

RENAISSANCE  
FRANCE  
AT WAR

—  
Armies, Culture and Society,  
c.1480-1560

DAVID POTTER

# **Warfare in History**

## **RENAISSANCE FRANCE AT WAR ARMIES, CULTURE AND SOCIETY, c.1480–1560**

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**RENAISSANCE FRANCE AT WAR**  
**ARMIES, CULTURE AND SOCIETY, c.1480–1560**

David Potter

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**To  
Robert Knecht**



## Preface and acknowledgements

The book that follows developed from a chapter written for my *History of France 1460–1560* that I was unable to include in the final version. Since then, I have kept the problems I sketched out in mind and published a number of related studies. This is an attempt, then, to consider a range of problems I began to think about for my earlier work, *War and Government in the French Provinces: Picardy 1460–1560* but now approached on a broader canvass. It is an attempt to map out how the long period of conflict from the Italian Wars to the Habsburg-Valois wars was understood in France, how its armies developed in terms of diversity and armament, how France itself became for the first time a country massively fortified in the modern style and, finally, how war impinged on the public consciousness of French society. The role of France in the early stages of the still controversially labelled ‘military revolution’ has not been fully recognised and, though much useful work has been done, there has hitherto been no attempt to pull together an overall picture. The royal army in the Wars of Religion has been effectively studied by James Wood and Philip Contamine’s remarkable work on the late medieval French army has many important implications for the 16th century. The bibliography alone indicates the depth of my debt to Professor Contamine. Much of this book concerns military organisation (though unfortunately there has not been space enough to cover developments in naval warfare). The overarching theme, though, is the reasons for war, its impact and mentality as well as the cultural dimensions of war. It is hoped that the last three chapters will place that dimension in the cultural context of public opinion.

Among the many colleagues in the field whose advice has proved invaluable, I would wish to single out Steven Gunn, who generously made an early copy of his work on war in England and the Netherlands available and, as ever, Robert Knecht, who constantly shared his unrivalled knowledge of the French sixteenth century. My debt to him is profound and is reflected in the dedication of this book. I must also acknowledge the enlightened support of the British Academy, for a grant which enabled me to undertake research in Paris.

My thanks to those who discussed parts of this book at seminars in Oxford, Leiden, London and Canterbury must also be expressed.

## Abbreviations

ABSHF	Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l'Histoire de France (Paris, 1863–)
AC	L. Cimber and F. Danjou, <i>Archives curieuses de l'histoire de France</i> , 27 vols (Paris, 1834–40)
AD	Archives départementales
AHP	Archives historiques du Poitou
AM	Archives municipales (or communales)
AN	Paris, Archives Nationales
AS	Archivio di Stato
Barrillon	<i>Journal de Jean Barrillon</i> , ed. P. de Vaissière, 2 vols (Paris, 1899)
BECH	<i>Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes</i>
BIHR	<i>Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research</i>
BN	Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale
Bourgeois (ed. L.)	<i>Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris sous le règne de François Ier (1515–1536)</i> , ed. L. Lalanne (Paris, 1910)
Bourgeois (ed. B.)	<i>Le Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris sous le règne de François Ier</i> , ed. V.-L. Bourrilly (Paris, 1910)
Brantôme, ed. Lalanne	Brantôme, P. de Bourdeille de, <i>Oeuvres complètes</i> , ed. L. Lalanne, 11 vols (Paris, 1864–82)
Brantôme, ed. Buchon	Brantôme, P. de Bourdeille de, <i>Oeuvres complètes</i> , ed. J.A.C. Buchon (Panthéon littéraire), 2 vols (Paris, 1838)
CAF	<i>Catalogue des actes de François Ier</i> , ed. P. Marichal <i>et al.</i> , 10 vols (Paris, 1887–1908) <sup>1</sup>
CAH	<i>Catalogue des actes de Henri II</i> , ed. M.N. Baudouin-Matuszek <i>et al.</i> , 6 vols (Paris, 1979–2001)
Commynes	Commynes, P. de, <i>Mémoires</i> , ed. J. Calmette, 3 vols (Paris, 1924–5)
CSP Venice	<i>Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs ... in the Archives of Venice and Northern Italy</i> , ed. R. Brown, 26 vols (1864–1947)
D'Auton	D'Auton, Jean, <i>Chroniques de Louis XII</i> , ed. R. de Maulde la Clavière, 4 vols (Paris, 1889–95)
Du Bellay, <i>Mémoires</i>	Guillaume and Martin Du Bellay, <i>Mémoires</i> , ed. V.-L. Bourrilly and F. Vindry, 4 vols (Paris: SHF, 1908–19)
BN fr.	Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, Département des manuscrits, fonds français
BN nafr.	Paris, Bibliothèque nationale, Département des manuscrits, nouvelles acquisitions françaises
EHR	<i>English Historical Review</i>

<sup>1</sup> References to this work are given with the volume number, then page number and finally the document number (e.g. CAF, I, 87, 512).

- HHSA Vienna, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv
- L&P *Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, of the Reign of Henry VIII*, ed. J. Brewer, J. Gairdner and R.S. Brodie, 22 vols in 38 (London, 1862–1932)
- La Pilorgerie La Pilorgerie, J. de, *Campagne et bulletins de la grande armée d'Italie commandé par Charles VIII, 1494–1495* (Nantes/Paris, 1866)
- Lenormant, C. Lenormant, *Trésor numismatique et glyptique: Médailles Trésor françaises depuis le règne de Charles VII jusqu'à celui de Louis XVI* (Paris, 1836)
- Lot, F. Lot, *Recherches sur les effectifs des armées françaises des Recherches Guerres d'Italie aux Guerres de Religion, 1494–1562* (Paris, 1962)
- lt. livre tournois (see below, Note on money)
- Mazerolle, F. Mazerolle, *Les Médailleurs français du XV<sup>e</sup> siècle au milieu du Médailleurs français XVII<sup>e</sup>* (Paris, 1902)
- Mémoires *Mémoires de François de Lorraine duc d'Aumale et de Guise*, ed. Champollion Figeac (Michaud and Poujoulat, Nouvelle Collection, n.s. VI) (Paris, 1850)
- Monluc (ed. Blaise de Monluc, *Commentaires, 1521–76*, ed. P. Courteault Courteault) (Paris, 1964); 3 vols edn (Paris, 1911–25)
- Monluc (ed. Blaise de Monluc, *Commentaires et lettres*, ed. A. de Ruble, 4 vols Ruble) (Paris: SHF, 1864–72)
- NA London, National Archives
- Ord. *Ordonnances des rois de France de la troisième race*, 22 vols (Paris, 1723–1849)
- Ord.Fr.I *Ordonnances des rois de France: règne de François Ier*, 9 vols (Paris, 1902)
- PAPS *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society*
- PWSFH *Proceedings of the Western Society for French History*
- RH *Revue historique*
- SCJ *Sixteenth-Century Journal*
- Seguin, Seguin, J.-P., *L'Information en France de Louis XII à Henri II L'Information* (Geneva, 1961)
- SHF Société d'Histoire de la France
- St.P. *State Papers Published under the Authority of His Majesty's Commission: Reign of Henry VIII*, 10 vols (London, 1830–52)
- Versoris *Journal d'un bourgeois de Paris sous François Ier*, ed. P. Joutard (Paris, 1963)
- Vieilleville *Mémoires sur la vie du maréchal de Vieilleville par Vincent Carloix, son secrétaire*, ed. J.A.C. Buchon (Panthéon littéraire) (Paris, 1836)
- Villars Villars, François de Boyvin, baron de, *Mémoires*, ed. J.A.C. Buchon (Panthéon littéraire) (Paris, 1836)

## **Editorial Note**

References to 16th-century printed works (the titles of which are often extremely long) are given by reference to the numbered sequence in the second part of the Bibliography, e.g. 'Bib.II, 93'. First citations of these works are not given in full.

All documents are quoted in translation. Some terms have no equivalent in English – 'mauvais garçons', for instance. 'Compagnons' is translated as 'follow soldiers', though 'lads' would probably be nearer to modern English; 'gens de bien' as 'men of honour', though could be 'men of standing/worth'. Cotgrove (q.v.) gives: 'Honest and (among soldiers) valient people'.

Appendices are numbered by chapter for convenience of reference.

## **Note on money**

Most sums are given in French money of account, the livre tournois (lt.), made up of 20 sols, each sol made up of 12 deniers (expressed thus: 2546 lt. or lt. 2546.13.4). The livre tournois stood at between 9 and 10 to the pound sterling. It was not coin in circulation. The common silver coin, the teston, was fixed at 10 sols in 1498 and had risen to 12 sols by 1561. The main gold coin of the period, the écu d'or au soleil, rose from 36s.3d. in 1498 to 60 sols in 1574 and was worth roughly 4 shillings sterling. These changes in value reflected both the availability of precious metals at any time but also the financial needs of the state and were sometimes offset by a true 'market' rate.

## Introduction: France and its Wars, 1494–1559

Early Modern dynastic states have been evocatively called ‘machines built ... for the battlefield’.<sup>1</sup> What does this mean in practice? While some have seen the build-up of war-making capacity as a prolongation of the ‘feudal’ nature of the French absolute monarchy, the all-embracing impact of war on French politics, society and culture in the Renaissance was shaped by the nature of international relations and the ferocious competition for power and resources that accompanied the consolidation of monarchical states in the period. However, it is highly unlikely that such a concept could have been at the forefront of decisions, simply because the necessary political vocabulary was scarcely available in the courts of kings and princes.

There used to be a common view that the Italian wars and their prolongation into the Habsburg-Valois Wars expressed the aggression of a French kingdom undergoing consolidation into a modern state. Michelet in 1860 linked the French ‘discovery’ of Italy to the formation of the nation, but Francis I, he thought, had lost the initiative for France in pursuing chimerical objectives.<sup>2</sup> Mignet, in the 1880s, saw France as a kingdom that was becoming highly centralised and for which external aggression was the logical next step at the end of the 15th century. That aggression, though, he saw as diverted from its ‘natural channels’ into the conquest of Italy by the wayward ambition of its kings. He thought the war between Francis I and Charles V was in some senses inevitable given the situations of their countries, their conflicting interests, not to speak of rival ambitions.<sup>3</sup> Calmette, in summing up the genesis of the Italian Wars, criticised Charles VIII for diverting French energies into a project that provoked an unnecessary quarrel with Spain and neglected the crucial need to ensure the Burgundian inheritance.<sup>4</sup> For Lemonnier, the Habsburg-Valois wars were the inevitable result of a struggle for supremacy, but the Italian dimension proved sterile. The northern and eastern theatres of conflict were more crucial and it was there, with the thrust towards ‘natural frontiers’ and the conquest of Metz, Toul and Verdun, that the future lay. This, though, had been unplanned and Lemonnier

<sup>1</sup> Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolute State* (London, 1979), p. 32.

<sup>2</sup> J. Michelet, *La Renaissance* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, n.d.), pp. 130, 179, and the concluding chapter 16.

<sup>3</sup> A. Mignet, *Rivalité de François Ier et de Charles-Quint*, 2 vols (Paris, 1886), I, pp. 2, 11, 215.

<sup>4</sup> J. Calmette, ‘La France et l’Espagne à la fin du quinzième siècle’, *Revue des Pyrénées*, 16 (1904), p. 121.



could dismiss the kings of the period as ‘inexperienced’ (Charles VIII, Louis XII) or ‘lacking consistency’ (Francis I) and, as for Henri II, describe his intentions as obscure, since he had ‘no organised military conceptions, shaped by a will.’ Nor were most of the ministers adequate to the task.<sup>5</sup> Ferdinand Lot took a very bleak view of the strategy of the Renaissance kings, which he generally regarded as futile and frivolous. Louis XII, though he won a series of battles, exploited none of them and ended his reign isolated. Francis I wasted his efforts in pursuing his dream of controlling northern Italy and displayed ‘culpable inaction’ in 1525.<sup>6</sup> An inclination by such historians to hand out praise, brickbats or booby prizes should not bother us. What their views tend to share is the assumption that geopolitical perceptions were possible but that the monarchs of the Renaissance and their ministers somehow failed to see them.

The idea that French policy was being driven by more ‘national’ imperatives is complicated by the fact that, for much of the period under discussion, Italy was the great military preoccupation of France. This has led to a significant revision of our understanding of foreign policy, though in highly traditional terms. So, Gaston Zeller argued that there was little conception of ‘natural frontiers’ in Renaissance France that might explain the thrust towards the Rhine in the 1550s.<sup>7</sup> Nicola Sutherland sought to show how the great wars of the 16th century stemmed from the long-term struggle between the houses of France and Burgundy-Habsburg, in other words that they were fundamentally dynastic. More recent interpretations have moved towards emphasising the personal: wars were fought to vindicate traditional rights, without any clear conception of geopolitical security.<sup>8</sup> The ‘competitive emulation’ of princes has also been increasingly seen as a major determinant of conflict. ‘Honour’ has been restored as a major preoccupation, though the constant Renaissance coupling of ‘honour and profit’ is sometimes forgotten.<sup>9</sup>

Of course, there is nothing new in military aggression and its linkage to modernity is trite. However, the resources galvanised by a much more active state in the 16th century permitted more serious and prolonged war efforts. Security, economic motives and grand strategy have been downplayed by modern historians and there are good reasons for this. Geo-politics, questions of the balance of power and factors of economic interest which preoccupy historians, rarely figured in the conscious formulations of early modern rulers and contemporary observers. Does this mean, though, that such strategic notions should be ruled out in any analysis of French war policy in this period? To do so would risk the exclusion of a major range of explanations for war. Yet to accept, for instance, the

<sup>5</sup> H. Lemonnier, *La Lutte contre la maison d’Autriche. La France sous Henri II* (vol. Vii of E. Lavisse, *Histoire de France*) (Paris, 1904), pp. 179–82.

<sup>6</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 33, 36, 39, 53.

<sup>7</sup> G. Zeller, ‘L’Histoire d’une idée fausse’, in idem, *Aspects de la politique française sous l’Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1964), pp. 90–108; idem, *La Réunion de Metz à la France*, 2 vols (Strasbourg, 1926).

<sup>8</sup> N.M. Sutherland, ‘The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Structure of European Politics’, *EHR*, 107 (1992), 587–625, at pp. 589–91. For an overview, R.J. Knecht, *Renaissance Warrior and Patron: the Reign of Francis I* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 62–8.

<sup>9</sup> G. Richardson, *Renaissance Monarchy* (Oxford, 2002).

idea that Francis I's policy was shaped fundamentally by a fear of geopolitical 'encirclement' by the Emperor requires a subtle marriage between ideas which are familiar now with an unease for which there may not have been a political vocabulary available at the time. However, we cannot just assume this. After all, Francis I declared he would send his younger son to Italy in 1542 'and because you shall know the trade of the world there, all matters of Italy and Italians shall come to me by your hands.' Thus he clearly had an understanding of the economic value of Italy.<sup>10</sup> Correspondence between kings and their diplomats might seem the key to understanding the formation of policy. In fact, it is very rare that the fundamental basis for policy is spelled out (presumably because the King and his ministers regarded this as *arcana imperii* and ambassadors, with a few exceptions, were usually treated as observers or executors). Brantôme at the end of the 16th century seems to have had an idea of imperialism (especially in Piedmont, whose occupation he distinguished from the pursuit of dynastic rights) and Duplessis Mornay could conceive of a balance of power.<sup>11</sup> That was an idea much discussed in the second half of the 16th century. How much was this true before 1560? The 'fear of encirclement' still crops up in the writings of historians as a motive, especially for wars after the 1530s, while the notion of a 'fear of Habsburg hegemony' is never very far beneath the surface.<sup>12</sup> These perceptions need to be combined and examined in depth, starting with the idea of dynastic war and personal rivalry (see Chapter 1).


In the period 1490–1560, France was actively at war for around 42 years.<sup>13</sup> Such a military effort needs explanation, which is partly the theme of this book. As an introduction to this analysis, though, a degree of narrative is necessary in order for the problems to be placed in context. On 2 September 1494, Charles VIII crossed the pass of Mont-Genèvre and began his descent into Italy for a long-planned challenge to the Aragonese dynasty in Naples. The fact that he faced a march right through the peninsula is indication enough that his plans involved alliances with some of the powers of Italy. This was not just an 'invasion of Italy', yet it was seen there at the time to signal a great upheaval and a new age. The march of the intimidating French army was rapid. Charles had reached Asti by 9 September, on 17 November he was at Florence and then, by 31 December, Rome. French troops in the Romagna committed atrocities in capturing cities allied with their enemies. Piero de Medici of Florence hastened to submit, while Pisa took the opportunity to revolt from Florence. The political balance of Italy was destabilised and Medici power disintegrated. The rapid collapse of the position of King Alfonso II and then of Ferrante II of Naples, while the French advanced to lay siege to their fortresses, allowed Charles VIII

<sup>10</sup> *St. P.*, IX, p. 197.

<sup>11</sup> Pierre de Bourdeille de Brantôme, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. L. Lalanne, 11 vols (Paris, 1864–82), V, p. 76; P. du Plessis Mornay, *Mémoires et correspondance*, ed. P.R. Auguis, 12 vols (Paris, 1824–5), II, p. 580.

<sup>12</sup> J.-L. Fournel and J.-C. Zancarini, *Les Guerres d'Italie: des batailles pour l'Europe (1494–1559)* (Paris, 2003), pp. 95–111.

<sup>13</sup> Depending on how they are counted: in the year 1494–6, 1499–1513 (intermittently), 1515–16, 1521–6, 1528–9, 1536–8, 1542–6, 1549–50, 1551–9.



Map 1. Western Europe and French Campaigns, 1494–1559

to enter Naples as King on 22 February 1495. The response was the formation in March 1495 of a remarkable alliance between powers that had hitherto been enemies – Venice, Milan, the Pope and Ferdinand of Aragon – which forced the French to return from Naples before they were cut off, leaving a garrison behind them (20 May). Rapid marches through Tuscany and then across the Appenines, saw the French confronted at the start of July by the army of the League, commanded by the Marquess of Mantua. The stage was set for the battle of Fornovo (6 July), long regarded as a turning-point in European history. In fact, the battle was inconclusive. The destruction was great on both sides and Italian casualties greater but the only (though crucial) advantage to the French was to gain a respite that enabled them to regain friendly territory at Asti on 15 July. This first campaign of the Italian wars is emblematic of what was to follow, for France effectively gained little. Ferrante II regained Naples and the isolation of the French garrison under Orléans (the future Louis XII) at Novara forced the conclusion of the peace of Vercelli with Ludovico Sforza, the ruler of Milan (9 October). A sort of guerilla war lingered on in Naples between Ferrante II (now supported by the Venetians and Spanish) and the French garrisons commanded by Montpensier and Stuart d'Aubigny, who were left without money to pay their men. This culminated in the defeat of the French by the great Spanish commander Gonzalo de Cordoba at Atella (July 1496) and the evacuation of the last French footholds in Calabria, though Ferrante II died soon after his victory. According to Commynes, Charles always had in mind to return to Italy, but died before he could so (7 April 1498).

Louis XII came to the throne with claims to both Naples and Milan. First, though, he needed Pope Alexander VI's support for the annulment of his marriage. This done, he began preparations for a new invasion of Italy. Ludovico il Moro had made enemies of the Venetians and Emperor Maximilian and his position crumbled as the French army entered Lombardy. Hearing of Ludovico's flight and the capture of Milan, Louis hastened to enter the city as duke (16 October 1499) and also brought Genoa into his obedience. The game, though, had only just begun. Ludovico used his financial resources to buy Swiss support, recaptured Milan in February 1500 and then Novara. French garrisons had been diluted for a side-show in occupying places in Emilia held by Caterina Sforza. A new French military effort commanded by La Trémoille pursued Sforza to Novara in April, where he was captured trying to escape after his Swiss refused to fight. French power was further deployed by the sending of an army into Tuscany under Beaumont to subdue Pisa to Florentine power, though the operation was a humiliating failure that contributed to poor relations with the new Florentine Republic (July 1500).

Machiavelli thought that Louis made two major mistakes: first, his links with the Pope led him to support Cesare Borgia in his acquisition of the Romagna and thus bolster papal power; secondly, his confrontation with the Aragonese dynasty in Naples, now ruled by King Federico, brought Spanish power into Italy. First, though, he concluded a secret deal with Ferdinand (Grenada, late 1500). France was to get Naples itself and the Abruzzi; Aragon, Puglia and Calabria. The French army again marched via Rome, this time under the command of Stuart d'Aubigny (May 1501), while Cordoba advanced in the

south. Federico fell back on his fortresses. Capua, though, was taken by assault and Federico threw himself onto the mercy of Louis (receiving the duchy of Anjou in compensation). War was not long in breaking out between the erstwhile allies over the division of the spoils. The first disaster was the defeat of Nemours' army at Cerignola (April 1503) by Cordoba's tactic of digging into a fortified position and forcing his enemy to break on his trenches. In August, Louis despatched two armies to confront Spain, one to Naples and another (abortive) into Roussillon. On 29 December 1503, after a long period of skirmishing around the river Garigliano, Cordoba definitively crushed the French army that had been reinforced by the Marquesses of Mantua and Saluzzo. The survivors fled to Gaeta, which shortly afterward surrendered (1 Jan. 1504). Naples was now in Spanish power. The French now dominated Milan, the Pope central Italy and Spain the south.

A sort of condominium now existed, symbolised by the meeting of Louis XII and Ferdinand at Savona in June 1507 and the Spanish King's marriage to Germaine de Foix. Louis in person led the army necessary to put down the rebellion of the Genoese that had been encouraged by the Emperor Maximilian and began a campaign in January 1507 that culminated in his entry by agreement into Genoa in April, after a ferocious and hard-fought series of encounters. The whole balance of power was now overthrown by the ambition of Pope Julius II to regain control of the Romagna, partly occupied by Venice after the death of Cesare Borgia. Under cover of a universal peace for the defence of Christendom, in December 1508 he finally arranged the alliance with France and the Emperor known as the League of Cambrai, aiming at a common attack on Venice and division of the spoils. Venice refused to give way and Louis XII in person led his army across the Adda on 9 May 1509 into Venetian territory. On 14th the Venetian army under Alviano (which had not concentrated all its forces) was heavily defeated at Agnadello. Venice survived by popular resistance against French and Habsburg occupation and by yet another reversal of alliances by Julius II, who lifted his excommunication in February 1510. The Republic regained control of much of its Terraferma, though henceforth played a much more careful role in international politics. The war now developed into a contest between France and the Pope for control of the Romagna. This shift culminated in another 'Holy League' (5 October 1511), which brought together the Pope, Venice, Henry VIII and Ferdinand against France. France was now beleaguered on several fronts in a way that was to recur through the first half of the 16th century. Measures had to be taken for defence against the English in the north and an English force under Dorset landed near St. Jean de Luz in Gascony (though let down by its ally, Ferdinand, who failed to provide any cavalry). In Italy, the League moved in January 1512. French forces, led by a capable general, Gaston de Foix, faced down its army, recaptured and sacked Brescia. Gaston now decided to force the League to a decisive battle by besieging Ravenna. On 11 April 1512, the League's 20,000 men faced 25,000 French in one of the bloodiest battles of the period, which involved a furious artillery bombardment by the French. The League army broke but Gaston was killed and casualties were heavy on both sides. Despite their victory, the French were on the verge of collapse. Their best general lost, they abandoned their march on Rome and, with Swiss forces

entering Lombardy against them, they were forced to evacuate the strongholds of Milan one by one (May 1512). Peace with Venice (14 March 1513) seemed to provide the opportunity for a French return. A new army led by La Trémoille crossed the Alps in May 1513 to join with the Venetian army against Massimiliano Sforza and his Swiss allies, now besieged in Novara. However, the French went down to a defeat by the numerically inferior Swiss sallying out from the city (6 June 1513). In the north, Henry VIII invaded in person and (with half-hearted help from Maximilian) captured Théroutanne and Tournai and defeated a French army of relief at the battle of the Spurs (16 August). In the east, Swiss forces entered Burgundy and in September forced the garrison of Dijon to surrender, extracting a ransom of 400,000 ducats and agreement by France to give up Milan. Far to the south, Ferdinand had profited from the fighting to invade and occupy permanently the kingdom of Navarre, hitherto ruled by the French Foix-Albret dynasty. Louis XII had thus lost practically all the gains of his reign and more. In Italy, the defeat of France satisfied most of the leading powers. But, after concluding peace with England, Louis was on the verge of yet another campaign in Milan when he died (1 January 1515).

A French effort to confront the Swiss in Lombardy was inevitable, given the loss of prestige and power in 1513. Francis I was continuing the plans of his predecessor when, after necessary diplomatic agreements with the young Charles of Burgundy and Ferdinand, he crossed the Alps by an unexpected route with one of the larger French armies of the era (nearly 40,000 men), commanded by a galaxy of old and new commanders. The Swiss were caught off guard and retreated to Milan, while complex negotiations followed to get them to withdraw willingly in return for payments. On the verge of an agreement, the war party among the Swiss came out on top and a ferocious two-day battle followed on 13/14 September, fought to the south-east of the city at Marignano. The battle was close-run and dominated by infantry and artillery but in the end the French prevailed and sealed their dominance of Lombardy for several years, the Swiss coming to terms. In 1516, Lescun was appointed *lieutenant-général* of the army sent to conquer Urbino for the Pope.

The contest for control of Italy now began to shade into a much wider struggle, generated by the succession of Charles of Habsburg as ruler of Spain in 1516 and his emergence as Emperor, after a contest with Francis for the votes of the Prince Electors in 1519. This had been to a degree concealed by Cardinal Wolsey's diplomatic finesse in negotiating a 'Treaty of Universal Peace' in London in 1518, which committed the great princes to arbitration of their disputes rather than war. This already began to look threadbare in 1520 when Francis (at the Field of Cloth of Gold outside Calais) and Charles courted the alliance of Henry VIII. The loss of the papal alliance was serious for France and Henry VIII began to prepare to join the Emperor's side. By the Spring of 1521, so many grudges had accumulated that a slide towards war began on the frontiers of the Ardennes and the Pyrenees (see Chapter 1). An initial French expedition to Navarre was defeated in June but Fuentarrabia was captured in October and Pamplona recaptured in December 1521 (France lost Spanish Navarre again in 1524).

In Autumn 1521, French control of Lombardy (weakened by bad government) began to slip as the Habsburg commander, Prospero Colonna, an Italian



*condottiere* in command of a mixed Papal-Imperial force, outmanoeuvred him and entered Milan. Lautrec had to take refuge in Venetian territory by December 1521. Reinforced by Swiss and Italian mercenaries, Lautrec was prepared to risk the battle he had avoided the previous year but the battle of La Bicocca, on 29 April 1522, though the French were superior in numbers, was a disaster, the Swiss breaking themselves against Colonna's entrenchments. Milan was lost definitively.

Elsewhere, the war went slightly better. In Summer 1521, the count of Nassau had crossed the eastern frontier and taken Mouzon, marching along the Ardennes frontier burning as he went. Francis I began the campaign with an audacious thrust into the Low Countries. The King had camped at Fervacques with 2000 lances, 12,000 Swiss, 24,000 other infantry, 1200 light horse and artillery, a very substantial army for the period. He moved towards Valenciennes, determined to challenge the Emperor there. Charles's forces were inadequate but he was able to take advantage of the fog to avoid battle and withdraw to Audenarde, depriving Francis of a decisive battle. The only positive outcome was the capture of Hesdin in Artois (held down to 1529) but Tournai, an enclave in Habsburg territory, could not be saved. While French power in Lombardy was collapsing, France also had to fight off two English expeditions in 1522 and 1523, at the height of an internal crisis brought about by the Constable of Bourbon's flight to the Emperor. The second English invasion (under Suffolk) was more serious in that it managed to cross the Somme but the English supply lines were too long and they could not cope with any but the most antiquated fortifications.

The mid-1520s saw armies flowing back and forth across the Alps like tides. A return to Italy was never far from French objectives; even at the height of the Bourbon crisis, an army was being prepared to cross the Alps, though in view of the internal dangers, it was given to Bonnivet to command over the winter of 1523-4. A cautious commander and unreliable Swiss troops forced the French army to retreat in April 1524, the famous Bayard was killed and the artillery shamefully left behind. In July, France itself was invaded by an imperial army commanded by Bourbon. Much of Provence was occupied but Bourbon undertook a siege of Marseille, against his better judgment. While Francis camped at Avignon unsure what to do, Marseille seemed to be about to fall to an assault, when a landsknecht mutiny forced Bourbon to withdraw (29 September). The French response was startlingly rapid. Francis's army was already assembling and in October he crossed the Alps. Milan (though not its castle) fell on 26 October.

If Francis thought the campaign was over, he was mistaken. The imperial forces had not been defeated and withdrew to their strongholds. Francis decided to besiege the key city of Pavia but the operation dragged on for three months. Meanwhile the forces of the imperial commanders, Lannoy and Bourbon, were strengthened by Frundsberg's landsknechts. Francis, who had detached part of his army under Albany for a march to Naples, thought his troops superior in numbers but his troops became bogged down in the siege and the imperial army seized the advantage of a night operation to break into the park where he was camped. The result, 24 February 1525, was the greatest disaster to French arms since Poitiers in 1356 and the King himself was captured. France was lucky that the Regent, Louise of Savoy, was able to take energetic measures for

defence. There was no serious invasion in the north and peace with England was concluded at the More in August 1525. The forces Albany had taken into central Italy were able to get back to France. But Charles, with Francis brought to Spain, was in a position to dictate terms, which, not surprisingly, were harsh. Francis abandoned his sovereignty of Flanders and Artois, his claims to Milan and Naples and agreed to Charles's claims to the duchy of Burgundy (Madrid, 14 January 1526).

Francis, who returned to France only by leaving his two older sons hostage in Spain for the treaty, never intended to carry out its terms. He was back in France on 17 March and on 22 May a new anti-Habsburg alliance, the 'Holy League' of Cognac was signed with the Pope, Venice, Florence and the duke of Milan. Henry VIII was to be its 'Protector.' Though France did not take part directly, it stood to gain from the inconclusive war waged by the League and its troops under the duke of Urbino. The problem was that neither side was effectively organised for a decisive battle. Pope Clement VII was beleaguered by local enemies and the imperial army under Bourbon, unpaid and out of control, sacked Rome and captured him on 6 May 1527.

When news of the sack arrived, war preparations were stepped up in France but the view was that not much could be done for the Pope. The main preoccupation was to ensure the alliance of Henry VIII, negotiated by Wolsey (Amiens, 18 August 1527). Open war was not declared against the Emperor until January 1528 but, well before that, armies were being prepared for operations in Italy. Surprisingly, though, the objective of the army commanded by Lautrec in the Spring of 1528 was not Milan but Naples, which he had to reach by a detour around the imperial forces at Rome through the Romagna. The Genoese Admiral Andrea Doria had placed his city and fleet at French disposal and this enabled France to control the sea. Naples was besieged on 1 May but almost immediately sea-power was lost by the desertion of Doria, who feared French objectives in Genoa and, anyway, had not been paid. The army disintegrated over the summer through disease, including the luckless Lautrec, swept away on 15 August. The tattered remnants of the French army had to march north to join the army of reinforcement brought by Saint-Pol. This, after a war of manoeuvre, was caught by Antonio de Leyva at Landriano on 21 June 1529 and destroyed. The game in Italy was effectively over and peace-terms signed at Cambrai in the Netherlands (3 August) restored the treaty of Madrid, without the provisions over Burgundy.

There now began an unusual respite in the wars that lasted until 1536. The major powers were exhausted from war but most of the great conflicts were unresolved, most notably the question of Milan, where the succession to the Sforza regime was a problem. Francis might have formally resigned his claims but the death of Francesco Sforza in November 1535 opened the question again. In addition, the power of the Emperor seemed to become more threatening with his success at Tunis in 1535 and covert French negotiations with the Turks and (rather more openly with the German princes) seemed to give a cause for war. England was effectively neutralised by its internal problems and Francis stopped paying his 'pension' to Henry VIII in 1534. Nevertheless, the war that broke out in 1536 signalled a new departure in French policy. Firstly, there was a new



strategy, that of occupying Piedmont and providing a permanent sally-port into Italy without attempting the increasingly difficult task of holding down Milan. An initial conquest by a French army under Chabot early in 1536 was threatened by a Habsburg counter-attack that, as in 1524, brought the Emperor's army (commanded this time by Charles in person) into Provence for another siege of Marseille. As on the previous occasion, Francis' refusal to give battle but rather dig in at Avignon sent the Emperor's forces back to Italy starving. Little could be done to reinforce Piedmont because a much more powerful threat had developed to the French northern frontier with Nassau's attack on Péronne (beaten off with ferocious determination in August). The French campaign of Artois in the Spring of 1537 (capture of Hesdin and Saint-Pol) at least established a French foothold in Habsburg territory that lasted, despite the Emperor's counter-attack. French forces in Piedmont remained beleaguered but the conclusion of a truce on the northern front (30 July) allowed the deployment of a fresh army of lansquenets under Montmorency (now very much the dominant minister) and the forcing of the pass of Susa in October 1537 confirmed the French domination of Piedmont that was to last until 1559. Both sides were financially exhausted (spending at least 5 million lt. a year on campaigns). A more substantial ten-year truce was concluded at Nice and Aigues-Mortes in July 1538. This, very much the work of Montmorency, signalled a highly unusual rapprochement between King and Emperor symbolized by Charles's visit to France in 1539.

Unfortunately, the underlying problems had been shelved, not solved. Charles had given undertakings to accommodate Francis' claims by enfeoffing one of his younger sons in Flanders or Milan. Neither was a practical possibility and relations were severely tested by Charles's decision in October 1540 to invest his son Philip as duke of Milan. In 1541, the murder of two French envoys in Italy (which turned out to have been done on the orders of the imperial governor del Vasto) provided a *casus belli*. By May 1542 the decision for war had been taken and in July it was openly declared, this time fought on a grand scale. Piedmont was reinforced by an army of 35,000 but most of this was withdrawn for an attack in Roussillon. There, an army of 40,000, under the nominal command of the Dauphin but led by Annebault, laid siege to Perpignan but was beaten off in August. Another French army crossed the north-east frontier under the King's younger son Orléans (really commanded by Guise) and quickly captured Luxembourg. This, though, fell to an imperial counter-attack. Meanwhile French forces were transferred to Piedmont again and a camp set up at Carignano. There, another failure before Coni overtook Annebault. The massive efforts of 1542 had proved largely fruitless.

The next phase was dominated by the formation of two great armies on the northern frontier in the Spring of 1543. Charles V, now assured of the English alliance, intended to go over to the attack but Francis assembled another massive army to confront him at Maroilles in July, with which he seized Maubeuge and Landrecies. He then pursued his objective of retaking Luxembourg (28 September) and getting help to his ally the duke of Cleves. But Charles's army was approaching and there took place one of the stranger confrontations of the wars, with two massive armies facing each other, almost within sight, but failing to fight. The risks of a decisive battle were enormous and neither side was

in a hurry to take the plunge. Francis, after waiting as long as honour required and revictualling Landrecies, decamped during the night (4 November).

The following year, 1544, was dominated by the Anglo-Imperial invasion of France and their project for a joint attack on Paris. Francis, though, had time to gain a last victory in Italy. Piedmont remained a vital frontier and the commander there, Enghien, aimed to seize the key fortress of Carignano; the imperial commander del Vasto was determined to prevent this. The outcome was the last great set-piece battle of the Italian wars, at Ceresole in Piedmont (14 April 1544), in which a French army of 12,000 defeated an imperial army of 13–14,000 (see chapter 7). The victory might have led to a new French occupation of Milan but there was no money to pay the troops and France was already overwhelmed by invasion.

The forces involved in the confrontation of summer 1544 were large. The Emperor was planning his force at Speyer from February but it took time to bring his troops from Germany together with those from the Low Countries. In May Gonzaga recaptured Luxembourg. When the siege of Saint-Dizier began the imperial forces came together and amounted to 35,000 (30,000 infantry) and 60 pieces of artillery. Meanwhile, Henry VIII advanced with a similar number against Boulogne and Montreuil. The outcome of the campaign was really determined by the heroic defence of Saint-Dizier, which lasted until 17 August. Charles continued his march through Champagne and then entered Soissons, though with supplies shrinking. Francis had established a fortified camp at Jalons, west of Châlons, with a force very similar in numbers to the Emperor's but was reluctant to counter-attack. Charles, running out of supplies and without help from Henry VIII, abandoned his attack on Paris on 11 September. Henry VIII, though, managed to capture Boulogne on 13th, five days before Francis and the Emperor agreed the peace of Crépy.

The peace shelved the major problems. The *status quo* of 1538 was restored and marriage alliances proposed that would give Orléans either the Low Countries or Milan. But the treaty was unworkable, as it would have aggrandised the King's younger son too much. The fact that Henry VIII had snatched Boulogne just before the peace made him reluctant to participate and so the war with England continued until June 1546, the main engagements being a naval war in the summer of 1545 that saw a French raid on the Isle of Wight and the sinking of the *Mary Rose* and a French expedition to help allies in Scotland. Francis may well have been on the verge of returning to war with the Emperor in 1547 but his death put an end to preparations.

In any case, French military objectives were again beginning to shift. The new regime of Henri II was deeply preoccupied by Scotland in its first years since the English invasion of 1547 seemed to threaten the destruction of a key French ally's independence. Expeditionary forces under d'Essé (1548) and Termes (1549) effectively neutralised English power north of the border and brought Scotland and its child Queen into a sort of French protectorate. This was confirmed with the brief war waged by the new King in person for the recovery of Boulogne (August 1549–March 1550). Yet other fronts were not forgotten. A war with the Emperor could not be contemplated at first but Germany remained crucial to French military planning and negotiations with princes disgruntled

with the Emperor's domination by the Augsburg Interim (1548) came to fruition in 1551. In Italy, imperial power was undermined by support for the Farneses in Parma and expeditions were sent there in 1550, then to Siena (1554–8), Corsica (1553) and, finally, Naples under the duke of Guise (1556–7). The Italian wars therefore continued in limited form down to the end of the 1550s, especially since the maintenance of French power in Piedmont was vital.

However, it is undoubtedly the case that the northern and eastern frontiers saw the operation of the most important French armies after the declaration of war against the Emperor at the start of 1552. The period down to 1559 saw the longest period of uninterrupted campaigning in the wars (except for the brief and uneasy Truce of Vaucelles in February 1556). The great 'voyage d'Allemagne' of 1552 that led to the capture of Metz (April–May 1552) and then the calamitous failure of the Emperor's counter-siege early in 1553 dealt a blow to Charles's self-confidence. However, he was able to assemble another great army to attack in the north in April 1553, where fighting concentrated on the possession of French enclaves in Artois at Théroutanne and Hesdin, which were definitively lost in June–July 1553. In response, in Spring 1554 three great French armies attacked in Artois, Hainault and Luxembourg, the most important commanded by Montmorency, that captured Mariembourg and Binche and wrought widespread devastation in return for imperial actions the previous year. With the French armies reunited, a thrust towards Brussels was projected under the King's personal command, but the Emperor had taken counter-measures and the French army moved towards Artois for the defence of the Boulonnais. Here Guise gained a limited advantage with a small force against a much larger imperial army at Renty (August 1554). This was not exploited but the French were able to establish a fort at Rocroi to dominate the Ardennes. In Italy, the long-drawn-out siege of Siena ended with the surrender of French forces on honourable terms in April 1555. Peace talks at Marcq in May–June 1555 came to nothing but approaches continued until the conclusion of the Truce of Vaucelles in February 1556.

The truce, meant to be for five years, broke down under the pressure of events in Italy (Pope Paul IV's determination to defy Spain and the intervention of Spanish forces against Rome in August) and lobbying for war by the Guises for command of an army to conquer Naples. The decision for war was taken in September and Guise was already well into Italy with an army of nearly 15,000 when the Truce was declared null on 31 January 1557. It had already effectively ended with Coligny's failed surprise attack on Douai on 6 January. With Charles in retirement, his son Philip took up the Habsburg cause and, fortified by a declaration of war on France by England on 7 June, his general, Emmanuel-Philibert duke of Savoy, dealt a devastating counter-blow to France at the battle of Saint-Quentin (10 August 1557). This forced the return of most French forces in central Italy operating under the duke of Guise. The capture of Calais by Guise in January 1558, followed by Thionville on 22 June, to an extent enabled French forces to be rebuilt and forces under Guise pressed deeper into Luxembourg in July. But an army under the command of marshal de Termes was almost annihilated near Gravelines on 13 July (in a battle that involved bombardment from the sea by English ships). This opened the way to

the Somme and it became necessary to draw up a new French army near Amiens to counter the threat. By the summer of 1558 both monarchies were seriously exhausted and forced to begin peace negotiations in October. A project to renew the French challenge in Navarre by Antoine de Bourbon, that came to fruition in January 1559, had firmly to be squashed in the interest of the peace talks. These culminated in the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (3 April 1559). French occupation of Piedmont was effectively ended and the dream of Italy seemed to French public opinion to be at an end. In retrospect, the peace seemed to write off seventy years of French effort.

In fact, there is no reason to suppose that the long Habsburg-Valois wars would have definitively ended had not France descended into political and religious conflict after the death of Henri II in July 1559. The great power conflict that had come to a peak in the 1550s was not settled and was to revive, of course, in the 17th century but France was now on the verge of forty years of civil war. For this reason, the years 1559–60 mark a significant watershed in French international and military operations that had begun in 1494.



# 1

## **‘One World is Not Enough’: Kings, Ministers and Decisions on Policy and Strategy in Renaissance France**

### **Dynastic war and personal rivalry**

François de Rochechouart, present on the field of Marignano, reported to his brother that he had not had the slightest hope ‘that we would be duke of Milan’ until the great victory that had just been won.<sup>1</sup> The sentiments are echoed by Brantôme at the end of the century, when he described Milan as ‘our heritage.’<sup>2</sup> Many contemporaries saw the making of war in terms of the vindication of royal rights and those rights were seen, in some inchoate way, to embody those of the state. Erasmus told Francis I in 1523 that kings ‘have the sword to defend the tranquility of the common weal, not to foster their own ambitions’. The year before, he wrote to Charles V that no reasons for war justified the sufferings that it inflicted.<sup>3</sup> Both Erasmus and Thomas More, though, assumed that princes waged war in the defence of their rights and reputations. The works of 1516–17, which in the case of More satirised French debates about war for dynastic rights or, in the case of Erasmus, systematically undermined the case for dynastic war, make this quite clear.<sup>4</sup> For Claude Collet in his Erasmian tract against the war of 1544, one argument for war was ‘for each to maintain his right’.<sup>5</sup> The same idea was expressed ironically by the voice of Mars in Claude Chappuys’s 1540 celebration of peace: ‘What’s a king worth who does not strive,/ his lands and kingdoms to make wide?’<sup>6</sup> The rules that governed international relations were expressed in terms of the rights of princes. No just war could be embarked upon without the vindication of such ‘rights’ and they, in a sense, provided a framework through which kings and princes could understand their role.

<sup>1</sup> L. Desaiivre (ed.), ‘Lettres de François de Rochechouart’, *AHP*, 31 (1901), pp. 246-70, and P. de Vaissière, *Une Correspondance de famille au commencement du XVIe siècle: lettres de la maison d’Aumont* (Paris, 1909), p. 9.

<sup>2</sup> Brantôme, ed. Lalanne, III, p. 50; VII, p. 9.

<sup>3</sup> *Opus epistolarum Erasmi*, 12 vols, ed. P.S. and H.M. Allen (Oxford, 1906-58), V, no. 1400, p. 354; *Obras escogidas de Erasmo*, tr. L. Riber (Madrid, 1964), p. 1238.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas More, *The Complete Works*, IV, ed. E. Surtz and J.H. Hexter (New Haven, Ct, 1965), pp. 86-91; Erasmus, *Collected Works*, vol. 27: *Complaint of Peace, Education of a Prince*, ed. A.H.T. Levi (Toronto, 1986), pp. 277-9, 312-13.

<sup>5</sup> Bib.II, 96, p. 10.

<sup>6</sup> Bib.II, 94.

The historiographer Jean d'Auton began his narrative of Louis XII's campaign to conquer Milan with a detailed exposé of the King's 'right and title' with 'a little genealogy.' This derived from the marriage of Duke Louis of Orléans to Valentina Visconti, a right 'usurped' by the Sforzas. Though the vindication of this had been impeded by the wars with the English, Louis XII on his accession logically and immediately took it up.<sup>7</sup> Nor does d'Auton find it surprising that the French, Swiss and Spanish troops, who found themselves momentarily together at Rome in June 1501, should have begun to brawl in the streets over whether king Louis or king Ferdinand had the better right to the kingdom of Naples.<sup>8</sup> Yet there were limits of realism to the vindication of such claims. By 1503, the conquest of Naples had become a drain on resources, to the extent that, though Louis XII despatched an army to avenge the defeat of Cerignola, he and Cardinal d'Amboise were actively seeking a way out by trying to negotiate the marriage of the young Marguerite d'Angoulême with the rightful king, Federico.<sup>9</sup>

In a widely distributed narrative of the dispute over Piedmont and the outbreak of war in 1536 by the poet and historian Jean Bouchet, he recounts how, rather conveniently, at the start of 1535, 'it was pointed out' to the King that he had a right to the duchy of Savoy through his mother. The argument ran that succession should go to the issue of Duke Filippo II's first marriage rather than to that of his second, from which the reigning duke, Carlo III, stemmed. Francis was also 'informed' that Nice, Villefranche and Piedmont belonged to him as dependencies of the county of Provence. This 'usurpation' and that of the marquisate of Saluzzo, which, it was argued, depended on Dauphiné, were placed before the King's council. Having received no satisfaction, the King was forced to resort to arms in vindication of his right. The strategic reasons for these developments will be discussed below but it is important to register at this point the way the public understood an act of aggression by France against Savoy.<sup>10</sup>

When, in 1542, a decision was taken to attack Charles V in Luxembourg and Roussillon, these objectives were made more attractive by genealogical claims. For Luxembourg, these were the 'illegal' acquisition by Philip the Good of Burgundy, set against the cession to France of their rights by the 'true' claimants of the house of La Marck. For Roussillon, it was possible to deny the validity of the cession made to Ferdinand of Aragon by Charles VIII in the treaty of Senlis on the grounds of the deceptions of that king's confessor, Olivier Maillard. It was also contrary to the inalienability of the royal domain. Added to this was the non-fulfillment of the contract by Ferdinand and his successors.<sup>11</sup> This sort

<sup>7</sup> D'Auton, I, pp. 4–7.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 31–3.

<sup>9</sup> Marino Sanuto, *Diarii*, ed. F. Stefani, 58 vols (Venice, 1879–19), 11 Dec. 1503; J. Godefroy, *Lettres du Roy Louis XII et du Cardinal G. d'Amboise ... depuis 1504 jusques et compris 1514*, 4 vols (Brussels, 1712), I, p. 1.

<sup>10</sup> *Bib.* II, 92, fo. 275r–v.

<sup>11</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 62.

of thing was the regular *modus operandi* of the early modern French state in justifying its aggression.

Such rhetoric, bolstered by Charles Estienne's translation of Giovio's history of Milan in 1552, was punctured by the ironic treatment of the various claims to Milan by Brantôme at the end of the 16th century in his biography of Francis I. Both the Valois and the Sforzas, he implied, had little legal claim since both were derived from the actions of military usurpers and the Emperor, as suzerain, had as much a claim. In any case, Francis had undermined his case by recognizing the Sforza claim at the time of the League of Cognac (1526). It all depended on the origins of the case, he thought, though he hints that any clear solution was impossible.<sup>12</sup>

Personal relations between rulers always mattered but in few periods more crucially than during the Renaissance, with all its pressures to competitive emulation.<sup>13</sup> The attitude of Francis I to Charles V and Henry VIII was vital, if only because it was through their personal duels that their subjects understood their conflict. How, then, did Francis regard his great rival the Emperor? Here the experience of Pavia was central. In a letter Francis wrote to Charles from prison, he asked:

Should you have that noble pity to arrange the safety that an imprisoned king of France deserves, who should be gained as a friend not made desperate, you can be sure of gaining an asset, not a useless prisoner, and of rendering a king for ever your slave.<sup>14</sup>

But Francis was determined to insist that his signature on the treaty of Madrid was worthless. In 1536 he reiterated that 'a prisoner keeps his freedom of his word.'<sup>15</sup>

Several times in their reigns, Francis and Charles – at a distance – confronted each other publicly and denounced each other's proceedings. The first major confrontation was over the imperial election in 1519. In his instructions for his envoys to the German princes, Francis stressed the dangers to Christendom in electing a prince who was 'cowardly, or who lacks will or power' and went on to point out 'the youth of the Catholic King' and the fact that he was 'sickly'.<sup>16</sup> During the extraordinary declaration made by the Emperor at Rome in the Consistory (April 1536), Charles recalled that Francis had then sent word that they should treat the contest like the pursuit of the one woman by two honourable men; whoever lost would not bear a grudge. Charles argued that, despite

<sup>12</sup> Bib.II, 104c; Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, pp. 270–2.

<sup>13</sup> G. Richardson, *Renaissance Monarchy* (London, 2002), *passim*.

<sup>14</sup> Quoted H. Lemonnier, *La Lutte contre la maison d'Autriche* (Paris, 1911), p. 38.

<sup>15</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, p. 405.

<sup>16</sup> A. Kluckhohn (ed.), *Deutsche Reichstagsakten unter Kaiser Karl V*, 8 vols (Munich, 1893; repr. Göttingen, 1962–2006), I, pp. 171, 173: 'Quant au Roy catholique, fault considérer son jeune âge et que ses royaumes sont lointains de l'Empire' (quoted Lemonnier, *La Lutte*, p. 6).



this, Francis ‘had become jealous of his greatness’.<sup>17</sup> In his reply to this, Francis insisted, ‘I spoke as I thought,’ and had asked the Emperor to renew their alliances.<sup>18</sup> Francis refuted the Emperor’s grievances point by point, portraying Charles constantly as the aggressor. He ceded to no prince in his concern for Christendom; his witness was ‘my patience, considering the wrongs that had been done me.’<sup>19</sup>

In 1523, Francis affected indifference to his rival: ‘I don’t fear the Emperor, since he has no money.’<sup>20</sup> In 1520, in the aftermath of his failure in the imperial election, he had sent an acute observation to his ambassador at Rome:

There is no need to fear, as you say, that he has more than his predecessors as Emperor, for his lands are so distant from each other and of such doubtful loyalty as everyone knows, that he will have enough to do to retain them, without taking on others. ... On the other hand, you know well enough that if the princes of Christendom knew that he wanted to gobble them up one after another, they would never allow it ... but would unite to send him packing. In addition, the princes of Germany, who live in freedom, would not have him so great he could make them his subjects.<sup>21</sup>

In 1528 when he delivered a formal cartel of defiance via the herald Guyenne, Francis pointed out that he neither claimed nor aspired to the Empire ‘nor to universal rule’ but not even prisoners of the infidels had been subjected to such onerous demands as he had.<sup>22</sup> For his part the Emperor had aimed to:

Make me abandon my friends before the return of my children, having captured a Pope, lieutenant of God on Earth, ruined all the sacred things, taken no action over the Turk ... nor over the heresies and new sects that are spreading through Christendom, which is the job of an Emperor.<sup>23</sup>

In 1536, when Charles again demanded personal combat in the interests of Christendom, Francis was more dismissive:

I reply that, accused of nothing concerning my honour ... and this offer of combat being voluntary and without any stain to that honour, it seems to me that our swords are too short to fight from such a distance.

Should war take place and they meet, then he would accept combat or risk ‘being condemned by all men of honour, something I fear more than combat.’<sup>24</sup>

<sup>17</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, p. 357. Francis had written to his ambassadors, 5 July 1519: ‘j’ay pris et prens (l’issue de l’affaire) comme je dois en bonne part et trop plus au prouffit et advantaige de moy et mon royaume que autrement’ (Kluckhohn, *Deutsche Reichstagsakten*, I, p. 856n).

<sup>18</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, p. 404.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 409–10.

<sup>20</sup> Quoted Lemonnier, *La Lutte*, p. 14.

<sup>21</sup> Barrillon, I, pp. 155–6.

<sup>22</sup> C. Weiss (ed.), *Papiers d’état du Cardinal de Gramvelle*, 9 vols (Paris, 1841–52) I, pp. 354–5.

<sup>23</sup> Weiss, *Papiers d’état*, I, p. 356; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, p. 47.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 412.

Du Bellay was convinced that Francis felt sharply the indignity that the Emperor had forced on him, by insisting on the terms of the 1529 treaty of Cambrai for the return of his children. His advisers, though, only encouraged his feelings of outrage – ‘a running sore in his heart at feeling such outrage and disdain.’<sup>25</sup> Others had often told him that the Emperor ‘only wanted to keep him busy while building up his alliance.’<sup>26</sup> On the other hand, Francis entertained Charles lavishly on his journey through France in 1539, with some of the most spectacular celebrations of his reign.

### French diplomacy and justifications for war

The rivalry of rulers may have stood in for the reasons for war in the eyes of many of their subjects but from 1519 onwards, the constant theme of French diplomats was the danger of imperial pretensions, the threat of a Habsburg ‘monarchia’ throughout all Christendom. In some ways this was an old debate. Dante and Marsilius of Padua had called for the unity of Christendom under the Emperor, while French scholars had refuted this. No matter how hollow these imperial claims were, they made a useful propaganda device, particularly in the remarkable circumstances of Charles V’s ‘empire.’ In 1532, Henry VIII and Francis declared that the Emperor wished to make himself ‘monarch of all Christendom’<sup>27</sup> and in 1533 Francis’s diplomats in Italy were insisting that ‘he aimed to reduce Italy entirely to a monarchy in his hands.’ These ideas were further developed in French propaganda of the 1540s. One declaration (1543) denounced the Emperor’s ‘furious appetite for power’ and the fact that ‘there is nothing he does not claim and wish to take from others.’ The Emperor thought he was destined to ‘command all kings, all peoples.’<sup>28</sup>

At the end of his life, Francis sent agents to Italy with proposals for an alliance which was, in his view, the best device ‘to rein in the Emperor’s ambition and stop him from carrying out he plan to make himself universal ruler (*monarque*).’<sup>29</sup> The same point was reiterated in debates over the relocation of the Council of Trent early in 1547. Charles V’s envoy reported from France:

always the same old vomit of those here, who say openly that Your Majesty aims only at universal dominion and not at a Council and by this means they will prevent it. These are their usual lies.<sup>30</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., II, pp. 124-5.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., II, p. 132.

<sup>27</sup> H. Hauser, *Les Débuts de l’âge moderne. La Renaissance et la Réforme* (Paris, 1929), p. 401. In 1540 Henry tried to sever the relations between Francis and Charles V by asserting that the latter ‘shuld have in his hedd ones to bring Christendom to a monarchie’ (*St.P.*, IX, p. 249).

<sup>28</sup> *Bib.* II, 86.

<sup>29</sup> E. Charrière, *Négociations de la France dans le Levant*, 4 vols (Paris, 1848–60), I, p. 648.

<sup>30</sup> HNSA, Frankreich 15, Berichte 1547, IV, fo. 13v; J.-D. Pariset, ‘La France et les princes allemands (1545–57)’, *Francia*, 10 (1982), at pp. 245–6.

Another informant revealed the closeness of informal relations between Francis I and England in 1546–7 ‘because of the universal dominion those here say the Emperor aims at.’ It was a fear that French allies in Germany played on after 1548.<sup>31</sup>

By the 1530s, it was widely assumed among a certain strand of French diplomats – most notably those in the du Bellay circle – that nothing could assuage the Emperor’s hostility. Nicolas Raince, agent in Rome for Jean du Bellay, took the view that tentative peace talks being mooted at the papal court were only favoured by the king’s enemies. The Emperor

knows well that the one thing that stands in the way of his plans is the King and that he will never cease to make things difficult for him and render him unthreatening, which will be, my lord ... when envy is dead.

For Raince, the Emperor’s declaration that he would challenge the King to personal combat and that he would deprive him of his kingdom or lose his life was a sign of derangement: ‘it seems he is completely out of his mind and has no good intentions.’<sup>32</sup>

The role of the du Bellays in formulating a coherent French propaganda attack on the Emperor was central. By 1536, a standard narrative of the conflict had emerged in the speeches and writings of French diplomats. In May 1536, Cardinal Jean de Lorraine gave the Pope ‘a true summary history’ of the wars that stressed the Emperor’s aggression throughout.<sup>33</sup> At the same time, Guillaume du Bellay drew up a long riposte along the same lines, nominally addressed to a German friend, which refuted the Emperor’s Rome declaration point by point.<sup>34</sup> This more or less followed the narrative of Lorraine’s speech; its main aim was to denounce the Emperor as the cause of the wars within Christendom:

The Emperor has been the aggressor in the previous war and this ... if he desires, as he claims and wants us to believe, to bring peace to Christendom, why does he not show it? Why, since he wishes to have the honour and glory of this, will he not allow the profit to go to others?<sup>35</sup>

What was more, the Emperor had shown himself to be cruel, first in his treatment of Francis and then of his children in captivity.<sup>36</sup>

Part of the du Bellay ‘campaign’ against the Emperor, if so it can be called, was to rally the support of the German princes and link their fears of Charles’s intentions to French interests, and in the course of this some novel ideas were aired.<sup>37</sup> Guillaume du Bellay wrote numerous letters to the princes of the Empire with this in mind. The argument was developed after Henri II’s accession in

<sup>31</sup> HNSA, Frankreich 14, St.Mauris to Marie, 1 April 1547.

<sup>32</sup> R. Scheurer (ed.), *Correspondance du Cardinal Jean du Bellay*, 2 vols (Paris: SHF, 1969, 1973), II, p. 322.

<sup>33</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 15–17.

<sup>34</sup> Bib.II, 99 (re-issued with Bib.II, 104).

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, fos. 82r, 92r.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, fos. 99r–100r.

<sup>37</sup> E.g. *ibid.*, fo. 107v; Bib.II, 102–3.

1547 and the Emperor's victory at Mühlberg. The latter seriously threatened French alliances in the Empire and stimulated greater efforts to intervene in Germany on the pretext of defending German liberties. Charles was accused in the treaty of Chambord (drawn up in October 1551 and signed 15 January 1552) of attempting to force the German nobility to abandon their ancient liberties and fall into 'a bestial, unbearable and everlasting slavery.'<sup>38</sup> Henri II's manifesto of 3 February, printed at Marburg, had at its head a Phrygian bonnet between two daggers and a scroll with the word 'libertas.' The French King was entitled 'Henry II King of the French defender of German liberties and of the captive princes.'<sup>39</sup> The text of this declaration was widely circulated, translated into French and included in Bouchet's *Annales*.

### Contemporary writers on the causes of war

War was the main theme of memoir writing in the 16th century. A number of modern historians have argued authors of these texts had little clear understanding of the causes of war.<sup>40</sup> However, such writers understood the origins of wars in a framework which, though it might seem strange to modern conceptions, made every sense in its own terms. Some were more sophisticated than others. Jean d'Auton, a Benedictine monk (born in Saintonge around 1466), whose chronicle of his master, Louis XII's, wars reveals a profoundly chivalric passion for war, provides a mine of information through his delight in the details of military campaigns. As a follower of Froissart, he makes clear that he drew his information from his own observation or eye-witness accounts and takes trouble to spell these out.<sup>41</sup> His conception of the reasons for writing chronicles is simply stated: fairness. Thus,

Every historiographer should show clearly, with authentic narrative, successes and failures according to their reality, without confusing them out of hope of favour or fear of displeasing.<sup>42</sup>

Elsewhere, he defines his conception of objectivity as: 'to advance the virtuous according to their merits and reprove the vicious according to their faults.'<sup>43</sup> His understanding of the causes of war, though, is limited. After exposing Louis's hereditary claims to Milan, he sketches the state of France and its readiness for war. With the kingdom at peace at home

<sup>38</sup> J. Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique du droit des gens*, 8 vols (Amsterdam, 1726–31), IV.3 (1726), p. 31.

<sup>39</sup> G. Zeller, *La Réunion de Metz à la France, 1552-1648*, 2 vols (Paris, 1926), I, p. 177.

<sup>40</sup> C. Gaier, 'L'Opinion des chefs de guerre français du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle sur les progrès de l'art militaire', *Revue internationale d'histoire militaire*, 29 (1970), 745–6; Y.N. Harari, *Renaissance Military Memoirs* (Woodbridge, 2004), pp. 127–8.

<sup>41</sup> See Maulde-la-Clavière's study of him, in d'Auton, II, pp. xvi–xxiii; see also *ibid.*, IV, pp. 196, 210, 229; II, p. 266; III, pp. 162, 217, 314–15.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 135.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, III, p. 158.

By the command of the King and the advice of his senior councillors, the most noble army of France was sent beyond the mountains to complete the conquest of Milan.<sup>44</sup>

D'Auton took, then, a highly stylised and traditional view of the reasons for war, while he understood the material basis for waging it. Outlining the measures for defence taken by Louis XII in 1506, he noted that the King's enemies had much to fear:

For he had men and money which, after God's help, secures victories, conquests and the defence of kingdoms. Though the building up of money is loathesome to all liberal princes, it gives succour in all battles.<sup>45</sup>

He also conveyed a highly aristocratic view of war, perhaps best shown in the speech about the Genoese he put into the mouth of the Grand Maître de Chaumont in 1507.<sup>46</sup> D'Auton's analysis was shared by Guillaume de Marillac in his biography of Charles de Bourbon, written at least partly in the reign of Louis XII.<sup>47</sup>

Martin du Bellay brought his memoirs, largely based until the 1540s on the writings of his brother the diplomat Guillaume, to completion in the mid-1550s. They were not published, though, until 1569, from which time they enjoyed great success.<sup>48</sup> These *Memoirs* are a complex composite work based on the highly informed analysis by Guillaume, the diplomat and soldier, and a supplementary narrative supplied by Martin. Martin's contribution, highly personal in observation, is more akin to the military memoir. Guillaume's work, embedded in it, is more a considered history of the times. Du Bellay's famous description of the opening of the wars between Charles and Francis was deployed as an example of how great and destructive wars could grow from small beginnings:<sup>49</sup>

The start was for trivial reasons, but God above had (as I think) decided on it either to punish the sins of subjects and call them to recognition of them, or to punish the great who all too often do not reverence him as they should. It has many times been seen, in our times and in the past, that a *great fire is lit from a small spark*, insofar as there is nothing easier than to provoke princes one against another. Then, once they have started, it is amazingly difficult to stop them.<sup>50</sup>

The same phrase had been used by the chancellery clerk Jean Barrillon in his memoirs. He, too, saw the marginal events in the Ardennes as the start of 'the war that since has been great and cruel' and for good measure added the homily

<sup>44</sup> Ibid., I, pp. 5–7.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid., IV, p. 63.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., IV, p. 187.

<sup>47</sup> G. de Marillac, *La Vie du connétable de Bourbon*, ed. J.A.C. Buchon (Panthéon littéraire) (Paris, 1836), pp. 144–8: 'le duc d'Orléans à présent regnant' (at p. 146).

<sup>48</sup> V.-L. Bourrilly, *Guillaume du Bellay, seigneur de Langey, 1491–1543* (Paris, 1905), pp. 376–400.

<sup>49</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 106–12.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid., I, p. 106.

that when God wanted to punish a man for his sins, he allowed him to follow his desires and so fall into misfortune. Those who started wars without just cause were truly evil.<sup>51</sup> The Emperor, in du Bellay's view, had been determined to 'ruin the King' since 1520 and had set out to undermine his alliances. In this, he had been favoured by the ill-considered actions of Marshal de Foix-Lescun in alienating the Milanese nobility. Only the vigorous actions of the King against the Emperor in the Low Countries had held him at bay.<sup>52</sup>

Du Bellay's view of the Emperor's reaction to his great triumph of 1525 and subsequent events follows the chronicle tradition established by Bouchet and Paradin. Charles, he thought, treated his captive harshly and only came to visit him at Madrid when he thought he was dying and thus he was in danger of losing 'the fruit of his victory.' He was intent on 'unreasonable' demands and even considered arresting Francis's sister Marguerite on the expiry of her safe-conduct.<sup>53</sup> His treatment of Bourbon was deceptive.<sup>54</sup> In discussing the Emperor's journey through France in 1539, Martin notes the 'malicious nature' of the Emperor.<sup>55</sup> Once safely in his own dominions he 'threw off the mask' and refused to carry out his promises over Milan.<sup>56</sup> Many had thought the Emperor's visit had boded well for peace but some 'knew the Emperors' disposition to be that he thought anything, by deceit or otherwise, was legitimate to achieve his ambitions.<sup>57</sup>

From around 1530, the du Bellay picture is one of an increasingly wily Emperor determined to check every French move. Du Bellay's judgment on the treaty of Cambrai was that Francis I could only feel resentment at the rigorous terms for ransom of his children, including the abdication of sovereignty in Flanders, Artois and Milan. He thought that 'some who preferred the trouble of Christendom to its peace' had persuaded Charles that, should Francis ever recover Milan, he would never let Naples and Sicily alone.<sup>58</sup> He should thus restore Milan to Sforza, satisfy the potentates of Italy and draw them into a League, which Savoy would join and generally undermine all French alliances.<sup>59</sup> Before crossing to Italy, Charles agreed to this strategy in Spain 'as many princes do, who prefer to listen to a pleasing than a salutary counsel.'<sup>60</sup>

In the sections of the *Memoirs* that are certainly by Guillaume du Bellay, the analysis of the Emperor's policy is subtle and careful, based on extensive diplomatic papers that reflect discussion within inner circles in France. Charles's position in October 1535 and his 'dissimulation' in showing himself contented at Francis's congratulations over Tunis was, thought du Bellay 'the way the Emperor wanted to amuse and divert the King', fearing the weakness of his

<sup>51</sup> Barrillon, II, p. 178.

<sup>52</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 171, 173–5, 162.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 12.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 32.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, III, p. 448.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, III, p. 453.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, p. 2.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 122–3.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 123.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 124n (ms version).

forces. Meanwhile the French army prepared to invade Milan. Despite Granvelle's proposals for a settlement of quarrels through marriage: 'the Emperor's intention was entirely concealment in order to delay the King,'<sup>61</sup> and was designed to make it seem to the world that he had sought peace and the king had broken it.

Guillaume, in one of the extended passages in which he reflected on the causes of conflict, argued that, though the two princes had been at peace for some years, all their actions and practices indicated that, though they were not at war, they were hardly at peace. Talk of deals was belied by the fact that a break was coming ever closer: 'All people of understanding judged that it only remained to both to cover themselves before the world from the blame of undertaking the first aggression.' By 1535, the King had accumulated enough grudges and the Emperor knew that resentment in a prince could be dissembled or made public at a convenient moment. So Charles, 'sought all means possible to strengthen himself.' The Habsburg-Savoy alliance was known in France, along with all the exchanges of territory and 'if this exchange took place, he would have surrounded this kingdom on all sides and thus achieved his goal' which would mean that Francis would not be able to 'show any sign of the discontent in his mind.' By the outbreak of hostilities in Piedmont in 1536, the mutual fears of both sides were locked in. Du Bellay thought that Charles had no intention of negotiating over Milan; he was negotiating sword in hand and had told the papal legates that 'he would never give Milan to the King or permit him to have a single foot in Italy.' One agent had informed the Pope that Charles 'had no friend or brother he loved enough to give the duchy to.' The Council held at Saint-Rambert in May 1536 took the view, according to du Bellay, that the Emperor's objective was 'the conquest of France and the total ruin and dispossession of the King.'<sup>62</sup>

As for the war of 1542, Guillaume du Bellay stressed essentially the King's view that he must exact vengeance for the deaths of his envoys Rincon and Fregoso in order to retain his credibility. His discussion of the reasons for war, though they have been described as 'ludicrous' to modern readers<sup>63</sup> are among the most nuanced and carefully considered by any French commentator in the Renaissance period and deserve to be analysed in detail since they reflect a real debate within the inner circle about the desirability of war.<sup>64</sup>

Guillaume du Bellay's writings thus provide a startling insight into the reasons for war, based on privileged access. An altogether more acerbic view of the Habsburg-Valois conflict had to await Blaise de Monluc's *Commentaires*. Monluc's is a much more personal history of his times. The *Commentaires*, though, are often acute in judgments and were widely read, especially after their first formal publication in 1592. In the additions that he made to his initial draft of 1571, many of them in the light of Du Bellay's or Paradin's work, Monluc allowed himself space to reflect and condemn. So, in narrating the start of the

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., II, pp. 297, 299.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., II, pp. 301, 304, 337; III, p. 32.

<sup>63</sup> Harari, *Renaissance Military Memoires*, p. 128.

<sup>64</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, pp. 53–5.



wars between Francis and Charles, this great inhabitant of the warrior's utopia, created by the Habsburg-Valois wars, gives a devastating critique of the futility of dynastic war:

God brought into the world these two princes, sworn enemies and jealous of each other's grandeur, which has cost the lives of 200,000 people and the ruin of a million families and in the end neither expressed more than a slightest regret at having caused such miseries ... The Emperor was a great prince who only in the end defeated our master by fortune and for this God allowed him to weep for his sins in a convent.<sup>65</sup>

Again, reflecting on the difficulty faced by Charles V and Henry VIII in their joint invasion of 1544, he observes that 'the desire for vengeance pushed the Emperor, against his word to the Pope, to ally with the King of England.'<sup>66</sup> On the likelihood of war and peace in 1550, he could observe that all depended on England and the Emperor, 'if these two princes did not move, France had the wherewithall to remain at peace.' However, it was impossible for France and the Emperor to remain at peace.<sup>67</sup>

François de Rabutin began his *Commentaires des guerres en la Gaule Belgique* (1574), the account of an ordinary *homme d'armes*, by simply reproducing the printed royal propaganda of 1551–2 on the causes of the war and the narrative provided by Paradin in 1556, adding what had become the orthodox French position that, despite all his protestations to the contrary, the Emperor 'did not refrain from starting his preparations for a furious war.' Henri II had swallowed all this in the desire for peace, for which the only recompense he received was the hostility of the Regent Mary of Hungary. Henri II again, 'to remove from the Emperor all pretexts for starting war,' had demolished the fort of Linchamps in Ardennes. 'Thus, it seems to me that the originator of these wars may be known.'<sup>68</sup>

Writing late in the 16th century about his experiences of the start of war in 1551, Boyvin de Villars evoked the common theme of the Emperor's *outrage*, his unwillingness to brook an equal, and specifically in his enticing Julius III's nephews to join in the attack on Parma and La Mirandola, an imperial fief which had become the French military magazine and springboard for 'infesting' Italy. The French, 'always the harbour and refuge of unjustly oppressed princes,' would never consent to the Emperor's 'infamy' in treating the Farneses thus, especially aided by his 'half Moorish' Spanish subjects. Henri II, aware of this, could only take the Farneses into his protection and gather the alliance of the Germans, who were ready to throw off the imperial yoke.<sup>69</sup> The decision on war, when it was made, 'God willed, unhappily for France, for Italy, the King himself and for all Christendom.' Reflecting further on the causes of war in

<sup>65</sup> Blaise de Monluc, *Commentaires, 1521–76*, ed. P. Courteault (Paris, 1964), pp. 30–1.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 169.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 191–2.

<sup>68</sup> F. de Rabutin, *Commentaires des guerres en la Gaule belgeque, 1551–1559*, ed. G. de Taurines, 2 vols (Paris, 1932–42), I, pp. 1–4.

<sup>69</sup> Villars, pp. 502–5.



general, Villars noted the confusion that was felt by people when princes went to war, largely through a failure to understand that there was no system of rules which could settle the quarrels of princes or rein in their ambitions. Princes were constantly on their guard and ever ready to employ pretexts for war 'which they never lack.' One further reason for conflict he saw in the readiness of ministers to say what their masters wanted to hear, rather than what they should be told.<sup>70</sup> Memoir writers, though many were bounded by the intellectual and social context, did reflect seriously, then, on the causes of war.

### Starting wars

A great deal of what has been said about the making of policy has been guesswork. That Francis I regarded himself as bound to vindicate his honour by bringing to fruition Louis XII's attempts to reconquer Milan seems clear enough, but more was involved than this. His concentration on Milan also involved the readjustment of the international situation by the isolation of Charles of Habsburg from Ferdinand of Aragon by the treaty of Noyon and the continuation of an English alliance in the form of the treaty for the recovery of Tournai in 1518, participation of the 'Treaty of Universal Peace' (1518) and the summit meeting with Henry VIII in 1520. The accession of Charles as King of Castile in 1516 did not immediately change this alignment but the struggle with Charles over the imperial election in 1518–19 certainly marked a watershed in their relations, after which war between France and the Habsburgs became more likely. Francis I, in his manifesto to the *bonnes villes* of 1523, argued that Charles V's 'true aim' was to occupy Italy 'and to establish himself, so as afterwards to hold down and keep in subjection our kingdoms, lands and subjects and do with them as he would.' This implies a strategic conception of the role of Italy.<sup>71</sup> It might seem that there was such a permanent state of enmity between Francis, Charles V and Henry VIII that war was inevitable and periods of peace simply opportunities for respite and regroupment. As we have seen, recent historians have restored an emphasis on the pursuit of honour and glory in the policy of Renaissance rulers. Dynastic claims, however tenuous, were always employed to justify war, though usually when they coincided with some strategic advantage. Such rules of international relations as existed between Christian princes demanded that war be presented in the light of the vindication of just rights. The processes by which wars exploded were far from straightforward and did not simply involve quixotic or frivolous decisions. All required extensive preparations and most, especially after 1521, complex manoeuvring to organize alliances and gain the moral high ground. The approach that follows is to analyse in some detail the reasons for war in four major phases: 1494, 1521, 1536 and 1551.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 712.

<sup>71</sup> 'Lettres des rois de France ... à la commune de Poitiers', *AHP*, 4 (1875), 277–340, no. x.

### The Italian wars, 1494

French intervention in Italy began with Charles VIII's invasion of August 1494 but that had little immediate consequence in terms of French military control of the peninsula; Naples was lost by 1496. It was the second round of fighting, initiated by Louis XII in 1499, that really anchored France in Italy. Nevertheless, there is good reason to accept the conviction of contemporary historians such as Guicciardini and Commynes that something momentous was happening in 1494.

In the year 1492, wrote Commynes, Ludovico Sforza began to 'make this young king of 22 sense the smoke and glory of Italy.'<sup>72</sup> Though he conjured up a memorable phrase, the memoirist was playing down the long gestation of the Italian wars. For a long time it was fashionable to blame the Italian wars on Charles VIII's chimerical ambitions. Then, in 1896, a detailed study argued that they were the 'fatal consequence' of two centuries of ambition in Italy by the French monarchy, going back to the Angevin conquest of Naples in 1265.<sup>73</sup> Others rejected this, pointing out that such ambitions were private and not national and were more inclined to revert to the explanation of Charles VIII's dreams of glory. The truly 'national' policy would have been to consolidate the recent successes against Burgundy and Brittany.<sup>74</sup> More recently, there has been a swing back to the perspective of 'Angevin' ambitions, expressed by serious efforts on the part of the house of Anjou in the 15th century to vindicate its claim to Naples. Other 'revisionist' views stress the vitality of the idea of crusade.<sup>75</sup>

In 1489, the historian Robert Gaguin was sent on embassy to Henry VII and declared that the King of France was determined to recover the kingdom of Naples by force as a first step on a crusade to overthrow the Turks. He mentioned earlier crusading monarchs and the contemporary campaign being waged in Spain to recover Grenada.<sup>76</sup> How serious was this? The idea of crusade was a live one in the last decade of the 15th century, though Commynes along with the Venetian Benedetti, thought it was all a 'lie.'<sup>77</sup> Naples presented a more tangible

<sup>72</sup> Commynes, III, p. 20.


<sup>73</sup> H.F. Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII en Italie. Histoire diplomatique et militaire* (Paris, 1888); L.-G. Pelissier, *Louis XII et Ludovic Sforza* (Paris, 1896).

<sup>74</sup> H. Lemonnier, *Les Guerres d'Italie: la France sous Charles VIII, Louis XII et François Ier (1492-1547)*, pp. 13-16.

<sup>75</sup> G. Peyronnet, 'The Distant Origins of the Italian Wars: Political Relations between France and Italy in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries', in D. Abulafia (ed.), *The French Descent into Renaissance Italy, 1494-95* (Aldershot, 1995), pp. 29-53, and A. Ryder, 'The Angevin Bid for Naples, 1380-1480', in *ibid.*, pp. 55-69.

<sup>76</sup> R. Gaguin, *Epistolae et orationes*, ed. L. Thuasne (Paris, 1903), pp. 77-87, 291-9; F. Bacon, *Historia regni Henrici septimi* (Leyden, 1642), pp. 151-3. Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII*, p. 215, denies its authenticity.

<sup>77</sup> Commynes, III, p. 249; A. Benedetti, *Diaria De Bello Carolino. Diary of the the Caroline War*, ed. D.M. Schullian (New York, 1967), part I, p. 1. The issue of crusade is discussed in Y. Labande-Mailfert, *Charles VIII et son milieu (1470-1498): la jeunesse au pouvoir* (Paris, 1975), pp. 181-5.



Map 2. The Italian Wars

objective than Constantinople. Charles VIII could at least make a plausible (if shaky) claim to it and investigations had begun into this as early as 1484. La Trémoille argued in 1489 that the King needed another kingdom 'to provide money to defend this one.'<sup>78</sup> The year 1492, when an attack on Naples started to become a possibility, was that of the Spanish conquest of Grenada, and the prospect of a Franco-Aragonese struggle for the control of southern Italy must have been apparent. Naples was also thought to be rich.<sup>79</sup>

The rulers of Italy had long been used to 'playing the French card' as a threat in their relations with each other.<sup>80</sup> On the other hand, 1494 presented new features. Ferrante I of Naples had died in January 1494 and the expedition was to be conducted by Charles VIII himself, not a member of a princely family. It thus represented a new departure.<sup>81</sup> The accession of Pope Alexander VI (August 1492) and the death of Lorenzo de Medici (April 1492) offered opportunities. Alexander VI at first seemed to favour French action in Naples but then approved the accession of Alfonso II. The death of Lorenzo removed a major force for holding Naples, Rome and Milan together. The new ruler of Florence, Piero de Medici, lacked his father's acumen and rapidly alienated public opinion. Ludovico Sforza, il Moro, the real ruler of Milan in his nephew's name, was concerned to establish Milanese domination at Genoa, a chaotic republic that had appealed both for French and Milanese protection in the past. The Franco-Milanese agreement of May 1491 allowed Milan to control Genoa and paved the way for French action against Naples.<sup>82</sup> The state of Italian politics thus opened the way for French intervention. The peninsula may have seemed in equilibrium between the five major states, but it was profoundly unstable beneath the surface, not least because of the many lesser *condottiere*-ruled statelets that were ready to welcome foreign intervention. France, in any case, already had a voice in northern Italy with its influence over Savoy-Piedmont and Saluzzo and the claims of the dukes of Orléans in Asti.

Whether economic motives coincided with dynastic, as had been argued, is difficult to determine. Naples was thought to be rich, if mistakenly. French merchants rapidly followed the army into Italy, arrived at Vercelli in 1495 and were actively involved in the Levantine fur trade at Naples.<sup>83</sup> The cities of Lyon and Marseille may well have welcomed the idea (first mooted under Louis XI) of turning the southern coast of France into a rival of Venice for the trade of the Levant. Provence had, after all, only recently been incorporated into the kingdom. Marseille in particular, in a period of growth, was restricted by the Catalan domination of the western Mediterranean and by the proximity of

<sup>78</sup> L. La Trémoille, *Correspondance de Charles VIII et de ses conseillers avec Louis II de la Trémoille* (Paris, 1875), pp. 141–2.

<sup>79</sup> Labande-Mailfert, *Charles VIII*, p. 200.

<sup>80</sup> M. Mallet, 'Personalities and Pressures: Italian Involvement in the French Invasion of 1494', in Abulafia (ed.), *The French Descent*, pp. 151–63, at pp. 152–3.

<sup>81</sup> Labande-Mailfert, *Charles VIII*, pp. 169–70.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 212–13.

<sup>83</sup> F. Catalano, 'Il problema dell'equilibrio et la crisi della libertà italiana', in R. Morghen, F. Giunta, R. Cessiu (eds), *Nuove questioni di storia medioevale* (Milan, 1964), pp. 357–98.

Genoa.<sup>84</sup> More directly persuasive, perhaps, were the arguments of the many aristocratic Neapolitan exiles who arrived at the court of France in 1489-90. They were abnormally influential because they represented the principle of *action* as opposed to a sort of lethargic consensus.<sup>85</sup> The decision for war emerged from a coalition of interests involving those who had long-standing claims in Naples, royal councillors like Etienne de Vesc, who had much to gain, and other French princes who had marriage alliances in Italy.<sup>86</sup>

First, however, the conflicts with Ferdinand of Aragon, Maximilian and Henry VII had to be settled. Some have argued that the treaties of Boulogne, Senlis and Barcelona sold out French interests in the north and the Pyrenees in return for the 'mirage' of Italy. However, in 1492-3 it was difficult to retain those possessions of the house of Burgundy to which the crown of France did not have a defensible claim, as the court preacher Olivier Maillard argued. The treaty with Henry VII (3 Nov. 1492) dictated the treaty with Spain that returned Roussillon and Cerdagne (Barcelona, 19 Jan. 1493). The treaty of Senlis (8 May 1493) completed this interlocking group of agreements, settled outstanding disputes with the house of Burgundy for the near future and consolidated the dynastic union with Brittany. That it also enabled France to obtain a free hand in Italy in 1494 should not, though, be thought of in terms of a sell-out.<sup>87</sup>

In February 1494, Charles VIII left Amboise for Lyon, where he remained until, on 24 July, he heard of the attempt by Federico of Aragon to seize Genoa and cut off the French naval route. Leaving French territory at the end of August, he arrived at Turin on 5 September. The conquest of Naples was rapid, largely as a result of the deep unpopularity of Alfonso II among the barons of the kingdom and inability of his successor, Ferrante II, to establish himself. Yet, once Charles had been crowned King of Naples on 20 May 1495 he rapidly marched home. The inconclusive battle of Fornovo against a hastily gathered Italian coalition (6 July 1495) allowed him to return to France but could not conceal the collapse of the diplomatic alignment on which he had relied, notably the alliance of Milan and neutrality of Venice. Ferrante II returned to Naples in 1496. Both Ferrante and Charles VIII were dead by 1498 and a new chapter began in French intervention.

### **The war with the Emperor, 1521**

The year 1521 saw the transformation of the long-established French involvement in Italy into a war with the Emperor Charles V that was to broaden and prolong the conflict throughout Europe. Jean Barrillon, probably reflecting the

<sup>84</sup> G. Rambert (ed.), *Histoire du commerce de Marseille*, 7 vols (Paris, 1949-66), III, pp. 136-43.

<sup>85</sup> E. Pontieri, 'Napoletani alla corte di Carlo VIII', *Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane*, 63 (1938), 127-82, and in his *Per la storia del regno di Ferrante I d'Aragona, re di Napoli* (Naples, 1947); Labande-Mailfert, *Charles VIII*, p. 191; Mallet, 'Personalities and Pressures', in Abulafia (ed.), *The French Descent*, pp. 151-63, at p. 163.

<sup>86</sup> Labande-Mailfert, *Charles VIII*, p. 193.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 117-38.

views of his master, Chancellor Duprat, argued that ‘the first cause of the war was the election of the Emperor.’ From the moment he lost the imperial election of 1519, Francis had done all he could to prevent Charles from going to Italy to be crowned and thereby threaten French control of Milan.<sup>88</sup> What had fundamentally changed in the relations between Charles and Francis between 1518 and 1521? A conference had been held at Montpellier in May 1519, during the imperial election, which had sought to settle matters left unresolved in the 1516 treaty of Noyon, such as the restoration of Navarre, compensation for Naples and the marriage alliance between the two dynasties.<sup>89</sup> This had been cut short by the death of the French negotiator, Boisy. Francis told Leo X that he thought Charles’s offers simply designed to allow the Emperor the opportunity to go to Italy for his coronation and to settle the other problems in his territories. To this, the French King could not agree and, above all, he would oppose the holding of the Empire and the kingdom of Naples by one ruler. He argued that this was contrary to the constitutions of the Church but the real reason was surely the power in Italy that would accrue to an Emperor in such a position: ‘if the Empire, the kingdom of Naples and Spain were in the same hand and that it was better to prevent future problems now than seek remedies afterwards.’<sup>90</sup> For the moment, Francis was content to pursue diplomacy in order to keep the Pope on his side but was clearly turning his mind to war.

Charles perceived the threat implicit in the Field of Cloth of Gold meeting by hastening to England to meet Henry VIII and issued a warning to Francis over his support for the duke of Guelders. Barrillon, like most contemporary observers, emphasised what were in themselves lesser conflicts in the Ardennes and the Pyrenees in precipitating war – hence the oft-repeated description of the war stemming from a small spark. Just beyond the borders of France, the lords of Sedan, of the house of La Marck, great lords within France but princes in their own right, had acquired the duchy of Bouillon in 1482 by the agreement of the bishop of Liège. The first element of the controversy was that Robert II de La Marck (d.1536), duke of Bouillon, the father of Robert III (in this period sr. de Floranges, the later marshal), had, possibly persuaded by his brother, the bishop of Liège, left French service in 1518 out of resentment that his company of 100 lances had been dismissed for excessive pillaging. The bishop felt resentful at having been promised a cardinal’s hat by France but not received it. In the region of Rocroi, two lords, Aymeries and Philippe de Croy-Chimay, had clashed over possession of Hierges. A decision by the ‘peers’ of the duchy of Bouillon had gone in favour of Chimay. Aymeries used all his contacts at the Habsburg court to get a reversal of this judgment, even though Bouillon was a sovereign principality. La Marck, unable to reverse this, returned to France in order to get the backing he needed to maintain his independence (February 1521) and proceeded to send his formal defiance to the Emperor at Worms. Against French advice, Floranges raised 3000 foot and 500 horse to attack Virton on the borders of Luxembourg and Lorraine. The Emperor sent an army against

<sup>88</sup> Barrillon, II, p. 178.

<sup>89</sup> E. Fournial, *Monsieur de Boisy, grand maître de France sous François Ier* (Lyon, 1996).

<sup>90</sup> Barrillon, II, pp. 153–4.



Bouillon under Nassau, supported by La Marck's own brother the bishop, ever hopeful of promotion to the red hat, this time by the Emperor. Nassau, having taken Hognes and Musancourt, besieged Floranges and his brother at Jametz. They held out but the towns of Floranges and Sansy fell.<sup>91</sup> On 17 August, the Emperor granted a truce to La Marck.

Francis's advisers took this as a signal that Charles was simply using his campaign against Bouillon to gather an army and attack on a wider front. At the same time, a similar 'private' vendetta developed in August into an attack on an important French enclave, in Tournaisis and Mortagne. The Emperor's line was that this was also a private quarrel but the threat to the French position in the north was palpable.<sup>92</sup> The war in the north-east, in effect, developed out of this small-scale campaigning, the French reinforcing Mouzon but told by Nassau, the Emperor's commander, that he was simply concerned with Bouillon and had no warlike intentions until in August his troops crossed the Meuse.<sup>93</sup> The struggles around Bouillon and Tournai can either be regarded as the triggers for war or as the *casus belli*.

In the spring of 1521, an expedition set out to take advantage of discontent in Navarre to recover that kingdom (annexed by Ferdinand of Aragon in 1512) in the name of its young King, Henri d'Albret, to whom Francis was bound by a treaty of 1515. Led by Lesparre, Lautrec's brother, the expedition overran Navarre in two weeks. Lesparre, though, proved to be over-confident and pushed on into Spain, having divided his forces. The result was a defeat at Ezquiros on 30 June and the recovery of Pamplona by Spain. This brought another expedition into Navarre under Bonnivet in August 1521, that culminated in the capture of Fuentarrabia on 19 October and recapture of Pamplona in December.

Meanwhile in Italy, Leo X had invested Charles V with the kingdom of Naples by a treaty of May 1521, which included Francesco Sforza and the concession of Parma and Piacenza to the Church. In Milan, Lautrec and even more so his brother Lescun alienated the notables by confiscations, so that a number of exiles started to take refuge in the lands of the Church. Lescun's attempt to intimidate the Pope's governor at Reggio into giving up the exiles nearly brought the Pope into open conflict in June. Nevertheless, as the summer wore on, signs of revolt in the duchy of Milan became more open, a military campaign was looking more and more likely and troops started to be raised in Switzerland.<sup>94</sup>

When, then, could it be said that war actually began? The siege of Mouzon by the imperial army seems the most obvious point, even though peace negotiations were still going on at Calais. This was followed by the siege of Mézières from early September. The relief of this place opened the campaign led by the King himself which nearly precipitated a military confrontation between the rulers in November. The chronicler known as the Bourgeois de Paris does not

<sup>91</sup> F. de Vaux de Foletier, *Galiot de Genouillac, maître de l'artillerie de France (1465-1546)* (Paris, 1925), p. 155.

<sup>92</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 131–3.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 136–7.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 171–85.

spell out exactly when war began; for him, it gradually crept into his consciousness. The Emperor sent Francis a challenge in April 1521, which he rebutted in forwarding it to Henry VIII. He had not, he argued, encouraged Bouillon or allowed his subjects to help him and, as for Navarre, Charles himself had promised to restore it to Henri d'Albret in the treaty of Noyon.<sup>95</sup> Formal war was still not declared but, by May, Barrillon observed that 'war was already open.'<sup>96</sup> One major complication was that Francis was still hoping for English help. He started to raise troops and sent to England for Henry VIII to declare himself on the side of the victim of aggression under the terms of the 1518 'treaty of Universal Peace'. Negotiations continued about a 'truce', which was concluded on 1 July in order to give Henry VIII six weeks to arbitrate.<sup>97</sup> The conferences that dragged on at Calais from July to November served many different purposes. For Henry VIII and Wolsey, they allowed the English to go through the motions required in the 1518 treaty of deciding who was the aggressor, but in reality spinning out the issue until it became so complicated that a decision in favour of the Emperor could be taken without disgrace.<sup>98</sup> For France, though Francis has been accused of being duped by the Emperor, it was essential to try as far as possible to ensure the alliance of Henry VIII. For the Emperor, the conference provided crucial time to recover from the military reversals early in the year. The war of 1521, then, more than most others, involved an extended slithering into conflict, concealed by deceptive initiatives at peacemaking.

### **The war of 1536**

The slide to war in the middle of the 1530s is another case in which it is difficult to pinpoint when conflict became inevitable. The 1529 treaty of Cambrai, though its terms were hard in ransom payments for the King's sons, seemed to settle some of the outstanding problems. A turning-point came with the death of Francesco Sforza in November 1535, which raised the question of a successor. The claim to Milan was widely regarded as crucial. A French courtier noted in 1537 that, if the rumour that the Emperor was about to invest his nephew Maximilian with it were true, 'we shall have war for our lifetimes and those of our children.'<sup>99</sup> In fact, there was an interval between Sforza's death and Philip's investiture that gave a chance for attempts at compromise.

War was already likely before 1535. Francis, by initiating serious diplomatic initiatives in Germany and re-routing Henry VIII's pension payments to German princes, had signalled a real change of emphasis by 1534.<sup>100</sup> While Charles

<sup>95</sup> BN Cotton, Calig. D VIII, fo. 190.

<sup>96</sup> Barrillon, II, p. 186.

<sup>97</sup> AN J 994, no. 2.

<sup>98</sup> J. Russell, 'The Search for Universal Peace: the Conferences of Calais and Bruges in 1521', *BIHR*, 44 (1971).

<sup>99</sup> Librairie de l'Abbaye, *Autographes et documents historiques* (Paris, n.d.), no. 284. Letter of La Roche du Maine, 11 Oct. 1536.

<sup>100</sup> Bourrilly, *Guillaume du Bellay*, pp. 173–213; *L&P*, VII, 1554.



offered significant concessions and Francis was apparently advised to treat them seriously by Montmorency, agents were sent to the Schmalkaldic princes in the summer of 1534. In the Levant, negotiations were being conducted with the Sultan and Barbarossa.<sup>101</sup> In October 1534, Chabot de Brion and Guillaume du Bellay were sent to England to persuade Henry to abandon his pensions and claims to France and pull back from a complete break with Rome but the French had little to offer. In normal circumstances, failure to secure the English alliance would have posed a severe danger to French policy but in this case it was obvious that an Anglo-Habsburg alignment was impossible in view of the break with Rome and the position of Anne Boleyn. England would have to stay out of the conflict.

Both Henry and Francis were also competing for allies in Germany. Francis had been advised that the German princes could provide serious military muscle if some kind of religious concord could be arranged with them. As it was, Germany was a vital recruiting ground for troops. The Affair of the Placards in October 1534 and its aftermath threw all this into doubt. Guillaume du Bellay's attempts to create the impression that the King of France was the true friend of the Protestants were compromised, while Charles was able to seize the opportunity to make offers of his own. It was from this point that du Bellay sought to rescue French policy in February 1535 by drawing up for Francis his Letter to the Estates of the Empire.<sup>102</sup>

The event around which all calculations revolved was the Emperor's decision to take up his role as crusader and destroy Barbarossa's base at Tunis. Charles seriously feared that Francis would take advantage of this and actually wrote to ask him for a commitment not to undermine his campaign. Francis, who was well aware of the effect of blatantly undermining the defence of Christendom, was prepared to do so but could hardly have been ecstatic at his rival's great success in July 1535. The voice at court of those who were pushing the King to set a limit to the Emperor's ambitions, to back Barbarossa, to pursue the alliance with the German princes, even to maintain the alliance with Henry VIII, was growing. Whether the French actually signed a treaty with the Sultan at this point remains a moot point but they were widely thought to have done so and benefited significantly from advantages in the Levant from then on.<sup>103</sup> It remained to provide a *casus belli* for a King increasingly attracted by the renewal of war.

There are many parallels between 1521 and 1536. The role of La Marck was played in 1535 by Jean d'Aspremont, who fortified a castle on the borders of France called Lumes near Mézières and refused accept the authority of the King

<sup>101</sup> V.-L. Bourrilly, 'L'Ambassade de La Forest et de Marillac à Constantinople (1535–38)', *Revue historique*, 76 (1901), 297–328.

<sup>102</sup> Bib.II, 101, repr. in Bib.II, 104, fos. 101–7; Bourrilly, *Guillaume du Bellay*, pp. 189–90.

<sup>103</sup> G. Zeller, 'Une Légende qui a la vie dure: les capitulations de 1535', in idem, *Aspects de la politique française sous l'Ancien Régime* (Paris, 1964), pp. 140–7; M. François, *Le Cardinal Tournon* (Paris, 1961), p. 122; Brantôme, ed. Lalanne, V, pp. 63–4, on justifications for French policy.

of France.<sup>104</sup> It was Savoy-Piedmont, though, that came to serve as the *casus belli*, like Navarre in 1521. Control of Piedmont would provide a bridgehead for entry into Milan; it might also serve as a bargaining counter with the Emperor over Milan.<sup>105</sup> This, though, does not explain why Savoy came to the top of the agenda in 1535. Here, we need to consider the threat posed by the duchy. There were many causes for grievance in France about the house of Savoy, historically linked as it had long been to the house of France, which provide an excellent example of the predicament of small powers trapped between superpowers.<sup>106</sup> The long-lived Duke Carlo III was Louis XII's ally in his Italian wars and actively co-operated with him against Genoa in 1507.<sup>107</sup> But French grudges had built up by 1536:<sup>108</sup> Carlo III had lent money to the Constable of Bourbon and taken pleasure at the news of Pavia. He had also negotiated to alienate the Swiss cantons from their treaty with France and had received the county of Asti, claimed by France, from the Emperor. Finally the duke had refused to allow the Franco-Papal meeting to take place at Nice in 1533. In strategic terms, the looming problem of the succession to Montferrat, an imperial fief, disposed the duke of Savoy to cultivate an Emperor who would have a major say in the matter. More recently, an Italian envoy long in the service of France, Giovan-Alberto Maraviglia (l'Écuyer Merveilles), had been executed on the orders of Francesco Sforza while, it was claimed in France, on mission at the invitation of the duke of Milan. Sforza had possibly tried to convince a suspicious Emperor that he was not double dealing with Francis.<sup>109</sup> The incident looks very much like the more well known *casus belli* of Rincon and Fregoso in 1541. At all events, Francis demanded passage for his troops to go into Milan to seek revenge but was refused.

Du Bellay outlines succinctly the position of Savoy as viewed by France. The latter was always the big neighbour and needed to be placated; indeed it had always been 'a long-standing neighbour' and ally. The Emperor might be powerful now but his position was elective, not hereditary. Du Bellay thought the duchess (Charles V's sister-in-law) had pushed her husband into hostility with France, to a point where he felt he could not go back.<sup>110</sup> The underlying problem in all this was that Francis could not allow Savoy-Piedmont permanently to pass into the orbit of the Habsburgs, since that would have precluded any further hope of intervention in Italy. French influence also depended on a number of other client dynasts in the region, notably the marquesses of Saluzzo

<sup>104</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 291–3.

<sup>105</sup> F. Decrue, *Montmorency, grand maître et connétable de France* (Paris, 1885), pp. 253–5; R.J. Knecht, *Renaissance Warrior and Patron: the Reign of Francis I* (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 330–4.

<sup>106</sup> A. Segre, *Carlo II duca di Savoia e le guerre d'Italia tra Francia e Spagna dal 1515 al 1525* (Turin, 1907); idem, 'La politica Sabauda con Francia e Spagna dal 1525 al 1533', *Atti della R. Accademia delle Scienze di Torino*, 50 (1901), 249–348; E. Ricotti, *Storia della monarchia piemontese*, 6 vols (Florence, 1861), I, pp. 211–15.

<sup>107</sup> D'Auton, IV, p. 173.

<sup>108</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 302–4.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 206–25.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 303.

and of Montferrat. The latter had been ruled by Guglielmo Paleologo, husband of a French princess, Anne d'Alençon, whose daughter and heiress brought the territory into the hands of the Gonzagas of Mantua. Together, these two principalities provided a corridor of territory into Italy and it was vital to control them. They were not, though, enough to ensure French security.

An excuse was needed, therefore, to attack Piedmont. Matters came to a head with the growing tension between the duke of Savoy and the city of Geneva, which he claimed as his inheritance. The Genevans made ready to bring their Swiss allies to their aid, as well as the King of France. Aware of this, in September 1535 the duke sent to the Emperor in Palermo offering to cede him his territories on the French side of the Alps from Nice to Geneva in return for compensation in northern Italy.<sup>111</sup> The French response was in effect an ultimatum in January 1536, employing all the specious genealogical lore for which French diplomacy was so famous. The upshot was a claim requiring passage through the Alps for French forces going to punish the treatment of Maraviglia and also the cession of the key fortresses of the duchy on the French side of the Alps, which Francis claimed as heir of his mother Louise of Savoy. The independence of Savoy would have been destroyed.<sup>112</sup>

In the last months of 1535 neither King nor Emperor was ready for open war. Charles had only recently returned from his expedition to Tunis and Francis, having countermanded a levy of lansquenets, only reactivated it in November. He still needed time to prepare for war and this explains the missions sent to the Emperor during the following months and various proposals for marriage alliance that were put forward. Granvelle had in any case dangled the prospect of a deal over Milan before the French ambassador, who was told to respond encouragingly.<sup>113</sup> The reply seemed substantial and had to be taken seriously.<sup>114</sup> But Francis was determined not to be strung along. He refused Milan for his youngest son and all he could offer in return was to give up his claims to Naples in return for the investiture at Milan of his second son, Henri. Having been challenged about the levy of lansquenets in Germany, he insisted that this was to vindicate the claims of his mother in Savoy.<sup>115</sup> Francis's envoy to the Emperor simply advised that Henri d'Orléans should simply be proclaimed duke of Milan.<sup>116</sup> The effect of the King's intentions could not have been clearer. The duke of Savoy's envoy to France reported in January 1536 that 'they are very intent on war here.'<sup>117</sup> Charles, too, wanted to spin things out, meeting Francis's proposals with 'good words' at Naples in January 1536.

The failure to come to an agreement over Milan may have given Francis the final impetus to move into Piedmont. In January-February, the count of Saint-

<sup>111</sup> A. Segre, *Documenti di storia Sabauda*, in *Miscellanea di Storia italiana*, ser. 3, 8 (1903), pp. 108–20.

<sup>112</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, p. 293.

<sup>113</sup> BN fr. 2846, fos. 57v–60v.

<sup>114</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 307–9.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 310–11.

<sup>116</sup> BN Dupuy 265, fo. 52.

<sup>117</sup> François, *Tournon*, p. 127n.

Pol overran Bresse and Bugey easily. He then moved against Savoy itself.<sup>118</sup> In March, the bulk of the French army, commanded by Chabot, moved rapidly to occupy Turin, brushing aside a small force under Leyva, not as the Emperor's general but as commander of the 'Italian league.' The quality of 'phony war' is conveyed by the fact that Chabot actually asked Leyva for free passage for Italian troops who had been raised to join his army. Leyva, under orders to avoid an open break, replied that he would give this as long as they were troops of the Italian League.<sup>119</sup> Yet again Francis was prepared to send a high-level mission under Cardinal Jean de Lorraine to Charles in April 1536, to discover his intentions and continue negotiations, while in Piedmont he sent orders for Chabot to halt his advance while awaiting the Emperor's reply. Lorraine had returned to court on 16 May and according to an observer there 'has brought us news, contrary to the general hope that neither peace nor friendship should be expected of the Emperor' and another that, with Lorraine awaited 'the rumour at court that we shall have peace rather than war.'<sup>120</sup> Du Bellay actually makes clear that he thought Francis at this time 'had a strong desire to recover what was his by agreement rather than by war', which implies that, to a degree, Francis was using military pressure as a bargaining counter.<sup>121</sup> While a sort of truce prevailed on the borders of Piedmont, Charles made his powerful indictment of Francis before the Pope, cardinals and ambassadors on 17 April. It took just over another month for formal war to be declared (2 June 1536), while the King digested his rival's manifestos and opted to take up a defensive position. While one observer at Lyon reported war as 'very hot' on 8 June, on the same day another noted that the Emperor's ambassador was still at court and the French ambassador still with the Emperor.<sup>122</sup> The defection of the marquess of Saluzzo from his French alliance in the hope of gaining imperial investiture of Montferrat had opened the way for Charles V to invade Provence through a corridor south of Piedmont, though Montmorency's defence of Coni held him up. As the fighting developed, the acquisition of Piedmont became a major feature of Francis I's objectives and a symbol of his achievements after many disasters. Piedmont and La Mirandola would become, as Villars recalled later in the century, the 'military depot' and 'stronghold for entry into Italy.'<sup>123</sup>

### The war of 1551–2

The death of Francis I in March 1547 for the moment put an end to talk of renewing the war that ended in 1544. Henri II needed to put his own house in order as well as to decide on what to do about the difficult problem of relations

<sup>118</sup> AN K 1484, Hannart, 14 Feb. 1536; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, p. 320.


<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 339–40.

<sup>120</sup> Librairie de l'Abbaye, *Autographes et documents* (s.d.) no. 45, letter of Aubeterre, 17 May 1536; *ibid.* Cat 249, no. 172, Nicolas de Lyon, 12 May 1536.

<sup>121</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 321–2, 332–6, 384–5 (quotation).

<sup>122</sup> Librairie de l'Abbaye, *Autographes et documents* (s.d.) no. 75, Letter of Dampierre, 8 June 1536; *ibid.* Cat 247, no. 90, Letter of Estissac, 8 June 1536.

<sup>123</sup> Villars, pp. 503, 505.



Map 3. Wars on the North-East Frontier, 1521–59.

with England and Scotland, especially after the successful English invasion and crushing victory over the Scots at Pinkie. This was not dealt with until 1550. Elsewhere the problem of seeking alliances and preparing for war was not neglected, as pretexts for war with the Emperor accumulated. That conflict was waged only indirectly after the Emperor's crushing victory over the Schmalkaldic League in 1547. The fact that Charles had been able to lay down the law in Germany added to the sense of alarm in France when he returned to the Low Countries in 1548–9. France could not be openly hostile to him but in Italy there were opportunities to be exploited. Charles invested the Pope's son, Pierluigi Farnese, with the duchies of Parma and Piacenza in 1545 in order to win Paul III's support for his war in Germany. Yet those territories had originally depended on the duchy of Milan and there was a temptation to recover them in order to augment the revenues of the Emperor's domains in Italy. When, in 1547, a rising broke out that led to the murder of Pierluigi, Ferrante Gonzaga, the Emperor's governor in Milan, hastened to send in troops to 'restore order' but in reality to take charge. Despite the fact that the new duke of Parma, Ottaviano Farnese, was his son-in-law, Charles showed no desire to restore his territory to him and also began an invasion of Parma itself. In June 1547, Henri II married Ottaviano's brother Orazio to his illegitimate daughter Diane and claimed the duchies for them. A stand-off for two years was followed by an agreement between the Pope and the Emperor to divide the spoils: Charles would keep Piacenza and the Pope, Parma. The Farnese brothers would be compensated elsewhere.

Despite Paul III's deathbed recognition of his grandsons' rights, his successor, Julius III, needed Charles's support for reconvening the General Council. The result was that Ottaviano Farnese placed himself under French protection. As late as January 1551, French nobles were being assured by the Emperor that there would be no war.<sup>124</sup> But in April 1551, Ottaviano appealed to the King of France. Julius III called on the Emperor to defend the rights of the Papacy, giving him the right to invade Parma with Papal blessing. While Charles anxiously set about galvanising resources for a major military campaign in Italy, French troops began to move towards Parma in May 1551 and in August skirmishes began along the border between Piedmont and Milan and the borders of the Netherlands. French troops were despatched to Piedmont.<sup>125</sup> Charles's advisers could not believe that Henri II would launch a serious offensive in Italy without Swiss troops and the support of the Germans (whom they mistakenly considered pacified). Parma was, however, very vulnerable. Henri II had already decided on war. Villars later recalled that a great king takes measures to avert problems rather than await them and also thought that Henri II's immediate objective was to use the Italian campaigns as proxy war:

The duke of Parma would perform the prologue of the comedy, where the first blows would be struck, with such a careful and reserved hand, that the King

<sup>124</sup> BL Add. 38032, fos. 186v, 193v.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, fos. 204r, 205r.



could always (as the game went) advance or retreat at his pleasure and profit from the dangers to others before they turned to tragedy.<sup>126</sup>

Villars makes clear that opposition to the war in France came from those who held a healthy respect for the Emperor's past successes and who doubted the reliability of Italian allies. The King took his decisions with, among others, the advice of Montmorency, now no longer shackled to a pro-imperial reputation, and especially of Guise. He concluded that early action could stop the Emperor's plans, though only with formal justifications in the light of the 'honour and word of treaties and the universal repose of Christendom.' In a telling phrase, Villars remarks that most advisers took the view that in matters of state 'utility should always be consulted before honour.' The decision on war remained in the balance until a final agreement to supply money and troops to be commanded by Paul de Termes was made.<sup>127</sup> In August 1551, Henri II told Brissac in Piedmont that he had decided to break the peace and ordered him to attack imperial positions as soon as possible as the nights would soon start to get longer and Gonzaga would have started to reduce his garrisons.<sup>128</sup>

One reason for confidence in France was the success of French diplomacy between 1548 and 1551 in building up the idea of 'protection' of French allies, not only in Italy but also in Scotland and Germany.<sup>129</sup> A 'party' of allies was formed among disgruntled German princes, who had a number of grievances: the growth of imperial power after the Augsburg Interim (1548), the creation of the circle of Burgundy as a 'state' almost independent of the Empire (1549) and finally the threat to the independence of the Prince Electors, represented by the 'horse-trading' over the imperial succession at Augsburg in 1550–51. Negotiations between France and the princes (including Charles's erstwhile ally, Maurice of Saxony) started seriously in February 1551 and by mid-October had produced an undertaking by Henri II to back them as Protector of German Liberties.<sup>130</sup> They were to be provided with a money subsidy in return for agreeing to French occupation of those cities on the western borders of the Empire of French speech. It may even be that both sides took seriously the creation of a new 'Empire' in which Henri II would rule nominally over the western parts of Germany.<sup>131</sup>

In May 1551, Gonzaga tried to prevent covert French attempts to insert troops into Parma, however inadequate in numbers. This provoked the despatch of seven infantry companies from Boulogne and orders were given to attack imperial fortresses such as Chieri on the border of Lombardy. Brissac and Gonzaga

<sup>126</sup> Villars, p. 505.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 507.

<sup>128</sup> BN Clair. 344, fo. 213 (copy).

<sup>129</sup> D. Potter, *A History of France 1460–1560: the Emergence of a Nation State* (London, 1995), pp. 273–4.

<sup>130</sup> Pariset, 'La France et les princes allemands', pp. 252–8.

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 258–81 (the terms on pp. 259–60); *idem*, *Les Relations entre la France et l'Allemagne au milieu du seizième siècle* (Strasbourg, 1981), pp. 84–114; J. Des Monstiers Mérinville, *Un Évêque ambassadeur au XVIe siècle. Jean des Monstiers, seigneur du Fraisse* (Limoges, 1895), pp. 10–13.

continued to play the game of deceiving each other and insisting that there was no intention of hostility until the outbreak of war.<sup>132</sup> While Henri II wanted to maintain his foothold in Italy, he wanted to avoid full-scale war there so as to concentrate on his eastern frontier.

In August 1551, Simon Renard, the imperial ambassador, was arrested and on 11 September Henri II decreed the arrest of the Emperor's subjects and of their property and merchandise in France, making war inevitable.<sup>133</sup> Horse-trading with the Germans went on through the Autumn and Winter until the formal conclusion of the treaty of Chambord on 15 January 1552 was accompanied by a formal declaration of war against the Emperor.

It is only by examining the start of wars in detail that the imperatives behind the conflicts can be discerned. It emerges that these were shaped by a constant consciousness of threat, of imminent attack and of long-term problems. Justifications and causes for conflict were prolific. Yet wars were seriously planned and considered, not simply the sport of kings. The next chapter will examine this thesis in more depth.

<sup>132</sup> Villars, pp. 512–14; Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 192.

<sup>133</sup> *Mélanges historiques, choix de documents* (Collection de documents historiques sur l'histoire de France), 5 vols (Paris, 1873–86), III, pp. 600–1.



## 2

### The High Command, Planning and the Army as a Whole

*The King had expressly summoned all the power of his kingdom, legionaries, companies, garrisons, bands of foot and all other men serving in war.*<sup>1</sup>

#### Kings and generals: the High Command

The king, as commander-in-chief, sometimes led the army in person and, while the idea of a king risking his life on the battlefield was occasionally deplored, most accepted Pierre Gringore's assertion that 'a prince present in battle is worth a hundred.'<sup>2</sup> All kings from Charles VII to Henri II appeared at the head of their armies and Charles VIII, Louis XII and Francis I actively commanded on the battlefield. Henri II was already experienced in war at his accession. How effective was this command? Louis XII seems to have had the sense to realise his limitations as a battlefield commander. It is often thought that Louis himself commanded the army for his first invasion of Italy in 1499 but, though he rode in triumph into Milan in October 1499, command was in effect exercised by Stuart d'Aubigny, Ligny and Trivulzio. The argument went that it was beneath the dignity of a King of France to command in person against a Sforza.<sup>3</sup> Louis did have some abilities and was in many ways a 'roi chevalier' like Francis I and Henri II. D'Auton insists that it was the King who, in the battle with the Genoese outside the walls in 1507, 'then arranged his battles and himself set all his men in place'. Louis commanded the 'battle' and, according to d'Auton it was he who took the decision to attack late in the day against the advice of his commanders.<sup>4</sup> At Agnadello on 14 May 1509, Louis was at the head of the army and, though the initial attack was conducted by marshal de Caumont, it was the King's arrival and the outflanking attack by Bayard that won the day after a close-fought battle.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> HNSA, Frankreich, Varia 7, fo. 57 (spy report, March 1552).

<sup>2</sup> G. Chastellain, *Oeuvres*, ed. Kervyn de Lettenhove (Brussels, 1863–6), I, p. 24; P. Gringore, *Oeuvres polémiques*, ed. C.J. Brown (Geneva, 2003), p. 168.

<sup>3</sup> Sanuto, *Diarii*, II, p. 960.

<sup>4</sup> D'Auton, IV, pp. 175–6, 219–20.

<sup>5</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, p. 33; de Marillac, *La Vie du connétable de Bourbon*, pp. 140–1.

Francis was as much, if not more, of a 'roi chevalier', who vindicated his status as warlord by his early victory at Marignano. Brantôme recalled that he had 'so well carried out the office of king, captain and man-at-arms that it could not be said which he did best.'<sup>6</sup> Though personally brave, he met mixed success on the battlefield. Whether this was a result of his own inadequacy remains uncertain, though Brantôme attributed it to 'fortune.' At Marignano, the French position was selected by La Trémoille and Boisy, though there is no doubt that Francis fought hard in command of the centre with part of the *gendarmerie* and 9000 lansquenets. Florange recalled the King's dogged stand with a few men-at-arms and swore he was 'one of the noblest captains in all his army, and would never abandon his artillery, rallying as many men as he could around him.'<sup>7</sup> Either he or his advisers used the night in between the two phases of the fighting to reorganise his position. During that night, he remained fully armed and, according to an observer, 'kept all his rear-guard in the best order that a captain could' and led the charge sword in hand the next day.<sup>8</sup> But the battle was close-run and tipped in his favour by the arrival of the Venetians.<sup>9</sup> At Pavia, again, he fought bravely, though whether much generalship was involved seems doubtful.<sup>10</sup> He has been blamed for detaching a significant portion of his army under Albany for the plan to conquer Naples, though Knecht has argued the sense behind this move.<sup>11</sup> The armies on each side were reasonably balanced but the imperial army had the advantage of attack (though not complete surprise: Francis had formed up his army by the morning of the battle). Florange criticised the King for silencing his own guns in order for the *gendarmerie* to attack, while Monluc suggested that the battle 'was not well conducted in various places on our side.'<sup>12</sup> What surely tipped the balance was the King's assumption that his *gendarmerie* could sweep the enemy out of the field, while failing to realise the dangers posed by the masses of concealed Spanish gunners. After 1525, Francis became much more cautious, usually maintaining a defensive strategy when his kingdom was attacked, as in 1536 and 1544,<sup>13</sup> highly circumspect when presented with the opportunity of battle as at Landrecies in 1543.<sup>14</sup> Yet these careful strategies were as much the work of ministers such as Montmorency and Annebault as of the King.

Henri II, having held at least nominal commands at Avignon and in Artois in 1536–7, Perpignan in 1542 and the Boulonnais in 1544 (the two latter cases with

<sup>6</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 260.

<sup>7</sup> Robert de La Marck, sr. de Florange, *Mémoires*, ed. J.A.C. Buchon (Panthéon littéraire) (Paris, 1836), p. 265.

<sup>8</sup> See also Barrillon, I, p. 122, and Desaivre, 'Lettres de Rochechouart', pp. 258–61.

<sup>9</sup> H. Harkensee, *Die Schlacht bei Marignano* (Gottingen, 1909), gives little credit to the Venetians; R.J. Knecht, *Francis I* (Cambridge, 1982), pp. 44–6.

<sup>10</sup> R. Thom, *Die Schlacht bei Pavia* (Berlin, 1907); J. Giono, *Le Désastre de Pavie, 24 février 1525* (Paris, 1963); F.L. Taylor, *The Art of War in Italy, 1494–1529* (Cambridge, 1921).

<sup>11</sup> C. Oman, *History of the Art of War in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century* (London/NY, 1937), p. 191.

<sup>12</sup> Robert de La Marck, sr de Florange, *Mémoires du maréchal de Florange, dit le jeune aventureux*, ed. R. Goubaix and P.-A. Lemoisne, 2 vols (Paris: SHF, 1913–24), II, p. 227; Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 43.

<sup>13</sup> Knecht, *Francis I*, pp. 282–3, 287, 370.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 364.

little success) was perhaps more experienced than his immediate predecessors on their accession. As King, he took a detailed interest in military administration and Monluc later recalled that he was the best king a soldier and commander could have had.<sup>15</sup> Henri led the army on the 'German campaign' of 1552 and again during the campaigning in Artois in 1554, though never in a ranged battle.

Under the King, the long-established high command of the constable of France and the three or four marshals, as well as the positions of the captains of the heavy cavalry of the *ordonnances*, formed part of the regime of offices, governed by edicts. However, as 'charges' rather than offices in the strict sense, military commands were never openly venal.<sup>16</sup> The constable and marshals shared the general quasi-judicial characteristic of office-holders under the crown. All other commands, from those of lieutenant-general of an army to victualler, were commissions during the King's pleasure. It was the King's prerogative to command military force that gave direction. The numerous *ordonnances* on military administration were promulgated by the king's sign manual, with the minimum of chancellery protocol.<sup>17</sup> In military matters, there was little by way of routine authentication and the administration of the army thus remained throughout this period a matter of the personal and absolute authority of the sovereign. As in other spheres, however, there was a loose convention that, in war, the king act by taking counsel.

The constable still sometimes commanded the army in person (as did Montmorncy in the campaigns of 1552 and 1554). When there was a constable in office, as in 1483–8, 1515–23 and 1538–67, he could exercise broad authority over the command and appointments in the army (though only fully if he retained the confidence of the King). Bourbon, on his appointment in 1515, participated in the formulation of new general military ordinances.<sup>18</sup> At a routine level he drew up lists of appointments for captains of horse and foot.<sup>19</sup> The post was held for life and, under Bourbon, was paid at 24,000 lt. p.a. One of the constable's prerogatives was to command the *avant-garde* of the army when the King was present on campaign, as did Bourbon at Marignano. His failure to obtain regular payment of his salary and pensions as well as to secure command of the *avant-garde* in the royal army of Hainault in 1521 may have been a cause of disgruntlement, though he seemed to accept the decision 'patiently'.<sup>20</sup> On rare occasions, in the absence of a constable, a lieutenant-general was appointed with even more sweeping military authority. This was the case with François duke of Guise in September 1557, when he was given powers to discipline the troops, oversee musters, to direct the cavalry, infantry, artillery, and to instruct governors and town councils in the King's name.<sup>21</sup>

More commonly, command was exercised by the marshals and, from the 1540s, by the *colonel-général de l'infanterie* (see chapter 4). By the mid-16th century,

<sup>15</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 358.

<sup>16</sup> P. Contamine, *Des Pouvoirs en France, 1300–1500* (Paris, 1992), p. 145.

<sup>17</sup> H. Michaud, 'Les Institutions militaires des guerres d'Italie aux guerres de religion', *Revue Historique*, 523 (1977), pp. 29–43, esp. pp. 31–2, 33–4.

<sup>18</sup> De Marillac, *La Vie du connétable de Bourbon*, pp. 153–4.

<sup>19</sup> BN fr. 2968, fo. 72.

<sup>20</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 159; de Marillac, *La Vie du connétable de Bourbon*, pp. 141, 167–9.

<sup>21</sup> *Mémoires de Guise*, pp. 387–90.

there were usually between three and five marshals (the number was not formalised at four until 1579). Like the constable, the marshals exercised jurisdiction, delegated to subordinate judges, located at the Table de Marbre at Paris.<sup>22</sup> Henri II, conscious of uncertainty in the chain of command, decided to allocate clear regions to each of the three marshals. Melfi was given Piedmont and the south-eastern provinces; La Marck Champagne, Burgundy and Brie; and Saint-André the central provinces.<sup>23</sup> This more or less reflected the zones in which their governorships were located but nothing was said of northern and western France and the ordinance remained a dead letter. The main task of the marshals was to oversee military discipline, through the *prévôts des maréchaux* under them and the *prévôts des maréchaux provinciaux*, each with their companies of 20 archers. The latter, though, were suppressed in 1554, their functions handed to the bailliages. *Prévôts* were only retained for the staffs of the marshals and the main provincial governors.<sup>24</sup>

The dominant figure at the start of the century and until his disgrace in 1504–5 was Pierre de Rohan-Gié, one of the great beneficiaries of Louis XI's favour.<sup>25</sup> The most notable marshals in the Italian wars were Stuart d'Aubigny, Chaumont, La Palice (Chabannes), Trivulzio and Lautrec; in the Habsburg-Valois wars, Gaspard I de Coligny, Montmorency, La Marck, d'Annebault and Saint-André, Strozzi and Brissac.<sup>26</sup> Marshals with military experience were sometimes the real commanders of formations nominally under princely command, as was Gaspard I de Coligny with the duke of Alençon in 1521.<sup>27</sup> Royal favour, of course, was as necessary as ability for promotion as marshal. This was obviously the case with Anne de Montmorency. In 1521 he took part in the defence of Mézières, determined, as du Bellay recalled, to 'make known to his master his desire to do him service' and was very nearly killed at Bicocca. He was promoted as marshal in succession to his brother-in-law Coligny on the latter's death in August 1522, though Coligny's command in Navarre was allocated to Chabannes.<sup>28</sup> Brantôme tells the story of how Montpezat, a minor gentleman of Quercy serving in Foix's company, became marshal in 1543, having come to Francis I's notice after Pavia as the only French gentleman available to serve him.<sup>29</sup> D'Annebault's promotion as marshal in 1538 (in succession to Florange) signalled his rapid emergence at the summit of royal

<sup>22</sup> G. Le Barrois d'Orgeval, *Le Tribunal de la connétablie de France du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle à 1790* (Paris, 1918); idem, *Le Maréchalat de France des origines à nos jours*, 2 vols (Paris, 1932).

<sup>23</sup> F.A. Isambert, *Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises*, 29 vols (Paris, 1822–33), XIII, pp. 19–22.

<sup>24</sup> G. Saugrain, *La Maréchaussée de France, recueil d'ordonnances et d'édits* (Paris, 1697), p. 4; G. Zeller, *Institutions de la France au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1948), pp. 127–9; *CAF*, VIII, 300, 32128; Isambert, *Lois*, XIII, pp. 411–27.

<sup>25</sup> R. de Maulde La Clavière (ed.), *Procédures politiques du règne de Louis XII* (Paris, 1885), pp. xiii–cxxi.

<sup>26</sup> By custom, marshals were referred to by their family names, not those of their seigneuries. Hence, 'marshal de Foix' not 'de Lescun' and 'marshal de Chabannes' not 'de La Palice.'

<sup>27</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 159, 241.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 54, 63, 139.

<sup>29</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 265.

favour.<sup>30</sup> The creation of a fourth marshalship for Saint-André in 1547 responded to the pressures of court faction and the intervention of Diane de Poitiers in favour of La Marck. Charles de Cossé-Brissac was appointed to succeed Melfi as governor of Piedmont in 1550 through the intervention of Diane de Poitiers. This was in the teeth of opposition from Montmorency, who wanted to promote his nephew Coligny. Then Brissac successfully solicited the marshalship vacant by Melfi's death.<sup>31</sup> By 1550, the holding of the marshalship in conjunction with the vice-regal command in Piedmont was becoming the norm. The Vieilleville biographer, discussing of the succession to Strozzi in 1558–9, argues that Paul de Termes' appointment in the field was a mistake, in that it aroused too much jealousy from those who thought they had as good a claim and therefore withdrew from the army. When Vieilleville was granted the next vacant marshalship in February 1559, the King is supposed to have expressed regret at Termes' appointment but Vieilleville did not actually become marshal until the death of his friend and patron Saint-André at Dreux in 1562.<sup>32</sup>

Marshals only commanded specific armies with commissions as *lieutenants-généraux du roi*.<sup>33</sup> It was thus that Béraud Stuart d'Aubigny and Gian-Giacomo Trivulzio commanded the army in Italy in 1499, while Montmorency in 1536 and duke of Guise in 1557–8 effectively exercised their commands in this way.<sup>34</sup> On some occasions a *lieutenant-général du roi* in a particular theatre could exercise wide authority. By contrast, some marshals could derive extra authority by combining their posts with other high offices in the army or at court, such as that of *grand maître de France*, as did Charles d'Amboise de Chaumont from 1504. Jacques de Chabannes-La Palice, *grand maître* from 1511, gave up that post on promotion as marshal in 1515, but Anne de Montmorency combined the two from 1526 and, as such, seems to have had overall control of the muster system.<sup>35</sup> Philippe Chabot de Brion and Claude d'Annebault, both Admirals of France (d'Annebault gave up the marshalship in his promotion as admiral in 1544), commanded royal armies as *lieutenants-généraux*. Chabot was thus appointed in February 1536 for the campaign in Piedmont.<sup>36</sup>

A *lieutenant-général* did not need also be a marshal or great officer of state; the count of Ligny was one of the commanders in 1499 without the title of marshal.<sup>37</sup> Louis de La Trémoille was also appointed *lieutenant du roi* at Milan in charge

<sup>30</sup> François Nawrocki, 'L'Amiral Claude d'Annebault (vers 1495–1552): Faveur du roi et gouvernement du royaume au milieu du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle', unpublished doctoral thesis, Ecole des Chartes, 2 vols, Paris, 2001, I, p. 116. D'Annebault was one of the few marshals made to resign as a result of losing royal favour (in 1547), the appointment nominally being for life.

<sup>31</sup> L. Romier, *La Carrière d'un favori. Jacques d'Albon de Saint-André, maréchal de France (1512–62)* (Paris, 1909); *Vieilleville*, pp. 462–9, a highly fictionalised account; Villars, p. 509.

<sup>32</sup> *Vieilleville*, pp. 701, 755.

<sup>33</sup> BN fr. 5500, fo. 192v (1522); L. Pinard, *Chronologie historique-militaire*, 7 vols (Paris, 1760–64), II, p. 240.

<sup>34</sup> D'Auton, I, pp. 7–11; BN fr. 46438, fo. 72; Dupuy 500, fo. 17; *Mémoires de Guise*, pp. 387–90.

<sup>35</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, IV, p. 279; VII, p. 96.

<sup>36</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, p. 326.

<sup>37</sup> D'Auton, I, p. 7.

of an army of reinforcements in 1500, once again in command of the army sent into Parma and Tuscany in July 1502, in the army of Naples in June 1503 and in command of the defence of Burgundy in 1507.<sup>38</sup> The youthful Louis d'Armagnac duke of Nemours, viceroy of Naples 1501–3, commanded somewhat unsuccessfully as *lieutenant-général* against Gonzalo de Cordoba.<sup>39</sup> Sometimes, a *lieutenant-général* was appointed to command a portion of a threatened frontier, as was Bayard at Mézières in 1521.<sup>40</sup> In fact, more often than not the army commanders were not the marshals.<sup>41</sup>

A deep pocket was a crucial advantage to a commander. Dunois's dazzling liberality at Marquiereuil in September 1501, in dispensing hospitality to all comers, in his tents and at long tables, indicates that a commander was expected to be joyous and open-handed.<sup>42</sup> One of the advantages of appointing Dunois to command at Salses in 1503 was that he had 'the wherewithal to keep open house and spend freely.'<sup>43</sup> One of the assets of Damville, as newly appointed commander of the cavalry in Piedmont in 1554, was that he was able to spend freely and maintain a suite of 'poor captains,' while in 1550 François Gouffier de Bonnivet, known as a court gallant, when he arrived in Piedmont to take up the post of colonel-general of the infantry, won acclaim by keeping a long table open to all comers. It was, said Brantôme, 'what the soldier asks for.'<sup>44</sup> The personal suite of a *lieutenant-général* on campaign is indicated by La Trémoille's archives: in 1500 he was to have 67 horses, including 4 war horses, 6 mules and hackneys, 10 horses for his household luggage, 2 each for the 12 gentlemen of his household, one each for four serving gentlemen and the rest for his domestic staff, which included a barber, washing woman, secretary, valet and butchers. The household stuff was estimated at 49 tablecloths and 28 dozen napkins, cups, flagons, basins etc.<sup>45</sup>

The quality of command was obviously of central importance for the success of an army. Jean d'Auton sums up this when he imagines the dismay of the army when La Trémoille fell ill at Parma in September 1503:

If we lose him, we are without a lucky chief. It is he who by right takes the decisions and carries them out to advantage. In battle he puts his men in order and rallies them at need. It is he who comforts the men by words and enriches them with gifts ... giving for brave deeds and punishing faults.<sup>46</sup>

Luck was thus an important aspect of this self-assurance. When Louis XII commanded successfully in the field, he was observed to be 'very joyful' and inspected the line 'with joyful countenance and assured manner.' He insisted that his men were 'joyous and determined to fight.'<sup>47</sup> An anonymous oration

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 143–9, 227–31; III, pp. 18, 28, 191; IV, p. 149.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 278.

<sup>40</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 139.

<sup>41</sup> See Pinard, *Chronologie historique-militaire*, e.g. I, pp. 192, 248, 197.

<sup>42</sup> D'Auton, II, pp. 120–1.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, III, p. 217.

<sup>44</sup> Villars, p. 654; Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 657.

<sup>45</sup> AN 1 AP (La Trémoille), household accounts 1500.

