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THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF LEISURE THEORY

Edited by
Karl Spracklen, Brett Lashua,
Erin Sharpe and Spencer Swain



The Palgrave Handbook of Leisure Theory

Karl Spracklen • Brett Lashua • Erin Sharpe • Spencer Swain
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Introduction to the Palgrave Handbook of Leisure Theory

Karl Spracklen, Brett Lashua, Erin Sharpe,
and Spencer Swain

Preamble

There is a long tradition of leisure studies in academic circles around the world and a strong history of handbooks about leisure. Historically, leisure studies had a multi-disciplinary lens and had a strong socio-cultural theory running through it in parts, but its

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dominant mode of inquiry and theorizing was positivist, scientist, managerial and practical. The older form of leisure studies, associated with leisure sciences, leisure management and active recreation, continues to operate in some areas of the world, but it has been sidelined by the rapid growth in offshoots of leisure studies such as events management, sport management and sport studies. However, in the last ten years, there has been a renaissance of interest in critical leisure studies, drawing on inter-disciplinary approaches that owe as much to sociology, geography and cultural studies as they do to leisure studies. There are record numbers of delegates attending the leisure stream of the International Sociological Association—in July 2016 in the International Sociological Association's third Forum of Sociology in Vienna, the leisure sessions on sociology were as likely to feature discussions of hyperreality as they were ways of getting people fit. New conferences are appearing and critiquing the notion of leisure using socio-cultural theory and historiography, such as one that took place at the Sorbonne in November 2015. Despite once predicting the demise of leisure studies, Chris Rojek continues to write theoretical work on the intersections of leisure, sociology and culture, and continues to publish such work through his role as an Editor at Sage (Rojek 2010, 2013; see also Bramham and Wagg 2014). Taylor and Francis (T&F) run the highly successful journal *Leisure Studies*, which has both a strong record of downloads and submissions and a significant impact factor. The T&F portfolio of leisure journals has increased in the last few years, taking on *Annals of Leisure Research*, *Leisure/Loisir* and *World Leisure Journal*. Additionally, Palgrave Macmillan publishes the inter-disciplinary *Leisure Studies in a Global Era* book series.

Leisure studies, then, is expanding and growing even if the number of leisure studies degrees, courses or programs is falling: leisure studies is now taught far beyond its original faculty heart, and this handbook captures the move from studies about recreation to research on leisure used to elucidate matters of philosophy, theology, anthropology, history, psychology, sociology and cultural studies. This drawing on leisure theory beyond leisure studies is also happening at the same time as the increasing 'criticalization' of leisure studies degrees and the related degrees in sport,

events and tourism. Researchers in leisure studies and the related subject fields are applying complex theory to their work and to their teaching.

This handbook is a summation of the growth in inter-disciplinary, socio-cultural leisure theory and meets a need that does not exist. There are no other handbooks that deal explicitly with leisure theory. There are dozens of handbooks of cultural theory and handbooks of social theory, too many to mention. These handbooks are important and useful, though obviously they leave much leisure out of their content. There are two key handbooks published in the first two decades of this century that shaped this handbook and to which our work can be seen as a complementary addition. The first one is *A Handbook of Leisure Studies* edited by Chris Rojek, Susan Shaw and Anthony Veal, published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2006. This is a very good handbook, but it serves the old style of leisure studies, draws on a narrow range of leisure scholars and has a relatively small amount of focus and content (albeit over 33 chapters). It is a combination of sociology and North American leisure sciences. It is in places out of date and out of touch with the changing curricula of leisure studies and the changing focus of the new critical, inter-disciplinary leisure studies, with chapters on Outdoor Recreation, Gender and Leisure and so on providing brief descriptive overviews but lacking critical, theoretical rigor. The second handbook with which we are in dialogue is the *Routledge Handbook of Leisure Studies* edited by Tony Blackshaw and published by Routledge in 2013. This is more contemporary, relevant and wider-ranging than the Rojek et al. (2006) handbook, and there is more content here. But the theme, organization and content of the handbook are rather loose, driven by Blackshaw's idiosyncratic suspicion of structural theories, philosophy and history. The handbook is skewed toward chapters that serve as case studies of what people are doing in leisure today. These are in the main well-written pieces, but there is no connection between chapters in each section, never mind the other chapters in rest of the book, and the theory content is lost to a superficial overview of things the authors need to use to talk about their research.

These other handbooks of leisure are driven by the older tradition of multi-disciplinary leisure studies. They serve as a useful function for courses that have curricula based on the practice of active recreation

and leisure management, where sociological theory is managed and minimized, reduced to content about policy, self-actualization, identity and constraints to participation in the global North. Our handbook is explicitly inter-disciplinary and driven by theory. Our handbook is aimed at students on sociology, media studies and cultural studies as well as those on leisure studies courses. Our handbook is defined by the breadth of its theorizing and its depth. Our handbook tries to break free from the narrow focus of the older leisure studies by having more content from the global South, and before the shift to modernity, while maintaining a strong socio-cultural interest in that shift and the move to postmodernity and post-structural theories. That is, we want this handbook to serve as a reference for both researchers and students in leisure studies, broadly speaking, who want to understand the origins and relationships of theories to history, philosophy and sociology, and also to researchers and students through the humanities and social sciences who might have an interest in leisure as a focus of their study. This handbook is a summation of the growth in inter-disciplinary, socio-cultural leisure theory and meets an important need. The other handbooks of leisure that exist are driven by the older tradition of multi-disciplinary leisure studies (Blackshaw 2013; Rojek et al. 2006). They serve a useful function for courses that have curricula based on the practice of active recreation and leisure management, where sociological theory is managed and minimized, reduced to content about policy, self-actualization, identity and constraints to participation in the global North. But our handbook transcends the old, multi-disciplinary boundaries of leisure studies to be a catalyst, as well as a focus point, for the new, global, inter-disciplinary leisure studies that is at home in a cosplay festival as much as a hockey field.

As an editorial team, we have connections with the world-class reputation for critical leisure studies at Leeds Beckett University, with the Leisure Studies Association (LSA) in the United Kingdom, and the healthy Canadian leisure studies work associated with the Canadian Association for Leisure Studies (CALS). The lead editor among us, Karl Spracklen, is a Professor of Leisure Studies, a former Chair of the LSA and a current Vice-President and Secretary of Research Committee

Thirteen (Sociology of Leisure) of the LSA. Brett Lashua is educated in North American leisure sciences and leisure studies and has found himself at Leeds Beckett University, one of the most important universities for leisure studies in the world and still a champion of leisure research. Erin Sharpe has been closely associated with the LSA and CALS for a number of years and is based at Brock University in Canada, an important leisure research and teaching hub in North America. Spencer Swain is an outstanding young scholar at Leeds Beckett, already making leisure studies scholars applaud his use of theory in his research on khat-chewing among British Somalis. Between them, Spracklen, Lashua, Sharpe and Swain have published hundreds of papers, chapters and books that indicate the direction of travel for the new leisure theory and the direction of travel of this handbook. So we are ideally positioned to make this intervention and contribution to the development of a new leisure studies, and a new leisure theory, for these new times.

Structure and Content

This handbook is grounded in an inter-disciplinary approach to leisure theory. That is, we want this handbook to have coverage across all the places, traditions, disciplines and subject areas where people think about leisure. People have done leisure everywhere around the world and in all cultures and communities over time. The biggest failing of leisure studies, we argue, is the false notion that leisure was something invented in modernity in the West or the global North. While it is true that leisure takes on a particular form in the structure of Western modernity connected to the rise of the factory system and the division of labor, other cultures and communities through time have taken part in leisure activities and constructed leisure spaces (Spracklen 2011). So we want to reflect the historical and philosophical construction of leisure before modernity and to rebalance leisure theory. We want to explore what leisure means in what we might call particular Wittgensteinian language-games (Wittgenstein 1968): world-views, epistemologies and

theories of leisure. As such, this is a handbook that explores different epistemological frameworks, belief systems, philosophies and ideas of leisure through time. We want to move away from a narrow focus on modernity and the postmodern turn, while recognizing these historical moments are important for leisure, for humans and for society. We wanted to try to break the focus on the global North, while recognizing that the epistemological and ethical debates about leisure today are grounded in Western tradition of philosophy, sociology and political theory.

So how do we make sense of all these theories and epistemological frameworks? We have opted to have four sections or parts to the handbook: traditional theories of leisure, rational theories of leisure, structural theories of leisure and post-structural theories of leisure. We discuss in the introductions to each section the rationale for this structure, but it is important to justify the structure at this point too. Our first section attempts to connect to the history and anthropology of leisure that is missing in most leisure studies handbooks and textbooks. We wanted to introduce theories and ideas of leisure from places beyond the global North and to explore alongside them leisure in key religions and faiths. For us these chapters all relate to what might be called traditions, or traditional epistemologies of leisure, so we have coined the term 'traditional theories of leisure' to encompass this work. These are ideas about leisure that are delineated by cultural habits, social and cultural capital, norms and values, theological guidance and sacred texts. We treat these different traditional theories of leisure with reverence and respect, as our authors do, while providing a place to situate them and critique some aspects of their power relationships. The second section has emerged in the structure to describe and include all the attempts to make a science or philosophy out of leisure. In this second section, there is an epistemological link that moves from classical Greek theories of leisure, through leisure in the political theory of the Enlightenment, to the social psychology of leisure today. We call these 'rational theories of leisure' because they have all been constructed by theorists who believe they are constructing theories about humans, human ethics and the place of humans in the world that come from the

theorist's reasoning. We do not use the term 'rational' here to suggest the rest of the theories in the handbook are irrational and false, only that the theorists in this epistemological tradition have taken it upon themselves to ground their ideas in formal philosophical methods of inquiry.

Clearly, modernity remains a key moment in history for leisure, and we have to include as much engagement as possible with the key social and cultural theory that modernity has generated. The third section is called 'structural theories of leisure' because the chapters and the theories discussed are historically and epistemologically situated in the problem of modernity: the structural power of class and other intersecting social structures. This third section is the section most familiar to theorists of leisure who have been trained in the leisure studies subject field. These structural theories are theories that engage with the work of Marx and travel into our century, structuring the way we think about leisure, and which continue to constrain leisure spaces and activities today. But of course there are many theorists who now reject the classical, Marxist account of modernity. Within the related subject fields of sociology, politics and cultural studies, there is a recognizable difference between the modernity of Marx and Marxism and theories that draw on what is termed postmodernity or post-structuralism. And this is why our fourth and final section is described as 'post-structural theories of leisure' and attempt to make sense of and critique leisure through the various theories and frameworks of the key writers in post-structuralism. This final section builds on the ideas in the first three sections, and our authors suggest trajectories for structures, spaces, traditions, epistemologies and ethics of leisure. By introducing the post-structural turn we are not endorsing the claims made about the changing world and the changing role of leisure; likewise, we are not rejecting the structural theories or even the rational and traditional theories of leisure. We want to provide readers of this handbook with the necessary knowledge to make sense of leisure for themselves, so they can contribute in their own way to the debate about the importance of leisure and the importance of leisure theory. What we have, then, is a loosely chronological structure, where leisure

changes its meaning and purpose for humans and their social and cultural spaces.

In putting this handbook together, we identified the content for each section and then invited 54 authors to write 54 chapters distributed roughly evenly across the four sections. It is the nature of any edited collection that sometimes authors go missing before deadlines are due, and so we have ended up with some glaring absences. We are regretful that we could not get a chapter on Africa, despite our best attempts to get one. We should have had a chapter on contemporary India, as well an additional one on Marxist theory. We are also sorry that in the final mix, queer theory does not get a clear chapter of its own, or transgression, though both do appear in a number of chapters. But we are pleased with what we have: the range of the handbook makes it unique and distinctive, and we have 50 very strong chapters that combine world-class critical-thinking with world-class knowledge. We are confident the balance of the matter and the content of the individual chapters in this book meet an unfulfilled need of leisure scholars (and other scholars with a research interest in leisure) throughout the world, as well as final-year undergraduates and postgraduate students in leisure for such a wide-ranging, critical, interdisciplinary handbook of leisure theory. We are confident this is a book that will appeal to scholars and students in the disciplines of sociology, cultural studies and media studies too, as leisure becomes more and more a focus for socio-cultural research and theory-making. Our authors are a combination of world-class authorities, established leisure scholars and fresh, emerging young scholars, including some PhD students. We are especially proud of our work to try to get authors from regions and countries beyond the white English-speaking leisure studies community: we have a strong cluster of chapters from colleagues in Japan and Brazil and they are not just writing about leisure in those countries. Everyone invited to take part has impressed one of us because of something they have written that is relevant to the chapter that we want them to write. Many of the people are known to us through our existing networks, but we have cast the net wider to get people beyond leisure studies involved where possible.

A Note on Leisure

We have deliberately chosen leisure as the focus of the theory in this handbook. For our colleagues beyond leisure studies, or with no training in it, leisure might be regarded as something old-fashioned, unfashionable or something studied by people in tracksuits. Leisure is no longer something identified as central in the political, social, cultural and economic spheres, something in which important insights can be found. This is partly to do with politics and policy-making around the world, and the unfashionable status of leisure and leisure policy in government is global. For example, British government policies now are a consequence of the long-term privatization of the State and the reduction in power of local authorities. Margaret Thatcher centralized much of the decision-making of the State, and her successors generally continued to maintain that central grip on policy and power, at least in England. This has meant that all things leisure-related have been subject to the whims of successive ministers of culture and prime ministers. Sport has managed to retain its importance in policy-making circles because it promotes nationalism and is generally seen to be good for the economy; physical activity has found a role to play in health policy, where it is held up as a solution to the problem of obesity—a problem caused by the overeating and bad food of late modernity, which is not targeted with the same kind of zealotry and vigor as physical exercise is promoted (fact that has clearly nothing to do with the amount of money invested in the economy by the makers of that bad food). The successors of Thatcher also continued to implement her business-friendly policies, which led to the postindustrial society in which I live, where every individual is a competitor against every other individual in the market for jobs, friends and status. In this immoral situation, leisure has shrunk to an adjunct to work, the most important way in which the successful show off their skills and their connections and their wealth and capital (Rojek 2010). Leisure has become something done merely to build capital or to rest and prepare the office worker for another hard day, inputting numbers into spreadsheets (Spracklen 2011, 2014b).

Another related reason for the unfashionable nature of leisure in the public sphere in the United Kingdom is its lack of novelty. Leisure was a new and exciting problem for the society that was emerging in the period after the Second World War. People believed that society would become a leisure society, a society rich and technologically advanced, in which all want was met and in which humans would develop novel ways of being active and meaningful in their leisure lives. By the 2000s, the leisure society was the subject of the same kind of mocking jokes that surrounded the idea that we would have jetpacks and hover boards and colonies on the Moon. At the same time, new things were attracting people's interest as problems or opportunities, such as the internet and the global popular culture. These things have come to the critical attention of many academics, who explore them while not even realizing that they are things that are part of leisure, leisure spaces and sites for leisure activities (Spracklen 2014a, 2015).

Our argument in this handbook is that leisure remains fundamental to understanding the inequalities of contemporary, globalized society. Leisure is just that thing and that space associated with the time when we are not working or engaged in domestic chores (even if the boundaries between all these things may be blurred). Leisure is games, stories, discussions, eating, drinking, moving, painting, playing, making music, reading and watching things. It is a space and an activity that makes humans, human culture and social structures. It is at the same time a place for the defense of humanity and the human spirit and a place for the destruction of and commodification of human life.

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Part I

Traditional Theories of Leisure

Erin Sharpe

Introduction

Eleven chapters comprise the first section of the handbook, titled “Traditional Theories of Leisure.” Oftentimes, the first section of a book is framed as an origins section, and the content looks back to earlier times or ways of thinking as a way to ground the later, more current sections. Given the more historical orientation of the chapters in this section, as well as the many references to texts that are centuries if not millennia old, it is tempting to think of this section in that way as well. However, this is not the purpose of this section. Although titled as “traditional,” this section is decidedly forward-looking, and its aims are to move us toward a study of leisure that is more expansive, global, and robust. As we discussed in the opening, much of the study of leisure has been grounded in Western perspectives and historical framings that conceptualize leisure as an invention of modernity. It is time to broaden our frames and enrich

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the scholarly conversation with a wider range of epistemologies, world-views, and cultural practices related to leisure. This is the aim of this section, and the contributions included in this section help us achieve it marvelously well.

Overall, we are delighted with the breadth and depth that is offered in this section. Its chapters offer insight into the ideas and practices of leisure in a range of cultural and historical contexts including traditional and contemporary Maori culture, nineteenth-century Hawaii, feudal Japan, cultures in pre-colonial and contemporary South Asia, and contemporary Spanish/Portuguese Latin America. These more socio-historical chapters are complemented by chapters that focus more directly on leisure in key religious traditions including Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Judaism, Taoism, and Buddhism. The historical accounts, contemporary discussions, and religious traditions that are presented in this section are richly described and meticulously researched. Some contributions, such as the chapter on leisure in Hinduism written by Veena Sharma, are the first that we know to be written on the topic. Each chapter is an outstanding contribution on its own. However, we are even more pleased at how well the chapters work together, and we expect that this collection of chapters will foster rich discussion and debate.

This section focuses on “traditional” theories of leisure, and all of the section authors face the challenge of writing about cultural and religious traditions a way that communicates a coherent philosophy yet acknowledges the heterogeneity and dynamism of the tradition. Cultural traditions and religions are not static; they change over time, and within particular traditions, there exists a great heterogeneity of beliefs and practices. Paul Heintzman addresses this tension in his chapter on Christianity. He draws on key Biblical passages to formulate a Christian perspective on leisure; however, he is careful to show different interpretations of Biblical passages and place them in historical context. Nitza Davidovitch also attends to the dynamism of religious traditions in her chapter on leisure and Judaism. Like Paul, Nitza presents key passages from the Torah and discusses how these passages have been interpreted by key religious leaders through history. She adds to this dynamism with a discussion about the ways that Jewish religious thought is being interpreted, debated, and written into law and policy in contemporary Israel. In their chapter on

leisure and Islam, Kristin Walseth and Mahfoud Amara also acknowledge the heterogeneity of Islamic religious practice by carefully situating the research they present in its specific global and diasporic context. They show how Islam impacts leisure through the notion of “halal leisure,” which are leisure practices that are consistent with Islamic beliefs and principles. In their review of current research on the impact of Muslim religiosity on involvement in sport and leisure activities, they emphasize how people negotiate religious identity through sport and leisure practices in different ways.

A key idea which underpins this section of the Handbook is that as a field we need to move beyond talking about leisure in broad and generalizing terms, and instead recognize how leisure is historically, culturally, politically, and socially situated. What we know, experience, and value as leisure is embedded in local knowledge and worldviews yet also shaped by cultural forces and broader influences of the time. We need to contextualize leisure and chronicle the ways that attitudes and practices of leisure shape and are shaped by broader contextual forces. We see this form of contextualizing in the chapter written by Minoru Matsunami, which chronicles sport in Japan from ancient through contemporary times. Matsunami explains how the sports that were practiced related to the ruling system, economic power, and religious practice and mythology that dominated at the time. A similar contextualizing of leisure is offered in the chapters on Maori sport and leisure written by Phillip Borrell and Hamuera Kahi, and on leisure in South Asian countries written by Sarah Moser, Esther Clinton, and Jeremy Wallach. In both of these chapters, the authors highlight the damaging impact of European colonization and the massive changes to culture and leisure that resulted. Borrell and Kahi discuss how Maori leisure tended to be dismissed as child’s play and entertaining pastimes in early anthropological accounts of Maori culture, most of which were written by Westerners. The authors aim to reframe Maori sport and leisure as bearers of tradition and culture and empowering of Maori values. In writing about leisure in the South Asian expanse, Moser, Clinton, and Wallach show how leisure practices and pastimes were taken up by colonizers in efforts to both “civilize” local subjects and how locally formed leisure practices are currently being taken up in movements of cultural revitalization and anti-colonial resistance. Throughout,

the authors illustrate how the leisure practices of South Asian cultures are formed through a collision of the local and the global. Like many other contributors, they remind us to not presuppose Western ideas about leisure, such as the separation of leisure and work into distinct spheres, as such presuppositions can obscure important aspects of cultural worldviews, leisure practices, and everyday experiences.

Thus, another key idea of this section of the handbook is the importance of looking beyond Western perspectives and acknowledging how Western worldviews and conventions shape and ultimately limit the possibilities we have for understanding, experiencing, and practicing leisure. The limitations of Western worldviews are particularly apparent in the chapters that discuss leisure in the Eastern philosophies of Taoism, Buddhism, and Hinduism, written by Steven Simpson and Samuel Cocks, Susan Arai, and Veena Sharma, respectively. Importantly, all three authors suggested that Western writing conventions limited their ability to convey an understanding of Eastern philosophies, and so the authors set some of these conventions aside in an effort to build understanding. For example, Simpson and Cocks refuse to offer a succinct definition of leisure or Taoism; because ideas about leisure run subtly through Tao writings, the authors write with the intent and in a style that allows Taoist ideas about leisure to be intuitively sensed and absorbed by the reader. Arai takes a similar approach in her chapter on leisure and Buddhism. She emphasizes how practice is the foundation of knowing Buddhism, and she envelops her discussion of key ideas in a rich experiential account of Buddhist mindfulness practice. Finally, Veena Sharma orients leisure to a Hindu conceptualization of freedom in which freedom is not the absence of constraint or obligation, but what results from the realization of oneness with an Absolute. These kinds of refusals of Western frameworks are important because they open up new ways of thinking about leisure and its possibilities.

Finally, the chapters in this section raise issues related to the challenges of cultural and epistemic translation. Authors Karen Fox and Lisa McDermott confront these challenges directly in their chapter on indigenous leisure in nineteenth-century Hawaii. They note that translation involves more than identifying new words but also often involves a translation from one worldview into another. In their chapter, they engage in

a comparative methodology that allows for a description of indigenous perspectives, experiences, and practices without a reinscription of harmful, non-indigenous worldviews. The theme of translation also underlies the chapter written by Christianne Luce Gomes on contemporary perspectives on leisure in Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking Latin America. In the chapter, Gomes reports on some of her current research about the ways that the concept of leisure is made sense of in different Latin American academic circles. Gomes shows some of the similarities and differences in the conceptualizations of leisure across these Latin American contexts, and in so doing, she offers insight to the global reader on some of the ways that the notion of leisure is being “read” as it moves into contexts where there is no direct translation. The chapter offers insight on the globalization of the scholarly discourse about leisure, and the visibility Gomes brings to Latin American discussions encourages us all to think about ways that leisure concepts are afforded local significances as they circulate through global academic spaces.

Islam and Leisure

Kristin Walseth and Mahfoud Amara

This chapter explores the relationship between leisure and Islam. It starts by focusing on the place of leisure within the Islamic tradition. In addition, the chapter focused on religiosity among Muslims in Diaspora and on how religiosity influences Muslims participation in leisure activities. It also discusses how policy makers and local authorities in the UK and Norway respond to/and accommodate the demand of Muslim communities to organize leisure activities and access to leisure facilities. The chapter ends by addressing the new development of “halal tourism” and discusses the need for “halal leisure”.

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The aim is not to provide an overview of leisure activities for Muslims in all countries. Therefore, the chapter is limited to the impact of Islam on Muslim youth's leisure participation in western countries.

Key questions explored in the chapter are as follows:

- What do the Islamic sources (the Quran and the hadiths) state about leisure?
- How does religiosity affect Muslims' involvement in leisure activities? Including in relation to choice of activities and the gender question
- How does the public opinion in Europe meet the leisure needs of the Muslim population?

Leisure in the Islamic Tradition

William and Mason (2003) came to the conclusion in their study of leisure in the Islamic tradition (including scriptures and interpretation of religious scholars) that:

at the least, there is no presumption against leisure in the form of rest or recreation in Islamic teachings. Equally, it is clear that, while some forms of leisure, such as sport and other activities contributing to healthy bodies and minds, are considered acceptable (halal), others, such as drinking alcohol and gambling, which are normal in the West, are generally unacceptable. Many others, notably various forms of entertainment, lie in the uncertain area in between halal and haram, their acceptability in practice often being influenced by the dominant interpretation of Islam in the area concerned, and the interaction between Islam and local cultural practices.

Physical activity and sports is perceived as “halal” and important first and foremost because exercising is interpreted as a way of taking care of the body, and the body is perceived as a gift from Allah. It is, therefore, important for Muslims to take care and not damage their bodies—through drugs and alcohol, for example (Walseth and Fasting 2003). Islam encourages Muslims to be strong and to seek the means of strength (Amara 2008). Moreover, physical activity is important in Islam due to the recreational aspect of Islam. The Islamic literature, particularly the

hadiths (reports of the sayings or actions of the Prophet and his companions), are full of stories about the Prophet and how he encouraged people to be involved in physical activities. Al-Qaradawy (1992) interpreted one such hadith to mean that the lives of Muslims should consist of both seriousness and play and that all ought to have some leisure time. The Islamic literature also tells us that the second caliph, Umar Ibn Khattab, stated: “Teach your children swimming and archery, and tell them to jump on the horse’s back” (Qaradawy 1992, p. 296). There is, in addition, another strong hadith that tells the story of the Prophet who raced with his wife Aisha in order to please her, to enjoy himself and to set an example for his companions. Aisha said: “I raced with the Prophet and beat him in the race. Later, when I had put on some weight, we raced again and he won. Then he said: ‘this cancels that’ [a draw] referring to the previous occasion” (Qaradawy 1992, p. 293). This last example seems to be especially important for Muslim women because it explicitly shows that Muhammad requested women to be active. It is also narrated that “The Prophet passed by some people from the tribe of Aslam while they were competing in archery (in the market)”. He said to them, “Shoot children of Ishmael (Prophet) your father was a skilled marksman. Shoot and I am with so and so”. One of the two teams therein stopped shooting. The Prophet asked, “why do not you shoot”, they answered, “How could we shoot while you are with them (the other team)”. He then said, “shoot and I am with you all” (narrated by Imam Bukhari).

In Amara’s (2008) “Introduction to the study of sport in the Muslim world”, he included “the Fatwa [a ruling on a matter of Islamic law, issued by a recognized religious authority] on the question of sport” (www.islamonline.net). The Islam Online website has a strong link with the European Council of Fatwa and Research. The Fatwa has included some tips for Muslims practicing sports:

1. A Muslim should not occupy himself with sports to the extent that leads to neglecting religious and other duties.
2. A Muslim is not permitted to give himself loose rein in practicing sports in a way that involves inflicting harm on others. Practicing sports in crowded streets, for example, thus causing traffic jam is not an Islamic way of example.

3. Blind fanaticism in favor or against a team has nothing to do with Islam, for this really contradicts the Islamic teachings calling for unity and love.
4. While practicing sports there should be no room for foul words, bad behavior and slandering.
5. Islam does not allow matches or games that involve both sexes, in a way that opens channels for seduction, temptation and corruption.
6. Islam rejects also all games and sports that stir sexual urge or encourage moral perversion such as women practicing dancing and being watched by the public.

(Amara 2008, p. 538).

The argument that sport is encouraged in Islam, providing it does not take precedence over faith, is also underlined by Jawad et al. (2011). Similarly, the argument that sport should not be too “exciting” for the male audience is underlined in Abdelrahman’s (1992) interview of religious leaders in Egypt.

Due to the Islamic texts’ positive attitudes toward physical activity and sport, one might expect Muslims to be involved in sports. Muslim youth are, however, significantly underrepresented in sports in western countries (Benn et al. 2011; Strandbu and Bakken 2007; Walseth and Fasting 2004). One reason for this is that other structures of Islam seem to discourage youths’ sports participation (particularly for girls). Of particular importance here is the Islamic ideal of gender segregation and the use of the hijab (the headscarf worn by Muslim women).

Muslim Youths’ Leisure Participation in Diaspora

There are scarce studies about leisure behavior among Muslim communities in the West. In her study of leisure patterns among Muslim community in the province of Calgary (Canada), Vandschoot (2005) contends that:

One example of a traditionally non-western community that resides within a traditionally western community is the 30,000 Muslim people living in Calgary, Canada. Although this is a substantial clientele, leisure service professionals have paid little attention to their unique leisure needs. This is because the Muslim community provides some particular challenges to recreation participation because of Islam's influence on the daily lives of its adherents. In addition to the religious doctrine, for example, Islam provides Muslims with guidelines regarding their social behaviour and conduct and as a result, influences the leisure choices and recreation behaviours of followers.

One of the findings from Vandschoot with a small sample of 11 from different nationalities is that they are constantly looking for ways to preserve and protect their religion and heritage. The respondents were clear that the majority of their leisure experiences were planned and organized by the Muslim community and that they participated to a very limited degree, if at all, in public leisure opportunities. Importantly, they perceived a conflict between how they currently, or would like to, spend their free time and the current supply of recreation services (leisure opportunities and facilities) in Calgary.

A survey of youth's leisure activities in Oslo (11,000 participants aged 15–19) shows that Muslim youth's leisure pattern differed from non-Muslims on some aspects. First, Muslim youth tend to spend more leisure time within religious organizations. One out of two Muslim girls and boys answered that they had been active in a religious organization last month (compared to one out of ten non-Muslims). Moreover, Muslim girls and boys tend to spend more time in youth clubs and on road trips than non-Muslim youth. Muslim youth reported that they spent more time on homework and more time in libraries. They reported to spend less time on taking care of animals, on choir, corps, orchestra and art-schools compared to non-Muslim youth. Even though these differences could be seen between Muslim and non-Muslim youth in general, the differences were most apparent among Muslim and non-Muslim girls. The findings that Muslim girls are less involved in organized leisure activities are underlined by the finding that as many as 39% of Muslim girls reported that they had never participated in any organization (compared to 13% of non-Muslim girls and 21% of Muslim boys).

In terms of sports, the survey shows great differences between Muslim boys and Muslim girls. Muslim boys report to be more active in sports than non-Muslim boys (both in sport clubs and at fitness centers). In addition, they report to use more time on playing team sports with friends outside sport clubs. Muslim girls reported a much lower participation rate in sport clubs. Only 21% of Muslim girls reported that they had been active in a sport club last month (compared to 34% of non-Muslim girls and 52% of Muslim boys). On questions measuring physical activity outside sport clubs, the picture is confirmed. Muslim girls reported to be significant less physically active in their leisure time than non-Muslim girls and Muslim boys (Walseth and Bakken, unpublished paper). This survey gives an overview of similarities and differences in leisure participation patterns among Muslims and non-Muslim youth in Norway. Smaller, qualitative oriented studies are needed to illustrate how Muslim youth give meaning to their leisure participation. For example, does religiosity influence on which sport they choose to play and on how they play sports?

Over the last ten years, there has been a substantial growth in research on Muslim youth and sport in western countries. The most common focus has been on religiosity among Muslims living in Diasporas and, more specifically, how this affects their involvement in physical activity and sports (Ahmad 2011; Farooq and Parker 2009; Benn et al. 2011; Palmer 2009; Ratna 2011; Strandbu 2005; Walseth 2006).

In the Muslim Diaspora, research underscores the struggle young Muslim women continue to face when they try to combine their right to religious expression with physical activity and participation in sports in Europe, North America and Australia (Ahmad 2011; Jiwani and Rail 2010; Hamzeh and Oliver 2012; Palmer 2009; Ratna 2011). The studies by Ratna (2010) and Ahmad (2011) reveal that British Asian girls choose to fight for the right to play football (soccer) while maintaining their religious identity. The British Asian female footballers in Ratna's study negotiated their entrance into sports using various techniques. Some referred to the Koran to empower themselves and justify their participation in football. Some engaged in the establishment of Muslim sports organizations to ensure that they could play football within an Islamic

framework, while others preferred to oppose sexism and racism by focusing on becoming highly skilled female footballers.

One of the especially significant issues identified by researchers is the lack of gender-segregated sports facilities and the lack of recognition of the hijab as part of sporting gear in western countries (Ahmad 2011; Benn et al. 2011a; Dagkas et al. 2011; Guerin et al. 2003; Jiwani and Rail 2010; Wray 2002). Ahmad's (2011) research illustrated how the hijab was a barrier to sport participation in Britain where football organizations discriminated against Muslim women, as evidenced in the FIFA hijab ban in 2007.¹ The veiled Muslim women in her study challenged traditional cultural ideals by competing in football at the Women's Islamic Games in Iran. The games became a safety zone where religious identities were not threatened and where the hijab did not present a barrier. The women not only negotiated their values by rejecting cultural ideals of femininities while holding onto their Muslim identity but also negotiated these values within British football and found a space for themselves representing Britain in the Women's Islamic Games. Nonetheless, the wearing of the hijab remains a contested issue in western countries. Pfister (2011) writes that there has been a dramatic increase in the number of Muslim girls wearing the hijab in Denmark in recent years. "Doing Islam has become a widespread habit, in some cases almost a fashion", according to Pfister (2011, p. 61). The wearing of the hijab is often perceived by non-Muslims as a sign of subordination and discrimination. However, Muslim girls claim various reasons for wearing it. For some, it is a reflexive choice and sign of resistance while, for others, wearing the hijab is an embodiment of faith, an expression of the belief that covering their bodies is the right way to be in the world (Pfister 2011).

Studies by Benn et al. (2011a), Strandbu (2005) and Wray (2002) show how young Muslim women's faith is embodied and how sports challenge women's right to embody their faith. Strandbu's studies from Norway concluded that some of the Muslim girls actually preferred gender-segregated physical activity. Their reasons cannot be attributed to strict parents that deny their daughters participation in any physical

¹ The FIFA hijab ban was lifted in 2012 after the FIFA medical committee found no problems with two tested soccer hijab prototypes.

activity whatsoever. Instead, the girls had internalized cultural ideas and values. That explains, moreover, why participating in gender-integrated sports embarrassed the girls. The girls opted out of gender-integrated physical activity because they did not see it as a “natural” thing to do.

The blurring of culture and religion in these stories is not new; it can be seen in older research (Sfeir 1985; Zaman 1997). The interrelationship between religion and culture is also described in Benn et al.’s (2011b) book, *Muslim Women and Sport*. Despite the increased focus on Islam as “embodied”, there does also seem to be a recent tendency among young European Muslims to separate culture from religion (Ramadan 2004). This has consequences for sport participation in the sense that culture seems to inhibit Muslim girls’ involvement in sports insofar as traditional gender roles give girls responsibility for younger siblings and traditional female household chores. In separating culture from religiosity, Muslim girls give themselves an opportunity to concentrate exclusively on the religious sources of prescriptions concerning sports, while previous research was shown to encourage Muslim women to participate in sports (Amara 2008; Jawad et al. 2011; Walseth and Fasting 2003). These arguments corroborate the findings of Ratna (2011) and Walseth (2006): By separating religion and culture, Muslims can argue that Islam supports women’s involvement in sporting activities.

The great diversity within a group of young Muslim women is also stressed in Palmer’s (2009) study from South Australia. The study explored the ways in which a group of young Muslim refugee women experienced playing on a football team. The study focused on how these women articulated their social identities through the traditions of Islam and the resources of western popular culture and how this was expressed on the football pitch.

Because Muslim women are less likely than men to be involved in sports in both Muslim countries and Europe (Benn et al. 2011b), the focus of research has mainly been on the reasons for this divergence. As such, the research on Muslims and sports has focused on women and not men. Some new research has focused on Muslim athletes and their experiences of combining religiosity with sport participation.

Burdsey’s (2010) study of religiosity in English first-class cricket reveals how Islam plays a major part in players’ lives but does not necessarily

influence their cricket careers *per se*. Religion seems to be the driving force behind the players' identity construction, with sport serving as a mere tool to assist that process. Farooq and Parker's (2009) study of sports and physical education in independent Muslim schools in Britain placed a similar emphasis on sports and illustrated how young Muslim males used sport and religion as tools in their reflexive identity work. Sports was perceived as a strategic site for the development of Muslim masculine identities.

Leisure Facilitation by the Public or by the Muslim Communities?

The experience of Muslim youth in sport clubs, particularly girls, has been studied extensively in the last decade. In contrast, little research has focused on those who facilitate sports. We will here refer to two research projects from Britain and Norway, which have focused on how policy makers and the Muslim community perceive and respond to the sporting needs of the Muslim population. In Britain, Amara and Henry (2010) show that Muslim organizations offering sports activities to their members have become a common phenomenon, particularly in cities with substantial Muslim populations such as London, Leicester and Birmingham. Muslim organizations in these cities offer a range of sports activities from karate and badminton to fitness and swimming as well as recreational activities for the elderly.

Amara and Henry's (2012) study reveals that the religious criteria for the selection and organization of sports activities are constructed around *Shari'a* guidance (the moral code and religious law of Islam). The general (minimum) rules that are adopted first and foremost concern the non-mixing of sexes. Other important parameters involve the dress code in a public domain (e.g., in a sports hall), general Islamic rules of halal (permitted) and haram (forbidden) and a code of conduct which, among other things, regulates relations between the Muslim community and other communities, including the laws of the state. Amara and Henry's (2012) study indicates that practicing sports is seen as a religious obliga-

tion. Nonetheless, the “us” and “them” dichotomy, the prejudice against Muslim communities and the subsequent lack of funding opportunities are limiting the sports activities offered by Muslim communities in Britain (Amara and Henry 2010).

In Norway, a similar development has taken place, though on a much smaller scale than in Britain. Walseth (2015, 2016) shows that Muslim organizations in Norway offer sports as a way of gathering Muslim youth together. The sports offered are influenced by Islamic theology. The findings indicate that the general Islamic rules that are adopted first and foremost concern the non-mixing of the sexes something that is particularly evident in the context of swimming. Other theologically influenced frames mentioned were sport during Ramadan and attitudes toward violent sports activities. When asked about the religious criteria for the selection and organization of sporting activities, Muslim sports organizations in Norway responded that they chose sports activities that appeared to be particularly popular among youth and did not offer sports activities mentioned in Islamic literature such as riding horses, wrestling or archery. This is similar to findings in Amara and Henry’s (201) British study, in which the selection of sports activities tends to be dictated by the availability of sports facilities and not necessarily by the literal interpretation of the Islamic texts.

The participants in the Norwegian study had different attitudes toward “contact sports” such as boxing. Some of the participants stressed that they were not willing to support sports that were violent because this was seen as being in conflict with the Islamic ethos. Their argument is in accordance with a Fatwa on the question of boxing (Amara 2008), which argues that boxing should not be permitted, although others accepted the practice of all sports being officially recognized by the sports federations.

Mosques in the Norwegian study offered some sex-segregated sporting activities for women only (mostly swimming but also some badminton and volleyball). These activities were arranged by each women’s committee within the mosque, though none of the mosques has female teams competing in the national leagues. The study revealed that, within Muslim organizations, sports activities for boys and men were more common than for girls and women. Some mosques have established their own cricket and football teams for boys. The goal behind the initiatives appeared to be to support Muslim (male) youth in their identity work. The organizations

wanted their youth to develop identities as Norwegian Muslims, indicating that the ultimate goal is to be well integrated (having education and jobs) as well as proud of one's identity as Muslims (Walseth 2015).

The two studies did also focus on how policy makers perceived and responded to the sporting needs of Muslim communities in Britain and Norway (Amara and Henry 2010; Walseth 2016). When comparing the findings from the two studies, several similarities are found. Policy makers in both countries are reluctant to perceive religion or Muslims as a target group, and there are few examples of cooperation between sport policy makers and representatives from Muslim organizations.

Moreover, gender seems to be "the" question when discussing how to meet the religious needs of the Muslim community. At this point, the countries do also differ. Norway seems more reluctant to accept gender segregation as part of the sport and integration policy. While a lack of gender-segregated sport offers in the UK may be explained by practical rather than ideological issues (Amara and Henry 2010), in the Norwegian context the reluctance is ideological. The lack of willingness to facilitate gender-segregated activities can be understood as an expression of an assimilation discourse, where policy makers tend to use their own interpretations of values as the standard view. The assimilation discourse is particularly present in questions that are related to gender, where the policy seems to be influenced by a wish to "save" Muslim women from their men, their religion and their culture (Walseth 2016).

Another difference found between the two countries is that Norway seems reluctant to accept the establishment of minority clubs, whereas in the UK, the existence of minority clubs is widespread. In popular sports like football, there is even a Muslim league. The Nordic Social Democracy model, which has stressed the importance of unity and equality before individualization and diversity, can partly explain this difference in policy and discourse. One effect is a restrictive policy concerning the financing and establishment of minority clubs. Implicitly, it is communicated to the Muslim population that sport and integration work is something the majority group is responsible for, and that it is something only the majority group has the necessary competence to conduct. This message can be read as a sign of mistrust toward minority clubs. The finding that none of the representatives from the policy makers interviewed in this study had

a minority background strengthens this message. As such, the members of the majority group possess the power to define the content of the sport and integration policy (Walseth 2016).

Seeking “Halal Leisure”

Alongside traditional sport and leisure activities offered by the public or by Muslim communities in Diaspora, new Islamic leisure activities are developing. In her study of aesthetic practices of young Turkish second- and third-generation women in France and Germany, who are volunteering for the activities of the Gülen movement institutions in Europe,² Sametoğlu (2015) comes up with the concept of halalscapes to define the boundaries drawn for balancing religious exigencies and the desire for fun. By creating “halalscapes”, Sametoğlu argues that:

young Islamic figures of the second and third generations exacerbate their own discourses, practices and perception of spaces. They do not stay secluded in those halal spaces (halalscapes) which incarnates the possibility of another way of leisure within secular spaces, by resisting a hegemonic “one-type” model of leisure, by accommodating to the traditional and secular norms and sometimes transgressing and intermingling them, thus creating and transforming new forms of personal and collective agencies and spaces.
(2015:144)

To cater for Muslim leisure tourist activities and the growing market of holiday and hospitality sector, particularly in wealthy countries of the Arabian Peninsula and among the growing middle class in other Muslim countries such as in Malaysia and Indonesia, an international conference on halal tourism was first organized in Spain in 2014. According to conference organizers’ estimates, “the halal tourism sector was worth \$140 billion in 2013 representing around 13% of global travel expenditures. This figure is expected to reach \$192 billion by 2020” (Islam.ru 2005). Another report by NBC NEWS (2005) suggested that “travellers from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Oman will spend

²The Gülen movement is a civic and social movement initiated for religious motives whose supporters are inspired by the works and ideas of Fethullah Gülen.

\$64 billion traveling this year and are expected to spend \$216 billion by 2030, according to a 2014 study for the travel tech company Amadeus. The study found that, on average, a traveller from these countries spends around \$9,900 per trip outside the Gulf". Another research by *VisitBritain* found that Middle Eastern visitors are the biggest shoppers of all UK inbound tourists, noting that the average visit from a Kuwaiti citizen delivers £4,000 (US\$6,646, €5,062) to the UK economy, compared to the £343 (US\$570, €434) spent by the average French tourist (Arabicbusiness.com 2014). Because of this trend, and equivalent to mainstream stars rating of hotels, "a crescent rating" has been introduced to rate "halal hotels".

Crescent rating is a rating system established to provide confidence and peace of mind to the Muslim travelers by providing information on prayer direction and times to fulfilling halal food requirements and services during Ramadan.

The trend of halal leisure is now extended to other entertainment scenes and pop culture genres such as music. The example of Islamic or Muslim Hip Hop, termed also "the transglobal Hip Hop Umma", has to be regarded according to Lohlker (2004) as a vital contribution to contemporary Islam. In the same vein, Miah and Kalra (2012) claim that the space created by Muslim Hip Hop in the West provides:

a means of expressing intergenerational distinction and creating a distance from the traditional—in this case South Asian- cultures from which parents come.

Muslim hip hop in the European context is therefore a way of forging a new identity that is different from the parochial parental migration generation, to one which is seen to transcend ties of kin, race and linguistic solidarity... The use of English lyrics, access via the internet and most visibly a modern western identity means that Muslim Hip Hop appeals to generations of young Muslims across the globe from the UK, Sweden, France, and Australia Muslim hip hop also forms part of the resistance to social inequality and injustice by marginalized and disaffected youths.

(pp. 14 and 21)

The growing industry of "halal tourism" and "halal leisure" illustrates that there is a need for leisure activities that are consistent with Muslims' religious identity and religious demands. As such, the development of sport and leisure activities organized by Muslim organizations can be seen as a result of policy makers' lack of success in meeting the sporting needs of

the Muslim population in western countries. Moreover, the development of “halal leisure” can be seen as a sign of the development of new hybrid identities where Muslims seek to combine their religious identity with modern western leisure habits.

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Centring Leisure: A Hindu View of Leisure

Veena Sharma

When I read James V. Schall's foreword to Joseph Piper's (1963) book in which he said, "Man has the power to know *all that is*... Yet he...knows himself as a finite being by knowing what is not himself", I felt I was reading a quote from the *Upanishads*! That is what led to the writing of this chapter—looking at leisure from the perspective of Hindu thought.

The chapter posits that leisure is not a teleological concept, an idea or an object to be gained in a future time or space. It is more a matter for discovery in the here and now, not a thing to be striven for in a future temporal and spatial dimension. Nor is it the privilege of a class for which others slave. Leisure is also not, as some have claimed, an ideal which is "not fully realizable" (de Grazia, p. 5). Rather it is in the very nature of things and forms. It is the underlying ground of existence even if a mechanistic view of the world has prevented human beings from consciously realising this fact. It is a human exigency that will actualise itself. If this

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were not so life would be impossible. Leisure, in this understanding, is a survival need. It is the attainment, or realisation, of a compulsive and universal human urge.

The paradox is that every human being knowingly or unknowingly partakes of it at some time or another, yet is not always conscious of it. A conscious recognition of leisured moments would make life richer and enable expansion of those moments into other areas of life as it is lived. It is, as such, not a coincidence that all traditional cultures have the possibilities of leisure realisation built within the frameworks of their world views and activities.

The word leisure is often used synonymously with recreation, entertainment, free time, pleasure, idleness or non-doing, or non-monetary activity. In all definitions, the idea of freedom from obligation, of being freed for some time from the burden of compulsory work, from family or livelihood restrictions is recurrent. Yet, the conventional terms used when referring to leisure as a topic of study—freedom, choice, flexibility, or recreation—are contingent as they depend on social formations and the world view of the culture in which they arise. As such, leisure and its study is not, as Chris Rojek rightly suggests, “the examination of integrally constituted physical space or 'natural' segmented time and 'free' experience. Rather it is about what freedom, choice, flexibility and satisfaction mean in relation to determinate social formations For basic to my argument is the proposition that one cannot separate leisure from the rest of life and claim that it has unique 'laws', 'propensities' and 'rhythms'” (Rojek, p. 1). There can, therefore, be no one understanding of “leisure” and what is sought from it. Even the idea of freedom, as Rojek (p. 2) points out, is socially constructed and that too, may carry with it particular constraints and limits.

Leisure, then, needs to be studied/examined holistically in a cultural context to get an idea of what the terms used with reference to leisure actually mean. To do this we must, to adapt a quote from Karl Potter, “come to some understanding of its [culture’s] ultimate values—of what is of paramount importance in the lives of the people of that culture, of what are the highest ideals of its wisest men” (Potter, p. 1).

Potter rightly emphasises that the ultimate value recognised in “Hinduism” is “freedom” (Potter, p. 3). As the ultimate value in Vedanta

(one of the philosophical schools of Hinduism¹), this freedom refers to the attainment, or realisation, of oneness with an Absolute, in which there is freedom “from” every constraint or restriction—be it temporal, spatial, emotional, or intellectual. One who realises this Oneness becomes free from fear, old age, and death... (see Chh, Chap. VIII). It is a search for freedom from fear and the underlying anxiety, leading to the unfolding of a self-sustaining felicity that Vedanta engages itself with. This state, in the Vedantic world view, would be the highest form of leisure that a human can experience.

M.P. Pandit, a scholar of Indian philosophy writes, “...one who has realized the Divine Self... [is described as] *atmakrida*, one who sports with the Self, *atmamithuna*, one who has the Self for his companion, *atmananda*, one whose delight is in the Self” (Quoted in Swami Abhishiktananda, p. xxii). Writing of the accessibility of such a state for anyone who strives for it, Swami Abhishiktananda, a Benedictine monk turned to Hindu spirituality, says, “...the rishi of the Upanishads, like the Buddha, has no personality to assert, no history in which he must be situated. The Buddha’s discovery is everyman’s discovery; the rishi’s discovery is within the reach of anyone who is really willing to apply himself to the inner quest and find his freedom” (*The Further Shore*, ISPCK, Delhi, 1997, p. 109).

Concept of Freedom in Hinduism

Vedantic seers who made a dedicated search into the mystery of the existential state discovered that freedom—as absolute felicity, freed of transient predications—is the substratum of existence. They discovered that there is, beyond the limited yearnings and actions of the individual made up of the mind-body complex and the great flux of the universe,

¹ Vedanta refers to the school of thought that technically made its appearance around the eighth century BC with the arising of the *Upanishads*. The word Vedanta can mean either the end part of knowledge—as it is supposed to form the end part of the Vedas—or the essence of knowledge. Knowledge, as expounded in the earlier Vedas, was ritualistic and dealt with expiating the external aspects of nature. Vedantic knowledge, on the other, stressed an exploration of one’s own inner constitution and knowing that the external world can be understood, and dealt with, better if one understood one’s own psyche properly.

an awareness, the *atman*, the final reality of beings, whose very nature is bliss or beatitude—a pure spontaneity—that is beyond the conscious, intellectual, emotional, and physical aspects of human experience (see, Gispert-Sauch, *Bliss in the Upanishads*, 1977, p. 64). They found that the ultimate essence of the human is the plenitude of self-satisfaction that can neither be grasped objectively nor expressed in intellectual terms. Freed of existential limitations, this state is characterised by an unalloyed state of bliss—called *ananda* or *sukham*. The word *sukham* refers to an undivided wholeness which brooks no division. *Bhumaiva sukham nalpe sukham asti* (Chh., Chap. VII)—the whole, the unlimited alone is *sukha*—there can be no experience of felicity in the limited. This is the vision of supreme leisure that the Upanishads project and proclaim.

The freedom experienced by attaining to the Absolute is neither determined nor qualified by temporality nor is it ever diminished or enhanced by any “happening” or event—or activity—that is perceptible to the mind or the senses. It is “something” that is ever there but not always *known* to (or realised by) the experiencing subject who sees herself as limited, therefore *bound*, by the world of empirical phenomena. This freedom is conceptualised a little differently from other cultures. As explained by Abhishiktananda,

This existential liberation has nothing to do with the purely intellectual knowledge of classical Gnosticism or with the ritual initiation of the Greek mystery religions. It is a person’s integration with his own depth, his coming to his own “place of origin”, as Sri Ramana Maharshi used to say, completely free and completely open to the Spirit.

(*Guru and Disciple*, p. xl)

Ananda does not wait for the right socio-economic conditions to emerge before it can be experienced. It is a matter for discovery and can be realised in the here and now. It is an experiential state. As a subject for understanding, it calls for the application of a specific methodology at the level of an individual constituent.

In real-life situations, leisure would have to be understood both as a means to the achievement of a leisured state and the end itself, thus being a verb as well as a noun. At the level of application, its manifestations

arise from the cultural and technological preferences within which a particular social/ethnic group functions. As a normative concept—the goal that guides activity—it affects and influences the values of the group. Effort made for the discovery of the experience can be classified under leisure “activity”. This would include the *preparation* of the mind for leisure actualisation as well as *education* about the nature of the leisure experience.


Methodology

By laying down different methods, Vedanta shows that humans have the “freedom-to” to experience this “freedom-from”. It is the uniqueness of Vedanta that it shows a “connection”, a “relation”, between the conditioned, phenomenon (body-mind complex) and the non-conditioned, self-sustaining phenomenon (the One non-dual Reality) so as to make the conditioned an “instrument” in the attainment of the non-conditioned. It is through an analysis of the conditioned/limited mental and intellectual capacities that the human has intimations of the non-conditioned and free existential core which is the fundamental constituent of the human being.

The human being (as represented in the *Taittiriya Upanishad*) is seen to be constituted of five sheaths or *kosas*, each one representing a particular level of awareness (see Fig. 1). The layers, or sheaths, are not actual physical forms but are symbolical representations of qualities that are graded according to their subtleness. The exercise here is to see through the first four outer layers in order to experience, or know, the innermost which is “pure, clean and eternal” (Gispert, p. 93). The objective is the realisation of the essence which is the free and divine (i.e., eternal, unannihilable, and unchanging) component of the self.

It is a return journey that connects the external to the innermost core which is free from space-time constructs and is, thus, coterminous with the state of *Ananda*. The journey is not a linear progression in which there is an exclusion, or *leaving behind*, of the previous rungs of the personality. Rather, it is an assimilation of them into the preceding ones from which they arise. As it is not going beyond or past them but getting to their

Notional Representation of the Human Personality



- Transactional Reality** Material physical level
Functions in the waking state
- Seat of imagination** Ego | Subtle body
Illusory perception Functions in waking and dream states
- Seat of total bliss** Autonomous | Ontological Being
Free from subject-object division
Experienced in deep-sleep state

Note: Though shown here as separate segments, the *koshas* are actually contiguous - one merging into the other.

Fig. 1 Vedantic understanding of the human person: integration of the inner and outer (Adapted from Advaita Vedanta and Akan: Inquiry into an Indian and African Ethos, by Veena Sharma [2015], pp. 74–75. Reproduced with permission of the publishers)

essence which does not exclude them. When the *kosas* are transcended, they are, so to say, *absorbed* into the previous one. The essence of the outer is contained in the inner towards which the withdrawal is made. What is transcended is the outer material limitation to experience its intrinsic truth. For, each “preceding sheath is infilled by each succeeding sheath...” (Ranganathananda, p. 527) So there is an inseparable inter-meshing between the “external” and the “internal”.

Analysis of the Three States of Consciousness

An experiential understanding of the innermost core and its connection to the four outer layers is gained by an analysis of the three states of consciousness experienced by every sentient being. An analysis of the three states—waking (*transactional*) state, dream (*illusory* or *imaginary*) state, and deep-sleep (the *reallconsciousness*) state—is meant to point to a reality that is free from alternation of change and mutation, thus free from anxiety. The first two states which operate in the realm of multiplicity are assimilated into one undifferentiated whole in the state of deep-sleep consciousness which underlies and animates the other two states. The first two states are congruent with the four outer *kosas* of the human personality. The state of deep sleep is congruent with the innermost, *anandmaya kosa*.

In this analytical journey, the “product” is not distant, or alienated, from the process. In fact, the process and the product are part of the same totality. In the process there is an incremental dissolving of the one into the other which is of its own essence and leads towards a state that is identical with that of leisure. In the final experience of undifferentiatedness, one stands uninvolved in the wheel of change but capable of enjoying all. For, in the final understanding, all activity—intellectual, mental, emotional, and physical—arises basically from the same innermost core.

So, in this framework, activity and work are not the result of anguish. Rather, they arise from the very nature of *Ananda*, a movement of the inner back to the outer—to the sensual and differentiated—layers of self-expression. It is spirit turned into matter. There is no alienation. To quote Abinash Chandra Bose, “We do not find in the Vedas any evidence of the

Notional Representation of Physio-Psychological-Spiritual Composition of the Human Being

Annamaya Kośa

- > Composed of material elements: space, air, fire, water and earth.
- > Nurtured by food, breath and physical products.
- > Transacts with other existents through sense organs and organs of action.
- > Limited and contained in space and time.
- > Undergoes birth, growth, decay and death.
- > Active in the waking state, inert in the dream and deep sleep state.

Pranamaya Kośa

- > Subtler than *Annamaya*.
- > Sustains and supports the physical body; itself is sustained by air.
- > Closely connected to the mind.
- > Facilitates digestion, absorption, excretion, flow of blood, motor functions.

Manomaya Kośa

- > Most dynamic and refined form of matter.
- > Nourished by the subtlest essence of food.
- > Subtler than breath (*prana*), yet vitally connected to it and the body.
- > Seat of memory and thoughts.
- > Swayed by emotions; imagines past and future; can distort truth.
- > Functions in waking and dream states but not in deep sleep.

Vijnanamaya Kośa

- > Seat of discrimination, reasoning, decision making, analysis, speech and knowledge.
- > Bridge between non-sense-tangible spiritual essence of *Anandamaya Kośa* and the other extroverted, perceptible sheaths.
- > Can be introverted – turned towards *Anandamaya* – or extroverted, as it turns towards the outer sheaths.
- > Functions in dream and waking states, but not in deep sleep state.

Anandamaya Kośa

- > Autonomous, ontological, blissful Being.
- > Seat of harmony, equilibrium, total knowledge.
- > Not supported by any material element; itself is the support of all other *Kośas*.
- > Experienced and known through reflection and intuition.
- > Experienced in deep sleep when all other faculties are dormant.

Fig. 2 Vedantic understanding of the human person: integration of the inner and outer (A above in the citation for figure one. Reproduced with permission of the publishers)

tragedy of the divided soul, and the anguish and misery that accompany it... No negative attitude, induced by disillusionment or frustration, ... no world weariness..." The Vedas reflect "...a joyous and radiant spirit, overflowing with love of life and energy for action, and looking up with serene faith to the Divinity for support and inspiration" (Bose 1954, p. 2).

A realisation of one's true being enables the right mode of approaching basic human needs, which would not only fulfil one's own individual self-interest but protect the social and natural environment of which the individual is an integral component.

The Four Great Aspirations

Hindu classical texts lay down four great aspirations, or values, that humans strive for. Called *purusharthas*, these are *Dharma*, *Artha*, *Kama*, and *Moksha*. The four are not discrete, unrelated, aspirations but are intermeshed with each other so as to make each one meaningful. They lay down the order of priority for the fulfilment of all human needs and desires and the attainment of prosperity in an appropriate way. *Artha*, the un-negatable material needs of human beings, and *Kama*, fulfilment of essential permissible, valid, desires, are sandwiched between *Dharma* (right behaviour/action, also translated as righteousness) and *Moksha*, which stands for ultimate liberation. If one is valorised at the expense of another, there is imbalance—both at the individual and societal levels. And if the whole is disturbed, the individual cannot enjoy a sense of felicity. Pleasures are enjoyed and human needs fulfilled in a manner which does not conflict with the dictates of *dharmā*, which among other things refers to one's duties according to one's station in life. And *moksha* (or liberation), whether achieved or not, becomes the underlying current towards which activity is directed. This liberation can be experienced when, through certain disciplines, the mind and intellect are rendered clear and transparent—uncluttered by constrictive thoughts and emotions. That is why righteousness, or *dharmā*, is listed as the first great aspiration. P.V. Kane writes that this mode of seeing recognises "a scale of values" (Kane 1930, Vol. V, Pt. II, p. 1628). It does not prescribe

that all beings should attain *Moksha*. But the underlying thought of it tends to place human striving in an appropriate context which would lead to a deeper enjoyment at the individual level and a larger good at the social level. As such, the first three *purusharthas* are held subservient to the spiritual goal. Pleasures are enjoyed and human needs fulfilled in a manner which does not conflict with the dictates of *dharma* which has to be understood and applied by each person according to the situation prevailing at a given place and time. The *Dharmic* attitude prepares the mind for the experience of a deep lasting joy. Dharma has been defined in the great Indian epic the *Mahabharata* which says:

All sayings of *dharma* are with a view to nurturing, cherishing, providing more amply, enriching, prospering, increasing, enhancing, all living beings... Therefore, *whatever* has the characteristic of bringing that about, is *dharma*. This is certain.

All the sayings of *dharma* are with a view to supporting, sustaining, bringing together, and in their togetherness upholding, all living beings... Therefore, *whatever* has the characteristic of doing that, is *dharma*. This is certain.

All the sayings of *dharma* are with a view to securing for all living beings freedom from violence, *a-himsa*. Therefore, *whatever* has the characteristic of not doing violence, is *dharma*. This is certain.

(Badrinath 2000, p. 1)

By this token that which has the characteristic of depriving, starving, debasing, degrading, and so on is the negation of *dharma*. When activity is carried out within the *dharmic* parameters, it is fulfilling and conducive to happiness.

The Four Stages of Life

The Vedic system of thought sees a normal healthy life as extending to a period of 100 years (*Isavasya Upanishad*, verse 2²). This is divided into four sections, or *ashramas*, all of which are ascribed different responsi-

²The *Upanishads* are texts which form the crux of Vedantic world view. They are part of the Vedas, the oldest texts extant, and are the result of ancient enquiries into the nature of life and the relation-

bilities and obligations suited to that particular state (Kane, Vol. II, Pt. I, pp. 416–426). Hence, each follows its particular *dharma*. Each stage allows for the fulfilment of particular natural human needs so that in course of time they may be transcended and the cravings for certain objects and desires may come to their natural culmination. The disciplines and practices followed for the fulfilment of relevant human needs in one stage prepare the person for the next stage as they provide the maturity that goes with each stage. The *ashramas* are *brahmacharya* (the stage of studentship and learning); *grihastha* (the stage of earning a living, raising a family, and supporting others in different stages who may not be contributing materially to social upkeep); *vanaprastha* (the stage of moving out of worldly affairs and dedicating oneself to study and teaching); and *sanyasa* (the stage of contemplation).

Grihasthas, or householders, are required to serve others and not cook for themselves alone. They should be prepared to serve any guest who may happen to come, feed mendicants, and feed parents and older persons, and of course younger ones, before sitting down to eat themselves (*Mahabharata, Mokshadharma Parva*, p. 243). In the process they are not only upholding and maintaining others but are themselves undergoing a discipline, a way of life, that prepares them for moving into the next stage.

Again, the stages are not discrete segments, separated from one another, but are intertwined as they enrich and enhance themselves from each other and link social beings into one homogenised and complementary whole. As such, no one need be marginalised or uncared for.

In the *dharmic* understanding of leisure, the model for integrating young and old for a better, richer, and wiser society, there is great scope for using leisure studies for preparing individuals for the different stages of life. In economically advanced societies, where there is more time available to people, especially older ones who have economic security, it is possible for them to dedicate a portion of their time to the pursuit and spread of leisure understanding. There is, thus, no place for loneliness or a sense of emptiness in life. A greater perceived role in society for the old is an important element in countering a sense of rejection.

A number of *Upanishads* are the result of scintillating dialogues between the young and the old. This tradition enables us to realise that an integration between the young and the old not only provides meaning to the lives of both but also has in it the capacity to leave behind valuable lessons and important knowledge for others in society.

Objective of Leisure

The objective of leisure, here, is not social transformation. It is concerned with the discovery of an undifferentiated felicity which underlies all existence but is not generally realised. Yet, the discovery cannot but leave a deep impact on the larger social structure. In the recognition of oneness with the other, as all are emanations of the same energy, the sense of separation and conflictual confrontation are reduced. Besides, when the source is understood all work and activity becomes a means of actualising, of giving expression, to that source. Traditionally, the “work” provided sustenance at the physical level, of course, but more than that it gave an expression of devotion to the energy that motivated and enabled it. The sense of fulfilment drawn from this expression of a deep feeling provided worth to life and gave to society works of a high degree of excellence. Great works of art and architecture have been produced in non-competitive, traditional societies.

Needed: A Critical Theory of Leisure

Many distinguished scholars have been looking into an understanding of leisure that would be enhancing and give meaning to life. A critical review of it could help leisure studies also to be emancipated from the constriction of a capitalistic mode which has come to appropriate and strangle leisure. John L. Hemingway in his “Critique and Emancipation: Toward a Critical Theory of Leisure” has suggested an inquiry into a number of fields for illuminating specific aspects of the meaning and content of leisure. He underlines the need for stressing the emancipatory

and enriching potential of leisure. Some of his suggestions are incorporated below:

1. To posit an alternative mode of viewing leisure since the mode of seeing it as consumption has made it appear as though that were a given, the only way of experiencing leisure—even though unfulfilling.
2. Identify contradictions between the content of leisure practices and its emancipatory potential. Interrogate the degree to which leisure practices are shaped by non-emancipatory forms of power (for example, the controlling power of capital). Thereby, stress a theoretical framework that would increase the emancipatory potential of leisure practices. He goes on to say, “To the degree that leisure reflects and is tied to work, as for example in dependency on the ability to consume or acquire, to that degree leisure’s emancipatory content is questionable”.
3. Recognise that social phenomena are polyphonic, hence the need to respect their complexity. Different cultures could gain from insights into other cultures.
4. Not be misled by issues of “free time”. It is content not the amount of time that is of primary concern.
5. Mode of studying leisure itself needs to be emancipated. Critical theory must look into its own ethical and practical intention. More than mere interpretation it needs to look into its potential for change.

(see Jackson and Burton, p. 504)

Yet, the paradox is that leisure is sought within a framework of time and activity that is as unfulfilling as the obligatory activity it is getting away from. There is a compartmentalisation between leisure and work as though time and activity devoted to leisure were somehow separate from the general continuum of time and movement that characterise the universe.

At a time when globalisation is making the world closer, the wisdom generated in different societies can be shared for the enrichment of all without giving in to unnecessary prejudice. Leisure education would enable students to realise that it (leisure) does not reside in an activity but rather in an understanding, an experience. This understanding requires time and education.

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Listening to Nineteenth-Century Kanaka ‘Ōiwi Voices; Re-imagining the Possibilities for Leisure

Karen M. Fox and Lisa McDermott

The intersection of Western leisure discourses and Indigenous peoples was and continues to be problematic, if not harmful. Although current Western leisure practices, with both beneficial and negative consequences, continue to impinge upon Indigenous lives, Indigenous scholars (e.g. Meyer 2004; Reder 2010) call for scholarship that sustains Indigenous ontologies, methodologies, cultural practices, and experiences while engaging in decolonizing processes. Broad generalizations and abstractions, characteristic of leisure and other scholarship, often improperly subsume Indigenous worldviews under Western generalizations or obscure important differences of local Indigenous knowledges grounded in specific place-based knowledge (Meyer 2004; Reder 2010; Smith 2012; Williams 2011). We thus look to Kanaka ‘Ōiwi¹ (Native

¹We use various terms (Kanaka Maoli, Kanaka ‘Ōiwi, ‘Ōiwi) interchangeably for the preferred ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i or ‘ōlelo [Hawaiian language] terms for the Indigenous people of Hawai‘i as

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Hawaiians), ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i (Hawaiian language) sources, mo‘okū‘auhua (genealogies, history),² mo‘olelo (stories, histories) as well as settler scholars to examine the effects of the intersection between Western leisure and Kanaka ‘Ōiwi worldviews. We suggest that Kanaka ‘Ōiwi contact with Euro-North American peoples was always imbricated with leisure discourses. This imbrication initially began with sailors who conceived of the Sandwich Islands (i.e., Ka Hawai‘i Pae ‘Āina—the Hawaiian archipelago) as a “paradise”, “refreshment” (Carr 2006), and locale for sexual entertainment. Variations on this theme continued to flow as Christian missionaries, merchants, military officers, entrepreneurs, and politicians from the United States and other imperial nations envisioned Hawai‘i for their own ends.

As two haole (foreign, strange; in recent times—a white person) researchers who became entranced with how Kanaka ‘Ōiwi navigated the nineteenth-century international world through what we know as leisure (Fox and Klaiber 2006; Fox and McDermott 2014), we approach this analysis with humility and in an effort to initiate a discussion. We were taken with Beamer’s (2008) suggestion of using a lens “in which native Hawaiian *ali‘i* were active agents in the appropriation of the ‘tools of the colonizer’...[and] asks whether the tools of the colonizers were used by Hawaiian *ali‘i* against colonialism itself?” (p. 67). Although we have distinct limitations in using this approach and awkwardly copy Beamer’s elegance, we found it a useful tool for challenging assumptions within Western scholarship, the assumed boundaries and conclusions about the colonizer and colonized, and straightforward applications of leisure across differences.

David Kalākaua became the first elected Ali‘i Nui (ali‘i belonging to the highest echelons of the general class of ali‘i [Brown 2016]) or Mō‘ī (First used in 1832, often equated to king, queen, sovereign, or

reflected in current popular and academic publications. We also use ‘ōlelo when an English translation is inadequate for the complexity of the ‘ōlelo. See “Comparative Method: A Word About Translation”.

²We follow a number of language conventions...when there are no adequate translations we provide a short discussion and use the ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i term to indicate the more ambiguous and complete implications of the words. We do not italicize ‘ōlelo terms to highlight the need to work within a multi-lingual world.

monarch) not directly related to the Kamehameha dynasty in 1874. His traditional³ Kanaka ‘Ōiwi responsibilities included developing a modern sense of lāhui. Lāhui, often associated with nation or state, is more like “both a singular organic body with branches that nourish the whole *and* a gathering of distinct, pre-existing elements combining to form a new entity” (Goodyear-Ka‘ōpua 2011, p. 139). Lāhui, expressed through various oral and written forms, is a form of Kanaka Maoli cultural and spiritual knowledge and mo‘okū‘auhu, encompassing ‘āina (land and ocean) and humans. The Hawaiian ali‘i (gender neutral term referring to ‘Ōiwi belonging to the ruling class whether one ruled or not [Brown 2016]) were the hereditary groups in Kanaka ‘Ōiwi society that provided leadership and specific expertise to sustain a complicated and integrated society connected to the ‘āina. The maka‘āinana were the commoners who farmed, fished, and labored for themselves and the ali‘i. English writings about the maka‘āinana in the nineteenth century and subsequent scholarship about the maka‘āinana were framed around participation, or lack thereof, in plantation and manual work in support of settlers (Merry 2000; Takaki 1983). However, Merry (2000), Barman and Watson (2006), and the Center for Labor Education and Research of University of Hawai‘i—West Oahu (<<http://www.hawaii.edu/uho/clear/home/Lhistory.html>>) maka‘āinana were hard workers given the right conditions. Like the Norwegians who broke their contracts with the plantation owners, the maka‘āinana were resisting back-breaking, slave-like conditions divorced from community and the ‘āina.

The lāhui in the nineteenth century was facing challenges to its sovereignty including a substantial decrease in native population (from 300,000 in 1778 to 40,000 in 1893) (Bushnell 1993⁴). Mō‘i Kalākaua dedicated substantial personal and government resources to social and cultural initiatives to sustain the lāhui. Although this clearly was political

³We use traditional following Beamer’s (2008) discussion of the phrase “mai ā kūpuna mai” [from the ancestors] from the Pukui and Elbert dictionary. Beamer interprets the phrase literally as *what comes from the ancestors into this time*. Conceptually, the phrase indicates that as generations pass, more knowledge can be passed down from generation to generation, not as an antithesis to modern.

⁴The scholarly debate about these estimates continues given the problematic nature of many sources (Brown 2011).

as Osorio duly notes (cited in Ing 2003, p. 9), we also suggest these strategies tapped into larger currents of spirituality, aesthetics, genealogical transferences, and joy to nourish the entire person, community, lāhui, and universe. It also addressed absences in settler⁵ leisure discourses (e.g., playfulness, sensuality, embodiment, frivolity, multiplicity, and ambiguity). We privilege Kanaka Maoli historical documents and current scholarship, especially those grounded in ‘ōlelo sources, that convey how ‘Ōiwi understood and created their positionality within an international arena and settler desires expressed through a Protestant work ethic and leisure discourses. Using Smith’s (2003) comparative approach, we examine the need for conceptual and epistemological precision by settler leisure scholars and practitioners in application of leisure concepts and entertain the rectification of leisure informed by Kanaka Maoli knowledge. We also hope to contribute to the growing scholarship, drawing from Indigenous as well as Western wisdom, that re-imagines the history between ‘Ōiwi and settlers with a view to thinking about living in a present world—particularly given leisure’s involvement in environmental and societal changes that, while affecting us all, are acutely felt by Kanaka Maoli.

Smith (2003), a religious studies scholar, posited that comparison is a fundamental intellectual process that is intercalated in how humans remember, recognize words, conceptualize, and sense the world. It occurs across cultures, in artificial intelligence, antibodies identifying pathogens, developing a physical skill, or encountering a new phenomenon. As Smith observes: “...comparison serves as one of the chief operations by means of which both our senses and our cognitive schemata function” (p. 2). At a scholarly level, however, it is vital that the comparative process, in terms of the criteria for selection and comparison, is transparent so as to make one’s “...workings so explicit that they can subsequently be undone—as is the case, at least in principle, with contemporary art restoration projects” (p. 5).

⁵The Hawaiian term for foreigner is haole (one who cannot speak ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i). Current usage can range from foreigner to Americans who immigrated or were born in Hawai‘i to highly derogative. Although the Hawaiian Kingdom was never technically a colony and illegally occupied and annexed, settler seems a better term given the colonial intentions of the American missionaries and merchants, not to mention the US government.

Smith’s (2003) comparative method requires at least two exempla. Turnbull (2003), building on Kuhn (1996), states exempla represent “shared examples of puzzle solutions...based essentially on agreements about which kinds of problems are sufficiently similar as to be treated in the same way” (p. 8). In this comparison, we use the social and cultural strategies of Mō‘ī Kalākaua and the responses of the settlers in the nineteenth century-Hawaiian Kingdom, reflecting various leisure interpretations, as exempla. According to Smith, a well-formulated comparison specifies the precise mode of relation between exempla with a third element (i.e., the Western concept of leisure). The third element (the hinge or conceptual category) governs the comparison in terms of aspects or relations, not as a totality or entity. Comparison thus implies the construction of resemblances of similarity *and* identification of differences and, therefore, is necessarily an act of translation. We also draw on Smith’s work, because it explicitly undermines casual and facile comparison in the service of universals, to contribute to an understanding of similarity that keeps differences constitutively in play. To this end we use his comparative method to examine ‘Ōiwi worldviews to exemplify differences, while acknowledging similarities to Euro-American leisure discourses. The similarities are vital for understanding how the chosen exempla can be seen comparatively to Kanaka Maoli in the nineteenth century and current leisure scholars. In doing so, the comparative method makes transparent the inherent assumptions of worldviews through the processes of description and redescription leading to the rectification of the scholarly leisure concept. We seek an analysis in the service of ongoing conversations of leisure’s decolonization (Meyer 2004; Oliveira and Wright 2016; Reder 2010).

We focus on Kalākaua’s Poni Mō‘ī [Coronation] and Jubilee (i.e., 50th birthday celebration), because both celebratory performances manifest the range of his social and cultural involvement and strategies (e.g., author, composer, Hale Naua [society to advance Hawaiian and modern sciences, art and literature], patron of hula, connoisseur of good food and drink, multi-lingual and world traveler) to strengthen and sustain Kanaka ‘Ōiwi as a lāhui while struggling to maintain viability in the international political arena. The analysis seeks to listen maieutically (Fox 2016) to ‘Ōiwi voices and worldviews through comparative methodology, calling

into question Western leisure concepts in the service affirming multiple understandings and decolonizing processes within leisure scholarship.

Comparative Method: A Word About Translation

As Smith (2003) highlights, comparison implies translation not only in terms of language but also understanding the meaning and purposes of any human behavior (not to mention other-than-human phenomena). Throughout this chapter, comparison and translation is ubiquitous. We focus on translation of ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i, because the history of Kanaka Maoli and leisure’s connection with Hawai‘i has been overwhelmingly written in English despite the substantial ‘ōlelo documentation. There were some 125,000 newspaper pages published between 1834 and 1948; many of these have now been digitalized. They were essential for the intellectual life of all Kānaka Maoli and formed an “intellectual commons” (Silva 2009) not to mention books, unpublished manuscripts, journals, and private letters (Nogelmeier 2010). Kalākaua, known as the “editor king”, wrote and edited *Ka Hoku o ka Pakipika* (The Star of the Pacific), a nationalist, anti-colonial nupepa from 1861 to 1863. In addition to local knowledge, the nupepa demonstrated Kanaka Maoli hunger for international news and serial novels such as *One Thousand and One Nights* (Bacchilega and Arista 2007). As Mookini (1974, cited in Chapin 1996, p. 59) observed: they “were not only reflections of politics and culture in its many dimensions, but primary instruments of movements and individuals, and influence on events, trends, and attitudes. Hawaiian newspapers are... indispensable sources for every aspect of [Kanaka ‘Ōiwi] history”. With Kanaka ‘Ōiwi reaching a literacy rate greater than New England in 1859 (Day and Loomis cited in Nogelmeier, p. 72), these resources are critical for a meaningful dialogue about Western leisure and its multiple interpretations in the nineteenth century. We keep ‘ōlelo terms in play because many do not have direct correlations in English, and we cannot provide exhaustive explanations for them within this text. This initial framing of a comparative approach gestures to the translation

requirements and standards emerging for transparency as demonstrated by such scholars as Brown (2016) and Lyon (2011), McDougall (2016), and Nogelmeier (2016).

Translation theory articulates the difficulty of intralingual translation ranging from “word-for-word” or literal translation to “sense-for-sense” translation attentive to contextual differences (Munday 2001). Although this is not a definitive discussion of the translation complexities of the Hawaiian language, we gesture to the topographical densities overlooked in word-for-word translations based on English concepts. Any application of Western leisure to ‘ōlelo requires, *at a minimum*: (1) the history and meaning of leisure within Western discourses, (2) an account of settler methods for creating an orthography and translations of the Hawaiian language, (3) an understanding of Kanaka ‘Ōiwi scholarship and cultural traditions, and (4) attention to and use of historical ‘ōlelo sources and their historical-cultural contexts.

Translation always entails an approximation, and the relative difference cannot (finally) be overcome (Smith 2003). Therefore, we deliberately use Hawaiian words to consistently remind us (both authors and readers) of the multiple meanings and ambiguities of working across differences. ‘Ōlelo is rich in description (especially local geographical occurrences), ambiguity, multiple meanings and is “a carrier of...ancestral culture, [that] articulates a cultural perspective of literary aesthetics, and expresses and demonstrates kaona as a literary aesthetic standard” (McDougall 2014, pp. 2–3). Kaona, an intellectual practice using language to express multiple levels of meaning “hidden out in the open, with a range of both ‘hiddenness’ and ‘openness’” (p. 3), is dependent on the relationship and worldviews of both speaker and listeners. The ability to access kaona rests in understanding Kanaka Maoli collective knowledges and experiences and is only one example of the complexities of translation.

Furthermore, translating for meaning shifts with context and is shaped by perspective including the translator’s. Smith’s (2003) exhortation for transparency so that an analysis or translation can be undone is not to be taken lightly because traduttore traditore (translator, traitor) can easily become a reality. The emerging ‘ōlelo translation scholarship as exemplified by Brown (2016), Lyon (2011), and Nogelmeier’s process of translating the ali’i letters with the Hawaiian Mission Houses Historic Sites and Archives

includes careful documentation of original handwriting or transcribing of original letters, the additions of diacritics in modern ‘ōlelo, various degrees of English translations, and translation notes when applicable. These are essential, given the various definitions for specific words, the contextual meanings, and historical changes. For instance, early translators often concluded that ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i was unformed, impoverished, and ambiguous, because it lacked words for abstract ideas (e.g., individualism, freedom, sin, conscience, and productivity); they complained of the necessity to introduce new words and neologisms of their own when translating (Lucas 2000; Morris 2006; Schütz 1994).

Pukui and Elbert (1986) identified numerous Hawaiian words and phrases for leisure: *manawa nanea*, *manawa walea*, and *wā ka‘awale*. These phrases are not found in early ‘ōlelo nupepa, although *le‘ale‘a* is present in the nupepa as well as Malo’s manuscript (1987 cited in Lyon 2011). It is far from clear how any of the phrases came into existence or their coherence with the English word leisure. *Le‘ale‘a* is associated with delight, to be pleased or satisfied with, content, having a good time, entertainments, or amusements (Andrews 2010 first published in 1865; Pukui and Elbert 1986 first published in 1956). *Le‘ale‘a* may connect to leisure depending on the context of its use. Simply exploring Pukui and Elbert’s list of meanings complicates our task. *Manawa* can mean time, season, date, chronology, but also for a short time, infrequent, affections, feelings, and the anterior fontanel in the heads of infants for *manawa*. Furthermore, the *Kumulipo*, which explains the *mo‘okū‘auhau* of Kalākaua, constructs Hawaiian space-time differently than Western temporal and measurable space-time. Osorio (2002) further discusses time within the concepts of *Ka wā mahope* (what is behind us) translated as future in English and *ka wā mamua* (what is in front of us) equated to the past. He (2002) explained: “These terms do not merely describe time, but the Hawaiians’ orientation to it. We face the past, confidently interpreting the present, cautiously backing into the future, guided by what our ancestors knew and did” (p. 7). And we have yet to discuss the various meanings of *nanea*!

Without much more research, it is hard to know how *manawa nanea* came into being or assess the multiple layers of meaning. Was it a neologism, a phrase with multiple meanings beyond the understanding of settlers, or something else? As Kimura (1983) observes, “[w]henver Hawaiian is translated into English, the English words used add cultural connotations to the idea conveyed, while eliminating, or obscuring, intended connotations and meanings of the original Hawaiian” (p. 182, cited in Silva 1999, p. 14). Simply looking up the definitions or inserting the English definitions for the Hawaiian words will not provide a depth of understanding or context.

Since this is an initial approach to the comparison, we leave both English and multiple ‘ōlelo words in play as we search ‘ōlelo sources and current translation by others⁶ as we create interpretations to rectify the leisure concept. This chapter also works across theoretical frameworks, historical time periods, and cultural worldviews. Each of these is a way of thinking or embodying reality differently and requires translation. The adequacy of the translations must be evaluated, criticized, negotiated, and improved through re-iteration of research processes, transparency of translation processes, and identification of translators. Furthermore, responses from others (specifically Kanaka ‘Ōiwi) and accountability must be ensured and enacted. Our point is that translation, critique, and rectification matters especially when Euro-North American scholarship has presupposed its categories as universal and beneficial for all.

Brief Summary of Context: The Hawaiian Kingdom 1874–1891

Description involves situating exemplum (i.e., Kalākaua’s Poni Mō‘ī and Jubilee) within the complex patterns and systems that surround the exemplum. A rich context of social, cultural, linguistic, natural, cosmological,

⁶Due to lack of space, translations are accessible in the cited sources.

and historical environments invest exemplum with their significance and, potentially, the relationship between exempla. Our *first attempt* at description of the exemplum, while initially framed by casual leisure similarities (i.e., similarity of activities—parades, dances, games), is *necessarily* partial as we argue for a specific comparative methodology and attention to ‘ōlelo sources of nineteenth-century Hawai‘i. In addition to further iteration, the description eventually needs to “account ... [for] how our scholarly tradition has intersected with the exemplum” (Smith 2003, p. 11).

The Hawaiian Kingdom was located along critical sea routes to Polynesia, Asia, and North and South America used by the prominent colonial nations of Great Britain, Spain, France, and the United States of America. As part of the “spirit of capitalism” (Weber 2002), they were seeking lands, resources, wealth, and productivity. Specific to the American context was the “manifest destiny” of the superior American white race (Horsman 1986). As a “port-of-call” and harbor to support military, whaling, shipping, and cruise adventures, Honolulu became a commercial hub. In 1848, it became the Kingdom’s capital and a major port with new ship designs that could access its shallow embayment. Honolulu boasted impressive amenities, many built before other major cities in Europe and North America. The city had or built substantial infrastructure including water systems, fire departments, police, printing presses, electricity, telegraph, and public transportation. Both ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i and English nupepa supported a lively and civically engaged population (Chapin 1996; Schütz 1994; Nogelmeier 2010). The Hawaiian Kingdom had a strong political economy including a constitutional monarchy, legal system inclusive of Hawaiian and Western laws, vibrant commerce, manufacturing, and trading systems. The cultural amenities included music (minstrelsy to opera), city parks, gardens and forested crown lands, visual arts (featherwork and weaving to photography and painting), drama (theater to circuses), museums, and associations (volunteer guilds, Free Masons [Karpel 2000]).

The politics of the Hawaiian Kingdom were complex with dynamic and shifting alliances among Kanaka ‘Ōiwi, merchants, missionaries, plantation owners, and immigrant communities. Merchants established themselves early alongside European “explorers” and traders. Hotels,

grog shops, bowling alleys, dance halls, and sexual entertainment, ranging from disreputable to upscale, were often located on Nu‘uanu Street in Honolulu. As Honolulu grew, merchants continued to adapt and included services, banks, investors, shipping magnates, and entrepreneurs from all over the world. This group was a powerful settler voice for development and trade.

The missionaries arrived in 1820. Lyon (2016) described the meeting as a “momentary embrace” of a belief that “education and religion” was the solution to facing the changes thrust upon the Hawaiian Kingdom. This “embrace” had many contradictory movements over the decades including civilizing Kanaka ‘Ōiwi bodies (i.e., chaste dress and demeanor, especially for the women, and self-denial especially of the sexual self and sensual pleasure) and teaching their minds (i.e., to always subordinate passion to reason, the importance of virtue, piety, and the Bible as the absolute symbol of authority). However, Williams (2013) describes how the ‘Ōiwi “Hawaiianized” their churches and preserved their own “native” traditions as well as interpreted Christianity within their cultural framework and in support of the lāhui. Buck (1993) points out that the missionaries’ religious and civilizing projects were combined with a nationalistic fervor that came from their recent experiences of achieving national sovereignty and the war of 1812, which increased American territory. As the missionaries began to see Kanaka Maoli’s resistance to their religious and nationalistic objectives, they refocused education on manual labor, which also supported their accumulation of wealth and political maneuvers to be annexed by the USA (Kuykendall 1967).

Plantations developed as settlers were able to own land primarily through the Great Māhele.⁷ Sustainable agriculture became capitalistic enterprises owned and managed by international settlers and the missionaries and their descendants. With networks gained through their American education, missionary descendants were able to capitalize

⁷The Great Māhele, or land division, of 1848–1855 redistributed Hawaiian land: 1/3 became crown lands, 1/3 was allocated to chiefs, and the remaining 1/3 was supposed to go to *maka‘ainana*. Yet, as Merry (2000) notes, few commoners in reality obtained land in their own names. Rather large tracts of it passed into the hands of naturalized foreigners and after 1850, non-naturalized ones. Merry (2000) argues the Māhele was highly significant as it transformed the Hawaiian Kingdom from a society based on a hierarchy of tenant-lord relations to one based on individual private land ownership.

on agricultural production and export, increasing influence and wealth within the Hawaiian Kingdom and the USA. During Kalākaua's reign, missionaries, merchants, and plantation owners' interests coincided in beliefs about racial discrimination, the Kanaka Maoli "inadequacies" for governing themselves, and the need for a Reciprocity Treaty, if not annexation, with the USA to protect their trade and wealth.

Comparative Method: Western Leisure Concepts or "The Hinge"

The "hinge of comparison" is the Western scholarly concept of leisure. However, leisure theories or concepts, typically, are conflated with Western leisure practices and worldviews. Western ontologies and epistemologies often differ from Indigenous ways of being and knowing (Meyer 2004). Hence, we use Smith's (2003) comparative method requiring rectification of the hinge or the leisure concept.

Although there are multiple concepts and theories about leisure, Pieper's (1952) discussion of leisure as a basis for culture frames this initial comparison. He envisioned leisure as the basis of culture; culture was those gifts and qualities beyond basic physiological needs, those practices (e.g., dance, music, stories, government, and economics) not strictly necessary although critical to a full human life. For Pieper, leisure had two fundamental components: (1) contemplation or apprehending the spiritual and (2) celebration. Contemplation was for "grasping the totality of existing things" (p. 36) and "not only for the good of the individual who so devotes himself [sic], but for the good of human society" (p. 37). He goes on to state that leisure is "an attitude of mind, a condition of the soul" (p. 40) that is open to the world, a silence, listening, or what the poet Konrad Weiss called "confidence in the fragmentariness of life and history" (cited in Pieper, p. 41). Celebration, "properly understood, goes to the very heart of what we mean by leisure" (p. 42); celebration was about understanding the meaning of the universe, encountering a oneness with it, and experiencing an aspect other than everyday life. Celebrations create experiences of the universe different from the

everyday where boundaries can be exceeded and life-giving existential forces, such as ecstasy, are refreshed and renewed. Notice these components (i.e., contemplation and celebration) in Pieper’s descriptions are relational implying processes; leisure is not a thing (i.e., activity, state of mind, or outcome). Understanding the relational requires attention to the specific and local manifestations through culture, economics, politics, gender, and so forth. While a specific activity (e.g., dance or games) might look similar, whether it is leisure depends on a comparison of the relationships. And if leisure is the basis of culture, then difference must be accounted for.

Pieper’s (1952) context and discussion hinted at contemplation beyond intellectual and religious confines. As a Catholic philosopher, he drew from a range of Greek and Catholic traditions including Dionysius and St Francis of Assisi with dance, playfulness, and inclusion of nature and animals. In the vernacular and communal setting, these might include “hanging around” or “just being” in space-time to experiment with various material for weaving, playing a ‘ukulele, observations of the best waves for surfing, or strategies for good government. Following Fox and Klaiber (2006), we take up Pieper’s view of leisure in its broadest implications to capture human impulses to puzzle and give explanation and meaning to their lives and relationships with the universe. We keep in mind rectification of the Western worldviews of superiority, separation of humans and other life forces, and dichotomies (e.g., right/wrong, work/leisure) that many Indigenous people would find strange and dividing between all life forms. We consistently leave open the question of whether the category of leisure can be inclusive.

Comparative Method: Poni Mō‘ī and Jubilee

After a contentious campaign that split the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi population, Kalākaua toured the islands of the Hawaiian Kingdom announcing “Ho‘oulu Lāhui” [Increase the Lāhui] and established himself as a “people’s king” (Tsai 2014, pp. 134–135). In 1881, he became the first monarch in the world to circumnavigate the world visiting Japan, China, India, Egypt, the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, France, the United

Kingdom, and the United States of America among others. During his round-the-world trip, he observed formal gardens, operas, theaters, horse races, country villas, music ranging from classical to military bands, and churches. He wrote to his sister, Lili'uokalani, about how all of this “recreation” is happening “at the same time, without a disorder or disturbance to be heard among a population of over a Milion [sic], can it possibly be that these light hearted happy people are all going to H-ll? All enjoying nature as natures best gift? Surely not! But what a contrast to our miserable bigoted community” (Greer 1971, p. 105). Clearly, Europe’s “recreation” left an impression on Kalākaua.

In 1883 on the ninth anniversary of his reign, he orchestrated a Poni Mō‘ī for himself and his queen. The Poni Mō‘ī included a formal coronation ceremony at the newly constructed ‘Iolani Palace, the unveiling of the Kamehameha Statue, a Grand Lū‘au, a full-dress feast, and hula program (Kamehiro 2000, p. 85). Three years later, on his fiftieth birthday, he would stage a Jubilee celebration. Not only did these celebrations capture attention in both English and ‘ōlelo nupepa but were focal points in Kanaka Maoli scholarship (Kamehiro 2000; Silva 2004).

The arguments presented to the Legislative Assembly for coronation funds revolved around preserving national autonomy, promotion of Ho‘oulu Lāhui, and a “modernization” of the installation ceremony as previous Mō‘ī had considered (Kamehiro 2000). We are intrigued by his choices and the richness of the potential meanings and ripples of his life. Although we agree that Kalākaua clearly had political objectives, we posit other nuances were as important and powerful for the lāhui. We suggest that he attempted to translate Hawaiian knowledge (the past) into an international world (the nineteenth century present) to sustain Kanaka ‘Ōiwi embodied lifeworlds (the present and future to come). We focus on the Poni Mō‘ī and Jubilee, because elements were highlighted in his letter to his sister and parallel Western forms of leisure: feasts, parades, ballroom dances, entertaining dignitaries, and light shows.

However, we are not convinced Kalākaua was “mimicking” Western leisure; we posit he was deliberately choreographing space-time in alignment with Kanaka ‘Ōiwi ontology and epistemology while wayfinding the changes in the nineteenth century. As an Ali‘i Nui, he was responsible for nourishing and maintaining pono (no equivalent English word;

a social virtue often equated with goodness, righteousness, prosperity, welfare, and morality) of the Kanaka ‘Ōiwi within the cosmogony. Lyon (2011)⁸ also suggests pono is a social virtue contributing to the well-being and prosperity of people around an individual. The interweaving of traditional and “modern” Hawaiian practices with international (Asian, Middle Eastern, and Western) templates suggested Kalākaua was orchestrating pono in an inclusive context.

The Coronation created physical, metaphysical, and public spaces. The Mō‘ī for some time did not have an official residence befitting a modern monarch. During his World Tour, Kalākaua carefully selected items for the palace and incorporated technical innovations and modern inventions (e.g., concrete blocks, telephone, and electric lighting). Although it was cosmopolitan and international in style and furnishings, it was a *Hawaiian chiefly* structure (Kamehiro 2006). The ‘Iolani Palace resembled a *kauhale* (chiefly residential complex) including traditional sacred spaces. During the Poni Mō‘ī and Jubilee, Kanaka Maoli were able to wander the grounds, view the performances, and attend some of the lū‘au; that is, the Mō‘ī shared his mana [supernatural or divine power, authority] with his people.

Three years later, the Jubilee celebrated Kalākaua’s fiftieth birthday, which coincided with the lunar time of the Makahiki season. Historically, the Makahiki was a space/time where war or strife was forbidden, fields were left fallow, and work was minimized while games and sports (stressing strength, wisdom, endurance, and strategic thought) were emphasized, sacred ceremonies were performed, and the harvest was distributed (Handy et al. 1991). The structure of the Jubilee, especially sharing food through lū‘aus, hula performances, and processions, resonated with the Makahiki, spiritual and creative processes, and embodied performances. Elements such as fireworks and lumination displays, He Hoikeike Tabalo au Kahiko [Performance of Historical Tableaux] and a ‘haole-style’ ball are modern, Western and *Hawaiianized*. Hula was/is a metaphysical performance that created space-time and invited the presence of ancestors

⁸ Lyon’s (2011) recent translations supports a move away from word-for-word translations toward “uniquely Hawaiian duality” (p. 94) conceptual relationships of pono and hewa within contexts of original manuscripts such as Malo’s *Mōlelo Hawai‘i*.

and powerful forces. In Kalākaua's words hula was "the life-blood of his people" (cited in Kamehiro 2009, p. 7), because it enacted mo'okū'auhau. He arranged for kumu hula [hula masters] to bring their hālau (meeting house) and provide public performances (Silva 1999). They extend or reshape the responsibilities of the Ali'i Nui as a choreographer of events, positioning and sustaining the lāhui within the universe and the international arena.

These two celebrations were designed to demonstrate and celebrate Kanaka 'Ōiwi knowledge and culture alongside Western traditions while promoting the sovereignty of the Hawaiian Kingdom. They were a celebration and an affirmation of Kanaka 'Ōiwi place in the universe. His inspiration was inclusive as he wove the two together and celebrated their cultures. The Poni Mō'i and Jubilee also created a space-time for certain seeds to be planted or vibrations set in motion for the lāhui that only time would unveil.

Nineteenth-Century Leisure Responds

The dominant nineteenth-century Western leisure discourses constructed a different worldview focused on frugality, purity, work, and the "Spirit of Capitalism" (Weber 2002). Social Darwinism and Manifest Destiny framed white Americans as more evolved, intelligent, and competent than Kanaka 'Ōiwi. American missionaries saw most amusements as distractions from the contemplation of God and the Bible. Hula was particularly problematic with its "heathenish" movements and "flagrant partial nudity" (Hopkins et al. 1982, p. 33). For 70 years, the missionaries would struggle to ban, forbid, regulate, and make illegal hula. The early missionaries had lobbied for the banishment of hula⁹ from their earliest days, because it was "a sign of libidinous behaviour, depravity, and a lack of civilization" (Buck and Erickson 2011, p. 156). First, it was sinful, licentious, profane, and lewd. Later, it was interfering with church attendance, work habits, intellectual studies, tending fields, or the prosperity of churches.

⁹The scholarship about hula is extensive and beyond the scope of this paper and the expertise of the authors. Our purpose is to demonstrate how hula was positioned for comparative purposes only.

The settlers and missionaries originally supported Kalākaua, because he supported a reciprocity treaty with the USA. As he focused on strengthening the lāhui through social and cultural policies, the Kanaka Maoli community was divided on their assessments, and critiques from various opponents emerged. He became known as the “Merrie Monarch” of the “Champagne Dynasty”, because of his enjoyment of wine, music, parties, lū‘au, and entertainment (Hopkins et al. 1982). Silva (2004) suggested he “may be the most reviled and ridiculed of the monarchs” (p. 89). Certainly, the missionary and merchant groups based their critiques on his “leisure pursuits” colored with racial and manifest destiny discourses. In the late nineteenth century, appropriate Christian leisure for settlers included church choirs, quilting, theater, opera, scientific interests (e.g., natural history or botany), sport, or physical activity (e.g., polo, rowing, or sailing), and middle-class self-interest charity (Cruikshank 1999). The inclusion of European ceremonial elements (e.g., haole-style ballroom dance, formal dinner, Royal Band Concert, yachting) within the Coronation might have gained favor with the settlers. However, they complained that the coronation was extravagant with “inauthentic theatrics” because of its European regalia and ceremonial elements (Hopkins et al. 1982).

On the other hand, racism and evolutionary theories connected to “primitive” Hawaiian practices were clearly present. The public performances of hula were considered a regression toward “heathenism” (Kamehiro 2009). Even though none of the oli or mele were printed in the official program, the missionaries brought charges against the printers denouncing “the program as obscene” (Silva 2004, pp. 108–109). A Jubilee float depicting a Hawaiian sacred story was represented in the English *Daily Bulletin* devoid of context and as “a black skinned fish labelled ‘Makaikai’ whether meant for a shark, whale or dolphin, no one seemed to know” (cited in Silva 2004, p. 114). Lū‘au on the lawn of ‘Iolani Palace that fed over 5000 maka‘āinana were seen as wasteful by settlers. The symbiotic relationship between ali‘i nui and maka‘āinana, sharing of mana, and the opportunity to participate in such a lū‘au were beyond the means of many escaped the settlers and their leisure ethic.

Rectification and Conclusion

This initial, partial comparative analysis provides tantalizing commonalities in terms of Mō‘ī Kalākau’s words and strategies and broad application of Pieper’s (1952) philosophical essay on leisure. On the other hand, we are acutely mindful of Smith’s (2003) injunction that “relative difference cannot be (finally) overcome” and there are some major theoretical differences left unaddressed. Kanaka Ōiwi ontology is a cosmogony of relational kinship, younger sibling to the kalo plant. Pieper’s philosophy rests in a separation and superiority of humans over the rest of creation. Nineteenth-century leisure discourses are imbricated with objectification and commodification contrary to social virtues such as pono and a valorization of rational thought and productivity over sensuality and process. The description has yet to sketch the richness of the lives and voices of the maka‘āinana. With the increasing number of Kanaka Maoli scholars writing in ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i and providing culturally rich translations, we are intrigued with what might appear in the nupepa about the daily lives and wisdom of *both* ali‘i and maka‘āinana. We are also uneasy about the relationship between work and leisure. Handy, Handy, and Pukui (1991) describe an intricate and integrated system of planting, fishing, land management, harvesting, eating, and celebration that differs from the work-leisure or human-nature dichotomy so familiar in the Western tradition. Furthermore, the Western dichotomy is deeply entwined with gender differentiations, class distinctions, and slavery. We have only scratched the surface of ‘ōlelo Hawai‘i sources and have yet to provide the necessary transparency. We are intrigued by the potential of the intersection of Pieper’s (1952) concept of leisure and Lyon’s (2016) notion of a “momentary embrace”—where leisure opens space-time into the immense potentiality of human being. The possibilities of seeing leisure differently, of having one’s leisure worldview challenged or rectified, is unsettling and exciting.

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Leisure in Latin America: A Conceptual Analysis

Christianne Luce Gomes

Introduction

This text evolved from more extensive research into the concept of leisure in Latin America (Gomes et al. 2012). Its aim is to carry out a conceptual discussion of leisure in this context. With this in mind, the understandings of 25 professors, professionals, and students linked to five master's degrees in leisure/free time/recreation, undertaken in four Latin American countries (Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico), were canvassed.¹

¹In Mexico, one of the masters' courses researched was created in 1997 by the Miguel Hidalgo Regional University/URMH (Master Degree in Recreation and Management of Free Time), and the other in 2004 by the YMCA University (Master Degree in Recreation). In Costa Rica, the master's course was created in 2005 by the University of Costa Rica (Master Degree in Recreation); in Ecuador, it was created by the Army Polytechnic school/ESPE in 2006 (Master Degree in

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Before presenting some of the results of the research, it is important to clarify that the word leisure (*loisir* in French, *lazer* in Portuguese) has no exact translation in Spanish language Latin American countries. In Spain, the Spanish term *ocio* is used as a synonym for leisure, a concept that takes on various meanings in Latin American countries, frequently pejorative (such as vagrancy, laziness, and idleness). This particularity needs to be underlined so as to not intensify conceptual equivocations.

Some Spanish language Latin American studies, proposals, and publications, however, are already open to the concept of *ocio*, which is being resignified and used with a sense close to that of leisure. In this way, even though in Spanish language Latin America, the terms *recreación* (recreation) and *tiempo libre* (free time) predominate, in this text the word leisure will be intentionally treated as a synonym for *loisir* in French, *lazer* in Portuguese, and *ocio* in Spanish.

The word, “concept”, will be taken in this context, as equivalent to comprehension, conception, and/or understanding. A concept expresses the form in which each person sees and nominates distinct phenomena, constituting a representation of reality (Gomes and Elizalde 2012). The process of the systematization of ideas involves abstractions that are influenced by diverse elements: vision of the world, personality, life story, values, ethical and moral principles, political projects for society, and so on. Even though a concept is never totally equivalent to the real that it seeks to express, it contributes to certain understandings becoming clearer.

Leisure Understandings of Latin American Interviewed

In the study, various Mexican interviewees emphasized their concept of leisure (*ocio*) as an autotelic experience. It was also affirmed that leisure allows personal growth for individual and human development. Leisure (*ocio*) was also considered more ample than recreation and also more ample than the notion of free time.

Recreation and Free Time) and in Brazil, it was created by the Federal University of Minas Gerais/UFMG, also in 2006 (Master Degree in Leisure Studies).

In the Mexican context, the influence of some concepts was widely recognized, especially autotelic and humanist leisure, as elaborated by the Spaniard Manuel Cuenca (2000). The author explains that autotelic leisure “is the true leisure, as a disinterested human experience, whose finality lies in itself” (Cuenca 2000, p. 84). Humanist leisure is conceived of by the author as a complete human experience, centred in cherished activities (free, satisfying), autotelic (having its end in itself), and personal (with social and individual implications).

Currently, Cuenca (2014, p. 26) has been systematizing the concept of “valuable leisure” (*ocio valioso*), defined as the “affirmation of leisure with positive values for people and communities, a leisure based in recognition of the importance of satisfactory experiences and its potential for social development”.

As the work of Aguilar (2011), Cervantes (2004), and Olivares and Paz (2011) shows, in Mexico, there is still a very strong use of the concept of recreation, with its being associated with the provision of services. This vision is resultant from the North American influence. The author most cited to ground the concept of recreation by those interviewed connected with the two Mexican master’s courses was Richard Kraus. In the case of the concepts of autotelic and humanist leisure, the influence comes from Spain, especially the contributions of Cuenca (2000). However, it was difficult for a number of the Mexicans interviewed to express the concepts of *recreación* and *ocio* in an articulated, grounded, and coherent manner, probably owing to the diversity of contexts and epochs in which these concepts were produced, frequently contrasting with the current Mexican reality.

Interviews carried out with Mexican volunteers also emphasized the concept of flow, systematized by Csikszentmihalyi (1999). For this author, flow is a subjective state of total absorption in an activity, which offers profound satisfaction. The author also works with the concept of “autotelic personality” as mobilizing activities according to their inherent values and not according to external recompense. Autotelic people develop great intrinsic motivation because they encounter gratification in the tasks themselves. The word autotelic is derived from this, signifying an end (*telos*) which the subject themselves determine.

Another concept underlined by the interviewees is “serious leisure”, elaborated by Stebbins (2008). The author was cited in interviews and defines serious leisure as the systematic practice of a determined activity by amateurs, practitioners of a hobby, or volunteers. This activity is considered significant, interesting, and pleasurable, allowing, in typical situations, one to acquire, express, and combine special abilities, knowledge, and experiences that generate a profound self-realization.

Leisure was also conceived of by the interviewees from Mexico as a personal and subjective experience that provides pleasure and satisfaction and facilitates human development. Among other aspects, the possibility of experiencing it in work was indicated, revealing an emphasis on the aspect of attitude to conceive of leisure.

Another aspect present in various interviews undertaken in Mexico was a concern with the positive/constructive sense of leisure. For Cuenca (2000), leisure can follow two distinct routes: the positive or the negative. In this way, one affirms the existence of two opposed prospects, which, inevitably, ends up reinforcing an interpretation by dichotomy.

One cannot neglect the fact that any polarized interpretation involves judgement of values, and these, frequently, vary according to the social, moral, and cultural context. What can be evaluated as positive by some people or in some contexts can represent something negative in others, and all of this needs to be taken into account. When we think about addictions and criminality, for example, the negative aspects for people and for society can be easily identified. However, in many practices, they can be minimized or overlooked.

To illustrate this point, one can consider the perspective of progress based on industrial urban development, generally seen as something beneficial. However, the supposed positivity contained in this model based on economic growth and on neoliberal globalization has been exacerbating levels of social exclusion (Santos 2002) and, in many cases, spreading consumerist and alienating practices.

Beyond this, we cannot ignore the many economic interests which are in play in neoliberal, capitalist societies and which are driving the commerce of legalized drugs such as alcohol, tobacco, and many medications used to slim, relax, sleep, and overcome depression, for example. These are also detrimental for people, for collectives, and for the planet, increasing

stress, unemployment, material poverty, hunger, illiteracy, prejudice, exclusion, consumerism, excess production of rubbish, and human, environmental, and social degradation, among other problems.

According to Rojek (2011), it is in so-called free time that people, when feeling themselves liberated from restrictive aspects of day-to-day life, at work, in education, and in the family, for example, enjoy greater autonomy and flexibility to act according to their desires.

Because of this, they frequently involve themselves in leisure practices considered negative because they are related with transgression of rules and social conventions. In this way, “some use heroin to avoid the stress and degradation state of unemployment; others became addicted through group pressure; others used the drug to cope with family pressure” (Rojek 2011, p. 427).

Themes such as these are polemical and generate contradictions, but one cannot adopt a simplistic posture to deal with the question. In this way, the reflections put forward here do not intend on exhausting the debate, nor to make an apology for practices considered prejudicial to the person or society. We seek to show that the question is more complex than we can suppose and because of this it requires an extensive analysis of its more profound causes. Certainly, this escapes from the positive leisure/negative leisure binary, a vision that needs to be problematized, since it can hide unknown interests, and as such silence experiences and power relations.

The negative/positive binary was amply emphasized in the statements of the interviewees in Costa Rica, especially when dealing with recreation, since leisure (*ocio*) is not a very widespread concept in the master’s course offered in that country. During the interviews, some people explained the option for the use of *esparcimiento* as a synonym for leisure, which signifies a feeling of satisfaction or well-being provided by the realization of recreational activities.

Salazar-Salas (2007) was frequently cited in interviews from Costa Rica as one of the main references used to ground the concepts of recreation and *esparcimiento*. The concepts of this author are grounded, in their turn, in theories formulated by North American authors, mainly from the United States. This reveals the influence of this country on the studies and recreational practices undertaken in Costa Rica.

This author explains that *esparcimiento* is the sensation or disposition which allows and promotes a person to carry out recreational activities during free time, characterized by the perception of liberty and self-realization experienced. Making correlations between the terms leisure/*ocio/esparcimiento*, she clarifies that she uses the word “*esparcimiento*” to identify the concept of “leisure” as an attitude, mental disposition, feeling, value, or philosophical perspective related to recreation (Salazar-Salas 2007, p. 7). Among those interviewed from Costa Rica, it was possible to identify a slightly more distant comprehension, which did not resemble leisure in the pejorative form, nor was connected to *esparcimiento*. For this interviewee, leisure is associated with the good use of free time for recreation.

Salazar-Salas (2007, p. 8) affirms that “all recreation is positive diversion, but not all diversion, the negative, is recreation”. Based on various authors (Kraus, Curtis, Russell, Godbey, and McMillen, among others), she cites as current examples of negative diversion, the consumption of drugs, alcoholism, betting, gang wars, sexual abuse, violence, blood sports, and destructive acts or vandalism. Owing to this, for her, recreation differentiates itself from negative diversion precisely because negative diversion does not contribute to the holistic development of people.

As was already mentioned in this text, the positive/negative binary is a complex question, and precisely owing to this, requires a more profound analysis of causes driving each behaviour and social practice. In the end, this dichotomy could be silencing experiences, hiding masked interests, and neglecting power relations.

The vision of leisure as time well used for recreational activities was also encountered in statements of some interviewees in Ecuador. It is worth pointing out that this master’s course counts on the participation of foreign professors, principally Mexican nationals, in its teaching body. One of the professors associated with this master’s brought forth considerations about leisure, articulating them through the positive/negative binary, in a way similar to that which occurred in many statements from Mexico and Costa Rica.

This same interviewee expressed their understanding of leisure, making use of three specific criteria to define it: attitude, time, and activities.

From their point of view, these elements constitute the concept of leisure in almost any period.

No congruence or uniformity, not even partial, was observed between the points of view of the interviewees from Ecuador, which, in general, occurred in the context of the other master's courses researched in this study.

It was in Ecuador that some of the interviewees affirmed that leisure, recreation, and free time are not totally distinct, which also differed from the other countries. The five interviewees affiliated with the masters in Ecuador showed varied comprehensions of leisure. While some associated it with a subjective satisfaction, others related it to the development of activities, with an understanding of leisure as an activity which the person enjoys or, in an inverse manner, as enjoyment provided by an activity. The activity not obligatory and of free choice was also highlighted.

Such a diversity shows a multiplicity of understandings and of theoretical influences, possibly because these themes have been developed for less time in Ecuador, in comparison with other countries participating in the research.

In Brazil, even though the understandings of leisure of the five interviewees have determinate peculiarities, culture was an aspect which ran through, in a transversal manner, all of the understandings. Such a finding contrasts significantly with the predominant conceptions in the other master's courses which were studied. Culture is a polysemical word, since it is understood from different perspectives, especially in recent years. There are many approaches and theoretical currents that develop the fundamentals of the subject, but in this text, it is interpreted as human production and as a symbolic dimension in which meaning is central (Geertz 2001; Sahlins 2003; Hall 2003).

Leisure is constructed according to the peculiarities of the context in which it is developed and involves the production of culture—in the sense of reproduction, construction, and transformation of cultural practices experienced by individuals, groups, societies, and institutions (Gomes 2008). These actions are built in a social time/space, are subject to dialogue and suffer interference from other spheres of social life, and allow us to reframe culture symbolically and continuously. Despite the conceptual differences between the Brazilian authors cited by the

interviewees from Brazil, the tendency to understand leisure according to the cultural perspective was general. We reiterate, however, that this does not signify that all the researchers had the same comprehension, with differences of conceptual approach to leisure in Brazil, being marked (Gomes and Pinto 2009).

To found their comprehensions of leisure, Brazilian interviewees emphasized the concepts of Marcellino (1987, 2007) and Gomes (2011, 2014). Marcellino (2007) conceives of leisure as lived culture in available time. For him most important, as a defining trace, is the disinterested character of this experience, since one does not seek further recompense beyond the satisfaction provoked by the situation. I express my conception of leisure as a dimension of culture characterized by a ludic experience of social-cultural practices in a social time/space. So from my point of view, leisure is the articulation of three fundamental elements: ludicity, social-cultural practices, and social time/space (Gomes 2014). It is important to clarify in this text, as these three elements are understood.

Ludicity in the usual sense of the word is associated with childhood and treated as synonymous with certain expressions of culture, especially games. This interpretation can be extended to an understanding of ludicity as human language, since cultural practices are not ludic in themselves: they are constructed on the subject's interaction with experience. Ludicity refers to the ability of *homo ludens* man the player—playful in its cultural essence—to develop, learn, and express meanings (Gomes 2004). According to Debortoli (2002) language goes beyond speech: it is expression, the ability to become a storyteller. In this sense, play is the possibility of expression from a creative person, who is able to give meaning to their existence, to reframe, and to transform the world.

In the context of constitutive activity and utterance,² ludicity is culturally constructed and constrained by several factors such as political and social norms, moral principles, rules of education, and concrete

² Bakhtin (1992) interprets language as constitutive activity and utterance. Utterance is the product of interaction between individuals who are socially organized, that is, between the speaker and listener, assuming the dialogue as one of its main elements. Language is related to a stance with respect to what is said and understood, so that the sense of the word is completely determined by its context. So language is also a constitutive activity.

conditions of existence, thus reflecting traditions, values, customs and contradictions present in every society. While narrative, it can manifest itself in various forms (gestural, verbal, printed, visual, artistic, etc.) and occurs in every moment of life. Thus, ludicity stimulates the senses, exercises symbolism, and exalts the emotions, blending joy and anguish, tension and relaxation, pleasure and conflict, joy and frustration, freedom, surrender, and granting resignation and delight.

These aspects end up traversing experiences of leisure throughout our lives. Thus, as the essence of leisure, ludicity presupposes aesthetic appreciation and the expressive appropriation of the process experienced, not just the product achieved. Even when you do not get the desired result (e.g., twisting an ankle or joining the losing team), the prevailing idea is that the experience was worth it, and resulting in the desire to repeat it, to overcome new challenges and to enhance opportunities for leisure.

The cultural practices that embody leisure are social practices experienced as enjoyment and are the fruition of culture, for example, a party, a game, messing about, a walk, travelling, diverse physical exercise, dance, a spectacle, theatre, music, cinema, painting, drawing, sculpture, crafts, literature and poetry, and virtual electronic entertainment. These and other practices hold special significance for the subjects who experience play in social time/space.

Leisure also includes social-cultural practices that focus more on the introspective possibilities—such as meditation, contemplation, and relaxation—because they can provide outstanding recreational experiences because of their interesting potential for reflection. Certainly, many possibilities such as these are the target of prejudice because they confront the productive ethic that prevails in our society since the advent of what is known as Western modernity, when they came to be classified as unproductive and therefore a waste of time (Gomes 2014).

Social-cultural events experienced playfully are therefore practices that integrate the culture of each group and that can take on multiple meanings: to be implemented in a determined social time/space to engage with a given context, and also to assume a special role for individuals, social groups, institutions, and society representing historical, social, and cultural experience.

These considerations underscore the relevance of the problems in the abstract representations of space and time categories. Santos (1980) notes that it is possible to define historical and social space events outside their own determinations or without taking into account the totality from where they emanate and reproduce. The author concludes that social space cannot be explained without social time, and vice versa, because these dimensions are inseparable.

This perspective shows the bias present in understanding leisure that neglects the issue of space and emphasizes the aspect of time, focusing primarily on the residual time after productive work or school. It also points to the partiality of the understanding of leisure located in a time of “no obligation”, as if life were made of watertight moments and situations. The different fields that make up our social life have blurred boundaries, as pointed out by Morin (2000). Thus, there are no absolute boundaries between work and leisure, or between this and other spheres of our social life (Gomes 2004).

Social time/space is produced, as a condition of possibility of social relations and of nature, through which society, while it produces itself, it also transforms nature that it appropriates (Lefebvre 2008) or rather, interacts with it. Therefore, time/space is a product of social relations and nature and is constituted of objective, subjective, symbolic, concrete and material aspects, highlighting conflicts, contradictions, and power relations—which inevitably affect leisure.

Returning to the search results, the statements of some of the Brazilian interviewees also highlighted the possibility of the personal choice/leisure option. This is one of the characteristics proposed by Dumazedier (1979) to conceptualize leisure, which once again reveals the influence of this author in the comprehensions of leisure given in interviews realized in Brazil and in the other countries studied.

In the interviews undertaken in Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico, Joffre Dumazedier was the only author mentioned in all the master’s courses studied. This sociologist continues to be an author with significant influence in the Latin American region. However, even recognizing the contribution of Dumazedier to leisure studies in Brazil, Uvinha (2007, p. 49) underlines that “his works do not seem to have

the same resonance in the vast production in leisure in the international literature published in the English language”.

Dumazedier defined leisure in opposition to the set of necessities and daily obligations, especially work. This interpretation can be questioned, since, despite work and leisure having distinct particularities, it is considered that both compose the same social dynamic and constitute dialectical and dialogical relations. Beyond this, it is important to point out that in daily life, absolute frontiers between work and leisure do not always exist, nor between leisure and professional, family, social, political, and religious obligations. We do not live in a society made up of neutral dimensions, water tight, and disconnected one from the others, as the concept of leisure proposed by Dumazedier would suggest (Gomes 2004).

Another aspect related to the comprehension of leisure by the interviewees from Brazil could be pointed out: the recognition of leisure as a social right, as is made explicit in the Brazilian Constitution of 1988. This recognition is amply emphasized by authors of diverse nationalities, also being present in the comprehensions of leisure and/or recreation of the interviewees connected to the master's courses developed in Costa Rica, Ecuador, as well as in Mexico.

Numerous countries from the Latin American region recognize, constitutionally, leisure/recreation as a social right, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, The Dominican Republic, and Venezuela. However, as Telles (2006, p. 71) makes clear, “the formal existence of rights does not guarantee the existence of a public space and of the politics of sociability which the practices covered by the notion of rights is able to create”. In other words, one can say that the effectuation of this right is not directly related to the existence of public and social policies, just as actions from a social group are capable of taking into account the different necessities of the whole population of the region. This aspect becomes relevant mainly in realities whose social inequalities are alarming and expose extreme levels of iniquity, as is common throughout Latin America.

Final Considerations

The elements employed by the authors studied and by the interviewees of the research, to conceptualize leisure in Mexico, in Costa Rica, in Ecuador, and in Brazil, were variable and distinct. The theoretical bases and authors used to ground the comprehensions of leisure in each country were also different, but it was possible to observe points of contact.

Though some of the Mexican interviewees had conceived of leisure as an occupation of free time, it was mainly considered to be a subjective experience, an understanding which involved principally contributions from interviewees from Mexico, with the satisfaction and enjoyment which it provides also being highlighted. Following the perspectives based on the comprehension of leisure (*ocio*) as a subjective attitude, in Costa Rica it was conceptualized as synonymous with *esparcimiento*, constituting a feeling of well-being. Such a comprehension constitutes a characteristic specific to Costa Rica, where the positive/negative binary was amply emphasized.

In interviews in Brazil, in its turn, leisure was conceived of as a dimension of culture or as a cultural phenomenon, expressing an understanding which, in recent years, has been recurrent in this country. In a not-so-relevant manner, leisure was dealt with as a social right and as a sphere which allows us to look at the world, seeking its comprehension, viewed as something important to consider in this field of studies and interventions. In Ecuador, a variety of understanding of leisure were encountered possibly because the theme has been studied in this country for less time in comparison with the other contexts researched, as was pointed out in one of the interviews.

Dumazedier (1979) was the only author mentioned in all the master's courses studied in Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Mexico. This sociologist continues to be an author with significant influence in the Latin American region. Some Brazilian interviewees, however, called attention to the importance of starting to rethink the fragmented and dichotomous vision that situates leisure and work on opposing poles, which is here considered to be urgent and essential.

As Santos (2002) made clear, it is not permitted that any of the elements have a life outside of that which is given them in a hierarchical

relation, or relation of dichotomy, as if none of them could be thought outside of a relation with the totality. Following this logic, it is as if leisure could not be thought outside of its relations with work or responsibilities, which, from the point of view of this research, greatly limits the understanding of leisure in certain contexts.

It was even possible to observe the importance that some authors acquire, in the statements of the majority of the interviewees. National or Latin American authors were cited, but they did not have the same weight as authors from Spain, France, and the United States. A difficulty was the fact that many ways of thinking were incorporated without reflection and without dialogue with local specificities. From this perspective, it is essential to understand that some theoretical conceptual developments can be inadequate and insufficient for the systematization of theoretical-practical understandings which would be able to critically dialogue with Latin American realities.

One hopes that this text would be viewed as a contribution to studies about leisure, giving visibility to some local Latin American discussions. We finally emphasize that the analyses undertaken here do not encapsulate the vision of a whole country, neither of all the Latin American scholars and authors who produce knowledge regarding the theme of leisure.

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The Sabbath as the Ideal Manifestation of Leisure in Traditional Jewish Thought

Nitza Davidovich

Introduction: From a Traditional Jewish Conception of Leisure to a Contemporary Jewish Approach

The Jewish attitude toward leisure developed over years, from a complete negation and refusal of leisure—to legitimization of leisure as a means of reinforcing the individual's ties to God. The basic assumption underlying the Sages'¹ attitude toward leisure was the belief that each unit of time has value (Davidovich 2014). This is a principled standpoint of faith regarding the nature of man's mission in life, which informed the traditional Jewish attitude toward time, activity, consciousness, and values.

¹The Sages, or HZal, is a collective term that refers to Talmudic scholars, but the term may be used more loosely to refer to the generally accepted opinions of scholars who contributed to Jewish law.

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The question of man's purpose in the world and the perceived value of the time in his life is as old as the universe. What is the meaning of the creation of man and the world, and what is the proper relationship between man, the world, and the Creator? In the reality of life, man encounters a variety of possibilities: learning, work, creativity, charity and giving, entertainment, and rest. What is the proper balance between productivity and rest, and between entertainment and the study of Torah?

The conception of leisure is affected by several variables (Almog 2004) including the individual's cultural background and religiosity. This chapter focuses on the traditional Jewish concept of the Sabbath as a manifestation of the ideal concept of leisure, in terms of time, activity, consciousness, and as a traditional religious value.

Leisure is culture dependent, and it is culture that determines the valence that we ascribe to leisure (Davidovich 2014). Cultural values and norms dictate whether a given activity is legitimate, good or bad, accepted or unacceptable to society. Different cultures and religions address the legitimacy of leisure differently. For example, in the Protestant (Weber 2010) or Jewish worldview, work is a highly valued ethic, while in modern cultures leisure is a value onto itself while work is considered the means to secure leisure (van der Poel 2006; Pronovost 1998).

In traditional-religious society, leisure is considered a "problem," a source of danger whose legitimacy is questionable. Actions designed to "pass the time," "burn time," or "kill time" are considered to signify unworthy leisure actions that fail to reflect the significance of the time available to the individual. Others, however, view leisure as an enormous opportunity and challenge (Raskin 1970), and the main issue is not the time at our disposal but our attitude to time. Leisure time, the time which is under the individual's exclusive control, is a test of the individual's personal, social, and national value system. Leisure becomes a problem when the individual is unaware of the need to plan and direct it; when leisure is considered "empty" time, this vacuum can become filled with idleness, boredom, and an "evil inclination." Awareness of the value of leisure and consequently, defining its goals and developing tools to accomplish them help fill the vacuum with content and meaning.

Research and debates on leisure time in Jewish tradition, its definition and features, have developed greatly in the past two decades, in step with technological developments and improvements in material quality of life as well as an increased awareness of workers' rights. As a result of these and other changes, leisure constitutes an increasing proportion of an individual's time, and the challenges that culture and leisure pose are constantly growing. Human culture will be affected by leisure habits and the direction toward which people direct their leisure time. These important relationships call for a thorough exploration of this topic and its myriad implications (Davidovich 2014).

Although the traditional and modern conceptions of leisure and time represent two ideological worlds, experience shows that these differences can be bridged. Leisure activities in traditional-religious society allow individuals to enjoy leisure activities yet establish a regulatory and supervisory framework for such activities, which prevents leisure activities from becoming an important end unto themselves. Religious society emphasizes restrictions on leisure consumption (such as the Haredi cellular network or Internet) based on its concern of a slippery slope. In the world of endless temptations in which individuals are constantly bombarded with messages from all directions, the religious setting constitutes an anchor that places such temptations within a perspective, reminding individuals that genuine fulfillment is realized from within, from the connection to the Creator. Educators seek to preserve the former world of values within a new path, implying a merger of the best of Jewish tradition and culture in modern times to create a unified moral worldview. *What is leisure?*

According to the research literature, it is possible to map the concept of leisure in the following manner:

1. Leisure in temporal terms: According to the conservative/traditional Jewish view, leisure does not exist (Stav 2012):

For Jews, a time free of obligations is an impossible concept, because Jews are required to devote all their time to the study of Torah. The Sages offered many warnings against wasting of time, referring directly to that domain that we currently call "leisure" and to the danger of idleness that it holds. Here are several of these warnings:

- (a) A warning against excessive rest and chatter whose purpose is to “whittle the time away” (Tractate Avot 3:10).
- (b) A warning against wasting time on idle thoughts (Tractate Avot 3:4).
- (c) Limiting rest and pleasure is instrumental in Torah learning (Tractate Avot 6:5).
- (d) Emphasis on the contrast between the world of culture and entertainment and the world of Torah (Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Brachot 28:2).
- (e) Anything that does not promote the divine purpose is likened to idolatry (Tractate Avodah Zarah 18:2).

These and other sources attribute great significance to the value of time and the value of Torah study. Maimonides² stresses that, “...It is a foundation of our Torah that people should occupy themselves in this world only in one of the following things: either wisdom, to complete them, or an occupation that will be beneficial to him in his existence in the world, such as a craft or trade” (Maimonides, Sanhedrin 83, 43).

Rabbi Yitzhak Yedidiya Frankel³ (1981) also writes that a virtuous individual, the apex of human perfection, does not have any free time. Every moment is directed to accomplish a significant purpose, and everything together is directed to worship God. In this spirit, we understand the multiplicity of stories of virtuous individuals and righteous individuals who utilized every moment of their lives, even under the most difficult conditions, and even during periods of rest and idleness.

2. Leisure in action: “Do good” “In all your ways acknowledge Him.” A negative attitude toward activities identified with leisure can be identified in traditional Jewish sources. This attitude stemmed from the concern that engagement in activities such as theater, circus arts, or hunting will lead to sin (Tractate Avodah Zarah 1:18:2). Rabbi Stav⁴

²Rabbi Moshe Ben Maimon was one of the greatest medieval philosophers and one of the greatest poskim in history. He was the first to systematically codify all of Jewish law and wrote numerous books on medicine. Maimonides remains one of the most widely studied Jewish thinkers today.

³Rabbi Frankel served as the Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv Yaffo from 1973 until his death.

⁴Rabbi David Shlomo Stav was born in 1960 and serves as the head of the Zohar organization, wiming to bring Jews closer to their Jewish heritage.

(2012) explains that when the Sages prohibited leisure activities, they were concerned that people might become ensnared by the material world. The Mishna on engagement in Torah learning also refers to the harshest physical conditions (“This is the way [to toil in] Torah: eat bread with salt and drink a small amount of water and sleep on the ground and live a life [whose conditions will cause you] sorrow and in Torah you toil,” Tractate Avot 6:4). The ideal world is the spiritual rather than the material world.

For example, Rabbi Yehuda Halevy⁵ and Maimonides refer to the role and functions of leisure activities when they discuss wholehearted worship of God, where personal passions do not become the center of a person’s life. The fact that leisure is discussed in such a context illustrates the significance attributed to these needs and to a great commitment—they are part of life itself which is always dedicated to worshipping God (Rabbi Yehuda Halevi, *Hakuzari*, 3; Maimonides, *Introduction to Avot*, Chapter 5). Maimonides concludes his discussion with the following summary of his ideas “In all your ways acknowledge Him” (Proverbs 3:6)—all the different deeds in our lives should be directed to advance us toward the acknowledgment of God.

Maimonides’ ideas give enormous space for extremely varied beneficial human activities—wisdom and knowledge, emotions, relaxation, and aesthetics—but they require subjection to a very high degree of spiritual tension. To be considered as “In all your ways acknowledge Him” (Proverbs 3:6) a person’s actions must satisfy a difficult condition: whether and to what degree the individual’s state of mind is that of worshipping God, and whether he performs all his actions “for the sake of Heaven” (Avot 2:12).

In summary, the issue of purpose is a key question in determining the value and legitimacy of a person’s activities. If the purpose is true and is the source of the means that lead to it, then the activities are desirable, even if they appear to be extremely pleasurable.

3. Leisure as a state of mind: In Avot 3:14, the individual is required to be in a mental state of divine worship even when he performs activities

⁵Rabbi Yehuda Halevy was a twelfth-century Spanish Jewish physician, poet, and philosopher, famous for his poems of longing for Jerusalem.

that ostensibly are unrelated to Torah study or faith in God, because otherwise the individual might experience a spiritual decline. The believer must be, at all times, in a state of mind of divine worship “All of your actions should be for the sake of Heaven” (Avot 2:12). According to this rule, even the basic actions of existence should be performed for the sake of divine worship or for the sake of something that drives such worship of God.

In a more practical manner, Bar Lev⁶ (1991) addresses the leisure activities that warrant our attention: needs related to task achievement, respite, need for serenity and calm, and the need for convergence of all elements of the self. Bar Lev insists that there is no single formula that defines leisure occupations, as these vary by individual and the individual’s changing states. However, he does justify guiding and nurturing creative and task-oriented activities, according to each person’s capabilities. In general, it can be said that the Torah guides us to engage in an active life of constant mental and spiritual development (Rabbi Frankel, cited in Liptzin 1981). This form of activity does not remain within the boundaries of human “self-realization” but rather elevates it to the degree of divine work.

Maimonides’ thinking laid the foundation for a moral-normative-cultural view of leisure. In contrast to previous prohibitions, Maimonides believed that leisure activities should be judged from a moral standpoint. Such judgment determines that leisure activities that have a superior purpose are permitted (the Babylonian Talmud⁷ also cites cases in which rabbis preceded their lessons with a joke in order to attract their students’ attention to the study material).

⁶Haim Bar Lev was Chief of Staff of the IDF after the Six-Day War and later served as a government minister. The line of fixed fortifications constructed as a defense against Egyptian military offenses in Sinai was known as the Bar Lev Line.

⁷The two books of the Talmud—Palestinian and Babylonians—are compilations of rabbinical discussions of the Oral Law (Mishna), which is the legal commentary on the biblical commandments, arranged in 63 tractates, each on a specific subject. The Talmud’s discussions are recorded in a consistent format. A law from the Mishna is cited, which is followed by rabbinic deliberations on its meaning. The Mishna and the rabbinic discussions together comprise the Talmud, although in Jewish life Talmud is also used to refer only to the rabbinical discussions (also known as the Gemara).

The traditional perception of the Jewish Sabbath as a manifestation of ideal leisure in terms of time, activities, state of mind, and traditional-religious principle may shed light on the concept of leisure in the modern world of the twenty-first century.

The Sabbath Between Tradition and Modernity: Features of the Sabbath in Modern Leisure Terms

The biblical commandment to observe the Sabbath (Genesis 2:1–3), one of the ten commandments handed down to Moses at Mt. Sinai, is a practical expression of God's actions after completing the creation in six days. In Judaism, the Sabbath symbolizes the creation of the world by God, and the distinction between the sacred and the profane—in terms of time, action, and state of mind—where the desire to transform the profane into the sacred is a value in itself. The Sabbath is not perceived on the basis of the non-action that characterizes it but rather as the climax of spiritual activity, where everyday activities gain a unique expression through the sacred and pleasurable study of Torah and the accompanying spiritual uplifting on the Sabbath. Observing the Sabbath is a practical and principled acknowledgment of the creation of the world and faith in its creator, and the observance of the Sabbath is considered a spiritual state in which the individual becomes closer to the Creator. The basic idea underlying the Sabbath as a weekly day of rest was adopted by other nations already in ancient times and promoted various socialist doctrines to shorten the working day and week. In Israel, Saturday is an official day of rest.

Sabbath as Leisure

The Sabbath as a Time of Leisure

According to the modern conception of time, leisure is freedom of obligations, the time remaining to the individual after completing all the

activities required for existence—eating, sleeping, learning, and work (Davidovich 2014). Sabbath infuses the Jewish concept of time through a distinction between the sacred and the mundane. The beginning of the Sabbath is the end of Friday, before sunset, and the Sabbath ends on the next evening when stars appear in the sky. Since the Sabbath is a manifestation of the sacred, it separates sanctity from the mundane. At the conclusion of the Sabbath, observers traditionally wait several minutes after the first three stars are observed before proceeding to perform mundane activities, to stress that observance is not a burden and is not “shaken off” immediately when the law permits this.

The Sabbath in Terms of Leisure Activities

According to the modern conception of time, leisure activities are characterized by choice, pleasure, potential of self-realization, personal growth, and expressions of creativity (Davidovich 2014). Sabbath activities are a reflection of time that is devoted to the sacred. The religious Sabbath has a fixed essentially sacred schedule from beginning to end. For example:

- Lighting the Sabbath candles—The Sabbath opens with the lighting of the Sabbath candles and a blessing, before sunset on Friday. Lighting the candles is considered a commandment that is designed to create a pleasant home atmosphere and induce a sense of peace, among other things. Traditionally the woman of the household lights and blesses the candles, and by doing so, ushers in the Sabbath.
- Kabbalat Shabat—The Sabbath prayer begins with selected hymns from Psalms, which is a relatively recent ritual developed in Zefat in the sixteenth century by Kabbalists, and, together with the song “Lecha Dodi,” spread from there to Jewish communities throughout the Diaspora.
- Kiddush—Kiddush is a ceremony performed before the beginning of Friday night dinner, in the presence of all the members of the household, and it includes a blessing that is recited over a cup of wine on Friday night and on Saturday.
- Sabbath prayers—The festive morning prayer includes a reading of the weekly Torah portion, and other readings and prayers. Reading a

different portion of the Torah every Sabbath in synagogue is an ancient Jewish tradition.

- Sabbath meals—Sabbath observers are commended to partake in three Sabbath meals that include delicacies that are not typically eaten on weekdays (Tanhuma Breshit B). These three meals are consumed on Friday night, Saturday morning, and Saturday afternoon. The commandment to partake in this extra meal in the afternoon stems from the commandment to partake in pleasurable activities on the Sabbath, to honor the Sabbath more than ordinary weekdays. In each Sabbath meal, a blessing is recited on two challahs, and these meals typically include meat and fish and other special delicacies. Zemirot (Sabbath hymns) are sung at these Sabbath meals.
- Havdalah—This ritual symbolizes the end of the Sabbath, and it is designed to separate the sacred from the mundane, from the Sabbath and the weekdays. It is only after Havdalah that people may engage in their regular weekday activities that are prohibited on the Sabbath.

Observing the Sabbath demands that individuals refrain from performing all the activities that are specifically prohibited. Jewish communities in Europe and the United States typically devote the Sabbath to family or social-cultural activities in the community, while Sunday is devoted to social activities that involve non-Jewish acquaintances.

In summary, the Sabbath is an enclave of serenity in the whirlwind of work, anxieties, struggle, and adversity that characterize our everyday lives and the other days of the week. On the Sabbath, for 25 hours, the world figuratively stands still: businesses are closed, cars remain in the driveway, the telephone stops ringing, computers, radio, and television are off, and the pressure and concerns of material life withdraw behind a veil of oblivion. When we stop all our productive involvement in the physical world, our mind turns inward to family and friends, to our inner selves, and to our souls.

Sabbath as a State of Mind

On the modern conception of time, leisure is a psychological and spiritual state of mind. Leisure is considered as a type of mental experience or

state in which a person is free of external obligations on his time or activities. On this view, the person is free of internal binds or restrictions and is a free person. This is the essence of the Sabbath (Davidovich 2014).

On the Sabbath, we recall that the world is not ours to do with as we please. The world is the creation of God. We are in a state of faithful consciousness. When we refrain from work on the seventh day, we follow the example of the Creator, confirm that God created the world in six days, and assimilate this acknowledgment into our consciousness. Furthermore, on the Sabbath we also connect to the idea of freedom, recalling how God took us out of Egypt and determined that we would never be slaves to any foreign master: We remember that our work, our financial obligations, and our engagement in material matters are not the masters of our lives, they are merely the tools through which we realize our spiritual purpose.

The Sabbath as a Value

The modern conception of time also addresses leisure as a value in itself, a time during which one may engage in activities or acquire skills related to moral development, which has implications for the behavioral norms of individuals in society. Leisure takes place not only in the private realm of the individual but also in the social realm, and it is driven by intrinsic reward, pleasure, and personal satisfaction rather than the desire to attain external benefits (Davidovich 2014).

This is also true of the Sabbath. Throughout Jewish history, Sabbath was a fundamental, focal value in Judaism. The commandment to observe the Sabbath as a day of rest and abstention from work was handed down to man at his creation and to the Jewish nation at Mt. Sinai, as the fourth of the ten commandments (Exodus 20:8).

When the Mishna was written, the Sages recorded debates related to the Sabbath. In tradition and in legends, the Sabbath is described as the day on which the entire universe rests, including animals, vegetables, and non-living things. It is recounted that when the nation of Israel was in the desert, the manna did not appear on the Sabbath, and the people were given a double portion for the Sabbath on Friday. Also described are the

animals, plants, and even realms, such as hell, that refrain from deliberate activity on the Sabbath, while other entities awaken such as the Tree of Life, all souls, or the divine spirit (Shekinah) that enters our world from the coming world on the Sabbath. The value of Sabbath observance and its separation from weekdays has several aims:

- To recall the creation and institute a day of absolute rest. The commandment to remember and observe the Sabbath brings people closer to God through engaging in an activity that is similar to the Creator and discovering the spirit of God and their purpose inside themselves.
- To mark the exodus from Egypt: To entrench the memory of the Jewish nation's exodus from Egypt, in order to reinforce faith in divine salvation and to compel everyone to act toward others with charity and justice (Numbers 5:12–15).
- A day of rest as a righteous act with social implications: Instituting a day of rest in order to improve the condition of man. The foundation of the Sabbath is human freedom: On the Sabbath, no man controls another and all are equal before God. The Sabbath also addresses the liberation of animals and plants that serve mankind and the entire universe: All slaves and beasts of burden who serve man, and all trees planted for the benefit of man, rest on the Sabbath.
- Affirmation of the covenant between God and the people of Israel: As one of the ten commandments, Sabbath observance is a fundamental part in the affirmation of the covenant between God and his people on Mt. Sinai, and a reminder of their status as the chosen people (Ezekiel 2:12).
- The Sabbath as the source of spiritual significance: The Sabbath grants meaning to all the days of the year. For people who are able to apprehend the sanctity of the Sabbath and allow it to uplift them experience the sanctity of the Sabbath throughout the entire week. These ideas also influenced Sabbath customs of the Hassidim and Kabbalists, promoting their efforts to extend the Sabbath even beyond its traditional conclusion.
- The Sabbath as a symbol of Jewish identity: The Sabbath has been and remains one of the many powerful ways to realize Jewish belonging

and convey Judaism to our children and the future generations, anywhere, and under the harshest conditions.

- Sabbath is pleasure: Sabbath is delicious food, an abundant, beautifully set table, candle lights, pleasant song, and pleasant sleep. On the Sabbath, the body and the soul are together elevated to higher realms of spirituality, and the Sabbath pleasures of food and drink are an act of God.
- Sabbath is spirituality. The Sabbath is the “soul” of the entire week. Sabbath blessings flow throughout the coming week to all who observe it. Observing the Sabbath guarantees that God blesses our success in the coming week and imbues the week with a sense of purpose and meaning.
- The Sabbath is a taste of the Next World to come: The Sabbath is our weekly taste of this future world to come.

In summary, a review of the concept of the Sabbath in Jewish sources indicates that the Sabbath is genuine leisure, even in terms of the modern twenty-first concept of leisure. In the Sabbath, the means (freedom, pleasure) converge with man’s purpose and meaning in this world. The mundane (time, activities, state of mind, and values) and the sacred are fused, elevating the mundane to a degree of sanctity.

We proceed to study Sabbath leisure styles in Israel, which are grounded on a cultural foundation that combines modernity and tradition, and affect all citizens: new and veteran immigrants, members of minority communities, and religious and secular Jews.

Modern Challenges to the Sabbath

In his book *The Sabbath* (2012), Abraham Yehoshua writes that the Sabbath, which expresses the sanctity of time, is Judaism’s unique contribution to human civilization. History shows that the concept of the Sabbath as a day of rest has moral and social implications. World cultures have adopted the Sabbath as a day of rest since the Roman and Greek empires, which is evident from the writings of Josephus Flavius “...there is not any city of the Grecians, nor any of the barbarians, nor any nation

whatsoever, whither our custom of resting on the seventh day hath not come, and by which our fasts and lighting up lamps, and many of our prohibitions as to our food, are not observed” (Against Apion, Book II, 40).

World nations adopted the basic idea of the Jewish Sabbath by defining a weekly day of rest from work. The three monotheistic religions have all defined one day in the week in which individuals deviate from their weekday routine: Friday in Islam, Saturday in Judaism, and Sunday in Christianity. Inspired by the Jewish Sabbath, various modern socialist thinkers called for workers’ rights such as restricting the work day to eight hours and shortening the work week.

The modern technological era also poses challenges for the mind-state and value of the Sabbath, the nature of Sabbath time and the activities that are suitable for the Sabbath. For example, with modern technological advances and the widespread use of electricity for lighting, heating, and the operation of various electrical appliances, decisions must be made regarding the use of electricity on the Sabbath. Debates remain on this issue, despite the options of turning on electrical appliances before the beginning of the Sabbath and turning them off only at the conclusion of the Sabbath, or using various automated devices. The main question is not whether such actions are permitted or prohibited, but whether operating an electrical appliance is consistent with the spirit of the Sabbath. It is argued in the Gemara (Avodah Zara 12:1) that the commandment to observe the Sabbath was designed to distinguish and separate the Sabbath from the other days of the week on three levels—through action, through speech, and through thought—thereby liberating man and the entire creation from all work and misery, and to induce freedom, pleasure, harmony, spiritual uplifting, and most of all a sense of sanctity, in their stead.

Asher Ginsberg, the essayist known as Ehad Ha’am [“One of the People”]⁸ attributed unique status to the Sabbath and wrote that more than the Jewish people observed [“protected”] the Sabbath, the Sabbath

⁸ Asher Ginsberg (1856–1927) was a central figure in the movement for cultural or spiritual Zionism. He abandoned his religious faith as a result of his encounter with modern philosophy and the sciences, yet remained deeply committed to the Jewish people and played a role in securing the Balfour Declaration.

protected the Jewish people. The idea that the Sabbath protects the Jewish people in the Diaspora is not new and appeared in the writings of Rabbi Yehuda Halevi in the twelfth century. He wrote:

I have often reflected about you and come to the conclusion that God has some secret design in preserving you, and that He appointed the Sabbath and holy days among the strongest means of preserving your strength and lustre. The nations broke you up and made you their servants on account of your intelligence and purity. They would even have made you their warriors were it not for those festive seasons observed by you with so much conscientiousness, because they originate with God, and are based on such causes as 'Remembrance of the Creation,' 'Remembrance of the exodus from Egypt,' and 'Remembrance of the giving of the Law.' These are all divine commands, to observe which you are charged.

(Kuzari Part 3:10)

In our era, even if the Sabbath is not observed according to Jewish law, it constitutes one of the elements in Jewish life that distinguish Jews from members of other faiths, and also constitutes an important element of Jewish identity. According to Shved (2001), "Even Jews who define themselves as secular look for ways to realize the halakhic⁹ concept of the Sabbath. First, because they usually do not wish to withdraw from the historical continuum of their cultural heritage and the unity of the public; and second, because outside Jewish law they will hardly find a thing" (para. 5)

Arguably, all streams of Judaism view the Sabbath as a holy day of significance, although their Sabbath customs may vary. The religious population in Israel observes the commandment of the Sabbath and typically devotes the day to rest and time with family and friends. Many people attend Sabbath prayers in a local synagogue even if they do not typically go to synagogue during the week. In religious neighborhoods, vehicle traffic is prohibited, and the Sabbath is also evident in the festive dress. For secular Jews, the conception of the Sabbath is complex and diverse.

⁹Halakha means Jewish law and legal matters. The rabbinical discussions in the Talmud, for example, focus either on halakhic (purely legal) discussions and aggadata (ethical and folkloristic speculations).

The traditional significance of the Sabbath, together with the fact that Saturday is the statutory day of rest for Jews in Israel, transforms the Sabbath into a special day even for the non-observant Jewish population of Israel. Shved (2001) proposed new ways of thinking to resolve the disputes surrounding the Sabbath in Israel. He wrote, “The Sabbath is a general cultural asset that people consider a right and are unwilling to relinquish! ... The contrast between religious and secular Jews...is a contrast of principles and modes of thought, of approaches on how to shape private and public lifestyles...” (para. 8) Shved directs our attention to the fact that as members of Israeli society, both observant and secular Jews in Israel are committed to each other and have the capacity to inspire each other. He suggests that the Sabbath debate should be explored from a perspective of what each group can contribute to the other’s Sabbath, with the aim of developing a single culture for a united nation.

In a study conducted by the Guttman Center in 1999–2000 (Sheleg 2006) on religious Jewish behaviors and the sense of self-concept of Jews in Israel, the vast majority of secular Jews reported that they prefer their Sabbath to be a quiet time with their families and prefer for the Sabbath to have a unique public character, although there was no agreement on the elements of its features. Some secular families light Sabbath candles or perform Kiddush¹⁰ as a symbolic act. Various secular communities have made efforts to develop a secular Kabbalat Shabat¹¹ ceremony with unique contents—either a combination of traditional and modern elements, such as Shabat ceremonies in the kibbutzim, or ceremonies that incorporate non-religious elements relating to the concept of a weekly day of rest. At the same time, many secular young people typically go out to cafes, bars, and clubs, on Friday night, which is the busiest day of the week for such venues.

The social and familial significance of the secular Sabbath is also evident in research. In a study on family and social meetings on the Sabbath, Sheleg (2006) found that 73% of all secular families have a family

¹⁰Kiddush is the prayer recited over a cup of wine before the evening meal, marking the beginning of the Sabbath.

¹¹Kabbalat Shabbat is part of the Friday evening service in synagogue that welcomes the Shabbat.

dinner on Friday night and 27% of the secular families also have a family meal on mid-day Saturday. Various locations in Israel hold “Cultural Sabbaths,” which are events held in a public venue where public figures or artists are invited to partake in a cultural discussion. Some museums and natural parks offer free or reduced entrance on the Sabbath.

This two-pronged attitude toward the Sabbath was evident from the beginning of the Haskala (or Jewish Enlightenment) period (1770s–1880s) in Europe and intensified in the Jewish settlement in pre-state Israel. Secular Jewish intellectuals acknowledged the cultural and social value of the Sabbath. Berl Katzenelson, one of the leaders of the labor movement, considered the Sabbath a pillar of Jewish culture and Jewish socialism and demanded that his comrades in the Kibbutz Movement¹² refrain from work on the Sabbath. “We must turn our Sabbaths and our holidays into bonfires of culture... For me, the Sabbath is one of the pillars of Hebrew culture and the first socialist achievement of the laborer in human history” (1947, pp. 273–274).

The Sabbath as an Educational Challenge for Promoting Intercultural Understanding and Tolerance

What are the practical challenges that the concept of the Sabbath poses for leisure education that imparts leisure behaviors and promotes intercultural understanding and tolerance? In the modern era, the Sabbath poses a challenge for groups seeking to live together in mutual respect and tolerance. In one of the most important contemporary initiatives related to the Sabbath, Gideon Sa’ar, then Minister of Education (2009–2014), participated in an initiative to define guidelines for a shared life in Israel, with specific focus on the Sabbath. The guidelines that he proposed concern the nature of the Sabbath in the city streets of Israel, which is defined as a Jewish country. Do the city streets look the same on the Sabbath as

¹²In Israel, all kibbutzim (collective agricultural settlements based on joint ownership of property and equality) belong to one of the three Kibbutz Movements, each of which is associated with a particular ideology.

they do in the middle of the week? he asked. He stated that the Sabbath is an important value for all Jews, irrespective of their religiosity or lifestyle. Sa'ar's proposal contained the following elements:

1. Why? There are two purposes underlying a day of rest: a societal purpose and a national-religious purpose. At the societal level, a day of rest is designed to ensure the health and well-being of workers, by ensuring that they abstain from work. This day of rest was defined for the entire economy and thus promotes the social benefits of spending time with one's family. The national-religious purpose views observance of the Sabbath as the realization of one of the most important principles of Judaism that has a national character.
2. How? First of all, the Sabbath is embodied in the Israeli Hours of Labor and Rest Law 1951,¹³ which limits the hours of work in the day and the days of work in the week, and resonates the historical commandment to observe the Sabbath. This law also has a social-socialist purpose, in granting one day of rest a week to all people. Sa'ar's proposal also addressed the public nature of the Sabbath and its broad manifestations. The principle of a weekly day of rest is a fundamental principle in our country. It is a gift from the Jewish nation to humanity. Many Western countries, including Germany, France, and Austria, which regard highly human rights and liberties, carefully enforce a weekly day of rest, with few exceptions.
3. How much? Another debate related to the nature of the Sabbath in Israel refers to the degree of observance of Jewish laws. On the one hand, it is argued that the Sabbath is a major symbol in the Jewish world and therefore should be preserved at all costs. On the other hand, it is argued that the Sabbath is merely a day of rest from work and should be used to devote time to families, entertainment, and enjoyment.

¹³According to the Hours of Work and Rest Law, 1951, a working week shall not exceed 43 hours to be allocated among five or six days of work, provided that each working day shall not exceed eight or nine hours of work, as the case may be. In principle, the Jewish day of rest, or Sabbath, is observed from Friday afternoon to Saturday night (lasting no less than 36 hours). Working during the weekly rest period without first obtaining a permit is forbidden by law, and violations may constitute a criminal offense.

Summary and Discussion

This chapter discusses the traditional Jewish conception of the Sabbath as a manifestation of ideal leisure, in terms of time, activities, state of mind, and traditional-religious value. We found that, in the modern era:

1. Leisure is a legitimate pursuit. In the past, when traditional thinking was dominant, leisure was considered an illegitimate activity, associated with idleness. Today leisure is considered a legitimate pursuit. The question is no longer whether to devote time to leisure, but how to spend leisure time, which underscores the importance of leisure education policy development for society as a whole. What are needed are programs that leverage leisure time for personal empowerment.
2. According to Jewish sources, the Sabbath is the ultimate manifestation of leisure, the time in which God's presence is felt more powerfully than at any other time during the week. The Sabbath is a spiritual time, a time of sanctity. The stability and regularity of the Sabbath transcend limitations of time and place. The Sabbath is also the litmus test of whether a person or family will remain a living, breathing part of the Jewish nation. The Sabbath is a powerful opportunity to connect to God and to freedom.
3. Judaism teaches that the body may be elevated to a state of sanctity. Even in the modern era, there are spiritual methods that acknowledge the conflict between flesh and spirit and between body and soul. In Judaism, the body is man's tool for a spiritual journey in life, and this journey should have some expression in the education system.
4. Sanctity is a concept that relates to the spiritual and transcendent, it represents the opposite of the mundane. The phrase "Holy Sabbath" implies that the Sabbath is holy. We perform Kiddush to sanctify the Sabbath. The root *k-d-s* means to designate something for a specific purpose and to distinguish it from other aims or purposes by doing so. Respect and tolerance for all conceptions of the sacred and the mundane should be taught within leisure education.
5. Individuals choose the nature of their social life and their leisure activities. Today's education system should therefore devote special efforts

to teach students how to make the most suitable social and leisure choices when faced with a broad range of available options, and how to assess the social and moral implications of their choices.

In summary, a review of the topic of the Sabbath in Jewish sources indicates that the Sabbath is the ideal manifestation of leisure, even from the perspective of the modern twenty-first-century conception of leisure. Maimonides established the ethical, normative, and cultural foundation for a conception of leisure. Leisure time, in which we are the masters of our own time, is that time to test our personal social and national values. Secular and religious Jewish intellectuals consider the sanctity of the Sabbath in the public sphere as a value-driven proclamation that reflects Jewish-cultural identity, as well as the principles of freedom and human rights as understood in the twenty-first century. Jewish Sabbath places leisure as a supreme value, independent of a person's age, gender or socio-economic status. The Sabbath is meant for all.

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Leisure Activities in Southeast Asia, from Pre-colonial Times to the Present

Sarah Moser, Esther Clinton, and Jeremy Wallach

The region known as Southeast Asia is a World War II era political construction, an ‘externally imposed geographic convenience’ (Reid 1993) broadly understood (both geographically and culturally) as the area between China and India. Currently consisting of 11 countries that span 4.5 million km², Southeast Asia is conventionally divided into maritime Southeast Asia (Brunei, Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore, Timor-Leste) and mainland Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam). While there is a tremendous amount of ethnic, religious, and linguistic diversity within the region, countries in Southeast Asia share a number of indigenous cultural practices

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and pre-colonial trade relationships, as well as (with the exception of Thailand) the common experience of European colonisation. The region also shares common post-independence struggles, nation-building efforts, and similar aspirations to ‘develop’ and ‘modernise’. Finally, *ramai* (Indonesian word meaning ‘crowded, noisy, fun’) aesthetics in music, visual arts, and even food are shared throughout the region, and sufficient other resemblances and continuities exist for contemporary scholars to argue for the utility of viewing the entire region as a single area (Adams and Gillogly 2011).

This chapter broadly explores leisure activities in Southeast Asia, starting with pre-colonial leisure pursuits. First, we investigate the varied influences on Southeast Asian leisure and patterns that demonstrate the regional spread of particular activities. Second, we examine how leisure pursuits shifted during the colonial era as European administrators sought to ‘civilise’ colonial subjects. Third, we investigate the post-colonial era and the ways in which leisure became a key nation-building strategy in states’ attempts to ‘modernise’ the citizenry. Fourth, we outline ways in which globalisation in recent decades has shaped leisure practices in Southeast Asia. Finally, we examine contemporary state-driven attempts to revive indigenous leisure activities.

Pre-colonial Indigenous Leisure and Its Contemporary Manifestations

Southeast Asia is a vast and diverse region with a great variety of ethnicities, languages, religions, political situations, geographic diversity, and cultural influences. The region has been exposed to a high degree of inter-cultural mixing due to its strategic location along the trade route between India and the Arab world to the west and China to the north. Hinduism and Buddhism spread to Southeast Asia around the fourth century CE, Islam entered the region in the fourteenth century, and Christianity soon after. Periods of Chinese domination in mainland Southeast Asia (especially Vietnam) as well as centuries of trade and immigration have also enriched the cultural diversity of the region and impacted a range of cultural practices, arts, and material culture.

There is no neat parallel term for leisure in Southeast Asian languages, but there are a number of terms that generally translate to mean how people spend their free time (Aman et al. 2007). Many such terms, such as *nongkrong* in Indonesian and *lepak* in Malay, refer to unhurried informal socialising while eating, drinking, smoking, or betelnut chewing, and such unstructured activities are still central to the public culture of the region. Today, these activities are often dismissed by political leaders and scholars (see Wah 2005) as exhibiting laziness or lack of direction, but we would argue that they remain central to Southeast Asian leisure.

Leisure practices in pre-colonial Southeast Asia were often intertwined with religious and spiritual beliefs, which were syncretic blends of several religions and shaped by local beliefs and practices. Festivals and important dates on religious calendars were important ways in which religion and leisure came together through games, performances, markets, and the creation and consumption of seasonal delicacies. Centuries after the populations of Indonesia and Malaysia had converted to Islam, the great Hindu epics continue to feature prominently in music, performing arts, and material arts. All-night *wayang* (puppet theatre) and dance performances of the Mahabharata and Ramayana were, and continue to be, elaborate and often raucous events that attract large crowds of all ages. In Thailand, *nang talung* puppetry is based on the Ramakien, the Thai version of the Ramayana (Dowsey-Magog 2002; see also Johnson 2006). Additional local characters are not in the original Hindu epics feature prominently and are often used as an opportunity to inject the performance with timely political satire and jokes tailored to local tastes. Puppet performances such as these using three-dimensional dolls, leather shadow puppets, or wood and cloth puppets submerged in water (Pack 2013) have long been an important part of leisure practices in Southeast Asia, the origins of which are unclear (Chen 2003). Similar puppetry existed in pre-colonial India and in China, which underscores the connectedness and circulation of ideas, religions, and cultural practices among them since ancient times. Today, water puppetry is presented as a quintessential Vietnamese art (Foley 2001).

Straddling the equator, Southeast Asia is a tropical region, with exceptions in highland areas. Approximately 70% of Southeast Asians live

along a coast, and the sea is an important venue for leisure activities for many (Colombijn 2000). Swimming, free diving for shellfish, and fishing are common leisure pursuits. Sailboat races are common throughout coastal Southeast Asia and are linked to a variety of related leisure activities, including boat building, boat decoration, and sailing. Such maritime leisure pursuits are linked to food production but are considered enjoyable, in much the same way that hunters enjoy the thrill of the hunt, while contributing to the family kitchen.

Many male leisure activities in Southeast Asia developed from the skillset of a warrior or soldier. While in parts of Southeast Asia royal figures in the pre-colonial era funded extravagant spectacles of war elephants fighting for the entertainment of their subjects and to show off their resources to stage such displays (Reid 1990), many war-inspired leisure activities were not directed or funded by the state. The arts of sword fighting, archery, and other forms of combat were popular male pastimes. Various types of martial arts developed in Southeast Asia over the centuries, with varying levels of influence from China and India. Some of these include *pencak silat* in Malaysia and the Indonesian archipelago, *muay boran*, the pre-modern ancestor of *muay thai*, in Thailand, *bokator*, *pradal serey*, and *bando* in Myanmar, *muay lao* in Laos, and *kbach kun boran Khmer* in Cambodia, among others. The martial arts found in pre-colonial Southeast Asia are non-standardised and highly varied, and while developed for war, they are a source of amusement, camaraderie, and pride for men.

Many pre-colonial pastimes required craft skills and manual dexterity, such as kite flying, top spinning, races on bamboo stilts and *takro*, a game similar to volleyball in which players can only use their feet (Brownfoot 2000). These activities were popular with the common folk and required locally available materials. 'Blood sports' such as cockfighting (Geertz 1973) were common as well as other forms of gambling including cards and other games of chance (Adams 2003). In some parts of pre-colonial Southeast Asia, the elite were highly literate and enjoyed writing poetry in their free time (Putten 2002, 2006).

The wide range of leisure activities found in Southeast Asia prior to colonisation was generally organised by individuals rather than by the leadership. Traditional leisure could be described as 'localised in its geo-

graphic range, irregular in its availability and timing and largely devoid of institutional structures and commonly accepted written rules' (Tranter 1998, p. 1). Leisure practices during this era were highly localised, styles and rules varied from place to place, and the venues for activities had many other purposes, in contrast to rationalised leisure introduced in the 'modern' era by European and Japanese colonisers.

Leisure pursuits for adults in pre-colonial Southeast Asia tended to be highly gendered. This is still the case; for example, Barlocco (2010) explains that, in Kituau, a village in the East Malaysian state of Sabah, men spend hours together at the general store, talking and playing cards and snooker. Women and children come to the store (the only store in the village), but they make purchases and then leave. In some leisure activities such as dance, puppet, and music performances and some games, men and women would mix as members of the audience, but many activities, as discussed above, were dominated by men. In their more limited leisure time, women engaged in pragmatic activities in the domestic sphere, including embroidery, batik, and other handicrafts. For example, the Hmong women from the mountains of Vietnam sew 'story quilts', colourful embroidery on black fabric showing images from daily life like farming and gathering water. These activities were also highly class dependent, as the elite had different social expectations and norms for how women would spend their time than the lower classes. Expected leisure time gender divisions still exist, but women throughout the region have begun to practice arts and crafts that were previously closed to them, including puppetry (Goodlander 2012) and dance (Davies 2006).

Various leisure activities have emerged in Southeast Asia that challenge conventional gender norms¹. For example, while cockfighting (and its attendant gambling) is considered an archetypal male hobby in the region (see Geertz 1973), many men engage in more gentle leisure activities involving birds, including bird breeding, pigeon racing, and birdcage decorating (Anderson 2005). In Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Brunei, the folk sport dove-cooing contests have experienced a resurgence among men that indicates a variety of ways in which

¹ It is worth noting that many Southeast Asian societies recognise more than two genders, which has important ramifications for understanding leisure practices (Boellstorff 2005; Käng 2011).

masculinity is expressed in leisure practices among Southeast Asian men (Kirichot et al. 2015). Men are also entering previously female realms; Thang (2005) mentions that cooking classes at a Singaporean senior centre are exclusively male because people at the centre want to try new things.

Colonial Leisure

Southeast Asia was highly valued by Europeans for its natural resources (timber, minerals) and agricultural products (spice, rubber, sugar) (Reid 1993). While European engagement with Southeast Asians began through trade, the Spanish, French, Dutch, Portuguese, and British fought to establish monopolies, which took the form of colonisation. The industrial revolution, improvements in technology and communications, and the broader process of rationalisation of daily life in Europe meant that ties between the metropole and the colonies grew increasingly close in the late colonial era and a growing number of Southeast Asians adopted European leisure practices.

Various shifts in European leisure practice were enacted in the Southeast Asian colonies. In the nineteenth-century Europe, the fundamental nature of leisure greatly changed due to the industrial revolution and scientific discoveries of the time that connected leisure activities to modernity and mental and physical prowess. During the 1800s, many aspects of European life grew increasingly rationalised, and there was a 'general sportisation of pastimes' (Elias 1982). Due to colonial policies, many parts of colonial Southeast Asia also experienced a 'sportisation' and standardisation of many aspects of daily life, including leisure practices. In 1826, British colonisers in Singapore set up Asia's first yacht club (Horton 2013), which still exists. The British also established parks, such as the Botanic Gardens (opened in Singapore in 1859); today the Gardens are a major tourist attraction (Henderson 2013). Leisure may be able to be understood as a category prior to the industrial revolution in Europe and the colonisation of Southeast Asia, yet it is widely accepted that the fundamental nature of leisure activities greatly changed during this time.

