Film, Form and Phantasy

Adrian Stokes and Film Aesthetics

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For Jasmine, Eloise, Thea and Joseph

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This book has evolved over a long period of time. It began in the enormously stimulating postgraduate seminars on psychoanalysis run by the late Richard Wollheim in the philosophy department of University College at the University of London in the mid-1970s. Wollheim's writings have been, and remain, a constant source of inspiration for the past thirty years.

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Introduction

> It is simple, immaculate: the perfection of Vermeer no longer needs expounding. His pictures contain themselves utterly self-sufficient. In each of them the surface and design alike mark an act which is accomplished and complete. Its limits are unconcealed.... On the surface of these pictures the forms of life lie flatly together, locked side by side in final clarity.[1]

> The material beauties of Vermeer's world uncover themselves quietly, neither sought for nor unexpected. The nature of things is perfectly visible; objects receive the light as if by habit, without welcoming or shrinking. Encrusted, lustrous, or with the lucent enamelled facets of the later works, these textures are familiar companions of life: they make no claims. Their character is not spectacular, the drips of light take no account of it. They never remind us that they could be touched. Often it is not matter that occupies the eye, so much as the reciprocal play of nearness and distance. Overlapping contours, each accessory to the next, confine the space, an envelope of quiet air. And suspended in it, near or far, bound unresisting by the atmosphere, each object yields up to the light its essence, its purest colour.[2]

That these two quotations from the late Lawrence Gowing's monograph on Jan Vermeer should stand at the beginning of a book dedicated to an understanding of film will warn the reader that what follows is committed to recovering film, or at least fairly large parts of it, often implicitly, for the visual arts in general. Gowing's writings also serve as exemplars of a mode of understanding art. He was also an art historian and critic strongly influenced by the English aesthete, art critic and historian Adrian Stokes whom he knew and whose work provides the critical framework of the present book.

While such a project may fly in the face of what was once orthodox film theory which has been adamant in constructing film as an autonomous art severed from the fine arts, nevertheless, it does find strong precursors in earlier film theorists like Rudolf Arnheim and Sergei Eisenstein. Similarly, among modernist-inclined film-makers and theorists this broad visual art approach has found support in the post-war writings of the American film-makers and writers Stan Brakhage, Hollis Frampton, Michael Snow and Stanley Cavell. This book's project is to offer an understanding of film, using Stokes' ideas expressed in his essays on architecture, painting, sculpture and dance.[3] However, it does not necessitate making film a subjunct of these practices,

but rather, I hope, sets out common ground which I believe exists between these visual arts, especially in the relationship between the psychology of the artist and spectator and the 'image in form' constituting particular films.

Gowing's *Vermeer* also stands as a remarkable instantiation of a critical sensibility which merges a sharp eye with a view of art that finds in the form of art a resonance as pervaded by meaning and phantasy as that found in art's so-called content or subject matter. It lends an integrity to the art object *qua* object, such that its representational properties are of a piece with its wholeness as object. Furthermore, there is to be found in such criticism a belief that the quality of the art object, whether a painting or sculpture, reflects qualities in both the psychical life of the viewer and in the world itself. In other words, it resists a purely formalist understanding, paradoxically perhaps, by lending a particular meaning to what we know as form, a meaning that Stokes isolated and called the 'image in form'.

My aim is to explore such a sensibility with respect to film and, in further-ance of this aim, to discuss the writings of Stokes, to whose work Gowing's *Vermeer* owes much for its approach, its style and its aesthetic. One question in response to such a project may be: What can a Stokesian view of visual art have to say about an entirely different medium, film? First, the area that the book will concentrate on is the nature of the aesthetic and psychological relationship to the visual arts, the nature too of the visual art object and the relationship between form in visual art and meaning. These are major questions for both art and for the philosophy of art, and in many ways, the book will try to articulate a possible answer. Just as ambitiously perhaps, it will attempt to go some way to providing an answer – or at least an intelligible response – to the question of how film can be addressed on such matters alongside other arts such as painting, sculpture and architecture.

At the core of this viewpoint is the ancient idea that art is an intentional activity. All art is artefactual and thus intentional, even when it comprises the found object or blank canvas or screen where the artist's role seems quite minimal and does not involve making anything at all. Intentionality, albeit complex, lies equally at the centre of the industrially produced Holly-wood film with its studio-based communities of directors, actors, writers, designers, cinematographers, costumiers, and so on.

As the product of desires, beliefs and feelings, art is inevitably something to which we respond with the same mental phenomena of desires, beliefs and feelings. As intentionality is a necessary condition of human agency so the latter is intrinsic to art practice, spectatorship and our understanding and appreciation.

In so far as what follows is an exploration of Stokes' ideas, it is committed to Kleinian psychoanalysis. Melanie Klein moved to England in the 1920s where, after a protracted struggle in the 1940s, she established her ideas in the mainstream of English psychoanalysis. Her impact on the wider cultural field has been fairly muted. Richard Wollheim, Peter Fuller, Michael Rustin

and Eric Rhode come to mind as writers who used Klein's ideas in their pursuit of an understanding of the arts and culture.[4] By and large, however, Klein's major influence has been on the practice of psychoanalysis itself and its attendant fields (e.g. child welfare). In the past twenty years it has been Lacanian ideas that have dominated the academic disciplines of literary criticism, film theory, feminism, photographic theory and cultural theory. In what follows, I shall claim that Kleinian psychoanalysis established a more sophisticated understanding of certain theoretical areas, particularly of phantasy, a central concept in much cultural theorising over the years (e.g. sexual difference, ideology, representation).

The other figure whose influence pervades the book is Richard Wollheim, who almost singlehandedly has merged Kleinian psychoanalysis, Stokesian aesthetics and analytical philosophy in an influential view of the visual arts, especially painting, best represented by his magnum opus *Painting as an Art*. To this extent the book is also in the very broadest sense Humean in that, like the eighteenth-century Scottish empiricist philosopher, it takes the naturalistic view that art must be grounded in human nature, in particular, in mental processes. Art, on this account, first profoundly established by Hume, is a response to human psychology and the needs expressed by the latter. If there is a unity in art it is in terms of the unity of the mind. The book is fully committed to this view.

Broadly speaking, Kleinian psychoanalysis can be differentiated from orthodox Freudianism by its strong accent on phantasy, its complex rendering of the Oedipal and notably the pre-Oedipal period of infancy, its adherence to a form of Freud's own often disparaged love and death instincts, and its placing of the ego, conscious and unconscious, in the forefront of its theory. Equally, Stokes is the subject matter of the book only in so far as his ideas resonate for film. Much of his work addressed areas in which I have no particular expertise – architecture, painting, sculpture and dance. At the moment of writing, barely any writing exists on Stokes.

What follows attempts to break with dominant modes of explanation in film and art in general flowing from the semiological camp. It contests the relevance of Jacques Lacan and the structuralist and so-called post-structuralist school which currently dominates in much visual cultural theory – film, art history, art theory, photography, and so forth. The reign of Saussurian linguistics has meant it would seem a daunting legacy of intellectualism, linguistic reductionism and indifference to the complexities and importance of aesthetics and aesthetic judgement itself. To this extent I have located the ideas in the English Romantic tradition of John Ruskin and Walter Pater. But since I started to write this book in the late 1980s I have found that it was critically hemmed in on another side by the wave of cognitivism that began to emanate from America and that by the mid-1990s was in full flood. A distancing from semiotics led to a defence of Freud from cognitive psychology as it found its place in film studies.

Stephen Bann has suggested a methodological division in British art history between a philosophical and scientifically-based approach exemplified by Ernst Gombrich (the science of perceptual psychology) and one which is experiential and phenomenological, represented at its best by Gowing who was primarily a practitioner, a painter. It is the Gowing approach that I wish to establish here on the terrain of film. A return to and a recovery of the experience of film is the clarion-call of what follows, and as Bann points out, to understand Gowing better it would be profitable to read Stokes (similarly, Hegel is helpful for an understanding of Gombrich). In such a project, where the confrontation of the artwork by the spectator is central, we would expect the notions of perception, form, phantasy and imagination to come to the fore. To this extent Stokes serves more as a model, albeit one who cannot be equalled. For in Stokes, particularly in his post-war writing when Kleinian explanations and concepts take their place alongside aesthetic and art history ones, there is an attempt to found the experience of the art object (importantly for artist as well as spectator) in a Kleinian psychology.

As a means of engaging the subject in hand, I have taken as my larger topic the traditional distinction in film theory between montage and realism. This has been a useful and at the same time misleading demarcation of film into two strands which characterise in a fairly exclusive way a fundamental difference in ontological and epistemological frameworks governing the two positions. Realism has represented the priority of the real, the idea of the camera reflecting the world, and in so doing more often than not commenting upon it – two incompatible ideas if reflection is meant as a neutral activity and ambition. Montage has always evoked the idea that film constructs its own world through the technique of editing and that it is expressive primarily of the film-maker, of personality itself.

Both polarities have had their prime statesmen – Eisenstein for montage and Bazin for realism. What follows is in many ways an attempt to rearticulate these two notions as they relate to film. For it is true to say that they both express plausible and attractive intuitions about film, and perhaps about art *per se*. To throw them into a wider framework of art theory, as Eisenstein did, will hopefully shed light on how they may be understood which may prove fruitful for any future understanding of film.

The crucial and perennial problem in much of this theoretical work has been the meshing of the social and psychological determinants of actual works of art themselves. To explain a work of art, be it a painting, sculpture, building or film, is to face the problem of how a coarse-grained determinant, say the studio system in Hollywood during the 1930s, has its precise effect in the complexities and details of a particular film and not in Hollywood films in general. Between such explanation are placed other factors such as genre, authorship, technology, actors, stars, and so forth. Equally, and less ably addressed, is the problem of what kind of explanation is being adduced

in such a scenario. Too much does the actual quality of a work of art, its aesthetic impact or otherwise, fall through the explanatory grids being applied. To some extent this position has been welcomed in the name of a critique of high art whereby distinctions are not tolerated, on political grounds, between the works of popular culture and high art. The analytical concepts and system do not recognise any difference between 'good' and 'bad' works of art and as such the latter distinction ceases to exist. It is not the limitations of the analysis that are brought to the forefront, but rather the analysis seems to prove the case itself. The differences between works of art on such grounds are elitist, ideological, culturally determined – whatever.

Aesthetics understood as the philosophy of art and not simply the technical aspects of an art has been neglected in the history of cinema, brief as it is. Aesthetics itself has been the target of a concerted attack by many film theorists in recent years. Seen as an ideological system and thus determined by class interests, it has been replaced by the idea of a contextualisation of art. Thus any film must be fundamentally understood and explained as being a reflection of or determined by particular conditions of existence which are necessarily economic, ideological and political in nature. This view is one found in art theory in general. T. J. Clark has come to represent this view in its most concerted attack on what has been perceived as a view of the autonomy and aesthetic level of art more often than not represented by the arch-modernist, Clement Greenberg. In many ways the argument is an old one between a form of relativism and a form of absolutism. Quite crudely, in modern terms, Marx versus Kant.

To take a philosophical stance on film is to address certain abstract questions, ones which involve the conceptual relationships holding in any understanding of what is film. These abstract questions can be construed in a purely conceptual fashion or they can be articulated and resolved through a more substantive analysis which involves a discussion of films and their makers. It is this latter approach that I will take in what follows. For the discussion of art without addressing artworks themselves is to ignore the potency of art itself in explicating any understanding of it. In film this idea has been fairly widely held, particularly in the influential *auteur* theory, although the latter is misleading in that its claim to being a theory seems to be misplaced. The idea that films can be understood by alluding to the themes in the work of an artist or film-maker is innovative only within a certain context in film, when the studio system was dominant in Hollywood. Otherwise, art criticism has been involved in such an approach to understanding art for some time.

In founding an aesthetic of film it would seem to be necessary to broach the issue of human nature for to answer certain questions about art as representation, or art as an object or the judgement and value assigned to film itself involves issues of psychology. This is not a novel approach. Eisenstein found it necessary to base his ideas loosely on a theory of Pavlovian

psychology. Years later, and in a very different vein, Christian Metz used psychoanalysis to understand cinema. In the interwar years Rudolf Arnheim implicitly embraced a psychologistic system to render a formalist view of film as art. André Bazin's realism was always infused with ideas culled from a mix of phenomenology and existentialism prevalent in post-war France. What separates some of these attempts from philosophical ones is the claim that psychoanalysis or psychology is a science and therefore free from ideological views of human nature associated with philosophical systems. This seems to be a covert way of attempting to establish the truth of such theories by fiat.

The book seeks to establish a close relationship between the disciplines of philosophy, art history and criticism. This is on the grounds that much pioneering work has been covered on certain issues in the visual arts since the inception of German art history in the nineteenth century. By treating film as an art, a visual art, perhaps something useful can be gleaned from these debates especially those by Heinrich Wolfflin, Ernst Gombrich, Michael Podro, and many others. Of course, the differences between painting and film are profound, but they share concerns in aesthetic terms. The book is divided into three parts. In Part I the notions of representation, depiction, expression and phantasy are set out in largely philosophical terms. In Part II I examine Stokes' writings and their context, especially as they allude to the carving and modelling distinction. In Part III, these ideas are applied to the traditional division in film between montage and realism, paying particular attention to Hitchcock and Ford as representatives of the success of art in traditional Hollywood and to so-called 'art-cinema' film-makers like Rossellini, Eisenstein and Dreyer. There is a final chapter on the implications of Stokes' ideas for black-and-white cinematography.

Part I

Representation, Expression and Phantasy

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Representation, Depiction and Portrayal in Film

An account of the *experience* of film *as art* that allows a central role to the notion of phantasy, as this book suggests, cannot fail to benefit from an account of representation. The reason for this will become clearer when we discuss the idea of phantasy itself being understood as a kind of representation, and as such a link can be established between pictorial representation and psychological states themselves. But in the first place such an argument requires a detour through heavily disputed philosophical questions of pictorial representation which, for historical reasons, have focused largely on the art of painting.[1] Since Plato, painting, as a two-dimensional means of representing persons, objects and events in three-dimensional space, has been the art form which traditionally has posed the question of the nature of understanding pictorial representation. What does pictorial representation involve? Is it a matter of an illusion, of a resemblance, of a symbolic system, or what? Put at its most schematic: what is it for one thing to represent another, where the representation could be a painting, a drawing, a diagram, a map?

This issue of the nature of representation in one way or another has been at the centre of film theory since its inception, making it a tributary of a stream of philosophical thinking since the work of Immanuel Kant in the late eighteenth century. On the face of it, a film's two-dimensional representation of a three-dimensional world has much in common with painting's traditional aims. On the other hand, there is a profound difference in that film (like photography) does not seem to mediate reality in the way that painting does, but rather provides it in a direct way. Whether in terms of representation, film is to be understood as a kind of painting, or whether the differences between them are in fact quite profound are questions to which it is worth returning.

These philosophical debates are concerned primarily with *pictorial* representation which is to be marked off from visual representation. This reflects the question posed by painting of whether the representing of an object in a picture has a relationship to that object, what we could describe as 'representing that object', where the notion of an 'object' is understood to

include non-existent objects, e.g. the goddess Venus, Hamlet, Norman Bates, as well as existent ones. What, we may ask, is entailed in this relationship to confer the status of representation on particular marks on a surface,[2] or in the case of film, on the organisation of moving light, sometimes coloured, on a surface?

In the case of film, the representation consists of areas of projected light, sometimes coloured, moving on a surface. It is this object which represents men riding horses, women striding in the sun, Norman Bates murdering Marion in the shower, the sinking of the *Titanic*, and so forth. Thus there is a prior 'representational' form to that projected on a screen and that is the film strip of photographic frames which are literally photographs of persons, objects and events, but which are *not* the representations of the moving images of cinema but a necessary condition of such moving images. There is also in fictional film the representational fictional characters played by actors and fictional places and events 'played' by sets, locations, etc. There are thus three levels of representation possible, although only one that is relevant to seeing a film as a film. There is the pro-filmic of actors and locations standing in for characters and places; there is the physical reel of photographic images which can be looked at as such; and there is the projected film of moving images.

Transparency

That is to say, is film, unlike painting for example, 'transparent' in some way so that it allows us, as it were, to see the world in the way a mirror or microscope or pair of binoculars do?[3] This responds to our intuition that a photograph or film of me does not represent or depict me. On the contrary, there is nothing like an actor standing in for me, nor is the image constituted by a medium like paint. Rather, it *is* me in some way, enough for such an image to stand in a court of law as evidence of my spatio-temporal position or of my actions at a particular moment in time, solid enough evidence for a life sentence. And while a photograph or film can falsify things and events, nevertheless, all other things being equal, it does not. In other words, we seem to see quite literally the world through the camera. This quality of photography and film is the cause of many difficulties associated with film aesthetics.

On this view, one held in some form by the influential proponent of cinematic realism, André Bazin, it follows that aesthetic properties cannot be assigned to the film as such, but only to what it films. Film is a recording device which simply captures reality and as such it can have no aesthetic properties except those of what it records. So narrative film can be aesthetically interesting only in terms of the drama that occurs before the camera's lens and not in terms of the film as a film.[4] As Roger Scruton puts it:

[P]hotography is not representation; nor is it representation when used in the cinema. A film is a photograph of a dramatic representation, and whatever representational properties belong to it belong by virtue of the representation that is effected in the dramatic action.[5]

Thus film, in Scruton's view, is essentially a recording medium and what it records is a drama. This implies that film *per se* is not a medium for art. There is no film art, only dramatic art which is recorded or documented by film.[6]

Scruton's argument seems counterintuitive in light of the general acceptance of film as a medium which has produced artworks and not simply for the dramatic aspects of what it films (although that is important), but for what are intrinsically filmic qualities, like editing, camera angles, lighting, colour, shot composition, all of which are not properties of what is filmed but of the means of depicting or representing it. Thus, we may counter, does not lighting, camera angle, editing and such like contribute an aesthetic quality to film *per se*? For example, is it not precisely through these intrinsically filmic elements that viewers come to recognise a director's style? In fact, this intuition is so strong that perhaps one must assume that the notion of representation Scruton uses in relation to film has been misunderstood perhaps or, more radically, requires to be thought about again.

Scruton compares film unfavourably with painting, which he believes involves imaginative work performed with materials to generate an image, something he feels is lacking in film understood as a reproductive medium. Scruton does concede an expressive quality to film when it creates an atmosphere by which 'it may be an instrument of expression'.[7] This happens when a film is constructed through its shot so as to give a 'dramatic unity' (Scruton cites Eisenstein as a good example of this), thus 'creating a unified expression of the prevailing mood'.[8] Scruton suggests that Eisenstein was able to exclude details in the image which are not 'designed as objects of attention' by his technique of highly controlled compositional forms and juxtaposition of shots.[9] In such cases (rare, according to Scruton) we see not only the photographic images, but the *intention* behind their construction which 'determines our understanding of the sequence'.[10] So part of what is represented here is determined not simply by the images of a dramatic enactment before the camera, but by the particular composition and juxtaposition of shots. This seems to be a major concession, for Scruton is only limiting such cases in the same way we may do for painting. If expression is what is *achieved* in art, then it may in fact be rare.

Another version of the transparency view found in different forms in Scruton and Bazin suggests that film does not represent but rather *re*-presents the world viewed through the camera's lens.[11] So film does not present us with something that resembles the world, but presents us 'with things themselves'.[12] This view is again to be associated with Bazin who wielded in

his writings many different expressions for his ontological claims for the film image.[13] Unlike the hard-line transparency view, this one seeks to preserve the idea of 'representation', that there is a distance in time, for example, between what was once before the camera and is now much later on the screen in front of us, while at the same time ascribing to the idea that somehow looking at the film image is the same as looking at reality in terms of what we see in the film image. This form of the problem of representation is unique to film (and photography). Stanley Cavell holds this view by way of his idea of re-presenting whereby, unlike painting, a film 'emphasizes the existence of its subject'. Painting, on the other hand, emphasises the subject's identity – in straightforward cases, its likeness to the subject. Cavell in another mode speaks of how 'a painting *is* a world; a photograph is *of* the world'.[14] But as we shall see, there are similar problems beneath the surface of more ancient debates about representation in painting.

Representation and depiction

One way traditionally of beginning to understand in what representation comprises, is to say that a representation is always *of* something. While appearing straightforward, this 'of-ness' opens a philosophical can of worms. If a representation stands in a particular relation to what it is a representation *of*, then we need to be clear about what the nature of this relation is. For example, a painting of Tony Blair is a representation of Tony Blair. Similarly, if someone draws my portrait, then it is a representation of me. Commonsensically, it would seem to achieve this representational quality by resembling me in some way, so that it *depicts* me, as opposed to somebody else or no one in particular. On this account, a picture's failure to resemble me is a failure to represent me (although it may still represent a man). At this point it is useful to introduce the notion of 'depiction'. For depiction, unlike representation, is a more precise term.[15] To describe a painting of Blair as a representation of him is rather awkward, or too technical; we would tend to say that it depicts Blair.

Not all representations are depictions whereas all depictions are representations. Depiction is a species of representation. For example, if I am explaining to friends at the dinner table my role in a street accident, I may choose to *represent* the affair by a schematic drawing on a paper napkin in which I show my fellow diners all the essential elements of the accident by means of symbols – an 'x' for myself, a circle for the car and a squiggle for the bicycle. To describe the movements of these elements I may choose to draw arrowed lines denoting the directions taken by the car, bicycle and myself. In this way we can say that I have *represented* the accident for a particular purpose but have not *depicted* any of its elements. The 'x', circle and squiggle would not allow someone to identify them as the figures or objects they represent if he or she was not party to my assignation of their

roles. In order to depict myself, the car or the bicycle, I would have to represent them in such a way that they would be recognisable as the *kinds* of thing that they depicted. A simple but, as we shall see, contentious way of discerning the difference is to say that the success of the representations in the depiction cases relies on how far they 'look like' their subject-matter or, to put it another way, we recognise what is depicted as depictions of whatever.

So representation is a matter of something standing in for something else in a way that is not necessarily depictive.[16] On the contrary, the nature of the representational relationship between the two things can be broad and often dependent upon the *point* of the standing-in – what it is attempting to achieve. In order to describe an event, as in my example of my recounting the accident, positions in time and space may be adequate. In a court room, a road accident could be represented using a toy car, bicycle and figurine which may not yet be depictions – the actual car, a Volvo, may be represented by a toy replica of a Ford Escort and so forth. Nevertheless, it will serve its purpose as representation when it is allocated a representational role for the purposes of the court case, whereas for a portrait, a *depiction* of the physical properties of the object represented may be required and if one knew the person portrayed, there would be an assumption that you would recognise that person in the portrait and this would not simply depend upon the title of the painting but on its qualities of resemblance. It would if a depiction of Tony Blair looked like Tony Blair.[17]

Further distinctions can be made where depiction is concerned. First, between depictions of particular subjects, e.g. Tony Blair, The Last Supper, Venus, and those of subjects which are kind-types in which a *particular* person, landscape or whatever is not intended, e.g. Manet's *Boy with Dog* (1860–1) which depicts a boy, but not a particular one, and similarly in Ingres' *Profile of a Bearded Man* (1808). Eisenstein's earlier films characteristically include more often than not kind-types – depictions of *a* worker, *a* capitalist, *a* bourgeois. In the first kind of case, that of particularity, standards of correction between a depiction and what is depicted would seem to be necessary for the picture to be judged as successful as a depiction of its subject-matter. In the latter kind-type case there is no such match between the depiction and what it is of, except of a *kind* – it has to resemble a boy or a dog. That is, the title of Manet's painting of the boy and dog is comprehensible in so far as we recognise a depiction of a boy and a dog in the painting. Its success would depend on broader criteria than those operating for particulars. Of course, depictions of particulars are necessarily also depictions of kinds. A painting of Tony Blair is also a painting of a man. A failed depiction of Blair may still be a recognisable depiction of a man.

It is also true that representations can be of different kinds of particulars. For example, a picture of Venus is of a mythical entity, whereas a painting of Napoleon is of a person who once existed but is now dead. And a painting of Tony Blair at the time of writing is of an existent person. Ontological

niceties such as these have implications for the notion of representation, especially in the case of fictional or mythical particulars. For example, if Venus never existed, how do we know that a picture of her is one of her? How can successful depiction be measured? The implication is that the picture of x should somehow resemble x; and if x did not exist and thus there is nothing to resemble, how can the picture depict x? In such cases, the depiction can be answerable to the mythological 'facts', found perhaps in classical writings and storytelling and more importantly for contemporary artists and spectators, the historical lineage of Venus-images provides a visual reference point or source. Thus the representation's setting or the figure's posture may provide enough context for us to assume rightly that it is Venus who is depicted. Or it may have to depict aspects associated with that mythical figure – her beauty, her sorrow, her divinity, and so forth. In such cases titling may be important, but a successful depiction of Venus, however outlandish or 'avant-garde', may have to comply with some of the descriptions comprising the name 'Venus'. It is with these aspects that cultural and historical determinants often have their say in art, what Gombrich calls the 'beholder's share'. A similar problem arises with film. If film can depict x, then the status of x can be as problematic as it is to be found sometimes in painting.

In the case of film, things are more complicated. Many fictional narrative films are shot on location. For example, a shot of the actual Himalayan mountain range can depict the Himalayas within a fictional world. A shot of the Himalayas may also depict some different (but actual) mountain range, e.g. the Alps in the eighteenth century peopled by fictional characters in fictional villages, etc. In Powell and Pressburger's film *Black Narcissus* (1946) the Himalayas are in fact painted sets built in the studios. On the other hand, the actual Himalayas could represent a fictional mythological mountain range in a film narrative. There is no real equivalent here in painting except where a painter paints the Himalayas from life for an historical scene which includes the Himalayas – using the mountain range as he would the subject of a portrait. A painter may use the Himalayas as a model for a painting of a fictional event which occurred in the Himalayas, or use a depiction of the Himalayas to depict a fictional mountain range.

Similarly locations depict places, e.g. the city of New York is shot to depict itself in a documentary or as the city in a fiction (like a fantasy in which we imagine a New York peopled by Travers et al. as in Scorsese's *Taxi Driver* (1976)) or a San Francisco peopled by the characters of Hitchcock's *Vertigo* (1958). New York can be shot to portray the city in an earlier or future period of time, or as another city altogether (maybe an anonymous or imaginary one). Budgetary constraints often force a film director to use another city to depict a particular city, e.g. Dublin to stand in for Trieste, where they share characteristics in terms of light, architecture and geography. In a documentary film a landscape is itself. In a fiction film it depicts itself in the film's fictional world just like

a novel can use a real location for imaginary narratives as in Dickens's novels based in nineteenth-century London or Balzac's stories using the Paris of his day. A particular landscape can be itself or another country or even another planet. So the transparency of film, that it records real persons, objects and events, means that the same object can have a different ontological status according to its context in a particular film.

However, before moving on to issues arising from such variants of representation, it would seem worthwhile, given that live-action film (excluding animation and computer-generated film) must always have someone or something before its lens, as opposed to painting where artists can produce representations from their imagination, to discuss the issue of painting portraits as they would seem to demand, as does life-drawing, the presence of their subject-matter, of the model before the artist, in the same way that film demands actual persons, objects and events before it.

Actors, models and depiction

In narrative film, characters are depicted using actors – John Wayne as the Ringo Kid, Orson Welles as Kane, Bette Davis as Elizabeth I, Sean Connery as James Bond. Let us take the case of portraits done with a sitter where the artist has painted a portrait of the sitter. Monroe Beardsley broadly interprets 'sitter' to cover landscapes, objects, that is, anything that 'serves as the original model for the painting'.[18] It could also include a portrait made from a photograph or another painting of the subject where an appropriate causal chain links the present portrait with the original subject-matter. For example, if I paint Rembrandt using one of Rembrandt's self-portraits as my model, then the causal relationship is an appropriate one for my painting to be of Rembrandt.

What cannot be ascertained readily from a painting is whether the painter did use a model. The problem found in painting of ascertaining whether an artist's depiction of a person has used a model (for example, Dante Gabriel Rossetti's use of Elizabeth Siddal for paintings of historical characters) or an actual landscape is only a marginal one in cinema. As in theatre we can see John Wayne playing (or depicting) the Ringo Kid in John Ford's *Stagecoach* (1939). We can see that it is actually Tombstone Valley, a location in which Ford has shot sequences for many of his films. However if a film is not shot properly, it may not achieve depiction of Tombstone Valley, that is, one cannot recognise the valley from the shots offered (even for a knowledgeable spectator). So, paradoxically, while it is a shot of x, it fails to depict x. But a dark studio shot could depict the character sleeping outdoors in Tombstone Valley. This is like the function of titles of paintings which can show the intention of the artist's depiction without the latter having to be fully depicted.