<sup>46</sup> D'Auton, III, pp. 206, 252.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 220–1; Florange, *Mémoires*, ed. Goubaix and Lemoisne, I, pp. 29–30, 62.



to Louis declared that ‘your face gave hope of victory, ardour and force shone from your eyes and in your words gaiety and constancy.’<sup>48</sup> A general in the field had both to exercise grasp and to show himself conspicuously brave, like Ligny at Mortara in April 1500, halberd in hand, decked out in cloth of gold with a yellow cap with white feathers, to show he was unafraid of being targeted.<sup>49</sup> Later, a certain ‘common touch’ became prized, famously the ability of François duke of Guise to ‘caress’ his men, singling out those who had done well for their opinion and carefully listening to their advice.<sup>50</sup>

How did French commanders measure up to tactical challenges? Brantôme, writing decades later about Louis XII’s commanders, thought that he had, in his ‘good captains . . . the best a king of France had since the twelve peers of Charlemagne.’<sup>51</sup> Such men as Trivulzio, Ligny and d’Aubigny, were often of foreign origin. Trivulzio was a hardened, no-nonsense commander who could control his men and deploy them effectively. His fellow marshal, Béraud Stuart d’Aubigny, had accompanied Charles VIII in 1494, became the captain of the Scots guard and then obtained higher commands under Louis XII, notably in the expedition to Naples in June 1501. In this, he was assisted by Cesare Borgia and San Severino, count of Caiazzo, who knew the country well, and then in the defence of Naples in 1502–3.<sup>52</sup> Stuart was an accomplished commander who wrote his own treatise on military affairs and was largely responsible for the occupation of the kingdom of Naples in 1501 and the defeat of a Spanish army at Terranova in December 1502. D’Auton described him as ‘a master for reconnoitring the land and detecting ambushes’ and his ultimate defeat at Gioia in April 1503 was largely the result of the insubordination of Humbercourt, about which he wrote in his own treatise.<sup>53</sup> In the War of the Holy League (1511–12), it was the military genius of Louis XII’s nephew, Gaston de Foix, duke of Nemours, that held the French position in northern Italy together against a formidable alliance, though the imprudent dash of the commander led to his death at Ravenna in April 1512. This signalled the rapid disintegration of the French position in northern Italy, compounded by the exercise of overall command by the relatively feeble Jacques de Chabannes-La Palice. The latter was already quite old in 1515 when he became marshal, having presided over the collapse of the French position in Lombardy in 1512. He had had a long career of fighting behind him by the 1520s and had received a good press for his efforts in Naples in 1503. His sobriquet ‘second Hector’ was earned for his skilful skirmishing with the Spaniards and for his strenuous, if doomed, defence of Ruvo di Puglia against Cordoba, single-handedly holding off an assault to encourage his men and covered in sulphurous chemical. Nevertheless, he became known for his excessive caution. He had perhaps learned his lesson in combat with Cordoba, who

<sup>48</sup> R. de Maulde La Clavière, ‘Eloge de Louis XII, père de la France, en 1509’, *RH*, 43 (1890), pp. 59–60.

<sup>49</sup> D’Auton, I, p. 242.

<sup>50</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 603.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 198 (Vies: Louis XII); C. de’ Rosmini, *Dell’intorno alle militari imprese e alla vita di G.J. Trivulzio*, 2 vols (Milan, 1815).

<sup>52</sup> D’Auton, II, p. 14.

<sup>53</sup> Bérauld Stuart, *Traité sur l’art de la guerre*, ed. E. de Comminges (The Hague, 1976), p. xxviii; D’Auton, II, p. 265, III, pp. 162–6.

notoriously refused to accept the rules of the chivalric game and was indifferent to demands for battle unless he thought he could win.<sup>54</sup> La Palice was killed at Pavia.<sup>55</sup> Similarly, Louis d'Armagnac, duke of Nemours, sent as viceroy to Naples in August 1501, though praised by d'Auton as a 'young prince of small means, great in knowledge, with good will and virtues', nevertheless showed himself in the same writer's narrative to be indecisive and suspicious of his captains. Stuart d'Aubigny, who had conquered the kingdom, was disgruntled and divisions ensued; La Palice reported Nemours's decisions to the King and claimed he could not be held responsible for the consequences. Admittedly, the duke was out on a limb, commanded to hold Naples with inadequate resources. Nemours was defeated at Cerignola in 1503.<sup>56</sup>

Brantôme was critical of many of the commanders appointed under Francis I, including Bonnavet, Lautrec, his brother Lescun and Montejean. Though personally brave, he thought them arrogant and lacking in strategic grasp.<sup>57</sup> In this, he was perhaps influenced by du Bellay's criticisms.<sup>58</sup> Brantôme's strictures were taken up by Lemonnier when he dismissed most commanders of the 16<sup>th</sup> century as inadequate, other than Gaston de Foix-Nemours. Lautrec, Bonnavet and Montmorency he thought pretty hopeless.<sup>59</sup> Lautrec was an unlucky commander (Bicocca, Naples), politically inept in his treatment of the Milanese and unable to take advice. But Monluc later recalled that he took note of the achievements of all those under his command and he seems to have had a certain charisma.<sup>60</sup> Lautrec had been put in a difficult position in trying to hold on Milan in 1521 with inadequate support. Nevertheless, his letters show him to be determined to shift the blame should anything go wrong. In December 1521, from his temporary refuge in Venetian territory, he wrote that he had done what a good servant could: 'if you lose what is here, you will have much ado to sustain the war ... the help must come from you, otherwise we cannot continue ... and above all things send money.' After Bicocca, Lautrec returned to France and confronted the King, recalling his warnings and claiming never to have received enough money. This, according to du Bellay's memoirs, was the source of the troubles of the finance minister, Semblançay.<sup>61</sup> He seems to have learned nothing by the time of his disastrous return to Italy in 1527–8, still autocratic with his subordinates and unwilling to take advice.

The nature of the finance and administrative system meant that successful commanders had to be able to navigate the labyrinth of politics and patronage in order to obtain funds for their armies, at a time when there were multiple demands on state funds and conflicting objectives. Lautrec was allocated 130,000 écus p.m. on his departure for Italy in August 1527. By January, he saw this reduced to

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., III, pp. 106–7, 139–41.

<sup>55</sup> H. de Chabannes, *Histoire de la maison de Chabannes*, 4 vols (Dijon, 1892–99).

<sup>56</sup> D'Auton, II, pp. 93, 97–8; III, pp. 1–2, 14, 137–8.

<sup>57</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, *passim*.

<sup>58</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 174–5, 184–5, on Lescun's mistakes in Lombardy, 1521.

<sup>59</sup> Lemonnier, *La Lutte*, p. 181.

<sup>60</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 814. On Lautrec, there is only the apologetic biography by B. de Chanterac, *Odet de Foix, vicomte de Lautrec, maréchal de France, 1483–1528* (Paris, 1930).

<sup>61</sup> BL Egerton 20, fo. 57. Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 233–4.



60,000. According to the Florentine agent with his army, this had been done by the manoeuvres of Chancellor Duprat, who was trying to turn Francis I against him. On the other hand, Lautrec's sour grapes may be the source for this story.<sup>62</sup> Villars, in his account of the Italian campaigns of the 1550s, replied to those who had criticised his portrayal of Brissac as 'an obstinate solicitor of money' with an evocation of the hackneyed but necessary line of Cicero: long experience had taught him that 'money is the nerve and pivot of war, without which the army cannot survive.' Brissac, he thought, well understood that those who managed the king's affairs were more inclined to keep his purse shut than open. His remonstrance of December 1551 to the King that 'he had always ... thought that His Majesty had not begun this war without having assured the money' was received badly by the Constable. Demands that he be sparing in his use of money stemmed to some extent from the fact that Piedmont was having to compete with the north-eastern front in royal calculations.<sup>63</sup> Decisions on the global sums necessary and on priorities for expenditure were taken for a mixture of ad hoc and strategic reasons that are not always easy to discern but remained a constant problem for commanders in the field.

Each major army had a complement of commanding officers which included the *lieutenant-général*, a *maréchal de camp* (for the cavalry), *maître de camp* (infantry) *maréchal de logis*, a *maître de l'artillerie*, later also a *sergent de bataille*. These, with the main *gendarmerie* captains and the infantry commanders, constituted the 'general staff' of an army. The duke of Guise's army for the Thionville campaign (1558) had a 'headquarters staff' that included two dukes, Guise and Nevers, three *maréchaux de camp* (Bourdillon, Tavannes and La Brosse), 5 gentlemen with unspecified duties, a secretary of state (Bourdin) and a *maître des requêtes* (Lalemant), two German interpreters, a conductor of lansquenets, the heralds, the *maréchaux des logis*, the lodgings officers, the trumpets, the doctors, surgeons, an Italian engineer, 20 'artisans' for the engineer. Their salaries give a good idea of their relative standing.<sup>64</sup> Monluc later noted how crucial were the *maréchaux* and *maîtres de camp* for surveying the field of battle and how disastrous it would be if they were inexperienced. Strozzi and Bourdillon, *maréchaux de camp* in 1552, had to ask for the appointment of another one since their colleague, Martin du Bellay, was too old for the job. The appointment of Francesco Bernardino of Vimercato to the post in 1554 indicated the high esteem in which he was held.<sup>65</sup>

The advice of such officers was given in council. When Francesco Gonzaga, marquess of Mantua, was appointed to succeed the ailing La Trémoille as commander of the army for the relief of Naples in September 1503, he was given four 'principal captains' to advise him in Sandricourt, Jacques de Silly (*maître de l'artillerie*), Antoine de Bessey and Jean Duplessis (*commissaire*). Ludovico, marquess of Saluzzo, was appointed to stand in for Gonzaga when he was inca-

<sup>62</sup> M. Arfaioli, *The Black Bands of Giovanni: Infantry and Diplomacy during the Italian Wars (1526–1528)* (Pisa, 2005), p. 102.

<sup>63</sup> Villars, pp. 497–8, 545–6; Cicero: 'Nervos belli pecuniam infinitam' (*Philippica*, V).

<sup>64</sup> *Mémoires de Guise*, p. 431; Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 234–6.

<sup>65</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 807; *Vieilleville*, p. 563; Villars, p. 640.

pacitated.<sup>66</sup> Memoir writers and chroniclers tell us something about the decision-making by such commanders in the field and it is significant that one of the major faults attributed to those unsuccessful commanders, Lautrec and Bonnivet, was failure to take advice. Lautrec, in his pride and arrogance, even though he assembled his commanders, would not take their advice. Lautrec's brother Lesparre lost Navarre in 1521, according to du Bellay, 'for lack of good advice.'<sup>67</sup>

When they survive, narrative accounts of councils held by generals in the field reveal the priorities of commanders. Sometimes, as in the accounts of Monluc and Vieilleville, such records are skewed by the desire of participants to exaggerate their role, though the incidental detail is telling. The Vieilleville biographer describes a crowd of 25 or 30 commanders, standing in no particular order and 'without ceremony' offering their advice to the duke of Guise at Metz in 1553.<sup>68</sup> An example from the early 16<sup>th</sup> century will serve for many. D'Auton describes, in the form of verbatim opinions which are meant to convey the substance of debate, a council of French commanders at Mortara, confronted in February 1500 by Ludovico Sforza's attempt to recover Milan with a force of 30,000 men. Trivulzio invited all the commanders in turn to give their opinions. The *bailli* of Dijon spoke first and argued strongly for withdrawing from a weakened Mortara to Novara and holding out there. All the others were of his view except the count of Ligny and Chandée. Ligny's is the only other opinion to be given verbatim. He insisted that his view was not expressed to hold up decisions but to get a better outcome by debate, since once a decision had been made in war it was difficult to go back on it. He argued forcefully for staying on at Mortara and sending reinforcements to Novara if necessary. His view, though a minority one, ultimately carried the day. The collective reply of the commanders at Novara is preserved in La Trémoille's papers and invites the army to approach Vespolate to break up the enemy threat.<sup>69</sup> Such consultations were frequent on campaign and well documented by chroniclers and memoir-writers.<sup>70</sup>

When not accompanied by the King, Trivulzio and his generation of commanders were left more or less to decide their own strategy.<sup>71</sup> This independence, though, could sometimes be limited by the need to keep an eye on the King's real intentions. The commanders of the siege of Perpignan in 1542 were all required to put in writing their advice to raise the siege.<sup>72</sup> In Piedmont in April 1536, Admiral Chabot, at the head of a formidable army that had overrun the country, was ready to move forward into Milan and had been warned that the Emperor was planning a counter-attack. An agent close to the Admiral reported:

<sup>66</sup> D'Auton, III, pp. 253, 270.

<sup>67</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 229 (Lautrec), 237 (Bonnivet); Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 124.

<sup>68</sup> *Vieilleville*, pp. 599–600.

<sup>69</sup> D'Auton, I, pp. 200–5, 349–50.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 126–30; on other such councils, see *ibid.*, II, p. 277; III, pp. 13–14, 170, 247, 295, 297; I, p. 311; IV, p. 186.

<sup>71</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, pp. 408, 426.

<sup>72</sup> *St.P.*, IX, p. 181.

The King had told me to write to the Admiral that his intention was that he should give battle and I had it for truth from the Queen of Navarre and Mlle. de Penthievre that only thus could the King be satisfied.

However, two days later the news was sent that he should take no risks and settle the garrisons.<sup>73</sup> Du Bellay recalled that he received explicit instructions from the King, conveyed by the cardinal of Lorraine (himself on his way to negotiate with Charles), not to ‘innovate’ anything. The dilemma was serious: halting his victorious march would be dangerous but to attack the Emperor and give him the excuse he needed to go back on his promises over Milan would have exposed him to blame by the King. The council of commanders that he held was scarcely helpful, in that most said that the King’s instructions had to be observed and others said the outcome was so doubtful they could give no good arguments for forward moves. The prospect of an attack on Vercelli was attractive and there were those ready to argue that it was worth the risk, since French troops could withdraw if the peace went ahead. The risk of disappointing the men of their booty was great. Chabot, though, remained convinced that this would give Leyva the excuse he needed.<sup>74</sup>

On the eve of the confrontation with del Vasto in Piedmont in 1544, Enghien took care to send to court for a decision on whether to give what would be a decisive battle and only pressed on when that permission arrived.<sup>75</sup> On the eve of the battle itself, with del Vasto’s army drawn up between Sommeriva and Ceresole, Enghien called his commanders in for their advice on tactics. Some were for giving battle the next day, though others pointed out that the army was exhausted from the day’s march and many had not eaten. Some even mentioned the precedent of Philip VI’s hasty rush to battle at Crécy. Thus, it was decided to retire to Carmagnola to re-form and rest. The actual battle took place as a result to the determination of del Vasto to seize the advantage and pursue the French in their withdrawal, to the point that it became impossible for the French army not to fight without retreating and the consequent loss of heart to the troops.<sup>76</sup> The records of Brissac’s command in Piedmont during the 1550s are replete with such discussions.<sup>77</sup> It is important to remember this, since it has been customary to regard the French army before the seventeenth century as largely a private enterprise affair in which effective command was delegated to the high aristocracy, without much inference from the high command.

<sup>73</sup> Librairie de l’Abbaye, *Autographes et documents* (s.d.), no. 45, Letter of Aubeterre, 17 May 1536.

<sup>74</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 384–7.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 201–3; Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, pp. 141–7.

<sup>76</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, pp. 213–16; Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, pp. 151–3.

<sup>77</sup> Villars, pp. 512, 517; Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 193; Villars, p. 561. See also Villars, p. 649.

### Planning for war

While no king was required to act on advice and the composition of a ‘council of war’ was unfixed and informal, the holding of such councils was normal. The Naples campaign of 1494, despite being highly controversial within France, was clearly planned carefully in advance; the logistical problems had been discussed by Antonello di Sanseverino with the marshals and Vesc in 1490. By 1494, the strategy for a land campaign by armies on both sides of the Appenines and a naval force along the Tyrrhenian coast, to ensure that neither Pope nor king of Naples could support the Florentines, had been mapped out. Urfé’s letters to the King from Genoa in June 1494 spell out the plan in some detail.<sup>78</sup> In 1495, Charles VIII’s return march from Naples was closely observed by Commynes. He indicates that on at least three occasions, matters were ‘put in council.’ The first, in June 1495, was over whether to hand back their fortresses to the Florentines and accept their offer of cash; added to this was whether to appoint the count of Ligny to command in Pisa. On both issues the council took one view and the king another.<sup>79</sup> Shortly afterwards, Cardinal della Rovere’s proposal to send men to Genoa to aid a rebellion was debated. The majority argued that, should the imminent battle be won, there would be no need, since Genoa would come over anyway. Again, the King decided otherwise and Commynes commented: ‘I am dismayed that it is possible that such a young king did not have some good servants who could tell him the danger he was running.’<sup>80</sup> Then came the decision about whether to drag the lumbering artillery train of 14 great cannons across the Appenines. Some wanted to break it up and go for a swift crossing but the King would not agree and so the artillery was hauled over the mountains.<sup>81</sup> On the eve of the battle, Commynes reports that Cardinal Briçonnet had put forward the – to him – absurd suggestion that the King could just march his army off in front of the enemy, firing some cannons, and make his way home.<sup>82</sup> At the end of the first day at Fornovo, it was seen that many of the enemy remained on the field and the King ‘put to the council’ whether he should advance on them. The Italian commanders (including Trivulzio) were in favour, the French against, arguing that enough had been done for the day and that it was late. Commynes, with hindsight, thought the Italians were right and a crushing victory could have been obtained, but the decision went against. The council debate on whether to continue truce negotiations was also inconclusive and the King took his decision whispering to Briçonnet.<sup>83</sup>

Under Francis I, councils of war were described by du Bellay, Monluc and others. In 1515, Francis was holding a council in the field when he heard of the

<sup>78</sup> P. Luc, ‘Un Appel du Pape Innocent VIII au roi de France (1489)’, *Mélanges ... de l’Ecole française de Rome*, 16 (1939), 332–55; Labande-Mailfert, *Charles VIII*, pp. 261–3.

<sup>79</sup> Commynes, III, pp. 142–3.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, III, pp. 152–3.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, III, pp. 160–1.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, III, p. 173.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, III, pp. 195–6, 200–1; d’Auton, IV, pp. 162–3.

developing Swiss attack at Marignano.<sup>84</sup> The King held a council of war at Rheims in September 1521 to decide what to do about the relief of Mézières. The composition was: Alençon, Orval, Marshals Chabannes and Châtillon, Telnigny, Galiot de Genouillac (grand master of the artillery), joined next day by Saint-Pol. It was, according to du Bellay, by Châtillon that ‘the most matters were conducted.’<sup>85</sup> On the whole, though, the du Bellays are reticent about deliberations in such councils and decisions are generally attributed firmly to the King himself. Sébastien Moreau recounts that, at Pavia, Francis, on hearing spy reports about an imminent attack by Bourbon, ‘summoned the princes of his blood and captains to advise him what was to be done.’ One group advised withdrawal to Milan, where supplies were plentiful, in order to await reinforcements. Others insisted that the dishonour of withdrawal was too great and that the army should wait until the city had fallen. The majority view was for staying put and not shutting up the army in Milan, ‘because whoever was master of the countryside was master of the towns.’<sup>86</sup>

In the aftermath of the Emperor’s retreat from Provence in 1536, in mid-September the King convened the Council to advise on whether he should continue with his plan to follow the Emperor into Italy. The consensus was that he could not move his army forward from Lyon in time to catch up with the enemy, especially with the winter so close. It was decided, though, not to break up the army since the Emperor was still at Fréjus and it was uncertain what he intended to do. By the end of the month, with clear news of the Emperor’s withdrawal, Francis decided to move towards Lyon ‘whatever persuasions the grand master could make to the contrary,’ leaving Montmorency to deal with the Swiss captains.<sup>87</sup>

In the case of Monluc’s famous description of the war council of March 1544 on whether to attack in Italy, though the story is tainted by Monluc’s obvious desire to magnify his own role, the circumstances are clear enough from his narrative. Monluc tells us he was summoned to a council consisting of the King himself, the Dauphin, Saint-Pol, Annebault, Galiot de Genouillac, Boissy and two or three others. The room was laid out with the King seated at the head of a table, Saint-Pol and Annebault facing each other on two sides. The rest were standing, with the Dauphin also standing behind his father’s chair. The King began proceedings by telling Monluc that it was difficult to give Enghien permission to give battle since they could not send reinforcements. He then invited Saint-Pol to elaborate on the imminent danger of the Anglo-Imperial invasion. A battle lost in Italy would remove the best infantry troops available (the old bands of Piedmont) and only new bands and *legionnaires* would be left. Annebault seconded this view. Monluc describes himself as anxious to butt in, silenced by Saint-Pol’s, ‘not so fast!’ The Dauphin said nothing. The King then asked Monluc if he had understood the decision. Monluc said he had, but wanted to make his own comment, which the King allowed. He began by insisting that he could speak frankly to a soldier King

<sup>84</sup> Barrillon, I, p. 116; Florange, *Mémoires*, ed. Buchon, p. 264.

<sup>85</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 146, 162.

<sup>86</sup> A.L. Champollion-Figeac, *Captivité du Roi François Ier* (Paris, 1847), pp. 75–6.

<sup>87</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, pp. 317–18; AN J 968/2, nos. 6 and 10; Francis made a rapid visit to Marseille at this point as described by Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, p. 318. See also AN J 968/2, nos. 6–10.

(encouraged by facial gestures by the Dauphin). The burden of his speech was that the Gascon and Swiss foot in Enghien's army, 9000 men, were resolved to fight to the death. The cavalry, though not complete (here the King stirred in annoyance), was equally resolved and of high quality. Monluc describes himself as speaking in so animated a way that he could almost have been on the battle field and this seemed to go down well in lightening the tone. The Dauphin was beaming more and more encouragement. He went on to insist that, denied the opportunity of battle, the army in Italy would lose heart. The King's advisers were moved only by fear of losing a battle: 'All they could say was "What if we lose?" I never heard any of them say, "What if we win!"' Francis turned to Saint-Pol, who asked him if he would change his decision on the words of a fool. Monluc countered that he was not an empty-headed Gascon, noting that lessons had been learned since Bicocca. Most continued to oppose, except Annebault who seemed to have taken a cue from the Dauphin. Monluc's description of the way in which the admiral and others began to change their opinion as they saw the King's mind being changed is revealing. Annebault knew the King was wavering and advised him that the men in Italy were the best. So, the King, taking off his cap, prayed, thought a moment and finally exclaimed: 'Let them fight!' Monluc's general comment on such meetings was that 'in the presence of these princes there are lots of fine opinions, not always the best. People only half say what they mean and always according to the master's whim.' This account has been much quoted by historians, some dismissing it as largely an invention, but that it would have been received as a credible account of a council of war by his readers seems a reasonable assumption.<sup>88</sup>

The correspondence of the King and his ministers and between ministers has survived in large quantity, if patchily, and throws light on the problems of command and the results of the advice that the King was given. Noblemen and soldiers on campaign kept in touch by letters carried by the riders of the royal *écurie*, as the letters between Aumont and the entourage of La Trémoille in Italy in 1515 show.<sup>89</sup> Brissac's correspondence with this lieutenant, Vassé, then at court, shows a serious range of critical opinion on royal military plans. Vassé thought the planned invasion of the Low Countries in 1554 ill-prepared and the execution eventually undermined by lack of supplies. He and Brissac had advised taking a place nearer the frontier than Mariembourg, as those taken deep in enemy territory could never be kept.<sup>90</sup>

The royal entourage maintained a constant flow of information by letter. For example, secretary Breton reported to Montmorency at midnight on 27 July 1528 that he had read the latter's letter to the King at his *lever*. On the point of going to bed, the King had received despatches from Saint-Pol, Marshal Trivulzio and Pomponio Trivulzio which had 'made the said lord ponder a little'. Despatches from the finance officers Morlelet and Boisrigault, seen by the King, had proved more reassuring about the pay of the troops and were also sent on.<sup>91</sup>

Some of the most revealing correspondence is preserved for the mid-1530s in

<sup>88</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, pp. 141–8.


<sup>89</sup> Vaissière, *Une Correspondance de famille*, p. 16.

<sup>90</sup> BL Add. 38032, fos. 291v–293r, 293v–294r, 301r–303r.

<sup>91</sup> BL Egerton 17, fo. 159.



the papers of Antoine Dubourg, while the King and advisers were separated from the Chancellor. The letters of Montmorency, for the campaigning period of 1537 in Artois and Piedmont, are particularly intensely concentrated in the months spent in the north, when the Chancellor was responsible for getting men to the royal army.<sup>92</sup>



Of the 56 letters from Secretary Breton, in the royal entourage while the King was on campaign, most contain orders for military payments or news of movements. On military administration, in August 1536 Breton dealt with the necessity of paying troops at Turin, allocations for Picardy, naval prizes at sea; in September, powers for Cardinal du Bellay as governor in Paris, the supply of wine to troops in Piedmont. In March 1537 in Artois, business included the supply of saltpetre for the artillery, commissions for recruitment in Paris, musters, Tournon's financial needs at Lyon, pay and supplies for Humières in Piedmont, the allocation of Vendôme's *gendarmierie* company. In April, he dealt with the siege of Hesdin and neighbouring fortresses; in July with the remounting of artillery and in August the truce with the Low Countries, garrisons and preparations for the campaign in Piedmont.<sup>93</sup>

The King had to rely on the advice of a small number of trusted military advisers. The letters between Francis I and Henri II and Montmorency and the duke of Guise are obvious evidence of this. A significant proportion of such material has survived for periods when the King and Montmorency were apart, a substantial part of it concerned with military and diplomatic policy, with the usual formula of advice of a minister, 'under correction, Sire'. There is a concentration of surviving correspondence in 1548, when Montmorency was putting down the Gabelle rebellion in the south-west. During this period the King sent his minister all the despatches from ambassadors and governors.<sup>94</sup> The exchanges show the King consulting the constable on the campaign in Scotland<sup>95</sup> and a long memorandum from the constable on policy towards the Emperor who, he argued, was trying to weaken the King by denying him access to German mercenaries and who should be countered by the timely distribution

<sup>92</sup> AN J 965/8; AN J 965/9; J 968/1, *passim*.

<sup>93</sup> AN J 968/2, nos. 1–54, *passim*.

<sup>94</sup> *Mémoires de Guise*, pp. 1–2.

<sup>95</sup> BN fr. 6620, fo. 26; Pierpoint Morgan MA 279.

of funds to the German princes and cities.<sup>96</sup> On the other hand, the King was tempted by Habsburg offers of an understanding but saw a balance of advantages: it would enable the Emperor to complete his subjugation of Germany but at the same time free the King to bring Scotland into his orbit and force the English to give way over Boulogne: 'on this I am sure you will be able to consider all things and offer such judgment as the good of my service requires and, following that, conduct this negotiation, in which as in all matters I intend to rely chiefly on you.' On balance he was inclined to temporise and find out what Charles V was up to. In the same despatch, though, the King asked advice about the problems of getting money to Scotland and ordered the Constable to fill up the infantry companies being prepared for Scotland and to oversee their embarkation from Bordeaux.<sup>97</sup>

In November 1553, the King consulted the Constable on a broad range of problems which included what to do about two main problems: first came Brisac's report on the governor of Milan's supposed plans to establish a fortress at Val Fevière in Piedmont. The King's initial view was that there was no great military rationale for this plan other than to divert his forces from any attempt to help the Corsicans or make some sort of attack on Genoa. Second, he had received a request for a decision on action in Corsica from the Baron de La Garde, on whether to stand on the defensive there or send 5–6000 men and risk a battle. La Garde had thought enemy troops of such poor quality that 1000 French could handle 2000 of theirs; if the French won the ensuing battle the Genoese would give up hope and 'by this means I would remain absolute master, with Calvi surrendered and all the rest reduced to my devotion' and if they lost, the French could still keep their strongholds on the island. On all this the King had told Marshal de Termes to stay on the defensive.<sup>98</sup>

Though it might sometimes seem that each commander operated separately and reported only to the King and his ministers, by the middle of the 16th century, commanders were kept informed of military activities in other theatres of conflict. In November 1523, La Trémoille gave a detailed summary of the strategic situation as he understood it to Montmorency, assuring him that the English were thoroughly beaten and, with Francis freed from the threat in the north, Milan could be taken by force 'seeing that the King faces no other threat.'<sup>99</sup> In 1536, Montmorency kept his brother La Rochepot regularly informed of the progress of the Emperor's invasion of Provence.<sup>100</sup> Maugiron, governor of Dauphiné, received from Cardinal de Tournon detailed news of the royal campaign of 1553 and was kept abreast more informally of developments in Piedmont by the governors there.<sup>101</sup> Du Lude, lieutenant-general in Guyenne, was kept fully informed of the Boulogne campaign

<sup>96</sup> Pariset, 'La France et les princes allemands', p. 247.

<sup>97</sup> BN fr. 6620, fos. 7–9; BN fr. 6611, fos. 3–6.

<sup>98</sup> BN fr. 6626, fos. 4–5.

<sup>99</sup> BL Egerton 22, fo. 125.

<sup>100</sup> D. Potter, 'The Constable's Brother: François de Montmorency, sieur de la Rochepot (c.1496–1551)', *Nottingham Medieval Studies*, 48 (2004), 141–97.

<sup>101</sup> J.-T. Leblanc, 'Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron durant les guerres de Piémont et du nord de la France (1545–52)', *Bulletin des Travaux du Comité des Sciences historiques*, (1888, 1890, 1893, 1895): (1888), pp. 73–7, (1895), pp. 25–83.



of 1549 and the Metz campaign of 1552–3.<sup>102</sup> Brissac in Piedmont in the early 1550s received regular and detailed bulletins of the war in the north and especially the siege of Théroouanne in 1553 and the northern campaigns of 1554.<sup>103</sup> Provincial governors and army commanders kept agents at court to keep them abreast of developments. Thus Miossens was able to warn Henri d'Albret in September 1554 of the transfer of half of his *gendarmerie* company to Piedmont, a move highly unwelcome, since it signalled that Guyenne was being downgraded as a priority. Miossens remonstrated at court that his master was unlikely to obey this order.<sup>104</sup>

The beginning of any war was naturally accompanied by serious planning meetings. The Vieilleville biographer gives a vivid account of Henri II's decision for war in council in 1551, with his declaration of a mobilisation strategy. This involved, between October 1551 and March 1552, the expansion of the *gendarmerie* by 500 lances, the recruitment of 6000 light horse, 60 companies (100 each) of mounted arquebusiers, 100 companies of 'new bands' of infantry and 40 of the old bands, with 60 cornets of reiters and 30,000 lansquenets, 12,000 Swiss and 12,000 men of the legions, 8–10,000 horse of the feudal levy and 8000 gentlemen volunteers. This semi-fictionalised account captures something of the priorities in creating a new army. Spy reports in February 1552 show frenetic consultations by the King with his council at Paris over strategy and planning for the German campaign.<sup>105</sup> The King had before him a detailed analysis by Jean de Fraisse, sent from Germany in October 1551. This posited two alternatives: either an alliance and joint campaign with the German princes subsidised by France or a strategy by which the King kept his money and waged war on his own terms. In either case, it would be essential to use German mercenaries to seize Metz.<sup>106</sup> Similarly, the campaign of 1554 was discussed in secret at La Fère in May.

Some original outline plans for campaigns survive. In 1521, Chabannes drew up one for an army to relieve Tournai: 2000 horse raised for local defence, three *gendarmerie* companies, 7000 Picard foot and either 3000 Swiss or the same number of *aventuriers*. Equipment was to include a range of artillery and transport for grain supplies. Deception, vital for a long march through enemy territory, was to be ensured by telling the victualling commissioners that the objective was the re-supply of Saint-Quentin.<sup>107</sup> The range of planning problems is revealed by some telling projects for the Pyrenees frontier in the 1540s. Campaigns there were relatively rare in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the emphasis resting on Italy, Picardy and Champagne. Nevertheless, there were substantial local military resources available in Gascony and Languedoc and there were two routes which were available, despite the obstacle posed by the mountains: in the west towards Pamplona (capital of lower Navarre) and in the east towards Perpignan. The Habsburg-Valois wars were heralded by a French-backed attempt in 1521,

<sup>102</sup> B. Ledain (ed.), 'Lettres de Jean de Daillon, comte du Lude, gouverneur du Poitou', *AHP*, 12 (1882), 1–396, *passim*.

<sup>103</sup> Villars, pp. 594–603 (1553), 617–24 (1552–3), 688–95 (July–Aug. 1554).

<sup>104</sup> *Bulletin du Comité historique du Comité des monuments historiques*, II (1842), p. 185.

<sup>105</sup> *Vieilleville*, p. 538; HHSa, Frankreich, Varia, 7, Nachtrag, fos. 57–60.

<sup>106</sup> Pariset, 'La France et les princes allemands', pp. 262–3.

<sup>107</sup> Approximately on 2 July 1521: BN fr. 2968, fo. 26.

in the name of the young King Henri d'Albret, to regain possession of Navarre. This had exploited the known discontent of the political elite of the region with the rule of the young King Charles. Though there was initial success, divided counsels and an over-ambitious strategy led to its loss by September 1523.<sup>108</sup> Thereafter, the front towards Pamplona remained quiet until the 1540s, though Marguerite of Navarre continued to press Francis to further her husband's interests. It seems to have been in 1540 that the idea of pressing forward in Navarre was revived.<sup>109</sup>

A detailed plan for this expedition survives in the form of a copy made in February 1551, when the issue surfaced again in French calculations.<sup>110</sup> The first part listed the number of troops that would be needed in each category. 18,000 infantry, made up of 8000 Germans, 4000 French and 6000 paid for by the King of Navarre, made up of 2000 Italians and 4000 French under eleven named captains. In addition to this, there were to be 6000 *legionnaires* of Guyenne in six bands of 1000. For cavalry: 600 men-at-arms (say 1500 horse) and 600 light horse. The artillery was specified in detail with requisite powder, cannoneers, 900 horses and 1200 pioneers.

The demands of grain for one month were estimated at 24,000 'charges' (cartloads), and thus 72,000 for a three-month campaign. These and 24,000 'charges' of oats were to be levied on the province of Guyenne, where Navarre was the governor, and allocated to listed communities. Meat was not specified in detail as it was to be made available at the time of the campaign:

Thus, it can be seen that [for] such victuals, transported by various routes and rivers, there can be no shortage of transport to the principal depots, which are Bayonne, Ustaritz, Saint-Palais and other easier places along the rivers as far as Saint-Jean-Pied-de-Port.

From there supplies would be moved by stages to Pamplona and the King of Navarre would supply pack mules and oxen. It was thought that 'undoubtedly' plenty of hay and straw would be available. '*Gens de bien*' were to be appointed in each district to ensure there was no 'exaction' on the poor people.

The plan next turned to costs. For one month, these were projected as the following:

Type of expenditure	Unit cost	Sub-total (lt.)
15,000 French Gascons German foot	100s	50,000
5000 Germans	6 lt.	30,000
5000 arquebusiers	15s extra	3750
Double pays, 10%	1000 at 100s; 500 at 6 lt.	8000
30 captains and officers	Captains @ 100s each extra	5250
3 colonels	300 lt.	900
600 light horse	10 lt.	6000
6 captains of light horse	100 lt.	600

<sup>108</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 104–6, 154–8, 282–5.

<sup>109</sup> A.N K 1485, Saint-Vincent, 5 Aug. 1540.

<sup>110</sup> BN fr. 3127, fos. 100–120; Villars, pp. 648–9.

6 lieutenants	50 lt.	300
6 caps d'escoadre	25 lt.	150
8 commissaires		720
Prévôts des maréchaux		400
<b>Total for troops</b>		<b>106,130</b>
Artillery		11,772
Bridges and boats		2273
Transport of bridges		2097
Victuals		109,427.10.0
Unspecified		72,390.10.0
<b>Total for one month</b>		<b>304,090</b>

The cost of troop pay was thus only one third of the overall costs, the rest being accounted for by equipment, supply and logistics. Another planning document for the transport of an army from Lyon to Susa, undated but probably from the same period, is much more detailed on the supply side. It consists of a list of the supplies necessary for an army of 1000 lances (i.e. 2500 horsemen with 12,000 horses) and 20,000 foot and concludes that the cost of supplies per *étape* would be 7360 lt. and with 15 *étapes* between Lyon and Susa, the total cost would be 110,300 lt.<sup>111</sup> The most obvious point revealed by these documents is the attention to detail in the general planning of a campaign.

In practical matters, such as the allocation of funds for the army, it was the *conseil privé* that normally discussed the details. It was in formal meetings of this body that the King promulgated his ordinance for the police of the army in January and February 1534.<sup>112</sup> Documents on its *modus operandi* only become plentiful, though, from 1547. These provide the best insights into its role, though we have scattered military orders well before that.<sup>113</sup> Membership was technically broad and in 1547 was defined, for the morning meetings on 'matters of state and finance' as the king of Navarre, three Lorraines (the cardinal of Lorraine, the cardinal of Guise and the duke of Aumale), the duke of Vendôme, the Constable, Chancellor Olivier, the sr. de Sedan (Marshal), Jean d'Humières, Saint-André father and son, President Bertrand, Villeroy and the four secretaries of state. For the after dinner meeting devoted to 'current affaires' and requests, a number of cardinals and bishops, Pierre Remon and the masters of requests were added.<sup>114</sup> In December 1552, the cardinals of Lorraine and Châtillon, Montmorency, Bertrand and *général des finances* La Chesnaye were round the table when it told the representatives of Compiègne the King's plans for fortification.<sup>115</sup> From the start of the new register in 1547, it is clear that military administration was a major activity of the council. The council sat on certain days to handle finance, naturally a vital aspect of war planning. In April 1553, it decided on the means to finance the King's war expenditure,

<sup>111</sup> BN fr. 3054, fos. 138–9.

<sup>112</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, VII, nos. 647, 652, pp. 104–9.

<sup>113</sup> BN fr. 3062, fos. 125–7; A.D. Lyublinskaya, *Документы по истории внешней политики Франции. 1547–1548r* (Moscow/Leningrad, 1963), no. 13.

<sup>114</sup> G. Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat*, 2 vols (Paris/Blois, 1666), II, pp. 1–2.

<sup>115</sup> AM Compiègne BB 21, fo. 72v.

especially at Metz.<sup>116</sup> Naval expenditure was also part its remit. So, in June 1547, orders were made for naval expenditure in Brittany by drawing on the *soldes* of La Rochelle; in 1548, the council registered a contract with a captain of royal ships and an ordinance on the royal galleys and in January and March 1549 issued further orders on the royal galleys and Jean Ango. In October and December 1549 there were contracts for the construction of 'roberges' (hybrid oared sailing ships). Costs of moving a galley fleet from Rouen to Ambleteuse were drawn up in December 1550.

Military supply was another major preoccupation. The *étapes* for Dauphiné were regulated, probably resulting in the document discussed above. In November 1548, the council drew up the terms for a victualling contract for the forts of Oultreau and Hardelot and another was concluded in January 1549 for the fort of Mont Châtillon and in November for the royal army in Boulonnais. It was on campaign with the King that the council concluded a contract for Ambleteuse in August 1549. In October 1549, it drew up the contracts for the supply of wine to the Picardy garrison and agreed the accounts for the supply of the King's army. A contract for the supply of Thérouanne for ten years was drawn up in April 1551 and another for the supply of Champagne in 1551. In 1553, it drew up a contract for the supply of the garrison of Bayonne. The contract for the supply of Metz, Toul and Verdun was 'passed' by the council in April 1553.

Other business included regulations on the legions, royal letters on the increase pay for light horse, funds for artillery and the list of the expanded *gendarmerie* in November 1552. Provisions for a certain number of offices in the military administration were registered by the council in this period. As for fortresses, in August 1550 the council made provision for strongholds in Savoy, and in December for teams of oarsmen employed in the works at Ambleteuse and Boulogne as well as expenses for ships used in work on fortifications at Le Havre and Dieppe. The Council registered the edict creating the provincial networks of captains of transport and artillery in December 1552. *Départements*, or draft allocations for expenditure on fortifications by provincial governors, were approved.

In broader matters, it was the *conseil privé* that in March 1549 drew up the King's estimate for allocation of funds from the *extraordinaire* to Scotland and registered the sums allocated the following month, along with a one-month's *Estat de despense* for the army there, in effect a complete plan for the deployment and pay of the troops. An *Estat de prévision* for the same theatre followed in August 1549 and an *estat de despense* in July 1550. The Council in the King's presence agreed the terms for a Luccan banker to transfer funds to the garrison in Edinburgh in October 1552. Another *état de prévision* for the army in Parma was drawn up in March 1552. In 1549, the *conseil privé* played a major part in consultations about new fiscal arrangements for the provisioning of the *gendarmerie* that led to the *taillon* and in July drew up the royal letters necessary for the new provisioning system. The council also entertained petitions, for instance

<sup>116</sup> The evidence in the following paragraphs is taken from BN fr. 18153.

from foreign captains for the pay of their men and allocated funds for the pay of Swiss troops with approval of the capitulations with captain Frohlich.

Other sources, in the form of registers kept by secretaries of state to note *arrêts* of the council, show the same pattern of activity in military provisioning. Guillaume Bochetel in July 1549 recorded an *arrêt* for the reimbursement of the magistrates of Abbeville for supplies made to Boulogne in 1543–4,<sup>117</sup> while Jean du Thier minuted an *arrêt* of the Council in March 1551 freeing Saint-Riquier from tailles for four years in view of war damage in 1544.<sup>118</sup> For 10 September 1551, there are two original orders surviving: one was for the collection of funds ‘for war expenditure’, the largest portion of which was for 1.4 million écus from the *décimes* of the clergy; the other is a memorandum for decisions on a range of matters: money to go Venice, fortifications, the navy, artillery, bridges and transport, as well as the need to decide a budget for the army in Piedmont and artillery and munitions for the frontiers of Champagne and Picardy.<sup>119</sup>

### Numbers of troops

How many men did the crown have to support and deploy? At the start of his chronicle of Louis XII’s wars, Jean d’Auton diffidently waived aside the problem: he ought to enumerate the army, ‘but I will not do it, fearing to prolong my account and bore the listeners.’<sup>120</sup> The potential tedium of numbers is aggravated by the inexact nature of the administrative documentation. Ferdinand Lot’s study was essentially preoccupied with this problem and provides a useful starting-point. However, fraud in both cavalry and infantry formations was endemic, despite the repetition of detailed regulations on the musters, with the result that the crown could often have no clear idea of how many men there were in an army, even though it might know the number of companies. Brantôme relates the story of an infantry captain, Montmas, who told Henri II that the muster commissioners had accused him of having an under-strength company. He brazenly argued that this was in the King’s interest since he, its captain, knew how to choose his men and was accustomed to use the pay saved by enrolling a smaller number than required to pay for the best men available. Thus, with only a half-strength company, his men would fight better than twice the number.<sup>121</sup> It is doubtful that the King and his ministers would have been amused by this and they certainly repeatedly sought to check on the strength both of cavalry and infantry through musters.

We can be certain that the tendency was for the size of armies to rise inexorably. The image conveyed by Jean de Bueil, subject of *Le Jouvencel*, makes clear that for warriors of the mid-15th century the growth of numbers of men on the battlefield had been bewildering. In the council of war held by Louis XI at Beauvais in 1471,

<sup>117</sup> BN fr. 5127, fo. 89v.

<sup>118</sup> BN fr. 3154, fo. 77v.

<sup>119</sup> BN fr. 3127, fo. 22.

<sup>120</sup> D’Auton, I, p. 14.

<sup>121</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 581.

when faced by the decision of whether to fight the duke of Burgundy, the real Jean de Bueil is reported advising the King that, though he is ready to risk his life in his service as he had for his father,

since his time war has become very different. Then 8 or 10,000 was thought a great army. Nowadays, things are very different. An army the size of the duke of Burgundy's, in artillery and munitions, has never been seen. Yours is also the finest ever assembled in the kingdom. I am not used to seeing so many men together. How are they to be governed?

This has often been taken as the authentic voice of chivalry when faced by technological innovation.<sup>122</sup> Louis XI claimed to have 20,000 men plus the *arrière-ban* available during the War of the Public Weal. From the later 1460s, it seems that he was employing in all 40,000 men and that at the height of his military operations in 1481–3 he had 45,000 at his disposal in different theatres.<sup>123</sup> With support forces, supply staff and hangers on, this amounted to feeding more like 80,000 people. On active campaigns, numbers were more compact. The Venetian Contarini in 1491 estimated the French army at 3500 lances (10,500 horse), 7000 archers and 10,000 *mortes-payes*.<sup>124</sup> Charles VIII, thought by some contemporaries to have led an army of more than 50,000 to Italy in 1494 (this would have been the biggest single army assembled in France since ancient times), himself claimed something like 12,400 foot and 18,000 horse (with 8800 men left behind in France), still a substantial number. In reality he probably took no more than 20,000 men (half of it cavalry) and left half of that behind him in various garrisons.<sup>125</sup> Louis XII's army for the conquest of Milan in July 1499 was supposed, according to claims to his Venetian allies, to stand at 1800 lances and 30,000 foot. The reality was much different. Besides 1000 lances necessary for the defence of the frontiers, the field army for Lombardy probably stood no higher than 6–9000 cavalry and 17–20,000 infantry, not all of which could be concentrated in the same place.<sup>126</sup> The army despatched to Naples in 1503 was officially listed as 1200 lances and 10,000 foot (French and Italian), though Venetian observers reported only 4000 foot.<sup>127</sup>

In 1523, for his planned invasion of Italy, Francis I declared that he had 50,000 men ready (including 36,000 foot) for the campaign and for the defence of the kingdom.<sup>128</sup> A number of changes can be observed by the early reign of Francis I. First, to judge by public pronouncements on the king's armies, it looks as though much more precise information was available to government about the size and structure of the army. Second, that army had begun to increase remarkably in size

<sup>122</sup> Jean de Bueil, *Le Jouvencel*, ed. C. Favre and L. Lecestre, 2 vols (Paris: SHF, 1887–9), I, p. cclxxxii.

<sup>123</sup> P. Contamine, *Histoire militaire de la France*, ed. A. Corvisier, vol. I (Paris, 1992), p. 230.

<sup>124</sup> L. Firpo, *Relazioni di ambasciatori veneti al senato*, 11 vols (1965–84), V, pp. 10–20.

<sup>125</sup> Delaborde, *L'Expédition de Charles VIII*, pp. 324–7, crit. by Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 15–21, p.j. II.

<sup>126</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 24–7.

<sup>127</sup> D'Auton, III, pp. 191, 254; Sanuto, *Diarii*, V, p. 112. The difference is probably to be explained by the Swiss.

<sup>128</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L.), pp. 117–21; Contamine, *Histoire militaire*, I, p. 240.



and third the infantry was much the most important portion of the force. However, it must be pointed out that, for fairly obvious reasons, the army lists distributed by Francis I to foreign envoys were usually over-estimates and can only be accepted in conjunction with payment rolls. The estimates for Francis's army in Italy in 1515 stem from Barrillon's fairly reliable account and the letters for the *taille* of August 1515. They can be put at 2500 lances (7500 combatants) and 23,000 lansquenets and 8000 Gascons.<sup>129</sup>

In 1542, Francis I claimed to have, on all fronts and for active campaigning, 103,000 infantry and 8800 cavalry in his pay, organised in three campaign armies and including only the garrisons of Piedmont. (Around 30,000 of these were Germans, 10,000 Swiss and 8000 Italians). That this was a gross exaggeration made for the attention of Henry VIII is confirmed by the assertion that the *arrière-ban* would raise a further 70,000 men to serve at their own expense for three months. We know that French access to lansquenets was made difficult by Habsburg levies of men for Hungary. Nevertheless, a total of 70,000 non-garrison troops on all fronts in that year is not improbable if the reports of several foreign ambassadors are conflated with the official estimate.<sup>130</sup> (See Appendix 2, Table 1) Francis is unlikely to have had more than an army of 30,000 foot and 3000 horse for the Landrecies campaign of the summer of 1543. In addition, though, the King had decided to raise 12,000 Swiss, 6000 Italians and another 2000 lansquenets. Given the 33,000 frontier troops in pay, this gives us a full total of 85,000 under arms.<sup>131</sup> At moments of military crisis, like the camp assembled at Jalons in 1544 to face the Emperor, it was claimed by a contemporary that France had assembled a force of 45,000 men.<sup>132</sup>

The military establishment of 1552 needed to be ratcheted up by the demands of repeated campaigns. There are a number of sources which, while they do not always agree in detail, allow a general picture to emerge. These include the general army list drawn up after the German campaign, reproduced by Villars, two closely related lists of the army for the Metz campaign and estimates of the likely garrison of Piedmont. The Villars text is useful for its comprehensive survey of the entire kingdom outside Piedmont, though it lacks precise figures for the infantry. The army was thus listed as: first, the military household, then 1600 lances (notionally 4000 horse), 2940 light horse in 36 companies, 41 companies of 'old French' infantry (c.12,300 men), 21 of new (6300), 7000 Swiss and four regiments of lansquenets, six companies of Scots and one of English. The likely maximum for the infantry is 30,000. The garrisons of the kingdom itself included a further 400 lances, 290 light horse and 43 infantry companies (c.12,000) with related formations. The garrison of Piedmont can be estimated at the same time 12–13,000

<sup>129</sup> Barrillon, I, p. 68; A. Spont, 'Marignan et l'Organisation militaire sous François Ier', *Revue des questions historiques*, n.s. xxii (1899), p. 66.

<sup>130</sup> *L&P*, XVII, 517, 554.

<sup>131</sup> August 1543: BL Egerton Charters 38. Otherwise, Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, pp. 130–1. On 1544, BN Clair. 339, no. 7599; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, pp. 240–1. In October 1544, Francis I claimed that the treaty of Crépy had enabled him to release 35,000 men from other fronts in order to convert their pay for the army against Henry VIII (HHSA, Frankreich, Varia 5, fo. 193r).

<sup>132</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 102–3.

foot and five *gendarmerie* companies, though the infantry stood at 17,550 (16,000 effectives) in November 1554.<sup>133</sup> The formations thus listed shifted around in the course of the campaign; the Swiss arrived late and were allocated to garrisons in France and Piedmont, as were the bulk of the light horse. The campaign lists for the army after the capture of Metz show around 36,000 men, to which the garrison resources of the kingdom should be added at 11,450 men.<sup>134</sup> This seems to have been the maximum the crown could put together.<sup>135</sup> A figure between 50 and 60,000 would therefore seem to be a good rough estimate for the entire military resources of the kingdom in 1552. The strength of the army for the royal campaign in Artois of August–September 1553 is known both from the detailed figures of Rabutin (9–9,500 horse and 26–29,500 foot) and also from an official bulletin which suggests 12,000 horse and 30,000 foot.<sup>136</sup> The official account almost certainly exaggerates the numbers of cavalry.

In 1557, with one army in Picardy facing the Spanish-Netherlands army, another was despatched to Italy, commanded by Guise. French forces were thus again seriously divided. The disasters and triumphs of the year provide a good insight into the weaknesses of the French military machine. Estimates of the army on the northern front are difficult but cannot have exceeded 20,000 foot (French and German) and 6000 horse. At all events, fewer were present at the battle of Saint-Quentin, when a maximum of 20,000 French faced over 40,000 Habsburg troops.<sup>137</sup> The army of the duke of Guise in Italy consisted of 20 ensigns of French infantry (4000), 6000 Swiss (24 ensigns), 500 men-at-arms in 7 companies and 600 light horse in 4.<sup>138</sup> Piedmont still needed at least a skeleton garrison of 10,000, though some Swiss troops were withdrawn after the battle. Re-equipping the army was vital. Infantry that in other times would not have been considered were recruited, while new armour and arquebusiers had to be rushed to the troops. Ten new *gendarmerie* companies were created. Guise brought back with him 1400 of his best arquebusiers, 9 French companies (1800) and 2 German and sent 10 more of French (2000) overland with the 6000 Swiss, the *gendarmerie* and light horse. He was therefore able to provide around 10,000 for the northern front and also to purge some of the inadequate troops taken on in the August crisis. However, there were now about 20,000 foreign troops on hand for whom there was little money to provide pay.<sup>139</sup> Guise's capacity to assemble a serious army for the siege of Calais was remarkable. A reliable source puts his army at 10,000 Swiss (in two regiments), 6000 lansquenets (2 regiments), an indeterminate number of French infantry (up to 10,000), 500 pistoliers and 500 men-at-arms, 3–400 light horse. An army of around

<sup>133</sup> Villars, pp. 619–22, 559, 561, 702.

<sup>134</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 125–34.

<sup>135</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 326–8, IV, pp. 130–1; Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 61–2, 69; Rabutin, *Commentaires*, I, pp. 49–52; Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 125–34, 234.

<sup>136</sup> Rabutin, *Commentaires*, I, pp. 221–4; *Bulletin des Travaux du Comité des Sciences historiques*, (1888), p. 73.

<sup>137</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 158–9.

<sup>138</sup> BN fr. 4742, fos. 1–2.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, fos. 7r, 11v, 21r–v.



30,000 foot plus cavalry had been assembled by the end of December to replace that of 20,000 lost at Saint-Quentin.<sup>140</sup>

Even for specific campaigns of movement, notable forces were assembled. Martin du Bellay's list of the army for the conquest of Piedmont in 1536, derived from a government source, gives 810 lances (2025 men), 1000 light horse, 16,000 French infantry (including 10,000 legionaries), 6000 Germans, 2000 Italians; that is, 24,000 foot and around 3000 horse. The king's army drawn up for battle at Maroilles in July 1543 comprised 1600–1800 lances (4–4500 men), 1800 light horse, 12,000 legionnaires, 16,000 Germans. To these army estimates we have to add the frontier garrisons, minimal in peacetime but necessary in time of war. Henri II's camp at Pierrepont near Amiens in 1558, possibly the largest single French army assembled in one place during this period, may have amounted to 50,000 men.<sup>141</sup> In the same period, the garrison of Piedmont stood at 310 lances, 700 light horse and roughly 12,000 infantry.<sup>142</sup> The garrisons allocated to the northern and eastern frontiers of Picardy, Champagne and Lorraine early in 1558 involved for Picardy alone 16,300 infantry, including 8900 lansquenets and 600 pistoliers (see Appendix 2, Table 2).<sup>143</sup> With such other commitments taken into account, the French state could not have been paying less than 80,000 men by the end of the Habsburg-Valois wars in periods of active campaigns.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 26r; D. Potter, 'The Duke of Guise and the Fall of Calais, 1557–58', *EHR*, 98 (1983), p. 495.

<sup>141</sup> Rabutin, *Commentaires*, II, pp. 222–9; Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 176–85; 'Portrait de l'armée du roi quand il la vit le 8': BN fr. 3081, fo. 67; BN fr. 6617, fo. 27; BN fr. 20470, fo. 167 (slightly later enumeration when there were 55 ensigns of French infantry). BN fr. 4552, fos. 72–3.

<sup>142</sup> Villars, p. 841.

<sup>143</sup> 'Estat de l'assignacion', Jan.-Feb. 1558: BN Clair. 346, fos. 77–92. Note, though, that this was the budgeted assignment. The actual effectives were fewer, when they can be compared with the returns of the captains as in the case of the Calais garrison in February 1558. Instead of the budgeted 2800 men there were actually 2317 (BN Cangé 15, fos. 22–25).

### 3

## Cavalry and the Nobility at War

The military power of France was symbolised by its heavy cavalry. Du Bellay remarked that ‘the French *gendarmerie* ... cannot be compared to any other nation’ and even Charles V was reported to have accepted the superiority of French cavalry.<sup>1</sup> It was assumed that the job of the nobility was to fight, preferably in the service of the King and the ‘common weal.’ For noblemen, war was *the* avenue to honour and renown. Guillaume du Bellay wrote that war was ‘the custom and common calling of the French nobility’ and that, through it, his ancestors had risen to high degree. Monluc reminded ‘you who are born gentlemen, that God gave you birth to bear arms and serve your prince, not to chase hares or make love.’<sup>2</sup> Montaigne, more measured, remarked that ‘the true and essential form of nobility in France is the military calling,’ while La Noue saw, in arms, what raised noblemen to great honour.<sup>3</sup> A survey of narratives of noble deaths shows that death in battle accounted for 40% of all deaths in such stories in the 16th and early 17th centuries.<sup>4</sup> But the military vocation was most important as an underpinning ideology of social privilege and there were many more nobles than places in the King’s army. It has been argued that the heavy cavalry retained its centrality in French military thinking and in the aspirations of the nobility essentially because of the prestige attaching to it, rather than for its usefulness.<sup>5</sup> The lessons of the great defeats of the 14th and 15th century had in some ways been learnt,<sup>6</sup> yet heavy cavalry remained at the centre of the army. The *gendarmerie* did score successes in the early 16th century, so its replacement by more flexible cavalry was necessarily slow but there were now other

<sup>1</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 144, 219; Villars, p. 708.

<sup>2</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, pp. 343, 362 (prologue to the *Ogdoades*); Blaise de Monluc, *Commentaires et lettres*, ed. A. de Ruble, 4 vols (Paris: SHF, 1864–72), I, p. 431; *Commentaires de Blaise de Monluc, Maréchal de France*, ed. P. Courteault, 3 vols (Paris, 1911–25), III, pp. 443–4.

<sup>3</sup> Michel de Montaigne, *Essais*, ed. J.-V. Leclerc, 4 vols (Paris, 1925) II, p. 99; François de La Noue, *Discours politiques et militaires*, ed. F. Sutcliffe (Geneva, 1967), p. 230.

<sup>4</sup> H. Germa-Romann, *Du «bel mourir» au «bien mourir»: le sentiment de la mort chez les gentilshommes français (1515–1643)* (Geneva, 2001), pp. 122–3.

<sup>5</sup> C. Gaier, ‘La Cavalerie lourde en Europe occidentale du XIIe au XVIe siècle. Un problème de mentalité’, in idem (ed.), *Armes et combats dans l’univers médiéval* (Brussels, 1995), pp. 299–310; Treva Tucker, ‘Eminence over Efficacy: Social Status and Cavalry Service in Sixteenth-Century France’, *SCJ*, 32 (2001), 1057–95.

<sup>6</sup> M. Bennett, ‘The Development of Battle Tactics in the Hundred Years War’, in A. Curry (ed.), *Arms, Armies and Fortifications in the Hundred Years War* (Woodbridge, 1994), pp. 1–20, at pp. 11–12.

avenues through which noblemen at all levels could enter the King's military service, including the infantry.

### The Royal Guards

One of the most honorable ways for a nobleman to serve the King was in the elite royal bodyguard. Under Charles VII, the household guard was still relatively small but in subsequent reigns increased to a core of 200 *gentilshommes*, 100 Swiss, 200 French mounted archers, and the 100 Scots guards and 24 Scots archers of the bodyguard.<sup>7</sup> By 1500, it stood at around 1000 and all except the Swiss served mounted. The household guards constituted a pool of reliable troops, who could be used to reinforce the royal army. Louis XII took his military household to Italy with him in July 1502 all 'on pain of dismissal'. These included the 200 *gentilshommes de l'hôtel*, the pensioners, 400 archers and the *cent Suisses* and, by the mid-16<sup>th</sup> century, it was normal to summon them to accompany the King on campaign by printed letters.<sup>8</sup> The pensioners were placed under Bourbon's command in 1509, before he had obtained a *gendarmerie* company. They were described as 200 great lords who each had up to 20 followers 'of deeds.' Louis XII simply placed Bourbon on the wing at Agnadello in 1509 with vague instructions to charge at the right moment.<sup>9</sup> The 200 gentlemen, the pensioners and the *cent Suisses* were despatched to Rousillon in June 1503, to reinforce an attack on Salses, in 'such cloth of gold emblazoned, such barded horses, such men-at-arms well mounted and fitly armed.'<sup>10</sup> The King took all his guards, the Swiss and his pensioners with him to Genoa in 1507 and his arrival in the midst of his military household was described by Jean d'Auton.<sup>11</sup> Around the King were the 200 gentlemen of the household in full armour and their horses barded. With the King himself were the great princes and the cortege was followed by a company of men-at-arms. The whole troop was a league in length.<sup>12</sup> On the field, the King was often accompanied by the leading princes of the kingdom.<sup>13</sup> Gentlemen of the household guard were well rewarded and sometimes held other military commands.<sup>14</sup>

The court was also usually full of young gentlemen anxious to make their mark, who at the start of a campaign would rush to the front in order to distinguish

<sup>7</sup> BN fr. 21448, fos. 32, 52, 54, 60. After 1476, the 'archers' of these companies seem to disappear, though they are still referred to as 'lances'. BN fr. 32772–778, summaries of accounts, 1471–1596; AN K 502, no. 5, account, 1512–13, for the *gentilshommes de la maison*.

<sup>8</sup> D'Auton, II, pp. 242–3; III, pp. 56–7; BN fr.17329. Bib.II, 63a.

<sup>9</sup> De Marillac, *La Vie du connétable de Bourbon*, pp. 140–1.

<sup>10</sup> D'Auton, III, pp. 192, 207.

<sup>11</sup> BN fr. 25720, fo. 158 (*CAF*, I, 222, 1220); BN fr. 18153, fos. 65–6; BN nafr. 7857, fos. 41–5.

<sup>12</sup> P. Contamine, *Guerre, état et société à la fin du Moyen Âge* (Paris, 1972), pp. 294–7; D'Auton, IV, pp. 149, 214–15.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, p. 221.

<sup>14</sup> *CAF*, VII, 288, 24641.

themselves; this is what Henri II described as ‘the ardent youth of my train’ whose energies needed to be employed.<sup>15</sup> D’Auton writes in 1499 of ‘so many fine young gentlemen and others, wanting to increase their valour ... to acquire honour in the service of the king.’<sup>16</sup> Such was the case in Lombardy (April 1500) and in Stuart’s army of Naples (July 1501).<sup>17</sup> In April 1507 the roads to Genoa saw the princes and great lords of France on their way to participate in the campaign, especially as the King was commanding in person. Among these were the hundred or so royal gentlemen who wanted an ‘invitation to the banquet’, the honour of joining La Palice’s attack on the fortress commanding the town.<sup>18</sup> At Théroüanne, just before the battle of the Spurs in 1513, there were several young men present ‘for their pleasure.’ Florange tells us of a number of lords who were on the field at Marignano for the same reason and the same words are used of the young gentlemen who were with Montmorency at Bicocca in 1522.<sup>19</sup> In Piedmont (1536) there were 50 or 60 who had arrived ‘to acquire honour and serve the King’, while others joined in the force to relieve Théroüanne, though in the latter case provoking the capture of their commander, Annebault, by frivolous behaviour.<sup>20</sup> Again, in 1543, the young François de Lorraine, then duke of Aumale, came to Théroüanne with 100 ‘gentlemen volunteers who were with him for their pleasure’ and including youths of the Dauphin’s ‘upbringing.’<sup>21</sup> The following year, with battle about to be given in Italy by Saint-Pol,

The youth of the court knew that the campaign could not avoid battle (*passetemps*), so, as is the custom of the French nobility, everyone got ready to be there, some with and some without the King’s leave ... so that few youths were left at court.<sup>22</sup>

The tradition was still going strong at the start of war in Piedmont in 1551, when, despite general orders to the contrary, fifty or sixty young noblemen, including Condé, Aumale and Nemours, rushed to take part in the fighting. Monluc later noted of this surge of enthusiasm that, though there was no nobility keener to mount up in the service of its King than the French, they needed to be properly employed. By this time, though, the arrival of such a number of undisciplined princes and nobles, outside any normal formation and riding in post without full equipage of war, was unwelcome to the commander, Brissac. Their complaints that he had not even visited them in their lodgings were met by a cold rebuff.<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, the court remained throughout the period a significant training ground for military skill and eventually access into higher commands and the *gendarmérie*.

<sup>15</sup> Vieilleville, p. 538.

<sup>16</sup> D’Auton, I, p. 13.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid., I, pp. 236–7, II, p. 38.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid., IV, pp. 164, 189.

<sup>19</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 32; Florange, *Mémoires*, ed. Buchon, p. 264; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 227.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., II, p. 386; III, pp. 392, 64–5.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., IV, p. 119.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., IV, pp. 201–2, 210.

<sup>23</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 198; Villars, pp. 537–8, 541, 543, 565.

Besides such high-status volunteers, there was the category of ‘gentlemen volunteers’ who served the King in war on a personal basis instead of in the feudal levy. The large numbers of ‘king’s pensioners’ of the late 15th century had served as a distinct formation in the Italian wars, but seem mostly to have found places in the *gendarmerie* by the mid-16th. In 1552, there was still room, though, for younger sons to volunteer for the infantry, commanded by Espinay. These were reviewed and thanked in person by the King after the campaign and given certificates of service which enabled them to boast to their families and loved ones that they had seen the King and served him in person. The following year, the King’s army included a large number of gentlemen volunteers ‘who had joined up without pay or position.’<sup>24</sup>

### The *compagnies d’ordonnance*

The royal army of the late 15th and early 16th centuries had been created in the last stages of the Hundred Years War. An ordinance of November 1439 had ordered that a certain number of captains ‘and men-at-arms and bowmen will be ordained for the waging of his wars.’<sup>25</sup> The specific act of February–March 1445 has not survived but was referred to and amplified by that of May 1445, which spelled out the composition of the ‘lance’ and that the King had ‘appointed certain notable chiefs’ to lead them, ‘who will be held accountable for the men in their charge.’<sup>26</sup> The act was traditional in many ways and built on procedures in force since the later fourteenth century but it proved revolutionary in its consequences by centralising the pay and supply of the garrisons.<sup>27</sup> It was the heavy cavalry of the *compagnies d’ordonnance*, the *grande ordonnance*, which was designed for active campaigning rather than garrison work (troops for the latter were described as the *petite ordonnance*). It was known commonly as the *gendarmerie* from about 1500 and formed the centrepiece of the permanent army for which the *taille royale* was allocated. The *compagnies d’ordonnance* were made up of ‘lances’ consisting, by the definition of May 1445, of 1 man-at-arms, a *coutillier*,<sup>28</sup> a page (with 3 horses) and 2 mounted archers with a page and a valet with a further 3 horses. Thus there were 6 horses in all, though 8 were permitted in a *règlement* of 1484 and this was confirmed in 1515 and

<sup>24</sup> *Vieilleville*, pp. 543–4, 667–8; Leblanc, ‘Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron’, (1888), p. 73.

<sup>25</sup> *Ord.*, XIII, pp. 306–13.

<sup>26</sup> Ord. 26 May 1445, AN K68, no. 14, ed. in E. Cosneau, *Le Connétable de Richemont* (Paris, 1886), p.j. LXXXIV; 4 Dec.1445, BL 11542, in A. Vallet de Viriville, ‘Notices et extraits de chartes et de manuscrits ... au British Museum de Londres’, *BEC*, 2nd ser., III (1946), pp. 122–32.

<sup>27</sup> For a full examination, see P.D. Solon, ‘Valois Military Administration on the Norman Frontier, 1445–1461: a Study in Medieval Reform’, *Speculum*, 51.i (1976), 91–111.

<sup>28</sup> The *coustillier*, by the mid-16th century the men-at-arms’ armour-bearer, was in origin a fighter equipped with a particular cutlass type-weapon called ‘langue de boeuf’ [R. Cotgrave, *Dictionnaire of the French and English Tongues* (London, 1611); Contamine, *Guerre, état*, p. 278].

1526.<sup>29</sup> The ordinance of 1549 again specified 8 horses per lance (4 for the man-at-arms and 2 each for the archers).<sup>30</sup> One projection for an army on the march implies that 1000 lances would need 12,000 horses.<sup>31</sup>

Service and pay were permanent, hence for administrative purposes it was the *ordinaire des guerres*. The original creation, vindicated by the successes against the English between 1449 and 1453, transformed the basis by which all groups, but especially the nobility, served the crown and provided for a reliable permanent army. Politically, the most important aspect was that the King controlled appointments to captaincies and used them as rewards. So, Francis I rewarded Bayard for his signal service at Mézières in 1521 with a company of 100 lances and later in the year created a substantial number of new captaincies of 25 lances for those who had served on the Hainault campaign.<sup>32</sup> After 1450, the crown continued to affirm the traditional primacy of cavalry in warfare but excluded a range of captains and subordinated the pay of captains to the whole muster procedure. It also operated a rigorous selection based on reliability and acceptability to the King and his immediate counsellors. Those who emerged victorious from the final stages of the Hundred Years War continued until Louis XI's wholesale changes (75% of the captains) after 1461. Louis was forced to compromise in 1465, though his later years saw constant changes in command. It was the regency of the 1480s that established a pattern whereby princes were routinely given commands and the numbers of companies were multiplied (though with reduced effectives) in order to spread patronage as widely as possible.<sup>33</sup> Only very rarely was an individual stripped of his command entirely, as was Marshal de Rohan-Gié in 1504.<sup>34</sup>

In the period 1445–94 domination of the higher command by the *grandees* grew, as well as their incorporation into the permanent service of the monarchy. Between 10 and 20% of captains were noted foreign commanders and 10% bastards of the higher aristocracy. Among the rest, subjects of the King, there was little homogeneity other than noble status. While in 1450 few princes deigned to accept positions as captains, by 1476, 36% of captains stemmed from the higher nobility (*chevaliers*, including princes) and by 1490 this had risen to 48%.<sup>35</sup> Princes occasionally led their companies in person, especially when the King was present in the field.<sup>36</sup> Usually, though, it was their lieutenants who did this job. Pierre duke of Bourbon was too ill to command his company at Salses in 1503, which had to be left to his lieutenant.<sup>37</sup> The leadership of princely companies by their lieutenants became routine,<sup>38</sup> though the appointment of foreign princes raised particular problems.

<sup>29</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, I, p. 49, no. 1; p. 50, no. 17 (art. 3); IV, no. 425 (art. 1).

<sup>30</sup> Isambert, *Lois*, XIII, p. 127.

<sup>31</sup> BN fr. 3054, fos. 138–9.

<sup>32</sup> Du Bellay, I, pp. 153, 169–70.

<sup>33</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, pp. 401–11.

<sup>34</sup> BN fr. 2928, fo. 10; BN fr. 25783, no. 69; Loyal serviteur, *Histoire ... des faits, gestes. Triomphes du beon chevalier sans paour et sans reproche le gentil seigneur de Bayart*, ed. J.A.C. Buchon (Panthéon littéraire) (Paris, 1836), p. 37.

<sup>35</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, pp. 418–23, 426–7.

<sup>36</sup> D'Auton, IV, p. 180; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 63.

<sup>37</sup> D'Auton, III, pp. 208, 245; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 19, 25–6.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 30–1, 188, 291–2.

Duke Filiberto II of Savoy's company in garrison in Lombardy in 1500–1 was commanded by his lieutenant, Coursinge<sup>39</sup> (Carlo III apparently offered personal service to Louis XII in 1507 but there is no sign he actually did so). Francesco Gonzaga, marquess of Mantua's company, awarded by Louis XII at Asti in July 1502, was commanded by a French noble appointed by the King, Humbercourt, and later by Bonnivet. Humbercourt could also double as captain of Aubigny's Scots men-at-arms in Calabria in the spring of 1503.<sup>40</sup> Even Cesare Borgia, duke of Valentinois in France, was accorded a company, in effect commanded by the Picard Pierre de Bellefrière.<sup>41</sup> One of the most revealing examples is that of Federico Gonzaga, who was forced to accept a lieutenant, count Alessandro Trivulzio, whom he had not chosen and who obstructed his choice of men-at-arms.<sup>42</sup> Du Bellay vaguely recalled this when noting that the lieutenant claimed that Gonzaga's appointment was only a matter of 'title and honour,' which may well have been the general assumption. Nevertheless, Federico found it all a matter of 'bad digestion' and this may have contributed to his defection to the Emperor in 1521, when he resigned his French commands.<sup>43</sup> A company could also sometimes survive the death of its captain, under the lieutenant's command.<sup>44</sup>

The post of lieutenant was important enough to lead on occasion to promotion to full captain of a company and even higher, since Anne de Montmorency was lieutenant of Boisy's company in 1515.<sup>45</sup> Vieilleville's biographer portrays his master as the ideal lieutenant of the company of Jean de Laval-Châteaubriand during the campaigns of the 1540s, 'where he won a marvellous reputation for this company, by the brave and risky enterprises he got it into, which in the main he led himself.' At the start of Henri II's reign, Vieilleville moved on to be lieutenant of Saint-André's company and then, in 1552, asked to take on the post of *maréchal de camp*, he left the lieutenancy to Fervacques, to the regret 'of all the soldiers, for they lost a good table.' Saint-André, commanded to defend Verdun, asked him to stay on as lieutenant 'knowing that nearly all the men-at-arms and archers are there through his favour and friendship.' Vieilleville was in a dilemma. There was the 'faith' and 'courtesy' that bound him to Saint-André and it seemed likely that 70 men-at-arms and 100 archers, mostly from Brittany, Anjou and Maine, would follow him.<sup>46</sup> When Vieilleville took over the company of Jean II d'Humières in 1554, he accepted the existing officers and twenty men-at-arms, adding 25 others from Saint-André's company, including five of Italian descent who had vowed to

<sup>39</sup> D'Auton, II, p. 12; I, p. 383.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., I, p. 122; II, p. 247; III, p. 161; IV, pp. 71, 161, 206; Florange, *Mémoires*, ed. Buchon, p. 265; BN fr. 21509, fo. 891.

<sup>41</sup> D'Auton, II, p. 5; BN fr. 25783, no. 39.

<sup>42</sup> R. Tamalio, *Federico Gonzaga alla corte di Francesco I di Francia nel carteggio privato con Mantova (1515–1517)* (Paris, 1994), p. 344; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 186.

<sup>43</sup> Du Bellay (*Mémoires*, I, p. 186) confused Francesco Gonzaga (d.1519) and his son Federico II, who was the one appointed to command a company by Francis I.

<sup>44</sup> That of Melfi, still in being in 1552 though the prince had died in 1550: see Leblanc, 'Lettres à Gui de Maugiron' (1893), pp. 19–20.

<sup>45</sup> D'Auton, IV, pp. 71, 162; BN fr. 26112, no. 1067; D'Auton, III, p. 110; I, p. 122; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 63.

<sup>46</sup> Vieilleville, pp. 429, 478, 540, 563, 570.



serve him for life. He immediately employed the company in active campaigning around Metz.<sup>47</sup>

Favour and lobbying naturally played their part in obtaining positions in the *gendarmérie*. Artus de Cossé reported to his brother in 1553 that, though the King and the Constable had shown themselves pleased with his service, hitherto no 'great miracle' had been done for him. Henri II had promised him the ailing Curton's company but Curton was lingering on.<sup>48</sup> One of the best documented examples concerns the protracted lobbying by the sixteen-year-old Federico (later Federico II) Gonzaga. He had raised the question of a company of men-at-arms while still in Milan in December 1515 and, as he travelled to France with Francis I in January 1516, continued to lobby for a company. On Grand Maître de Boisy's intervention with the King, he was granted a commission for 60 lances. This, though, was just the start. Federico was, even by the standards of the time, young for such a command but his father Francesco, who had also held a company, was not to be lightly offended. The King had wished to insist that half the company should be French and reserved the question of lieutenant for further discussion. Federico wanted as many Italians in his company as possible and Ludovico da Fermo, a Gonzaga servant, as his lieutenant.<sup>49</sup> Despite Federico's success in attracting good will and the apparent determination of the French to gratify him, the matter of the lieutenant remained unresolved.<sup>50</sup> In April Federico heard that Alessandro Trivulzio had been chosen and that merely the *guidon* and ensign had been left to Federico's choice. He thus simply had the choice of these officers and the thirty new men-at-arms. The scramble to select men-at-arms from the following of the Gonzagas in Italy now began.<sup>51</sup> The first muster of the company did not take place until later in the year. The case illustrates vividly the fact that nomination to command of the *ordonnances* was highly prized, sharply competed for and carefully overseen by the King in person.

The post of captain in the *gendarmérie*, so sought after by the higher nobility, was an office. When Federico Gonzaga finally received his documents of appointment in December 1516 (having taken a year to extract them), they were the letters-patent of commission, the *lettres d'attache* of the *généraux des finances*, the Constable's notification of the oath taken and a blank quittance for his payments for signature.<sup>52</sup> The post, though, was never formally subject to venality of office or heredity.<sup>53</sup> This does not mean that, among the higher nobility, possession of a company was not regarded as a virtual right. When the duke of Vendôme died in 1537, his company was divided up among others but his young son, Antoine, was almost immediately given his own company of 70 lances.<sup>54</sup> When Antoine's brother François, comte d'Enghien, died in February 1546, his company of 50

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 625.

<sup>48</sup> BL Add. 38032, fo. 270r.

<sup>49</sup> Tamalio, *Federico Gonzaga*, pp. 169, 189–91, 195.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 197–8, 203, 207.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 214–5, 217, 219, 233, 238.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 367.

<sup>53</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*; Michaud, 'Les Institutions militaires', p. 34.

<sup>54</sup> AN J 968/2, no.18; BN fr. 3044, fos. 90–97, June-Dec. 1537.



lances was immediately transferred by royal brevet to his younger brother Jean, 'Monsieur de Bourbon.'<sup>55</sup>

Despite some restrictions, captains and lieutenants were largely free in their choice of men. The crown played some role in the composition of companies, in that, when a captain died, some favoured men-at-arms were awarded pensions 'until they have another appointment.'<sup>56</sup> When the count of Tende died in 1527, the court favourites Montmorency and Chabot got together to carve up his 24 lances 'with which we can fill up our companies to do more service to the King.'<sup>57</sup> The choice of officers was limited in some ways. The Dauphin, when the *guidon* of his company died in 1536, asked his lieutenant, Humières, to appoint young Dampierre in his place 'for the services he has done me'.<sup>58</sup> Marshal de Termes died in 1562 leaving his son Hugues as *guidon* of his company. Hugues got into trouble, arrested both at Orléans by Condé and at Bordeaux by Burie. He could thus not press for his succession to his father's company, which was broken up. Hugues found himself without resources, 'and it seems to me that this is poor recognition for the services of the late marshal and will complete my ruin.'<sup>59</sup> Succession to a company therefore depended on much more than being one's father's son and involved opportunity for lobbying, contacts and reputation.

Philippe Contamine concluded that service in the *grandes ordonnances* had by the end of the Middle Ages become 'a quality, a profession, an "estate"'.<sup>60</sup> What this meant in practice was that a man-at-arms of the *ordonnances* would customarily be denoted as such in public acts along with his *seigneurie* (for instance in acts of homage).<sup>61</sup> Only one 15th century captain of the *grande ordonnance* has been found in origin to have been a man of 'low estate' and even he was ennobled.<sup>62</sup> In the main, both the captains and the men-at-arms of a company were nobles, though status could vary widely. The *gendarmérie* was also in the main a force of young men (the average age of those seeking letters of pardon in the 15th century was 28 and only 6% were over 36). When Charles de Bourbon appeared on the field at Agnadello, he was only 19, though closely advised by a couple of experienced servitors of the Montpensier family on what to do.<sup>63</sup> There were exceptions, such as Martinet Baron, who followed the duke of Burgundy in his youth, served Louis XI, Charles VIII and Louis XII and met his death at the siege of Salses in 1503.<sup>64</sup> In 1528, Jean de Canny, *chevalier*, then 53, claimed to have been serving in the *ordonnances* for thirty years. He had been at Agnadello, Marignano, defending Théroouanne against the English, and served with two or three

<sup>55</sup> BN fr. 5127, fo. 3r.

<sup>56</sup> BN fr. 3044, fos. 93–104; *CAF*, VIII, 219, 31290.

<sup>57</sup> BN fr. 3067, p. 95.

<sup>58</sup> BN fr. 3008, fo. 151.

<sup>59</sup> *Lettres de Catherine de Médicis*, ed. H. de La Ferrière-Percy, J. Bagueuault de Puchesse and A. Lesort, 11 vols (Paris, 1880–1943), I, p. 311; BN fr. 15876, fos. 418–19.

<sup>60</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, p. 545.

<sup>61</sup> *CAF*, VII, nos. 24476, 24613.

<sup>62</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, pp. 416–17.

<sup>63</sup> De Marillac, *La Vie du connétable de Bourbon*, p. 141.

<sup>64</sup> D'Auton, III, p. 221.

other captains.<sup>65</sup> In general, though, there was even a tendency for men-at-arms to get younger. Bayard was 17 when in 1493 he was ‘brought out’ (*mis hors de page*) by the count of Ligny, a captain renowned for his bringing-up (*nourriture*) of 50 gentlemen, of whom 30 became captains. Ligny immediately appointed Bayard to his company while keeping him in his household.<sup>66</sup> Monluc recalled that, once appointed an archer of Lorraine’s company (lieutenant, Bayard), on being brought out, ‘I took it into my mind to go to Italy, on the rumour of the fine feats of arms that were going on there.’ This was in 1521 and he would have been between 18 and 20. Brantôme tells us that his father, Pierre de Bourdeilles, had, in the generation before that, fled the family home as a youth to seek adventure in Italy and serve with Bayard. He so loved his liberty, though, that he would never accept the rank of an officer of a company.<sup>67</sup>

An ordinance of 1549 specified the minimum age of 19 for a man-at-arms and 17 for an archer.<sup>68</sup> This raised questions about their suitability for, according to one account, captains had been bringing too many young untrained men into their companies. Seven or eight ‘children’ appointed for their ‘good race’ were fine, but ‘let them be well mounted and armed, for young people need to be brought out.’ There may have been many more.<sup>69</sup> In the 16<sup>th</sup> century, men-at-arms usually received their appointments at the start of their military careers, sometimes as early as 18.<sup>70</sup> Antoine de Richarmes began as a man-at-arms in Saint-Pol’s company, became its ensign, was present at the capture of Pavia in 1528 and then became *maréchal de logis* to Louis, monsieur de Nevers, at Cambrai, when he was 28.<sup>71</sup> In 1534, Francis I tried to insist, in the interests of the ‘common weal’, that all ‘young gentlemen of ancient family’ who had been ‘brought up’ as pages in royal and noble households could only be eligible for posts at court or for royal pensions if they had served four years as men-at-arms or archers.<sup>72</sup>

For an overview of the entire *gendarmerie*, a useful measure is provided by a survey of all known muster rolls of the companies.<sup>73</sup> In this, 240 captains received commands between 1500 and 1562. Of these, 28 were figures of princely rank, represented by members of the royal family, princes of the blood (the houses of Bourbon, Orléans-Longueville), foreign princely families established in France (Lorraine) or the remaining great feudatories such as the house

<sup>65</sup> AN JJ 241, no. 312, fos. 379r-82r.

<sup>66</sup> Loyal serviteur, *Histoire*, ed. Buchon, pp. 8–10.

<sup>67</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 30; P. de Bourdeille de Brantôme, *Dames illustres*, ed. L. Moland (Paris, n.d.), pp. vi-viii.

<sup>68</sup> Isambert, *Lois*, XIII, p. 129 (art. 36).

<sup>69</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, p. 456; idem, ‘Un Traité politique inédit de la fin du XV<sup>e</sup> siècle’, *Annuaire-bulletin de la Société de l’Histoire de France*, ann. 1983–4 (1986), p. 164.

<sup>70</sup> AN JJ 238, no. 143, fos. 152r-153r.

<sup>71</sup> AN JJ 245B, no. 52, fos. 71r-72v.

<sup>72</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, VII, no. 665.

<sup>73</sup> Fleury Vindry, *Dictionnaire de l’état-major au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Bergerac, 1901). This lists only those companies for which musters survive. Trivulzio de Vigevano and Paul de Termes, for example, do not appear. It does not reflect the full chronological span of a company either, only the period for which musters survive. In a few cases I have corrected the time span given by Vindry.

of Albret. As had been the case in the late 15th century, foreign, mostly Italian, princes and nobles played a significant role, amounting to 25. These included Cesare Borgia, as well as reigning princes. Thus, around 21% of the captains were of the highest princely rank. Of the remaining captains, the overwhelming majority were drawn from the higher nobility of chevaliers. A significant proportion, 20, were members of families linked to service and the highest favour in the royal household: Albon (2), Amboise (2), Annebault (2), Batarnay (3), Brosse-Bretagne (1), Chabot (3), Boisy (3), Montmorency (4). Some of these were among 31 of the highest military officers who held captaincies as a matter of course: two constables, 22 marshals and 7 admirals. Promotion to captaincies obviously reflected social and political status.

As for the durability of companies, this varied very widely as a result of the fact that many companies seem to have lasted for only brief periods (this was particularly the case with some of the promotions of Italian allies). Where the dates of companies can be roughly established through the musters (some 230 companies), we find an overall average of 12.9 years per company, though this evolved in the course of the century:

Period	No. of companies	Average length of service
1500–14	85	9.1
1515–24	52	12.7
1525–46	50	12.7
1547–62	43	13.3

While we have to guard against distortion through the pattern of survival of musters, these figures reflect the increasing domination of the *gendarmerie* by the highest social elite, the titled nobles who were provincial governors and holders of high military and court offices, by contrast to the late 15th and early 16th century, when a number of obscure professional soldiers survived on the rolls. The companies that lasted longest were those whose captains combined success in command and access to royal favour. Long service reflected both the good fortune of the captain and also generated the renown that brought these prominent individuals to the fore in war. Royal favour also determined the fortune of a captain's command. It became the norm in the 16th century for a marshal to be given command of 100 lances, the maximum.<sup>74</sup> Grand Maître de Chaumont increased his command from 50 lances to 70 in 1504 and in the same year inherited another 30 from Lanque, at the time he took the marshal's baton from Gié.<sup>75</sup>

It is usually assumed that in 1445 there were 15 permanent cavalry companies, amounting to 1500 lances. This figure is mentioned by chroniclers rather than administrators and it may be that the number was nearer 1800 lances in the years up to 1461.<sup>76</sup> It was increased to 4000 by the later years of Louis XI.<sup>77</sup> Despite


<sup>74</sup> See Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 166: 'les cent de mareschal.'

<sup>75</sup> BN p.o. Amboise, nos. 188-189; BN fr. 25784, no. 76.

<sup>76</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, pp. 282–3.

<sup>77</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 16–17, 54–5; Contamine, *Guerre, état*, pp. 278–90.

the massive pay-offs after 1483, numbers were back to 3200 by 1489–90 [see graph 1].<sup>78</sup>



Sixty or so companies provided a very significant proportion of the nobility with military posts even before the beginning of the Italian wars.<sup>79</sup> In 1495, Pierre de la Guishe wrote to his mother that:

I have no great desire about the *gendarmierie* and am content the King does not appoint me and that he does me some other favour, for few men profit from the *gendarmierie*.<sup>80</sup>

However, at 360 lt. p.m. (372 with the captain's supplement) the pay of a lance was the equivalent of the revenues of a small barony.<sup>81</sup> This was not all. Every other military formation under the crown, even the infantry, was officered overwhelmingly by nobles as *lieutenants*, *guidons*, *enseignes* and *maréchaux des logis*.

For operations in Italy in 1499, Louis XII envisaged a complement of 1500 lances. 1460 have been counted, providing a force of 5840 combatants, while the garrison for Milan in 1500 stood at 845 lances or 3380 men in 1500, after Novara.<sup>82</sup> A similar force of 900 lances was used against the Genoese in 1507. The number remained comparable during the first half of the 16th century. The King, in an ordinance of 1522, declared that he wished 'usually' to maintain 3500 lances, while

<sup>78</sup> The figures drawn from BN fr. 4523 have to be amended for the period 1483–92 for the 200 lances then stationed in Roussillon. See Contamine, *Guerre, état*, pp. 286–7. The gap 1532–42 can partly be filled by the quarter payment April–June 1538, 2580 (*CAF*, VIII, pp. 282–4).

<sup>79</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, pp. 278–90.

<sup>80</sup> A. Cutolo, 'Nuovi documenti francesi sulla impresa di Carlo VIII', *Archivio storico per le provincie napoletane*, 53 (1938), 183–257, at p. 237.

<sup>81</sup> Contamine, *Histoire militaire*, I, p. 220.

<sup>82</sup> Pelissier, *Louis XII et Ludovic Sforza*, p. 396; d'Auton, I, p. 383.

there were 58 companies in being in 1526, though reduced to 45 in 1530.<sup>83</sup> In June 1554, there were 47 companies in 2720 lances, though in this case augmented by 700 mounted arquebusiers.<sup>84</sup> By the 1550s, the royal field army typically involved the bulk of the *gendarmerie* at 26 companies, with 6–8 companies kept for garrison in Picardy and Piedmont and a scattering for Languedoc and the other provinces. The companies detailed for the field army and for garrison duty do not seem to have been much interchanged, with just two or three exceptions.<sup>85</sup>

The continued existence of the ‘lance’ as a unit of the cavalry expressed the traditional organisation of the *grande ordonnance*. The essence of the ‘lance’ was to bring together heavy cavalry (represented by the man-at-arms in full plate armour, *harnois blanc*) and the bowmen still considered the key to success at the end of the English wars. The effective fighting power of a lance consisted of 3 or 4 men (depending on whether the *coutillier* was considered a combatant).<sup>86</sup> The essential problem in organization by lances was that the pay had to stretch to support a tail of non-combatants and inevitably in the long run prompted the men to turn to foraging to support themselves. It seems that it may never have been easy for commanders to know exactly how many active combatants they had at their disposal. As late as the 1520s, men-at-arms were receiving supplementary pay for themselves and ‘their’ archers.<sup>87</sup>

How did they fight? The usual image is of a force armed from head to toe with plate armour and carrying their war lances and riding on armoured or ‘barded’ destriers. The plate armour of the French *gendarmerie* had raised their value on the battle-fields of the early Italian wars. On the field, there were two tactics: the charge *en hot* (in a mass), usually ineffective, and the advance *en haie* (in successive lines) at great speed with the aim of smashing the opponent by the ‘fury’ of the attack. Men-at-arms formed up in line and charged with their lances ‘couched’ on specially designed rests.<sup>88</sup> Rabutin, a man-at-arms himself, praised the grandeur of their achievements at Cambrai and Renty in 1554.<sup>89</sup> But this *furia francese* of the *gendarmerie* was a tactic that came under attack later in the century and was to be replaced by 1600.<sup>90</sup> It was fundamentally called into question by the development of the pike square, stiffened by arquebusiers in the first quarter of the 16th century. Even in the first half of the century, the vulnerability of the cavalry in difficult terrain was recognised, as was the ease by which horses could be brought down in some circumstances. After all, the cry of the Spanish infantry was ‘Once the horse is down, the man-at-arms is finished.’<sup>91</sup> By 1562, it seems that companies were routinely deployed in larger formations,

<sup>83</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, III, p. 109; appendix 3, table III (BN fr. 3122, fos. 37–8, BN fr. 3002, fos. 36–8).

<sup>84</sup> BL Add. 38032, fos. 284–5 (copy).

<sup>85</sup> For 1553: Villars, pp. 617–19; July 1554: BL Add. 38032, fos. 284–5 (copy).

<sup>86</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 16–18, 54–5, 62.

<sup>87</sup> *CAF*, VII, 780, 29103–4.

<sup>88</sup> See Tucker, ‘Eminence over Efficacy’, pp. 1062–7.

<sup>89</sup> Rabutin, *Commentaires*, I, pp. 303, 309.

<sup>90</sup> La Noue, *Discours politiques et militaires*, discours 15, pp. 330–40.

<sup>91</sup> Loyal serviteur, *Histoire*, ed. Buchon, p. 94.

referred to as 'regiments' and by this time the attack *en haie* was starting to be regarded as outmoded.<sup>92</sup> More crucially, the increasing effectiveness of firearms forced plate armour to become heavier after 1500, perhaps as much as 350 pounds. The result was that the fury of the charge was seriously reduced, since few horses could bear the increased weight of armour. Monluc thought that 'cavalry are not bothered with killing, unless in the pursuit of victory', while Tavannes thought cavalry only effective if led in an ordered way to the charge.<sup>93</sup> These problems meant that, whatever may have been said about the primacy of the *gendarmerie* in war, it inevitably had to adapt to new conditions.<sup>94</sup>

Of course, they travelled lightly and only armed fully for battle. Helmets, gauntlets and lances were carried by the valets. Artus de Cossé, as lieutenant, complained in August 1549 that, though Aumale's company had advanced to Abbeville for the campaign against the English, there were no carters to be had to transport the 'bardes' and lances.<sup>95</sup> Men-at-arms could at times move rapidly; at Bisceglie in 1502, the troops included many whose horses had died under them in the fury of the ride from Canosa.<sup>96</sup> At Barletta in January 1503, the 400 men-at-arms under La Palice awaited the attack of the Spanish army for four hours 'lance at rest'. Du Bellay describes one company in 1544, on an expedition to interrupt English supply lines: 'after three long leagues at the trot, the men-at-arms helmeted and their lances at rest', which, once arrived before the enemy, 'they charged them, so that they were routed.'<sup>97</sup> Bayard is supposed to have said at Padua in 1509 that 'it's a fairly disagreeable pass-time for men-at-arms to go on foot', though in fact he commanded infantry formations and prided himself on the selection of his men.<sup>98</sup> Though men-at-arms were armed as mounted knights, this did not prevent them dismounting and taking part in assaults on fortresses if need be.<sup>99</sup> If dismounted, they would, as at Novara, take off their 'heavy armour and greaves' for an assault on a fortress.<sup>100</sup> In sieges, they could be the essential stiffening of a garrison and, in frontier defence, effective against infantry unprotected by cavalry. So, in Champagne in 1523, the absence of cavalry escort for the imperial lansquenets enabled the *gendarmerie* to deprive them of access to supplies and starve them out.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> E.g. Mémoire: BN fr. 15876, fo. 235; La Noue, *Discours politiques et militaires*, discours 15.

<sup>93</sup> Tucker, 'Eminence over Efficacy', pp. 1092–3; Jean de Saulx, vic. de Tavannes, *Mémoires de très-noble et très-illustre Gaspard de Saulx, seigneur de Tavannes*, ed. J.A.C. Buchon (Panthéon littéraire) (Paris, 1836), pp. 203–4; Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 526.

<sup>94</sup> Tavannes, *Mémoires*, p. 205.

<sup>95</sup> BN fr. 20523, fo. 1 (BL Add. 38032, fo. 185, copy); Montaigne, *Essais*, II, p. 124 (bk. II, ch. ix).

<sup>96</sup> D'Auton, III, p. 8.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, III, p. 105; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 262.

<sup>98</sup> Loyal serviteur, *Histoire*, ed. Buchon, p. 53; S. Champier, *Les Gestes ensemble la vie du preulx chevalier Bayard*, ed. D. Crouzet (Paris, 1992), p. 160.

<sup>99</sup> D'Auton, IV, pp. 196–7, 207–8.

<sup>100</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 220.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 290–1.

'Archers' remained integral to the formation of the *gendarmérie*. Companies of men-at-arms had originally been designed to provide combined forces of cavalry and archers; both English and French companies during the first half of the 15th century consisted of men-at-arms and archers. The proportion of archers to men-at-arms varied widely. In the early years of the 15th century Bournonville's companies were fairly evenly balanced between the two.<sup>102</sup> From 1498, each lance was to include one man-at-arms and two archers. With the reorganization of pay in 1533–4 (see chapter 8), 100 lances would contain 100 men-at-arms and 150 archers. At what stage did archers evolve from real bowmen into slightly less heavily armed cavalry men? Balsac's treatise of the 1490s assumes that archers should be just that and deplored that so many 'cannot shoot'.<sup>103</sup> But there are records of companies of archers actually wielding their bows in the Italian wars.<sup>104</sup> In 1515, the King decreed that the main cities should maintain armourers (exempted from *tailles*) to manufacture bows for the archers of the *ordonnances* and that captains should ensure that there would be 'a good number of archers and crossbow-men drawing the bow well from the saddle or on foot.' This requirement was repeated in 1526.<sup>105</sup> These enactments conceal to some extent the process by which 'archers' developed into simply rather less heavily armoured men-at-arms. The ordinance of 1549 prescribed much the same armour for the archers as the men-at-arms as well as a lance, but also a 'pistolet' in the saddle-bow.<sup>106</sup> The archers have been described as 'second-class' or 'medium' cavalry, armed slightly less expensively than the men-at-arms but sharing the social prestige of the *gendarmérie* and, crucially, lighter and more flexible. Their task was to follow up the first wave of attack and in skirmishing, not unlike the *chevau-légers* to be discussed below.<sup>107</sup>

Though companies were often stationed within the kingdom over the winter months and during peacetime<sup>108</sup> and were generally attached to the particular region from which they were recruited, they could naturally expect to be routinely moved around in time of war. Thus, the Dauphin's company was transferred from Auvergne to Picardy in 1542<sup>109</sup> and from Languedoc to Picardy in 1544 along with the companies of Orléans, Boisy, Maugiron, Brissac, La Roche-du-Maine and Escars.<sup>110</sup> In spring-early summer of 1537, whereas there would normally only be 5 or 6 companies stationed in Picardy, for the royal campaign there were no less than 16 existing companies and 7 new ones raised.<sup>111</sup> Meanwhile, in Piedmont, where the existing garrison had held 4 companies, at least 1

<sup>102</sup> B. Schnerb, *Enguerrand de Bournonville et les siens* (Paris, 1997), p. 142.

<sup>103</sup> Contamine, 'Un Traité politique', p. 164.

<sup>104</sup> D'Auton, IV, p. 205.

<sup>105</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, I, p. 65 (art. 36); IV, pp. 284–5 (art. 50).

<sup>106</sup> Isambert, *Lois*, XIII, p. 127 (art. 23).

<sup>107</sup> Tucker, 'Eminence over Efficacy', pp. 1061, 1068.

<sup>108</sup> BL Add. 38032, fo. 228v.

<sup>109</sup> AD Puy-de-Dôme, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 7, no. 21.


<sup>110</sup> Marquis d'Aubais, *Pièces fugitives, pour servir à l'histoire de France*, 2 vols (Paris, 1759), I.ii, p. 84.

<sup>111</sup> BN fr. 3044, fos. 93–109; *CAF*, VIII, 219, 31293.



of these was transferred to the north (that of the Dauphin) and 3 others moved in from elsewhere.<sup>112</sup>

Graph 2



Numbers of lances continued to fluctuate – as they always had – between 2050 (with a low point of 1500 in 1505) in peacetime and a maximum of 3847 in the war year of 1523 (the latter a force of over twelve thousand men). In the course of 1522 and 1523, for instance, the number of ‘lances’ rose from 2866 to 3847.<sup>113</sup> Indeed, the 1520s seem to have been a particularly unstable period in terms of overall numbers of lances, though the pronounced tendency to stand down a proportion of the companies during the winter was long established.<sup>114</sup> [see graph 2 above]

The start of wars and active campaigning always saw the formation of new companies.<sup>115</sup> Newly enrolled men were carefully recorded.<sup>116</sup> In 1547, the count of Sancerre was given back the 50 lances he had been stripped of in 1545.<sup>117</sup> The expansion of the whole *gendarmerie* at the start of a war can be precisely documented by an act registered in the *conseil privé* on 17 November 1552<sup>118</sup> which created 100 new lances and expanded existing companies by 170:

Captain	Previous	Revised
New companies created		
Humières <sup>119</sup>		50
Du Roulle		50
Increases		
Dauphin	80	100
Vendôme	80	100
Montpensier	40	50

<sup>112</sup> BN fr. 3008, fos. 6–7.

<sup>113</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, p. 50, p.j. XI, p. 244; BN fr. 4523, fos. 43–51 (source for graph above).

<sup>114</sup> Jean de Poncher, accounts for 1520–1, was responsible for between 1200 and 1260 lances, half the complement at the start of 1521; BN fr. 2933, fos. 1–15. Complete list of serving companies after reductions, 1526–7, with list of the companies in 1529–30: BN fr. 3122, fos. 37–8, BN fr. 3002, fos. 36–8. See Appendix 3, table III.

<sup>115</sup> *CAF*, VII, 781, 29018; 1536: BN fr. 3044, fos. 93–101; 1552: BN fr. 18153, fo. 340r.

<sup>116</sup> 1537–8: *CAF*, VIII, pp. 216–18 *passim*.

<sup>117</sup> HHSA, Frankreich 14, Berichte 1547, III, fo. 35v.

<sup>118</sup> BN fr. 18153, fo. 340r.

<sup>119</sup> BN fr. 5128, fo. 247: 12 Nov. 1552.

Nevers	70	80
Aumale	70	80
Admiral d'Annebault	70	80
Jametz	40	50
Villars	40	50
Burye	40	50
La Guische	40	50
Espinac	40	50
Sansac	40	50
La Roche-du-Maine	40	50
Thureins	40	50
Tavannes	40	50

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With Bourdillon's company raised at the start of the year (50 lances) and the duke of Lorraine's take-over of the count of Nanteuil's 40 lances (raised to 60), this added 340 to the existing complement of 2410 lances. Sometimes, the recruitment of a company was rapid. La Trémoille was given a captaincy in the summer of 1557 and summoned with his men to the muster in September. In November, the King wrote to him that he had decided on his assignment for the campaign.<sup>120</sup>

The toll of battle had to be taken into account. At Saint-Pol (Artois) in 1537, two companies of men-at-arms, those of Villebon and Moyencourt, were severely affected by casualties. Villebon's was down to a quarter of its strength, those that remained were 'defeated and dismounted', others still prisoner. Loans were needed for new recruits.<sup>121</sup> These were taken on at need and, of course, when the crown conferred new numbers on a captain. The duke of Vendôme enrolled three men-at-arms and nine archers in the camp besieging Boulogne in the summer of 1545.<sup>122</sup>

At the end of war, there were reductions, with all the consequent problems of readjustment for paid-off soldiers observed by Contamine in the 15th century,<sup>123</sup> not to speak of the effects on the incomes of the men sent home. Federico Gonzaga's reaction to the dismissal of ten of his lances in February 1517 is indicative: he immediately protested to Boisy and Bonnivet that the act 'did not conform to the loving words the king had always given him' and that they had 'taken his reputation' from him. He was told that everyone else was in the same boat, since the King had decided on a reduction to 2500 lances.<sup>124</sup> The San Severino brothers both had companies but on the death of Galeazzo, the *grand écuyer*, in 1525, his brother the marchese of Valenza protested that, though he had served for 27 years and had lost all his property in Milan and Venice, as a reward his company had been reduced by 76 men-at-arms and the rest left unpaid. In addition, he had lost his lands after his brother's death.<sup>125</sup> The most famous reduction came in the reign of Francis II in July 1559 when the companies of 100 were reduced to 80 lances,

<sup>120</sup> AN 1 AP 24, nos. 78–9.

<sup>121</sup> BN fr. 3044, fos. 93–104.

<sup>122</sup> BN fr. 25793, no. 537.

<sup>123</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, pp. 287–8.

<sup>124</sup> Tamalio, *Federico Gonzaga*, p. 390.

<sup>125</sup> BL Egerton 26, fo. 22.

those of 80 to 60 and those of 60 to 40.<sup>126</sup> Historians have long attributed perhaps excessive importance to this act; such reductions were simply the norm at the end of every war.

Many companies were recruited from the regional acquaintance and clientele of the chevaliers and titled lords who were commissioned as their captains. A prince of the house of Savoy was recommended for a command in the 1490s, since he had a number of young gentlemen of his country 'both of his household and otherwise, who have great desire to serve the King.'<sup>127</sup> Federico Gonzaga aimed, on the argument that it was in the 'authority' of captains, to nominate five of his chamber servants as men-at-arms and five others as archers. In the event, his lieutenant, nominated by the King, refused to enroll them for muster.<sup>128</sup> When Nemours was given a company in 1552, Paul Baptiste Fregoso went into Piedmont to recruit the men for him.<sup>129</sup> Oudart du Biez's company (1521–49) included twelve members of his own family and was overwhelmingly made up of his clientele in the Boulonnais.<sup>130</sup> The most vivid case is that of the younger Saint-André's company, raised to 100 lances on his promotion as marshal, taken in hand by his new lieutenant, Vieilleville, in 1547. Vieilleville found the company a disgrace, full of valets, sons of tavern-keepers and 'vermin', many of them unable to ride and many hiding behind medical certificates. He dismissed most of them and replaced them with 80 or so 'brave gentlemen' he had brought mainly from Brittany, because they were 'gentlemen of honour, rich and very well equipped.' Eventually, he had a presentable company of 500 horse, either men-at-arms or archers.<sup>131</sup> The 1549 ordinance prohibited the enrolment of valets 'if they are not proper gentlemen.'<sup>132</sup> The Vieilleville memoirs again recount how, in 1551, he recommended 21 men-at-arms of the Saint-André company for promotion as lieutenants of newly-created companies and in their place promoted 'old archers.' He then recruited in their place young gentlemen, younger sons of families in Brittany, Maine and Anjou,

Who their fathers or elder brothers, in his favour, equipped for this journey. For, he was such a man of honour and conscience that he would have quit the profession of arms for ever, rather than place, as do many captains of *gendarmerie*, their valets and those of their wives, cofferers, harbingers, tailors, apothecaries and barbers, ... for he said it was daylight robbery of the King.<sup>133</sup>

Companies often had a regional character and tended to be based in their home areas except for expeditions beyond the mountains to Italy. There were exceptions to this pattern. In 1546, all men-at-arms and archers were stood down from

<sup>126</sup> BN fr. 3150, fo. 39; BN fr. 3127, fos. 3–4.

<sup>127</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, p. 425.

<sup>128</sup> Tamalio, *Federico Gonzaga*, pp. 245, 344.

<sup>129</sup> BL Add. 38032, fo. 237r.

<sup>130</sup> D. Potter, *Un Homme de guerre au temps de la Renaissance: la vie et les lettres d'Oudart du Biez, Maréchal de France, Gouverneur de Boulogne et de Picardie (vers 1475–1553)* (Arras, 2001), pp. 255–74.

<sup>131</sup> *Vieilleville*, pp. 482–3.

<sup>132</sup> Isambert, *Lois*, XIII, p. 129 (art. 35).

<sup>133</sup> *Vieilleville*, p. 540.

garrison duty except for foreigners and those without homes in the region. Of La Hunaudaye's company in Auvergne, no less than 17 men-at-arms and 32 archers remained in garrison, a significant number of them with Italian-sounding names and a few listed as 'Albanes.' One archer was simply called 'the little German.' Of the other archers, it could be assumed that many were poor soldiers of fortune who had no home (there were three 'bastards' among them).<sup>134</sup> A captain was also expected to promote the interests of his officers. Charles de Coucys-Burie, seeking to displace an unreliable captain at Saint Jean d'Angély in 1562, recommended his *maréchal de logis*, Chesnal, who had served in his company for 25 years, had managed all his captain's many displacements and was 'a very honest and honourable gentleman.'<sup>135</sup>

Archers have been regarded as products of the poorest nobility, eager to serve in the *gendarmérie* but unable to afford the full equipment of a man-at-arms. Nor was there any automatic promotion from archer to man-at-arms. Vieilleville is supposed to have enrolled new-comers to the Saint-André company as men-at-arms or archers 'according to their means.'<sup>136</sup> Many archers clearly shared the ethos of the military nobility as a whole, though by the 1570s Monluc thought the position 'bastardised' since no longer were great lords prepared to enter service through the position of archer.<sup>137</sup> So, too, a few years later, La Noue regretted the passing of the days when young gentlemen entered the companies as archers in their later teens and early twenties.<sup>138</sup> Villars recalled that one of the reasons offered by the imperial General Gonzaga against a convention on 'good war' was that French lords often enrolled in an 'abject way' as archers and thus escaped the impact of ransom if captured. Brissac's reply was a fierce defence of the French nobleman who went 'gaily and freely to war to serve his prince and his country.'<sup>139</sup> Many of the archers were indeed from obscure or penurious noble families, sometimes even the sons of farmers.<sup>140</sup> Nicolas le Grand, who lived on a farm called La Fossée near Plainval (Somme), was 52 in 1541 when, as an archer of the ordinances, he petitioned for pardon with his son, Jean, also an archer. Clearly, he viewed himself as a gentleman since the violent events he described took place when he and his son went to church at Plainval, each with a servant and each armed with a sword and short dagger, which they normally carried 'like men of our *ordonnances*' accompanied by their Spanish dogs.<sup>141</sup> One of du Biez's archers in 1544 was clearly labelled 'young unmarried gentleman.'<sup>142</sup> Among the archers of the Dauphin's company lodged at Montferrand in 1542–3, we find 11 archers, all but one of whom was referred to as 'Monsieur', five of whom were 'seigneurs' and two noble bastards.<sup>143</sup> An archer of the duke of Vendôme's company stated in 1546 that:

<sup>134</sup> AD Puy-de-Dôme, E 113, fonds 2, EE 7, no. 44.

<sup>135</sup> BN fr. 15876, fo. 375.

<sup>136</sup> *Vieilleville*, p. 483.

<sup>137</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault (3 vols edn), I, pp. 42, 30.

<sup>138</sup> La Noue, *Discours politiques et militaires*, discours 5, pp. 145–6.

<sup>139</sup> Villars, p. 540.

<sup>140</sup> AN JJ 257B, no. 131bis, fo. 42r-v; JJ 251, no. 99, fo. 16r.

<sup>141</sup> AN JJ 255B, no. 111, fos. 34–5.

<sup>142</sup> AN JJ 256C, no. 12, fo. 6r.

<sup>143</sup> AD Puy-de-Dôme, E 113, fonds 2, EE 7, no. 15.

From his youth and in the time of our dear father-in-law, the late King Louis, he has always followed arms in our wars and service, was at the day of the Swiss, the day of Pavia and others, including the defence of Théroouanne, where he was besieged in the year 1537, and has always conducted himself virtuously.<sup>144</sup>

*Gendarmerie* companies were increasingly the focus of loyalties that involved degrees of clientage and *fidélité* and they often embodied the personal suite and service of a captain. The company of Dampierre, King's lieutenant at Ardres, who had died on active service in September 1545, was a veritable clientele, responsible for the bearing of their master's corpse to his home. Jean de Vizean, sr. de Trueil, was man-at-arms and his *maître d'hôtel* was described as 'one of his chief servants'. Another, La Cave, was in charge of the company's horses and another was a 'gentleman and domestic,' the sieur de Gibanet.<sup>145</sup>

Did the regime of offices that governed the appointment of captains and the operations of clientage mean that the crown allowed the nobility in effect to control armed force under only very indirect tutelage? A definite answer is not easy. The pay of the *gendarmerie* was a major preoccupation of royal *ordonnances* and will be discussed in chapter 8. As for other matters, we have seen that the crown took a close interest in the officer cadre of companies. It is the case that aristocratic captains were often allowed to choose their officers and men and that they were only rarely removable. The 1515 ordinance even placed 40 positions as archer at the disposal of the officers.<sup>146</sup> On the other hand, the crown ruthlessly operated 'reductions' of the numbers of lances during peacetime, a process only palliated by lobbying for favour by captains. Moreover, the existence of a long series of ordinances governing the administration of the *gendarmerie* reveals that the crown was far from indifferent to the operation of this expensive military arm, while there are signs of the crown's will to oversee the effective strength and combat fraud in the administration.<sup>147</sup> The ordinances of 1534 and 1535, for instance, included stipulations of dress (silk surcoats were forbidden in favour of serge) and prohibition of the appointment of valets by captains as men-at-arms in order to retain their pay. These were ultimately published in a collection of military ordinances in 1540.<sup>148</sup> Behaviour was also a preoccupation. In times of crisis, the *gendarmerie* would get out of hand and behave in ways little better than robber gangs. In 1514, Louis XII declared that certain companies had been pillaging the countryside, 'riding through the country under colour of going to and from their garrisons and musters, taking great followings of men and horses, of whom sometimes most are not their servants but are only avowed by them.' Things were no better in Burgundy in 1530, when the governor reported all kinds of lurid rape and pillage.<sup>149</sup>

<sup>144</sup> AN JJ 257B, no. 19, fo. 6r.

<sup>145</sup> AN JJ 257B, no. 26, fo. 8r-v.

<sup>146</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, I, pp. 56-7 (art. 14).

<sup>147</sup> D. Potter, *War and Government in the French Provinces: Picardy, 1470-1560* (Cambridge, 1993), pp. 161-5.

<sup>148</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, VII, pp. 106, 192; *Bib.II*, 21.

<sup>149</sup> AD Puy-de-Dome, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE4, no. 4; BN fr. 3066, p. 171.

### Light horse

During the first half of the 16th century, the heavily-armoured aristocratic cavalry lost their monopoly of mounted warfare. In the 1550s mounted arquebusiers (in effect mounted infantry) appeared. So, the *états* of 1552–3 list, for the field army, a complement of arquebusiers who were meant to supplement the archers by providing a mobile force of firearms that could dismount to provide their cavalry with covering fire. They were not expected to fire their weapons on horseback. By this stage, for every 80 light horsemen, 10 arquebusiers were attached.<sup>150</sup> Perhaps the greatest problem is one of definition. Some consider them to be virtually the same as archers.<sup>151</sup> The archer, of course, was armed with equipment similar to but lighter and cheaper than the man-at-arms. The administrative system certainly regarded light horse as a separate category but the most sensible approach is to see them as lightly armed and fundamentally assigned to skirmishing.

The light horse, *chevau-légers*, had been present in the Italian wars of the 1490s, though usually as enemies of the French paid by the Venetians or Ludovico Sforza. To d'Auton they were men 'from afar' who fought against the French 'out of gaiety of heart'.<sup>152</sup> Many were from the Balkans, collectively known as 'Albanians' or 'Stradiots' (from the Greek στρατιώτης, and could have included Croats and Greeks. The Spanish equivalents were the *génétaires* of Gonzalo de Cordoba and those who formed part of Ferdinand II's army in Roussillon in 1503.<sup>153</sup> The term *chevau-légers* could sometimes denote the nature of the horses employed, as when La Palice advanced on the Spaniards at Barletta in Naples (January 1503).<sup>154</sup> Plainly, though, their main job was skirmishing. Light horse were frequently employed for this in Lombardy and Naples in 1502 and their commanders included one Italian and the French Thibault de Mauléon. In the Roussillon campaign of 1503, there were 2500, while in the same period, the relief army for Naples included 'stradiots' provided by the marquess of Mantua.<sup>155</sup> By 1506, there was a company of 100 'Albanians' in French service under a Greek named Bua, or 'Messire Mercure', which did good service in skirmishing with Genoese irregulars near Busalla and then in the battle outside the walls. They were accompanied by their commander, the marquess of Mantua, 'mounted and armed like Albanians', who seems to have specialised in their employment. They were, declared d'Auton, 'good at skirmishing in mountains.'<sup>156</sup>

The point at which light horse were established in the royal army is not clear.<sup>157</sup> There were certainly 'light horse' in the army of Naples in 1501, commanded by

<sup>150</sup> Villars, pp. 617–18; BL Add. 38032, fos. 284–5; Tavannes, *Mémoires*, pp. 203–4.

<sup>151</sup> Tucker, 'Eminence over Efficacy', pp. 1085–6.

<sup>152</sup> Benedetti, *Diaria*, pp. 87–9; D'Auton, I, p. 253.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid.*, III, pp. 9–10; BN fr. 2961, fo. 17.

<sup>154</sup> D'Auton, III, p. 106.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 134, 265, 276, 279; III, pp. 10, 209; Sanuto, *Diarii*, V, p. 112.

<sup>156</sup> D'Auton, IV, pp. 71, 184, 220, 222; 1503: *ibid.*, III, pp. 255, 259; IV, p. 220.

<sup>157</sup> BN fr. 25792, no. 501; see also D'Auton, I, pp. 26–9.

Aulbert du Rousset, lieutenant of Cesare Borgia's company and a specialist in commanding lightly armed troops. These were probably not Albanians.<sup>158</sup> It seems reasonable to assume that the 'mounted adventurers' sent out as scouts by Orval in Champagne in 1521 were effectively light horse.<sup>159</sup> In 1513, Louis XII appointed Fontrailles as captain-general of the light horse and Albanians in his service and praised them highly.<sup>160</sup> The command was to go to Claude d'Annebault in 1527,<sup>161</sup> though the captains serving under him in 1536–7 seem to have been a mixture of Italians, Albanians and French (one of whom was Martin du Bellay and others such as Canaples had their own *gendarmerie* companies).<sup>162</sup> Martin du Bellay describes his action in the observation of the Emperor's retreat from Provence: 'I say what I saw, in view of my efforts in this pursuit with my company' in which he had ridden so hard that he was unable to mount a horse for two weeks after his return to Marseille.<sup>163</sup>

Annebault was captured at Thérouanne in the spring of 1537, while commanding 1600 light horse (of whom 400 were Albanians).<sup>164</sup> For the Piedmont campaign of October, therefore, he was replaced by the Genoese Cesare Fregoso.<sup>165</sup> The companies listed under his command in November – 'old bands of light horse' – amounted to 836 men (the rest having been paid off at Lyon).<sup>166</sup> By 1543, Martin du Bellay's 200 light horse and the elderly Theaulde de Manessy's 200 could be described as 'long in the King's service'.<sup>167</sup> Light cavalry played an important part in the Ceresole campaign, this time under the command of Termes as colonel.<sup>168</sup> The movement of commanders between the *gendarmerie* and light horse was fairly normal, as when Vassé was assigned to command them in Piedmont in 1542.<sup>169</sup> It should also be remembered that Italian and Levantine recruits were joined in the 1550s by Englishmen, notably the company of 100 English light horse under John Tottyl.<sup>170</sup>

The *cheveau-légers* were increasingly viewed as a flexible and audacious arm of war and were used extensively in the Italian campaigns of 1536–8. By the 1540s, French gentlemen were much more prominent among them. A company at Outreau

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., II, p. 39.

<sup>159</sup> BN fr. 3059, fo. 91.

<sup>160</sup> BN fr. 2930, fos. 30, 31, 29; see also Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 31.

<sup>161</sup> *CAF*, I, 492, 2694 (Feb. 1527). In 1529 he commanded the light horse in Saint-Pol's army in Italy (Brantôme, ed. Buchon, p. 283).

<sup>162</sup> *CAF*, VIII, 3, 29284; VIII, 17, 29399; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 326–7; *CAF*, VIII, 109, 30248; 139, 30548; 301, 32141; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, p. 404.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., III, pp. 297–300.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid., III, pp. 391–2; *CAF*, III, no. 8979.

<sup>165</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, p. 425.

<sup>166</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, p. 219; *CAF*, VII, 232, 24354.

<sup>167</sup> Musters: BN fr. 25792, nos. 410, 449. On Theode Manes: Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 350, 391; IV, pp. 98, 149, 150, 165. A. Tausserat-Radel, *Correspondance politique de Guillaume Pellicier, ambassadeur de France à Venise, 1540–42* (Paris, 1899), p. 669; Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 232; Villars, p. 640; Brantôme, ed. Lalanne, IV, p. 72; V, p. 238.

<sup>168</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 209.

<sup>169</sup> Tausserat-Radel, *Correspondance ... Pellicier*, pp. 668–9.

<sup>170</sup> BN fr. 25799, nos. 491, 512.



in 1549, commanded by Riou ‘to serve as escort for supplies and what occurs in the King’s service’, included two ‘captains’, Loges and Hamel, and the Chevalier de Villiers.<sup>171</sup> In 1551, on the eve of a new war, the duke of Vendôme urgently lobbied the King through the Constable for a command of light horse even though, of course, he already had his own company of *gendarmerie*. His reasons are a mixture of envy and a consciousness that this was the most effective way to serve:

What I say is not to wrong M. d’Aumale, who also has charge of light horse while he has a company and government like me ... I won’t mention my losses of property, more than anyone in France, for it is not by this appointment that I want to recoup them but rather for the honour, which I shall always be obliged to you for and also because, in the hope of having it, I have already retained many honourable men. I beg that I should not receive the shame of having abused them, for the small charge I have.<sup>172</sup>

In 1552–3, there were 2940 light horse in 36 companies, most of them under titled nobles or *chevaliers*. In addition there were a further 290 in garrisons within France.<sup>173</sup> Commands were now as sought after as in the *gendarmerie*. When Gonnor’s company was reassigned to Espinay in 1554, the new captain chose a completely new complement of men and officers from the many who flocked to join the colours and made a turn-out as impressive as a *compagnie d’ordonnance*.<sup>174</sup>

The German *Reiters*, armed with pistols, were about to burst onto the battlefields of Europe and were extensively recruited by the French crown in the 1550s through its network of agents in Germany (see chapter 5). The *gendarmerie* had already, therefore, lost its claim to be the exclusive repository of French military prowess by 1559, a process accelerated also by the dominance of infantry in warfare during the first half of the Sixteenth century.

### War and the noble mentality

Were the Italian wars fuelled by the eagerness of the nobility for foreign adventure? The Florentine ambassador reported how lukewarm enthusiasm for war was in 1494<sup>175</sup> though successes undoubtedly encouraged the spirit of adventure. At Pavia, the young Aumont was observed taking wild risks in skirmishing, with the bullets whistling round his ears.<sup>176</sup> A confidant of Cardinal de Tournon in 1547 told the imperial ambassador that ‘the nobility here would very much like war’, though all the King’s ministers were dissuading him from it.<sup>177</sup> Monluc’s *Commentaires*

<sup>171</sup> BN fr. 25794, no. 62.

<sup>172</sup> MC Chantilly, L VII, fos. 63–4.

<sup>173</sup> Villars, pp. 618–19.

<sup>174</sup> *Vieilleville*, pp. 624–5.

<sup>175</sup> A. Desjardins, *Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane*, 6 vols (Paris, 1886), I, pp. 292–3.

<sup>176</sup> Vaissière, *Une Correspondance de famille*, p. 63.

<sup>177</sup> HHSA, Frankreich 14, Berichte 1547, III, fo. 54v.

reveal that, for him, war was the only time he was fully alive and that life speeded up when he was on campaign. He also had to make his way in the world:

I came into the world, son of a gentleman whose father had sold all his property except 1000 livres of revenue. And as I was the first of six brothers, I had to make known the name of Monluc, of our house, with as many perils and risks to my life as any soldier or captain there has ever been.<sup>178</sup>

Brantôme declared that his family had never been stay-at-homes and that he was of the type that preferred the houses of other people to his own.<sup>179</sup> This may not have been the case for all his contemporaries and even Monluc in his 'remonstrance' to the King argued that the soldier unrewarded would begin to turn his mind to his home and forget about war; once he had begun to sense the pleasures of hearth, wife and dogs it would be hard to winkle him out and exchange his comforts for sleeping rough. When Monluc was given the post of gentleman of the chamber in January 1553, it was reported that 'he shows himself as content as before he appeared disgruntled.'<sup>180</sup> Villebon remarked in October 1536 that, should there be no peace agreement, 'we are likely for ever to be banished from home. [...] As for me, I am going to see if I can find some dry firewood at home to pass the winter.'<sup>181</sup> Plainly, the attractions of the 'off-season' were not entirely uncongenial.

Nevertheless, a significant proportion of the nobility saw its *raison d'être* in terms of war. This has been described as a 'ludic' conception that assumed, for instance, that the life of a nobleman in war was infinitely more significant than that of a common soldier, though this did not exclude a sophisticated technical understanding of war.<sup>182</sup> The military vocation of the nobility grew out of centuries of pronouncements on chivalry and its duties to the crown by lawyers and nobles, which created parallel visions. Insofar as he considered 'chevalerie' at all, the influential Gilles of Rome declared that 'chivalry's main function is the defence of the common weal ... knights should mainly follow the King's commands in matters of war.'<sup>183</sup> The view was to be repeated by Honoré Bovet in the *Arbre des Batailles* in the 1380s and by Philippe de Mézières in the 1390s.<sup>184</sup> The obligations of service were also underpinned by the growing influence of Vegetius and Frontinus, notably in the fascination with ancient forms of military organization which had little to

<sup>178</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires et lettres*, ed. Ruble, I, pp. 29–30, 105.

<sup>179</sup> Brantôme, ed. Lalanne, V, p. 395.

<sup>180</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 819; BN fr. 20449, fo. 187.

<sup>181</sup> Villebon to Charles Chabot de Jarnac, Lyon, 11 Oct. 1536: Librairie de l'Abbaye, *Autographe et documents* (s.d.), no. 95.

<sup>182</sup> Gaier, 'L'Opinion des chefs de guerre', pp. 723–46.

<sup>183</sup> S.P. Molenaer (ed.), *Li livres du gouvernement des rois. A XIIIth Century French Version of Egidio Colonna's Treatise* (New York, 1899), p. 372.

<sup>184</sup> G.W. Coopland (ed.), *The Tree of Battles of Honoré Bonet* (Liverpool, 1949).

do with feudal obligation.<sup>185</sup> 16th-century narratives of death in battle frequently stressed the honour of dying in the King's service.<sup>186</sup>

There was also a highly individualistic view of chivalry conveyed by Geoffroi de Charny in the 14th century and the author of the *Jouvencel du Bueil* in the 15th.<sup>187</sup> However, the experience of defeat and the need to reform the military lent greater weight to the 'Roman' example from the time of Crécy onwards. Jean Juvénal des Ursins wrote that 'knights, nobles and others following arms have the discipline of chivalry and obedience to their chiefs.'<sup>188</sup> Chartier in his *Quadrilogue invectif* (1420s) was to stress the 'discipline of chivalry' and criticize the individualism of nobles, among whom 'everyone wants to be the chief of his own company and there are so many masters that soldiers and valets are hard to find.'<sup>189</sup>

The reinvigorated *chevalerie* of the *compagnies d'ordonnance* inherited both the 'discipline' and the individualism of the previous era. The *gendarmerie* continued to be shaped by ideas of chivalry and honour, however poorly they were maintained in practice. The words supposedly spoken by La Palice at Genoa in 1507 indicate the contemptuous assumptions of the nobility about commoners in war:

The disarray of commoners in battle is such that the first to retreat attracts all the rest and invites them to flight. There is such disorder that, after giving way, they can never be rallied.<sup>190</sup>

This anticipates Noel du Fail's (probably tongue-in-cheek) description of the origins of nobility in his preface to the *Propos Rustiques* of 1547, a highly traditional identification of the 'commoner' with the coward, who in battle 'turned tail and gained the safety of the high ground.'<sup>191</sup> These notions shaded into a kind of snobbery in the words put into Bayard's mouth by his biographer, the Loyal Serviteur: 'though I have scarcely anything in this world, still I am a gentleman.' Was it reasonable to risk such noble blood alongside foot soldiers 'of whom, one is a shoemaker, another a blacksmith, another a baker, all mechanicals, who do not hold their honour so high as gentlemen'?'<sup>192</sup>

The conventions of chivalric discourse also reveal much about the self-image of the military nobility. Jean d'Auton, like many other clerical writers, fully shared these assumptions, which permeate his account of the wars of Louis XII. A major aspect was reckless courage. François d'Odaulx, man-at-arms of Châtillon's

<sup>185</sup> C. Allmand, 'Entre honneur et bien commun: le témoignage du *Jouvencel* au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle', *Revue historique*, 301 (1999); R. Kaeuper, *War, Justice and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages* (Oxford, 1988); P. Richardot, *Végèce et la culture militaire au Moyen Âge (XV<sup>e</sup>-XV<sup>e</sup> siècles)* (Paris, 1998).

<sup>186</sup> Germa-Romann, *Du «bel mourir» au «bien mourir»*, pp. 137–51.

<sup>187</sup> Allmand concluded that the *Jouvencel* emphasised the professional side of chivalric training, ('Entre honneur et bien commun', pp. 463–81).

<sup>188</sup> Jean Juvénal des Ursins, *Ecrits politiques*, ed. P.S. Lewis, 2 vols (Paris, 1978–92), II, p. 250.

<sup>189</sup> Alain Chartier, *Quadrilogue invectif*, ed. E. Droz (Paris, 1950), pp. 54–9.

<sup>190</sup> D'Auton, IV, p. 189.

<sup>191</sup> Noel du Fail, *Propos Rustiques*, ed. G.-A. Perouse and R. Dubuis (Geneva, 1994), pp. 42–3.

<sup>192</sup> Loyal serviteur, *Histoire*, ed. Buchon, p. 53.

company, deserved 'a place in the hall of fame' for having sustained a desperate combat at Novara all day long and finally lost his life. Another had his horse killed under him holding an enemy attack while a captain of foot captured two enemy horses. Humbercourt attacked 300 Germans with thirty horse, was brought down and only just rescued.<sup>193</sup> D'Auton's admiration for the Scot, Gilbert Turnbull, for dying at Gioia in 1503 in defence of his company's banner is obvious. Turnbull, he notes, had been found with the lance in his hand and the banner gripped between his teeth. In the same battle, Aubigny had been so determined to wipe out the disgrace of his defeat by plunging wounded into enemy ranks, that he had to be restrained and told that it would be better to live and fight another day.<sup>194</sup> Similar accolades are accorded Gabriel d'Albret, who, though seriously ill during the siege of Gaeta in 1503 and knowing the Spaniards were about to storm the town, had himself carried in his bed to the breach and armed, if only to make up the numbers.<sup>195</sup> On a more mundane level, courtesy in war continued to be observed, including an ability to switch from furious combat to 'sport' with an enemy as though the whole thing were a game,<sup>196</sup> the generous and friendly treatment of enemies after combat,<sup>197</sup> the restitution of an enemy commander's personal effects.<sup>198</sup>

The rite of dubbing knights on the eve of battle survived well into the 16th century. At Novara in 1500, La Trémoille was still inviting the bravest men-at-arms to take the order of chivalry and, according to d'Auton, many did so 'who that day wished to manifest and perpetuate their names by the force of their arms.'<sup>199</sup> The 'new knights' were detailed by Lautrec at Bicocca in 1522 to cover the rear of the army under Pont-Remy's command.<sup>200</sup> However, change was indicated by the fact that, at Marignano, the dubbing of knights took place at the end of and not before a battle,<sup>201</sup> which has been seen as a visible sign that 'chivalry' was being transformed from a rite of initiation for youth into one of recognition and reward for the distinguished.<sup>202</sup>

<sup>193</sup> D'Auton, I, p. 244.

<sup>194</sup> Ibid., III, pp. 164–5.

<sup>195</sup> Ibid., III, p. 199. For later examples, see Germa-Roman, *Du «bel mourir» au «bien mourir»*, pp. 51–85.

<sup>196</sup> E.g. Loyal serviteur, *La Très-joyeuse, plaisante et récréative histoire composée par le loyal serviteur, des faits, gestes, triomphes et prouesses du bon chevalier sans paour et sans reproche gentil seigneur Bayard* (1527), ed. M.J. Roman (Paris, SHF, 1878), pp. 316–17.

<sup>197</sup> Ibid., pp. 358–62; Monluc, *Commentaires et lettres*, ed. Ruble, II, pp. 104, 294, n. 2 (after Siena).

<sup>198</sup> Brissac in 1558, see Villars, p. 299.

<sup>199</sup> D'Auton, I, p. 250.

<sup>200</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 226.

<sup>201</sup> Florange, *Mémoires*, ed. Goubaix and Lemoine, I, p. 198. At Ceresole, Monluc received knighthood after the battle from the duc d'Enghien (Monluc, *Commentaires et lettres*, ed. Ruble, I, p. 117). Dubbings before battle at Fornovo and Novara, see P. Contamine, 'Points de vue sur la chevalerie à la fin du Moyen Age', *Francia*, 4–5 (1976–7), p. 282. For the continuation of dubbing before a battle, see Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 226, on Bicocca (1522).

<sup>202</sup> Contamine, 'Points de vue sur la chevalerie', pp. 255–85, esp. 272–83. In 1513 Louis XII declared that he had created the lieutenant in the *sénéchaussée* of Quercy a *chevalier* 'qu'il soit en couraige de perseverer' in his service (BN fr. 5085, fo. 46).