The story of the rationalisation of leisure begins in Europe, where industrialisation brought about a shift in many cultural practices, including leisure activities, that was characterised by modernisation and rationalisation (Bale and Cronin 2003). Some scholars contend that the very concept of leisure emerged out of the particular conditions of industrialisation, giving rise to the distinct spheres of work and leisure. It is possible that this separation, by now very much taken for granted in the Global North, should not be presupposed as given when investigating contemporary Southeast Asian societies, where it was both coercively imposed and foreign to everyday experience. John Clarke and Chas Critcher (1985, p. 85) observe that the concept of leisure cannot be separated from work:

looking overall at the trends evident by the 1840s, the clearest impression is of the wholesale changes in the rhythms and sites of work and leisure enforced by the industrial revolution. It was during this period that what we have come to see as a discrete area of human activity called “leisure” became recognizable.

Colonial policy and, more recently, industrialisation had significant impacts on leisure activities in urban Southeast Asia, shifting leisure times from a seasonal structure based on agriculture to one based around industrial, ‘modern’ production schedules. As such, the impact on leisure has been far more pronounced for urbanites than for rural, agriculture-dominated societies. This may be one reason so many of this chapter’s examples come from Singapore, a highly urbanised country. Singapore’s economic wealth and the fact that English is the primary language also contribute to its outsize importance in the literature relative to the size of its population. In the case of Southeast Asia, leisure activities experienced both radical transformations and a high degree of underlying continuity prior to and after colonialism, allowing us to examine the same category of experience in different historical periods (Borsay 2006; see also Burke 1995). While not to deny a greater rationalisation of society, particularly in the late colonial period, there are shared qualities in leisure activities such as music, games, festivals, competitions, and so on that have persisted until today.

The colonial introduction of European standardised sports took place among other activities in a wide range of venues, much like how football was played in medieval Europe, as a non-standardised folk pastime (Bale 1993). For example, badminton in the nineteenth-century Indonesia was ‘as much about entertainment as about physical exercise or participation’, and tournaments would be staged in the carnivalesque environment of *pasar malam* (night markets), indicating a lack of rationalisation (Brown 2006, p. 74). In small, remote communities, sports such as volleyball are still played in non-standardised ways, with teams surpassing six people to include a dozen or more on each side.

In the late colonial era, formal and standardised leisure activities became more common as European team sports were introduced more widely, including soccer, badminton, volleyball, basketball, and others, as part of ‘muscular Christianity’ and the ‘western civilising mission’ (Huebner 2016). The Japanese occupation (1942–45) of parts of Southeast Asia also introduced new activities and a higher degree of standardisation, including group callisthenics and civilian marching troops. The Japanese occupiers also made an attempt to standardise some Southeast Asian leisure activities that were maintained after independence, including *pencak silat*, an indigenous martial art, as a way to instil a sense of Asian pride and foster a sense of solidarity with the Japanese. This politicisation of leisure activities continued after independence and became an important strategy for nation-building in the former colonies.

Leisure as a Nation-Building Strategy

Early in the twentieth century, the audience at Filipino *Zarazuela* theatre heard anti-American political commentary. Similarly, *Cai Luong* plays in Indochina criticised French colonisers (Brandon 1966, p. 402). Keeler argues that art forms should not be reduced to political meaning, as art is also aesthetic (1992, p. 65). Nonetheless, leisure activities played a pivotal role in Southeast Asian anti-colonial resistance movements as well as nation-building projects.

Leisure activities, particularly sports and dance, became important tools for instilling ethnic and national pride for nationalists in the

decades before independence and, later, for nation-building in newly independent countries in Southeast Asia. At that time, strategies were needed to bring together disparate people linked by little more than their historical subjugation by a colonial European power. Leisure activities constituted a 'soft power' approach to uniting people, diffusing tensions, and advancing political ideologies (Bale 2003; Bale and Cronin 2003; Adams 2003). As the sultan of Selangor, Malaysia, pointed out several years after independence from the British, 'sports can remove racial barriers' (*New Straits Times*, August 19, 1969, p. 4). The moral value placed on leisure activities by colonial administrators was largely internalised and reproduced by post-colonial Southeast Asian leaders who greatly expanded colonial sports programmes (Adams 2003; Antolihao 2012; Moser 2010; Brown 2008). Southeast Asian countries enthusiastically adopted standardised international sports that would provide legitimacy and a sense of legitimacy for the 'imagined communities' of newly independent nations (Anderson 1991; Hargreaves 1986). Golf is and has been very popular in Southeast Asia as symbolic of modernity and wealth, with impressive courses in Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia (Horton 2013). With the development and expansion of programmes for international sports, new countries aspired to participate on the world stage at the Olympics and other international tournaments (Houlihan 1997). The Southeast Asian Games were established in 1958 as a way to improve the performances of local athletes, to cultivate good relations within the region, and to reinforce states' desires to enhance regional political and economic cooperation within a disjointed region made up of newly independent states (Lutan 2005; Sie 1978). This move stimulated state funding for national sports programmes and sports training in schools, largely at the expense of local activities. 'Modern' leisure practices adopted for nation-building purposes grew more standardised so that teams from across the country could play each other and dancers could perform in revues in televised national specials. As Southeast Asians have become more urbanised, global, and more closely governed, many village-based leisure activities have been abandoned.

Similarly, indigenous leisure activities such as dance, theatre, and shadow puppet performances were and continue to be marshalled for

nation-building purposes after independence. While a burgeoning tourist industry in Southeast Asia was an important motivation for nurturing arts activities (Picard and Wood 1997, 1990), such leisure activities were used by states both to showcase ethnic diversity and to depoliticise brewing ethnic tensions (Hitchcock 1998). Certain leisure activities, such as the Balinese *legong* dance and puppet theatre traditions, were seen as more representative of national or ethnic identity, and therefore more worthy of governmental support (see Davies 2006; Dowsey-Magog 2002; Foley 2001).

Several activities introduced under the Japanese occupation that were intended to foster civilian solidarity and readiness for combat were maintained as leisure practices for the purpose of nation-building after independence (Akashi and Yoshimura 2008). For example, the civilian marching troops and group callisthenics have been normalised as leisure practices that encourage nationalistic ideals, including discipline, cooperation, and unity (Moser 2010, 2016).

Globalisation and Leisure in Southeast Asia

Increasing global connectedness, lowered relative costs of manufactured goods, and a growing middle class have dramatically altered leisure activities in Southeast Asia in ways that parallel other parts of the world. Southeast Asians have developed global tastes and expectations as to how they spend their free time, mirroring the changing preferences of people around the world. Home karaoke machines, computer games, and the ubiquity of smartphones mean that growing numbers of Southeast Asians spend their leisure time in sedentary and highly globalised ways that indicate a significant degree of homogenisation of leisure (Heryanto 2014). In fact, karaoke is the most popular pastime at a Singaporean senior centre (Thang 2005). Video games are also important in Southeast Asia; one study found that Bangkok children play about three hours per week (Jaruratanasi et al. 2009).

Similarly, the emerging urban middle class in Southeast Asia are engaging in a variety of other globally circulating leisure activities, including Formula One, spa treatments, yoga, imported martial arts including

karate and taekwondo, gym activities, and shopping. Such leisure activities demonstrate a growing commercialisation of the leisure sphere, at least for urbanites. Indeed, the urban Southeast Asian landscape has been dramatically transformed since the 1980s by the introduction of gigantic shopping malls that tower over traditional outdoor markets and offer a growing population of middle-to-upper-class shoppers the opportunity to browse expensive, often imported commodities and patronise global fast-food franchises in air-conditioned comfort (Ibrahim and Soh Kok Leng 2003). Globally circulating leisure activities are most salient in Southeast Asia's more affluent sectors: Singapore, South Jakarta, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Manila. They are inaccessible to the region's overwhelming non-affluent majority, except in the form of television advertisements and billboards. The rural hinterlands of Laos, Myanmar, and East Timor, for instance, are far from the glamorous world of the mega-malls.

Current trends in leisure activities also reflect shifting international influences in Southeast Asia. While the Global North was a dominant force that shaped Southeast Asian leisure in past decades, more recent trends from South Korea, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, and other countries reflect new patterns of cultural circulation and cultural influences. For example, many youths in urban Southeast Asia spend their weekends engaging in 'cosplay', a Japanese contraction of the words 'costume' and 'roleplay', a performative activity that involves dressing up in homemade costumes and acting in the role of particular characters inspired by animated cartoons (anime), Japanese comic books (manga), video games, and pop music bands (Baehaki and Badri 2016; Yamato 2016). Cosplayers make their own costumes, so many young people are engaged in sewing and tailoring in their leisure time. Among Southeast Asian youths, cosplay can be understood as a way to transgress social norms, briefly escape from reality, and for the reassurance of being a member of a subcultural collective in which all activities are public and in groups (Peirson-Smith 2013). A similar subcultural approach to Do-It-Yourself artefactual production can be found in the 'indie scene' that has emerged since the 1980s throughout Southeast Asia, a phenomenon encompassing music, fashion, and graphic design that blurs the line between creative leisure and commercial activity (Luvaas 2012).

Music and Performing Arts

While in the Global North it is customary to view musical activities as primarily a matter of consumption of commercially produced recordings, in Southeast Asia, live concerts featuring a range of global music genres and other performances—from martial arts demonstrations to fashion shows—are commonplace. Often such events are sponsored such that the price of admission is low or non-existent (as in the case of concerts to celebrate a life-cycle event or national holiday that are open to the entire community), and they play a prominent role in the everyday leisure of many Southeast Asians.

Informal amateur music performance of popular songs is also a common leisure activity. Popular, rather than traditional, music is best suited for this purpose because such music generally makes use of Western chord progressions that can be reproduced on an acoustic guitar. The guitar in informal ensembles is often augmented by homemade percussion instruments such as a wooden stick with three rows of punctured, smashed bottle caps played like a tambourine (known as a *gicik* in Indonesia) and an empty water cooler bottle played like a hand drum. While informal music-makers can choose to perform the contemporary youth-oriented pop music of the day, they are far more likely to draw from the evergreen repertoire of the national syncretic popular music genre, such as *dangdut* in Indonesia (Weintraub 2010) or *luk thung* in Thailand (Mitchell 2015) or the popular music written in their ethnic group's native language or dialect (Byl 2014). These musics hold a special place in the daily lives of many Southeast Asians, as they are felt to represent the experiences of ordinary people more authentically than Western-style popular music (Wallach 2014). Of course, genres like *dangdut*, *luk thung*, and *asli* (a type of Malaysian popular music) also appropriate studio production values and promotional strategies from Western pop, which allow them to claim a sense of modernity and expand their audience. But, as in many post-colonial contexts, Southeast Asians often denigrate their own art forms and revere foreign (often, but not always, Western) art; for example, many Singaporeans prefer K-pop and J-pop to local music (Legun 2013).

Informal performances take place at cigarette stalls, palm wine stands, outdoor cafes, college campuses, and other public places often late into the night (Wallach 2008). The popularity of this form of public amateur music-making can be related to the popularity of karaoke in Southeast Asia. While both involve amateur performance of popular music, the main differences are the latter is mostly relegated to indoor use, either in restaurants or in private homes, and requires greater material resources. By contrast, informal streetside performance is valued for its affordability to all walks of life and enhances the populist credibility of the music performed, even though the songs originate from the recording industry and not the local community.

Like most forms of public leisure, informal musical performance is dominated by men, especially when it takes place at night. Women are becoming more prominent in Southeast Asian music scenes, however, even in the so-called underground genres such as extreme metal. For example, the band Gugat (Shock), from Bandung, Indonesia is headed by a woman who wears the hijab on stage while she shrieks her vocals in a monstrously inhuman voice (see Clinton and Wallach 2016). In addition to reminding us that women are taking more active roles in music throughout the region, this example also shows how, at least in Muslim Southeast Asia, Islam is frequently incorporated into leisure practices. However, especially in Indonesia, this variety of Islam can be more flexible than Islam is in many other places vis-à-vis popular culture (Daniels 2013).

Reviving Indigenous Leisure Activities

In the post-independence rush to modernise and build a citizenry that could participate in legible international activities such as the Olympics and Southeast Asian Games, many indigenous leisure activities were neglected. In recent years, there have been attempts to revive some indigenous leisure practices, including theatre (Brandon 1966; Diamond 2008; Foley 2001), dance (Anggraeni 2015; Davies 2006), music (see Diamond 2008; Harnish 2007), and various local games such as the Filipino *sungka*. Competitive dimensions have been added to indigenous

activities including sailing wooden boats and kite flying, for which there has been a proliferation of tournaments over the past decade. In many state schools, students learn how to make mini boats, kites, textiles, puppets, and other local crafts that would have circulated as common knowledge among villagers in the past. A variety of performance styles, including music, dance, and puppetry, are also taught at state schools (Diamond 2008). This revival can be seen at a variety of levels, from state-level directives down to village-level education curricula.

Takro (also called *sepak takraw*, *takrau*) has experienced a revival across Southeast Asia and has received state support for the development of local, provincial, national, and regional leagues as well as the creation of standardised practice spaces in cities and villages (Anderson 1989). The revival of *takro* parallels the standardisation of other indigenous games elsewhere such as lacrosse. While in the past, *takro* was played in villages on makeshift non-standardised dirt courts, teams now wear colourful soccer-inspired uniforms and play on hard surfaces with painted boundary lines, a referee chair, and stadium lighting. Southeast Asian promoters of *takro* are advocating for it to be accepted as an official sport in the Olympics, and its first appearance in the Southeast Asian Games occurred in 2015. The struggle to develop *takro* and other 'ethnic sports' (Sogawa 2006) reflects the desire for Southeast Asian nations to participate in and gain recognition on the global stage.

Across Southeast Asia, indigenous games have been added to school curricula as a heritage revival strategy (Moser 2011, 2016). For example, in physical education classes, students continue to receive instruction in soccer, volleyball, badminton, track and field, and other 'modern' sport activities, yet a variety of 'village' activities have also been introduced that are intended to instil an appreciation for local culture.

Conclusion

Horton (2013) argues that 'play' is an imported European, specifically British, concept in the Southeast Asian context. There is evidence to suggest that the regimented, structured leisure activities imposed by colonial authorities (and later indigenised) were without precedent in the

region. What is beyond dispute is that organised play activities have been enlisted in the service of fashioning citizens for the modern nation-state in Southeast Asia and that this effort has met with some success. It is also the case, however, that Southeast Asians choose to spend their leisure time in a myriad of ways not sanctioned by their governments. For example, many people in urban Vietnam do not recognise the public/private space divide that is so important in Western countries—in spite of the state's desire to regulate 'public' spaces, people in urban Vietnam spend much of their time on the street—eating, playing, bathing, buying, and selling (Drummond 2000). Despite their governments' wishes, Southeast Asians' leisure pursuits take advantage of expanded opportunities for self-expression through consumption offered by globalisation as well as an 'ethic of sociality' (Wallach 2008) in which the community, not the individual citizen, confronts the state apparatus. Recent attempts to revive indigenous games as 'sport' (with all the routinisation that term entails) illustrate the tensions that still surround the project of nation-building in the Southeast Asian region. Whatever state authorities choose to promote, it is clear that official leisure activities will always be 'disorganised' to some degree by those whom Southeast Asian regimes seek to govern.

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Sport, Leisure and Culture in Māori Society

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Prior to European contact, Māori partook in a number of traditional sports, martial arts, and leisure activities. Such participation would often be used to identify characteristics of young men or women and could, at times, serve to determine one's position in the wider tribal hierarchy. Physical challenges, competition, and leisure were integral elements of "traditional" Māori life and would regularly be at the centre point of social gatherings. Sports (such as running, cliff diving, or, in particular, martial arts) could be used to preserve mana (authority, power, and prestige), face, and honour between iwi (tribes). Thus, sport and other leisure activities, with their competitive elements, became, according to Patrick Te Rito (2006), "quite inseparable from everyday life, ritual, and survival" (p. 11).

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Upon colonisation many of the traditional sports and leisure activities of, pre-European contact, Māori were dismissed as child's play, folk games, or were simply not acknowledged as sport. The aim of this chapter will be to examine beyond the general, early Western, depictions of "traditional Māori pastimes" and provide an understanding of the roles that leisure and culture played, and continue to play, in Māori society.

Throughout contemporary New Zealand sport literature, it is evident that Māori have played, and continue to play, a significant role in New Zealand's, as well as the world's, sporting landscape (Borell 2012, 2015; Falcous 2007; Hokowhitu 2004, 2008a; Obel 2001; Ryan 2005). These sources discuss, at length, the different fields within which Māori succeed, offer explanations as to why Māori excel in such areas, and offer critiques of the colonial influence that sport has had on Māori people. While there are multiple resources to examine Māori in contemporary sport, there are few resources that can be drawn from to give a complete overview of pre-European contact Māori sporting traditions and leisure activities. This chapter does not claim to provide this either. This chapter will, however, provide a single source to connect a seminal early ethnographic text with some of the more contemporary views of Māori sport and the revitalisation of existing Māori sports. The chapter will also provide an analysis of a current resurgence in Māori sport to provide insight into the extent to which culture and tradition shape Māori sport and leisure practices.

Ethnography and Māori Sport and Leisure

Māori are the indigenous people of New Zealand. Current knowledge is that the first Māori settlers arrived in New Zealand around AD 1280, at the end of several oceanic migrations that brought the Polynesians to the Pacific. Māori, and their settlement of New Zealand, can be described as the last major phase of the Polynesian migration. Once in New Zealand Māori adapted to the land and climate and established a distinct lifestyle balanced between Polynesian tradition and the new environment. Distinct tribal structures and political hierarchies were established and maintained. Although the first documented encounter between Māori and Europeans is dated in 1642, the first settlers from Britain didn't

arrive until the late eighteenth century, and the subsequent colonisation of Māori, via a treaty of cession, began in 1840.

The pool of literature pertaining to pre-European contact Māori sport and leisure activities is not a deep one. Most of this literature arrives in the form of brief descriptions and sections of larger ethnographic texts that attempted to document Māori lifestyles and culture (Shortland 1854; Taylor 1855). There are few examples from within Māori oral traditions that explicitly mention sports; one is the tradition of Ponga and Puhihuiua. The tradition is about two young members of different iwi in the Auckland region. In the narrative, the two iwi Ngā-iwi of Maungawhau and Ngāti Kahukōkā of Manukau maintained an uneasy peace due to conflict over a fishing ground. Ponga travelled with his people to Maungawhau. During the welcoming dances, he and Puhihuiua, the young daughter of the chief of Maungawhau, fell in love. The pair eloped, escaping by canoe. Puhihuiua's mother sent a war party of women to recapture her daughter. Puhihuiua refused to return and defeated the women in a series of duels. Due to her efforts, the two families were convinced of their love, and peace was made. The tradition, according to John White's (1889) account, features the following passage that highlights that games and competition featured when two tribes came together.

But in one of those intervals of peace, the young people of these tribes exchanged visits, taking part in the ancient games of *haka*, *kanikani* (dance), *niti* (a game of throwing a fern-stalk along the ground), *poro-teteke* (stand on the head with the legs straight up in the air), *mamou* (wrestling), *takaihoteka* (whipping-top), *tumatia* (the art of fencing and defence with the spear), and many other games of the days of old (1889, p. 117).

The preeminent literature in the field of traditional Māori sports and leisure comes from Elsdon Best.¹ Best is one of New Zealand's most prominent ethnographers and was a founding member of the *Journal of the Polynesian Society*. He was a prolific writer, and his work has documented

¹ Elsdon Best was born in New Zealand in 1856 and became one of New Zealand's most notable ethnographers of his era. In the late 1890s and early 1900s, Best spent considerable time with the Tuhoe tribe on the central East Coast of New Zealand's North Island. Through his engagement with Tuhoe, he was able to note considerable amounts of Tuhoe history and tradition, much of which he published through the Polynesian Society, later the Journal of the Polynesian Society.

many facets of early Māori life, and lifestyles. Best's work titled "Games and Pastimes of the Maori [sic]", first published in 1925, is the foremost literary work on early/traditional Māori sport and leisure activities on account of it being the only text that is devoted to the subject.

This section of the chapter will provide an overview of the core components of Māori sporting practices according to Best. It is important to note here that while Best covers a wide gambit of Māori leisure practices, he refers to them for the majority of his work as games and pastimes. The idea that these activities, some of which are clearly contests or in competition, are categorised as mere games and pastimes is something that deserves further scrutiny. However, the intent of this chapter is to demonstrate the importance of sport and leisure to Māori as more than games and pastimes but as bearers of tradition and culture.

Best introduces the origins of "all amusements and arts of pleasure" (p. 11) as being descendent of the gods; in particular, Rongo-maraeroa, the god of peace, agriculture, and harvest. It is said that during the time of harvest that Māori would surrender themselves to "ngā mahi a te rehia", or the arts of pleasure and joyfulness. Best explains that through these arts, Māori were able to preserve knowledge and traditions. This provides our first clear link between tradition and sport in *te ao Māori*, or the Māori world. Other deities associated as being originators of the art of amusement were the sisters, Raukatauri and Raukatamea, who are known for defeating the chief Kae through way of laughter and performance. Takataka-putea and Marere-o-tonga were also mentioned in oral traditions for being strong protagonists in the art of amusement. The stories that link back to these originators vary depending on region and or tribe, and, as such, are significant to the establishment and maintenance of Māori tribal identities. Oral traditions were, and are, of utmost importance to Māori society. It is through such traditions that contemporary practices maintain connections with the past.

Best provides origin narratives of particular deities that have a continued presence in contemporary oral traditions with regard to competition, leisure, and sport. Like his positioning of sports and leisure activities as games and pastimes, the oral traditions he speaks of are also reduced to the level of "a great mass of myths, folk tales and demon lore" (p. 13). Brendan Hokowhitu (2004, 2008b) has been critical of

early ethnographical accounts, such as Best's work. He provides a critical analysis of the imperial ideological position that Best and the early European ethnographers took, where they viewed Māori, and their unorganised games and sports, as that of the uncivilised savage. He notes further (2008) that Māori physical activities were incomprehensible and the ethnographers were unable to grasp the philosophical foundations of these activities. He points to Best's rudimentary taxonomy of games and pastimes to evidence this.

While Best's belittling of Māori tradition is somewhat skewed, his work set a precedent for how Māori participation in sport has continued to the present day. In outlining the role of oral traditions and the importance of a connection to the deities, Best does capture a connection between leisure and Māori society that transcends simple "amusement". One thing that Best manages to do well in his work is to document a wide range of leisure activities that Māori participated in prior to European contact. He breaks down Māori leisure into three distinct categories: exercises, games, and pastimes. He also identifies that within these particular groups "no specific line can be drawn between these divisions" and that "the mode of classification of native games...is an arbitrary one" (1973, p. 23). Of the categories that Best gives us, the area with most connection to modern "sport" is exercise.

In his section discussing Māori exercise practices, Best makes his first connection between exercise and contest, or competition. Different forms of competition fill this section and include wrestling, the use of arms, boxing, jumping, running, slinging, and climbing. As mentioned earlier, Best did state that particular areas had a lot of crossovers; thus, other exercises that could also be interpreted as being competitive in nature include surfing, swimming, diving, and canoe racing.

Best does give a detailed explanation of each of the exercise sports. For the use of arms, he outlines the types of weaponry used and acknowledges that the martial arts were a practice that begins in childhood as encouraged by parents that also carried over into adult life in the settlement of disputes and in warfare. Best discusses wrestling and boxing as common practice among Māori pre-European, and during early European, contact. He discusses the level of ceremony attached to these forms of combat and describes how competition in these sports could spark "quarrels

and even serious affrays” (1973, p. 28), as well as settle them. The connection between leisure and ceremony is highlighted throughout Best’s work. Ceremony, tradition, and cultural practices have maintained significant importance in Māori leisure practices.

Jumping, running, and climbing are detailed as competitive, such as running races held between youths and young men. Best describes a running contest as the competitors racing to a predetermined destination, leaving a mark, then returning to the starting point. In contemporary times, such a contest would be considered sport.

The first time that Best describes these “pastimes” as sport is when detailing the sport of slinging. Slinging involved a pole being placed in the ground, with cord attached to the tip which was used to draw back a projectile, sometimes a spear or dart, to be flung to some distance. Other variations of slinging included using a hand-held sling to project spears or darts. Best, like with boxing and wrestling, makes the connection here between sport and warfare. Like the origins of sport, warfare too is highly ritualised and shares deep connections to the deities such as Tūmataunga, the god of war, and the Māori religious practices of *tapu* and *noa*.² *Tapu* is often reduced to the English “sacred”, but for Māori, it meant, and still means, a lot more than that.

The connection between sport and warfare for Māori has maintained. It appears to be a connection that, while to an extent is justified, has maintained without too much real connection into modern sport practices.³

In discussing water sports such as surfing, diving/cliff jumping, and canoe racing, Best alludes to aquatic pastimes and practices as being commonplace for Māori of both genders. One of the primary focuses of his aquatic sport section is that Māori were trained from a young age to be fearless in the water. This fearlessness was driven by traditional accounts of ancestors and deities performing aquatic feats which may seem out of reach of everyday human beings. The most common tradition of the

² *Tapu* and *noa* were complementary forces that restricted and freed Māori society respectively. Akin to religion *tapu* and *noa* regulated most facets of Māori life. These forces were said to be derived from the gods and were not openly challenged or broken prior to European contact. Certain aspects of *tapu* and *noa* are still adhered to in contemporary Māori society, mostly in the form of etiquette and ritual.

³ See Hokowhitu. Tackling Māori Masculinity.

origins of New Zealand as a land mass derive from the demigod Māui who, while on a canoe with his brothers, fished up *Te Ika-a-Māui* (the North Island). The ocean features prominently in many of the oral histories of Māori.

Surfing appears to be more of a recreational practice; surfing and canoe racing both seem to have developed more competitive elements. In particular, canoe racing had formal competitions known as *kaipara* that became a common feature of sports meetings among Māori.

Best's analysis extends to other areas of recreational practices; these however have less connection to contemporary sport. The fields that he divides the remaining pastimes into include games requiring agility or manual dexterity; games and pastimes requiring calculation, mental alertness, or memorising powers; games and pastimes of children; and introduced games (meaning post-European contact).

Games requiring agility or manual dexterity include *ruru* (which has been likened to the European game of jacks). Best notes the range of the game as being "world-wide" (p. 55), and it is possible that this game has been maintained due its familiarity to other European games. *Teka* was a game of dart throwing that was known across the Pacific (Davidson 1936), and Best describes it as a "semi-military exercise" (p. 61). Similar to javelin, perhaps, the darts were thrown by a person building momentum with taking steps and releasing the dart. He who threw the dart the furthest would be the winner.

If we accept Best's articulations of Māori sport and leisure, we can derive that leisure activities were common among Māori. Leisure provided an outlet for competition and sporting contest between people, and likely between village/tribal groups; there was a distinct connection between leisure practices, oral traditions, and the deities. The fact that Best wrote his observations a century after the early colonial period demonstrates either that Māori sporting traditions had persevered through colonisation or that, for many, they were still known to members of Māori society. This, in itself, serves as an indicator of the resilience of Māori leisure practices and the importance of the connection between tradition and leisure.

Best's observations of Māori leisure practices stood alone for over a century with his work standing as the sole comprehensive work on

Māori leisure and sporting practice. A small number of texts such as Alan Armstrong's (1975) handbook on Māori native games were produced, and these relied heavily on the information that Best had originally provided. Sutton-Smith's (1951) article on Māori games of children was another sporadic addition to the larger body of work that captures and documents Māori sports and games. Throughout this period, the destructive totality of colonisation impacted on what was known and what physical activities Māori engaged in. Most of the material on Māori sport and leisure activities focused on the uptake of Māori into colonial sports such as rugby, and the presence of Māori through the popular global codes of sport (Falcous 2007; Hokowhitu 2004, 2008b; Obel 2001; Ryan 2005). It was not until 2008 that a new perspective from within Māori culture on sport and leisure was published.

The Revitalisation of Māori Sport and Games

Māori communities have consistently resisted the impacts of colonisation. From the 1970s, these challenges culminated in what is often called the Māori renaissance (Walker 2004). As a broad social movement, it was built on increased recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi⁴ through gains in education and a number of social policy opportunities. Māori aspired to engage in practices informed by Māori custom and culture for the self-determination of Māori people. This has included sports and leisure.

The publishing of Harko Brown's *Ngā Taonga Tākaro: Māori Sports and Games* (2008) is an important entry to the corpus of Māori sports and games. It encapsulates the shift within Māori communities towards Māori-centred practices. Brown has been leading the revival of these practices. He first re/introduced them through his position as a high-school physical education teacher. He currently runs workshops and lectures on

⁴The Treaty of Waitangi was signed in 1840. It was a treaty of secession that saw the transfer of sovereignty from Māori to the British Crown. The Treaty of Waitangi has since become an agreement of constitutional importance which establishes a partnership between the Crown and Māori in New Zealand. This partnership has been implemented across a wide ambit of policy areas including health and education, where Māori have sought to improve outcomes for Māori people and the upholding of culture and tradition.

Māori games. He has also collected and published the traditions, writing about the revival of Māori games and pastimes. His work traces the history and traditions behind each game, providing a cultural context, as well as giving the rules and instructions on how to play each game.

Brown provides a more contemporary lens of how we may perceive traditional sporting practices. A number of the sports and games that he draws attention to are not described in Best's work. For example, he introduces *Ngā Taonga Tākaro* by providing a brief overview of the connection between Māori sport and games to the gods. Within the introduction, Brown also alludes to the colonial influence on traditional sport, with a particular emphasis on the impact that the early missionaries, and Christianity, had in subsuming aspects, including sport and games, of Māori traditions and culture. Brown credits the work of Best in preserving many of the traditional leisure activities of, what Brown describes as, a particular enclave of Māori society.

Brown also critiques some of Best's findings; however, most of his critique of Best is purely due to the limitations, mostly geographic, that effect the reach of his work. Best's focus was predominantly in one tribal area and, as a result, cannot speak to the entire population (Smith 1999). It is important for the reader to note that Māori were not a homogenous people and, thus, variations in practice, tradition, and even language occurred between regions. Brown acknowledges that some early ethnographers would have had difficulty in interpreting particular games and the "enormous impact that game-playing had on every aspect of Māori life" (p. 11).

Brown's account provides an explanation of the variations in tribal traditions and dialects and provides the reader with the rules and history of several physical and mental games that he believes to be traditional in Māori society. Of the physical games, running, throwing (rocks and poi), and a ball sport, *ki-o-rahi*, dominate. Brown's main focus in *Ngā Taonga Tākaro* is the revival of Māori sporting traditions. It is important to note here that although Brown gives some critique of Best's observations, there are similarities between their works. Both Best and Brown acknowledge the connection between games and the gods. Through their discussion of oral traditions and the use of particular oral traditions relating games and competition to certain gods, we can make a distinct connection between

leisure and tradition. Both have the goal of preserving the tradition of, and in, Māori sport and leisure practices; Best as a means of preserving the memory of the games and pastimes of Māori, and Brown by way of revival and reinvention through practice.

Other “traditional” Māori leisure practices that have proved resilient, and also benefited from contemporary revitalisation, include *mau rākau* (martial arts; literally to “bear a weapon”), *kapa haka* (Māori performing arts), and *waka ama* (out rigger canoe racing). All three of which have strong oral traditions and direct connections to particular deities. Mau rākau has numerous tribal traditions connecting the practice to Tūmataunga as the god of war and people. Karakia (prayers) would be used to instil the qualities of certain gods, as well as to make the weapon bearer, and the weapon itself, *tapu*.

Kapa haka has long been the domain for retaining oral tradition, retelling histories, and expressing identity. According to Te Rita Papesch,

At its most fundamental, Kapa Haka is a relatively new ‘traditional’ performance practice. Its repertoire is highly codified, composed from early Māori ritual (especially pōwhiri⁵) and social practices (such as the concert party), which have been theatricalised and influenced by contemporary popular culture.

(2015, p. 30)

The art of performance for Māori is not new, but the “sport” of kapa haka has been transformed from performance to competition in recent years, particularly since the advent of the bi-annual Te Matatini National Kapa Haka competition established in 1972.

Waka ama has also developed a strong resurgence from the 1990s. Initially, *waka* were used as transport. Oral traditions record *waka* as the vessels which brought the earliest Māori ancestors to New Zealand. These traditions remain fundamental in the Māori genealogical traditions. *Waka* were also used for competition through organised canoe races and events such as the Turangawaewae Regatta that has been held annually since 1895. In New Zealand and throughout the Pacific, *waka ama* has

⁵ Formal greetings.

seen increased popularity as a competitive sport (Wikaire and Newman 2013).

Within the climate of revitalisation of Māori culture, *kī-o-rahi* is an interesting example. *Kī-o-rahi* is a tangibly Māori sport. It was not played, or even known by the majority of Māori two decades ago. The popularity of *kī-o-rahi* and other Māori ball games has surged amongst Māori communities across the country, growing from obscurity within the span of 15 years. It is currently played in high schools across New Zealand, with regional and national tournaments and was benchmarked by an international tour to France and Italy in 2010. Due to its rapid emergence, it has yet to receive proper academic attention, the most significant being Brown's "Ngā Taonga Tākaro" (2008) and a report by Palmer et al. (2009). Brown connects *kī-o-rahi* and other Māori sports and games to important historical movements, describing how the sport was played by the Māori 28th Battalion that fought with distinction in World War II. He also states that the historical Tainui leader Te Puea Herangi⁶ was active in revitalising *kī-o-rahi*. Brown's work documents the genealogy and oral tradition for *kī-o-rahi* that provide a cultural knowledge framework for the sport.

The Rahitūtakahina (Rahi) tradition provides a narrative that details the origins of the sport. The tradition begins when Rahi's wife, Te Arakurapakewai (Te Ara), was abducted by *Patupaiarehe* (mythical creatures). In brief, it is his quest to save his wife that provides the narrative, and also some of the game play action. He followed the captors on a large kite. The *Patupaiarehe* saw Rahi and cast a spell which caused a second scorching sun to appear in the sky. It left the forest barren. Rahi sought protection by hiding behind a special rock. The rock was his *tipuna* (ancestor) that helped sustain Rahi while he recovered. Namu also came to the aid of Rahi and trickled water from its beak on to Rahi.

A *taniwha* (lizard like monster) named Utumai appeared and began to attack them. The lizard was unable to approach Rahi because of the

⁶Princess Te Puea Herangi was a prominent Māori leader of the twentieth century from the Tainui people. She was the niece of Mahuta Tawhiao, the third Māori king. Her leadership achievements included opposing conscription of Waikato men through the two World Wars; establishing a tribal community and headquarters after a quarter of the people at one settlement died from the influenza epidemic in 1918; and maintaining and placing a high value on cultural customs.

wairua and *mauri* (life essence) that surrounded the rock. The lizard circled the rock while its tail thrashed, throwing rocks, stone, and sand at Rahi. The *Patupaiarehe* then cast another spell that made the two suns disappear. Looking to the heavens, Rahi saw the seven stars of Matariki (Pleiades) and was able to make his way to Te Ara. Once Rahi was on safe ground, he gained enlightenment (*Mārama*). The tradition ends with Rahi pursuing Te Ara and the *Patupaiarehe* to a volcano, saving his wife. A decision was made by both Rahi and the *Patupaiarehe* to live in peace and allow each other to coexist. The ball game was then created to remember the intertribal quarrel and the ardent pursuit of peace (Brown 2008; Palmer et al. 2009).

The oral tradition of Rahi explains some of the rules about *kī-o-rahi*. It is a fluid and dynamic sport. Two teams play, with each team having their own objective and way of scoring. The teams are known as *kī-oma* (ball runners) and *taniwha*. Much of the game play is dictated by the field, which is made up of three concentric circles. These circles form zones, which restrict where the players can and cannot occupy. The outer and largest zone, *Te Ao*, can be occupied by both teams. This zone has seven *pou* or posts standing equidistance through its perimeter. The middle zone is called *Te Roto* and can only be occupied by the *taniwha* team. Intersecting this zone is *Te Ara*, or pathway. The narrow pathway leads in to *Te Pā Wero*. This area can only be occupied by a restricted amount of members of the *kī-oma* team. *Te Ara* acts as lane for the *kī-oma* team to move from the inner zone to the outer.

The way teams score is different for each team. The *kī-oma* team run and pass the ball around the outside, with their members attempting to touch the *pou* while they have possession of the *kī* in order to accumulate the potential to score points. Once they have touched a *pou*, they are eligible to score a point, with their potential score increasing with the touch of each respective *pou*. In order to transfer potential points into points, one member of their team can attempt to score a try by running through *Te Roto* and making it in to *Te Pā Wero* without being touched. It is the only time they are allowed to break the threshold of *Te Roto*.

The *taniwha* attempts to score by gaining possession of the *kī*. They then throw the *kī* at the *middle thing*. If they hit it, they gain a point. The *kī-oma* team are able to defend the throw by blocking the *kī* with any

part of their body. A number of the rules are established before the game through a process of negotiation called *tatu*. This might include whether the particular game is full contact including tackles, or touch and flag varieties. This negotiation is undertaken by the respective captains of the two teams. Often, *kī-o-rahi* is played in quarters with teams switching between the two roles of *kī-oma* and *taniwha* each quarter.

The connection between tradition and game play in *kī-o-rahi* exemplifies a Māori cultural framework. According to Brown (2008), the narrative of *kī-o-rahi* illustrates Māori spirituality and connection to deities of the past. The game itself is a way of remembering past events and highlighting values such as love, perseverance, reciprocity, and forgiveness. Palmer et al. (2009) describe how the narrative of the traditions within Māori sports and games provide a forum of intergenerational transmission through which cultural knowledge can be passed on. Through sport and games, behaviours and elements of culture and knowledge are socialised through to future generations. It also embeds elements of the game play in to the tradition. Part of the uptake of Māori games and sports is, as practitioner and academic Heperi Harris describes, a result of Māori identity, connecting people to their culture.

Conclusions

What we can draw from both Best's and Brown's work is the importance of tradition and culture to both early and contemporary Māori leisure practices. Any conclusions that Elsdon Best draws on the connection between leisure and tradition relegate the influence of tradition to the developmental stages of what we may now call sporting practices. Through this work, it is now apparent that tradition did more than assist the development of sport but nurtured sport and leisure as an integral part of traditional Māori society.

Through the work of Brown, the role of tradition becomes more expressive of sport, and, as a result, sport has become more expressive of tradition, and thus the two are holistically intertwined. Where Best wrote from an outsider position that reflected his cultural hierarchies and

distinguished Māori practices from European practices, Brown writes from within Māori culture and highlights the connections of activity to culture as an important feature. The common element between the two, however, is the connections between sport, the deities, and oral tradition. Oral traditions, stories, and mythology all link Māori leisure practices to Māori society. Through competition, whether formal or informal, leisure has provided Māori with an outlet for a continued connection with the gods, and with the oral traditions of the past. In this way, Māori sporting and leisure practices can be seen as an extension of Māori culture, empowering Māori values.

On this note, it can be argued that tradition provides purpose to Māori sports and leisure. Tradition enhances and shapes the way we view sport, the way we engage with sport and the ways in which we reflect upon sport. By maintaining distinctly indigenous practices, such as aligning and developing contemporary sporting practices with oral traditions, or creating new traditions, Māori sport and leisure will continue to uphold a purpose within Māori society and also outwardly into other societies through a point of difference that is distinctly Māori.

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Leisure Experience and Engaged Buddhism: Mindfulness as a Path to Freedom and Justice in Leisure Studies

Susan M. Arai

I wake to my alarm clock. The face glows 6 am. I stumble to the meditation cushion. My mind cycles through a list of things to do, and I notice these thoughts. I notice the sensations of these thoughts—a quickening of mind, a feeling of pushing in the shoulders and upper torso. Breathe in. Breathe out. Breathe in and send breath to the places I notice quickening. Breathe out. As I follow the breath in, I notice tightness in my jaw. Breathing out, I feel jaw release. Breathe in. Breathing out, posture shifts as the rigidity in my abdomen releases. I notice my body slouching forward. I straighten my spine, lengthening as if a string attached to the top of my head draws me upward. Breathing in, a glint of anger surfaces in my lower back. I replay a scene moment by moment in my head feeling anger rise, my pulse quickens. I am caught up in the storyline. I gently remind myself to return to awareness of breath. Breathe in. Breathe out. I shift awareness to the quality of thoughts. I notice the fast speed of my thoughts. I notice I am holding my breath. I breathe in deeply to that space of anger in my abdomen. Breathing out, I feel tightness in my abdomen release.

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This captures the first two minutes of my meditation practice this morning, a moment-by-moment awareness of my internal world. Mindfulness is about paying attention to things we normally do not, things we miss in the frantic pace of daily living, or as we are lulled to sleep by distractions and technology. In mindfulness practices, we move attention from the content of consciousness (thoughts, feelings, and sensations) to noticing how these arise and vanish (impermanence) while anchoring attention in the body to in-breaths and out-breaths and bodily sensations that rise with thoughts and emotions. I begin this chapter on leisure and Buddhism with this practice because it is through mindfulness practice that we come to know the dharma and the possibility to open to the interconnectedness in all things including the dharma and leisure; it is not through our thoughts, following a storyline, or figuring things out (i.e., the solutions to yesterdays' problems, or tomorrows' uncertainties). Mindfulness asks us to let go of striving and the pursuit of goals for this is connected to grasping or wanting a certain outcome. It asks us to release competition with ourselves and with others so that a deeper wisdom and being may surface. There is nowhere we are trying to get to—no destination, no achievement, and no goal. Buddhism is a “path to free our minds of limitation and open our hearts” (Aronson 2012, p. xvi). Only from within this practice can we know a different kind of leisure, a different experience of freedom, arrive on a different path to justice.

As we engage in routines of daily life, spirit often becomes buried in sediment created by habitual and automatic routines of daily life. When we grasp at things to soothe and make us feel better (e.g., alcohol, shopping, the latest gear of our leisure pursuit) or to avoid discomfort (e.g., excluding people who are different from us during our leisure pursuits), we perpetuate suffering. As we engage in the habitual and automatic in leisure, freedoms of spirit assumed to be a part of this experience move further and further to a distant horizon. Hedonic approaches to leisure, the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain, which characterizes much of leisure experience in the long run, may diminish our freedoms. Garland, Farb, Goldin, and Fredrickson (2015) explore the connection between mindfulness and eudaimonia stating that mindfulness practitioners report significantly higher levels of eudaimonic

well-being “characterized by a sense of purpose and meaningful, positive engagement with life that arises when one’s life activities are congruent with deeply held values even under conditions of adversity” (p. 294). The focus of this chapter is to explore mindfulness as a path for leisure practices. I introduce the idea of *insight leisure* as an approach to leisure that brings the possibility for deepened connection with eudaimonia and, in so doing, a different experience of freedom.

The challenge of writing about leisure and Buddhism for academic audiences is our propensity to focus on the thoughts of Buddhism as we would any academic concept or idea. Instead, I emphasize in this chapter an engaged Buddhism or experiencing the dharma that requires us to shift our emphasis to *practice as the foundation for knowing*. “Broadly speaking, ‘dharma’ refers to the teachings of the Buddha and to those aspects of reality and experience with which his teachings are concerned” (Batchelor 1997, p. xi). For leisure studies, it is the *practice* of the teachings of the Buddha (dharma), or *dharma practice*, in daily life that shows the most promise. As Batchelor (1997) notes, “The Dharma is not something to believe in but something to do” (p. 17). It is concerned with existential experience and our ability to live life with natural integrity, dignity, and authority on the path to awakening. Batchelor describes that in awakening, the Buddha “awoke to a set of interrelated truths in the immediacy of experience here and now” (p. 6). As such, mindfulness is deeply connected to freedom, not as a philosophical principle or ideology, but rather as liberation from the perpetuation of suffering through engaged dharma practice of moment-by-moment awareness. It is in this embodied knowing rather than pure cognition that we can know a different sort of freedom. As Aronson (2012) describes, through mindful experience and emotional understanding of the processes of mind (rather than content):

we can have some control over the pervasive cultural influences that limit our lives. . . . Once we acknowledge our differences, it becomes possible for us to consider if there is something we wish to alter in our orientation. The more differences we discern, the more opportunities we have to reflect on who we are and what we may wish to become.

(p. xvi)

Mindfulness is essential to social justice. Mindfulness recognizes that our collective freedom is bound in our interconnectedness and differences and an intentional shift away from the perpetuation of violence and suffering through ongoing awareness of the full catastrophe (Kabat-Zinn 2005) of our present moment experience. As Kabat-Zinn (2005) describes, the “whole catastrophe” includes pleasure, pain, and all other aspects of experience as it unfolds in each moment. As he states, “The full catastrophe lies within the complex web of their past and present experiences and relationships, their hopes and their fears, and their views of what is happening to them” (Kabat-Zinn 2005, p. 6). In deep connection, spirit awakens. Rather than pursuit of an absolute truth, dharma practice engages a complex inter-related set of truths in the immediacy of here and now experience (Batchelor 1997). Dharma practice calls us to, as best we can, empty our minds of the cyclical or habitual nature of thoughts (my list of things to do, our assumptions and judgments of each other). It asks us to engage awareness of our own experience moment by moment and the conditions that perpetuate suffering (e.g., anger arising, tension held in jaw, shallow breathing, thoughts of how to respond, tightness in my jaw) that might lead to actions that create suffering. In this chapter, I introduce some principles of Buddhist psychology. As we engage in mindfulness practices, it is important to shift the psychological foundations of understanding away from themes of individualism, competition, capitalism, striving, and rationality (mind) that shape Western leisure forms. The challenge is as Aronson (2012) describes, “when we assimilate Buddhist practice into preexisting patterns, we merely introduce new context into old forms. This can ... show up in adherence to cultural norms or in more particularized reinforcement of psychological patterns” (p. 1); that is, the norms and patterns that rob us of our freedoms. This chapter addresses the questions: *How might mindfulness reshape how we experience leisure? How might mindfulness reshape how we practice, facilitate and teach, and conduct leisure research?*

Mindfulness as the Path to Deepening Leisure Experiences

While mindfulness can be simply defined as “paying attention in a particular way; on purpose, in the present moment and non-judgmentally” (Kabat-Zinn 1994, p. 4), it is also challenging to know for it is both a practice spanning back 2500 years to the fifth century B.C. (Aronson 2012) and rooted in historical and cultural contexts much different from the modern Western world. Conceptually, mindfulness is simple to define in words; however, the ongoing *practice* and knowing of mindfulness through direct experience poses significant challenge. Our attitudes, beliefs, and preconditioning often stand as barriers to experience. The value of mindfulness practice is that it becomes a mirror for each of us, “it simply reflects what is there” (Rosenberg and Guy 2004, p. 15) in how we approach experiences in the present moment.

Mindfulness brings us to a preconceptual and preconscious space before thought. There is a shift away from the driven nature of habitual thinking of the rational mind. Bishop et al. (2004) broadly conceptualize mindfulness as “a kind of nonelaborative, nonjudgmental, present-centered awareness in which each thought, feeling, or sensation that arises in the attentional field is acknowledged and accepted as is” (p. 232). As such, there is opportunity for engagement in mindfulness practice to liberate us from the conditions that limit our experiences of leisure; those that draw our attention and awareness out of this moment and the full and direct experience of our present encounter. These conditions may be our learned thoughts and assumptions (e.g., I am not good at painting, I am not a good skier, I am not tall enough to play basketball), our risk avoidance (e.g., It is not lady-like to yell during a basketball game people will think less of me), or our pleasure seeking that has us already looking to the future (e.g., if I sink this basket everyone will applaud, next time I want to ski a steeper hill).

Consider the following mindfulness practice introduced by Jon Kabat-Zinn and used in mindfulness-based practices such as mindfulness-based stress reduction (Kabat-Zinn 2005; Stahl & Goldstein 2010) and mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (Segal, Williams, & Teasdale 2013). This

practice begins with each person being given a single raisin to hold in hand. The guided meditation on the raisin begins with the instruction to treat this object as if it has never been seen or encountered before. In short, it is the mindful leisure practice of eating a raisin:

First we bring our attention to seeing the raisin, observing it carefully as if we had never seen one before. We feel its texture between our fingers and notice its colors and surfaces. We are also aware of any thoughts we might be having about raisins or food in general. We notice any thoughts and feelings of liking or disliking raisins if they come up while we are looking at it. We then smell it for a while and finally, with awareness, we bring it to our lips, being aware of the arm moving the hand to position it correctly and of salivating as the mind and body anticipate eating. The process continues as we take it into our mouth and chew it slowly, experiencing the actual taste of one raisin. And when we feel ready to swallow, we watch the impulse to swallow as it comes up, so that even that is experienced consciously. We even imagine, or “sense,” that now our bodies are one raisin heavier.

(Kabat-Zinn 2005, pp. 27–28)

Several leisure scholars argue for the strength in exploring leisure beyond the use of Western frameworks (*cf.* Arai and Kivel 2009; Dieder, Magnuson, & Scholl 2005). This same practice introduced in the raisin exercise may then be applied to any leisure experience. Kumar (2005) suggests “[a]ny activity, when done mindfully, becomes a meditation session and can help you gain experiences that can serve as the building blocks of a mindful way of living” (p. 23). This mindfulness practice provides each of us with a mirror that reflects to us the challenges that arise that keep us from fully being present to the depth and richness of leisure experience as it unfolds. This five-minute experience gives us insight into all of the challenges—wanting, aversion, restlessness, expectations, past memories, doubt—that draw us away from fully experiencing leisure. Mindfulness practices such as meditation, eating a raisin, walking, and other leisure engagements are an opportunity to actively cultivate 13 *inter-related attitudes of mindfulness*:

*Noticing when we are on autopilot,
as we practice present moment awareness,*

*and approach experiences with beginner's mind;
to grow a basic trust in self, intuition, and own authority (freedom).
Growing capacity to sit with discomfort,
enacting patience as a form of wisdom,
without judging (non-judging),
without striving or goal-orientation (non-striving, non-doing), and
without pushing experience out of consciousness.
Knowing impermanence and awakening deeper connection with self,
others, and environments (interconnectedness),
as we become aware of tendencies for disconnection and isolation.
Letting go (non-attachment) of thoughts, feelings, or situations we want
to hold on to, and
opening to acceptance and to see things as they really are without illusion,
denial, or resistance.*

This list expands upon Kabat-Zinn's (2005) seven attitudinal foundations of mindfulness practice to capture a wider array of the seeds or attitudes that must be planted for engaged mindfulness practice. Rather than list format, they are offered here, intentionally, in a poem form to represent the light, non-linear, and less rigid way in which these attitudes are held in mindfulness. In the mindfulness groups I facilitate, people often struggle to engage these attitudes at first and quickly descend into very harsh self-judgment and punitive claims against self (i.e., "I am doing this wrong!" "Oh, there I go again being on autopilot") or question the practice ("This is boring," "What am I doing this for?"). These are the very seeds of struggle for mindfulness practitioners that open up possibilities for freedom.

Noticing When We Are on Autopilot

When we engage in mindfulness practices, we begin as best we can to slow the body and chatter of the mind (monkey mind) to return to direct experience of the present moment. We shift the habitual and automatic uses of mind to create storylines (this is how it always is), to shift away from the patterned associations our beliefs draw us to (because x happened, y will inevitably result), to shift away from sorting and accounting

for things in socially constructed categories, and judgments rooted in binaries (i.e., good–not good [bad]; white–not white [black], right–not right [wrong]). So let us return to the raisin experience. The text to the left reflects the text for this guided practice. The text on the right (italics) reflects my inner experience of the practice.

This practice asks us to be fully present with experience of the raisin, without labeling it or judging it. First, feeling the object in our hand, looking at the textures, contours, reflections of light.

As I gaze at the object in the palm of my hand I see the tiny little wrinkles criss-crossing across its body. As I tilt my palm left and right, I see the light dancing across its surface.

Feel the texture of the object, notice the shape, what happens when you apply pressure.

I feel the soft object give way to the pressure of my thumb and index finger, rolling, changing shape, slightly moist. I become aware of the feeling of stickiness. This is followed by the thought of wanting to wash my hands.

Hold the object up to your nose, smelling the earthy, sweet aromas.

The instruction sounds strange to me. As I hold the raisin up to my nose and breathe in deeply I note that I have never smelled a raisin this directly. Feeling self-conscious for a moment, I wonder what it would look like if someone were passing by.

Holding the object up to your ear and hearing the sound of squishing and the raisin rolling between thumb and finger.

I wonder what it is that I am hearing. The raisin? My fingers in contact with the raisin? I notice the dull rolling sound and the slightly sharper sounds of what I imagine to be the crystals in the object.

As we begin to slow and bring awareness to the present moment encounter, we become clear about the things we began to take for granted, or the

details we missed when we were on automatic pilot. The raisin experience caused me to reflect on how when I apply the label raisin, I have reduced the object and missed the details in the way it reflects light, the way it sounds, and the way it smells. When we apply this to leisure experiences, what else are we missing when we are on autopilot?

Practicing Present Moment Awareness

For many of us the challenge arises in staying with present moment awareness, rather than spiraling into thoughts about the past or future. Whenever we move toward stillness—whether it is sitting down on the meditation cushion, eating a raisin, or engaging in mindful walking, skiing, or painting—our body becomes still or more focused while our mind becomes lost in a swirling mass of thoughts. We tend to spend most of our time caught in the replaying of past experience or the future world of planning and anticipating what is to (be)come.

As we slow things down and work with each sense, the practice asks us to be in the present moment and to simply be with the raisin. We soon notice that we are caught in ruminations from the past, such as a problem from yesterday we are trying to solve, an argument with someone that has been weighing on us, or a story about the object in our hand.

As I continue to hold this object in the palm of my hand my mind wanders to a childhood memory of the little red boxes of Sunmaid raisins people would give out at Halloween and my preference for small-sized chocolate bars. I focus my awareness back again on the raisin, noticing the colour of deep purple. Soon my mind has wandered off to my recent home decorating project and I wonder if that would be a good colour for an accent wall.

If you notice your mind has wandered, simply bring awareness back to seeing the raisin.

Catching myself, I bring my awareness back again to seeing the object in the palm of my hand. I notice the colour. Slowly I draw my gaze across the various contours of the raisin.

Drawing from the *Satipatthana Sutta*,¹ the Buddha's discourse on the four ways of establishing mindfulness, Goldstein (2013) describes that this present moment experience calls us to pay attention in "four fields, or pastures, for establishing mindfulness: body, feelings, mind, and *dhammas* (categories of experience)" with a sustained, warm, and enthusiastic contemplation of each in a way that is mindful, clearly knowing, and "free from discontent in regard to the world" (p. 3). As Garland et al. (2015) describe, in neuroscience, "this shift from evaluative processing to nonjudgmental awareness" activates different areas of the brain and brings increased integration of sensory information rather than a dominance of conceptual systems that engage in elaboration (p. 294).

Approaching with Beginner's Mind to Understand

When we approach with beginner's mind, we approach with openness, curiosity, respect, and interest with the intention to understand (Kornfield 2009). With beginner's mind, we set the intention to drop labels, assumptions, opinions, and pre-assessments we make of objects, people, and experiences.

We are invited to hold the raisin up to our lip and to notice what happens in our body.

I hold the object up to my lips and notice the feeling of saliva emerging in my mouth. I have to actively resist completing the action of placing the object in my mouth. As I let the object touch my lower lip, the sensation feels strange. I notice a feeling of revulsion in my stomach.

Now place the object in your mouth and, without biting it, roll the object around with your tongue.

With my tongue I roll the raisin against the roof of my mouth, feeling the density of the object. I begin to salivate.

¹ For more information on the *Satipatthana Sutta*, see *The Way of Mindfulness: The Satipatthana Sutta 1949* from the Majjhima Nikaya translated by Bhikku Soma and Cassius A. Pereira, Lake House, Colombo, Kessinger Publishing.

When we slow the experience down, we may see our reactions and responses rise and pass away. Both revulsion and salivation are present, and mindfulness practice enables us to see both as part of this complex experience, rather than reacting to either and pulling our self out of the present moment experience. On automatic pilot feelings of revulsion often lead to rejection or avoidance (pushing the raisin away) and salivation leads to a wanting of more (reaching for another raisin, and another). Mindfulness practice creates an opportunity for us to develop a steadiness with the complexity of experience when we return to full sensory experience. When we slow things down and stay present to moment-by-moment experience and become “free from views” (Kornfield 2009), we become open to learning and there is a capacity to grow a trust in self and intuition and embark on a path to freedom (p. 99). In “seeing what is true, the heart becomes free” (Shunryu Suzuki cited in Kornfield 2009, p. 99).

Growing Our Capacity to Sit with Discomfort, Enacting Patience as a Form of Wisdom Without Judging, Striving, or Pushing Experience Out of Consciousness

As we engage with beginner’s mind, we grow our capacity to engage a non-judgmental or compassionate stance. Mindfulness provides a point of practice to notice the chatter of associations in the mind as we bounce between past and future—thinking, judging, comparing—barely landing in the present moment. This is an opportunity to notice *when we are on autopilot* with our beliefs and expectations.

Keep chewing without swallowing the object.

I notice I am feeling hungry. I wonder when this will be over? I begin to wonder what is for dinner. Dinner is not for 3 hours. Darn. I am still chewing these little bits of raisin. I really want to swallow them and move on to the next thing. I chastise myself for being impatient. I try to stay with the experience. I notice the movement between sweet and sour as the object moves on my tongue.

This shift to non-judgment then enables us to shift out of the automatic pilot of evaluative processing. As Goldstein (2013) describes, “When

we are not mindful, not aware, then we often get lost in unwholesome reactions, creating suffering for ourselves and others” (p. 13). These challenges are tied to our *judgments* which in addition to wanting and aversion include: *restlessness* (I wonder when this will be over? I really want to swallow them and move on to the next thing), and *wandering mind* (I wonder what is for dinner today?). There is also *sleepiness* and *doubt*. When I have done this exercise with my class of undergraduate students, they report wondering “What is the point of this? What does this have to do with therapeutic recreation?”

Now take a bite without swallowing the object.

Finally! I bite down, and notice how awkward it is to bite such a small object. A burst of sweetness comes forward. I smile. I notice how full the taste is in my mouth—sour, sweet. I feel my face wrinkle up in response. I don't like sour things. Saliva glands at the back of my mouth feel activated. I feel the object, now in two on my tongue. I want to swallow the object and intentionally resist again. I want a few more, I think to myself.

As we grow our capacity to sit with discomfort, we lean in to the things we avoid and let go of things to which we grasp or cling (wanting). Boorstein (1995) describes mindfulness as “the aware, balanced acceptance of the present experience. It isn't more complicated than that. It is opening to or receiving the present moment, pleasant or unpleasant, just as it is without either clinging to it or rejecting it” (p. 60). Easier said than done. This means shifting away from our automatic response to judge things as right or wrong, pleasant or unpleasant, or desirable or undesirable and then trying to fix or control the situation based on this assessment. Instead, mindfulness invites us to simply notice moments of wanting things we deem pleasant, right, or desirable (I only have 1 raisin, I want more), and aversion to things we deem to be unpleasant, wrong, or undesirable (I do not like sour). In mindfulness practice, we attempt to walk a path on the middle ground between aversion and pleasure seeking, to simply be with what is, be it pleasure, pain, and all other aspects of experience as it unfolds in each moment. When we can be present with the whole of experience of something or someone, when we can let go of the judgment of something being good or bad, positive or negative, all

we are left with is our experience. In these moments—when pain and joy can co-exist—we can be with the profound nature of experience, we can arrive into *being*.

As we continue to shift into direct connection with sensory experience, mindfulness engages in a reconnection of mindbody. Mindfulness then is the practice of slowing down and settling in to the twin modes of *non-doing* and *being*. With a reminder to return to the body, Kabat-Zinn (2005) reminds us that mindfulness means engaging in a non-doing mode. With an emphasis on the nature of mind (the cognitive component), Teasdale, Williams, and Segal (2014) ask us to settle in to “the being mode of mind” (p. 27).

Knowing Impermanence and Awakening Deeper Connection with Self, Others, and Environments (Interconnectedness), as We Become Aware of Tendencies for Disconnection and Isolation

Mindfulness begins to shift our relationship to ourselves, physical and emotional pain, mindbody, and to relationships. We come to know the many ways of impermanence and interconnectedness: “Wisdom arises when we pay attention to impermanence in ways we may already know but often overlook” (Goldstein 2013, p. 31). This includes the relationship of thought to emotion and emotion to thought and how each conditions the other (Goldstein 2013)

Keep chewing without swallowing the object and expand awareness to include your mouth, your whole body, the community, the country.

I bring awareness to the mouth that holds this raisin. I notice the tightness in my jaw as I will myself to hold on to the last piece of raisin that sits on my tongue. As I expand to bring awareness to my whole body holding this object I notice I am leaning to the left. I shift my posture to stack one vertebrae on top of the other and a deeper breath becomes possible. As I move outward to take in the whole country of Canada, the thought arises that this grape did not originate here. Soon my mind begins to wonder about the origins of this object. I become aware of the distance this one object has travelled and all of the resources needed to bring it here.

As I begin to “see” the raisin, I become aware of how I am grasping to it and also the myriad of conditions that have arisen for this raisin to be here (e.g., water and nutrients needed to grow the raisin, people to care and tend to the fruit, and all that was needed to transport the raisin to this moment). As we let go of our thoughts and judgments (attentional fixation, rumination), we may open more fully to the experience, “while enhancing sensory awareness of stressor’s broader socioenvironmental context” (Garland et al. 2015, pp. 298–299). In understanding the interconnection with all things, compassion is able to emerge (Kornfield 2009).

Letting Go (Non-attachment) to Thoughts, Feelings, or Situations We Want to Hold on to and Opening to Acceptance to See Things as They Really Are Without Illusion, Denial, or Resistance

Mindfulness asks us to deeply engage in a process of letting go of the constructs and frames of reference that we have learned, engrained, and habitually use to connect with ourselves and others as we negotiate being in the world. This process is deeply tied to the process of compassion. As Christina Feldman (2005) explains:

Love asks you to let go; compassion asks you to let go. Your capacity to be wholeheartedly present for anyone or anything in this world asks you to release your longing for how things used to be and your yearning for a better future. Letting go frees you to take your seat firmly in this moment and in the truth of loss and change.

(p. 114)

Mindfulness practice shifts our connections with our self and, in doing so, creates changes in our engagement with others. Through daily mindfulness practice, we begin to see the constructs we impose on self and others—constructs that keep us separate or divided. As Pema Chodron (1997) describes in *When Things Fall Apart: Heart Advice for Difficult Times*,

Only in an open, non-judgmental space can we acknowledge what we are feeling. Only in an open space where we're not caught up in our own version of reality can we see and hear and feel who others really are, which allows us to be with them and communicate with them properly.

(p. 78)

As we engage in practices of non-judgmental awareness, we also shift our capacity for social connection. Shifting away from thinking about relationships as transactional or as resources, Aronson (2012) describes, “two other bases upon which to consider relationships with others: engaged concern (compassion and love) and an absence of fixated connection (non-attachment)” (p. 204).

Engaging Insight Leisure in Practice, Teaching, and Research in Leisure Studies

Various disciplines and professions incorporate mindfulness practices to address physical and mental health, enrich teaching, leadership and therapeutic practices, and deepen spiritual understandings (Kumar 2005; Langer and Moldoveanu 2000; McGarvey 2010; Miller et al. 1998).

What if we engage insight leisure in practice, teaching, and research in leisure studies? This is the focus of the remaining section in this chapter. Rooted in a deeply engaged practice of mindfulness, I would like to introduce the notion of *insight leisure* to differentiate it from other leisure practices that are documented in our literature. To engage in insight leisure is to deeply experience what leisure is (a being mode), the being of and with the “full catastrophe” of leisure rather than what it does (a doing mode). Insight leisure cultivated through mindfulness embodies the following:

- clear seeing: able to see situations more clearly;
- presence: able to engage authentically (while inwardly attending with receptivity and ability to extend);
- capacity to see and respond to complexity: capacity to respond more effectively to complex or difficult situations;

- resiliency: able to find more balance in leisure, work, home, and in relationship without tending toward exhaustion and automatic pilot;
- creativity: capacity to be more creative; and
- spiritual ardency: “the wellspring of a courageous heart” (Goldstein 2013, p. 4) which provides the capacity to continue through all of the difficulties of the life journey.

In deep connection to ourselves, others, and experiences, spirit awakens. As we engage in an ongoing consistent practice of mindfulness, we begin to experience a deeper connection with self and become less susceptible to the vagaries of power emanating from social constructions embedded in our external world. Therein lies the connection to freedom—it becomes possible to exist in deeper connection with self, others, and the material and in deeper connection to creativity, play, and the sacred in leisure experiences.

Insight leisure has implications for practices, teaching and leadership, and research in leisure studies. Notice that in the previous paragraph, I stated that insight leisure *embodies* the following. I did not write that it leads to (outcomes) the aspects of experience described above. This is not a causal relationship that is often found in mindfulness research (i.e., if we engage in mindfulness we will achieve x, y, z); that is, we cannot do insight leisure as a striving to achieve particular outcomes as this does not embrace the attitudes of mindfulness. Rather, these aspects of experience (presence, spiritual ardency) are interwoven within the cultivation of mindfulness, and they are not separable or able to be reduced from the practice. In this way, we are called to approach mindfulness and insight leisure as practitioners, educators, and researchers in a different way. A mindfulness approach adds alternative ways of knowing and *being* focused on acceptance of people just as they are, while exploring processes that allow practitioners, participants, and researchers to be *present-centered*; attending to the *present moment* with curiosity and openness; and to accept sensation, emotions, and thoughts non-judgmentally. Introducing mindfulness as content provides participants with opportunities to view self compassionately, to think clearly about needs, and be curious about present choices.

While explorations of mindfulness are quite limited in leisure studies, it has been taken up in explorations of leisure (*cf.* Gim 2009; Sanford 2007), therapeutic recreation (*cf.* Arai et al. 2016a, b; Carruthers and Hood 2011; Curtis et al. 2015; Dattilo 2015), community development (*cf.* Arai and Tepylo 2016), and tourism (*cf.* Nawjin 2011). Gim (2009) introduces mindfulness through some of the ideas found in Buddhist texts. Carruthers and Hood (2011) describe mindfulness in relation to savoring, happiness, and flourishing in their leisure and well-being model. Arai, Griffin, and Grau (2016a, b) explore mindfulness and sensorimotor aspects of outdoor adventure experiences in relation to cognitive flexibility, self-knowledge, and healing in the aftermath of trauma and eating disorders. Curtis et al. (2015) explore yoga and post-traumatic stress disorder, and Sanford (2007) describes white-water kayaking as a ritual practice. Sanford (2007) describes kayaking as an embodied encounter with the sacred mediated through physical performance in the water. Negotiating risks requires skill, awareness of the river, and embodied mindfulness. Narayanan and Macbeth (2009) found tourists develop a growing sense of self-awareness in the desert. However, neither solitude nor activities necessarily bring mindfulness; quieting the mind comes with specific training. Nawjin (2011) explores mindfulness to enhance happiness during travel experiences. These areas of exploration are leading us to a new way forward in thinking about leisure. As we continue on this journey of mindfulness in practices of leisure, it is also important to embed explorations in embodied practices as the basis for knowing mindfulness. This will help to disrupt the imposition of Western thinking on mindfulness so that we do not fall into some of the critiques raised in studies of mindfulness. These critiques and a different way forward are the focus of the following sections.

How Might We Embrace Buddhist Psychology?

The roots of leisure studies in Western notions of developmental psychology have emphasized the role of leisure in tasks of individuation, separation, and attachment. Previously, as these concepts were taken up in

practices like therapeutic recreation, there was a tendency to emphasize the individual's needs or deficits and the qualities that will manifest independent functioning. Instead, Buddhism reveals to us a different set of qualities about leisure, which emphasize the mind's capacity for wisdom, love, and compassion as the conditions for leisure practices, and caring as the spiritual equivalent of developmental tasks such as attachment, separation, and individuation. As a challenge to the emphasis on autonomy and individualism in leisure studies, Buddhism reveals much to us about the relational capacity of leisure and the idea of "social interdependence" (Aronson 2012).

How Might We Avoid Reducing Mindfulness Practice to Activity?

As mindfulness is taken up more in practices of leisure, recreation, therapeutic recreation, and tourism, we need to avoid reducing mindfulness practices to activity or physical activity. At times, the concept of mindfulness is thinly used and connoted with having an awareness of something but without connecting it to the engaged practices of mindfulness (*cf.* critique by Holloway et al. 2011) described in the first half of this chapter. We have seen this beginning to happen when yoga and martial arts are offered at recreation centers and offered as activity by a practitioner who is not rooted in mindfulness practice. It is important to keep in mind that the presence and cultivation of the foundational attitudes of mindfulness are central to any practice. For example, while the West often approaches yoga and the martial arts as physical activity, the foundation for both revolves around meditation, mindfulness, and harmonizing with the universe. As Eastern practices continue to be taken up in the West, will need to avoid the assumptions that when yoga and martial arts are offered in practice that they are necessarily engaged practices of mindfulness. Mindfulness cannot be reduced to a technique or strategy that can be taught in a three-hour workshop, nor is it an appeal to lofty and permanent goals (a forever wakened or enlightened state).

How Might We Avoid Reducing Mindfulness to Goal Orientation and Fixing Problems?

There is a large body of literature that connects mindfulness practice to reductions in stress (Kabat-Zinn 2005), depression (Barnhofer and Crane 2009; Teasdale et al. 2014; Williams, et al. 2007), anxiety (Greeson and Brantley 2009; Stahl et al. 2014), eating disorders (Wolever and Best 2009), addictions (Bien and Bien 2002; Bien 2009; Bowen et al. 2011), and pain (Burch and Penman 2013; Gardner-Nix 2009). It is important to understand that mindfulness is not used to fix problems; it is not a rational process of mind. Mindfulness is a deeper practice of cultivating insight which itself has no goal. Mindfulness as it is taken up in the West is being reduced when we do not shift out of a goal orientation. When we focus the provision of leisure pursuits and activities on participation and problem identification (i.e., engaging in the *doing* of leisure to increase health benefits, develop socially appropriate skills, or increase community well-being), we limit our understandings of insight leisure and mindfulness. It is important not to lose sight that these “outcomes” are connected to a deeper practice of cultivation. We are wise to remember Kabat-Zinn’s (2005) words that as you engage in your own practice of mindfulness meditation, you “will come to know something for yourself about your own not knowing. It is not that mindfulness is the ‘answer’ to all life’s problems. Rather it is that all life’s problems can be seen more clearly” (pp. 25–26).

How Might We Shift Awareness from Doing to Explorations of Being?

This shift to an emphasis on *being* has begun to emerge in therapeutic recreation with mindfulness integrated into programs and individual practices of recreation therapists. For example, cultivating mindfulness is central for engaging trauma survivors in experiential leisure exercises and psychoeducation to explore the impact of trauma and leisure in their lives (Arai et al. 2008). Mindfulness reflects values inherent in *leisure* such as choice, expression of oneself, and nourishing one’s well-being. Instead of a leisure or therapeutic recreation professional as an *expert* applying standardized

frames of activity or treatment, mindfulness enables practitioner and participant to dwell in the deep of one's own processes, open to exploring the whole catastrophe of the present moment with curiosity. Mindfulness cannot be solely reduced to a treatment per se for depression or anxiety; however, it does support a shift in awareness to present moment experience rather than ruminations of the past (depression) and worry and panic about the future (anxiety) and supports noticing and steadying oneself in the impermanence of experience (e.g., pain, joy, sadness).

How Might We Shift from Hedonism to Explore Meaning Making, Savoring, and Eudaimonia?

A growing body of literature in neuroscience and Buddhist psychology explores the inner workings of mindfulness. For example, Garland et al. (2015) make the connection between mindfulness, cognitive flexibility, narrative meaning making, and eudaimonia. As they state:

mindfulness introduces flexibility into the creation of autobiographical meaning, stimulating the natural human capacity to positively reappraise adverse events and savor the positive aspects of experience. By fostering positive reappraisals and emotions, mindfulness may generate deep eudaimonic meanings that promote resilience and engagement with a valued and purposeful life.

(Garland et al. 2015, pp. 295–296)

These authors connect “hedonic adaptation” as playing an important role in minimizing the psychological impact of negative life events. In contrast, an emphasis on mindfulness practice in relation to eudaimonia is connected to “a sustainable, positive trajectory of stress resilience and well-being” (Garland et al. 2015, p. 296).

How Might We Create Conditions that Support Letting Go?

In an attempt, I think, to foster letting go, we have turned at times in leisure studies, tourism, and therapeutic recreation to the creation of

sacred environments and spaces. For example, tourism often focuses on the creation of retreats and pilgrimages. This calls for us to be aware of connection to sacred environments but also awareness of the complex conditions they create (e.g., for racialized groups with complex histories of colonization). As we turn to practices of mindfulness, we will need to expand our consciousness and also capacity to be with the emotions and sensations that come with insight in these sacred spaces. Emotions that we often suppress may arise (e.g., anger, sadness) as we become aware of the oppressions imposed in built environments, in the creation of place, and the social constructions of relationships and identities. With an emphasis on impermanence, these too will need space to rise and pass. This raises a call for *ardency* in leisure practitioners. To be ardent is to use a balanced and sustained application of effort. As Goldstein (2013) describes, spiritual ardency “is the wellspring of a courageous heart. It gives us the strength to continue through all the difficulties of the journey. The question for us is how to practice and cultivate ardency, so that it becomes a powerful and onward-leading force in our lives” (Goldstein 2013, p. 3). Too often though, we have tended toward further oppression, silencing, or rendering invisible experiences and others who bring to consciousness experiences of oppression.

How Might We Embrace Paradox in Leisure Studies?

Mindfulness requires that we have theoretical frameworks and methodologies that move away from reductionism and the creation of binaries or dualisms in our research approaches. Too often, there are assumptions inherent in leisure research that all leisure activity is good activity associated with positive benefits with a blindness to the more challenging or painful aspects of leisure. We also become fixated on beliefs or thoughts that there is a single universal truth. As we bring a mindfulness framework to explore insight leisure in contexts such as therapeutic recreation, heritage, nature, wildlife, outdoor recreation, and wellness/spiritual retreats, we will need to embrace paradox and multiplicity.

Mindfulness and Buddhism offer us one approach to embracing paradox (others include knowledge from other Eastern traditions,

indigenous knowledge, existentialism). Embracing paradox is the call to shift away from Cartesian thinking to explore intersecting pairs such as choice–responsibility, connection–isolation, living–dying, and meaning–meaninglessness (Farley 2008; van Deurzen-Smith 1997). Embracing paradox means being with the whole catastrophe of these experiences and engaging lenses and methodologies that allow us to open to the broad aspects of being. For example, the literature on pilgrimage tourism touts the connection to “trials of the spirit,” encountering the “other,” self-transformation and self-realization, as well as contemplation, meditation, silence, and rituals connected to sacred sites, religious or spiritual practices, and individual desires. Insight leisure asks us to embrace the paradox, it is this too, and also asks that we open with beginner’s mind to colonizing histories, past and present, as well as power relationships and the complex impact of intersecting economies.

When we are able to engage in paradoxical thinking (and paradoxical experience), we relinquish the division between right-wrong, subjectivity-objectivity, masculine-feminine and engage in a “both/and perspective” (Farley 2008) to open up space for other possibilities. This asks us to embrace multiplicity—the understanding that “each individual is unique and thus will experience their world in a completely unique way, we also have to agree that our individual experiences, even of the same phenomenon, will result in unique perceptions and responses” (Farley 2008, p. 22). As Farley (2008) describes, this calls us to see:

the human journey as an experience wrought with profound possibility; with awareness that all aspects of our being encompass both the good and the bad, the masculine and feminine, the right and the wrong. It is our willingness to accept this and to make our choices in life accordingly that affords us the gift of living a meaningful and balanced life.

There are many paradoxes to be explored. Here we can also include exploration of the eight worldly dharmas—pleasure and pain, gain and loss, fame and disgrace, and praise and blame. As the teaching describes, it is becoming immersed in these four pairs of opposites that keeps us stuck in the pain of *samsara* (suffering) as we grasp at the first aspect of each

pair and attempt to avoid the second aspect. Chodron (1997) reminds us that these pairs we create are “nothing concrete in themselves,” that we make up the eight worldly dharmas “as we react to what happens to us in the world” (p. 47). Nor are we or our paradigms, theories, and fields of study including leisure, therapeutic recreation, and tourism, “all that solid either” (Chodron 1997, p. 47).

A Present Moment Awareness of Insight Leisure

Rather than a conclusion, I end this chapter with a statement that what I reflected on these pages is itself impermanent and rife with complexities and paradoxes. Despite two and a half centuries of texts on Buddhism and mindfulness, we enter into this exploration of insight leisure as a true beginner. I have offered here some foundational ideas that I think are useful to leisure studies, and also some of the perils of exploration to avoid as we embark on this adventure. There is much depth and richness that awaits to enliven and awaken possibilities for freedom and justice in leisure studies. The path forward for leisure studies will be to continue these various threads of exploration and new avenues for insight, mindfully.

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Traditional Sport in Japan

Minoru Matsunami

Introduction (Preface)

This chapter looks at traditional Japanese sport. These do not include modern sports or competitive sports such as Olympic sports, which have a Western origin and were introduced to Japan in the Meiji period (1868–1912). This does not mean there were no activities like sport in Japan before this time. There were many physical activities which were sport-like in nature and related to the livelihood and lifestyles in ancient Japan. When I talk of traditional sport, I use the term “sport” in its wider sense.

According to Japanese mythology, Japan is a country that has the longest history in the world. The historical records “*Kojiki*” (Record of Ancient Matters) and “*Nihonshoki*” (Chronicles of Japan) say that Japan was founded by Emperor Jimmu in 660 B.C. In other words, Japan has

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a history more than 2600 years. Since then, Japanese royalty can trace its lineage in straight succession until today.

This chapter focuses on the ethnic and traditional sport that existed before the introduction of modern sports into Japan. First, I will discuss Japanese mythology and sport particularly in relation to *sumo*. Second, I will discuss traditional sport in Japan. Finally, I will elaborate on the spirit of *budo*.

Japanese Mythology and Sumo

An Outline of Japanese History and Culture

To begin with, I provide an outline of Japanese history and culture. Humans began living on the islands of Japan from the Old Stone Age (Paleolithic period). The oldest stone tools and human bones discovered date back more than 30,000 years in Japan. During the Jomon period, this was from 10,000 B.C. until around fourth or third century B.C., people depended mainly on hunting, fishing, and gathering for their livelihood. In the ensuing Yayoi period, which lasted to around third century, the Japanese mastered the art of rice cultivation and set the fundamental patterns of Japanese life.

According to the Chinese historical books, a united kingdom called Yamatai which was ruled by Queen Himiko flourished in Japan in the first half of the third century. Japan was divided into numerous small warring countries at that time and Himiko brought stability to Japan. In the fourth century, powerful clans emerged in the Kinki region which is in the western part of Japan. These were consolidated into the Yamato Court which later evolved into the Imperial Family. During this time, people were engaged in agriculture focusing on rice cultivation under the domination of the Emperor. Thus, Japan was united gradually over a long period of time. Therefore, a date of the actual founding of Japan cannot be specified.

On the other hand, it was written that the first Emperor Jimmu founded Japan in 660 B.C. in “*Kojiki*” (Records of Ancient Matters) which was compiled in 712 and “*Nihonshoki*” (Chronicles of Japan)

which was compiled in 720. This means that there are 125 generations from the first Emperor to the present Emperor. It is very difficult to prove that what is written in “*Kojiki*” and “*Nihonshoki*” are historically accurate. However, there is no evidence that the Imperial lineage has been interrupted after the sixth century in Japan. Therefore, the Imperial Family has ruled Japan for at least 1500 years or more. This is unparalleled in the world. Japan is a country with a rare long history in the world.

Japanese myths are deeply connected to Japanese religion, Shintoism. The Japanese belief system is polytheistic. There are so many gods that Japanese people call them the gods of eight million kinds (myriads of gods) in Japanese mythology. From ancient Japan, there is a concept about gods that gods live in the entire universe. Gods, with a supernatural nature, have a human nature at the same time and gods were depicted as realistic presences in these myths. The myths found in “*Kojiki*” and “*Nihonshoki*” are based on Shintoism that originated in ancient Japan. Shintoism had a great influence on the development of Japan. Buddhism was transmitted to Japan via mainland China in the early sixth century. Shintoism and Buddhism were mixed (the syncretism of Shinto and Buddhism) and reorganized as one religion system in the Nara period (eighth century).

In the Meiji period (1868–1912), the Japanese government prohibited the mixture of Shintoism and Buddhism and promoted the separation of Shintoism and Buddhism as government policy for national integration under Emperor Meiji. That is to say, Japanese believed in the conflation of religions for a long time.

The reason that the people in Japan believed in the mixed religion of Shintoism and Buddhism was that the original religious tendencies of Japan was polytheistic worship of nature. As I mentioned before, Shintoism closely ties the worship of nature to Japanese mythology. Shintoism was believed to protect the community (tribes and villages) related by territorial and blood bonds. In contrast, Buddhism has been believed in for the purpose of personal spiritual peace, enlightenment of soul, and the protection of the nation. Thus, the purposes of these two faiths were different. This was also one reason that the Japanese believed in the conflation of these religions.

Dating back to ancient times, Japan belonged to the cultural sphere of China and had imported Chinese culture from the continent. However, Japan simultaneously built a unique culture of its own because Japan is a collection of islands surrounded by the sea. Japan's warm and humid climate is suitable for rice cultivation. The development of rice cultivation provided the foundation of the ancient nation of Japan. It was also a deciding factor of Japanese ethnic characteristics such as group consciousness, because rice cultivation in Japan requires people to work together cooperatively in planting and harvesting the rice during specific time frames. Good organization of the entire village was very important for the allocation of irrigation water to rice paddies. This aspect of village life stressed the importance of the group in daily life, whether at work or at play. Moreover, it also fostered an attitude of diligence, strict punctuality, and other ethnical characteristics particular to the Japanese.

From the ancient times, Japan has called their country "the land blessed with rice", reflecting the important role of rice not only as the staple food but also as the foundation of Japanese life and culture. Although initially imported, this culture based on rice cultivation has become part of the very fiber of the Japanese identity and what makes Japanese culture unique.

Sumo in Japanese Mythology

The oldest Japanese historical record books are, as I said before, "*Kojiki*" and "*Nihonshoki*". Both were records about Japanese mythology. The purpose of the story in "*Kojiki*" is to hand down the history of the nation of Japan such as "What is Japan" and "What is the Emperor" to posterity.

Combat sports are one of the oldest sports in the world. There are many types of combat sports all over the world. As a combat sport, *sumo* is a unique style of wrestling in Japan. There were articles about *sumo* in "*Kojiki*" and "*Nihonshoki*".

Sumo in "*Kojiki*" is the wrestling of the gods named Takemikazuchi (the god of the thunder and also the god of sword) and Takeminakata (the water god and also god of metallurgy and iron manufacturing) at the beach of Inasa in Izumo in ancient time. It is called the myth of the transfer of land, and it should not be recognized as a historical fact.

Takeminakata, the son of Okuninushi, tried to wrestle with Takemikazuchi to decide who was stronger. Takemikazuchi was dispatched from the kingdom of gods to get the land of Okuninushi. Okuninushi was the king of gods in Izumo. Takemikazuchi changed his own arm into an icicle and then into a sword and attacked Takeminakata while Takeminakata held Takemikazuchi's arm. Further, Takemikazuchi held Takeminakata's arm and squeezed it easily and then threw it away. Thus, Takemikazuchi defeated Takeminakata. Takeminakata handed over his land to Takemikazuchi. The myth tells how the transfer of territory was decided by *sumo* between gods. The area of the territory affects the quantity of the harvest of the rice. To get territory means to gain control of the rice harvested there.

This fight is the one of the original myths of *sumo*. It was also clear that *sumo* functioned as a trial by ordeal because gods wrestled to decide the territory. Therefore, by wrestling in front of gods, the winner was judged as right.

In "*Nihonshoki*", there is another story of two human *sumo* wrestlers named Nomino-Sukune and Taimano-Kehaya who wrestled in 23 B.C. This story is also one of the original myths of *sumo*.

Taimano-Kehaya, who lived in the country of Yamato and boasted a Herculean strength, looked for an opponent to fight who was either dead or alive. Emperor Suinin heard about the story and called Nomino-Sukune from the country of Izumo. He was a warrior who was very famous for his strength. Emperor Suinin let them wrestle *sumo*. Nomino-Sukune and Taimano-Kehaya kicked each other and Nomino-Sukune stepped on and broke Taimano-Kehaya's back killing him. Nomino-Sukune won *sumo* and was praised as the god of *sumo*. The territory of Taimano-Kehaya was confiscated and given to Nomino-Sukune, and Nomino-Sukune served for Emperor Suinin afterward.

Later, Nomino-Sukune was responsible for the funeral of the Imperial Family. Thus, *sumo* became connected to the funereal rite. *Sumo* is the ritual to send a soul to the next world (heaven). It should be noted that *sumo* of Nomino-Sukune and Taimano-Kehaya is the origin of *Sumai no sechie* (the Imperial ceremony of *sumo* wrestling). Thus, *sumo* appears in Japanese myth and is called one of the oldest sports in Japan.

Sumai no sechie was one of the Imperial Court events held from around the eighth century to the twelfth century. The *rikishi*(s) (*sumo* wrestlers) were selected from all over Japan to wrestle *sumo* in front of the Emperor. This *sumo* was wrestled as a part of fertility rites connected to growing rice. *Sumo* wrestlers were bare-handed in their bouts and wore only a loincloth called *mawashi*. *Sumo* of *Sumai no sechie* did not have a *dohyo* (the ring for *sumo* wrestling) or an umpire. The first person who touches the ground with any part of his body except the soles of his feet is the loser. The final judgment was passed by the Emperor.

As Japanese culture was tied closely to the culture of rice growing, *sumo* was also closely tied to the rice crop. The present-day *dohyo* is surrounded by bags made of straw. The straw bag is made from the dried stems of rice.

In addition, *sumo* includes the movement called *shiko*, stepping cautiously on the earth. This action of rising one's foot high and placing the foot on the ground. This is conducted to send bad spirits (malicious) in the earth away. The grounds where bad spirits were sent away by stamping (*shiko*) became good farmland and so a good harvest of rice was expected. Thus, *sumo* is deeply related to soil fertility rites in Japan.

In *O-zumo* (the present grand *sumo* tournament), the form of *sumo* carried out today, *dohyo* is remade every tournament, and *dohyo* festival is performed to pray for the safety and security of *sumo* tournament on the day before the first day of *sumo* tournament. Rice, dried cuttlefish, dried seaweed, salt, torrey nuts, and dried chestnuts are buried in the center of *dohyo*, and sacred *sake* is poured into the center of *dohyo*. So, as can be seen by these practices, *sumo* is still closely tied to religious services, especially Shinto rituals, even now.

The History of Sumo

Sumo traces its beginnings back to some of Japan's earliest myths and was performed as a Shinto ritual in the Imperial Court. *Sumo* had the ceremonious function as soil fertile rite and funeral rite. In addition, *sumo* was entertainment and recreation for the common people.

Sumo was also used as training for battle of the *samurai* (*bushi*, warriors) in the Kamakura period (around 1185–1333).

It is during the Edo period (1603–1868) that *sumo* took its current form.

During this time, funds were needed to cover the expense to repair the old Shinto shrine and Buddhist temple. Therefore, it was started to have *sumo* tournaments to raise the necessary money through entrance fees in the precincts of Shinto shrines and Buddhist temples. This is the origin of *Kanjin-sumo* (admission charged for a *sumo* show). *Kanjin* means that collecting money to build and repair such buildings as Shinto shrines, Buddhist temples, Buddha statues, and so on. Because *sumo* in those days did not have clear rules, the rules and systems of *sumo* were gradually established during this time.

For example, a *dohyo* (sumo ring) was created. The place to wrestle *sumo* was not decided until then, but a *dohyo* limited the place of *sumo*. Through the *dohyo*, a new standard of victory was decided. The *rikishi* (sumo wrestler) who was pushed out of the *dohyo* became the loser. A new technique of pushing away the opponents to win appeared. Furthermore, the *rikishi* started to become physically larger in order to gain an advantage when pushing. The *rikishi* needed an unusually big body in addition to a technique to throw an opponent.

Kanjin-sumo was a tournament which was performed for eight days during fine weather. If it rained, *Kanjin-sumo* was canceled and no admission was able to collect. Therefore, a roof was placed over the *dohyo* to prevent the ground getting wet from rain. Thus, the ticket sales of *Kanjin-sumo* became stable. *Kanjin-sumo* gained popularity due to the activity of the excellent *sumo* wrestlers.

After the Edo period, a new government, the Meiji government, was formed in the Meiji Restoration (1868). In the name of Westernizing Japan, it was said that past systems and customs were barbarian. Japan was going to introduce Western culture as a means by which to modernize the country. Because of this, traditional Japanese culture was banned. *Sumo* lost popularity because *sumo* wrestlers were regarded as old-fashioned and barbarian because they were almost naked. This all changed when the Emperor Meiji watched *sumo* on March 10th in 1885. Due to the fact that *sumo* matches were held in the presence of the Emperor, *sumo* was accepted socially again. It was an opportunity for the revival of *sumo*.

In 1909, Ryogoku Kokugikan was built. Kokugikan was the permanent *sumo* wrestling arena. The seating capacity was 10,000 people. In 1928, when radio broadcasting began, *sumo* became one of the first Japanese media-sports. After World War II, *sumo* gained in popularity with Japanese people with the spread of television.

The biggest feature of current *sumo* is that the performance reflects many aspects of Edo culture. The *chonmage* (topknot), *mawashi* (loincloth), the costume of *gyoji* (referee), *yobidashi* (usher), writing style used to write the rankings of *sumo*, and so on are all examples of the *sumo* culture that was unique to Edo culture. The *rikishi* with topknot and wearing of a loincloth is totally different from modern people's appearance. This means that a *sumo* wrestler is not a common person and an existence near to god. Therefore, it is believed that a baby who is hugged by a *sumo* wrestler will grow up healthy. *Yokozuna*, the highest ranking of *sumo* wrestler, is worshiped as the existence that is nearest to god. *Sumo* is accepted as not only sport but also Shinto ritual by Japanese people now. Even today, *sumo* is seen by most Japanese as the national sport of Japan.

Traditional Sport in Japan

Modern sports (competitive sport or Western sport) were introduced into Japan after the nineteenth century. The first, gymnastics were adopted in military education and modern sports were played in school for education. However, there was sport-like physical activity before this. Here, I will provide an overview of some traditional sports in Japan before modern sports were introduced.

Sport for the Nobility

Because sport has the ability to facilitate communication with others, it is very effective as rites. It may be said that a ruler hierarchy was born from about third century when an ancient nation was formed in Japan. The nobility who form the ruling hierarchy played sports as means by which to establish authority. In addition, the sports were strongly tied with military training.

In the law code system nation which began in the mid-seventh century, sports were played as a seasonal event in the Imperial Court. These sports were Japanese archery, horse racing, and *sumo* wrestling. Those sports related to the sports performed in the cultural sphere of Silk Road and were transferred from the Chinese continent.

In the feudal society that was established with the birth of *samurai* (*bushi*, warrior) class and which expanded under their power in the thirteenth century, *samurai* and noble played sports such as Japanese archery, horse race and *sumo*.

Japanese Archery

Archery competitions were carried out in the Imperial Court from ancient times. Of course the bow and arrow is a means of the hunting and fighting in battles, but was also considered as a means by which to exorcize evil spirits. The rites are to keep the evil at a distance by making sounds with the bowstring or by shooting an arrow into the sky. By making these ceremonies important, it showed that the Emperor was the pinnacle of power in Japan's social hierarchy.

Horse Race and Equestrian Archery

Horses as domestic animals were imported to the Japanese islands in the fifth century. Japanese people could gain access to greater power by using domestic animals. For example, using horses enabled people to move things in bulk and also allowed for faster communication and exchange of information. Controlling information is related to the power of government to enforce its authority. In addition, horses were not only the means to move things but also an important battle tool. The technique of horse riding was very important for battle. Thus, it helped the *samurai* enforce their authority.

The competitive events such as horse racing were also a way to select the swiftest horse. Connecting with archery led to equestrian archery. Horse race and equestrian archery in Imperial Court were also seasonal rites.

Hunting and *Takagari* (Hawking)

Hunting was a privileged sport of rulers, and it was also a symbol of authority. The Emperor had his own hunting field. Hunting on horseback was one way of training in the technique of equestrian archery and organized military force. Not only the Emperor but also the local powers held hunting events in their own hunting fields to show their power.

The custom of hawking was transferred to Japan from the nomadic tribes in Central Asia via Korean Peninsula. Hawking was performed as the privileged play of the Emperor and the feudal lords. For the rulers, hunting was also carried out as a recreational activity until the end of Edo period (mid-nineteenth century.)

Kemari (An Ancient Football Game Played in the Imperial Palace)

Kemari is a kind of ball game. *Kemari* had come from China to Japan during the Yamato period in the seventh century. There are no winners or losers in this game. The objective of this game is simply to pass the ball to fellow players successively without the players dropping the ball on the ground. *Kemari* was enthusiastically played within the Imperial Palace.

During the Kamakura period (around thirteenth century), in addition to the Imperial Palace, *samurai* (*bushi*, warrior) classes also engaged in *Kemari*. Through the Muromachi period to the Edo period (approximately mid-fourteenth to mid-nineteenth century), *Kemari* also became popular with the common people.

However, after the Meiji Restoration, *Kemari* declined in popularity, and in 1903, with a donation from the Emperor Meiji, a society to preserve the ancient game was established, resulting in the survival of *Kemari* to this day.

Dakyu (Ancient Japanese Polo)

Dakyu (Ancient Japanese polo) is of Persian origin. It was introduced into Europe and became polo. The same ancient game however was introduced

to Japan via China and the Korean Peninsula and became *dakyu* during the eighth or ninth century.

Dakyu became an annual event in the Imperial Palace performed on the seasonal court banquet of the *Tango* Boy's Festival (on May 5th) in the Nara and the Heian periods (eighth to twelfth century). During the Kamakura period, the game declined, but in the Edo period (seventeenth to mid-nineteenth century), *dakyu* was promoted as a form of exercise for warfare on horseback, and leading to its resurgence.

In the Meiji period, ancient traditional forms of equestrianism were increasingly changed to more practical European forms. Thus, *dakyu* once again declined. However, *dakyu* is still practiced and preserved in the stables of the Imperial Household Agency in the former popular mid-Edo period style.

Sport for the Common People

Tug-of-War

The physical activity of “pulling the rope” has been carried out associated with faith and ritual in many parts of the world since ancient times. Tug-of-war, or “pulling the rope”, has been done in various forms such as the ritual to pray for a good harvest, to quell conflict, and as a means of acquiring territory.

As in other Asian countries, the history of Japanese tug-of-war is also old. It has been carried out in many places as a ritual that predicts a good harvest and fortune. Tug-of-war had been popular as a game of common people in the Kamakura and Muromachi periods. Tug-of-war as a fertility ritual in Japan is common event in the New Year and *Bon* Festival (Buddhist festival of dead). Even to this day, tug-of-war is held as a traditional event to pray for a good harvest and a good catch in various parts of Japan.

Tug-of-war continues to be performed at physical education events since the spread of *Undokai* (athletic meets) that came to be held in various parts of Japan in Meiji period.

***Chikara-Ishi* (Lifting a Heavy Stone)**

Chikara-Ishi is a huge and heavy stone (It weighs about 60–300 kg). Typically, *Chikara-Ishi* is to hold and to lift the huge stone. There are various ways to lift the stone such as to chest, until the shoulder, up overhead, or not attached to the body. Young men challenge each other to lift *Chikara-Ishi* to show their physical strength. The contest of strength was a common form of recreation of youth in the past. *Chikara-Ishi* was also a rite of passage. Lifting a huge stone was regarded as having reached adulthood.

A contest of strength using *Chikara-Ishi* was performed at villages and towns in a various part of Japan from the Edo period to Meiji period. *Chikara-Ishi* was performed as a part of a festival's program at *Jinja* shrines (Shinto shrines) and Buddhism temples. The stone used for *Chikara-Ishi* was dedicated there.

As *Chikara-Ishi* was an activity to show Herculean strength, *Chikara-Ishi* was strongly related to *sumo*. The stone used for *Chikara-Ishi* is also dedicated at Ekoin temple in Ryogoku where *Kanjin-sumo* was held in Edo period.

Festivals

There is a close relationship between Japanese traditional sports and festivals. A feast is a stylized action to supernatural existence. There are many festivals performed periodically in conjunction with an annual event and a rite of passage. Thus, a festival is included in the cycle of the daily life. Moreover, a festival is transfer from daily life to the extraordinariness.

The etymology of “sport” is “*deportare*” of the Latin. The meaning of “*deportare*” is a pastime and play, and it can be said that this means transferring from daily life to the extraordinariness. In other words, sport is also movement to non-daily life, and is tied to feasts.

Many Japanese feasts are affected by folk belief tied to nature worship and Shintoism and Buddhism. Feast is a communication with gods. Dance, physical activity, and the feast are communication tools with gods. The festival is held by the whole community with one of the goals of the festival being building a sense of community.

It is difficult to generalize the function of Japanese festivals as an annual event. However, the four seasons play an important role in determining the function of a festival. Festivals in spring pray for fertility. Festivals in summer pray for protection from epidemics. Festivals in autumn celebrate Thanksgiving Day. At these events, people dedicate dance and physical activity such as *sumo*, archery, horse racing, tug-of-war, and *Chikara-Ishi* to the gods. These activities were developed from one event into festivals.

The Birth and Philosophy of *Budo*

Budo (Japanese martial arts) was developed from *Ko-bujutsu* (old Japanese martial arts) after the Meiji Restoration. *Bujutsu* are techniques to kill, injure, and control the opponents. In contrast, *budo* is the philosophy of self-development. The philosophy of *budo* has changed over time, and it is different from the organizations related to the arts, and cannot be defined as just one idea.

According to the Japanese Budo Association (Nippon budo kyoukai), the philosophy of *budo* is the following:

Budo, the Japanese martial ways, have their origins in the age-old martial spirit of Japan. Through centuries of historical and social change, these forms of traditional culture evolved from combat techniques (*jutsu*) into ways of self-development (*do*).

Seeking the perfect unity of mind and technique, *budo* has been refined and cultivated into ways of physical training and spiritual development. The study of *budo* encourages courteous behaviour, advances technical proficiency, strengthens the body, and perfects the mind. Modern Japanese have inherited traditional values through *budo* which continue to play a significant role in the formation of the Japanese personality, serving as sources of boundless energy and rejuvenation. As such, *budo* has attracted strong interest internationally, and is studied around the world.

However, a recent trend towards infatuation just with technical ability compounded by an excessive concern with winning is a severe threat to the essence of *budo*. To prevent any possible misrepresentation, practitioners of *budo* must continually engage in self-examination and endeavour to perfect and preserve this traditional culture.

(Nippon Budokan 2014)

Budo is based on the traditional Japanese culture, and *budo* was established by modern restructuring with learning from modern sports in modern times. Thus, *budo* has both elements of tradition and modernity essentially.

The Beginning of *Budo*

Budo is not the same as *bujutsu*. *Budo* was created based on *bujutsu* after the modernization of Japan.

The Chinese character “*jutsu*” means technique, so *bujutsu* means combat techniques. On the other hand, the Chinese character “*do*” means one’s way of life, so *budo* has educational meaning. That is to say, *bujutsu* is the technique of martial arts and *budo* is the educational system. In other words, the role of *bujutsu* changed. *Bujutsu*, the technique of combat, changed to *budo* which became esteemed part of education after Japanese modernization.

The origin of *bujutsu* can be traced to the birth of mankind. *Sumo*, archery, and Japanese fencing (*kenjutsu*, Japanese swordsmanship) are some forms of *bujutsu*. *Bujutsu*’s origins date back to around the tenth century, when the *bushi* (*samurai*, Japanese warrior) class was born. *Bushi(s)* are professionals who specialized in *bujutsu*, Japanese martial arts. From the latter half of the fifteenth century to the sixteenth century, the power of the *bushi* became stronger and *bushi* started to play a leading role in Japanese history. It is called the Warring States period. Battles between powerful groups of *bushi* occurred frequently in various places in Japan. *Bujutsu* as techniques of battles began to become specialized and various schools of *bujutsu* were born.

In the seventeenth century, the Edo period started, and since there were no battles between *bushi*, *bujutsu* became a way to cultivate *samurai* spirit.

After the Meiji Restoration, the entire society had been forced to modernize rapidly by the Meiji government. A modern military system was also introduced from Europe. The *samurai* (warrior) class was dissolved. It was prohibited to carry the sword as the symbol of *samurai*. Moreover, *samurai* society was regarded as outdated. *Bujutsu* was also regarded as outdated and faced extinction.

However, the Satsuma Rebellion (1877), a civil war between Satsuma warriors and the Meiji new government, became an opportunity to reevaluate traditional *bujutsu*. The governmental army defeated the Satsuma warriors through the use of firearms and guns, but it was reconfirmed that *bujutsu* (*jujutsu* and *kenjutsu*) were useful for close (hand-to-hand) combat. That is why Japanese police started to train in *jujutsu* and *kenjutsu*.

Budo was considered as an educational system to discipline the mind and body not as a military art from the Meiji (1868–1912) to Taisho (1912–1926) period.

After the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895), *Bushido* (the spirit and behavior of *samurai*) experienced boom in Japan with the rise of imperialism. Under the influence of *Bushido* and imperialism, *budo* was used to encourage militarism and nationalism.

Japan was occupied under the General Headquarters, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers after World War II. As *budo* had been influenced by ultra-nationalism, it was regarded as dangerous and prohibited all over Japan at that time. Therefore, to reestablish *budo* as an important cultural asset, the emphasis was shifted from militarism and nationalism to that of *budo* as sport.

The Diffusion of *Judo*

In this section, I will discuss about *judo* and its spirit because *judo* is a form of *budo* that has spread all over the world and is an official Olympic sport. *Judo* was established according to the vision of Jigoro Kano. The basis of *judo* is *jujutsu*, and Kano transformed *jujutsu* into *judo*.

The Founder of *Judo*, Jigoro Kano

Jigoro Kano, the founder of *judo*, was also instrumental in Japan being able to participate in the modern Olympic Games through the founding of the Japanese National Olympic Committee.

Jigoro Kano was born in 1860. In 1870, he started to learn Eastern and Western thoughts in several schools. However, he felt it was necessary

to train his body more because he was not very tall and not so strong physically. As a consequence, Kano wanted to learn *jujutsu*.

Kano started to learn *jujutsu* in the school of *Tenjin-Shinyo* in 1877 when he attended Tokyo University. In 1881, the master of *Tenjin-Shinyo* died, but Kano did not stop his career in *jujutsu*. He continued to learn it at the school of *Kito* instead.

After his graduation from the university in 1882, Kano started his career as a teacher. In the same year, he founded “Kodokan Judo” which incorporated the best points from various schools of *jujutsu*. He built a training institution named Kodokan to teach *judo* beside his residence. This was the start of *judo* that has now become an Olympic sport.

From 1893, Kano was appointed as principal of the Tokyo Koto Shihan Gakkou (Tokyo Normal school), which was the only school to train teachers for secondary education in Japan. He adopted sports (games) for physical education for all students in the school.

With the experience of two wars, the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), the importance of exercise for physical strength as a soldier was noticed. When Kano was recommended as a member of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1909, the importance of exercise and sports for physical education was recognized. Kano promoted physical education in his school. That is the reason he is regarded as the father of physical education and sports in Japan. He worked his whole life as a teacher, as an educationist, the founder of *judo*, and as a member of the IOC to encourage physical education through sports.

The Spirit of *Judo*

Kano founded *judo* and promoted it all over the world. *Judo* has its origin in the traditional *jujutsu*, but the technique, ideas, and rules are different from traditional *jujutsu*. Kano was also a teacher, so the idea of *judo* and Kano’s educational ideas cannot be separated.

Martial arts all over the world have their own original characteristics, but in one sense, they all share the same origin. It is the art of self-defense. The various martial arts all over the world vary because of climate, nature,

nationality, races, ethnicity, and so on. *Judo* is characterized by the idea that the small or weak person can beat the bigger and stronger person.

The purpose and method of *judo* were different from other traditional *jujutsu*. *Jujutsu* was the technique to kill or beat an opponent, but the purpose of *judo* was not to kill or beat opponents. Kano founded *judo* as a method of education through the body. *Judo* is not only a sport but also a method of education for the whole human. On this point, *judo* is different from traditional *jujutsu*.

The goals of *judo* are the following: knowledge education, moral education, physical education, self-defense, *Seiryoku-Zenyo*, and *Jita-Kyoei*. It is especially *Seiryoku-Zenyo* and *Jita-Kyoei* which show the fundamental principle of “Kodokan Judo.”

Seiryoku-Zenyo and *Jita-Kyoei* are the mental goals of *judo*. *Seiryoku-Zenyo* means that a human must use his or her mind and body effectively to achieve his or her goal. Consequently, Kano encouraged the cultivation of both the mind and the body. Humans must be sure of what their goal is and choose the most effective method to achieve the best result. *Seiryoku* means the energy which influences all human power. *Zen* means goodness. *Zenyo* means to use *Seiryoku* for goodness. Kano emphasized that this was the fundamental principle for the improvement, development, and achievement of humans for the development of the body, knowledge, and virtue of individuals. Kano thought that the word *Seiryoku-Zenyo* should influence not only *judo* but also all human life including education, science, economics, military affairs, and so on.

There are few things that can be done alone. In many cases, people help each other and make compromises in order to achieve their goals. Thus, the relationship between person and person, organization and organization, and nation and nation should help each other and compromise to achieve their goals. *Jita-Kyoei* means everyone can prosper together through good communication. This is an idea of peaceful coexistence that is emphasized by mental cultivation. *Ji* means oneself. *Ta* means others. *Kyoei* means to prosper together.

Seiryoku-Zenyo is physical and mental education through sports. *Jita-Kyoei* is pacifism (world peace). These ideas share much in common with Olympism. Kano started to use these words after he became a member of the IOC, so these words are thought to be influenced by

Olympism. Of course, Kano was also influenced by Eastern philosophies such as Taoism. The essences of these two words reflect the fusion of Western and Eastern philosophy.

Conclusion (Afterword)

Japanese traditional sport is tied to Japanese climate, politics, lifestyle, religion, and so on. Japanese culture was influenced by culture transmitted from the Chinese continent but also simultaneously developed as a unique culture. The mix of culture, religion, and thought is the background of Japanese traditional sport.

Leisure and the Dao

Steven Simpson and Samuel Cocks

If a person wanted to learn about leisure in Aristotelian thought, he or she could begin by reading Book X of *Nicomachean Ethics* (1976). In the same way, if anyone was interested in leisure from a pragmatist perspective, Chapter 19 of John Dewey's (1944) *Democracy and Education* would provide an excellent overview. If, however, a person wanted to learn about leisure and the Dao, there would be no single reading that would serve as a starting point. Whereas both Aristotle and Dewey intentionally set aside distinct sections of major texts to write specifically about leisure and its relationship to work and recreation, no Dao philosopher (to our knowledge) ever set aside a section of any work to focus on this topic.

Dao literature does not address leisure directly. Instead leisure, or at least a sense of leisureliness, subtly runs throughout Dao writings. It is

There are several ways to Romanize Chinese characters. The original methods (Legge, Wade-Giles) spell 道 as Tao. Pinyin spells it as Dao. Other than when Tao is used in a direct quote, we will use Dao. One is as good as the other, but the current trend is toward Dao.

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not so much a term that is defined as it is a sense to be intuitively gleaned after an overall introduction to Dao philosophy. In this regard, leisure is like the Dao itself. Nowhere in Daoist literature is Dao succinctly defined. In fact, just the opposite is true, as the classic opening sentence of the *Tao Te Ching* (Lao Tzu 1989, p. 3) actually states, “Tao can be talked about, but not the eternal Tao.” In other words, any spoken or written definition of the Dao would be inadequate and incomplete.

However, to say that leisure and the Dao cannot be defined adequately by words does not mean that they should not be discussed. They should be. Words may be imperfect, yet they still are the best available way to introduce something that is unexplainable. As the *Zhuangzi* (Chuang Tzu 1968, p. 302) puts it,

The fish trap exists because of the fish; once you’ve gotten the fish, you can forget the trap. The rabbit snare exists because of the rabbit; once you’ve gotten the rabbit, you can forget the snare. Words exist because of meaning; once you’ve gotten the meaning, you can forget the words.

Therefore, with the *Zhuangzi*’s fish trap/rabbit snare metaphor in mind, this chapter is an introduction to leisure and the Dao. There will be no concise definitions. Instead, there will be a series of descriptions of Dao concepts, each with a leisurely component to them. Collectively these descriptions will begin to explain leisure from a Dao perspective. Along the way, two questions will guide the inquiry. First, is there merely an association between Dao and leisure, or is it reasonable to conclude that there is actually a Dao of leisure? Second, how does Daoism explain the relationship between leisure and work?

What Is Daoism?

Before delving into leisure and the Dao, it may be worthwhile to say a few things about the Dao itself. Dao usually is translated as road or path or the Way. In a broad sense, this Way can be viewed as a way of life. In a narrower practical sense, it is an ongoing calm response within life’s experiences that allows a person to accomplish things—things as simple as crossing a stream, interacting with another person, or, in general, recognizing and experiencing

an opportunity. Dao is often associated with gentle flow, such as the flow of water in a stream as it seeks the path of least resistance on its way to the sea.

Daoism, like most other Chinese philosophical views, is laced with complementary opposites (i.e., the yin and the yang) that seem contradictory at first glance, then insightful when given careful thought. A prime example is that each person's journey is individualistic, yet radically holistic. As stated in the ancient *Huainanzi* (Cleary 1992a, p. 3), "The wise leave the road and find the Way; fools cling to the Way and lose the road." No one following the Way is an independent, detached individual. Following a unique path, a man or woman experiences interconnectivity with both his/her human and non-human (i.e., natural) surroundings.

Perhaps the best way to initially grasp the meaning of the Dao is to acknowledge the human characteristic that best symbolizes the Dao, and that would be humility. Easily a fifth of the *Tao Te Ching's* chapters mentions humility, with phrases such as:

Wealth, status, pride are their own ruin. To do good, work well, and lie low is the way of the blessing.

(Lao Tzu 1998, p. 12)

The Sage does not make a show of himself, hence he shines; Does not justify himself, hence he becomes known; Does not boast of his ability, hence he gets his credit; Does not brandish his success, hence he endures; Does not compete with anyone, hence no one can compete with him.

(Lao Tzu 1989, p. 45)

Humility is the root from which greatness springs.

(Lao Tzu 1989, p. 79)

If I can be the world's most humble man, then I can be its highest instrument.

(Lao Tzu 1955, p. 120)

With this general definition of Dao in hand, an explanation of the Dao and its relationship to leisure can now be attempted—and one approach is to present several Daoist concepts that have a direct link to leisure. In particular, this chapter will look at *wu wei*, *wu yu*, the art of leaving things undone, the desire to not be needed, and *jing jie*.

Wu Wei

A good place to begin is with the notion of *wu wei*. While not a term used in the West as often as some other Mandarin terms (e.g., Dao, yin and yang, qi), Alan Watts (1957, p. 19) described it as “after the Tao (itself), the second important principle of Taoism.” Usually, *wu wei* is translated as non-doing or no action. Wu means “no” and wei literally translates as “to do” or “to act out,” but combining these two literal translations does not capture the real meaning. “Non-doing” suggests idleness, even laziness, which is not *wu wei* at all. *Wu wei* is action, but action with as little effort as necessary to accomplish the task—because if done correctly, only a little effort is needed. With *wu wei*, a person is fully engaged, is aware of all that is occurring, and acts when intervention is required (but does not act when all is progressing as it should on its own). Thomas Cleary, the most prolific contemporary translator of Chinese Dao literature, often translates *wu wei* as “non-contrivance.” For example, Chapter 37 of the *Tao Te Ching* usually is translated as “The Tao does nothing, yet nothing is left undone.” Cleary (1991, p. 31) translated it as “The Way is always uncontrived, yet there’s nothing it doesn’t do.” Another way to look at *wu wei* is to realize that nature moves effortlessly in accord with the Dao, whereas humans do not. Hence, the Daoists look *to* nature for examples and analogies of what “effortless effort” may involve. As already mentioned, the classic example is water as it moves from the mountains to the sea. It is beautiful and powerful yet willingly bends to its topography on a journey toward its ultimate destination. Humans are not so gentle and pliant, nor are they so consistently dedicated to following their Way. Humans too often resist when pushed; they fail to go with the flow as they try to elevate their position. As termed in *Mentoring: The Tao of Giving and Receiving Wisdom* (Huang and Lynch 1995, p. 13),

Wu Wei is the Watercourse Way, as one acts from the heart and follows nature’s flow, just as when leaves fall, they follow the wind, land in water, and go with the flow.

The connection between *wu wei* and the natural world lies in the Daoist appreciation of individuality and diversity. Individuals who express *wu*

wei are acting in accordance with what is comfortable or natural for them. There is a physical and emotional equilibrium in their actions, but the point of equilibrium varies with each individual. Nature is full of such singular beings—individual plants and animals doing what is natural for them, yet also thriving as part of a community.

Wu Yu

A second wu-term that is relevant to leisure is *wu yu* or “non-desire.” Just as *wu wei* does not imply any activity, *wu yu* does not imply a lack of emotional satisfaction. *Wu yu* is associated with the individual who does not want too much, does not want the wrong things, and does not damage his/her environment—broadly put—in the pursuit of the few things he or she does want. Implicit in the term is the state of mind and the overall experience that this way of living fosters. According to Ames and Hall (2003), *wu yu* is:

- Non-coercive, that is, activity that is not oriented around owning, controlling, or consuming
- Oriented around “simple enjoyment and celebration”
- Deferential, that is, appreciating what is “given” or “offered” to a person in the moment

For those familiar with Western philosophy of leisure, the mention of “simple enjoyment” and especially of “celebration” might bring to mind Josef Pieper’s *Leisure: The Basis of Culture* (1952)—and revisiting *Leisure* from a Dao perspective would show that many of the phrases Pieper used to define leisure could have come directly from Dao literature. In just a few examples, Pieper described leisure as:

- “an attitude of contemplative celebration” (p. 28)
- “the attitude of mind... of those who are open to everything” (p. 28)
- “non-activity” (but very different from sloth and idleness) p. 29
- “touching upon the superhuman life-giving powers which... renew and quicken us” (p. 32).

Pieper's thinking and the Dao obviously have strong commonalities, but there is a difference in that Pieper actually gives this attitude the name of *leisure*. The Dao encourages a subtle attitude that should permeate every aspect of life. Pieper, we think, not only wholeheartedly agreed but also acknowledged the genuine pull of an opposing attitude that comes from work and a society that values work. Therefore, if not a constant attitude of leisureliness, then individuals may seek frequent periods of time for a celebration of happiness and the experience of simply letting go.¹

The Art of Leaving Things Undone

A third element of Dao closely related to *wu wei* and *wu yu* is the notion that good enough is good enough. In fact, good enough usually is better than perfection. The perfectly honed physique, for example, is not necessarily the most healthy body. The chemically treated lawn may appear cosmetically perfect but is neither healthy nor ecologically diverse. Lin Yutang (1937, pp. 162–163), a twentieth-century Taiwanese philosopher who often compared West and East, stated beautifully the notion of good enough is good enough when he wrote,

The desire for one hundred per cent efficiency seems almost obscene. The trouble with Americans is that when a thing is nearly right, they want to make it better, while for a Chinese, nearly right is good enough.... One must start out with a belief that there are no catastrophes in this world, and besides the noble art of getting things done, there is a nobler art of leaving things undone.

Lin (1937, p. 162) went on to say that Americans tend to spend 50 percent of their time getting something 99 percent right and the other 50 percent tweaking the remaining 1 percent. To him, it made much more sense to just stop at good enough and do other things—other things such as experience leisure.

¹ The Dao often suggests that a person may become humble by behaving humbly. An analogy may be that a person may develop an attitude of leisureliness by participating in leisure experiences.

To some extent, leaving things undone is a specific example of the broader Dao notion of moderation. Here Dao philosophy may not be significantly different from Aristotelian thought—that a man or woman works to have basic needs satisfied but then moves on to leisure. “It must not be supposed,” wrote Aristotle (1976, p. 1179a), “that because one cannot be happy without external goods, it will be necessary to have many of them on a grand scale to be happy at all.” Aristotle mirrored Dao writings in observing that the content person would be seen as odd by the masses due to his (or her) lack of material possessions.

Key to the notion of moderation is that living a life of moderation is not limited to material goods. It includes the expenditure of time and energy needed to acquire those material goods (Cleary 1992b, p. xiv). As is so often the case, the *Tao Te Ching* (Lao Tzu 1989, p. 9) states the concept most succinctly by observing, “When you have done your work, retire.”

Desire to Not Be Needed

When looking toward leisure, there is a specific element of the concept of *wu wei* that deserves special mention. It is the desire to not be needed. An individual who would like to fully commit himself to leisure might want to withdraw from society and live a monastic life dedicated to leisure pursuits. Dao philosophy, however, does not afford that luxury. Even though Dao is an individualistic philosophy and is often critical of societal norms that promote conformity, it is a philosophy of societal responsibility. When an individual is needed by family or community, he or she is obligated to act. People may hope that they will not be needed, but they must be willing and able to serve when needed. Again citing Lin Yutang (1937, p. 161),

The distinction between Buddhism and Taoism is this: the goal of the Buddhist is that he shall not want anything, while the goal of the Taoist is that he shall not be wanted at all. Only he who is not wanted by the public can be a carefree individual, and only he who is a carefree individual can be a happy human being.

Dao writings repeatedly encourage people not only to work toward non-action but also to step up when needed. The *Wen-tzu* (Cleary 1992b, p. 44), for example, says that a person can succeed without striving yet must act when pressed and when there is no other choice. The Dao writings of Lü Yan (Cleary 1998, p. 92) state that, “Even after you have attained nondoining, you should still carry out undertakings, fulfilling them and realizing their proper results.” And the *Zhuangzi* (Chuang Tzu 1994, p. 145) may state the point as well as any, when it warns that while a philosophy of non-action is the only way to be one with the Dao, it also can entice people down the wrong path. Non-action provides people with balanced lives from which to serve effectively and indiscreetly, but if someone is not wary, it also can lead to idleness and a retirement from the world.

Jing Jie

The final concept to mention before delving purposely into leisure and the Dao is *jing jie*. The Chinese character *jing* (境) means environment or situation, and *jie* (界) means border or territory. However, just like *wu wei* and *wu yu* are not exactly a literal translation of their two individual characters, *jing* and *jie* combined have a depth of meaning not evident in the definitions of the individual characters. *Jing jie* refers to an ideal state attained.

Wang and Stringer (2000, p. 39) called *jing jie*, within Chinese philosophy, “the closest connection between Taoism and leisure.” They compared it to Csikszentmihalyi’s (1975) concept of Flow—a higher state that occurs when a person is fully engaged in activities such as art, religious practice, and interaction with nature. The link to Flow is apt, for Flow occurs when the skill level of the fully engaged participant matches the level of difficulty of the activity, and the participant is neither bored because the activity is too easy nor anxious because the activity is too difficult. By the same token, *jing jie* refers to the psychological state associated with full engagement with an activity. Wang and Stringer (2000, p. 39) observed that *jing jie* can occur when a person participates in an activity that requires skill, but it also happens when a person concentrates

“on the beauty and tranquillity of nature and the Tao.” The key, very much like Flow, is the level of engagement.

Linking *jing jie* and the Dao to leisure and Flow does suggest that a Dao perspective on leisure has more to do with the mindset or perception of the participant than with the specific activity itself. While *jing jie* has an association with activities in nature, it also is fluid enough to pertain to a wide range of activities—even activities that ordinarily would be considered work.

So What Is Dao Leisure and What Leisure Pursuits Coincide with Dao Leisure?

Wu wei, *wu yu*, the notion of good enough, leaving things undone, wanting not to be needed, and *jing jie* combine to create a consistent sense of calm and reflection. These Dao concepts easily conjure images of leisure pursuits that Westerners associate with the East—tai chi, yoga, Chinese calligraphy, or a quiet moment with a friend and a pot of tea. These same concepts just as naturally suggest a list of leisure activities that are not associated exclusively with the East but still seem Dao-like, for example, painting, woodworking, birdwatching, fly fishing, gardening, or the very same quiet moment with a friend, this time in the corner of a coffee shop.

Conversely, a person could just as easily come up with a list of leisure pursuits that seem to be in opposition to the Dao. These would be activities that highlight competitiveness, maybe violence, and certainly a lot of physical exertion. American football immediately comes to mind. The problem with this approach, however, is that the compilation of hard and fast lists itself is not particularly Dao; the Dao abhors dichotomies and an either/or approach. Human activity, according to the Dao, does not fall into neat, exclusive categories.

The image that most strongly represents the Dao is the yin yang symbol (called the *T'ai-chi T'u*).² Implicit in the circle of interlocking tadpole-

² We won't go into much detail defining yin (feminine, intuitive, non-hierarchical) and yang (masculine, logical, assertive), except to point out that (1) the yin yang spectrum itself is consistent with Dao thinking and (2) various Dao concepts (e.g., yielding, humility, one with nature) tend toward the yin side of yin yang continuum.

like shapes is the notion that no matter how extreme on a continuum people find themselves, they still possess the seed of the opposite perspective. The most macho men have a feminine side hidden away somewhere. The least competitive people sometimes play to win. The most ardent workaholic sometimes slows down.

From a Dao perspective, no leisure pursuit is entirely Dao-like, nor entirely non-Dao. A good example of the yin and the yang of a recreational pursuit is rock climbing (Fig. 1).

At its most elementary, the activity may strike a non-climber as very yang and not particularly Dao. The sport tests physical strength, conquers nature, confronts personal fear, and centers on the very concrete goal of reaching the summit. Even the very fact that climbing is largely a vertical activity (i.e., to say, hierarchical) symbolically adds to its yang identity. Yet when experienced climbers explain the appeal of climbing, they acknowledge the yang elements just described but also include the activity's yin side. They describe a feeling of oneness with the rock, a sense of flow within their bodies, a communion with nature, even a feeling of peace.

Rock climbing cannot be categorized on an either/or list, nor can canoeing, running, collecting stamps, playing board games, and so on. At a superficial level, many recreational pursuits seem either largely Dao (i.e., yin) or largely not Dao. Yet, as each activity is looked at more deeply, the dichotomy evolves into a continuum. More importantly, each activity's place on the continuum becomes less a matter of the activity itself and more the state of mind of the person while doing the activity.

One way to envision the differences between the yin and yang extremes of a leisure spectrum is to think of it in terms of a wanderer and an adventurer. The wanderer is personified by the old bearded man within



Fig. 1 T'ai-chi T'u, also known as the yin yang symbol

many Chinese landscape paintings who is barely noticed walking along a trail or sitting quietly on the edge of a cliff. The actions of the wanderer call for open-mindedness more than intense focus, reflection more than action, slow movement more than speed, and often a sense of solitude. There is little or no challenge even if the activity is challenging, because the individual feels no need to test himself or herself. Contrast with this the Adventurer, personified by an American teenage male risk taker, seeking leisure pursuits that require careful focus, that are exciting, that test technical ability, and exemplify a sense of accomplishment and self-sufficiency. Competitive sports and high-risk outdoor recreation appeal to adventurers. For example, if there is a mountain, the adventurer climbs the steep rock face along its most difficult route, whereas the wanderer just as likely takes the long and winding path around the backside. Both arrive at the summit but have very different experiences.

Stereotypically the adventurer and the wanderer differ in age and/or maturity. The non-Dao adventurers do tend to be young—still finding their place in the world, a little insecure, and constantly testing and competing. Conversely, the Dao wanderers have a few miles on them; they no longer need to prove themselves, they understand their personal niche in the world, and they want to experience life in a peaceful, slow, open-minded way.

The adventure/wanderer comparison demonstrates the relevance of attitude over activity. It is not hard to image a person being introduced to whitewater paddling for the adventure and thrills, then gradually transitioning into a person who continues to paddle not for the adventure but to be one with the water. As already mentioned, this brings to mind Csikszentmihalyi (2008) notion of Flow. When the level of difficulty matches the skill level of the participant, there can be a oneness with the experience. That means that non-competitive paddling is not necessarily seeking out the calmest water possible; rather it is paddling in water where the skill level matches the level of difficulty of the activity. Here it is revealing that the common metaphor for *wu wei* is the watercourse (i.e., the flow of a river), and Csikszentmihalyi's Flow has as much in common with both *wu wei* and *jing jie*. Flow is when individuals perform an activity so well that it seems effortless—because after training and practice, skilled practitioners reach what the Daoist understand as equilibrium (*jing*).

There is a unique and perhaps ideal example of complementary opposites where the participant's mind is simultaneously focused yet open. The individual's body is active, not overly strained, and integrated with his or her broader environment. His or her emotions and thoughts are calm and harmonized—experiencing Flow and also approaching Dao.

Many of the recreation activities mentioned so far in this article have been outdoor or nature-dependent activities. This is not surprising, because there is a close relationship between nature and the Dao. As mentioned earlier in the section defining *wu wei*, nature consistently abides with the Dao and humanity does not. One reason for this is that humans (from a Dao perspective) are unique creatures on the planet as they are part nature and part not nature. The more that people divorce themselves from their own nature side and the less that they spend time in nature, the more likely they fail to act in accordance with the Dao.

The non-human natural world, for as much humans might resist, *draws* people to dwell and become active within its domain. This may be because of nature's symbolic power and its straightforward, non-distorted manifestation of Dao. It is in the natural environment that humanity finds the setting for so many of those activities that lead to the kinds of experiences already discussed. Daoism takes very seriously the complexity of place, the flow of *qi* or energy, and how particular environments do and do not allow for certain possibilities.

Can a person find the Dao without understanding, appreciating, and being in nature? In answer to this question, Lin Yutang (1937, pp. 278–279; Simpson 2003, p. 130) tells the story of a man who asks God for a new planet, because this one is not good enough. God shows him natural wonders such as the petals of an orchid and asks the man whether he has considered such subtle beauty. The man is not impressed. God provides the man with a cool breeze and the relaxing sound of that breeze passing through a pine forest, but the man says that these are not important to him. God then goes for the grandiose and takes the man to the Grand Canyon, to the Himalayas, and to the wild gorges of the Yangtze River (now largely dammed up by the way), and the man still says that this planet offers nothing worthwhile. Eventually, God loses his temper and tells the man, “I will send you to Hell where you shall not see the sailing clouds and the flowering trees, nor hear the gurgling brooks

and live there forever till the end of your days.” Then God puts the man in an apartment in the city.

The Two Questions

In the introduction to this chapter, two questions were posed. The first was “Is there is a Dao of leisure or merely an association between Dao and leisure?” The second was “What is the Daoist relationship between leisure and work?”

Is There a Dao of Leisure?

To some extent, this entire chapter has been a confirmation that there is a Dao of leisure, and there may not be much to add. Certain aspects of most leisure pursuits have a Daoist aspect to them. At the same time that no one can rightly say that X is a Dao leisure activity and Y is not, it is entirely appropriate to say that X and Y have Dao characteristics in unequal measure. Popular self-help books might not be the best measure of anything, but the proliferation of “Tao of...” books about various leisure pursuits (e.g., hockey, coaching, gardening, dating, travel) supports this assertion.

What Is the Daoist Relationship Between Work and Leisure?

Unlike the question about the Dao of leisure, this chapter did not do an extensive job of differentiating work and leisure. It barely cited the word *work* in any of its references. In substantive ways, it used it only twice; once was “to do good, work well, and lie low is the way of the blessing,” and the other was “when you have done your work, retire.”

Daoism does not necessitate that leisure be differentiated from work, and Dao literature sets no clear distinctions between work and leisure. This does not mean, however, that the terms in Dao thinking are so

ambiguous as to be undiscernible. Just as too much time away from nature makes a connection with the Dao more difficult, so too does too much time engaged in activities generally considered work. A life of strain and struggle in the city, punctuated with occasional leisure pursuits in natural settings, lacks the consistency and integration essential to a Daoist life.

The *Tao Te Jing* (Lao Tzu 1989, p. 31) refers to the return to the stage of the “uncarved block.” It is a Daoist staple that the common approach to work-like toil actively distorts human potential—that is work carves people up, limits them, and leads them away from what is natural as singular individuals. The more radical suggestion is that, in being an expression of what is natural and most real, leisure offers a view of what work *could* be like—an expression of uniqueness, vitality, and equilibrium. There are activities (and aspects of activities) that pull people from their true selves and drain them mentally and spiritually, and there are activities that restore. While Dao writings may not actually use the words *work* and *leisure*, it might be helpful to sometimes think of activities in those terms. Obviously, there are tasks on the job that rejuvenate just as there are vacations that are exhausting, but this fuzziness of terms and experiences is consistent with the Dao.

Conclusion

The opening paragraphs of this chapter stated that there is more a sense of leisureliness in the Dao than precise definitions. Leisure theorists may find something appealing in this lack of precision. Leisure professionals, those who run camps, manage parks, and supervise playgrounds, may equally appreciate the leisurely tone but then wonder how the Dao of leisure translates into practice and into their professional philosophy. Our response is that while the Dao of leisure is ethereal, the practical aspects still are there. Get people into nature, have them slow down, have them wander, have them place enjoyment over perfection. Equating leisure with the symbolic flow of a river lacks specificity, but it is an image from which most of us can draw connections.

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“Have Leisure and Know that I Am God”: Christianity and Leisure

Paul Heintzman

Although the word “leisure” (*scholē*) arose in Greek culture, Fox and Klaiber (2006) suggested that the leisure studies field has emphasized one Greek tradition of leisure to the neglect of other Mediterranean traditions, such as the Judeo-Christian tradition. Likewise, Trafton (1985) argued that ancient Hebrew ideas informed the Western concept of leisure in addition to Greek and Roman notions. God’s rest on the seventh day of the Judeo-Christian creation account, life in the garden of Eden, and the Sabbath commandment to do no work on the seventh day contributed to the organization of life into seven days and a valuing of leisure. Although Christianity has waned in the West, Christianity has grown elsewhere in the world to total over 2.4 billion adherents, and for these Christians, the Bible is more instructive than Greek philosophy for understanding leisure. This chapter will review biblical themes (e.g., Sabbath, rest), activities (e.g., festivals, feasts, dance, hospitality, friendships, leisure practices in Luke’s gospel), and

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passages (Psalm 46:10; 2 Thess. 3:10; Ecclesiastes) relevant to leisure as well as historical perspectives, and empirical research on Christianity and leisure.

Biblical Themes and Passages Relevant to Leisure

Lexical words related to *scholē* are not prominent in the Christian scriptures; however, a number of biblical elements may be used to develop a Christian understanding of leisure: Sabbath, rest, Psalm 46:10, practices relevant to leisure as activity, and leisure and work in Ecclesiastes and Thessalonians.

Sabbath

Christians often draw on the biblical Sabbath to develop an understanding of leisure (e.g., Doohan 1990; Johnston 1983; Ryken 1995). Heintzman (2006, 2015) suggested that the biblical Sabbath cannot be equated with leisure but that it provides insights to develop a philosophy of leisure that encompasses both quantitative and qualitative dimensions. First, the Sabbath teaches a rhythm to life including periods of work and periods of non-work. Repeatedly in the Old Testament, instructions are given not to work on the Sabbath. Humans are to have periods of non-work (i.e., the quantitative dimension of leisure). Second, the Exodus (20:8–11) version of the Sabbath commandment with its reference back to the creation account in Genesis 1 and 2, when God not only rested but blessed and hallowed the seventh day after six days of creation, suggests that Sabbath and leisure are for experiencing God and the gifts of creation. Therefore, in terms of the qualitative dimension of leisure, the Sabbath inculcates a spiritual attitude for a Christian's basic position in relation to God through rest, joy, freedom, and celebration in God and the gift of God's creation (Heschel 1951). Reflective of this qualitative dimension, Christians are encouraged to enter into God's Sabbath rest (Heb. 4:10). Third, the

Deuteronomy (5:12–15) version of the Sabbath commandment with its reference to the deliverance of Israel from Egypt reminds Christians that ultimately humans are able to rest because of God's graciousness to them. Fourth, Exodus 23:12 and Deuteronomy 5:14 suggest that the Sabbath, and likewise leisure, is for everyone including male and female slaves, foreigners, and animals. As Gordis (1982) noted, this equality was unlike classical Greek leisure which was for an elite class of people. Fifth, the description of the Sabbath as a sign of the Covenant in Exodus 31:16–17 implies that for Christians, Sabbath and similarly leisure are experienced within a relationship with God. Sixth, the prophets condemned those who worked on the Sabbath for their own gain (e.g., Amos 8:5), and suggested that keeping the Sabbath led to delight (Isaiah 58:13–14). Leisure is for enjoyment and not for oppressing others. Seventh, Jesus's teaching and practice of the Sabbath (Matt. 12: 1–14, see Mark 2:23–27, Luke 6:1–4; Mark 3:1–5; Luke 13:10–17; 14:1–6; John 9:13–16) suggest that leisure is a time for wholeness and healing.

Rest

The biblical concept of rest includes a range of physical and spiritual dimensions. While an operational definition of leisure cannot be derived from this biblical concept, it supplies a wide variety of clues that are descriptive of what leisure may be: a rest of completion, not inactivity, such as the Creator enjoyed when the works of creation were completed (Gen. 2:2); a pleasant, secure, and blessed life in the land (Deut. 12:9–10) for as Preece (1981) noted, "We don't rest in a doctrine, we need a place to put our feet up, but a place in which God is personally present" (p. 77); an entering into God's rest (Ps. 95:11); a Sabbath rest of peace, joy, well-being, concord, and security (Heb. 4:9–11); and a relief and repose from labors and burdens, as well as a peace and contentment of body, soul, and mind in Jesus (Matt. 11:28–30). While Christians may not fully experience all these dimensions of rest until God's kingdom has fully arrived, they can begin to experience them now.

Psalm 46:10

Leisure writings sometimes reference the Septuagint version of Psalm 46:10: “Have leisure and know that I am God” (Allen 1989; Bregha 1980; Lee 1964; Neville 2004; Shivers and deLisle 1997; Teaff 2006). This verse is probably most well known in the leisure studies field because Pieper (1963) quoted it at the beginning of his *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*. An understanding of the historical and linguistic context of Psalm 46 is necessary to understand this verse. Historically, recent scholarship suggests that the psalm is not necessarily tied to a specific historical episode such as the deliverance of Jerusalem from the Assyrians in 701 BCE (2 Kings 18:13–19:36) as previously thought. Rather, the psalm may have originated in ancient Jerusalem worship traditions. Eaton (1967) suggested, “The ‘events’ are better understood as the universal issues of life and death, good and evil, as presented in Jerusalem’s dramatic rituals” (p. 127).

In terms of literary context, Psalm 46, with Psalms 47 and 48, appear to form a trilogy as they communicate the same theme, use similar language, and reflect a confidence in God’s protection and kingship (Heintzman 2009a). The theme of Psalm 46 is introduced in verse 1: “God is our refuge and strength, an ever-present help in trouble” and then is reinforced in the refrains of identical verses 7 and 11: “The Lord Almighty is with us; the God of Jacob is our fortress.” These refrains and the use of the term “Selah” at the end of verses 3, 7, and 11 divide the psalm into three sections: 1–3, 4–7, 8–11 (Craigie 1983). The theme in each section is to trust God in the face of danger: natural disasters (1–3), misfortunes related to the political realm of nations and kingdoms (4–7), and both natural and political calamities (8–11). Then verse 10 describes how the reader is to respond to God’s protection and presence: “Be still and know that I am God.” The Septuagint (the ancient Greek translation of the Hebrew Old Testament completed in Egypt at the beginning of the second century BCE) used the Greek word *scholē* in this verse, so in English it reads, “Have leisure and know that I am God.” In the Vulgate version (Jerome’s fourth-century Latin translation from Hebrew), this verse reads: *vacate et videte quoniam ego sum Deus*—“be at leisure and see that I am God.” Unlike the Hebrew and Greek, the Latin communicates

the notion of the “vision of God” rather than “knowing God,” which might be due to alliterative purposes—*vacate et videte* (Neville 2004, p. 17). The English “be still” and the Greek *scholē* are translated from the Hebrew stem of the verb *rapha*, which means “to release, to let go, to be weak” and can be translated as “cause yourselves to let go” (Parsons 2008, n.p.). In Hebrew grammar, the emphasis is on the second coordinate imperative (“know” rather than “be still”). Thus, the goal of letting go is to know God. Hence, the people may be still or relax as they can be confident in God as protector and know God as the Lord of nature and nations rather than relying on themselves (Craigie 1983).

In applying this verse to today, we cannot remove Psalm 46:10 from its context and simply state that this verse is providing biblical support for many contemporary understandings of leisure (e.g., free time, activity, “state-of-mind” psychological experience, holistic leisure). However, this verse is consistent with statements Pieper (1963) made about leisure, especially as Pieper connected his understanding of leisure to divine worship. In particular, the following quote from Pieper suggests an attitude similar to the “letting go” understanding of the Hebrew verb *rapha* in Psalm 46:10:

Leisure implies ... inward calm ... letting things happen. ... Leisure is not the attitude of mind of those who actively intervene, but of those who are open to everything; not of those who grab and grab hold, but of those who leave the reins loose and who are free and easy themselves—almost like a man falling asleep, for one can only fall asleep by “letting oneself go.”
(p. 41)

Psalm 46:10 provides support for a Christianized classical understanding of leisure as a spiritual attitude such as Pieper and others (e.g., Doohan 1990) held. It is less likely that Psalm 46:10 can be interpreted as Lee (1964) did: “Stop what you are doing, you busy little man, who thinks he has no leisure, and choose leisure!” (p. 262). While there are larger themes and elements in Scripture that offer support for developing a philosophy of leisure in our present culture, and are probably better starting places for developing this philosophy, Psalm 46 is consistent with these other themes, especially the biblical themes of Sabbath and rest, and as Ryken, Wilhoit, and Longman (1998) noted reflects a latent leisure motif.

Biblical Themes Relevant to Leisure as Activity

A number of biblical elements inform a Christian understanding of leisure as activity. These include festivals, feasts, dance, hospitality, friendships, and also leisure practices in Luke's gospel.

Festivals

Israel's festivals, as described in the Old Testament, are a significant image of leisure (Ryken et al. 1998). These religious festivals and holy days, chiefly agricultural, provided an orientation and lifestyle of celebration, thanksgiving, and joy. Johnston (1983) noted, "Religious festivals were occasions for a break from life's larger concerns, a special time, or a 'parenthesis' within life, consecrated to the Lord in joy" (p. 110). These festivals indicate that the Hebraic lifestyle was not totally dominated by work; there were times of celebration and rejoicing. From the Hebraic festivals, Christians learn that all of life should not be consumed by work. Although Christians do not celebrate the Old Testament festivals, these festivals offer a model of how leisure activity can meet human needs for festivity and communal rituals (Ryken 1995).

Feasts

Significant events in the life of an Israelite frequently involved a feast in the form of a meal that included celebration as well as physical nourishment (Johnston 1983). For example, "Abraham held a great feast" (Gen. 21:8) when Sarah weaned Isaac and a feast was prepared to celebrate Jacob's marriage (Gen. 29). These feasts, associated with special moments in Israelite life, are "symbolic of God's gracious presence with" his people (Johnston 1983, p. 116). Feasts were part of both Jesus's experience, such as his participation in the Cana wedding feast, and his teaching that used feasts symbolically as in the case of the parable of the prodigal son (Luke 15:11, 31; see Matt. 9:14–17, 22:1–14, 25:1–13).

Dance

The Old Testament mentions dance on numerous occasions (Johnston 1983). The psalmist instructs the Israelites to praise the Lord "with dancing" (Ps. 149:3; see Ps. 150:4). Psalm 68 (see Ps. 118:27) describes a processional dance of timbrel players and singers up to Zion. Judges 21 records the dance of Shiloh's daughters, which most likely occurred during a harvest festival. The famous passage from Ecclesiastes 3 that begins with "There is a time for everything" (v. 1) notes that there is "a time to dance" (v. 4). Jeremiah laments that "our dancing has turned to mourning" (Lam. 5:15; see Ps. 30:11; Jer. 31:13) when Jerusalem is destroyed. However, he anticipates a future time after exile when the Israelites will "go out to dance with the joyful" (Jer. 31:4) as they again celebrate their festivals. When David brought the Ark of the Covenant to Zion, he danced before the LORD (2 Sam. 6:14). Thus, dancing "features strongly in the Old Testament as a means of expressing celebration and worship" (Ross 1993, p. 47). While in the Old Testament singing and dancing often occur together, as Witherington (2012) noted, the Bible also includes much to say about the activity of music (see Job 21:11–12 and the psalter, which was Israel's songbook).

Hospitality

For Israelites, providing hospitality for, and taking care of, a sojourner or stranger was a holy and needed reciprocal responsibility as public places to stay were few and the danger of robbery was great (Johnston 1983). An example of the importance of hospitality can be seen in Genesis 18 and 19 when Abraham arranged a feast for the divine messengers although he did not know they were heavenly guests (Witherington 2012). This classic story of hospitality is a leisure occasion as it is set apart from daily life, involves the rest of the visitors, a lavish meal, and conversation between host and visitors (Ryken 1995). Johnston (1983) concluded: "The ethical force of the obligation to be hospitable was formidable in ancient Israel.

But ... not only were the guest and his party to be *cared* for, they were to be *entertained*. Hospitality was not only a *duty*; it was meant to be a delight” (p. 117).

Friendships

Friendships were important to Jesus (Johnston 1983). Indeed, Jesus was criticized for his companionship with others who were seen as questionable: gluttons, drunkards, tax collectors, and prostitutes (Luke 7:34; Matt. 21:31–32; Luke 19:1–10; John 8:2–11). These types of relationships led Marshall (1978) to write that Jesus brought “the offer of divine forgiveness and friendship” (p. 302). Friendship is highlighted in the account of Jesus’s visit to share a meal with Mary and Martha in their home at Bethany (Luke 10). Martha’s preparation of a meal is contrasted with Mary who sat at Jesus’s feet and listened to him. Although many commentators on this passage stress the importance of listening to Jesus, Johnston (1983) emphasized that Jesus was highlighting the importance of friendly conversation: “Hospitality should involve more than a sumptuous banquet. It should also include friendly attention. It should be an occasion for enjoyment ... and not merely a duty” (p. 122).

Leisure Practices in Luke’s Gospel

Luke’s gospel focuses on activities and settings associated with leisure activity: socializing, traveling, sharing and eating food, partaking in outdoor meals, and visiting wilderness. Fox (2009) explained that “Jesus seemed to understand that taste, smell, touch, and the daily attentions of one person to another comprised much of what was ‘good’ in human life” (pp. 22–23). Jesus’s life and teaching are connected with various food practices that are interrelated with leisure, such as Luke’s accounts of a few loaves and fishes being multiplied, Jesus eating with prostitutes and sinners, the Last Supper itself, and many parables related to the growing of food. Fox claimed that a significant portion of Luke’s Gospel (4:16–22,

31–35; 6:1–10; 13:10–17; 14:1–6) criticizes an emphasis on piety and law associated with leisure actions that lacks compassion. The portions of narrative and parables that focus on food and eating practices encourage the values of generosity, sharing, and a hospitality that extend beyond meals, visitors, and guests, to making a stranger feel “at home.” A number of parables (Luke 5:27–32; 7:36–50; 15:1–24; 19:1–10) describe Jesus sitting at tables with prostitutes, tax collectors, and other sinners, which would be unusual for a literate person like Jesus who was able to converse with Pharisees and other members of the upper classes. Fox concluded, “These parables posited a Christian-Judaic leisure that challenged the normative and hierarchical structure of the Graeco-Roman banquet and promoted a ‘table fellowship’ that invited all to participate and share without regard to worth or status” (p. 24).

Work and Leisure in Ecclesiastes

The book of Ecclesiastes critiques those who distort God’s intended rhythm of work and leisure by pursuing either a compulsive work ethic or a hedonistic and consumptive leisure ethic. Ecclesiastes points to an alternative: enjoying the good life on the good earth God has given humans. Throughout Ecclesiastes (2:17–26; 5:9–16; 6:7–9; esp. 4:4–16) the author emphasizes the folly of compulsive work and refutes three arguments often put forward in its support: the need to achieve (4:4), the desire for wealth (4:8), and the desire to gain fame (4:13–16). The conclusion is unavoidable—overwork is foolish, and moderation is sensible. Ecclesiastes also addresses those who hold a hedonistic, consumptive recreation ethic. A life of unreserved pleasure-seeking and acquisition of possessions is “meaningless, a chasing after the wind” (2:1–11). Leisure activity that is focused on pleasure-seeking, on consumption and acquisition, or that becomes one’s all-consuming end is ultimately not fulfilling. The recommended lifestyle, in contrast to a compulsive work ethic and a hedonistic leisure ethic, comes at the end of Ecclesiastes 2. Here we learn that life is to be enjoyed: “People can do nothing better than to eat and drink and find satisfaction in their toil” (v. 24). Commentators suggest

that this phrase stands for a contented and happy life characterized by joy, companionship, and satisfaction. The writer of Ecclesiastes further elaborates on the theme of enjoying the life God has given (2:24–26; 3:12–13, 22; 5:18–19; 9:7–9; 11:9–12:1). God has given humans the opportunity and the encouragement to enjoy the good life on God’s good earth.

2 Thessalonians 3:10

Leisure textbooks sometimes quote 2 Thessalonians 3:10 to illustrate and explain a biblical view of work. For example, Henderson et al. (2001) directly quoted part of this verse, “If any would not work, neither shall he eat,” to support their statement that “diligent work is praised as a virtue in several Biblical passages” (p. 112). While Henderson and colleagues made reference to one other verse (1 Thess. 4:11), the partial quotation of 2 Thessalonians 3:10 is the only biblical quotation used to support their statement. In a discussion of Christianity and work, Goodale and Godbey (1988) did not quote or reference 2 Thessalonians 3:10 but alluded to it in a paraphrase: “And Paul, in his missionary work, was quite clear; if you want to eat, then you must work,” and then incorrectly attributed to Paul the phrase from Genesis, “From the sweat of thy brow” (p. 33). In a discussion of the Judeo-Christian view of leisure, Sylvester (1999) quoted this verse, and also included the two subsequent verses. Neither Henderson and colleagues, Goodale and Godbey, nor Sylvester explained this passage’s context. While Sylvester referenced and quoted other biblical passages on work, the majority of these referred to God’s work (Gen. 2:2; 1 Cor. 3:10; Pss. 7:28, 22:24) or spiritual activities (1 Cor. 3:9; Matt. 4:19). To understand this verse, it needs to be seen within its historical and literary context (Heintzman 2005, 2015). When done so, the saying “Anyone who is unwilling to work shall not eat” occurs in a very specific context where the original readers were not working as they had a confused understanding of eschatology and expected Christ’s immediate return. Therefore, direct applications to other contexts require caution. This frequently quoted and misunderstood saying was not a callous expression toward those who were unable to sup-

port themselves. The verse states, “Anyone who is unwilling to work shall not eat,” and not “Anyone who does not work shall not eat.” An example of a modern situation that might be similar to the original situation that Paul criticized was provided by McGee (1983) when he described two students at a theological seminary sitting in their dormitory and not showing up for meals or engaging in the daily activities, as they thought they would receive some sort of special revelation if they waited patiently. If 2 Thessalonians 3:10 is not put into its historical and literary context, the saying definitely suggests a strong work orientation and even sounds overly harsh and callous to contemporary readers. It needs to be understood within its original context and within the total biblical teaching on work (Heintzman 2015), which is conditioned by other biblical elements suggestive of leisure.

Christianity and Leisure Through Time: Historical Perspectives

Throughout Christian history, two understandings of leisure—the classical state of being view and the activity view—have prevailed. The early Christian notion of *otium sanctum* or holy leisure was “A sense of balance in life, an ability to be at peace through the activities of the day, an ability to rest and take time to enjoy beauty, an ability to pace ourselves” (Foster 1978, pp. 20–21). As Christian theology developed, Christian understandings of leisure were influenced by the Greek concept of *scholē* which was modified in early Christianity where it became associated with the contemplative or spiritual life. Augustine (354–440 CE), a theologian and bishop, noted that there were three types of life: the life of leisure, the life of action, and the combined life of action and leisure. All of these lives were worthwhile as long as the life of leisure did not ignore the needs of one’s neighbor and the life of action did not ignore the contemplation of God. For Augustine (1972), leisure involved the “investigation and discovery of truth ... and no one is debarred from devoting himself to the pursuit of truth, for that involves a praiseworthy kind of leisure” (Book XIX, ch. 19, p. 880).

Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), a prominent theologian of the Middle Ages who brought together Aristotle’s thought with Christian teachings, located Aristotle’s notion of leisure and contemplation in the blessed vision of God. This understanding of leisure was an important part of monastic culture, where the work of monks was united with the contemplative life of leisure (*otium*) (Leclercq 1982). This tradition continued in the Roman Catholic theologian and philosopher Josef Pieper (1904–1997), who defined leisure as

a mental and spiritual attitude—it is not simply the result of external factors, it is not the inevitable result of spare time, a holiday, a week-end or a vacation. It is, in the first place, an attitude of mind, a condition of the soul.

(1963, pp. 40–41)

Today, this classical view of leisure is advocated by many in the Roman Catholic tradition (e.g., Billy 2001; Doohan 1990; O’Rourke 1977; Teaff 2006) who, like Pieper, see leisure as a spiritual attitude.

Although Christian versions of classical leisure as expressed by Pieper (1963) continue to this day in the Roman Catholic Church, with the Reformation and the development of Protestant theology, there was a move away from classical understandings of leisure to activity understandings. Sixteenth-century Protestant reformers rejected the classical and medieval distinction between the active (secular) life and the contemplative (spiritual) life. For them, all of life and work was sacred. For the reformer Martin Luther (1483–1546), every activity, including non-work activities, could be used to glorify God (Luther 1965). Luther saw work as very honorable, “a most holy thing and, as the means through which God blesses us,” but the high value he put on rest prevented him from idolizing work (Althaus 1965, pp. 101, 104). Luther’s evaluation of work was based on the Sabbath commandment that not only commands Christians to work but also establishes the limits to work by commanding them to rest. In Luther’s hymn on the Ten Commandments, he interpreted the Sabbath commandment in this sense: “From thine own work thou must be free, that God his work have in thee” (Luther 1965, p. 279). In a letter of May 12,

1530, Luther exhorted Melanchthon: “We worship God when we rest; indeed there is no greater worship of God than this” (as quoted in Althaus 1965, p. 53).

John Calvin (1509–1564), another key reformer, was opposed to excesses but approved of participation in the arts, games, and social parties as long as they contributed to the rhythm of life: “no where are we prohibited to laugh, or to be satiated with food, or to annex new possessions ... or to be delighted with musical harmony, or to drink wine” (Calvin 1813, p. 316). The Puritans, who were enthusiastic reformers, frowned upon over-indulgence in activities such as drinking and destructive activities such as blood sports (bear-baiting, cockfighting, and boxing) but celebrated life. While non-work activities often served work, as illustrated by Benjamin Colman’s (1673–1747) comment that “we daily need some respite and diversion, without which, we dull our Powers; a little intermission sharpens ’em again” (as quoted in Miller and Johnson 1963, p. 392), the use of leisure for instrumental purposes happily co-existed with enjoyment in the Puritan view (Johnson 2009).

A contemporary Christian expression of the activity view was provided by the Protestant scholar Ryken (1995) who included a quote from Lee:

Its [leisure’s] purpose is to bring us back to physical, mental, and emotional strength and wholeness. ... The purpose of leisure is to re-create a person, to restore him or her to an earlier condition. ... Leisure ... is “the growing time of the human spirit” and a time “for rest and restoration, for rediscovering life in its entirety.” ... Leisure is, in the best sense of the word, an escape. ... Relaxation is one of the inherent qualities of leisure.

(pp. 236, 261)

In recent decades, Christian understandings of leisure have not been restricted to classical and activity views. Sherrow (1984) and Neville (2004) focused on leisure as time as reflected in their book titles, *It’s About Time: A Look at Leisure, Lifestyle and Christianity* and *Free Time: Towards a Theology of Leisure*, respectively. Neville wrote: “a theology of leisure must be a particular aspect of a theology of freedom, because leisure ... is time freed from external constraints, at work or in social duties” (p. 100).

More recently, a number of Christian authors have articulated a holistic understanding of leisure. For example, Dahl (2006) wrote:

Work and leisure are not distinct; they lie on a continuum. ... Leisure is being able to combine work, worship, and recreation in a free and loving, holistic way which integrates these three elements as much as possible. Although a person goes to different places to perform different functions, leisure lies in integrating these three aspects in order to experience wholeness in one's life, family, and community.

(p. 95)

In Joblin's (2009) holistic view, leisure understood as an attitude or state of mind "is an engaged and responsible pursuit of freedom in work, play and worship" (p. 103). Heintzman (2015) advocated holistic leisure as it encompasses the variety and richness of the biblical material relevant to leisure including both the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of leisure, one related to human being and one related to human doing, as well as combines the two historical Christian traditions, the Roman Catholic state of being and the Protestant activity views of leisure.

The majority of Christians now live in Africa, Asia, and South America rather than Europe, North American, and Australasia; however, little is written about their leisure. One example is a paper by Ross (1993) that describes how many Africans resonate with Old Testament passages that include dancing as worship and celebration. In South America, the recent book *El Juego: Una Perspectiva Christiana* (Sabean et al. 2014) provides an historical, sociological, and theological orientation toward play.

Empirical Research on Christianity and Leisure

A small amount of empirical research exists on the leisure of a variety of Christian groups: Amish (Anderson and Autry 2011), Old Order Mennonites, and Amish (Wenger 2003); evangelical theologians (Hothem 1983), Assemblies of God (Livengood 2004), Brethren (Collins 1993), and the Black Church (Waller 2009); and Christianity and leisure in Australia (Schulz and Auld 2009). Although there has

been increasing empirical research on leisure and spirituality within the leisure studies field (Heintzman 2016a, b), little of this research has focused on Christians and Christian spirituality. A few exceptions are studies on leisure and spirituality of New Paradigm Christians (Berkers 2012; Livengood 2009), and Christians who belly dance (Kraus 2010) that document how leisure and spirituality are interwoven in the lives of Christians. Nevertheless, the history of Christian spirituality has much to contribute to the present study of the relationship between leisure and spirituality, yet this tradition is largely ignored. In fact, some present-day findings on leisure and spirituality merely confirm what has been known throughout the history of Christian spirituality (Heintzman 2011). At least eight processes that link leisure and spirituality have been identified through empirical research (Heintzman 2009b). Spirituality is facilitated through: leisure that creates *time and space*; a *balance of work and leisure* in life, in contrast to busyness; leisure settings of *personal or human history*; an *attitude* of receptivity, gratitude, and celebration during leisure; opportunities in leisure to experience *nature* and develop a relationship with it; *being away* to a different environment; *solitude* within leisure activities and programs; and activities that help people explore and develop their *connections with each other*. Heintzman (2011, 2015) has documented how these processes have been advocated as spiritual practices within Christian spirituality for centuries. For example, researchers (e.g., Fredrickson and Anderson 1999; Heintzman 2000, 2012; Stringer and McAvoy 1992; Sweatman and Heintzman 2004) have found that solitude is important for leisure participants' spirituality. Such a finding is consistent with biblical passages such as Jesus withdrawing to the hillside to pray (e.g., Mark 6:46) as well as Christian teaching throughout history. For example, Thomas à Kempis (c. 1379–1471) explained that "The person who wants to arrive at interiority and spirituality has to leave the crowd behind. ... In quiet and silence the faithful soul makes progress" (as quoted in Foster and Griffin 2000, pp. 149–150). John Main (1926–1982) stated: "Now to tread the spiritual path we must learn to be silent. What is required of us is a journey into profound silence" (as quoted in Foster and Griffin 2000, p. 156). Similarly, Henri Nouwen (1932–1996) wrote "without solitude it is virtually

impossible to live a spiritual life” and continued “solitude allows us gradually to come in touch with this hopeful presence of God in our lives, and allows us also to taste even now the beginnings of the joy and peace which belong to the new heaven and the new earth” (as quoted in Foster and Smith 1993, pp. 95–97). Examples from the classics of Christian spirituality can also be found to support the other seven leisure-spiritual processes identified by empirical research (Heintzman 2011, 2015). Thus, research studies on leisure and spirituality confirm, with a different type of knowledge—empirical knowledge—the experiential knowledge and wisdom that have been passed down through the centuries in Christian spiritual tradition.

Conclusion

This chapter provided a brief introduction to Christianity and leisure. A number of biblical themes and passages relevant to leisure have led to a diversity of Christian understandings and expressions of leisure throughout time and across space. It is impossible to conclude that there is one homogenous Christian conceptualization or expression of leisure. Furthermore, there are many Christian themes or practices, such as Sabbath and rest, that are not directly equated with leisure, but that can be described as leisure-like. As little empirical research has been conducted on the leisure of Christians or on the relationship between leisure and Christian spirituality, research on these topics, and especially the leisure of Christians in the non-Western world, is recommended.

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Part II

Rational Theories of Leisure

Karl Spracklen

Introduction

By calling this section of the handbook the part concerning rational theories of leisure, we are not suggesting that everything in the other three sections is somehow irrational. We are using the term ‘rational’ in this section to imply an attempt to make sense of leisure using the tools of philosophy and, later, the tools of science. This section is what might be called a history of the philosophy of leisure and also a history of what might be described as the Western ontology and epistemology of leisure. In the first section of the handbook, we were interested in how leisure was understood implicitly and explicitly in different traditions, belief systems and cultures. In the next two sections, we will begin to concern ourselves with theories of leisure constructed from, in and out of the historical circumstances of modernity and its post-modern continuations. These two sections will concern themselves with what might be thought

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of as socio-cultural theory of contemporary leisure. In this section, then, we are interested in the historical and philosophical development of the Western ontology and epistemology of leisure, and how this has transformed into the work of what might be called classic sociologists and modern-day social psychologists.

In this section, Thanassis Samaras reviews theories of leisure in Classical Greek philosophy. This is the starting point for the entire section and the starting point for Western philosophy. Western epistemology, or what might be called the Western epistemological tradition, is the line of imagined and real debate from the Classical Greek world, which survives, through all kinds of strange and wonderful Christian and Muslim interpolations, to become the founding way of doing knowledge in Western Europe in the Renaissance. This is a crucial period in history in which Western European power begins to expand and dominate the globe. This political power is intertwined causally with the economic, cultural and technical power of the West. In the period of the Renaissance, philosophers and artists start to identify with the Classical Greek world. Soon after, philosophers and artists start to claim that they are superior to the Classical Greeks. There is a new knowledge emerging from the Western epistemological tradition that does not depend on the arcane logic of medieval scholasticism and its defenders in the European universities. This is an epistemological tradition that is based on making observations about the way the world works, a tradition based on trying things out to see what happens, as well as a tradition that values publication of ideas, findings and theories about the world. This new philosophy informs, and is informed by, the rise of capitalism, the rise of Protestantism and free-thinking, and is allowed to grow through the development of the European version of the printing press.

There are many critical accounts of the Scientific Revolution (see discussion in Spracklen, this section), but it is a fact that the idea of doing natural philosophy to improve the world—socially, politically and materially—becomes commonplace in Western Europe by the start of the eighteenth century. In this period, there are philosophers like Newton who see the truth about the nature of light as something to be found through experiment; in the same epistemological tradition, Locke,

Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant and Paine try to make sense of the political to come up with recommendations for improving or maintaining the social and cultural. There are chapters in this section that explicitly engage with the ideas emerging in philosophy at this point in the history of Western epistemology. In the second chapter, Ian Lamond explores the connections between the ideas of Locke and the notion of recreation-as-leisure and traces these ideas into contemporary debates about leisure and politics. In the third chapter of this section, Matthew Mendham turns the focus on Rousseau's theory of leisure and its philosophical and political context. After Mendham's chapter, Wallace McNeish and Steve Olivier apply some philosophical concepts from Kant to make sense of leisure and recreation today. Then Karl Spracklen examines the importance of radical Jacobinism in the construction of freedoms to be at leisure, and freedom to do leisure.

The Western epistemological tradition helps shape modernity by shaping and influencing what is now called the Enlightenment, that moment in the eighteenth century when philosophers, readers and activists construct the public sphere, engage in free debate and develop justifications and theories for liberalism and radicalism. One way out of the Enlightenment is a rejection of its liberalism and radicalism, and the embrace of idealism, romanticism and nationalism. But the Enlightenment also provides the template for the construction of the modern scientific world view, and the rise of science as way of finding truth. In this section, Robert Snape follows one of those lines of development by exploring ideas of leisure in the liberal philosophy of Mill. After that chapter, Maria Manuel Baptista and Larissa Latif follow the course of idealism and explore the meaning of leisure seen through the prism of the work of Hegel.

The ethos and ethics of modern science are formed in the West in the nineteenth century, and the idea of science as a profession, and the job of the university, follows from this. In this moment, the status of individual social sciences is much debated, but many important sociologists such as Dewey, Durkheim, Veblen and Weber try to make the case for sociology as a science of society based on the epistemology of science: sociology provides theories to be tested in experiments or sociology gathers observations from which theories emerge. While sociology's attempt to be as scientific as physics or biology is strongly contested,

psychology has been more amenable to adopting the methods and habits of modern science, and social psychologists have been able to make more confident, rational claims about the meaning and purpose of things such as leisure. In this section, there are four chapters that engage with the idea on leisure found in these four sociologists. The first by Mary Breunig is a reflexive, historical and sociological account of Dewey and his place in leisure and sociology. Stratos Georgoulas' chapter explores leisure in the work of Durkheim and the importance of Durkheim for leisure studies; then, a similar chapter on the importance of Veblen follows written by David Scott. After this exploration of Veblen, Weber is used by Pauwke Berkers and Koen van Eijck to explore the limits of leisure today.