Failure of depiction can occur at the level of the pro-filmic. An actor can fail to depict a character, or a set or location can fail to depict a place and a film

can fail in its depiction of an event just as is in other pictorial arts. But film cannot fail to depict what it films. This is the counter-factual nature of film and photographic representation.

In some films, settings are problematic. As we have seen, in Powell and Pressburger's film *Black Narcissus* many people may well believe that it was shot in the Himalayas where the story is set, even though it was entirely shot in studios in England using techniques involving painted backdrops to depict the mountains in the background to the old monastery. In such a case, these props depict the Himalayas and its environs, through what may be seen as resemblance. The props and painted sets, etc. resemble the Himalayas. Thus embedded in the film is a depiction akin to that found in painting. In summary, what can we say about the resemblance criterion as it applies to visual representation in general and film representation in particular?

Resemblance

The resemblance view is an ancient one. It holds that a picture depicts a subject by resembling that subject. This is a commonplace view of depiction and one that seems to have the virtue of common sense itself. After all we often judge a picture as being a good likeness of its subject, meaning that the picture somehow resembles its subject and in doing so is a successful representation. As a theory, however, it has encountered fierce opposition, largely because its classical formulations have been found wanting if not incoherent.

What the notion of resemblance needs to explain is just how a picture of x resembles x. For instance, a painting of Napoleon resembles Napoleon in that they are both physical objects. But for resemblance to be a useful notion in explaining representation it must mean something more substantial and pertinent than a shared physicality. On the face of it, Napoleon, made of flesh and blood, is totally unlike the marks of coloured paint on the surface of the canvas which depicts him. And what properties of something would count as those which would depict him? As Nelson Goodman has pointed out: 'the object before me is a man, a swarm of atoms, a complex of cells, a fiddler, a friend, a fool, and much more.' For Goodman, the resemblance theory begs the question of what is being resembled, as if the latter was something straightforwardly given.

Goodman's attack on the resemblance view is an influential one.[19] He argues that representation is intrinsically enmeshed in language systems with symbolic functions. For Goodman, the resemblance theory of representation is an empty one. It ascribes resemblance without making clear what properties of an object or person a painting of that object or person resembles. For example, things can share properties of spatiality (the painting of x is the same distance away from the painter as is x). Such properties, infinite in number, can be shared between a representation and its object but hardly

suggest resemblance between the two objects, even though a sharing of properties might seem to imply resemblance between two things. It would seem that the properties have to be specific. But to delineate them would be to beg the question.

We can reply to Goodman's objection to the resemblance theory of representation by making sure that the properties in question are of the right *kind* to establish a relation of resemblance between two things. This way banal and irrelevant properties are banished. Of course, the counter-objection is that identifying such properties assumes we have the answer to the question we are asking, that is, how do we define representation of x by y in any case?

Goodman is committed to an attack on object-language, and on understanding objects as sets of descriptions, which are not even stable. The visual depiction of a seventeenth-century courtier most likely involves a different set of descriptions, a different way of seeing, from a depiction of a contemporary politician. In fact, for Goodman, representation is a matter of denotation. A painting is of x because it denotes x, just as the phrase 'the British Prime Minister John Major' denotes the person John Major who was Britain's Prime Minister. Thus depiction is akin to description.[20] For this reason, Goodman's view has been understood to be a semiotic one.

Resemblance can also take place between a non-iconic symbol and its referent. For example, the word 'red' written in red ink resembles what it refers to but only in some accidental sense as the word 'red' means red in whatever coloured ink it is written. The word 'red' written in red ink is not a representation of red. In fact, a red patch in a painting does not represent red but *is red*. However, the red as the colour of Napoleon's jacket in the painting of Napoleon is part of the iconic depiction of Napoleon's jacket. It is also the case that a sample of x (of cloth for a suit), although resembling x in a rich way, is not a pictorial depiction of x.[21] Such a representation is neither pictorial nor depictive.

With regard to film, however, the resemblance view seems somewhat apt. The fact that photography and film have a direct causal relation to their subject-matter, surely guarantees that a photograph or film of x must resemble x, all other things being equal (adequate lighting, in focus, etc.). But if this is true, how can resemblance apply at all, for there would be no room for failure to resemble if it is guaranteed in the first instance? In which case, how can we ascribe resemblance in the first place? Furthermore, we all know that sometimes photographs do not capture a resemblance to their subject. Often we look at family snapshots in which the camera has caught the expression of someone we know extremely well in such a way that they are unrecognisable. In such a case, we are excluding obvious problems of someone being hidden in the shadows, or blurred by bad focusing, and so on. But the causal argument does not shore up the resemblance argument for film and photography. After all, the mercury in a thermometer stands at a certain point, caused by my body temperature but it does not resemble me or my

fevered state. The causal story in relation to film may be a red herring anyway. Surely, there is also a causal relation, albeit perhaps more complexly mediated, between an artist and the model he or she successfully draws. While causality may be considered a necessary condition for x to be a representation of y where y exists, it would seem to have no thrust in explaining how we can experience a representation as resembling its subject. A causal relation between depiction and what is depicted may be a necessary condition, but it is not a sufficient one.

Unlike painting where one can have a depiction of a non-existent person or scene or incident, it would seem that film is necessarily a depiction of something or someone. Thus, even though the Ringo Kid never existed, nevertheless, the film *Stagecoach* does depict the actor John Wayne who plays the role of the Ringo Kid. Or does it? Surely John Wayne depicts Ringo. Like the theatre case, in watching *Hamlet*, we are also seeing Sir Laurence Olivier, the actor who plays Hamlet, but Olivier is depicting Hamlet, not himself. If the children of John Wayne wanted to see (in a literal, physical way) their father long after his death, going to see *Stagecoach* would fulfil that desire, and they may watch the film in a disengaged way *qua* narrative, only concentrating on their father when he appeared in the film. While this is a fairly general state of affairs in film, it is not entirely missing in painting. For example, a drawing of a figure from life is of a model x – it might be entitled something like 'Figure', 'Nude' or even 'Untitled'. The drawing is not intended to be of the model in the sense of her personality or character being expressed or of being recognisable as x. However, it may be the case that the depiction is detailed enough or some distinct property of the person's figure is depicted well enough for x's mother to recognise x. Does this make the drawing a representation of x even though in some sense it was not intended to be one *of* x? To some extent this question is the beginning of an account of the distinction between figure life drawing and portraiture. Not all life drawings are portraits and not all portraits are life drawings. But perhaps there are borderline cases.[22]

A fairly knock-down argument against resemblance as a criterion is the case of a picture of an identical twin. If the picture resembles one twin, then it must also resemble the other twin. So on the resemblance theory it is a portrait of both twins – an absurd conclusion. Flint Schier, who uses this example, has pointed out that despite the claims of the resemblance theory 'a picture of one twin brother is not necessarily a picture of the other'.[23]

The illusion view

Behind the resemblance view lies its most radical form – representation as illusion, that is, that a picture resembles reality to such a degree that it is an *illusion* of reality. Of all the visual arts, film is the one most readily associated with illusionism so-called. Its hallucinatory qualities it is argued are such that

we are in a state of mind in which we believe that what is happening on the screen is real. The traditional characterisation of the illusionary view is that when confronted with a painting of x, we are deceived into thinking that x is actually there before us. We have the illusion that we are seeing the person Napoleon and not simply his representation in a painting. It seems fairly obvious that such a view does not reflect our experience of representational paintings, even of the most realist type. Only in the cases of *trompe l'oeil* pictures are we perhaps not aware that even the most 'realist' painting is still a painting and that we believe we are seeing a door, window, curtain, or whatever. It would seem on the illusion view that a painting is a representation of its subject when we take the representation to be the subject, which begs the question posed by Plato as to why we bother with a representation in the first place. More importantly, however, is the belief that the illusion view leaves no room in pictorial experience for an aesthetic experience, as our experience is of the object and thus we cannot consider its representational qualities, that which makes it an object for artistic attention in the first place. In this way we may argue that the illusion theory subverts the very nature of the pictorial experience it was set up to explain.

Paradoxically perhaps, film is the least illusory of the visual arts. The actual conditions of the medium – light projected in a darkened space before an audience usually sitting in close proximity to each other looking at an image which is not in the same scale as their surroundings – make it highly unlikely that a film could be taken to be anything other than what it is. It is quite another matter how it can force a spectator almost to become lost in its relentless dramatic pull. However, in this way it is little different from the power of the novel. To be lost in a film or novel does not imply any confusion on the part of the spectator or reader as to the reality of what they are seeing or reading. There is little space in film for the *trompe l'oeil* experience found in painting. A painting placed in the right setting is much more likely to mislead a spectator into thinking they are seeing something other than a representation – e.g. *trompe l'oeil* and the super-realist figures of Duane Hanson.[24] The three-dimensional 'illusionism' of Gary Hill's famous installation *Tall Ships* is more akin to the uncanny aspect or spookiness of cinema and does not mislead a spectator into thinking they are seeing real figures and not video projections.

Lumière's train, which supposedly led its first spectators to believe they were being approached head-on by a real train, tells us more about Schier's notion of 'natural generativity' – the impact of a new form of representation and depiction – or about cinema's power to overwhelm its audience than it does of illusionism. A novel can overwhelm us too. I can remember as a teenager not being able to finish Bram Stoker's novel *Dracula* because of the unbearable and overwhelming fear it aroused in me.[25]

Interestingly, with regard to film, Richard Allen has argued for what he calls 'projective illusion'.[26] It is unclear at times what Allen means by 'illusion'.

On the one hand, he asserts that '[I]n order to experience a drama as a projective illusion, as a fully realized world, we must imagine that the actors and props are neither physically present nor a part of this world'.[27] Because film is not 'embodied before us in the auditorium' and even further 'lacks a surface', it is even more appropriate to projective illusion, he argues. For Allen, projective illusion, however, does not mean we 'think that the represented object is before us in the space of the real world', rather 'we visualize that the object is . . . fully realized before us'. At another point, he suggests that 'we imagine that we inhabit the world of the painting in the manner of an internal observer'. Besides the problem of how visualising or imaging is cashed in in this statement, it would seem from these remarks that Allen is committed to something like Walton's make-believe view of pictorial representation which I will discuss next. My objections to Walton encompass Allen's view of film representation.

The make-believe view

The make-believe view understands pictorial representation (and other medium-based representations) as a form of prop 'in visual games of make-believe'.[28] In seeing a picture of Napoleon we make-believedly see Napoleon. The notion of 'make-believe' is synonymous in Walton with 'imagining' or 'fictionally taking', and so forth. It is important for Walton that we distinguish between simply imagining that we see x (as in the case of, say, the verbal description of x in a book) and imagining one's looking at a picture of x that it is a seeing of x (as in the case of pictures). That is to say, it is not in seeing the words describing x that I imagine x, for seeing the words is 'only the occasion for . . . imaginings'.[29] For Walton, '[L]ooking at a picture . . . is part of the content of the imaginings it occasions'.[30] Therefore, in visual depiction, the imagining of x involves the actual experience of seeing the representation of x. Seeing x in the picture of x entails that the seeing itself is part of the imagining, a characteristic which separates off such an experience from non-visual representation such as is found in the novel or any other literary artform even though we need to see the words in order to understand the descriptions upon which the imaginative act depends in such cases.

In some ways this is a version of the illusion theory which hopes, however, to avoid the latter's problems. That is, it wishes to take on board the idea that we do see Napoleon in the picture and not just paint marks on a canvas, but that we also do not confuse the pictorial Napoleon with the real Napoleon. Nevertheless, Napoleon is taken as really before us – in our imaginations. We make-believe through the picture of Napoleon that Napoleon is before us.

A problem with Walton's account is the strain it places on the notions of 'make-believe', 'imagining', 'fictionally taking . . . to be . . .' in which it seems there has to be an operation of the will in cases in which we seem passive. For example, in most cases of pictorial representation, I just see Napoleon in

the picture. There is no sense of my trying or willing myself to see Napoleon. It would seem that in some way I cannot help but see him. And even if I do not know it is Napoleon, I can see in the same direct way that it is a picture of a man dressed in particular clothes, standing before a chair in a gloomy room. There is more sense in the case of descriptive fictions, as in novels, that I allow myself to engage with when I read in such a way as to become imaginatively engaged. Pictures, on the other hand, as Wittgenstein suggested, have more direct impact as in seeing an actual person (hence many of the problems arising from *pictorial* representations). It would seem to be another thing as to whether I allow myself, as in the case of reading the novel, to become imaginatively engaged with a painting. The latter seems to be intrinsic to understanding such depictions in terms of art whilst depiction and representation themselves do not necessarily imply the notion of art. Walton seems to suggest that a formulation of the answer to the question of how we perceive an object as an art object, which would perhaps involve notions of imagination, is somehow a resolution of the more general question about the nature of visual representation and depiction *per se*.[31]

The make-believe view for Walton is rooted in examples found in child's play when, for example, a roll of mud is taken to be a cake, and treated as if it is cake.[32] A child make-believes that it is a cake. As such, the mud is a representation of cake. Stones added to the mud can be cherries, and so forth. This demands conventions and rules agreed by the players. Someone coming upon the mud encrusted with stones would not necessarily see it as a representation of a cake with cherries on it (they could guess it is a cake of some sort, depending on how good the play-cake is). Whether this has got rid of resemblance seems questionable. In fact, it assumes that what we see is a horse in order for us to imagine it to be a horse. The make-believe view does not answer the basic question: how is it we take these marks on a canvas as a representation of a horse? Walton, for example, remarks that a spectator's imagining is spontaneous; she 'just finds herself imagining seeing a horse and imagining her actual seeing to be a seeing of a horse, as she looks at the picture.'[33] But then why does she imagine she is seeing a horse and not something else? We might add that on this account there seem to be no criteria offered of what counts about the representation for it to be seen as anything in particular. In fact, as Schier points out, on this view the relationship between the representation of x and the seeing of x in representation is one of convention.[34] But if it is one of convention to be decided upon within the imagery world of seeing the representation, then x could be seen as y.

Allen's view of representation in film would be susceptible to the same objection. But unlike the make-believe position, Allen also suggests that in seeing a film we suspend 'medium awareness' and experience the film as a 'projective illusion'. Whether an illusion is 'projective' or otherwise, it remains an illusion and as such means that we take what is represented to be real. If Allen believes this, then the make-believe position hardly seems

necessary or even possible. For if I believe x is in front of me when seeing a representation of x, then what sense does it make to assert, when in front of a representation of x, that I am *imagining* I am seeing x in front of me?

Representation and intention

Allen's view brings us closer to our own subject matter: film. There are strong reasons for supposing that photography, under which rubric film might fall, is also non-representational. For example, if a painter paints a portrait of a person and the result does not allow us to identify that person in a pictorial fashion, then we can claim that the failure is one of representation. The painter has failed to represent that person inasmuch as that was his intention. Of course, the painting might still look like a person – it has a recognisable face, torso, legs, and so forth – but it is not of a particular person. But intention is crucial on this account for representation to have any appropriateness here. On the other hand, in photography, the role of intention is not as clear. As a mechanical means of 'representation', one can have an image of x without a 'representer' being present. For example, the camera can be pre-set and a person may be facing its lens unbeknown to anyone else and a photograph (a rather good one as it happens) be produced. Intentionality plays no part here in so far as there is no individual action which results in the photographic image of a particular person or event.

However, it could be argued that there is a minimal intention embedded in the very physical make-up of the camera and its accoutrements (film stock, processing, printing) and that is to capture whatever appears at a particular place – an underground station platform – so that a type is intentionally specified and the tokens of that type are quite accidentally photographed. It is intended that the camera should take pictures, should achieve representation all things being equal – correct light, focusing, etc. Thus it is separated from the case of the purely accidental images discerned in the stained surface of a wall, for instance.

So photography and film can achieve depiction even when there is no causal connection between the depictor and what is depicted, or even where there is no depictor at all – an unlikely state of affairs in painting. Here we are responding to the mechanical means of representation intrinsic to the camera. If a person made pictures in such a way, they would not be making pictures *qua* person but as some kind of machine-like entity. That is, causality in such a case would not pass through intentions. Of course, mainstream film-making spends much time, money and expertise in making sure that the images in a film are highly controlled so that nothing enters the image unintended, so to speak. Sets are built, costumes are designed, locations are scoured for anachronisms, extras are employed to play crowds, sauce bottles are placed quite precisely on tables, peeling wallpaper is either designed and made or carefully chosen. Of course, the painter may do the same in the studio,

but he or she is always capable of changing these things on a whim or fantasy, unlike the film-maker who, when the camera is switched on, gets what he or she gets from that point on. A dog straying into shot either means the editing out of the relevant images or taking the shot again. In contrast, a dog straying before the painter could not find its way unintentionally into the painting.[35]

Similarly, the relationship between the marks on paper or a canvas stand in a different relationship to their subject-matter from the mechanical marking of the surface of what is a photograph. We believe for good reason that there is a more direct relationship between subject-matter and photograph than is the case with a painting and its subject-matter, even if the latter has been painted from life, with the subject before the artist as he or she painted it.[36]

The role of intention is crucial to representation. The fact that a smudge on my wall looks like my neighbour does not mean that it is a representation of him. Neither would a painting of x be a representation of y if it just happened and unbeknown to the painter to look like y. However, it is a representation of a man with brown hair, blue eyes, in a black suit, and so forth.

Beardsley has influenced Noel Carroll to set out a three-fold notion of film representation. In *Stagecoach*, for example, there is the person John Wayne who is *physically portrayed*, and the Ringo Kid whose part Wayne plays, who is the *nominally portrayed*. Third, there is the *depiction* of a man. One can compare this three-fold notion of representation in film with say Rossetti's painting *Beata Beatrix* (1863) whose subject-matter is Dante's true love, Beatrice. The painter used his wife, Elizabeth Siddal, as the model for Beatrice and it is thus also a painting, in some sense, of Siddal as Beatrice (painted in fact after her death). Siddal, the model, would seem to occupy the role of physical portrayal, whilst Beatrice, the subject-matter of the painting, is the nominal portrayal. To round off, the painting also depicts, in Carroll's sense, a woman. What separates painting from film here is that we cannot tell from the painting itself that Rossetti used a model; it is not discernible in the painting that there is a physical portrayal. He could have imagined the woman, with no model before him at any stage or even without any particular woman in mind. This is not the case with the example from *Stagecoach*. We might not know that the actor is John Wayne, but we do know that there is a person who is playing the role of Ringo and his image is on the screen (an interesting case is a person playing him- or herself).[37] The same is also true of theatre: there is portrayal of a physical being, the actor who is playing the role, the nominal portrayal.

In the case of photography we are presented with other kinds of case. For example, in 1979, a number of models were photographed by Martin Hugo Maximilian Schreiber for a book of photographs titled *Bodyscapes*. This is a case of representation with a physical portrayal (nude models) and depictions of women. But there is no nominal portrayal. Many years later one of these anonymous models, Madonna Ciccione, shot to fame as the

pop star Madonna. The same nude photographs of her were published by Schreiber in another book with the title *Madonna: Nudes 1979*. In this case, there is a physical portrayal, of course, which has become the subject-matter. No longer are they the same photographs – nude studies – but rather are nude photographs of Madonna. Is there a difference here of representation? The photographer did not intend to do a series of photographs of the model but of the nude, as in the case of life drawing say. Of course, they are now to be judged, if their new title is considered, as portraits of a particular person and not of a body as a nude *per se*. What were good photographs of the nude may be unsuccessful portraits. Intention has changed in the retitling, and hence the conditions of success or failure of representation have changed too.[38]

This example is similar in some respects to the Rossetti one. Rossetti paintings are seen as images of Siddal as much as they are of Beatrix. However, there is a difference. As a work of art, its success or failure must be judged in terms of its intention as a painting of Beatrix.[39] For it to be a representation of Beatrix there must be a visual experience that determines this to be the case, and it is an experience satisfied by the success of the artist's intention. Such a judgement is indifferent to whether the woman painted is modelled on Rossetti's wife. However, the painting itself might not be completely indifferent to the use of that kind of female figure. For example, it may be thought that the subject-matter would have benefited aesthetically from using a different hair colour, or less full lips, and so forth. Indirectly, then, the choice of life model for the painting may influence its artistic success or otherwise. In other words, part of the artistic process may involve the choice of model as part of the conception of the painting. But the model is not the cause here, rather the decision of the artist to use a particular model in the context of his conception of the painting.

Thus a painting may be more successful, in some sense, as a portrait of Siddal than it is as a painting of Beatrix.[40] But this would seem to spell its failure as a painting as such if it were intended originally to portray a mythological or fictional personage. How far, for example, unconscious intentions are allowed to sway any artistic judgement in this case, is another question. The relationship of the painting's subject-matter – a poet's lover and muse – with the painter's own feelings for the woman who models for the subject-matter, makes such a case more complex than, say, the use of a model for a painting where the subject-matter does not have this emotional resonance. Many paintings of the Pre-Raphaelite Movement, as in other historical periods, used life models to portray nymphs, vestal virgins, and so on. These figures are often incidental to the main subject-matter of the paintings in question and knowing that a certain nymph was modelled on a particular woman is an incidental art-historical fact, if it is one at all, as the identity of many of these models is lost, and does not touch on the aesthetic judgement of the painting in question.[41] What does mark off the two cases

is that in the photographs of Madonna there was always something which they were of. This is by the way of the causal-chemical nature of photography, which is not the case for Rossetti's painting *Beata Beatrix*.

What does this imply for Carroll's notion of representation in film? First, that the causal and ontologically-based rendition of film representation remains embedded in his notion of physical portrayal. Carroll's analysis is of the ontological levels of film representation and does not address the problem of how representation is possible at all.[42] To go some way to answering this question, we need to return to the notion of what the relationship between a film of x and x is that makes it one of representation? Resemblance is one way of unpacking the relationship and one that Carroll's view seems to entail. That a representation resembles what it is of would seem to be a useful line to follow in the case of film or photography. To point the camera at a subject ensures, all other things being equal (e.g. enough light, etc.) that light falls on the film stock in ways similar to what falls on our retina, and hence certain aspects of x – shape, spatial relations to other objects, solidity – find their equivalence on the film stock through chemical means. This does not guarantee resemblance if that should require identification of x or recognition of x to an appropriately informed viewer. An intense film or photographic close-up of my chin would be very unlikely to satisfy that condition and hence not fulfil the criterion of resemblance in such a case. This would also be the case for a painting of the same kind.

What seems to be guaranteed by photography is that there is something in the world that it is a photograph or film *of*.[43] Equally important is that this relationship does not seem to demand intentionality. The camera could easily capture my image accidentally as it does in a large city's surveillance cameras on stations, in supermarkets, shopping malls, etc. It is this weakening of the intentionality condition that would seem to exclude film and photography from being representational at all, if we take pictorial representation as an experience related necessarily to intentionality by the representer, so to speak. This would seem to be counterintuitive. Whether I intended to photograph a dog or not, there is nevertheless an image of the dog which is a representation of one. We can see the dog in the photograph! Does this mean that intentionality has to be jettisoned as a necessary condition of photographic representation? Not if we make the intentionality condition somewhat broader. We may argue that the camera is such an instrument which was intended to capture representations which are recognisable as such. Schier suggests that we understand photography (and by implication film too) as involving a mechanism which 'is designed with the intention that it should produce depictions which are interpretable by those able to recognise the depicted objects'.[44] In contrast, the weathered wall in which we see a face is not such an instrument. A face seen on the wall is purely accidental, the result of arbitrary weathering and surface marking. However, if we could control such a phenomenon, then it would be a mechanical means

of representation through the intentional interception of representation-makers and perceivers.

We could also recover the intentionality condition by limiting the film and photography cases to those of fiction or narrative. John Wayne dressed as Ringo and speaking pre-written dialogue in a hand-made studio saloon is intended to represent Ringo in a saloon and this has to be achieved: failure is possible. As Scruton argues, this is unarguably a case of representation. Wollheim complies with this view. However, there remains a further distinction to be made between film and painting even when the former stems from a complex intentional situation and that is that the photograph can capture the accidentally unintentional – a camera boom, an object lying on a surface, a stray dog. This is not possible in the case of painting.[45]

The difference between painting and photography, as Walton quite rightly suggests, is not one of realism.[46] After all, if we mean by realism, the ability of any image to fit the conventions of what is to count as realistic representation, then paintings can be more realist than photography. For example, Ingres' painting of *Monsieur Bertin* (1832)[47] is more realist than Bill Brand's photograph of a nude woman, *April 1953*.[48] Rather, it is that we 'see through' photographs. Knowing that Brand's photograph is of a naked woman we see that naked woman in a way in which knowing that Gerhard Richter's representation of a woman (*Betty* (1988)) is a painting we do not, even though Richter's painting may have been taken from the model or a photograph. In the Richter case we would not know what the relationship was of the depicted figure to the painting in the way that in Brand's photograph we know that we are seeing a particular woman who existed in front of the lens at the time the photograph was taken. Walton remarks that the jolt we feel when we realise what seems to be a photograph is in fact a painting signals this difference.[49] But we may be making too much of this kind of factor. After all, Derek Jarman's film *Caravaggio* (1986) gives a fascinating insight into how, for the painter's contemporaries, paintings could act akin to photographs in being portraits of young men and women known to the patron. In the scene when Cardinal Del Monte watches Caravaggio paint the young male models, the eventual painting as a form of sexual arousal resembles the modern-day photograph. The causal route for portraits, life drawing and photographs seems to share features not necessarily found in other kinds of pictorial representation.[50]

Wollheim's view

Richard Wollheim's account of pictorial representation largely centres on painting. This view eschews resemblance and argues instead for represen-tations in painting having a two-fold nature. This approach is experiential or phenomenological in its attempt to analyse the actual *experience* of seeing a representation. Wollheim is largely concerned with meaning in a painting

when we can assume what the painting is *of*. It is perhaps the case that for Wollheim recognition of the painting as a representation of something, however basic that may be, is a primitive ability we have that is irreducible in terms of explanation. Much like a child comes to recognise its mother's face, so we can recognise a face in a painting.[51] Of course, this does not constitute an analysis of the notion of representational seeing.[52]

For Wollheim, in seeing a picture of Napoleon we see Napoleon *in* the picture. This means that not only do we see Napoleon, we also see a painting. In this way, Wollheim argues that our experience of seeing a representation is essentially two-fold. The experience itself is not felt to be two-fold (except in certain circumstances). We do not see a painting of particular shapes and colours and then infer that we see Napoleon.

Wollheim's two-foldedness avoids the problems of illusionism and those that beset a resemblance view. We do not see Napoleon in the painting because it resembles Napoleon for what is it we are checking against the real person Napoleon? On the basis of such an account of representation, Wollheim has suggested that *trompe l'oeil* painting along with certain kinds of abstract paintings are not representations at all.[53] They do not fulfil one of the two criteria for something to be a visual representation in the first place, namely that we are aware that the painting of x *is* a painting comprised of intentional marks on a surface. A representation has a two-foldedness comprising its subject-matter and its surface markings. We are aware of both when looking at a pictorial representation.

Wollheim connects representation and seeing-in with what he calls thematisation. It is the latter that 'ushers in representation' in its most basic sense, that is, the experience of seeing 'in a marked surface things three-dimensionally related'.[54] Wollheim is at pains to point out that representation does not necessarily involve figuration where thematisation is concerned. But what is more germane to our argument is that there is no real equivalence to thematisation as it applies to painting in film (or photography). The camera and its lens were made to produce such an effect, all other things being equal. The film-maker does not come to thematisation through marking a surface and gradually achieving such a condition and experience. All things being equal – lens in focus, adequate light, etc. – film achieves such a condition willy-nilly. It is embedded in the camera's technology that this should be so.