Tournament continued to be viewed as a preparation and training for war.<sup>203</sup> Indeed, campaigning still sometimes involved an element of the tournament. At Trani, Venetian territory in Apulia, in 1503, the French captain Urfé invited eleven Spaniards, with whom he had been skirmishing around Barletta, to combat with eleven French (including Bayard) in a tournament field witnessed by thousands of Venetians. What seems to have been a savage *mêlée* (not without cheating), that lasted from morning until night, ended in a draw, with a meeting in the middle of the field of the battered participants with ‘good cheer’ and embraces. The affair was closely followed by a ‘grudge match’ occasioned by insulting words, between the French and the Italians in Cordoba’s service, this time at Barletta and much to the discomfort of the French.<sup>204</sup> At Ravenna in 1512, Nemours and Bayard even persuaded the Spanish arquebusiers to cease fire while they exchanged courtesies with the enemy commanders.<sup>205</sup> In October 1521, jousts were held at Mézières between ‘champions’ on horseback and on foot between the French garrison and the besieging force under Nassau. Serious skirmishing at Théroanne in 1543 was accompanied by an invitation from John Wallop to Villebon that ‘if he had any gentlemen under his charge that would break any staves for their lady’s sake’ he would appoint champions.<sup>206</sup> Similarly, when the Emperor’s army marched past Châlons-sur-Marne in 1544, the ‘youth’ under Nevers went out to skirmish and ‘break their lances for the love of their ladies.’ Men were killed on both sides and the encounter was only broken off by the arrival of the main force of the imperial army.<sup>207</sup>

The Renaissance of chivalric values in the Italian wars, saw their perpetuation through a rage for works such as the mediaeval Spanish chivalric romance, *Amadis de Gaule*, published in French from 1540 onwards.<sup>208</sup> This had a special resonance in France where the heroic figures it deployed, cloaked in an assumed aura of historicity, seemed to prefigure the warrior kings of the Renaissance. Its greatest vogue was in the middle decades of the 16th century.<sup>209</sup> The dedicatory poem introducing book 8 (1548) made the point clearly. By Perion and Amadis

<sup>203</sup> A. Vayssière, *Le Pas des armes de Sandricourt* (Paris, 1874), pp. 66, 34; P. Contamine, ‘Les Tournois en France à la fin du Moyen Âge’, in J. Fleckenstein (ed.), *Das ritterliche Turnier im Mittelalter* (Göttingen, 1986). See also Florange, *Mémoires*, ed. Goubaix and Lemoisne, I, pp. 62–3.

<sup>204</sup> D’Auton, III, pp. 112–33; Loyal serviteur, *Histoire*, ed. Buchon, pp. 34–5, and Champier, *Bayard*, ed. Crouzet, pp. 145–9.

<sup>205</sup> Loyal serviteur, *Histoire*, ed. Buchon, pp. 92–3.

<sup>206</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 148–9, 152; Florange, *Mémoires*, ed. Goubaix and Lemoisne, II, p. 22; *St.P.*, IX, p. 459 (*L&P*, XVIII.i, 979); BL Harl. 288, fo. 3 (*L&P*, XVIII.ii, 13).

<sup>207</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 266.

<sup>208</sup> E. Baret, *De l’Amadis de Gaule et de son influence sur les moeurs et sur la littérature au XVIe et XVIIe siècle* (Paris, 1853).

<sup>209</sup> E. Bourciez, *Les Moeurs polies et la littérature de cour sous Henri II* (Paris, 1886), p. 63. La Noue, *Discours politiques et militaires*, p. 162, points out that ‘they were in greatest fashion in the reign of king Henry II.’ R. Cooper, ‘“Nostre histoire renouvelée”: the Reception of the Romances of Chivalry in Renaissance France’, in S. Anglo (ed.), *Chivalry in the Renaissance* (Woodbridge, 1990), pp. 177–8.

The puissant King of France is understood,  
And all the royal blood of their descent ...

Its translator dedicated the book to the Constable de Montmorency as ‘the Chevalier of the Great Sword’, a direct echo of the book’s main character.<sup>210</sup>

If the Amadis cycle was a literary craze, other works sought to blend history and edification. *Le Jouvenel* (which went through five printed editions from 1493 to 1529), Symphorien Champier’s 1510 translation of Llull’s *Libro de la Orden de Caballeria*,<sup>211</sup> his 1525 biography of Bayard<sup>212</sup> and that of 1527 by the ‘Loyal serviteur’ (Jacques de Mailles),<sup>213</sup> as well as Jean Bouchet’s life of La Trémoille<sup>214</sup> all added to the genre. Bouchet portrays battle very much in the tones of the *Amadis*: siege warfare is ‘against the nature of the French’,

who, if they do not attack in anger and fury, lose their force and boldness in pretence ... the French should take care not to change their ancient ways ... stratagems are good for men who have not been brought up comfortably and who are used to putting up with cold, heat, hunger and thirst ... but those used to their ease, like the French, cannot bear them for long without illness ... the French are stronger in the first rush of battle.<sup>215</sup>

There seems almost to have been a competition to find the contemporary equivalent of an Arthurian hero fighting in the Italian wars. Bayard, on ceasing to be a page, immediately ‘touched the shields’ of a Burgundian knight, Vauldray, who had come to Lyon to challenge all comers. Bayard had to beg the money for horse and harness from his uncle and the Arthurian overtones of the narrative are obvious.<sup>216</sup> For the Loyal Serviteur, no one in history had fought more furiously against the cruel, more gently among the humble or more humanely among the common people. The key, though, was that he was ‘infused by the grace of the Holy Spirit.’ Denis Crouzet has seen in this regeneration of chivalry an order instituted by God after the fall to defend justice. In this view, *chevaliers* are to be seen first and foremost as warriors of the faith defending the Catholic religion.<sup>217</sup>

<sup>210</sup> Cooper, “‘Nostre histoire renouvelée’”, p. 183.

<sup>211</sup> Bib.II, 116a. M. Keen, *Chivalry* (London, 1984), p. 11.

<sup>212</sup> Champier, *Bayard*, ed. Crouzet, pp. 7–13, 194.

<sup>213</sup> Jacques de Mailles, his archer and secretary, is generally thought to be the ‘Loyal serviteur.’

<sup>214</sup> Jean Bouchet, *Le Panegyric du chevalier sans reproche* [Louis de La Trémoille] (Poitiers, 1527), ed. J. Buchon (Paris, 1839); A. Hamon, *Un Grand Rhétoriqueur poitevin: Jean Bouchet* (Paris, 1901), pp. 179–84, and J. Britnell, *Jean Bouchet* (Edinburgh, 1986), pp. 115–21, 138–9.

<sup>215</sup> Bouchet, *Panegyric*, ed. Buchon, pp. 801, 803. See also Bouchet’s *Annales d’Aquitaine*, quoted in Britnell, *Jean Bouchet*, p. 139. For similar terms, see Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 144.

<sup>216</sup> Loyal serviteur, *Histoire*, ed. Buchon, pp. 8–10. Champier is not interested in this episode.

<sup>217</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 1. Champier, *Bayard*, ed. Crouzet, introduction, pp. 21, 44, 52. See also D. Crouzet, ‘Un Chevalier entre “les machoires de la mort”’: note à propos de Bayard et de la guerre au début du XVIe siècle’, in J.-P. Bardet and M. Foisil (eds), *La Vie, la mort, la foi, le temps: Mélanges offerts à Pierre Chaunu* (Paris, 1993), pp. 285–94.



There was doubtless still an element present in the minds of the nobility that they were serving their King out of a sense of honour and were responsible to no one else. So, the gentleman punished for insubordination at Ceresole is supposed to have said that ‘in matters of service ... everything served for war ... it was all the same and he would not budge.’<sup>218</sup> How many more cases were there like that of Brantôme’s turbulent brother? Serving in Piedmont in the late 1540s at the age of 18, quarrelsome and prompt to draw his sword, he was only saved from severe punishment by the affection of the prince of Melfi for his family. Faced by the new command of Brissac and the unlikelihood that his temper would be further tolerated, he took off for the wars in Hungary and then in the duchy of Parma. When he returned to Piedmont he had a company at Mondovi but threw that up to join the King’s campaign of Metz. Wounded severely twice, he finally had his head blown off by a cannon ball at the siege of Hesdin in 1553.<sup>219</sup>

These assumptions ran alongside the conviction that bravery and the pursuit of honour were most effective when disciplined by training.<sup>220</sup> The lecture given by Brissac to the princes and lords of the court who had rushed to service in Piedmont in 1551 sums up the need to amalgamate chivalry and discipline: the call to ‘set aside the hot passion and ardour of courage that perhaps masters you too much’ and accept ‘gentle correction and reproof.’ The ‘apprenticeship that teaches to noble hearts ... the skill of commanding well’ required them to accept the commands of their generals. No army could operate ‘if all the army did not render him at one moment a willing and common obedience.’<sup>221</sup> Villars’ strictures against the French nobles’ fatal error in ‘not knowing how to discipline their force and courage’, for instance in rushing to take up their positions in indefensible castles where the enemy could only view them as ripe ransoms for the plucking, develops this point.<sup>222</sup>

The problem of individualism and obligation became more serious for Brantôme at the end of the 16th century, in his long meditation on ‘dulce et decorum est pro patria mori’ and on the duties of subjects to their kings. To the argument that subjects simply had to put up with it when they went unrewarded for their service, or flee the country and wait for mercy if they had offended their prince, he simply asked: ‘who will feed me in the meantime?’ Blind obedience to the prince was the act of a fool.<sup>223</sup> The ground here has shifted away from the demands of feudal obligation to the limits of loyalty to any superior cause or body.

<sup>218</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 623.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 165.

<sup>220</sup> D. Potter, ‘Chivalry and Professionalism in the French Armies of the Renaissance’, in D.J.B. Trim (ed.), *The Chivalric Ethos and Military Professionalism* (Leiden, 2002), pp. 149–82.

<sup>221</sup> Villars, pp. 541–2.

<sup>222</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 636–7.

<sup>223</sup> Brantôme, ed. Lalanne, VII, pp. 230–8 (quotation at p. 238).



## 4

### The Birth of the French Infantry

#### The reputation of foot soldiers

In the preamble to his infantry ordinance of March 1551, Henri II declared the importance of having ‘experienced and battle-hardened men of our nation.’<sup>1</sup> This came after a long period of trial and error in infantry recruitment. The predominance of infantry on the battlefield has long been a theme of early modern military history and it has obvious implications for the survival of chivalric attitudes and the inception of a professional army.<sup>2</sup> One modern historian, while accepting that the birth of a national infantry was undeniable, still emphasised difficulties that were caused by the reluctance of the kings to arm the masses.<sup>3</sup> This preoccupation was clear in the earlier work of Alfred Spont and Gaston Zeller.<sup>4</sup> Where did these assumptions come from? Despite its increasing importance in warfare since the 14th century, infantry did remain a problem and the assumption was deep-rooted among foreigners and French alike that France, unable to produce its own infantry, relied excessively on foreign mercenaries. Such observers, if they were military men, tended to look with contempt on French infantry levies and, if they were writers, speculated on the reasons for failure. The publication of manuals on the command and organisation of *piétons* is testimony enough to this, including the *Familière instruction* of 1536 and Fourquevaux’s *Instruction* of 1548. It was in the later 15th century, under Italian influence, that the term ‘infanterie’ (*la fanteria*) began to appear, though it took a century to push out the traditional terms, ‘gens de pied’ or ‘piétons.’ ‘Lacquais’, a term common in the early 15th century, had dropped

<sup>1</sup> Jean du Bouchet, *Preuves de l’histoire de l’illustre maison de Coligny* (Paris, 1662), p. 457.

<sup>2</sup> See the chapter on ‘The Military Revolution from a Medieval Perspective’, in A. Ayton and J.L. Price (eds), *The Medieval Military Revolution: State, Society and Military Change in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (London, 1995); D.S. Bachrach, ‘A Military Revolution Reconsidered: the Case of the Burgundian State under the Valois Dukes’, *Essays in Medieval Studies*, 15 (1998), pp. 9–14.

<sup>3</sup> Gaier, ‘L’Opinion des chefs de guerre’, p. 738.

<sup>4</sup> Spont, ‘Marignan et l’organisation militaire’; Zeller, *Les Institutions*, pp. 297–301; Michaud, ‘Les Institutions militaires’; P. Contamine, ‘Naissance de l’infanterie française’, in *Quatrième centenaire de la bataille de Coutras*, 16–18 octobre 1987 (Pau, 1988).

out of use but *aventurier* for an ordinary foot soldier was still very common and 'soldat' was also appearing.<sup>5</sup>

The late medieval French army was not an exclusively cavalry force. Lessons had been learned from the catastrophic defeats of Crécy, Poitiers and Agincourt so that, when French men-at-arms took the field after 1346 and until 1415 they often dismounted to fight. The accompanying formations of archers and crossbow-men also travelled on horseback and dismounted for battle.<sup>6</sup> Terminology can therefore be misleading. There was certainly an assumption that the effective core of the King's host was his force of men-at-arms. Froissart tells the story that, at the siege of Calais, Philip VI declared that

He would henceforth only make war with the gentlemen of his kingdom and that bringing the commons (*communaultés*) to the field just caused loss and a nuisance and that such men just melted away on the field like snow in the sun ... and that he would have no more of them, only the crossbow men of the cities and good towns. He would have their gold and silver to pay the wages of the gentlemen but they would stay at home to guard their wives and children and carry on their trade. The nobles would exercise their craft of arms in which they were trained.<sup>7</sup>

Of course, this represents what Froissart thought Philip would have said but indicates well enough a mode of thinking. It was none-the-less obvious that armies on campaign could not do without some form of contribution from the 'commons' and that the King alone could not ensure the garrisoning of all his cities. The problem was, what kind contribution? We have to balance Froissart's against other views. Philip VI had also received the dedication of a French translation of Theodore Paleologos's *Enseignements* in 1335 which taught that natural lords did not need to rely on foreigners to fight for them. On the contrary, even peasants could usefully be recruited, with their pitchforks, to defend the land. Such a lord should have lists of all those between 25 and 70 who were 'fighting men.'<sup>8</sup>

It may have been the case that the popular uprisings of the second half of the 14<sup>th</sup> century made nobles wary of allowing the 'people' to bear arms.<sup>9</sup> In the first half of the 14<sup>th</sup> century, the *arrière-ban* (feudal levy) had included masses of commoner soldiers but there is some evidence of a reaction against arming the 'communes' in the period 1346–56, even though in that period peasants were very active in resistance to unruly soldiers, then for the first time being labelled

<sup>5</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, pp. 351, n. 90, 308, n. 182. Brantôme's 'Des couronnels', in *Oeuvres*, ed. Buchon, I, pp. 578–80; Estienne Pasquier, *Les Recherches de la France*, ed. M. Fragonard and F. Roudaut, 3 vols (Paris, 1996), III, p. 1524. Ord. 3 June 1543 on recruitment of 'aventuriers et legionnaires' (BN Cangé 13, fo. 136).

<sup>6</sup> Bennett, 'The Development of Battle Tactics', pp. 10–12

<sup>7</sup> J. Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. S. Luce, 15 vols (Paris: SHF, 1869–1975), IV, pp. 270–1.

<sup>8</sup> Theodore Paleologos, marquess of Montferrat, *Les Enseignements*, ed. C. Knowles (London, 1983), quoted in P. Contamine, 'The Soldiery in Late Medieval Urban Society', *French History*, 8 (1994), at p. 3.

<sup>9</sup> *Chronique du Religieux de Saint-Denis*, ed. L. Bellaguet, 6 vols (Paris, 1839), I, pp. 235–7.

as 'brigands' (at first after 'brigandines' they wore).<sup>10</sup> In 1394 it was reported that the French crown had ordered its subjects to limit their recreation to the bow or cross-bow, as a precaution against war with the English. In no time, the French population began to rival the English in this form of war, so much so that worries began to emerge: 'if they had got together, they would have been more powerful than the princes and nobles.' So, according to one chronicler, it was decided that the numbers so trained would be strictly limited.<sup>11</sup> In 1412–13, Christine de Pizan wrote that 'there is no greater folly for a prince ... to allow the commons to arms themselves.' Her recommendation was therefore, if the French King lacked troops, to recruit 'foreign soldiers.'<sup>12</sup> The herald Berry declared that 'the people of this realm are simple men and not warlike as others, for their lords do not set them to war if they can help it.'<sup>13</sup>

Such habits of thought were deeply ingrained by the early 16th century. Machiavelli argued that native infantry troops were not used because 'they are from the countryside, all non-nobles and manual labourers and are so subordinated to the nobles and in all matters tyrannised that they are of low quality.' He allowed that the Gascons were a little better because, as frontier men, they had become a little like the Spaniards. However, they were ruffians and thieves and best for use in sieges rather than in open campaign.<sup>14</sup> In *Il Principe*, he developed his views on the weakness of French infantry, which he saw as stemming from Louis XI's supposed preference for hiring the Swiss. The result was that French infantry had been demoralised. France thus had a 'mixed' army, partly national partly mercenary, which was better than a purely mercenary force but inferior to the great force France would have had if it had maintained what he thought had been Charles VII's 'national army.'<sup>15</sup> Machiavelli would return to the theme in *Arte della Guerra*, where he asserted that the King of France had 'disarmed all his subjects in order to rule them more easily', an act of poor judgment that 'had much weakened the kingdom.'<sup>16</sup> Guicciardini echoed Machiavelli's remarks on the Gascons but thought that the French kings feared the 'strength' of the people.<sup>17</sup>

Venetian ambassadors tended to follow the same line. Francesco Giustiniano in 1538, asking why the legions were so unsatisfactory, suggested that it was either because, as peasants, their long subordination precluded any martial spirit

<sup>10</sup> J. Maurice *et al.* (eds), *Images de la guerre de cent ans*, Actes du colloque de Rouen, 2000 (Paris, 2002), p. 50.

<sup>11</sup> Jean Juvénal des Ursins, *Chronique de Charles VI*, ed. D. Godefroy (Paris, 1653), p. 104.

<sup>12</sup> *Livre de la paix*, ed. C.C. Willard (Hague, 1958), p. 133.

<sup>13</sup> Gilles Le Bouvier, *Le Livre de la description des pays*, ed. E.T. Hamy (Paris, 1908).

<sup>14</sup> N. Machiavelli, 'Ritratto delle cose di Francia', in *Opere*, ed. E. Raimondi (Milan, 1966), p. 808.

<sup>15</sup> N. Machiavelli, *The Prince and the Discourses*, ed. M. Lerner (New York, 1950), *The Prince*, ch. 13.

<sup>16</sup> Machiavelli, *Arte della guerra*, trans. E. Farnsworth, *The Art of War*, ed. N. Wood (New York, 1975), pp. 28, 32.

<sup>17</sup> F. Guicciardini, *History of Italy*, ed. J.R. Hale (Chalfont St. Giles, 1966), bk. I, ch. XI; bk. II, ch. XI, pp. 154, 261–2.

or because, once they were accustomed to war, they would no longer be willing to obey their lords. The nobles, he thought, had protested time after time that arming the people would dissolve their privileges and that they would become the servants and their servants the masters. So, the King had abandoned the legions as a serious force.<sup>18</sup> Matteo Dandolo, whose debt to Machiavelli is revealed by his copying the latter's description of the *francs-archers*,<sup>19</sup> reported in 1542 that the long-standing subjection of the peasants to their lords had prevented the emergence of a French infantry. In this he was simply repeating Giustiniano's earlier remarks and, like Machiavelli, he praised the Gascons for their toughness.<sup>20</sup> Michele Suriano crystallized many of the received opinions about French armies in his *Relazione* of 1561. He, too, stressed the importance of the Gascons and argued that, if the French were trained as infantry, they would be formidable. But the plan to form a national infantry had been abandoned because

if the common people were armed they would rebel against the nobles and rulers (partly out of envy and partly for revenge for the oppressions they suffer). The judges would not be able to hold them back, and they would leave their jobs, stop working the land, become robbers and, in short, throw the kingdom into wild confusion.<sup>21</sup>

Such views were also reflected in French political discourse. Claude de Seyssel, early in the reign of Francis I, thought it inexpedient to allow the common people to have 'too much freedom, neither excessively rich nor generally experienced in arms', since, as had been seen many times before, they would rise up against their superiors. Should they have recourse to arms the people might refuse to pay taxes and oppress the nobility. Nevertheless, he recognised there was a penalty to pay: with the people untrained for war, foreign enemies, especially those with well-trained infantry such as the English, the Germans and the Swiss, would have France at their mercy. True, there were advantages in employing foreign infantry in that, at the end of campaign, they could be sent home without oppressing the labouring people. Still, there were problems with this. French money flowed out of the country in pay to foreign troops, who could not be trusted as much as the King's own subjects to maintain discipline and carry out orders. Nor were they always available when needed and employing them would inevitably lead to military secrets seeping abroad.<sup>22</sup> Seyssel's answer was to revive some force along the lines of Charles VII's *francs-archers*. Later in the century, Jean Bodin echoed earlier writers in asserting that Francis I failed to persevere with the attempt to create a national infantry in the form of the

<sup>18</sup> Firpo, *Relazioni*, V, p. 122.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, V, p. 138; Machiavelli, 'Ritratto', p. 816.

<sup>20</sup> Firpo, *Relazioni*, V, p. 140; Contamine, *Histoire militaire*, I, p. 253.

<sup>21</sup> Suriano, in J.C. Davis, *Pursuit of Power: Venetian Ambassadors' Reports to Spain, Turkey and France in the Age of Philip II, 1560–1600* (New York, 1970), p. 186.

<sup>22</sup> Claude de Seyssel, *La Monarchie de France*, ed. J. Poujol (Paris, 1961), part I, ch. 16, p. 124; part III, ch. 4, pp. 169–71.

legions because of his view that it was unwise to accustom subjects to the use of arms.<sup>23</sup>

It was also argued that, in order to preserve the exclusive hunting rights of the nobles, peasants were forbidden to bear arms in France.<sup>24</sup> On the other hand, there is no suggestion that the *franc-archers* had been impeded in their bearing of arms by hunting regulations and there was, as will be seen, a formidable tradition of urban militia in late medieval France. In 1557, some villages of Comminges, when called on to supply infantry, alleged the regulations enforced by the nobles against bearing arms. They were somewhat disingenuous since the villages of the region were replete with daggers, swords and crossbows.<sup>25</sup>

Fourquevaux accepted that the problems had begun with Louis XI's recruitment of the Swiss, a practice continued by Charles VIII, Louis XII and Francis I. The latter's inception of the legions had been a good idea but undermined by faults in practice, mainly in the acceptance of volunteers, who were usually the worst imaginable. He also attacked the idea that the Swiss and Germans made better soldiers than the French. It was, he thought, evident that the Germans were unwilling to undertake arduous work in sieges but their great quality was their 'good order ... both in forming their battle-lines and in obeying their commanders,' not a strong point for the French.<sup>26</sup> He refuted the argument that it was dangerous for the King to raise an army from his own people, the argument that 'it is safer to let his commons sleep in peacetime than to wake them up and put arms in their hands'.<sup>27</sup> The colonels he appointed to command them would be changed regularly and, for those who feared such an army would raise the spectre of rebellion, his answer was simple:

Those who once made the people bold to rebel are now extinct and their duchies and lands joined to the crown, such that there is not a man in France who would dare to persuade any soldier to take the field to diminish the king's authority or attack his authority.<sup>28</sup>

Later in the 16th century, Monluc began his *Commentaires* with a highly emotional passage in praise of the infantry and the honour to be acquired in its service.<sup>29</sup> Brantôme, in his celebrated essay on the command of the French infantry, entirely accepted the story of Louis XI's rejection of French infantry in favour of the Swiss and went on to paint a comic picture of a ruffianly French

<sup>23</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, p. 174; A. Spont, 'La Milice des francs-archers, 1448–1500', *Revue des questions historiques*, n.s. xx (1897), pp. 456, 481.

<sup>24</sup> AN JJ 234, no. 29; R. de Maulde la Clavière, *Les Origines de la révolution française au commencement du XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1889), p. 314, no. 72; P. de Vaissière, *Les Gentilshommes campagnards de l'ancienne France* (Paris, 1903), pp. 88–9.

<sup>25</sup> P.D. Solon, 'Le Rôle des forces armées en Comminges avant les guerres de religion (1502–62)', *Annales du Midi*, 103 (1991), pp. 19–40.

<sup>26</sup> R. de Beccarie de Pavie, sr. de Fourquevaux, *Instructions sur le Faict de la Guerre*, ed. G. Dickinson (London, 1954), fos. 6–7.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 11r.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 9v

<sup>29</sup> Brantôme, ed. Lalanne, V, pp. 306, 348, 367–8; ed. Buchon, I, p. 605; Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, pp. 23, 25.

infantry, gallows' fodder got up like gypsies, unwashed for months, shirts open to hairy chests, stockings torn or barelegged. On the other hand, he thought them in his own time capable of being the equal of gentlemen: 'there is nothing so brave and fine as seeing a gentle soldier, well set up, armed and ready' and capable of attaining the 'nobility of arms.' The professionalism that he envisaged is clear in his dismissal of La Noue's idea that the common infantryman should return to his trade at the end of a war. Brantôme reserved praise only for those foot soldiers who, moved by the gallant desire to 'live and die as soldiers' preferred to take service abroad rather than be demobilised in 1559.<sup>30</sup> He tended to assume, though, that they were usually in it for the money. That was why able captains were so important: 'the soldier does not think about the rights and wrongs of war but what he can get out of it. He who feeds him is his father.'<sup>31</sup>

Such conflicting writings testify to a degree of puzzlement about the failure of such a highly populated country as France to generate its own supply of effective foot soldiers.<sup>32</sup> The reality was even more complicated. The 15th century continued to see a role for the urban militias which had played such a prominent role in the wars of the Low Countries in the 14th.<sup>33</sup> In May 1465, Paris was able to arm about 22,000 'tough and well set-up men' and 12,000 of the youngest and strongest actually served as a protective force for the King.<sup>34</sup> The Parisian militia organisation, in force since the era of Etienne Marcel, was by now managed by the 61 *métiers* and their *bannières* and those of the sovereign courts.<sup>35</sup> In September 1465 the city could claim to produce 60–80,000 men in this way, of which 30,000 were properly armed.<sup>36</sup> Other cities had proportionately smaller but still important manpower resources. Great cities were proud and jealous of their companies of archers.<sup>37</sup> The *arbalestriers* of Dijon were not alone in receiving in the 1520s royal confirmation of their yearly festival of shooting at the 'papegault' (a parrot set up on a steeple or pole) with fulsome praise for the arts of archery:

The sports and industries of the bow and the crossbow are honest and young people and others of the good towns of our realm need to practise them both for recreation ... as also ... for the safeguard and defence of such towns.<sup>38</sup>

Such resources were vital for urban defence, though of questionable general use. Nevertheless, the competitions evolved under Francis I and Henri II into contests both with the crossbow and the arquebus, the winners gaining tax exemption

<sup>30</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, pp. 579–80.

<sup>31</sup> Brantôme, ed. Lalanne, V, pp. 92–3; V, p. 368; VII, pp. 66–7.

<sup>32</sup> Giovanni Michiel, 1561: Firpo, *Relazioni*, V, p. 426

<sup>33</sup> P. Contamine, 'L'Armement des populations urbaines à la fin du Moyen Age', in P. Contamine and O. Guyotjeannin (eds), *La Guerre, la violence et les gens au Moyen Age*, II: *Guerre et gens* (Paris, 1996), p. 61; idem, 'The Soldierly in Late Medieval Urban Society', *French History*, 8 (1994).

<sup>34</sup> *Journal parisien de Jean Maupoint, prieur de Saint-Catherine-de-la-Couture, 1437–1469*, ed. G. Fagniez (Paris, 1878), p. 88.

<sup>35</sup> Contamine, 'L'Armement des populations urbaines', p. 61.

<sup>36</sup> *Journal de Jean de Roye*, ed. B. de Mandrot (Paris, 1894), I, p. 180

<sup>37</sup> G. Durand (ed.), *Inventaire sommaire des archives communales de la ville d'Amiens*, 7 vols (Amiens, 1891–1925), ser. BB, p. 312 (1510).

<sup>38</sup> BN fr. 14368, fo. 100r; Cotgrave, *Dictionarie*, s.v. 'Papegay.'



for a year.<sup>39</sup> The crown also made contributions to the upkeep of firing ranges for companies of town arquebusiers.<sup>40</sup> There was a problem of security, though measures for the control of fire-arms (e.g. ordinances of 1546, 1548 and 1558) were mostly concerned with the repression of crime and disorder. Infantry and the urban confraternities of arquebusiers were exempted, though there had been problems with excessive individual exemptions.<sup>41</sup>

One form of permanent infantry was of only limited value. The *petite ordonnance* created in the 1440s had been envisaged as garrison troops and became known as *morte-payes* in 1452. Originally they were mounted, though with a smaller complement of horsemen than the *lance fournie* of the *grande ordonnance* and paid less (10 rather than 15 lt. p.m.). Under Louis XI, they were gradually transformed into foot soldiers, first the archers being dismounted, and under Charles VIII, they were entirely infantry, mainly armed with pikes. Numbers had been substantial in the 15th century, rising to 8000 in the later reign of Louis XI and still 3500 in the late 1480s.<sup>42</sup> By the reign of Francis I, there were fewer, dismounted and substantially reduced in pay. Nevertheless, every region continued to have modest number of *mortepaies*, paid by the crown. For payment purposes, they were grouped into provinces and each had a *trésorier* to pay them.<sup>43</sup> They were clearly also employed in Italy during periods of French occupation since we have a list of 1700 such troops scattered throughout the towns and cities of Lombardy in 1503.<sup>44</sup> In France itself, musters indicate that their numbers were vestigial and the most common use for them was as garrisons of old castles.<sup>45</sup> Their pay was either 5 lt. or 2 lt. 10s.<sup>46</sup> In the 1530s, one year's pay for the *mortepaies* of Picardy amounted to 24,300 lt. and Burgundy 26,640, though it is clear from the general accounts of the crown's financial commitment that pay was often only partial or delayed.<sup>47</sup>

With the development of the 'old bands' of infantry and the stationing of *aventuriers* 'which have long been in garrison'<sup>48</sup> the rationale for a separate category of *mortepaies* withered. Though they were local troops, relations between them and the inhabitants could be poor, involving, at Nantes in the mid-16th century, 'exactions and pillage.'<sup>49</sup> In 1557, Henri II seems to have recognized that they had become anomalous and proposed to replace them with 'bands of foot that I

<sup>39</sup> AM Nantes, EE 39; AM Angers EE 3; B. Fleureau, *Les Antiquitez de la ville et du duché d'Etampes* (Paris, 1683), pp. 232–4.

<sup>40</sup> *CAF*, VII, 782, 29033.

<sup>41</sup> Contamine, 'L'Armement des populations urbaines', p. 70; Isambert, *Lois*, XIII, pp. 66–7 (Nov. 1548).

<sup>42</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, pp. 290–4.

<sup>43</sup> *CAF*, VII, 169, 24055; VIII, 209, 31198–31201.

<sup>44</sup> BN fr. 25783, no. 57; *Estat de Millan*, in d'Auton, II, p. 352.

<sup>45</sup> *CAF*, VIII, 209, 31198; 252, 31624; BN fr. 25789, nos. 294, 293; BN fr. 25789, no. 295; V. de Beauvillé, *Recueil de documents inédits concernant la Picardie*, 5 vols (Paris, 1860–82), II, pp. 208–9; *CAF*, VII, 176, 24085.

<sup>46</sup> BN fr. 25788, nos. 157–8.

<sup>47</sup> Burgundy: *CAF*, VII, 171, 24063; 172, 24065; 176, 24085; Picardy: *ibid.*, VIII, 102, 30182; 209, 31198–31201. BN fr. 17329, fos. 82r–112v; AN J 968/1, no. 10.

<sup>48</sup> BN fr. 25793, no. 579.

<sup>49</sup> AM Nantes, EE 23, depositions of 1542, 1550 and 1556.



maintain usually in wartime and peacetime.<sup>50</sup> Where the *mortespaies* were the only troops, there was a question whether to replace them with permanent troops paid at the rate of 7 lt. p.m.<sup>50</sup> They do seem to have disappeared from the royal financial allocations after 1558.

The fundamental dilemma remained: could any country, even one such as France endowed with considerable administrative resources, afford to maintain an army of infantry both during war and peace? How could a mass of such idle men be sustained? The two alternatives were either to import troops from abroad or to maintain a reasonably trained pool of men from whom an army could be recruited in time of war.

### The *francs-archers*

The 1448 ordinance sought to create an infantry counterpart to the *gendarmerie*: the *francs-archers*. This, recruited in companies of 200–300, served well in the last campaigns against the English. The ordinance specified that each parish would choose an archer, who would be freed from the *taille*, and under Louis XI it was even argued that seven years' service should confer permanent enfranchisement.<sup>51</sup> The parish was to equip its archer with a heavy helmet (*salade*), a dagger and sword, a bow, quiver of arrows and plated mail-coat (*brigandine*), a serious array of equipment.<sup>52</sup> Companies were officered by nobles (though initially it was not assumed that nobles would play much part), and were eventually placed under 4 captains-general, and their numbers doubled by Louis XI after 1465. In 1469, there were 16,000 and by the late 1470s 18,000, including, for the first time, some pikemen on the Swiss model. Such numbers may have been allowed by population growth as well as recruitment throughout the kingdom (the Midi had been exempt hitherto) on the basis of one soldier for 50 hearths. Soldiers usually served for long terms, often over 20 and sometimes over 30 years, though frequency of campaigns and growing discontent increased turnover around 1470. With an average age of 32 (51% of them over 31), this, unlike the *gendarmerie*, was a relatively elderly force akin to a home guard<sup>53</sup> and from the middle of the 15th century they became objects of literary ridicule in the form of cycles of monologues and dramas. The most widely read was *Le Franc-archer de Baignolet* but there were many others and their influence continued into the middle of the 16th century (see chapter 12). In these works, they are mocked for cowardice, *braggadocio* and the tendency to think themselves above their neighbours. This certainly reflected widespread unpopularity of the system. The villages had regularly to re-equip them after campaigns and they often oppressed the peasantry in the name of the King's service.

The *francs-archers* had a generally poor reputation, even though they

<sup>50</sup> BN Cangé 15, fo. 60.

<sup>51</sup> BN fr. 2900, fo. 37.

<sup>52</sup> *Ord.*, XIV, pp. 1–5.

<sup>53</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, p. 354.

performed well in 1478.<sup>54</sup> In 1477, though, there was already some doubt about their reliability when Louis XI demanded the arrest and punishment as traitors of those who had been abandoning his army and going home.<sup>55</sup> In 1472, they had surrendered at Roye, and at Dôle in 1479 went over to the Burgundians. Finally, in 1479 the *francs-archers* fought poorly at Guinegate, 6000 being killed and others pillaging the camp instead of fighting.<sup>56</sup> So, in 1481 Louis abolished them and ordered their equipment into store in the parishes. In 1487, the *élus* were ordered to inventory the equipment held by the parishes in order to deposit them with reliable men and ensure that the *francs-archers* no longer held them.<sup>57</sup>

After abolition by Louis XI, the *francs-archers* came back as a territorial force organised through the *élections*. Robert de Balsac took the view in the 1490s that ‘these lackeys’ were useless and could be replaced by poor gentlemen without employment, since the existing *francs-archers* ‘are worthless on the battlefield or in making an assault, and they are not armed or sure enough to defend strongholds, since often they sell them to the enemy like the vagabonds and malefactors they are.’<sup>58</sup> Machiavelli observed around 1510 that each parish (he shared the common delusion that there were 1,700,000 in France)<sup>59</sup> paid a *franc-archer* to maintain a horse and arms and, during the King’s campaigns abroad, these were obliged to ride to the defence of any threatened frontier.<sup>60</sup> Louis XII in May 1513 ordered the levy of 22,000 men for frontier defence. They were organised in 44 ensigns of 500 men each commanded in turn by five *centeniers* but they only stayed in being for 18 months.<sup>61</sup>

In January 1522 a large levy of 24,000 *francs-archers* was decreed for campaigns in Picardy, Guyenne and Italy.<sup>62</sup> This was an attempt to produce an updated *franc-archer* force. The reasons given included foreign invasion and the general disorder caused by ‘adventurers.’ The *francs-archers* were to be raised as ‘in the time of the kings our predecessors, had raised them for their armies.’ The *baillis* would be required to review the old rolls and order the parishes to choose ‘known men, with hearth and home, of the finest and most experienced for war,’ to be given freedom from *tailles* but only up to 60 sols. However, whereas they had in the past been required to serve with *brigandines* and crossbows, they were now to appear with corselets, mail gorgets, arm-pieces, mail skirts (*faudes/faudières*) and helmets. As for arms, two thirds were to be pike-men and the rest made up halberdiers, crossbowmen and arquebusiers; all were to have swords or daggers and *hoquetons* (sleeveless coats) in the liveries of their captains, a small number

<sup>54</sup> Jean Nicolay, ‘Kalendrier des guerres de Tournay (1477–1479)’, *Mémoires de la Société d’histoire et littérature de Tournai*, II (1853), pp. 244–5.

<sup>55</sup> *Lettres de Louis XI*, ed. J. Vaesen, 11 vols (Paris, 1883–1909), VI, pp. 203–4 (no. 1010).

<sup>56</sup> Commynes, II, p. 275; Jean Molinet, *Chroniques*, ed. G. Doutrepoint and O. Dodogne, 3 vols (Brussels, 1935–7), I, pp. 313–14.

<sup>57</sup> *Journal de Jean de Roye*, II, p. 103; *Lettres de Charles VIII*, ed. P. Pelicier, 5 vols (Paris, 1898–1905), I, pp. 141–3.

<sup>58</sup> Contamine, ‘Un Traité politique’, p. 170.

<sup>59</sup> A mistake made by the Venetian Contarini in 1492 (Firpo, *Relazioni*, V, pp. 24–5).

<sup>60</sup> Machiavelli, ‘Ritratto’, p. 816.

<sup>61</sup> Spont, ‘Marignan et l’Organisation militaire’, p. 60.

<sup>62</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L), p. 110; (ed. B), p. 94. Decreed on 17 Jan.: BN fr. 2702, fo. 56.

of experienced gentlemen in charge of groups of provinces.<sup>63</sup> The *francs-archers* were to receive one écu conduct money and the cost of their equipment from their fellow-parishioners.<sup>64</sup> By February, the *élus* at Clermont-Ferrand had already issued the necessary orders to the magistrates for the retention of men with crossbows and arquebuses, armed with daggers and swords and in the liveries of their captains. Nearer the time, royal letters were despatched to the *élus* who in turn ordered town magistrates and the rural parishes to ensure that archers were ready for the musters.<sup>65</sup> This involved a proclamation that the *francs-archers* should be ready to march after the muster and that failure to do so would leave them as rebels against the King. This took place in June of 1522, 1523 and 1524.<sup>66</sup> 1523 was an active year. 500 *francs-archers* were raised in Dauphiné and we know that the *francs-archers* of Auvergne served at Fuentarrabia in that year.<sup>67</sup> The levy was even expanded and 900 were raised in the *prévôté* of Paris alone.<sup>68</sup> A royal pardon of the same year declared that a recruit

Had been presented by the inhabitants of Liberamont to be received in the estate of *franc-archer* by our *élus* ... who received him as such and administered the oath required, compelling the inhabitants to provide him with arms, including a corselet.<sup>69</sup>

In fact, there was much resistance to the levy *francs-archers* by the 1520s, a fact demonstrated by local responses all across France. At Montferrand, the designated *francs-archers* refused to accept the one écu conduct money, arguing that they had received more the year before. They had to be compelled to do so.<sup>70</sup> At Angers in 1521, the chronicler Jean de Bourdigné reported that, with all the bad weather and also recent levies of the *tailles*, the ‘poor people’ of the rural parishes in Anjou were forced to provide *francs-archers* (500 for the *élection* of Angers alone), to their ‘great grief’ because every parish was required to provide a man ‘who had to be equipped with bonnet, feathers, doublet, leather cape, shoes, boots and such harness and arms as the captain required.’ The cost of another *taille* would, he thought, have been less burdensome. Then, when they were mustered by their captain they were dismissed and told to hold themselves ready when called for service.<sup>71</sup> Bourdigné was so impressed by the oppression of all this – ‘most annoying, odious and burdensome’ – that he thought the *francs-archers* an ‘innovation.’ Despite the chaos they caused, they

<sup>63</sup> E.g. the sr. de Forges for Nivernois, Auvergne and Bourbonnais; La Roche-du-Maine in Maine, Anjou and Touraine.

<sup>64</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, III, pp. 92–4 (27 Jan. 1521/2).

<sup>65</sup> AD Puy-de-Dôme, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 2, no. 5

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, EE 2, nos. 10, 13.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, EE 2, no. 20; L.S. van Doren, ‘Military Administration and Inter-Communal Relations in Dauphiné, 1494–1559’, *PAPS*, 130 (1986), p. 81.

<sup>68</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L), p. 179; (ed. B), p. 149; *Chronique parisienne de Pierre Driart, chambrier de Saint-Victor (1522–1535)*, ed. P. Bournon, *Mémoires de la Société de l’Histoire de Paris*, xxii (1895), p. 82.

<sup>69</sup> AN JJ 236, no. 72, fols. 154v–155v.

<sup>70</sup> AD Puy-de-Dôme, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 2, nos. 12, 14, 20.

<sup>71</sup> *Bib.II*, 93, fo. 197r–v.

were mustered again in October 1523 – ‘expensive for the people and worthless for the public good.’<sup>72</sup> To some extent, these problems were addressed in the royal summons in July 1523, which specified that the *francs-archers* were only to be equipped with ‘boots, doublet in livery and leather cloak without jerkin with their harness’ that they had from the previous campaign and otherwise only with ‘arms for defence.’ The captain-general responsible for the central region, Forges, was empowered to select, from the 1300 men under him, 700 of ‘the best fellows’ and lead them to the royal camp, sending the rest home to remain in readiness.<sup>73</sup> After a further levy in 1525 during the crisis of Pavia, they were definitively abolished in 1535.<sup>74</sup> La Noue looked back on them in the 1580s with amused contempt:

Since then, it has been seen how they have trained themselves: so that, if we called to mind the old *franc taupins* equipped as they were then, in the presence of these old and brave regiments of our modern infantry, who among them could stop laughing?<sup>75</sup>

### The quest for a permanent infantry

Louis XI, so criticised in retrospect for abolishing the *francs-archers*, envisaged a new permanent French infantry and in tentative ways began a process that was ultimately to result in major changes.<sup>76</sup> The main characteristic of both garrison troops and *francs-archers* had been their impermanence. They were paid month by month and stood down at the end of campaigning. Louis turned instead to the idea of raising a force of 14,000 volunteer pike-men on the Swiss model from the provinces of Normandy and Picardy.<sup>77</sup> These were also to be exempted from the service of the *arrière-ban*. They were recognisably permanent in that they were to be paid quarterly, in three-month instalments from 1 January and stationed in *campes de manoeuvre* that would train them for instant service in any of the northern theatres of war. It may be in this period that Louis dictated the passage of the *Rosier des guerres* arguing for an army of 40,000 men to be commanded by a hierarchy of four royal lieutenants, ten ‘vicaires’ below them, each commanding ten captains who would command 10 ‘dizainiers’ in charge of ten soldiers.<sup>78</sup>

From 1481, Louis was aiming at a permanent infantry army of 10,000, assembled in a mobile encampment similar to the Hussite waggon lager, 4000 from Normandy and 6000 from Picardy. He intended them to be armed with pikes (6m long) and halberds, very like the Swiss. As Louis’s enemy, Thomas Basin, described them, they were ‘infantry called halberdiers, armed similarly to

<sup>72</sup> Bib.II, 93, fo. 200v

<sup>73</sup> AD Puy-de-Dôme, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 2, no. 19.

<sup>74</sup> R. Doucet, *Les Institutions de la France au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 2 vols (Paris, 1948), II, p. 630.

<sup>75</sup> La Noue, *Discours politiques et militaires*, p. 259.

<sup>76</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, pp. 298–301, 343–4.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 344; AN, K 72, no. 73.

<sup>78</sup> [Louis XI/P. Choynet], *Le Rosier des guerres*, ed. M. Diamantberger (Paris, 1925), n.p., ch. 5, section ‘Comme le prince peut ordonner ses gens.’

the *francs-archers*, carrying iron-tipped staves the Flemings call pikes or great battle-axes like those of the German foot.<sup>79</sup> They were also recruited from a limited number of provinces, not universally, a point of future significance. A Swiss envoy wrote of the King's orders for the manufacture of pikes: 'if he could manufacture men capable of using them, he would have need of no one else.'<sup>80</sup> According to Commynes, by 1481 Louis had 20,000 foot at his disposal (including 6000 Swiss regularly recruited since 1474). Nevertheless, Louis's demands for money in 1483 involved the provision of the same number of archers as in 1481.<sup>81</sup> The cost of such a permanent infantry was crushing (no doubt the fundamental reason for the failure of the crown to develop it) and it was abandoned shortly after the King's death in 1483.

After the reaction against Louis's policies in 1483–4, these infantry corps were abolished and the camps dissolved. Unsurprisingly, the need for infantry was apparent again by 1485, when the Beaujeu government sent out demands for suggestions as to how *piétons* were to be raised in Normandy, Champagne and Picardy. The answers from the communities showed an inclination to return to the old *francs-archers*, though now communities should not find the arms and movements of armed men were to be limited. A new plan emerged in June 1486, which included the provinces of the Midi as well, and proposed a levy for the recruitment of 12,000 infantry who would be chosen and paid for by the crown. The negotiations led to the partial recreation of an infantry army directly recruited and paid for by the crown and in 1490 *francs-archers* were again suppressed.<sup>82</sup> In 1486, there were also companies of *arbalestriers gascons* operating in northern France.<sup>83</sup> The quality was still unsatisfactory and Charles VIII's recourse to Swiss mercenaries was thus seen by foreign observers as a rejection of arming the French people.

The French state had yet to solve the problem of how to recruit and pay for a decent native infantry force. What, then, was the line of development between Louis XI's tentative schemes and the 'old bands' of infantry in being by the middle of the 16th century? The quality of the French infantry remained poor because it was unable to develop the strategies of recruitment, training and arms that were the strengths of the Swiss and the Germans.<sup>84</sup> Ultimately, it was easier to rely on individual captains to raise companies of *aventuriers* which could be paid during a campaign and then sent home. These were volunteers, not always of good quality. Nevertheless, a more reliable French infantry continued to be called for in the early 16th century. Marshal de Gié advised Louis XII in 1503 to create a new force of 20,000 foot based on regional recruitment. Captains were appointed and some recruitment conducted, though in the absence of money and amidst some disorder

<sup>79</sup> T. Basin, *Histoire de Louis XI*, ed. C. Samaran, 3 vols (Paris, 1963–72), III, pp. 334–7.

<sup>80</sup> B. de Mandrot, *Les Relations de Charles VII et Louis XI avec les cantons suisses* (Zurich, 1881), p. 185 n. 2.

<sup>81</sup> *Lettres de Louis XI*, ed. Vaesen, X, p. 83.

<sup>82</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, pp. 346–7.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 134–6.

<sup>84</sup> Spont, 'La Milice des francs archers', now superseded by Contamine, 'Naissance de l'infanterie française', pp. 63–88.

the plan lapsed. In any case the fall of Gié in 1504 discredited any plans for reform that he had put forward.<sup>85</sup>

French armies in Italy always had some French infantry, often called *aventuriers*. However, success was limited.<sup>86</sup> Charles VIII raised several 'bands' of 2000 men in Normandy in 1498. The army for the Milan expedition of 1499 included a troop of 2500 Normans and these were referred to in 1500 as *aventuriers*.<sup>87</sup> In May 1500, the expedition to Tuscany included a force of 300 Gascons and the Normans were garrisoned along the Milanese frontier with the Swiss Cantons.<sup>88</sup> Normans, Picards and Gascons were among the 7000 infantry despatched for the Naples campaign of 1501 and in the following year there were 3500 French or Gascons, Dauphinois and Lombards there.<sup>89</sup> In 1503, Normans constituted about half the 10,000 men sent to Italy, while 7500 Gascons were detailed for the campaign in Roussillon, serving under local noblemen in companies of 500.<sup>90</sup> Troops from Picardy, Normandy and Gascony were levied in 1504 for another Neapolitan campaign and again in 1511.<sup>91</sup> Infantry paid for the 1515 campaign included 'Gascons, Navarrais, French adventurers and others.' Alongside 6000 Gascons, there were 4000 'French' in companies of 500.<sup>92</sup> One report of the battle of Marignano has it that the French adventurers 'wrought marvels' in the first phase of the battle but were then routed.<sup>93</sup>

The term *aventurier* had the dual meaning of 'foot soldier' and of 'pillager', though the regulation of January 1545 was clear enough in mentioning: 'French foot soldiers called adventurers.' They were sometimes ill-disciplined bodies of men under no clear chain of command. In the 1520s, 'adventurers' and '*mauvais garçons*' were frequently linked.<sup>94</sup> In 1521, six gentlemen 'close to the person' of the King were commissioned to raise 1000 foot each under the overall command of the count of Saint-Pol. Among the provincial *grandeés*, Saint-Pol's brother, Vendôme, and the constable de Bourbon were each commissioned to raise 6000. The plan, at least, was to raise 18,000 French infantry. In the case of Vendôme's levy, the Picard regional character is clear from the list of captains: Sarcus, Estrées, Bournonville, Heilly. These units were again operating in 1523, indicating at least a semi-permanent formation, soon referred to as the 'bands of Picardy'.<sup>95</sup> The levy of infantry promulgated in February 1522 was very different from that of the *francs-archers* raised at the same time. Now, the *bonnes villes* were to pay for the troops from sales taxes permitted by the King and the men – 1000 were to be contributed by Paris alone – could only be used for defence of the King's territo-

<sup>85</sup> Maulde la Clavière (ed.), *Procédures politiques*, pp. 87–94.

<sup>86</sup> Michaud, 'Les Institutions militaires', p. 30.

<sup>87</sup> D'Auton, I, pp. 24, 245.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 275, 381.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 13, 278, 285.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, III, pp. 191–2, 209, 257.

<sup>91</sup> Spont, 'Marignan et l'Organisation militaire', p. 60 (no refs given).

<sup>92</sup> BN fr. 25720, fo. 40 (*CAF*, I, 80, 470); Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 60–1; Barrillon, I, pp. 68–9.

<sup>93</sup> Spont, 'Marignan et l'Organisation militaire', p. 73.

<sup>94</sup> A. Fontanon, *Les Edicts et ordonnances des rois de France depuis Louys VI*, 4 vols (Paris, 1611), III, p. 172; *Bourgeois* (ed. L), p. 275; (ed. B), p. 232; Brantôme, ed. Buchon, p. 579.

<sup>95</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 124–7, 255, 160, 169.



ries. They were to be levied in the city and its *prévôté* and given surcoats with the city arms but, unlike the *francs-archers*, paid a wage of 6 s. p.m. for the campaign only.<sup>96</sup> The same method seems to have been used in 1536 for the recruitment of infantry in the two most threatened provinces, for instance, 6000 in Picardy, 5500 in Provence.<sup>97</sup> In the provinces with Estates, the assemblies levied men, as when in 1514 the Estates of Dauphiné levied 4 men per hearth (with the notional total of 18,400 men) and in 1523, 2 per hearth.<sup>98</sup>

By the 1530s the terms 'old' and 'new' bands were current to classify French infantry. Louis XII's ordinance of January 1509 for the conduct of the army in Italy described the French bands as 'valiant men and good fellow soldiers.'<sup>99</sup> Du Bellay observed that the infantry sent to defend Mouzon in 1521 were 'newly raised and not battle-hardened', and therefore unable to take the bombardment by the imperial army. Similarly, the companies of Reffuge and Montmoreau, used in the defence of Mézières, were 'inexperienced' under artillery fire and fled.<sup>100</sup> From this time on, established bands of French foot are seen in Italy and these were from the 1530s to evolve into the 'old bands of Piedmont.' These formations, the 'bands of Picardy' or of 'Piedmont', kept on a permanent footing and regularly paid, were decent enough. The old bands of Piedmont in particular can be seen as the real origins of the permanent and top class French infantry, despite the side-lining of the Italian theatre in the 1550s. At Ceresole, Enghien's victorious army was made up of Swiss and the 'old French bands' and the battle was looked back upon as their great achievement.<sup>101</sup> Brantôme described the old bands of Piedmont as particularly well turned out, with ornate gilt armour and silk surcoats. Infantry commands at that time, he recalled, were highly regarded, well paid, and 'uncommon.' The officer ranks of the old bands included, under the lieutenant and ensign, *caporals* for the pikes as well as for the arquebusiers and, under them, 25 *lanspessades*, in some cases demobilised *hommes d'armes* who had sought positions in the infantry.<sup>102</sup>

By 1552–3, there were 41 companies of 'French infantry and old bands' and 21 of new. In addition to these 'line' companies, there were 20 garrison companies (usually smaller in numbers) in Picardy, 20 in Lorraine, 3 in Champagne and 18 held in reserve if needed.<sup>103</sup> These figures do not include Piedmont, which seems normally to have had a garrison of 6–12,000 men. An *état* of the garrison there in 1537 lists 3000 French *aventuriers* (including 2000 arquebusiers) in ten companies alongside a much larger contingent of 8900 Italian foot. There were, though, another 2000 *aventuriers* 'that the King intends to be newly raised for reinforcements.'<sup>104</sup> These were probably 'new bands'. By 1548, the garrison was much reduced but

<sup>96</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, III, pp. 108–17, 140–1.

<sup>97</sup> BN Dupuy 486, fo. 89. *CAF*, VII, 211, 24252.

<sup>98</sup> Van Doren, 'Military Administration', pp. 80–1.

<sup>99</sup> L. Susane, *Histoire de l'infanterie française*, 5 vols (Paris, 1876–7), I, pp. 63–4.

<sup>100</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 138, 140.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, p. 201.

<sup>102</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, pp. 600, 657–8, 388; Fontanon, *Edicts*, III, pp. 152–7: *lancia spezzata* or 'broken lance'.

<sup>103</sup> Villars, pp. 617–20. Regulations for garrison companies, Fontanon, *Edicts*, III, pp. 152–7 (1553).

<sup>104</sup> BN fr. 3008, fos. 6–7.



in 1552 Brissac estimated a need for 13,000 foot and for the campaign of 1553 he led a campaigning force of French, Italians and Swiss amounting to 12,000 foot, 300 lances and 600 light horse.<sup>105</sup> The numbers in each company varied very widely. While 300 could be considered the norm, companies often fell short of this and sometimes operated in bands of as few as 160, augmented in times of emergency.<sup>106</sup>

The new bands, to which the name of *aventuriers* with its pejorative connotation was applied until the 1550s, were paid only for each campaign and then dismissed.<sup>107</sup> An example are the two ensigns of 500 'Picard adventurers ... previously raised in this land of Picardy, conducted by the sr. de Belleforrière' in 1545 with a complement of 166 and 186 arquebusiers.<sup>108</sup> Terminology was not always consistent but in the 1550s, infantry formations 'of the new bands' were often mustered for garrison duty on the northern frontier.<sup>109</sup> The distinction was made clear in Henri II's March 1551 ordinance on the infantry, which declared that the good service done by the old bands on the Boulogne campaign had led him to maintain them 'normally'. Their superiority, he added, lay in the fact that they could take the field rapidly because already trained.<sup>110</sup>

The reliability of *aventuriers* of the new bands was questionable and their discipline notoriously bad. Jehanet Ponchon, involved in an affray near Abbeville in 1548, was 'dressed as an adventurer, with a long sword at his side ... with no means of livelihood, if not poaching partridge and other game forbidden by our ordinances', the notorious Jean Cappel alias Pellut, known as 'le Bastard', a priest's son and 'vagabond adventurer', was finally murdered in the course of a raid on a farm in Ponthieu in 1544, and Colin Caige, 'adventurer, a man of bad life, bold and feared for the wrongs he did to the poor villagers in pillaging and ransoming them', was killed near Amiens in 1538.<sup>111</sup> Though the crown was regularly raising substantial bodies of French infantry by the 1550s, they were still considered of questionable value. In the aftermath of the defeat of Saint-Quentin, secretary Fresne recorded, a large number of French infantry were raised 'of whom, though men were employed who at other times would not have been accepted, need made them necessary.' These then had to be fully equipped with armour and firearms. A company that was drafted to La Capelle early in 1558 was entirely without arms.<sup>112</sup>

Most observers agreed that the best French infantry of the old and new bands

<sup>105</sup> Lublinskaya, ДОКУМЕНТЫ, no. 85; Villars, pp. 559, 609.

<sup>106</sup> BN fr. 3118, fo. 20; Villars, p. 833.

<sup>107</sup> BN fr. 25793, no. 571.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., no. 548. D. Potter, 'The International Mercenary Market in the Sixteenth Century: Anglo-French Competition in Germany, 1543–50', *EHR*, 111 (1996), 24–58.

<sup>109</sup> 1552: BN fr. 25797, no. 288; 1558: BN fr. 25799, nos. 566, 570.

<sup>110</sup> Du Bouchet, *Preuves de ... Coligny*, p. 457.

<sup>111</sup> AN JJ 258, no. 5, fos. 2v–3r; JJ 256C, no. 81, fo. 36r–v; JJ 251, no. 117. On the usage of the term *aventurier*, see G. Zeller, 'De Quelques Institutions mal connues au XVIe siècle', *RH*, 68 (1944), pp. 193–218, esp. pp. 210–18, 250. BN fr. 25793, nos. 554, 562; BN fr. 25800, no. 6. BN fr. 25799, nos. 566, 570; Michaud, 'Les Institutions militaires', p. 35.

<sup>112</sup> Fresne, BN fr. 4742, fo. 7r; BN nafr. 21698, fos. 81–2.

were the Gascons, observed in the Perpignan campaign of 1542 as ‘very fine.’<sup>113</sup> The reasons for this are still disputable and may be connected to social structures of the Pyrenees region and the frontier status of Gascony.<sup>114</sup> In the crisis of 1557, when the Estates of the little province of Comminges, near the Pyrenees, was called upon to find infantry, it certainly made an effective survey of the men with arms available, of whom there was a large number.<sup>115</sup>

The *aventuriers*, through the development of the ‘old bands’, had effectively evolved into regiments by the 1540s. The term ‘regiment’ was applied initially to the Germans in the 1530s but, by the 1540s, many French infantry of the ‘old bands’ were effectively organised as such. Thibault Rouault was colonel of ten companies in Picardy in the mid-1540s<sup>116</sup> and in Piedmont Jean de Taix commanded a similar formation.<sup>117</sup> When he moved to Picardy, Taix seems to have absorbed Rouault’s command.<sup>118</sup> Coligny had eight ensigns under his command as ‘colonel’ in Picardy during his campaign against the English at Boulogne.<sup>119</sup> These were soon known as the ‘Châtillon regiment’ and moved, first, to Piedmont in 1551 and then back to France for the German campaign in 1552.<sup>120</sup> The model taken was the ‘old bands’ of infantry amalgamated into larger groups like the Italians and German *landsknechts* (*lansquenets*). The first clear use of the term ‘regiments’ for French formations is often thought to be by Monluc, writing of the manoeuvres in Picardy in August 1558.<sup>121</sup> In traditional military history, the creation of ‘regiments’ (of Picardy, Guyenne etc.) took place the advice of the duke of Guise in 1562, though it is clear that such formations already existed.

As for armament, France faced infantry armed with firearms at an early date. Louis XI’s *francs-archers* in Hainault met German ‘*haquebutiers*’ successfully in 1478<sup>122</sup> and it seems that in the 1470s a proportion of them were armed with spears, halberds and pikes; even some *coulevriniers* were expected.<sup>123</sup> At Fornovo, the French infantry was covered by arquebusiers.<sup>124</sup> Certainly, the Swiss in French service in Italy in 1500 were armed not only with pikes and halberds but also ‘*hacquebutes*.’<sup>125</sup> Brantôme, though he thought the French infantry was beginning to improve in the early 16th century, still took the view that at that time they were

<sup>113</sup> AS Modena, Francia, B 18, deciph. p. 3. See also A. Communay, ‘Les Gascons de l’armée française’, *Revue de l’Agenais*, 21 (1894).

<sup>114</sup> Solon, ‘Le Rôle des forces armées en Comminges’, pp. 11–12; V.G. Kiernan, ‘Foreign Mercenaries and Absolute Monarchy’, in T.H. Aston (ed.), *Crisis in Europe* (London, 1965), pp. 117–40; G. Zeller, *Le Siège de Metz par Charles-Quint* (Nancy, 1943), p. 53.

<sup>115</sup> Solon, ‘Le Rôle des forces armées en Comminges’, pp. 12–13.

<sup>116</sup> BN fr. 25792, nos. 517, 518.

<sup>117</sup> BN fr. 25792, no. 460; BN fr. 25793, no. 554; BN fr. 25792, no. 513; BN fr. 25792, nos. 509, 511.

<sup>118</sup> BN fr. 25792, no. 558.

<sup>119</sup> BN fr. 25794, nos. 59, 60.

<sup>120</sup> Villars, pp. 522, 586.

<sup>121</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires et lettres*, ed. Ruble, II, p. 310; Villars, p. 513.

<sup>122</sup> Nicolay, ‘Kalendrier des guerres de Tournay’, pp. 244–5.

<sup>123</sup> Contamine, ‘Naissance de l’infanterie française’, p. 68; idem, *Guerre, état*, p. 349.

<sup>124</sup> Benedetti, *Diaria*, I, p. 91.

<sup>125</sup> D’Auton, I, p. 243.

unwilling to adopt firearms and remained wedded to the crossbow.<sup>126</sup> He thought that it was the shock of Pavia that led them to adopt firearms. The Parisian Nicolas Versoris reported that the defeat of Bayard's army in Italy in 1524 'happened more as a result of the enemy's firearms than anything else' and French troops suffered greater casualties at Pavia in 1525 as a result of firearms.<sup>127</sup> Yet it is clear that the crown was requiring the raising of companies of arquebusiers in the great cities by 1521.<sup>128</sup> An Edict for Paris (March 1524) noted that, 'considering ... new war industries and inventions', it was necessary to muster a company of 100 arquebusiers with the same privileges as the guard of archers and crossbow men, with the requirement to train once a week in order to inspire others to exercise.<sup>129</sup>

Firearms developed rapidly in French infantry formations from the 1520s, bowmen still being common in 1521, and Piedmont provided an important impetus.<sup>130</sup> When Francis I issued an ordinance for the French and Italian infantry in 1537, he specified a maximum of one quarter of any company to be armed with guns, though it seems that this was more a measure of control for the Italian companies, which were notably dominated by firearms, at around 70%.<sup>131</sup> By the 1540s French infantry companies were also very heavily reinforced by firearms.<sup>132</sup> Piedmont was the area in which this happened earliest, since local regulations assumed that campaigning there required a preponderance of firearms in a company, sometimes 80–90 against 30 pikes.<sup>133</sup> The vidame de Chartres claimed that he had led northwards a force of arquebusiers from Piedmont in the aftermath of Saint-Quentin because, in his opinion, the main advantage the enemy had was in his Spanish arquebusiers, whereas pike-men could be raised easily in France and Germany.<sup>134</sup> By the end of the 1550s, then, arquebusiers were as common in the north, where the typical proportion in a company equipped with firearms was now half-and-half. However, the ordinance of December 1553, specified that there should only be 58 arquebusiers in a company of 280 of the new bands and 97 in a company of 270 of the old bands, while the garrison companies were to be one third arquebusiers.<sup>135</sup> There were some problems in that infantry had carefully to balance the offensive capability of firearms and the flexibility of pikes. If there were too many arquebusiers in a company, they were exposed to attack. In a formation, the arquebusiers had to retire behind the pike square while reloading. Infantry with

<sup>126</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 580.

<sup>127</sup> Versoris, p. 60.

<sup>128</sup> Isambert, *Lois*, XII, p. 228 (March 1521).

<sup>129</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, IV, p. 12; *Bourgeois* (ed. L), p. 226; (ed. B), p. 189.

<sup>130</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires et lettres*, ed. Ruble, I, pp. 52, 77; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 216–17; Brantôme, ed. Buchon, pp. 646–7.

<sup>131</sup> BN fr. 2965, fo. 73, in *Ord.Fr.I*, VIII, no. 815, and Jean Calvin, *Plaidoyers pour le comte de Fürstenberg*, ed. R. Peter (Paris, 1994), pp. 110–11; Arfaïoli, *The Black Bands of Giovanni*, pp. 19, 67.

<sup>132</sup> BN fr. 25791, no. 402; BN fr. 25793, no. 580.

<sup>133</sup> BN fr. 3147, fo. 46; Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, pp. 646–7.

<sup>134</sup> BN fr. 20471, pp. 153–6; *Mémoires de Guise*, pp. 433, 429.

<sup>135</sup> BN Cangé 15, fos. 20–25 (1558): total of 2634 men in 16 companies with about 600 listed arquebusiers. Fontanon, *Edicts*, III, pp. 152–7.

firearms required greater training and discipline and was also more vulnerable to breakdowns in the supply of powder and shot.

Fourquevaux naturally approved of the arquebus, though only in trained hands. His doubts were raised by what he thought was the desire of too many soldiers to be arquebusiers, either for higher pay or to fight at a distance. He thought that there should be fewer and better. The effect was often just noise, since sometimes for 10,000 shots not a single enemy was killed. He also had some regard for archers and crossbow-men, who, he thought, could serve well in bad weather, when arquebusiers were out of action.<sup>136</sup>

### The legions

In the wake of the attempts in 1503 and 1512, discussions continued on the formation of a national infantry. Some time in the 1520s, one such scheme emerged which had some similarities to the later scheme for the legions. Entitled 'Memoir for a formation of infantry',<sup>137</sup> it envisaged a force of 50,000 men, to be recruited in the parishes but definitely not called *francs-archers* since many 'good fellow-soldiers ... refuse to be called *francs-archers*.' The captains should be gentlemen of military experience, drawn from the *élections* in which their men were recruited, and receive individual commissions.<sup>138</sup> Each of them would command a maximum of 500 men and, with four other local gentlemen of experience, to be called *centeniers*, would each command 100. The *centeniers* would have ten other gentlemen below them called *chefs de chambre*, each responsible for 10 men. Thus the whole force would be closely monitored and controlled. Each captain would have 150 arquebusiers and 50 halberdiers and the rest pikes. Musters were to be in May to show 'if they are maintaining their arms and have them manoeuvre (*faire l'ordre bastaillon et limasson*) to teach them so they do not forget.' Captains and *centeniers* were to receive permanent pay at 500 lt. and 100 lt. p.a. and the ordinary soldiers 3 lt. pa. in peacetime and be free of the *taille*, like the *francs-archers*. It was aimed to reduce the cost by removing the burden of providing harness from the parishes, so that, where a *franc-archer* used to cost 40 or 50 lt., the new troops would cost only 15. The parishes, though, would still pay the wages of the men on campaign at 8 lt. per month, 6 going to the men and 2 to the officers. This was evidently a compromise between the *franc-archer* system and a professional army.

The ordinance creating the legions (23 July 1534) attempted to deal with some of the problems of quality and organisation and, though it absorbed some of these principles, effectively broke with the system of recruitment by parishes.<sup>139</sup> There were to be seven legions, raised in the frontier and seaboard provinces, and they were to consist, like a Roman legion, of 6000 men (thus in theory an army of 42,000 men). As usual, they were to be officered by nobles. All the officers were

<sup>136</sup> Fourquevaux, *Instructions*, fo. 12r.

<sup>137</sup> BL Add. 38028, fos. 68–71.

<sup>138</sup> BN Dupuy 273, fo. 34r–v.

<sup>139</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, VII, no. 666, pp. 137–49.

to be drawn from the province.<sup>140</sup> As in the earlier plan, close attention was paid to the command structure. There was to be a very large corps of officers (2800), the higher ranks filled by noblemen, including 7 colonels and 35 captains.<sup>141</sup> While the crown appointed the colonels and captains, it left the choice of the rest of the officers to them. A proportion of arquebusiers was prescribed (12,000 out of 42,000), though curiously this was expected to vary from province to province: Brittany 10%, Normandy and Picardy 20%, Burgundy-Champagne-Nivernais 16.6%, Dauphiné-Provence-Auvergne 33%, Guyenne 50%, Languedoc 50%. The 1536 *Familière instruction*, a printed manual for the execution of the King's edict, gave the following as a model:

In each thousand men ... there should be 603 pikes, 80 halberds and 300 arquebuses, not counting the captain, his lieutenants, ensigns, sergeants, fourriers, drums and fifes, in all 17.<sup>142</sup>

In practice, it does not look as though these specifications were observed for long.<sup>143</sup> Exemption from the *taille* was to be limited to 4 lt. p.a., a minimal sum, and twice yearly musters were to pay the men 40s for expenses. On active campaign, pay was set at 5 lt. p.m. and 6 for arquebusiers.<sup>144</sup> The regular cost of the permanent officer corps and yearly retainers for the men was a little over half a million lt., roughly five times the cost of the 22,000 men envisaged in 1513.<sup>145</sup>

As for protective gear, arquebusiers were to be equipped with mail *gorgeret* (throat-piece) and *secrète* (a thin steel cap worn under the helmet) and the rest with corslet and a *cervelière*, an inner cap. Thought was given to the encouragement of 'proofs of virtue' on the part of soldiers, in the form of the gold ring (for which models were to be sent to all commanders) to be presented for valour and honourable conduct by the colonel. Commoners who proved their courage, rising through the ranks to the position of lieutenant, would be ennobled.<sup>146</sup> In reality, the legions never seem to have got the relation between firearms and pikes right and the organisation in an amorphous column of 6000 may have hindered their manoeuvrability. By the 1540s they seem to have been operating as more normal companies of 300 rather than the 500 originally envisaged.

Recruitment varied from province to province. There is some evidence from Dauphiné that legionaries were levied through the tax system, sometimes one per hearth.<sup>147</sup> There was some interchange between provinces. The King authorised the colonel of Languedoc legion to recruit in both the area around Toulouse and in Gascony. Henri d'Albret authorised the colonel of the Guyenne legion, to recruit in

<sup>140</sup> Ibid. (art. II).

<sup>141</sup> AN JJ 251, no.142; AN JJ 251, no. 145; BN fr. 25790, no. 334; BN fr. 25791, no. 412.

<sup>142</sup> Bib.II, 22.

<sup>143</sup> BN fr. 25791, nos. 393, 394.

<sup>144</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, VII, no. 666, pp. 137–49 (arts. 18, 45).

<sup>145</sup> Spont, 'Marignan et l'Organisation militaire', p. 50.

<sup>146</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, VII, no. 666, p. 148 (art. 51).

<sup>147</sup> Van Doren, 'Military Administration', pp. 81–2.

Comminges. Clearly this region was prolific in potential recruits.<sup>148</sup> Initial muster rolls show that the Languedoc legion commanded by François de Voysin, with Fourquevaux and La Valette as his two lieutenants, was commanded by 12 noble *centeniers* and 40 *caps d'escouadre*, at least ten of them nobles.<sup>149</sup> All 500 men of one were arquebusiers (Languedoc was one of those provinces that required 50%) and, of them, over 200 can be located with a high degree of precision in the dioceses of Mirepoix, Carcassonne, Pamiers, Toulouse and Lavaur. In fact the heaviest concentration of recruits came from around Mirepoix and Carcassonne and it is obvious that the men were recruited by their officers. The largest single body of recruits, 16, came from the village of Chalabre near Mirepoix and it is no surprise to find the sr. de Chalabre among the centeniers. There were a further 8 from nearby La Rocque and 5 from Mirepoix itself. In the diocese of Carcassonne, while the city supplied 7 men, nearby Montréal contributed 8 and La Valette 5. Around Pamiers (which supplied 6 men), the village of Saint-Felix supplied 8. Plotted on Map 4 the concentration of recruitment is clear and is most likely to have followed lines of seigneurial influence. The prominent role of the nobility in the command of the legions, expanded during the following ten years. Nearly all muster rolls contain lists, not only of the officers, but of usually 6 'gentlemen' extra paid 15 lt., increased to 18 in 1546, only a little below the *sergens de bataille* and more than the *caps d'escouadre*.

The legions performed reasonably well at first in the Italian campaigns of 1536–7, one of their first 'outing' being the Piedmont campaign in March 1536, when 12,000 were raised for Chabot's army.<sup>150</sup> They had, though, acquired a reputation for indiscipline and unreliability by the end of the 1530s. As early as August 1536, the men of the Champagne legion in garrison at Arles began a fight with the Italian troops in the same garrison. As soon as this had been appeased, a major mutiny broke out in one of the companies of the Gascon legion under the count of Caraman, over their defiance of the regulations against pillaging the munition merchants. Threatened with punishment, the men came out with cries of 'Gascogne!' to rally the other troops of their legion. An example was made of them.<sup>151</sup> A significant number of *légionnaires* feature among the ranks of those involved in pardons for murders and other crimes from the late 1530s onwards. In May 1535, a group of them set up an ambush for a man from Corbie, in which there was a murder when *baillage* sergeants took action.<sup>152</sup> Jean Messier, foundryman described as 'poor young unmarried son' aged 22, attended the muster Saisseval's company of the Picard legion in his home town of Amiens in 1535 and became involved in a tavern brawl leading to a murder.<sup>153</sup> The Boulonnais legion seems to have been particularly turbulent. Ferry d'Achicourt, one of the *centeniers*, was in prison for

<sup>148</sup> AD P-A, B 2076.

<sup>149</sup> BN nafr. 8620, no. 1, 21 Nov. 1535.


<sup>150</sup> A. Thevet, *Les Vrais Pourtraits et vies des hommes illustres (1584)*, facs. edn (New York, 1973), fo. 383r; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, p. 329; III, pp. 65, 225.

<sup>151</sup> *Ibid.*, III, pp. 257–60, 268–73.

<sup>152</sup> AN JJ 249B, no. 123, fos. 79–80. See also D. Potter, "'Rigueur de justice': Crime, Murder and the Law in Picardy, Fifteenth-Sixteenth Centuries", *French History*, 11.iii (1997), 265–309.

<sup>153</sup> AN JJ 249B, no. 15, fo. 11r–v.





Map 4. Zones of Infantry Recruitment, Legion of Languedoc (BN nafr. 8620, no. 1 (1535)).

a murder committed in September 1535.<sup>154</sup> In the same period, the three brothers from Longueville, having enlisted in the legion under du Biez's command, were involved in another tavern brawl after too much beer. The problem was that the eldest brother had been involved in a killing ten years before as an adventurer.<sup>155</sup> Longueville was the focus for another related incident at the same time. A group of recruits had gone to the village of le Waast 'where they were enrolled with the others,' returned to Longueville to invite friends to a wedding and hear Easter mass and carrying the pikes they had taken to the muster. On the way they were involved in a fight. Significantly, they claimed that they could not flee since 'it would be shameful to them as men of our legions.'<sup>156</sup> There are many other cases.<sup>157</sup> Even a captain of the Picard legion, Chaulmont, was pardoned for homicide in 1546.<sup>158</sup> To enlist as a soldier in some ways marked a man off as turbulent. When divisions opened up within the family of prosperous farmers in Picardy during the 1530s that led to the murder of one of the sons by another, a priest, it was at least in part because, as was claimed, the eldest son 'had enlisted as a legionary and led an immoral life with a public whore in the paternal home.'<sup>159</sup>

The legions performed poorly in the Luxembourg campaigns of 1542–3. By

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 169.

<sup>155</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 21, fos. 15–16.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 77, fos. 53–4.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, nos. 43, 101, fo. 66. JJ 251 (1538), nos. 246, 260, 377, 434; JJ 252 (1537), nos. 165, 174, 195, 241; JJ 253B (1540), nos. 64, 97; JJ 256C (1544), no. 11, fos. 17v–18r; JJ 257B (1546), no. 128; JJ 257B, no. 74, fos. 23–4.

<sup>158</sup> AN JJ 257B, no. 128.

<sup>159</sup> AN JJ 251, no. 320, fos. 103v–104v (Aug. 1538).



the mid-1540s they were more likely to be organised like the rest of the French infantry. The Normans (colonel, Lorges), mustered in June 1543, were scheduled by the King to ‘march to the camp he intends to establish in Picardy.’ That of Champagne (colonel, the count of Brienne), was earmarked for the ‘camp and army’ in Hainault.<sup>160</sup> Further companies were mustered ‘for the defence of Champagne,’<sup>161</sup> while 1500 men of the Picard legion were mustered at Landrecies, bolstered by an extra levy of French foot.<sup>162</sup> In November, another company was to be sent at need to Landrecies.<sup>163</sup> Again, in the summer of 1545, the Picard legion was scheduled to ‘march urgently into the Boulonnais for the reinforcement of his camp and army there for the recovery of Boulogne’, for which musters for 4 companies of 500 survive.<sup>164</sup> In March 1547, captains were told to pick out men quietly without formal enrolment who could be called up if the Emperor attacked France.<sup>165</sup> A similar summons for frontier defence went out when news of the Emperor’s victory over the Protestants arrived.<sup>166</sup>

Thereafter, the legions were reduced to a territorial and frontier role and were little mentioned. The crown attempted to revive them as ordinary infantry forces in March 1558. This retained the structure of 7 provincial legions of 6000 men, though the groups of provinces were re-arranged in a force of 42,000. Each legion, though, was to consist of 15 companies of 400 men. In the case of the Picard legion, a list of 20 new captains was put forward to the royal council. Some of them were themselves former captains-in-chief and others officers in gendarmerie companies; one had recruits ready.<sup>167</sup> In general, though, the new levy proved unsatisfactory. The Norman legion under Saint-Simon got to the Somme at Saint-Valéry but refused to cross for lack of payment.<sup>168</sup> The crisis over a Spanish threat in Guyenne in summer 1558 brought out the provincial legion under the command of Duras. Seven companies of this legion were again mustered at Bazas in October of the same year<sup>169</sup> and they were being called on in Provence in 1562.<sup>170</sup>

Beyond the problems already mentioned, there were faults in payment and administration, coupled with the obvious fact that such troops could not at first be expected to match battle-hardened veterans. Fourquevaux’s *Instructions*, written around 1540, offered a utopian solution, which differed in some significant respects from the institution created in 1534. He deplored the necessity of relying on foreign troops and applauded the creation of the legions, though he thought the reform had not been well carried out.<sup>171</sup> With a mixed army, foreigners got all the

<sup>160</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, pp. 175–6. BN fr. 25791, nos. 393, 394, 395, 397, 399.

<sup>161</sup> BN fr. 25791, no. 411.

<sup>162</sup> *Ibid.*, nos. 412–14.

<sup>163</sup> BN fr. 25792, no. 453.

<sup>164</sup> BN fr. 25793, nos. 526, 527.

<sup>165</sup> HNSA, Frankreich 14, Berichte 1547, III, fos. 28v, 29v.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*, Berichte, 1547, V, fo. 1.

<sup>167</sup> Fontanon, *Edicts*, III, p. 158; AD Pas-de-Calais, 9B 2, fo. 62; BN fr. 23191, fos. 107–8; BN Clair. 350, fo. 102.

<sup>168</sup> BN fr. 20536, fo. 57; BN Clair. 352, fo. 153; Zeller, *Le Siège de Metz*, p. 53.

<sup>169</sup> BN fr. 6908, fos. 52, 54, 75.

<sup>170</sup> BN fr. 15877, fo. 76.

<sup>171</sup> Fourquevaux, *Instructions*, fo. 108v.

credit for French victories and the French all the shame for their defeats. He was all too aware, however, of problems in the quality of the legions and called for a 'true election', by which he seems to have meant some form of selection of the best men using, at first, a degree of compulsion.<sup>172</sup> Naturally, some incentive would be necessary, and here he proposed the concession of privileges and the pursuit of honour.<sup>173</sup> It was a scheme which would provide a large and permanent militia for each of the four fronts on which France was threatened. He therefore retained the regional basis of the legions but rejected the idea of taking volunteers or those chosen by the communities. He envisaged a cycle of training which would select 25,000 men in each zone, train them for three years and then proceed to another round of selection. At the end of six years, the King would have at his disposal 200,000 trained men.<sup>174</sup> Fourquevaux was quite explicit in limiting military service to those between 17 and 35; any younger and they would be physically unable to cope, while those over 35 would be too old to learn. But how to choose the men? Other than those who had already served, who could be selected according to whether they had all their limbs and were thought to be 'men of good life' by their neighbours, it was a matter of 'lively eyes, upright head, tight stomach, large shoulders, long arms, strong fingers, small belly, big thighs, slender legs, sturdy feet.' These would guarantee strength and agility but moral qualities were also required; they should be 'honestly brought-up according to their station' and free of vice.<sup>175</sup>

### **Recruitment of *gens de pied***

Fourquevaux's remarks on selection raise the difficult problem of recruitment.<sup>176</sup> In the 1520s, it was still possible for gentlemen to raise companies of foot on their own initiative and without formal authorisation. When such troops got out of hand in Picardy in 1522, their captain, a local nobleman, was executed.<sup>177</sup> Royal commissions for raising men indicate some assumptions. One from the 1520s was issued for 500 foot, 'crossbow-men and men experienced in war, fine fellow-soldiers and apt to serve.' A commission to raise 300 foot in the 1530s specifies 'places where you may easily find them.'<sup>178</sup> Provincial governors still in the 1540s authorised the raising of men in their provinces for local defence but, in 1545, it was explicitly decreed that captains could only raise men under royal commission and only up to the numbers specified. Those raising men on their own initiative were to be condemned to death.<sup>179</sup>

The recruitment process is sometimes revealed by letters of pardon. At Beauvais,

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, fos. 7v, 10r.

<sup>173</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 7v.

<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 8r-v.

<sup>175</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 10v. These qualities were largely derived from Vegetius and can also be found in *Le Rosier des guerres*, ch. 4.

<sup>176</sup> 'Liste des lieux destinés pour faire assemblées et recrues des troupes de chacune province', BN fr. 18587, fos. 23-5 (early 1520s).

<sup>177</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. B), pp. 159-60. He had raised 'sans adveu' 6-700 foot.

<sup>178</sup> BN fr. 14368, fo. 95v; BN Dupuy 273, fos. 34v, 89.

<sup>179</sup> Ledain, 'Lettres de Daillon' *AHP*, 12, no. 3, pp. 4-5; Fontanon, *Edicts*, III, p. 172.

in August 1522, the recruiting officers of Sarcus's company of foot had the drum beaten and raised a number of local men, 'who were enrolled by his harbinger in the inn at the sign of the St. Christopher.' They were then marched off to a temporary billet in a nearby village before being taken to join the colours in Picardy. One decided he did not like the place and sloped off home. Charles d'Aoust was a merchant born in Poitiers, who had served the bishop of Noyon for 10 years. Some time in the reign of Louis XII he became an *aventurier* and it was in garrison at Montreuil that he killed a man.<sup>180</sup> A farmer from Wierre-Effroy in the Boulonnais took service in an infantry company because, at the start of the war in 1521, 'he had no livelihood . . . and to make a living for himself, wife and little children.'<sup>181</sup> In 1524, a soldier declared that he had served for three years, when he was commissioned to raise men in and around Soissons. This he did and marched the men to Ham to take up garrison but, by that time, they were a month in arrears of pay and had to take supplies on credit against their muster. Called to Saint-Quentin, they were told when they arrived that there was no room for them and they must go back to Ham. They were then refused entry, so the company broke up and went home. The soldier then took up a promise of a place as archer in Montmorency's gendarmerie company.<sup>182</sup> Clearly a recruitment process like this could not produce satisfactory men.

Captains received commissions to raise a certain number of men, conduct them to their muster and lead them for a specific campaign. These, especially in Gascony or Picardy, would be homogeneous companies raised by gentlemen from their own neighbourhood.<sup>183</sup> The King commissioned the duke of Vendôme in the summer of 1536 to raise 6000 foot 'good and experienced fellow-soldiers . . . for whose levy you will appoint good and valiant captains, experienced in war.' The 300–400 raised in Paris were described as 'both men and boys, and I assure you I have seen many who would be hard put to carry their pike.' They were also described as 'the most pitiful riff-raff you ever saw.'<sup>184</sup> Estrées was nominated as 'colonel-general' and we know that Blaise de Monluc and Salvador d'Aguerre from Gascony were among the captains recruited by the duke in the following Spring.<sup>185</sup> Daguerré was a gentleman of Lower Navarre, who went on to serve in Piedmont commanding a company of French *aventuriers* and to be appointed governor of Dax in 1549.<sup>186</sup> After the 1536 campaign was over, Monluc returned to Provence, where he had left his heavy equipment, and received another commission to raise two companies for Piedmont.<sup>187</sup> The *modus operandi* of such commissions is indicated by a 1545 letter of pardon, which recounts that 'we then ordered the raising of many soldiers

<sup>180</sup> AN JJ 236, no. 62, fo. 53r–v; no. 399, fos. 425v–26v.

<sup>181</sup> AN JJ 236, no. 104, fos. 93v–94v.

<sup>182</sup> AN JJ 236, no. 62, fo. 59r–v; AN JJ 236, no. 569, fos. 616r–17v.

<sup>183</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires et lettres*, ed. Ruble, I, p. 77.

<sup>184</sup> BL Add. MS. 38033, fos. 126, 138.

<sup>185</sup> 28 Aug. 1536: BN Dupuy 486, fo. 89. On Monluc and Daguerré: *CAF*, VIII, 140, 30555.

<sup>186</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, p. 217; *Catalogue des chartes provenant du cabinet de M. de M.* (Paris, 1867), no. 1282; *CAH*, III, no. 4533.

<sup>187</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, pp. 73–4.

and to this end sent commissions to the srs. de Monseaulx and de Milly and others, who by our order had raised three hundred men.<sup>188</sup>

In Dauphiné, where there was significant recruitment throughout the 1550s, the voluntary pool of recruits dried up 'because most of the soldiers in Piedmont are from this land', as des Adrets reported. In 1550-2, Maugiron was told to raise 2000 foot in September 1549 and captain Bourchenus issued commissions to raise two men per hearth for garrison duty. Another four companies were to be raised in Dauphiné in the summer of 1551 but Maugiron insisted that they could not be raised as legionaries (i.e. always ready to march when summoned), but would have to be found all over the south-west, in Provence, Lyonnais and Languedoc as well. Nor were the captains rich enough to support them for more than 15 days before the muster.<sup>189</sup> Maugiron told Chastel, captain of 300 foot, in 1552, to select 50 men from the valley of Grésivaudan 'of the most valiant and gentle fellows' in view of the enemy threat.<sup>190</sup> Recruitment therefore remained unsystematized and rather hit-and-miss but there is no doubt that there was a formidable pool of recruits from which to draw.

### Command of the infantry

In the 15th century, other than the *grand maître des arbalestriers* (a title defunct by the 16th) there was no overall commander of the infantry as a separate unit and all troops were commanded by individual captains responsible to the general command of the army. The role of the nobility in the command of the infantry was well established. Jean Molinet observed that the reason for the triumph of the Burgundians over the French at Guinegate was that Maximilian's infantry was stiffened by 200 gentlemen 'of good stuff.'<sup>191</sup> Marshal Joachim Rouault had shown himself an accomplished leader of the *francs-archers*.<sup>192</sup> Marshals d'Esquerdes and Gié both showed a clear command of the needs of infantry warfare.

A high proportion of the captains of all branches of the infantry were noblemen. Command of the *francs-archers* was assigned to noblemen and in the later 16th century it was observed that the *gendarmerie* had become so admixed with commoners that many noblemen preferred to serve in the infantry.<sup>193</sup> Brantôme highlighted the appointment of distinguished commanders of the infantry to the siege of Genoa by Louis XII in 1507.<sup>194</sup> Even before that, commanders of infantry in Naples in 1502-3 included François de Daillon, Yves de Mallerbe, Jean de

<sup>188</sup> AN JJ 257B, no. 106, fo. 36r.

<sup>189</sup> Leblanc, 'Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron', (1893), p. 37; BL Add. 38032, fos. 218v, 221v. See also van Doren, 'Military Administration', pp. 82-3, 97 n. 25.

<sup>190</sup> Leblanc, 'Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron', (1893), pp. 39-40; (1890), p. 365; BL Add. 38032, fo. 243r.

<sup>191</sup> Molinet, *Chroniques*, I, pp. 301-17.

<sup>192</sup> Mathieu d'Escouchy, *Chronique*, ed. G. du Fresne de Beaucourt, 3 vols (Paris, 1863-4), II, p. 37.

<sup>193</sup> Relazione of Correro: see L. Lalanne, *Brantôme, sa vie et ses écrits* (Paris, 1896), p. 130.

<sup>194</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 580.

Montauban (in charge of Gascons).<sup>195</sup> Louis XII's ordinance of 1509 sought to raise 20,000 French infantry and have them commanded by experienced nobles. Bayard set an example by turning over command of his gendarmerie company to his lieutenant and taking a command of 500 foot.<sup>196</sup> Well before this, the count of Ligny had led the battle at Mortara in 1500, dismounted at the head of the 14,000 Swiss who constituted the centre of the French army and the 14,000 infantry deployed against Genoa were commanded by a German expert and French nobleman.<sup>197</sup> Infantry could sometimes put on a real show, as when Cesare Borgia turned up at the siege of Capua in 1501 with 400 foot fitted out with damask surcoats in the King's colours of red and yellow.<sup>198</sup> Commanders of the French infantry sent to take Urbino for the Pope in 1517 included François de Voisin, knight of Malta and the seigneurs d'Ossun (of Lautrec's company) and Saint-Blimont.<sup>199</sup> The infantry raised in Picardy in 1521–2 was commanded by local noblemen, including Guillaume d'Humières, commander of 1000 foot despatched to reinforce Mouzon.<sup>200</sup> Among the others, Monclou was an Auvergnat gentleman later executed for depredations during the era of the *mauvais garçons* in 1523.<sup>201</sup>

Monluc, who began his military career in 1521 as an archer of the *ordonnances*, quickly decided that his *métier* was as a commander of infantry and later as *maître de camp*.<sup>202</sup> Writing after 1570, he thought that the post of captain in the infantry, like so many others, had been debased by appointment 'at the whim of a monsieur or a madame', as if the post were no more than a minor law post. In his youth the title of captain was honourable and 'gentlemen of good family did not disdain to bear it.' Now, he thought, every ploughman was affecting the name.<sup>203</sup> Most of the captains of *aventuriers* employed in Piedmont during the winter of 1537 were nobles.<sup>204</sup> Many infantry commanders were to be found among the lesser nobility and were often simply known as 'capitaine ...'; the name 'capitaine Lalande' occurs throughout the period to label two distinguished infantry commanders. The Norman Louis de Bigars, always known as 'capitaine Lalande', son of a simple man-at-arms, became commander of an infantry company in 1498 and went on to be *maître d'hôtel du roi*.<sup>205</sup> His better known successor, Eustache de Bimont, known by the same sobriquet, was born at Sancerre but from a family of Picard or Artois origin. He commanded 2000 foot sent to help the King of Denmark in 1519, was commander of 500 at Hesdin in 1522, captain of 1000 men of the Picard legion and defender of Landrecies in 1543. For Brantôme he was 'a brave old

195 D'Auton, II, p. 278, III, pp. 159–60. On Malherbe, see *ibid.*, I, p. 245n.

196 J. Jacquart, *Bayard* (Paris, 1987), pp. 156–7.

197 D'Auton, I, p. 242; IV, p. 159.

198 *Ibid.*, II, p. 42.

199 Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 87.

200 *Ibid.*, I, p. 135.

201 *Ibid.*, and *Bourgeois* (ed. L.), p. 140.

202 Monluc, *Commentaires et lettres*, ed. Ruble, I, p. 47.

203 Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 810.

204 Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 198–231.

205 D'Auton, I, p. 60.

adventurer of war', killed at the siege of Saint-Dizier in 1544.<sup>206</sup> Nor were nobles restricting themselves to positions as officers since many were now even serving as rank-and-file soldiers, though often as double pays.<sup>207</sup> This sometimes looks like the augmentation of the officer cadre of a company, as with the 5 gentlemen of Aix's company in November 1543, who were paid 10 lt. p.m. on top of the simple pay of 5.<sup>208</sup> The Vieilleville biographer recounts that in 1552 a great number of gentlemen volunteers who were unable to afford a horse signed up for the infantry, 'for there were in those days places to honour the nobility in the French bands' so they could learn to fight, paid at 30 lt. p.m. These were appointed by provincial governors to the companies in their charge and were privileged enough not to do ordinary guard duty. Nor did they carry halberds or arquebuses or carry out the disciplinary duties of lower officers, regarding them as 'mechanicals.'<sup>209</sup>

The 1540s and 1550s saw the consolidation of an overall command structure for the French infantry. There was much puzzlement at the end of the 16th century as to when the post of 'colonel' (in command of groups of companies that can be viewed as embryonic regiments) appeared. By 1537, Italian mercenaries in French service were commanded by a single colonel, Giovanni Paolo Orsini, and in 1542 by Gian-Paolo da Cere and Antonio Melloni. In 1543 the count of San Secondo was colonel of all Italian infantry.<sup>210</sup> Nevertheless, the emergence of the rank of 'colonel' of the infantry was a complex affair and it was only in the 1540s that it became more common. There were several 'colonels' of infantry formations in the same period. There was a formation of 10 ensigns of Picard foot under M. de Riou as their colonel<sup>211</sup> and in November 1544, there appeared 8 ensigns of Italians under the count of San Secondo.<sup>212</sup> In July 1545 Genlis was colonel of the 6000 *legionnaires* of Picardy.<sup>213</sup> So, by 1545, there was a system of colonels in being, in command of embryonic regiments of around 10 ensigns (3000 men) or legions of 6000: the old bands of Piedmont, the Picards, the Italians and the legion of Picardy.

Brissac was colonel of the infantry for the siege of Perpignan, though Brantôme thought his command extended to one army only.<sup>214</sup> Then, in April 1543, Jean de Taix was appointed colonel-general of the French infantry in Piedmont in succession to Brissac and in October 1544 this was specified as 'on both sides of the mountains.'<sup>215</sup> From January 1545, we have musters for a number of ensigns of

<sup>206</sup> A. Rozet and J.-F. Lembey, *L'Invasion de la France et le siège de Saint-Dizier par Charles-Quint en 1544* (Paris, 1910), pp. 75–80.

<sup>207</sup> BN fr. 3154, fo. 27v; BN fr. 25793, no. 579.

<sup>208</sup> BN fr. 25792, no. 448; BN fr. 23792, nos. 443, 447.

<sup>209</sup> Vieilleville, p. 543.

<sup>210</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, p. 228; CAF, VII, 317, 24813. AS Modena, Francia B 18, 25 Sept. 1542; CAF, VII, 334, 24910; J. Lestocquoy (ed.), *Correspondance des nonces en France Capodiferrò, Dandino et Guidiccione, 1541–46* (Rome, 1963), pp. 112, 186.

<sup>211</sup> BN fr. 25792, nos. 517, 519.

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.*, nos. 503, 510, 512.

<sup>213</sup> BN fr. 25793, no. 526.

<sup>214</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, pp. 582–3.

<sup>215</sup> CAF, VII, 345, 25972; Pinard, *Chronologie historique-militaire*, III, pp. 480–1; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 192.



French and Gascons of the old bands of Piedmont under M. de Taix, their ‘colonel and capitain-general.’<sup>216</sup> With Taix’s removal after the accession of Henri II, Brantôme thought the post of *colonel-général de l’infanterie* for troops in France and in Italy was divided. Gaspard de Coligny was initially appointed colonel-general of the infantry in France only. Nevertheless, on 29 April 1547 he was appointed ‘colonel and captain-general of all French infantry.’<sup>217</sup> Meanwhile, for Piedmont only, François Gouffier de Bonnivet was appointed colonel general of the French infantry, while Piero Strozzi held the same command for the Italian foot.<sup>218</sup> Continued doubts over the competence of the two commands are shown by the disputes over whether formations which had taken the oath under Coligny and Andelot should have to do so to Bonnivet when moved to Piedmont in 1551. When Bonnivet died of wounds at Volpiano in 1556, his cousin, the vidame de Chartres, succeeded him but had very bad relations with Brissac, the governor, who removed control of military stores and hospitals from him.<sup>219</sup> Coligny was certainly colonel-general of all the French infantry this side of the Alps.<sup>220</sup> It was in 1548 that he drew up the celebrated ordinances for the French infantry, designed to regulate the relations between them and the civilian population and it was these that formed the basis for the royal ordinance on military discipline for the whole country in 1553, which was ordered to be read at the musters in January 1554.<sup>221</sup>

On his promotion as admiral of France in 1552, Coligny retained the post of colonel-general while his brother François d’Andelot (captured at Parma) was in captivity, but on the latter’s release in the truce of 1555 he relinquished it to him.<sup>222</sup> From that point French infantry companies were mustered under Andelot’s overall command.<sup>223</sup>

The idea that the French crown remained wary of forming a permanent national infantry force out of a fear of arming the people is thus largely unwarranted outside some prejudiced remarks by political theorists. The *Bourgeois de Paris* of the 1520s linked the creation of the legions to the wish of Francis I to free himself from dependence on mercenaries, particularly the Swiss.<sup>224</sup> However, opinions were divided about the quality of the new recruits. When the *francs-archers* were levied in 1521, one chronicler reported in Anjou that ‘they did nothing useful for the prince or the people, rather at first attacked the common people, aiming to live idly without working, pillaging the land as though they

<sup>216</sup> Taix as colonel: BN fr. 25792, no. 460; BN fr. 25793, no. 554; BN fr. 25792, no. 513; BN fr. 25792, nos. 509, 511.

<sup>217</sup> *CAH*, I, no. 124 (from du Bouchet, *Preuves de ... Coligny*, pp. 446–7). See also E. Bersier, *Coligny avant les guerres de religion* (Paris, 1884), p. 30.

<sup>218</sup> Villars, p. 512.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 513; *Mémoires de Guise*, p. 434.

<sup>220</sup> Coligny: BN fr. 25795, nos. 91, 93, 107, 117, 130; 1551–2: BN fr. 25796, no. 270; 1553: BN fr. 25797, nos. 314, 315, 356, 357, 359.

<sup>221</sup> Bersier, *Coligny*, pp. 34–5; Henri II, 15 Jan. 1553/4: BN fr. 21541, fo. 11.

<sup>222</sup> 25 Nov. 1552: *CAH*, VI, no. 1210.

<sup>223</sup> BN fr. 25799, nos. 566, 567, 570; BN fr. 25800, nos. 5, 6.

<sup>224</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L), pp. 440–1; (ed. B), pp. 388–9.



were the enemy', some finishing up on the gallows.<sup>225</sup> Fourquevaux supposed that only the worst sort would volunteer, but Brantôme thought these 'young men from the villages, shops, schools, forges and stables' had great potential and could aspire to be the equal of gentlemen once recruited. They seem to have been a mixture of men who had already acquired some experience in the infantry or who were forced to look for employment for various reasons.<sup>226</sup>

With all its faults, a recognisable French infantry did come into being in the middle decades of the 16th century, built essentially on the experience, not of the legions, but of the 'old bands' of volunteer battle-hardened veterans.<sup>227</sup>

<sup>225</sup> Bourdigné, *Histoire agregative* (Bib.II, 93), fo. 197v.

<sup>226</sup> Brantôme, ed. Lalanne, V, pp. 367–8; AN JJ 251, no. 260; JJ 252, nos. 174, 165.

<sup>227</sup> Contamine, 'Naissance de l'infanterie française', p. 85.

## 5

### Foreign Mercenaries in the Service of the King of France

#### The need for foreign troops

When Coligny drew up his infantry regulations in 1550, he prescribed severe punishment for a quarreller in the ranks who ‘gave the cry of a nation.’<sup>1</sup> The French army of the 16th century was obviously a multi-ethnic one. Why? As we have seen, Christine de Pisan recommended that, if the French King lacked men, he should recruit ‘foreign soldiers.’<sup>2</sup> On the other side, we can recall the observations of Machiavelli, Seyssel and Suriano. Thomas More saw France as overrun by mercenaries, even in peacetime, because of the decision to have an army of veterans, though he thought native French levies a match for them if properly trained.<sup>3</sup> Du Bellay observed, on Bicocca, that the Swiss had to be appeased and that ‘you can thus see the problem of having the bulk of an army made up of foreigners.’<sup>4</sup> Soldiers were thought to exemplify national characteristics. For du Bellay, ‘the Spaniard fears death more than any other nation’ because he goes to war for gain and if he sees no gain he will not risk his life.<sup>5</sup> The French were furious in attack but easily bored by long campaigns and wearied by long sieges.<sup>6</sup> It was customary to echo Livy’s formula that the Gauls were more than men at the start of battle and less than women at the end.<sup>7</sup> On the other hand, du Bellay thought French infantry had more stamina for marching than the Germans – ‘better legs than the lansquenets’.<sup>8</sup>

It has been argued that French troops gradually came to outnumber foreigners in the armies of Francis I and Henri II whereas the latter had predominated in the Italian wars. This stretches the case.<sup>9</sup> The figures for the army commanded by Montmorency in Piedmont in 1537 show that the infantry were mainly Germans, three groups of whom amounted to 14,500 men in November. Added to them

<sup>1</sup> Du Bouchet, *Preuves de ... Coligny*, p. 458.

<sup>2</sup> *Livre de la paix*, ed. Willard, p. 133.

<sup>3</sup> More, *Complete Works*, IV, *Utopia*, pp. 63–5.

<sup>4</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 225.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 308.

<sup>6</sup> Machiavelli, ‘Ritratto’, p. 808.

<sup>7</sup> Davis, *Pursuit of Power*, p. 188; Machiavelli, *The Prince*, ch. 26; La Noue, *Discours*, p. 330.

<sup>8</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, p. 128.

<sup>9</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, p. 32; Zeller, *Le Siège de Metz*, pp. 51–2.

were 6597 Italians and 9263 French and Gascons.<sup>10</sup> Besides the poor conventional reputation of some French troops and the need for battle-hardened professionals, one problem may have been mobility. French infantry companies normally did not move far from their home base. For flexibility the crown relied, down to the 1550s, on foreign troops. When the French commander in Piedmont was faced by a serious imperial counter-attack in 1537, it was natural to call on a strong force of Swiss or German infantry to remain ‘master of the country.’<sup>11</sup>

### The Swiss

The Swiss occupied a special place among foreign troops, recruited under treaty relations. Montmorency remarked in 1548 that the alliance with the Swiss was ‘one of the chief sinews of this kingdom,’ though Brantôme remained sour about these ‘tamers of princes’ in the later 16th century. He thought their reputation overblown and pointed to their failure at Marignano, Bicocca, Pavia, Ceresole and Dreux.<sup>12</sup> The links of the Swiss to French service do not go back much further than the later 15th century.<sup>13</sup> The royal guard from 1497 included the *cent-Suisses*, the first Swiss troops to enter the permanent service under a foreign power (the Papal guard goes back to 1506). Their task was to ensure the security of the King’s person and they remained in the service of the French crown until 1792. It was the *cent-Suisses* who, sporting feathers in their caps and armed with halberds, marched before Louis XII on his entry into Pavia in the same year. Their commander was Guillaume de la Marck.<sup>14</sup>

As for larger formations, some Swiss had been brought into France by Jean duke of Calabria in the 1460s and Louis XI levied as many as 6000 for his camp at Pont de l’Arche in 1481. Commynes even thought they regarded Louis as their own King.<sup>15</sup> Charles VIII employed them in his Neapolitan campaign and at Forno in July 1495, where Commynes describes them as ‘hope of the army’, acting as the King’s guard the night after the battle.<sup>16</sup> At the siege of Novara, two large formations of 10,000 and 12,000 Swiss converged for French service, with wives and children, though only 12,000 had been summoned. Commynes thought that such a large force had never left the mountains before and that Switzerland was denuded of troops. Why, he asked, had so many Swiss turned up? The main reason was

<sup>10</sup> BN fr. 3058, fos. 35–74, pr. in full in Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 197–231. See also AN J 967, nos. 8/6 and 8/10.

<sup>11</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, p. 403

<sup>12</sup> Pariset, ‘La France et les princes allemands’, p. 247, but see Montmorency’s sour remarks about them as early as 28 June 1522: Decrue, *Montmorency ... grand maître*, p. 22; Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 261.

<sup>13</sup> Baron Zur-Landen, *Histoire militaire des Suisses au service de la France* (Paris, 1751–3).

<sup>14</sup> D’Auton, III, p. 29.

<sup>15</sup> Commynes, II, pp. 285, 302.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, III, pp. 181, 196. Commynes alternates between using the term ‘Suisses’ and ‘Alemants.’ Cp. D’Auton’s ‘dix mille Allemans qui estoient venus du pays des Ligues’ (IV, p. 162).

poverty and he feared a large levy since this would put the King into their control. As a result, they were not all accepted for service.<sup>17</sup> Commynes' fears were justified in October 1495 when the treaty was concluded with the duke of Milan and the Swiss mutinied. His description of this is classic: formed up in their cantons, they beat their drums and formed rings; some wanted to take the King hostage, others to compel him to pay the three months' pay that, by tradition, they received as conduct money. Charles VIII managed to escape but eventually, in November 1495, had to agree to three months' pay for the late comers, amounting to 500,000 lt.<sup>18</sup> Again, in 1500, when time came for the muster of 3500 Swiss who had fought at Forlì, the threat of going over to Ludovico Sforza extracted six weeks' pay from the French *commis*.<sup>19</sup> At Pisa in June 1500, their demand to be paid before they would return to the assault ruined the siege, since their departure removed a third of the French army. Such troubles were frequent in those years.<sup>20</sup>

Like all mercenary forces, they had a distinctive reputation. Commynes in 1495 describes them in glowing terms: 'I never saw so many fine men; it seemed to me impossible to have defeated them, except by hunger, cold or other need.' The 2–3000 who served the King in Naples and on into 1496 he considered deeply loyal; others rather less so.<sup>21</sup> Monluc was to write that they were 'real men of war, the ramparts of an army; but they must have their money.'<sup>22</sup> They repeatedly precipitated battle in order to finish campaigns and sometimes brought disaster on their commanders, as at Cerignola in 1503 and at La Bicocca in 1522.<sup>23</sup> The Swiss regarded French infantry as poor when they clashed with them and thought themselves equal to two Frenchmen. A savage fight in a queue between a Swiss and the Frenchman, witnessed by d'Auton in 1507, was pacified, but the Swiss continued to say that 'without the help of their Leagues the French cavalry would have no sure backing from their infantry, who are unsteady in battle, break up easily and [are] difficult to rally.' It was true, he thought, that the Swiss were steadier on the battlefield, were hard to break and better at rallying, 'but even so, they are often difficult over payment, often restive and at need quick to pillage.' Indeed, on this campaign, though paid promptly, it was reported that they demanded all kinds of extras for their servants and female camp followers.<sup>24</sup> At Barletta in 1502, newly arrived by sea from Lombardy, many of them delightedly fell on the vineyards as the grapes ripened early in Apulia; they were picked off by the watchful Spanish skirmishers.<sup>25</sup>

They were famous for a dogged determination to attack on the field but also disliked siege warfare. At Novara in 1522, they told Montmorency, when instructed to assault the place, that 'they were ready to fight in open battle but assaulting

<sup>17</sup> Commynes, III, pp. 224, 238–9; *Ord.*, XX, p. 493 (5 Feb. 1496).

<sup>18</sup> Commynes, III, pp. 244–5.

<sup>19</sup> D'Auton, I, pp. 195–6.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 310–11, 380; II, p. 125; IV, p. 157.

<sup>21</sup> Commynes, III, pp. 239, 267, 269.

<sup>22</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 32.

<sup>23</sup> D'Auton, III, p. 170; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 225.

<sup>24</sup> D'Auton, IV, pp. 237–9, 243–4.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, III, p. 11.

places was not their trade.<sup>26</sup> Martin du Bellay observed of their defence of Mondovì (Piedmont) in 1543 that they were ‘unseasoned for garrison work.’<sup>27</sup> Nevertheless, their esprit de corps was such that, when in February 1524 a company of 200 were massacred after surrender at Binasco, their compatriots demanded of Bonnavet that they be allowed to fight ‘evil war’ and kill all prisoners in revenge.<sup>28</sup> They were also expensive and difficult to discipline.<sup>29</sup>

Access to the Swiss involved direct negotiations with the Cantons. When Louis XII sent his army into Lombardy in 1499, he planned to have 5–6000 Swiss as part of a complement of 17,000 foot. His envoys to the Leagues had to counter the rival offers of Ludovico il Moro and were asked for 20,000 florins as a first quarter’s payment. In March 1500, one troop of 1800 Valesiens in three ‘bands’ and another of 1000 are reported.<sup>30</sup> Figures are often exaggerated in the period and the 10,000 men Louis XII was thought to have raised for the re-conquest of Milan in 1500 are a wild exaggeration, especially in view of his poor relations with the Leagues at the time. These were caused by the manoeuvres of the Cantons to withdraw their men while they bargained for their own advantage.<sup>31</sup> Nevertheless, there were Swiss on both sides at Novara in April 1500 (around 3500 in French service) and it was their unwillingness to fight each other that destroyed Sforza’s army and led to his capture.<sup>32</sup> More were raised to bolster the French infantry despatched to Naples in 1501 and again in 1502.<sup>33</sup> In the following years they figured in all major French armies.<sup>34</sup> In the Genoa campaign of 1507, though Louis had commissioned Duras to raise 10,000 Swiss, there were actually 4000. However, the terms agreed with the Leagues involved some uncertainty over whether they could be used against the Genoese and one troop of 3500 refused to march until ordered to do so by the Cantons. In the attack on the ‘bastillon’ some accounts have them refusing to move at first, claiming in their ‘ring’ they never attacked up hill (!) and then demanding cavalry support. They attacked only after elaborate ceremonies of kissing the ground, crossing themselves and lowering their pikes, waiting on one knee until the time to fight. On the King’s ceremonial arrival at the camp, though, they put on a grand display, their great drums beating and going down on bended knee in salute.<sup>35</sup>

A French agent in Switzerland around this time reported a ‘great press of soldiers who wanted to enter your service’ but the anti-French war chief, Matthias

<sup>26</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 220.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, p. 189.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 307.

<sup>29</sup> Zeller, *Le Siège de Metz*, p. 55. See also J. Bodin, *Les Suisses au service du roi de France* (Paris, 1988).

<sup>30</sup> D’Auton, I, pp. 347, 351–2; Pelissier, *Louis XII et Ludovic Sforza*, p. 396, but see the correction by Lot, *Recherches*, p. 27.

<sup>31</sup> C. Kohler, *Les Suisses dans les guerres d’Italie de 1506 à 1512* (Geneva, 1896), pp. 8–9; S. Frey, *Le guerre milanese*, in R.M. Feldman and H.G. Wirtz (eds), *Storia militare svizzera*, 12 vols (Berne, 1915–36), fasc. 2; D’Auton, I, pp. 246–7; Lot, *Recherches*, p. 28.

<sup>32</sup> D’Auton, I, pp. 260–1.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 13; III, pp. 10, 28.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.*, III, pp. 56, 192; Lot, *Recherches*, p. 32.

<sup>35</sup> D’Auton, IV, pp. 157, 162, 178, 197–8, 215, 222–3; Lemonnier, *Les Guerres d’Italie*, pp. 78–9.

Schiner, cardinal of Sion, was working to disturb the levy.<sup>36</sup> Sure enough, in the diplomatic contortions that followed, with the construction of the Holy League by Julius II (1511–12), the cardinal won the Leagues to the alliance against France. The disaster of Novara and the subsequent invasion of Burgundy by Swiss troops demanding several thousand écus due to them for service over previous years marks the lowest point of French handling of the Swiss.<sup>37</sup>

The Swiss, despised by Bayard as ‘cheese-makers,’ remained the enemies of France in 1513–15. On the eve of Marignano, though, a treaty had been drafted at Gallarate by which they were to agree to evacuate Lombardy except Bellinzona, in return for 1 million écus (with 150,000 as down-payment).<sup>38</sup> France would be able to recruit as many troops as were needed in return for an annual subsidy to each Canton of 2000 lt. In the event, the Cantons were divided and so it failed. The main change after Marignano was the establishment of formal treaty relations with the Cantons. The peace signed at Geneva on 7 November 1515 was opposed by the pro-Habsburg Cantons and so unworkable. The ‘perpetuel peace’ of Fribourg (November 1516) settled outstanding quarrels and talks started in 1519 for a convention on military service.<sup>39</sup> In January 1520, the terms were mapped out and a treaty signed in May 1521 (renewed in 1549).<sup>40</sup> The terms ensured the supply of Swiss in return for an annual pension. They committed the Cantons to supply between 6000 and 18,000 men at need and, in return, they received the protection of France against their enemies. The Swiss were to serve as allies and auxiliaries and retain control of their own formations, the Cantons reserving the right to recall them at need. They were to have their own *règlements*, judges and banners.<sup>41</sup> France thereafter usually had two envoys resident in Switzerland, one with the thirteen cantons and the other in the territory of the allied Grey Leagues, another vital source of supply for men.

Such reliance on quasi-independent forces might seem surprising, especially in the light of practical problems, their poor behaviour and hard bargaining. Their first major campaign under Francis I was around Valenciennes in October 1521. The King had raised a substantial force and, as usual, they were pressing him to give battle. Du Bellay remarked charitably that this was ‘to demonstrate their willingness to serve him’ and because their alliance was not yet well founded.<sup>42</sup> Worse was to come. The Swiss were employed in the defence of Lombardy in the summer of 1521 and Lautrec sent for another 8000, bringing their total complement to nearly 20,000.<sup>43</sup> However, discontented by October over lack of pay, some of them deserted to the enemy and the rest went home. Their unreliability played its part in the loss of the city of Milan.<sup>44</sup> Francis I therefore had to raise another army

<sup>36</sup> BN fr. 3030, fo. 63.

<sup>37</sup> E. Rott, *Histoire de la représentation diplomatique de la France auprès des cantons suisses* (Berne, 1900), I, pp. 190–5.

<sup>38</sup> Barrillon, I, pp. 102–8.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 207–17, 236–45.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 154–5, 165, 185; Dumont, *Corps universel diplomatique*, I.iv, p. 133.

<sup>41</sup> Bodin, *Les Suisses au service de France*, pp. 65–85.

<sup>42</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 163, 170.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 183, 191.

<sup>44</sup> BN fr. 2992, fos. 106–7, BN fr. 2978, fos. 188, 191; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 193–4.

in mid-winter and sent a high-level delegation to raise 16,000 men.<sup>45</sup> These were ready to move by early February, delayed according to their French commanders, by severe snows in the Alpine passes. Though they were described a 'fine, strong company', the French commanders feared that, should their pay be delayed a single day, they might go over to the enemy and also hold them prisoner 'until full payment.'<sup>46</sup> The observation was prescient. Their determination to give battle or leave proved as disastrous as it had at Marignano. At La Bicocca in April 1522 the Swiss constituted the bulk of the infantry in Lautrec's army, according to Swiss and Italian sources amounting to 15,000 out of the 30,000-strong Franco-Venetian army. The reality is that they stood at a maximum of 10,000 out of a force of 14,000 (since the Venetian army did not join in the battle). Nominally, they were under the command of two French captains, Pont-Remy and Montmorency, though it is obvious that they were impossible to command.<sup>47</sup> As at Cerignola in 1503, badly paid and exhausted by operations over the previous months, they demanded an attack on Prospero Colonna's position in order to be finished with the campaign; they were severely mauled. The following day the remaining Swiss marched off home and the French army crumbled. Their casualties are put at between 3000 and 4000 and 17 captains dead and the battle proved decisive in destroying French power in northern Italy.<sup>48</sup> Not surprisingly, at Ceresole in 1544, Enghien was anxious to get the pay of his Swiss troops ordered 'for he feared that, in the event of battle, they would refuse to fight for lack of pay.' The failure of adequate sums to get through in time led him to pretend to the troops that the funds were ready for delivery after the imminent battle.<sup>49</sup> Nor were the Swiss content simply with waiting for their musters. They took the view that, after a campaign, the pay of their dead comrades, along with any money lent to them, would be lost. They therefore tended to insist on receiving the pay of battle casualties.<sup>50</sup> In 1557, the regiment of Swiss brought from Piedmont to Calais insisted on an extra muster in order to ensure that deaths of men on the journey did not result in the captains' loss. Henri II told his agent 'to strike the best bargain he can, without any omission by which, after their return, they might raise a just argument.'<sup>51</sup>

As for command, the Swiss had their own captains but were often commanded by French nobles whom they knew and trusted. Thus at Genoa (1507), they nominated Jean de Bessey, gruyer of Burgundy, as 'captain-general.'<sup>52</sup> They seem to have been paid on a different basis from other mercenary formations, presumably because their services were obtained under treaty conditions. Firstly, the *cent-Suisses* of the royal guard were a permanent feature of the King's military household. As for large corps of Swiss infantry, the Swiss confederation was paid

<sup>45</sup> Rott, *Représentation*, I, pp. 256–61; Decrue, *Montmorency... grand maître*, pp. 20–2; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 205.

<sup>46</sup> BL Egerton 26, fo. 51.

<sup>47</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, p. 47; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 220–1.

<sup>48</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 44–5.

<sup>49</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, pp. 201, 206.

<sup>50</sup> BN fr. 20525, fo. 40 (BL Add. 38032, fo. 339r, copy); BN fr. 20641, fo. 61; BL Add. 38032, fo. 361r.

<sup>51</sup> 29 Sept. 1542: AS Modena, Francia, B 18; BN Cangé 6, fos. 22, 25, 27.

<sup>52</sup> D'Auton, IV, p. 182.



a retainer, administered through an official known as the *trésorier des ligues*. The amount varied but in peak years exceeded 1 million lt. In the late 1520s, the Swiss regiment raised for active service was being allocated 100,000 écus per quarter to acquit their arrears.<sup>53</sup> Swiss infantrymen were paid a slightly higher rate than other soldiers under the crown. They received 3 écus p.m. which in the 1520s rated 6 lt. 15s. (simple lansquenets received 6 lt.). There was also an assumption that they would be paid one month's pay in the event of a battle.<sup>54</sup>

The projected campaign in Italy in 1523 was indecisive.<sup>55</sup> According to an official bulletin, there were to be 30,000 Swiss, lansquenets and Italians not counting adventurers.<sup>56</sup> This is highly exaggerated, though the Swiss constituted the largest single body in the infantry at Pavia.<sup>57</sup> In 1536–7, though the bulk of foreign troops employed were Germans under Fürstenberg and Wurtemberg, Francis sought to raise 18,000 Swiss for the Artois campaign. There were also 6000 Swiss raised for Piedmont in 1537, under the command of the count of Tende, and at the end of the campaign 13 of their captains were retained on 27 écus p.m.<sup>58</sup> In the spring of 1542, Annebault left for the Italian campaign with 8000 Swiss out of a force of 20,000 foot. Four ensigns remained in Piedmont and came close to mutiny for lack of funds, having to be loaned 500 écus per company.<sup>59</sup> The rest joined the army that Annebault led to the siege of Perpignan. The exact numbers are uncertain, though Hans Picher had been commissioned as their captain-general in August.<sup>60</sup> One regiment had to be dismissed because of massive looting during the Perpignan campaign, though 22 ensigns were freshly levied for service in Picardy in August.<sup>61</sup> There is no evidence of Swiss in the King's army at Maroilles in 1543 but, faced by del Vasto's attack in Piedmont in November 1543, the King ordered the recruitment of 5000 men by the count of Gruyère to join the 5000 Swiss regularly stationed there. Martin du Bellay thought little of them, remarking that 'it's not easy to disguise a donkey as a courser.'<sup>62</sup> At Ceresole, 3400 Swiss in 13 ensigns formed the core of 'battle' of the French army. Like du Bellay, Monluc regarded the Gruyère men of the *arrière-garde* (on the left) as useless. On the other hand, though these had buckled and fled, the other Swiss had contributed largely to winning the battle.<sup>63</sup>

There were no less than 48 newly-raised Swiss ensigns in July 1544 under the command of Etampes as colonel-general, with Clermont-Dampierre in charge of the Grisons. Thus, at the Jalons camp, the royal army included 10,000 Swiss and

<sup>53</sup> BN fr. 3039, fo. 16.

<sup>54</sup> Des Monstiers Mérinville, *Fraisse*, pp. 31, 177.

<sup>55</sup> BN fr. 3897, fo. 244.

<sup>56</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. B), p. 119; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 282.

<sup>57</sup> 'Lannoy to Marguerite', 25 Feb. 1525, pr. *ABSHF*, 1 (1863), p. 45.

<sup>58</sup> *CAF*, VIII, 154, 30682; 28, 29483; 40, 29601; 79, 29955; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, p. 429.

<sup>59</sup> Desjardins, *Négociations*, III, pp. 23–5; BN it. 1715, fol. 333; Tausserat-Radel, *Correspondance ... Pellicier*, pp. 666–7.

<sup>60</sup> *CAF*, VII, 330, 24891; 25 Sept., 5 Oct. 1542: AS Modena, Francia, B 18.

<sup>61</sup> *CAF*, VII, 330, 25889.

<sup>62</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 192.

<sup>63</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, pp. 163–8.

6000 Grisons.<sup>64</sup> Their numbers were rumoured to be between 20,000 and 30,000 when the time came for their return march in October, though in fact there were only 32 ensigns. When encamped between Montreuil and Saint-Riquier, it was observed that they were holding the King's envoy, Boisrigault, hostage for their payment.<sup>65</sup> By this period, the chief agent for recruiting and commanding the Swiss was captain Frohlich, scheduled to raise 6000 men in 1545 and again active in Piedmont in 1552–3, when they were reported to be in an 'strange humour.'<sup>66</sup> There seem to have been no Swiss in the army of the 'voyage d'Allemagne' in 1552, which included a very large force of lansquenets. 6000 Swiss arrived late and were employed in the defence of the kingdom during the campaign.<sup>67</sup> Swiss nevertheless served in Piedmont under Brissac (regiments of 3–4000 under Fourquevaux) and then in Parma under Strozzi. Their service was negotiated in the Grisons by the wily French diplomat Jean de Fraisse. He assured their first muster but the money he had sent via Venetian territory (23,000 écus) was captured by the enemy. This forced Piero Strozzi to retreat and suffer a defeat, during which the Grisons troops took heavy casualties. The anger at this mismanagement left Fraisse under siege by an angry mob at Coire. The Constable dismissed their grievances as a 'storm,' which was simply designed to get more money out of the King and expressed outrage at the indignity offered to the King's representative.<sup>68</sup> The French army entered the 1560s with a significant Swiss component still in place, which had been seriously diluted by its German competitors.

### The Germans: Lansquenets

The great rivals of the Swiss were the German pike-men, known as lansquenets in France after the name they were given under the Emperor Maximilian (*Landsknechten*).<sup>69</sup> For mid-16th century France, Germany was 'store-house of your forces'.<sup>70</sup> It was not necessarily the areas of recruitment that defined lansquenets, since the Swiss were often referred to as 'Allemans' and in the early years, lansquenets could be raised in Guelders but also in the upper Rhine and Swabia, the Vaud and Savoy. Under Louis XI, it was argued that no troops 'of the French tongue' (from Savoy or Lorraine) or indeed anyone of Maximilian's 'party', be included in German companies.<sup>71</sup> Nor were some lansquenet regiments without recruits from Switzerland proper, as the career of Niklaus Guldi of Saint Gallen

<sup>64</sup> Pinard, *Chronologie*, III, p. 562; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, pp. 240-1.

<sup>65</sup> AM Senlis, BB5, fo. 15r.

<sup>66</sup> Leblanc, 'Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron', p. 34; Villars, pp. 611, 656, 660.

<sup>67</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 129–33.

<sup>68</sup> Des Monstiers Mérinville, *Fraisse*, pp. 26–32, 198.

<sup>69</sup> D. Potter, 'Les Allemands et les armées françaises au XVIe siècle. Jean Philippe Rhinegrave, chef de lansquenets: étude suivie de sa correspondance en France, 1548–1566', *Francia*, 20.ii (1993), 1–19, introduction; 21.ii (1994), 1–62.

<sup>70</sup> *Vieilleville*, p. 537.

<sup>71</sup> BN fr. 2900, fo. 18.

shows.<sup>72</sup> Later, the middle Rhine and the borderlands of Lorraine as well as lower Saxony became important recruiting territory.

Germans were above all paid as reliable shock troops, though the conventional wisdom was that they were not useful in siege operations.<sup>73</sup> In the 1490s, there was already an established grudge between them and the Swiss on the battlefield; Commynes reported in 1496 that they ‘naturally hate the Swiss and vice versa.’<sup>74</sup> They already had the reputation of being difficult to control if not paid regularly, since Bayard remarked that ‘it is not easy to keep them in peace just with promises, which they think poor cheer.’<sup>75</sup> Bayard was also reported as saying: ‘Tell your lansquenets rogues that I would rather give them a noose to hang themselves.’<sup>76</sup> Like the Swiss, they expected lavish pay in advance. In April 1515 on the eve of Francis I’s departure for Italy, 8000 Gelderlandes were ready to march but had to be promised three months’ pay in advance before they would move.<sup>77</sup> Brantôme later recalled that they were ‘very apt to mutiny ... great spendthrifts ... ravagers and wasters,’ and, indeed at Caen in 1513, during the famous *journée des lansquenets*, those troops employed for the defence of Normandy against the English went on the rampage.<sup>78</sup> Their reputation for loutishness towards the civil population was spelled out in great detail by Italian observers in 1544–6.<sup>79</sup> In 1552, during the desertion of Margrave Albrecht of Brandenburg’s troops, the duke of Guise lamented reliance on ‘such a nation, whose infidelity is well proved.’ Castelnau, reflecting on their service in the civil wars, thought that ‘it is a dangerous thing to call on foreigners of a different religion ... who only want the continuation of our civil wars.’<sup>80</sup> Lansquenets were notoriously independent of mind and unprepared to put up with poor conditions. Pushed too far, they were apt to form committees and intimidate the royal commissioners. Even their own commanders were wary of them. Roggen-dorf in 1562, for instance, needing to get his men to agree the articles he had signed, put off discussions to a morning, remarking that ‘negotiation with the rank-and-file should not be left until after dinner.’<sup>81</sup> The difficulties in managing lansquenets were paralleled within the armies of the Emperor Charles V, who, if anything, experienced more prodigious horrors at their hands.<sup>82</sup>

Why, then, were they employed? From the time of Caen in 1513, opinions about

<sup>72</sup> Commynes, III, p. 267; T. Schiess, *Drei St. Galler Reisläufer* (St. Gallen, 1906).

<sup>73</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, p. 131; Potter, ‘Les Allemands et les armées françaises’, *passim*. F. Blau, *Die deutsche Landsknechte* (Görlitz, 1882); H.M. Möller, *Das Regiment der Landsknechte* (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp. 14–35.

<sup>74</sup> Commynes, III, p. 267.

<sup>75</sup> *L’Amateur d’autographes*, ed. G., J., E. and N. Charavay, ser. 1–2, nos. 1–422 (Paris, 1862–92; 1898–1914), ser. 1, 17 (1862), p. 266.

<sup>76</sup> Spont, ‘Marignan et l’Organisation militaire’, p. 61.

<sup>77</sup> Sanuto, *Diarii*, XX, p. 220.

<sup>78</sup> Brantôme, ed. Lalanne, VI, pp. 220–7.

<sup>79</sup> Rozet and Lembey, *L’Invasion de la France*, pp. 684, 695, 717; Navagero, 1546: Firpo, *Relazioni*, II, pp. 471–2.

<sup>80</sup> Zeller, *Le Siège de Metz*, p. 171; Michel de Castelnau, *Mémoires*, ed. J. Le Laboureur, 3 vols (Brussels, 1731), I, p. 114.

<sup>81</sup> BN fr. 15876, fos. 308–9, 310–11.

<sup>82</sup> J.D. Tracy, *Emperor Charles V, Impresario of War* (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 32–6.

them were highly critical but their solidity under attack made them essential for any major army.<sup>83</sup> Fundamentally, the reason was that they provided, for the most part, a reservoir of trained and battle-hardened troops who could be hired without the expense of keeping a constantly trained body of native troops in being. With the Swiss sometimes enemies to France after 1509, their services were welcome and, though Maximilian tried to stop them entering French service, they did so in numbers in July 1512.<sup>84</sup> Gaston de Foix claimed to have 6000 in his army and they seemed at least to have formed a stiffening corps of 2000 men in the right wing of his army at Ravenna in 1512.<sup>85</sup> In March 1513 another force marched through Champagne on its way to Italy, commanded by 'count Wolf'. The corps of 7500 that formed part of the French expedition of 1513,<sup>86</sup> commanded by La Marck and Tavannes, was more formidable. However, in a classic surprise attack by the Swiss, fighting for Maximilian Sforza at Novara, they were completely routed, leaving a lasting enmity between the two mercenary 'nations'.<sup>87</sup>

Their role grew at the start of Francis I's reign, when the duke of Guelders not only supplied 6000 men but was appointed 'captain general of lansquenets' in the royal army of Marignano.<sup>88</sup> His lieutenant was Jean de Tavannes, another commander of German origin, naturalised in 1518.<sup>89</sup> The young Claude de Lorraine count (later duke) of Guise, was to serve on foot alongside his uncle the duke of Guelders.<sup>90</sup> The independent princely family of La Marck also specialised in their command.<sup>91</sup> In 1516 Florange succeeded his kinsman, Guillaume de La Marck, in this role.<sup>92</sup> For the Marignan campaign, Bubenberg's troop of 3500, already in France, was reviewed at Lyon in July 1515 along with 5500–6000 Gelderlanders known as the 'black band'.<sup>93</sup> These were 'Low German' Gelderlanders commanded by Tavannes. When serving as infantry (rather than the 'Cleves horse') they were thought of as less disciplined than the 'High Germans' from the Upper Rhine/Swabia region. Du Bellay, though, noted that they were 'a fighting unit for twenty years' and they continued until Pavia.<sup>94</sup> There was a particularly intensive drive to recruit men in Germany in 1515. Barrillon's estimates reached as high as 23,000, confirmed roughly by an English spy, who reported 16,000 lansquenets and 6000 Gelderlanders.<sup>95</sup> A printed German pamphlet of the time details them:

<sup>83</sup> Potter, 'Les Allemands et les armées françaises', introduction.

<sup>84</sup> Spont, 'Marignan et l'organisation militaire', p. 61, after 'AM Châlon, EE (1498–1634)'.