The Western epistemological tradition then is aligned with the aims of the Classical Greek philosophers, to use reason to provide natural explanations for the world, for us and for our relationships and our practices. Leisure is one part of our lives, one part of society and the spaces in which we move and interact. It is something that is sometimes in the forefront of rational philosophies and theories of the world, sometimes absent, but often one part of a bigger theory. These rational theories of leisure take it as evident that we can identify and isolate leisure, that we can know what the purpose of leisure is in the wider world. Leisure's ontology becomes something simple—leisure is understood as something voluntary, something taken part in for fun, something that is contrasted with work and other duties. As we will show in the following chapters, rational theories of leisure have a long history and cover the most disciplinary and subject ground, and their contemporary equivalents, their inheritors, are present in work on flow and on serious leisure. In the last two chapters of this section, both these traditions in contemporary social psychology of leisure are explored and critiqued, with Sam Elkington exploring flow, and Karen Gallant taking on the enormous task of exploring serious leisure. In all the contributions to this section, we can see how the idea of science and philosophy as guarantors of epistemological certainty has been made throughout the West's history, and especially in modernity, which has allowed for the construction of an ontology of leisure that is real and measurable: we hope now our decision to name this section 'rational theories' of

leisure makes sense. We contend that these are all writers who have tried to use philosophy and science to make sense of leisure, without resorting to traditions, beliefs or other norms and values, and there is a connection from the work of Aristotle to the work of Stebbins.

Leisure in Classical Greek Philosophy

Thanassis Samaras

The concept of leisure plays a significant part in the ethical and political thinking of the Greek philosophers of the classical era. Freedom from the need to work is one of the main definitions of leisure (see Merriam-Webster online), and, for the purposes of this chapter, the term will be used as designating freedom from the need to engage in manual labour or spend time on activities necessary to ensure one's economic well-being. Nevertheless, it should be kept in mind that although "leisure" is the closest possible English translation of *scholê*, the Greek term has a wide range of meanings, not all of which are captured by "leisure".

Plato and Aristotle share the same fundamental understanding of leisure: it is freedom from material necessity, which allows the right kind of individual to achieve virtue, human flourishing (*eudaimonia*) and the higher ends that a (but not every) human being is capable of. In the *Phaedo* 66b–d Plato correlates the contrast between "leisure" (*scholê*) and

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“occupation” (*ascholia*) with the mind-body dichotomy and claims that leisure is a prerequisite for the philosophical life, a point repeated in the *Theaetetus* 172a–176a. Aristotle insists that *scholê*, which must be contrasted not with activity but with *ascholia*, is itself activity and ultimately the most important one, “the exercise ... of the speculative faculty” (Newman 2010 [1902], p. 442; cf. Stocks 1936, p. 178; Destrée 2013, pp. 308–319). But what kind of leisure is necessary for virtue and *eudaimonia* and which social groups may attain it? Plato’s two major political dialogues give different answers to these questions.

In the *Republic*, a work widely recognized as belonging to his “middle period” (Vlastos 1991), Plato argues that ethical perfection, which necessarily entails true *eudaimonia*, can only result from comprehension of the Forms of the four cardinal virtues of justice, temperance (*sôphrosunê*), wisdom and bravery. No one can be unfailingly just without knowing the Form of justice, for example, or perfectly brave without knowing the Form of bravery. Moreover, the person who fully grasps the Form of justice, or in other words who knows what is just, will have the right motivations and can be trusted to always act justly. But knowledge of the Forms, including the Forms of the cardinal virtues, involves understanding the whole order of reality and is the only kind of real knowledge (*epistêmê*) that exists. Because of the extraordinary difficulty of accomplishing this understanding, which presupposes a firm grasp of the highest and most abstract mathematical principles and philosophical concepts, a very strict regime is imposed on aspiring philosophers: they begin with intensive military training at age ten (*Rep.* 540e–541a) and gradually move on to loftier subjects. It is indicative of the difficulty of achieving infallible knowledge (and, in consequence, moral perfection) that few individuals are expected to ever become philosophers (428e–429a). In places, Plato describes the realization of this goal as almost superhuman.

Given the exceptionally demanding character of this preparatory regime, it is obvious that no individual engaged in any form of manual labour or working for a living, in other words no non-leisured individual, can ever follow it. Lack of free time would thus be sufficient to disqualify any working person from becoming an Auxiliary, the name that Plato gives to those training to become philosopher-rulers or Guardians.

It is not, however, only this lack that bars most people from even the aspiration of becoming Guardians. Plato believes in the essential inequality of human beings, some of whom are born with gold in their souls (the Guardians), some with silver (the Auxiliaries) and some with bronze (the Producers). The occasional transfer of an individual across these boundaries is allowed, but this does not establish anything like the ideal of equal opportunity of modern liberal political theory, because in the vast majority of cases one's genetic inheritance determines his or her placement in one of the three groups (415a). Moreover, Plato explicitly claims that it is the inaccuracy of the timing of the Guardians' breeding festival which leads to deficient offspring and the downfall of the best city (546a–547a), a suggestion entirely incompatible with any type of equal opportunity doctrine. Given that, in the framework of the aforementioned tripartition, Producers are characterized by their inability to control their desires and are thus psychologically incapable of achieving virtue; it follows that it would be ethically and politically inappropriate to allow them leisure.

Two passages in the *Republic* are particularly revealing in this respect:

For philosophy, abused as it is, still retains a far higher reputation than other occupations, a reputation which these stunted natures covet, their souls being as broken and maimed by their mechanical lives as their bodies are deformed by manual trades ... They are for all the world like some bald-headed little tinker who's just got out of prison and come into money, and who has a bath and dresses himself up in a new suit, like a bridegroom, and sets to marry his master's daughter because her family's fallen on hard times ... What sort of children are they likely to produce? Illegitimate and base, I think ... And when men who are unworthy of education have intimate dealings (which they don't deserve) with philosophy, are not the thoughts and opinions they produce fairly called sophistry, with nothing legitimate not any trace of true wisdom among them?

The crucial claim here is that manual workers have “stunted natures” (*ateleis* ... *phuseis*): this means that they are intellectually and morally flawed human beings, incapable of achieving the knowledge, virtue and *eudaimonia* of the Guardians, and that this is the case *before* their souls

become broken and maimed (*tas psuchas ... sugkekklasmenoï* and *apotehrummenoï*, two strong terms) by their menial occupations (*dia tas banausias*). It is exactly this deficiency in their nature which explains why they are “unworthy of education” (*anaxious paidouseôs*). In addition, the tinker is bald and small: despite the fact that Plato offers no argument in support of this assumption, he clearly associates physical repulsiveness with the status of manual labourer; by contrast, elsewhere in the *Republic*, he calls the Guardians “wonderful to look at” (*eueidestatous*, 535a). This is a reiteration of the aristocratic belief, going all the way back to Homer, that the well-born possess *ipso facto* beauty, whereas their social inferiors are *kakoi* or *phauloi*, both terms entailing moral depravity and ugliness. Plato calls the children “illegitimate” (*notha*) and “base” (*phaula*): despite the fact that the marriage is perfectly legal and thus does not violate conventional law, it violates nature by bringing together one individual from the golden and one from the bronze group, as demonstrated by the use of *phaula* with its connotations of both moral deficiency and physical unattractiveness. Finally, one may notice that possession of wealth is no indication of moral worth, especially when coming from industry of trade. Essentially adopting the aristocratic values of pre-monetary Greek societies, Plato places no value on money *per se*. The Guardians own no property, but they do command the labour of others (Wood 1988, p. 114). It is only leisure achieved through such command and devoted to military and intellectual pursuits that is a worthy goal for Plato. Leisure achieved by someone like the tinker in the story, or even by Hesiod’s successful farmer who will be discussed below, is both attained through the wrong means and unlikely to be devoted to the right pursuits (Hunnicut 1990, p. 213).

The second passage is 590c:

And why do we despise manual work as vulgar? Isn’t it because it indicates a certain weakness in our higher nature (*phusei*), which is unable to control the animal part of us, and can only serve and learn how to pander it?

In the framework of Plato’s moral psychology, Producers are by nature dominated by their desires (“the animal part of us”) and this domination typifies the structure of their souls. The reference to nature makes clear

that the primary factor that prevents them from moral achievement is not lack of time, but the fact that they are unable to control their desires—and therefore unable to become virtuous.

Since those involved in manual labour or trade are *by nature* incapable of achieving knowledge and human flourishing, it follows that they have to be excluded from the education given to the Auxiliaries and Guardians and reduced to providing for the material needs of the latter (416e–417a). Leisure thus becomes the rightful prerogative of the two higher classes of the city, because only its members have the potential of achieving true *eudaimonia* and they are the only citizens who can make proper use of it. It would be wrong to allow leisure to the Producers: not only can they not use it to achieve any higher end, but idle Producers will not perform their single socioeconomic function, which is to sustain the Auxiliaries and Guardians with their labour. It is for this reason that a sharp demarcation line is drawn between the leisured higher two classes and the manually working Producers and that the preservation of this line is essential to the survival of Plato's paradigmatic city.

Plato's second major political dialogue, the *Laws*, was written late in his career and presents a model which is explicitly "second best" compared to that of the *Republic*. There are some fundamental differences between the two works. In Magnesia, the city of the *Laws*, the institution of the household (*oikos*), which was abolished for the Guardian class in the *Republic*, is reinstated. There are no philosopher-rulers because, as Plato now admits, finding individuals with the perfect knowledge and incorruptibility of the Guardians is precluded by the limitations of human nature (*Laws* 691c and 713c). Perfect knowledge and perfect virtue are now conceded to be unattainable for human beings, and a lower, less exalted kind of virtue becomes the goal of citizen education in Magnesia (Bobonich 2002, pp. 258–292). As for political authority, since no individuals with infallible knowledge are available, it is to be exercised exclusively on the basis of written law. As a consequence, a meticulous delineation of the institutions of the city and the duties of its officials occupies most of the *Laws*.

Magnesia is a colony and all its citizens receive equivalent lots of land, but they are divided into four classes on the basis of their movable property. According to one interpretation, they are all leisured, which

means that toiling on their land is done exclusively by slaves (Saunders 1970, pp. 29–30; Roochnik 2010). This reading is suggested by Plato's association of virtue with leisure and by his claim that virtue is the goal of all citizen activities, as well as by the statement that their farms will be "assigned to slaves". This statement notwithstanding, however, the assumption of an exclusively leisured citizen-body is strongly contradicted both by several passages where Plato attributes leisure only to the higher classes (756b–e, 758b, 763d, 764a) and by the overall social, political and constitutional structure of Magnesia. In the aforementioned passages, Plato uses the differentiation of the four classes in terms of free time as a determining factor in his distribution of officialdoms, with the result that the higher classes get more power (Morrow 1960, p. 230). He also appears, without argument, to treat "greater wealth [as] proof of superior worth" (Brunt 1993, p. 275). None of these moves would be intelligible if all the citizens enjoyed the same degree of leisure. Even more crucially, Magnesia has a "mixed constitution" (756e), composed of oligarchic (although Plato calls them "monarchic") and democratic elements. But for such mixing to come into being, it is necessary for two distinct social groups, one supporting oligarchic and one democratic ideas, to be present in the city. If Magnesian citizens constituted a single homogeneous leisured class, differing only (and not widely, 744d–e) in the extent of their mobile property, the "mixed constitution" would be a meaningless concept. Plato acknowledges the existence of such distinct groups in the *Laws*. In 757e, a part of Magnesian citizens are called *hoi polloi* ("the many"), a term designating the democratic masses, and are said to be in favour of appointments by lot; by implication, the other citizens will belong to *hoi oligoi/hoi aristoi* ("the few" or "the best"). But, in the context of Greek political terminology at the time, it would be absurd to call leisured landowners *hoi polloi* or to expect that they would be in favour of the democratic institution of the lot. Moreover, in a critical passage in 832b–c, Plato argues that rule by one class is not a "genuine political system" (*ou politeias*) but "party rule" (*stasiôteiai*), a point repeated in 715b. Without doubt, for this argument to be intelligible (a minimum of), two different classes with diverse ideological perspectives must be present in the city.

The assumption that most Magnesians will be at least occasionally toiling on their land is further buttressed by three features of the dialogue. First, Plato's model of agricultural cultivation is based on Athens in an earlier period of its history, that is a model involving mostly small independent farmers (Morrow 1960, pp. 79–91; Hanson 1995, p. 190) who use both family and slave labour (Jameson 1977, p. 125). Second, as Richard Stalley astutely observes, Magnesians citizens “will not be rich and there will be rather a lot of them”, which “does not fit the conventional picture of an aristocrat” (Stalley 1983, p. 110). Third, those roughly belonging to the two lower classes serve in the infantry as *hoplitai*, whereas the members of the two higher ones in the cavalry. Historically, and with the unique exception of Sparta, *hoplitai* were self-employed farmer-soldiers, not leisured landowners. The last point has added significance, because the ideal of the “mixed constitution” in the fourth century BC involved a city in which the majority of the citizens would be farmer-soldiers.

But how can this interpretation of the dialogue be reconciled with the fact that leisure is a prerequisite for the acquisition of virtue? If some citizens do not have leisure, does it not follow that they cannot become virtuous? This problem can be solved, as I have argued elsewhere, if we realize that full leisure is an ideal situation that Plato desires for his citizens, but one that he does not expect will always be obtained (Samaras 2012, pp. 17–19). Crucially, and unlike what happens in the *Republic*, in the *Laws*, Plato does not prohibit agricultural labour for his citizens and never claims that this type of labour is incompatible with virtue or active citizenship.

This, in fact, turns out to be the greatest difference between the *Republic* and the *Laws* as far as their appreciation of labour is concerned. In both dialogues, artisanship, trade and financial activities are denigrated as destructive to the soul and incompatible with virtue and participatory citizenship. But whereas farming is included in this group of activities in the *Republic* (415a), it is not in the *Laws*, where it is legislatively regulated and thus treated as a legitimate citizen occupation (842d–e). The social and economic structures of the two works are correspondingly different: in the *Republic*, a small fully leisured minority controls the labour of and rules over a majority of manually working citizens, including farmers

(in terms of division of labour, Guardians and Auxiliaries form a single class). In the *Laws*, the richest citizens are fully leisured, but the majority of citizens are independent farmers who contribute physical labour on their land.

It is the latter model that fits in better with aristocratic opinion in Plato's time. Virtually, all elite authors of classical Greece disdain manual labour, as well as offering one's services to another person and define freedom (*eleutheria*) as "freedom from labour". This definition is a direct response to the democratic concept of freedom, which entails the "freedom of labour", that is increased political rights for labouring adult males (Wood 1988, p. 134; cf. Raaffaub 1983, pp. 520–36; Hansen 2010). But the kind of work that these authors find degrading and incompatible with moral autonomy and, in consequence, political self-determination is labour in what they call "*banausic*" (vulgar) crafts. (Revealingly, the word *banausoi*, which they use to refer to the individuals occupied in these professions as well as in trade, is an outright insulting term.) Farming, however, when done on one's own land or for recreation, is normally not included in the "*banausic*" arts. Xenophon, an Athenian general and author whose aristocratic mindset is beyond dispute, does not only present farming as perfectly compatible with active civic participation but even attributes engagement in it to the Persian king Cyrus, an icon of virtue for late fifth-century BC aristocrats (*Oeconomicus* 4.21–24). As Vassilis Anastasiadis (2004, p. 74) succinctly puts it, "involvement with the land was never considered degrading in antiquity".

It is in the *Laws*, then, rather than in the excessively exclusivist *Republic*, that Plato comes closer to common aristocratic opinion. But where does his famous student, Aristotle, stand on the matter?

Aristotle undoubtedly shares Plato's contempt both for manual labour and for the moral and intellectual capacities of those who engage in it. In the *Politics*, he compares craftsmen to slaves (1260a40–b1), that is, to individuals with feeble minds who cannot determine either the appropriate goal for their lives or the means to achieve it, and thus need a master to ensure their survival (1252a31–34); he claims that any *banausic* work "renders the body or the mind of free persons useless for the employment and activities of virtue" (1337b10–11, trans. Kraut); and he repeatedly emphasizes that the life of the "vulgar" artisan makes the acquisition of

virtue impossible (1277a38–b6, 1278a9–11 and 20–21, 1328b39–41, 1329a19–21). But whereas there is no question about where Aristotle stands on the moral and intellectual capacities of the *banausoi*, he does recognize that, politically, they represent a challenging problem: unlike the other disenfranchised groups of the classical city—women, resident foreigners and slaves—they think of themselves as entitled to citizenship. Moreover, their social classification, on which their political position ultimately depends, presents a particular difficulty: since they are native they cannot be considered foreign residents, and since they are free they are not slaves; but there is no other generally recognizable status group that they might be included in. Aristotle very specifically asks how they may be classified (1277b38–1279a2) but never quite answers the question. In fact, as Josiah Ober points out, the only “natural” solution to this problem would be to make them citizens (especially given that they are the authoritative rulers of free households), and the only “natural” constitution democracy, since it is the constitution that allows them citizenship (Ober 1998, pp. 301–302 and 306–10; cf. Keyt 1995, p. 135). But despite the fact that Aristotle formulates the problem in a way suggesting that their enfranchisement is the only solution, he goes on to claim that “the best city will not make a workman (*banauson*) a citizen” (1278a8, trans. Robinson). This raises questions about the extent to which his attitude towards free manual workers is informed more by his aristocratic predilection than by his philosophical principles (Miller 1995, pp. 244–45); and even these principles are not necessarily socio-logically neutral: his assertion of a teleologically determined hierarchy in nature, for example, correlates with a belief in the fundamental inequality of human beings and, as a consequence, provides justification for “natural” relations of gender and class subordination.

The one remaining question is whether or not Aristotle includes independent farmers who toil on their own land among those “vulgar” individuals who ought to be excluded from the citizen-body. *Prima facie*, it appears that he does: in his “city of our prayers”, the *polis* where the best possible conditions are obtained, all citizens are fully leisured and farming, along with manufacturing and trade, is to be conducted exclusively by non-citizens (1329a24–26). This demonstrates that he values a wholly leisured citizen-body, but does not necessarily entail that he thinks that

self-employed farmers ought to be disenfranchised under any circumstances. There are two pieces of evidence suggesting that Aristotle would accept farmers as citizens under imperfect conditions. The first is a passage in the *Rhetoric*:

This is why men like the liberal and the brave and the just. And they assume to be of this kind those who do not live off others. And such are those who live from their toil, and of these those who live from farming and of the others the self-employed especially.

(1381a20–23, trans. Lawson-Tancred)

Independent farmers, then, by not having to offer their labour or services to another individual—a morally debilitating situation according to all classical elite authors—can be morally distinguished from craftsmen, and can be “liberal, brave and just”. Given that for Aristotle citizenship ought to be predicated on virtue, the bravery and especially the justice of these farmers indicates that they may be accepted as citizens. Moreover, in the middle Books of the *Politics* Aristotle discusses a constitution that he calls *politeia* (“polity”). This is not a constitution created under the best conceivable conditions, like the “city of our prayers”, but it is the best that his existing contemporary Greek cities can hope for (Samaras 2015, pp. 134–41). The sovereign group in polity consists mostly of middle-income (*mesoi*) farmers, a class that is not leisured, but does not offer its labour or its products to others, like the “vulgar” craftsmen (*banausoi*) and wage-earners (*thêtes*). The fact that Aristotle includes them in the citizen-body of polity indicates that his position is fairly close to Plato’s. Under the best possible conditions, both philosophers prefer a fully leisured citizen-body, with all farming, artisanship and trade relegated to non-citizens (it must be pointed out here that in the *Republic* Producers are nominally offered citizenship but are *de facto* deprived of it, since they enjoy no rights and are allowed no form of political participation). But in less than immaculate conditions, both thinkers find acceptable a constitution in which labouring independent farmers participate. Plato’s “second best” city of the *Laws* and Aristotle’s “polity” are examples of such a constitution.

But how did other Greeks, who did not have freedom from material necessity and did not lead the life of the leisured gentleman respond to the notion of leisure as *conditio sine qua non* for a fulfilling life? Because of the primacy attributed to the literary record, a type of record monopolized by upper-class authors, including philosophers, the prevailing scholarly opinion had been for a long time that all Greeks appreciated leisure and disdained manual labour. In recent decades, however, largely due to the increasing contributions of disciplines such as gender and race studies, a new and much more complex picture has emerged. The crux of the matter is that, as Kurt Raaffaub has argued, most Greeks do agree that leisure is a highly desirable condition, one that they would themselves like to attain; but whereas they accept the desirability of leisure, free farmers and artisans categorically reject the degradation of manual labour, or the assumption that it makes one unfit for moral self-determination and political participation. In fact, democracy's policy of providing pay for public service might be interpreted as an attempt to provide leisure to those who cannot achieve it by their own means, thus permitting them to devote time and effort to public affairs (Raaffaub 1983, pp. 531–32).

One helpful way to understand this approbation of agricultural and artisanal labour is to place it in the framework of what Ian Morris has called the “middling” ideology (Morris 1996). According to Morris, this ideology is the antipode of the elitist point of view expressed in the Homeric compositions and certain lyric poems. These works present the distinction between noble-born and commoner as divinely ordained or natural—and, thus, as unconquerable. In this framework, the aristocrats define themselves as *agathoi* (later as *kaloikagathoi*; see Donlan 1973), that is as “good” or “worthy” people, in possession of *aretê* (virtue or excellence). In the world described by Homer, they exclusively control land, the primary and only safe source of wealth in their society. This secures, on the political plane, their dominance over all other social classes and, on the ideological plane, their claim to be the only individuals who possess *aretê*. Since they do not engage in manual labour but only in military, artistic and administrative activities, these are the pursuits that are deemed worthy of an *agathos*, and the leisured lifestyle that they enjoy the only morally commendable one. Beginning in the eighth century BC, however, the introduction of money and the fact that

land becomes alienable at least in some parts of the Greek world radically changes this picture (see Adkins 1972, pp. 22–23). It now becomes possible for non-leisured farmers of common birth to amass wealth and to buy land that they can add to their initial lot. Being able to challenge the aristocracy’s monopoly of land and wealth, these farmers proceed to challenge its ideological—and, eventually, its political—hegemony. A critical part of this ideological challenge is the radical re-evaluation of the moral import of manual labour.

The first example of a literary work offering this re-evaluation is Hesiod’s *Works and Days*, a poem dated around 700 BC (*Works and Days* belongs to the archaic period [seventh-sixth century BC], but is relevant to the present discussion because non-aristocratic attitudes towards manual labour in the classical era [fifth-fourth century BC] are part of the “middling” ideology described above and this ideology is attested continuously from the early archaic to the classical period). The poem includes the following verses:

It is from work that men are rich in flocks and wealthy, and a working man is much dearer to immortals. Work is no reproach, but not working is a reproach; and if you work, it will readily come about that a workshy man will envy you as you become wealthy. Wealth brings worth (*aretê*) and prestige. But whatever your fortune, work is preferable.

(WD 308–314, transl. West)

A full discussion of the ideological implications of these lines cannot be undertaken here, but for a succinct analysis one may turn to Peter Rose:

Key ruling-class values and attributes—divine favour ... wealth ... freedom from ordinary labour, excellence/success (*aretê*), fame, the shame-culture obsession with avoidance of disgrace—are here refigured and reassessed in relation to work. The celebration of hard work, parsimony, self-reliance and the positive evaluation of constant, internalized anxiety over the passage of time represents a set of values sharply differentiated from the implied values of the leisured ruling class portrayed in the *Odyssey* and the warrior ruling class in the *Iliad*.

(Rose 2012, p. 196)

The free and economically independent peasantry, whose ideology Hesiod expounds in the *Works and Days*, becomes more powerful during the following centuries. Militarily, they start fighting as heavy infantry, as *hoplitai*, and therefore they become the cornerstone of the armed forces of the city. Politically, they challenge the hereditary nobility's monopoly of power, a process that takes different forms in different Greek cities, but which leads to many of those cities ending up as tyrannies in the archaic age and as democracies in the classical one. But whereas we find strong evidence for the perseverance of the "middling" ideology in the political developments between the seventh and the fifth century BC, only limited attestation for the appreciation of manual labour is available in either the literary or the archaeological record. Nevertheless, when carefully examined, even this limited evidence leaves little doubt that the elitist view was upheld only by a—probably small—minority.

One important clue about the attitudes of non-aristocrats towards manual labour comes from the fact that, beginning in the seventh century, craftsmen start signing their work (Buford 1972, 212), an unmistakable sign that they take pride in their labour and its end product. In the *Works and Days*, Hesiod mentions that "neighbour vies with neighbour as he hastens to wealth ... so potter is piqued with potter, joiner with joiner" (23–25). These verses indicate that upward social mobility was possible for skilled workers already in the archaic period. The ideological perspective of this group is also reflected in a literary tradition that views humanity as constantly progressing through both technological and political innovation. The significance of this tradition can hardly be underestimated, because, as Bryant aptly remarks, "In any artisanal ideology, the most important and inspirational feature is the recognition that technology is the foundation and wellspring of civilization" (Bryant 1996, 114). Technological progress is celebrated in two renowned fifth-century plays. In *Prometheus Bound*, a tragedy attributed to Aeschylus, the Titan disregards Zeus' orders and offers to humans many types of technological expertise, as well as writing. There is little doubt that Prometheus' resistance to Zeus' will expresses the inclination of increasingly large numbers of Athenians to find protection from arbitrary power—associated with either tyranny or aristocratic rule—and to take pride in their labour. Moreover, written law provides to the poor a safeguard against injudicious

decisions by the ruling classes and is generally regarded as democratic (see Euripides, *Suppliants* 433–37 and Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon* 6). A very similar attitude towards technology and, by extension, towards working people, pervades the famous ode in Sophocles' *Antigone* 334–75.

But the most philosophically articulate connection between technological progress and the political aspirations of non-leisured native adult males is to be found in the myth narrated by Protagoras in Plato's dialogue of the same name. This myth is remarkable in many ways. Although it includes positions that almost certainly reflect the views of the sophist Protagoras with historical accuracy, it is written by Plato, who disagrees with these views and refutes them in the rest of the dialogue. Protagoras' speech offers a theoretical defence of democracy (Taylor 1976, pp. 83–84)—actually, the best one that we have from the classical period. It is, of course, paradoxical that this defence is penned by an outspoken critic of democracy like Plato, but this can be explained by the fact that virtually all philosophers at the time are leisured aristocrats, whereas there is no one sympathetic to democracy producing political theory. In the myth, Protagoras acknowledges the importance of technological innovation for survival (322a–b) but argues that political virtue (*politikê aretê*), the skill of being able to live peacefully with others, must also be present for human societies to be sustained. This virtue is given by Zeus to all, and “all men” participate in it (322d). On this basis, the sophist explicitly justifies democracy's practice to include all native adult males, including craftsmen, in the citizen-body, as well as full citizen equality (this follows from his tacit premise that political virtue is the only qualification for citizenship) and majority rule. In the rest of the *Protagoras*, Plato argues that moral and political virtue presuppose expertise and thus cannot be possessed by all. This argument foreshadows the epistemic restrictions on meaningful citizenship that he will advance in the *Republic*.

Plato's position in the *Protagoras* is put forward by the dramatic character of Socrates. The historical Socrates, whose inquiry into the nature and definition of virtue was a huge influence on Plato, famously led a life devoted to philosophical thought. What did common Athenians think about this *vita contemplativa*? A glimpse into a possible answer is offered by Aristophanes. As a comic poet who produced plays with the

explicit aim of prize-winning, Aristophanes could only be successful if he adopted, at least *prima facie*, the ideological assumptions of his audience, and therefore his comical exaggeration of Socrates can be assumed to reflect the views of the average Athenian. In the *Frogs*, he describes him as “a man going crazy” because he “spends time idly in pompous words and frivolous word-scraping” (1496–99, trans. Dillon) and in the *Clouds*, the Clouds that Socrates worships are “great divinities to idle men” (316, trans. Hickie) who feed “very many sophists” and “idle people who do nothing” (331 and 334). Aristophanes is not alone: in a fragment from an unidentified comedy by his contemporary poet Eupolis, Socrates is characterized as an “idle talker” who is unable to win his own food. If these lines are any guide, the majority of Athenians morally disapproved of what they perceived as a life of idleness (Lis 2009, p. 36), especially in the case of someone like Socrates who did not have the resources to engage in philosophical quests without condemning himself to poverty.

But what is probably the strongest evidence that the majority of Athenians appreciated labour and did not believe that engagement in it is morally debilitating comes from two speeches: Pericles’ *Funeral Oration* and Andocides’ *On the Mysteries*. Pericles’ speech is related by Thucydides, but the latter is a brilliant and diligent historian who would be extremely unlikely to distort the ideological content of the speech. The point that both speeches make about labour is that not only does it not involve anything inherently degrading, but engaging in it is actually a morally commendable course of action, at least for those who do not have (or, in Andocides’ case, have lost) the means to live in leisure. According to Pericles, “As for poverty, no one need be ashamed (*aischron*) to admit it: the real shame is in not taking practical measures to escape from it” (Thuc. 2.40, trans. Warner). Andocides tells his jury:

Think, furthermore, what a citizen you will have in me, if you give me your protection. I was once, as you know, a man of great wealth. Then to begin with, through no fault of my own, but through the disasters which overtook Athens, I was plunged into utter penury and want. I then started life afresh, a life of honest (*ek tou dikaïou*) toil, with my brains and my hands to help me.

(*On the Mysteries* 144, trans. Maidment)

Pericles takes for granted that his fellow citizens think of work as something that in the case of individuals who lack the resources to be leisured involves no shame, but, on the contrary, is to be applauded. Andocides, initially a leisured *agathos*, associates manual labour with *to dikaion*, a term which might be translated as “just”, and which definitely is one of the strongest terms of moral approval available to him. Whereas working is something that a traditional *agathos* would be ashamed to do, Andocides claims, in effect, that he can work and still be an *agathos*.

Since both speeches would disastrously fail if they did not adopt the viewpoint of their audience, it is fairly certain that they reflect the beliefs of the average Athenian. Pericles is, at the time of the *Funeral Oration*, a veteran politician with an unprecedentedly successful career spanning more than three decades. It is therefore extremely unlikely that he would misrepresent the position of his fellow citizens on a matter of this kind. Andocides, as a defendant in a trial involving the death penalty, needs to present himself as “one of the people” and cannot possibly afford to endorse a position divergent from that of his popular jury. Moreover, both orators make the aforementioned claims in a matter-of-fact way, indicating that they take for granted the full agreement of their listeners. There can be little doubt that, in context, these two texts present incontrovertible evidence for the moral acceptability of manual labour by the majority of Athenian citizens.

Finally, there is the “silent majority” of the hardest working groups of the classical *polis*, women, metics and slaves. The practically complete absence of their voice from the literary record means that we can only know what their male lords (*kurioi*), citizens of hosting cities and masters thought of them. In the case of women, as Sue Blundell points out, “Almost everything that we know about Greek women is derived ultimately from a masculine source”, so that “the women of Ancient Greece are, to a large extent, creatures who have been invented by men” (1995, p. 10). Slaves totally lacked both the education and the opportunity to leave behind any written record. As for metics, as a group they were “politically mute” (Whitehead 1977, p. 174). (Aristotle, a foreign resident in Athens with the resources to devote himself to philosophy, is an atypical case, and his political analysis is written entirely from the perspective of the citizen.) This means that the groups who did the most to make citizen

leisure possible are also the groups entirely excluded from the discussion about its moral value. This is hardly surprising, however, since they are excluded from almost any form of ideology producing activity.

In classical Greece, then, the discussion about leisure and the moral implications of engaging in manual labour takes place exclusively within the citizen community and three distinct approaches to the subject are clearly identifiable. The first is based on the assumption that any form of such labour is morally debilitating and incompatible with the best life. Plato and Aristotle provide detailed arguments in favour of this thesis and build their best cities on this premise: the citizen-bodies of the *Republic* and of *Politics* VII–VIII are entirely leisured. Given the difficulty of realizing this ideal, however, both philosophers accept a “second best” solution, where citizenship is bestowed to independent farmers toiling on their farm, but to no one who does not own land. The regimes of Plato’s *Laws* and of Aristotle’s “polity” are construed on that principle. In opposition to the first approach, which is inspired by an aristocratic ideology going all the way back to the Homeric epics, we find the average Greek citizen’s belief, developed within the framework of the “middling” ideology, that although leisure may be desirable, there is nothing degrading in manual work and there is no justification for political exclusion on the basis of one’s labour status. The extension of citizenship to all native adult males and the positive attitude towards work in the classical rhetorical record demonstrate that, at least in the democratic city of Athens, this is an ideological battle that the common citizens ultimately won.

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John Locke: Recreation, Morality and Paternalism in Leisure Policy

Ian Lamond

This chapter will consider the legacy that the philosophy of John Locke has had on paternalism within leisure as a field of inquiry and as an aspect of state intervention. Whilst it draws on a history of the association between paternalism and state intervention in leisure that is rooted in UK examples, much of the argument developed also applies to the remainder of the Anglophone world (particularly Canada and Australia) and much of Europe.

There is, however, an important proviso around how the term “Leisure” can best be applied to the thinking of Locke, and why the alternate, “Recreation”, has been used in the chapter’s title. In his discussion of the emergence of the sociology of leisure as a field of study, Burke (1995) suggests the social history of leisure we currently work within owes a considerable debt to rapid industrialisation, specifically since the

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mid-nineteenth century; and the political, social and economic reforms brought about through the activism of worker and labour movements. Whilst he acknowledges that pre-industrial societies certainly contain entertainments, festivals and diversionary activities, the distinction between work and leisure, as we currently understand it, is a product of the forms of capitalism that emerged in industrialised states. Etymologically, the English word “Leisure” derives from the old French noun “Loisir”, which referred to a freedom from being otherwise occupied (Cunliffe 1920); it was not, singularly tied, to an absence from labour. To apply such a contemporary sensibility to leisure, therefore, could be seen as working with a concept alien to the context in which Locke was writing.

Despite that noted absence, Burke points out, “there was no lack of terms opposed to ‘work’” (p. 139), during that period. Even when we look to the works of Locke himself, we actually find very few direct instances of the word “Leisure”, preferring the term “recreation” himself. Whilst Locke acknowledges the significance of time free from labour in “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding”, the two treatises “Of Civil Government” (Locke 1943) and in “Some Thoughts Concerning Education”, he does not refer to that time as Leisure, but as the best use of recreation. For these reasons, “recreation” will be used in our discussion of Locke’s thinking around leisure.

The chapter will be in three parts. The first will consider the foundations of the link between recreation and morality. A concentration on their long association is not one to be focused on here. However, some consideration of its place in the ideas of Plato and Aristotle is relevant as these tie closely to Locke’s consideration of childhood education, and his discussion of the foundations of ethical learning in the epistemology he espouses in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. So some indication of the foundations of the connection between recreation and morality, by those earlier philosophers, before turning our attention to John Locke’s reflections on moral education, is appropriate.

The second section will draw out Locke’s discussion of the epistemological foundations of ethical learning. In order to illustrate the development of his line of reasoning, his argument for the emergence of ethical learning from what he considers our innate capacity to reflect and bring ideas together will be presented. Ideas which Locke suggests are not

themselves innate, but derived from our sensory experience of the world we encounter. That capacity, he argues, can only flourish if we have the opportunity for recreation. However, it comes with a cost. Those who fully recognise their moral responsibilities, as a result of the recognition of how morality emerges in human understanding, if they are to act ethically themselves, need to encourage the moral development of others. It is such an obligation, itself forming an important part of the good governance of the state, that underlines the paternalistic roots of state intervention in leisure.

The third section will indicate how state paternalism grew throughout the nineteenth century and into the 1970s, in turn contributing to the emergence of a more neo-liberalist position that tries to supplant the paternalism of the state with an assumption that the unregulated market (or, at the very least, one that offers a facade of working within loose state regulations) will operate in a similar way. Laying the foundations for a commodified moral paternalism that is directed by corporate interests, feeding us the idea that it is only through selling us the objects of leisure that we can become ethical beings.

In conclusion, the view that there is a connection between leisure and morality, rooted in Locke's epistemological frame of reference, will be critiqued. In place of locating leisure in the absence of occupation, it will be suggested that it is the occupation of leisure, at an ontic rather than epistemic level, its potential for confronting domination and repression, that gives leisure its moral value.

Recreation and Morality

Whilst we shall see that there are direct linkages between recreation and morality in the work of Locke, the roots of that connection date back to ideas pertaining to the theories of knowledge acquisition and personal growth, developed in the work of Plato and Aristotle. In this section, those foundational ideas, linking them forward to those of Locke, will be considered.

The relationship between knowledge and morality is of central importance in Plato's work. In the *Republic*, Socrates outlines his ideas for what

would be a utopian state, only to have it denounced by Glaucon as a city only fit for pigs (*Republic*,¹ Book 2). That said, it does present a Socratic articulation of an ideal state (Melling 1987), one which lays the groundwork for his argument around the nature of justice that appears later in the book. At the heart of that *pig city* rests a clear and full understanding of our own capabilities, understanding the same of others, and using that knowledge to give the people of such a state the capacity to form a society which operates for the benefit of all its constituent population.

Now Plato, through Socrates, recognising that *pig city* is an idealisation, presents us with a myth. He suggests the metal which characterises the soul can help distinguish between those who should labour for and those that should be guardian of the state. Interestingly, it is the capacity to effectively reflect on his myth that is considered indicative of having a soul suitable for state guardianship, and who thus can be granted the privilege of being removed from labouring for the state. They are given, in a sense, leisure time to let their minds play with the important ideas and concerns of the state. It is that playfulness, which leads them to the wisdom, they need to correctly steer the state through the issues it faces. In other dialogues, the connection between playfulness as reflective capacity and wisdom is explored further; Ardley (1967) suggesting that the Platonic corpus represents just such a playfulness at work, and that the use of myth making in many of the dialogues, is just one symptom of that.

Though D'Angour (2013) rightly points out that Plato has an ambiguous relationship with play, his casting out of certain forms of entertainment from his proposed *Republic* (Plato 1980b) are a clear illustration of that (see, e.g., Belfiore 2006 for a link between that and more recent debates in cultural policy), the connection between certain forms of intellectual play and the development of human understanding is made through a number of his works (overtly in books such as the *Statesman*, *Parmenides*, *The Laws* and, by illustrating the capacity of a slave boy to resolve, through directed play, a complex mathematical problem, in the *Meno*).

All references to the works of Plato are taken from the translations of his complete works, edited by E. Hamilton and H Cairns. They appear in the reference section as separate entries for Plato (1980c), and listed with their individual translators.

Although Plato's position drew a clear line between leisure as playfulness and human understanding, the link to morality is more of a sidestep: playfulness supports understanding; the application of right understanding will lead to morally correct solutions to problems. Aristotle, especially in the *Politics* (Aristotle 2009b), on *Rhetoric* (Aristotle 2004) and in his *Nicomachean Ethics* (Aristotle 2009a), makes an explicit connection between the opportunity for leisure and our capacity to develop as ethical beings. It is since Aristotle, Fain (1991) argues, that the "epistemological tie ... between leisure and moral philosophy is readily apparent ... where the referent 'moral philosophy' is in close proximity to the 'philosophy of leisure'" (p. 14).

It is in Book 7 of the *Politics* that Aristotle advocates that the provision of learning for all should be publicly provided, and that such schooling should be the same for all. Education forming a central element of his vision for a good society, one where the happiness, understood as the raising of the highest virtues for the greatest number, of the populous is the central aim of politics (Curren 2010). The association of values and knowledge is reinforced in the Aristotelian account of rhetoric, which balances *logos* (the logic of the argument) with *ethos* (the credibility of the speaker) and *pathos* (those values held by the audience). However, despite the emphasis on happiness, it is not the *Eudaimonia* that forms the mainstay of his consideration of the importance of leisure and ethics but the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

According to Morgan (2006), it is in *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book 10, that Aristotle most clearly identifies that the greatest happiness for an individual, and presumably thus for society, is to learn the art of reflecting on the virtues (*theoria*). A content society, one where the basic needs of the populous are met, being one where the people, appropriately educated, have the free time (leisure) to contemplate and realise the higher virtues of our humanity. Whilst he admits three possible activities associated with leisure—amusement, political/military activity and *theoria*—it is only the latter that is considered the ultimate objective for our leisure. It is only reflection on what he would consider the higher human virtues that is thought capable of placing all other work and non-work objectives into a proprietorial order that will lead to individual (and societal) *eudaimonia* (happiness). It is thus the states capacity to educate and support

the best use of leisure that stands any chance of producing a content, productive and morally strong populous.

It is correct that Locke addresses questions regarding moral education in his “An Essay Concerning Human Understanding”; however, it is actually within the slightly later work (Some Thoughts Concerning Education—1692²) that he most clearly defends a similar position to Aristotle’s over the importance of supporting children, through education, to realise their moral sensibilities. His apparent connection to classical philosophy seems at odds to the suggestion that he was more fascinated, whilst a student, by the ideas emerging on mainland Europe (such as those of Descartes), than in the antiquarian authors he was taught whilst an undergraduate at Christ Church, Oxford (Cranston 1957). And not just in his youth. Whilst in self-imposed exile in the Netherland, between 1683 and 1688 (Woolhouse 2007), despite their paths never crossing, he is known to have met and conversed with former members of dissenting groups associated with Spinoza. Nevertheless, his own ideas diverged from theirs and gravitated more towards those of Francis Bacon, which would form the foundations of British empiricism. Significantly, Bacon had been a great admirer of Aristotle’s methods (if not the doctrinal codification of Aristotelian philosophy) (Ibid), and observed in that earlier philosopher’s work, the roots of a scientific approach to acquiring knowledge.

For Locke, direction in learning, from the earliest age, was central to making sure that we developed our understanding in such a way as to best benefit ourselves and the society of which we are a part. In such a vein, he notes that all “gentlemen should use their children, as the honest farmers and substantial countrymen” (CE §4), in *cultivating*³ them as fit for the life that lies ahead for them; such that “bowing to a gentleman,

² References to Locke’s ‘Some Thoughts Concerning Education’ used in this chapter are taken from the online version of the essay to be found at www.thefederalistpapers.org, section references mentioned corresponding to the section demarcation in that version of the text. When referencing it, the abbreviation CE and the symbol § will be used to denote the section, which will be followed by the number of the section in which the quotation appears. The abbreviations CU will refer to references from the ‘Essay Concerning Human Understanding’, whilst CG will be used in references to the Two Treatises of Civil Government. In those latter works, the symbol § will also be used to mark section, but will be preceded by a page number.

³ It is interesting to observe that the English words for organic *cultivation* of crops and that enculturation that is meant to engender a *cultured* human being have the same Latin root—*colere* (Cunliffe 1920).

when he salutes him, and looking in his face, when he speaks to him is ... as natural to a well-bred man, as breathing" (CE §64). Because, as we shall discuss later, such etiquette and moral respectability are not born with us, they need to be acquired and directed; "The weakness of our constitutions both of mind and body, requires that we should be unbent" (CE §197). How? Locke is quite clear that such moral learning is not attained through violent discipline; beating a child into compliance with what is to be acceptable behaviour is very strongly opposed: "Beating them, and all other sorts of slavish and corporal punishments, are not the discipline fit to be used in the education of those we would have wise, good and ingenious men" (CE §52).

In place of harsh discipline, Locke commends that "They (children) must not be hinder'd from being children, or from playing or doing as children" (CE §69), but that learning, itself, should "be made a play and recreation to children ... that they may be brought to desire to be taught, (as) if it were proposed to them as a thing of honour, credit, delight and recreation" (CE §148). It is through the adult directing the child's recreation that moral correctness, understood in Locke's terms of acting for the benefit of the individual and the society of which they are a part, can be attained. "Recreation" he argues, "is as necessary as labour or food" (CE §108), whilst ensuring that care "be taken, that what is of advantage to them, they should always do with delight" (CE §108); for it is in experiencing delight that the child is rewarded and learns.

The foundations of Locke's view of the importance of recreation is not just centred on childhood moral development, but is very much rooted in his epistemological position. It is towards the foundations of his empiricism, the connection between that and morality in the development of human understanding, and the link between both of those and his principles of civil government, that we now turn.

Locke, Empiricism, Paternalism and Recreation

Locke's significance as a pioneer within the empiricist movement of philosophy is without doubt. His rejection of a counter position, that knowledge is rooted in innate ideas which, through the application of

reason, enable us to gain an understanding of the world, not only puts him in stark contrast to the dominant rationalism of many of his contemporaries, but also challenges the Platonic tradition in philosophy itself. Plato's myth of the cave articulated a position where the senses have been dulled into accepting a mere shadow-play as reality. It is the chained prisoner's escape and encounter with the world beyond the cave that is disclosed as the reality beyond their confinement, which is experienced as a confrontation with unquestionable truth.

Towards the end of the *Republic*, and to a lesser extent in the *Phaedo* and the *Phaedrus* (Plato 1980a), where the argument for the pre-existence of the soul before birth is made most directly, Plato begins to consider why such a revelation has such a strong verisimilitude. Through the use of storytelling, Plato suggests that the soul, prior to birth, has the potential to gain direct access to the structure of reality. It is the shock of birth that means the knowledge of that time is lost. However, those ideas are retained, only to be awakened when we exercise reason to gain a true understanding of the world. Truth is thus to be understood not as built on our experience of the world around us (the shadow-play of the cave), but *Aletheia*—a disclosedness (a remembering) brought about by the application of reason to those innate, though hidden, ideas. Knowledge, in such a framework, is already there, only requiring training in the right use of reason to unlock it.

For Locke, the root of knowledge is a complete reversal of the process suggested by Plato and, to varying degrees, at work in the background of his rationalist contemporaries on mainland Europe. Book 1 of his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* makes it abundantly clear that the human mind is free of all ideas before birth. "The senses", he writes "at first let in particular *ideas* and furnish the yet empty cabinet; and the mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them. They are lodged in the memory, and names got to them" (CU p. 5 §15). The human mind is thus not a cabinet full of ideas that are simply waiting to be taken out, dusted off and contemplated with the power of an incisive and well-trained intellect. Instead, it is an empty vessel, waiting for contents that only the senses can provide.

It is, however, not a sufficient characterisation of Locke's position to claim that access to truth is only possible through the acquisition of exper-

riences gained through the senses. Whilst he does hold that the mind is empty of innate ideas—using a referent to idea that resonates with how it is used in Plato’s epistemo-ontological theory, it would be inaccurate to say the mind was devoid of all capacities. A cabinet is a cabinet in which ideas can be located—the concept of the mind as a *tabula rasa* (which predates Locke, going all the way back to Aristotle, and enjoying something of a revival in his own time due to the work of Francis Bacon (Bowen 1993)) is a slate upon which ideas can be inscribed. Both metaphors are ones that presume knowledge requires something of the vessel in which it is to appear, if it is to count as knowledge. In CU p. 29 §23, he suggests that “God (has) ... fitted men with faculties and means to discover, receive, and retain truths, accordingly as they are employed”. Differences in understanding emerging as a result of the misuse of those divinely *fitted faculties*, whilst most “misemploy their power ... by lazily enslaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others” (CU p. 29, §23). This is a full reversal of the Platonic position of innate *ideas* and the application of learnt reason to one where reason (as the capacity to *discover, receive and retain* truth), whilst it needs refinement, is organically built into us, with the foundation of our *ideas* being attainable through sensory experience. It is the application of reason to the impressions drawn from our senses, not the disclosedness of prior knowledge (*Aletheia*) recognising the truth beyond the veil our senses place over reality, which enables us to gain understanding.

Sharing with Plato an epistemo-ontological position, that there is a knowable reality that is intimately connected to how we can come to know it, Locke’s emphasis on training our natural capabilities is significant. Even though our senses give us an inbuilt capacity to acquire knowledge of the world outside our mind, it is in the correct application of reason, the *unbending of the weak constitution* of our *mind and body* (CE §197), that leads to human understanding and the development of more complex ideas and relationships. Such complexity draws on our capacity to derive truth from capacities of *discernment* (CU p. 71 §1): *comparison* (CU p. 73 §4) and *composition* (CU p. 73 §6) of those ideas obtained through one or more sense. But, he warns, if such capacities are not cultivated to focus on the “constant pursuit of true and solid happiness” (CU p. 120, §51), we will mistake imaginary for real happiness

and undermine “the necessary foundation of our liberty” (ibid). It is, he argues, the association of the correct application of reason to our moral discernment that enables us to establish those virtues and values that are essential for “public happiness, and ... the preservation of society” (CU p. 20, §6), and hence the emphasis placed on directing and steering play in the education of children found in CE. Only through the intervention of those who have already obtained clarity of moral insight themselves, through the inculcation of learning as pleasurable and the appropriate shaping of the child’s experiences during play and recreation (CE §148), can the individual hope to emerge as a morally happy person, and a broader level of happiness be attainable for society as whole. There is a responsibility here, which Locke attributes principally to a child’s father (CE §199), to ensure reason develops in such a way as to support the individual in developing those capacities of “questioning and examination” (CU p. 349, §4) that will increase their own happiness, whilst supporting them in the promotion of the happiness of others. Central to that is Locke’s suggestion that there is an important connection between the opportunity to engage in reflection and our capacity for moral development, which can only be achieved through the freedom to participate in recreation.

Even though “(r)ecreation is as necessary as labour or food” (CE §108), it is toil (where an individual must focus on their labour, over their need for personal growth) and the *misdirection* of recreation (CE §207) that Locke sees as robbing us of our capacity for moral development and, consequently, of preventing society attaining a state of true happiness. It is in his *Two Treatises of Civil Government* (Here referred to as CG—first published anonymously in 1689, and only posthumously published with the inclusion of his name) that he considers how to establish a strong and harmonious society. In it he weaves together, and progresses, a number of topics already addressed in the two works already considered, emphasising the importance of recognising how each reflects, and develops, the positions articulated in the works, separately.

Structurally, CG is a much simpler work than CU, yet they both begin in a similar fashion. Where CU starts by outlining and then dismantling a construction of the development of human understanding through a critique of innate ideas, Book 1 of CG establishes and critiques a number

of *false principles* that Locke suggests are part of the dominant worldview, before delivering his alternate perspective. Such a process is in keeping with the pedagogical position presented in CE, which encourages playing with ideas before being directed to what is, arguably, a more reasoned position: one based on a foundation of experience gained, but tempered with a capacity to rationally combine, contrast and consider the composition of those ideas generated from experience. For Locke, humanity's natural state is one that, whilst differing, resonates with that of Hobbes. It may not cohere with a Hobbesian state of Nature, but it does sit well with a view that human Nature's first interest is self-interest and self-preservation. Such a position echoes Locke's view of childhood. Where Locke significantly diverges from Hobbes, at this foundational level, is in taking self-interest and self-preservation as best served by considering others as equals, in so doing Locke's state of Nature draws into itself a Natural Law that acts as a governor to the mechanisms of individual interaction. So, he writes, "though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state of licence. ... The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges everyone, and ... teaches all mankind who will but consult it" (CG p. 118, §6). Humanity's nature is a state of innocence, an empty cabinet, similar to that of the child, but also, like the child, it is one where there are certain latent capacities for reason, capacities which can produce an understanding of the value of forming societies and communities, that can better support self-interest and self-preservation.

Sir Robert Filmer's metaphor of the parent/child relationship as a justification for monarchy, popular at the time, is redrawn by Locke (CG pp. 5–6, §6) as an argument for establishing a morally happy society under a civil government. He applies it to both the rational direction of recreation in a child's moral education (CE §148) and the relationships of power at the heart of the formation of a just government: "For God having given man an understanding to direct his actions, has allowed him a freedom of will and liberty of acting. ... But whilst he is in an estate wherein he has no understanding of his own to direct his will, he is not to have any will of his own to follow" (CG p. 144, §59). Just as the wise parent, who has learnt how to apply their reason to derive moral laws, can direct the child into achieve a similar "state of knowledge" (CG p. 204, §170), so the wise state, Locke argues, should direct its citizens

into deriving the moral principles that will produce the good society (CG pp. 204–206, §169–174). It is the parent-like care of the state, which he considers a paternal power, which needs to be brought to bear on the individual whose recreation is undirected, or overwhelmed by concentration on their labour, so that all may achieve a capacity for moral discernment and, thereby, achieve a morally secure and ‘happy’ society. In the next section, that linkage between recreation, paternalism and morality, which has formed a keystone in much nineteenth- and twentieth-century discussion around leisure policy, especially by the supporters of Victorian liberalism (and current neo-liberalism), in the Anglophone West, which has itself borrowed so heavily from trajectories in Locke’s thinking, will be considered.

Recreation, Paternalism and Morality in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

To attain a rich understanding of the significance of the linkage between recreation, and morality, especially its emergence in Victorian liberalism, would require a substantial work in its own right. What is present here is intended as an overview.

With industrialisation came significant tensions between those working in the new factory system and those that owned and managed such resources. Those tensions had been exposed through a number of clashes between workers and forces mobilised by those with power. Perhaps one of the historically better-known examples of this was the St Peter’s Field demonstration of 1819 which, following a charge of the Manchester and Salford Yeomanry, became known as the Peterloo Massacre, where 15 were killed and more than 600 injured (Hobsbawm 1988). The outcry that followed being a significant factor in increasing pressure for wider enfranchisement. Although the 1832 Parliamentary Reform Act increased the number of representatives in the House of Commons (Lang 1999), it was still very restricted regarding who was and was not eligible to vote. After the Newport Rising of 1839 (Jones 1985), Chartism began to be felt as a political force associated with working-class action across the

UK, coming to a head during the 1840s when several local and national strikes unsettled the British establishment (Thompson 1963).

Based on his stay in Salford, whilst working in the offices of his father's thread mill in Weaste, the young Friedrich Engels observed the desperately poor conditions of working-class people in Manchester (Hunt 2010) during the 1840s. His description of the housing, sanitation and health condition of those working people puts one in mind of Hobbes characterisation people in his state of nature: "poore [sic], nasty, brutish, and, short" (Hobbes 1985, p. 186). In same the year *The Condition of the Working Class in England* was published⁴ potato blight, which impacted the whole of Europe (Engels 2009) and had a particularly tragic impact on the population of Ireland. With potatoes being a staple crop for many of the poorest people of that country, almost one million people (Ross 2002) died of starvation. British governmental policy, particularly around the Corn Laws the economic rights of absentee landlords, compounded the tragedy of the famine, strengthening Irish republicanism, and furthering unrest around the treatment of the country's working class.

The "Disturbances in Hyde Park" (The Guardian, 26th July 1866) at a demonstration of the Reform League shook the so-called *respectable* society. Protest, ostensibly against the inequity of working people to gain access to the eastern portion of the park, took the form of opening an access point to the space. In its report, at the time, *The Guardian* described events of 26 July 1866 as a "scene of wild excitement and disorder" with the park's beautiful flowerbeds bearing traces of "having been trampled under the rough feet of a careless multitude"; protesters were described as so many "(b)ands of idle vagabonds ... with no other purpose apparently than that of causing the utmost possible destruction of property". The following year the Second Parliamentary Reform Act significantly widened the franchise to include those paying £10 or more a year rent, and not just those that owned property (Lang 1999). Also in 1867, Matthew Arnold began publishing a series of essays in the *Cornhill Magazine*, which specifically argued for the moral value of directed recreation, suggesting what he took to be the

⁴ Though 'The Condition of the Working Class in England' was not available in English until 1887, it had been originally published by Otto Wigand, a publisher based in Leipzig, in 1845.

anarchic elements of such seemingly unwarranted working-class behaviour as symptomatic of a lack of acquaintance with the “sweetness and light” (Arnold 1999), a circumstance that spending time to appreciate culture could obviate.

Though not a new idea, there are ruminations of it in the pedagogy of Catherine Macaulay (Titone 2009) in the eighteenth century, and the Royal Commission set up by Prince Albert, which would result in the Great Exhibition of 1851 (Minihan 1977), the idea that recreation needed to be directed for the moral benefit of society, in its most familiar and Lockean form, appears in Matthew Arnold’s *Culture and Anarchy* (Arnold 1999). For Arnold, an undirected culture, in his terms—“doing as one likes” (pp. 81–101), is one that leads to barbarism and philistinism (pp. 105–111). Such a state is one that resonates with Locke. As we have seen, for Locke, the child has natural inclinations in their recreation that need to be “unbent (so that *he*) ... will make a good use of any part of his life” (CE §197) by a caring and wise father. So, for Arnold, the ordered state (which is, for him, to be considered sacred), whomever holds administrative power, must direct recreation in such a way as to properly introduce culture into people’s lives, for “culture is the most resolute enemy of anarchy” (p. 181). It is through the paternal directedness of recreation that “we grow to have clearer sight of the ideas of right reason” that, in turn, helps the state to “fashion all its internal composition and all its laws and institutions” (p. 181). As we have seen, this echoes Locke’s view of the relationship between leisure and morality—it is only through the wise and caring direction of a caring and wise state that the morally healthy and happy society can be achieved.

Hewison (1997) argues that Arnold’s, and thereby Locke’s, association of paternally directed recreation with morality is a dominant trope amongst intellectuals and government during, and just following, the Second World War. It is a theme we can see at work in the emergence of the Workers Educational Association (whose luminaries include Raymond Williams and Richard Hoggart), as well as forming founding principles (According to Summerfield 1981) in the Forces Book Club, the Army Bureau of Current

Affairs, both of which were connected to Alan Lane's Penguin Books,⁵ and the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts.⁶

Leisure and recreation were to form a significant element of party policy for both the leading parties in the UK from 1955 onwards. A content analysis of UK election manifestos suggests that leisure and recreation formed strong elements of how Labour and the Conservative's construed culture at elections between 1955 and 1992 (Lamond 2014).⁷ Crucially, for understanding how those two parties were to articulate a moral imaginary of leisure, there are four documents of particular interest.

For the Labour Party's 1959 October conference in Blackpool, their National Executive Committee produced two interlinked booklets: *Learning for Living* and *Leisure for Living* (Labour Party 1959a, b). Both texts consider the new opportunities opening up, post war, for forming a good society through the widening of access to learning and wise direction in the provision of facilities associated with recreation. In a sentiment that transferred directly over to the party's 1964 manifesto 'Leisure for Living' states, "the principle that public money ought to be spent ... in providing for many kinds of recreation, is universally accepted; indeed, its acceptance is one test of civilisation" (Labour 1959a, p. 7). Existing legislation, it argues, is *archaic* and does not give people the opportunity to engage with leisure in a way that is beneficial to them or wider society, specifically suggesting that such *out-of-date laws* only succeed in *aggravating* such *ills* as *increased drunkenness* and *credit betting* (p. 5). Concluding, "Leisure, in short, is enjoyed most deeply and creatively by those who have a sense of direction in their everyday life and work". And whilst it supports increased funding for the Arts Council, "it would be even better that this (i.e. government funding for leisure) should be done as part of the more purposeful replanning (sic) of the economic and social structure of society" (p. 7).

⁵ Emerging from its precursor, The Bodley Head, Penguin Books, can also be seen as founded on a Lockean principle that directed recreation is central to a moral education and the construction of a good society (Rylance 2005).

⁶ Which, post war, would be re-formed under J.M. Keynes as the Arts Council of Great Britain (Hewison 1997).

⁷ It was a stronger trope in texts produced by the Conservative party prior to Margaret Thatcher's first manifesto in 1979. In the Labour manifesto, its strength began to wane about the same time, though the rate of decline was much slower.

At around the same time, the Conservative Party, through the Conservative Political Centre (CPC), produced two booklets. The more substantial “Patronage of the Arts” drew on research undertaken by Richard Carless and Patricia Brewster (Bow Group 1959) for the party’s Bow Group; its topic is the importance of state funding for the arts. For us the shorter text, “The Challenge of Leisure” (CPC 1959), is the more interesting. It explicitly addresses the role of leisure in society. For much of its 23 pages, the focus of the identified *challenge* seems to be young people. On their opening page, citing Disraeli, they note: “‘the Youth of a Nation are the trustees of Prosperity’, and that ‘increased means and increased leisure are the two civilizers of man’. Our policy of opportunity—to learn, to earn, to own—should be extended to include the use of leisure” (CPC 1959, p. 5). However, as in *Leisure for Living*, whilst leisure is seen as a *civilizer* (or *test of civilisation*), it is not simply the presence of leisure that is sufficient. Undirected leisure, which is consistent with Arnold’s “do what you like” culture and Locke’s state of Nature for the child, produces the challenge rather than resolves it. “Our central aim”, they suggest, “is to promote the best use of the extra leisure time brought about by the emancipation of the adolescent and the impact of the scientific revolution” (p. 6). Continuing, “it is the State’s clear duty to encourage the true leisure of the subject” (p. 6). But why? Because, “leisure wrongly used, especially by young people, constitutes a real threat to society” (p. 6). It is in the reference to a *clear duty* of the state to *encourage true leisure* that the *unbending* of the recreation of the young by those who are presumed to be older and wiser, in order to produce a *civilised* country, that we find Locke’s association of recreation, rationality and morality.

Such a sentiment is not merely a residue that found expression in leisure policy in the 1960s and 1970s. On page 4 on the 2015 Conservative Party election manifesto, we find: “We may not be the biggest country but our museums are second to none. In music, art, fashion, theatre, design film, television and the performing arts, we have an edge. Conservatives understand these things do not just enhance our national prestige and boost our economy; they help tie our country together, strengthening the bonds between all of us” (Conservative Party 2015). There is, however, a significant difference. Where Locke, Arnold, the Conservative and

Labour parties throughout the 1950s, 1960s and much of the 1970s saw morality and leisure as supported through the paternal guidance of the state, the current dominant neo-liberal hegemony has transferred that role to the rule of market forces and consumable imaginaries of well-being, happiness and moral worth. Central government legislation and policy advice; fiscal measure impacting the price of objects we purchase associated with leisure and recreation activity; health organisation recommendations (such as RDA guidance) ostensibly there to enable informed choices, and so on, concentrate on directing leisure through the stuff we consume. This consumerist imaginary of leisure, as articulated in our present era, does not mean that Locke's link between recreation and morality, through paternalism, has been broken or scrapped. What it does suggest is that neo-liberalism, understood as the articulation of liberalism in late capitalism, has reconfigured that connection; it is that, and how it might be confronted, that will be considered in the final section of this chapter.

Conclusion

Wearable technology that monitors our heart rate, sleep patterns and metabolic activity are increasingly commonplace. Super foods, nutritional plans, slim club/fit club memberships, expert “scientifically proven” advice are available online 24/7 or on the high street. Breathable fabrics, ergonomic and ultra-lightweight (or high-spec/high-durability) equipment and a myriad other material forms much contemporary leisure and recreation takes, attempt to sway us through their veneer of offering a good, healthy, happy life, but at a price (see chapter “[Postmodernism and Leisure](#)” by Malick, this volume). The commodification of leisure has reconstrued the capacity for reflection afforded by recreation as consumer preference. Paternalism has had a brand makeover to become articulated as more malign forms of marketing and the some of the more suspect aspects of public relations. But the Lockean connection is still there, prompting us into becoming commodified moral beings. This form of morality is one that is subservient to late capitalism's rendition of humanity as merely a consuming unit, and it is to Locke we must return if we are to confront the roots of our current situation.

In whatever form they are currently attired, morality, leisure and paternalism are connected by Locke through a purely epistemological association. It is the epistemology of the CG that argued for morality being based on the application of reason to experience to generate new *knowledge*. In CE, it is the external guidance of those that *know* more, because of their greater experience and time to reflect upon it, which leads us into being moral individuals; whilst in CG, we are led to consider that model as one which, on a grander scale, produces the happy society and the well-ordered state. However, as we have seen, such a confluence of recreation, morality and paternalism results in the commodification of leisure and thus our humanity. To confront this, we need to widen our vision as to what leisure is, looking beyond the epistemic, whilst holding onto an understanding that ethics is an activity where rationality, particularly critical rationality, is vital. The work of Stebbins (such as Stebbins 2006) and others suggests that leisure can also be considered as an ontological activity, one that interweaves the individual and the social in mutual creation and recreation, enabling new communicative ties, new expressions of rationality, which can enable the growth of fresh modes of being and provoke change. It is through the ontological connection between leisure and rationality, how leisure builds us as people and as communities, that morality emerges.

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⁸ In the chapter, these references have been abbreviated to: Some Thoughts Concerning Education (Locke n.d.)—CE, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (Locke 1977) (CU) and Two Treatises of Civil Government (Locke 1977) (CG). The symbol § has been used to denote the section number in Locke's text.

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Rebuking the Enlightenment Establishments, Bourgeois and Aristocratic: Rousseau's Ambivalence About Leisure

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I challenge anyone to show me how, on my principles, the word leisure can mean anything honorable.

(Rousseau 1997c [1752], p. 81)

We sing, we laugh all day long, and the work goes only the better for it. Everyone lives in the greatest familiarity; everyone is equal, and no one is forgotten.

(Rousseau 1997g [1761], p. 496)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) is an especially difficult author to grasp. He is prone to paradox and overstatement, and many conflicting interpretations of his fundamental stances have been attempted.¹ Among political philosophers, he is known for moving far beyond traditional

¹ The broader theoretical and scholarly background to this chapter is provided in Mendham (2011). In this chapter, citations not preceded by an author's name refer to works of Rousseau.

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concerns about abstract justice, reflecting ambitiously on what might make any human life worth living. Accordingly, he may be expected to shed light on the question of leisure, even if this does not play a prominent role in scholarly interpretations.² We pursue this question through one fairly secure entryway into his thought. For however contentious his overall meaning may be, there is little dispute that he was profoundly opposed to most of the dominant intellectual and practical tendencies of his times (Hullung 1994; Garrard 2003). For our purposes, we will simplify somewhat, and focus on two “Enlightenment establishments”—the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie. Both groups were leading forces behind the Enlightenment, and both were roundly condemned by Rousseau.

From many perspectives, it seems natural to see the aristocracy as the prevailing establishment, and bound to be the eternal enemy of the rising bourgeois class and its call to unleash commerce from its shackles and slumber. This conflict is prominent not only in the later interpretation of Marx but also in some of the leading polemics of the time (Muller 2002, pp. 15–17, pp. 36–37, pp. 84–103). However, it would be a distortion to see these as well defined and uniformly hostile groups. Instead, some saw the aristocracy as the natural friend and most helpful support of the new commercial and political liberalism (cf., Cheney 2010, pp. 52–116). In addition, the French aristocracy was experiencing a crisis and needed to redefine its prestige, decreasingly linking it with military valour or noble birth, and increasingly relying on the manners and cultural practices *l’homme du monde* (Lilti 2015, pp. 8–9). The *salons* provided a venue for this, allowing the aristocrats to socialize with, and often provide decisive financial and political support to, the most promising “men of letters” and artists of the day (pp. 93–94, pp. 105–6). This often included support for many of the most radical ideas of the day, which in hindsight proved obviously incompatible with the survival of aristocracy (cf., Tocqueville 1998 [1856], pp. 195–209; Schama 1989, p. 155). It was not only the middle class, then, which forged the broad consensus of philosophers and men of letters in the Enlightenment, in favour of liberating

² An exception is Saint-Amand (2011, pp. 51–75). After a brief discussion of our normative themes, Saint-Amand focuses on a very different side of Rousseau—the “idle life” the Genevan would eventually reveal in his autobiographies. This is an important topic, but beyond our scope.

commerce from many of the norms and institutions that had traditionally constrained it. The mainstream Enlightenment has been plausibly defined as a pragmatic endeavour to improve human existence in this world, and this entailed a commitment to the new political economy and commercial liberties (Robertson 2005; Rasmussen 2014, pp. 8–9, pp. 260–293). Times may have changed since then, but at that point, to be *bien-pensant* was to be an advocate of what we would call capitalism and globalization.

If the practical Enlightenment may be seen as a kind of alliance between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, Rousseau's early writings become a demolition of the practical Enlightenment. If figures such as Montesquieu, Voltaire, and Hume saw commerce as facilitating toleration, moral refinement, and political liberty (Hirschman 1997 [1977]), Rousseau saw it as amplifying cruel stratification, moral effeminacy, and political absolutism. There is a duality to his criticisms, however. At times the rise of private property and economic ambition seems to be faulted for its cruelty, and at other times the new interdependence and commercial excess seem to be faulted for making us soft and weak (Mendham 2010). Similarly, in considering his response to leisure, we find that he is comparably concerned about two contrasting Enlightenment tendencies—on the one hand, the kind of indulgent idleness characteristic of the aristocrat, and on the other hand, the kind of misguided frenzy characteristic of the bourgeois. After tracing these criticisms in his early writings, we turn to explore his own “constructive” or “prescriptive” alternatives. These can be seen as moderating some of his earlier criticisms, notably in seeming to readmit certain aspects of the bourgeois and aristocratic characters. As to leisure, he never endorses it in its prevailing forms. The model economic lives he prescribes for his typical republican citizens are based on the simple people of the Swiss mountains. To us, they seem surprisingly bourgeois in their economic diligence, yet they lack ambition and vanity, and are able to find delight and leisure in their work itself. A second set of models provide his most sustained depictions of the “art of living,” and these seem surprisingly aristocratic. Again, we find diligence combined with ways of enjoying the present moment, but we also find clear accounts of the natural and relational delights of pure repose. Both positive models provide alternatives to the pathologies of aristocratic idleness and bourgeois frenzy.

Polemical Contrasts

In contrast with the polite dishonesties of his day, Rousseau never hid his sentiments about the aristocrats and the bourgeois. On the first, we find: “I hate great nobles, I hate their status, their harshness, their prejudices, their pettiness, and all their vices, and I would hate them even more if I despised them less” (1995b [1762], p. 582).³ The bourgeois are famously invoked in an indictment of the usual product of contemporary educational practices: “Always in contradiction with himself, always floating between his inclinations and his duties, he will never be either man or citizen. He will be good neither for himself nor for others. He will be one of these men of our days: a Frenchman, an Englishman, a bourgeois. He will be nothing” (1979 [1762], p. 40). Especially in his earlier writings, Rousseau portrays the grave limitations of these figures by contrasting them with two others: The republican citizen (especially of ancient Sparta or Rome), and the “savage.”

The Citizen

We have seen that the intellectual life of the time was shaped by a substantial alliance of commercially minded aristocrats with intellectuals of aspiring ranks. Beginning with Rousseau’s first major publication, the *Discourse on the Sciences and the Arts* (1751), his appeals to the citizen can be seen as discrediting both the aristocrats and the bourgeois by showing how intellectuals combine some of the worst traits of each of them, and none can be seen as fulfilling the objective standards of citizenship. Although Rousseau at times clarifies that a select few may be benefitted by genuine philosophical study, his main focus is the uselessness of most of our studies: “if the labours of our most enlightened learned men and our best citizens provide us with so little that is useful, tell us what we are to think of that host of obscure writers and idle literati who devour the state’s substance at a pure loss” (1997a [1751], p. 17). Like the bourgeois, such writers may frame their pursuits as conducive to the good of

³Translation modified (cf., 1959, p. 1145).

all, while in fact pursuing their personal interests at the expense of the rest.⁴ In the Parisian high society, the leading professions—judges, military officers, priests, and financiers—each speak with a voice common to their faction, and one need know “only their interests, to make a fair guess about what they will say on every subject.” Even authors and moralists show no interest in reconciling their writings, their spoken words, or their conduct; all are accustomed to these inconsistencies, and many even take pride in them (1997g [1761], pp. 191–193). These writers may never enjoy the wealth and luxury of the rich, but they are corrupted by them nonetheless, by coveting them and devoting to them “the time and effort which every human being owes to nobler objects” (1997b [1751], pp. 45–46).

Like the aristocrats, the horde of scholars and intellectuals are found to neglect essential labours while pursuing idle distractions. Against an interlocutor who maintained that the scholarly sciences may be born of leisure (*loisir*), but this must be distinguished from idleness (*oisiveté*), Rousseau responds: “I do not understand this distinction between idleness and leisure. But I do most certainly know that no honourable man can ever boast of leisure as long as good remains to be done, a fatherland to be served, unfortunates to be relieved; and I challenge anyone to show me how, on my principles, the word leisure can mean anything honourable” (1997c [1752], p. 81).⁵ Time and again, such duties, also including friendship and fatherly cares, are said to preclude time for empty amusements such as theoretical study, not only for the honourable person but also for the citizen of any “well-constituted state.”⁶ The republican citizen is devoted to high positive duties: “In politics, as in ethics, not to do good is a great evil, and every useless citizen may be looked upon as a pernicious man” (1997a [1751], p. 17).

⁴ See esp. 1997 [1753], pp. 97–100; 1997c [1755], pp. 153–154, pp. 197–199; Kelly 2003, pp. 44–46, pp. 100–101.

⁵ Translation modified (cf., 1964, p. 91f).

⁶ See 1996a [1751], p. 16; 1997b [1751], p. 46; 1997 [1753], p. 97; 1960 [1758], p. 16.

The Savage

If the polemical appeal to the republican citizen leans mainly against idleness—a characteristically aristocratic vice—the appeal to the savage leans mainly against the characteristically bourgeois vice of frenetic yet sterile activity. The savage also begins to reveal that Rousseau is not as “puritanically” opposed to leisure as his citizenly appeals might initially suggest. Although it is hinted at in some of the polemics following the first *Discourse*, the model of the savage is only substantially developed in the second *Discourse*, that on the *Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men* (1755). We might clarify that the term “savage” here should not be taken as synonymous with brutality or ferocity—characterizations which Rousseau did much to counter. Rather, it should be understood as having a technical meaning for many Enlightenment thinkers, depicting people whom we would describe as foragers or hunter-gatherers (Meek 1976, p. 76, pp. 90–94).

For Rousseau, humans in their most primitive condition were not insatiable and locked in a state of war, as Thomas Hobbes had argued. Rather, they lived almost entirely solitary lives, and with undeveloped reason and foresight, they were content to meet the simplest needs in a (relatively) abundant environment (1997a [1755], p. 142; 1997h [1763], p. 266, pp. 279–280). It is apparently as population and therefore resource pressures built that humans were pushed towards more social—initially tribal—ways of life. Here we begin to see the cultivation of reason, foresight, and “*amour propre*” (a competitive form of self-love, leading most socialized humans to be consumed by positional status as such). This raises difficult interpretive questions. The main thrust of Rousseau’s argument is that this turn to society is a kind of historicized “fall” of humanity, and yet as careful scholars now tend to agree, in his account the rise of society and *amour propre* are not merely negative, since they also make possible all of the deepest delights and genuine virtues of which human nature is capable (Neuhausser 2008, pp. 9–11, pp. 59–70). Our main topic illustrates this tension. After the “first revolution” in which humans began settling in huts with families, social bonds tightened, and gatherings became customary: “song and dance, true children of love and leisure, became the amusement or rather the occupation of idle men and

women gathered together” (1997a [1755], p. 166). This newly cultivates human emotional life, including “the sweetest sentiments known to man, conjugal love and paternal love” (p. 164).⁷ However, during this time when humans had “very limited needs” and “a great deal of leisure,” some also sought “to acquire several sorts of conveniences unknown to their fathers.” The ostensible benefits came to weaken them in body and mind and became habitual necessities rather than sustained sources of happiness—it became “much more cruel to be deprived of them than to possess them was sweet” (pp. 164–165). After many such changes, “Savage man and civilized man differ so much in their inmost heart and inclinations that what constitutes the supreme happiness of the one would reduce the other to despair. The first breathes nothing but repose and freedom, he wants only to live and to remain idle, and even the Stoic’s *ataraxia* [imperturbability] does not approximate his profound indifference to everything else. By contrast, the citizen, forever active, sweats, scurries, constantly agonizes in search of ever more strenuous occupations” (p. 186f). Here even the citizen does not remain unscathed in the exposé of bourgeois frenzy.

As for the aristocrat, we see that the ambitious person does not merely compromise himself in departing from our primitive condition in favour of gnawing concerns with material accumulation and positional status. In our earlier condition—when we were not tied to any particular piece of land, and our economic arts did not “require the collaboration of several hands”—we might have had something seized from us, but we could flee any attempt at systematic oppression (1997a [1755], p. 158, pp. 167–168). After agriculture, metallurgy, and landed property, economic imbalances steadily increased inequalities, until finally we arrive at the sort of brutal, incessant warfare that Hobbes attributed to human nature itself (pp. 167–173). The kind of social contract which finally brought a semblance of peace was skilfully contrived “for the profit of a few ambitious men” (p. 173). In another account, it is the most active and bloodthirsty hunters who become, in time, “warriors, conquerors,

⁷In a different account, leisure and love are especially linked with the life of “herders”; the “pastoral art” is “father of repose and of the indolent passions” (1997h [1763], pp. 271–272; see Saint-Amand 2011, pp. 58–59).

usurpers,” and the “first kings” (1997h [1763], p. 271). Almost all in the vaunted ranks of contemporary Europe are descended from “knaves,” and attained their great leisure through the bloody usurpations of their ancestors (1997g [1761], pp. 138–139).

Many links could be drawn between social science and Rousseau’s critical analysis of the rise of civilization and commerce. He would not be surprised, for instance, to see the failure of predictions that once modern economies met everyone’s needs, people “would enjoy longer and longer hours of free time”—instead, there we found “an endless list of wants” and “positional competition” (Roberts 2011, p. 11). Rousseau had already seen how poorer citizens who “become seduced into consumerist lifestyles” can be driven to dependency, vulnerability, and degradation (Branham 2006, p. 387). He was a perceptive critic during a time when many traditional, more autarkic communities were first disrupted (cf., Appleby 2010). In general, if a negative effect of increasing economic development and interdependence can be found, its logic will have already been laid bare by Rousseau. Despite the prescience of many of his observations, he also predicted imminent, epic collapses of liberal societies such as England, whereas they have now proven their substantial resilience (Melzer 1990, pp. 288–290; cf., Reisert 2003, pp. 189–191). It is significant, then, that some of the more profound defenders of modern liberal society—including Adam Smith and Alexis de Tocqueville—owe much of their depth and balance to the seriousness with which they read Rousseau and took his diagnoses seriously (Hanley 2008; Rasmussen 2008).

Constructive Alternatives

In his early writings, Rousseau sweepingly dismissed the principles and ways of life most celebrated in his times. Accordingly, he has often been read as advocating a straightforward return to the ancient republican city or to the primitive forests. In the case of a return to savage life, he clearly renounced this (e.g., 1997a [1755], pp. 203–204). His own positive, normative proposals are quite different, although it remains disputed how far they overlap with the ancient city, and even with the psychological

equilibrium of the savage (cf., Cooper 1999, pp. 17–26, pp. 51–59). At least since Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), many of his most careful readers have attempted to reconcile his early, polemical discourses with his later constructive proposals by seeing the earlier work as diagnostic rather than prescriptive (Mendham 2011, p. 177). This is one plausible way to understand how arts and institutions which he seemed to portray as roots of all evil in his critical genealogies of modern civilization—including property, agriculture, and philosophical study—can become parts of a worthy life or a just society if put on a substantially different basis. Here we will explore two of his apparent models for lives practicable in modernity, at least in some locations. We will also see, against certain “proto-totalitarian” interpretations, that he does not require a devotion to political life that precludes personal and domestic sources of happiness (see Marks 2005, p. 75, p. 82; Cohen 2010, pp. 25–30).

The Villager-Citizen

The first model portrays decent villagers under free governments, the “happiest” condition of all (1997g [1761], p. 439). Rousseau’s paradigm cases are drawn from the mountainous regions of Switzerland, where the rugged terrain reinforces economic and cultural independence (2005 [1765], pp. 134–135). Given his intense critique of bourgeois ambition, these models are strikingly industrious. However, his villager-citizens labour not to move ahead in status or frivolous luxuries but to sustain their modest prosperity and to add to their genuine well-being (1960 [1758], p. 61; 1997g [1761], pp. 13–14).

In mountainous Swiss regions such as the upper Valais and the area around Neuchâtel—for centuries, but perhaps decreasingly since the time of Rousseau’s youth—each farming household diligently cultivated its own plot of rocky soil. Money was “quite rare,” there was no “trade to the outside,” and no division of labour—no carpenters, clockmakers, or the like—since the inventive crafts of each family’s hands sufficed for their needs. “Buried under the snow for six months,” they had little contact with other families for long periods, but these “enjoyable labours” staved off boredom. Despite all this diligence and simplicity, most of

these Swiss are also surprisingly proficient in what we would call the arts of leisure—sketching, painting, singing, and playing the flute. Finally, there is more serious reading and independent thinking done in such provincial areas than in Paris, since they are “less pressed for time,” and less expended by ephemeral writings.⁸

A related but more complicated case is Geneva, Rousseau’s homeland. In his polemic against the proposal of d’Alembert (and Voltaire) to establish a theatre there, Geneva’s work ethic is central. A few there are wealthy, but “several live in quite harsh deprivation and . . . the comfort of the majority come from diligent work, economy, and moderation rather than positive wealth” (1960 [1758], p. 93).⁹ The theatre would introduce a new perceived need for lucre, while undermining the old leisure habits: “not much is needed for the pleasures of men exhausted by fatigue, for whom repose alone is a very sweet pleasure” (p. 58). Moreover, in Geneva and the surrounding countryside, leisure is often voluntarily spent in craftsmanship. Shifting their leisure to foreign distractions would make their labours “cease to be their amusements” (pp. 61–62). In this approach to leisure, as well as the civic education of their public festivals, the Genevans parallel Sparta, where “in a laborious idleness [*une laborieuse oisiveté*], everything was pleasure and entertainment; it is there that the harshest labours passed for recreations and that small relaxations formed a public instruction” (p. 133; see pp. 134–137). However, this parallel should not be pushed too far, since Geneva is more thoroughly commercial than not only Sparta but also the more isolated regions of Switzerland. It may be that, at a certain point in his later life, Rousseau came to see his homeland as more Parisian than Spartan, increasingly handed over to their “greed for gain,” and no longer fundamentally republican.¹⁰

⁸ See 1960 [1758], pp. 60–62; 1997g [1761], pp. 13–14, pp. 65–66; 2005 [1765], pp. 134–135; Marks 2005, pp. 77–82; Saint-Amand 2011, pp. 52–55. These ways of life are in keeping with the general principle that regarding subsistence, the government’s duty consists “not in filling the granaries of individuals and exempting them from work, but in keeping plenty so within their reach that, in order to acquire it, work is always necessary and never useless” (1997f [1755], p. 23).

⁹ Translation modified (cf., 1995a, p. 85).

¹⁰ See esp. 1960 [1758], pp. 115–116; 1997g [1761], pp. 540–545; 2001 [1764], pp. 292–293; Rosenblatt 1997, pp. 84–87, pp. 227–231; Kelly 2003, pp. 131–132.

The Art of Living

A second positive model can be seen in two lengthy works that had tremendous popular appeal at the time, the first an epistolary novel and the second an educational treatise with novelistic elements: *Julie, or the New Heloise* (1761), and *Emile, or On Education* (1762). Having excoriated the aristocracy throughout so many critical remarks, it ends up being aristocrats who display his most sustained models of the “art of living” or “art of enjoyment” (1997g [1761], p. 433, p. 443). They have servants and substantial inherited property; this being said, Rousseau insists that their actual wealth is comparatively modest, and that not even kings should see themselves as immune to the reversals of fortune which may leave them dependent on manual labour for their subsistence (1997g [1761], p. 434; 1979 [1762], pp. 41–42, pp. 196–97, p. 419). The approach is surprising, but may be explained, at least in part, by the need to provide some sort of guidance for life within the world as it actually was, as opposed to the republics of antiquity or a few isolated corners of Europe. *Emile*, in particular, seems to be presented as a model for countries like France, where republican citizenship is no longer possible (Melzer 1990, p. 92, pp. 277–281).

Among the philosophical highpoints of the *Julie* are the presentations of the Wolmar household as a model of justice and harmony, centring on the charismatic eponymous heroine and her husband of godlike rationality (Starobinski 1988 [1957], pp. 92–111; Shklar 1969, pp. 127–150). When they established their household, they judged their holdings less in view of their rank, and more in view of their needs, and therefore found them adequate for any honourable family, including as an inheritance for their children. “They applied themselves therefore to improving it rather than extending it; they invested their money more for security than for gain . . . , and the example of their conduct is the only treasure by which they wish to increase their heritage” (1997g [1761], p. 433).¹¹ Moreover, the Wolmars understand that human affairs do not allow for complete

¹¹This contrasts with a portrayal of Geneva, where they are “more enamoured of money than glory, to live in abundance they die in obscurity, and they leave to their children no other example than the love of the treasures they have acquired for [their children’s] sake” (p. 545).

security, and thus prevent “insatiable avarice” from encroaching “under the guise of prudence” (p. 433). They allow for comfort, freedom, and cheerfulness, since another duty they owe their children is the example of “the happiness that goes with wisdom” (p. 434). Julie’s philosophy of temperance is to deny herself small pleasures many times in order to better enjoy her pleasures (pp. 443–444, pp. 451–452). Unlike Rousseau’s austere Spartans, Julie rejects only those luxuries which derive their value solely from “magnificence and vanity”—from their appeal to exclusive status or others’ opinions—but allows for genuine elegance, grace, and anything with “real utility” for “the true needs of nature” (p. 435, p. 448). For instance, in hearing of Parisian trends in carriage-making, she disapproves of their great expenses for painting them, but “rather approves” of their new inventions for suspending them more comfortably (p. 435).¹²

In their social relations, the Wolmars are quite unlike Rousseau’s typical aristocrats, who are harshly indifferent to those of lower ranks. A major part of Julie’s life is personally engaging in the relief of the unfortunates who pass by her home (1997g [1761], pp. 436–442). The family is only occasionally disturbed by the “droves of idlers who go by the name of good company” in a place like Paris (pp. 13–14, p. 433, pp. 452–453).¹³ This allows them to enjoy the comparative seclusion of country life, spending time with family, friends, and their unpolished yet honourable and content neighbours (p. 453). The family’s most leisurely time is depicted in a well-known passage, and associated engraving, on “a morning in the English manner [*une matinée à l’angloise*], gathered in silence, enjoying at once the pleasure of being together and the sweetness of contemplation” (455–59; see Reisert 2003, pp. 97–101).¹⁴ They spend two hours in an “ecstatic immobility, a thousand times sweeter than the cold repose of Epicurus’s Gods” (p. 456f). It is only alone among friends that one may feel free to sit in silence, and yet the keen, divine sentiments of friendship are better communicated: “How many things are said by a clasped hand, a lively expression, a warm embrace, the sigh that follows

¹² Similar reflections are offered in an unusual personal interruption in *Emile*, on the life the author would live “If I were rich” (1979 [1762], pp. 344–354). See Rasmussen 2015.

¹³ Among the welcome guests are “merchants bored with getting rich” (1997g [1761], p. 453). Evidently, the merchants had previously known little of true leisure.

¹⁴ Translation modified (cf., 1961, p. 557f).

it, and how cold after all that is the first word that is uttered” (p. 456).¹⁵ This sociable leisure is not without activity—they are variously reading, embroidering, or observing the children play. Yet they illustrate a powerful alternative to the incessant strategic chatter of the aristocrat, as well as the consuming ambition of the bourgeois.

These commitments are also displayed in Rousseau’s celebrated depiction of the Wolmars’ grape harvest, which becomes a kind of festival (cf., Starobinski 1988 [1957], pp. 92–104). Throughout, we see order combined with equality, and labour intermixed with leisure and levity. Although Madame de Wolmar and her friends distribute the tasks (p. 495), “We sing, we laugh all day long, and the work goes only the better for it. Everyone lives in the greatest familiarity; everyone is equal, and no one is forgotten” (p. 496).¹⁶ The leading household works and dines “with the peasants and when they do” (p. 496). Evening brings a respite from labour—a time of dancing until supper. This is followed by an hour or two of singing while working with hemp. At last, fireworks are lit by the outstanding labourer whom Julie selects (pp. 497–499). The Wolmar approach to labour is compared favourably with the Roman reversal of class orders in the Saturnalia, since in the Wolmar case, “the gentle equality that prevails here re-establishes nature’s order, constitutes a form of instruction for some, a consolation for others, and a bond of friendship for all” (p. 497). More generally, in arranging the tasks of her workers, Julie considers what suits them and will make them “as good and happy as is possible,” since man “is too noble a being to serve merely as an instrument of others” (p. 439; see pp. 378–379, p. 386, pp. 439–441, p. 462).¹⁷

Overall, we can see that in several ways, Rousseau became a philosophical poet of rustic simplicity, in a time when the common people and the provincial life were seen as backward to the point of vulgarity (cf., Payne 1976, pp. 13–14). The well-born Emile could have many opportunities

¹⁵Translation modified (cf., 1961, p. 558).

¹⁶Translation modified (cf., 1961, p. 607, and Starobinski 1988 [1957], p. 97). The “English manner” seems to mean eating breakfast together “as a proper meal”—also a Swiss custom, but not a French one (2000 [1770], p. 231).

¹⁷Kant was famously brought around to his belief in human dignity by reading Rousseau (see Wood 1999, pp. 5–9).

to pursue civic influence in large cities, but “one of the examples good men ought to give others is that of the patriarchal and rustic life, man’s first life, which is the most peaceful, the most natural, and the sweetest life for anyone who does not have a corrupt heart” (1979 [1762], p. 474; see p. 195; 1997g [1761], p. 438, p. 493). Rousseau clearly saw this life as marginalized and under siege in modernity. His “romantic” alternative often invoked Greek, Roman, and biblical imagery of the charms of farming and herding amid close communal bonds (1997g [1761], pp. 13–15, p. 494; Mendham 2014). For a time, these appeals generated some remarkably high watermarks of cultural influence. For instance, the father of Louis XVI sought to raise his sons in keeping with the precepts of *Emile*, including the training of that future king as a locksmith (Blum 1986, p. 138). Rousseau’s pastoral opera, *Le devin du village*, was performed at Louis’s wedding to Marie Antoinette in 1770 (Damrosch 2005, p. 472). Finally, Marie was known periodically to wear a shepherdess costume, in a (sometimes tone-deaf) homage to simpler times (Schama 1989, pp. 155–156). Rousseau was interested in the effects that altering fashion might have, but he was also convinced that mainstream civilization could not go backward in its economic trajectory (1990 [1776], p. 213). This seems to have generally proven true. The economic idol of his heart was the independent shepherd or farmer. At least for the latter, this work is portrayed as physically demanding, and even exhausting in times such as the harvest season (1997g [1761], p. 492f). Yet it allows for proper sociability and cheerfulness while meeting our genuine natural needs. In channelling nature’s own labours, it allows for cyclical labour, and respites for communion and reflection alongside loved ones.

How far could such patterns be recreated under different economic circumstances? Rousseau’s own childhood was in the small city of Geneva; his father was a craftsman. Jean-Jacques surely portrays this as allowing for strong familial bonds, a deep sense of communal belonging, and ample time for study and reflection (1960 [1758], pp. 135–137; 2000 [1770], pp. 8–9). At times, too, he regrets not having pursued the obscure life of a respectable artisan in a free city, as opposed to his actual fate: “the sad job of telling the truth to men” (1979 [1762], p. 474; 2000 [1770], p. 42, p. 142). These concessions bring our economic conditions somewhat closer to the Genevan’s, although at least two other cycles of

regretful nostalgia have since passed—first with the alleged obsolescence of the small craftsman by the many degradations of mass industrialization, and then with the widespread deindustrialization that makes the time of stable, humble industrial work seem like a golden age to many of the working (or post-working) classes. Even for those who would take Rousseau's economic thought to be an object lesson in the excesses of wistful romanticism, he may offer guidance for the kinds of priorities that could prove beneficial in a time of globalized ambition, yet diminishing affections and satisfactions.

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Contracting the Right to Roam

Wallace McNeish and Steve Olivier

Introduction

This chapter critically examines the issue of free recreational access to the environment—the right to roam, from the perspective of political philosophy. We begin by setting the right to roam within a comparative socio-legal context that indicates how ongoing social and economic change has moved it to centre stage in the increasingly contested sphere of what Rojek (2001, 2010) calls leisure politics. We then move on to consider the political–philosophical debate that has traditionally revolved around rights and duties pertaining to private property, and the conception of the social contract. In recent decades, the emergence of environmental ethics—and in particular conceptions of environmental sustainability and environmental justice—has added extra dimensions of complexity to the philosophical terrain upon which the right to roam is contested.

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Two very different versions of the social contract will be juxtaposed to bring the key arguments into high relief. On the one hand, we consider Hardin's influential eco-Hobbesian *Tragedy of the Commons* (2000 [1968]) thesis. This positions human beings as possessive, selfish and competitive individuals who will inevitably be responsible for generalised environmental degradation, unless their restless desires (including to roam) are held in check by a coercive Green Leviathan. On the other hand, we consider Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* (1971), which constructs social contract theory from a Kantian premise. This holds that human beings have the capacity to work cooperatively and reciprocally to reach a publically reasoned consensus about the principles of justice through which to allocate rights and duties—including the environmental rights and duties that are integral to the right to roam. In other words, for Rawls, human beings have the collective capacity to devise just and fair social arrangements that involve a minimum of coercion—indeed this collective reasoning process is integral to Rawlsian procedure.

We will argue that Hardin's pessimistic, exclusionary and potentially authoritarian conclusions are incompatible with the background consensus concerning the allocation of rights and duties in liberal democratic societies. Hardin should therefore be rejected in favour of an interpretative development of Rawls which views the right to roam as a primary social good that is compatible with a conception of justice as sustainable fairness. This ideal can be used to inform a fair social contract as the basis of an inclusive environmentally sensitive leisure citizenship. Here, the Scandinavian model of *Allemannsretten* points to a progressive way forward for meaningful reform.

Life Politics and *Allemannsretten*

Changing patterns of employment, welfare and consumption across the global economy have meant that leisure and recreation are playing an increasingly important role in identity formation, and a key role in the attainment of personal satisfaction, happiness, spiritual fulfilment, well-

being and health (see e.g., Gammon and Elkington 2015). Sociologists have long identified the development of global trends towards expressive or post-materialist values (Inglehart 1990, 2008), whereby self-actualization is sought through life-political activities centred upon personal ethical strategies and lifestyle choices (Giddens 1989, 1991). In terms of leisure, these are often connected with green spaces and the rural environment, where perhaps there remains an element of unpredictability, excitement and a sense of authentic connection to the natural world, which stands in contrast to the controlled, bland and sanitised urban world of daily routines of work and home. As Wilson (2000) says:

Given the means and sufficient leisure, a large proportion of the populace backpacks, hunts, fishes, birdwatches, and gardens ... they crowd the national parks to view natural landscapes, looking from the tops of prominences out across rugged terrain for a glimpse of tumbling water and animals living free. They travel long distances to stroll along the seashore, for reasons they can't put into words.

(p. 159)

Recreation and leisure have diversified with growing participation in sports connected to “cool” lifestyle sub-cultures such as surfing, mountain biking and skateboarding. There has been a concomitant development of tourism to accommodate an ever widening range of demands for what were once relatively niche experiences; from the visceral thrills of sky-diving, water-skiing and bungee-jumping, through to the more sedate pleasures of wilderness trekking, mountain climbing or wild swimming. Clearly, as Spracklen notes, in postmodern leisure culture “what matters is the plurality of choices, the freedom to choose and the identity it confers” (2013, p. 174).

The personal significance of leisure and lifestyle to individual life projects, the diversity of recreational activities available and the growing numbers of participants mean that conflicts of interest are inevitable. Hence, life politics has increasingly moved from the personal realm to dialogue in the public sphere involving political and sub-political actors whose focus is upon what Habermas calls “the grammar of forms of life”

(1987, p. 392). This is no more so than when it comes to land and water use for recreational purposes where tensions are generated:

- Between the interests of property owners (for privacy and economic utility) and those who seek access for recreational purposes; for example, farmers versus campers or walkers.
- Between those who aim to preserve sustainable biodiversity and natural landscapes, and recreationists whose presence may impact negatively upon such goals; for example, seaside landowners versus jet-skiers.
- Between individuals and groups engaged in different activities (e.g., kayakers vs. anglers occupying the same space) or even the same recreational activities (e.g., surfers competing for the same waves) (Funck 2006; Young 2007; Olivier 2010; MacLennan and Moore 2011; Morgan-Davies et al. 2015).

Variations in national and regional socio-economic contexts, legal-institutional frameworks and leisure cultures are important in determining how these tensions are addressed and resolved. In relation to the right to roam, Norway, Finland and Sweden currently have legislation that is the most permissive in the world. Access rights to the countryside environment are areal and universal, with the only caveats being legal obligations to ensure that no damage occurs, that privacy be respected, and that economic activity is not disrupted. Informal codes of country recreational behaviour (e.g., in Sweden the “golden rules”) are combined with education in formal environmental codes. Added to this, participatory stakeholder management bodies engage in dialogue to ensure that this system, which is popularly conceived as *allemannsretten* (everyman’s right) works for all the parties concerned (Campion and Stephenson 2014).

Even in Scandinavia, public access rights have not gone uncontested by private property interests (*grunneierretten*) where farming, tourism and development around popular fjord shorelines is concerned. However, the public interest in access has largely prevailed because at the heart of the Nordic conception of citizenship is a deeply embedded tradition of outdoors sporting and recreational activity, as embodied in a cultural sensibility towards *friluftsliv* (a simple life in nature) and *idrett* (purposeful

outdoor sporting activity), underpinned by the notion of *allemannsretten* (Sandell and Fredman 2010). Other national states have developed more limited systems of access which are partially areal (specifying particular geographic spaces) and partially lineal (centred upon designated pathways), but in both theory and practice the tendency has been to privilege landowners' rights to exclusion over public access.

In the UK, Scotland has pioneered a shift towards the Nordic model with the Land Reform (Scotland) Act 2003, which put free public access to most of the countryside and inland water on a statutory basis. This legislation will be supplemented by a Land Reform Bill that in 2016 is making its way through the legislative stages of the Scottish Parliament. In the rest of the UK, a much more restrictive and piecemeal system of access prevails, and is enforced by punitive trespass laws. Historically, private landowners and related interests have vigorously contested all attempts at reform—indeed 20 reform bills have failed in the UK parliament during the period of the twentieth century (Shoard 2000). The last attempt at reform in this area—the Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000, was significantly watered down after intense lobbying. Although this Act introduced a conditional right of public access to walk upon limited parts of the English and Welsh countryside, 98% of rivers remain out of bounds.

There are currently ongoing campaigns led by organisations such as the Ramblers Association, the British Canoe Union, The Land is Ours and related water and sports organisations, for reforms that would move the rest of the UK towards the Scottish, and by extension Nordic model. Liberalisation is strongly opposed by private interests through, for example, the Countryside Landowners Association, the Intrusive Footpaths Campaign, the National Union of Farmers and various Anglers Associations. As Parker states, land governance has historically been “subject to continual, if only periodically visible, resistance and contestation and a vigorous, sometimes brutal defence. The issues discussed are rooted in deeply political, if modernist notions of equity, justice, liberty and equality” (2002, p. 103). In other words, the issues pertaining to the right to roam are inseparable from the realm of political philosophy, to which this chapter now turns.

***Allemannsretten* Versus the Green Leviathan**

In political philosophical terms, the debate surrounding the right to roam revolves around the status of private property—the axiological institution which modern capitalist societies are organised around. Social contract theory of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as articulated with different emphases by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, created a pervasive foundation myth bound up with the transition from an unbounded property-less and primitive state of nature to a bounded propertied and sophisticated society. As Smith argues, the social contract “was an agreement to enter into the moral and political order of civilization, to limit one’s inherent freedoms and control one’s inherent (selfish) nature in the name of reason and social progress” (2011, pp. 67–68).

Modern analytical political theory and philosophy has evolved around questions of justice pertaining to the trade-offs between individual freedoms, their allocations as embodied in rights and duties, how they relate to conceptions of citizenship and the notion of what constitutes mutual benefit in the good social contract. In the context of the debate surrounding the right to roam, this dialogue has traditionally focused upon the balance between the rights of property owners—for example, to privacy, economic utility and amenity—and the rights of the public to access that property for recreational purposes. The type of property concerned; countryside landscapes and green spaces including rivers, lakes, shores, mountains, wilderness, farmland and forests, is clearly different from other property forms because of its public nature, and in democratic societies is therefore potentially open to challenge from those interest groups who campaign for free access on the basis of public interest (Warren 2002). In straightforward left versus right terms, the right to roam is therefore “an enduring site of class struggle ... with the landless seeking to establish their ‘moral’ right to roam in contradistinction to the ‘landed’ seeking to maintain the hegemony of private property” (Ravenscroft 1995, p. 64).

Over the past few decades, environmental sustainability and environmental justice have added extra dimensions of complexity to the right to roam debate that blurs traditional left versus right fault lines. As famously defined in the Brundtland Report, development that is sustainable “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future

generations to meet their own needs” (1987, p. 8). From the green perspective, this intergenerational ethical duty must take precedence in all decisions concerning the allocation of rights amongst the current generation. This involves a precautionary approach that is most loudly articulated in the contemporary demands of the environmental movement to tackle global warming. The environmental justice movement’s aim is firstly “to equalize the burdens of pollution, noxious development, and resource depletion” (Shrader-Frchette 2002, p. 6). Secondly, its aim is to equalise access to environmental goods, including the right to roam. For example, Wightman has argued that “just as free speech is regarded as a fundamental right, so should access. ... Freedom to roam is the natural condition of humanity” (1996, pp. 198–199).

The growing influence of the environmental justice movement can be seen in the European Council on Environmental Law’s conclusion in 2006 that free access to nature should be a universal human right. This recommendation was sustained in the 2010 United Nations Environmental Programme Draft Declaration on the Environment and Human Rights. In its deliberations, the European Council concluded that access to nature is “essential for physical and psychological health of human beings and a key element of individual and social well-being”. It also noted that such access is “acutely threatened by, *inter alia*, rapid urbanization, changing interpretations of property rights, the commodification and parcelling of nature and the landscape, increasing alienation of humans from nature and failures in land use plans” (Scannell 2010, p. 229).

Growing environmental consciousness coupled with sociological trends towards life politics has led to an increasing demand for access to nature. As a result, the environmental justice movement has successfully moved this issue to the top of the international legal agenda, whilst encouraging numerous localised campaigns across the world for a right to roam that mirrors Nordic *allemannsretten*. Yet paradoxically, this call for environmental justice pertaining to access stands in contradiction to the demand for environmental sustainability due to the negative impacts that increasing numbers of recreational users and their activities will have. It is also the case that the more people who utilise environmental amenity and resources—scarce or otherwise—will potentially detract from the recreational experience of all those who are sharing the same

environment. This paradox was (in)famously recognised by Hardin who argues that “freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (2000 [1968], p. 189), the key claim that stands at the heart of his influential “tragedy of the commons” thesis. In relation to the right to roam issue, he gives the example of:

The National Parks ... At present, they are open to all, without limit. The parks themselves are limited in extent—there is only one Yosemite Valley—whereas population seems to grow without limit. The values that visitors seek in the parks are steadily eroded. Plainly, we must soon cease to treat the parks as commons or they will be of no value to anyone.

(Hardin 2000 [1968], p. 189)

For Hardin, it is not only human experience that is degraded when environmental resources are left open to free public access but also more seriously in terms of consequences for interconnected human life, it is environmental biodiversity that is inevitably destroyed. He uses the game theory metaphor of a pasture held in common which herders inevitably over-graze, and points to the way that other common resources such forests are logged to ruin, seas are over-fished, and air and land is polluted. Population growth is the main enemy—indeed Hardin argues in an explicitly Malthusian manner that “freedom to breed is intolerable”, because ever more individuals in a finite eco-system cannot do anything else but enter into self-defeating competition for ever dwindling resources. Population density is particularly problematic due to the fact that “using the commons as a cesspool does not harm the general public under frontier conditions, because there is no public; the same behaviour in a metropolis is unbearable” (Hardin 2000 [1968], p. 190). Welfare and human rights pertaining to family size compound this problem—no doubt Hardin would be horrified by the right to roam recently being designated another such legal human right.

Hardin’s foundational assumption is a Hobbesian view of human nature whereby human beings have infinite desires and diverse appetites that they will always rationally seek to maximise at an individual level. Humans are possessed by what Hobbes calls a propensity to “felicity”, which in the state of nature leads to a state of war “of every man against

every man ... and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes 1955 [1651], p. 82). For Hobbes, this pre-moral situation is escaped through an application of reason that enables the recognition that peace is of mutual benefit. Peace can only be attained by “the covenant of every man with every man”—a social contract—whereby each says to the other “I authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this assembly of men, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorize all his actions in like manner”. This unification signifies the birth of the Commonwealth, “the great Leviathan ... that *mortal god*” (Hobbes 1955 [1651], p. 112), whose first duty is to institute the law of property as the foundational basis of morality in a peaceful civil society.

Hardin’s solution to the tragedy of the commons is also suitably Hobbesian—he does not trust moral imperatives or educational propaganda because free riders will always undermine self-regulation—and he categorically rejects Bentham’s utilitarian argument that it should be possible “to maximise the greatest good for the greatest number” because individual goods are incommensurable. For Hardin, as for Hobbes, the aim of the social contract is security, and history indicates that this goal will only be achieved by “mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon by the majority”, exercised by a strong centralised state through administrative law which protects extensions of enclosure and private property as well as limiting population. From this perspective, *allemannsretten* like fecundity constitutes a legally sanctioned state of nature and should be avoided at all costs.

Hardin acknowledges that liberals will balk at his proposals because they run counter to dominant conceptions of rights and freedom. He counters liberal objections with an appeal to situational ethics whereby “the morality of an act is a function of the state of the system at the time it is performed” (Hardin 2000 [1968], p. 190). This type of relativism can be criticised as ethically dubious, but Hardin justifies his Green Leviathan on the ontological grounds that it would be more dangerous to not prevent the unfolding environmental tragedy. Social stability and human security must be paramount, so in Hardin’s view desperate times call for desperate measures.

Since its publication in 1968, Hardin's tragedy thesis has provoked significant debate across the social and life sciences in relation to questions of land ownership forms and sustainable development, the management of access and the calculation of environmental carrying capacity. It has also fed into green political philosophy where it is associated with conservative authoritarianism (Dobson 1997), a position which, given the seriousness of the negative impacts of global warming, could become increasingly attractive as its effects become ever more apparent. Hardin's thesis has been widely criticised for perpetuating elitist top-down technical/managerial approaches to public access which ignore social scientific research showing viable living real-world alternatives in the form of collaborative community based dialogic approaches (Ostrom 1990). Williams summarises the main points of critique when he argues that Hardin's thesis "ignores contextual factors such as history and culture, it underestimates the ability of people to cooperate in commons situations and it emphasizes property rights to the exclusion of other factors" (Williams 2001, p. 365). In terms of social contract theory, the deontological liberal approach developed by Rawls offers the most significant and comprehensive alternative to Hardin's pessimistic authoritarianism.

***Allemannsretten* and Justice as Sustainable Fairness**

Since its publication in 1971, Rawls' *A Theory of Justice* has become a foundational text for contemporary welfare state liberalism in much the same way that Marx's *Capital* (1867) is for the socialist tradition. Its precepts have been debated *ad nauseam* by scholars, students and political commentators, whilst Rawls himself modified and honed the argument presented in follow-up books and revisions of his original thesis (Rawls 1996, 1999, 2001). It is not the intention here to revisit these discussions. Rather, we will briefly explore Rawlsian contract theory in order to identify possible applications and potential extensions which may provide a basis for situating the issue of free public access to the environment within a broad distributional justice framework that takes account of the

ecological concerns that are raised by Hardin and environmentalists more generally.

Rawls' social contract starts from the Kantian premise that in a society containing free and equal individuals, reasonable value plurality concerning religion, morality and conceptions of the common good will be irreducible. Therefore, in order to treat individuals as ends in themselves, a just social contract must accommodate that plurality so that individuals can pursue individual life projects with self-respect and dignity. Again following Kant, for Rawls human beings possess a capacity for practical reason, and a capacity to be reasonable which are the integral ingredients of a sense of justice that is both reciprocal and fair. Hence, given the right conditions, free and equal moral agents recognise that it is necessary to agree to disagree with others over reasonable conceptions of the good and to cooperate in devising fair first principles of justice that inform "well ordered" stable political and institutional arrangements. This enables all to pursue their own reasonable conceptions of the good.

The domain governed by these arrangements as informed by the exercise of public reason—what Rawls calls the "basic structure"—is necessarily thin because the overlapping consensus will breakdown if it is extended beyond what the contracting parties can agree is fair and reasonable. These first principles are of the utmost importance to Rawls conception of justice as fairness because they form the background consensus through which key social, political and legal institutions are devised and the framework through which life-chance determining primary goods are distributed. The initial situation where first principles are chosen must therefore ensure that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the contracting process (Rawls 1999, pp. 6–10).

It is here that Rawls employs his famous heuristic device whereby an original position of equality is imagined in which the contracting parties are cast under a hypothetical "veil of ignorance". Hence "no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities" or even "their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities" (Rawls 1999, p. 11). All that is assumed of the contracting parties is rationality, mutual disinterest and a sense of justice, and all they know is that moderate scarcity defines the economic conditions of the society

and the primary goods that they are bargaining about. Rawls argues that on this original position, two key principles of justice as fairness will be agreed by the contracting parties:

First: each person is to have an equal right of the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.

Second: social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all.

(Rawls 1999, p. 53)

These principles are used to determine the basic structure of society, rights, duties and social and economic advantages. The first principle of liberty, which is concomitant to the political sphere, has lexical priority over the second difference principle, which is concomitant to the social and economic sphere. They are applied together in the allocation of primary goods which Rawls describes as “the things that every rational man is presumed to want” regardless of life project. These include basic rights and liberties, freedom of movement, occupational choice, opportunities to hold office in the basic structural institutions, income, wealth and most significantly for Rawls, the social bases of self-respect. Included amongst basic rights as primary goods is the right to own personal property. However, Rawls is quite explicit that the application of the liberty and difference principles means that this right does not include “the right to own certain kinds of property (e.g., the means of production) and freedom of contract understood as *laissez-faire*” (Rawls 1999, p. 54). As Abplanalp (2010), says in his commentary:

Free and equal citizens can still develop and pursue a reasonable conception of the good without the absolute right to own a phone company or a coal mine. Denying a citizen the basic property right to a river or a forest will not undercut the social basis of her self-respect. But unlike owning the means of production, personal property is undoubtedly required for a reasonable citizen to pursue their conception of the good.

(2010, pp. 75–76)

Rawls distinguishes the index of “social primary goods” from “natural goods” such as “health and vigour, intelligence and imagination” that may be influenced by the basic structure but are not directly under its control (Rawls 1999, p. 54). According to Rawls, the contracting parties will move through a four-stage procedural sequence. This process gradually lifts the veil of ignorance as the deliberative process moves from first principles, through a constitutional convention to a legislature, and finally to a fully operational liberal society where public reason is being exercised in accordance to justice as fairness (Rawls 1999, pp. 171–176).

When it comes to the issue of the right to roam, in the Rawlsian contract it could be conceived of as being resolved through trade-offs concerning basic freedoms such as freedom of movement and the right to hold personal property. A strong case can also be made that the contracting parties would consensually adopt a form of *allemannsretten*. This would enable individuals to pursue reasonable life-political goals that involve public access to land and water for leisure and recreation purposes, because such goals are an essential basis for the attainment of self-respect. However, the environmental issue would remain unresolved unless the distribution of environmental goods is included in Rawls’ index of primary goods. Indeed, environmental ethicists argue that social systems must be located as operating within a natural environment. Hence, natural capital should be understood as a “meta-primary” good—“that is, without it none of the other primary goods could exist” (Ashford and Hall 2011, p. 66).

Rawls is often criticised by green political philosophers for developing an irretrievable anthropocentric perspective that excludes the natural environment and animal species from his framework of justice as fairness (Curry 2006). Other green theorists have argued that there are resources within Rawlsian theory that can be utilised to develop a form of liberal ecogism. Most notably, this includes his notion of a just savings scheme that addresses the issue of intergenerational justice (Dobson 1998; Postma 2006). Under the veil of ignorance in the original position, the contracting parties do not know to which generation they belong. They thus do not know “if it is poor or relatively wealthy, largely agricultural or already industrialized” (Rawls 1999, p. 254). The reciprocity which stands at the heart of justice as fairness therefore cannot be limited to the contemporary generation and must be applied so that no generation is

disadvantaged when it comes to the basic liberties and the distribution of primary goods. If the ability to live in a clean and safe environment is added to the index of primary goods alongside a public right of access, a background consensus of environmental values will inform public policy concerning sustainable practice.

Ashford and Hall (2011), suggest that if natural capital is recognised as a primary good, and a just saving scheme is adopted, then the contracting parties would add a third principle of justice along the following lines:

Social arrangements are to be organised so that they:

- (a) Protect and continually improve the environment, especially for those individuals and species most heavily affected by environmental degradation and pollution.
- (b) Do not result in actions that exceed ecological carrying capacity. (2011, p. 66)

This third principle would ensure justice as sustainable fairness. Environmentalists might argue that this principle should come first in terms of lexical priority—that it should become a meta-ethical principle of justice. However, as Ashford and Hall (2011) argue, it should stay as third in terms of lexical priority because to do otherwise would disrupt the overlapping consensus generated by the first principle that guarantees social stability, and thereby destroy the elegance of Rawls' social contract. This move would also potentially lead back to Hardin's authoritarian solution to the issues of sustainability and public access to the environment—a position that stands in direct opposition to liberal principles of justice as fairness, and the way that real working liberal democracies are constituted.

Towards an Inclusive and Sustainable Leisure Citizenship

Right to roam campaigners point to the Nordic model as an example for their own national states to follow. They counter objections made on the grounds of non-universalisable cultural specificity by noting that

allemannsretten is the product of concrete democratic political choices about the nature of citizenship and the significance of outdoor leisure made by the Nordic states in the early part of the twentieth century. For example, in 1918–1919, the Norwegian parliament, under pressure from the labour movement in the wake of the Russian Revolution, uniquely legislated for leisure with division of the day into three equal eight-hour segments for work, recreation and rest. As Riddich argues, “the inclusion of leisure as a state sanctioned activity—perhaps even a statutory obligation—had a profound impact on public attitudes” (Riddich 2015, p. 239), and cemented *allemannsretten* as a key component of recreation in the public consciousness. In Sweden, modern *allemannsretten* was mentioned in law for the first time in the 1960s, though its origins can be traced to the 1930s when the government decided to revive the ethic of free public areal access in order satisfy the growing demand for recreational amenity. Initially opposed by landowners, it was strongly supported by the public and had the added advantage of avoiding the expense, and legal complications of national park creation (Campion and Stephenson 2010).

What the Nordic experience shows is that liberal states can achieve a pragmatic democratic consensus that balances the right to roam with the rights of property owners. This consensus can be viewed in Rawlsian contract terms as operating at the level of an inclusive background value consensus concerning the distribution of primary social goods. *Allemannsretten* and the related *friluftsliv*, and *idrett*, are inseparable from Nordic citizenship that over time has come to redefine property rights quite differently from the exclusive ownership model that remains dominant in other liberal democratic states. Whilst private property remains the primary form of land ownership, “rights are commonly viewed as an entitlement to benefit from property and not as ownership of the land itself”. Added to this conception of property is an emphasis on environmental sustainability so that “although productive values take precedence on private rural property, there is a strong expectation that private land will also serve recreational and conservation purposes” (Campion and Stephenson 2010, p. 24).

Hardin’s Hobbesian Leviathan may appeal to authoritarian Greens who place sustainability above all other values, and to landowners who

remain wedded to neo-liberal property rights. However, the fact that access to nature is increasingly being recognised as a human right that works in tandem with environmental justice, illustrates that the consensus on this issue is slowly shifting. The Rawlsian social contract, developed to encompass an orientation towards the natural world, offers a political justice model from which to inform processes aimed at closing the gap between the ideal and the real in relation to the issues of free public access and sustainability.

Concluding Thoughts

Individuals are increasingly seeking self-actualisation through consumer, ethical and health related lifestyle choices in the field of leisure and recreation, leading to situations where conflicts of interests concerning the right to roam are inevitable. On the one hand, it can be argued like Hardin that a libertarian attitude to access results in degradation to both human experience and the natural environment, but as this chapter has shown, Rawls' deontological, liberal approach (incorporating Kantian elements) to the social contract is not necessarily incompatible with sustainability.

In short, our argument is that legislators in states where the right to roam remains contested ought to adopt a "greened" version of Rawls, arriving at political decisions underpinned by democratic consensus, ultimately leading to a modified conception of private property. It is of course not possible to re-create the conditions of Rawls' hypothetical original position, but as Rawls indicates in *Political Liberalism* (1996):

The OP serves as a means of public reflection and clarification. It helps us work out what we now think, once we are able to take a clear and uncluttered view of what justice requires when a society is conceived as a scheme of cooperation between free and equal citizens from one generation to the next.

(p. 26)

Applied to the right to roam issue, Rawls heuristic device can be used to inform the creation of formal and informal fora which enable all stake-

holders to engage in dialogue that can lead to mutual recognition of the diverse interests at play, and thereby facilitate reasoned consensus formation about rights and duties. Here it might also be suggested that Habermas' conception (1992) of the open-ended communicative dialogue with its procedures aimed at removing power differentials amongst the parties involved to construct an ideal speech situation, compliments the Rawlsian approach. Habermas, like Rawls points to the ideal-type of democratic process through which the release of public reason might operationalised in relation to the right to roam issue

In the messy, far from ideal real world, *allemannsretten* is the most progressive living example of how the rights and duties of co-agents can be balanced through dialogic processes involving all stakeholders to reach consensus. The experience of the Nordic states shows in practice, that only by the public being in nature, can a leisure culture be developed in which the public learns to respect nature as citizens of an environment that is intrinsically linked to their status of citizens of a democratic society. This cultivation of a sense of shared ownership, and therefore shared responsibility, is surely the first step towards establishing an inclusive, fair and environmentally sustainable leisure citizenship.

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Leisure and Radical Jacobinism

Karl Spracklen

Introduction

The late eighteenth century in the global North saw the rise to prominence of radical political theory associated with the left wing of the Enlightenment and what was disparagingly referred to as Jacobinism. This was the era of the writing of liberty and leisure into the founding documents of the United States of America and revolutionary France, and of the unfulfilled radical promise of the French Revolution and the progressive movement more broadly. For a brief moment, such constitutional declarations and bills spelled out the belief that humans were equal, that every citizen of the commonwealth had a right to be a full and active member of that commonwealth. And leisure was a protected space and activity, through which citizens could flourish in the full Aristotelian sense of the concept. That is, leisure and the public sphere fulfilled the conditions of a life that was

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lived to promote happiness and well-being. In the writing of radicals such as Thomas Paine, human rights to liberty extended to the right to have the same freedoms from work and for leisure that elites had established themselves in the culture of the “leisured gentleman”. In this chapter, I will explore the meaning of leisure in the ideology, theory and manifesto of this radical movement. I will focus on Paine’s contributions to this radical Jacobin milieu in especially his *Rights of Man* (Paine 1791) and the political charters of radical Jacobinism to show that leisure attained its modern importance in this period, but the failed outcome of the radical movement meant free leisure for most people in the nineteenth-century global North remained an ideal at best, or forgotten at worst.

The Enlightenment’s Radical Context: 1600–1700

What I am calling radical Jacobinism in this chapter is the political philosophy and radical movement identified by Jonathan Israel as the “radical Enlightenment” (Israel 2001). This radical Enlightenment sought to use knowledge and the liberty of philosophical discourse to overturn hegemonic power. Israel, like Habermas (1989) and E.P. Thompson (1963), believes two things about the radical Enlightenment. Firstly, that the radical Enlightenment was marginalised by the hegemonic rulers who continued in power, or who regained power, through the period. (I have taken the idea of radical Jacobinism from Thompson’s [1963] account of the failure of the English working classes to defeat their rulers in this period; this does not mean I am denigrating radical Jacobinism, despite adopting the name used by its reactionary rivals—it is commonly used to describe the radicals of the period by historians.) Secondly, the radical Enlightenment has its roots in changes happening in society and culture in Europe in the early modern period: that is, the idea of liberty and freedom was a product of the society constructed from the Renaissance and the Reformation, the European society of the age of the Scientific Revolution (Israel 2001). The right to be treated as an equal struggled with the right to change society in the name of God—and leisure was both a site for such liberty and a space for making society righteous.

During the English Civil Wars of the 1640s and afterwards, leisure became the site of an instrumental struggle over morality and meaning, between reformers seeing the work of the Devil in idle hands and Monarchists who used the suppression of popular culture and leisure as means to gain support for their anti-Puritan campaigns. The Puritans who dominated the Government of the Protectorate in England enacted laws banning leisure activities associated with the Medieval Catholic world, such as friars and festivals on Saint's Holy Days (Hill 1991). They also banned a host of sports and recreations on the holy day of the Sabbath and banned sports and leisure activities such as bear-baiting, maypole-dressing and dancing which offended their Christian sense of decorum. These bans were never enforced beyond some areas that were predominantly Puritan, and there is some debate among historians about the meaning and official nature of the bans (Bremer 2009). But whether the bans were carried out, and whether they carried the force of execution beyond the rhetoric of Puritan generals, what is obvious is that the non-Puritan majority of England was coerced into self-censorship and restrictions in their everyday lives (Spurr 1998). The great radical hope of the Civil Wars was expressed eloquently in the famous Putney Debates of the Leveller movement (the puritan radicals who wanted to remove privilege and share wealth in common), from which Lilburne's *Agreement of the People* (1647) set out the case for individual religious and moral freedom, and equality before the law, including:

4. That in all laws made or to be made every person may be bound alike, and that no tenure, estate, charter, degree, birth, or place do confer any exemption from the ordinary course of legal proceedings whereunto others are subjected.

5. That as the laws ought to be equal, so they must be good, and not evidently destructive to the safety and well-being of the people.

(<<http://www.constitution.org/eng/conpur074.htm>>, Accessed 3 February 2016)

Unfortunately, the instrumentally rational Puritan drive to suppress leisure practices, and limit choice and freedom in people's leisure lives, played into the hands of the Royalist party, who portrayed the Stuarts as defenders of traditional English liberties and leisure (Hill 1991).

In the 1650s, public feeling returned to the Crown as a symbol of certainty and traditional values, against the wrathful modernity of Cromwell and the Puritans. Leisure was not the only area of life used in the struggle between the Puritans and the Crown, but it was one that all sections of English society could understand—whether it was right to get drunk, whether it was the role of the State to ban drinking or whether an autocrat like a Stuart king would be a defender of private liberties while controlling political freedoms. The Restoration of 1660 saw the return of theatres, brothels and drinking to the streets of London (Burke 1999; Linnane 2007). This period saw the emergence of the coffee house as a place for bourgeois conversation and fashion, and the emergence of the Royal Society as a place where gentlemen could discuss natural philosophy. In some ways, then, the Restoration created the climate for the Enlightenment—and nurtured some individual agency in the pursuit of leisure activities. But the price was a restriction of political liberty—the Crown and the State used these leisure pursuits to keep the public in check, and their hegemonic control secure.

Through the early modern period of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, this elite sphere was subject to and dictated by the whims of the ruler. Habermas (1989) describes how the jousts and other festivities associated with the nobility of Europe became increasingly associated with the palaces of the princes. This association defined an elite culture that was dislocated from the taverns, towns and tradesmen of the emerging European states. But in the establishment of autocracy in high culture, there was, in the same period, an inevitable reaction against such feudal submission. Those men (and the few women) who owed their wealth to their own capitalist endeavours, at first denied acceptance into the elite, soon found their wealth bought them status and recognition, as princes out-spent their land-based resources. Autocracy, then, gave way to a synthesis: what Habermas calls the good society. This “good society” was both a part of the social world of the eighteenth-century Royal Courts and a product of the rise, on the back of colonialism and industrialisation, of the early modern capitalist economy. These in turn were connected to the rise of nation states and concepts of territory and power. With the freedoms and individuality associated with capitalism, trade and the emergence of power away from the Court, the good society

flourished. And the good society allowed the creation of the modern public sphere.

This moment, the birth of the public sphere in the coffee houses of eighteenth-century London, Edinburgh and Paris, is also the high point of European rationality: the Enlightenment. It is the time of radical political ideas such as secularism and republicanism, an age beginning with a conservative bookworm like Gibbon, and ending with the modern science, atheism and mathematical reasoning of Laplace. Until quite recently, men like Hume, Kant, Diderot, Voltaire, Rousseau and Lavoisier needed no introduction or footnote among the educated classes of the West: these were the *philosophes*, those who had rejected superstition and autocracy, and established reason and rationality as the only arbiters of truth. However, although these men—for the published and well-read writers of the Enlightenment were mainly men (Hankins 1985)—wrote for a public that would discuss their work in public places, that public was not the same as the people: the public was the bourgeois classes, who saw themselves as intellectually and socially distinct from the popular masses. As Marx shows, most of the men who constructed the public sphere wanted to find a way of challenging feudalism and autocracy while privileging their own bourgeois tastes (Marx 1992). Only at the edges of the Enlightenment, in its radical form, did the beliefs of the Levellers take root (Israel 2001). But that root formed the basis of the two most successful attempts to build a radical and fair commonwealth: the birth of the United States of America and the French Revolution. Before I turn to these results of radical Jacobinism and their versions of leisure, it is necessary to introduce Thomas Paine and his writing on both results.

Thomas Paine

Thomas Paine is not the only source for radical Jacobinism, and he was certainly not the most active politician of the time, but his contribution to history makes him (arguably) the exemplar radical agent in the period (Larkin 2005; Thompson 1963; Vincent 2005). Born in England in the 1730s into a respectable lower-middle-class family, he entered into trade

as his father's apprentice at the age of 13. He did not receive a higher education and was self-taught, as many others at the time. In adulthood, he became an excise officer, working for the (British?) Government, and wrote his first political pamphlet attacking the poor conditions in which he and his colleagues worked. This led to his dismissal in 1774, and in the same year, he moved to America where he had gained the friendship of Benjamin Franklin. With Franklin's support, he soon became the editor of the *Pennsylvania Magazine*. At the centre of the political movement for more freedom from direct rule, Paine soon found himself writing a series of pamphlets in favour of American independence, and in favour of armed insurrection against the English Crown. The first and most famous of these pamphlets, *Common Sense*, was published in 1776 (Paine 1776), and spelled out in simple terms the arguments for fighting for the just cause of freedom from the immoral and autocratic rule of the British monarchy (Larkin 2005).

As the War of American Independence came to its end, Paine found himself sidelined, despite his working and journeying to raise funds in France. He moved back to England, and in 1789 he was able to watch the rise of the French Revolutionary movement. Fully supportive of this movement, Paine felt moved to write his book *Rights of Man* (1791) in response to Edmund Burke's attack on the revolution *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (Burke 1790). Burke argued against the overturn of the established order and for a return to rule of the landed gentry and kings, who were rulers by divine right. In response, Paine argued that the only rights were human rights, enjoyed by all equally. The rights of kings and lords were only rights won in battle or through deception and theft. Paine's book was hugely popular but brought charges of sedition against him. But before he could be arrested Paine moved to Paris, where he took part in the shaping of the revolution, becoming a member of the National Convention and engaging in debates about the future of the Republic. Around this time, Paine also wrote *The Age of Reason* (1794), a scathing attack on religion, which rejects all argument for the existence of a deity based on revelation, miracles or cultural tradition. This book is a classic text of freethinking and rationality. Paine points out the logical absurdities in the Bible with relish, before suggesting the only true way to find God is in the world that we see around us, and in our scientific

knowledge of it. Such talk was enough for Paine to be condemned as an atheist in Europe and in America.

As the idealism of the radicals turned into the oppression of the Terror then the dictatorship of Napoleon, Paine remained in France and criticised the betrayals as much as he could (Thompson 1963). But he was watched by the State and eventually helped to return to America, where he passed the rest of his days reviled for his attack on religion and his association with the French Revolution (Vincent 2005).

Leisure in the Documents of the American Revolution

Not everybody at the time of the American Revolution wanted radical changes—and there is no doubt that the society invented by the American Revolution did not do anything to improve the rights of women, slaves or Native Americans. But the society imagined and constructed in the documents of the American Revolution—the *Declaration of Independence* of 1776, the Constitution ratified in 1788 and the Bill of Rights of 1789—is one of a liberal democracy that protects the rights of its citizens and encourages the flourishing of citizens by maintaining certain freedoms and liberties, especially those freedoms of speech that underpin the communicative leisure of the public sphere. The so-called Founding Fathers of the United States of America were inspired by radical Jacobinism, the writings of Paine and the radical Enlightenment, to attempt to construct a more equal society, in which leisure and culture were sites for individual freedom and expression.

Thomas Jefferson's *Declaration of Independence* captures the philosophy of radical Jacobinism at the heart of the American Revolution. This is the most important text for the radical philosophy and radical politics at the heart of the American Revolution. And despite the compromises of later history, and the appalling lack of inclusion over who counts as a member of the citizenry, it is still radical in intent, and still inspires a radical view of the American public sphere—one of equal and respectful citizens engaged in the leisure and work of the public sphere. Influenced by the rallying call of Paine's *Common Sense*, the revolutionaries drafted

this declaration as a statement of intent, and as a justification of their armed resistance to the British Monarchy. The preamble (actually the second paragraph) famously states:

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed,—That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.—Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.

(<http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/declaration_transcript.html>, Accessed 29 February 2016)

We are all born equal, and all given rights that include the right of leisure: the right to be at liberty and to pursue happiness. For Jefferson, following Paine and the radical Jacobins, this is a self-evident truth, one they believe to be the consequence of the existence of a just Creator. But the maintenance of our right to liberty and happiness, the maintenance of our right to leisure, is the function of the governments that we humans create. So we humans have the right to throw out governments that fail to protect our human rights, including the pursuit of happiness—and if we cannot throw them out by legal means we are permitted to defend

our rights against hegemonic tyranny through more separate measures such as revolution. The American Revolution is primarily about political freedoms, of course, but those freedoms include the right to have a public sphere in which all may take part without constraint, and the right to have leisure time and space that makes us better humans: educated, free, healthy and happy.

This meant that any future government established by the American revolutionaries had to be given a written constitution that protected all the rights of humans mentioned in the Declaration and listed in the works of Paine. And this is what happened. The preamble to the original Constitution sets out that:

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

(The Constitution of The United States of America, Available from: <<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-REV-2014/pdf/GPO-CONAN-REV-2014-6.pdf>>, Accessed 4 February 2016)

This one sentence captures the essence of the radical idea that leisure has meaning and purpose for an equal and free society, though the notion that the promotion of general welfare and the blessings of liberty are as important as establishing justice and tranquillity. The remainder of the original Constitution concerns itself with political arrangements and relationships. But in the Bill of Rights are a number of articles that spell out certain freedoms and restrictions. One of these is the Third Article, which became the First Amendment of the Constitution:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

(<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/First_Amendment_to_the_United_States_Constitution>, Accessed 4 February 2016)

The First Amendment combines political secularism—the right to believe in anything one likes and the determination that the State has no role in religion (or in favouring one)—with a commitment to free speech and assembly. The Bill of Rights and the amended Constitution, then, give legal status to the public sphere and the right of citizens to use their leisure time to inquire, learn, debate and criticise. This protection was partly a political ideal inspired by radical Jacobinism but also partly a reflection of the politicised leisure space that already existed in the cities of the Revolution.

Leisure in the Documents of the French Revolution

The 1789 start of the French Revolution followed the start of the American Revolution, overlapping the end of the latter. This meant individuals such as Paine could move from the United States of America to France, taking with them revolutionary ideas such as the equal rights of humanity and the basic right of liberty and leisure. Unlike the American Revolution, a war of independence undertaken by a colony far removed from its rulers, and which did not physically harm those rulers, the French Revolution was a civil insurrection against the ruling classes that ultimately saw many of those ruling elites killed or exiled. The Americans could create their nation as a tabula rasa, free from nobles and royals. The French who wanted to create their new nation in the image of the United States had to deal with the fact that their ruling elites were all around them. At first the French radicals tried to work with the ruling classes, but the ruling classes were incompatible with the Radical philosophy that inspired them.

The most important document of the French Revolution is the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen*, inspired by Thomas Paine's work and the *Declaration of Independence*, and written in the same radical year, 1789, as the Bill of Rights (Thompson 1963; Vincent 2005). It was adopted by the French revolutionaries of the National Constituent Assembly, and underpinned subsequent constitutional work in the period. *The Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen*, like the *Declaration of Independence*, had an enormous impact on the ruling elites

of Europe and America, and gave succour to progressives everywhere suffering autocratic rule. The Articles salient to the argument of this chapter include:

Article I—Men are born and remain free and equal in rights. Social distinctions can be founded only on the common good.

Article II—The goal of any political association is the conservation of the natural and imprescriptible rights of man. These rights are liberty, property, safety and resistance against oppression.

Article IV—Liberty consists of doing anything which does not harm others: thus, the exercise of the natural rights of each man has only those borders which assure other members of the society the enjoyment of these same rights. These borders can be determined only by the law.

Article V—The law has the right to forbid only actions harmful to society. Anything which is not forbidden by the law cannot be impeded, and no one can be constrained to do what it does not order.

Article X—No one may be disturbed for his opinions, even religious ones, provided that their manifestation does not trouble the public order established by the law.

Article XI—The free communication of thoughts and of opinions is one of the most precious rights of man: any citizen thus may speak, write, print freely, except to respond to the abuse of this liberty, in the cases determined by the law.

Article XVII—Property being an inviolable and sacred right, no one can be deprived of private usage, if it is not when the public necessity, legally noted, evidently requires it, and under the condition of a just and prior indemnity.

(<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Declaration_of_the_Rights_of_Man_and_of_the_Citizen>, Accessed 4 February 2016)

The Articles of the Declaration in their full ambit suggest that it is individual and collective responsibility to ensure that social distinctions are not made in an arbitrary or unjust manner. All citizens are equal, and their wealth and their family should not be measured. This is because we are all ultimately equal in the state of nature—all the wealth and power accumulated by others is given to them through unfair and hegemonic means. We might collectively decide to make someone a prime minister with powers to rule over us, but this is determined by the rules of the constitution we create and agree upon as equals. It is society, that is, the

collective polity of every citizen, that is sovereign, not an arbitrary monarch or bishop. The lack of any mention of the rights of women or any condemnation of slavery is of course a regrettable absence—especially as there were radicals in revolutionary France and beyond who were fighting for women's rights and against slavery, using the same radical argument that everyone is born equal (Larkin 2005).

The Articles cited are clearly inspired by Thomas Paine and by the radical Enlightenment. The first article tells us that all male citizens are not only born equal but remain equal and free. The second article defines the rights of man to include liberty. Articles Four and Five define the extent of what the State's power over the individual's life and leisure. Every man has the right to do whatever leisure activity they please, so long as it does not harm anyone else. This is the definition of liberty and the definition of radical Jacobin leisure, what we might call communicative leisure in the Habermasian public sphere (Habermas 1989). The role of the State is thus to protect and support the full development of that public sphere, and the full involvement of every citizen in its lifeworld: every citizen is encouraged to be active in their liberty, active in their leisure, their education and their culture. Articles Nine and Ten confirm the liberties demanded in the public sphere. Citizens should be free to think and say whatever they like, so long as it does not harm to the newly established public order. That is, citizens were allowed to hold political beliefs and religious beliefs of whatever kind. And the tenth article ensures that citizens can discuss and develop those beliefs in the leisure space of the public sphere, by ensuring freedom of speech in the press. In the French Revolution, then, the ideal of an equal society with radical, communicative leisure, became enshrined in the public sphere. But the utopianism of the French Revolution and the wider radical movement did not last, as I discuss below.

The Failure of Radical Jacobinism

Radical Jacobinism failed in Europe with the rise and fall of Napoleon, and the compacts made between capitalists and nobles to keep the working classes in check (Thompson 1963). The notion that the middle classes might resist the elites alongside the working classes became politically

ridiculous. The working classes were like the slaves, or the native workers in the colonies, merely units of force for the production of goods. The rise of capitalists into the ranks of the ruling classes fuelled industrialisation, urbanisation and imperialism (Marx 1992). In America, a shade of radical Jacobinism continued to haunt its political discourse and its popular culture, but the idea of freedom and radical leisure was reduced to an essentialist strain of liberalism. In America, every white man was allowed his gun and his pleasures, so long as he had hard cash—and this distortion of the communicative leisure at the heart of the radical founding documents became something merely instrumental (Spracklen 2009). The nineteenth century was the age of high modernity, with its new society and its new nation states. Any commitment to universal human rights was swept away in the long struggles to restrict voting rights and to restrict power and freedom to the new (and old) Victorian elites. The leisure space and activities that were associated with radical Jacobins were censored, controlled or stopped altogether.

In the nineteenth century, as discussed in the chapter “John Stuart Mill and Leisure” by Snape in this book, an echo of the radical Jacobin form of leisure was found in the philosophy of private pleasure and public restraint associated with John Stuart Mill’s 1859 treatise *On Liberty* (Mill 1998). It was Mill who articulated the belief that the role of the State was to allow as many people as possible (men and women, a dissenting argument for his time) access to the public sphere, where they could contribute to political debates and take part in formal, public leisure and cultural activities. However, Mill also believed that the State had no role in policing the private lives of individuals. In privacy, one could do anything with one’s leisure time, providing the choices of leisure activities did not harm anyone else (see Spracklen 2009). Individual liberty was paramount for Mill in the private sphere—in public, a more virtuous role for individuals was assumed, which could result in individual freedoms being restricted for the common good. Mill, for example, would see complete sense in the public smoking bans enacted by many Western countries in the twenty-first century: he would support the ban on smoking in public if presented with the evidence of the dangers of passive smoking, though he would defend the right for individuals to smoke in private where their smoke did not drift into another person’s breathing space.

But Mill's liberalism was not the dominant form of political philosophy in the period, or the dominant influence on modern leisure. Liberalism became co-opted into the systems of control and power, something reduced to a justification of the *laissez-faire* of the free market. Modern historiography of leisure (e.g., Borsay 2005; Rojek 2005; Bramham 2006; Blackshaw 2010; Roberts 2011) identifies this moment in the growth of Modernity as being essential to the construction of leisure as we currently recognise it. Certainly, leisure is something that only becomes meaningful and familiar to us in this period, when the focus on individuals, freedom and work allow people to see leisure as something universal and something to which all humans have a right (Borsay 2005; Spracklen 2009). Modern historiographers of leisure are correct to see this period as important: we cannot think of leisure, sport and tourism without thinking through the language game (Wittgenstein 1968) provided by the advent of the modern world. But the defeat of radical Jacobinism and the rise of the instrumental logic of modernity meant that modern leisure was shaped by what was allowed and what was profitable. The idea of leisure as a radical, communicative space was replaced by the idea of leisure as something to perpetuate hegemony.

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John Stuart Mill and Leisure

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John Stuart Mill was one of the most important philosophers of nineteenth-century Britain. He was born in London in 1806; his father James Mill was a political philosopher and friend of Jeremy Bentham. He had an unusual childhood, being educated at home by his father and given the task of teaching his eight siblings. A highly intelligent boy, his father prohibited him from going to Cambridge on the grounds that there was nothing he could be taught there, and when invited as a visiting speaker at the age of 16 he made a “great impression” through his “massive power in disputation” (Harris 2004). Around the age of 18, he became a convert to Utilitarianism and remains today the principal apologist for that school of thought. In 1830, he met Mrs. Harriet Taylor whom he later married on her husband’s death, and it is widely believed that she exerted an intellectual influence on his work. In 1865, he became Liberal MP for Westminster, a seat he held until 1868. He died in France in 1873.

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Mill's work covers a wide range of fields. This chapter focuses on three works which have a particular relevance to leisure. In *On Liberty* (1859), *Utilitarianism* (1863) and *On the Subjection of Women* (1869), Mill expounded philosophical arguments which illuminate contemporary issues and debates around leisure, particularly those concerned with the freedom of the individual in leisure and the social functions of leisure. Like all philosophers, Mill does not provide satisfactory answers to every possible question and neither does he express all his arguments in terms of leisure. He does however provide a framework within which the nature and purpose of modern leisure can be analysed, evaluated and discussed in philosophical terms.

Utilitarianism

More so than Jeremy Bentham, Mill was arguably the greatest advocate of Utilitarianism, a philosophical position which held that in any situation the correct course of action should be determined by its consequences rather than by moral values, religious belief or public opinion. Mill's interpretation of Utilitarianism was a revisionist re-working of Bentham's arguments, modifying them to reflect the changing cultural and social values of late-nineteenth-century Britain. Jeremy Bentham was born in London in 1748. In a period when greater freedom of religious and political belief was being pursued across all social classes, Bentham aimed to formulate an overarching rule of conduct which did not rely on subjective religious, moral or political opinion. The guiding principle was the utility, or the consequences of an act:

By Utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good or happiness (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered; if that party be the community in general, then the happiness of the community; if a particular individual, then the happiness of that individual.

(Bentham 1987, p. 66)

Bentham also maintained that the end of ethical action was the provision of the greatest possible quantity of happiness on the part of those whose interest was in view (Bentham 1907, p. 310). In terms of leisure, this would mean that no leisure activity was inherently right or wrong and that a right use of leisure could not be defined in terms of religious belief, political expediency or opinion, but only in terms of its effects. Furthermore, the utility of leisure would be assessed in terms of the amount of pleasure and pain it produced, so that the right use of leisure would be that which produced the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people. A weakness of Bentham's utilitarianism is its reliance on the idea of the "greatest happiness" and its quantification. How, for example, would the great happiness of a minority be calculated to be more or less than the moderate happiness of the majority? Would the happiness of the community be subsidiary to the happiness of a majority of the individuals forming part of the community? In an attempt to measure happiness, pleasure and pain, Bentham devised a "felicific calculus" based on criteria such as the intensity, duration and purity of a pleasure and other qualitative indicators entirely ill-fitted to quantitative analysis. Significantly, he made no distinction between the value of differing leisure activities that might contribute to pleasure; push-pin was as good as poetry if it led to an identical outcome in terms of individual happiness. In today's society, the potential consequences for leisure of such a crude utilitarianism would be far-reaching; subsidies for cultural provision to cater for minority tastes, for example, ballet or classical music, could be more difficult to justify. Despite its shortcomings, the Principle of Utility was widely adopted because it provided a perceived objective means of identifying right action in terms of its consequences rather than on contentious grounds of morality, public opinion or religious belief. Although he did not agree with several aspects of Bentham's version, Mill was nevertheless an advocate of utilitarian principles. Several of his works accordingly set out to moderate Bentham's approach. In *On Liberty*, Mill demonstrates how utilitarianism can help answer questions about the limits of the freedom of the individual as a leisure actor and, in *Utilitarianism*, how some forms of leisure can be rationally argued to be inherently preferable to others.

In *On Liberty*, Mill explored the nature and limits of the power that society can legitimately exercise over the individual. This is an ever-present question in terms of politics as it concerns the extent to which the state is entitled to interfere in the actions of individual citizens. It is useful to note that Mill was writing shortly after the mass democratic movement of Chartism in the mid-nineteenth century when a minority ruling class feared democracy as a “tyranny of the majority” who might impose civil penalties on them as a dissenting minority while seemingly remaining oblivious to the fact that they themselves were a minority that was curtailing the freedom of activity of a dissenting majority. The question of the extent to which the state can or should be entitled to limit the freedom of the individual is clearly relevant to leisure as the state regulates and prohibits some leisure activities whilst promoting and encouraging others. The regulation of alcohol consumption through the licensing of its sale, the criminalisation of some recreational drugs and the promotion of sport and physical activity are examples of this. Mill however identified a further and more subtle force of interference in individual liberty in the form of public opinion, working through ideology and cultural norms. The relevance of this to leisure is evident in those instances when, on grounds of religious belief, conventional morality or political advantage, the state or influential institutions within it have sought to suppress certain leisure forms. Mill’s response to the question of what leisure activities the state might be justified in restricting was expressed in his assertion that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others” (Mill 1929a, p. 11). That an action might be harmful to the agent is not relevant; the sole criterion is whether it might harm other persons. Mill’s second principle follows naturally from this, requiring liberty of tastes and pursuits without interference from others, even when these may be thought foolish, perverse or wrong. These arguments provide a context within which to debate the extent to which leisure activities can really be said to be freely chosen.

Before considering the application of Mill’s principles to leisure in greater depth, it is worth noting that leisure, in its common contemporary usage, is not, as sometimes supposed, a sphere of absolute freedom. The word “leisure” is in fact derived from the Latin *licere* meaning to

be allowed or lawful; it is also the root of the word “licence”. There are several types of actions a person might perform in leisure which may harm others and, as Mill readily concedes, everyone who receives the protection of society owes a reciprocal service and is obliged to observe a certain line of conduct towards everyone in that society. So, for example, preventing one’s neighbour from sleeping by continuously playing loud music throughout the night or using a shotgun in close proximity to a public footpath, thereby endangering the lives of others, both fall within the category of involving potential harm to others and would thus be amenable to some form of control or prohibition. Those seeking to prohibit blood sports, on the other hand, might find Mill’s argument less useful unless a case for their injurious effect on other people could be convincingly articulated.

Mill was writing at a time when religion exercised a powerful influence on social norms and values; for Mill, however, a person’s individual liberty could not be limited on religious grounds; the only justification would be if it was harmful to others. Mill cited a number of contemporaneous examples of attempted interference in leisure to illustrate the application of this principle. Observing that social mores and values tended to be determined by the opinions and values of a dominant social class, he noted how the Puritans, on coming into power, had banned several categories of public and private amusements, notably music, dancing and public games. However, as these activities could not be shown to be harmful to others, Mill accordingly argued that Puritan legislation to prevent them had not been justified. Puritan values had also led to prohibition of the sale of alcohol in several American states and as Mill noted, many “professed philanthropists” were agitating for similar restrictions in Great Britain (Mill 1929a, pp. 109–10). Much of this pressure was exerted by a non-conformist constituency that was gaining economic and political dominance and exhibiting similarly censorious attitudes to other aspects of leisure; the Lords Day Observance Society, for example, sought to reduce leisure activity on Sundays by preventing the public from visiting parks, museums and zoos on the grounds of religious belief. There was also a strong campaign to restrict the consumption of alcohol both on religious grounds and upon the argument that drunkenness could lead to harm to others through violence, or expenditure which

might leave families without food. The anti-drink lobby was represented by the United Kingdom Alliance to Procure the Total and Immediate Legislative Suppression of the Traffic in All Intoxicating Liquors, an organisation formed in 1853 with the aim of ending drunkenness by banning drink. Lord Stanley, the secretary of the Alliance, justified this object by claiming that his social rights were undermined by the social act of another, that is, the drinker. Mill responded by arguing that this in fact meant that Stanley was insisting that everyone should act in accordance with his values and opinions, which in effect would mean that no one could drink, which was not a sufficient reason. While Mill did believe that excessive drinking should be controlled so as to minimise harm to others, the fact that drunkenness was damaging to the drunkard was insufficient grounds for the prohibition of alcohol. However, drinking did have damaging social consequences where a drunken person committed acts that harmed other people. Therefore, if in making himself drunk a person knew that he was likely to harm others, his excessive drinking constituted a conscious potential harm to another. Mill thus argued that it was legitimate to place restrictions on a person convicted of violence against others while under the influence of drink so that if he were to commit a further offence while drunk he would be liable to a penalty. The restriction on liberty was not thus expressed through an overall suppression of drinking alcohol but through the punishment of the individual for a harmful act he might have known he would commit once drunk (Mill 1929a, p. 121). However, Mill found a further way of dealing with the issue which avoided direct restrictions on the individual drinker by limiting the freedom to sell alcohol; as drunkenness was a social evil which could be empirically demonstrated to lead to harm, Mill argued that it was justifiable to regulate its sale through restrictions and controls. This assertion, which conformed to the utilitarian principle of maximising the freedom of the individual while maintaining the greatest amount of happiness for the greatest number of people, was later embedded in the rationale for the licensing of outlets for alcohol, regulating rather than banning its consumption; similar arrangements now also apply to gambling.

Mill seems on less sure ground, however, in terms of leisure activities which might be considered to offend decency, as decency is a social con-

struct and a realm of opinion. Some acts, he wrote, may not be directly injurious to the agents themselves but if performed in public would be a violation of good manners and could thus be prohibited (Mill 1929a, p. 121). There are several examples of leisure which have raised public concern in Britain but which did not in themselves cause direct harm to others. A notable case was the prosecution in 1962 of the publishers of D.H. Lawrence's novel *Lady Chatterley's Lover* which had been banned under the Obscene Publications Act. The case for the prosecution was that the book would "tend to deprave and corrupt persons likely to read it"—the publisher was thus being prosecuted on the basis that the act of publishing the book could cause harm to others. This argument, which was based on moral judgement and an assumed public opinion, was unsuccessful, and several witnesses for the defence attested to the artistic, sociological and moral value of book. The prosecution called no witnesses. A more complex example is the blacking out of the racing news from newspapers in public libraries in the decades immediately prior to the First World War. Betting on horse races was then legal only at the racecourse; there was however a huge network of illegal gambling throughout Britain. Popular newspapers responded to this latent demand for information on horse racing by legally publishing notices of races and betting odds. Several librarians, embarrassed by accusations that public libraries were facilitating illegal gambling, blacked out the racing news in library newspapers, thus restricting the liberty of the public to read material that had been legally published. In doing so, they were not entirely out of step with public opinion as a considerable portion of the population believed gambling to be a social evil and were happy to condone an act which constrained individuals to act illegally by placing a bet on the basis of published information (Snape 1992). One might debate as to whether this was in accord with Mill's defence of liberty or whether the librarians were lawfully preventing a potential social harm.

Although Mill was a committed advocate of utilitarianism, stating that, like Bentham, he regarded utility as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions, there were points upon which he did not agree with him. In *Utilitarianism*, Mill (1987, p. 275) challenged Bentham's first principle of moral obligation as acting in a way that everyone would agree was rational; this could, he argued, lead to the adoption by all rational beings

of immoral rules of conduct; for example, a population finding its greatest happiness and pleasure in gluttony and drunkenness. To further this argument, Mill had to articulate a means of identifying preferable actions without resort to religious or political belief. His method for doing so is of critical importance in drawing distinctions between good and bad uses of leisure. Mill's first point was that the animal, or sensual, pleasures of satisfying the basic appetites were not those which led to a human conception of happiness; human beings had more elevated faculties than beasts and once conscious of them (a critical condition, not to be overlooked), they found happiness only in the satisfaction of higher pleasures. Some kinds of pleasure, he argued, were in fact inherently more valuable and desirable than others and that qualitative as well as quantitative considerations were important in distinguishing between these (Mill 1987, p. 279). However, no felicific calculus or any other method of quantitative measurement could help in this; the determining criterion of what made one pleasure more valuable than another was that if it was preferred by people who were competently acquainted with both pleasures, and if this preference was based not upon moral grounds but upon qualitative grounds, then that was the more desirable pleasure for everyone. The critical word here is "competently" as such distinction could be made only by people "capable of appreciating and enjoying" the higher pleasures and using their higher human faculties. Those whose capacities of enjoyment were limited to the animal pleasures had, in Mill's view, the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied, whereas those with the capacity for a higher form of enjoyment would feel that any happiness would always remain imperfect. It was, Mill concluded, better to be a dissatisfied human being than a satisfied pig. He allowed that some people might enjoy both the higher and lower forms of pleasure, but they would do so knowingly; we may here think, for example, about the ways some people read for leisure, choosing popular novels for amusement and relief of boredom and literary novels for intellectual engagement. It is not however difficult to see how this argument might be harnessed to a defence of a leisure class or an imagined cultural hierarchy. Indeed, this was the case in some British public libraries in the early twentieth century when librarians were trying to find ways of persuading their members to read literary fiction rather than popular novels. The library profession

co-ordinated a campaign to ban the purchase of popular fiction, thus restricting public access to them. At least one library went so far as to put this idea into practice (Snape 1995). The defence of this act was not that romances and sensation novels were harmful (although some critics argued they set bad examples of behaviour) but that literary fiction was qualitatively better; as a value judgement, this would be invalid in terms of Mill's conditions. On the other hand, Mill's arguments could be used to support the proposition that a persuasive approach to the promotion of literary fiction as a more desirable pleasure would be appropriate, and this was in fact the approach that libraries adopted.

Through these arguments, Mill enables us to come to a more refined idea of leisure and seems in some ways to be making a distinction, as did Aristotle, between leisure, recreation and amusement. This is not to imply that Aristotle was a utilitarian; as has been argued, Aristotle's focus was primarily on what was good for the individual while Mill and Bentham were concerned with social consequences of action (Ryan 1987, pp. 7–64). Nevertheless, there are points of comparison between Aristotle and Mill in terms of their understanding of leisure. Happiness, in Mill's terms was not a continuity of highly pleasurable excitement or sensation but a state of "exalted pleasure" or rapture and was, like Aristotle's understanding of leisure, essentially active rather than passive. Furthermore, although Mill is generally regarded as the champion of individual liberty, he was conscious that the opportunities for happiness were not evenly distributed through society. Insisting that the happiness which formed the utilitarian standard of right conduct was not the agent's own happiness but that of everyone, he called for political action to address the social and economic obstacles to the pursuit of happiness amongst all social classes; only amoral persons, he claimed, could plan to pursue their own happiness with no regard to others (Mill 1987, pp. 284–8).

The dominance of Utilitarianism as a guiding philosophy waned in the later years of nineteenth century having been roundly mocked by Dickens (2008), undermined by Matthew Arnold (1869), and the economic system to which it had given validity severely attacked by Ruskin (1907) and Morris (1962). In a far-reaching critique of Utilitarianism, Thomas Hill Green, a tutor at Balliol College, Oxford, argued that as it was concerned with nothing more than the attainment of pleasure and the avoidance of

pain; it was of little value to social change and the pursuit of the good society (Green 1941, p. 43). Green maintained that the good of the individual was not to be measured solely in terms of the right to do as he or she pleased; individual actions and indeed the liberty to undertake them had to be understood in terms of the good of the whole society. Social well-being, he claimed, was the final object of all activities (Green 1941, p. 245). Turning Utilitarianism on its head, he argued that a person's duty was to be interested primarily in his or her neighbour's well-being (Green 1941, p. 246). Green was hugely influential on the emergence in the late nineteenth century of the "new liberalism" which superseded the classical mid-nineteenth-century liberalism of the individual. Political liberalism became more concerned with social issues and essentially socially democratic in nature. Green's disciples included John Hobson and Ernest Barker, both of whom produced important work on the social meanings of leisure in the early twentieth century (Hobson 1914; Barker 1947).

The Subjection of Women

A further area in which Mill's thinking has been important in terms of leisure is that of the equality of opportunity for women. He was by no means the first writer to address this issue; Mary Wollstonecraft's *A Vindication of the Rights of Woman*, published in 1792, had forcibly argued that women's unequal status in a male-dominated society was a product of culture rather than nature. Nevertheless, in *On the Subjection of Women*, published in 1869, Mill provided a powerful reminder that the social equality of women had barely improved in the intervening period (Mill 1929b). He readily attributed that much of the book had been influenced and indeed partly written by his wife, Harriet Taylor.

Mill articulated two principal arguments against the subordination of women, both of which were consistent with those introduced in *On Liberty* and *Utilitarianism*. The first was that the prevailing assumption of women as a weaker sex was based entirely upon theory and supposition; no alternative had ever been tried and thus there was no empirical foundation for such a claim, only an opinion. Secondly, this assumption had not been formed through deliberation or adopted for a utilitarian

benefit to the whole society but was based in a customary practice that had existed throughout history. A customary and culturally normative restriction of a range of social rights to males had been abused, he argued, as the basis of legal rights. Mill acutely observed that there had never been any domination that did not appear natural to those who possessed it. It was accordingly several decades before women gained political, social and cultural equality, a process many feminists maintain is not yet complete. However, while change may have been slow, Mill was important in drawing attention to women's inequality and in setting out arguments for equality that remain potent in terms of pursuing equality for women in leisure. A notable feature of the arguments presented in the book is that many could be equally applied to other perceived subdominant social groups.

Modern Applications of Mill

Utilitarianism remains important in the twenty-first century as the validity of deontological approaches, that is, those based on rational principles and a fixed moral framework, is less readily recognised. It is, for example, a tenet of social policy that policymakers must place an emphasis upon its consequences rather than informing principles. Through utilitarianism, policy can be planned and evaluated in terms of its expected outcomes. This process is aided by a refinement of utilitarianism into Act and Rule versions; the former referring to the classic form of utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill in which a specific act is adjudged to be right or wrong in terms its consequences and the latter, which interprets correct action as that which, if followed, will result in the greatest good. Rule utilitarianism has been widely adopted by public sector leisure managers whose decisions affect large numbers of people at local and national levels and who must adopt policies they believe will promote the greatest welfare of public sector leisure users. This does however expose the above-mentioned weakness of utilitarianism in terms of the calculation of the social effects of an action. McNamee, Sheridan and Buswell (2001) cite the example of judging between the extraordinary pleasure that might be gained by a small number of people attending an opera and

the marginal pleasure that might be enjoyed by a much larger number of people provided with the opportunity of swimming in a local leisure centre. They suggest as a solution the idea of welfare utilitarianism which focuses in the satisfaction of interests rather than preferences. It might thus be argued that excluded or disadvantaged communities would be in greater need of public investment in leisure provision, and this was in fact a guiding principle of much of the leisure policy of the 1997–2010 New Labour government which allocated resources to the areas of greatest social deprivation. However, this approach, as they note elsewhere (McNamee et al. 2000), introduces an element of paternalism and moral judgement to decision-making. In an era of neoliberalism, the primacy of markets and the satisfaction of consumer demand have to a large extent displaced claims of social need and the well-being of the community and the moral authority of the leisure policymaker are less valued than economic gain. Thus, while not necessarily providing a conclusive resolution to all questions of leisure, Mill nevertheless provides a framework in which they can be debated.

In terms of individual freedom in leisure, Mill remains as relevant today as in the nineteenth century. A dominant social trend of the early decades of the twenty-first century has been the claim for greater individual autonomy in leisure and the relaxation or repeal of regulations and laws constricting it. We have seen how Mill argued that restrictions on individual freedom in leisure were justifiable only in those cases in which harm was caused to others, but should that still remain if there is possible, and perhaps even probable, harm to the agent? The rise in popularity of extreme or dangerous leisure activities foregrounds this question. While superficially it may appear that such activities harm only the individuals undertaking them, there is in fact potential harm to others such as family members and rescue workers. A strong defence of the right of the individual to engage in dangerous sports (Olivier 2006) has argued, using Mill's criticism of paternalism, that there is no justification for proscribing the autonomy of the individual in leisure except where there is an inescapable risk to others, such as smoking, and that dangerous activities may have individual benefits which outweigh the potential negative costs and should thus remain free of restriction. A further example, based on the relationship between the athlete and the coach, questions the extent of

the authority of a coach either to limit the actions of an athlete or to place intense pressure upon him/her to win competitions if these interventions are not welcomed (Ravizza and Daruty 1985). The authors conclude that the coach never has the right to compel an athlete to do anything even if it is in the athlete's own interests and that informed consent on the part of the athlete is required.

Mill remains relevant to leisure and to leisure studies. In an era in which consumerism, deregulation and a retreat from state provision for leisure are dominant trends, issues of individual freedom, protection from harm and the qualitative value of differing leisure forms are likely to become increasingly important. Furthermore, the question of why some forms of leisure might be argued to be better or preferable to others remains highly relevant to both individual and social well-being. While Mill does not provide fully satisfactory solutions, he does offer a framework within which this and other questions pertinent to leisure can be addressed.

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Unproductive Leisure and Resented Work: A Brief Incursion in Hegel (and in Nietzsche)

Maria Manuel Baptista and Larissa Latif

Introduction

To consider the role of leisure, according to Hegel, primarily requires a reflection on the centrality that the Lord/Slave dialectic occupies in the construction of *The Phenomenology of Spirit* and later in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. It is, in fact, a kind of double-sided mirror, one concave and the other convex, in which we can see the relationship between work and leisure in Hegel: for the Lord, all play and no work; for the Slave, all work and no play.

And yet, is it through work and not through leisure that the subject realises what he potentially is, through the dialectical movement directed towards a resisting world that he transforms by his work. Thus, as we shall see in the following reflection, Hegel does not see any virtuality of subjectivity in the leisure activities of the Lord, for everything to him (including the Slave himself) is but an object, purely instrumental things.

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In order to understand in greater depth, the type of conception of leisure (and of work) in Hegel, we decided to contrast it, where relevant, with that which became Nietzsche's concept of work and leisure (or *otium*, as leisure is designated in relation to Ancient Greek culture), to verify whether Hegel's concept of leisure is Modern, Nietzsche's theorisation develops what is already a postmodern concept.

In the following text, our primary aim was to show how approaching the notion of leisure cannot prevent a dialogue that has been historically instituted, from Ancient Greece, between Slave and Lord, between work and leisure. Hegel masterfully poses the issue to describe the dialectic, which makes the work transforming and turns leisure into slavery.

Secondly, in addressing the problem of subjective recognition, we examine the reasons why only work is liberating, describing in detail the dialectical process that occurs in the confrontation between consciousness desiring mutual recognition, without desiring mutual annihilation.

Thus, by showing the way in which two conflicting desires of consciences can be resolved through the process of recognition, in the final section of this text we present (resented, according to Nietzsche), while the other, the desire of the Lord, is the only acceptable desire, but without the possibility of recognition.

Finally, we conclude—in line with Gorz and Lafargue—that it is necessary to rethink the concepts of leisure and work in the light of a new conception of temporality, to discuss the profound political implications that the Hegelian vision of work and leisure still bears on contemporary societies.

The Absolute Idealism of Hegel

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) is one of modernity's most important philosophers, for having tried to establish an idealistic philosophy as a foundational understanding of all other types of knowledge. As he himself affirms in his greatest work, *The Phenomenology of the Spirit*, written in 1807.

Philosophy is frequently taken to be a purely formal kind of knowledge, void of content, and the insight is sadly lacking that, whatever truth there may be in the content of any discipline' or science, it can only deserve the name if such truth has been engendered by philosophy.