There seems no reason why two-foldedness could not be applied to film, at least in one broad version of it. In perceiving a film we see in its two-dimensional surface of light and shadow three-dimensional figures while being aware of the fact that it is a flat film surface. In other words, illusionism is not part of the film experience. This seems similar to the kinds of paintings where surface effects (brushstrokes, etc.) are at a minimum and, at a fairly normal distance for viewing, may not be readily perceived. Until the nineteenth century there were two schools of thought on oil painting. In one (practised, for instance, by Frans Hals and Diego Velazquez) oil paint was

exploited for its expressive qualities using impasto and deliberately leaving signs of handling of the paint in the picture. The other school 'aimed at an even, glassy surface from which all evidences of manipulation had been banished'.[55] Glazes and scumbles were commonly used to achieve a transparent all-over effect (by Ingres, for instance). The use of poppy seed oil in the nineteenth century meant that brushstrokes were more easily preserved in the final painting, whereas before they had disappeared as the oils dried out. The glassy surface of the glazing, varnishing and scumbling tradition rendered what we might call a more photographic-like surface. This raises the question of whether Wollheim is claiming that two-foldedness is a matter of the awareness that the painting is a painting or an awareness of its surface marking. While a film has no surface strictly speaking, nevertheless a viewer is aware of its being a film. The application of two-foldedness to film depends on how Wollheim's view is interpreted, that is whether strictly and strongly – surface marks awareness – or weakly – medium awareness. As we shall see, Wollheim proposes two types of case which deal with either option.

If it is important, for the illusionist view, that it pertains to the idea of the viewer not simply believing that there is an actual object in front of him or her, but that he or she has a perceptual experience of that object, then medium awareness in seeing the image is enough to establish the same anti-illusionist argument for film.

Wollheim's approach is an experiential or phenomenological one. It attempts to provide a means of accounting for the *experience* of seeing a pictorial content in a painting. In experiencing a painting we see a group of figures sitting on the grass in the countryside and we see that this is achieved by marks on a flat surface. This is an experience of two aspects of the painting which are not cognitively separated. Both aspects are there at the same time. We do not believe even when engrossed or lost in a painting that somehow the representation is real in the way that the gallery or room in which the painting hangs is real. If the same approach is useful in film, then there are also profound differences, as we shall see, when it comes to unravelling the nature of that experience *qua* film representation. This is supported by more scientific views where it is accepted that part of the perception of a depiction must entail its medium, or the surface upon which the depiction has been made, in order for it to be a perceptual experience of a depiction and not an illusion as is the case with a *trompe l'oeil*.[56] It is interesting that in the case of *trompe l'oeil* it is not so much that the painting itself uses such glassy surface techniques (they are often cruder on close-up view), but that they are placed or installed so as to deceive. A door is painted on the wall where a door might be, for example, and with all the surrounding objects of a room. All the visual clues are for a real door and not a painting (no frame, not hanging where a painting might be expected, etc.).

Are there any objections given the differences between painting and photography/film to treating film as two-folded? If there are problems of

taking film as being characterised by two-foldedness then it would imply that film was not representational at all, as some have argued.[57] On Wollheim's earlier suggestion for recognising something as a representation, film and photography would seem to comply, being two-dimensional media that can minimally represent three-dimensionality. Film is projected onto a flat surface (it does not have to be white – experimental film-makers have used black screens, for example, and other colours too). But in his detailed account of painting as representation, Wollheim has stressed that we can see both the painted surface and what it is of:

> when seeing-in occurs, two things happen: I am visually aware of the surface I look at, and I discern something standing out in front of, or (in certain cases) receding behind, something else.[58]

On these conditions, film would seem to be representational notwithstanding its direct causal nature. In the cinema, we are aware of the screen surface and we discern, at the least, three-dimensional forms. If the forms are not intentional in the direct sense in which a brushstroke is, or the chiselled mark on the marble statue, nevertheless the image experienced is an intentional one – in the way that music is intentional even though the composer may never have heard his composition played by instruments or sung. The composer does not have to play the instruments, in the same way that the film-maker does not literally have to produce the image – but he or she points the camera, agrees the edits (or not), decides to keep in the accidental shot, and so on. There is an awkwardness to saying that we see Ringo *in the film*. Our linguistic usage favours the transparency view of simply saying 'we see Ringo' as we would in a theatrical performance. The idea of discerning in the paint a depiction has no parallel in how we experience a film.

What needs to be admitted is that film is essentially more open to its 'image-content' being the result of accident. The surveillance camera may fortuitously capture a hilarious scene on an underground station, in a way that paint, drawing, sculpting, making music could not (except in the case of a very bad painting which causes hilarity because of its badness, but this is a different kind of case). The image produced by a surveillance camera is a representation, but only of events which contingently happen before the camera's lens.[59] It is like recording an event (filming an opera, say) which is the comings and goings on an underground station platform over a period of time from a particular vantage point or points (the camera may automatically move in, say, vertical and horizontal pans).

The concept under strain in this discussion of film is intentionality. Wollheim states that seeing-in precedes representation and does not necessarily involve intentionality. We can see a face in the clouds or a horse in the stains on a wall. These cases of seeing-in are not representational because they are not intentional. The clouds just happen to take the form of a face.

The nearest case to the surveillance camera one is that of conceptual-based land art, where a particular piece of the landscape is moulded or marked by the artist and then the subsequent accidents of nature which change it – wind, soil movement, rain, plant growth – are accepted as part of its aesthetic content or subject-matter. An art structure is made (a fixed automatic camera, e.g. Snow's film *Central Region* (1971), or metal rods in a field, as in Walter De Maria's *The Lightning Field* (1974–7) within which accidental changes (changes of light, weather, incidents occurring before the lens, etc.) become part of its substance, so to speak. We take these accidents into account when judging its efficacy as an art object.

Wollheim, in discussing photography in relation to his concept of 'seeing-in', makes an interesting distinction, almost in passing, when he describes a photograph as not being seen as a photograph when it is a pictorial representation involving a re-identification of the subject matter of a photograph.[60] For example, if a photograph of a friend dressed as a cowboy is used to depict a cowboy, then intention overrides the causally produced photograph and thus the photograph seen as a depiction is 'no longer to be seen as [a] photograph[s]'.[61] The context for these remarks is Wollheim's discussion of criteria of correction in establishing what a representation is of. The sitter/model distinction found in painting does not hold, he argues, in photography.[62] In photography the model is always the sitter because its strong causal component dictates that it is a photograph of whoever or whatever is before the camera lens when the shutter is opened to capture a photograph. Wollheim here is claiming, it seems, that photographs are not representations except when they are used to depict something other than what they are of. There seems to be some problem with this. If a photograph is not a representation of what it is of, then what is it? It is obviously not the subject-matter itself. A photograph of my cat is not my cat. We use the same grammar of 'of-ness' in both the case of painting or photography.

Wollheim suggests that there is seeing 'appropriate' to photographs *qua* photographs and a seeing appropriate to photographs *qua* pictorial representations. In the case of the photograph of a friend which is used to depict an historical character as in Wollheim's example, then 'intention cancels out the deliverances of the causal process, and that is because these photographs are no longer to be seen as photographs'.[63] Wollheim seems to be implying that photographs *per se* are 'transparent'. In other words, photographs are not representations of the world but somehow give us an immediate access to the world, bypassing representation. They achieve an image through causal processes of what they are of which is not to be characterized as representational.

One of the reasons, it would seem, that Wollheim follows this line of argument with regard to photography is his belief that standards of correctness for seeing a representation are set through the intentions of the maker of the representation (this does not mean that these standards are necessarily

achieved, often they are not through 'incompetence, ignorance, or bad luck').[64] Where intention is either minimal or non-existent (for example, in surveillance cameras or photo-booth photographs) and a photograph is produced without human intervention (we must accept that the camera was made by humans and situated by humans), then for Wollheim one of the conditions for something being a pictorial representation is lacking – intentionality. A simple causal relationship is not enough for representationality. Photography in such a non-intentional mode is akin to the weathered surface of a wall which happens to look like Tony Blair. But there is a difference and that is that in the case of the photograph the subject-matter is Tony Blair (if he should happen to accidentally trigger a camera and take a picture of himself unawares). It *is* a photograph of Tony Blair and not an image which happens to look like Tony Blair (by a freak of lighting and environment as in photographs which seem to show faces but which are in fact just a trick of the shadows).

Wollheim would seem to designate photographs along with *trompe l'oeil* painting and certain abstract painting (like Barnet Newman's *Vir Heroicus Sublimis* (1950–1), cited by Wollheim) we have already mentioned, as being non-representational.[65] In the cases of *trompe l'oeil* and Newman we do not *see* something in something else. In the case of *trompe l'oeil* we suffer an illusion and so we do not have an experience as of seeing something in something else; we take it to be that something. In the other case, the mechanical, smooth-surfaced abstractions of some hard-edged abstract painting, we do not have an experience of a surface in which there is a representation; the medium does not bear an illusory appearance; in the case of *trompe l'oeil* it is all illusion. We must assume that Wollheim takes such latter paintings as being object-like and not offering a representational experience to the viewer.[66]

In these cases it is not the lack of intentionality that matters, but rather the presence of a certain *kind* of intentionality on the part of the artist to deceive the eye, in the case of the *trompe l'oeil*, or to refuse representationality altogether by the technique and compositional qualities in the case of a particular kind of abstract painting.

What do these views imply for our discussion of film? The notion of 'seeing-in' would seem to require a recognition mechanism; we see Napoleon in the picture. Currie suggests that seeing-in is possible through some 'object-recognition capacity'.[67] It is what Wollheim calls 'transfer'.[68] In other words, seeing an x in a picture depends on our being able to recognise an x. Recognition of an x depends on aspects of the picture provoking or triggering that capacity for recognising an x. Transfer, for Wollheim, isolates a capacity in perception that differentiates it from language. If recognition of a particular animal in a picture is achieved, then seeing pictures of other animals will usually follow. In fact, for children, coming to know what particular animals look like is often learnt from pictures of them. The same procedure is not possible in language.

More to the point, 'seeing-in' depends on a psychological-perceptual capacity. This is an implicit acceptance of a particular version of the resemblance view of representation. Its natural commonsensicality has been provided with a bedrock in a basic perceptual capacity. Pictorial representations involve perceptual recognitional capacities. Some of the aspects of a picture of x which make it a picture of x are the same as the aspects we recognise in seeing an x.[69] This view has some of the merits of transparency, i.e. its bolstering of a form of realism in pictorial representation and especially film without its philosophical counterintuitivity that in seeing a representation of x we are somehow seeing x, which associates transparency too closely with illusionism itself. Currie, who is deeply critical of psychoanalytical renderings of film understanding, uses the resemblance or what he calls the 'likeness' view to postulate the intrinsic realism of cinema.[70]

2
Expression, Projection and Style in Film

Freud remarks in his paper 'The Moses of Michelangelo':

> In my opinion, what grips us so powerfully can only be the artist's intention, in so far as he has succeeded in expressing it in his work and in getting us to understand it. I realize that this cannot be merely a matter of intellectual comprehension; what he aims at is to awaken in us the same emotional attitude, the same mental constellation as that which in him produced the impetus to create.[1]

Various ideas circulate in this extract: the powerful nature of art, its expression and communication to the spectator; the status of the emotions in understanding the force of art and the ideas of an 'emotional attitude' and, most interestingly for our purposes, that of a 'mental constellation'. Central to the passage is the notion of art being the expression of something in the artist which 'awakens' something the 'same' in the spectator. This chapter attempts to carry forward Freud's insight by trying to argue that expression by the artist is central to an understanding of art and film in particular. Freud is only asserting here what is probably a commonplace belief among art lovers and cinema-goers. Yet this view has been found wanting by both analytical philosophers like Monroe Beardsley and the semiotic-influenced film theorists of the past two decades or more, the latter dressing it up as the anti-authorship position adumbrated originally by such figures as Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes. For Beardsley, expression in art is another and not very coherent way of discussing meaning to be found in the art object itself. Expression is a redundant notion which simply predicates qualities of the art object itself.[2] For the semioticians, broadly speaking, the art object is a form of signification in which 'meaning' is more a matter for the reader/viewer.

Since the impact of Romanticism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in Europe, 'expression' has played an important part in discussions of art and aesthetics.[3] The idea of the artist expressing and communicating feeling through his or her artwork lies at the core of Romantic art and its

theories. For the Romantics, emotional expression was understood as uplifting, consciousness-expanding and educative; an emotional and spiritual education was to be gained through the artwork by way of sharing the artist's own feelings and insights. As Leo Tolstoy states:

> Art is a human capacity consisting in this, that one man consciously by means of external signs, hands onto others feelings he has lived through, and that others are infected by those feelings and also experience them.[4]

This is the famous 'infection' theory of art. Tolstoy stresses communication over expression particularly of ideas and feelings related to Christian morality and sensibility. Under the influence of Helenic Idealism, Benedetto Croce influentially propounded the view that art is the expression of feeling.[5] On the other hand, for R. G. Collingwood, expression in art was a matter of 'lucidity' or 'intelligibility' and not simply its physical expression. Expression is a conscious affair over which there is some kind of control. Being overcome by emotion for Collingwood is not an expression of that emotion. Inchoate emotion is to be rendered individual and intelligible in order to pass as expression. This is achieved through the imagination. An unfortunate upshot of this view is that an artwork is intrinsically a mental thing. Externalisation of the 'work of art' is unnecessary – a perverse conclusion.

In chapter 1, a consideration of representation led almost inevitably to the question of expression and expressiveness in art. In seeing a representation, we may also 'see' the feeling in it, so to speak. To take a classic example, we can say of a particular painting of a landscape that it is a sad landscape (as we can of a real landscape). Or we might say of a film that it is an angry film. In other words, in ordinary language we commonly assign a mental or psychological property to what is a material object or event – a painting, film, novel. And while we may not think that the sadness is literally in the film, we would quite naturally ask someone, if we felt quite strongly about the matter, who claimed they did not see the film as sad, to view it again. In some sense we believe, quite rightly, that the sadness resides somehow in the film. Like many strong intuitions, they can lead to false or at least unenlightening conclusions as this one has in the mode of the 'naturalistic fallacy', or, on the other hand, they can lead to ones that offer a better understanding of the phenomenon in question.[6] In this chapter, I would like to argue for a member of the latter kind of pathway from this intuition, one that is heavily influenced yet again by Wollheim's discussions, over the years, of expression in art.[7]

While much of Wollheim's thinking around expression has been in relation to painting, my concern with film means that other questions have to be addressed, namely ones concerning, for example, the narrative nature of much film art.[8] Film, only very rarely, comprises a single image.[9] It deals with shots, scenes, sequences and crucially movement in time and space. Of course, the idea that painting is always some kind of frozen image is a misleading one.

Painting can deal with narrative and not simply in the sense of the dramatic historical and mythological canvases of the period from the Renaissance up to David and Ingres, but also in the sense of a 'narrative' flow through a particular circuit of emotions, with a particular 'direction' aided by gazes, light, dynamic, shape and other aspects of the painting. But with film, an image is never held for us, and even if it is, it still passes through time; it has a beginning and an end as in Chris Marker's *La Jetée* (1964) or Michael Snow's film of a series of photographs *One Second in Montreal* (1969).[10] This essential movement of film through the projector's gate and its consequent image stream on the screen before the spectator separates film from all other pictorial arts. It needs to be remarked at this point that the conception of mainstream film as narrative is not one that has passed uncriticised. There seem to be good grounds for describing much mainstream film as dramatic, as opposed to narrational, in form.[11]

If an experiential approach is taken, as has been the case so far, then it is clear that it is never simply a matter of seeing a scene in a simply descriptive, almost neutral way, if we are seeing it as art. To see a particular scene in a painting is not only to see a set of objects and figures represented but also to *see* its sadness, for example. The painting depicts a sad landscape, a triumphal procession or a face of despair. John Ford's film *The Searchers* is melancholic (this is shorthand for the benefit of argument). Just as we see the representations in the painting and film so we see the melancholia, sadness in them. Ford's film expresses a melancholy (and much else as I am using this rather bare emotional expression for the sake of economy). It is not meant by this the literal expression of melancholy of characters through facial expressions, behaviour, music and dialogue. Rather, the emotion expressed here is of the film as a whole, something that supervenes its detail, its moment-by-moment enactment.[12] Of course, in film (as in the novel) there may be entire sequences given over to a different emotional expressiveness – say of a brooding defeat (the famous scene in Ford's *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* (1949) of the 7th Cavalry retreating over the stormy prairie with Wayne at its head), then scenes of communal love and friendship shot through with a sense of loss, followed by a scene expressing triumphal revenge as the cavalry defeat their Indian foe. In all these scenes expression is achieved in the way intended. Yet there may be an overall, albeit complex, emotional expression to the film as a whole in which these emotional states expressed in sequences, scenes, shots are experienced in an emotional complexity which perhaps acquires an order not identical to its narrative order and yet determined by the latter. This is a way of denying the view that the expressive order is simply its narrational one. As we know, a final expressive scene may trickle back through a film's entirety and transform its prior expressive content; in the same way that emotions can project back into our own pasts so can a film's.[13] Thus a work of art can contain expression in its characters and can express itself. The latter is what is meant by a work of art's expressiveness, which in turn is usually

aligned to the artist who has taken an expressive attitude to what he or she has made. An artist may express his own feelings about the characters he has created. To see John Ford's handling of the scene when Wyatt Earp meets Clementine and formally escorts her to the half-built church in *My Darling Clementine* is to see Ford's expression of his feelings towards those characters, a feeling not shared by the characters themselves. A viewer may understand the character's feelings without being responsive or even detecting Ford's expressive handling of the scene and its characters.

In the previous chapter, we saw that in understanding representation the emphasis shifted from a focus on the relationship between the representation and what it is of, to a stress on the relationship between the perceiver and the representation. Representation was unpacked as a variety of 'seeing-in' understood as less to do with the relationship between a set of marks and so-called reality than with our recognising or seeing something *in* a set of marks. Perhaps by such a switch to an experiential account, many of the philosophical conundrums spinning out of the resemblance theories of representation, for example, can be resolved, or at least bypassed, without begging too many argument-stopping questions. An account that rested on the way in which a film image or series of images causally related to its world, whether it be the studio setup, a landscape, or whatever, tends to neglect the central feature of representation and that is that it is a representation *for someone*, namely a spectator where the artist is a spectator too. Moreover, a film as art is essentially a matter of how that film is experienced and what comprises that experience.

Representation in art implies the notion of expression, and in fact we may say that they coincide. For as we have seen, part of what may be represented in a painting of a landscape is sadness, or in a Western film, anger. The sadness is *in* the painting in some sense as the brooding anger is *in* the film.[14] It is represented in them through the painting or images comprising the film. It seems natural to describe such emotions, feelings and moods as being expressed by the painting or film. In fact, one of the puzzles of art is how emotion comes to be represented and thus expressed by way of an image. This is not simply a matter of recognising the particular emotional states of figures within a representation, but of how an overall mood or feeling is represented. A painting representing a landscape can express sadness, while another painting of the same landscape can leave us emotionally untouched – it can seem cold, neutral, academic. Equally, a painting depicting laughing figures can still be a sad painting. Notably, expression implies a relation between an art object and mental states.

If a film-maker makes a film telling a story, then it is usually the case that it involves fictional desires, beliefs, imaginings, feelings and emotions.[15] A narrative film involves us in *beliefs* about the characters – Ringo on the stagecoach with a rifle resting on his knees, the bright sun above, the noise of the wagon wheels and horses galloping, and so forth. We are also led to believe

through the dialogue, facial expressions, character behaviour that Ringo is kind to the harlot Dallas, and that the gambler is a snob and not to be trusted, and so on. We also have desires or wants here of a certain kind – a desire for Ringo and Dallas to survive and perhaps make a couple. We have feelings too – sympathy for Doc, fear for the travellers' fate when the Indians pursue the stagecoach, distaste for the 'aristocrat's' snobbishness towards Dallas, apprehension when Ringo enters the saloon to face the Plummers. And overall the film may invoke a general mood in a viewer of lyrical nostalgia for values now in the past, or barely recoverable in contemporary Western culture. At times, such a film may even move the viewer to tears. All these elements can also be present in reading novels, seeing a painting (of a certain kind perhaps) and in some cases listening to music, although with music our beliefs and feelings may take a more generalisable subject-matter.[16] The main difference being that in the case of film it is visual (and aural) representations that are the objects of these beliefs, desires and feelings.

To this extent, film expresses feelings, moods and emotions and in ways that can be often more complex than in a painting (although not necessarily because of its length and narrative form). For film as a temporal art, often extending over 90 minutes and dealing with the interplay between characters, involves centrally different emotions, often emotions interleaved or imbued with each other. Also over the time of a narrative, emotions are transformed, lost, gained and discovered. In this way, film shares much with music, theatre and the novel. There are, for example, the *occurrent* emotions and feelings of characters in the story – an angry argument, a jealous remark, feelings of envy, hate and love between characters, returned and unrequited, and so forth. In the same scene we can feel empathy with two characters who both feel different things. These feelings could be interlaced with quite different feelings for a character who is the object of their dialogue and who is not in shot. This other 'character' need not be an individual but a social group – the nation, the proletariat, the school class. In other words, there is often a complexity of emotions represented in film to which we may respond in an equally complex way.

Over and above this, the film can evoke as a totality a feeling (or feelings) of loss, despair, sadness, redemption which is less an occurrent feeling and more a *disposition* set up in the audience by *mise en scène*, colour, landscape, editing and the overall patterns of the narrative. This latter understanding of expression in a film, and in art in general, is the one associated with value in art.[17] We judge that a film expresses sadness and in such a judgement we are usually giving it a value aesthetically. It is deemed a successful work of art if it expresses such feelings through its wedding of form to content. So a film which may express, as it unfolds, a rich variety of emotions, may yet overall express only one emotion. We may say that as a whole it is a successful expression of sadness or whatever. Like other works of art, films often do

not readily give up their expressive character. Often coming to understand a film, grasping its true value is something we discover sometime later, or even after many viewings, that it is a film which expresses *y*. Some films, on each viewing over many viewings, enrich our experience through their expressive qualities. And this overall expression of a film may never be instantiated in its narrative. A sad film may not as such contain a sad scene. Rather it is the sum of its elements and many other aspects of it which achieve the expression in question. Part of the nature of art, it would seem, is the difficulty of understanding how it achieves an overall expressiveness.

Empathy, sympathy and identification

The central form of expression, and the one that stands as the basis for all other expression, is that achieved through the body or face at times used in conjunction with dialogue. The relationship between words and body can be congruent. That is, the words can be at one with the facial and bodily expression. On the other hand, they can be at odds with one another. One can provide the expression or behaviour without the concomitant feeling (lying or cheating emotionally). The body or face can belie the words spoken. Martha's gesture as she strokes Ethan's coat in what she thinks is privacy in John Ford's film *The Searchers* betrays her feelings, and we witness this expression through the judicious eyes of Ward Bond's preacher after the breakfast scene. In such a scene, it is not even clear whether Martha is expressing love or an affection which disguises her inarticulable love. Nor does it particularly matter, as it is in the nature of particular gestures, expressions of feeling that they are imprecise, ambiguous or even open-ended. They are often indeterminate because the feeling they express is for another. Ford's cinema is gestural and action-based. For example, the close-up is rarely required to express the internal feelings of characters. However, there is no ambiguity in Ethan's face after he shoots out the dead Indian's eyes in front of the rest of the posse. The context and Ethan's ferociously delivered verbal and facial expression are of a piece in the expression of the emotion – hatred. (But it could also be understood on seeing the whole film as also an expression of guilt for the fact that he was not there to defend Martha and her family.) However, in general, Ethan's feelings towards Indians are more complex over the duration of the film than others. So feelings expressed by characters can be understood both as an appropriate response to events in the narrative and as the expression of deeper mental currents. It is with the latter that critical disputes occur, evidence for which will have to be marshalled and perhaps be reasonably disputed. In this way fictional characters can bear the complexity of motivation found in life itself.

  The opening scene in *The Searchers*, as the family, distracted from their various household duties, gather on the porch to squint in the sun at the figure slowly riding towards them out of the flat, hot, prairie landscape with

its accompanying music, evokes a feeling of what was lost being regained, of a gentle loving welcome, of pastoral goodness and simplicity. There is also present a disturbance, from the outside, in a place where all approaching figures are objects of suspicion – the eyes squinting in the strong sunlight – one that depends on the genre from which it arises suggests as much. A lyricism pervades the film, although not without anger, melancholy and desolation also present.

Identification and expression

One of the problems of many psychoanalytical approaches has been an obsession with identification of the spectator with the character through the techniques of shot-reverse-shot, eyeline matching, and so forth. This rigid and simplistic rendering of the highly complex business of experiencing a film as a spectator has led to schematic 'readings' of films, or, more perniciously, the wholesale neglect of films which do not use mainstream narrative techniques and approaches,[18] for example, art cinema and the work of the film avant-garde which are very often not rigidly 'identificatory' (for that matter, neither are some Hollywood films). It can also reduce 'expression' in film to a formalist-based account of so-called identificatory moments achieved by eyeline matches, close-ups, etc.

Identification has been central to understanding narrative in film theory over recent decades.[19] However, under examination its most popular variant does not stand up to this association. For example, it has been asserted that a character's point of view often quite mechanically achieved through over-the-shoulder shots or shot-reverse-shots places a spectator in a relationship of *identification* with that character. But for any minimal kind of 'identification' to take place the viewer must take on at least some of the beliefs and feelings of the character. But of course even with the most marginal character, like a walk-on policeman who is patrolling the street as the bank robbery takes place, we can assign very crucial beliefs to them, narrative-wise, simply on the grounds of having the concept of a policeman – that he is always on the lookout for misdemeanours, that he represents and will uphold the law, that he is trained to and may use force, that he can call on reinforcements, and so forth, and this is all achieved simply by a shot of an anonymous policeman – a device used repeatedly in cops-and-robbers films. If the film has a shot from this policeman's point of view, then are we to assume we identify with the policeman? Even in ordinary language we would be extremely pushed to say, yes. The example so far seems too lacking in something for such a claim and yet it fulfils some of the conditions. So what is missing? We may suggest that it is something like a deeper commitment to the character, for example, in the very way we feel for the outlaws Bonnie and Clyde who are not in shot but in the bank. In fact, in this shot of the policeman we are more likely to be feeling concern, anxiety, fearfulness even on behalf of our at present

non-visible protagonists. We are *not* feeling with the policeman but *for* him. That is to say, we are not empathising with him but feeling anxiety about him, a feeling the character himself is not experiencing as he strolls down the street ignorant of imminent events in which his life might be threatened. Our anxiety in fact may be two-fold – anxiety about his threat to the heroes and anxiety about his own life, which may be lost in the expected subsequent shoot-out.[20]

We have got so far using the classic dramaturgical concepts of empathy and sympathy which rely on the spectator experiencing a character in two ways. In empathy we experience characteristically what the protagonist experiences. We feel Gloucester's horror in *King Lear.* The sympathetic spectator experiences something towards the protagonist – an experience obviously not the same as that suffered by the protagonist – we are sad at their shame. We pity Gloucester's horror and pain at being blinded. It may be objected that I am speaking of identification. To some extent this is true in so far as we use 'identification' in ordinary language, but it is not, as we shall see, what psychoanalysis means by such a term. And in terms of the sympathetic response, it seems like a misnomer. We can understand Gloucester's feeling towards which we have another feeling not shared by Gloucester, although it may be argued that we have to empathise with Gloucester's horror at his blinding in order to sympathise with him. The latter is somehow a consequence of the former. But we may feel x because of our belief that y, and not because we feel y.

So in seeing a film or painting we often see such an emotion in the representation, and it is one we sometimes feel ourselves. Our feeling is of its inseparability from the representation, as if it were imbued in the emotion, saturated in it. This is given often purely visually with aural support. This feeling is something expressed by the film or painting and thus while it is of a piece in our experience of the scene or picture, we can however separate it out as an element for purposes of analysis. Thus, some images have no expressive quality; they are simply descriptive of a scene and have either failed in expressiveness or expression has not been attempted. This does not mean we do not have feelings before such an image, but it may be more in reaction to its failed attempt, perceptible in the picture but not engaging us somehow; perhaps it is a cliché, or a mechanically used convention, or it has not succeeded because technique has failed it.