<sup>85</sup> J. Godefroy, *Lettres du Roy Louis XII et du Cardinal G. d'Amboise ... depuis 1504 jusques et compris 1514*, 4 vols (Brussels, 1712), III, pp. 181, 200; Lot, *Recherches*, p. 35.

<sup>86</sup> Spont, 'Marignan et l'organisation militaire', p. 62; BN fr. 647, fo. 56; E. Gagliardi, *Novara und Dijon* (Zürich, 1907); Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 12.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 27–8.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 61.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 27.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 61–2.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 12.

<sup>92</sup> BN fr. 25720, fo. 50 (*CAF*, I, 87, 513).

<sup>93</sup> BN nafr. 1483, p. 30; Sanuto, *Diarii*, XX, p. 220.

<sup>94</sup> C. Lanz, *Korrespondenz des Kaiser Karl V aus dem Konglichen Archiv ... zu Brussel*, 3 vols (Leipzig, 1844–6), II, pp. 264–7; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 66.

<sup>95</sup> Barrillon, I, p. 68; BL Cotton, Vitellius B II, fo. 192.

12,000 pikes, 2000 arquebusiers, 2000 ‘men with two handed swords (*zweihander schlachtschwert*)’, 800 halberdiers, in total 17,000.<sup>96</sup> The battle of Marignano was a clash between lansquenets and Swiss, roughly equal in numbers (even though the Swiss were outnumbered by the French army). That the lansquenets held firm around the artillery decided the outcome of the battle after the break-up of the French infantry. But paying them off and sending them home after the battle was a problem. On this occasion the money was available but they began their return march discontented with their treatment and there was much anxiety about the route of their return through eastern France.<sup>97</sup>

In the 1520s, lansquenets were still raised, even though access to Swiss troops had been placed on a stable basis and experience with the Germans was distinctly mixed. Bonnivet went to Navarre in 1521 with 6000 raised by count Wolfgang and captain Brandhec (probably of Swiss origin, commanding 2500).<sup>98</sup> Guise, now something of a specialist in raising such troops through his contacts in Lorraine, was in overall charge.<sup>99</sup> Another corps, at the camp of Attigny on the northern frontier in 1521, were noted ‘poorest men you ever saw.’<sup>100</sup> 800 ‘lansquenez of Picardy’ and about the same number who had been serving in Guyenne were drafted to Bonnivet’s army in Italy in 1523, along with 6000 under Richard de La Pole.<sup>101</sup> They also served for frontier defence in Picardy in 1523 and Champagne in 1524 and under the Count of Vaudemont in 1525.<sup>102</sup> In addition, there were roughly 5–6000 lansquenets out of around 26,000 foot in Francis I’s army at Pavia in 1525, again commanded by Richard de la Pole and also François de Lorraine, Vaudemont’s brother. They were overwhelmed by the imperial Landsknechts.<sup>103</sup>

With the reopening of war in Italy and the march of Lautrec’s forces towards Naples in the spring of 1528, along with 10,000 Swiss, there was a new levy of 6000 lansquenets, once again led by Vaudemont.<sup>104</sup> Men were already being raised in September 1527, shortly after Francis I’s decision to move in Italy. 2000 under Count Volf were at Bassigny ‘without money, on the rampage.’ The duke of Guise was to shepherd them through Champagne.<sup>105</sup> From Dijon in March 1528, Admiral Chabot remarked on Lautrec’s progress:

As you will see, things are not much further forward. There is some practice for getting some of the captains and soldiers who are being raised in Germany.

<sup>96</sup> Harkensee, *Marignano*, p. 72.

<sup>97</sup> Spont, ‘Marignan et l’Organisation militaire’, p. 73, report of La Trémoille; Vaissière, *Une Correspondance de famille*, pp. 24–5.

<sup>98</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 127, 154, 20.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 127.

<sup>100</sup> BN fr. 3060, fos. 20, 32.

<sup>101</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. B), pp. 118–19; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 282.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 253 (1523); BN fr. 5500, fo. 264v; BL Cotton, Calig. D VIII, fo. 299; BN fr. 25788, no. 215.

<sup>103</sup> ‘Lannoy to Marguerite’, 25 Feb. 1525, pr. *ABSHF*, 1 (1863), p. 45; Champollion-Figeac, *Captivité*, p. 78; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 320, 354.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 50–2.

<sup>105</sup> BN fr. 3066, pp. 123, 135–6. The explanation was probably the embezzlement of 900 écus by Bastien Zeller (BL Egerton 22, fo. 235).

And then he asked what the King had done about the money to pay them on their arrival.<sup>106</sup> Later in the month he reported that it would be possible to raise 5000 good men who would be at Bar-le-duc in 15 days.<sup>107</sup> While the fate of Saint-Pol's army in Italy hung in the balance in the spring of 1529, new levies of lansquenets were made. In June, Chabot was again occupied with arranging the passage of lansquenets. One such 'band', which seems to have been of 4000 men, would not march on until their arrears were paid and could only be appeased with 'supplies for the march.'<sup>108</sup> Guise reported in May that, while 2000 men raised by Chabot were on their way from Champagne to Lyon to march into Italy, agents sent into Germany in his name 'had done their duty poorly and could not do what they intended.' Instead of 1000 men as promised, one captain came to say that, since the word had gone out so late, a very fine company had been enticed over to the Emperor's service. Guise himself insisted that he had been sent no money. Money was of the essence, since 'you know what a nation they are.'<sup>109</sup>

The musters of these companies indicate that by June there were two levies of 6000 men each, raised by Guise and Keuringen and in turn commanded by Brumbach and Gultiger. The companies of Vince (154 men) and Blondel were 'recently arrived' in April, and were joined by another company of 200 in May. They were joined by further companies in June, with the result that for the first time we can gain a precise idea of the structure of a lansquenet levy.<sup>110</sup> Whatever the size of the company, and this could be between 400 and 500, the number of 'double pays' was constant at 50, with a similar number of arquebusiers per company. Eventually 4000 lansquenets were led into Italy by Montejean, but only 2500 seem to have remained in French service by June and there were only 1500 commanded by Niccolò de Rustici on the field at Landriano, when Saint-Pol was decisively defeated.<sup>111</sup>

Lansquenets were raised through a network of agents, who included princes of the Empire such as the dukes of Wurtemberg and Guelders and lesser imperial counts and lords with contacts in the Rhineland or the north. It was a major task of French diplomats to maintain this network and ensure the smooth recruitment of troops when needed. In May 1547, faced with the Emperor's triumph in Germany, Henri II ordered fresh measures to maintain contact with his German allies and pensioners.<sup>112</sup> At the end of the wars in 1559, with talk of peace in the balance, French envoys to the Reichstag were besieged by the King's 'servants and pensioners' eager to know what employment they would get in the coming season.<sup>113</sup> The loyalties of imperial princes did not preclude their seeking employment elsewhere and the King of France was able to pose as the protector of German liberties. As Guillaume du Bellay observed in 1536, 'the

<sup>106</sup> BN fr. 3067, p. 39.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 45.

<sup>108</sup> BN fr. 3066, p. 51; 27 June [1529]: *ibid.*, pp. 63–5; 7 July [1529], La Fère: *ibid.*, p. 79.

<sup>109</sup> BN fr. 6635, fo. 47; BN fr. 3049, fo. 19.

<sup>110</sup> BN fr. 25789, nos. 243, 244, 251, 252.

<sup>111</sup> BL Egerton 25, fo. 89; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, p. 101.

<sup>112</sup> HNSA, Frankreich 14, Berichte 1547, V, fo. 59.

<sup>113</sup> *Mémoires de Guise*, p. 417.



King's money flows better than the Emperor's.<sup>114</sup> Josef Truchsess von Rhein-elden declared in court at Innsbruck in 1536 that 'as an honourable member of the nobility he has had to seek a living for ten years abroad, that he had not fought against the Emperor while serving the King of France and furthermore, it was permissible to him as a free member of the German nobility to go where he could make a living.'<sup>115</sup>

Princes and nobles were often paid pensions and retainers in order to exploit their contacts for recruitment but they were not employed as completely independent military entrepreneurs.<sup>116</sup> The most prominent in the 1530s was Count Wilhelm of Fürstenberg, imperial count and margrave in south-west Germany. Fürstenberg, though he had served France in 1521 and the Emperor in 1523,<sup>117</sup> had passed into the service of Philip of Hesse and the Schmalkaldic League in 1529. Despite his Protestantism, he had quarrelled with Philip over arrears of pay and been retained in the King's service in 1534.<sup>118</sup> In the following year, one of du Bellay's tasks was to settle the quarrel between the Landgrave, a crucial French ally, and Fürstenberg.<sup>119</sup> The latter had a reputation as one of the great warriors of his age, a great fighter and drinker, a manager of troops, turbulent and quarrelsome; he was described by Marguerite of Navarre as 'as fine and bold a gentleman as ever was in Germany' and by Brantôme as a great and brave captain but too given to pillage and untrustworthy. A German chronicler said he was a 'wonderful satyr', fluent in French but seldom writing it.<sup>120</sup> Fürstenberg's retainer of 6750 lt.<sup>121</sup> was surpassed only by that of Johann Wilhelm of Saxony's 15,000 lt. 'to entertain the said lord in good will.' Margrave Albrecht of Brandenburg was negotiating for new terms in 1554 and threatening that, should the King refuse his terms, he would easily find other employment. The French agent thought it would be difficult to keep him with 8000 écus of pension.<sup>122</sup> On the lower level, individual captains received a wide range of pensions.<sup>123</sup> One was captain Hans of Breda, who acted as a liaison between the King, Wurtemberg and Fürstenberg in 1537.<sup>124</sup> Once they had recruited their men, commanders were paid as captains in the King's armies by agents of the crown.<sup>125</sup> Royal commissions were issued to conduct the troops to their assembly points and to ensure victuals were avail-

<sup>114</sup> BN Dupuy 269, fos. 22–3.

<sup>115</sup> R. Peter, 'Les Lansquenets dans les armées du roi. Le Capitaine-Général Guillaume de Fürstenberg', in *Charles Quint, le Rhin et la France: droit savant et droit pénal à l'époque de Charles-Quint*, Actes des journées d'études de Strasbourg, 2–3 mars 1973 (Strasbourg, 1973), p. 97; Calvin, *Plaidoyers*, ed. Peter, introduction.

<sup>116</sup> Agreement with the duke of Guelders, 14 Oct. 1534: BN fr. 23037, fos. 33–7.

<sup>117</sup> Peter, 'Les Lansquenets', p. 99; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 243, 265, 290.

<sup>118</sup> Calvin, *Plaidoyers*, ed. Peter, p. xvii.

<sup>119</sup> V.-L. Bourrilly, 'François Ier et les Protestants', *ABSHF*, 49 (1900), 361.

<sup>120</sup> Peter, 'Les Lansquenets', p. 98; Calvin, *Plaidoyers*, ed. Peter, pp. xv–xvi.

<sup>121</sup> *CAF*, VIII, 276, 31874.

<sup>122</sup> Des Monstiers Mérinville, *Fraisse*, pp. 22–3; *Mémoires de Guise*, pp. 223–8; Egerton 17, fo. 4; BN Clair. 348, fo. 119.

<sup>123</sup> Potter, 'Les Allemands et les armées françaises', part 2, pp. 4–5.

<sup>124</sup> AN 18 AP, liasse 1.

<sup>125</sup> BN fr. 18462, p. 15.



able at the *étapes*.<sup>126</sup> The principal captains appointed trusted subordinates to do the actual recruiting. Fürstenberg acted through Vogelsperger in 1538, when, with the war nearly over, the latter reported that the rush of recruits to the colours was good.<sup>127</sup> Though there was no formal treaty arrangement of the kind that governed the recruitment of the Swiss, it is still the case that men were being recruited in foreign territory, the Empire, where local obligations might conflict with service abroad. Thus, Fürstenberg's lands in Swabia were confiscated by the Emperor for 'treason' against the Holy Empire and given to his brother in 1537. It was therefore necessary for Francis I to compensate him with property in France.<sup>128</sup>

Such service was governed by terms called '*capitulations*', agreed for each levy, and in which the obligations of the recruits to the Emperor had to be specified. In one of the earliest surviving, which dates from the 1520s, article 1 specified service in defence or offence, with a promise not to withdraw if the Emperor ordered them to do so, while the King promised to make no treaty with the Emperor without including them.<sup>129</sup> The terms of this contract were in some ways impractical. Authority was given to a 'captain-general' (later called a colonel), to whom the particular captains were responsible. On active service, a new month's pay was to begin from the firing of artillery in a siege. Should their pay be delayed, they could not mutiny for 8–10 days (!) and were forbidden to hold complaints meetings ('*guyménées*'), while anyone involved in a mutiny was to hand over letters from foreign princes. Musters were to involve physical counting of the men by the *commissaires*, companies were to be of 500 and the wages were set at 6 lt. p.m. basic, 6 lt. 15s. for the usual 10% arquebusiers. The pay was thus roughly 20% greater than the standard French infantry pay.<sup>130</sup> The pay of the captain was set at 100 lt. p.m. above his basic pay, with 30 for the lieutenant and 25 for the ensign. The pay of 10% was to be set aside for other officers, fifes and drummers. The rest of the capitulation concerned the maintenance of order and discipline and the treatment of the civil population. Women were to be respected, swearing forbidden, quarrels settled by the formal peace (*fride*), gaming losses only to be paid by consent and cheating punished by death. Indeed, death (without hope of pardon) was specified for such diverse matters as pillaging churches, cheating at dice, participation in quarrels, quarrelling on guard duty, leaving camp to get supplies. A group of companies under a captain-general would have a complement of general officers to oversee the whole formation: a lieutenant-general, provost (*Provos*), judge, billeting officer, guard officer (*Wachtmeister*) and supply officer (*Proviantmeister*). Normally, money would be distributed to the men immediately on arrival and failure to promise such an arrangement (and rather require them to

<sup>126</sup> BN Dupuy 273, fos. 33r–34r.

<sup>127</sup> Calvin, *Plaidoyers*, ed. Peter, p. 14.

<sup>128</sup> Peter, 'Les Lansquenets', p. 101.

<sup>129</sup> BN fr. 6637, fos. 320–3 (art. 26).

<sup>130</sup> When employed by the Emperor, the simple rate of pay was 4 Rhine gulden: W. Bauer (ed.), *Die Korrespondenz Ferdinands I: IV, Die Familienkorrespondenz, 1527, 1531 und 1532* (Vienna, 1973), pp. 367–9, no. 553.

defray their own expenses until formal muster) in the levy of 1538 gave cause for anxiety that the King would not pay the troops well.<sup>131</sup>

From the 1530s, lansquenets usually operated as a distinct corps of the French army under a succession of leading colonels, Fürstenberg and Christoff of Wurtemberg in the 1530s and the Rhingrave Jean-Philippe in the late 1540s and 1550s. It is interesting to compare the 1520s *capitulations* with the terms 'accorded by the King' to the duke of Wurtemberg in January 1537 and signed by Francis himself.<sup>132</sup> These were more like a treaty with a foreign prince and included an obligation to serve the King against any enemy without exception and promised the same conditions to the officers as those accorded to Fürstenberg's. The main concern was to spell out the structure of the duke's force. He was to raise between 10,000 and 12,000 men. Companies were to be no lower than 400 and any below that number were to be partitioned between the remaining companies. Subordinate command was to be held by two or three captains-general, commanding ten companies and paid 600 lt. p.m., and the force organised in two 'regiments or judgments' (an interesting early use of the term in France). An exception was made for Landenberg, who had offered to bring 13 companies and had previously done the King good service. He was to get 1000 lt. p.m. Discipline was ignored in this document but elaborated in the *Artickelnbrief* that Duke Christoff himself promulgated.<sup>133</sup>

How do the terms of this agreement compare with the realities of service? Fürstenberg played a major part in the defence of the kingdom at the Avignon camp in 1536 and, of all the German troops employed, his were the only ones retained in the winter for operations against rebels in Piedmont. However, his men were ill-paid and prone to loot as a result. Tournon, lieutenant-general of the region, was forced to borrow from the Lyon merchants to pay them and reported that 'he's a terrible lord who knows he has the upper hand.'<sup>134</sup> For the spring 1537 campaign in Artois, it was decided to employ Fürstenberg's 6000 men (including 1000 arquebusiers) and deploy 10,000 new Germans under Wurtemberg in Piedmont.<sup>135</sup> The campaign in the north went well and Fürstenberg's regiment had been expanded by new recruits in the spring. However, the count was detained by the imperial threat to Théroouanne until the end of July.<sup>136</sup> Meanwhile, Francis I had been warned early in May of the impending threat to his new conquest of Piedmont. Wurtemberg's regiment, only just over 1000 men in March,<sup>137</sup> were already on the way to France. On 3 May they were reported as 8000 men in 18 ensigns, when 71,480 lt. were allocated.<sup>138</sup> However, they were ordered to divert to Piedmont and arrived at Moncalieri on 25 June. Humières, the French governor, was in desperate need of them but they quickly mutinied at Asti for lack of pay and he was forced to borrow

<sup>131</sup> Calvin, *Plaidoyers*, ed. Peter, pp. 11–12.

<sup>132</sup> BN fr. 3069, fos. 138–9 (copy); *Ord.Fr.I*, VIII, no. 767. Peter, 'Les Lansquenets', p. 104, and in Calvin, *Plaidoyers*, ed. Peter, p. 100.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 104–9.

<sup>134</sup> M. François (ed.), *Correspondance du Cardinal François de Tournon*, 1521–1562, (Paris, 1946) no. 151, p. 130.

<sup>135</sup> Calvin, *Plaidoyers*, ed. Peter, annexes 3, 4 and 5.

<sup>136</sup> AN J 965/8, no. 3; AN J 965/10, no. 3.

<sup>137</sup> AN J 968/1, no. 4.

<sup>138</sup> BN fr. 3062, fos. 125–7.

money in the camp to keep them happy (something Montmorency had had to do for the Fürstenberg regiment in Artois in April 1537).<sup>139</sup> Even after the pay arrived, they insisted on being paid according to rolls that were outdated, since, though nominally 10,000 in number, there were no more than 5000. Wurtemberg was young and 'not obeyed because of his youth', du Bellay wrote. Nor was the royal governor, Humières, equal to the situation. The main author of the mischief was the colonel of one of his largest regiments, Landenberg, who had raised difficulties at the start of the campaign by demanding the pay of officers, which had already been accounted for. Money had been made available to deal with any problems this might cause but Landenberg was not satisfied.<sup>140</sup> He 'outraged' Borran, the royal victualling commissioner, and even drew his sword against Humières. Ultimately, he was arrested and beheaded.<sup>141</sup>

Partly as a result of these problems, the French position in Piedmont crumbled and had to be restored by Montmorency in Autumn 1537. In mid-August, the King decided to form a new army for Piedmont under the Dauphin and Montmorency and directed Fürstenberg's regiment of 9264 and another lansquenet regiment of 3788, commanded by an Italian, Niccolò de' Rustici, or 'le petit bossu'. With the remnants of Wurtemberg's men, this produced 14,800 lansquenets alongside 10,000 French infantry.<sup>142</sup> Wurtemberg's 'regiment' seems to have been partly dismissed and partly absorbed into the army of occupation in Piedmont by the end of 1537, where the remaining companies were inscribed in the *état*.<sup>143</sup>

As far as organization is concerned, the records relating to Fürstenberg's regiments are full for this period.<sup>144</sup> These are derived from the *états de dépenses* of the army in Piedmont in November and December 1537 and the litigation produced by the count's actions against his rivals. In February 1536, at initial recruitment, the regiment consisted of 5944 men in 20 companies. Fürstenberg had assembled them at Chaumont-sur-Marne in January and administered the oath to serve the King for a minimum of three months. In February he grouped them into 20 companies with between 600 and 1000 arquebusiers.<sup>145</sup> A commission for escort indicates that a second levy was mustered for the first time at Langres.<sup>146</sup> In the aftermath of the conquest of Piedmont, Francis I decided to increase his levies of lansquenets massively to 18,000 men.<sup>147</sup> So, by November, Fürstenberg's corps had expanded to 9244 men in 24 companies commanded by 22 captains. The number rose slightly to 9445 men in December and fell back to 8335 in 25 compa-

<sup>139</sup> AN J 965/8, no. 22.

<sup>140</sup> BN fr. 3062, fo. 126v.

<sup>141</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, pp. 404, 409, 415–17, 423–4; AN J 965/8, nos. 3, 8, 22.

<sup>142</sup> E. Picot, *Les Italiens en France au XVIe siècle* = *Bulletin italien*, I (Bordeaux, 1902), pp. 285–6; BN Dupuy 273, fos. 33v–34r.

<sup>143</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 197–231.

<sup>144</sup> J.V. Wagner, *Graf Wilhelm von Fürstenberg, 1491–1549, und die politisch-geistigen Mächte seiner Zeit* (Stuttgart, 1966); Peter, 'Les Lansquenets', pp. 95–109.

<sup>145</sup> BN fr. 3002, fo. 75; Calvin, *Plaidoyers*, ed. Peter, pp. 92–4.

<sup>146</sup> BN Dupuy 273, fo. 33.

<sup>147</sup> *Acta Nuntiaturae Gallicae, correspondance des nonces en France*, 16 vols (Rome/Paris: Université Pontificale/Ecole Française de Rome, 1961–84), I, p. 170.

nies in January 1538.<sup>148</sup> The regiment had cost 59,204 p.m. in February 1537; in November, it was absorbing 86,640, rising to 89,785 lt. in December.<sup>149</sup> Money for their payment was a constant problem through 1537 and funds had to be galvanised by repeated letters to the Chancellor.<sup>150</sup>

There is some uncertainty about the number of men in each company. Though it is often suggested that German companies were larger in size than the typical French formations, this was not always the case.<sup>151</sup> Musters show that lansquenets usually attained numbers between 400 and 500, though *capitulations* usually assumed 500 men per company. In practice, the numbers were smaller and the *état de l'armée* of 1554 certainly assumes a figure of 300, the norm for French companies.<sup>152</sup> The King and Constable, finding in 1555 that many of the companies were below strength, wanted some amalgamated. The circular counter-argument was put, on Roggendorf's behalf, that this would only encourage the enemy to think that the companies were below strength.<sup>153</sup>

Pay rates had been improved since the 1520s, since, though simple pay remained fixed at 6 lt., arquebusiers were now paid 8 lt. Captains also had advantages over those in the French companies. By 1537 captains received 100 lt. per month, plus 40 lt. for what was called the *droit du premier feuillet* of the muster roll, the German custom of *prima plana*. Each captain also received 6 lt. for each of the 21 members of his personal suite and a variable number of pays (roughly 20% of the numbers in the company at 6 lt. each). Fürstenberg himself received 2000 lt. p.m. on campaign, with 376 lt. for servants.<sup>154</sup> His lieutenant-general, Fleckstein, received 600 lt. p.m. by December 1537 and led his own regiment in 1538.<sup>155</sup> At the end of campaigning the captains under Fürstenberg were allocated pensions of 200 écus each.<sup>156</sup>

Fürstenberg was well worth his salt. 'Captain general' of all the Germans in French service by the end of 1537, he was effective in controlling his men, most notably in suppressing a dangerous 'mutiny' between them and the French troops in Piedmont in April 1536.<sup>157</sup> When he was needed, in 1537, Montmorency took the trouble to ensure that the grant of an estate went through and that the arrears of his pension be paid.<sup>158</sup> Despite this, he was a difficult personality and managed to fall foul of Montmorency. The reasons are obscure, though numerous. Firstly, nearly half his men had been paid off at the end of 1537 and so he lost two key lieutenants, Fleckstein and Sebastian Vogelsperger, his provost. At the Nice conference in 1538, he refused to kiss the Pope's slipper as requested by the Constable. This was symbolic of his being out of tune with the new policy of rapprochement

<sup>148</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 202–27.

<sup>149</sup> *CAF*, VIII, no. 29382.

<sup>150</sup> AN J 965/9, no. 17.

<sup>151</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 131, 141, 143, 183–4.

<sup>152</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 240–1.

<sup>153</sup> BL Add. 38032, fo. 334r.

<sup>154</sup> BN fr. 3002, fo. 75; Calvin, *Plaidoyers*, ed. Peter, pp. 98–9.

<sup>155</sup> *CAF*, VIII, 278, 31893; VII, 737, 28727.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, VIII, 287, 31980.

<sup>157</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, p. 340.

<sup>158</sup> AN J 965/9, no. 18.

with the Emperor and co-operation of Catholic princes against heresy.<sup>159</sup> Tournon had already, in 1536, alerted his colleagues to the fact that corruption was rife in Fürstenberg's companies (though where was it not?). He suggested that the larger the company, the less service would be obtained. A muster commissioner had found three of the cardinal's former kitchen boys dressed up as lansquenets: 'you can imagine whether there are others.'<sup>160</sup> In the spring of 1538, Montmorency seized the opportunity to humiliate Fürstenberg by encouraging Vogelsperger to take over the levy of men that Fürstenberg had thought were to be under his command.<sup>161</sup> With the conclusion of the truce of Nice, the lansquenets under Fürstenberg could be paid off and another levy of men, who had marched as far as Vienne, countermanded with a hefty two months' pay. In 1539, Fleckstein and Vogelsperger were the captains paid to select 12 German captains for retainers.<sup>162</sup> In addition, Vogelsperger was active in the Catholic Union, formed at Nuremberg to combat the Schmalkaldic League, to which Fürstenberg was offering his services. Returning to the French court in September, he found a chilly welcome. Humiliated in a public confrontation with Vogelsperger, he resigned his posts in France, left the court and called on Calvin to draw up a defence in which he claimed he could get no justice in France.<sup>163</sup> After a brief attempt to return to French service in 1542, he offered his services to Charles V and led a force to attempt the recapture of Luxembourg in the summer of 1543. During the invasion of 1544, he led 8000 men but was captured and imprisoned in the Bastille, only released by an enormous ransom, to which the Emperor did not contribute.<sup>164</sup> Fürstenberg was thus a figure who fitted the role of German commander in French service with great difficulty, partly because of his quarrelsome character and partly because his religious loyalties (however sincere) left him open to attack.

Despite the experience with Fürstenberg, the recruitment of German troops by France, if anything, accelerated in the 1540s. The war of 1542 posed problems of loyalty to the Empire. During the negotiations of Longueval with the duke of Cleves in 1541, Francis was calling for modification of the capitulations so that their oath was 'to serve the King against all comers except the Holy Empire, provided that the King could call on them when he wished against the Emperor and his supporters.' The duke would be able to raise men anywhere he chose. Every French army had a high proportion of lansquenets. According to du Bellay, there were 6000 in the army for the siege of Perpignan in 1542, while in the north the Germans were brought by Heideck (an old lieutenant of Fürstenberg's), Mansfeld, Piquelin and Reckrod.<sup>165</sup> The infantry in the army at Maroilles in July 1543 was made up half of lansquenets in three 'colonels' (one from Lorraine).<sup>166</sup> In 1544,

<sup>159</sup> Calvin, *Plaidoyers*, ed. Peter, p. xxxiv.

<sup>160</sup> BN fr. 3019, fo. 149.

<sup>161</sup> Calvin, *Plaidoyers*, ed. Peter, pp. 21–2.

<sup>162</sup> *CAF*, VIII, 250, 31602; 252, 31608; VII, 733, 28691.

<sup>163</sup> Calvin, *Plaidoyers*, ed. Peter, pp. lii–lxiv.

<sup>164</sup> Peter, 'Les Lansquenets', p. 103 and n. 14; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 193.

<sup>165</sup> SA Dusseldorf, Julich-Berg, II, fo. 316 (31 Oct. 1541); *St.P.*, IX, p. 103; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, pp. 69, 78.

<sup>166</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 68–72; Du Bellay, IV, pp. 130–1.

the royal army at Jalons included 6000 lansquenets (outnumbered by Swiss).<sup>167</sup> On the 'voyage d'Allemagne' of 1552, though the figures are contradictory, there were perhaps 8000 lansquenets (11 ensigns of them commanded by the Rhinegrave).<sup>168</sup> An agreement on pay rates for this levy is a good pointer to wage inflation: the infantryman was now set at 9 lt. and the cavalryman at 22.10.0 lt.<sup>169</sup> In 1553 during the campaign in Picardy, according to Rabutin, the Rhinegrave commanded 20 ensigns (perhaps 8000 men)<sup>170</sup> and a reliable *état* for the campaign of 1554 fixes the number of lansquenets at 11,000 in 32 ensigns at 300 men each.<sup>171</sup> The army at Pierrepoint in 1558 included 12,000 French infantry, 1800 Swiss and 18–19,000 Germans in 63–4 ensigns.<sup>172</sup>

These prodigious figures bear witness to the massive development of the French recruitment network in Germany, backed up by diplomacy and money. After the departure of Fürstenberg, he was replaced by Sebastien Vogelsperger, Georg von Reckrod<sup>173</sup> and a prince from the borderlands between Lorraine and the Rhine, the Rhinegrave Jean-Philippe (whose brother served Henry VIII). One measure of the importance of German recruitment is the ferocious competition between English and French agents in Germany during 1545, at a time when the two countries were at war. The subtlety of the French agent, Fraise, and the fact that France had all the diplomatic cards in its hands enabled him to break up the English levy.<sup>174</sup> From the mid-1540s, the Rhinegrave became a pivotal figure in French troops recruitment.<sup>175</sup> Few royal armies from 1549 to 1563 were without at least one regiment under his command.<sup>176</sup>

The recruitment of troops for the renewal of war with the Emperor in 1551–2 was again a part of Fraise's task. From the conclusion of the agreement with the German princes in October 1551 and the treaty of Chambord in January 1552, the recruitment of lansquenets became part of the offensive alliance between the German princes and France. Here, Prince Elector Moritz, Margrave Albrecht of Brandenburg (who ultimately proved difficult to manage) and the duke of Mecklenburg played leading roles. This was the more crucial as the Reichstag at Speyer had declared Henri II an enemy of the Empire on the grounds of his alliance with the Turks and forbidden subjects of the Empire to enlist in his service.<sup>177</sup> So, while the princes undertook to raise an army of 20,000 foot and 6000 horse, the Rhinegrave was raising 10,000 lansquenets in companies of 500.<sup>178</sup>

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 241–2.

<sup>168</sup> 1552: Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 129–35, 234–5.

<sup>169</sup> Pariset, 'La France et les princes allemands', pp. 275–6.

<sup>170</sup> Rabutin, *Commentaires*, I, pp. 221–4; Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 140–2.

<sup>171</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 240–1.

<sup>172</sup> BN fr. 4552, fo. 72; Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 176–85.

<sup>173</sup> BL Add. 38032, fo. 278v.

<sup>174</sup> Potter, 'The International Mercenary Market', pp. 24–58.

<sup>175</sup> HHSA, Frankreich 15, Berichte St. Mauris-Karl V 1547, VI, fo. 38.

<sup>176</sup> Potter, 'Les Allemands et les armées françaises', pp. 1–20.

<sup>177</sup> Pariset, 'La France et les princes allemands', p. 259.

<sup>178</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 278.



By the middle years of the 16th century, more *capitulations* survive. The agreement with Albrecht of Brandenburg for a regiment of 6000 men in 1555 was reissued in 1562, slightly modified. Jakob of Augsburg (the colonel) received a pension 'while waiting' in time of peace that was fixed at 1200 écus, with 12 captains, each to raise 500 men and each of whom would have a pension of 200 écus. Captains would choose their officers and have the *droit de premier feuillet*. The men were to be given an écu in advance on recruitment and paid the wages usually paid to Germans. As in earlier agreements, the 10% of arquebusiers were to get 2 lt. above the basic pay of 6 lt. At musters, no company was to be accepted at less than 300 men, on condition that the full 500 would be presented at the second. No pages or valets were to be offered, only 'Germans, true lansquenets of service.' The regiment was to serve as long as the King wished and would receive one month's pay on dismissal. The men were to be brought to the frontier despite any prohibition by the Emperor and subject to the King's justice, not their own. Whereas the duke of Wurtemberg in 1537 had promised simply to serve 'against all comers, none excepted,'<sup>179</sup> the oath sworn by the Margrave and Augsburg, transcribed into their agreement, held them to swear on their honour and their hope of eternal life to serve the King faithfully:

Against all comers, of whatever estate, dignity or condition they be, none excepted save the Holy Empire in case of aggression only<sup>180</sup> ... either for defence against his enemies or for attack as he thinks fit.

In the text signed by the King, he promised to observe the terms and maintain the captains as long as they observed their obligations.<sup>181</sup>

### **The Germans: *Reiters***

Germany also produced mercenary cavalry ('Cleves horse' played an important part in the campaigns of the 1540s). During the 1550s, French armies were increasingly accompanied by squadrons of German light horse known as *Reiters* (in France *reîtres*), sometimes also called *pistoliers* or 'black riders,' from their black cloaks. Organised in '*cornettes*', they combined light cavalry tactics with a still rather cumbersome firearm carried in a holster next to the saddle. They thus represented a strange by-way of military evolution, since, although it may have seemed valuable to combine cavalry with firepower, they were not easily manoeuvrable. Their tactic of advancing in ranks, discharging their pistols and withdrawing before the next rank, was exceptionally difficult to execute in battle. It may thus have seemed easier to use them for skirmishing. Their ill-treatment of the civil population was dire and, not surprisingly, they were widely feared. Part of the problem was that, as cavalry, they required large quantities of fodder and, because they were not at first incorporated in the elaborate supply system

<sup>179</sup> Peter, 'Les Lansquenets', p. 104.

<sup>180</sup> In other words, the King was to be served against the Emperor in defence of his kingdom.

<sup>181</sup> BN Clair. 348, fos. 119–20 (27 May 1555), BN fr. 15876, fos. 229–32 (1562).



developed for the *gendarmerie*, they took what they needed. It was in March 1552, during the preparations for the German campaign, that we find one of the earliest levies of *reîtres* for France, in this case by the Rhinegrave.<sup>182</sup> He seems to have absorbed Fontenoy's Cleves horse into his *cornette* in 1554 and there were complaints about their looting in 1555. Nevertheless, their captain was retained during the peace of 1556.<sup>183</sup>

Immediately after Saint-Quentin, messages were sent to Reiffenberg to raise 2–3000 *pistoliers* and by December a surplus of men was reported ready to serve. Those retained normally expected *Waitgelt* of 5 écus for the three months of their retainer and then 8 écus conduct money. Secretary Fresne estimated the total cost at 500,000 écus.<sup>184</sup> The army assembled at Pierrepont in August 1558 included around 8000 *pistoliers* out of a figure of roughly 11,000 cavalry, a sign of how fast they were emerging as a leading force in cavalry.<sup>185</sup> Another levy was undertaken by arrangement with two Saxon princes and, separately, with Reiffenberg. The latter had to be pacified since, while the Saxon princes had been commissioned for 4300 *Reiters*, Reiffenberg was only asked for 3000. The captains he had appointed had to be content with pensions.<sup>186</sup> In November 1558, Guise drew up a *règlement* for the supply of the *pistoliers* in the King's service which the King welcomed as a persuasive argument ('doux moyen'). What was this? Essentially it was an attempt to limit the tendency of *reîtres* to live off the land and oppress the people before the harvest, by designating areas in which they could gather fodder for their horses (excluding wheat) and then, after the harvest, by allocating villages where they could obtain fodder at a price fixed by the lieutenant-general. On campaign or in garrison they were to be given *étapes* in convenient places for the delivery of supplies at a fixed tariff of hay and oats worth 2s 3d p.d. Naturally, they were given freedom to live off the land in enemy territory.<sup>187</sup>

These attempts at regulation were complemented by the *capitulations* agreed with colonels of *pistoliers* in 1557–8. Duke Henry of Brunswick-Luneburg mentions a 'letter of retainer,' which had fixed his annual pension, usually in abeyance on active service and replaced by direct pay.<sup>188</sup> He undertook to raise a regiment of 1000 *pistoliers* in three *cornettes* and would be paid a florin p.m. for every man he produced (this could thus yield 12,000 florins p.a. = 18,000 lt.). The captains would receive 400 écus p.a. pension and on campaign a florin per month for every man as wages and the same again allocate to 'the most notable gentlemen of his *cornette*.' Conduct money would be paid to each captain at the rate of 8 écus per man to bring them to the place of first muster and thereafter

<sup>182</sup> Potter, 'Les Allemands et les armées françaises', part 1, p. 8. See also Tavannes, *Mémoires*, p. 170, and Zeller, *Le Siège de Metz*, p. 81.

<sup>183</sup> Potter, 'Les Allemands et les armées françaises', part 1, p. 9, part 2, nos. 62, 67, 69.

<sup>184</sup> BN fr. 4742, fos. 43v–44r; *Mémoires de Guise*, p. 325.

<sup>185</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, p. 184.

<sup>186</sup> *Mémoires de Guise*, pp. 419–20; BL Add. 38034, fo. 249v (copy); *Mémoires de Guise*, p. 397.

<sup>187</sup> BN Cangé 15, fo. 63.

<sup>188</sup> AD P-A, E 580, no. 6234.

musters would be monthly.<sup>189</sup> The arms of the men are specified as: a corselet, mail ‘manches’, gauntlets, head-piece, good strong horse, ‘at least’ 2 pistols, a cutlass or mace. Pay would be 15 florins (22.10.0. lt.) p.m. (thus nearly four times the pay of a lansquenet).<sup>190</sup> Terms of service were for a minimum of three months and thereafter as long as the King pleased, against all enemies, except the Empire and their feudal superiors in aggressive war. Right to obey a revocation by the Emperor, Cameral Court or their feudal princes was excluded. All orders for deployment were to be obeyed and one month’s pay was guaranteed for return. Detailed provisions were made against muster fraud, substitution (especially by lansquenets), provision in case of loss of horses or illness. No victuals were to be taken without paying, provision made for ransoms and booty. Exactly the same oath was administered as to the lansquenets.

These terms were more or less repeated for the *capitulations* with Saxe-Weimar, also dated March 1559, with the amplification of the special payment due to him.<sup>191</sup> His retainer, or pension, was specified as 15,000 lt. p.a. with 1500 florins (2250 lt.) p.m. to distribute to ‘the most notable.’ In general, the terms are spelled out in more detail and prefaced by a series of *états* specifying the pay of all the officers and men. The duke was contracted to lead 2100 *pistoliers* in person in 7 *cornettes* of 300, led by seven captains, each of whom would receive a pension of 400 écus. The pay scales then follow, as in the diagram below.

**Pay-scales in the regiment of Johann Wilhelm,  
duke of Saxe-Weimar, 1558**

	Per month/fl.	In lt.
Colonel	2000 fl	3000
Colonel, supplement	900 fl.	1350
Lieutenant-general	300 fl.	450
Chaplain	15 fl.	22.10.0
Interpreter	15 fl.	22.10.0
Surgeon	15 fl.	22.10.0
<i>Fourrier</i>	25 fl.	37.10.0
12 halberdiers, guard	96 fl	144
Drummer	15 fl.	22.10.0
4 trumpeters	60 fl.	90
Captain of <i>cornette</i>	300 fl.	450
Lieutenants	75 fl.	112.10.0
Cornet	75 fl.	112.10.0
6 <i>Rittmasters</i>	150 fl. (25 each)	225
Secretary	15 fl.	22.10.0
Fourrier	25 fl.	37.10.0
Barber	15 fl.	22.10.0
Trumpeteer	15 fl.	22.10.0
Marshal	15 fl.	22.10.0
Maitre ouvrier for pistols	15 fl.	22.10.0
Each horseman	15 fl.	22.10.0

<sup>189</sup> *Mémoires de Guise*, p. 419.

<sup>190</sup> The exchange rate was fixed at 1 fl. = 1 vache; 1 vache = 30 st.

<sup>191</sup> AD P-A, E 580, no. 6254 (1 March 1558/9). BN fr. 4742, fos. 43v–44r.

The judicial staff of *prévôts* etc. was doubled in the case of this regiment, in view of the likelihood that it would be divided for operational reasons.

The only distinction with the *capitulations* signed with Guillaume Gombach was that his annual pension was fixed at the much lower sum of 1200 *écus*, an indicator that these retainers reflect the social standing of the colonel.<sup>192</sup> As conditions of service, they were virtually identical to those agreed with the younger Rhinegrave, Jean-Philippe, in August 1568 for 1500 men in 5 *cornettes*, with the exception that the conduct money was fixed at 12 florins.<sup>193</sup> These terms of service fixed by the crown were in practice undermined by events. Henry of Brunswick-Luneburg, for instance, reported as early as April 1558 (a few weeks after his agreement) that the men under his command 'are very angry at the delay of their money from 1 October until now and I'm having trouble calming them.' They had learned that they were to lose two months' pay. Order was needed for munitions to be made available if he was to stop them foraging. They refused to obey the November 1557 ordinance on supply without express instructions.<sup>194</sup>

### The Italians

Italian troops were naturally an important component of French armies in Italy during the early 16th century, providing the most immediately accessible formations of infantry and light horse. Charles VIII had 500 Italian men-at-arms conducted by Gian Francesco di San Severino, count of Caiazzo.<sup>195</sup> Their position as mercenaries is much more ambiguous than that of the Swiss and Germans since many Italian captains served the King of France, at least nominally, as his subjects and vassals in the Italian territories to which he had a claim. Royal policy was also constructing an intricate web of clientage and fidelity with a range of Italian princes and nobles, while the crown was attracting to its service *fuorusciti* (emigrés) driven to leave their lands by the massive political upheavals of the period. All this created a significant pool of recruitment for *condottiere*.<sup>196</sup> In the first generation of Italian wars, the links were firmly established with the Trivulzio, Fregoso, Birago and Carracciolo families. Major Italian dynasties such as the Gonzagas and the Estes were integrated in the French alliance and provided significant military support. Such families were favoured by lavish concessions and gifts. Gian Giacomo Trivulzio, marshal of France, benefited extensively from such gifts to compensate for losses in Italy as did his relatives.<sup>197</sup>

Italian dynasts, though they might fight for France, always had their own agendas. The marquesses of Saluzzo, as neighbours of Dauphiné, occupied a

<sup>192</sup> AD P-A, E 580, no. 6255; *Mémoires de Guise*, p. 415.

<sup>193</sup> BN fr. 16020, fos. 161–4.

<sup>194</sup> BN Clair. 351, fos. 278, 280, 282.

<sup>195</sup> Comynnes, III, p. 38.

<sup>196</sup> J.-F. Dubost, *La France italienne au XVIe et XVIIe siècles* (Paris, 1997), pp. 60–5.

<sup>197</sup> BN fr. 5500, fos. 234v, 249v.

crucial point of entry into Italy. They were thus often in the French orbit, particularly in view of their struggles with the dukes of Savoy. Ludovico II fled to France in 1488 (where he wrote a commentary on Vegetius) before returning to his lands in 1490. Michele Antonio (b.1495), son of Ludovico II and Marguerite de Foix-Candale, fought for France at Agnadello and Marignano and was given a *gendarmerie* company in 1517. His successor Gian Ludovico was arrested in France in 1529 and deposed in favour of his brother Francesco, lieutenant-general for the King in Piedmont in 1536. He then turned coat and joined the imperial cause, only to be killed at Carmagnola in 1537. In the period 1548–57 there were 40 Italian princes and commanders (17 of them Neapolitans) who were being paid pensions for their military services, including such families as Trivulzio, Caracciolo, Birago, Bentivoglio, San Severino and Strozzi. A salient example is that of the Fregosos: Paolo-Battista served in Charles VIII's army, Ottaviano as governor of Genoa under Louis XII, Janus-Maria in the campaigns of 1526–7 and Cesare, agent for French negotiations with Sultan Suleiman, killed on imperial orders in 1541. Galeazzo di San Severino – ‘messire Galyas’ –, son of the count of Caiazzo, served Ludovico il Moro in the 1490s before entering French service in 1503. Ultimately, he received a company of men-at-arms and the office of *grand écuyer*, remained with France and was killed at Pavia. The family was a branch of the Neapolitan dynasty of the princes of Salerno, dukes of Somma and counts of Bisignano, some of whom also served France after 1499. They were sons and grandsons of military commanders under the Sforzas, who had gained the county of Caiazzo. Galeazzo's younger brothers, Giovan Francesco, Gaspare, Antonio Maria and Giulio all served France at some time while another, Alessandro, became archbishop of Vienne. The youngest brother, Giulio, marquess of Valenza, wrote to Montmorency in 1526 bitterly complaining of his treatment after his brother's death. He claimed he had been in French service since 1499, the flower of his age from 19 to 46, had lost his inheritance in Venetian territory and Milan with no hope of getting it back and was ill, probably with gout, though he claimed still to be able to serve. Giulio seems to have given up and retired from service.<sup>198</sup>

Perhaps the most extensive case is that of the Trivulzios, members of an illustrious family of the Milanese nobility who served the King of France over three generations. Giangiacomo, ‘il Grande’ (1447–1518), patrician of Milan, senator and privy councillor to the duke in 1477 and military commander, moved into French service during Charles VIII's Neapolitan expedition, when he was granted the duchies of Melfi and Venosa (1495). Marshal of France in 1499, he became marquess of Vigevano and Louis XII's lieutenant-general in Milan in the same year. His son, Giovanni Niccolò (d. 1512), was governor of the castle of Milan and his grandson Gianfrancesco (1509–73) commander of a *gendarmerie* company.<sup>199</sup> Giangiacomo's cousin Teodoro (1454–32) commanded in the Venetian army and then acted as governor of Milan for Francis I (1524), then of Genoa (1527) and of Lyon (1525), and finally became marshal in 1526. In the next generation, Teodoro's nephew Pomponio (d. 1529) was also governor of Lyon. In addition to these,

<sup>198</sup> BL Egerton 26, fo. 22.

<sup>199</sup> Vindry, *Dictionnaire*, s.v. ‘Trivulce’; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, p. 336n.

numerous allied members of the family, including Pietro Camillo,<sup>200</sup> Alessandro,<sup>201</sup> Renato and Girolamo, served France.

Italian commanders can be broadly divided into the loyal and the opportunists, and both illustrate the difficulties for France in navigating in the seething politics of Italy. Among the opportunists, Marquess Cristoforo Pallavicini of Busseto, with land around Parma and Piacenza, served France in the war of the League of Cambrai, and had commanded at Cremona. His elder brother Galeazzo had commanded a French *gendarmerie* company between 1507 and 1511.<sup>202</sup> Cristoforo, though, joined the Sforzas and fought against Francis I at Marignano. Lautrec had him executed at Milan in November 1521 for having given refuge to enemies of the King, a reckless act which alienated many of the leading families (another member of the family in the Milanese, Manfredo, who had turned against the French after 1515, had been executed in July). However, when Giovanni de Medici entered French service again in 1524, he brought over Cristoforo's cousin Gian Ludovico, marquess of Cortemaggiore, who commanded 2000 foot and 400 horse in the Pavia campaign.<sup>203</sup> This great condottiere, Giovanni de' Medici 'delle Bande Nere,' father of the wily Grand Duke Cosimo I of Tuscany, came to serve the French army in Italy in March 1522 with 3000 foot and 200 horse. The later part of his military career is a particularly startling example of the problems of handling mercenaries in Italy. In 1522, he and his fellow commander, Federico de Bozzolo, failed to defend Lodi and withdrew into Cremona, where Giovanni proceeded to blackmail his French commander into paying his men's salary by threatening to open the gates to the enemy. The town fell anyway.<sup>204</sup> In August 1523, he transferred to the service of the duke of Milan.<sup>205</sup> By yet another turn, Giovanni returned to Francis I's service in November 1524 in the middle of his Milanese campaign, bringing with him a clutch of expert Italian commanders and his army of 3000 foot and 300 light horse.<sup>206</sup> At Pavia, he commanded a company of 50 men-at-arms, 200 *chevau-légers* and 2000 infantry.<sup>207</sup> Giovanni's troops played a leading part in the army of the League of Cognac and their correspondence with the Florentine republic has been studied in depth.<sup>208</sup> After Giovanni's death (1526), his troops were commanded by Orazio Baglione and fought under Lautrec in 1527–8. Giovanni Carracciolo, prince of Melfi in the kingdom of Naples, was won over after the capture of his castle by Lautrec in 1528 and the failure of the Emperor to pay his ransom. He received lands and pensions in France instead.<sup>209</sup> Firmly anchored in loyalty to the French crown, he went on to command against the Emperor in

<sup>200</sup> Ibid., II, p. 91.

<sup>201</sup> Ibid., II, p. 176.

<sup>202</sup> Vindry, *Dictionnaire*, s.v. 'Pallavicin.'

<sup>203</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 173–4, 181–3, 184–5, 347–50.

<sup>204</sup> Ibid., I, pp. 216, 232. P. Gauthiez, *Jean des Bandes-Noires* (Paris, 1901); Arfaïoli, *The Black Bands of Giovanni*, pp. xiii–xiv.

<sup>205</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 305, 307.

<sup>206</sup> Ibid., I, p. 347.

<sup>207</sup> Sanuto, *Diarii*, XXXVII, p. 236.

<sup>208</sup> Arfaïoli, *The Black Bands of Giovanni*, pp. 29–76.

<sup>209</sup> *CAF*, VII, 162, 24014 (1529); Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 163.

Provence in 1536, in the Luxembourg campaigns of 1542–3 and finally as marshal of France and governor in Piedmont, in 1545–50.

The quality of Italian troops was unfairly impugned by Brantôme, a view now seriously undermined by detailed research. Moreover, they were heavily reinforced by firearms.<sup>210</sup> In the campaigns of the 1530s, there was a regular component of Italians in the royal armies fighting in either France or Piedmont. In spring 1536, Guillaume de Dinteville was sent to recruit 6000 foot and 500 light horse in Italy commanded by a number of royal pensioners: Francesco di Gonzaga, Guido Rangone, Annibale di Gonzaga, described by du Bellay as ‘most of them top men and brought up in the wars of Italy.’ Gonzaga and Birago actually managed to join the force assembled at Turin in September, ordered to march to the King’s camp, while Rangone also played a major part in the securing of Turin against Imperial counter-attack.<sup>211</sup> Rangone, count of Spilimberto (1485–1539), served the Medicis, Pope Clement VII and then Francis I, receiving the Order of Saint Michael in 1537.<sup>212</sup> In September 1536, Francis I inspected a ‘fine band’ of 3000 Italian infantry at Marseille under the command of Cesare Fregoso, Cristoforo Guasco and Petro Corso which an observer reported ‘have a fine and warlike air’ and had been promised that the King would always maintain them.<sup>213</sup> Such troops usually contained a high proportion of arquebusiers, such as the 400 in the garrison of Arles during the Emperor’s invasion.<sup>214</sup> In October 1537, though the garrison of Turin was made up mainly of French infantry, at Pinerolo there were 4347 Italian infantry, at Savigliano another 1250 and at Verolengo another 100, all ordered in companies of very unequal sizes.<sup>215</sup> The numbers of Italians in the Piedmont field army under the command of Gian Paolo da Cere had risen to 4811 in December 1537, while the garrison troops were 2950.<sup>216</sup> Marc’Antonio de Cusano, a Milanese gentleman who had become an *écuyer d’écurie* of Francis I, commanded 2000 Italian infantry in Piedmont in 1536 along with another 1000 under Cristoforo Guasco. Cusano was killed near Savigliano in August 1536 ‘leaving a good reputation and regret.’<sup>217</sup>

6000 Italian infantry were to be raised by Gian-Paolo da Cere in May 1542 and a colonel-general was appointed in August for the Italian troops in the Rousillon army. More Italians were raised in October under Antonio Melloni.<sup>218</sup> Italian infantry companies were employed in the army of Piedmont in 1544 and 2000 of

<sup>210</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, pp. 675–6; Arfaioli, *The Black Bands of Giovanni*, pp. 12–20.

<sup>211</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 339, 326–36; BN fr. 3062, fos. 107, 112 etc.; R. Scheurer (ed.), *Correspondance du Cardinal Jean du Bellay*, 2 vols (Paris: SHF, 1969, 1973), II, pp. 466–7.

<sup>212</sup> Picot, *Les Italiens*, pp. 114–15.

<sup>213</sup> Librairie de l’Abbaye, *Autographes et documents*, no. 162.

<sup>214</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, p. 256.

<sup>215</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 213–16.

<sup>216</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 320–1; Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 198, 227–8 (Dec. 1537).

<sup>217</sup> *CAF*, VII, 798, 29144; Du Bellay, II, p. 328; III, pp. 65, 229–31.

<sup>218</sup> *CAF*, VII, 317, 24813; 330, 24890; 334, 24910; AS Modena, Francia, B 20, fasc. 4, pp. 108–13; Weiss, *Papiers d’état*, III, p. 91.



them formed part of the rear-guard at Ceresole.<sup>219</sup> Pier Maria Rossi, count of San Secondo (1502–47), from a family based in the Parmense, began as a page of Francis I and served in the French army in 1523. As a nephew of Giovanni delle Bande Nere, he commanded some of his companies in the League of Cognac but then entered imperial service in 1527. He did not return to French service until 1542 but in March 1543 was given the Order of St Michael and named colonel-general of the Italians in French service.<sup>220</sup> As such, he was active at Landrecies and Boulogne. In November 1544, though, he was instructed to reduce his Italian infantry to 2000, ordered in companies of 300.<sup>221</sup> San Secondo was thus in command of a regiment of 8 companies, roughly one third of the strength arquebusiers, one of which was commanded by Sampietro Corso.<sup>222</sup> What the records of their musters make clear is the way in which the Italians were thoroughly integrated into the administrative structures of the French army, their pay assured by the normal *commis* and *contrôleurs* of the *extraordinaire des guerres*. Basic pay was fixed at 6 lt. p.m. and 7 for arquebusiers, thus the same pay rate as lansquenets; captains received 106 lt. Italians were heavily involved in the fighting around Boulogne in 1545–6. At one point Count Berlinguero was so enraged at the non-payment of his 2000 troops facing Boulogne that he went to court in June 1545 to demand that they be paid or sent back to Italy; otherwise, he threatened, they would defect to the service of Henry VIII.<sup>223</sup> Naturally, throughout this period a large part of the Piedmont garrison was made up of Italian troops.

San Secondo returned to Italy in 1546, leaving his son Troilo to command his regiment, and died in August 1547. He seems to have quarrelled seriously with the Strozzi and at the end of the reign it was Piero Strozzi who commanded the Italians, assuring Francis I that he could provide 7 or 8000 (mainly light horse) in the event of war.<sup>224</sup> Strozzi, who had been in French service for some years along with his brother Leone, prior of Capua, was assured of his pension in 1542.<sup>225</sup> He had taken part in the summer campaign of 1545 against the English in the Channel, quarrelling with Annebault over strategy.<sup>226</sup> Strozzi was colonel of the Italian infantry of the ‘old bands’ in Piedmont and in 1547 had 2400 men under his command.<sup>227</sup> In 1551 he had five captains: his own lieutenant Cornelio Bentivoglio, who had left imperial for French service before 1547,<sup>228</sup> Francesco Chiamonte, a Neapolitan who had deserted Savoyard service for France in 1536, Giovanni da Torino, a Florentine originally of the household of Cardinal Ippolito de Medici, Moretto Calabrese, who had been in French service since 1543 and one Vincent

219 Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, pp. 199, 211, 217; Picot, *Les Italiens*, p. 28.

220 *CAF*, VII, 340, 24945.

221 Picot, *Les Italiens*, pp. 36–7; Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 172; Francis I to San Secondo, 2 Nov. 1544, Pierpoint Morgan Library (from Azzolini Collection).

222 BN fr. 25792, nos. 497, 503, 510, 512; BN fr. 25798, no. 427.

223 AS Modena, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, pp. 170–2.

224 HHSA, Frankreich 14, Berichte 1547, III, fo. 31v.

225 Villebon, Archives de L'Aubespine, liasse 20.

226 AS Modena, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, pp. 214–38.

227 Lyublinskaya, *Документы*, no. 85.

228 *Ibid.*, no. 102.



Taday.<sup>229</sup> Later, Ludovico Birago was colonel in Strozzi's absence and governor of Chivasso, Verolengo and Santhia.<sup>230</sup> Strozzi, killed at Thionville, received accolades from Brantôme for his military learning, mathematical skill and organizational ability.<sup>231</sup>

The dominating presence of foreign troops might seem to give the French army of the Renaissance a 'pre-modern' air. This is deceptive. Mercenaries were engaged because they were the best men available and, despite the famous problems, they avoided training systems that were beyond the state to undertake at this stage. All other major monarchies employed them and, usually, they did their job effectively.

<sup>229</sup> Villars, p. 513; Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, pp. 212n, 233n, 405n.

<sup>230</sup> Villars, p. 931.

<sup>231</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 675.

## 6

### The Artillery Revolution, Fortifications and Siege Warfare

During the first half of the 16th century, there were two major French frontier zones subject to continuous tension, Picardy in the north and, from 1536, Piedmont in the south-east. Neither had clearly or easily defensible frontiers, even though treaties and conventions marked them in detail. From 1552, the acquisition of Metz, Toul and Verdun in imperial territory added a new defensive complex. Major efforts in terms of fortification and defence were thus required. The impact of new weaponry in the period made this all immensely more costly and complex.

#### Artillery

The development of artillery warfare in the second half of the 15th century placed France in the forefront of a revolution in a domain that had for centuries given the advantage to the defensive. Territory had been held by networks of strongholds, in which the arts of castle-building had reached summits of complexity. The appearance of artillery during the 14th century had begun to present opportunities but it was the development of the iron cannon-ball in the 15th that transformed artillery and in a few decades rendered the fortifications inherited from the past virtually useless unless seriously updated.<sup>1</sup> The evolution of fortification was directly related to the development of the state's artillery resources. These played a key role in driving out the English in the mid-15th century but were massively augmented during the period, from the late-15th to mid-16th centuries, that corresponded with the Italian and Habsburg-Valois wars. Did artillery and the consequent changes in fortification also contribute to a 'revolution' in the relationship between the state and war? Great feudal princes had long taken responsibility for the maintenance and extension of fortifications in their domains and in many ways the expertise involved was built upon in the 16th

<sup>1</sup> K. DeVries, 'The Use of Gunpowder Weaponry by and against Joan of Arc during the Hundred Years War', *War and Society*, 14 (1996); R.L.C. Jones, 'The State of Fortification in Lancastrian Normandy, 1417-50', unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford, 1994; C.J. Rogers, 'The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years' War', *Journal of Military History*, 57 (1993).

century. However, the heavy costs of artillery fortifications ultimately concentrated control in the hands of the crown.

Though Benedetti in 1496 noted the role of French artillery (*tormenta*) at Fornovo, it was Guicciardini who signalled the lasting reputation of the French artillery train as decisive in the Italian campaign of 1494–5.<sup>2</sup> According to him, the great French bronze cannons were so numerous and deadly as to render most existing fortification useless. This has to be qualified. In reality there were not so many great cannons in the train but the ruthlessness and rapidity with which they were deployed was startling. Mobility, derived from the smaller size of bronze cannons that fired iron shot, and the manoeuvrability of pieces cast with trunions and mounted on horse-drawn wheeled carriages, enabled them to be fired rapidly.<sup>3</sup> The French artillery train used teams of between 11 and 25 horses, in place of the oxen or even manpower of Italy. It therefore combined fire-power with rapidity and manoeuvrability. Italy was not completely denuded of modern fortifications and the ‘terror’ effect of French artillery was the result of some lucky successes.<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the effect can hardly be denied. Comynnes gives a vivid account of the importance of artillery in Charles VIII’s 1494 expedition. The enemy was poorly provided with artillery ‘and in France it had never been so well understood.’<sup>5</sup> On his return from Naples, Charles marched his army rapidly, trying to reach the safety of Asti and also to secure the position of his *avant-garde* at Fornovo. The problem of getting the guns across the Appenines was formidable and there was much discussion about whether to leave it behind. Some wanted to do so but the King would have none of it. For once, the Swiss volunteered to do the hard work, hauling the 14 great guns up and down the steep tracks in teams of a hundred at a time.<sup>6</sup> In 1499, the French artillery train surprised the garrison of La Rocca d’Arazzo near Asti with the rapidity by which it was placed at the ditches in order to demolish the walls. They had expected a more ceremonious form of siege according to tradition. At Alessandria, in d’Auton’s vivid language, it was as if ‘the furies of hell issued from their stygian depths ... as though Vulcan was striking all the hammers of his forge ... the appalling tempestuous thunder.’ The artillery at Canosa (Puglia) in 1502 is described as an ‘noisy storm’ and a ‘thunderbolt’.<sup>7</sup> Much depended on the accurate planting of artillery and its placement as close to the fortifications as possible. For this, it was necessary first to sweep the crenellations with smaller pieces so that the besieged could not disturb the firing of the great cannons.

The Kings of France lavished attention on their artillery, none more so than

<sup>2</sup> Benedetti, *Diaria*, pp. 81, 55, 89, 91; F. Guicciardini, *The History of Italy*, tr. Goddard, 10 vols (London, 1753–56), I, pp. 148–9; ed. Hale, pp. 152–3.

<sup>3</sup> J. Bergue, M. Decker and B. Sevestre, ‘A Propos de l’église d’Assier’, *Bulletin de la Société des études du Lot*, 107 (1986).

<sup>4</sup> S. Pepper, ‘Castles and Cannon in the Naples Campaign of 1494–95’, in Abulafia (ed.), *The French Descent*, pp. 263–93.

<sup>5</sup> Comynnes, III, p. 50; Delaborde, *L’Expédition de Charles VIII*, p. 402.

<sup>6</sup> Comynnes, III, pp. 160–1.

<sup>7</sup> D’Auton, I, pp. 20, 55, II, pp. 284–5.

Charles VIII, in an age when great artillery pieces were given individual names.<sup>8</sup> By the reign of Francis I, though, a degree of standardisation was attained. The artillery of his reign is known from at least 22 surviving pieces as well as various depictions. Bronze artillery, the most reliable, existed in four calibres:<sup>9</sup>

Category	Weight (tonnes)	Calibre (mm.)	Ball (kg.)	Length (cal.)
<i>Canon royal</i>	1.9	177–80	19	16
<i>Grande coulevrine</i>	1.8	136–42	9	20–21
<i>Coulevrine bâtarde</i>	1.2	100–110	4	26–32
<i>Coulevrine moyenne</i>	0.6	77–82	1.5	35–38

The *canon royal* was the major siege piece. The culverin and ‘bastard’ culverin (*coulevrine*) were longer and thinner and, for the technical reason that the breach was cast more strongly, possible to charge more heavily. They were therefore more accurate at longer range. The ‘medium’ culverin was a lighter version of the long gun. The ‘faucon’ and ‘fauconneau’ were more like anti-personnel weapons. Other pieces are recorded but seem to have been obsolete by this time: the heaviest was the *basilisque*, 8–9000 pounds, firing an 80 lb. ball, then the serpentine cannon, 8 to 10 feet long and calibre of 110–140 mm. and weighing about 6–8000 pounds, firing a 42-pound iron ball. Around 1500, advances were made in the precision and range of artillery resulting both from improvements in powder manufacture and the casting of cannon. Henri II issued an ordinance on calibres in 1550 but it was not until 1572 that standard calibres were finally established for French artillery: cannon (balls of 20 kg.), culverin (2.5–10 kg.) and falcon (1–2 kg.) for, respectively, effecting breaches, destroying parapets and sweeping defenders.<sup>10</sup> However, it is clear that French artillery was manufactured according to standard patterns by the reign of Francis, marked by the King’s personal emblem (the salamander in this case) and his monogram.<sup>11</sup>

A speed of 300 m./per second and 50 m. distance for assault batteries was then attained and not much overtaken until the 18th century. Batteries therefore had to be placed fairly close to fortresses. Frequency of fire had in the past been limited (especially for the massive siege cannon) to one shot an hour per cannon. By the early 16th century the interval between shots was down to 15 minutes and then an average of 5 rounds an hour was achieved.<sup>12</sup> Even so, artillery could not always be guaranteed to achieve the objective. An observer of the siege of Dinant in 1554 reported that 3000 artillery rounds had been fired over two days against a

<sup>8</sup> P. Contamine, ‘L’Imaginaire de la guerre médiévale. Les noms propres de canons dans l’espace français au XVe et au début du XVIe siècle’, in *L’Homme armé en Europe XIV siècle–XVIe siècle, Cahiers d’études et de recherches du musée de l’Armée*, 3 (2002), p. 196.

<sup>9</sup> S. Leluc, ‘L’Artillerie du règne de François Ier. Essai d’une approche typologique’, in *L’Homme armé en Europe*, pp. 205–15.

<sup>10</sup> N. Faucherre, *Places fortes. Bastion du pouvoir* (Paris, 2000), p. 21.

<sup>11</sup> Leluc, ‘L’Artillerie’, pp. 209–10.

<sup>12</sup> See J.F. Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1974); Vaux de Foletier, *Galiot de Genouillac*, p. 41.

'miserable castle' and still it could only be taken by surrender.<sup>13</sup> An eye-witness to the siege of Thionville in 1558 wrote of 30,000 artillery rounds before the town surrendered.<sup>14</sup>

As for quantities of artillery on campaign, we have a number of surveys in the early 16th century. Jean d'Auton lists the pieces taken by the army to Naples in 1501: 12 great cannons and 24 falcons.<sup>15</sup> In the battles around Genoa in 1507, French artillery was dragged uphill with cables so that 8 large cannons and 30 culverins could sweep the Genoese positions.<sup>16</sup> D'Auton made a special journey to record the artillery used for the siege of Genoa in 1507 held at Rivarolo: there were 6 'great serpentine' cannons, 4 'bastard' culverins, 9 medium culverins, 8 falcons, 50 arquebuses à croq easy to carry on the backs of pioneers. Added to this were carts and 406 horses brought from the *élections* of France.<sup>17</sup> A protocol for an artillery company, both in the field and for sieges, drawn up in the 1520s, lists 12 serpentines, 8 *grands coulevrines*, 8 *bâtards*, 8 *moyennes* and 140 arquebuses à croq with 6400 balls.<sup>18</sup>

The development of artillery, as Philippe Contamine has shown, reflected both the increased financial resources of the state and the development of the necessary industrial technology. In 1469 there were 40 *canoniers du roi*, in 1491 over 100 and by 1541 at least 275. These men were responsible for the manufacture of the royal ordnance. In 1442, 20,000 *livres* of gunpowder were needed for the year, in the 1490s, 100–150,000 and in 1544, 500,000.<sup>19</sup> Grand Master Estrées allocated 50 *milliers* of powder and 4000 cannon balls to Piedmont in 1553.<sup>20</sup> Of the ingredients for gunpowder, carbon and sulphur were purchased in the market, saltpetre was a state enterprise. In 1543, it was reported that 'they have great store of artillery, and as for powdred they have cole and sulphur ynowgh, but very little saltpetre, which at present is one of their great sollicitudes, and they go about earnestly for the recovery of the same.' In an ordinance of 1544, 300 *salpêtrières* were set up, the state established a monopoly and exports were forbidden. The major cities were required to ensure a constant supply of it.<sup>21</sup> A national allocation list for the provision of saltpetre was drawn up around 1544–5 for 803 *milliers* of saltpetre, divided into three zones based on the generalities: Outre-Seine at 213 *milliers*, Languedoil at 334 and Languedoc at 250. The largest cities were allocated vast sums: Paris at 50 *milliers*, Rouen at 30 and Lyon at 20 but a score of cities were allocated 4

<sup>13</sup> BL Add. 38032, fo. 301r.

<sup>14</sup> *Mémoires de Guise*, p. 425.

<sup>15</sup> D'Auton, II, p. 13.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, p. 218.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 229–31. Florange exaggerates: cf. *Mémoires*, ed. Buchon, p. 222.

<sup>18</sup> P. Contamine, 'Un Seigneur de la Renaissance: Jacques de Genouillac, dit Galiot, maître de l'artillerie et grand écuyer de France', in *François Ier du château de Cognac au trône de France* (Cognac, 1996), pp. 277–94, at p. 290.

<sup>19</sup> P. Contamine, 'Les Industries de guerre dans la France de la Renaissance: l'exemple de l'artillerie', *RH*, 271 (1984), pp. 249–80; see also R.J. Knecht, 'The Duke of Argyll's Cannon', *History Scotland*, (March–April 2008), pp. 21–9.

<sup>20</sup> BL Add. 38032, fos. 266v, 290r.

<sup>21</sup> *St.P.*, IX, p. 289; BN fr. 16691, fos. 257–361. AC Clermont-Ferrand, C, iii, e, nos. 2 and 3, royal letters of 1537, 1544, 1547 and 1557. *CAF*, III, pp. 443–4, 472, 478, 520, 546 and *passim*; IV, pp. 694, 699, 773 and *passim*.

*milliers* and above and many more smaller contributions.<sup>22</sup> Cities themselves acted as stores for artillery. When most royal artillery had been sent to the Channel fleet in the summer of 1545, Francis I ordered the seizure of pieces in towns throughout Burgundy, Champagne, Picardy and Ile-de-France.<sup>23</sup>

The artillery surveyed on the northern frontier in 1544 consisted of 1,012 pieces (including 42 large cannons) and this probably represents one third of the total. It was valued was 150,000 *lt.* but it has been estimated that the total capital value of the entire royal artillery was then 500,000, or one twentieth of the royal revenues at that time.<sup>24</sup> Arsenals for the store of artillery were created in the major cities; the Paris artillery compound was taken over by the King in 1533, when he annexed a property attached to the Celestins near the Bastille. This was to become the nucleus of the royal Arsenal and serious building work began there in 1547, when Henri II commissioned Philibert de L'Orme to design it. Eleven other arsenals were created in 1540 alone.<sup>25</sup> At the start of the war with the Emperor in 1521, the King called for the expansion of his artillery on the eastern frontier by 12 cannons, 4 bastard culverins and 4 *moyennes*. In 1533, the gun founder Etienne Tanneguy cast around 100 new guns.<sup>26</sup> At the end of his reign, Francis I ordered the founding at Paris of new artillery, around 80 large and medium pieces.<sup>27</sup>

The administration of the royal ordnance was in the hands of the *maître et capitaine-général*, already sometimes called *grand maître de l'artillerie*.<sup>28</sup> The first half of the 16th century saw the dominance of a number of highly professional artillery captains. Jacques Galiot was born at Genouillac in Quercy in 1465 and was nephew to another Galiot, Louis XI's grand master (1479, d.1493), who unofficially adopted him and ushered him into a career at court. The first Galiot was succeeded as grand master by Guinot de Lauzières, whose senechalcy of Armagnac was taken over by the younger Galiot, by now one of the close favourites and chambellan of Charles VIII. He took part in the Naples expedition as captain of 25 lances and gained his first experience with serious artillery. Paul de Benserade, *premier maître* or *capitaine* on the Genoa expedition, followed Lauzières in 1500. Galiot became in turn grand master of the artillery in May 1512 in succession to Benserade.<sup>29</sup> Galiot de Genouillac was to remain in charge of the royal artillery until he obtained the succession for his son François in 1542, so his career very much mirrors the reign of Francis I. François had been trained up to succeed him by his father, but

<sup>22</sup> BL Add. 23222, fos. 22v–27v.

<sup>23</sup> AM Compiègne BB 20, fos. 85r–87v, demanding 5 medium culverins.

<sup>24</sup> 14 fortresses between Ardres and La Capelle in 1544, BN fr. 5195. 279 pieces between cannon and *fauconneau* were listed. See Contamine, 'Les Industries de guerre', p. 257.

<sup>25</sup> P. Lecestre, *Notice sur l'arsenal royal de Paris jusqu'à la mort de Henry IV* (Paris, 1916), pp. 76–9; C. Grodecki, *Les Travaux de Philibert de L'Orme pour Henri II et son entourage, 1546–1566* (Société de l'Histoire de l'Art français, Archives, n.s. XXXIV) (Nogent-le-Roi, 2000), pp. 15–25.

<sup>26</sup> Vaux de Foletier, *Galiot de Genouillac*, pp. 152–3.

<sup>27</sup> HHSA, Frankreich 14, Berichte 1547, III, fo. 69r.

<sup>28</sup> Vaux de Foletier, *Galiot de Genouillac*, pp. 35–6.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 21–34; Contamine, 'Un Seigneur de la Renaissance: Jacques de Genouillac', pp. 277–94; Florange, *Mémoires*, ed. Buchon, p. 222.

was killed at Ceresole in 1544, so Galiot resumed his duties until his death in 1546. His successor, Jean de Taix, fell foul of the changes that accompanied the start of Henri II's reign. Jean d'Estrées, from the Boulonnais, then took over until his death in 1567. Brantôme stresses his abilities as an artillery commander and his role in the development of cannon-founding, that enabled French cannon by 1558 to fire a hundred rounds without interruption.<sup>30</sup>

The competence of the grand master over the artillery was very wide and brought him a salary of 2000 lt. p.a. plus 500 p.m. on campaign. Like other military officials, he was at the head of a jurisdiction, located in this case at the Louvre, administered by the *bailliage de l'artillerie*. The artillery had a growing complement of technical experts to run it, which, like other aspects of military administration, was divided into an *ordinaire* and *extraordinaire*. Their job was dangerous since, in hard-fought sieges, such as that of Salses in 1503, casualties among the officers and men of the artillery could be serious.<sup>31</sup> By 1552, there were 20 *capitaines de charroi* throughout the provinces and by 1559 even a *capitaine des ponts et bateaux*.<sup>32</sup> The *ordinaire* consisted of a lieutenant, a *trésorier*, *contrôleur*, and *prévôts*. This expanded appropriately in the form of the network of *commissaires de l'artillerie*, who worked with the officials of the *élections* in organising the vast resources of horses and labourers necessary to move artillery in time of war. Many of these *commissaires* were gentlemen of military experience and it was the grand master who allocated the *canoniers* to provinces in conjunction with the governors.<sup>33</sup> The *extraordinaire* included the three *trésoriers des salpêtres*, who concentrated the manufacture of saltpetre by small-scale operators in order to assure maximum supply to the crown. In effect this was to create a royal monopoly. It also included the pioneers.

For individual campaigns, artillery was handled by specially commissioned commanders: Guillaume Legier in the army of 1502 in Italy,<sup>34</sup> Jacques de Sully on the Naples campaign of 1501 and Regnaud de Saint-Chamand, in the same area in 1502.<sup>35</sup> These had a range of experts to assist them.<sup>36</sup> In the Savoy campaign of 1536 and that of Piedmont in October 1537, the artillery was commanded by the Gascon Burie, at the start of a long military career that was to lead to the governorship of Guyenne.<sup>37</sup>

### Fortification of the frontier

Despite the Pyrenees and the Alps, Renaissance France was a country with vulnerable frontiers. Threats even existed along the Pyrenees and the frontier

<sup>30</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, pp. 241–2.

<sup>31</sup> D'Auton, III, p. 222.

<sup>32</sup> Vaux de Foletier, *Galiot de Genouillac*, pp. 182–8; BL Add. 23222: staff described as all 'roturiers privilégiés des tailles' (fo. 3v). BN fr. 20451, fo. 51; BN fr. 4052, fo. 8.

<sup>33</sup> Vaux de Foletier, *Galiot de Genouillac*, pp. 173–4.

<sup>34</sup> D'Auton, III, p. 28.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 13, 278.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, p. 229.

<sup>37</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, p. 328; III, p. 425.



zone of Provence that took shape after 1480. Burgundy, Champagne and Picardy were all regularly subjected to invasions. Opinions differed on the value of a strategy of fortification. One French observer remarked that ‘strongholds are useless.’<sup>38</sup> Others appreciated the changed circumstances posed by new fortification techniques. Monluc, reflecting on the Anglo-imperial invasion plan of 1544, pointed out that:

A united France cannot be conquered without losing a dozen battles, considering its fine nobility and its strongholds. I believe those who say that, Paris taken, France is lost are wrong ... there are so many towns and fortresses in this kingdom that they are enough to swallow up thirty armies, so it would be easy to rally and beat them back before they have conquered others.<sup>39</sup>

Fourquevaux, writing in the 1540s after the Anglo-Imperial invasion, was not so confident:

As for relying on the fact that the frontiers are well provided with strongholds, this is an unsure trust: for, whoever is of master of the open country in such a large country as France, afterwards easily gets control of the towns.<sup>40</sup>

It is possible that he was influenced in this by Machiavelli’s rather ambiguous attitude to fortresses.<sup>41</sup> As late as 1561 a Venetian ambassador thought too many of them still constructed of earthworks.<sup>42</sup>

Despite these conflicting views, military assumptions dictated the construction of a network of fortified *places* along the frontiers of the kingdom. When La Noue discussed military innovations since Roman times, he singled out ‘fortification of strongholds, since artillery was invented.’<sup>43</sup> Francis I stated the problem simply in 1546 when he remarked that ‘in many places there are no mountains or frontiers that stop us entering into war.’<sup>44</sup> During his reign, from Théroouanne in the north to Narbonne in the south, walls were thickened with *terres pleines*, towers taken down and bastions, first of earth, later of brick and stone projected out from the curtain to support artillery and control the terrain.<sup>45</sup> The years from about 1480 to 1560 saw the start of the impact of a European revolution in military architecture that in France was to culminate in the great network of fortifications completed by Vauban. In Italy, the French had begun to encounter modern fortifications, such as those of Canosa in 1502, with ‘great well-pierced bulwarks and deep wide ditches; and thick walls well crenellated.’<sup>46</sup> However, as late as 1537, when Montmorency

<sup>38</sup> Contamine, *Histoire militaire*, I, p. 262.

<sup>39</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, pp. 169–70.

<sup>40</sup> Fourquevaux, *Instructions*, fo. 6r–v.

<sup>41</sup> Not so much in the *Arte della Guerra*, as in *Il Principe*, chapter 20, which expresses scepticism on whether fortresses are effective in holding territory. See J.R. Hale, *Renaissance War Studies* (London, 1983), pp. 189–210.

<sup>42</sup> Firpo, *Relazioni*, V, p. 422.

<sup>43</sup> La Noue, *Discours politiques et militaires*, discours 15, p. 333.

<sup>44</sup> Francis I to Mesnage, 28 Feb. 1546: Pierpoint Morgan Library, MA 147.

<sup>45</sup> N. Tommaseo, *Relations des ambassadeurs vénitiens sur les affaires de France*, 2 vols (Paris, 1838), II, p. 13.

<sup>46</sup> D’Auton, II, p. 283.

was besieging the castle of Villane in Piedmont, the planting of two cannons on a distant hill was enough to breach the walls quickly since the place was not 'rampired' and could not be since there was no supply of earth within it to build *terres-pleins*.<sup>47</sup>

Vauban in effect systematised and strengthened a network of fortresses that had begun in the later 15th and early 16th centuries.<sup>48</sup> The destruction of early modern fortifications in the 19th and 20th centuries, though, poses some problems. We are left with some plans and, fortunately, in recent years a growing serious scholarly interest, aided by archaeology. It is now possible, therefore, to be much more specific about the role of France in the early phase of the artillery revolution. At first, the refortification of cities was impossibly expensive and both crown and nobles worked to transform castles to meet the threat. Examples of this were the Luxembourg family's castle at Ham in Picardy, transformed in the 1470s into an up-to-the-minute artillery-proof fortress with walls 10 m. thick and low round bastions (the *tour du connétable*, built around 1480, had walls 11 m. thick) and the Croy fortress of Montcornet in the Ardennes. It became necessary to mount artillery on castle walls and, given the existing structures, this proved impossible without the reinforcement of vaults and construction of openings for cannon. A classic example of this is the castle of Bonaguil in Quercy, restructured for artillery by the Fumel family in the 15th century, where the outer curtain wall was lowered and equipped with *fausses braies*, in effect outer artillery emplacements. Platforms were constructed to mount artillery; next came the siting of artillery on bulwarks (*boulevards*) outside the old fortification, protected by works that would develop into the later ravelins. All this was a temporary phase. Castles alone were inadequate to defend territory against the new artillery. In the case of Hesdin, held by the French for much of the time between 1521 and 1553, the town was hopelessly indefensible and the strength of the place was in the castle, its great towers converted into artillery platforms. This, though, could not in itself hold out against a determined artillery siege.<sup>49</sup>

In the last decade of the 15th century and the first of the 16th, the innovations of engineers such as the San Gallos and Michele San Michele opened the way to a complete overhaul of fortification that solved the problems of emplacement of artillery and of flanking fire by developing the system of angle bastions. The development of printing allowed the rapid diffusion of treatises on architecture. Two treatises on war written at the start of the 16th century, otherwise heavily indebted to Vegetius, both indicate the practical importance of preparation for artillery sieges in France even before the impact of Italian theories. In 1502, Balsac's *Nef des batailles* could spell out as a matter of course the main lines.<sup>50</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, p. 430.

<sup>48</sup> D. Buisseret, *Ingénieurs et fortifications avant Vauban. L'organisation d'un service royal aux XVIe–XVIIe siècles* (Paris, 2002).

<sup>49</sup> P. Martens, 'La Destruction de Théroouanne et d'Hesdin par Charles Quint en 1553', in G. Bliet, P. Contamine, C. Corvisier, N. Faucherre and J. Mesqui (eds), *La Forteresse à l'épreuve du temps. Destruction, dissolution, dénaturation, xie–xxe siècle* (Paris, 2007), pp. 63–120, at p. 84.

<sup>50</sup> Bib.II, 87b, fo. 60r; Bérault Stuart, *Traité sur l'art de la guerre*, ed. E. de Comminges (The Hague, 1976), p. 17.



Map 5. Fortification of the Frontier, c. 1500–1560.

Philippe de Clèves-Ravestein recalled his experience of the siting of artillery when serving in France. His description of siege-works and fortification shows most of the preoccupations associated with later artillery works.<sup>51</sup>

The start of Francis I's reign saw a serious programme of fortification. In the initial stages, the use of earth ramparts and bastions reinforced by tree-trunks – a natural development of the *terre-plein* designed to reinforce curtain walls subjected to artillery assault – was most common, cheaper and also very resistant to artillery. It was, of course, liable to severe weathering. Some brick was used for facing and stone only for angles and revetments. A distinction should be noted in the terminology of the time between *plateformes* and *bouleverts* (more properly, bastions). *Plateformes* usually involved the construction of earthen circular mounds within the ramparts at strategic positions most useful for the emplacement of artillery. By the mid-16th century, these would be complemented by the construction of

<sup>51</sup> Bib.II, 122a, pp. 49, 120–2.

*boulevarts* in the Italian style, projecting beyond the ramparts, which could give protection to them from outside. The face of the bastion was usually designed to slope slightly backwards in a *talus* to prevent land-slips and reduce the impact of cannon balls. The earth used was taken from the vastly increased moats bounded by walls and counter-scarps. Artillery could be lodged in vaulted compartments within the bastions. There was still scope for experimentation, though, in the first half of the 16th century.

The design of bastions that was characteristic of the early reign of Francis I was circular; great round bastions still survive at Bayonne, Le Havre, Mézières, Langres and Toulon from this period.<sup>52</sup> There were some presentational reasons for this. In cities, it may have been preferable to impose the presence of the King's power by such fortresses, rather than by bastions sunk into defensive ditches that would not be nearly so visible.<sup>53</sup> The problem with this design was increasingly apparent, in that the round bastion inevitably left 'dead ground' in front, unprotected by covering fire from neighbouring towers. This was the problem the 'angle bastion' effectively solved from the 1540s onwards and by the mid-16th century the most common form of this was the angle bastion with 'ears' (*orillons*). Thus, the work undertaken in the later years of Francis I and early in the reign of Henri II took on a new urgency. After the war of 1536–8, masonry was collapsing at Doullens (considered indefensible) and Théroüanne. In January–February 1538, Jean de Saint-Remy was sent with Jean d'Humières to inspect these places and the King wanted the restoration work completed during the truce. Large sums of money were allocated for this.<sup>54</sup> Henri II was heard to declare in April 1547 that 'he wants to employ part of his revenues in the fortification of the frontiers,' especially in view of his fears of an imperial invasion.<sup>55</sup>

### Zones of Fortification

The frontier zones will be surveyed in anti-clockwise order, starting with the south-west. In Guyenne, Menault Daguerre was sent in 1483 to report on the state of fortifications.<sup>56</sup> It was the border guarded by Bayonne and Bordeaux that seemed to be most threatened. Work started at Bayonne in 1510 (**Plan 1**). At Bordeaux, two fortresses, Château-Trompette and Château du Hâ, were begun under Charles VII though still incomplete by 1470; Louis XII gave orders for the repair of Trompette in 1501.<sup>57</sup> Both fortresses were irregular rectangles fortified by round, horse-shoe shaped and square towers with the curtain-walls exceptionally thick and artillery-proof, some of them protected by *fausse-braies*. One

<sup>52</sup> N. Faucherre, 'Louis XII, François Ier et la défense des côtes provençales', *Bulletin monumental*, 151 (1992), 293–301.

<sup>53</sup> N. Faucherre and J.-P. Brighelli, *Le Château d'If et les forts de Marseille* (Paris, 1999), p. 38.

<sup>54</sup> BN fr. 3044, fos. 14–15; BN fr. 20500, fo. 75.

<sup>55</sup> HHSA, Frankreich 14, Berichte 1547, IV, fo. 27v.

<sup>56</sup> P. Roudié, 'Documents sur la fortification des places fortes de Guyenne au début du XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle', *Annales du Midi*, 72.i (1960), 43–57.

<sup>57</sup> BN fr. 26107, no. 298.

innovation was the great semi-circular bastion protecting the Trompette sea gate. (**Plate 23**) A German engineer, Jean de Coulogne, began work on the deepening of the town ditches in 1525. In the same year, an Italian, Anchise de Boulogne, who had earlier worked at Narbonne and Toulouse, came to plan what was one of the first proper artillery bastions in France, the 'boulevard Sainte-Croix.' This was a massive polygonal work, 200 m. around, about 12 m. high and 8 m. thick linked to the main rampart by a drawbridge and with wings of the type later to be called *orillons*. It was completed by 1535.<sup>58</sup> In 1537, bastions were built at Dax, in 1538 at Libourne and in 1542 at Narbonne. All these were probably designed by Fabrice Siciliano, a 'gentleman and engineer' of Naples.<sup>59</sup> Siciliano certainly designed Henri d'Albret's great fortress of Navarrenx between 1542 and 1549, with four great bastions with *orillons* (still surviving). The Albret regime ploughed substantial resources into the strengthening of this place.<sup>60</sup> (**Plate 27, ii; Plan 2**)

In the eastern Pyrenees, Narbonne, Béziers and Carcassonne were threatened from the 1490s by the construction of the new Spanish artillery fortress at Salses just over the frontier in Roussillon, a formidable fortress where, as one report had it during the French siege in 1503, 'the wall is so thick that artillery cannot do what one would wish.'<sup>61</sup> Work on this scale was beyond the means of municipal authorities, as Louis XII recognised by his enquiry of 1503. Louis acquired Narbonne by exchange with Gaston de Foix in 1507 and a programme of refortification began in 1510. The town was freed from some of its *tailles* for successive years and the crown made financial contributions to the work. There were also extra levies on the Estates of Languedoc of 20–25,000 lt. p.a., generating some resentment and grumbling over several years, unsurprising in view of the fact that they had contributed some 700,000 lt. by 1559.<sup>62</sup> The curtain wall at Narbonne was reinforced under Louis XII and it was under Francis I that the stone-finished network of bastions ornamented with antique sculptures and the fine royal gate with the royal emblems was finished. The reconstruction of the port of Aigues-Mortes was also undertaken at this time.<sup>63</sup>

Provence was in urgent need of defence, invaded as it was in 1524 and 1536. In 1519 Francis I visited the works on the great tower at Toulon, started by Louis XII in 1513. Between 1524 and 1536 a new defensive scheme for Marseille was constructed. This consisted of the Château d'If and the fortress of Notre-Dame de la Garde. The Château d'If, designed to deal with the weaknesses revealed by

<sup>58</sup> Roudié, 'Documents sur la fortification des places fortes de Guyenne', *passim*.


<sup>59</sup> Contamine, *Histoire militaire*, I, pp. 270–1.

<sup>60</sup> C. Desplat and P. Tucoo-Chala, *Navarrenx* (Pau: Société des Sciences et lettres de Béarn, 1981); Faucherre, *Places fortes*, p. 25. For works on this place, see the numerous references in AD Pyrénées-Atlantiques, C 681, 692 (Etablissements de Béarn, 1521–47, 1548–76), *passim*.

<sup>61</sup> Bibliothèque de l'Institut de France, Godefroy 255, fo. 5.

<sup>62</sup> P. Solon, 'War and the *Bonnes Villes*: the Case of Narbonne, c.1450–1550', *PWSFH*, 17 (1990), 65–73; *Ord.Fr.I*, III, pp. 148–9.

<sup>63</sup> Contamine, *Histoire Militaire*, pp. 266–7; R. Cairou, *Narbonne, vingt siècles de fortifications* (Narbonne, 1979); Faucherre, 'Louis XII, François Ier', pp. 293–301. Aigues-Mortes: *Ord.Fr.I*, III, pp. 149, 260–2.



Plan 1. Bayonne.


Bourbon's siege of 1524, was started in 1529 and initially completed in 1531. Though its value was at first limited by the short range of its artillery, it certainly dissuaded an imperial attack by sea in 1536. The core of the fortress was a massive artillery tower, designed in an archaic style with circular towers at each corner but ordered in three levels of casemates with careful ventilation for cannon. The tower could effectively sweep the sea lanes at the entrance to the harbour. Du Bellay recounted that, on the arrival of Clement VII in 1533, there were 300 artillery pieces in the fortress. An important function was also to protect the Mediterranean galley fleet, consisting of 17 galleys in 1526, 23 in 1536 and 42 in 1548. Provence was obviously cruelly exposed by the inadequacy of its fortifications in 1536 and one of the first actions of Francis was to despatch Guillaume du Bellay to survey the work of refortification that was needed.<sup>64</sup> This included the bastioned fortress on the hill above Marseille at the vantage-point of Notre-Dame de la Garde, which included one of the earliest angle bastions built in France, that of la Vigie.<sup>65</sup> The first fully bastioned fortress was begun at Saint-Paul de Vence, possibly by Jean de Saint-Remy in 1537, to cover the invasion route by land from Nice,<sup>66</sup> while Arles,

<sup>64</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, pp. 318–19.

<sup>65</sup> Faucherre and Brighelli, *Le Château d'If*, *passim*.

<sup>66</sup> Contamine, *Histoire militaire*, I, p. 271; Faucherre, *Places fortes*, p. 16.





Plan 2. Navarrenx.

Avignon, Beaucaire, Gap, Marseille, Sisteron and Tarascon were all provided with bastions in this period. This was also the period when Montmorency oversaw the great military camp near Avignon, the work of the prince of Melfi and Stefano Colonna.<sup>67</sup> In 1546, Francis I appointed Jean de Saint-Remy, to survey the fortifications of Provence. He had already been a member of his military household and had already worked in Picardy, Languedoc and Burgundy as well as at the siege of Perpignan in 1542.<sup>68</sup> The care taken over design is shown by Saint-Remy's letters, in which he asked for the return of his plans for Quirieu in Dauphiné, having realised that they would not prevent the enemy from approaching and undermining the bastion he had designed.<sup>69</sup> It is in this period that the four-bastioned Fort-Carré at Antibes was begun, probably also designed by Saint-Remy, and where the surviving bastions with *orillons* facing the sea strongly resemble Navarrenx. (**Plan 3**) In Dauphiné, Briançon and the castles of Exilles, Quirieu and Château Dauphin were being equipped with bastions in the 1540s, the latter at first under the supervision of Saint-Remy. In 1552, the bastions at Exilles were being redesigned, to cover each other with artillery fire, by an engineer called 'Monsieur Antoine.'<sup>70</sup>


<sup>67</sup> Hale, *Renaissance War Studies*, p. 81.

<sup>68</sup> H. Vérin, *La Gloire des ingénieurs, l'intelligence technique du XVIe au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris, 1993), p. 120.

<sup>69</sup> Leblanc, 'Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron', (1893), pp. 74–5.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, (1888), pp. 180–3 (on 1546); (1890), pp. 358–9 (on 1552); (1893), pp. 24–5, 64–5, 74–5; BL Add. 38032, fo. 206v.





Plan 3. Antibes, Fort Carré

One of the major preoccupations of the crown between 1536 and 1559 was the maintenance of fortifications in Savoy-Piedmont. This was a massive commitment, which involved the improvement of the existing elaborate works at Turin, Carmagnola, Moncalieri and a host of small castles in the marquessate of Saluzzo (held by force by the French after the client marquesses became unreliable). These were necessary for the control of territory abutting Lombardy. While Savoy was attached to Dauphiné and more easily defended, Piedmont and its capital of Turin were much more exposed, the more so as the 1544 peace of Crépy had entailed handing back a range of fortresses to the Habsburgs.<sup>71</sup> (Map 6) The territory between Turin and Milan marked by the Po, Tanaro and Ticino rivers was shared between French and imperial commanders in isolated fortresses, such as Casalborgnone, Villanova and others further south such as Bene and Mondovì. Up to 1551, the imperial forces in Milan occupied Chieri and Vulpiano (almost at the gates of Turin), so that the route from Turin to Chivasso was threatened. The Habsburgs also controlled Lanzo, near the route between Turin and the pas de Suse into Dauphiné. At Barge, the Habsburgs held the castle and the French the town. The King and the *conseil privé* viewed a series of plans for works in the region in June 1547 and 20,000 lt. p.m. were allocated. In November of that year Melfi listed ‘ditches, walls, bastions, terreplains and platforms’ as part of the agenda and needed 35,000 immediately. By April 1548, 25,000 lt. had been spent, at a time

<sup>71</sup> See Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 272; Lyublinskaya, Документы, no. 14; Villars, p. 559.

when no money had been sent for gunpowder for 14 months.<sup>72</sup> Piedmont was very difficult to defend until the energetic moves by Brissac at the start of war in 1551 secured places such as Chieri, San Damiano, Vercelli, Verrua and Casale (captured by Jacques de Salvoison in 1554).

In the East, Burgundy was highly exposed since there was no serious frontier between it and Franche-Comté until 1493. Louis XI's fortifications along the Saône in Burgundy have been seen as the earliest attempt to create a 'frontier zone' as later understood. This involved the fortification of places from Mâcon to Auxonne, with the strengthening of Dijon and Beaune as the inner defence. These became more important with the loss of Franche-Comté in 1493 and the emergence of this region as the effective frontier.<sup>73</sup> At Auxonne, Louis equipped the citadel with four massive artillery towers and a bastion covering the gate.<sup>74</sup> At Dijon, the castle was rebuilt after 1477 with two massive semi-circular artillery towers equipped with the latest ventilation systems. The work in some ways anticipated the Spanish fortress of Salses in the Pyrenees (1497).<sup>75</sup> **(Plan 4)** At Mâcon, the Boulimard and la Porcherie bastions, evidently round artillery towers, had been begun in the 1460s under the Burgundian dukes.<sup>76</sup> After 1500 work started on the strengthening of Dijon, Auxonne and Beaune. Threats posed by Maximilian to the frontier of Burgundy in 1501 indicated the danger.<sup>77</sup> Even so, at the time of the Swiss invasion of 1513 the walls of Dijon were inadequate.<sup>78</sup> In 1515, work started on the 'Saint-Pierre bastion' at Dijon and others at Chalon (1515) and Autun (1536). Later in the reign of Francis I, Girolamo Bellarmato was particularly active in Burgundy. In Autumn 1546, Francis aimed to visit the frontier of Champagne and Burgundy, 'to see how effectively the fortifications he had ordered had been carried out.' The places involved included Chalon,<sup>79</sup> Bourg-en-Bresse, Beaune, Dijon, Langres, Ligny and Saint-Dizier.<sup>80</sup> From 1547, the works at Dijon were completely overhauled with a system of bastions and artillery ramparts.<sup>81</sup> Further south, the security of Lyon was a constant preoccupation in view of the complexity of the site for enclosure. Nevertheless, Saint-Remy was able to construct some artillery positions and casemates.<sup>82</sup>

In the north and north-east, the strong points were based on existing towns though in some cases, as at Le Câtelet on the northern frontier, new specially designed fortresses were built in the Italian manner. In Champagne, though Mouzon had

<sup>72</sup> Lyublinskaya, *Документы*, no. 13, p. 141.

<sup>73</sup> Buisseret, *Ingénieurs*, p. 12; H. Drouot, *Mayenne et la Bourgogne. Etude sur le Ligue, 1587–1596*, 2 vols (Paris, 1937), I, p. 7.

<sup>74</sup> Faucherre, *Places fortes*, p. 16, based on the model in the Musée des plan reliefs.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 17, gives effective plans.

<sup>76</sup> AM Mâcon, EE 8, EE 9.

<sup>77</sup> D'Auton, II, pp. 4–11.


<sup>78</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 36.

<sup>79</sup> Buisseret, *Ingénieurs*, p. 26.

<sup>80</sup> N. Faucherre, 'Le Bastion Saint-Pierre de Chalon-sur-Saône', *Mémoires de la Société d'histoire ... de Chalon-sur-Saône*, 62 (1992–3), 111–27; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 332.

<sup>81</sup> G. Le Hallé, *Histoire des fortifications en Bourgogne* (Amiens, 1990).

<sup>82</sup> Contamine, *Histoire militaire*, I, p. 272.




Plan 4. Castle of Dijon.

been equipped with a bastion by the time of the siege in 1521,<sup>83</sup> the main work took place after the invasion of 1544 when Marini also worked on the fortifications of Saint-Dizier (three new bastions) and the castle of Sainte-Menehould.<sup>84</sup> Martin du Bellay recalled that, in view of the invasion of 1544 and because ‘there was no frontier in his kingdom so ill-provided with strongholds,’ the King in December 1545 gave him the job of inspecting the frontier between Vervins and Coiffy. Du Bellay and Marini together concluded that a fortress was necessary in the 18 leagues open front between La Capelle and Mézières. He recommended Aubenton but the King decided instead on Maubert-Fontaine. Mézières, which had seen the construction of a new artillery bastion, the tour de Bobresse (now de Millard) in 1509, was severely damaged by the three-week siege of 1521 and had to be reconstructed with the aid of tax concessions. In 1544 a massive circular artillery bastion (the tour du roy) was added. (Plate 28) Also in the valley of the Meuse, Mouzon, too, was also refortified, though, as Du Bellay noted, it was difficult to work on because it was overlooked by high ground on the Imperial side of the river Meuse.<sup>85</sup> Hieronimo Marini constructed new fortresses at Maubert-Fontaine (now

<sup>83</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 136.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, p. 326.

<sup>85</sup> A. Sartelet, *Les Fortifications de Mézières, Ardennes* (Langres, 2003); P. Laurent, ‘Mézières pendant la défense de Bayard’, *Variétés historiques ardennaises*, XI (1893); Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 324.



Map 6. French Piedmont.

disappeared) and Rocroi (still extant, though modified). The latter consisted of a regular star-shaped fortress with (originally) 5 'orilloned' bastions. The curtains were of earth but the bastions lightly faced with masonry, as in the case of the Petit-Fort begun in 1545. Work continued with a new contract between Bordillon and a master mason from Senlis in 1555.<sup>86</sup> Near Vitry-en-Perthois, destroyed in 1544 but unsuitable for new works since it was overlooked by three hills, Marini created a new town, Vitry-le-François, based on a grid pattern with orilloned bastions at regular intervals along the ramparts which survived until the 1930s.<sup>87</sup> (Plan 5) Villefranche-sur-Meuse was built to cover the frontier opposite Stenay in Lorraine.<sup>88</sup> At Châlons-sur-Marne, five bastions were constructed from 1534 and new works started in 1552, all of which appear in Tassin's 1636 plan.<sup>89</sup>

<sup>86</sup> M.-F. Barbe, 'L'Étoile de Rocroi', *Vieilles maisons françaises*, 110 (1985), pp. 34–5.

<sup>87</sup> Contamine, *Histoire Militaire*, I, p. 273; P.-E. Cadilhac, 'Les Démolisseurs de Vitry-le-François', *L'illustration*, 199 (1939), pp. 236–7. Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, pp. 332–3.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, p. 325.

<sup>89</sup> E. Barthélemy, *Histoire de la ville de Châlons-sur-Marne* (Châlons-sur-Marne, 1883); Buisseret, *Ingénieurs*, pp. 27–8.

Picardy was an increasingly urgent case for refortification from the early 16th century. As the frontier zone itself began to be consolidated, so certain places came to be viewed as the 'keys' to France.<sup>90</sup> By 1513, Théroouanne, an isolated French position in Habsburg territory, had already been extensively re-fortified. In the 15th century it had been described as the 'evil window through which the French wind issued' into the Low Countries and was often called one of the 'keys to France.' In 1513 it was captured by the English and on its return to France had its fortifications almost totally razed.<sup>91</sup> A completely new programme of works was therefore undertaken on a grand scale. A Milanese observer noted that it was receiving the most up-to-date fortifications 'with many fine bastions ... the ditches are still small but they say that they want to enlarge and deepen them with good scarps.' Work began in 1517, when Francis I came in person to inspect them.<sup>92</sup> It remained an object of constant attention (with recorded work in 1528 and 1534 and after 1537) and, though it was entirely destroyed after 1553, contemporary drawings give some idea of the work. An English plan of the siege of 1553 shows a city equipped with low round artillery bastions (the result of work after 1517) and a large artillery platform on the site of the former castle, 'la Butte'. Some of this work had collapsed in 1537 after the Burgundian siege but was restored during the truce.<sup>93</sup> (Plate 26) Another plan dating from c.1539 shows the only other angled bastion immediately to the south, the 'la Patrouille', probably constructed after 1537 by the Italian Antonio Castello and still being completed in 1543. This was a classic bastion *aux orillons*. At some time by 1553, another bastion, possibly of earth, was constructed to the north-east outside the Saint-Omer gate.<sup>94</sup> Some of these works were perhaps old-fashioned by the middle of the 16th century but they posed a formidable obstacle combined with the ditches fed by the waters of the river Lys. The city fell to a ferocious artillery assault on the curtain wall to the east of 'la Butte'.<sup>95</sup>

At Amiens, new bastions were started on royal orders in the early 1520s. These included a new angled bastion in front of the (northern) Montrécu gate. This replaced an earlier work probably begun under Louis XI in 1471. It took until the

<sup>90</sup> Louis XI on Amiens: 'l'une des clefz de nostre royaume', in A. Thierry, *Recueil des monuments inédits de l'histoire du Tiers Etat*, 4 vols (Paris, 1850–70), II, p. 374; 'le clef de la frontiere de toutes celle de ceste frontiere et celle qui vous sert de boulevard': AN X<sup>1A</sup> 1527, fo. 375r. See also E. d'Orgeix, 'Les Clefs du royaume de France au milieu du xvie siècle. L'exemple des frontières du Nord vu à travers les atlas militaires royaux de la première moitié du xviiie siècle', in A. Marino (ed.), *Fortezze d'Europa* (Rome, 2003), pp. 383–9.


<sup>91</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, p. 40; Martens, 'La Destruction de Théroouanne et d'Hesdin', p. 73.

<sup>92</sup> BL Add. 24180, fo. 30r-v; BN fr. 5500, fo. 254. See also L. Vissière, 'L'Éternel Gambit: Théroouanne sur l'échiquier européen (1477–1559)', *Commission départementale d'histoire et d'archéologie du Pas-de-Calais*, XVIII (2000), 61–106, at pp. 82–4.

<sup>93</sup> BN fr. 3044, fo. 17.

<sup>94</sup> BN fr. 20521, fo. 13; Martens, 'La Destruction de Théroouanne et d'Hesdin', pp. 73–9.

<sup>95</sup> A. Legrand, 'Notice explicative d'un plan du siège de Théroouanne découvert aux archives de la Tour de Londres', *Mémoires de la Société académique de la Morinie*, V (1839–40), pp. 367–409; Abbé Bled, 'Une Ville disparue', *Bulletin historique et philologique du Comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques*, (1894), pp. 191–216. Plan, 1513–18: see *L&P*, I, 4411 (BL Augustus, I, ii, no. 72).



Plan 5. Vitry-le-François.

late 1530s to complete and was a free-standing wedge known as an *éperon*.<sup>96</sup> By 1523 it had *cannonières*, a vault and mine, oak floors and a ‘*moisneau*’ (ravelin) but this was ordered removed by the King when he inspected it in 1524. It also had an *avant-mur* and *glacis* by 1526. Its core was earth but the sandstone (*grais*) lining was 24 feet thick at the base and 12 at the top.<sup>97</sup> The other preoccupation in this period was to take down the towers to the level of the new ramparts and establish artillery platforms, particularly along the stretch from the *vidame* to the Guyencourt tower. In the early 1540s we begin to hear of bastions started outside the Guyencourt tower and the Noyon gate. The former was described as new work in 1549. We know that Henri II had approved work on the Guyencourt bastion during his visit in 1547<sup>98</sup> and that the *échevinage* had viewed drawings in 1547 of

<sup>96</sup> AM Amiens, CC 99, 101, 103, 105, 109 (Durand, *Inventaire sommaire ... Amiens*, IV, pp. 407–27 etc.); E. de Crouy-Chanel, ‘Le Boulevard de la porte de Montrescu d’Amiens (1520–26). Un éclairage sur l’adoption du système bastionné en Picardie sous le règne de François Ier’, in K. de Jonge, N. Faucherre and J. Guillaume (eds), *La Genèse du système bastionné en Europe (1500–1540)*, Actes du Colloque tenu à Tours, 2002 (forthcoming); A. de Calonne, *Histoire de la ville d’Amiens*, 3 vols (Amiens, 1889–1900), I, pp. 487–9.

<sup>97</sup> AM Amiens, CC 103 (Durand, *Inventaire sommaire ... Amiens*, IV, p. 413; II, p. 327; IV, pp. 421, 427).

<sup>98</sup> AM Amiens, EE 269.



an 'éperon devised by him at the Guyencourt tower, to beat the flanks of the ditch from one side as far as the la Haultoye gate and from the other to the Beauvais gate.' Then the painter-surveyor Zaccarie Celliers made more elaborate plans.<sup>99</sup> Work went ahead and the bastion was built of masonry that combined brick and sandstone and by 1550 there was already a vaulted passage for entry into it.<sup>100</sup> The town was again being surveyed for new work by Jean Bullant, *maître maçon* of the town, among others in 1553.<sup>101</sup> (Plan 6) The next new bastion we hear of is that of the Rabuissons, eventually known as that of Longueville, started in 1564.<sup>102</sup>

Ardres, Montreuil, Doullens and Péronne all received attention, the latter especially after the ruins caused by the siege of 1536. The bombardment opposite the castle and St Nicolas gate by 72 cannons in one day alone had led to the destruction of much of the *enceinte* on the north of the town. Total losses, including demolition of houses to shore up the ramparts, were estimated at 300,000 écus in a petition to the crown that led to the perpetual enfranchisement of the town from the *taille* in February 1537.<sup>103</sup> (Plates 24, i; 25) The next decade saw the thorough transformation of the town's defences. It seems that the ruins of the walls left in 1536 were firstly demolished so that the enemy should not make use of the knowledge of them they had gained.<sup>104</sup> In June 1541, there were quarrels between the captain, Feuquières, and Antonio Castello over the design of the new works.<sup>105</sup> The first of the new bastions, probably the one built beyond the ruins of the castle, was 37½ *toises* long, 40 high with the inner angles 4½ *toises*.<sup>106</sup> A new section of rampart was constructed between the old castle and the new wall. A terrace was being built for the rampart between the castle and the new section. Where the ground was rising on this side, the rampart had to be higher, 48 'pieds'.<sup>107</sup>

The other major work was on a new bastion in front of the old Alexandre tower, to be called the Vendôme bastion.<sup>108</sup> In 1547 a mass of earth at the newly-built 'torillon' was cleared.<sup>109</sup> The imminent threat of war brought fresh enquiries by the King about the state of the fortifications in 1551, and 1552 saw work begin again on the ditches.<sup>110</sup> In 1552 there was also a general survey made of the fortifications by the *échevinage*.<sup>111</sup> Money was made available from a royal grant and the *aides* in 1553 to develop the works between the castle and

<sup>99</sup> 26 July 1547: AM Amiens, BB 25 (Durand, *Inventaire sommaire ... Amiens*, II, p. 370); AM Amiens, CC 149 fo. 21r (Durand, *Inventaire sommaire ... Amiens*, IV, p. 487)

<sup>100</sup> AM Amiens, CC 152, fo. 11 (Durand, *Inventaire sommaire ... Amiens*, IV, p. 489); AM Amiens, CC 156, fo. 17 (Durand, *Inventaire sommaire ... Amiens*, IV, p. 494).

<sup>101</sup> AM Amiens, CC 151 (Durand, *Inventaire sommaire ... Amiens*, IV, p. 488); AM Amiens, CC 160, fo. 34 (Durand, *Inventaire sommaire ... Amiens*, IV, p. 501).

<sup>102</sup> AM Amiens, EE 270. See M. Wolfe, 'Building a Bastion in Early Modern History', *PWSFH*, 25 (1998), p. 38.

<sup>103</sup> AM Péronne, AA 44, nos. 1, 2; BN Pic. 174, fos. 37–8.

<sup>104</sup> AM Péronne, BB 9, fo. 239v.

<sup>105</sup> BN fr. 20521, fo. 35.

<sup>106</sup> 14 June 1541: BN fr. 20521, fo. 37.

<sup>107</sup> BN fr. 20521, fo. 39.


<sup>108</sup> BN fr. 20521, fos. 45–6.

<sup>109</sup> AM Péronne, BB 9, fo. 45r.

<sup>110</sup> BN fr. 3134, fo. 29; AM Péronne, BB 9, fo. 185v.

<sup>111</sup> AM Péronne, BB 9, fos. 240r–241r.





Plan 6. Amiens.

Vendôme bastion, but more was needed for the outworks of the Saint-Sauveur gate.<sup>112</sup> The scope of the work is revealed by comparison between the drawing of the siege in the Bibliothèque Sainte-Geneviève and the plan of 1631, which shows the likely placement of orilloned bastions on the north-east and south-east corners of the *enceinte*.<sup>113</sup> Two bastions, built of masonry, were certainly in existence by 1553, one being the Vendôme tower supervised by the duke in 1541, the other the Saint-André bastion.<sup>114</sup> (Plan 7)

Ardres was crucial as the French bulwark against Calais and Guînes. It had been sacked twice in the later 15th century and was described in 1520 as ‘an old town long ago destroyed.’<sup>115</sup> Francis I had the castle and ditches repaired for the Cloth of Gold meeting, transformed later into the *boulevard du Festin*,<sup>116</sup> but this work remained incomplete, since Henry VIII asked Francis to suspend it in the aftermath of the Cloth of Gold meeting.<sup>117</sup> Such work as had been done was ruined again

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, fos. 277v, 300r, 321v.


<sup>113</sup> Buisseret, *Ingénieurs*, pp. 14, 102.

<sup>114</sup> AM Péronne, BB 9, 26 May 1553.

<sup>115</sup> *L&P*, III.i, 869.

<sup>116</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 101.

<sup>117</sup> Barrillon, II, p. 173.



Plan 7. Péronne.

by the Burgundians in 1521 and it was still 'ruined and abandoned' in 1522.<sup>118</sup> It has been suggested that the first angle bastion constructed (and the only one now extant), the Condette (later Royal), was started between 1529 and 1531, in direct line from works at Dijon and Coucy between 1510 and 1520. If so, it would have been the first modern bastion in northern Europe and earlier than most in Italy. In view of the precarious position of the town, serious work may have started a little later and there is certainly more evidence from the later 1530s, especially after the truce of 1538, when relations with England were deteriorating.<sup>119</sup> Work was going on in April 1539 and was intensified in June 1540, when it was reported that 'their fortifying is of stone, fagots, turf and earth and but little brick.'<sup>120</sup> Work was still unfinished in June 1541 but completed by July 1542, though the local captain bemoaned the lack of funds for repairs in June 1543.<sup>121</sup> The Condette bastion was one of the most advanced then constructed in northern Europe, containing three radiating stairways leading to the casemates, themselves ventilated by a counter-mine gallery.<sup>122</sup> (Plans 8a and 8b) A general fortress survey of 1545 prescribes a number of new works: firstly a *terre-plein* between the Gascogne platform and the *logis du Festin* (the western rampart), then the widening of the ditches in several places and finally the closing up of the rampart.<sup>123</sup> Errard's later 16th century

<sup>118</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 133, 247; *L&P*, III.ii, App. 10 and 18; ii, 1568; iii, 1560; A. Le Glay, *Négociations entre la France et l'Autriche*, 2 vols (Paris, 1845), II, pp. 187–92.


<sup>119</sup> *The Lisle Letters*, ed. M. St. Clare Byrne, 6 vols (Chicago, 1981), 5, no. 1317.

<sup>120</sup> *L&P*, XXII (Addenda), 1408; London, NA, SP1/160, fos. 200–1 (*L&P*, XV, 795).


<sup>121</sup> BN fr. 20521, fo. 44; BN fr. 6616, fos. 66–7.

<sup>122</sup> M. Cabal and N. Faucherre, *Ardres, place forte* (Ardres, 1990), p. 12; M. Cabal, *Ardres au XVIe siècle* (Ardres, 1995), pp. 30–3.

<sup>123</sup> BN fr. 5195, fo. 29r; BN fr. 26132, no. 300.



Plan 8a. Ardres.



Plan 8b. Ardres, bastion royal.

plan shows six orilloned bastions and also a horn-work. An English plan of the 1540s indicates two (north and south) completed and two facing west partially completed.<sup>124</sup> Henri II inspected the town in 1547 and the *vidame* de Chartres inspected it after a disastrous fire in 1548. The new work may have been envisaged as a citadel but took the form in fact of an *ouvrage à cornes*, in effect a bastioned outwork on the western side but built only of earth.<sup>125</sup> It may have been these that collapsed in March and November 1558 through the effects of rain.<sup>126</sup>

Montreuil, taken by assault in 1536, was worked on by Antonio Castello and proved strong enough to resist the English siege in 1544. (**Plan 9**) Castello also initiated major work at Le Câtelet, La Capelle and Guise with the latest bastion designs.<sup>127</sup> He persuaded Francis I to refortify Hesdin and Saint-Pol after the campaign of 1537<sup>128</sup> and was surveying Doullens for repairs in 1538. By this time Doullens, Théroouanne and La Capelle were all considered out of date.<sup>129</sup> At Doullens, the castle was remodelled after 1537 as a fortress with four orilloned bastions (still largely intact) designed in a very distinctive style without the slope and bonding ridge typical of other work of this period. (**Plate 27, i**) The work begun at Guise in this period resulted in a fortress with three bastions surrounding the ancient keep (work only now re-emerging from the neglect of generations).<sup>130</sup>

Castello also worked on the refortification of Hesdin after 1537, though this was a difficult place to secure, as its history of capture in 1521, 1537 and 1552–3 shows. He may have been responsible for the one bastion built to defend the lower town that has been identified in plans.<sup>131</sup> Completely new fortresses with four bastions were created at La Capelle and Le Câtelet to cover the frontier in Thiérache and approaches to Saint-Quentin and Péronne.<sup>132</sup> (**Plan 10a and b**) These, again, seem to have been built of earth in the first phase, since there were severe collapses early in 1541 and again early in 1548, through thaws after snow. Little is known about the building process, though, other than their basic plans.<sup>133</sup> The other outstanding fortification enterprise was at Boulogne. This had been surveyed by Siciliano in 1539 but the works, which may have involved some bastions, were not adequate to resist the English in 1544 (though the city was not taken by assault). After that, the main concern was the construction of a network of fortresses to constrict English garrison in the town between 1545 and 1549. This resulted in two major forts, Châtillon and Oultreau, for which a detailed English plan survives. This shows that Oultreau, on the opposite side of the river from Boulogne, though criticised by du Bellay as too far from the harbour to bombard it, was an ambitious five-bastioned

<sup>124</sup> BL Cotton, Augustus, I, ii, 71.

<sup>125</sup> Buisseret, *Ingénieurs*, p. 35; Cabal and Faucherre, *Ardres, place forte*, p. 13; BN Picardie 26, fo. 71v.

<sup>126</sup> BN nafr. 21698, fos. 288–9, 283, 353, 104–5; BN fr. 23192, fos. 358–9.

<sup>127</sup> BN fr. 5195.

<sup>128</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, p. 360.


<sup>129</sup> BN fr. 3035, fo. 15; *CAF*, VIII, 40, 29608.

<sup>130</sup> Buisseret, *Ingénieurs*, pp. 30–1.

<sup>131</sup> Martens, 'La Destruction de Théroouanne et d'Hesdin', pp. 81, 88.

<sup>132</sup> N. Faucherre, *La Capelle, forteresse retrouvée* (Compiègne, 1994). Plans: BN Picardie 26, fo. 152r–v. Work in 1558: BN nafr. 21968, fos. 39–40.

<sup>133</sup> BN fr. 20521, fos. 17, 21–2, 10–11; BN fr. 3035, fo. 88.



Plan 9. Montreuil.

fort designed to the latest specifications (in appearance much like the fort Carré at Antibes). It was designed by a soldier, Antonio Mellone, who was intensely criticised by du Bellay:

Mellone, getting the calculations wrong, had designed his fort with five bastions in a pentagon; and, so that it should be built faster, had made the ditches forty feet wide and eighteen deep, hoping on the inner edge of the ditch just to build a rampart in parapet form for cover, inasmuch as no high ground commanded it. But, with the ditches complete and the earth thrown in to build the parapet, thinking only the faggots and turf were left to add, it was found that his calculations were so short, estimating from bottom to top and forgetting the slope that was necessary, that the bastions were too small and there was nowhere to mount the artillery.

The inside of the fort was also, he claimed, too small for the garrison and the fact that the ditches had to be filled in to expand the bastions meant the transport of huge quantities of timber from Hardelot in order to shore up the foundations once the loose soil was tipped back into them.<sup>134</sup> It is difficult to judge the extent

<sup>134</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 306. See P. Héliot, 'Les Fortifications de Boulogne sous l'occupation anglaise (1544-50)', *Revue du Nord*, xl (1958), pp. 9-11.

of this failure, given du Bellay's desire to show the French commander, du Biez, in a bad light.<sup>135</sup> Blaise de Monluc adds a vivid description of the difficulties of getting the pioneers to work on the site.<sup>136</sup> Fort Châtillon, started in June 1548, was nearer the harbour, smaller and had three bastions. The outworks of this seem to have been initially an earthwork construction.<sup>137</sup> The designer and engineer were Camillo and Girolamo Marini, men whose expertise was widely praised.<sup>138</sup> Another completely new hill-top fortress was constructed at Monthulin near Desvres in Boulonnais some time in 1545–6 and became an important strategic position from 1551.<sup>139</sup>

In the course of the long wars from 1551 to 1559, further works were needed. At Chauny, two new bastions and deeper ditches were being built in 1557–8, though the captain thought they would not make the town much more secure.<sup>140</sup> Calais, though it had received some artillery fortification under the Tudors, was hopelessly outclassed as a fortress by the time of its fall to France in 1558. Forts Risban and Nieullay remained in much the same state until the construction (in the case of the former) of landward bastions at the start of the 17th century and (in the case of the latter) with new bastions under Richelieu. In Calais itself, though, Paul de Termes and then the vidame de Chartres, began work on its renewal almost immediately, with galley slaves whose sentences had been commuted for work there. August 1561 saw the start of demolition of the district of fine houses around Saint Nicolas for the construction of a new citadel that incorporated the old 13th-century castle into one of its bastions. The citadel was designed by the Italian Castriotto and Errard de Bar-le-duc with four large angle bastions, and was completed by 1574.<sup>141</sup> (Plan 11)

Curiously, in view of its crucial role in the wars against the English, Normandy saw little new fortification in this period, with the exception of the new port of Le Havre. Work began there in 1517<sup>142</sup> and speeded up in 1541 with the arrival of Girolamo Bellarmato, who designed the sequence of orilloned bastions to defend the town and harbour.<sup>143</sup> In Brittany, by the 1540s Nantes had been equipped with some bastions, one of them covering the Saint-Pierre gate.<sup>144</sup> Elsewhere, Brouage and La Rochelle had to await the later 16th century for their new fortifications.

The spectacular destructions of Théroutanne and Hesdin after 1553, the refortification of Calais and the Habsburg works at Charlemont and Philippeville indicate a degree of rationalisation, particularly of the north-eastern frontier. The advance of

<sup>135</sup> Modena AS, Francia, B 21, fasc. 1, p. 234.

<sup>136</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires et lettres*, ed. Ruble, I, pp. 302–3.

<sup>137</sup> BN fr. 3116, fos. 59–60.

<sup>138</sup> Héliot, 'Les Fortifications de Boulogne', p. 36; Hale, *Renaissance War Studies*, pp. 82–5; Buisseret, *Ingénieurs*, p. 35.

<sup>139</sup> Baron de Calonne, 'Jehan et Raoul Pocques', *Mémoires de la Société des Antiquaires de Picardie*, XXVIII (1885), pp. 505–36.


<sup>140</sup> BN nafr. 21698, fos. 161–2.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid.*, fos. 301–11; L. Lenoir, *A la Découverte des anciennes fortifications de Calais* (Cambrai, 2001), pp. 58–9.


<sup>142</sup> *CAF*, I, nos. 1151, 1328, 1417.

<sup>143</sup> Buisseret, *Ingénieurs*, pp. 36–8.

<sup>144</sup> AM Nantes, EE 139, EE 168.




Plan 10a. Castelet.



Plan 10b. La Capelle.





Plan 11. Calais.

fortification techniques meant that sieges were becoming lengthy and costly. The week-long battery at Hesdin had taken 531 barrels of powder. Enclaves therefore had to be eliminated in order to stabilise the frontier.<sup>145</sup>

### Personnel: architects and technicians

The first half of the 16th century saw the development of a network of agents responsible to the crown for the design and maintenance of fortifications.<sup>146</sup> In 1521 Arnaut Cousteaux, the first known *contrôleur des fortifications*, was appointed in Guyenne.<sup>147</sup> In 1526 a *contrôleur général des réparations* appeared, a post later introduced into all the frontier zones, with a network of royal *commisaires* to oversee works. The job had earlier been done by the *receveurs-généraux* in the *recettes-générales*.<sup>148</sup> The first known *contrôleur-général des réparations* for Picardy was Gaspard de Lanzeray in 1536, followed by Pierre Favre (as *commis*) and Pierre de La Grange. By 1549 the post had been amalgamated into the charge of *contrôleur* for *réparations, fortifications et advitaillements* for Jacques Adam.<sup>149</sup>

<sup>145</sup> Martens, 'La Destruction de Thérouanne et d'Hesdin', pp. 104–5.

<sup>146</sup> G. Zeller, *L'Organisation défensive des frontières du nord et de l'est au xviii<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1928), p. 328.

<sup>147</sup> Buisseret, *Ingénieurs*, p. 13.

<sup>148</sup> BN fr. 2930, fo. 100v.

<sup>149</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, pp. 180–1.

In 1546 a *commissaire général des fortifications* appeared in Champagne.<sup>150</sup> The network seems to have been generalised through all the provinces, then, by about 1550 but the simple commissions were erected into offices for *trésoriers généraux* by Henri II in 1555.<sup>151</sup> At that time they were still directed by the four secretaries of state, who were responsible for the fortifications in their provinces in conjunction with the provincial governors.<sup>152</sup> Lanzeray was also secretary to the provincial governor, which reinforced this role.

In the 1544 survey of 15 fortresses in Picardy, the governor or captain was required to list stocks of food, further requirements, artillery and munitions and necessary repairs with their estimated cost. This must have been drawn up by the *contrôleur* for the province.<sup>153</sup> Such officials, some of them notable French engineers, such as Jean de Saint-Rémy, were essentially financial supervisors, disbursing funds and ordering supplies. There were also agents in the royal entourage regularly appointed to inspect work on fortifications, such as Guyencourt and La Chapelle in the 1550s.<sup>154</sup>

Design was largely in the hands of the King's Italian engineers. Girolamo Bellarmato, born at Siena in 1493, had fled his native city in 1525 and by 1540 was employed as an engineer on fortifications in France. He worked at Le Havre, in Burgundy and on the redesign of the fortifications of Paris. He died in 1555, leaving a bastard son, Bernardino, who went on to be an engineer of fortifications and worked on the fortification of Calais after its recovery from the English in 1558.<sup>155</sup> A Sieur Fransèque advised on the construction of the Montrécu bastion at Amiens in 1524.<sup>156</sup> Antonio Castello had worked in 1535 for the Venetian Republic in its fortifications against the Turks. By 1537, he was in French service, persuading the King to refortify Hesdin and Saint-Pol, and was captured there when the town fell again to Charles V.<sup>157</sup> In March 1538 he was sent on a tour of inspection of the northern frontier and by May 1539 he was listed as a royal pensioner. He was named as *maître des ouvrages* in Picardy<sup>158</sup> and thereafter concentrated his operations on the northern frontier. He was surveying Doullens in 1538 and at work on Péronne and La Capelle in 1541–2.<sup>159</sup> Antonio Mellone of Cremona had been commander of Italian mercenaries in French service in 1542 before being employed to design the

<sup>150</sup> Contamine, *Histoire Militaire*, I, p. 269.

<sup>151</sup> Zeller, *L'Organisation*, p. 16, n. 3; J.E. Jung, 'L'Organisation du service des vivres aux armées de 1550 à 1650', *Bibliothèque de l'Ecole des Chartes*, 151 (1983), pp. 269–306 (dates it 1557).

<sup>152</sup> Beauvillé, *Recueil*, III, p. 371.

<sup>153</sup> BN fr. 5195.

<sup>154</sup> Calonne, 'Pocques', pp. 517, 515.

<sup>155</sup> Buisseret, *Ingénieurs*, pp. 26, 35; P. Gras, 'Les Dernières Années et la mort de Girolamo Bellarmato', *Bulletin philologique et historique*, (1953–4), pp. 259–63.

<sup>156</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, p. 181; Buisseret, *Ingénieurs*, p. 126.

<sup>157</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, p. 360; *CAF*, VIII, 81, 29974.

<sup>158</sup> *CAF*, VIII, 40, 29608; 220, 31296; Durand, *Inventaire sommaire ... Amiens*, IV, p. 459; AM Amiens, BB 23, fo. 127v.

<sup>159</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, p. 181; Hale, *Renaissance War Studies*, p. 82; BN fr. 3035, fo. 13; BN fr. 20521, fo. 37; BN fr. 20521, fos. 21–2, 45–6.

fortress of Oultreau.<sup>160</sup> Piedmont was the territory of Italian engineers, of course, the most well-known being Francesco Bernardino of Vimercati. Bernardino, who had commanded light horse under Guillaume du Bellay in Piedmont, was sent to inspect the fortresses of Piedmont by Francis I shortly before his death. In 1549 he was given 'general charge of all the fortifications in Piedmont,' evidently as *commissaire général des fortifications*, a position he retained through the 1550s.<sup>161</sup> Piedmont also produced Italian engineers, such as Gian Petro de Torno, sent to look into the works necessary for Dauphiné in 1546.<sup>162</sup>

Both Picardy and Champagne saw work by Girolamo Marini (or da Modena) and his brother Camillo. Girolamo, often called 'of Bologna,' was born at Carsara in the territory of Modena, about 1490. As a partisan of the Bentivoglios, he was forced into exile and is first observed in French service when working at Pinerolo in 1537.<sup>163</sup> He was knighted by Francis I in 1542.<sup>164</sup> Until that year he was *commissaire général* in Piedmont<sup>165</sup> but after ill-success at Perpignan he was moved north as *commissaire général* in Champagne to work on Landrecies, Luxembourg, Mézières, Mouzon and Saint-Dizier.<sup>166</sup> He was at work on Villefranche-sur-Meuse, another new fortress on the border of Champagne, in 1544.<sup>167</sup> When Martin du Bellay was commissioned to inspect the frontier fortresses in Champagne in December 1545, he took Girolamo with him and described him as 'a man well versed in fortifications.'<sup>168</sup> Girolamo was favoured by Mme. d'Etampes and fell out of favour in 1547. Diane de Poitiers obtained his arrest but he fled across the frontier. Camillo obtained permission for him to return<sup>169</sup> and he was back at work on Mézières in December 1547. Cavaliere Marino was working on the fort of Châtillon opposite Boulogne in 1548–9.<sup>170</sup> Girolamo and his brother were sent by Montmorency in May 1548 to begin work on this fortress,<sup>171</sup> the former described as 'a person highly competent in such matters.'<sup>172</sup> In 1549 he was advising on work on the Guyencourt bastion at Amiens.<sup>173</sup> Their kinsman Ippolito Marini was a mercenary active in French service at this time who was passing information to the English ambassador in 1549.<sup>174</sup> He defected to imperial service and may

<sup>160</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 306. On Mellone, AS Modena, Francia B 20, fasc. 4, p. 84.

<sup>161</sup> CAF, VIII, 29284, 30336; BN fr. 5153–5, *passim*; BN it. 1716, pp. 29–30, 174, 315; BN Clair. 342, fo. 121.

<sup>162</sup> Leblanc, 'Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron', (1895), p. 35.

<sup>163</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, p. 423.

<sup>164</sup> CAF, VIII, 292, 12354; Rozet and Lembey, *L'Invasion de la France*, p. 84.

<sup>165</sup> CAF, VII, 597, 27419; 598, 27425; 600, 27461.

<sup>166</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 132.

<sup>167</sup> G. Livi, *La patria e la famiglia di Girolamo Marini* (Bologna, 1901); Rozet and Lembey, *L'Invasion de la France*, pp. 35–6, 62, 80–90. L.R. Shelby, *John Rogers, Tudor Military Engineer* (Oxford, 1967), p. 79.

<sup>168</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 324.

<sup>169</sup> BN it. 1716, pp. 251–2.

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 451–53; Modena Francia B 25, fasc. 6, pp. 104, 126r.

<sup>171</sup> BN fr. 3116, fos. 23, 19.

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 31; CAF, II, nos. 3816, 4105, 4106, 4107.

<sup>173</sup> AM Amiens, CC 151 (Durand, *Inventaire sommaire ... Amiens*, IV, p. 488).

