northern Ireland and its troubles became part of the political concerns of the period in Scotland as well as the wider UK. The Province's close cultural and geographic ties and long historical relationship with Scotland ensured that there would be strong emotional reactions, especially in

the industrialised West where Irish immigration of both Catholic and Protestant had shaped so much of the social and cultural landscape. However, the political effects would be more ambiguous and less straightforward to discern.

It was by no means fanciful to fear the spill over of conflict from Ulster to Scotland after 1969. The veteran socialist of the 'Red Clyde', Harry McShane, warned about the danger in a letter to the press shortly after serious riots broke out in Londonderry and Belfast in August of that year: 'It [sectarian division] does not have the same background as in Ulster, but we all know that it is there. It is pandered to by certain political elements.'⁶⁸ In July 1970, shortly after the Conservatives took office in London, the observation was made in a cabinet meeting on forthcoming Protestant marches in Derry that 'trouble in the past came from visiting contingents of Scots who were more aggressive than local Orangemen.' Consideration was then given as to how Scottish participation might be reduced or curtailed.⁶⁹ There also seems to have been concern within the Heath Conservative government that the industrial dispute around Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) in 1971—this involved a 'work in' by the shipyard workers led by prominent Communist from Govan Jimmy Reid—could result in civil violence spreading from Belfast to Glasgow.⁷⁰

The Home Secretary in the previous Labour Government responsible for Northern Ireland, James Callaghan, prevented Scottish MPs becoming involved in the affairs of the troubled Province. Tam Dalyell, Labour MP for West Lothian, recalls feeling that it was a dereliction of his duty to avoid the Ulster problem, given that he represented a constituency with many second-generation Irish. However, on reflection, Dalyell wrote: 'At that point in time, Callaghan was right and I was wrong. I did not go. Scotland was tinder dry and the Troubles could easily have spread to the land of Glasgow Rangers and Celtic.'⁷¹ In 1972, the Labour MP for Motherwell, George Lawson, warned that support for Irish unity on the part of his party would split the Labour ranks in Scotland and endanger every seat the party held in the West of the country.⁷² In March of the previous year, three young Scottish soldiers from Ayrshire were murdered by the Provisional IRA, an act of savagery that stunned the nation. It was a key moment: had there been an uncontrolled response then Scotland could plausibly have been embroiled in sectarian strife. Significantly, however, the country seemed to draw a breath and resolve never to let this happen. The relative strength of civil society in Scotland, including the churches and the trade unions, was a crucial factor, as was the ability of

the political parties to hold the line. Despite McShane's fears, there was no serious attempt by any of Scotland's political parties or individual politicians to exploit the situation for partisan ends. The most controversial interventions came from SNP representatives who criticised the decision to put Scottish soldiers into Northern Ireland, particularly 17-year-olds as in the case of one of the soldiers who was killed. William Lindsay, the Chairman of the Regional Council of the SNP and a Glasgow Councillor, commented: 'One has to face the unpalatable fact that sectarianism in Scotland has been a bitter issue in the past. Happily this has now eased. But to put Scottish troops into an area like this where there is virtually a religious war going on is wrong. It is certainly not going to help relationships between the Catholic and Protestant communities in Scotland.'⁷³ However, former Labour Secretary of State for Scotland and Ayrshire MP, Willie Ross contended that the killers had succeeded only in uniting Scotland in outrage but that they should remain calm. An army spokesman stated that the regiment that the murdered soldiers belonged to was two-thirds Protestant and one-third Catholic, and that there were 'no problems between ourselves'.⁷⁴

In retrospect, the murder of the three soldiers appears to have been the challenge that once met successfully, Scottish society could be confident of containing any fall-out from Ulster into the future. This is not to say that there were not still tensions around the Northern Ireland problem: there were activities, mostly of a fund-raising nature, carried out on behalf of rival paramilitaries throughout the course of the conflict, and there were those in Scotland who were apprehended in their efforts to convey weapons to Northern Ireland.⁷⁵ There were also two pub bombings in Glasgow during the 1970s, and it was fortunate in these cases that no lives were lost and that the perpetrators were quickly caught and convicted. The songs and chants and displays of emblems in support of Ulster Loyalists and Irish Republicans at Ibrox Park (home of Rangers) and Parkhead (home of Celtic), respectively became more noticeable, and, although condemned by the clubs themselves, tolerated by the authorities. The Orange Order, AOH, and Republican groups in west-central Scotland all attempted to help their respective causes and at least send morale-boosting messages of support and promises of help in the event of any 'Doomsday' scenario. Scottish Orange figures were indeed involved in attempts to bring unity to Ulster Unionist politics during the 1970s.⁷⁶ As the novelist Liam McIlvane has intuited in his 'All the Colours of the Town', there was an important sense in which many Scots related vicariously to the nearby conflict.⁷⁷

Nevertheless, it is remarkable how little Ulster resonated politically in Scotland from the early 1970s onwards. A tacit, unspoken agreement not to intervene in debates about political solutions for the Province appeared to be maintained by all the main political parties, and it is clear that all of them felt that doing so could de-stabilise matters, distract attention from other pressing issues of the day, and risk loss of support at some level. Bradley refers to testimony by Labour Party members in Lanarkshire who were stopped from raising Irish issues during the Troubles,⁷⁸ while Labour MP for Garscadden in Glasgow from 1978 (and future First Minister of a devolved Scotland) Donald Dewar, recalled in a speech in 2000 that he was struck by the wish of his constituents with an Irish background to avoid discussion of Northern Ireland; he added: ‘The great thing is that tolerance has grown and tensions which at one time were evident in West Central Scotland have now very largely faded.’⁷⁹ In 1978, the Secretary of the Labour Party’s Scottish Council, Helen Liddell, reported that a proposal to send a Scottish visitor to the Northern Ireland Labour Party conference could not be approved.⁸⁰

It was not until the signing of the controversial ‘Anglo-Irish Agreement’ of 1985 that there was a meaningful Parliamentary contribution by a Scottish member, Hugh Brown, Labour MP for Provan in Glasgow. The sentiments expressed by Brown make interesting reading many years later in their note of regret about the relative absence of Scottish voices in the debate and the sensitivities that had constrained Scottish political figures up until then. He said: ‘I think that there should be a voice from Scotland. I am not presuming to speak for Scotland. In fact, that is one of the disadvantages. Even in the parliamentary Labour Party and the Northern Ireland group, of which I have been a member for many years, there are only a few members from Scotland who even take part in discussion on Ireland. One of the things that we have to offer is that in Glasgow and the West of Scotland we understand what a Billy and Dan situation is.

‘My contribution has some significance because in Glasgow and the west of Scotland, even the media—I make no complaint about that—accept that we have been muted in all the previous deliberations on the subject.’ By his own admission this was Brown’s first public statement on Northern Ireland in the space of 21 years.⁸¹

There had also been strenuous efforts, on the part of the Labour Government between 1974 and 1979, and the Labour Party, to pursue the matter of devolution for Scotland (and Wales) without reference to Northern Ireland, notwithstanding the numerous ways that the issues

crossed over, the devolutionary experience of Northern Ireland, and the constitutional implications for the whole UK.⁸² In Scotland nonetheless there was some negative use made by both pro and anti-devolution campaigners of Northern Ireland: those for a Scottish Parliament warned about the possibility of Irish-style troubles developing in the event of the demand being refused by London; while anti-devolutionists tended to argue that the strife in Northern Ireland was at least partly the outcome of the Province having been given its own Parliament between 1921 and 1972.⁸³ Tam Dalyell, probably the most prominent of the opponents of devolution in Scotland, warned that the kind of sectarian problems bedevilling Northern Ireland would be far likelier to develop in a ‘small, inward-looking governmental set-up’ as Dalyell viewed the proposal for Scotland,⁸⁴ while George Lawson’s ‘Scotland is British’ campaign group tended to use ‘Stormont’—the name of Northern Ireland’s Parliament that was suspended in 1972—as a bogey word.⁸⁵ It has certainly been suggested that Labour opponents of devolution, in defiance of their government’s wishes, used the Stormont example to scare off Catholic voters in the Referendum of 1979, although one academic has cast doubt on how significant this turned out to be given that the political territory dominated by Labour in west-central Scotland recorded a ‘Yes’ vote overall.⁸⁶ However, it should be remembered that the Orange Order in Scotland was in favour of devolution, in the hope that it would strengthen the case for the return of Stormont; and there was little sign at this point of any significant Scottish nationalist enthusiasm in the Catholic community. Moreover, the ‘Yes’ vote in the Referendum was only slightly ahead of ‘No’ and failed to achieve the necessary level of 40% of the electorate, the overall turn-out being just over 60%.⁸⁷

As the Northern Ireland conflict wore on, Scotland, like the rest of the UK, tended to become immune to the mounting death toll and the continually frustrating search for a political solution. Once the tense moments of the early troubles had passed it was clear that factors that distinguished Scotland from its neighbour across the North Channel were of paramount importance in preventing any similar carnage on Scottish soil. These included the relative lack of residential segregation, the rising frequency of ‘mixed marriages’ and indeed the long tradition of these, and the more harmonious relationships of an ecumenical kind between the churches.⁸⁸ In addition, there was the continuing relevance of the greater degree of class solidarity and co-operation around issues of working-class interest, and the strength of the trade unions. The Labour Party, more

than any other, had to tend carefully to its support base with Ulster's problems in mind. Although, as Vince Cable's memoir makes clear, the Labour Party in Glasgow found the management of sectarian pressures and expectations often difficult, and got caught in the maelstrom of the periodic controversies around separate schooling, a cross-religious alliance was largely preserved in the 1970s. Catholic Church influence featured alongside the activism of Protestant church ministers such as Geoff Shaw who became part of the city's folklore for his work with the poor.⁸⁹ The tumultuous struggle at UCS, alluded to above, proved impervious to any sectarian disruption that might have been possible given the 'Orange and Green' identities and Rangers and Celtic allegiances of so many of the workforce.⁹⁰ Indeed, Orange Order members and supporters gave notable support to the workers.⁹¹

While Labour Party policy in the 1980s formally favoured Irish unity by consent, in practice this amounted to little. It was the Labour government's pragmatic willingness to co-operate with the Ulster Unionist Party during the later part of its time in office in the 1970s that continued to shape the public's perception; in effect there was a bi-partisan approach to Northern Ireland at Westminster that discouraged any radical departure in terms of policy. Labour gave its support to the Conservative government's decision to sign the Agreement of 1985 that provided for a consultative role in Northern Ireland affairs by the Dublin government. Unionist fury in Northern Ireland found its echo for a brief period in Scotland: the Orange Order declared that it would back a 'Scottish Unionist Party' to fight the next general election on an anti-Agreement platform. In the event this party did not stand candidates but the Order's directions to its supporters to cast a protest vote against the Government may have helped bring about Conservative losses to Labour in certain targeted seats. However, conclusive evidence of this is elusive, and such losses have to be put in the context of the general Conservative decline in Scotland at this juncture; the election resulted in the return of 50 Labour MPs in Scotland.⁹² The fall-out from this episode probably sealed the rupture between the Conservatives and militant Protestant and 'Loyalist' voters that had been developing for decades. The new breed of Tory in the metropolis had little appreciation of the extent to which support in Scotland had long been Unionist rather than Conservative.

Certainly, the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher, in power from 1979, took little heed of the need to look after what remained of its working-class support as the government pursued its mission

to re-orientate the British economy away from heavy industry and to promote the market individualism and the service sector that became the Thatcher era's hallmark.⁹³ This signalled the demise of the craft culture in which Protestant skilled workers had been dominant. As Knox has put it: 'The year of 1979, then, marked the beginning of the end for the male, skilled industrial, Protestant worker in Scotland and represented a climacteric in the political development of working class politics north of the border.'⁹⁴ The 1980s and 1990s were to see Scotland react to the Conservative prescription by moving towards the endorsement, this time in an emphatic fashion, of its own devolved Parliament; for Labour, specifically, much of its previous centralist cast of mind and its disparagement of Scottish national sentiment had to be jettisoned.⁹⁵

As the 1980s progressed, individual Scottish Labour personalities such as the maverick figure of George Galloway openly sided with the Irish Republican cause, but the party as a whole remained guarded in its management of the issue.⁹⁶ The first Scot to hold office in Northern Ireland was Michael Ancram between 1992 and 1995; he was a patrician Tory who carried no discernible sectarian baggage. The first Labour appointments, Adam Ingram and John McFall followed by Secretary of State John Reid, came in the very different circumstances of the 'Peace Process' and the aftermath of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. This context will be discussed in succeeding chapters. However, as developments in Lanarkshire in the early 1990s were to show,⁹⁷ there was every need even by the last decade of the century to tread warily around issues with a religious and ethnic dimension, and the potential for outright sectarian friction.

5

Scotland thus avoided the kind of troubles that convulsed Northern Ireland for over a quarter of a century. Indeed, as the violence persisted across the water and the toll of victims of sectarian killings mounted, the wish to keep Scotland apart from the conflict merely deepened. Moreover, the notion of 'troubles fatigue' undoubtedly applied to Scotland as much as other parts of Britain.

If there was a cost to this successful exercise in distancing, then it might have been the postponement of a proper evaluation of the nature of sectarianism in Scotland. The freer social and cultural climate of the 1960s might have been expected to produce the self-examination in Scotland necessary for the resolution of historic divisions over religion and the

persistence of much prejudice and sectarian stereotyping. The connection of such matters to the stronger sense of national consciousness that had developed by the 1960s could also have been profitably explored.

In the event, the frightening spectacle of Ulster's conflagration had the effect of closing down such possibilities. A widespread nervousness about investigating the charged topics of job discrimination, separate schooling, and Irish-derived allegiances and identities in effect curtailed public debate. As argued above, the political parties all steered clear of such issues for fear of Scotland being drawn closer to Northern Ireland, and it was Labour with its cross-community working-class support base that felt it had most to lose by anything that looked likely to stir sectarian passions. It is easy at this distance to say that the political parties and players of the time should have showed more courage: the dangers were real and Scotland has undoubtedly derived great benefits by avoiding serious political polarisation on sectarian lines.

It is rather to suggest that the constraints imposed on the public discussion of sectarian issues in Scotland for virtually a generation may have added further layers to the question. By the time the spotlight of public and media attention was turned on the issue many profound social changes had taken place, and workplace cultures in particular had been transformed. Scotland had become decidedly more secular if measured in terms of church attendance and worship and changing attitudes on sexual and moral questions; in many ways religious identity had become detached from religion itself. The nation's cultural orientation was less straightforwardly male in character, and class divisions were also less pronounced and easily defined, if still clearly pertinent. A substantial amount of the comment that surrounded sectarianism in Scotland by the end of the century either drew on inescapably subjective and partial recollections of a world that had largely passed away or had been greatly altered, or was based on interpretations of that world and its legacy that were shaped by contemporary concerns and values and different conceptions of the issues involved.

On Irish matters more specifically, the general wish to keep Scotland apart from them did not preclude the possibility that the troubles still impacted considerably in terms of perceptions of the conflict. Anger and outrage over atrocities or the handling of the problem by the State and the security forces could well have been widely internalised, and it may have taken a toll that is difficult to calculate or assess. At any rate it is plausible that such suppressed feelings were released in some form in the public controversies over sectarianism in Scotland that got underway—significantly—as peace returned to

Northern Ireland. These issues will be further explored in succeeding chapters with particular reference to the Labour movement in Scotland and the challenges it faced in the new political context of devolution and a changing UK.

NOTES

1. See W. Knox and A. McKinlay (eds.), *The ILP on Clydeside*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991.
2. See the memoir of Labour activist W.M. Haddow, *My Seventy Years*, 1943; also G. Walker, *Thomas Johnston*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988, ch. 1.
3. It should be noted that, notwithstanding the profound religiosity of the Highlands and Islands and the strict fundamentalism of the Free Presbyterian Church, relations between Protestants and Catholics were generally civil and largely free of the sectarian tensions that came to characterise the Lowlands.
4. Walker, *Thomas Johnston*, pp. 14–16.
5. I.S. Wood, *John Wheatley*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990.
6. A. McKinlay and M. Black, ‘Never at rest’, *The Diary of John S. Taylor*, *Scottish Labour History Society Journal*, No. 29 (1994), 50–62.
7. T. Cowan, *Labour of Love. The Story of Robert Smillie*, Glasgow: Neil Wilson Publishing, 2011.
8. See *Forward* 6 December 1913.
9. See, for example, J. Foster and C. Wolfson, *The Politics of the UCS Work-In*, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1986.
10. See Glasgow Labour History Workshop, ‘Roots of Red Clydeside: The Labour Unrest in West Scotland, 1910–1914’, in R. Duncan and A. McIvor (eds.), *Militant Workers*, Edinburgh: John Donald, 1992.
11. The classic statement of this case is I. McLean, *The Legend of Red Clydeside*, Edinburgh: John Donald, 1983.
12. See the memoirs of W. Gallacher, *Revolt on the Clyde*, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1936; and M. Shinwell, *Lead with the Left*, London: Cassell, 1991. Also, G. Brown, *Maxton*, Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1986; and J. Broom, *John Maclean*, Loanhead: MacDonald Publishers, 1973.
13. J. Stewart, ‘“Christ’s Kingdom in Scotland”: Scottish Presbyterianism, Social Reform, and the Edwardian Crisis’, *Twentieth Century British History*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2001), 1–22.
14. M.J. Mitchell, ‘Irish Catholics in the West of Scotland in the Nineteenth Century: Despised by Scottish workers and Controlled by the Church?’, in M.J. Mitchell (ed.), *New Perspectives on the Irish in Scotland*, Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2008; B. Aspinwall, ‘Catholic Realities and Pastoral Strategies: Another Look at the Historiography of Scottish Catholicism, 1878–1920’, *Innes Review*, Vol. 59, No. 1 (2008), 77–112.

15. J.J. Smyth, *Labour in Glasgow 1896–1936: Socialism, Suffrage, Sectarianism*, East Linton: Tuckwell, 2000.
16. J. Foster et al., ‘Sectarianism, Segregation and Politics in Clydeside in the later Nineteenth century’, in M.J. Mitchell (ed.), *New Perspectives on the Irish in Scotland*, Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2008; also J. Foster et al., ‘Irish Immigrants in Scotland’s Shipyards and Coalfields’, *Historical Research*, Vol. 84, No. 226 (2011), 657–692.
17. Ibid.
18. W.W. Knox, *Industrial Nation*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999, p. 137.
19. J. Melling, *Rent Strikes*, Edinburgh: Polygon, 1983; see also entries on Crawford and Barbour in W. Knox (ed.), *Scottish Labour Leaders 1918–1939*, Edinburgh: John Donald, 1984.
20. S. Bruce, *No Pope of Rome: Militant Protestantism in Modern Scotland*, Edinburgh: Mainstream, 1985; also the same author’s *Conservative Protestant Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, ch. 4.
21. The SPL and PA made a significant impact on local elections in Glasgow and Edinburgh, respectively during the 1920s and 1930s. See T. Gallagher, *Glasgow: The Uneasy Peace*, Manchester: Manchester, 1987, ch. 4; and the same author’s *Edinburgh Divided*, Edinburgh: Polygon, 1987.
22. See G. Walker, ‘Varieties of Scottish Protestant Identity’ in T.M. Devine and R.J. Finlay (eds.), *Scotland in the Twentieth Century*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996.
23. J. McCaffrey, ‘Roman Catholics in Scotland: Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, in C. MacLean and K. Veitch (eds.), *Scottish Life and Society: A Compendium of Scottish Ethnology*, Vol. 12: Religion, Edinburgh, John Donald 2006.
24. M. Rosie, *The Sectarian Myth in Scotland*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, ch. 7; G. Walker, *Intimate Strangers: Political and Cultural Interaction Between Scotland and Ulster*, Edinburgh: John Donald, 1995, ch. 4.
25. See, for example, *Glasgow Observer*, 25 May 1929.
26. See memoir of controversial Labour MP John McGovern, *Neither fear nor favour*, London, Blandford Press, 1960.
27. K. Robbins, *England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales: The Christian Church 1900–2000*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 210–216.
28. See A. McCarthy, *Personal Narratives of Irish and Scottish Migration, 1921–1965*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007.
29. Memo by Sir John Jeffrey, SRO 37110/1. Quoted in Walker, *Intimate Strangers*, p. 66.
30. R. McGinty, *This Turbulent Priest: The Life of Cardinal Winning*, London: Harper Collins, 2003, pp. 25–26.