(1977, p. 41)

In fact, in the history of western philosophy, Hegel constitutes a point of arrival for the development of German idealism, reaching its system of understanding the reality that is designated "absolute idealism". Using the Greek concept of "dialectic" (Heraclitus), Hegel considers the universe to be immanent to the individual and that the irrational does not exist. On the contrary, everything may be justified by the rational progression of the Idea: although it may appear irrational and contradictory, it is not more than an antithetic aspect of reality, which would then turn to rationality, seen at a higher level of complexity.

The more conventional opinion gets fixated on the antithesis of truth and falsity, the more it tends to expect a given philosophical system to be either accepted or contradicted; and hence it finds only acceptance or rejection. It does not comprehend the diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of truth, but rather sees in it simple disagreements. The bud disappears in the bursting-forth of the blossom, and one might say that the latter refutes the former; similarly, when the fruit appears, the blossom is shown up in its turn as a false manifestation of the plant, and the fruit now emerges as the truth of it instead. These forms are not just distinguished from one another; they also supplant one another as mutually incompatible. Yet at the same time their fluid nature makes them moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole.

(Hegel 1977, p. 2)

Similarly, according to Hegel, history itself is no more than the development of the Idea in a progressive moment of becoming conscious of the self. In other words, all facts can be rationally explained, from the dialectic development of the idea and the contradictions, struggles

and oppositions are merely apparently, although necessary. Thus, the true motor of History is Reason, the Idea or the Spirit. In the words of Hegel,

reason is purposive activity. The exaltation of a supposed Nature over a misconceived thinking, and especially the rejection of external teleology, has brought the form of purpose in general, into discredit. Still, in the sense in which Aristotle, too, defines Nature as purposive activity, purpose is what is immediate and at rest, the unmoved which is also self-moving, and as such is Subject.

(1977, p. 12)

Effectively, the importance of Hegel for Western thought is precisely due to its integrating Cartesian rationalism (the idea of the rationality of the real), Kantian criticism (the transcendental logic that considers the subject to reside in pure conditions before knowledge) in addition to Fichte (in his version of the dialectic movement) and Schelling (in relation to objective idealism).

Recognised today as one of the last philosophers to construct a system which aimed to explain and rationalise, and although he had a great deal of influence in the twentieth century, in Marxist and existentialist theories, for example, the truth is that the response elicited was the emergence of theories which challenged reason, opening the door for all kinds of intuitionistic and irrationalistic philosophies. Of these, we highlight that of Nietzsche, one of the most profound and radical contesters to the absolute idealism of Hegel. Thus, to analyse Nietzsche and Hegel in light of each other allow a deeper understanding of the two great theoretical lines developed throughout the twentieth century: one Hegelian, idealistic and even hyper-rationalistic; and the other Nietzschean, anti-rationalistic, intuitionistic and even irrationalistic, both of which form the basis for our current postmodernity. Each has entirely different modes of understanding relations between leisure and work in contemporary culture.

The Slave–Lord Dialectic: The Problem of Recognition

The separation between leisure and work implies a differentiation between forms of using time that is fundamental to self-consciousness in Hegel, that is, for the whole process of individuation and the formation of identity according to Hegelian thought. Indeed, work appears in Hegel as the mediator between self-consciousness and what is outside it, a consciousness which is separated and distinguished from the objective world by the objective conditions of its action in it, that is, according to its relationship with life and freedom as a Lord or a Slave.

To speak of work and of leisure in Hegel implies speaking of subjectivity and recognition. This is because the relation with work—and due to its opposition with leisure—is central to the process of subjectivity in Hegelian philosophy. But, in order for us to understand subjectivity in Hegel, we must also understand recognition.

The process of separation and distinction of the consciousness of the self from that which is outside it is the heart of the formation of the subject in Hegel. It is therefore a process of subjectivity that, put simply, may be described as the process of differentiation between the subject and things. Subjectivity may only exist when self-consciousness becomes self-conscious, becoming a self-consciousness of the self and for the self—in other words, a subject. However, that process, in the Hegelian dialectic, may not occur without the recognition of self-consciousness for another consciousness of the self. That is, there is neither subjectivity nor separation between the conscience and things, without the recognition of this subjectivity of the other, for another self-consciousness.

In the words of Jean Hyppolite:

The separated self-consciousnesses are primarily foreign to each other, and then enter in opposition; in the end, one dominates the other, a fundamental phenomenon in the development of the self. A dialectic: bonded domination leads to the recognition of the unit of self-consciousnesses (...). Indeed, Hegel recalls the etymology of *servus*. The Slave is whom has been saved (*servare*), in other words, he that prefers life to liberty, and thus has

been saved by grace. The Lord, on the contrary, did not fear death, and showed himself to be independent in his relationship with life.¹

(1941, p. 155)

Recognition, in the Hegelian dialectic, means the recognition of a self-consciousness separate from things, that is of a subject, for another self-consciousness separate from things, that is, another subject. It is in the relation between the Lord and the Slave and in the relation between each of them and the world of things and of work that transforms that which comprises, in Hegelian philosophy, the entire process of subjectivity and of recognition, thus the dialectic of the Lord and of the Slave are vital for the constitution of the Hegelian subject, a self-conscious individuality that may only exist when it is recognised by another self-conscious individuality. Throughout the text, we will examine how this dialectic can be unravelled and its consequences for thought about work and leisure.

Thus, for Hegel, the relationship with work is central to recognition and simultaneously supports the conception of the Hegelian subject, “self-consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (1977, p. 111). Therefore, it is impossible for self-consciousness to free itself from things without recognition of this liberty for another self-consciousness and this recognition is subject to an opposition and a confrontation, after which one chooses risk and the other chooses life. The dialectic between the Lord and the Slave is established, between that which is free and has achieved recognition of his humanity at the expense of having put his life at risk and that which chose to live at the expense of his own humanity.

The Lord relates himself mediately to the bondsman through a being (a thing) that is independent, for it is just this which holds the bondsman in bondage; it is his chain from which he could not break free in the struggle, thus proving himself to be dependent, to possess his independence in thinghood. But the Lord is the power over this thing, for he proved in the struggle that it is something merely negative; since he is the power over this

¹ Free translation from the original French of a note by Jean Hyppolite in his commented translation of Hegel's work *La Phénoménologie de l'Esprit*, published in the 1940s.

thing and this again is the power over the other (the bondsman), it follows that he holds the other in subjection.

(1977, p. 115)

However, the Lord can only be recognised by and as himself once that which differs from him has been recognised, that is, the Slave. This, however, will never be recognised by the Lord, which means the Lord is recognised by someone he himself does not recognise.

Thus, a contradiction is established and, by dialectical inversion, the Lord becomes a Slave and the Slave becomes Lord, but not by the Lord's recognition of the Slave. Such an inversion is made possible by the relation between the pure desire of the master with the object of desire, as it is not the Lord who works on the object, but the Slave. Therefore, the Slave is the eternal mediator between the Lord and his object of desire, converting him into upon whom the Lord depends. Hence, we turn to Hegel's perspective of work as a basis for recognition and therefore for subjectivity, as observed by Jason Read in a reflection on the contradictions of work in Hegel:

Labour constitutes another basis for recognition. Whereas Hegel's passage on self-consciousness began with a rigid division between appetite and desire, between relations with the world of objects and the world of subjects, desire for things and desire for recognition, the overturning of the relation of Master to Slave obscures this very distinction. What is more important to Hegel is less the sharp division between the desire for recognition, what we might want to call intersubjectivity, and the relation with things, than the fundamental negation of one's determinate condition: to be recognized is to be seen as something more than this determinate existence, a point that can be arrived at through the instability of fear and the determination of work as much as it can through recognition. One can arrive at recognition of oneself, an awareness of one's potential, either through the recognition of an other or the recognition of oneself in the world transformed by work.

(2013)

Read observes that this Hegelian conception of work as an externalisation of itself, a path to subjectivity, is replaced at a later stage by an

understanding of work as an internalisation of norms and commands, a disciplinarian pedagogy capable of making men interchangeable among themselves, not a particular, expressible self, but a standardised and universalised self. In the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Hegel poses the problem of the impoverishment of the working class and the concentration of wealth:

When the standard of living of a large mass of people falls below a certain subsistence level – a level regulated automatically as the one necessary for a member of the society – and when there is a consequent loss of the sense of right and wrong, of honesty and the self-respect which makes a man insist on maintaining himself by his own work and effort, the result is the creation of a rabble of paupers. At the same time this brings with it, at the other end of the social scale, conditions which greatly facilitate the concentration of disproportionate wealth in a few hands.

(1967, p. 221)

If in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* work is the means by which the Slave acts on the object, establishing the subjectivity of the Lord—in the first stage dialectic and at a later stage, his own—in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, Hegel discusses, in the context of relations between the state and civil society, work and access to work in the centre of ethics of industrial societies. Earning a living through work itself appears as an inviolable principle of civil society and contradicting it would jeopardise the self-esteem and self-respect of its members:

When the masses begin to decline into poverty, (a) the burden of maintaining them at their ordinary standard of living might be directly laid on the wealthier classes, or they might receive the means of livelihood directly from other public sources of wealth (e.g. from the endowments of rich hospitals, monasteries, and other foundations). In either case, however, the needy would receive subsistence directly, not by means of their work, and this would violate the principle of civil society and the feeling of individual independence and self-respect in its individual members.

(Hegel 1967, p. 221)

Thus, in Hegel, we see work as that which gives man his humanity, establishing it in the dialectic of Lord and Slave and maintaining it within the ethics of civil society. Work makes the man and preserves him as such, even whilst the subject that is an external, individual being becomes a universal and interchangeable being.

The central contradiction of labour of the Philosophy of Right implicates this contradiction between the individual and social dimension of labour from another angle. Not from the contradiction of its aspect of externalisation and educational, or expressive and formative aspect, but its social contradiction between its ethical dimension, the role of labour in forming habit and character, and its economic aspect, producing goods. This contradiction comes to light in any attempt to resolve the crisis of unemployment and overproduction that is endemic to civil society. Hegel argues that as technology and the division of labour develop, they necessarily produce a mass of unemployed people, rendered obsolete by these changes. Examining this obsolete group, what Hegel calls the rabble, brings to light a central contradiction of not only civil society but also, more importantly, of how work is viewed (Read 2013).

In any case, the dialectic of the Slave and the Lord presents an idea of work with a creative dimension, able to confer the slave with a certain freedom, while the Lord himself remains the Slave of unproductive leisure, from which he is unable to free himself. In the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (Hegel 1967), the creative dimension of work becomes a means of maintaining self-esteem. Here, there is no more mention of individuation or freedom, but conformity to the standard. The worker cannot be saved, neither by charity nor by state assistance, due to the risk of losing respect. On the other hand, it is the whole society which depends on the work of the working class, not only for the objective production of goods but also to protect the social norm and its ethics. In this case, liberty is no longer possible unless through the disruption of all social order, as defended by the so-called “Young Hegelians”, including Bauer, Feuerbach, Stirner and Marx.

In Hegel, leisure does not appear except as negative to work. This includes not only slavery and creativity, liberation, but also the social order, which is desirable to maintain in the process of liberating the spirit.

Pushing away the Hegelian construction's boundaries of subjectivity and society, leisure can almost be glimpsed as a dehumanising force or dissolution. We found a counterpoint in Nietzsche's philosophy, whose moral inverts the dialectics of the Slave and the Lord, denouncing it as a negation of life, a mere reaction instead of action, pure resentment and the denial of desire.

In his scathing and radical questioning of all rationality, Western morals and philosophy, Nietzsche proposes a reversal of values that do not place work, but rather *otium* at the centre of becoming human. A becoming which is not controlled by a previously conceived duty, a becoming without imperatives that does not depend on the other, against "the organising idea, intended to dominate", totalitarian idea that "makes us slowly regress with shortcuts and detours, preparing qualities and skills that will prove one day, as indispensable means of reaching the whole" (Nietzsche 1997a, p. 155).

The critics of Nietzsche's philosophy and the links between his work and fascism and totalitarianism are well known. We will not bury ourselves in this problem, but maintain the counterpoints of a logical inversion of social values in our sights, starting with the dignity given to leisure rather than to work, with the aim of, by contrast, exposing the normativity of Hegelian ethics and the invisibility of *otium* as opposed to the centrality of work. While work operates in the Lord and the Slave's dialectics, as well as in the philosophy of law, as a device which brings simultaneously subjectivity and subordinating, in Nietzsche², working to earn is to conform to a mediocre and contemptible existence which levels the most civilised men of their era. Complaining about the absence of pride of classical antiquity:

A Greek of noble birth found, between the height of his position and the last rung of the hierarchy and so many enormous echelons that he could barely see the Slave. Plato himself could no longer fully see him. For us it is different, accustomed as we are to the *doctrine of equality*. A being who

²According to Hegelian thought, the Lord's non-working time does not produce anything, not even its own subjectivity. Nietzsche, however, uses the classical terminology *otium*, free time, and in particular for Nietzsche, the free time of the philosophers.

can not dispose of himself and who completely lacks leisure does not, in any way, appear before our eyes as something negligible.

(1996a, p. 33)

Slavery is inside every man who conforms, work as a means of subsistence is demeaning, not being afraid of insecurity and of the unknown, welcoming adversity as a favourable condition are inherent to the “best and most fertile men and peoples” (idem). No consciousness frees another consciousness. The Nietzschean Demon challenges each one with the curse of having to relive his own life ad infinitum, “with every pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small and large in your life, and everything in same order and sequence” to throw himself on the ground, grinding his teeth or saying yes to the question “do you want this over and over again without a limit?”.

Desire and Work

Once the dialectical movement in which the Lord/Slave relationship develops has been described, it is important to introduce a new concept: desire. Indeed, for Hegel, desire is the engine of recognition by the other. But this movement is twofold because, on the one hand, the desire for consciousness aims to be recognised in the desire of the other (thereby understanding the autonomy of desire itself), and on the other hand, two desires confront and deny each other in a battle that only ends when one of them turns their desire into repressed desire (the Slave) leaving the Lord to experience a desire that henceforth will be given only to things, objects and the Nature that he cannot resist and that are consumed in the same act of desire:

This Lord and Master of the world holds himself in this way-to be the absolute person, at the same time embracing within himself the whole of existence, the 'person for whom there exists no superior Spirit. [...] Their impotent self-consciousness is the defenceless enclosed arena of their tumult. In this knowledge of himself as the sum and substance of all actual powers, this Lord and Master of the world is the titanic self-consciousness

that thinks of itself as being an actual living god. But since he is only the formal self who is unable to tame those powers, his activities and self-enjoyment are equally monstrous excesses.

(Hegel 1977, pp. 292–293)

That movement in which the Lord imposes his desire without restrictions also prevents him from recognising the desire of another consciousness. Indeed, the Slave himself becomes a “thing” among other things to the Lord: “In the moment which corresponds to desire in the lord's consciousness, it did seem that the aspect of unessential relation to the thing fell to the lot of the bondsman, since in that relation the thing retained its independence” (Hegel 1977, p. 118).

On the contrary, the Slave, in suppressing his desire and turning it into work, acting on the world and transforming it, is now recognised as an objectified spirit:

Work, on the other hand, is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing. The negative relation to the object becomes its *form* and something *permanent*, because it is precisely for the worker that the object has independence. This *negative* middle term or the formative *activity* is at the same time the individuality or pure being-for-self of consciousness which now, in the work outside of it, acquires an element of permanence. It is in this way, therefore, that consciousness, *qua* worker, comes to see in the independent being [of the object] its own independence.

(Hegel 1977, p. 118)

Thus, the Lord presents a relationship with the world and with nature which is superficial and merely consumerist. On the contrary, through work, the slave maintains a dialectical relationship of opposition and recognition before the world.

Through this rediscovery of himself by himself, the bondsman realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own. For this reflection, the two moments of fear and service as such, as also that of formative activity, are necessary, both being at the same time in a universal mode.

(Hegel 1977, pp. 118–119)

Therefore, it becomes absolutely clear how Hegel promotes the appreciation of work at the expense of a spontaneous and uncompromised relationship with the world, for which desire propels the subject.

It would also be on the basis of this particular interpretation of the relationship between work and leisure/the non-committed relationship with the world/the abandonment of desire, that whole Marxist theory founded the possibility of emancipating the workers for their progressive grasp of self-awareness that repressed desire transformed into work permits in accordance with *The Phenomenology of Spirit*: “Through work, however, the bondsman becomes conscious of what he truly is” (Hegel 1977, p. 118).

Thus, if we wish to proceed with the counterpoint between the philosophies of Nietzsche and Hegel that we have sketched regarding the purpose of leisure and work concepts, there is nothing better than reproducing his own words, in an excerpt included in *The Gay Science* and symptomatically entitled “Work and Boredom”:

There are men, although they are rare, who would rather die than work at something without *pleasure*. They are demanding people, difficult to satisfy, who are not content with a considerable gain if the work is not the greatest gain. This rare genre is not only of artists and contemplatives of all kinds but also of the idle who spend their lives hunting, travelling or involved in love or adventures. They all want to work and poverty, once it is associated with pleasure, and even work that is harder or more painful, if necessary (...). They have less fear of boredom than of work without pleasure.

(Nietzsche 1996a, pp. 54–55)

In fact, it is in the context of a “transmutation of values” that all of Nietzsche’s philosophy operates, beginning with the value of work and of leisure. Considering that the Lord (ultimately, the Superman) is the model which all the working “Slaves” that Hegel tells us of must emulate, he proposes an approach that exceeds the Good/Evil dichotomy on which Christian and Socratic morals were based, building Western culture and Western man.

In the same passage of *The Gay Science*, the author explains the conception of time and temporality, which distinguishes the Eastern from the European:

For the thinker, as for all sensitive spirits, boredom is that disagreeable “lull” of the soul that precedes the blissful journey and jovial breezes. They must tolerate the lull and await its effect. That is exactly what mediocre natures can not achieve for themselves! Keep boredom away at any price, is something as common as work without pleasure. Maybe this is what distinguishes the Asians from the Europeans – that they are capable of a longer and more profound rest. Even their narcotics operate slowly, in contrast to the disgusting rapidity of the European poison – alcohol.

(Nietzsche 1996a, p. 55)

Hence, the relationship between work and desire in Nietzsche is inverted, and constantly appeals to the value of instincts and to the aristocratic man, who despises work as an absolute value, but affirms life, thus reversing the Hegelian Slave/Lord dialectics, in considering the moral of the Slave to be a moral of resentment, of the denial of desire, the no to life, which does not act, but only reacts (Nietzsche 1997b, p. 35).

And, in a very irreverent manner, and in open opposition to modern rationality in relation to the conception of leisure and work in Hegel, defiantly concludes:

I think of otium with a good conscience, transmitted by heredity and by blood, thus the aristocratic sense whereby work dishonours, is not entirely strange, in that it connects the body and the soul. Consequently, for the soul, it is the noisy modern concern for work, which counts time, which prides itself to the point of stupidity, which, more than anything else educates and prepares precisely for “disbelief”.

(Nietzsche 1996b, p.77)

Conclusion

Work, much more so than leisure, occupies a prominent place in Hegelian thought. The unproductive leisure of the Lord is not sufficient for him to become subject, self-conscious of himself and for himself. Only the work

of the Slave is action in the world, capable of differentiating, individualising, subjectivising, creating identities. Mediator between man and the objective world, work establishes humanity through the separation of the human from the object. This process also separates the free man from the Slave, but the distance between the free man and action about nature, about the world of things, which belongs to the Slave, through dialectical reversal, converts the latter into Lord and the former into Slave.

The Hegelian dialectic—which was a strong influence throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries on the thought of philosophers and left-thinking intellectuals for whom the liberation of the working class from the yoke of work for the reproduction of capital—leaves aside the potential liberation of imagining a world in which the individual's subjectivity, in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, and later, their dignity, in the *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* could be achieved by means other than the subjection of other individuals or the individual himself. Humanity can be reached through becoming a Lord; but to be a Lord, first it is necessary to be a Slave. Slavery is the path to freedom, and being a Slave means being one that works, but being the master does not imply being free but rather being slave to another's work.

Similarly, earning a living through work itself is to maintain dignity. Here, work, more than wealth, becomes the mainstay of society. As Hegel tells us, however rich a nation, it will never be rich enough to suppress work. Interestingly, this idea appears not infrequently in a certain discourse aligned with the neoliberal policies that condemn social rights acquired by employees and that the state is required to provide and guarantee, such as healthcare, universal education, minimum wage, retirement due to age or disability. Furthermore, perhaps we can reflect on the right to employment, in the context of globalised and automated societies, where it is often lacking on the one hand, while on the other, it is no longer necessary. As already explained by Hegel in the nineteenth century, it simultaneously concentrates income, the product of work, in a few hands (guarding, of course, the proper proportions, since in the globalised economy of societies living in the present acceleration of time and the compression of space due to the advancement of technology, capital not only focuses but also dilutes and volatilises, as concrete relations are diluted between one who works and the one who receives the profits).

In Gorz (2013), the right to leisure appears as a right that should be as structuring as the right to work, just as Lafargue (2011) draws attention to the devaluation of human time which is not devoted to work. In contemporary societies, we see ourselves within a logic that continually validates or invalidates human time according to their productivity or non-productivity. One must produce, consume, keep running on the system's wheel.

We must ask whether the Nietzschean rebellion in his refusal of work as a means of subjectivity might not be more fertile in the quest for a humanity beyond the slavery of work, to light an alternative path, perhaps not the path of the superman but the path of a subjectivity constituted without Lords or Slaves.

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John Dewey: Purposeful Play as Leisure

Mary C. Breunig

The Silver Airways prop plane provided a breathtaking view of crystal-line blue and turquoise waters interspersed with island (keys) as I flew into the small airport on my first visit to Key West in February 2015. A sign welcoming me to the Conch Republic greeted me upon my arrival as I entered the small terminal. I had just landed at the Southernmost point in the United States, situated only 90 miles from the Republic of Cuba. The Conch Republic (República de la Concha) is a micronation declared as a tongue-in-cheek secession (attempt) by the city of Key West, Florida, from the United States on April 23, 1982. Today, the name is predominantly maintained as a boost for tourism with the organization, a “Sovereign State of Mind” continuing to celebrate “Independence Day,” seeking to bring more “Humor, Warmth and Respect” to a world in sore need of all three, according to their website. Artists Winslow Homer and Mario Sanchez lived and painted in Key West. James John Audubon

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came to Key West to study the flamingo, discovering 18 new species of birds while there, with the white-crowned pigeon being one of the most notable locally. Well-known writers, such as Tennessee Williams, Shel Silverstein, “Papa” (Ernest) Hemingway, and Robert Frost all lived and wrote in Key West. The poet Elizabeth Bishop also lived in Key West and many of her poems were inspired by this beautiful, quirky city. In her poem “Full Moon,” Bishop writes about Key West as a town of paper white and as an island that hums. She describes the sites and sounds as a zither laid upon the glittering Gulf.

The above introductory images and descriptions of Key West contextualizes its reputation today as a tourist destination with three cruise ships lining the port and people meandering up and down Duval Street in the historic Old Down throughout the day and night.

Key West was initially inhabited by the Calusa (Native American) people living on Florida’s Southwest coast (Cox 1983). Estuarine fisheries were a prominent resource for the Calusa and for the Spaniards who colonized the land. Cigar, sponge, and salt manufacturing alongside salvaging (and pirateering) were the primary sources of income for the early American inhabitants of Key West (Cox 1983; Kerstein 2012). A naval base was established and Key West continues to serve as an important military outpost. Today, the island’s motto is “Key West: Close to Perfect. Far from Normal” (Kerstein 2012).

As I contemplated this history during that first trip in February 2015, I inadvertently found myself standing in front of an inn called the “John Dewey House.” Upon enthusiastic investigation, I learned that Elizabeth Bishop and John Dewey were neighbours in Key West and that Bishop and Dewey’s physicist daughter Jane were close friends. I cannot help but wonder about Dewey’s choice to spend his winters in a city that was built on profiteering and threatened secession from the United States in light of his Democratic ideology but neither that or Elizabeth Bishop are the foci of this chapter.

This chapter’s focus is to explore John Dewey’s views on leisure. That said, the fact that John Dewey spent work and leisure time in Key West with family and friends is central to this content and provides a backdrop to what follows. Dewey was in fact one of the first present day “snowbirds,” leaving his home in New York City to travel to Key West for the

winter months to “simply break free from the big city.” Dewey asserted, “The *mañana* mood develops very easily” in Key West (John Dewey House, n.d.). He would often write letters to associates saying that the climate and laid-back attitude was easy to accept and hard to ignore. Dewey frequented the beaches, observed the fishermen bringing in their daily catch, sunbathed, and sat on his porch. He enjoyed the ability to simply be here and write, without anyone bothering him. The healing properties of the good weather and relaxed attitude definitely played a part in his active lifestyle (John Dewey House, n.d.).

In writing a chapter about Dewey’s impact on the field of leisure theory, these details about how Dewey spent his own leisure time and where Dewey spent this time, including that Dewey ever had a “*mañana* mood,” are entirely fascinating to me and are likely to others as well. Leisure (as “recreation”) is not a word that Dewey would have likely used but purposeful activity, an active lifestyle, and play were all terms he would have employed.

I therefore entitled the chapter “Purposeful Play as Leisure.” In this chapter, Dewey’s views on labour and leisure will be discussed. Dewey’s use of the terms “activity” and “experience” as components of present day experiential education theory will be introduced. The concepts of “play” and “unification” will be explored as components of his broader educational philosophy. The chapter will return to Dewey’s time in Key West with a view towards place and leisure. I first begin with a brief biographical sketch of John Dewey prior to these other discussions.

John Dewey

John Dewey was born in 1859 and grew up in a devout Congregationalist household in Burlington, Vermont (Ryan 1995). He attended the University of Vermont, was a public school teacher and father, and completed his PhD at John Hopkins University at the age of 25. He worked as a professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan and the University of Chicago prior to teaching at Columbia University, where he spent his most productive years. Dewey was a well-known public intellectual and a prolific writer (including authoring major works during his time in Key

West). He was both a pragmatist and a progressivist. His educational philosophy is based on the idea that instruction should commence with practical human problems and should promote a Democratic citizenry. Much of Dewey's writing focuses on the intellectual development of individuals but that development is premised on the presupposition that they live in society and society is most effective when it is lived as a democracy (1916). This view of education is one that nurtures individual students' development while simultaneously preparing them for active participation in Democratic activities.

The educator's task was to sequentially design the "minimum necessary structure" (Dewey 1938) for students to actively pursue curriculum in a manner that would ignite their capacities and interests. While Dewey is often cited as the founding father of experiential education having written *Experience and Education* in 1938, he never used that term himself. To state that Dewey was a proponent of experiential activity or that his approach was student-centred oversimplifies his pedagogy. Dewey was a proponent of activity but not aimless experience, advocating instead for purposeful curricular initiatives that physically and mentally engaged students along an experiential continuum (Dewey 1938). As Seaman (2011) asserts, Dewey "rejected the spectator theory of knowledge, arguing that the only way we can know the world is by interacting in it socially" (p. 7). Knowing the world beyond the classroom walls was central to Dewey's educational ideals. Dewey's many publications extend well beyond his contributions to education and include his views on epistemology, metaphysics, aesthetics, art, logic, social theory, ethics, and human nature (Ryan 1995).

Labour and Leisure

The term leisure would have been antithetical to the term "labour" for Dewey. In *Democracy and Education* (1916), Dewey introduces the terms "useful labour" and "leisure" suggesting that when used in opposition to one another, they reflect a division within social life. According to Dewey, if the two functions of gaining a livelihood by work and enjoying leisure opportunities were distributed equally, it would not occur

to anyone that there was any conflict of educational agencies and aims involved. It would be self-evident that education could effectively contribute to both. The separation of technical/industrial education from liberal education goes back to the time of the Greeks and was formulated expressly on the basis of a division of classes into those who had to labour for a living and those who were relieved from this necessity, possessing ample leisure time, releasing the mind for leisurely thinking and reflection (Dewey 1916).

According to Dewey (1916), when we confine the education of those who work with their hands to a few years of schooling devoted for the most part to acquiring the use of rudimentary symbols at the expense of training in science, literature, and history, we fail to prepare the minds of workers to take advantage of the opportunity for higher order thinking. More fundamental is the fact that the great majority of workers have no insight into the social aims of their pursuits and no direct personal interest in them. The actual results achieved are not the ends of their actions but only of their employers. Labourers do what they do, not freely and intelligently, but for the sake of the wage earned. This was of deep concern to Dewey's view of a Democratic society. According to Dewey, quality leisure was important for immediate health but also for the positive effects upon habits of mind.

Dichotomizing labour and leisure is one example of the type of either/or thinking that Dewey consistently rejected throughout his career, viewing bifurcations as unnecessarily artificial and overly simplistic. Dewey believed that one of the greatest failings of the Progressive education movement is rooted in the dichotomous fallacy that education is either "traditional" or progressive, failing to recognize intermediate possibilities (Dewey 1938). Dewey rejected the notion that any activity falls neatly into a category, believing that there is no singular "one way" to educate and no pure work or pure play (1916). According to Wu and Simpson (2011), Dewey believed that it was insufficient to simply recognize that people cannot spend all their waking hours on the job. Dewey recognized the monotony of assembly line jobs, referring to factories as workplaces that deadened creativity and the imagination. Dewey believed that boring jobs dull the human mind and that this numbing carried over into other aspects of life leading individuals

to seek stimulation in the forms of gambling and drinking rather than pursuing quality leisure pursuits. In thinking back upon the ideals of Democracy, the labour/leisure dichotomy points to a worrisome class distinction. “As long as labour and leisure remain separate, leisure is primarily the purview of the elite and labour the burden of the underclass” (Simpson 2011, p. 124). Dewey worried that the working class may lack not only the time but the energy and skills for quality leisure, opting for idle amusement instead. On the other hand, the elite may benefit from time, privilege, and power but may lack the personal drive and work ethic needed to elevate the quality of their leisure pursuits (Wu and Simpson 2011). Dewey was concerned that the elite would not pursue the virtuous ideals of leisure as introduced by the Greeks (i.e., music, art, service, physical activity) but may instead choose capricious, self-indulgent activities (i.e., big game safari and polo).

As was so often the case with Dewey, purposeful education that was neither the liberal/intellectual education of the elite or the technical/practical education of the working class (as previously mentioned), but a combination of the two would be the most effective leisure education. He asserts that the leisure educator must engage students in activities such as outdoor excursions, gardening, and sewing in ways that promote manual skill, technical efficiency, socialization, and fun but also provide immediate satisfaction (Dewey 1916). As with so much of Dewey’s teachings, leisure too must be teleological, having an end goal and intentionality.

Activity and Experience

One of Dewey’s greatest concerns was that of aimless activity (Dewey 1938). Activity for the sake of having an experience without purpose and structure may lead to miseducative experiences, those that arrest or distort learning and growth. Experience and activity must be purposeful and of a high quality. I spoke earlier of quality leisure. For Dewey, a quality experience is comprised of two aspects: (1) there is an immediate aspect of agreeableness or disagreeableness and (2) there is influence upon later

experiences (what Dewey refers to as the experiential continuum). Dewey reminds educators that students have experiences in traditional schools, the trouble with these experiences is that they are not often sufficiently connected along an experiential continuum, taking into account students' previous experiences and offering educative experiences that build upon them. The same critique can be made about the field of experiential education.

John Dewey is often cited as the “founding father” of experiential education. Dewey did propose a philosophy of education based on a philosophy of experience (Dewey 1938) but never applied the term “experiential education” in his writing. According to the Association for Experiential Education (2016), experiential education is a philosophy that informs many methodologies in which educators purposefully engage with learners in direct experience and focused reflection in order to increase knowledge, develop skills, clarify values, and develop people’s capacity to contribute to their communities. Experiential learning and experiential education are buzzwords within many educational circles and these terms are often used interchangeably (Breunig 2008). In 1984, David Kolb introduced the experiential learning cycle (see Fig. 1).

This cycle (Kolb 1984) helps illustrate how experience, reflection, new knowledge, and application can be employed as a way of teaching experientially. I have added preparation to this, which helps to incorporate Dewey’s focus on intentionality and purpose. Many experiential educational initiatives are based on this learning cycle but do not prescribe an intended learning outcome or aim. In essence, employing the experiential




Fig. 1 Experiential learning cycle (Figure made by the author)

learning cycle without an intended educational aim represents experiential learning as methodology, implying that there is a certain way of teaching that makes the learning experiential. Experiential education as philosophy employs both methodology (experiential way of teaching) and philosophy as part of the educative process (Breunig 2008). Experiential education as philosophy implies that there is an intended aim towards which the experiential learning process is directed. In this sense, experiential learning which combines experience and reflection may not be educatively purposeful but the intent of experiential education is just that, an intentional, purposeful approach to teaching and learning, resonant with Dewey's ideals.

As mentioned above, some educators hold concerns about the miseducative potential of experiential education if activities are disconnected or lacking aim/purpose. Ritzer (1996) has written about what he refers to as the McDonaldization of experience in education, stating:

McDonaldization can be defined as the process by which the principles of the fast food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world. McDonaldization affects not only the restaurant business but also education, work, health care, travel, leisure, dieting, politics, the family and virtually every other aspect of society. McDonaldization has shown every sign of being an inexorable process by sweeping through seemingly impervious institutions and parts of the world.

(p. 198)

Chris Loynes (1998) refers to this type of leisure as “adventure in a bun” or what Roberts (2005) calls the Disneyfication of experience and its potential to sanitize and trivialize transformative pedagogies. “The experiential construction of experience functions to amplify its commodification and it makes the broader pedagogy more vulnerable to co-optation and criticism,” according to Roberts (2005, p. 24). Gone from this construction is the Deweyan legacy of placing intentional, well-facilitated, and connected experiences at the centre of any endeavour. Clearly, Dewey placed an uncontested emphasis on aim and purpose when designing experiences and leisure activities.

Play and Unification

Dewey argues for the integration (unification) of leisure and labour, in the same manner that he promotes the connection between liberal and technical/practical education (Simpson 2011) as mentioned above. In *How We Think* (1910), Dewey refers to the intellectual harm that can accrue from the divorce of work and play. Dewey believes that to be playful and serious at the same time is possible, and, in fact, defines the ideal mental condition. For Dewey, this ideal mental condition consists of an absence of prejudice and the presence of intellectual curiosity and flexibility manifest in free play. This type of purposeful free play can include engagement in art, keeping active and healthy, cooking, and planting, and cultivating a garden, according to examples that Dewey provides. For children, the construction of play and “play things” is limitless. Dewey asserts that, in fact, “The more unfitted the physical object for its imagined purpose, such as a cube for a boat, the greater is the supposed appeal to the imagination” (p. 166). Children exist in a “wonderful world” full of mystery and promise, one that allows for the imaginative activity of constructing (and making) meaning from play experiences, according to Dewey. For children, there is no difference between doing things for utility and for fun. Dewey suggests there is nothing mysterious or mystical in Plato’s discovery that play is the chief and almost only mode of education for the child in the years of later infancy.

The adult, on the contrary, is “acquainted with responsible labour upon which serious financial results depend” (Dewey 1910, p. 167). An adult, thus burdened, seeks relief, relaxation, and amusement, leading too often to less quality leisure pursuits and ones that further bifurcate the labour/leisure (play) divide. Dewey believes that adult play and leisure should be less about the activity and more about the attitude, summarizing, “Not the thing done but the quality of mind that goes into the doing settles what is utilitarian and what is unconstrained and educative” (p. 167).

Dewey thus believes that playfulness is a more important construct than play. Play or leisure, in his view, are merely passing outward manifestations of a playful attitude. The playful attitude is one of freedom, according to Dewey (1910) and an attitude that children automatically

possess. Dewey provides the example of a child playing horse with a broom and chairs. The fact that the broom does not really represent a horse, or a chair a locomotive, is of no account. The imaginary attitude of mind and the deliberate construction of experience are what matter. Dewey is not talking about arbitrary fancifulness or the building up of an imaginary world but the actual ways in which a play attitude can gradually pass into a work attitude, both requiring an attitude of mind that promotes meaning-making and value.

Over time, children find make believe play inadequate. They begin to take part in “real” activities. If the attitude is one of playfulness, the school or work project can be one that takes advantage of the meanings and activities built up in their early free play experiences. Dewey talks about children and play in *Experience and Education* (1938). One illustration that reflects his thinking about this is captured in the following example. Consider the ways in which children play with a ball. A child with a ball arrives amidst a group of children. Before long, a child in the group will have an idea that they should all play a game together, inviting the child with the ball into the fold. Ideas begin to be shared amongst the children about what to play and how to play. A free play game begins and as the activity progresses, the ideas about how to play may get refined and improved upon, depending upon the game’s success and level of inclusivity. The children themselves create rules and order so as to optimize on both the fun and full and fair participation. For Dewey, rules and order in play (and work) create social order and freedom. As mentioned above without “minimum necessary structure,” chaos is likely to ensue. Children and adults engaged in free play (and work) benefit from rules, order, and structure, particularly when these are co-created. The rhythm, the competition, and cooperation involved in most play introduce organization (Dewey 1910) and with order and structure comes freedom (1938). As Dewey summarizes, “The ‘freest’ plays observe some principles of coherence and unification” (p. 162). And the same can (and should be said) for work, translating the knowledge gained in play by young children into their work/school projects, further unifying labour and leisure.

This concept of unification is rooted in Dewey’s pragmatic and progressivist views on education (and life). Dewey formulated many of his ideals on leisure and labour based on what he describes as the failings of

the progressive education movement itself to not adopt a more unified view of education. Dewey criticizes the reification of progressive ideals over “traditional” ones, which only lend themselves to an unnecessary bifurcation of either/or thinking. Dewey reminds us that Froebel (1826) purported for child-centred, student-initiated play as the best method for learning social and intellectual skills that might serve as a foundation for their whole life, further emphasizing the importance of unification.

Is this perhaps what Dewey was doing in Key West—unifying his own labour with leisure?

Back to Dewey in Key West

Despite Dewey’s self-proclaimed “mañana (leisure-oriented) mood,” his time in Key West was a productive period. Was Dewey’s own leisure time integrated with his writing labour? He wrote four of his books during the winters he spent there, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938), *Freedom and Culture* (1939), *Problems of Men* (1946), and *Knowing and the Known* (1949). I like to imagine Dewey as he appears below in archive photographs available to inspect at Key West library, writing from his front porch at his home in Key West.

On a return trip in winter 2016, I decided to head to the local branch of the Monroe County Library to learn more; while there, I encountered Tom Lambright, curator of the archives for Key West. I (and William Gaudelli) who wrote a compelling paper entitled, “Locating John Dewey: Place Theory and Dewey’s Retirement in Key West,” agree that there are too few literature-based insights about Dewey’s time in Key West. Tom and some of the archived photos, alongside a bit of historical information from select websites, provided some insights. Lambright wasted no time informing me that Dewey was regarded as a snowbird and not as a true community member as I began my investigations.

Gaudelli, who also visited Tom Lambright and the library archives, conducted a content analysis of the local paper, the *Key West Citizen*, and uncovered original correspondences that Dewey wrote during his time in Key West. One of the key goals was to uncover references to Dewey’s time in Key West. According to Gaudelli, Dewey’s early correspondences

focused on the weather, the town, and the natural environment. Dewey's home, which was actually owned by his second wife, is now an upscale inn and the site that sparked my original curiosity for this chapter as stated in the introduction (see Fig. 2).

Gaudelli's (2005) content analysis revealed five primary themes about Dewey's Key West experiences: Relaxation and laziness, social awareness, warm climate and appreciation of nature, isolation, and health and old age. Dewey was very self-critical about his lack of work ethic and productivity despite the four books he wrote during his time here. He did block off time for writing each day but he was also drawn into a self-described lazy vacation mode due to the climate. Dewey was drawn to the natural beauty of Key West, spending leisure time exploring the birds and plants and visiting the fishing docks, where he surveyed the hauls (Gaudelli). Dewey spent some of his leisure time at the Naval Base to try and better understand World War II (WWII). In another photograph in the Key West library archives, and with what appears to be a developing tan, we see Dewey entertaining his associates Max Eastman, a poet and a political activist and Alexander Barmine, an officer in the Soviet Army and later a journalist.

I believe that Dewey did live a life replete with leisure experiences, particularly given the themes that arose in Dewey's own correspondences when writing about his time in Key West. There are also indicators that Dewey unified his leisure time with his writing labour, including his wife's remarks that Key West served as a place of solitude and reflection that prompted his writing (Gaudelli 2005).

As we know from above, however, Dewey expressed concerns about being lazy and unproductive. He further worried that he was becoming dull and mundane because so many of his personal correspondences to associates commenced with reports about the fine weather (Gaudelli 2005). I believe that Dewey would have been particularly bothered by his self-prescribed lax attitude given his own strong work ethic and the Democratic ideals of work as a societal good. That said, Dewey also spent the later years of his life in Key West and "Key West's laid-back atmosphere seemed both a comfort and annoyance to Dewey, as the warmth helped soothe the aches of old age and Key West's isolation contributed to his growing sense of intellectual deterioration" (Gaudelli, p. 32).




Fig. 2 The Dewey House and Placard on South Street (Taken by the author)

I imagine that Dewey believed for himself (and others) that too much leisure time poses a threat to Democracy, further augmenting his own concerns about being “too leisurely” in Key West.

I also believe that Dewey was contemplating the ideals of Democracy as he visited the naval base in Key West. While he wanted to better understand WWII and the United States involvement, he also grew increasingly critical of the navy’s presence in Key West, citing the ways in which they impacted the property values and observing the men’s ill behaviour. As a pacifist, Dewey was dismayed by this as well as the attention that the base received from presidents Roosevelt and Truman. Dewey’s observations of these visits made him increasingly critical of the Democratic Party and its leadership, which Dewey generally viewed as too moderate and beholden to capitalist interests (Gaudelli 2005). Dewey further commented on the weakness of the local city council and the failure of the local media to criticize public actions but Dewey himself never took action.

Concluding Remarks

Dewey was highly self-critical about being too lazy in Key West and was critical in general about how people invested their leisure time in Key West given the climate and context were less conducive to intellectual pursuit. I wonder what Dewey would think about present day Key West and leisure pursuits? We now know he would likely be critical of the infamous Duval Crawl, which involves paying a visit to the 60+ bars that line the street. What would Dewey think about the ongoing Navy presence—continuing to impact the socio-political and economic terrain in Key West? Would Dewey have evolved further in his thinking about leisure time and socio-economic status? There is too little mention in Dewey’s writing about issues of race, class, gender, and an acknowledgement of privilege. For Dewey to have the time, resources, and societal acceptance to easily spend the latter years of his life in Key West engaged in contemplative reflection and leisure is an indication of his own privilege.

From a theoretical viewpoint, Dewey would wish to have leisure be easily accessible and available to everyone in a fair and equitable manner. He would wish for people’s leisure to be unified with their labour and

he would wish for people to enter into leisure experiences with a playful attitude and purposefulness. These views are the same as those he holds for education and growth generally. To learn that Dewey's views on education extend into his views on leisure provides broadened insights into his educational philosophy. As I left the Monroe County Library, having wrapped up my research about this, Tom Lambright looked up from his desk bidding me goodbye stating: "You know, there are consistent comings and goings of people like you, asking questions about Dewey. People seem to still be pretty interested in him. He really did have an impact, didn't he?"

I certainly think so...

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Durkheim and Leisure

Stratos Georgoulas

Introduction

It is important, when you try to feel a scientist's contribution—who has rightly been considered as the founding father of a specialized field of knowledge, that was established after his generation—that you should present even briefly, as an introduction, some elements of his life, the historical period he lived in and the wider scientific climate of the specific era. Besides, Emile Durkheim had a clear social integration and political expression; he lived in very interesting times from a historical and scientific point of view, whereas he did not stop interacting with relevant scientific movements of other countries and schools, thus creating a personal and scientific course that was full of continuous ruptures and contradictions as well as discontinuities, and he certainly exerted

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very significant influence on contemporary sociological knowledge of phenomena.

In 1858, Emile Durkheim was born in Épinal, Lorraine/Alsace, the most nationalist region of France, in the elite of the Jewish community, to a rabbi father who intended him to be the successor of the family tradition. Within the first years of his life, he experienced a disastrous country war, and had also to make the difficult decision to break with the religious and cultural tradition, by departing from any religious commitment. He studied at the *École Normale Supérieure*, the traditional cradle of French intellectual leadership, being oriented towards the public discourse and the interventionist scientific work in a time of crisis when the wounds of failure and suppression of the French Commune were very recent; when there were efforts so that monarchies and dictatorships could be reinstated; when economic and political scandals, anti-Semitic and racist climate and the polarization of political forces were tantalizing French life; when the centre-left rulers were proven weak to reform; and when the working class was discontent because it was strongly experiencing political and social exclusion. Finally, Durkheim lived in a period when the socialist movement and nationalism and expansionism of the German political leadership were emerging, the final result of which was the Great War, during which Durkheim experienced a personal loss.

Within this socio-political context, Durkheim grew up, respecting and reproducing critically and in a specialized way the work of great proponents of both the French Enlightenment (Rousseau, Montesquieu) and French social scientists (Saint-Simon, Comte). At the same time, he was in a dialogue—while disagreeing—with his contemporaries, both in France (Tarde) and England (Spencer), while he was influenced by the German school of thought (Kant, Tönnies). He was established as an academic teacher and developed a whole school of thought behind the journal *L'Année Sociologique*, which he founded in 1896 and which would be the most important example of the French sociological—and not only—thinking that shaped education in France for many years.

Should we capture in an expression Emile Durkheim's vast and multifaceted contribution, we could use Coser's expression (1971) that this is the search for secular social ethics. This might have been derived from Durkheim's realization of the social need of his era, an era of transition,

an era of the crisis; it might have been exacerbated by overcoming his personal values; it might have been flourished in the fertile environment of Rousseau's "general will", Montesquieu's "relevance of social and cultural phenomena", Tönnies' "types of social organization", Comte's "consensus"; it may have led to a first conceptual formulation of an entire social theory that he himself rejected later, starting another theoretical hypothesis, which was never led to a new composition, as Parsons (1968) refers. In any case, his great contribution was that he defined the field of Sociology and formulated clearly methodological principles whose applicability has been demonstrated by empirical research. He showed that social phenomena are both real and natural and, therefore, their rules of objective observation and classification can be formulated. Whereas together with his statement that society as a whole is more than the sum of its parts, Durkheim takes a clear thesis against the dominant until then utilitarianism of British social thought, which limited the analysis of social phenomena in actions and motivations of individuals. Durkheim's collective consciousness is more than the outcome of participating parties with individual interests; it is a force that is outside and above the individual. Within this specific context, we will try to delineate Durkheim's specific contribution to leisure.

Leisure as a Social Fact

"Social fact" is any course of action, stable or not stable, able to act upon the individual an external constraint, generally in a given society and has special substance independent of individual events. With his work *The Rules of Sociological Method*, Durkheim declares the independence of Sociology from other sciences and also draws boundaries against voluntarist, subjective and psychological approaches. When we study a phenomenon from a sociological point of view, we study it as a social fact. This is to be found in the individual because it is in the whole and not vice versa. It may have been fixed or can be a free movement of social life. In the former case, we talk about an imprinted crystallization of a mode of energy a form (e.g., laws). In any case, these social facts either drag us against our will or we ourselves have contributed spontaneously so they

can become enforcement agents. Ultimately, society “invades” into the individual as a moral force. The social fact is generalized throughout the whole society, while preserving its own existence, which is independent of individual manifestations.

Consequently, if we want to study leisure sociologically, that is, as a social fact, we should avoid looking at its individual manifestations; we should avoid giving psychological, utilitarian or individualistic dimensions. If we do, then this is not a sociological analysis of the phenomenon. How should we approach it? In the same work, Durkheim presents specific observation rules, explanation rules and regulations so that sociological evidence is brought up—rules and regulations that form a comprehensive framework of methodological approach. To observe the social fact “leisure”, we should first of all put aside all our prejudices about this. The object of observation neither should be the idea we have about it nor should we mix emotions and prejudices. At the same time, we should neither take for granted the conventional character of leisure nor believe that it can only be changed with a prescript of will. The second feature of the sociological study of leisure is that it refers to a group of phenomena, which are predetermined and based on common external characteristics. Leisure as a social fact should be separated from its individual manifestations. The starting point is the data of our sense that we should, however, work differently from the way “common knowledge” defines.

The second step, after the observation and on the way to the necessary sociological deepening, is that we should follow specific rules to explain it. Should we want to explain the social fact “leisure”, we should seek the cause that creates it separately from the function that it itself performs. The explanation may not be simply its usability. Instead, its function is to maintain the cause that created it. This cause must be sought among the earlier social facts rather than situations of individual consciousness. Thus, on the one hand, leisure does not have only an existing social importance (there can be change in its function over time or in forms that are of no importance), and on the other hand, an interpretative psychological approach that will reduce it to human nature or to a human necessity is wrong, because leisure is a phenomenon that puts pressure on individual consciousnesses, thus it derives from them.

Where can we look for it? We can look for it in the composition of the internal social environment, that is, in the material and moral density of the society. The former relates to its measurable size and the latter is the degree of shortening of the social parts, the common life. It is there that the cause of the sociological explanation of leisure should be sought too. Nevertheless, since leisure as a social fact is objective, a sociological explanation should be accompanied by providing sociological evidence. Durkheim also presents specific rules that we should follow in what he calls “comparative method”, the only way to prove causality. Based on the proposition that in one and the same result there is one and the same cause that always corresponds, we should compare cases with absent–present phenomena, seeking whether changes in circumstances show that one depends on the other. After Durkheim has refuted specific procedures of the comparative method that cannot offer anything (e.g., residual method, coincidence or difference method of subsequent changes), he comes up with the “genetic method” he defines as follows: A social fact cannot be explained if we do not follow its whole development through its all social types, and at the same time when we compare societies, these should be on the same development phase. In fact, he invites us to observe social facts and leisure as such, as they are formed and crystallized in different societies, to distinguish by comparing what constitutes the stable nature of this crystallized social fact, its social “substance”. When we draw upon other societies the elements that will allow us to clarify aspects of the society of our time, this comparative method aims to highlight the creation and enhancement of the function of leisure in modern society.

What does it mean when we approach leisure as a social fact? We should avoid subjective and voluntarist explanations, individual manifestations and psychological interpretations of the phenomenon. Instead, it is a social phenomenon with a special feature that it is out of the separate individualities and with clear, though not always recognizable by the individuals, coercion. It is independent and measurable. To be able to observe it, nevertheless, we should avoid prejudices and ideas that justify it. It has a distinct function and causality and in order for us to discern the latter, we should deepen the objective explanation of the intensity of the social environment in which it evolves, assisted by the comparative

historical and genetic method, bearing in mind, however, that we refer to a general phenomenon (and not an individual or a special), because it is just a collective, that is, a coerced one.

Leisure and the Division of Labour

Should we want to study leisure as a social phenomenon, we should seek its function separately from the cause that created it. It is not just a study of what purposes, for example, leisure fulfils in modern society, a comprehensive sociological study of this social phenomenon, according to Durkheim. Instead, its function is to maintain the cause that created it. Thus, with the aid of the genetic method, we should deepen the generative cause and to do this, we should first clarify the development of social division and division of labour.

Modern society sprang out of specific structural changes which have as their cause corresponding changes in the society's volume and density. From a state with obvious features of homogeneity of the members of society, homogeneity in abilities, capabilities, ideas (where each non-homogeneous member was out of this society), with a mechanical social cohesion as a consequence, we are led—due to the aforementioned reasons—in a state of heterogeneity and diversification of social work. Nevertheless, it is in this new situation that consensus is fulfilled—precisely in the element of differentiation as a peaceful solution to the struggle for life. This new social division is the fundamental social fact in modern society.

Instead of entailing contradictions and conflicts and thus disruptive trends in society, it brings a new organic connection, which rests on a corresponding social morality, that is, organic solidarity. This new social ethics—all the beliefs and feelings that are common to the average members of the same society—the collective consciousness is precisely what explains how the social whole is more than the sum of the individuals it consists of.

Here there just comes the concept of time, and more particularly of leisure time, to be defined. It is not a subjective concept, but an objective reality, with autonomy over the mind and to some extent inviolable

from knowledge. Humans use categories with which they put in order the chaos of empirical reality and in this way, they know this reality. So the concept of time, and by extension of leisure time, is not an a priori concept, but it has a specific social context, resulting from the collective sense of the pace of social life. As Durkheim mentions, the real guides—in relation to whom all things are placed in time—derive from social life. The divisions into days, weeks, years and so on correspond to the periodic return of functions, festivals, public rituals.

So we have a real and objective process in society, leading to a diversified division of labour, whose result is not only to increase the efficiency of dividing functions but also to make them bound. This social differentiation is explained neither economically (with the increase of productivity) nor with a utilitarian point of view (in search of pleasure or happiness, or desire to dispel boredom); it can be explained only in relation to changes in the volume and density of society. The concept of time and, by extension, that of the subcategory of leisure time cannot be explained based on aforementioned classifications (economic, utilitarian). It is an objective reality that is related to the collective sense of social life, and just because it is a consequence of an evolutionary process that leads to a situation of an organic solidarity, we expect it to be an ever-growing democratic.

As Rojek (1985, p. 51) has claimed, the development of leisure is interdependent with the division of labour. Sport and recreation develop side by side with the serious life, and they serve to give balance and relieve people. They restore people's energies and faculties spent in the "serious life" of labour. The function they perform is not trivial; the relationship between work and leisure is anything but haphazard.

In fact, just because a structural and functional differentiation in society has preceded and mechanical solidarity is replaced by organic solidarity, all these deep changes have affected both leisure practices and the rules and resources governing leisure. Divisions are incomparably more complex but, at the same time, fixed and established dates which everybody conceives in the same fashion and leisure space are thus divided, differentiated and arranged. Leisure in the modern society of organic solidarity cannot be explained with a utilitarian point of view. Instead, it takes place at a predefined location known in advance and accepted by all; it takes time at a predetermined time known and accepted by all; it

has diversified but organic solidarity processes that serve a specific social function.

As Jarvie and Maguire (1994, pp. 12–13) mention:

Modern sports are more organized, structured and regulated...sport gradually became more specialized, bureaucratized...This breakdown of tradition in folk pastimes...was marked by a relative absence of conflict between social groups... this process was both progressive and democratic... modern sports and leisure forms were thus in tone with more rational ways of living.

Therefore, should we limit the social function of leisure within the benefit to rest and relax as a counterbalance to “serious life”, we would misconceive Durkheim’s work. Leisure in modern society is an integral part of the new organic solidarity and is interdependent with other social phenomena. It should follow these new social developments, and its social function is to express them in how it is expressed as social action.

Leisure and the Sacred

Durkheim’s work that is most connected with leisure issues may be *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, a work of the last period of his life. The connection made is with the definition of leisure as civic rituals, the equivalent of Durkheim’s positive rituals, processes through which we are transformed from consumers into stakeholders and, in fact, their repetition is to maintain faith in the collectivity, the society. What Durkheim notes in his work is the primary cause of creation of a universal social phenomenon, and therefore responsive to a real social need, corresponding to a true social reality. With special emphasis on rituals and beliefs, as collective activities that bring the person out of himself/herself, the result is that in this way they make the person commune with the power of the group.

Ultimately, the need for confirmation of social cohesion, that is, it is ensured that the smooth reproduction of society as a functional unity is the cause of these phenomena. At the same time, however, this sense of participation in the group cannot be safeguarded without practices,

symbols of faith and ways of renewal. With these very symbols and practices, we show as members of the society that the society itself is sacred and inviolable. They are sacred symbols and practices that are distinguished from the “profane” and daily ones and are kept holy, because they are experienced through a feeling of dependence, awe and respect and lead to obedience to rules and norms that are not invented by us. Durkheim himself noted that “games and the principal forms of art seem to have born of religion” (1965, p. 425) and later that “every feast ... has certain characteristics of the religious ceremony” and “leisure is one of the principal forms of moral remaking” (p. 427).

Therefore, secular non-work relations, such as leisure, are placed within the same context as the religious life, in the specific work by Durkheim; in fact, they belong to the realm of sacred.

Within this context then, every leisure activity is a confirmation process of social cohesion of the group we belong to; it is a manifestation of the sacred and inviolable that we can distinguish from the every day, trivial and profane.

The outcome (e.g., defeat or victory) does not count, but rather the participation in leisure events and sports, as indeed it is the dominant motto. Our participation in these is the constant confirmation of importance—sanctity of specific civic rituals, and this is done through practices such as consumption of special products, special processes (e.g., slogans, hymns in football grounds), but primarily by the fact that the rules of leisure activities “become metaphors for the metanarratives of life. Playing by the rules for some is so obligatory that it constitutes a neurosis. Some children will develop into hyper conformists... most of us will just try to get things right because getting things right is a virtue. Of course, what is deemed to be right will depend from our reference group and being right is still related to the hegemonic order of things” (Ingham 2004, p. 28).

Leisure and the Deviance (Anomy)

The social individual accepts moral, that is, social ties. S/he is ruled not by a material environment that is brutally imposed on him/her but by a conscience superior to his/her own, like the way s/he feels it. But what

happens if after a social crisis or a sudden social change, society cannot exercise this influence?

There should be new “ethics” that would reflect these changes, which, however, cannot occur immediately or give fruits quickly. This social period is characterized by anomie, a very interesting element in Durkheim’s work, which reflects his time as he himself experienced it.

A condition in which individual wishes cannot be regulated by common rules, so there is a lack of group cohesion; it is a condition where collective representations, collective consciousness and every manifestation of it has been weakened. It is a pathological condition, a pathological phenomenon, which we can distinguish by using specific sociological rules.

Durkheim draws our attention to this specific distinction, as there should not be an explanation on the basis of a judgement of the desired—or not desired. The normal and abnormal phenomena are of the same nature; they are simply different variations of it. When the social phenomenon is general and frequent in space/time it is normal, when it deviates from the above measure it is abnormal and pathological.

Nevertheless, this is not enough as we have to go back to the conditions that determined it, since there is a case that a universal and frequent phenomenon may seem normal, but because it is generated under special circumstances we have described it earlier as ultimately pathological. And then, there are social phenomena, whether they are desirable or not, that are judged as pathological or abnormal, whereas, in fact, they are normal. One such example is crime that exists and will always exist, and it will fulfil a specific social purpose.

We therefore have a non-simplistic understanding guide of when a social fact is normal and when deviated, a guide that can be used for the corresponding categorization of leisure activities.

At the first level, the exceptions to the rule of the general and the frequent are deviant.

At the second level, and more interesting, the abnormal conditions create abnormal phenomena and thus leisure; and such conditions are when we have weakened social cohesion and collective consciousness, that is, anomie. The dimension of the distinction between normal and deviant is an important theoretical issue in Durkheim’s work, because

it leads us to the need for interventionist sociology, in connection with social policy reform plans. It is precisely because contemporary society is characterized by organic solidarity rather than mechanical, a mere repressive punishment policy cannot work to address phenomena of deviant leisure at the first level. Social control should be primarily multifaceted and deterrent at prevention level, and thus social control mechanisms should be extended to this level, connected with social policy agencies.

Too much leisure is a sickly phenomenon and a danger to society. It increases the attraction of idleness and tempts individuals to be chronically work-shy (Durkheim 1933, pp. 240–241). In this case, the division of labour that exists in society is at risk as a whole.

At the same time, there is another form of deviant leisure at the first level, as an exception to the rule. It is exactly because, for the division of labour to produce solidarity, each has his/her task, and this task is fitting (Durkheim 1933, p. 375), participation in leisure activities should also function. So in cases mentioned by Rojek (p. 56), where there is a mismatch between the individual's inclination and the leisure activity s/he performs (e.g., individuals are forced to participate if they are inmates of a total institution, school, prison, army) and there is a material deprivation in terms of the outlets available to an individual to exploit and develop his/her faculties and interests (e.g., long-term unemployed), there are abnormal phenomena. Society should face these phenomena with corresponding policies, because the rule is the increasing democratization in leisure activities and not the coerced leisure with social exclusions.

The deviant of the second level, where rules governing collective life are inadequate to maintain equilibrium between relations, and thus phenomena even in leisure are generated that are defined as anomic. In these cases, there generated leisure that is meaningless, purposeless, discordant, without centralized control, ultimately self-destructive and antisocial. Then specific and specialized actions of the social control mechanism and social policy measures are not enough. There should be a broader socio-political change in the institution of occupational groups. Just because the institution is a moral power capable of containing individual egos (dominant in anomic situations), of maintaining a spirited sentiment of common solidarity, these groups should perform and govern both work and non-work life.

Durkheim Revisited

Durkheim dominated sociological thought of his time and its development. He contributed greatly to the development of French Sociology, but exceeded the limits of space and time and became one of the pillars of the international literature on functionalist thought in general and on leisure in particular with direct or indirect effect on numerous theoretical or research works in this cognitive field.

Nevertheless, reading Durkheim's work only through the perspective of functionalism is a narrow approach to the study of leisure and society. It is ahistorical and neglects comparative studies, whereas Durkheim himself invited us to use the comparative–genetic approach, should we want to have sociological evidence. It is insufficient if we are to deal with change and conflict, whereas Durkheim opened the debate on the societies in transition and change. It is ideologically oriented, if we stay in the debate on the necessary reforms for a normal social cohesion and normal leisure with the only function to maintain that consistency, whereas Durkheim has called us get rid of all prejudices, biases, ideological crises. Individuals can be viewed as passive and constrained by cultural and social forces that lie out of their control, but they are also actively involved as social actors in something that shapes every aspect of life, in a dynamic way, as they can obey, react selfishly or remodel the new that changes the old.

We could use theoretical loans from Durkheim to offer solutions to the problems of the shift workers in order for leisure activities to be organized temporally to fit in with their shift schedules (Blakelock 1961); we could study the development of rugby football in Britain as an activity developed discordantly, without centralized control (Dunning and Sheard 1979). Or we could discuss about spontaneous communities, rituals that sustain the belief for as long as the reality is suspended (Turner 1969, 1974), civic rituals that mask the differences between dominant and subordinate groups (Ingham et al. 1987) and about leisure consumption that keeps the sacred alive (Slowikowski and Loy 1993).

Then, how could we reread Durkheim with an open rather than narrow functionalist horizon, without excluding historical and comparative views on conflict, change?

We should first read Durkheim as a break with individual positivism. This is of course completely understandable from a simple reading of the thinker's work and leads us to the thesis that if we explain a social phenomenon such as leisure through a biological or psychological phenomenon, then we should be assured that the explanation is false.

Similarly, we should understand that similar explanations that use terms "choice" and "freedom" cannot be correct, because persons act under a "compulsory" division of labour.

Moreover, we should understand that Durkheim's view has no room for romantic views on reading of the past, no relevant search to revive the stability of older social types and respectively no corresponding views on reading forms and activities of leisure of other times.

Finally, we should leave an "open window" in a reading of Durkheim's theoretical view, as a radical critique of industrialization and a complex (potentially non-positivist and certainly not static) image of modern humans and how they participate in social phenomena. We should shed light on this criticism that has at least two dimensions. The first is that the anomic-egoistic condition is a pathological condition in the development of society and, therefore, when leisure is actually a "cult of the individual", it is negative and should be corrected.

The second is that when social inequalities do not reflect only natural inequalities, if social action in the field of leisure does not capture differences in the distribution of organic capabilities but it is rather socially determined, then we should take care to correct this.

But even more importantly, if the aforementioned pathological phenomena in leisure are not small exceptions but rather general phenomena, then this is explained as inability of the collective consciousness and anachronistic social nature, that is, a society in crisis, a society in transition.

In this case, the stagnation of society is an obstacle to social development. There is no other way out than to change the status quo and create a new one and, in this case, when social phenomena are defined as deviant, they are in essence the hope that keeps open the journey to the necessary changes.

When forms of leisure in modern anomic-selfish society, at times of crisis, are defined as deviant due to the fact that they go against this spirit

of the time, they actually prepare a new morality, especially if they come from the bowels of people's unions which are the basis of the community participation in the production process.

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Why Veblen Matters: The Role of Status Seeking in Contemporary Leisure

David Scott

Introduction

Over 100 years ago, Thorstein Veblen (1934) published *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (TLC). A scathing attack on the avaricious leisure class of his day, TLC described how people used wealth to elevate their social position in society. Importantly, the book illuminated how people across *all* social strata use wealth and goods to bolster their social position relative to their neighbors and peers. TLC remains a classic and is used by sociologists, economists, and other scholars to explain patterns of fashion (Wilson 2003), female subordination (Mestrovic 2003), economic inequality (Edgel 2001), and environmental degradation (Mitchell 2001).

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Surprisingly, only a few leisure scholars have used TLC to explain contemporary forms of leisure. One of these is Chris Rojek (1995, 2000), but he warns against assuming that the lifestyles of the upper classes automatically trickle down to the masses. Over the years many of my graduate students have shied away from TLC as they find the book dense and Veblen's style of writing agonizingly cryptic. While there is truth in all this, I argue that Veblen's ideas about leisure, consumption, and status seeking are as relevant today as they were over 100 years ago when TLC was first published. My goal in this chapter is to explain some of Veblen's key ideas and then illustrate how they might shed light into present-day leisure and consumption.

Emulation, Conspicuous Leisure, and Conspicuous Consumption

Published in 1899, TLC is probably the first major sociological inquiry into the meaning of leisure in everyday life. A central tenet of TLC is that people are hardwired to seek status and elevate their social position in the eyes of their peers. Veblen used the term *pecuniary emulation* to describe the tendency for people to seek favorable comparisons with others. Emulation, for Veblen, was a deep-seated motive that spurs humans to grade themselves and others in terms of relative worth. Individuals deemed unworthy are avoided and often disparaged; in contrast, people judged to be respectable or of high repute are used as models for acceptable behavior. Much of the TLC can and should be read as a critique of the leisure class of nineteenth-century America. Yet Veblen recognized that emulation was practiced across all socio-economic levels in society: "Members of each stratum accept as their ideal of decency the scheme of life in vogue in the next higher stratum, and bend their energies to live up that ideal" (p. 84). Veblen regarded pecuniary emulation as pervasive and critical to understanding leisure and consumption.

TLC provides an explanation of the origins of class differences and social stratification processes. The beginning of class differences, according to Veblen, stems from the importance our forebears ascribed to various employments. Occupations held in high esteem were exploitive

in nature whereas unworthy employments entailed drudgery and were deemed “unworthy, debasing, ignoble” (p. 15). Status and deference were conferred to those individuals who were exempt from everyday work and chores. The 2001 motion picture, *Kate and Leopold*, provides contemporaries a colorful illustration of the repugnance that members of the leisure class ascribed to prosaic jobs. In the film, Leopold Mountbatten, Duke of Albany, time travels forward some 125 years to twenty-first-century New York. One of the chores foisted on him is walking a dog. In so doing, he is confronted by a police woman who demands he clean up the dog’s business. Leopold is astonished and exclaims, “Are you suggesting that there exists a law compelling gentlemen to lay hold of canine bowel movements?” While an extreme example, it shows unmistakably that members of the leisure class felt some jobs were simply beneath them. As Veblen explained, members shared a “pervading sense of the indignity of the slightest manual labour” (p. 42).

TLC shows that status and position over time became increasingly conferred on the basis of wealth. As Veblen noted, wealth had evolved as a “customary basis of repute and esteem” and was regarded as “intrinsically honourable” (pp. 28–29). Of course, in Veblen’s time, old money was regarded more meritorious than new money: “Wealth acquired passively by transmission from ancestors or other antecedents presently becomes even more honorific than wealth acquired by the possessor’s own effort” (p. 29). Today, wealth and material possessions remain an important indicator of social class, and people within any given society can be arranged along a hierarchy from rich to poor (Lanski 1984; Massey 2007).

Although wealth certainly implies status, it is not conferred automatically. Indeed, another central point of TLC is that people achieve status by how effectively they *display* their wealth. As noted by Veblen, “Wealth or power must be put in evidence, for esteem is awarded only on evidence” (p. 36). Conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption constitute the two methods people display status. Veblen defined conspicuous leisure as “non-productive consumption of time” (p. 43). This definition is a bit ambiguous, but the point here is that people have ample time to pursue activities and develop skills that validate that they have enough wealth to abstain from productive work. Veblen provided

several examples of skills and activities that come under the banner of conspicuous leisure:

Knowledge of the dead languages and the occult sciences; of correct spelling; of syntax and prosody; of the various forms of domestic music and other household art; of the latest proprieties of dress, furniture, and equipage; of games, sports, and fancy-bred animals, such as dogs and race-horses.

(p. 45)

One's social position could also be advertised through the display of "manners and breeding, polite usage, decorum, and formal and ceremonial observances generally" (p. 45). In sum, conspicuous leisure included a wide range of skills and knowledge that clearly demonstrated that one had the time and financial means to avoid gainful employment.

It is worth noting that the life of leisure described in TLC required considerable time and effort. Having leisure was far from a life of idleness and, in the words of Veblen, "does not connote indolence or quiescence" (p. 43). He explained that a person who had leisure had to demonstrate tangible proof that he or she was in fact wealthy enough to not work. Manners provided Veblen a vehicle for driving home his point. He stated that the display of good manners and breeding:

Requires time, application, and expense, and can therefore not be compassed by those whose time and energy are taken up with work. A knowledge of good form is *prima facie* evidence that portions of the well-bred person's life which is not under the observation of the spectator has been *worthily spent* [italics added] in acquiring accomplishments that are of no lucrative effect. In the last analysis the value of manners lies in the fact that they are a voucher of a life of leisure.

(p. 49)

Veblen went on to say that the acquisition of manners and other skills required a specialized education which involved "a laborious drill in deportment and an education in taste and discrimination as to what articles of consumption are decorous and what are the decorous methods of consuming them" (p. 50). It is not an overstatement to conclude that

much exertion and sweat went into developing the skills and knowledge that signified a person had leisure. For this reason, during Veblen's lifetime, the *nouveau riche* were often slandered because their newly acquired wealth could not hide the fact that they had not satisfactorily mastered the requisite manners that were considered essential conduct of the leisure class (King 2009).

As noted, conspicuous consumption is the second way people seek status. Veblen did not provide a precise definition of conspicuous consumption but he inferred that goods and services are purchased and displayed for the express purpose of showing off wealth and social position. Although goods have practical value and provide comfort to the buyer, Veblen observed that many goods are purchased because they are "a mark of prowess and perquisite of human dignity" (p. 69). More simply, people obtain status by buying and showing off goods and services that are excessive and too expensive for others to acquire. According to King (2009), the entire Gilded Age in the United States rested on conspicuous consumption. Exclusivity and outward appearances exhorted elites during this era to pay inordinate sums of money for clothes, jewelry, artwork, servants, travel, carriages and yachts, homes, and hosting parties and balls.

Women's clothing provides a useful example of the ubiquity of conspicuous consumption. During Veblen's lifetime, elite women were raised to be dependent on men and were objects of display. As such, their clothing was often highly impractical and adorned to give evidence that they were exempt from productive work and thus beholden to the men in their lives. According to Veblen, "the high heel, the skirt, the impracticable bonnet, the corset, and the general disregard of the wearer's comfort which is an obvious feature of all civilized women's apparel" (p. 188) reflected conspicuous consumption in the decoration of women's clothing. Today, many women continue to wear clothes that are impractical, astonishingly expensive, and provide evidence of their subservient position in society (Entwistle 2015; Mestrovic 2003). Some clothing is worn a single time (e.g., a prom or wedding dress), while other clothing is worn for a relatively short period of time and then discarded with the introduction of new fashions. Thus, for many women, clothing functions primarily as adornment and secondarily as affording comfort.

Although the display of status can be achieved by either conspicuous leisure or conspicuous consumption, there are several reasons why moderns today rely progressively on the latter to advertise their social position. One reason is that few people today have independent means to spend their lives in pastimes that have little outward productive value. A related reason is that gainful employment has become highly valued as an end in itself. David Riesman (1953) observed that TLC had immediate shock value and many elites sought to distance themselves from practices that smacked of pretentiousness. This point is supported by Chris Rojek (2000) who noted that many wealthy people today work long hours (e.g., Bill Gates and Warren Buffett) and their free-time activities show little evidence of conspicuous leisure.

Arguably the most important reason for the ascent of conspicuous consumption is that contemporary societies are now highly mobile and interactions tend to be fleeting. Over a century ago, Veblen recognized that as societies become differentiated and fast-paced, conspicuous consumption would become far more efficient than conspicuous leisure to convey one's social position. He noted that people would find themselves increasingly interacting with others in places such as "churches, theatres, ballrooms, hotels, parks, shops.... [and] in order to impress these transient observers, and to retain one's self-complacency under their observation, the signature of one's pecuniary strength should be written in characters which he who runs may read" (p. 87). For all these reasons, status seeking today is far more likely to be expressed through consumption than skills and knowledge acquired during leisure time. In the remainder of this chapter, I will explore the relevance of TLC to contemporary societies.

Necessity and Keeping Up Appearances

Conspicuous consumption pervades contemporary societies. George Ritzer (2010) observed wryly that consumption has taken on something of a religious or sacred quality. He noted that great "cathedrals of consumption" (e.g., shopping malls, modern sport stadiums, Disney Land, and themed restaurants) entice people to visit and practice their "consumer religion" (p. 7). Veblen anticipated Ritzer and others as

he explained that consumption is very much instilled in how people think and act. In most, if not all, contemporary societies, subsistence needs are easily met and much of what people consume probably comes under the umbrella of conspicuous consumption. Yet many of the goods and services people routinely consume are taken for granted, and few moderns are introspective about the role of consumption in their lives. Veblen recognized that people tend to look upon many of the goods and services they consume as *necessities* rather than luxuries. He further understood that once people achieve a particular standard of living, that standard takes on the form of “habit” and they are reluctant to recede from it. This point of view is fueled by a certainty that a good life is dependent on wealth and the acquisition of consumer goods (de Graaf et al. 2014; Kasser 2002). Indeed, moderns make purchases on a whole range of luxury products and services as if their lives depended on them.

Although family, neighbors, and friends provide people clues about what is fashionable and decorous, moderns’ opinions about consumer goods and services are formed very early in life and fairly well established by the time they enter adulthood. Juliet Schor (2004) noted that sophisticated marketing techniques have percolated down to young people resulting in them becoming “repositories of consumer knowledge and awareness” (p. 11). She added that children’s social worlds “are increasingly constructed around consuming, as brands and products have come to determine who is ‘in’ or ‘out,’ who is hot or not, who deserves to have friends, or social status” (p. 11). What seems remarkable is that young people today grow up feeling they are entitled to a wide range of goods, services, and opportunities that were scarcely unavailable to previous generations. My college students, for example, accept unthinkingly that they own their pickup trucks, personal computers, and cell phones. They also don’t find it unusual that they have credit cards in their own names, live in luxury condominiums, and have enough money to buy expensive lattes at Starbucks. Many of them also own pedigreed dogs, belong to private fitness clubs, pay to have manicures, and travel to exotic places during spring break. There is little doubt in my mind that these students would feel deprived and less privileged if they were to go through school with less.

Few moderns appear satisfied with their current goods and services. A major point of TLC is that standards of emulation are continually evolving which gives rise to gradual dissatisfaction with one's lifestyle: Veblen stated, "But as fast as a person makes new acquisitions, and becomes accustomed to the resulting new standard of wealth, the new standard forthwith ceases to afford appreciably great satisfaction than the earlier standard did" (p. 31). Thus, my college students have graduated to more luxurious automobiles, homes, and vacation destinations and now deprecate the very goods and services they were once loath to live without.

In her provocative book, *The Overworked American*, Juliet Schor (1992) noted that productivity in the United States doubled between 1948 and 1990. Stated differently, American workers in 1990 were able to reproduce the 1948 standard of living in half the time. Schor concluded Americans could work as little as 20 hours per week and still maintain the same standard of living they had just a few generations ago. She recognized, however, that Americans' lifestyles are oriented to an "insidious cycle of work-and-spend" (p. 127). The simple truth is that Americans prefer goods and services over free time. As Veblen observed over 100 years ago, people's status in the community will be judged increasingly by appearances and not by the skills they have acquired during their leisure time. Keeping up appearances results in people *needing* all the goods and services that money can buy.

If It's Expensive, It Must Be Good

As noted above, Veblen pointed out that wealth has evolved to become a conventional way of conveying status. Television shows, such as *Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous*, glamorize wealthy people by extolling their extravagant homes and furnishings, their popular haunts, and their stylish clothes and accoutrements. Viewers of shows like this would probably be disappointed if they were to learn that the objects on display were mock-ups or purchased at bargain prices. This leads to an important insight offered from TLC: People's tastes and definitions of beauty are shaped by "the expensiveness of the articles" (p. 126). This means that goods that are expensive and in relative short supply are deemed more

beautiful, tasteful, and fashionable than goods that are cheaper and in relative abundance.

By way of example, Veblen noted that fashionable people in his day regarded silver spoons as more beautiful and delicate than wrought-iron spoons simply on the basis of the expense that went into creating them. He stated, “The hand-wrought spoon gratifies our taste, our sense of the beautiful, while that made by machinery out of the base metal has no useful office beyond a brute efficiency” (p. 127). Many people today make similar judgments regarding a wide range of consumer items. Moderns seem willing to pay enormous prices for designer clothes and apparel, gourmet food and wine, luxury watches, ink pens, and automobiles because they equate value with cost (Bagwell and Bernheim 1996). It is hard to dispute that in many cases, expensive items are of high quality—some people are willing to pay more for a product because they know it will last a long time, require little in the way of servicing, and will be of practical use. For fashion-minded consumers, these factors may be far less important than the status that they hope to garner from the purchase. As Veblen noted, “But the utility of these things to the possessor is commonly due less to their intrinsic beauty [or utility] than to the honour which the possession and consumption confers” (p. 129).

Of course it is not enough to simply possess expensive goods—recall Veblen noted that for status to be conferred, goods must be displayed for all to see. Empirical studies show that consumers are willing to pay a premium price for luxury goods that signal their social position to their peers and social inferiors (Han et al. 2013). An interesting example of this form of conspicuous consumption is evident among individuals who purchase leather-bound books to decorate their homes or offices. These books cost far more than ordinary books and are highly valued because of the expense that went into manufacturing them. In some cases, the books are valued because they are originals and rare. One company that specializes in selling antique leather-bound books advertises as follows: “They are perfect for decorative and *display* purposes and are not in English.” Another company describes the books it sells as “approximately eight to nine inches in height...and are primarily chosen for their decorative appearance rather than their subject matter.” Buyers are not expected to actually read these books—they are purchased because of their expense

and because they provide tangible evidence of their superior taste and social position. Keeping up appearances can be expensive; it is also very good for the economy.

Emulation and Collecting

Collecting provides an interesting extension of Veblen's ideas about emulation and conspicuous consumption in contemporary societies. Collecting can take the form of amassing automobiles, art, jewelry, exotic fish, and any number of other objects. A unique item of contemporary collecting is that of sneakers. Collectors or "sneakerheads" stockpile, trade, admire, and display a wide range of limited edition or vintage shoes, including Air Jordans, Adidas Shell Toes, and Puma classics (Skidmore 2007). It is not unusual for sneakerheads to own hundreds of pairs of shoes from their favorite sport. Some scholars tend to downplay the role of conspicuous consumption as a factor in explaining collecting in contemporary society (Belk 1995) and emphasize instead the intrinsic rewards (e.g., enjoyment and sociability) associated with the hobby (Scott et al. 1999). Yet clear standards of emulation exist among collectors which lead to unambiguous patterns of conspicuous consumption. Sneakerheads, for example, are driven to possess rare or limited item shoes and being in possession of them is a badge of honor. Some sneakerheads are willing to spend thousands of dollars on a single pair of vintage sneakers.

A collecting mentality exists in many leisure activities that are not typically associated with collecting. One of these activities is birdwatching or more specifically "birding." Ken Kaufman (1997), one of North America's best-known birdwatchers, described birding as an activity where participants "are out to seek, to discover, to chase, to learn, to find as many different kinds of birds as possible—and in friendly competition, to try to find more of them than the next birder" (p. xi). Importantly, most birders keep *lists* of all the bird species they have identified by sight and sound. When birders talk about birds not on their lists, they will often say, "I *need* that bird!" Many birders spend thousands of dollars and travel long distances, often at a moment's

notice, in their quest to amass large lists of birds (Obmascik 2004). The stakes pursued by birders are minimal, and no birders have become household names. Nevertheless, standards of emulation lead to conspicuous consumption. A list constitutes a point of comparison and pride among birders and inspires them to devote time and resources to “collect” new birds.

A similar pattern of collecting and emulation is evident among many golfers, hunters, whitewater rafters, mountain and rock climbers, baseball fans, and national park visitors. Some golfers, for example, travel extensively to play at different courses (Petrick et al. 2001). Their mentality is to “collect” golf courses. In other activities, many participants are motivated to bag as many different animals as they are able to raft the “big drops,” climb all 14,000 feet mountains in North America, attend baseball games in all major league parks, and visit every park administered by the United States’ National Park Service. It is no coincidence that the subtitle of Patricia Schultz’s (2003) bestselling travel book, *1,000 Places to See Before You Die* reads *A Traveler’s Life List*. As with birds, travel destinations in the book are treated as objects in a collection. In summary, standards of emulation exist across a range of pastimes and inspire participants to spend lavishly as they seek conquests and enhanced reputations in their respective social worlds.

The Leisure Class Transfigured

The TLC is laden with a strong moral undertone and is satirical in its depiction of the leisure class of nineteenth-century America. As noted earlier, the book was shocking enough that many elites sought to curb their avaricious lifestyles (Riesman 1953). The leisure class has been on decline since, and this decline has occurred in tandem with the shrinking of the work week for laborers and the middle class and a concomitant rise in discretionary incomes. Moreover, despite the fact that wealth remains unevenly distributed in many societies, some sociologists have argued that leisure choices and skills are less subject to social class and financial resources than they once were (Roberts 2006). Other scholars have argued that TLC fails to describe leisure and

consumption related to other social categories, including race, ethnicity, and gender (Dunlap 2010). Accordingly, two contemporary scholars have moved away from characterizing leisure as status-driven and, in so doing, have transfigured the leisure class as being preoccupied with time and identity.

Staffan Linder's *The Harried Leisure Class* (1970) provides an important alternative to Veblen's status-driven individual. Like Veblen, Linder believed that consumption was integral to explaining how people behaved. Both Veblen and Linder assumed that a higher standard of living is associated with increased purchasing power. Linder, however, minimized how consumption was related to status and instead focused on how consumption contributes to the speed up of time. Given the plethora of goods and experiences that moderns can afford, they are constantly reminded that time is scarce. Leisure and consumption are pursued with an eye toward maximizing the yield on time. One way this can be done, according to Linder, is through *simultaneous consumption*. As the name indicates, this is "when a consumer tries to enjoy more than one consumption item at a time" (p. 79). In sum, members of Linder's harried leisure class are time starved and are driven to accelerate the pace of consumption and leisure activities.

A second reconceptualization of the leisure class is based on the work of Dean MacCannell (2013). In *The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class*, MacCannell begins with the assumption that differentiation in contemporary society has resulted in acute alienation as people feel disconnected from stable communities and institutions. Members of contemporary societies are faced with puzzling questions about meaning and how they fit within the grand scheme of things. Leisure and sightseeing are less about seeking status than they are about people's endless quest for self-discovery and meaning. MacCannell's ideas are a sharp departure from those of Veblen. He argued that differentiation in contemporary societies has broken down traditional social cleavages, leaving moderns to search for identity and authenticity relatively unfettered by social-class ties. For MacCannell, the tourist is a metaphor for the human condition as people are driven to seek authentic experiences and selves.

Conclusions

Linder's and MacCannell's theories provide compelling explanation of the leisure habits of people living in affluent societies. In many ways, they complement Veblen's classic work and in no way invalidate his ideas about how status seeking and emulation are linked to patterns of consumption and leisure. Veblen's ideas, particularly those related to conspicuous consumption, are as relevant today as when they were first published over a century ago. Clothes, jewelry, food and culinary products, sporting equipment, private clubs, and vacation destinations continue to be bought and sold as objects to display. The value of many consumer goods and services has moved way beyond their practical value and ability to satisfy basic needs. Their value lies in their ability to help people keep up appearances.

Leisure also continues to be a site where individuals seek to display their status and distance themselves from individuals and groups deemed undesirable. There exist standards of emulation in many leisure activities and leisure social worlds that inspire participants to collect experiences (e.g., adding new birds to a life list). TLC continues to provide researchers theoretical guidance about how status influences a whole range of leisure behavior, including our choice of activities, friends, and tourism destinations. The book may also help explain how some people seek to live more simply and sustainably. Researchers can use the book to understand the challenges some moderns face as they seek to distance themselves from wasteful consumptive practices.

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Max Weber and Leisure

Pauwke Berkers and Koen van Eijck

Introduction

At first sight, including the work of Weber in a handbook on leisure theory seems rather odd as his work is mainly concerned with the domains of religion and work. Unsurprisingly, the term “leisure” is never mentioned in his 1400+ page magnum opus *Economy and Society*. Yet, his work in both domains has greatly influenced leisure studies. Below we will discuss (1) the Protestant Ethic and the absence of leisure, focusing on the relationship between religion and consumption, (2) bureaucracy and rationalization of leisure, discussing McDonaldization and re-enchantment, and (3) social inequality and leisure: class, status, party, discussing how status—vis-à-vis class—matters for lifestyle studies. Each section consists of a discussion of Weber’s theories on the topic, followed by a description

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of how his ideas have affected recent leisure studies. Finally, we will provide some suggestions for further research in the conclusion.

The Protestant Ethic and the Absence of Leisure

Weber's Foundations

In his masterpiece *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* as well as in other works on the sociology of religion, Weber examines the “inner relationship between certain expressions of the old Protestant spirit and modern capitalistic culture” (1997 [1930], p. 11). These certain expressions refer to the ascetic rationalism of Calvinism, which differed from the mysticism of many other world religions in several ways (Turner et al. 1995, p. 205). First, those who accepted the Calvinist doctrine believed in predestination, that is, that God—and God alone—decided who would be saved and who would be damned. As such, Calvinists were anxious to know whether they were among the chosen ones. Second, as they could not get any certainty about their fate, they inevitably felt a great inner loneliness and isolation. Third, although one could not influence God’s decision—his ways were considered incomprehensible and his motives unsearchable—people began to look for signs that they were among the elect. People wanted to be convinced that they deserved good fortune (Weber, 1947a, p. 271). Besides faith, intense worldly activity helped to win certainty of his state of grace and alleviate doubts (Weber, 2013 [1968], p. 547). Fourth, all believers were considered instruments of God who were expected to live rational ascetic lives and master this world through work in a worldly vocation (Weber, 1947b, p. 325). The devout should therefore not fall for irrational sensual pleasures, superstitions, or things of the flesh. As such, “the path to salvation was turned away from a contemplative ‘flight from the world’ and towards an active ascetic ‘work in this world’” (Weber, 1947a, p. 290).

According to Weber, such worldly asceticism was one of the factors that fostered the rise of the spirit of capitalism (*Social Psychology*,

p. 268). This capitalistic culture contains several key elements (Turner et al. 1995, p. 203). First, work is valued as an end in itself—a duty—instead of means to an end. “The valuation of the fulfilment of duty in worldly affairs as the highest form which the moral activity of the individual could assume” was unquestionably new, according to Weber (1997 [1930], p. 40). As such, considering one’s profession a “calling” is a key characteristic of the ethic of capitalistic culture (p. 19). Second, wealth and profit are evidence of economic as well as personal virtue, that is, a certification of grace. “If success supervenes upon such acquisitive activity, it is regarded as a manifestation of god’s blessing upon the labour of the pious man and of god’s pleasure with his economic pattern of life” (Weber, 2013 [1968], p. 543). Third, everyday life should be methodically organized by reason. Calvinists took systemization of ethical conduct quite literally by entering or tabulating their sins, temptations, and progress in religious account books (Weber, 1997 [1930], p. 76). Fourth, future satisfaction is more important than immediate happiness. As such, the enjoyments of wealth are forbidden to the ascetic and profit should be reinvested in the honour of God.

When such capitalistic culture is (still) strongly coupled to Calvinism, there is hardly any place for leisure as every worldly activity should be performed in God’s glory. First, if labour is a divine calling and considering the short span of human life to confirm one’s election by showing personal virtue, “loss of time through sociability, idle talk, luxury, even more sleep than is necessary for health, six to at most eight hours, is worthy of absolute moral condemnation” (Weber, 1997 [1930], p. 105). Second, enjoying non-rational activities (art and erotic life) that do not have a clear religious value were considered suspect, as deifications of the creaturely. As long as the creative artist experiences his work as resulting either from a calling, the relationship between art and the religious ethic remains harmonious (Weber, 1947b, p. 341). However, as art aims to provide “salvation from the routines of everyday life,” it begins to compete with the redemptory function of religion and the relationship becomes more problematic, even blasphemous (p. 342). Third, indulging in immediate material wealth was morally abject. “The real moral objection is to relaxation in the security of possession, the enjoyment of wealth with the consequence of idleness and the temptations of the flesh,

above all of distraction from the pursuit of a righteous life” (Weber, 1997 [1930], pp. 105). Thus, leisure in general was regarded a competitor to the kingdom of God (Weber, 1947a, pp. 291).

Building on Weber

Probably the most important and celebrated publication on leisure and consumption taking much of its inspiration from Weber’s *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* is Colin Campbell’s (1987) *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism*. In this book, Campbell wonders how it is possible that the Puritanically inclined English middle classes shifted to an ethic of consumerism in the eighteenth century. Campbell (1987, p. 12) aims for an update and extension of Weber’s arguments:

“Thus, the basis of an ethical code which served to justify consumption is described largely by a process of distinguishing it from that ‘Protestant ethic’ described by Weber. Despite these differences, the underlying structure of the argument advanced mirrors that of Weber’s, stressing the central role of a cultural ‘ethic’ in enabling the introduction of a ‘modern’ form of economic action, demonstrating both their ‘congruence’ and their psychological and cultural connections.”

Indeed, if we consider Weber’s thesis as “an account of the development of a distinctive ‘motivational complex’” (Campbell 2006, p. 210), the parallels Campbell is pointing at are obvious. The middle class did not seek pleasure in material consumption or physical sensations but rather in emotions to be tickled by the imagination and daydreaming. The novel, probably the romantic consumer good par excellence, was not loved as a commodity to be owned but as an object of self-illusionary engagement or modern autonomous imaginative hedonism (Campbell 1987, p. 78). Thus, other than traditional hedonism, which seeks gratification in the object itself, Campbell’s modern hedonism finds pleasure in a degree of control over the meanings of objects. Moreover, “the modern hedonist possessed the very special power to conjure up stimuli in the absence of any externally generated sensations. This control is achieved through the power of imagination, and provides infinitely

greater possibilities for the maximization of pleasurable experiences than was available under traditional, realistic hedonism to even the most powerful of potentates. This derives not merely from the fact that there are virtually no restrictions upon the faculty of imagination, but also from the fact that it is completely within the hedonist's own control. It is this highly rationalized form of self-illusory hedonism which characterized modern pleasure-seeking" (p. 76).

But how can this modern hedonism be derived from the Protestant Ethic? Campbell notes that the Puritans were no total strangers to the concept of pleasure. "Rational" recreation was permitted and pleasure, including the enjoyment of sexuality, was alright as long as it was not an end in itself but "accompanied acts demanded by God or supported by reason" (p. 102). Campbell goes on to argue that Weber, trying to unravel Protestantism's impact on economic production, did not pay much attention to strands of Protestant thought that were more relevant for understanding its relation to consumption. Thus, Calvinism was not only very rational and ascetic, but its teachings also had the abovementioned profound emotional effects of loneliness, self-doubt, and fear as a result of predestination. Interestingly, as Calvinism went into decline, signs of godliness were increasingly sought in character traits, the experience of saving grace, and emotional states that had a special spiritual significance, not just in conduct or material success. Valuing the possession and manifestation of feelings in Calvinism, together with the attenuation of belief and a growing faith in the natural goodness of man, ultimately led to sentimentalism, allowing one to derive pleasure or bitter-sweet melancholy from religious meditations. Thus, Campbell (1987, p. 142) arrives at the notion of sensibility as an ideal of character in the eighteenth century that "clearly embraces a readiness to indulge emotions for the pleasures which they can supply."

Sentimentalism, stemming from Calvinism, then, is a precursor to romanticism. With its emphasis on creativity and personal, divine genius, this shift "resulted in two closely connected forms of religious faith: a pan-psychic mysticism, or pantheism, with regard to nature at large, combined with a purely personal drama of salvation and redemption to be acted out within the confines of the self," turning romanticism into "a theory of art extrapolated into a philosophy of life" (p. 182). And now, pleasure became not just something acceptable but in fact something

dignified, the “defining attribute of all life” (p. 191) demonstrating one was not too alienated from nature. Hence, with creativity being a central characteristic of the divine, imagination became a highly appreciated quality allowing one to ponder the true and perfect world and experience pleasure in doing so. Experiencing such pleasure came to indicate one’s search for a more perfect world and was therefore valued positively (unless it was pleasure derived from immediate sensation). As such, Campbell’s brilliant application of Weber’s work demonstrates how Weber’s thought is still relevant for explaining today’s insatiable consumer on his ongoing quest for pleasure and why some forms of pleasure seem more in line with “good taste” than others.

A limited number of studies into the relation between leisure and religion is more loosely based on Weber and markedly less ambitious in this respect. Katz-Gerro and Jaeger (2012) find that religiosity (frequency of church attendance), rather than religion per se, is positively related with cultural consumption. Moreover, the impact of religiosity is comparable to that of well-known determinants of cultural lifestyles such as education, income, and age (see also Katz-Gerro et al. 2009). Van Eijck (2012) found less strong direct effects of religion once socioeconomic and demographic characteristics were controlled for. Especially social value orientations, which were closely related with religious identification, turned out to be relevant for explaining cultural preferences for classical and modern art styles. This finding aligns with DiMaggio’s (1996) study on museum visitors whom he found to be less often Protestants, less often believing the Bible to be the literal word of God, and less likely to claim that religion is important for the good life than non-visitors. In fact, these studies confirm that effects of religion are largely mediated by the values and convictions that come with certain religions. For example, van Eijck (2012) found that a preference for modern or abstract visual arts is negatively related with being religious as well as with indicators of traditionalism such as communitarianism and social disorientation. Weber alluded to this very animosity between art and religion, which he attributed to the rise of the intellectualist perspective that values aesthetic criteria over ethical ones when judging works of art: “The rejection of responsibility for ethical judgment and the fear of appearing bound by tradition,

which come to the fore in intellectualist periods, shift judgments whose intention was originally ethical into an aesthetic key” (2013 [1968], p. 608). The findings suggest that, indeed, religious people find it more difficult to put their moral criteria aside and make room for the more playful attitude that is required for an aesthetic enjoyment of images, irrespective of their moral connotations. Thus, the “distinctive motivational complex” offered by religion is highly relevant for contemporary leisure studies and, as Campbell has demonstrated, can lead us into unexpected directions.

Bureaucracy and the Rationalization of Leisure

Weber’s Foundations

In his sociology of religion, Weber contrasted capitalistic with traditionalist culture and rational ascetic Calvinism with mysticism. Similarly, in his work on social stratification, he distinguishes three ideal types of domination or authority: charismatic, traditional, and rational legal (Weber, 2013 [1968], pp. 212–301). First, charismatic authority rests “on devotion to the exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an individual person, and of the normative patterns or order revealed or ordained by him” (p. 215). Charismatic leadership is solely based on the belief in the “divine powers” of an individual. While the administrative apparatus initially consists of faithful disciples, over a longer period of time charismatic authority faces the problem of routinization, that is, receding to traditional or rational-legal authority. Second, traditional authority is based “on an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them” (p. 215). Third, rational-legal authority rests “on a belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands” (p. 215). Here, legitimacy is defined by having followed the “right” procedure, for example through voting, and leadership based on position, irrespective of the charisma of the individual fulfilling that position. Weber labelled the administrative apparatus of the rational-legal system a bureaucracy.

A bureaucracy contains the following elements (pp. 956–959). First, employment is based on knowledge and experience, often formalized in qualifications. Second, its operations are governed by general and calculable rules in the form of written documents (laws or administrative regulations) applicable to all. These rules are “more or less stable, more or less exhaustive and can be learned” (p. 958) and are supposed to prevent arbitrariness. Third, there is a formal hierarchy with a clearly established system of super- and subordination. Fourth, all bureaucrats have a fixed number of specialized tasks, which fulfil a functional yet impersonal function. Fifth, there is segregation of official activities from the sphere of the private life. According to Weber, “the fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with non-mechanical modes of production. Precision, speed unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and material and personal costs” (p. 973). Yet, a process of bureaucratization has also removed the magical from many forms of social interaction, which Weber labelled disenchantment.

Building on Weber

Weber’s work in rationalization and bureaucratization has been used in leisure studies to study the leisure industries. Building on the work of Weber, George Ritzer has shown the extensiveness of rationalization in what he has labelled McDonaldization, that is, “the process by which the principles of the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world” (1996, p. 1). He distinguishes between five “alluring” dimensions.

First, the fast-food model offers *efficiency* or at least an attempt to find and use the optimum means to a given end. In practice, this entails three things: streamlining a variety of processes (e.g., assembly-line production of the product and drive-troughs), simplifying goods and services (e.g., offering limited menu options), and using the customer to perform tasks that employees used to do (e.g., salad bar; Ritzer 1996, pp. 36–58). An example of the latter is how [Amazon.com](https://www.amazon.com) has the consumers not only do

all the work in placing the order but also serve as unpaid reviewers (Ritzer 1999, pp. 79–80). Online consumers even “do the research” for these organizations by providing them data.

Second, McDonaldization emphasized calculability of process and product, that is, a focus on quantity rather than quality of products (e.g., coffee sizes at Starbucks), efforts to create the illusion of quantity (e.g., use of an abundance of ice in drinks) and to reduce production and service processes to numbers (e.g., pizza-delivery time; Ritzer 1996, pp. 59–78). Leisure businesses often also operate under the moniker “50,000,000 Elvis Fans Can’t Be Wrong.” Consider, for example, the importance of TV ratings and box office openings in defining a successful (good?) movie.

Third, predictability is achieved through a replication of settings (e.g., using the same interior for restaurants all over the world), the use of scripts to control what employees say (e.g., by welcoming customers in a standard manner), the routinization of employee behaviour (e.g., by using training programmes), and the offering of uniform products (Ritzer 1996, pp. 79–99). This echoes Horkheimer and Adorno who wrote in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*: “In a film, the outcome can invariably be predicted at the start – who will be rewarded, punished, forgotten – and in light music the prepared ear can always guess the continuation after the first bars of a hit song and is gratified when it actually occurs” (1947, pp. 98–99). In contemporary culture industries, predictability is seen as a strategy to handle risk uncertainty, explaining for example, the popularity of sequels and movies based on successful books.

Fourth, McDonaldization emphasizes control by replacing humans with non-human technology (Ritzer 1996, pp. 101–120). One example could be the replacement of gatekeepers (e.g., reviewers)—those providing tips to cultural consumers on related tastes by algorithms. Another is the use of devices allowing people to scan the prices of the products they buy in the supermarket by themselves so they will not have to wait in line at the cash register.

Fifth, the irrationality of rationality refers to the negative effects of rationalization, to rational systems as unreasonable, dehumanizing systems, and moreover, a dominating system (Ritzer 1996, pp. 121–142).

However, as Weber noted, the price that McDonaldization pays is that of disenchantment, in the realms of both work and leisure. This might lead to a growing resistance to the rationalized business side of leisure facilities as cathedrals of consumption, critiquing its quality, absence of the unpredictable, and lack of autonomy (Ritzer 1999). As such, some theorists have suggested the possibility of re-enchantment, particularly within the postmodern tradition (Ritzer 1999, pp. 75–77). First, the contemporary rationalized world could be seen as both enchanting and disenchanting, for example places like Las Vegas. Second, consumers are ever more demanding and this affects competing leisure organizations. For example, as contemporary museum visitors want their visit to be more of an experience, they push museums to new, more “enchanting” presentation styles. The famous concept of the “experience economy” itself (Pine and Gilmore 1999) is largely about re-enchantment. Third, but on a related note, postmodern theory calls for an abandonment of the focus on the agentic actor and instead emphasizes the setting in which consumption occurs.

Social Inequality and Leisure: Class, Status, Party

Weber’s Foundations

The study of social inequality owes to Weber the notion that social stratification is not merely a matter of class but rather a multidimensional phenomenon. For starters, Weber refined the notion of class by distinguishing between three types of classes. Property classes are largely determined by differences in their properties and spending power, commercial classes by the marketability of goods and services they own or provide, and social classes are groupings within which social mobility is “easy and typical” (Weber, 2013 [1968], pp. 302, 303, 305). But more importantly, Weber added status group and party as alternative sources of power. Parties are mostly relevant as units of political power, as their actions are always directed towards a set goal and they involve associa-

tion in order to achieve political control. Our focus, as in most studies on social inequality in leisure and lifestyles, will be on Weber's fruitful distinction between classes and status groups. This distinction is by far the most relevant for leisure studies.

While all three types of classes can be defined in terms of their members' position in the system of production based on ownership, entrepreneurial and/or other skills, or shared working experiences, status groups can have different origins. Status (*ständige Lage*) is a claim to social esteem in terms of positive or negative privileges founded on (1) style of life, (2) formal education, or (3) hereditary or occupational prestige. Status may rest on class position, but money, property, or entrepreneurial positions will never be the sole determinants of status. Nor will the lack thereof foreclose status attainment. Inversely, status may influence class position but will not be identical to it. The status order, for Weber (p. 927), reflects "the way in which social honour is distributed in a community between typical groups participation in this distribution." Honour and power are linked in multiple ways but must be distinguished due to the different yet partly overlapping sources of power and honour. Thus, Weber explains that "other determinants of reciprocal relations" than those determined by the power of property (class) are at play and that "status groups hinder the strict carrying through of the sheer market principle" (p. 930).

For Weber, status honour "normally stands in sharp opposition to the pretensions of sheer property" (p. 932). He argues that "status honour is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of life is expected from all those who wish to belong to the circle" (p. 932). This implies certain restrictions on social intercourse and the use of fashion items or other consumer goods which might be considered as a claim to qualify as a member of a certain status group. Status groups can be quite inaccessible for non-members. Especially when membership is limited to people with a specific ethnicity, they can become closed castes. Such a process turns what might initially be mere diversity into a vertical social system of super- and subordination. However, each status group believes in their own specific honour and a dignity which, depending on their relative position, lies either in this world or, for the less fortunate, in "a future lying beyond the present, whether it is of this life or on another" (p. 934).

According to Weber, “classes are stratified according to their relations to the production and acquisition of goods; whereas status groups are stratified according to the principles of their consumption of goods as represented by special styles of life” (p. 937). This makes their relation inevitable as “the possibility of a style of life expected for members of a status group is usually conditioned economically” (p. 935). In addition, “material monopolies provide the most effective motives for the exclusiveness of a status group: although, in themselves, they are rarely sufficient, almost always they come into play to some extent” (p. 935). It is crucial that status groups are based on consumption patterns, or styles of life, in order to grasp Weber’s importance for the study of leisure. Leisure itself in fact becomes an indicator of status honour and shared leisure interests, and consumption patterns are potentially powerful sources of honour, prestige, and the power that comes with that.

Building on Weber

With regard to the relevance of consumption for social inequality, the work of Pierre Bourdieu has been most influential, especially his major work *Distinction* (1984). In this book, Bourdieu leans heavily on Weber. Consumption patterns, or lifestyles, are (re)produced through differential access to economic, cultural, and social capital embodied in habitus. By introducing the concepts of cultural and symbolic capital, Bourdieu acknowledged, too, that social inequality entails not just economic or class differences. It is based on other sources of honour, especially cultural capital as indicated by manners and taste. Bourdieu does not, however, follow Weber in trying to clearly demarcate classes from status groups. He rather treats status as the symbolic aspect of class structure, arguing that class positions are not defined by economic resources alone. Instead of assuming objective class boundaries based on economic structures, Bourdieu focuses on “the structured formation or self-production of class collectivities through struggles that simultaneously involve relationships between and within classes and determine the actual demarcation of their frontiers. Bourdieu replaces the concept of class structure with that of social space, understood as the

multidimensional distribution of socially effective forms of power (or capital, be it economic, cultural or social) underlying social positions” (Wacquant 1991, p. 52).

More recent scholarly work has shown a growing interest in distinguishing between class and status in studies of cultural lifestyles or leisure activities. According to Chan and Goldthorpe (2010), a main weakness of research into the relation between social stratification and leisure consumption results from inadequacies in the operationalization of the former which typically fails to apply Weber’s distinction between class and status. Referring to Weber, they argue that classes are not real sociocultural groupings, yet, class has been the main way to operationalize social inequality. The status order seems however more relevant for understanding cultural consumption as it is more explicitly linked to social honour. Status is expressed in differential association with others and “lifestyles that are seen as appropriate to different status levels. Status affiliations are thus more likely than class affiliations to be ‘real’ in the sense of ones that are recognised by and meaningful to the social actors involved” (p. 12). Lamenting the “loss of Weberian refinement” (p. 12), they demonstrate that since the 1950s, class and status have not been properly distinguished but used interchangeably by scholars from both the US and Europe, assuming, like Bourdieu, that class and status are necessarily closely and universally connected. The international survey research project launched by Chan and Goldthorpe re-establishes Weber’s distinction. It demonstrates that, indeed, cultural consumption is stratified more by social status, which was measured using information on the occupations of significant others, than by social class (Chan 2010; Chan and Goldthorpe 2007).

Finally, we can also see the growing interest in taking the status group concept seriously in attempts to link lifestyles to the composition of people’s social networks (Mark 1998; Lizardo 2006). Using relational data is increasingly called for in order to understand leisure patterns in their social context. DellaPosta, Shi, and Macy (2015, p. 1502) argue as follows: “Unlike the members of the underlying population, the respondents in a national random sample are atomized individuals, unaccompanied by friends and family. In the absence of relational data, there is no way to measure the effects of sorting and influence in the clustering

of opinions. Investigators are then left with only one analytical option: to assign all the explanatory power to other individual attributes.” This calls for more research that pays explicit attention to shared interpretations, concrete interactions, and group identification when explaining leisure and taste patterns. Thus, explanations of cultural taste patterns, for example omnivorism, are increasingly cast in terms of underlying shared values (van Eijck and Lievens 2008; Ollivier 2008), (changing) symbolic boundaries (Holt 1997; Friedman and Kuipers 2013; Jarness 2015), and people’s engagement in multiple status groups with which they all partly identify (Lahire 2011) and interact (Collins 2004; Ridgeway 2013).

Conclusion

In this chapter we discussed the relevance of the insights of Max Weber for leisure theory. First, we discussed the Protestant Ethic and the absence of leisure, focusing on the relationship between religion and consumption. Second, we took a closer look at Weber’s ideas on the bureaucracy and the rationalization of leisure and how these ideas were used to discuss McDonaldization and re-enchantment. Third, we included a section on social inequality and leisure, discussing how status—vis-à-vis class—matters for lifestyle studies. While we demonstrated that each approach has led to fruitful new research, we would like to end this contribution by suggesting some avenues for future research. First, despite a trend towards secularization in most Western countries, religion remains important and in many parts of the world its impact is increasing, especially if we look at Islam. More research could examine how religion affects leisure consumption across the globe, particularly with a context of societal integration and how particular religious values are translated into leisure restrictions or opportunities. Second, how does re-enchantment work with online leisure consumption? To what extent do online enchantment rituals and meaning-making processes differ between online and offline cultural practices? Finally, the growing interest in the class-status distinction opens up the field of inequality and leisure to questions of shifting hierarchies of honour and prestige. Which leisure activities are

considered more or less legitimate and how do non-class indicators such as gender, age, and ethnicity affect the honour associated with specific leisure practices?

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Flow Theory and Leisure

Samuel D. Elkington

Introduction

Modern leisure has evolved into a complex domain of life with myriad personal and social meanings and is increasingly recognised as significant to human and social development. As a consequence, the quality rather than the quantity of leisure in peoples' lives is now firmly established as a central pillar of individual, as well as societal wellbeing. No longer can leisure be simply explained by objective measures of time or activity; rather, it is recognised as an evolving and dynamic "lived" phenomenon involving personal and social meanings and challenges. Understanding the nature of the leisure experience has become key to comprehending not only what leisure is but also how it is lived, the complexity of its character, and as an opportunity for exploring what it means to be human.

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Csikszentmihalyi's (1992) flow theory has perhaps had the greatest influence on theorising about leisure experience and its affinity for human flourishing, amassing a substantial bank of empirical evidence across several decades. Moving beyond the excellent work of recent reviews detailing the theoretical development and application of flow in leisure (i.e., see Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi 2009; Csikszentmihalyi 2014; Perkins and Nakamura 2013), the primary intention of this chapter is to provide a contemporary illustration of flow theory's ongoing contribution to leisure studies. The chapter attempts to present a more nuanced treatment of the broader dimensions that frame an understanding of flow in modern leisure by way of reconsidering and reassessing such defining features as freedom, discretionary time commitment, and activity involvement and incorporating recent empirical evidence pertaining to the theoretical extension of Csikszentmihalyi's original framework (Elkington 2010, 2011).

Flow Theory and the Leisure Experience: Contributions and Critique

Conceptually, flow was developed on the basis of Csikszentmihalyi's (1975) pioneering empirical studies regarding the experiences of a variety of groups engaged in leisure (i.e., rock climbers, recreational dancers, and chess masters) and work (i.e., artists and surgeons). All described a psychological state whose conditions proved to be universal (Csikszentmihalyi 1975). This state of mind occurs in an existential equilibrium achieved when a person perceives a balance between the challenges associated with a situation and their competence (skills) to accomplish or meet those challenges (Csikszentmihalyi 1990, 1992). To this Csikszentmihalyi adds that flow arises from the challenges to which individuals apply certain competences successfully in certain social situations. When individuals push themselves and extend their competencies, a state of deep involvement is achieved in which individuals become pleasurable immersed in chosen behaviours. This is the experience of flow, a term that is itself a metaphor for a process in which action follows upon action according

to an internal logic that seems to need no conscious intervention on our part. We experience it as a unified experience flowing from one moment to the next, in which we feel in control of our actions and in which there is little distinction between self and environment, between stimulus and response, or between past, present, and future (Csikszentmihalyi 1990, p. 36).

Flow is taken here to refer more generically to a deeply enjoyable psychological state in which complete absorption in the task at hand leads to a number of positive experiential qualities, namely: First, the experience usually occurs when an individual is confronted with a task which they have a realistic chance of completing. Second, that individual must be able to concentrate on what it is that needs to be done in relation to the completion of that task. Third and fourth, the requisite concentration is made possible because the task undertaken contains clear goals and provides near-immediate feedback. Fifth and sixth, the individual acts with a deep yet effortless involvement that eliminates from conscious awareness the concerns of daily life, allowing them to exercise a sense of control over their actions. Seventh, as a consequence of this involvement, the concerns for self fade, though re-emerge as both stronger and more complex after the experience is over. And, finally, the subjective sense of time is altered. In the event that the activity is characterised by a combination of these components, it is experienced as worth doing for its own sake; the experience is said to become *autotelic* (Latin for “self-goal”; Csikszentmihalyi 1993, pp. 178–179), the sensation that comes with the actual enacting of an intrinsically rewarding activity (Csikszentmihalyi 1990).

Though Csikszentmihalyi’s flow concept has since been employed in both the human and social sciences, flow theory has done more than most to influence the study of leisure as a positive experiential state whose essence is the experience of being freely chosen and intrinsically rewarding, providing valuable insights into how the activities of everyday life come to be invested with meaning and experienced as deeply enjoyable. The concept is popular in leisure studies because it appears to describe the fusion between the personal motivation to achieve competence and the situations in which the attempt to affirm or extend competence is made. Research has shown that active leisure activities such as sports, games, arts, and hobbies merge the fun of

leisure with focused attention and enjoyment, maintaining aspects of play, providing pleasure, self-expression, and intrinsic motivation, while also promoting intentional effort towards well-defined, meaningful, goals and competencies (Delle Fave and Bassi 2003; Walker 2010). Other activities, such as socialising, watching television, reading, and listening to music, provide pleasure and fun without high demands. These passive activities do not necessarily represent opportunities for developing specific skills. The crucial aspect distinguishing active and passive leisure activities is complexity in structure—that is, a clear set of rules and procedures that can be associated with personal engagement, concentration, effort, and commitment towards meeting incremental challenges and achieving meaningful goals (Nakamura and Csikszentmihalyi 2009). It is worth noting that the complexity of a flow activity is limited by the degree of challenge it can provide and by the willingness and “creativity” of the person to create challenges in an activity (Csikszentmihalyi 1988).

Flow theory has shed light on to the character and form of what has been labelled “optimal experience” and provided significant insight into issues of freedom, discretionary time commitment, and activity involvement in leisure (Csikszentmihalyi 1988; Perkins and Nakamura 2013). Optimal experience in leisure occurs when the appropriate balance is struck between motivation, competence, and the environment for action that is entered into freely and experienced as pleasurable (Rojek 2010). It would seem conceivable that leisure is more conducive to the flow state than other domains. The roots of leisure tend, after all, to be in individual choice and self-determined activities, so encapsulating a greater freedom to select and control individual activities that should, in theory, allow the achievement and maintenance of a match between challenges and skills. But as Csikszentmihalyi notes, flow and leisure are not equivalent concepts; while flow can occur during some leisure activities, it can also take place during productive activities (i.e., work). Flow theory goes further to focus only on those actions and activities that interrelate challenge and skills, thus replicating a pattern of dualism as it favours active challenges and skill-based leisure, while openly dismissing other forms of potentially enriching leisure such as reading, contemplation, walking, or taking in the theatre. Such activities are relegated to a value-laden category entitled

“passive leisure”, setting up a value hierarchy based upon action and challenge as essentially “good” and all other facets of leisure as negative.

An approach to freedom in leisure flow theory reflects the predominantly liberal background against which psychological analysis of leisure has been developed, a background increasingly criticised in certain spheres of social and political analysis (Fox and Walker 2002). It is characterised by the conceptualisation of the self as disembodied, its defining characteristics existing apparently pre-socially and thus independently of context. Criticism squared against such conceptualisations argues that the individual conceived independently of context is also empty of content, in the words of Hemingway (1996, p. 29) “an autonomous will without ends, to be willed upon”: and that such conceptions exclude broader social and cultural factors that decisively shape and colour the actual range of freedom, and so choice, available to individuals.

Abstracting such supposedly context-neutral concepts as perceptions, subjective experience, or spiritual condition ignores the fact that individuals are situated in specific contexts shaping both these mental experiences and their range of possible content, thus committing the essentialist error of seeking to explain motivation, location (as setting), and context in terms of ethnocentric categories (Rojek 2010). It would appear from its natural psychological vantage point that the true terrain of flow in leisure is the interior of the human mind—a way of seeing, an outlook to be turned on the world rather than simply reflecting it. But such a view fails to take sufficient account of the fact that freedom is a duality: “the difference between action dependent on the will of others and action dependent on one’s own will” (Bauman 1988, p. 9). It is in this social relation that we find the ambivalence of leisure; on the one hand, it is an idea that always implies freedom but on the other hand, it is also one that almost always signifies constraint (Blackshaw 2010). It is also here that the implicit assumption of flow theory that all individuals are striving for the same enhanced sense of enjoyment and competence through their leisure is revealed to be at best a value judgement. The very nature of privileging such a narrow perspective of leisure experience replicates normalised practices; analogously, the categories of choice, freedom and self-determined action prevail. As an exemplar of leisure experience, however, flow theory reduces leisure to a small fraction of its potential,

neutralising the significance of ideology and interpellation in clarifying notions of freedom, individual motivation, and the composition of environments for action.

Freedom, as the argument goes, no matter how internalised, does not exist independently of the contingencies of the contexts in which human beings find themselves. These contexts consist not only of the social and the material conditions in which people are located but also include the forms of rationality these conditions make available to individuals—the conformity of one's actions with one's reasons for action (Hemingway 1996). Hemingway posits that there is dialectic interplay between these social and material conditions and forms of rationality that establishes the range of freedom and choice experienced. This interplay is largely absent from considerations of freedom through flow in leisure, thus neglecting the fact that the individual interior in which freedom is said to be found derives in large part from the forms of thought available to it and that these forms are historically conditioned by social and material factors. Any analysis of freedom in leisure must, by this logic, explore the dynamics of this interplay. But if an understanding of flow in leisure is to be constructed around a sense of freedom, so conceived, what should we make of those free time activities that require a commitment to a schedule or that bring about some degree of stress or discomfort? Freedom and enjoyment might predictably be threatened under these conditions.

Csikszentmihalyi (1993) is keen to stress that optimal experiences do not always need to give immediate gratification, noting that the journey to a state of flow does not always feel pleasurable at the time, but can be achieved later, through reflection. Here the notion of freedom is undergone by the manner in which individuals pursue these activities, which is likely to be characterised by a sense of necessity, obligation, and commitment expressed by self-discipline and regimentation, involving the rehearsal and practice of behaviour and technique over time. Indeed, using Csikszentmihalyi's flow model, it is possible to map an aetiology of flow in leisure that is developmental rather than merely circumstantial: the early experiential enjoyment found in learning about a new subject or making preliminary attempts to execute its requisite skills, the initial acceptance of being novice in the activity, the experience of committing to learning more about it, and finally the experience of committing to the

activity in the longer term and seeking out new challenges and possibilities through expressions of ever more refined action. That such developmental experience may fit within the context of leisure is supported by the fact that they are embedded within a personal framework of choice and self-expression. The allure here is that leisure allows individuals to enter into a relationship with time, space, and experience that is far removed from everyday life. In this way, as well as being current, fully occupying our immediate mental faculties, the flow experience is also open to possibility, allowing creativity to move through individuals who are at one with the process and content of their chosen leisure activities.

This initial sketch of flow in leisure is framed by the instrumental proposition that, in truth, fundamentally speaking, leisure has little meaning except in terms of how it is used. People who regularly select relaxing and passive avenues of leisure devoid of challenge are unlikely to experience flow. Of course, suggests Csikszentmihalyi, “if one uses leisure to engage in a sport, an art form, or hobby”, examples of what he terms active leisure activities, “then the requirements for flow will be present”. Such activities are akin to what leisure researchers have termed “high-investment activities”, that is “activities that have developed over time, require a great deal of effort and resources and acquisition of skill and are more likely to yield outcomes of an enhanced sense of competence and worth” (Kelly et al. 1987, p. 197). But free time with nothing specific to engage attention will leave a residue of listlessness and dissatisfaction (Stebbins 2001). Consequently, high-investment activities typically involve commitment, obligation, discipline, and even occasional sacrifice (Mannell 1993). That an individual must invest time and energy to experience flow is supported by a bank of research (Delle Fave and Massimini 1988; Mannell et al. 1988; Mannell 1993; Declou et al. 2009) that has shown that, contrary to expectations, freely chosen but extrinsically motivated activities produced the highest levels of flow. For instance, Delle Fave and Massimini (1988) have emphasised the importance of freely chosen obligations for setting the structure for flow to occur; they consider that “given the freedom to choose, some people may need the feeling of compulsion, obligation to self or others or long term commitment to overcome resistance to engagement in activities that require an investment of

effort but as a consequence produce higher levels of intrinsically satisfying flow” (Delle Fave and Massimini 1988, p. 302). On the surface this appears to be paradoxical because responding to a set of requirements reflects relinquishing of choice, and choice is the freedom most commonly associated with leisure (Kleiber et al. 2011). But freedom should not be so easily equated with choice nor is it always a reflection of control or of some form of constraint. For abandoning choice with ongoing consent for involvement is an aspect of commitment that can deepen the leisure experience (Harper 1986; Hemingway 1996).

This drives at the heart of what is a very human dilemma to matters of free will and how materialism and contemporary consumer culture increasingly preoccupies mind and body to the extent that in the era of modern leisure, while people may claim to be free and devoted to their leisure pursuits, this invariably means giving nothing of themselves in what is a mashup of superficial experiences devoid of any real meaning (Elkington and Gammon 2014). But modern western societies have witnessed exponential growth in leisure and not just the kind that is provided for by contemporary consumer culture, revealing more and more activities to be marked with a significant degree of meaning, draw, and devotional practices (Florida 2004; Bille 2010). A central concern in searching for the heart of leisure today, therefore, lies in identifying the human role, and while conventional social science conceptualisations rightly acknowledge the acting individual and the play of human agency as key features in the shaping of leisure, this does not capture what is exceptional about our most compelling experiences, for instance, when participants find interesting and absorbing experiences associated with flow. In its purest form, argues sociologist Robert Stebbins (2001) “psychological flow is more likely felt in certain “serious” leisure activities that are rewarding for their self-expression, cherished experiences, self-gratification and tendency to refresh mind and body” (p. 21). Stebbins (2007) has since conceptualised psychological flow as an optimal example of what he terms “the thrills” available in so-called serious leisure activities. These thrills or high points are the “sharply exciting events and occasions that stand out in the minds of those who pursue a kind of serious leisure” (p. 15). Thrills in serious leisure may be seen as situated manifestations of certain more abstract

rewards; they are what many participants seek as concrete expressions of the rewards they find there. They are deemed of great importance, in substantial part, because they motivate the participant to continue their pursuit of an activity in the hope of finding similar experiences again in future leisure episodes. For example, Stebbins (2005) found it to be highly prized in the hobbies of kayaking, mountain/ice climbing, and snowboarding.

Flow Theory and Leisure Activities: Limitations and Extensions

Csikszentmihalyi's concept of flow has been employed in a variety of theoretical contexts, each of which has tended to draw on particular dimensions of this relatively complex concept that happens to be relevant to the context at issue. Little effort has been made, however, to undertake empirical explorations of the dimensions of flow experience that might serve to underpin this theoretical discourse (Elkington 2010). As such, flow is readily accepted to be a state of mind, as mental activity and as an experiential phenomenon. Contemporary flow research relies heavily on concepts and methods depicting flow experience as something an individual can easily frame, that endures through time, and whose essential qualities are captured in a single isolated experience. However, research undertaken by Elkington (2010, 2011) exploring the complex phenomenology of individuals' experiences of flow in "serious leisure" activities has exposed a major limitation of the contemporary sketch of Csikszentmihalyi's flow to be its outline character, that is, its lack of elaboration and detailed reflection on process and procedure. In his research, Elkington has attempted to provide a more complete and systematic understanding of the flow experience, demonstrating that there is more to the lived flow experience, what he calls "flow-in-action" (Elkington 2010), than engaging in the core activity that generates it. His research subjects in hobbyist table tennis, amateur acting, and voluntary sport coaching talked about the importance of the activities undertaken in preparation for experiencing flow (pre-flow) and the importance of those undertaken afterward (post-flow). He found that pre-flow preparation

included developing a feeling of “readiness” to participate in the activity and having a clear idea of what will be necessary to do this successfully. This includes developing trust with other participants in the activity setting so that, to the extent they are part of it, the individual will experience flow as expected. One common process observed in post-flow was the participants’ tendency to describe and analyse the earlier flow experience, either to themselves or through sharing their experiences with others in the activity. The self-awareness that follows flow in post-flow experience was found to invariably include sensations of enhanced and extended personal mastery of a particular leisure situation and enjoyment derived from successfully accomplishing a challenging task. This is crucial as the natural course of enjoyment of any moderately complex activity, notes Csikszentmihalyi (1990), leads to the refinement of judgements and the development of new skills. To continue experiencing the exhilaration of flow, as the theory goes, “it is necessary to take on a slightly greater challenge and develop slightly greater skills. So the complexity of adaptation increases, propelled forward by the enjoyment it provides” (Csikszentmihalyi 1988, p. 367).

Elkington’s phenomenological work shows that largely due to the highly positive and rewarding characteristics of flow, the associated activities of amateur theatre, hobbyist table tennis, and volunteer sport coaching tended to be preferentially replicated and over time shaped individual leisure repertoires, these being the sets of activities, interests, and goals a person preferentially selects and cultivates in his/her leisure. Elkington has gone further still to reveal that the problem of reaching and entering a state of flow remains part of the phenomenology of experiencing flow and is subject to the continued development and expression of individual ability situated within the peculiarities of certain leisure settings (Elkington 2011). There certainly appears to be conditions that must be met by these activities if they are to successfully attract high investment from participants in their freely chosen pursuits. Csikszentmihalyi has maintained that the flow experience is more likely to occur within sequences of activities that are goal-directed and rule-bound and that could not be done without the appropriate skills (Csikszentmihalyi 1992). Elkington’s extended “systematic” phenomenology of flow in leisure has shown to be framed by a situated confluence of these same features. The crucial

aspects here being (1) a clear set of rules and procedures which foster agency, concentration, commitment, and autonomous action towards meeting challenges and pursuing goals, and (2) enacting leisure activities according to an “autotelic rationality”, the idea of surrendering of one’s actions to one’s reasons for action that are, at once, self-evident, perceptively self-determined and require a degree of trust, faith and, indeed, comfort within one’s surroundings. Participants in Elkington’s study invariably evaluated their involvement in their leisure activities as good or bad, according to such autotelic rationality, the level of satisfaction derived turning on the extent to which experiences positively reflect and affirm their reasons for becoming involved. It is by way of such deeply enjoyable leisure activities and their core tasks that participants realised a unique combination of, what were for them, powerful personal benefits aligned with certain values peculiar to a social setting: success, achievement, and freedom of action and expression.

Relatedly, Csikszentmihalyi’s flow is, claims Stebbins (2005), perhaps “the most widely discussed and studied generic, intrinsic reward in the psychology of work and leisure’ and ‘although comparatively few types of work and leisure generate flow for their participants, those that do are found primarily in the ‘devotee occupations’ and the ‘serious’ forms of leisure” (p. 40). Although the idea of serious leisure originates within the work of Stebbins (2007) and has, therefore, an intellectual history separate from Csikszentmihalyi’s flow framework, experiencing flow is commonly reported as an important motivational force for serious leisure participants (Stebbins 2005). Serious leisure is “the systematic pursuit of an amateur, hobbyist, or volunteer activity that people find so substantial, interesting, and fulfilling that, in the typical case, they launch themselves on a (leisure) career centred on acquiring and expressing a combination of its special skills, knowledge, and experience” (Stebbins 2007, p. 5). All forms of serious leisure share common ground in that each centres on a core activity, taken to mean “a set of interrelated actions or steps that must be followed to achieve an outcome or product that the participant in the larger activity finds attractive” (Stebbins 2007, pp. 20–21). Stebbins continues to note that “engaging in the core activity and its component steps and actions, is a main feature that attracts participants to the leisure activity in question and encourages them to return” (p. 21).

Csikszentmihalyi and Stebbins have been key contributors to the belief within leisure research that “good leisure” needs to be much more than simply a pleasant or diversionary experience. Both Stebbins and Csikszentmihalyi have observed that few people intentionally seek out activities or situations that command the investment of significant psychological and physical energy. Indeed, Stebbins (2001) suggested that such persistence of habitual passive or “casual” leisure stems from the public’s apparent ignorance towards more intensive, rewarding, and serious leisure alternatives. Such is the theoretic association between flow and serious leisure that the impression within the current literature linking these two important ideas is that by implication, all serious leisure offers significant moments during which participants find flow. However, Stebbins (2010) has reasoned that flow is not a universal feature of serious leisure as there are certain forms that appear unable to bring about this experience; he identifies the apparent non-flow character of the liberal arts hobbies. Their goal being the acquisition of a body of knowledge and understanding of, for example, one or more arts, sports, foods, beverages, languages, cultures, histories, sciences, philosophies, or literary traditions. Furthermore, Elkington’s research has illustrated that one of the main reasons that participants devote time and effort to their leisure is because they gain a deeply enjoyable state of experience from it, an experience that is not accessible in everyday life. Involvement in these leisure activities and settings does not guarantee flow will be experienced; rather, what makes these activities conducive to such deeply enjoyable experiences is that the structural design of their core activities functions to shape the nature of participation, facilitating concentration and individual involvement by making an activity as distinct as possible from day-to-day living. That being said, Elkington has reported that participants do not routinely happen upon flow in their leisure; instead, flow in serious leisure demands perseverance and personal effort in the development of specifically acquired knowledge and skill. Only activities that require such an investment of effort are seen to provide opportunities to maintain and further develop the sense of competence that allows the individual to frequently experience enjoyment and develop positive feelings about themselves (Elkington 2011).

When this dynamic is brought to bear on the broader interaction between individual and activity in the context of flow in leisure, the nature and intensity of involvement has been found to be mediated by an attitude of “seriousness”, “itself a psychological marker characterised by an important degree of personal commitment to, and trust in, the core activity and its wider setting” (Elkington 2010, p. 353). This seriousness component was found to frame much of the flow experience associated with the serious leisure activities studied by Elkington, characterised by a purposeful commitment of self to the core activity over time. Though a point that must be understood is that individuals become committed to a leisure role (as actor, musician, player, or coach) based on their deepening involvement in and attachment to its highly valued core activities, individuals will discover in the course of their involvement therein just how fulfilling the core activity can be (Elkington and Stebbins 2014). The need for personal commitment, persistence, and perseverance in order to find flow in serious leisure activity not only contradicts the positive psychological stance of contemporary flow discourse but also suggests that negative experience cannot be avoided or ignored and that the positive and negative facets of experience may in fact be interrelated. Achieving flow in leisure certainly appears to be fundamentally constituted by the basic dialectic between positive and negative experience in that individuals must occasionally persevere in order to achieve the elusive yet necessary balanced state of mind associated with finding flow.

Articulating a Tentative Ecology of Leisure Involvement

Elkington’s theoretical extension of flow theory in serious leisure articulates what is more accurately an ecological perspective of leisure involvement, illustrating how the activity involvement of devotees from amateur theatre acting, hobbyist table tennis, and volunteer sports coaching shares a degree of intensity that is consistent with experiencing flow, an experience that is usually associated with high-quality performance and a pattern of commitment that joins them with others in a unique ethos of

shared meaning and perseverance, in a personal and collective sense. This commitment and personal endeavour forges a connection with other individuals or groups that share these interests, reinforces shared commitment, and creates the experience of being part of a defined social world containing clearly defined activities and roles, perhaps only known to its members/the individual. For each of the serious leisure groups involved in Elkington's research, this social world was experienced as somehow separate from wider society, with this separation largely based upon the special skills, knowledge, and attributes required to perform well in each. This not only illustrates that the social context has a crucial role to play in establishing the quality of the experience derived by participants but also suggests that finding flow in serious leisure may be more applicable to social contexts and activities where achievement plays a dominant role.

Regularly finding flow in serious leisure activities has been found to lead to the accrual of certain personal and social benefits, including the enhancement of self-concept, self-actualisation, feelings of accomplishment, enhanced self-esteem, and social interaction (Elkington 2010; Jones et al. 2000; Stebbins 2005). The accrual of the majority of these benefits occurs as a consequence of finding flow and is associated with increased perceived competence in these activities. This would suggest that it is not enough for an individual to just do an activity to feel good about themselves but rather that some expression of skill or mastery is necessary to create that affect, forging a strong attachment to or identification with that leisure setting as being one that is flow producing. Experiencing flow in serious leisure has been found to be a source of deep and personally enriching experience that provides opportunities for the progressive development and expression of individual ability, representing perhaps the principal motivational drive for individuals in their leisure (Elkington 2011; Stebbins 2007). Concomitantly, individuals may gain a profound sense of continuity of experience, and hence leisure career, from their continued and steady development as a skilled, experienced, and knowledgeable participant in a particular form of serious leisure and from the deepening fulfilment that accompanies such meaningful personal growth. A person's sense of the unfolding of his or her career in any complex leisure role, observes Stebbins (2007), can be a powerful motive to act therein. But it is also possible the inverse of

this effect may occur, where repeated episodes of low-activity involvement and failure to achieve flow-like involvement, over time, deflate the willingness for continued involvement. To the extent that intensity of involvement equates to long-term involvement, it also seems possible that some participants will reach a plateau in their level of seriousness. That is, they will continue to participate in the serious leisure but no more seriously than earlier. Others may even cut back on their seriousness, as for example, work forces reduce in leisure time or when physical skills wane (Elkington 2011).

When tied with personal interest and cultivated in a trusted context of social support for seeking challenge and self-expression, experiencing flow in leisure serves as a context for growth and personal development and a source of meaningful subjective experience that integrates three distinct but interrelated levels: the individual, significant/involved others, and the place/setting (Elkington 2011). The first, individual level comprises of the initial subjective interpretation of the individual of his/her personal skills and competencies as they attempt to provide some degree of significance and meaning to their actions. The second level concerns the social interaction with those directly (i.e., fellow participants) and/or indirectly (i.e., family members) as individuals start to collaboratively put together a fuller understanding of the nature and quality of their experience. The third and final level subsumes the relations between the previous two and the places in which leisure experiences occur. During leisure time, people relate to different places or settings, with this affiliation comes the realisation that specific places contribute to specific “meaningful” leisure experiences (Elkington 2014). The evolution of meaning in perception and the giving of meaning to an environment or setting through positive action are thus integral to the ecology of flow in leisure. It is the interaction between the individual, involved others, and leisure settings that defines the overall meaning of leisure experience for an individual. As a consequence of this dialectical process, individuals can learn more about themselves as active and interactive beings. For example, based on the success or failure of an individual’s efforts, and the feedback he/she receives from others around them, that person may come to see themselves as a competent actor, table tennis player, and so on.

Both individual and social dimensions of flow in leisure appear to constitute a broader and defining space within to forge a positive self-concept. In this sense, it could be claimed that self-hood (who we are) and the good (captured most profoundly in flow) are inextricably intertwined, themselves essentially tied up with what the individual is committed to, what is valued, and what the individual strives for in their leisure. The central project of flow in leisure is essentially that of personal growth and development or, more specifically, of differentiation, of moving an individual forward, and of integration, establishing a union with significant others, with ideas, traditions, and values, that transcend the boundary of the self. But a range of factors can affect the individual's capacity to fulfil this project. Meaningful differentiation and integration depends upon such criteria as commitment from participants, high levels of effort and skill in the activity, time involvement, trust in a supportive environment, and the willingness and creativity to maintain and/or increase their involvement in the activity in the future—in short, the *seriousness* with which they approach their leisure.

In addition to the associated positive psychological qualities, the potential for whole-person growth through experiencing flow in leisure demonstrates important quality of life consequences; the ultimate achievement in this is perhaps the development of a personal life theme, “a meaningful arrangement of goals and means” forged around the focused wellbeing that is characteristic of flow (Chalip et al. 1984, p. 263). As it stands, Csikszentmihalyi's flow theory does not suffice to break from the abstract individualism of its essential structure to an adequate understanding of the interconnectedness and constructed nature of such experience as evidenced in recent theoretical extensions of this established framework. Subsequently, the flow experience is all too often studied and debated in isolation from the settings in which it occurs. Conflating the flow and serious leisure frameworks thus widens and enriches the theoretical and conceptual lens through which Csikszentmihalyi's flow is viewed and provides a framework within to deal with the dynamic and interactive relationship between internal and contextual factors which combine to shape the nature, quality, and meaning of the flow experience. With reference to the characteristics of experiencing flow in leisure and to the seriousness component found to underpin them, Elkington's research

has demonstrated how flow and serious leisure share much more than a theoretical affinity but are, in fact, mutually reinforcing of one another. That is to say that flow functions, more accurately, as a unifying positive psychological construct for the special qualities of serious leisure representing the richest, most nuanced portrayal yet of “optimal leisure experience” (Elkington 2011). The term optimal is not used here to imply some utopian leisure state nor the presence of a true or pure form of leisure experience for which each individual should strive. Instead it denotes incidences of intense, purposeful action and personal commitment of self that have been shown to bring about a more authentic, meaningful resonance between an individual, a leisure activity, and its setting.

To slip into flow at all in leisure, participants must attain certain levels of experience, skill, knowledge, and conditioning appropriate to the challenges presented by the activity-context. Normative expressions of flow often substitute for any further elaboration about what comprises it, for example, the ability to establish a distinction between everyday reality and that of flow turning on a level of seriousness or personal commitment to and involvement in a particular leisure activity. It is likely that the typical beginner does not know of such structures, while the typical expert probably incorporates them automatically into her interactions with an activity and its setting. The challenge for the individual is to learn to manage time, space, and the activity and to internalise as many of these features as possible. As a source of relative freedom for self-expression, the experience of flow in leisure has been found to afford the opportunity for self-direction of personal development. Whether such leisure is generative of meaningful growth and development, however, would seem to depend primarily on whether the activity is entered into seriously—whether it is used to address higher-order intrinsic needs for autonomy and competence and whether it results in feelings of personal expressiveness and social integration. The goal for the individual is to embrace the complexities and ambiguities of experiences that give the promise of deeply positive and enjoyable leisure, concurrently as well as over time. It is reasonable to suggest, therefore, that the activities that people continue to take seriously will be those that are likely to be intrinsically enjoyable and flow-producing, in many cases taking on the form of broader leisure lifestyles.

Concluding Remarks

Irrespective of how we might choose to define or delimit the phenomenon of leisure, it is likely that we think of the paradigmatic leisure experience as an inherently positive one (Perkins and Nakamura 2013). Csikszentmihalyi's flow theory has done more than most to influence the study of the leisure experience, providing valuable insights into how the activities of everyday life come to be invested with meaning and experienced as enjoyable. A substantial bank of empirical evidence exists suggesting that flow is certainly something real for people in their leisure. But to think of it as if it were "good" solely because it provides enjoyment for those involved is misleading, according to recent advances in flow theory (Elkington 2010, 2011). Such a view of flow in leisure misses what is really at the heart of the matter and in enjoyment focuses on something that may or may not be immediately evident for people. What really counts is to have discovered a devotion, a passion for something that has intrinsic—autotelic—value, something to commit oneself to wholeheartedly and something to take seriously. Here the vital insight is that in modern western societies, leisure is often the emotional centre of peoples' lives. Leisure, so conceived, represents a special art of arrangement or an ordering of life found within the extraordinary meeting place of self-determined action, unobligated time commitment, and intrinsic motivation. In this way we may say that the presence of flow in leisure is inspiring despite its everydayness; that is, although it is something that seems tacit and thus subjective, it nonetheless engrosses the foreground of peoples' productive energies, permeating their fundamental attitudes to notions of freedom, affect, pleasure, commitment, and creativity in leisure.

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Serious Leisure: Past, Present, and Possibilities

Karen Gallant

Introduction

Serious leisure is a concept that has captured our imagination since it was first introduced in the 1980s, because it diverged from the suggestion, common at the time, that leisure was inherently superficial and inconsequential. Reflecting a new way of representing leisure that was pursued in systematic and committed ways and leading to similarly significant benefits, serious leisure has been a foundational concept in leisure scholarship, providing a framework for exploring and discussing a diverse collection of activities that offer through participation the potential for meaningful and consequential experiences.

The goal of this chapter is to both describe and critique the evolution of serious leisure as a concept and to add to current debate about

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its status as a theory. I will begin by briefly recounting the conceptual and theoretical development of serious leisure. From there, the qualities and types of serious leisure will be described as they are understood today. Recent leisure literature employing a serious leisure framework is discussed in the context of significant themes and issues emerging from this research. The chapter culminates in a discussion of the suitability of serious leisure as a *theory* for studying and understanding leisure in the twenty-first century.

Overview and Origins of Serious Leisure

The concept of serious leisure was introduced in the 1980s in response to the growing prominence of leisure, rather than work, as a source of identity and self-fulfilment in the post-industrial era (Stebbins 1982a). While studying musicians, astronomers, and other groups of amateurs in the late 1970s, sociologist Robert Stebbins noticed that many participants approached their chosen leisure pursuits in systematic ways, with a seriousness that was considered uncharacteristic of leisure at that time (Stebbins 1982b, 1992). The concept of serious leisure grew from Stebbins' work on defining amateurism, that is, those who do "for fun" what others do in a professional capacity (Stebbins 1992). Stebbins' work on amateurs expanded as he conducted ethnographic studies in each of the four areas of amateurism he had identified—sport, science, entertainment, and arts (Stebbins 1992, 2007). Jointly, he referred to this group of studies as "the 15-year project", which culminated in his book *Amateurs, Professionals and Serious Leisure* (1992).

Serious Leisure Defined

Stebbins suggested the first definition of serious leisure in 1992, and his updated definition has changed little. Stebbins describes serious leisure as

the systematic pursuit of an amateur, hobbyist or volunteer activity sufficiently substantial, interesting, and fulfilling for the participant to find a

(leisure) career there acquiring and expressing a combination of its special skills, knowledge, and experience

(Elkington and Stebbins 2014, p. 4)

Further, serious leisure is characterised by its six defining characteristics:

1. *The occasional need to persevere*, typically to acquire skills and abilities in the activity. In his early work on amateurs, Stebbins (1981) noted the need to persevere during cold nights of stargazing as an amateur astronomer. Stebbins (1977) notes that while a love of an activity is what motivates people to participate, it is perseverance in that activity during times of adversity and frustration that leads to levels of skill and experience that distinguish serious leisure participants from those engaged in casual leisure.
2. *The ability to follow a (leisure) career in the pursuit*. Serious leisure careers typically follow a temporal pattern where participants progress through a series of stages, including beginning, development, establishment, maintenance, and possibly decline (Stebbins 2007). Like professional careers, serious leisure careers may span more than one organisation and may involve setbacks, which are usually temporary. Even when the nature of a serious leisure pursuit is such that there is no explicit opportunity to progress in the field (such as in the solitary pursuit of a hobby), the acquisition of skills and related rewards (accolades, personal fulfilment, etc.) constitute the milestones of a serious leisure career (Stebbins 2007).
3. *Significant personal effort, leading to the development of specialised skills, knowledge, or training*, which allows serious leisure participants to engage in their chosen pursuits at advanced levels compared with their casual counterparts. These advanced skills may be acquired through training or experience and may be either self-taught or acquired through education programmes (Stebbins 1992).
4. *The experience of durable benefits, including both personal and social benefits*. Among the personal benefits are intrinsic benefits such as personal enrichment, self-actualisation, and self-expression, along with financial gain associated with serious leisure involvement (Stebbins 2007).

5. The experience of a *unique ethos* of common attitudes, values, and practices through involvement in a *unique social world* (Stebbins 2007). Unruh (1979) described a social world as “an internally recognisable constellation of actors, organisations, events, and practices which have coalesced into a perceived sphere of interest and involvement for participants” (p. 115). Unruh further characterises social worlds as diffuse, informal social organisations characterised by voluntary identification and sustained through informal communication.
6. *Strong identification with the pursuit* (Elkington and Stebbins 2014). For example, serious leisure participants are often eager to describe their serious leisure endeavours to others and may define themselves in terms of their serious leisure participation. Empirical work on serious leisure has illustrated the strong link between identity and participation in a social world (Baldwin and Norris 1999; Gillespie et al. 2002; Jones 2006; Lawrence 2006).

Serious leisure participants may be amateurs, hobbyists, or volunteers. Amateurs, as described earlier, are defined as those who do “for fun” what others do in a professional capacity, such as musicians or astronomers (e.g., Stebbins 1978). Hobbyists are similar to amateurs but distinguishable from them by the lack of professional counterparts. Types of hobbyist activities include collecting, making and tinkering, sports and games, and liberal arts pursuits (Stebbins 1992, 2007). Volunteering can be either casual or serious in nature, but volunteering as serious leisure, called *career* volunteering, is volunteering that aligns with the qualities of serious leisure. There is some overlap between these three types of serious leisure participation, and indeed an individual engaged in serious leisure might take on more than one of these roles through their involvement. For example, Baldwin and Norris (1999), in their study of amateur dog enthusiasts involved in American Kennel Club (AKC) activities, noted that the serious leisure participants they studied tended to be both amateur dog handlers and volunteers within the AKC.

In Stebbins’ recent books (Elkington and Stebbins 2014; Stebbins 2014), serious leisure is presented as part of the “serious leisure perspective” (SLP), a typology that encompasses all leisure pursuits and some work. The three main categories within this typology are casual leisure,

project-based leisure, and serious pursuits, where serious leisure is presented alongside “devotee work”—compensated occupations in which participants feel a sense of devotion, attachment, and pride. Casual leisure is defined as “immediately, intrinsically rewarding, relatively short-lived pleasurable activity requiring little or no special training to enjoy it” (Stebbins 1997, p. 18). Falling somewhere between casual and serious leisure, project-based leisure embodies some of the qualities of serious leisure within an abbreviated timeline. Stebbins defines project-based leisure as “a short-term, moderately complicated, either one-shot or occasional, though infrequent, creative undertaking carried out in free time” (Stebbins 2007, p. 43).

Serious Leisure as a Research Framework

Leisure scholars continue to build on Stebbins’ early conceptualisations of serious leisure. Some research focuses on examining the scope of serious leisure as a concept, exploring its application to pastimes that do not fit neatly into hobbyist, amateur, or volunteer activities, such as life-long learning (Jones and Symon 2001), involvement in local politics (Fleming 2006), attending comedy festivals (Frew 2006), or being an ardent football fan (Gibson et al. 2002; Jones 2000). These studies confirm that the serious leisure can be applied to an expansive and diverse assortment of leisure pursuits and that it is the way in which participants approach their involvement, rather than the activity itself, which defines a leisure experience as serious leisure.

Research has also explored the acquisition of stories (Kane and Zink 2004) and leisure artefacts (Fawbert 2006), and the careful selection and use of equipment (Littlefield and Sindzinski 2012), to express involvement in serious leisure, affiliation with its social worlds, and progression in its career paths. Also of interest to researchers are the theoretical links between serious leisure and other concepts prevalent in leisure theory, such as deviant leisure (Rojek 1997; Stebbins 1997; Williams and Walker 2006), flow (Elkington 2006), self-determination (Lee and Scott 2006), and constraint negotiation (Kennelly et al. 2013). Research also delves further into the benefits of serious leisure, exploring how empowerment

(Arai 1997; Major 2001; Reid and van Dreunen 1996), social capital (Jones and Symon 2001; Perkins and Benoit 2004), and social inclusion (Patterson 2001) stem from the durable benefits of SLP. Further, some research has explored drawbacks of SLP, including time and relationship tensions (Gillespie et al. 2002; Raisborough 2006; Yarnel and Dowler 2002/2003), social marginalisation (Lawrence 2006), and ongoing need for perseverance (Lamont et al. 2014). A few studies have taken a critical or feminist perspective to examine inequities in access to serious leisure, power within the serious leisure sphere, and progression in its career paths (Bartram 2001; Raisborough 2006). Further, several studies have examined the costs and benefits of SLP (Jones 2000; Lamont et al. 2014; Lee and Scott 2006; Major 2001; Stebbins 1991/1992).

Critiques of Serious Leisure

While heavily used as a framework for guiding leisure research, serious leisure has also been subject to debate and critique, particularly related to the following aspects of serious leisure:

- (1) its lack of evolution as a concept;
- (2) its status as a *theory*;
- (3) the tendency for specific activities to be defined as serious leisure rather than defining serious leisure based on the characteristics of the experience;
- (4) lack of clarity in terms of how serious leisure is associated with casual leisure;
- (5) a conceptual focus on the benefits of serious leisure rather than a more balanced conceptualisation that includes costs of serious leisure; and
- (6) lack of attention to social and political context within serious leisure research and conceptual development.

This last area of critique is broad and expansive and represents the area where there is most need for evolution if serious leisure is to remain relevant through the twenty-first century.

The Static Definition of Serious Leisure

The core definition and defining characteristics of serious leisure have evolved little since its inception as a concept in the early 1980s. Compared with other leisure theories such as constraints, there has been relatively little debate about serious leisure as a concept. Even when critique of serious leisure has emerged in the literature (e.g., Dilley and Scraton 2010; Gallant et al. 2013a; Shen and Yarnal 2010), such critique has not typically led to change in the way serious leisure has been conceptualised. Jones (2006) suggested an updated definition of serious leisure based on identity as the core characteristic of serious leisure experiences, while Gallant et al. (2013a) offered an updated definition of serious leisure intended to emphasise the social and political context of serious leisure. However, neither of these definitions have been heavily utilised, as scholars tend to rely on Stebbins' seminal work in defining serious leisure. While Stebbins has developed and collaborated on several extensions of serious leisure, these developments build on a conceptualisation of serious leisure that remains much as it was first defined in the early 1980s. Similarly, a key development, the publication of a scale intended to measure involvement in serious leisure and inventory-associated benefits (Gould et al. 2011, 2008), focuses on measurement of the defining characteristics, much as they were outlined in Stebbins' (1992) seminal book on serious leisure.

Does Serious Leisure Constitute Theory?

There is some debate around whether serious leisure constitutes a *theory*. A theory is typically defined as a set of concepts or constructs and the relationships among them, which have been confirmed and can be used to explain a phenomenon, in this case the pursuit of committed leisure. As the bulk of serious leisure research has focused on the pursuit of serious leisure activities by individuals, rather than the relationship between serious leisure and related constructs, some suggest there is little support for its alignment with theory (e.g., Veal 2015). At the same time, others have used the term "theory" to describe serious leisure (i.e., Shen and

Yarnal 2010). Veal's critique, which focuses on the SLP as a whole rather than serious leisure itself, asserts that the SLP is simply a typology of leisure activities—that is, a list of categories that can be used to catalogue all forms of leisure. The SLP could be considered a theory due to its assertion that serious leisure is a necessary ingredient of an optimal leisure lifestyle. However, there is little research to support this assertion, and Veal suggests that it is certainly possible to achieve a fulfilling life without participation in serious leisure.

Activity Focus of Serious Leisure

The definition of serious leisure is focused on individuals' experiences, such as their experience of persevering in times of difficulty, experiencing durable benefits, and partaking in a social world associated with the activity's unique ethos. At the same time, there is often an assumption that certain leisure activities are experienced as serious leisure by those who engage in them (Gallant et al. 2013a). Shen and Yarnal (2010) describe the importance of looking for alignment with the qualities of serious leisure rather than defining serious leisure in activity-based terms, as “[a]ny leisure activity can be approached with different styles and most activities offer a range of skill or behavioural involvement levels for participants. Serious and casual leisure pursuits can be found in practically any activity” (p. 165). Similarly, Scott (2012) argues that “*participants in any leisure activity* can be arranged along a continuum of involvement from casual to serious” (p. 368). This assertion leads to the next critique of serious leisure: the problematic “dichotomous” relationship between serious and casual nature.

Ambiguity of Relationship Between Serious and Casual Leisure

Despite significant research efforts related to serious leisure, there remains ambiguity about the relationship between serious and casual leisure. Although theorised as dichotomous (i.e., Gould et al. 2008), there are

several ways that the two concepts overlap. As Shen and Yarnal (2010) note, most people's experiences align with neither the fleeting nature of casual leisure nor the high levels of commitment that are most often profiled in serious leisure research but fall somewhere in between. Writing of serious and casual leisure, they assert:

the two concepts approximate two prototypes of leisure pursuit located at the far ends of a broad leisure experience spectrum. What is left unrepresented by the dichotomy is a wide range of leisure pursuits in between, which are likely to be the typical experiences of the majority of individuals.

(p. 167)

Similarly, Scott (2012) suggested there may be “gradations of seriousness” (p. 369) within serious leisure. Further, Shen and Yarnal (2010) question the extent to which the six distinguishing qualities of serious leisure are truly distinguishing—in other words, do they distinguish serious leisure from casual leisure? This is a particularly relevant question in the context of the Serious Leisure Inventory and Measure developed by Gould et al. (2008), intended to achieve an “improved ability to potentially distinguish ‘casual’ from ‘serious’ behaviour” (Gould et al. 2008, p. 64). The authors imply that there is a defined point at which leisure participation can be considered casual rather than serious. In contrast, Shen and Yarnal suggest there is inherently “continuity and connectedness between the two contrasted concepts” (p. 168).

Dilley and Scraton (2010) provide further evidence of the artificial divide between serious and casual leisure. They problematize the stark boundaries often drawn between casual and serious leisure, with, for example, serious leisure being associated with “durable” benefits and casual leisure with more hedonistic pleasure. They note that Stebbins (2001) describes social conversation as a form of casual leisure, although there is evidence (e.g., Green 1998) that such conversation contributes to friendships that are central to women's identity and leisure and constitute much more than transient and superficial enjoyment. The implied devaluation of conversation and relationships within serious leisure and the privileging of outcomes such as achievement and skills development

imply an androcentric vision at the heart of conceptualisations of serious leisure—just one of the ways in which serious leisure has failed to evolve since its inception.

The “Benefits” Focus of Serious Leisure

The benefits of serious leisure are immediately evident, whether one refers to the definitions of serious leisure offered by Stebbins (1992, 2007) or as one of the six defining characteristics of serious leisure. However, the costs, such as time away from family, are not noted among the defining features of serious leisure. There is growing critique of how costs are conceptualised within serious leisure (Lamont et al. 2014, 2015; Thurnell-read 2016) and particularly of the “profit hypothesis” (Stebbins 1992, p. 93) that suggests that people continue in their serious leisure pursuits because the benefits outweigh the costs. Within serious leisure, costs are treated as anecdotal rather than universal elements of serious leisure experience (c.f., Stebbins 2007), although the benefits of serious leisure are also known to vary by individual and activity. Underlying this contradiction is an inherently positive conceptualisation of serious leisure that suggests its superiority over other forms of leisure, notably casual leisure.

Is Serious Leisure Still Relevant?

Conceptualisations of serious leisure are isolated from social and political contexts that influence who can engage in serious leisure and how they do so, and similarly, theorising on serious leisure fails to extend its implications for social and political contexts. Further, since the foundational characteristics of serious leisure remain largely unchanged since this concept was developed, serious leisure is grounded in an androcentric, inherently positive, apolitical conceptualisation of leisure that is now decades old. With this in mind, we might ask: *Is serious leisure still relevant as a way of understanding leisure experiences?*

Serious leisure is in part defined by the occasional need to persevere, yet constraints related to time and resources that may inhibit participation

or the ability to persevere are rarely studied. In other words, “we tend to focus our attention on those participating in serious leisure without examining who is not participating and why” (Gallant et al. 2013a, p. 100). In Dilley and Scraton’s (2010) research with women climbers, they observed that the serious leisure careers of these climbing enthusiasts were not necessarily linear or progressive due to family responsibilities and gender-based constraints and point to an androcentric vision of what it means to engage in serious leisure. Raisborough (2006) had similar concerns based on her research with female Sea Cadet volunteers, as did Bartram (2001) in her work with female kayakers. Rather than the traditional focus on achievement of high levels of skill through perseverance, Dilley and Scraton found that serious leisure was, at its core, about “creating, negotiating, and/or resisting ideological expectations (about physicality, motherhood), and creating individual spaces to ‘be’ and social spaces to ‘belong’ and be ‘different’” (p. 136). They suggest that the long-term participation that characterises serious leisure often occurs because of the friendships that have resulted. They problematize what is “serious” or valued within serious leisure: “Serious activities appear to be defined by traditional masculine values of action, challenge, and mastery, as opposed to the more traditionally feminine activities of creating meaningful interpersonal relationships and intimate spaces” (Dilley and Scraton 2010, p. 127/128). Similarly, Shen and Yarnal (2010) also comment on the centrality of relationships and social support in women’s lives and the lack of emphasis on these aspects of serious leisure.

While it is possible to engage in serious leisure as a solo pursuit, most participants seek social ties through clubs, associations, informal groups, commercial venues, and events (Gibson et al. 2002; Stebbins 1996). Rojek (2001) asserts that SLP, when it brings participants into contact with other enthusiasts, becomes a source of meaning, identity, and solidarity. My own work with serious leisure volunteers (Gallant et al. 2013b) affirms that serious leisure has strong potential for cultivating sense of community. Similarly, a study of football fans engaged in tailgating as a serious leisure pursuit found that individuals’ social identities, formed around common interests in tailgating and watching football, gave football fans a sense of belonging as a result of their collective interests and activity (Gibson et al. 2002). At the same time, the implications

of serious leisure for building community are absent from serious leisure theory. The “social benefits” associated with serious leisure—group accomplishment, sense of contributing, and social attraction—are benefits enjoyed by individual participants as a result of the social nature of serious leisure (Stebbins 2007). While there may be benefits of serious leisure for groups or communities, this form of benefit is not a defining feature of serious leisure.

Serious leisure is a highly utilised conceptual framework for understanding the experience of committed leisure and moves beyond conceptualisations of leisure as casual and inconsequential for individuals. To ensure its relevance into the future, the role and potential of serious leisure for the broader spheres of family, community, and society must be considered and further, must be integrated into the *theory* of serious leisure. The alternative is for serious leisure to remain a static concept that does not adequately represent leisure experience in contemporary society.

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Part III

Structural Theories of Leisure

Spencer Swain

Introduction

By using the term ‘structural theories of leisure’, this part of the handbook builds upon the rational ideas of leisure developed in the previous section. We feel this part is important in introducing prospective readers to the sociological thought that helps critique the deterministic thinking of Enlightenment Europe. Subsequently, at its core, the chapters which make up this section seek to challenge the structural inequalities brought about by the instrumental ideologies promoted through scientific legislations that have shaped interpretations of the social world. Such an undertaking explores the ‘dialectic of modernity’, by analysing the effects of these unyielding thoughts and their consequences on specific populations and groups within society. The importance of this insight is that it exposes how leisure—a part of human life often associated with the value

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of freedom and liberty—can also be a site of conflict, discrimination, and social upheaval. In this section, these critical positions are analysed and unpacked to expose how structural obstacles limit both the accessibility and behaviours of certain social groups within the realm of leisure.

Throughout this part of the handbook, structural inequalities brought about by social class, totalitarianism, gender, 'race', and disability are explored, to provide the reader with a detailed insight into how access to leisure remains a site of contestation. Here, the chapters by Bruce Erickson, Gabby Skeldon, Flavio Lins and Ricardo Freitas, Robert Cassar, and Paul Blackledge focus on the concept of social class, examining the influential works of Karl Marx and other neo-Marxists who emanated out of the world-renowned Frankfurt School. These chapters focus on inequalities relating to income, communicating how leisure has become a site used by the ruling elites to alienate and invoke a sense of false consciousness onto the proletariat, quashing their propensity to rebel. At their core, these works explore the concept of hegemony and its effect upon the working classes within the realm of leisure, through analysing how the masses are manipulated in their free time.

Building upon this critical thread, the chapters by Vassil Girginov and Brett Lashua analyse the effects of totalitarian thinking on leisure provision. Introducing the reader to the thought processes of social movements which aimed to shape leisure around strict understandings of what free time should entail. Here, the cultural tropes of sport, music, and cinema are used as examples to show how sites of entertainment become moulded around authoritarian principles. The chapters by Karl Spracklen and Stephen Wagg introduce the philosophical works of Jurgen Habermas and Norbert Elias, to critique the use of such deterministic thinking. Exposing the reader to the ways in which leisure serves as a site where such ideologies can be contested as well as enacted highlights the potential for free time to represent a place of liberation, as well as collaboration with authoritarian regimes.

The work of feminist theorists Bronwen Valtchanov and Diana Parry moves the section towards the theme of discrimination. In this strand of sociological insight, the reader is introduced to a discourse that explains the patriarchal oppression placed upon women within the sphere of leisure. Exposing how men control and manipulate what women are allowed

to do, and the ways in which they are permitted to express themselves during their free time, is carried over into the realm of 'race' and ethnicity, where Rasul Mowatt criticises the essentialist reasoning augmented through Enlightenment philosophy, over its propensity to classify and structure humanity into distinct, biologically separate 'races'. Here, Elie Cohen Gewerc's chapter articulates how these ideas have created a culture of discrimination, which has penetrated the realm of leisure, causing certain ethnic groups to face discrimination when partaking in certain activities and segregated from accessing specific spaces. Finally, the section goes on to analyse the inequalities faced by members of society who are classified by others as having a disability. Here, Viji Kuppan adds a valuable and insightful chapter to the handbook, by highlighting how leisure has been contrived to service the able-bodied. He explains how people with disabilities find themselves restricted from partaking and accessing specific forms of recreation, causing their presence in specific recreational settings to be substantially diminished.

The theme of this section provides the reader with a greater understanding of the consequences brought about by modernity and the impact the social epoch had—or as individual sociologists might say, used to have had—on the role and place of leisure in society. In particular, these critiques are useful in analysing the next section on 'post-structural theories of leisure', where many of the themes unpacked within this part of the handbook are critiqued for being too deterministic and rigid in their explanation of the current cultural trends in contemporary society. Here, an approach can be taken which either uses this section to critique the other, and vice versa, or may be applied to a more nuanced approach that fashions theories articulated from this section and the one on post-structuralism. Creating conceptual perspectives that safely navigate the choppy waters of sociological determinism and the rocky outcroppings of post-modern relativism is tricky. This approach is, of course, entirely up to the reader; however, given the aim of this handbook, we encourage an approach that is critical and cultivates perspectives that serve to expand the sociological understandings of leisure in contemporary society.

Marx, Alienation and Dialectics Within Leisure

Bruce Erickson

Read enough, and you will find contradictions. Take, for example, two recent comments on Karl Marx's influence in leisure studies: "Marxism came late to leisure studies," writes Chris Rojek (2013, p. 19). Yet, for Karl Spracklen (2013, p. 68), "Karl Marx has had more influence on sociology and leisure studies than any other theorist." Both coming from similar sympathetic approaches to Marx and leisure, the two contradictory statements about Marx's influence in leisure studies are perhaps best explained by considering, on one hand, the overall influence of Marx in leisure studies and scholarship in general and, on the other hand, the specificity of Marx's influence in leisure studies. There is no doubt that questions of class, alienation and social control are foundational to much work in leisure studies, especially the British strand of leisure studies that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. Drawing from the influence

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of Marxism on the general scholarship of sociology and history, leisure studies depended upon the frameworks that were at one point in time explicitly drawn from Marx but had since lost the direct allegiance. Yet, as Rojek (2013) points out, the specific engagement with Marx's work in leisure studies is limited to only a few authors in the 1980s. As the market economy expanded throughout the world, the influence of Marx on leisure studies waned (Rojek 2013) and was overcome by a focus on the individual and their experiences in leisure (Arai and Pedlar 2003).