<sup>174</sup> BL Calig. E IV, fo. 227v.

have long been a double agent.<sup>175</sup> Mellone, too, had told the English ambassador, who described him as ‘chief engineer to the French King’, that he was weary of French service and that he was willing to transfer to England. He too defected to the Emperor.<sup>176</sup> There were thus dangers in the employment of foreigners who might leak secrets of fortifications to the enemy. Presumably as a result of his kinsman’s defection, Girolamo Marini was reported in 1552 to have been imprisoned for some time.<sup>177</sup> He wrote to the duke of Ferrara from the Conciergerie in April 1553 but the following month was at Amiens as *maître ingénieur du roy* to survey the fortifications with Jean Bullant and Zacarie de Cellers.<sup>178</sup> He was killed in the siege of Théroouanne.<sup>179</sup>

Another Italian, probably Florentine, captain Megliorin, was also *maître ingénieur du roi* and at work on Corbie and Le Câtelet in the same period.<sup>180</sup> At Corbie, he designed an extension to one of the bastions to bring it under cover of the neighbouring works.<sup>181</sup> He had been looked on favourably by Henri II as dauphin.<sup>182</sup> Repairs at Compiègne in 1544 and the refortification of Toul were carried out from 1552 on designs by Fredence *le père* and his son.<sup>183</sup> Another Venetian, Giovan Tommaso Scala, having served Francis I on the northern frontier in 1543–4, was present on the King’s campaigns of 1552 and drew up plans of newly conquered places and proposals for new bastions.<sup>184</sup> Finally, Jean-Baptiste Porcelli was employed between 1554 and 1560 to add a bastioned section to the walls of Paris adjacent to the Bastille.<sup>185</sup>

A degree of coherence was beginning to emerge in the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> century when the architect Sebastiano Serlio was appointed *surintendant des bâtiments*. Serlio had serious interests in civil as well as military architecture. But for all their achievements, engineers were still not regarded as gentlemen. Brissac described an Italian engineer, Germanic Savorgnan, as one of the most knowledgeable experts in fortification, though ‘he is not one of those called engineers, but a gentleman of good family.’<sup>186</sup>

<sup>175</sup> BL Add. 30663, fo. 37; Weiss, *Papiers d'état*, III, p. 91.

<sup>176</sup> *L&P*, XXI.i, 981.

<sup>177</sup> Rozet and Lembey, *L'Invasion de la France*, p. 90.

<sup>178</sup> AM Amiens, BB 28, fo. 57: 4 May 1553.

<sup>179</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, p. 182.

<sup>180</sup> BN fr. 3116, p. 137; BN fr. 3128, fo. 29.

<sup>181</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, p. 182, n. 92; Beauvillé, *Recueil*, I, pp. 248–9.

<sup>182</sup> C. Casati, *Lettres royales et lettres missives inédites ... relatives aux affaires de France en Italie*, 2nd edn (Paris, 1877), pp. 85–6.

<sup>183</sup> AM Compiègne, BB 20, fos. 5v, 11v; BN fr. 3136, fos. 20–1.

<sup>184</sup> A. Coppa, ‘«Quanto a la fortificacion, jo ui dicho che le si bisogna intender lauera.» Guerre e fortezze di un ingegnere veneziano del xvi secolo tra Francia e Inghilterra: Giovan Tommaso Scala’, in M. Viganò (ed.), *Architetti e ingegneri militari italiani all'estero dal xv al xvii secolo*, vol. 2: *Dall'Atlantico al Baltico* (Livorno, 1999), pp. 175–87.

<sup>185</sup> Buisseret, *Ingénieurs*, p. 39; Vérin, *La Gloire des ingénieurs*, pp. 113–15; N. Faucherre, in *Sous les pavés, la Bastille: archéologie d'un myth révolutionnaire: exposition, 1989–90* (Paris, 1989).

<sup>186</sup> C. Marchand, *Charles Ier de Cossé, comte de Brissac et maréchal de France, 1507–1563* (Paris/Angers, 1889), p. 158.

### Building operations and financing fortifications

How were fortresses actually constructed? Plans rarely survive but are often mentioned in passing. When the Italian Fredence was sent to repair the walls of Compiègne in 1544, the King sent a gentleman of his suite, Yzeulx, to carry out the work and make a plan.<sup>187</sup> There is some surviving evidence for the conclusion of contracts with building contractors for the construction work.<sup>188</sup> Work at Ardres in 1549 involved the supply of timber by a merchant, who was paid directly by the provincial *contrôleur*.<sup>189</sup> There were also in most provinces *maîtres des ouvrages*, skilled craftsmen, who planned the work in detail.<sup>190</sup> The *contrôleur général des réparations*, for instance, would conclude contracts with the *maître des ouvrages* and building contractors. At Doullens in 1534, this involved a contract for the excavation of the ditches with two ‘engines’ in order to build up terraces and platforms.<sup>191</sup> Rolls of pioneers, paid at 20d a day, were kept and the terms of their employment set out.<sup>192</sup> Work on the ditches at Ardres in 1540–2 was undertaken by a syndicate of Amiens merchants, paid for in part by that city. They asked to be released from their contract but the governor suspected they had been involved in fraud and called for full accounting.<sup>193</sup> The pioneers at work there in October 1541 were ‘a great number of labourers and tumbrils a great sort carrying to and fro the ditch into the town through the vaults, but we thought they laboured as men be wont that be evil paid.’<sup>194</sup> Naturally, the costs of work varied by place and time. The most common measurement offered by those in charge of work was by the ‘toise’, usually of 6 feet, which produced the bulk measurement of the ‘toise cube.’<sup>195</sup> An example will serve from the calculation made by the captain at Péronne in 1542 for the clearance of debris. A ‘mass of earth’ in front of the old castle, 41 toises in length, 32 wide and 3 thick produced roughly 3900 cubic toises. Calculations based on this document yield a labour-cost of 2.12.0 lt. per cubic toise of rubble clearance and of 12 lt. for the construction of masonry. We learn, though, that the cost of masonry, in the event of war, would go up to 30 lt. per cubic toise for the simple reason that wood and sand for bricks all came from Artois (no longer available in wartime) and the French side of the frontier had no nearby quarries.<sup>196</sup> In the more peaceful year of 1545, the going rate for the cubic toise of masonry was

<sup>187</sup> AM Compiègne, BB 20, fos. 5v–6v.

<sup>188</sup> BN fr. 5195, fo. 61.

<sup>189</sup> BN fr. 26132, no. 300.

<sup>190</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, p. 182; Durand, *Inventaire sommaire ... Amiens*, IV, pp. 430–1, 442; Beauvillé, *Recueil*, I, pp. 232–3; BN p.o. 2031, no. 102; AM Amiens, CC 156.

<sup>191</sup> Beauvillé, I, pp. 232–3.

<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 238–9.

<sup>193</sup> *CAF*, IV, 129, 11589; 145, 11664; 157, 11721. AM Amiens, BB 24, fos. 214v–215r, 225: 29 Sept. 1540 (Durand, *Inventaire sommaire ... Amiens*, II, pp. 342, 345, 346).

<sup>194</sup> *L&P*, XVI, 1276.

<sup>195</sup> See Cotgrave, *Dictionarie*: the ‘toise cube’ is given as 6x6x6 = 216 cubic feet.

<sup>196</sup> BN fr. 20521, fos. 58–9.

9 lt.<sup>197</sup> At the other end of the kingdom, repair work on the castle of Exilles in Dauphiné was costing only 24s per toise in 1552.<sup>198</sup> By the mid-16<sup>th</sup> century, labourers on fortifications were usually paid 20d. a day (though at Compiègne in 1544 180 men were paid 2s p.d.). A week's labour on the two new bastions at Chauny in 1558 cost 5000 lt.<sup>199</sup> For the Guyencourt bastion at Amiens, a contract was drawn up by the *procureur du roi* with a Brussels merchant for the supply of 1 million bricks a year for 12 years (for 30s the 1000 instead of the usual 60s) and another 500,000 for the inhabitants at 40s. He was to find his mud in a 'marais' in the suburbs and bake them on the spot in the Flemish manner. The first consignment of 1,600,000 was devoted to the construction of the Guyencourt bastion but in 1550 the inhabitants of the villages bordering the work site attacked and chased off the 50 workers, brought in from Flanders to bake the bricks, on the grounds that their grazing was being damaged and work ground to a halt.<sup>200</sup>

At Corbie in 1551–2, work on the construction of a platform behind the abbey buildings, the deepening of the ditches and the strengthening of a tower involved 'craftsmen, carters, carpenters, labourers and masons.'<sup>201</sup> Maintenance work was sometimes carried out by forced labour. For the new forts of La Capelle and Le Câtelet, for instance, the surrounding villages were subject to *corvées* for this purpose.<sup>202</sup> At Briançon in 1545, the local captain had to ask for the work on the fortress to be suspended for three months because the people needed to work on their harvest and in any case there was a shortage of limestone.<sup>203</sup>

Fairly complete records for the total allocation of funds for fortifications survive for the reign of Henri IV. From these we can see that they fluctuated roughly between 400,000 and 570,000 lt. p.a. Within this total, Picardy undoubtedly absorbed the largest segment, usually well over half.<sup>204</sup> Is it possible to compare these sums with the first half of the 16th century? This is difficult in view of the relative absence of complete runs of figures, other than global statistics constructed retrospectively for the *extraordinaire des guerres*. In 1533, Picardy, Champagne and Guyenne together received 54,600 lt.<sup>205</sup> The end of the 1530s saw a massive programme planned for several frontiers. Some 4 million lt. was to be allocated for this work and for the fleet.<sup>206</sup> This became even more urgent after the invasions of 1544.<sup>207</sup> In 1545–6, the accounts of the *extraordinaire* included 706,000 lt. for fortifications (this not including Piedmont in

197 BN fr. 5195, fos. 1–4 on Hesdin. This rate is used throughout except at Saint-Quentin, where it is 8 lt (fo. 91).

198 Leblanc, 'Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron' (1893), p. 65.

199 AM Compiègne, BB 20, fo. 9r; BN nafr. 21698, fos. 161–2.

200 AM Amiens, EE 269.

201 BN Picardie 31, fo. 277r–v.

202 BN nafr. 21686, fo. 159.

203 Leblanc, 'Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron' (1893), p. 67.

204 Buisseret, *Ingénieurs*, p. 49.

205 BN fr. 15629, nos. 496, 512, 541.

206 CAF, IV, 11202.

207 Faucherre, *Places fortes*, p. 9.



1545 and the southern provinces for 1546).<sup>208</sup> The Venetian envoy Cavalli estimated the annual expenditure on fortifications in 1546 as 250,000 écus (that is 562,500 lt.).<sup>209</sup> The figures in Appendix 5 (ii) give the order of magnitude for payments in Picardy for years when records of individual payments are well preserved. We therefore have minimum sums for 1537 of 44,000 lt., for 1538, 110,800, for 1540 of 57,700, for 1548, 99,000. It seems likely that Picardy was thus absorbing a fifth of the annual allocation at a time when the whole frontier network was being seriously overhauled.

The routine maintenance of fortifications was generally the responsibility of town councils, usually financed by indirect taxes on merchandise, technically due to the King but more profitably employed locally, the *octrois*.<sup>210</sup> These were regularly being milked by the mid-16th century for levies. Senlis was rebuked in the crisis of 1544 for its lack of diligence in fortification. The popular assembly had proved so riotous when told about the plans that the council resolved to stop calling it.<sup>211</sup> When the King ordered Compiègne to repair its walls at the same time, he told the town and surrounding villages to pay for the work, otherwise he would have them demolished the moment the enemy headed in their direction. The consequence was intense wrangling with the smaller communities of the region. In 1545, he told them peremptorily to repair the crumbling walls and in 1552 they agreed to pay for 100 workmen a day. When they tried to get away with employing women and children ('who only got in the way'), the King found this 'strange' (the usual threat).<sup>212</sup> More extensive refortification required direct subsidy from royal finances. By the 1530s, money was allocated by royal order to the *receveur des finances extraordinaires* to pay the *contrôleur* or *commis des fortifications* in the province concerned.<sup>213</sup> This individual held the funds for use in each province. Payments could then be ordered from such funds by governors and town captains holding the power of 'commissioner of works'.<sup>214</sup> At Ardres in 1549, the captain ordered the purchase of 40 great oaks for the construction of a windmill and work on one of the new bastions.<sup>215</sup> Accurate record-keeping was a major preoccupation. The crown demanded precise 'états au vray' of what had been spent. *Commis-saires* were to check on the pioneers and review their work every three days.<sup>216</sup> Such an *état* survives for work at Corbie from October 1551 to January 1552 for expenses of 1039.10.2 lt., certified by the *conducteur des ouvrages* and audited by the *commis* of the *contrôleur-général des réparations, fortifications and avitaillements* of the province.<sup>217</sup>

<sup>208</sup> BN fr. 17329; P. Hamon, *L'Argent du roi: les finances sous François Ier* (Paris, 1994), p. 37.

<sup>209</sup> Firpo, *Relazioni*, V, p. 198.

<sup>210</sup> E.g. AM Péronne, BB 10, fos. 74–5 (royal *octroi* of 5 March 1558).

<sup>211</sup> AM Compiègne, BB 21, fos. 48v–49r, 50v; AM Senlis, BB 5, fos. 4r, 10r.

<sup>212</sup> AM Compiègne, BB 20, fos. 5v, 7v–8r, 9r, 18v, 20r, 75v; AM Compiègne, BB 21, fos. 65v, 94v–95r.

<sup>213</sup> Beauvillé, *Recueil*, I, p. 241; II, pp. 205–6.

<sup>214</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 245–9.

<sup>215</sup> BN fr. 26132, nos. 300–2, 313.

<sup>216</sup> BN fr. 2995, fos. 39–40; BN fr. 3008, fo. 102.

<sup>217</sup> BN Picardie 31, fo. 277r–v.



The refortification of frontier zones had profound implications for the relationship between the state and the *bonnes villes*, the nobility and the crown.<sup>218</sup> The cities of the late middle ages had taken charge of the construction and maintenance of their walls. This had deep resonance for the sense of pride and independence of the urban communes and the nobility. Paradoxically, that independence involved the concession by the crown to the cities of the right to raise taxes for the cost of their own defences. The consequence of the artillery revolution for municipal self-government was far-reaching. The increased costs of building work from the early 16th century led to greater royal interference. The crown was insistent that the *octrois* be used for the purposes they were intended for rather than as a supplement to municipal budgets. Louis XII reiterated that the *octrois* should only be used for the purposes for which they had been conceded. In 1515, the post of *contrôleur des deniers communs* was created. In 1532, Francis I demanded half the *deniers communs* raised in the towns and, in 1535, the totality. In 1541, the money of the *deniers communs* were ordered into the hands of the *trésorier des parties casuelles* in view of the high level of war expenditure and the need to ensure that local taxes were not diverted.<sup>219</sup> When this happened again in the following year, there were complaints that part of the money involved had already been spent on fortifications and attempts to retain the *octroi* money in the hands of local receivers, to ensure that it was spent locally rather than just being absorbed into general state funds.<sup>220</sup> Demands thereafter became more urgent. By the mid-16th century, it is obvious that the crown was largely in control of the overall planning and execution of expensive refortification.

<sup>218</sup> See B. Chevalier, 'The *Bonnes Villes* and the King's Council in Fifteenth-Century France', in J.R.L. Highfield and R. Jeffs (eds), *The Crown and Local Communities in England and France in the Fifteenth Century* (Gloucester, 1981); M. Wolfe, 'The *Bonnes Villes* of France during the Hundred Years War', in I. Corfis and M. Wolfe (eds), *The Medieval City under Siege* (Woodbridge, 1995), pp. 63–87.

<sup>219</sup> BN Picardie 89, fo. 375; *CAF*, VII, 293, 24675; 304, 24735.

<sup>220</sup> BN fr. 20521, fos. 49–51.

## The Field of Battle

A description of a French army on the march in July 1502 brings together all the elements necessary: ‘there were scouts sent out on the route, skirmishers across the country, carts on the way, infantry on the march, men-at-arms at the trot and supplies to follow.’<sup>1</sup> In an age when a community of 10,000 was a substantial town and few cities topped 30,000, armies of between 10,000 and 50,000 were the largest gatherings of human beings most people would ever encounter. The concentration of such numbers on a single field of battle represented a prodigious achievement of leadership and administration. The deployment and care of troops was a major concern of all good commanders: how to get men trained and ready; how to get them to the field and how to command them in battle? When the battle-fields of Italy had become sought out as ‘places of remembrance’ by the end of the 16th century, Brantôme recollected that his father had seen his first battle with Bayard at the Garigliano (1503) and recalled visiting the site himself one day in 1559 or 1565, at sunset, imagining the shades of the brave French dead rising up and bewailing with him the marshy ground that had spelled the doom of the French *gendarmerie* on that day.<sup>2</sup>

### The evidence: the memoirists describe war

The military memoirists provide a distinctive perspective on the mentality of war. High- and middle-ranking commanders, such as Blaise de Monluc and Martin du Bellay, and men-at-arms such as Rabutin had stories to tell, and historiographers such as Jean d’Auton were eager to record them. D’Auton, at the start of the 16th century, regretted that the French were tight-lipped, ‘for the French are so disposed that, when asked to write up or respond about their deeds, they shut their mouths and let them be forgotten.’<sup>3</sup> We might wonder whether French men-at-arms were such shrinking violets when it came to singing their own praises or whether they found d’Auton a bore. At all events, one of the most salient features of French military history in the Renaissance period is this flourishing genre of memoir-writing by noblemen experienced in war at all levels. Some

<sup>1</sup> D’Auton, II, pp. 277–8.

<sup>2</sup> Brantôme, ed. Lalanne, II, p. 387, I, p. 134.

<sup>3</sup> D’Auton, III, pp. 316–17.

have argued that this was a quintessentially French phenomenon.<sup>4</sup> Claude Gaier, in surveying the writings of a score or so of 16th-century memoirists, argued that they conveyed the mentality of a warrior class which remained essentially 'ludic', with no conception of the causes of war, until the impact of reality in the decades around 1560 forced the abandonment of the idea that the man-at-arms was the soldier par excellence.<sup>5</sup> Nadine Kuperty argued that the many such texts which have survived consist of attempts to place individual life stories in a historical narrative through personal testimony, in effect a new genre of historical narrative.<sup>6</sup> Yuval Harari lends weight to Gaier's thesis. He denies that these texts had much to do with history and argues forcefully that such writers were concerned essentially with deeds of valour and had no historical, or indeed political, consciousness. Starting from the very confusing nature of military writings, sometimes incorporating personal experiences but often losing track of the writer's actions all together, he first dismisses the idea that such writers were concerned with the establishment of a 'true' narrative through the medium of personal 'eyewitnessing.' They say little if anything about their personal reactions to battle and convey little of themselves as individuals. Thus, even when describing personal experiences in battle, they convey no emotional reaction to death or injury. Indeed, Harari challenges the very idea that they had a concept of the individual. They reflect very little on war as a concept, as opposed to individual acts of heroism. They see history as a series of events and their purpose within this is to commemorate individual deeds, hence the rather startling jumps from campaign to campaign with little overall framework for understanding. For most of them, their open 'narrative' can simply be an accumulation of acts, all of which have the same value as examples of military valour; they have no conception of a shape of historical narrative or causality. For them, 'the ultimate and only reality is the reality of tangible actions' and the purpose of narrative is 'commemoration rather than understanding.'<sup>7</sup> Furthermore, he argues, the Renaissance nobleman could have had no clear conception of the reasons for war, other than that it was a natural state as well as a kind of sport and that the function of the nobleman was to fight in his lord's cause.<sup>8</sup>

Blaise de Monluc's is very much a personal history of his times and of the part played by the writer himself in them. His *Commentaires*, though, are often acute in judgments and observations and were widely read, especially after their first formal publication in 1592. Monluc, writing after 1570, looked back on his experience of the Habsburg-Valois wars for his concluding address to Henri III on the problems of military command, from the viewpoint of a *maître de camp*. These he enumerated as, first, the necessity of appointing brave and

<sup>4</sup> Pierre Nora, 'Les Mémoires d'Etat', in idem, *Les Lieux de mémoire. II: La Nation*, 3 vols (Paris, 1984–92), II, pp. 355–400, at p. 363. See also E. Vaucheret, 'Le Fait de la guerre, témoignages et réflexions, de Jean d'Auton à Monluc', thèse de doctorat ès lettres, Paris-Sorbonne, 1977.

<sup>5</sup> Gaier, 'L'Opinion des chefs de guerre', pp. 723–46.

<sup>6</sup> N. Kuperty, *Se Dire à la Renaissance: les mémoires au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1997).

<sup>7</sup> Harari, *Renaissance Military Memoirs*, pp. 154–5.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 127–8.

able commanders, since one cowardly or inexperienced captain of a company could precipitate the rout of an entire army. A general could not have his eyes everywhere and was bound to rely on his subordinates 'for four cowards taking flight are enough to drag along the rest.' Second, the general officers for the deployment of the army in the field must be experienced since, when an army was deployed in a state of fear, that fear spread to the entire army: 'there is nothing that gives commanders more heart than knowing that the enemy is in a state of fear.' Agreement among commanders was crucial and failure to co-ordinate was the cause of the winning or losing of battles. Above all, he thought, it mattered little if the commanding general was an inexperienced prince as long as the *maître de camp* was experienced.<sup>9</sup>

A useful case-study is the battle of Ceresole in Piedmont (April 1544), a rare French victory in the Italian wars. Martin du Bellay and Blaise de Monluc were both present and both published accounts of it. Du Bellay's, written in the 1550s and published in 1569, was read by Monluc before he composed his own account in the 1570s, in part to remedy du Bellay's scanty mention of him.<sup>10</sup> Du Bellay gives the order of battle in traditional form: the avant-guard under Boutières with two companies (60 lances) of men-at-arms, 635 light horse and 4000 foot of the old bands; the battle under Enghien himself, three companies, 100 court gentlemen, 4000 Swiss; rear-guard under Dampierre with the archers of the *gendarmérie*, 3000 Gruyeriens, 3000 Italians. On the morning of 14 April, with battle inevitable, the French line was drawn up with, on the right, the 3000 French infantry without arquebusiers. On their wing were the light horse under Termes and to the left Boutières with about 80 men-at-arms. Further to the left were the 3000 Swiss and then came Enghien with the troops of the battle. On his left were the Italians and Gruyeriens (4000) flanked by the archers of the *gendarmérie*. Du Bellay, who was given the role of co-ordinator, finishes his battle-plan by mentioning that Monluc was detailed to cover the front of the line with 800 arquebusiers for skirmishing.

After giving the superior numbers of the imperial army under del Vasto, du Bellay tells us that the skirmishing began at sunrise, probably correctly even though other sources say 11 or 12 o'clock. The battle-front was only 1000 metres, as a result of the concentration of the Swiss into a square. The battle took place in two phases, first beginning with the skirmishing of the arquebusiers, which was inconclusive and allowed the French infantry to maintain their position. Du Bellay tells us that the arquebusiers were reinforced until there were 4 or 5000 on each side, each trying, as at Pavia, to outflank the other. 'I can assure you there was much pleasure in viewing all the stratagems of war' on each side. After about five hours del Vasto ordered his lansquenets to attack the Swiss in the centre. Du Bellay's only reference to himself is that he was active in bringing the French and the Swiss together to face the attack of the imperial lansquenets. Meanwhile, the light horse on the right charged the Floren-

<sup>9</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, pp. 807–9, 814.

<sup>10</sup> Du Bellay, IV, *Mémoires*, pp. 209–26; Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, pp. 154–63. Commentary in P. Courteault, *Blaise de Monluc historien* (Paris, 1908), pp. 158–72; Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 71–86. See also Bib.II, 17 and 73a.

tine cavalry and Villefranche on the far wing successfully extended his line to outflank the lansquenets. The latter were repulsed and del Vasto left the field. On the other wing, however, the Spanish veterans advanced and crushed the Italians and Gruyeriens. The battle hung in the balance, Enghien launching a desperate and costly cavalry attack, until the victorious Swiss and French infantry moved to support Enghien and the Spaniards retreated in a rout.

Du Bellay's account is measured and, as far as can be checked, accurate in detail. It places little emphasis on his own achievements (even though these were clearly important). His is the account of a commander responsible for the overall tactics of the battle. Monluc's account, on the other hand is much fuller, dominated by incidental detail with himself at the centre of the narrative and derives any overall view of the field from his reading of du Bellay. Monluc's account sets the scene by describing his own movements before the battle and tells us little about numbers. Du Bellay describes Frohlich's appeal to him to bring the French into the attack by claiming that the Swiss would not endure artillery but rather march forward and risk being taken in the flank. Monluc attributes this exchange to himself and Taix, commander of the French infantry, forced to march forward by his men who would not endure artillery standing still. According to Monluc, he saved the day by turning this advance back. Monluc is a writer for the press of battle, described very much in terms of a rugby scrum ('shove soldiers, shove'). His account concentrates on his own part in the battle and his opinions are trenchant. Enghien's charge, he describes as 'ill-advised', 'furious but ill-considered'; the Gruyeriens were cowards and 'unworthy to bear arms'. What these two accounts display is that, from their very different perspectives, both soldier-writers were anxious to explain and understand the causes of success and failure in battle.

### The military manual

Military commanders had at their disposal many manuals, which more or less effectively described the organization of armies. A number were produced in the Renaissance period which carried on the tradition of Honoré Bovet's *Arbre des batailles* (c.1387) and Christine de Pizan's *Livre des Fayttes d'Armes et de Chevalerie* (c.1408), themselves to a greater or lesser extent shaped by the reading of the classical works on war, most notably Vegetius.<sup>11</sup> The *Rosier des guerres*, probably dictated by Louis XI to Pierre Choynet, drew heavily on Vegetius but offered some useful common-sense information to the commander on preparing for battle. The work was a largely private one, though, meant as a political testament for the

<sup>11</sup> Potter, 'Chivalry and Professionalism', pp. 149–82; P. Contamine, 'The War Literature of the Later Middle Ages: the Treatises of Robert de Balsac and Bérault Stuart, Lord of Aubigny', in C.T. Allmand (ed.), *War, Literature and Politics in the Late Middle Ages* (Liverpool, 1976), pp. 102–21. See also the very useful conspectus of French theoretical military writings in the period in Fourquevaux, *Instructions*, pp. xcii–cix.

Dauphin and, when it appeared in print in 1523, seems to have had little impact.<sup>12</sup> A more typical example was the *Traité sur l'art de la guerre*, a work dictated at the very end of his life by Béraut Stuart, seigneur d'Aubigny (c.1452/3–1508), veteran of the Italian wars, who had also fought in Grenada, adversary in battle of the *Gran Capitan* Gonsalvo de Cordoba.<sup>13</sup> Stuart was influenced by Vegetius, as were most of his predecessors, and drew very heavily on Robert de Balsac's *Le Nef des Princes et des Batailles de Noblesse*,<sup>14</sup> but the importance of his work is that it is a practical handbook written by a skilled soldier and diplomat which emphasises the professional approach to the command and administration of armies: decisions for war, the role of experienced commanders, the disposition of reserves, reconnoitering and map-making, spies. Much of this is a personal interpretation of the lessons of Vegetius but the emphasis on artillery and its protection is, of course, very much of the time and reflects the importance of this new arm of war in Stuart's own experiences in Italy during the 1490s. In many ways comparable is the *Instruction de toutes manières de guerroyer*<sup>15</sup> of Philippe de Clèves-Ravestein (1456–1528), a Netherlands prince who entered French service in 1488 and served both Charles VIII and Louis XII in the Italian wars and the Levant. Unlike Stuart, Ravestein, though highly cultured and possessed of a fine library, largely ignored the classical sources and concentrated, except for vague echoes of *Le Jouvenel* and Bovet, on his own experiences. While he appealed to ancient concepts of the just war and crusade and specified the appropriate religious rites, Ravestein was remarkable for ignoring classical precepts on the siting of a battle-line (high ground, sun to the back etc.) taking the view that the mass of infantry (seen as the dominant element of any battle) and the use of artillery was more important. In fact, the strongly practical element is confirmed by the attention paid to the functions of the *maréchal des logis* and his use of reconnoitering, the assembly of statistical information on paper and finally by the annexes concerning the 'art of firepower', costs of artillery and supply (left out in the printed version).<sup>16</sup>

The treatises of the Renaissance period continued to combine this practical streak with the principles of chivalry. There were a number of rather slight and routine examples of the genre, such as that by a captain, Michel d'Amboise, in his 1543 *Le Guidon des gens de guerre*. This avowedly drew on the classical sources while adding 'something of myself'.<sup>17</sup> Most famously, of course, Fourquevaux's *Instructions sur le Faict de la Guerre* of 1548, studied in depth by Gladys Dick-

<sup>12</sup> For a rather defective modern edition, see *Le Rosier des guerres*, ed. M. Diamantberger (Paris, 1925), ch. 6, *passim*. See A. Stegmann, 'Le Rosier des guerres: testament politique de Louis XI', in B. Chevalier and P. Contamine (eds), *La France de la fin du XV<sup>e</sup> siècle – Renouveau et apogée* (Paris, 1985), pp. 313–23.

<sup>13</sup> See Stuart, *Traité sur l'art de la guerre*, ed. Comminges, introduction.

<sup>14</sup> Bib.II, 87b.

<sup>15</sup> Pr. 1558 (Bib.II, 122a); MS in BN fr. 1244, probably written c.1516 in retirement.

<sup>16</sup> P. Contamine, 'L'Art de la guerre selon Philippe de Clèves, seigneur de Ravestein (1456–1528): innovation ou tradition?', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen Betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden*, 95 (1980), 363–76. The work is closely related to a manuscript, BN fr. 3890, by Jehan Bytharne: 'Livre de guerre, tant par mer que par terre.'

<sup>17</sup> Bib.II, 87a. Fourquevaux, *Instructions*, Dickinson in her introduction, p. c, rather harshly described it as 'worthless.'

inson, provided a systematic printed handbook for the military commander.<sup>18</sup> Fourquevaux was profoundly dismayed by what he saw as the corruption and ineffectiveness of French armies, brought about, he thought, by godlessness, idleness and poor training. His solutions involved classical models. Above all, he formulated a code of military discipline, which predated that issued by Coligny in 1551 as *colonel-général de l'infanterie*.<sup>19</sup>

What does the development of military manuals tell us about thinking on battle-field deployment in the 16th century? One of the more interesting, written with a *sergent de bataille* of the infantry in mind, is among the least known because it remained unpublished. Around 1540, Jacques Chantareau, a soldier of the Turin garrison, having been wounded in the course of a treacherous plot against him, retired from active service and began to set down his long experience in writing (he had served in wars for 28 years since the battle of Ravenna). The book, prepared in elegant calligraphy for presentation to the King and prefaced by a handsome picture of the author doing so, takes the form of a series of observations for all commanders of troops, with detailed instructions and visual plans for the deployment of the men. Its lack of scholarly pretension is notable. Not a single classical authority is mentioned.<sup>20</sup> His avowed objective was to broaden the minds of those born to war and to inform those who wanted to know more about it but there is more than a hint of disillusion. His greatest cause for complaint is the promotion to command of those without experience and his primary intention was to provide surrogate experience for those who were appointed to command at an early age – ‘showing briefly in writing what it would take years to learn.’ All arts could now be learned more quickly than in previous centuries ‘by the lively minds and work of the young’ and for the military art this was all the more so, as he thought it among the chief and most necessary arts.

Chantareau’s main concern is that of a *sergent de bataille*, that is the officer responsible for the movement and deployment of the men, hence the fact that the greater part of his treatise is taken up by diagrams of battle formations. Advice is offered to a series of officers: captains, their lieutenants, *sergens de bande*, *caps d’escouadre* etc. and not surprisingly the advice to captains is the fullest. Their first task should be to choose a decent, uncorrupt lieutenant who should levy men in the area designated, not more widely and thus cause unnecessary oppression to the common man. Chantareau saw the role of the lieutenant in turn as crucial in support of his captain: ‘you should understand war better than those under whom you are placed.’ The reason was that so many young and inexperienced men were being appointed as captains. His main task was to moderate the anger of his commander towards the men but keep them in order. He should know the names of the men.<sup>21</sup> Should the lieutenant raise more men than the commission specifies, this will reflect badly on the captain since they

<sup>18</sup> For the substance of Fourquevaux’s arguments, see the useful summary by Dickinson in *ibid.*, pp. lxxxii–xci.

<sup>19</sup> Fontanon, *Edicts*, II, pp. 152–7.

<sup>20</sup> BN fr. 650.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 8r.



will be struck off at the muster and the King's lieutenant general think badly of the captain. Above all, real soldiers should be raised, not rogues, pillagers and other riff-raff. The captain should know the qualities of his officers so as not to be shamed by their conduct. Once levied, the men should be mustered at the place specified and only the best maintained, while the administrative commissioners should be treated with respect.

The captain must be sure his officers were gentlemen of worth ready to die rather than be dishonoured. The first indicator of this would be their equipment: they should have respectable doublet, hose and collar, good corslet, sword, dagger, pike, arquebus or halberd, with a helmet. To get the best service from them, they should be treated well and not sharply, like ordinary soldiers. They should have pages to care for their horses, so that, once they had marched a mile or so to set an example to their men, they could mount up and give their pikes and helmets to their pages to march in their place. Thus mounted, they could patrol up and down the column to keep the men in order. The *sergens de bande* would patrol the wings of the column to beat any stragglers. Measures should be taken to protect the baggage in the rear.<sup>22</sup>

The men mustered, the route of march should then be studied.<sup>23</sup> At the hour decided, the captain's ensign should be set up in the field at the assembly point and the drummers sent round the lodgings and inspection made to make sure the laggards did not hang around to loot before departure. Order must be issued that the men should remain with the standards, since some get ahead 'having their minds more on the next meal than on arms or virtue.' The men should then be drawn up by the *sergens de bande* in ranks of 5 to 9 depending on the route to be taken, with the first three ranks pikemen, then the first half of the arquebusiers, then the pikes following with the ensign in the midst accompanied by the halberdiers and the rest of the arquebusiers and pikes as before. The company on the march was thus in a position to deploy into battle, drummers in the front rank giving the pace and drums and fifes next to the standard. Drunks might give themselves away by rowdy joking and singing.<sup>24</sup>

Should the route involve a series of *étapes* (depots), the *maréchal de logis* must be sent ahead to prepare marked lodgings and arrange supplies. The time of departure should be announced by the drummer, with order to assemble at the sound of the drum and householders who thought they had been mistreated invited to submit complaints. While in lodgings, the captain and his lieutenant should patrol the rooms 'showing the soldiers a good face, laughing and talking with them familiarly.' The men should be deterred from quarreling but if they broke out, the men should be warned without serious punishment the first time and only then dealt with seriously.<sup>25</sup> The *maréchaux de camp* were to be there to distribute the 'tickets' for accommodation to the men and, if battle were imminent, each *chef de chambre* would be given instructions to prevent any distur-

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., fo. 5r.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., fo. 4r.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., fos. 4v–5r.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., fo. 4v.

bance to their hosts.<sup>26</sup> Prices were to be set carefully for food supplies. Should the stay in that place be extended, the men were to be daily exercised in arms out in the fields (e.g. target practice for the arquebusiers, pikemen marching to form battalions and *limaçons*, ‘showing them the stratagems of war’ to prepare them for battle, ambush, skirmish in good light or bad.<sup>27</sup>

Should the company be encamped with an army, the captain must liaise with the King’s lieutenant-general to receive his orders and make regular reports on enemy movements. In his absence a *colonel de gens de pied* would be treated with equal honour. The captain must learn from him the movements of the enemy and their intentions, so as to be on guard. If guard duty were ordered, and there was no *sergent de bataille*, the captain must inspect his quarters and the most direct routes of access to the enemy, place sentinels and spot unusual movements in the countryside. The watchword would be received from the army commander and passed on to the officers (with due caution should any of them be captured). The captain should then station himself at his ensign in order to receive reports from the sentinels, with the *sergens de bande* patrolling and reporting movements. Fourquevaux echoes this almost exactly.<sup>28</sup>

Faced with making sorties in search of supplies, the lie of the land must be thoroughly inspected and reliable guides used. No money should be spared on spies, since so much depended on them. It was essential to know whether the surrounding country was open, whether the roads were wide or narrow, to determine whether to place arquebusiers in front or on the wings. Surprise must be expected at all times. On line of march, it was essential to conserve the strength of the men; too fast a pace would tire them and spread out the stragglers so that they would have to stop on alert<sup>29</sup> and the men would be exhausted before battle. In crossing fords, the captain should be first in to give an example and keep order. Waggon trains with supplies must be kept secure so that they did not impede defence against enemy attack. Private enterprise pursuit of supplies was to be repressed, since this usually involved attacks on supply merchants, and reliable men allowed to lead sorties.<sup>30</sup>

When the men were drawn up in battle (according to a series of plans Chantareau drew), they should be kept so quiet that a mouse could be heard. Surprise could thus be avoided and the enemy’s movements be better understood. Naturally, it was essentially for a captain to have exact knowledge of the numbers under his command since only then would he be able to deploy them rapidly into a battalion (i.e. fighting formation) with a certain frontage and wings. Lack of such knowledge had led to some *sergens de bataille* taking too long to deploy the men. It should always be assumed that the enemy was stronger until his strength was tested. Only then should you deploy to attack

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., fo. 5v.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., fos. 5v–6r.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., fo. 5v; Fourquevaux, *Instructions*, fo. 17v.

<sup>29</sup> *Faire haut le bois*: ‘to stop and make a stand, advancing their pikes’ (Cotgrave, *Dictionary*).

<sup>30</sup> BN fr. 650, fos. 6v, 7r.

and always with a fall-back position prepared in case of the need to retreat. Chantareau's captain, though, must in the end lead from the front:

If you come to battle, you should be in the first rank and fight hard, thinking nothing of this world, exhorting your men to do their duty and, finally, praying to God to preserve you this day from shame and dishonour; and if you were to be killed that he accept you soul in Paradise. Thus you will have eternal reputation and be by chronicles and writings placed among the valiant knights who have ended their days on the field of honour.<sup>31</sup>

The other officers that Chantareau dealt with in detail were those responsible for control and deployment. His remarks on the *sergent de bataille* reinforce his view that these officers constitute the core of the command system: they were able to give instructions to the ranks and to the lieutenant-general but in the latter case they should show him respect. They should know exactly how many companies there were and how many men in each company and draw up a roll after seeing them all in array. They would thus be in a position to construct battalions of particular numbers according to the lie of the land. Individual captains were to be informed whether they were to be part of the avant-garde, battle or rear-guard and they should be allocated not by favour but according to the needs of war.<sup>32</sup> Their battle stations should be allocated and the number of men in each rank determined so that a column of march could rapidly deploy in battle formation. Good men should be placed both in front and in the rear so that, should it be necessary to change position, the whole army would not be exposed. Arquebusiers should be evenly deployed and in the most advantageous positions. Naturally, they must be covered by battalions for re-loading. Though foreign troops were now preferred for guarding the artillery, it still sometimes had to be guarded by French. Care should be taken to avoid quarrels over precedence and the greatest lords placed next to the colonel's ensign in order to appease their self-esteem.

Above all the *sergens* were to maintain constant vigilance and the approaches of the enemy, changing the guard regularly. Monluc is clear on the role of the *sergent major* (as he calls him) in placing arquebusiers in the line. A quarrel, related by Brantôme, at Ceresole between a *sergent de bataille*, Pierre de La Burthe, and a gentleman volunteer revolved around the latter's unwillingness to accept his place allocated by the *sergent*, arguing that he was there to serve his King and he could do so anywhere he chose. La Burthe had decided he was inadequately equipped and would be best stationed among the skirmishers in front of the lines but the gentleman persistently refused to obey. The result was that the *sergent* killed him. Many gentlemen were scandalised by this but Brantôme, who thought the post 'fine and honourable' and one in which the holder could give instructions to all the captains, took the view that 'he did his job well that day.' Summing up on the post, Brantôme thought that:

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., fo. 8v.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid., fo. 9r-v.

He should always go mounted, not only in the battle line but in camp, indeed, if he come up with the King or the general of the army, he should speak on horseback without setting foot to ground ... the day of a battle, he should never dismount among the captains, but go back and forth among the columns; for, dismounting and fighting he is worth but one more man, whereas, mounted, he can go back and forth to see to many problems and is worth many more.<sup>33</sup>

As for the standard-bearer, Chantareau tells us that, besides his obvious job of keeping high the company's banner in the field and raising it atop the battlement of a stormed fortress, he was to act as arbitrator of quarrels and to keep open house. The *sergent de bande* was to supervise the watch and also ensure the distribution of supplies, keeping a roll of all the *chefs de chambre* and the soldiers under them. The *caps d'escouadre* (a name brought from Italy) signified the leader of 25 men (thus a quarter of the smallest company of 100). They were not to become arrogant through promotion, maintain a roll of the men under them and report all casualties and illnesses. They should know where all their men were lodged.

Chantareau gives us as his first drawing a battalion in the course of deploying into the field in the form of the *limaçon*. This is a manoeuvre peculiar to the period and needs some explanation. At first sight, it looks like a battalion parading in the form of a snake. Chantareau shows a force of 1200 pikes, halberdiers and arquebusiers in ranks of five. In a document of the 1520s designed to create a new infantry force, the soldiers were required to muster and exercise every year in May to show 'if they maintain their arms and to manoeuvre in battalion and *limaçon* to constantly remind them so they do not forget.'<sup>34</sup> This idea of 'doing the *limaçon*' appears in Clément Marot's celebrated verse portrait of the royal army in 1521.<sup>35</sup> The manoeuvre was one by which an army in line of march deployed for battle, forming a pike square or other front.<sup>36</sup> A *limaçon* is a snail and the term was interpreted by Cotgrave in 1611 as 'to wind, twirl, or turn around about; soldiers to do the ring, or to cast themselves into a ring.'<sup>37</sup> In Fourquevaux's description of the deployment of a column of march for the field, he has his men do the *limaçon*, doubling up each line in turn. The *sergent de bataille* has no specific place 'for he should constantly ride back and forth through the ranks, keeping order.'<sup>38</sup>

Chantareau gives detailed plans of battalions of various sizes but says little about how these are to be formed up. A more precise set of instructions for this is to be found in Fourquevaux. The latter was to some extent working on the

<sup>33</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, pp. 159, 162; Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, pp. 623–5.

<sup>34</sup> BL Add. 38028, fo. 70.

<sup>35</sup> Clément Marot, *Epistres*, ed. C.A. Mayer (London, 1958), pp. 109–19.

<sup>36</sup> See also Fourquevaux: in doubling up lines of march for battle 'il est necessaire leur faire faire des limassons' (*Instructions*, fo. 17r).

<sup>37</sup> Cotgrave, *Dictionarie*. By the later 16th century, the *limaçon* was a word used to describe what elsewhere was known as the *caracole* of the mounted pistoliers (see Tavannes, *Mémoires*, p. 204) but in the early 16th century it meant something more like a deployment in face of the enemy by infantry.

<sup>38</sup> Fourquevaux, *Instructions*, fo. 17v.

theoretical model of battalions of 500 men plus 10 officers who would march in 102 ranks of 5 men each. Once the arquebusiers had deployed to the flanks, the remaining 85 ranks of 5 would then double up to 42 of 10 and then 20 ranks of 21 men. The first 8 would be pikes, the central ranks halberdiers and the last again pikes. Fourquevaux makes it clear that, for him, the capacity to deploy in this way was the true indicator of experience in the field.<sup>39</sup>

### Keeping order: discipline

Each army was accompanied by *prévôts* to punish infringements of discipline and one manual of the 1540s placed the *prévôt's* tent at one end of the camp near the victuallers' market, with a gibbet.<sup>40</sup> What kind of justice did they administer? Firstly, it was delegated from the marshals of France, whose jurisdiction extended to all cases involving the military and when they were in dispute with civilians. The *prévôts des maréchaux* had troops of archers in each *bailliage* and *sénéchaussée*, while at times of severe disturbance, provincial governors were empowered to pursue malefactors.<sup>41</sup> The *prévôts* were also empowered to appoint lieutenants in each company to administer justice.<sup>42</sup> Most detailed attention was given, in regulations, to the discipline of the *compagnies d'ordonnance* but the first half of the 16th century saw repeated attention to the maintenance of discipline throughout the army. Francis I's 1515 ordinance ordered dismissal for men-at-arms for blasphemy and more drastic punishment for theft and failure to pay bills. Here the captains of companies were to be responsible but if they refused to act, the *commissaires* were to report them to the Constable or marshals; *commissaires* who failed to do so were punished. Such crimes were deemed capital. The extent of the captain's right to dismiss a man-at-arms for evil life was spelled with the right of the soldier's appeal should this be for personal animosity. Billetting officers who engaged in pillaging were to be hanged. Failure to pay for pack-horses and victuals was to be punished by dismissal. Failure to be equipped properly with a mount without cause was reason for dismissal.<sup>43</sup>

The ordinances for the police of the army in January and February 1534 and February 1535 were concerned with administration and said little about discipline.<sup>44</sup> However, a series of twelve articles were issued for the army generally, defining the jurisdiction of the marshals, in 1540.<sup>45</sup> Both the crown and local commanders developed detailed regulations for the infantry in this period. The regulations for the Legions in 1534 contained in embryo many of the later provisions for discipline. *Prévôts* were to be responsible for the regulation of quar-

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 18r–v.

<sup>40</sup> BN fr. 3890, fos. 12–13, treatise of Jean Bytharne, 1543.

<sup>41</sup> E.g. *Ord.Fr.I*, III, p. 301 (25 Sept. 1523).

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 64.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, I, pp. 55, 59–60, 61–2, 64.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, nos. 647–8, 652, 682.

<sup>45</sup> Fourquevaux, *Instructions*, pp. lxxviii–xxxii.

rels and the muster lists were used to identify the place of refuge of those who absconded. Punishments such as death (for rape), hanging (for stealing church property, mutiny), piercing the tongue (for shouting aloud on the march, blasphemy), whipping and banishment (for cheating at dice or cards) were decreed. Parleying with the enemy without permission was to be treated as treason.<sup>46</sup> In 1548, Fourquevaux formulated a version of these regulations, which he wanted posted up at the colonel's headquarters. This was more draconian in terms of the crimes punishable by death, while assuming that others such as blasphemy and sodomy were so notorious that no one anywhere could countenance them. If put into practice, these would certainly have had a terror effect but few regulations went so far.<sup>47</sup> In October 1537 a short ordinance for the French and Italian infantry was issued quite obviously for the Piedmont campaign and ordered to be read aloud at each muster.<sup>48</sup> The prime purpose was to place the French and Italians on a comparable footing by insisting that companies of both nations contained no more than a quarter of arquebusiers; that all officers should take the oath to serve against all enemies and that desertion and pillage be punished by death. Blasphemy was to be punished and officers were made responsible for apprehending them. Order was to be kept in the ranks and voices kept low on the march. All double pays were to be enrolled as such.

The development of thinking on military discipline is apparent when we compare these orders with the infantry regulations, drawn up by Gaspard de Coligny as colonel-general, some time in 1549–50. This was promulgated as a royal ordinance in March 1551 and then re-issued in slightly modified form in December 1553.<sup>49</sup> Coligny became known as a no-nonsense, stern disciplinarian and the body of this edict consists of 40 concise clauses, the bulk of which were designed to control the disorder of the rank-and-file. It is clear that these orders had two main preoccupations, both of which were long-standing: the control of quarreling among the ranks and the reinforcement of the hierarchy of command by making clear the responsibility of individual captains to obey superior officers. Punishments, in themselves no more draconian than tradition required, give a good idea of what was regarded as most undesirable in the ranks. These ranged as follows: running the gauntlet (*'passé par les piques'*) (failure to rally to the colours on the battle-field, failure in guard duty, picking a quarrel with someone of guard-duty, denouncing the 'nation' of an enemy in a quarrel, mutiny, ambush, foraging); hanging (pillaging church property, pillaging victualling merchants, rape, using unofficial exits and entries in garrison towns, cheating at cards, stealing a fellow soldier's arms); unspecified death penalty (injuring the *prévôts de justice*); cutting off of the hand (taking up arms in a garrison town); public penance (giving the lie); public humiliation (giving an affront); prison (gambling away arms); degradation from the service (failure of captains to obey the *sergent major*, provoking quarrels unnecessarily, issuing challenges to duels without the colonel's permission, loss of arms in battle or

<sup>46</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, VII, no. 665.

<sup>47</sup> Fourquevaux, *Instructions*, fos. 94–96.

<sup>48</sup> BN fr. 2965, fo. 73; *Ord.Fr.I*, VIII, pp. 342–4.

<sup>49</sup> Du Bouchet, *Preuves de ... Coligny*, pp. 457–61; Fontanon, *Edicts*, III, pp. 150–7.

cowardly surrender, looting during an assault). The system was to be integrated by placing all captains in charge of discipline under the *prévôts* whether the malefactors were under their immediate command or not.

At the same time (in 1551) Marshal Brissac published his own military ordinance for all the troops under his command in Piedmont.<sup>50</sup> These, perhaps as a result of the particular conditions of border warfare in Italy, stressed the requirement to obey the *maréchaux de camp*, of the captains to make weekly inspections to check on supplies and the creation of a fund for medical treatment at the rate of 5% of pay and for remounting cavalry (by creating a fund of 400 écus per company). Unlike Coligny's, they began with blasphemy, though the range of punishments is not dissimilar: running the gauntlet (foraging during campaign); unspecified death (pillaging church property, rape, communication with the enemy without permission, armed provocation to quarrels in camp, mutiny, infringements of passports and safeguards, making an assault without permission,<sup>51</sup> flight in the face of the enemy); flogging over a cannon (crying out or firing volleys after guard set); degradation from the service (abandonment of a post, especially on guard, failure to help with the deployment of artillery when ordered); commander's discretion (failure to rally to the colours in an emergency, quarelling over billets, selling arms by cavalry). The carrying out of sentences is vividly described by the Vieilleville biographer, mainly because he wanted to explain why the gentlemen volunteers in the infantry refused to act as sergeants or corporals. If a soldier infringed the ordinances:

They must arrest him and often themselves fix the collar to him or apply the strappado, or bring him to place for punishment. If by the pike, to push him through the ranks at the mercy of his peers; if by shooting, to tie him themselves to the post. These are tasks the gentleman abhors, at least among our French nation.<sup>52</sup>

From all these texts there emerges a pattern of discipline that was stern and reflects the fact that armies and companies were by their nature turbulent and difficult to control. The crown and its officials were groping towards a system of military justice but had not by 1560 managed to finalise it. A jurisprudence of military law was only tentatively coming into being.<sup>53</sup>

### **Deployment: giving battle, ensigns, battle cries and speeches**

In Italy, between September 1494 and June 1529, French armies were involved in 99 battles with one or more enemy (see Appendix I), mostly alone, sometimes

<sup>50</sup> Villars, pp. 533–4.

<sup>51</sup> The case of the *bâtard de Boissy* (a Gouffier), condemned to death but then spared by Brissac when he accepted that it had been done out of bravery and to give an example to his men (Villars, pp. 765–6).

<sup>52</sup> *Vieilleville*, p. 543.

<sup>53</sup> See for example Claude Cottureau, *De jure et privilegiis militum libri tres* (1539), translated into French in 1549.



in alliance with one of the Italian states. Most involved just a few thousand men, sometimes no more than one or two thousand, but some, like Marignano, were ‘battles of giants.’ The simple figures tell a number of stories. In terms of victory and defeat, the honours were roughly equal over the 35 years: 47 victories and 53 defeats. Of the key battles, involving between 10 and 30,000 troops and clearly having longer term consequences, the French won 8 and lost 6. However, the balance shifted from decade to decade. From 1521 to 1529, French armies fought 34 battles but only won 9, while they lost 25 (including the key battles of Bicocca, Pavia and Landriano).

Success and failure in the field was linked closely to the capacity to deploy and pay the troops. One of the main practical problems for command was the balance of infantry and cavalry. In 1501, the French garrison in Lombardy was faced by an incursion of 6–7000 Swiss pikemen and could only confront them with some 600 lances commanded by Chaumont. The dilemma this provoked is revealing about the way in which infantry and cavalry had to be deployed together in order to face battle, for it became clear that the Swiss could not be stopped from their dogged retreat into the mountains laden with booty by a force of heavy cavalry and light horse alone. These could only harry them and cause some damage but not stop their march. For that, a much larger force of infantry would have been needed.<sup>54</sup>

Conventions, of course, governed the battle-field. At Fornovo in 1495, Commynes was deputed to negotiate with the enemy before the battle. One of the King’s counsellors, Cardinal Briçonnet, had even suggested that the French army could simply march off in the face of the enemy after firing off its cannons. This ran counter to the convention that, once two armies had come in sight of each other, battle was inevitable. As Commynes advised: ‘I never saw two such great armies so close to each other that separated without fighting.’<sup>55</sup> The King’s rapid departure for Asti on the morning of 8 July he described as ‘an alarming thing for an army.’<sup>56</sup> The one great exception to this rule was the withdrawal of the finely balanced French and imperial armies in sight of each other at Landrecies in November 1543, when the risks of an engagement were found too great by both sides.

Once battle was engaged, visual symbols came into play. The most obvious were flags and banners. One of the painter Jean Bourdichon’s jobs was to produce banners for Charles VIII and Louis XII. This was not so mundane an activity as it sounds, for the elaboration of banners was an important element of military display and solidarity that gave some coherence to the French army. What was the range of signs and images used for the armies of the King of France? When Louis XII’s armies took the *bastillon* above Genoa in 1507, their success was apparent first of all to the defenders by the appearance of the white cross and the banner of France on the captured fortress.<sup>57</sup> The Swiss who invaded Lombardy through Bellinzona and Lugano in 1501, when challenged, alleged

<sup>54</sup> D’Auton, II, pp. 128–34.

<sup>55</sup> Commynes, III, pp. 173, 176.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, III, p. 203.

<sup>57</sup> D’Auton, IV, p. 208. See Maulde in *ibid.*, I, p. 88.

that the white cross on their banner showed that they were not there as enemies of the King.<sup>58</sup> Complications arose when, at the battle of Marignano, both sides, the Swiss and the French, used the banner of the white cross, differentiated only by Swiss bearing a white marking ('clef') on their shoulders.<sup>59</sup> The colours of the banner were used to rally the men as at Ravenna (1512), when La Marck, whose colours were black and white, rallied his company with the cry, 'Black and white, march!'<sup>60</sup> Battle was accompanied by noise, of course, and the instruments of war will be discussed in chapter 11. But we should note the battle cry of '*France, France*', which came to dominate the field in this period in place of the earlier '*Montjoie Saint-Denis*'.<sup>61</sup>

Practically every narrator of war assumed, as part of tradition, that words played a natural and significant part in the preparation of battle. This should hardly be surprising since it simply continued the tradition by which ancient writers put grandiose speeches into the mouths of commanders before battle, as had Froissart in the 14th century. The describers of battle entered into a conspiracy to fictionalise, shared by the reader, and by which the extremely unlikely circumstances in which commanders could deliver composed and polished speeches to their troops was accepted as reality. Jean Barrillon states explicitly, when he gave the text of the speeches by the cardinal of Sion and Francis I at Marignano: 'I have written them down as I imagined them.'<sup>62</sup> The purpose was plainly to dignify the occasion of battle with high moral purpose in the defence of honour and to show how such exhortations served the purpose of encouraging bravery. Bayard's stern response to Nassau at Mézières in 1521 that, before surrendering, he would make a bridge of the piled-up bodies of his enemies over which to ride out, was said to have given his troops new heart.<sup>63</sup>

Usually, commanders were said to be addressing their men-at-arms, fellow noblemen, though this was not exclusively the case. At the start of the 16th century Jean d'Auton, claiming to have access to those who took part in the Italian wars, gave his commanders speeches, which encouraged the soldiers: 'At these words, everyone regained vigour and heart.'<sup>64</sup> What does the tenour of such speeches tell us about the expectations of commanders and soldiers? In the skirmishing around Vigevano in February 1500, Chastellart exhorts his men-at-arms to 'one more push':

What's this, Frenchmen? We shall find the way in this battle. Since we have started with such hard work and followed it up, all that's left is to bring it to

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., II, p. 125.

<sup>59</sup> Du Bellay, I, *Mémoires*, p. 71.

<sup>60</sup> Loyal serviteur, *Histoire*, ed. Buchon, p. 94.

<sup>61</sup> 'France, France': see d'Auton, I, pp. 25, 88, 181, 309; III, pp. 5, 58, 65, 264 (Garigliano); IV, pp. 113, 141, 181, 275; Villars, p. 522 (1551); Barrillon, I, p. 120 (1515, Marignano); 'Ville gagnée', d'Auton, I, pp. 225, 310; for the Spanish: 'Vitoria', 'Saint Jacques', see d'Auton, III, p. 163.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., I, pp. 114, 117.

<sup>63</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 140.

<sup>64</sup> D'Auton, III, p. 6.

an honorable end. We shall do this if by care, diligence and virtue we go to work. Let us set on, then, and let no man risk the dishonour of shame!<sup>65</sup>

The Swiss, in the same campaign, receive an exhortation from their captains not to desert the King disloyally, while the French troops at the siege of Novara were exhorted by Alègre, starting with the reservation that now was not the time for words but 'if ever we had our honour, the King's service and our lives in mind' now was the time to show it and defend themselves furiously like 'wild boar' (a common image). 'Audacity' would serve them for defence instead of walls.<sup>66</sup> So encouraged were the French by this and 'hearts stiffened with furious will, that rather would their armour have melted than their courage abated.' La Trémoille, before the battle at Novara with Ludovico il Moro in April 1500, declared:

My lords, the hour has come that each must go about his business, for we have the enemy in view and battle is imminent. Do not let us refuse the invitation, knowing that that the price of mens' valour stems from feats of arms. Let us be the first to attack and let no man accuse us of being soft, for in battle those who fear run the greatest danger. Audacity is the sure shield by which Fortune protects the adventurous. Let us then place the price of honour and the tenour of life in the safety of the armed fist.<sup>67</sup>

Stuart d'Aubigny is made to say to 'my lords and friends' at the siege of Capua in July 1501 that the time had come to serve the King and win glory.<sup>68</sup> At Bisceglie in Apulia (July 1502) and Venosa in 1504, the adventurous captain Louis d'Ars spurred on his men by high-flown appeals to honour and the duty to serve the King.<sup>69</sup> Perhaps more likely are the shouted words of La Palice in the siege of Genoa (1507), confronting his own retreating men: 'Turn, rogues, turn! If I see one man retreat, I'll have him cut to pieces.'<sup>70</sup>

The efficacy of words was stressed as much in the mouths of enemy commanders such as Pierre de Peralta, constable of Navarre, whose furious tongue-lashing of his men at Canosa in 1502 turned the course of the fight to defend the city against the determined French assault.<sup>71</sup> Even Spanish chroniclers could record the 'speeches' of French commanders, otherwise unknown. Mariana, for instance, records the words of Aubigny at the defeat of Gioia (1503):

In the past you have fought a powerful army and the boldest commanders in Italy. You were victorious and showed that the French are better than other peoples. Could it be that today you should lose heart in the face of some ill-armed soldiers and that you should lose the honour and glory you so recently won? God would not permit it nor your hearts forgive. Die if you must but

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 193.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 197.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 248.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 59.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, III, pp. 6–7, 321.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, p. 199.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 286–7.

do not give an inch! Remember your glory and the name and honour of France.<sup>72</sup>

Francis I, in Spanish accounts of Pavia, was praised to the skies for his bravery and, naturally, given a suitably dignified speech to his cavalry before the final charge, which mixed exhortation in the defence of honour with the consciousness of a shared 'right' which had to be defended:

Gentlemen, in whose hands I put all my hopes this day, if you hold me for your king, if you love me and want to place your honour, goods, wives, children, brothers and sisters in good state, you will show today to your enemies, arms in hand, how great is your worth. And, though I believe your great courage, noble through birth and ancient lineage, has no great need of exhortation, nevertheless, let me briefly say that, if we are victorious over our enemies, as I hope we shall be through our natural valour, we can justly say we are the defenders and recoverers of our rights.<sup>73</sup>

### **New tactics: the fortified camp; battle-field artillery**

As the wars continued, the incidence of major and decisive pitched battle declined. After 1529, only the fields of Ceresole, 1544 (widely celebrated) and Saint-Quentin, 1557, stand out (smaller engagements such as the Pass of Susa, 1537, and Renty, 1554 were also celebrated). The focus shifted towards wars of manoeuvre and siege warfare, while the fortified encampment became more significant. This had already been present to some extent in Italy early in the century. The cavalry commander Louis d'Ars put the point succinctly in 1503. Three things, he said, commonly gave victory: 'array, rest and chosen ground.'<sup>74</sup> At Cerignola (1503) Cordoba's position was fortified. The French attacked with cavalry and infantry as night fell against a position strongly fortified with entrenchments and garnished with artillery and massed arquebusiers. The fighting was hellish; it was only possible to see what was happening by the light of explosions and firearms and Nemours was shot three times.<sup>75</sup> At Ravenna (1512) both Gaston's and Navarro's camps were fortified and at Marignano, the French position was heavily entrenched around the artillery. At La Bicocca in 1522, the battle turned on the French assault on the imperial entrenchments. Florange apparently devised a fortified wooden camp that could be dismantled and transported for use in terrain that provided no cover. Du Bellay was rather negative about its value, since the equipment, transported with such trouble, was unused in the disastrous encampment near Novara.<sup>76</sup> The battle of Pavia, of course, turned on a night attack against a fortified French position. The greatest

<sup>72</sup> Stuart, *Traité sur l'art de la guerre*, ed. Comminges, introduction, p. xxviii (after Padre Juan de Mariana, *Obras*). Presumably the fact that this was a defeat deterred d'Auton from inventing a suitable speech.

<sup>73</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, pp. 261–2.

<sup>74</sup> D'Auton, III, p. 171.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, III, pp. 172–3.

<sup>76</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, pp. 13, 27.

example was the fortified camp constructed by Montmorency near Avignon in 1536 but such tactics were employed again at Landrecies in 1543 and Jalons in 1544.

The Emperor's fortified camp in 1554 was surrounded by very deep entrenchments, which made attack impossible. Charles could not be drawn out into battle and Montmorency's bulletin makes the assumptions very clear. Henri II had not ordered an attack on it 'seeing that reason of war forbade him to assault him in his fort.' On the other hand, by standing on the defensive, the Emperor could not stop the devastation of the Low Countries any more than Francis I had been able to in 1536.<sup>77</sup>

The complement of battle-field fortification was battle-field artillery. By 1515, artillery was capable of playing a decisive role on the battle-field. Ravenna (1512) may have been the first occasion on which serious artillery manoeuvres were undertaken on the battle-field. The Spanish infantry were ordered onto their stomachs before the battle to minimise casualties. Their own 20 pieces were covered by the arquebusiers, interspersed with carts armed with anti-personnel spikes. Contemporary narratives indicate not only the elaborate use of artillery on both sides but also severe casualties resulting from it.<sup>78</sup> Guicciardini, who coined the term 'battle of giants' for Marignano, affirmed, on the authority of Marshal Trivulzio, that had it not been for the artillery, the Swiss would have won.<sup>79</sup> As has been shown, French artillery was rapid in deployment and normally protected by infantry and cavalry on the march. As the battle-field was chosen, the *maître de l'artillerie* chose the emplacement for the guns and the pioneers worked on temporary entrenchments for it.<sup>80</sup> The disparity between French artillery at Marignano (72 heavy guns, 60 light and 400 arquebuses) and the 9–10 culverins of the Swiss<sup>81</sup> is all too obvious. The avant-garde under Bourbon had 30 cannon to beat the dikes along which the Swiss had to approach and two thirds of the heavy pieces were placed with the 'battle' under the King's command. All through the first day Genouillac's artillery played mercilessly on the massed ranks of the Swiss, concentrating fire expertly on the heads of the columns in the form of the *tir massue* (aiming a number of pieces together – sometimes 8 – on a single target) in batteries that extended wheel to wheel for 30 metres. The night was used to reposition the artillery for the next day's clash in a large arc, ready to cut into the first and second ranks of the massive Swiss column. It was on this day that Francis gambled everything in defending the artillery from capture. His determination indicates clearly the importance of artillery for the outcome of the battle.<sup>82</sup> Contamine has calculated that two artillery companies (72 pieces), with an average of 5 salvos an hour for 12 hours of intense fighting, produced 4320 balls (roughly one third of the available

<sup>77</sup> Des Monstiers Mérinville, *Fraise*, p. 187.

<sup>78</sup> E.g. Loyal serviteur, *Histoire*, ed. Buchon, pp. 93–4.

<sup>79</sup> F. Guicciardini, *Istoria d'Italia*, ed. Rosini, 5 vols (Pisa, 1812), IV, p. 85.

<sup>80</sup> Vaux de Foletier, *Galiot de Genouillac*, pp. 44–5; Contamine, 'Un Seigneur de la Renaissance: Jacques de Genouillac', pp. 281–8, on Marignano.

<sup>81</sup> Barrillon, I, p. 116, says 9 large pieces.

<sup>82</sup> See Vaux de Foletier, *Galiot de Genouillac*, pp. 51–9.

material). This would have required 30,000 livres of gunpowder. Two companies would normally have taken 2416 horses, 344 carts and 1000 pioneers. In fact, there were 2500 pioneers at Marignano, which would indicate a strategy of field fortifications.<sup>83</sup>

### The conventions of siege warfare

Military necessity and strategy dictated that sieges of fortresses were often at the centre of campaigns. They were governed by powerful conventions. Fortresses were allowed to surrender *bagues sauvées* (with baggage) and banners flying if they chose to do so before the planting of artillery – ‘before the artillery had played its part’ – as du Bellay put it.<sup>84</sup> These conventions were, in the words put into the mouth of Pedro de Peralta, constable of Navarre, who abandoned Spanish for French service because of a breach of conventions by Gonzalo de Cordoba. Such were ‘the ceremonies of war which, by the statutes of the military art should be so strictly observed that, whoever presumes to do the contrary is worthy of mortal punishment.’<sup>85</sup> On occasions, if a fortress was only given an exploratory battering by ‘small pieces’ and then surrendered, it could do so *bagues sauvées*, though usually without the honours of war. At Mariembourg in 1554, the Constable began a sudden artillery barrage three days after the start of the siege and the garrison quickly asked for terms. They were allowed to march out with their swords but leave their banners, artillery and provisions behind. The same terms were accorded the garrison of Dinant, even though they had sustained a furious assault, and at Thionville in June 1558.<sup>86</sup> At Susa in 1537, though only two cannon had been fired before the enemy surrendered, they were only suffered to march out ‘unarmed, in shirt sleeves.’ Thus, once a battery had begun, the terms of any surrender depended on the grace of the commander and the convenience of terminating a siege quickly.<sup>87</sup> During the royal siege of Hesdin in 1537, after a bombardment, the consensus of the commanders was that the walls were too thick to be reduced by artillery and that mining was therefore the only way. The siege dragged on in the presence of the Queen and the court (20 March–16 April) and Francis I personally took the decision to bombard the fortifications at a particular point. Unfortunately, an unauthorised and disastrous assault took place by young men eager to shine in front of the King and the troops had to be got under control. Only after the drawing up of the entire army for an assault the next day did the garrison propose surrender *bagues sauvées*, leaving all artillery and munitions.<sup>88</sup> At nearby Contes, the King himself commanded that if the garrison held out long enough for the firing of

<sup>83</sup> Contamine, ‘Un Seigneur de la Renaissance: Jacques de Genouillac’, pp. 290–1.

<sup>84</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 137.

<sup>85</sup> D’Auton, II, p. 294 (1502).

<sup>86</sup> Des Monstiers Mérinville, *Fraisse*, pp. 144–8, 158; *Mémoires de Guise*, p. 426.

<sup>87</sup> D’Auton, IV, p. 71; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, p. 429; AM Saint-Quentin, liasse 150, O.

<sup>88</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, pp. 354–8; AN J 968/2, nos. 11–25.

'great pieces', they would all be hanged. They surrendered.<sup>89</sup> At another siege of Hesdin in December 1552 and at Lanzo Torinese in January 1553, it was agreed that the garrison should march out with weapons and banners displayed but drums muffled.<sup>90</sup> Perhaps the most celebrated surrender was that of Monluc at Siena in April 1555, after a long and gruelling siege involving the famous expulsion of 'useless mouths'. The terms accorded to the French and their allies were to march out in arms, banners displayed and drums beating, but the terms for their allies were less happy. In this case, it was the anxiety of the besiegers to end the siege that counted.<sup>91</sup>

The surrender of Mouzon in 1521 was controversial in that the commander, Montmort, claimed to have been forced to parley by the mutiny of his men. He could only obtain terms that men-at-arms could ride out without their arms, the infantry on foot with staves only.<sup>92</sup> At Fuentarrabia in 1521, Bonnivet's assault made rapid progress. The initial assault failed but the placement of more artillery and the threat of a second assault persuaded the garrison to parley and surrender *bagues sauvées*.<sup>93</sup> The rapid fall of Hesdin in 1521, after bombardment and assault, led some of the townsmen to take refuge in the castle. When that surrendered in turn, the aristocratic residents were allowed to withdraw but the townsmen held prisoner.<sup>94</sup> The Piedmontese fortress of Mondovì held out against the assault of del Vasto's army in November 1543 until forced to capitulate 'arms and baggage safe.' However, the Swiss troops of the French garrison were pillaged and some killed when they marched out.<sup>95</sup>

It was always understood that a garrison should hold out if it had reason to expect to be supported by a relieving army. On 19 November 1521, Francis I authorised Tournai to surrender within 15 days if they heard no more from him. On the 26th, though, he wrote again, thanking the town for its loyalty and telling them to await the arrival of the emissary they had sent to court. The surrender actually took place 15 days after the truce concluded on 30 November.<sup>96</sup> To surrender while there was still hope was a disgrace (as Vervins found to his cost at Boulogne in 1544).<sup>97</sup> Sometimes a garrison, realising its position was hopeless, would ask for talks and, during them, the besieging force would storm the place and massacre the garrison. Such was the case at Rocca d'Arazzo in Lombardy (1500) and Capua in Naples (1501), one of the most appalling atrocities of the period.<sup>98</sup> This was, strictly speaking, dishonourable, though often connived at by a commander who

<sup>89</sup> AN J968/2, no. 24.

<sup>90</sup> Hatfield House, MSS of marquess of Salisbury, 151, fo. 72; Villars, p. 563.

<sup>91</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, pp. 328–35.

<sup>92</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 138.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 158.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, I, p. 168.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 189, 196.

<sup>96</sup> A. Hocquet, *Tournai et le Tournaisis au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Brussels, 1906), p. 43 n. 2; BN fr. 2971, fos. 77–8.

<sup>97</sup> D. Potter, 'A Treason Trial in Sixteenth-Century France: the Fall of Marshal du Biez, 1549–51', *EHR*, 105 (1990), 595–623, at p. 596.

<sup>98</sup> D'Auton, I, p. 21.



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### **3. Commemorative medals:**

- i.** Charles VII, 1451, commemorating the reconquest. Obv.: Legend in two concentric lines: QVANT IE FV FAIT SANS DIFERANCE AV PRYDENT ROI AMI DE DIEV ON OBEISSOIT PAR TOVT EN FRANCE FORS A CALAIS QUI EST FORT LIEV. Escutcheon with arms of France surmounted by open royal crown surrounded by two rose branches. Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. II, no. 1; 82mm. Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, no. 1
- ii.** Louis XII, 1499. Obv.: LVDOVICVS XII FRANCORVM REX MEDIOLANI DVX. Rev.: VICTOR TRIUMPHATOR SEMPER AUGUSTUS, crowned porcupine; 37mm. Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. IV, no. 2; Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, no. 26
- iii.** Francis I, 1515. Young head, armour. Obv.: FRANCISCUS REX FRANCORUM PRIMUS DOMITOR ELVETIORUM. Rev.: DEO FAVENTE ET IMPERATORIS VIRTUTE, trophy; Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. VIII, no. 1

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- 4.i.** Francis I, 1515. Obv.: young head. FRANCISCVS PRIMVS F R INVICTISSIMVS. Rev: DOQM [? Dominusque Mediolani], army and a city. On banner 'LP' [Leo Papa?]; Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. VII, no. 5
- 4.ii.** Francis I, 1515? Obv.: FRANCISCVS I FRANCORUM REX. Rev: VICI AB VNO CAESARE VICTOS. Below: MARIIGNAN, trophy
- 4.iii.** Francis I, 1515 (same head as ii). Rev: VNVS NON SVFICIT ORBIS MDXV, terrestrial and celestial globes, closed crown; Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. VI, no. 2
- 4.iv.** Francis I, 1519 (same head as ii). Rev: PACE STABILITA ET RECEPTO A BRITANNIS TORNACO. Peace seated holding olive branch and arms cast into flames; Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. VIII, no. 3

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- 5.i.** Henri II, 1550? Young head. Obv.: HENRICVS II FRANCORVM REX. Rev.: ΟΛΟΣ ΑΓΟ ΜΗΧΑΝΗΣ (transl.: 'I fight by all means'), Perseus rescuing Andromeda [Boulogne?]; Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. XIII, no. 5
- ii.** Henri II, 1551 [Étienne Delaune]. Obv.: HENRICVS II D G FRAN REX. Rev.: SVA CIRCVMIT ORBE FAMA 1551. Victory on globe holding two trumpets and blowing into the one in her right hand, 35mm.; Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, no. 95
- iii.** François duke of Guise, 1552. Obv.: FRANCISCVS DVX GVISIVS. Rev.: 1555 HAEC TIBI META, Metz besieged; Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, no. 408

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- 6.i.** Henri II, 1552 (Guillaume Martin). Obv.: HENRICVS II GALLIAR[um] REX CHRISTIANISS[imus] P P. Rev.: NOMEN AD ASTRA 1552, Diana with a bow and arrow, 37mm.; Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, no. 112.
- ii.** Henri II, 1552? Obv.: HENRICVS II GALLIARVM REX INVICTISSIMVS PP. Rev.: Two armies facing each other; the King, crowned by victory greets another commander [the duke of Guise?]; Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. XIII, no. 7
- iii.** Henri II, 1552 (by Etienne Delaune; same head as 8.i). Obv.: HENRICVS II GALLIARVM REX INVICTISSIMVS PP. Rev.: RESTITVTA REP[ublica] SENENSI LIBERATIS OBSID[ione] MEDIOMAT[ricis] PARMA MIRANDOLA SANDAMI ET RECEPTO HEDINIO ORBIS CONSENSV 1552, laurel wreath; Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. XII, no. 2; Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, no. 101

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7.i. Henri II, 1552 (by Marc Bechot). Obv.: HENRICVS II REX CHRISTIANISSIMVS. Rev.: OB RES IN ITALIAM GERMANIAM ET GALLIAM FORTITER GESTAS (transl.: 'for courageous and happy achievements in Italy, Germany and France'). Triumphal chariot pulled by four horses bearing peace with horn of plenty. Renown with trumpet with arms of France. Below: EX VOTO PUBLICO 1552. Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. XIII, no. 2  
ii. Henri II, 1552 (by Bechot; same head as 7.i). King armed, laurel wreath. Obv.: HENRICVS II REX CHRISTIANISSIMVS. Rev.: LIBERTAS, bonnet of liberty between two naked swords (symbol of Brutus). Below: VINDEX ITALIAE ET GERMANICAE LIBERTATIS.  
iii. Henri II, 1552 (by Bechot; same head as 7.i). Obv.: HENRICVS II REX CHRISTIANISSIMVS. Rev.: ET PACE ET BELLO ARMA MOVET (transl.: 'He is armed both in peace and war'). Henri II in antique mode, sword in one hand and in the other a bow topped by a caduceus; two angels supporting crown above head; Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. XIII, no. 1



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- 8.i** Henri II, 1552 (by Etienne Delaune; another version of 7.i; same head as 6.iii). Obv.: HENRICVS II GALLIARVM REX INVICTISSIMVS PP. Rev.: OB RES IN ITALIAM GERMANIAM ET GALLIAM FORTITER GESTAS, triumphal chariot facing right. Below: EX VOTO PUBLICO 1552; Lenormant, *Trésor*, p.XII, no. 1; Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, no. 99
- ii.** Henri II, 1558 (Guillaume Martin). Obv.: same head as 6.i. Rev.: DONEC TOTVM COMPLEAT ORBEM 1558; crescent surmounted by royal crown, 38mm.; Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, no. 113
- iii.** Henri II, 1558. New head, armour. Obv.: HENRICVS II REX CHRISTIANISSIMVS. Rev.: MAIORA SEQUENTUR (transl.: 'greater things will follow'). The King as Roman Emperor rides to the right followed by a soldier with legionary ensign and preceded by Mars and Victory. Below: EXACTIS BRITANNIS ET CALETO GUINIAQ[ue] RECEPTIS (transl.: 'the English expelled, Calais and Guines retaken'); Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. XI, no. 6

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10. Print of the battle of Fornovo [1495] Copy in National Gallery of Art, Washington Rosenwald Collection, 1952.8.5. On the left: the Italians attack from the woods and are confronted by Charles VIII's Swiss mercenaries. On the right: Charles (crowned) and his men are fighting another Italian formation. Lower left: Albanian mercenaries are looting the French camp rather than taking part in the battle. This action undermines the plan of attack and allows the French to escape.

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11. Maître de la Ratière, 'La bataille de Marignan' (Chantilly, Musée Condé)

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12. Italian battle prints from the mid-16th century:

i. *Bologna in Francia* (1549)

ii. *S. Quintino* (1557)

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13.i. The Battle of Gravelines (1558)

ii. *Il vero ritratto di Cales preso à Inglesi* (1558)

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14.i. *Ritratto della fortezza di Ghines (1558)*

ii. *Thionville: Vera Thionvillae effigie sum (1558)*

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**15. Flemish battle prints:**

- i. Hieronimus Cock, *Boloniae maritimae per Anglos Gallis ademptae ab Henrico II Valesio* (Antwerp, 1549)
- ii. Hieronimus Cock, *Vrbs S. Quintini* (Antwerp, 1557). View also adapted by Sebastian Munster, *Cosmographie universel* (1598 ed.), and used as the basis for the painting in the Sala de batallas, Escorial



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16. Military operations in the 1550s viewed by a Flemish artist; pr. E. Lemaire *et al.*, *La Guerre de 1557 en Picardie* (Saint-Quentin, 1896):

- i. The siege of Le Câtelet, 1557 (Brussels, Bib. royale, 22,089, fo. 36)
- ii. The siege of Ham, 1557 (Brussels, Bib. royale, 22,089, fo. 37)

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17. French war prints, 1558:

i. *Le pourtraict de la ville de Calais faict au naturel* (1558)

ii. *Le vray pourtraict de la ville & Chasteau de Guines* (1558)



**18.** The tomb of Galiot de Genouillac, *grand maître de l'artillerie* and frieze from the church at Assier (photos by author)

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wished to strike fear into the fortresses next on his list.<sup>99</sup> At Marigliano in Naples (1501), the garrison refused to surrender at first but did so after the planting of the French artillery.<sup>100</sup> Their reward was for all 200 to be hanged from the battlements (though one lucky man's rope gave way after he had been left dangling for an hour). The French had gained a reputation for ruthlessness by the time of the siege of Pisa in June 1500, when the city had to consider that: 'the French manner was such that all the towns and forts they took by assault were abandoned to fire and sword.' In this case, though, the refusal of acceptable terms forced them to fight back.<sup>101</sup> At Capua in July 1501, the French heralds summoned the town to surrender on the grounds that Louis XII was the true King of Naples and had the military power to make good his claim. They warned them of

The cruel excesses that happen in war and the danger they were in if Fortune willed that they should be taken by assault and that, if this happened, the sword would spare neither sex.<sup>102</sup>

At Nocera de'Pagani in 1502, the fact that the Spanish garrison fled at the arrival of the French meant that the latter could enter 'gently' without harm to the inhabitants, though the subsequent move against Canosa di Puglia was designed to 'strike fear' in the Spanish enemy. The failure of two murderous assaults, sustained by only 1200 Spaniards against a vastly superior force with the loss of 300, was one of the first signs of the limits to the *furia francese* that had dominated Italy for a decade. It encouraged the French commanders to agree a composition, *bagues sauvées*, with the Spaniards, which they guaranteed by hostages and placing guards to prevent attacks on the retreating garrison.<sup>103</sup> If the commander, on accepting surrender, chose to be generous, he had to act decisively in order to prevent a sack. Thus, at Genoa in 1507 the Swiss expected the city to be put to the sack after its surrender and Louis XII ordered the gates to be shut against them once he had made his ceremonial entry. They still clamoured mutinously all day outside the city and threatened to take the baggage train of the French commanders instead.<sup>104</sup> Simply allowing 6500 Swiss and French to be billeted on Alessandria after its rebellion in 1507 was punishment enough.<sup>105</sup> A surrender on terms could allow the garrison to depart without arms, carrying white sticks as a sign of their acceptance. The count of Sommeriva's description of the siege of Orange in 1562 shows that, while the garrison parleyed, in the end they would not accept terms and suffered an artillery bombardment full assault, after which they were put to the sword.<sup>106</sup>

There is some evidence for the processes of planning for sieges, which were always risky and required meticulous preparation if they were to be successful.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., I, p. 30.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., II, pp. 44–5.

<sup>101</sup> Ibid., I, p. 302.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., II, p. 40.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., II, pp. 276, 282–3, 289–93.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., IV, pp. 236–7.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., IV, p. 245.

<sup>106</sup> BN fr. 15876, fos. 132–3.

Cesare Borgia and Yves d'Alègre reconnoitred Capua carefully for the placement of the artillery in 1501.<sup>107</sup> Discussions of the siege of Vercelli in 1536 are particularly revealing. Claude de Coucys-Burie, in command of the artillery, was anxious to press forward and promised to mount such a battery that Vercelli could be assaulted in twenty-four hours. Older commanders raised questions: a siege needed to consider the number of the garrison and those of the relieving army. There were 3000 men in the town (1000 of them lansquenets). French forces amounted to about 16,000 foot but only 100 men-at-arms and 200 archers plus 200 light horse. But Antonio de Leyva was only 4 miles away on the Sesia with 12–14,000 foot and 600 horse. These could either supply the town or, in the case of assault, take French troops in the rear or even attack Turin. Even if the town were taken, part of the army would have to be detached and the rest then have to face Leyva. This was a classic dilemma for any besieging army where there was a relieving force in the offing.<sup>108</sup>

In the first phase of the Italian wars, it looks as though the fortifications of Italian cities simply could not cope with the French artillery train. Town after town crumpled, gave way to assault or was intimidated into surrender. Capua in 1501 was subjected to four days' non-stop artillery bombardment and 'the Neapolitans had never seen such a barrage.' At the end of that period, its two protecting bastions had been reduced to rubble and the outworks constantly fought over. The garrison fought hard but was overwhelmed.<sup>109</sup> French artillery, though, met its match at Salses in 1503. In that case, supplies of gunpowder and losses among the pioneers began to undermine operations.<sup>110</sup>

By the 1540s, fortification had evolved significantly. In Piedmont, 1543–4, though the little town of San Germano was without bastions and could thus be battered into submission, the key town of Carignano had been equipped both by French and imperial garrisons with five earthen bastions, reinforced curtain walls and wide ditches. As it also had a garrison of 400 men, there was thus no question of an assault and the only course was to starve it out by establishing encampment and forts on the routes by which supplies would be sent to it.<sup>111</sup>

A siege needed to be rapid because of the dangers of a prolonged operation to a besieging army. Armies could easily become bogged down in siege warfare and begin to suffer from epidemics. This was, of course, the case at the siege of Pavia, which lasted in the middle of winter from 26 October to 24 February 1525. The initial ferocious French attack was beaten off and the siege settled into a blockade. By late January, one member of the besieging force remarked that if it were to go on any longer and the army be caught by warm weather, the filth and stench would extend for 6 leagues around and mortality would strike. Already 7 or 8 dead were being buried in communal graves.<sup>112</sup> The battle of Pavia therefore hit a French army

<sup>107</sup> D'Auton, II, p. 47.

<sup>108</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 385–7.

<sup>109</sup> D'Auton, II, p. 52.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, III, pp. 221–3.

<sup>111</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, pp. 197–8.

<sup>112</sup> Vaissière, *Une Correspondance de famille*, pp. 62–3.

already in trouble. The worst example was that of Lautrec's army besieging Naples in 1528, overwhelmed by disease.

With the progress of fortification by enemy powers over the course of the wars, siege operations by the French army became more sophisticated and costly. They also began to reveal a strategy of securing key fortresses beyond the frontiers of the kingdom that would both protect it and act as sally-ports into enemy territory. Piedmont served this purpose from 1536, but on the northern and eastern frontiers the campaigns against Landrecies in 1543, Metz in 1552, and Mariembourg in 1554, served a similar purpose.

### **The aftermath: casualties**

Alessandro Benedetti witnessed himself the corpses strewn across the battlefield of Fornovo, half-naked, stripped by peasants who had watched the battle from the neighbouring hills. The wounded lay naked in the sun begging for water and in the Venetian camp, there were amputations and the guts of the dying strewn around.<sup>113</sup> D'Auton vividly described the gentlemen coming into Chaumont's headquarters after the attack on the bastillon at Genoa in 1507:

The whole building, above and below, was full of the dying. I saw there several gentlemen arrive who had been in the battle, of whom some had not yet had their armour removed, all exhausted, their faces spattered with powder and sweat ... at supper-time a great crowd of Swiss arrived, some carrying others on their pikes, all wounded and bleeding.<sup>114</sup>

The period was one in which not only the rank-and-file but also the commanders suffered high casualty rates, especially if the battle was lost. Even after a victory, losses among the commanders were sometimes high and disease could set in to an army, as after Marignano.<sup>115</sup> Far-flung expeditions to Naples, as under Lautrec in 1528 and Guise in 1557, led to the disintegration of armies through epidemics.<sup>116</sup> Artillery and its destructiveness was a normal feature of pitched battles by the start of the 16<sup>th</sup> century. In the first stage of the battles for the crossing of the Garigliano in October 1503, we are told that twenty French cannons were firing at once against Gonzalo de Cordoba's forces 'which carried off ten, twenty, thirty and forty at a time, so that where the shot struck there was nothing but dismembered heads, arms and bodies.'<sup>117</sup> At Ravenna, one of the hardest fought battles of the age, the Loyal Serviteur gave French losses as 3000 foot and 80 men-at-arms while the Spanish lost 10,000 infantry and 20 captains.<sup>118</sup>

<sup>113</sup> Benedetti, *Diaria*, part I, p. 109.

<sup>114</sup> D'Auton, IV, p. 210.

<sup>115</sup> Vaissière, *Une Correspondance de famille*, pp. 24, 26–7. Around 20 major commanders were killed on the French side at Marignano.

<sup>116</sup> *Mémoires de Guise*, pp. 370, 324 (making the parallel with Lautrec in 1528).

<sup>117</sup> D'Auton, III, p. 265.

<sup>118</sup> Loyal serviteur, *Histoire*, ed. Buchon, p. 330.

At Marignano, according to Bouchet, 'The fight was cruel and long ... and the French and Swiss were so determined to slaughter each other that only nightfall separated them.' Estimates of Swiss casualties are around 15,000 out of 35,000.<sup>119</sup> At Ceresole a contemporary observer noted that for a quarter league around the town 'our horses were up to the knees in blood and couldn't walk for dead bodies.' Estimates of imperial casualties were 12–15,000 'of all nations.'<sup>120</sup>

Monluc recalled at the end of his life that he had been shot seven times while serving the King and that not one of his limbs was without a wound.<sup>121</sup> It is usually thought that before the late 17th century there was little organised system for caring for battle wounded. This is not entirely the case, though measures were rough and ready. The letters of Louise of Savoy offer vivid testimony to the 'poor soldiers, horse and foot, who came from the camp nearly all in their shirt-sleeves' after Pavia.<sup>122</sup> The issue was a crucial one, for it affected the morale of the troops. It seems that in this period, the only possible course of action for the severely wounded was to place them in monasteries as lay brothers<sup>123</sup> though La Noue later in the century thought the system ridiculous and very ineffective.<sup>124</sup> There was an ambitious attempt by Brissac to deal with this in his 1551 ordinance by making a levy of 5% on the pay at musters to be used to create military hospitals. Among the infantry companies at Casale in 1558 an average of just over 10% of the men were sick. Among the legionaries at Calais at the same date, just over 11% were out of action through illness or wounds.<sup>125</sup>

Royal letters of 1537 observed that in Fürstenberg's lansquenet regiments there were a large number 'sick, who for the extremity of their illness, cannot march with the colours' at Sens. The King had therefore 'to heal and restore them' and decided to move them 'gently' to Auxerre. They were to be lodged in 'some suitable place' allocated by the *échevins*.<sup>126</sup> Some of the commanders of the Grisons troops who had been killed in the disastrous Parma campaign in 1554 were recommended to Ambassador Fraisse for royal alms, including captains who left children to be looked after, and a dozen common soldiers who returned minus limbs.<sup>127</sup> Henri II sent a chain for a German page who had his leg blown off at the siege of Thionville in 1558. Monluc's infantry had large numbers of wounded after the capture of the town but they were taken to Metz 'and I had hospital money distributed to them, that the Admiral [Coligny] had allocated, which was the reason for saving a whole world of wounded soldiers and prompt the men to risk themselves more boldly in

<sup>119</sup> Jean Bouchet, *Le Panegyric du chevalier sans reproche* [Louis de La Trémoille, (Poitiers, 1527)], ed. J. Buchon (Paris, 1839), pp. 786–7; Barrillon, I, p. 125; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 74.

<sup>120</sup> Courteault, *Monluc*, p. 168; Bib.II, 73a; Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, pp. 227–8.

<sup>121</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, p. 821.

<sup>122</sup> Champollion-Figeac, *Captivité*, pp. 82, 84.

<sup>123</sup> See Fourquevaux, *Instructions*, introduction, p. lvi.

<sup>124</sup> La Noue, *Discours politiques et militaires*, discours 17, pp. 352–3.

<sup>125</sup> Du Bouchet, *Preuves de ... Coligny*, pp. 457–61; Villars, pp. 534, 833; BN fr. 23192, fos. 263–4.

<sup>126</sup> BN Dupuy 273, fo. 31.

<sup>127</sup> Des Monstiers Mérinville, *Fraisse*, p. 235.

battle.<sup>128</sup> Individuals who could obtain favours might be treated generously by the crown, as was Pierre de Rieux, a ‘poor gentleman’ who had lost an arm by a cannon shot in Scotland and in 1549 was granted 300 écus out of the sale of fallen trees in the royal forests through the intervention of the Cardinal de Guise.<sup>129</sup>

<sup>128</sup> BN fr. 20646, fos. 132–3; Monluc, *Commentaires et lettres*, ed. Ruble, II, p. 296.

<sup>129</sup> BN fr. 5127, fo. 72v.

# 8

## ‘The Sinews of War’: Military Administration and Finance

### The cost of war

The waging of war in a newly conquered territory, measured by avarice or thrift, only ever brought disorder and ruin. The wars of Naples and Milan unleashed by Charles VIII, Louis XII and Francis I bear only too deplorable witness to this.<sup>1</sup>

Here is the voice of the frustrated military commander, in this case Brissac, at being kept short of funds at a critical moment. The problem was repeated constantly throughout the Italian and Habsburg-Valois wars. Was the French financial system simply not up to waging war?

How much did war cost in 16th century France? A simple question, perhaps, but not one that is remotely simple to answer. Some foreign ambassadors made estimates of war expenditure that can be treated as educated guesses. The Venetian Contarini in 1491, for instance, thought that the *gendarmerie* cost 2.3 million lt. and fortifications and equipment 3 millions, while total revenues were only 3.6 millions.<sup>2</sup> The figure for the *gendarmerie* is certainly an over-estimate but there is no way of judging the rest. Priorities were always difficult to establish. In October 1515, the pay of the *gendarmerie* had to be diverted for the April quarter to satisfy the pay of the lansquenets.<sup>3</sup>

Marshal d’Esquerdes estimated the cost of the Italian campaign of 1494–5 as 1 million écus.<sup>4</sup> Demands sent to the clergy for the *don gratuit* in August 1542 included a statement that the war with the Emperor was currently costing 1 million lt. a month (the high cost of campaigning months in the summer), financed through loans. The King had raised 250,000 lt. from Italian merchants (at 16%) and a further 50,000 from French merchants at 10%. To this could be added the revenues from the new tax for the infantry levied on the cities (200,000 écus from Paris) and grant from the Estates. Later in the year Francis admitted he had been short of funds but was sure he would have 6 millions for the following year’s campaign.<sup>5</sup> The rebellion at La Rochelle over the salt duty was a symptom of the problem.

<sup>1</sup> Villars, p. 720.

<sup>2</sup> Firpo, *Relazioni*, V, pp. 10–20.

<sup>3</sup> BN Moreau 800, fo. 223.

<sup>4</sup> Desjardins, *Négociations*, I, p. 268.

<sup>5</sup> *St.P.*, IX, pp. 103–4, 197; BN Picardie 95, p. 326 (*CAF*, VII, 331, 24894).

*Contrôleur des guerres* Bayard told an imperial envoy in 1544 that the war of 1542–4 had cost France 11 million lt.<sup>6</sup> The imperial Ambassador reported to the Emperor in 1547 that Cardinal de Meudon had gone to the Louvre to inspect the coffers of the King's reserve war chest and had declared that there were 1,500,000 écus. The ambassador thought there was less, in view of other charges on the money:

It is true that the King gathers all he can, indeed makes the walled towns pay the tax of 50,000 men that they earlier agreed for four or six months, turning it into something normal whereas they had agreed it for necessity of war. It is also said that he will levy individual loans on the rich.

But the King was furiously gathering money 'as if he were at war.' The *soldes* would bring in 600,000 écus and loans 500,000. The King also intended to levy *décimes* on the clergy, pointing out that they had not been collected in the previous year and Paris had offered a *don gratuit* of 100,000. All this was to be placed in the Louvre.<sup>7</sup> The war of 1551–5 was reported to have cost 45 million écus and another loan of 900,000 taken up from Italian bankers at 16% interest.<sup>8</sup> The resources for war of the French state were an object of constant speculation and guesswork which reflects the fact that state finance was an imprecise science subject to much complexity.

Serious answers to the problem of how much war cost should be possible from archival sources but the disappearance of so many financial documents means that the remaining sources are sometimes ambiguous. The subject has been treated seriously by Pierre Hamon in his study of royal finances, in which war of course played an important part. For the period from about 1480 to 1562, two sources are central to any understanding of this problem. The first is a series of *états au vrai* (in effect budgets) for royal finances which were collected in 1571 in abridged form for a number of years between 1515 and 1562.<sup>9</sup> These cover all major headings of royal expenditure and allow a comparison between military and other expenditure. The second is a series of accounts collected in 1555–6 by an official who was trying to gather all the surviving accounts of war expenditure since 1484.<sup>10</sup> These are particularly valuable for the *ordinaire* and *extraordinaire de la guerre* but rather less so for expenditure covered in the first of these sources. Together, they at least permit the establishment of a sequence of figures, even though they inevitably do not include provision for inflation. By comparing them with partially preserved documentation – the famous *état par estimation*, or draft budget, of 1523 (Appendix 6, table iii), estimates for other isolated years – and with other sources on royal revenues, we can discover a surprisingly extensive range of information about the financing of war.

Appendix 6, table i presents the figures in the first of these documents, the only comparable sequence available. An idea of the magnitude of expenditure on

<sup>6</sup> HHSA, Frankreich, Varia 5, fo. 172v.

<sup>7</sup> HHSA, Frankreich 14, Berichte 1547, III, fos. 33r, 67v–68r.

<sup>8</sup> *CSP Venice*, VI.i, pp. 314–30, 343; Weiss, *Papiers d'état*, IV, pp. 556–7.


<sup>9</sup> BN fr. 17329, fos. 82r–112r.

<sup>10</sup> BN fr. 4523, fos. 1–52, esp. 43–51, pr. Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 241–53.



the *ordinaire* and *extraordinaire* together, along with the miscellaneous expenditure through *deniers par acquits* (sometimes used to defray the costs of fortification), can be seen in graph 1. There are obviously gaps and points where the figures cannot be compared but they do give an idea of the increasing magnitude of expenditure:

Graph 1



The cost of the *ordinaire des guerres* was still the most regular and inexorable form of military expenditure (Appendix 6, table vi). Little primary evidence survives for the accounts at the start of the Italian wars. In February 1495, the two *trésoriers de l'ordinaire* between them were allocated 768,789 lt. for the *gendarmerie*.<sup>11</sup> However, in the first stage of the Italian wars, the conquered territories could probably pay for part of their military establishment. In the accounts of the *généralités des finances* for 1502–3, we find that 492,902 lt. were assigned to the *trésorier des guerres* Pierre Le Gendre (the equivalent sum for the previous year had been 416,541 lt.) for the *gendarmerie*, then at a total of 2175 lances. The kingdom was to bear the cost of 1655 lances (actually the number dealt with by the *ordinaire des guerres*), 628 402 lt., less 135,000 drawn from the duchy of Milan. In addition, 580 lances, costing 193,445 lt. were to be paid from the revenues of Naples. At the same time, the generalities of France were only assigned to pay 200,000 lt. for the *extraordinaires*, when we know at least 600,000 had to be accounted for in this department.<sup>12</sup>

The *ordinaire des guerres* accounted for in the 1523 computation of the crown's commitments (infantry was dealt with separately), amounted in that year to 1,450,240 lt.<sup>13</sup> (Appendix 6, table iii) How much did the *gendarmerie* itself cost in total? The account for the *Trésorier de l'ordinaire* Jean Poncher of 1520–1 reveals that the *gendarmerie* was costing, for the first year of war with the Emperor, around 115,000 lt. per quarter for the 24 companies for which he was responsible, perhaps a third to half of the total (made up of 1233–80 lances).<sup>14</sup> A list of payments to the *gendarmerie* authorised by Montmorency alone from January 1537 to January

<sup>11</sup> BN pièces orig. 937, dossier of Geoffroy de La Croix.


<sup>12</sup> *Généralité* of Outre-Seine, 1502–3: BN fr. 2930, fos. 95–9; Le Gendre's account, 1501: BN fr. 2927, fos. 34–46.

<sup>13</sup> R. Doucet, *L'Etat des finances de 1523* (Paris, 1923), pp. 71–81.

<sup>14</sup> BN fr. 2933, fo. 1.

1538 (covering his campaigns of Artois, Piedmont and garrisons in Languedoc) amounted to 158,079 lt. Of this, 135,344 was disbursed to 23 companies made up of 1095 men-at-arms and 1616 archers. Relatively few men-at-arms were taken to Piedmont by Montmorency.<sup>15</sup> The increases in pay agreed in 1549, to cover the increased cost of supplies, were defrayed by the new supplement to the *taille*, the *tailion* levied from 1550. In November 1549, the *généralité* of Outre-Seine (with Languedoil the largest contributor), subject to a *taille* of nearly 885,000 lt. as its part of the national *taille* of 4.6 millions, received a supplementary demand of 286,973 lt. for the increased pay of 600 lances stationed within it. The national total was 2,400 lances, costing 1,195,720 lt. A sum of 1,146,236 lt. was actually raised for the kingdom as a whole.<sup>16</sup>

Graph 2



The records of the musters, particularly for the *gendarmerie*, were carefully filed with the *Chambre des Comptes* but many were lost in the dispersal of its archives. Originally, two sets of *commissaires* were responsible for payments under the *ordinaire des guerres* (for the *gendarmerie*) and the *extraordinaire des guerres* for the rest, mainly infantry.<sup>17</sup> More muster rolls survive for the *gendarmerie* and more analytical accounts for the infantry. Graph 2 summarises the crude figures for assignments of the *extraordinaire des guerres* derived from the abstract figures in BN fr. 4523, which gives the totals of expenditure on the *extraordinaire des guerres* for the period 1484 to 1555.<sup>18</sup> This shows a steady increase from a figure like 319,908 lt. for the year 1490, to typical sums around 650,000 lt. in the early years of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, with peaks during the major crises of the mid-1520s (5 millions), 1537 (5.2 millions) to between 9 and 12 million lt. in the first half of the 1550s. This reflects only partly the course of inflation in the form of the devaluation of the *livre tournois*. It also indicates the increasing predominance

<sup>15</sup> BN fr. 3044, fos. 93–109.


<sup>16</sup> BN fr. 18153, fos. 118–19, 126–30, 255r–56v; levy of 1551, fo. 283v.

<sup>17</sup> L. Mirot, *Dom Bevy et les comptes des trésoriers des guerres* (Paris, 1925).

<sup>18</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 248–51.

of the infantry in French military planning.<sup>19</sup> From 1547, we have separate figures for the two departments of the *extraordinaire*, dealing with expenditure within and beyond the Alps, called ‘Picardy’ and ‘Piedmont’ (see graph 3).

Graph 3



These figures may not be complete, since they represent assignments rather than actual expenditure. For the campaign of 1494, for instance, we have an assignment of 1,211,652 lt. (easily the largest for the period and yet dwarfed by the sums allocated by the mid-16<sup>th</sup> century) and yet only 593,865 lt. for expenditure.<sup>20</sup> The destination of the remainder is unknown but may be accounted for by the high unexpected expenditure on the Naples expedition. An *état de la dépense* for the garrison of Piedmont and Dauphiné in May 1547 indicates how modest the demands of the *extraordinaire* were in peacetime at 37,050 lt. p.m.<sup>21</sup> The *état par estimation* for 1549, though, signed by the King on 2 January (Appendix 6, table v), budgeted 800,000 lt. for Scotland and incidentally wildly underestimated necessary expenditure in Picardy and Piedmont.

Some of the most detailed evidence for the period covers the years 1536–8, when war was being waged on two fronts. (Appendix 6, table ix) Even in the incidentally preserved orders for the *trésorier de l'épargne* to make payments during the 1530s, we can list at least 1.5 million lt. for the northern frontier alone during March 1537 to April 1538.<sup>22</sup> The years 1537–8 were among those in which there were the highest allocations of funds for the *extraordinaire des guerres* in the reign of Francis I. In 1537, the year of the campaigns in Artois and Piedmont, 5.27 million lt. were allocated and in the following year 2.1 million.<sup>23</sup> Of these sums, we have detailed records derived from the orders to the *trésorier de l'épargne*

<sup>19</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, p. 189; Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 248–51.

<sup>20</sup> The figure corresponds reasonably closely to the report of Esquerdes's estimate of likely expenditure on the Italian campaign in Nov. 1493 as 'un milione d'oro' (the écu au soleil being slightly weaker than the ducat). Desjardins, *Négociations*, I, p. 268.


<sup>21</sup> Lyublinskaya, *Документы*, no. 14.

<sup>22</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, p. 186.

<sup>23</sup> For details, see Appendix 6, table viii.

and the *trésorier des parties casuelles* to transfer funds to the *extraordinaire des guerres*. As a result roughly half the allocations for each year are preserved.<sup>24</sup> This enables the balance of funds disbursed in Picardy and Piedmont to be established and makes clear that the *extraordinaire* was concerned above all with the finance of active campaigning, the change-over from expenditure in the north and the south being clearly marked in the summer of 1537 as the royal armies, mostly mercenary formations, moved south.

Graph 4



With the cessation of hostilities, allocations virtually cease. The weight of expenditure on Piedmont in the first half of 1537, though, is shown by an *état* finalised at Saint-Germain on 1 February 1537, allocated for extraordinary expenditure in southern and south-east France for six months. This amounted to 795,044 Lt. All but 76,625 was for war expenditure in Piedmont; 560,744 accounted for the costs of 8900 Italian infantry under the count of La Mirandola alone.<sup>25</sup> Martin de Troyes not only moved large sums south for the campaign of Piedmont but also supplied the Cardinal de Tournon, effectively in charge of government at Lyon, with funds. Accounts for sums supplied by Martin de Troyes in the summer of 1537 are fairly complete. These indicate that 233,166 Lt. were disbursed in July and 324,999 Lt. were paid in August on Tournon's instructions, with a regular rhythm of despatch throughout those months of sums to the governors of Piedmont and Turin as well as for the garrison of Marseille.<sup>26</sup> The cardinal's estimate for the total financial needs in Piedmont, Lyon and south-east France in August 1537 was 442,561 Lt.<sup>27</sup> The *conseil privé* allocated (3 May 1537) 145,960 Lt. due to Wurtemberg's lansquenets for two months. Commissaire Bourran had already received 60,000 in cash plus

<sup>24</sup> AN J 961/11 and J 962/12–14, summarised in *CAF*, VIII.

<sup>25</sup> AN J 967, no. 8/10 (the pay for Mirandola's men was 76,790 Lt. p.m.).

<sup>26</sup> AN J 967, no. 8/11: expenditure for July 1537; expenditure for Aug. 1537: AN J 967, no. 8/6.

<sup>27</sup> AN J 967, no. 8/19.

10,000 for new men under Fürstenberg. 36,000 were covered by a 'comptant' held at Paris by Jacques Marcel drawn on the receipt of Outre-Seine and other cash supplied by the *trésorier de l'épargne* to the *trésorier de l'extraordinaire*. 39,960 were in the form of a 'comptant de l'épargne' at Amiens.<sup>28</sup>

One of the most detailed surviving *états de l'assignation*, that is, a retrospective list of orders to pay the garrisons by the *trésorier de l'extraordinaire*, drawn up by the office of the duke of Guise for January 1558, gives a total of 377,781 lt. for the garrisons alone.<sup>29</sup> Thus, infantry had become the main cost of the French army and was covered not only by loans but also by the institution in the late 1530s of the new urban tax, the *solde des 50,000 gens de pied*.

On occasions, we have the expenses for a whole army during a single campaign or for a specific period. The most accessible is the *état des dépenses* for Montmorency's army in Piedmont, October-December 1537. The total expenditure was 596,348 lt., most of it in November and December, with the lion's share going to Fürstenberg's lansquenets. In July and August, expenditure of the *extraordinaire* alone in Piedmont had totalled 556,805 lt. To all this can be added the relatively modest cost of the *gendarmerie* (4 companies only) in Piedmont in the second half of 1537, 19,268 lt. These figures, well over 1 million livres for Piedmont alone for a half year, do not include the regiment of Swiss who were also employed.<sup>30</sup>

Military intervention in Scotland during the late 1540s was a major drain on revenues: in March-August 1549, the *conseil privé* authorised nearly 768,000 lt. and that cannot have been the total spent.<sup>31</sup> At the start of 1554, a budget projected by the council for an army of 34,600 foot and 8400 horse was 537,521 lt.<sup>32</sup> Reliable information from secretary Fresne in 1558 indicates that the Cardinal de Lorraine had drawn up a budget estimate of 6.8 million lt. for 6 months from April 1558 to face the Spanish military machine.<sup>33</sup> The great army drawn up for review at Pierrepont in August 1558, though it was never in fact employed, was budgeted at 780,887 lt. a month, the infantry at 392,000, the cavalry at 218,867 (this including the larger number of light horse and *reîtres* now employed by France), transport was to cost 32,000 and artillery 80,000.<sup>34</sup> Such figures of 500–700 000 lt., per month for a campaigning army in the 1550s explain why the campaigns broke down in payments crises and why the finances of the state were exhausted by 1559. When it is remembered that these were only the overt forms of military expenditure and that there was much more involved, we see the scale of the problem. The financier responsible for the state credit, the *Grand Parti*, Albisse del Bene,

<sup>28</sup> 3 May 1537: BN fr. 3062, fo. 127.

<sup>29</sup> BN Clair. 346, fos. 77–92.

<sup>30</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, p.j. IV, pp. 197–231; AN J 967 nos. 8/6 and 10: *extraordinaire des guerres*. Rôle of payments authorised by Montmorency in Piedmont: BN fr. 3044, fos. 93–109. Account of Jean Laguette, *trésorier de l'extraordinaire* April–June 1529, total paid: 180,028 lt. (AN KK 102).

<sup>31</sup> BN fr. 18153, fos. 66–7, 68–9, 69–72, 91–21; M.-N Baudouin-Matuszek, 'Henri II et les expéditions françaises en Ecosse', *BEC*, 145 (1987), pp. 339–82. See also BN fr. 4552, fos. 8–52 for accounts of the *extraordinaire*, 1549–51.

<sup>32</sup> BN fr. 3090, fo. 12, figures corr. by Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 143, 240–1.

<sup>33</sup> BN fr. 4742, fo. 46.

<sup>34</sup> BN fr. 4552, fos. 72–73.

despatched 736,000 lt. to Italy in May-December 1551, more than a million in 1552 and 1.5 million in 1553, 2 millions in 1554 (during the war of Siena) and 1.5 million in 1555.<sup>35</sup>

There was the basic problem of how funds were moved around, of course. Vast sums of cash could not be paid to the troops without problems of moving coin. Though there were coffers for reserve funds in the Louvre and at Blois, most funds were stored for convenience in the houses of royal finance officials. The payments of the city of Paris for the King's ransom in 1529 were stored in the residence of the *Trésorier de l'extraordinaire* ApesteGuy and in 1538, Martin de Troyes's *commis* on his death was in possession of 9756 lt. of the King's money given him by Troyes for safe-keeping.<sup>36</sup> Despite the reforms of the 1520s, the device of *assignation* on provincial receipts for agents responsible for royal expenditure was unavoidable. Thus, Martin de Troyes, when allocated money directly by the *trésorier de l'épargne*, as often as not had to pursue a range of funds earmarked for extraordinary military expenditure on provincial receipts in areas nearest to the object of payment.<sup>37</sup>

The finance officials themselves did not usually transport funds. This task was sometimes deputed to their *commis* but most often to transport contractors and guides. An edict of 1542 required that local receivers move money on the basis of a contract for its transport, to be done by 'loyal and diligent clerks' or 'clerks conductors' with due certification of the dates of delivery.<sup>38</sup> A typical 'convoy' would consist of 14 packhorses, though small sums could be despatched, at high cost, by express courier. Armed escorts were not usually needed for the despatch of sums on routine business but became essential for the despatch of funds into areas of military operations. During the Artois campaign of 1537, Montmorency ordered those in charge of the money for the army not to pass beyond Saint-Riquier without written permission so they could travel more securely with an escort. It is also clear that money was only despatched when the 'month' fell due to particular formations, so as not to have cash left in the theatre of operations.<sup>39</sup> The failure of the pay of the Swiss mercenaries in Piedmont to arrive in August 1542 was explained to the angry captains by the story that the clerk who held the cash had gone to Avignon with it, thinking all the troops under Annebault's command were there.<sup>40</sup> Thirty light horse were employed as escort for money sent to the army in Italy in 1527 and 150 cavalry for the escort of the pay for the entire French army in Scotland in 1547. Only rarely did an important sum get waylaid; 5000 écus being sent from Paris to Lyon in 1537 were stolen and Martin de Troyes, responsible for them, wrote: 'I have such anguish in my heart about it that I cannot sleep. I thought this despatch the surest and best I have ever done.' Such losses were unusual. Even

<sup>35</sup> M. François, 'Albisse del Bène, surintendant des finances en Italie', *BEC*, 94 (1933), 337-60; I. Cloulas, *Henri II* (Paris, 1985), pp. 311-12.

<sup>36</sup> P. Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*»: *les grands officiers de finance dans la France de la Renaissance* (Paris, 1999), pp. 120-1.

<sup>37</sup> E.g. *CAF*, VII, 218, 24289.

<sup>38</sup> Isambert, *Lois*, XII, pp. 797, 800-01.

<sup>39</sup> AN J 968/1, nos. 5-6.

<sup>40</sup> Tausserat-Radel, *Correspondance ... Pellicier*, pp. 666-7.

within France, treasurer Mondoucet bore heavy costs in transporting money for the artillery of the royal army in 1537, and had not been paid his salary.<sup>41</sup> For obvious reasons, gold coin offered the advantage of ease of transport and the prince of Melfi for this reason asked for the infantry in Piedmont to be paid in it in 1547.<sup>42</sup> Availability of gold plainly governed this. Sending money abroad, for instance for pensions or advance payments to mercenaries, always involved greater insecurity and therefore higher costs, sometimes as much as 8% of the total and commonly between 2 and 5%.<sup>43</sup> When 17 new ensigns of lansquenets were raised in Germany in 1538, Hans Bruno of Metz was sent with 8500 écus, one to be paid to each recruit as a retainer 'to get the troops under way' and handed the money over in Lorraine.<sup>44</sup> Guillaume du Bellay's account of how he got the crucial pay through to the beleaguered garrison at Turin in August 1537 makes clear that a whole troop of lansquenets was necessary for its escort. The arrival of the pay under escort was then the signal for the peasantry around to come into the city with supplies that they would have refused to bring had the money not arrived to enable the garrison to pay for their produce.<sup>45</sup> Curiously, Langey's brother Martin du Bellay was made responsible for a similar, though this time inadequate, despatch of funds to Enghien's army in Piedmont (March 1544) and his account reveals much about the security problems of transporting cash in a war zone.<sup>46</sup> As we have seen in chapter 5, huge problems resulted when the pay of the Grisons troops was waylaid in Italy in 1552–3.<sup>47</sup>

Italian bankers still often required the physical transfer of money before undertaking to pay French troops in Italy, though letters of exchange obviously offered the advantage of greater security. Their main disadvantage was that, as Lautrec and Lescun found in 1522, they could be refused, thus causing a serious payments problem.<sup>48</sup>

### **Officialdom, financial and military**

It was the royal council in times of war that authorised expenditure. In the first stage of the Habsburg-Valois wars, for instance, a meeting at Lysesse on 10 October 1521 drew up a budget of November's expenditure on the *extraordinaire* amounting to 382,000 lt. for Picardy, Champagne and Burgundy, 100,000 to go to the Swiss, 50,000 for victuals and unexpected expenses and 20,000 for the artillery. The other major theatre of operations was northern Italy. The cost of the garrison of Piedmont was fixed by Francis I in March 1537 and absorbed 678,856 lt. between April and August of that year.<sup>49</sup> An estimate for the 1550s

<sup>41</sup> Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*», p. 123; AN J 968/1, no. 19.

<sup>42</sup> Lyublinskaya, *Документы*, no. 85: 'in gold coin for the expenses of transfer.'

<sup>43</sup> Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*», pp. 121–2.

<sup>44</sup> Calvin, *Plaidoyers*, ed. Peter, p. 10.

<sup>45</sup> Du Bellay, III, *Mémoires*, pp. 419–20.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 201, 203–6.

<sup>47</sup> Des Monstiers Mérinville, *Fraisse*, pp. 26–32, 198.

<sup>48</sup> Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*», pp. 126–30.

<sup>49</sup> BN fr. 3008, fos. 6–7 (8 Mar. 1537).



gives a budget of 700,000 lt. per month for Picardy and Champagne, while the garrison troops necessary for the northern and eastern frontier early in 1558 was budgeted at 766,562 lt. for two months. When money was needed urgently at the start of a war, as in 1551, or because of a looming deficit, it was the royal council that deliberated.<sup>50</sup>

The movement, pay and supply of the army were handled by different agents. In certain periods, the ministers who held the *maniement des affaires* were responsible. So, the Cardinal d'Amboise in 1507 was sent on to Asti by Louis XII to hasten the movement of his army into Genoese territory.<sup>51</sup> The pay of the army depended on the effective functioning of the financial machinery: at the top, the council for finance presided by the Chancellor for much of this period; below that, the cadres of the generalities. The role of the Chancellor is amply illustrated by the correspondence of Duprat, Dubourg and Poyet in succession. The failure of funds to be moved rapidly enough in 1521–2 to support the army in Milan was, rightly or wrongly, blamed on the *gens des finances* by Francis I, with major consequences. Similarly, the failure to keep Lautrec supplied at Naples in 1528 was blamed on Chancellor Duprat. In addition, commanders in the field were frequently at odds with the council over what they considered shabby treatment. Guillaume du Bellay had to contract debts of 300,000 lt. in Piedmont.<sup>52</sup>

The network of *trésoriers* and *commis* responsible for military pay and supply was co-ordinated in the early 16th century by *secrétaires des finances*, who often doubled as controllers in the *ordinaire des guerres*. This position was often held by one of the main *secrétaires des finances*, such as Florimond Robertet, or after him Jean Breton and Gilbert Bayard in the 1530s and 1540s. From 1547 the position was held by one of the secretaries of state.<sup>53</sup> The employment of trusted royal secretaries in the administration of armies was well established. In 1513, Louis XII despatched 'to the borders of Picardy and Burgundy, where we are sending presently two of our secretaries of finance to accompany our lieutenants on those frontiers.'<sup>54</sup> From the extensive correspondence preserved concerning the armies in Provence in 1536, and in Artois during 1537, it is clear that Jean Breton played a crucial administrative role between the commanders in the field and the Chancellor who, as head of the finance council, was responsible for ordering and assembling funds. By the 1550s the attachment of a secretary of state to major armies seems to have been normal.<sup>55</sup>

Dependent on the secretary-controller was a network of *commissaires* and *contrôleurs* for the two branches of the *ordinaire* and *extraordinaire* (70 in 1559). The two branches were not completely segregated, of course, and occasionally

<sup>50</sup> 1521: BN fr. 3002, fo. 80; 1550s: BN fr. 3127, fo. 75; Jan.–Feb. 1558: BN Clair. 346, fos. 77–92; Michaud, 'Les Institutions militaires', p. 37, n. 5.

<sup>51</sup> D'Auton, IV, p. 159.

<sup>52</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 80, 85, 364–5.

<sup>53</sup> *CAF*, VII, 188, 24140; Michaud, 'Les Institutions militaires', pp. 39–40. Gilbert Bayard recalled in 1544: 'as controller of war he should know what costs France bore more than any other', HHSA, Frankreich, Varia 5, fo. 172v.

<sup>54</sup> BN fr. 5085, fos. 6–7; BN fr. 5503, fo. 17.

<sup>55</sup> Breton: AN J 968/2, nos. 1–58; Potter, 'The Duke of Guise', pp. 482–3.

officials of one were authorised to account for expenditure in the other if the appropriate agents were not available.<sup>56</sup>

### The *ordinaire des guerres*

The *ordinaire des guerres* was principally responsible for the *gendarmerie*. By the 1520s, the staff of this 'department' consisted of 2 *trésoriers* (the most important), 12 *commissaires* and a *contrôleur-général* with 13 *commis*.<sup>57</sup> The two *trésoriers* held their posts as offices and were paid the unusually high salary 2000 lt. p.a. between 1498 and 1533, after that augmented by 1000 lt.<sup>58</sup> The office was long established, though in the early years of the 16th century provincial *trésoriers* for Milan, Brittany and Guyenne also existed. By 1528, these functions had been absorbed into the two central offices. Directly responsible to them for payment were the 12 *commissaires des guerres*, often noblemen (paid 400 lt. p.a.). The marshals of France had the privilege to nominate one of them on their accession of office, as did Brissac for Fourquevaux in 1550.<sup>59</sup>

In 1534, these offices and commissions were suppressed, ostensibly as a result of complaints about corruption, and replaced by many *paieurs des gens des ordonnances* who rendered their accounts separately, paid at the rate of 112.10.0 lt. p.m.<sup>60</sup> (The same process affected the *extraordinaire des guerres*, artillery and victualling administration). These were appointed formally as office-holders with the normal prerogatives, though excluding venality. The network of *payeurs* was established for companies and on a geographical basis and the aim was to integrate the administration of the taxes through the *recettes-générales* and the payment of the troops by making out patents of appointment as *payeur* to each of the clerks of the *généralités*. The change was unsuccessful (one consequence had been that, since they all accounted separately, it was impossible to establish retrospectively how many lances were paid). So the former two posts of *trésoriers* and of the *commissaires* were restored, though when exactly this was done is uncertain. The 1556 *état abrégé* states clearly this came in 1543, when they were paid at the rate of 3000 lt.<sup>61</sup> However, accounts kept by Guy de la Maladière, undoubtedly *trésorier* in the 1540s, show that he was quite clearly acting as such in 1537.<sup>62</sup> It seems likely that La Maladière had continued to receive his salary from about 1533 onwards, and the edict of 1543, which referred to the impossibility to assembling the *payeurs* in council at one time, made little difference to him. After 1543, La Maladière, Nicolas de Troyes and François de Raconis, men who had been closely

<sup>56</sup> 15 July 1555, order to *Chambre des comptes* to allow in the accounts for Jacques Veau, *trésorier de l'ordinaire*, musters of infantry in Piedmont taken by Brissac because of the absence the *commissaires* (BN fr. 5128, fo. 487).

<sup>57</sup> BN fr. 4523, *état abrégé* drawn up in 1570.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 46v, pr. Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 242–6.

<sup>59</sup> Villars, p. 509.

<sup>60</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, VII, pp. 91, 107; Hamon, *L'Argent du roi*, pp. 278–9.

<sup>61</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, p. 246.

<sup>62</sup> BN fr. 3004, fos. 93–103.

involved in the running of the *ordinaire des guerres* in the 1530s, were appointed. By 1543 there were 15 *commissaires* (17 from 1548) paid at 400 lt. p.a.

Next came the *contrôleurs*, also called *secrétaires*, then *secrétaires généraux des guerres*,<sup>63</sup> paid 600 lt. until 1533, thereafter 1200 lt. This double title was the norm still in the 1520s – Jehan Petitde was *contrôleur et secrétaire general des guerres* in 1521 as was Jean Breton in 1533<sup>64</sup> – but was dropped after the reorganizations of the early 1530s in favour of *contrôleur général des guerres*. It is not clear whether they continued in the same way after 1534 but from 1543 there was again a *contrôleur general* at 1200 lt. p.a. As in most other finance departments, the *contrôleur* was responsible for the checking of the accounts. Beneath him came the *commis* of the *contrôleur*, 13 of them rising to 17 in 1548 and 25 in 1553, paid, as before 1533, at 240 lt. pa. These were the men who audited the payments to the companies. The pay for the officials rose in 1550 alongside those of the soldiers: *commissaires* now received 500 lt. p.a. and the *commis* 300. The remainder of the administrative staff for the *gendarmerie* consisted of the judicial apparatus of 4 *prévôts des maréchaux* (6 from 1550), assisted by 90 archers in 1543 and over 100 during the 1550s.

### The *extraordinaire des guerres*

The *extraordinaire des guerres* dealt with all military expenditure not concerning the *gendarmerie*, though even here the division of labour was not absolute. The department was made responsible for compensation payments to the men-at-arms and archers of Florange's company in 1517 and staff of the *extraordinaire* were sometimes paid out of funds held by the *ordinaire*.<sup>65</sup> By the same token, a *commissaire des guerres* was sent to Hesdin in 1537 to take the muster of the infantry in Artois but also to act as a spy 'to observe and note the state of affairs' since the reports of the spies on the spot were contradictory.<sup>66</sup> The *trésoriers de l'extraordinaire* were, strictly speaking, royal *commis* and not officials and remained so despite the constant pressure for them to become officials. This may partly be explained by the crucial financial weight of their functions – easily the greatest in the entire financial administration and therefore undesirable to concede in terms of an office. Expertise in the management of large sums naturally paved the way for promotion to the more prestigious financial offices, so that until the 1530s, the tenure of *trésoriers de l'extraordinaire* was relatively short. The upheavals of the early 1530s seem to have led, from Jean Godet and Martin de Troyes in the 1530s, to a tendency for longer tenure in the post.<sup>67</sup>

The department was not clearly defined until the reign of Louis XII, since

<sup>63</sup> Jean du Plessis Courcu, *secrétaire de la guerre*, 1501: BN fr. 2927, fo. 34.

<sup>64</sup> BN fr. 2933, fos. 1–00, *état* of Jean Poncher, *trésorier des guerres*, Jan–Mar. 1521; Breton *contrôleur et secrétaire général*, 1533–4 (*CAF*, VII, 756, 28847).

<sup>65</sup> BN fr. 25720, fo. 72 (*CAF*, I, 110, 644); BN fr. 25720, fo. 97 (*CAF*, I, 135, 775); *CAF*, VII, 781, 29019.

<sup>66</sup> AN J 965/10, no. 3.

<sup>67</sup> Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*», pp. 15, 30–1.

before that *commis* had tended to be appointed to ensure the payment for specific armies on campaign (for example, François Doulcet, contrôleur of the King's *chambre aux deniers* but also *commis* for *extraordinaires* in Italy in 1500,<sup>68</sup> or Thomas Bohier, *général* of Normandy for the Genoese campaign of 1507). The first *trésorier de l'extraordinaire* with an overview over the entire infantry and related forces emerged in 1509. Etienne Grolier, then *trésorier* of Milan, was in charge of payments for the campaign against Venice. On his death in July, while his son took over his responsibilities for Milan, it was Morelet du Museau who became *trésorier de l'extraordinaire*.<sup>69</sup> The holder of the post was sometimes referred to as *trésorier et receveur général* and for brevity, though confusingly, *trésorier général des guerres*.<sup>70</sup> It is not clear whether the *extraordinaire* experienced the same upheaval as the *ordinaire* in 1533–4, though the previous *commis*, Jean Godet, disappears from the administration before the emergence of Martin de Troyes for the campaign of 1536 (probably accompanied by separate *commis* for the King's campaign in Provence). This prefigures the establishment of the two separate *trésoriers* under the terms of the edict of Cognac of December 1542, initially with the idea that they would serve in alternate years in order to give the outgoing *commis* the space to finish his accounting. This seems not to have worked well and from 1547 the two *commis* had distinct geographical responsibility for Picardy and Piedmont, reflected in the double series of accounts surviving from that time.<sup>71</sup>

This was not the only form of specialisation. The *trésoriers* had staffs of clerks who were managed by *commis*, such as Pierre Bourguignon in Piedmont in 1541. Jean Joise was deputed to oversee the pay of the troops in Scotland in 1545.<sup>72</sup> While the *trésoriers de l'ordinaire* often followed armies on campaign,<sup>73</sup> the *trésoriers de l'extraordinaire* were more concerned with the management of funds at the centre and deputed the actual payment of the troops to clerks and *commis*.<sup>74</sup> Jean Prévost was usually found at Paris or at court. Though some high officials of finance died of illness on campaign (Italy in 1528 was particularly devastating) and some were captured at Pavia, of the purely military administrators only Jean Carré ran the risks of battle, at Pavia in 1525, and he seems to have escaped, along with Jean Prevost.<sup>75</sup> By the 1540s the *trésoriers de l'extraordinaire*, the post being now subdivided between Benoist le Grand and Raoul Moreau, seem to have spent more time following the armies.

<sup>68</sup> D'Auton, I, pp. 194, 351–2.

<sup>69</sup> Hamon, *L'Argent du roi*, p. 280.

<sup>70</sup> BN fr. 25720; *CAF*, I, 102, no. 594.

<sup>71</sup> Hamon, *L'Argent du roi*, pp. 281–2; Desjardins, *Négociations*, IV, p. 141.

<sup>72</sup> Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*», pp. 55–6.

<sup>73</sup> Poncher to Robertet in 1521, BN fr. 2985, fo. 78.

<sup>74</sup> Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*», p. 87.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 87, 95.

### Officials and their social status

These are the basic functions but what do we know about the officials who staffed this apparatus? The connection between the *gens des finances* and war is symbolised by the knighting of Thomas Bohier at Genoa in 1507 and Guillaume de Beaune at Marignano in 1515.<sup>76</sup> Gilbert Coiffier, royal secretary and *maître des comptes* in Piedmont was in the front line of the infantry at Ceresole and knighted by Enghien the following day.<sup>77</sup> Some of these officials were undoubtedly *fidèles* of the royal house, indeed often held posts in the royal household.<sup>78</sup> Until the attempted reorganizations of the 1530s, many of the holders of the higher posts in the military administration were allied to and sometimes members of the complex social group who monopolized the higher financial administration of the state, '*Messieurs des finances*' – in other words the *généraux des finances* and the *receveurs-généraux* as well as in some cases the *élus*. There was, of course, good reason for this in that military administration depended crucially on the availability of funds. Morelet du Museau and Jean de Poncher were closely identified with families which had long dominated the summits of royal finance. One classic career path was from that of clerk or commis of existing *trésoriers* to the same post; subsequently there could be a move away from a post simply handling cash (such as that of *trésorier de l'extraordinaire*) to the more dignified post of *contrôleur* in the *ordinaire*. This is what happened to Lambert Meigret, who in the *extraordinaire* had to obtain allocations of funds for his office from the generals of finance, though sometimes such funds could be enormous.<sup>79</sup> Pierre Hamon, in his studies of royal finances under Francis I, has suggested that positions in the military administration, especially in the *extraordinaire*, were often, until the later part of Francis's reign, springboards into the higher offices.<sup>80</sup> Some of them also acquired the honoured and coveted position of *notaire et secrétaire du roi*.<sup>81</sup> Offices such as those in the military administration were necessarily only open to those who had both financial and political resources behind them. Even though the King could on occasion remit the payments necessary for the patent of an office, normally this would be payable by the seller or the acquirer and such offices were indeed venal. Thus, even though Jean Godet, *trésorier de l'extraordinaire*,

<sup>76</sup> B. Chevalier, *Tours, ville royale* (Chambray-lès-Tours), pp. 290–6.

<sup>77</sup> Père Anselme, *Histoire généalogique et chronologique de la maison royale de France*, 9 vols (Paris, 1726–33), VII, p. 493; Leblanc, 'Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron', (1893), pp. 24–9.

<sup>78</sup> On Jean du Plessis, sr. d'Oschamps, 'Courcu', see Maulde la Clavière, *Procédures politiques*, pp. cviii, 1231n; D'Auton, I, p. 195.

<sup>79</sup> Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*», p. 72; BN fr. 25720, fo. 179 (*CAF*, I, 261, 1419); BN fr. 25720, fo. 207 (*CAF*, I, 304, 1649); AN K 953, no. 9 (*CAF*, I, 309, 1669); BN fr. 25720, fo. 219 (*CAF*, I, 318, 1722).

<sup>80</sup> Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*», p. 30.