31. See G. Walker, 'The Orange Order in Scotland Between the Wars', *International Review of Social History*, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1992, pp. 177–206.
32. See E. Kaufmann, 'The Orange Order in Scotland since 1860: a Social Analysis', in Mitchell, *New Perspectives*.
33. M. O'Caithain, 'A Winnowing Spirit: Sinn Fein in Scotland, 1905–1938', in Mitchell, *New Perspectives*.
34. G. Walker and D. Officer, 'Scottish Unionism and Ulster', in C. MacDonald (ed.), *Unionist Scotland 1800–1997*, Edinburgh: John Donald, 1998.
35. B. Murray, *The Old Firm*, Edinburgh: John Donald, 2nd ed., 2000.
36. See McLean, *Red Clydeside*, pp. 183–184.
37. Wheatley and Maxton were the leading Scottish critics of the Labour Party's approach in the late 1920s and early 1930s, while Johnston became the most accomplished persuader for gradualism. Wheatley died before ILP disaffiliation but it is highly likely he would have been in favour.
38. For a range of scholarly appraisals of the ILP, see Knox and McKinlay, *The ILP on Clydeside*.
39. John Foster, 'The Twentieth Century, 1914–1979', in R.A. Houston and W.W. Knox (eds.), *The New Penguin History of Scotland*, London: Penguin, 2002, p. 440.
40. *Irish News*, 5 May 1933.
41. A. McKillop, 'The forgotten man of Scottish Labour history', *Scottish Review*, 14 March 2013. The most informative source on Dollan remains Gallagher, *Glasgow*.
42. See Jackson *The Two Unions*, pp. 145–146; also Walker, *Intimate Strangers*, ch. 5.
43. See papers of Scottish Conservative and Unionist Association NLS, Acc. 10424, especially 10424/8 and/9.
44. Bruce, *Conservative Protestant Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, ch. 3; Walker, *Intimate Strangers*, ch. 3.
45. D. Butcher, 'Ladies of the Lodge: a history of Scottish Orangewomen, c. 1909–2013', PhD Thesis, University of North London, 2014, especially ch. 5.
46. Foster, 'The Twentieth Century', p. 434.
47. Testimony of Michael Clark in I. MacDougall (ed.), *Voices from the Hunger Marches*, Edinburgh: Polygon, 1990.
48. Walker, 'Orange Order'.
49. C. Harvie, 'The Covenanting Tradition', in G. Walker and Gallagher, T. (eds.), *Sermons and Battle Hymns*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990; T. Brotherstone (ed.), *Covenant, Charter and Party*, Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1989.
50. Walker, *Thomas Johnston*, ch. 3.

51. R. Finlay, 'National Identity in Crisis: politicians, intellectuals and "the end of Scotland", 1920–1939', *History*, Vol. 79 (1994), 242–259.
52. C. Harvie, 'The Moment of British Nationalism, 1939–1970', *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (2000), 328–340.
53. J. MacCormick, *Flag in the Wind*, Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2008; first published 1955.
54. Jackson, *Two Unions*, p. 270; see also P. Ward, *Unionism in the UK*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, especially chapter on Tom Johnston.
55. See J. Reid, *Reflections of a Clyde Built Man*, London: Souvenir Press, 1976, p. 3 regarding the benign effects of the full employment of the post-war era on relations between the communities; also T.M. Devine, 'The End of Disadvantage?' in Mitchell, *New Perspectives* for a qualification of this argument.
56. Foster, 'The Twentieth Century', p. 462.
57. Kaufmann 'The Orange Order'.
58. C. Brown, *Religion and Society in Modern Scotland*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997, pp. 62–63.
59. E. McFarland and R. Johnston, 'Faith in the Factory: The Church of Scotland's Industrial Mission, 1942–1958', *Historical Research*, Vol. 83, No. 221 (2010), 539–564.
60. See comment on the Church and Scottish Nationalism around the removal by Scottish students of the Stone of Destiny from Westminster Abbey in 1950 in R. Weight, *Patriots*, London: Pan Books, 2002, p. 134.
61. See the seminal thesis advanced in J. Bulpitt, *Territory and Power in the United Kingdom. An Interpretation*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983. The Conservatives until led by Margaret Thatcher were respectful of such diversity.
62. C. Brown, *The Death of Christian Britain*, London: Routledge, 2001, pp. 175–176; S. Bruce, *Secularization*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, ch. 3.
63. See discussion in G. Walker, 'The Religious Factor', in T.M. Devine and J. Wormald (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Modern Scottish History*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
64. J. Brand, *The National Movement in Scotland*, London: Routledge, 1978, pp. 150–154; see also W. Miller, *The End of British Politics?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 94, 144–147.
65. Judith Hart Papers, People's History Museum, HART/14/21, Hart to Tom McNally, 14 April 1978; Arthur Woodburn Papers, National Library of Scotland (NLS), Acc. 7656/16/3.
66. See Lord Lexden, 'Michael Forsyth was right. The Conservative Party must reassert its historic Unionism', *conservativehome* (www.conservative-home.com/author/lord-lexden), 22 April 2015.

67. Interview with Bob Thomson, 20 July 2015. See also obituary of Peggy Herbison, Labour MP for North Lanarkshire between 1945 and 1970, *The Scotsman*, 31 December 1996.
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69. National Archives (NA), CAB 128/47, 21 July 1970.
70. Foster, 'Twentieth Century' p. 476; also Foster and Wolfson, *UCS*.
71. T. Dalyell, *The Importance of Being Awkward*, Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2012, pp. 131–135.
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73. *Evening Citizen*, 11 March 1971.
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75. S. Bruce, *The Red Hand*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992, ch. 6; I.S. Wood, *Crimes of Loyalty*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006, ch. 13.
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78. J. Bradley, 'Wearing the Green', in T.G. Fraser (ed.), *The Irish Parading Tradition*, Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2000, fn. 54.
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81. House of Commons Debates, 26 November 1985, columns 794–795.
82. See G. Walker, 'Scotland, Northern Ireland and Devolution, 1945–1979', *Journal of British Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2010), 117–142.
83. G. Walker, 'The Scotland is British Campaign, 1976–1978', *Scottish Affairs*, Vol. 61 (2007), 74–100.
84. T. Dalyell, *Devolution: The End of Britain?*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1977, p. 293; also see Dalyell Papers NLS, Acc. 12917/1 for examples of sectarian scare-mongering.
85. Walker, 'Scotland is British'.
86. Gallagher, *Glasgow*, pp. 327–328; Rosie, *Sectarian Myth*, pp. 58–61.
87. An amendment to the Scotland Act of 1978 recommended that this level of support be reached before the government proceeded with legislation to enact devolution.
88. Walker, 'Religious Factor'. Another possibly significant factor was that Scotland did not produce a populist Protestant agitator like Ian Paisley despite the best efforts of Pastor Jack Glass.

89. V. Cable, *Free Radical*, London: Atlantic Books, 2009, ch. 6; Ron Ferguson, *Geoff*, Ellon: Famedram Publishers, 1983.
90. See J. Kemp (ed.), *Confusion to our Enemies*, Glasgow: Neil Wilson Publishing, 2012, p. 139 for the testimony of a shipyard worker to Reid's ability to unite Protestant and Catholic in industrial struggle.
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93. See E. Cameron, *Impaled Upon A Thistle*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010, Chap. 10 for an evidence-based account of the restructuring of the Scottish economy and the disproportionate suffering in relation to unemployment and social deprivation of Glasgow and the West of the country.
94. Knox, *Industrial Nation*, p. 252.
95. J. Mitchell, 'The Evolution of Devolution: Labour's Home Rule Strategy in Opposition', *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 33, No. 4 (1998), 479–496.
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97. See next chapter.

The Sectarianism Debate and the Advent of Devolution

Abstract This chapter focusses on the way religious sectarianism became a major topic of public debate in Scotland from the 1990s. It considers the media coverage of the issue and how it became entangled in the Labour–Scottish National Party (SNP) power struggle. It puts the controversy firmly into the context of the early days of devolution in Scotland. The chapter examines Jack McConnell’s ‘crusade’ around the issue and questions its political value; it is contended that Labour by the 2000s was effectively unable to tell the positive story of the containment of sectarianism in the past and the extent to which working-class people were persuaded to unite around socio-economic matters. The chapter also assesses the SNP’s handling of the topic in government, including its football legislation of 2012.

1

Since the 1990s, there has been a marked degree of public controversy over, and scrutiny of, the issue of religious sectarianism in Scotland. Indeed, debating the topic has been viewed as an overdue exercise in Scotland’s development as a modern nation, and the desire to eradicate it has been shared by political parties, churches, football clubs, and civil society groups against a background of eager media prompting. On the surface, there has been apparent consensus over the existence of sectarianism as a social ill, and a sense in Scottish society that it should be relegated to history.

However, as the debate has gained momentum it has become clear that there is little agreement on the meaning of sectarianism beyond rather platitudinous statements about people being ill-treated on the grounds of their religious beliefs or affiliations. Much of the ‘evidence’ underpinning the early discussion in the media was anecdotal in kind, and even when academics entered the arena to supply some pertinent facts and figures and proper context, sharply polarised opinions as to the nature and extent of the phenomenon were still vigorously advanced. The most influential schools of thought can perhaps be characterised as, firstly, the view that sectarianism is deeply rooted in Scotland and takes the form of anti-Catholicism; and, alternately, that the seriousness of the problem at least in contemporary Scotland has been overstated and that equating it simply with anti-Catholicism is reductionist and misleading. Given that the Scottish Government published three reports into aspects of the issue in 2015, it is unlikely that the debate, whether in the public realm or between scholars, will run out of steam for some time yet.¹

This chapter attempts to trace the development of the debate over sectarianism in Scotland in the late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century period, and to relate it to political, social, and cultural changes with particular reference to the Labour Party. As was contended in the previous chapter, discussion of this issue in Scotland cannot neglect to consider the Irish dimensions that have shaped identities and blended with factors such as social class.

2

Writing in 1990 on the relationship between socialism and nationalism in Scotland, the academic Cairns Craig referred to ‘the great unspeakable divide, the religious divide.’ Craig was examining the apparent dissonance in 1980s Scotland between the cultural revival of this decade and what he perceived as the political sterility of the time, particularly surrounding the Labour–SNP rivalry. For Craig too much about Scottish politics was hidden from the light of proper debate and engagement, and fears about religious antagonisms inhibited progressive change. He instanced the tendency of journalists to regard religion and politics as a ‘no go’ area, and the commonly held view of Scottish independence as carrying the threat of turning Scotland into another Northern Ireland. Perceptions of the SNP as an ‘Orange’ party and Labour as the defenders of Catholic schools formed, in Craig’s view, a crucial ‘subtext’ for much of what went on in Scottish politics.²

Craig's baleful observations came later to be echoed by influential controversialists such as Gerry Hassan as political debate in Scotland entered a new era along with the coming of devolution.³ Moreover, it should be remembered that academics such as Steve Bruce and Tom Gallagher did tackle the topic of religious tensions in Scotland in important books published during the 1980s.⁴ Nevertheless, there was relatively little in the way of examination of how the political parties managed their support bases, and of the nature of the political dynamics at local level in Scotland.

Recently published memoirs such as those of Stirlingshire Labour MP during the 1970s and 1980s, Dennis Canavan, provide a valuable insight into the Labour Party's careful handling of sectarian sensitivities in their choice of candidates for certain constituencies and local wards, a matter also confirmed by a former Party office-holder and a former party worker from this era.⁵ Canavan describes, in illuminating detail, the challenge he faced as Labour candidate in 1974 as a Catholic attempting to win votes in a fiercely Orange, if also Labour, mining area, and indicates the pragmatic readiness of the party in some cases to avoid fielding candidates of a different persuasion to the majority of voters for fear of a sectarian backlash.⁶ Canavan's recollections of the devolution Referendum of 1979 also tend to confirm suggestions that the Labour Party was willing to scare Catholic voters with the Northern Ireland experience of their co-religionists, and to attempt to convince the same part of the electorate that the SNP favoured the abolition of Catholic schools.⁷

The memoirs of the Labour Party's Scottish Organiser in the 1970s and 1980s, Jimmy Allison, are also revealing. In a chapter entitled 'The Religious Divide', Allison, whose father was a committed Orangeman, recalls his attempt as a local councillor in the 1970s to challenge the system of denominational schooling. On appointment as party organiser afterwards he was then advised by a number of Catholic councillors to keep his views to himself. Although the Labour Party's Scottish conference voted in favour of integrated schools on occasions during the 1970s and 1980s, Allison contends that 'the party never did anything to put this policy into effect because they were too scared to lose the Roman Catholic vote.'⁸ Correspondingly, Allison's recollections of what became known as the 'Sam Campbell Affair' gesture to the party's concern over Protestant voters. Campbell, a Labour councillor in Midlothian, made anti-Catholic remarks at an Orange demonstration in 1986 for which he was disciplined by the party but not expelled. Despite the pressure for expulsion, it was clearly felt that the issue had to be dealt with in a manner that preserved the delicate balance between rival religious allegiances.⁹

For the Labour Party in Scotland the religious issue called for balancing acts, trade-offs, and tactical manoeuvres. Glasgow MP Hugh Brown, whose intervention over the Anglo-Irish Agreement has been noted, took a deep interest in Irish history and the conflict in Northern Ireland and was a firm supporter of the cause of Irish unity. He was one of the Scottish representatives on the Parliamentary Labour Party's group on Northern Ireland. In 1981, he felt compelled nonetheless to remind his colleagues of 'the strength of the Orange vote in Scotland',¹⁰ and in 1984 he was a guest speaker at a Presentation Banquet to honour senior Scottish Orangeman, Thomas Orr. Brown wrote subsequently to the Grand Secretary of the Orange Order in Scotland: 'It is always good to see recognition being given to someone who so obviously gave a lot to your Movement.'¹¹ In the late 1970s the Scottish Orange Order used their contacts with Brown to press for a meeting with the Lord President in the Labour Government, Michael Foot, over devolution, but were turned down for fear that such a meeting would 'be likely to cause some resentment among Scottish Catholic voters.'¹²

The Orange Order was unsurprisingly vocal in its opposition to the State funding of Catholic schools. While Orange interventions on the matter could be characterised by critics of the Order as motivated by bigotry, there were, nonetheless, criticisms of separate schooling that could be shared by Labour activists. These included the Church's veto over appointments to teaching posts in denominational schools, and claims of discrimination against non-Catholic teachers over promotion.¹³ Furthermore, non-Catholic Labour MPs such as Brown were relentlessly harassed by the Catholic Church over the issue of abortion. In 1976, a priest in Brown's constituency wrote to the secretary of Provan Labour Party saying that Brown's support for the legislative status quo meant that there needed to be 'an anti-"murder by abortion" candidate in place of Mr. Brown.' Brown replied depicting the priest's tactics as 'reminiscent of Hitler'.¹⁴ The Catholic Church indeed periodically threatened Labour with directing its adherents not to vote for the party on account of the abortion question (and sometimes also when Catholic schools were threatened with closure), although it was perhaps mollified by those Labour MPs who were publicly anti-abortion; this group included Scottish MPs in the 1970s and 1980s such as James Dempsey, Richard Buchanan, and Dennis Canavan.¹⁵ It is doubtful that the Church's attempts to urge the Catholics of west-central Scotland to pressure Labour into toeing the line on abortion had more than a limited effect; on the other hand, the sense

of vigilance over the protection of Catholic schools, and the strength of opinion on the part of Catholic parents, appeared to douse any ideological momentum within the party towards integration.¹⁶ Separate schools were clearly regarded as central to the Catholic community identity, and were viewed as having been won and subsequently defended through struggle and a sense of solidarity that was essentially tribal.

3

In 1992, the sociologist Steve Bruce argued that Catholics in Scotland were no longer ghettoised and that the ties between the community and the Church were loosening. Bruce highlighted the impact of Catholics on local politics: ‘Although less glamorous, political power at local government level has important consequences for the distribution of such public goods as council employment and housing.’ Bruce pointed to the heavily Catholic character of the Labour Party in Strathclyde, the country’s biggest regional authority, and instanced the continuous run of Catholic Lord Provosts of the city of Glasgow. The contrast between Scotland and pre-Troubles Northern Ireland was, he averred, clear and significant.¹⁷ Indeed, in relation to the particular issue of council housing allocation, a later study demonstrated that none of the discrimination that had been such a feature of local councils in Northern Ireland and which was instrumental in the rise of the Civil Rights movement in the 1960s, was to be found in Scotland.¹⁸

Moreover, the general election of 1992, which the ‘Glasgow Herald’ had confidently predicted would be ‘a secular affair’ with religious affiliations playing little part, did in fact provide evidence of a limited loosening of the Catholic–Labour relationship with some 16% of Catholics voting for the SNP in contrast to the previous figure of 7%.¹⁹ This bolstered the argument that Catholics were coming more into line with other Scots in terms of political choice—the SNP voting figure for Protestants was 20%—and the survey evidence also indicated that Catholics were largely in favour of constitutional change.²⁰ It appeared to be the case that Catholics were sharing in, and perhaps disproportionately shaping, what was viewed as a new culture of distinctively Scottish political priorities and values²¹; in addition, the specifically Protestant, or more accurately Presbyterian, associations with Scottish national identity were weakening against a background of increasing secularisation.²²

Nevertheless, no simple, linear narrative of a Catholic march towards the SNP amidst the crumbling edifice of 'Protestant Scotland' can be drawn. In 1997, the Catholic figure in support of the SNP was back down to 8% although this may well have been more a reflection of the 'New Labour' moment that swept Britain as a whole and the confident expectation in Scotland that a Labour government would at last deliver devolution. It should be noted that, according to survey evidence from 1997, Catholics were slightly more likely than Protestants, although not those of 'no religion', to favour a 'Yes' vote for both a Scottish Parliament and tax-varying powers.²³ Certainly, outlooks had materially changed since the previous Referendum in 1979. However, the swing back to Labour on the part of Catholics might suggest that the friction between the party and the Catholic Church over issues like the threat of closure of a number of schools in the early 1990s had something to do with the 1992 vote; moreover, the 1997 election took place in the shadow of a major local government controversy that has gone into folklore as 'Monklandsgate'.