This, indeed, could be said for many fields of academic study—Marx's influence wanes and waxes, not simply due to its explanatory power but also because of the social and political circumstances. For example, in the midst of the 2008 economic collapse, sales of *Das Kapital* tripled in Germany (Connelly 2008). This leads to new rounds of interpretation and analysis, as scholars and activists take Marx's writings and reread them in light of contemporary social and economic problems. While there has been some of this work in leisure studies, there is still much more that can be done. For leisure scholars to draw productively from Marx, we must focus on the ways, as both a philosophical and economic critique of capitalism, his analysis maintains relevance even through the undeniable changes in the political economy of capitalism. In particular, as will be shown, his approach to alienation, labour and history is relevant to leisure studies as we attempt to understand (and influence) the place of leisure in the neoliberal context of global capitalism. In this chapter, I will begin with an explanation of the role alienation plays in Marx's writings, focusing how it anchors the humanist perspective within Marx's philosophy. From there I will trace how alienation has been incorporated into work in leisure studies, concluding with some recent work that offers potential for a reinvigoration of the role of alienation in leisure theory.

Alienation

The most detailed description of alienation in Marx's writings comes in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844*. These were a series of (incomplete) essays written when Marx was 26 and living in Paris, but yet

were never formally published until 1932 (English translations weren't widely available until after 1959). The manuscripts, as Erich Fromm (1961) argues, are some of the clearest articulations of his philosophical thinking, and show, more than his later works, his debt and allegiance to Hegel and the left Hegelians. The left Hegelians followed Hegel's philosophical method of seeing history as a dialectic process that was designed to overcome the restriction of freedom and bring about the triumph of reason. This promise of history meant that different, opposing, social structures would come into conflict and the resultant synthesis would slowly progress towards a more ideal world. Unlike Hegel who used his method to argue for the support of the status quo, the left-Hegelians used this method to critique the Prussian state and religious elite. Marx's *Manuscripts of 1844* held firm to the Hegelian promise of history, not just because of the dialectic method that would work its way through all of his later writings but also because of Marx's commitment in the manuscripts to the enlightenment of the human spirit. This commitment comes out clearly in his description of waged labour and alienation.

There are four parts to Marx's concept of alienation as it arises from waged labour: the alienation of the worker from the products of their labour; the worker's alienation from their own labour; the alienation of the worker from human nature; and the alienation of the worker from other humans. For Marx, these forms of alienation all proceed from the establishment of wage labour, where the worker needs to sell their labour in order to access the means of production. In this relationship, no matter how long or how complete the worker's engagement with the product of their labour is, they do not own that product. Thus, Marx concludes (with the rhetorical flair found throughout his writing), "It is true that labour produces for the rich wonderful things—but for the worker it produces privation. It produces palaces—but for the worker, hovels. It produces beauty—but for the worker, deformity" (1844, p. 110).

The simplest, and most commonly discussed, side of alienation is the estrangement of the worker from the products of their labour. As the worker exchanges wages for labour, those who paid the wages own the products that are produced. For Marx, this is the starting point of alienation, and it stems directly from the establishment of private property.

Labour cannot be done without the material world—the “sensuous external world” (1844, p. 109)—but as this material world is enclosed (and unevenly distributed) through private property, the worker must rely upon selling labour to access those materials. Thus, at the end of the day, what is transformed by the worker’s labour is external to them, as their labour becomes only one part of the overall cost of the product.

The selling of labour leads to the second aspect of alienation Marx identifies, which is the alienation of the worker from their own labour. As the worker sells labour, the labour itself becomes a commodity, much like the other resources involved in the production of a product. Labour differs only in that it is a “live commodity.” Thus, as it becomes sold, the worker’s labour becomes not their own, but external to them: “The worker’s activity [is] not his spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self” (1844, p. 111). Labour is sold not only to get access to work but also as a way to access a livelihood, thus making labour a means to a particular end, one which is often very divorced from the activity itself. This aspect of alienation provides the basis for the belief that modern work conditions leave the worker empty and devoid of purpose. Thus, as working conditions are reformed, leisure time becomes a central form of compensation for alienating work. In leisure, one could assert one’s own life purpose and gain a sense of self. However, for Marx, this form of alienation was not one that could be ameliorated by finding purpose in other aspects of life. Rather, as we will see, the overcoming of alienation for Marx could only be achieved by emancipating the conditions of work from its alienating circumstances—work was a necessary part of overcoming alienation.

We can start to see Marx’s humanism shine through in this second aspect of alienation, as the human subject is fulfilled through labour, through their productive capacities, and this fulfilment is taken away by the fact that workers no longer control their own labour. This proposition is taken further in the third aspect of alienation, the alienation of the worker from human nature. Drawing from the work of the left-Hegelian, Ludwig Feuerbach, Marx argues that the alienation from one’s own labour leads to a condition of alienation from the “species-being.” In this view, the capacity for humans to understand ourselves as species, and to act on that collectivity, is what differentiates humans

from other animals. This conscious collectivity becomes what Marx sees as the species-being, that uniquely human side of the social sphere. Yet, under wage labour, the worker's capacity to act upon this collectivity is undermined by the establishment of labour as simply a means to satisfy one's own material needs. Thus, "In degrading spontaneous, free, activity, to a means, estranged labour makes man's species life a means to his physical existence" (1844, p. 114). Wage labour restricts the collective will as it presents individual competition as the primary relationship between human actors. More importantly for Marx, this has the potential to stop the dialectic of history, in that the spontaneity of social action becomes scripted away from collective action towards a routinized fulfilment of individual needs. Thus, with the alienation from one's own labour and the treatment of it as a means to the satisfaction of individual needs, wage labour attempts to eclipse the progressive path of history towards the enlightenment of the human spirit from restrictions.

Within this alienation from human nature comes the fourth aspect of alienation for Marx, the alienation of humans from each other. Marx's view that the collective, social being was the defining feature of being human was in contrast to rationalist individualist nature of the political economy of capitalism. For the political economists at the time, the human subject was best understood as a rational, self-interested individual (indeed, this subject remains at the heart of liberal theory, especially in the resurgence of neoliberalism from Frederick Hayek and Milton Friedman). Collective action was only a result of self-interest from this perspective, yet for Marx the social sphere is not a limit placed on the individual but rather the necessary enabler of the individual's potential. Thus, in an economic system in which individuals become atomized in the search for their own interests, they can only treat each other as means through which those interests can be gained. The alienation of leisure works against, for the most part, the collective action of human subjects, except from the basis of need, or greed.

The four aspects of alienation in Marx's critique combine together to form a powerful critique of private property and the wage labour system. And while alienation is only rarely brought out in Marx's later writings, it is possible to point to the seeds of his later critique of the mode of

production and his efforts to bring about their change, within this analysis of alienation. Indeed, the *Manuscripts* contain Marx's optimism that illustrates part of Marx's Hegelian legacy and his revolutionary desires. As the worker confronts the alienation of labour, it becomes possible to trace the social side of this alienation—that is, the worker can see that it is not the universal laws of the economy that produce this alienation but the particular social system that enables private property as the realization of that alienation. Alienation, then, gives rise to the conditions of its overcoming the collective acknowledgement of the estrangement of workers through labour and the possibility of changing these conditions of labour. For Fromm (1961), the humanism of Marx's early writing has the potential to bring Marx's critique of political economy forward into the world, as it relies more upon an understanding of the subject under capitalism and less on the distinct economic arrangements of a particular era of capitalism (which has certainly changed quite significantly since 1844 or even from Fromm's writing in 1961).

This belief in the social sphere as the structural basis of human life also distinguishes Marx's work from Hegel and the left-Hegelians. While both Hegel and Marx (again, in opposition to many enlightenment thinkers) see subjectivity produced through history (and not inherent in the rationalist individual), Marx argues that Hegel's theory places too much emphasis on the intellectual agency within the path of history. Thus, Hegel's theory of history still presents an "abstract spirit of mankind" (Marx and Engels 1845, p. 115) that directs the progress of history. Thus, a significant part of overcoming alienation is the intellectual accomplishment that seeks to redefine one's place in the world. As Alex Callinicos, simplifying a bit, suggests, for Hegel alienation was "the result of seeing the world in a mistaken way" (2011, p. 76). As Marx writes of Feuerbach, while philosophers have long attempted to interpret the world, "the point is to change it" (1845, p. 158). Thus, Marx argues that we cannot work from particular ideas about human essence, but rather must work from the material conditions of the social world. It is these conditions that hold within them the articulation of the historical dialectic. For Marx, the essence of the human spirit is not found as conceptualized by philosophers, rather it is only found in the ensemble of social relations that surround them; as those social relations change, so too does the human

spirit. This is, of course, what classifies Marx as a structural thinker as the social relations structure the kind of opportunities and subjectivities available throughout history.

Leisure and Alienation

For leisure scholars, one of the key significances of Marx's scholarship is the articulation of the dividing line between the productive sphere of life, which is contained in the relationships of exchange based on monetary value, and the non-productive outside sphere, which includes the domestic, leisure and unemployed spheres of life. Under the laws of political economy, value is produced not in the production, or labour of a material, but in the exchange. Within this, an object (or activity) outside of exchange, outside of a formal monetary value, is then valueless, insomuch as the value produced in capitalism is only established by the exchange and enclosure (it follows that an object or activity freely given, without return, is similarly held to have no value). Leisure, as sphere in which one has control and freedom, then necessarily becomes outside of the productive sphere, in that control and freedom is mortgaged in the aims of making a profit.

Although this does not mean that leisure has no value in capitalism, it certainly does, especially as a sphere of exchange and consumption. For Marx,

the industrial capitalist also takes *his* pleasures...but his pleasure is only a side-issue – recreation – something subordinated to production; at the same time, it is a *calculated* and, therefore, itself an *economical* pleasure. For he debits it to his capital's expense account, and what is squandered on his pleasure must be replaced with profit through the reproduction of capital. (1844, p. 157)

In political economy, pleasure and recreation are subsumed to the sidelines of the wealthy, but they can also be a threat to the working classes. The production of "unintended leisure" in the form of unemployment pits workers against each other to ensure one's own access to value and a

livelihood. Marx sees this threat in the production of a “reserve army of labour”: “The over-work of the employed part of the working class swells the ranks of its reserve, while conversely, the greater pressure that the reserve by its competition exerts on the employed workers forces them to submit to the dictates of capital” (1867, p. 789). Yet, in each of these cases, there is a relatively clear theoretical distinction between the value of production and the non-value of the leisure sphere. One must only allow for the amount of leisure (of the individual, or of the reserves) as one can afford.

Certainly, as we look at the differences in the structure of capitalism, leisure has significantly changed over the past 150 years. Thus, while we can still talk about the relationship between the costs of recreation and the profits of production, the overwhelming reliance on consumer debt makes the relationship not as linear as Marx makes it out above. Similarly, there is still a relationship between the increasing competition between individuals in precarious labour positions (something evidenced by the often unbelievable “internship” positions available in leisure-related industries), but the existence of a reserve army of labour is less tangible. These changes are based upon both the quality and quantity of leisure time available: leisure is quantitatively more freely available and the possibilities available to us are dramatically more central to our understanding of our self. Indeed, this change in leisure prompted two responses to the problem of alienation.

First, in the post-war period, especially in the 1970s and 1980s, much was made of the possibility of the post-industrial society becoming a “leisure society,” where work would be diminished to an insignificant part of our lives. The abundance of leisure was positioned as the response to the problem of alienation and the drudgery of work. Taking the cue from Marx’s distinction (in *Capital*) between the necessity of labour and the true realm of freedom, André Gorz (1982) argued that the industrialization of work could open the possibility of an un-alienated society by abolishing work to its most minimal amount, and replace it by autonomous activity, which could be productive. For Gorz, it is only in leisure, specifically in un-alienated leisure focused upon the self-fulfilment of the individual (in his utopic chapter describing the future society, he suggests that “in order to encourage the exercise of imagination and the greater

exchange of ideas, no television programs would be broadcast on Fridays and Saturdays” p. 152), that we can overcome the alienation of work. This argument forms part of what has become known as the “Leisure society thesis,” in which proponents believe that the industrialization and modernization of work holds the potential to reduce the amount of work in a society such that the majority of one’s life will be dedicated to leisure. Criticisms of the leisure society thesis, beyond simply being “that optimistic gift of imagination” (Rojek 1993, p. 213), suggest that at the heart of the leisure society thesis is a lack of understanding of the historically constructed nature of leisure.

Marx’s theory of alienation relies not simply upon the fact that work can cause oppression, or necessity, for the worker. Rather, through alienated work, the worker is estranged not just from control but also from a sense of self and the possibility of community with the wider world. This condition is not implicit within the acts of providing for society but rather is historically produced by conditions of labour under capitalism. Thus, instead of moving away from work, towards leisure, or individual freedom, Marx argues that the conditions of work must be used to overcome alienation itself. Or, as Hinman argues, “The alienation found in leisure is not to be overcome within the sphere of leisure itself, but rather must involve the overcoming of the very division between work and leisure” (1978, p. 221). This distinction is produced through the alienation of labour, in which leisure exists as compensation. The leisure society thesis promotes leisure similarly as a reward in the production of “life as a daily circuit of misery and pleasure” (Clarke and Critcher 1985, p. 3), hoping to reduce the amount of misery with an abundance of pleasure.

In the failure of the leisure society to fully remove us from work, many leisure theorists have suggested that indeed, we are now living in a leisure society, in which work means less and leisure means more. Work, while potentially still alienating, is less subjectively alienating because we see leisure itself as more productive (both personally and economically). Indeed, one of the major thrusts within leisure scholarship has been to document the un-alienating aspects of leisure in the modern world (or the constraints to such levels of freedom). From Csikszentmihalyi’s life-long work documenting the role of flow in leisure experiences to Robert

Stebbins' work on serious leisure and life fulfilment, leisure studies has often made a case for the importance of leisure on the individual. This drive to understand the experiential side of leisure maps well onto the idea of leisure as compensation (or alternative) for the drudgery of work. John Kelly (1991) makes this point explicitly in light of critiques by Marxists and neo-Marxists of the positive approach to leisure that dominated leisure studies. Kelly argues that these critiques present leisure as "a factor of production...so distorted by 'commodification' that it is not a domain of freedom at all" (1991, p. 9). For Kelly, this critique overemphasizes the economic and structural role of leisure and forgets that "all of this leisure consumption is within a framework that emphasizes the self and one's immediate community" (1991, p. 17). Leisure, he argues, is consumptive, but consumptive within the framework of the individual as they choose it, which is often about reproducing their own communities.

This push to understand alienation and the leisure experience from an experiential perspective is dominant within leisure studies, but it is not the direction that Marx's analysis points us to. As Clarke and Critcher argued in 1985, the critical perspective pushes "the main focus of attention [in leisure studies] from the study of what people do in leisure to the conditions under which leisure is experienced" (1985, p. xii). Thus, we move from the individual to the structural, with the recognition that the structures are established through the conflicts within society. Clarke and Critcher continue,

We have tried to offer an account of leisure which considers the way in which social groups—differently positioned in the social structure of British capitalism—encounter these institutions of leisure, and create leisure activities. To garble a famous quotation from Marx—people make leisure, but not under the circumstances of their own choosing.

(1985, p. xiii)

This flows from the recognition insisted upon by Marx that our social behaviours take place in a "historically developed sphere of activity" (Sayers 1998, p. 70).

Clarke and Critcher's (1985) *The Devil Makes Work* details the historical rise of leisure (and leisure studies) to illustrate how leisure has been

manipulated not only as a tool of social control but also as a form of resistance to that social control. Theirs is arguably the most influential Marxist text in leisure studies, but it has some precedent, flowing from the British cultural studies tradition and the field of social history. As Peter Borsay argues, leisure studies as a discipline was “born when the idea that class was the motor of history was in full flood” (2006, p. 75). Alongside Peter Bailey’s (1978) *Leisure and Class in Victorian England*, the significance of class to leisure can be seen in Clarke and Critcher’s work. Discussing the state-based use of leisure as a cure to social ills, they write,

these “debates” about leisure are grounded in complex social forces...[yet] behind the rhetoric stands a familiar social distribution of who does the labor of drudgery, who is suspected of idleness and vice, and who is likely to be the victim of “involuntary leisure”. The class structure of British capitalism is not one which is confined to the sphere of production, but organizes the field of leisure too.

(1985, p. 10)

This line of argument draws inspiration from Raymond Williams, E.P. Thomson and Richard Hoggart who examined the dynamics of social control and power outside of the formal institutions of government. Byron Dare, George Welton and William Coe’s (1987) *Concepts of Leisure in Western Thought* is one of the few North American texts before 1990 to really consider this scholarly lineage in the context of leisure studies.

Alongside the conceptual use of class to understand the history of leisure, Marx’s influence also pointed to the power of the state to mobilize leisure and recreation as a form of social control (Andrew 1981). More so than the focus on class, the legacy of social control and state power has moved outside of neo-Marxists into a more general scholarship within leisure studies. The contemporary writing on social control draws largely from historical research, functionalist analysis, Foucauldian discourse analysis and feminist theory; however, the early social control studies in leisure studies were decidedly in debt to Marx’s ideas of history and the role of the state.

Class, alienation and social control might be the most significant concepts for leisure studies coming out of Marx’s scholarship, but the method

of analysis preached by Marx, starting from the material conditions of the social practices, has also had a significant and long-lasting influence on Leisure studies. The prolific work of Chris Rojek, starting with *Capitalism and Leisure Theory* (1985), has engaged heavily with Marx's influence, although Rojek would be hard-pressed to be called a Marxist. However, his writings demonstrate the value of approaching leisure not simply as an experience but as a particular set of social phenomenon. Indeed, in some ways, Rojek takes Marx's early work and applies it beyond twentieth-century Marxist theory, drawing on the post-modern turn to argue that the flexibility of modern capitalism combines with the scepticism of post-modernity as central to our organization of leisure. While leisure was once subsumed by work, the rise of commodified and planned leisure spaces has made leisure not an escape from work but a reflection of the conditions of work. Where Marx starts from the importance of capitalism as the organizing feature of life, Rojek maintains that leisure, as we know it, is structured through both capitalism and modernity, an argument made throughout his major books on leisure theory.

Indeed, even as his works wander theoretically far and never commit to any one particular theory, Rojek's has always maintained the value of Marx's method. In his recent article on this topic, Rojek argues that most significantly, Marx can offer insight on "how organized inequality operates in societies that are formally based upon individual liberty and electoral quality" (2013, p. 32). While Marx's critique of political economy and enlightenment philosophy was rooted in the conditions of an emerging capitalism in the nineteenth century (conditions which have since changed radically but are still triumphantly capitalist), leisure scholars can draw from his insights into the historically constructed nature of our economic systems as well as from his analysis of the way individuals, and individualism, is produced through labour and alienation. For Rojek, "The reform of capitalism does not mean that the fundamental contradiction between the forces and relations of production identified by Marx has been overcome" (2013, p. 26). Indeed, given the rising importance of leisure as a central sphere of activity for all aspects of capitalist life (consumption, production and reproduction), it is necessary that leisure scholars address the reforms of capitalism and understand how they reproduce the inequalities of the older models of capitalism.

Conclusion

Rojek's suggestion to consider the production of ideology based on individualism within a system of inequality points not only to the importance of Marx to leisure studies but also to the power of leisure studies to offer an insightful analysis of contemporary social and economic dynamics. While mass leisure was once adopted as a "compensation" for the alienation of work, we now find ourselves in the situation where leisure activities themselves become work, outside of a clear compensation scheme. From the lifestyle sports model to the rise of the creative class, there is a trend to find not only one's own personal growth in leisure but also one's ability to perform economically. In this shift from a collective notion of work, in which we are positioned as workers in opposition to the owners of production, we have moved to an individualized model of leisure entrepreneurs, in which work and leisure are blended together. While this may seem like we have overcome the production/leisure divide that Marx identified, it is instead an intensification of the relations of alienation. As leisure entrepreneurs, we are positioning our whole lives as commodities, as a source of exchange value (Rojek 2009; Ravenscroft and Gilchrist 2009; Banks 2009). Labour then becomes not just an isolated feature of our work days but also of our leisure pursuits (think here, not just of the young athlete dreaming of making it big but also of the stay-at-home mom wondering if her hand-knit hats could be sold on Etsy). This commodification of leisure, according to Marx, not only estranges us from our own pleasures but also as a collective confronting the forces of inequality that are spread through the economic system. Addressing the dominance of the entrepreneurial individual model of the economic system, pushed forward by the rise of neoliberalism, requires us to understand how our leisure experiences have dramatically reshaped not only the GDP but also the way that we interact as a political community. Marx's theory of alienation and his request that we start our analysis from the material conditions of production (as they are happening in leisure, for instance) are important in the tasks that leisure studies has for the future.

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The Dialectics of Work and Leisure in Marx, Lukács, and Lefebvre

Paul Blackledge

Beyond a few pregnant paragraphs, neither Marx nor Engels wrote anything of substance on the concept of leisure. Nonetheless, their oeuvre is far from irrelevant to the subject. On the contrary, Marx, who liked to quote Terence's maxim that "nothing human is alien to me," made an indispensable contribution to the study of social relations that remains of the first importance to understanding leisure as a concrete historically and sociologically determined concept. Specifically, he outlined the methodological foundations for understanding leisure not simply as the antithesis of work but rather as a definite social form internally related to, but not reducible to, broader, and changing, social relations. This approach incorporates but is much wider and deeper than the common-sense conception of leisure as the simple inverse of work, and it is so in large part because Marx historicised the concept of work itself. Indeed,

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whereas even the most historically astute of pre-Marxist writers tended to conflate work with the specific historical form they knew as the first-order mediation between human needs and the natural environment within which we produce to meet those needs, Marx was the first thinker to fully recognise and explore the distinction between work as a universal fact of human life and the numerous historically specific forms by which we have met and reconstructed our needs through history. And it is by grasping work as a historical form that he provides the intellectual tools by which we might understand leisure as a similarly specific historical form.

His method of analysis, as extended by Georg Lukács and Henri Lefebvre, thus points beyond the simplistic opposition between work and leisure to explore these practices as novel forms characterised by historically specific contradictions. Specifically, Marx's model implies, and Lefebvre in particular makes this explicit, that leisure under conditions of capitalist alienation is best understood not as the free alternative to the necessity of work but as an aspect of broader alienated relations: leisure time is generally experienced as a break from work that allows for the day-to-day reproduction of the labour force. This is not to suggest that Marx dismissed leisure as mere alienation, for at their most active and critical leisure activities can point beyond leisure as a mere break from work to a broader critique of existing social relations as a totality. As Lefebvre points out, some leisure practices can thus contribute to a broader critique of alienated labour relations and point towards a more authentically human experience of the dialectic between necessity and freedom.

According to Marx, the complex interaction between the multifarious aspects of any particular social formation is best understood as a totality, specifically, as "the concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse." And the method of reconstructing the totality in the mind involves "rising from the abstract to the concrete." Pointing to the economists of the seventeenth century, Marx wrote that the "scientifically correct method" began "with the living whole ... but ... always conclude[s] by discovering through analysis a small number of determinant, abstract, general relations such as division of labour, money, value, etc. As soon as these individual moments had been more or less firmly established and

abstracted, there began the economic systems, which ascended from the simple relations, such as labour, division of labour, need, exchange value, to the level of the state, exchange between nations and the world market." Marx similarly begun an (albeit much more complex) intellectual movement from the abstract to the concrete in *Capital* as an attempt to grasp reality in all its rich complexity as constituted through the internal relations of its many parts (Ollman 1976). He insisted that this method "is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the concrete in the mind" (CW 28, pp. 37–38).

Marx and Engels first outlined their approach to the study of history in *The German Ideology* where they insisted that social production functions as the anthropological starting point of their analysis because men and women "begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence." And in so producing to meet their needs, these "definite individuals ... enter into definite social and political relations" the concrete form of which cannot be deduced a priori but must be ascertained through "empirical observation" (CW 5, p. 31, p. 82). Marx explored the distinction between production in general and production as a specific historical form in the *Grundrisse* where he suggested that though "all epochs of production have certain common traits," there exist specific qualities whose "elements ... are not general and common [but] must be separated out from the determinations valid for production as such, so that ... their essential difference is not forgotten" (CW 28, p. 23). Changing forms of production underpin historical change because consumption could not occur without there first being some form of production: "production and consumption are ... moments of one process, in which production is the real point of departure and hence also the predominant moment." Concretely, production, distribution, exchange and consumption form parts of a "totality" within which "production predominates" (CW 28, p. 36).

To understand leisure from this perspective, it is thus essential first to grasp the nature of work in its concrete specificity. This is not simply because, as Chris Rojek writes, work and leisure are "interdependent" forms for Marx (Rojek 1984, p. 165). Rather, as Henri Lefebvre points out, Marx reckoned work and leisure to be a complex, evolving whole whose parts are internally related (Lefebvre 2014, p. 64). As to the nature

of work itself, Rojek's claim that for Marx, it was "axiomatic" that "individual are not free ... [because] they live within a conditioning framework, 'a real of necessity'" (Rojek 1984, p. 164) doesn't satisfactorily address how the relationship between freedom and necessity in Marxist theory. For Marx and Engels, these are not mutually exclusive terms but rather are dialectically related. This relationship was felicitously expressed by Engels who, drawing on Hegel, argued that "freedom is the appreciation of necessity. ... [it] ... consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on a knowledge of natural necessity" (CW 25, p. 105). Engels's gloss on the issue highlights an important facet of human freedom that had been tacitly suppressed by pre-Marxist thinkers: labour is the process through which we (potentially) begin to freely realise our potential as human beings. Lefebvre points out that because pre-Marxist critics of everyday life tended to originate within privileged leisured strata, their writings tended towards the "criticism of other classes, and for the most part found expression in contempt for productive labour" (Lefebvre 2014, p. 51). Classically expressed in Aristotle's conception of the ideal citizen as a man of leisure (Kain 1982, p. 153), this contempt for productive activity finds expression even among those who are nominally much more sympathetic to the progress of industry. Thus, Marx recognises this bias in the work of James Mill: "When James Mill for example says: 'To enable a considerable portion of the community to enjoy the advantages of *leisure*, the return to capital must evidently be large' ... he means nothing other than this: The wage labourer must slave a good deal so that many people can have leisure, or the free time of one section of society depends on the ratio of the worker's surplus labour time "to his necessary labour time." (CW 30, p. 210).

This deep-seated contempt for those engaged in productive activity is both rooted in capitalist social relations—as Marx wrote in *Capital*, "In capitalist society spare time is acquired for one class by converting the whole life-time of the masses into labour-time" (Marx 1976, p. 667)—and informs an ongoing failure to grasp either the positive part played by work in human self-realisation or the historically evolving forms of either leisure or work. Because Marx, by contrast, recognised that the human essence is constituted through our productive engagement with nature, he was able to grasp that historical change is underpinned by the

changing forms of this interaction. As Engels wrote in his unfinished minor masterpiece, *The Part Played by Labour in the Transition from Ape to Man*, social production constitutes much more than the source of wealth; it is the medium through which we create and recreate ourselves: “Labour is the source of all wealth, the political economists assert. And it really is the source—next to nature, which supplies it with the material that it converts into wealth. But it is even infinitely more than this. It is the prime basic condition for all human existence, and this to such an extent that, in a sense, we have to say that labour created man himself” (CW 25, p. 452). Similarly, Marx famously argued that it is “in his work upon the objective world ... that man really proves himself to be a *species-being*. This production is his active species-life. Through this production, nature appears as *his* work and his reality. The object of labour is, therefore, the *objectification of man’s species-life*: for he duplicates himself not only, as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively, in reality, and therefore he sees himself in a world that he has created” (CW 3, p. 276).

It is through the notion of species-being that Marx differentiates his conception of human nature from that of the political economists. Whereas they conceived work one-sidedly as a negative barrier to freedom, he insisted on its positive character: though work is a necessary chore, it is also the medium through which we begin to realise our potential. Thus, in the *Grundrisse*, he wrote that for Adam Smith, labour is simply “a curse.” “Tranquillity” appears as the adequate state, as identical with “freedom” and “happiness.” “It seems quite far from Smith’s mind that the individual, “in his normal state of health, strength, activity, skill, facility,” also needs a normal portion of work, and of the suspension of tranquillity. Certainly, labour obtains its measure from the outside, through the aim to be attained and the obstacles to be overcome in attaining it. But Smith has no inkling whatever that this overcoming of obstacles is in itself a liberating activity—and that, further, the external aims become stripped of the semblance of merely external natural urgencies, and become posited as aims which the individual himself posits—hence as self-realisation, objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose action is, precisely, labour. He is right, of course, that, in its historic forms as slave-labour, serf-labour, and wage-labour, labour always appears as repulsive, always as *external forced labour*, and

not-labour, by contrast, as “freedom and happiness”. This holds doubly: for this contradictory labour, and, relatedly, for labour which has not yet created the subjective and objective conditions for itself (or also, in contrast to the pastoral etc. state, which it has lost), in which labour becomes attractive work, the individual’s self-realisation, which in no way means that it becomes mere fun, mere amusement, as Fourier, with *grisette*-like naivete, conceives it. Really free working, for example composing, is at the same time precisely the most damned seriousness, the most intense exertion. The work of material production can achieve this character only (1) when its social character is posited, (2) when it is of scientific and at the same time general character, not merely human exertion as a specifically harnessed natural force, but exertion as subject, which appears in the production process not in a merely natural, spontaneous form, but as an activity regulating all the forces of nature” (CW 28, p. 530; See Magdoff 2006 for a discussion of this argument).

Conceived thus, labour has a fundamentally positive character at odds with the simplistic view that it merely constitutes lost time spent dealing with necessity. By supposing it to be otherwise, Smith evidences his own inability to transcend the standpoint of modern bourgeois society characterised by alienated labour. As Marx wrote in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1844, whereas work could be the means to self-realisation, once we presuppose “private property, my work is an *alienation of life*, for I work *in order to live*, in order to obtain for myself the *means* of life. My work *is not* my life.”

Marx famously articulated a fourfold definition of capitalist alienation. He argued that because the labourer has control neither over what he produces nor how he produces it “labour is *external* to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind.” Importantly for a theory of leisure, Marx insists that this situation entails that “The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside himself. He feels at home when he is not working, and when he is working he does not feel at home.” This is because “his labour is ... *forced labour*. It is therefore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a *means* to satisfy

needs external to it. Its alien character emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague.” If this situation explains leisure in a capitalist society as an alienated form, Marx also points to the life-affirming possibilities of unalienated labour. He argues that whereas man is a “species-being,” that is a “free being” who “makes all nature his *inorganic* body—both inasmuch as nature is (1) his direct means of life, and (2) the material, the object, and the instrument of his life activity ... In estranging from man (1) nature, and (2) himself ... estranged labour estranges the *species* from man. It changes for him the *life of the species* into a means of individual life.” So, while our essence involves freely working on nature to meet our needs, estranged labour transforms work into a mere means to an end. Consequently, through estranged labour, *Man’s species-being* is transformed into “a being *alien* to him, into a *means* for his *individual existence*. It estranges from man his own body, as well as external nature and his spiritual aspect, his *human* aspect.” Lastly, and as a consequence of this, alienation leads to the “*estrangement of man from man*,” though we are social beings who work together to meet our needs, because estranged labour alienates us from ourselves, it equally alienates us from the rest of humanity (CW 3, pp. 274–278).

The great error of the political economists, and all those who share their standpoint, is that they conflate labour with alienated wage labour. This means that they conflate not merely work but also leisure with their capitalist forms. Conversely, Marx suggested that our “authentic nature” does involve work to meet needs, but this work should not be understood one-sidedly as a purely negative phenomenon: “My work would be a *free manifestation of life*, hence an *enjoyment of life*” (CW 3, p. 228).

If this line perhaps underestimates the negative side of work, the fact that Marx continued to stress the positive, self-realising potential of labour in his mature works suggests that Philip Kain is mistaken to counterpose Marx’s youthful (utopian) writings on the relationship between work and leisure with the (much more orthodox) comments characteristic of his mature works (Kain 1982, p. 89, p. 117, p. 124). Indeed, the *Grundrisse’s* critique of Fourier’s idea that work could become like play is best understood as implicitly deepening rather than rejecting his earlier thoughts (Postone 1993, p. 138). Nonetheless, it is true that Marx does

shift the emphasis of his argument to stress that real freedom is measured in time released from work.

As he wrote in *Theories of Surplus Value*: “Labour-time, even if exchange-value is eliminated, always remains the creative substance of wealth and the measure of the *cost* of its production. But free time, *disposable time*, is wealth itself, partly for the enjoyment of the product, partly for free activity which—unlike labour—is not dominated by the pressure of an extraneous purpose which must be fulfilled, and the fulfilment of which is regarded as a natural necessity or a social duty, according to one’s inclination” (CW 32, p. 391). Similarly, in the third volume of *Capital*, he argues that “the realm of freedom really begins only where labour determined by necessity and external expediency ends.... The reduction of the working day is the basic prerequisite” (Marx 1981, p. 959).

But if true freedom begins where the necessity for work ends, our experience of freedom cannot be reduced to this: for not only do increases in the productivity of labour create the potential for people to devote more time to the development of “human powers as an end in itself,” they also lead to an expansion in human needs themselves (Marx 1981, p. 959). Indeed, human history can be understood, in part, as an unfolding expansion of human needs. Thus, Marx’s claim in *Capital* that through labour, man “acts upon nature and changes it, and in this way he simultaneously changes his own nature” (Marx 1976, p. 283). Kain rightly suggests that Marx’s ideal involves the emergence of humans who are rich in needs, such that our essence expands with the expansion of our needs, as at least some wants and desires are transformed through history into “directly felt needs” such that he praised capitalism for creating the potential for a “rich individuality which is as all-sided in its production as it is in its consumption” (Kain 1988, p. 60, p. 28; CW 28, p. 251). Leisure activities can be counted among the expanded rich new needs to have evolved under capitalism, thus Lefebvre’s claim that “according to Marx the development of the need for leisure and needs of leisure is deeply significant” (Lefebvre 2014, pp. 60–61).

This argument should not be read as supporting Marx and Engels’s infamous (though tellingly unpublished in their lifetimes) claim made in *The German Ideology* that, under communism, one could “do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the

afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, herdsman or critic” (CW 5, p. 47). Beyond (probably) being a witty gibe aimed at the Young Hegelian idealists, the rational core of this argument is the claim that Communism would remove the worst dehumanising excesses of the present division of labour. Missing from it, however, is a sense of how this might be realised in anything other than a utopian fashion. The problem, as Marx was well aware, is that our existence as social individuals presupposes some degree of division of labour as the medium through which society itself is possible (Beamish 1992, p. 162). While these divisions mean that it is impossible to develop *all* of our potential, it is nonetheless possible to remove most of the barriers to human self-realisation that are a consequence of what Marx latter came to call the manufacturing and subsequent Marxists the technical division of labour, while maintaining the social division of labour thus allowing people to flourish to a level that is presently denied the vast majority.

Accordingly, for Marx, the social and the manufacturing divisions of labour could be differentiated thus: whereas the former facilitated increases in the productivity of labour by occupational specialisation, the technical division involves the subdivision of jobs such that individual workers perform increasingly simple tasks for which they require only a minimum of training (Ratanssi 1982, p. 150). This second form of the division of labour emerged through the need to control workers by deskilling them and thus making them interchangeable (CW 30, p. 271, p. 279; cf., Marx 1976, pp. 1019–1024). In this new situation, Marx argued, “the division of labour within the workshop implies the undisputed authority of the capitalist over men” (Marx 1976, p. 477). Marx suggested that while the former process was an inevitable precondition of economic and social advance, the tendency immanent in it towards “crippling of the body and mind” by occupational specialisation was taken to the extreme in the factory for reasons that had little to do with increasing the “universal opulence.” Rather, the manufacturing system emerged to ensure capital’s control over the labour process and was an “entirely specific creation of the capitalist mode of production” (Marx 1976, p. 480, p. 484).

If the technical division of labour primarily exists to help capitalists impose their control over workers, capitalists themselves are by no means immune from the power of capital. The market imposes its logic upon them just as much as it does upon workers: while “the capitalist, by means of capital, exercises his power to command labour; ... capital, in its turn, is able to rule the capitalist himself” (CW 3, p. 247). Capital consequently acts as an ever-expanding alien power over everyone within the capitalist system. Marx expanded on the consequences of this situation in a report to the General Council of the First International in 1868: “what strikes us most is that all the consequences which were expected as the inevitable result of machinery have been reversed. Instead of diminishing the hours of labour, the working day was prolonged to sixteen and eighteen hours.” Against this tendency Marx praised the laws limiting the working day as “a step of progress, in so far as it afforded more leisure time to the work-people.” (CW 21, p. 382).

But, of course, these laws only mediated against the worst excesses of alienation, they did not overcome it. As István Mészáros points out, there are three aspects to Marx’s notion of freedom: humanity’s free engagement with natural necessity, our ability to realise our essential powers, and our free relations with the rest of humanity (Mészáros 1975, pp. 153–154). Capitalism, by expanding the productivity of labour, creates the potential to realise this third aspect of freedom by generalising free leisure time across society as a whole and not merely among the leisured classes. As Engels writes: “And it is precisely this industrial revolution which has raised the productive power of human labour to such a high level that—for the first time in the history of mankind—the possibility exists, given a rational division of labour among all, of producing not only enough for the plentiful consumption of all members of society and for an abundant reserve fund, but also of leaving each individual sufficient leisure so that what is really worth preserving in historically inherited culture—science, art, forms of intercourse, etc.—may not only be preserved but converted from a monopoly of the ruling class into the common property of the whole of society, and may be further developed” (CW 23, p. 325).

The importance of this development should not be overestimated because free “[t]ime is the room of human development. A man who has no free time to dispose of, whose whole lifetime, apart from the mere

physical interruptions by sleep, meals, and so forth, is absorbed by his labour for the capitalist, is less than a beast of burden. He is a mere machine for producing Foreign Wealth, broken in body and brutalised in mind. Yet the whole history of modern industry shows that capital, if not checked, will recklessly and ruthlessly work to cast down the whole working class to the utmost state of degradation” (CW 20, p. 142). Conversely, engagement in really active leisure activities enriches our very being: “Free time—which is both leisure and time for higher activity—has naturally transformed its possessor into another subject; and it is then as this other subject that he enters into the immediate production process” (CW 29, p. 97).

But freedom isn't simply a question of time spent away from work. Because of its alien character, work under capitalism distorts all our activities, such that life tends to become a pseudo-praxis, contemplative rather than active in nature. Georg Lukács, for instance, argues that “In consequence of the rationalisation of the work-process the human qualities and idiosyncrasies of the worker appear increasingly as *mere sources of error* when contrasted with these abstract special laws functioning according to rational predictions. Neither objectively nor in his relation to his work does man appear as the authentic master of the process; on the contrary, he is a mechanical part incorporated into a mechanical system. He finds it already pre-existing and self-sufficient, it functions independently of him and he has to conform to its laws whether he likes it or not. As labour is progressively rationalised and mechanised his lack of will is reinforced by the way in which his activity becomes less and less active and more and more *contemplative*. The contemplative stance adopted towards a process mechanically conforming to fixed laws and enacted independently of man's consciousness and impervious to human intervention, i.e. a perfectly closed system, must likewise transform the basic categories of man's immediate attitude to the world: it reduces space and time to a common denominator and degrades time to the dimension of space” (Lukács 1971, p. 89).

In this situation, time spent away from work tends to function merely as break from work rather than a moment for free expression. Thus, Lefebvre writes that “the most striking imperative as far as leisure among the masses are concerned is that it must produce a break” that is it must

be “as far away from real life as possible” (Lefebvre 2014, pp. 55–56). Indeed, capitalist alienation means that “the worker craves a sharp break with his work, a compensation. He looks for this in leisure seen as entertainment or distraction.” Leisure, from this standpoint, “appears as the non-everyday in the everyday,” an escape that is “an illusion” but which is “not entirely illusory” because the world of leisure is “both apparent and real” (Lefebvre 2014, p. 62).

Lefebvre adds that whereas criticism of everyday life had previously been the monopoly of the leisured classes, with the emergence of capitalism the expansion of leisure time creates a space for a renewed critique of the everyday from within the everyday: “the man of our times carries out in his own way, spontaneously, the critique of his everyday life. And this critique of everyday plays an integral part in everyday: it is achieved in and by leisure activities” (Lefebvre 2014, p. 51). This is a novel situation, for whereas the work-leisure totality had always existed as a “unity,” before the advent of bourgeois society critics of the everyday “*appeared* to remain outside the social division of labour and social practice”—though in “reality they were prisoners of the separation of manual and intellectual work” (Lefebvre 2014, p. 52). So while the objective basis for leisure time under capitalism is rooted in capital’s need to reproduce labour power, and while the existence of discreet elements of work, family life and leisure is itself a characteristic of alienation (Lefebvre 2014, p. 54), the very fact that workers have won this right and shape its practice creates the possibility for it to become a springboard from which to criticise society as a whole. Of course, this is not true of leisure as a whole: paralleling Lukács’s distinction between contemplative and active praxis, Lefebvre points to the contradictory character of leisure. It is a phenomenon that “embraces opposing possibilities and orientations, of which some tend to impoverish through passivity while others are more enriching” (Lefebvre 2014, p. 54).

If capitalism tends continuously to reconstruct us as passive consumers of, among a myriad of other things, leisure time, it is never able to completely reduce our activity to the pseudo-level of the merely contemplative. Of course, much of what we do as a break from alienated work simply constitutes the rest and recuperation necessary for the daily reproduction of the labour force, and much of what is done beyond

that is dominated by the pseudo-praxis of consumerist “contemplative praxis” (Jarvis 1998, p. 76). Nonetheless, at their most active, leisure pursuits, like many other aspects of modern life (Blackledge, 2012), point to the kind of free activity that can act both as a critique of leisure as a mere break within an alienated life and consequently as a critique of that life as a totality. The more active and critical and less contemplative and uncritical forms of leisure activities can point beyond the simulacrum of freedom characteristic of capitalist social relations and towards a broader critique of alienation that recognises the profound limits of contemporary leisure relations and the fundamental importance of a revolutionary transformation of work as a necessary moment in the creation of really free leisure time (Postone 1993, p. 364). This Marxist perspective points to a historical conception of leisure both as a concrete capitalist and consequently alienated (unfree) form and as a form that, at its best, can occasionally point beyond this situation. So, just as modern sport is an alienated form of play that can, occasionally, point towards the real freedom of play (Blackledge 2014), so alienated leisure more generally can sometimes point beyond itself to the possibility of real freedom.

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“Let’s Murder the Moonlight!” Futurism, Anti-Humanism and Leisure

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Introduction: Getting Back to the Futurists

When the Futurist cinema opened in 1912 on Liverpool’s Lime Street, it was celebrated for its modern design. Cinemas or “picture houses” such as the Futurist—by 1914 there were approximately 4000 picture houses in operation in the UK¹—were marvels of their time, not only for the technological magic of moving pictures but also as they were often marvelously futuristic “houses” in other ways, with bright electric lighting, indoor plumbing and central heating. The names of early cinemas are richly illustrative and instructive here: Scarborough had a “Futurist” (1920) cinema too, while cities such as Bath (1910), Birmingham (1909) and York (1911) each had a cinema called the “Electric”; Notting Hill

¹According to Historic Scotland (2009, p. 5), moving pictures made their debut in the UK “from around 1896.”

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had both the “Electric” (1910) and the “Electric Palace” (1911), echoed in “Electric Palace” cinemas in Harwich (1911) and Islington (1911); and Brixton had the “Electric Pavilion” (1911). Entering into these leisure spaces, it is important to consider that “[p]eople mostly came from houses that lacked central heating, probably only having one warm room, with a tin bath out the back. They walked into a world of luxury” (Parkinson 2015, para. 14). Such luxurious leisure was indicative of a larger, newer “futuristic” era in which the natural world was being modified and surpassed technologically. Electric lighting would, in the words of Filippo Marinetti (1909b), “murder the moonlight,” shattering both the romantic and natural cycle of day and night, allowing people to pursue activities around the clock if they chose to do so. Beyond the zing of electric lights and kinetic energy captured in motion pictures, there was *action*: motorcars, airplanes and trains, phonographs and telephones were transforming and accelerating human activity, and thus leisure, in innumerable ways. This chapter is focused on an “explosive but still somewhat underrated” (Lacayo 2014, p. 58) movement, 1909–1914, of dramatic changes in technology, art, leisure and philosophy. Unsurprisingly, this movement was called Futurism and its proponents, Futurists.

For the Futurists, mechanical change was an exciting new kind of art in itself, with technological transformations extending into far broader socio-cultural changes. Art could not be radical enough as their avant-garde movement sought to push change to extremes. Consequently, this brief era saw a burst of unconventional thought and revolutionary action about leisure, art and technology. Leisure scholars have yet to address this era, in part, as argued below, because the Futurists were also emblematic of a philosophical shift away from Hegelian Humanism, whereas much of the philosophy of leisure (e.g., as freedom, free choice, happiness, pleasure and so on) remains deeply embedded in Humanist thought. Another factor in leisure studies’ collective neglect of the Futurists is perhaps in the legacy of the movement itself, as it was embraced by the Fascists in the years leading directly to the Second World War (Perloff 1986). I also contend that Futurism is overlooked because it is now nearly ubiquitous in “modern,” urban, mass-mediated, technological leisure: in many ways we have all become Futurists.

Accordingly, going “back to the Futurists” (Adamowicz and Storchi 2013) offers useful opportunities to revisit a critical moment and rethink theories of leisure. Futurism signaled not only a full embrace of modernity and technology but also a radical philosophical shift put into concrete practice. In just its first five years “Futurism became the focal point for a vast debate that stretched across Europe, spanned the spectrum of the arts, and encompassed the gamut of forums for critical discussion” (Rainey 2009, p. 1). Here too was the idea of a new kind of public figure—the artist-intellectual—as *provocateur* engaged in creative thought and social action. For Rainey (2009, p. 1), the Futurists revealed the power of a new type of intellectual formation: a small collectivity, buttressed by publicity and spectacle, that could produce cultural artifacts that spanned the spectrum of the arts and were constructed in accordance with a coherent body of theoretical precepts grounded in not just arbitrary aesthetic preferences but a systematic reading of contemporary society.

In sum, Futurism may be read as something of a barometer of artistic, philosophical and cultural change; it was also an *engine* of change. This chapter offers first a consideration of Futurism, before turning to the philosophical shift from Humanism toward Anti-Humanism, and ends by reading these two movements in concert via their impact on contemporary leisure and leisure studies.

Futurism

Futurism was an avant-garde art and cultural movement started in 1909 by the Italian poet and journalist Filippo Tommaso Marinetti (1876–1944). Marinetti came to be widely admired as a kind of “one man public relations firm” (McLendon 2013, p. 14)² for his efforts to promote Futurism’s ideals. Marrying avant-garde art and media savvy, Marinetti is most well-known for his “Manifesto of Futurism,”

²Perhaps less generously, Lacayo (2014, p. 58) refers to Marinetti as “chief theorist, pamphleteer, impresario, and motormouth” while also noting that Marinetti thought of himself as “the caffeine of Europe.”

published on 20 February 1909 (as “The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism”) on the front page of the leading Parisian newspaper, *Le Figero*. This manifesto heralded the birth of the Futurist movement by listing a series of direct artistic interventions aimed at smashing conservative art and cultural traditions. Brashly bombastic, the Futurists embraced speed, technology, machinery, cities, noise, pollution, youth and violence (Perloff 1986). Futurism was to break with the past. Marinetti’s first manifesto was followed quickly by another, “Let’s murder the moonlight!” (1909b) and a deluge of over 30 manifestos followed, written by artist-intellectuals on painting (Boccioni et al. 1910a; Soffici 1914), sculpture (Boccioni 1913), fashion (Balla 1914), dance (Marinetti 1914), literature (Marinetti 1912), architecture (Sant’Elia 1914), cinema (Marinetti et al. 1916), music (Pratella 1911; Russolo 1913), dance (Marinetti, 1917) and more. In their feverish efforts to turn from the past, the Futurists brought avant-garde art together with the project of modernity (Rainey 2009).

Intended to shock and stir controversy—a “slap in the face of public taste” (Burluk et al. 1912, quoted in Lawson and Eagle 1988, p. 51)—the Futurists called, for example, for the destruction of museums, libraries and academies as static “cemeteries” celebrating a dead past. The future was to be written anew, based on energetic, electric, youthful urbanism, always in motion, in celebration of the fleetingness of life. After a near-fatal car crash in 1908, Marinetti embraced the motorcar as a symbol of life’s urgency and used it symbolically in the introduction to his initial manifesto (Marinetti 1909a, quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, p. 49):

[...] suddenly we heard the famished roar of automobiles.

‘Let’s go!’ I said. ‘Friends, away! Let’s go! Mythology and the Mystic Ideal are defeated at last. [...] We must shake at the gates of life, test the bolts and hinges. Let’s go!’ [...] And like young lions we ran after Death, its dark pelt blotched with pale crosses as it escaped down the vast violet living and throbbing sky.

Although the writing style may seem florid and romantic by current standards, for Cody (2013), this invocation to drive with reckless speed toward a new dawn resonates with Nietzschean philosophy—the rejection

of traditional values and morality. This rejection is presented in the Futurists’ fascination with speed which races through the first eight points (of 11) in Marinetti’s “Manifesto of Futurism” (see Table 1).

In their embrace of dynamism, and as the movement itself gained momentum, the Futurists produced manifesto after manifesto in attempts to bring art apace with the rapid technological changes taking place at the time, and in turn, to spur further changes. From music to painting to architecture, the Futurists imagined a techno-modernist world characterized by dramatic movement and change. This section of the chapter is focused on a few illustrative examples. For instance, Luigi Russolo’s (1913) “The Art of Noises: A Futurist Manifesto” celebrated a new kind of music—the noises of engines, machines and cities—through which everyday sounds become music and vice versa: a factory is as musical as a symphony orchestra and is more in tune with the times. For Russolo, a painter-turned untrained musician (1913, quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, p. 6):

Beethoven and Wagner have stirred our hearts and nerves for many years. Now we are satiated with them, and we derive far more pleasure from ideally combining the noises of trams, internal combustion engines, carriages, and noisy crowds, than listening once more, for example, to the heroic pastoral symphonies.

In “The Art of Noises,” Russolo translates Marinetti’s (1909a) initial call to “destroy the museums, libraries, and academies of every kind” (quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, p. 51) into a direct challenge to the canonical music of the past. Russolo questioned not only “what is good music?” (Frith 1990, p. 92) but also assailed the aesthetic notion of what counts as music at all. Russolo’s first Futurist compositions, titled *Awakening of a City* and *The Meeting of Automobiles and Airplanes* (1913), aptly characterize the oeuvre. These pieces were performed on curious instruments called “noise tuners” of Russolo’s own invention. *Awakening of a City* was described by a journalist from the London *Pall Mall Gazette* at its November 1913 premiere:

At first a quiet even murmur was heard. The great city was asleep. Now and again some giant hidden in one of those queer boxes snored portentously; and a new-born child cried. Then, the murmur was heard again, a faint

Table 1 Extract from Marinetti's (1909a, quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, pp. 51–52) "The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism"

We intend to sing the love of danger, the habit of energy and fearlessness
 Courage, audacity, and revolt will be essential elements of our poetry
 Up to now literature has exalted a pensive immobility, ecstasy, and sleep. We
 intend to exalt aggressive action, a feverish insomnia, the racer's stride, the
 mortal leap, the punch and the slap

We affirm that the world's magnificence has been enriched by a new beauty:
 the beauty of speed. A racing car whose hood is adorned with great pipes,
 like serpents of explosive breath—a roaring car that seems to ride on
 grapeshot is more beautiful than the Victory of Samothrace

We want to hymn the man at the wheel, who hurls the lance of his spirit
 across the Earth, along the circle of its orbit

The poet must spend himself with ardor, splendor, and generosity, to swell the
 enthusiastic fervor of the primordial elements

Except in struggle, there is no more beauty. No work without an aggressive
 character can be a masterpiece. Poetry must be conceived as a violent attack
 on unknown forces, to reduce and prostrate them before man

We stand on the last promontory of the centuries!... Why should we look
 back, when what we want is to break down the mysterious doors of the
 Impossible? Time and Space died yesterday. We already live in the absolute,
 because we have created eternal, omnipresent speed

We will glorify war—the world's only hygiene—militarism, patriotism, the
 destructive gesture of freedom-bringers, beautiful ideas worth dying for,
 and scorn for woman^a

We will destroy the museums, libraries, academies of every kind, will fight
 moralism, feminism, every opportunistic or utilitarian cowardice

We will sing of the great crowd excited by work, by pleasure, and by riot; we
 will sing of the multicolored, polyphonic tides of revolution in the modern
 capitals; we will sing of the vibrant nightly fervor of arsenals and shipyards
 blazing with violent electric moons; greedy railway stations that devour
 smoke-plumed serpents; factories hung on clouds by the crooked lines of
 their smoke; bridges that stride the rivers like giant gymnasts, flashing in the
 sun with a glitter of knives; adventurous steamers that sniff the horizon;
 deep-chested locomotives whose wheels paw the tracks like the hooves of
 enormous steel horses bridled by tubing; and the sleek flight of planes
 whose propellers chatter in the wind like banners and seem to cheer like an
 enthusiastic crowd

^aThis last point is addressed by Margaret Wynn Nevinson (1910) in "Futurism and Women", by Valentine de Saint-Point' in (1912) "Manifesto of the Futurist Woman" (Response to F. T. Marinetti)" and in "Futurist Manifesto of Lust" (1913) and again, later, in "Women of the Near Future" (1917) from Rosa Rosà.

noise like breakers on the shore. Presently, a far-away nose grew rapidly into a mighty roar. I fancied it must have been the roar of the huge printing machines of the newspapers.

(quoted in Brown 1981, p. 35)

Then, the city burst into life through Russolo’s music, when “hundreds of vans and motor lorries seemed to be hurrying towards the station, summoned by the shrill whistling of the locomotives. Later, the trains were heard, speeding boisterously away” (quoted in Brown 1981, p. 35). Here was the marriage of technology and modernity formulated by Marinetti, made musical by Russolo, inscribed through the sounds of everyday urban life. Russolo’s fantastic onomatopoeic instruments—the howler, the roarer, the crackler, the rubber, the hummer, the gurgler, the hisser, the burster, the croaker, the rustler and others—can only be imagined (all have since been destroyed or lost), yet they revolutionized music and what it represented. They presaged the work of composers such as Edgar Varèse and John Cage (2004 [1937]), among others, and can be said to be seeds of electronic, synthesized music, and “techno” and “industrial” music too. Most importantly, Russolo’s *Art of Noises* represents a sharp turn from elite artists and the romanticized celebration of high culture; this was music—a *soundscape*—of the urban working classes.

In every instance, the myriad Futurist manifestos cry for change, not only to the aesthetics of music or art but also for cultural change too: to sweep away the old order. Like Russolo’s approach to music, and in the zeal of Marinetti’s initial manifesto, Boccioni et al.’s “Manifesto of the Futurist Painters” (1910a) challenged the traditional romantic view of art that had dominated since the nineteenth century, proclaiming “we desperately want to re-enter into life” by aiming “to destroy the cult of the past, the obsession with antiquity” (quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, p. 63). Futurist painting must be new and original: “We rebel against the spineless admiration for old canvases, old statues, and old objects, and against the enthusiasm for everything worm-eaten, grimy, or corroded by time” (Boccioni et al. 1910a, quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, p. 62). Rather than traditional landscapes or static portraits, Futurist paintings would (of course) focus on machines, movement and technology.

Like many Futurists, Boccioni, Carrà, Russolo, Balla and Severini (1910b) also produced a “Technical Manifesto” offering a kind of how-to guide (in this case) for painting to accompany the conceptual framework. Conceptually, for Boccioni et al. (1910b), rather than focus, for example, on capturing the suffering of the person sitting for a portrait, Futurist painters could focus on the “suffering” of an electric lamp (building on Marinetti’s notion that electric street lighting could “murder” the moonlight). In this way, Futurist painters sought to shift away from the ideal of “recoverable human content as the aim of painting (it was no longer possible ‘to look upon man as the centre of universal life’)” (Rainey 2009, p. 9). Technology could “act” and had “emotions.” This represents a stark rejection of Humanism, and the “Manifesto of the Futurist Painters” (among other manifestos) “points to a vision of the nonhuman world as the pre-eminent site of art’s activity, a way of imagining the world as a machine of infinite productivity” (Rainey 2009, p. 6). To achieve this technological ideal, Boccioni et al. (1910b) championed a starkly minimalist technique called “Divisionism” that reduced painting to thin lines of pure color applied with machine-like precision. Stripping art of its past trappings and breaking it down into its barest components, Futurist paintings can claim to have had influence on contemporary and later forms such as Cubism, Dadaism and Vorticism. Arguably, much of what is generically categorized as “Art Deco” draws heavily from Futurist concepts. Futurism’s legacy echoes as well in Pop Art such as the Ben-Day dots of Roy Lichtenstein and Andy Warhol’s soup can labels: mechanized industry elevated into art.

The Futurists envisioned a comprehensive approach to modern life that extended through music, painting and cinema to the lived spaces (cities) where Futurism might be fully realized. Perhaps the most influential manifesto in this regard was “Futurist Architecture” (1914) written by Antonio Sant’Elia. Taking as its central focus “the Futurist city” Sant’Elia “rejected all historicism and every use of decorative ornament” (Rainey 2009, p. 18). Melding technology and functionality into a new aesthetic, Sant’Elia’s architectural style relied on the use of reinforced concrete and celebrated internal machinery such as elevators and pipework by putting it solidly on display: “Elevators must no

longer hide away like solitary worms in the stairwells—but the stairs—now useless, must be abolished, and the elevators must swarm up the façades like serpents of glass and iron” (1914, quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, p. 200). In this, Sant’Elia envisioned a style that later found form in the Le Corbusier’s “Brutalist”³ architecture and sits comfortably along celebrated “postmodern,” “deconstructive” and “high tech” (also called “Neo-Futurism”) architecture such as the Pompidou Centre (1977) in Paris which openly wears its pipework, ductwork and electrical circuitry on its exterior. So too, in Sant’Elia’s words, houses should be designed “like a gigantic machine” (1914, quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, p. 200). Here too, the new cinemas or “picture houses” began to take physical shape. Although they were yet to shed some of the decorative legacy of the music halls and variety theaters they were rapidly replacing, cinemas—such as those named “The Futurist” or “The Electric”—are powerful, enduring symbols of Futurism. They are houses of machines (e.g., with central heating, central plumbing, electric lighting, elevators, etc.) built for the celebration of new technology: motion pictures. The cinema, in many ways, represents the epitome of Futurism.

In these brief examples of music, art and architecture, the Futurists embraced radical modernism and rejected canonical “classics” and conservative traditionalism: “Every day we must spit on the altar of Art. We must destroy art with a capital A” (Marinetti 1912, quoted in Rainey 2009, p. 15). Following the publication of Marinetti’s initial “Manifesto of Futurism” (1909a), the Futurists found targets for their subversive work in nearly every element of contemporary life: poetry, literature, cinema, cooking, urban planning and more. In such examples, Futurism exemplified not only modernism but also Anti-Humanism, where humans are not given special metaphysical status elevated above the rest of “reality.” Hurling from the past, Futurism was explained by Paden (1987) as an apocalyptic rush toward the end: the end of Humanism.

³Although the term “Brutalist” aptly characterizes the serious, stark, often fortress-like buildings that bear its legacy, its origins are from Le Corbusier’s choice of material, *béton brut*: raw concrete.

“Humanity Is Mediocre”⁴: From Humanism Toward Anti-Humanism

In the opening section of his “Technical Manifesto of Futurist Literature” (1912), Marinetti placed his narrator in an airplane flying high over a metropolis. Gazing into the city below, the narrator loses sight of himself as his being merges with the airplane and his voice becomes the voice of the airplane itself: “And this is what the propeller told me” (quoted in Rainey 2009, p. 15). This transmogrification represents a transcendence of self-hood, leading Marinetti to later proclaim, “We must destroy the ‘I’” (quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, p. 122). For Rainey (2009, p. 15), Marinetti called for:

an assault against the notion of a unitary subject, that coherent self which had presided over the scene of writing in the long tradition which runs from Cartesian speculation through nineteenth-century liberalism.

In this, Futurism was above all else a radical critique of Humanism; it occupies part of the philosophical territory that later came to be seen as Anti-Humanism (Paden 1987). Futurism fiercely rejected Humanist ideals of a “common moral core,” equality, freedom and the universal idealism of Hegel whereby “being” could be conceived as an absolute “whole”. Humanism also found form in Kantian autonomy and rational consciousness; it had surfaced too in Marx’s early utopianism: people with freedom could think rationally and “progress” to a state of improvement that could, someday, become utopian. Such progressive idealism was rejected as hollow by the Futurists via their reading of the work of Nietzsche: people do not have a special, transcendent metaphysical status in the world. Nietzsche dourly questioned what kind of future was worth having. In this the Futurists sought to show a way forward.

⁴Anti-Humanism resonates loudly in the work de Saint-Point (1912, quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, p. 109): “Humanity is mediocre. The majority of women are neither superior nor inferior to the majority of men. They are equal. Both merit the same disdain.”

Nietzsche’s work had a significant and widely acknowledged impact on Marinetti’s thinking (Cody 2013). Marinetti himself stated: “Nietzsche was for us everything. He represented liberation from moralism and mediocrity, the capacity for renewal and rescue from entanglements, for doubting everything that accumulated up until now” (quoted in Berghaus 1996, p. 23). For example, the “The Founding and Manifesto of Futurism” (1909a, quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, p. 49) opens with the lines “We stayed up all night, my friends and I...” under electric lights, writing furiously, until their work was broken by the sudden sounds of trams and automobiles at the start of the day. In lines following his exclamation “let’s go!” (omitted from the Introduction, above, with an ellipsis) (1909a, quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, p. 49), Marinetti greets daybreak with a “Nietzschean expression” (Cody 2013, p. 126) of radical rebirth: “Look! There, on the earth, the earliest dawn! Nothing can match the splendor of the sun’s red sword, skirmishing for the first time with our thousand-year-old shadows” (Marinetti 1909a, quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, p.49). Here, Nietzschean philosophy served as a kind of “sword” to cut down Hegel’s “millennium” of absolute idealism. For Boccioni et al. (1910a, quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, p. 63), Futurists must “exalt every form of originality, however daring, however violent.” The past was Humanist, signified in museums, libraries and in the established traditional “arts”: to smash these meant also to smash Humanism.

More than violence, the key to Futurism’s Anti-Humanism was *motion*. “Nothing, for a Futurist poet” wrote Marinetti “is more interesting than the action of a mechanical piano’s keyboard. Film offers us the dance of an object that disintegrates and recomposes itself without human intervention” (1912, quoted in Rainey et al. 2009, p. 122). Here, emphasized through motion and decentered humanity, is the presence of “two thinkers whose ideas were particularly significant in the formation of Futurism and, indeed, in the development of early modernism as a whole: Friedrich Nietzsche and Henri Bergson” (Humphreys 1999, p. 17). Griffiths (2013, p. 27) added:

Futurism was born in [against] an atmosphere of Hegelian idealism and [in favour of] Bergsonian pragmatism when philosophers and thinkers were

refuting notions of objective removal from political or social affairs and insisting instead upon the importance of engagement.

Bergson's (1910) writing on time and simultaneity augmented features of Nietzsche's philosophies and was critical to the Futurist's embrace of speed. Bergson's ideas questioned human understandings of "reality" and "experience"; they "influenced a whole new generation of artists and writers whose key words were 'energy', 'vital impulse', 'dynamics'" (Bière 2013, p. 113). For Futurists concerned with evoking and representing *motion*, Bergson's (1910) philosophy of duration (or simultaneity) offered new understandings of the immediate relations between time and space (i.e., "reality"). Bergson was in turn influenced by the work of William James (i.e., pragmatism), which had emphasized "reality, life, experience, concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will, exceeds our logic, overflows, and surrounds it [...] and by reality here I mean reality where things happen" (James 1909, p. 212). While Bergson's arguments exceed the limits of this chapter, they underpin the revolutionary ideas of Marinetti's obsession with speed, Russolo's approach to machine-noise music, Boccioni's dynamic approach to painting and Sant'Elia's inversion of architectural form and function. Bière (2013, p. 121) summarized:

Bergson realised that science considered time "whose essence is to flow", like space, whose essence is simultaneity, which is quite the opposite. Bergson argues that simultaneity is the relationship or the contact between a specific duration and another reality. In other words, we all make simultaneous mental pictures of moments in time that are never there at the same time. [...] this notion of simultaneity is a prerequisite when it comes to conceptualising the relationship between beings and the passage from duration to homogenous time.

Bergson offered that any flat, static abstraction should not be mistaken for "reality": *motion* is the relation between time, space and reality. Heavily influenced by Bergson, for the Futurists "no object is stationary" (Lacayo 2014, p. 58), and Futurist art sought to represent reality as depicted in motion.

For the Futurists, and Boccioni’s approach to painting in particular, Bergsonian and Nietzschean philosophies converged as “dynamism” through which painting (and art) aims at “giving life to matter by translating it into its movements” (Boccioni 1913, quoted in Bière 2013, p. 123). Seeing, movement, perception and “reality” appear then only as choices that must also be considered as socially contingent and historically relative: that is, dynamic, *in motion*. Such a perspective shifts not only what it means to be human but also humanity’s place in the grander scheme of things. Rejecting Humanism⁵ was thus a crucial plank of the Futurist worldview, part of their vision to sweep away old forms of art, philosophy, science and static social order and replace it.

Conclusion: Leisure and Futurism

Futurism presented a radical turn away from scientific and philosophical notions that dominated the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Its legacies are many and complex, and once clear where to look for it, Futurism can be seen almost everywhere. Futurist poetry idealized “words in freedom” (Marinetti 1912) without syntax or grammar: arguably a progenitor of free-form poetry, perhaps even a precursor to the concrete brevity of text-speak. Futurist theater (Marinetti et al. 1915) presaged performance art and “happenings.” For Castrillo (2014, p. 281), Futurists’ visions for the cinema (e.g., Marinetti et al. 1916) were “essential in the evolution of the medium over many decades,” shaping what was arguably the preeminent form of mass media of the first half of the twentieth century (Curran and Seaton 2003). Beyond cinema, the Futurists’ intuitive mix of “new media” (cinema, advertising, phonographic sound recording, abstract painting, etc.) stands as an important reference point for digital technologies and multimedia today. From 1909 to 1914, the Futurists were riding a wave of dramatic technological and cultural change, yet their own activities also vividly illustrate how a small group of artist-intellectuals

⁵Althusser (1971) is largely credited with coining the term “Anti-Humanism” in the mid-twentieth century to emphasize social structure and relegate individual agency to a product of social (ideological) practices.

brought philosophy, art and leisure together in concrete and revolutionary ways to push these changes further. There is something extraordinary in this: ideas and art *matter*. By extension, such a perspective reasserts the importance of leisure, and leisure-intellectuals, not only in understanding the world but also in changing it. The Futurists—for their faults and tainted legacy—offer a view that also shakes the idea of leisure firmly, if violently, away from Humanism.

Futurism was an attempt to transform not only the arts but also all of society; the Futurists sought to shock into wakefulness a “sleeping” public from the oppressive lull of conservative art and culture. In this it was openly ideological and also highly political. Marinetti’s (1915) “The Futurist Political Movement” and later “Manifesto of the Italian Futurist Political Party” (1918) assembled “a grab-bag of ill-formed ideas [...] struggling to synthesize socialism, anarchism, and capitalism” (Lacayo 2014, p. 60). Futurist politics fed from, and into, the fervent nationalism that crested into the First World War, particularly in terms of Italian patriotism. Rather than dampen their project, the cataclysm of the First World War (which saw the deaths of many Futurists, including Boccioni and Sant’Elia, both killed in battle in 1916) only served to further strengthen the Futurists’ rejection of Humanism. During the interwar years (1919–1939), Marinetti and many others churned out further manifestos on subjects ranging from Futurist theater (Marinetti and Canguillo 1921), mechanical art (Pannaggi and Paladini 1922) to cuisine (Marinetti 1930) and advertising (Deparo 1931). If nothing else the ideas of sweeping away an old order gained force and greater political engagement in the aftermath of war (“the world’s only hygiene” as Marinetti’s original manifesto had proclaimed; see Table 1, above) just as many Futurists have hoped. In 1919, the Futurists merged with Mussolini’s Fascist Party (Berghaus 1996). The Italian Futurists—especially Marinetti—became “on-again, off-again apologist[s]” (Lacayo 2014, p. 60) for Mussolini’s regime,⁶ leading to yet more manifestos on “Fascism and Futurism” (Prezzolini 1923) and “The Italian Empire” (Marinetti et al. 1923). Futurism’s entwinement with Fascism has “thrown a retroactive shadow”

⁶Hitler condemned the Futurists as “degenerate” modern art, and Marinetti rebuked Hitler’s Anti-Futurism in an open letter, “Response to Hitler” (1937).

(Lacayo 2014, p. 60) over the movement which darkens and diminishes the luminosity of what the Futurists produced, particularly in its first fluorescence, 1909–1914.

As for Liverpool’s Futurist cinema... having sat empty and derelict since 1982, by 2016, all that remained was its façade on Lime Street. At the time of this writing, it is slated for demolition, deemed too far decayed for conservation, although a grassroots effort has sought to preserve what remains, set against the wider regeneration—and some might argue erasure—of the historic character of Liverpool’s city center (Lashua et al. 2010). In an ironic twist, cinemas such as the Futurist have become centers of fierce debates about preserving the past, precisely the sort of thing that the Futurists had aimed to demolish.

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The Frankfurt School, Leisure and Consumption

Gabby Skeldon

Introduction: The Problem with Marxism

The Institute of Social Research established in Frankfurt in 1923—otherwise known as the Frankfurt School—was an establishment created to conduct research underpinned by Marxism and its potential for political change. In the aftermath of the First World War and the Russian Revolution, European intellectuals grappled with the remarkable social and political changes. Marx's initial theory discusses the idea that certain points of history are organised around a mode of production, and this produces the material necessities of life. Each mode of production has a specific way of obtaining necessities of life, a specific relationship between workers and those who own the mode of production and specific social institutions these were built upon (Storey 1997) and included in these

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social institutions are leisure and popular culture. The core members of the early Frankfurt School such as Max Horkheimer (1895–1973), Theodor Adorno (1903–1969), Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) and Erich Fromm (1900–1980), while sometimes disagreeing on their assessment of the development of modern capitalism, agreed on many of Marx's observations concerning the organisation of modern society. First, they explain how society is dominated by the capitalist mode of production where society is based on exchange and commodities, where emphasis is on profit rather than human satisfaction (Held 1980). Second, that the social relationships that appear natural, that is, the relationship between those who own the means of production and those who produce are “natural” (Storey 1997), therefore, the model of exchange and consumption to pacify the masses is veiled by false consciousness; third, that capitalism does not run as a harmonious social whole, it is full of contradictions and when conflict occurs between illusion and reality it can lead to crisis. This is a crisis that Marx predicted, where the masses would no longer be pacified by the ideology created by the bourgeoisie and rebel against the capitalist mode of production. However, Rojek (1985) writes that Marx's original theorisations predicted the demise of capitalism in economically advanced societies. However, what can be seen is that class differences have not caused a revolution and that capitalist economies have only expanded and adapted in order to maintain economic stability, and therefore, the most important predictions of Marx's theory have not come to fruition.

Consequently, in the post-war period, western Marxists made it their task to explore why social change had not occurred and how Marxism might be practically implemented. This was the task of the Frankfurt School. While the Frankfurt School made theoretical contributions in a wide variety of areas, this chapter will primarily discuss the way in which it has influenced our understanding of leisure and popular culture via what became known as “Critical Theory”. Marx has made the largest contribution to leisure studies than any other theorist (Spracklen 2009), and his work discusses the capitalist nature of society, in which, every element is dominated by production and commodification. Rojek (1995) argues that there are three main paradigms that are accepted in the discussion of leisure; the Functionalist perspective that sees leisure

as part of the organic matter of society. Individuals must engage in leisure activity for society to remain in good order. Positivism suggests that leisure, to be a concept at all, must be measured and observed so that there can be correlation between leisure practices and existing social categories, for example, Roberts (1970) identifies five things that were seen as acceptable leisure activities in the modern era: gambling, annual holidays, alcohol, TV and sex, that come with certain expectations of class and specific time and place constraints. For example, gambling was seen as a male working class form of leisure characterised not only by its roughness (Borsay 2006) but also by the need to place bets at an actual event or in a specific establishment and at the time of the race or event. TV also has these modern constraints, for example, certain televised events such as the Queen's speech at Christmas were watched by millions of people, which can be recorded and compared with other leisure practices. Finally, Pluralism creates the idea that leisure practice is dominated by power structures and that, as no one structure can maintain power absolutely, acceptable leisure pursuits are subject to change. While these three views all slightly differ in approach they rely on some of the same fundamentals: that leisure must exist in a set time period, that it is defined not as an individual concept but as opposed to something else and that there are set activities that constitute leisure. It is this latter paradigm that Marxist views of leisure fall into. Leisure, for Marx, was something that existed as opposed to work (Rojek 1985), in a way in which the masses replenished themselves for another working day, and this enabled the maintenance of the status quo. Through this spare time, which was viewed as "free", cultural norms and values are transmitted, the individual accepts their place in society as they are anesthetised by popular culture (Jarvie and McGuire 1994). Within a late capitalist society, free time is not time "of potential creativity and self-cultivation, but rather a time subtly controlled within the economic system" (Edgar 1999, p. 186). Leisure and popular culture are intricately caught up in the process of labour and the acquisition of capital. This chapter will discuss the work of the Frankfurt School to our understanding of popular culture and leisure. It considers a brief history of the institute and their move from traditional Marxism to Critical Theory. It will also discuss Adorno and Horkheimer's work surrounding culture

and the “Culture Industry” and how this affects the individual’s relationship with leisure and free time. Furthermore, the chapter will explore how the Culture Industry is still at work within contemporary capitalist institutions, such as the RuPaul franchise, particularly the reality TV show *RuPaul’s Drag Race* (RPRD) and how Frankfurt School contributions have helped gain understanding into contemporary leisure and cultural practices.

History of the Frankfurt School and Critical Theory

The Institute of Social Research was created in the early 1920s as a response to the social climate of Europe at this time (Wiggershaus 1995). After the First World War, it was increasingly apparent that Marx’s theorisations did not have realistic, practical applications. Following its defeat, Germany’s imperial government was overthrown by revolutionaries and replaced by a republic in 1918 (Jay 1973). The revolutionaries’ original aim was to create a socialist government much like what had been achieved in Russia in late 1917; however, the leaders of the Social Democratic Party of Germany opposed this idea. As the party was so newly in power, they feared that stripping the bourgeoisie class of all their wealth and privileges would result in civil war (Wiggershaus 1995). Those that had believed in the power of a socialist government saw the shortfalls that emerged when theory and practice did not align. This realisation led those who still believed in Marxist ideals to further their research and create a sociological understanding of theory and practice (i.e., praxis) as one (Jay 1973).

The Frankfurt school was officially attached to the University of Frankfurt from early 1923 (Jay 1973). However, in order for its research to remain somewhat autonomous, it was funded in part by the son of a wealthy merchant, Felix Weil (Held 1980). In 1922, Weil proposed the idea of an Institute for Social Research primarily concerning itself with Marxist social theory and how this could be implemented in practical terms. With the consent of the University of Frankfurt and Weil’s financial backing, the Institute of Social Research was to open with Kurt

Gerlach as its director in 1922. However, Gerlach unexpectedly died in October of 1922 therefore leaving the institute under the direction of Carl Grunberg, officially opening in early 1923. In 1929 the directorship of the institute was passed to Max Horkheimer, and it has been argued that under his direction, the school made some of its more recognised and crucial developments to Marxist social theory (Jay 1973; Wiggershaus 1995; Held 1980).

The institute sought to conduct social research that would “examine the contradictions of modernity, interrogate the limits of the present order” (Calhoun and Karaganis 2001, p. 179) to overcome the limitations of modern thought. The Frankfurt School was committed to the idea of enlightenment, intellectual progress and human emancipation. Those who are described as key members of the School, Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, to name a few, argued that current social research relied too heavily on the positivist paradigm and did not reflect the social differences and subjectivities of human nature. Frankfurt School theorists criticised multiple aspects of traditional theoretical understanding, however, the majority agreed that when society is discussed in rigid way, it suggests a model of sociology that is outside human action and choice. In light of this, Frankfurt School theorists believed that there needed to be a move away from the structure of theoretical Marxism into a new Marxism. They believed this could be applied to emancipate the proletariat, bring class consciousness and make social and political changes, and this is widely referred to as the beginning of Critical Theory.

Bronner (2011) states that Critical Theory was “conceived within the intellectual crucible of Marxism” (p. 2) but however, those in the Frankfurt School, while inherently Marxist in their theoretical standing, were dismissive of the belief in the inevitable triumph of socialism. Horkheimer (2002) in his essay *Traditional and Critical Theory* argues that “if experience and theory contradict each other, one of the two must be examined” (p. 188) and it became apparent that it was theory that needed to be amended. Calhoun and Karaganis (2001) state that theory needed to be “recovered from a cerebral and abstract philosophical tradition that failed to challenge the status quo” (p. 179) so that it could be made useful. Theory then is stored up knowledge (Horkheimer 2002) that is only useful to explain certain elements of society; it is a hypothesis

that can be applied to only describe those things that are close to it. For example, Marxism could be used to describe the capitalist situation of society; however, in this form, it did little towards the actual implementation of a revolution. Frankfurt school theorists made a move away from the rigid structure of theoretical Marxism into a new Marxism which they believed could be applied to emancipate the proletariat making it “useful in movements that would bring about radical and liberatory social change” (Calhoun and Karaganis 2001, p. 179). Marcuse (1969) stated that the work of the Frankfurt school needed to “refrain from what might reasonably be called utopian speculation” (p. 3) and move towards an understanding of society and its parts, articulating how this new understanding might be used for emancipating the masses. In light of this, Frankfurt school theorists focused on leisure and the way in which it has been consumed by the masses and how this has maintained the class inequalities of the social system.

The Culture Industry

Leisure, from its origins in Western philosophical thought, has been seen as something that we do in our free time through choice and because we want to (Spracklen 2009). On one side of the coin, this outlook has been defended (Roberts 2004) with the understanding that we, as individuals, have agency and choice, and our every move is not constricted by social institutions. Theories of postmodernity suggest this, that social metanarratives have been deconstructed (Lyotard 1984) so therefore, there is no way in which our leisure lives can be controlled. We have made a move from leisure as opposed to work to leisure for leisure’s sake (Rojek 1985). Globalisation means that culture has changed and become fluid, and it has been argued that we have been swept up in the need for the “American dream” (Ritzer 2004). We are consumers, but we are consumers of our own free will. On the other side of the coin are structural critiques. The idea that individuals believe that it is their own free choice is what makes leisure such a strong capitalist tool. Popular culture, TV and sport can all be enjoyed, but it is not for free. Bramham (2006) argues that while some may have the luxury of real choice such as the white, middle-class male,

the majority are marginalised and disempowered. Leisure is only one of the things that enables this as it diverts the masses from becoming class conscious; we engage with leisure that makes us feel good and to forget our working lives and remain passive. This is the view of the Frankfurt school and the “Culture Industry”.

“The Culture Industry” is what Adorno and Horkheimer labelled “mass culture” in *The Dialect of Enlightenment* (1944). They use the first phrase as opposed to the latter to exclude culture from any positive connotations that suggest it had spontaneously sprung from the masses and that the culture being consumed by the masses should be distinguished from this in the extreme (Adorno 1991). Adorno and Horkheimer stressed this move away from the “popular” or “mass” as they believed that culture was no longer representative of this; it was not a genuine demand from the people but something that had been evoked and manipulated by those in power (Storey 1997). Frankfurt school theorists also rejected the idea that culture could be studied as something in its own right and as separate from society, but they also insisted that it could not be analysed within the simple base-superstructure model (Held 1980); therefore, the phenomenon itself needed to be explored.

What can be seen from Adorno and Horkheimer’s “Culture Industry” initially is the juxtaposition of the term itself (Mussell 2013). Culture is something that usually connotes art or music which is typically seen as non-industrial. Highmore (2016) argues that culture has undergone many changes since the beginning of the nineteenth century—which is when the term was originally extended to include intellectual and artistic items. Later, it was further extended to include the achievements of a society at a particular stage, that is, the enlightenment. From his writings on culture, there are two ways in which it can be attributed to Horkheimer and Adorno’s views on the subject. The first is that culture is a form of cultivation for the mind, a lesson in art and taste which is represented in forms such as books or paintings, otherwise referred to as “high culture” (Highmore 2016). The second is culture as a way of life, “culture or civilisation, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Tylor 1871, p. 42). There is no longer “high culture”, only popular culture which

reflects the individual's everyday life, such as reality TV and pop music. These descriptions fall in line with what Marcuse discussed as "material" and "intellectual" culture. Intellectual connotes the first and refers to the idea of "higher values" (Held 1980) such as science, the humanities and religion. Material connotes the second, that which comprises actual patterns of behaviour such as earning a living, family, education and leisure (Marcuse 1969).

Adorno discusses the difference between these two definitions of culture at length in his works. He writes that there is a specific distinction between high culture and popular culture. Adorno argued that high culture such as bourgeois art or the avant-garde was a sign of resistance towards capitalist culture (Held 1980). For Adorno (1947), music such as that by Beethoven represented the idea of revolution and that class consciousness had already been realised. It presents a new form of reality and demands a change in attitude. However, when the Frankfurt school was relocated to America before the Second World War, it became apparent that culture for resistance had undergone rapid changes. High culture had been transformed into popular culture such as the glitz and glamour of the Hollywood film industry (Jay 1973).

Popular culture is something that is typically discussed as well liked by the people or from the people themselves (Williams 1983). However, for Adorno and Horkheimer, this was no longer the case. Culture was commodified, and the individual engaged with mass entertainment and leisure that was dictated by those in power, therefore, the individual becomes subordinate and obedient (Rojek 1985). For Frankfurt school theorists, the individual had become enmeshed in a world where they consume standardised goods. While some academics such as Arnold and Leavis believed that popular culture represented resistance to cultural norms and social authority (Storey 1997), Adorno and Horkheimer see only conformity and compliance, where the masses are deceived into false class consciousness. Lowenthal (1961) furthers this and argues that the Culture Industry depoliticises the working class. Whenever revolutionary tendencies begin to show, they are cut short by false fulfilment. We experience love, adventure and power in the form of cinema, TV, music and entertainment so the masses do not think beyond the present and capitalist dominance is unchallenged.

Rojek (1985, pp. 113–114) identified several key features that Adorno and Horkheimer attribute to the Culture Industry:

1. The Culture Industry is universal. It enmeshes the individual, by default, on both the conscious and the unconscious level.
2. The Culture Industry exploits the individual's leisure time. Its control is most complete when leisure experience has to be bought and sold. For this reason, the Culture Industry aims at the commodification of leisure activities...
3. The Culture Industry also functions to induce uncritical mass obedience to the existing power order in society...
4. The Culture Industry supports only the veneer of free choice. The customer's "choice" amounts to little more than the received options which the Culture Industry lays before him. These options in themselves tantalise with images of pleasure and emancipation from the cares of everyday life. But the images are never allowed to become anything more substantial than mirages...
5. The extravagant concern with the individualisation of products, expressed in merchandising and design factors, is a mask to disguise their mass-produced origins.

Leisure then, in capitalist society, is used as a tool to control the masses. It is part of a capitalist industry that provides for our consumer needs (Bacon 1997) and can be understood as a place, activity or structure that constrains the working classes or other social groups (Sugden and Tomlinson 2002). Witkin (2003) argues that for Adorno, participation in high culture was dwindling fast and only those that have not been sucked in, or those that call themselves "elite", still participate in it. The masses now only have culture in a "corrupt and degraded form" (Witkin 2003, p. 30) or as pseudo-culture. Within the Culture Industry, all spiritual connection to culture in its authentic form is lost and becomes a tool of capitalist society.

The Frankfurt school view of leisure then is bleak. It suggests that individuals are so caught up in false realities that they are willing to consume whatever is put in front of them by those who aim to control and manipulate them. However, the view of Frankfurt school theorists has

been criticised for their thoughts on leisure. First, it assumes that leisure practice only functions to maintain capitalist control and therefore disregards the two-sided nature of leisure, where it can be used to undermine class structures (Rojek 1985). Second, leisure is oversimplified and only exists as theoretical function; it is assumed that leisure functions in the same way for every person and that everyone responds in the same way. This is problematic for the Frankfurt school on different levels, as theorising leisure in this way suggests they are in danger of returning to the idea of traditional theory, with no practical grounding or application. Finally, the Frankfurt school does not produce any realistic alternatives to capitalism, and their work moved away from the classic Marxist struggle with class structures (Held 1980). As Popper (1984) writes, it is surprising that those who claim to uphold Critical Theory turn to such a romantic view of culture and leisure.

Case Study: RuPaul's Drag Race

The Culture Industry then and the work of the Frankfurt school sometimes fall short of practical application. It does not account for theories such as postmodernism (Spracklen 2009) or multiple understandings of leisure and popular culture. However, despite these criticisms, the Culture Industry can still be seen at work today. If what Frankfurt school theorists argue is correct, capitalism has invaded all our leisure choices. We are directed into certain activities that reproduce the status quo and a prime example of this in contemporary society is in TV and particularly the concept of "reality TV". Within this Culture Industry, I am particularly interested in the world of female impersonators on the reality TV show RPDR.

Drag is commonly explained as a man or a woman who chooses to wear clothing more conventionally worn by the opposite sex for the purpose of entertainment, performance or artistic expression (Barnett and Johnson 2013), and it has recently made its way into mainstream or popular culture through RPDR and has acquired thousands of fans both in the US and worldwide. It can be argued that drag is an outlet to which individuals turn to explore their gender (Rupp and Taylor 2003), and

because of this, it has a reputation of being “free”. However, through the increasing popularity of RPDR, it has become a microcosm of capitalist society and uses every form of popular culture to transmit various norms and values associated with drag in the form of freedom and choice.

RPDR is a show that premiered on LOGO TV in February 2009 (Daems 2014) and quickly became the channel’s most popular show, now running for eight seasons. The “RuPaul” franchise now boasts two spin-off shows: *RuPaul’s All Stars Drag Race* and *Drag U!*, which have arguably revitalised RuPaul’s career. The show has been nominated for a number of TV awards since its airing and has won many of them. The success of RPDR has been attributed to its format (Edgar 2011). It encapsulates a mix of reality TV subgenres from fashion, runway and drag superstar and game show contests. As RuPaul herself said in a pre-season interview in 2008: “To be a winner on this show the contestants need to be a fashion designer, an American Idol, and a top model all rolled up into one”. It combines all these elements to create a show that is accessible to the masses.

The premise of RPRD is to find “America’s Next Drag Superstar” (Daems 2014). The show opens with a “mini challenge” where the contestants are judged on some skill or task which RuPaul had devised (Daems 2014). “Mini challenges” range from those which have drag routes such as “reading”, politically orientated creating abstract art with their bodies to celebrate marriage equality to the bizarre “Boudoir Fight With the Pit Crew” for purely entertainment purposes. The winner of the mini challenge usually gets an advantage in the main or maxi challenge such as putting teams together or ordering runway line ups. The contestants are then given a brief for the main challenge, a task which is more elaborate and puts the queens in situations where their different skill sets are showcased and tested. The tasks range from designing couture dresses out of paper, curtains or wigs, choreographing dance numbers, recording songs or standup comedy, which they then perform for the judges, in front of a live audience or showcase on the runway. Finally, the contestants show their male to female transformation to be judged by a panel made up of RuPaul, regulars Michelle Visage, Carson Kressley and Ross Matthews and celebrity judges that range from Latoya Jackson to Chaz Bono. The queens are judged on their performance that week and the runway look

they have presented and the week's winner is announced. Those who have performed the most poorly are put head to head in a "Lip Sync for Your Life" battle—one performer is eliminated and asked to "sashay away". What can be seen then is that, on the surface, RPRD looks much like any other reality TV show. It uses make over scenes, competitive challenges and guest stars to keep audiences engaged and entertained (Edgar 2011). Then it is "rinse and repeat" for 14 episodes per season.

For many individuals, RPRD is where information about drag culture is learnt. RuPaul (in this case, the bourgeoisie owner of the means of production) dictates what it takes to be a drag superstar, what is appropriate for performers to wear, how they do their hair, their makeup and so on. Contestants (the proletariat) and fans internalise these norms, they believe that to be a successful drag queen, you must be able to sing, dance, act, interview and create the perfect female illusion. These norms are internalised, much like the values of the Culture Industry, RPRD is identical every season and it is predictable (Storey 1997). The majority of performers will be young, ranging from 19 to 50 years, their races will be mixed with one Puerto Rican contestant and at least one "big girl". For the first three seasons, the winners were high-fashion "pageant queens", those that had "top-model" potential. For the next three seasons, the winners were "comedy queens", the underdogs of the previous competition—still glamorous and presenting the perfect illusion and season 7 winner—the extreme (Violet Chachki boasting the smallest waist in Drag Race herstory at only 18 inches). These winners also follow a similar pattern, almost every contestant has released an album, done a world tour, featured on reality TV or produced a film. Here, it can be seen that the Frankfurt School way of thinking suggests that drag can be used to exploit the leisure time of those that invest in its culture. The previous points laid out by Rojek (1985) can be seen at work within the franchise. First, as drag relies heavily on the aspect of illusion, the fashions, make-up techniques and merchandise of performers can all be bought and sold so that individuals can fully immerse themselves within the culture and emulate their favourite queens. The winners of RPDR are also constantly touring around the world, so, meeting with them, other fans and seeing them perform is a reality which reinforces the connection to the culture, every aspect of RPDR is commodified. This then allows

fans to engage with RPD (not only through TV but also in their physical lives). Furthermore, this means that, in line with Rojek's (1985) fourth point, the culture of drag can be seen to only support the veneer of free choice. Drag, in this setting, suggests a way of self-expression and emancipation for the individual that cannot be found in many other avenues of life. It represents itself as a culture that offers emancipation from everyday struggles that individuals face, especially offering comfort to those who suffer homophobic abuse. However, it can be argued that while this culture offers a safe place for these individuals, because of its commodified nature and the way in which it produces a standardised picture of what it means to be a female performer, this can never be a reality and therefore remains an illusion that is used as a capitalist tool to engage the masses. Just like in Adorno's theorisations, RPD creates a culture that is standardised, stereotypical and reproduced (Lowenthal 1961). As an outsider watching RPD, drag culture is what RuPaul dictates it is. Drag queens aspire to be the queens that are seen on RPD and they must be standardised, stereotypical and able to produce capital.

Conclusions

What can be seen then is that the work of the Frankfurt school has greatly influenced the way we understand leisure and popular culture, and while its work is sometimes seen as pessimistic (Popper 1984), its theoretical underpinnings can still be seen as relevant in contemporary society. First, there is the emergence of Critical Theory to consider and the changes this made to the way we understand society and traditional theory as a whole (Bronner 2011). This approach of Frankfurt school theorists created the need for theory to be more grounded so that it could be implemented practically within society. Furthermore, the work of Adorno and Horkheimer helps create a wider understanding of leisure and culture as a capitalist tool and enables the critical deconstruction of leisure. While there has been much advancement in the study of leisure since the work of Frankfurt School theorists, their contributions can still be seen as relevant today. While this chapter focuses on the way in which RPD reinforces the Culture Industry, the same can be seen in many other arenas of

popular culture. RPRD offers a lens through which one can explore the Culture Industry on a new level, and what it shows is that society, culture and leisure are still bound up with capitalism and profit those who own the means of production. RuPaul offers her contestants freedom; however, she does so while profiting from their performances on RPDR and delivering standardised “RuPaul Bots” which are presented to the world as objects that can be bought. While its outlook is somewhat bleak, the work of the Frankfurt School has changed the way we understand leisure as a social activity, that it is not just for our own personal gain but sometimes controlled and manipulated by those in power who wish to remain in control.

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Leisure, Instrumentality and Communicative Action

Karl Spracklen

Introduction

Jurgen Habermas (1984, 1987, 1989, 1990, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2006, 2008) has continued the work of the Frankfurt School (Adorno 1967, 1991; Adorno and Horkheimer 1992) but also in many ways broken with it. In this chapter, I will use his ideas about communicative and instrumental rationality as they relate to leisure, both in his work and in the work of Spracklen (2009, 2011, 2013, 2015). In this new century of (post)modernity and technological progress, it is easy to think that leisure lives have become more meaningful and important. Leisure is claimed to be the space or activity in which we become human, find our Self and find belonging. There is an enormous range of literature that makes the case for contemporary leisure as a form that allows for meaningful

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human agency and human development, whether through the discipline of physical activity or the virtual communities of the internet—and in this *Palgrave Handbook of Leisure Theory*, especially in the first two sections, many of our authors make such a case. In this chapter, I will make the opposite case. I will concede that leisure has had an important role to play in human development (as a Habermasian communicative discourse and playful pleasure) but using the theories of Jurgen Habermas, I will argue that the lifeworld of contemporary leisure has been swamped by the systems of global capitalism and captured by the power of hegemonic elites.

Before I turn to own use of the work of Habermas, I will place his work in his own personal and theoretical context. I will then explain some key theories of Habermas: namely the public sphere; juridification; and communicative rationality and instrumentality. After setting out those key theories, I will turn to show how I have applied these to make sense of leisure in my other work (Spracklen 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015).

Habermas in Context

Jurgen Habermas was born in 1929 in the last years of the Weimar Republic of Germany (Horster 1992). Habermas grew up in Nazi Germany and could see every day the consequences of the failure of the Weimar Republic and the failure of liberal democracy. The first years of Hitler's Third Reich brought confidence and prosperity to the country, alongside the racial politics, anti-Semitism and totalitarianism of the Nazis. But the logical consequences of Hitler's project to make Germany pure, to make other countries bow to German superiority, led to the horrors of war and genocide. Habermas himself was caught up in the lie of German solidarity, and when he was old enough he joined the Hitler Youth (Finlayson 2004). Only at the end of the war, when the horrors of the camps came to light, did Habermas see the error of his own reason. Through all this, the young Jurgen Habermas must have pondered the weakness of democracy, the cold rationality of totalitarianism and the danger of using German romantic philosophers such as Hegel to justify murder and intolerance. In 1949, the year West Germany was

founded as a democratic, liberal bulwark against the communism of what became East Germany, Habermas went to university to study philosophy (Finlayson 2004). There, an interest in Hegel led to a doctorate in philosophy critically exploring the ontological and historiographical work of Hegel's contemporary and friend Schelling (Habermas 1988). Schelling's fundamentally conservative view of the absolute in nature and the relationship between this and Hegelian historical (manifest) destiny had been largely forgotten in twentieth-century German philosophy, but it had been influential as a theme in the work of Martin Heidegger, who joined the Nazi Party in 1933 and who remained a member of the Party until the end of the war in 1945 (Finlayson 2004).

Habermas' careful critique of Schelling led to him joining the Institute for Social Research at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University at Frankfurt am Main. This was the famous Frankfurt School, dominated by post-Marxist critical theory. Here Habermas was taught and supervised in his post-doctoral work by Horkheimer and Adorno. Both of these had already published influential works in philosophy and social theory. Adorno had just published research on the poverty of popular music and the evil of modern culture (see discussion in Adorno 1991). Horkheimer's book *Eclipse of Reason* (2004) dealt with the ontology of rationality and its historical development. For Horkheimer, true reason was rationality. Horkheimer claimed that the modern world had moved from true, objective reason to subjective reason. Subjective reason led to arguments about the ends justifying the means, to defining meaning through function, to removing the concept of the ideal and replacing it with the dangerous idea of the will or interest of the people. Nazi Germany was Horkheimer's example of this dangerous eclipse of objective reason. With Adorno, Horkheimer also wrote *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Adorno and Horkheimer 1992), which set out the critical theory approach of the Frankfurt School and the attack on the Enlightenment as a failed, misguided and arrogant project.

Habermas could have simply become another member of the Frankfurt School, aligning himself with critical theory's pessimism about the evils of modernity and the failure of rationality. Instead, he developed his own position on critical theory to account for individual freedom and agency within an optimistic view of progress taken from Marx. In doing this, he fell out with Horkheimer and left the Institute before his post-doctoral

thesis could be formally examined. But his brief connection with the Frankfurt School opened up other career opportunities in philosophy and sociology, and Habermas soon became an established Professor and member of the liberal-left West German intelligentsia. His own work, especially his historical sociology, owes a debt to the historical materialism of Marx, but unlike Marx, Habermas did not try to construct some dialectical truth from his history: historical progress is never inevitable in a Hegelian sense in the work of Habermas. Instead, things happen that construct modernity out of feudalism. Schelling and Hegel give Habermas his interest in the history of thought and rationality, and the notion that there may be different ways of reasoning at certain epochs, or in different social structures and cultures, but Habermas' critical theory comes from Marx, Adorno and Horkheimer. His alignment with Marxism was broken when he disagreed with the confrontational tactics of hard-line Marxist student activists (Finlayson 2004), but he remained a key critic of capitalism and totalitarianism/fascism and a defender of liberal democracy. By the 1970s he was also a public figure in West German civic life not only supporting federalism and the enlargement of the European Union but also, ultimately, criticising the unification of Germany and the creeping growth of nationalism and revisionist history. For Habermas, the idea of Europe as a public sphere (Habermas 1989) was evidenced by its transcendence of national self-interest and the establishment of a shared, civic discourse. This contrasted with the myth-making and self-serving stories of patriotism that, especially in Germany, resonated too closely with the far-right ideologies of the early-twentieth century. Habermas' later political thinking, then, was a product of his earlier struggles with authority and autonomy: Habermas attempts to defend reason and the philosophy of the Enlightenment and Truth (Habermas 1998, 2000, 2002). Both, however, faced difficult challenges at the end of the twentieth century.

The Public Sphere

Habermas did not invent the concept of the public sphere but his version of it has become influential in political studies and sociology. For Habermas (1989), the public sphere is constructed in early modernity in

the West and is defined as a political and cultural space where autocratic government is countered by free, communicative discourse and rationality. For Habermas, the public sphere emerges in the towns and cities of Western Europe because these urban spaces consciously resist and reject feudalism, monarchies and the hegemonic power associated with them. In the cities, a new class of bourgeoisie emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth century who make their money through capitalism—they are the first capitalists who invest in natural philosophy and technological development; they are the first urban bourgeoisie who cherish free-thinking, an idea that rejects traditions, the irrationality of miracles and the Divine Right of Kings. In the cities, the public sphere is constructed by its inhabitants as a communicative lifeworld, in which each individual is allowed to think freely, to read books and to learn and to talk with others about politics and philosophy. The public sphere is constructed on the middle-class, urban and cultural spaces and activities. The public sphere becomes exemplified by the free discourse of coffee shops and the growth of the free press: books, pamphlets, magazines but especially newspapers (*ibid.*, p. 51):

The privatized individuals coming together to form a public also reflected critically and in public on what they had read... In an age in which the sale of monthly and weekly journals doubled within a quarter century, as happened in England after 1750, they made it possible for the reading of novels to become customary in the bourgeois strata.

What is interesting in this conception of the public sphere is that it is a public sphere defined through leisure practices. The capitalists of the age use their leisure time to discuss what we call science and politics. This is the age of the Enlightenment, when it becomes possible to think that the West is entering the age of modernity. The public sphere gives individuals the free space to solve problems, use reason and construct new technologies, new societies and new constitutions. But autocratic governments do not simply give up their power, and Habermas shows how the public sphere is bitterly contested by the ruling elites, even as the public sphere shapes modernity and its culture and economy. Crucially, the public sphere gives the elites new ways of thinking and acting from science that

allow them at many times and places to shape and control society—and the public sphere—in later periods of modernity. The public sphere challenges unreason and tradition, while celebrating individualism, progress, free trade and free exchanges of ideas. The public sphere leads to liberalism, liberal democracy and the individual rights enshrined in law. But it also leads to the industrial revolution, the growth of modern science, the legitimization of capitalism, secularism and the building of empires.

The public sphere is something that has extended into popular discourse today with its Habermasian meaning intact. The freedom of the press, and the autonomy of the arts, is seen as something necessary for good and fair democratic societies (Habermas 1990, 1996, 2000). Limits on the freedoms of the public sphere are imposed by authoritarian states whenever they can get away with it. In recent years, the internet has become a potential public sphere, a space of leisure in which its supporters claim people can find freedom from authority and the power to construct a communicative lifeworld. Habermas himself, however, rejects this idea that the internet is a communicative public sphere, as its users only engage with a narrow range of others with similar interests (Habermas 2006). That said, the internet is a part of the public sphere, a leisure space and a cultural space that contributes to the freedoms of the news media, and which provides knowledge to those who are otherwise banned from finding it. When authoritarian governments ban or control the internet they are legislating against the nature of the internet as an element of the public sphere.

Juridification

At the end of the previous section, I talked about governments writing legislation to ban things. Habermas' notion of juridification is tied in with his narrative of the rise of instrumentality in nation-states. Nation-states are constructs of modernity and give rise to the appearance of bureaucracies: civil servants, policies, government departments, government controls, census and audits, professional armies and police, and the development and codification of written laws and constitutions. In his earlier work on the rise of the public sphere and communicative action, Habermas (1984,

1987, 1989) traces the juridification of society and the slow development of written law and law courts that stand independent of autocratic powers. Habermas shows how monarchs, feudal lords and religious leaders are forced to be subject to the same written laws as their subjects and this equality helps construct the lifeworld and the public sphere.

In his earlier work on juridification, Habermas then shows how this juridification allows modern nation-states to establish their control over their citizens. Laws are written and judiciaries are independent, and the power to rewrite laws may be restricted to assemblies or parliaments that represent the will of the people. But in the rise of the modern State, such assemblies are often suborned by the hegemonic elites so that the will of the people becomes the de facto will of the capitalists and the older elites. Juridification then becomes a way of constraining the public sphere, constraining the lifeworld and constraining the free actions and thoughts of individuals. In leisure, for example, we might cite legislation that bans certain forms of intoxication, or limits and restricts pornography, as juridification that has an instrumental purpose.

However, in *Facts and Norms* (Habermas 1996), Habermas rejects his earlier account of juridification. While the law can be and is used by hegemonic powers to limit the freedoms of its citizens and to close down the public sphere and the lifeworld, it does this because juridification is part of the lifeworld and part of communicative rationality. Juridification is a defence of and a bulwark for freedom, reason and communicative discourse because it explicitly makes all equal before its power and because it explicitly operates to protect human rights and fairness. So while some forms of leisure may well be controlled by legislation, the idea that we are free to do as we please in our free time, so long as we do not harm others, is protected as much as possible in the various acts, charters and laws that define our rights today.

Communicative Rationality and Instrumentality

I have already mentioned communicative rationality and instrumentality in the previous two sections. These concepts are related to Habermas'

interest in the history of thought and the history of ideas, though he is far away from any Hegelian concept of rationality. Communicative rationality and communicative action are necessary for the construction and maintenance of the lifeworld. For Habermas (1984, 1989), the lifeworld is the society and culture we choose to create as free-thinking, democratic agents. In the public sphere, historically in the Enlightenment, the bourgeoisie and then other urban dwellers such as the working classes have the opportunity and the freedom to think for themselves. Communicative rationality is the pursuit of thinking and reason in a free and public debate. In the lifeworld it becomes possible for every human to be treated equally and for every human to access knowledge and debate things for themselves. In history, we see the Enlightenment lead to a plethora of ideas about how to construct a fairer society, how to improve the world and find out the truth about the universe (Spracklen 2011). These ideas are freely shared and freely checked by others in the debate. This is how science works and shapes the modern world. It is the way liberal democracy emerges with its bills of rights and checks and balances between interests. In the lifeworld, it is communicatively rational to arrange our culture and our leisure in the ways in which we desire them. Communicative rationality, then, leads to communicative action and free choice in the things we do when we are not working. Communicative rationality is predicated on discourse and interaction, with rules of fair play and equality, but communicative action does not always have to be so ethically and politically charged. Communicative action does not have to be group walks and games or even solitary active pursuits. It is possible to choose to read silently or sit in contemplation, as an act of communicative leisure—the communicative act can be with oneself, or with the written word or some other cultural form produced by some other's communicative act.

In the historical public sphere, as have seen, reason was privileged and protected by the free and open discourse that took place inside it. Reason—philosophy, logic and science—allowed individuals in the public sphere to reject tradition, religion, feudalism and arbitrary power. Reason allowed individuals to construct the lifeworld, where freedom and human flourishing are valued. But reason also allowed the capitalists and the older elites to transform modernity in an image of their own making. As scientific and technological knowledge expanded, it became easier to

control flows of power, people and capital. The modern State could use the products of reason for its own ends. It could identify each citizen and conscript them into its armies and its industrial complexes. It could generate profits from monetising transactions and services. Capitalists could be ensured of wrenching as much profit as possible from their workers and their deals. In the age of Marx, modernity had already become associated with instrumentality and the power of elites to control the masses and the power of capitalism to generate huge amounts of money. Instrumentality for Habermas (1984, 1987), influenced of course by Weber (1964), is the transformation of rationality in modernity. Instead of being a way to make humans free and happy, rationality is taken over and misused by systems: bureaucracies that maintain the power of the State and the hegemonic system of capitalism. Habermas shows that in the former system, the modern nation-state, instrumentality is used to change the relationship between citizens, politicians and civil servants, disrupting the equality and the communicative discourse of the lifeworld. Increasingly, citizens become cogs in machines, measured and assessed for their usefulness and their effectiveness, like children in schools and their teachers.

In the capitalist system, instrumentality reduces all human actions and relationships to the economic impact, the bottom line. Increasingly in this century, such economic instrumentality is so hegemonically powerful that it has grown to dominate the instrumentality associated with the nation-state. Everyone and everything in the neoliberal society today has to be added to the accounts sheet, monetised as a profit or loss. In modern leisure, much of what we do is a product of such instrumentality. Instead of throwing a ball around, we pay money to watch professional athletes do it for us. We become passive audiences and passive consumers, watching and eating, watching and drinking, as instructed by adverts and sponsorship deals to spend money as a form of leisure. Our consumption is good for the State because every meaningless thing bought means an incremental increase in Gross Domestic Product, the reductionist measures by which governments assess their success: the amount of money being spent and the profits being made. Some capitalists who own rival corporations may be angry if we buy one soda instead of another brand, but everything we buy makes a capitalist happy and more confident about making money through exploiting our desires for stuff. For Habermas

(1984, 1987, 1990), instrumentality is a consequence of modernity and an unhappy one that threatens to colonise entirely the lifeworld.

Leisure in the Work of Habermas

I have shown that Habermas has an interest in leisure throughout his work, though it is only central to his conception of the public sphere, which only exists due to leisure time and the development of communicative discourse as a form of leisure (Habermas 1984, 1987, 1989). In *The Theory of Communicative Action* (1984, 1987) he postulates that leisure is and will be increasingly controlled, subject to juridification and instrumentality, as nation-states and global capitalism take more control of the lifeworld. This use of leisure has already been discussed in this chapter in my account of instrumentality, so I do not need to expand those ideas further but Habermas returns to occasionally leisure in his later works.

The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Habermas 1990) is one of Habermas' most difficult books, but in it he provides his strongest defence of the Enlightenment against theorists such as Foucault and Derrida. His argument, that the Enlightenment project in philosophy, sociology and politics, remains central to our understanding of modernity and ranges widely across current and previous theory, always endeavouring to challenge critiques of epistemological and epistemological truth and realism. Leisure is invoked in one short section of Habermas' analysis, in relation to a discussion about the consumption of goods unnecessary for life. Here Habermas is talking about what Veblen (1970) called conspicuous consumption, the deliberate waste of resource on expensive goods or practices that give the consumer a self-defined sense of status and power. Leisure is, in the beginning of modernity, something that is a symptom of wasteful consumption, though not in an absolute sense: some leisure can be productive. But rather than invoking Veblen, Habermas engages with the theory of consumption discussed by Georges Bataille (1985). Bataille's theory of consumption, drawing equally from Marx and Mauss, predicts a catastrophe of excess wealth in capitalist society. According to Habermas (1990, p. 222), Bataille "sees a deep ambivalence embedded

in consumption itself between the reproduction of labor power directly necessary for life and a consumption of luxury that removes the products of labour from the sphere of vital necessities in a wasteful way and hence from the dictates of the processes of sheer metabolism. Only this unproductive form of expenditure, which from the economic perspective of individual commodity owners represents a loss, can simultaneously make possible and confirm the sovereignty of human beings and their authentic existence.”

Habermas is aware that these ideas have also been discussed by Marx, though in a pessimistic way that suggests individuals do not have the freedom to use leisure time wisely. In his later works, Habermas’ political agenda becomes more urgent, as the impact of globalisation and economic change (what could be called postmodernity), and the rise of extremism, all call into question the (Western) liberal democratic settlement of late modernity. As he observes in *Postnational Constellation*, “[the] same consumer goods and fashions, the same films, television programmes, and best-selling music and books spread across the globe” (Habermas 2000, p. 75). This spread weakens local and national social structures and also swamps any attempt to provide a communicative space for the free exercise of reason. Here, leisure is simply commodified, instrumental, popular in nature and used to turn us all into pliable, docile consumers. In other places, Habermas uses leisure in a more positive way, using leisure to identify where we are free to make rational decisions about our lives.

In *Between Naturalism and Religion*, Habermas uses leisure as a basic good that is negotiated over between different parties committed to a democratic dialogue, consensus and distribution. The commitment to compromise is crucial and separates communities of faith, with their absolutes, from such a dialogue. As he suggests (Habermas 2008, p. 135), “the acceptance of voting procedures is explained by the willingness to compromise of parties who at any rate agree in their preference for the largest possible share of basic goods, such as money, security, or leisure time. The parties can reach compromises because they all aspire to the same categories of divisible goods... conflicts over existential values between communities of faith cannot be resolved by compromise.”

In *Between Facts and Norms* (Habermas 1996), Habermas attempts to provide both a justification for political freedom and a programme for

political ethics based on shared legal rights. In examining how individuals use the legal system to ensure their individual and social rights, Habermas also tackles the paradox of social welfare and individual liberty. He sees in the countries of late-twentieth-century Western Europe exemplars of the welfare state, where legislation is made by states to protect those who do not have the individual power to protect themselves in the existing legal frameworks. But, as he puts it (*ibid.*, p. 407),

welfare state paternalism has raised the disturbing question of whether the paradigm is compatible with the principle of legal freedom at all. This question has become more acute in the view of the juridification effects arising from certain properties of administrative power as the medium for state interventions, properties that are hardly neutral. The welfare state provides services and apportions life opportunities, by guaranteeing employment, security, health care, housing, minimum income, education, leisure, and the natural bases of life, it grants each person the material basis for a humanly dignified existence. But with such overwhelming provisions, the welfare state obviously runs the risk of impairing individual autonomy, precisely the autonomy it is supposed to promote by providing the factual preconditions for the equal opportunity to exercise negative freedoms.

If the State provides leisure opportunities, the danger is that such leisure is also prescribed by the State (and other leisure may be proscribed). The debate about obesity in the West is a classic example of a moral panic leading to instructions and interference over individual lifestyles, justified by an instrumental argument over the cost to the economy of the unhealthy, overweight working classes.

A way out of the paradox is offered by Habermas, though it is only a partial solution. He suggests (1996, pp. 410–411),

in the area of private law, we find a number of proposals for escaping welfare-state paternalism. One line of thought directs attention to the actionability of rights. This approach starts with the observation that materialized law, because of its complex references to typical social situations, requires conflicting parties to have a high level of competence. Rights can become socially effective only to the extent that the affected parties are sufficiently informed and capable of actualizing, in the relevant cases, the legal

protection guaranteed by the basic right of due process. The competence to mobilise the law already depends in general on formal education, social background, and other variables (such as gender, age, previous courtroom experience, and the kind of social relationship affected by the conflict). But the access barriers are even higher for using materialized law, which requires laypersons to dissect their everyday problems (regarding work, leisure and consumption, housing, illness, etc.) into highly specialized legal constructions that are abstractly related to real-life contexts.

Again, Habermas invokes the idea that leisure is one private sphere where our individual preferences may be at risk of instrumental intervention from the systems of the State and capitalism. Habermas argues in favour of mobilising education to improve access to legal systems, reducing the power of experts, but he acknowledges that in a context like leisure it is difficult to debate legal issues without the need for formalised (professionalised) interpreters of the rules.

Communicative and Instrumental Leisure: Spracklen (2009, 2011, 2013, 2015)

In this final section I need to return to my work on using Habermasian rationalities to make sense of leisure (Spracklen 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015). My work extends the critical lens of Habermasian rationalities to exploring what I call the instrumental whiteness present in leisure (Spracklen 2013). Instrumental whiteness is a form of hegemonic power that is normalised in contemporary leisure forms, especially those that have become part of global popular culture. More recently, I have used communicative and instrumental leisure to describe the different forms of digital leisure that exist today (Spracklen 2015).

This work started as an attempt to make sense of the extreme ideologies associated with the black metal scene (Spracklen 2006). I wanted to understand why musicians and fans of heavy metal wanted to create and listen to this music that was linked with racism, fascism, church burning and murder. From a careful ethnographic and semiotic analysis of the scene I realised that the individuals involved were trying (but failing) to

resist the rise of globalisation and commodification: that is, they were trying to fight against the instrumental colonisation of their Habermasian lifeworld and their communicative leisure form. Habermas' rationalities seemed to map perfectly onto black metal, extreme metal and leisure more broadly (Spracklen 2009, 2011). Leisure seemed to be something that in common-sense terms was defined by its communicative nature. It was something supposedly done for fun, something freely chosen, something done away from work, something done in some kind of symbolic or actual discourse with others. Yet at the same time, in late modernity and into this century, leisure was being colonised or co-opted by capitalism, commerce, security agencies and governments. For the people in black metal, their form of leisure was listening to heavy metal music but that communicative pleasure was being eroded by what they saw as the selling-out of "mainstream" bands. So they create their own forms of metal that rejected the mainstream, embraced elitism and became anti-modern. The elitism may be politically abhorrent to me, but it made sense as an act of communicative rationality in the scene. Of course, black metal's ideology and its music were already part of the instrumentality of modernity, as nationalism legitimises nation-states, and rock music is just another form of pop music. But the formation of black metal was a communicative act.

In *The Meaning and Purpose of Leisure* I set out to apply my thinking on Habermas to leisure in its widest form, from culture to sport through tourism (Spracklen 2009). I show that Habermas' work helps us resolve the paradox of leisure, that it can be both freedom and constraint. Put simply, leisure is free when it is communicative, but it becomes a constraint when it is instrumental. So just as instrumentality increases in late modernity to threaten the survival of the lifeworld and the public sphere, instrumental leisure started to become normalised, and the space for communicative leisure narrows. In *Constructing Leisure*, I show how communicative leisure and instrumental leisure have been enacted over a number of historical spaces (Spracklen 2011). I suggest that communicative leisure is something that is fundamental to the human condition and that everybody in every space and culture desires and gets satisfaction from such leisure. There is evidence for this even in the deep history of humanity (ibid.). Habermas' work, then, remains salient in any attempt to make sense of the world, and of leisure, today.

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Leisure and Hegemony

Robert Cassar

Introduction

The quest for leisure has been and will always be an intrinsic part of the human condition. Then again, leisure itself can be notoriously difficult to define (Wilson 1980, p. 21; Hamilton-Smith 2006, p. 243; Harris 2005, p. 116). In order to understand “otium¹” one has to juxtapose it to its antithesis, work (Rojek 1990, p. 12). Leisure offers an area of enjoyment which resides outside man’s work and community obligations (Hamilton-Smith 2006, p. 246), and thus, the act of leisure is primarily the result of one’s free will. Indeed, from time immemorial leisure has always been linked with freedom (Baris Kilinc 2006, p. 2). While in ancient times this primarily meant freedom from work, in more contemporary times this concept became mainly associated with “freedom

¹Otium is Latin for leisure.

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of choice” or rather the possibility to consume whatever products one desires (Hamilton-Smith 2006, p. 247).

At first glance leisure is one of those activities which might reveal choice, autonomy from other activities and in most cases freedom from political influence; however, even the most innocent of leisure activities can offer interesting insights into the ideological fabric of society. As such, leisure itself is obligatory to the modern man, in that one can't permit himself to do nothing. Human beings engage in various forms of leisure to satisfy their quench to do “nothing” since this has a social value to it (Baudrillard 1981, p. 77). In point of fact it is in the social value of leisure that one has to start looking for its hegemonic² credentials. Leisure itself is social construction that plays various roles in modern societies (Hamilton-Smith 2006, p. 243). It tells us a lot about who we are as humans and in and of itself plays a very important role in maintaining the social system as a whole (Best 2010, p. 31). Generally, a hegemonic analysis of leisure reveals what are the dominant and subordinate cultures of any society. In addition to this, it also highlights which groups are allies and which ones are “battling” each other out.

McLean and Hurd (2012, p. 49) argue that the history of leisure is a “rich tapestry of people, places, events and social forces showing the role of religion, education and government, and the customs and values of different cultures, their arts, sports and pastimes”. In antiquity, leisure was only a privilege of free man; thus, it can be argued that leisure always possessed a strong ideological and political identity to it. Ironically, postindustrial societies³ are not too different as only those who possess the means of production possess the luxury of “pure” free time because they are exempt from labor. The rest only have time which is free from labor. Because of this, the study of leisure is indivisible from questions of production, exchange and distribution (Clarke and Critcher 1985 in Rojek 2013, p. 21).

²The social, cultural, ideological or economic influence exerted by one group over another.

³Postindustrial societies are characterized by a shift from a producer society and associated institutions (family, church, job security, etc.) to a consumer-oriented society which has “altered the experience of self-identity, so that life choice, images, symbols and lifestyles are now increasingly filtered through abstract systems like computers” (Wearing et al. 2015, p. 4).

As production processes became more repetitive and monotonous, consumer culture became the primary site where people sought gratification and excitement (Wearing et al. 2015, p. 7). The total merging between consumption and leisure became a reality in the early part of the twentieth century when business moguls and politicians realized that mass production required a corresponding mass consumption. However, it was only thanks to the development of a globalized world media system which is capable of reaching the far sides of the world that leisure (tourism, sports, television, cinema, video games, etc.) became one of the most important manifestations of this culture of consumption (Rowe 2006, pp. 423–424).

Thanks to mass communication, leisure products became a particularly valuable vehicle to distribute ideological content. This also led sociologists, philosophers and media specialists to start conceiving leisure as an arena for political struggle. As leisure activities became more complex in nature, the range of ideological forces housed within them, both hegemonic and counterhegemonic grew tremendously.

Leisure as a Form of Control

As society became increasingly more obsessed with consumption, understanding the ideological implications of what was being consumed became an extremely pressing matter. This was also due to the fact that leisure products in postindustrial societies tend to construct self-identities that reinforce the urge to consume more as well as enable the reproduction of power structures in the cultural and social life of individuals. The need of British cultural studies to address capitalism holistically as a “totality structured in dominance, with social, political and cultural ramifications” (Bramham and Wagg 2011, p. 4) was sated once Gramsci’s work was translated.

As leisure became an increasingly greater site of excess, escape, transgression, resistance and change, almost obfuscating work itself (Bramham and Wagg 2011, p. 4), leisure became a key site for the observation of hegemonic forces. Nevertheless, demonstrating that certain leisure activities possessed hegemonic credentials remained problematic due to the

fact that it is sometimes difficult to conceptualize how hegemony operates. One challenge in particular is centered on how class struggle manifests itself in leisure.

All things being equal, there are most definitely instances where class struggle is particularly evident, such as in the association of specific types of leisure with particular social classes. This is the case of bourgeois men and women who form alliances during specific non-competitive recreations, for instance when enrolling at exclusive Golf Clubs. This segregation is done at the expense of the working class who seldom have access to such places (Harris 2005, p. 116). Still, predicting a person's leisure behavior on the basis of his/her socioeconomic position remains extremely difficult (Kelly 1976, p. 137 in Wilson 1980, p. 27) because lower socioeconomic groups tend to imitate the leisure styles of higher socioeconomic groups, albeit of course with some differences.

Ultimately, what types of leisure are consumed is only in part determined by the individual and/or his/her socioeconomic background as this is also a direct prerogative of the country in which that individual is residing. The state is particularly invested in the kind of leisure activities its citizens have at their disposition as this will impact the country on a cultural, social and economic level. For all intents and purposes, leisure can be considered as yet another tool used by the state to further consolidate its control over citizens.

In the history of leisure, there are plenty of examples which demonstrate how leisure was used to control the masses while keeping them in line with state policies. By the early nineteenth century, there was already a huge civic concern about the kinds of leisure the masses were consuming. Many economists and men of affairs argued in favor of an intervention on behalf of the ecclesiastical authorities to condemn various forms of leisure since they were seen as immoral and counterproductive to the development of a healthy economy (McLean and Hurd 2012, pp. 62–67).

Such concerns became even more tangible during the twentieth century. There was a huge fear that without adequate control, public programs and facilities, leisure would be used unwisely by the uncultured masses. Industrial leaders and civic officials were worried that once the eight-hour workday would come into force, the level of drunkenness and loitering would increase dramatically. Places of entertainment were

seen as becoming increasingly “devoted to the titillation of the senses and intoxication of the nerves by colorful glamour, light, music and above all, the excitement of sexual feelings” (Wearing and Wearing 1992, p. 5).

This led political leaders to consider the introduction of various forms of controlled entertainment to coerce the masses into less harmful forms of leisure (McLean and Hurd 2012, p. 72–82). Two methods which were commonly used for this purpose include the creation and management of an exclusive and self-evident collective identity that comprises beliefs, customs and symbols and the development of a framework of occupation and recreation for all (Bramham and Wagg 2011, p. 5). Both these methods aim to generate in citizens a false sense of fulfillment which ultimately leaves no room for the creation of emancipating/empowering leisure. In this regard, Rojek (2013, pp. 20–21) argues that the primary objective of the state’s financing of leisure activities is to maintain the “status quo”. The next section will further explore the ideological implications of leisure and the extent of its manipulative nature.

Leisure and Work: Hegemony in Action

As has been pointed out in the introduction, leisure and work are two faces of the same coin. Such a dichotomy is also true of human existence in the sense that a person’s life is split into two: labor and free time. Once bourgeoisie class had placed work as the core value of its times, leisure became that (or rather the only) aspect of a person’s life which is not dominated by labor. As work became more and more secularized, man began to consider himself a prisoner of his daily routine. In this context, leisure became the primary means of escape from the tyranny of work.

In truth the opposition between leisure and work is one of the most important sites where to observe hegemonic forces. Most leisure takes place during that small amount of time which man saves for himself beyond the realm of work. It is also for this reason that leisure is considered to be a reward (or rather a commodity), which is granted to workers to alleviate the fatigues of their work and to be eventually ready to work once again. Since free time has always been a prerogative of the rich and

the powerful, workers' unions have made it one of their primary *raison d'être*s to reduce the number of hours workers spent at work. In fact, the modern conceptualization of leisure was born out of and shaped by this struggle for more free time (Bosserman and Kutcher 1974, p. 122 in Wilson 1980, p. 22). While there is no denying that having more free time is in itself a good thing, there are other considerations which need to be made before any conclusion can be drawn about the nature of leisure time.

Naturally, more free time also meant that workers had more opportunities for consumption and alienation. Under a capitalistic mode of production, individuals live under the illusion that more leisure equals more freedom. On the contrary, due to its commodified nature, leisure can be just as alienating as work (Richards 2004, p. 4). According to Baris Kilinc (2006, p. 4), expanding free time increases servitude rather than freedom. To him free time is but a "shadowy continuation of labour" (2006, pp. 4–5) and ultimately meant to complete the cycle initiated by work. The same perspective is shared by Herbert Marcuse (1974, p. 47) who argues that "from the working day, alienation and regimentation spread into the free time".

Marcuse feared the creation of a "leisure mass", unable to cope with their newly won leisure time (Richards 2004, p. 3). He saw in the leisure industry another tool which capitalism uses to get back the wages paid to the workers for their labor time. As the standard of living increased and with it the disposable income, man became increasingly more obsessed with satisfying new needs which emerge all the time. In this regard, Wilson (1980, p. 21) points out that never in the history of man has technological advances brought with them so many opportunities to escape the necessities of daily toil.

Because of this, the leisure industry can be particularly insidious in that it is capable of creating new (false) needs which further increase control over man (Baris Kilinc 2006, p. 71). While commodified leisure activities (holidays, park visits, playing games and watching television) do promise some respite from the drudgery of everyday life, attempts to emancipate oneself through leisure are all bound to fail (Richards 2004, p. 5). According to Marcuse (1974, p. 100), people keep on seeking these ephemeral distractions due to the exhaustion they have experienced

during the course of the day. All this is aggravated by the fact that everything takes place with little or no awareness of what is really going on.

Thinkers like Marcuse were critical of the “soporific and depoliticizing effects of a hedonistic consumerism, fuelled by standardized mass entertainments in music, film and broadcasting” (Bramham and Wagg 2011, p. 2) because to them the commodification of time and leisure degenerated the experience of leisure into one where everything is promised but satisfaction is seldom achieved. Their view of leisure is that of a constructed need in a consumer society which produces endless, unsatisfied other needs (Wearing and Wearing 1992, p. 5).

On his behalf, Baudrillard believed that consumers and audiences are alienated from their “real” condition by being pushed from one distraction to another. He saw in most leisure activities an extension of the hyper-real world man has created for himself. Baudrillard argues that this “reality” can be experienced in “happy places” such as Disneyland which are presented to the general public as imaginary. In reality it is not just Disneyland which is hyper-real but the whole world. Thus, rather than being a form of escapism, visiting Disneyland is an act of conformity and control (Rojek 1990, p. 14).

Obviously in order to satisfy one’s quench for leisure, an individual has to work hard in order to be able to afford the price tag found on these desirable objects. Apple’s yearly aggressive marketing campaigns are but a constant reminder of how much postindustrial societies are addicted to this process of desire and consumption. In this regard, Marcuse (74, p. 100) points out that the goods and services that the individuals buy control their needs and petrify their faculties. Leisure products keep people occupied and oblivious to the fact that they could work less and be more in control of their lives.

As has been observed above, while leisure activities do have within them the potential to offer some respite from the drudgery of work, such capacity is often encumbered by the commodified nature of leisure products which restricts such potential. According to Hamilton-Smith (2006, p. 252), more than any other human behavior, leisure is an expression of the struggle between individual free will and structural determinism. The friction between leisure and work is particularly symptomatic of the struggle between the structural forces which

try to coerce and control man through labor and the resilience of the individual to emancipate oneself through activities which contribute to self-development. Ultimately, leisure ends up being both freedom and control (Marcuse 1974, p. 78). In the next section, this juxtaposition will be observed in the light of Gramsci's theory of hegemony. This will be used as a platform to observe this "nexus of coercion and consent" (Hamilton-Smith 2006, p. 253).

Counter Hegemony

Over the course of this chapter, it has been asserted that the globalized culture of consumption of which the leisure industry is part of has nefarious effects on the individuals who consume its products. To an extent, it has been given the impression that the leisure industry is somewhat a single, uniform entity which delivers the same message under different forms and from different platforms. In reality there is no individual or defined social group behind those influential powers which determine leisure/media content.

According to "agency theory", society is defined in pluralistic terms, which implies that power does not belong to a single group but is shared out between a number of groups (Rojek 1990, p. 8). While agency theory accepts that the distribution of power is unequal, it is highly unlikely that one single group will dominate the rest completely. Thus, any change which takes place in modern societies is a process of negotiation and agreement. This idea is in line with Gramsci's conceptualization of hegemony which he argued operates through a continuous process of negotiation and consent.

Products which are synonymous with postindustrial society and considered as the epitome of capitalism still withhold within them the power to offer counterhegemonic values. Traveling in particular comes to mind as one of those leisure activities which is highly commodified yet has important redeeming factors to it. Traveling can be considered as the quintessence of alienation and escapism, as it literally allows the individual to leave everything behind. On the other hand, traveling can also grant the individual a personal space for resistance, some room for choice

(outside consumer choice) as well as the chance to develop one's identity beyond the reach of authoritative figures.

In the case of other commodities, it has been known that the same companies producing such wares have imbued in their products, various forms of deviance in order to make them more appealing to a generation of youngsters who are more inclined toward rebellion and have a tendency to be anti-establishment (Wearing et al. 2015, p. 9). Rock, Rap music, the Punk culture, skate boarding and music festivals are but few examples of leisure products which are synonymous with rebellion and the younger generations. While most certainly these activities have a subversive flair to them, they are also extremely commodified forms of escapism. Still, the extent of their commodification varies from case to case. For instance, in the case of the Summersong music festival, the dichotomy between alienation and emancipation is quite alive and kicking.

This festival is renowned for being a hub and a catalyst for social change. Although music and parties are still the central focus of Summersong, the festival also offers educational workshops and the opportunity to attend for talks on various issues such as the environment and politics (Sharpe 2005, p. 2). Counterhegemonic agendas are communicated to patrons through various acts both formal (talks and seminars) and not, including the use of solar-powered generators, recycling, composting waste, serving food on reusable plastic containers and collaborating exclusively with local entities. From an ideological perspective, in the Summersong song music festival one can observe elements which, albeit conflicting in nature, converge and coexist quite easily within the same leisure activity.

Gaming is yet another site where an individual can explore one's identity and challenge cultural and social dogmas (Wearing and Wearing 1992, p. 4). Adolescents seek in video games some sense of individual purpose, away from the restrictions and constraining influences of commodifying processes and authority figures (Wearing et al. 2015, pp. 2–4). Even the context⁴ in which games are played gives rise to interesting resistance scenarios. The act itself can be considered a form of resistance due to the level of immersion and the amount of time young players spend

⁴Young players enjoy their hobby in the familiar setting of their homes.

in virtual worlds. This normally gives rise to tensions with parents, who are not very sympathetic that their children are spending so much time playing. Players “walk a fine line between gaming as a form of defiance, resistance and escape from various forms of societal control to one of adopting the value sets imposed by the games themselves” (Wearing et al. 2015, pp. 4–5).

Online games give youngsters the opportunity to resist and break away from the shackles of authority and conservatism. It is in this context that their deviant and/or rebellious behavior must be understood. In “Selected Interviews”, Foucault (1972–1977) points out that diverging power relations are the crux for understanding deviance. According to Wearing et al. (2015), the type of deviance players engage in while playing can be creative, refreshing and fun. While acknowledging such potential, Wearing et al. are still cautious about the level of emancipation granted by games. In fact, they argue that such deviance takes place within the parameters established by the same consumer culture which originated the product in the first place (Wearing et al. 2015, p. 6).

The examples provided above show that even commodified leisure activities provide some emancipatory relief; however, they also show that audiences and consumers of leisure are not mindless dupes who passively absorb whatever is passed onto them. Rather than being a one-way process, the relationship between producer and consumer of leisure products should be considered a two-way kind of relationship with the former affecting the latter and vice versa. In the next section, this relationship will be further explored in the context of gender representations in leisure products.

Struggles/Gender Identity/Self-formation

As pointed out above counterhegemonic forces can manifest themselves in the most unexpected places. In other words, even heavily commodified/gendered texts and/or leisure activities possess compensatory if not emancipatory qualities to them. It is widely accepted, and research is there to prove it, that competitive sporting activities as well as mainstream

media are important platforms for gender formation.⁵ Both of these leisure activities play a very important role in reinforcing class structures and gender identities, in particular male dominance (Kivel and Johnson 2009, pp. 111–112). Together they put forward a hegemonic image of masculinity which is heroic, virile, narcissistic and in some cases violent (Kivel and Johnson 2009, p. 131).

Notwithstanding the overwhelming popularity of these images, this conceptualization of masculinity is not embedded in individuals by default. On the contrary, a person's identity is molded through a continuous process of struggle and negotiation. Thus, the image of hegemonic masculinity put forward by media and competitive sport is never fixed but in a continuous process of conflict. The same can be argued for the stereotypical and in most cases sexist representation of females in mainstream media (and non) and related leisure products. Pornography in particular can be an extremely interesting site for the analysis of the female identity in leisure products.

While pornography is considered by many as the quintessential leisure activity in which women are objectified, there is most certainly another side to this story which in recent times has been gaining terrain. The popular rhetoric that the porn industry simply reproduces hegemonic femininity, through the objectification and inferiorization of women, has been contradicted by feminists who believe that porn empowers and provides women with a lucrative and liberating kind of work. While this argument is most certainly not a mainstream one, it is still strong enough to merit our attention. Indeed, sexuality and freedom have often been associated together. In the *History of Sexuality*, Foucault (1972–1977) makes an analogous argument about the liberating power of sex.

A similar phenomenon to the one discussed above can be encountered in an equally controversial leisure activity—Japanese hostess clubs. Since World War Two, Japan has made a name for itself for being one of the most hyper-capitalist countries in the world. At the center of this philosophy is the idea that everything can be commercialized

⁵Examples of this self-fulfilling ideology are plenty and present everywhere but particularly in Hollywood action movies. Hollywood celebrates the steroidal uber-masculine persona of the action hero by churning out a large number of action movies whose protagonists typically are male characters who are self-made, explorers, fearless, individualistic and in most cases narcissistic.

through exchange value including human affection. Hostess clubs in particular put a price tag on the pleasure of spending time in the company of young, well-versed, attractive women. The interaction of these men with hostesses reinforces the hegemonic position and prestige of the middle class, white collar, heterosexual male (Gagné 2010, p. 31). Nevertheless, such an obvious position of power does not necessarily mean that all the gender dynamics created in the club are chauvinistic in nature.

Gagné (2010) realized that men also invest emotionally in their relationships with hostesses. Indeed, in some cases these patrons take on the dual role of both customers and collaborators, aiding hostesses to entertain other customers. In other cases, these patrons were the first line of defense, defending a hostess when scolded by “mamasan⁶” or when under duress due to some difficult customer. Gagné (2010, p. 41) argues that the relationship between salary men and hostesses is often characterized by a “give and take” kind of continuum, one that blurs the economic and emotional dynamics of service and care. Contrary to what happens in other parts of the world, Japanese hostess club patrons accept and embrace the idea that once inside they have to let go and rely on hostesses to feel like “real men” (Gagné 2010, p. 42). Such a display of vulnerability is not a sign of weakness, on the contrary it is a sign of willingness on behalf of these clients to relate and trust other human beings.

Thus, if pornography and hostess clubs do have within them the potential to empower women either through a rhetoric of sexual liberation or through the conscious abandonment of a salary man in the care of a hostess, so can other forms of leisure products/activities which are broader (less controversial) in scope. Research has shown that leisure spaces do offer women a means of escaping such restrictive social and sexual identities. In this regard, Parry⁷ (2005, p. 1) argues that leisure can be a good context were pronatalists’ ideologies are challenged.

⁶Mamasan is the owner/manager of the hostess club.

⁷According to Parry (2005, p. 3), pronatalist ideologies can be extremely oppressive in that they give the impression that for a woman there is very little outside motherhood; thus, a woman who is unable to bear children is incomplete and unhappy.

In her study on how women who struggled with infertility use their leisure time to resist pronatalist ideologies, Parry (2005, p. 3) comes to the conclusion that such resistance is not only possible but also extremely beneficial to those who live with this problem. Through leisure,⁸ these women experienced a huge sense of accomplishment and empowerment proving their worth beyond motherhood. In this case leisure time is also serving as platform to challenge traditional views of femininity, sexuality and motherhood.

Kivel and Johnson's study and Parry demonstrate that human beings are not passive recipients of media messages and/or leisure products. These messages are processed and used to negotiate their gender identities which in turn makes it easier for them to transit into adulthood. These studies also demonstrate that leisure products are both a site for manipulation and control as they are for empowerment, resistance and self-determination. Which aspect is predominant depends on the individual and his/her deliberate choices. Indeed, Gramsci's theory of hegemony makes it much easier to understand the process of struggle between the forces operating in the media which put forward a very limited perspective of male and female identities and the ability of human beings to negotiate and, if necessary, appropriate such messages.

Contrary to other Marxist power structures Gramsci's "compromise equilibrium" concedes for forces which under normal conditions would usually annihilate each other but according to this framework are able to persist on the same plane of existence. Obviously, for this equilibrium to be established, some elements are reinforced while others are excluded (Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006, p. 4). Nonetheless, it is through this expansion and contraction of forces that social order and ultimately democracy are established. The hegemonic process reconciliates society's eternal need for power and control by providing some form of structure to said struggles. It should be pointed out that while there are various forms of hegemonic order, some are more democratic than others but all are necessary as the alternative would be an authoritarian regime (Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006, p. 4).

⁸ For example, motorcycle riding, horse riding, self-defense and so on.

Conclusion

Throughout this chapter, it has been contended that leisure studies can tell us a lot about power structures found in our society. Leisure itself plays a very important role in the maintenance and reproduction of hegemony. However, it has also been demonstrated that these ideological forces are not absolute. Indeed, hegemony never operates in such a fatalistic kind of way (Carpentier and Cammaerts 2006, p. 5). Leisure commodities should not be considered as some kind of deceiving ideological framework which justifies class, gender and race inequalities nor should they be conceived as merely another form of escapism necessitated by the times we are living in. This can be attested by the fact that most countries in their management of leisure recognize and incorporate working-class values (Rojek 2013, p. 20). In truth, leisure has a lot to offer to the individual and society in general however more often than not, those positive effects are overshadowed by an aggressive commodification process too intent on generating profits.

In this regard, Wearing and Wearing (1992, p. 13) argue that there is a need to distinguish between the ideology of leisure and the phenomenon of leisure. Wearing et al. argue (2015, p. 11) that notwithstanding the fact that the commodification of leisure pushes the individual to consume more, promising some form of self-fulfillment, which is unattainable, it still remains an important site where resistance and deviance are possible. There is nowhere where this is more felt than on the Internet.⁹ Since the Internet cannot be “policed/controlled”, it provides various opportunities for “expropriating the expropriator” (Rojek 2013, p. 26).

Under those circumstances it is important to point out that “all of leisure experience is by no means false consciousness” (Wearing and Wearing 1992, p. 13). This is particularly the case of leisure products which induce the consumer to challenge the status quo or at least look at the world differently. Leisure products can and should challenge capitalistic views of the world. Those which succeed in this task have the

⁹ Even though many attempts have been made to curb the illegal downloading of intellectual property, this is still rampant. The Internet has also provided creative consumers with an important platform to share their creative interventions. Because of this for the first time in history the balance of power has shifted slightly from the producers' end to the consumers' one (Rojek 2013, p. 26).

potential to act as a catalyst for the enhancement of one's self-identity. Also, it is extremely possible for consumers to enjoy these distractions while remaining vigilant and conscious of the various problems faced by modern societies.

Leisure activities which achieve this can be considered as truly counterhegemonic in nature, in that they invite the consumer to go beyond the ephemeral nature of the commodity and think about mankind's real condition in this world and the illnesses which afflict our condition. It is also for this reason that leisure providers and leisure policy makers have a huge responsibility toward society. The aforementioned must ensure that citizens have access to leisure which does not only have lucrative interests at heart but one which is both "self-exploring" and "self-determining" (Wearing and Wearing 1992, p. 14).

Leisure can and should also consolidate the social system as well as act as a safety valve for the wider social systems by easing stress and strains, imprint values such as leadership and teamwork, provide an opportunity for people of all ages and classes to develop their skills and finally help to compensate for the unrewarding and unsatisfying aspects of life (Best 2010, p. 33). Leisure has important tension management functions which allow the individual to restore their sense of self after the stressful experience of work. Video games in particular have been proven to be quite adapted to relieve such tension through their cathartic experiences. On the other hand, leisure activities also provide people with the opportunity to carry out voluntary work and thus help others during one's free time.

Correspondingly, leisure activities are not necessarily a direct manifestation of globalization and its capitalistic endeavors. In this regard, Rowe (2006, p. 427) argues that there is no single determining process of globalization. The leisure industry is made up of elements which are: local, regional, national, international and global, thus its messages are subject to non-linearity, fragmentation and entropy. While it is most likely that for the foreseeable future, mainstream leisure-media products (e.g., Hollywood movies and big sporting events) will keep on dominating the leisure habits of most, at least in the Western world, leisure artifacts with a local flair will still remain alive and popular. Those countries which attempted to reduce or eliminate local content for American productions

quickly realized that too much non-indigenous content proved to alienate viewers and antagonize governments (Rowe 2006, p. 429). Indeed, Gramsci believed that in order for media to maintain its hegemonic dominance, at times it has to give leeway because otherwise its agenda would be immediately visible to all.

Even so, it should be pointed that while the fragmentation of the media message is real, powerful patterns and processes do exist and are an important part of what leisure is (Rowe 2006, p. 428). While human beings are not immune to the alienating effects of leisure, these patterns are not forced violently on people. According to Bramham and Wagg, in a sophisticated society, the sort of antagonistic behavior found in extremely indoctrinating media products is out of place and unnecessary as there is no need to employ direct colonization measures. In this regard, they point out that it suffices to release market powers and the people themselves voluntarily will complete their own colonization (Bramham and Wagg 2011, p. 6). Ging (2005, p. 48) argues that unless audiences recognize and deconstruct dominant ideologies in the texts they consume, the pleasure they get from their consumption will never be liberating or empowering.

Obviously the state plays a very important role in determining the type of leisure activities found in a specific country as well as in preparing citizens to critically evaluate the leisure products they consume (Bramham and Wagg 2011, p. 7). The state can either increase the level of control on leisure products in an attempt to reorganize and supervise even further leisure time or otherwise train the individual to fulfill his/her freedom and gain mastery over one's life, including leisure time. Obviously the second option requires more courage from the state and it is more difficult to achieve. Bramham and Wagg (2011, p. 7) argue that the state should be extremely wary in this regard as it is extremely easy to be tempted to cooperate with the producers of leisure.

As a matter of fact, it is much easier to manipulate an alienated populace than it is to control an emancipated one. On the other hand, creating a program which does emancipate the masses can be a difficult task to undertake. It can also be counterproductive to the interests of the state. Nonetheless, if done right, the citizens of the state would be no longer slaves of what they consume but in control of their lives and time. If someone regains control over his/her leisure time, s/he

would be in a much better position to resist the sirens of the consumer society. The person who achieves this higher level of consciousness would start perceiving the outside world in a different way and thus change the way s/he approaches life. Ultimately leisure is central to the development of a social space for friendship, parenting, community interaction and the family to flourish (Best 2010, p. 44). This is one of the most important, if not the most important, characteristics of leisure time.

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Reclaiming the “F-word”: Structural *Feminist* Theories of Leisure

Bronwen L. Valtchanov and Diana C. Parry

Feminism has had a broad and diverse history, beginning with the suffragist movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, to its re-emergence in the 1960s–1980s, to its current, contemporary forms (Shugart 2001; Tong 2014). Given this breadth and diversity, feminism has variously been conceptualized as “waves” (first, second, and third) (Shugart 2001) or as “critical moments” (Hesse-Biber 2012) that attempt to encompass broad distinctions of feminist concerns, epistemologies, and social actions. Feminist theories have also been categorized by similar distinctions (Tong 2014). Others, however, have challenged such finite or linear distinctions and have instead encouraged more dynamic conceptualizations, such as “interconnected ripples” rather than feminist “waves” to emphasize both the “continuity and difference” of feminist ideas over time (Parry and Fullagar 2013, p. 574). Still, others have asserted that while labels and categories can be useful, they must be situated within

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the recognition that feminist thought is inherently *interdisciplinary*, *intersectional*, and *interlocking* and as such, “resists categorization into tidy schools of thought” (Tong 2014, p. 1).

Despite these significant challenges with conceptual distinctions, at its core, feminism is “fundamentally about transforming patriarchal culture and society” (Snyder-Hall 2010, p. 256). Specifically, feminism—and its theories and research—“exposes and analyzes a patriarchal system of domination and oppression and seeks social justice through action-based frameworks that help create a society based on gender equity” (Parry 2014, p. 351; Snyder-Hall 2010). In this way, feminism is a way of thinking, being, and acting in the world.

Undoubtedly, feminism, feminist theories, and feminist research remain controversial since they challenge “taken-for-granted beliefs about women ... and gendered lives within society” and insist on activism for social change, gender equity, and the empowerment of women (Freysinger et al. 2013, p. 63). Some of this controversy and a notable backlash against feminism are evident in the seductive, contemporary contentions of postfeminism, signalling the “death” of feminism and a rejection of its relevance and necessity (Aronson 2003; Braithwaite 2002; Douglas 2010). Crucially, however, “the equality [postfeminism] assumes is largely a myth” (Aronson 2003, p. 904; McRobbie 2009); there is still serious “unfinished business” for feminism, beginning with a reclamation of the pejorative “F-word” (Douglas 2010, p. 306).

In this chapter, we will demonstrate feminism’s essential work and its continued relevance and necessity, focusing on the complexities of gendered lives in leisure contexts. Indeed, leisure often uniquely elucidates the interconnections between gender and popular culture as sites of individual experiences, social practices, and both the reproduction and resistance of gendered relations of power (Freysinger et al. 2013). To acknowledge, appreciate, and distinguish the diverse approaches to feminist leisure research, two broad approaches have been conceptualized: structural and poststructural. This chapter focuses on the first approach, structural feminist theories (for a discussion of poststructural feminist theories, see Berbarry “Thinking Through Post-structuralism in Leisure Studies: A Detour Around “Proper” Humanist Knowledges”, this volume).

In the first part of the chapter, we begin by situating *structural feminist theories* and then provide a brief overview of two particular structural feminist theories: liberal and radical feminist theories. We suggest how these foundational feminist theories have informed key ideas about popular culture and leisure. In the final part of the chapter, we extend these considerations of structural feminist theories to the development of *structural feminist critiques of leisure* in six bodies of work by different scholars, within three central contexts: health, physical activity, and popular culture. Collectively, we hope to highlight the value, diversity, and complexity of structural feminist theories of leisure.

Structural Feminist Theories

Aitchison (2003) described a general structuralist approach as “constructing social critiques” (p. 18). Specifically, structuralist approaches construct critiques that focus on social relations and material realities (Aitchison 2013), incorporating both micro-social and macro-analyses (Freysinger et al. 2013). Structural feminist theories, in particular, “examine the effects of societal structures and power relations between dominant and oppressed groups on women” (Given 2008, p. 332). These descriptions are consistent with structuralism’s influence on critical theory (Aitchison 2003) and with the alignment of structuralist feminist approaches with critical constructionism (Freysinger et al. 2013). These theories, like other critical theories (e.g., critical race theory), are specifically part of a (social) constructionist epistemology (unlike poststructural theories) that aims to critique, transform, and emancipate by producing knowledge that can “change existing oppressive structures and remove oppression through empowerment” (Lincoln et al. 2011, p. 103).

This more contemporary “integrative approach” of structuralist/constructionist reflects a shift from a more traditional structuralist perspective that minimized the role of individual behaviours and instead viewed social location (such as being female or male) as determining one’s relationship to existing structures of power (Freysinger et al. 2013). This deterministic perspective fuelled structure versus agency debates between structuralists and poststructuralists (Aitchison 2003; Wearing 1998).

Some feminists were concerned that a (traditional) structuralist perspective undermined women's agency and they expressed that "there is a danger within this framework of viewing women as passive victims of oppressive social forces" (Hayes and Flannery 2000, p. 13). For other feminists, this debate compelled the question of where to focus their efforts, that is, "how much they should pay attention to ... the experiences and actions of individual women, versus the extent to which they should focus on structured relations of power within society" (Freysinger et al. 2013, p. 73). The more integrated structuralist/critical/constructionist approach reconciles this "seeming polarisation" and points to the "mutual dependency of both structure and agency ... [wherein] the individual both shapes and is shaped by society" (Aitchison 2003, p. 19).

With this contextualization of a broad and integrated structuralist feminist approach, we turn now to an overview of two particular structural feminist theories. First, liberal feminist theory¹ focuses on public structures, such as the education and legal systems, as sources of women's inequality (Aitchison 2003). Second, radical feminist theory emphasizes the overarching structure of patriarchy, which is present in all social structures and viewed as the source of women's "deeper structural and cultural oppression" (Aitchison 2003, p. 25; Given 2008). Along with other feminist theories, these structural feminist theories insist on emancipatory knowledge and action for social change (Hesse-Biber 2012).

Liberal Feminism: Reforming Gender Inequality

The main tenets of liberal feminist thought contend that a just society is one in which all individuals are rational and free, share fundamental rights, and are equal (Tong 2014). Liberal feminists recognize that

¹We classify liberal feminist theory as a structural feminist theory following Aitchison's (2013) inclusion of liberal feminist theory in her broad category of structural/social feminist approaches (in contrast to poststructural/cultural feminist approaches). We acknowledge, however, that other categorizations of feminist approaches do not consider liberal feminist theory a structural feminist theory and instead delineate it as an "individually focused" feminist theory (e.g., Given 2008, p. 332).

women have typically been excluded from this liberal vision of “equality of opportunity,” and work towards sexual equality by addressing both “the structural and attitudinal impediments to women’s progress” (Tong 2014, p. 35). Specifically, liberal feminists seek to provide equal opportunities for women particularly within the public sphere—where women’s inequality has been most pronounced—in areas such as politics, education, and employment. This work is done through changing structures, including laws, policies, and government interventions. Liberal feminists realize, however, that if equal opportunity is ever to mean more than “paper rights” then there is also a need for reformed social institutions, which include major changes in “people’s deepest social and psychological structures” (Tong 2014, p. 46). These social changes must involve an examination of socialized gender roles, which limit individuals’ possibilities for development as a whole and unique self. Below, we provide a brief account of a key, early liberal feminist, Mary Wollstonecraft, whose ideas were foundational in advancing liberal feminist thought in her own historical context and well beyond, influencing significant ideas about popular culture and leisure.

Mary Wollstonecraft: Educational Equality

In eighteenth-century England, early feminist philosopher Mary Wollstonecraft wrote her classic (1792/1975) liberal feminist² text *Vindication of the Rights of Woman*. She grappled with the implications of the work-life (im)balance of married, middle-class women confined to the private sphere of their home. Since industrialization had moved labour into the public sphere (reserved for men), affluent women did not perform productive work or even housework since most had several servants (the working-class women not addressed in Wollstonecraft’s *Vindication*). Instead, these women predominantly

²The term “feminism” in its current meaning was not used until the twentieth century, however, as Pilcher and Whelehan (2004) note, “it has become common practice to refer to early writers and thinkers—for example the eighteenth-century writer Mary Wollstonecraft—as ‘feminist’ in acknowledgement of the connections between their arguments and those of modern feminism” (p. 48). Specifically, Mary Wollstonecraft is widely recognized as a liberal feminist (Tong 2014).

led a life of leisure. While Wollstonecraft certainly did not use terms such as “work-life balance,” “gender roles,” or “leisure constraints,” the basis of many of her observations and arguments involved our modern conceptions of these terms. She recognized that (certain) women’s life of leisure—“novels, music, poetry, and gallantry”—was a form of leisure as constraint, which served to reinforce socially constructed gender expectations of women (Wollstonecraft 1792/1975, p. 61). Wollstonecraft challenged the “attitudinal impediment” of her culture’s beliefs about women’s natural “emotionality,” which was associated with their moral and intellectual inferiority to men. She insisted that these traits were not biological imperatives but were rather the result of women’s confined existence. The structural remedy Wollstonecraft proposed for women’s liberation was an equal education. At the time, the education system followed Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s popular educational philosophy of “sexual dimorphism” where women typically only “dabbled in” skills such as music, poetry, and homemaking, and men studied the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences (Tong 2014, p. 14). Wollstonecraft reasoned that if women received the same education as men, they could develop their rational and moral capacities and thus their full human potential, benefitting women, men, and society at large.

Critiques of Liberal Feminism

There are several major critiques of liberal feminism, two of which we will outline here. The first critique is the assumption a number of liberal feminists have made (including Wollstonecraft) that the way to achieve gender equality is for women to be like men. Critics suggest that promoting gender equality by encouraging women to mimic traditional masculine values dismisses (many) women’s roles as wives and mothers and may “serve only to erode what may be ... the best about women: their learned ability to create and sustain community through involvement with friends and family” (Tong 2014, p. 41). Instead, critics implore women to create the kind of society in which relationships with friends and family are as valued as those with professional colleagues and where

there is time and space for women and men to engage equally with both social spheres.

Another critique—and one of the harshest—of liberal feminism is that it is a “bourgeois, white movement” (Tong 2014, p. 45). Certainly liberal feminists, such as Wollstonecraft and others, addressed this selective group of women, largely unaware of the social and economic privileges that shaped their realities. In addition to social class, liberal feminists have also often ignored issues of race and sexuality, both of which have been historically dismissed as detrimental to a unified women’s rights movement (Tong 2014). More contemporary liberal feminists, however, point to the progress they have made to be attentive to how race, class, and sexuality affect women’s experiences (Tong 2014).

Summary

For liberal feminists, including Mary Wollstonecraft, the paramount goal for women’s liberation is achieving equal rights for women by *reforming* the existing “system” through working to remove discriminatory educational, legal, and economic policies (Hole and Levine 1971). To this end, Tong (2014) reminds us that “women owe to liberal feminists many of the civil, educational, occupational, and reproductive rights they currently enjoy” (p. 48). Perhaps this recognition—coupled with the continued restructuring of liberalism and liberal feminist thought—is enough for feminists who are critical of liberal feminism to reconsider their dismissal (Tong 2014).

Radical Feminism: Revolutionizing Patriarchy

For radical feminists, the liberal feminist approach of gender equality through reforming the “system” ignores the root of gender inequality: the sex/gender system of patriarchy (Tong 2014). In general, a sex/gender system is a “set of arrangements by which a society transforms biological sexuality into products of human activity” (Rubin 1975, p. 159). In the patriarchal sex/gender system of our society, individuals’ male or female

biology (their sex) is the basis for constructing masculine and feminine gender identities comprising a set of naturalized and normalized behaviours (Tong 2014). Crucially, these constructed gender identities constitute a “gender order” of “social structures and practices in which men dominate, oppress and exploit women” (Pilcher and Whelehan 2004, p. 95). Radical feminists variously contend that women’s oppression *as women* within patriarchy is the first and most widespread form of oppression, the hardest to eliminate, and the most damaging, and it thus “provides a conceptual model for understanding all other forms of oppression” (Jaggar and Rothenberg 1984, p. 186).

Since our society is deeply patriarchal, radical feminists insist that there must be a radical restructuring of society to abolish male domination and female subordination—patriarchy—in all social and economic contexts (Willis 1992). As such, radical feminists are “revolutionaries rather than reformers” who seek to eliminate patriarchy by challenging existing norms and institutions (Tong 2014, p. 50). In particular, radical feminists focus their attention on sexuality, gender, and reproduction—making women’s bodies “the centrepiece of their feminism” (Tong 2014, p. 191). The personal was made political by radical feminist efforts, such as challenging traditional gender roles (cf. Millett 1970; Rich 1979), encouraging sexuality beyond heteronormativity (cf. Firestone 1970; Rubin 1984), and opposing the sexual objectification of women (in pornography, for instance) (cf. Dines 2010; Dworkin 1981). We turn now to some of the foundational contributions of radical feminist Simone de Beauvoir.

Simone de Beauvoir: Women as *The Second Sex*

French writer Simone de Beauvoir laid the foundation of modern feminism with her classic treatise on women’s oppression, *The Second Sex*. Written in 1958, her text still sounds contemporary and remains a major theoretical work informing feminist thought (Tong 2014).

While it is beyond the scope of this overview to detail the nuances of *The Second Sex*, particularly as they relate to existentialist feminism,³ we

³For our purposes, de Beauvoir is classified within radical feminism. At the time of writing *The Second Sex*, she did not define herself as a feminist (of any kind), but she later identified herself as

highlight some of de Beauvoir’s insights on the roles of popular culture and leisure in reinforcing women’s oppression and in facilitating possibilities for resistance or what de Beauvoir (1949/1974) called “transcendence” (p. 147).

De Beauvoir’s central question was “why is woman the Other?” (p. 41). That is, why are women the “other” in the self/other and subject/object binaries that structure patriarchal society such that women are subordinated to men as the “the second sex?” To address this question, de Beauvoir analysed women’s oppression through men’s use of myths about women (e.g., irrationality), as disseminated through popular cultural forms such as literature and through which women internalize these myths as accurate reflections (Tong 2014).

Moreover, de Beauvoir identified social roles as the main mechanism: the self, or subject, uses to control the other, or object (Tong 2014). Within patriarchal society, de Beauvoir saw the institutions of marriage and motherhood, in particular, as impeding women’s freedom, self-development, and self-defined destiny (Tong 2014). Accordingly, to escape the limits imposed on them and refuse the internalization of their “otherness,” de Beauvoir urged women to free themselves from constraining social roles and focus their energies on creative, intellectual, or service-oriented endeavours—pursued within leisure, for instance—that would enable women to reclaim their selfhood (Tong 2014).

Critiques of Radical Feminism

While there are a number of critiques of radical feminism from non-radical feminists, some of the most fervent critiques come from radical feminists themselves. Although radical feminists agree that sexism is the root of gender inequality, they are divided about the best way to eliminate it, particularly around issues of sexuality, depending on whether they are *radical-libertarian* feminists—who support any form of sex between equal partners—or *radical-cultural* feminists—who reject heterosexual sex as objectifying women (Ferguson 1984; Tong 2014).

a radical feminist and discussed a wide range of ways of being a radical feminist (Card 2003). De Beauvoir is also widely recognized as an existentialist feminist (Tong 2014).

One context in which this fundamental divide was especially evident was the so-called “Sex Wars” between radical feminists over pornography. Radical-libertarian feminists supported pornography as an extension of their acceptance of all forms of sexuality (Rubin 1984). Conversely, radical-cultural feminists, such as Andrea Dworkin (1981), insisted that pornography is patriarchal propaganda that subordinates and objectifies women, which compelled their anti-pornography legislation. Such debates and critiques demonstrate the diversity of thought and action within radical feminism.

Summary

Radical feminists, such as Simone de Beauvoir, seek to revolutionize society by getting to the “root”—another word for “radical”—of its inequality: patriarchy. Thus, they emphasize undermining hierarchical structures within patriarchy that disempower women, including existing gender roles and institutions. Many of the debates among radical feminists highlight a range of views and approaches to gender equality through a focus on what distinguishes women in the sex/gender system: their bodies. Considering such personal experiences as sexuality and reproduction, and the implications and alternatives for women, radical feminists indeed insist that “the personal is political.” Together, as structural feminist theories, radical and liberal feminist theories offer different, but equally valuable, insights for developing structural feminist critiques of leisure, which we now consider.

Structural Feminist Critiques of Leisure

While structural feminist theories have informed many fields and disciplines, leisure scholars—and others who are researching leisure contexts—have also embraced the distinct analytical frameworks of structural feminist theories. Below, we provide a necessarily selective overview of six different bodies of work (some with multiple works and co-researchers), which have each developed insightful structural feminist critiques of

leisure in a range of contexts. These works are considered within three broad topical areas: health, physical activity, and popular culture. By emphasizing both the distinctions and interconnections of these structural feminist critiques, and their topical contributions, we hope to galvanize future collaborative work by feminist scholars both within and beyond leisure studies.

Health

Women’s Experiences of Infertility in a Pronatalist Society

Diana Parry (2005) explored women’s experiences with infertility, a health issue that affects about five million American women. This work was critically informed by how women’s experiences with infertility were negotiated within the powerful ideological context of pronatalism. Ideologies are crucially connected to a structural critique since they inform the “social superstructure of our experiences” by shaping society’s interpretation of behaviours, including social roles (p. 338). As Parry articulated, a pronatalist ideology shapes “society’s interpretation of women’s and men’s social roles regarding parenthood ... [and] is particularly harmful to women because it perpetuates the belief that women’s *primary* social role is motherhood” (p. 338, original emphasis).

Within patriarchal society, women experiencing infertility are often made to feel “abnormal” or “incomplete” through the pervasive influence of pronatalism within social structures and institutions, including the media, medicine, and family. Indeed, the women in Parry’s research were acutely aware of a pronatalist ideology, which manifested for them as insensitive comments or questions and unsolicited advice. In addition to demonstrating the influence of pronatalism for women with infertility, Parry’s research also asserted that “women have personal agency and actively determine how they will respond to ideologies” (p. 338). Specifically, Parry examined how some women responded to a pronatalist ideology by buffering or resisting its impacts in their leisure pursuits, through which women gained a sense of empowerment, accomplishment, self-worth, and social worth—outside of motherhood.

Thus, Parry's research took up issues of control over women's reproductive agency—central issues within radical feminist theory—and problematized the “unequal power relations” (p. 338) that are normalized and concealed within a pronatalist ideology, defining women's social worth within patriarchy through their biological motherhood.

Women's Recovery from Depression

Another health issue facing women is the mental health epidemic of depression, which disproportionately impacts women across the world (Fullagar 2013). Women's mental health, and their health and well-being in general, must be situated within the social conditions that support and/or constrain women's lives, including gender, class, ethnicity, religion, age, disability, and sexuality (Fullagar 2013). This recognition underpins the women's health movement and an understanding of the “gendered politics of health” that challenge the biomedical conceptualization of health and illness and instead privilege women's own knowledge of their minds, bodies, and emotions, combined with a critical focus on the “social context of women's everyday experiences” (Fullagar 2013, p. 426).

This “politicized health” focus was demonstrated in Simone Fullagar's (2008) research on women recovering from depression as it was connected to stultifying gendered expectations and inequities that culminated to constrain women's lives. While Fullagar's work critically highlighted the social context of gendered expectations and their destructive impact on women's mental health, she also focused on how women used leisure as a “counter-depressant” to recover or transform themselves. For instance, women's friendships and social activities with other women enabled spaces where they could “question the gendered expectations that evoked deep feelings of failure (as mothers, workers, partners, and daughters)” (Fullagar 2013, p. 431).