<sup>81</sup> Morelet du Museau, Jean Grolier, Jean de Poncher, Pierre Le Gendre, Geoffroy La Croix. See the entries in A. Lapeyre and R. Scheurer (eds), *Les Notaires et secrétaires du roi sous les règnes de Louis XI, Charles VIII et Louis XII*, 2 vols (Paris, 1978).

referred to his post as an 'office', it was a commission and he had had to buy it as well as pay the necessary loan.<sup>82</sup> Moreover, it would also be normal to pay the crown a fee for the right to resign an office to a specified successor. So, Georges Hervoet could negotiate the concession of his office as *trésorier de l'ordinaire* with a prospective buyer while undertaking to pay the costs of the letters (a sale *à la provision* as opposed to a sale *à la procuration*, when the acquirer paid).<sup>83</sup> Increasingly, though, it was the capacity to loan money to the crown that guaranteed entry into administrative posts. Jean Prévost made a loan to the King for entry into his commission in 1523 and we know that Jean Carré loaned the King 40,000 lt. when he took up the same post in 1524, when Gaillard Spifame mustered a similar sum by taking out a *rente* himself in 1525. It seems that 40,000 lt. was the tariff loan for acquisition of the commission of *trésorier de l'extraordinaire*.<sup>84</sup>

Lambert Meigret was *trésorier de l'extraordinaire* from 1516 to 1522, probably because of the absence of serious war until 1521. He remained a specialist, moving on the post of *contrôleur-général de l'ordinaire*. One of his brothers, Laurent, became a *commissaire des guerres* but the other, Louis, moved in learned circles and translated Valturio's 1472 work on war, publishing it at Lyon in 1555.<sup>85</sup> Both were implicated in heresy in 1532.<sup>86</sup> Most subsequent holders of Meigret's post had a shorter tenure and many, like Morelet du Museau and Jean Prévost, went on to become *généraux des finances*. The opportunities for enrichment in a department which was necessarily one of the highest spending in the administration no doubt made the acquisition of more prestigious offices possible, though on the other hand the shortness of their tenure may indicate the rapidity with which their financial resources were depleted.<sup>87</sup> At any rate, in the later part of this period, the tenure of the *commis* at the *extraordinaire* became lengthier and their posts less often led on to higher positions in the financial administration. This was the result of greater institutionalisation and the requirement for expertise.

The *commissaires* were sometimes bourgeois in origin, but frequently members of the lesser nobility. In addition, a *commissaire des guerres* could occasionally be appointed whose activities were also diplomatic, as in the case of Jean du Plessis, Louis XII's envoy to Florence 1501, or Livio Crotto, *valet de chambre* and envoy to Venice in 1537. *Payeurs* and *commis*, greater in number, were obvious financial experts and were subject to an unpredictable game of patronage: the Dauphin Henri in August 1536 agreed to promote Humières's secretary la Porte as *payeur* of his company but he immediately resigned the post to a *contrôleur*, Rageau, clerk of the general of Normandy. The latter had intervened to get this confirmed, assuring the Dauphin that the man was an 'homme de bien' and capable, likely to provide satisfaction to the men.<sup>88</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Hamon, *L'Argent du roi*, p. 280n.

<sup>83</sup> Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*», p. 12.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 15.

<sup>85</sup> *Bib.*II, 118.

<sup>86</sup> Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*», p. 343.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>88</sup> BN fr. 3008, fo. 135.



### Controlling fraud: payment and muster

Significant changes took place in the middle period of Francis I's reign in the relationship between men-at-arms and archers and altering pay structures accordingly. The ordinance of May 1445, as we have seen (chapter 3), laid out the basic structures and pay. The pay of the lance was initially allocated as 31 lt. but could also be paid partly in kind (21 lt. p.m. plus 10 lt. to be delivered as food) or largely in kind (with only 9 lt. in cash). This was because economic conditions varied from province to province. By 1490 the pay was simply allocated as 31 lt. in cash. It was the two *Règlements* of January and February 1534 that altered the balance between men-at-arms and archers.<sup>89</sup> The pay of the principal officers was substantially increased, the 'customary appointments' over and above the 20s per lance paid to the captain, and new rates of pay established for the officers, as shown in the table below.

Pay of a company of 100 lances (per annum)

Rank	Up to 1534	January 1534	February 1534	1549
<i>Capitaine</i>	1200 + 180 + appointments	1200 + 600 + 240	1200 + 800 + 240	2800 + 400
Lieutenant		600 + 180	500 + 180	900 + 400
<i>Enseigne</i>		400 + 180	400 + 180	600 + 400
<i>Guidon</i>		400 + 180	400 + 180	600 + 400
<i>Maréchal des logis</i>		200 + 180	100 + 180	200 + 400
2 <i>fourriers</i>		120	120	
<i>Payeur</i>			450	450
Man-at-arms, <i>grand paye</i>	180	240	240	400
Man-at-arms, <i>petit paye</i>	—	180	180	—
Archer, <i>grand paye</i>	90	120	120	200
Archer, <i>petit paye</i>		90	90	

Sources: Pre-1534: Musters; Jan. 1534: *Ord.Fr.I*, VII, no. 647; Feb. 1534: *ibid.*, no. 652; Isambert, XIII, no. 102; Lot, pp. 240–5

A sting in the tail here was that, while in companies of above 50 lances the pay would be made as for companies of 100 lances, for those of 50 and below, the rates would be at 50% of those above. Considering the many companies reduced to 40 and 50 lances, this had major implications. (In the revised rates of 1549, the disadvantage to commanders of smaller companies was softened).

It was in 1534 that a pay differentiation between two levels of men-at-arms and archers was introduced 'so that captains should have the wherewithal to mark out the leaders of their companies': the proportion of men-at-arms to archers changed from 100:200 to 100:150.<sup>90</sup> A third of the pay saved was to be reallocated to 25% of the men-at-arms (5 lt. p.m.) and in return they had to be more effectively armed.

<sup>89</sup> Solon, 'Valois Military Administration', p. 94; *Ord.Fr.I*, I, no. 17, pp. 56–7; IV, no. 425, p. 281; VII, nos. 647, 652.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, no. 647; III, no. 652 (art. I).



The other two thirds was to go to 100 of the archers whose pay was increased by 50s p.m.<sup>91</sup> The significance of the lance as a discreet unit was diluted and the distinctions between men-at-arms and archers reduced by redistributing the pay of the redundant archers. The pay of the captain was finally set in 1534 at 800 lt. p.a. (with 20s p.m. supplement per lance, giving 1200 lt. p.a. for 100 and thus a total of 2000 lt. p.a.). The following year,<sup>92</sup> the role of captains in selecting for 'great pay' was limited in that they were forbidden to demote and promote at their own will so long as those already selected for the great pay maintained their equipment at the standards set in 1534.<sup>93</sup> Further injunctions were also issued against captains who enlisted 'valets and other persons of low quality' as archers at the great pay, merely in order to get their pay for themselves while those posing as substitutes for men-at-arms or archers were to be hanged and their captains deprived of their charges. The sharing of places between two or three men was also severely forbidden.<sup>94</sup> In 1549, as a consequence of the introduction of the *tailion*, new pay scales and arrangements for supply, the distinction between the 'great' and 'little pay' was abolished and the differential between companies above and below 50 lances modified. The number of archers was also restored to 2 per lance.<sup>95</sup>

One consequence of reorganization was the further disintegration of the 'lance' as the basic unit and the amalgamation of the heavy cavalry as a single entity. The original establishment of the *gendarmerie* gave a pay of 10 lt. p.m. for men-at-arms and 10 for the 2 archers; each lance was to consist of 1 man-at-arms, a *coutilier*, a page and 3 horses, 2 archers with a page, a *valet de guerre* and 3 horses.<sup>96</sup> From 1498, each lance was to be at 1 man-at-arms and 2 archers, the man-at-arms at 15 lt. p.m. and the archers at 7.10.0. lt. Though these basic rates remained formally in force until 1550, from 1533, the pay of 100 lances was augmented to 5000 lt. p.m. Therefore at 50 lt. per month, the cost of the lance was now raised to 600 lt. p.a. in place of 372. What this meant for individuals was that, with a company of 100 lances containing 100 men-at-arms and 150 archers, among the men-at-arms, a quarter were now to be paid at 20 lt. p.m. and two thirds of the archers at 10 lt. p.m. ('great pay').<sup>97</sup> For captains, hitherto paid at the rate of 1 lt. p.m. per lance, an additional new salary scale was introduced at 200 lt. p.q. and commensurate scale established for the other officers. The revision of the payment rates in 1549 is also significant, accompanied as it was by the introduc-

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, pp. 104–5.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, no. 682.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, no. 682 (1535) (art. I).

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, VII, no. 682 (arts. II, VII).

<sup>95</sup> Isambert, *Lois*, XIII, p. 127.

<sup>96</sup> Viriville, 'Notices et extraits de chartes et de manuscrits ... au British Museum de Londres', p. 122, publishing the relevant legislation of 1445.

<sup>97</sup> *État abrégé*, BN fr. 4523 (pr. Lot, *Recherches*), gives the impression that the pay of the advantaged archers was to rise to 15 lt. per month but the *règlement* of 1534 is clear that their increase p.m. was to be 50s (over and above their existing 7.10.10 lt.). The terms 'grande' and 'petite paye' are present in Poncher's accounts for 1520–1 (BN fr. 2933, fos. 1–7), though this signifies the difference between the traditional 'grande ordonnance' and the 'petite ordonnance.'

tion of a new tax supplement, the *tailion*.<sup>98</sup> With the suppression of the great and little pay the following year, the men were paid at general rates of 400 lt. p.a. for men-at-arms and 200 for archers (33.6.8 and 16.13.4 p.m. respectively). Then in 1552, the monthly rates were raised to 36 lt. and 18 lt.

Yet rules could always be broken or would be difficult to apply in complex circumstances. To take one telling example, in 1551 François Conygan reported on the state of his company at Mâcon, stating that 30 men-at-arms and 40 archers had left for service in Piedmont. The rest wanted to follow but were uncertain what was wanted of them. If they were not needed in Italy, they wanted leave 'to take steps to gather money and horses' to serve the King the following spring. Their captain himself needed to go home in order to see to his affairs because his father had died.<sup>99</sup>

Musters of *gendarmerie* companies were controlled by the staff of the *ordinaire des guerres*, of course. The muster itself was taken by a *commissaire*, usually attached over a period to the company, at the time the *comptable*, clerk of the *trésorier des guerres*, paid the men and checked against the roll he had retained from the previous muster. The predominant unease reflected in royal regulation was over fraud in the lists of active men. In 1527, two gentlemen commissioned for the purpose were to countersign the lists.<sup>100</sup> This may have been in response to a report by Marshal de la Marck that there had been 'amazing disorder' in the holding of musters, partly he thought, because *commissaires* had not been allocated to companies early enough. He suggested appointing them to their duties for the whole year.<sup>101</sup> From 1534, the lists of men were to be supplied by the clerks of the *secrétaire/contrôleur des guerres* and both first name and surnames were required.<sup>102</sup> From 1539 both *contrôleurs* and captains were to retain copies that were to be checked against each other before the actual muster, while afterwards the new roll, containing names of dead and new appointments, was to be agreed and signed by both parties, who would then file them. Each company had its *payeur*, appointed by the *trésorier des guerres*. This was a figure who could attract hostility on the part of the men when their pay was delayed.<sup>103</sup>

The roll usually contained the certification by the *commissaire* that the men had received payment by the clerks of the *trésorier*. Ultimately, it was presented by the *commissaire* as quittance to the *trésorier de l'ordinaire des guerres*, certified by him as true and checked by the *contrôleur*, who countersigned it as quittance for the *payeur*. The *rôles* thus accumulated in the *Chambre des comptes* as evidence for the accounting of the *ordinaire des guerres* were dispersed

<sup>98</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 242, 245, 247; on 1549 see Potter, *War and Government*, pp. 164–6. In Feb. 1541, Montmorency wrote to the *Chambre des comptes* that all the *ordonnances* issued in the past 'it is found that one does not agree with another' and raise disputes. BL Egerton 23, fo. 262.

<sup>99</sup> BN fr. 20470, fo. 6.

<sup>100</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, V, no. 457.

<sup>101</sup> BN fr. 3082, fo. 91.

<sup>102</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, VII, p. 96. This had been prefigured in 1526: *Ord.Fr.I*, IV, p. 279 (art. 34), the *commis* of the *secrétaire de guerre* was to provide the role for the *commissaire*.

<sup>103</sup> BN fr. 3008, fo. 189.

in ways now well-known during the 18th century. The purpose of the muster was to pay the men but also to check abuses, which were widely known. The ordinance of 1549 ordered hanging for anyone standing in for another at the muster, dismissal of the captain and banishment for the man-at-arms in whose favour the imposture operated. When an archer borrowed horses for the muster, they were to be confiscated in favour of those who revealed the fact.<sup>104</sup> The companies transferred from Dauphiné to Piedmont in 1552 were at first unpaid because 'they have not presented their arms according to the ordinance', though others reported that they were moving their equipment, great horses and arms, in slow stages and, though not yet complete, were 'a very good and serviceable troop.'<sup>105</sup>

The process of control and payment was operated through the theoretically regular muster made by the *commissaire* of the *ordinaire des guerres*. In principle, all members of the company had to be present either 'in arms' or, in peacetime, *en robe*. Absence had to be authorised even for an individual by a royal lieutenant.<sup>106</sup> Individual captains received missives from the King detailing their muster dates.<sup>107</sup> Musters were usually announced four to five weeks in advance to the provincial governors and transmitted through the *bailliages* or *élections* so that the men had no excuse for not appearing.<sup>108</sup> In April 1540, the duke of Vendôme announced general musters in arms for the following May for two quarters with orders to:

Publish by trumpet and public proclamation, in the places accustomed for such matters, the general musters, so that none of the men-at-arms and archers of the companies claim they did not know; but that they do not assemble before the 25th day of May and thus oppress the people and scour the country, but immediately return to their garrisons on pain of being punished as vagabonds. Further, we order you to have it proclaimed that all gentlemen and others of the King's *ordonnances* return to their garrisons within that time with equipment and harness and horses for muster in arms.<sup>109</sup>

The following year, the musters were fixed for 15 February for the pay of October to December 'en robe and without arms to avoid oppressing the people, where said lord also wills that, in the musters, those excused by ordinary leave be passed as present, according to the ordinances.'<sup>110</sup> Leave from garrison duty was sometimes given, in order to spare the costs of supply, especially over winter. By 1530, the crown specified that a minimum of one third of a company should be resident in garrison during peacetime and in fact in 1531 the King ordered two thirds of the men to be sent on leave until the May musters.<sup>111</sup> In June 1541, a third of the men in each company were stood down in Picardy.<sup>112</sup> In June 1546, the

<sup>104</sup> Isambert, *Lois*, XIII, pp. 129–30 (arts. 37 and 38).

<sup>105</sup> Leblanc, 'Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron', (1893), pp. 23, 38–40.

<sup>106</sup> Potter, *Un Homme de guerre*, p. 95.

<sup>107</sup> Aubais, *Pièces fugitives*, I.ii, pp. 82–3.

<sup>108</sup> *Mélanges historiques*, III, p. 598.

<sup>109</sup> AM Amiens, AA 12, fo. 195v.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 202v.

<sup>111</sup> AD Puy-de-Dôme, E 113, fonds 2, EE 6, nos. 16–17.

<sup>112</sup> BN fr. 20521, fo. 35.

King ordered all companies to go home, except for foreigners and those without homes, 'for the relief of my people.'<sup>113</sup> In December 1548, when the musters for the following January (*en robe*) were set out, those for the interior provinces were scheduled for only two thirds of each company, i.e. the third actually in garrison and the third due to enter garrison next were to be mustered in arms and with war horses.<sup>114</sup> In times of urgency, musters were advanced, as when Henri II decreed the advance of the *gendarmerie* musters 'for the good of our service' from 10 January 1550 to the previous December, with the books to be left open for latecomers until 2 January.<sup>115</sup> The systems of control were thus spelled out but, as the Vieilleville biographer makes clear, were difficult to maintain when captains and local muster officials got together. Saint-André's company went on for years – he called it a 'rustrierie' (knavery) – paying absentee or sub-standard men through the collaboration of the *commissaire*, *contrôleur* and regional receipt at Lyon.<sup>116</sup>

Despite all these attempts at regulation, certain fundamental problems remained: firstly, in the absence of barracks and the continuing quartering of men on the civilian population (see chapter 9), discipline could never be enforced; secondly, the career structure remained unstable and prone to the vagaries of patronage; finally, in the absence of provision for men who had been paid off, they were all too likely to resort to crime, treachery or enlist in private retinues.<sup>117</sup> Delays in payment caused by the crown's financial difficulties also lay at the heart of the problem. The companies fighting Gonzalo de Cordoba in Naples in 1503 were ten months in arrears at the time of their defeat.<sup>118</sup> The classic instance is that of the *gendarmerie* in Milan in 1522 when Lautrec's troops had served for 18 months without any pay and had been desperate.<sup>119</sup> The correspondence of the duke of Vendôme is replete with anxieties: when new men were recruited, there were often delays in getting them onto the *rôle*. The King was told by Vendôme in 1521 that 'the new levies have not yet taken the oath and you will find it difficult to make use of them without money.'<sup>120</sup> In July 1521, it was reported that the men-at-arms at Théroutanne had received nothing since January and then only a half quarter's pay. A year later, not one was left in garrison for want of pay.<sup>121</sup> By the winter of 1523–4, 'as for the men-at-arms, there are few or none in garrison, all for lack of pay.'<sup>122</sup> Montmorency, on a mission to oversee the musters in June 1524, was told 'that [they] believe nothing they are told, because of the failures of previous promises that have not been kept.'<sup>123</sup> In 1531, delays prompted du Biez to write: 'most of my company have been here for the last two weeks waiting for the *commissaire*

<sup>113</sup> AD Puy-de-Dome, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 7, no. 44.

<sup>114</sup> AD Puy-de-Dome, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 8, no. 45 (Blois, 27 Dec.).

<sup>115</sup> BN fr. 20543, fo. 52.

<sup>116</sup> Vieilleville, p. 482.

<sup>117</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, pp. 528–30, on the vivid career of Pierre du Rozet, *écuyer* of the Auvergne.

<sup>118</sup> D'Auton, III, pp. 136–7.

<sup>119</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 233.

<sup>120</sup> BN fr. 3059, fos. 59–60.

<sup>121</sup> BN fr. 2985, fo. 1; BN fr. 3030, fo. 6.

<sup>122</sup> BN fr. 3072, fo. 87.

<sup>123</sup> BN fr. 3054, fo. 7.

and treasurer both for men-at-arms and *mortespaies*, who are still not here. This is strange, seeing they were sent some time ago.<sup>124</sup> In the aftermath of the 1536–7 war, the King's younger son reported to his father the disorder that was happening because of non-payment of the troops 'who had taken to pillaging' and the towns 'so deserted that only a few gentlemen were left there.'<sup>125</sup> A typical delay in the payment for a company was the muster on 24 September 1541 for the pay for the quarter April–June of that year.<sup>126</sup> Espinac made clear in July 1543 that his men had not been paid for six months at a time when food prices were high. Vassé's company in garrison at Ardres in 1545 were without pay in an expensive post and 'declare they will no longer stand guard, for by the Cross of Christ, they are fairly dying of hunger.'<sup>127</sup> The company of the duke of Guise, 60 'gentlemen' serving in Piedmont in 1551–2, was described as impoverished through lack of pay, though willing to serve.<sup>128</sup>

Poor pay only partly explains absenteeism. This had to a degree become endemic in the 15th century, when the proportion of those with *congés* for absence had grown from 5% in the mid-century to 25% in 1475. By the beginning of the 16th century an absenteeism level of 30% was normal. Once campaigns were over it was very difficult for captains to keep their men in the garrisons allocated and they had to be allowed to return home. At first, this was tolerated as long as the men were present at the musters but in 1484 they were allowed to undergo an early muster in case they could not return for the full one.<sup>129</sup> The ordinances of the reign of Francis I simply accepted the fact that men-at-arms would receive written *congés* and tried to insist on minimum periods of service for the officers and that men on leave should travel home without oppression of civilians.<sup>130</sup> That of 1539 sought to tighten up the conditions of leave and institute punishments for those on leave without written permission.<sup>131</sup> Unauthorised absenteeism on campaign was a serious problem by the 1540s. The count of Enghien fired off a rebuke to Crussol during the Ceresole campaign that he had observed his company in the field and found 'far fewer men than you had promised me' and that most were not in their garrison.<sup>132</sup> The concerns of the crown are reflected in a survey conducted for the musters of July and October 1544,<sup>133</sup> when the number of absentees was recorded, and seemed to hover between 30 and 40% for the large companies of 100 lances, as shown in the following tables.

<sup>124</sup> Potter, *Un Homme de guerre*, p. 126.

<sup>125</sup> AN J 964, no. 42.

<sup>126</sup> BN nafr. 8620, no. 24.

<sup>127</sup> A. de Rosny, *Documents inédits ou rarissimes, concernant les sièges de Boulogne, 1544–1549* (Boulogne, 1912), no. 2: 3 July 1543; Leblanc, 'Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron', (1893), p. 30.

<sup>128</sup> BL Add. 38032, fos. 225r, 227r.

<sup>129</sup> Contamine, *Guerre, état*, pp. 500–1.

<sup>130</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, IV, no. 425 (1526) (art. 28).

<sup>131</sup> *Ibid.*, IX, no. 945 (1539) (arts. IV and V).

<sup>132</sup> Aubais, *Pièces fugitives*, I.ii, p. 82.

<sup>133</sup> BN nafr. 8620, fos. 30–42: 'les nous et surnoms de'hommes d'armes et archers ... qui ne se sont point presentez es dermieres montres'.

**Absentees at the musters for July 1544 (northern theatre)**

Company	Men-at-arms	Archers
Dauphin (100)	44	70
Orléans (100)	31	51
Nevers	15	41
Grand Ecuyer	15	23
Brissac	13	16
Escars	8	6
Maugiron	16	11

**Absentees at the musters of October 1544 (northern theatre)**

Company	Men-at-arms	Archers
Constable (100)	68	117
Du Biez (100)	22	34
La Rochepot	40	49
Villebon	9	20
Vendôme (100)	93	140

It seems to have been as a result of this alarming situation that orders went out for surveys of each company to be made, with a report on the reasons for absence of each individual. Henceforth, regular checks were made of the effective strength of the companies.<sup>134</sup>

As a relatively new force, the light horse were usually, though not exclusively, paid by the *extraordinaire des guerres*, but by 1538 there was a specific *commis* for their payment, Henri Maréchal, who was still present in 1543.<sup>135</sup> Each company had a *commissaire* and *contrôleur*.<sup>136</sup> Nevertheless, on occasions they were paid on the same basis as the *ordonnances*.<sup>137</sup> The basic pay of a light horseman was a modest 10 lt. p.m. but in du Bellay's company in 1543, 10 % were paid double.<sup>138</sup> Antragues observed in the Boulogne campaign of 1549 that they were earning their 10 francs a month well in skirmishing and preventing the enemy from pasturing their livestock.<sup>139</sup> The basic pay of 30 lt. per quarter was increased to 50 in November 1549, the same pay as an archer in the *ordonnances*, and double pays revoked as part of the revision of pay scales that accompanied the introduction of the *taillon*. At the same time, their captains (who held commissions not offices) saw their pay increased from 1200 lt. p.a. to 1800.<sup>140</sup> Thus, after 1549 the basic monthly pay was set at 16.13.4 lt., though

<sup>134</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, p. 161.

<sup>135</sup> BN fr. 25792, no. 449.

<sup>136</sup> CAF, VIII, 301, 32141, but see BN fr. 25792, no. 501.

<sup>137</sup> BN fr. 25792, no. 501.

<sup>138</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, p. 219; paid 'at the rate of 10 lt. per month.' BN fr. 25792, no. 449. But note that Haraucourt's 100 light horse in 1536 were only paid at the basic rate of 7.10.0 lt. p.m. (BN fr. 25790, no. 335).

<sup>139</sup> BN fr. 20457, fo. 201.

<sup>140</sup> Isambert, *Lois*, XIII, p. 132; BN fr. 18153, fo. 120r-v: captains' pay raised to 1800 lt. p.a. from 1200, giving them 2000 lt. with their 'place' as a light horseman. 1200 lt. was the



judging by the muster rolls of the 1550s, few were paid at this rate. In one company only 4 out of 30 light horsemen were thus paid, the rest receiving 20 or 25 lt. and all the sr. de Riou's 30 light horse were paid at 20 lt. in 1549.<sup>141</sup> By 1556, there was a separate *trésorier général de tous les chevaux légers*, in the person of Pierre Bonarcorsi, descendant of a family of Florentine origins which had recently conquered the highest reaches of the financial administration.<sup>142</sup>

Unlike the pay of the *gendarmerie* and of the newly created legions, the pay of the ordinary French infantry was not at first subject to repeated legislation. The pay rates, though, are clear from accounts. The infantry levied in 1522 were to be paid at 6 lt. p.m., but normally *aventuriers* were paid 5 lt. p.m. and 6 if they were arquebusiers.<sup>143</sup> The costs of each company, though, could differ according to a number of variables, such as the number of 'double pays' and arquebusiers. Thus, one company of 500 men active in 1537 received 3750 lt. p.m., while another 500 only 3095. 700 men in garrison at Théroutanne received 4437.<sup>144</sup> In the 1530s, the average company of *aventuriers français* seems to have included around one third arquebusiers.<sup>145</sup> Though an order of Francis I in 1543 indicates pay of 10 lt. for both arquebusiers and pike men, this must have been a temporary arrangement. The Piedmont infantry of 1552 still received 6 lt. as pikes and 7 as arquebusiers per month.<sup>146</sup> This pay was virtually impossible to live on. Whereas the *gendarmerie* were supposed to be mustered every quarter, the infantry were theoretically paid every month but such frequent musters were rare. As a result captains had to loan money to the men or attempt to have them paid in kind (sometimes clothes).<sup>147</sup> In Piedmont in 1553, the infantry were owed a quarter's pay and the total needed was 450,000 lt. The treasurers only came up with 260,000 in cash, which was not even enough to pay the 312,792 owed to the Swiss and lansquenets.<sup>148</sup> In December 1553, the crown issued detailed regulations for the pay and muster of the infantry (along with similar acts for the *gendarmerie* and light horse). This was a response to the fraud by which captains had been enrolling artisans temporarily at the musters and, after giving them one or two testons, keeping their pay for themselves and their favourites. Companies were to be slightly reduced in number and rates of pay for the old

normal rate paid to a captain in 1543 (BN fr. 25791, no. 410), but Martin du Bellay was paid at the rate of 2400 in 1543 and it was his lieutenant (Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, IV, p. 98) who was paid at 1200 lt. (BN fr. 25792, no. 449).

<sup>141</sup> BN fr. 25799, no. 486: 16 Mar. 1557, 30 under Rabodanges, 4 at the basic rate; *ibid.*, no. 506: 49 under Chocqueuse, 7 at basic rate; *ibid.*, no. 508: 47 under La Ferté, 6 at basic rate. Riou, April 1549: BN fr. 25794, no. 62.

<sup>142</sup> BN fr. 25799, no. 491; on the Bonarcorsi, see Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*», p. 111.

<sup>143</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, III, p. 113; AN J 967, no. 8/10.

<sup>144</sup> *CAF*, VIII, 26, 29469; 14, 29376; VIII, 139, 30544, 30547.

<sup>145</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 198, 214.

<sup>146</sup> Isambert, *Lois*, XII, p. 850 (1543); BN fr. 3147, fo. 46.

<sup>147</sup> BN fr. 20646, fos. 2–7; Villars, p. 812.

<sup>148</sup> Marchand, *Charles de Cossé*, pp. 585–8.



and new bands specified in detail, as well as schedules of pay for times when the crown aimed to reduce the strength of the companies after campaigns:

**Pay per month (in lt.) of infantry companies in the Ordinance of 1553**

No. of men	270/280	200	150
Old bands	2562	1970	1532
New bands	2395	1776	1366

This act also orders that pay should vary, so that arquebusiers of the old bands, for instance, could be paid between 7 and 14 lt. p.m. depending on their experience and armament.<sup>149</sup>

A broad overview of the evolution of military expenditure shows that the cost for the campaign of 1515 was 7.5 to 8.5 million lt. (including costs acquitted in 1516). The accumulated costs of war for 1521–5 were roughly 20 million lt. Military operations began again in 1526 and formal war continued through 1528–9. These accounted for around 11 million lt. The costs of war in 1536–8 reached 15 millions. The war of 1542–6, which saw Charles V and Henry VIII allied against France and a major naval effort in 1545, reached a cost of 30 millions.<sup>150</sup> Through the 1550s, it is likely that the monthly cost of military operations was little less than 1 million lt., while during Henri II's reign crown revenues nearly doubled from 7.4 million lt. to 13.54 millions. The recourse to consolidated debt is therefore not surprising. The accumulated royal deficit stood at over 41 million lt. by 1561, even though there was a peacetime surplus on current expenditure of 2.3 millions. Part of this is explained by the diplomatic arrangements resulting from the end of the wars (dowries to princesses for marriages and money owed to the duke of Ferrara, for instance, 14.9 millions). But 15 millions was represented by accumulated debt.<sup>151</sup>

The financial apparatus for paying the armies of the King of France was elaborate and extensive. The systems for deploying large amounts of cash to troops were well established, though often subject to breakdown. The officialdom of the *ordinaire* and *extraordinaire des guerres*, often able, were saddled with a system that by its nature was arcane and unresponsive to emergencies. By sometimes superhuman efforts, though, the show was kept on the road until cash seriously ran short at the end of the 1550s.

<sup>149</sup> Fontanon, *Edicts*, III, pp. 132–7.

<sup>150</sup> Hamon, *L'Argent du roi*, pp. 45–7.

<sup>151</sup> D. Potter, *The French Wars of Religion. Selected Documents* (London, 1997), p. 14.

## 9

### The Impact of War: Supply, Garrisons, Logistics and the Problem of Disorder

Narratives of war frequently convey the urgency of supply problems. As the lansquenet commander Roggendorf put it in 1562, when confronted by a failure of supplies for his *Reiters*, ‘no one willingly lets himself die of hunger.’<sup>1</sup> The alternative to regular supply was all too often self-help on the part of soldiery and much of the energy of military administration went into the – not always successful – task of keeping armies fed. This itself generated innovation.

The numbers of fighting men were always inflated by a vast train of support services. In 1491, for instance, the council estimated that, for the army in Brittany of 20,000 men, food was needed for 40–50,000 mouths.<sup>2</sup> It seems probable that the norm was to double the number of active fighting men. When an army of around 40,000 men was being prepared for the Metz campaign in 1552, the duchess of Lorraine was warned that 90,000 would need feeding. Early modern soldiers are thought to have required two kilos of bread a day. This meant 200,000 ration loaves and also 600 *muids* of wine, with 50 cows and 600 sheep for the German troops who were not expected to observe Lent.<sup>3</sup> A list of daily provisions for a man-at-arms in Dauphiné in 1494 lists a loaf of 25 ounces, a pot and a half of wine, two livres of meat, a quintal of hay and a charge of oats.<sup>4</sup> The scale of the task is immediately apparent.

#### The *bonnes villes*, garrisons and military supply

The essence of the supply system for the heavy cavalry remained, from the start until around 1550 (and well beyond that in some ways), one by which local communities were made responsible for the supply of food and equipment to troops in garrison. Indeed, some obligations to provide lodgings for garrisons remained until well into the 18th century. The reforms of 1445 envisaged

<sup>1</sup> BN fr. 15876, fos. 308–9.

<sup>2</sup> Contamine, *Histoire militaire*, I, p. 232.

<sup>3</sup> L. Perjes, ‘Army Provisioning, Logistics and Strategy in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century’, *Acta historica*, 16 (1970), pp. 5–6; Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 125–6; Zeller, *La Réunion de Metz*, pp. 326–7.

<sup>4</sup> Van Doren, ‘Military Administration’, p. 87.

supplies valued at 10 lt. p.m. per lance contributed through local communities.<sup>5</sup> By the end of the 15th century, this sum of 10 lt. had been absorbed into the pay of the lance but the communities remained responsible for a proportion of the costs of the *gendarmerie*. The ordinances of 1515 and 1526 insisted that the *gendarmerie* would be garrisoned in walled towns, that they would be supplied there and forbidden to live off the country villages, as they had done hitherto.<sup>6</sup> As for supplies, the 1526 ordinance spelled out the processes of control and the *règlement* of July 1525 the quantities.<sup>7</sup> Prices for supplies were to be established at the quarterly musters according to the market rates and an allocation made to the parishes for supplying the town 'munitions' every week according to the productive resources of each village. Two *prudhommes* were to supply the troops at the specified rate, the *taux des vivres*, and then repay the communities from the money they received. As for household equipment (*ustencilles*), these were to be supplied only by the towns themselves and then returned at the end of their use. Billeting (*logement*) was, of course, crucial. Men-at-arms were forbidden to take the bedrooms of their hosts but on the other hand, inhabitants were forbidden to dismantle stables and clear rooms in order to escape billeting. In these cases they were to be compelled to re-instate them.<sup>8</sup> Debts were to be paid fully on departure and, if this were not done, captains obliged to promise full payment at the next muster. These provisions remained in force under Francis I, only modified in 1539 when the failure of town munitions to stock adequate supplies led the crown to permit men-at-arms, furnished with certificates, to take commercial lodgings at the expense of their host towns.<sup>9</sup> The manner of dissemination for this act illustrates the normal *modus operandi*: the King sent it with a missive to the provincial governors with orders for its publication in all the *bailliages* and *sénéchaussées* 'so none claim ignorance.'<sup>10</sup>

Provincial governors had some say in the allocation of garrisons in their provinces. Henri d'Albret gave the King a roll of such allocations when he was at court in 1551, and when the council allocated Mayenne's company to Poitou, the King of Navarre designated the town.<sup>11</sup> During the crisis of 1544, in May one third of the Constable's company was in garrison at Senlis, ready for the whole company to be mustered on the 24th (which would take 3 days). By July, the horses and valets of the company were billeted at Senlis while the men-at-arms were besieged in Montreuil. But the duke of Vendôme allocated the whole company to Senlis in February 1546, with orders to supply them according to the ordinances.<sup>12</sup> How in reality did the towns cope with lodging and feeding men-at-arms? Each lance

<sup>5</sup> Viriville, 'Notices et extraits de chartes et de manuscrits ... au British Museum de Londres', p. 129.

<sup>6</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, I, no. 17 (art. 5); IV, no. 425 (arts. III–IX).

<sup>7</sup> *CAF*, I, 410, no. 2184.

<sup>8</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, I (1515) (art. VII).

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, IX (1539), p. 633 (art. V).

<sup>10</sup> AD Puy-de-Dôme, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 7, no. 6 (copy).

<sup>11</sup> Ledain, 'Lettres de Daillon', no. 39, pp. 55–6: the two companies between them amounted to 80 lances and du Lude was instructed to remonstrate with the King if he thought more than that would be a burden to the region.

<sup>12</sup> AM Senlis, BB5, fo. 377v; AM Senlis, BB6, fos. 6r, 31v.

consisted of eight men and eight horses under Francis I.<sup>13</sup> Senlis had to accommodate 100 men-at-arms and, even after royal orders, stuck to its exemption conceded in 1544 (arguing that it had spent 30,000 lt. on fortifications). It had to accept the King's order (sweetened by a confirmation of its theoretical exemption).<sup>14</sup> The allocation of even 4 or 5 lances to a small town still represented a substantial effort of supply. In 1528, the companies of La Trémoille and Laval were oppressing Saintonge because of billeting problems and royal commissioners were appointed to establish proper lodgings.<sup>15</sup> Grignan, governor of Provence, complained in April 1545 that he had to lodge the companies of Montpezat, Rolles and Tende at a season when 'the country cannot feed so many horses.'<sup>16</sup>

In Dauphiné, the daily *taux des vivres* established under the 1526 ordinance was: 2 loaves of 12 ounces each, 1 pot of wine, 2 quintals of hay and 3 *picotins* of oats per horse. Meat, eggs, oil etc. were to be bought in the market-place according to agreed market prices.<sup>17</sup> Montferrand in Auvergne provides plentiful evidence for the allocation and pricing of supplies for the duke of Albany's company from 1525 to 1536. It was exempted from garrisons by Bourbon in 1517 but was again accommodating them in 1525, when Louise of Savoy ordered Albany's 100 lances to be garrisoned in Auvergne. In 1525, the lieutenant of the company listed the needs of one 'lance' comprising 8 men and 8 horses and these can be compared with the offer made by the royal judges and the consuls of the 13 *bonnes villes* in 1529 – 'this once only and considering what that company has suffered on the Naples expedition' – and to a ruling of the company's lieutenant in conjunction with the judges in 1531:

Commodity	1525		1531 (4 horses)		1535 (4 horses)	
	No.	Price	No.	Price	No.	Price
Quartes of wine	8		6			
White loaves	16	2.8d	12			
Rye/coarse loaves	16	2.8d				
Quarter sheep	1					
Joint of beef	1	2s				
Bacon	Half livre					
Chicken	1					
Hay	2 quintals		160 liv.	1 quintal 20d.	1 quintal	2.6d
Oats	3 quartes		24 coupes	12 coupes 20d.	12 mesures	16d
Straw			3 cartloads	2 quin./p.w.	4 quin./p.w.	
Wood: fagots			20			
Wood: cordes			3	1 3s	3	
<b>Total</b>		39.10				

In 1525 each lance was to pay only 12s towards the 39s.10d. total daily cost, the rest to be contributed by the communities.<sup>18</sup> By 1526, Montferrand was accommodating three lances (24 men and 24 horses) and contributing 282 lt. with the rural parishes up to 116 lt. each, since in most cases the cost of trans-

<sup>13</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, I, no. 17 (1515) (arts. III and XXI).

<sup>14</sup> AM Senlis, BB6, fos. 37v–38r.

<sup>15</sup> AN IAP, 227, nos. 12 and 14, royal letters of 31 Dec. 1528 and 10 Feb. 1529.

<sup>16</sup> Leblanc, 'Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron' (1893), p. 66.

<sup>17</sup> Van Doren, 'Military Administration', pp. 87–8.

<sup>18</sup> AD Puy-de-Dome, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 6, nos. 1–2 (April–May 1525).

porting food was too high.<sup>19</sup> Accounts for lodgings from September to December survive in which the cost of supporting a man and his horse was assessed at 9s a day, which he received from the consuls. None of them had paid their hosts by 15 November.<sup>20</sup> In 1529, though supplies of food were more limited than in 1525, straw, wood, lodgings and laundry were included without payment by the men. Meat was presumably to be purchased at the market. In this year, all towns and bourgs of the province were to receive garrisons. Then in 1531, supplies were further limited in type, with the proviso that in places where there was no market in wood, the men would not pay.<sup>21</sup> Despite the reduction of 1531, the burden of support was heavy, especially as the officials of the *senechaussée* were careful to exempt themselves from lodgings because of illness. In January 1535, when Montferrand was assessed at 4 lances, hay and straw were in very short supply. Again, the men-at-arms were to pay nothing for lodgings, laundry, plate, oil, vinegar, verjuice, wood and straw.<sup>22</sup> An account for the cost of accommodation throughout 1535 indicates that in that year the cost of supplies was consistently above the fixed rate and that one man-at-arms (Comte Lazare) and an archer, 6 men and 6 horses cost in supplies lt. 27.7.6d p.m. for 10 months and 3 lt. p.m. in lodgings. This one man-at-arms and his suite thus cost lt. 353.15.0d for 10 months.<sup>23</sup> The pattern is the same in Dauphiné.<sup>24</sup>

From 1537, Auvergne was governed by the duke of Etampes and his company replaced that of Albany. In August 1538, Etampes issued a detailed ordinance on the supply and lodging of the *gendarmarie*, defined as 4 horses per man-at-arms and 2 per archer. Only hay, oats, straw and wood were to be supplied at fixed tariffs but straw and wood would not be paid for directly by the men. Nor were the consuls to 'compose' with the men and pay them in money, while they were to receive their *ustenciles* in kind not cash. All munitions were henceforth to be conveyed 'only through the hands of the said commissioners.' Strict instructions were reiterated against the pillage of the countryside by the men-at-arms.<sup>25</sup> In January 1541, Etampes instructed his men to see to the lodging of 50 men-at-arms (thus, between 300 and 400 men with horses), of which Montferrand was expected to accommodate 2 men-at-arms and 2 archers (12 men). Despite the King's orders for the leave of two thirds of the companies in June, the allocation to Montferrand remained the same. Each man-at-arms was to have a bedroom, kitchen and a bed in the stable (for his valets).<sup>26</sup>

By the next year, the Dauphin's company had replaced that of Etampes and for this period we have a detailed book on the supplies made to each man-at-arms and archer that gives the fullest possible profile of billeting arrangements as well as accounts for their supply.<sup>27</sup> The company was in garrison from 10

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., EE 6, no. 4 (12 Sept. 1526).

<sup>20</sup> Ibid., EE 6, nos. 5, 15.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., EE 6, no. 17.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., EE 6, no. 13 (January 1535).

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., EE 6, no. 22, account of Jean Dève, Nov. 1535.

<sup>24</sup> Van Doren, 'Military Administration', p. 88.

<sup>25</sup> AD Puy-de-Dôme, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 7, no. 5.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., EE 7, nos. 9, 10 (Francis I to Etampes, 15 June 1541), 11, 12.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., EE 7, no. 15.

November 1542 to the end of February, the King having ordered its transfer to Picardy in January.<sup>28</sup> The tariff established was for a man-at-arms: bed, sheets, plate, kitchen and cauldron in the stables; for an archer: one or two bedrooms. One man-at-arms was to have 4 horses and one archer 3. From All Saints to Easter, garrison places were to provide 5 *cordes* of wood per week with half that rate for the rest of the year. One man-at-arms or two archers were to rate a quintal of rye or wheat a day without paying (presumably to be accounted for at the following muster) and 2 quartes of oats (all measure of Clermont) and 1 quintal of hay (the latter to be paid for in cash by *commissaires*). All other necessities were to be bought at the market price paid by all inhabitants (with price rises prohibited).<sup>29</sup> The total supplies made over three months and 12 days amounted to:

	Receipt	Expenditure	Cost at fixed tariff
Rye	2229 quartes 3 quartin	2865 quart	432.15.0 (3s)
Hay	1583 quintals	1432 quintals	429.6.0. (6s)
Straw	1568 quintals 1 tiers	1432 quintals	89.0.5 (15d)
Wood	1018 cordes	950 cordes	427.5.0 (9s)

Source: AD Puy-de-Dome, 3E 113, fonds 2, no.42

Each man-at-arms had his lodgings paid at the rate of 100s p.m. (thus 17.10.0 lt. each and for all the men-at-arms and their servants, 122.10.0 lt.) and the 9 archers at 50s per day (in total 78.15.0 lt.). The total cost in money for lodgings and minor supplies for 3 and a half months was 465.6.10 lt.

The 1515 ordinance of Francis I represented existing practice, insofar as it was already normal for supplies of fodder to be contributed at fixed rates. Rolls for allocations of contributions by the villages to the ‘munition’ of Montferrand for the supply of Albany’s company there in 1514–15 bear this out.<sup>30</sup> There was the system of *aides* by which the cost of garrisons was spread out throughout the country. In Dauphiné, Bayard’s company was supplied by Romans and 23 surrounding villages in 1522 and this was continued in 1524 and 1526 with money levies per hearth.<sup>31</sup> In Auvergne, supplies in kind were levied through an assessment of 3725 hearths (called *beluges*), in Montferrand itself and 98 villages throughout Lower Auvergne and even in the distant Livradois.<sup>32</sup>

Although wood and straw were no longer supplied free as in the past, receipts survive for two men-at-arms, which indicate that they had received supplies for 3 months and 12 days for which they had not paid and would not do so until their next muster.<sup>33</sup> The city was all too anxious to stop supplying the men when they were drafted to Picardy (they were ordered on 31 January to be there by

<sup>28</sup> Francis I to the lieutenant of the Dauphin’s company, 31 Jan. 1542/3, *ibid.*, EE 7, no. 21.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, EE 7, no. 15/4 (12 Nov. 1542), with agreement of Artus de Rubempré, *maréchal des logis*.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, EE 4, no. 3; accounts, 1515, EE 5, nos. 1, 3, 4.

<sup>31</sup> Van Doren, ‘Military Administration’, pp. 88–9.

<sup>32</sup> AD Puy-de-Dome, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 7, no. 42 *passim*, general account 1542–3.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, EE 7, nos. 34, 35, for Jean de Mézières and Jean d’Auberon.

20 February for muster on 1 March) and, when there was inevitably a delay in the arrival of their commanders, it was ordered to continue until they were on the move while ‘awaiting their captain, in the fields, going from village to village, to the very great loss of the country.’<sup>34</sup> Rubempré, billeting officer, had already reached Monchy in Picardy by 12 February, when he wrote a gracious letter to the consuls asking them not to complain against any of his men who might have ‘taken more than their due’, that he would do all he could, not wishing that they ‘leave complaints behind.’<sup>35</sup>

The moves of February 1543 were part of a general re-arrangement of garrisons, which reflects the fact that companies stationed in the interior over winter or in times of peace were moved to the frontiers in emergency. The general movement order for February 1543, proclaimed by the regional *sergenteries*, indicates the moves of the companies of Etampes and the Dauphin to Picardy, Nevers and Boisy to Champagne, Annebault to Normandy, Montpensier, Melfi and Maugiron to Burgundy and Tende and Acier to Languedoc.<sup>36</sup>

By 1548, further changes had been made: the *aides* derived from the allocation of villages were to be devoted to the supply of hay, straw and oats. The town was to supply the cost of lodging.<sup>37</sup> The lieutenant of the Saint-André company was to receive the supplies of three men-at-arms and, at least in some cases, the cost of supplies such as wine, candles and verjuice were paid over in money.<sup>38</sup> On the basis of Francis I’s last ordinance on supply, Nectaire de Saint-Nectaire decreed the daily rates of supply for one man-at-arms (the billeting officer of Saint-André’s company) in December 1548: 1 quintal hay (18d), 16 *picotins* of oats (20d), half quintal of straw (free), and per week 26 *buches* of wood, 3 livres of candles, 1 pint each of verjuice and sour wine and salt. Hay etc. was to be supplied by the villages (specified), the rest, including lodging, by the town.<sup>39</sup>

The ‘system’ of supply became increasingly unstable throughout the 1540s as the burden shifted onto the communities by the fixing of prices at times when market prices were soaring through shortages and inflation. In March 1545 du Biez reported from Picardy:

There is a rumour among the men-at-arms of the companies in this country that they will only be paid one quarter. I doubt, Sire, that you will get much service from them, considering the high cost of supplies, which is such that a man-at-arms cannot live on less than one écu a day.<sup>40</sup>

In Piedmont, poor harvests in the middle of the 1540s had led Francis I to concede a daily monetary equivalent of 15s for the man-at-arms and 9s for the archer and light horseman. Henri II on his accession reduced this to 10 and 6

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., EE 7, nos. 21, 23.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., EE 7, no. 49 (orig.).

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., EE 7, no. 22, 7 February 1542/3.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., EE 8, nos. 2 and 3, exchange with Vieilleville, lieutenant of Saint-André’s company.

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., EE 8, no. 16 (receipt of Jean de la Roquetaillade).

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., EE 8, no. 22.

<sup>40</sup> Potter, *Un Homme de guerre*, p. 209.



since goods were cheaper but the garrison protested that it could not live on the money and claimed a rate of 30 and 18, obtaining the rate of 15 and 9 in June 1547.<sup>41</sup>

The system had become unworkable by 1549, when a large-scale consultation of all the garrison provinces produced the solution of commuting obligations in kind into a supplementary tax, the *tailion*. The communities of Guyenne petitioned for the commutation of their contributions in kind to the *gendarmerie* in September 1549 on the grounds that food and supplies were short. The King was sympathetic to the problem and already close to formulating a new ordinance but would not agree to it until he had heard the deputies of the estates.<sup>42</sup> At All Saints 1549, Henri II was at Paris to 'complete the matter of my *gendarmerie*', in other words promulgate the fundamental reforms in pay and supply of the cavalry. The essence was the substantial increase in pay (discussed above, ch.8) in return for the abolition of the obligation to supply on the part of the communities. Lodgings, for which the country villages were no longer to be held to contribute, were to be allocated on the basis of an inventory and all equipment broken or missing to be paid for. Officers were to reside in garrisons by rotation to see the regulations observed. Royal *commissaires* were to oversee movement from province to province and no place was to be occupied for more than one night.<sup>43</sup>

The light horse, too, posed problems of supply in garrisons. Condé's company at Péronne had been refusing to pay for their lodgings and equipment as they were required under the regulations of 1549. One company at Montreuil in 1555 could not manage on 20s a day for a man and a horse and some of the men had five horses to keep. Unless the local governor had kept 'open table' for them, they would have had to go looting.<sup>44</sup>

### Armies on campaign: new systems of supply

During the Italian wars, the army relied heavily on the local merchants to supply food. By some alchemy, François d'Orléans, count of Dunois, in command of the King's military household sent to help repel the Swiss from Milan in 1501, managed to lay on a positively Lucullian feast for his men, long tables groaning with viands, despite 'the sterility of the place.' Jean d'Auton, who reports this, simply marvels at it and remarks on the reputation for liberality of the count.<sup>45</sup> Presumably, hard work lay behind this. At Genoa in 1507, the whole valley of Polcevera, 12 Italian miles in length, was full of victuallers (*vivendiers*), 'and the army was so well supplied that there was as good a market as in the best city of France.'<sup>46</sup> The picture was not always so harmonious. Nevertheless, with the

<sup>41</sup> Lyublinskaya, *Документы*, no. 13.

<sup>42</sup> Ledain, 'Lettres de Daillon', no. 30, pp. 43–4.

<sup>43</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, pp. 164–6; *Mélanges historiques*, III, p. 599; Isambert, *Lois*, XIII, no. 102, pp. 119–33 (arts. 3, 4, 5, 6, 13–16).

<sup>44</sup> AM Péronne, BB 9, fo. 260v, 260r; BN nafr. 23162, fo. 55bis.

<sup>45</sup> D'Auton, II, pp. 119–21.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, p. 211.

*gendarmerie* in the kingdom of Naples seriously ill-paid in 1503, the men had to live off the villages that had been assigned for their support. One consequence was the rebellion of the people of Castellaneta (Lecce), who, fed up with empty promises to pay, offered their town to the Spaniards, while the French garrison was ‘without money for their bills, unless they are helped’; they were seized and handed over.<sup>47</sup> When a campaigning theatre lay just beyond the borders of the kingdom, the region adjacent to the frontier was put under pressure to supply the army. In the Roussillon campaign of 1503, the city and diocese of Albi were required to provide an enormous shopping-list of supplies to be sold to the men, ranging from 930 sheep to 156 barrels of sardines and anchovies, provided by a merchant on advance of 6000 lt. from the diocese.<sup>48</sup>

The Habsburg-Valois wars generated significant changes in the administration of the supply system. In effect, a framework was put in place that lasted until the advent of the *intendants de l’armée* in the 1630s. When armies were on the move, special arrangements had always been necessary. In the 1515 ordinance on the *gendarmerie*, *commissaires* were made responsible for feeding the troops on the march at a strictly specified rate per item and one sheep per lance (beef, veal and pork were forbidden but chickens allowed).<sup>49</sup> In July 1515, the King commissioned Jacques Challençon de Saint-Bonnet to buy and gather a wide range of supplies from all over central France, compelling millers to grind the grain, and to bring them to his army assembling at Grenoble. There, they were to be received by special commissioners, Serpens (*premier maréchal des logis*), Lansac and Vigean, both court officials. Challençon was to supervise the movement of supplies from *châtellenie* to *châtellenie* and be exempted from all normal tolls.<sup>50</sup> In 1524, a team consisting of the archbishop of Rouen, Robert Gedoy, *secrétaire des finances* and Jean Gaudet were commissioned to receive the provisions coming into Avignon from all over France and then, having requisitioned the necessary boats and carts, despatch them to the army in Provence facing the Emperor.<sup>51</sup> Although the need to supply armies was an ancient one and royal officials had often been commissioned for this purpose, from the early 1520s every army had teams of *commissaires aux vivres* attached for the campaign. From the 1530s, at least 14 of the higher financial officials – including a number of *généraux des finances* and *trésoriers de France* – were appointed to such commissions, underlining the fact that the provision of funds was central to the maintenance of supply.<sup>52</sup>

From 1537, a series of *commissaires généraux* were appointed from among a group of specialists. Some of them were lawyers, like the future chancellors Guillaume Poyet and François Olivier. In Picardy in 1537, Poyet, Dodieu and La Rochepozay were in charge of victualling the royal camp, using the transport supplied by the *élections*.<sup>53</sup> In October 1537, the army of Piedmont had 4 *commis-*

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, III, pp. 136–7.

<sup>48</sup> BN Doat 104, fos. 293–5.

<sup>49</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, I, no. 17 (arts. XX–XXI).

<sup>50</sup> AD Puy-de-Dome, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 5, no. 5.

<sup>51</sup> BN fr. 14368, fo. 97v.

<sup>52</sup> Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*», p. 107.

<sup>53</sup> AN 968/1, no. 17; AN J 968/8, no. 1.

*saires généraux* attached to it, headed by Poyet and including Laguette, a former *trésorier de l'extraordinaire* and now *trésorier des parties casuelles*, Lezigny and Secretary Bayard paid specifically for this task at 300–600 lt. p.m. The following month, they were joined by one Avention in 'having undertaken provisioning.' In December, three of them were still at work.<sup>54</sup> Du Bellay reports that all the pack-horses and mules available from Auvergne, Provence, Forez, Lyonnais and Dauphiné were drafted in to make sure that the army for the recovery of Piedmont did not go short of supplies.<sup>55</sup> Earlier in the same year, the army in Artois was attended by a commission including two finance officials, Pierre d'ApesteGuy (*général* of Burgundy) and Charles de Pierrevive (*trésorier de France*), a secretary, Claude Dodieu, a *maître d'hôtel*, La Hagerie, and La Rochepozay. It was d'ApesteGuy who was initially sent to Rouen to procure wine and oats and have them transported by sea to Etaples.<sup>56</sup>

By 1543, a royal army on campaign (that in Hainault) had seven *commissaires* attached to it.<sup>57</sup> Other *commissaires* were linked to the royal household as *maîtres d'hôtel*.<sup>58</sup> Such specialist administrators of the royal household were experienced in the provisioning of that institution (which was, in any case, very similar to an army on the march). One such was François de Raisse, sr. de La Hagerie, *maître d'hôtel du roi* and the most frequently employed *commissaire aux vivres* in Picardy. In Piedmont in 1551, the *commissaire général* was René de Birague, president of the Turin Parlement and later Chancellor, who, according to Villars, was no less versed in matters of war than of justice. He was highly regarded by Marshal Brissac and in 1552 himself led a besieging force to Cardé.<sup>59</sup> Jean de Serres, *commissaire général des vivres* for northern and eastern operations, was one of the ablest. His correspondence with the duke of Guise in 1557–8 confirms the close relations reported by Brantôme.<sup>60</sup> There is reason to suppose that he was the first *commissaire et surintendant-général* of supply, though the office was not formally created by edict until 1573. Guy Karnel de Bouran, eventually *gentilhomme de la maison*, victualing commissioner from the 1530s to the 1560s, was thought a remarkable man by Rabutin and the length of his service in this department is testimony enough.<sup>61</sup> These *commissaires* in turn appointed *commis* to carry out detailed tasks. In the same period, the keeping of records was deputed to a network of *contrôleurs* with one clerk.<sup>62</sup>

The *commissaires généraux* were responsible for getting the food to the men by invoking the orders of the crown to communities and towns to provide grain, baking facilities, drink and other necessities. In September 1537, they issued an

<sup>54</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, p. 435; Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 202, 224, 231.

<sup>55</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, III, p. 424. Even so, a catastrophic famine ensued in Piedmont, *ibid.*, III, pp. 454–5.

<sup>56</sup> AN J 967, no. 12/1 and 4.

<sup>57</sup> Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*», p. 107.

<sup>58</sup> Iung, 'L'Organisation du service des vivres', pp. 269–306, esp. pp. 272–5; AN J 968, no. 8.

<sup>59</sup> Villars, pp. 520, 587.

<sup>60</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, pp. 197–9; Brantôme, ed. Lalanne, IV, p. 257.

<sup>61</sup> Iung, 'L'Organisation du service des vivres', pp. 275–6; Potter, 'Les Allemands et les armées françaises', esp. n. 115; Rabutin, *Commentaires*, II, p. 17.

<sup>62</sup> Iung, 'L'Organisation du service des vivres', p. 278; BN fr. 18153, fos. 67, 72, 91.

order to the *élections* and *échevins* of towns to assemble supplies for the movement of troops in *étapes* to be sold at prices fixed by the *commissaires* and the *élus* and forbidding the soldiers to get supplies anywhere else.<sup>63</sup> Sometimes, the local *baillis* were commissioned to ensure supplies. One example will serve: in the early 1520s, for the supply of an army in Guyenne for defence against possible invasion, the *bailli* of high Auvergne (Cantal) was commissioned to supply the camp with grain, wine, meat and oats from villages nearest to Bayonne. He was empowered to visit such villages with his experts in order to procure 1800 cattle and 2000 sheep, leaving enough for the ‘poor people’ to survive.<sup>64</sup> The officials of the *élections* were responsible for providing transport.

By the start of the 16th century, two main methods coexisted: requiring local communities to contribute directly and contracting with individual suppliers, the *marchands volontaires*. *Commissaires* were empowered to assemble supplies by assessments of communities, who were usually required to maintain a magazine in time of war.<sup>65</sup> These, obviously, were only of use to armies operating near the frontiers of the kingdom or stationed within it. 2000 lansquenets, passing Pont-Saint-Maxence in February 1524, needed 4 *muids* of wine, a cask of herrings and ‘as much wine as possible’ sent from Senlis alone. On the northern frontier in the crisis of 1536, Senlis was required to provide 12,000 loaves and 12 *pièces* of wine a day for the royal camp.<sup>66</sup> In July alone the small town of Chauny was first of all required by the provincial governor to be fully armed, then provide flour for 4000 loaves, then bake 4000 loaves a day and provide 5 *poinçons* of wine for the royal camp, and repair the walls. The repetitions of demands into the following month show the limitations of this source of supply. In September, dray-horses and more flour milling were demanded.<sup>67</sup> In 1543, the *élections* managed the levy of supplies for the royal armies in Champagne and Picardy. Senlis alone was levied at 22 *muids* of flour per week for 3 months as well as transport. Then, in May 1544, the same town was called to agree supply with *marchands volontaires* for the royal army using the same procedures as in 1537. By June 2000 loaves a day were being supplied.<sup>68</sup> Compiègne was required to send 15 *muids* of grain to the castle of Guise in July 1544, raised by *commissaires*, and the cost had to be recovered by selling it later in the year before it rotted. The grain was actually supplied by a *marchand volontaire* at Saint-Quentin. In September, flour was also levied from ‘several inhabitants’ to provide an ‘extraordinary munition’ for the army going into the Boulonnais.<sup>69</sup> Like many other towns in the same region, its expenses in the aftermath of the defeat of Saint-Quentin were unusually heavy.<sup>70</sup> The governor of Lyonnais and the central provinces in 1544 assessed the threat to the city from the Emperor and in the light of a poor harvest both of grain and wine in the Lyonnais

<sup>63</sup> AD Puy-de-Dome, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 7, no. 1, signed Poyet and Olivier.

<sup>64</sup> BN fr. 14368, fo. 198v.

<sup>65</sup> AM Compiègne, BB 20, fo. 88r.

<sup>66</sup> AM Senlis, BB 5, fos. 210r, 306v.

<sup>67</sup> AD Aisne, AM Chauny, BB 5, fos. 172v, 173r, 174r, 176v–77r, 177r–v, 181r, 183r, 184v, 185v, 187v, 189v, 190r.

<sup>68</sup> AM Senlis, BB 5, fos. 358v, 377r, 381v. Bib.II, 20a

<sup>69</sup> AM Compiègne, BB 20, fos. 12r, 26v, 31r–32r, 54r.

<sup>70</sup> AM Compiègne, CC 43, fos. 280–91.

and Dombes, assembled the grain merchants and ordered supplementary levies in Auvergne, Forez and Beaujolais for the stocking of the 'munition' at Lyon. These sums were to be assessed on the communities by the *élus*.<sup>71</sup>

In areas where Estates existed, such as the county of Comminges, these would take an active role in the enforcement of the regulations concerning supply.<sup>72</sup> In other places or where supplies were unavailable locally (often the case north of the Somme towards Boulogne), the *commissaires généraux des vivres* struck contracts with local merchants to supply specific quantities over a certain period. This was done by advancing cash to the merchants, who then had to make their profit on the purchase of the specified supplies before returning it to the *commissaires*. In addition, the royal council drew up contracts with entrepreneurs who undertook, for a profit, to ensure the supply of armies or garrisons through the market. The crown exempted such merchants from tolls and dues, as long as they produced certification, in return for bringing supplies to the camp, which they were allowed to sell at a market rate.<sup>73</sup> Such men were not always merchants; they could as easily be provincial governors or military men. One such was Pierre de Salcedo, who was put in charge of the munitions for the army of Hainault in 1554, sourly described by one observer as 'high and mighty Salcedo, who governed all in this army' and was accused of profiteering by driving prices up.<sup>74</sup> Such complaints were naturally frequent. The 10,000 loaves per day required by the Rhinegrave's regiment at Laon in 1555 were impossible to procure and it was arranged for the mayor of Saint-Quentin, Gibercourt, to provide 6000 and have them taken half way to Laon.<sup>75</sup> At all events, the crown was constantly concerned to make sure the stocks were kept fresh by sale and re-supply at the best market terms.<sup>76</sup>

Supply through depots – the *étapes* – was developed as a means of reducing military disorder and required local communities to contribute. This was normal by the time of the invasion of Italy. The stages of the army's march and the exact location of the camps was managed by the *grand maréchal des logis* and four *maréchaux des logis*. The task was made easier by the willingness of the Milanese and their allies to provide supplies until the royal army arrived in 'conquered land.'<sup>77</sup> From the 1530s, there was a clearly organised network of *étapes*, essentially victualling stations, for which urban communities were made responsible.<sup>78</sup> This network hit Dauphiné hard for the first time in 1536 and 1537, when troops were

<sup>71</sup> AD Puy-de-Dôme, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 7.

<sup>72</sup> Iung, 'L'Organisation du service des vivres', pp. 270-1; Solon, 'Le Rôle des forces armées en Comminges', pp. 16-17.

<sup>73</sup> E.g. Fontanon, *Edicts*, III, pp. 180-1 (June 1553). Bib.II, 78b (April, 1558).

<sup>74</sup> BN fr. 18153, fos. 135v, 142-3; P. des Forts, *Le Château de Villebon* (Paris, 1914), pp. 228-31; G. de L'Hôtel, *Nouveau Recueil de documents pour servir à l'histoire de Montreuil-sur-Mer* (Compiègne, 1910), p. 125. BN fr. 18153, fos. 55-7, 95-7. BL Egerton 5, fo. 36. BL Add. 38032, fo. 301r.

<sup>75</sup> Saint-André to Rhinegrave, 9 April 1555, Potter, 'Les Allemands et les armées françaises' part II, pp. 25-6.

<sup>76</sup> BN fr. 2995, p. 59.

<sup>77</sup> See the Ord. against pillage, Jan. 1545: Fontanon, *Edicts*, III, p. 172; Labande-Mailfert, *Charles VIII*, pp. 252-7.

<sup>78</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, pp. 195-9; e.g. BL Add. 38033, fos. 35v-37r.

pouring into Piedmont and *étapes* were established on several routes. Each one had to be supported by the system of *aides* by the surrounding villages and these were expected to be available rapidly. The King ordered an *étape* for Fürstenberg's men at Crémieu on 6 October 1537 to be available on the 9th. One bourg was levied at 4000 loaves, 4 cattle and 50 *sommées* of wine. Not surprisingly, there was resistance and a degree of compulsion needed.<sup>79</sup> When infantry were moved from Piedmont to Provence in 1546, the governor of Dauphiné, Maugiron, asked for exemption, but the route from Susa via Briançon and the pass of l'Argentière to Barcelonnette was the most convenient for infantry and *étapes* were ordered to meet them.<sup>80</sup> Maugiron again had to order *étapes* for the passage of 8 ensigns of lansquenets in August 1553, aiming to move them as rapidly as possible into Piedmont with as little trouble as possible.<sup>81</sup>

In the north, the network of marching routes and *étapes* was also dense. 14,000 infantry of the avant-guard were camped around Senlis in September 1544, 'without doing any wrong to the inhabitants or lodging in the town, but 15 *muids* of wine and 14,000 loaves were distributed, for which they paid a part and the rest at the town's expense.' When 20–30,000 Swiss were demobilised and sent back to their country from Boulogne in October 1544, an *étape* was established at Senlis, the troops conducted by Vault, the King's *valet de chambre*. The reaction of the town was one of horror, desperate envoys sent to court at Saint-Germain, while the town gates were locked. The King's ministers were obdurate; Francis had approved the list and they would have to put up with it. On 31 October, the town council recorded that 'this day 30–32 ensigns came and lodged the most amiably they could and most lodged at the cloister without any insolence, paying for everything.'<sup>82</sup> In November 1545, 10,000 Italians, sent into garrison in Champagne, were expecting an *étape* at Barbery in Ile-de-France, to which Senlis was expected to contribute 1000 loaves, 20 *muids* of wine, 20 sheep, 6 cattle plus large quantities of hay and oats. The escort commissioner, an archer of Marshal du Biez's company, only had simple letters from his master, not enough to persuade the town to forego its privileges, but they offered a voluntary contribution if given more notice. Meanwhile, the gates were firmly shut and drummers posted to sound the alarm.<sup>83</sup> *Étapes* in Normandy were regulated by printed ordinance in 1548 and Coligny in 1552 received formal powers to establish the *étapes* for troops marching to the northern frontier, requiring Compiègne to appoint a substantial gentleman as *commissaire* and a receiver and controller.<sup>84</sup>

Transport was more effectively organised from the mid-16th century. Traditionally, dray-horses were levied through the *élections* as a sort of tax in kind. An edict of 1552 created the office of *capitaine des charrois* for 20 captains who were to keep 4000 horses and 1000 carts ready and another in November 1558 created a

<sup>79</sup> Van Doren, 'Military Administration', pp. 89–90.

<sup>80</sup> Leblanc, 'Lettres adressées à Gui de Maugiron', (1893), pp. 80–1.

<sup>81</sup> BL Add. 38032, fo. 161 (copy).

<sup>82</sup> AM Senlis, BB 6, fos. 13r, 15r–18v.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*, BB 6, fo. 28v.

<sup>84</sup> Bib.II, 77a; AM Compiègne, BB 21, fo. 35r.



similar equipage for mules.<sup>85</sup> Yet despite all this, practically every campaign of the Habsburg-Valois wars saw bodies of troops short of cash and supplies, with the correspondence of the King's ministers full of complaints from captains that their men were starving or on the brink of mutiny. A Scottish captain at Montreuil in 1555 complained that his men had been living off the land for two months for lack of pay, many of them with five horses and having to find 20s per day for feed. Had not the town governor advanced them money until the musters and kept 'open table' for them, they would have deserted.<sup>86</sup>

In some ways, the bargaining processes inherent in the Renaissance state provided a means for the crown to tap the resources of the privileged towns while allowing them to maintain their status. Municipal independence throughout France was chipped away from the reign of Louis XI onwards, notably in the appointment of royal captains, but at the price of conceding major tax exemptions. In consequence, the crown was able, in regions as far apart as Picardy and Languedoc, to make use of the urban militias, the munition capacity and artillery stores of towns like Amiens and Narbonne.<sup>87</sup>

Agents were also required for transport and infrastructure. Here, again, it was administrators from the royal household who were relied upon. In 1524, Christophe Daresee, a *huissier de salle* in the royal household, was commissioned as 'an expert in this' to construct a number of temporary bridges over the Rhône and other rivers to allow the transport of troops for the campaign in Provence.<sup>88</sup>

### **Destruction, problems of discipline and the impact of disorder**

While campaigning in Piedmont was by the 1550s subject to conventions that limited the impact on the peasantry, the direct impact of war was obviously greatest in the frontier zones open to frequent incursions, notably Picardy, the Ardennes, Champagne and Burgundy.<sup>89</sup> With the beginning of the Habsburg-Valois wars in 1521, the impact of fighting on France itself became much more immediate and was symbolised by the march of Nassau along the frontier from Mézières to Guise. Du Bellay memorably summed up this campaign and its effects:

After sacking the little town of Aubenton, they put everyone to the sword, without distinction, of all sexes and ages, with a remarkable cruelty; from that stemmed the terrible cruelties of the wars for thirty years after.<sup>90</sup>

<sup>85</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, pp. 195–9; Iung, 'L'Organisation du service des vivres', pp. 287–8; BN Cangé F 173, fo. 100.

<sup>86</sup> BN nafr. 23162, fo. 55bis.

<sup>87</sup> Potter, *War and Government*, pp. 233–64; Solon, 'War and the *Bonnes Villes*', pp. 65–73.

<sup>88</sup> BN fr. 14368, fo. 74r; Hamon, «*Messieurs des finances*», p. 108.

<sup>89</sup> Villars, pp. 538–40, 627; Potter, *War and Government*, ch. 6, *passim*.

<sup>90</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 152.



As has been seen (cf. chapter 7), military discipline was a regular preoccupation of the crown, expressed in the numerous and detailed ordinances like that of 27 July 1498 on the *gendarmerie*. There were 55 such ordinances issued by Francis I between 1515 and 1538 covering the whole range of behaviour and concentrating on relations with the civil population when supplies were being requisitioned. Francis I in 1545 spelled out in conventional terms the responsibilities for control of disorder. The people, declared the King, had borne 'great and unbearable burdens' for the waging of the King's wars, yet had to suffer 'daily oppression because of the coming and going of my soldiers, matters which should move me to take measures for their relief, being those who bear the chief cost of my war.' One answer was to insist on specific garrison towns for infantry formations. In June 1546, the King declared that his soldiers 'have been banding together in large companies, scouring the land and committing infinite evils, excesses, pillages and robberies against our poor people' and ordered that unauthorised groups of more than ten infantry or two cavalry would be cut to pieces.<sup>91</sup> The repetition of these acts testifies to their general ineffectiveness, even though Gaston Zeller thought that the reign of Henri II saw the French army, in comparison with its Imperial counterpart, tightly policed under the aegis of firm commanders like Coligny and Guise.<sup>92</sup> Coligny's military code as *colonel-général de l'infanterie*, though not the first of its kind, was the most influential in the 16<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>93</sup> Nevertheless, the impact of military indiscipline on local communities remained persistent.

Provinces where Estates were active had limited ways of solving the problem. The exemption of Dauphiné from troop levies seems to have been overcome by 1520.<sup>94</sup> In Languedoc, exempted formally from the provision of infantry in 1486, the Estates thereafter refused to pay for any such levies. Nevertheless, Louis XII raised men in the province which, the Estates complained, 'did endless damage so that, after their dismissal, they could hardly be purged from the country two or three years after.' Demands for contributions for troop supply in 1522 were met by complaints that the province was short of food, that taxable goods came in mainly by sea and that the merchants of the province already paid taxes on taking their produce into Lyon. The province also claimed that it had only ever been required to supply troops in its own territory and yet in the previous war had been required to send large quantities of food for the army at Bayonne and for the siege operations at Salses in 1503.<sup>95</sup> The Estates agreed from the early 1530s to subsidise bodies of infantry in their province (which they had hitherto refused), not through any anxiety to do the King's bidding but as a result of gaining the right to appoint local agents who would supervise the movement and supply of the troops. In 1545,

<sup>91</sup> Société des Antiquaires de Picardie (Amiens), Charrier de Heilly, 57, no. 36, 20 May 1545. Fontanon, *Edicts*, III, pp. 171–2 (Jan. 1545 and June 1546).

<sup>92</sup> J. Brink, 'The King's Army and the People of Languedoc, 1500–1560', *PWSFH*, 14 (1986), p. 3; Zeller, *Le Siège de Metz*, pp. 64–5.

<sup>93</sup> Fontanon, *Edicts*, III, pp. 150–7.

<sup>94</sup> Van Doren, 'Military Administration', p. 80.

<sup>95</sup> C. Devic and J. Vaissette (eds), *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, 16 vols (Toulouse, 1872–1905), XI, p. 138; *Ord.Fr.I*, III, pp. 142, 152.

they agreed to pay for the upkeep of 12,000 foot but only as long as they remained within the province, where they could be controlled by the power of the purse.<sup>96</sup> Brink's argument, that problems decreased under Henri II with the inception of the *tailion*, seems somewhat improbable for the rest of the kingdom. The *tailion* was a palliative, not the real solution to the lack of any firm control of soldiers in action. Nor is it reasonable to suppose that the *commissaires* of the estates in Languedoc were the model adopted for the whole kingdom since the network of royal *commissaires* was already well established.

From the inception of the *gendarmerie* onwards, the disciplining of these bodies of horsemen became a notorious problem. Commynes commented that they were:

Constantly quartered throughout the country, without paying for anything, and doing other evils and excesses which everyone of us knows about: for they are not content with their rations, and so they beat and abuse the poor people and force them to go and find bread, wine and other food for them; and if the goodman has a wife or daughter who is beautiful, he would be wise to keep her out of sight.<sup>97</sup>

In Lombardy in 1500, Marshal Trivulzio reported that Cardinal d'Amboise was 'tremendously angry about the pillage by the men-at-arms this side of the Ticino and the ransoms we hear they have extorted'. Scarcely a town or village had escaped ransom and the captains were to be ordered to account for their men.<sup>98</sup> Vile behaviour was double-edged, of course. In Puglia in 1502 we hear of a 'lackey' (footsoldier of a band used to skirmish with the Spanish garrison at Attripalda), a 'murderer and *mauvais garçon*' who redeemed himself in the eyes of Aubigny (who had intended to hang him) by slaughtering twenty Spaniards.<sup>99</sup>

It should be remembered that a company of 100 lances involved as many as 800 men and 800 horses, a formidable problem when breakdowns of supply led them to get out of hand. A plan for the security of Auvergne envisaged that gentlemen would be stationed at all points of entry for men-at-arms into the province, 'to exhort them calmly and wisely not to start pillaging', keep the agent of the Regent informed, who in the case of pillage would mobilise the gentry and concert plans with the neighbouring provinces.<sup>100</sup> A member of Albany's company in the 1520s, the sr. de Bessant, was prosecuted for grievous 'acts of force' including smashing down of doors, insults and assaults on his host's family and injurious words to royal officials.<sup>101</sup> A similar case around 1547, reported by the Vieilleville biographer, involved the sr. de Saint-Bonnet, who stabbed a boy who was defending his widowed mother from rape.<sup>102</sup> Admiral

<sup>96</sup> Brink, 'The King's Army', pp. 6–7.

<sup>97</sup> Commynes, III, p. 74.

<sup>98</sup> D'Auton, I, p. 380.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 268.

<sup>100</sup> AD Puy-de-Dôme, 3E, 113, EE 6, no. 3.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, EE 9, no. 10.

<sup>102</sup> *Vieilleville*, p. 483.

Chabot de Brion reported from his *gouvernement* of Burgundy in 1526-7 that 140–160 horse of the count of Tende's company had been 'out in the fields, raiding, doing wickedness, much pillaging, rape of girls' and promised to attack them as 'violators of the commonwealth.'<sup>103</sup>

The early 1520s seem to have been a period of intense disorder as a result of ineffective recruitment and control. Repeated public injunctions spoke of disorder perpetrated 'under the cover' of the passage of regular troops in numerous provinces. The governor of Champagne reported in August 1521 that 'many of our adventurers here go through the villages pillaging and carrying off what they can' and requested that pickets be stationed at the gates of Reims and Chalons to arrest all those bringing in war booty and restore it to its owners.<sup>104</sup> Jean Bouchet reported the outbreak of military disorder almost as soon as war began in 1521. In Poitou-Xaintonge, an area he knew well, he noted the effects of Bonnivet's troops on the way to the siege of Fuentarrabia:

So that, under the cover of this army, cattle and horses were stolen, from which some of the commissioners made a private profit, to the oppression of the people and not the king's or the public good.<sup>105</sup>

Rebellion and pillage were already a problem in Maine and Anjou in 1518, when a *prévôt des maréchaux* was sent down to quell it.<sup>106</sup> When the *francs archers* raised in Maine in 1521 started to get out of hand (having been mustered, armed and then sent home), some were quickly caught and hanged by the *prévôts des maréchaux* but others continued to cause scandal, according to one report, by stealing a cow and proceeding to baptise it with ornaments stolen from a church. One soldier used the windows of the church at Saint Cosme as target practice for stolen apples but, before he was arrested and hanged by a *prévôt des maréchaux*, the arm he had used was miraculously struck with paralysis. One band of nearly 1000 actually tried to attack the city of Angers before being driven off. Ultimately, the disturbance was so great that the captains were fined and Gabriel de la Châtre, sr. de Nanzay, captain of the archers of the royal guard, was sent down to administer punishment. One Boysselou, from Berry, an ensign of *francs-archers*, was beheaded and his head put on a spike.<sup>107</sup> A similar story from summer 1522 was recounted by a Parisian bourgeois, about a band of *aventuriers* in Poitou who, after killing a priest, stealing the chalice and eating the consecrated wafers, were found to have spontaneously combusted in a tavern. The problem was still acute in July 1523, when Francis I commissioned local gentlemen to put them down.<sup>108</sup> Then in April 1523 Louise of Savoy sent Montmorency down to scour out bands of 'wicked gallows-fodder' who had gone on pillaging 'on pretext of claiming to be soldiers.' Most fled but a *prévôt*

<sup>103</sup> BN fr. 3066, p. 171.

<sup>104</sup> BN fr. 3059, fo. 96.

<sup>105</sup> Bib.II, 92, fos. 206v–207r.

<sup>106</sup> BN fr. 25720, fo. 118 (*CAF*, I, 149, 854).

<sup>107</sup> Bib.II, 93, fo. 198r.

<sup>108</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L), p. 159; (ed. B.), p. 138; 'Lettres des rois de France ... à la commune de Poitiers', *AHP*, 4 (1875), 277–340, no. 9, pp. 281–2.

*des maréchaux*, La Guygnardière, hanged four in front of the town hall and beheaded two more at the pillory (one having his hand cut off and burnt first for laying hands on the sacrament).<sup>109</sup>

This was the era of the *mauvais garçons* reported all over France, and stories involving them were common in these years. In one of the most extraordinarily flowery and high-flown royal ordinances of the age, Francis I in September 1523 denounced:

Some adventurers, vagabond men, idle, lost, wicked, criminal, abandoned to all vices, thieves, murderers, ravishers, violators of women and girls, blasphemers and deniers of God, cruel, inhuman, merciless, who make a virtue of vice and have cast themselves into the pit of all evils, ravishing wolves made to destroy everyone and who will and can do no good service; whose custom is to devour the people. ...

His intention was empower all local holders of high justice, whether malefactors were domiciled or not, with the temporary powers of *prévôts des maréchaux* to execute summary justice on them without right of appeal.<sup>110</sup> The level of armaments – including firearms – in the hands of ‘masterless men’ was regarded as a threat to public order and in 1524 orders were issued to control them. Villagers could, of course, fight back. On 20 September 1523, a band of 100 adventurers came to the village of Bonneuil-en-Valois (Oise), belonging to the recently fled Constable de Bourbon, and proceeded to ransack it, arguing that letters of safeguard were of no account and that, anyway, they and the constable were traitors. The peasants were driven into the cemetery but then, finding they were greater in number, fought back and drove the soldiers off. The captain then threatened to return and punish them.<sup>111</sup> In Anjou, at La Guygnardière, ten or twelve *mauvais garçons* were arrested in possession of arquebuses and swords and all hanged.<sup>112</sup>

According to one account, 1500 *mauvais garçons* roamed through Poitou and were only put down with great losses by a commune force led by the local nobility.<sup>113</sup> Bouchet named their leader as a gentleman of Berry, captain Monclou, at the head of 6000–7000 men who began their devastation in Berry and then moved on to Poitou.

They were men abandoned to all vice and wickedness and attacked, among others, priests and judges and all the gallows they found along their way they cast down.

It was said that no *prévôt des maréchaux* would face them, since the *prévôt* of Poitou, Montmorillon, had been slaughtered, his nose and penis cut off. Once Monclou had surrendered, his men gave themselves up to Commarques,

<sup>109</sup> Bib.II, 93, fo. 199v.

<sup>110</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, III, pp. 293–302.

<sup>111</sup> AN 1AP, 221–3.

<sup>112</sup> Bib.II, 93, fo. 202r.

<sup>113</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. B), pp. 137–8. BN fr. 3028, fo. 17; BN fr. 3032, fo. 40; BN fr. 2997, fo. 58; BN fr. 3012, fo. 41; BN fr. 3068, fo. 9; BN fr. 3027, fo. 35.

another captain of infantry, but the whole band joined together in laying siege to Poitiers. After several skirmishes and frights, the townsmen held out and Commarques's men moved on to Anjou.<sup>114</sup> Bourdigné tells us that Commarques, a captain of Limousin, supposedly on the way to La Rochelle to embark for England, ravaged the country of Anjou helped by certain 'wicked knaves' from the region acting as guides to the richest houses, extracting money by threats and torture. Such was the chaos that local peasants even began to form their own bands to pick them off and 'where they found these brigands by themselves they slaughtered them like animals.' The affair came to a pitched battle at la Motte de Bourbon near Coudray. The local bands were put to rout but the raiders moved on into Poitou.<sup>115</sup> In Marche and Limousin, the 'Thousand Devils', a band of *mauvais garçons* led by a local noble called 'king Guillot' was, again, only defeated in pitched battle.<sup>116</sup> In September, Francis I formally promulgated an ordinance against the '*mauvais garçons*, calling themselves adventurers', essentially unauthorized infantry, that summary justice could be meted out by local judges against those apprehended by the *prévôts des maréchaux*.<sup>117</sup>

Again, in 1525–6 there was another outbreak of war-related disorder. A letter of pardon of January 1525 spoke of 'many pillagers and men of wicked life who, on pretext of the war, pillage, rob and strip the poor people' in the Boulonnais.<sup>118</sup> Early in 1526, more '*mauvais garçons* calling themselves adventurers,' accompanied by some cavalymen, spread havoc in a wide swathe south of Paris around Chartres, Melun and Provins and in Brie. There were 6–7000 of them 'and they said they were of the King's ordinance and that they had not been paid.' The authorities seemed powerless against them.<sup>119</sup> The brigandage unleashed on the borders of Champagne in the summer of 1528 by Antoine de La Marck, a clerical brother of Florange, involved 2–3000 *mauvais garçons*. La Marck, it was observed, 'made war against the King.'<sup>120</sup> Nothing much seems to have changed when, in the hungry mid-1540s, Poitou was terrorised by two bands of soldiers moving from village to village and ransacking them and joining with *mauvais garçons* 'so that it is a pity and horror to hear about.'<sup>121</sup>

Quite apart from years such as these of severe military disorder, the problems of troop management were constant and involved the control of crime and conflict between civilians and the military. One of the main problems involved disbandment of troop formations. When in 1486 the Gascon troops operating in the north were reported to be 'living on our people', they were ordered home by proclamation in

<sup>114</sup> Bib.II, 92, fo. 210v.

<sup>115</sup> Bib.II, 93, fo. 200r.

<sup>116</sup> J. Nouaillac, *Histoire du Limousin et de la Marche* (Paris, 1931), pp. 267–8; *Bourgeois* (ed. L), pp. 166–8; (ed. B), p. 140; BN fr. 3027, fo. 35.

<sup>117</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. B), p. 147; (ed. L), pp. 176, 185, promulgated 20 Oct. at Paris.

<sup>118</sup> AN JJ 238, fo. 3r–v.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 275–6. A *lieutenant lai* was empowered at Paris in May 1526 to scour the taverns and other places of ill-repute for 'adventurers, vagabonds, idle and of evil lives' (*Ord. Fr.I*, IV, pp. 232–3).

<sup>120</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L), p. 365; (ed. B), pp. 306–7; *Chronique du roy François, premier de ce nom* [S. Picotté], ed. G. Guiffrey (Paris, 1860), pp. 73–4; Versoris, p. 122.

<sup>121</sup> Ledain, 'Lettres de Daillon', pp. 14–15, nos. x–xi.

small groups of three or four, not in large companies, on pain of summary hanging if caught looting on the way.<sup>122</sup> Almost exactly the same terms were employed for the expulsion of the ‘vagabonds and masterless men’ from Languedoc in 1522.<sup>123</sup>

In 1525, after the disaster of Pavia, Louise of Savoy ordered the repression of ‘*mauvais garçons*, pillagers’ who, during the return of the infantry from Italy and ‘under their cover’, ‘hold the country in this kingdom and live on the people.’<sup>124</sup> The edginess in military–civil relations is shown by a confrontation in Auvergne in autumn 1524 between a *franc-archer* who turned up at Chamalières (just outside the walls of Clermont) with his arquebus on his shoulder and his sword in his belt. A group of local men demanded his papers and, when he refused, seized his weapons.<sup>125</sup> However, in 1526, at the end of the war, a company of Italian men-at-arms seized and pillaged the little town of Decize on the Loire between Nevers and Moulins for having refused admittance. Several townsmen were killed.<sup>126</sup>

The 1520s saw the beginning of a new scourge, that of the lansquenets. In August 1525 Nicolas Versoris recounted that the lansquenets, returning from the repression of the ‘Lutheran’ peasants in Lorraine, committed ‘endless wickedness’ on their return, particularly at Chelles and its royal abbey and elsewhere around Paris.<sup>127</sup> In September 1523, lansquenets were marching through Auvergne and being supplied at Montferrand and other places. The royal commissaire informed the consuls that 4–5000 would be arriving at the nearby town of Maringues. They were ordered to provide a list of supplies (to be paid for at an agreed rate) on pain of being reputed rebels.<sup>128</sup> The lansquenets who were sent into Brittany for embarkation to Scotland in 1543 stirred much alarm. The governor, Châteaubriand, told the town to show them ‘the mouth of your cannon’ if they had to.<sup>129</sup>

This survey indicates that the summit of military disorder came between 1520 and 1550 with particularly savage periods in the 1520s and 1540s. The relative absence of major upheavals in the 1550s is possibly an indicator that the disciplinary measures undertaken throughout the period were beginning to bear fruit and that the efforts poured into the supply system were at last producing an army that could be effectively fed. Yet this was a precarious achievement and depended both on the willingness of thousands of communities to support it and on the shaky financial stability of the crown. This had begun to collapse at the end of the 1550s.

<sup>122</sup> *Lettres de Charles VIII*, ed. Pelicier, I, pp. 134–6 (to Gié, 30 Sept. 1486).

<sup>123</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, III, p. 259.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, p. 67.

<sup>125</sup> AD Puy-de-Dôme, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE2, no. 16, depositions of 12 June 1525.

<sup>126</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L), p. 280; (ed. B), p. 236; *Chronique parisienne de Pierre Driart*, ed. Bournon, pp. 106–7.

<sup>127</sup> Versoris, pp. 88–9.

<sup>128</sup> AD Puy-de-Dôme, 3E 113, fonds 2, EE 5, nos. 9, 16, 20.

<sup>129</sup> BM Nantes, EE 133, two letters of Châteaubriand, Jan. and Feb. [1543].



# 10

## War, Propaganda, History and Public Opinion

*'War is a matter not only for the king, his kingdoms and estates but also our private concern and those of his subjects, friends and allies.'*

(Marshal de Brissac, 1551: Villars, p. 517)

We assume that the foreign policies of dynastic states were the prerogative of princes and that decisions on peace and war were taken by rulers without consulting their subjects. Though in a strictly legal sense this was true, there were conventions of governance by 'good counsel' that summoned princes to take the advice of their nobles and commanders before committing themselves to war (see chapter 2). Was war, though, conducted in a vacuum of public opinion before widespread participation in 'the public sphere', required this? It has been argued that the formation of an articulate public opinion in France only began with the onset of the civil wars in 1560–2 and did not mature until the 18th century.<sup>1</sup> While we now know more about the propaganda of medieval French kings,<sup>2</sup> the Renaissance is still usually held to be the domain of swaggering princes who laid down the law to their subjects and pursued wars in vindication of their honour. At times of crisis, such as 1523 or 1525, there is evidence enough for seditious pamphleteering.<sup>3</sup> It will be argued in this chapter that the Kings of France, far from conducting 'wars of magnificence' solely for the sake of honour and with sovereign disdain for subjects' opinions, had long been acutely aware of the need both to justify their wars and present them in such a light that their subjects would understand their motives and offer enthusiastic support. Subjects, after all, were required to pay for them. As Andrew Pettegree has aptly remarked, in this period 'the exercise of power was always persuasive.'<sup>4</sup> Louis XI, in a passage he dictated for the *Rosier des guerres*, stressed the desirability of carrying his subjects with him in his wars, 'for battle

<sup>1</sup> M. Yardeni, *La Conscience nationale en France pendant les guerres de religion, 1559–1598* (Louvain/Paris, 1971).

<sup>2</sup> J. Strayer, 'France: the Holy Land, the Chosen People and the Most Christian King', in T.K. Rabb and J.E. Seigel (eds), *Action and Conviction in Early Modern Europe. Essays in Memory of E.H. Harbison* (Princeton, NJ, 1969), pp. 3–16; P. Lewis, 'War Propaganda and Historiography in Fifteenth-Century France and England', *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 5th ser., 15 (1965), pp. 1–21; A. Bossuat, 'La Littérature de propagande au XVe siècle', *Cahiers d'histoire*, 1 (Grenoble, 1956), 131–46.

<sup>3</sup> Versoris, p. 167.

<sup>4</sup> A. Pettegree, *The French Book and the European Book World* (Leiden, 2007), p. 20.



fought through common will yields victory,' and the King should always consult wise counsellors:

And then he should require his subjects orally, by letter or messages, that all should ready themselves for war; and once they have arrived ... should thank them and praise their good will and diligence, promising them goods and, with courage and pride declare to them the wrongs the enemy has done to the kingdom's rights, recite the prowess of their predecessors and their virtuous battles, the goods and honour that will fall to them by defeating their enemies, ... and by such words and exhortations raise their courage and move them to war.<sup>5</sup>

Louis, then, was well aware of the crucial need for support in war. The consequences of defeat were the subject of debate. After the failure to hold on to Naples in 1504, d'Auton listened to talk at court about responsibility: some inevitably blamed ingratitude to God but others a divided command and the desire of the generals for personal profit. Yet others thought that the soldiers had not maintained 'order of war or discipline of chivalry', while some blamed the royal Council that this 'work was foolishly begun and shamefully ended.' The treasurers (as in 1522) were in the firing line for failure to supply the troops. This, after all, was the period of Marshal de Gié's political trial.<sup>6</sup>

Under Francis I, even Président Guillart, in the nervous speech he made before the King in the Lit de Justice of July 1527, could assert that, 'since the people pay the wages of the *gensdarmes* to keep them safe and in freedom', the King should take order for military discipline.<sup>7</sup> Royal presentation of policy often involved direct pressure and influence through the fiscal apparatus. There was also a subtle and complex relationship with the literary world through unspoken conventions and limited control of the press, as well as the employment of more obvious means of persuasion and presentation. Only rarely did the King of France appear before a formal assembly to justify his policy and appeal for aid. The Estates-General did not meet between 1484 and 1560 but a partial summons of the Estates to the Chambre Saint Louis on 5 January 1558 heard a grave appeal for assistance by Henri II that must have amazed an audience unused to such occasions. He began by justifying the return to war after the truce of Vaucelles, blaming it on Philip II and the need to assist allies who could not with honour be abandoned. The disasters of the previous year, sent by God of course, had placed the realm in extreme danger. Expenses had been so great that he was 'astonished.' He was determined to raise the greatest army ever assembled in the kingdom to face the imminent danger of invasion. A final appeal to their honour was fortuitously capped by the arrival of news of success at Calais and the assembly voted a loan of 3 million écus to be paid by 3000 of the richest in the kingdom.<sup>8</sup>

Such startling occasions, though, were rare. The pulpit, of course, was a vehicle

<sup>5</sup> *Le Rosier des guerres*, ed. Diamantberger, n.p., ch. 4: 'Des exhortations'.

<sup>6</sup> D'Auton, III, pp. 339–40.

<sup>7</sup> R.J. Knecht, 'Francis I and the 'lit de justice': a 'Legend' Defended', *French History*, 7.i (1993), pp. 67, 82.

<sup>8</sup> BN fr. 4742, fo. 35r–v.

for the dissemination of information, particularly at times of celebration or when royal taxes were being demanded, but what we know about sermons indicates that they were a double-edged sword. Under Charles VIII, the preacher Olivier Maillard played a role in pushing for the cession of Roussillon in the treaty of Senlis.<sup>9</sup> A Carmelite friar was reported in April 1497 to have exhorted Charles to make peace, with some effect.<sup>10</sup> Most preachers were not concerned with rights and wrongs of war but Michel Menot, like many of them, castigated unruly soldiers and even declared in one of his sermons that, though Charles VIII had made all Italy tremble, he now lay rotting in the ground.<sup>11</sup> When portents such as comets and earthquakes were held to signify God's anger, preaching could hardly fail to play its part.<sup>12</sup> War and human misery could always be explained by God's anger. Under Henri II, the Parisian preacher François Le Picart declared:

Do we not have great cause and reason to return to God, seeing all parts of the earth are engaged in war and that misery and poverty are everywhere? Is this not a great advertisement to convert to God and to ask his pardon and grace for our sins?

He was even more specific in contemplating the events of 1544, when he argued in one sermon that the fall of Boulogne was a signal to recognize the sins of society. In another he argued:

Have you not seen that for thirteen or fourteen years we fled with fear from our enemy? And those who were supposed to protect the city left first. Despairing of peace, we saw peace made. Who made it? God. God permitted things to get to the point of despair, in human terms, in order that He could intervene and it would be said: 'God did that. This is not the work of men.'<sup>13</sup>

The pulpit by the middle of the 16th century was thus not a vehicle for the straightforward dissemination of the royal view of war and foreign affairs. On the other hand, when preaching got out of hand in Paris in the 1550s, the crown was careful to ensure that the balance was restored by sermons on obedience and that the parishioners left the sermons 'edified and enclined to obey and serve the King.'<sup>14</sup> We must ask, then, how else opinion could be swayed.

<sup>9</sup> B. Chevalier, 'Olivier Maillard et la réforme des Cordeliers (1482–1520)', *Revue d'histoire de l'Église de France*, 65 (1979), 32; Labande-Mailfert, *Charles VIII*, pp. 123–4.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 536.

<sup>11</sup> L. Taylor, *Soldiers of Christ: Preaching in Late Medieval and Renaissance France* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 149, 68.

<sup>12</sup> *Chronique de Benoit Maillard, grand-Prieur de l'Abbaye de Savigny en Lyonnais 1460–1506*, ed. G. Guigue (Lyon, 1883), pp. 50–68, 83, 93–100; *Journal de Jean Aubrion, bourgeois de Metz*, ed. L. Larchey (Metz, 1957), p. 354.

<sup>13</sup> L. Taylor, *Heresy and Orthodoxy in Sixteenth-Century Paris* (Leiden, 1999), p. 196.

<sup>14</sup> BL Egerton 30, fo. 63.

### News reporting and public opinion

In December 1512, the bishop of Amiens invited the mayor and *échevins* to dinner at the episcopal palace and, after some 'good cheer,' told them that he had just heard from his father, the provincial governor, that 'the pope, the emperor, the Kings of Spain and England had allied against the King our sovereign lord' and that the town should be on its guard.<sup>15</sup> There were, of course, many formal and informal channels of communication for news which have not left much trace. Municipal government sometimes recorded fast-moving events, as when Compiègne chronicled the movements of the Emperor through France in September 1544, noting that he had entered nearby Soissons at 6 in the evening. In October 1552 the city register noted the entry of the Emperor's army into Noyon at 7 a.m. and the burning of the town the same day. The women and children left Compiègne as the remnants of the Noyon garrison and emergency reinforcements came in: 'the business of the town in these days cannot adequately be expressed ... though it can be known by the letters sent to the representatives at Paris, replies and others from various persons.'<sup>16</sup> The most visible communications are the letters missive, by which the crown kept local communities abreast of such news as was thought necessary. In 1544, Compiègne diligently noted all the King's letters. Before the generalization of the provincial *gouvernements*, the crown was apt to use such letters to the *bonnes villes*, the *bailliages*, and indeed powerful individuals, in order to mobilize support.

The traditions of communication between ruler and subjects were well established but changed subtly from period to period according to need. For the period when royal letters close (letters *De par le roi*) and missives have been systematically published, 1461–98, the *bonnes villes* received about 14% of them.<sup>17</sup> Of these, over half concerned the communication of political information and military matters. In the 15th century, at least, the crown was unable to impose itself by force on its subjects and relied instead on diverse channels of persuasion. In areas such as Guyenne and Languedoc, which retained active assemblies of Estates, these were the main avenues for political communication. Elsewhere, and especially on the northern and eastern frontiers, letters-close were preferred and rose to peaks during severe political and military crises in 1465, 1477, 1486 and 1492.<sup>18</sup>

In the 15th century, the content of royal letters falls into four main categories: justifications for war; narratives of success and calls for thanks to God or further precautions; problems in finance and demands for contributions; detailed war needs and demands for specific action. In the first two of these the presentational aspects of royal policy are most apparent. Narratives of military action took a

<sup>15</sup> AM Amiens, BB 21, fo. 163 (Durand, *Inventaire sommaire ... Amiens*, pp. 318, 316).

<sup>16</sup> AM Compiègne, BB 20, fos. 24r–26v; AM Compiègne, BB 21, fos. 54r, 56r.

<sup>17</sup> B. Chevalier, 'The *Bonnes Villes* and the King's Council in Fifteenth-Century France', in J.R.L. Highfield and R. Jeffs (eds), *The Crown and Local Communities in England and France in the Fifteenth Century* (Gloucester, 1981), pp. 114, 118–19.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 120–3.

standard form in which a grievance or threat was identified, the King's prompt action avenged or averted this and prayers to God were required. In the year of the League of Public Weal, 1465, Louis XI set out systematically to garner support against his enemies and put his actions at Monthéry and afterwards in the best possible light.<sup>19</sup> These developed a 'line' on the battle but shared certain common features, including a dubious insistence that the King had 'won' the battle.<sup>20</sup> In 1472, the King sent out batteries of letters to reassure the people of Beauvais during the siege and present himself to his men as a warrior capable of defending his kingdom.<sup>21</sup> The year 1477, unsurprisingly, saw much use of news by Louis to mobilize support.<sup>22</sup>

The same conventions can be observed in the reign of Charles VIII, when the outbreak of war with Maximilian in June 1486 was signalled by circular letters to the *bonnes villes* which detailed the Archduke's perfidy and treachery in seizing Thérouanne.<sup>23</sup> In May 1488, another long circular went out to describe the treachery of the duke of Brittany and his allies, leading up to the renewal of conflict and the successful capture of Châteaubriand.<sup>24</sup> When Charles VIII was seeking aid to confront Henry VII in 1492, he issued a long declaration that, though he had desired peace with all his heart and though Henry's demands had been heavy 'nevertheless, to avoid the evils and set-backs that can happen because of war' most of the demands had been conceded. However, the English King, knowing that Charles had withdrawn to the Loire, had maliciously brought his army to Calais. The King therefore appealed to his subjects for aid.<sup>25</sup>

The events of the Italian wars played a large part in public communications between the crown and its corporate subjects (much of it printed). Regular bulletins kept subjects informed of the King's triumphs. Charles VIII's printed manifesto of November 1494 asserted his will to defend Christendom and ensured his subjects that he had left his wife and son in command of a peaceful and rich kingdom.<sup>26</sup> In 1501, Louis XII delayed publishing news of the capture of Capua until he could announce the fall of Naples and Gaeta.<sup>27</sup> Such letters were published initially as broadsheets, then as *plaquettes* (cheap in-octavo pamphlets). Francis I's decision to cross into Italy in August 1523 was communicated through extraordinarily detailed missives to the *bonnes villes*, which show the King almost in defensive mode. These sketched out the invasions by Henry VIII and Charles V and asserted that 'the true aim of our enemies is to occupy

<sup>19</sup> *Lettres de Louis XI*, ed. Vaesen, II, pp. 230–2, 238–9, 251–3, 314–16, 355–6, 328–32, 332–4, 339–42.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 328, 332–4, 339–42.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, V, pp. 32–5.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, VI, pp. 151–2, (no. 978), 183–5 (no. 999), 192–3 (no. 1003), 197–200 (no. 1007); VII, p. 45.

<sup>23</sup> *Lettres de Charles VIII*, ed. Pelicier, I, pp. 112–15, no. 68 (12 June 1486).

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 24–30.

<sup>25</sup> 2 September 1492 (examples to Saint-Quentin, BN Picardie 89, fo. 362; to Rheims, *Lettres de Charles VIII*, ed. Pelicier, III, dated 30 Sept.).

<sup>26</sup> *Ord.*, XX, pp. 458–9; French version in Molinet, *Chroniques*, II, p. 404.

<sup>27</sup> BN Picardie 89, fo. 371; A. Ledieu, *Inventaire sommaire des archives municipales d'Abbeville* (Abbeville, 1902), p. 34; D'Auton, II, pp. 73–4; Bib.II, 42.

Italy' and then hold France in servitude. So, the King announced his intention of crossing the Alps and, 'since it seems to us you might find it strange that we should leave our kingdom while it is faced by war' he promised to return should his presence be needed.<sup>28</sup> The most well known event of the wars, the capture of Francis I at Pavia (24 February 1525), was widely communicated through letters. Louise of Savoy received the news on 1 March and letters were going off on the 3rd and 4th, reaching the north by the 7th. City registers record the response of the communities to this disaster. When the kingdom was seriously invaded, the King took care to ensure his subjects that he was doing everything necessary for their defence.<sup>29</sup>

As for negotiations with foreign princes, in the 15th century it was common to communicate the contents of truces by royal proclamations.<sup>30</sup> When major treaties were concluded, summaries in the form of proclamations were sent to the *bonnes villes*, while on the few occasions, when ratification by towns or regional Estates was demanded by other powers, the proclamation and the form of ratification was despatched. There was, of course, to be no debate, as the peremptory orders clearly indicate.<sup>31</sup> Though the contents of treaties could sometimes be published in some detail, only rarely would the full text become public knowledge. In a typical case, manuscript extracts of the 1482 treaty of Arras were sent to the city of Mâcon.<sup>32</sup> Jean d'Auton seems to have had the full text of the Franco-Spanish truce of Narbonne (Nov. 1503).<sup>33</sup>

The summary printing of treaties began at the end of Louis XI's reign with the first printed royal act, the terms of the treaty of Arras in 1482. It continued with those with England and Burgundy in 1492–3.<sup>34</sup> Though it was normal for the crown to notify the *bonnes villes* of the conclusion of treaties,<sup>35</sup> diplomatic instruments were not consistently published throughout this period and there certainly was judicious editing of them for public consumption, as the text of the treaty of Etaples with Henry VII makes clear.<sup>36</sup> Treaties with England were fairly consistently published (in 1514, 1525, 1527, 1546, 1550), as was the joint manifesto of Francis and Henry VIII to challenge the Emperor.<sup>37</sup> The treaties with Charles V (Noyon) and with Maximilian Sforza (1515) were published early in the reign. Later, those of Cambrai and Crépy were also published<sup>38</sup> as was that of Cateau-Cambrésis, in the latter case in the form of proclamations,

<sup>28</sup> *AHP*, 4, no. x.

<sup>29</sup> BM Beauvais, Coll. Bucquet 57, p. 476; BM Abbeville, MS 378, fo. 16r; AM Péronne, BB 7, fo. 273v; *AHP*, 4, no. xi.

<sup>30</sup> *Lettres de Louis XI*, ed. Vaesen, VI, p. 229; X, pp. 392–3; VII, pp. 92–3; Nicolay, 'Kalendarier des guerres de Tournay', p. 266.

<sup>31</sup> Thierry, *Recueil des monuments inédits*, II, pp. 402–6; *Lettres de Louis XI*, ed. Vaesen, X, pp. 36–7.

<sup>32</sup> AC Mâcon, EE 44; AC Nantes, EE 133.

<sup>33</sup> D'Auton, III, pp. 239–43.

<sup>34</sup> Bib. II, 78a, 8, 66.

<sup>35</sup> AM Amiens, AA 5, fo. 255v; AM Compiègne, BB 13, fo. 155v; BN Picardie 89, fo. 372. AM Amiens, AA 12, fo. 150.

<sup>36</sup> Bib. II, 66.

<sup>37</sup> Seguin, *L'Information*, L 53, 1514; F 46; F 56; Bib. II, 66b.

<sup>38</sup> Seguin, *L'Information*, F 10, 17–18; F 83, 84. H. Hauser, *Les Sources de l'histoire de*

the basic texts (both between France and Spain and between England and Spain) and speeches and celebrations.<sup>39</sup> Initially, the terms of the treaty with the Pope in October 1515 were kept very secret and an otherwise well-informed observer could not discover them; the King's plans to visit the Pope at Bologna were found by some 'hard to swallow.'<sup>40</sup>

Most treaties were only declared in very general terms in printed form, such as that of 1550 with England.<sup>41</sup> In 1526, though there seems to have been no printed text of the treaty of Madrid, the terms were widely known; hence Jean Bouchet's detailed analysis of them in his *Annales d'Aquitaine*. Relevant clauses would be formally copied and forwarded to officials when action was needed, for instance for reinstatement in property after the treaty of Madrid.<sup>42</sup> The terms, signed on 14 January 1526, seem to have become known in Paris in general by the start of the following month in considerably more detail than the publication of the peace itself on 14 February.<sup>43</sup> While knowledge of treaties generally depended on reports of heralds' proclamations, some of which were printed,<sup>44</sup> when extra obligations to treaties from the chief cities were required, the details would be more widely known.<sup>45</sup> The magistrates of Paris were reluctant to commit themselves to the financial obligations under the 1525 Anglo-French treaty, until the terms were declaimed in open session of the Parlement.<sup>46</sup> The terms of the Holy League of Cognac, declared briefly at Paris on 2 July 1526 as a Universal Peace for the good of Christendom, were known rapidly to be in reality an alliance of France, the Swiss and Venice to expel the Spanish from Italy.<sup>47</sup> In other circumstances, the public ratification at Notre-Dame of the Anglo-French Treaty of Universal Peace on 9 June 1527 declared that the terms involved the marriage of the Dauphin and Princess Mary. But shortly after, 'it was then rumoured that, besides the marriage, a treaty of perpetual peace and alliance was negotiated between the Kings.'<sup>48</sup> Treaties were sometimes tricky to get registered by the Parlements when this was specified. The terms of the 1544 treaty of Crépy were communicated to the Parlement when Charles de Mailly, came to the *palais* to demand in the King's name that processions be staged and that 'it seemed to him, in the light of what he had seen on his journey with the Admiral to the Emperor's court, that, if ever there were a perpetual peace, this is it and that the Emperor has good will to keep it, as also, he believes, does the

*France, XVIe siècle*, 2 vols (Paris, 1906), I, no. 1122; *Bourgeois* (ed. L), pp. 388–92; (ed. B), pp. 323–30; treaty of Crépy: Seguin, *L'Information*, F 219–221 and Bib.II, 14.

<sup>39</sup> Bib.II, 80; 57; 34; 67; 44; 87; 82; 77.

<sup>40</sup> Vaissière, *Une Correspondance de famille*, pp. 16–19, 24.

<sup>41</sup> Bib.II, 79.

<sup>42</sup> BN Mélanges Colbert 304, no. 307.

<sup>43</sup> Bib.II, 92, pp. 273–4 (terms), pp. 278–9 (proclamation). The text of the proclamation is also to be found in the MS Chronicle, BN fr. 17527.

<sup>44</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L), p. 364; (ed. B), pp. 305–6. MS Chronicle fr. 17527, fo. 71: *Bourgeois* (ed. B), p. 413.

<sup>45</sup> *Lettres de Charles VIII*, ed. Pelicier, IV, pp. 36–7; IV, pp. 116–17.

<sup>46</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L), pp. 260–1, 264–5; (ed. B), pp. 219–20, 222–3.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.* (ed. B), pp. 239–41, (ed. L), pp. 285–7.

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.* (ed. L), p. 321; (ed. B), pp. 268–9. Presumably the author had at his disposal *plaquettes*: cf. Bib.II, 27, 66b.



King for his part. And if it were up to him it would be perpetual for it is more to his advantage than he could have hoped.<sup>49</sup>

With Paris one of the greatest centres of printing in the 16th century, printed royal acts grew steadily in numbers and, though the period before 1561 represented only 20% of all the printed royal acts of the century, there was an acceleration in the 1540s and 1550s. What is more the proportion of acts printed out of the total of royal acts rose from 2% under Francis I to 20% under Francis II. Between 14% and 16% of printed acts in the period down to 1560 concerned war. Usually, in this period the crown relied on generally respected printers such as Jean Dallier, Galiot du Pré and Jacques Nyverd to print its acts.<sup>50</sup> From the late 15th century, printed royal declarations or reports of military campaigns became a major source of news.<sup>51</sup> The spread of print culture, at first alongside manuscript, begins in the later 15th century. Besides the importance of print in publicising treaties, royal legislation on military affairs also benefited and it became the norm to print such promulgations from the middle of Francis I's reign.<sup>52</sup> There is, indeed, good evidence for conscious printed propaganda by the French state from the beginning of the Italian wars in 1494. Some of these texts are extremely rare and many (for example in the Nantes collection) survive only in one copy.<sup>53</sup> The first of them is a long extract from an official bulletin published in late November 1494.<sup>54</sup> There followed Charles's manifesto issued at Florence<sup>55</sup> and documents on the negotiations with the Pope and the King's entry into Rome, many of them incorporating letters from members of the royal entourage or the King himself.<sup>56</sup> The capture of Naples was published in the form of a series of letters from the King to the duke of Bourbon.<sup>57</sup> Charles's coronation at Naples was related in printed form,<sup>58</sup> followed by a further sequence of letters from the King in March<sup>59</sup> and another in May.<sup>60</sup> The King's return from Naples via Pisa was related by another series of published letters to Bourbon.<sup>61</sup> There was naturally wide coverage of the battle of Fornovo and the return.<sup>62</sup>

<sup>49</sup> AN, U 152, 20 September 1544; protests of the Parlement of Toulouse: see G. Ribier, *Lettres et mémoires d'estat des Roys, Princes, Ambassadeurs, et autres ministres sous les regnes de François Premier, Henry II et François II*, 2 vols (Paris/Blois, 1666), pp. 579–80; register under protest by the Parlement of Paris, 9 Jan. 1545: AN, X<sup>1A</sup> 8615, fol. 33v–53.

<sup>50</sup> L. Jee-Su Kim, 'French Royal Acts Printed Before 1601: a Bibliographical Study', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Saint Andrews, 2008, pp. 102–6, 184–97, 145–7.

<sup>51</sup> Hauser, *Sources*, pp. 14–15. Bibliothèque Nationale, *Le Catalogue de l'histoire de France*, 12 vols (1855–95), I, Lb<sup>28</sup>–Lb<sup>31</sup>. This shows a concentration of *plaquettes* in the periods 1543–4, 1552–3 and 1558–9.

<sup>52</sup> See in particular Bib.II, 21.

<sup>53</sup> Bound up with a printed text of poems by Jehan Meschinot in the BM of Nantes, and were printed by La Pilorgerie.

<sup>54</sup> Bib.II, 7.

<sup>55</sup> BN Lb 28 no.1, La Pilorgerie, pp. 101–3.

<sup>56</sup> Bib.II, 43; 55 (a text mainly cast in the form of letters from the king to Bourbon); 51.

<sup>57</sup> Bib.II, 36; another version, 39; 26.

<sup>58</sup> Bib.II, 81.

<sup>59</sup> La Pilorgerie, pp. 207–17.

<sup>60</sup> Bib.II, 58.

<sup>61</sup> La Pilorgerie, pp. 301–4; also Bib.II, 59.

<sup>62</sup> La Pilorgerie, pp. 351–61; Bib.II, 60.



One feature of the early Italian wars is the co-existence of the well-established means of communication, through duplicates of royal circular letters in manuscript and printed bulletins. Manuscript copying of royal acts had attained a high degree of efficiency in the 14th and 15th centuries, so that print culture was not uniformly a revolutionary innovation. It remained normal to send copies of operational commands to *bonnes villes* when their interests were concerned.<sup>63</sup> So, Louis de la Trémoille's report to the King on the capture of Ludovico il Moro in April 1500 was printed and also disseminated in manuscript.<sup>64</sup> Louis XII wrote to the *bonnes villes* in the usual way to proclaim his victory at Agnadello in 1509 and order ceremonies of thanksgiving, but there were also numerous printed accounts quickly available.<sup>65</sup> Jean d'Aumont, lieutenant-general in Burgundy, was kept informed by members of La Trémoille's entourage of Francis I's successes in 1515.<sup>66</sup> Picotté's *Cronique* shows that royal circular letters continued to be sent in manuscript copies in the mid-16th century.<sup>67</sup> Copies of letters sent to the government from local commanders also indicate the crown's desire to disseminate favourable news. An unusually detailed bulletin of current affairs in the eve of war in 1521 kept the young Henri d'Albret abreast of a wide range of internal and foreign developments.<sup>68</sup> We can add that officials throughout the country continued to be kept abreast of events by contacts at court, who sometimes repeated the optimistic talk current in the royal circle.<sup>69</sup>

Though the periodical press did not formally start in France until the *Gazette* of 1631, the years from 1490 to 1560 have been credibly described as ones in which print media gave rise to a real sense of popular journalism.<sup>70</sup> In the late 15th century, news publications were perhaps rarer and more lavishly produced. After 1500, *plaquettes* became the norm. At least 365 anonymous news publications involving pamphlets (often illustrated) of up to 8 octavo pages have been identified for the period 1498 to 1559 and there were undoubtedly more, perhaps three times as many. Another cache of 33 previously unknown pamphlets has recently been unearthed, printed at Rouen in the late 1530s and early 1540s, which show that the original number of news pamphlets was vast, that the appetite for news was extensive and that provincial centres could be as active as Paris.<sup>71</sup> This is to say nothing of longer reflective works or others for which a

<sup>63</sup> E.L. Eisenstein, *The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 46; *Lettres de Charles VIII*, ed. Pelicier, I, pp. 134–6; Letter from the siege of Coucy (May 1487), *BEC*, 24, pp. 80–1.

<sup>64</sup> D'Auton, I, pp. 354–9, and La Pilorgerie, pp. 453–8; Bib.II, 64.

<sup>65</sup> F. Bonnardot, A. Tuety and P. Guérin, *Registres des délibérations du bureau de la ville de Paris*, 3 vols (Paris, 1883–6), I, pp. 152–3; Bib.II, 45; 10.

<sup>66</sup> Vaissière, *Une Correspondance de famille*, e.g. pp. 1–19.

<sup>67</sup> See *Chronique du roy Francoys*, pp. 252–3, reproducing the king's letter of 18 July to the governors on the interview at Aigues-Mortes (BN fr. 3088, fo. 56).

<sup>68</sup> P. Raymond (ed.), 'Nouvelles des affaires de France (1521)', *BEC*, ser. 5, 4, pp. 369–80.

<sup>69</sup> Librairie de l'Abbaye, *Autographes et documents* (n.d.), nos. 75 and 141, letter of Dampierre and Leclerc to Chabot, 1536.

<sup>70</sup> Seguin, *L'Information*, pp. 1–53.

<sup>71</sup> Pettegree, *The French Book*, pp. 22–3.

writer can be identified, while poetry can also be seen as a form of commentary on public events. In general, the need for information on the part of both the merchant community and the nobility provided a ready market for such publications.

A very high proportion of these publications concerned public events and most appealed to the appetite for news of war and peace negotiations. Of the 365 anonymous texts, 120 covered battles, 36 treaties and 20 others related events.<sup>72</sup> It is clear that, although, as we have seen in the 1490s, there may occasionally have been concerted propaganda, the overwhelmingly patriotic and optimistic tone is to be explained more by the expectations of readers than by any system of censorship. The regime of *privilège* for publishers, in being from around 1507, ensured the very short-term copyright of the publishers to a text (often no more than a month), which was meant to reinforce the reliability of the text and generate income. One of the earliest surviving was that issued to Guillaume Sanxon for the Anglo-French treaty of 1514.<sup>73</sup> The crown could do little to impose a view, even though it tried to do so (as when Francis I ordered the best interpretation to be put on the losses at Landriano in 1529).<sup>74</sup> The initiative for printing royal acts could come from the crown and its agencies or from the printers themselves and their estimate of the saleability of an act; only from the middle of the 16<sup>th</sup> century did the crown take a more interventionist role. News could be got out by printers astonishingly quickly, often in a matter of days and the cost of a sixteen-page octavo pamphlet was well within the range of an artisan.<sup>75</sup>

The most usual form of the bulletin was that of the personal letter: accounts of battles often stemmed from an individual perspective. The Genoa campaign of 1507 was reported in a series of *plaquettes*, some of which were printed in the city itself.<sup>76</sup> The Marignano campaign was quickly reported in a range of prints, *plaquettes* and longer treatises, for the grandeur that the victory reflected on the French crown.<sup>77</sup> Defeats had no place. For Pavia, readers in France would have had to rely on pamphlets printed in the Low Countries and Italy for details; none seem to have appeared in France.<sup>78</sup> Some narratives were designed to bolster the royal position, including many *plaquettes* which put a favourable gloss on Lautrec's ultimately doomed expedition to Italy<sup>79</sup> and others accompanying Francis I's defiance of 1528.<sup>80</sup> The return of the royal children

<sup>72</sup> Seguin, *L'Information*, p. 30.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 49–50; E. Armstrong, *Before Copyright. The French Book-Privilege System, 1498–1526* (Cambridge, 1990); Bib.II, 66a.

<sup>74</sup> BN fr. 3066, p. 73; Kim, 'French Royal Acts', p. 142.

<sup>75</sup> Seguin, *L'Information*, pp. 47–8; E. Armstrong, *Robert Estienne, Royal Printer* (Cambridge, 1954), pp. 165–68; Kim, 'French Royal Acts', pp. 109–15; A. Pettegree, *Reformation and the Culture of Persuasion* (Cambridge, 2005), p. 16.

<sup>76</sup> Seguin, *L'Information*, Louis XII, nos. 18–25; Bib.II, 28.

<sup>77</sup> Bib.II, 97; 116; 78.

<sup>78</sup> Bib.II, 25.

<sup>79</sup> Hauser, *Sources*, nos. 1110–18.

<sup>80</sup> E.g. Bib.II, 30.

and Queen Eleanor's reception in 1530-1 were amply covered.<sup>81</sup> The Emperor's Provence campaign of 1536, the Nice and Aigues-Mortes meetings of 1538 and Charles's visit to France in 1540 were all fully reported.<sup>82</sup> The 1530s thus saw a burst of contemporary printed narratives on relations with the Emperor in war and peace and this is precisely the period in which the newly discovered Rouen pamphlets were produced. Another peak of publishing activity came with the northern campaign of 1542-3 and the successful Ceresole campaign of 1544, with repeated printings that testify to a lively demand.<sup>83</sup> The taking of Thionville in 1558 alone generated no less than 11 pamphlets.<sup>84</sup> As for speed of printing, news of the taking of Nice was published at Rouen three weeks later. This was not, as far as we can tell, through any process of control but simply as a response to demand, though authoritative printed royal newsletters continued to be issued throughout the period, from 1521 down to 1558.<sup>85</sup> One hint of a more sombre kind is the publication of orders for the defence of the frontiers published at Rouen on 5 August 1544, with the Emperor's army already well into French territory. We cannot be certain how far all this publication was officially sanctioned or promoted. Pettegree has suggested that city councils, such as that of Rouen, were anxious to allay panic in times of war but there is also the response to an avid desire for news.<sup>86</sup>

The 1530s also saw many formal declarations involving foreign policy, several by Guillaume du Bellay. These bring to mind a modern politician's 'rebuttal' unit, so determined was each side not to let its case go by default. The aftermath of the Placards Affair (October 1534-January 1535) required a justification to the German princes for the persecution of Protestants while the envoys of the Sultan were flaunting themselves at Paris.<sup>87</sup> The presentational problems were enormous. As Brantôme later put it, what could a King of France do in the circumstances, 'seeing such a great emperor, all the German empire, Italy and Spain joined so bitterly and strongly against him,' but look for help where he could? Any action for self-preservation was legitimate.<sup>88</sup> War with the Emperor in 1536 was justified in du Bellay's manifesto of the French case, written for German consumption.<sup>89</sup> 1542 saw the publication of Francis I's case against the Emperor along with the French declaration of war. This listed all the outrages committed by the Emperor, starting with the murder of the envoys Rincon and

<sup>81</sup> Hauser, *Sources*, nos. 1132-33.

<sup>82</sup> Bib.II, 54, also pr. in *AC*, ser. 1, III, p. 20. Bib.II, 75.

<sup>83</sup> Seguin, *L'Information*, pp. 113-17; Hauser, *Sources*, no. 1232; Pettegree, *The French Book*, p. 28.

<sup>84</sup> Seguin, *L'Information*, p. 27, and texts H 47-57.

<sup>85</sup> Bib.II, 11a, 32a, 51a, 52; Seguin, *L'Information*, F 38, 45.

<sup>86</sup> Pettegree, *The French Book*, pp. 29-33.

<sup>87</sup> Bib.II, 98, pp. 183-94; Bourrilly, *Guillaume Du Bellay*, pp. 189-90. Royal letter was published as a *plaque*, 25 Feb. 1535 (orig. form, AN K 1483, no. 61, microfilm, and Bib. II, 98, pp. 195-8. See Bib.II, 84).

<sup>88</sup> Brantôme, ed. Lalanne, V, pp. 63-4.

<sup>89</sup> Bib.II, 99; 100; 101, by Du Bellay and repr. in Bib.II, 104, fos. 101-7; Bourrilly, *Guillaume du Bellay*, pp. 189-90. Yuval Harari argued that Renaissance soldiers such as Martin du Bellay 'just could not care less' why war was fought (*Renaissance Military Memoirs*, p. 128).

Fregoso, 'an injury great, so execrable and so strange against the status of a prince that he could no wise forget or tolerate it.'<sup>90</sup> Oddly, Henry VIII's declaration of war in 1543 was published at Rouen, clearly a text needed by the Rouen merchant community.<sup>91</sup>

The war with the Emperor in 1536 also stimulated further campaign reporting of a longer and more satirical kind. The French translation of an Italian satirical narrative, *Du glorieux retour de Lempereur de Provence*<sup>92</sup> employed heavy irony:

As if he were there to see the country and not make war; and afterwards, wanting to do penance for the fault he had committed in invading, he went to Aix, as through a desert, and there, having fasted forty days and forty nights, he was hungry. So he decided to return to Italy, the spirit telling him: if you have supernatural powers as some say, in this place, called of old the stony ground, command that these stones be turned into bread. ...<sup>93</sup>

Having thus taken the advice of the spirit and retreated without doing anything, it was apparent to all that he had simply wanted to put the blame on Antonio de Leyva, to whom the chronicler also ascribed the plan to poison the Dauphin.<sup>94</sup>

The final decade of the Habsburg-Valois wars saw a significant growth in printed news alongside the rise in government publications. It became routine to print the quarterly muster summons for the gendarmerie as well as some orders for army provisioning. New regulations for discipline were also printed. As had been the case from the 1490s, the triumphs of the King and justifications for his policy were emphasised in print. Henri II's first campaign, that of the reconquest of Boulogne and the Boulonnais, was reported by Nicolay<sup>95</sup> (used in turn by the historian Bouchet for his narrative of the campaign published soon afterwards). Then in 1551 a propaganda campaign on both sides ensured the publication of discourses in justification for the King's war against the Emperor by Charles Estienne. In Germany, French diplomats were charged to issue refutations of the Emperor's declarations, sometimes with difficulty because of the climate of fear.<sup>96</sup> The subsequent 'German campaign' in 1552, the siege of Metz in 1553<sup>97</sup> and the Low Countries campaign of 1554 were lavishly described in print, while manuscript copies of reports of specific events continued to circulate regularly during the campaign.<sup>98</sup> The truce of Vaucelles and the subsequent renewal of

<sup>90</sup> Bib.II, 18a; 65; 12. The latter was published also in Troyes, Lyon and Rouen, see Pettegree, *The French Book*, p. 27. See also Bib.II, 86. B. Bennassar, 'Les Relations entre Charles Quint et François Ier', in *François Ier du château de Cognac*, p. 234.

<sup>91</sup> Bib.II, 13, and Pettegree, *The French Book*, p. 28.

<sup>92</sup> Bib.II, 20; *Chronique du roy François*, p. 147.

<sup>93</sup> *Chronique du roy François*, p. 150; see also pp. 180–1.

<sup>94</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 150–1.

<sup>95</sup> Bib.II, 119.

<sup>96</sup> Bib.II, 3; 6; 5; 4; 80a; 61, 62. Pariset, 'La France et les princes allemands', p. 276.

<sup>97</sup> Bib.II, 104a; 8a; 48a.

<sup>98</sup> The fall of Théroanne was only publicised in the Low Countries (Bib.II, 47a); but the King's campaign in Artois was lauded in France (Bib.II, 104b). MS copies were sent to Fraise, see Des Monstiers Mérimville, *Fraise*, pp. 144–6, 152–4, 166–8, 186–90.

war were the object of even more publicity.<sup>99</sup> Here again it was the victories that were stressed, not the defeats. Naval battles off Flanders, the start of the war with England in 1557 and, of course, the capture of Calais, Guînes and Thionville all received attention, underlining the centrality of the duke of Guise in these campaigns.<sup>100</sup>

### War propaganda and taxation

In 1543, with war in full swing and demands for the *solde des gens de pied* being made, the English ambassador reported from Paris of Francis that 'his people murmureth marvelously, not only here, but universally through his realme, whereas we have gone; and let not to speke many sherewd wordes.' Though in France the King's right to levy taxes was formally unchallenged, the crown felt obliged to offer justifications for war expenditure. These took the form of formal letters-patent, sometimes declaring the King's policy objectives in some detail. Such manifestos built on the traditions of the 15th-century fiscal machinery. Letters patent directed to officials, nobles and clergy would give some circulation to the King's policies, though were not meant for the widest dissemination.<sup>101</sup>

The crown sometimes issued formal manifestos justifying its policies. The King's 1536 declaration required prayers by the clergy and listed his grievances: his struggle to maintain the peace and spare his subjects loss of life and property; the Emperor's invasion of Tunis and installation there of an infidel ruler; his neglect of Italy; the death of Francesco Sforza, which Francis had not used as an excuse to retake Milan as he could easily have done; the Emperor's promise that he would restore it after Sforza's death; finally his invasion of France on the pretext that Francis had taken back certain places of the duke of Savoy that were his by right, 'threatening me in public and private and never ceasing until he had destroyed my kingdom.'<sup>102</sup>

The most frequent communications were addressed to the assemblies of Estates, the *élections* and municipal authorities to demand subsidies or for alienating the domain in order to raise money. These would be viewed, of course, mainly by social elites. In the early 16th century, it was still possible to cash in on the crusading idea; thus, the *décimes* levied in 1516 were supposedly to be used for the liberation of the Christians of the Greek East.<sup>103</sup> The 2.4 million *taille* of 1517 was justified on the basis of achieving of peace.<sup>104</sup> Such posturing could only have been of limited value. In 1518, there was more compelling

<sup>99</sup> Bib.II, 116a.

<sup>100</sup> Bib.II, 23; 16; 49; 83; 40; 9; 50; 18; 52; 74; 61; 56.

<sup>101</sup> *St.P.*, IX, p. 285. *Lettres de Louis XI*, ed. Vaesen, VI, pp. 118–19; X, pp. 398–9 (no. 2107), pp. 125–6; IX, pp. 101–3; X, pp. 83–5; A. Janvier, *Les Clabault, Famille municipale amiénoise, 1349–1539* (Amiens, 1889), p. 185.

<sup>102</sup> HHSA, Frankreich, Varia 4, fos. 200–1.

<sup>103</sup> *CAF*, I, 87, 512.

<sup>104</sup> BN fr. 25720, fo. 80 (*CAF*, I, 121, 701).

reason to use the costs of regaining Tournai from Henry VIII as justification for the extra *taille* of 600,000 lt.<sup>105</sup> That of June 1521 instanced: the costs of defence and maintenance of ‘universal’ peace over three years; the Catholic King’s breaking of his agreements and the present state of war ‘to our very great regret and displeasure;’ finally, the costs of the Field of Cloth of Gold and of the treaty with the Swiss.<sup>106</sup> The full-scale manifesto of August 1521 for the Estates of Languedoc gave a *tour d’horizon* of Franco-Imperial relations. The King had always striven to maintain peace by marriage alliance, especially since the ‘Catholic King’ possessed so many lands (most of them in fief) along his frontier, but since the death of Maximilian it was evident that Charles had sought other alliances and refused to pay his yearly portion for the kingdom of Naples, rejecting the right of appeals from Flanders ‘which is the thing we have most to heart and which we wish to defend.’ Furthermore, he had sought to break the King’s alliance with the Pope and the Swiss and refused to restore the kingdom of Navarre. So, the King had provided military support for the latter while also assembling an army for defence near Mouzon. While the King had maintained a defensive stance, seeking agreement with Charles at the Calais conference, Charles, ‘acting in bad faith,’ had conspired to wrest the duchy of Milan from him.<sup>107</sup> On the outbreak of war with England in 1522, letters were issued to the effect that, though they knew about the ‘damned machinations’<sup>108</sup> of the King’s enemies, he wanted his subjects to know that he had omitted nothing for defence and to maintain the peace. Henry VIII and Charles had offered nothing but a shameful truce, which they knew the King could not accept, in order to give Henry, his sworn ally, time to declare against him. This, he had now done. Francis had known that Henry was secretly aiding the Emperor but now he had sent an army across the sea and a fleet to Brittany. The King wished the world to know that he only wanted a just peace and had sent to the Pope to this effect. The force of 12,000 foot plus cavalry that he had despatched to save Milan had been countermanded to Picardy on news of the English invasion. The King, therefore, now had fronts to guard in Picardy, Languedoc (Roussillon), Guyenne (Fuentarabia), men to maintain in Champagne, Normandy and Brittany as well as a fleet to equip.<sup>109</sup> The *taille* demand of 2.4 millions in July 1522 instanced the need for new artillery to resist the English invasion of Brittany without stripping other frontiers.<sup>110</sup> In such promulgations, the crown was careful to stress its positive achievements. In the demand for the extra 600,000 lt. in December 1522, having outlined the ‘damnable enterprises’ of the enemy, with forces attacking at sea, in Guyenne and Picardy, the King was able to claim that they had, through his measures for defence, been forced to withdraw on all fronts ‘to their great shame and confusion.’<sup>111</sup> The strategic dilemma of France, though, at times could not

<sup>105</sup> *CAF*, I, 169, 955–8.