Films which have attempted to reject emotional expressiveness of any kind can of course express a coldness or abstractness the viewer feels too. Straub and Huillet's *The Chronicle of Anna Magdalena Bach* (1968) is elegant and powerful in its 'expressionlessness' in relation to its characters, compared, say, with a film like Howard Hawks's *The Big Sleep* (1946).[21] Straub and Huillet often shun expressive *acting*, condoning non-acting techniques, so that we remain immune to identification with characters' feelings. Of course, we may still feel enormously drawn into such films – through sympathy, feelings about the

character and not least by the film's own expressiveness. Straub and Huillet's film achieves a great serenity and dignity in its characters through its anti-naturalistic, pared-down style. Few other films of artists' lives express such a sense of the rigours imposed by art and life as a piece. We are also moved by the characters despite their lack of expression. In fact, the very lack of expression may be what moves us. In painting, the same distinction could be made between, say, the action-based narrative of a Rubens or Michelangelo and the pensiveness of people represented in many of Manet's portraits.[22] Similarly, Piero della Francesa's work often depicts Biblical characters with little expression but the painting as a whole is deeply expressive. What is expressed in *Last Year at Marienbad* (1961) by way of characters is either opaque or confused. (Are they thinking of anything? If so, what? And how could we even begin to answer that question?) But we can come to identify with or even experience as spectators that mode of perception and experience expressed within the film.

We can say, as we have already discussed, that a film *is* sad. In other words, we seem to assign to a film a property that can only be genuinely and properly assigned to a person. Films do not have minds, bodies or consciousnesses through which an emotion could be expressed. Nevertheless, we use the expression in ordinary language when discussing works of art, films included. If we are not to be victims of the naturalistic fallacy, that is the assignment of human qualities to what is inanimate, then how are we to explicate this experience of a work of seeming to have an emotion? Part of what is being discussed here is the idea of art being a form of communication.[23] That is to say, art communicates, among other things, emotions. But if it does so, and in any way that is perhaps essential to it, then it must do so in a way specific to it, otherwise why go to art for such a thing in the first place? Why doesn't the emotion found in communication with others suffice? But even if it didn't, then turning to art for such an emotion would place the latter on a par with emotions found in human communication, and we have reason to believe that the emotions found in art are not the same as those found between communicators. It is perhaps best to leave until later the idea that art and its emotions can replace normal emotional relationship with others for some, and that this is seen as a failing and art understood, wrongly, as a form of therapy.

If emotion is expressed in a work of art, then it can be recognised as such and, in many cases, the same emotion can be felt by the viewer. It could be argued that for an emotion to be expressed as opposed to being simply depicted, then there must be some form of emotional engagement with the viewer involved. But it would seem that there is difference here. We can see that x is expressing anger, but we need not feel anger ourselves; that would require our empathising with what they felt and sharing their feeling so to speak. Similarly, with a work of art we can recognise a feeling being expressed but remain unmoved ourselves, in the case where we would say

we were fully involved with the work as a work of art, and not as something else, a piece of valuable property, for example.

We may also feel, for whatever reason, that the feeling expressed by a work of art and which we share in is also one that was felt in some way by the artist. Thus we can understand the idea that art not only communicates feelings to the spectator, but that through art the artist communicates his or her feelings to the spectator. This implies that the artist has experienced the feelings expressed in the work of art. This view has met with strong objections. It has been understood as assuming that an artist must be feeling x at the time of painting an expression of x; in painting an angry picture, he or she must be in a state of anger. There is both a strong and weak sense in which this can be interpreted. One is that it may not be the case that a painter has experienced the horror of decapitating someone with a knife, but he may have felt horror at something else. In other words, the emotion should not be identified by its particular object in a specific instance of its occurrence, but rather by the kind of object it requires for it to be an apt emotion whenever it should occur. It would seem less demanding then that we should perhaps assume the artist has such a feeling for it to be expressed. In fact, if we are to believe that the work of art in itself cannot have an emotion, then we must believe that somehow it is an expression related to the artist, not necessarily in an occurrent sense but perhaps in a dispositional one.

We might add that in such a case we might want to say that the kind of object of which the artist has found cause for horror may be one of a superficially mundane kind, for example, the horror brought about by finding his own faeces in bed one morning as a child. I have deliberately chosen an example which signals an interest in the development of emotions in early life which I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter.

A linking aspect here, which derives from our discussion of representation, is found in the role of intentionality. For reasons rehearsed elsewhere, we would want to claim that emotional expression found in a work of art is one that is intended by the artist, albeit often unconsciously.[24] To believe otherwise – that, for example, an emotion finds its way accidentally expressed in a work of art – suggests that the work has failed, for any value given to it has not been intentionally placed there and as such is disqualified as a work of art but is rather an interesting aspect of an object which somehow, like the natural weathering of a wall, suggests a face of intense sadness, say. It is something we as viewers bring to it as we do to a landscape as opposed to a representation of one.

Wollheim has argued[25] that one reason for denying the relationship between expression and the artist is that the model taken is that between having a feeling and its physical expression. In other words, the artist has a feeling and through painting at that moment somehow expresses it in the direct way he would do if in feeling sad he cried, or looked aghast if feeling horror. But the link between emotion and its expression can run deeper and at a more distant causality than that, he suggests. It is an emotion which can lie back

in time or which has a relationship not entirely related causally to a specific incidence in the world, but one that somehow survives in that person's life, and importantly, in his work. This will be discussed at greater length in the next chapter.

Projection

But if a film can be imbued with a particular emotion or mood, as Eisenstein claimed, to the extent that we predicate a mental state of it, then what explanation can we give of such a phenomenon? In order to answer this question I want to discuss the notion of projection, which is intimately related to expression.[26] Of course, projection as a mechanism for understanding artistic mechanism is not new. Heinrich Wolfflin had offered a version of it in his book *Renaissance and Baroque*. Similarly, Worringer held a projectivist view in his argument on empathy as a key psychological concept in art interpretation.[27] Projection is also the mechanism by which the power of art as expression can be laid bare. Expression is rooted in mental states and passions and they are connected to the external world, including artworks, through the mechanisms of projection.[28] The power of art lies precisely in its projective properties.

Any objection to the use of projection must answer the question how we can otherwise unpack such experiences of what Wollheim calls 'expressive perception'. If we do experience the world at times (and artworks at others) as if they were emotionally laden, or in Wollheim's usage, if we see emotion in the world outside us, excluding seeing a person expressing an emotion, then some account must be given of this experience, one that does not make false assertions about the connection between such expressions of emotion. It also needs to be stressed that the terminology of projection, at least at present, does not mean subscribing to psychoanalytic theory, although as the argument proceeds it will be seen how this theory is apt, enriching this view and in line with our common-sense approach to the phenomenon in question. Thus the argument furthers the aim of the book in trying to weld aspects of psychoanalytic theory to an account of the experience of film and its critical framework, to show how they support one another.[29]

If the emotion does lie in the artwork itself, then it must stem from the viewer who projects onto the artwork the feeling in question. But this is not an arbitrary mechanism that acts regardless of its object, the artwork. If this were the case, then any representation would be capable of expressing any emotion. But quite the opposite, the relationship of the emotion to the artwork is a congruent one, one in which a correspondence exists between them.[30] Aspects of the artwork correspond to a mental state experienced by the viewer. Wollheim discusses two kinds of experience by which he hopes to throw light on what he calls *expressive perception*. In one experience, we are at the mercy of a particular feeling or mood, one that settles on everything

we encounter. Having fallen in love, everything seems to be vivacious, joyous almost, just as when in a sad mood everything seems to be dismal, heavy and sad itself. Our mood suffuses our entire world.[31] In the second experience, we come across a specific aspect of the world – a landscape, a figure – which evokes in us a feeling which was not there before, perhaps sadness or joy. Wollheim argues that his notion of projection in relation to expressive perception is like the second one in that it requires a particular state of affairs outside us to stir our emotions in a particular way, unlike the former case, which is undiscerning in its blanket bathing of the world. However, he adds that the model does require the inseparability of the emotion and the perception as found in the former type. In other words, we see the mood or emotion in the world. In Wollheim's words, '[E]xpressed emotion and perception fuse.'[32] Second, the emotion seen in the landscape, say, is one that is projected there by me, as in the former case. So whilst the landscape somehow causes the feeling, the projection is from the viewer onto the landscape and this projection of emotion fuses with the perception, so that it seems that the landscape is sad.

Wollheim goes on to distinguish between two fundamental kinds of projection – simple and complex.[33] In simple projection, I feel sad, say, and anxious about this state I project it onto an other, a figure in the environment, and in doing so believe that I am no longer sad but that the other, the figure, is sad (with positive loving feelings I feel anxious to retain them). In complex projection, I feel sad and this causes me anxiety; to relieve this anxiety I project my sadness onto the world in general. In doing so, I may no longer feel sad but experience the world as 'of a piece with his sadness'.[34] For Wollheim, there are crucial differences in these two forms of projection. First:

> With simple projection the person ends up with a belief about the figure on to whom he has projected his sadness, whereas, with complex projection, he ends up with a way of experiencing the external world.[35]

In other words, complex projection involves at its core an *experience*, whereas simple projection incurs a *belief*. Second,[36] in the complex case, I do not end up with the belief that the external world is sad, thus inviting the incomprehensible view that the world has the property of sadness; rather, as Wollheim points out, the world is *of a piece with* my sadness. So to call the world sad in such cases is to employ sadness metaphorically and when the psychological predicate 'sad' is used of the world it is, according to Wollheim, a 'mere quirk of usage'. Third, the sadness ascribed to the world is not the same emotion felt by me before being projected, for I do not imagine the world as being in the same state as me (tearful, empty). So the emotion projected into the world is related to my emotion through being 'of a piece' with it. This 'doubling-up of the predicate' sets the view apart from the naturalistic fallacy view, while retaining the 'truth' embedded in the latter.[37]

It is the complex projection which can serve as a primary model for expressiveness in a work of art. However, as it stands, there seems to be no reason why a particular emotion should be projected, and why it should be projected onto the world or some part of it. Projection, in other words, as it has been used so far, is 'haphazard and responsive solely to inner needs and demands'.[38] Now, while some projection is of this kind, as we shall see in the following chapter, especially in early life, when its transience means that it fades away as quickly as it occurred, in general projection and projective properties are susceptible to a maturing and eventually start to 'owe something to the features upon which they are overlaid'.[39] So there are features, aspects and parts of the world which become appropriate for projection. They welcome particular emotional projections. In other words, the connection between projection and the world is not always as arbitrary as the initial account above suggested.

> the suitability of some part of the world to support projection, its fitness to be the bearer of projective properties, its power to forge correspondences, is not something that discloses itself in a flash: it becomes apparent only through trial and error, and all kinds of influence, cultural as well as private, may be assumed to stabilize projection, and thus to mold correspondence.[40]

In the case of art, however, this correspondence is not something which has as one polarity – the world as it is so to speak, e.g. a landscape – but rather it has an object – an art object. In terms of the latter there is a correct way of taking this object in relation to expression. There is a standard of correctness, as Wollheim puts it. And this standard is essential to any account of expression in art because the object dealt with is an intentional one. It has been intended, and importantly achieved, by an artist. Unlike the natural landscape which has no standard for how it is taken, for the artwork this is not the case. The difference is the same as that between the stain on the wall which we can see as a horse, and which we may all see as a horse, but which nevertheless has no correct way of seeing it, and a representation which requires an intentional activity on the part of an agent and thus can be successful or otherwise and its success or failure can be judged by a standard shared by representer and spectator alike. So intentionality is as crucial to an account of expressive perception as it is to one of representation and it performs the same function in both accounts, of establishing grounds of correctness and ultimately of identifying certain phenomena as representations or expressions. The implication of intentionality here is that in a particular painting or film, our experience of the latter is such that it agrees with the achieved intentions of the artist. It is important that the qualifying idea of 'achieved' is used in this statement, for not all intentions are successful, fulfilled or achieved. It is this condition of intentionality which allows the important matter of value and aesthetic judgement a function in art, for both artist and spectator.

Causation

Intentionality implies causation.[41] If an artist intended to paint a particular picture (and this would be a complex intention), then his or her intention also caused the painting. But Wollheim is eager to conceive of intentionality here to be broadly understood. The intention cannot comprise simply a desire to paint so that the painting should be seen in a certain way. On the contrary, the painting should be the result of an intention which includes 'thoughts, beliefs, memories . . . emotions and feelings, that the artist had and that, specifically, caused him to paint as he did'.[42] The intention must have a certain mental and psychological depth. It must engage with the complexity of beliefs and feelings of which the painting is an intentional effect. Now this does not incur a view of the artist as having to cause directly an expressive emotion through an emotion currently held at the time. This view perceives the causal link as immediate and direct, and leads to the false view that an artist must be in the grip of an emotion at the time of expressing it in the work of art. Any knowledge of the art-making process would dissuade us of such a view. The most tempestuous artworks can be made in a mood of great calm on the part of the artist. It is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the expression of emotion in art. But if causality is an element of this account, as it is, and a crucial one, then how is it to be understood?

First, as we have seen, it does not involve a causal relation in the same direct immediate way that having an emotion and its bodily expression can. In being angry my face may redden and my hands tremble and in a way these behavioural and bodily characteristics are of a piece with my anger, my emotional state. In making art – in its very process of continual adjustments, decisions, reworkings – emotions are recollected within that process which is not a one-off activity but a long-standing, established method, although the latter term is too rationalistic and rigid-sounding. In other words, while a medium has certain demands determined by that medium – mixing colours, pressure of brushstroke, editing processes, camera positioning which have their own, often fairly strict, determinacy, there are also more personal, more private aspects to the artistic process which have been gradually accumulated through the experience of art-making and may involve modes of thinking, decision-making, etc. – ways which may, on the face of it, seem irrational or idiosyncratic, irrelevant to the work in hand. For an artist achieving expressive representation, this complexity gathers up emotions in ways that are more at a distance and in a recollection of emotions and not a re-experiencing of them. And part of that recollection and its relation to the artwork is not something which happens externally to the process; recollection, feeling and thinking take place *in* the process itself.[43]

It is one of the central problems of film theories in recent years that even among theorists who have resisted the 'death of the author' doctrine of semiotic theory, intentionality, and thus the role of the 'artist', remain

anathema. In many ways it accounts for what is often a technical account of spectatorship in film and of the role of the emotions in the latter. Murray Smith, for example, has proposed an anti-semiotic and anti-psychoanalytical view of the role of the emotions in film. He argues for a broadly cognitivist account of spectatorship in film, one that gives paramount importance to the emotions and the role of characters in fictional films. Much of his critique of semiotic models of film spectatorship, and thus of meaning in cinema, rests on his notion of the 'imaginative spectator'. In this, he borrows Wollheim's distinction between centrally and acentrally imagining something to elaborate his own view of how a spectator becomes emotionally involved (or not) with fictional film characters. In doing so he rejects the simplistic versions of film spectatorship, that relies on identification and point of view. Smith offers instead a more graduated range of engagements with character (the latter elements he takes as fundamental in this matter in relation to fictional film) and these engagements are essentially imaginative. They fall into three broad categories denoting *kinds* of engagement: *recognition*, which is almost a perceptual recognition of figures as characters in a fiction film (he uses the unhelpful notion here of the spectator constructing character); *alignment*, which seems to involve knowledge about a character so that we can understand them in a fuller way as behavioural, contextualised figures; and *allegiance*, in which we have an emotional, moral, ideological response (sympathetic or antipathetic) to characters in the film.

While there is much to sympathise with in his account, especially as it questions the semiotic-Lacanian orthodoxy,[44] there is nevertheless a wholesale neglect of the artist or director in the account of the spectator's emotional response to film. In fact, the film by and large remains understood as a text, something which is identified with 'narration', which itself is the 'ultimate organiser of the text' and the 'force which generates recognition, alignment and allegiance, the basic components of the structure of sympathy'.[45] Later, and cheekily borrowing from Wollheim and getting it wrong, Smith states that the spectator and film-maker are not 'particular individuals' but roles taken on by individuals and that the film-maker is the first spectator of his or her work.[46] Assigning roles to individuals does not mean that one gets rid of individuals. Surely, the individual John Ford (and his collaborators) made *Stagecoach*, and in making it they were also spectators of the film. Other spectators of the film cannot genuinely or meaningfully take on the role of film-makers except by coming to experience the film in a way that corresponds to the experiences of those who made the film.

As we have seen, there is more at stake here than Smith acknowledges. Smith gives no separate account of the film-maker in the rest of the book, the assumption being, it seems, that the spectator is the sole determining point of the film as meaning and that narrative conventions determine the text's construction. This is possible because, for Smith, the notion of emotion in film is a fairly conventional one. It deals with quite conscious techniques

for expressing characters' beliefs, attitudes, desires and emotions that are owing to what he calls, using Gombrich, a schema. The film text offers choices from alternatives governed by the ongoing culture and its value-system (social, political and moral issues, fashions, knowledge, etc.) which also include the institution of film-making and its genres, styles, techniques, etc. So in many ways Smith is offering a categorisation of *techniques* and *devices* used in fiction film to convey information and to align (moral, emotional, psychological or otherwise) attitudes and feelings to characters. Two objections stand out. First, Smith considers emotions in film in terms of emotions expressed by characters. He does not confront the emotion we may want to assign to the film as a whole and which does not have a particular representation in the film. In other words, he is concerned with the conventions of representing emotions, as I may illustrate happiness on a blackboard with a circle and two dot eyes, a vertical line nose and an upturned curve for a mouth. Now while this may be a representation of a happy smiling face, I would not say that *qua* picture it has *expressed* happiness. Just as one painting of a landscape titled *Melancholy* while suitably using 'devices' to express such a feeling yet fails, another using the same kinds of device achieves an expression of melancholy, enough for us to call it a 'melancholic landscape' and not simply in some descriptive sense. What is the measure or criterion for success or failure in such instances? It would seem that both artists have made the right choices within the schema of forms, colours and composition which express melancholia (or sadness), yet one we would want to say has failed somehow.[47]

There is a sense in which, for Smith, failure is not countenanced in film in any substantial way. This may have been acceptable if Smith was dealing with examples of films of which there was a general acceptance of some kind of standard of success. In comparison, art historians and theorists deal with bodies of work which come under the category of art and where the general levels of artistic achievement are rarely controversial, even between competing methodological camps. They are working on an accepted critical canon, e.g. Courbet, Manet. In Smith's case, such a categorisation is not operating. For example, Jonathan Kaplan's film *The Accused*, whose interest is mainly in its depiction of a social issue (rape), is discussed alongside the work of Alfred Hitchcock and Robert Bresson of whose work there exists a general consensus among theorists and critics of quite different persuasions that it is not reducible to socio-cultural interest but somehow denotes artistic excellence, or at least exemplifies a richness of interpretation *qua* film, say, and not simply as cultural or social object.[48]

There are alternative responses to such a question of artistic *value*. One is that there are no grounds for judgement here – between achieved works of art, here films, and those which are not. There is no means of determining artistic value between films. Of course, competence may be thrust forward as a candidate for making some kind of distinction. But competence measured

against what standard? If the answer (and could there be another one?) is what complies within the domain of the institution of film-making with rules of narrative construction and coherence-eyeline matches, 180 degree rule, acting competence, dramatic and narrative consistency and coherence, etc. – revealed in the body of work conventionally acceptable to other film-makers, funders, audiences, etc. in some generalisable way – then we are faced with the situation of an episode of the Australian soap-opera *Neighbours* being in the same camp of acceptability as *Citizen Kane* (1941), *Battleship Potemkin* (1925) or *The Big Sleep*.[49] More importantly, we are also deprived of any means of readily judging where a break with the conventions, in what can seem as incompetence, is in fact one of development or innovation in representational and expressive possibilities (e.g. Jean-Luc Godard's *Breathless* (1959)), for how could we judge such a case? We can see in this view the problems for the 'schemata' view, or what is a narrower version of Gombrich's account of the schema in art.

Style

There is also the question of artistic style which is closely connected and in fact underlies and presupposes expression in art.[50] Style is a precondition of expression. The case could be put much more fiercely and say that style is expression. There are two fundamental kinds of style. One is of a general nature which embraces a school of art identified by a 'look' (*film noir*) or emanating from a particular studio (MGM musical) or in the style of a particular artist (Fordian in relation to, say, Sam Peckinpah or Hitchcockian in relation to de Palma?), or a 'universal' art style (classical, realist or surrealist). The other meaning is that of the style of an individual artist – John Ford, Alfred Hitchcock, Jean Renoir – where it applies to that artist's own works and not to the works of artists who may come under their style, as already mentioned. It is the latter notion of style – individual style – which is embedded in expression as discussed in this chapter. This conception of style differs from the general type of style in many ways, but most importantly it differs in its inseparability from artistic process which passes through psychical phantasy. Style like expression is an internally located phenomenon. On Wollheim's account in *Painting as an Art* style is explanatory of art and is something which, in Arthur Danto's words, is 'psychologically real'.[51]

Style in the general sense is externally located. On such a view an individual style cannot always be easily 'read off' from a work of art. On the contrary, coming to understand an artist's style will tend to be difficult. For example, it may not be locatable simply in formal or in contentual aspects of an art work. What, for example, sets Jan Vermeer apart from his contemporaries Pieter de Hooch or Emanuel de Witte in terms of style? What kind of thing are we looking for in such a discernment? What are the criteria for asserting of an artist that they have a style? Bordwell takes film style to be 'a film's systematic and significant use of techniques of the medium'.[52] In acknowledging the

distinction between general and individual style, Bordwell believes that the latter differs from the former only in so far as an artist may have 'favored subjects or themes'.[53] Bordwell's account of film history with regard to style is very much one of the history of film techniques and their uses by film-makers, and his model is one that uses the concept of the schema. Bordwell has chosen a particular schema, 'depth staging', within the broader schemata including lighting, colour, editing, camera movement, and so forth. By and large, he sees one central aim of film-makers as being that of setting and solving such problems, although he also asserts that a film resolving such a problem does not mean it is a better film than one that fails to do so. So he concedes that he is not dealing with an aesthetic issue, at least not necessarily. But it is precisely the difference between what we may call a good and an inferior film which begs the question of style. In fact, it shows how much Bordwell is providing an account of the history of film *technique*. What Bordwell provides to fatten out such a sparse matter is the role of particular techniques in certain film theories, histories and film-makers themselves. So deep staging has been strongly associated with film realism, for example, and particular points in film history. Bordwell shows that this is not quite true by giving an account of the myriad examples of deep staging throughout film's history and refusing to assign a fixed historical pattern to its use. He says:

> A technique does not rise and fall, reach fruition or decay. There are only prevalent and secondary norms, preferred and unlikely options, rival alternatives, provisional syntheses, overlapping tendencies, factors promoting both stability and change.[54]

It is well worth remembering that we are not dealing with painting but with a medium – film – which in its mechanical reproductive qualities provided, in one fell swoop, depth, along with many other properties which painting had to struggle to achieve. The first films had depth, in fact infinite depth so to speak, given the type of lens and use of lighting (broad daylight often allowing such depth of focus). Where it didn't was close to the lens, which was usually not occupied by an object, which would have been unfocused.

   It is also implicit in Bordwell's view that all films have a style in so far as they use any technique. For example, it would seem quite reasonable to believe that an individual style in film did not appear until some years after its beginnings. In other words, when, we may ask, did film produce its first artist? And if we do gain aesthetic pleasure from some very early films, as it seems, then we need to understand what we mean by this and in fact whether we have mistaken the feeling involved. So much of the early years was accidental, contingent and undetermined. Yet the results have a quality, even a *frisson*, one which we can find, as Barthes reminds us, in the innocent snapshot.[55] Such a quality is more one that we may assign to the invention

itself than to any particular human design. Thus one of the dangers of the deluge of research into early cinema is to connect it up too readily with subsequent film as representation proper, as a designed object with the possibilities of aesthetic response proper. We should not assign style or, for that matter, expression to much early film until we have evidence of it being produced under some conception of art. This is one reason for objecting to Bordwell's identification of style with technique. To search for realism in a film where it was not an issue for the film-maker is wrongheaded. An example of the ambiguities of early film is Georges Melies, whose manipulation of the camera would seem to exclude him from the naive mechanical cameraman. Yet it is noteworthy that it is a surrealist who wrote an important text on Melies – Paul Hammond – and in the spirit of the *objet trouvé*, albeit a cultural entertainment.[56] Tom Gunning has explored the idea of early film (pre-1906) being primarily a *presentation* of images or, quoting Fernand Léger, 'a matter of making images seen'.[57] Gunning associates Melies with such a conception of film. But he also sees it as an impetus which cinema never loses, passing most strongly through cartoons, musicals and the avant-garde itself (or at least its most exhibitionist 'theatrical' end of Kenneth Anger, Jack Smith, Andy Warhol). What does this mean for style? If style, expression and phantasy are wedded in my account, then it should be clear that changing historical forms does not mean that psychical structures and processes change. Only that at times some psychical-cum-aesthetic aspects are served better than others. In other words, we are asked to understand how far these films are to be released from entertainments which can equally be in service to the dualism being set out in what follows. Brewster suggests that phantasy is attenuated in early films. He remarks about the move to character-based narrative away from spatial organisation *per se*:

> A shift in the centre of fiction from the presentation of scenes to the presentation of differing character perspectives on scenes, and a displacement of point of view from a mechanism for articulating diegetic space to one of articulating characters' knowledge, go with a move from the direct photography of real environments to the presentation of a world much more penetrated by phantasy.[58]

Equally, Uncle Fred may always take snapshots with tops of heads missing, to the point that within the family his photographs are immediately recognisable. This is not a style, except in the most sarcastic sense. Bad films or the work of a bad film-maker can be quite distinctive and immediately recognisable. This does not, however, comprise a style. A style is not a recognitional property of artworks. In fact, an artist may produce work which *looks* quite different and yet be in his style. As Wollheim also points out, artists can lose their style (post-stylistic or expressiveness), or not use it (style-deficient may be more common in Hollywood film than in painting, say) or they can

make work before a style is established (that is pre-stylistic, like much student work of artists).[59]

If Hitchcock or Bresson are working within schemata which they inevitably share with film as a medium in the period in which they were working, then is it simply a matter of such film-makers choosing within the schemata? Such a view is propounded by Bordwell.[60]

This is not to deny that some notion of a schema does operate in film as in other arts, but it is to ask whether this is explanatory enough, allowing us to individuate particular film-makers in terms of expression and style.[61] But already this assumes that there is a separation between form and content. It is as if there is a thing – an idea, a subject-matter – which then has to be matched to a particular element or elements in the schema. For this view to have any coherence it must assume that two film-makers have the same idea or subject-matter content which then is provided with a 'form' or configuration from the offered schema. If this not the case, then it is hard to see how a choice could be made within the schema. The only way in which this might make sense is if the film is utterly conventional and clichéd so that a film-maker decides to make, say, a *film noir* and in choosing a script the whole style-schema is taken over, with the result that we have a 'routine' genre film. Genre film-making (or even painting) is perhaps open to such mechanical, literally, routine making. Furthermore, if there is no distinction between the schema-perception and what it is of, so that I see x *as* y, say, then there is no means of correcting y when it fails to capture x.

So what could account for a difference here between a routine and otherwise artistically interesting genre film? One difference could be novelty of technique although the schema as convention does not help such a phenomenon. The individuality of expression in art, the particular achievement of a film-maker through their style and hence expression, finds no outlet in cognitivist-based theories like Smith's where intentionality gains no real purchase on any explanatory account of emotion understood as expression as opposed to simple devices for emotional cues.[62] In fact, for Smith, the essential characteristics of film, their function, does not really encompass a role for expression in his notion of the aesthetic. He remarks that 'art...provides a forum for reflection on the nature and structure of automatized beliefs and practices'.[63] This sheer intellectualist rendition of art would not, on the face of it, establish a difference between artforms and plainly cognitive forms of understanding. On this account art is simply a reflective practice and not one that seems to have emotion as its central term.