As such, Fullagar's research on women's mental health critically situated “the personal within the social realm to examine the structural and cultural effects of gender inequities” (Fullagar 2013, p. 433). Examining gender inequities within social structures, including the family and bio-

medicine, foregrounds "the complex interrelationships between gender, leisure, and the politics of women's health" (p. 432).

Physical Activity

History and Sociology of Women's Sports

Jennifer Hargreaves' "groundbreaking" book *Sporting Females: Critical Issues in the History and Sociology of Women's Sports* was "instrumental in developing a comprehensive analysis of the structural and cultural influences shaping gender and sport relations" (Aitchison 2003, p. 56). Hargreaves (1994/2003) placed women at the centre of her historical and sociological discussion of women and sports in the nineteenth and twentieth century to critically examine gender "as a relationship of power" (p. 3). For instance, Hargreaves discussed patriarchal relations of power as demonstrated in forms of institutionalized discrimination in various sport contexts. In particular, Hargreaves critiqued legislation such as the UK Sex Discrimination Act and the American Title IX, which were both undermined by "sexist policies and discriminatory practices" (p. 175). Furthermore, gender relations in the private sphere of the home perpetuated the unequal division of domestic and care labour, which meant the "uneven sexual division of leisure," including resources and opportunities for women's participation in sports (p. 185). Both of these "uneven" divisions were situated within the "broad structure of male dominance inherent in modern capitalism" (p. 185).

Through her critical examination of women in sports, Hargreaves revealed that sports, like other cultural forms, are "deeply contradictory"; women are both "determined by circumstances *and* active agents in the transformation of culture" (p. 289, original emphasis). This "cultural struggle" centres on women's bodies, which have variously been the sites of presumed biological differences and inferiority (as challenged by liberal feminists) and the "sites of oppression" (the focus of radical feminists) (p. 289). For Hargreaves and "sporting females," women's bodies can also be the sites of changes in "women's

consciousness about their own physicality” (p. 289), supporting new possibilities for women’s experiences with sports in the twenty-first century.

Women’s Ice Hockey and the Politics of Gender

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, Nancy Theberge (2000) explored some of these new possibilities for women in sports with her critical ethnographic account *Higher Goals: Women’s Ice Hockey and the Politics of Gender* based on a detailed account of one Canadian team that played at the highest levels of women’s hockey. Theberge examined the multiple contexts of gender inequality in hockey, both on and off the ice.

The politics of gender were particularly evident within the cultural context of the “feminine apologetic,” which positions athleticism and femininity in opposition. For the women in Theberge’s ethnography, they resisted the “feminine apologetic” by celebrating their accomplishments as athletes, but they also reproduced it in emphasizing their “otherwise feminine appearance and asserting a heterosexual image” (p. 91).

Female athletes’ emphasis on their heterosexuality was also significant in countering the stereotype of female hockey players as “mannish lesbians,” which functions as the “bogeywoman” of sport (p. 90). This cultural construction was examined within the team’s treatment of lesbian players, ranging from overt homophobic policies that previously excluded lesbians from the team to the later, complex situation of lesbians as both included and excluded.

Theberge’s “useful accounts of patriarchal constructions of sexuality in sport” prompted Aitchison’s (2003) assessment of her work as an important contribution to “radical feminist critiques of sport” (p. 29). Despite Theberge’s radical feminist approach, her evaluation of the state of gender politics in women’s ice hockey was one of “reform, not revolution” (as advocated by liberal feminism) (p. 91). This was the case for Theberge’s elite female hockey team, which offered a “setting for the celebration of women’s athleticism ... within a framework that leaves intact elements of traditional gender constructions” (p. 91).

Popular Culture

Young Women, Femininity, and Feminism

British cultural theorist Angela McRobbie has studied popular culture, media practices, and feminism over the course of four decades. While her work has variously been informed by feminist theories that are both structural (particularly socialist feminist) and poststructural, we provide an overview of two of her structural works on the complexities of young women and popular culture.

In her now classic (1976) essay, McRobbie confronted the “invisibility” of girls in youth culture studies by centring issues of gender and revealing girls’ “culture of the bedroom” as a primary site for leisure and identity construction through the consumption of media (McRobbie and Garber 1976/2000). Far from being passive pop culture consumers, however, McRobbie critically examined the “negotiative processes” that demonstrated girls’ relative agency (p. 23). This critical work laid the foundation for over 30 years of youth culture scholars’ attention to how gender influences the experiences and cultural practices of young people (Kearney 2007).

Writing just over 20 years later, McRobbie (2000) considered how the position of young (British) women had changed. Now centring social class and ethnicity along with gender, she offered an incisive critique of the commercial representations of young women that depict a dominant visual culture of “slim bloneness,” which “perpetuate daily a series of violent exclusions, of the non-white, non-heterosexual, non able-bodied” (p. 198). Examining media such as newspapers and magazines, McRobbie also challenged the “dangerously easy” (p. 200) assumption that young women have achieved equality. She instead insisted that these media practices have resulted in “de-politicising and re-individualising the terrain of sexual politics” (p. 210) (see also McRobbie 2009). While McRobbie has remained troubled by these changes, she also views them as potentially productive points of “renewed” feminisms (p. 212) that can challenge the current “decline and marginalisation of the political discourse of feminism [which] limit the possibility for change” (p. 211).

Young Men, Media Consumption, and Masculinity

Dana Kivel and Corey Johnson (2009) also explored the media's role in the construction of young identities, in their case, those of young men. Specifically, through a critical social constructionist approach, they examined the media consumption of young men to understand how they construct and maintain their masculinity. Kivel and Johnson framed their work around an understanding of hegemonic masculinity as gender practices that legitimize patriarchy.

Using the participatory action research approach of collective memory work, Kivel and Johnson's research revealed that young men consumed a variety of media forms, including movies, television and sports shows, and magazines, through which they "constructed and maintained impressions of masculinity based on notions of heroism, violence, and 'macho' images" (p. 110). Moving from a descriptive individual level of analysis to a more explanatory societal/macro-analysis, they identified how "manhood is created by culture" as connected to broader theories about men as physically and emotionally strong, defined in terms of sexual relationships (to women), and as being a "real/ideal man" by fighting well, impressing women, and maintaining a macho image (p. 129).

Like the young women in McRobbie's research, these young men also actively negotiated their transition into adulthood and their gender identities. Their participation in this research prompted them to think differently about their experiences and the underlying ideologies that influenced how they viewed what it means to be men. Informed by radical feminist theory's focus on patriarchy, Kivel and Johnson offered a social critique of men's consumption of media within leisure as "cultural texts through which the gender order is constructed, reified, and negotiated" (p. 112).

Conclusion

Structural feminist theories offer a critical framework to examine how societal structures and power relations shape the lives of women and other marginalized groups (Given 2008). In particular, liberal femi-

nist theory attunes us to public structures, such as education, employment, and politics, as sources of women’s inequality (Aitchison 2003). Radical feminist theory confronts the overarching structure of patriarchy as the pervasive, persistent, and powerful source of women’s cultural oppression (Tong 2014). As feminist theories, these approaches compel us not only to think differently but also to act differently as we work towards *critiquing* and *changing* existing gendered social structures (Parry 2014). When structural feminist theories inform the development of social critiques of leisure, it becomes clear that leisure is a significant context for both the reproduction and resistance of limiting gendered practices.

The significance and complexities of multiple leisure contexts are clearly demonstrated in our overview of six bodies of work by scholars whose research collectively spans nearly four decades (from the mid-1970s until just a few years ago). These scholars also cross several fields and disciplines, including leisure, sociology, women’s studies, youth, cultural, and media studies. Their work provides valuable insights on broad areas such as health, physical activity, and popular culture, among other related areas. This breadth of perspectives, and their interconnections, speaks to ample opportunities for collaborative work between researchers within leisure studies and beyond to more fully articulate the structural social critiques that are necessary to address the “unfinished business” of feminism: “motherhood/parenthood, pay equity, poverty, violence against women, and the acceptability, even celebration, of sexism” (Douglas 2010, p. 306). As Parry and Fullagar (2013) aptly asserted, “feminist leisure scholars have much to offer this agenda through a focus on leisure as a significant experience in everyday life with respect to gender equity, relations, and identities” (p. 578). Furthermore, we echo Freysinger et al.’s (2013) call for future feminist leisure research that recognizes diversity, local and global interconnections, and social justice. Indeed, it is clear that the work of feminism is far from “done.” We must reclaim the “F-word” from its mire of dismissal, controversy, and backlash to reassert feminism’s crucial role in critiquing and changing the social structures and power relations that limit possibilities for *all* people.

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A Critical Expansion of Theories on *Race* and *Ethnicity* in Leisure Studies

Rasul A. Mowatt

Situating theory is fundamental to leisure studies. In explaining the results of research, it allows us to analyze the nuances of human behavior that we encounter at the individual level. In addition, theory allows us to develop an understanding of societal behavior. Theory can also inform or become a foundation for our research endeavors prior to developing studies. Theory can determine the manner in which we see leisure as an important experience in the lives of people. It also serves us as a lens to view society and the structures within that engage or inhibit leisure as an experience for all. In courses and in studies we often present and discuss a range of theories, such as Compensation Theory, Feminist Theory, Flow Theory, Neulinger's Paradigm, Theory of Planned Behaviour, Theory of

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Reasoned Behaviour, Reversal Theory, and Spillover Theory. Those theories are just a few that leisure scholars have used or have drawn from in exploring and discussing leisure behavior. Each of those theories, as is the nature of the field of leisure studies, comes from another discipline or field such as Anthropology, Sociology, Psychology, Gender Studies, and Public Health. Despite a robust body of research and conceptual discussions on *Race* and *Ethnicity*, leisure has drawn very little, if at all, from actual noted theories regarding either social construct.

The technical concept of *Race* has historically been defined in phenotypical terms, and this is grounded in the application of foundational texts in various fields of science (Biology, Psychology, Anthropology, and Sociology) that corroborated the significance of phenotypes and the application of value, characteristics, and behavior assigned to each “racial” group (Stanfield 1995). For example, skin tone has long been associated with racial identification. *Race*, *Ethnicity*, and even Nationhood are falsely integrated into a single connected unit of social organization rather than being distinct and often disjointed entities with their own units of analysis (Brubaker 2009). In terms of its technical use, *Ethnicity* or an ethnic group is distinguished primarily on the basis of cultural or nationality traits (Alba 2005). An ethnic group usually shares a social or cultural heritage that is passed on from one generation to the other. Despite the distinction, the terms *Race* and *Ethnicity* share the common denominator that both physical and cultural characteristics can serve as a basis for discrimination in society (Anderson 2002; Fox and Guglielmo 2012; Murji and Solomos 2005). The two categorical identifiers of *Race* and *Ethnicity* invoke, subtly and overtly, a permanent status of inferiority (minority group) that is predominantly discriminated against, subjugated, and is assigned a lower status in a society (Yetman 1985). Nonetheless, current definitions of *Race* have refuted the application of pseudo-science on to the category of *Race* based on DNA analysis and recognize it is a social construct. But the salience of the pseudo-scientific definition of *Race* alongside the values, characteristics, and behaviors continues to influence racial and by extension ethnic interaction and hierarchy in the United States (Carter 2007).

As Immanuel Kant once wrote upon hearing of an African saying something of note in public, “this fellow was quite black from head to

foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid” (originally published in 1764; Kant 1997, p. 57). Kant, one of the preeminent philosophers of the Enlightenment, had a profound impact on both European and American thought. Clemence Royer (1862) translated Darwin’s *Origin of Species* to French and added the commentary that “Races are not distinct species but...quite unequal varieties” (p. xxxviii). Superior *Races* are destined to supplant inferior ones, “one needs to think carefully before claiming political and civic equality among people composed of an Indo-European minority and a Mongolian or Negro majority” (p. xxxviii). But more insidiously, this line of thinking was not just academic conjecture but was the basis for policy as Thomas and Sillen (1972) noted that in 1844, John C. Calhoun, the US Secretary of State utilized a loosely applied epidemiology study that highlighted “insanity and idiocy” were 11 times more prevalent in Northern “free” Black people than their Southern enslaved counterparts to argue for the fundamental necessity for slavery. In having this historical understanding of *Race* and *Ethnicity*, the field of leisure studies is better informed to consider the implications of present-day observations, deductions, and discussions related to the two social constructs.

Floyd (1998) warned that, “the most critical issue currently facing the race and ethnic studies literature is the absence of viable theoretical frameworks” (p. 4). In more recent years, Critical Race Theory (CRT; Arai and Kivel 2009) has become another theoretical framework to discuss *Race* and *Ethnicity* in leisure research alongside marginality hypothesis (Washburne 1978), *Ethnicity* hypothesis (ethnic subculture theory; Lee 1972), and perceived discrimination (West 1989). The persistence of the initial three frameworks of marginality, *Ethnicity*, and perceived discrimination remains a feature of research on *Race* and *Ethnicity* in more contemporary research (Chhabra 2006; Li et al. 2007; Mbutia and Maingi 2010). The propensity to discuss *Race* and *Ethnicity* absent of a history and longevity of oppression runs counter to the call that Arai and Kivel (2009) in leisure studies and Hylton (2005) in sport sought and the very nature of CRT to question and challenge authority.

The aim of this chapter is to present a body of theories, the history associated with them, the focus of each, and lastly, some ways that leisure scholars could consider utilizing them in future research or discussions.

More importantly, there is the need to locate questions of racial and ethnic power differentials as expressions of historical and ongoing issues linked to *Race* and *Ethnicity*, rather than simply forms of discrimination, constraint, and opportunity. In hopes of moving beyond the use of theories that have become mainstays in researching *Race* and *Ethnicity*, this chapter seeks to invigorate the field of leisure studies with perspectives on *Race* and *Ethnicity* that have been birthed from social movements and informed by scholars with decades of analysis on the concepts and constructs of both social constructs.

W.E.B. Du Bois: Theories of “The Veil” and “Double Consciousness”

In a century rife with scientific racism that explained *Race* (and by extension *Ethnicity*) biologically, genetically, and physiologically, Du Bois (originally published in 1903; 2007) presents the first known argument that *Race* was a social construct. Scientific racism measured skull/head sizes, the width of eyes, assumed functions of the brains, connected evolution to the matter of *Race* and racial superiority/inferiority, and reified in a new way what religion had established as “fact” in centuries prior. Thus, Du Bois, in a bold move as a young sociologist, presents the notion that most scholars operate from, that *Race* and all of its dimensions are not fixed upon the body of people (Morris 2015). Society has created the idea of *Race* and that it is how society has made *Race* fixed in our minds and social behaviors is what ought to be studied. Among several theories on *Race*, Du Bois’ “The Veil” and “Double Consciousness” are most worthy to note for this chapter (Stepo 1991).

In conceptualizing the experiences between Black and White Americans, Du Bois envisioned the veil as the line of separation. Enough to see through and enough to divide, the veil is a unique structure that keeps Black Americans within, to only then be the home of their oppression. The awareness of the veil is entirely placed upon the Black Americans experiencing the oppression within its confines, as White Americans have been socialized to not see the veil nor the oppression

occurring within it. The veil defines the Black experience, and the veil is the Black experience. As long as Black Americans exist in America, so too will the veil.

With this chapter and concept in *Souls of Black Folk*, Du Bois begins to give us a glimpse of life inside the veil (or ways to articulate it) at the micro- and macro-level. According to Winant (2004), the veil “expresses both the conflict, exclusion, and alienation inherent in the dynamics of race and racism, and the interdependence, knowledge of “the other,” and thwarted desires that characterize these phenomena” (p. 25). Oppression within the veil creates antagonistic actions of anger and resentment and also creates opportunities for self-determination by those living within (Brodwin 1972).

The veil creates Du Bois’ second theoretical idea on *Race*, “double consciousness”, as it creates the sense and notion of “always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity” (Du Bois 2007, p. 3). This in turn establishes two identities for the oppressed that are at war with each, the American and the Negro [Black]. Black Americans are denied the ability to become fully American due to the social conditions that created and allowed for disparities in income, education, and health (Banks and Hughes 2013; Lemert 1994). And yet Black Americans are not fully African any longer due to the long and brutal nature of slavery that separated them from any former traditions and customs known on the continent of Africa (Lyubansky and Eidelson 2005).

Du Bois (2007) warned that as Black Americans attempt to toil in their conditions, this occurs, “while sociologists gleefully count his bastards and his prostitutes” (p. 11). Although Du Bois was specifically being critical of the systematic type of Sociology work of the times, the sense of inventorizing the experiences of Black people and other populations of color dramatically reduces their experiences to the confines of data for tables and not the understanding of the complex lived experiences that are impacted by systematic oppression. The experiences of populations of color become modes for noting who does what, when, and for how long. We come to see only that x number of Asian visitors come to a park, x number of Black participants play a sport, and x number

of Latino/a spectators attend events rather than the great social forces that have limited, altered, or regulated their experiences to begin with (see older examples of this in “Recreational Activity Patterns in a Small Negro Urban Community: The Role of the Cultural Base”: Craig 1972; and, “Mexican-American/Anglo Cultural Differences as Recreation Style Determinants”: Irwin et al. 1990).

Frantz Fanon: “Theory of Racialization” and “Theory of Colonial Identity”

Localizing and transcending experiences is one of the chief contributions of Frantz Fanon. In both *The Wretched of the Earth (Les Damnés de la Terre)* (2004 [1961]) and *Black Skin, White Masks (Peau Noire, Masques Blancs)* (1967), he presses upon the reader to see the experience of the Black oppressed living under French colonial rule in France, Martinique and the rest of the Antilles. But Fanon also pressed upon the reader to see how being colonized can transcend to all living under those conditions (Kane 2007). As Kane (2007) argued, “Fanon reminds the reader of a key concept—that racism is not merely a superstructural effect of a determinant economic base—it is an organizing principle of society” (p. 355). *Race* is a class, and class is *Race*, thus it is not a separate categorization of people based solely on income and wealth generation. Class becomes an extension of efforts to ensure that people stay in their place, especially racially and by extension ethnically, and this is his “Theory of Racialization”. Poverty is the gate that locks people of color within while serving as a checkpoint for poor Whites to be screened if they are deemed worthy enough for upward-class mobility.

Cities become divided into sectors that segregate the wealthy from the poor, and within those wealthy sectors the worlds “belly is permanently full of the good things” which by description are often leisure-related things (Fanon 2004, p. 4). Similar to the criticisms placed here about marginality, *Ethnicity*, and perceived discrimination, globalization is often color-blind to the conditions of people living in those societies and fail to see beyond the status quo. Realities are not current and in fact

are reproductions of old colonial formulations (Parris 2011). Leisure is not just an example of conspicuous consumption, but it is the venue for cultural commodity fetishism. The racialized Other produces food, song, dance, and fashion and is then estranged from their labor and becomes a hallmark of the colonizer's leisure.

Without acknowledging Du Bois, Fanon's "Theory of the Colonial Identity" extends the analysis of "the Veil" and "Double Consciousness" by seeing the oppressed (colonized) and the oppressor (colonizer) as interlocked into seeing the other as the Other, and they understand each in relation to this dynamic. This relationship creates instantaneous polarization in society, and movement in society between those sectors depends on one's embrace of racial hierarchy, domination, and the seeking of the vain things of the world (Itzigsohn and Brown 2015; Kane 2007). Liberatory social change is the counter movement in society when the raced (Black, Brown, Red, Yellow, and White) choose to see and understand each other's worlds, and dialogue, and act in contradiction and beyond those worlds (Fanon 1967).

Edward Said: "Theory of Orientalism"

For some, what lies beyond those worlds is the stuff of fantasy and illusion and exotic landscape that the *Ethnic* Other only resides. This is the fundamental aspect of Edward Said's (1977) "Orientalism" and inherent in this is the need to utilize this Other as a form of contrasting discovery and confirmation of what the Western woman and man see themselves as (Sadowski 1993). The Other resides in the "Orient", which is all that is not considered the West (Brennan 2000). However, what is most important about Said's logic is that there are two societies, the political and civil. Ordinary citizenry is dominated in the political society as the state imposes its will through the various social institutions of the society. However, in the civil society, the citizenry voluntarily affiliates themselves with various social roles and responsibilities. The civil society is where hegemony resides, *Ethnicity* is erected, the process of othering occurs, and Orientalism is created.

A tourist, writer, photographer, and so on must determine who they are. Are they the West (the Occident) or the “Orient” (the Other)? This will then direct their behaviors, interpretations, or lens as a form in the “Western style for dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient” (Said 1977, p. 3). The Other as an “Oriental” and the “Orient” are products that are then featured in texts (literally and symbolically) that are biased and prejudicial in nature. This then influences fields of study on the “Orient” to be extensions of political imperialism in how they situate imagination and awareness. Said’s aim was to launch a humanistic criticism on this notion of domination rather seeking peaceful cultural coexistence. He postulates that knowledge of other peoples and their culture should foster compassion and care, as opposed to generating ethnocentricity and justification for war (Nayak and Malone 2009).

Michèle Lamont: “Social Boundaries Theory”

Michèle Lamont as a cultural sociologist has been at the center of research on social boundaries, as they are generated by an in-group to oppose and inhibit out-groups. Building upon Durkheim’s (1965) the realms of the sacred and profane and Marx’s (1963) concept of class boundaries, she has extended this discussion of boundaries and borders to institutionalized social differences (in particularly, *Race* and *Ethnicity*). Lamont and Molnár (2002) noted that, “symbolic boundaries are conceptual distinctions made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time and space” (p. 168). Whereas, “social boundaries are objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities” (p. 168). However, this is not an explanation of difference between the two but in fact the relationship of the two. Lamont and Molnár sees symbolic boundaries as becoming social boundaries once they are socially exclusionary and racially segregating, when they become widely known, constrain character, and develop identifiable patterns for social interactions.

Nation-states operate as the producer of racial and ethnic differences, while simultaneously developing a sense of unity. This fosters tension and polarization between the dominant White groups in society with

the “historical” non-Whites but then it also fosters antagonism between Whites along with the “historical” non-Whites and the immigrant. Even further, it establishes additional tension between the “historical” non-Whites and the immigrant, as the immigrant seeks to “identify with the white population in the defence of their privileged market position or status” (p. 175).

John B. McConahay and Joseph C. Hough: “Symbolic Racism Theory”

As Racial Justice has been a fundamental part of the experience of oppression in society, our perception of populations of color efforts to offset *Racism* and xenophobia have been mostly ambivalent as leisure researchers. It would seem to us that populations of color exist in contemporary bubbles of discrimination and not lengthy sentences to subjugation by authority in the political sector or by vigilante acts in the social sector (McConahay 1986). As these populations have struggled against Jim Crow in the American South to the British Raj in Indian to the French communes in Algeria to finally the system of Apartheid in South Africa, some fields have taken note of how “proponents of Blacks’ interests have therefore continued to push for further advances, efforts that have often met with substantial White opposition” (Sears and Henry 2008, p. 259). New forms of racism are recreated that return to a more symbolic formulation rather than social or structural forms.

Although Sears and Henry (2008) specifically speak to the Black experience in the United States, their and other’s analysis can be extended to racial and ethnic injustice in any society. There are four very potent forms of this new form of symbolic racism: (1) attempts to prove that populations of color do not face racial prejudice or racial discrimination (Henry and Sears 2002), (2) perceived factual statements that progress for populations of color is a result of the failure to work hard enough to attain their needs (Sears et al. 2000), (3) outcries on how populations of color are demanding too much, too fast, with an assumed too little of a justification (Tarman and Sears 2003), and lastly, (4) overtures of populations of color have received far more than they deserve (Tarman and Sears

2003). The two most fundamental aspects of “Symbolic Racism Theory” to the relevance to leisure studies are (1) that it is rooted in the social and behavioral sciences, and researchers have devised a scale for measuring anti-Black and anti-dark (or other populations of color) sentiment and beliefs; and (2) that it attempts to bridge the discussion of how those sentiments and beliefs block policy that could achieve greater racial and justice in society and lead to calls for policy that could be racially and *ethnically* unjust (McConahay and Hough 1976).

Herbert Blalock: “Racial Threat Theory”

Those calls for policy often take the form of social control practices before or after official policy creation. Blalock (1967) looked at the differential treatment of populations of color through social control practices in the criminal justice system (harassment, arrest, detainment, sentencing, and incarceration). The disproportionate and disparate number of populations of color, in various criminal justice system outcomes, indicates the propensity to “deal” with those populations with harsher and often unfair penalties. However, as Blalock in 1967, and various contemporary criminal justice researchers (D’Alessio et al. 2002; Dollar 2014) indicate, this propensity is often as a result of public outcry to do so.

In thinking about public space, in particular leisure spaces such as parks, malls, trail systems, and open cafés, the notion of who belongs and who does not take on a tone of racial discrimination goes beyond mistreatment. The “Racial Threat Theory” posits that non-White racial groups are threats to the social order in society. The threats are distinctively economic, political, and symbolic (Dollar 2014). When we think of the outcries from White majorities that engage in racially tinged football hooliganism toward non-White players that results from social angst that non-Whites threaten job availability, and as a result represent economic, political, and symbolic threat (Hylton 2005). Blalock (1967) and Dollar (2014) both forewarn that as the percentage of the population of color increases, so to the perception of threat. As such, this results in increasing calls for state-sanctioned social control of those populations of color.

John Gaertner and Samuel Dovidio: “Aversive Racism Theory”

Kovel (1970) attempted to explain a difference in types of racism that could be seen in society, one that is dominative and the other that is aversive. The dominative form of racism takes on the various forms that we can envision (hate crimes and hate speech). However, the aversive form of racism appears benign on the surface but is illustrated by denial of personal prejudice of various non-White racial groups, which is coupled with negative beliefs and attitudes toward a non-White racial group that may or may not be conscious. This in turn led to the examination of the implicit attitudes that may lie at the sub- and unconscious level through the development of the *Implicit Association Test* (the IAT; Greenwald et al. 1998). The application of the IAT in various fields has shown large amounts of Whites that score very high in having racially implicit bias, whereas other studies may show them scoring very low on explicit bias. Social media, forms of entertainment, and locations of amusement can be wrought with messaging that enforces beliefs and attitudes of various racial and ethnic groups (Maestro et al. 2008).

Gaertner and Dovidio, separately and in collaboration with themselves and others, have attempted to congeal the past work of Kovel (1970) and Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998) into focused studies in Sociology and Psychology (Dovidio 2001; Dovidio and Gaertner 2004; Dovidio et al. 2008; Gaertner and Dovidio 1986; Gaertner et al. 2010). The implications are that we make quick decisions in service-delivery, belief, recognition, and value judgment in our encounters with each other. Those encounters across racial groups could be as benign as lack of collegiality or cordiality, or they could be as detrimental as delaying or refusing service in health care provision (Green et al. 2003; Harris et al. 2006) or law enforcement situations (Hodson, Hooper, Dovidio, Gaertner 2005; Kahn & Davies, 2011). As news media has highlighted a number of shootings by police of young boys and girls in the United States due to a perception of their threat as full “savage” adults, the nature of implicit bias should be alarming (Goff et al. 2014). A great degree of leisure service provision involves children and youth, and we have yet to uncover the extent

that youth of color may be marginalized or even excluded from service provision and program delivery in various leisure contexts.

Kimberle Crenshaw: “Intersectional Theory”

Intersectionality is a conceptual consideration in how populations of color may have different personal abilities, social class, sexual orientation, and gender identities that then interact with one another to impact a person’s experience (Cho et al. 2013; Crenshaw 1991). However, this concept and the idea of thinking *intersectionally* are often devoid of its historical origins and has come to mean only the multiple identities that people enter any given situation. The idea of intersectionality has slowly entered some of the critical feminist scholarship in leisure studies (Henderson and Gibson 2013; Johnson 2014; McDonald 2009; Pavlidis and Fullagar 2013).

However, the purpose here is to insert it into this discussion of theories related to *Race* and *Ethnicity* based on how Crenshaw (1991) initially conceptualized it as “*Intersectional Theory*”. More forcefully, *intersectionality* was not just about the identities or categories (Collins 1993; McCall 2005; Nash 2008) but intersecting forms of oppression that are experienced (Crenshaw 1989). Dealing with the manner in which anti-discrimination law was looking at *Race* and gender as separate entities, as a Black feminist legal scholar and lawyer, Crenshaw brought a legal argument that Black women could sue GM Motors for discrimination. The suit was attempting to show that discrimination toward the women was compounded by their identities as Black and women since the court would not recognize that there was enough evidence of discrimination solely on the basis of being Black or a woman. The reality of needing to think this way was just another marker of evidence on the oppressive lived experiences of a racial group, as only women of color needed to prove their cases for discrimination. Once again, policy served as a roadblock to not seeing these women as both raced and gendered. But Crenshaw’s theoretical lens enables us to see that discrimination is not neatly targeted at one aspect of a person’s being but is in fact utter and complete for populations of color, “women of colour are invisible in plain sight” (1989, p. 161).

Conclusion

As a field, we remain in comfortable discussions of the uniqueness of various cultural groups and the individualized experiences of poverty and opportunity rather than examining the macro-level systemic nature of domination that creates poverty, develops other social disparities, and determines opportunity, such as leisure. Further, this distance from an examination of oppression, over discrimination, also prevents us from seeing the ways that leisure could be one of the very ways that *Race* and *Ethnicity* are reified as structures that unfairly categorizes populations and then dominates those populations of color through structures of Racism and xenophobia (Johnson, 2014). What is proposed in this chapter is the insertion of theories on *Race* and *Ethnicity* that begs students, scholars, researchers, and practitioners to examine power, authority, oppression, and domination in relationship to leisure, more broadly, and more specifically to hospitality, outdoor recreation, park management, recreation, recreational therapy, sport, and tourism.

Kivel, Johnson, and Scraton (2009) argued for us to envision leisure experiences as being highly racialized and ethnocentric as opposed to being absent of the effects of *Race* and *Ethnicity* and the importance of the politics of racial identities. Within the politics of racial and ethnic identities, there is an interweaving of power being instilled on the subjugated and the subjugated attempting to assert varying measures of struggle against that subjugation. This level of understanding grants us the opportunity to question the basis for a host of leisure-based decisions of inquiry and practice and to determine if they reify dominant norms and alienate subordinate aberrations to those norms.

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Spasticus Auticus: Thinking About Disability, Culture and Leisure Beyond the “Walkie Talkies”

Viji Kuppan

The title of this chapter may appear puzzling, provocative and/or simply politically incorrect. This is intentional. In what follows I will briefly explain the history, meaning and context of *Spasticus Auticus*, drawing out some of the key themes that will be further developed throughout this critical discussion of disability, culture and leisure. However, before proceeding with this, I would like to provide an overview of my theoretical positioning to these debates: although this essay falls under the rubric of Structural Perspectives on Leisure, this work should more accurately be seen as a *syncretic* approach to disability and leisure. That is to say, although I view materiality (the social and economic conditions of leisure) as vitally important, I also consider *discourse* and *affect* (the textuality and feelings that are implicated in leisure) as similarly significant and influential factors in shaping and constructing disabled people’s

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experience of leisure life. To understand leisure in late capitalism is to be attentive to the interplay between the forces of materiality, discourse and affect, which have porous and reciprocal bonds. As this chapter progresses, these abstract concepts will be unpacked by drawing on examples of disabled people's uneven access to and exclusion from leisure. This is achieved through viewing disability, culture and leisure in a mainly British context.

Disability, Leisure and Rebellion

Spasticus Auticus is the name of a 1981 song by the disabled post-punk rock artist, Ian Dury. The song title is a reference to the iconic historical figure, *Spartacus* (died in 71 BC), who was also the subject of the celebrated 1960 Hollywood film, directed by Stanley Kubrick and starring Kirk Douglas. Spartacus was a Thracian slave leader and was instrumental in orchestrating sustained counter-insurgent attacks against the might of the Roman Empire. The legacy of Spartacus and these uprisings have been referenced by social and political thinkers including: Toussaint Louverture, Karl Marx and Bertolt Brecht as an illustration of how oppressed people resist and challenge hegemonic power in order to gain freedom and equality.

Dury, a polio survivor, re-imagined himself as *Spasticus Auticus* a liberated slave and revolutionary (McKay 2009, p. 359), the lyrics of his song exposing the uncomfortable realities of some forms of disabled embodiment. He sang with a candid humour about the problems of going to the toilet, widdling when piddling and of negotiating urban spaces that induced discomfort, hobbling and wobbling on street surfaces which failed to take account of people with corporeal differences. Dury also drew attention to a society whose primary form of interaction with disabled people was often based on throwing coins into a collection tin. He mordantly noted how this dissimulating action was used to assuage the existential anxiety that non-disabled people felt around the "tragedy" of impairment (Dury 1981). Despite *Spasticus Auticus* being denuded of the obscene language that his work had become known for, the single was still denied airplay by the BBC till after 6pm. Previously, the BBC

had banned *Sex & Drugs & Rock & Roll*. Perhaps as McKay has argued, because Dury and his music had developed a reputation for being contentious, his work came to represent something: “distasteful, dangerous, deviant and sexually threatening within, even inherent to people with disabilities” (McKay 2009, p. 355). Dury’s music offended the establishment’s sensibility surrounding “good taste”, which is exactly what he intended; his mischievous and pugilist persona wanted to confront the “pity” and prejudice that disabled people regularly encountered by the “walkie talkies”, Dury’s term for “able-bodied” or non-disabled people who occupied what he referred to as “normal land”. These included charities that were *run and organized* on behalf of disabled people, such as The Spastics Society, who were involved in advocating and assisting people with Cerebral Palsy and who complained about Dury’s insensitive language towards this group (McKay 2009). Ironically, the charity has since been renamed Scope, no doubt because of the offence the term “spastic” has invoked among disabled people themselves. Dury’s record label made a perceptive point about the single’s inability to achieve chart success: “just as nobody bans handicapped people—just makes it difficult for them to function as normal people—so ‘*Spasticus Autisticus*’ was not banned, it was just made impossible to function” (Balls 2000, p. 240 cited in McKay 2009, p. 360).

Spasticus Auticus is a song of protest and resistance from the liminal alterity of disablement; therefore, it should be considered an example of the “reappropriation and revalorization by disabled people of abject terms for impairment” (Gleeson 1999, p. 136). Recognition for Dury’s song came belatedly but with great symbolic and material significance, as it was performed by the disabled-people-led theatre company, Graeae, to mark the opening of the 2012 Paralympic Games. The large ensemble cast was notable for the diversity of its disabled performers who represented differently impaired and simultaneously gendered and racialized people. The sculpture of the pregnant disabled artist Alison Lapper was included in the finale, and, together with Dury’s song, was a symbol of disabled people’s unity and pride.

The success of the 2012 Paralympic Games led Lord Coe, the then Chairman of the London Organizing Committee of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, to opine that “in this country we will never think of

sport in the same way and we will never think of disability in the same way” (cited in Dawson 2012, unpagged). Coe’s positive reading of the Paralympics can be contested on numerous levels: firstly, the games themselves were not accessible to all people equally, with some disabled spectators claiming that discriminatory ticketing policies prevented them from sitting with their families (Disability News Service 2012). Think here of how disabled people were not denied complete access to the games but, as with the *Spasticus Auticus* example above, it was made “difficult for them to function as normal people” (p. 360). Secondly, the rejection of term “disabled” by many Paralympic athletes is divisive and does little to generate an understanding of how disabling structures, policies and practices are woven into leisure, sport and society. Thirdly, it distorts non-disabled people’s perceptions of disabled people by further reifying the trope of the “superhuman” or “supercrip”, suggesting that if you are not a Paralympian, then it is simply because you are “work-shy” and “lazy”. Fourthly, one of the major sponsors of the games was the French information technology corporation, Atos, who at the time were actively involved in the administration of the Work Capability Assessments of disabled people on behalf of the coalition government. The “ruthless” manner in which the boundaries of the “disability category” were redrawn, and as a consequence saw many disabled people lose their benefits, was highly controversial; it led to mass demonstrations by many disabled activists and their supporters (for a more detailed discussion on these protests, see Wagg forthcoming). In the context of my argument here, it is the entanglement of government policy with “big business” in articulating the ideology of the “productive citizen”, one who is rewarded with leisure time and who in turn shows a capacity for managing the “*Labour of Leisure*” (Rojek 2010).

Social and Historical Perspectives on Disability and Leisure

Dury’s *Spasticus Auticus* has helped signpost the leisure worlds of film, television, radio, popular music, dance, theatre, art, sport, spectatorship and fandom and in so doing has begun to articulate some of the

complex social relations through which disabled people's participation in leisure is patterned. If we begin from the assumption that leisure is fundamental to human happiness and fulfilment, it must therefore follow that leisure is of equal value to disabled personhood, conveying a strong sense to disabled people of who they are, what they feel and what they believe important in life (Rojek 2000). However, in an age of neoliberalism and *post* everything, where the agentic, acquisitive individual is valorized as pre-eminent (Hall 2011), there are constraining structural, discursive and affective forces that inhibit the opportunities available to disabled people to pursue meaningful leisure experiences.

The roots of these formal exclusions can be traced back to industrial capitalism and the genesis of both disability and leisure as concepts that develop in opposition to work. Spracklen (2013, p. 23) has argued that "leisure is something that has always been as much about control as it is about choice"; throughout history the "control" of disabled Others has often involved their cruel exploitation and oppression to satisfy the recreational needs of the non-disabled world. In what follows I will provide a truncated history of how disabled people were used as "curiosities" of leisure for the both the rich and proletariat classes. Moreover, drawing on agrarian cultures of work, I will argue how exploitation may have been disrupted through their inclusion within leisure time and activities and then demonstrate how their marginality was restored with the coming of the factory and the birth of the asylum.

The disabled Other has had a long history of being excluded, segregated, sterilized and killed (Hughes 2014); re-imagined as damaged, contagious, wretched or even abominable (Hughes 2009), one can quite easily see how they have become *dustbins of disavowal* (Hevey 1991; Shakespeare 1994). In ancient Greece and Rome, the representation of the human body in visual arts predominantly portrayed an idealized, physically "perfect" and usually white male human form. Think of the Greek god Apollo or the athletic sculpture of the discus thrower, Discobolus of Myron. According to Garland (1995), it was not until the Hellenistic period that an interest in artistic realism emerged focusing on disabled individuals with little or no social status. However, it was the

idea of the deformed and afflicted Other as a form of entertainment that gained in popularity rather than works of art:

... no fashionable household was complete without a general sprinkling of dwarves, mutes, cretins, eunuchs and hunchbacks whose principal duty was to undergo degrading and painful humiliation in order to provide amusement at dinner parties and other festive occasions.

(Garland 1995, p. 45)

The disabled body was to be objectified and publicly consumed throughout the Middle Ages. As Barnes (2008) has noted, many of the royal courts in Europe at the time employed people of short stature as court jesters. Commenting on the Renaissance naked painting of the “Dwarf Mogante”, the art historian Sefy Hender (cited in Lorenzi 2010) wrote that, although he was favoured by the Grand Duke of Tuscany, “he suffered humiliation and physical violence by certain courtesans”.

Europe’s first “psychiatric” facility, Bethlem Royal Hospital, has existed in some form since 1247, offering care and later “treatment” for people with mental health conditions. Bethlem was an abbreviation of Bethlehem but with time became known more pejoratively as Bedlam, a moniker long associated with “madness”, and thus Bethlem became synonymous with the “mad house”. From the seventeenth to the late eighteenth century it would have cost visitors little more than a “shilling to see ‘the beasts’ rave at bedlam” (Bazar and Burman 2014, p. 68); it became part of the established tourist trail of London and was recognized as “one of the wonders of the city” alongside “a tour of sites that could include the Tower, Westminster Abbey, the Zoo, The Waterworks, the Exchange, Whitehall, The China houses, the theatres and gardens of London” (Andrews et al. 1997, p. 187). The carnal voyeurism that these visitations promulgated has led Dale and Robinson (2011) to argue that they can be understood as an early form of *dark leisure*. Society’s insatiable appetite for what was considered “extraordinary” flourished into the nineteenth century culminating in what came to be known as “freak shows” (Gerber 1996). These promoted “formally organized exhibitions of people with alleged physical, mental or behavioural differences at circuses, fairs, carnivals and other amusement centres” (Bogdan 1996, p. 25). Such fairs and

carnivals were prominent throughout Europe and North America until the early part of the twentieth century. In America, alongside the exhibition and parade of disabled people, the cultural production of normative values around beauty, form and economic function generated boundaries of acceptability; these were enshrined in the passing of “ugly laws” designed to clean up environments and make social and leisure spaces more “attractive” for mainstream society. However, they unfairly targeted the disabled, poor and homeless who, if caught in public, could be issued with a fine or jailed; it is staggering to think that some of these laws were not repealed until the early 1970s (Garland-Thompson 1997).

What is clear is that throughout history, the disabled body/mind has become a “spectacle”, an object of fascination for non-disabled people’s amusement and vilification. Garland-Thompson (1997) argues that the cultural inferiority given over to disabled people does not come about through physical or intellectual flaws but through social relationships where authority is invested in the dominant normative body/mind position. Guy Debord (1992) writing about the spectacularization of society argues that there are economic dimensions to this relationship too:

The spectacle is not a collection of images; rather it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images... the spectacle is both the outcome and the goal of the dominant mode of production.

(Debord 1992, pp. 12–13)

Michael Oliver’s seminal book *The Politics of Disablement* (1990) delivered a cogent chronicle of historical materialism as related to disabled people. He demonstrated that in capitalist societies the production of disability was based on the ideological discourses of individualization, medicalization and personal tragedy. Despite criticism from Shakespeare (1996) of an over-emphasis on the economic factors in early disability scholarship, Oliver makes it abundantly clear that disability is culturally produced “through the relationship between the mode of production and the central values of the society concerned” (Oliver 1990, p. 23). According to Oliver, the foundational ideology that attended the rise of industrial capitalism was that of individualism; pre-industrial society was characterized by a collectively arranged agrarian-based work system in

which disabled people were able to participate in the production process as far as they could manage. In the absence of literature that examines disabled people's leisure time in this period, I speculate that because families and communities worked together collaboratively, and included disabled people in these practices, that this cooperation may have extended to recreation and play. However, with little empirical evidence, this is difficult to say with certainty and is an area that requires further detailed research and study. What we can be sure of is that capitalism bequeathed the individual "as a commodity for sale in the labour market" (Burton, as cited in Oliver 1990, p. 44); in order for capitalism to function profitably, individuals needed to be "able-bodied" and "able minded", as "defective" human beings would be unable to operate the new technology of factory machinery or be able to conform to stricter, more regimented working patterns. This phase of industrialized, capitalist development led to disabled people being removed and isolated from "productive" society into workhouses and asylums. Those incarcerated in these institutions enjoyed little of the freedom or pleasures that leisure afforded and instead often endured a life of suffering (Miron 2011), mediated by a regime of authoritarian and medical discursive practices.

Popular Culture and the Politics of Disablement

The burgeoning of the twentieth century witnessed capital's rapacious desire for surplus value. This continued lust for hitherto untapped markets required a new strategy: one that would see the mode of production shift from the "transformation of raw materials into mass manufactured products" (Andrews 2010, p. 219) evolving to colonize the cultural sphere, to which leisure is inextricably connected. The Marxist literary and political scholar Fredric Jameson has argued that late capitalism's tryst with culture has seen it expand "throughout the social realm, to the point at which everything in our life—from economic value and state power to practices and to the very structure of the psyche itself—can be said to have become 'cultural'" (Jameson 1991, p. 48). In our present conjuncture, leisure has become increasing commodified, consumed and

is fiscally highly significant. As Angela McRobbie insightfully elucidates “in the most recent stage of capitalist development culture is integral to the economy, it provides the economy with a new dynamic, a new source of growth a new world of possibilities for profit and control” (McRobbie 2005, p. 155). I want to suggest that in cultures of consumption the disabled body/mind is placed in an invidious position. Let us consider television and Channel 4’s foray into the leisure world of personal relationships and dating. Over the past few years, Channel 4 has run two parallel programmes, one that features non-disabled people, called *First Dates*, and another that focuses on disabled participants and entitled, *The Undateables*. Both feature people meeting for the first time and getting to know one another in various leisure spaces. However sympathetic the actual programme is to the experience of dating in disabled people’s lives, the representation of disabled people as “undateable” in its title draws on a discourse of disabled people as inferior, unfortunate or incompetent in matters relating to love; it signals that their relationships may be difficult, inappropriate and untenable. But aren’t all relationships, whether disabled or non-disabled, fraught with many of these same tensions and anxieties over self-worth? Discourses construct our understanding of the subject by controlling and limiting the knowledge we can have about them. The insidious consequences of the public narratives that frame disabled people is that they become taken-for-granted “truths” and reified as “common-sense” forms of knowledge. These written, spoken and visual texts are practices, discursive practices, which are deeply implicated in the production of meaning. If our consumption of this material is unconscious and lacks criticality then “the text has interpellated us into a certain set of assumptions and caused us to tacitly accept a particular approach to the world” (Gauntlett 2002, p. 27). While in this passage I draw attention to the programme makers’ problematic use of language, the final responsibility lies with the network controllers, the owners of the means of production if you will, who are paid to manage cultural performances. In a consumer-led leisure market, they become the arbiters of ratings and profits and set the moral boundaries of what we consider acceptable and “appropriate”.

Cinematic representations of disabled people also draw on negative discourses of them and fail to render the complexity, rich texture and

vitality of disabled people's lived experience; emblematic of this failure is James Cameron's film *Avatar* (2010). It is the highest grossing film of all time (Box Office Mojo 2016), winning three academy awards, including Best Picture, thus signalling its mainstream popularity and profound cultural penetration. The first point to note is that the protagonist of the film, Jake Scully, is a disabled character played by a non-disabled actor. That there are so few roles available for disabled actors is indicative of Hollywood's structural discrimination towards disabled people and its normative support of "able-bodied" values.

While the narrative of empire and colonialism is fairly well exposed in *Avatar*, the centrality of disability is initially concealed in the opulence of its computer-generated visual landscapes inviting the audience to become immersed in the lush pleasures of its cinematography. Nonetheless, beneath this superficial gloss, the trope of disability becomes highly visible and forms a very durable part of the film's script. For example, ex-marine Scully's arrival on Pandora in a wheelchair is watched by a number of troops, one who comments "meals on wheels" and another who remarks "that's just wrong"! I read these disparaging remarks as a reference to Scully's imminent engagement as a disabled combatant in their military operation. So although the film is set in the middle of the next century, prejudice towards disabled people still exists. Moreover, we learn that Scully's impairment is sustained through his work as a soldier; although surgery can help repair his spinal injury he is unable to afford the cost (Peterson et al. 2010). This naturalizes a view, that even in the future, the social and economic structures that support the poverty of disabled people are still considered inevitable (Oliver 1990).

Empire magazine's (2015) online "five star" review would like us to believe that *Avatar* is "a love letter to humanity and the glory of mother nature" (unpagged). Yet, beneath the veneer of anti-colonial respectability, it supports a discourse on the worthlessness and expendability of the disabled body. Part of this legitimacy comes from the general sacrificing of bodies throughout the film, particularly racialized bodies (Peterson et al. 2010). Scully's disabled body is given particular attention as an object than can only be of service to humanity if "enhanced" as an avatar. All this he believes; the excitement evoked by the computer-generated graphics shows his visceral delight in being able to walk, run, jump and

climb anew. The seductive visual scenes and accompanying narrative interpellate the audience to see his impaired, “wheelchair bound” identity as pitiable. The film’s message is clear: the only way Scully can rediscover his value and meaning is through the transcendence of his broken corporeality and the recovery of an “able-bodied” norm. Thus confirming the idea that disability is a personal tragedy (Oliver 1990).

In this previous section, using examples from antiquity to late modern times, I have considered some of the cultural representations and functions of disabled people in the leisure lives of predominantly non-disabled people; these are significant as they not only provide the discursive context for how opportunities to engage with leisure for disabled people are constructed but also signify how leisure can and should be resisted, challenged and transformed to become a more equitable set of activities and sites. Cara Atchison’s trenchant observation is apposite: she argues: Leisure Studies fails to “engage adequately with disability studies, disability politics and disabled people as both leisure participants and leisure theorists” (2009, p. 375). In what follows, I take up this challenge by engaging with the politics of disablement drawing on leisure research to understand if the contours of leisure have sufficiently changed to reflect more enabling environments for the practice of a disabled leisure life. Where appropriate, I draw on the voices of disabled leisure participants themselves to provide “expert knowledge” on their lived experience of leisure in terms of the time, spaces, activities, functions and costs of leisure.

Throughout this chapter I have used the term “disabled people” rather than “people with disabilities”; this is not a preferred writing style but a purposeful political argument. The latter term, which was popular in the UK in the 1980s, and remains so within North America, advances the proposition that it is the person that we should acknowledge first and foremost, not “their disability”. However laudable this idea is, the term “people with disabilities” is conceptually and ideologically problematic as it “implies that disability is the property of the person” (Slorach 2016, p. 25). The systemic individualization of disability was first addressed by the *Union of Physically Impaired Against Segregation* (UPIAS) in their paper *Fundamental Principles of Disability* (1976). Their radical analysis lucidly explained and essentially disentangled biology (impairment) from society (disability), arguing that it was not individuals that had disabilities

but society that was disabling: “Disability is something imposed on top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from full participation in society” (UPIAS 1976, p. 14).

This profound exposition of disability laid the foundations for further examination and analysis and resulted in the *social model of disability* (SMD) (Oliver 1983). This explanatory framework argued that it was not individual deficiency that caused disability but economic, social and cultural barriers. The SMD continues to challenge the ideologies of individualization and medicalization, which together provide a conduit for the social creation of disability. Within Enlightenment thinking, scientific rationality attempted to displace magical and theocratic notions of impairment as being a “punishment” from God. The explanation of medicine from this perspective is viewed as a progressive and beneficent force for human well-being. While modern medicine has successfully cured and stabilized a range of illnesses and provided rehabilitation for other impairments, its efficacy is still contested. Oliver (1990, p. 48) argues that societal conditions become reconstituted as medical problems; the corollary is that doctors and medical professionals have too much power in the lives of sick and disabled people as “gatekeepers” of certification and services. Thus medicalization becomes a powerful means of social control.

The SMD is not without its critics and has been accused by some of being an “outdated ideology” (Shakespeare and Watson 2001, p. 9). This postmodern turn in Disability Studies (Shildrick 2012; Tremain 2005) has been mirrored by both social theorists (Bauman 2000) and leisure theorists (Blackshaw 2014; Urry 1995), who utilize a post/liquid modern lens to understand contemporary social and leisure lives. For example, Blackshaw asserts that “in liquid modernity, *everyone* wears many hats and inhabits many worlds” (2014, p. 131, original emphasis). I would argue that this kind of plurality is a fictitious and romanticized account of *everyone’s* position in society; post/liquid modern approaches to social theory and leisure have over-emphasized agency, mobility and movement and have tended to ignore determining social structures and, in this instance, the material forces that create disability. As the black feminist and intersectional scholar Sara Ahmed argues, “you are not witnessing what or (who) is being stopped; you are not noticing the cement;

that things hold together; how things hold together” (2016, unpagged). The SMD pays attention to this social glue, the barriers it supports and maintains, and is involved in a project to expose and dismantle them. Organizations that have used an SMD approach have been effective in bringing about changes to the structures of leisure. For example, this includes work by *Level Playing Field* and *Attitude is Everything* that are successfully improving access for disabled people to football’s *English Premier League* and the *Glastonbury Music Festival* respectively. I would agree that the SMD has omitted to take account of the difficulties arising from impairment and pain (Wendell 1996) and failed to interrogate the complexity of multiple oppression as viewed through the gendered prism of disablement (Lloyd 2001) and/or the racial elements of disability (Hussain 2013). However, this is a pragmatic attempt to deal with the oppressive structures, policies and practices that shape. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to engage in detail with these arguments now, except to say that I am an advocate of *intersectional analyses* that consider the complexity of different social locations including how disability overlaps with “race”, class and gender (see for example Erevelles 2011). While discussions about impairment, pain, identity and difference contribute to a politicized, mature and nuanced understanding of disability within contemporary society, I want to argue here that an epistemology of disability that excludes the primacy of the SMD renders it incomplete and insubstantial. Moreover, postmodernism’s “overreliance on metaphor at the expense of materiality” (Erevelles 2012, p. 119) hinders the effectiveness of drawing “links between disability and the capitalist mode of production” (Sheldon 2009, pp. 669–70). It should be understood that “the social model does not explain what disability is; for an explanation we would need a social theory of disability” (Finklestein 2001, pp. 11). Models help make sense of intricate and complex ideas; in this instance, the SMD exposes the differences between impairment and disability. Therefore, the SMD should more appropriately be regarded as a *tool* to help challenge social barriers (Oliver 2009). Or as Beckett and Campbell (2015) have syncretically argued using Foucault, as an *oppositional device* to reject the putative assumptions about the innate or “natural” inferiority of disabled people and how it can “allow for the proliferation of resistance-practices” (2015, p. 280). This is affectively

and perceptively summed up by the disabled artist and activist Liz Crow who argues:

For years now the social model of disability has enabled me to confront, survive and even surmount countless situations of exclusion and discrimination. It has been my mainstay, as it has been for the wider disabled people's movement. It has enabled a vision of ourselves free from the constraints of disability (oppression) and provided a direction for our commitment to social change. It has played a central role in promoting disabled people's individual self-worth, collective identity and political organisation. I don't think it is an exaggeration to say that the social model has saved lives.

(Crow 1996, p. 56)

Challenging Leisure Spaces: The Right to Be Included

In this next section I want to highlight how the sites and activities of late modern leisure present opportunities for disabled people to participate in leisure time but despite some of the gains highlighted above, continue to be constructed on an unequal basis. Witnesses to a 2016 House of Lords Select Committee examining how the Equality Act (2010) was working in practice showed how it was failing to meet the needs of disabled people. One witness, a former member of the armed forces who was shot and injured while on a tour of Afghanistan, spoke of the difficulties of going out for a meal.

I only want to take my girlfriend out for dinner... But it can often be a problem. Sometimes I am told to go round the back and fight my way through bins of rotting food and through the kitchen which feels really embarrassing. Some places just say no, sorry mate, you'll have to get out of your wheelchair if you want to come in. How am I supposed to do that?

(cited in the BBC online 2016)

I want to unpack this narrative account to draw out some of the material, discursive and affective issues involved. Going to a restaurant is a quotidian leisure experience that most non-disabled people take for

granted. The kind of spontaneity and ease with which we associate this activity is not the case for many disabled people who must carefully think and plan how they access leisure. This is because the spaces and places of leisure are not consistently designed to be inclusive of disabled corporeality and are in effect interdictory spaces, that is to say they purposefully inhibit or repel certain bodies from entering these environments (Flusty 2005). These social and material conditions are rendered completely normative by discourses of *neoliberal ableism* (Goodley 2014) which privilege the “capable” and “productive” body insisting that disability is “exceptional” and a private matter to be negotiated by the individual. The leisure participant in this example talks of either being denied complete access, or given restricted access, painting the visceral picture of having to struggle “through bins of rotting food”. This situation is entirely “legal” under the Equality Act (2010), as *reasonable adjustments*, albeit unsatisfactory ones, have been made to accommodate disabled patrons; but the feelings of embarrassment, humiliation and anger that ensue from these arrangements are also *reasonable* and are an entirely justifiable response to structural barriers. Moreover, encountering unequal spatial relationships often leaves an affective residue that can shatter confidence, making disabled people feel alone and isolated as bodies out of place in leisure.

At the end of 2014, access information providers, DisabledGo, carried out an audit of “High Street” leisure services for disabled people across the UK. Their findings (DisabledGo 2014) revealed that of 3716 restaurants they audited, 45% provided no disability awareness training for their staff, 40% had no accessible toilet, only 23% provided menus in large print for visually impaired customers (no mention was made of how widespread braille menus were), only 14% of restaurant chains gave information about the accessibility of their premises on their website and just 9% had hearing loops for hearing-impaired customers. In addition, of the 27,000 retail stores DisabledGo audited: 91% of leading high-street retailers provided no accessibility information about their stores on their website, 65% were given no disability awareness training, 33% had no accessible toilets and a similar number provided no accessible changing rooms, 20% were inaccessible to wheelchair users because of steps or ramp provision and only 15% provided hearing loops.

These “facts and figures” may appear trivial, yet DisabledGo’s research (developed by disabled people themselves) reveals how everyday leisure practice is routinely inaccessible to many of them; although I have been critical of Bauman’s liquid lens, he has insightfully argued that when it comes to the consumption of leisure, “the poor” are “flawed consumers... a bad investment, unlikely ... [to] bring profit: a black hole sucking in whatever comes near, and spitting back nothing, except, perhaps trouble” (2005, p. 113). Although Bauman is specifically referring to the unemployed here, it is easy to see how disabled people are also interpellated in this narrative of being feckless and mendacious. Leisure, then, is not always a social good but has instead the potential to create social harm: in terms of the unwelcoming messages it transmits to disabled people, the negative feelings they potentially invoke and the structural conditions in which they instantiate. However, it would be wrong to suggest that all leisure service providers think only instrumentally; the National Tourist Board, Visit England’s *Access For All* project campaigns for disabled people’s access to leisure as well as highlighting inclusive leisure spaces, such as hotels, museums and stately homes. The Vindolanda Roman Fort situated within Hadrian’s Wall is a good example of engagement and provision: its detailed access information demonstrates an active commitment to serve disabled visitors’ needs, both in the welcoming language it uses and effort to make the museum and site as physically and sensorially accessible to a broad range of disabled people.

A disabling society not only creates barriers for people with physical or sensory impairments but those with cognitive ones too. Southby’s (2013) ethnographic study of football fans with learning difficulties explores the contingent freedoms and limitations for this group in pursuing football fandom. Drawing on the concept of *sociability*, his research demonstrates that, despite the challenges for fans with learning difficulties fitting into these leisure environments, a sense of sub-cultural belonging became possible because of their ability to converse knowledgeably with other fans about the status and progress of their team. Southby argues that it is this sub-cultural capital that they can exchange and transact in the relatively familiar and “stable” settings of stadia: spaces where they know and are known by other fans that give them the opportunity to be included, if only for the duration of the game or season. However,

he is right to highlight the influence of family and friends in providing an important social ballast in these leisure activities. Aitchison makes a similar point about her own research concerning the leisure experiences of young people with cerebral palsy (Aitchison 2000), additionally arguing that more important than leisure time, leisure space and leisure activity is “who [disabled people] encountered and interacted with as part of their leisure” (Aitchison 2009, p. 383). I have argued elsewhere (Kuppan 2013) that football’s borders are patrolled and defended to repel or punish those that do not conform to a white, male, “able-bodied” aesthetic. As if to emphasize these cultural conditions, in a recent Capital One Cup semi-final football game, an eight-year-old Everton fan with cerebral palsy was allegedly told by Manchester City fans, among other forms of abuse “that he should have been drowned at birth” (cited in *The Liverpool Echo*, 2016). This is not simply an aberrant act by “rogue” supporters but has a discursive and material history; the increase of disablist hate crime in the leisure spaces of football has been widely reported by Level Playing Field and others and highlights the precarity of leisure for those that are deemed “alien” or Other.

Re-imagining Leisure: No Triumph and No Tragedy

In this chapter I have endeavoured to provide a brief history of disabled people, culture and leisure through thinking syncretically about materiality, discourse and affect. There is no doubt that late modern leisure is more ecumenical, providing greater opportunities for disabled people to participate. Leisure is no longer regarded as a simply a “therapy”, moving from a set of activities that are designed to “rehabilitate” the disabled body/mind to becoming uncoerced practices that disabled people actively seek to do and which gives them a sense of pleasure and fulfilment (Stebbins 2015). However, I have drawn attention to the ways in which leisure continues to be subtly, overtly and normatively constructed around an “able-bodied” and “able-minded” form. Leisure for many disabled people still takes place in the home (Aitchison 2009). This should not suggest they are intrinsically “at risk” or vulnerable in outdoor leisure

spaces, it is a disabling society that creates these situations; rather it means that attention should be paid to inclusive design and to the assistance additional human support could offer some of its citizens, in accessing different forms of leisure (Burns et al. 2013). Throughout this chapter I have illustrated the ways in which leisure can potentially cause harm to disabled people: through the structures they encounter, the discourses they are subjected to and the disabling affects they experience. None of this should be a surprise as Rojek (1999) has compellingly argued; leisure is full of spaces that are capable of generating great violence. These social damages often ensue from political ideologies; one of the ways that we can rescue leisure from the instrumental weight of neoliberal logic (Spracklen 2013) is to *actively communicate* with the notion that disabled people are part of the inherent variation of the human species and to welcome their presence by creating more habitable leisure worlds (Garland-Thompson 2015). Dury's *Spasticus Auticus* served to remind us that disabled Others are a part of the communities in which we live; however, their leisure lives are often mired by the invisibility and hegemony of "ableism". One of the ways in which this situation can be challenged and transformed is for Leisure Studies to engage more strongly with the *politics of disablement*. Similarly, Disability Studies must shift from regarding leisure as something "peripheral" to a key area of analysis and critique.

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Leisure, Media, and Consumption: The Flavour of Rock in Rio

Ricardo Ferreira Freitas and Flávio Lins

Introduction

In our time, the biggest cities are replete with invitations for entertainment and leisure. The media, in its turn, reinforces this tendency, occupying a good part of its users' time with publicity which invites us to have new experiences in artistic and sporting events, in games on the Internet, or on the well-known and efficient mass media. At the same time, the contemporary urban citizen, surrounded by violence, creates spaces of escape, constructing his/her life story behind bars, walls, and

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screens. Leisure is transported into the walled condominiums, shopping centres, and a series of events behind closed doors, even if for a large public.

In this chapter, we will discuss this new scenario for leisure and communications, utilizing as an example the music festival created in Brazil, Rock in Rio. Far from being just a spectacle, Rock in Rio establishes itself as a platform for market interests connected with leisure, which includes attractions, such as a fun park, circus spectacles, fortune tellers, and name brand clothes outlets, beyond music shows and especially playful experiences with well-known brands. Since its inception at the beginning of 1980s, Rock in Rio developed a series of marketing strategies that transformed it into a multiple business, occupying the calendar of the cities that host it, especially Rio de Janeiro.

Our intention is to highlight certain capitalist elements that are irremediably connected with the consumption of leisure in the modern world, especially when dealing with events which become media spectacles. In this way, as with international mega events such as the World Cup and the Olympic Games, we perceive that events of the most diverse forms and sizes tend to concentrate different agents from contemporary marketing. With this, the concepts of diversion and occupation of free time are impregnated by what Simmel already called at the end of the nineteenth century “The Philosophy of Money”, a work in which he argues that money is the medium and expression of relations and reciprocal dependencies between individuals, generating a complicity where the satisfaction of desires by one is always connected with that of the other (Bruno and Guincharde 2009, p. 43). In this context, Rock in Rio is an excellent example of the use of money in the name of leisure.

Media, Culture, Leisure

The interactions between media, culture, and leisure are more than ever present in the day to day of contemporary cities around the world. Throughout human history, we perceive important relations between

culture and leisure, proper to each epoch, but beginning from the Second World War, these involvements became exponentially greater, through the introduction of mass communication, especially television, in the life of many citizens.

After the war, leisure became one of the main domains for the application of industry. Beginning during this period, the attainment of leisure also represents the possibility of generating a private life. Edgar Morin, when analysing the crisis of happiness and the problems of the private life in the decades subsequent to the Second World War, considers that “mass culture then becomes the culture of the private individual, developing at the same pace as the techno-urban-bourgeoisie society” (Morin 1984, p. 380). Morin further illustrates this search for happiness in terms of the construction of concrete utopias, such as holiday clubs. In this sense, now in the last decades of the twentieth century, we can add shopping centres, gated communities, and mega shows (such as Rock in Rio) as phenomena of this spatial culture that shows itself to be segmented but at the same time globalized. Owing to this ambivalence, the main attractions of these urban spaces become used for consumption and leisure, at the same time as they collaborate with various changes in the interpretation of the limits between the public and the private, be it in the quotidian urban sphere or in the sphere of media communication.

In the 1980s, Baudrillard argued that society was moving towards a divestiture of the system of objects in favour of a hyper-reality where things and people mixed themselves in multiple network terminals: “Today, neither stage nor mirror, but a screen and a network. Neither transcendence nor profundity, but (...) the smooth and operational surface of communication” (Baudrillard 1987, p. 12; see also Redhead “You Make Me Feel Mighty Real: Hyperreality and Leisure Theory”, this volume). The picture, three decades later, is not much different but contains other perspectives due to the popularization of the Internet. Lipovetsky (2006), when reflecting on contemporary hyper-consumption, believes that the spirit of untrammelled consumption has definitively infiltrated into religious, family, political, and union relations, as well as those of culture, art, and leisure.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, communication and technology “re-aesthetised” the production of goods and services,

constructing a variety of discourses of consumption centred in the expansion of necessities, with leisure being one of the main points. Instead of a recuperation of labour force according to the Marxist perspective, the plurality of products and entertainment services are stimulated, providing a certain feeling of “unfinishedness” to the everyday (Maffesoli 1996, pp. 87, 201). The innumerable consumption options for leisure, present in the day to day, provoke a state of emergency, giving the impression of one never having time to finalize things, given that there is always something new to be experienced. The objects are increasingly ephemeral, despite being, like never before, impregnated with the imaginary of the urban quotidian, which, without communication, would seem to have no sense. Despite contemporary man having accustomed himself to perceiving the other through machines (smartphones, televisions, and desktops) and within new spaces (shopping centres, condominiums, and business centres), he continues to want or need to live in direct contact with different people, even if in an ephemeral way, in which the spectacle is one of the environments which brings them together.

Different researchers, such as Canclini (1996), Maffesoli (1996), and Castells (1999), converge on the definition of culture as a plural, unstable, and complex process, which becomes dynamic in cities, energizing distinct communicational processes in the everyday. From the media point of view, the communication vehicles emphasize this hypothesis of investing in leisure as a news value or using it as a product. This is the attribute which standardizes this news value, given that leisure is a necessary common place for the press. For the press, leisure is often not necessarily a way of achieving a new social status, but simply, of selling news. In this sense, the media changes its discourse according to the time and the passing interests of its editorial line, as we perceive in the televisual transmission of football matches in Brazil. Selling is more important than transforming leisure into a democratic practice for new cultural and political horizons. Citizens are sometimes less submissive to this logic and take the space that is owed them, creating new communication tools, a viable process owing to easy access to technology, and produce other content parallel to the mass media.

Consumption, Communication, and Leisure in Cities

During times in which technology is popularized by way of smartphones and wireless Internet, the cultural models of cities experience constant changes, due to the new plural, unstable, dynamic processes provoked by the exponential spread of everyday media. This process constitutes itself in communicative actions, sustained by the exchanges between individuals in society, with a new power of production of content never before known. In this way, the individual, society, and organizations find themselves in a context of change, in which the global network of communicational flows and interactions impose new instances of social mediation and articulation (Castells 1999). Once again, it is to communication that the citizen will turn, creating social movements through the networks offered by the Internet, as we could see in the spontaneous demonstrations, real and virtual, after the Paris terrorist attacks at the end of 2015. In diverse mediatized forms, people from different countries united in acts of protest against terrorist violence in important and emblematic squares.

According to some theorists such as Maffesoli (2014), Yonnet (1999), and Teboul (2004), the contemporary individual, more active in the communicational proposals beginning from the Web 2.0, replaced the subject submissive to the means of mass communication. Launched into this new role, the citizens integrated with the social networks and with the social information revolution, waiting for a type of reunification of social temporalities which can take place starting from the private, as the increasing growth of professionals who work at home indicates (Yonnet 1999). At the same time, according to Yonnet, for the phenomenon to globalize, it is necessary to totally reconstruct society, the city, the State, and the economy. Almost 20 years after the proposition of the French theorists (*ibid.*, p. 15), we perceive that this is the way that many countries are going with free access to wireless Internet in the streets and squares of diverse metropolises of the world, without losing sight, however, of the market character of this digital inclusion. The work world mixes itself with that of leisure in the most varied social environments, globalizing cultural elements in all the continents of the planet.

Leisure constitutes itself as a form of inexorable consumption of the contemporary, be it by the simple reception, still without apparent financial cost, of the technological apparatus created every instant in the name of entertainment or by purchasing market goods with diverse applications and games widely used in the day to day (Teboul 2004). The difficulty for understanding leisure as one of the faces of consumption in its breadth occurs owing to the impossibility of quantifying leisure according to the number of hours or financial figures, owing to its most profound significations which touch as much on collective coercions as well as choices of a purely individual order (*ibid.*, p. 7). It is not our intention to speak here of active or passive past times but to underline the impregnation of what would be understood as free time in other places, with activities which become obligations such as going to the gym, taking the children to school, or being obliged to update your Facebook. In this sense, the sociological approach to leisure could be more interesting in this article than the economic approach, given that the consumption of leisure constitutes itself from its own dynamics, with new cultural values, which are difficult to quantify.

Despite the undeniable importance of the studies of Dumazedier (1962) regarding leisure, it does not seem viable to still conceive of its cultural value purely as a creation of industrialized society, since in the contemporary era, called by some as the post-industrial (Bell 1974) or postmodern (Lyotard 1986) era, the automatization of a series of tasks, previously necessarily done by people, revolutionized notions of time in the quotidian. For Teboul, leisure constitutes itself as a form of social time which constructs itself as a global evolution of society. On the other hand, leisure is the result of social struggle and claims in the name of free time. In this manner, one can affirm that it creates new forms of production and consumption and consequently new qualifications (2004, p. 40). On the other hand, we refer to leisure within a new symbolic order which bases itself in exchange, in correspondences, in natural media relations and, especially in experience. All the elements that lead to the metaphors of diverse plays of images are constructed and reappropriated in the day to day (Maffesoli 2014).

In looking at past decades, we perceive that the mainstream media is clearly based on the theme of “leisure and entertainment”. Television

news, series, documentaries, and media products, in general, bring together or mix these two perspectives. With elements of diversion always valued, the journalism and audio-visual industry maintains its audience, drawing on a day to day that does not always have to do with the day to day of the cities depicted but which values representations about leisure in diverse aspects, inviting us to consume the pleasure presented.

Consumption is the most important contemporary global order. Considering that consumption simultaneously implies incompatibilities and competition, we cannot approach it only as one of the consequences of the diverse dislocations in recent centuries between money and the power between the dominated and dominating societies. Consumption transforms itself, especially after the two great wars of the first half of the twentieth century, into one of the most expressive forms of effective negotiation between people. Leisure is one of the great values and products of this logic of post-capitalist production.

Leisure as a Business Opportunity

Stanley Parker (1978, p. 33) underlined that “industrial leisure” assumes the same characteristics of this work universe by observing the institutions which satisfy this demand. This process continues being amplified, being analysed later on by Teboul (2004). As part of this movement during our time, the leisure industry casts a long shadow, lending it strength and the spread of entertainment to other fields of social life, bringing together work and life. Gabler (1999) highlights politics, justice, sport, and education as being transformed into entertainment, citing judgments transmitted on TV, the classes that become shows, and sporting spectacles as samples of life turned into entertainment, which are, according to the author the greatest force of our time. But the discomfort generated by the blurring of the frontiers between work and leisure, as occurs in some modern tech companies, where leisure time can even supplant work time is refined with discussions brought forth by the Italians Domenico de Masi (2001) and Barbara Maussier (2010). While De Masi (2001) wrote the thesis of creative idleness, where study, work, and free time succeed each other such as that occurred in the Florentine

workshops of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Maussier (2010) argues that man goes in search of this diversion where knowledge and work can come together. In this context, festivals of every type and size would explode like a balsam for the anguish of the modern world, supplementing the partiality of the academic formation, generating work and diversion, a place which Maussier (2010) calls invisible universities, initiatives which converted into great events and which can also reconfigure the urban space, reinvigorating the entertainment industry, and amplifying leisure possibilities.

The image of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil's capital until 1960, was always related to diversion, for example, a bath house occupied by beautiful women, an eternal carnival. From the narratives of the first voyagers who passed through Brazilian lands, the Edenic vision predominated. Violence and economic problems were not able to corrode the image of the seventh most powerful ranked city in the world (Michael 2014).

In 1985, perceiving the potential of the name of the city as a place made for diversion, the businessman Roberto Medina created the music festival Rock in Rio, even though at that time talking about Brazilian rock, or rock in Brazil, caused a certain discomfort, within and outside the country. Even with the rhythm having achieved success in the country since its emergence, Brazil was the land of samba and bossa-nova. In that period, the North-American paper, the New York Times, lamented that the invasion of rock would put at risk the "exuberant Brazilian music" (Riding 1985, pp. 1–3). But the choice of the model of rock festival said more about the possibility of uniting international artists that magnetize thousands of people, as well as drinking from the counter-cultural and youth ethos of Woodstock, with an ample commercial capacity, than about materializing a Brazilian passion for rock 'n' roll. Beyond this, pop was always present on the stages of the event.

Lit up by the Brazilian festival spirit and by the local *carioca* warmth, the brand strengthened itself and the festival consolidated itself in Portugal, with biennial events, as well as being realized in Madrid and, in 2015, in Las Vegas, in the United States. It is noticeable that it did not matter where it happened, the Rock was always *in Rio*, as happened in Portugal with Rock in Rio, in Spain with Rock in Rio, and in the United States with Rock in Rio USA (see Table 1).

Table 1 Calendar of the occurrences of the festival

Year	Local	Days	Public	Investment EUROS	Employment
1985	Rio de Janeiro	10	1,380,000	35,000,000 €	15,000
1991	Rio de Janeiro	9	700,000	25,000,000 €	7,000
2001	Rio de Janeiro	7	1,235,000	30,459,400 €	15,000
2004	Lisbon	6	386,300	25,000,000 €	9,000
2006	Lisbon	5	350,000	25,000,000 €	9,000
2008	Lisbon	5	354,000	25,000,000 €	9,000
2008	Madrid	5	291,000	30,000,000 €	9,000
2010	Lisbon	5	329,000	25,000,000 €	9,000
2010	Madrid	5	250,000	27,000,000 €	9,000
2011	Rio de Janeiro	7	700,000	40,000,000 €	15,000
2012	Lisbon	5	353,000	25,000,000 €	9,000
2012	Madrid	4	183,000	25,000,000 €	8,000
2013	Rio de Janeiro	7	595,000	46,875,000 €	16,500
2014	Lisbon	5	345,300	25,000,000 €	9,000
2015	Las Vegas	4	172,000	73,076,923 €	9,000
2015	Rio de Janeiro	7	595,000	62,500,000 €	16,000
Total	4 countries	96	8,218,600	544,911,323 €	173,500

Source: Communication Office of the Rock in Rio Lisbon 2015 (Table mailed by Joana Tomás of the Office of Communication of the Rock in Rio Lisboa from our request on 18 Dec, 2015)

The data in Table 1 above shows the economic force, the impact on the work market, and the potential of Rock in Rio to magnetize a large public and sponsors in the diverse places where it occurred, giving further range for the repercussions of the huge event in the cities where it happened. Beyond this, the festival is a success also in its multiple unfoldings online. In 2013, for example, the visit of Pope Francisco to Brazil, for the World Youth Pilgrimage in Rio de Janeiro, which had the same duration as the festival, and in the same city, generated 1.2 million messages on twitter, while Rock in Rio generated 2.4 million (Congo 2013). Already in 2015, Rock in Rio achieved a total of 306 million people on social networks, three times the results obtained by the super bowl, the final of the American football championship (Góis 2015), considered the greatest “day event on the planet” (Somoggi 2015) with an economic impact of US\$500 million.

A partner of the largest media company in Brazil, the Globo organization, since its emergence, Rock in Rio has always achieved huge media coverage in the country and in tens of others that accompanied

the transmissions of the event on the television, a process that was energized by the Internet. In Brazil, the rights for transmission of the Reed *Globo*, the absolute audience leader, guarantees that the event interweaves itself to such an extent with the reality of the city/country that hosts it, to the point of the television news during the duration of the festival being almost entirely, or to a greater extent, dedicated to the festival. Symbolically, the keys to the city of Rio de Janeiro are usually given over to Roberto Medina, “mayor” of the City of Rock, which becomes the city that matters most, at least, during the period of the festival. It is the centre around which all manner of interests gravitates, given the great visibility of the event and of those that participate in it and of the size of the business involved.

Though the festival presents international artists, also brought together in similar events around the world, Rock in Rio presents itself as an idealized space and time for specialists in entertainment, offering multiple options for leisure, as occurs in theme parks such as Disneyland. However, in the Brazilian initiative, music stars, and brands converted into stars, align themselves, that is to say, the show functions as background music so that people experience memorable moments with the diverse companies represented there. In other words, having the *carioca* genius as a hook, the festival becomes an instrument to communicate brands, starting from the media mix which unites potent brands with people and products in a playful and attractive package. That is to say, the multiple leisure options offered in the arenas of Rock in Rio strengthen it as a spectacle of consumption, where experience is the word of the day and is what energizes the proposal of Brazilian diversion.

The Experience Uniting Consumption and Leisure

When Campbell (2001) shows the approximation of consumption and entertainment, having communication as the driving force, we approach the reflections of Featherstone (1995) and Pine and Gilmore (2000). The first emphasizes the approximation between places of consumption and carnivalesque elements, while the second identifies in this process the

ascension of the *economy of experience*. For this reflection, we consider it important to underline the thought which Alvin Toffler developed throughout the decade of the 1960s and explicated in the work *The Shock of the Future* (1998).

Published for the first time in 1970, the work of Toffler, about this ascension of sensations not only presages the conceptions of Pine and Gilmore, made public almost two decades later (1998) but also makes contact with other subsequently published works, such as *Simulacra and Simulation* (1991) of Jean Baudrillard, dealing with human experience as the simulation of reality, published for the first time in 1981, and *The Economy of Entertainment* (1999) by Michael J. Wolf, which reports that this point is becoming one of the main topics in the world of business. Alvin Toffler's work, dialogues still further with the work of Douglas and Isherwood, *The World of Goods*, published in 1979, almost ten years after the text came to the public. Toffler had underlined the creation of an economy which is directed towards psychical gratification, in which the products should provide "psychological extras for the consumer" (Toffler 1998, pp. 183–184).

Toffler's text was written in the context of the experience of Woodstock and in the same country. Fruit of five years of research, 1966–1970, in which the author frequented diverse universities, centres of research, and government agencies, beyond having interviewed "Nobel prize winners, hippies, psychiatrists, doctors, businessmen, professional futurologists, philosophers, and educators" (Toffler 1998, p. 14) about changes, adaptations, and the future, Toffler's work generalizes as a portrait of the anxieties and desires that gave form to the first great rock festival, as a way of speaking about that generation, beyond coinciding with the birth of the hippie movement which also germinated in the second half of the decade of the 1960s (Campo 2004) and was transformed in consequence of the festival. We do not have any indications of Woodstock's sponsors nor signs of the brands attached to products sold in that period, even though it had been realized with the aim of multiplying the capital of young entrepreneurs. But if the companies were still not present, there was a sign that gigantic number of youths united in the name of peace, love, music, and the profit of organizers, established a new level of communication through events. Borrowed from the hippie movement, the

slogan peace and love was eternalized in an experience and in the brand of the Woodstock festival. This spirit, still today, converts itself into big business, such as what happened with the film of the festival, shown in 1970, which generated 50 million dollars profit just at the American box office. The cutting edge of this business is in the sounds, images, and affects, that is to say, in its sensible portion. At the same moment, we believe that Toffler (1998) manages to accompany and describe the ripening of intentions and anxieties throughout the decade of the 1960s, such as those of the hippie movement and the young, and their rapid conversion into lucrative products, be they artists, pants, or T-shirts. This is reflected in his investigation of the interweaving of emotions and the economy, just as in texts written subsequently by other authors. Regarding the playful pathways linked to the experience of consumption, Douglas Kellner concludes that diversion is attractive in the context in which acts of purchasing and selling were codified as experience (Kellner 2004).

As such, the consumption of the Rock in Rio experience composes itself from the fruition of an ample number of experiences offered by its online platforms or offline by the event itself and its partners, before and after it takes place, where, as underlined by Wolf (2003), when talking about the economic phenomenon, a mix of content of entertainment and experiences predominates.

Now we are clearly in a world of entertainment. A film offers a voyage to another time and place. A popular song offers three minutes of romantic daydreams (or of commiseration for wounded feelings). Enter into a clothes store, and you will enter into a world according to Calvin or Armani: the lights, the music, the furniture and decoration, the cool sales people who create the sensation of a piece in which you, the buyer, have a principal role (Wolf 2003, p. 68).

The market for the creation of experiences is one of those that strengthens itself in times of new relations to brands. In the 2013 edition of the festival alone, the Dream Factory, a Brazilian company which specializes in live marketing, was responsible for “unforgettable experiences created, planned, and executed for 14 big brands during Rock in Rio”¹, according to a public announcement soon after the end of the festival. During the festival, the company made an invite for brands: “If you need to realize

a Live Marketing project that enchants, engages, and moves your public, enter in contact with us”.

Beyond the Dream Factory, other creative industries collaborated to bring the Disneyland of rock into being, with its experiences which seek to “touch people, which leaves the activity much more complex from the point of view of risks involved, such as accidents, amongst other factors”, as Roberto Medina, Vice President of Rock in Rio explained, during the first Brazilian congress of live marketing (Lorente 2013, p. 2). The budget of the 2013 edition of the festival presents some numbers and indicates the popular prestige of these events which attracted and moved almost 100,000 people.

Ferris wheel *Itaú and the Prefecture of Rio de Janeiro*: around 37,000 people

Tirolesa *Heineken*: around 5900 people

Turbo Drop *Trident*: more than 20,000 people

Russian Mountain *Chili Beans*: more than 28,000 people

Rock Climbing *Correios*: 3600 people

Total: 95,700 people used these activities together with the City of Rock
(Rock in Rio 2013)

Rock in Rio constitutes itself as a space of sensation, where you can have new experiences in a safe and planned environment, especially designed by specialists for this purpose. They seek to control the uncontrollable, seducing the public with an intoxicating atmosphere for consumption.

Conclusions and Other Considerations

Already born from a great festival in a distant country, Rock in Rio was filled with some of the greatest music stars and international brands. To enchant it further, there was nothing better than Brazil’s happy and insipid genius, especially, that of Rio de Janeiro, converting the playful tattoo of the tropics, like an export, into business and entertainment know-how. Its numbers, from the first event, indicated that leisure had consolidated itself as big business in Latin America. That is to say, it took

the form of a cultural and media spectacle whose environment had been carefully planned for seduction, using the ample potential of media communication for messages of all types. Within the walls of the oneiric City of Rock, erected for the brands, as much of people as things, an opportunity to impart live contact with a massive public, until then never before brought together in Brazil, was realized in a time and space planned for acts of consumption in a pleasurable form, where people were predisposed to experimentation.

Media, culture, and business had given form to an enterprise which extrapolated the Brazilian frontiers and encountered in the music festival format a public avid for entertainment which would bring them comfort from the fluidity of our times. One does not deal here with casting a shadow over these opportunities for diversion but of underlining how Rock in Rio became a model for demonstrating the vigour of the leisure industry and of festivals of interests, that begin to circulate through this precious space and time, as well as pointing out the commercial potential of the image of the brand Rio. The event transformed itself into a spectacle disputed between cities and countries interested in its media and economic potentials, whose echoes coincided to reveal the ample spectre investigated by leisure studies, increasingly inseparable from the universe outside it. In the end, we would risk saying that in the contemporary world, leisure in big cities is irremediably connected to capital, especially when we deal with the entertainment industries, and almost impossible to imagine without the competition of the brands which probe and integrate it.

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Leisure and “The Civilising Process”

Stephen Wagg

Introduction

The Civilising Process is the title of a two-volume work by the social theorist Norbert Elias (1897–1990), a Jewish exile from his native Germany, who spent much of his life in England. The book was first published on the eve of the Second World War and re-issued in Britain in revised form in 2000 (Elias 2000). The “civilising process” covers the period in Western social and political history from the Middle Ages to the establishment of parliamentary democracy. As a theory, it might be seen as compatible with, or akin to, theories of rationalisation and/or the Whig interpretation of history,¹ in which (Western) society is seen as progressing inevitably towards liberty, enlightenment and parliamentary democracy. It has

¹The term was coined by the Cambridge historian Sir Herbert Butterfield (Butterfield 1973).

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its scholarly adherents in various fields but nowhere has it been more widely debated than in the social analysis of sport and leisure.

The key themes of the civilising process, as a mode of analysis, are violence, or, more specifically, the social construction of violence—the changing in ways in which violence is regarded in society; the body and, in particular, shifting social attitudes towards the public exercising of bodily functions; the growth of the state and the promotion of universal suffrage; the transition from a “segmental” (loosely speaking, a tribal) form of social bonding to “functional” bonding, based on interdependence; and the corresponding tightening of social configurations. This latter concern has caused the exponents of this approach to be called “figurational sociologists”.

The Civilising Process: A Brief Outline

The word “civilisation” is, ordinarily, a value-laden term—the word “civilised” signifies decency and decorum; to be “uncivilised” is to be brutish. Elias, though, implied no value judgement in his use of the term “civilising”. “The civilising process” is intended as a descriptive term charting the progress of European societies towards what is now generally referred to as “modernity”. The book was originally published in two volumes—*The History of Manners* (Elias 1969) and *State Formation and Civilisation* (Elias 1982). Elias’ account of Western social history is to a degree familiar and, in substance, widely accepted—it certainly has close parallels in the work of other key writers. The “civilising process” encompasses many aspects of the life of modern Western society—its “technology, the nature of its manners, the developments of its scientific knowledge or view of the world, and much more” (Elias 2000, p. 5). More specifically, it is founded on:

- the centralisation of the state and its corresponding monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and taxation. This, in practice, entailed the breaking of the power of the feudal nobility, who had had their own armies.

- the state becomes based on *impersonal rules*, not on the whim of powerful individuals. A person could no longer be put to death, or otherwise punished, on the word of a monarch, but only in a court of law and according to statute.
- the growth of bureaucracy.
- the advancement of science at the expense of religion.
- Industrialisation.
- standardisation, often now called “Fordism”.
- the government of the emotions, so that actions become less passionate or *affective* and more *instrumental* or calculated to achieve some end.
- a lower tolerance of violence and a growing attention to personal hygiene and accompanying embarrassment about the public display of body functions.
- the growth of privacy (and the public/private distinction).

Life, it is claimed, becomes more “efficient”, rational or “civilised”. There are strong echoes of these central themes in the work of Max Weber on rationalisation and bureaucracy (see Gerth and Mills 1967, pp. 196–244) and Elias’ emphasis upon embarrassment and emotional restraint is similar to Sigmund Freud’s notion of the super ego (Freud 1991, pp. 89–90).

To be sure, the biggest source of discomfiture with this framework among sociologists is probably its comparative lack of attention to economics. To Marxists, of course, the economy (and, specifically, the mode of production) is central to the analysis of any society and the work of Elias, like that of Weber, could nevertheless be seen as in some kind of unspoken dialogue with Marxian ideas and the three share a close attention to history. The leading Marxist social and political theorist Alex Callinicos compares Elias to Weber and points to the importance of Elias’ theory in countering the ahistorical sociology (for instance, expounded by the influential American scholar Talcott Parsons) which dominated the social sciences until the late 1960s when *The Civilising Process* first appeared in English (Callinicos 1999, p. 262).

For the purposes of considering leisure, the considerable stress laid upon manners (in the broadest sense), the controlled display of emotion, rationality and changing attitudes to violence all assume great importance. The book is replete with historical examples between the fourteenth and eighteenth centuries of people being exhorted to moderate their approach to table manners, bodily hygiene and sexual etiquette. “It is unseemly”, read a fifteenth century injunction to German courtiers, “to blow your nose into the tablecloth” (Elias 2000, p. 122); the 1570 courtiers in the (now German) town of Wernigerode were instructed that “One should not...relieve oneself without shame or reserve in front of ladies...” (Elias 2000, p. 111); and in mediaeval society, there was a “lack of inhibition in showing the naked body” which began to disappear in the sixteenth century (Elias 2000, pp. 138–139). Similarly, Elias noted that in the pre-modern period, there was a greater acceptance of aggressive behaviour: “Outbursts of cruelty did not exclude one from social life. They were not outlawed. The pleasure in killing and torturing others was great, and it was a socially permitted pleasure” (Elias 2000, p. 163). In a modern society, subject to the civilising process (entailing, among other things, greater social differentiation) people must “attune their conduct to that of others” and they become “compelled to regulate their conduct in an increasingly regulated, more even and more stable manner” (Elias 2000, p. 367).

This process originates in the courtly society of the Middle Ages, but grows with rise of middle classes and the modern nation state. The growth of the modern state is in turn associated in England with the growth of the power of monarchy. Successive kings—notably Henry VII (1485–1509)—moved to weaken the feudal nobility, who were obliged to give up their private armies. The legitimate use of violence and weaponry was thus monopolised by the state (Elias 2000, pp. 268–277), vested in the army (and, from the early nineteenth century, by the police force). Parliament was increasingly the place for settling of conflicts, especially after the English Civil War (variously dated between 1625 and 1651) whereafter the monarchy ceded significant powers to the House of Commons. This was linked, in Elias’ exposition, to the growth in society of “functional interdependence”—the increased recognition on the part of social groups (classes, gender groups...) that they depended upon each

other. This perceived tightening of social configurations, as noted, gives “figurational sociology” its name.

Clearly, these arguments have enormous implications for the study of leisure. The growth of inhibition with regard to the human body is clearly relatable to debates about sexuality, about gender, about the media and the portrayal of sex, and about obscenity, pornography and freedom of expression. Increased decorum in respect of the committing of violence similarly speaks to contemporary controversies about aggression in sport and among sport spectators, about “binge drinking”, about the purported evils of rock and roll, punk or heavy metal and so on. This chapter will now consider how some of these issues either have been, or might have been, analysed with reference to Elias’ notion of the civilising process.

Leisure, the Civilising Process and Public Conversation

At the end of the 1960s, a period during which sociology and left-wing politics (not by any means the same thing) had flourished, leisure (and, for that matter, sport, with which it was often bracketed by the academics concerned) was still comparatively a new area of sociological work. An early contribution here—*The Future of Work and Leisure* by Stanley Parker, a research officer at the British government social survey, had come out in 1971 (Parker 1971) and by 1980 John Wilson at Duke University in the USA felt he had enough sociology of leisure to warrant an annual review of it (Wilson 1980). Sociologists working on the “civilising process” were among the first who wanted to analyse leisure and sport. A number of these were based at Leicester University in the UK, where Elias himself taught between 1954 and the mid-1970s. The leading figure here was Elias’ postgraduate student, Eric Dunning, who later recalled in print how sport had come to be seen as a topic ripe for sociological analysis (Dunning 2008, pp. xi–xii).

The Civilising Process was rich in historical detail—American sociologist Gary Alan Fine once said that Elias’ books “revel in data” (Fine 1988)—and the history of sport certainly seemed, on the face of it, to conform to the pattern identified by Elias. Dunning drew unprec-

edented scholarly attention to pre-modern sports which were held to have had several crucial characteristics: they were violent; they had no written rules; they entailed no restrictions on number of participants; and they were subject to local lore (as opposed to the governance of modern national and supra-national governing bodies). During the playing of these sports, it was pointed out that, as Elias had suggested of life generally in the Europe of the Middle Ages, violence was linked to pleasure. Elias and Dunning describe whole villages rampaging, as was the custom on “holy days”, across the parish in opposition to the neighbouring village pursuing some folk game in which “the open and spontaneous battle-enjoyment, the riotousness and relatively high level of socially tolerated physical violence as far as one can see, were always the same” (Elias and Dunning 1971, p. 125). Indeed, the history of sport yields numerous examples of what might today be called unacceptable or pleasurable violence. For example, the Ancient Greeks practised pankration (meaning, literally, “all force”)—a combination of boxing and wrestling in which everything was permitted except biting, gouging and attacking the genitals. In backwoods America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a sport known as Rough and Tumble was popular for settling disputes and frequently involved the gouging out of an eye (Gorn 1985). Deaths in (bare knuckle) prize-fighting were common in preindustrial England, as they were in American college football in the early 1900s (Oriard 2011). In 1979, Dunning and his former postgraduate student Kenneth Sheard published *Barbarians, Gentlemen and Players: A Sociological Study of the Development of Rugby Football*, probably the first full-length application of the “civilising” explanatory framework to sport; it discussed, among other things, the controversy over hacking (kicking an opponent on the shins, often drawing blood) that occurred within the game in 1870–1871 (the time of the formation of the Rugby Football Union), the subsequent abolition of this practice being an apparent sign of the civilising process at work (Dunning and Sheard 1979, pp. 121–125). Fox hunting, too, was assimilated to the civilising process, Elias and/or Dunning arguing here that, unlike earlier forms of hunting for the pleasure of killing and eating animals and sports such as bear-baiting, fox hunting was more civilised, based as it was on the rationale of safeguarding poultry and with the actual killing

being left to the hounds² (Elias 1986, pp. 159–173; Dunning 1989, pp. 44–45).

Then, in the 1980s, unusually for a team of sociologists at a provincial university, "figurationists" became participants in a public conversation. Professional (association) football was becoming of increasing interest to television companies: BBC's *Match of the Day* had begun in 1964 and the World Cup Finals of 1966 in England, unlike the previous, fitfully televised ones in Chile in 1962 had attracted big audiences. This in turn had alerted advertisers and sponsors. But English football seemed perpetually afflicted by "football hooliganism"—fighting before, during and after games between opposing groups of (invariably young, male) supporters. The Leicester team had already received a grant from the Social Science Research Council to study this phenomenon in 1979 when, in 1985, "football hooliganism" appeared to trigger a political crisis of national proportions. In May of that year, disturbances preceded the European Cup Final due to being contested by Liverpool and the Italian club Juventus at the Heysel Stadium in Brussels; a wall collapsed and 39 people, mostly Italians, died. English clubs, whose supporters already had a reputation in Europe for causing mayhem, were then banned indefinitely from European competition. (The ban lasted until 1990 and Liverpool was excluded for a further year.) The second Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher, mindful, no doubt, of the adverse effects that this ban was having on British businesses, now, via the Department of the Environment, gave a grant to the Leicester "figurationist" team to study the problem. The Sir Norman Chester Centre for Football Research was duly established at Leicester University in 1987.

Looking beyond the paradox of a government opposed in principle to sociology as a discipline awarding research money to a coterie of scholars who practised it, this move made political sense. For the government to be seen to be investigating the problem was imperative. These sociologists were among a comparatively small number of academics who not only studied sport, but were already engaged in analysing football violence. Moreover, drawing on "Problems of Involvement and Detachment",

²Adrian Franklin has suggested that the theory fits angling better than fox hunting—see Franklin (1996).

Elias' much-thumbed article of 1956, those practising sociology in his name have claimed to do so from a position of comparative moral detachment. Elias wrote of the need for a clear head in studying the (unspecified) dangers that social groups posed to each other

How far it is possible under present conditions for groups of scientific specialists to raise the standards of autonomy and adequacy in thinking about social events to impose upon themselves, the discipline of greater detachment, only experience can show. Nor can one know in advance whether or not the menace which human groups on many levels constitute for each other is still too great for them to be able to bear, and to act upon, an overall picture of themselves which is less coloured by wishes and fears and more consistently formed in cross-fertilization with dispassionate observations of details

(Elias 1956, p. 252).

Thirty years later, Chris Rojek, a specialist in the work of Elias, reiterated that, for Elias and the figurationists, sociologists should not allow personal convictions to affect their work (Rojek 1986). Figurationists therefore presented themselves as free of political bias and preferred, as one of their number reiterated recently, to see other sociological approaches to these matters as “ideologically driven” (Liston 2011, p. 163). Neither the government nor the international football authorities would, for example, have welcomed a report by Marxist sociologists that blamed the “monetarist” economic policies of the Thatcher administration or the break-up of working class communities for football hooliganism, since, to such a government, such findings would support no viable programme for action.

The subsequent Leicester research produced a number of books—notably, for the purposes of this essay, *The Roots of Football Hooliganism* (Dunning et al. 1988)—and much argument. The central contention, elsewhere summed up by Dunning, had expectable recourse to the civilising process: the “hooligans” were drawn, in general, from the “rougier” sections of the working class, relatively unincorporated by an increasingly affluent society and thus denied its “civilising effects”. A lack of conscience or sufficiently constraining superego released their fighting tendencies—tendencies compounded by the brusque treatment they

usually got from the police: “That, in a nutshell, is why football hooligans fight. They develop relatively aggressive personalities, firstly because their involvement in the complex interdependency networks does not lead to pressure to exercise foresight and restraint to the same extent as other groups, and secondly because their communities receive less protection from the monopoly of violence than other groups” (Dunning 1989, p. 50).

Dunning and his associates might privately have thought that they had met Marxist sociology halfway—they had, after all, cited social class and material disadvantage as factors in hooliganism³—but there was also a strong endorsement of the emergent politics of gender. In their submission to the Taylor Inquiry into the Hillsborough Stadium disaster of 1989, the Chester Centre wrote “we are at pains to point out that gender relations are at least as important in the production of aggressive masculinity as those of social class” (<hillsborough.independent.gov.uk/repository/.../HOM000021650001.pdf> Accessed 30 Oct 2015; see also Dunning et al. 1988, p. 220).

In the early 1990s with top football clubs no longer excluded from lucrative international competition, football hooliganism, as Dunning himself observed, became “de-amplified” (Dunning 1994, pp. 129–135), that is, it persisted but mass media and policymakers had lost interest in it.

Many sociologists and historians were, predictably, uncomfortable with the notion of a “civilising process” (one sociologist described figurationist sociology as “not...a theory of society at all, merely a conceptual mapping replete with methodological exhortations to observe process and watch interaction”) (Wilson 1992, p. 68) and this process, as a series of intellectual propositions and as the bedrock of figurationist or “processual” sociology, itself soon became as much a matter of contention among scholars as football violence. The “Leicester School” in turn became its own rapid rebuttal unit claiming the right to reply to any criticism and, as elsewhere within the discipline, sociologists fell, in large part, to discussing each other, the best example being in 1992 when a

³ One writer even suggested that, in adopting the notion of incorporation, the “Leicester School” had abandoned the “civilising process” altogether—see Best (2010).

group of academics—some favouring and others rejecting the civilising process—all wrote for a book, the last chapter of which refuted the arguments presented against Elias’ theory in the preceding pages (Dunning and Rojek 1992; see also Dunning 1994; most of the disputes are catalogued by Liston 2011).

Leisure and the Civilising Process: The Quest for Excitement

Much work related to the civilising process, notably Dunning and Rojek’s book of 1992, purports to deal with sport *and leisure* in Elias-derived theorising. But leisure receives only a small fraction of the attention accorded to sport, sometimes giving the erroneous impression, either that sport and leisure are somehow the same thing or that Elias was not concerned with leisure. True, the word “leisure” does not appear in the index of *The Civilising Process* but there are substantial implications in the civilising process for the understanding of leisure which will now be briefly outlined.

If, as Elias, Dunning and others have forcefully and repeatedly argued, Western societies have, via the civilising process, become progressively more chary about the expression of emotion (anger, grief, exultation...) and about sex and bodily functions, it follows, they argue, that life in these societies has become more sedate and humdrum (although they accept that these societies are exciting in the sense of generating cultural change—Elias and Dunning 2008, p. 52). They write “Uncontrolled and uncontrollable outbreaks of strong communal excitement have become less frequent. Individual people who openly act in a highly excited manner are likely to be taken to hospital or to prison”; moreover, “[o]nly children jump in the air and dance with excitement; only they are not immediately censored [censured?] as uncontrollable or abnormal if they publicly cry and shake with tears in their sudden grief, if they panic in wild fear, or if they clench their fists or beat or bite...” (Elias and Dunning 2008, pp. 44, 45). In these cultural circumstances, therefore, people, according to Elias and Dunning, are likely to seek pleasurable excitement—to “let their hair down” (a recurrent phrase in the explanatory literature)

in compensation for the relatively dull and repressed nature of modern life. Modern leisure therefore provides “balancing counter moves” music, dancing, theatre, singing, cinema and kindred leisure forms all take on increasingly “mimetic” form, in that they stimulate pleasurable excitement—the sort of excitement either forbidden or unavailable in non-leisure life (Elias and Dunning 2008, pp. 46–47).

One can readily see how a variety of pursuits might fit this notion. Elias and Dunning use as examples romantic fiction, a Beatles concert and *The Dance of Death* (a play of 1900 by the Swedish playwright August Strindberg about a bitterly unhappy married couple)—although the exposition soon returns to football for its illustrations (Elias and Dunning 2008, pp. 53, 64–65, 66–69). Looking at contemporary leisure, heavy metal music, for instance, is frequently celebrated as a holiday from the “civilised” modern values described by Elias (Halnon 2006) and is just one form of popular music to have posed apparent threats to public decency (rock ‘n’ roll, punk...); bungee jumping, skydiving and a range of extreme sports provide the danger and exhilaration often lacking in day-to-day life; raves and a pharmacy of (mostly illegal) drugs spring to mind, as does a night in the pub or a (thoroughly profane) alternative comedy gig. It is, though, for any thinking—and, perhaps, research-minded—person to decide what relationship, if any, these activities might have to an historic “civilising process”. The chapter concludes with an assessment in this regard.

The Civilising Process: It’s Here, It’s There, It’s...

There’s little denying that *The Civilising Process* is a work of prodigious scholarship or that it yielded a great many insights. However, for sociologists and others trying to understand leisure as part of the human experience, there are serious problems with the notion of a civilising process and of figurational sociology. I will briefly mention three.

First, for many critics, the theory has a vagueness and an elasticity such that virtually any social phenomenon which appears to cast serious doubt on the existence of a civilising process in relation to leisure is all too readily construed either as further evidence that the process *does* exist or that

there has been a “de-civilising spurt” (Giulianotti 2004, pp. 154–155). Good examples here are the “counterculture” of the 1960s and 1970s and what was often pejoratively called “The Permissive Society” of that period, as a result of which personal behaviour as regards sex, the body and other matters became, it is widely accepted, greatly more relaxed in many quarters in Western society. This triggered queries about the validity of the theory of the civilising process which were readily countered by figurationists. Stephen Mennell, for instance, suggested not only that there could be “criss-cross movements, shifts and spurts in various directions” within the process but that Elias himself (on page 187 of the original edition of *The Civilising Process* in 1939) had already acknowledged such things as the greater visibility of the human body—for example, in females’ bathing costumes, arguing that such change could only take place in a society where a high degree of restraint is taken for granted (Mennell 1990, p. 212). Similarly, Cas Wouters, while recognising a process of “informalisation”—a “loosening of manners”, a relaxation of sexual mores and greater informality—in European societies nevertheless insisted that this was simply “a rather mild counter-movement, one of those smaller eddies that spring up again and again from the many-layered structure of historical change” (Wouters 1977, pp. 441–442. Quoted in Newburn 1992, pp. 13–14).

For many scholars, this may express the frustration of the notion of a civilising process and attendant prescriptions for research and the understanding society. The civilising process is always there, except when it isn’t and, even when it isn’t, it’s still there, albeit briefly spurting or eddying in various directions. Researchers embracing it are counselled to have an open mind, but always to reach the same conclusion; they have the right to roam, so long as they arrive always at the same destination.

That prompts a second point: the civilising process, for many, may represent the beginning of a good analysis, rather than the end of one. It’s a fascinating description of certain social changes, particularly in the late Middle Ages, but the notion of leisure experiences as giving pleasurable excitement is surely only scratching the surface of an explanation of them. We may ask what *explains* the emergence and popularity of, to take some examples at random, leisure forms such as film noir, heavy metal music, “chic lit”, the “theatre of the absurd”, lap-dancing or alternative

comedy? Consider the last-named leisure form and this remark by the comedian Jack Dee:

Some of the stuff I do is releasing thoughts and ideas that the audience wouldn't usually be able to get away with and the audience need you for that reason. That's why they don't want you to be ingratiating. They want you to have a 'fuck you' attitude, because a lot of people wish they could have that 'fuck you' attitude all the time

(quoted in Cook [1994](#), p. 195).

Again, what Dee says is ultimately reconcilable with the idea of a civilising process, but where does this perceived desire on the part of the audience come from? For many, the idea of tightening social configurations wouldn't constitute an adequate answer. They might instead argue that there has to be a more full-blooded consideration of people's economic circumstances and the contradictions that they must try to resolve in their leisure lives. Thus, a more substantial explanation would be that comedy of this explicit kind is a lucrative way of resolving the contradiction between the individualistic, do-your-own-thing values held out to the citizens of contemporary Western societies and the oppressive work and domestic regimes under which many of them have to live. Unlike the football hooligans of the 1980s, these comedy fans are, no doubt, "incorporated" into capitalist societies but incorporation does not mean emancipation and leisure sometimes offers them a temporary (and, of course, pleasurable) release from that incorporation.

Besides this, the social issues attaching to leisure have taken on other dimensions which, on the face of it, the civilising process cannot encompass. For example, the state—so central to Elias' arguments—might be thought to be losing much of its legitimacy. In a political exercise widely styled as "neo-liberalism" state, services have been privatised in a wide range of countries and transnational corporations have successfully deployed tax avoidance strategies, privileging private and corporate wealth over state revenue: even armed conflict (and, thus, the use of "legitimate" violence) is increasingly being delegated to private companies—by 2010, for example, the majority of troops stationed by the USA in Iraq were mercenaries, employed by private companies (Newsinger [2015](#)).

Satirical comedians mock politicians of all stripes on mainstream TV. In the twenty-first century, the gap between rich and poor has continued to widen, considerably reducing the leisure-time options of the latter. A swathe of states now have debts that they cannot expect ever to pay off, leaving them economically and politically beholden to non-state institutions (principally banks) or supra-national ones such as the European Union—at the time of writing, Greece, the recipient of a third “bail-out” in 2015, is the best example of this. This pattern of course has major implications for leisure—leisure is diminished because more people are taking two or even three jobs to scratch a living and several countries have raised the official age of retirement—but it also raises significant questions about the Eliasan concept of “increasing interdependence”. To what extent, for instance, are the European Central Bank and the youth of Greece (the former holding a debt that it knows can never be repaid and 50 % of the latter experiencing the involuntary leisure of unemployment) increasingly interdependent? The figurationists would no doubt claim that the debt tightens the interdependence; their opponents, however, would point to the one-sided nature of this interdependence, since the debt enables the banks to prescribe “austerity measures” to the Greek government, in defiance of the Greek electorate, who in 2015 have twice voted an anti-austerity party into office.

Take a second example: the Internet. Not only has there been huge transnational disquiet over state surveillance and restriction of Internet use (the rise in Europe of pro-Internet freedom “Pirate Parties” from around 2010 and the uproar that greeted disclosures in 2013 by the former CIA computer professional Edward Snowden of widespread surveillance of personal Internet communications by the US National Security Agency are illustrations of this) but also the Internet has brought new versions of Elias’ aforementioned “menace” that “human groups constitute for each other”. On the face of it, the Internet has, by definition, facilitated tighter social networks, but sexual codes have surely been loosened and diversified further by such innovations as online dating and “adult” sites (see, e.g., Attwood 2010); shopping online has made transactions easier and cheaper, albeit at the expense of oppressive working conditions for those despatching the goods (Daisey 2015); and we have the greater capacities for individual expression and human communication

afforded by Facebook, Instagram, Twitter and other Internet information-sharing facilities. Conversely, the Internet has brought new forms of fraud and political activism (both encompassed by the term “hacking”); young jihadists visiting bomb-making instruction websites; the disconcerting, Internet-specific phenomena of the cyber-bully, the troll and the putative abuser engaged in “grooming” and the proliferation of child pornography—often, like other illegal services, available, via special software, on the “dark web” (Dredge 2014). For sociologists trying to shed light on these developments, the notions entailed in *The Civilising Process*, as it has been repeatedly set out, do not seem the obvious place to start.

This relates to a third point, which is that, in a world plainly beset by social problems—many of them leisure-related—sociologists wedded to the theory of the civilising process and to the intellectual inheritance of its chief exponent may have been shackled by an apparent double bind in the Eliasan mission statement: Elias counselled scholars *both* to address the problems of humankind *and* to suspend all political and moral judgement. This will look, to many, like an “either/or”. In practice, the pursuit of value-free scholarly integrity may have led to the conscious avoidance of explicit social purpose. For instance, in the author’s introduction to an albeit scholarly and interesting study of the history of smoking—one of comparatively few figurationist analyses of a leisure issue—sociologist Jason Hughes makes clear that the project arose simply out of his interest in Elias, coupled with the need (since he was a student when he had the idea) to find a dissertation topic and the fact that he was himself a smoker. At the same time, in a presentation-of-self stratagem worthy of the Canadian social psychologist Erving Goffman (Goffman 1971), he fashioned a social purpose defence, sprinkled with Marxian terminology, largely to appease doubtful colleagues. Challenged by a female friend that the proposed research seemed “a bit anaemic”, he recalled “I’d already been thinking and reading about the topic for some time, so I’d gathered enough material to muster a defence. Taking the moral high ground, I mentioned that it was the leading cause of preventable disease in Europe, that it was the ultimate in commodity fetishism, a ‘false need’; she was a little more convinced” (Hughes 2003, pp. x–xi). Moreover, as it has turned out, frustratingly for agnostics and those concerned with arguing about the world of leisure (or sport, or any other social phenomenon),

the debate over figurationist propositions about the social world has generated much heat and comparatively little light. Exchanges in the journals and academic literature have too often been reduced to disputes about who was or was not a “process sociologist”; who had, or had not, said what about whom; how, invariably, Elias and his followers had been misrepresented or misunderstood; and reassertions of the fundamentals of Elias’ intellectual legacy (Dunning and Hughes 2013 is a recent instalment in what is now a saga of 35 years’ duration). As in other areas of the discipline, too often sociologists, rather than what they might tell us about society, have become “the story”; thus, arguments about Elias have often taken precedence over arguments about actual social practices and trends. Reflecting on these disputes, one is sometimes reminded of the mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead’s wry observation that “A science which hesitates to forget its founders is lost”.⁴

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The Politics of Leisure in Totalitarian Societies

Vassil Girginov

Introduction

This chapter explores leisure's role in the construction of totalitarian politics during the period after the World War II (WWII). This presents a challenging prospect for three main reasons. First, the notion of totalitarianism has a long and complex history rooted in different political traditions and socio-economic conditions that have left their mark on its meaning and practices. As a scholarly concept, developed for studying fascism in Germany and communism in the former Soviet Union, totalitarianism gained currency in the 1950s mainly through the works of German academic emigrants to the USA such as Hannah Arendt, Franz Brokenau, Carl Friedrich and a few others. Totalitarianism grew out of dissatisfaction with the many failings of liberal democracy and the rapid industrialization of societies across Europe that had produced irreconcilable social and economic inequalities. Totalitarianism thus offered a

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promise that appealed equally to the fears and hopes of both the ruling elites and the masses that a strong authoritarian rule would present a solution to the unfolding social and economic crises (Dam'e 2001). Gradually, a considerable body of literature on the topic emerged resulting in a multitude of versions of totalitarianism. Nolte's (1998) comprehensive review of the literature cites Janicke's work who, as early as 1971, presented no less than 660 works on the subject. The concept has not lost its relevance and more recently Grieder (2007) offered a nine-point defence of the validity of totalitarianism theory as a powerful analytical tool for studying the links between state and society.

However, the multitude of interpretations of totalitarianism did not result in a greater clarity and explanatory power and Rush (1992, pp. 77–78) challenged the concept by noting that:

the term “totalitarian” clearly implies an absolute rather than a relative state of affairs, but for analytical purposes this is a disadvantage, since not only can it be argued that no society has ever been totalitarian in the absolute sense, but it means that a given society must be classified as totalitarian or not ... applied therefore as a tendency rather than an absolute, totalitarianism is a more useful analytical tool.

Second, as Rojek (2006, p. 18) argued, “sustainable propositions in leisure theory are always provisional. They must be tested against narrative data that are always and already situated in determinate historical and social conditions that are subject to change just as the propositions themselves are subject to change”. Rojek's wider point that the Western leisure theory has not yet achieved this level of understanding is even truer for the subject matter of this analysis concerned with totalitarian societies and their leisure policies. What is more, Rojek places location and context at the heart of any analysis of leisure policy. Finally, Mommaas (1997) expressed concern that overtime the notion of leisure has been side-tracked at the expense of studies of time and consumption. He also drew attention to the conceptual discrepancies in the use of the term “leisure” across different countries as the organizing principle behind the field. The meaning of “leisure” in English simply loses its connotations and becomes reduced to “free time” in any of the languages of the former

totalitarian societies, for example *Freizeit* in German, *svobodno vreme* in Bulgarian, *dosuga* in Russian and *Xiu Xiang de* in Chinese. A more encompassing term that better resembles the meaning of “leisure” that was used instead was “culture” and “physical culture” in particular. What follows from this “linguistic reductionism” are a range of important ontological and epistemological implications for the study of leisure policies in totalitarian societies, so we avoid the trap of Western ethnocentricity.

Since what is commonly and sometimes mistakenly referred to “totalitarian societies” in Eastern Europe covers a relatively long historical period of some 50 years, between the end of the WWII and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (i.e., a historical perspective on leisure), it would be untenable to assume that leisure’s role in totalitarian policies was consistent and followed similar patterns across a number of vastly culturally and economically diverse societies (i.e., a comparative perspective on leisure). At the end of 1980s, which marked the disintegration of the USSR, the “totalitarian societies” in point included 20 countries (Albania, Belarus, Bosnia–Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Serbia and Montenegro, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Russia and Ukraine) that occupy some 59 per cent of Europe and constitute 40 per cent of Europe’s population.

The above three challenges, in combination with time and space constraints, dictate that this chapter will only pursue the modest task of offering some well-grounded generalizations on the subject.

Understanding the Role of Leisure in the Construction of Totalitarian Politics

To overcome the challenges presented by the concept of totalitarianism, the discussion takes a lead from Rojek’s (2006) that any meaningful analysis of leisure must get beyond individual narrations and needs to address the notion of ideology which interpellates subjects through institutions of normative coercion. As Rojek (2006, p. 21) puts it “by treating ideology as central to leisure practice we foreground the importance of *politics*

in leisure theory in general". Building on Hobbes (1651), Rojek (2006, p. 23) identified three conditions that are indispensable in the analysis of leisure:

struggle (human life is competitive and revolves around power relations); scarcity (the condition in which human beings are situated is marked by scarcity. The condition of scarcity is the pretext for competitive struggles of accumulation), and solidarity (if the struggle over scarcity is unregulated civilized life is impossible. Arrangements around basic rules of human practice is the basis for social solidarity).

Further, to ensure that the analysis of leisure policy is grounded in a coherent conception of totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt's influential work is employed. Arendt published the first edition of her seminal book under the title *The Burden of Our Time* (later republished as *The Origins of Totalitarianism* 1973) in 1951, but she elaborates that the manuscript was finished in 1949. This is just four short years before the death of Stalin. As well documented, after that the Soviet state and the Eastern bloc countries have taken a course of "de-Stalinization", first announced by Nikita Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the USSR Communist Party in 1956, and embarked on a rather different road towards the kind of society they were going to build.

The emergence of totalitarian states in Nazi Germany and in Soviet Russia was the result of a power struggle, which was not only political and economic. In the case of Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries, this struggle involved important cultural, temporal and geographical dimensions where at stake was the existence of the state and nationhood (Girginov 2004a). Totalitarianism was a state-building project which goes beyond mere negation of or a break with history, and develops into alternative versions of society. Admittedly, there were essential differences between "fascist ideology, which was irrational, biological and pessimistic, and Soviet ideology, which was rational, humanistic and optimistic" (Aron as cited in Kjeldahl 2001, p. 133). Thus, the introduction of the "new man" reflects a constructive potential of this project. However, communism and fascism offer competing models of the ideal man derived from different political anthropologies. For fascists, the new

man who had the will for power and the desire to dominate belongs to a master race with a historic mission. This “superman”, according to the guiding philosopher of the Third Reich, Friedrich Nietzsche, would emerge and rise to power in order to impose his law and his will on the spineless multitude with its Christian slave morality. Hence, human domination became the highest moral expression in life, a proposition with its emphasis on strength that clearly highlighted the supremacy and exclusivity of the body, and its necessary transformation into a public organ—the body as a *politicum*. Communists, for their part, largely renounced this type of political body, paid little attention to the concept of the leader and assigned a major role to the party. As Rokeach (1973, p. 170) observed “to fascists the power of the state is seen to be a weapon to coerce inequality, whereas to communists it is a weapon to coerce equality”.

In the *Human Condition*, Arendt (1956) postulated that the automation of labour in the future would inevitably lead to the liberation of humans from work and therefore they would have greater leisure. Thus, a major task for people and governments becomes how to best use that leisure. For Arendt, most people are *animal laborans* (the labouring animal), engaged in mind-numbing, repetitive tasks that have no lasting permanence or reward apart from a pay check. She was concerned that *animal laborans* were the dominant type of the modern industrial age, as announced by Karl Marx, who were threatening the extinction of *homo faber* (the creating human). In addressing the task of leisure, Arendt drew heavily on the political ideas of Plato and Aristotle. Similar to the ancient Greek philosophers, Arendt’s proposed solution was to be found in the sphere of political action where people take initiative through typically the forms of speaking and communication of ideas. For her, this was the only free human activity that was in sharp contrast with the enslavement to machines, repetitive tasks and demanding bosses, but for its realization there was one main prerequisite—leisure.

Arendt’s approach to the relationship among work, labour, action and leisure brings us to the second and third conditions of Rojek’s (2006) analysis of leisure—scarcity and solidarity. As discussed, the introduction of the “new man” in Eastern European societies was a state-building project that was to be implemented under conditions of extreme scarcity of

human and material resources. Eastern Europe emerged from the ruins of the WWII with devastated economies, changed boundaries and geographies and hugely traumatized, divided and impoverished populations the majority of who lived in rural areas. For example, about a quarter of Soviet capital resources had been destroyed and much of the cost of rebuilding was borne by its people because the reconstruction programme focused on heavy industry such as steel production at the expense of agriculture and consumer goods. Liponski (1996, p. 24) reported that Polish leisure infrastructure suffered massive destructions as

“77 per cent of sports buildings, stadiums, gymnasias, swimming pools and other facilities had been destroyed or heavily damaged. ... In Warsaw 86 per cent of sports facilities had been completely destroyed after the Warsaw Uprising in 1944. In Poznan, ‘only’ 40 per cent of facilities were affected”. What is more, almost the entire sports leadership elite was murdered by the infamous Soviet NKVD, including 80 presidents and vice-presidents of various associations, editors of sports newspapers, top coaches and sports doctors.

Building social solidarity became a crucial precondition for establishing general- and leisure-specific policies of “totalitarian societies” aimed at securing sustainable accumulation in the pursuit of the “new man”. However, this social solidarity goes beyond the need for recovery after WWII and reflects a historic struggle of all Slav nations to preserve their cultural identity. The mass recreational and sport movement, as a form of popular leisure, which started to emerge at the end of the nineteenth century illustrates the point. The Czechs were the first to establish a national sporting movement, Sokol (Falcon), in 1862, followed shortly by the Slovenes (1863), the Poles (1867), the Bulgarians (1878), the Serbs (1891) and the Russians (1905). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, some of the most influential Russian thinkers—Belinski, Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov—advocated games as an essential adjunct to mental development. For the first time in history, the physiologist Ivan Pavlov linked successfully philosophical views about education in Russia to a general theory of physiology. As Riordan (1977, p. 55) points out this theory had several implications; primarily, it meant that exercise was

highly salutary for the central nervous system; systematic participation in a variety of games, gymnastics and sports improves the general functioning and capacity both of the physical organism and of the mind, hence the need for regular physical activity by all citizens, for the good of society as well as of the individual. The notion of holistic education was reflected in the term “physical culture”, which broadly encompasses all aspects of active leisure—from walks and personal hygiene and diet to regular training. In Russia, physical culture was associated with philosophers and writers such as Nikolai Dobrolyubov, Nikolai Chernyshevsky and Anton Chekhov, a founder of the Russian Gymnastics Society (Girginov 2004b). To cite Rojek (2006) again:

the institution of leisure performs an important and increasingly prominent role in managing these issues (i.e., of scarcity, resource allocation and behaviour control, explanation added) as acting as the basis of *identity* formation, the *representation* of solidarity, the achievement of *control* and challenging unsatisfactory resource allocation and civic regulation through *resistance*.

(p. 8, emphasis in original)

The above examples suggest that historically the notion of leisure has been associated with wider issues of cultural identity and more importantly that in Eastern European societies it favoured collectivist forms of provision. Guided by historical experiences and egalitarian ideas, countries variously put collectivism and the public good above the narrow private interests of individuals as a fundamental principle of their leisure policies. Inkeles (1950, p. 469) note on the aftermath of the WWII summarizes the point “when the Soviet Union had experienced extensive social upheaval and strain there had been a marked tendency for the society to move away from stratification towards social equalization and the elimination of class differences”.

Collective consumption and production of leisure in “totalitarian societies” therefore emerged as a specific expression of identity, representation, control and resistance, and brings to the fore two important constructs—that of the masses and the state both of which play a central role in Arendt’s treatment of totalitarian societies. The “masses” in

Arendt's writing appear largely as a destructive force and she does little to hide her negative attitude towards them. As she commented "mass support for totalitarianism comes neither from ignorance nor from brainwashing (xxiii). The masses are loyal not to an interest but to the 'fiction' that totalitarian movements have concocted but which nicely synchronize with their own experiences" (cited in Baehr 2007, p. 13). The elitist views of Arendt are convincingly exposed by Canovan (1978, p. 6) who argued:

she attributes totalitarianism largely to the rise of "mass society"; she express contempt not only for the activity of labouring but for the characteristic tastes and dispositions of the labourers; and she shows... a truly astonishing lack of interest in the social and economic welfare of the many, except in so far as the struggle to achieve it poses a threat to the freedom of the few.

It was the state who made the welfare of the many its core concern. It follows that the broader objectives of leisure policies were to be achieved through a centralized and coordinated approach that could only be ensured by the state. Arendt described power in the totalitarian state as lying "exclusively in the force produced through organisation" (cited in Bernstein 2002, p. 381). Most of all, it was social power representing society itself *qua* conscious. However, her three-stage analytical model of the logic of total domination including "first the killing of the juridical person in human beings, second, the murder of the moral person, and third, destruction of any vestige of human individuality" (2002, p. 418) is not particularly helpful for understanding the role of leisure. Arendt's model completely precludes individuals from having an agency in deciding how to shape their own leisure needs and what would be the best way to satisfy them. The same critique applies to Arendt's (1953) insistence that the main instrument of state domination was a total terror. She wrote "total terror, the essence of totalitarian government, exists neither for nor against men. It is supposed to provide the forces of Nature or History with an incomparable instrument to accelerate their movement" (p. 312). She also contended that totalitarian lawfulness "executes the law of History

or of Nature without translating it into standards of right and wrong for individual behavior. It applies the law directly to mankind without bothering with the behavior of men". Similar claims fail to account for the huge cultural diversity of the Soviet Union and other countries, for the role of the Church which was reinstated after Stalin's death and was particularly influential in Russia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and local community and bureaucratic interests and power relations. It is instructive that both Orthodox Christianity and Catholicism remain the moral foundation of Russian and Polish societies respectively today despite some 50 years of "total terror" and the lack of standards for "right and wrong".

From the early 1950s, "totalitarian societies" have taken a very systematic approach to leisure which was evident in establishing a strong tradition of comprehensive and longitudinal time-budget studies. The pioneering work of the Gorki University and the Soviet Academy with the Sverdlovsk's (1959) study was followed by extensive investigations of the composition and the finer structure of leisure time in Poland (Strzeminska 1964), Staikov (1964) in Bulgaria and in Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Hungary (Szalai 1965). The Soviet time-budget research has made an original contribution to the field in that they started to shed light on the general and specialized learning and educational activity of workers on and off the job (Szalai 1966). Education was a central element in Aristotle's (1996) ideas of leisure, which he saw not simply as an entitlement of a certain class of people, but a privilege and should be used to the noblest ends. In this regard, Gramm (1987) criticized the limitations of Arendt's triad of labour, time and action as based on a seventeenth-century John Lock's distinction between the labour of the body and the work of the hand and pointed out her failure to "relate the intellectual element of human effort to the changing nature of education and work" (pp.171-2).

The state has made concerted efforts to put in place a comprehensive system of vocational and professional education with the view to increase productivity and to free up time for meaningful leisure. Horna's (1988) historical analysis of leisure studies in Czechoslovakia supports

the growing importance of this phenomenon and the drive for taking a scientific approach towards it. She noted the expansion of the thematic scope, which became linked with the social and political decision-making processes, and reasserted the view that above all, leisure has always been seen as an element of overall life styles. An important element of the labour-free time dichotomy across “totalitarian societies” was the belief in the intellectualization of labour.

Systematic data, in combination with studies on labour reserves, productivity and time husbandry, were used to analyse the living conditions of the working class with the view to constantly improve them and to provide quality leisure services. As general economic conditions and those of the population in particular started to improve during the early 1960s, it has allowed for putting in place a range of welfare policies with great implications for the provision of leisure. For example, the introduction of the five-day working week, paid holidays for all workers with almost universal access to sea and/or mountain resorts, guaranteed pension, universal free education and healthcare and three-year paid maternity leave has resulted in altering significantly the structure of leisure time and the forms of provision. Enhanced welfare conditions coupled with increased free time and disposable income and greater leisure opportunities have also impacted on the forms of leisure consumption, which were far from being confined to the dichotomy of collective and home-bound leisure as argued by some commentators. In discussing the pleasures of socialism, Crowley and Reid (2010, p. 32) contended that “by late socialist period two pictures of the socialist citizen at leisure emerged: in one she was engaged in the production of socialist identities through increasingly banal collective activities, in the other, she had withdrawn from public culture into a privatized realm of individual and home-oriented interests”. In reality, a multitude of different forms of leisure consumption emerged including individual and family pursuits, interest, culture and ethnicity groups, professional and community-based activities and others. Although not completely independent from state regulation, these forms of leisure consumption did not comply with the normative coercion promoted by official policies.

Reconsidering the Politics of Leisure in Totalitarianism: Conclusions

The rise of leisure both as a cultural and economic phenomenon and a field of scientific inquiry has urged governments and other public and voluntary organizations to develop a range of policy interventions and a vast network of agencies responsible for their implementation. The most notable areas of policy intervention include, in the first place, framing the ideology of leisure within the context of the “culture of the masses” as opposed to the bourgeois “mass culture”. This ideological interpellation has served the triple purpose of providing the basis of identity formation, the representation of solidarity and ensuring control over resource allocation (Rojek 2006). Increasingly, researchers of life and culture in Eastern Europe during socialism have also started to acknowledge that there were forms of resistance in particular by young people who have developed their own forms of leisure consumption that were not officially sanctioned by the state (Riordan 1982, 1988; Taylor 2006). The state was also actively creating the public locations for leisure and was promoting specific genres of culture. A wide network of “culture houses” emerged across cities, towns and villages designed to provide various forms of passive and active leisure consumption including providing institutional support to a range of civic initiatives.

Despite the visible presence of the state, it would be an overstatement to claim that totalitarian leisure policy was omnipresent. Deep cultural and economic divides between towns and villages were never bridged. From that perspective, many forms of leisure and sport in particular remained predominantly an urban phenomenon, the structure and cultural meaning of which the villages were reluctant to accept. Representative social surveys in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the former East Germany support this conclusion. One by Ponamarev (1988) in 1983 reported that only some 8–15 per cent of the Soviet population participated regularly in sport and that in villages this figure was significantly lower. Foldeshi’s (1988) study in Hungary and Poland suggested similar trends where pupils ranked sport only sixth and seventh in their preferences. In Bulgaria, even the most optimistic statistics never

claimed more than 7 per cent of people living in villages were actively practising sport (BSFS 1982). Vladimir Rak's (1989) analysis of sport participation in Czechoslovakia also identified the town-village difference as clearly in favour of the former.

The analysis in this chapter demonstrates that a meaningful understanding of the contribution of leisure to totalitarian politics needs to go beyond the master narrative of the total state domination over civil society through a reign of terror and submission of the individual to the collective. Apart from the political and economic realities of the West-East divide, the master narrative also resulted in the production and organization of knowledge in line with this duality. In the words of Verdery (1996, p. 330), the "Cold War laid down the co-ordinates of a conceptual geography grounded in East vs West". The need to challenge the notion of undisputed state control over leisure is reinforced by Clark (2006) in her analysis of the politics of leisure in Britain and applies equally to "totalitarian societies". As she observed "the historiography of leisure has moved far beyond the old thesis of social control, the idea that the bourgeoisie or government manipulated leisure provisions for the working class to ensure their acquiescence and submission to the established order. Now, historians analyse leisure activities as a process of complex negotiations between authorities, reformers, leisure entrepreneurs, and audiences" (p. 715).

Taylor (2006, p.6) echoed this point and showed that a different point of view about leisure politics under state socialism is possible:

in the case of Bulgaria, as Gerald Creed paved the way for a new perspective for life in socialism by demonstrating that when socialist practice could not be made to fit "ideology" the government in many instances reconfigured its assumptions in order to be able to declare popular "arrangements on the ground" consistent with socialist principles even if they appeared inconsistent with socialist principles.

Across Eastern European "totalitarian societies", leisure emerged almost universally as a main concern of the state for two main reasons. First, in line with cultural traditions and in order to overcome the devastations of the WWII, it was perceived as an inseparable element of the life of

the “new man” who these societies set out to develop. Leisure, therefore, was not framed just as an antidote to work but was closely intertwined with labour and the intellectual, moral and physical development of the individual. Second, this holistic understanding of human nature and the role of leisure in it has prompted establishing a range of egalitarian welfare policies coordinated by the state and designed to provide the material, informational and environmental conditions necessary for leisure activities. During the 1950s and 1960s, the ideological rationale behind these policies was much more pronounced than the scientific one. This period was characterized by greater scarcity of resources and by necessity, the struggle for accumulation was controlled by the state, the main concern of which was to ensure social solidarity around a common ideal. Gradually, throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the ideological rationale started to lose its dominance and a more pragmatic and pluralistic approach both to the provision and to the consumption of leisure started to take place. Similar to leisure policies elsewhere, the role of leisure under totalitarianism was essentially about identity formation, the representation of solidarity, the achievement of control and civic regulation through resistance.

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Leisure, Community, and the Stranger

Elie Cohen-Gewerc

Introduction

To feel secure and stable means to organize our existence according to familiar patterns of collective identity, so as to identify the other, the stranger. It entails marking canonical paths where one is readily recognized as being part of the imagined community (Anderson 1995), perceived by most of the legitimate members as “ours”. It is a kind of “ready-to-wear” identity, an embracing, caring identity, which adheres to the individual and settles in his or her consciousness, thanks to habit. Meursault, the protagonist of Albert Camus’ *The Stranger*, tells of his mother who cried much when he took her to the nursing home; but, he explains, it is a matter of habit, “after a month or two she’d have cried if she’d been told to leave the Home” (Camus 1942, p. 5).

Thus, we become accustomed to the identity that defines and frames us, and we will surely “cry” if we are removed from it. As Anderson noted,

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identity is a purely abstract concept; hence, it does not matter whether “one could be fully aware of sharing a language and a religious faith (to varying degrees), customs and traditions, without any great expectation of ever meeting one’s partners” (Anderson 1995, p. 188). To belong means to be identified as belonging, as opposed to all those who do not belong. The imagined community constitutes a kind of “exclusive world” within a world divided between “them” and “us”.

Nowadays, however, in the era of high-speed existence, the distinction between *us* and *them* is less obvious, as borders become fluid and permeable. Goods, information, concepts, trends, as well as people, move all over the world. Big cities are more or less cosmopolitan.¹ Even the people who have stayed put feel challenged, as their familiar environment appears to have metamorphosed. What does this mean for established identities? Bauman (1998) argues “that the word *people* is fast falling out of fashion, except during the electoral campaigns” (p. 10).

We are reminded of Toffler’s predictions in *Future Shock* (1970), which now seem quite outdated, if we consider the decisive influence of speedy physical as well as virtual connections: easily accessible and affordable flights across the globe, comprehensive smart phones, and social networking. These raise the question: how—and to what extent—do all these constant changes, and the inherent feeling of uncertainty they generate, influence our relationship with and attitude towards the unknown other? How do we perceive the unavoidable and tangible meeting with the stranger and how—if at all—do we adjust our thoughts? What are the manifestations of the relatively new vision, which Graham (2008) referred to as “the oncoming *leisure era*”?

Our purpose here is to analyse the two concepts *identity* and *stranger* through the changing reality, including the relatively new dimension of leisure. We will demonstrate people’s assumption of belonging to “imagined communities”, which endow them with predefined, clear-cut identities. In the last three decades, large and strong currents of change have been affecting the circumstances of our lives. We will discern the

¹ “The increasing rate of migratory currents has significantly affected not only the demographic profiles of the societies, but also their cultural contours. In one sense, all the countries of the world have become multicultural societies, and their capitals, as well as other metropolitan centers, have assumed a cosmopolitan character” (Atal 2004, p. 207).

manner in which the complexity of life emerges again and again, in innumerable paths, and observe individuals' involvement in a complex reality of linkages, fusions, promiscuities, and encounters. These aspects strain the limits of any hermetic world, repeatedly challenging those who persistently attempt to maintain a unidimensional and neat identity.

Leisure, which by definition takes place in a space that is beyond one's traditional roles and customs, contributes to the process in a unique way. As communities generate defined identities and draw the neat contours of *what constitutes a stranger*, leisure space, which in this sense is exterritorial, can be an agent of renewal.

Leisure no longer has to do with brief intervals inserted between structured roles, tasks, and obligations; it has acquired a legitimate space and has become a realm within itself. We will show how leisure, occurring in new and wider horizons, with essential encounters with different partners, can rehabilitate the intimate dialogue between what we think and what we truly sense; a dialogue leading towards a vital readjustment of definitions, including self-identity, community, and stranger. If that occurs, personal identity ceases to be an isle surrounded by impermeable fences and grows into an open place connected by bridges and human linkages far away from the limited imagined community.

Identity

The Predefined Identity

The concept of identity can be seen as part of the great effort to gain a sense of stability, in order to feel secure. The cycle of life is built on beliefs, norms, rituals, habits, and rites of passage, which confer on us a palpable sense of the ways in which we are different from those we define as *strangers*.

Step by step, a communal narrative is created and disseminated; symbols emerge and are absorbed in the consciousness and imaginations of the community's members. "What, in a positive sense, made the new communities imaginable was a half-fortuitous, but explosive, interaction

between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a technology of communications (print), and the fatality of human linguistic diversity” (Anderson 1995, p. 42). We must mention the crucial role that the secular school plays in instilling the national narrative in the minds of the younger generations, by strengthening the national language and imbuing the mythology with symbols, narratives, and moving ceremonies. This systematic effort is intended not only to promote a sense of stability for an entire community, but also to endow the *imagined* community with signs that imply its eternal existence. “*Traditions* which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented” (Hobsbawm and Terrence 1984, p. 1). Thus, the communal imagination is the only platform that sustains this defined way of life, because imagination is, according to Deleuze (1990), the indiscernibility of the real from the unreal.

Nevertheless, the history of humanity shows us that the innumerable aspects, frontiers, fences, and mental boundaries, which we encounter throughout life, are constantly being transcended. Nowadays, when predefined identities are challenged by the tangible presence of newcomers-cum-strangers, when the supposedly homogenous environment is being repeatedly invaded by manifestations of foreign cultures and languages, the cloak of a predefined, ready-to-wear identity can no longer deliver that imagined sense of security. The sudden re-emergence of all kinds of fundamentalist views is a patent indication that the era of donning a prefabricated and clearly defined identity is coming to an end, and the escape to fundamentalism is the equivalent of seeking a hasty-but-violent retreat when under an immediate and undefeatable threat.

Reassembling the Puzzle of Identity

Smartphones, worldwide instant messaging, and the high-speed era drag us into a massive superficiality. The current era appears as the ultimate embodiment of Nietzsche’s famous exclamation: “O sancta simplicitas! What a strange simplification and falsification people live in!”² Indeed, it is easier to move on the surface of life, in this false kingdom where our

² *Beyond Good and Evil*, § 24.

authentic self is exiled (Camus 1957), where we are led by habits and routines full of events, agitations, and distractions, which can fill all of the chronological time of one's entire existence.

Hence, despite the noisy and stunning displays, questions emerge in light of the difficulty to gather and decipher the puzzle of one's being, as the pieces are spread through infinite sensations, doubts, caprices, attractions, and repulsions. The process of reassembling the identity puzzle may best be explained in an artistic context. Imagine the loneliness of a painter, a sculptor, a poet, a writer in deep concentration in front of a canvas, a piece of marble, and a piece of paper. Although the artist senses his or her origins, there is an awareness of one's individuality and uniqueness, a sense that transcends boundaries and definitions. Through connections and affinities involving a plurality of intersecting entities and identities, the artist seeks a new vision that touches on the universal human essence.³

Pablo Picasso was in Paris when a small Basque village in northern Spain was bombed by German and Italian planes. The numerous figures of the painting *Guernica* appear neither Basque nor Spanish; they are universal. Through his great work, Picasso, the Spanish painter, spoke, speaks, and will speak all the languages of all communities, to all generations. Thus, creation in art begins from the most intimate paths of one's identity, but it is an attempt to explore the limits of this identity, in an effort to enhance its resonance in a fruitful dialogue extended in all directions.

The Realm of Leisure

In the context of daily superficial routines and the constant strain of background noise vying for centre stage, the leisure space can provide a catalyst for something more. The leisure realm is the space where artistic creativity can take place. It constitutes a privileged crossroads, where the veiled parts of life, the hidden essence of potential life can be revealed and sensed. From this perspective, leisure "is the birthplace of the self, of the

³ Could we know, for instance, even a few aspects of the richness of the inner life of Jean Valjean (*Les Misérables*, by Victor Hugo), who otherwise is likely to be labelled "a brutal convict"?

realization of one's own nature pursued purely for its own sake" (Cohen-Gewerc and Stebbins 2013, p. 106).

The word *leisure* invites us to enter into a delightful mood of freedom, of open horizons, a new state of mind, open to the unknown reality, to this dark side of life.⁴ In this realm, clear-cut and preconceived concepts tend to blur. The differentiating contours that had defined and separated each identity are no longer obvious. This transformation, rendered through the creative process, changes our attitude to strangers. Experiencing the tangible presence of the other, of the stranger, we discover a human visage,⁵ an entire world observing mine.⁶

In the realm of leisure, one attempts to embark on a journey unmarked by preset categories, to enter a realm that transcends reductive concepts, such as the hermetic identity of a community or nation, or the stereotypical reference to the *other* as *stranger*. Sometimes, like Meursault and the heroes of Camus' last book *Exile and Kingdom* (1957), we realize that our apparent identity, the world in which we used to feel at home, that genuine parcel of our imagined community, reveals itself as an exile. Albert Camus, in his presentation of the book, described the opposite of *exile* as a kingdom "that coincides with a life, free and bare, which we must rediscover, in order to finally be reborn". To sense one's own strangeness and to discover genuine parts of one's hidden self, to encounter the *other* beyond the narrow and simplistic stereotype saved in mind—that is the venture the leisure realm can offer.⁷

Engaging in a real and sensitive contact with other worlds and other people, numerous aspects require adjustment, including the basic concept of *stranger*, as well as its alter-ego, *self-identity*. Who is a stranger? What is strangeness?

⁴"Like the dark side of the moon, formal institutions tend to ignore this part of life, in which everyone has to be by themselves; a space where knowledge and skills of social functioning are not helpful enough and sometimes not at all" (Cohen-Gewerc 2012).

⁵"The way in which the other presents himself, *exceeding the idea of the other* in me, we here name face" (Levinas 1971/1991, p. 50).

⁶In the *Stranger*, by Camus, the Arab has no name and no visage.

⁷Free time is not only an empty schedule and freedom is not a fact; rather, it is an act. La Bruyère (1688) wrote: "Liberty is not indolence; it is a free use of time." Leisure is now a legitimate and present part of life. The new era of leisure entails a review of concepts, which are assigned a new place in the hierarchy of one's personal life. Concepts, such as *work, time, body, age, country, state, homeland, stranger, uniqueness, and human solidarity*, are revised and acquire new meanings.

Stranger

A Clearly Defined Mental Construct

The classic definition of stranger is a simple negation: anyone who is not a legitimate member of a given group, regardless of whether the group is comprised of two dozen people attending a social party, or millions of people in the imagined communities called *nations*. The term *stranger* is defined in reference to a unidimensional and general category, much like social class, origin, race, religion, nation, and so on. Kamel Daoud (2013) wrote a novel, *Meursault, contre-enquête*, which is supposed to be a mirror image of *The Stranger* by Camus. He claims that in Camus' book, "the word 'Arab' appears 25 times and without any reference to the character's first name" (p. 131).

As a mental construct, the notion of stranger is simple, clear, and is equipped with a series of characteristics and attributes associated with the category. This one-dimensional conceptual framework gives the illusion that one can recognize, be aware of, and—above all—keep one's distance from the stranger.

A stranger is tagged, and his or her beliefs, habits, and behaviours seem to belong to some *other zone*, another planet. Thanks to this mental distance, strangers can be gathered under the same label and easily demonized. These people have no personal name, no past, and no future; and if they live nearby, they are tolerated only in their unidimensional roles. Enclosed in their social utility or stigma, often both, they are no more than Arab, Hispanic, Jew, Portuguese, or Gypsy. Shylock, Shakespeare's protagonist in *The Merchant of Venice*, calls attention to his human condition, despite being a stranger, or worse, a Jew:

And what's his reason? I am a Jew! Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions; fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as a Christian is? If you prick us, do we not bleed? If you tickle us, do we not laugh? If you poison us, do we not die?

(Act III, scene I)

Yet the hermetic divisions and clear-cut distinctions between groups or communities could be definitive and indeed were effective in a world where mobility was reduced to a radius of a few kilometres. At a time when individuals depended almost entirely on the community and its affordances, not only identities and concepts were fixed, so too were people. Only during a tangible encounter with a stranger could one's prejudiced opinion be tested and re-examined.

Can Reduced Distances Reduce Strangeness?

We all know that the whole world is now a global village. News moves along innumerable networks, goods transit all over the world in a very short time, more than a billion people travel all around, and emigration is a very common option; *stranger* is no more than an abstract notion and the tendency to rely solely on a mental pattern is mostly obsolete. The imagined community ceased to be homogenous, the different social classes are not confined to their respective zones, and strangers are not only encountered during trips abroad. Everybody meets everybody and the external contours of identity seem to blur in the process. For many, the absence of a fundamental sense of a unique identity is perceived as a perilous phenomenon. The risk of feeling that one is “transparent”, that one's existence is not noted by others is an actual cause for anxiety. Perhaps this explains the compulsive need to post innumerable *selfies* on the social nets?

Nowadays we are witnessing an upsurge in terms of the manifested expressions of this perceived danger and the resulting fear. On the one hand, groups are increasingly stressing particularities. The drive to declare one's distinct identity leads individuals and communities alike to adopt evermore idiosyncratic customs and habits. On the other hand, and yet, simultaneously, people are shopping around for the best country to live in, suggesting that they perceive themselves not as citizens, but as potential clients. Citizen, patriot, client, member, stranger, individual—have the distinctions been entirely blurred? How many thoughts, how many contradictions dwell together in one mind?⁸ The shift from a clear iden-

⁸“The possibility of the dwelling together of these contradictions in the same mind, without seeming recognition that they are contradictions, is one of the curious facts of psychology” (Gordon 1906, p. 28).

tity to a sense of estrangement, when one's familiar environment ceases to feel familiar and becomes strange, can be sensed acutely when transitioning into a new phase in one's life. When experienced, one is compelled to re-create the self and redefine its uniqueness. In the emerging reality of the *global village*, "one is... impressed by the resurgence of a concern for cultural and ethnic identities. In the face of enormous give-and-take, identities have not always blurred" (Atal 2004, p. 207). This raises the question: how is the "give-and-take" different? How does it contribute to the blurring of identities?

Martin Buber (1923) explained that life is relationship and that there are two basic types of relationship between individuals: *I-Thou* and *I-It*. The latter is the most common mode, determined by the demands of survival, efficacy, and utilitarianism. Human beings are reduced to their specific function and considered in terms of the product or service they are expected to deliver. Suppose you wanted to withdraw cash from an automatic teller. Finding the machine out of service, you enter the bank to ask for cash from a human teller. In an *I-It* relationship, the human teller is viewed as a substitute of the machine, and thus one's attention focuses on the gestures leading to the final target: the monetary transaction. As a result, the teller—albeit the human version—becomes an instrument designated to satisfy a specific need. In this encounter, both of the participants in the interaction are instruments: you manifest a need for cash and you perceive the human teller as the provider of that need. In the *I-It* relationship, the *other* is automatically designated *as the stranger*, the negation of my identity.

When in court, Meursault felt that he was reduced to the one who "didn't weep at his mother's funeral" (Camus 1942, p. 75). He is called *the stranger*; yet his name is clearly mentioned, and every event in which he was involved revealed another aspect of his personality and identity, indeed of his strangeness. He observes, listens, and evaluates. The prosecutor described Meursault's behaviour at the trial: "It is always interesting, even in the prisoner's dock, to hear oneself being talked about... It seemed to me that his way of treating the facts showed a certain shrewdness. All he said sounded quite plausible" (ibid., p. 62).

Other times, we are able to witness relationships of a different quality. In the film by Henri Verneuil, *The Cow and the Prisoner* (1959), we see

the French prisoner (the actor Fernandel) trying to comfort a couple of worried German parents, telling them that if their son (a German soldier) is in Marseille—his city of birth—they can be assured that he is in good hands! The sincerity in his appearance and in his words, together with the typical parents' worry, enables us to skip over their differences, over the event (a French prisoner escaping from Germany during the Second World War), over the circumstances (the dreadful war), and to rescue in each of the characters an authentic human being.

This scene is a pertinent illustration of Buber's *I-Thou* concept. The *I-Thou* relationship is the pure encounter of one whole unique person with another. The *I* is totally present and approaches the *Thou* as a whole. It involves two different individuals trying to communicate beyond any instrumental concern. The *I* puts aside all the partial categories used in various roles, ignores the inner sense of social exile, and tries to evoke from the fertile encounter with the entire *Thou* the essential undefined self, the self-untainted by status, titles, or classifications. In the *I-Thou* relationship, the encounter is not the means, but the end. In contrast to the precise goal, the predefined roles, and the respective hierarchies involved in a meeting involving an *I-It relationship*, an *I-Thou* encounter has no defined objective, other than the vague hope of discovering a new facet of both.

The state of mind associated with the experience of leisure invites us to set aside for a moment all our constricting definitions and views and to step into an open space called *vacation*, a word that evolved from the Latin *vacare*, "to be void". Indeed, leisure time is a time without rules (Jankelévitch 1963), a sphere in which one can escape from the moulds of conventional thought, from limited definitions, roles, labels, and uniforms. Entering into the realm of leisure is like returning home; all social envelops become superfluous. This is a moment when the void and the nothingness are revealed, in which the unique self will emerge. This void is in fact a pregnant one, pregnant with infinite perspectives and voices, whispering from backstage, behind the scenes of one's "normalized" existence.

Thanks to the experience of leisure, we can go behind the scenes. There, the world ceases to be a stage; it becomes a sort of workshop, where nothing is pre-established, nothing is predicted, and all eventual-

ties are possible. Free of roles, without instrumental targets, the privileged relationship follows the *I-Thou concept*, in which I am my whole self, my sensitivity, my awareness, and all the mystery of my unrevealed self, with its interrogations, dreams, aspirations, hidden talents, and even strangeness. This intimate encounter with oneself is facilitated through significant *I-Thou* interactions with others.

In the realm of leisure, everything can be strange and yet no one is a stranger. The experience of leisure is a venture into the domain of mystery, with its folds, its secret paths, and its innumerable facets. Time ceases to be equated with money, efficiency, and bottom lines; instead, it becomes open-ended processes undertaken only for the sake of discovery, the infinite discovery of nature, human nature, and its prolific diversity which illuminates the unlimited facets of the self and of the humanity.

Certainly, the *concept of leisure* described herein is not the kind of distraction (i.e., dispersion of the self) and fun typically provided by leisure industries. Rather, leisure is perceived as a realm of freedom, outside the secured exile in which we live. Leisure space with its open horizon is not a simple outdoor activity, it is—or at least it can be—the threshold of a new kind of initiation. Janine, in the first story of *Exile and Kingdom* by Albert Camus, experienced that kind of self-revelation in an oasis, far in the deep Algerian desert.

Janine, leaning her whole body against the parapet, was speechless, unable to tear herself away from the void opening before her... Over yonder, still farther south, at that point where sky and earth met in a pure line—over yonder it suddenly seemed there was awaiting her something of which, though it had always been lacking, she had never been aware until now

(Camus 1957, p. 9).

This kind of initiation can be a genuine emancipation from our defined self, shaped by education and local mentality. Leisure space then tends to join the realm of art and science, based on a real interest in and genuine search for universality. Scientific discovery does not cease to be effective if we transcend imagined community boundaries. The universal and human questioning of Hamlet can be understood in all languages; antibiotic treatments do not discern whether the patient is a member of or

a stranger to a given group; and the *Lacemaker* by Vermeer, a banal and fleeting anecdote painted centuries ago, is able to break “all the boundaries of time, space, ethnicity, all the boundaries that humanity has tried to build with the purpose of separating each individual from every other and from each one’s own potential wholeness” (Cohen-Gewerc and Stebbins 2013, p. 113).

Stranger or Strangeness?

Identity evokes defined frontiers and sovereignty, a realm in which imagination, more specifically, the indiscernibility between the real and the imaginary has a crucial role (Deleuze 1990). It seems that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, *identity* was the magic word that helped governments establish, by means of the educational and military frameworks as well as the printed media, the imagined community called *nation*.

I am writing this chapter at the time of a massive terrorist attack in Paris (13 November 2015); the aftermath of this event provides an opportunity to feel the tangible reality of concepts grounded in imagination. One of the symbols that is enjoying a fervent renaissance is the French national anthem. These days, thousands are singing it jointly at ceremonies, in stadiums, and public places, possibly without paying attention to the stringent meaning of the words (the chorus provides a suitable example: “*To arms citizens/ Form your battalions/March, march/ Let impure blood/ Water our furrows*”) (<<http://www.marseillaise.org/english/english.html>>). One of the effects of that photogenic demonstration of solidarity is that it compels us to recognize the malaise of the Arab/French citizens. Yet, are they part of this emotional revival of the imagined community or are they being relegated to their tacit status as strangers? Some, on both sides, Arab and “genuine” French people, try to affirm their inclusion; many others exploit the occasion to demand their exclusion. For a while, this common issue seems to take centre stage and provides a veil of shared concern, a protective shelter, but once people return to attend to their daily lives, their needs, challenges, and doubts, the enveloping collective identity will again strain at the seams.

It bears repeating: yes, there is a fundamental need to be secure, to know who I am and who I am not. However, life is not confined to general categories; rather, it evolves through innumerable subcategories and multiple folds—imagined or real. Some are neatly defined zones; others are vague, perceived as having a greater or lesser degree of strangeness. Patterns, roles, and preset activities maintain the illusion of stability and equilibrium. In that case, what happens during unstructured time? Abandoned to ourselves, we might feel lost, given the multitude of situations, reactions, emotions, and thoughts, thoughts to which we tend to belong more than they belong to us. Leisure industries are there, aware of the apparent void, and equipped to supply an effective distraction, to rescue us from ourselves, at least for a while. Yet, leisure can give us a useful passport, which allows us to exit our habitual mode of being. At the same time, it allows us to wander away from our routinized identity, to follow unfamiliar and meandering paths into the realm of strangeness.

Inspired by the essential spirit that characterizes the state of mind during leisure, one realizes this voyage does not stigmatize differences, but rather allows us to discover, behind the appearances, what we have in common. As our eyes adjust to the multi-coloured local decors, which reveal a universal essence, we are able to decipher some of our own strangeness, concealed as it is under our external particularities. The works of Oded Wagenstein (<<http://www.odedwagen.com/>>), a photographer of cultures from around the world, manage to transcend exotic voyeurism, by focusing on universal aspects of the human being, such as the hand of a child safely ensconced in that of a caring adult.

For no one is a stranger to the universal human condition. Thanks to the leisure experience, one can transcend the protective veil of one's own and others' external particularities. One then gains full sight of all the vast and distant horizons. Of course, this process is neither obvious nor spontaneous. In this sense, the framework of leisure provides only a kind of catalyst, a privileged crossroads from which one can explore the veiled parts of one's life. In other words, one is now prepared to dialogue with life, dialogue—not chat. At the threshold of any new encounter, there is the promise of discovering something new, about one's partner and about oneself, for through a genuine *I-Thou* dialogue, the *other* becomes *I*. I and

Thou are thus two unique individuals who have agreed to shed, step by step, their external personas.

Through leisure we acquire a perspective which I refer to as “*humanité oblige*”. It enables us to expand the concept of *human being* to include the entire scope of infinite humanity and to identify its essence in ourselves and in others. From this perspective, there is no need to distinguish members from strangers; there are only human beings, searching to drive away the shadow of their strangeness with the light generated by each sincere encounter.

The world, our global village, can be more than a stage with predestinated characters; it can be an arena for exploring the enigma called the human being, including ourselves. Through this promising process of discovery, the offensive concepts of *stranger* and *strangeness* can be altered.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that in the constant quest for survival and efficiency, categories and preset patterns serve an important and life-facilitating function. Belonging to some large and well-established—albeit imagined—community that protects our fragility makes us feel privileged. From that sheltered perspective, strangers constitute both a threat and a challenge: a threat,⁹ because they are different and unpredictable; a challenge, because they place us at the brink of that common temptation of viewing ourselves as superior.

People may be prone to believe that their imagined community with its universally elected leaders, along with the promise of economic growth, could provide a solid framework, in which they could enjoy life, free of supervision. However, in the last decades, we have witnessed the fragility of even the most solid of frameworks and we feel life’s tenuousness in all areas. This uncertain world seems too open, too precarious. This stressful atmosphere has led to a new wave of separatism, instigating the return to narrow communitarianism and fundamentalist religions. This outcome,

⁹“They brutally expose the fragility of a most secure of separations. They bring the outside into the inside, and poison the comfort of order with suspicion of chaos. This is exactly what the strangers do” (Bauman 1990, p. 146).

in turn, entails a disastrous regression regarding the readiness to meet the other, the stranger, and certainly precludes the option of a human encounter in a universal context. The imagined community has become vulnerable¹⁰ and is no longer able to deliver the goods.

Consequently, the time has come to invest in our inner self, the one unique factor that we alone control. “For the human being has no other definition than an act, and there is no other form of absolute action than the substantial deployment of the joy of existing, being thoughtful and autonomous consciences” (Misrahi 2009, p. 421).

Leisure provides a framework in which we can delve into and freely explore our essentially humane core. It is a magical time, when people feel in touch with their most intimate presence, as they tentatively look for new horizons, new enriching encounters. This is a wonderful process that leads from a limited vision to a universal one, from closed and “imagined” communities, to open and pluralistic associations between real people. Through leisure we reconnect to our human dimension; from this perspective, the concept of stranger becomes obsolete and every individual is perceived to offer a new and inspiring world, where the aim is to be wholly oneself, thanks to the “open air we respire in the vast field of humanity” (Renan 1882, p. 46).

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¹⁰Coming back to the imagined community of Anderson, we can ask ourselves, together with Christine Chivallon, about a “certain fragility due to inherent theoretical contradictions that prevent any clarification of the antithesis between the ‘actual’ and the ‘imaginary’” (Chivallon 2007, p. 172).

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Part IV

Post-structural Theories of Leisure

Brett Lashua

Introduction

The theorizations covered in Part Three “Structural Theories of Leisure” presented a number of critiques about leisure, calling particular attention to questions of structure and agency. The chapters that follow in this part of the handbook advance these conversations by further troubling the idea of leisure, while simultaneously embracing and celebrating the multiplicity of different leisure meanings, voices, and views. In doing so, the chapters map out, to some extent, the “inheritance” of the enlightenment and modernity (Heikkala 1993) in the field as well as future directions for leisure scholarship.

In calling this section “post-structural theories of leisure” we believe that, beyond showcasing multiplicities of leisure practices and theories, the chapters draw particular attention to conceptualizations of power. As Foucault reminds us, post-structural theorizations move discussions

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beyond agency and structure to matters of agency and power: “Power is not an institution, not a structure; neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name one attributes to a complex strategical relationship in a particular society” (Foucault 1981, p. 93). The chapters in Part “Post-structural Theories of Leisure” turn away from discussions of what leisure is or is not, and offer considerations of what power *does*, both in and through leisure, and what it allows social actors *to do*:

We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms; it ‘excludes’, it ‘represses’, it ‘censors’, it ‘abstracts’, it ‘masks’, it ‘conceals’. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production.

(Foucault 1977, p. 194)

Echoing Foucault, leisure is productive, it produces social relations, and it brings people into relations with others. In this sense, the chapters in this section explore questions of power, difference, and also the act itself of knowledge production involved in theorizing leisure.

The philosophies and critiques introduced in Part Two “Rational Theories of Leisure” and Part Three “Structural Theories of Leisure” of the handbook are pushed further in the chapters that follow: Part Four “Post-structural Theories of Leisure” provides, in some ways, critiques of critiques. Questions raised in earlier sections regarding rationalism, modernity, and structure are reimaged in Part Four through critical postmodern and post-structural lenses. Mira Malick’s chapter opens the section with a playfully incisive treatise on postmodernism, first through the work of Jean-François Lyotard and then offering a critical alternative via the work of Bruno Latour and Actor-Network Theory. Postmodern conditions echo through the discussions of hyperreality and ultra-realism from Steve Redhead, focused on three key theorists—Jean Baudrillard, Alain Badiou, and Slavoj Žižek—in an attempt to understand leisure theory in a post-capitalist era following the 2008 financial crash. Building upon similar “post” critiques, Ken Roberts’ chapter approaches “reflexivity modernity” via the theorizations of Anthony Giddens and Ulrich Beck in discussions of leisure in a “risk society” that valorizes self-discipline.

The work of Giddens also resonates through the chapter from Spencer Swain, which he carries into “liquid modernity” through the theorizations of Zygmunt Bauman. The chapter from Swain shares conceptual territory with Trent Newmeyer’s account of the effects of neo-liberalism and governmentality in a case study of community gardens in Toronto, Canada. Through these chapters, the frame of modernity that was resonant in Part Three “Structural Theories of Leisure” is re-tuned to grapple with the complexities and dissonances of an increasingly deregulated, globalized, mediatized, consumerist, and fragmented world: all characteristic hallmarks of postmodern and post-structural thought. In this view, the project of modernity and rational recreation has been “superseded by new agendas, policy alliances and corporate forces” (Bramham and Wagg 2011, p. 5) that have centralized individuals’ choices and commodified leisure experiences. Simon Beames and Mike Brown bring these changes into a (global) focus in their chapter about leisure and consumption through Bryman’s theory of Disneyization. Power and control, in and through leisure, have shifted, and these theorizations help us to read and make some sense of these social, cultural, political, and economic changes.

The chapters in this section unpack and deconstruct the often unquestioned and unremarked forces that shape contemporary leisure. Several chapters address questions of “liminal” leisure identities caught “in-between” different places and cultures. For those swept up in global flows of migration and post-nationality, Dan Burdsey brings the “in-betweenness” of liminality into conversation with theories diaspora, diaspora studies, and leisure. The issues that characterize diasporic identity politics are also theorized in view of the “vanishing borders” of leisure tourism and mobilities research in the chapter by Kevin Hannam and Basagaitz Guerenio-Omil. These authors engage with the movements of refugees and question the politics of borders and re-bordering in order to develop an understanding of the politics of identity, nationalism, and social exclusion as they play out through leisure (im)mobilities.

Three chapters grapple specifically with post-structuralism. Lisbeth Berbary’s chapter provides a critique of the humanist philosophical foundations of leisure studies and its insistence on truth, reality, reason, and knowledge. She overviews a number of “post” theoretical positions that

challenge leisure scholars to move beyond the traditions in Part Two “Rational Theories of Leisure” and Part Three “Structural Theories of Leisure” to do things differently. Erin Sharpe’s chapter also brings a central concept from Part “Structural Theories of Leisure”—resistance—into contact with post-structuralism via concepts of power and the work of Michel Foucault. Rejecting the binary categories of dominance and resistance, Sharpe seeks to understand how power is exercised in attempts to influence or control the actions of others. Rather than simple revolutions from below, Sharpe seeks to showcase moments of change that occur through leisure practices (such as parkour) that offer fissures or breaks in wider webs of existing power relations. The contribution from Mary Ann Devine and Ken Mobily brings post-structural identity politics into conversation with disability and embodiment. They offer that access to leisure is shaped by competing histories of disability and espouse alternative, contextual understandings (e.g., political, cultural, and historical) of discourses of the body, difference, and social justice.

A number of chapters (de)centralize leisure and post-structural leisure along intertwining lines of identities and spaces. The chapter from Brian Kumm and Corey Johnson employs a Deleuzian framework to reconfigure spaces for becoming. Exploring power, they engage with the de-territorialization and re-territorialization of racialized, sexualized, gendered, and classed identities. Also in terms of identity politics, social space, and belonging, Troy Glover’s chapter explores the contestation and negotiation of belonging through the theories of Henri Lefebvre. Troy reminds us of the entanglement of leisure, belonging, and power in the production and consumption of social space.

The theorizations in this section compel us to remain restless; there is always more theorizing to do: again, Foucault reminds of the importance of this enterprise:

The work of an intellectual is not to mould the political will of others; it is, to re-examine evidence and assumptions, to shake up habitual ways of working and thinking, to dissipate conventional familiarities, to re-evaluate rules and institutions and starting from this re-problematization ... to participate in the formation of a political will.