<sup>106</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, III, pp. 32–3, 28.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, III, pp. 64–9.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 24, 45.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, III, pp. 174–7.

<sup>110</sup> BN fr. 25720, fo. 205 (*CAF*, I, 300, 1623).

<sup>111</sup> *CAF*, I, 315, 1700, 1701; *Ord.Fr.I*, III, pp. 202–2.



be hidden. In October 1524, the King admitted openly that for five years, winter and summer, enemies had invaded the country 'and not only in one place, but in three or four all at the same time, to confuse us the more.'<sup>112</sup>

Evident disasters required careful presentation. 'Everyone knew',<sup>113</sup> declared the Regent in her manifesto of September 1525, that in the previous year the King had raised an army to expel the enemy from Provence and raise the siege of Marseille. He had then realised that, unless he pressed forward into Italy, the enemy would be able to return when they wished. So he did so in the hope of coming to 'some good treaty of peace.' Having occupied Milan, he was advised by 'the chiefs and captains of war' to besiege his remaining enemies in Pavia. However, God had willed otherwise, for his army was wasted by a winter siege and the enemies were able to win the battle on 24 February in which the King was captured. The misfortune was a heavy burden but the Regent had not lost heart and had taken the advice of princes and other councillors for the defence of the kingdom. The loyalty of all estates to their King had undoubtedly deterred the enemy but further measures for defence were needed as well as the costs of the army for the previous year.<sup>114</sup> The demand for the extra *taille* in January 1526 was justified by a lengthy discourse on the Regent's efforts to make peace, the costs of the treaty with Henry VIII, payments to the Swiss and the costs of the fleet.<sup>115</sup>

The royal manifesto of August 1526, the first full one since the King's return from captivity, was one of the longest of the 1520s and provided a structured narrative of the King's capture and captivity, his near death in Spain and the negotiations leading to his release. The theme throughout was that the Emperor had subjected him to unreasonable demands, that Francis had protested that the terms on offer were contrary to his honour and that he had only agreed to them after a protestation that he would repudiate unreasonable conditions on his return. This he had done, though he had had to leave his eldest sons in captivity. All this, with the costs of defence and of the treaty of the Holy League, were his justification for the new budget.<sup>116</sup>

By the 1540s, the justifications for military expenditure and for war strategy were even more elaborate. In his manifesto for the *taille* of 1543, the King declared his regret at the war and the burdens on his subjects. However, to have accepted the assassination of his ambassadors Rincon and Fregoso 'would have been a perpetual blame and reproach to us and our crown,' not to speak of the continued occupation by the Emperor of Milan. The King declared at length that he had assured both the Pope and the princes of Germany that, after some redress, he was prepared to talk peace. But the Emperor had refused to make reparation and had brought the King of England in on his side. The purpose of the manifesto was to publish in remarkable detail the King's military decisions and plans, 'considering the advantage to divert the enemy and transfer the war beyond our

<sup>112</sup> Ibid., IV, p. 45.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid., IV, p. 299.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., IV, pp. 117–24, 124–7.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid., IV, pp. 160–2.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., IV, pp. 299–303.



frontiers ... all for the relief of our people, who move us more and more to pity and compassion.' Nevertheless, the King was forced 'by urgent necessity' to raise a *taille* equal to previous years of 4.6 million lt.<sup>117</sup> The following year, again, the enemy 'follow their obstinate course aiming to ruin our kingdom, lands and subjects, if they can, and by all means.'<sup>118</sup>

Most of the population derived their understanding of wars from briefer demands for taxes sent down by the *élections* or the provincial estates. These arrived in the form of *brevets* sent to towns and communities, referring to the fuller letters-patent. In the late 15th century, this was the nearest the taxpayers got to knowing the reasons for royal expenditure. In 1488, for instance, there was the need to pay for the garrisons of newly-won towns in Artois,<sup>119</sup> in 1489 and 1490 the 'maintenance and pay of his army still in Brittany to resist the English and Spaniards who recently invaded' and 'the pay of certain numbers of troops on the frontier of Brittany.'<sup>120</sup> The *brevets* of 1492 are more specific:

To resist the damnable enterprises of the English, old enemies of this realm, and by the King of the Romans, who plans daily to join with the English to attack the King our lord, his kingdom, lands and subjects; and also to repair various frontier towns and fortresses with men, artillery, supplies and other things necessary for the safety of the kingdom, as also for having fitted out ships to resist these enterprises and send into Ireland to the Duke of York, true heir of England, as also for the general census being done throughout the kingdom.<sup>121</sup>

1494 naturally saw new demands for money. In February, taxpayers were informed of the King's need for an extra *taille* and at the same time came demands to the towns for loans for 'for the good of Christendom.' This was widely resisted in northern France.<sup>122</sup> A *décime* was demanded of the clergy, authorised by Pope Alexander VI.

Even in the absence of war, its aftermath could be used as justification for new taxes, as did Louis XI after the treaty of Arras in 1483.<sup>123</sup> In the early years of Francis I, with demands in 1517 centring on the 'costs' of making peace and arrears from previous years (1517), an extra *taille* in 1518 involved both the costs of recovering Tournai and of the proposed marriage of the Dauphin and Henry VIII's daughter.<sup>124</sup> Another of 1519 noted 'maintenance of peace, security and defence of his kingdom',<sup>125</sup> while that of 1532 could instance the cost of the Mediterranean galley fleet against the Turks.<sup>126</sup> That of 1534 raised the need to defray 'various expenses necessary to negotiate universal peace with all the princes and

<sup>117</sup> BL Egerton, Charter 38.

<sup>118</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, IV, p. 24.

<sup>119</sup> AM Péronne, BB 6, fo. 68v.

<sup>120</sup> *Ibid.*, fos. 102v, 125v.

<sup>121</sup> AM Chauny, BB 1, fo. 10r.

<sup>122</sup> *Lettres de Charles VIII*, ed. Pelicier, IV, no. 763, 783; *Ord.*, XX, p. 437.

<sup>123</sup> *Lettres de Louis XI*, ed. Vaesen, X, p. 83.

<sup>124</sup> AM Chauny, BB 2, fo. 13; AM Chauny, CC 292.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, CC 292.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, EE 1.

powers of Christendom, as for the redemption of certain lands held in gage as part of the said lord's ransom.<sup>127</sup> Once war was declared, of course, it was easier to justify special levies, such as that of 1521 to 'resist and frustrate the invasion by the Catholic King in his duchy of Milan, lordship of Genoa, county of Champagne and other lands and lordships.'<sup>128</sup> That of 1524 was to resist the invasion 'that the Emperor elect, King of England and their allies are attempting more than ever.'<sup>129</sup>

From time to time, towns were required to contribute funds from their *deniers communs*. In 1516, Poitiers was asked for such money on the basis of the cost of royal armies to resist the Emperor's plans to take back Milan and then invade France.<sup>130</sup> The inception of the *solde* for the pay of 50,000 infantry from the late 1530s onwards provided another vehicle for the deployment of propaganda. Epernay in Champagne received in March 1543 a brief letter about the King's need to combat the aggression of his enemies but this was accompanied by a manifesto justifying the demand for the pay of 50 foot. The analogous manifesto in February 1544 instanced 'the great power of the Emperor and the King of England, the declaration of open enmity they bear us, the great armies by them raised.'<sup>131</sup>

Demands for loans from individuals, regular throughout the reign of Francis I, also required formal justification. Those sent in 1515 to Louis Picot, president of the court of Aides, instances 'my enterprise with the great army I have raised, where I am in person in order, with God's help, to recover the duchy of Milan.' Another in June 1524, points to the expenses necessary to preserve his subjects from the 'wicked and damned' policies of his enemies, which had led him to raise several armies at great expenses on the frontiers. In August 1527, it was the army, and particularly the Swiss, raised under Lautrec for the defence of the Holy See and to ensure that the King's affairs in Italy did not collapse, and in February of the following year for the defence of the frontiers. In 1536 came the need to raise an army for the defence of Picardy.<sup>132</sup>

### Ceremony and commemoration

News was often conveyed in public celebration and ceremony, a normal and recurrent aspect of civic life. A year after the raising of the siege of Beauvais in 1472, the King ordered a procession to be made yearly, on Saint Agadresme's day, to commemorate the procession made by the women of the town with the saint's relics during the siege and their crucial role in the defence.<sup>133</sup> Such events often consisted of thanksgiving for victories and peace treaties. In 1482, circular

<sup>127</sup> Ibid., BB 5, fo. 53.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid., BB 3, fo. 8r.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid., BB 3, fo. 15v.

<sup>130</sup> Anon., 'Letters des rois France', AHP, 4 (1875), 178–9 (24 April, 1516) ... à la commune de Poitiers', AHP, 4, no. ii.

<sup>131</sup> R. Briailles, *Archives municipales d'Epernay, t. I: XVI siècle*, 2 vols (Paris, 1906), I, pp. 26, 48–52.

<sup>132</sup> H. d'Arbois de Jubainville, 'Lettres de François Ier', *Revue des Sociétés savantes de Haute Normandie*, ser. 3, IV (1858), pp. 431–7.

<sup>133</sup> *Lettres de Louis XI*, ed. Vaesen, V, pp. 165–6.

letters went out to all the *bonnes villes* for Te Deums, bonfires and processions in celebration of the treaty of Arras. At Compiègne, trumpets announced the proclamation at the windows of the *hôtel de ville* followed by bonfires at night and the next day the relics of Saints Corneille and Cyprien and of the true cross were carried through the streets, as on Corpus Christi day, followed by more bonfires that night.<sup>134</sup> In September 1489, circulars went out to the *bonnes villes* to celebrate the peace treaty with Maximilian with ‘bonfires and a solemn procession.’<sup>135</sup>

During campaigns, the populace would be reminded of the need for victory by church services and processions. The victory over King Federico of Naples at Capua was celebrated immediately on receipt of letters from the commanders but the news of the fall of Naples was celebrated at Paris in grand style with a Te Deum at Notre-Dame, bonfires and tables in the streets and children crying ‘Noel’.<sup>136</sup> The peace with Spain after the fall of Naples was similarly celebrated at Nantes with bonfires.<sup>137</sup> After the victory over Genoa in 1507, there were three days of processions in Paris, and d’Auton stresses the fact that the news was rapidly published throughout Christendom and even in Turkey, much to the general astonishment. In this sense, good news was an obvious instrument of policy.<sup>138</sup> During Louis XII’s 1509 campaign in Italy, for instance, the principal churches of the *bonnes villes* were required to say prayers for the health and success of the King with general processions every Sunday until his return.<sup>139</sup> News of his victory at Agnadello was to be marked by processions, bonfires and prayers that God would always aid the King.<sup>140</sup>

In October 1525 at Paris, processions with many reliquaries moved from Notre-Dame to the Cordeliers for high mass and a sermon from the bishop to mark the arrival of definitive news from the Regent of the King’s recovery of health in Spain.<sup>141</sup> The following 1 February, with news of peace negotiations coming to a head, a procession of the entire governing establishment with the True Cross went from the Saint-Chapelle to Notre-Dame for high mass. The following Sunday another procession ended with a sermon by a Carmelite on the hope for the marriage of the King and Emperor’s sister.<sup>142</sup> The programme of thanks and celebration for the King’s return from Spain took place a month after the event (13–17 April) on the King’s orders, involving the entire governing bodies of the capital, the clergy of the Sainte-Chapelle and Notre-Dame, processions of the True Cross, sermons, Te Deums and high masses.<sup>143</sup>

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, X, pp. 41–2 (22 Dec. 1482).

<sup>135</sup> AM Péronne, BB 6, fo. 98r; AM Amiens, AA 12, fo. 97v; Rheims (*Lettres de Charles VIII*, ed. Pelicier, II, p. 408); AM Saint-Quentin, liasse 150; AM Nantes, EE 133, payments to heralds for news of the treaty of Frankfurt.

<sup>136</sup> D’Auton, II, pp. 65–6; Bib.II, 42.

<sup>137</sup> AM Nantes, EE 133.

<sup>138</sup> Bib.II, 24; D’Auton, IV, p. 241.

<sup>139</sup> AM Péronne, BB 6, fo. 196r.

<sup>140</sup> *Ibid.*, BB 6, fos. 196–7.

<sup>141</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L), p. 263.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 273.

<sup>143</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 283–4.

The passage of foreign ambassadors through the great cities could sometimes (on special royal orders) be marked by conspicuous receptions.<sup>144</sup> At Narbonne in January 1528, the release of the Pope from captivity was marked by processions, tournaments and bonfires and, in the evening, artillery fire, so that the Spanish garrison at Salses should know, as was shouted throughout the night, 'that there is no peasant in France who does not say that the King has delivered the Pope from the hands of the Jews.'<sup>145</sup> Yet artillery fire was forbidden when processions and humble prayers of thanks to God were ordered in August 1549 for the capture of the English fortifications around Boulogne. This was no doubt because the victory was as yet incomplete.<sup>146</sup> The recovery of Boulogne was celebrated fully in the following year. Programmes for royal entries became ever more complex in the 16th century and Henri II's entry into Rouen in 1550 was a celebration of his recent military success against the English. The centrepiece was a great military procession before the King but in this case put in the context of a *mise-en-scène* involving Topinambou 'savages' that may have been meant to persuade the King not to agree to Portuguese monopoly of Brazil.<sup>147</sup>

Among the more elaborate commemorations of victory staged during this period was the programme put on at Paris in February 1558 for the reception of the King after the reconquest of Calais. On hearing on 8 February of the King's intention to dine at the *hôtel de ville* on the 14th, the magistrates quickly commissioned the poet and dramatist Etienne Jodelle to compose the entertainment. His scenario, involving words and images, was quickly arranged and issued in print as a *plaque* in June. That Jodelle was able to put it all together in so short a time suggests that he was drawing on material he had been composing in honour of French victories since about 1550 and the work is important as an indicator of how victory could be encapsulated in literary and artistic form. The text consists, firstly, of the programme of celebration (decorations, masquerades etc.) and then of 64 'Icones', Latin inscriptions devised to accompany the images of the leading personalities of the time. The décor seems to have been complex, meant in effect to 'deify' the King.<sup>148</sup> The masquerade began with singing, Orpheus attempting to charm the rocks and the latter singing in reply (the form was probably a precursor for the better known *Ballet comique de la Royné* of 1581). Next, the ship Argo entered, carried by the Argonauts, accompanied by declamations by Minerva and Jason.

<sup>144</sup> AM Amiens, BB 21, fo. 71 (Durand, *Inventaire sommaire ... Amiens*, p. 313).

<sup>145</sup> Devic and Vaissette, *Histoire de ... Languedoc*, XII, p. 442.

<sup>146</sup> Ledain, 'Lettres de Jean de Daillon', no. 29, pp. 42–3.

<sup>147</sup> M. McGowan, *L'Entrée de Henri II à Rouen 1550* (Amsterdam/New York, 1970); M. Wintroub, *A Savage Mirror: Power, Identity and Knowledge in Early Modern France* (Stanford, Cal., 2006), pp. 15–38.

<sup>148</sup> Estienne Jodelle, *Le Recueil des inscriptions 1558: a Literary and Iconographical Exegesis*, ed. V.E. Graham and W. McAllister Johnson (Toronto, 1972), p. 117.

### Public opinion and narratives of war: '*la matière historique*'

How were war and contemporary events understood? The tradition of history-writing was embodied in the great chronicles that passed into print in the closing years of the 15th century. The tradition represented by Froissart and Monstrelet was continued into the 16th century by Jean d'Auton, in many ways their natural successor, who set out his objectives clearly at the start of his work on the wars of Louis XII: to preserve achievements for the present and future for the

exaltation of the most Christian kingdom and triumph of the lily-bearing sceptre of France, both for eternal commemoration as also to perpetuate the evidence of the praiseworthy labours of those worthy of titles of honour, so that their benefit may both profit them and be an example to others ... and open the road of honour to those who would follow the path of virtue, as also for remembrance of those who pass their time in silence.<sup>149</sup>

D'Auton, like Froissart a poet, worked in a format that appealed to the sense of chivalry of the nobility and of the court and to a degree influenced the memoir writers of the 16th century.

Printed history was a different matter. The generation around 1500 was still able to practise the apparently contradictory techniques of subscribing to fanciful notions of the distant Trojan origins of the French while seeking to deploy careful contemporary historical reportage.<sup>150</sup> The chronicles published by Robert Gaguin or the anonymous recensions of the *Mer des hystoires* printed from 1488 onwards<sup>151</sup> saw the history of France as a continuum from the story of the Bible and continued through the deeds of the 57 Kings who reigned up to the time of Francis I. *La Mer des croniques*, continued by editions in 1525 and 1527, also brought the great chronicle tradition up to date.<sup>152</sup> The impact of printing encouraged the mutation of the chronicle into a contemporary commentary, brought up to date by current affairs. The reign of Francis I saw the last stage of the great French chronicle tradition, now no longer under royal patronage but often in the form of regional annals, in which contemporary history formed the final and vital part. Some of these began as chronicles of provinces, which their authors expanded into national chronicles for their own times. Jean Bouchet first published his *Annales d'Aquitaine* in 1524, an edition which had little to say on the events of Francis I's reign. The editions of 1531 and 1535, though, were among the first serious attempts in print to chronicle the reign. It was further expanded as contemporary history until the final, and best known, edition in 1557.<sup>153</sup> This is one of the best-informed chronicles of the period; Bouchet obviously had connections in government and politics by the 1550s and he was widely read and plagiarised. Indeed the 1536 *Mer des*

<sup>149</sup> D'Auton, I, pp. 3–4.

<sup>150</sup> R.E. Asher, *National Myths in Renaissance France: Francus, Samothès and the Druids* (Edinburgh, 1993), p. 13.

<sup>151</sup> Bib.II, 53, the first edition since 1517.

<sup>152</sup> Bib.II, 33.

<sup>153</sup> Bib.II, 92.

*hystoires* took material from him.<sup>154</sup> Bouchet firmly subscribed to the Trojan myth, while proving a careful contemporary historian.<sup>155</sup> The *Annales* are unusually detailed on certain military campaigns and we are bound to ask how he obtained his information. For the war of 1536–8, for instance, his narrative of the royal camp at Avignon gives some prominence and praise to the activities of marshal du Biez as well as narrative detail on the fighting in Artois, derived from an archer of du Biez's company, Jean de Mieurre.<sup>156</sup> Bouchet brought out his 1545 edition in response to piracy and covered the wars of the 1530s and 1540s in authoritative detail.<sup>157</sup>

While Bouchet was not uncritical of Francis I, he does not depart from the official orthodoxy that the wars of the era were the Emperor's responsibility.<sup>158</sup> For the war of 1521, he firmly blames the Emperor's malevolence: 'Thus began the time of tears and lamentation, for the injustices, exactions and other misfortunes that since happened in France.'<sup>159</sup> The King's taxes were the result of the alliance of enemies against him.<sup>160</sup> In 1535–6, the Emperor had achieved 'a glorious act, worthy of a King before men' in taking Tunis from the Sultan and restoring its rightful King, 'though I do not know about God, since I believe the King of Tunis was an infidel.'<sup>161</sup> Francis I had behaved honourably by not pursuing his attack on Piedmont during this war but the Emperor by 'excuses and dissimulations' was determined on war and just dragged out talks over Savoy 'to divert the King.'<sup>162</sup> The Emperor's visit to France in 1539 had proved a deception and a disappointment.<sup>163</sup> By 1551, Bouchet, like other writers of the period (Paradin for example), stresses the role of France in rescuing the 'liberties of Germany.' His introduction to the 1551 war consists of an indictment of the Emperor's tyrannical actions in Germany which, undertaken in the name of religion, were in reality 'to make himself universal ruler of all Christendom.'<sup>164</sup> In translating the King's letter to the German Estates, he makes the standard French case against the Emperor: Henri II had wanted peace and to settle the conflicts of

<sup>154</sup> Britnell, *Jean Bouchet*, pp. 121–2; Bouchet's lamentation of the effects of war on France from 1521 (1531 edn, fo. 117r–v) is copied in truncated form by *La Mer des hystoires* (Bib. II, 33a), fo. 178r.

<sup>155</sup> Asher, *National Myths*, p. 19.

<sup>156</sup> Bib.II, 92, fos. 276v–277r; Potter, *Un Homme de guerre*, p. 31; J. Bouchet, *Epistres morales et familières*, fo. 83r–v (Bib.II, 91).

<sup>157</sup> Bib.II, 92, fos. 274v–275r.

<sup>158</sup> Britnell, *Jean Bouchet*, pp. 137, 139.

<sup>159</sup> Bib.II, 92 (1531, 1535: fo. 117r–v; 1557: fo. 206r–v), a passage copied in *La Mer des hystoires* (Bib.II, 33a), II, fo. 178r.

<sup>160</sup> Bib.II, 92, fo. 208r.

<sup>161</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 275v. Guillaume du Bellay in *Translation d'une lettre écrite à un Alleman*, pr. at the end of his *L'Antiquité des Gaules* (Bib.II, 104), fo. 92v. See also M. François, 'L'Idée de l'Empire en France au temps de Charles V', in *Charles-Quint et son temps* (Paris, 1959), p. 31; Kluckhohn, *Deutsche Reichstagsakten*, I, p. 596; G. Poumarède, 'Justifier l'Injustifiable: l'alliance turque au miroir de la Chrétienté (XVIe–XVIIe siècles)', *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, 111 (1997), 217–46.

<sup>162</sup> Bib.II, 92, fo. 276r–v.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 284r.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 351v.



his neighbours in England and Scotland; Charles V had done all he could to frustrate this by deception and trickery. The German Estates had appealed to him against the Emperor's desire to reduce them to 'perpetual servitude' in the guise of reuniting the church and resisting the Turks.<sup>165</sup>

Jean de Bourdigné published his analogous *Hystoire agrégative* in 1529 as a chronicle of Anjou, like Bouchet's brought up to date with a narration of contemporary events (much fuller than other printed chronicles of the time).<sup>166</sup> Another parallel with Bouchet is the way in which contemporaries copied him. Bourdigné, though, is a good example of how such a chronicler, highly aware of his own region and widely read, could be largely uninformed about the real reasons for events in this period and credulous about claims, for instance, that the Emperor was sending agents to set fire to towns. He certainly laments the wars against the Emperor in the 1520s: war is just a misfortune visited on France. His introduction of the war in 1521 is simply descriptive.<sup>167</sup> Bourdigné's main preoccupation, though, was the disorder caused by military recruitment in Anjou. His observation in 1524 of the despatch of arsonists by 'the Hainaulters, mortal enemies of the French'<sup>168</sup> is in line with other chronicle sources of the period, while he attributed the disaster of Pavia to 'deception or mistakes' of those who advised Francis to divide his army and simply bad luck on the day of the battle.<sup>169</sup>

The process by which these views of war could be absorbed and transmitted is usefully illustrated by private chronicles. The first is the *Cronique du Roy François*, unpublished at the time and heavily plagiarised,<sup>170</sup> probably by an *échevin* of Sens named Sébastien Picotté, in 1542–3. For much of the period from 1521–8 he simply reproduces the chronicles of Bouchet and Bourdigné, with echoes of the popular *La Mer des Hystoires* and the *La Mer des croniques*.<sup>171</sup> His narrative of Pavia is lifted entirely from Bourdigné, though with the addition of the comforting note that God had not permitted the enemy to take advantage and invade the kingdom and generally adding expressions that testify to a much more anti-Imperial and anti-Spanish sentiment than Bourdigné showed.<sup>172</sup> The conclusion of the treaty of Madrid is attributed to the hard work of Louise of Savoy, again following Bourdigné's narrative word for word except for a personal comment on the Emperor's exorbitant demands.<sup>173</sup> He copies Bourdigné's remarks about the dismay at the sending of the King's sons

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.*, fos. 352v–355r.

<sup>166</sup> Jean de Bourdigné, *Hystoire agrégative* (Bib.II, 93).

<sup>167</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 196v.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 202r.

<sup>169</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 203r.

<sup>170</sup> H. Hauser, 'Etude critique sur La Chronique du Roy François, premier de ce nom', *Revue de la Renaissance*, 8 (1907), 49–63. Hauser was unaware of the borrowing from Bouchet (Britnell, *Jean Bouchet*, p. 122) and the complex relationship between Bouchet, Bourdigné, the *Mer des hystoires* and Alain Bouchard has yet to be explored.

<sup>171</sup> The denunciation of Lutherans (Bib.II, 33, fo. 233v) is inserted by Picotté erroneously under the events of 1521 (*Chronique du roy François*, p. 31).

<sup>172</sup> *Chronique du roy François*, p. 46.

<sup>173</sup> Bib.II, 93, fo. 204v; *Chronique du roy François*, pp. 48–9.



to Spain, adding his own comment ‘Spanish faithlessness was feared, which had already been signalled by signs, prodigies, earthquakes’ and unaccustomed storms.<sup>174</sup> For the rest of his chronicle, Picotté depends heavily on contemporary news-reporting in printed *plaquettes* which, as we have seen, become particularly numerous in the 1530s.

A number of private chronicles or journals composed in Paris during the reign of Francis I show the degree of public awareness of current events. Only one, that of Nicolas Versoris, can be tied to a known individual and begins as a private family record. Versoris was interested in all sorts of events, less detailed in his observations of foreign affairs but sometimes critical.<sup>175</sup> His comment that Cardinal Wolsey had crossed the Channel in July 1527 for major negotiations ‘kept very secret’ well expresses the position of non-privileged but interested observers of the secrets of state. An anonymous Parisian chronicle is the most useful as a source for the texts of newsletters and proclamations.<sup>176</sup> This is a compilation of documents in the public domain – newsletters, pasquils, poems, proclamations – and gives a further idea of what sort of information was available to the aware observer. The most well known text is that of the contemporary history crafted as a chronicle by a Parisian lawyer or cleric – it is significant that there is not enough personal information to tell – and published in the middle of the 19th century as *Journal d’un bourgeois de Paris*. This is a compiled chronicle very similar to Picotté’s, though the author is more explicit in his acknowledgement of his sources, and it is very full, especially for the wars of the 1520s.<sup>177</sup> Superficially, it shares many of the characteristics of provincial chronicles and is better informed in detail and also more independent in its use of contemporary sources of information.

The opinions of these chroniclers are widely divergent. The Bourgeois hazards a few judgments on the causes of royal actions but is basically a conformist, eager to understand royal policy in terms of the public propaganda of the crown.<sup>178</sup> Versoris, though, takes little notice of propaganda and is much more critical of the war taxes levied and the King’s actions in foreign policy and especially of the influence of Duprat.<sup>179</sup> In the crisis of 1523, he gives little credit to the King for warding off perils (ascribing the good fortune of the French to the outbreak of disease in the English army). Paris, he thought, was without help ‘because the great power of France had been sent into Italy to recover Milan, which weakened the kingdom.’<sup>180</sup> God sent wars, he wrote, in a series of plagues as a sign of his anger.<sup>181</sup> The news of Pavia is viewed as ‘the total loss and destruction of the kingdom.’<sup>182</sup> When the

<sup>174</sup> Bib.II, 93, fos. 204v–205r; *Chronique du roy François*, p. 50.

<sup>175</sup> Versoris, Introduction.

<sup>176</sup> BN fr. 17527, used by Félibien in his *Histoire de Paris* [hereafter, ‘Chronique parisienne’], and excerpted by Bourrilly in his edition of the *Journal d’un bourgeois de Paris* [*Bourgeois* (ed. B.)], pp. 399–436.

<sup>177</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L.), superseded by Bourrilly’s edn.

<sup>178</sup> Critical remarks *Bourgeois* (ed. L.), p. 454; (ed. B.), p. 378; (ed. L.), p. 458; (ed. B.), pp. 359–60; (ed. L.), p. 460; (ed. B.), p. 361.

<sup>179</sup> Versoris, critical remarks: pp. 30, 35, 40, 47, 50, 59.

<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 54.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 66–7.

<sup>182</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78.

truce with England and the Burgundians was proclaimed in August 1525 Versoris observed that this was the cause of some grumbling in Paris because of the rumour that the enemy would draw wheat and wine out of the kingdom. His description of the meeting summoned for the ratification of the Anglo-French treaty is cynical in tone and his criticism of the agreement of the Parlement to the terms trenchant.<sup>183</sup> There is perhaps a hint of softening of his attitude towards those in authority towards the end of the 1520s. This may be at least in part because of the King's more sober deportment in Paris after his return. The return of the King's sons is celebrated much as any conformist writer would have done.<sup>184</sup>

Most of these writings were to some extent contrived, taking the form of contemporary journals but carefully composed. That of Versoris comes closest to a day-by-day composition. The Bourgeois, far from writing a contemporary 'journal,' produces a highly contrived account mixing contemporary notes on events in Paris with extended narratives of military and diplomatic events that could only have come from complex sources.<sup>185</sup> The first few years of Francis I seem to have been written up in 1521–2 and then the following decade around 1530. The final years down to 1535 may have been by another writer. The text is thus retrospectively composed, so that themes can be covered together but is also in part confusingly chronological. So, while recounting the effects of war levies on Paris in some detail, the writer pays great attention to foreign wars and narrates them in some depth. The campaign of 1515 is covered in detail; the narrative of 1522–3 is intensely detailed and thematic rather than chronological: the dispute with Charles V over Navarre in 1521 is discussed in some depth as is the quarrel over Sedan that led to the Emperor's capture of Mouzon and Mézières.<sup>186</sup> The start of war with England in 1522 is outlined and the text of heralds' declarations given.<sup>187</sup> The capture of Milan in 1522 is covered,<sup>188</sup> followed by the Italian campaigns of 1523–4,<sup>189</sup> the treason of Bourbon,<sup>190</sup> then the English invasion of 1523 and the Provence campaign of 1524.<sup>191</sup> For the narrative of the sack of Rome he had at his disposal some printed accounts.<sup>192</sup>

It is certain that the Bourgeois read manuscript relations of events, printed official acts and ordinances and *plaquettes* as well as the *Mer des croniques* and *Mer des hystoires* editions of the 1520s.<sup>193</sup> He is sometimes confused about the real

<sup>183</sup> Ibid., pp. 89, 90–2.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid., p. 133.

<sup>185</sup> Lalanne's edition is misleading in that he seeks to insert the miscellaneous notes on notorious trials at the end of the text in their appropriate place by date.

<sup>186</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L), pp. 89–92; (ed. B), pp. 76–9 (on Navarre); (ed. L), pp. 100–8; (ed. B), pp. 86–93 (on the Ardennes campaign).

<sup>187</sup> Ibid. (ed. L), pp. 128–31; (ed. B), pp. 106–8. Bourrilly suggests that the text here summarises that of a contemporary *plaquette* that has not survived (ed. B, p. 108, n. 1).

<sup>188</sup> Ibid. (ed. L), pp. 131–8; (ed. B), pp. 108–15 (probably dependent on a no longer extant *plaquette*).

<sup>189</sup> Ibid. (ed. L), pp. 139–49; (ed. B), pp. 116–25.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid. (ed. L), pp. 151–8; (ed. B), pp. 125–31.

<sup>191</sup> Ibid. (ed. L), pp. 161–76, 211–18; (ed. B), pp. 133–52.

<sup>192</sup> Ibid. (ed. L), pp. 323–25; (ed. B), pp. 271–2. The writer may have used here Bib.II, 63.

<sup>193</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. B), p. x; Seguin, *L'Information*, identified at least one more in the form of the *Voyage de monsieur de Lautrec*, p. 32 (F 60). See also J.-P. Seguin, 'Faits divers sensation-

meaning of events and, though he is a faithful copyist of some printed texts, his résumés of others are muddled, especially for the early years of Francis I. Like other chroniclers who used *plaquettes*, he tends to leave out some telling points.<sup>194</sup> He had a fairly clear idea of the purposes of the embassy to England in 1517 for the recovery of Tournai and of that of March 1518 to the Montpellier conference. Would he have had this at the time?<sup>195</sup> The sources, though, are absorbed into a narrative structure and may well contain some privileged information, such as army estimates and state correspondence, including letters from the front sent to highly placed individuals with a view to wider publication in manuscript.<sup>196</sup>

The Bourgeois is not always prepared to transcribe what he thinks are widely available accounts. His description of the Field of Cloth of Gold is brief since, as he tells us, it was ‘since printed and sold publicly in the city and narrates at length the triumph held there.’<sup>197</sup> His translation of a contemporary Italian *plaquette* by Paolo Giovio on the naval battle off Salerno in 1528 is very faulty, even though there was a more accurate French translation in print.<sup>198</sup> Lautrec’s campaign in Italy of 1527–8, for which many contemporary *plaquettes* were available and were explicitly used by the writer, is narrated in detail.<sup>199</sup> Significantly, he says very little about Saint-Pol’s ultimately disastrous expedition in 1529.<sup>200</sup>

How did chroniclers receive news? The Bourgeois’s description of the reception of the English ambassadors in 1518 looks like an eyewitness account.<sup>201</sup> He seems to have been present at royal proclamations and other events such as the reception of the Imperial herald at the Palais in September 1528.<sup>202</sup> He frequently reports the arrival of news.<sup>203</sup> Other Parisian chroniclers, such as Versoris, give a similar

nels dans seize bulletins imprimés en France pendant le règne de François Ier’, in *Mélanges d’histoire du livre et des bibliothèques offerts à Frantz Calot, conservateur en chef honoraire de la Bibliothèque de l’Arsenal, Paris* (Paris, 1960), pp. 65–80.

<sup>194</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. B), p. xi; Seguin, *L’Information*, p. 33n.

<sup>195</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. B), pp. 62–3, 71–2.

<sup>196</sup> Access to privileged sources: *Bourgeois* (ed. B), p. 22, n. 1, pp. 140–3; (the anonymous ‘Chronique parisienne’, pp. 408–10, also inserted a detailed troop estimate for 1524), and *ibid.* 237–9, 199–201, 240–2, 202–4. Same by Versoris, pp. 72–3, 79.

<sup>197</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. B), p. 73; refers to Bib.II, 31, 73.

<sup>198</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L), pp. 352–60; (ed. B), pp. 294–304.

<sup>199</sup> *Ibid.* (ed. L), pp. 332–7, 342–3; (ed. B), pp. 277–81, 286–7. Bib.II, 71, 37–8. ‘This news was printed at Paris in the following May’: *Bourgeois* (ed. L), p. 344; (ed. B), p. 288. The text is given as: ‘other news by letters, which was printed and sold at Paris in the following terms’, (ed. L), pp. 361–2; (ed. B), pp. 302–3.

<sup>200</sup> For a *plaquette*, Bib.II, 69. The *Bourgeois*’s account of Saint-Pol’s defeat is placed at the end of the events for the Paschal year 1529–30: (ed. L), pp. 397–8; (ed. B), pp. 330–1.

<sup>201</sup> *Ibid.* (ed. B), pp. 64–7.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.* (ed. L), p. 368; (ed. B), p. 309. On all this, there was a *plaquette* available: Bib.II, 30. The anonymous Chronicle BN fr. 17527 says: ‘All the truth of which was printed, which treaty I have bound up in another book.’ See *Bourgeois* (ed. B), appendix, p. 422; for the publication of the treaty of Noyon, 1516, see *ibid.*, p. 38.

<sup>203</sup> *Ibid.* (ed. B), pp. 36, 92, 79, 111, 94, 91, 78; (ed. L), pp. 262; (ed. B), p. 220; (ed. L), p. 267; (ed. B), pp. 217, 225; (ed. L), p. 342; (ed. B), p. 286; (ed. L), pp. 344–6; (ed. B), p. 288. For this naval battle, there was a *plaquette*, Bib.II, 29. On these events, see Versoris, pp. 117–18; *Bourgeois* (ed. L), pp. 301, 367; (ed. B), pp. 252, 308.

impression of the rhythms of news.<sup>204</sup> The Anonymous Parisian Chronicle records the arrival of Lautrec's death with the note that 'the common rumour was that he was poisoned', but that in reality he had died of plague.<sup>205</sup> There is a degree of credulousness that we should expect from someone outside the court. The Bourgeois reported the arrival of Turkish envoys in December 1534 and the rumour that their intention was to conclude a marriage treaty and that the Sultan would be converted to Christianity!<sup>206</sup>

The avid absorption of all these diverse sources by different chroniclers has been thought to indicate a common body of knowledge, a *matière historique* current among 'a public avid for news and of infinite credulity.'<sup>207</sup> The Bourgeois and the other Parisian chroniclers are most useful for what they tell us about the appetite for and understanding of public events.

### Scholars and contemporary history

The writing of contemporary history, reflective narratives that sought to portray an understanding of events, was of increasing importance.<sup>208</sup> Humanist histories had been written by Paolo Giovio and Paolo Emilio, though usually with little contemporary relevance. Their importance lay mainly in deploying a discourse on the historical foundations of the state rather than understanding contemporary events.<sup>209</sup> But in 1540, the poet, scholar and publisher Etienne Dolet brought out the first edition in French of his history of the reign of Francis I, the *Gestes*.<sup>210</sup> This work was an expansion in prose of a Latin poem he had published the year before as *Francisci Valesii Gallorum Regis Fata*.<sup>211</sup> This was a highly literary account, in which the battlefield of Pavia saw appearances of Mars, Jupiter, Lecto and the Gorgons, an element suppressed in the French prose history. The historical horizon is provided by the reverses of the wars of 1512–13, which in a sense set the scene for the problems Dolet addresses, notably, the experience of defeat. Thus, while the earlier pages of his history are padded with passages from the Bourdigné/*Mer des hystoires* tradition,<sup>212</sup> they are larded with reflections on the faithlessness of the Italians in abandoning their loyalty to France or exaggerating the role of Bourbon and ill fortune at Pavia.<sup>213</sup>

<sup>204</sup> Versoris, pp. 73–4, 81–3, 86, 108.

<sup>205</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. B), appendix, p. 421.

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.* (ed. L), p. 440; (ed. B), p. 357.

<sup>207</sup> *Ibid.* (ed. B), p. x.

<sup>208</sup> C.G. Dubois, 'Les Lignes générales de l'historiographie au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle', in M. Viallon-Schoneveld (ed.), *L'Histoire et les historiens au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle: actes du VIII<sup>e</sup> colloque du Puy-en-Velay* (Saint-Etienne, 2001), pp. 13–20.

<sup>209</sup> C. Beaune, *Naissance de la nation France* (Paris, 1985).

<sup>210</sup> *Bib.* II, 97a.

<sup>211</sup> C. Longeon, 'Etienne Dolet historien', in *Mélanges à la mémoire de Franco Simone: France et l'Italie dans la culture européenne* (Geneva, 1980); Etienne Dolet, *Correspondance*, ed. C. Longeon (Geneva, 1982), p. 201.

<sup>212</sup> E.g. *Bib.* II, 97a, pp. 37–8; cp. *Bib.* II, 93, fos. 195v–196r; *Bib.* II, 97a, pp. 43–4, cp. *Bib.* II, 93, fo. 203r.

<sup>213</sup> *Bib.* II, 97a, pp. 39, 44–8.

Like most chroniclers and poets of the time, including Rabelais,<sup>214</sup> Dolet blamed the King's defeat at Pavia on treason.

As history, Dolet's work is certainly peculiar but it is also important as one of the first contemporary histories to sum up the reign. Dolet's history has been judged by literary scholars to be his least interesting work.<sup>215</sup> Like many others he was a cut and paste historian but he also had an idea, to which his original title, *Fata*, points. In a work written for his newborn son the previous year, he had expressed the view that the military life was dishonourable and that in war 'There is no art ... Everything happens through chance, and is begun haphazardly. You will never see a war conducted as it should be or prudently carried out.'<sup>216</sup> He was anxious to explain causes, especially as he was faced by the difficult task of writing the history of his King's military failures. He had in fact been accused at Lyon of heresy in suggesting that human actions were the plaything of fortune.<sup>217</sup> Despite the King's 'prudence and good execution', 'everything he had suffered in his enterprises of war' has stemmed from destiny that stood above all human power. The King was a ruler of great spirit, advised by wise counsellors. The kingdom of France was lavishly endowed with people, revenues and trade. 'Why, then, was this world not conquered by this King or at least the glory of Spain brought down?' The answer was: destiny, the eternal orderer of things, the daughter of God who causes all things, good or bad, 'by the infallible will of God.'<sup>218</sup> At the start of his narrative, 'Destiny, joined with Mars God of war, seriously threatened the French'<sup>219</sup> and so it was to continue. Such an emphasis on Fortune, as one of the major determinants of historical change alongside divine providence, has been signalled as one of the most important themes of 16th-century French historical writing.<sup>220</sup> It could not have been welcome to a monarch who in the 1530s commissioned from Cellini the medal that showed him trampling the female figure of Fortune under foot and with the motto FORTUNAM VIRTUTE DEVICIT ('He has vanquished fortune through his valour').<sup>221</sup>

The most interesting part of Dolet's historical writing came in the 1543 edition of the *Gestes*, in which the third book brought the account to the end of 1542. This was distinctly contemporary history. Dolet was seriously menaced at the time by accusations of heresy. Pardoned once by the King, he was to be re-arrested in early 1544 and executed for heresy in August 1546, after a brief escape at Lyon. How, then, did he seek to ingratiate himself with the King during this crisis? His answer was a truculent mixture of chauvinism and criticism of royal policy. He had finished his previous edition with the truce of

<sup>214</sup> See C. Lenient, *La Satire en France, ou la littérature militante au XVIe siècle*, 2 vols (Paris, 1886), I, p. 273.

<sup>215</sup> M. Chassaing, *Etienne Dolet* (Paris, 1930), p. 224.

<sup>216</sup> Bib.II, 97b.

<sup>217</sup> C. Longeon, *Documents d'archives sur Etienne Dolet* (Saint-Etienne, 1977), p. 26.

<sup>218</sup> Bib.II, 97a, pp. 3–14.

<sup>219</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 20.

<sup>220</sup> Dubois, 'Les Lignes générales de l'historiographie au XVIe siècle', pp. 15–16.

<sup>221</sup> A. Armand, *Les Médailleurs italiens des quinzième et seizième siècles*, 3 vols (Paris, 1883), I, p. 147; Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. VIII, no. 7.

Nice and now took up the story of the Emperor's visit to France, after which 'the French did nothing memorable. And it seems to me the fault was great on our side ... for then the time and opportunity were great.'<sup>222</sup> The argument that France should not have attacked the Emperor while he was on crusade against the infidel at Algiers was 'the fine restraint of some scholar in his study; or to put it better, the stupid opinion of the ignorant or of malicious pro-imperialists who aimed to cover the deceits and wiles of the Emperor with idle pretexts.' All the world knew that the Emperor's main objective was the security of Spain<sup>223</sup> and that, once he had achieved this, his intention was to 'make the harshest and bitterest war on France he could.'<sup>224</sup> The Emperor, to cover himself, had spread the rumour that the French were no more than 'half Turks' themselves, 'the greatest tom-foolery there ever was.' Dolet, thus develops a fully secular view of policy:

First, is it forbidden to a prince to make an alliance and understanding with another, whatever belief or law he subscribes to? Shouldn't he do it to attract him to his own, either for the advantage of his country or of his subjects, such as to export commodities there or import them here, to trade by sea and land with one another? These are a prince's chief means to make his subjects rich and himself powerful over their wealth when necessity demands.

Furthermore, everyone knew that the Spaniards were nothing but Moors 'and if thus it is, God knows Mr Spaniard is rather thin-skinned to make such a fuss about understanding with the Turks.'<sup>225</sup>

Dolet recurs to his earlier analysis of the manifold strengths of France and suggests that its failure to dominate Christendom was due to the fact that 'order and conduct' of the kingdom did not correspond to them.<sup>226</sup> While the Emperor was at Algiers, Francis kept his word 'notwithstanding everyone knows the wrong the Emperor was doing him.'<sup>227</sup> Finally, the failure at the siege of Perpignan was the result of the fact that 'the siege was conducted negligently.' So, while Dolet praises the honour and bravery of the King, he is less than complimentary about the execution of his policy. Unsurprisingly, the pleas he made to the King for his freedom in the *Second Enfer* of 1544 fell on deaf ears.

While Dolet was writing his history, his friend Guillaume Paradin, author of a history of Lyon published by Dolet the same year,<sup>228</sup> was trying to make sense of contemporary events, though initially on a smaller scale. Early in 1544 he published a brief pamphlet<sup>229</sup> on the reasons for the war that had broken out in 1542, in which we can detect the publicly acceptable view of these events and the extent to which wild allegations were used to drum up support. Paradin

<sup>222</sup> Bib.II, 97c, p. 83.

<sup>223</sup> Ibid. pp. 83–4. Perhaps relying here on Pierre Tolet, Bib.II, 123.

<sup>224</sup> Bib.II, 97c, p. 84.

<sup>225</sup> Ibid., p. 85; Brantôme, ed. Lalanne, V, pp. 59, 63–4.

<sup>226</sup> Bib.II, 97c, p. 86.

<sup>227</sup> Ibid., p. 89.

<sup>228</sup> Bib.II, 120.

<sup>229</sup> Bib.II, 119a. This work also shows how far Montmorency had become a non-person by 1544 (p. 2).



concentrated first on Charles's deception in negotiating his journey through France in 1539 to put down the rebellion of Ghent in return for concessions over the duchy of Milan, a plan Paradin describes as 'more useful to him than honest.'<sup>230</sup> The Emperor then conveniently forgot his promises over Milan and the murder of Rincon and Fregoso revealed to Francis that he had been duped.<sup>231</sup> This was an Emperor, moreover, who had in previous years sent into France arsonists,<sup>232</sup> who, had they not been caught, would have spread havoc throughout the kingdom.<sup>233</sup>

By 1550, when he published the French translation of his history of the times, Paradin was more judicious and more aware of religious dimensions in princely conflict.<sup>234</sup> Beginning his narrative of the wars between King and Emperor with the quarrel over Sedan in 1521, he judged that as a result of this, 'these two princes, fearing the disdain of each other, have been the cause of the great evils and troubles, to the great advantage of the enemies of our holy faith.'<sup>235</sup> But, then, by 1550 the Emperor was leading the struggle against the German Protestants (Paradin's last thirty pages of this edition are devoted to this) and Francis I was dead.

The *Continuation* of this History, finished in December 1555 and published in 1556<sup>236</sup> developed a more detailed analysis of the reasons for the war that had begun in 1551, based on contemporary royal declarations. Significantly, he headed this 'the Austrasian War for the restoration of German liberty.' Paradin thus provides a retrospective view of Franco-Imperial relations since 1547. He begins by the extravagant claim that 'it seems that the conjunction of the stars ... the disposition of the planets, the intelligences of the heavens had all worked a thousand years with nature to produce a King who would be the liberator of the Germans.' Unsurprisingly, the juxtaposition was, on the one hand, Henri II's desire for peace, horror of war and efforts to maintain his treaties with the Emperor; and on the other Charles's thorough untrustworthiness. Paradin was, of course, unable to ignore the struggles over the duchy of Parma, which so exacerbated Franco-Imperial hostility, but emphasised that Charles V had deceived the King. The Emperor had simply taken advantage of him.<sup>237</sup> The explanation for Charles's aggression? 'Desire for aggrandisement, or awareness of his ill-will (which meant he could not trust the King for having plotted such deceptions and diversions against him).'<sup>238</sup> These, then were the reasons that impelled the French King to respond to the desire of the princes of the Empire for protection by concluding a close alliance with them.

Paradin's *Continuation* also amplifies the religious dimension that had been

<sup>230</sup> Ibid., p. 2.

<sup>231</sup> *Chronique du roy François*, pp. 186–9.

<sup>232</sup> Bib.II, 119a, p. 4; Bib.II, 93, fo. 202r; *Chronique du roy François*, pp. 3, 9, and *Bourgeois* (ed. L), p. 197.

<sup>233</sup> Bib.II, 119a, p. 2.

<sup>234</sup> Bib.II, 121.

<sup>235</sup> Ibid., p. 10.

<sup>236</sup> Bib.II, 122.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid., pp. 3–4, 5–7.

<sup>238</sup> Ibid., pp. 8–9.



present in his previous book. The text is suffused by a Catholic sensibility, lauding the happy events that had led to the accession of Queen Mary in England and the overturning of Protestantism there. This balanced the awkward dilemma (experienced also by the Provins chronicler, Claude Haton) of France, a Catholic kingdom in alliance with Protestants abroad and fighting, among others, German bishops allied with the Emperor. Thus, he quotes the duke of Guise:

There has never been a people whose arms were more terrible than ours, and we strike our enemies, the greatest part of whom are heretical and schismatic, keeping in mind that France's prosperity depends on the defence and maintenance of the Catholic religion. Doing our duty for God, the King and the world, we will have ample reward; the eternal felicity of God, the great goods and honours of the King. The world of praise and congratulations for victories will be sculpted and engraved on the temple of honour and renown and written down in chronicles for all posterity.<sup>239</sup>

Facile optimism is a phrase which readily comes to mind when we note Paradin's declaration that the current victories indicate 'that the reign of our King will be nothing but a succession of happy events.'<sup>240</sup>

<sup>239</sup> Ibid. (Paris, 1575 edn), pp. 187–8, 162.

<sup>240</sup> Ibid., p. 248.

## War and Renaissance Culture: Music and the Visual Arts

*If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself  
to the battle?* (I Corinthians, 14,8)

### *Les bruits de la guerre*

As the vainglorious and strutting Franc archer de Baignollet is made to declare as he unconsciously betrays his own poltroonery: ‘When the trumpet sounds, / the courage grows of every man.’ Rabelais, in the *Quart Livre* of 1552, described the Andouilles (Chitterling) folk marching against Pantagruel to the sound of bagpipes and merry fifes, drums, trumpets and clarions.<sup>1</sup> From time immemorial, war was accompanied by noise – ‘sound of war’ so vividly evoked by Froissart that it seemed as though all the armourers of Paris and Brussels were at work together.<sup>2</sup> We can get a good idea of the discordant din suggested by Guillaume Guiart’s evocation of the armies of Philip IV, in which he hears ‘horns blowing / pipes piping and trumpets braying.’<sup>3</sup> There is evidence enough that by the 14th and 15th centuries a degree of competition in music played a major part in morale boosting and intimidating the enemy in battle (as at Agincourt) and in sieges (as at Melun in 1420 or Neuss in 1474–5). Music was also increasingly used in France in the later Middle Ages as a medium of command and discipline.<sup>4</sup> Froissart evoked a moment which is strikingly close to later modes of command, when ‘The trumpets of the marshals sounded after midnight ... at the second call, the men armed and prepared for battle. At the third they mounted up and rode off.’<sup>5</sup> There was nothing new even in this. Music had long played a part in battle, from the ‘menestrels’ of the early Middle Ages. Around 1100 the

<sup>1</sup> *Le Franc-archier de Baignollet*, ed. L. Polak (Paris, 1966), ll. 74–5; François Rabelais, *Tiers Livre*, ed. M. Screech (Geneva, 1964), ch. 36.

<sup>2</sup> Froissart, *Chroniques*, ed. Luce, XI, p. 55.

<sup>3</sup> Guillaume Guiart, *Branche des royaux lignages*, ed. J. Buchon (Paris, 1828), II, p. 370.

<sup>4</sup> P. Contamine, ‘La Musique militaire dans le fonctionnement des armées: l’exemple français (v.1300–v.1550)’, in *From Crecy to Mohacs: Warfare in the Late Middle Ages*, 22nd Colloquium of the International Commission of Military History, Vienna, 1996 (Vienna, 1997), pp. 93–106.

<sup>5</sup> Jean Froissart, *Chroniques*, Amiens MS, ed. G. Diller (Geneva, 1991), p. 707. Terser version in Rome MS: Jean Froissart, *Chroniques. Dernière édition du premier livre. Manuscrit de Rome*, ed. G. Diller (Geneva/Paris, 1972), p. 131.

*Chanson de Roland* had portrayed its hero's last call on the famous 'olifant' (an ivory horn) and the emir Baligant summoning his men with his 'clear *buisine*' to rally his men.

Trumpets, horns and cornets all had their distinctive role in military activities and in the muster rolls of many 15th century companies of men-at-arms provision was made for trumpeteers.<sup>6</sup> Zarlino, in his *Instituzione armoniche* of 1562, remarked that one army could not attack another without the sound of trumpets and drums. Italians, Germans, Swiss and French all used them and they learned from each other.<sup>7</sup> Drums and fifes played a central part in the music of the royal *écurie* at least from the 14th century and had a distinctive military role. Charles VIII in 1494 appointed four Swiss drummers and six Italian trumpeteers, subsequently recruiting more Italian players during the course of his campaigns. Such players wore the King's livery and from early in the reign of Francis I were joined by sackbuts and hautboys.<sup>8</sup> These were able to accompany the singers of the *chapelle de musique* in a mass shared with Henry VIII's chapel at the Field of Cloth of Gold.<sup>9</sup> From the late 15th century, although before the era of 'military marches' as understood in modern times,<sup>10</sup> it is clear that drums and fifes played a vital role in the marching order and battle discipline of troops.<sup>11</sup> (See **Plate 1**) The use of 'great drums' by the Swiss suggests the function of rhythmic marching as well as raising the spirits<sup>12</sup> and appeared among Maximilian's *Landsknechts* around 1490.<sup>13</sup> At Fornovo, Commynes records how the Swiss troops in the French army beat their drums during the night. When the army marched out of Fornovo an hour before dawn on 8 July 1495, it did so to the trumpet call of 'Be on guard' but, he adds, 'there was no other sound at moving off, nor do I think there was any need. However, it was to give alarm to the army, at least to men of understanding.'<sup>14</sup> The relieving force at Bisceglie in 1502 arrived with the sound of 'trumpets and clarions so loud ... that the air shuddered.'<sup>15</sup> At Genoa in 1502, on Louis XII's arrival at the palace, there were 'many trumpets and clarions, great Swiss drums and other instruments, so loud that no one could hear themselves talk', while in the siege of the city in 1507, the trumpets and drums of the Swiss heartened them into battle.<sup>16</sup> Turenne, in his accounts of the 1574 Mardi Gras coup, gives memorable description of the drums of the

<sup>6</sup> Contamine, 'La Musique militaire', pp. 95–6.

<sup>7</sup> I. Cazeau, *French Music and the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries* (Oxford, 1975), p. 143; G. Reese, *Fourscore Classics of Music Literature* (Indianapolis/New York, 1957); G. Kastner, *Manuel général de musique militaire* (Paris, 1848), p. 92.

<sup>8</sup> C. Cazaux, *La Musique à la cour de François Ier* (Paris, 2002), pp. 43, 107.

<sup>9</sup> Cazeau, *French Music*, p. 206.

<sup>10</sup> H.G. Farmer, *The Rise and Development of Military Music* (London, 1912); idem, 'Sixteenth and Seventeenth-Century Military Marches', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 28 (1950), 49–53.

<sup>11</sup> H.G. Farmer, 'The Martial Fife', *Journal of the Society for Army Historical Research*, 23 (1945), 66–71.

<sup>12</sup> Molinet, *Chroniques*, I, p. 204; II, p. 129.

<sup>13</sup> Contamine, *Histoire militaire*, I, p. 253.

<sup>14</sup> Commynes, III, pp. 196, 202–3.

<sup>15</sup> D'Auton, III, p. 7.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, III, p. 60; IV, p. 221.

Swiss and other guards regiments beating across the fields as the court withdrew to safety.<sup>17</sup> The Welsh soldier Elis Gruffydd, describing the sailing out of Admiral d'Annebault's fleet against the English in the summer of 1545, recalls that 'many men were displaying their musical skill on such warlike instruments as trumpets, shawms, sackbuts, drums, tapretts and fifes until land and sea re-echoed to the sound.'<sup>18</sup> Brissac's troops at the siege of Ivrea in 1554 began the day with cannonades, volleys of arquebus, trumpets and drums.<sup>19</sup>

The drum (*tabourin*) was also a standard recruiting instrument. In August 1522, an officer of the Sarcus company of foot 'sounded the drum in the town of Beauvais to assemble the fellow-soldiers.'<sup>20</sup> The Protestant militia of Rouergue assembled for war 'deployed at the sound of the drum' in 1562.<sup>21</sup> Nor were these the only purposes of military music. Brantôme tells the story of Admiral Bonnavet having his private band play their violins to calm his men while expecting an assault and Antoine de Bourbon's men used cymbals as they marched out to war in 1562.<sup>22</sup> Instruments also conveyed triumph and rejoicing: the heralds announced the victory of Marignano to the sound of 'trumpets, clarions and drums.'<sup>23</sup>

The new infantry formations in the 16th century pushed these developments further. The Legions of 1534 were to deploy four tambours and two fifes for each 1000 men, paid as part of the permanent staff at 7.10.0 lt. p.m. (at a time when pikemen were paid 5 and arquebusiers 6).<sup>24</sup> The 1536 *Familiere institution* for the legions called such musicians 'the true joy of the infantryman'.<sup>25</sup> Jacques Chantareau in 1540 described the infantry on the march:

Near your standard, you should place two drummers and a fife. Of the drummers, one will always be beating, one after another; also, after the first three ranks there should be two drummers who sound all the route of march, and if there are two fifes in the company, one should be there. When the company arrives at its destination, all the drums and fifes should sound.<sup>26</sup>

Fourquevaux in his *Instructions* of 1548 gives us some of the most revealing remarks about the state of military instruments in the mid-16th century. He tells his soldiers to:

Hold ranks steadily in all movement, that is, march slowly or quickly: and furthermore learn all the sounds, signs and all the cries by which commands

<sup>17</sup> Henri de La Tour d'Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne, *Mémoires du vicomte de Turenne depuis duc de Bouillon, 1565–86*, ed. G. Bagueuault de Puchesse (Paris: SHF, 1901), pp. 55–8.

<sup>18</sup> Elis Gruffydd, *Chronicle*, extract in M.B. Davis, 'Boulogne and Calais from 1545 to 1550', *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts of Fouad I University, Cairo*, XII.i (1940), p. 4.

<sup>19</sup> Villars, p. 651.

<sup>20</sup> AN JJ 236, no. 62, fo. 53r–v.

<sup>21</sup> BN fr. 15876, fo. 47.

<sup>22</sup> Kastner, *Musique militaire*, pp. 116–17.

<sup>23</sup> Jean Marot, *Oeuvres* (Paris: Coustelier, 1723), p. 160: *Epistre à la Royne Claude*.

<sup>24</sup> *Ord.Fr.I*, VII, pp. 139–49; A. Fairley, *Flutes, Flautists and Makers* (London, 1982).

<sup>25</sup> *Bib.II*, 22.

<sup>26</sup> BN fr. 650, fo. 5r.

are given in battle and let everyone know their meaning, no more or less than galley slaves know what to do at the slightest whistle of command.<sup>27</sup>

He assumes the problem of keeping order in manoeuvre was to be managed by drum beats and it would be the drums that would signal advance, halt or retreat: 'the pace of each will therefore follow the beating of the drums, so that all will keep pace together.'<sup>28</sup> Fourquevaux noted that the ancients had also had flutes and fifes 'and sounds consonant: for, just as a dancer keeps time to the music, so a battalion that keeps to the time of the drums cannot fall into confusion.' He notes the common usage of drums for the infantry and trumpets for the cavalry, producing 'sounds to spur on the soldiers when necessary. To this end they were invented to give commands and to be heard from afar.'<sup>29</sup> As for trumpet calls, Fourquevaux details some of them: the sergeant major can order the doubling and redoubling of ranks by commanding the Trumpet to sound: 'The King orders the doubling of the ranks'; 'the King expressly wills the redoubling of the ranks', and so on.<sup>30</sup> The drummers in turn were to take their tune from the colonel's trumpeters, since trumpet calls were 'heard better' because 'louder' than drums in a 'great tumult.'<sup>31</sup> This the Swiss, who were the inventors of the 'tabourin', understood. At Marignano they deliberately avoided using their drums in order to effect surprise but still used 'cornets' to signal their movements.<sup>32</sup> Military trumpeters, equipped with instruments ornamented with pennons in the colours of the commander, stood near the commander and relayed his orders. They ran some risks: Commynes reports difficulty in finding one because nine had been killed in battle.<sup>33</sup>

### Music and the art of war

The art music of the period conveys something of these sounds. War had been a theme of music throughout the Middle Ages but in the 16th century a vogue for representing war itself grew up. Thus Janequin's (c.1485–1558) 'Saddle up' in *La Bataille* corresponds closely to a trumpet theme published in 1626 as one of 'those trumpet-calls used in the army.'<sup>34</sup> Some of the drum-rolls of Janequin's piece are also to be found transformed in Thoinéau Arbeau's *Orchesographie*. One of the great values of Janequin's piece is that it constitutes some of the earliest evidence of French military music. We have already noted Clément Marot's evocation of the army in full review, 'Plumes in the air, fifes sounding, the air resounding to the great drums.' His father, Jean, had already, in the

<sup>27</sup> Fourquevaux, *Instructions*, fo. 16r.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 63r.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 20r.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, fo. 29v.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, fos. 16r–v, 41v–42r.

<sup>32</sup> Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, I, p. 71.

<sup>33</sup> Commynes, III, p. 197.

<sup>34</sup> Marin Mersenne, *Harmonie universelle* (Paris, 1636), facs. edn (Paris, 1963), V, p. 264.

*Voyage de Venise* of 1509, described how the Swiss marched before the King in his livery, fifes and drums booming.

Sadly little is known about marching songs in the later Middle Ages. Their origins may lie with songs sung by pilgrims on the road to Jerusalem. We know that songs and ballads were composed during or shortly after great sieges in the 15th century such as Orléans in 1428 and Pontoise in 1441.<sup>35</sup> The most popular military song of the 15th century was *L'Homme Armé*, *l'homme armé doit-on doubter*, used as the *cantus firmus* of more than thirty masses, the basis for many chansons and instrumental pieces.<sup>36</sup> It may have started life as a song calling for the re-conquest of the East from the Turks but took on a life of its own and can also be read as a song about men-at-arms in general. Other examples include *Gentils galans de France* about the battle of Saint-Aubin-du-Cormier in the Breton War<sup>37</sup> and *Reveillez-vous Picardz* that began life in the war between Louis XI and Maximilian in the years between 1478 and 1482.<sup>38</sup> In the assault on Arras in 1492, Molinet records the song 'Marchons la dureau, hault la durée.'<sup>39</sup> Such songs continued into the 16th century with the popularity of pieces such as *Le Franc archer à la guerre s'en va* and Compère's *Ung Franc archer*<sup>40</sup> and the song about La Palice at the battle of Pavia.<sup>41</sup> The 'song of the adventurers' at the battle of Marignano is an example of a genre that was to become increasingly common and one that illustrates the quality of marching song in the period with the refrain, 'The King goes forth beyond the mountains'.<sup>42</sup> The words of many of these military 'chants' have survived, though sadly little of the music to which they were sung.<sup>43</sup> In June 1535, Francis I reviewed the newly-formed Legions at Rouen and Amiens in the presence of the court and himself took part in leading the parades.<sup>44</sup> This emerges from the 'chants' which were composed, and their words published, to bolster the spirit of pride and emulation in the provincial legions. The King himself took part in the parade:

<sup>35</sup> Contamine, 'La Musique militaire', nn. 47-8.

<sup>36</sup> J. Cohen, *The Six Anonymous L'Homme Armé Masses in MS VI. E. 40 of the Biblioteca Nazionale, Naples* (American Institute of Musicology, Studies and Documents, 21) (Rome, 1968).

<sup>37</sup> G. Paris and A. Gevaert, *Chansons du XVe siècle* (Paris, 1875), pp. 127-8.

<sup>38</sup> Rec.: *Les Ecrivains & la Musique: François Villon*, La Maurache (Achanthus, AL/EN 2005 02).

<sup>39</sup> A. van der Linden, 'La Musique dans les *Chroniques* de Jean Molinet', in Charles van den Borren and Albert van der Linden (eds), *Mélanges Ernest Closson. Recueil d'articles musicologiques offert à Ernest Closson, à l'occasion de son soixante-quinzième anniversaire* (Brussels: Société Belge de Musicologie, 1948), pp. 166-80, at p. 144.

<sup>40</sup> BN fr. 12616; Petrucci, *Odhecaton*: Cazeau, *French Music*, p. 147.

<sup>41</sup> P. Barbier, *Histoire de France par les chansons*, 8 vols (Paris. 1956-61), I, pp. 60-1.

<sup>42</sup> A. Leroux de Lincy, *Recueil de chants historiques français*, ser. 1-2 (Paris, 1841-2), 1, pp. 389-90.

<sup>43</sup> E. Picot, *Chants historiques français du seizième siècle* (Paris, 1903).

<sup>44</sup> See Du Bellay, *Mémoires*, II, pp. 289-91.

King Francis our lord, of prowess replete,  
Himself on foot has shown them the way:  
It was noble to see him march in array.<sup>45</sup>

It should be clear, then, that sound and music were a normal part of late medieval warfare. The Renaissance, though, saw a flourishing of art music that used war as one of its themes at a time when the line of demarcation between the artist and the artisan was still fluid. Philippe Contamine pointed out that it is easy to imagine the 'sound world' of the Feast of the Pheasant being adapted for the battle-field.<sup>46</sup> The same could happen in the other direction. The precursors for this were the many *caccie* of 14th-century Italy that exploited the noise and din of battle, fanfares etc. It was in a three-part Italian vocal song that cries of combat were imitated for the first time.<sup>47</sup> Theoretically, French readers would have learned, if they did not already know, from Loys Meigret's 1555 translation of Roberto Valturio's treatise that the use of music in war was sanctioned by the ancients and that it had long been understood that certain modes – the Phrygian for instance – were conducive to aggression in war.<sup>48</sup> It was widely thought that no army was complete without the din of wind instruments.<sup>49</sup> Again, this is stated in Meigret's 1555 translation of Valturio:

But what were the cornets, clarions, trumpets and drums of our legions for, if not in war to sound the advance or retreat, or to hearten the discouraged to rein in the impetuous.<sup>50</sup>

It is tempting to conclude that the art music of the Renaissance was trying to convey the sound of war as it was understood at the time. This is too simple a view, though war was certainly being represented in some form, perhaps even constituting the inner argument of many pieces of music.<sup>51</sup> Art music also sought to commemorate (not simply imitate) war within certain conventions.

The Renaissance in France saw a further development of the relationship between war and music in the swagger and celebration by which music was used to amplify the grandeur of victories, treaties and formal entries into conquered cities. It is tempting to think that it is through some of this music that we can come nearest to the aural experience of the battle-field.<sup>52</sup> Some care, though, needs to be taken. Undoubtedly the best known single piece of war music to emerge from Renais-

<sup>45</sup> A. de Montaignon, *Recueil des poésies françoises des XV<sup>e</sup> et XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, 13 vols (Paris, 1855–78), I, pp. 181–5.

<sup>46</sup> Contamine, 'La Musique militaire', p. 103.

<sup>47</sup> BN fr. 15123, Pixierécourt MS.

<sup>48</sup> Bib.II, 118, p. 7.

<sup>49</sup> E.g. the remark of Tinctoris in *De inventione et usu musicae*, c.1485, in Cazeau, *French Music*, p. 142.

<sup>50</sup> Bib.II, 118, p. 19.

<sup>51</sup> R. Cotterill, 'War and Music in the Sixteenth Century', in J.R. Mulryne and M. Shewring (eds), *War, Literature and the Arts in Sixteenth-Century Europe* (London, 1989), pp. 63–77.

<sup>52</sup> See Cazeau, *French Music*, ch. 7; F. Freedman, 'Musical Life in Paris and the French Royal Court during the Early Sixteenth Century', in S. Sadie (ed.), *Man and Music: A Social History of Music* (London, 1989), pp. 174–96.



sance France was Clément Janequin's piece, variously known as 'La Guerre', 'la Bataille', 'la Bataille de Marignan', 'la Chanson des Suisses', 'la Bataille des Géants.' It is possible that Janequin, about whose early life very little is known, but whose earliest activity is linked to his role as a clerk at Bordeaux, accompanied Louis de Ronsard (father of the poet) on the Milan campaign of 1515. Janequin's music was well known at the court of France, even though he was only briefly a *chantre* of the chapel royal in 1530-1. His chanson 'Chantons, sonnons trompettes' probably celebrated the arrival of the court at Bordeaux in 1530.<sup>53</sup> *La Guerre* was not published, though, until Attaignant's 1528 *Chansons de Maître Clément Janequin*<sup>54</sup> and reappeared in his 1537 collection of his programmatic music, *Chansons de la guerre*.<sup>55</sup> It was not until its appearance in an Italian lute tablature in 1540 that it was given the name 'Bataglia de Maregnano.'<sup>56</sup> Thereafter it was widely transcribed for instruments, one popular example being that by the viole player Claude Gervaise,<sup>57</sup> and it received a fifth part by Verdelot in Teilmann Susato's *Dixième Livre* of 1545.<sup>58</sup> (Plate 2) When Janequin came to make a new version of the piece in 1555, he accepted this fifth part and updated it to replace the Swiss by the Hainaulters and Burgundians.<sup>59</sup>

Janequin chose to work in the form of the polyphonic song rather than the motet, though his style used a form of polyphony which was distinctively French, called 'Parisian', avoiding the complexity of the Flemish tradition.<sup>60</sup> Within Janequin's oeuvre, it can be associated with four other extended programmatic works, sometimes called *chasses* after the Italian Ars Nova form, *caccia*, which were designed to evoke the sounds of specific milieux and were related to the *quodlibet*, or in France the musical *fricassée*. Such works included: *Le Caquet des femmes* (1545), *La Chasse* (1540) and *Les Cris de Paris* and *Le Chant des Oyseulx*. As were several of these, *La Guerre* was made up of two parts.<sup>61</sup> The *prima pars* constitutes an exordium in regular rhymed octosyllables. The work impels the listener to the battle-field, replacing the traditional 'Oyez!'

<sup>53</sup> Cazaux, *La Musique à la cour*, p. 153; F. Lesure, 'Clément Janequin, chentre de François Ier (1531)', *Revue de Musicologie*, 40 (1957), 201-2.

<sup>54</sup> Bib.II, 108.

<sup>55</sup> Bib.II, 109; a similar imprint in Venice, 1545: *La bataglia* ... (Antonio Gardano, 1545).

<sup>56</sup> It was in H. Isaac's instrumental piece *A la Bataglia* that the title first appeared.

<sup>57</sup> Rec.: Ens. Jacques Moderne, CAL 6293.

<sup>58</sup> Instrumental version, Rec.: Jordi Savall, Hesperion XXI, *Carlos V, Mille regretz*, Alia Vox, AV 9184 (2000). Older, plodding LP mono version, Noah Greenberg, New York Pro Musica, *Renaissance Festival Music*, Brunswick, AXA 4511.

<sup>59</sup> G. Dottin, review of T. Merritt and F. Lesure (eds), *Chansons polyphoniques de Clément Janequin*, 6 vols (Munich, 1965-71), in *Revue de Musicologie* (1972), p. 134. *Ier livre des inventions musicales de M. Cl. Janequin. Contenant La Guerre, la Bataille de Metz, la Jalouzie. Le tout à 5 parties* (Paris: Nicolas du Chemin, 1555). Janequin's work went on being adapted for generations: e.g. Michael Praetorius, who had access to a vast store of French court music for his *Terpsichore*, published a version as *Courant de bataglia*. Janequin's work was still being performed in 1600 for Marie de Medici's entry into Avignon (Cazeau, *French Music*, p. 148).

<sup>60</sup> Cazaux, *La Musique à la cour*, pp. 36-7.

<sup>61</sup> Written in F Major it is usually transposed to A Major in performance. CDs: Dominique Visse, Ens. Janequin, *Les cris de Paris*, HMT 7901092, track 10; Joel Suhubiette, Ens. Jacques Moderne, *Clément Janequin. La bataille de Marignan*, CAL 6293, track 33.

by: 'Escoutez ...' and uses a counterpoint that suggests the sounds of fanfares. There are descriptive plays and the introduction of strong rhythmic pulses as well as homophonic passages to stress the text. The *secunda pars* is the sound of battle proper in which the textual onomatopoeia is underlaid by counterpoint and rhythm that has been likened to a 'fricassée', a term in any case used of many of the polyphonic chansons of the 16th century ('von von patipatoc ... tricque trac...'). The climax is closely paralleled in the other 1528 work of the same nature, *La Chasse. La Guerre*, though, is not simply a straightforward attempt to recreate the sound of battle. It is in fact a highly complex combination of imitative sounds, counterpoint and homophony drawing to a climax with the tied note on the name 'noble roy François.' The vocabulary of the text, incidentally, constitutes a sort of lexicon of contemporary military terminology. The music has been criticised for the limitations of its harmonic range, counterpoint and even melody. Yet it remained a yardstick throughout the 16th century, as its imitators show, and this may be because of the way its 'rhythmic counterpoint' achieved such clarity in laying out the supposed sounds of war.

Marignano and similar events also gave rise to church music. Francis I effected a division in his chapel service between the *chantres* of the *chapelle de la musique* and those of the daily *chapelle de plain-chant*. The former were required to produce music for solemn occasions. So, the Boulonnais Jean Mouton wrote his motet *Exalta Regina gallie, Jubila mater ambasia* addressed to Louise of Savoy as Regent.<sup>62</sup> This 'motet for the victory' was despatched from Vigevano to Sigismondo d'Este on 29 October 1515, a little over a month after Marignano.<sup>63</sup> It forms part of a genre now known as *staatsmotteten*, 'court motets', in effect church motets composed for great state occasions such as the Franco-papal meeting at Bologna in 1516, the Field of Cloth of Gold and, later, the meetings at Boulogne in 1532 and at Nice in 1538.<sup>64</sup> The motet sung at Boulogne on 22 October 1532, *Da pacem, Domine, in diebus nostris*, was by Sermisy, head of the *chapelle de la musique* and was published by Attaignant in 1535.<sup>65</sup> In the same year as the Boulogne meeting, a *missa parodia* now known as 'La Bataille' was published by Jacques Moderne at Lyon<sup>66</sup> in a collection of masses by famous composers of the time. This has long been attributed to Janequin himself, though this attribution now seems less secure.<sup>67</sup> The composer uses the basic motifs and sonorities of the *prima pars* throughout, most notably in the Gloria and the Agnus Dei but even the Kyrie is woven out of strands of the *secunda pars*. At Lyon, Jacques Moderne in his first collection of motets

<sup>62</sup> E. Lowinsky, 'The Medici Codex: a Document of Music, Art and Politics in the Renaissance', *Annales musicologiques*, V (1957), 61–178, at pp. 84–5.

<sup>63</sup> L. Lockwood, 'Jean Mouton and Jean Michel: New Evidence on French Music and Musicians in Italy, 1505–20', *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, 32 (1979), 191–246, at pp. 204, 212.

<sup>64</sup> A. Dunning, *Die Staatsmottete, 1480–1555* (Utrecht, 1969), pp. 111–12, 215.

<sup>65</sup> I. Fenlon, 'Paris and the French Court under Francis I', in idem (ed.), *Man and Music: the Renaissance* (London, 1989), p. 180.

<sup>66</sup> Rec: Dominique Visse, Ens. Janequin, *Clément Janequin, Messes*, Harmonia Mundi, HMA, 1901536.

<sup>67</sup> Cazaux, *La Musique à la cour*, p. 198.

entitled *Motteti dei Fiori* included pieces on the siege of Florence, the King's marriage to Eleanor of Austria and the return of the princes from captivity in Spain. The third book is heavily dominated by the events of the conferences at Nice in 1538.<sup>68</sup> The defeat of Pavia, it need hardly be said, evoked no echoes in French music. This had to await oblique treatment by the Netherlandish Adrian Willaert's motet *Victoria salve*<sup>69</sup> and more explicitly by the *maestro di cappella* at Milan, Matthias Hermann Werrecore, who published *Bataglia Taliana*, in 1544.<sup>70</sup>

Though Janequin's *La Bataille* may have been the most famous battle-piece of the age, there were many more, by him and others. Janequin wrote a series which appealed to a taste for such music from the late 1540s onwards, and also indicates the patronage he received both from the King (he was the first to hold the post of 'composer in ordinary') and from François duke of Guise from about 1555. These included *La Guerre de Renty*,<sup>71</sup> *Le Siege de Metz*,<sup>72</sup> *La Prinse de Boulogne*,<sup>73</sup> and *La Reduction de Boulogne*,<sup>74</sup> the latter containing a tribute to Henri II, the queen and their children. Guillaume Costeley (c.1531–1606) wrote *La Guerre* [or *Prise*] *de Calais*<sup>75</sup> to celebrate the joyful return of that city to its true French obedience in 1558, in which the second verse evokes war in a more mannered way than Janequin:

Sound cannons, smash the ramparts!  
Let's march soldiers, the ramparts are weak:  
Down to the water, cross the moat,  
Surrender Calais, furl your standards,  
Death, scum, your time is up.

He followed it by *La prise du Havre* in 1563, possibly to coincide with the declaration of Charles IX's majority at Rouen in August of that year.<sup>76</sup> Janequin had also celebrated public events such as the return of Francis I's sons from

<sup>68</sup> F. Dobbins, 'Lyons: Commercial and Cultural Metropolis', in Fenlon (ed.), *Man and Music: the Renaissance*, p. 208.

<sup>69</sup> Rec: LP, *Die Staatsmoteten der Renaissance*, Telefunken, Das Alte Werke, 1972. See A. Dunning, *Die Staatsmotette 1480–1555* (Utrecht, 1970). Willaert was a servant of Cardinal Ippolito d'Este.

<sup>70</sup> See Ch. van den Borren, in G. Abraham (ed.), *New Oxford History of Music*, IV: *The Age of Humanism* (London, 1968), pp. 6–7.

<sup>71</sup> Bib.II, 111: J 456. Merritt and Lesure (eds), *Chansons polyphoniques*, VI, 254. Only rec. at present: LP: Cochereau, Birnbaum, Ens. Vocal et instrumental, Philips 835.785 (1967, unavailable). This is an execrable instrumental version incorporating the organ of Notre-Dame.

<sup>72</sup> Bib.II, 112; Merritt and Lesure (eds), *Chansons polyphoniques*, VI, 235.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, V, 210.

<sup>74</sup> Bib.II, 113.

<sup>75</sup> CD: Dominique Visse, *Fricassé parisienne*, HMA 1951174, track 13.

<sup>76</sup> I. Godt, 'Guillaume Costeley, his Life and Works', unpublished dissertation, 2 vols, New York University, 1969, I, pp. 69–71; II, pp. 437–39; K.J. Levy, 'Costeley's Chromatic Chanson', *Annales Musicologiques*, III (1955), 213–63.

captivity in 1530<sup>77</sup> and the recapture of Calais in his ‘When Israel out of Egypt came.’<sup>78</sup> Desbordes wrote a *Guerre marine*, published by Le Roy and Ballard in their *Unziesme Livre* of 1559.<sup>79</sup>

The best of such works is Claude Le Jeune’s *La Guerre*, first published in 1608 but probably written in time for the celebrations of the duke of Joyeuse’s wedding in 1581, which also generated the *Ballet comique de la royne*.<sup>80</sup> Like Costeley, Le Jeune was one of the poet Baif’s circle, and *La Guerre* was in part based on his verse. It was a piece written for a tournament that celebrated the victory of love, the theme taken up by Monteverdi in the *Combattimento di Tancredi e Clorinda*. However, the continuity with Janequin’s ‘Bataille’ is clearly marked in its use of onomatopoeia in the attempt to conjure up the sound of battle.<sup>81</sup>

The music of the 16th century was encouraged by the patronage not only of Francis I but also of the great princes.<sup>82</sup> Diffusion of music was helped by the advent of printing by men who were often not only publishers but also composers themselves (such as in the Netherlander Teilman Susato). While Ottaviano Petrucci in Venice had been able (from 1501) to print scores using ‘multiple impression printing’, i.e. printing the staves and notes separately, the process was speeded up and made more economic by the ‘single impression printing’ system developed in France by Pierre Haultin of Paris (d.1580) and used by Pierre Attaignant (c.1494–1551/2) with his first collection of *Chansons* of 1527, followed quickly by the *Chanson nouvelles* of 1528, the first printed musical publications in France. Attaignant, who obtained exclusive rights to sell music in Paris in 1529, became music printer to the King in 1537. He ran a serious business in the rue de la Harpe which published over 150 books of

<sup>77</sup> ‘Chantons, sonnons, trompetes’: Merritt and Lesure (eds), *Chansons polyphoniques*, I [17]. Music to celebrate public events was of course hardly new. The Motet *Adoretur in ultimo pacem* was written to celebrate the surrender of Bordeaux by the English in 1451 (Abraham, *New Oxford History of Music*, III: *Ars Nova and the Renaissance* (Oxford, 1960), p. 164.

<sup>78</sup> Bib.II, 111. This may have been sung at the King’s entry into Calais on 24 January 1558: see Pollet, D. (ed.), ‘L’Entrée de Calais faict par le très Chrestien Roy...’, *Bulletin de la Commission des Antiquités Départementales du Pas-de-Calais*, n.s. VII (1966), 547–50.

<sup>79</sup> F. Freedman, ‘Du Chemin’s Unziesme livre and the French Chanson in the 1550s’, in *Unziesme livre de chansons à quatre. Nicolas Du Chemin, 1552* (Paris, 1552) facs. edn (Tours: Centre de musique ancienne, in press).

<sup>80</sup> F. Yates, ‘Poésie et musique dans les “Magnificences” au mariage du duc de Joyeuse, Paris, 1581’, in J. Jacquot (ed.), *Musique et poésie au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1953), pp. 241–64, and eadem, *Astraea: the Imperial Theme in the Sixteenth Century* (London, 1975).

<sup>81</sup> See K.J. Levy, ‘The Chansons of Claude Le Jeune’, unpublished dissertation, University of Princeton, 1955; Isabelle His, *Claude Le Jeune (v.1530–1600), un compositeur entre Renaissance et Baroque* (Arles: Actes Sud, 2000). CD: Gabriel Garrido, Students of the Conservatoires of Geneva and Lyon, *Le Ballet Comique de la Royne*, K 617080; dir. Anne Quentin, *Inconstance et vanité du Monde*, CD Astrée naïve, E 8814.

<sup>82</sup> F. Freedman, ‘Un Prélat de la Renaissance, mécène de la musique’, in Y. Bellenger (ed.), *Le Mécénat et l’influence des Guise, Actes du Colloque organisé par le Centre de recherche sur la littérature de la Renaissance de l’Université de Reims, Joinville, 1994* (Paris, 1997), pp. 161–73.

music and thousands of compositions between 1528 and 1558.<sup>83</sup> For many years, his only competitor was Jacques Moderne (d.1561), who started publishing at Lyon in 1532.<sup>84</sup> It was the rapid diffusion of music in print that allowed the novel experience of the widespread diffusion of secular *chansons*. In music, the Renaissance did not look back to the classical past but rather concentrated on the fresh development of the old forms.

How did audiences respond to the music of war? There is relatively little information about the performance conditions of any music in France during the Renaissance period. Illuminated manuscripts and some paintings convey an idea of the performance milieu, though relatively little about the occasions on which music of war would have been heard. The richly illuminated secular music manuscripts that have survived from the early 16<sup>th</sup> century may have been intended for the use of bands of highly skilled musicians but the vast corpus of printed music after 1528 is unlikely to have demanded advanced skills.<sup>85</sup> It would seem reasonable to suppose that most of the polyphonic songs so far discussed were meant for performance in fairly small companies at court, in aristocratic households or in the city. There is some evidence that new compositions were heard by Francis while at dinner. For instance, Admiral Chabot de Brion reported from Saint-Germain in Lent 1527 that ‘in the morning there are usually sermons and in the evening, for pass-time, many songs and hymns.’<sup>86</sup>

There seems to have been an assumption that art music employing military motifs would somehow stir the listener to martial action. Noel du Fail recounts in his *Baliverneries* of 1548 that:

When voice and word are tempered by interlacings, pauses and intervals, joined to the string of the instrument, the force of the words and their grace remain entwined, without hope of separation, remaining as true ravishment of the soul, either in joy or pity. As for example when Janequin’s Song of War was sung before that great King Francis, about his victory over the Swiss, there was no one who did not look to see if his sword was still his scabbard and who did not stand on tip-toe to make himself taller and more swaggering.<sup>87</sup>

A similar comment appears in 1611 about the slightly later work by Claude Le Jeune, *La Guerre*:

when this air was rehearsed at a private concert, it caused a gentleman who was present to take up arms, swearing loudly that he felt absolutely impelled

<sup>83</sup> D. Hertz, *Pierre Attaignant, Royal Printer of Music* (Berkeley, Cal., 1969); R. Freedman, ‘Clément Janequin, Pierre Attaignant and the Changing Image of French Music, ca. 1540’, in M. Rothstein (ed.), *Charting Cultural Change in France around 1540* (Selingsgrove, Penn., 2006), pp. 63–96.

<sup>84</sup> S.F. Pogue, *Jacques Moderne: Lyons Music Printer of the Sixteenth Century* (Geneva, 1969).

<sup>85</sup> L. Litterick, ‘Performing Franco-Netherlandish Secular Music of the Late 15th Century: Texted and Untexted Parts in the Sources’, *Early Music*, 8 (1980), 474–85.

<sup>86</sup> Lockwood, ‘Jean Mouton’, p. 216; BN fr. 3066, p. 21.

<sup>87</sup> N. du Fail, *Baliverneries et contes d’Eutrapel* (1548), ed. E. Courbet (Paris, 1894), pp. 267–9.

to rush to fight someone. And when they commenced to sing another air in the Sub-phrygian mode, he became quite tranquil again. This has been confirmed to me by some of those who were present, so great is the force and the influence on the spirit of the modulation and movement of the music closely conjoined to the voice.<sup>88</sup>

In 1603, Artus Thomas wrote of Le Jeune's 'alarms' and his ability to switch from sadness to happiness: 'in short this man was more than human.'<sup>89</sup> Not all listeners felt such a martial response, of course. Brantôme tells the story of how Isabeau de la Tour d'Auvergne, demoiselle de Limeuil, one of Catherine de Medici's maids of honour, had her violinist-valet Julien play Janequin's *La Guerre* to her on her death-bed. She had him play the passage corresponding to 'All is lost' four times and turned to one of her ladies to say: 'All is truly lost now', and so died.<sup>90</sup>

### War and the visual arts

How did the visual arts reflect warfare in Renaissance France? The French wars in Italy have, since Michelet, been seen as a turning-point in the introduction of the Renaissance into France. In fact, there is little evidence of much interest among the courtiers and nobility of France under Charles VIII in the masterpieces of Renaissance art. The full effects of Italian visual culture had to await the reign of Francis I.<sup>91</sup> The direct impact of war on the visual arts is similarly late. In his ground-breaking survey of the visual imagery of war in the Renaissance period, John Hale presented a dazzling picture of a genre that grew to fruition essentially in two cultural zones: Germany and Italy.<sup>92</sup> By concentrating on the portrayal not only of battle but of the ordinary soldier, he was able to show how the social and cultural needs of those societies shaped a voracious interest in the visual portrayal of war. Both traditions developed a visual grammar for the portrayal of battle, yet the prevalence in Germany of the contemporary portrayal of individuals in war was not matched in Italy. This is partly explained by the strong link between regional loyalty and armed force, as well as by the undoubted role of the Emperor Maximilian's patronage of figures such as Burgkmair, Kolderer and Altdorfer. Maximilian was unequivocally a figure who understood the significance of modern warfare (whatever his chivalric inclinations). He therefore wished it to be vividly portrayed. Italy, where

<sup>88</sup> Yates, *Astraea*, pp. 154, 156, accounts of Vigenère and Mersenne.

<sup>89</sup> His, *Claude Le Jeune*, p. 283.

<sup>90</sup> Brantôme, *Vie des Dames Galantes*, ed. H. Vigneau (Paris, n.d.), p. 338 (6th Discours); M. Brenet, *La Musique militaire* (Paris, 1917), p. 37; F. Lesure, *Musicians and Poets of the French Renaissance* (New York, 1955), p. 38; J.G. Kastner, *Les Danses des morts* (Paris, 1852), p. 148.

<sup>91</sup> See A.V. Antonovics, "'Il semble que ce soit un vrai paradis terrestre": Charles VIII's Conquest of Naples and the French Renaissance', in Abulafia (ed.), *The French Descent*, pp. 311–25; Knecht, *Renaissance Warrior and Patron*, pp. 425–61.

<sup>92</sup> J.R. Hale, *Artists and Warfare in the Renaissance* (New Haven, Conn., 1990).



theory and classical tradition were much more dominant, had also developed complex traditions on the portrayal of war that impeded the kind of realistic approach to soldiers as individuals that was characteristic of Germany.

Hale could find little to say about France, though. He pointed out that there was little equivalent there for the mass market in woodcuts and paintings about soldiers and battle: 'In France the notion that a soldier, other than a well-born one in a portrait or on a tomb, might be imagined as an individual had no appeal.'<sup>93</sup> It was not until the wars of Religion were well under way that such a market emerged, particularly in the publication of Tortorel and Perrissin in 1570.<sup>94</sup> Thereafter, the demands of war propaganda, particularly but not exclusively on the Protestant side, fed a lively appetite for pictures of war. Of course, the portrayal of the individual soldier certainly became widespread in France from the early 17th century – with the 'artillery manual' of 1613<sup>95</sup> and in the works of Callot and later Lagniet.<sup>96</sup>

At first sight, it is puzzling that a society which had seen the fruition of the Franco-Burgundian school of illumination in the 14th and 15th centuries and had developed a sophisticated visual grammar for the depiction of war,<sup>97</sup> did not immediately go on to exploit the technology of print for the visual dissemination of news, propaganda or moral teaching. After all, Robert Scribner argued persuasively for the power of visual propaganda in 16th-century Germany,<sup>98</sup> and religion was not the exclusive field for this, as the role of visual propaganda in the Thirty Years War attests.<sup>99</sup> A number of reasons could be advanced for this. We may simply be looking at a matter of delay in cultural dissemination. It seems difficult, though, to understand why warlike France could be at the forefront in the realms of literature and music (as has been seen), but not in the visual arts. In Germany, the activities of the soldiery were ubiquitous and often uncontrolled in the later Middle Ages, perhaps more so than in France. This, though, is debatable. However, in Germany the market for woodcuts developed in urban contexts which were largely self-governing, unlike in France. Patronage was heavily aristocratic in France and Hale suggests that 'in a country where the dominant ethos of the patrons who commissioned secular works was militant, there was little interest in images that presented war in abstract or explanatory

<sup>93</sup> His makes a few remarks on the matter at pp. 257–63.

<sup>94</sup> P. Benedict, L.M. Bryant and K.B. Neuschel, 'Graphic History: What Readers Knew and Were Taught in the *Quarante Tableaux* of Perrissin and Tortorel', *French Historical Studies*, 28.ii (2005), 175–229.

<sup>95</sup> Vassalieu MS, in BL Add. 15726.

<sup>96</sup> Jacques Callot, *Les Misères et les mal-heurs de la guerre* (Paris, 1633); Jacques Lagniet, *Recueil des plus illustres proverbes* (Paris, 1663).

<sup>97</sup> See D. Conty, J. Maurice and M. Gueret-Laferté, *Images de la Guerre de Cent Ans* (Paris, 2002); N. Hurel, 'La Représentation de la violence dans l'illustration des chroniques universelles en rouleau', in Contamine and Guyotjeannin (eds), *La Guerre, la violence et les gens au Moyen Age*, vol. I, studies of the Gruthuse Froissart.

<sup>98</sup> R.W. Scribner, *For the Sake of Simple Folk: Popular Propaganda for the German Reformation* (Cambridge, 1981).

<sup>99</sup> J. Tanis and D. Horst, *Images of Discord: a Graphic Interpretation of the Opening Decades of the Thirty Years War* (Bryn Mawr, Penn., 1993).



form.<sup>100</sup> Publishing in France, after its initial surge in the 1470s, receded in the late 15th century and many of the smaller presses folded. Provincial presses did not bounce back until the mid-16th century. Moreover, the large-scale production of printed maps was also late to develop there, coming largely after the middle of the 16th century. Finally, it may be suggested that it took a religious reformation to generate a real market for visual propaganda (and that this only happened in France after 1560). Yet Hale's work makes it clear that the genre of military portrayal was an independent tradition in Germany.<sup>101</sup>

In other contexts, the glorification of the military achievements (however questionable) of the Emperors Maximilian I and Charles V generated a demand for images of war. It could perhaps be argued that the relative lack of success of French arms in the Italian wars muffled a similar development in France. This seems improbable. French writers on war, particularly the memoirists, were not slow to exploit such victories as were gained by France to glorify their country and their King. Moreover, the continuing centrality of the military mentality in the self-definition of the nobility provided a market.

It is, of course, the case that artists played their part in the celebration of victories and the affirmation of the claims of the Kings of France.<sup>102</sup> It remains, though, that the visual depiction of battle took time to emerge in printed form in France. Explanation is not therefore a simple matter. It is clear that in some respects high art in France was heavily dominated (as was military architecture after all) by imported Italians, painters, draughtsmen and sculptors who worked for a royal and princely clientele. These imported the classical and idealistic view of war prevalent in Italy. As for printed works, the French could simply import their maps and pictures from Germany, Italy and the Netherlands and there is no reason to suppose that the market in France was not a lively one. The absence of a developing French tradition for the depiction of war may partly result from this temporary dependence as well as the strong attachment of Renaissance artists in France to classical motifs that may have left them reluctant to portray war in strictly contemporary terms.

It is important to distinguish between commissions for private patrons and publications for a wider market. France continued the traditions of medieval manuscript illumination on the events of war until the end of the 15th century but aristocratic patronage for this medium then began to dwindle. In terms of printed works, there is little more to go on than the conventional depiction of a contemporary man-at-arms, such as the one to be found on the title page of volume II of the widely-read 1488 edition of *La Mer des Histoires*.<sup>103</sup> Such depictions of war remained largely archaic and conventional. The one

<sup>100</sup> Hale, *Artists and Warfare*, p. 261.

<sup>101</sup> J.R. Hale, 'The Soldier in Germanic Graphic Art of the Renaissance', in R.I. Rotberg and T.K. Rabb (eds), *Art and History: Images and their Meaning* (Cambridge, 1988), pp. 85–114, at p. 112: 'The Germanic image of the soldier and military genre were fully developed before the Reformation.'

<sup>102</sup> R.W. Scheller, 'Ensigns of Authority: French Royal Absolutism in the Age of Louis XII', *Simiolus*, 13 (1983–4), 75–141; idem, 'Imperial Themes in Art and Literature of the Early French Renaissance: the Period of Charles VIII', *Simiolus*, 12 (1981–2), 5–69.

<sup>103</sup> A. Martin, *Le Livre illustré en France au XV<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Paris, 1931), pl. xviii.

exception that proved the rule was the justly famous 1495 print of the battle of Fornovo that went on being copied into the mid-16th century and may have influenced Tortorel and Perrissin.<sup>104</sup> (Plate 10) Hale considered this to be the only such French attempt to depict battle in printed form until 1560. The print embraces the battle as a whole, depicts it in contemporary (not classical) mode and provides a believable visual commentary on the action, especially its confusion and turbulence. It shares the general tradition of a three-part ‘register’ of action: the foreground in detail (the break-up of the French baggage train and slaughter of the ‘stradiots’), the middle ground (clash of infantry and cavalry) and the landscape background (the crossing of the river Taro). The conventions for battle are not much further developed by Tortorel and Perrissin in 1570. That publication sought to place its images in a general context of news reporting and provide a subtle Huguenot view of history. It did so by producing believable images, though the visual grammar of battle portrayal are quite traditional.<sup>105</sup>

If we look at private commissions in other media, however, there is more to be said. Manuscript chronicles continued into the 16th century to be equipped with serious programmes of illuminated illustration. For the most part these were fairly traditional.<sup>106</sup> In the case of the miniatures executed by a young Lyonnais artist for the *Alarmes de Mars*, c.1500, the artist, in depicting soldiers equipped in Louis XII’s colours of red and yellow, effected a fusion between late medieval French styles of portrayal of war and Renaissance *encadrement*.<sup>107</sup> Closely related to this work is the series of eleven accomplished illuminations executed around 1509, probably by Jean Bourdichon, for Jean Marot’s verse celebrating Louis XII’s expedition to Genoa, showing the King and his army marching out of Alessandria, artillery on the march, the capture of a fortress and his entry into Genoa.<sup>108</sup> This took shape in the entourage of Anne of Brittany but Bourdichon had long been employed at court to depict scenes of war and paint standards and was also capable of incorporating Renaissance *encadrement*.<sup>109</sup> (Plate 9) The taste for such work is illustrated by Louis XII’s request while at Asti in 1507 for a copy of a chanson by the composer Antoine de Févin with

<sup>104</sup> Washington, National Gallery, Lessing J. Rosenwald Collection. For a mid-16th century copy of this, updated in costume, see the 1555 edition of *La Mer des hystoires*.

<sup>105</sup> Benedict *et al.*, ‘Graphic History’.

<sup>106</sup> Jean d’Auton, *Chronique de l’an 1500 ... contenant les ultramontanes gestes de François Ier*, BN fr. 5083, e.g. Ligny and Trivulzio leaving Milan in 1500.

<sup>107</sup> *Alarmes de Mars sur le voyage de Milan avec la conquête et entrée d’icelle*, BN fr. 5089, e.g. the miniature on the entry of Louis XII into Milan; see illustration in J.-L. Fournel and J.-C. Zancarini, *Les Guerres d’Italie* (Paris, 2003), p. 28. F. Avril and N. Reynaud, *Les Manuscrits à peinture en France, 1440–1520* (Paris, 1993), p. 261; N. Hochner, *Louis XII: les Dérèglements de l’image royale (1498–1515)* (Seyssel, 2006), pp. 96–100.

<sup>108</sup> Jean Marot, *Le Voyage de Gênes*, c.1508, BN fr. 5091: ed. G. Trisolini (Geneva: Droz, 1974); C. Couderc, *Les Miniatures du Voiage de Gênes de Jean Marot d’après la manuscrit fr. 5091 de la Bibliothèque Nationale* (Paris, 1928).

<sup>109</sup> Avril and Reynaud, *Manuscrits à peinture*, p. 302; D. MacGibbon, *Jean Bourdichon: Court Painter of the Fifteenth Century* (Glasgow, 1933), p. 184 (the Triptych of Saint-Antoine-de-Loches), 139 (payments for painting ‘six men-at-arms’ in 1490). MacGibbon had nothing to say on *Le Voyage de Gênes*.

illustrations by ‘Jean de Paris’ (Perréal) so that he could show them to the ladies of the court.<sup>110</sup>

An illumination, usually attributed to a ‘Maître de la Ratière’, of the battle of Marignano must be nearly contemporary and observes the usual battle-piece conventions of a detailed foreground with individual encounters (here Francis’s own charge at the head of his *gendarmérie* is the main feature), with the shock of pikemen in the middle ground and artillery prominently displayed (here the debt to the Fornovo print is clear). The *paysage* in the background conveys the subsidiary action.<sup>111</sup> (**Plate 11**)

Italianate/classical portrayal of war and contemporary style is evident in the sculptural detail of Francis I’s tomb at Saint-Denis. (**Plate 19**) In April 1551, the sculptor Pierre Bontemps concluded an agreement with the architect Philibert de L’Orme to execute the famous bas-reliefs. The images he constructed have been widely reproduced as illustrations of war, particularly of Marignano. In fact, they represent Bontemps’s particular response to the memory of the battle transmitted by various sources and interpreted through his own version of artistic conventions in the 1550s. In the precise words of the contract, he was to

Portray the history of the defeat of the Swiss according to the text of the annals and chronicles of France ... in which frieze the said histories will be sculpted in low relief ... garnished with knights, infantry, artillery, banners, standards, trumpets, clarions, drums, fifes, baggage, towns, castles and other things following the historical truth of the chronicle.<sup>112</sup>

In October 1552, Bontemps signed a contract in very similar terms for bas-reliefs for the tomb showing the battle of Ceresole.<sup>113</sup> As Maurice Roy pointed out, de L’Orme specified the range of figures to be included but it was Bontemps and his collaborator, François Marchant, who devised the details.

How did great aristocrats seek to portray themselves in their tombs? To some extent we are hampered by extensive destruction during the Revolution, but substantial records of them survive as well as some superb preserved examples. One theme is the dominance of classics. The tomb of Alberto Pio, prince of Carpi, a favourite of Francis I, by Rosso (1535), originally at the Cordeliers in Paris, now in the Louvre, shows him half-reclining, in Roman armour. The supporting sarcophagus seems to have paid little reference to his military role.<sup>114</sup> The traditional aristocratic tomb showing the warrior noble also continued. The bas-reliefs for Gaston de Foix’s tomb portrayed battle in largely classical terms.<sup>115</sup> Galiot de Genouillac’s at Assier showed him appropriately as *grand maître de l’artillerie* leaning on a cannon and at a siege scene. The church itself is surrounded by a remarkable – perhaps unique – frieze showing the role of

<sup>110</sup> Pr. by Maulde la Clavière, *Revue de l’art français*, (1886), p. 9.

<sup>111</sup> Musée Condé, Chantilly.

<sup>112</sup> M. Roy, *Artistes et monuments de la Renaissance en France* (Paris, 1929), p. 174.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 177–8.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 142–6.

<sup>115</sup> Turin, Museo Civico d’arte Antica.

artillery in war.<sup>116</sup> (**Plate 18**) Other examples – Jean d’Humières, Guillaume du Bellay – are traditional.

Coins and medals were a significant vehicle for visual messages about war. Though a couple of French medals have survived from the early 15th century, probably commissioned by the duke of Berry and representing classical themes, commemorative medals began in 1451 with a series of gold pieces, issued by Charles VII, to celebrate his victories against the English.<sup>117</sup> (**Plate 3, i**) Kings from Charles VIII to Francis I were presented with medals by cities, such as the one Lyon issued in 1494 on the occasion of the King’s departure on his first Italian campaign and that of Tours for Louis XII in 1499, with the inscription ‘Victor.Triumphator.Semper.Augustus’ with the King’s porcupine badge.<sup>118</sup> (**Plate 3, ii**) Another, with a fine portrait of Louis and Anne in coronation robes, declared: ‘Ludovico XII regnante Ceasare altero gaudet omnis nacio.’<sup>119</sup> The ‘Maximus Franciscus Francorum Dux’ medal of 1512 shows only Francis I’s bust. His conquests were marked by medals struck in Italy or by Italians, the most famous being by Cellini, in which the reverse shows a knight in classical armour conquering a naked woman, Fortuna.<sup>120</sup> Early in his reign, though, a number of Italian medals appeared to commemorate his victories.<sup>121</sup> Francis commissioned several showing himself as a laurel-crowned Roman Emperor on the obverse, one with the inscription ‘Domitor Elvetiorum’ and another with a design combining trophies of war on the reverse with the inscription ‘Vici ab uno Caesar victos’ (I have conquered those whom Caesar first conquered).<sup>122</sup> (**Plate 4, ii**) Shortly afterwards appeared a medal with a depiction of an army and a city in the background and the enigmatic inscription ‘DOQM’ (possibly ‘Dominus Que Mediolani’).<sup>123</sup> The recovery of Tournai in 1519 was also commemorated by a medal.<sup>124</sup> (**Plate 4, i and iv**)

Though a few medals of Francis I’s later years celebrated the King’s

<sup>116</sup> Galiot commissioned a similar, though more limited, freize, at Lonzac, see Vaux de Foletier, *Galiot de Genouillac*, pp. 123–7, 143–7; anon., ‘A propos de la frise d’Assier: système de repérage des bas reliefs et description sommaire’, *Bulletin de la Société des Etudes littéraires, scientifiques et artistiques du Lot*, 96.i (1986), 97.i (1987).

<sup>117</sup> M. Jones, *The Art of the Medal* (London, 1979), pp. 8–9, 52; Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, cat. 1–2. The reverse inscription: ‘Quant ie fu fait sans diférance au prudent roi ami de Dieu on obeissoit par tout en France fors a Calais qui est fort lieu’ contains the date 1451 in the letters IVLCM.

<sup>118</sup> Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, no. 22, obv.: ‘Felix.Fortuna.Div.Exploratum. Actulit. 1493’; no. 26 (Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. VI, no. 1). Some of these medals made much of the King’s titles as duke of Milan, King of Sicily and Jerusalem.

<sup>119</sup> Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, no. 27 (Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. IV, no. 6).

<sup>120</sup> Armand, *Médailleurs italiens*, I, p. 147, no. 3.

<sup>121</sup> Most notably that with the obv. inscription ‘Franciscus Primus Fr Invictissimus’ and on the reverse, a battle, presumably that of Marignano, Armand, *Médailleurs italiens*, I, pp. 187–8.

<sup>122</sup> Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. VIII, nos. 1 and 2. There is a version of the latter in circulation which must be a 19th century interpretation.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, pl. VII, no. 5.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, pl. VIII, no. 3, obv.: ‘Pace stabilita et recepto a Britannis Tornaco’, with an image of peace seated, olive branch in one hand, casting arms into the flames with another.

courage and improbable role as defender of Christendom,<sup>125</sup> medal manufacture became a more explicit vehicle for political propaganda only during the reign of Henri II. This was aided by the overhaul of the royal mint's manufacturing processes between 1547 and 1550 (involving a new mechanical press), and partly prompted by Henri II's desire to improve his own imagery on the coinage and the artistic quality of minting. The engraver Marc Bechot (c.1520–1557) was appointed the first *tailleur graveur général* in 1547 and took responsibility for the design of the most widespread silver coins, the *testons*, as well as for the design of commemorative medals.<sup>126</sup> The artist and designer Etienne Delaune and Guillaume Martin also participated in this work. In the case of the latter we have the text of the commission for him to manufacture 60 gold pieces equivalent to 6 écus for the King to distribute to German officers in his service. These were to bear a crescent and imperial crown and were probably designed with the King's 'Donec totum impleat orbem' motto.<sup>127</sup> (See also **Plate 8, ii**) Medal images were widely understood in a context of symbolism and allegory and the images conveyed were also sometimes deployed in printed form.<sup>128</sup> Henri II's Perseus and Andromeda medal (showing a young King on the obverse and Perseus rescuing Andromeda from the sea monster on the reverse) may have been issued to commemorate the recovery of Boulogne in 1550.<sup>129</sup> (**Plate 5, i**) It is certainly paralleled by the peace allegory in the portrait of Sir John Luttrell commemorating the treaty of Boulogne.<sup>130</sup> Two mintings by Marc Bechot of 1552 make political messages much clearer. Henri II in one is shown proclaiming his role of protector of German liberties and of Italy while in the other as a composite deity commemorating victories in Germany and Italy.<sup>131</sup> (**Plate 7, ii and iii**) The Metz medal bears the image of the duke of Guise on the obverse and an accomplished panorama of its capture on the reverse. The point is driven home by medals by both Bechot and Delaune commemorating victories in Germany, Italy and Flanders. (**Plates 6, iii; 7, i; 8, i**)<sup>132</sup> Another medal

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, pl. VIII, nos. 5, 7 (Cellini), pl. X, no. 5.

<sup>126</sup> Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, pp. xxxviii–xl.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, p. xlvi, docs. 43 and 45.

<sup>128</sup> See *Bib.II*, 122aa.

<sup>129</sup> Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, cat. 340 (Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. XII, no. 5). Armand, *Médailleurs italiens*, II, p. 248, no. 2, lists this as an Italian medal. The obv. Greek inscription seems to mean 'I fight in all ways.'

<sup>130</sup> F.A. Yates, 'The Allegorical Portraits of Sir John Luttrell', in D. Fraser, H. Hibbard and M. J. Lewine (eds), *Essays in the History of Art Presented to Rudolf Wittkower* (London, 1967).

<sup>131</sup> One obverse has 'Et pace et bello arma movet' and image of the King standing as a laurel-crowned God bearing the sword and the staff of peace. The reverse has 'Fortiter gestas ob res in Ital. Germ. et Gal.' This commemorates the German and Italian campaigns (Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, cat. 89–90; Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. XIII, no. 1). On the prototype for the King's portrayal, see F. Bardon, 'Sur un Portrait de François Ier', *L'Information de l'histoire de l'art*, 8 (1963), 1–7. The other medal is inscribed 'Libertas: Vindex Italicae et Germanicae Libertatis, 1552' with a bonnet of liberty supported by two swords (Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, cat. 91; Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. XIII, no. 3), a reference to a medal of Brutus.

<sup>132</sup> Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, cat. 408: 'Haec tibi Meta'.

of Henri II in the Louvre shows peace between two armies on the reverse and may relate to the truce of Vaucelles.<sup>133</sup> (**Plate 6, ii**) Two splendid medals were issued, designed by Antonio de Rossi, for the taking of Calais in 1558. Both versions are inscribed on the reverse ‘Maiora Sequentur’ and both pay tribute to Roman imperial coinage showing victorious emperors.<sup>134</sup> (**Plate 8, iii**) A medal by Martin of 1559 alludes further to victories in peace and war with the motto ‘Sua.Circuit.Orbe.Fama’ and the image of ‘Renown’ holding a palm in one hand and a trumpet in the other.<sup>135</sup> This is adapted from Delaune’s similar design of 1551. (**Plate 5, ii**)

Another vehicle for the glorification of war was parade armour, often not even designed for use in jousts but more as elaborate trophies and increasingly influenced by Renaissance motifs. Few French examples have survived from before the later years of Francis I, though we have two versions of François Clouet’s equestrian portrait of Francis which show him in parade armour that has not survived. Surviving pieces range from full suits of armour to shields, morions, helmets etc.<sup>136</sup> In particular there are a number of important surviving full suits of armour made for Henri II. One (in the Royal Armouries, Leeds) is elaborately embossed and made by Giovanni Paolo Negrolì of Milan. Caparisons for horses could be equally decorated with embossing, for example the panel made for a horse of Henri II by Etienne Delaune, the medallist.<sup>137</sup> It is now clear from designs preserved in Munich that Delaune played a crucial role in the development of a French school of armour design in the middle decades of the 16th century. He designed the bucklers in the Louvre and New York for which drawings by him survive<sup>138</sup> and the full suit of armour, also in New York. (**Plate 22**) This retains its original painting and gilding and includes at the centre of the breastplate a Roman warrior receiving tribute.<sup>139</sup> Other pieces are connected with public events: a *bourguinotte* made for Henri II,<sup>140</sup> with putti blowing horns

<sup>133</sup> This (undated) medal shows the King crowned by victory and shaking hands with another figure, both at the head of armies. This may show Henri II and Guise after the Metz campaign or symbolise the truce of Vaucelles (Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. XIII, no. 7).

<sup>134</sup> Armand, *Médailleurs italiens*, I, p. 243, nos. 1 and 2. The second of these also has the motto: ‘Exactis.Britannis.et.Caeto.Guiniaque.Recept.’ (Lenormant, *Trésor*, pl. XI, no. 6). The image is of the King as a Roman emperor on horseback preceded by two soldiers bearing standards.

<sup>135</sup> Mazerolle, *Médailleurs français*, no. 118.

<sup>136</sup> J.A. Godoy and S. Leydi, *Parures triomphales* (Geneva, 2003); J. Rieu, ‘La Décoration des armures au XVIe ou le corps du prince’, in *L’Homme de guerre au XVIe siècle*, ed. G.-A. Perouse, A. Thierry and A. Tournon (Saint-Etienne, 1992); S. Grancsay, ‘The Armor of Henry II of France from the Louvre Museum’, *Bulletin of the Metropolitan Museum of Art*, 11 (1952), 68–80.

<sup>137</sup> Louvre, ECL 1346.

<sup>138</sup> Louvre, Mi. 57; New York, Metropolitan Museum, Harris Brisbane Dick Fund, 34.85.

<sup>139</sup> New York, Metropolitan Museum, Dick Fund, 39.121. The preparatory drawings by Delaune are in the Graphisches Sammlung, Munich, see B. Thomas, ‘Die Münchner Harnischvorzeichnungen des Etienne Delaune für die Emblem- und die Schlangen-Garnitur Heinrichs II. von Frankreich’, *Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorisches Sammlungen in Wien*, 56 (1960), 7–62; idem, ‘Die Münchner Waffenvorzeichnungen des Etienne Delaune und die Prunkschilder Heinrichs II. von Frankreich’, *ibid.*, 58 (1962), 101–68.

<sup>140</sup> Godoy and Leydi, *Parures*, no. 6 (Musée de l’armée H 143).



and a double crescent and HD device. This almost certainly coupled the parade shield in the Wallace Collection, also made for Henri II (of Milanese manufacture), featuring Scipio and the surrender of Zama in 202 BC. The reference may well be to the surrender of Boulogne in 1550 or of Calais in 1558.<sup>141</sup> This is paralleled by the equally elaborate parade shields in the Louvre, New York and Turin. (**Plates 20 and 21**) In fact, there are at least six surviving shields in collections throughout the world based on Delaune's designs and possibly commissioned for the armoury at Fontainebleau planned by Henri II.<sup>142</sup>

While French artists had little to commemorate after Marignano and did little even for that, Italian artists, as has been seen, seldom engaged directly with wars in this period, even though from 1494 to 1559 the peninsula was the focus for much of the international conflict. An accomplished Italian engraving of the first stage of the battle of Ravenna appeared in 1512 and became the source for much interpretation by subsequent artists.<sup>143</sup> This print not only provides a stirring evocation of French men-at-arms and *Landsknecht* allies but also pays tribute to the role of artillery in the battle. Otherwise, only an eight-sheet woodcut of the battle of Marignano, highly archaic in style, printed by Zuan Andrea Vavasori, survives from this period. This seems to have emerged from Venice as a tribute to the intervention of Alviano's artillery in the outcome of the battle. Since this has only survived in one copy, it raises the problem of how many other such works were produced in Italy that have not survived.<sup>144</sup> Be that as it may, the great outpouring of visual commemoration of the battle of Pavia emerges essentially from Germany and the Low Countries. Not surprisingly, there was little appetite in France to produce works of this kind.

The court of Maximilian had seen the development of a highly-skilled tradition of battle painting through such projects as the *Triumphzug* in the Vienna Albertina that commemorated the Emperor's wars and was partly created by Altdorfer. This, in the context of a Germany that produced works by Holbein and Dürer on battles (notably Dürer's 1527 siege woodcut) as well as similar works by lesser-known figures such as Baldung and Burgkmair. German artists were therefore in a good position to respond to the demand for visual accounts of Pavia based usually on detailed written accounts, rarely if ever on eye-witness observation. Otherwise, Hans Schäufelein produced a two-page woodcut, highly evocative in its portrayal of German soldiery but scarcely credible as a representation of the battle, and Jorg Breu a bird's eye view of the siege and battle. Wolf Huber made a similar tumultuous drawing that was the basis of the tomb sculptures of his patron Niklas von Salm, commander of *Landsknechts*

<sup>141</sup> James Mann, *Wallace Collection Catalogues: European Arms and Armour* (London, 1962).

<sup>142</sup> Louvre, MS 118; New York, Metropolitan Museum, S. Grancsay, 'A Shield of Henry II of France', *Bulletin of the Metropolitan Museum of Art*, 29 (1934), 212–16; H. Nickel, 'The Battle of the Crescent', *ibid.*, n.s. 24.3 (1965), 110–28.

<sup>143</sup> Hale, *Artists and Warfare*, pp. 140–1.

<sup>144</sup> The only complete copy to survive is in the Zurich Zentralbibliothek: Hale, pp. 143–4.



at the siege.<sup>145</sup> Another category of paintings sought more closely to depict the sequence of events, notably the imperial army's outflanking attack through the wall of Mirabello park. The two commemorative paintings in the Royal Armouries and the Ashmolean may have been produced by anti-Habsburg Italian exiles. Ruprecht Heller's painting in Stockholm comes closest to conveying the nighttime 'camisado' involved. Other examples of this type are by the School of Jan Patinier, highly stilted and placing the surrender of Francis clearly in the foreground<sup>146</sup> and a panel usually said to be of Flemish origin in the Kress Collection, Birmingham, Alabama, painted in sombre colours and moving from the foreground depiction of individual *Landsknechts* through to the 'camisado' attack in the middle ground.<sup>147</sup>

Pavia, widely understood as a decisive and remarkable battle, was perhaps an exception. Only the prints would have had any chance of circulation in France of course. These become increasingly important from the 1540s onwards. Just as maps were imported from abroad, so also were battle-prints. Here, contrary to Hale's view on Italian artists in the period, we can detect a lively production line in Italy, which produced numerous battle prints for the French and Netherlandish markets in this period. A precursor for these may have been the print of the siege of La Mirandola in 1511.<sup>148</sup> From the mid-16th century, these became numerous. The recovery of Boulogne in 1550 was commemorated by a remarkable Italian print showing a vivid topographical awareness of the region if some invention in its portrayal of fortifications.<sup>149</sup> (**Plate 12, i**) The French campaign itself was commemorated by a print by Hieronymus Cock, the Antwerp publisher and artist in 1549.<sup>150</sup> A 1557 print of the capture of Saint-Quentin and the associated battle, dedicated to Philip II and Emmanuel Philibert, shows the same characteristics and almost certainly formed the basis for the commemoration of the battle by Granello and Castello in the Sala de batallas at the Escorial.<sup>151</sup> (**Plate 15**) In the following year, numerous Italian prints were issued to commemorate the capture of Calais,<sup>152</sup> Guînes,<sup>153</sup> the battle of Gravelines<sup>154</sup> and the siege of Thionville.<sup>155</sup> (**Plates 13 and 14**) It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that there

<sup>145</sup> F. Winzinger, *Wolf Huber; Das Gesamtwerk*, 2 vols (Munich, 1979).

<sup>146</sup> Vienna Kunsthistorisches Museum, Inv. No. 5660.

<sup>147</sup> Birmingham, Alabama, Museum of Art, Kress Collection.

<sup>148</sup> Siege of La Mirandola, BN Estampes.

<sup>149</sup> 'Bologna in Francia', 'Questo e il vero ritratto di Bologna in Francia ... al presente assediato dal Christianissimo Re di Francia' (BM Prints and Drawings).

<sup>150</sup> 'Boloniae maritimae per Anglos Gallis ademptae ab Henrico Valesio...' Copy preserved in the Cambridge University Library, copy of Braun, *Civitates Orbis terrarum* (1577-8) L\*7 13(A).

<sup>151</sup> 'S. Quintino' (BM Prints and Drawings).

<sup>152</sup> 'Il vero ritratto di Cales preso à Inglesi ...' (BM Prints and Drawings).

<sup>153</sup> 'Ritratto della fortezza di Ghines presa per forza de englesi ...' (BM Prints and Drawings).

<sup>154</sup> 'Eccouci amantissimi lectori il uero sito della bataglia data nel anno 1558 ... intorno a Gravellina' (BM Prints and Drawings).

<sup>155</sup> 'Vera Thionvillae effigies sum ... cecidit ille Stroza Italum Petrus gloria summa ducem' (BM Prints and Drawings).

was now a very lively market for such prints (they have survived in fair quantities) in France as elsewhere.

The contrast between these works and the few prints issued by French publishers to commemorate the same events is instructive. These may have been based on drawings by Nicolas de Nicolay, *geographe du roi*, who had already issued a map of the Boulonnais and Calésis. The print of the siege of Guînes certainly explicitly declares this<sup>156</sup> and its companion piece on the siege of Calais was sold in the same street, the rue Montorgueil, centre for the production of images in Paris.<sup>157</sup> (**Plate 17**) The distinguishing characteristic of both these prints is their archaic technique. The view of Calais shows the castle twice, once in its proper place and once projected forward in order to show its detail.<sup>158</sup>

France, then, was slow to participate in mass-produced visual imagery of war but developed a market for battle commemoration produced abroad and also a highly sophisticated ‘luxury’ end of the market in medals, armour and sculpture. Hale’s general perception stands but needs some nuance.

<sup>156</sup> ‘Le vray pourtraict de la ville & Chasteau de Guînes’ (‘On le vend à Paris, en la rue de Montorgueil. À l’enseigne du Pasteur’), BN Est. Va 148. The main difference between this and the Italian print is that it shows the lower town fortified only by fascines and not by stone ramparts and towers.

<sup>157</sup> ‘Le pourtraict de la ville de Calais, fait au naturel’ (‘On le vend à Paris, rue de Montorgueil, au Cœur nauré’): Bibliothèque Mazarine, 5921 F9e/ 2 Rés. See J. Adhémar, ‘La Rue Montorgueil et la formation d’un groupe d’imagiers parisiens au XVIes siècle’, *Le Vieux Papier*, 21 (1951), 25–34.

<sup>158</sup> This depiction of the castle is remarkably similar to that in the now destroyed Cowdray frescos commissioned by Sir Anthony Browne. See Potter, *Un Homme de guerre*, pl. 3.

## War, Renaissance Culture and the Literary World

### War, ideas and public opinion

The previous chapters centred on interpretations of public events to a greater or lesser extent guided from the court but we need to know how far knowledge of public affairs spread throughout society; in other words, how was the informed non-political observer to make sense of war in public policy during the Renaissance? Printing gave a further purchase to the intellectual critique of war that developed from the medieval just war doctrine and the exploration of ancient texts. The early years of Francis I saw intellectual circles across Europe engaging in a formidable critique of war.<sup>1</sup> Erasmus's *Dulce bellum inexpertis* of 1515, the *Institutio* of 1516 and the *Querela pacis* of 1517 were known in France, but how widely disseminated were they?<sup>2</sup> There was no separate edition of the *Querela* in France after 1530. By 1559 and the placing of Erasmus's works on the Index (limited to expurgation in 1564), his very name was a problem and they seem to have been little read later in the century. Indeed, the *Querela* was not fully translated into French until 1924. Despite Erasmus's complimentary remarks in the *Querela* on France as the citadel of Christendom and hopes placed in Francis I's desire for peace, his ambiguous ideas on the just war – including the view that an unjust peace is better than a just war – and condemnation of bellicose prelates, aroused hostility. Moreover, his strictures, both in the *Dulce bellum* and the *Querela*, on the futility of dynastic war and his insistence in the *Institutio* on the idea that war must always be a last resort, could hardly have won him many friends in high places (and this despite his apparent resiling from his earlier pacifism by 1530).<sup>3</sup> Louis de Berquin's lost translation of the *Querela* was condemned in 1526 (the assumption being that a vernacular text was more harmful). When edited translations did appear later in the century they cut out attacks on the clergy and some of Erasmus's strictures about war with the Turk. The first reasonably close adaptation in French had to await Charles Sevin's *Complainte de la paix* of 1570. In this case, Erasmus's

<sup>1</sup> J.H. Hexter, *The Vision of Politics on the Eve of the Reformation: More, Machiavelli and Seyssel* (New York, 1973); R.P. Adams, *The Better Part of Valor* (Seattle, Was., 1962).

<sup>2</sup> J. Hutton, 'Erasmus and France: the Propaganda for Peace', *Studies in the Renaissance*, 8 (1961), 103–27.

<sup>3</sup> J.A. Fernandez, 'Erasmus on the Just War', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 34.ii (1973), 209–76. In 1532 Erasmus wrote to Francis I defining the King's right to the 'sword': *ibid.*, pp. 223–4; *Opus epistolarum Erasmi*, V, p. 354 (no. 1400).

conception of war as a civil war within Christendom was peculiarly suitable for the circumstances of 1569.<sup>4</sup>

Other cases illustrate the range of earlier Erasmian influences. Josse Clichtove, who examined Berquin's work, published his own *De Bello et pace opusculum* at Paris in 1523, which echoes Erasmus and is even more critical of warrior clergy. He toned down the attack on war, though, for recovering lost lands or attacking the Turks. He is generally more influenced by the tradition of just war.<sup>5</sup> Claude Colet's *L'Oraison de Mars aux dames de la Court* published in 1544, to celebrate the peace of Crépy, forms part of the French tradition of 'remonstrances' in favour of peace, also influenced by the ideas of Erasmus. Here Mars declares, in terms not far removed from Bovet's *L'Arbre des batailles*, that war is the natural state of man. The response of the ladies of the court is formulated along the lines of Erasmus's 'portrait of man' in the *Bellum*: animals may be designed for fighting but man is born weak 'to do good to all creatures.'<sup>6</sup> It concludes, after declaring the miseries of war, with an appeal to Kings to consider the miseries of their people.

Guillaume Aubert's published speech, the *Oraison de paix* of 1559, was written to celebrate the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis by a lawyer associated with the Pléiade, who had edited the first collected edition of du Bellay. Indeed, though we are often told that the nobility greeted that peace with dismay, the literary world seems almost ecstatic.<sup>7</sup> Aubert is also heavily dependent on Erasmus's *Dulce Bellum* in his discussion of the unnatural state of war and his condemnation of the ambition of Kings and their greed for glory. He echoes some Erasmian ideas in imagining a Brazilian Indian sent to France by Villegaignon gazing at the assembled armies near Amiens in the summer of 1558. His own contribution is the rather whimsical idea of arbitration between princes and the deposition of those who refuse to submit to it.

The other side of the picture is represented by Erasmus's contemporary Guillaume Budé, whose *Institution du Prince*, though influenced by Erasmus's *Institutio*, is only a pale reflection of Erasmian pacifism.<sup>8</sup> The works of French humanists, though they may have paid tribute to Erasmus, tended, in the words of Paul Chilton, to 'evaporate into patriotic enthusiasm' when, as in 1521, they were confronted by real war. Thus Budé's letters of 1521 exulted in French successes against invaders, while French aggression was played down.<sup>9</sup> Rabelais was far from being a straightforward Erasmian pacifist, despite Grandgousier's offer of peace talks in chapters 26–7 of *Gargantua*. Indeed, the limits of his pacifism are clear in the prologue and chapter 1 of the *Tiers Livre* of 1542 (pr. 1546), written as part of French justifications for the occupation of Piedmont. Here, war appears as

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 122.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., pp. 108–9.

<sup>6</sup> Bib.II, 96: pp. 27–30; Hutton, 'Erasmus and France', p. 113.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 117.

<sup>8</sup> C. Bontemps et al. (eds), *Le Prince dans la France des XVI et XVII siècles* (Paris, 1969).

<sup>9</sup> G. Budé, *Budaei epistolae graecae*, ed. A. Pichon (Paris, 1574), pp. 81–5; P. Chilton, 'Humanism and War in Rabelais and Montaigne', in Mulryne and Shewring (eds), *War, Literature and the Arts*, pp. 118–43, at p. 121; A.C. Keller, 'Anti-War Writing in France, 1500–1560', *Publications of the Modern Language Association*, 67 (1952), 240–50.

‘the father of all good things,’ though the argument is qualified by ambiguity and obscurity.<sup>10</sup> In the *Quart livre*, war is proclaimed, surely ironically, as one of the material gifts of ‘Messer Gaster’ (the belly) for conserving material life, along with agriculture, mathematics, water-mills etc. Having in *Pantagruel* described artillery as ‘diabolical’, Rabelais now praises it.<sup>11</sup> The ambiguity, though, is still evident in the passages in which he goes on to deal with the human drive to master the world.<sup>12</sup>

### War and the literary world

Literary works also exploited the theme of the horrors of war without working in a systematic tradition, such as that deployed by Erasmus. Though they seldom stepped beyond a publicly acceptable view of foreign policy, to regard them as simply one-sided propaganda would be simplistic. Their scope for comment, in a society which regarded the conduct of relations with foreign princes as beyond open public discussion, was limited to specific failings. Jean d’Auton, wrote a lengthy poem on the failures and inadequacies of the Garigliano campaign as did Pierre Gringore.<sup>13</sup> Others, including Rabelais, commented adversely on war in general, in close connection with those engaged in struggles for influence at court.

When Rabelais published his *Gargantua* at Lyon late in 1535, the year of Charles V’s expedition to Tunis and of Rabelais’s own visit to Italy with his patron the ambassador Jean du Bellay, he included an oblique yet telling mockery of the Emperor in the figure of Picrochole. The fictional Picrocholine War started with a quarrel between Grandgousier’s shepherds and the cake-bakers (*fouaciers*) of Lerné. King Picrochole, enemy of Grandgousier, is by his name a bitter and choleric King, who parodies local family enemies and the Emperor at the same time. Grandgousier does not at first understand the cause of Picrochole’s anger and, when he finds out about the cakes, offers to return them. Picrochole is implacable and Grandgousier sends to negotiate and deliver a harangue in favour of peace with the words: ‘Where is faith? Where is law? Where is reason? Where is humanity?’<sup>14</sup> A close analogy can be found in the battle between the two villages of Flameaux and Vindelless in du Fail’s *Propos rustiques*, similarly grown from an obscure cause and exacerbated by boasting and insults that could easily invite analogies with wars between princes.<sup>15</sup> This

<sup>10</sup> F. Rabelais, *Le Tiers Livre* (1546), ed. M. Screech (Textes littéraires français, 102) (Geneva, 1964), p. 12: ‘I have little reason for not agreeing with the good Heraclitus in affirming that war is the father of all good things.’

<sup>11</sup> F. Rabelais, *Le Quart Livre* (1552), ed. A. Lefranc *et al.* (Paris, 1955); ed. R. Marichal (Geneva, 1947), ch. 61.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, ch. 61–2.

<sup>13</sup> ‘Le deffault du Garillant’, in D’Auton, III, pp. 340–6; Pierre Gringore, *Les Folles entreprises*, in *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. A. de Montaignon and C. d’Héricault, 2 vols (Paris, 1858), I, p. 31.

<sup>14</sup> F. Rabelais, *Gargantua* (1535), ed. M. Screech and R. Calder (Geneva, 1970), p. 185.

<sup>15</sup> Noel du Fail, *Propos rustiques*, ed. L.-R. Lefèvre (Paris, 1928), pp. 62–3.

suggests that a covert form of satire on war could be expressed through certain established literary forms.