This affair emerged into the glare of media publicity in 1993 when accusations were made against the ruling Labour Monklands District Council in Lanarkshire. The Council Labour Party was entirely Catholic and it needs to be noted that the subsequent internal Labour Party rift was thus between different sets of Catholic councillors. However, on account of the Council district encompassing the mainly Protestant town of Airdrie and the largely Catholic town of Coatbridge, when it emerged that there were vast differentials in public spending and the awarding of jobs and contracts between the two places, a reductionist tendency to conclude that Catholic local politicians had discriminated in favour of a Catholic town over a Protestant one quickly gained currency. The media interest in the affair was also greatly heightened by the fact that most of Monklands lay in the parliamentary constituency of the then Labour leader nationally, John Smith.²⁴ An inquiry held by the Council in 1994 revealed the apparent spending anomalies; however, a fuller inquiry the following year chaired by leading QC William Nimmo Smith dismissed the nepotism charges while acknowledging that the exercise of power by the local councillors in question was such as to arouse suspicion and prompt allegations.²⁵

These inquiries in any case came too late to prevent an outpouring of sectarian claims and counter-claims, particularly the notion of a Catholic 'mafia' using the Labour Party as a vehicle for dispensing favours on a religious basis. Such rhetoric was prominent in the bitterly contested by-election in the area in June 1994 following Smith's death; sectarianism

indeed was the overriding issue in the campaign.²⁶ During this contest, long-running resentments over perceived religious bias erupted on to the streets and at public meetings. Dennis Canavan has written of doors being slammed in his face as he canvassed in Airdrie.²⁷ The SNP, clearly Labour's strongest challenger for the seat, was accused by Labour of playing the 'Orange' card, a charge subsequently denied by the party leader Alex Salmond, while there were again reports of Labour alleging that the SNP would abolish Catholic schools.²⁸ Helen Liddell, an experienced party official from a Catholic background in the area, held the seat for Labour with a slim 1640 majority in contrast to the near 16,000 majority of the previous election. A poll that correctly predicted the outcome found that 80% of Catholics voted Labour, and 65% of Protestants voted SNP.²⁹

The significance of Monklands lay less in whether there was actual deliberate wrongdoing than in the issues that flowed from the Labour Party acquiring such a Catholic character in the area. Notions of balance and of keeping both sides of the religious divide satisfied appear to have lost traction in this most volatile of places for sectarian tensions. As noted in the previous chapter, engrained tribal prejudice of a religious nature was more difficult to overcome in Lanarkshire, although it must be remembered that the voluminous support Labour had enjoyed in the region for at least a generation did suggest a considerable measure of support from both sides, however variable in enthusiasm. The ravages of the Thatcher government's assault on the industry of the area such as the steelworks at Ravenscraig and the consequent levels of unemployment and post-industrial social problems combined to maintain a Labour political hegemony along with the consolations of sectarian tribalism.³⁰ For many, the only real sense of community belonging and support was Orange or Green orientated. This applied too in those mining communities that were devastated in this era: as a current Orange Order official has put it in relation to its historical development, 'the Order grew along the coal seams.'³¹

Monklands bears all the familiar hallmarks of a rather humdrum local government scandal in which the ruling party have been in power too long. As political scientist James Mitchell commented at the time, the Monklands councillors became complacent and neglected to try to counter the 'mafia' accusations by demonstrating that there was no discrimination being practised. Instead, the Council allowed the situation to fester.³² 'Most of the ills of old Labour', wrote former 'Glasgow Herald' editor Arnold Kemp, 'arise from its long years of domination in the councils of the central belt.'³³ Joyce McMillan, a penetrating commentator on

Scottish politics and culture, went further: ‘it is no secret that the Labour Party in many parts of Scotland has been a kind of Catholic fiefdom, a party more closely identified with a particular community and religious tradition, and with the business of looking after “our people”, than with socialist ideas as such.’³⁴

McMillan’s observations certainly chimed with many people’s perceptions, and Monklands triggered strong reactions on account of a widespread belief among non-Catholics that similar behaviour was occurring elsewhere, particularly in Glasgow City Council. What Bruce was able to cite as evidence of the Catholic integration into the Scottish political mainstream, others could—and did—view as tribal politics. That Catholics might only have been reversing the direction of practices that had in the past disadvantaged them was little solace to those concerned about the lingering evidence of sectarian divisions that Monklands provided. ‘The West of Scotland Labour Question’, as it was dubbed by Gerry Hassan, linked unchecked local power, patronage and sectarian tensions and was all too reminiscent of Northern Ireland.³⁵

The legacy of Monklands was in part the opening up of the large-scale public debate into the question of sectarianism that took off during the 1990s and later fed into areas of political decision-making, legislation, and public policy when devolved powers came to Scotland at the close of the decade. The way that debate was conducted and the political dimensions to it have arguably had an important bearing on the key questions of Scotland’s future as either part of the Union or an independent country—this will be explored in the following chapter.

In a more short-term sense, it can be suggested that the rawness of sectarian emotions around Monklands, and perhaps the allegations of the SNP’s opportunism during the by-election in 1994, helped bring Catholic support more firmly behind Labour in 1997. At the same time, an unflattering light had been shone on the party, prompting some Catholics themselves, including a young Stephen Noon, to seek alternative political pastures.³⁶ There was, in relation to Monklands, at one and the same time a defensiveness and a restlessness apparent in the Catholic community.

On the Protestant side, Monklands may have strengthened already baleful views of the Catholic–Labour alliance; yet the crude sectarian nature of the protests only deepened the chasm between those Protestants who experienced sectarian rivalry as a way of life and those who devoutly wished it would disappear and were inclined to adopt a ‘plague on both your houses’ stance. The predominantly middle-class Church of Scotland,

although strong in its condemnations of the impact of the Conservative government's policies on Scotland, had little meaningful contact with working-class Protestants in areas like Lanarkshire, and the latter indeed had formed the impression of a Church that had deserted them in pursuit of a politically correct ecumenism.³⁷ The marginalisation felt by many working-class Protestants was also reinforced following Monklands when the SNP made extensive efforts to dispel any negative perceptions among Catholics that had arisen or had been re-kindled.³⁸ To such Protestants, it could appear that the major political forces in the country and the church to which most nominally gave allegiance, were simply taking them for granted, refusing to listen to their concerns, and much more interested in appealing to, or improving relations with, 'the other lot'.³⁹

4

The Labour Party's emphatic victory in the 1997 general election was the prelude to a momentous period of constitutional reform that effectively re-shaped the UK as a political project. From being an albeit largely fictional 'unitary state', by the end of the century three constituent parts possessed their own devolved institutions and the UK came to assume the character of what political scientists had come to call a 'Union State'.⁴⁰ The Blair government followed through on its commitment to hold referenda on devolution in Scotland and Wales, and the positive outcomes, albeit marginally so in Wales, permitted the government to proceed with the requisite legislation. In the Scottish case, what John Smith had called 'the settled will' of the Scottish people in favour of their own parliament—a product, it is generally agreed by political analysts, of the impact on the country of 18 years of Conservative rule—appeared to betoken a widespread desire for a new kind of politics to accompany a socially and culturally changing Scotland. There was certainly a pronounced mood in favour of constructing a different kind of nation for the new millennium. Moreover, it was inescapable that such a constitutional shake-up⁴¹ should lead to serious speculation about the future of the Union itself. For the Labour government the devolution measures were seen as part of a project to modernise the UK and connect to the spirit of regionalism and subsidiarity then current in the European Union (EU). It was considered necessary to devolve power in order to maintain the health of the Union overall. Nevertheless, the appearance at last of a Scottish Parliament with a wide range of responsibilities encouraged Nationalists to believe that

people would increasingly think Scottish rather than British politically and that a desire for independence would grow accordingly. Devolution, in this light, was a serious political risk, but it was one that the circumstances of their taking office left Labour with little option but to take.

Coincidental with these developments in relation to Scotland and Wales was the ‘peace process’ in Northern Ireland and its culmination in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. Central to this Agreement was the restoration of devolved government for Northern Ireland in a tightly circumscribed power-sharing form. This breakthrough, after nearly 30 years of troubles and political violence, had far-reaching implications for the rest of the UK and Ireland; for Scotland peace in nearby Northern Ireland with its close historical and cultural and family ties appeared to present new opportunities to assess and re-assess old relationships and to deliberate the thorny issue of sectarianism that so shook a Scottish commentariat out of its assumptions regarding religion and politics when the Monklands affair erupted. The academic Elinor Kelly remarked in a reflective and challenging essay in 1999: ‘Scotland stands on the brink of constitutional change which will transform its relations with the other countries of the United Kingdom. At the same time, the peace process in Northern Ireland has reached the point where we can contemplate an end to years of sectarian strife and their impact on Scotland.’⁴² Certainly, the profound political happenings of the turn of the century did help to create much scholarly interaction and new directions in research in the field of Irish–Scottish relations, particularly in areas such as literature, language, the arts, and social and economic history.⁴³ However, academic work in the area of political connections between the two places remained under-developed, and this factor undermined some of the academic contributions to the debate on sectarianism that can be said to have achieved ‘lift off’ in the summer of 1999.

The factor that triggered the intensification of this debate was an Edinburgh Festival address by the Scottish classical composer, James MacMillan who had always stressed the importance of his Catholic faith to his work. MacMillan spoke of ‘Scotland’s Shame’ being an ‘endemic’ anti-Catholic bigotry, and his charges brought forth an immediate tide of both support and criticism.⁴⁴ One historian has judged the speech as ‘a determination to break the link between Scotland and Presbyterianism’,⁴⁵ and MacMillan indeed sprinkled his address with derogatory comparisons of John Knox and Pol Pot and the Reformation and Year Zero. In the context of the time, just prior to the opening of the new Scottish Parliament,

it might also have been a carefully directed message to Scotland's new legislators to leave the Catholic schools sector alone. MacMillan's lecture had followed the early development of a largely media-led debate over sectarianism in which the education question had loomed large and in which certain surveys had appeared to suggest public backing for an end to the segregated schooling system and a replacement to the 1918 Education Act.⁴⁶ MacMillan seemed also to take his cue from the intervention of academics who had earlier sought to prime the Catholic Church on how best to defend its educational interests in the new devolution context.⁴⁷ MacMillan's main fear seemed to be a future SNP government; his speech defended and rejoiced in the role of Catholics in the Labour movement and rehearsed Labour allegations about anti-Catholic impulses behind Scottish Nationalism.

As time was to show, however, there was no appetite on the part of any of Scotland's major political parties to confront the Catholic Church on the schools issue. Indeed, the relative absence of any political lobby in favour of ending state support for faith schools, as opposed to support for initiatives around sharing campus facilities, has tended to be seen by some as a discouragement to public discussion of the issue and thus preventing the kind of comprehensive consideration of the sectarianism question required. In relation to Scotland's development as a multi-faith and multi-ethnic society, the apparent attempts to close down debate over faith schools have hardly been helpful in terms of the formulation of educational policy on the grounds of equality. Catholic defensiveness over the issue has hindered discussion of the privileges this sector enjoys regarding the legal right to religious instruction, as opposed to education, in school, and aforementioned matters regarding vetoes over appointments and promotions. Attitudes and fears bred through years of Protestant–Catholic friction in Scotland have in effect prevented an education debate appropriate to Scotland's contemporary diversity.⁴⁸ Similarly, Cardinal Winning, leader of Scotland's Catholics, seemed indifferent to the sensitivities of the country's other faiths when he stated in January 1999 that Catholicism would be Scotland's 'sole faith' sometime in the twenty-first century.⁴⁹ Interventions such as Winning's and MacMillan's injected a combative note to the sectarianism controversy of the turn of the century, and left other interests feeling very much on the back foot. In the early days of the new devolved Scotland, Winning also made his presence felt in a controversy over the teaching of homosexuality in schools.⁵⁰ The 'Section 28' affair, as it came to be called, left Winning bemoaning the performance of

the Scottish Parliament; as one scholar has persuasively argued, it also left a legacy in respect of the Catholic Church's willingness to seek political allies elsewhere.⁵¹

5

If the MacMillan furore set the tone for discussion of sectarianism in the new devolved Scotland, the political parties were obliged to view its emergence as a hot topic as the kind of project the new political context gave them space and resources to pursue. The first batch of Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs) were certainly under pressure to demonstrate that devolution could make a difference to how Scottish problems, or problems perceived as distinctly Scottish, were tackled. In relation specifically to the Labour Party, an extraordinary development early in 2001 intensified the pressure to deal with sectarianism in a more open and transparent fashion, and brought, once again, unwelcome attention to the murky way that the issue was intertwined with the workings of the Party in west-central Scotland.

Again, the focus of the controversy was Lanarkshire. An invitation to the Irish Taoiseach Bertie Ahern—a central figure in the Northern Ireland peace process—to unveil a monument to the victims of the Irish Famine who had migrated to Scotland was embarrassingly withdrawn following an intervention by the Labour MP for Motherwell and Wishaw, Frank Roy. Roy was Parliamentary Private Secretary (PPS) to Scottish Secretary Helen Liddell, and former PPS to John Reid, then Northern Ireland Secretary but previously the first post-devolution Scottish Secretary; all three were notable figures in Labour's legendary Lanarkshire machine. Roy cited the scheduling of an Old Firm football match on the same day as likely to present problems for the ceremony, the clear implication being that sectarian animosities could flare up and ruin the proceedings. The ceremony was to take place on the site of the Catholic grotto at Carfin, a clear signal that the affair was strictly the business of one side of the religious divide. Ahern later made an official visit to the Carfin site but by then the damage had been done.

The affair brought several problematic issues to the surface. First, it contributed to the teething troubles of devolution: First Minister Henry McLeish later claimed in his memoirs that he had not been given notice of the invitation which seems to have been issued privately by the local Catholic parish in Coatbridge, and McLeish was clearly riled by the

officiousness with which both Reid and Liddell had intervened in the affair. One academic commentator even went as far as to suggest that Reid had wished to ‘diminish the pretensions of the Scottish Parliament.’⁵² Second, it caused considerable diplomatic embarrassment for the new Scottish political class and undermined much of the positive work that had been done in opening up a new era of Scottish–Irish contacts.⁵³ Third, outside observers were invited to draw the conclusion that religious bigotry was such a problem in Scotland that a high-profile event such as this with all its possible benefits for relations between the two countries could not be held without risk of disruption: the Scottish press took up this line with crusading vengeance.⁵⁴ Fourth, the affair, like Monklands, turned the spotlight on the Labour Party’s role in the region: it transpired that Roy was a member of the AOH; as previously noted this was an exclusively Catholic society equivalent to the Orange Order. It appeared to some that the Labour Party was treating the Carfin event as its own property, with its own support base in mind; as a Party rather than a national event. In Northern Ireland, Nationalist politician Brian Feeney accused Reid of placing ‘local West of Scotland intrigue’ above the peace process.⁵⁵ When Ahern did finally visit, First Minister Henry McLeish was careful to share the honours with Liddell and Reid in welcoming him.

Later in 2001, McLeish resigned as First Minister over financial irregularities and was succeeded in the office by Jack McConnell, the man he had defeated for the post a year previously. McConnell was another leading light in the Labour operation in Lanarkshire and McLeish was later to write jaundicely of a clique ‘which seemed to think it had some kind of hereditary right to control Scottish Labour.’⁵⁶ It was also suspected that McConnell had played a role in the Carfin affair that McLeish clearly felt had undermined him at the time. ‘Scotsman’ political correspondent Hamish Macdonell noted that McConnell had been an outsider who had taken over a Lanarkshire seat, moved to the area and started going to Celtic football matches with his fellow Labour colleagues from the region.⁵⁷

This profile of McConnell was guaranteed to alienate certain sections of Scottish opinion and did not help him to appear entirely credible when he launched a ‘crusade’ against sectarianism on becoming First Minister. Moreover, in October 2002, against a background of pious statements about eradicating ‘Scotland’s Shame’, it was reported that McConnell had intervened on behalf of an IRA-aligned group who wished to stage a march in his constituency.⁵⁸ A plausible, if somewhat cynical, interpretation of McConnell’s prioritising of the sectarianism issue would discern an incentive

to alter the narrative in the wake of Carfin away from Labour Party Catholic tribalism in Lanarkshire to broader questions about bigotry in society.

Regardless of the fairness of such an interpretation, the sectarianism debate was given a decisive steer by McConnell and before long this gave rise to something of an industry that engaged the media, the political classes, academics, football clubs, Churches, policy groups and NGOs, and random contributors claiming various kinds of expertise. In 2002, a cross-party working group in the Scottish Parliament on 'religious hatred' produced a report⁵⁹ with several recommendations that were taken forward, the most salient of which was a change in the law to make sectarian behaviour an aggravation of a criminal offence. This was effected in 2003 after a private member's Bill was introduced by Liberal Democrat MSP Donald Gorrie. Gorrie later admitted that sectarianism 'is a convenient shorthand term to cover a complex issue, which is partly religious, partly historical, partly political and racial.'⁶⁰ The complexities were duly revealed in the difficulties of proving a sectarian motive in offences, yet the level of subsequent debate could often be simplistic and reductionist.

The parliamentary working group signalled its indebtedness to the anti-sectarianism campaign group 'Nil By Mouth' (NBM) which had emerged in 2000. An annex to the 2002 report reproduced NBM's 'Charter for Change' that included the suggested law reform. NBM was a group founded by a friend of a victim of a savage murder in 1995. The murder was football related and NBM's focus was mainly on the sectarianism surrounding the Old Firm.⁶¹ However laudable its motivations and intentions, it has never been clear on what basis of expertise NBM was judged to be such a sure guide to government action, and such a deserving case for the funding it received.⁶² NBM's influence on the Scottish government was acknowledged by McConnell, Gorrie, and the Deputy Minister for Justice, Richard Simpson, in the proceedings of the Scottish Parliament,⁶³ and the pressure group's influence indeed endured well into the future in the way that it helped to shape the debate around sectarianism, and directed a narrative that appeared to discount the role of separate schooling and prioritise instead crude sectarian language, songs and 'banter'.⁶⁴ Rightly or wrongly, this approach was viewed by some Protestants as an attempt to skew the debate and reduce it essentially to the MacMillan diagnosis of straightforward anti-Catholicism.⁶⁵ It should be noted that NBM's campaign was given strong support by the Church of Scotland, although this tended to be dismissed as gesture politics by those Protestants, or those with an embattled Protestant identity, who had long felt distanced from

the Kirk.⁶⁶ In 2001, the Church made a public apology for the anti-Irish Catholic stance taken by some ministers and members in the 1920s and 1930s, a move welcomed by Labour MSP Brian Fitzpatrick who called for ‘changes in attitude and culture’ as well as legislation.⁶⁷ This apology, however, did not prevent Cardinal Winning’s de facto successor as leader of Scottish Catholics, Archbishop Mario Conti, claiming, in December 2002, that calls for the abolition, or even the amalgamation, of Catholic schools were ‘tantamount to asking for the repatriation of the Irish, and just as offensive.’⁶⁸ Conti was unlikely to have been unaware of the significance of the repatriation charge, echoing as it did the past campaign conducted against Irish Catholic immigrants. Such an intervention as Conti’s hardly seemed to design to foster the ‘mutual respect’ that Fitzpatrick had also called for in the Scottish Parliament.

The McConnell-inspired campaign appeared to be shaped by a ‘hate crime’ discourse then influential in analyses of racial and ethnic discord in England and elsewhere; again there were those in Scotland who felt that such a discourse was freighted with assumptions and concepts that were not unarguably apposite to the Scottish context.⁶⁹ Notwithstanding the way that the Carfin affair served to highlight the Irish and Ulster political and cultural dimensions to Protestant–Catholic relations in Scotland, it is also arguable that the interaction between Scotland and the north of Ireland in particular did not receive the consideration and investigation it merited as the Scottish debate intensified. Politicians and the media tended to look for clear-cut proposals such as Gorrie’s law change, while NBM urged the kind of anti-sectarian education projects and awareness training that smacked to some of patronising elitism, and could hardly do justice to the complex nature of the phenomenon’s historical roots and development in Scotland and its many inter-related themes.⁷⁰ Within a short time it appeared to be the case that there was widespread public consensus around the proposition that sectarianism was indeed ‘Scotland’s Shame’, but the level of debate was often superficial and either lacking in relevant hard evidence, or indifferent to it.