The strong, character-driven argument found in Smith, Carroll and others is often at the expense of other elements, especially *mise en scène*. In other words, it is surely the case that emotional tone and expression can be provided as much by the image as a whole as by the occurrent emotions of characters. The emotion expression found in Andrei Tarkovsky's *The Mirror* (1974) is deeply felt and difficult to pin down by commentators on his work. For example, it

would be testing and probably impossible to articulate the final sequence of the film where landscape, character setting/dialogue, camera movement, editing and music as well as narrative ambiguity are of a piece in expressing a sense of loss but also of renunciation for that loss which provides a feeling of redemption across the sequence and to the film as a whole. Here is a sense in which neither dialogue nor facial expression, nor point-of-view shot alone expresses these feelings. Rather, the sequence as a whole evokes such feelings in a way analogous to seeing-in, described earlier. This is not to say that elements could not be picked out and examined with such an expressiveness in mind; they could. Rather, it is to say that the scene works all of a piece.[64]

Point of view and emotions

Noel Carroll argues that point-of-view editing 'is deployed to represent the emotional states of characters'.[65] A shot of a look by a character off-screen, followed by the object of his or her look (or sometimes vice versa) can indicate the object of the emotional facial expression of the character in question. Of course, this works fully only if there is an emotional expression by the character. Carroll puzzlingly rests part of his case on psychological evidence that, following the gaze of an other, is an instinctual matter and that babies do it.[66] There seem to be two problems here. First, whatever the scientific evidence presented here there would seem to be a key difference between the case of a three-month-old infant doing this and an adult. In the former case there would seem little ground for arguing that the infant is conceptually (pre-linguistic conceptualisation) sophisticated enough to understand that there is an intentional direction to the other's look, but perhaps more fatally for the view, why understand it in this way and not simply (as in cats) a failure to catch the eyes means the infant's gaze wanders? Second, there seems little reason for citing such evidence for adult cinema-goers who are not acting instinctually but meaningfully according to their socialisation and agency, which includes following a gaze. If there is such an instinct it may be of the kind which, once it has performed its developmental function, no longer is to be cited as a *reason* for looking at what another is looking at – 'I wanted to see what he or she was looking at' would be a reason and a cause for looking (an intentional act).

  Carroll's account is primarily a technical one and does not cover the more interesting cases. For example, the look off-camera of Masha as she lies in the field with her husband in the final sequence of *The Mirror*, is emotional, in Carroll's sense, but in a way not easily identifiable. The shot following her look is also ambiguous between what we feel she would see (a particular view from her point of view of the field in which she is sitting) and a memory of a past in which she was once present. It is in this gap between the nature of the possible views here that the spectator can insert himself as an internal

spectator (of which more in the next section) posited in the film by Tarkovsky. Equally important in this sequence is its overall emotional feeling (from the first panning long shot of the field and distant woods to the rising Bach chorus, ending with the camera tracking back away from the grandmother and children into the forest's gloom) which cannot and should not be tied to any character, but in fact to the film-maker Tarkovsky. In representing the sequence as he does the representation is given expression, which is not entirely character-ascribed.

A further example from the same film is the famous post-credit sequence when Masha, perched on a fence at the field's edge, meets the flirtatious doctor. As the doctor resumes his journey into town seen from a shot behind and over the shoulder of Masha, the field of long grass sways and ripples in a strong gust of wind which comes out of nowhere – an expressive moment in the film which is not particularly assigned to either character in the scene, yet is reminiscent of the sad landscape painting example used earlier. Its meaning is felt as quite clear but inarticulable. Mark Le Fanu, for instance, describes the moment as one of 'pure grace and mystery'.[67]

Of course, in figurative cinema any edit between a person and another shot, where obvious narrative matching is not used, can by contiguity suggest a perception, dream (if person unconscious and eyes closed), memory, fantasy – in other words, a mental or perceptual item. This is due to the fact that such a person has both an inner life and perceptual means (compare such edit cuts in Alain Resnais's *L'Année Dernière à Marienbad*). More subtly, the cut between scenes in cinema can imperceptibly create expression by bringing together on the ground of narrative spatio-temporal strategies slabs of a film which produce expression (after all, interpretative understanding of a film's expression may not be presented fully on a first viewing, or for that matter, ever, no matter how many viewings). The capacity of certain films continually to reveal their expressiveness is a fact about cinema, and art in general.

So I have been arguing *contra* Carroll and Smith that emotion is not something just ascribed to characters through the more obvious devices, but is also part of the expression of a film as a whole. While they admit to this they offer no explanation. We experience the film as expressing what it does. It cannot be peeled off the film or mechanically extracted. In Carroll's discussion of narration in his book *Mystifying Movies*, he seems to understand expression (quite justifiably) as a more imaginative use of devices like camera movement and editing.[68] But Carroll has also bracketed off his discussion by dealing only with what he calls 'movies' which are the 'popular mass market narratives' of the industrial-based film-making of Hollywood and excludes art cinema and experimental film. He sees his task as providing an account of the technical devices and mechanisms employed by 'movies' to explain their 'incredible impact' on wide-flung markets embracing different cultures, languages and classes.[69] If certain devices serve the function of focusing the spectator's attention on what will facilitate the smooth running of the

narrative, they can also serve expressive ends. He remarks that '[T]he speed of editing or of camera movement . . . can invest the scene portrayed with expressive or aesthetic qualities'.[70] Musical scores accompanying the film images also serve this role for Carroll. Similarly, music by and large 'imbues the scene with certain expressive properties'.[71]

There are objections to the projection theory, or at least certain forms of it. First, it can be argued that I can recognise an emotion in a work of art without feeling that emotion, thus it cannot be a case of my projection onto it, as there is no emotion to project.[72] On this objection, the emotion stays firmly with the art object. Second, it is an objection to the projection view that I can be faced with a feeling in the artwork I have not felt before, a new experience so recognition is impossible, but instead I come to know about such a feeling through the artwork. A countermove to this argument is, how can I come to know it at all if I cannot recognise it? Furthermore, examples of such cases are not convincing. It seems to hold that certain feelings – wise serenity – are achieved by rare humans only (e.g. Beethoven); therefore they are impossible to project. This view does not take into account in the visual cases the fact that such emotions are given in a particular pictorial representation in which I see a configuration of complexity which corresponds in some way to a mental state which I then project. But of course, the real case against projectivism is upturned on the genetic-projectivist account where there is a correspondence between a state pre-existing in the subject and one in an exterior state.

In order to provide a fuller argument for expression we need to look at a concept which would seem to be important where the idea of projection is concerned. Understanding that projection is involved in the relationship between a film and its expressiveness leads us to a discussion of the psycho-analytical concept of phantasy which has been broached earlier in this chapter by way of providing a mechanism for projection. It is the concept of phantasy which may provide mechanisms and structures whereby projection can become more explanatory of complex emotional states in art. For it is via phantasy that such projections exist and are facilitated. Phantasy also lies at the heart of style in its richest and fullest sense.

3
Phantasy

> For the artist, unlike the neurotic, the phantasy is a starting point, not the culmination, of his activity.[1]

If projection is at the centre of expression and style in art, we need to examine the phenomenon from which it is derived – phantasy.[2] In what follows, phantasy does not mean that thing which can be uncovered only by a complete psychoanalysis of the artist-*cum*-film-maker, an impossible task even if the artist (often long dead) submitted to such an analysis, but rather the kind of phantasy that can be judged to be operating in the work from our experience and understanding of the work itself – its content, meaning and forms, and the context we can bring to it. Any other course would fall foul of the problems found in Freud's own analysis of art, especially that of Leonardo and Michelangelo. None the less what follows is dependent on the view of the artwork as being the intentional outcome of a process and an eventual product of human agents, the film-makers, and the spectator's experience of art *as art* as an understanding and experience of the artwork by way of how those intentions are fulfilled, unfulfilled or even fail.

This schema may appear simple, but its richness can be appreciated when a fuller account of what is to be brought under the conception of 'intentional', for example, is provided. It is not a narrow, 'internalist' view of the intention, in which the latter is understood purely as an opaque highly subjective phenomenon. Nor does the intentionalist account, properly understood, neglect desires, beliefs, feelings, and so forth, which relate to wider concerns in culture, history, social milieu. It is part of many artists' intention when making an artwork that it is made under the idea of the tradition or of rival artists. But what is crucial in what follows is that such intentional states have a bearing on the appropriate intentional chain of which the artwork is the end-result. A so-called social understanding, in other words, passes through the artist's own experience – through the process of making the work. The social conceptualisation is not an explanation in itself of the artwork *as art*.

The model used will be a desire–belief view of action or rational-explanation as phantasising using a Davidsonian model of psychoanalytical explanation.[3] It should not be surprising that at this point in the argument we should be setting out a view of the mind. Any account of the aesthetic experience must be grounded in some kind of conception of the mind in the Humean sense referred to earlier. It is only through such an account that we can do justice to the sheer power of art – the strong passions it arouses, the pleasure it provides and its persistence through history.[4] Whether we believe that film is primarily a matter of dramatic narrative or of moving forms, or a mixture of both, the power of such qualities to move us has to be explained. Similarly, if there is an experience which we have before an art object as a result of a proper engagement with it – looking at a painting, reading a poem, watching a film – then this involves understanding the nature of experience and how it relates to perception, imagination, feeling and expression, all of which incur a conception, however schematic, of the mind.

The idea of film as a moving pictorial representation of expressive powers lodged in forms of projection leads us to explore the aspects of the mind by which a richer account can be provided of film as an art. One of the most powerful accounts of spectatorship of the pictorial arts, namely painting, has been provided by Richard Wollheim[5] to which this chapter owes much, as it does to Sebastian Gardner's philosophical analysis of the Kleinian notion of phantasy.[6] Wollheim and Gardner have attempted to derive a *philosophical* account of experiences which they believe is not only compatible with but also in part arises from a Kleinian conception of the mind. It is important to stress *contra* the views of Carroll and Bordwell, that Freud provided a general theory of the mind and not one that simply explained irrational actions, beliefs and behaviour, though the impetus for much of his thinking was the latter phenomenon. It was the breakdown of rational behaviour, belief and feelings that more often than not deeply affected the lives of his patients and provided the puzzles on whose resolutions psychoanalysis was founded. From *The Project* onwards, Freud never lost sight of the need for a broad explanation and description of mental phenomena common to us all. Importantly, Freud always believed in the physical underpinnings of his psychological findings, even if they were unnecessary for psychological explanations *per se*. To this extent, what follows is materialist in its ontology and dualistic in epistemology.[7]

Since the 1970s, film theory has relied heavily on particular models of the mind. For instance, the Lacanian-inspired theory of film has used a psychoanalytical model of the mind in which the idea of the conscious rationalising 'I' has been subject to a form of semiotic critique so that it is understood as being pervaded and, more importantly, even constituted by what Lacan calls the Imaginary. As such, the self is cast as identical to the idealisations and identifications of a stage of development before language came into operation, which in turn set up the true basis of the mind – the

Symbolic, which is ruled by, indeed identified with, what used to be the unconscious. On such a view the unconscious is understood in terms of a linguistic model. Language is taken to be profoundly important in determining the 'structure' of what we may call persons. On the other hand, the more recent cognitivist view is anti-psychoanalytical. And while it has rehabilitated the conscious subject as a central element in unpacking the experience of watching film, it has at the same time reduced the conscious spectator to a nexus of perceptual and cognitive capacities and skills by which persons sustain and negotiate their relations with film and with the world.[8]

However, I am arguing that it is important for our understanding of the experience of film as art, that our emotional relationship to a particular film is explained. It is in the area of emotion that we would want to establish initially the role of phantasy as a shaper of emotional life. Phantasy is 'constitutive...of normal, ordinary mental life'.[9] In fact, on the Kleinian account adumbrated here, we would want to argue that a source of emotional life is to be found in early phantasy in its role as a representation of instinctual states.[10] As Gardner suggests, phantasy's influence 'consists in its power to cast situations and objects in certain emotional "lights"'.[11] To some degree, phantasy is part of a longer tradition in philosophical thought pertaining to the role of the imagination in perception and understanding as set out by Hume, Kant and Ludwig Wittgenstein. This is not to say that phantasy is to be identified with this more technical notion of imagination, but rather that it has some aspects in common – especially the idea of seeing-as, which involves the suggestion that seeing, or certain kinds of seeing at least, includes the idea of a concept saturating our perceptions, albeit on the Kleinian view this is an unconscious concept so to speak.[12]

In discussing representation and expression in film, we have called on a notion of projection which involves emotion, belief and seeing-in. In other words, films move us and we experience them in a fine web of beliefs and feelings somehow expressive of the film. What follows is not especially an argument for our experience and aesthetic response to a film being one that is in Kleinian psychoanalytical terms, for of course we do not need knowledge of psychoanalysis to respond to film in the fullest sense. Rather, Kleinian psychoanalysis, I shall argue, provides a model of the mind by which many central issues pertaining to the experience of film as art can be better explained. In many ways, I am setting this Kleinian account, sometimes explicitly at other times implicitly, against the two other models which have most currency in contemporary film theory.[13]

As I have remarked, the notion of phantasy adumbrated in this chapter is not one that sets itself against normal mental thoughts and actions.[14] It is not to be identified with simply irrational actions, conventionally related perhaps to neurosis or psychosis. On the contrary, phantasy, on the Kleinian model, is involved in all mental states, both infantile and adult. It is not

purely malign; in fact, it is largely benign, involved as it is in our day-to-day ordinary life. It is not something that is operative in irrational mental states or pathologies only. As the spelling denotes, phantasy is to be separated from fantasy. Phantasy is, by definition, an unconscious phenomenon, although it does, as we shall see, connect crucially and necessarily with conscious intentional states.

In order to clarify the book's main thesis we need to set out the notion of phantasy as it relates to the *experience* of film as an art. The proviso of film in terms of art and not as something else, say, entertainment, is important, for many theories of film seek an analysis in which the distinction between film as art or otherwise is confounded or difficult to make. For example, the recent upsurge in cognitivist psychological approaches to cinema once more treats film simply as a structure in relation to a particular conception of the mind in which there is no attempt to identify its value or otherwise.[15] This is partly due to cognitivism's problems with the role of feelings in expression.[16]

In so far as we are percipient beings we are immersed in phantasy. Freud always seemed to be moving towards this view. For Freud phantasy was an activity which remained in thrall to the pleasure principle after the appearance of the reality principle by which it was not governed. It is important to note that a phantasy is the result of a mental activity and not simply an epiphenomenon of the mental, or the mechanical effect of an underlying mechanism. Phantasising is what Freud's patients *did*. Behaviour, beliefs, thoughts, desires and feelings which Freud's patients presented in the analysis were those deemed 'irrational' by them. So while their behaviour, thoughts, and so on took on the features of rational activity, at times by the presence of beliefs and desires, they also experienced the forceful way that such action took grip or thoughts were held and over which they seemed to have no control and under whose influence powerful anxieties and fears were experienced. In using the term 'phantasy' I am distinguishing it from 'fantasy' which I take to be, roughly speaking, intentional in so far as it is fantasy, although phantasy can play a part in an intentional mental or physical act. Rather, phantasy would be revealed in, implied by, be formative of or disguised by an intentional act. Thus I am speaking of the unconscious as the lair of phantasy, even if it is only through the world of consciousness, dreams and symptoms that we can ever come upon it. Interestingly, Freud rarely refers to or discusses unconscious phantasy as such, however he gave it a crucial role in his psychopathology and his case-studies, especially the Wolf Man and Rat Man, both of which contain some of his most sophisticated accounts of phantasy. Phantasies, as we shall see, involve internal objects which found their most serious discussion in Freud's essays 'On Narcissism' (1914) and 'Mourning and Melancholia' (1917).

Although Freud had always provided a role to phantasy in psychopathology, it was during his clinical investigation of the Wolf Man that phantasy had

its most dramatic effect in overthrowing the seduction theory. In the Wolf Man case Freud was rescued from the uncomfortable view that neurosis was largely the result of the patient's early seduction by a parent or authority figure. This view had been forced upon him to a large extent by the child-hood seduction stories recounted to him mainly by female patients. Through the Wolf Man case he was able to understand such stories as phantasies by which the patient expressed an unconscious desire or wish to enter into a sexual relationship with his or her parent. This wish remained operative and productive in that it created in the consulting room a phantasy about what had allegedly happened during the patient's childhood.

Freud conceived of phantasies in three ways. First, he observed in patients phantasies of a sort we (and he) associate with daydreams. These are phantasies understood as mental images. In such cases, the patient has a visual image in his mind's eye, so to speak, or hears voices or sounds, say. In these latter, aural, cases we can distinguish between cases where the person hears voices in his or her head, literally, as in the Schreber case, and cases where the person hears something that is apparently external but which does not exist, as in the case of the young woman in 'A case of Paranoia Running Counter to the Psycho-analytical Theory of the Disease' (1915), who heard a ticking sound while making love and took it to be an actual clock. In the latter instance, the sound is firmly placed, even if mistakenly, in the world and not in the mind. However, they have in common the hearing of an imaginary sound of some sort. Such cases are to be found most typically in psychotic states. The point to be made is that all the cases involve images of some sort or another or the appropriate sensuous experience. The various phenomenological differences between them will be discussed more fully later.

Second, Freud treated as phantasies cases which involve primarily, if not totally, thoughts. Thus, the Rat Man bedevilled by obsessive thoughts rarely had any attendant images to his phantasy-thought as far as we can tell from the case study. For example, he was seized by the *thought* that the rat torture would be carried out upon his loved ones. In such a case, the phantasies comprise thoughts involving beliefs which lead to neurotic actions and behaviour.

Third, and the most complex category, was that of seeing something under an aspect where the latter is informed or, to put it more strongly, saturated in phantasy. For the sake of argument, this kind of phantasy will be called seeing-as-phantasy. In order to distinguish this from the thought-dependent phantasy (although they are decisively distinguishable), I mean by seeing-as-phantasy the phenomenon of taking an event, situation, person or thing as something else whereby what is taken as or seen-as is inappropriate in some way or another. Often such cases involve phantasy-thoughts too, but the distinctive characteristic is that perception is saturated in some way. A crude means of separating this kind of phantasy from others is to understand it as

involving essentially perception in a way we may call non-literal or metaphorical or even symbolic.

However, in paradigmatic cases there is no separate conscious act of interpretation; rather, the perception is infused or saturated in the concepts involved. In other words, the seeing-as is unconscious in the strongest sense. The following example, from Susan Isaacs' classic article 'The Nature and Function of Phantasy', illustrates this:

> a little girl of one year and eight months, with poor speech development, saw a shoe of her mother's from which the sole had come loose and was flapping about. The child was horrified, and screamed with terror. For about a week she would shrink away and scream if she saw her mother wearing any shoes at all, and for some time could only tolerate her mother wearing a pair of bright-coloured house shoes. The particular offending pair was not worn for several months. The child gradually forgot about the terror, and let her mother wear any sort of shoes. At two years and eleven months, however (fifteen months later), she suddenly said to her mother in a frightened voice. 'Where are Mummy's broken shoes?' Her mother hastily said, fearing another screaming attack, that she had sent them away, and the child then commented: 'They might have eaten me right up.' The flapping shoe was thus seen by the child as a threatening mouth, and responded to as such, at one year and eight months, even though the phantasy could not be put into words.[17]

Such phobic behaviour clearly brings out the distinction I wish to make, for the child was not so much the victim of a thought but of a seeing to which she reacted in a way that was apt for how she saw the shoe – that is to say, the seeing of a shoe where the shoe was seen as something quite different, and where the seeing was not consciously formed by any thought although it did perhaps involve a thought. In many cases, 'seeing x as y' may be used as a substitute for 'thinking of x as y' and such is the case with the Rat Man when he moves the stone in the road. In the case of Isaacs' little girl what is centrally involved is perception, not thinking. So it is not that the little girl sees that the shoe is like a menacing, greedy mouth; rather, she sees the mouth *as* a menacing, greedy one. Such seeing cannot be reduced to a belief or set of beliefs, of even the perceptual kind.[18] I will discuss the nature of the seeing-as relation later, in the meantime I hope at least I have given intuitive criteria for distinguishing it from other forms of phantasy.

Phantasy and wish-fulfilment

We discussed the structure of projection in the previous chapter. Projection was divided, as set out by Wollheim, between simple and complex, where the simple projection was internally driven and took as its object the world

in general. Its lack of discrimination was determined by an overall mood which in order to be allayed was projected on external things in general.

Sebastian Gardner defines the psychoanalytic concept of phantasy as:

> that of a non-accidentally inaccessible state, in which the world is represented in conformity with the demands of motivational states, and which receives expression in behaviour.[19]

In order to understand fully what he means by this, we need to describe the model of the mind in which such a conception of phantasy is articulated. To do this it is useful to return to Freud's use of phantasy in both his theories and his case-studies. In this way some useful distinctions and characterisations can be made so that the psychoanalytic notion of phantasy does not collapse into associative phenomena, such as self-deception, irrationality *per se* or fantasy.[20]

In his 1911 essay 'Formulations on the Two Principles of Mental Functioning', Freud understands phantasy as appearing only after the establishment of the reality principle. This view did not connect with his hallucinatory wish-fulfilment mentioned in the same essay. It was Klein who developed the relationship between the two. Her conception of phantasy was built on a very early idea that the infant's instincts were expressed in the mental by representations – Klein called these wishes – and these were unconscious and were experienced unconsciously by the infant as being fulfilled. Initially, however, the first phantasies would be without purpose, simply providing a representational shape for early impulses.[21] The child experiencing the first pangs of hunger would experience that hunger in some fairly minimal mental representation. Isaacs' notion of phantasy 'is the mental corollary, the psychic representative, of instinct'.[22] And for Isaacs this is a necessary condition for human instincts:

> There is no impulse, no instinctual urge or response which is not experienced as unconscious phantasy.[23]

In passing, this throws up an interesting problem about what the relationship between this unconscious phantasy and the infant's conscious experience is. These unconscious experiences may be 'conscious' in so far as they deserve the description unconscious as there is no awareness of them so early in life and such experiences would probably be predominantly sensory with little in the way of representation as such.

As we have seen, Freud suggested that the earliest identifiable mental content pertaining to his theories was that involved in wish-fulfilment. This is the phenomenon by which the infant thwarted in satisfying one of its instincts or impulses forms a representation by which it can experience satisfaction, and thus momentarily ease instinctual pressure by allowing it some hallucinatory satisfaction. The wish for the food of the breast – articulated

non-propositionally, of course – is fulfilled by a representation of some kind. But wishes and their imaginary fulfilments need to be distinguished from phantasy. The latter occurs when the wish is not fulfilled, mainly by interruption, and its representation is converted into a phantasy. What distinguishes these phantasies from wish-fulfilment?[24]

Freud, at least at times, understood wish-fulfilment through his economic view of the mind. It was a means of discharging a level of excitation caused by the energy of the instinctual demand. Normally carried out by an action on the world but, where this condition is not available, as in sleep or in the organism not motorily equipped as in the case of the infant, this can be achieved by the energy's regression to a perception-based memory which, when activated, discharges the built-up energy. The infant then experiences satisfaction (more exactly, relief), albeit temporarily.

What is characteristic of this mechanism is that it does not have an intentional structure. In other words, it does not depend upon an action-like mental framework of beliefs and desires leading either to an action or, more appositely in this case, to a thought or set of thoughts, which would comprise an imagining of the object of the wish. If actions are understood as intentional, then on the causal account of action, the latter would involve a bodily movement which falls under a description. An intentional action involves a relationship between a belief and a desire, which not only explains the action but also causes it. Thus to attribute a reason to a human agent in explanation of an action he or she does, is to represent the reason as rationalising the action, and as causing it. Thus we can understand rationalisation as a type of what we might call ordinary causal explanation. This view supports our common-sense view of reasons for actions being the causes of actions too.[25]

An objection may be lodged at this point concerning the introduction of causality into an account of mental items. It could be asked: how can we assign or attribute the property of bearing causal relations to mental phenomena such as thoughts, desires and beliefs? By way of a reply we can turn to the work of Donald Davidson.[26]

Davidson makes a distinction between events and descriptions of events. Causation is a relation between events whatever the description used to pick out the events – 'the firing of the gun caused Jack's death'; 'the throwing of the stone caused the window to break'. On the other hand, causal explanation is intentional and so causal explanation relates sentences making the description under which the events are brought relevant to the truth-value of an explanation statement.

In the case of infantile wish-fulfilment an action (and thus intentional) framework would entail something like the following:

1. a biological need [or motivational state] for water which instigates the whole operation;
2. a desire [to drink];
3. a belief [or beliefs] as to how that desire may be satisfied;

4. a willing to perform the action appropriate by way of the belief[s] to satisfy the desire [to drink];
5. an action resulting from the desire [2] and belief(s);
6. satisfying of desire and fulfilment of need;
7. experience of satisfaction.

In the case of wish-fulfilment, Freud seems to suggest that belief plays no part in such a schema, so that (3) is replaced by the memory/perception of a past drinking (2*) and this does not involve a belief on the part of the infant or sleeper. And it is (2) that satisfies (1) by way of a sensory experience.[27] Similarly, (6) is a state in which the infant is not imbued with beliefs about the satisfaction fulfilled by the mental representation achieved by regress to a memory/perception. Thus wish-fulfilment does not have the same structure as rational satisfaction. A wish does not lead to an action but only produces a representation. As Gardner puts it: 'in rational action, persons satisfy their desires, in wish fulfillment, wishes *misrepresent themselves* as fulfilled' (author's emphasis).

Importantly, then, wish-fulfilment essentially involves sensory experience. This separates wish-fulfilment from ordinary rational satisfaction of a desire which involves sensory experience as far as a desire may wish such, but it is not a necessary feature of the desiring-action. On the other hand, wish-fulfilment is satisfied by a sensation which, although it has a content, nevertheless does not have a judgemental quality (truth and falsity of the content is a constitutional irrelevance). Even dreams which seem to betray pre-conscious content are at the service, in the final analysis, of instinctual demands. So even in such propositional-like cases, the representation involved is serving the pre-propositional demands of the instincts.

To return to phantasies, we may claim that the most general difference between them and wish-fulfilment is that they involve thoughts, and relations between thoughts, which wishes do not. For Freud, phantasies were a primitive, archaic form of thinking of which we are ever influenced. What is meant by this claim? We must return to the theories as to how phantasy was originally generated. The most influential writing on this matter is not by Freud but by Isaacs.[28] Phantasy is distinguished from wish-fulfilment by the fact that the former involves the mind experiencing itself. What does this involve?

Phantasies, and the representations they comprise, are related to the external world. The world of objects, persons and events has an effect on phantasy which involves intentional relationships between phantasy and the external world. For example, a wish-fulfilment achieved by a memory/perception of the mother's breast does not imply that the infant represents such a representation for itself, so to speak. On the other hand, a phantasy involves an operation of the mind on its content such that it takes an object for its content and this taking is a process of some kind – especially of incorporation

(of taking in something from outside to inside) or projection (of pushing something outside). Thus an infant suckling at the breast is not simply assuaging and experiencing the instinctual demand for food, but is also experiencing it *as something* which is represented, however primitively, as, say, a taking in. The object of such a representation may well be a sensation, but it is nevertheless experienced in phantasy as a sensation which has the nature of a belief.

This phantasy is a means by which instinctual – that is, motivational – states can be brought into some kind of relationship with one another. They are also permanent representations with a past. Links between them are established as in a sequence. Isaacs claims that a phantasy is 'a member of a developing series whose rudimentary beginnings can be traced backwards and whose further, more mature, forms can be followed forward'.[29] As Gardner remarks, this suggests that the connections between phantasies are not arbitrary and this trait gives them the mark of a series or sequence.[30]

> [This] points in the direction of the Kleinian concept of an *inner world*, a permanent structure of phantastic representation with a synchronic and diachronic organisation. Synchronically, the inner world is occupied by a multitude of distinct *internal objects*. Diachronically, it has the form of a *narrative*.[31]

We should say something at this point about the nature of this inner world and the functions of phantasy which make it a kind of thinking.

Phantasy is a vehicle for introjection, in its earliest form as introjecting the breast (or feeding source) which nourishes the infant. The breast is taken inside the body by way of an incorporating phantasy of eating the breast (a part-object). This breast-incorporating phantasy is motivated by defence, against anxiety at being deprived of the breast. The introjected breast is then threatened when the child's hunger is transformed into aggression and the introjected breast is attacked, represented as poisoned (perhaps based on the sensations of cold milk or curdled milk, for example) and thus experienced as attacking itself. On the basis of these experiences, the child divides the good from the bad breast – one nourishing, other attacking – so that they are distinct, internal objects which can in turn be treated by the infant – one cherished and the other attacked.

The other dominant kind of phantasy involves projection. Bad objects experienced as painful are pushed out and into another person – this is projection and projective identification.

Through these mechanisms involving mental objects the idea of an inner world or psychic reality is established. Phantasy is a mental activity relating to thoughts. Its prime aim is to provide a psychic defence. And from these beginnings it comes to impinge on a person's conscious beliefs about the world. Unlike wish-fulfilment, which involves a representation of the motive,

the activated need, phantasy involves a representation which assigns a 'primitive' value or significance to its represented object. This is not a passive state for, in ascribing value to the object of phantasy, the infant comes close to a judgement as Freud suggests in his essay 'On Negation'. The judgement 'no' is given its earliest form in infantile ejections from the body through excretion, urinating, spitting, vomiting. Similarly, the affirmative 'yes' is the bodily taking in through eating, sucking and caressing. Thus the activity embodies a representation with a meaning, albeit a primitive one for the infant. The earliest Kleinian notions of good and bad objects are in some way phantastic equivalents of this Freudian insight. So in phantasy, intentionality, hence thinking *per se*, operates. This distinguishes it from wish-fulfilment. There is a strong suggestion here that it is the very fact of phantasy that makes propositional thinking possible at all.