(Lotringer 1989: 34)

Throughout, the theories chapters in this section challenge us to think differently about leisure and power. This “re-problematization” alerts us to the possibility that changing the way we think about leisure might mean also changing the ways that people (re)enact leisure in their everyday lives.

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Postmodernity and Leisure

Mira Malick

Introduction

I am going to begin this with a crude assumption, which is that most of the people who are reading this chapter either actively use, are made to use, have at some point come across a user or feel used by some kind of social media platform. It is becoming increasingly difficult to use more “traditional” forms of media such as print, radio and broadcast television without being reminded of the smorgasbord of the others. When talk show hosts on television report on the latest gossip involving celebrities (or soon to be ones), such trivialities now involve Twitter wars, someone “throwing shade” on Instagram, conversations, videos and pictures leaked online that are at once accessible as they descend upon the public worldwide, creating a fascination with the abomination of the hour which

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will then be followed up by a parodic YouTube video of the event that has been timed impeccably to some song with appropriately inappropriate lyrical content. It goes viral. “Local”, “subcultural” and “politicized” versions and adaptations may emerge appealing to new audiences in a manner that causes a further fragmentation of resonance. Fast forward a month later and what was once event now seems archaic. “Oh, *that* old thing?” There is already a multitude of new information, new images and newer events to be consumed at this very moment that signifies the “now” with a far more savvy *je ne sais quoi*. Why did that old hat linger in your mind? Feeling slightly sheepish, you turn your attention to your unfinished quesadillas and pick up your Samsung (not iPhone!), only to remember that you were supposed to Skype over an hour ago with your grandparents, who still live in what was once your hometown. Ah, home. That sepia-colored word which now seems a lot less sepia and far more high definition because your grandparents have learnt “to Skype”. Wait, how did we even get here? Oh yes, that viral video that someone on that community page for owners of Scottish Folds shared a few minutes ago. Tiring isn’t it, keeping up with all this leisure? Wouldn’t it be nice to take a holiday and to get away “from it all?” *Googles “Vacation in Bali”*. Forget it, ISIS have infiltrated Indonesia apparently.

I am not attempting to make fun of you dear reader, nor am I extrapolating some kind of personal experience onto a universal hypothetical “you” I assume to exist in every one of us. After all, I have never eaten a quesadilla. But what I have done is to depict a hypothetical experience with certain features which are conventionally associated with the notion of the postmodern; a shift in the experience of time and space, the constant mediation and filtering of technology in our daily experience, the mundanity of mixing, *mélange* and *mulatto*, a kind of kitchen-cosmopolitanism, the high speeds of transcendence and of course, the lingering anxiety that something isn’t right, we aren’t all that free to globetrot as we please and that it wasn’t always like *this*. One need not even be online to be concerned with such sentiments as they are present in many aspects of our daily lives, one of which is leisure. They are detectable when we enter into conversations about the authenticity of music styles, the risk-taking involved in extreme sports and the lifestyles of weekend organic farmers.

Here comes the second assumption I will make. That you have come across this book probably because you are interested in leisure research or one of the topics or theories indexed or referred to by some of its authors. Perhaps you are reading this chapter because you are keen to find out about the links between leisure and postmodernism. Maybe in your own research you have struggled with how to deal with some of the issues that others have associated with and suggested that you contextualize your findings within “the postmodern condition” and so you came here in search of some insight. Or perhaps you are already a well read, well-armed scholar of the postmodern, amodern or post-post-postmodern and have come equipped with knowledge that will expose the existence of a “differend” or of how this chapter is but another tooth on the leviathan that is metanarrative as it contributes to the development of the idea of an enigma labeled “leisure”. Whatever your dispositions, I offer you but this, my humble agenda: I will first outline a Lyotardian take on what the postmodern is, followed by an introduction to how we can use some of his ideas on paralogy and the sublime, as critical tools for research on leisure. In the second part of the chapter, I will introduce criticisms of Lyotard and the idea of the postmodern, as raised by Bruno Latour and introduce some of Latour’s ideas on Actor Network Theory (ANT) and the amodern as an alternative to how to deal with “postmodern” phenomena. I do not endeavor to build a dichotomous model of two alternatives, but instead what this chapter aims to do is to put into circulation the works of two important thinkers whose ideas have still yet to be vigorously explored in the realm of leisure studies.

Lyotard and the Postmodern Condition

Although he wrote on a vast variety of topics ranging from esthetics, art, literature, linguistics, politics and justice to media, Lyotard is best known as a scholar of postmodern theory where his definition of postmodernity as “an incredulity toward metanarratives” (Lyotard et al. 1984, p. 24) is often evoked as capturing one of the main tenets of critique of the postmodern perspective. From there, the ideas of scholars like Bauman and Baudrillard are then used to further elaborate the features of the

perspective; however, researchers of leisure studies will find that there is still much that we can learn from that which has become but a passing statement.

The incredulity toward metanarratives that Lyotard speaks of, put in other words, refers to doubt or a lack of ability to continue believing in all-encompassing, totalizing, universally applicable systems of thought. The foundations that granted modernity its legitimizing force were based on such grand narratives: that there was a future we were all progressing toward, development could be achieved via accumulative processes, and that emancipation, freedom and liberties could and would be the destiny of societies. These ideas were the driving rhetoric of the Enlightenment, saw the end of monarchic dynasties and propelled the industrial revolution. There was the idea that people had developed relativity, an awareness of a shared future that was in the making, *their* making, and that same idea simultaneously gave them a means to review, justify and retroactively position the past.

One such metanarrative that Lyotard was critical of was that of Marxism. The mass application of concepts such as class, ideology and false consciousness to the problems of society was in Lyotard's view done without taking into consideration the specificity of the individual cases in question (Lyotard 1988, 1993b). To him, such prescriptive analysis arose from the taken for granted nature of metanarratives as real and as systems of thought that had come to frame all political struggles in capitalist society, leaving no room for counternarratives to emerge. Perhaps more accurately, the effectiveness of labeling Marxist solutions to Marxist problems silences aspects, voices and situations in each case that do not fit the mode of prescription. Thus, struggles are made, by those who produce the analysis of them and the knowledge and forms of their representation. Postmodernism is therefore a challenge that exposes the limitations of such established ideas about social organization (Jameson 1991) and the production of knowledge: that not all progresses according to a linear (albeit with hiccups) master plan toward the greater good of all mankind.

The limits of metanarrative are brought into focus here not as a critique for critiques sake, but in order to reveal the deeper ramifications of the ways in which our lives are "constructed by contemporary structures of knowing" (Malpas 2003, p. 18). This is what Lyotard sets out to

investigate in *The Postmodern Condition*, where he presents a hypothesis, “that the status of knowledge is altered as society enters what is known as the postindustrial age and cultures enter what is known as the post-modern age” (Lyotard et al. 1984, p. 3). He goes on to illustrate how this takes place as new forms of media technology alter not only how we communicate, but also how “the miniaturization and commercialization of machines is already changing the way in which learning is acquired, classified, made available and exploited” (Lyotard et al. 1984, p. 4). Knowledge, it seems, appears to take on the form of a market commodity, valued for its performability, efficiency and programmability. Writing on the relationship between new media, capitalism and knowledge, Gane summarizes Lyotard’s idea:

Lyotard’s thesis then is that culture has been transformed by digital technology, which, like the capitalist system, follows the principle of minimizing “optimal performance”...that technical principles, in collusion with the capitalist market, are transforming the internal structure of this realm from within, with the implication that practically all culture is now becoming capitalist culture

(Gane 2003, p. 434).

Like other commodities, the faster one can buy, sell and exchange, the more profit there is to be reaped from their creation. Digital technology aids this process of speeding things up by making knowledge, now reduced to “information”, move faster in standardized formats. Amidst this, what we witness is that knowledge is increasingly being produced in the service of capital and those who control the capital, control the knowledge making apparatus. If this is the reality, that we live in a world where knowledge is co-opted by capitalist institutions that use it to solidify their power and the ubiquity of their profit making systems, then what becomes of the knowledge that isn’t generated toward these goals? Is there such a thing as knowledge that can serve other purposes? What form does it take? If you think about it, many people are caught in this ouroboros: we pay to learn something, and then we learn that we have to sell that something (or simply just “something”) in order to afford to sustain our lives which we have to pay for. Dismal but “true”.

Paralogy, the Sublime and Leisure

This is where leisure comes in. Because it is through activities, events and experiences that we conventionally place under the umbrella term of leisure, we are provided a window into how people contend with this overwhelming aspect of their existence. Now of course, leisure is not the only arena in which we can view how people attempt to subvert, negotiate as well as opt out (or cop-out) of the horrors of hegemonic homogeneity, but it is certainly one filled with a myriad of poignant case studies for this conundrum. In leisure, there is thought to lie a glimmer of the existence of something outside the previously mentioned dismal equation. Through leisure activities, people envision or aspire to find a space where they can experience a kind of elusive spontaneity, a quality of affect or emotion that may be difficult to pinpoint or articulate concisely that is thought to provide them some kind of alternative to what has become its institutionally tacit binary equivalent: labor¹. We see the presence of this in studies that have depicted the pleasures of hearing live music performed by human beings, that try as digitalization may, cannot fully be replicated (Auslander 1998; Arditi 2014; Leipert 2012). It is present in the narratives of why people enjoy extreme sports (Rinehart and Sydnor 2003) and precisely why they object to the increasing instrumentalization of sporting events (as well as to the sportification of non-sports-related activities). It is part and parcel of the rhetoric that gives subcultures their “alternative” status and why people claim to feel “reborn” (Halnon 2006) or are “keeping it real” (Condry 2006) and enjoy “making something with my own hands” (Kurochkina 2014) when they mosh, freestyle and grow organic potatoes in their backyards. Put otherwise, it is through leisure that people endeavor to carve out some form of resistance to the sterility of the culture of capitalism that has left people skeptical of its

¹ I am not denying the existence of people who combine labor and leisure or those who engage in serious leisure (Stebbins 2014) or work in the leisure industry or any combination of instances that blur the lines between the two, but here I take the position that there exists various state promulgated laws and policies that define what leisure is for its citizens in terms of non-work time when “New forms of work were created in the mills, factories and docks...sharply divided the time of work and the time of leisure” (Spracklen 2015, p. 13) or through leisure policies and the creation of leisure facilities which point to leisure as something “outside” of paid work (Leheny 2003).

supposed good. This is of course a massive cliché and as many a sociologist has shown, often ends up in spectacular self-defeat as alternative spaces, subcultures and counter-cultures have been shown to reproduce the very logics and sociocultural dynamics that they initially sought to challenge. But, skepticism for the chances of success aside, these sentiments remain present, even if only as ideals in the narratives of participants, prosumers, practitioners, fans or by whatever other name you call those engaged in the act of leisure.

Here I would like to introduce two Lyotardian tools that may be of use for those who find themselves dealing with this “postmodern condition” of sorts: paralogy and the sublime. I have already alluded to the presence of both these terms in the “meaning” people get out of participating in leisure, but with these ideas, Lyotard provides an astute articulation of just how postmodern perspectives can highlight the contours of challenges posed to grand narratives. One way of looking at these attempts of resistance is by paralogy, the potential for something to enter a field and with its appearance it forces a rethinking, a destabilizing of existing rules and the entire game itself for that matter. Paralogy is present in the “undecidables, the limits of precise control, conflicts, characterized by incomplete information, ‘fracta’, catastrophes, and pragmatic paradoxes” (Lyotard et al. 1984, p. 60). Thus when people appear to engage in a sociality that is not geared toward capitalist reproductivity, when they engage in activities that seem to offer no profit to be made, when they put into circulation alternative ways of doing, presenting, thinking and living, they are multiplying the possibilities for the use of knowledge via their micro-narrative voices and they are putting forth examples that point to the existence of variants beyond a universal consensus.

A similar line of thought can be found in Lyotard’s writings on art and esthetics. For him, postmodernism is not simply a movement of destabilizing through the act of creating experimental bricolage. *Mélange* itself is after all highly marketable, and there is nothing radical or subversive about buying/doing things across culture. In fact that was the point I tried to make about using a Samsung phone, eating quesadillas and vacationing in Bali. These everyday examples suggest the mundane experience of the eclecticism in cultural deterritorialization that Lyotard referred to as the “degree zero of contemporary general culture” (Lyotard

et al. 1984, p. 76). Is this what we want when we think of challenges to the system? Lyotard writes about what he thinks lies in the potential of art, that it should reveal a world that is discontinuous and not so easily explained by two-for-the-price-of-one-size-fits-all metanarratives that realign with rational logics.

The postmodern is... an avant-garde force within the upheavals of this modernity that challenges and disrupts its ideas and categories, and makes possible the appearance of new ways of thinking and acting that resist those dominant modern themes of progress and innovation.

(Malpas 2003, p. 43)

Art achieves this by evoking the sublime: the feeling of confusion or disruption that arises when one is confronted with something that one lacks the ability, means, vocabulary or capacity to fully understand. A combination of pain and pleasure arise from this experience: the former from the inability to grasp, and the latter from the newfound realization of the existence of that which cannot at this point be comprehended, which links back to Lyotard's vision of the sublime as presenting the existence of something unrepresentable (Lyotard 1993b). While he saw this as a defining feature of true avant-garde art and also noted its presence in literature that challenged the representation of narrative through its application of non-linear form, it seems to me that the sublime can also be found in other forms of experience outside of those which can be labeled avant-garde. It could arise from accidental discoveries, as an unintended consequence and would also depend on an individual's "horizon of expectations" (Jauss and Benzinger 1970). The experience of the sublime may be one of the reasons people become attracted and devoted to particular forms of leisure even if they do not articulate it in such a manner, or precisely because they fail to articulate it at all. Sheer repetition, commercial co-opting and the loss of radical politics in leisure (Spracklen 2014) may lead to the obscuration and defeat of "presenting the unrepresentable". But through Lyotard's idea of sublime interceptions and interruptions, we are provided a key analytic that better illustrates the process of effectual bearings and esthetic experiences on individuals. This key analytic is that there lies in attraction not only

the allure of the “unknown”, but also the very ability to challenge the gamut of established forms that exists by way of the sublime. Leisure, with its links to play and its openness to experimentation, makes it a particularly ripe site for generating the sublime, and along with that, the politics of difference.

But What If “We Have Never Been Modern?”: Latour and the Amodern

Postmodernism is a symptom, not a fresh solution. It lives under the modern Constitution, but it no longer believes in the guarantees the Constitution offers. It senses that something has gone awry in the modern critique, but it is not able to do anything but prolong that critique, though without believing in its foundation.

(Latour and Porter 1993, p. 46)

If you are familiar with Latour, on the surface, he may appear to be promoting several “postmodern” views: the distrust of jumping to conceive of things as established categories and his questioning on the taken for granted origins of power. But a closer look, as the statement above indicates, reveals that he is a vehement critic of the postmodern, which in his view suffers from a denunciatory paralysis for postmodernism:

rejects all empirical work as illusory and deceptively scientific...its adepts indeed sense that modernism is done for, but they continue to accept its way of dividing up time...they feel that they come “after” the moderns, but with the disagreeable sentiment that there is no more “after”.

(Latour and Porter 1993, p. 46)

It is not only this stuck in a rut skepticism that Latour is critical of here but equally, the postmodern acceptance of the entire idea of modernity itself. What Latour provocatively proposes is that “we have never been modern” (Latour and Porter 1993) and so there is no post-modern era and instead we are “simply amodern” (Latour 1990). But how does he arrive at this?

Modernity to Latour is a conviction that there is a separation between the natural and the social, and it is this separation that dichotomizes the “scientific mind” from the “savage one”. This is, for example, evident in the very way academic disciplines have come to be categorically conceived, as “sociology”, “biology” and “psychology”, each pertaining to a separate domain that is assumed to have justifiably different contents. It is also notable in this juxtaposition: there are causes and effects due to the “facts of nature” of which man can observe and report on and that there are also “social facts” that can be attributed to the existence of human phenomena such as culture, society, religion, and so on. As a result, there is also a separation of a human realm from the realm of things. What made people modern was their realization that unlike the tribes and civilizations of the past who are in the studies of their societies

you will get a single narrative that weaves together the way people regard the heavens and their ancestors, the way they build houses, and the way they grow yams or manioc or rice, the way they construct their government and their cosmology...you will not find a single trait that is not simultaneously real, social and narrated

(Latour and Porter 1993, p. 7).

“We” who are “modern” are different from “them” in that we have purified ourselves of this seamlessness. Being modern is knowing that there was this “before/past” and that “now” forms a break from “then”. This is also what underscores a linear understanding of time in the modern project, that there is a development from this past toward a more rational/progressive state of now and toward the future. In this sense, society and its subjects have agency to act and produce things, while the “social” is a transcendental phenomenon that simply “is”.

The solution to this is to neither work in the opposite direction (to see nature as transcendental), for this would simply be replicating the separation of nature and society, nor treat them as equally transcendental in that society and cosmology mirror one another. Instead, what “we have never been modern” implies is that we have never really been able to purify the domains and acknowledge the existence of past “hybrids” as two separate

practices. Take for example, any of the most heated topics in circulation: terrorism, environmental catastrophe, stem cell research, artificial intelligence and they will all reveal the same paradox; we have absolutely not separated science from nature, nature from culture and technology from god. And even when we think we do, it is because we have come to accept the bracketing of the domains, for the modern constitution allows one to “mobilize Nature, objectify the social, and feel the spiritual presence of god, even while firmly maintaining that Nature escapes us, that Society is our own work, and that God no longer intervenes” (Latour and Porter 1993, p. 34). If we have arrived at the postmodern, this would indicate that mankind has truly in practice separated the domains from one another, and it would mean that they had to first succeed at being modern. But as Latour suggests, because there are overwhelming examples of hybrid systems in which the domains mingle, perhaps we are not so different from those who we think we have evolved beyond. In other words, we have never been modern, only what he terms amodern. And what people have been doing all the while is to “co-produce at once their natures, and their societies and their gods” (Latour and Porter 1993, p. 25). Both nature and society are not separate points at which we utilize as explanatory positions in order to begin to understand phenomena, but can now be “accounted for as the historical consequences of the movement of collective things” (Latour and Porter 1993, p. 24). Things? Yes, *things*. But what things?

Actor Network Theory and Leisure

If we agree with Latour that we have never been modern, does this discredit and dispose of what Lyotard presents in his take on postmodernity? Latour invites us to ask this question to thinkers who align with the idea of the postmodern: is it enough just to destabilize and deconstruct? If we use the tools that Lyotard has provided us (such as ideas pertaining to the existence and possibilities of paralogy and the sublime) and put into circulation that there are micro-narratives and alternatives to the powers that be, is this enough to undo their power in effect?

Several years and gestations later, Latour refined what is now often referred to as Actor Network Theory² (ANT), a mapping tool that can be employed to reveal how taken for granted collectives such as groups, organizations and power are not produced because they are fundamentally a part of the social, but that heterogeneous materials, that is people, things, ideas, texts and so on, all of which are equally important, interact, form and generate networks that then appear to assemble more concrete collectives of which the parts that associate are often obscured.

Scholars of leisure often have to deal with such collectives when we address the subjects of our research, be it a “genre” of art, film or music, the “ministry of health”, or an online “community” of fans. But when we rely on “ready-made” notions such as “upper-middle class consumers” or “civil society”, we limit the scope, shape and dimensions of what we are trying to describe and in doing so, pulverize the presence of changes and uncertainties that we will later have to tidy up and account for. To avoid this, Latour deems it is necessary to “follow the actors” and let them define and order their own account of things. So instead of starting with “the group”, begin instead with the idea that there is “no group, only group formation” (Latour 2005, p. 27) by looking at all the ways, methods and mechanisms, all the controversies present that go into the process of *making* the group, which was after all, not just there to begin with, but had to be made to be there now. While a summary will no doubt result in a butchering³ of the complex approach of ANT scholars, Latour’s three moves may be a good place to start for those attempting to find an entry point to ANT (Nakajima 2013). Actor Network Theory is a highly empirical approach that looks at processes of construction and how constructs become translated into form. The three moves are used to follow the actors and the “trail of associations” (Latour 2005): first we “localize the global”, then we “redistribute the local”, and once we’ve done that, we now move on to “connect the sites”.

Localizing the global involves keeping things flat by “not jumping to pre-given categorizations that explain away local sites without capturing

² Also known as the sociology of translation (Law 1992) and the sociology of associations (Latour 2005).

³ This chapter is no replacement for the actual text and for a detailed account of ANT see Latour (2005), Law (1992) and Law and Hassard (1999).

the specific connections performed by the actors themselves” (Nakajima 2013, p. 371). What this means is that we should not make dichotomies of scale and size our go-to for explaining relations, but that power instead comes not directly from a macro-source, but through interactions of actants and their translations of things in circulation. To redistribute the local means that all interactions never terminate simply in one locality, but are connected to other distant places and times. This cannot be achieved without the presence of non-human actors. For example, you could not read this text without it taking the form of a book and this book would not be published without machines. These non-human actors are not just “hapless bearers of symbolic projection” (Latour 2005 p. 10); they do not just aid the network flow, but it is more so that the network would not even exist without them.

So if the “global” is made of many different connections which we have now flattened and the “local” has been shown to always exceed mere “micro” interactions, how are we to understand how they assemble to become the systems, institutions and agents that come to be taken for granted? To connect the sites, we first look at how “standards” (Latour 2005) form; how technology can format things to be more easily reproduced and practices more prevalent. For example, the MP3 format allows for music to be stored and transferred in particular ways that have transformed the way music is made and consumed. Standards allow particular collectives to assemble, as do “collecting statements” (Latour 2005), the discourses that people use to talk about phenomena. At a dinner party, people may express various views about “Bollywood” and by doing so they confirm its presence, but they also make its presence real verbally through their voices, of defense, critique, satire and even silence, which in turn contribute to the construction of “Bollywood” as a reality.

Actors in the network are not merely vessels of transportation, but that they are “mediators” (Latour 2005) and they will therefore alter meanings. Thus different networks form depending on how mediators change the appearance and meanings of the elements in the network. This reveals how network formation is processual, and mediators are not just “intermediaries” who perform meaning without the act of translation. Finally, now that these have been accounted for, you will also have to consider that there is a vast terrain, an entire realm of possibilities of networks that

you have yet to account for. Latour labels this breadth of the yet to be accounted for “plasma” (Latour 2005). Plasma is not hidden; it is simply unformatted, unknown and unstructured. Moreover, this is not necessarily a reason to be overwhelmed, for it points to yet another important aspect of ANT:

there is no such things as the last instance. And since there is no last instance, in practice there are real differences between the powerful and the wretched, *differences in the methods and materials that they deploy to generate themselves*. Our task is to study these materials and methods, and to understand how they realize themselves, and to note that it could and often should be otherwise

(Law 1992, p. 390).

Conclusion

Leisure is a realm in which people continue to explore a range of possibilities and alternatives for identity, community and expressive resources, where they challenge, contest and reproduce power and “the social”. Lyotard and Latour have provided us with some very provocative ideas about how we position things vis-à-vis the compelling term that is modernity. What they both point to is that whether you go slow and map the social with a network approach, or you look out for the disruptive events and moments that unveil new possibilities for presenting alternatives, it is important to *trace the possibilities* and to demystify power. It is only out of the ordinary that we make the extraordinary, and therein lies the rub: that we *can* make the extraordinary.

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Leisure, Risk and Reflexivity

Ken Roberts

Introduction

During the twenty-first century, there has been a proliferation of risk discourses surrounding leisure in general and young people in particular (see Turnbull and Spence 2011). We are all (but especially young people) said to be in danger from alcohol, tobacco, drugs, unhealthy diets, sedentary lifestyles and unsafe sex. Cyberspace has become an addition to this list. Once again, young people are regarded as especially vulnerable. They are said to risk harm from exposure to inappropriate images on the Internet and grooming in chat rooms. Safeguards are recommended and are increasingly implemented: lots of health warnings, restrictions on the advertising and marketing of risky products and parental controls on PCs (though these controls have been undermined by the spread of smartphones). These risks are judged in terms of a combination of the likelihood and magnitude of the harm that may result, but the emphasis

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is on the magnitude of possible harm, usually impaired health and premature death.

In sociology, there is a long-standing counter-narrative about risk. Here “risk” has been used in its mathematical sense and is shown to be a pervasive and normal feature of everyday life. Risks of a job or a spell of unemployment terminating can be calculated for different socio-demographic groups in different places. Likewise, risks can be calculated for a marriage or cohabitation terminating, or a period of living singly ending. Risks, meaning the likelihood of higher education yielding positive returns on the “investment”, can be calculated by subject studied, degree results and awarding institution. Very little in life today is (or in yesteryear was) absolutely certain. Life can be likened to a series of games of chance. Here, risk is purely a matter of the likelihood of an outcome arising from a practice or course of action.

Ulrich Beck (1944–2015), one of sociology’s leading writers on the latest modern era, has built on his discipline’s treatment of risk but implicitly takes account of the magnitude of potential harm. *Risk Society* was the title of Beck’s first book that gained international attention. The book was first published in Germany in 1985 (it preceded the Internet) and then in English language in 1992. The book argued that in our latest modern age we face a new kind of incalculable risk. The book also introduced the terms “globalisation” and “individualisation” into mainstream sociology. It argued that an outcome is that risks of all types now have to be addressed by reflexive citizens acting collectively and individually.

The following passages present Beck’s theory, then proceed to outline how leisure studies add to our understanding of risks in all the senses that have been summarised above. This leads to some conclusions but even more questions for leisure scholars to address.

Beck’s Risk Society

Risk Society was written following the partial meltdown in 1979 at the Three Mile Island (USA) nuclear power station. It was first published just before the incident at Chernobyl, which has been in Ukraine since 1991 but was part of the Soviet Union in 1986 when a fire and explo-

sion at the nuclear plant released radioactive particles across a wide area in Eastern Europe. Beck's arguments about new risks receive renewed attention with each similar incident such as Fukushima (Japan) in 2011 where three out of six reactors at a power station were hit and disabled by a tsunami. *Risk Society* argued that the world was facing a new kind of risk, different from all previous risks in that the new risks were products of modern science and science had no solutions. Nuclear disaster was just one example. Another was damage to the earth's atmosphere. Throughout the 1980s, there was concern about a widening gap in the earth's ozone layer. Subsequently, climate change and global warming have become the headline issues. Pre-Beck the main ecological challenge was believed to be the depletion of fossil fuels and other natural resources which meant that humanity was pressing "the limits to growth" (Meadows et al. 1974). Subsequently, the perceived threat has been to the habitat on which human survival ultimately depends. Beck claimed that these were examples of a new kind of risk. No one was safe. The risks were incalculable and therefore uninsurable. The implication, according to Beck, was a collective need to become reflexive which would require unprecedented global cooperation to anticipate risks and, at worse, to try to minimise them.

Beck was probably wrong about incalculable and potentially catastrophic risks being new. The same had been said when the world's major powers began to build H-bombs after the Second World War. There was the risk of an incident or accident which could lead to entire countries being obliterated. Long before then, in premodern times, people faced the risks of plague, drought and famine. These risks were incalculable. A difference was that at that time people were more likely to look for help to religion than to science and secular rulers. There was no way in which those at risk could protect themselves. No one could be risk-free. This also applied to risks of devastating earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. War was another premodern risk. Countries today are better able to deter potential aggressors, and we are also able to address the causes of climate change (assuming that human action is responsible) and to improve safety at all nuclear installations.

Fortunately for Beck's reputation, there were further arguments in *Risk Society* which have endured and become influential throughout sociology

in thinking about the character of the latest modern age. *Risk Society* was the book that introduced the term “globalisation” into mainstream sociology. Beck argued that globalisation was disempowering national governments, rendering them less able to protect their own citizens. Greater international openness and flows of goods, people and capital, especially the latter, meant that hitherto stable fixtures of the industrial age had lost their former solidity. A city’s major employer could be taken over by a multinational which then closed the site and sent unemployment rocketing in the local labour market. An entire industry could be lost to international competition. “Individualisation” was another term that *Risk Society* introduced into mainstream sociology. This was said to be a consequence of weaker families together with religious and neighbourhood communities. Rising standards of living and welfare states were said to have made households less dependent on one another. State-funded education which opened all opportunities to all the talents irrespective of family class, income, religion and gender was said to have made children’s and young people’s life chances less dependent on material family support. Biographies had thus become individual projects—“choice biographies”. Individuals had to build lives for themselves and take responsibility for making the crucial decisions in societies where little could be considered secure. This meant being constantly reflexive, reflecting on their opportunities as well as their own abilities and aspirations, then acting accordingly (Beck 1994).

These are ideas that other sociologists have subsequently adopted and built upon. *Risk Society* was written before Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web, but subsequently the new information and communication technologies have been incorporated into characterisations of the latest modern age. However, Beck’s standing as arguably the leading theorist of this age rests on how he (independently and with Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim) has traced connections between macroeconomic and political changes on the one hand, and, on the other, inter-personal including intimate human relations. In the new risk societies, men’s and women’s biographies alike are said to be built on their own achievements in education and the labour market. Their intimate relationships are said to be “pure”: they are held together not by necessity or external constraints but solely by inter-personal attraction (usually called love). In the

wider risk-laden world, intimates become more dependent on each other than ever before for personal security and confirmation of their worth. Yet their separate lives in the wider world have become more likely than ever before to pull couples apart. There are more instances of “distant love”, families and couples separated geographically yet who remain close using the latest technologies. There are couples who manage to live apart but remain together (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 1995, 2013). Mobility by people, especially young people, is said to be creating a cosmopolitan generation of young Europeans who routinely welcome one another as visitors in their respective homelands (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2009).

Needless to say, other sociologists have made major contributions in developing this theory about the character of the latest modern age, most notably Anthony Giddens, independently and as a co-author with Ulrich Beck (Beck et al. 1994; Giddens 1990, 1993), and Zygmunt Bauman who describes the new era as a “liquid modernity” (Bauman 2006). All concur that individuals are now required to take charge of their own lives. Individuals must take responsibility. Every biographical step, every choice, involves risk whether it is the decision to enter or bypass higher education, or to train for a particular profession, or to embark on a child-rearing partnership. Individuals must stake their own futures on these risky choices. They have no alternative but to be risk takers with their own future lives.

There are features of the latest modern age to which Beck pays scant attention. He does not accord a major role to new technologies. The global spread of capitalism, and its inroads in what were formerly public services and utilities, receives scant attention. This also applies to the reshaping of occupational class structures and widening inequalities of wealth and income within countries all over the world. Beck forgets, or never seems to have recognised, that risk in its mathematical sense has always been a feature of social life. Outcomes may have become less certain: more like 50:50 than 90:10. Beck does not cite any statistics, but a change of this magnitude applies to the likelihood of marriages in Europe and North America lasting until one partner dies. The same trend may have occurred in labour markets, but jobs for life were always exceptions even under communism, and there are still careers, in medicine for example, that are most likely to outlast entrants’ working lives. Beck is impor-

tant for highlighting how risk extends far beyond a limited number of potentially harmful practices, but this was already recognised and applied in sociology's standard research techniques such as event history analysis.

Leisure and Risk

The study of leisure makes further additions to our understanding of risk. First, persons alleged to be most at risk, nearly always young people, often disagree with the experts (typically health professionals) over what is risky and potentially dangerous. Studies of young people find consistently that they do not regard drinking alcohol, smoking or viewing X-rated movies and their Internet equivalents as risky activities (see, e.g., Abbott-Chapman and Denholm 2001). This is because the young people insist that they can handle the risks. They often earn status among peers by showing that they can handle the drink, tobacco and drugs, and have "seen it and done it". In Denmark, young people know that among peers it is better to have a reputation as an experienced or, at least, a mainstream drinker than as a cautious drinker. The latter risk is social isolation (Jarvinen and Gundelach 2007). Drinking enables young people show that they are strong, competent and in control (Bogren 2006). Similarly, young motorcyclists insist that their skills override the risks (Bellaby and Lawrenson 2001). Some young people feel most at risk in the presence of known persons, possibly family members or other acquaintances who need to be avoided when not among trusted friends (Green et al. 2000).

Second, young people implicitly agree with Ulrich Beck in arguing that risk is just a normal part of life and that growing up must involve learning to live with and handle risks (Lupton and Tulloch 2002). The peak ages for exposure to the experts' risks are 18–34. These are also the ages when individuals are most likely to be worried about the risks that they are taking (Cebulla 2009). At the same time, members of the age group argue that risk taking is both normal and necessary during their life stage, and express confidence that they will come through and "grow out of it" (Seaman and Ikegwuonu 2011; Stephen and Squires 2003).

Third, leisure research abounds with examples of people deliberately exposing themselves to risks because they find risk-taking a source of

intense pleasure. Excitement, thrill: these have to be earned by taking risks. The clearest examples are some popular forms of gambling where punters hope to win but expect to lose. They pay for the thrill of an afternoon at a racetrack or an evening in a casino. They know that they can heighten the excitement of a football match by placing a stake on the outcome (see Reith 1999). The safeguard is remaining in control of the risks which means, in the case of gambling, setting a prior limit to your stake. Setting their own limits enables participants in sado-masochist scenes to feel safe. This also involves practising only with trusted partners (see Newmahr 2011). Sea kayakers and participants in other extreme sports are thrill seekers, always striving to stretch their skills and abilities and extend their limits (Varley 2011). Enthusiasts who practise these sports and participants in other kinds of adventurous outdoor recreation argue that making safety the top priority would remove the adventure and the activities would become dull, bland, not worth the time, effort or money (Dickson 2004). Young women know that they expose themselves to risk when using drugs and flaunting their sexuality in public places, but doing so can be exhilarating, empowering, a source of intense pleasure (Green and Singleton 2006; Hutton 2006). An attraction of adultery is the unrivalled tension and excitement when people knowingly risk their marriages, families and homes (Lawson 1990).

There is another kind of risk in which people deliberately surrender control, feel that they are placing themselves in the hands of fate but in practice are always immersing themselves in a group. Here “liminality” is a key concept. The term was first used by Arnold van Gennep (1873–1957), a French social anthropologist who was studying life stage transitions among tribal people, principally the transition from childhood to adulthood. Young men and women would perhaps undergo tests and trials, and initiation ceremonies once the tests and trials had been passed. During these processes, they were said to occupy a “liminal” state, neither children nor adults. Subsequently, van Gennep applied his concept of liminality in studying people making the transition from immigrants to settlers in their new societies (van Gennep 1960 [1909]). Use of the concept of liminality was further developed by Victor Turner (1920–1983), another social anthropologist, but from Scotland. He explored people’s feelings while in a liminal state. They were said to experience ambiguity,

loss of any sense of who they were and a collapse of normal social class and other status divisions and distinctions (Turner 1967).

Some leisure researchers have embraced the concept of liminality because it seems to fit so neatly onto how people experience spectator sports events, music and other festivals and disco music clubs. It also happens when binge drinking. Individuals let go of their normal selves, surrender to the flux of the occasion and immersion among peers (see, as examples, Griffin et al. 2009; Sterchele and Saint-Blancat 2015). The experience of liminality resembles the “flow” that, according to American social psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1990), is experienced when people address a challenge which extends their knowledge and abilities to the utmost. They are said to become fully absorbed, to lose consciousness of time and their surroundings. “Flow” may be experienced anywhere, at work or when at leisure.

[Ken—is there room/scope to discuss (briefly) Lyng/Edgework here too?]

Very few of sociology’s major theorists have addressed leisure systematically and engaged with the enjoyment of risk and losing control. The main exceptions are Talcott Parsons who had a latency/pattern maintenance quadrant in his model of the social system (Parsons 1951), and Norbert Elias who was persuaded while at Leicester University that people needed occasions when they could escape from the self-restraint demanded by “the civilising process” (Elias 2000 [1939]). Elias was also persuaded by colleagues at Leicester that sports were exemplary activities and offered ideal spaces, times and places for people to engage in a “quest for excitement” (Elias and Dunning 1986).

Of course, it need not be sport and it is not only young people who seek excitement and are willing to take risks. Adults are most likely to continue to drink alcohol products. They may continue to use drugs if they did so when young. They have learnt and know their limits, and can be confident that any liminal experiences will be temporary. Young rockers and Goths are able to grow old disgracefully (see Bennett 2006, 2013; Bennett and Hodkinson 2012; Hodkinson 2011). They can continue their youthful behaviour but are likely to do so more occasionally and more moderately. Some may build serious leisure careers (Stebbins 1992) which become reliable sources of excitement and additional gratifications

as the participants become more experienced and knowledgeable, earn status among and become respected as experts by fellow enthusiasts.

Conclusions and Questions

We could now construct a typology of different kinds of risks, then ask which of these arise in leisure, and which are more and which are less likely to arise in leisure than in other parts of life. The answers are that all kinds of risk can arise in or affect leisure, but that some risks arise only or mostly within leisure. The typology would reveal a glaring difference between risks taken voluntarily in order to make leisure exciting, and those that characterise Beck's Risk Society. Leisure risks payout winnings and inflict losses rapidly, during an evening out drinking or at a casino for example. Also, these risks can be controlled by the actors. They can stop drinking when they feel that they have had enough, or just a little more than enough, and can enter a casino with no more cash than they can afford to lose. Self-regulation and rules of play make serious long-term consequences unlikely—death or permanent injury on the sports field, termination of an occupational career or marriage or loss of lifetime savings. Otherwise those concerned do not accept that their smoking, drinking, drug use and sedentary lifestyles are risky, or insist that the short-term costs of removing the risks would be excessive. In Beck's Risk Society, nuclear disasters and climate change are both known and perpetual risks. They are present when people are born and outlast a human lifetime. Risks of losing occupational careers and marriages are also perpetual, and these losses are likely to have long-term consequences.

Reflexive decision-making has always been a feature of some modern leisure. It predates Beck's latest modern age. The features of Beck's Risk Society associated with globalisation and individualisation appear new when contrasted with earlier modern and premodern eras when people are said to have unreflexively followed life paths expected and available for persons of their social class and gender. It is possible, in principle and practice, to test statistically whether people today are encountering more junctures in their lives when they are required to make what may

be fateful decisions. We know that risky decisions are not new, but we are now required to make such decisions more frequently in our educational, employment, housing and family careers. Young people are experiencing more transitions between courses in education, training schemes, jobs and spells of unemployment (Pollock 1997). We know that young people are experiencing and terminating more intimate relationships than in the past, and that there are more second and third marriages. We have no equivalent time series for leisure careers, but in principle, it is possible to test whether over their lifetimes people today are making more changes in their leisure activities, companions and places, and whether there is a trend towards greater variety in leisure practices within socio-demographic groups. So far, as well as very limited conclusions, we have questions for leisure scholars to address.

If risks in the rest of life have increased in frequency, does this make it more or less likely that people will engage in risky leisure practices, or does it make no difference? All these outcomes are plausible. These questions are a subset drawn from the wider and larger issue of how, if at all, leisure has been affected by the end of an earlier, relatively solid modern era. Two contradictory answers have been proposed, each currently searching for evidence.

In a series of books, Tony Blackshaw has charted how the loss of an older solid modernity has impacted on different birth cohorts. Blackshaw adopts Zygmunt Bauman's description of the latest modern age as a liquid modernity. Two books draw upon ethnography, basically Blackshaw's own biography. The books are about people and places in West Yorkshire (England). His first book featured young adult males who were using leisure, nights out with "the lads", to preserve a version of masculinity that had become redundant in the labour market and in the home (Blackshaw 2003). Later the same cohort becomes "the inbetweeners" who grew up in the older solid industrial era, and who are unable to come to terms with the new liquid times (Blackshaw 2013). However, Blackshaw (2010) has also presented his own vision of the possibilities for leisure in liquid modernity. The collapse of the old structures and associated identities is said to have opened space for people to use their leisure to build identities that develop fully the humans that they are. Blackshaw revives Aristotle's *scholē*, the full cultivation of the mind and body, said

by Aristotle (384–322 BC) to have been possible for freemen in Ancient Greece, but now, according to Blackshaw, within the reach of all. Here Blackshaw is rekindling the vision, the hope, of an earlier generation of leisure scholars (e.g., Neulinger 1990).

Finn Bowring (2015) presents a counter-scenario. He reverts not to Aristotle but to Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) to argue that more liquidity means more “freedom from” and more “freedom to”, which must lead to more anomie, indicated by increasing societal and intra-personal disorganisation (Durkheim 1938 [1893], 1970 [1897]).

Thesis begets antithesis, and the synthesis is that people are best able to benefit from leisure, taking limited risks to experience occasional peaks of excitement and otherwise pleasurable daily leisure routines, when the rest of life is fully structured. Modern leisure was created in and for a solid modernity. As yet, despite Blackshaw’s optimism, we have no leisure that has been remodelled for a liquid age.

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Thinking Through Post-structuralism in Leisure Studies: A Detour Around “Proper” Humanist Knowledges

Lisbeth A. Berbary

Current Leisure Studies scholarship is often grounded in humanist traditions that preserve universal foundations of knowledge, meta-narratives, logical progressions, Cartesian dualisms (A/Not-A), categorical representation, 1:1 representational logic, linguistic transparency, the coherent subject, reliable Truth/Truths, and rationality (Barad 2007; Coole and Frost 2010). Our participation in such traditions of humanism has served and may, at times, continue to serve us well. However, humanism also coordinates to produce and reproduce the unjust effects of status quo and therefore should also be met with suspicion (St. Pierre 2000).

Scholars in our field have already begun to take up this call to question humanism by critiquing those foundations espoused by such humanist theories as positivism and post-positivism (Parry et al. 2013). However, even as the limitations of post-positivist foundations are illuminated, such critique commonly has been positioned from with/in humanist

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theories, such as critical theory, feminism(s), and critical race theories, *rather than stepping outside of humanism* into the ontologically radical terrain of post* theories, such as post-structuralism, queer theory, post-colonialism, and post-humanism. Therefore, a great deal of even our most critical scholarship still upholds humanism and privileges legacies of the Enlightenment, modernity, interpretivism, and structuralism. Adhering to humanist traditions and theories, without also making room for the possibilities of theorizing outside of this paradigm, only limits the potential breadth and application of our interdisciplinary field's social justice commitments. Recognizing the usefulness of engaging in a pluralism of theories to explain, understand, critique, deconstruct, and ultimately transform leisure phenomena, this chapter provides an overview of aspects of post-structuralism¹ to encourage scholars to continue stepping outside of humanism in our theorizing with/in leisure studies.

What Are the Legacies of Humanism?

And what is this humanism we are turning away from through critique? Humanism is a grouping of ideas that have coordinated over time to preserve notions of essentialism, the proverbial “tree of knowledge,” universal/meta-narratives of human progression, binary structures, the ability to capture reality, common sense, the agentic subject, and foundational Truth(s) (Barad 2007; Braidotti 2013; Flax 1990; Foucault 1984a). Because these concepts represent many of our fondest attachments, humanism is difficult to locate (St. Pierre 2000). It is the “template” in our lives that we fail to recognize even as it invisibly organizes our existences through taken-for-granted orientations (Amed 2006), modes

¹ Post-structuralism is a complex, rhizomatic, multiple, and constantly fluid terrain of thought. Because of this complexity, it is difficult to thoroughly capture nuances in a book chapter, particularly details around issues of ontology and shifts towards post-humanism (Braidotti 2013). Due to this limitation, this chapter includes multiple references in order to provide a starting point for subversive scholars who wish to “read more” into the thinking(s) of such theorists as *Foucault, Derrida, Butler, Sedgwick, Halberstam, Bhabha, Said, Spivak, Deleuze Guattari*, and so on. “While some of us who have escaped our cages may start looking for ways back into the zoo, others may try to rebuild a sanctuary in the wild, and a few fugitive types will actually insist on staying lost” and will keep reading (Halberstam 2011, p. 25).

of production (Marx 1977), ideological state apparatus (Althusser 1971), false needs of consumption, and other coordinations of power (Marcuse 1964). St. Pierre (2000) elaborated on humanism, describing it as,

the air we breathe, the language we speak, the shape of the homes we live in, the relations we are able to have with others, the politics we practice, the map that locates us on the earth, the futures we can imagine, the limits of our pleasures. Humanism is everywhere, overwhelming in its totality; and, since it is so 'natural,' it is difficult to watch it work.

(p. 478)

Therefore, we are often complicit in humanism in our day-to-day lives even when we are not necessarily aware of our complicity. At times, whether with or without awareness, our participation in expectations of humanism has served and may continue to serve us well. Hence, this chapter is a call to more pluralism—an opening up of multiple theorizations of leisure versus a closing down of any paradigm. However, like with all paradigms of thought, humanism has its limitations and therefore warrants more careful scrutiny (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947). In particular, aspects of humanism such as the assumptions of a linear meta-narrative of progress, the belief or call for transparent language (Lather 1996), reliance on stable, discrete categories of similarity and presence (Derrida 1974), and the preservation of binary structures (even in an attempt to equalize them) all maintain taken-for-granted structures of thought. The limitations of these taken-for-granted ideologies must be examined because they have produced the world in ways that are “harmful to women as well as to other groups of people. This is hardly surprising, since patriarchy, racism, homophobia, ageism, etc. are cultural structures, cultural regularities that humanism allows and perpetuates” (St. Pierre 2000, p. 479).

Complicating Humanism

Yet, humanism itself is too diverse, too supple to dismiss fully, especially in light of the many positive contributions humanist work has made. In other words, we should not make the assumption that humanism is an

error (Foucault 1984a), or that we can escape it, or that we even could leave it behind. Rather, post* theories are *palimpsests*—the overwriting of one text on another partially erased text—of humanist theories, borrowing upon critical theories, expanding them, reorganizing them to show their limits, and reworking them to think and live differently. Therefore, instead of a blanket dismissal of humanism, post* theories work to show the limitations of it. Still, even as we use post* theories to show its limitations, we pull humanist traditions along with us, working both within and against humanism, finding points of existence from its enabling and organizing conditions, grids of regularity, and boundaries.

When working against humanism, we still must proceed with caution. As we show its limitations by engaging with and borrowing from its legacies, the danger of such an engagement, as Rubin (1975) reminded us, is that the sexism, racism, classism, ableism, heterosexism, and so on “in the tradition of which [humanism] is a part tends to be dragged in with each borrowing” (p. 200). And this is the work to be done in post* paradigms—the work of redeploying humanist theories and concepts to open them up to doing themselves differently, even as they are entangled with histories, legacies, and ideologies of the Enlightenment, modernity, interpretivism, and structuralism. With each borrowing and re-inscription, we must constantly interrogate that which we pull along with us as we attempt our departure from humanism. This constant critique *is* the work of post-structuralism.

What Must We Consider When Thinking Through Post-structuralism?

We can begin a deliberate and thoughtful shift away from humanism by thinking with post-structural theory, “one of the most productive points of departure for postmodern human studies influenced by the linguistic turn” that “emphasizes the role of language and discourse in shaping subjectivity, social institutions, and politics” (Seidman 1994, p. 18). However, post-structural theory is often one of the more misunderstood theories because it lacks clear boundaries, is often purposefully inaccessible, and is less deeply read than many other theories because of its

inaccessibility. Why might a theory that asserts itself as ethical-political choose to engage in purposeful complex language?

Accessibility, Transparency, Clarity

Accessibility and transparent language are often held to high standards in humanism and seen as being essential to social justice work. However, the linguistic turn that enabled post* theories challenges the claim that more accessible language is necessarily more socially just. Instead post* theories illuminate the alternative view that clear language is *not* innocent. Rather, acknowledging the power of language, post* theories affirm that sometimes *not* being easily understood might be an ethical imperative because any call for transparency, clarity, or accessibility is always already a call for consensus or a call to reinforce status quo (Lather 1996). In other words, accessible language and clarity always already rely upon the taken-for-granted or *common sense* (Gramsci 2000) meanings and common sense beliefs that are “persuasive precisely because they do not present themselves as ideology or try to win consent” (Halberstam 2011, p. 17). Such common sensibility conceals the power embedded in language and simply reinforces how things already are. As Lather (1996) wrote,

To speak so as to be understood immediately is to speak through the production of the transparent signifier, that which maps easily onto taken-for-granted regimes of meaning. This runs a risk that endorses, legitimates, and reinforces the very structure of symbolic value that must be overthrown.

(p. 528)

Based on this rationale, post-structuralism is at times purposely complex as a move against anti-intellectualism and common sense. This move to redeploying the meanings of common sense language also works to dismantle *dominant discursive “structures”*², which then creates cracks in the

²As Butler (1992, p. 15) wrote, “I place them in quotation marks to show that they are under contest, up for grabs, to initiate the contest, to question their traditional deployment, and call for some other. The effect of the quotation marks is to denaturalize the terms, to designate these signs as sites of political debate.”

foundations of the *dominant material “structures”* upheld by discursive relations that serve to maintain the often *oppressive power “structures”* of humanism. The mechanism of re-inscribing language differently is itself a political aspect of post-structuralism—a move that serves as an oppositional politics of resistance that reworks linguistic/discursive relations into different material realities (Halperin 1995).

In this sense, we remember that there is power in the rewording of our worlds because a way of thinking becomes a way of acting within material-discursive entanglements (Barad 2007; Deleuze and Guattari 1987). As St. Pierre (2000) reminded us, “language does not simply point to preexisting things and ideas but rather helps to construct them and, by extension, the world as we know it. In other words, we word the world” (p. 483). Thus, we come to understand that our language *words our worlds*, and that we may, through language, subvert common sense and the structures it upholds. Therefore, we are no longer allowed “to place the blame elsewhere, outside our own daily activities, but demand that we examine our own complicity in the maintenance of social injustice” within our material-discursive realities (St. Pierre 2000, p. 484).

What Is the Post in POST-structuralism?

When using post-structural thought to examine our own complicity in social injustice, what exactly does the *post* of post-structuralism mean? Many assume that the inclusion of the *post* is based on chronological development “after” structuralism. Yet, the *post* more importantly refers to a theoretical position that calls for a constant critique or deconstruction of that which came before, the illumination of an afterthought, or a revisiting of that which already “exists” or will exist—it is a call for “a permanent political critique that has no end” (St. Pierre 2000, p. 484). Foucault (2000) explained such critique as that which

...consists in seeing on just what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established and unexamined ways of thinking the accepted practices are based....Criticism consists in uncovering that thought and trying to change it; showing that things are not as obvious as people believe, making it so

that what is taken for granted is no longer taken for granted. To do criticism is to make harder those acts which are now too easy.

(pp. 456–457)

Therefore, in order to engage in constant critique through thinking with post* theories, one must also understand the *familiar notions* or *unexamined ways of thinking* that already exist to be critiqued or troubled. Often the most productive and useful critiques begin with examining those pre-existing, taken-for-granted notions found within humanism (e.g., an essential, unified, autonomous, and rational human subject; meta-narratives of human progress; and various binary oppositions of man/woman, straight/queer, work/leisure, etc.) because of their often invisible grasp on our thoughts, institutions, and possibilities for thinking and living.

What Might Post-structuralism Be?

According to Lather and St. Pierre (2005), post* theories, such as post-structuralism, queer theory, post-colonialism, and post-humanism, are all connected by this general critique or troubling of *familiar notions* and *established ways of thinking* of humanism. However, post* theories are not ends in themselves but rather “detours en route to something else” on route to redeployments, re-inscriptions, reinterpretations, and (re)newed materialisms, whereby the world is reconfigured or reassembled to function and perform quite differently than the status quo (Hall 1991, p. 3; Coole and Frost 2010). Yet, Butler (1992) warned that post* theories are so diverse that close reading is required so that we do not succumb to Spivak’s notion of *symbolic violence*, reducing the supple complexity of post* thinking(s) to a single trope or discourse. As Butler asked,

Do all these theories have the same structure (a comforting notion to the critic who would dispense with them all at once)? Is the effort to colonize and domesticate these theories under the sign of the same, to group them synthetically and masterfully under a single rubric, a simple refusal to grant the specificity of these positions, an excuse not to read, and not to read closely?

(p. 5)

Taking Butler's warning into consideration, we still might attempt to come to some agreed upon definition of what it means to take a post* position in order to work across paradigms. Richardson and St. Pierre (2005) defined the basic contingent foundation of post-structural thought as,

the *doubt* that any method or theory, discourse or genre, tradition or novelty, has a universal and general claim as the "right" or the privileged form of authoritative knowledge. Postmodernism *suspects* all truth claims of masking and serving particular interests in local, cultural, and political struggles. But conventional methods of knowing and telling are not automatically rejected as false or archaic. Rather, those standard methods are opened to inquiry, new methods are introduced, and then they also are subject to critique. The postmodernist concept of doubt distrusts all methods equally. No method has a privileged status. But a postmodernist position does allow us to know "something" without claiming to know everything. Having a partial, local, historical knowledge is still knowing.
(p. 961)

Critiques of Relativism

After reading about the doubt and suspicion of *foundational, universal Truth*, many sceptics will argue that post-structuralist thought is relativistic and therefore useless in terms of political action or social change (Seidman 1994). Relativism is commonly considered the view that all beliefs, or belief systems, are equally valid and true in relation to their specific contexts, *rather than in relation to* a foundational structure of universal Truth(s) that would assign hierarchical value to beliefs across humanity. Based on this definition, relativism can only occur if "a foundational structure exists that is ignored" (Seidman 1994, p. 5). Without such a structure against which other positions can be objectively judged, the definition of relativism—which requires comparison to a universal foundation—fails to hold useful meaning or critique (Cherryholmes 1988; Seidman 1994, p. 5). Therefore, because post-structuralism argues that "there is no centre, no unifying ground of order, coherence" (Seidman 1994, p. 5), and no constant foundation, an accusation of it being relativistic holds little merit within its own paradigm. Yet, this argument

against the label of relativism can be simply seen as one of linguistics and definitions, offering a less than useful refutation. A more meaningful discussion on relativism instead looks to the practices that proceed from the rejection of universal structure.

Critics argue that, whether labelled relativistic or not, the failure to acknowledge universal foundations renders thinking with the posts* ineffective for political action (St. Pierre 2011). In particular, there is the accusation that post* work lacks the ability to judge various socio-political or historical positions as more or less relevant for social change. This accusation is based on the belief that if there is no universal “Truth” to set foundational values across humanity, then there is no way to determine that which is just or positively transformative—the belief that without universals, all positions must be equally valid (based on the collapse of ethical hierarchies caused by the rejection of transcendent absolutes). However, similar to the idea that *not knowing everything, doesn't mean we don't know anything*—in this case, *not* having “an ultimate rational foundation for any given system, does not imply that one considers all views equal” (Mouffe 1988, p. 37). Instead, within post-structuralism, even without stable foundations, there is still the understanding that some human practices/engagements are more useful, just, and inclusive than others—that there *can be* long-term, agreed-upon material-discursive practices that serve justice across time and space even in their contingency, uncertain longevity, and ever lingering tentativeness.

However, the distinction of “more useful or just” within post* thought is not made *based on* inherited, uncontestable, universal structures, particularly because, according to post* thought, those structures, while they *can* be mobilized to serve “the oppressed,” also simultaneously construct the binary structure that enabled and maintains “the privileged” in the first place (Foucault 1970). Hence, in order to resist this dangerous double bind of the universal, post* evaluations of “useful and just” reject making judgements in relation to notions of foundational structures. Instead, evaluations are *based in constant political critique* of the usefulness of ongoing *evolutions of material-discursive practices* in the local, partial, contingent, and momentary realities of the current now. This lack of belief in a foundational structure against which to objectively determine good/bad forces us to do the difficult work of *evaluating* and *re-evaluating*

human practices over and over again across time, space, and history to reaffirm that they remain the most useful, most just, and most inclusive contextualized practices *again and again and again*...for now (Deleuze and Guattari 1987)—or at least until material-discursive transformations or re-articulations enable or necessitate differently just, inclusive, and affirmative ways of living.

Such contingency creates critique and rejection of post* theories by those who value *absolutes*, *essentialisms*, and *foundations*. Yet, perhaps instead of full rejections of humanist *or* post* approaches for evaluating justice, it is more useful to employ pluralism—recognizing that in different spaces, with different purposes, we may find that multiple ways of evaluating views/beliefs/practices, including approaches of comparison to universal foundations, strategic essentialism (cf. Spivak 1988), post* critique, and even at times relativism, may work simultaneously to create multiple points of resistance against unjust realities. Therefore, although claims of relativism are a common critique of post-structuralism, such critique fails to take into consideration post* critiques of universal structures and the rhizomatic, contingent, multiple, and non-foundational tenets of post-structuralism that always already refuse the structure required for a definitional claim of relativistic meaning making.

Post-structuralism Versus Postmodernism

Another relevant discussion when thinking through post-structuralism is the distinction held between post-structuralism and postmodernism. Richardson and St. Pierre's (2005) definition above used the term "post-modernism" to also define much of the underlying assumptions made by post-structuralism's "ongoing skepticism about humanism and its effects" (St. Pierre 2000, p. 507). However, although the terms are sometimes used interchangeably, there are important distinctions between *postmodernism* and *post-structuralism* (Lather 1993). *Postmodernism* "raises issues of chronology, economics, and aesthetics" in relation to American modernity, the Arts, architecture, "the new stage of multinational, multiconglomerate consumer capitalism, and to all the technologies it has spawned" (Kaplan 1988, p. 4). *Post-structuralism*, on the other hand, is a "French

post-Marxian critical approach” (Seidman 1994, p. 18) representing the European avant-garde (Jameson 1988; Huyssen 1990) “in relation to academic theorizing ‘after structuralism’” (Lather 1993, p. 688) that makes “challenges to the empiricist, rationalist, humanist assumptions of our cultural systems, including those of science” (Hutcheon 1993, p. 247).

Adhering to this distinction, this paper focuses on *post-structuralist* theories, those European avant garde academic theories “that both describe and critique our fondest attachments and more importantly, critique the effects on real people of whatever system of meaning our attachments produce” (St. Pierre 2000, p. 478). Such theory is not about right/wrong, good/bad, universality or Truth but rather about ongoing scepticism of our cultural systems. Post* theories force us to remember that what exists is far from filling all possibilities (St. Pierre 2011), leading us to theorize that which is yet to *become* as we ask “*Why is it we come to occupy and defend the territory we do? What does it promise us? And from what does it promise to protect us*” (Butler 1995, p. 127)?”

Deconstructing Humanist Leisure Studies Through Post-structuralism

How then do we as leisure researchers put post-structuralist practice, thought, and questions to work to deconstruct humanism? In practice, the engagement in oppositional politics of resistance asks that we each challenge the taken-for-granted grids of intelligibility that set boundaries around what can be thought, lived, and experienced. We are called to consider what else could *become* in our field, our research, our teaching, and our lives—“a logic of connection, a logic of the *and* (this and this and this and...), of becoming” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; St. Pierre 2013, p. 653; Spivak 1974). Most importantly, this conjunctive “*and*” indicates a radical, new materialist ontology of *becoming* that flattens typical surface/depth logic, shifting us from assuming “depth in which the human is superior to and separate from the material” towards instead theorizing that all human activity takes place at the surface as *a part of matter* (Barad 2007; Lather and St. Pierre 2013, p. 630). As St. Pierre (2013) noted,

The ‘posts,’ however, do not accept the “metaphysics of the depths” (Foucault 1966/1970, p. 245) but *present an aesthetics of depthlessness and suggest that everything appears at the surface, at the level of human activity*. In this way, ontology in the “posts” flattens what was assumed to be hierarchical. Here, there is no Real—nothing foundational or transcendental—nothing beneath or above, outside—being to secure it. Language and reality exist together on the surface.

(p. 649)

Therefore, because all activity takes place at the surface, we are reminded again that we are each complicit in the maintenance of unjust structures/relations—and so we each also have the duty to revolt every day, “with constant civil disobedience within our constituted experience” (Rajchman 1985, p. 6). We can no longer place the blame on some external, absolute authority to justify “how things are,” but instead must acknowledge that we are all responsible for upholding regimes of injustice. As St. Pierre (2000) reminded us, “When we say ‘that’s just the way it is,’ when we place responsibility on some centred presence, some absolute, foundational principles outside the realm of human activity, we may, in fact, be acting irresponsibly” (p. 484). We can answer the call for revolt and responsibility in our leisure research and practices through our own pluralistic thinking through theories and in particular by thinking through post* theories about deconstructing the taken-for-granted structures of intelligibility that uphold less useful “matters of practices/doings/actions” (Barad 2003, p. 802).

Deconstructing Our Common Sense Attachments

What does it mean to take part in deconstruction in leisure studies theorizing and research? To deconstruct “is not to negate or to dismiss, but to call into question and, perhaps most important, to open up a term, like ‘the subject,’ to a reusage or redeployment that previously has not been authorized” (Butler 1992, p. 165). Such opening up of a term is not “a corrective or a fix” (St. Pierre 2000, p. 613), a resettling or a locating of hierarchy, or an attempt to provide yet another, albeit, more useful foundation for knowledge (Derrida 1967; Seidman 1994). Rather, we

deconstruct to unsettle, displace, and uncover a term's authority. We illuminate their "historically contingent origin and their political role....to dislodge their dominance and to create a social space which is tolerant of difference, ambiguity, and playful innovation, and favours autonomy and democracy" (Seidman 1994, p. 19). This deconstruction of the linguistic/discursive creates material effects as we open up the possibilities of *wording of our worlds* differently (Butler 1992; Derrida 1967; St. Pierre 2000).

General engagements with post-structuralism encourage the deconstruction of terms such as *language, discourse, rationality, power, resistance, freedom, knowledge/Truth, materiality, and the subject* (cf. St. Pierre 2000). While a deconstruction of these terms is useful to leisure scholars, we should also ask, what are the terms leisure scholars may choose to deconstruct and redeploy to destabilize norms (Derrida 1967) and point us towards more socially just engagements with our practices/doing/thinkings? We should begin with our field's strongest material-discursive (Barad 2007) attachments and trouble the "unstable, shifting, multivocal, sites of contestation" (Seidman 1994, p. 19) that revolve around those taken-for-granted leisure concepts such as *work, leisure, production, consumption, free time, choice, health, wellness, disability, activism, independence, education, tourism, sustainability, diversity, inclusion, entrepreneurship, management, media, culture, community, freedom, aging, therapy, space, place, social capital, citizenship, commodification, and identity* to name a few (Aitchison 2003; Arai et al. 2015; Rojek 1995; Scraton and Watson 1998; Wearing 1998). These are some of the linguistic terms and discursive relations that shape our fields' intellectual and social practices as they "become part of institutions, mass culture, therapeutic regimes, gender codes", education, research practices, and so on (Seidman 1994, p. 19).

Such deconstruction begins by producing the "possibility of the irruptive emergence of a new concept" (Jackson and Mazzei 2012, p. 12). A new concept, rather than maintaining a reproduction of what is already known (Derrida 1967), instead disturbs "the dominant binary meanings that function to perpetuate social and political hierarchies" (Seidman 1994, p. 19). In this sense, we are asked to make a double move of "persistently critiquing a structure that one cannot not inhabit" (Spivak 1993, p. 284), igniting the experience of both "'doing it' and 'troubling

it' simultaneously" (Lather 1996, p. 3). Once a doing and troubling leads to a deconstruction, the move produces the emergence of new or different knowledges. Yet, our work is not done, for even new knowledges remain dangerous—dangerous in the sense that there is always already still work to be done (Foucault 1984b). Therefore, deconstruction must simultaneously begin again as we partake in constant critique through asking questions that continue enabling us to think differently about emergent knowledges, constantly deterritorializing and reterritorializing meaning (Jackson and Mazzei 2012). St. Pierre (2000) reminded us, that "surely, this is the hardest work we must do—this work of being willing to think differently" time and time again (p. 478).

Thinking differently about those terms we hold most dear, and interrogating the structures, ideologies, and discourses of dominance that they have perpetuated within our field, may create space for the emergence of more inclusive possibilities as "we consider how *we function*, how *our practices function*, and how our long held *beliefs function* to produce, reproduce, and enable certain possibilities while simultaneously silencing others, at times rendering them unthinkable" (Arai et al. 2015, p. 314). It is through this process of deconstruction of those "taken-for-granted" underpinnings of leisure that we begin to consider asking questions and asking questions differently. Such questions will work to dislodge the potential of our common practices in maintaining hegemony and dominant discourse (Butler 1992).

Asking Questions Differently

What kinds of questions does post-structuralism encourage us to continue asking in order to create space for the emergence of thinking differently within leisure studies? Before asking questions, it is meaningful to consider that when we choose to ask questions—when we call the "taken for granted" into question—this is not the same as doing away with common sense terms as though they have no purpose or potential positive effect. Rather, asking questions initiates "modes of unbecoming" (Halberstam 2011, p. 23) in order "to repeat terms subversively, and to displace them from the contexts in which

they have been deployed as instruments of oppressive power” (Butler 1992, p. 168). In other words, similar to how we cannot simply “do away with” humanism, asking new questions is an affirmative practice that *does not negate* that which has already been answered but instead asks new questions to free up terms from their “metaphysical lodgings in order to occupy and to serve very different political aims” that can enhance material effects in leisure spaces (Butler 1992, p. 168). What are the kinds of questions we can ask in order to deconstruct leisure terms and continue to make space to “do leisure research differently” in ways that generate emergent differences in how we think and live, encourage de/reterritorializations of common knowledges, and give rise to material-discursive transformations? We must ask questions that will engage with ideas of *function, processes, silences, production, meaning, and materiality* such as:

How has a structure been constructed?; What holds a structure together?; What does a structure produce?

(St. Pierre 2000)

In what specific contexts, among which specific communities of people, and by what textual and social processes has meaning been acquired?; How do meanings change?; How have some meanings emerged as normative and others have been eclipsed or disappeared?; What do these processes reveal about how power is constituted and operates?

(Scott 1988, p. 35).

What is the Reason that we use? What are its historical effects? What are its limits, and what are its dangers?

(Foucault 1984c, p. 249)

How does discourse function?; Where is it to be found?; How does it get produced and regulated?; What are its linguistic and material social effects? How does it exist?

(Bove 1990, p. 54)

Who gets to speak?; Who is spoken?

(St. Pierre 2000, p. 485; Spivak 1988)

How is it that one particular statement appeared rather than another?

(Foucault 1972, p. 27)

What are the systems of rules, and their transformations, which make different kinds of statements possible?

(Davidson 1986, p. 222)

How do we keep disciplinary forms of knowledge at bay?; How do we avoid precisely the ‘scientific’ forms of knowing that relegate other modes of knowing to the redundant or irrelevant?; How do we engage in and teach antidisciplinary knowledge?

(Halberstam 2011, p. 11)

What sorts of intellectual, aesthetic, scholarly, and cultural energies went into the making of imperialist traditions?... How can we treat the cultural, historical phenomenon of [imperialism] as a kind of *willed human work*—not of mere unconditioned ratiocination—in all its historical complexity, detail, and worth without at the same time losing sight of the alliance between cultural work, political tendencies, the state, and the specific realities of domination?

(Said 1978, p. 15)

How do we think the social and natural together? How do we understand the entanglements of the natural and social without “defining one against the other or holding either nature or culture as the fixed reference for understanding the other? How do we read material-discursive insights ‘through one another in ways that help to illuminate differences as they emerge?’ How do we re-conceptualize ‘how different differences get made, what gets excluded, and how those exclusions matter?’”

(Barad 2007, p. 30)

Scholars can therefore, “employ poststructural critiques both to respond differently to the questions about living that humanism has answered in certain ways and also to ask questions that the discourses and practices of humanism do not allow” (St. Pierre 2000, p. 479). It is through the asking of such questions that we may produce different possibilities for living. Yet, some might challenge if these questions are in any way novel

or specific to post-structuralism or may argue that these same questions can be addressed through more critical theories. However, as we return to *ontology* (how things are) and *epistemology* (how we know what we know) (Crotty 1998), we begin to see that post* questions and the research they inform have different starting points, unique understandings of meaning making, contingent foundations, and rhizomatic entanglements (cf. Arai et al. 2015; Berbary 2011, 2012, 2015; Berbary and Boles 2014). Most importantly, post* questions rely on different articulations of self, power, knowledge, language, identity, imperialism, freedom, resistance, and existence (St. Pierre 2000).

Therefore, these questions are not essentializing or about “meaning,” but rather aim to deconstruct “the surface linkages between power, knowledge, institutions, intellectuals, the control of populations, and the modern state as these intersect in the functions of systems of thought” (Bove 1990, p. 55). Thinking with post-structuralism encourages a pluralism of theorizing in leisure studies that works as a disruptive yet generative additive among our field’s strong humanist traditions. Adding post* theorizations exposes the limits of humanism and serves to disrupt humanist meta-narratives that dominate much of our field. Such disruption illuminates “the yes of responsibility within possibility, as well as, the necessity of history and what remains to be done” (Lather 2007, p. 77) to enhance the intellectual and material practices found in leisure studies.

The Ethical Imperative to “Keep Reading” and Speak Outside Ourselves

Post-structuralism’s work that *remains to be done* through a persistent critique of humanism can at times make scholars uncomfortable. Yet, “those who find discomfort in poststructuralism...often ignore how uncomfortable humanism has made many of the rest of us,” in particular, people of colour, women, queer people, people disabled by society, and so on (St. Pierre 2000, p. 506). Those common sense structures produced and reproduced by humanism become most dangerous and create the most work to be done, when we allow ourselves to believe

humanism and its ideologies are “real,” uncontestable, and all encompassing. In other words, as Lather and St. Pierre (2013) asked, “have we forgotten that we made it up? Could we just leave it behind and do/live something else” (p. 631)? While we cannot simply leave humanism behind, we can think outside of it to produce different knowledges, re-inscribing ways of thinking into different ways of acting, deconstructing our fondest attachments, and reconstructing them into more useful, more socially just realities.

It is clear there will always be work to be done; and this work often beings with reading theory, reading more theory, and reading theory carefully (Butler 1995) as an ethical imperative. For just as we produce theory, theory produces us—we simply cannot think differently or act differently without it (Nordstrom 2015). As St. Pierre (2011) noted,

If we don’t read the theoretical and philosophical literature, we have nothing much to think with during analysis except normalized discourses that seldom explain the way things are. However, when we study a variety of complex and conflicting theories, which I believe is the purpose of doctoral education, we begin to realize, as Fay (1987) suggested, that we have been theorized, that we and the world are products of theory as much as practice (p. 614).

Still even as we produce and are produced by theory, reading theory is not always easy. Even if just reading in bits and pieces, we must recognize that theories have their own languages that take time and effort to understand, but “to read does not obligate one to understand. First it is necessary to read ... avoid understanding too quickly” (Lacan as cited in McGee 1992, p. 196). We must allow Foucault’s (2003) “subjugated knowledges” or “knowledge from below” (Halberstam 2011, p. 11), specifically those forms of knowledge production that have been “disqualified, rendered nonsensical or nonconceptual, or insufficiently elaborated” (Foucault as cited in Halberstam 2011, p. 11) to wash over us. As we do so, we should be patient, remembering that too often,

we hesitate to read outside our comfort areas and too casually reject texts that seem too hard to read. It’s doubtful we would expect to quickly understand an advanced physics text, yet we expect a philosophy text to be welcoming and accessible...perhaps it’s arrogant to think we should quickly

understand concepts that have age-old and contentious histories such as *knowledge, truth, reason, reality, power, and language* (St. Pierre 2011, p. 614).

And still reading carefully, even with hesitation, should not be reserved only for the privileged “subversive intellectual” (Halberstam 2011, p. 19) who has the time, space, and courage to think about alternative ways of knowing while risking “failing well, failing often, and learning, in the words of Samuel Beckett, how to fail better” (Halberstam 2011, p. 24). Instead, as scholars and academics, there is a call to make time to read—if not all at once, then in the nooks and crannies of our academic lives, making space to explore the “detours around “proper” knowledge” (Halberstam 2011, p. 25) that enable us to “produce different knowledge and produce knowledge differently” (St. Pierre 1997, p. 175).

Recognizing the usefulness of engaging in a pluralism of theories to explain, understand, critique, and deconstruct leisure phenomena, post-structuralism becomes a vast and diverse theoretical terrain “that will let us think in terms of pluralities and diversities rather than of unities and universals...will break the conceptual hold, at least, of those long traditions of (Western) philosophy...will enable us to articulate alternative ways of thinking” and thus acting in our worlds (Scott 1988, p. 446). Using such a deconstructive process will rupture structures and make us at times “lose our way, our cars, our agenda, and possibility our minds, but in losing we will find another way of making meaning” (Halberstam 2011, p. 5) within leisure studies that is more useful, socially just, and inclusive. No longer are we comfortable just “speaking to ourselves,” keeping leisure studies “intellectually isolated from important and relevant bodies of literature” (Samdhal and Kelly 1999, p. 17; Shaw 2000). Instead, we must *continue* to answer the call to speak outside of ourselves, drawing from multiple disciplines and pulling from *primary sources* to continue putting different theories to work differently. Doing so will change our worlds by making us think differently, and “...as soon as people begin to have trouble thinking things the way they have been thought, transformation becomes at the same time very urgent, very difficult, and entirely possible” (Foucault 2000, p. 457).

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Who Should Inhabit Leisure? Disability, Embodiment, and Access to Leisure

Mary Ann Devine and Ken Mobily

Hubbard (2013) asks “Who should and should not inhabit the world?” in an examination of living life with a disability, discrimination faced by people with disabilities, and the extent to which efforts have gone to detect and eliminate a fetus with a disability to spare unnecessary suffering. We pose a similar question which serves as the frame for this chapter, *who should inhabit or have access to leisure?* From this frame, we will discuss ways in which access to leisure is shaped around discourses of the body, how discourses of the body are a response (e.g., political, cultural, historical, and theoretical) to difference, and ways in which leisure can be understood based on the various discourses surrounding embodiment of people with disabilities. One point of discussion will be the social context of embodiment and disability. Specifically, we will

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discuss how context shapes discourses around embodiment and disability. Then we will consider the ways the discourses around disability shape the leisure discussion with a focus on how some differences are valued and others are not.

Disability Defined

Disability has been defined in many ways through history and in contemporary society. One common thread in definitions of disability has always reflected ways in which those with disabilities measure up to those without disabilities (Ben-Moshe 2013). Some contend that this comparison has launched an overemphasis on the role the body plays in shaping the individual, known as *embodiment* (Siebers 2013). According to Davis (2013), *embodiment* has been defined as a comparison to the norm, with the norm being the majority of a population. “The norm pins down that majority of the population that fall under the arch of the standard bell-shaped curve.” (p. 3). The norm implies that the majority of the population should look, behave, sound, achieve, and live in similar ways. With the concept of norm comes the concept of deviations or extremes, and those who are outside of the norm are considered deviant or inferior (Davis). An embodiment of the idea of norm frames the notion of deviance or a deviant body. A deviant body not only lies outside of the normative curve but also evokes the need to rehabilitate, change, cure, pity, excuse, and segregate (Coleman 2013). Thus, embodiment creates the paradigm of what the body “should and shouldn’t” be, eliminating deviant bodies and instead striving for bodies that meet standards of the norm. According to Siebers, embodiment is central to disability including definitions, ways in which social and political decisions are made, and how people view those with disabilities. For the purposes of this chapter, we use *embodiment* as our point of reference for disability, in that the person with a disability is compared to the “norm,” and what it has meant historically, politically, theoretically, and its relationship to leisure.

The Moving Target of Disability

Historical

Tremain (2015) defines discourses as “...culturally-relative and historically-specific material conditions that enable and constrain disciplinary knowledge practices such as speaking, writing, thinking, and analyzing” (p. 35). Turn of the twentieth century discourses that affected disability and impairment include the: Playground Movement (PG) and Settlement Houses, World War I, sterilization laws, eugenic movements, emergence of rehabilitation medicine, and ugly laws—all designed to repair the damaged individual for return to society as a fit citizen or sequester him to protect him from society or society from him.

Disability and the leisure of persons with disabilities both lie on contested terrain and in that sense alone they “intersect” with one another. Disability is embedded, surrounded, and informed by popular discourses of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although the leisure of persons with disability is often linked to therapeutic recreation and its emergence around World War I as part of Red Cross services to wounded soldiers (Carter and Van Andel 2011), there is a parallel history that corresponds more with the PG Movement and Settlement Houses in the US. The PG Movement and Settlement houses were expressions of social concern over the crowded and hazardous conditions of industrializing cities. The peak of immigration into the US between 1880 and 1920 brought many Europeans whose first language was not English and who met the demand for hard manual labor in factories, mills, and mines. Underpaid, overworked, and living in a foreign land, their families were subject to the hazards of cramped and unhealthy living conditions of urban ghettos. Leaders of the era pointed to play as a utilitarian means of correcting disadvantage, particularly among children in the PG Movement and among adults in the Settlement Houses.

The formulation of evolution by Charles Darwin was widely applied not only to physical sciences but also to social sciences. A rather extreme social application of evolution was eugenics. It was articulated and led by Galton in the latter part of the nineteenth century and represented

the broad application of evolution to advancement of “national fitness” (Davis 2013). The fundamental idea of eugenics was to improve the “stock” of a nation by encouraging the fittest members to have more children and the unfit to have fewer children, none if at all possible. However, the application of eugenics had its “dark side;” it led to sterilization laws, particularly the sterilization of people with disabilities in the US, which were adopted by more than 30 states. Ugly Laws were consistent with the eugenics theme and prohibited the appearance of the unsightly (many of whom were disabled) on the streets of many US cities (Schweik 2009).

Leisure was not immune from the influence of evolution. Many of the early theories of play (see Ellis 1973 for a review) applied evolutionary principles to play. Instinct-practice and recapitulation serve as examples. In company with the “Muscular Christianity” (Kraus 1984) of the early YM/YWCA’s, the PG Movement was clearly driven in the US by a dominant culture and its moral purpose. Kraus (1984, p. 85) reported that Joseph Lee, one of the early advocates for play, argued that play and work were closely related; play was not for pleasure but for training of the child for moral purposes—to combat preoccupation with sex. John Dewey (Kraus, p. 104), a leading author of American Pragmatism, indicated that play was a learning activity. Unfortunately, according to Bullock, Mahon, and Killingsworth (2010), people with disabilities were not among the people who were thought to benefit from play.

Closely related to the PG Movement, Dieser (2013) investigated the Settlement House Movement and detailed how Jane Addams founded the Labor Museum as part of the Hull-House. Settlement Houses were intended to be local, leisure-based centers designed to assist immigrants who were impoverished financially and culturally. The intent was to change the attitudes of the “normal” population toward marginalized peoples, many of whom were disabled or who had disabled family members. Another issue Settlement Houses attempted to address was that of abuse, typically perpetrated by husbands on their families, thought to largely result from the de-humanizing working conditions of industrialized society and from intoxication at local taverns. Dieser reported that Jane Addams saw the settlement houses as an alternative to the pub, a place where men could associate with one another but in the absence

of alcohol. Hence, like the PG Movement, the Settlement Houses approached social problems on a reforming mission.

The two histories of the leisure of persons with disabilities result in different interpretations of today's leisure experiences of disabled persons. One school of thought, the product of the emergence of Rehabilitation Medicine during World War I, aligns with a medical model; the leisure of persons with disabilities is designed by professionals to promote cure, remedy, repair, or functional improvement (see American Therapeutic Recreation Association 2013). The emphasis of the medical approach is on changing the individual, not the environment. The other history is the legacy of the PG Movement and Settlement Houses; both tried to alter the environment to help the person.

The degree of emphasis on remediation or cure in the medical model approach to embodiment of disability transforms every action taken by the individual into "therapy." The medical model of disability places the person with a disability in a position of ill or sick and in continual need of treatment. In other words, according to the medical model, all people who have disabilities are sick in need of being cured, treated, and /or rehabilitated to conform to the norm; thus, one-way leisure is understood based on disability embodiment (Coleman 2013). This point has not escaped the attention of Devine and Sylvester (2005). They maintained that "... people with disabilities are more likely to have non-medical problems framed as medical conditions that require medical rather than social solutions" (p. 93). A sector of leisure service Therapeutic recreation (TR) has embraced the idea that leisure has a role in curing the person with a disability. For those siding with a medical approach, the leisure of disabled persons is constructed as "therapy" even though they may be pursuing recreation for the very same reasons as the so-called "normal" population.

The two histories characterize the leisure of persons with disabilities in very distinct ways. We interpret the two histories within the framework of Sylvester's (2015) post-structural analysis of the leisure of disabled persons (see also Kuppen "Spasticus Auticus: Thinking About Disability, Culture and Leisure Beyond the 'Walkie Talkies'", this volume). He argued that there is no essential/objective truth to the leisure of persons with disabilities but rather a historically nuanced struggle for power and control for what counts as knowledge (fact). Discourses, he maintained,

are power struggles that compete for what is accepted as true. In other words, power and “knowledge” are linked. Disciplines tend to use (historically) constructed knowledge to acquire and use power by endorsing one interpretation or discourse in preference to alternatives (Siebers 2013). In other words, discourse is based on situated knowledge—knowledge that is unquestionable in a given context—and embodiment. TR (Sylvester), similar to any institution (Tremain 2015), is a political entity that uses “knowledge” to control. Like Foucault, Sylvester was concerned with why some histories/discourses were taken to be more valid than others and how discourses around the body respond to differences.

Political

Post-structural interpretation tasks itself with not only examining (and deconstructing) the (historical) origins of current “fact” (ideology) about disability and leisure but also examining the political consequences of the mainstream/dominant history. Truth, fact about concepts and institutions, is socially constructed through history, making much of what is taken as “fact” temporary and transitory. The job of post-structuralism is to tease out how we come to accept one discourse as fact instead of an alternative (Sylvester 2015). As a sequel to tracking the two (competing) histories of disability and leisure, we now consider the impact of both on the current state of the leisure of persons with disabilities and the related concept of inclusive leisure.

Post-structuralism aims to help understand how certain truths that are held as self-evident occur, whether there are reasons for changing them and how these affect people, such as persons with disabilities. For instance, when bodies are culturally constructed (usually by a dominant historical interpretation), disabled bodies are interpreted as rehabilitation patients in one context, patients with a significant medical condition at another historical moment, patients in relapse at another, and Para-Olympians at another. In all cases, this could be the very same person with a spinal cord injury. Power is unstable and often resisted (by demands for inclusion) because it is linked to knowledge/fact/truth. It is the struggle for which version of the “truth” is to be accepted. Sylvester’s

post-structuralist argument amounts to this: the “best” history should be judged based on its effects on people—ethically the people served by therapeutic recreation or leisure services. In other words, the criterion against which truth should be tested is its effects— “...the effects of truth must be questioned, opening spaces for views that are otherwise marginalized, ignored, or rejected” (p. 18).

In the US and Canada, therapeutic recreation is a popular face of the leisure of persons with disabilities. The leading professional organization for therapeutic recreation in North America is the American Therapeutic Recreation Association (2013), and its definition of the profession is very much a medical model and remedially oriented. Some authors have maintained that TR has associated itself with the medical model to secure legitimacy by riding its coattails (Rusalem 1973; Sylvester 1998). Unfortunately, leisure outcomes (e.g., enjoyment, freedom, and intrinsic motivation) are devalued in preference to repairing (rehabilitating) the damaged person so that he/she may return to society as a productive member. However, TR has not escaped criticism of several writers from within TR itself (Lahey 1987; Mobily 1996; Rusalem 1973; Sylvester 2014).

Several problems become evident when recreation/leisure is profiled as “therapy.” Branding the leisure of disabled persons as “therapy” encourages stigma, labeling, and oppression, which is contrary to the ethical standards of most professions. For example, Devine and Sylvester (2005) exposed the harmful effects of labeling the leisure of persons with disability as therapy; recreation/leisure as therapy exacerbates stigmas and marginalizes disability identities through its medically oriented focus on cure, remediation, and treatment instead of addressing the built and social environments that serve to oppress and constrain the “living” of a disabled person.

Leisure programs for disabled persons provided for intrinsic reasons and enjoyment are branded as out of touch, unprofessional, or less important than physician ordered and “medically necessary” recreation therapy (see Passmore 2010). Sylvester (1989) asserted that the leisure of disabled persons has been undermined by TR in its efforts to justify existence within the healthcare bureaucracy by deference to non-leisure outcomes. Insisting that a usual activity like recreation/leisure is therapy

and that the disabled person needs the “expertise” and counsel of the “professional” qualifies TR as a “troubled person profession” (Devine and Sylvester 2005; Lane 2010). The disabled person could not possibly engage in meaningful leisure without the *wisdom* of the TR professional.

One principle of the Disability Rights Movement that runs contrary to “therapy” is inclusion is not only in leisure but also in all usual, typical, and customary aspects of life. Inclusion means “...the ability to participate in all major aspects of life, in which I would include (for Canada and the United States) at least work, social life, political life, religious life, cultural life, personal relationships, and recreation” (Wendell 1996, p. 50).

In many cases, inclusion has been legitimized through statutory fiat. For example, “special” programs and segregation of people with disabilities have a long history in many Western nations. In the US, segregated education was made unlawful in 1974 with the passage of federal legislation, which essentially applied the principle of “separate is not equal” to the education of disabled children. The Americans with Disabilities in the US and similar legislation in some other Western nations did the same for all people with disabilities who choose to interact with and use government services and private businesses, many of which provide leisure services. However, these laws and regulations entered the conversation about inclusion and disability rights only after decades, even centuries, of segregation in practically all aspects of life.

Ugly Laws in the US, for example, prohibited the appearance in public of unsightly peoples (often persons with disabilities) and foreshadowed the difficulties with inclusive experiences and opportunities; “out of sight, out of mind” had been the historical tradition of dealing with disabled persons (Schweik 2009). Schweik argued that Ugly Laws were not only designed to accomplish segregation but also found segregation to be a reasonable solution and acceptable norm:

What I wish to emphasize is this: by a peculiar miracle, American culture in general barely recognized these arrangements of categories of bodies in space as potentially problematic, as open to question. The ordinance [the Ugly Laws] was a strong expression of territoriality...Ugly Law segregated, as did developing state institutions that drove it and followed it (pp. 184–185).

Consistent with Ugly Laws, incarceration of persons with disabilities (Ben-Moshe 2013) and other forms of separation of persons with disabilities, society accepts, even endorses, segregated leisure experiences (e.g., Special Olympics). In contrast, inclusive recreation disrupts the play space because it runs contrary to society's wishes, notwithstanding legislation; inclusion is the embodiment of resistance to being marginalized and disenfranchised. Inclusion forces the hand of "normate" (Garland-Thomson 1997), privilege, and hegemony; it compels negotiation. Moreover, disabled individuals have a choice to conform to or contest normative standards for what an "acceptable" body is (LoJa et al. 2013) in a leisure environment. Therapy competes with inclusive recreation to stake a claim on the disabled body and the leisure of disabled persons.

But if leisure is not for mending the disabled person, then what remains is the possibility (probability) that the leisure of disabled persons is the same or similar to that of the "normal" population, and the threat of sameness of leisure is frightening. Inclusive leisure may even serve as a metaphor for human frailty and mortality. "Disability is a threatening category because, unlike a subordinated race or sex, anyone can fall into the category of disabled at any time," resulting in not empathy but fear—"fear of the other in oneself makes one phobic of the other" (Emens 2013, p. 50).

Why does disabled embodiment(s) in the playground threaten the stark binary of normal/abnormal? Segregated leisure not only serves to hide the reality of human vulnerability but also demarcates/walls off the disabled, making them easy to identify and support the abled/disabled binary that society historically has preferred. Inclusion obscures that binary in a manner that reminds one of Prendergast's (2013) argument with respect to the society's preference for the exceptional schizophrenic. She maintains that the exceptional schizophrenic, the mad genius, or the psychotic serial killer are easier to identify and consequently to stigmatize, label, and fear.

Likewise, only under extraordinary (exceptional) conditions do we even consider inclusive leisure with disabled persons, a class of performances that have been termed "inspiration porn" (Young 2012). The general public tends to look for disability embodiment that heroizes or sensationalizes disability. Smart (2009) discusses the heroizing of

disability as a means to make the non-disabled public feel more comfortable around those with disabilities, thus having little to do with admiration of individual accomplishments. Another view on the disability hero is the “supercrip” (Coleman 2013). The image of the “supercrip” is conjured when those without disabilities consider the person with a disability extraordinary or super human simply because they accomplish ordinary tasks but do it with a disability. Perhaps most people need an inspiring story to “cozy up” to a person with a disability and affect their attitude in a positive sense. Being a person who identifies as different from the norm, or functions diverse from the norm, is never enough. The effort to be included has to be heroic, the overcoming of monumental adversity that earns the person with a disability a place alongside of the abled in leisure. Furthermore, the initiative has originated in the disabled actor to be accepted (see Devine and Lashua 2002), not in the environment or abled co-actors. Alternatively, we search for reasons to justify exclusive/ segregated play based on its instrumental value apart from the playing itself—disabled peoples learn social skills from play, play is a way to cope with stress, to adjust—it is really “therapy.” Naked and unadorned (inclusive) leisure by itself is seldom sufficient.

Theoretical Versions

Another way to critically reflect on how leisure is understood based on disability and embodiment is to examine theories used to explain disability in leisure contexts. Theories explain and predict behavior. In the case of people with disabilities, they explain and predict individual and collective response to disability. Theories most frequently used in leisure relative to people with disabilities are (a) self-determination theory (Deci and Ryan 2000) (SDT), (b) social capital theory (Portes 1998), and (c) social construction theory (Berger and Luckmann 1966).

Self-determination theory (SDT) is built on the concepts of personal goals, autonomy, and human motivation (Williams, McGregor, King, Nelson and Glasgow 2005). Humans have three innate psychological needs: autonomy, competence, and relatedness (Deci and Ryan 2000). Based on this premise, people have more opportunity for healthy growth

when they are motivated to be autonomous, competent, and can relate to other humans (Williams et al. 2005). Thus, self-determination involves acting as one's own agent in making choices and decisions, free from external influence. Individuals are empowered by others to make independent life choices rather than being dependent on others to tell them what to do. When individuals experience self-determination, he or she is more likely to be motivated to meet personal goals in work, home, education, and leisure contexts. SDT assumes the people have choice and autonomy in their environments and presumes that the preferred mode of human behavior is an individualized approach to promoting independence and autonomy (Sheldon et al. 2003; Taylor et al. 2011). This theory also assumes all individuals have control over their environments to exercise choice and autonomy, including those with disabilities. Basing services and research on this assumption becomes problematic in leisure contexts because it assumes individuals with disabilities (a) have choices, (b) are empowered to make choices to meet goals, and (c) empowered to "fix" barriers that to choice making (Devine and Wilhite 1999). Historically, these people have had few leisure choices and have not been supported in making autonomous decisions. The majority of leisure options are not designed to include people with disabilities as participants as the dominant ideology reflects a narrow perception of ability, resulting in limited choices for leisure engagement (Siebers 2008). Further, SDT assumes that people with disabilities are empowered to eliminate barriers to their leisure engagement. This places the responsibility to eliminate barriers to leisure engagement squarely in the laps of those with disabilities, without sharing the responsibility with people without disabilities. While the individualistic approach is effective for addressing a person's goals and choices, it is not effective for addressing barriers related to leisure choice issues faced by individuals with disabilities (Sylvester 2011).

A second theory commonly used to understand disability in leisure contexts is *social capital*. The main premise of social capital is that there is equal power among others within various settings and situations (Portes 1998). For example, individuals with and without disabilities would have the same "voice" and shared life experiences (Bourdieu 1986; Glover and Hemingway 2005). Equal power is based on equitable access to resources (e.g., fitness centers, information) and reciprocal sharing of resources.

When this occurs, relationships have the potential to grow based on the reciprocity between people. Typically, social capital has one agency or context to gain shared life experiences, in this instance a leisure experience, which then can be transferred to other life experiences (Coleman 1990; Glover and Hemingway). For example, according to social capital theory, if people with and without disabilities have shared work experiences in which they have equal power, then those shared experiences can generalize to leisure experiences. Understanding leisure and disability embodiment through a social capital lens centers on the reciprocal nature of interaction between people with and without disabilities, creating equal power across all people. In other words, the important principle of this theory is based on give-and-take between people with and without disabilities in leisure contexts so that power is equitable. This mirrors the fundamental principle of inclusion in that inclusion of people with disabilities in leisure is the responsibility of all individuals, thus requiring a give-and-take process and sharing of power (Devine and Sylvester 2005). Historically, one-way disability has been defined from a capability perspective. This perspective assumes that people with disabilities are not capable of having reciprocal relationships, contributing valued resources, or being equal peers in leisure contexts (Devine and Parr 2008; Smart 2009; Sylvester 2011). Consequently, assuming people with disabilities are incapable in these life aspects creates an imbalance in reciprocity and inequity of power between people with and without disabilities.

The third theory that has been frequently used to frame individuals with disabilities in leisure is *social construction theory*. This theory seeks to explain how meanings are developed through social interactions (Berger and Luckman 1966; Devine 1997; Gergen 2003). It frames the connection between language, meaning, social contexts, and interactions that ultimately defines the realities of the world we live in (Berger and Luckmann 1966; Devine and Dattilo 2000; Devine 2004; Gergen 2003). The realities are constructed through interactions between others. Interactions are then interpreted to yield specific meanings, and the meanings are determined as reality resulting in a common understanding of behaviors, objects, and language used in interactions. After realities are formed, negotiations of the knowledge are made to form broad categories (Berger and Luckmann 1966). The application of social

construction to people with disabilities centers on the meaning society gives to physical, intellectual, emotional, or sensory impairments (Oliver 1990). For example, if a person sees an individual in a wheelchair they may associate the meaning of a wheelchair as an object of dependence. The person, according to social construction theory, then links the meaning of the wheelchair (dependence) to the individual using the wheelchair to mean helpless, incapable, and powerless. This constructed reality places this person in a category where the person's identity is the category rather than that of an individual. When people are categorized, assumptions are lumped on them at all times and in all situations. The case of social construction, leisure, and people with disabilities is one in which discourse produces practice in response to socially constructed differences. TR recreation practice has been the predominant response to socially constructed differences and has guided leisure practices. In particular, the dominant practice has been to consider leisure as therapy for anyone with a disability. This is problematic because it discounts and devalues the basic nature of leisure, and as previously mentioned, renders leisure for people with disabilities not possible unless prescribed by professionals (e.g., recreation therapist).

Disability and Leisure

Through the years, leisure's response to disability has varied. What is clear is that responses have mirrored society's view of people with disability as an inferior, dependent, incapable, and disenfranchised group of people. Additionally, responses are used to support decisions in leisure. The initial response to meeting the recreation needs of people with disabilities was establishing segregated programs in buildings or areas separate from those available to people without disabilities. The intent was to create borders between people with and without disabilities and maintain segregation of people with disabilities (Hevey 2013). For instance, the Special Olympics was formed to promote sport opportunities for people with intellectual disabilities but since its inception it has been criticized as a bastion for segregation, fostering attitudes of "them" versus "us." (Hughes and McDonald 2008).

Another response to disability from leisure has been to treat it as a means for rehabilitation through recreation therapy. The purpose of recreation therapy is to prescribe recreation activities to improve social, emotional, intellectual, or physical functioning of individuals with disabilities or illnesses (Shank and Coyle 2002). Critics of recreation therapy contend that it is founded on the medical model of disability in which the person with the disability is seen as sick and in need of being cured or rehabilitated, staking claim on a disabled body and, thus, at odds with the fundamental tenants of leisure (Devine and Sylvester 2005; Mobily et al. 2015; Sylvester 2009). The use of the medical model of disability as the basis of recreation therapy also created a divide in the leisure service delivery paradigm for people with disabilities. Specifically, any leisure services for people with disabilities were treated as therapy and were only to be delivered by professionals trained as recreation therapists. This paradigm divide has been difficult to bridge particularly with efforts to provide inclusive leisure services because leisure service professionals continue to perceive services that include individuals with disabilities as “therapy” instead of recreation engagement (Devine 2015). The profession prefers a clear and easily recognized distinction between therapy and engagement. Inclusive leisure services blur that distinction.

Legislation, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990) (ADA) in the USA, garnered a varied response from leisure professionals relative to disability. As a civil rights law, the ADA mandates non-discrimination in services, access to services, or benefits of services based on disability. As a result of the ADA, people with disabilities in the US have the right to visit amusement parks, play competitive sports, attend a concert, hike in a park as a result and leisure professionals must make changes to accommodate the needs of these individuals so they can engage in activities of their choosing. An outgrowth of compliance with the ADA in the field of leisure has been the inclusion movement, where people with and without disabilities engage together in leisure as peers. This movement has resulted in an increase in awareness and opportunity for people with disabilities to have their leisure needs met, but has not given rise to a paradigm shift in service delivery. A lack of a paradigm shift in service delivery, even applying legal mandates, could be based on the deeply regarded inferior status of individuals with disabilities (Emens 2013). Specifically, given

disability's long-held inferior status, it is difficult to imagine people without disabilities seeking to engage in leisure with those with disabilities where each would have equal status. Emens contends that there is a lack of consideration of what people with and without disabilities offer each other, as equals. "Rather, benefits are almost always seen traveling one way—from nondisabled to disabled" (Emens, p. 54). With the imbalance in perspective of disability status, why would a paradigm shift in leisure service delivery occur?

A Paradigm Shift Using Social Justice

Encouraging a paradigm shift in leisure relative to people with disabilities entails incorporating excluded groups into current structures with the emphasis on changing the structures (Ben-Moshe 2013). In other words, the intent of changes is to bring people with disabilities out of the shadow of ideology of ability. A construct for change in leisure is the application of social justice (Devine and Piatt 2013). Social justice recognizes influences such as unequal power, unearned privilege, and oppression (Alston et al. 2006). It is founded on the tenants of freedom, respect, dignity, and equal opportunity. Social justice's most distinct principle is the notion of equitable and meaningful opportunities. At the heart of this principle is promoting valid and valuable opportunities in all aspects of life. Tenants of social justice encompass the right to fair treatment and a share of the benefits society has to offer. As well, these tenets are based on the foundations of human rights and equality of all people (Loewen and Pollard 2010).

According to Asch (2001), social justice for persons with disabilities means having the opportunity to play the valued social roles expected of peers without disabilities. Smart (2009) discussed three parameters to understand and achieve social justice and individuals with disabilities: (a) everyone receives *equal treatment*, (b) everyone receives what he/she *earns*, and (c) everyone receives what he/she *needs*. Receiving *equal treatment* refers to the ways in which all people have access to resources and can achieve similar outcomes or benefits. Relative to persons with disabilities, this tenet of social justice centers on the equity

of the outcomes or benefits being similar for people without and with disabilities (Alston et al. 2006). The second principle, receiving what one *earns*, is based on rehabilitation counseling which assists people with disabilities to achieve career and independent living goals. This principle challenges the myth that the absence of one's success is due only to inferior aptitude, desire, or ability (Smart 2009). Historically, perceptions of a lack of success people with disabilities experienced in vocational, educational, or leisure contexts are rooted in stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination resulting in few valuable and valid life experiences (Asch 2001; Devine and Parr 2008; Smart 2009). The last tenet centers on individuals with disabilities having their rights recognized by society and having access to opportunities that aid in meeting their needs. This parameter is founded on systemic social changes, such as passing of civil rights laws for people with disabilities, addressing the shortcomings of systems designed without consideration of those who have been marginalized (e.g., people with disabilities), and providing rules for making accommodations necessary to permit access to valuable and valid life experiences.

Framing Leisure in Principles of Social Justice

Introducing disability as a form of human variation versus a limitation or defect changes the paradigm shift and how professionals view leisure opportunities for this group. From this perspective, thinking of limited leisure opportunities for people with disabilities as a social justice movement frames it as a new opportunity for society. In this chapter, we frame *opportunity* as the right to valuable and valid life opportunities (Nussbaum 2006; Tollefsen 2010). This brings us to the questions: *what do we need to do to increase opportunities? and how do we accomplish this paradigm shift?*

First, the responsibility of creating and sustaining a paradigm shift is the responsibility of all, not just individuals with disabilities. Placing the responsibility of addressing social justice on only individuals with disabilities negates the role communities and society plays in creating inequities. This includes the leisure professional manifesting the notion of separate

and not equal. The purpose of promoting the collective responsibility in addressing social justice in leisure is to foster dignity and well-being of all community members (Nussbaum 2006).

Since the early 1990s, the leisure profession has been challenged to view leisure as a right for all, not a privilege for some (Sylvester 1992). Sylvester proposed that leisure is a right since it is a necessary aspect of the human experience and [for Americans] its ideals are in keeping with Thomas Jefferson's notion of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Sylvester offered that "the deprivation of natural rights threatens one's humanity" (p. 11) and leisure is an aspect of life where one can gain a sense of their humanity by considering and acting on one's values. We propose that the principle of a right to leisure was some of the first wave of social justice for individuals with disabilities in leisure studies and practices.

Summary

We began this chapter by framing it in the question of, *who should inhabit or have access to leisure?* This was examined by discussing ways in which leisure is shaped around the body by looking at ways in which disability is defined. Disability as a moving target was examined historically, politically, and theoretically to explore ways in which leisure is understood from embodiment discourses. There are at least two competing histories of disability within the context of leisure's larger history. One history tracks disability into an undesirable difference, something that needs to be corrected, managed, and rehabilitated to make the person as "normal" as possible. The second history urges that altering the environment is the preferred path and that leisure professionals ought to look to change unwelcoming settings, negative attitudes, and unfair policies, and service delivery practices that segregate, sequester, and marginalize persons with disabilities. Hence, when the former, currently accepted history is allowed to delimit discourse and interaction with disabled persons, then corresponding power structures follow. Disabled individuals are then presumed to be uniformly miserable; disability is seen as a tragedy and is to be pitied; and every aspect of the person's life needs "therapy."

Next, we recommend a paradigm shift in leisure discourses relative to disability by framing services for people with disabilities in principles of social justice. All people are not created equal but they are all equally human. Humanity is a rich and diverse assortment of talents and limitations. Instead of singling out limitations imposed by DNA or environmental inequity, we prefer to consider all humanity as a totality, a summation—as a body of work made of necessary parts, with all the dents and flaws included, a collective that together makes the “whole greater than the sum of its parts.” Accordingly, every human ought to have opportunity to access equal resources, to receive equal compensation, and to have their equality recognized by greater society.

We conclude with challenges in ways leisure services can apply principles of social justice to view disability as a form of human variation versus a limitation or defect. The time is now to bring people with disabilities out from the shadow of ableism and ideology of the “normal” body. Leisure, like all important aspects of life, is a matter of social justice, fairness, and equality. We advocate for nothing less than “a level *playing* field,” an idiomatic expression that seems more apropos here than in other analogies. Everyone, regardless of ability, has a “right to leisure.” Leisure is not a privilege only reserved for hegemonic society.

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Leisure and Diaspora

Daniel Burdsey

Introduction

As a truly interdisciplinary entity, the study of leisure has historically employed and integrated a wide range of theoretical and conceptual constructs from sociology, geography and psychology, among others. Ideas related to class, race, gender, sexuality, space, place, life course, consumption, media, well-being, adaptation, acculturation and self-esteem have all been used extensively to explore, explain and critique modern leisure practices. Conversely, there are also ideas and trends that have emerged and gained popularity in other academic fields which have struggled to establish a substantial foothold within leisure studies. It is within this latter scenario that the focus of this chapter—diaspora—sits.

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In an influential essay from a decade ago, Rogers Brubaker (2005) noted a significant proliferation of uses of the term “diaspora” in the Western public lexicon since the 1980s, both inside and outside the academy. Dedicated academic journals now provide outlets for diaspora scholarship (e.g., *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* and *Diaspora Studies*), while articles addressing diasporic formations, identities and processes have become relatively commonplace in publications on race, migration, globalization and transnationalism. According to Joanna Story and Iain Walker (2016, p. 135):

over the past two decades, ‘diaspora’ has evolved from a term with a somewhat restricted usage to something considerably more ubiquitous, simultaneously crossing over from political and academic discourse into the vernacular. In academia, the word ‘diaspora’ has, rightly or wrongly, come to be applied to almost any population or group living outside its homeland, while in popular usage diaspora now seems to be a collective noun used to refer to anyone not at home.

The outcome is what Brubaker (2005, p. 1) playfully refers to as a “‘diaspora’ diaspora”, signifying “a dispersion of the meanings of the term in semantic, conceptual and disciplinary space”.

The processes by which the concepts, theories and nomenclature of the academic “mainstream” arrive in diverse associated sub-disciplines are rarely straightforward or immediate. Existing gatekeepers of particular fields embrace or resist change to varying degrees as they hold onto or loosen their grip on the existing scholarly *doxa* (Blackshaw 2010). Nonetheless, given its evident applicability and usefulness to the study of leisure (see below), the absence of references to diaspora within the academic literature in this area, and in the related study of sport, is perplexing (see, e.g., Burdsey 2006 as a notable exception). In a review essay on sociology of sport literature on race over the last half century, Ben Carrington (2015, p. 394) remarks that “‘diaspora’ is one of the most important concepts in contemporary social theory and a burgeoning area of study across various disciplines, yet it is frequently and surprisingly ignored within sport studies and the sociology of sport”. This is an especially curious omission given that, as Janelle Joseph (2014, p. 669) points

out, “diaspora is a crucial heuristic for thinking about cultural heritage. While diasporas are often constructed as homeless and displaced, they also draw on modes of cultural production, such as sport, to feel at home or emplaced”.

A keyword search of the websites for the principal English language journals that publish articles on aspects of, broadly speaking, leisure *identities* and *practices* (rather than, say, management, business, marketing or policy) yields very few results for diaspora. Across *Annals of Leisure Research*, *Journal of Leisure Research*, *Leisure/Loisir*, *Leisure Sciences*, *Leisure Studies* and *World Leisure Journal*, the number of articles that include “diaspora” in their title or abstract is miniscule. Likewise, “leisure” does not emerge as a significant focus whatsoever in peer-reviewed outlets such as *Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational Studies* and *Diaspora Studies*. Moreover, specific texts around ethnicity and leisure—such as the recent excellent accounts by Karl Spracklen (2013) on *Whiteness and Leisure* and Monika Stodolska et al. (2014) on *Race, Ethnicity and Leisure*—make no mention of diaspora. In many respects, some of the most important insights are to be found within a handful of books that consider (to varying degrees) the more *leisured* aspects of the sporting realm (see, e.g., Carrington 2010; Delamont et al. *forthcoming*; Joseph *forthcoming*; Thangaraj 2015; Thangaraj et al. 2014, 2016).

The tentative academic relationship between leisure and diaspora needs to be placed in the broader context of scholarship addressing leisure and processes of transnational human movement in all forms. As Diana Mata-Codesal et al. (2015, p. 1) state:

leisure does not feature strongly in migration studies, nor do leisure scholars pay a lot of attention to migrants. Migrants are frequently perceived through the conceptual lens of their ‘mobility’ and work-related activities. When leisure is addressed, the focus is on its functional aspects, e.g. the role leisure can play in adaptation to and integration into a new society.

Migration research that explicitly addresses leisure is thus a relatively recent phenomenon (see, e.g., the 2015 special issue of *Leisure Studies* on “Migration, Migrants and Leisure: Meaningful Leisure?”). Notwithstanding this, I would argue that this body of research is now

sufficiently substantive for us to expect it to have engaged with, endorsed or critiqued diasporic frameworks to a greater extent than it has thus far.

Given the inchoate status of research on leisure and diaspora, this chapter is inexorably somewhat exploratory in its content and approach. Unlike other chapters in this collection that address leisure studies' more developed analytical frames, there is little in the way of extant literature on leisure and diaspora to build upon here. As such, in this chapter, I consider some of the *potential* ways that these two concepts might usefully come together, helping us to theorize the leisure practices and identities of migrant communities and their subsequent generations. To achieve this, I begin the next section by outlining some of the key contributions to diaspora studies and the "phases" through which this field has travelled, and I highlight some of the main critiques as well. Following that, I explore some of the principal themes that have emerged in recent years in relation to leisure and migration processes more broadly. In the final section of the chapter, using a couple of examples from my own research in this area, I consider how the concept of diaspora might be harnessed in diverse ways to think—certainly further, perhaps *differently?*—about twenty-first-century leisure.

This chapter is illustrative rather than exhaustive in its subject matter, and I concentrate on a number of important thematics rather than attempt to overview all relevant literature. The focus is placed explicitly on *leisure*, as differentiated from related and overlapping phenomena of sport and tourism. Furthermore, while there are relatively well-developed literatures on music and cinema, for instance, which engage with ideas of diaspora, globalization and transnationalism, the space constraints of this chapter necessitate that I prioritize those contributions that foreground leisure identities and practices explicitly. Lastly, it should be noted that, due to my own limitations, the analysis in this chapter is limited to an engagement with the English-language scholarly literature.

Diaspora: Key Ideas, Phases and Critique

According to Jana Evans Braziel (2008, p. 24), diaspora "historically and typically denotes the scattering of people from their homelands into new communities across the globe". Similarly, Floya Anthias (1998,

pp. 559–560) refers to “a connection between groups across different nation states whose commonality derives from an original but maybe removed homeland”. She adds that “a new identity becomes constructed on a world scale which crosses national borders and boundaries”. Diaspora is linked to distinct but related terms, such as globalization and transnationalism, yet differs crucially in the fact that it connotes primarily the movement of *people*, as opposed to flows of technologies, capital and media, among others (Brazier 2008).

In his historical overview of academic scholarship on diasporas, Robin Cohen (2008) argues that there have been four “phases” of diaspora studies. First, there was the classical use of the term in relation to what might be regarded as a “victim” or “catastrophic” diaspora: individuals viewing their “scattering as arising from a cataclysmic event that had traumatized the group as a whole, thereby creating the central historical experience of victimhood at the hands of a cruel oppressor” (ibid., 1). In this phase, the focus was directed almost exclusively towards the Jewish experience but was augmented later in the 1960s and 1970s by coverage of African, Armenian, Irish and Palestinian diasporas. This paradigm viewed diaspora as a matter of dispersal from the “homeland” to two or more foreign destinations, and, while it can be difficult—conceptually, practically and politically—to distinguish force from volition, it referenced a sense of compelled human movement (ibid.).

The second phase occurred in the 1980s and 1990s, driven by scholars such as William Safran (1991), with the categorization of diasporic formations expanded to include a variety of diverse expatriate, refugee, migrant and “settled” minority ethnic communities. Diasporas started to be viewed as variegated and intersectional entities, rather than homogenous and bounded masses, and they included displaced ethnic, religious and national groups such as Poles, Mexicans, Kurds, Sikhs, Maghrebis, Vietnamese, Tamils and Somalis (Cohen 2008).

According to Cohen (ibid, p. 2), the third—and arguably most critical and paradigm-shifting—phase of diaspora studies comprised a social constructionist critique of the second-phase theorists. This revolved around challenges to the primacy attached to notions of “homeland”, the ontological status of “ethnic or religious community” as the unit of analysis and received wisdom about a desire for “return” (see, e.g.,

Brah 1996; Clifford 1994; Gilroy 1993; Tölölyan 2012). As Anthias (2001) points out, up until then diaspora had tended to be used in a manner that privileged the point(s) of “origin” in constructing identities and solidarities and so did not sufficiently acknowledge *transethnic*, rather than transnational, processes. These observations were part of a broader critique of academic “methodological nationalism”, that is the assumption that the nation/state is “the natural social and political form of the modern world” (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002, p. 301). For instance, Ien Ang (2003, p. 142) argues that “the limits of diaspora lie precisely in its own assumed boundedness, its inevitable tendency to stress its internal coherence and unity, logically set apart from ‘others’”. Indeed, Yasemin Soysal (2000, p. 2) argues that global social processes since the Second World War mean that diaspora has become “untenable as an analytical and normative category”. Instead, she argues, we must “direct our discussion to new forms of membership, claims-making, and belonging—which either remain invisible to the conventional conceptions of diaspora, or are frequently deemed insignificant in the face of its normative weight” (ibid.). A number of critical scholars subsequently began to emphasize concepts of heterogeneity, fluidity, creolization, syncretism and hybridity (see, e.g., Brah 1996; Gilroy 1993; Hall 1990). Within this approach, diaspora challenges dominant discourses about authenticity, belonging and citizenship and illustrates how the formation of “new ethnicities” (Hall 2000) often renders national borders insignificant. In particular, it enables a disentangling of the relationship between place(s) of “origin” and place(s) of “settlement” and a nuanced consideration of the respective significance attached to them.

According to Cohen (2008, p. 2), we are now in a fourth phase of diaspora studies—one of consolidation—which is “marked by a modified reaffirmation of the diasporic idea, including its core elements, common features and ideal types”.

Felix Ndhlovu (2016, p. 33) argues that:

while ethnicity and affiliation to specific speech communities may still remain, they are no longer the sole prime markers of group solidarity especially in predominantly immigrant societies where diasporas construct and

(re)negotiate their identities on the basis of shared migration histories and other life experiences.

This has led to conceptualizations of other forms of diasporic formations that do not rely on notions of “homeland” or shared ethnicity but underscore the significance of *routes* over roots. For example, Paul Gilroy’s (1993) notion of the transnational “Black Atlantic” considers the common experiences, identity formations and cultural constructions of black populations in the United States, the United Kingdom and mainland Europe, while the likes of Gayatri Gopinath (2005) and Martin Manalansan (2003) have made critical interventions in the study of “queer diasporas”.

To be clear, diaspora remains a contested concept, and its interpretations and implementations continue to vary, both across academic research and in the popular imagination. Nonetheless, Rogers Brubaker (2005, p. 5) points out that:

one can identify three core elements that remain widely understood to be constitutive of diaspora. Some subset or combination of these, variously weighted, underlies most definitions and discussions of the phenomenon. The first is dispersion in space; the second, orientation to a ‘homeland’; and the third, boundary-maintenance.

It is the fluid, processual, indefinite and non-essentialist interpretations and manifestations of diaspora that have underpinned my own work to date and which I consider in relation to modern leisure identities and practices in this chapter. These flows, movements and multiplicities are emphasized in Paul Tiyambe Zeleza’s (2010) essay on African diasporic music forms. He states that “diaspora is a state of being and a process of becoming, a condition and consciousness located in the shifting interstices of ‘here’ and ‘there’, a voyage of negotiation between multiple spatial and social identities” (ibid., p. 211). The currents between “homeland” and “diaspora” are, he argues, “often simultaneously covert and overt, abstract and concrete, symbolic and real, and their effects may be sometimes disjunctive or conjunctive...[and] include people, cultural practices, productive resources, organizations and movements, ideologies

and ideas, images and representations” (ibid., 212). Furthermore, Jana Evans Braziel (2008, p. 25) calls for acknowledgement of the simultaneous multilaterality of diasporas, which “challeng[e] both the strictures and structures of nationalism and the increasingly imperialist, hegemonic forces of globalization”.

Leisure Identities and Practices in the Context of Transnational Human Movement

Although they rarely foreground diaspora as an analytical concept, some important recent contributions have added to and extended our understanding of the role of leisure in the context of various forms of transnational human movement. A selection of these examples is addressed in this section. Rather than providing a comprehensive review of their content, my intention here is to draw out some of their key underlying themes and arguments, especially those that challenge the idea that leisure is unilaterally a positive experience or source of identity formation for migrant communities. These observations provide the basis for thinking through the utility of diaspora as a concept for understanding contemporary leisure practices and identities in the final section of this chapter.

Taking the British situation as an exemplar, Jonathan Long et al. (2014, p. 1781) argue that, “where there has been research on the role of sport and leisure in integration in the UK it has focused on refugees rather than migrants; and more general research on new migrants is heavily dominated by the economic”. Leisure is evidently a fundamental social activity for all forms of migrants though not least for diasporic communities. As Diana Mata-Codesal et al. (2015, p. 1) note, “migrants” leisure activities contribute to self-perception, daily life organization, multiple embeddedness and sense of belonging. The precariousness of, and the new challenges in, the situation of many migrants brings out the importance of leisure for leading meaningful lives. The authors go on to highlight how leisure plays a crucial function in creating connections and distances, both to/from groups in an

ancestral “homeland” and those in the “host” society. Importantly, they stress the role of leisure as an *embodied* and *spatialized* cultural practice, whereby the relationship between migrants and the places they live and play becomes co-constitutive: these spaces and places underpin and influence their leisure activities and identities; and their leisure pursuits facilitate an ontological engagement and embeddedness with the locations in which they occur.

In an essay on the recreational mobility of Polish migrants in the UK following Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004, Anna Horolets (2015, p. 6) characterizes leisure pursuits as “micro practices of negotiating and re-constructing ones’ identity in a new environment”. For Horolets, the mobilities facilitated by and through leisure activities and encounters assist the adaptation of migrants through increased certainty over particular situations. Critically:

the certainty that is achieved through leisure experience is self-referential: it is not necessarily connected to better understanding of an environment in some objective terms or to engaging in interactions with mainstream population. The uncertainty reduction resulting from it is due to increased embodied knowledge of new environment and improved self-image (*ibid.*, p. 15).

Moreover, Horolets considers the embodied nature of leisure in facilitating connections between migrant bodies and spaces, which manifest themselves in physical, emotional and affective ways (*ibid.*, p. 16).

Processes related to the spatial, embodied and emotional effects of leisure occur with a range of different migrant groups in various geographical contexts. In their account of Afghan refugees in Winnipeg, Canada, Julie Stack and Yoshitaka Iwasaki (2009, p. 243) note that the extant research in this field concludes “that some forms of leisure, in particular, those forms that are in line with immigrants’ cultural, social and/ or spiritual orientations to life, may positively facilitate adaptation processes as they navigate through these challenging and potentially stressful processes”. For example, Nicola De Martini Ugolotti (2015) considers the experiences of young men of migrant origin in Turin, Northern Italy. Through the physical cultural activities of capoeira and

parkour, as public performances and articulations of leisure in the city's built environment, these young men use their leisure time and practice to navigate processes of belonging, being "out of place" and self-worth. Similar observations as to the importance of embodied leisure forms in processes of integration and ethnic and cultural community formation—both tangible and figurative—are identified in Hannah Lewis' (2015) study of music, dancing and clothing in the lives of asylum seekers in the UK. A further notable contribution on leisure spaces—which is also a rare example of a reference to diasporic formations in this context—is Beccy Watson and Aarti Ratna's (2011) case study of a South Asian cultural festival in Leeds, Northern England. Spaces of leisure, the authors conclude, are critical for the public performance of diasporic formations, shedding light on their heterogeneity and the containing power that characterize their existence.

Experiences of leisure are not nearly so benign for some migrant groups. As Miri Song (2005, p. 63) argues, diasporic populations may struggle to form and uphold their identities: "not all diasporic people may be equally successful in their efforts to assert hybridized identities or occupy and enunciate a 'third space'". Ien Ang (2003, p. 142) likewise calls for scholars "to recognise the double-edgedness of diasporic identity: it can be the site of both support and oppression, emancipation and confinement, solidarity and division". This situation is acknowledged in some notable recent critical reflections on the components and ramifications of migrant leisure. As Karl Spracklen et al. (2015, p. 114) remark, "the leisure lives of new migrant communities are diminished by the ways in which the instrumental powers in their new homes operate to define, delineate and constrain their leisure". Evidence points to the fact that leisure does not necessarily create capital and facilitate positive inter-group relations, while migrants often compare their leisure experiences in their "new" places of residence negatively with their lives before migration (Long et al. 2014). Sine Agergaard et al. (2015) stress the importance of recognizing the broader socio-political context, highlighting that the leisure time of certain migrant young people is increasingly politicized. Focusing on a particular intervention providing sporting activities in Denmark,

the authors identify how “unregulated” leisure time is regarded in the dominant imagination as problematic and threatening, with migrant youngsters seemingly in need of the “civilizing” effects of dominant leisure practices and values.

This discussion should not be read as signifying a binary interpretation of the effects of leisure. Research suggests that migrants’ leisure scenarios revolve around forms both of integration and exclusion, with participation enabling acculturative effects and also being inhibited by a range of cultural and structural constraints (Hasmi et al. 2014). As Lauren Wagner and Karin Peters (2014) identify in their multi-sited analysis of diasporic Moroccan women negotiating leisure experiences in Morocco and the Netherlands, the participation of Muslim women is not just hampered by restrictions. Instead, these “women balance and negotiate multiple and competing expectations from within their families and from contextualized religio-cultural circumstances into viscous spaces of leisure” (ibid., p. 426).

The leisure experiences of migrants are evidently contingent on a variety of factors. Accordingly, an intersectional analysis is critical (Watson and Ratna 2011; Watson and Scraton 2012). For instance, Jonathan Long et al. (2014) highlight the importance of underscoring the processes and effects of racialization in migrants’ leisure lives, with their construction as “black” or “white” impacting on possibilities for inclusion and integration. Janelle Joseph (2012), on the other hand, addresses the gendered relations inherent to diasporic communities, as well of those around age and generation, in her ethnography of Caribbean-Canadian recreational cricketers in the Greater Toronto Area. Lastly, Zana Vathi (2015), whose work addresses leisure and tourism in the Western Balkans by London-based Kosovan migrant families, calls for a further stratification of our understanding of migrant leisure, noting that the experiences of non-elite migrants are especially under-researched.

Having outlined some of the key trends within recent literature on migration and leisure, the final section explores the potential for a conceptual and analytical frame of diaspora to shed further light on these phenomena.

Situating Leisure Within Diasporas and Diasporas Within Leisure

A move towards a more substantive utilization of diaspora in theorizations of leisure must be rooted in appropriate intellectual trajectories, rather than simply being a matter of incorporating another neologism. Leading diaspora scholars have warned against the conceptual inflation of the term (see, e.g., Cohen 2008; Tölölyan 2012), with Rogers Brubaker (2005, p. 3) pointing out succinctly that “if everyone is diasporic, then no one is distinctively so”. Nonetheless, as Tony Blackshaw (2010, p. xii, emphasis added) argues, “in order to develop a contemporary interpretation of leisure we must not only break with the convention of seeing it as merely a residual category of work...*but also re-think it in nearly every other aspect*”. This requires leisure scholars to undertake “an imaginative engagement with the different social, cultural, economic and political conditions that are the mark of ‘liquid’ modernity” (ibid.).

Given the examples and themes outlined in the previous section, the potential for a more rigorous engagement with diaspora in leisure studies is apparent. Diasporas encompass shared migration histories and other life experiences which are often promoted by, and celebrated through, leisure. Leisure is a matter of interactions between identity and space, individual and group activities, processes of inclusion and exclusion, inter- and intra-cultural exchange and transnational links, all of which are germane to a diasporic framework when applying to migrant and/or minority ethnic communities. To further detail the opportunities for using diaspora in leisure studies, two examples from my own research illuminate the potential analytical and empirical connections. The first example is a more traditional application of diaspora to a leisure phenomenon; the latter is more about the use of what might be called a diasporic imagination.

In the first instance (Burdsey 2008), I examined the Amsterdam World Cup (WK Amsterdam) amateur football competition and multicultural festival in the Netherlands. Alongside the 11-a-side adult men’s football tournament involving the city’s diverse migrant, refugee and diasporic communities that formed the centrepiece of the event, I showed how

leisure can be a site of diasporic formation in the ways that attendees perform and consume cultural identities through national dress, music, dance and food. Placing the event within the context of Dutch integration policies, the study examined the differing and contested conceptions of identity, community and multiculturalism articulated by participants and organizers and, more broadly, the role that “alternative” events play in resisting or reinforcing dominant political ideologies. The article showed how leisure is both a means of intra- and inter-cultural exchange among different diasporic communities and within the “host” society. Critically, it also highlighted the structural constraints of certain leisure forms that inhibit the development of long-lasting social networks, as well as the intersections between ethnicity and gender that can bring about various patriarchal and masculinist forms of diasporic identity and practice.

More recently (Burdsey 2016), I considered the multiple engagements between minority ethnic residential communities and the English seaside. In these settings, the numbers of migrants are comparatively small, and migration is often undertaken alone or with a very small group of significant others rather than as part of large-scale ethno-national migrations. As such, while the use of diaspora *per se* does not pertain to the communities here, our understanding is boosted if we employ what we might consider to be a *diasporic imagination*. In this book, I introduced the idea of “coastal liquidity”, which challenges and writes against static portrayals of the seaside: those that containerize it in a particular time period, separate it from other geographical environments and “fix” particular types of racialized bodies within and outside it. I showed how leisure spaces, such as the seaside, are key to forging links between “home-land” and new places of residence and in residents’ capacities to develop an ontological belonging to their new homes and to share commonalities with coastal neighbours of other backgrounds. Moreover, aspects of the coastal environment were also shown to provide a means of coping with the stresses that characterize attempts to adapt to, and integrate within, new environments.

Elsewhere with colleagues I have noted that the few existing contributions in leisure (and sport) studies that employ diaspora tend to treat it “as merely a descriptive, rather than analytical, term—literally a shorthand for *what* happens after migration, rather than *how* and *why* such

processes occur” (Thangaraj et al. 2014, p. 6). This observation reiterates other calls for diaspora to be used not as a descriptive term but as a social condition (Anthias 1998) or as a practice, project, idiom or stance (Brubaker 2005). In this regard, an intersectional framework that connects ethnicity to religion, gender, age and sexuality, among others, is critical. Diasporic theorizing in/of leisure can also benefit hugely from engaging with the epistemologies, ontologies and methodologies of the Global South, which can help us to trouble analytical perspectives that privilege the experiences of the receiving society (Horolets 2015, p. 6). As Felix Ndhlovu (2016, p. 28) states, “diaspora cultures and identities have been theorized from a wide range of perspectives. However, the majority of such theorization has come from the Global North, a development that has invisibilized other alternative epistemologies, particularly those from the Global South’. Proposing a ‘decolonial epistemology”, Ndhlovu argues for a “push for the recognition of alternative knowledges and alternative ways of conceptualizing cultural identities in order to both counter and complement dominant Euro-American epistemologies” (ibid., p. 37). This insightful observation must be incorporated into future leisure theorizing, directing us towards the study of diasporas and perspectives outside, or not moving towards, the Global North.

This chapter has highlighted the under-developed relationship between studies of leisure and diaspora. It has outlined some of the underlying key concepts, ideas and critiques of how the term has been used in the scholarly literature. It has documented some important contemporary trends and analyses around leisure and migration. Lastly, using some of my own work, it has shown how diaspora can be usefully employed to help us understand a variety of leisure identities, practices and phenomena. Diaspora offers scholars a dynamic framework for understanding the ways that migrants and subsequent generations orient themselves in relation to their multiple global selves and sites/sights of past, present and future lives. The opportunity—indeed arguably the *onus*—now falls on leisure scholars to make it a more central part of the theoretical and conceptual tool kit, both as a means of understanding the transnational dis/connections between leisured bodies, identities and spaces and in terms of decentering dominant ideas around the components and ramifications of migrants’ and subsequent generations’ leisure.

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You Make Me Feel Mighty Real: Hyperreality and Leisure Theory

Steve Redhead

Introduction

This chapter in this *Handbook of Leisure Theory* looks at the idea of hyperreality and related concepts in the recent development of theoretical and empirical work in Leisure Studies, especially since the global financial crisis of 2007/2008, the effects of which still permeate our fractured globe. The aim is to produce better theorising of these concepts in leisure theory and ultimately better empirical work on our rapidly digitising world in its wake. After pioneering work on “digital sociology” (Lupton 2014) what is in store for Leisure Studies? Digital Leisure Studies with hyperreality incorporated? On the brink of Digital Leisure Studies, what critical theoretical resources can we turn to?

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Alongside the neo-communism of Alain Badiou (Badiou 2010) and Slavoj Žižek (Žižek 2014a), the late Jean Baudrillard is, in my view, one of the select few resources we have left to shine a bright theoretical light on the ravages of post-crash leisure culture. Baudrillard died in March 2007 when the global financial crisis from which we are still suffering was just around the corner. His work on such features pre-crash remarkably was (unlike many other comparable theorists) extremely prescient and revealed a subtle and sophisticated analysis of the history and contours of neo-liberalism from the early 1970s (Gane 2015; Baldwin 2015). This present chapter is a part of long-term work on the post-crash global condition and the narrow theoretical ledge we now inhabit (Redhead 2016), utilising theorists such as Jean Baudrillard, Alain Badiou, and Slavoj Žižek to make more sense of this condition for Leisure Studies. Consequently, this chapter looks at hyperreality in terms of a posthumously re-interpreted figure, Jean Baudrillard (Redhead 2015, 2016) and the way in which there is a possible convergence with the current work of Slavoj Žižek (Hamza 2015) and Alain Badiou (Badiou 2012; Ruda 2015). Connections between the three of them are complex and sometimes somewhat bizarre. For example, punk: Žižek corresponded with one of the Russian punk band Pussy Riot in an extended series of prison letters (Tolokonnikova and Žižek 2014) and Baudrillard once dressed in a gold lame jacket with mirrored lapels reading his punk poem “Motel Suicide” at Whiskey Pete’s in Las Vegas (Redhead 2008). All three theorists were connected in the past to Maoism (Badiou 2010: 261–279), especially Baudrillard and Badiou in France. Although Baudrillard was interested in psychoanalysis in general, Badiou and Žižek are steeped in specifically Lacanian psychoanalytic theory (Badiou 2009, pp. 1–5; Lacan 2008; Roudinesco 2014; Badiou and Roudinesco 2014; Badiou and Žižek 2009) of “the real”—or as Žižek proclaimed—Twitter-like, in less than 140 characters in the wake of 9/11, “Welcome to the Desert of the Real!” (Žižek 2002). Also there was an important implied shared critique of Michel Foucault’s “anti-statism” (and by implication Foucault’s own closet neo-liberal sympathies) in the work of Baudrillard, Badiou, and Žižek which binds them together on the present theoretical continuum. Finally, all three figures are among the foremost theorists of neo-liberalism and of the causes of the global meltdown and its aftermath.

I am interested here in this chapter on how the combination of the three named distinct, singular theorists might change leisure theory and its ongoing engagement with the concept of hyperreality, in this post-crash context. One direction that may be productive in this context for the future of the discipline is to consider developments in other disciplines/subject areas alongside Leisure Studies—in what has been called “deviant leisure” for example. There is no space here but in criminology, the “ultra-realist” work of Steve Hall and Simon Winlow has incorporated elements of the work of Žižek, Badiou, and Lacan to produce a radically different take on crime, deviancy, and harm in capitalism from a “transcendental materialist” perspective (Johnston 2014). Ultra-realism here is necessary to capture the “ultra-real” of contemporary capitalism and can be applied to the international empirical work I have done in “deviant leisure” on football hooligans and football ultras (Redhead 2014).

You Make Me Feel (Mighty Real): The Real and the Hyperreal

What is hyperreality? Jean Baudrillard throughout his long writing career since the early 1950s was associated with the idea of hyperreality. Re-reading today a Jean Baudrillard book like the expanded, second edition of *The Spirit of Terrorism* (Baudrillard 2004), first written in the months after the “event” of 9/11, it is obvious that Baudrillard’s “requiem for the twin towers” that saw him vilified internationally, but especially in America, is wholly dependent on his subtle development of the concept of symbolic exchange although his work was even then being seen as framed by hyperreality. Symbolic exchange¹ is uppermost in the text though ideas of the real, reality, and hyperreality were prominent in media commentary and publicity around the 2002 Verso book

¹ Symbolic exchange in Baudrillard’s work in part relates to the gift economy in pre-modern barter societies, where the idea of exchanges of “gifts” rather than commodities is prominent. But Baudrillard’s notion of symbolic exchange goes further than this and forms part of a general critique of reality in both modernity and postmodernity which he makes in his work.

mini-series which also included an enigmatic book by Baudrillard's long-time friend, Paul Virilio and Slavoj Žižek's own five-essay discourse on hyperreality—entitled as we have seen *Welcome to The Desert of the Real!* (Žižek 2002). Oddly, Žižek's book managed, somehow, not to engage with Baudrillard on what was then regarded as his own “hyper-real” terrain. Jean Baudrillard's mid-life epiphany with regard to symbolic exchange came in San Diego in America in the mid-1970s when teaching with the global theorists Fredric Jameson, Michel de Certeau, and Jean-Francois Lyotard. Baudrillard came to the realisation that, in Sylvère Lotringer's words, society was “losing all its moorings” (Baudrillard 2010, p. 11). The precise and productive structure of symbolic exchange in Baudrillard's work was quickly born and the following 30 years of his oeuvre unfolded accordingly. As Lotringer, who was geographically present on the West Coast of the USA some of this time, recalls, the speed at which Baudrillard wrote his great tome *Symbolic Exchange and Death* (Baudrillard 1993) manifestly signified its importance to him. The watershed nature of this book in Baudrillard's life and times is also noteworthy. The rest of Baudrillard's work after 1976 is, in some sense, an extended event of this mid-1970s history. Before leaving for Europe at the time of its construction, Baudrillard wrote furiously about the anthropology of symbolic exchange. Lotringer, as the Semiotext(e) publisher of a lot of the English language work of Baudrillard, tells us in the fascinating introduction to Baudrillard's posthumously published *The Agony of Power* (Baudrillard 2010) much about the genesis of this major work. This key book in the Baudrillard pantheon was actually written at a frantic pace as if new theory had literally emerged at the “speed of light” (Redhead 2011). The book was originally published in 1976 in French but not really fully read or appreciated by English-speaking theorists and students until very much later. Crucially, this work contained the theory of reversibility which would become so important to Baudrillard's writing until his own death in 2007. As Lotringer puts it succinctly “reversibility is the form death takes in a symbolic exchange” (Baudrillard 2010, p. 14). For sociologist Mike Gane, the best global interpreter of Baudrillard (Gane and Mahoney 2014), the notion of symbolic exchange is fundamental because:

what interests Baudrillard is the fact that gifts are obligatory, they are a form of empowerment through debt, and the counter-gift cancels this power and any accumulation. This counter-gift is conceived by Baudrillard as a kind of reversibility which annuls power, a reversibility that is founded on the fundamental dualism of the world.

(Gane in Smith 2010, p. 211)

Gane contends that “symbolic exchange is perhaps the most central of Baudrillard’s terms and yet the most allusive” (Smith 2010, p. 210). He further claims that “the concept of symbolic exchange is the basis of Baudrillard’s critical thinking of contemporary societies, and in this sense is comparable to Marx’s notion of communism” (Smith 2010, p. 211). Mike Gane has developed his ideas on Baudrillard’s array of concepts using “symbolic exchange” as the root. Reality and hyperreality for Baudrillard, as Gane explains, are constructions and not in any way “given”. On reality and hyperreality, Gane argues:

Baudrillard’s work involves a consistent effort to chart and theorise what happens to the idea of “reality” in western cultures. For most readers this is paradoxical since it is assumed that “reality” is universal and it might seem absurd to think that there are societies which do not encounter the real world. For Baudrillard, however, the idea of the real and the real world is a cultural construction, certainly linked to the sciences and technology. When the real is born it engenders a profound modification from the primordial cultures which are symbolic to modern cultures that are organised around signs... It is one of Baudrillard’s most provocative ideas that in contemporary cultures from the middle of the twentieth century there is a return to a situation in which the reality principle is once more questioned and abandoned.

(Gane in Smith 2010, p. 95)

Hyperreality has indeed been so accelerated in global leisure culture that it has almost doubled back on itself. As we shall see later in this chapter, this has “caught out” the theorists and theory too. It is more real than real, in a sense. As Sylvester sang at the height of disco in 1978 “You Make Me Feel (Mighty Real)”. If in our Leisure Studies practice and leisure theory work we are looking at Reality TV, celebrity culture including

intellectuals, sporting World Cups, contemporary art, cloning, the Arab Spring (Zizek 2012), or Disneyfied America, we are exploring the realm of the hyperreal. In my own area of work on deviant leisure and digital football cultures, Baudrillard and hyperreality have been applied to subjects such as fan forums and fan identities, football celebrity culture and social media, and video gamers, cyber hooligans, and hate crime. Even disasters like the deaths of 96 Liverpool FC football fans at Hillsborough in April 1989 and its aftermath have received this Baudrillardian treatment (MacIntosh 2014). In popular culture too (dead) Baudrillard is still, in a way, everywhere. Baudrillard devotees can still buy, wear, and read the special T-shirt made by the Philosophy Football company, sporting outfitters of intellectual distinction. The shirt is “Chelsea” blue, with the number 3 and the name Baudrillard on the back, and an abbreviated Baudrillard quotation on the front. The words “Power is only too happy to make football bear a diabolical responsibility for stupefying the masses” are emblazoned on it.

For Jean Baudrillard, the process of hyperreality, which has been historically associated with Baudrillard’s canon of concepts although it partly “disappeared” as his work went on (Smith and Clarke 2015), meant that that “the real” has become transformed in such a way that as the virtual takes over, the real, in its simulation, has scooped up its own images. For Baudrillard the real can no longer be thought separately from the image. We live today, he argued, in “integral reality”. Baudrillard’s theory of symbolic exchange is integral to such explanations (Redhead 2015) and is fundamental to his theory of power (Redhead 2012, 2016). Jean Baudrillard’s two key ideas throughout his work were that, first, reality had disappeared and became replaced by simulation and simulacra and the virtual and, second, that there was a potential symbolic challenge in this disappearance. For Mike Gane:

identification of the hyper-real as a stage in the cultural development marked by the appearance of the mass media is framed by Baudrillard’s general theory of the transition from the bourgeois culture of drama and the spectacle to that of a mass culture mediated by television and computers. Hyper-reality is a precursor of virtual reality.

(Gane in Smith 2010, p. 95)

Further, Gane sees that “the way in which modern cultures implode...the hyper-real is that which moves towards the ‘more real than real’. Indeed as reality decamps into the image the image ironically absorbs the space of the real” (Gane in Smith 2010, p. 96). In what he always sees as “radical uncertainty”, Baudrillard himself points out that:

there is a risk of the subject being taken hostage, in a way, by his own tool. However, I do not see a doom-laden phenomenon there. I would side more with Leo Scheer, when he says that virtuality, being itself virtual, does not really happen. To make the network operate for the network, by a machine whose end is to operate at all costs, is not to give it a will.

(Clarke and Smith 2015, p. 110)

Baudrillard argues for seeing a “radical uncertainty” in the world which is not just about a dark side or bright side of the virtual world:

I don’t think it is possible to find a politics of virtuality, a code of ethics of virtuality, because virtuality virtualises politics as well; there will be no politics of virtuality because politics has become virtual; there will be no code of ethics of virtuality, because the code of ethics has become virtual, that is, there are no more references to a value system. I am not making a nostalgic note there: virtuality retranscribes everything in its space; in a way, human ends vanish into thin air in virtuality. It is not a doom-laden danger in the sense of an explosion, but rather a passage through an indefinable space, a kind of radical uncertainty.

(Clarke and Smith 2015, p. 110)

The space for Baudrillard is a “screen”, which is “pure surface” (Smith and Clarke 2015, p. 31). There is an “immanence of the hyperreal” and we are all caught in it, changing intellectual culture for ever. Indeed for Baudrillard “there are no longer any intellectual positions in the traditional sense” (Smith and Clarke 2015, p. 32). Baudrillard in his lifetime, as critical commentators have recently noted, often endured a reading of his work which “became fixated on a handful of concepts—most notably ‘postmodernism’, ‘simulation’ and ‘hyperreality’” (Smith et al. 2011, p. 326). Focus on “telemorphosis” (Genosko 2015), “integral reality”, “dystopia”, and “apocalypticism”, conditions more attuned to

the forthcoming 2007/8 global financial crisis were actually much more common in the various works in the 2000s (Featherstone 2011) before his death in 2007 than works on postmodernism, simulation, and hyperreality. In many ways, integral reality replaced hyperreality in his lexicon. In the words of some commentators, his interests moved over time “from hyperreality to disappearance” (Smith and Clarke 2015, p. 1). For some astute writers on Baudrillard, from this theoretical starting point there can be a radical theory of society in Baudrillard’s work compatible with earlier French theorists like Bataille (Pawlett 2013). As some of these critical commentators, and re-interpreters of Baudrillard and his significance, have rightly pointed out:

While it is perhaps understandable that this situation should have arisen, particularly given Baudrillard’s initial reception within the English-speaking world as the “high priest” of postmodernism, it is far from an accurate portrayal of the potential Baudrillard’s work offers, or indeed, of Baudrillard himself. It is telling that the waning of interest in the postmodern since the 1990s has not, in fact, led to a corresponding decline of interest in Baudrillard. On the contrary, now that his work is no longer interpreted in the one dimensional terms dictated by the modern/postmodern debate, a far, fuller, richer, and more diverse understanding and appreciation of Baudrillard’s import is beginning to emerge.

(Smith et al. 2011, p. 326)

As Richard Smith, editor of *The Baudrillard Dictionary* has noted,

rather than a ‘postmodernist’ Baudrillard was in fact a trenchant critic of many of the taken-for-granted features of advanced capitalism and western culture—consumerism, the postmodern celebration of pluralism and ‘diversity’, globalisation, capitalism, modernity, mass communication and the information economy—as destroyers of the act and social relation of symbolic exchange.

(Smith 2010, p. 1)

Indeed, Jean Baudrillard is really best conceived of as a “non-postmodernist” theorist of “non-postmodernity” (Redhead 2008) as I have myself argued.

Hyperreal Theorists: Post-theory and Hyperreality

Ironically, theorists like Baudrillard themselves now occupy a kind of “immanence of hyperreality” where there are “no intellectual positions in the traditional sense”, whether or not they are dead or alive. In Mike Gane’s definition of the hyperreal, they are part of “a popular culture which breaks down the difference between the real and the artifice’ and a reality where ‘the real is no longer real’” (Gane in Smith 2010, p. 96). It is a contemporary culture where a “hyperreal culture invades all spheres...especially information” (Gane in Smith 2010, p. 97). The theorists are no longer bound by disciplinarity—as Baudrillard once was as a University sociology academic (Smith and Clarke 2015). It is, in this context, worth taking stock of the relationship between the “post-crash” global society and contemporary theory, and new disciplinary and interdisciplinary movements. What I label here in this chapter, Digital Leisure Studies is one such putative movement. Fortunately, we live, interestingly, in what are, in my view, “theoretical times” (Redhead 2016). Study has attached itself to what I call “post-theory” (Redhead 2011) and to contemporary critical theorists on a completely new scale, and Leisure Studies is to some extent playing catch up with the hyperreality of global celebrity intellectual culture which has mushroomed partly as a result of burgeoning digital profiles, a consequence of our common tendency to live life online in a seemingly permanent state of “play” and leisure even if we are at “work” and selling our “labour power” in the same old way (Badiou 2010). The celebrity intellectual culture, which has developed very quickly over the past few years since the millennium, has produced myriad YouTube appearances by myriad “theorists as rock stars” as well as open access online journals devoted to these theorists and the minutiae of their theories. For instance, theorists such as Jean Baudrillard, Alain Badiou, and Slavoj Žižek have their own dedicated online open access journals. The *International Journal of Baudrillard Studies* began in 2004, the *International Journal of Žižek Studies* began in 2007, and *Badiou Studies* began in 2012. Dictionaries devoted to Žižek (Butler 2014), Baudrillard (Smith 2010), and Badiou (Corcoran 2015) have also started

to be written, published, and consumed to considerable international acclaim. In some senses, in the interstices of this hyperreality, disciplines have been superseded. We have become post-disciplinary in our interdisciplinarity. Leisure Studies is no exception to these upheavals, and the “digital turn” has simply emphasised the need for a new and more critical perspective and substantial innovative thinking. For theorists like Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou, a return to universalism, and universal concepts, following the relativist concepts of the so-called postmodern era, is absolutely crucial. For them globalisation is always something as part of the neo-liberal era to be avoided; universalism is a part of the neo-communist fight back. This issue of universalism and universality raises important issues on how, for instance, Baudrillard, Žižek, or Badiou’s work encompasses feminist or queer studies concerns. It also forces us to think how previously “postmodernised” fields such as Leisure Studies and digital leisure cultures can be transformed by the renewed use of universal concepts, such as, for instance in the case of the three theorists I have selected, communism, justice, love, and harm.

I have contended that Baudrillard remains, along with a small “pantheon” of fellow theorists such as Alain Badiou (Badiou 2009) and the “Slovenian Lacan” (Irwin and Motoh 2014), Slavoj Žižek, a necessary if insufficient resource for the millions of followers who gather on the precarious vantage point of social media and other virtual communities after the uneven global shocks of the recent past. Theory, though, and theorists are no longer optional or marginal: they are central to reconstruction—political, economic, cultural, and social in so-called “postmodern capitalism”. As Slavoj Žižek himself has gently reminded us “today is the *time for theory*... These are, and not just in a cynical way, the proofs of our interesting times... it is a very good effect of postmodern capitalism that everyone is given a chance” (Žižek 2013, pp. 32–34). The current watershed for theory is the global financial crisis, a global mega event, a radical political rupture, an “event” of the kind envisaged by Slavoj Žižek in his work on “Philosophy in Transit” (Žižek 2014b). For Žižek, after such an event nothing remains the same, even if there are no obvious large changes. The crash has been seen as a fatal consequence of a post-millennial catastrophic search for “fool’s gold” in the shadow banking system. Now, we are “after the goldrush”, as Neil Young once succinctly put it in the

early 1970s when yet another “capitalist crisis” was manifesting itself and furthermore weirdly “post-catastrophe” (Redhead 2011), a frantic search for theory is beginning again. The order of the day, according to some theorists, is theory after “theory” (Elliott and Attridge 2011). This is what I have described as a “claustropolitanism” in the air (Redhead 2011). In other words, we feel increasingly closed in—foreclosed we might say in linking this to the sub-prime mortgage saga—and more than ready to exit the small planet we inhabit. The narrow theoretical ledge from which to view this claustropolitanism passing by at the speed of light seems more precarious by the minute but finding space on it to theorise anew is a necessary condition for survival. As English group Fairport Convention sang in “Meet on the Ledge”—“The Way Is Up, Along The Road, The Air is Growing Thin”—on the album *What We Did On Our Holidays*, recorded in the immediate wake of May 1968, explaining partly why “we are still the contemporaries of May 68” as Alain Badiou has put it (Badiou 2010, pp. 41–100). Where though can we look for resources, for maps, and routes out of the quicksand? Fifty-year-old texts, such as Louis Althusser and Etienne Balibar’s *Reading Capital* (Althusser and Balibar 2009) from 1965², have been the subject of whole international conferences, and overflowing conventions committed to theorising a new, resurrected communism for the contemporary world are regularly occurring (Zizek 2013, 2014a, b) as far apart as England, USA, Germany, and South Korea as the search for neo-communist answers to the ravages of contemporary neo-liberalism continues apace.

The global financial crisis was followed by a brief “global Keynesianism” (Blyth 2013) before a return to business as usual and an even more brutal neo-liberalism (Mirowski 2013). Discipline after discipline in the academic world has agonised over whether the tenets of yesteryear still hold good after this earth-shattering event. This “turn” has been mostly from the left not the right and the new “new left” at that. This process, displaying

² The Louis Althusser/Etienne Balibar version was first published in 1968. An abridged version of the original 1965 text by Althusser and Balibar and also Ranciere, Macherey and Establet was published by Maspero as *Lire Le Capital Vols 1 and 2*. Althusser’s co-author Etienne Balibar himself was one of the speakers at the Princeton University conference in the USA in November 2013, which celebrated the publication, 48 years previously, of Althusser and Balibar’s continuously influential book.

the power of “agony” (Redhead 2012), has, for instance, already begun in a re-energised contemporary Political Economy (Lapavitsas 2013) which attempts to “demystify finance” and show “how finance exploits us all”. Also, after Cultural Studies lost its way as some have known it, other founding fathers have asked agonisingly “what is the future of cultural studies?” Further, Criminology has charted new directions away from both neo-liberalism *and* liberal postmodernism (Hall and Winlow 2015) and towards a new “ultra-realism”. In turn, Legal Studies has renewed its call for a “new interdisciplinary legal studies”, incorporating new critical legal theory and the re-discovery of “critical legal thinkers” and for “law and critique” and “critical legal studies” as never before. Even economists, largely in thrall to neo-liberalism in the first place, have asked “what is there left of economics after the (economic) crisis?” whilst all the while re-generating neo-liberal economics (Mirowski 2013). Psychoanalysis, once again, has renewed its love/hate relationship with Jacques Lacan’s life and work (Lacan 2008; Roudinesco 2014; Badiou and Roudinesco 2014). Theology has moved beyond its previous terrain to look at “God in Pain” (Zizek and Gunjevic 2012) and a materialist Christianity, whereas Philosophy has returned to German idealism, Hegel, Marx, and dialectical materialism (Zizek 2013, 2014a, b; Badiou 2010, 2012) to forge a transcendental materialism (Johnston 2014). Philosophy, furthermore, has mused about whether it still has the power to explain contemporary events like the 2011 riots in the UK and the various aspects of the Arab Spring (Zizek 2012, 2013; Badiou 2010, 2012; Badiou and Zizek 2009) in the way that, for instance, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels once analysed the revolutions in Europe in 1848 (Badiou 2010, 2012; Zizek 2013, 2014a).

Leisure Studies cannot escape this baring of the soul and my nomination of the three theorists (Baudrillard, Zizek, and Badiou) and the re-interpretation of hyperreality which this involves points to a route out of the post-theory disciplinary impasse for the study of leisure in the future. As pointed out in the beginning of the chapter, using Mike Gane’s entries in *The Baudrillard Dictionary* (Smith 2010), Baudrillard’s notion of hyperreality is integrally related to the overall task of charting and theorising of what happens to the idea of “reality” in western cultures, especially since the middle of the last century. For Baudrillard, in Mike

Gane's view, hyperreality was a stage in cultural development marked by "the appearance of the mass media" and was a "precursor of virtual reality" (Gane in Smith 2010, p. 95). As we have seen in this chapter, the irony is that Jean Baudrillard and his fellow theorists became caught up inextricably in a celebrity intellectual culture which itself was part of depthless hyperreality, a "complex hybrid of origin and artificiality" (Smith and Clarke 2015, p. 26).

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Leisure in the Current Interregnum: Exploring the Social Theories of Anthony Giddens and Zygmunt Bauman

Spencer Swain

Introduction

The term “interregnum” in my title characterises the uncertainty and insecurity in the period that has followed the “death” of modernity. This concept, coined by the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci (1978), was historically used to describe the constitutional gap between ruling monarchs. Gramsci employed it to discuss changing social, cultural, political and economic epochs: an old order no longer accurately describes social conditions, what ideas are supplanting them? I am using the idea of an interregnum to theorise leisure, once “ruled” by the conditions of modernity, yet awaiting the “coronation” of another set of ideas. This interregnum, and what may come next, is explored through the theoretical works of “reflexive modernity” (Giddens 1991, 1993, 1994) and “liquid modernity” (Bauman 2000, 2007). These theories help to evaluate how

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societal transformation, characterised by individualism, globalisation and consumerism, has affected public leisure. Additional theorisations by Bauman (1988) and Fromm (1984 [1941]) articulate how perceived increases in personal freedoms have fostered feelings of uncertainty and insecurity, representing a form of excess freedom that becomes “negative freedom”. The chapter constructs an understanding of leisure built around a balance between personal autonomy invoked through individual liberty and social security provided through democratic state institutions. At heart, the chapter places leisure at the centre of a political system that invokes a sense of “positive freedom”, through promoting democratic values, which enable people to experience sentiments of security and tolerance in their leisure time. In order to develop the idea of the interregnum, the chapter starts with leisure during the period of modernity.

Leisure in Modernity

During the middle of the eighteenth century—a period referred to by historians as “The Age of Enlightenment”—society experienced an avalanche of social changes, brought about by rational scientific thinking that attempted to order society around universal laws. These laws helped propagate a change in how members of the population understood the social and natural world around them, a process which led to a shift in theoretical reasoning. The consequences of this led to the myths and traditions that had previously guided individuals within traditional society—based on the principles of religion and superstition—to be gradually dismantled and replaced by a secular world guided by the hand of science (Bauman 1989). This transition gave birth to the modern world, characterised by philosophers as the period of modernity. At its core, this epoch constituted three distinct vicissitudes. The first centred on the realisation that the world was open to transformation by human intervention. The second saw economic advancements aided by the spread of industrialisation and the subsequent development of market-based economies. While the third forged political institutions built on the underlining principles of the nation-state and mass democracy (Giddens 1998).

The development of scientific rationality, the legislative method of reason, the marking of boundaries and distinctions between social phenomenon promoted an understanding of the social world through standardised categories: one prominent example being the distinction between work and leisure Bauman (1991, p. 24) explained:

Hence the two-pronged task merges into one: that of making the boundary of the “organic structure” sharp and clearly marked, which means “excluding the middle”, suppressing or exterminating everything ambiguous, everything that sits astride the barricade and thus compromises the vital distinction between inside and outside. Building and keeping order means making friends and fighting enemies. First and foremost, however, it means purging ambivalence.

This search for order delegitimised all forms of knowledge that it perceived to be philosophically uncontrollable (Blackshaw 2005). The consequences of which caused the institutions of modernity to devise an efficient method that manifested itself in the form of a machine-like bureaucracy and state structure. This had the effect of making governmental structures and rationalities appear unchallengeable and rigid. Subsequently, the institutions of modernity made ethics their concern, because they would not “entrust the judgement of right and wrong to the people themselves” (Bauman 1995, p. 10). In particular, this environment facilitated the implementation of a “bureaucratic rationality”, which moulded society into a “calculative enterprise”, leaving individuals consigned to specific social positions that were clearly marked and policed.

The process of structuring society around rigid classifications and ethical legislations produced “an age of artificial order and grand societal designs, the era of planners, visionaries and more generally gardeners who treat society as a virgin plot of land to be expertly designed” (Bauman 1991, p. 113). Leisure was in no way immune from this order, a point mentioned by Snape and Pussard (2013, p. 2) who articulate how the political institutions of modernity saw leisure as something to be “both feared and welcomed”. The ambivalence that leisure time created led to a situation where the “culture of free time” had to be managed, due to

its propensity to incite a variety of forces. In particular, such forces were seen, on the one hand, as contriving to represent a site of social renewal, through helping to promote a more “civilised” way of life, while on the other, fuelling fear about the potential for rebellion and social upheaval. Russell (2013) explains how this facilitated a situation where leisure became managed under the auspices of the “rational recreation” movement. This movement—actively supported by the British government—sought to order and structure leisure around a more functionalist cause, by negating its potentially disruptive nature.

It was this fear that caused the political institutions of modernity to mould leisure into a part of daily life that facilitated an “explicit link between the moral fibre of the ruling classes and physical activity (... while attempting) to combat degeneracy and immorality” (Spracklen 2011, p. 150). A pertinent example of this legislative attitude was the Whitsuntide festival in Victorian Oxfordshire, an event that was “tamed” from several days of feasting, copious amounts of alcohol consumption and blood sports. This was reconstructed instead as a “one-day event combining moderate drinking (or none at all) with cricket, brass bands and all the fun of the fete” (Russell 2013, p. 23). The reasoning behind this shift was that leisure should embrace a part of social life assembled around the principles of ethical forms of physical and mental engagement. This philosophy exposed the view expressed by many administrative institutions that leisure exemplified a site of social life that could help replenish the bodies of workers after the toil of manual labour; induce nostalgic nationalistic sentiments of pride; and reduce the propensity of the population to rebel (Borsay 2006).

The Current Interregnum

Towards the latter half of the twentieth century, this stage of modernity began to collapse, mainly as a consequence of technological advancements that allowed a variety of different cultural influences to permeate the borders of the nation-state (Beck 1992). In particular, devices such as TVs and radios provided individuals with commentaries and insights that went against the legislative principles endorsed by the institutions

of the state. Leisure was in no way immune from this change; in fact, it could be argued that it was a central catalyst behind this transformation, due in part to the influence that external media sources had upon the cultural dynamics of the population (Snape and Pussard 2013). This was seen in the way pirate radio stations, television shows and cinema exposed western populations to cultural influences that went against the strict ethical mores espoused by national governments. In particular, this culminated in a landslide of protests directed towards the political institutions of modernity, under the guise of new youth subcultures which challenged hierarchical discourses, political struggles in the form of the “Civil Rights” movement and anti-war protests which culminated in calls for nuclear disarmament (Hall 2011).

As the institutions of the nation-state began to flounder under the weight of such protest, a new economic charter came along to replace it. Neo-liberalism, a dogma characterised by free-market economics, privatisation and individualisation, symbolised the retreat of the state from everyday life (Beland 2007). This sudden transformation in the role of the state led many cultural theorists to reflect upon Antonio Gramsci’s (1971, p. 276) conceptual idea of an “interregnum”, used to describe the statutory gap between the death of one Monarch and the instalment of another—a process which brings about a “great variety of morbid symptoms”. Bauman (2010) builds upon this notion of an “interregnum”—by reimagining the concept and going beyond its original usage. In so doing, he described the uncertainty felt by the population of a society during a constitutional gap, by describing the ambiance created as a social order begins to fragment, at a time when there is no predetermined successor to take control. For Bauman, the interregnum describes how the old order of “solid modernity”, characterised by the unity of the nation-state, the marriage between power and politics and the artificial order induced by state institutions, is now falling away with no new “king” or “queen” made to the measure of the newly globalised world of “liquid modernity” to replace it. Bauman (2010, p. 120) explained:

When the extant legal frame of social order loses its grip and can no longer keep burgeoning social life on track, and a new frame, made to the measure of the newly emerged conditions responsible for making the old frame

useless, is still at the design stage, has not yet been fully assembled, or has not been made strong enough to be enforced and settled in place.

Subsequently, for the populations of economically developed countries, uncertainty lingers within the daily environment of contemporary life. Something, which manifests itself through the perceived lack of government leadership, has led to the view held by many that national politics no longer provides the remedies to the wide variety of social problems now faced by individuals in society (Zizek 2010). Leisure is troubled by these antagonisms, due in part to the way “neo-liberal ideologies regard people as ‘consumers’ rather than ‘producers’, representing a shift in the mode of contemporary citizenship, and the axis upon which identity is constructed in free market societies” (McDonald et al. 2007, p. 489). A point which highlights the importance of leisure time and the interpretations assigned to leisure choices is the way leisure now plays a key role in the construction of identity and the management of individual life projects. The uncertainty of this environment represents a major shift from the rigid identities that were commonplace in earlier societal epochs, where an individual’s biography and life project were ascribed to them at birth and narrated through a well-defined cultural framework (Giddens 1991), and leisure choices were largely controlled by the state.

This shift in citizen behaviours can be attributed to the unleashing of commodification and consumerism (Castells 2004). These forces have led individuals to invest in a variety of leisure practices and products that help them embark on a range of life projects. These life projects are perceived to provide members of society with more dynamism in navigating the shifting landscape of the social world (Baudrillard 1998). For many, it is felt that such changes have brought about a “politicisation of leisure” (Rojek 2001, p. 123), which, some now hail as an era of freedom for individuals who have the liberty to construct their own self-identities away from the scripted performances enforced by traditional society and the legislative institutions of the nation-state (Giddens 1991). For others, this only serves to expose a new form of social strife characterised by increased alienation and insecurity manifested through increased desires for togetherness and communion in an effort to stave off feelings of isolation (Bauman 2010).

The Current Interregnum in the Work of Giddens and Bauman

At the centre of the theoretical debate regarding the change in the socio-cultural fabric of modernity is the work of Anthony Giddens (1991) and Zygmunt Bauman (2000). Both theorists articulate the effects of globalisation, increasing levels of privatisation and individualisation and the ramifications of a shift from a production-based economy to a consumer-based one. While both understand the distinct effects this “interregnum” has had on the leisure lifestyles of individuals in western society, they take diverging paths in interpreting its consequences.

The work of Anthony Giddens (1991, 1993, 1994) theorises the liberating potentials offered through the demise of “simple modernity”. Giddens highlights how individuals are becoming free to formulate their biographical narratives and life projects through the use of abstract systems in the form of consumer markets. At its core, Giddens’ work “centres on questions of how we should live our lives in emancipated social circumstances” (Giddens and Cassell 1993, p. 34). A theme throughout this work is the concept of “reflexive modernity”, a stage in human development beyond the rigid setting of “simple modernity”. The main thrust of Giddens’ (1991, p. 214) argument is built on the concept of society being dis-embedded and re-embedded onto a new plain of existence, away from “the fixities of tradition and (...) conditions of hierarchical domination”. This process, he argues, is brought on by globalisation and the subsequent development of an international division of labour, which causes economic exchange to become “lifted out” of local communities and reconstituted over time and space.

A central component in the process of re-embedding is the use of “abstract systems”. These are made up of an amalgamation of “symbolic tokens” and “expert systems”: “Symbolic tokens are media of exchange which have standard value, and therefore interchangeable across a plurality of contexts” (Giddens and Cassell 1993, p. 292). An example of a “symbolic token” is monetary currency, which is both valued and compatible throughout the world. On the other hand, “expert systems” enable the bracketing of “time and space through deploying modes of

technical knowledge which have a validity independent of the practitioners and clients who make use of them” (Giddens and Cassell 1993, p. 292). “Abstract systems” penetrate virtually all aspects of society, influencing a range of leisure activities, from the food we eat to the clothes we wear. The consequences of this are seen as pivotal in delivering the populations of advanced industrial nations into the reflexive modern era, where individuals share in the reflexive application of knowledge to meet the challenges of an ever-changing, globally connected and consumer-oriented society.

As a result, social reflexivity becomes based on “information rather than pre-given modes of conduct. It is how we live after the retreat of tradition and nature, because of having to take so many forward orientated decisions” (Giddens and Pierson 1998, p. 115). In an environment exposed to a variety of “abstract systems”, individuals are encouraged to indulge in independent decision-making. An example of this can be seen in the way consumers choose which travel agent to book their holiday with, or which clothing label is understood to be at the height of fashion. Such decisions become central to managing biographical narratives, constructed away from the restraining forces of tradition and the regulations of the state. In Giddens’ theorisation, such a process represents a new form of social existence where the old structures of domination no longer restrict individual choice.