As the first decade of the twenty-first century wore on academics increasingly brought such evidence to light. Studies by sociologists led by Steve Bruce, and an important contribution by Michael Rosie, both published in 2004, laid out compelling findings about relative Catholic and Protestant socio-economic status and educational attainments, voting behaviour, and the rate of intermarriage.⁷¹ These studies in effect contended that Catholic communal distinctiveness and disadvantage had diminished in Scotland to

the point where differences around qualifications, access to employment opportunities, and career prospects were insignificant, and that there were no divisive effects of political attitudes and voting behaviour. In Bruce's study it was claimed that almost half of marriages between people under the age of 35 were 'mixed', that is between a Catholic and Protestant partner.⁷² Taken together these studies constituted a challenge to notions of sectarianism as a serious problem in contemporary Scotland, or to popular beliefs about the form the problem took. Shortly afterwards a similarly rigorous study by Paterson and Iannelli indicated that Catholics had not been widely discriminated against in the labour market since the 1950s, and that meritocratic principles had been emphatically applied.⁷³

Notwithstanding such academic interventions, the thrust of the debate hardly altered as the decade progressed: if support for the case that sectarianism was 'Scotland's Shame' could not be found readily in research findings on topics such as those noted above, then the demands for action tended to focus on more nebulous areas like attitudes and the factors that sustained prejudice,⁷⁴ phenomena that presented obvious difficulties of pinning down to permit dispassionate analysis. The capacity of the issue to allow for widely different interpretations was illustrated by the publication in 2003 of a landmark inquiry conducted on behalf of Glasgow City Council.⁷⁵ This report certainly bore out what has been called 'social anxiety' around sectarianism, yet it also revealed that only a small minority had actually experienced sectarian behaviour. Rather, it seemed to be the case that most respondents in the inquiry perceived it to be a problem that involved other people in other parts of the city. As Rosie has observed, the report was not taken up by the media and its findings did not inform the subsequent course of the debate as might have been expected.⁷⁶ However, it was also the case that groups like NBM could—and did—make use of the Report: in an article in 2004 the NBM spokesperson, Fred Shedden, argued that the large number of respondents who said that 'sectarian language' and jokes were common, the 50% in favour of banning Orange Walks, the common view of the Old Firm rivalry sustaining the sectarian divide, and the 65% who believed there was a serious problem of sectarian violence, all added up to uncomfortable reading.⁷⁷

Five years into the new devolved Scotland the sectarianism controversy had become entangled in the Labour–SNP power struggle. In 2004, a proposal by the Labour-controlled council in North Lanarkshire to create a number of shared primary school campuses for budgetary reasons sparked a full-scale row when the Catholic Church responded

with fury and threatened the Labour Party with ‘an inevitable electoral backlash.’⁷⁸ The Church indeed threatened to go to court over the matter. McConnell’s government supported the shared campuses proposal and a Lanarkshire MSP, Michael McMahon, openly questioned the political motives of the then Church spokesman who had intervened to denounce the scheme, Peter Kearney, a former SNP candidate. Kearney claimed that many Catholics were walking away from Labour ‘in disgust’.⁷⁹

Kearney’s part in this affair, and subsequent ones, was an indication that the Catholic Church was at least open to being wooed by the SNP, and that old communal voting habits and traditions were being put seriously under review. Indeed, Cardinal Keith O’Brien seemed to signal the Church’s approval of the SNP late in 2006.⁸⁰ In a sense the opening up of the sectarianism question in the new devolution context had stimulated a new kind of Catholic political activism, and for many trust in Labour was withering. The role of the Church in this is unclear: its influence on lay Catholics was no longer as powerful if judged in terms of church attendance and fidelity to the faith; nonetheless, it took up with relish the lobbying opportunities devolution offered, it recognised the advantages in appearing to be open to the bidding of the parties, and it thus might have contributed significantly to the loosening of the Catholic–Labour bond by giving the signal that other political choices would not ‘let the side down’.⁸¹ Equally, it should be kept in mind that the new devolution circumstances had produced genuine political tensions within the Catholic community: Kearney’s outburst in 2004 contrasted starkly with MacMillan’s old-fashioned warnings about the SNP in 1999, and MacMillan was indeed to become a vociferous opponent of the independence cause. There was not the communal cohesion and unity of purpose that some disaffected Protestants—sidelined by the respective Labour and SNP pitches for Catholic votes—perceived.

McConnell’s decision to identify his government so intimately with the campaign against sectarianism could be said to have rebounded on him and on Labour. It quickly became clear that the Labour Party in Scotland could not manage the issue with the firmness and dexterity that was the case pre-devolution, or at least pre-Monklands. The course of the debate over the issue conditioned a sense of Catholic purposefulness to right the wrongs of the past that were being highlighted, and to emerge from the margins of Scottish society (as many of them individually had). This reflected confidence about the future: a belief that Catholics would not face the prejudices of the past.⁸² On the other hand, there remained

bitterness over perceived ill-treatment and an engrained suspicion that Scotland was still at root hostile to their faith and identity.⁸³ Either way, ‘the Catholic vote’ was no longer to be counted on, and the political energies that had been aroused could no longer be modulated by local government dominance and patronage.⁸⁴

McConnell perhaps unwittingly increased the pressure on himself by holding a high-profile ‘summit’ on sectarianism early in 2005. This brought together representatives from the worlds of sport, business, and the media as well as the Churches and the politicians. It was hailed a success with some minor caveats,⁸⁵ but an editorial in ‘The Herald’ reflected the scepticism felt by many about effective action being taken subsequently.⁸⁶ The newspaper referred to the summit’s value in cementing a ‘national consensus’ against sectarianism, yet this also begged the question of what the nation was being invited to unite against: as has been indicated, there was not the level of agreement on the nature and extent of the problem suggested. This factor seriously undermined plans of action beyond calling on the usual suspects—Old Firm football clubs and supporters—to change their ways. A follow-up summit was held in a more low-key atmosphere. In 2006, Cardinal Keith O’Brien urged McConnell to join him in asking the Scottish media to adopt a ‘far more cautious and measured approach in future to the topic of Catholic schools’,⁸⁷ a clear attempt to exclude this issue from any ongoing deliberations around sectarianism. In 2008 Scotland’s leading historian, Tom Devine, intervened to say that sectarianism should simply be regarded as ‘anti-Catholicism’, the MacMillan position of 1999 that he had criticised then as insufficiently nuanced.⁸⁸ It seemed that even as the debate attracted more and more investigators and increasing amounts of evidence and testimony were produced, there was still a tendency on the part of participants to retreat to entrenched positions.

If McConnell and the Labour Party felt that they could control the sectarianism issue and emerge with plaudits from their engagement with it, then developments proved them hopelessly wrong. There was no evidence that the campaign around sectarianism or any other major issue in the public eye in these years, proved helpful to an Executive that was losing popularity, and a Labour Party perceived to be losing its touch. In 2007, the SNP won the Scottish Parliamentary elections by the slightest of margins.⁸⁹ In retrospect, this was a huge turning point in Scottish, and UK, history. It paved the way for the SNP to perform with sufficient competence, and indeed flair, as a minority government to increase

its political capital in anticipation of the following Scottish election in 2011. In this latter contest, the SNP won an improbable overall majority at Holyrood, wiping out Labour in many of its heartlands and ensuring that a Referendum on independence would be held during the life of the Parliament.⁹⁰

6

By the time the SNP came to office in 2007, sectarianism was something of a staple of public and political discourse. It was a subject that blended in with the ‘identity politics’ that had come to dislodge the old politics based on social class divisions.⁹¹ Anti-sectarianism was a cause all political parties subscribed to, although this concealed the complexities around the concept; moreover, as the commentator Bob Kernohan put it: ‘it is easy to be anti-sectarian when you cannot understand why anyone should adhere to a sect.’⁹² Jack McConnell believed he could capitalise on the apparent public mood in favour of tackling what the media had been happy to dub ‘Scotland’s Shame’ following the key intervention of MacMillan in 1999. However, scrutiny of the issue revealed matters that reflected poorly on the Labour Party in relation especially to its grip on certain local councils. Moreover, acceptance of the proposition that sectarianism was such a disgrace to the country and such a hindrance to its modernisation prevented Labour from making the case that it had, in fact, done much to defuse sectarian friction over the years by persuading working-class Protestants and Catholics to unite politically around a raft of socio-economic objectives. The positive story Labour had to tell could not, in the new devolution context of the 2000s, be credibly and cogently told. As tempers rose around claims of endemic and innate prejudice, and counter-claims of victimhood-wallowing, much that was heartening in relation to Catholic–Protestant interaction in the past was effectively forgotten, while the undoubted endurance of bitterness and prejudice was instead remorselessly highlighted and excoriated, often with scant appreciation of the ambiguities of the phenomenon and the extent to which there was always two sides to this particular coin. It was true to say that Labour had been guilty of containing and managing bigotry rather than confronting it, but this was true of all political, and other interested, parties. However, it was Labour that was made to suffer most when the ‘Pandora’s Box’ was opened in the early years of the new century.

The SNP treaded more warily around the issue when it was a minority government, and duly attracted criticism from McConnell and groups like NBM that it had lowered the eradication of sectarianism as a priority.⁹³ The SNP had perhaps learned to be cautious from McConnell's experience, but the new government hardly challenged the new orthodoxy of sectarianism as a blight on the nation's affairs. SNP leader and First Minister Alex Salmond quickly set about calming Catholic Church fears about schools when he used the occasion of the Cardinal Winning Education Lecture at Glasgow University in 2008 to pledge his 'unswerving support' for faith-based education, and to say how much he looked forward to celebrating the centenary of the 1918 Act.⁹⁴ Reeling from the shock defeat of 2007, Labour was in effect kicked when it was down by the Catholic Church as the party most to blame for the accelerating secularism in Scottish society; Salmond's carefully pitched endorsement of the role of religious faith in public life seemed to carry more appeal, notwithstanding the SNP's differences with the Catholic Church over issues such as gay equality.⁹⁵ On sectarianism, the SNP, like the previous Labour-led coalition, was more comfortable blaming the perceived problem on outdated attitudes and on football.

When the SNP found itself with an outright majority after May 2011, unruly scenes at an Old Firm match a couple of months earlier coupled with devices being sent in the mail to Celtic manager Neil Lennon, prompted the government to draft new legislation dealing with supporters' behaviour at football matches.⁹⁶ The new law was intended to curb singing and chanting of a sectarian nature and it unleashed another round of controversy over the sectarianism question.⁹⁷ So controversial did the proposals prove that the government had to abandon plans to have the laws in place for the start of the 2011–2012 football season. The legislation was eventually passed early in 2012.⁹⁸

The 2011 election had revealed Catholic support for the SNP on a par with Protestant,⁹⁹ and the Labour Party desperately attempted to claw back lost ground by championing the objections of mainly Celtic football supporters to the new law, and by accusing the SNP of lacking a proper understanding of the social and cultural realities of the West of Scotland.¹⁰⁰ These realities included the prevalence of Irish and Ulster allegiances, and Irish/Ulster-shaped identities, in certain parts of Scotland. The SNP government's new measures allowed some to view their aim as essentially the suppression of such identities on the grounds that they did not conform to a new confident sense of Scottishness. Indeed, during the McConnell era an academic intervention in the sectarianism debate made a prescient point

in this respect: ‘The danger can be that both communities, Protestant and Catholic, run the risk of being demonized for expressing what they perceive as their identity if the legislation [anti-sectarianism legislation] does not address the cultural context that each camp inhabits. The Executive and wider Scottish society must seek to understand the two cultures, their identities, their fears and their suspicions, before they can begin to legislate fairly and responsibly.’¹⁰¹

McConnell’s ‘crusade’ had earned media and civic society support and the SNP’s intentions were similarly praised. Yet in both cases, serious criticisms could be made about a failure to grasp the sensitivities involved around identity questions, and a tendency towards a ‘thought police’ kind of approach that raised libertarian objections. The SNP government, in addition to the legislation on football, pledged some £9 million investment in community and education projects. Critics argued that what was on the rise was an anti-sectarianism industry, not sectarianism itself, and that the effect of successive Scottish government campaigns had been to create scapegoats and ‘pantomime villains’, usually working-class football fans.¹⁰²

The SNP campaign, like McConnell’s, avoided proper consideration of the Irish dimension to the issue, notwithstanding the fact that the songs and chants the new law was aimed at were often about the Irish troubles, and that the Old Firm clubs carried hugely symbolic importance in Ireland, North and South. In both the Labour coalition and SNP cases, the main purpose seemed to be the need, for domestic political purposes, to be taking action on something that was believed to be damaging Scotland’s image. From the time of the football law’s introduction in 2012, the controversy was overtaken by the prospect of a Referendum on independence, and the grievances that had been stirred were channelled, if in a muddled and ambiguous way, into that momentous political campaign. This will be explored in the following chapter.

7

It might be appropriate to advance some summarising remarks on the question of sectarianism in the light of its prominence as a topic of debate during the last 20 years in Scotland, and with reference to its political effects.

It can certainly be contended that sectarianism is an issue of significance in contemporary Scotland, and not just a matter for historical enquiry; moreover, its expressions through football gesture to a deeper sense of division in Scottish society. Yet it can also be said that it is not

as widespread a phenomenon as often suggested and that it cannot be reduced to one form of prejudice. There is a lingering Protestant–Catholic division in Scotland but it is important not to distort the nature of it. It is largely confined to certain parts of Scotland, particularly the west of the country, and it is at its keenest in working-class communities where there is both persistent social and economic disadvantage, and a long history of friction that has carried strong overtones of the Irish troubles. The issue could be depicted as essentially one of tribalism, and the fact that this divide has been most obviously expressed through football has helped it assume this character over time. It is eminently a two-way flow of distrust, mutual suspicion, pejorative stereotyping, fear, loathing, and—in some cases—hatred, leavened to a significant extent by black humour and by a markedly higher degree of social interaction than in Northern Ireland: this by virtue of the relative lack of residential segregation and the much higher rate of mixed marriages in Scotland. The tribal tension is sustained by a complex set of factors and dynamics, one of which may be the fact of separate schooling if only on account of the perceptions or misconceptions to which such a system gives rise.¹⁰³ It is perfectly correct to point out that there are faith schools in many other societies and that they appear not to be regarded as a problem—it is only indeed necessary to look South of the border to England. The difference in Scotland (and Northern Ireland), however, is that faith schools are overwhelmingly Catholic whereas in England and elsewhere there are many different types and there is no perception of special treatment and of any one religious group being privileged. Also in Scotland, it has been the case that the Catholic Church has been particularly entrenched in its opposition even to what most Scots regard as commonsense initiatives such as shared campuses.¹⁰⁴ Moreover, the Catholic Church has also tended to view impeccably secularist criticisms of faith schools as further evidence of deep-rooted anti-Catholicism in the Scottish make-up. The old joke about atheists being asked if they are ‘Protestant or Catholic atheists’ carries a serious twist in contemporary Scotland: the Catholic Church appears to view opposition to it as stemming from the bigotry of self-identifying Protestants, or secularists who have been conditioned by Protestant attitudes to Catholicism.

Notions around sharp binary divisions and monolithic Protestant and Catholic blocs are not helpful when they enter the debate about sectarianism in Scotland. If, as MacMillan and others suggest, there is a derogatory concept of the Catholic ‘other’ abroad in Scotland, then, equally, there is a Catholic tendency to conceive of ‘Protestant Scotland’ as a

single community of interest whereas it is a highly diverse and fractured entity, if such it can be called at all. Catholic perceptions of their place in Scottish society have often seemed to carry assumptions about the Protestant community which make little allowance for denominational, class, and belief divisions.

The highlighting of sectarianism and the terms in which the debate has been conducted in Scotland have induced a sense of shame among some Protestants who have been willing to subscribe to the ‘sectarianism means anti-Catholicism’ school of thought. This has deepened divisions, which can largely map on to those around social class, between subscribers to the ‘Scotland’s Shame’ thesis and those Protestants who feel they are being made into scapegoats. The latter have watched as episodes such as Monklands and Carfin—which to them have revealed Catholic sectarianism or tribalism—led to national inquests that invariably ended up casting the Catholic community in the role of victims. To such defensively minded Protestants there has been a tendency towards denigration of Protestantism’s role in Scotland’s past and its part in shaping the national story which has reflected the current sense in which Protestantism is simply unfashionable.¹⁰⁵ The narrative of anti-Catholicism supposedly sanctioned by a Scottish ‘establishment’ seems to such Protestants to be an absurd fantasy. The Scottish media’s celebratory coverage of the Papal visit of 2010 at a time when the Church was engulfed by scandal struck some observers as symptomatic of the way the sectarianism debate had rendered any criticism of the Church a decidedly risky venture.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, the sophisticated theorising around sectarianism by some academic contributors to the debate risks losing sight of important, if prosaic, questions such as when does ‘looking after your own’ stop and sectarianism begin? The sectarianism debate, indeed, has been complicated and distorted by ethnic special pleading masquerading as anti-racism.

As Scotland began the long deliberation around the independence question that was to be answered in 2014, patterns of religious and political behaviour were altering significantly, and questions of identity were encompassing and absorbing the effects of years of deliberation over another question, that of sectarianism. A picture was emerging of a new Catholic sense of confidence, although this was often laced with continuing resentments over religious-based issues; and a deeply fragmented Protestant community with a largely working-class and socially deprived element that mirrored its counterpart in Northern Ireland in feeling marginalised and left behind.¹⁰⁷

NOTES

1. See next chapter.
2. C. Craig, 'Sham Bards, Sham Nation, Sham Politics: Scotland, Nationalism and Socialism', *The Irish Review*, No. 8 (1990), 21–33.
3. G. Hassan, 'Caledonian Dreaming: The Challenge to Scottish Labour', in A. Coddington and M. Perryman (eds.), *The Moderniser's Dilemma*, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1998.
4. S. Bruce, *No Pope of Rome*; Gallagher, *Glasgow*.
5. D. Canavan, *Let the People Decide*, Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2010; interviews with Bob Thomson, 20 July 2015, and Alf Young, 24 August 2015.
6. Canavan, *Let the People Decide*, pp. 99–101.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 199–200.
8. J. Allison, *Guilty By Suspicion*, Glendaruel: Argyll Publishing, 1995, p. 140.
9. Allison, *Guilty*, pp. 141–144. Interview with Bob Thomson (20 July 2015) who was also a member of the disciplinary panel. See also Gallagher, *Glasgow*, pp. 330–331.
10. Strathclyde Regional Archives, Hugh Brown Papers, Box 4, files 6 and 7, meeting of 13 May 1981.
11. Brown Papers, File titled 'Devolution (Orange Lodge)'.
12. *Ibid.*, letter from Private Secretary of Labour Party to Private Secretary of the Office of Prime Minister, 5 December 1977.
13. See discussion in G. Walker, 'Identity Questions in Contemporary Scotland: Faith, Football and Future Prospects', *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2001), 41–60.
14. Brown Papers, Box 6, File on abortion.
15. The issue flared up spectacularly in 1997: see *Daily Record*, 10 January 1997. Also, see discussion of the abortion issue in P. Lynch, 'Catholics, the Catholic Church and Political Action in Scotland', in R. Boyle and P. Lynch (eds.), *Out of the Ghetto?* Edinburgh: John Donald, 1998. It is perhaps also worth mentioning that Catholic Labour MPs, along with others with conservative views on the issue, were happy to see the decriminalisation of homosexuality delayed in Scotland until 1981, around the same time that Northern Ireland's laws were changed on account of a case taken to the European Court of Human Rights.
16. For statistics on education and the views of Catholics, see L. Bennie et al., *How Scotland Votes*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997, ch. 8.
17. Bruce, 'Out of the Ghetto: the Ironies of Acceptance', *Innes Review*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1992), 145–154.
18. I. Paterson, 'Sectarianism and Municipal Housing Allocation in Glasgow', *Scottish Affairs*, No. 39 (2002), 39–53.

18. J. Brand and J. Mitchell, 'Identity and the Vote: Class and Nationality in Scotland', *British Elections and Parties Yearbook*, 1992, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 143–157.
19. Ibid., and Bennie et al., *How Scotland Votes*, ch. 8.
20. See discussion in D. McCrone, *Understanding Scotland*, London: Routledge, 1992, ch. 6; also A.D.R. Dickson, 'The Scots: National Culture and Political Action', *The Political Quarterly*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (1988), 358–368.
21. J. Mitchell, 'The 1992 Election in Scotland in Context', *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 45, No. 4 (1992), 612–626.
22. Bennie et al., *How Scotland Votes*, ch. 8.
23. See M. Stuart, *John Smith: A Life*, London: Politicos, 2005, pp. 350–365 for an account of the affair's impact on Smith.
24. Ibid., pp. 393–394.
25. See *The Scotsman*, 28 June 1994.
26. Canavan, *Let the People Decide*, p. 225.
27. Allison, *Guilty*, p. 144; also P. Jones, 'Mything the Point', *The Scotsman*, 5 August 1994.
28. *The Scotsman*, 28 June 1994.
29. An illuminating account of growing up in the region during the Thatcher years is provided by Damian Barr in his *Maggie and Me*, London: Bloomsbury, 2014.
30. Interview with J. G. McLean, 5 October 2015.
31. 'The real scandal of Monklands', *The Herald*, 11 July 1994. See later discussion in G. Hassan and E. Shaw, *The Strange Death of Labour Scotland*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012, pp. 66–68.
32. Kemp, *Confusion*, pp. 96–97.
33. 'Time for Labour to come clean on sectarian link', *Scotland on Sunday*, 19 June 1994.
34. Hassan, 'Caledonia dreaming'.
35. Letter entitled 'Not Embattled' in *The Scotsman*, 15 August 1994. Noon went on to become an adviser to SNP leader Alex Salmond.
36. G. Walker, 'The Role of Religion and the Churches' in G. Hassan and C. Warhurst (eds.), *Anatomy of the New Scotland*, Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2002; Interview with Harry Reid, 18 December 2015. See also H. Reid, *Outside Verdict*, Edinburgh: St. Andrews Press, 2002, Chap. 6 for discussion of class divisions and the Kirk.
37. P. Lynch, 'A Scots Mosaic', *The Herald*, 9 September 1995.
38. In the local elections of April 1995, the Labour candidate came bottom of the poll in New Monkland West ward that included working-class 'Orange' areas such as Greengairs, and an 'Independent anti-mafia' candidate came a close second to the SNP.