What is the nature of the content of phantasy, especially with regard to how it stands in relation to conscious thoughts involving beliefs? If we understand conscious thinking as being propositional, we are committed to the idea that a thought involves an object, and that that object is described, implicitly or explicitly, in a particular way. Thus the objects of thought are intentional. This view does not imply that all thoughts have to be held in a linguistic mode. Much mental content can be rendered propositional by understanding many mental states including emotions and desire as being propositional. Thus they take an object given under a description. The description claim is important as it serves to provide a means of identifying and individuating thoughts.[32]

Sensations and propositional attitudes

It is worthwhile at this point stepping back and discussing what is meant philosophically by propositional attitudes and how they fit into an under-standing of the mental.[33] Any philosophical account of the mind would have to set out a basic, broad division between states of the mind which were necessarily conditional on thought or language and those that were not. It is probably uncontroversial to state that sensations exist in creatures that have no language and thus where thought does not exist or is at least of such a sort that it cannot be articulated. For example, cats and dogs experience pain. Humans experience pain directly without the need for con-ceptualisation of any kind. All that is required is consciousness. In fact, it seems a presupposition for ascribing sensations that the thing so ascribed is a conscious being. In the animal world, there are obvious beings where such an ascription is difficult to make, e.g. worms, maggots, microbes. For example, claims of cruelty to such creatures are more defensible than those relating to cats, dogs and cows, which clearly, through their behaviour and bodily reactions, experience pain.[34] A pain of which we are not conscious seems like a contradiction in terms (the exception perhaps being mental 'pain').

Colin McGinn has characterised sensation so that it involves such diverse phenomena as

> bodily feelings like pains, tickles, nausea, as well as perceptual experiences like seeming to see a red pillar-box, hearing a loud trumpet, tasting a sweet strawberry.[35]

In contrast, many of our mental phenomena have what might be called propositional content. They include beliefs which depend on understanding the world in such a way that their contents may have a purchase on the world. They are characteristically defined when speaking of third-person cases, or others, as involving 'that'-clauses, e.g. 'Smith believes that the bus is red'. This categorisation of mental phenomena is broadbrushed but, for example, responds to the gross differences between animals and language-using humans.

But sensations can have, and often do have, propositional content. For example, I may be afraid (and have a sensation of fear) that a dog will attack me. In this case, my fear is a direct response to a belief that I have about the world. Interestingly, whether such a belief is true or false (I may be afraid of all dogs and, in this case, the dog is not showing aggressive behaviour and does not have any intention of attacking me) is not necessarily relevant to my being afraid. Equally, my fear in this case seems to be partly caused by a further belief that I hold, consciously or otherwise, that all dogs are aggressive. In such a case, the perception of a particular dog, together with my general belief about all dogs, causes my fear, and not the perception of an actual aggressive dog. I share two beliefs: (a) that I perceive (see, hear) a dog; and (b) that all dogs are aggressive. Compare this with the more rational case of (a), I perceive an aggressive dog. But the sensation of fear does not necessarily follow from holding such beliefs. I may not feel fear despite my belief about a particularly aggressive dog. How the sensation of fear, or fear, arises is a problem in philosophy.

As this example shows, the introduction of propositional attitudes involves rationality. Sensations, on the other hand, presuppose no such thing. Dogs, babies and mice have sensations without having thoughts of any propositional kind. For this reason, we may claim, justifiably, that sensations are more primitive, chronologically, in the case of humans, and evolutionary in the case of animals. The ascription of propositional attitudes necessarily implies understanding a creature as being rational. Ascription of sensations has no such implication. Simple cause and effect largely determines sensation in such cases. A baby receiving an inoculation squeals with pain in a causal fashion. An adult may squeal with pain at the *thought* of being injected! In fact, convincing someone of the need for an injection, etc. may allay all such attitudes and feelings towards injections. A good dentist can change our feelings about injections by talking to us.

A further difference between sensations and propositional attitudes is that the former demand consciousness. However, we can hold beliefs unconsciously, in both the weak and strong sense of unconscious. That is to say, my beliefs are not held in mind all at once. I have masses of beliefs that are not conscious, but can be made so if required. But the fact that they are not literally in consciousness at a particular time does not mean that I do not hold such a belief. Sensations, however, are necessarily conscious. If I am not conscious of a pain, then I am not *in* pain. Although this distinction seems to undermine any attempt to define the mental through consciousness, it does not because in the case of unconscious propositional attitudes we believe that they are the same kind of phenomena as conscious ones.

Unconscious propositional attitudes are the same kind of entity as their conscious counterparts, and their existence is defined largely in terms of their conscious ones. In fact, one of the radical aspects of Freud's theory of mind and his analysis of pathological mental states was his understanding of unconscious propositional attitudes as being capable of being brought to consciousness through therapy. Equally, his means of discovering unconscious thoughts was through association along an often complex path of rational connections between conscious thoughts, in the first instance, and their unconscious determinants. Thus the philosophical and psychoanalytical insights would seem to provide mutual support to each other. It needs to be emphasised that the philosophical view of propositional attitudes does not commit one to psychoanalysis as such. Indeed, unconscious propositional attitudes are fully compatible with other psychological theories.

The structure of phantasy

The language of propositional attitudes allows us to articulate the structure of phantasy in ways that provide philosophical support for the psychoanalytical concept of phantasy whilst not claiming to be a clear-cut argument for the proof of its existence. One can only hope to persuade through setting out some of the necessary and sufficient conditions for certain mental phenomena, that some notion equivalent to phantasy is desirable in an account of the mental, even if it is not strictly necessary.

In view of the account given so far, phantasy is built on wishes, which in turn are the consequence of motivational states driven by instinctual drives. For example, and it is a much quoted one, the Rat Man's death instinct passing through the motivational aspects of the Oedipal scenario comes to produce wishes of an oral and anal-oriented nature, which in turn, with reference to aspects of his reality (the rat story told by the Captain), come to be represented in phantasies like the one concerning the rat torture. Thus wishes act as the immediate causes and rationalisation of the phantasy in the same way as beliefs and desires in relation to actions do. Freud's analysis of the Rat Man

traces this pathway back from the phantasies – some acted out in his behaviour towards Freud – to the network of wishes and through to the early originating motives of the Oedipal phase, motives reliant like all others on the twin power of the death and love instincts, Thanatos and Eros.

But if such unconscious ideas and feelings produce phantasies, especially ones ending in actions, how are they different from any other action? What has to be accounted for here is the transition from the unconscious stages of motives and wishes to phantasy and how the latter is experienced in conscious life. One difference here is that between phantasy understood dispositionally and that understood occurrently. Some phantasies, maybe all, suggest that they act in the form of disposing a person towards certain patterns of understanding, feelings, perceptions. They have a generality by which they come to influence types of behaviour which are normally defined in terms of characters or personality, e.g. a tendency to submit to authority figures, or to be anxious about things, but not in ways construed as neurotic: or should we say phantasy actually determines these types of actions, thoughts and feelings?

On the other hand, there are specific occurrences of phantasy and their concomitant actions or belief which are determined in a token-like way to a phantasy. Gardner has suggested that the level of structure in which phantasies take a particular form – hatred of the father, fear of a rat torture being carried out on a particular person – is the occurrent level of phantasies, whilst the instinct, the Oedipal phase and oral and anal inputs are dispositional in so far as they dispose the person, unconsciously, to adopt certain phantasies in relation to their content and the aspects of reality to which they are drawn for content or acting-out.[36]

This is going to be an important distinction in accounting for the role of specific subject-matters and their treatments in the works of particular filmmakers. In other words, the tendency to repeat themes, images and feelings in works is an example of the dispositional and occurrent operating in works of art, that is to say, the difference between governing phantasies and their different instantiations in particular films.

Now the crucial aspect of phantasy is that it seems to be like other ordinary conscious networks of mental events and processes. Beliefs and desires lead to particular phantasies and in some cases to actions – parapraxes, acting-outs, etc. But as Gardner points out, phantasies are representations and as such have properties like other representations, especially pictorial ones as, say, a painting.

Now phantasies seem to take the form of propositional attitudes. For example, the Rat Man believes *that* his father wishes to beat him. But if propositional attitudes are the elements of the phantasy chain, how are we to explain the links between conscious rational behaviour and pre-propositional content? In other words, if irrational action and behaviour are just that kind of behaviour not responsive to the rational connection between desires, beliefs

and external reality, then in what does such behaviour comprise? How are desires, beliefs, thoughts which are part of irrational behaviour, answerable to profounder explanation?

Despite phantasies being of the form 'X phantasises that p', there are strong reasons for not treating phantasies as propositional. First, phantasies do not provide reasons for beliefs. The propositional attitudes expressed in a conscious feeling which stems from phantasy are not part of a web of beliefs. So fear of X is not part of a set of beliefs by which fear of X can be understood, hence the way it protrudes from our rational web of beliefs and desires. Second, the relationship between propositional attitudes and rationality does not exist. Propositionality entails an understanding of how the world is in relation to the propositions in question. In phantasy, the relationship is more akin to that found with sensations, the propositional attitudes are thrust upon the subject willy-nilly. Third, phantasy does not respond to truth or falsity. It does not treat the world as evidence of any sort for its so-called propositional content. It has only a crude and fixed connection to particular aspects of the world. Fourth, the psychoanalytic explanations of phantasy, locating it in the non-inferential domain of the primary process, plus its origination in the pre-verbal states of infancy, do not seem to support propositionality. Finally, as Gardner puts it, 'phantasies are not *about things*';[37] their nature is one of idealisation in which the thought is inseparable from its object.

The view of phantasy as pre-propositional favours the possibility of a connection between the pre-propositional world of motivation and wish-fulfilment and that of propositional attitudes. Without such a connection some kind of unconscious agency may be posited which would generate the unacceptable idea of an unconscious agency distinct from conscious person-based agency.[38]

Phantasy as picture

Gardner suggested that the analogy for phantasy is that of pictorial representation, particularly in relation to the way the latter influences the spectator, with the proviso that a phantasy, unlike a painting, say, can influence our desires and beliefs.[39] The difference is that a painting is confronted in a context in which it can be seen to be a painting of X, so that we are not led to believe that X is before us. In the case of phantasy, it is a representation (what Gardner calls an Inner Picture) which is not demarcated from reality. As an unconscious 'picture' it would be allowed to influence a subject's propositional network, and in fact that is what phantasy has to explain – changes in beliefs and desires of the phantasising subject. This analogy produces the idea that phantasy, like pictorial representation, effects an influence on the subject through setting 'inner conditions for belief and desire of a kind isomorphic with those set by ordinary awareness of the world',[40] in the same way that a pictorial representation sets up conditions

which fit with the perceptual conditions for a viewer to believe that p follows from the perception that-p.[41]

But what is it that facilitates the impingement of phantasy on propositional attitudes? How are we to understand unconscious phantasy's ability to influence the network of beliefs and desires held in a propositional network of the subject? Gardner suggests two opposing views of this facilitation. First, phantasy simply imposes itself on our beliefs and desires, as it is insensitive to rational estimations. Hence it can generate beliefs and desires willy-nilly. It does not require a bridging belief or desire. Under the influence of phantasy on this account, I would not be aware of its effect. Second, phantasy can be understood as having a more difficult route into the propositional network, one in which it requires what Gardner calls the 'Omnipotence Belief', his rendering of Freud's notion of the omnipotence of thoughts. This belief operates to represent the self in a certain way which is pre-propositional and allows the self to distort its own representation so as to allow the phantasy to have its effect. This distortion will probably be phenomenological in kind. As Gardner puts it: 'the right formulation will be experienced as matching psychological reality in the right way.'[42] The omnipotence of thoughts, which Gardner has adapted for his own purposes, operates here to guarantee that the phantasy is taken to be the world.

Of course, phantasies have a spread of potencies, of strength. Some do nothing more than incline a person towards certain beliefs, desires and actions. Others take a grip in a way which we may describe as dominating and it is these kinds which we will be encountering in our discussion of film. Further down the line are the phantasies whose strength is such that they can be called compulsive as in the Rat Man who found himself beset by horrific thoughts and who, despite and against his most rationalist judgements, was forced to repeat irrational actions (moving the stone back and forth in the potential path of his fiancée's carriage). Reflection on one's actions in such circumstances is impotent before the compelling phantasy, and its effective determining of beliefs, wishes and actions known to be irrational, and not based in the subject's rational propositional network.

In searching for a reason for these strengths of phantasy, we must return to the idea of the bodily functions as needs which have no brook with other desires and beliefs but instead effect desires of great imperative as to their satisfaction, e.g. the need to excrete, urinate, drink, eat, and involuntary sexual arousal. Desires arising in this way become misrepresented as arising from bodily needs:

> Compulsion is…explained as a condition in which a desire's exaggerated force derives from its being unconsciously misrepresented as issuing from a current bodily need.[43]

We can turn now to the two most fundamental relations between phantasy and beliefs in terms of how the former achieves the latter. These two relations

involve, on the one hand, unconscious seeing-as in terms of external reality and, on the other, acting-out. In terms of our broader topic of film-making and film spectatorship, it is seeing-as which is to be of more interest.

Seeing-as

When phantasy makes its influence through seeing-as we are witnessing something like the early example found in children's play of taking x to be y and used by Melanie Klein as part of her therapeutic method where she used toys in her analysis of children. When something in the world (as opposed to something in our mind) is taken to stand in for something else, there must be some appropriateness about the object in order for it to act as a symbol. For example, a longish stick can be taken for a rifle whilst a short one might be rejected as inadequate. To take a round pebble as a rifle would seem not to fulfil any of the conditions, although a round pebble could stand in as a coin, or a cake and so forth. In Klein's classic case-study of Dick, something more demanding was asked of the child, that somehow he identified with one toy train, and that he should take another toy train to stand for his father. He was asked, in other words, to pretend. The implication for seeing-as in such cases is that Dick does not literally think the train is his father, but rather pretends that the train is his father. As in watching a dramatic performance we take the actor to be Hamlet whilst never confusing them as identical. If we did believe the actor was Hamlet, this would lead to beliefs, desires and perhaps actions incompatible with watching a play – we may intervene in the murder of a character, for instance.

The convergence of propositional beliefs and desires with phantasy through seeing-as allows the most sophisticated use by phantasy of conscious desires and beliefs in relation to the external world. In such a way, seemingly rational actions can be carried out at the behest, so to speak, of the governing phantasy. Thus 'propositional thought may "transmit" its sophistication to phantasy'.[44] Equally, and conversely, phantasy may transfer its cruder 'desire' to propositional thought. An intelligent agent can be seen in such cases to follow the cruder irrational demands of phantasy.

Gardner suggests that sublimation found very much at the centre of artistic activity is a form of seeing-as. But in sublimation there is the realisation that the thing in the outside world taken to be a symbol of something internal is understood as a symbol. Thus there is a merging of phantasy with reality that is not found in the other cases just described.

> The corrective belief constitutive of sublimation need not, of course, take an explicit form; it is implicitly present whenever the subject is aware that the symbolisation is . . . 'created by the ego' – whenever S is no longer 'felt to *be*' X, but instead 'felt to *represent*' X.[45]

The implication of the notion 'felt' in this quote underlines the fact that this is an experiential or phenomenological matter. That is, the subject does not acquire a belief in relation to S and X, but takes a different stance so to speak towards it, one in which agency is seen to be what establishes the connection between the two – a symbol and what it is. For Gardner, it is this aspect of the reality principle in artistic practice which describes sublimation in such practice. And 'when this attitude is well entrenched, it will prevent phantasy from becoming dominant'.[46]

Phantasy kinds: paranoid-schizoid and depressive

Klein posited what she called two positions in early infantile mental life. These two positions – the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive – describe particular qualities, structures and object-relations characteristic of each position. Klein believed that these two positions are fundamental to all mental life, not simply infantile and pathological but normal and adult. In fact, they are, in her terms, necessary for mental life. Our emotional and cognitive life is determined by them, although not at the expense of denying the importance of external reality itself. As we have seen in the above discussion of the nature of phantasy, the latter is always adaptive to reality and embedded in our experiences of the world, others and ourselves.

As we shall see in discussing Adrian Stokes' writings on art, Klein's two positions are crucial to his ideas of the carving and modelling in his early work. For Stokes, the two broad attitudes of carving and modelling and their later, more Kleinian formulations are basic to all art. Naturally, film should be included in the latter category. In the third part of this book I will explore through case-studies the understanding of film aesthetics in Kleinian terms.

The phantasy-governed duality of carving and modelling is all-encompassing which in many ways is constitutive of all mental life. They suggest that our relationships to the world and others can be understood within Klein's all-inclusive parameters. For the present, we need to examine the two positions themselves and link them into the discussion of phantasy in general.

While Klein provided a structural view of her two positions, they nevertheless have a chronology. The earliest infantile mental life was in the grip of the paranoid-schizoid phantasies, which were to be mitigated later in infancy (in the second half of the first year, by and large) by the depressive position's phantasies. In many ways, they can be loosely understood as representing articulations of Freud's division of early infantile mental life as being governed, in turn, primarily by the pleasure principle and subsequently by the reality principle. But as Freud also noted, the pleasure principle is not vanquished by the reality principle but simply moderated by it. In other words, using the conceptual understanding adumbrated above, the propositional

attitude network to a large extent is established in the depressive position as beliefs and desires are consciously aimed at the world itself and influenced in turn by the latter.

On the other hand, in the paranoid-schizoid phase, the infant experiences unconsciously in terms of objects – represented to a large degree in sensations with their concomitant concepts of a raw and primitive kind (kinds we may want to assign, for instance, to certain animals like dogs, cats, monkeys, etc.). What is lacking initially is a means of individuating objects and reidentifying them. In other words, the infant has no grasp that a particular object is the same object when it reappears in its world. This is the result of lack of individuation, for there is a sense in which individuation and identity are of a piece, although conceptually distinct. To individuate something as a particular thing demands that we have a concept (however basic) of that thing, which in turn allows us possibly to identify it at a later point in time. As an aside it is in this sense that phantasy comes to bear some of the responsibility once assigned to the imagination of bridging perceptions and sensations and judgement and understanding.[47]

For the infant in these early weeks and months, objects (often the same ones) are experienced as separate and different. So the same object is taken at different times to be different objects – the object which at times provides pleasure and at other times frustration is experienced as separate objects. Hence the same 'breast' is both the good object and the bad object, with no understanding on the infant's part that it *is* the same breast. The source of pleasure and of frustration is never understood to be the same 'thing'. In this way the paranoid-schizoid distorts reality, affording no real grasp of it; everything is shifting and unfocused. The unconscious representations of good and bad are exclusive and antagonistic to one another, involving emotions of extreme force and driven apart by the precarious beginnings of the infant's hold on the difference between the self and others. For the good object, there is an incorporative phantasy of taking in the good object, and for the bad object a phantasy of expulsion, of throwing out the object. These structuring operations are lodged in the instinctual behaviour of fending off pain, struggling away from discomfort, becoming fretful at frustration. And because there is no re-identification of objects in mental representations, mental life has the quality of being in pieces, what Gardner calls 'episodic'. It is this position which dominates the modelling mode in art.

With a grasp of re-identifiable objects, the infant can begin to experience the same object as being both bad and good. Thus an ambivalence towards objects is produced, dominated by fears that the good will be destroyed by the aggression towards the same object. In order to deliver itself from this ambivalence, the infant adopts a splitting tactic by which the two representations of the object are kept apart to secure the intactness of the good object. With the true onset of the depressive position, the infant can re-identify objects enough to establish a connection with reality and the beginnings of

propositional attitudes answerable to and serving desires and beliefs involving practical reasoning in relation to the world. In this way, the good object is secured as an internalised object in phantasy. The episodic nature of the paranoid-schizoid position is also less dominant as a wholeness takes hold in conscious and unconscious mental life. The aggresssive phantasies associated with the most fundamental emotion – envy – are subdued by the emergence of gratitude, guilt and its concomitant activity, reparation.[48] The depressive position is characterised by the establishment and growth of the reality principle, and the propositional attitudinal network. It is this position which influences the carving mode in art. The paranoid-schizoid's *diktat* of pleasure (and its negation or frustration) does not vanish but becomes more formed by the demands of reality and practical reasoning of the infant.

Phantasy and the emotions

Finally, the nature and function of the emotions must be examined in the light of phantasy. It is also important in what is essentially an argument about aesthetic experience that the emotional aspects of the latter should receive some consideration. It is an important characteristic of the encounter with art that we should have feelings that are decidedly intrinsic to our experience of art as an aesthetic one. That such feelings are part of our commonplace lives would suggest that they would be explained at least in part by a general understanding of the emotions.

A central quality of having an emotion is that there is feeling which more often than not overtakes us. We find ourselves moved by something. Despite ourselves, we become angry, and these occurrences are often characterised by a feeling with physical and behavioural properties – we redden with anger; we turn pale with fear; we tremble with rage; we hang our heads in shame to avoid catching the other's eye. It is this involuntary phenomenological quality of emotion which counters any rationalist account determined strictly by beliefs and desires. Of course, on Klein's account certain emotions seem to be primitive, almost intrinsic to being a conscious human being. They do not seem to rest on propositional attitudes – beliefs and desires instrumentally conjoined in intentions – at least in any full-fledged sense; nor do they seem to be acquired through convention or social interaction and learning. The one posited by Klein and by others as of a fundamental nature is envy. And it is envy that Klein gives centre place in her theory of infantile mental life and development.

But to return to the emotions. One of the most fascinating accounts, not least for its antipathy to a Freudian rendering, is Jean-Paul Sartre's in *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions*.[49] Sartre is keen to make the phenomenology of the emotions central to how we understand them. For him, the emotions are a means of resolving certain kinds of problems. Faced with an awful face at the window in the dead of night, we take flight from it in fear. We do this

not by literally fleeing as reason would dictate, but by annihilating our consciousness which contains the object feared. Fear is thus like an action which is not carried out but mentally achieved as if this sufficed to remove the danger. Sartre calls this a 'magical' act and Gardner suggests, rightly, that it is a mechanism reminiscent of Freud's omnipotence of thought.[50]

Linking phantasy to the emotions is clearly asserted by Klein, who claims that a basic emotional state such as envy is at the root of much mental life itself. Spinoza places envy at the centre of his account of the emotions. Envy's primitiveness lies in its relationship to desire itself. For the desire for x is always one which may not be fulfilled, for reasons of scarcity, say, and thus the sight of another who has x can mean that we desire an other's x. This is a *constitutional* form of envy. It is a short remove to hate an other for having what we desire. McGinn discusses such issues in his book *Ethics*, *Evil*, *and Fiction*. Although he refuses to assert any particular *kind* of cause (psychological, environmental, genetic) for the primitiveness of envy, nevertheless he acknowledges its simple and rational form as being endemic to rational beings.[51] As Gardner states:

> Envy is a fundamental emotion-kind because it is so intimately connected with the *very phenomenon* of desire; the situation of one who desires is *ex hypothesi* a situation in which goodness is as yet unpossessed and hence recognized as external to the ego. Consequently, it is a situation which stands on the threshold of envy. Envy is a fundamental emotion-kind because it is immanent in desire.[52]

In some ways this is a philosophical response to the crucial role of envy in Klein's psychoanalytical theories. The primitive phantasy of the ever-bountiful breast, an endless source of nourishment and pleasure for the infant, which, with its inevitable frustration in reality, creates a response of envy and destructive aims at the beneficent object. For Klein, 'one of the deepest sources of guilt is always linked with the envy of the feeding breast, and with the feeling of having spoilt its goodness by envious attacks'.[53] Envy is Klein's rendering of Freud's death instinct. Envy is directly and primitively expressive of Thanatos. As such, human mental life, as we understand it, is forever at the least tinged with envy. Emotional and moral life is founded on the envious response to the loss of the early and overwhelming ecstasy of the good part-object, to the extent that this intense pleasure can be only an intermittent one.[54]

In relation to film, this view of phantasy entails a mental category which is not simply subject-based, but has its own structures and forms. The latter pervade conscious as well as unconscious life. Stokes' use of Klein can be seen as leading to his stress on form or the formal aspects of art, for phantasies are not simply expressed in an artwork's subject matter but also and most powerfully in its very form. And these phantasies are located in what Freud

called a 'mental constellation' more identified with the ego than with the id. At the same time, the distinction between form and content becomes a precarious one, for form too is expressive of phantasy and the separation of a shape from its figure, say, is rather one of attitude than of any objective properties.[55]

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Part II

Adrian Stokes: Carving and Modelling

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4
Stokes: The Carving and Modelling Modes

Melanie Klein's ideas are at the centre of Stokes' view of art. Her two psychical positions of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive, and her major contributions to psychoanalytical theory and practice, came more and more to underpin Adrian Stokes' theory of art. This chapter discusses in broad terms Stokes' ideas as they developed from his early writings of the 1930s which were centred on Italian Renaissance architecture and sculpture, painting and ballet and were dominated by his unique rendering of the distinction between carving and modelling, to the post-World War II 'Kleinian' books. In the latter this distinction gives way to another duality, the idea of the visual arts comprising integral, self-standing autonomous objects – other to the spectator – which at the same time exercise an 'invitation' to the spectator, an identificatory drawing in. In other words, the carving and modelling modes came to be more associated, respectively, with Klein's fundamental psychical positions of the depressive and paranoid-schizoid modes in which whole-object and part-object mental formations establish complex relationships. In order to develop my argument about film, it is necessary to discuss Stokes' ideas in their context.[1]

Analysed by Klein throughout most of the 1930s and already familiar with Freud's writing in the early 1920s, Stokes established a distinction between carving and modelling which originated in a technological division found in sculpture. Transformed into an aesthetic, he came to apply it to painting, sculpture and architecture and the quite different artform of ballet.

Stokes and modernist carving

Stokes first gave expression to his idea of the carving attitude in art in his two volumes of the 1930s, *The Quattro Cento* and *Stones of Rimini*. Both volumes are classics of a particular kind of art history and aesthetics, standing firmly in the English Romantic aesthetic tradition of John Ruskin and Walter Pater.[2] His writing style, at least in his early works, owes much to both men, but also to the modernism of the American poet Ezra Pound. His *Stones of*

Rimini is a rejoinder to Ruskin's classic *Stones of Venice*. Eccentric in their style, poetic in their approach and embedded in the autobiographical, both of Stokes' books remain two of the richest, if also the most dogmatic, accounts of the Mediterranean of the Early Renaissance as the locale *par excellence* of the carving tradition.

Stokes was born in London in 1902. He attended Rugby school from 1916 to 1919 and in the following three years studied Philosophy, Politics and Economics at the University of Oxford. There he encountered Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* and *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* but did not study Freud seriously until the late 1920s at about the same time that he was introduced to the leading English psychoanalyst Ernest Jones. In 1930, after a period of depression, Stokes began seven-years' analysis with Melanie Klein. He first visited Italy in 1921 and during the 1920s returned often sometimes in the company of Osbert Sitwell, nurturing and consolidating his love of visual art. Thus, as a very young man, Stokes was at the centre of a curious strand of English modernism – the Sitwellian one. The Sitwells' work and patronage of such literary figures as T.S. Eliot represented an approach to the rise of modernism in England exemplified by Sergei Diaghilev's Ballet Russe, Jean Cocteau, Gertrude Stein and others. Coming after the heyday of Bloomsbury, the Sitwell clique dissociated themselves from the latter by their more purely aesthetic stand compared to Bloomsbury's more socially 'responsible' and politically-inclined aesthetic. The Bloomsbury Group importantly coalesced literary and visual art practitioners in the work of Vanessa Bell, Roger Fry, Duncan Grant as opposed to the Sitwells' largely literary coterie, although Sacheverell Sitwell was fascinated by and wrote on European architecture. The discrepancy between the two groups' reputations is to some degree the result of the overwhelming status of Virginia Woolf as a writer and the collapse of Edith Sitwell's reputation as a poet.