Rabelais himself knew directly about war and policy. As a doctor, he was attached to military commands while in the service of Guillaume du Bellay. He had accompanied Cardinal Jean du Bellay to Rome in 1534 and 1535 and seen the Emperor in person at Aigues-Mortes in 1538. Indeed, he wrote in 1539 a now lost documented history and justification of Guillaume's campaigns called *Stratagemata*.<sup>16</sup> His narrative of war is therefore precise in terms of military detail and terminology. He was no doubt also aware of satires of the Emperor published in Italy and France in 1536–7.<sup>17</sup> In the prologue to the *Quart Livre* of 1552 he was to describe Charles as 'a little crippled man,' who had subjugated the liberties of the Germans.<sup>18</sup> Yet he was not simply a propagandist for the King of France in the service of the du Bellays. He tended to plough his own furrow and was distinctly cool about Francis I's obsession with the duchy of Milan.<sup>19</sup> Just like the Emperor in French eyes, Picrochole likes to be thought of as a new Alexander, a conceit Grandgousier mocks as blasphemous.<sup>20</sup> The comic setting of the war as a parody of chivalric romance is appropriate to the satire of Charles's chivalric dreams of establishing the Christian empire championed by Dante's *De Monarchia*.<sup>21</sup> Picrochole's overweening ambition and the foolishness of his councillors are lavishly exposed, perhaps in riposte to More's satire of the French King's council in *Utopia*.<sup>22</sup> Once Picrochole has been defeated, Gargantua makes the allusion to Charles V's supposed harsh treatment of Francis I perfectly clear.<sup>23</sup> Yet Rabelais puts into the mouth of the outrageous toper, gourmand and warrior monk, frère Jean des Entommeures ('mince-meat'), the declamation against the 'run-aways of Pavia' threatening to turn them into docked-tailed dogs: 'Why didn't they die there rather than leave their prince in such need?'<sup>24</sup>

In Rabelais's second book, a humanist vision of French policy, perhaps that of his patron Jean du Bellay, seems to be expressed. Diplomacy was to avert war, armed force used in a just cause and only in extremes and mercy exercised in victory. The Picrocholine war seeks to legitimize armed conflict but only in terms of Christian humanism.<sup>25</sup> The Emperor is firmly cast as a malignant figure whose megalomaniac ambition for world domination leads him to ruin.

<sup>16</sup> C. Perrat, 'Le Polydore Virgile de Rabelais', *Humanisme et Renaissance*, 11.ii (1949), pp. 203–4. See also S. Gigon, 'L'Art militaire de Rabelais', *Revue des études rabelaisiennes*, ser. 7, VII (1907), 4–27. See the long description of siege warfare in the Prologue to Rabelais, *Tiers Livre*, ed. Screech, pp. 9–11.

<sup>17</sup> Bib.II, 20.

<sup>18</sup> Rabelais, *Quart Livre*, ed. Lefranc, pp. 38–9; ed. Marichal, pp. 18–19.

<sup>19</sup> N. Aronson, *Les Idées politiques de Rabelais* (Paris, 1973), pp. 135–8.

<sup>20</sup> M.A. Screech, *Rabelais* (London, 1979), p. 165.

<sup>21</sup> Rabelais, *Gargantua*, ed. Screech and Calder, ch. 31.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, ch. 31, p. 197. See Thomas More, *Utopia*, in *Complete Works*, IV, ed. Surtz and Hexter, pp. 87–91.

<sup>23</sup> Rabelais, *Gargantua*, ed. Screech and Calder, ch. 48.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 224–5 (ch. 37).

<sup>25</sup> Chilton, 'Humanism and War', p. 22.

The book was published at a time when Charles, conqueror of Tunis, seemed to stand on the verge of recovering Constantinople, if not Jerusalem. This was not a development that could be viewed with crusading zeal in a France still smarting under the humiliation of Pavia and the loss of Milan, the treaties of Madrid and Cambrai. La Roche du Mayne, in a private letter of October 1536, having as a hostage seen the Emperor's army assembled at Fossano, claimed to have told him that he would have done better to take the road to Constantinople with his enormous army and that he would not find France as easy a prize as Tunis.<sup>26</sup> The Emperor's excess, symbolised by his motto as King of Castile, *plus ultra*, is conceived as Picrochole's *outrécidance*.<sup>27</sup> However, Rabelais's satire at the expense of Charles V is in effect part of a critique of the waste and foolishness of war in general.

Rabelais's work is perhaps the most complex literary sortie into the realms of high policy in the first half of the sixteenth century. Through his writings, we can start to understand some of the limits of literary polemic in the service of political power. Rabelais's story illustrates the role of the literary figure in the Renaissance as both hierophant and critic of wars of magnificence. France's enemies were to be satirized (in the interests of the French crown) but a certain oblique critique of war indulged in. This was very much the case with some of the satirical writing of the period which also points up the difficulty of knowing how far 'war propaganda' actually influenced opinion and whether there was indeed such a thing as public opinion in this period.

### Propaganda and the literary milieu

The invasion of Italy in 1494 was accompanied by a wave of literary production that revolved around the idea of the Golden Age and the Crusade. André de la Vigne wrote of Charles VIII's entry into Florence as though it were a sort of 'second coming'.<sup>28</sup> At the same time, the genre of 'visions' or 'prognostications' was still powerful. Thus, *La vision de Jehan Michel* of 1494 predicted world conquest for Charles VIII in the context of a fresh outburst of millenarian prophesying in the Florence of Savonarola.<sup>29</sup>

The role of history in propaganda became increasingly important. The expeditions to Italy and particularly the upheavals of 1509 and 1512 produced quasi-historical treatises to justify royal policy. Indeed, the War of the League of Cambrai was one of the earliest examples of a large-scale propaganda campaign in the interests of French policy.<sup>30</sup> That war was followed closely in France through bulletins, public processions and other ceremonies designed to galvanize support. There was nothing new in this. But in the same period a theoretical

<sup>26</sup> Librairie de l'Abbaye, *Autographes et documents*, no. 284.

<sup>27</sup> Rabelais, *Gargantua*, ed. Screech and Calder, p. 194.

<sup>28</sup> Scheller, 'Imperial Themes', p. 36.

<sup>29</sup> Bib.II, 47.

<sup>30</sup> M.A. Sherman, 'Political Propaganda and Renaissance Culture: French Reactions to the League of Cambrai, 1509-10', *SCJ*, 8 (1977), 96-128.



approach to the conflict between France and Venice produced coherent arguments attacking Venice, lauding the greatness of France and its monarchy and producing a structured view of French history.

History, politics and morality came together in a small but influential group of writings in 1509, that justified the French position. Jean Lemaire de Belges published *La Légende des Vénitiens* at the time of Louis XII's return to Lyon.<sup>31</sup> His intention seems to have been to justify the King's policy in terms of chivalric history and honour. Starting from prophecies of the destruction of Venice, the body of his argument is a slanted view of Venetian history. He attacks its republican constitution as no more than a vehicle for lawlessness and mob rule. He demonises Venetian policy as institutionalised treachery among nations and in particular he attacks Venetian help to the Sforzas, which had deprived the house of Orléans of its legitimate possession of Milan.<sup>32</sup> Lemaire remained anxious to ingratiate himself with Louis XII, publishing his *Traicté des Schismes* attacking the Pope.<sup>33</sup>

Lemaire's work was quickly followed in November 1509 by that of his new friend Symphorien Champier, at this stage very much within the sphere of royal patronage.<sup>34</sup> Champier's work is also a vindication of royal policy through historical discourse.<sup>35</sup> It is a more sophisticated piece of historical writing which disentangles the moral critique of Venice from a general cyclical view of history, in which he sees Louis XII as the latest in a succession of 'worthies' and employs the Trojan myth to show the superiority of French claims. In the course of this, he displays a much greater understanding of the historical process, particularly of Venetian history, than Lemaire. Venice had risen to power through the weaknesses of its neighbours but had been cast down by the restoration by France of those neighbours' rights. Agnadello, for Champier, becomes the vindication of French superiority.<sup>36</sup>

The last major contribution to this argument was made by Claude de Seyssel in May 1510.<sup>37</sup> Seyssel had published his *History of Louis XII* in 1506, based on a harangue he had made before Henry VII. He had argued that Louis was the greatest King France had ever had and was anxious to defend his thesis against critics. He defended himself against the charge of flattery by pointing to the domestic peace of France and the great victory against the Venetians. He expanded on his view that it was the job of the historian to point up the results of virtuous rule in contrast with depraved:

<sup>31</sup> *Oeuvres de Jean Lemaire de Belges*, ed. J. Stecher, 4 vols (Louvain, 1882–91), III, pp. 231–359.

<sup>32</sup> Sherman, 'Political Propaganda', pp. 108–12.

<sup>33</sup> J. Lemaire de Belges, *Traicté de la différence des schismes*, ed. J. Britnell (Geneva, 1997); idem, *Oeuvres*, III, pp. 68–86.

<sup>34</sup> B. Copenhaver, *Symphorien Champier* (The Hague/New York, 1978).

<sup>35</sup> Bib.II, 70.

<sup>36</sup> Sherman, 'Political Propaganda', pp. 113–16, for a full analysis of Champier's argument.

<sup>37</sup> Bib.II, 72.

by this means the people recently conquered in Italy may more easily confirm for themselves and maintain the domination of France; and the princes or potentates who would like to trouble the king's state may fear more to undertake such a project.<sup>38</sup>

In the second part of the tract, he seeks to demonstrate that the Venetian war, a difficult campaign, was undertaken for reasons of honour and vindicated by victory. He does not, though, share the view of other commentators that Venice was doomed by its constitution. On the contrary, their state was a well-run one, maintaining continuity and avoiding factions. Seyssel's is therefore a much more impressive piece of writing on Venice which thereby serves to magnify the extent of the King's victory.<sup>39</sup>

### Major poets and war

Court poets were inevitably called upon to celebrate the King's wars and to summon up the image of armies on campaign. Louis XII's historiographer, Jean d'Auton, produced verse which glorified the King's exploits and condemned his enemies.<sup>40</sup> In 1521, Clément Marot, whose father, Jean, had already celebrated the wars of Louis XII, depicted the assembled French armies in conventional terms.<sup>41</sup> Ronsard, having taken up the role of the great hymnodist of the French nation from the beginning of the 1550s, published a series of *plaquettes* in the years between 1558 and 1560 on political matters. In the summer of 1558, at the time of Henri II's camp at Amiens and of the assembly of one of the greatest French armies of the age, he wrote his *Exhortation au camp du Roy Henri II* in which, commissioned by the King as official chronicler of the battle,<sup>42</sup> he called upon the nobility's fighting traditions and patriotism: 'courage, then, my friends, it is a holy war to die for one's prince and defend one's land.'<sup>43</sup> There is nothing new about the theme here, though the language is remarkably spare and free from classical allusion. In his description of the battle to come (a convention of epic poetry he was to spell out clearly much later on), Ronsard relies on sound and repetition.<sup>44</sup>

Criticism of war for poets was therefore limited by circumstance. However, satires (*coqs-à-l'âne*) enabled writers to express certain truths that were impossible to convey in any other way. As a genre, *coqs-à-l'âne* were often shrouded in obscurity and vulgarity which, as with Rabelais, generated much of the literary humour of the era. Leaps from one apparently unassociated idea to

<sup>38</sup> See Sherman, 'Political Propaganda', p. 120.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 117–26.

<sup>40</sup> D'Auton, IV, pp. 175–8.

<sup>41</sup> Clément Marot, *Epîtres*, ed. C.A. Mayer (London, 1958), pp. 109–19.

<sup>42</sup> Pierre de Ronsard, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. G. Cohen, 2 vols (Paris, 1950), II, p. 435.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, II, pp. 433, 435.

<sup>44</sup> In an earlier work, the *Harangue* of the duke of Guise to his soldiers at Metz, published first in 1553 (Ronsard, *Oeuvres*, ed. Cohen, II, pp. 304–11), the diction is much more magnificent and conventional.

another forced the reader to ‘construct’ the satire for himself to some extent. For writers, the genre allowed them to address matters that were sometimes too sensitive.<sup>45</sup> The *coq-à-l’âne* also provided a mode of poetic expression which enabled the reader to construe it in a sense critical of established orthodoxies, though many remained unprinted and thus have survived only patchily. As a courtier, Marot was expected to express conventional aristocratic ideas of war, as we have seen in his *Epistre* of 1521 to Marguerite. In his letter of late 1521 to Marguerite, though, Marot lamented the desolation ‘by reciprocal vengeance’ of the fields of northern France by the enemy.<sup>46</sup> Marot had been enrolled in his youth as a clerk in the *basoche*<sup>47</sup> and in his second *coq-à-l’âne* of 1535 (written in exile at Ferrara, published in 1539), we find him in far more acerbic manner, evoking the tone of discussion of war at the time: ‘So what’s new? /When does the King leave?/ O what a fine piece of land?’<sup>48</sup> In the third *coq-à-l’âne* of July 1536 (again published in 1539), Marot, writing this time in Venice, is even more explicit and mordant in his view of dynastic war. The Emperor has just crossed into France: ‘The French cry: long live France / the Spaniards, Long live the Empire / There’s nothing to do but laugh. / What nonsense to fight a war just for a piece of land?’<sup>49</sup> These lines could, of course, be interpreted as straightforward anti-imperial propaganda; the tone, though, is one of criticism of war in general: ‘I’d rather go as a lamb to the slaughter to such killing. ... Away! Die for glory! / Die on the field of honour from a cannon ball just to be a great lord?’<sup>50</sup> The idea resurfaces in the *Coq-à-l’âne* of 1542: ‘What’s this, will there be peace? / No, what they want is war / What folly to waste your own land / to acquire a new one.’<sup>51</sup> That the court poet Marot ever thought seriously of criticising royal policy in public print is highly unlikely but he did in his more scurrilous and obscure works exploit gaps in official censorship. The *Grup* of 1542, if indeed by him,<sup>52</sup> is a case in point, though so extreme as to be unpublishable at the time. The author of that *coq-à-l’âne* at least begins his works by taking up his weapon against Charles V, though was rather wry about the waste of money on his visit to Paris.<sup>53</sup> A more mannered and poetic critique of war (and one at variance with some of his celebratory verse) was offered by Ronsard to his patron, the parlement magistrate and Epicurean Jean Brinon, in *Les Armes* of

<sup>45</sup> ‘Sauter du coq à l’âne’, or to reason incoherently. On this see C.E. Kinch, *La Poésie satirique de Clément Marot* (Paris, 1940), pp. 141–59, esp. pp. 145–6. Joachim du Bellay, *La Deffence et illustration de la langue francoyse*, ed. H. Chamard (Paris, 1970), p. 118; Lenient, *La Satire en France*, I, pp. 34–5.

<sup>46</sup> Marot, *Epîtres*, ed. Mayer, p. 281.

<sup>47</sup> Lenient, *La Satire en France*, I, pp. 25, 29.

<sup>48</sup> C. Marot, *Oeuvres satiriques*, ed. C.A. Mayer (London, 1962), p. 121; Kinch, *La Poésie satirique*, pp. 181–2.

<sup>49</sup> Marot, *Oeuvres satiriques*, ed. Mayer, pp. 142–3, ll. 181–92.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, ll. 197–200.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*; 1542: *ibid.*, p. 172, ll. 114–17.

<sup>52</sup> Henry Guy, *Histoire de la poésie française au XVI<sup>e</sup> siècle*, t. II: *Clément Marot et son école* (Paris, 1926), p. 303; Marot, *Oeuvres satiriques*, ed. Mayer, p. 38.

<sup>53</sup> Clément Marot, *Oeuvres*, ed. G. Guiffrey, 5 vols (Paris, 1911), II, p. 447; Marot, *Oeuvres satiriques*, ed. Mayer, p. 176. See also Marot, *Oeuvres*, ed. Guiffrey, II, p. 475.

1555.<sup>54</sup> As a general attack on war, this uses recent developments to point up the lack of honour in modern battle: ‘For the strongest / are nowadays killed by cowards from hiding/ by a musket-shot.’ He concludes by wishing the discoverer of iron had never been born and thus given birth to ‘neither pistol, wheel-lock nor cannon.’<sup>55</sup>

### Poetry and politics

It might seem surprising that poets had much to say on war in this period but verse played an important part in news publications and was indeed to do so in France until the end of the 19th century. Its memorability and sometimes capacity to be sung had much to do with this. The periods 1508–9, the War of the League of Cambrai, and 1510–13, when France was beleaguered in Italy by yet another ‘Holy League’ and in the north by Henry VIII, were particularly productive of both praise poetry and ‘political’ verse. Jean Marot (d.1526), the father of Clément, had entered Anne of Brittany’s service as secretary in 1507, two years before following Louis XII to Italy. For this occasion, he penned *Le Voyage de Gênes*, followed in 1509 by *Le Voyage de Venise*, while in 1515 he produced *Le Défaite des Suisses* for Francis I.<sup>56</sup> Jean Bourdichon executed a series of miniatures for the presentation manuscript and the two works of 1507–9 were printed with a preface by Clément Marot in 1532.<sup>57</sup> Jean Marot, in his preface addressed to Anne of Brittany, disclaimed any pretensions to style and declared his venacular work to be full of ‘squalid and barbarous scabrosity.’ The verse is, though, suffused with an ornate classicism that set much of the agenda for the depiction of war in Renaissance France. First, there was the rage of Mars at being balked of his favourite pass-time (a theme endlessly repeated by poets in the 16th century). Allegorical exchanges between the spirit of Genoa and the various classes of society arise from rebellions and civil war against the nobles, all provoked by Mars. Marot castigates rich and poor for attacking each other and the nobles of Genoa for appealing to Louis, while unwilling truly to accept him as their master.

The conclusion of the League of Cambrai was widely celebrated in verse<sup>58</sup> and Pierre Gringore’s *L’Entreprise de Venise* of 1509<sup>59</sup> was written in the context of the propaganda campaigns considered above. Faced by the need to justify France’s war with a former ally, Gringore attacked the Venetians as arrogant and avaricious oppressors whose republican constitution was a source of disorder.

<sup>54</sup> *Les Armes* dedicated to Jean Brinon in *Les Meslanges* of 1555 (Marot, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Cohen, II, pp. 311–14).

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 313.

<sup>56</sup> Marot, *Voyage de Gênes*, ed. Trisolini.

<sup>57</sup> Bib.II, 117.

<sup>58</sup> Bib.II, 35, rare piece pr. in facsimile in the 19th century.

<sup>59</sup> Bib.II, 107.

Finally he summoned his countrymen to greatness: ‘you never had the honour that you will have’.<sup>60</sup>

Guillaume Crétin, chantre of the Sainte-Chapelle, repaid the protection of Louis XII and Francis I in composing ephemeral works such as the *Invective contre la guerre papale* waged by Julius II against the King of France, which, unlike most of his verse, was published in *Les Excellentes Vaillances, batailles et conquestes du roy dela les mons*.<sup>61</sup> Other verse seems to have circulated in manuscript. Jean d’Auton wrote poems in 1511–12 in praise of Louis’s wars in Italy and attacking the Pope.<sup>62</sup> Pierre Gringore had long been an active Gallican propagandist before the poems he published in 1511 against Julius II, notably the savage *La Chasse du Cerf des Cerfs* of 1510 and *L’Espoir de Paix* of 1511.<sup>63</sup>

Criticism of foreign princes was surprisingly restrained in publicly printed verse. The key to the explanation for this is offered by the Pléiade poet Etienne Jodelle in his *Recueil des Inscriptions* of 1558:

I have always thought that it was the most foolish thing to attack in writing princes who are our enemies, mainly with invented things or which touch their honour so much that even our own princes would be angry at them. As for light digs, true reproaches, prophesies and promises we make ourselves, that is permitted between enemies.<sup>64</sup>

So, Jodelle himself invoked a prophesy against Mary Tudor, likening her both to the Thalestris, Queen of the Amazons, as the last of her line and Philip and Mary (somewhat improbably) to Anthony and Cleopatra.<sup>65</sup>

Published crude popular verse was thus relatively careful about the Emperor Charles V. The English and Henry VIII presented easier game. In 1512, Jean Bouchet published anonymously his *Epistre envoyee des champs Elisees au Roy Henry dengleterre a present regnant au dit royaume*<sup>66</sup> in the form of a letter sent from beyond the grave by Henry VII to his son. Bouchet’s objective was firstly to castigate Henry VIII for ungratefulness in view of the help it was alleged that France had given to his father,<sup>67</sup> and secondly, like Auton and Gringore, to attack Julius II as an unworthy Pope and call for reform of the Church. Cruder material appeared at the same time under the titles *Le Courroux de la mort contre les Anglais* and *La Folie des Anglois* who treated them much as had done

<sup>60</sup> Gringore, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Montaiglon and Héricault, I, pp. 145–56, at p. 156.

<sup>61</sup> G. Crétin, *Oeuvres poétiques*, ed. K. Chesney (Paris, 1932), p. 58.

<sup>62</sup> *L’Epistre du preux Hector* (BN fr. 1952, fos. 1–15), and *L’Epistre elegiaque par l’eglise militante* (MS at St. Petersburg).

<sup>63</sup> Gringore, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Montaiglon and Héricault, I, pp. 157–67, 169–84.

<sup>64</sup> Jodelle, *Recueil des inscriptions*, p. 95.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 96, 190. Jodelle had produced his tragedy, *Cléopâtre captive*, in 1552.

<sup>66</sup> Two undated and anonymous versions: Bib.II, 88 and 89. The second bears a woodcut of the King on the title page. On the 1544 re-issue, see Britnell, *Jean Bouchet*, pp. 169–71, 307–8. A related text c.1517, though probably written in 1509: Bib.II, 90. G. Ascoli, *La Grande Bretagne devant l’opinion française* (Paris, 1927), p. 49.

<sup>67</sup> This was a literary tradition dating back to Robert Gaguin, see A.V Antonovics, ‘Henry VII, King of England “by the Grace of Charles VIII of France”’, in R.A. Griffiths and J. Sherborne (eds), *Kings and Nobles in the Later Middle Ages* (Gloucester, 1986), p. 186.

Saint-Gelais in 1492: ‘Godamns, tailed ones, toads. ... you are so hideous and detestable.’<sup>68</sup>

Bouchet’s *Epistre* was reissued in 1544 to suit the context of Henry VIII’s coalition with the Emperor Charles V against France; Charles takes the place of Julius and Francis I that of Louis XII. The attack in satirical verse against the Emperor in France was relatively muted. The thirteen volumes of Montaignon<sup>69</sup> contain little directly critical of him. This is also reflected in the decline of the critical *sottie*. The *Epistre* from beyond the grave was a form available to make a range of political points. Just two years after Bouchet’s letter of Henry VII, an anonymous missive was sent to Francis I from paradise by Pepin and Charlemagne which predicted that he would conquer Africa and Asia.<sup>70</sup>

One genre that proved popular was that of the ‘Regrets’ in which the protagonist, usually an enemy of France, laments his fate. The Italian campaign of 1494 saw the publication of *Les Regretz et complaints du roy Alphonse d’Arragon à son partement de Naples*.<sup>71</sup> Marignano elicited triumphalism, Pavia laments and satire, as well as attacks on the treason of those blamed for the defeat (not, of course, the King). Francis I found more sympathy in defeat than he had in victory.<sup>72</sup> At the end of the period under discussion, in 1558, the later protestant dramatist, Jacques Grévin (c.1538–70), published a long poem in the same tradition in which an aged Charles recalls his life and deplures his fate.<sup>73</sup> His first ‘regret’ is the remorse he feels for the treachery he had practised in achieving his goals. For all his early victories, Charles only suffers reverses and defeats at the hand of Francis I. Even his son’s victory at Saint-Quentin is overshadowed by the fall of Calais and the fear that now Naples, Milan, Flanders and Artois will be regained by France. The theme of Charles V’s abdication was commented on by a number of poets, including Joachim du Bellay in the 1558 edition of his *Regrets*.<sup>74</sup> Du Bellay took up the same theme as Grévin in his *Les Tragiques Regrets de Charles V, empereur*, probably written in 1559, a more polished if rather less passionate work than Grévin’s.<sup>75</sup>

For leading poets, problems of patronage led them to be circumspect. Conclusions of treaties were an opportunity for extravagant effusions on peace. Among the *Chants* of Clément Marot published in his 1544 edition but circulating before that, there were the ‘Song of joy’ for the return of the royal children Spain

<sup>68</sup> Montaignon, *Recueil des poésies françoises*, II, 79–85, 253–5 (possibly by Laurent Desmoulins, see Ascoli, *La Grande Bretagne*, p. 50).

<sup>69</sup> On satires about the English, see Montaignon, *Recueil de poésies*, I, pp. 125–30; II, pp. 253–69; III, pp. 26–71, 247–60; for various epitaphs on the reconquest of Calais in 1558: *ibid.*, IV, *passim*.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, p. 189.

<sup>71</sup> La Pilorgerie, pp. 434–47.

<sup>72</sup> Lenient, *La Satire en France*, I, p. 273.

<sup>73</sup> Bib.II, 105; L. Pinvert, *Jacques Grévin (1538–1570), étude biographique et littéraire* (Paris, 1899), pp. 203–5.

<sup>74</sup> Joachim du Bellay, *Les Antiquitez de Rome et les Regrets*, ed. E. Droz (Geneva, 1960), p. 104.

<sup>75</sup> J. du Bellay, *Oeuvres françoises*, ed. C. Marty-Laveau, 2 vols (Paris, 1866–7) II, pp. 144–9.



(1530), the 'Canticle' of 1538 on the truce of Nice, and that for the coming of the Regent of the Netherlands to France in 1539.<sup>76</sup> When the Emperor came to France in 1539, Marot followed the current conceit of likening him to a new Julius Caesar,<sup>77</sup> come to Gaul this time in peace.<sup>78</sup> When times had changed Joachim du Bellay could turn the conceit of Charles as 'Caesar' rather sour.<sup>79</sup>

Claude Chappuys took up the same optimistic theme on concord in the prologue to his *Complainte de Mars* of 1539: 'Soon you will see the eagle and the salamander/ one route, one way to take.' The body of the poem is an elaborate celebration of the Emperor's visit in the form of a lament by Mars at the loss of his power over kingdoms as a result of the Franco-Imperial alliance. The responsibility is attributed to Montmorency, who has put the idea of a crusade against the Turks into the heads of the two princes. But not even this will satisfy Mars, since the Great Turk, rather than face them, would even prefer to become a Christian. Now the two princes together have no enemies since they give the law to all the rest.<sup>80</sup> Such writings were the product of specific moments in international relations which were overtaken by changes of alliances. By 1543, Chappuys was an enthusiastic celebrant of his King's supposed 'victory' over the Emperor at Landrecies.<sup>81</sup>

The victory at Metz and the triumph of the duke of Guise stimulated poetic effusions both in French and Latin. Michel de L'Hospital published Latin verse on the victories at Metz and Calais.<sup>82</sup> Naturally, the triumphs at Calais and Guînes were celebrated in published verse and produced at least 35 works by major and minor poets, many of them in honour of the duke of Guise.<sup>83</sup> In 1559, Jacques Grévin, contributed to this celebratory genre with his *Chant de joie de la Paix* in honour of the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis.<sup>84</sup> This was written almost at the same time as Ronsard's better-known poem in alexandrines, *La Paix*.<sup>85</sup> The two pieces provide an interesting contrast. While both laud peace in contrast to war, for Grévin this is the reason to rejoice, instead of crossing pikes 'for antique quarrels,' perhaps a rather too barbed and oblique comment on the reasons for the war just ended. Ronsard graciously sums up the virtues of peace: better live in peace, build your Louvre or read a book. He takes more care to

<sup>76</sup> C. Marot, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. A. Grenier (Paris, n.d.), I, Chants divers, pp. 368, 381, 383.

<sup>77</sup> See the verse of Brodeau copied in *Chronique du roy François*, p. 317.

<sup>78</sup> Marot, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Grenier, I, pp. 385–6. Marot wrote two other Chants for the Emperor at this time, no. 17, pp. 386–7 and no. 20, p. 393. See also *ibid.*, II, p. 67: *Epigrammes*, no. 166.

<sup>79</sup> Joachim du Bellay, *Oeuvres poétiques*, 8 vols (Paris, 1910–85), VII: ed. G. Demerson (Paris, 1984), p. 97.

<sup>80</sup> *Bib.* II, 94.

<sup>81</sup> *Bib.* II, 95.

<sup>82</sup> *Bib.* II, 114; 11; 115 by L'Hospital.

<sup>83</sup> V.-L. Saulnier, 'Les Poètes de la prise de Calais', *Bulletin du Bibliophile et du Bibliothécaire*, (1949). This lists 27 works. There are at least 8 more (see Jodelle, *Recueil des inscriptions*, p. 4).

<sup>84</sup> *Bib.* II, 106; Pinvert, *Jacques Grévin*, pp. 26–7, 211–14.

<sup>85</sup> Ronsard, *Oeuvres*, ed. Cohen, II, pp. 441–6, pr. early 1559 *en plaquette* by A. Wechsel.



praise both Anne de Montmorency and the Guises as authors of the peace as well as to celebrate the retention of Calais that was assured by the treaty.<sup>86</sup>

Ronsard, from the publication *Les Hymnes* of 1555, was emerging as the great celebrator of the monarchy and nation. The *Hymne de Henry Deuxiesme* likens the court of France to a more impressive Mount Olympus and celebrates the King's triumphs at Boulogne and Metz. This seems simply absurd to the modern reader but was meant to invest the court and the King's wars with significance, through assimilating them to the appropriate classical parallels.<sup>87</sup> Ronsard played an even more central role in in the years 1558–9 by preparing the country for peace. In September–October 1558 he had written his *Exhortation pour la paix* before the news of peace negotiations had become public, possibly as a trial balloon in order to prepare public opinion for a change of policy.<sup>88</sup> *La Paix*, written once what were perceived to be unfavourable peace terms were known, thus served the important purpose of winning over support to the peace policy.<sup>89</sup> Ronsard concluded his sequence of poems in support of the peace by the skilful *Discours à Mgr le duc de Savoie*.<sup>90</sup>

By the 1550s, issues of peace and war had become an important theme for the poets of the Pléiade. During his increasingly irksome stay at Rome in the company of his cousin the cardinal (1553–7), Joachim du Bellay pondered such questions in some of the sonnets he sent home with news to friends and potential patrons (*Les Regrets*, 1557). This is particularly the case in the sonnets written at the time of the truce of Vaucelles. In one, du Bellay salutes the truce 'that no Christian could celebrate enough.'<sup>91</sup> He admits that France is tired of war and needs peace but angry that Spain, which has more need of peace, can boast that it has the best deal and that the allies of France feel abandoned.<sup>92</sup> In reporting Italian opinion, he notes that the Florentine exiles in Rome claim that Henri II has forever lost hope of victory in Italy and the Pope will no longer trust him. Charles V will make the Empire hereditary and control England. 'so say those who speak about the King.'<sup>93</sup>

### War in popular verse

Popular verse in support of royal policy was churned out in great quantities in the 16th century. This is scarcely surprising, given the evident intermingling of the arts of history and poetry.<sup>94</sup> In part at least, it was a vehicle for the memori-

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, II, p. 442.

<sup>87</sup> F.M. Higman, 'Ronsard's Political and Polemical Poetry', in T. Cave (ed.), *Ronsard the Poet* (London, 1973), p. 244; Ronsard, *Oeuvres*, ed. Cohen, II, pp. 142–54, esp. pp. 151–2.

<sup>88</sup> Ronsard, *Oeuvres*, ed. Cohen, II, pp. 436–41, pr. as a *plaque* by Wechsel, late 1558.

<sup>89</sup> Higman, 'Ronsard's Political Poetry', pp. 247–8.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 248.

<sup>91</sup> Du Bellay, *Antiquitez de Rome*, ed. Droz, no. 126, p. 114.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 123, p. 112.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*, no. 124, pp. 112–13.

<sup>94</sup> Asher, *National Myths*, p. 17.

sation and communication of simple ideas on public affairs.<sup>95</sup> To this traditional activity was added the printing press in the 1480s. Rhétoriciens, in their turn, were employed by the crown to publish invective against its enemies and engage in controversies. Robert Gaguin's *Passe-temps d'oisiveté* of 1488, written in the context of a diplomatic mission to England, called for peace between the two countries in a verse which ended 'Long live France, long live England.'<sup>96</sup> In the war of 1492, though, Octovien de Saint-Gelais's *Exhortation à chasser vaillamment les Angloys* called on the sluggish French nobles to throw them out,<sup>97</sup> using the conventional poetic evocation of war as the clash of artillery and men:

Blast forth, bombards, serpentines,  
Culverins, great canons and curtalls,  
Artillery filled with powder fine.  
Dig mines for silver stuff  
And gold, smelt metal.  
Takes horse by hill and vale,  
Set on and cry, to the death  
In fighting, long live the King of France!

Around the same time, a poem in honour of Anne de Beaujeu announced 'France cemetary of the English' and told the English: 'Go back to Wales and drink your ales.'<sup>98</sup> The King of Naples was demonised in 1494 by the verse of Guilloche de Bordeaux as 'half devil ... born of union with the moors.'<sup>99</sup>

Popular printed verse tended to concentrate on the heroic achievements of the French, however limited. Examples include the naval fight off Brest in April 1513, when admiral Howard was killed,<sup>100</sup> and the conquest of Hesdin in 1522. There were numerous rather neutral pieces published on Francis I's act of 'defiance' of 1528.<sup>101</sup> The peace of 1529 was celebrated with verse to welcome back the King's sons from captivity that confirms the point made by du Bellay, that the country was tired of war and had great hopes of peace.<sup>102</sup> So also, the entry ceremonies arranged all over France for the arrival of the new Habsburg Queen Eleonor celebrated the promise of a new departure.<sup>103</sup> The subsequent disappointment did not appear publicly.

The siege of Péronne (1536) was extremely popular subject in verse and

<sup>95</sup> Lenient, *La Satire en France*, I, pp. 272–3.

<sup>96</sup> Gaguin, *Epistolae et orationes*, ed. Thuasne, II, p. 409.

<sup>97</sup> H.-J. Molinier, *Essai biographique sur Octovien de Saint-Gelays* (Rodez, 1910), pp. 277–83.

<sup>98</sup> 'L'ainée fille de Fortune' (BN fr. 25409, fo. 8, Ascoli, *La Grande Bretagne*, p. 22).

<sup>99</sup> Guilloche de Bordeaux, *La Prophecie*, pr. in C. de Cherrier, *Histoire de Charles VIII*, 2 vols (Paris, 1868), I, pp. 487–90.

<sup>100</sup> One of these was a verse cast in an English 'accent', Ascoli, *La Grande Bretagne*, p. 52.

<sup>101</sup> Montaignon, *Recueil de poésies françoises*, X, pp. 305–50.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, V, pp. 85–93.

<sup>103</sup> See the entry for Abbeville, 19 Dec. 1531, pr. by E. Prarond, 'Mistère fait à l'entrée de la très noble et excellente dame Regne de France Madame Alyenor', *La Picardie*, 13 (1867), 351–65, and A. Ledieu, 'Entrée de la reine Eléonore d'Autriche à Abbeville le 19 déc. 1531', *Bulletin de la Société d'Emulation d'Abbeville*, 5 (1900–02), pp. 15, 53–60.

these contributed to the building up of its mythology. Some were epitaphs for commanders,<sup>104</sup> others rather extravagant regrets addressed to the memory of marshal de La Marck, who died at the end of 1536. The town was portrayed as ‘la Peronnelle’, an unsullied virgin. In a long piece of doggerel with pretensions to chivalric romance, La Marck is portrayed as ‘the beauty’s swain’ and rushes ‘to save her good name.’ The siege is pictured in all its violence. At the end of the siege, La Marck ‘takes leave of his love.’ His noble companions resolved ever to defend ‘the beauty.’<sup>105</sup> The pamphlets published to celebrate the splendid entries of the Emperor into the cities of France in 1539 add to the impression that much was expected of the peace then reigning.<sup>106</sup> On the other hand, more popular verses were circulating in 1536 on the Emperor’s ignominious retreat from Provence.<sup>107</sup> Verse was published in 1543 to celebrate French military successes against the Emperor.<sup>108</sup>

The imagery of the eagle pitted against a symbol for France, the salamander or the cock, was common in these years.<sup>109</sup> In 1543, the court poet Claude Chappuys published *L’aigle qui faict la poule devant la Coq à Landrecy* (deliberately playing on the words *coq à l’âne* used for the genre of scurrilous satire). Chappuys casts himself as a soldier of the muses ready to use his pen as a bow with which to serve his King in war. The piece is very lightly allegorical with the Emperor and King plainly visible in the form of the eagle and the cock and the propagandistic message for Francis is quite explicit: ‘When he fights, it’s to guard his people, / It’s for honour and not for land.’ What, asks the poet, could have moved the Emperor to such fury when he had been honoured by the King and received in the ‘the garden of France where all fruits grow.’ What caused the conflict? Milan – ‘usurped by the Eagle, not conquered by prowess.’<sup>110</sup> So, finally provoked by all the Emperor’s injuries, Francis moves to take Landrecies and face the Emperor’s counter attack (‘For it’s in his nature to conquer or die’). The poem then deploys a vivid description of the French army drawn up to face down the Imperial counter-attack. In reality, both armies, having come face to face, most unusually for the period, decided to withdraw from the risk of battle but Chappuys’s poem is designed to show that it was the Emperor’s cowardice that led to this result: ‘Eight days the cock awaited him, / What more could he have done?’ Brantôme preserves some satirical rhymes about the Emperor that appeared in France during his lifetime which were to some extent a response to rhymes published in the Low Countries satirising the ‘frippery’ of the French Kings. These may have circulated in manuscript.<sup>111</sup>

<sup>104</sup> Bib.II, 15. This was copied by Picotté in *Chronique du roy Francoys*, pp. 170–1.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., pp. 166–9.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., p. 309.

<sup>107</sup> Inserted in *Chronique du roy François*, p. 191, along with a long poem pitting the eagle against the salamander (pp. 189–90).

<sup>108</sup> Montaiglon, *Recueil des poésies françaises*, VI, p. 215.

<sup>109</sup> *Chronique du roy Francoys*, pp. 189–90, a long poem pitting the eagle against the salamander.

<sup>110</sup> Bib.II, 95: sig. Biii.

<sup>111</sup> Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 21, col. ii. See also *Chronique du roy François*, pp. 189–90.

Most of this verse, then, served a purpose that was positive from the point of view of the crown. It reinforced attitudes to foreign powers that were in tune with the drift of royal policy. Only occasionally was criticism of the powers that be able to surface. One such period was the exceptionally dire politico-social crisis of 1523–5 when a number of poems appeared whose authors were arrested for sedition. One example is *Le monde qui est crucifié* which describes the sufferings of all three estates. When dealing with the Third Estate it is ‘Labour’ who speaks:

I have to feed footmen and gendarmes  
 Cowardly boys, worth nothing in the field  
 Scoundrels, gallows-fodder, blasphemers  
 In my home; they talk big  
 But when they hear the trumpet sound  
 They scurry off like the sheep dogs  
 They are, they’re nothing but boasters;  
 As they have shown in the land of Italy  
 .....  
 Then comes tax after tax  
 Tax after tax, that is the cruelty.<sup>112</sup>

This was but one example in a great wave of public discontent that swept over the country in 1523–4 and involved the treason of Bourbon, despair at poor harvests and criticism of the King himself.

### Literature and satire: *sotties*, farces and *contes*

The confraternity of the Parlement of Paris law clerks, known as the *Basoches*, an institution that dealt with cases involving its own members, seems an unlikely forum for dramatic satire but it provided a stage for one of the leading satirical poets of the age to pronounce on public affairs in the form of *sotties*. The *Basoches* was also a *société joyeuse* (an Abbey of Misrule) which staged burlesques and farces, as was another group associated with them called the *Enfants-sans-souci*, one of its related companies (sometimes called the *Confraternité des Sots*) with which Pierre Gringore and Clément Marot were associated. Both groups were presided typically by a *Prince des sots* and a *Mère sottie*.<sup>113</sup> Though there has been much debate about the definition of *sotties* and *farces*, there is enough overlap between them for them to be treated for our purposes as a single genre. While it has been argued that farce had little or no social or ideological charge,<sup>114</sup> in fact both forms could contain satire and critique of society. The difference

<sup>112</sup> Montaignon, *Recueil de poésies françaises*, XII.

<sup>113</sup> H.G. Harvey, *The Theatre of the Basoches: the Contribution of the Law Societies to French Medieval Comedy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1941), pp. 24–6; M. Lazard, *Le Théâtre en France au XVIe siècle* (Paris, 1980), pp. 41–2; Lenient, *La Satire en France*, chs. 21, 23, 27.

<sup>114</sup> B.C. Bowen, *Les Caractéristiques essentielles de la farce française et leur survivance dans les années 1550–1620* (Urbana, Ill., 1964); B. Cannings, ‘Towards a Definition of Farce as a Literary Genre’, *Modern Language Review*, 56 (1961).

seems to have resided in the range of the dramatic action, more extensive in the farce than the *sottie*.<sup>115</sup>

The scope of poets to criticize public policy openly was very limited, as we have seen. Gringore had written some uncomplimentary pieces, criticising the King's ministers and their policies, and the Basoche in 1504–5 was unrestrained in its attacks on the disgraced Gié, associated as he was with the failure of the Garigliano campaign.<sup>116</sup> Louis XII, though, was prepared to see the stage used as an instrument of propaganda, especially as the tone of performances became more favourable to him. Pierre Gringore pushed this freedom of expression as far as it could go in a genre which by custom gave full liberty of speech only to the fools. Jean Bouchet praised the openness of *sotties* under Louis XII.<sup>117</sup> Such liberty of expression for fools (limited under Louis XII, who saw it primarily as an instrument of policy, and even more so under Francis I) was conceded mainly because it was usually oblique. On Shrove Tuesday 1512, Gringore staged the *sottie*, *Le Jeu du Prince des sottz et Mère Sotte*, which sought to portray Pope Julius II as an object of scorn.<sup>118</sup> But at the very end of Louis XII's reign, with the King showing distinct signs of over-exertion with his new wife Mary Tudor, the Basoche put on a play in which they said Henry VIII 'had sent a mare to the King of France, to carry him quickly and gently either to hell or to paradise.'<sup>119</sup>

Not surprisingly, liberty of expression for the *Basoche* was much more restricted under Francis I than under his predecessor. A celebrated incident of a farce played in the place Maubert in 1515 that implicated the King in an affair with the daughter of a Parlement conseiller led to orders against farces damaging to the King's honour.<sup>120</sup> Agitation against the Concordat of Bologna and the staging of a show proclaiming that 'Mère Sotte' ruled the court was the signal for arrests in December 1516.<sup>121</sup> Thereafter, players were more careful. In the *Sottie des Croniqueurs*, for instance, we find no more than a slavish defence of royal policy.<sup>122</sup> A limited revival of political satire took place during the King's absence in 1525. There were orders issued in Paris against school children singing 'Long live France nor its alliance' or playing the King in school.<sup>123</sup> In October, with rumours of the King's death rife, a troop of fools appeared in *cour du mai* of the Palais riding on asses, disguised in green cloaks and declaring from an official-looking document that the King was dead, that the wise were keeping it secret but that the fools were declaring it. 'it was said it was the clerks of

<sup>115</sup> H. Lewicka, *Etudes sur l'ancienne farce française* (Warsaw, 1974), pp. 11–13.

<sup>116</sup> Gringore, *Les Folles Entreprises* (of 1505), in *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Montaiglon and Héricault, I, pp. 3–156; d'Auton, III, p. 353.

<sup>117</sup> Bib.II, 91: i. 32v.

<sup>118</sup> Gringore, *Oeuvres complètes*, ed. Montaiglon and Héricault, pp. 201–6; E. Picot, *Recueil général des Sotties*, 3 vols (Paris, 1880), II, nos. xi, xiii.

<sup>119</sup> Florange, *Mémoires*, ed. Buchon, p. 257.

<sup>120</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L), pp. 13–14; (ed. B), pp. 14–15.

<sup>121</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. B), pp. 39–40.

<sup>122</sup> Picot, *Recueil général des Sotties*, II, no. xvi: 'La Farce morale des Trois Pelerins et Malice'.

<sup>123</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. B), p. 195.

the basoche.’ An order came from Lyon for their arrest, so seriously was the matter taken in the circumstances, though nothing could be done as their identity was unknown.<sup>124</sup> Francis I was not opposed to the *Basoche* in principle and indeed continued to order payments to some of the players.<sup>125</sup> However, performances became more difficult from the early 1530s, partly because of the fraught religious situation. Further restrictions were imposed in May 1536 and from January 1538 censorship was more explicit, public performances banned and some playwrights imprisoned.<sup>126</sup> Nevertheless, at Rouen in 1540 the Mardi Gras parade by the Conards involved a ‘funeral’ for Merchandise led by ‘Alcofribas’ (Rabelais’ anagram, of course) and a float in which the Pope, the Emperor, a King and a fool were playing catch with a ball representing the world and slogans on their backs such as “take that” or “give it here.” The satire of princes turning the world into their personal playground is obvious. Even more pointed was the elaborate vision of the Tupinamba Indians put on for Henri II at Rouen in 1550. The city wished to remind the King of the importance of their trade with Brazil, despite his wish to maintain good relations with the King of Portugal. A few days later, though, the abbaye des Conards mocked the whole show, much to the King’s approval.<sup>127</sup>

When Rabelais included in his 1542 edition of *Pantagruel* an expanded version of his satirical library catalogue of the abbey of Saint-Victor, one of the works listed was a so-called *Stratagemata* of the Franc archer de Baignolet.<sup>128</sup> The title echoes his own work on war but he was also reflecting the continuing popularity of a genre that had been vibrant since the mid-15th century. This was the dramatic monologue in farcical form on the theme of the *francs-archers*, essentially the lampoon of the *miles gloriosus*, *le soldat fanfaron*, reflected in the saying recounted by Rabelais in the *Quart Livre*: ‘I don’t speak from fear, for I fear no dangers. I still say it. So said the Franc archer of Baignolet.’<sup>129</sup> One of the few verse defences of the ‘bold and fine’ *francs-archers* appeared in the 1520s, attacking the ‘wicked’ *aventuriers*, who do nothing but pursue booty.<sup>130</sup> Generally, though, the *francs-archers* had a bad press (see also Chapter 4).

The dramatic monologue, *Le Franc-archier de Baignollet*<sup>131</sup> has often in the past been improbably attributed to François Villon, largely because Galliot du Pré first printed it at the end of his 1532 edition of Villon’s works. It was, though, written some time between 1468 and 1480, in other words the ‘golden age’ of the

<sup>124</sup> *Bourgeois* (ed. L), pp. 268–9; (ed. B), p. 226.

<sup>125</sup> R.J. Knecht, ‘Popular Theatre and the Court in Sixteenth-Century France’, *Renaissance Studies*, 9 (1995), p. 371.

<sup>126</sup> Harvey, *The Theatre of the Basoche*, p. 195.

<sup>127</sup> H. Heller, *The Conquest of Poverty* (Leiden, 1986), pp. 1–26; Wintroub, *A Savage Mirror*, pp. 25–32, 115–41.

<sup>128</sup> Rabelais, *Pantagruel*, ed. Lefranc, III, p. 83; IV, p. 322.

<sup>129</sup> Rabelais, *Quart Livre*, ed. Lefranc, ch. LV, ll. 32–5.

<sup>130</sup> Picot, *Chants historiques*, no. 33.

<sup>131</sup> *Le Franc-archier de Baignollet*, ed. Polak. This work was printed again in 1533 and 1550. For a 19th century edition: E. Picot and C. Nyrop, *Nouveau Recueil de farces françaises des XV<sup>e</sup> et XVI<sup>e</sup> siècles* (Paris, 1880), pp. xxvi–xxxiv.



*franc-archers*, and was widely known and performed before its first printing. As Rabelais's writings and the continuation of the genre by other anonymous hands in the first half of the 16th century show, the theme of the *miles gloriosus* was still very much alive. Rabelais refers to the *franc-taupin* Thevot, for instance,<sup>132</sup> a character in what is almost certainly part of cycle of farces, including one that survives, *La farce nouvelle de Colin fils de Thevot le maire*. Here the cowardly Colin is some kind of foot soldier who returns to his father having lost his equipment, robbed an old woman and brought back a 'Turkish' prisoner who turns out to be a German pilgrim. The work as it survives, printed first in 1542, is almost certainly a version of a story that goes back to the late 15th century and testifies to the continuation of a lively genre.<sup>133</sup> Among dramatic monologues, the text of *Le Franc-archier de Cherré* was first printed at Tours in 1544 (composed at Angers c.1523–4) and that of the *Pionnier de Seurdre* appeared with a second edition of this at Angers in 1580. These show the continuing popularity of the form in the 16th century and also tell us something about the circumstances of their composition. Both texts stem from the period when Francis I was attempting to re-activate the *franc-archers*, along with all the hostile reactions that entailed. *Cherré* was probably written late in 1523 or early 1524 and reflects the intense disturbances surrounding the repression of *aventuriers* in Anjou (see Chapter 9), while *Seurdre* was written in the same region a few months later. In both cases, it is the impossibility of raising a satisfactory and disciplined French infantry which lies in the background, as had also been the case under Louis XI.

Another name used for *franc-archers* was *franc-taupins*, a term which stresses the farcical reputation of the type.<sup>134</sup> The comic monologue was extremely popular throughout France in this period, partly for its simplicity and cheapness. After all, it only required one performer to stand up on a table or platform. It also served to introduce more substantial performances of moralities or farces and is closely linked in origin to 'merry sermons' and usually involved the narrator getting his laughs by recounting his own exploits.<sup>135</sup> The earliest known, contemporary with *Baignollet*, is Coquillart's *Botte de foing*.

All these monologues share certain patterns: the protagonist invites his audience to fight, lists the great soldiers he has known, mentions battles he has been at, notes that his heroism has been recognised by the great of the land, laments the

<sup>132</sup> E. Philipot, 'Sauve, Thevot, le pot au vin' (Notes et commentaires), *Revue des Etudes Rabelaisiennes*, 10 (1912), pp. 240–7; G. Cohen, 'Rabelais et le théâtre', *ibid.*, 9 (1911), 58–60. Rabelais, *Pantagruel*, ed. Lefranc, III, p. 83: 'Franctopinis, De re militari, cum figuris Tevolti.'

<sup>133</sup> Pr. at Lyon in 1542. See E. Viollet-le-Duc, *Ancien Théâtre français*, 10 vols (Paris, 1854), II, pp. 388–405. See the text in E. Mabile, *Choix de farces* (Nice, 1872), I, pp. 161–91, written around 1528, this time reflecting flight at the battle of the Spurs in 1513 and events at the siege of Hesdin in 1521. See also G. Cohen, *Recueil de farces françaises inédites du XV<sup>e</sup> siècle* (Cambridge, Mass., 1949), nos. v, xiv.

<sup>134</sup> Cotgrave, *Dictionarie*: 'a clowne, carle, churle, chuffe, cluster-fiste' as well as a 'trained man, or soldier made of a husbandman.' In the *Tiers Livre* Rabelais writes: 'Doncques ne faudra dorénavant dire ... quand on envoyra le franc-taupin en guerre, 'Saulve, Thevot, le pot de vin' ...' (Plattard in Rabelais, *Oeuvres*, ed. Lefranc, VII, p. 78 var.).

<sup>135</sup> *Le Franc-archier de Baignollet*, ed. Polak, pp. 16–17.



poor recompense he had received for his valour and then undermines his case by recounting a farcical combat with an insignificant enemy. In *Baignollet*, the strutting coward, Pernet vaunts his valour at the siege of Alençon, while betraying his own cowardice. In the ranks, he had captured five Englishmen (ll. 14–16), who were ransomed. The fourth fled but of the fifth:

.... He'd have taken me by the throat:  
If I hadn't cried «Saint George !»  
Though I'm a good Frenchman. (ll. 22–5)

He claims to have been taken up by the greatest in the land and to be the equal of noblemen. After all, 'we are all gentlemen on the watch against the rabble.'<sup>136</sup> Similarly, the Franc-archer de Cherré remarks of wars, 'we are trained up in such fights, we gentlemen' (ll. 30–31) The franc archer finally meets a scarecrow dressed in the colours of Brittany and armed with a cross-bow. Terrified at what he takes to be a real man, he pleads for his life, swearing he is good Breton too, his only true words probably being 'I never killed anything except poultry' (l. 320).

The *Franc-archier de Baignollet* probably derived its enduring popularity from the fact that it is both a welcome satire of the soldiery and and a portrait of a coward who has some redeeming features. Though the *Franc-Archer de Cherré* is not so well characterised as its predecessor it is much more revealing on the circumstances of the franc-archers, especially after their revival in 1521 and the battles against the *aventuriers* in Anjou in 1523. There are also the same themes of boasting and cowardice, even a desire to attribute a defeat to chivalric instincts: 'But she was a woman and I had pity on her. It was better to be well-behaved' (ll. 288–90). The protagonist finishes this work by assuring the spectators of the truth of his being in the battle: 'I was really there/ at least I guarded the horses' (ll. 528–30). The *Pionnier de Seudre* shares many of the devices of the *Franc-archer* tradition (for example the boasts about familiarity with the great), while attacking franc-archers from the point of view of an angevin villager recruited as a pioneer during the campaigns to repress the *aventuriers* in 1523. On the other hand the narrator makes no distinction between *aventuriers* and franc-archers (or in his terms, *francs taupins*) 'who eat up the poor people' (l. 85), whose greatest deeds on campaign, 'are to torment the poor people' (ll. 234–6).

The story-tellers of the 16th century, drawing on vast corpus of tales from all over Europe, were naturally led to tell tales of soldiers, some of them facetious some of them grim. Nicolas de Troyes in the *Grand Parangon*, recounted a widely told tale of *aventuriers* who were so evil that they were not even welcome in hell.<sup>137</sup> Noel du Fail took up the theme in the course of his extended fictional

<sup>136</sup> Ibid., ll. 135–7. See also ll. 172f.: 'J'ay fait rage avecques la Hire:/Je l'ay servy trestout mon aage./Je fus gros vallet, et puis page./ Archier, et puis je pris la lance./ Et la vous portoye sur la panse./ Tousjours troussé comme une poche.' Cp. with *Le Franc-archier de Cherré*, ed. Polak, ll. 39–40: '... j'ay faict raige./ N'a pas une annee et demye./ A Milan, a Fontharabie.'

<sup>137</sup> N. de Troyes, *Le Grand Parangon des nouvelles nouvelles*, ed. K. Kasprzyk (Paris, 1970), pp. 200–4; K. Kasprzyk, *Nicolas de Troyes et le genre narratif en France au XVIe siècle* (Warsaw/Paris, 1963), pp. 193–4.

ruminations on the desirability of social stability and the superiority of the past in *Propos rustiques* (1547, revised 1549). His version of Rabelais' Pichrocoline war is told in chapters 9–10, as the story of the feud between the villagers of Vindelless and their neighbours of Flameaux, a kind of rustic Iliad replete with ridiculous equivalents of Ajax and Achilles. Du Fail does this in a way that suggests that he had absorbed many of the motifs of the franc-archer tradition.<sup>138</sup> The contingent from Vindelless are fired up by drink and set off for their confrontation with their neighbours at Flameaux with a collection of old weapons, including a 'halberd left over from the day of Monthlery.'<sup>139</sup> For their part, the people of Flameaux, conscious of having offended their neighbours but frightened to fight, recover their sense of honour enough to slope off to the tavern in order to acquire some Dutch courage. They adopt a strategy of ambush and the day ends with a general confrontation between the men and women of each village. The confrontation between the Vindelless and Mistoudun and his brother Brelin is even more redolent of the franc-archer tradition, with Brelin exclaiming at his brother's grievance: 'Where are they? What's this? God's blood, there are no more the seven, leave them! Ho, ho, Saint Gris' stomach! God's snake! Saint Quenet's stomach, what a war!' In turn, their opponent Maître Pierre Baguette in his boastfulness is redolent of the ridiculous franc-archer, to the point of insisting that he had not had his ears boxed by an old woman in Utopia.<sup>140</sup>

All this serves to introduce the two *franc-archers* of Vindelless and Flameaux, Guillot le Bridé and Philippot l'Enfumé, to whose absurd quarrels du Fail devoted a whole chapter. Guillot, 'elected' *franc-archer* for 'his boldness, especially at table, as much for his size', a good guard dog, had he felt moved to bite, a gentleman, perhaps, because of a field his father sold, his coat-of-arms dished cabbage, quartered with bacon (we are here in du Fail's chosen world of the *coq de village*, after all). The feud between the two *franc-archers* stemmed from Guillot's getting away with leaving his garrison to 'pay his arrears' to his wife and not being fined. When Philippot, a blusterer and a coward, challenged this, Guillot 'cut the lace' to him (in other words, issued a rustic cartel) and so an endless absurd feud began fuelled by Philippot's inability to accept apologies.<sup>141</sup> By a strange irony, the words used to sum up this conflict: 'it is difficult, nay almost impossible, that neighbours shouldn't have quarrels' was echoed by Brantôme in his biography of Charles V, when makes the Emperor say: 'Never two great and envious neighbours can live in peace.'<sup>142</sup>

<sup>138</sup> Du Fail, *Propos rustiques*, ed. Lefèvre, pp. 62–83; ed. Pérouse and Dubuis, pp. 106–35. For commentary, cf. E. Philipot, *La Vie et l'oeuvre littéraire de Noel du Fail* (Paris, 1914), pp. 166–9.

<sup>139</sup> Du Fail, *Propos rustiques*, ed. Lefèvre, p. 65, ed. Pérouse, p. 111. The *pertuisane's* origins are obscure but by this period it indicated an archaic form of halberd.

<sup>140</sup> Du Fail, *Propos rustiques*, ed. Lefèvre, pp. 77, 79, ed. Pérouse, pp. 128, 130. See *Le Franc-archier de Baignollet*, ed. Polak, ll. 8–10.

<sup>141</sup> Du Fail, *Propos rustiques*, ch. XI, ed. Lefèvre, pp. 84–9, ed. Pérouse, pp. 135–47; Philipot, *Du Fail*, p. 169.

<sup>142</sup> Du Fail, *Propos rustiques*, ed. Pérouse, p. 141; Brantôme, ed. Buchon, I, p. 11, col. ii.

### Conclusions: War in French public opinion

How far can we gage the temper of 'public opinion' or indeed the possibility of its formation in this period? How well was the populace informed of public events? There are at least traces of discontent at the time of the expedition to Naples in 1494–5. At a time when the flow of precious metals abroad was regarded as little less than a disaster, the prospect of taxes flowing out to sustain the army in Italy was daunting.<sup>143</sup> There was widespread resistance at the time in towns of northern France to forced loans, while the lords of the court were asked for 50,000 'ducats' in August 1494.<sup>144</sup> On Louis XII's return from his first expedition to Milan, the nobles of Anjou held celebratory jousts but during them the students, who always had bad relations with men-at-arms, picked quarrels with them 'for many defamatory and scandalous libels and many mockeries of such jousts were stuck up everywhere.'<sup>145</sup> The discontent at the state of the kingdom in the early 1520s is well documented.

To a degree, printed 'propaganda' could offset this. The circulation of *plaquettes* is measurable to some extent by Sébastien Picotté's reliance on them,<sup>146</sup> alongside Bouchet's chronicle until 1535, larded with Marot's Chants on public events. From 1535, Picotté's reliance on news *plaquettes* is more extensive, beginning with a French translation of the richly ironic Italian account of the Emperor's campaigns of 1536, *Du glorieux retour de Lempereur de Provence*.<sup>147</sup> The *Relation du siège mémorable de la ville de Péronne* of 1536 is used for events in Picardy in that year, as well as published epitaphs on the comte de Dammartin.<sup>148</sup> The story of the prosecution of the Italian poisoner for the Dauphin's death is included.<sup>149</sup> For 1537, a narrative of the campaign in Artois, a report of the Turkish raid on Brindisi, the Sarzay-Saint-Julien duel, a *plaquette* on the investiture of the Constable and the narrative of the negotiations of the truce of Nice are included.<sup>150</sup> Picotté was much more impressed by the Emperor's visit to France, copying page after page of official descriptions and thereafter filled his chronicle with transcripts of documents concerning the Emperor's activities in Germany<sup>151</sup> and Algiers. Picotté copied the entire text of Villegaignon's narrative of the Emperor's campaign in Algiers. On the beginning of the war with the Emperor he had no understanding other than that the King had despatched his armies to the frontier.<sup>152</sup>

<sup>143</sup> Desjardins, *Négociations*, I, p. 293.

<sup>144</sup> Labande-Mailfert, *Charles VIII*, pp. 237–8.

<sup>145</sup> Bib.II, 93, fo. 184r.

<sup>146</sup> See Hauser, 'Etude critique', 49–63.

<sup>147</sup> Bib.II, 20.

<sup>148</sup> *Chronique du roy François*, pp. 153–6; Bib.II, 15.

<sup>149</sup> *Chronique du roy François*, pp. 184–9; Bib.II, 19.

<sup>150</sup> *Chronique du roy François*, pp. 206–14; 225–7; 232–6; 237–9; 240–56; Bib.II, 46 and 54.

<sup>151</sup> *Chronique du roy François*, pp. 322–37, are a version of a relation of the Emperor's negotiations at Regensburg (precis. pp. 324–5); pp. 337–62 are a translation Villegaignon, Bib.II, 124, dedicated to Guillaume du Bellay.

<sup>152</sup> *Chronique du roy François*, p. 386.

The readership for news *plaquettes*, which were, after all, ephemeral and cheap, seems to have been widespread. Though proclamations declaring public events were frequent, they seem not to have satisfied a public thirst for information. That the bourgeois read them avidly seems hardly in doubt, though they could also be read out loud to those who could not read. There was only limited room for independent public opinion about foreign affairs. There is some evidence of grumbling and possibly even of a concerted attack on royal policy in 1525. An anonymous Parisian chronicle copied the text of an otherwise unknown *plaquette* found in pulpits on 19 March 1525 attacking ‘madame Ambition with her chancellor’ and blaming the misfortunes of the kingdom on them.<sup>153</sup> Public attitudes to the King’s policy towards the Emperor were initially shaped by the need to reject the treaty of Pavia and recover the King’s sons from captivity in Spain. The fever of rumour in Paris during the Autumn of 1525 about the King’s death is a case in point.<sup>154</sup>

Royal declarations served the purpose of mobilizing support. The royal manifesto for tax assessment of 1527 specified that, in view of the impossibility of handing Burgundy over to the Emperor and the continued detention of his sons, the King had taken counsel with his allies, the Pope, England and Venice, to bring the Emperor to reason, ‘who, seeing this, and by his or his council’s unnatural will’ had marched his armies into Italy to capture Rome.<sup>155</sup> How much did the French people know or care about wars with the Emperor other than as a justification employed by their rulers for taxation? Charles usually appears as a real or potential enemy in French public declarations from 1519 but Burgundy, ancestral domain of the Emperor, was still something of an exception. We know that a minority in Dijon were active in the months after Pavia in the production of verse that was to welcome the return of Burgundy to its ‘natural’ ruler the Emperor, and addressed him in extravagant terms as ‘issued from celestial Burgundy’.<sup>156</sup> Prophecies were recorded that predicted the battle of Pavia and the emergence of Henry VIII as King of France.<sup>157</sup>

It is certainly the case that such opinions were quickly marginalised and that during the half century from 1477 to 1525 the political and military elite of Burgundy had become securely embedded in France through ties of patronage, advantage and loyalty. Nevertheless, the rejection of the terms of the treaty of Madrid was carefully stage managed. The remonstrances of the Estates of Burgundy and Auxonne on 4 and 8 June 1526 (in virtually the same words) declared that since 1477 ‘the people of Burgundy have always resisted their enterprise ... like good and loyal subjects of the King of France.’<sup>158</sup> This seems

<sup>153</sup> The chronicle in BN fr. 17257, see *Bourgeois* (ed. B), p. 195n.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.* (ed. B), pp. 220–1.

<sup>155</sup> H. Hauser, *Le Traité de Madrid et la cession de la Bourgogne à Charles-Quint* (Paris, 1912), pp. 177–8.

<sup>156</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 110–11.

<sup>157</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 113.

<sup>158</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 165.

to have been carefully prepared by Duprat and the royal council at Cognac. In such matters, nothing was left to chance.<sup>159</sup>

There is much evidence for a widespread public sense of disillusionment with Montmorency's policy in 1540, partly stemming from chroniclers and writers of the mid-1540s, including the rather sour comments of Dolet in the 1543 continuation of his *Gestes*. A great deal of patronage had gone into a literary campaign to laud the hopes of peace as a result of the Nice meeting and the Emperor's visit in 1539. In this, court poets were well to the fore. Claude Chappuys's *La Complaincte de Mars sur la venue de l'empereur en France*<sup>160</sup> and Marot's conceit, likening Charles V to a new Julius Caesar,<sup>161</sup> come to Gaul this time in peace, testify, as has been seen, to a longing for peace. Much of this verse was copied by Sébastien Picotté.

Jean Bouchet also testifies to the general disappointment at the results of the Emperor's visit: it was more magnificent than that of a King but the world was dismayed by the event 'considering that not three years before the Emperor had boasted that he would make the King of France the poorest gentleman in his kingdom.'<sup>162</sup> Charles's failure to honour the commitment to hand over Milan was taken up by Guillaume Paradin in the short history of the conflict published early in 1544, by which time Montmorency was officially a 'non-person'. Paradin notes that Charles had

made use of the authority of a person then in charge of all the affairs of France, who, it was said, had letters from the Emperor promising perpetual faith, peace and friendship.<sup>163</sup>

Private writings tell a more nuanced story. For the Provins chronicler Claude Haton (1535–1605), writing in the mid-sixteenth century, these events had already become hazy<sup>164</sup> but Haton's is an important testimony to the development of public opinion in France on foreign policy after the onset of the religious divisions around 1560 and all the more telling for being an entirely private document. Haton had much to say about the Emperor and considered him the most feared since Charlemagne.<sup>165</sup> He discoursed at length on his wars against the Turks and the heretics in Germany in defence of the Catholic Church and summed him up as 'one of the greatest warriors and fortunate knights of his age and a century before in Christendom; all his life there was no knight or prince more fortunate in war than him' other than the reigning King, Henri II. France, he thought, 'could well call him her Atilla, in other words her great enemy and

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 77–83.

<sup>160</sup> *Bib.II*, 94 (also pr. Rouen, 1539). See also the semi-official relation in verse by René Macé, pr. as *Voyage de Charles-Quint par la France*, ed. G. Reynaud (Paris, 1879).

<sup>161</sup> See the verse of Brodeau copied in *Chronique du roy François*, p. 317.

<sup>162</sup> *Bib.II*, 92, fo. 284r. These words appeared in the 1545 edition.

<sup>163</sup> *Bib.II*, 119a, p. 2.

<sup>164</sup> Claude Haton, *Mémoires*, Vol. I, ed. L. Bourquin *et al.* (Paris, 2001). Why the peace of Cambrai broke down he did not know, and 1540 'is the beginning of our childish understanding' (p. 99). He is hazy on the captivity of Francis I and mixes up the war of 1542–44 with that of 1552–5.

<sup>165</sup> For what follows, see *ibid.*, pp. 97–102.

persecutor, for he made war on her all his reign until his death.' The treaty of Cambrai and the marriage to Eleonore of Portugal had promised peace but this had not materialised. It was true that Charles had been sumptuously received in France in 1539 and had again promised perpetual peace 'but the hope was in vain.' The French invasion of Luxembourg in support of the Protestant princes he thought 'one of the worst faults committed by the late King Francis.' The death of the King's youngest son Charles d'Orléans had come as a relief to the people for he had been favoured by the Emperor and the promised marriage between Orléans and the Emperor's daughter would have been the cause of more wars. Haton's understanding of the wars that began in 1552 is important. Charles, he thought, had justly punished the rebel Lutheran princes in 1546–7 but this had led the princes to send an appeal to the French King 'to tell him of the oppression' from which they suffered. The King of France consequently declared himself their protector, even though the German Catholics were 'in good union and agreement with the Emperor.' Haton had recourse to the suggestion that Henri II 'could not have understood this before taking up arms.' The Metz campaign, Haton did not understand 'unless it was to favour the German Lutherans.' So, though Haton, writing his notes before the death of Henri II, acknowledged him as a great ruler who had got the better of the Emperor, the latter's commitment to the Catholic cause outweighed considerations of *Realpolitik*. This view was not entirely consistent, of course. A critical attitude towards the Constable de Montmorency's policy for his lack of energy in prosecuting war with the Emperor is also apparent for the 'understanding he had with the Emperor', even though the King would never have believed it and Haton himself acquits the Constable of treason.

Where, then, we can test the reception of news and propaganda, it is possible to identify a sort of public opinion that was eager for information, sometimes gullible but often critical. The waging of war in Renaissance France could simply not be done by ignoring the opinions of the King's subjects. A wide range of publicists commented, for or against, the very act of waging war.

## Conclusion: ‘Until It Fill the Whole World?’

On 1 August 1558, three weeks after the alarming defeat of the French army at Gravelines, Henri II arrived at Laon, where he was joined by a duke of Guise who was busy sending out spies to reconnoitre the enemy’s positions and asking for details of enemy movements company by company.<sup>1</sup> While the King took up residence at the cardinal of Lorraine’s Château of Marchais, the duke moved on 3rd to Pierrepont, near Marle, sending out letters of instruction for the assembly there of a great army.<sup>2</sup> On 8 August, the King himself arrived to dine and at 1 o’clock to review in a broad plain the most splendid army assembled in one place by a King of France in the Renaissance period. Monluc remembered that ‘it was the finest and largest army a King of France had ever had’ and that it took three hours to pass in review before the King. The Venetian ambassador, thought it extended for 6 or 7 Italian miles.<sup>3</sup> Rabutin, who was also there, noted that ‘never could be remembered an army in which there were so many foreigners, even German cavalry amounting to 8000 horse.’ The army, he said, was drawn up in a great crescent with the avant-garde and rear guard at each extremity and the ‘battle’ in the centre. ‘Thus was ranged this fine and powerful army that the King, accompanied by many great princes of his realm, inspected from one end to the other. It is certain that His Majesty took a particular pleasure in seeing so many princes, great lords, captains, gentlemen and generally so many men assembled there, ready to sacrifice their lives for his service and to support his cause. But what gave greatest cause for amazement, and by which could be known all the horrendous powers and inventions of the bloody god of war Mars, was to hear the roar of the artillery and the discharge of so many arquebuses and pistols by the *Reiters*. It seemed as though heaven and earth were exploding in thunder and that the Almighty wanted to smash the world to pieces.’ Rabutin tells us that the royal inspection lasted for six or seven hours amidst the heat and dust of the August afternoon.<sup>4</sup>

According to Rabutin, the 1750 lances of the gendarmerie were joined by 1400 light horse and 8000 German pistoliers (including Wilhelm of Saxony’s 7 cornets). Among the infantry there were 6000 French infantry, 2000 Swiss and around 19,000 lansquenets. The army stood in total at a little more than 40,000 men with 53 artillery pieces. A contemporary document follows Rabutin’s description but attributes somewhat larger numbers to most categories of the army.<sup>5</sup> After the review, the King returned to Marchais and Guise continued

<sup>1</sup> BN fr. 3149, fo. 28; BN fr. 3123, pp. 223, 225, 237.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 235.

<sup>3</sup> Monluc, *Commentaires*, ed. Courteault, pp. 451, 1165n.

<sup>4</sup> Rabutin, *Commentaires*, II, pp. 223–9.

<sup>5</sup> BN fr. 6617, fo. 27.



to monitor enemy threats against the Somme towns.<sup>6</sup> The army moved via Assy, arriving at Roye on 20th. Finally, towards the end of August, the new camp was established outside Amiens to face down the army of Philip II.<sup>7</sup> Though some troops had been detached for garrison duty along the Somme, the whole army was seriously reinforced by French infantry (including the legion of Champagne) and crack troops in the form of 10 or 12 old bands from Italy. 10 ensigns of Swiss also seem to have arrived.<sup>8</sup> The total thus seems to have reached 50,000 men who were paid for a period of five months, which represents a prodigious effort of finance and organisation as well as a remarkable recovery from the disasters of the previous year.<sup>9</sup> The army remained encamped at Amiens until late October, when the truce was proclaimed there for peace negotiations at Cercamp. Only then was the process of pay-off and allocation of garrisons started.<sup>10</sup> As on several other occasions in the period covered by this book, the risks of pitched battle were too great for the dynastic monarchies to run, even though they had channelled vast resources into their armies. They had reached a point of stalemate.

Fittingly, the ordinary man-at-arms Rabutin, at the end of the Renaissance period, evokes the same sort of imagery as Jean d'Auton's descriptions of the armies of the Italian campaigns in the first decade of the century. For him, this was an army whose sense of personal loyalty to the monarch and sense of display was deeply traditional but it is apparent that it was infinitely transformed from the forces that had crossed the Alps at the start of the century, in its size, diversity of formation and armament. This book has argued that in the era of the Renaissance, war and its demands pervaded French society, that the bulk of the state's efforts was channelled into the preparation and fighting of war. Every community knew about the King's quarrels and, by extension, those of the kingdom. This was a society in which the prevailing attitudes to war and those responsible for it were deeply traditional (the nobility remained convinced of its leading role) but also in which the sheer costs of the new armament demanded a wider participation of public opinion than that of the traditional social elites. Enthusiasm for war was generated at many different levels in news reporting and the literary world at a time when instruments of control on opinion formation were relatively weak.

James Wood has convincingly argued that that royal army after 1560, well-adapted to the waging of foreign campaigns and frontier defence, was a lumbering Leviathan when confronted by civil war and rebellion.<sup>11</sup> A major

<sup>6</sup> BN fr. 3123, pp. 329–30, 243–5.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 249, 251, 253, 255, 257, 259, 261; BN fr. 3149, fo. 67; BN fr. 3134, fos. 100, 102.

<sup>8</sup> The description of the army in BN fr. 3081, fos. 67–8 seems to relate to this stage.

<sup>9</sup> Lot, *Recherches*, pp. 176–86. The *Estat des forces* of summer 1558, which seems to relate to the Amiens camp, produces a total of around 53,000 men including the King's military household (BN fr. 20470, fo. 167).

<sup>10</sup> AM Péronne, BB, fos. 113r-v; BN fr. 20646, fos. 132–3; BN fr. 3123, p. 267; BN Cangé 15, fo. 69.

<sup>11</sup> J. Wood, *The King's Army, Warfare, Soldiers and Society during the Wars of Religion in France, 1562–76* (Cambridge, 1996).

reason for this was the fragmentation of the command structure and the disintegration of the sometimes fragile systems of pay and supply under the impact of civil dissension. The royal army of the Renaissance could not impose control any more than its much more powerful successor could do in 1789. The exercise of power internally remained a matter of persuasion. Yet France had responded effectively to the challenge of military change and produced by 1558–9 a military machine that could take on and face down the formidable world might of the King of Spain.

Was the state in Renaissance France and the army that it commanded a ‘machine built for the battlefield’, in the way that Perry Anderson understood it? In one sense this is obviously the case, though it did much else besides. Was that army effective? The answer here is equivocal. It was generally successful in the 1490s and 1500s, less so in the 1520s to 1540s, much more so in the 1550s. Did it participate in a ‘military revolution’ in the sense that has been argued by Geoffrey Parker, among others? Here the answer is at least debatable. In many ways it remained highly aristocratic and it is a false perspective to think of the period as one in which a ‘feudal’ army was replaced by a modern one (any more than this can be argued for the 15th century). The nobility retained the right to command but mediated through its obligations to the state. Yet the army grew inexorably in size and complexity and by bolting on new adjuncts such as mercenary formations and a highly sophisticated siege train. Existing institutions were invigorated to energise the supply and control of armies.

Warfare became in the Renaissance period a preoccupation of the public sphere, a matter of debate and opinion (partially but never entirely controlled). It was an all-encompassing fact reflected in art, music, architecture and print. It thus ceased to be the preserve of a small ruling class and its depiction moved out of the realms of the private chronicle and into the street. It remained the prerogative of the King, advised by his chosen ministers, yes, but the demands made, strategic and financial, were so great as to require the involvement of the entire society, directly or indirectly. Indeed, it is the extent of the strain imposed by the final stage of the wars that in part explains the failure of the crown to control the accelerating disorder of 1560–2.

# Appendix 1

## French troop strength and battles during the Italian wars (1494–1529)

Date	Place	Enemy	Numbers of French
1494			Total army: HC: 6–7000; Swiss: 5000; I: 6-8000
9	Rapallo	Naples, Genoa	
10	Saint Agata	Naples	
10	Del Magra	Florence	
1495			
1	Ponte della Torre	Naples	
2	Monte S. Giovanni		
2	San Germano	Naples	
3	Seminara	Naples	
7, 6	FORNOVO	League	HC: 3200; Swiss: 2500; I: 7000
7	Trecate	Milan/Venice	
9	Eboli	Naples	
9	Pomigliano	Naples	
1496			
4	Fiume Chilone	Naples	
6	Atella	Naples/Spain	
6	Borgo Lauro	Naples	
6	Palena	Naples/Rome	
7	Venosa	Venice	
8	Aversa	Naples/Venice	
1499			Total: C: 6-8000; I: 17–20,000
1500			
3	Mortara	Milan	
4	NOVARA/S. Nazzaro	Milan	HC: 4000; I: 14,000? Swiss
1501	Naples army		HC: 3600; I: 7000; A: 36 pieces
1502			
10	Seminara/ Terranova	Spain	
10	Atripalda	Spain	
10	Ruvo	Spain	
1503			Total, La Trémoille: HC: 4000; I: 6000
	Calimera	Spain	
	Gerace	Spain	
2	Corato	Spain	
3	Ruvo/Canosa	Spain	
4	Seminara/Gioia Tauro	Spain	
5	CERIGNOLA	Spain	HC: 2000; LC: 110; I: 3500 Swiss: 3–3500 Fr: ?
10	Aquino	Spain	
12, 29	GARIGLIANO	Spain	
	Andria	Spain	
	Pontecorvo	Spain	

1507			Total, Genoa camp: HC: 3200; I: 14,000
4	Rivarola Ligure	Genoa	
4	Sampierdarena	Genoa	
1509			
4	Treviglio	Venice	
4	AGNADELLO	Venice	HC: ?; I: 22,000
7	Isola della Scala	Venice	
9	Cagnola	Venice	
	S. Martino	Venice	
	Isola della Scala	Venice	
10	Castelbaldo	Venice	
11	Ferrara	Venice	
1510			
5	Legnano	Venice	
9	S. Felice/Verona	Venice	
9	Montagnana	Venice	
	Prato dei Cortili	Rome	
	Reggio Emilia	Rome	
1511			
2	Santerno	Rome/Venice	
3	Bellaria	Venice	
5	Marsa Finalese	Venice/Rome	
	Casalecchio	Venice/Rome	
8	Villanova	Venice	
9	Marostica/ Sandrigo	Venice	
	Soave	Venice	
	Montello	Venice	
9	Noale	Venice	
12	Della Buffalara	Swiss	
1512			
2	Torre del Magnano	Venice	
	Brescia	Venice	
4, 11	RAVENNA	Spain/Venice/ Rome	HC: 1800; I: 16,000
1513			Total: HC: 4800; LH: 600; 14,000; Venetians: 10,000
6, 6	NOVARA	Milan/Swiss	HC: 1200; I: 9000
1515			Total army: HC: 7500; I: 8000 Fr: 23,000 lans. Venetians: 9000
8	Villafranca	Milan/Empire	
9, 13–14	MELEGNANO MARIGNAN	Swiss/Milan	
1516			
4	Lodi	Empire	
1517			
5	S. Remulo	Free companies	
8	Rimini	Free companies	
1521			
6	Como	Empire/Sforza	
9	Finale Emilia	Empire/Florence/ Rome	
	Cremona	Empire	
	Robacco sul Naviglio	Empire/Rome	

11	Vaprio d'Adda	Empire/Sforza/ Rome	
1522			
3	Gambole	Empire	
4, 27	BICOCCA	Empire/Milan/ Rome	HC: 150; LC: 200; I: 14,000
	Trezzo	Milan/Empire	
1523			Total Bonnavet army: HC: 4000; LC: 200; 10,000 + Swiss
1524			
1	Robeco d'Oglio	Empire/Milan	
3	Garlasco	Venice/Milan/ Empire	
	Sartirana Lomellina	Empire	
	Pizzighettone	Empire	
	Scaldasole	Venice/Milan	
4	Abbiategrasso	Milan	
	Romagnano Sesia	Empire/Mantua/ Venice	
11	Melzo	Empire	
1525			
1	Casciano	Empire	
	S. Angelo Lodigiano	Empire	
	Varazze	Empire	
2, 24	PAVIA	Empire/Spain/ Milan/Venice	C: 6000; 24-26,000
	Torrente Orba	Empire	
	Casalmaggiore	Empire/Milan	
3	Abbazia delle Tre Fontane	Empire/Colonna	
9	Ravello	Empire	
1527			
3	Salerno	Empire	
7	Carate Brianza	Empire	
9	S. Pietro in Valle	Empire	
1528			Total, Lautrec army: C: 2900; I: 26,000
3	Lucera	Empire	
6	L'Aquila	Empire	
6	Piedigrotta	Empire	
8	Nola	Empire	
	Aversa	Empire	
	Crescentino	Empire	
1529			
6, 21	LANDRIANO	Empire	HC: few; LC: 400; I: 1500 lans.

Legenda: A Artillery    C Cavalry    HC Heavy Cavalry  
 LH Light Horse    LC Light Cavalry    I Infantry    lans laniquenets


## Appendix 2

**Table i French Military Resources in Royal Propaganda: 1542**

*In Luxembourg*

14,000 lansquenets under Longueval

2,000 German horse

13,000 lansquenets under duke of Orléans 

6,000 Champagne legion

6,000 Norman legion

4,000 Picard legion

1,200 hommes d'armes

1,200 light cavalry

leaving 30,000 foot, 2400 cavalry

+ 36 large pieces of artillery

*With the King on his projected campaign*

13,000 lansquenets

10,000 Swiss of last levies

4,000 old bands of Piedmont

4,000 Italians

[12,000] legions of Guienne and Languedoc

? other foot

46/7,000 foot (less 6000 lansquenets sent to Navarre)

40,000

1,600 hommes d'armes

(500 of the military household)

3,000 light horse (2,000 brought from Piedmont)

45,100

60 large artillery pieces (incl. 24 double cannons)

*With the King of Navarre for the Guyenne enterprise*

6,000 lansquenets

2,000 Gascon foot

6,000 raised by King of Navarre

4,000 Italians

18,000

*Garrisons left in Piedmont*

For 12 large and 150 smaller ones:

6/7000 Swiss  
6/7000 old bands (French, Gascons, Italians)  
14,000 foot

500 hommes d'armes  
7/800 light horse  
Total: 15,200.

*Estimate of the arrière-ban for the winter of 1542–3*

70,000–80,000 men divided in two corps, one for Spanish, one for the Flanders frontier

*Total: at least 103,000 foot; 8800 horse; 96 large artillery pieces*

Source: Instructions of Francis I for Claude de Laubespine, envoy to England, 9 July 1542, copy by E. Chapuys in HHuSA, Vienna, PC 223, fos. 45–54; *L&P*, XVII, 517, PRO 31/18/3/1, pp. 599–601.

**Table ii Infantry garrisons on the northern and eastern frontier, Jan.–Feb. 1558**

Place	No. of men	Place	No. of men
<i>Picardy: main garrisons</i>		Boulogne-sur-Mer	400
Guise	2420	Ardres	1920
La Fère sur-Oise	1100	Calais	2800
Ribemont	200	<i>Picardy: small forts</i>	
La Capelle	720	Monthulin	100
Laon	400	Beauquesne	25
Chauny	800	Dompierre	100
Noyon	400	Auchy	100
Roye	400	Caumont	100
Soissons	200	Etaples	50
Montdidier	200	Vendeuil & Mouy	40
Coucy	200	Forts nr. Chauny	69
Péronne	1200	Forts nr. Calais	50
Corbie	440	<i>German troops</i>	
Bray-sur-Somme	200	Lansquenets	8400
Doullens	1120	Pistoliers	600
Abbeville	200	<b>Total</b>	<b>16,300</b>
Rue	440		
Montreuil-sur-Mer	720		

Source: *état d'assignacion for extraordinaire des guerres*, BN Clair. 346, fos. 77–92



## Appendix 3

### i Ordonnance Companies, 1500–1515

#### Ordonnance companies left in garrison in Milanais, 1500 (D'Auton, I, p. 383)

La Trémoille	80 lances (musters, BN fr. 23783, nos. 30–31)
Maréchal de Gyé	50
Admiral	50
Sandricourt	40
Mauleon	40
Lanque	40
Bâtard Mathieu	50
Maréchal Trivulce	100
Ligny	100
Marquis of Saluzzo	40
Alègre	50
Chandée	50
La Lande	30
Chevalier de Louvain	50
Bailli de Dijon	25
Duke of Savoy	50

#### Account of Pierre Legendre, *trésorier des guerres*, Jan. 1501–Dec. 1501 (BN fr. 2927, fos. 34– ) (for half the complement)

Louis de Luxembourg, c. de Ligny	100
Robinet de Frametzelles	100
D'Oyzon	100
G F San Severino, c. of Caiazzo	100 (in garrison at Beaune, 1499–1500: d'Auton, I, p. 383)
Chaumont	70
Prince of Orange	60
La Gruthuse	60
Admiral de Graville	50
Maréchal de Rieux	50
Chandée	50
Gracien de Guerre	50
Pierre d'Urfé, gr. éc.	50
Miolans	50
Jacques de Silly	50
La Palice	50
Sen. d'Agenais	50
Bâtard de Cardonne	40

Châtillon	30
Des Querdes	30

**Ordonnance companies detailed for the campaign of Naples, 1501 (d'Auton, II, pp. 12–13)**

Duke of Savoy	100 (Lt. Coursinge)
Cesare Borgia	100
San Severino-Caiazzo	100
Stuart d'Aubigny	100
J. de La Tremoille-Mauléon	50
Pierre d'Urfé	50
La Palice	50
Yves d'Alègre	50
Aymar de Prye	50
Chandée	50
Jacques de Silly, b. de Caen	50
Saint-Prest	50
Antonio Pallavicini	50 (Lt. Aymer de Villars)
Jean de La Lande	50

**Companies in the kingdom of Naples, 1502–3 (d'Auton, II and III, *passim*)**

Louis d'Armagnac, duke of Nemours	100
Duke of Savoy	100 (Lt. Cornon – at Ruvo)
Berault Stuart, sr. d'Aubigny	100 (Lt. Robert Stuart)
Monpensier (part, incl. Bayart)	100
Yves d'Alègre	50
La Palice	
Aymar de Prie	50 (Lt. Louis de Saint-Bonnet)
Adrien de Brimeu, sr. de Humbercourt	50
Sr. de Grigny	50
Jacques de la Trémoille, sr de Mauléon	
Louis d'Ars	
François d'Urfé	(Lt. Coligny)
Sr. de Chandée	(Lt. Chastellart)
La Lande	
Pallavicini	(Lt. Aymer de Villars at Terlizzi)
Jean Stuart	50 (Calabria)
Honorat de San Severino	50 (Calabria)

**Ordonnance companies for the Roussillon campaign, 1503 (d'Auton, III, pp. 208, 223)**

Jean de Levis, sr. de Mirepoix	50
Comte d'Estrac	50
Odet d'Aydie	50
Sr. de Bonneval	50
Duc de Bourbon	100 (Lt. Robert Potin)
Pierre de Rohan, sr. de Gié	100 (Lt. Duretal in place of Ploret)

Jean de Rieux, maréchal de Bretagne	100 (Lt. sr de Froisi)
Marquis de Rothelin	50 (Lt. Capt. Sarron)
Reinforcements:	
Robinet de Frametzelles	
Jacques de Coligny, sr de Châtillon	
Louis de Marraffin	

**The army for the expedition to Bologna, 1506 (d'Auton, IV, pp. 70–1)**

Charles d'Amboise-Chaumont	100
La Palice	50
Yves d'Alègre	50
Robert Stuart	100
Marquis of Mantua	100 (Adrien de Brimeu)
Jean de Durfort-Duras	50
Roger, baron de Beart	50
Galeazzo Pallavicini	40
A M di San Severino	50
Philibert de Clermont-Montoison	50
Oroze	40
Chastellart	40
Fontrailles	30
Comte de Misoc	50
Mercure/ Bua	100 (Albanoys)

**Ordonnance companies for the Genoa campaign, 1507 (d'Auton, IV, pp. 160–1)**

Charles d'Amboise	100
Philippe de Clèves	50 (Lt. bâtard de la Clayette)
Marquis of Montferrat	50
Marquis of Mantua	50 (Lt. Bonnivet)
Alain, sire d'Albret	50 (Lt. Duras)
La Palice	50
Gaston, count of Foix	50 (Lt. Roger sr. de Beart)
Trivulzio	100
Robert Stuart	100
Jean de Bessey	50
Montoison	50
San Severino-Caiazzo	50
A M di Pallavicini	50
Yves d'Alègre	50
Adrien de Brimeu-Humbercourt	40
Chastellart	40
Fontrailles	30
Teodoro Trivulzio	25
Messire Mercure	100 Albanoys

**La Trémoille's army at Novara (1513) (Du Bellay, I, pp. 25–6)**

La Trémoille	100
Duke of Bourbon	100 (Lt. bâtard de Clayette)
Robert de La Marck	100
John Stuart duke of Albany	50
Jean d'Abon sr. de St-André	50
Jacques d'Amboise sr de Bussy	50
Marq of Montferrat	50 (Lt. Jacques sr de Malherbe)

**The relief army for Théroutanne, August 1513 (Du Bellay, I, pp. 30–1)**

Duke of Longueville	100 gent. de la maison
La Palice	
Adrien de Brimeu-Humbercourt	
Bayart	
Roger, baron de Béarn	
Aymar de Prie	
Bonnivet	
Germain de Bonneval	
Admiral Graville	Lt. Antoine de La Fayette
Jules de San Severino	
Count of Guise	Lt. Robert de Malberg
François d'Angloulême	Lt. René de Clermont d'Anjou
Vendôme	Lt. Nicolas sr de Mouy
Duke of Alençon	Lt. François de Silly, bailli of Caen

**Disposition of *gendarmerie* for the army of Italy, 1515 (Du Bellay, I, pp. 60–1; Barrillon, I, p. 68– without indication of companies)**

Avant-garde (Bourbon)
Duke of Bourbon
François de Bourbon
Marshal de Chabannes-La Palice
Charles de La Trémoille, Prince de Talmont
Jean-Jacques Trivulzio, marshal
Bonnivet
Humbercourt
Teligny, sen., of Rouergue
Baron de Béarn
Charles du Bueil, count of Sancerre

Battle (the King)
Duke of Lorraine
Duke of Vendôme
Count of Saint-Pol
Jean d'Albret, sr. d'Orval
Louis de la Trémoille
Robert Stuart, duke of Albany
René, bâtard de Savoie

Odet de Foix-Lautrec  
 Bayart  
 [Boisy?]  
 Rear-guard (Alençon)  
 ?

**ii Dispositions of *gendarmerie* in garrisons in Picardy, November 1521  
 (Du Bellay, I, pp. 169–70)**

<b>Company</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Number</b>
La Fayette	Boulogne	50
Rochebaron d'Auvergne	Boulogne	25
Moreul-Fresnoy	Thérouanne	50
Dammartin	Thérouanne	25
Listenay	Thérouanne	25
Escars-La Vauguion	Thérouanne	25
Lavedan	Bray-sur-Somme	25
Telligny	Montreuil	?
Vendôme	Doullens	70 <sup>1</sup> ?
Saint-Pol	Corbie	?
Humières	Péronne	25
Chabannes <sup>2</sup>	Saint-Quentin	?
D. de Guise	Guise	?
C. de Brienne	Guise	?
C. de Braine	Vervins	?

***Ordonnance* companies in Italy, 1521 (du Bellay, I, pp. 174–6)**

Lautrec (100)  
 Thomas de Foix-Lescun, marshal (100), p. 187  
 Alessandro Trivulzio, p. 176  
 Michele-Antonio, mar. of Saluzzo, p. 176  
 Antoine de Créquy-Pont-Remy (50), pp. 184, 188  
 Telligny, p. 175  
 Aubigny, Scots, Capt. Lucas lieutenant, pp. 188, 191  
 Philippe Chabot de Brion, 40, lieutenant, Gaspard de Paris, p. 188  
 Louis d'Ars (60), p. 188  
 Saint-Pol (30), p. 188  
 Ottaviano Fregoso, doge of Genoa, p. 193

<sup>1</sup> Muster, 70, March 1519, Rosny, IV, p. 275.

<sup>2</sup> Muster, St Quentin, 29 Nov. 1521. Chabannes, *Histoire*, I.ii, no. 281.

iii The *compagnies d'ordonnance*: 1520s

	1521 <sup>i</sup>	1521 <sup>ii</sup>	1523 <sup>iii</sup>	1527 <sup>iv</sup>	1530 <sup>v</sup>
Albany	50			60	80
Guelders	90			36	36
Bât. de Savoie	80		100		
Lautrec	100		100	60	
Bonnivet	100				
La Palice/ Chabannes	90		100 <sup>vi</sup>		
Lescun	40		100		
Prye	40		50		
Bryon	40		70	60	80
Aubigny	60		100	60	80
Florange	50		50	40	80
Pont-Remy	40		80		
Theod. Trivulzio	40		50	60	50
Marq. de Saluzzo	40		100	60	30
Saint-André	40		50	30	40
Marq. Mantua	25				
Montmor	30				
Tournon	40			30	
Montaillon-Laval	30		50		
Guard, Tournai	100				
La Fayette	20	50		24	40
Moreul-Fresnoy	50	50	50	40	40
Bourbon			100		
Longueville			50	36	40
Saint-Pol		?	80	48	80
Chabannes		100	100		
Adm. Bonnivet			100		
Montmorency			100	60	80
Vid. Chartres			100		
Bayart			100		
Mézières			50		
Vandenesse			50		
Valery			50		
Aigremont			50		
Esguilly			70		
San Severino it.			90		
Barn. Visconti, it			50		
Fed. Gonzaga, it			50	40	
Paolo Trivulzio			50		
Lud. Belgiojoso			50		
Hieron. Trivulzio			50		
Jean-Hi Castillon			50	20	
Maumont			50		
Vendôme		70 <sup>vii</sup>	50	60	80
Lavedan		25	50		
Dammartin		25	30	30	
Turenne		25	25	30	40
Du Biez		30	50	40	40
Sarcus			50		
Rochebaron d'Auv		25	50		

Escars	25	50		
Rumesnil		80		
Roussy		35		
Guise	?	60	60	80
Brienne	25	25	36	40
Humières	25	25	30	40
Orval		100		
Sedan		50	50	50
L. du Lac		50		30
Espartoz		60		
Touran?		50		
Bonneval		50	36	40
Navarre		100	60	80
Rieux		50		
Châteaubriant-Laval		40		40
Lude		50	30	
Ars		60	36	
La Trémoille		50	20	20
Lorraine			45	60
Vaudemont			42	
Galiot de Genenouillac			40	
Maulevrier			60	80
Châteauvillain			24	
Villars			36	
Clermont Lodeve			30	40
Des Roches d'Estaing			30	
La Rochepot			30	40
Gov. Auxerre			60	
Alègre			24	40
Créqui			24	
La Roche Mayne			24	24
Du Lude			30	40
Barbezieux			24	40
Moy			30	
Negrepelisse			30	
Lignac			24	24
Montpezat			30	40
Villebon			20	30
Laval de Dauphiné			20	
Pompeyranc			30	
Renzo da Cieri			40	60
C.de Chalon			24	
Berniculles			24	24
A.Trivulzio-Vigevano			20	
Renato Trivulzio			10	
C. de Laval			40	
La Meilleraye				30
Tende				40
Boisy				40
Montejean				40
D'Aster				40
Listenay	25			
Telligny	?			
C. de Braine	?			



- i BN fr. 2933 fo.1, acc of Poncher for half the companies.
- ii Garrison forces and promotions of companies of 25 after the campaign, 1521, Du Bellay, I, pp. 169–70.
- iii Journal d'un bourgeois, ed. Bourrilly, pp. 117–21.
- iv 'Compagnies des gens de guerre des ordonnances' (1525–8 – probably 1527) BN fr. 3122 fo. 37–8.
- v 'Estat des compagnies ... des ordonnances' paid by Grolier and Hervoet, Jan.Mar. 1529, BN fr. 3002, fos. 36–8.
- vi Same as Chabannes in 1523?
- vii Perhaps nominally. 'ma compagnie qui n'est que de soixante huit hommes d'armes' (Vendôme to Francis I, 23 July [1521], BN fr. 3059, fo. 59–60.

## Appendix 4 (for chapter 5)

### Musters of *Landsknecht* companies in French service

#### 6000 men raised in Germany by the duke of Guise, Hans von Brumbach, captain-general, June 1529

	No. in company	harquebusiers	Double pay	Month's pay	Fr. 25789
Georg Wunch	522	58	58	3883	No.252
Georg Vince	453	50	50	3130	272
Adolf Steinfurt	229	30	50		253
Bastien Soly	410	47	50	2845	254
Bastian Sollier	434	50	50	3015	271
Guy Branchet	444	50	50	3001	261
Guy Branchet	391	50	50	2742	270
Wolf Steinfurt, c de Hageneu	459	50	50	3168	262

#### Felter von Keuringen's regiment of 6000, Peter von Gultiger, captain-general, June 1529

Peter Gultiger	330	50	50	2359	255
Adam Culpele	495	50	50	2307	256
Adam Scupot	363	50	50	2575	258
?	?	50	50		259
Yetel Lem	298	50	50	2125	265
Mondy	334	50	50	2341	266
Jheronysme Zeller	402	50	50	2749	267
Christople Christin	423	50	50	2875	268
Adam Cupelle	422	50	50	2869	270

#### Regiment of 2000 under Arnoul, comte de Mandreschet, June 1529

Vernerman v Croissuel	150	15	15	1191	257
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#### Count Wilhelm von Fürstenberg's regiment, Nov.–Dec. 1537

	No. in company	Harquebusiers	Double pay	Month's pay	Lot (fr. 3058, fos. 35–74)
Berthould v Wolsperg	341	50	34	2350	
Felix de Lendeberg	352	50	30	2416	
Martin du Lis	368	50	37	2560	
Hans v Heremberg	316	50	32	2188	
Mendybech	432	50	45	3082	
Bastian Vogelspec	444	50	44	3028	
Jorg Och Baffoult	498	50	50	3388	
Laurens Choalbach	378	50	38	2596	

Comte de Bettelingo	400	50	40	2740
Hir Hurich won Wrien	376	50	38	2574
Rolt Folch	337	50	34	2326
Berthoul won Wilsburg	505	50	50	3433
Georges Truerugnan	383	50	38	2626
“ for Brian	285	50	28	1954
w. Wissehorn				
Veyl Yocchel	290	50	29	2014
“	293	50	25	2032
Martin Ulbach	411	50	41	2812
Bernard won Tralb	501	50	50	3406
Jobst Suessernyer	323	50	32	2233
Jorg de Wissebach	348	50	35	2398
Hans won Flechsten	428	50	43	2926
Bastian Voglespert	435	50	44	2984
Hans Lang won	370	50	37	2542
Petesperg				
“	430	50	43	2938
<b>Total</b>	<b>9244</b>			

**Remains of duke of Wurttemberg’s regiment, Nov. 1537**

Daniel Sautel	438	50	44	2992
Hans w Bettelinguen	437	50	44	2986
Hand won Hach	429	50	44	2932
Wolf Selingnan	425	50	42	2902

**Regiment of Nicolas de Rustichy, dit le Bossu, Nov. 1537**

Jehan de Mergrin	450	50	45	3070
Elis von Remunde	440	50	44	3040
Six von Munychen	419	50	42	2866
Renolt von Valt	477	50	48	3250
Hans Stangler	431	50	43	2944
Dietricd von Hosen	471	50	37	2548
Hansdrich von Langlan	489	50	49	3328
Heinrich Danyel	388	50	39	2662

**Ludovic [von] Deben’s (for the count of Altemberg) regiment, 1543**

	Nos.	harquebusiers	Double pay	Month’s pay	Fr. 25791
Georges Hierspart	140		106	1466	no. 386
Christoff von Hatstat	311	31	31	2114	387
Hans Flott	479	50	48	3262	424
Georges Houshame	300			2080	431
Thomas Willier	320			22..	434
Hans Heinrich Welsingar	274			2478	447

**Regiment of Anthoine de Louvain, dr de Rognac, Sept. 1543**

Hans von Essen	200			1870	426
Herbert von Langnen	344			2944	427

**Georg von Reckenrot's regiment of eight ensigns, Sept.–Oct. 1543**

Herman Hessen	337	30	30	2294	428
“”	300			2646	436
Heinrich Karneffel	389			?	435

**Rhingrave's regiment, August 1547–50**

					<b>Fr. 25794–9</b>
Hans Danguestain	494	49	49	4060	25794, 14
Nicolas von Wilestang	329	33	50	3050	25795, 98
Conrad de Rotheuze	300	30	50	2870	25794, 67
Achatius von Stern	200	20	30	1950	25795, 100

**Ludovic von Deben's regiment, 1548–9**

Jheronime Franc	300	30	49	2858	25794, 27
?	300				25794, 68
Anguillart von Mallin	317	50	50	3012	25794, 87
Michel Schermer	291	50	50	2856	25795, 96
Tantonville	355				25795, 99

**Rhinegrave's regiment of 12 ensigns, 1553–4**

Achatius von Sterne		36	50	3242	25797,306
Jehan de Bar	313	50	50	2988	Ib, 355
Hans Lesmellan?	300	50	50	3150	Ib, 358
Hans Spec	198	50	50	8730	25798,409
					(3 months)

**Rhinegrave's regiment, 1558**

Tantonville	296	50	50	17,316	25799,560
					(6 months)

**Ludovic Wondoven's regiment, 1548-50 (from general summaries)**

	<b>June 1548</b>	<b>Nov. 1548</b>	<b>Nov. 1549</b>	<b>Jan. 1550</b>
Felix de Joinville	300	300	321	340
Engelard von Mallin	300	298	342	353
Jheronime Franch	300	300	353	343
Baptiste Jacob	300	300	338	352
Philipp de Auberk	300	298	352	356
Jacob Munich	300	296	331	333
Michel Schercheymer	300	300	326	328
P.Hershcof/Dondreval	300	298	338	345

**Rhinegrave's regiment (Scotland and Picardy), 1548–50 (ditto)**

	<b>1548</b> <sup>1</sup>	<b>1549</b> <sup>2</sup>	<b>1550</b> <sup>3</sup>
Jacques de Nyeuville	300	?	?
Nicolas Wilstein	300	395	388
Achatius Sterne	300	356	349
Tantonville		398	395
Count von Kastel		391	391
Conrad v Rothouzen	300	300	
Hans Muret		300	
Conrad Ruik		300	
Hans Danguestain	494	300	
Capt. Froch		300	

<sup>1</sup> BN fr. 4552, fos. 8– ; BN fr. 18153, fo. 69v.

<sup>2</sup> BN fr. 20543, fos. 54–5.

<sup>3</sup> Musters.

## Appendix 5 (for chapter 6) Fortifications

### i BN fr. 5195, fos. 1–124, *Etat des victuailles, d'artillerie et reparations* for 15 fortresses in Picardy, January 1544.

The necessary works needed were:

#### **Hesdin:**

1. Raise the wall between the tour Robin and the gate towards the street by 3 toises and 40 toises in length and 3 thick
2. Raise the wall from the ruined tower to the town gate at 1 toise thick along 41 toises to hold the earth rampart
3. traverses of earth on the rampart to watch from the montagne de Blacmont to la Justice
4. Lengthen the vault of the town gate
5. Raise the wall from the tour Robin to the tour de France by 2 toises along 18 toises and raise the earth rampart at 7 toises in thickness along 18 toises
6. Raise the 'avant mur' serving as a 'traverse' between the tour de France and the tour du Parc, being 5 toises thick along 25 toises
7. Lengthen the vault by the tour du Parc and make an arch to find a countermines beneath the rampart; this will serve also to access the prison tower
8. Earth rampart needed there

Total: 627 toises at 9 lt. per toise carré: 5647 lt.

#### **Boulogne, 3285 lt.:**

1. Ditch near the boulevard des Dunes, 53 toises long and 10 wide and a bridge to cross it
2. Widen the ditch at the porte Gayolle and lengthen the bridge
3. A countermines to cover the 'allé' of the boulevard de Gayolle going towards the fausses braies, 6 toises long and 4 high
4. The facing of the wall from the fausse braie from the tour de Gayolle half-way to the porte des Degrez
5. Raise the front of the tour Gayolle

Total: 365 toises of masonry et 9 lt.: 3285 lt.

**Ardres**, not priced

#### **Montreuil** (ruined in 1537):

Total: 2522 toises at 8. 10.0 lt.: 21,440 lt. plus other work,

Grand Total: 32,946 lt.

**Le Crotoy**, no works listed

**Abbeville**, no works listed

**Doullens**, no works listed

**Amiens**, no works listed

**Corbie**,

A platform near the tour du Roy, 3200 lt.

A rampart next to it, 2000 lt.

Deepening the moats, 3000 lt.

Total: 8200 lt.

[Work at 2400 lt. already complete]

**Péronne**, needed complete reconstruction, all the walls are at present very weak, unpriced.

**Le Catelet**, the captain is reporting requirements at court, not priced.

**Saint-Quentin**,

Total: 45,860 lt. plus the cost of new ditches and 4 platforms (1. Adjacent to the tour du Coupement, 2 near the old market, 3 near the tour dame Eude, 4 at the windmill near the tour Billon) – undertaken by the town at its own expense

**Landrecies**, no works listed

**Guise**,

Total: 1828 toises at 9 lt.: 16,442 lt., plus the cost of completing 2 new platforms.

**La Chapelle**, no works listed

## ii Funds allocated for Picardy, 1536–59

Date	Sum	Source ( <i>CAF</i> unless otherwise stated)
June 1536	18,000	BN fr. 3008, fo. 85
May 1537	10,000	29431; BN nafr. 10227, no. 8
May 1537	3000	29435
Sept. 1537	10,000	30203
Aug. 1537	20,000	30364
Dec. 1537	10,000	30003
Feb. 1538	20,000	29658
April 1538	12,000	31410; BN fr. 3088, fo. 1
May 1538	12,000	32084; BN fr. 2995, fo. 265
May 1538	15,000	BN fr. 3088, fo. 26
July 1538	32,000	31459
Aug. 1538	3000	BN fr. 3088, fo. 67
Aug. 1538	2000	BN fr. 3088, fo. 70
Nov.–Dec. 1538	1800	31875
Nov.–Dec. 1538	13,000	32045
Jan. 1539	60,000	31028
Jan. 1540	9000	11316



July 1540	21,000	11589
July 1540	1200	11592
Aug. 1540	4000	11599
Aug. 1540	3000	11609
Aug. 1540	6000	11620
Sept. 1540	4000	11636
Oct. 1540	1500	11664
Oct. 1540	1000	11670
Nov. 1540	2000	11721
Nov. 1540	5000	11722
Jan. 1548	16,000	
April 1548	60,000	
May 1548	15,000	
May 1548	6000	
July 1548	12,000	
Sept. 1548	10,000	
March 1558	20,400	BN nafr. 21698, fo. 348 (see table III)
March 1558	20,000	BN nafr. 21698, fos. 161–2
March 1558	4000	BN nafr. 21698, fos. 148–9

**iii ‘Département’ of money allocated for fortifications,  
north and north-east, 9 March 1558**

BN nafr. 21698, fo. 348

La Fère	1200
Guisse	2800
Péronne	1200
Montreuil	1200
Ardres	300
Rue	1500
Doullens	2000
Corbie	1200
La Capelle	1000
Calais	5000
Mariembourg	2000
Rocroi	1000
Total	20400



# Appendix 6

Table i, Summary State Budgets 1515–62

	1515	1516	1529	1530	1531	1545	1548	1549	1553	1558	1560	1561	1562
<b>Royal household</b>													
Chambre aux deniers	80,536	64,220		70,796	71,149	89,939	119,472	70,128	91,111	117,660	126,903	143,735	113,490
Ecurie	95,978	71,562	75,074	77,545		88,009	84,566	131,390	175,767	167,842	147,251	101,464	109,928
Officiers domestiques	98,237	129,905		169,500	181,774	199,328	192,190	304,585	302,253	308,699	212,919	237,744	191,785
Argenterie	99,147	115,511		43,762		21,425	142,885	256,243	83,104(*54)	162,444	80,064	59,460	56,912
Menus affaires	6186	7644	67,424	37,266		86,756	143,695 *1	108,234	119,350	115,094	92,585	59,472	80,985
Maison militaire-100 gents	29,940	29,628	86,419	86,424 *2		85,866	86,019	88,800	86,886	43,901	—	112,012	61,862
– archers de la garde	88,230	144,337		97,796	98,436	97,212	128,904	136,585	150,030	130,343	150,419	153,195	170,659
– Suisses	16,300	16,300		26,400	16,233	15,600 *3	15,600	16,400	16,400	16,400	17,200	17,200	17,200
<b>Garrisons</b>													
Mortepates-Picardie	18,017	17,912		11,322	11,040	—*4	7973	35,364	46,544	26,905			
– Normandie	20,835	21,527		22,268	10,134		26,190						
– Champagne	3900	1950						[98,109]*11	30,163	12,929	23,095*14		
– Languedoc						3420	3900	4500	4500	11,600			
– Guyenne				12,035	5740		59,670 *6			151583*15			
– Bourgogne	19,223	19,156		26,640	13,320	29,640							
<b>Navy</b>													
Marine de Ponant – ord				12,000	12,000	14,800	13,400		17,490	21,514		12,075	13,015
– extraordinaire			70,075(*28)			1,092,874		202,150	283,543	72,135	460,467	18,504	36,884
Marine de Levant ord				289,326 *7		535,797	302,866		359,032	363,050	226,036	247,736	201,289
– extraordinaire						286,374	94,641	245842*12	57,877	237,977	194,293	28,078	29,855
<b>Military</b>													
Tresorerie des Suisses	1,161,732			106,900	106,900	164,035	324,380	315,974	197,417	211,562	441,038	520,174	1,460,805
Ordinaire de la Guerre	1,471,777	1,555,550		408,873	618,483	463,304	758,107	1,018,501	1,325,852	2,751,448	2,552,645	905,880	1,802,319
Extraordinaire de la guerre	2,248,137	3,060,441		783,929 *8	2,893,929	1,581,091	2,348,523	2,373,055	10,580,632	12,862,246	1,576,802	1,079,332	4,812,818
Ordinaire de l'artillerie	28,536	29,735		35,553	36,070	36,000	36,000	43,030	40,507	42,849	29,673	}	}

Extraordinaire artillerie	314,753	426,764	162,975	221,910	463,721	805,022	51,415	41,049	36,613
Reparations- Picardie		75,176	274,407	155,109	148,329	98,675	140,392	129,623	164,636
- Champagne		—	259,490 *9	208,632	173,922	79,484	148,224	122,524	104,498
- Normandie		10,130	29,643	3087	45,608	10,963	40,824	17,783	18,827
- Piedmont			58,167 *10	172,766	204,430	297,989	93,287		40,611
<b>Bâtiments du roi</b>									
Officiers des cours	134,258	169,125	278,686						
<b>Political payments</b>									
Pensions	568,301	341,833	229,733	362,242	350,045	818,979	726,473	627,265	730,478
Deniers par acquit	190,896	1,061,176	1,811,936	812,370	1,347,075	4,738,488	63,406	37,655	142,364
							1559	1560	1561
Dois et recompenses	198,401	216,152	165,795	154,949	293,722	487,324	554,438	631,812	607,534
Deniers par mandements	14,904	26,753	3873	8936	10,870	22,600			
Deniers par ordonnance	125,346	17,304	52,041	75,710	295,058	1,063,504	312,369	175,408	162,098
Ambassades	10,431	13,072	34,489	49,174	191,957	372,830	160,680	117,361 *13	148,703
									146,868
									191,541
									198,896
									190,259

Source: BN fr.17329, fo.82r-112v, *Estats abrégés de ce que monte la despense from 1515 to 1562*, drawn up in 1571.

\*

1. One year and a half down to last June 1547. Note that the wages of the royal chapel and the *chevaucheurs d'écurie*.
2. Half-year accounts doubled up.
3. Half-year accounts doubled up.
4. Figure for 1546 represents 2 years up to June 1546.
6. Four years 3 months to 31.III.1546.
7. Includes both ordinaire and extraordinaire.
8. 17 months to July 1531.
9. 1545 and 1546.
10. Jan.–Oct. 1546.
11. Sum for Jan. 1535–June 1548.
12. 1547 and 1548.
13. BN fr.4523 fo.35v gives 175,418.
14. 4 yrs 9 months to 31 June 1560.
15. Totals 8 years 9 m April 1548–Dec. 1555 and 3 years to 16 April 1559.

## ii Allocations of expenditure on the generalities, Oct. 1502 – Sept.1503

Source: BN fr. 2930, fos. 88–95

Chambre aux deniers	26,000
Officiers domestiques	82,000
Maison militaire	67,367
Military payments	14,043
English pension	49,740
Saltpetres	
Swiss	48,153
Mortepaies – Gâtinais	1200
Mortepaies – Burgundy	17,800
Castles, Burgundy	1000
Extraordinaires des guerres	200,000

### Ordinaire des guerres

Total number of lances: 2175

To be paid by Naples: 480 lances = 193,445 lt.

Of remainder 1155 = 628,401 lt. (of which Milan will pay 135,000 lt.)

Therefore the 'estat de France' will pay 492,901 lt.

		1502–3	1503–4
Ordinaire			
Lances	2175		
Naples	480		193,445
France	1155	450,901	492,901
	Languedoil	237,901	17,200
	Outre-Seine	30,500	8000
	Normandie	126,850	10,200
	Languedoc	48,000	6500
	Languedoil, dom	4000	
	Picardy, dom	1700	
	Normandy, dom	1500	
Milan	?	?	135,000
	<b>Total</b>	?	628,401

## iii Allocations for Military Expenditure in the *Etat des finances* of 1523

Source: BN Dupuy 486, fo. 137–241; R. Doucet, *Etat des finances de 1523* (Paris, 1923)

Ordinaire de la guerre	3500 lances	1,324,950
	347 lances and creus	100,690
	<b>Total</b>	1,450,240*
Captains of fortresses		29,820*
Mortepaies	Normandy	19,068
	Picardy	11,520
	Burgundy	16,800
		2400
		2400
	Guyenne	11,480

	Languedoc	360
	Brittany	11,772
	<b>Total</b>	75,800
Maison militaire		377,350*
Reparation des fortifications	Dauphiné	12,000
	Provence	12,000
	La Rochelle	4000
	Bayonne, Dax, Fontarabia,	26,000
	Bordeaux	
	Normandy	22,000
	Languedoc	30,000
	Champagne and Picardy	106,000
	Burgundy	16,238
	Normandy – marine	25,000
	Brittany, Picardy – billots	18,200
	Domain	13,000
	<b>Total</b>	294,200
Ravitaillement des places		200,000
Royal Household		543,800
Pensions.	Pensions	485,200
Paid par ordonnance for misc. expenses	To Swiss, for campaigns of Picardy and Milan	432,000
	<b>Total</b>	1,053,602
Arrears from previous year		2,545,227
	<b>Grand Total</b>	8,650,334

\* indicates Doucet's corrected figures

The document lists the deficit for 1522 as 2,458,888 lt. (Doucet, p. 124) and admits a deficit for 1523 of 226,069. The total estimated expenses for the year are 5,944,557. Insufficient money was available for the first *état* for pensions thus creating a total deficit of 2,770,760 lt. No money at all was available for the second pension list. Note that in this year no provision was made for the *extraordinaire des guerres*

#### iv *Etat de recette et dépense de l'Épargne, Jan.–March 1532*

Source: BN fr. 20502, fos. 108–10.

Money that the King intends and wishes to be paid with priority:

Royal household	Chambre aux deniers	15,000
	Ecurie	17,423
	Officiers domestiques	48,681
	Argenterie	6000
	Menus affaires	1,250
	Maison militaire	51,511
	Suisses	4150
Garrisons		26,004
Navy		–
Swiss pensions		254,000
English pensions		259,594
Ordinaire de la guerre	Gendarmerie	195,000
Extraordinaire guerre		–
Reparations	La Havre	12,000

As for other payments due, which the King has seen at Rouen, amounting to 297,560 lt., he

has ordered that they be dealt with out of the domain revenue for that quarter and for the quarter of April–June.

Signed at Rouen, 27 Feb. 1531/2 ‘Francoys, Breton’

**v *Etat par estimation of royal income and expenditure, 1549:*  
military and court requirements**

Source: BN fr. 3127, fos. 91–3 (rearranged in the order of other accounts)

Royal household	Chambre aux deniers	72,000
	Ecurie	131,405
	Officiers domestiques	303,182
	Argenterie	24,000
	Menus affaires	19,859 <sup>1</sup>
	Maison militaire	209,773
Garrisons	Mortespaies	Blank
Navy	Ponant, ordinaire	114,455
	Ponant, extraordinaire	24,000
	Levant, ordinaire	229,699
	Levant, extraordinaire	21,320 <sup>2</sup>
Tresorerie des Suisses		242,500
Military		
Gendarmerie		1,000,000
Extraordinaire guerre	Picardy	391,452
	Piedmont	600,000
	Scotland	800,000
	Chevaux légers	94,383
Artillery	Ordinaire	68,500
	Extraordinaire	120,000
Reparations		322,000
Ravitaillement	Picardy	21,750
	Champagne	12,241
Pensions		800,000
Dons et récompenses		100,000
Ambassades		200,000

**vi Ordinaire des Guerres**

<b>Year</b>	<b>Number of lances</b>	<b>Expenditure</b>
1484	2417	724,494
1485	2081	782,827
1486	2514	804,927
1487	2326	952,982
1493	2866	955,855
1494	2423	1,022,827
1495	2701	1,091,357
1496	2073	846,455
1515	3010	1,471,777
1516	2416 av.	1,555,550

<sup>1</sup> Includes music.

<sup>2</sup> Two items listed under Extraordinaire: ‘L’entrenement des navires du Roy’ and ‘ce qui est deu pour ... l’annee derniere’.



1530	2180	408,873
1531	2042	618,483
1545	3020	463,304
1546	3060	758,107
1548	2370	1,018,501
1549	2410	1,325,852
1553	2750	2,751,448
1558		2,815,913
1560		2,552,645
1561		905,880
1562		1,802,319

Source: BN fr. 4523, fos., 43–51, and BN fr. 17329, fos. 82–112 for 1515–62

### Ordinaire des Guerres (comparison of number of lances and costs)

Year	Number of lances	Nominal cost per lance <sup>3</sup>	Dépense <sup>4</sup>
1484	2417	899,124	724,494
1485	2081	774,132	782,827
1486	2514	935,208	804,927
1487	2326	865,272	952,982
1493	2866	1,066,152	955,855
1494	2423	901,356	1,022,827
1495	2701	1,004,772	1,091,357
1496	2073	771,156	846,455
1515	3010	1,119,720	1,471,777
1516	2416 av.	898,752	1,555,550
1530	2180 <sup>5</sup>	810,960	408,873
1531	2042	759,624	618,483
1545	3020	1,812,000	463,304
1546	3060	1,836,000	758,107
1548	2370	1,422,000	1,018,501
1549	2410	1,446,000	1,325,852
1553	2750	1,650,000	2,751,448
1558			2,815,913
1560			2,552,645
1561			905,880
1562			1,802,319

Source: BN fr. 4523, fos. 43–51, and BN fr. 17329, fos. 82–112 for 1515–62.

<sup>3</sup> On the basis of the computations of number of lances (see BN fr. 4523) and that from 1484 to 1533 the pay per lance was 372 lt. p.a. Each lance was to be at 1 *homme d'armes* and 2 archers, the lance paid at 31 lt. p.m. (the *homme d'armes* at 15 lt. p.m. and the 2 archers at 7.10.0. lt. plus the 1 lt. p.m. to the captain for each lance). There were of course also the gaiges of the captains and the gaiges of the trésoriers des guerres and commissaires. These have not been included. From 1533, the pay of 100 lances was augmented to 5000 lt. p.m. Therefore at 50 lt. per month, the cost of the lance was now raised to 600 lt. in place of 372. Again, the pay of officers and administrators has not been included.

<sup>4</sup> From 1484–96, dépenses given in BN fr. 4523. From 1515, figures from BN fr. 17329, états of expenditure.

<sup>5</sup> Confirmed, by BN fr. 3002, fo. 36, 2188 lances.

## vii Extraordinaire des guerres: (1) 1486–1546

Year	Assignment <sup>i</sup>	Notes <sup>ii</sup>
1486	364,107	30,342 m av.
1487	293,490	24,457 m av.
1488	343,831	28652 av.
1489	363,693	
1490	342,270	
1491	587,898	9 m @51,548 3 @ 41322
1492	495,864	41,322 av.
1493	140,880	
1494	1,211,657	
1495	472,962	39,413 av.
1499	649,518	
1500	792,913	
1502	452,064	37,672 av.
1503	452,064	37,672 av.
1510	472,116	39,343 av.
1511	964,512	6 M @ 39343, 6 @124409
1512	898,716	6 m @ 110443, 6 @39343
1513	2,001,231	9 m @216962, 3 @ 16191
1514	194,292	16,191 av.
1515	2,673,050	
1516	1,765,572	147,131 av.
1517	1,765,572	as above
1518	728,953	Oct.-Sept.
1519	1,351,229	Oct.-Sept.
1520	571,833	Oct.-Sept.
1521	3,535,956	294,663 av.
1524	2,854,188	237,849 av.
1525	1,906,920	5m@237,849.7@102525
1528	1,763,664	146,972 av.
1529	1,367,247	
1530	435,024	36,252 av.
1531	302,884	7m@36252,5@9824
1532	117,888	9824 av.
1533	117,888	9824 av.
1534	117,888	9824 av.
1536	4,339,890	
1537	5,274,665	
1538	2,113,617	
1539	307,791	25,649 av.
1540	307,791	25,649 av.
1542	4,725,018	
1543	5,937,940	
1544	6,249,926	
1545	2,894,637	
1546	1,581,091	

<sup>i</sup> Complications: from 1486 we have assignments and expenditure but no indications of why expenditure was often much less than assignment. It may be surmised that the surplus funds were used for royal expenditure on ambassadors of the royal household. From 1498, the figures given in the document are for receipt only.

<sup>ii</sup> The figures in this column indicated as monthly averages result from the periods when the receipt does not correspond with a calendar year. Year figures are therefore reconstruction as notional ones for comparative purposes only.

## Extraordinaire des guerres: (2) 1547–62

Year	Picardy	Piedmont	Notes
1547	30,000	344,589	
1548	1,427,134	930,229	
1549	1,821,275	856,184	
1550	1,198,097	701,951	
1551	660,902	2,828,569	
1552	4,496,066	3,057,725	
1553	4,564,592	6,016,040	
1554	4,312,948	6,742,129	
1555	3,018,798	7,083,366	
1558	8,514,548	4,347,698	
1560	1,119,070	457,732	
1561	530,722	548,610	
1562	3,712,791	1,100,027	

Source: BN fr.4523 supplemented by fr.17329 for 1558–62. Note that the accounts in fr.4523 consist of figures for allocation not expenditure (expenditure is only given for 1486 to 1495). The lack of concordance between the figures in the two sources may be accounted for by the fact that fr.17329 is an account of expenses.

For a number of years, the summary accounts in fr.4523 are based on the accounts of treasurers for periods other than 1 calendar year. These have had to be corrected by calculating monthly averages over such periods and then applying them to calendar years. The figures are therefore artificial and must be taken with caution, though serve to establish a broad order of magnitude.

viii Allocations for the *extraordinaire des guerres* (Martin de Troyes)  
1537–9

CAF no.	Picardy	Type	Piedmont etc	Type	Source
<b>April–May 37</b>					
29277	400	Transport			
29283			45,000	Pay	R gLanguedoil
29284	158579	Including:			
	89700	Pay legion			
	34420	Pay chev leg			
	7004	Cas inop			
	10,000	Pay pion			
	6000	Transp.supplies			
	4541	Dray horses			
29301	7733	Pay foot			Décimes
“	1135	Cas inop			“
29316	4222	Rochepot exp.			
29326	13,000	Lansq. Pay			
29377	5481	Camp ex			
29371	45,539	Camp ex			
29373	60,000	Lansq pay			Legal profits
29374			12,980	Swiss	
29375	1181	Pay ch leg			
29376	12,275	Pay and camp			
29382	90,000	Lansq pay			
29399	19,317	Pay leg chev l			
29400			20,000	Pay	

“	22,140	Camp			
29401	41,560	Pay lansq etc			
29402	12,169	Camp supply			
29403	18,100	Supply St Pol			
“	25,000	Pay			
29424	3000	Pay Hesdin			
29435	3000	Rep St Pol			
29454	270	Lansq admin			
29469	99,394				
	81,240	Pay lansq			
29470			70,000	Pay	R gLanguedoil
<b>Oct.1537</b>					
29480			58,272	Pay	
29481			29,623	Pay	
29482			18,000	Pay	
29483					
<b>Feb–Mar 1538</b>					
29522			30,000		
29523			10,689	Pay-narbonne	
29524			366	Guards	
29577			20,000	Pay	
29600			35,896	Pay lansq	
29601			850	Pay	
29609			2911	Pay	
29610	12,767	Pay			
29689			4000	Pay lansq	
29697			13,725	Pay	
29727			132,814	Pay	
29732			2836	Secret Italy	
29734			3450	Marine	
29801	10,167	Pay			
29817			6000	Fortific	
29818			1200	Mortesplanguedoc	
29819			225	“	
29866			7112	Garr Narbonne	
<b>Dec 1537</b>					
29915			34,725	Pay	
29953			7128	Pay	
29954			4500	Fortic	
29956			86,348	Pay Swiss	
29956			129,875	Pay lansq	
29957			22,500	Loan repay It	
29971	9097	Pay			Rg Rouen
<b>Nov–Dec 1537</b>					
29992			80,000	Pay	
30006			25,000	Pay	
<b>Nov 1537</b>					
30078			7000	Pay	
30079			1600	Transport	
<b>Oct 1537</b>					
30084			7650	divers	Parties cas
30088			1308	transport	Partis cas
30099			13,450	Pay Swiss	Parties cas
<b>Sept 1537</b>					
30175			84,461	Pay	“
30181	21,535	Pay			

30200	3000	Pay			“
30204			337	fortific	
30248			2372	Ch leg. pay	
30278			20,000	Pay etc	
<b>Aug 1537</b>					
30290			115,222	Pay lansq	
30291	2741	Supply			
30316	53,370		Same		
30317			35,000		
30325	10,386	Pay lansq			
30334	1406	Transport			
30368			10,000		
30369	15,000	————	Same		
30370	17,272	————	Same		
30372	62,475	Pay			Loans Paris
30373	17,344	Pay			Profits just
30374	15,000	Pay			“
30375	12,062	Pay			“
30376			51,156	To pay by ord. of Tournon	Parties cas.
30377	3000	Camp			
30378	44,155	Camp			Loans Paris
30421	13,180	Camp			Décimes
30426			11,000		Den qui se distribuent autour de la personne du roi
30427	50,000	Camp			“
30428	19,653	————	————	Same	
30429	15,000				“
30430	22,500	Camp			
30431	71,229	Pay lansq			
30432			3000	Normandy	“
<b>July 1537</b>					
30481			100,000	Pay lansq	
30482	30,000	Pay lansq			
30483	4500	Pay garr			
30484	7500	Pay garr			
30485	5000	Pay garr			
30486	15,000	Transport			Décimes
30499	9000	Pay lansq			
30511	8000	Pay			
<b>June 1537</b>					
30516	2745	Camp			
30529	2250	Supply camp			
<b>Apr–May–June 1537</b>					
30541	1692	Supply camp			Part cas
30542	1200	Transport			“
30544	7014	Pay			“
30545	3375	Pay lansq			“
30546	4000	Supply			“
30547	6015	Pay			“
30548	5000	Pay garr			“
30555	450	Pay			

<b>June 1537</b>					
30567	36,000	Pay lansq			
30568	3000	Repar			
30569	7680	Pay Pic and Champ			
30596	77,928	Pay			
<b>April–May 37</b>					
30610			2250		Repar
30611	8500	Swiss			
<b>May–June 1537</b>					
30641	7467	Pay lansq			R g Burgundy
30642	7280				Louvre
30643			4342		Pay Guyenne
30668	12,000	Pay garr			
30681			1350	pay	Part cas
30682	18,755	Swiss pay			
30683	18,000				
30684	2250	Swiis pay			
30685			19,356		To pay on Tournon's orders
30691	900	Pay lansq			
1538 passim					
30735			2000		Cherbourg
30736			26,225		Supplies
<b>Jan–Feb 1539</b>					
30897			6750		
30929			20,233		
30930			7150		Pay lansq
31010			22,435		Pay
31044			2700		Fortif
<b>April 1538</b>					
31331			69,012		Pay lansq
31406			15,538		Pay
31407			4475		Supply
31408			40,000		Pay lansq
31409	21,535	Pay garr			
<b>July 1538</b>					
31473			7112		Pay Languedoc
31479			18,816		Pay
31480			4500		Supplies
<b>Dec 1538</b>					
31512			23,453		Pay
<b>June 1538</b>					
31524			3464		Pay lansq
31561			1061		Pay lansq
31562			2055		Pay
31563			67,500		Pay
31572	1500	Artillery			
31602			164,000		Pay lansq
31603			41,280		Pay lansq
31604			3324		Misc.
31617			2025		Lansq Langres
31618			3485		misc
31624			1380		Mortesp. Lang
31625			32,089		Pay

31636		1125	Pension
31637		501	Pay, Chât d'If
<b>1538</b>			
31673	5000		Supplies 1537
<b>Sept 1538</b>			
		7475	supplies
Aug 1538			
31893		37,351	Pay lansq
31894		1737	supplies
31895		95,865	Pay lansq
31896		37,016	Pay foot
31925		2528	pay
32043		3868	supplies
<b>May 1538</b>			
32046		4432	Misc
32047		628	Rep
32048		32048	
32049		6649	Rep
32050		2000	Etat of gov
32051		2155	Swiss
32052		9000	Supplies
32087		1125	Raising lansq
32089		68,000	Misc
32090		68,000	Pay lansq
32091		5000	Rep
32092		6000	Lansq pensions
32128		5977	Garr Marseille
32136		3577	“
32129		3000	Exp. Nice
<b>Nov 1538</b>			
32165		225	Swiss
32173		120	pay
1537			
32182	1113		Pay Mezieres
<b>Sept 1538</b>			
28727		72,886	pay

legenda:	cas inop.	cas inopinés (unexpected expenses)
	chev. leg.	cheveu-légers
	exp.	expenditure
	den.	deniers
	lansq.	lansquenets
	leg.	legion
	rep.	réparations (repairs)
	parties cas.	bureau des parties casuelles
	Rg	Recette-générale





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