39. See J. Mitchell, 'Scotland in the Union, 1945–95: The Changing Nature of the Union State', in T.M. Devine and R.J. Finlay (eds.), *Scotland in the 20th Century*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996; and the same author's re-conceptualisation of the UK as 'A State of Unions' in *Devolution in the UK*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009, ch. 1; also I. Mclean and A. MacMillan, *State of the Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005. A 'Union State' idea of the UK stresses the multi-national diversity of the State and the need for institutional and political expression of it, in contrast to a 'Unitary State' concept that envisages as much centralisation and uniformity as is compatible with such a composite entity. The terms originally derive from the work of S. Rokkan and D. Urwin (eds.), *The Politics of Territorial Identity*, London: Longman, 1982. See recent discussion in P. O'Leary, 'States of Union: Modern Scotland and British History', *Twentieth Century British History*, Advance Access published 5 December 2015: doi:[10.1093/tcbh/hww038](https://doi.org/10.1093/tcbh/hww038).
40. For a contemporary commentary on the whole range of constitutional changes and proposals relating to the Blair government see R. Hazell (ed.), *Constitutional Futures*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
41. E. Kelly, "'Stands Scotland Where It Did?'" An Essay in Ethnicity and Internationalism', *Scottish Affairs*, No. 26 (1999), 83–99.
42. Walker, 'Ireland and Scotland: From Partition to Peace Process', in A. McCarthy (ed.), *Ireland in the World*, London: Routledge, 2015.
43. See T.M. Devine (ed.), *Scotland's Shame?* Edinburgh, Mainstream 2000. This book includes the text of MacMillan's lecture and a representative spread of opinions on it.
44. K. Robbins, *England, Ireland, Scotland, Wales: The Christian Church 1900–2000*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 462.
45. See, for example, *Scotland on Sunday*, 23 October 1994.
46. Boyle and Lynch, *Out of the Ghetto?* Conclusion. See assessment of the Catholic lobby in the early days of devolution in M. Steven, 'The Place of Religion in Devolved Scottish Politics', *Scottish Affairs*, No. 58 (2007), 96–110.
47. Walker, 'Identity Questions'; Kelly 'Stands Scotland'.
48. *Scotsman*, 16 January 1999.
49. McGinty, *Turbulent Priest*, ch. 20.
50. See M. Steven, 'Secessionist Politics and Religious Conservatism: the Scottish National Party and Faith-based Interests', *Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 3, October 2008, 188–196.
51. See Henry McLeish, *Scotland First*, Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2004, pp. 162–163. McLeish had succeeded Donald Dewar, whose death in October 2000 dealt a considerable blow to the new Parliament. At the time of his death, Dewar was also embroiled in considerable controversy

- over the spiralling costs of the new Parliament building. Also, O.D. Edwards, 'Ireland and the Liddell Re-Conquest of Scotland', *Scottish Affairs*, Vol. 35 (2001), 25–34, for a swingeing attack on Reid and Liddell and on Labour's presumptuousness in relation particularly to the Catholic vote in the West of Scotland.
52. See Dan Mulhall, 'Making the Caledonian Connection: Building Bridges Between Ireland and Scotland', *Scottish Affairs*, No. 36 (2001), 1–11. Mulhall was the first Irish Consul in Edinburgh post-devolution. See also his reflections in *Sunday Herald*, 16 August 2009.
 53. See, for example, *Scotland on Sunday* 11 February 2001; *Sunday Herald*, 11 February 2001.
 54. *Irish News*, 14 February 2001.
 55. McLeish, *Scotland First*, p. 163.
 56. *Scotsman*, 24 February 2004. For a sympathetic reading of McConnell's political skills and revelations about his own experience of sectarian aggression, see L. Davidson, *Lucky Jack*, Edinburgh: Black and White, 2005, pp. 102–103; 158–159.
 57. *Sunday Times* (Scotland), 27 October 2002.
 58. 'Tackling Religious Hatred: Report of Cross-Party Working Group on Religious Hatred', Scottish Executive, 2002, <http://www.scottishexecutive.gov.uk/Publications/2002/12/15892/14532>
 59. Quoted in *The Herald*, 8 January 2005.
 60. See H. Miller, 'Realities of Scottish Sectarianism', *Fortnight*, No. 431, December 2004. The founder of NBM was Cara Henderson, friend of victim Mark Scott. The individual convicted of his murder, Jason Campbell, came from a family with Ulster Loyalist paramilitary connections.
 61. 'Tackling Religious Hatred', para 4.15.
 62. See, for Gorrie Scottish Parliament, Official Report 6 September 2001, 2343–2344; for Simpson 25 April 2002, 11303; and for McConnell 7 October 2004, 11132.
 63. See comments of Gorrie on banter: Scottish Parliament Official Report 4 May 2005, 16660–16662; and Cathy Jamieson (Labour) on lack of evidence to link schools with sectarian behaviour: 19 December 2002, 16594.
 64. Interview with J.G. McLean, 5 October 2015. The Rev. Stuart McQuarrie, a Church of Scotland minister and former Labour Councillor in Glasgow has referred to the 'sectarianism industry' needing examples of sectarianism however petty to maintain itself. Interview, 23 July 2015.
 65. See Bob Kernohan's discussion of the 'liberal establishment' in the Church of Scotland in the online journal *Scottish Review*, 30 July 2009.
 66. Scottish Parliament Official Report, 25 April 2002, 11302–11303.
 67. Bruce et al., *Sectarianism*, p. 113.
 68. Kernohan, *Scottish Review*.

69. See Stuart Waiton, 'The New Sectarians' in J. Flint and J. Kelly (eds.), *Bigotry, Football and Scotland*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013 for a critical perspective. The schools and colleges work on the part of NBM continues to the present: Dave Scott, the current public voice of the organisation, articulates their value in engaging young people and getting them to think seriously about the issues involved. Interview with Dave Scott, 22 September 2015.
70. Bruce et al., *Sectarianism*; Rosie, *Sectarian Myth*.
71. Bruce et al., *Sectarianism*, p. 97.
72. L. Paterson and C. Iannelli, 'Religion, social mobility and education in Scotland', *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 57, No. 3 (2006). The census returns of 2001 disclosed little or no difference between Protestants and Catholics in relation to occupation; see M. Rosie, 'The Sectarian Iceberg?', *Scottish Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2015), 328–350.
73. See Tom Devine's criticisms of Bruce in *The Scotsman*, 16 February 2005.
74. NFO Social Research, *Sectarianism in Glasgow—Final Report*. Glasgow City Council, 2003.
75. Rosie, 'Sectarian Iceberg?'.
76. The document is titled 'Sectarianism—still Scotland's Shame?' and is undated.
77. *Scotland on Sunday*, 20 September 2004.
78. Ibid.
79. See Steven, 'Secessionist Politics'.
80. See comments of Ronnie Convery (Cardinal Winning's Press Secretary), and the criticisms of Labour MP Ian Davidson of the way the Church was operating in *Scotland on Sunday* 28 December 2003.
81. See the journalist John MacLeod's discussion of the Catholic middle class in *The Herald*, 11 February 2002; and the report on the Medical Research Council survey that indicated greater Catholic confidence in *The Herald*, 20 October 2003. See also O.D. Edwards, 'Is the Cardinal Anti-Catholic? A Review Essay', *Scottish Affairs*, No. 33 (2000), 1–22.
82. This perspective is most plaintively conveyed in various essays in J. Bradley (ed.), *Celtic-Minded*, Vols. 1 and 2, Glendaruel: Argyll Press, 2004, 2006.
83. It should also be noted that the introduction of a PR voting system at local government elections in Scotland began to impact damagingly on Labour control of several councils by the late 2000s. See I. Macwhirter, *Road to Referendum*, Cargo Publishing, 2013, p. 228.
84. See coverage in *The Herald*, 15 February 2005. However, the Orange Order was a significant dissenting voice.
85. *The Herald*, 15 February 2005.
86. Scottish Catholic Media Office Press Release, 27 November 2006.

87. *Scotland on Sunday*, 14 September 2008.
88. For a study of this election, see J. Curtice et al., *Revolution or Evolution?* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009. Catholic support for the SNP in this election was still below that of Protestants (24% against 29%)—see Chap. 6.
89. For a racy and well-informed account of these dramatic political developments, see Macwhirter, *Road to Referendum*; for a scholarly anatomy of the SNP, see J. Mitchell et al., *The Scottish National Party. Transition to Power*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
90. See the discussions in M. Leith, ‘Governance and Identity in a Devolved Scotland’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (2010); and in G. Hassan, ‘Anatomy of a Scottish Revolution: The Potential of Postnationalist Scotland and the Future of the United Kingdom’, *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 82, No. 3 (2011).
91. *Scottish Review*, 30 July 2009. See also the penetrating discussion of the term ‘sect’ in Hugh McLachlan, ‘Bigotry row misdirected’, *The Scotsman*, 4 January 2012.
92. *Sunday Herald*, 13 November 2011. Dave Scott of NBM has claimed that the SNP provided just enough funding to keep NBM going, but tended to view the organisation with suspicion, partly because Scott had been a Labour Party worker—interview with Dave Scott, 22 September 2015.
93. *Sunday Herald*, 3 February 2008.
94. See discussion in Gallagher, *Illusion*, pp. 135–139.
95. There was a long established pattern of intimidating and aggressive behaviour following Old Firm matches on the part of both sets of fans. In October 2010, for example, a number of threats were made to a referee and his family after the match official had awarded Rangers a penalty in the first Old Firm match of the tempestuous 2010–2011 season. See *Belfast NewsLetter*, 27 October 2010.
96. There had also been another significant intervention by Peter Kearney late in 2010 about alleged hostility to Catholics. This prompted others to allege in turn that the Catholic Church was seeking to divert the spotlight away from the sex abuse scandals that were discrediting it, and on to what it claimed was historic intolerance. This episode had the effect of entrenching the ‘Catholics as victims’ line on one side, and ‘the Catholic Church attempting to foreclose legitimate criticisms’ on the other. At this juncture, it was also reported that an anti-sectarian educational pack endorsed by the Scottish government contained a poem that portrayed the Lanarkshire town of Larkhall as a hotbed of anti-Catholic bigotry, a development that drew an angry response from residents. For Kearney, see *The Herald* 29 November 2010; for responses, see *The Herald*, 30 November 2010 and letters in *The Herald*, 1 December 2010. For the educational

- pack, see *The Herald*, 1 December 2010, and for responses, see letters in *The Herald*, 2 December 2010.
97. For scholarly commentary, see S. Christie, 'The Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Bill—strong on rhetoric but weak on substance?', *Scots Law Times*, 19 August 2011, pp. 185–189.
 99. See J. Curtice, 'The truth is, Scotland is no longer the Protestant country it once was', *The Scotsman*, 31 August 2011.
 100. See M. Kelly, 'SNP will pay heavy price for Churches' loss of faith', *The Scotsman* 6 October 2011; and B. Wilson, 'Let the People Sing', *The Scotsman*, 30 November 2011.
 101. D. McMenemy and A. Poulter, 'An Identity of Two Halves?', *Irish Studies Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2005), 139–150.
 102. See Waiton, 'The New Sectarrians'.
 103. It is interesting to note, especially in the light of his prominence in the 'Yes' campaign, that journalist Iain Macwhirter wrote on the subject of Catholic schools in 2002 that they 'write sectarianism into the very fabric of society by encouraging children to define themselves in terms of their faith, and in a largely secular society where few people go to church this is a dangerous anachronism.' *Sunday Herald*, 8 December 2002.
 104. For Archbishop Tartaglia's re-statement of hard-line views on education and gay marriage at a meeting with First Minister Salmond, see *The Scotsman*, 5 November 2011; see also *The Herald*, 16 December 2012 for a recent statement on shared campuses.
 105. Interview with J.G. MacLean, 5 October 2015; for comment on unfashionableness of Protestantism, see the journalist John MacLeod's column in *The Herald*, 18 February 2002.
 106. See *Sunday Herald* Special Supplement on the Papal visit, 19 September 2010. Tom Devine's contribution to this publication compared the Scottish coverage favourably with that in England which he viewed as dominated by those with a 'militant secularist' agenda.
 107. For some recent scholarly perspectives on the Ulster Protestant working class, see T.P. Burgess and G. Mulvenna (eds.), *The Contested Identities of Ulster Protestants*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. For recent fictional treatments of Glasgow working-class Loyalists, see R. Sieffert, *The Walk Home*. London: Virago, 2014; and A. Clements, *Rogue Nation*. Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2010.

‘Indyref’, Identity Politics, and the Union in Question

Abstract This chapter examines the book’s theme in the period of the long independence referendum campaign and final vote on 18 September 2014. It also considers subsequent political developments, in particular the 2015 general election and the SNP’s achievement of winning 56 out of 59 Scottish seats. It discusses changes in political behaviour in the Catholic community, the divisions that have crystallised among Protestants, and the political effects of the growth of the ‘No Religion’ category in Scottish life. It examines the continuing significance of Irish influences in west-central Scotland, and the latest report into the question of sectarianism. It argues that the Labour Party, in attempting to revive its fortunes, needs to challenge the prevailing identity politics and the narratives and assumptions around them.

1

On 18 September 2014, in an historic Referendum, the Scottish people were asked to vote Yes or No to the question ‘Should Scotland be an Independent Country?’ Over 55% said ‘No’, and Scotland thus remains within the UK. The turnout was close to 85% of those entitled to vote, which included 16- and 17-year-olds.

The Referendum, or ‘Indyref’, affected Scotland profoundly, on account of not only the significance of such a constitutional decision but also the experience of a long and intense campaign that compelled people to examine their hopes, fears, identities, loyalties, and obligations. In the

UK general election of May 2015, the scale of the political change undergone by Scotland was evident in the return of the SNP for 56 out of 59 seats. The hitherto dominant Labour Party—in Westminster terms—was reduced to a single seat. Although the independence option had been rejected in 2014, the political momentum had swung behind the SNP. The Nationalists were able to build on the remarkable campaigning energy of the ‘Yes’ side during ‘Indyref’, increase its party membership to over 100,000, and capitalise especially on the Labour Party’s loss of credibility in its own heartlands, a development that had been demonstrated both in the 2011 Scottish Parliament election and in the Referendum itself. The few areas that voted ‘Yes’ in 2014 were all former Labour fiefdoms: they included North Lanarkshire, West Dunbartonshire, Dundee, and—crucially—the city of Glasgow and all the electoral wards in it.

In February 2015, anticipating the SNP ‘tsunami’ about which he was to write an ‘instant’ book, the political journalist Iain Macwhirter proclaimed that nationalism was replacing class as ‘the driving force’ in Scottish politics in those former Labour strongholds where the social structures were being transformed in post-industrial times. ‘The independence referendum’, Macwhirter reflected, ‘was a transformative event that drew a line under a century of working class industrial politics in Scotland’.¹ Commentators like Macwhirter were struck by the extent to which the SNP had appropriated the socialist or social democratic appeal of Labour in its heyday and blended it with an overarching concept of a new Scotland making its own future unfettered by the broader politics and distinct agendas of the UK state. In some ways, academics had picked up on these shifts earlier.² On the eve of the 2015 election, the journalist Alex Massie observed that ‘Nationalism is our new secular religion’, and that ‘Identity politics defeats all comers’.³

The ‘Yes’ campaign had indeed tapped into the widespread desire for a different kind of future for Scotland and had skilfully encouraged voters to think along the lines of the country they would wish to see, rather than the realities of their present circumstances.⁴ It became all the easier from this angle to convince people that the ‘No’ campaign, with its stress on the risks of breaking away from the Union, had nothing positive to offer and was in effect ‘Project Fear’.⁵ Moreover, at times it did appear that ‘Better Together’ (the official ‘No’ campaign name) was relying on voters exercising caution and eschewing sentiment; only the late intervention by former Prime Minister Gordon Brown injected passion and positivity into the arguments for maintaining the Union.⁶ Following the Referendum,

it is conceivable that sizeable numbers of 'No' voters—perhaps in many cases reluctant 'Nos'—moved in a way more in line with the optimistic spirit that animated at least part of the 'Yes' campaign and the SNP's post-Referendum bounce. Such is the political importance of moods, trends, and notions of 'historic moments' and 'turning points' that people do not wish to miss out on or be out of step with.

For many former Labour voters, there was also a strong perception of Westminster politics no longer working in their interests and a commensurate sense that independence could not damage further, and might even improve, their prospects. A pronounced antipathy to the Conservative Party continued to hold popular sway, and repudiation of the 'No' campaign was undoubtedly heavily influenced by the Tories' involvement in it. The Labour Party was duly excoriated for its willingness to consort with the Tories in 'Better Together'.

Evidence also suggests that the 'Yes' vote was disproportionately Catholic: a trusted poll in the wake of the Referendum indicated that 57% of Catholics voted 'Yes'.⁷ In the months leading up to the vote, close observers of Catholic political behaviour and prominent lay Catholics such as Tom Devine and Tom Gallagher correctly predicted that they would be the most pro-independence religious group.⁸ The Catholic 'Yes' figure contrasted with only 41% of self-identifying Protestants.⁹ Discussion of religious identity and the constitutional question in Scotland was relatively muted during the Referendum campaign, and academic contributors generally sought to discount it as a significant factor in voting either 'Yes' or 'No'.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the disparity between Catholic and Protestant levels of support for independence merits further explanation; nor, it might be argued, can 'Indyref' be separated from the way the issue of sectarianism had impacted on the new devolved Scotland, and indeed continued to be a source of dispute and investigation up to and beyond the Referendum poll.

2

Disproportionate support for 'Yes' in the Referendum and large-scale desertion of Labour in the 2015 election have radically altered the political profile of the Catholic community in Scotland. The causes may be said to amount to a mixture of disillusionment with Labour, the appeal of the SNP's message, growing community self-confidence, the part played by a more politically interventionist church that was plunged into crisis, the continuing pertinence of Irish cultural influences, and the impact of Scotland's self-examination around the question of sectarianism.

The Referendum campaign provided clear evidence that the warnings Labour politicians had previously been in the habit of issuing about the dangers of independence to Catholics were no longer effective. The SNP as a party had worked hard to dispel any notion of deep-lying anti-Catholicism, and the public attention given to sectarianism had created a climate in which old prejudices could find no political breathing space. The best oratorical efforts of the colourful figure of George Galloway to convince Catholics that an independent Scotland would release bigoted demons to hound them swayed few.¹¹ Galloway had broken with the Labour Party during the Blair years; his message was an ‘Old Labour’ one of workers’ solidarity throughout Britain. Labour stalwarts in Scotland such as Brian Wilson and John Reid who shared, with Galloway, a special relationship with the Catholic community through their Celtic FC connections, also stressed the same theme to little avail. Wilson had in fact been a strong opponent of Labour’s initial devolution departure in the 1970s, and he remained sceptical about its benefits in practice after 1999. The Referendum may have re-affirmed his fears about the impact of devolution on the prospects of broad and cohesive progressive politics in Britain, and the likelihood of devolution bringing constitutional uncertainty and identity squabbles to the forefront of politics at the expense of urgent issues of social reform.