During one of the visits to Italy, to Rapallo in 1926, Stokes befriended Pound, who shared Stokes' love of the sculptural and architectural marvels of the Tempio Malatestiano. But their friendship did not survive the 1920s. Pound's ongoing work on the *Cantos* at the time involved approaches not unlike Stokes' ideas on the distinction between the carving and modelling traditions of Renaissance Italy, but there were profound differences too. Stokes had read Pound's poetry and sympathised with Pound's love of carving. After all, when Pound was supporting the sculptor Henri Gaudier-Brzeska before his death in the trenches in 1915, Stokes was only a young boy. It was, as we shall see, during these years that sculpture adopted its modernist aesthetic by way of carving.

Carving and modelling remain a technical distinction in sculpture. Nevertheless, in the early decades of the twentieth century, in Britain and elsewhere, the burgeoning modernist movement in sculpture, which we will discuss in more detail later, had this distinction at its very core, in its aesthetic and its rhetoric. A technical distinction was the means by which

many of the young modernist sculptors asserted their new forms, skills, ideas and even ethics in their commitment to carving against the modelling tradition embodied by Auguste Rodin.[3] Barbara Hepworth, for example, began carving in stone in the mid-1920s.[4] As Charles Harrison remarks:

> In Paris, shortly before the war, the highly reductive carved sculpture of Constantin Brancusi had presented a decisive challenge to the pre-eminence, as exemplar of modern sculpture, of the modelled work of Auguste Rodin. By the end of the first war carving was well established as the modernist practice in sculpture.[5]

Carving involves the use of cutting and shaping instruments on a material, usually stone and wood, although it can include other materials such as bone and, of course, marble. Modelling involves (typically) the making of a maquette from which a mould is made into which molten metal (bronze is the traditional modelling material) is poured to form, when hardened, the sculpture. Of course, carved sculpture existed during the dominant modelling period, but carved sculpture until the turn of the century was primarily produced by artisans using the long-established pointing method, by which the finest calibrations could be taken from the sculptor's model to carve the shape from the block. So it was not so much that carving *per se* had literally fallen from the hands of sculptors, but rather that direct carving by the sculptor was rare and had become a skill performed by anonymous, largely Italian, craftsmen (this remains the case today). In fact, many ambitious sculptors would exhibit plaster casts hoping to attract finance from a patron so that the piece could be cast in bronze or carved in marble, usually on a larger scale.[6] Tucker perceives in the distinctive work of Rodin and Constantine Brancusi, something of Stokes' own perceptions:

> Whereas modelling in Rodin's hands, however intimate the subject-matter, had become public, aggressive, extravert and generalized, Brancusi realized carving as the opposite mode: private, individual, separate, concentrated and quiet.[7]

Tucker associates the aggressive and the more subdued aspects of Rodin and Brancusi's work respectively to Stokesian-like positions. The two methods are quite distinct and the skills involved quite different. Put simply, for Stokes 'carving is a cutting away, while modelling or moulding is a building up'.[8] This schematically expressed distinction was fundamental for Stokes in his pre-war writings as it made a claim, albeit an ancient one, for the different kinds of activity involved in the two sculptural practices. He remarks:

> Whatever its plastic value, a figure carved in stone is fine carving when one feels that not the figure, but the stone through the medium of the

figure, has come to life. Plastic conception, on the other hand, is uppermost when the material with which, or from which, a figure has been made appears no more than as so much suitable stuff for this creation.[9]

Most importantly, he felt that this distinction was the 'most suggestive in relation to all visual art'.[10] The reaction to Rodin and nineteenth-century Romantic sculpture was extreme. The representational aspects of Rodin's work were at odds with the properties of modernist work, whose appeal, according to Fry, was 'essentially permanent and universal'.[11] It was Fry who had opened Henry Moore's eyes to carving.[12] In other words, formal values came to the fore so that the particularity of traditional representation was an anathema to what was understood as the true aims of sculpture. This was a rather narrow view of Rodin's innovations in his handling of the clay and in a more modernist vein in his use of 'accidents', in later work especially.[13] Besides much of the early British modernist sculptural work was not abstract but figurative (mainly animals among the carvers).[14] However, it did not stress the emotive gesture, the purely pictorial and graphic qualities that nineteenth-century sculpture had done, nor did it allow that meaning resided in anything other than formal properties – the cube, sphere, cylinder, etc.

If so-called primitive art became the main source of inspiration and the clearest standard of achievement for the early modernist sculptors, it was Michelangelo in the European tradition who had famously endowed the highest status on carving through his work and also in his Platonist-derived idea of the figure already existing in the block of stone or marble and awaiting release by the artist's chisel. Equally, Michelangelo believed that carving involved 'greater judgement and difficulty, obstacles and toil', whereas he thought modelling belonged essentially to the realm of painting.[15] This ethical notion of carving as toil is also found in Moore and Gaudier-Brzeska. Stokes, referring to Michelangelo's sonnet with its famous lines on sculpture, claims that they 'reveal the conviction that the sculptor projects no absolute form: his skill and imagination are needed to uncover something of the myriad forms the stone contains'.[16] Of course, this sort of neo-Platonism was prevalent during the Renaissance and the metaphysical implication of Michelangelo's lines are either false or trivially true. Nevertheless, for those of a modernist persuasion, the Platonic view did give status and a function to the stone which was not lost on them. If the form was in the stone in some sense, then it meant that some kind of qualities in the finished piece were integral to the properties of the stone itself. The stone was therefore not simply a medium for an idea but was a materiality which dictated kinds of form (which is not to say that such forms were always achievable, for like Platonic kinds of knowledge, they most definitely were not). The impetus here was the rejection of overwhelming representationality in the material – no absolute form – so that the stone retained its qualities as stone, especially in terms of an attack on its surface for representational ends.

These ideas, which suggest a particular relationship between artist and material, were also important to the English modernist school. For example, the notion of what the art critic Reginald Wilenski calls 'collaboration' between sculptor and the substance upon which he worked set it apart from modelling. The fact that the artist actually carved was also defining of sculpture, distinguishing it from the kind of carving done by an artisan from a clay model using the 'pointing' method, described above. In an often quoted sentence which captures the heroic ethos of the new sculpture, Gaudier-Brzeska asserts: '[T]he sculpture I admire is the work of master craftsmen. Every inch of the surface is won at the point of the chisel – every stroke of the hammer is a physical and mental effort. No more arbitrary translations of a design in any material.'[17]

Gaudier-Brzeska is saying no more than the sculptor Eric Gill in an essay dated 1918 in which he remarked:

> I shall assume that the word sculpture is the name given to that craft and art by which things are cut out of a solid material, whether in relief or in the round. I shall not use the word as applying to the art and craft of modelling.[18]

The battle-lines had been drawn. In some ways Stokes was to become a theorist of this movement, exploring the relationship between carving, aesthetics, psychology and culture itself, although after the first wave of modernists like Jacob Epstein, Gill and Gaudier-Brzeska. Stokes' own allegiance was to a younger generation – Henry Moore, Ben Nicholson and Barbara Hepworth, who were active in the late 1920s and 1930s.[19] Nevertheless, within this context Stokes' celebration of the carving tradition and his own provision of a theory of psychology and eventually an aesthetic of such a practice become comprehensible. It places him firmly within the early modernist movement in English art and hooks his concerns to those of other artists, critics and sympathisers like Ezra Pound and T. E. Hulme. In other words, Stokes is working under a variant of early modernism's rallying cry 'truth to the materials' and therefore he is to be understood as being part of a larger movement which was modernist in spirit and included Pound, Moore, Gaudier-Brzeska and Brancusi. It was also profoundly humanist in its moral attitude to the practice of sculpture.

This rearticulation of the carving mode was also a realignment of the history of sculpture and its related arts, especially architecture. It was the focal point of an embracing of so-called primitive art, what Gaudier-Brzeska called 'the tradition of the barbaric peoples of the earth'.[20] It was an art that shunned the stifling influence of rational classicism of the Greeks, what Wilenski called the 'Greek prejudice', in other words, what Gaudier-Brzeska perceived as the enemy in his manifesto which appeared in the journal *Blast* in June 1914.

The other main critic for the carving tendency in English sculpture and also a supporter of Epstein and Gaudier-Brzeska was Hulme, who vied with Fry as the spokesman of the English modernists. Hulme espoused an aesthetic which favoured the geometrical over the naturalist and humanist in art. Ideas in Gaudier-Brzeska and Pound were shared by Hulme. For example, Hulme celebrated 'arts like Egyptian, Indian and Byzantine, where everything tends to be angular, where curves tend to be hard and geometrical'.[21] Hulme's support of Gaudier-Brzeska, like Pound's, was part of a broad view which, in Hulme's case, made a distinction between geometrical art and vital art, between empathy for nature (in naturalist and realist art) and a separation from nature, between states of flux and states of permanence.[22]

Quattro Cento

Richard Wollheim has isolated a series of characteristics embedded in Stokes' *The Quattro Cento* by which carving is to be individuated, namely, 'the love of stone', the emblematic, mass, immediacy and perspective. Stokes was keen to separate his concept of the *quattro cento* from the conventional art history period of the *quattrocento*, which was purely a dating notion. He intended its use as a concept within art itself, one that embodied fundamental attitudes which were to be understood essentially as nonchronological. It was to apply to art in general and to art practices and processes from different historical periods. Nevertheless, he felt that this conception of art had found its most exuberant and successful expression in the Italian Renaissance of the fifteenth century, an account of which takes up most of his book.

In his idea of a love of the stone, found in such architectural examples as the courtyard at the palace of Urbino or Giorgio's Palazzo del Commune in Jesi, Stokes invokes ideas and a vocabulary resonant with Freudian associations and mechanisms, although freed enough from their source to suggest something broader:

> I write of the South in contrast to the North and East thus brought together; not the South of the eruptive noon-day which has relation to North and East, but the South in which life is outward, spread in space. This southern stone is neither barren nor volcanic, but the repository for humanistic fantasies, particularly those symbolizing southern compulsion to throw life outward, to objectify. In the great period of the fifteenth century, Renaissance sculptors made stone to bloom.[23]

In its astonishing opening chapter, entitled 'Jesi', Stokes announces, 'I write of stone'. Wollheim has pointed out that this love resides in a compliance

between the artist and the medium where the former projects phantasies onto a medium itself expressive of certain kinds of phantasy. It is in the working over of the material by the artist that the stone's 'phantasies' are released in what he describes as a 'bloom' or 'encrustation' or 'exuberance'. Interestingly, for Stokes, this encrustation is also visible in non-artefacts, for instance in the stone's reaction to water, sun and natural wear as found quintessentially in Venice's dominant feature of stone and wood meeting water.

Stone-carving gains artistic expressiveness not by a wayward indiscriminate simple form which attacks the surface (as Stokes thought happened to some degree in highly naturalistic Florentine marble carving) but through an amicable relationship between carver and stone where the latter is respected for its intrinsic qualities which are retained as far as possible against the demands of representation.

Stokes states that '[F]ew Northerners and few Orientals love stone' for reasons associated with climate and type of stone. But revealingly the distinction between modelling and carving is not simply one of technique. Stokes conceded that bronze could equally reveal carving emotions:

> bronze can well convey an emotion primarily imputed to the stone, while, on the other hand, stone can be carved, as it was by Lombard sculptors, to perpetuate a conception not only founded upon the model but inspired by modelling technique.[24]

So carving is a kind of *value* which has formal properties that can range over other materials; in this case bronze, the ultimate modelling material. Stokes recognised that the Mediterranean light contributed to the effect. At this point we have to bring in his second book *Stones of Rimini*, which concentrated on stone itself and particularly the marble low or bas-reliefs of Agostino di Duccio in the Tempio Malatestiana. It also brought to the surface the concept of carving in its most sophisticated form.

Mediterranean light is of fundamental importance to carving values and stone. Stokes' own comments on this use of light related to the way in which objects were articulated in light. The separateness of the object in light was a value Stokes wished to preserve for sculpture (and later painting). In early modernist carved sculpture it was the stress on the materiality and the formal qualities of the materials which expressed this idea. More particularly when working with stone it was the light reflected from the stone which gave it in part an aesthetic strength. On its own such a view is strictly aesthetic but connected, as it was, to a Kleinian view of phantasy and its objects, it was also a form of explanation as to why such a feeling or experience of sculpture was to be valued and, more ambitiously, why it occupied the centre of aesthetic experience in general.

What is important here is the relationship between love and separateness. What Stokes describes as love of the stone is in fact dependent upon the sculptor (and in the final analysis the viewer too) working on the stone as that particular stone where its essential qualities (and accidental ones at times) *qua* stone are considered in creating what he called the 'image in form'. Stokes asserted that the artist's self, as he called it, does come to reside in the stone in so far as the artist has objectified certain internal aspects of himself or herself but

> the artist has identified an aspect of himself with the object, has transfixed the object with his own compulsion, though not to the extent of utterly overpowering its otherness.[25]

This statement expresses Stokes' division of carving and modelling in terms of the nature of the phantasies governing their production in which projection's identification is secured and not the overpowering modelling value in which the art object is swamped by the self's projections.

Wholeness in sculpture was personified by the *quattrocento* relief sculptures of Agostino:

> Stone is solid, extensive and compact, yet reflects light pre-eminently. The process of living is an externalization, a turning outward into definite form of inner ferment. Hence the mirror to living which art is, hence the significance of art, and especially as the crown to other and preliminary arts, of the truly visual arts in which time is transposed into the forms of space as something instant and revealed. Hence positive significance to man (as opposed to use) of stone, and of stone-building.[26]

This otherness was intimately connected with what Stokes called mass and mass-effect, the latter an elusive term but one we have met in Gaudier-Brzeska. Mass-effect is the result in part of the immediacy of the art object to the eye, where the object is 'dissociated . . . from past, present and future. Things stand expressed, exposed, unaltered in the light, in space'.[27] It is the opposite of the dramatic and its temporality. In other words, it seems to describe the very presentness of the art object. Architecture was the supreme embodiment of this quality for Stokes (the term in this form does not survive the early period):

> Neither Luciano's courtyard nor Piero's paintings are in any sense dramatic. The finality revealed is too great in Piero's pictures for any such word, the finality revealed even when, like Ucello, he represents a battle in progress.[28]

This finality brings the different qualities together – light, love, otherness, mass-effect and finally, the emblematic. This notion of the emblematic is one we find in Pound's writings in the Imagist movement:

> An 'Image' is that which presents an intellectual and emotional complex in an instant of time.[29]

The emblematic is also fundamental to Stokes and he struggles to express it in his discussion of mass-effect in *The Quattro Cento*. Temporality is what introduces the dramatic, the narrative, however minimal, of an unfolding governed by the properties of time as opposed to space. Stokes is aware of the difficulty of articulating the view that in the best art of the *quattrocento*, as he describes it, space governs for 'mass reveals an entirety, reveals space'. Luciano's courtyard is exemplary of this idea whereby there is 'not so much the detachment of spatial values, but a supreme translation of the successive into spatial effects'.

In his discussion of Brancusi, Pound relates mass to an appreciation of the 'stone as stone':

> It is also conceivably more difficult to give...formal satisfaction by a single-mass, or let us say to sustain the formal-interest by a single mass, than to excite transient visual interests by more monumental and melodramatic combinations.[30]

In Brancusi's case the object was a small, ovoid sculpture. But the same effect is possible with representational art if the emblematic governs.

For film we have to turn to Stokes' ideas on another art which embraces temporal form: dance. The emblematic appears in Stokes' writing on ballet during this period. Ballet is of interest because it shares some of the features with film. At the end of the section on mass-effect, he sets out the extremes of art itself. At one end is the purely spatial, architecture; and at the other, dance:

> To turn subject into object palpable as death the perfect object, to turn time into space without eradicating time as does the incident of death, to show living under the form of the complete, the manifested, was the highest exploit; since it was the final expression of the universal aim, strongest in that time, to show, to objectify; in other words, it alone entirely reflects the process of living carried to conclusion, of object charged with subject. It is an expression as vital as the dance to which it is the opposite, the complement and the end. All the rest of art lies between.[31]

The emblematic is quite clearly part of this idea of mass-effect as it is of dance and other theatrical forms of art. Fascinatingly, Stokes in *To-Night the Ballet* discusses film in relation to the ballet:

> Mickey Mouse, like Charlie Chaplin, like the Harlequin, like the ballet dancer, like marionettes, like the pre-Wagnerian opera singers, like the Clown, is a mask, a figure, an emblem. Nothing escapes.[32]

The place of the emblem is guaranteed by the fact that it is a mask, it is artificial. For Stokes, Walt Disney's Mickey Mouse and the silent films of Charlie Chaplin are more expressive than the 'realistic and expressionistic film' of the period.[33] In all these cases, mime, bodily expression are paramount. Motive is visibly acted upon and is readable on the surface of things – in the harlequin, Mickey Mouse, marionettes – and the contortions of fit between inner life and character or decor are eschewed.

The modelling tradition

The modelling tradition was eclipsed by carving earlier in the twentieth century at the beginnings of modernism. As we have seen, Brancusi, Gaudier-Brzeska, Moore, Gill and Epstein were all defenders of carving, although this can be overstated. Brancusi, for example, still modelled and did not hold to hard-and-fast rules about its use. Nevertheless, he did seem to give carving and polishing some kind of status in tune with his Platonist ideas. Famously, Epstein also returned to modelling.

Modelling was treated negatively by Stokes in the pre-war period. Sometimes he was indifferent to it, at others aggressively critical and yet again could be willing to concede its virtues. No doubt as he released himself from a traditional and technical distinction between the two modes and established a more conceptual one he seemed less critical, although it was not until the late 1940s that he rehabilitated the modelling tradition and mode in the guise of a Kleinian appropriation of the death instinct, Thanatos, in art later to become the 'invitation in art'. This chapter will look at his ideas on modelling as they are found mainly in *Stones of Rimini* and *The Quattro Cento*.

Modelling, when it involves casting, is a more technologically-based skill in sculpture. Like carving, however, the methods developed in Ancient Greece (and in other distinct cultures) remain the same today. For example, the lost wax method and sand method were both used by the Greeks and are still used today.[34]

In *The Quattro Cento* Stokes treats modelling ambiguously. Primarily, he has a technical notion of it although he is also developing the idea that it is an attitude towards the materials. In this way he is beginning to make the break between a technical concept and a conceptual one, which he explores fully in *The Stones of Rimini*.

Stokes is also emphatic at times in his judgement that *quattro cento* art is not necessarily the best art of the period although he believes it embodies the supreme virtues which he attempts to set out in *The Quattro Cento*. The definition of *quattro cento*, not fully achieved in the book, needs the kind of conceptual distinction he is struggling for between carving and modelling. At one point he states:

> The distinction I am making is laborious. I might have simplified it into a distinction between carving and modelling, between the use of stone and of bronze, were it not for the fact that the bronze can well convey an emotion primarily imputed to the stone, while, on the other hand, stone can be carved, as it was by Lombard sculptors, to perpetuate a conception not only founded upon the model but inspired by modelling technique.[35]

In many ways modelling is negatively articulated by Stokes. It is that which does not share the values and techniques of carving. Or, as he also suggests, it shares the opposing characteristics of those of stone carving. In modelling, plastic values rule. In other words, the figure and form take precedence over the material, so that the latter simply becomes 'suitable stuff' for the former. In carving, shape and form are achieved through a sculptor's relationship with the stone such that for Stokes the stone block relates in projected phantasy as a mother to her children. Form and figure are the children of the mother stone. Plasticity is always involved in sculpture as far as it has form and is figurative. But for Stokes, it is in the way in which the stone reveals form and figure that carving values are achieved.

Importantly, it is through the intrinsic property of emanating light in stone that carving achieves its ends. Stone's light is not the reflective light of bronze which has a brilliant almost illusory effect, a light destroying the very surface of the modelled material. Stone light is translucently luminous and suffusive, akin to the light reflected by skin and blood. In true carving, typified by Agostino's low reliefs, shape and form are fully achieved through the most flattened surface. A fully rounded angelic cheek is the effect of the lightest cutting into a slightly curved surface. Thus the stone's surface retains its integrity *qua* stone and in combination with the plastic marks, carving values are instantiated.

There is here the strong echo of Pater's approach to *quattrocento* Renaissance sculpture found in his essay 'Luca Della Robbia' where he notes of Tuscan sculptors:

> They are haters of all heaviness and emphasis, of strongly-opposed light and shade, and seek their means of delineation among those last refinements of shadow, which are almost invisible except in a stronglight, and which the finest pencil can hardly follow.[36]

The final lines of this quote could easily describe the Malatesta low reliefs of Agostino. Pater perceived sculpture as being characterised by particular features which are partly formal and partly associative. The best of sculpture is always struggling against 'its stiffness, its heaviness, and death'. Pater's attack seems to be on naturalism or realism in sculpture with its associations with the expired body now rigid in its form and materiality – stone.

Here Pater reveals his inability to shake off his deeply felt feelings before much sculpture and his willingness to explore the implications of this feeling. Much of Stokes resides in this brief essay. The Greeks, according to Pater by way of Johann Winckelmann, resolved this 'limitation' by abstraction understood as the ability to render the particular universal. They refused realism which makes sculpture 'look like a frozen thing' and instead expressed 'only what is structural and permanent, to purge from the individual all that belongs only to him'. Pater articulates the danger of sculpture as being 'pure form' which for him was always characterised by 'hardness and unspirituality'.

Stokes reiterates such a view in *The Quattro Cento* when he speaks of death as being 'the name for complete objectivization':

> the subject to be converted is eliminated. Timeless-ness is complete. Detached thought is near death, is death's instrument, turning life to stone.[37]

This deathliness is to be turned to positive and life-giving effect in art for Stokes. It must be death that is transformed into life by stone for both 'are needed for untrammelled living'. For Pater, Michelangelo represents an achievement surpassing the Greeks in so far as he brought individual expression to his art. But Pater, again as a precursor of Stokes, speaks of Michelangelo as someone involved in work which, if it did not 'bring what was inward to the surface . . . was not worth doing at all'. The ambiguity here rests interestingly with 'inward' and 'surface' for we cannot immediately assume that he is speaking of the emotions but perhaps means to incorporate the idea of the inwardness of the stone and its surface. Luca falls between the classical Greek sculptors and Michelangelo in that he takes 'select elements only of pure form' and his art is:

> an intense and individual expression by a system of conventionalism as skillful and subtle as that of the Greeks, repressing all such curves as indicate solid form, and throwing the whole into low relief.[38]

Beneath the surface of this text is the notion of the emblematic so central to Stokes' early writings on architecture and sculpture – the idea, in other words, of conventional signs and systems being used for expressive purposes but where the accent is formal so that the denial of strong 'curves' leads to the high status given to the surface plane of the stone.

Wollheim has rightly pointed out that in *The Quattro Cento* Stokes is unclear about how the qualities he associates with carving, or more precisely *quattrocento* art, are to be picked out in any particular case.[39] Stokes moves from descriptions and judgements that are his own *qua* spectator to ones he ascribes to the artist and, at times, to the culture of the Italian Renaissance. This is a matter of unifying the characteristics in such a way as to be able to identify a particular example of *quattrocento* art, applying the appropriate

criteria. In many ways this is to misunderstand Stokes' book, or at least to take it for what it is not. *The Quattro Cento* remains one of the great books of the twentieth century in its writing, its insights and its picture of a young man in love with his subject-matter. It is a book that is saturated in enthusiasm and joy. The text is a poetic declamation of a particular aesthetic in the loosest sense of that word and in its style is an exhilarating mix of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries – Pater and Pound, for example, are strong influences, but not enough to eclipse the most distinctive writing of Stokes.

In this period Stokes treated modelling as a process which was necessarily grounded in pictorial and temporal rhythmic values. The fact that modelling in many ways stressed the physical process of the *imaginative* treatment of suitable materials set it against carving with its confrontation with the stone (or wood) itself and the idea that the image is in the stone and not something manufactured, however brilliantly, by the artist. As we have noted, Stokes' position was at one with the general prejudice of the modernists.[40] Stokes states:

> That which you model in sculpture is as much a material as the stone to be carved. But the plastic material has no 'rights' of its own. It is a formless mud used, very likely to make a model for bronze or brass.[41]

To this extent modelling is a freer activity for Stokes but only in so far as it is 'unrestricted by so deep an imaginative communion with the significance of the material itself'.[42] Freedom here is that of the overwhelming projection of phantasy in representation onto the medium. The artist's compulsion is too strong and attacking. Reality – here, the stone – is subjected to an almost annihilating attack by phantasy-projections.

The modeller realises a design with the materials whereas the carver imagines the shape within the stone, the material itself. This Platonic conception is no different at this point from Michelangelo's and is still used in discussing the distinction in question. Thus for Stokes the most imaginative and subjective aspects of the graphic and calligraphic arts are closely associated with modelling. Painting, on the other hand, is to be associated with carving, particularly when it 'illuminates a certain space' or when the 'use of pigment' is grounded in an 'architectural conception of planes', e.g. Piero della Francesca and Paul Cézanne. Modelling at its best is like a wonderful handwriting; it betrays the personality of the writer almost necessarily by its very nature. This supports Stokes' list of non-individualistic popular artforms – marionettes, film cartoons – in which broader cultural values dominate over the narrow, individual compulsions. For this reason, the plastic sculpture of modelling is essentially a rhythmic one dictated by the proclivity of the mental – what Stokes calls the 'mental pulse'. It is in the Baroque that such a quality reigns:

> A Baroque church, a Baroque painting, a Baroque sculpture, each of them possesses the verve of experienced and rapid handwriting.[43]

This opposes the spatiality of carving:

> Carving conception . . . causes its object, the solid bit of space, to be more spatial still. Temporal significance instead of being incorporated in space is here turned into space and thus shown in immediate form, deprived of rhythm[44]

The spatial in modelling is when it is conceived musically as a rhythm so that different elements of the spatial sequence are related through some differing order within it. Materiality is ignored for the expressive conjunction of elements so that there is almost a narrativisation of the image. So plastic objects for Stokes 'betray a tempo'. In these passages in *The Stones of Rimini* he quite clearly attributes qualities to modelling which are derogatory, although he is quick to point out that both conceptions coexist in some degree or other without fully revealing how. In fact, it is the existence of a strong modelling inclination in fifteenth-century Renaissance art that produced, in part, the supreme examples of carving in what he calls *quattrocento* art. The pressure of naturalism in Renaissance art also affected the carving tradition. It was the attempt to incorporate the figure into the work on the stone that produced some of the great carving work, especially in the low reliefs.

The spatial in modelling is connected with perspective. Just as Stokes sees the latter property as being central to carving so it is with modelling in so far as there it is such that the elements constituting the perspectival space are connected through devices which makes the space rhythmic. What does Stokes mean by this? Often he means the use of a device like overlapping figures used to produce the illusion of space. Here the fragmentation and connection between parts for overlapping means foreground figures or objects occluding midground and background ones to give the illusion of depth.

The intricacies of pictorial space related to the plane surface are formidable in relief sculpture. The relationship between figures is often one of flow or movement along limbs (or whatever) into the limbs (or whatever) of a further figure and so forth. These are the very qualities for which much relief sculpture is celebrated, but for Stokes such a device strikes against immediacy – the eye must trace across the image in various ways. It is also a view of space which stands against the idea of an object simply standing. The concreteness of an object represents space fully for Stokes. It is no accident that relief sculpture is the form Stokes wishes to defend and to celebrate for it is in the very fact of the ground on which or in which the relief stands that the notion of encrustation, stone-blossoming and the objectness of art achieves its most satisfying instantiation. To this extent free-standing sculpture does not interest Stokes. At this point his interest is in architecture and low-relief sculpture.