The dominance of “abstract systems” within contemporary society has also led the reflexive modern era to become synonymous with managing risk. Risk plays a substantive role in helping individuals navigate the current social landscape, with leisure time becoming a site where risk is managed on a daily basis (see chapter by Roberts “[Leisure, Risk and Reflexivity](#)”, this volume). The term relates to “the active assessment of future hazards” (Giddens 1998, p. 101) by individuals on a daily basis. However, this does not mean that “social life is inherently more risky than it used to be; for most people in the developed societies, this is not the case” (Giddens 1991, p. 3). Risk only becomes prominent in a reflexive society, because social life must be approached with a calculative attitude, in which the possibilities of future actions become confronted in a continuous way. This reflexive risk stands in contrast to traditional societies where life was fraught with dangers and hazards; in those days

“people didn’t think in terms of risk but much more in terms of fate or God-given fortune and misfortune” (Giddens and Pierson 1998, p. 103).

Risk-based reflexivity highlights Giddens’ (1991, p. 33) assertion about how “the self has to be explored and constructed as part of a reflexive process centred on personal and social change”. One theme which underlines this thinking is the way individuals partake in leisure activities and lifestyles of their choice, helping to develop identities and life projects that were previously “repressed by the core institutions of modernity” (Giddens 1991, p. 223). Individuals can exercise a degree of personal autonomy, and escape the socially embedded expectations which previously legislated their leisure time. A benefit of this in Giddens’ view is that it enables people to explore and experiment with their sense of self. Subsequently, a person’s leisure represents an important site in constructing reflexive life projects, through the consumption of commercialised goods, such as clothes, foods and cosmetic products, as well as consumer services in the form of holidays, therapies and communal gatherings such as festivals. Roberts (2004, p. 2) builds upon this understanding by articulating how leisure activities enable “consumers to be recognised as—and to feel like—particular kinds of people as a result of what they wear, eat, drink, what they listen to and watch, and where they are seen and who they are seen with”.

Consequently, in reflexive modernity the concept of leisure is employed to help individuals plot their life project through the help of life coaches, councillors and other therapists (Giddens and Pierson 1998). Roberts (2004, p. 2) explains the role of expertise in leisure: “it is not leisure goods, activities or services which confer identities. They come from the meanings which become associated with them”. For example, someone who wants to lose weight to develop a fit and toned body will be enticed by the range of fitness products and services on offer in the form of gym memberships and dietary supplements. Subsequently, these individuals must sift through this information, taking on board the reflexive arguments made by life coaches, general practitioners, personal trainers and lifestyle bloggers, who each provide their own “expert” opinion on each of the products and services on offer. The process of sifting through and listening to this information helps the consumer decipher the benefits of the products on offer. This process, in Giddens’ view, is performed on a

daily basis by individuals in their leisure time and is seen as promoting the “freedom” that each person has in constructing biographies and lifestyles through their own personal autonomy.

Giddens’ (1991) conceptualisations of leisure within “reflexive modernity” have been widely critiqued. In particular, his analysis of individuals creating biographical solutions that enable the development of various life projects is seen by many as narrating the prosperity of “the heroic consumer who connects freedom and social dynamism through the market pursuit of self-interest” (Slater 1997, p. 36). Arguably, such accounts fail to comprehend the “negative side of freedom—confusion, loneliness and feelings of individual insignificance and powerlessness” (Keller 2005, p. 219). Kennedy (2002, p. 188) explained that while such a theory celebrates the acquirement of personal freedom through consumer goods, far less is said about the fact that “not everyone can afford that choice”. Subsequently, Giddens’ understanding of leisure within the current interregnum, developed around the freedom of constructing one’s identity through navigating risk, is seen as falling dangerously close to promoting the concept of the “possessive individual” (Beland 2007, p. 102). Additionally, for Alexander (1996, p. 135):

There is something very Parsonian about Giddens lite. The pathologies and alienations of modernity are converted into positive reaffirmations about the powers of the modern self and the emancipating contributions that apolitical scientific experts make to the reconstruction of society.

Subsequently, Giddens’ interpretation of leisure within contemporary society fails to incorporate a broader understanding that the development of individual freedom centres heavily upon the monopolistic capitalist values of consumerism and identity creation. This problem magnifies how the individualised management of risk only serves to expose further the isolated nature of contemporary society; this process facilitates an “era of dis-embedding without re-embedding” (Bauman and Tester 2001, p. 89). This highlights how society has not been re-embedded onto a material plane that provides its tenants with security, but rather one that leaves them isolated from others, in a world devoid of comforting

patterns that facilitate feelings of togetherness and belonging. Such an argument centres upon asserting how members of society have become exposed to the vagrancies of a privatised economy, characterised by heightened feelings of individualisation and a subsequent fear about what the future might hold.

Bauman (2000, p. 2) explained this uncertain existence through the metaphor of liquidity: “while solids have clear spatial dimensions [...] fluids do not keep to any shape for long and are constantly ready and prone to change”. Accordingly, Bauman (2007) employed the terms “solid” and “liquid” to characterise these two distinct phases of modernity. The “solid” modern epoch sought to obliterate social forms of “contingency, variety, ambiguity, waywardness and idiosyncrasy” (p. 20). During “solid modernity”, order was set through the creation of spatial boundaries in the form of nation-states, principles of regulation, planning and standardisation to reduce and eventually eradicate uncertainty (Bauman 1987).

“Liquid modernity” can be understood as “solid modernity” coming to terms with the impossible task it set itself. It represents a stage of modernity “that consciously discards what it was once unconsciously doing” (Bauman 1991, p. 272), forming an interlacing contrast, whereby one cannot be discussed in isolation from the other. The transition from solidity to liquidity centred around the substitution of the reality principle for the pleasure principle and has seen the erosion of certainty, safety and security in daily life, leaving individuals “dis-embedded” from the close social ties offered by community and tradition. In its place has arrived the spectre of individualism, where “identity always remains a work in progress and is largely achieved through consumption” (Blackshaw 2005, p. 49). This environment leaves individuals deprived of any enduring legislative frames of reference, forcing many to deal with short, fragmented life projects. Subsequently, citizens experience “uncertainty in everything regarding the future” (Bauman 1997, p. 192) in an atmosphere brought about through the separation of power and politics, a marriage which had characterised the solid modern era and solidified control over space and time. As this divorce has taken effect, the state’s role in the daily lives of its citizens has diminished, because governments

can no longer wield power over the extraterritorial social forces that roam within their borders (Bauman 1998, 2004). For example, leisure services and provision that used to be run by the state are now controlled by a variety of private corporations with headquarters and operations based all around the globe.

Globalisation has led to a significant destabilisation in the principles that constituted solid modernity, due to the structural changes that have happened within the global economy, leading to the vanishing of borders. The consequences of globalisation have spread far deeper into society than the mere freeing of financial markets, as seen in the way that political and cultural dimensions which run in conjunction with globalisation have changed the relationship between the local and global, the domestic and foreign and the uniformity of the nation-state. This change has exposed individuals to the vagrancies of free-market forces, brought on by the spread of wide-reaching monetary and cultural systems, which continue to permeate national borders, influencing a broad range of issues from politics to the role of leisure (Beck 1994). This process has led to individual dependency shifting from the state to the free market, in the way individually produced solutions become sold as being able to solve social/globalised problems. Bauman (1997, p. 39) explains this in the following way:

The care of the human plight has been privatised, and the tools and practices of care deregulated, it is now individual wit and muscle that must be stretched in the daily struggle for survival and improvement.

The current social climate exudes uncertainty, which is “a powerful individualising force. It divides instead of uniting” (Bauman 2001, p. 24). The social theory of Erich Fromm (1984 [1941]) underpins Bauman’s ideas, articulating how the breakdown of old securities in the form of community and society has increased levels of anxiety. In Fromm’s view, people find solace in belief systems and social movements that bind them to wider social groups. Subsequently, when members of society become disconnected from these comforting patterns, they find themselves at the mercy of conforming to the expectations of others. This in Fromm’s

opinion is due to the essence of human nature, which centres upon the need to be related to the outside world:

To feel completely alone and isolated leads to mental disintegration just as physical starvation leads to death. This relatedness to others is not identical with physical contact. An individual may be alone in a physical sense for many years, and yet he may be related to ideas, values, or at least social patterns that give him a feeling of communion and “belonging”.

(Fromm 1984 [1941], p. 15)

This lack of relatedness to values, symbols and cultural patterns of social life, fostered within the social patterns of communities and wider society, results in feeling aloneness. Such feelings may come across as trivial, but being associated with the most basic pattern of social life is preferable to being entirely alone. Fromm (1984, p. 15) explained: “Religion and Nationalism, as well as any custom and any belief however absurd or degrading, if it only connects the individual with others, are refuges from what man most dreads: isolation”. Subsequently, in a world characterised by incessant individualisation, the retreat of the state and the fracturing of communities, individuals seek sites of security to which they can belong. Leisure therefore occupies a social space which takes on the impossible task of trying to provide sites of community and belonging, done via individualised, fragmented, consumeristic solutions. In these, we seek belonging, but the approach we take to achieve it only increases alienation and uncertainty.

Leisure Beyond the Interregnum

Navigating the insecure and uncertain environment of the “interregnum” forces many to flee from the “negative freedoms” induced by consumer society (Bauman 2000; Fromm 1984 [1941]). Leisure becomes a site of social life where feelings of anxiety and uncertainty have to be continuously managed. The consequences of this environment are brought on through the way in which the contours of the social world

move too fast for habits and routines—pillars of comfort provided by certainty—to have any chance of solidifying. Subsequently, citizens seek sites of togetherness, where they can reconceptualise their life projects and devise strategies to provide a greater degree of coherence. Leisure offers the location around which many of these antagonisms become expressed, a point unpacked in the work of Lawrence (2015), who exposes how football fans find a shared sense of cultural identity through supporting their local football team. However, this feeling of togetherness is a paradox, in the way the same fans place markers of division onto other supporters and cultural groups who do not conform to their interpretation of identity. Similarly, Blackshaw's (2003) ethnography of the leisure lives of men living in the wake of deindustrialisation in the north of England. Blackshaw explained how leisure facilitated a site of belonging, where men drank in the same neighbourhood pubs and participated in the same "lads" nights out; however, although such leisure activities provided them with a brief sense of security, they also served to incite division and resentment against those who they saw as disrupting the coherence of their imagined community. In so doing, this reminded them of their powerlessness in a world subjected to the forces of globalisation and capitalism that have changed and threatened their working and leisure lives.

These examples expose Giddens' (1991) theoretical understanding of risk-based reflexivity to further critique. The belief that encouraging individuals to seek extreme forms of freedom serves to expose increased insecurity and subsequent division (Fromm 1984 [1941]). Bauman (1995, p. 127) explained this in the following manner: "freedom without community means madness, while community without freedom means serfdom". For Bauman (2000), freedom does not refer to an incessant free will, but rather conveys itself through a relation to others. He explains that individuals cannot have freedom without dependency because the very prospect of being "free" is built around an aspiration to escape from dependency. Here, consumer-based freedom is problematic, acknowledging how "abstract systems" facilitate greater choice but fail to challenge the mechanisms that cause power to become channelled towards the consumer market. Subsequently, leisure is reduced to a "reproduction of the capitalist system (...) through 'individual freedom'" (Bauman 1988,

p. 61). This produces a paradox in which individuals disconnect from one another, at the same time as they seek security in social groups that create a sense of belonging.

Bauman's (2000) remedy focuses on the concept of "public freedom", a similar concept to Fromm's notion of "freedom to", which builds upon the classical Republican tradition of political participation. Bauman explains that "positive freedom" brings about involvement in public affairs, formulating open debates and negotiations between social groups without the presence of a dominant structure. Such a perspective sees the potential of leisure as a social site where members of the population can come together to debate and negotiate with one another, forging communicative rationalities. Central to this situation unfolding is the role of a democratic state management of leisure, which can provide members of society with space where "private problems are translated into the language of public issues, and public solutions are sought" to alleviate burgeoning individual insecurities (p. 39). The management of leisure through democratic institutions is seen as being central to enabling members of the polis to develop a genuine autonomy, which in turn can be used to facilitate an environment where individuals can exercise their right to self-assertion.

In conclusion, I have argued that leisure has come to symbolise a site of "negative freedom" in both the "solid" epoch of modernity and the "current interregnum". Giddens' (1991) and Bauman's (2000) theoretical frameworks have been used to explain the issues that characterised the deterministic thinking invoked by the legislative institutions of modernity, which sought to use leisure as a site of control. "Reflexive modernity" and its relativist perspective on leisure were critiqued for not recognising the feelings of uncertainty and divisiveness that an individualised, consumerist society exudes. Subsequently, the Republican tradition of democratic state institutions, which represent an alternative. Here, it is argued that leisure can play a prominent role in the creation of "positive freedom". Leisure offers a site in social life where individuals can come together to experience a balance between liberty and security, to develop ideas and identities fashioned around tolerance and moral responsibility.

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The Politics of Leisure Mobilities: Borders and Rebordering Processes in Europe

Kevin Hannam and Basagaitz Guereño-Omil

Introduction

On 15 January 2016, it was widely reported in the international media that a German town had banned male asylum seekers from a public swimming pool after women complained of harassment. This incident powerfully displays the tensions that are involved in contemporary mobilities. The asylum seekers in Germany and elsewhere have come to Europe from Syria, Afghanistan, and other countries in order to escape political persecution, war, and economic distress, among others. Their mobilities within Europe have also been widely discussed by politicians,

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the international media, and more recently in academic circles. This particular incident also highlights the politics of leisure mobilities. People move to do leisure activities but may face constraints and immobilities as they attempt to do so.

In this chapter, we draw upon work from the mobilities literature to further develop an understanding of the contemporary politics of leisure mobilities. While it may be argued that the study of leisure mobilities has antecedents in much earlier work by Veblen and later the Frankfurt School, research into contemporary mobilities is both quantitatively and qualitatively different (Rickly et al. 2016). Moreover, the study of mobilities is not just about researching movement but also about theorising different movements and their multiple interconnections. It also recognises the fundamental politics of mobilities such that we cannot conceptualise leisure mobilities without paying attention to issues of social exclusion (Coalter 1998; Cass et al. 2005) as well as wider geopolitical structures. Hence, in this chapter we consider leisure mobilities in relation to borders and processes of rebordering. Borders, on the one hand, are commonly seen as inhibitors of mobilities, but changes in border processes have led to greater porosity enabling an increase in cross-border leisure practices for those cosmopolitan individuals with the time and money to travel.

On the other hand, recent governmental responses to the refugee/asylum-seeker crisis and terrorist attacks have opened up new debates about reinforcing border controls and such rebordering affects the idea of a “borderless” Europe, which then leads to further leisure constraints. In this chapter, we discuss the politics of leisure mobilities through the analysis of the case of the Basque Eurocity as an example of a geographical area in which cross-border leisure mobility has been enabled. We then analyse the politics of the contemporary European refugee crisis as an example of the increased securitisation of leisure mobilities (see also Lisle 2013).

Mobilities Theory

When mobilities are thought of as constellations of movement, representation, and practice, we can think through a more finely developed politics of mobility, one that works with mobilities and immobilities

so as to deduce particular facets, such as motive force, speed, rhythm, route, experience, and friction (Cresswell 2010, p. 17). This framework provides new ways of thinking about the interconnectivity of different mobilities. Moreover, “[n]ot only does a mobilities perspective lead us to discard our usual notions of spatiality and scale, but it also undermines existing linear assumptions about temporality and timing, which often assume that actors are able to do only one thing at a time, and that events follow each other in a linear order” (Hannam 2009, p. 109).

The “mobilities turn” recognises that all mobilities involve, in one way or another, concomitant immobility (Sheller and Urry 2006). Mimi Sheller and John Urry (2006) claimed that a new mobilities paradigm was being developed based upon the fact that current social research needed to focus more attention to people’s systematic movements. This paradigm, therefore, has turned the sociological perspective to be centred on the analysis of societies in the context of the rise of multiple mobilities (Mavrič and Urry 2009). These multiple mobilities are, in a sense, the different levels and intensities of mobility, but also immobilities. The relations between mobilities and immobilities, places and moorings, movement and stillness (Hannam et al. 2006) are at the core of mobilities research (Sheller 2011).

As Sheller (2011, 2014) has argued, mobilities research in its broadest sense concerns not only physical movement but also potential movement, blocked movement, immobilisation, and forms of dwelling and place-making (see also Büscher and Urry 2009). Issues of uneven motility and of mobility rights, ethics, and justice have become crucial to the paradigm of mobilities research (e.g. see Bergmann and Sager 2008; Cresswell 2006, 2011; Uteng and Cresswell 2008). It requires attention to subaltern mobilities (and immobilities), as well as recognition of the importance of uprooting, dwelling, “homing,” and “grounding” (Ahmed et al. 2003; Sheller 2004, 2014).

The mobilities turn has come about at a similar time to other interdisciplinary and post-disciplinary approaches and theories which all inspire changes in perspective ranging from a move towards diachronic rather than synchronic analyses, a focus on fluid over fixed social patterns, and a widespread replacement of binary categories for the blurred boundaries of reality and virtuality (Cohen and Cohen 2012; Hannam et al. 2014;

Rickly et al. 2016). Similarly, Salazar has noted how “as a polymorphic concept, mobility invites us to renew our theorizing, especially regarding conventional themes such as culture, identity, and transnational relationships” (Salazar 2011, p. 576). Shifts towards phenomena in process and the collapse of dichotomies have inspired a new generation of scholars seeking a more inclusive reading of leisure practices that attend to not only mobility but also the politics and embodied nature of practices (Rickly et al. 2016).

Yet, as Salazar explains, “mobility is a contested ideological construct involving so much more than mere movement” (Salazar 2011, p. 576). Kaufmann (2002) and Urry (2000) have highlighted the ways in which notions of “society,” “nation,” and “global” have been replaced by multi-scalar assemblage analysis that takes into account the complex interweaving of different scales of politics, bodies, objects, and movement. Researchers employing a mobilities approach have challenged these notions further, especially as Cresswell (2010, p. 18) observes, in the contexts of physical movement, representations of movement, and experienced and embodied practices and, in this way, “mobility studies have begun to take the actual fact of movement seriously.” Hence, to argue that tourism or leisure is simply a particular form of mobility only begins to hint at its relations, as different mobilities inform and are informed by tourism and leisure (Sheller and Urry 2006; Hannam et al. 2014; Rickly et al. 2016).

Leisure Mobilities

Leisure is commonly conceived as a perceived freedom that can be chosen and practiced by individuals. Research has focused upon various leisure constraints which could “result in the inability to maintain or increase frequency of participation and/or lead to negative impacts on the quality of a leisure experience” (Hung and Petrick 2010, p. 209). However, a leisure mobilities perspective attempts to question the dichotomy between freedom and constraints by examining how the freedoms embodied in the discourses and practices of leisure often lead to other “unfreedoms” (Freudental-Pedersen 2009). Thus, for example, the freedom to drive

a car may lead to further obligations such as to take children to leisure activities which may be conceived as “unfreedoms” on the part of the car driver and care-giver (see Hannam 2016a; Waitt et al. 2016). Thus, we begin to see constellations of mobilities and immobilities based upon specific leisure practices.

It has been argued that leisure can be “viewed as a site for the reproduction (or at least reflection) of wider economic, social and cultural inequalities” (Coalter 1998, p. 23). In recent mobilities research, a concern with social inequalities and exclusion has developed analyses of the broader social mobilities and immobilities that have ensued in both western and non-western societies. For example, Cass, Shove, and Urry (2005, p. 539) have argued that “much of the literature on social exclusion ignores its ‘spatial’ or ‘mobility’ related aspects.” They thus examine the mobile processes and infrastructures of travel and transport that engender and reinforce social exclusion in contemporary societies through the notion of “access” to activities, values, and goods. In this vein, they note that, “[w]hat is necessary for full ‘social’ inclusion varies as the means and modes of mobility change and as the potential for ‘access’ develops with the emergence of new technologies such as charter flights, high speed trains, budget air travel, SUVs, mobile phones, networked computers and so on. These developments transform what is ‘necessary’ for full social inclusion” (Cass et al. 2005, p. 532).

A mobilities approach to leisure thus encourages us to think about how leisure experiences bring other mobilities into sync, or disorder, and as a result re-conceptualises social theory. In doing so, mobilities studies advance an agenda that thinks relationally about the politics that hinder, encourage, regulate, and inform mobilities at various scales, from the microbiological to the bodily to the national, as well as the mobility of information and non-human objects. Researching leisure mobilities involves an understanding of complex combinations of movement and stillness, realities and fantasies, play and work (Sheller and Urry 2004; Adey et al. 2013; Hannam et al. 2014; Rickly et al. 2016). Studies of leisure mobilities have begun to examine different forms of material and sociable dwelling-in-motion, places of and for various activities (Veijola and Falin 2014). These “activities” can include combinations of leisure, tourism, and work, almost always involving being connected,

maintaining a moving presence with others that holds the potential for many different convergences or divergences of global and local physical presence (Hannam et al. 2006, 2014; Rickly et al. 2016).

Current research in leisure mobilities thus challenges the conventional relationships between work, travel, and recreation, as leisure is woven into and across our everyday practices. For example, leisurely walking—in the form of meanderings—holds the promise of overlooked treasures and visual adventures (Collier 2016). Collier demonstrates the ways moving *slowly* can affect the experience of place, allowing one “to stop whenever and wherever they find something interesting to ‘explore’.” Leisure mobilities thus also foreground the role of the body and embodied practices. Bodies perform leisure and leisure puts bodies into motion, and in so doing, the performance of leisure produces social relations that rarely distinguish work/leisure and home/away as mutually exclusive. We can explore the politics of leisure mobilities further by engaging with recent literature on borders and processes of rebordering.

Borders and Leisure Mobilities

Recent cultural and social transformations illustrate that mobilities have become a central component of contemporary life but that borders and boundaries remain significant obstacles for some. This is even more visible and tangible within the European Union (EU). With the deregulation of European borders, the European Commission has sought to foster greater human and other mobilities across Europe, in an effort to transform national borders “from barriers into places of communication” (Prokkola 2007, p. 120). Rojek and Urry (1997, p. 90) formerly stated that globalisation brought the creation of new spaces for tourism, spaces in which “the boundaries between things—between people, places and cultures—are being transgressed and redrawn.” Dallen Timothy (2001, 2006) has discussed how borders can act as constraints and limit cross-border leisure and tourism mobilities, but also that contested national and urban borders can be viewed as destinations in themselves (see also Sofield 2006; Taylor 2007), and also as tourism landscape modifiers. However, it is not entirely clear how borders and boundaries affect leisure mobilities. The relationships between leisure mobilities and borders are

complex and multi-scalar since leisure practices often involve different places in-between borders.

Rob Shields (2006) distinguished between “borders” and “boundaries,” conceptualising “borders” as the more tangible separations between people, spaces, and territories encountered in daily life, whereas “boundaries” are distinctions which may be socially constructed as well as materially produced. Nevertheless, the constitution of both borders and boundaries is interwoven with strong imaginaries of territory and identity (Bialasiewicz and Minca 2010). As Rumford (2006, p. 159) has argued:

Borders may take the form of political boundaries and securitized perimeters but they are also increasingly mobile and dispersed, and, as a consequence, more commonly encountered and frequently traversed (although not by all). Importantly, borders are not experienced in the same way by all people.

In fleshing out such border imaginaries and materialities, Burrell (2008) has examined the significance of passports, car and coach journeys, suitcases, and laptops in airport lounges for Polish migrants in terms of their performances of mobilities. She argues that “the physical practice of journeying and border crossing is not an empty act, suspended in space and time between two realities, but is a highly materialised and emotional undertaking, and a real, tangible space in its own right” (Burrell 2008, p. 353).

Borders and boundaries have also been considered in terms of increasing securitisation (Amoore et al. 2008; Cresswell 2012; Richardson 2013; Jensen 2013). As Jensen (2013, pp. 37–38) argues:

Significantly, alongside the increased securitisation and intensification of border control for certain groups of people, e.g. migrants from Arab or African countries, there is an ongoing emergence of boundaries which reflect and represent difference and differentiation as experienced in daily lives, often connecting to identification and affiliation with particular groups of citizens or people.

This has led to research into a multiplicity of social inclusionary and exclusionary practices where different mobility regimes target the control

and governance of circulation through the development of new techniques in conjunction with and against mobile subjects (Kesselring and Vogl 2010; Jensen 2013).

Furthermore, Scuzzarello and Kinnvall (2013) have analysed the events in 2011 that led to the temporary closure of borders in France and in Denmark, and show how some European nation-states attempt to reclaim their power of border control and reinstate national identities through interventions in the Schengen Agreement.¹ Conversely, Cooper and Rumford (2013) have examined the significance of the development of border monuments such as the “Star of Caledonia” situated on the English/Scottish border in order to show how certain postnational borders have and are being (re)configured as visibly welcoming and “outward looking” for visitors. Significantly, Marcu (2016) has highlighted how cross-border mobilities are producing new geographies of the EU border and that on the one hand, “(re)bordering makes human mobility difficult, while, on the other hand, networked bordering facilitates mobility.” She emphasises that the flexibility of the European border allows people *to learn about mobility* as well as practice it. We can explore these issues further by examining firstly the case of the Basque Eurocity as an example of the development of increased leisure mobilities and, secondly, the politics of the contemporary European refugee crisis as an example of the increased securitisation of leisure mobilities (see Lisle 2013).

The Basque Eurocity: Enabling Leisure Mobilities

The Bayonne-San Sebastián Basque Eurocity is an interurban cooperation fostered by the communities on both sides of the French/Spanish border in the coastal area of the Basque Country. This initiative began in January 1993 and was developed by the Provincial Council of Gipuzkoa, in Spain, and the Community of Agglomeration Biarritz-Anglet-Bayonne (BAB), in France, in order to promote cooperation between institutions on both sides of the border. At that time, a strategy was developed with

¹ The Schengen agreement establishes that all EU citizen can travel, work and live in any EU country without special formalities, and therefore, cross international borders without being subjected to border checks (European Commission 2016).

the objective of transforming the disorganised urbanisation that straddled the 54 km between Bayonne and Donostia-San Sebastián and turning it into a new European city of over half a million inhabitants (Euro-ciudad 2003; Ahedo Gurrutxaga 2004).

Although there are significant differences between the communities on both sides of the border, there are also significant similarities in terms of economic development and, more importantly, the Basque culture and language that they share. The territory designated as the Basque Eurocity is one of the main corridors between France and Spain, between southern and northern Europe, and also between northern Europe and Africa. The possibility of the border as a constraint to people's cross-border mobility and leisure participation was based on the idea that, in general, people are afraid of crossing borders or develop a behaviour that involves not crossing the border. This concept was considered in *The White Paper of the Basque Eurocity* (2000), where it was argued that the border constituted a psychological and political constraint in the valuation of the cross-border territory and a significant inherited burden.

Cooperation between both sides of the border was not an easy goal due to national borders. However, transport infrastructures were one of the key instruments for the intervention of the administrations in both sides (Franco and Etxebarria 2005). Furthermore, there were also some institutions and organisations that worked together to show some signs of complementarity between two sides of the border. The public institutions of the province of Gipuzkoa and the Pyrenees Atlantiques signed an agreement in May 2016 to develop European projects of cross-border cooperation in priority competencies (Noticias de Gipuzkoa 2016a). Following this agreement, some joint actions have been undertaken. For instance, they have developed joint sports events and championships in both sides of the border in order to create a cross-border leisure community (Noticias de Gipuzkoa 2016b).

Nevertheless, Lozano Valencia (2007) has argued that the Basque Eurocity project has been less successful than what they thought it could be, due to political and administrative differences, as well as the insufficient funds (Arbaiza Álvarez 2006). Markusse (2011, p. 361) has argued that the absence of a Basque territorial authority on the French side of the border and the resistance of this government to Basque regionalist

demands have led to limits on cross-border mobilities. A lack of awareness about the constitution of the Basque Eurocity has also been a source of criticism, due to the fact that the actions and agreements between the institutions in both sides have not been explicitly demonstrated to the wider Basque public.

Indeed, empirical research identified four existing mobility styles—responding to different leisure orientations—in the cross-border area of the Basque Eurocity corridor (Guereño-Omil et al. 2013). This analysis highlighted different mobility patterns based upon motivations, cross-border leisure participation styles and values, attitudes, and lifestyles. The importance of nationality was highlighted in terms of the identification of different leisure patterns: the French were more orientated towards shopping experiences and the Spanish were more orientated towards relaxation and outdoor leisure experiences. This research demonstrated that while the border may be open, leisure practices remain informed by the border even in an era of increased mobilities. The proximity of the border played an important role in people's cross-border mobility such that people living closer to the border developed leisure mobility patterns that coexisted with the cross-border plan (Guereño-Omil 2010). The Basque Eurocity provides us with a recent example of the porosity of borders and increased leisure mobilities. In the second example discussed below, however, we can see that the politics of mobilities in Europe has also led to increased calls for rebordering and a restriction on leisure practices for new migrants and refugees.

Rebordering Europe: Refugees and Leisure Immobilities in Hungary

Since September 2015, the issue of refugees, asylum seekers, and/or migrants has entered centre stage in terms of the geopolitics between western Europe and eastern Europe with the centre of Europe and Hungary, in particular, being reimagined as a space of transit for those seeking a new life away from the fragility of becoming human in Syria, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. The reception that refugees faced on arrival in Europe was polarised between those, on the one hand, who welcomed

these new arrivals and, on the other hand, those who expected their governments to enforce the borders and prevent so-called abuse of the EU's system of asylum. As Kallius et al. (2016) noted:

Almost immediately there emerged in response a dialectic between, on the one hand, depoliticizing narratives of crisis that sought to immobilize the migrants and, on the other, concrete political mobilization that sought to facilitate their mobility.

As a consequence of these tensions, this led to the “mooring” of many potential refugees and migrants at the main railway station in Budapest, Hungary—a geopolitical space which was subsequently framed and reframed by both the international media and international tourists as either a place to avoid or, conversely, a place to visit and offer voluntary help.

For example, Charles Hebbert wrote an article in the UK *Daily Telegraph* on 7 September 2015 entitled “Migrant crisis: advice for city breaks in Budapest” where he argued that: “In the city itself, travellers are unlikely to notice the refugee crisis unless they go near the railway stations. Since most refugees see Hungary as a step towards the north and west, they are keeping close to the stations in the hope that they can move on as quickly as possible” (Hebbert 2015). This advice was further updated in the *Daily Telegraph* on 18 September by travel correspondent Natalie Paris, who quoted directly from the UK Foreign Office website's advice: “Disruption and delays are possible at rail and road border crossings with Serbia, Hungary and Slovenia, as a result of significant numbers of people seeking to transit Croatia” (Paris 2015).

The above quotations spatially separate the events of migration from the events of leisure and tourism. Here, we see the differential mobility empowerments at play for these two categories of people, with the tourist able to exercise both freedom to travel and freedom of choice in terms of accommodation, and time of travel in contrast to the refugee/migrant. In this sense, what we find in these accounts is a geopolitics of erasure at work, where the figure of the refugee becomes hidden from the tourist as the latter is encouraged to seek out “alternative” sanitised spaces to perform tourism (Hannam 2016b).

Conversely, both locals and international volunteers did seek to actively engage with the refugee crisis in Budapest. An international social media campaign, “Volunteers for Refugees at Budapest,” was organised via Facebook as part of a wider initiative by the Inter-European Human Aid Association, an NGO based in Austria and Germany. This NGO, founded in September 2015, is funded by member donations, and sought to co-ordinate the provision of basic hygiene facilities in Budapest using volunteers. Such efforts can also be viewed as part of the extension of a postmodern discourse of leisure philanthropy, whereby individuals become intensely more involved compared with more traditional modes of aid and giving-at-a-distance (Mostafanezhad 2013; Novelli et al. 2015).

In September 2015, in order to prevent further refugees and migrants entering Hungary, the Hungarian government completed the installation of a border fence with Serbia, blocked a railway line used as a crossing point, and deployed 10,000 police and soldiers along its southern border (Fekete 2016). The Hungarian government was subsequently accused by the UN refugee agency of using excessive force to expel migrants who then have to return to makeshift over-crowded camps in Serbia. This example shows us that in an era of mobilities, the borders of Europe are becoming much tougher to move across.

Conclusions

The restriction of leisure mobilities may become more commonplace in the future as tensions regarding wider mobilities in Europe intensify, particularly in the light of recent terrorist attacks which sought to kill people specifically at leisure spaces such as concerts and football matches. On the evening of Friday 13 November 2015, a series of co-ordinated terrorist attacks occurred in Paris, France. Three suicide bombers struck outside the Stade de France during a football match and this was followed by several mass shootings, and suicide bombing at cafés and restaurants. Gunmen carried out another mass shooting at a concert in the Bataclan theatre. In total, the attackers killed 130 people. In Nice, France, on the evening of 14 July 2016, 84 people were killed and 303 injured when a 19-tonne cargo truck was deliberately driven into crowds celebrating

Bastille Day on the promenade. Leisure spaces were specifically targeted in these attacks and the French authorities responded by imposing a “state of emergency” which has involved a tightening of border controls. This has led to a reinstatement of the border between France and Spain in the Basque Country, with stricter checks on anyone crossing.

As people move, they engage with leisure activities but may face increasing constraints and immobilities as they attempt to do so in the face of increased threats of terrorism and insecurity which have resulted in a rebordering of Europe. In this chapter, we have engaged with work from the mobilities literature to further develop an understanding of the contemporary politics of leisure mobilities. We have argued that the study of leisure mobilities should not just be about researching movement but also about theorising different movements, their multiple interconnections, and political outcomes such that we cannot conceptualise leisure mobilities without paying attention to issues of social exclusion as well as wider geopolitics (on the case of China see Rowen 2016).

Hence, in this chapter we have discussed leisure mobilities in relation to borders and processes of rebordering. Borders and boundaries can be seen as inhibitors of the freedoms inherent in discourses of mobilities, but changes in border processes have led to both greater porosity enabling further cross-border leisure practices for some and also constraints on leisure mobilities for others. Nevertheless, this is not an either/or situation, as mobilities research has emphasised there are many amplifications of mobility where people, objects, and memories may continue to move in different and unexpected ways and forms (on the Polish case, see Szewczyk 2016). Moreover, geopolitical and security considerations have meant that a new process of rebordering is now at work which will further constrain leisure mobilities within Europe.

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“Obligations and Entitlements”: Neoliberalism, Governmentality, and Community Parks

Trent Newmeyer

Hundreds of parents waited up to five hours in line, on the phone, and online to sign up for spots for camping, swimming, and other summer programs offered by the city for their kids across Toronto in March 2016 (Rider 2016). The registration process (itself outsourced to a private organization due to neoliberal budget cuts) received most of the blame for the backlog yet reporters and parents didn't question: why are there so few spots that people have to wait hours to get one and many leave empty handed? The City of Toronto and municipalities across Canada have underfunded parks and recreation for years, as they have moved to cost-recovery (via user fees) as a funding model and leisure services are increasingly being shifted to the domain of the private sector (Thibault et al. 2004). The retrenchment of government services has occurred steadily over the past 20 years (with the possible exception of the military) with a neoliberal focus on “balanced budgets”, and increasingly, recreation and

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leisure are made the responsibility and choice of individual consumer subjects. The chapter uses two case studies from Toronto, Canada, to illustrate the ways in which governmentality and neoliberalism intersect and have transformed recreation and leisure services—especially at the municipal level.

The chapter will outline Michel Foucault's notion of governmentality—the active production of citizens that are responsible for their own conduct, health, well-being, pleasure, and happiness (Burchell 1996; Foucault 1991; Rose 1996). Governmentality also connects well to the neoliberal (or some might argue, advanced liberalism) shift in the governing of programs: less services offered by the state at the various levels of government; a focus on creating leisure “choices” with user fees that all-wise and responsible consumers can make and taxpayers don't have to support; and “supporting” leisure choices through tax-credited spending of consumers rather than actual resources for programs (Fullagar and Harrington 2011). However, rather than viewing these active and responsible subjects as passive consumers of leisure, they are also capable of taking their leisure (parks, programming) into their own hands, challenging authorities' control and knowledge and creating grassroots programming outside of the profit sector (Coalter 2000). Through a focus on municipal recreation in Toronto, Canada, I use my own experiences of helping to start a local community garden as well as an established community park to highlight some of the benefits and pitfalls of community organizing self-governing subjects in a neoliberal environment. It offers hope that, despite the devastating retrenchment brought on by neoliberalism, communities can initiate, organize, and govern their own recreation and leisure in the absence of state services.

Governmentality

Governmentality as a mode of liberal political reasoning emerged in the eighteenth century when there was a concern that there was too much (state) governance. Scholars were concerned that too much state control and intervention, through the police for example, led to more crime and violence and not less. Because of this, new technologies of governing were

needed outside of the state apparatus that would encourage people to govern themselves. Thus, governmentality emerged as a way of cultivating subjects (or subjectivation) who were self-regulating in the “conduct of their conduct” (Foucault 1991).

The suggestion is that, rather than pursuing governmental objectives through the detailed regulation of conduct in the manner of police, it might be more effective for government to work through the maintenance and promotion of certain forms of individual liberty (Hindess 2001, p. 93).

Governmentality encompasses a wide scope—both in terms of targeted objects/subjects and in terms of technologies used and crucial to this chapter, types of subjects produced. The bulk of governmentality studies has for the most part concentrated on what used to be called social problems or issues of social control. They have looked at how alcohol and alcoholism have been governed (Valverde 1998), the role of reform societies in the governance of morals (Hunt 1999), consumption (Hunt 1996), the regulation of heterosociality in the early twentieth century (Hunt 2002), or how health has been “self-responsibilized” (Fullagar 2002; Rose 1999). One of the unfortunate consequences in the popularity of Foucault’s work has been a concentration on Foucault’s (1979) *Discipline and Punish*. Not only does this neglect the significant and intriguing contributions earlier and later in his life but it also posits a rather static and hierarchical operation of power. Foucault admitted in one of his last interviews that his conceptualisation of power/knowledge in *Discipline and Punish* was totalizing and over-determined that he neglected the subjectivating component to power and he tried to correct for this in his later works. In one of his final interviews, Foucault discussed his turn to conduct.

I tried to mark our three types of problems: that of truth, that of power, and that of individual conduct. These three domains of experience can be understood only in relation to each other and only with each other. What hampered me in the preceding books was to have considered the first two experiences without taking into account the third. By bringing this last experience [of individual conduct] to light, I had a guiding thread which didn’t need to be justified by resorting to rhetorical methods by which one could avoid one of the three fundamental domains of experience (Foucault 1989, p. 318).

For Foucault, there are many forms of governance that, while they could employ the same technologies, produce very different forms and types of subjects. The technologies of discipline—panopticon, routine, and hierarchical observation—differ from the technologies of governmentality—“self-inspection, self-suspicion, self-disclosure, self-decipherment and self-nurturing”—and produce a very different type of subject (Rose 1996: 132). Projects of governance can and do employ technologies, techniques, and strategies from other modes of governance but, in the end, produce very different types of subjects; the disciplined subject benefited the productive side of capitalism but definitely not from the point of consumption that relied more on a self-aware (of desires, needs, wants) consumer.

Foucault is well known for his work on disciplinary technologies and leisure scholars have utilized his work to highlight the ways in which sport and leisure were used to discipline, shape, and control certain populations (Barker-Ruchti and Tinning 2010; Dortants and Knoppers 2013; Howe 2007). Leisure scholars, however, have been slow to utilize Foucault’s notion of governmentality. I think in some ways it is because this concept of governmentality challenges some of the basic assumptions that underlie much of leisure studies, for example, leisure being the domain of “free will” and “choice”, the role of non-state organizations in the provision of leisure experiences, and increasingly the responsible, self-governing leisure subject. “Subjects are to do the work on themselves, not in the name of conformity, but to make them free” (Rose 1999, p. 268). Yet I argue the concept of governmentality has a lot to offer the field of leisure studies (or critical leisure studies at least) in understanding the emergence of the discipline but also a better understanding of how leisure is governed currently.

Some leisure scholars have taken up governmentality as it applies to the leisure sphere. Law (2001) examines the ways in which “surfies” (surfers) were made objects of governance in Australia especially as it relates to the apparent deservability (or lack thereof rather) of this population to unemployment benefits. He examines the discursive ways surfies are constructed as undeserving (compared to the ideal citizen) of social benefits in a neoliberal revamping of social services. Fullagar has been the main leisure scholar who has taken up governmentality as a key theoretical

concept in the leisure sphere particularly as it applies to health, wellness, and leisure. Her work on healthy living campaigns and other interventions as they relate to leisure demonstrate the various roles different organizations play in creating self-regulating subjects. In particular, her work highlights the ways in which discourses of health, well-being, and lifestyles are notably gendered, with women constructed as more self-nurturing and, thus, self-governing (Fullagar 2002, 2003). However, the focus has mostly been on health as a mode of self-regulation but I think leisure scholars need to look more critically at the subjectivities that result as part of governmentality and how this impacts recreation and leisure in neoliberal times (e.g., in the final part of this chapter, via a focus on urban municipal recreation and how it is governed).

It is then understandable to see governmentality as a form of liberal political reasoning; however, what Foucault highlighted well was that reduced/withdrawn state control doesn't mean that there is less governance: governance is dispersed amongst a diverse set of institutions and organizations designed to produce subjects that govern their own subjectivity through leisure amongst other things (Foucault 1991; Rose 1996, 1999). Recreation and leisure have a significant role to play in this subjectivation and have been part of the long history of recreational programming. For example, the Young Men's Christian Association's (YMCA) original purpose was to protect young men from the temptations and vice of urban areas: gambling, drinking, and prostitution (Mjagkij 1997). Its other purpose was to cultivate proper citizens through wholesome, healthy, and rational recreation. Citizens, once properly cultivated, would be able to resist the temptations of urban living and make proper leisure choices. This approach to recreation programming was also evident in municipal recreation departments.

Municipal Recreation

Municipal recreation programs were developed as the state expanded its role in the twentieth century from the expansion of higher education, social and health services, and so on. Inspired by the work of John Maynard Keynes and others, an ideology of social liberalism argued the

state had a key role to play in social security, equal opportunity, and an inclusive community structure (Cureton 2010, p. 8). Brodie (2007) and Cureton (2010) argue this ideology informed government policy and guided the expansion of services that governments provided. The Great Depression demonstrated what happened to society when there is not a social safety net and regulation of the market. Governments responded by regulating the market (rules about banking, health, and safety for workers) and creating services ostensibly available to everyone (health, education, social services). Recreation services were also seen to be part of this new approach to government (Glover 1999) as recreation had either been the domain of the wealthy (private clubs or the private sector) or offered by organizations such as the YMCA. While higher levels of government have their own recreation policies and programs, the municipal level is where most programs are actually delivered especially after the divestment of programs in Ontario in the 1990s (Côté and Fenn 2014). In Canada, municipalities have limited means of revenue—property taxes primarily—which restrict the delivery and maintenance of programs and facilities. Municipalities are also not fully autonomous entities in Canada; they are responsible to provincial governments. As well, in periods of economic downturn, it is often recreation services that are first on the chopping block (David 2008).

Neoliberalism

Municipal and other recreation programming are also under threat by a different political ideology: neoliberalism. Inspired by the liberal economic theories of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, neoliberalism maintains that the state has little role to play in regulating the economy, or delivering programs that could be more efficiently done by the private sector where consumers/taxpayers (not citizens) can make their own choices (Thibault et al. 2004). Indeed, regulations and programs must be reduced if not removed so that the wisdom and operations of market economics can operate unencumbered. Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan were two politicians closely associated with a neoliberal approach to government. Thatcher is well known for stating:

There is no such thing as society: there are individual men and women, and there are families and no government can do anything except through people and people look to themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then also to help look after our neighbour and life is a reciprocal business and people have got the entitlements too much in mind without the obligations, because there is no such thing as an entitlement unless someone has first met an obligation.

(Keay 1987, p. 8)

Such statements highlight the neoliberal approach to government, service provision, and the responsabilization of conduct.¹ Neoliberal ideology and practice were both inspired by liberalism but more so a reaction against a social liberal mode of government (Cureton 2010). Industries once thought essential to the well-being of the country were privatized or closed down entirely and life quality is now each of our responsibility. Governmental budgets were now meant to be balanced resulting in severe cuts to the public sector, a retrenchment of government that has never been replaced. Trade protections and restrictions were diminished if not entirely wiped out with free trade (Brodie 2007). The logic of the market ruled and government intervention and regulations were seen to stifle the economy and innovation. Less government equalled more freedom and liberty, and there was much less concern with addressing inequality and inclusion. If anything, inequality would be fixed by the market by creating the conditions for individuals to thrive, be free, and better themselves.

The move to a neoliberal mode of government had a significant impact on the provision of recreation services by governments. Governments either cut or eliminated programs, privatized services or they offloaded these services to lower levels of governments like municipalities (Harvey 2001). Ontario experienced this offloading in the 1990s when the Conservative provincial government of Ontario offloaded services such as social housing to municipalities (from 0% to 100%) (Côté and Fenn 2014). The neoliberal approach also changed the ways in which

¹ Thatcher restated this stance (Keay 1987, p. 9): “There is no such thing as society. There is living tapestry of men and women and people and the beauty of that tapestry and the quality of our lives will depend upon how much each of us is prepared to take responsibility for ourselves and each of us prepared to turn round and help by our own efforts those who are unfortunate”.

policies are developed to respond to social problems. The 2000s saw the emergence of a child obesity epidemic in Canada and other countries. The government's response was neither to fund recreation programming for children nor to make access to healthy foods affordable and tax unhealthy foods. Rather, the Canadian Conservative government instituted the Children's Fitness Tax Credit in 2006 (Report of the Expert Panel for the Children's Fitness Tax Credit). Families with children under 18 who participated in a "prescribed program of physical activity" would not have to pay taxes on the \$500 they spent on recreation expenses for their children. In the end, the tax savings resulted in \$75 reduction (per child) in taxes to be paid by families. This type of "intervention" requires little to no payment by the government and shifts the responsibility for this social problem on to families to pay for their own recreation programs. "The strategies deployed in public health policy and promotion work not only to mobilize the subject's capacity to govern itself, but to enact these decisions about health in the name of freedom and choice" (Fullagar 2002, p. 71). Under this neoliberal approach, it is up to parents to save the money and choose to send their kids to camp. The responsibility for this health issue is no longer the domain of state services—but of responsible self-governing parents making healthy decisions and payments for their children's health and well-being.

The other way in which governments have managed recreation services is the move to a model of cost-recovery particularly at the municipal level (Thibault et al. 2004). Partly due to offloading from other levels of government and limited revenue tools for municipalities, municipal governments have resorted to charging user fees for things like water, garbage collection, facility rental, and recreation programming. As well, since the 1970s, many municipalities have outsourced the management and provision of leisure services to the private sector or not-for profits (Glover 1999). Even when given revenue tools are made available to municipalities (like vehicle registration tax), neoliberal municipal politicians refuse to use these as forms of revenue. Before he was known internationally for his drug-induced antics, former Toronto Mayor Rob Ford's first changes to protect taxpayers was to get rid of the vehicle registration tax that had brought in \$64 million dollars to the city (Toronto councillors kill car tax, cut budgets 2010). However, in an era of balanced budgets as

the ideal, other sources of revenue had to be found: user fees. Each year under Ford’s reign, user fees went up 3–10% for recreation services. User fees were even instituted at priority community centres (also a feature of allowable neoliberal interventions) in low-income areas where programming had been free to encourage participation. After participation plummeted, the fees were withdrawn (Dale 2015). The City of Toronto website states that “User fees can help the city keep the cost of property taxes down by making sure that services which only a few people choose to use are not paid for by everyone” (quoted in Gee 2015). What if those services were health or social security, would that be socially acceptable? Politically popular? User fees now make up nearly a third of Toronto’s budget (Gee 2015) and represent a significant shift in the way in which recreation services are perceived by politicians, staff, and the public. Recreation is no longer a right that should be made available to everyone but a consumable that good subjects decide to participate in and purchase should they so choose, amidst a range of other recreation options. This approach disproportionately affects the poor, hence (as noted at the start of this chapter) the crush of people on opening day to sign up for free/reduced sports and the plummeting participation when user fees were introduced at priority centres in urban parts of Toronto (Dale 2015).

So then, how does this neoliberal ideology and practice affect both the provision of recreational programming and the participation of consumers in these programs? How has the introduction and continued increase of user fees for recreation programs affected demand? A Global/IsposReid poll from 2014 (four years after Ford increased user fees) found that 46% of residents would pay more in user fees if services offered were better (Armstrong 2014). However, no one seems to ask why aren’t they better now? Why have recreation services been cut back so much that people are forced to look to the private sphere for other options? Fundamentally, there has been a shift of recreation from the domain of the public sphere to the private sphere (i.e., recreation for profit).² The explosion of yoga and dance studios, gym facilities that look like community centres (day

² This was particularly felt in Toronto that had made significant investments in municipal recreation programming and infrastructure in the 1960s and 1970s. With provincial offloading of social services to municipalities in the 1990s, recreation funding and programming were cut substantially (Thibault et al. 2004).

care, varied programming), and private camps (not just camping but also youth sport development camps) demonstrates the ways in which the private sector dominates the field of recreation. For some, this positions participants as passive consumers and that with this commercialization, people's experiences of leisure are less meaningful (Stormann 1991; Glover 1999). Others such as Coalter (2000) challenge this idea that commercialized leisure leads to passive consumers and, more importantly, that leisure that is consumed somehow less engaging, less inclusive, and less participatory. While the glory days of leisure as a public service might well be remembered, the current political and economic climate does not bode well for a return this model of recreational delivery. Does this mean the end of recreation at the municipal level?

Rethinking Municipal Recreation?

Institutions, municipalities, departments of recreation, and individual directors have all been forced to be creative in service delivery. In some places, this has resulted in public-private partnerships, public-public partnerships, and public-not for profit partnerships (Glover 1999; Thibault et al. 2004). Other jurisdictions have taken on different approaches even to the point of adopting, rather than resisting, a neoliberal approach. A parks and recreation department in Georgia facing budget cuts and increased demand came up with a creative solution to fund growth: build a radio station that would be advertiser-supported and would fund the expansion of leisure services. The director stated: "we can operate on our own income and not cost the taxpayers a dime. We want to be a place where fiscal responsibility is on us; we want to earn our keep" (quoted in David 2008, p. 45). Other jurisdictions approached neoliberal transformations of leisure delivery in other ways. After user fee increases ranging from 785% to 10,000% in one year (e.g., afterschool programs went from US\$12/year to US\$25 a week) in Tampa community centres, the community organized a community-based, youth-led research project to research the impact of such a fee increase. Fortunately, the Mayor and City council decided to roll back the fee increases based on public outcry (Arney et al. 2011). Cureton and Frisby (2011) researched what hap-

pens when social liberal and neoliberal values conflict and contrast for employees in municipal recreation. They argue that while the two ideologies are mutually opposed in theory, in practice the contrasting ideologies did lead to conflict and tension but, at other times, were experienced as complementary.

What happens then to recreation when programs are cut and/or user fees are introduced to make recreation programming more inaccessible to those with lower incomes? Does recreation cease? Given a neoliberal atmosphere, how can recreation programs and departments adapt to this political reality yet at the same time offer programming that the population needs and desires? Increasingly with governmentality, more and more of the responsibility of life and living (including leisure and recreation) is individualized whether it responding to climate change, child obesity, or global capitalism. In examining the two cases below, I would suggest that rather than just providing programs to the public that recreation departments consider adopting a facilitator's role in helping citizens be able to take more responsibility and ownership of their recreation activities and spaces given this neoliberal age but also given the effects of governmentality.

Dufferin Grove Park

Dufferin Grove Park is a 14.2-acre park in west downtown Toronto, Canada. It is a mixed neighbourhood of rental housing, semi-detached homes, and a large mall across the street. It is well known as an example where active citizens implemented a model of partnership between a community and a recreation department (Sharpe and Barnes 2009). In 1992, the mall expanded, and this upset residents. The mall offered \$20,000 to the Toronto Parks and Recreation Department, and the community was consulted as to what it would like in the park (albeit through the Friends of Dufferin Grove (FDG); the Parks department had organized a public meeting but no one attended. This speaks to level of engagement between the Department and the community at the time) (<<http://www.dufferinpark.ca/aboutus/wiki/wiki.php?n=History.FrontPage>>). The plan initially introduced a new playground, basketball court, more seating, and

food in the park. As the years progressed, the programming and facilities evolved from a bake oven (to two), a wetland garden, a cob courtyard, and a popular farmers market. It had a puppet theatre, Friday night community dinners, music, gardening education, and offered workshops to other communities who wanted to enact change in their own parks. Through its workshops, online newsletter, and networking, DFG helped to cultivate subjects that we were able to collaborate with city staff to imagine and implement the park they wanted.³

Spanning nearly 20 years, a unique model of collaboration between the Parks Department, Centre for Local Research into Public Space⁴ (CELOS) and the FDG helped shape the park's evolution and interactions. CELOS was responsible for research about the park's usability and received grants for many of the physical infrastructure improvements. FDG worked with the Parks Department—notably the area supervisor—to make changes to how the park was run. Staff were paid more than the pay for the usual job category and this increase was offset by food sales. Staff were hired year-after-year so they were familiar with the community but also with this unique model of collaboration. Additionally, staff had a diversity of tasks, informally, as part of their job based on their experiences and skill sets. The differing capacities and skill sets of staff were also incorporated into their duties. It was not always easy; the park supervisor had to balance the demands of his/her own department's bureaucracy with the demands from the FDG who argued that a park should be considered a community centre without walls (<<http://www.dufferinpark.ca/aboutus/wiki/>>). Dufferin Grove Park was one of the first to have fire pits in the park. This required a lot of negotiation and education between the Fire Department, the Parks Department, and FDG. Self-aware, active, and responsible subjects were taking leisure into their own hands yet still working with the city employees to modify programming to the community's needs. The park has won several awards for its model of collab-

³ Interestingly, there were at times FDG's approach, which had challenged the bureaucratic status quo, itself came under conflict where conduct "unbecoming" occurred in the park: men changing in their hockey gear in public place, a woman breast feeding uncovered (Newmeyer et al. 2010).

⁴ CELOS and FDG while separate organizations often involved the same people and worked together to secure funding to both support research on park users' needs, etc. and helped to support staff that worked in the park.

orative programming. Dufferin Grove provides a good example of how governmentality produces subjects that are self-aware, can mobilize, and organize to create recreation services that fit their needs. Community members could have accepted the status quo of recreation services at the park but instead organized and constantly challenged what could be done in a park and how it could be achieved. The responsabilization that comes with governmentality is often portrayed as a negative effect, but as Foucault reminds us, power also has positive and productive effects (Kelley 2009).

There is not a happy ending to this story. Many of the programs continue to exist in the park and are generally popular, but the model of collaboration (that made these possible) is no longer in place. In 2010, the area supervisor who had worked collaboratively with FDG was removed. The collaborative relationship between the city and CELOS (and FDG) ended. This was the same year neoliberal Mayor Rob Ford took office and raised user fees and slashed city budgets. Staff were no longer paid more for their experience and skill sets. Staff were also no longer allowed flexibility in their work tasks:

They must stick to their job codes. If they were baking cookies, they would not be watering plants. If they were serving at the Zamboni café, they would not be picking up litter inside the change room. The most glaring inflexibility is at the wading pool, whose staff are administered by a central unit, and whose monumental boredom is on display on cool days with four staff sitting in a group beside an empty wading pool—all four prohibited from doing anything in the park other than look at the pool, or talk to each other. The long-time diversity of tasks is gone (<<http://www.dufferinpark.ca/aboutus/wiki/wiki.php/News2015.FrontPage>>).

The staffing of the park became centralized by the Parks Department with no consultation with FDG or CELOS as to hiring. The costs of running the park have increased substantially from roughly \$550,000 to \$750,000 (<<http://www.dufferinpark.ca/newsletter/wiki/wiki.php?n=September2015.FrontPage>>). Part of the issue was that food sales (bread and pizza from the bake oven; Friday community supper) were down significantly over the past year's sales. The centralization of management and staffing meant an increase in costs as well. In 2008, the park had 14 part-time city staff and 3 contractors from CELOS. In

2015, the park has 51 part-time city staff—substantially more staff than other parks. The model of collaboration between CELOS, FDG, and the parks department was not only better in terms of community engagement and programming but was actually cheaper and more efficient to run. However, this demonstrates that while these types of public-not for profit partnerships can work effectively and efficiently, they can't always survive the “logics” of neoliberalism.

The Christie Pits Community Garden

I want to write now of my experiences as participant and observer in the development of a community garden in Toronto. These experiences highlight both the strengths and difficulties of grassroots organizing and program development in a neoliberal environment. More importantly, they demonstrate that self-regulated subjects resulting from governmentality still require some level of other governance and point to a potential new role for recreation programming.

The Christie Pits Community Garden started in 2009 with local residents interested in creating a garden that had both individual and communal garden plots (food grown for local organizations). Christie Pits is two subway stops east of Dufferin Grove Park. A former sand pit, most of the park sits below street level. The initial organizers of the community garden were inspired by what was going on in Dufferin Grove. The City Parks Supervisor was the same individual as at Dufferin Grove and was open to having a community garden in the park and providing assistance from the city (installation of a fence, water access, tiling of the soil, construction of a garden shed and compost tumbler). The design of the garden was done at an initial meeting and a formal volunteer structure was determined: executive, operations, events, and fundraising (T. Newmeyer, personal communication, 11 May 2009). Volunteers were expected to serve on a committee or two and commit 1–2 hours per week in addition to tending to their own plot. People with individual plots also were expected to devote time and effort to tend to the communal plots for community kitchens. However, none of these expectations were formalized and were based on “good faith”. The garden started with the hope that the vision of what the garden should be was shared amongst all members.

By midsummer 2009, everything was completed and the gardens were growing well despite the poor sandy soil. There were some initial growing pains. The city water hook-up took the longest to get installed so two large water buckets had to be filled using a long heavy hose twice a day. The composter had to be turned twice a day to hasten the process and better the soil sooner. It became clear that the responsibility for the two vital activities had to be made concrete—shifts were identified and people were asked to sign up for these duties. The garden was near a set of maple trees, and clearly, the seedlings were enjoying the enrichment of the soil—hundreds had to be plucked from the communal and individual gardens nearly every day. Despite these hiccoughs, the year ended well with lots of fresh fruit and vegetables being donated to local community kitchens. Yet, it also became quite clear that members had very different ideas about what the garden should be and what the acceptable level of individual and communal plot commitment entailed.

The year 2010 saw significant changes to the organization of the garden—the activities of the garden were now more scheduled around communal times in an attempt to lessen individualized labour and increase socialization and knowledge sharing (T. Newmeyer, personal communication, 20 November 2010). Planting of the communal garden was done at one event rather than staggered. Work on the community plots was no longer organized informally; two formal communal work times were instituted for the week. Unfortunately, the communal times were decided on traditional 9-to-5 work patterns and those available during weekdays or with irregular work schedules were often left out. The gardens were also visited daily by gaggles of destructive and voracious toddlers (and other visitors) from nearby day cares—so discussions were had with day-care staff about how to enjoy the garden in a responsible way. As well, signs were made in several languages outlining the garden's purpose and that it wasn't meant to be free for the picking as there was a significant increase in theft from the garden in 2010. Due to these concerns, at the end of the 2010 season, the steering committee felt the need for a reformat of the garden and instituted a five-hour volunteer requirement to the community garden and its maintenance.⁵ In subsequent years, important

⁵ It should be noted that I left the garden group in 2011 as I moved out of the catchment area but continue to observe via email and Facebook.

meetings became mandatory and more rules had been developed such as plot maintenance (T. Newmeyer, personal communication, 13 March 2016). Expectations for labour contributions now were requirements. What had started off very organically and loosely organized, now had evolved into a much more regulated space and governed experience.

The evolution of the Christie Pits garden highlights the ways in which community groups, especially new ones, require some level of governance beyond the sum of its members' own sense of self-governance and responsibility. For example, initially there were no rules about the aesthetics of individual plots and members were explicitly told not to weed/touch another plot. This evolved into a policy that required plots to be weeded regularly and if a plot had not been taken care for more than two weeks (unruly weeds, unharvested crops), the "ownership" of the plot would put in jeopardy. The labour involved in the maintenance of the communal gardens was the main issue that involved several attempts at developing expectations (that then became requirements) that would govern communal labour. In the beginning, meetings were held in person as a way to build community and increase socialization but with diverse work schedules and availability, this became burdensome. Facebook was introduced as a more efficient way to connect garden members, communicate updates and occurrences. Incorporating social media technology has increased garden governance in both time (adverse events are reported more quickly) and efficiency (members include gardeners, City staff, and the local councillor). It has also increased the visibility and communication of individualized ("I watered the whole garden today so it is good for today") and communal labour and responsibility of garden maintenance.

Conclusions

The chapter has illustrated how the intersection of neoliberal political theory and practice with governmentality (where governance is devolved from the state and individuals are responsabilized) impacts the provision of recreation and leisure policy and services in Canada, in this case at the municipal level in Toronto. Neoliberal governments at all levels have divested significantly in recreation and leisure infrastructure and services (to an irrecoverable level) leaving the private sector, and to a lesser extent,

non-profits, as primary providers. The leisure, health, and well-being of Canadians have become the responsibility of individuals and families (and not the State) to purchase. However, with this withdrawal, citizens, made more “free”, responsible, and self-aware through governmentality, are more able to take more control over recreation and leisure programming and infrastructure in their own communities. The Dufferin Grove Park case demonstrates how organized, self-governing citizens can forge creative and effective collaborations with governments that allow for a higher level of input and control. The Christie Pits Garden case demonstrates that in this process of responsibility and ownership transition, community groups still need some level of extra-individual governance and support.

Municipal recreation departments will continue to provide services to the community albeit in a much reduced way in this neoliberal era. Departments will have to be creative in how programs are funded and delivered including a diversity of partnership possibilities. Consequently, I see a new role for recreation programmers: as facilitators for community groups and individuals to help make recreation collaborative. Given that more individuals and communities (those responsible and capable subjects) want to organize and make recreation and leisure their own responsibility (or are forced to due to divestment), but clearly in need of some level of organizational governance, history, and education, recreation programmers could work with community groups to facilitate what domains require further regulation and what domains do not, when subjects take more control and responsibility for their municipal recreation. Ideally, governments would view services as investments and assets in the population and the economy. But until neoliberalism is gone, communities and individuals will have to take more responsibility and ownership of their leisure and recreational activities.

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Disneyization and the Provision of Leisure Experiences

Simon Beames and Mike Brown

As with other forms of social life, leisure practices are directly influenced by the social, cultural, political, and economic features of their era. In the globalized, late modern times in which we live, many forms of consumer leisure experiences are increasingly being driven and shaped by highly sophisticated and rationalized processes that have been influenced by principles developed in the corporate world. This chapter explains a particular theoretical framework called *Disneyization* to examine how some leisure experiences are constructed from discernible principles.

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Disneyization's principal argument is that the characteristics of consumption, initially exhibited in Disney theme parks, are becoming increasingly pervasive in broader society; a myriad of consumer experiences now incorporates performed, themed narratives that adhere to a defined script. What distinguishes Disneyized arrangements from other, perhaps less institutionalized forms of leisure, is that consumers can "eat, play, and shop" in the same "storied" location; everything needed to have a "good time" is found in one place.

According to Bryman (2004), Disneyization has five distinguishing features. First, there is *theming*, which refers to how an overall narrative can imbue an experience. Irish pubs, which seem to exist in every major airport and big city, are an example of this. Second is *hybrid consumption*, which entails the buying of merchandise, food, and drink while being engaged in the actual leisure activity. *Merchandising*, the third feature, is strongly linked to hybrid consumption, as branded goods are often available for purchase at the leisure facility/venue. The fourth feature is *performative labour*, whereby employees, who interact with the public, follow scripts that govern much of what they say and how they act. The final aspect refers to how the provision of experiences may be *controlled* and accompanied by a high level of *surveillance*.

This chapter explores the degree to which a variety of leisure experiences can be considered to be within the purview of Disneyization. The analysis continues with a discussion of the implications of Disneyization and how it shapes the provision and ensuing experiences of leisure in the twenty-first century.

Leisure and Consumption

Our interest in the relationship between consumption and leisure experiences follows a longstanding tradition, with Thorstein Veblen's *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (originally published in 1899) being an early examination of how displays of leisure time activities/interests were used as markers of social status. Veblen asserted that displays of wealth were exhibited through "conspicuous leisure" (2007, p. 35). Veblen's work provided an insight into how leisure practices served to confer social

status upon individuals through public consumption. The modern iteration of this trend continues with displays of wealth exhibited in a myriad of ways. These range from attending exclusive wine tasting events to buying adventure holidays in “exotic” locations and then using social media to convey these images to a wider audience.

More recently, Stebbins (2009) has made a distinction between consumption and leisure to avoid unnecessary conflation of these terms. He argues that consumption “is to *have* something, to possess it, whereas the end of leisure is to *do* something, to engage in a positive activity” (p. ix). He does, however, acknowledge that “there are times when consumption and leisure are so closely aligned as to make it impossible to distinguish the two in this way” (p. ix). We concur with this point and in this chapter we focus on how rationalized forms of consumption shape how leisure participants (consumers) experience leisure activities. For Stebbins (2013), leisure consumption is when the having (consumption) and the doing (leisure) occur at the same time: it is leisure itself that is being consumed. Our focus is very much on the commercial provision of leisure services (e.g., indoor rock-climbing, bowling alleys) that exist to facilitate a leisure experience, rather than the acquisition of a tangible material product that might be purchased to facilitate a leisure experience (e.g., a fishing rod, kayak, or guitar).

Social Context

As mentioned earlier, leisure practices are heavily influenced by the social circumstances of their times. It is no coincidence that the relatively new theoretical framework of Disneyization (Brymer first published a paper on it in 1999) emerged at a time of rapid global change and development. The Internet was emerging as part and parcel of everyday life, it became normal for people to communicate by email and mobile phones, and air travel became relatively inexpensive. This era in which we still inhabit is what Giddens (1991) calls *late modernity* and is characterized by fast-paced lifestyles, cosmopolitanism, high tech communications, global mobility, constantly evolving technology, and the diminishing “grand narrative” (Elliot and Urry 2010; Young et al. 2011). A grand

narrative refers to elements of society that many people used to take for granted as “right” or desirable, like going to university, getting a job for life, being married to someone of the opposite sex, or the desirability of settling down in the suburbs.

While our social worlds are indeed characterized by constant change (just think of how often you have to update your software on your various devices), they are also characterized by an obsession with risk minimization and avoiding preventable harm (Giddens 1990, 1991; Beck 1992), whether it be physical, emotional, or financial. Despite perceptions that risks from pandemics and terrorism lurk around every corner, research indicates that in global terms, people today are much healthier and live much longer than those at any point in history (Roser 2015). Still, humans today seem to worry increasingly about how to manage both personal and public risk (Elliot 2014). Bauman (2007) describes this ever-changing contemporary life as “liquid times”, where nothing is fixed and humans are dealing with constant insecurity and uncertainty.

What does constant change and uncertainty have to do with the consumption of leisure? Drawing on Bryman’s Disneyization hypothesis, we argue that leisure practices have responded to the general “busyness” and fast pace of life by becoming increasingly predictable, controllable, and efficient.

Weber and Rationalization

While our primary focus is on Disneyization (Bryman 1999, 2004), which we explain in more detail below, it is important to see how this theoretical framework is located within a tradition of sociological inquiry that is concerned with how societies are structured and how people make meaning of their lives. Bryman’s ideas extend Ritzer’s work on McDonaldization (1983), which drew its inspiration from the German sociologist Max Weber, whose most well-known book, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905/2001), laid the foundations for examining the “processes of rationalization, bureaucratization and resulting disenchantment that he associated with industrialization and the rise of capitalist societies” (Varley 2013, p. 35).

Weber (2001 [1905]) was particularly interested in the changes wrought by industrialization on the lives of individuals. This happened, he argued, through the application of technical and scientific approaches, initially used to enhance production of goods, to all aspects of peoples' lives. One of Weber's principal motives was to stress the interplay between modes of production (Marx's focus) and the cultural influences that underpinned the rise of industrialized society (Roberts 2012). Weber referred to this nexus as the "rationalism of Western culture" (p. 26).

Varley (2013) has suggested that the pervasiveness of rationality as a guiding principle in modern life has tended towards the "elimination of emotion, spontaneity, randomness and surprise" (p. 36). This is not to say that individuals do not experience a range of emotions; rather, the rise of rationalized leisure activities in the form of adventure tourism (e.g., bung jumping, white water rafting) epitomizes the "experience economy" (Varley 2013, p. 38), which heavily shapes the types of emotions that one might experience. For example, Holyfield's (1999) article on white water rafting, *Manufacturing adventure: The buying and selling of emotions*, provides an insightful analysis of the interaction between service providers and consumers as they co-construct specific and desirable affective states. For example, Holyfield identified "scripts" that raft guides adhered to on certain sections of the river to arouse participants' emotions. They might tell a story of a previous "incident" or use hyperbole to deliberately raise participants' anxiety levels about the big "drop", wave, or "hole" that was around the next bend.

Adventure tourism is a significant contributor to the tourism industry in many countries (e.g., New Zealand, Costa Rica). One of the hallmarks of any "industry" is the application of rationalization, and this is evidenced by the increasing rise of bureaucratic processes that enforce conformity, such as industry-wide standards, accreditation bodies, and regulatory control by government agencies. The growth of modern industrialized societies has been based on scientific-technical rationality that has permeated beyond the boundaries of production into many aspects of social life. Indicators of this rationality are observable in most sectors of human life, whether they be packaged holidays, standardized testing of educational achievement, social media campaigns to influence personal behaviour such a diet and sexual practices, or the amalgamation of small

shops into “mega-stores” to improve efficiency. While Weber’s work was not without his critics (e.g., Habermas 1989), it provided the platform upon which the American sociologist George Ritzer would develop his McDonaldization thesis.

Ritzer and McDonaldization

Ritzer argued that the McDonald’s fast-food franchise provided an exemplary model of the process of rationalization of goods and services on a global scale. He defined McDonaldization as

The process by which the principles of the fast food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more sectors of American society as well as the rest of the world. McDonaldization affects not only the restaurant business but also education, work, health care, travel, leisure, dieting, politics, the family and virtually every other aspect of society.

(2001, p. 198)

Ritzer’s thesis is more than merely an explanation of what the consumer gets when they buy a hamburger or a leisure experience. He posited that broader cultural, ideological, and economic circumstances were forcing businesses to rationalize their products and services in order to decrease costs and increase profits. The McDonaldization framework outlines how companies are focusing on increasing the efficiency, predictability, calculability, and control of the products they are selling, while replacing human labour with technology wherever possible (Ritzer 1983). In the section below, we briefly outline the key points related to the five elements of Ritzer’s framework.

First, the drive for efficiency focuses on achieving an intended outcome with the least cost (material and/or labour). For example, a ski rental company can maximize profitability by buying “all-round” skis with easy to maintain and fast to adjust bindings that will accommodate customers of varying abilities and boot sizes. Therefore, the ski shop does not have to spend a lot of time “fitting” clients according to their individual needs.

The second feature is calculability, or the increasing emphasis that is placed on quantifying operations. In many cases, this is reflected by valuing quantity over quality or longevity. Thus, the ski rental shop might buy a large number of skis on a discounted bulk order in the knowledge that any damaged ones will not be repaired, as it will be cheaper to replace them than pay for the parts and labour. Calculability is driven by cost-benefit analyses, rather than issues of environmental impact (e.g., disposing of partially damaged skis) or the labour conditions under which the workers are employed to produce low-cost items.

The third feature of the McDonaldization framework is predictability. A company can lose income through unexpected events, and so will try to control as many factors as possible in order to minimize disruption to production or sales. Customers also desire predictability and have an expectation that they will receive what they paid for (e.g., a Big Mac looks and tastes the same in Manchester as it does in Toronto). In order to keep events and occurrences as predictable as possible, a business might do everything it can to ensure that factors, such as the weather and the economy, have as little influence on profits as possible. In regard to the ski hire business, one approach might be to have an indoor ski slope or to provide alternative activities for bad weather days (e.g., a café, indoor rock-climbing wall, or mountain bike rental). Thus, an income stream is guaranteed irrespective of the weather.

Control, the fourth feature, refers to the manner in which a business has influence over the behaviour and actions of its employees and customers. For example, customers at the ski rental shop may have a limited choice of what is on offer (e.g., they may only be able to choose between two makes of ski or may only be permitted to ski on specific slopes). Control is also exerted upon the employees, in terms of how they are expected to dress, conduct their tasks, and interact with customers. Often, employees are given clearly defined codes of conduct to follow and may not be expected (nor permitted) to exercise anything but very limited judgement. Standard operating procedures will stipulate how an activity is to be conducted. Another example of this deference to controlling policies is the dutiful pool attendant who adheres to a prescribed

way of acting by prohibiting aqua-jogging in swimming lanes, even when they are empty.

The final feature of McDonalidization is the substitution of non-human technology for tasks that might have been previously completed by people. For example, ski passes contain an electronic chip that permits entry on to lifts, which removed the need for staff to check passes, while some indoor rock-climbing centres use automated belaying devices that “completely remove human involvement in what was once an integral component of climbing” (Beames and Brown 2014, p. 120).

Ritzer’s development of McDonalidization as an analytic framework has highlighted how Weber’s seminal work on rationalization continues to permeate aspects of contemporary life across a wide range of contexts. In regard to leisure experiences, Ritzer (2004) has argued that, rather than being an alternative to the rationalization of daily life, recreation and leisure have merely become an extension of it. Having briefly outlined some of the background relating to rationalizing processes, our attention now turns to Disneyization as a further explanatory approach in our analysis of the provision of leisure experiences in contemporary Western society.

Bryman and Disneyization

Just as Ritzer’s usage of the term McDonalidization applied to a process of rationalization that extended beyond the production of hamburgers, Bryman has argued that Disney theme parks are “emblematic of certain trends” in studies of consumerism (2004, p. vii). Disneyization refers to the adoption of the principles underpinning the operation of Disney’s parks across diverse sectors of society and can be viewed “as a complementary notion to McDonalidization” (Bryman 1999, p. 25).

It is important to distinguish Disneyization from the concept of Disneyfication, which involves transforming “an object into something superficial and simplistic” (Bryman 2004, p. 5). Disneyfication involves reformulating an existing story or fairy tale into a standardized, sanitized format that will have mass appeal to a global audience. Bryman refined his original 1999 Disneyization framework for his 2004 book, and we

will refer to his five defining characteristics by their more recent names: theming, hybrid consumption, merchandising, performative labour, and control and surveillance.

Theming is common in a range of leisure settings. For example, restaurants such as the Hard Rock Café, where diners are immersed in the sights and sounds of all things rock and roll, and the proliferation of Irish or English pubs are further illustrations of this trend. A crucial concept within theming is that the various elements of the experience have a high degree of coherency: the décor, the name of the dish, the employees' attire, and the music. The consumer is made to feel that they have been transported to that era or place.

The second characteristic of Disneyization is *hybrid consumption* (formerly known as the "de-differentiation of consumption"). This can be understood as the blurring of lines between partaking in a leisure experience (e.g., rafting or a music concert) and purchasing material objects (e.g., a t-shirt, photo, poster, CD). Put simply, it is mixing "doing" and "buying". For example, while at Legoland there are many opportunities to purchase Lego products in-between rides. A key point here is that different forms of consumption (e.g., playing, eating, drinking, and buying souvenirs) are "inextricably interwoven" (Bryman 1999, p. 34). Hybridity encourages consumption of goods and services that might not initially be the prime driver of participation.

Bryman's third feature is *merchandising*, which is strongly related to hybrid consumption. If you have been to a Starbucks café, you will know that there are also many types of branded products for sale. These include bags of coffee, French presses, CDs, mugs, cups, and flasks that are all available for purchase. These are often placed adjacent to where one waits for the coffee to arrive. Music concert promoters often provide opportunities to buy special event merchandise (e.g., tour t-shirt or limited edition release), while professional sports teams (e.g., Manchester United or The All Blacks) also have an extensive range of branded merchandise that is available when attending a game (as well as online and through retail stores). Bryman (1999) has suggested that in some businesses, it is the merchandising that provides a stream of revenue that matches or exceeds that from the principal activity.

The fourth feature of Disneyization is *performative labour* (termed “emotional labour” in his 1999 paper). As Ritzer (1998) highlighted in his work on “McJobs”, these forms of employment usually need a restricted range of skills, demand little independent decision-making, and require the expression of certain emotions and specific ways of interacting with customers (Ashforth and Humphrey 1993; Hochschild 1983). Performative labour involves employees exhibiting “cheerfulness and friendliness towards customers as part of the service encounter” (Bryman 1999, p. 39).

The final aspect that Bryman included in his 2004 iteration of Disneyization is *control and the ensuing surveillance of staff and customers*. Bryman asserts that control (viewed here in conjunction with “surveillance”) differs from McDonaldised forms of control in that

it is more of an *enabling* one rather than an aspect of it *per se*. Control and surveillance permit Disneyization in the form of the four dimensions outlined to operate to its full capacity. In other words, without control, theming, hybrid consumption, merchandising, and performative labour are less likely to be effective.

(Bryman 2004, p. 131)

Ritzer’s study of control in McDonald’s restaurants (e.g., the division of labour, how food is produced) lies at the heart of this feature. While Bryman acknowledges that control and surveillance are analytically different, in Disneyization they merge into one another. He explains that surveillance is both “a means of checking that control procedures are working as well as being a control device in its own right” (Bryman 2004, p. 132). Control and surveillance extend to both staff and consumers. For example, when visiting the cinema, customers are corralled and directed through the confectionary shop, and the preview area for new releases, before entering the designated theatre. Likewise, CCTV footage in many leisure settings (e.g., swimming pools, bungee jumping operations) serves the dual purpose of providing a sense of security and also monitoring staff working practices (Table 1).

Table 1 Disneyization in practice: a case study of Ski Dubai

We'll now put all five features of Bryman's Disneyization framework to work by using them to interrogate one "mega-leisure centre". Although deeper empirical work in this vein has been done in other papers (see Beames and Varley 2013; Beames and Brown 2014), we wanted to show how it can be applied to an operation that we haven't visited and which is located in a part of the world that is unfamiliar to us.

We chose to conduct a brief analysis *Ski Dubai*—a ski slope located inside one of the largest shopping malls in the world, that is located in what was once the desert. Ski Dubai boasts 22,500 m² of skiable terrain, with five runs of up to 400 m long.

Bryman's first feature of Disneyization is theming, and the ski operator's promotional literature says as much in its claim to having "an amazing mountain-themed wintery setting". Further theming is evident by the names given to its two restaurants: the St. Moritz Café and the Avalanche Café. This type of theming was also a feature of indoor ski slopes in the United Kingdom and New Zealand.

Hybrid consumption is facilitated by the "Snow Pro" retail shop and, perhaps more obviously, by the fact that the entire indoor ski hill is located within one of the biggest shopping malls in the world. While at the hill, there is plenty to do when not skiing or snowboarding, such as tobogganing, drinking hot chocolate in minus four temperatures, "sight-seeing" from the quad chairlift, playing in 3000 m² Snow Cavern, riding the Snow Bullet zip wire, and observing (and even swimming with) real penguins who live in a special enclosure.

Merchandising is rampant—both on the part of Ski Dubai and other retail outlets who are hoping to cash-in on the Ski Dubai's brand recognition. Branded products such as baseball hats, mugs, fridge magnets, hooded sweatshirts, t-shirts, and wall clocks are all on offer.

We can't accurately assess the level of performative labour, since we've never been to Ski Dubai, but there is a "team of professional Ski School instructors will guide you through the simple, fun process of learning to ski or snowboard". We would speculate, however, that staff are immaculately presented and convey only the friendliest and most positive emotions. Comments such as "Very helpful and kind staff at the counter" on the Ski Dubai Facebook page suggest that this is the case. The [Indeed.com](https://www.indeed.com) website shares a quote from a Ski Dubai employee who states: "I have learned how to interact and associate with almost all nationalities". In our earlier study of indoor ski slopes, we found that the front of house staff and lift operators demonstrated the easy-going demeanour typical of more traditional outdoor ski slope staff. Dress, language, and mannerisms were transferred from the mountain to the "factory floor"—for this is after all is an industry.

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

Bryman's fifth feature of control and surveillance is also difficult to comment on. Presumably there are the usual, ubiquitous "security cameras". It is, however, made clear in the terms and conditions (a) that all guests' bags have the right to be searched, and (b) Ski Dubai may share your personal details with other companies. Control and surveillance also operate in less obvious ways than "control towers" or CCTV cameras. For example, positioning the bar or restaurant overlooking the ski slope creates an atmosphere of constant surveillance from both other staff members and paying clientele.

In addition to Bryman's five features of Disneyization, we found that the influence of social media loomed large. The ubiquity of media such as Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram is evident, as physical and virtual visitors alike are encouraged to "stay connected" to the organization, lest they miss out on something fun. People are also urged to tell their friends that they're going to Ski Dubai (and are really looking look to it) or that they went (and had a great time).

Source: <http://www.theplaymania.com/skidubai/about-us>

Discussion

Our objective with this analysis is not to definitively state that a given leisure operation is either Disneyized or not. Rather, it is through the rigorous employment of a theoretical framework such as Bryman's that we can move beyond the kind of discussion that might take place in a café to a more precise academic interrogation of existing social conditions.

Our examination of Ski Dubai has direct links to ideas that Lindner was exploring almost half a century ago in his book, *The Harried Leisure Class* (1970). Linder's central thesis was that the "nature" of leisure experiences mirror broader societal trends; as the pace of life in modern Western societies quickens, so too does the way we consume leisure. Linder suggested that working time and consumption time both become more productive when combined with capital. Drawing on Lindner's work, Scott (2013) explains that

Given the glut of goods and services that people can afford in contemporary societies, it becomes highly problematic to devote sufficient time to them all. Members of the harried leisure class are constantly reminded that

time is scarce. A feeling of time scarcity results in people's striving to increase the yield on time.

(p. 114)

Members of the “harried leisure class” are ideal targets for what Edwards and Corte (2010) call “mass market commercialization” (p. 1135). The widespread appetite for predictable, safe, and stress-free fun seems to thrive in one-stop leisure centres. These can be regarded as “synthetic visions”, as they provide a “simplified, sanitized experience that stands in for the more undisciplined complexities of the city” (Sorkin 1992, p. 208).

With these newer leisure centres, place is “dispersed into a sea of universal placelessness” (p. 217), as they completely ignore local socio-cultural and geo-physical phenomena. Increasingly, outdoor leisure practices traditionally done outdoors, such as rock climbing, are becoming “indoorised” (see van Bottenburg and Salome 2010). Contemporary leisure can be practiced anywhere and without any engagement to local culture and landscape.

Conclusions and Implications

The ideas within the McDonaldization and Disneyization frameworks are not new *per se*, and are not immune to criticism (see Alfino et al. 1998). The journey of these ideas being organized into conceptual frameworks can arguably be seen itself as a reflection of a “series of rationalization processes that had been occurring throughout the twentieth century” (Ritzer 2004, p. 39). What is becoming apparent is that “public spheres” are becoming more and more commodified, and has this shift takes place the capacity for social actors in these spheres is increasingly constrained (Roberts 2005).

Whether you accept the Disneyization framework in its entirety, or aspects of it, is almost beside the point. It is arguably more important to recognize that discernible patterns in the provision of leisure experiences are emerging across the globe. We contend that the most noteworthy of these is the advent of commercial leisure sites that combine “doing”

with “purchasing”, where one can combine eating, playing, and shopping while interacting with others. These Disneyized leisure experiences are based on a commercial transaction, where a customer buys a series of experiences that can be quantified, reliably delivered, and replicated day-after-day.

The provision of leisure as a “product” results in a transfer of responsibility from the consumer to the supplier. For example, if I wish to paddle a grade 5 river, I can spend time, money, and personal effort acquiring the necessary skills, experience, and judgement to plan and undertake my own trip. Alternatively, I can pay a commercial rafting company to guide me down the river in one of their craft, where an experienced guide is responsible for my safety. If I take the second option, I remove the necessity to undergo an apprenticeship and can do lots of thrilling activities in a short holiday timeframe (e.g., rafting, bungee jumping, sky-diving). If I took the first option, I would have fewer opportunities to experience lots of different activities, as time and effort are required to build the necessary skills. I might, however, build a strong social network with like-minded enthusiasts, develop an appreciation of wild places as I build my skills on progressively more difficult rivers, and possibly undergo some form of personal transformation through gaining mastery and taking responsibility for my actions.

Our exploration of rationalization in the provision of leisure experiences leads us to ask: How do these changing social arrangements shape how leisure is experienced and how do these arrangements advantage some people and disadvantage others?

We find ourselves in broad agreement with Bryman’s Disneyization and Ritzer’s McDonaldization frameworks. They explain many of the nuances of social relations in contemporary society and they provide useful lenses for thinking more deeply about many “taken-for-granted” leisure practices. While we have used the Disneyization and McDonaldization frameworks to cast a critical eye on educational practices (see Beames and Brown 2014), who are we to decree whether or not it is wrong for people to have a Disneyized leisure experience? Indeed, operations like Ski Dubai are positioned as family experiences, where people can come for the day to have fun together in a manner that makes them feel happy, safe, worry-free, and without hassle.

We do, however, have reservations about the environmental and social damage Disneyization potentially conceals behind a veil of fun and pleasure. The nature of part-time and casual employment contracts coupled with low pay rates for service workers impacts negatively on employees and their communities. In addition, the demands that running a Disneyized leisure operation place upon the local (and distant) ecosystems that host and provide energy are almost too complex and large to fathom. Drawing on Giroux (1999), Roberts (2005) argues that “questioning Disney is as much about keeping a critical eye on the social forces of commercialization and its effects on real lives as it is about deconstructing the iconic meaning of a Mouse” (p. 23). When viewed in this critical light, there is a moral imperative for leisure studies scholars and students to question the economic arrangements of given social situations in ways that might reveal how some people (and living beings) are being advantaged, while others are being disadvantaged.

If we accept the proposition that leisure experiences add value to individuals and to communities, then an informed debate on the nature of leisure provision is vital; otherwise, there is the risk of inadvertently perpetuating social inequalities. The challenge confronting leisure studies scholars is to continue refining analytic frameworks in order to better understand and address the needs of human beings in a rapidly changing world.

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Leisure, Social Space, and Belonging

Troy Glover

Most people yearn to form meaningful relationships, to be part of a group, and to belong. More than a fleeting desire, though, belonging represents a fundamental human need (Baumeister and Leary 1995). A growing body of evidence attests to the power of belonging as a powerful social determinant of health and well-being (see Pinker 2014), particularly as it relates to accessing caring, trusting, and supportive interpersonal relationships (Deci and Ryan 2001). Even so-called *mere belonging*—a minimal social connection to another person or group—affects individuals beneficially (Walton et al. 2012). Social isolation, by contrast, predisposes individuals to increased mortality and serious morbidity (Pantell et al. 2013). House (2001, p. 273), interestingly, compared the magnitude of risk associated with social isolation to that of smoking and other major biomedical and psychological risk factors. In short, human

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connectivity matters. Accordingly, humans seek to form and maintain enduring interpersonal bonds with others. These efforts often take place within leisure contexts.

Here, I invoke the term *place* deliberately, for leisure, like all human activities, happens *somewhere*. Just as we recognize time as a fundamental dimension of leisure because leisure is embedded in temporally contingent contexts (e.g. free time, discretionary time), so too should we acknowledge space as an integral element of leisure because leisure is a spatially organized realm of existence (e.g. coffee shops, playgrounds, living rooms). As embodied entities, we tend to take space for granted, yet space remains an integral element of human experience (Susen 2013), including our leisure. Even online social networking fails to fully replace (though it may challenge) our need to connect face-to-face (Pinker 2014; Turkle 2011). Leisure, like other realms of social life, has its time and place in our lived experiences.

In a variety of social spaces, people associate and identify with others through their leisure, often forming social groups and social bonds in the process. Accordingly, Glover and Parry (2008, p. 222) referred to leisure as a “sphere of sociability” that fosters quasi-public sphere effects by providing the social infrastructure to facilitate social attachments and social capital. Hemingway (1996) argued, along the same lines, that leisure brings people into communicative interaction with common purposes. The sometimes liminal quality of leisure—what we may understand as leisure’s temporary state of being—presumably releases its participants “... from day-to-day structural necessities and obligatoriness” (Turner 1973, p. 217) by giving them permission to embrace the moment, share the experience, and dispense with pre-existing social structures (see Sharpe 2005). But do social divisions really dissolve in leisure spaces? Not likely.

As Glover, Parry, and Mulcahy (2013, p. 2) wrote, “[c]laims to a [leisure] space can open up that space to some and close it to others, thereby resulting in emancipatory practice, as well as marginalization, social friction and/or exclusion.” No matter how inclusive a space, someone will always be excluded. Leisure spaces, in other words, have the potential to promote belonging, while at the same time distancing, differentiating, and distinguishing individuals and groups from culturally constructed others (Mowl 2001). The result is not “either/or,” but rather “and/both.”

Though leisure conjures up positive sentiments, leisure spaces have always been, and will always be, a contested terrain.

Understanding belonging, then, means understanding power. In the context of space, Benson and Jackson (2013) noted, “[belonging] draws attention to the different relationships people may have to [social space] depending on their biographies and preconceptions, with [certain individuals and groups] claiming moral ownership over [social space] through their (relative) symbolic power” (p. 795). Examining social (leisure) spaces as contexts for belonging, therefore, requires a recognition that social spaces “... are unavoidably shaped by the power-laden relationships between inclusivity and exclusivity” (Susen 2013, p. 334). Spatial separations, boundaries, and practices exert decided impacts on how individuals and groups relate to one another and how they relate to themselves. As leisure researchers, we should aim to critically explore how and why individuals and groups are granted or denied access to a given (leisure) social space. Doing so exposes exclusive practices that privilege certain groups over others, thereby opening up the potential to pursue greater equity and social change.

This chapter unpacks the dynamic interplay of leisure, social space, and belonging by examining, in theory and practice, how leisure relations are negotiated and contested in the production and consumption of social space. Drawing mainly on the seminal work of Henri Lefebvre, the chapter demonstrates how social space in leisure settings encourages and discourages certain forms of social interaction and gives form to social structures and ideologies that have implications for belonging.

Henri Lefebvre and the Production of Space

Unlike his contemporaries who viewed space as fixed, Henri Lefebvre, a Marxist philosopher and social theorist, regarded it as a complex social construction that affects social and spatial practices and perceptions. Space is not external to our bodies, he argued, but rather generated by them. Our bodies, in short, cannot be separated from the space in which they are located. Instead, Lefebvre positioned the body at the centre of the production of space. As Shields (1999 pp. 146–147) explained:

This [Lefebvrian] system of space operates at all scales. At the most personal, we think of ourselves in spatialized terms, imagining ourselves as an ego contained within an objectified body. People extend themselves—mentally and physically—out into space. We become as much a part of these extensions, as they are of us. Arrangements of objects, work teams, landscapes and architecture are the concrete instances of this spatialization. Equally, ideas about regions, media images of cities and perceptions of “good neighbourhoods” are other aspects of this space, which is necessarily produced by each society as it makes its mark on the Earth.

According to Lefebvre, social relations “have no real existence save in and through space. Their underpinning is spatial” (p. 404). The partitioning of the social from the spatial is, therefore, impossible.

In making this argument, Lefebvre introduced the concept of *social space* to denote the spatial forms of social relations. In so doing, he suggested “a social space is not a socialized space” (p. 190) in that it did not exist beforehand as a non-social space or natural space; rather, social forces produced the space. Lefebvre described social space as a realm in which the “cultural life of society” is enacted, but he made clear it is not a “form or container of a virtually neutral kind, designed simply to receive whatever is poured into it” (p. 94), as is typically assumed. By contrast, Lefebvre explained, society “secretes” space through its rhythms of social interaction. These rhythms impose their products on their users and therefore shape society. Thus, a social space such as a dog park involves a dynamic social process of production, reproduction, and resistance whereby it is shaped by (e.g. uses of space) and shapes (e.g. constrains certain social interactions) the social relations of its members.

While a dog park enables dog owners to run their pet dogs without a leash within certain boundaries, how their dogs behave towards other dogs and towards other people in the dog park has implications for their access to social network formations with other dog park users and the resources available in these networks (Graham and Glover 2014). Dog park users base their judgements of other users, in other words, on their spatial interactions (including with other people’s dogs) and regulate desired behaviours within the socio-spatial boundaries of the dog park by using social sanctions against those who fail to conform. In short, the dog

park gives structure to the norms established by users, thereby determining who belongs at the park and who does not.

As illustrated in the dog park example, space encourages and discourages certain forms of interaction and gives form to social structures and ideologies. Lefebvre underscored the point that space perpetuates the power of dominant groups by normalizing the authority of specific social groups, setting out spatial boundaries and functioning as a symbol of social values. The gendered nature of American football fields provides a further example. Men and boys claim the playing field and locker rooms as their exclusive domain, whereas women and girls are subordinated to the sidelines and stands as either literal or figurative cheerleaders. These spatial divisions normalize heterosexual and gendered behaviours so that men belong on the field and women belong in the stands (see Messner 2000). Socio-spatial regulation and sanctions normalize football as a sport exclusive to males. A woman on the field would be, quite simply, “out of place.” In short, spaces such as dog parks and football fields are inscribed with dominant cultural values. In Lefebvre’s terms,

(Social) space is a (social) product ... the space thus produced also serves as a tool of thought and of action ... in addition to being a means of production it is also a means of control, and hence of domination, of power.

(p. 26)

Building on this point, Lefebvre appealed to scholars to pay critical attention to the ways spaces are produced and maintained through social norms.

Despite this observation, Lefebvre argued space is rarely recognized as a reflection of power because it tends to be divided discreetly into physical and conceptual components to obscure its social functions. To this end, Lefebvre insisted representations of space as coordinates, geometry, and cartography render space an abstraction. These abstractions usurp the production of space by imposing an image of space to regulate its use (e.g. a football field is merely a playing surface). In other words, the “organization of space” renders power invisible, yet reproduces power relations insidiously, thereby working to exclude, elude, and eliminate all opposition to it (Shields 1999). While abstractions appear to make

space transparent and comprehensible, Lefebvre argued “this transparency is deceptive, and everything is concealed” (p. 286). In other words, “power stems from the ability to abstract space” (Miller 2005, p. 65). If the gendered nature of the football field remains concealed, its associated values of hegemonic masculinity remain unquestioned and continue to pervade. Much of Lefebvre’s scholarship aimed to undermine this division between physical and conceptual space.

Lefebvre’s Spatial Triad: Perceived, Conceived, and Lived Space

To truly understand space, Lefebvre argued we need to comprehend the concrete (physical) and the abstract (conceptual) jointly. In advancing this agenda, Lefebvre (1991) identified three “moments” of social space that, collectively, constitute an analytical tool for understanding the production of space: (1) perceived space, (2) conceived space, and (3) lived space. The first, *perceived space* (also known as spatial practice), refers to “the particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation” (p. 33). Here, perceived space is not only the bounded space or concrete materiality of spatial forms that can be mapped empirically (e.g. the physical structure of the football field) but also the everyday spatial routines in which people engage (e.g. hours of operation, practice schedules, game day rituals, locker-room etiquette). The latter “demonstrate[s] the ways in which bodies interact with material space” (van Ingen 2003, p. 203). In this first moment, space is perceived as a physical form generated and used in such a manner that the space of daily practices exhibits certain norms and constraints. In Shields’ words, “more than just being expressive of power, (social space) is repressive in the name of power” (p. 413).

The second moment, *conceived space* (also known as representations of space), refers to the conceptualized spaces constructed out of symbols, codifications, and abstract plans envisioned to impose rationality and order (e.g. stadium layout and the signage used to signify appropriate usage). As van Ingen (2003, p. 203) explained, “[representations of space]

are the kinds of social spaces that we engage in through our thoughts, ideas, plans, codes, and memories. It is space that remains abstract in thought rather than being directly lived.” Often, representations of space embody the ideas associated with institutional knowledge, which Soja (1996) suggested impose order, decode spatial practice, and control the production of spatial knowledge. For this reason, Lefebvre (1991, p. 38) described the second moment as “the space of scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers” because of its link to production relations and to the order such relations impose. Interestingly, conceived space implicates leisure, sport, and tourism professionals for their role in “theorizing space” as sites of leisure activity and presenting notions of lived experience in space (e.g. designating stadium stands as a place to cheer; identifying the steps at city hall as a place *not* to skateboard). As Shields (1999) noted, these representations are central to forms of knowledge that ground the rational/professional power structure of the capitalist state.

The third moment, *lived space* (also known as spaces of representation), refers to the experiential aspects of space whereby we experience space, participate in the world as actors, and create meaning. In other words, they are the spaces through which life is actually lived. Here, space is produced, modified over time and through its use, and invested with symbolism and meaning. Lefebvre (1991, p. 39) described lived space as “space as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, and hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’ ... This is the dominated ... space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate.” The inclusion of this moment in Lefebvre’s conceptual triad decentres conventional spatial thinking restricted to the physical and the conceptual. Drawing on Lefebvre’s framework, Soja (1996) underscored the insurgent possibilities of lived space, which he likened to “third spaces” (not to be confused with Oldenburg’s (1989) third places)—that is, differential spaces within which individuals can engage in emancipatory practice. Accordingly, these spaces represent “the terrain of social struggle, counter-discourses and resistance” (van Ingen 2003, p. 204) by offering complex re-coded versions of social space. Here rests the possibility of social change inasmuch as lived spaces can be “dynamic, counterhegemonic

social spaces that are spaces for diverse, resistant and oppositional practices” (van Ingen 2003, p. 204).

Of course, lived spaces can also be oppressive, sometimes embodying sites of discriminatory practices that produce and enforce marginalization (van Ingen 2003). The qualities that define social (leisure) spaces can be at once liberating and exclusionary; the space supports one social group’s entitlement, while simultaneously physically and/or symbolically evicting its “others.” Lefebvre’s interconnected moments in the production of space allow us to explore the ways social relations are produced, negotiated, and contested in social space.

Applying Lefebvre’s Spatial Triad

Glover, Parry, and Mulcahy (2013), in one of the few leisure studies to use Lefebvre’s spatial triad as an analytical framework (see also Fox and Lashua 2010; Fox and Riches 2014; Lashua and Kelly 2008), examined the production of space at Gilda’s Club of Greater Toronto, a non-traditional venue that provides complementary care and support to people living with cancer through its delivery of high-quality recreational programming, social networking, and therapeutic space. Their findings underscored the insurgent and transformative possibilities of a social space like Gilda’s Club for people living with cancer, while also exposing the club as a site of discriminatory practices where marginalization was produced and imposed. With respect to perceived space, they found that Gilda’s Club transformed its members’ social interactions and daily movements by providing a social space to which members could retreat from their homes and cancer treatment centres. In this sense, Gilda’s Club changed the landscape of its members’ social relations and gave them a place where they felt they belonged.

As a conceived space, Gilda’s Club relied on its aesthetics to perform a supporting role in endowing it with signs that made the club readable to its members. As a result, its members recognized Gilda’s Club as an explicit attempt to integrate a more humane therapeutic landscape into standard medical practice for cancer patients and therefore represented an important but missing link in standard cancer care. And as a lived space,

members described Gilda's Club as a warm and inviting place where they made new and important friendships. They also referred to Gilda's Club as an emotionally safe space in which members could congregated with others who shared their experiences of living with cancer.

Interestingly, though, the absence of bodies at Gilda's Club revealed a subtext of exclusion. The membership was largely female and white. Even though the club was conceived and perceived as a space where all people impacted by cancer were welcome, the absence of non-white bodies (and men to a lesser extent) suggested Gilda's Club as a lived space was not fully inclusive. Monopolization of space (van Ingen 2004) and centrality/periphery of space (Lefebvre 1991) expose power. In rendering invisible issues of gender, race, and ethnicity, the club preserved the social, political, economic, cultural, and spatial status quo and normalized the absence of certain groups, chalking them up to cultural differences. By identifying these "exceptions," study participants re-inscribed the club as a place of whiteness, reinforcing the invisibility of ethnic and racial minorities. As Lefebvre (1991, p. 289) argued, "there are beneficiaries of space, just as there are those excluded from it, those deprived of space; this fact is ascribed to the 'properties' of a space, to its 'norms.'"

Clearly, Lefebvre's spatial triad introduces a useful analytical lens when examining belonging in social (leisure) space. By understanding the three Lefebvorean moments, social space can be understood as an ongoing and dynamic production of spatial relations and not an inert, neutral, and pre-existing given. Using Lefebvre's interconnected moments in the production of space as a guiding framework enables scholars to outline the complex interplay of leisure, social space, and belonging.

Performativity and Belonging: Doing Social Space

Lefebvre's lauded theorization of the production of space necessarily guides much critical scholarship on social space, though it remains surprisingly underutilized in leisure studies. Even so, its common usage tends to ignore the temporal dimension in Lefebvre's thought. In his

more recent work, Lefebvre (2004) further underscored the importance of what he referred to as the “field of rhythm”—the reiteration of spatial practices—in the production of space (see also Fox and Lashua 2010; Fox and Riches 2014, for their use of *rhythmanalysis*). Some scholars interpret this clarification as a *performative* reading of space, the body, and the every day. Building on Lefebvre’s observations, scholars such as Gregson and Rose (2000) and Rose-Redwood and Glass (2014) invoke *performativity* to enrich Lefebvre’s work and to provide further theoretical heft to his belief that there is “[n]o rhythm without repetition in time and space” (Lefebvre 2004, p. 6).

Performativity refers to “... that reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains” (Butler 1993, p. 2; see also Butler 1990). Discourse can be thought of as “a historically evolved set of interlocking and mutually supporting statements, which are used to define and describe a subject matter” (Butler 2002, p. 44). It expresses the political authority of its users and can be mobilized to subordinate those outside of it. In so doing, it normalizes and brings into being an “other.” Accordingly, the perpetual reassertion of political authority through discourse is enacted as a performative force.

Social space is made possible through discourse. “If a word ... might be said to ‘do’ a thing,” wrote Butler (1995, p. 198), “then it appears that the word not only signifies a thing, but that this signification will also be an enactment of the thing. It seems here that the meaning of a performative act is to be found in this apparent coincidence of signifying and enacting.” Social space, then, can be thought of as a signifier, indicating categories of space based on power relations. In essence, we “do” social space. Thus, social space is not a universal or existent “thing,” but rather an unstable cultural category with which people identify and enact. Its representation becomes “an embodied practice that produces a conceptual field within which the world comes to appear as a collection of objects” (Rose-Redwood and Glass 2014, p. 12).

Spatial practices, in this context, produce an ontological effect by bringing social space into being through the “ritualized repetition of norms” (Butler 1993, p. x). That is, repeated discursive practices enact and reinforce particular understandings of social space. And so, through the performance of everyday life, social space is (re)made and

(re)inscribed on the individual. Social space, put differently, can be thought of as something produced through performances—“what individuals do, say, or act out”—and performativity—“the citational practices that reproduce and/or subvert discourse and enable and discipline subjects and their performances” (Gregson and Rose 2000, p. 434). Correspondingly, by using performativity as a lens, we can think of social space as “... a process of materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter” (Butler 1993, p. 9).

Performativity draws attention to the ongoing interplay between people and social space, the performative dimensions of belonging, and the processes by which particular social spaces become (de)valued. Accordingly, Benson and Jackson (2013) argued the concept of performativity enables placemaking—the (re)shaping, (re)territorializing, and (re)making of social space (Silverberg et al. 2013)—to be understood as “a discursive practice in action through which [social space] and classed subjectivities intersect and are shaped” (p. 797). Ultimately, placemaking disciplines social space even as it produces it.

In their ethnographic research on Lesbian Night at a country-western gay bar, for example, Johnson and Samdahl (2005) revealed how gay men actively engaged in repetitive misogynistic practices, namely the use of discriminatory language and behaviours, not only to protect and maintain their claim over their space but to bring the gay bar into being. Through their (re)assertion of their political authority as the main clientele at the bar, gay men ensured the space remained in their control. While the gay bar offered male patrons respite from normative heterosexuality, the bar was produced as a social space, in part, through performative acts of hegemonic masculinity towards female patrons who were perceived as a threat to male claims to the space. These regulatory practices can be seen as performative to the extent that they succeeded in bringing into being the very effects they proclaimed. By “othering” lesbian patrons through misogynistic acts, gay male patrons constructed insiders and outsiders premised on gender—that is, they determined who belonged and who did not. Interestingly, women in this study, not heterosexuals, represented a threat to male claims over the space. In short, Lesbian Night at the gay bar illustrated how gay men (re)asserted their

masculine authority to bring their vision of gay space into being as a performative effect.

Repetition, though effective, does not ensure success, however. In Lefebvre's (2004) view, the seemingly fixed identities of social space are but fabrications shaped by the "field of rhythm" that necessarily fails to fully reduce difference to sameness. Consequently, he noted "the new and unforeseen' can arise from the apparent reiteration of the same" (p. 4). Judith Butler's (largely non-spatial) work on performativity makes a similar point: "There is no guarantee," she insisted, "that its repetition will be successful; its disciplines may fail" (1995, p. 39). Repetition, in other words, is susceptible to disruption, even though it may advance an impression of permanence and stability (Rose-Redwood and Glass 2014). As a result, repetition opens up the possibility of slippage and subversion in the production process.

Consider Arora's (2015) discussion of how public parks in the United States, the United Kingdom, and China have been appropriated historically as sites of resistance. In the examples she cites, the paternalistic intent of the state, through the repeated reassertion of political authority, drives the design and shape of public parks to socialize the masses into modern, cultured, and active consumers. As political claims to legitimate authority, these efforts represent aspirations and expectations of citizen conduct, accumulating a degree of performative force by being repeatedly invoked, reasserted, and rearticulated. Even so, these public leisure spaces can morph into "... emblems of freedom and human dignity through ongoing interaction and participation of the masses" (Arora 2015, p. 62), which serve to transform parks into sites of resistance through reiterative counter-performances in the form of protests. In Arora's (2015, p. 62) words, "[t]he continuous public struggle to democratize these leisure realms accumulate and form a rich social memory of these spaces, affecting future ideology and public protest." Clearly, not all parks witness such social activism, yet historically and cross-culturally, a critical relationship appears to exist between public leisure sites, such as urban parks, and social protest. Parks serve as public stages on which a range of ideologies play out. Within what Arora referred to as "social theatre," democratic practices emerge repeatedly despite architectural manoeuvrings and surveillance by the state. Parks assume a hybrid identity where corporate

branding, political campaigning, and propaganda skirmish. Still, the history of urban parks shows, if a critical mass harnesses these leisure spaces for political activism regularly, such persistence inscribes them as contemporary protest spaces.

Of course, slippage can just as easily lead to the colonization of social space by socially dominant groups. Zukin's (1995) notion of "domestication by cappuccino" comes to mind as a fitting illustration here. Efforts to gentrify an inner city—"the conversion of socially marginal and working-class areas of the central city to middle-class residential use" (Zukin 1987, p. 129)—aids not so innocently in attracting new (more affluent) residents to areas of the city as a lifestyle offering. Though attracted to these neighbourhoods for their aesthetic appeal, in large part, because of the urban lifestyle amenities available in them and seemingly cool spatial practices of their existing residents, new residents can be turned off by uncomfortable differences associated with the true diversity of residents within these spaces—starving artists may add to the chicness of a neighbourhood, but the coffee they drink *ain't* exactly Starbucks. "Doing urban living," then, becomes a performative act for new residents to cleanse and claim space in a manner that reflects their own self-interest. Over time, new residents mobilize around their consumption practices made tangible through repeated patronage of desirable products by desirable franchises in desirable venues. Gentrification works to the new residents' advantage, as these repeated spatial practices eventually displace the very people who made the neighbourhood cool in the first place, thereby causing a disruption in the original production of the space. These "others" (the original residents) no longer belong, even though the new residents sought to replicate the lifestyle that attracted them to the neighbourhood in the first place. Because the new neighbourhood is premised on consumption practices rather than on controversial divisions of social class, ethnicity, or race, the covert process of producing space becomes generally palatable. Displacement is regarded as unfortunate collateral damage. Thus, repeated performances of taste and "authenticity" become means of colonizing social space and evicting others from it (Zukin 2008).

The consumption of space, as demonstrated in the example above, participates in the production of space. Overton (2010) argued consumption validates social spaces and authenticates values. Through performative

acts of consumption, individuals "... literally buy into the notion of the place, giving it economic value, extending its use and cementing its reputation" (p. 761). As Zukin's example above shows, the consumption of space involves a set of discursive practices (i.e. performativity). These practices reify certain social spaces in the imagination of consumers, so that consumers become agents in the discourses that characterize places in such a way that bestows qualities on products. Purchasing wine from the Napa Valley in California means something. Buying [something from somewhere else] means something else. As Overton (2010, p. 761) explained, "[a]cts of consumption accept these discourses and thus give economic value to the place constructions. These values are then reworked and redistributed through markets." Understanding belonging in the context of social spaces warrants an appreciation that social space cannot be detached from its commodification (Gottdiener 2000). In sum, performativity provides a lens complementary to Lefebvre's spatial triad that enables leisure researchers to understand the ways leisure spaces articulate social identity, social difference, and social power relations.

Conclusion

This chapter contributes to the emerging literature on the "new geographies of leisure spaces" (Aitchison 1999; Crouch 2006; Scraton and Watson 1998; Sharpe et al. 2011; Skeggs 1999), which "takes us beyond the limit of an instrumental empiricist view of space in leisure as merely 'located'" (Crouch 2006, p. 127). In so doing, it provides complementary theoretical lenses through which leisure researchers can explore the interplay of leisure, social space, and belonging. Lefebvre's spatial triad in combination with Butler's performativity reveals the ways social relations are produced, performed, negotiated, and contested in social space. Despite the long-standing belief otherwise, space is not fixed or neutral; it is political and contested. If we take leisure as performative and actualized in space through the repetition of spatial practices, then we can examine how "belonging' to [a social space] can therefore be understood as an act of territorialization" (Leach 2005, p. 302). In this sense, readers should understand that space is at once both emancipatory and discriminatory.

Leisure provides a particularly relevant lens for examining the production and performativity of space because it represents a socially relevant realm of social life that contributes to our sense of belonging (or isolation) and therefore our general well-being.

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Subversive Imagination: Smoothing Space for Leisure, Identity, and Politics

Brian E. Kumm and Corey W. Johnson

Subversive Imagination: Smoothing Space for Leisure, Identity, and Politics

In the United States, the third Monday of January is a federal holiday to celebrate, remember, and rouse to consciousness the life, work, and legacy of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., one of the great subversive and prophetic voices of Civil Rights of the twentieth century. While watching a recent observance, televised from the historic Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, Georgia, Brian was struck by a phrase Dr. William Barber used in a particularly impassioned moment of his sermon. Dr. Barber

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spoke with such unbridled velocity. He juxtaposed scripture, Dr. King's speeches and letters, and current political, economic, and social events, involving not only people of color but also the systematically impoverished and the struggles of LGBTQQIA+ communities. It was electric. He spoke with a creative virtuosity reminiscent of a master musician borrowing melodies and themes from across the musical landscape, stitching an oratory equivalent of a patchwork quilt from pieces of the social fabric he experienced across his life. It was a clarion: he shouted, "SUBVERSIVE IMAGINATION!"

Brian heard these words clearly—"subversive imagination"—but he felt them too. There was something about Dr. Barber's gestures, the way his ministerial gown and stole swept side to side and shook violently, as if trembling, resonating with multiple generations of struggle for equality, equity, and justice. There was something about his posture, the way his head seemed to jut from his shoulders, as if each word was ushered forth by a face and eyes that witnessed these struggles firsthand. His tone cut through an otherwise predicable service. Impassioned, yes; but also urgent and necessary, the way we imagine one speaks when survival is at stake! But there was joy too. Periodic chuckles interrupted the powerful oration, as if indicating that there was something about the struggle itself that exceeded survival and elevated all of life.

Brian counts himself fortunate to experience such moments; moments that suspend logical coordinates of space and time, where the highly orchestrated order of a solemn service of remembrance approaches a threshold of running away with itself, and where a televised broadcast might bring a home viewer to shout, "Amen," religious or not. We appreciate voices like Dr. Barber's; voices that refuse cliché, that refuse acquiescence and the easy way out, and that arouse a collective subversive imagination. Inspiration! We'd wrestled with how to write about identity politics and leisure. As white, European-descended, middle-class, able-bodied, men—average, typical white men—we struggle to engage with identity politics, given we benefit from so much privilege. When we looked for other transgressive forces that inspired subversive imagination, we were drawn to the two-volume, philosophical text, *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (2009) and *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (2011), written by Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.

The texts and their concepts were subversive, imaginative, open-ended, and generative, enabling difference in how we typically think, feel, and live in relation to the political complexities of everyday life.

And how desperately do we need our subversive imagination provoked and coupled with a pragmatics useful to think, feel, and live differently in our contemporary moment? At the time of writing this chapter, there are multiple threats to the prophetic vision Dr. King spoke forth and paid for with his life. Consider the range of global political problems involving immigration and refugees, a flow of various “undocumented” identities across multiple striations and stratifications of continents, nations, and communities. The “vision” for a unified Europe put forth by Habermas and Derrida (2005) seems not only improbable but perhaps also counterproductive inasmuch as such a multiculturalism may quash ethnic differences, cultural values/practices, as well as minority politics (cf., Watson 2008). Or in the 2016 presidential election cycle in the United States, where the vulgarity of protofascist and Republican, presidential front-runner Donald Trump would eschew any mode of multiculturalism in favor of registering immigrants, refugees, and, in particular, Muslims, restricting any political power, voice, or even entry into the country. Our contemporary political moment presents complex challenges, and appears dire on multiple levels, even in our leisure. Some of the most popular, everyday forms of leisure such as television, movies, smartphone and computer apps, as well as video games function to detain as much as entertain. Rather than offer an escape, these modes of leisure suture and enclose a consumerist loop limiting what is even possible to think, feel, and live.

Nevertheless, there is still productive space to work toward justice, equality, and equity, especially in leisure. The purpose of this chapter is to explore this productive space, rouse a pragmatic subversive imagination, and engender difference in relation to how we think, feel, and live in the midst of ongoing political struggle. Taking the works of Deleuze and Guattari as our conductors, we articulate their concepts of *smooth* and *striated space* (2011). We then discuss the implications this conceptual framework bears for leisure, identity, and political action. Finally, we conclude with brief suggestions for experimentation with these conceptual tools in everyday, leisure contexts and research. Ultimately, we hope

this chapter serves as a clarion to join the struggle to ferret out fascism, even those persisting in seemingly benign, but powerful contexts such as leisure.

Smooth and Striated Space: A Geometry of Everyday Life

If the work of Deleuze and Guattari can be described as an introduction to “*the Non-Fascist Life*,” as Foucault did in his preface to *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (2009, p. xiii), then one may question what adversaries may impede this way of life?¹ This is a profound question and one that serves as the impetus for a considerable amount of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophical oeuvre, particularly as it relates to politics. In his preface, Foucault listed several *tactical* adversaries: “the political ascetics, the sad militants, the terrorists of theory, those who would preserve the pure order of politics and political discourse. Bureaucrats of the revolution and civil servants of Truth” (xii). And to this list he named other adversaries as “the poor technicians of desire—psychoanalysts and

¹ It is important to note that the relationship between Foucault and Deleuze is quite complex and still relatively underexplored. Although their relationship can be characterized as one of mutual admiration, or even friendship, it was not without tensions or even rivalries. As contemporaries, both are considered central figures of postwar, and more precisely, post-1968, French philosophy, variously approaching the political. Yet, a full discussion or description of their relationship and the various points of intersection and departure for the two philosophers’ works is beyond the scope of this chapter. To provide a brief historical marker, we wish to note that the works of Deleuze (and Deleuze and Guattari) that we reference were first published as follows: *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Deleuze and Guattari 1972), *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia* (Deleuze and Guattari 1980), and *Postscript on the Societies of Control* (Deleuze 1990). And this marker is intended to illustrate the historical intersections between these works and those of Foucault. It is worth noting, however, that *Postscript on the Societies of Control* (Deleuze 1990) was the first instance (well after Foucault’s death) that Deleuze directly addresses Foucauldian themes related to politics in an individual publication (i.e., outside of an interview, lecture, or book on Foucault’s philosophy, etc.). Again, much of the relationship between Foucault and Deleuze (including work produced, with Guattari) is relatively underexplored and a matter of speculation. Readers interested in exploring the relationship between Foucault and Deleuze further should reference the special edition of *Foucault Studies* (2014) edited by Morar, Nail, and Smith. Moreover, Deleuze’s course lectures on Foucault (1985–1986) at the University of Paris are now available online in the form of digital MP3s via the Bibliothèque Nationale de France (2011). Finally, Deleuze’s (1999 [1986]) book, *Foucault*, which developed from these lectures, may also serve as a resource to explore this relationship further.

semiologists of every sign and symptom—who would subjugate the multiplicity of desire to the twofold law of structure and lack” (pp. xii–xiii). Yet the *strategic* adversary, according to Foucault’s reading of Deleuze and Guattari, is fascism itself:

not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini—which was able to mobilize and use the desire of the masses so effectively—but also fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behavior, the fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us.

(p. xiii)

Political struggles are inexhaustible, as is our strategic adversary. Political struggles never conclude, but change form and take on new dynamics, adopt new strategies, and deploy new weapons in response to a fluid state of affairs. There is never a panacea, but always an urgency to multiply and transform our efforts. We must invent parries, outflanking maneuvers, and even means of escape from that which dominates and exploits us. “There is no need to fear or hope, but only to look for new weapons” (Deleuze 1992, p. 4).

We encounter these adversaries in our everyday lives. Standing in queues, filling out forms, ticking boxes, we often move through everyday life with bovine docility. Vast bureaucracy keeps individuals and groups of people organized, categorized, and functionally acquiescent to the dominant structures and processes of everyday life, even when they infuriatingly work contrary to our interests. When everyday life and its slow synchronicity to these structures becomes too much to bear, we sometimes turn to therapists who occupy our time in different ways but with similar docility. And why would they not? They are, after all, remunerated for our time on their couch.

In short, much of everyday life functions in what Foucault (1977) aptly identified as environments of enclosure—families, schools, barracks, hospitals, prisons (Bogard 1991). The ideal project of such enclosures was to concentrate, to distribute in space, and to order in time, a production greater than the sum of its constituting elements, which was a hallmark of discipline societies (Deleuze 1992). Despite Foucault’s

influential analysis, Deleuze (1992) argued that this model was already outdated at its first articulation: “a disciplinary society was what we already no longer were, what we had ceased to be” (3). Rather than a discipline society, Deleuze posited that, with the global spread of State-stimulated capitalism, the rise of ubiquitous corporatization, and the advent of information computer technologies (ICT), we were already entering a new era of *societies of control*. In a disciplinary society, one passes from enclosure to enclosure, from family to school to the barracks to the factory (perhaps with periodic stints in hospital or prison). Yet, in a control society, we witness the modulation of each environment of enclosure so as to effect a paradoxical open, gaseous environment, no less harsh and subjugating than that of enclosure, and the perpetual modulation of their functions.

In our contemporary social, economic, and political moment, this modulation involves the corporation replacing the factory, perpetual training or continuing education replacing the school, and qualifying examinations being replaced by continual corporate demands affecting every sphere of life, both public and private. The effect is a sort of gaseous environment, according to Deleuze (1992), where one may perceive open borders all around, where instead of standing in queues we conduct our social and personal transactions via online networks. We find ourselves in an open environment, but one where “what counts is not the barrier but the computer that tracks each person’s position” (Deleuze 1992, p. 7). If not convinced, consider the warfare of late modernity: instead of artillery, we witness crippling modulations of currency exchange rates; and the global positioning technology that enables unmanned drone strikes is the same used to deliver packages from [Amazon.com](https://www.amazon.com). The contemporary conditions of social, economic, and political life are gaseous; they are such that “the family, the school, the army, the factory are no longer the distinct analogical spaces that converge toward an owner—state or private power—but coded figures—deformable and transformable—of a single corporation that now has only stockholders” (p. 6).

From this critical orientation, the contemporary mutation of capitalism we live and contend with is not that of the nineteenth century:

capitalism is no longer involved in production, which it often relegates to the Third World ... [It] is no longer a capitalism for production but for the product, which is to say, for being sold and marketed ... Man [*sic*] is no longer enclosed, but man [*sic*] is in debt.

(Deleuze 1992, p. 6)

As characteristic of late capitalism, this gaseous and noxious environment is what Deleuze and Guattari (2011) called a *striated* space. Indeed, it is an extreme iteration of a striated and highly coded space, despite its contrary appearance as a *smooth* space. A striated space is “a *dimensionality* that subordinate[s] *directionality*, or superimpose[s] itself upon it, becom[ing] increasingly entrenched” (Deleuze and Guattari 2011, p. 480). The State apparatus imposes and institutes striated space upon a smooth space, which is characterized as purely directional, a space of free flowing, nomadic movement capable of destroying various State interests. The two spaces are distinguished by their social functions, either to organize, contain, and subordinate a movement to a grid of dominant social structures and functions (striated space) or to unfetter and free movement from the striations of social orders (smooth space).

Movement within striated space is always subordinated to specific points, specific locales, various coordinates plotted along the journey. Striated space serves the interests of the State apparatus that institutes it; it is the striation of space—its *dimensionality*—that subordinates the movement to points within a grid-work and to functions of the State. Contrariwise, a voyage in smooth space is never dimensional; it is purely directional, nomadic, unmoored from the fixity of imposed points on a grid. Moreover, it is a voyage in immanence, a becoming, which always involves the dislocation of determinate points of positionality. Although it is rather easy to problematize striated space as an imposition of the State apparatus, as well as valorize smooth space—particularly in relation to social implications—Deleuze and Guattari (2011) insisted “that the two spaces in fact exist only in mixture: smooth space is constantly being translated, transversed into a striated space; striated space is constantly being reversed, returned to a smooth space” (p. 474).

Various examples can be given, demonstrating the intermixture of striated and smooth space, and their relative functions to the State appara-

tus. History is no less a striated space, constituted as a grid, because of its relatively abstract nature. It is made of a horizontal axis of time and a vertical axis of meaning whereby events are retroactively pinned into the grid-work and imbued with different degrees of significance according to State functions (cf., Bogue 2003). The “history” of the Thanksgiving Holiday, as one example from the United States, erases or whitewashes the genocidal practices of colonialism for the sake of the State. The imposition of striated space proves more than a minor imposition to minority groups whose historical narratives are thus relegated to a category of Other to master or majoritarian accounts. Likewise, various expressive arts always involve striated space. Music compositions are scored along horizontal lines of melody and vertical harmonic planes; and textiles are woven with a horizontal woof and vertical warp. In spite of its artistic and expressive qualities, music often functions as a model of “popularizing, capitalizing, and imperializing of the arts (indeed [it is] the most majoritarian and popularizing, the most capitalizable of all the arts forms)” (Grosz 2008, p. 57). Even the most radically independent musical genres, involving various counter-politics and -cultures, are eventually captured, commoditized, and coded according to social striations, often put into service of the State apparatus.

There is a potential fascism to music, that can “draw people and armies into a race that can go all the way to the abyss,” whereas banners and flags function as a “means of classification and rallying” (Deleuze and Guattari 2011, p. 302). Yet, the critical concern is not just that “everything is dangerous” (Foucault 1984, p. 343), but “how the forces at work within space continually striate it, and how in the course of its striation it develops other forces and emits new smooth spaces” (Deleuze and Guattari 2011, p. 500). In music, for example, Electronic Dance Music and Hip-Hop are exemplary in generating smooth spaces that cut across social and artistic striations (cf., Saldanha 2013; Miller 2004; Kumm 2015). In textiles, patchwork quilts create a very different space than knitting; and crochet generates “an open space in all directions, a space that is prolongable in all directions” (Deleuze and Guattari 2011, p. 476).

Yet, textiles are also captured and coded according to social striations. The clothes we wear places a signature upon our bodies, naming them as belonging or not belonging to certain social groups, a process Deleuze

and Guattari (2011) called *territorialization*. Territorialization is a process that occurs whenever components of a social or natural milieu “cease to be directional, becoming dimensional instead, when they cease to be functional to become expressive” (p. 313). Daily routines of grooming and dressing are equally acts of territorialization as are maintenance regimes of one’s home. Mowing one’s lawn, trimming one’s hedges, and tending to the structure of one’s domicile render the components of the milieu expressive of occupancy and/or ownership, belong to neighborhoods, social classes, and even conformity to official and unofficial codes of “appropriate” behavior. Territories are coded spaces; expressive components correspond to social codes, and in our contemporary moment these codes not only include official laws but also homeowner covenants, religious texts, and even cyber codes that rigidly enforce territoriality.

Such codes can become lethal. Consider the case of Trevon Martin, an African-American teenager who was harassed and eventually shot and killed by a “captain” of a neighborhood watch program of an exclusive, gated community where Martin was suspected of not belonging.² The residential segregation characterizing any city bears witness to the highly coded striations of territories, divided and subdivided according to class, race, ethnicity, and even, sometimes, according to sexual identity. Likewise, any division of labor involves not only an abstract division based upon skills but also social constructs of gender, sexuality, race, language, and customs, an operation of striation that relegates certain bodies to certain territorial zones of occupation. How often do we hear of struggles to exceed the containment and confines of one’s life? Break a glass ceiling? Feminists critiques of maintenance regimes in leisure are long standing (Berbary and Johnson 2012), yet can these critiques not also be extended to address limitations on the amount of *space* women can occupy (Johnson and Samdahl 2005)?

Rosa Parks refusing to give up her seat on a bus or a lone protester in Tiananmen Square are not just struggles of ideology but also of geopolitics and territorialities. When such acts of resistance are exerted with sufficient force, they begin to break down walls built by powerful institutions to open new vistas of possibilities, of different social belong-

²<http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/05/us/trayvon-martin-shooting-fast-facts/>

ings. As Massumi (1987) remarked, “Force is not to be confused with power. Force arrives from outside to break constraints and open new vistas. Power builds walls” (p. xiii). An outsider, occupying space of a different territoriality, can become a directional vector, a social force, an operative for smoothing space for change and alteration. Smoothing space in this way is a process of deterritorialization. Deterritorialization occurs when the common sense coordinates of space and time become unfixed, dislocated, and detached, when ontological domains and presumed hierarchies are transversed, crossed, or broken (cf., Bogue 2003). Deterritorialization is the act of freeing movement from the punctuated coordinates imposed by the State apparatus in striated space, the refusal to stay put, to stay in one’s place.

Of course, deterritorialized movements are then reterritorialized according to transformed social codes: Rosa Parks was reterritorialized as an emblematic figure of the Civil Rights movement. Yet, the critical issue with de/re/territorialization is the potential political impact of Deleuze and Guattari’s (2011) conceptualization of *becoming*, as an ontological unfixing of dominate social hierarchies that place the hegemonic, or molar, figure of a white, heterosexual, European-descended, able-bodied, man, speaking in a standard language at its apex. A *becoming* does not pertain to punctual systems of localizable points or even localizable lines of movement connecting points of positionality within various striations of space; rather, “a becoming is the movement by which the line frees itself from the point, and renders points indiscernible” (p. 294).

The subordination of movement to localizable, punctuated hierarchies of positionality is not only the characterizing trait of striated space but also constitutes an *arborescent* order of phallogocentrism—“the most privileged model of rocklike identity ... the proudly erect tree under whose spreading boughs latter-day Platos conduct their class” (Massumi 1987, p. xii). A becoming occurs in smooth space, “strangling the roots of the infamous tree” (Massumi 1987, p. xiii). A becoming arises in the middle of things, in the midst of fluid states of affairs, and “always turns out to be a political affair” (Deleuze and Guattari 2011, p. 292). In this way, becomings are always minoritarian or molecular; that is to say, they exist in opposition to majoritarian or molar standards of domination, a deterritorialization of social codes, coordinates of space and time, where its oper-

ations necessarily engage the underprivileged term of binary oppositions (e.g., man/woman, adult/child, human/animal, molar/molecular, etc.).

In smooth space, we are not just individuals but we become other individuals as well as other genders, races, sexualities, and classes, which is not to say that our bodies literally morph and take on other biological and phenotypical traits. Rather, the way we live and how our bodies function no longer conform to the dominatory pretenses of determinate and fixed positionalities imposed upon them in striated space (cf., Kumm and Johnson 2014). Of course, Deleuze and Guattari (2011) cautioned that “smooth spaces are not in themselves liberatory,” and we should “never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us” (p. 500). Yet, they do present opportunities for diverse political action within a minoritarian or molecular framework that may become liberatory. Within our gaseous, noxious, contemporary social, economic, and political moment, this seems to us particularly urgent. Is it not time to kindle a subversive imagination and invent new countermeasures to these conditions? We believe leisure is among the most appropriate places to start.

Smoothing Space for Leisure, Identity, and Political Action

Our contemporary Western world inherited the conventional concept of leisure by way of a nineteenth-century elaboration of a Work-model, imbricating both physics (force-displacement) and socioeconomic (labor power or abstract labor) conceptualizations of *work*, which was fundamental to the State apparatus in disciplining populations and industrialized production (Deleuze and Guattari 2011). The Work-model was imposed upon every activity, translating every act into possible or virtual work, which was tantamount to the disciplining of free action or leisure. “Physics had never been more social,” for it was a question of defining the constant mean value “in the most uniform way possible by a standard-man” (p. 480). This physicosocial model of Work was an invention of the State apparatus, and performs the general operation of striating space and time within the concentrated efforts of industrialized production,

whereby it nullified smooth space of free action or leisure in the name of the State (Deleuze and Guattari 2011).

Thus, the problem of leisure is not only definitional—an abstract conceptualization—but also a real territorial construction of striated space with a molar or standard-man acting as overlord. In most leisure scholarship, this tends to generate a crisis of identity. As Henderson (2010) noted, the lack of a singular, unifying paradigm is disconcerting to many in our discipline; however, the articulation of a collective identity is problematic when considering the radical societal shifts of the twenty-first century. As we have previously commented, the conditions of late modernity and capitalism no longer resemble the concentrated environments of enclosure, but have rendered our existence to a gaseous, dispersive, open environment. We need a renewed imagination to subvert the striated space of the Work-model and of leisure as its diminutive, poorer-half of a work/leisure binary.

The way forward is not to seek answers from the “King” (Henderson 2010), which would only serve to further entrench striations nor should we necessarily fret over various reconceptualizations of leisure and work, regardless of how promising some efforts may seem. By and large, feminists have demonstrated the way forward by smoothing the space of leisure scholarship. As Parry and Fullagar (2013) noted, contemporary feminists have eschewed “the problem of definition (what is leisure?)” in favor of analyses of gendered power relations, diverse leisure practices of resistance, and the social–cultural nexus within patriarchy as the masculine context of leisure (p. 575). Likewise, other scholars are smoothing the space of leisure scholarship by foregrounding spatiality in relation to individual and collective identities, belongings, and non-belonging in complex social milieus (e.g., Riches 2011; Lashua 2010, 2011; Lashua and Kelly 2008).

This is not to diminish the considerable ground gained by other leisure scholars, particularly with regard to social justice efforts related to sexism (Parry 2005; Johnson and Samdahl 2005), racism (Richmond and Johnson 2009; Johnson et al. 2008), classism (Richmond and Johnson 2009; Mulcahy and Parry 2011; Rose and Johnson 2016), ableism (Parry 2007), transphobia (Lewis and Johnson 2011), and heterosexism (Dunlap and Johnson 2013; Johnson et al. 2012; Johnson 2005) evident in leisure

settings and contexts; rather, it is to foreground how, more often than not, leisure scholarship tends to locate identity politics within ideological struggles and disciplinary discourses of hegemony. We ask you to consider whether it is even possible to think “identity” outside spatiality. The term we often use to describe our identities—“positionality”—is one of spatial arrangements. Although Deleuze and Guattari (2011) may be read as offering a taxonomy of space, emphasizing what various spaces *do* in relation to the social field—a worthy contribution to the spatial turn in the social sciences and humanities in its own right (cf., Lashua and Kelly 2008)—we contend that their spatial concepts are best when used as tools for leveraging a subversive imagination toward a geopolitics of everyday life, for inventing parries, outflanking maneuvers, and means of escape from that which dominates and exploits us.

For Deleuze and Guattari, identity was never a pre-given or predetermined reality; rather, identity was considered to be formed, deformed, and reformed in particular spatial arrangements, very real processes of *de/re/territorialization*. More than a factor in identity formation, or context in which identity formation and politics occur, space is a sort of germinal influx from which social, economic, and political bodies (both individual and collective) individuate, emerge, and become (Colebrook 2013). Take for example, Pavlidis and Fullagar’s (2014) work with roller derby grrrls. Exploring the smooth space and velocity of movements afforded by roller derby rinks, they examined the multiplicity of feminist identities emerging and becoming among participants. Likewise, Lashua and Kelly’s (2008) study of Aboriginal Hip-Hop artists exemplified the mutual imbrication of space and practices deeply weeded to youth identities. Yet, we wonder if further analysis might demonstrate how the smooth spaces of sidewalks and streets become striated with territorial markings, perhaps generating other injustices. For example, Johnson and Samdahl (2005) offered a pointed account of how the smooth space of a dance floor in a country-western gay bar became striated with misogynistic injustices perpetrated against lesbians. With these notable exceptions aside, we believe contemporary discourses of identity politics and leisure underemphasize spatiality, and the absence of ontologically obfuscated geopolitical boundaries remains a serious impediment toward progress (Saldanha 2013; Milevska and Saldanha 2013; Colebrook 2013). The underlying

principle of striated space is that when the vertical and horizontals intercept with increasing regularity and uniformity, a tighter, more rigid, and more homogenous social field emerges (Deleuze and Guattari 2011); and the displacement, dislocation, and disruption of the gridded social field is integral to increasing difference and heterogeneity in leisure contexts.

What becomes of leisure in a society of control, where capitalism overcodes or overwrites everything and simultaneously constructs its own opacity, where the complicity of the State apparatus and of capital in “discriminatory violence on the ground is, for the most part, yet to be brought out into the open” (Milevska and Saldanha 2013, p. 237)? What new forms of active political action and resistance are yet to be invented, implemented, and discussed? What becomes of race and racism, for example, in the context of globalism, the spread of State-stimulated capitalism with the drift, collision, and deterritorialization of continents and nations? Can a productive dimension of race be recovered with the emergence of hybrid, or even new, racial identities via nomadic movements in deterritorialized spaces of late capitalism that resist subordination to racist codes (Colebrook 2013)?

When the borders are collapsing, as we witness in our contemporary moment, the potential emergence and proliferation of creative identities and political activities is yet to be fully explored. Moreover, the growing emphasis of ICT within everyday life renders this potential proliferation of creative identities and political expression exponential, but also the tendency to reterritorialize minority movements into existing structures. Our sheer interdependence with ICT imbricates both majority and minority groups, and we question what becomes of majoritarian identities in such deterritorialized spaces. Doubtless, one of the pressing concerns for future scholarship on identity politics and leisure is related to the types of subjectivities, oppressions, and resistances that are enabled or blocked by digital or virtual technologies, as a complex mixture of striated and smooth space.

Elsewhere, we have argued for leisure as a site of becoming, of dislocating determinate coordinates that situate various positionalities affording various becomings—otherwise to how one is located on various grids of striated space, and we believe the spatial concepts we have emphasized engender a subversive imagination to outflank dominant structures

(Kumm and Johnson 2014). Yet, what is most critical for scholarship that engages these complexities from the orientation we advocate is the active work of creating or recovering productive spaces where identity can become otherwise in fluid, nomadic movement. Not only does this require diligent and persistent refusal of the dominate structures of striated space, it also calls for creative and inventive maneuvers that undercut and subvert those same structures, both within the context of study and our academic discipline.

Pragmatics: Make a Map Not a Tracing

Within leisure scholarship, we believe, it is no longer sufficient to simply report what happened, who was involved, what identities were claimed or disavowed, and then discuss these matters in relation to existing theory. We believe it is time to act, time to make all scholarship *active*. Whether one identifies as an activist or not, we contend that all scholarship is creative of a shared reality, constitutive of a shared intellectual territory, and responsible for various operations of striating and smoothing that terrain for others. And if we do indeed believe that the non-fascist life is in our best interest, it is necessary to ferret out the dominate structures that restrict and limit our capacities to think, feel, and live with a productive difference in our contemporary moment.

“Make a map, not a tracing” (Deleuze and Guattari 2011, p. 12). A tracing belongs to a representational logic, which portends that identity can not only be given adequate signifiers but that it can also be reproduced and replicated (cf., St. Pierre 2013). A map belongs to a different logic. A map can be folded into multiple spatial arrangements; a map has infinite entry points and exists; a map can be torn, drawn on a wall, or reworked by various social groups for different purposes. A map is never one-same for all. A map is distinguished from a tracing insofar as the map forces one to experiment with the concrete dimensions of life: a map requires “performance,” whereas a tracing requires “alleged ‘competence’” (Deleuze and Guattari 2011, pp. 12–13).

The stakes are new modes of living, not reproductions of the same. To rely upon “competence” rather than “performance” indicates a tendency

to play it safe, to always come back to the established arborescent order, and, perhaps unintentionally, reify striated space, becoming a servant of the State apparatus. Instead, we believe the future of leisure scholarship must become cartographic. Whether maps take the form of works of art, political movements, or computer applications, our future depends upon action and cannot wait for competence. Map bodies (individual, collective, animal, human, cybernetic). Map space–time configurations and arrangements that are always in processes of becoming, regardless of how unbecoming such cartographies may be to established practices. Refuse any concept that does not have mobility, whether that concept is “Individual,” “State,” “Capitalism,” or “Identity.” Give movement its due; resist subordinating movements to pre-given, pre-plotted points of location and identity. Move quickly—a point can become a line with enough velocity (Deleuze and Guattari 2011).

Take risks, experiment, and leverage the words and concepts of others as tools to smooth space, to smash the courthouse of reason and judgment to pieces, and to deterritorialize established practices. Do not analyze or interpret as much as utilize and experiment. Build upon the established works and fragments of others, but in so doing make their efforts perform in unimaginable and uncontrollable ways to the curators and custodians of propriety. In this way, one becomes a subversive and imaginative cartographer, outflanking and inventing new weapons for resistance.

To our way of thinking, this is indeed a pragmatism we can embrace—a subversive imagination. We cannot imagine trying to trace, represent, or reproduce the territorialities, the re/de/territorializations, the various intermixtures of striated and smooth space forming, deforming, and reforming our multiple identities and political struggles. But we can imagine cartographies of this sort that generate productive spaces, especially within leisure, whereby the gaseous and noxious conditions of late modernity and capitalism are exploited rather than exploiting. We imagine what we need is action. We recognize that our actions are limited by the striated space in which we live and conduct our scholarship; however, that does not stop us from imagining.

What inspired us in writing this chapter, drawing upon Dr. Barber’s impassioned plea for subversive imagination and Deleuze and Guattari’s

philosophical texts, is that they *move* us; they compel us to action. They force us to move into different intellectual and geopolitical territorialities. This is not always comfortable or easy. Creating a map of racial and racist de/re/territorializations of his neighborhood, Brian's recent work (Kumm 2015) not only offered an analysis of the identity politics of movement within a segregated, suburban area but also created a passageway for African-American young people to walk from place to place and avoid harassment and abuse by various homeowners. This passage was created at the expense of his own home territory, identity, and belonging to certain social groups, much to the chagrin of other neighbors. The impetus for his modest experimentation was not to resolve racial conflict in his neighborhood by rerouting foot traffic to a more "acceptable" location; rather, it was to facilitate movement in ways that disrupted the established coded and punctuated coordinates of belonging and non-belonging. It was intended to engender a people-to-come, not to erase phenotypical and behavioral traits, but to risk loosening, or even losing, some of the entrenched identities that mark us all for the sake of difference and change: the question was not just "who are we" but also "where are we" (Kumm 2015)? We believe it is time to move—with subversive imagination—and cross barriers toward justice, equality, and equity—something Dr. King's legacy continually inspires us to *do*.

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Against Limits: A Post-structural Theorizing of Resistance in Leisure

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Resistance has always been a slippery concept to study. What, exactly, is resistance? How do we know it when we see it? And who gets to decide? As Weitz (2001, p. 669) wrote, the term resistance “remains loosely defined, allowing some scholars to see it almost everywhere and others almost nowhere”. In a review of the sociological literature, Hollander and Einwohner (2004) found that while the term is often used, scholars fail to define it in any systematic way, and noted that “everything from revolutions to hairstyles has been described as resistance” (p. 534). Perhaps this argument could be applied to leisure studies as well, where resistance has been linked to a wide range of leisure practices, spaces, and identities including young girls’ leisure-based smoking (Wearing 1998), older adults gardening (Raisborough and Bhatti 2007), parkour (Bavinton 2007), roller derby (Pavlidis 2013), female Harley riders

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(Roster 2007), and competitive masters athletes (Dionigi 2002). Sharp, Routledge, Philo, and Paddison (2000) expressed concerns that the concept has become so widely applied that it has become almost meaningless. Perhaps this is why some of the recent research on politically charged leisure draws on theoretical frameworks or concepts other than resistance, such as queer theory (Calley-Jones 2010), “anarcho-politics” (Gilchrist and Ravenscroft 2013), and prefigurative politics (Calley-Jones and Mair 2014; Sharpe 2008). Given this breadth and variety of its conceptualization, is resistance still relevant?

In this chapter, I argue that resistance is still relevant to leisure studies. The field came to an interest in resistance through its recognition that leisure is not “innocent” but, like any domain, is a sphere of struggle in which power is negotiated, won, and lost (Shaw 2001). Studying resistance allows us to look more closely at the various contestations and power struggles that play out in and through leisure, and the ways that leisure is used to oppose or change various manifestations of domination and the status quo. And, in its recognition of oppositional behavior as informed and political, resistance offers us a way to explore the interconnections between leisure and politics in meaningful ways (Raby 2005). That said, resistance is not resistance—how we think of resistance is shaped by how we think of power (Raby 2005; Shaw 2001). For the concept to have utility for theorizing interconnections between leisure and politics, it needs to be located within broader theorizations of power.

To this end, this chapter offers readers a *post-structural* theorizing of resistance in leisure. Not all scholarship on resistance in leisure has been undertaken from a post-structural vantage point; in fact, much if not the majority of research has looked at resistance in leisure through a modernist lens that conceptualizes resistance in terms of acts of opposition, conducted by subordinate groups against a dominant power. I begin the chapter with a review of modernist perspectives and offer some illustrations of leisure research and practice that have been undertaken within this theoretical position. Following this, I offer post-structural theorizations of power and resistance. The contents of this section draw almost exclusively on the work of Foucault; therefore, I acknowledge that what is being offered as post-structuralism is more accurately a *Foucauldian*

theorization of power. Foucault conceptualized power as circulating through a culture or a system and exercised at innumerable points and times. Power is not held but exercised, and arguably in Foucault's framework (and indeed the argument has been made) power and resistance are, ontologically, redundant concepts. Interestingly, even in acknowledging this redundancy, Foucault continued to apply the concept of resistance in his work because, as I explain in the third section of the chapter, the concept of resistance gave Foucault a language to promote his politics. Politically, Foucault promoted freedom; what he was against, and thus resisted, were any limits or constrictions placed on the possibilities for how people might wish to live their lives. To Foucault, resistance was power exercised in the attempt to destabilize the limits of the present order, including what we do, what we know as truth, and our sense of who we are (Hoy 2004). In the last section of chapter, I apply Foucault's perspective of resistance as "against limits" to leisure research and practice.

Modernist Perspectives on Power and Resistance

Foucault's conceptualization of power ran counter to the dominant social theories of the time, which framed power in terms of a binary of dominance and subordination. In these "orthodox" (Sharp et al. 2000) or "modernist" (Raby 2005) perspectives, power was equated with domination: the power to coerce or to control. Dominant groups "held" power and wielded it against a subordinate; subordinates, in turn, resisted and attempted to "seize" power (Raby 2005). Modernist scholars of power had varying interests regarding who dominated and which power structures to attend to. Marxist and subcultural theorists, for example, focused on power embedded in class structure, whereas feminist scholars focused on how power was embedded in patriarchies (Raby 2005).

Modernist theoretical perspectives conceptualize resistance as having two core elements: *action* and *opposition* (Hollander and Einwohner 2004). In other words, resistance is an activity: it is "a social action that is carried out in some kind of oppositional relation to power" (Johansson and Vinthagen 2015, p. 109). Over time, the concept of resistance has

expanded, to include not only direct, open, and confrontational acts of resistance such as protests and strikes but also the less visible and everyday acts of opposition such as foot-dragging, feigned ignorance, or sabotage. James Scott, resistance scholar and author of *Domination and the Arts of Resistance* was influential in this regard. Scott's work focused on the resistance of peasant peoples to various systems of domination (e.g., political, economic, cultural, religious). In this work, he was able to show the varied ways that a subordinate group might resist when open confrontation and direct action are not easily available. He showed how the acts of resistance of peasant groups were more disguised, piecemeal, quiet, and "every day" forms of resistance. For Scott, resistance is "any act(s) by member(s) of a subordinate class that is or are intended either to mitigate or deny claims made on that class by superordinate classes or to advance its own claims vis-à-vis those super-ordinate classes" (1989, p. 36).

Modernist perspectives on resistance in leisure maintain this binary of dominant and subordinate. From this theoretical vantage point, leisure is conceptualized as a political arena that is used either by dominant groups in ways that extend or maintain the "established order" or by subordinate groups to oppose or challenge it (Carrington 1998, p. 279). Oppositional action in and through leisure may take a variety of forms—it may be collective or individual, public or private, symbolic or material. The scholarly literature offers many examples of subordinate groups using various forms of leisure to oppose or challenge the "established order"; excellent examples include Radway's (1991) analysis of women claiming leisure time to read romance novels in an effort to resist patriarchy, Wallace and Alt's (2001) report of the 1930s' German youths' swing dancing movement as an act of opposition to the Nazi totalitarian regime, and Beal's (1995) analysis of skateboarding as resistance to capitalist ideology.

Perhaps nowhere in the field of leisure is this perspective considered more than in the arena of sport. As Messner (1992) argued, "sport must be viewed as an institution through which domination is not only imposed, but also contested; an institution in which power is constantly at play" (p. 13). As sport scholars have noted, sport can become transformed into vehicles for political or cultural resistance, particularly when sporting contests involve subordinate (e.g., colonized, racialized, politically oppressed) groups playing against groups that represent the

dominant power. By way of example, much of the scholarly attention that has been directed to analyzing the sport of cricket has focused on cultural or political resistance. Due to the history of cricket in relation to British imperialism, cricket contests that involve nations or peoples that have been dominated through the history of British colonization (e.g., West Indies [James 2013], India [Khondker 2010], and Black British [Carrington 1998]) become opportunities to symbolically resist domination and express national or cultural pride—especially in matches in which the subaltern group “beats them at their own game”.

The debates that circulate in relation to modernist conceptualizations of power and resistance focus on issues of intent, analytical perspective, and effects (Raby 2005). For example, does a “resistor” need to have the intent to resist for the act to “count” as resistance? Or do we focus on the effects of the act, regardless of its intentions? Who decides what qualifies as resistance: the actors or the analyst? Resistance theorists respond differently to these questions. Vinthagen and Lilja (2007), for example, argued that a consciousness of intent from the actor is not required; intent does not matter as long as the action involved an act done by someone subordinate, that in response to power challenges power, and that the act contains at least a possibility that power gets undermined by the act. Alternatively, intent is important to Routledge (1997), who defined resistance as “any action imbued with intent that attempts to challenge, change, or retain particular circumstances relating to social relations, processes, and/or institutions” (p. 361).

Questions are also raised regarding the ways that modernist theories of resistance are built on, and maintain, certain theoretical assumptions about social structure, agency, and the subject. In modernist theorizing, resistance is the result of agency arising from a rational, pre-discursive, internally coherent, acting subject (MacDonald 1991). As Raby (2005, p. 161) pointed out, in modernist theories of power “the subject is whole, with a clear position in relation to domination, rather than fragmented, and thus has a clear source of agency, and of morality”. From this position, the avenues for social change, such as overthrowing the dominating class, while daunting, are clear as it is evident who is dominant and who is subjugated. Raby (2005) wondered if these aspects of modernist theories of resistance are part of what makes them attractive: the enemies are easy

to spot and the avenues for social change are more clear-cut. However, as Rose (2002) noted, modernist resistance theory is also caught in a trap: that “by illustrating the different ways that agents respond to dominant power, [it] inadvertently establishes the system as a pre-established entity” (p. 383). And resistance may be more fragmented and transitory than can be accounted for in and through the modernist narrative.

Foucauldian Perspective on Power and Resistance

A Foucauldian perspective on resistance is altogether different from modernist perspectives on resistance because Foucault conceived of power altogether differently. Foucault rejected a number of the fundamental principles of modernist theorizing of power, including the notion that power equated to domination. Rather than viewing power as a “thing”—a possession that could be “acquired, seized, or shared” (1990, p. 94), Foucault conceived of power as an *ability* that was produced and exercised in the myriad social relations in which we are all embedded. It was, put simply, “the ability of individuals to create change, no matter how insignificant” (Heller 1996, p. 83). In Foucault’s conceptualization of social life, power is ubiquitous, diffuse, and omnipresent, moving and circulating through a “capillary-like” network of social relations and “exercised from innumerable points” (1977, 1990, p. 94). As Foucault described:

[Power] is produced from one moment to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from one point to another. Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. And “Power,” insofar as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing, is simply the over-all effect that emerges from all these mobilities.

(Foucault 1990, p. 93)

Foucault rejected the modernist conception of power as a binary (“There is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations” [1990, p. 94]), not because he rejected that

unequal power relations exist but because of how binary theorizing *presupposes* a relationship of domination and submission between groups of people. Foucault argued that the groups that we assume to hold power—governments, social institutions, laws, dominant groups, and the like—are the *result*, not the *cause* of workings of power, and represent “only the terminal forms power takes” (p. 92). Foucault was interested in exploring and exposing the workings of power—the ways that power is produced and exercised in the daily and ceaseless relations that occur between all people in all locations of the power network. He wanted to know: how is power exercised in attempts to influence or control the actions of others? How is domination (of individuals, groups, corporations, and states) achieved, and through what strategies or tactics? Further, how is power exercised “from below”—by the so-called “subordinate” individuals or groups in the power relation? For example, how might a student (by not answering a question) exercise power that influences the teacher? How might an athlete (by threatening to quit) influence the coach (Markula and Pringle 2006)?

Foucault’s theory of power has necessarily demanded a rethinking of the concept of resistance. Whereas in modernist frameworks resistance is conceptualized as action coming from “outside” the power structure (and directed toward the inside), Foucault contended that “resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power...there is no ‘escaping’ it, there is no absolute outside...this would be to misunderstand the strictly relational character of power relationships” (1990, p. 95). Foucault promoted a vision of power and resistance as much more entangled, existing in a relation akin to a yin–yang (Sharp et al. 2000). Indeed, as his often-quoted phrase “where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault 1990, p. 95) suggests, there is no complete separation between enactments of power and resistance; “one will always contain at least the seed of the other” (Sharp et al. 2000, p. 20). Resistance tends to be conceptualized as mobile and transitory; rather than “violent ruptures” that overturn power, there are “cleavages”—points, knots, or focuses of resistance—that are distributed in irregular fashion over power relations at multiple points (Foucault 1990).

Because Foucault (1990) emphasized the existence of a multiplicity of points of power and resistance in a power network and further that

each point of resistance is a special case deserving of its own consideration and analysis, a Foucauldian perspective pushes us toward an analytical approach that focuses on the micro-workings of power: the ways that power is exerted and contested in the daily, mundane relations and interactions that comprise social life. And, we can see this interest in the micro-workings of power and the exercise of power “from below” in the scholarship on leisure undertaken using a post-structural perspective. What is emphasized in these works are the unique and local context, a multiplicity of relations of power, and the ways that power is both enacted and resisted.

For example, a paper by Raisborough and Bhatti (2007) about the gardening experiences of a woman named “Joy” offers a useful example of a post-structural analysis of resistance. In their analysis, the authors refused to claim Joy’s gardening *as* resistance to (or reproduction of) domination, as their intent was to unsettle the domination–resistance binary. The authors instead focused on how Joy negotiated through and creatively positioned herself within the traditional gendered norms to which she was subjected (e.g., wife, mother, neighbor, friend, gardener). In so doing, the authors emphasized that while Joy’s varied identities were restraining, Joy was also able to maneuver through them to “find her own location”. Similarly, Pavlidis’ (2013) post-structural telling of her experience in roller derby refuses to frame roller derby as “a simple case of women united against a ‘dominating’ men ‘outside’ of roller derby” (p. 665). Instead, Pavlidis focused the analytical lens on the workings of power among women involved in roller derby and her own desires, strategies, and practices in her attempt to occupy the subject position “roller derby grl”. Pavlidis’ analysis also showed how subject positions such as “roller derby grl” are simultaneously restraining and liberating, in that they celebrate certain versions of femininity while rejecting others.

Similarly, Bavinton (2007) engages in a post-structural reading of the practice of parkour or urban freerunning. Parkour is a way of moving in which runners appropriate and creatively reinterpret various urban forms (buildings, rails, ramps, walls) in their effort to move fluidly and swiftly from point A to point B in an urban space. Parkour as an activity challenges norms of behavior and the rules of how spatial-material features are to be used. While Bavinton argued that parkour is resistance,

he rejected structuralist notions of the resistance in parkour as a struggle against power. Instead, he emphasized how power and resistance are relational and it is the very existence of norms and conventions that enables the exercise of resistance. In the case of parkour, resistance is exercised when runners play with and circumvent the norms of behavior and conventional uses of public space. Acknowledging that the effects of these acts of resistance are transitory, Bavinton also showed how the effects of power are negotiated and incomplete.

Foucault's theorizing of power as relational has introduced an important question: are power and resistance redundant concepts? Heller (1996), for example, contended that resistance is an impossibility in Foucault's framework because power and resistance are no more than two different names that Foucault gave to the same capacity. Similarly, Rose (2002) has called resistance a "theoretically redundant" concept because "practices of domination and resistance are both enactments... They operate in overlapping networks of enactment and are dedicated to appropriating and reconfiguring each other's efforts" (p. 396). Foucault's framework has led some to wonder if resistance has any theoretical or analytical utility at all. Should Foucault reject resistance? Does he? If the answer to these questions is no, then it begs new ones: where and what is resistance in Foucauldian theorizing? Why does it remain?

Post-structural Resistance: Destabilizing Limits

Foucault did consider power and resistance as redundant concepts. However, he did not reject resistance; instead, he continued to discuss, theorize, and locate it in his theorizing of the relationships between freedom, power, and domination. How do we make sense of this contradiction? It helps to remember that Foucault was a scholar of contradictions. He was both a philosopher and a social scientist, and while Foucault the philosopher saw no ontological distinction between power and resistance, as a social scientist the term offered a useful way of communicating what he was for politically, as well as what he was against. Fundamentally, what Foucault was *for* was freedom—in other words, an expansion of the possibilities for how we might want to live our lives or be who we want

to be. He framed domination and resistance in these terms as well. As Hoy (2004) wrote, Foucault thought that “power can be productive if it opens up new possibilities, but it turns into domination if its function becomes entirely the negative one of shrinking and restricting possibilities” (p. 66).

Foucault’s career-long interest in tracing the histories of “systems of thought”—the knowledges and truths that are accepted without question in a particular field—was driven by his concern with power and domination. In most of his work, Foucault traced the dynamics of two processes: “freezing and liquefaction—the ways that categories of various sorts are delineated and stabilized, and de-delineated and destabilized” (Michael and Stills 1992, p. 873). Like Nietzsche, Foucault questioned the innocence of our accepted truths; he thought of truth as “invented” rather than “discovered” and what emerges as truth is not the result of progressive or continuous development but of power struggles—“accidents, violence, disputes and clashes of will” (Markula and Pringle 2006, p. 12). The thrust of Foucault’s historical work was to trace how particular ideas come to be fixed and elevated as truth and knowledge at particular times and places, while alternatives become rendered invisible or inarticulable (Michael and Stills 1992).

This work had a political intent as well. Foucault considered systems of thought to be inherently limiting; in fact, that is essentially what a system of thought does: it lays a grid of intelligibility atop of social life that *delimits* the sayable, intelligible, and visible from the unintelligible and invisible (Sotiropulos 2013). A system of thought also delimits people: it establishes boundaries and rules for what is recognized and counts as a person—what counts, for example, as a proper relation to one’s gender, or nationality, sporting practice, or role in the classroom (Markula and Pringle 2006). In so doing it recognizes, categorizes, constrains, and *subjects* individuals to certain ends, identities, and modes of behavior. In other words, the system of thought sets limits to freedom; what is produced as “identity” is fabricated from within the possibilities that are intelligible in the system.

Foucault used the term *subjectification* to describe the process through which people become categorized within a particular system of thought. He spent much of his career focused on examining the production and

effect of systems of thought of the various human sciences, tracing “how knowledge produced in these fields acted to construct humans as particular objects—such as Caucasians, asthmatics, homosexuals or morons... and how humans subsequently become subject to those scientific truths” (Markula and Pringle 2006, pp. 8–9). He was especially concerned with the ways that systems of thought were particularly punishing “for people who behave in specific sorts of ways, who have certain types of habits, who engage in certain kinds of practices, and who put to work specific kinds of institutions” (Foucault 2001, p. 74). He was amazed that these punishments were generally accepted without question. He wanted to know: why do people “buy in” to particular regimes of truth? How are people made to accept the power to punish—or when punished, tolerate being so (Hoy 2004)?

Foucault turned some of his attention to power that is exercised in ways that maintain particular regimes of truth. He was interested in forms of power that had the ability to *discipline*—the ability to control, judge, and normalize subjects in such a way that they were “destined to a certain mode of living or dying”. He considered norms to be one of the great instruments of power partly because their effects are easily masked; although we use norms to help us make sense of, classify, and judge our different actions and behaviors, they tend to be “unwritten rules” that circulate unremarked yet over time become asserted as not only normal but also necessary, natural, and universal (Hoy 2004, p. 66). Foucault was not against norms per se; he was concerned with *normalization*—the linking of norms to power in ways that encourage people to value and become efficient at performing a narrowly defined set of practices (Taylor 2009). He was concerned with the expansion of normalizing judgment throughout our social institutions. As he described, “the judges of normality are everywhere...”:

We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor-judge, the educator-judge, the social worker-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behaviour, his aptitudes, his achievements.

(1977, p. 303)

Again, Foucault's concern with norms was with how norms limited possibilities. As Hoy (2004, p. 66) wrote, the problem with normalization is that it has "spread too far in our lives, and is blocking many other viable forms of life. The constriction of possibilities is achieved when normalization asserts the norms as necessary, or natural, or universal".

If we put this all together, we can see where resistance fits in Foucault's political project. What he was really against, as Pickett (1996, p. 466) explained, was *limits*:

What, then, is resistance against? Foucault's answer is "limits." Foucault is concerned with the foundational issues of a culture. These are basic categories, which he sees as dichotomies, providing the context for social belief and action, such as good/evil and normal/pathological.

Therefore, resistance involves *acts against limits*—acts of refusal, negation, destabilization, disobedience, or transgression of the limits of the present order, including what we know as truth, what we do, and our sense of who we are.

(Hoy 2004, p. 94)

A Post-structural Resistance in Leisure

What does Foucault's theory of resistance offer to the study and practice of leisure? For one, it offers some fruitful directions for leisure scholarship, as it encourages a scholarship of problematization: scholarship that calls into question the norms, behaviors, and constructed categories of various leisure-based systems of thought. Clearly, Foucault has shown us that his historical/genealogical scholarship *is* resistance; genealogy is able to show that the body has lived differently, which allows us to recognize that it "can be seen to be 'more' than what it now has become... the contrast alone will not make us change, of course, but it will open the possibility of change" (Hoy 2004, p. 63).

A number of scholars of leisure and sport have embarked on important historical work in this regard. For example, Adams' (2011) genealogy of figure skating has revealed shifting gender norms for both men and women; although now associated with femininity, at one time figure

skating had been exclusively a gentlemen's pastime that celebrated masculine grace and style. Adams' study exposes and troubles the association between particular bodily movements and the constructed categories of gender. However, a scholarship of problematization need not only be historical; any research that troubles the taken-for-granted truths and assumed knowledges of various leisure-related fields can have destabilizing effects.

A post-structural theory of resistance also offers innumerable possibilities for leisure as everyday lived practice. We can think of leisure practice as resistance when it takes the form of acts of refusal and disruption of the limits that are produced and normalized through everyday action and behavior. It involves leisure that recognizes things in new ways—as *more than they were*. Again, Bavinton's (2007) discussion of parkour offers an instructive example. Parkour as a leisure practice disrupts some of the spatial-material limits of everyday public space; in so doing, particular features (e.g., the public park bench) become recognized as something more that they were before (a springboard, a tightrope).

It can also involve leisure that recognizes people differently, often involving a dissolution or negation of the subject. Butler (2002) refers to this as a process of "unbecoming subjects". Unbecoming implies an undoing of self and to some extent it is; unbecoming involves problematizing the limits that are placed on "what a subject can be" and enacting those problematics through acts of disobedience "to the principles by which one is formed" (p. 221). This involves, as Hoy (2004, p. 89) described, "dissolving your sense of who you are and disrupting your sense of what the right thing to do is" (Hoy 2004, p. 89). However, unbecoming is more than this: it is also a practice that opens up spaces for creative possibility. Through negating what is known, we open up possibilities to imagine otherwise and enter a world of "may be". As Markula (2003) described, it is when we can question the "naturalness" of our identity and recognize ourselves as subjects and with resistant agency that "the possibility of transgression emerges and thus, the potential for creating new types of subjective experiences" (p. 102).

Therefore, we can think of leisure practice as resistance when it allows us the space to try to create ourselves as works of art, and expands the possibilities for who we might imagine ourselves to be.

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