Certainly, in retrospect, Labour paid a heavy price for failing to balance de-centralisation of various responsibilities with a clear statement of the value of remaining a UK with common rights, benefits, and entitlements. As Aughey has argued, devolution pushed the balance between the ‘contract’ aspect of the way the Union worked—the bargaining between its different nations, regions, and interests—and the ‘solidarity’ aspect—mutual support and risk sharing—precariously towards the former.¹² Or, to follow the eminent historian of the construction of British identity, Linda Colley, the UK as ‘a composite state’ has had to operate on two levels—acknowledging the distinctiveness of the separate nations and regions and sustaining an overall sense of belonging and allegiance—and in recent times it has failed to give the attention required to the whole as well as the parts.¹³

Between 1999 and 2007, Labour in Scotland failed to demonstrate convincingly enough the value of having devolved powers within a larger polity, and was not helped by the Blair government’s failure to follow through the constitutional reforms of their early days with joined up thinking around the relationship between the devolved seats of power and the centre. The stakes, with hindsight, were high: either devolution was

proved quickly to bring ‘the best of both worlds’, or Scots would increasingly consider whether the further step to independence represented a better bet. The most outspoken opponent of devolution in the 1970s, Tam Dalyell, who coined the analogy of a ‘motorway without exits’, felt duly vindicated in 2014.¹⁴

The starkness of the choice faced by Scots in 2014 also ensured that previously fluid, tangled, and pluralist concepts of national identity and belonging became more sharply realised, simplified, and indeed polarised. Had there been a third option on the ballot paper—and for some time it looked possible that a stronger devolution scheme might also be on offer—then the subsequent debate may not have revolved around the emotive question of ‘showing faith in Scotland’ or ‘saving the Union’ to such an extent. The term ‘Unionist’ had never been one the Labour Party in Scotland had made any significant use of, save where the votes of Orange Order-influenced Protestants were concerned. The Party recognised its association with Orangeism and Ulster Loyalism, not to mention the Conservatives, and consequently avoided it where it could. Popular Unionism in Scotland, as discussed in the first chapter, had always carried sectarian baggage and derived from the impact of the Irish national question.¹⁵

It proved difficult for the ‘No’ campaign in the Referendum to avoid ownership of the ‘Unionist’ label, and the ‘Yes’ campaign certainly made sure that the term was common currency in the debate. Significantly, following the Referendum and his election as Scottish Labour leader in succession to Johann Lamont, Jim Murphy moved quickly to disavow the ‘Unionist’ label as if conscious of the damage it had done to the ‘No’ campaign’s cause among the Catholic community from which he himself came. ‘As a family of Irish Catholic immigrants we are not Unionists’, stated Murphy, going on to distinguish between the ‘Conservative and Unionist tradition’ and the trade unionism and ‘socialist solidarity tradition’ of the Labour Party.¹⁶ Murphy had earlier pledged that he would scrap the SNP’s football legislation were he to become First Minister, a clear pitch for support from those, mainly Celtic fans like himself, who resented the law being applied to songs about the ‘Irish struggle’.¹⁷

For younger Catholics in Scotland’s industrial wastelands, the recent rise of an Irish cultural profile around issues such as a proposed Famine memorial in the city of Glasgow further diluted any sense of broader British affinity. It was perhaps telling that the main political figure behind plans for the memorial was Fergal Dalton, a native of Dublin who became an SNP councillor on moving to Glasgow.¹⁸ Alex Salmond had long been enamoured of the

historical example of Irish Nationalist leader Charles Stewart Parnell, and used Parnell's famous injunction about no man having the right to halt the march of a nation at every opportunity.¹⁹ Such flourishes were designed to signal the unstoppable momentum and historical inevitability of independence, and to place Scottish Nationalism in a narrative of resistance to the British State that would appeal to a community conscious of its Irish roots. The parallels between 'Indyref' Scotland and the 1916 generation in Ireland were to say the least imprecise, but there was enough to permit romantic licence and to spur the imagination of young people hungry for change.²⁰ The journalist and academic Peter Geoghegan's Referendum trip to the 'Little Ireland' of Coatbridge involved him in discussion with representatives of the Irish Republican organisation, *Cairde na hÉireann*, amidst images of IRA hunger striker Bobby Sands and Scottish-born leader of the 1916 Easter Rising, James Connolly.²¹

The symbolism of the latter has become particularly potent. Connolly indeed has become a Che Guevara cult figure among the politically conscious young Catholics of Irish descent and the Celtic supporters' 'Ultras' group, the self-styled 'Green Brigade'. The fashionableness of this 'rebel culture' among such groups has been highlighted by the academic Tom Gallagher who sees its growth as the result of a vacuum left by the traditional community leaders of old, in particular the Catholic Church itself.²² As 'Nil By Mouth's' current organiser Dave Scott points out, there is now a pronounced tendency among young Catholics to derive political inspiration from those, like Connolly, who can be said to have combined socialism and nationalism in their ideology, rather than the heroes of the Scottish socialist past such as Keir Hardie, John Wheatley, and Jimmy Maxton.²³ Worship of Connolly leads to an alignment of both Irish and Scottish 'freedom' narratives, something that perhaps explains the support given by leading SNP figure, former Justice minister Kenny MacAskill to the proposal that there should be a statue erected to Connolly in Edinburgh, the city of his birth,²⁴ and a Glasgow City Council initiative to commemorate the Easter Rising.²⁵ It also leads to the disparagement of all things British, including the history of the Labour movement to which Scotland—and its Irish migrants—contributed so much. Nor does it appear to concern the 'Green Brigade' and others that Connolly's socialism found no expression in an independent Ireland, and was never likely to be given the strength of the Catholic Church, the prevailing rural conservatism of the country, and the relative absence of an industrial proletariat outside of the north-east where it was fiercely pro-British. For the Connollyites, their reverence

for his prospectus is all the stronger for it never having been tested. Like Connolly in the end, moreover, it is likely that Nationalism counts for more than socialism on the part of those extolling his memory; St Patrick's Day means more to the 'Green Brigade' than May Day.²⁶

Irish Nationalist and Republican sympathies had of course long been a characteristic of parts of the Catholic community in Scotland. However, such sympathies had not prevented the emergence of the strong Catholic–Labour alliance discussed in the first chapter, within the political context of the UK State, or the career achievements at government level of someone like John Reid, the former Celtic Chairman who was known to sing a 'rebel song' in convivial surroundings.²⁷ By the Referendum, such quirks were being smoothed out and the complexities of identity were being left behind in accordance with an anti-British narrative. The 'Green Brigade' had by this time staged controversial and well-publicised demonstrations against the wearing of the poppy on the Celtic shirt, and displayed banners with pointed political messages featuring Bobby Sands and Scotland's 'Braveheart', William Wallace.²⁸ The 'Green Brigade' was unhappy about the SNP's football legislation, but it chose to use the language and imagery of Celtic Nationalism to make its protest. For these Celtic supporters, and for Irish Republican sympathisers in Scotland, it was of paramount importance to distinguish the 'Irish struggle' from sectarianism and to strengthen the perception carefully fostered since MacMillan's intervention of 1999 that the latter was a 'Protestant problem' in Scotland. The more this was believed to be the case then the more its association with pro-Union and pro-British sentiment would discredit those causes.

It was something of an irony that MacMillan himself came to deplore what he, like Gallagher, saw as an essentially gimmicky form of political posturing that carried quasi-secularist condemnations of the Catholic Church and fed into a growing refusal to conform to Church teachings. Yet the 'Green Brigade', and the Irish Republican 'politicos' of Coatbridge and beyond are hardly post-Catholic. They may have stopped following the Church's line on issues such as gay marriage, but their tribal or cultural Catholic identity has remained intact. Indeed, one of the outcomes of the intense public debate around sectarianism in Scotland since the end of the twentieth century has been the alertness of the Catholic antennae when it came to perceived slights or attacks based on religion. One of the research findings of the Advisory Group tasked by the SNP government to report on how to tackle sectarianism was that there remained 'acute sensitivity in the West of Scotland Catholic community'.²⁹ No spokesperson

for Irish Republican or Irish heritage groups in Scotland has made any criticism of Catholic schools in the manner of humanist and secular campaigners such as Garry Otton and the late Norman Bonney; or, indeed, like important social commentators in Ireland itself.³⁰ No common front around humanist or secular values has been constructed involving any significant post-Catholic representation. The James Connolly-inspired young Catholics, like the Church itself, still take the view that calls for an end to separate schooling are evidence of old-fashioned anti-Catholic bigotry, and the schools may indeed be said to be a major factor in maintaining a tribal or cultural Catholic identity. It is fair to speculate that if the SNP had not taken great pains to proclaim support for Catholic schools and had not shown the Catholic Church such lavish courtesy, then no amount of anti-austerity and left-leaning policies would have lured the Catholic vote from Labour so dramatically.

Rather it seems the case that the tempo of the Catholic Church's political activity has fallen on account of the sheer volume of scandal that has been visited upon it, and a vacuum of a sort has indeed been created. The public disgrace of Cardinal Keith O'Brien in 2013 was a scandal too far for the Church; moreover, O'Brien's admissions of homosexual conduct following his strident opposition to gay equality issues laid the Church open to the charge of hypocrisy and have made it more difficult for the Church to get a hearing, at least on moral questions, than in the heyday of Cardinal Winning. While there have been opportunities for the kind of inter-denominational co-operation against secularism in political lobbying terms that has been a feature of other democracies,³¹ the Catholic Church's insistence on seeing secularist attacks on their schools as more evidence of 'Protestant Scotland's' supposed anti-Catholic nature has largely inhibited this. The sectarianism debate might have signalled to the Catholic Church and to Catholics, faithful or cultural, that Scotland was changing, yet its capacity simultaneously to replenish a deeply rooted sense of grievance has ensured that suspiciousness and defensiveness continue to co-exist with rising expectations among both clerical and lay constituencies. For a time it looked as if a purposeful church that was geared to exploiting the new political world of Scotland after 1999 would be able to manage the restless identity politics that became such a feature of the early days of devolution. This now looks less likely, although Church and community would not appear to be far apart on the question of the future being an independent Scotland rather than a reformed and re-vivified Union.³²

3

In a communication to members ahead of local elections in 2012, the Grand Secretary and Most Worthy Grand Master of the Grand Orange Lodge of Scotland warned of the dangers of Scottish independence and the undoing of the benefits that had flowed from the Glorious Revolution of 1688. The letter signalled the Order's readiness to campaign tirelessly in favour of the Union: 'What William III created and his successors defended is in crisis if we, our families and loyal supporters fail to defend our basic beliefs.' It ended by urging all to turn out and vote for parties and candidates opposed to independence before adding: 'However, the largest party who [sic] have declared their whole hearted support for the Union is the Labour Party.'³³

This heavy hint to support Labour was undoubtedly occasioned by pragmatic political calculation rather than ideological affinity. Nevertheless, it might be said to have acknowledged first, the extent to which even Orange Order members had habitually voted Labour for some time regardless of the disapproval this had once aroused on the part of Lodge Officials³⁴; and second, recognition that in the circumstances of Scotland in 2012 only the Labour Party looked capable of stemming the SNP tide. In fact, the role of the Labour movement in all its political, industrial, and cultural dimensions had been the cornerstone of the Union since at least the Second World War. As observed previously, the effectiveness of this Labour contribution related to the avoidance of the flag-waving popular Unionist enthusiasm typified by the Orange Order, and the Order had little choice but to tailor its advice to suit the times: 'members have to realise this isn't Northern Ireland and we don't have the same clout in the Scottish context', an Order source was reported as saying a year later.³⁵

The Order could not but be aware of the socio-economic problems of those areas where its strength was concentrated, or of the hope, however vaguely defined, that the idea of independence appeared to some to offer.³⁶ A high-ranking Orange official admitted, following the Referendum, that the organisation had lost members who were sufficiently won over to the independence cause to break with the Order, and that some families were split.³⁷ It should not be forgotten, in this respect, that one of the most powerful motivations for joining the Orange Order from the organisation's earliest days in Scotland was family and cultural ties with Ulster. The desire to support Protestant Ulster during the 'Troubles' may well have sustained Orangeism in Scotland more than has been realised, and the

effect of peace coming to Northern Ireland may equally have been viewed by some as releasing them from a sense of obligation. In addition, as Colin Kidd has pointed out, Scottish Unionism was for most of the twentieth century very little concerned with the Union with England which was simply taken for granted.³⁸ Indeed, popular Unionist sentiment in Scotland was more than capable of accommodating hostility to England.

For those who remained members, or under the sway of the Orange Order, the predicament of Loyalists in Northern Ireland, particularly those in depressed working-class areas like their own, still very much mattered. The ‘hands across the water’ sense of solidarity remained powerful in Orange/Loyalist circles in the west of Scotland and it mirrored the strong Republican allegiances of places like Coatbridge. In 2012, indeed, an exhibition entitled ‘Legacy’ by Glasgow artist Roderick Buchanan at the Scottish National Portrait Gallery highlighted the enduring dedication of these communities, through the study of respective flute bands, to maintaining their Ulster and Irish links and identities and their regular demonstrations of support in Northern Ireland itself. This was a facet of contemporary Scotland that invited awkward questions in relation to the independence project.³⁹

For the Unionist community in Northern Ireland, Scotland has long been the strongest social and cultural link in the British chain, the part of the British ‘family’ to which they have felt most emotional pull.⁴⁰ The idea of Scotland breaking away from the family, and perhaps breaking up the family in the process, filled Unionists with dread: it laid bare the prospect of a diminished UK within which their identity and their hopes and fears would be far less congenially accommodated and recognised. Scotland may not have been the reservoir of sympathy that Unionists liked to imagine; yet it was the part of the UK that was most familiar with, and comprehending of, Ulster’s tensions and enduring preoccupations. Had Scotland voted ‘Yes’, the pressures on Unionism politically would have been intense: it would likely have faced a re-energised campaign for Irish unity, and there may even have been splits among Unionists themselves around the question of finding a role in a ‘rump UK’ or pursuing an independent Northern Ireland. A ‘Yes’ vote would also have effectively terminated the prospect of the ‘Union State’ project launched at the end of the twentieth century leading to a civic unionist future and the eclipse of ethnic fractiousness.

There were attempts by some Unionist politicians in Northern Ireland to intervene in the ‘Indyref’ campaign, but the alarmist nature of many

of their comments played badly in the Scottish media, and the 'No' side made it clear that they did not need or welcome such assistance.⁴¹ This was the message that was also relayed to the Orange Order, and the latter played no part in the 'Better Together' organisation, setting up instead their own 'British Together' campaign and spending in total, according to the Electoral Commission, £47,072. In the view of Order member and Rangers supporters' spokesman Mark Dingwall, 'British Together' was effective in their own constituencies, but 'a little old-fashioned and preaching to the converted'.⁴² The Order's 'Proud to be Scottish, Proud to be British' message attempted to counter the Nationalist equation of British with 'English' and 'Westminster', but 'Better Together' was reluctant to make too much of the idea of pride in Britishness, thus eschewing any appeal to more emotional notions such as shared history and institutions, collective sacrifices and achievements, identity and belonging. While academic studies of identity in Scotland have traced a notable decline in the popularity of British identity since the 1970s, evidence remains of the significance of some form of dual 'Scottish-British' identity.⁴³ The outcome of the Referendum might have reflected the endurance of Britishness as a meaningful factor in many people's lives with reluctance to lose or impair certain cultural connections and bonds as strong a motivation for a 'No' vote as fear of damaging economic consequences in the event of independence. 'Better Together' should perhaps have argued more vigorously in favour of the virtues of dual or indeed multiple identities, although it has to be kept in mind that the Yes/No nature of the question unavoidably encouraged voters to make an either/or choice between 'Scottish' and 'British'. Indeed, the Referendum presented a severe challenge to the historic co-mingling of unionist and nationalist feelings and outlook. Where for so long Unionism and Nationalism took on capital 'U' or 'N' characteristics in Ireland, and were viewed as binary opposites, Northern Ireland actually appeared more 'post-nationalist' than Scotland in 2014.⁴⁴

Comparisons between Scotland and Northern Ireland nonetheless revealed much in common between those working-class Protestants in Scotland as spoken for by the Orange Order, who resented the dismissive treatment accorded to them by the official 'No' campaign,⁴⁵ and those Ulster Protestants who perceived the peace process to have brought little positive benefit for them. In both constituencies, there was a profound sense of 'losing out' or being 'left behind' whether in terms of territory, recognition, cultural and political capital, identity matters, or a range of social and economic disadvantages.⁴⁶

In this light, the Orange Order's pro-Union parade in Edinburgh a week before the Referendum vote was a show of defiance on several levels. The march took place in spite of the best efforts of people connected to 'Better Together' to stop it for fear of it being counter-productive⁴⁷; the Catholic swing to the 'Yes' side had become apparent and an Orange demonstration was considered likely to accelerate the trend, as well as running the risk of alienating other undecided voters.⁴⁸ The Order thus ignored the pressure and all the advice coming from the 'political establishment' on their side of the question. Secondly, the march proved once again that the Order still had the capacity to bring many thousands on to the streets and still was part of the social fabric of the country in spite of the tendency on the part of the Scottish media to depict it as belonging to the past and as an irrelevance in today's Scotland.⁴⁹ The march was the only mass outdoor event to take place in support of the 'No' side. Thirdly, the march was billed as a 'Great Demonstration of British Pride' and injected an unapologetic note of pro-British sentiment into a campaign in which it had hitherto been largely absent. Fourthly, the Edinburgh event risked the Referendum choice being mixed up in people's minds with the topic of sectarianism, given the level of the media attention of previous years and the blame many were inclined to apportion to the Order. Indeed, in 2012, the SNP government had set up an 'Advisory Group on Tackling Sectarianism in Scotland' which was to go on to research issues such as parades and to keep the matter very much in the public realm. The work of this group will be discussed below.

It is impossible to state with any certainty the impact of the Order's intervention at such a critical juncture. Not surprisingly, the Order itself felt that it did much to boost pro-Union morale. 'I think the parade in Edinburgh swayed the vote. That and Gordon Brown', commented one Orangeman to Peter Geoghegan.⁵⁰ This assessment certainly needs to be taken with caution, although it is notable that both of these interventions occurred near the end of the campaign when the polls had narrowed and there were still a crucial number of undecided voters, and both could be said to have encouraged more favourable reflections on the virtues of the Union and Britishness, if from very different standpoints. Brown's re-affirmation of the social solidarity aspect of the Union undoubtedly resonated much more widely, but it needs to be remembered that the prevention of more working-class, normally Labour-voting people plumping for 'Yes' was probably a complicated matter that involved both bread *and* circuses. There are many Scotlands, and the one where the Orange Order was still a

presence may have resisted the blandishments of the independence project in sufficient numbers to have made an important difference. One senior Orange official took the view that their campaign was a valuable exercise in 'damage limitation', and certainly prevented further inroads being made by the 'Yes' side.⁵¹ Iain Macwhirter's point, made later in 2014, about Scottish nationalism being held in check in the past by the Labour Party and the Orange Order may have been more pertinent to the Scotland of the Referendum than he believed.⁵² The Brown and Orange interventions could be interpreted as triggering a last gasp of popularly rooted pro-Union sentiment soon to be swept aside by a rampant SNP confident that history was on its side and sure to deliver next time round. Nevertheless, history will still record that the Union was given another chance, and comparable constitutional showdowns in places such as Canada warn against any glib notion of independence being inevitable.

Discussion of the Protestant community of west-central Scotland cannot neglect popular cultural phenomena such as football. Just as the political climate influenced the behaviour of some Celtic supporters, so there should be due acknowledgement of the coincidence between 'Indyref' and the subsequent SNP surge of the 2012–2015 period and the crash of Rangers, first into administration in 2012, then liquidation, then re-emergence under new ownership in the bottom tier of the Scottish game. This catastrophic series of events stemmed from the financial recklessness of club owner Sir David Murray in the 2000s, and the fraudulent conduct of the club's affairs by Murray's successor, Craig Whyte. The huge support base of the club was traumatised, and the relentlessly hostile response of the Scottish media and opposition clubs and fans seemed to give rise to either deep embarrassment or outright defiance.⁵³ Despite notions held by some Celtic fans, and others, of Rangers remaining Scotland's 'establishment' club, the reality was that they found no sympathy or assistance at any significant governmental or civic level, and became regarded in several quarters as sporting 'pariahs' not least on account of their traditional pro-Union image. The changing stature of the club in Scottish life said something about the passing of an idea of Scotland that celebrated its place within the context of Union and indeed Empire and Commonwealth.⁵⁴ In the circumstances of twenty-first-century Scotland, the fervent singing of 'God Save the Queen' and 'Rule Britannia' at Ibrox strikes an incongruous note. The 'Financial Times' journalist John McDermott has referred to Rangers as 'a faded emblem of a faltering belief in the UK'.⁵⁵

If anything, the supporters' culture became more stridently Unionist during the crisis years with fans adding abusive songs about Alex Salmond and independence to their repertoire. There were pro-independence fans of the club,⁵⁶ and there had always been SNP Rangers fans, although their voices could not be heard in the songs and chants. Equally, there were of course many anti-independence supporters of other Scottish teams, including Celtic. However, Rangers were unique in the Unionist fervour of their vociferous fans and in the tendency of some of their fans to relate their club's fall to what they saw as broader forces hostile to its Unionist ethos. As with the Orange Order, it is conceivable that the defiance many fans were moved to display at their club's lowest ebb, and the British Loyalist expression of it, contributed to the 'damage limitation' exercise among certain groups in respect of the Referendum vote. The Rangers fan base has remained extensive, although clearly there is a significant overlap with the 'Orange' constituency. A 'No' vote may also have carried an element of protest over the way sectarianism controversies in Scottish public life had often singled out people like them for blame, and placed undue weight on the singing of crude sectarian songs in a football context, notwithstanding the fact that such 'blame games' were occurring long before the SNP came to power and long before the Referendum became a political reality.⁵⁷

Rangers remain troubled by off-field issues but look set to play at the top level again soon. If so, it will be a reflection of their supporters' determination to see the club regain that status. The club is thus likely to remain a potent pro-Union symbol. In the light of the Catholic 'Yes' vote and the many signs of pro-independence among Celtic fans close to the Referendum, the chances of the pro-Union sentiment that is left in Scotland becoming increasingly sectarianised are high. The eclipse of class politics has entailed a heightened Britishness among a section of Protestants to match the heightened anti-Britishness on the part of some Catholics. Previously, such sentiment was not as politically loaded as today's constitutional politics in Scotland has at least potentially made it.

Moreover, such is the continuing sense of identification on the part of Orange and Republican organisations and bands, and Old Firm fans, with Irish political and cultural causes that the continuance of peace in Northern Ireland may be a significant variable in the identity politics and the constitutional deliberations to come in Scotland. 'Nil By Mouth' spokesperson Dave Scott has referred to the way Scotland acts as 'an echo chamber' for what happens across the North Channel.⁵⁸ In late 2012, early

2013, a series of Loyalist protests in Northern Ireland over the decision of the Belfast City Council to limit the flying of the Union flag over City Hall threatened to de-rail the peace, and the political fall-out included Loyalist demonstrations outside City Chambers in Glasgow in support of the flying of the Union flag there.⁵⁹ Individuals claiming to be connected to Dissident Irish Republicanism were recently convicted in Scotland of plotting to murder former Ulster Loyalist paramilitary leader Johnny Adair who re-located to Scotland in the early 2000s. Dissident republicans indeed pose an ongoing paramilitary threat and they, like the Provisional IRA before them, do not care about the impact of their violence on the social fabric of the UK. One of those convicted in the Adair case was reported—chillingly—as saying that he wished ‘to get a war started’.⁶⁰

Examination of changing Catholic political behaviour has suggested the salience of a category that might be labelled ‘cultural’ rather than devout in relation to religious identity and observance. Consideration of the Protestant part of Scotland’s contemporary religious landscape does not so readily permit the use of such a concept. In the 2011 census, the largest category in relation to religion was actually comprised of those who claimed to be of ‘no religion’, 37%. Those identifying as Church of Scotland came to 32%, and Roman Catholics 16%.⁶¹ A social attitudes survey from the same year found that over half of the adult Scottish population had no religion.⁶² Given that secularisation is widely agreed to have weakened Protestant church membership and attendance significantly earlier than that of the Catholic Church,⁶³ and in the light of the relative stability of the Catholic figure as a percentage of the Scottish population, and considering the higher proportion of those with ‘no religion’ being mainly from the east of the country where Catholic numbers are relatively low,⁶⁴ it is reasonable to suggest that the great majority of the ‘no religion’ category come from a Protestant background or nominally Protestant background. Such people appear in general to have repudiated any kind of religious label, and would not be motivated to retain the kind of tribal or cultural qualification that it has been argued many Catholics these days tend to do. The cultural—and perhaps in many cases—political distance between such ex-Protestants and those who still value a Protestant identity is considerably wider than that occasioned by differences between Catholics. If there is still a Protestant ‘community’ in Scotland, it is a deeply fragmented one and it carries a weaker sense of collective purpose. Where the Church, or Churches, and their ancillary organisations such as the ‘Boys Brigade’ and Sunday Schools with their activities, picnics, trips,

and camps used to provide the elements of such a sense of community, there is only a shadow of such social infrastructure today. In the course of his engagement with young people, Dave Scott has been struck by how tentatively, if at all, those who, in objective terms, are from a Protestant background actually identify as Protestants.⁶⁵ This points to a dramatic erosion even of the popular cultural knowledge of Scotland's Protestant history that was evident as recently as a generation ago: the role of figures such as John Knox, of missionaries like David Livingstone and Mary Slessor, of the contribution of the Kirk to education, local government, and civic life, and of the fanaticism and sacrifices of the Covenanters.

In terms of the growth of a 'No Religion' constituency at the expense of mainstream Protestant denominations, Scotland thus appears to share the experience of other European countries such as the Netherlands.⁶⁶ Politically, as in such other democracies, Scotland's 'No Religion' or 'Post Religion' constituency appears to pursue a left of centre line. It is people such as this who have become disillusioned with the Labour Party and have been alienated by issues such as the Iraq war, and have shifted support to the SNP, or indeed have been attracted by the SNP—as a party without such baggage—into political activity.⁶⁷ This may help explain why the SNP has been pressured into taking a more left of centre approach. In addition, the appeal of independence as marking a new radical departure for Scotland leaving such matters as sectarianism in the past is a powerful one for those who see religion and religious identity as problematic. While their outlook can be described as secular, their inclination is to concur with those analyses of sectarianism which stress anti-Catholicism as the main driving force, and to shake off emphatically the Protestant associations of their past. Thus, while those defining themselves as 'No Religion' may wish for the day that all children can be educated together, their sensitivity over being 'implicated' in what is viewed as past wrongs generally prevents them joining with the militant secularism identified as such a threat by Catholic contributors to debates in this area such as Tom Devine and Tom Gallagher. The dedicated secularists in the real sense of the term remain a relatively small minority in Scotland.

In the Referendum, those of 'No Religion' voted 'Yes' by 54–46%.⁶⁸ This made them the most pro-Yes group after the Catholics. If it is correct to call those of no religion predominantly ex-Protestants of some kind, then the discrepancy between their position on Scotland's future and that of Church of Scotland identifiers (59% 'No') is striking. Rosie has stressed that we have to factor age into any calculation of this kind, and it is certainly the case that the Church of Scotland profile is increasingly an

elderly one.⁶⁹ Nevertheless, it cannot be assumed that religious identity did not play a part in people's choices and that a 'No' vote was simply down to the reluctance of people to experience change at a particular time of life.⁷⁰ For a long time, notwithstanding the pro-devolution weight of opinion in the Church of Scotland, the Kirk had nonetheless been happy to go along with the idea that its annual Assembly functioned as a surrogate deliberative gathering in the name of the nation. With the advent of a Scottish Parliament, there was thus something of a diminishing of the Kirk's national public role; many members may have feared that independence would only further weaken this role and even revise the Church's 'national' status itself. The symbolism of the 'established Church' was still significant to many, and it was a product of, and it was bound to, the Union.⁷¹ Moreover, the 'Church of Scotland' category undoubtedly contained many for whom the actual Church connection was no longer meaningful but for whom a Protestant identity may still very much have been.

The part played by secularisation in the decline of British identity, vis-à-vis its erosion of a once thriving Protestantism, has yet to be fully explored,⁷² but there are indications from the Scottish experience of recent years that Linda Colley's seminal thesis concerning the historic pillars of British identity has compelling contemporary relevance: Protestants are still far more likely, relative to other faiths and those of no faith, to feel British in Scotland.⁷³ Significantly, the 'No Religion' camp appears to be shunning even the secular arguments for the retention of the Union; it was not fashionable to relate 'Scotland's Choice' to a British or UK future in 2014, and the 'civic canopy' role played by Britishness in multi-cultural England has been identified as Scottishness in Scotland,⁷⁴ a reflection of the belief that broader concepts of civic nationalism characterise today's Scotland rather than capital 'N' Nationalism of an ethnically exclusivist or chauvinistic variety.⁷⁵ The Labour Party and other pro-Union parties faced an uphill task in convincing sufficient people of the danger of the enduring tendencies in Scotland towards a narrower Nationalism; complaints about online abuse of a xenophobic and quasi-fascist sort on the part of 'CyberNats' could not stem the pro-SNP tide in the wake of the Referendum.⁷⁶

4

The Advisory Group set up by the Scottish government in 2012 to inquire into sectarianism in Scotland and how to tackle it duly reported in 2015. The main report was accompanied by a number of other ones on public

attitudes, on marches and parades, and on community experiences and perceptions.⁷⁷ The Chair of the group was a Northern Irish academic, Duncan Morrow, which might have led some to assume that the obvious connections around the subject between Scotland and Northern Ireland were being acknowledged. Morrow was reported as saying in 2013 that Scotland was ‘in denial’ about sectarianism,⁷⁸ a curious observation in the light of the way the subject had been endlessly debated, scrutinised, legislated around, and fuelled by a media that apparently could not highlight the issue, and moralise about it, enough. If there was denial, then it surely related to the exclusion of the Irish and Ulster historical connections and contemporary interactions from the discussion, something typified by the SNP government’s legislation of 2012.

Following publication of the Group’s report, Morrow preferred to stress the limits of any comparisons between Scotland and Northern Ireland.⁷⁹ In the report itself, there was no serious exploration of the continuing relevance of Irish-shaped allegiances, identities, and outlooks in Scotland, despite the many references made to Orange Order and Irish Republican marches, and to the Irish content of football songs. The research findings did confirm ‘the emergence of a “loyalist” working class more distinct from the secular and Protestant mainstream of Scottish society than Catholics’,⁸⁰ yet declined to explore the comparison between this social group and what might be seen as its counterpart in Northern Ireland. In their written evidence to the Justice Committee of the Scottish Parliament in 2011, the Association of Chief Police Officers in Scotland stressed that ‘the greater driver’ of sectarian behaviour in Scotland was ‘Irish loyalist/republican *political* prejudice’.⁸¹ There seems little excuse for the Advisory Group’s failure to weigh up such advice seriously, especially since, as will be stressed below, the relatively nuanced definition of sectarianism in their report embraced the role of such political factors.

Notwithstanding his commitment to integrated education in Northern Ireland, Morrow appears not to have steered his group towards consideration of the experience of integrated schools there and what lessons might have been drawn for Scotland. Indeed, the group’s interim report concluded bluntly that its members were of the view that sectarianism did not stem from denominational schools and that closing them would not eradicate the problem.⁸² While a number of recommendations in favour of the sharing of ‘classes and facilities’ between schools were made, the thrust of the section on education was simply to encourage schools and local authorities to pursue anti-sectarian programmes of the kind that had

been advanced some years before. The suspicion thus arises that either the group was instructed to ensure that separate denominational schooling was not called into question⁸³ or the group itself quickly took the collective decision not to stray too far into this controversial area. The easy targets—football and marches—again dominated, although neither, arguably, was effectively contextualised or discussed. Tom Devine, criticising the report with his historian's hat on, claimed persuasively that it lacked historic input to account for 'momentous changes' in Scottish society.⁸⁴

The Advisory Group's findings confirmed previous academic research concerning the absence of any correlation between economic disadvantage and religion, and echoed the Glasgow City Council Report of 2003 in revealing that, while 88% of those surveyed considered sectarianism 'a live problem', only 14% claimed to have experienced religious prejudice.⁸⁵ In relation to the former statistic it can hardly be wondered at that it is so high given the sensationalist media coverage of the issue from the 1990s. The Advisory Group's findings made clear that violence and social media aggression operate in both directions; moreover, the report's definition of sectarianism offered a corrective to the often simplistic conceptions that had bedevilled the long public debate. There was acknowledgement of 'a mixture of perceptions, attitudes, actions and structures', and of the way perceptions of the issue were mixed with other factors such as politics, football allegiance, and national identity.⁸⁶

It can be contended that the issue of sectarianism became decidedly mixed up with Scotland's independence referendum, if in complex ways. The disaffected Protestant group identified by the Advisory Group and discussed in the previous section might be said to have been all the more anti-independence on account of the way the national conduct of the sectarianism question had, in their view, revealed a Scotland from which they felt alienated, a Scotland that seemed eager to make them scapegoats, and a Scotland whose sense of wider British identity and allegiance was rapidly eroding if measured in terms of emotional commitment rather than mere pragmatic calculation of self-interest. It was also, from this angle, a Scotland with no sense of 'kith and kin' in relation to Protestant Ulster, and indeed a Scotland more inclined to adopt the Irish Nationalist historical example. The kind of 'zero sum' reasoning redolent of Northern Ireland's Unionist and Nationalist communities during the 'Troubles' became a feature of twenty-first-century Scotland: if their traditional Catholic antagonists were moving to an independence position, then they should automatically be all the more firmly opposed. This dynamic may well have worked in reverse:

Catholics were all the more likely to warm to the idea of an independent Scotland the more that the voluble Loyalist opposition to it on the ground in the west of the country disparaged the way the nation had changed and even dis-associated itself from the Scotland of the present day.

As previously noted, the Referendum forced people to choose, and thus upset the balance of identities and loyalties that had hitherto held sway. The impact of this on 'Protestant Scotland' was profound: it encouraged part of it to assert Britishness at the expense of Scottishness, and it encouraged others to drop the British layer of their identity and embrace a straightforward Scottish identity in accordance with the 'Yes' narrative that insisted on such a choice being made as a condition of controlling one's destiny. As many have remarked, the Referendum has changed everything. The example of the Lanarkshire town of Airdrie, typical of Scotland's post-industrial problems and central to the Monklands local government controversy of 20 years before, is instructive. Here, Orangeism remains part of the social fabric and it is in such places that the 'damage limitation' exercise of the Order's pro-Union campaign may well have been highly significant in terms of vital votes. Yet, following the Referendum the SNP membership in the town has soared past 1000.⁸⁷

The challenge now facing the Labour Party in such places is thus of mountainous proportions: managing sectarian divisions that have their roots in the Irish national question has now been rendered more hazardous by the impact of the Scottish national question. Labour's task in reproducing their historic success in acquiring support across the sectarian divide in west-central Scotland has been complicated by a split among Protestants over Scottish/British loyalties, and the need to appeal on Scottish nationalist grounds as well as Irish folk memory to Catholics. Labour's project in religiously conscious Scotland was always about more than a simple appeal to class interest, fundamental as that was; it had also to tread carefully around ethno-religious identities. Post-Referendum, the interplay between class and identity politics is knottier than ever, and the long-contained matter of Scottish national sentiment has spilled over the intricately patterned Orange and Green rivalries spawned by the Irish question and Irish population settlements in Scotland.

5

The SNP's landslide victory in the May 2015 general election was a personal triumph for new leader Nicola Sturgeon. Following her accession to the leadership in the wake of Alex Salmond's resignation the day after the

Referendum, Sturgeon made it a priority to strengthen the party's social justice credentials and consolidate the support of former Labour voters.⁸⁸ The extent of the challenge this posed for the new Scottish Labour leader, Kezia Dugdale, was perhaps best illustrated by her bold decision to declare that 'Yes' voters and supporters of independence should feel at home in the Labour Party. This surely amounted to at least tacit agreement with the proposition that the UK was no longer unarguably the most appropriate territorial unit in which to achieve social justice, an undermining of Gordon Brown's stirring eve of poll message in 2014. It certainly did little to stall the momentum towards a second referendum, or to challenge the continuing mood music about the supposed inevitability of independence in the near future. Less surprisingly, if still significantly, Dugdale further stressed the autonomy of the Scottish Labour Party from the London leadership.⁸⁹

The report of the cross-party (including the SNP) Smith Commission⁹⁰ of November 2014 was duly taken forward by the government before the end of the Parliament in the form of proposals for new taxation powers and welfare capabilities for the Scottish Parliament, better inter-governmental relations, and the entrenchment of the Parliament's constitutional status. This latter proposal, if enacted, will remove the final remnants of the doctrine of the sovereignty of the Westminster Parliament, although in practical terms this had been the reality since the Labour government's reforms of the late 1990s.⁹¹ However, the impact of Smith and these potentially radical constitutional changes has been relatively slight, and has hardly resulted in a revival of pro-Union enthusiasm. The idea that the UK should become a formal federal polity, advanced before the Referendum by political figures such as the Scottish Conservative Murdo Fraser, and influential commentators and scholars such as David Torrance, David Marquand, and Linda Colley,⁹² has also failed to achieve the popular resonance required to challenge the Nationalist narrative. Carefully argued prospectuses for a reformed UK short of federalism, and cogent defences of the UK as the territorial unit still best suited to deliver social progress, have not registered in the 'Indyref' and post-Referendum climate.⁹³

In a valedictory address to the House of Commons in early 2015, Gordon Brown railed against the Conservatives' proposal to pursue 'English Votes for English Laws' at Westminster, and spoke of the danger that a perception was emerging of the UK as being about separate interests and not a common interest.⁹⁴ Indeed, it appeared by this point that the constitutional future of the UK had become, to a significant extent, a contest involving grievance politics across the UK as a whole. Sometime

in 2016–2017, the UK will also vote in a Referendum on the question of whether to remain in the EU, and the signs are that this will provide further evidence of a divided UK, and perhaps a pretext for the SNP to call for a second referendum on independence.⁹⁵

Should the Union continue to hold off the Scottish independence challenge, survive the divisions over the EU question, and absorb the pressures of grievance politics, it will yet be likely to evolve into an even looser arrangement than at present. This will raise questions about its ability to continue to be a capacious structure for the expression of multiple identities, and to cope with the many challenges to social cohesiveness which currently affect the UK. In Scotland, specifically, there is something disjointed about the optimistic ferment around the building of a new future for the country that was such a feature of ‘Indyref’, and the continuing introspective scrutiny of the time-worn issue of sectarian tensions between Protestants and Catholics. The amount of attention given to this particular sectarian controversy has arguably delayed a much broader national deliberation over the extent to which Scotland is now an ethno-religious patchwork, a society in which there are in effect many minorities, among them those who adhere to no religious faith.

If ‘Indyref’ was notable for the healthy level of grass-roots engagement with the debate, it can also be said to have been excessively self-referential and neglectful of the impact of the vote on relationships within the British Isles. It would, for instance, have helped the credibility of the case for independence if its advocates had outlined how the new Scotland might contribute to the maintenance of the uneasy peace in Northern Ireland that any fracturing of the Union would have been likely to put under threat. The inter-governmental body known as the British–Irish Council (BIC), the most significant part of the East–West strand of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, now has its base in Edinburgh. Notwithstanding the apparent opportunities this offers to a Scottish government to take initiatives and mobilise the body meaningfully, the BIC has continued to languish in obscurity. There was no attempt during the Referendum campaign to suggest how such a body could possibly have taken on the role of easing and managing the tensions and ruptures that would have accompanied a Scottish departure from the UK. Nor apparently has the Scottish government considered the BIC’s potential suitability for sharing expertise and experience of the sectarianism problem with Northern Ireland and perhaps also another member of the BIC, the Republic of Ireland.⁹⁶

Scotland has many years of silence on the Northern Ireland situation to make up for, and no amount of obsessing over Old Firm antagonisms will ever be a substitute for positive interaction and thoughtful engagement. There is an obligation to acknowledge the claims of history over this relationship above all others within these islands. For a long time, the Labour Party in Scotland had an incentive to hold any engagement with the Northern Ireland problem to a minimum in order to keep working-class communities in west-central Scotland as focused as possible on local socio-economic issues at the polls. With the advent of identity politics and the upscaling of constitutional questions, it perhaps should fall to the Labour Party as it attempts to claw its way back in Scotland to challenge a Nationalist narrative in which allegiances and loyalties derived from nearby Northern Ireland are too glibly assumed to be withering in the warmth of an all-encompassing pride in a resurgent Scotland.

There may still be unforeseen twists in Scotland's identity politics, not to mention its constitutional future. Profound changes have occurred in the last five years, but little in the way of the country's ambiguous ethno-religious and social class relationships has been consigned to the past.

NOTES

1. *The Herald*, 5 February 2015, 'Scotland has changed and it may be too late for Labour'. Also, I. Macwhirter, *Tsunami*, Glasgow: Freight Books, 2015.
2. See, for example, J. Curtice et al., *Revolution or Evolution? The 2007 Scottish Elections*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009, especially ch. 6; and Mitchell et al., *The Scottish National Party*, especially ch. 8.
3. 'The disunited kingdom', *The Spectator*, 9 May 2015.
4. See P. Geoghegan, *The People's Referendum*, Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2014; also Lesley Riddoch, *Blossom*, Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2013. Riddoch, a well-respected journalist and commentator, was a prominent 'Yes' campaigner and media performer.
5. J. Pike, *Project Fear*, London: Biteback Publishing, 2015.
6. Brown also contributed the most substantial written defence of the Union in his *My Scotland Our Britain*, London: Simon and Schuster, 2014.
7. See report in *The Tablet*, 14 February 2015.
8. See, for example, Gerry Braiden in *The Herald*, 28 March 2014; Tom Devine quote in *The Herald*, 17 March 2014; Tom Gallagher contribution to *Daily Telegraph* Politics Blog, 29 January 2014.
9. See *Daily Record*, 27 March 2015.
10. See M. Rosie, 'Tall Tales: Understanding Religion and Scottish Independence', *Scottish Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2014), 332–341.

11. See Pike, *Project Fear*, p. 133; also P. Hennessy, *The Kingdom to Come*, London: Haus Publishing, 2015, p. 27. Communication from Andrew McFadyen, Al Jazeera Journalist and former Labour Party worker, 10 November 2015. Galloway's dire warnings can be viewed as an ironic reversal of the 'Home Rule is Rome Rule' slogan of Ulster Unionists back in 1912.
12. A. Aughey, 'Far Away, So Close', in G. Hassan and J. Mitchell (eds.), *After Independence*, Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2013.
13. L. Colley, *Acts of Union and Disunion*, London: Profile Books, 2014, p. 10.
14. See Hennessy, *Kingdom*, p. 73.
15. See C. Kidd, 'The Defence of the Union: Ironies and Ambiguities', in Hassan and Mitchell, *After Independence*.
16. *The Herald*, 14 January 2015. On her resignation, Johann Lamont complained about the Scottish Labour Party being treated as 'a branch office' of London. Murphy's role in the 'No' campaign was a prominent one; he undertook a tour of the country addressing street meetings and was roughly handled in several, mainly former Labour, places.
17. *The Herald*, 5 November 2014.
18. *Irish Post*, 9 February 2013.
19. D. Torrance, *Salmond: Against the Odds*, Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2011, pp. 378, 456 fn. 23. Also see preface to 'Choosing Scotland's Future: A National Conversation' (Scottish Government, 2007).
20. M. Kettle, 'Once again a generation is rejecting the political order', *The Guardian*, 23 October 2014.
21. Geoghegan, *People's Referendum*, ch. 2. Connolly settled in Ireland as a young man and attempted to relate the cause of an Irish Republic to his socialist beliefs. He founded the Irish Citizen Army which fought in the 1916 Rebellion. Connolly was executed for his leading part in the Rising. The radical writer and commentator, the late Ian Bell, proclaimed his Nationalism stridently during the campaign and cited Connolly (a distant relative) as his main influence. See *Sunday Herald*, 15 January 2012.
22. T. Gallagher, 'The Scottish Church showed little statesmanship or common sense during the referendum', Spectator Blog, 22 September 2014. See same author's *Divided Scotland: Ethnic Friction and Christian Crisis*, Glendaruel: Argyll Publishing, 2013, especially ch. 10.
23. Interview with Dave Scott, 22 September 2015.
24. See commentary by Ruth Dudley Edwards in *Belfast Telegraph*, 5 October 2015.
25. See coverage of this affair in *The Herald*, 4 and 5 December 2015.
26. For a critique of Connolly's subordination of his socialism to a Nationalist creed, see A. Morgan, *James Connolly: A Political Biography*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988.

27. George Galloway claimed on his radio show 'Talksport' that Reid 'taught a generation of Scottish Labour activists...the entire IRA songbook'. The show was aired on 25 May 2007. My thanks to Dr. James Greer for this reference.
28. See *The Herald*, 8 November 2010; for comment on the Green Brigade and the Sands/Wallace display see M. Kelly, 'Green Brigade can't rewrite history', *The Scotsman*, 5 December 2013.
29. D. Morrow, 'Learning from Tackling Sectarianism in Scotland?'—Address at Northern Ireland Assembly in Knowledge Exchange Seminar Series, 7 October 2015. This address was based on the research findings of the Advisory Group of which Dr. Morrow was Chair.
30. See N. Bonney, 'Religion and the Scottish Independence Referendum', *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 84, No. 4 (2013), 478–485. Bonney died in 2014. Otton contributes regularly to online debates in the Scottish press. For a recent example of a critical assessment of the control of education in the Republic of Ireland, see D. Ferriter, 'Sectarian schools system an affront to Republic's ideals', *Irish Times*, 28 November 2015.
31. See Kettell, 'The Militant Strain'.
32. The Catholic Church may simply have arrived at the view that the SNP will wield power for the foreseeable future and that it would thus be wise to be close to it.
33. This undated letter was sent from Grand Orange Lodge HQ in Glasgow—my thanks to Mark Dingwall, Orange Order member. James G. MacLean, an Order official, has confirmed that advice was indeed given out widely to back Labour. Interview with J.G. MacLean, 5 October 2015.
34. James MacLean believes that probably a majority of Orange members were voting Labour by the 1990s. Interview, 5 October 2015.
35. 'Scottish Independence: Orange Order's No vote plan', *The Scotsman*, 23 April 2013.
36. See Massie, 'The disunited kingdom'.
37. Interview with J. G. McLean, 5 October 2015. Claims that Orange Order members were defecting were also made in pro-Yes websites such as 'Bella Caledonia' in the run-up to the vote.
38. Kidd, 'The Defence of the Union'.
39. See A. McKillop, 'The SNP avoids the dirtier complexities of Scottish identity', *Scottish Review*, 11 September 2012.
40. Note should also be taken of the growth of the Ulster-Scots movement in Northern Ireland over the past 20–30 years around language and cultural objectives, and the recognition given to Ulster-Scots as a minority language and culture in its own right in the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. See discussion in Edna Longley, 'Multi-culturalism and Northern Ireland', in E. Longley and D. Kiberd, *Multi-Culturalism: the View from the Two Irelands*, Cork: Cork University Press, 2001.

41. P. Geoghegan, 'Unionists in the North faced with a Scottish Problem', *Irish Times*, 9 September 2014.
42. Private communication.
43. See M. Rosie and E. Hepburn, "'The Essence of the Union...': Unionism, Nationalism and Identity On These Disconnected Islands', *Scottish Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (2015), 141–162; F. Bechhofer and D. McCrone, 'The End of Being British?', *Scottish Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (2014), 309–322.
44. Although, see arguments in M. Breeze et al., "'Everybody's Scottish at the end of the day": Nationalism and Social Justice Amongst Young Yes Voters', *Scottish Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2015), 419–431.
45. See *The Orange Torch*, November 2014.
46. For Scotland, see Andrew McFadyen's piece 'Defenders of the Union' on his website: <http://andrewmcfadyen.net/Also> e-mail communication to author by Andrew McFadyen, 10 November 2015.
47. Interview with J.G. McLean, 5 October 2015.
48. See Hennessy, *Kingdom to Come*, p. 85 regarding the fears of Labour MP Tommy McAvoy and Tam Dalyell.
49. See, for example, Paul Hutcheon's report in *Sunday Herald*, 14 September 2014.
50. Geoghegan, *People's Referendum*, p. 36. See also letters in *Orange Torch*, November 2014.
51. Interview with J.G. Maclean, 5 October 2015.
52. *Sunday Herald*, 28 December 2014.
53. W.S. Franklin et al., *Follow We Will*, Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2013.
54. G. Walker, 'From Darlings to Pariahs: Rangers and Scottish National Pride', in A. Bissett and A. McKillop (eds.), *Born Under a Union Flag: Rangers and Scottish Independence*, Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2014.
55. *Financial Times*, 18 January 2015. See also, in relation to the fans' choice of songs and support for the Union, O.D. Edwards, 'Ireland: the Elephant in the Room', in O.D. Edwards and J. Maxwell (eds.), *Why Not? Labour and Scottish Independence*, Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2014.
56. See various chapters in Bissett and McKillop (eds.), *Born Under a Union Flag*.
57. See A. Truman, 'Scapegoats in Scotland's Blame Game', in R. Esplin and G. Walker (eds.), *Rangers: Triumphs, Troubles, Traditions*, Ayr: Fort Publishing, 2010.
58. Interview with Dave Scott, 22 September 2015.
59. *The Herald*, 7 June 2013. For an investigation into the flag controversy in Northern Ireland, see P. Nolan et al., *The Flag Dispute: Anatomy of a Protest*, Belfast: Queen's University, 2014.
60. BBC Scotland News, 31 August 2015.
61. M. Rosie, 'The Sectarian Iceberg?', *Scottish Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2015), 328–350. See also commentary by leading historian of religion, Callum Brown in *The Herald*, 27 September 2013.

62. See Bonney, ‘Religion and the Scottish Independence Referendum’.
63. Walker, ‘The Religious Factor’.
64. ‘Who do we think we are?’, *The Scotsman*, 27 September 2013.
65. Interview with Dave Scott, 22 September 2015.
66. See A. Need and N.D. De Graaf, “‘Losing my religion’: a dynamic analysis of leaving the church in the Netherlands”, *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (1996), 87–99; and H. Knippenberg, ‘Secularisation in the Netherlands in its historical and geographical dimensions’, *GeoJournal*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (1998), 209–220. My thanks to Dr. Chris Raymond for alerting me to these works.
67. It was discovered after the Referendum that most ‘Yes’ voters belonged to the 25–39 age group. See *The Herald*, 24 September 2014. For statistics regarding religion and the SNP, see Mitchell et al., *The SNP*, ch. 4. Some 43% of SNP members in 2007–2008 were of ‘No Religion’ and this figure seems highly likely to have increased.
68. *Daily Record*, 27 March 2015.
69. M. Rosie, ‘Tall Tales’.
70. See discussion in A. Schneider, ‘Age and Variations in the Attitude towards Scottish Independence’, *Scottish Affairs*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2014), 55–78.
71. Interview with Harry Reid, 18 December 2015. Harry also stressed the disjunction there often is between the people in the pews and the official spokespersons of the Church.
72. See Alasdair McKillop’s review of Linda Colley’s book ‘Acts of Union and Disunion’ in the *Scottish Review of Books* blog, 20 January 2014.
73. See Rosie and Hepburn, “‘The Essence...’”; Linda Colley, *Britons. Forging the Nation 1707–1837*, London: Pimlico, 1994.
74. Rosie and Hepburn, “‘The Essence...’”
75. See Breeze et al., “‘Everybody’s Scottish’”. Those interviewed in this article focus entirely on Scotland and do not consider the rest of the UK.
76. Well-publicised incidents of this kind involved the author J.K. Rowling and the Olympian cyclist Chris Hoy.
77. Advisory Group on Tackling Sectarianism, *Tackling Sectarianism and its Consequences in Scotland*, Scottish Government, 2015. For articles discussing the findings of this report and of the others commissioned, see the special issue of the journal *Scottish Affairs*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (2015).
78. *The Herald*, 7 January 2013.
79. Morrow, ‘Learning from tackling sectarianism in Scotland?’
80. *Ibid.*
81. Emphasis in original. The written submissions on the Bill were published on the committee’s web pages.
82. Executive summary of report published by the Scottish government in December 2013.

83. This was suggested as a possibility by Dave Scott—interview 22 September 2015. However, critics of NBM would accuse them of effectively keeping the schools off their own agenda.
84. *The Herald*, 6 June 2015.
85. Executive Summary of ‘Tackling Sectarianism’ final report, 2015; Morrow, ‘Learning from tackling sectarianism in Scotland?’
86. Executive Summary, ‘Tackling Sectarianism’.
87. *The Herald*, 18 November 2015.
88. See J. Mitchell, ‘Sea Change in Scotland’, *Parliamentary Affairs*, Vol. 68, Special Issue (2015), 88–100.
89. See Iain Macwhirter, ‘Dugdale’s chance to take Labour into new territory’, *The Herald*, 29 October 2015. The new UK Labour leader from September 2015, Jeremy Corbyn, expressed his willingness to respect the autonomy of the Scottish party.
90. The Commission was the outcome of ‘The Vow’ made by the three pro-Union parties (Labour, Conservative, and Liberal-Democrat) that measures would immediately be taken in the event of a ‘No’ vote to enhance the powers of the Scottish Parliament: see Pike, *Project Fear*, ch. 9. Research has indicated that ‘The Vow’ did not sway the result: see *The Herald*, 26 March 2015. It had been clear for some months before the vote that there would be a push for new powers in the event of a ‘No’ outcome. See the intervention by Gordon Brown and Menzies Campbell, *The Herald*, 11 March 2014.
91. See former Conservative Scottish Secretary Lord Lang’s objections in the House of Lords to the Scotland Bill, *Scotsman*, 25 November 2015.
92. D. Torrance, *Britain ReBooted*, Edinburgh: Luath Press, 2014; Colley, *Acts of Union*; D. Marquand, ‘United States of Britain?’ *Prospect*, June 2014; *The Herald*, 26 June 2014 for Fraser’s intervention in favour of federalism.
93. J. Gallagher, ‘The English Question’, *Prospect*, December 2014; Ben Jackson, ‘The Break Up of Britain? The Left and Scottish Nationalism’, *Renewal*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (2014), 15–23.
94. *Scotsman*, 5 February 2015. Brown’s last speech to the House of Commons repeated the charges of the previous one: he attacked those who threatened the Union with their ‘me too, me first, me now, me above all, me whatever’ manifestos. See *The Herald*, 27 March 2015.
95. Nicola Sturgeon has indicated that a Scottish vote to stay in, if overridden by an English vote to leave, would be grounds for another independence Referendum. For a broader discussion, see T. Devine, ‘Is this the end of the Union as we know it?’ *The Conversation*, 12 May 2015.
96. See G. Walker, ‘Scotland’s Sectarianism Problem: Irish Answers?’ *Political Quarterly*, Vol. 83, No. 2 (2012), 374–383.

Conclusion

Abstract This concluding chapter draws together the various strands of the book and stresses the way that the Labour Party struggled to command the new devolved context of Scottish politics after 1999. It again highlights the salience of the sectarianism debate to the Party's loss of political authority in Scotland and its eclipse by the SNP. The chapter provides further comment on the apparent triumph of identity politics in contemporary Scotland and on the role of religion in public life.

The Labour Party in Scotland grew out of the crusading struggles of the old ILP and became the country's dominant political force in the second half of the twentieth century. In so doing, it proved itself capable of appealing across the main religious boundary in Scotland, that between Protestants and Catholics, and of managing the religious underpinnings of Scottish culture and society and the Irish influences that often gave them such vigour. Moreover, by successfully promoting the politics of class interest over those of religious one-upmanship, Labour made a crucial contribution to Scotland's settled place within the UK and the Union. It gave ballast to a British party system that for a long time revolved around a Labour–Conservative/left–right axis. Religious and ethnic identity co-existed with social class loyalties in Scotland to a marked degree, and the salience of the former was largely contained within the broader British political framework. Northern Ireland was not part of the mainstream British party system and in that corner of the UK, ethno-religious factors decisively shaped political behaviour. When the Northern Ireland troubles

began at the end of the 1960s, Scotland had enjoyed a long enough period of relative communal peace to ensure that she would not be dragged into the conflict. On the other hand, such were the chastening effects of persistent violence across the narrow sea through the 1970s, 1980s, and early 1990s that the climate for expansive consideration of the Scottish national question was to a significant extent forbidding, and it was probably no coincidence that serious contemplation of Scottish independence, as opposed to reform of the Union, took place when the ‘peace process’ in Northern Ireland got underway.

While it was a Labour government that delivered—in remarkably short order—devolution, it was the Labour Party in Scotland that was discredited by the Parliament’s undistinguished early years against a backdrop of sustained media criticism.¹ The desire on the part of Jack McConnell, First Minister from 2002, to create a better press around the devolved administration involved him in highlighting sectarianism as a national ‘shame’ to be eradicated as soon as possible. Subsequent scrutiny of the issue, coming on top of public controversies over the speech in 1999 by James MacMillan, and the Carfin episode of 2001, may have convinced Catholics in particular that Scotland was changing, yet it could not avoid creating a stir with unpredictable political fall-out. Confronting sectarianism was widely seen as part of the ‘growing up’ process on the part of Scotland as a nation and this was certainly a viewpoint shared by a sizeable number of Protestants and those of ‘No Religion’. Those who were less inclined to subscribe to what was often presented as a national consensus were fragmented and largely unable to alter the course of the debate: such people included disaffected Protestants, militant secularists and libertarians, and some academics who did not accept the framework in which the national soul-searching was conducted and objected to the loss of a sense of proportion and perspective on the part of some campaigners. The foregrounding of sectarianism contributed significantly to the eclipse of class politics by those of identity.

Devolution allowed sectarianism to become a political football, and to encroach, if in ambiguous ways, on the power struggles between Labour and the SNP. The former unitary British political system with its left–right divide had kept sectarian controversies in check, and enabled Labour to maintain its appeal on social class issues. The new dynamics of the devolved arrangements disrupted this paradigm. The unsettling effects of devolution on the old pattern of politics in Scotland were illustrated by the way such issues as sectarianism became politicised and contributed

to a profound stir in Scottish life. Grievances were rehearsed and hopes for the future were articulated; rather glib reasoning was often employed, and impatience for change could leave certain groups feeling unsure of whether they belonged in the new Scotland.

For all the criticism they received over the legislation on singing and chanting at football matches, the SNP largely benefited from the effects of the sectarianism controversies. The SNP, in this as in so many other areas of public concern, appeared to represent the new: a more positive vision of Scotland. Labour was seen as implicated in sectarianism, even by Catholics, and the Party could not tell the positive story relating to its own history of helping to overcome religious divisions. With the decline of the industrial working class, the growing salience of white-collar and public sector radicalism in Scotland has proved to be fertile ground for nationalism and identity politics. There is a lingering sense of old class loyalties on the part of such workers as a gesture of respect to the struggles of previous generations, and this feeds into leftist positions on contemporary issues. However, this demographic has become impatient with Labour as a party too embroiled in the politics of careerism and personal advancement, and insufficiently committed, at least since the premiership of Tony Blair, to the social justice agenda. The SNP has expertly colonised the territory of ‘old’ Labour while projecting a nationalism both radical and civic.² The relative cultural dynamism and youthful energy of the SNP has also disposed it more advantageously to the politics of the Internet and social media. Bandwagons can be jumped on more rapidly and effortlessly in the contemporary political age.

Devolution also altered the basis of religion’s role in public life, calling into question, for example, the extent to which the Church of Scotland could credibly be viewed as a focus for the national interest. Indeed, it was the Catholic Church that adapted more speedily to the new political context of devolution and the lobbying opportunities it presented. The Catholic Church enjoyed success in protecting its schools and in steering debates around sectarianism away from the role of separate schooling; it was less successful in its defence of moral positions on homosexuality and gay marriage. Furthermore, its authority came to be considerably undermined by scandals, particularly the fall of Cardinal O’Brien in 2013.

Scotland in the new century has seen a simultaneous loosening of religious certainties and traditions in public life, and the increasing salience of religion in the realm of identity politics. The greater prominence of non-Christian faiths in Scotland has added another significant layer of

religiosity, with implications for future policy in areas such as education. In Scotland, as elsewhere in the UK, the terms of public discussion around faith and politics, and the separation of Church and State, will require serious reflection.³

There were religious, and sectarian, undercurrents in the recent Scottish independence debate, and there is potential for communal discord around any future independence referendum, especially if there is concurrent instability in nearby Northern Ireland. Pro-Union opinion in Scotland, even if still mainly Labour-supporting, is divided among three parties, while the SNP now monopolises pro-independence support and even gains the backing on socio-economic grounds of some who voted ‘No’ in 2014. The SNP’s dominance ensures that the constitutional question remains central to Scottish politics and that identity politics in all its forms—class, religious, national, ethnic, gender, and sexual orientation—will continue to swirl around it.

NOTES

1. See H. Macdonell, *Uncharted Territory: The Story of Scottish Devolution, 1999–2009*, London: Politics, 2009.
2. See Iain Macwhirter’s suggestion that Labour should re-invent the old ILP, with its crusading socialist energies and commitment to Scotland, if it is to survive as a force. Macwhirter, *Tsunami*, pp. 88–91.
3. See C. Calhoun and T. Modood, ‘Universities should rethink secularism to deal with religious diversity’, *The Conversation*, 17 November 2015.

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