In the post-war years Stokes modified his conception of modelling values, which reached its most potent and richest theoretical articulation in his

essay 'The Invitation in Art', in which the term 'modelling' is replaced by the 'incantatory' and the 'invitation'. Such qualities offered by the art object, alongside its objecthood, are descendants of his modelling view. For Stokes, art was characterised by the interplay between the carving-based otherness and art's invitation. There is a binding of what was clearly demarcated in the earlier writings. Of art's potential for envelopment he says:

> under the spell of this enveloping pull, the object's otherness, and its representation of otherness, are more poignantly grasped.[45]

Such envelopment was a powerful effect of the dynamics of the paranoid-schizoid phase as it survives into adult life and perception. It was the way that aspects of the representation in art interacted in the representation that drew the spectator into the picture by way of the part-object-like identifications in which, crucially for Stokes, spatiality in the representation was obliterated. He assigned such qualities to particular painterly devices in a picture:

> We are dynamically implicated with visual stress, particularly with the enveloping use that art makes of it. When the final balancing, the whole that is made up of interacting parts, is suspended for a time by the irregularities of stresses, these same stresses appear to gain an overwhelming, blurring, and unitary action inasmuch as the spectator's close participation, as with part objects, removes distance between him and this seeming process.[46]

Like the activities of part-objects, the elements of the paranoid-schizoid position, these experiences in the thrall of art's invitation are extreme, providing either a sense of 'elation' or one of attack and aggression. Interestingly and importantly, many of these devices are related to illusionist aspects of art, the attempt to construct a representation of illusory values – realist detail, chiaroscuro lighting and such like. He remarks that 'extreme illusionism is an extreme form of art, not least, in the aggressive and omnipotent attitude to the materials employed'.[47]

It is still with some sense of movement, of an almost temporal blurring of spatial values, that Stokes identifies the invitation in art. Its most essential property is one that he pinpoints through the word 'incantatory' – the hypnotic rhythm of song. In fact, he states that 'dance, song, rhythm, alliteration, rhyme lend themselves to, or create, an incantatory process, a unitary involvement, an elation if you will'. These thoughts are relics of Stokes' earliest essay on Pissanello in which he attacked certain kinds of architecture in terms of movement, rhythm and their counterparts in stillness and thereness, with none of the drama of architectural rhythms which, he argued, negated spatial relations in a building.

Carving and modelling in painting

As we have seen, Stokes' taste in bas-relief sculpture of the *quattrocento* approaches the state of painting. The marble or stone surface is marked almost like a canvas. In 1937 he published *Colour and Form* in which he gave an account of painting in terms of his carving/modelling distinction and while still under the spell of carving as the supreme value in all pictorial arts. As one would expect, Stokes is critical of any aggressive attack on the canvas through plastic values in painting. For Stokes,

> [T]he colours of a picture are fine when one feels that not the colours but *each and every* form through the medium of their colours has come to an *equal* fruition. Thus is carving conception realized in painting.[48]

So colour is central to Stokes' notion of carving in painting. Colour is the medium of painting. Colour has the role of carved stone in sculpture and through it painting, when successful, achieves a 'charged outwardness' equivalent to the 'efflorescence' on stone.[49] It is only through the 'total configuration' of colour that carving values are attained in painting, but it is through the use of colour which does not forfeit its otherness or external objectiveness. Stokes cites two extremes of the use of colour. In one it sinks into what he calls 'film colour', as in the dark canvases where we cannot detect the 'structure or the orientation of the surfaces of objects' so that only the outlines of objects or their brightness survives. In this modelling mode, painting lacks externality either of subject matter or of colour per se. In the other, in the brightly coloured paintings of the fifteenth-century Florentine school, colour succumbs to a brightness, an illumination which stresses tactile values and draws the spectator in. Instead of colours and their hues being supreme, their illuminatory brilliance (or dullness) reigns – like light reflecting on a metallic surface, bronze or brass.

Dividing film into the two broad aesthetic camps of carving and modelling is further complicated and enriched by Ann Hollander's *Moving Pictures*. Echoing Stokes, whom she quotes, Hollander divides painting roughly into North European art and the classical Renaissance art of Southern Mediterranean Europe, especially Italy. Hollander associates these two familiar art-historical and geographical areas of Western European art with certain qualities related not only to painting and printmaking but also to cinema. The North European naturalist tradition in particular is identified as 'proto-cinematic'.

For Hollander, artists from the Northern tradition such as Van Eyck and Vermeer share certain qualities – a propensity for expressing the 'mystery of surface'; an underlining of the random and arbitrary quality of vision; an interest in the instability of sight and the lack of a formal order in the way that visual phenomena strike the eye. All these qualities, she believes, depict

the 'uncertain movement of consciousness'. Thus, in these painters, an 'optical' experience stands for a psychological one. The optical aspect of visual experience in pictorial arts is stressed at the expense of formal qualities associated with classical Renaissance Italian art where there is a contrary tendency to create fictional worlds and a general aim to erect 'carefully wrought' ideal worlds of extreme beauty with a sense of completeness and in which the true subject is the artist. In Hollander's view, paintings by such artists as Michelangelo or Botticelli are in the form of a 'performance'. They call attention to themselves and to the artists whose visions they decidedly are. According to Hollander this tradition is not essentially proto-cinematic, although one could argue that certain forms of cinema and certain film-makers have more in common with it than they do with the Northern European tradition. For example, Eisenstein, Fellini and other deeply authored film-makers do deal with idealisations, with a fascination for the large gesture, a formal overwroughtness and a sense of film as an expressive performance, drawing attention to the director's skills and visions in which there is to be found an aim to express higher values in an ordered fashion aided by formal composition in which all the elements are gathered up into one, internally coherent meaning.

Interestingly, the Northern tradition and its cinematic descendants, with their stress on ordinary contingent aspects of the world, are ones in which we are 'invited' into the frame, often aided by chiaroscuro lighting. Hollander states that '[M]ovies have taught us to recognize the presence of meaning in uneventful scenes full of vivid objects.'[50] We shall see how this notion is developed in Stokes' later work where the 'invitation in art' comes to replace his original notion of 'modelling', which was not a welcoming invite into the art object but rather an aggressive overwhelming envelopment and pulling-in of the spectator, which of course it often still remained.

5
A Stokesian and Kleinian Interpretation

In one of his few brief references to the cinema in his later writings, Stokes described cinema (together with television) as largely a 'dream-screen'.[1] As a medium he thought that film was 'poor in spatial volume and embodiment', unlike, he suggested, the experience of radio and reading where he thought 'we may reconstruct the person at the instance of the voice'.[2] In an earlier book he had suggested that cinema is intrinsically 'expressionist' in so far as it is a projection and does not involve a real space (unlike theatre or the ballet), and as such its projections are not really externalised but remain in the mind.[3] Stokes believed this to the extent that he placed Disney's cartoons of the 1930s on a scale at the opposite end to the shadow silhouette animation of Lotte Reineger. Obviously there were shades of difference here. If cinema was a mind projection-screen, some film artists (e.g. Reineger) were more firmly tied to this necessary condition of cinema than others. If film-makers like Walt Disney did not escape this condition, they did offer something that was more 'concrete' or 'real', albeit in Disney's case an animated mouse.

It is with a Wollheimian working of Stokes' ideas that it is possible to approach film using the Kleinian-based model. It would seem, for example, that the montage position can be broadly understood as a modelling-type aesthetic in which the artist and spectator are caught up in overwhelming attacking experiences generated by the formal devices used to express a subject-matter itself often deeply imbricated in or conducive to part-object phantasies. At the other extreme are films which exemplify carving values. These are films in which strong devices are rejected for a more restrained form of delivering a narrative (in the case of mainstream cinema), which itself is appropriately autonomous and object-like in its distancing from strong enveloping phantasies. More often than not, these two forms – carving and modelling, part-object and whole-object – cohabit and there is never a complete obliteration of one or the other in a film, or for that matter any artform. However, a film can be grounded in and thus be more expressive of

one or the other, taking its shape and form from their respective stances. In the remaining chapters, I will be discussing films of both standpoints in order to explore the potency of the theory for film.

Klein posited what she called two positions in early infant mental life – the paranoid-schizoid and the depressive. Each describes particular qualities, structures and object-relations. Klein believed that these two positions are fundamental to all mental life – not simply to infantile and pathological but to normal and adult. Our emotional and cognitive life is determined by them, although not at the expense of denying the importance of external reality itself. As we have seen in the discussion on the nature of phantasy, the latter is always adaptive to reality and embedded in our experiences of the world, others and ourselves. In marked contrast to Freud, Klein posited an ego at birth (and before) and phantasy as an immediate element of mental life being a representational mode of the instincts.

Klein's two positions are crucial for Stokes' early ideas on carving and modelling. For Stokes, the two broad attitudes of carving and modelling and their later, more Kleinian, formulations are basic to all art. Naturally, film should be included in the latter category. In Part III of this book I will explore through case-studies the understanding of film aesthetics in Kleinian terms.

As I have already discussed, the phantasy-governed duality of carving and modelling is all-encompassing and in its grounding in Klein's two positions is constitutive of all mental life. It implies that our relationship to the world and to others can be understood within Klein's all-inclusive parameters. For the present, we need to examine the two positions themselves and link them into the discussion of phantasy.

While Klein provided a structural view of her two positions they do have a chronology. The earliest infantile mental life is ruled by the paranoid-schizoid phantasies, which are only to be mitigated later in infancy (in the second half of the first year) by the depressive position's phantasies. In many ways, the two positions can be loosely understood as representing articulations of Freud's division of early infantile mental life as being governed by the pleasure principle and then by the reality principle. But as Freud also noted, the pleasure principle is not defeated by the reality principle but simply moderated by it. In other words, as discussed in chapter 3, the propositional attitude network to a large extent is established in the depressive position as beliefs and desires are consciously aimed at the world itself and influenced in turn by them.

On the other hand, in the paranoid-schizoid phase, the infant experiences unconsciously in terms of objects – represented to a large degree in sensations with their concomitant concepts of a raw and primitive kind. What is lacking initially is a means of individuating objects and re-identifying them. In other words, the infant cannot grasp that a particular object is the same object when it reappears in its world. This is the result of lack of individuation for there is a sense in which individuation and identity are of a piece, although

they remain conceptually distinct. To individuate something as a particular thing demands that we have a concept of that thing, which in turn allows us to identify it at a later point. In this sense the phantasy comes to bear some of the responsibility once assigned to the imagination of bridging perceptions and sensations and judgement and understanding.[4]

The infant in these early weeks and months, experiences objects (often the same ones) as separate and different. So the same object is taken at different times to be a series of different objects – the same object which at times provides pleasure and at other times frustration is experienced as different. Hence the same 'breast' is both the good object and the bad object, with no understanding on the infant's part that it *is* the same breast. The source of pleasure and of frustration is never understood to be the same. In this way the paranoid-schizoid distorts reality, affording no real grasp of it; everything is shifting and unfocused. The unconscious representations of good and bad are exclusive and mutually antagonistic, involving powerful emotions and driven apart by the precarious beginnings of the infant's hold on the difference between the self and others. There is an incorporative phantasy of taking in the good object and a phantasy of expelling, of throwing out the bad object. These operations of a structuring kind are lodged in the instinctual behaviour of warding off pain, escaping from discomfort, becoming fretful at frustration. Because there is no re-identification of object in mental representations, mental life has the quality of being fragmented, what Gardner calls 'episodic'. It is this position which dominates the modelling mode.

In grasping of re-identifiable objects, the infant can begin to experience the same object as being both bad and good. Thus an ambivalence towards objects is produced, dominated by fear that the good will be destroyed by the aggression towards the same object. In order to escape from this ambivalence, the infant adopts a splitting tactic by which the two representations of the object are kept apart to secure the intactness of the good object. With the onset of the depressive position, the infant can re-identify objects enough to establish some connection with reality and the beginnings of propositional attitudes answerable to and serving desires and beliefs involving practical reasoning in relation to the world. Thus, the good object is secured as an internalised object in phantasy. The episodic nature of the paranoid-schizoid position dominates as a wholeness takes hold in mental life, conscious and unconscious. The aggressive phantasies associated with the fundamental emotion envy are subdued by the emergence of gratitude, guilt and its concomitant activity, reparation.[5] The depressive position is characterised by the establishment and growth of the reality principle and the propositional attitudinal network. It is this position which influences the carving mode in art. The paranoid-schizoid's *diktat* of pleasure (and its negation or frustration) does not vanish but becomes more formed by the demands of reality and the infant's practical reasoning.

Klein and Stokes

Klein was always a presence, even if rarely explicit, in Stokes' early writings of the 1930s. However, it was not until the 1950s that Stokes established a more Kleinian expression of his distinction between carving and modelling, transforming it from an aesthetic one based on technical difference to a psychological one. The first explicit Kleinian revisions of his work are in his essay 'Form in Art' published in 1955[6] and in his book of the same year *Michelangelo: A Study in the Nature of Art*. As Stokes hinted, the transitional works were the autobiographies *Smooth and Rough* (1951) and *Inside Out* (1947) in which he completed his analysis in literary acts of restoration of his own past.

There is a simplicity to his mapping of the two Kleinian positions onto the carving and modelling distinction except that, with the appearance of the part-object and whole-object modularities of the paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions respectively, Stokes re-evaluates what was once modelling. In fact, he begins to see the two values less as separate approaches but, as in the best of art, a single, integrated one. It is at one with his theory that such a restoration of the modelling mode is entangled with a re-evaluation of particular artists, once disliked. If the early Stokes struggled to establish criteria of value in art and at the same time answer the question as to the nature of art itself, it was only with the support of a theory of mind, of human nature in the shape of Kleinian theory, that such a question began to receive a substantial and profound response. As Stokes put it:

> the history of art might be written in terms of an ever-changing fusion between the love for the self-sufficient object, fully corporeal in essence, and the cultural disciplines for oceanic feeling.[7]

Ontologically Stokes submitted to Klein's notion of the internal object understood as both whole, and as such, separate, autonomous and self-sufficient as opposed to the notion of the object as something we can merge with – dependent, interpenetrative and overpowering. The latter he associated with Freud's description of the infant's experience at the breast – 'the oceanic feeling', 'the sense of oneness with the universe'.[8] However, if the Kleinian impulse is in this book, it is just beneath the surface. His introductory section setting out his psychological views is fairly restrained, even if he briefly mentions 'internal objects'. Compared with his first few pages of his book on Greek culture published three years later, these mentions are tentative. In the later book, he immediately plunges into Klein's system of part-objects and whole-objects.

We can only assume that it was through Stokes' analysis with Klein that certain warring aspects of his own psychical formation found a form of resolution and respite. It is the post-analysis Stokes who reveals a more understanding and benign attitude towards what he had named the 'modelling'

mode in art and which he had once associated very much with an art that was inferior to the supreme achievements of the carving mode. It is perhaps important that Stokes took up painting himself in the 1930s. At the same time, he began to use a terminology that is more Kleinian and less art-historical. The modelling/carving division comes to have less of a role in his writings and instead the discussion of whole-objects and part-objects begins to dominate. Importantly, over the post-war period he reviewed and revised the old modelling concept in terms of what he called 'the invitation in art'. The tension in art comes to be one less between metaphorically understood concepts and more one between the Freudian dual instincts where hate, Death or aggression (Thanatos) come to be associated with the attacking fragmentation and aggressive feelings of the modelling mode. Carving is represented by whole-objects and their role in reparation and love. In other words, psychoanalytic conceptualisation becomes the main interpretative force in his critical writings.

As we have seen, it was during the 1930s Stokes had been analysed by Melanie Klein. We can cull from the later autobiographies that Stokes came to terms with certain governing aspects of his mental life during these years. Without venturing into areas where knowledge is meagre and at least pre-sumptuous, we know that he recovered and acknowledged in himself those pieces, or feelings, that had made his opposition to the modelling tradition so harsh and ungiving. In the post-war years we witness his recuperation of modelling into his views on art. Interestingly, 'modelling' as a concept becomes less visible and instead he develops ideas associated with the 'oceanic feeling' at the breast and finally the idea of the 'invitation in art', a phrase which marked his gathering of the modelling attitude into an overall conception of what art meant for him.

Equally in the post-analysis years, Kleinian terminology replaced the more traditional art-historical terms within his art criticism, a fact that lost him his publisher, Faber and Faber, and some of his support in the art community. With the publication of his book *Michelangelo: A Study in the Nature of Art* in 1955 he integrates Kleinian thinking into the carving and modelling distinction and as such recuperates modelling as a positive aesthetic in art. It is as if Stokes had come to terms with feelings allied with the paranoid-schizoid position in his own person and which now could take their place creatively within his own work. He broadens his view of art that he felt and considered was good under this new enlightenment so that there was a place for the depressive and the schizoid-paranoid, although he always retained the centrality of the reparative qualities of the depressive mode within his conception of the nature of art. Art is always the construction, so to speak, of a good object, a reparative act upon an original aggressive use of materials, but also an act in which aggression is part of the construction itself. It is characteristic of Stokes that such a change of views resulted in or was part-and-parcel of a change in style, attitude and critical judgement. For him, theoretical

or critical viewpoints were always the expression or articulation of feelings and phantasies.

The Michelangelo essay begins with Stokes drawing a parallel between love and art:

> Art, I believe, as well as love, offers us some share in the oceanic feeling. Yet with the phantasm of homogeneity, of singleness, the lover experiences in the beloved her singularity: she is the acme of emotive otherness, the essence of object.[9]

Stokes embraces the idea of the art lover's view of the art object as embodying a 'separate sufficiency' and at the same time feeling a 'sense of identity' with it. These distinct aspects of art are felt whenever we approach a work of art. In trying to be more precise about how this works Stokes places emphasis on the object as a whole with its components in relationship to each other. Turning to other artforms, he states that '[T]he poem, the sum-total, has the articulation of a physical object'.[10] On the other hand, the 'incantatory element of poetry ranges beyond, ready to interpenetrate, to hypnotize'.[11] As far as the visual arts are concerned, he claims that

> [S]pace is a homogeneous medium into which we are drawn and freely plunged by many representations of visual art: at the same time it is the mode of order and distinctiveness for separated objects.[12]

So what binds and draws us in is at the same time the very aspect that creates separateness. This view underlines the importance of space in Stokes' thinking about painting. Similarly in speaking of poetry as a whole-object, he recognises that the incantatory properties of metre and perhaps rhyme which comprise this totality are what draw us in. Here we are witnessing the reconciliation of the warring attitudes of carving and modelling that had dominated his work and it is articulated in the language of psychoanalysis, particularly of the Kleinian variant.

This is not to say that Stokes believes that much art succeeds in integrating these aspects. His recognition of their interdependence has to be seen in his re-evaluation of the highest achievements of the European art tradition. Stokes is also performing a more radical task in these passages. Not only is he making the previous distinction but he is also making a controversial claim about the status and relationship between form and content. He suggests that no particular aspect of a work of art can be assigned to either relationship – of objectness and of identity:

> I think it is impossible to tie a formal quality – the isolation is itself artificial – to one of these functions to the exclusion of the other.[13]

If objectness and identity cannot be simply assigned to either form or content then how can they be understood in terms of the art object? Stokes speaks of the fact that 'each formal quality has further function in the pulsation of the whole' as if (in his words) there is a 'doubling of roles'. One example of this merging of form and subject-matter is the role of the proportions of the body in Renaissance art as the foundation for proportion *per se* and in particular in relation to architecture. The formal, whilst being for Stokes the dominant means of dictating the identity and separateness in a work of art, is also joined by the subject-matter when an artwork is successful in evoking the two modes of relationship between the viewer and art. In Wollheim's introduction to Stokes' collection of essays *The Invitation in Art*, published in 1965, he discusses this breaking down of the traditional distinction of form and content in art and in orthodox Freudian interpretations of art. For Wollheim, the distinction is not one that can be derived from the aspects of the object itself but rather from the *attitude* taken towards it:

> I do not see how we are to distinguish between what is and what is not form in a work of visual art save by appeal to a difference in the attitudes that we might adopt towards any specific element in the picture.[14]

The same element in a painting can be seen from both viewpoints – from that of form and from that of content. Wollheim provocatively suggests that we can scan a work of art for the representation of repressed or split-off wishes and desires; alternatively, we can look into it for the mirroring of object-relations.[15]

It is through an understanding of the relationship between art and the spectator as one of the 'mirroring of object-relations' that form and content can be brought under the same rubric. For it is one and the same thing to view the use of colour, say, in a Bonnard painting as an expression of object relations as it is to view it as a representation of a woman in a bath. Although we can still retain the distinction here, in some sense, between a formal quality and one of subject-matter, so all elements of a visual representation are formal as well as being subject-matter, depending upon which aspect we may bring them under.

As Wollheim argues, the orthodox Freudian account, with its stress on subject-matter and the importance of the id ('split-off wishes and desires'), has been supplanted in Stokes' Kleinian aesthetic by the stress on form and the ego. To this extent Stokes is true to his earlier conceptions of art found in the writings of the 1930s when he placed the emblematic centrally in his writings on sculpture, architecture and the ballet. The transparency of the emblematic is one that is passed over to the formal. For Stokes, the interpretation of art is not to be seen as akin to dream analysis with its dividing line between manifest and latent content. In some way, often a rather obscure one, the formal carries its meaning so to speak on its face. Wollheim suggests

that, for Stokes, art *exhibits* rather than *expresses* something. As Wollheim states '[D]reams exhibit nothing'. In this way, he is against the reading of an art object through the biography of the artist – something implicitly demanded in the dream-analysis model of interpretation which Freud practised in the Leonardo essay. When we encounter a painting we are not faced with a puzzle of manifest content for which we need the key to unlock its latent content, a key which can be provided only by the artist's own associations, repressed desires, and so forth. Remaining true to his earlier conceptions of the blossoming stone and the art object as an emblem, Stokes wants to hold on to the art object as a face, which exhibits or shows the ego states it reflects.

The Stokesian position can also be seen to contain an objection to the Lacanian analysis of art which similarly places itself in a framework which stresses the narratives of the id, of the repressed impulses and desires which are 'found' in such film criticism as so many variations on the Oedipal configuration. For Lacanian film analysis, all narratives (and to some extent all representations) are Oedipal ones. The story-line of the unconscious syndromes are expressed in the story-lines of the classic Hollywood narrative film. It is no accident that Lacanian film analysis has stumbled before abstract film and modernist film of the sort associated with Brakhage, Snow, Gidal *et al*. Such films, which are set against the narrative, do not allow any analytical leverage for the Lacanian theory of art.[16]

The new division reflected the Kleinian ontological distinction between whole- and part-objects developed over the years. As we have seen, for Klein phantasy always involved such objects, alone or together. Mental life universally comprised relations between these objects. Stokes was aligning himself, superficially at least, with a tradition in art thinking which had used a similar conception. As Wollheim points out, it is in Heinrich Wolfflin that we receive a fairly explicit use of whole-objects and part-objects without the Kleinian framework:

> We always project a corporeal state conforming to our own; we interpret the whole outside world according to the expressive system with which we have become familiar from our own bodies. That which we have experienced in ourselves as the expression of severe strictness, taut, self-discipline or uncontrolled heavy relaxation, we transfer to all other bodies.[17]

Wolfflin's work is permeated by this relationship between the body and art. In his account of style it is the deportment and customs of the body in a particular era which is reflected in its art. Michael Podro describes this, justifiably, as an empathy theory of art by which he means the method of 'endowing inanimate objects with a sense of body posture and mood'.[18]

In his book *Mannerism and Anti-Mannerism in Italian Painting* Walter Friedlaender describes the fragmented, violent and almost abstract styles of such painters as Jacopo da Pontormo, Fiorentino Rosso and Girolamo

Parmigianino. Friedlaender's Baroque Mannerists are very much part of the part-object, modelling trait he articulated. Stokes' novelty lies not so much in a recognition of the emotional and pictorial qualities of the artists he discusses as in his grounding of such qualities in a Kleinian theory of human nature and in the repercussions that had for a general theory of art, although the notion of a 'theory' grates somewhat when discussing Stokes.

Friedlaender describes the ambitions of the Mannerists as not being to create a representation of an object as in nature whether idealised or otherwise nor as from the artist's own viewpoint, but rather as how the artist 'would have it seen'. In other words, an imaginative ideal object is created in particular works, an art that is no longer restricted by classical rules based on the imitation of nature or by the idea of the optical autonomy of the painter. Subjectivity reigns in Mannerism proper according to Friedlaender, one which is the source of the fragmentation, distortion, energies and unnaturalness associated with Mannerist works:

> there arises a new beauty, no longer resting on real forms measurable by the model or on forms idealized on this basis, but rather on an inner artistic reworking on the basis of harmonic or rhythmical requirements.[19]

The notion of the 'invitation' in art is a further formulation of the incantatory that Stokes uses continually in his post-war writings. In many ways the model is music and poetry, art forms that share in a temporality with strong rhythmic patterns and structures. It is also a conception that emanates from the paranoid-schizoid position which he had previously associated with modelling.

The spectator in the picture

It is fascinating to see how Wollheim, in his monumental work *Painting as an Art*, transformed many of Stokes' ideas into the language of philosophy and a more general aesthetics. In a chapter on Caspar Friedrich, Edouard Manet and Frans Hals, Wollheim discusses what he calls the 'spectator in the picture' with respect to some paintings by these artists. He distinguishes different subtle notions of the spectator. The internal spectator contrasts with the external spectator who views the paintings. But the internal spectator in a painting is not to be identified with a literal figure in the painting, for example, one who looks on the scene.

In the case of Friedrich, Wollheim argues that in a painting like *Landscape with a Rainbow* (*c*. 1810), it is not the spectator internal to the scene who represents the internal spectator but the viewpoint from which the scene is painted, which in many cases in Friedrich's work is higher than the view depicted and the figure's view contained. Unlike other landscape painters, who obviously also chose views from which the scene was depicted, Friedrich's

viewpoint is 'primarily the locus of some identifiable person',[20] and that person, according to Wollheim, is Friedrich's conception of the artist:

> He is a person, or a kind of person, who, disentangled from the exigencies of material life, gains a certain detachment from nature, which he then makes use of only so as to return to nature and make it the object of profound and devout contemplation.[21]

However, a viewpoint in itself is not enough for the internal spectator; there must also be what Wollheim calls a 'repertoire' with which the internal spectator's viewpoint is infused. In other words, the spectator is a person, and for that to have weight, the viewpoint must share in beliefs, desires, feelings, thoughts, moods, and so forth, germane to that viewpoint. In fact, it is these mental states which were the original determinants of the paintings' internal spectator. To that extent, an internal spectator is akin to a case of what Wollheim calls 'centrally imagining' in which in imagining an event, one imagines it from the viewpoint of someone, and in doing so, crucially, takes on enough of the beliefs, feelings of such to experience the events and images as if one were that person.

In the case of Manet, Wollheim argues, the internal spectator does not have a particular viewpoint. On the contrary, the internal spectator is let loose to wander in and about the painting's space:

> Manet's internal spectator is essentially a mobile spectator. He must be free to prowl through the represented space: questing, probing, prying, endeavouring to trap the figure into some momentary contact.[22]

Wollheim claims that Manet reveals this internal spectator through what he calls the painter's seeming ineptitude. For instance, in the portraits in question, Manet uses a frontal viewpoint and particular backgrounds, two kinds in fact. One has a mass of detail that is not spatially or formally well connected to the figure in the foreground (*Mademoiselle V. in the Costume of an Espada* 1862) and another has a monochrome background lacking any detail at all, even suggestive of space (*The Saluting Matador* 1866 or 1867). In both cases, of the spaces concerned, one is 'an undefined or irrational volume of space'[23] and the other an 'indefinite' kind of space 'into which an internal spectator could vanish to good effect'.[24]

Later in the same chapter Wollheim remarks that the danger presented by the internal spectator is a loss of awareness or perception of the painting's marked surface, the other condition of the two-foldedness required for seeing-in according to Wollheim.

> once the spectator of the picture accepts the invitation to identify with the spectator in the picture, he loses sight of the marked surface . . . the

spectator must be returned from imagination to perception: twofoldedness must be reactivated.[25]

Here is Stokes' notion of the 'invitation in art' reworked philosophically by Wollheim, even to the point of reiterating the idea of the painting as an invitation. According to Wollheim, the illusion argument for pictorial representation is met by the prerequisite that in seeing x in y, we are always aware that x is a painted flat surface. If the latter is removed, then illusionism of a kind reigns.

Wollheim is keen to stress in relation to the internal spectator that illusionism is not at stake, but rather the imagination. For, if I am not aware of the marked surface at a point, then I am not aware of its being a representation of x, but see x itself. For if awareness of the marked surface is not what separates seeing x from seeing x in y, then what is being concealed here as a mark of representation? Clearly, Wollheim's point is not that the spectator in being caught up by the internal spectator believes that what he or she sees is an actual landscape, rather it is that the powerful repertoire of beliefs accompanying the imaginative exploration of the space does not play a role in such a mental state. It is as if we have forgotten where we are; we become unaware of our surroundings, lost in our thoughts, but at one level still aware of our physical position. In an extreme case we may literally swoon.

Stokes' essay 'The Invitation in Art' is a key statement of this view of art in which the overpowering invitation in art aligned with the imagination is coupled with its ability to assert its objectness, its otherness in perception itself. This is not to say that perception, as is used here, is a neutral sensory state, somehow stripped of phantasy, of emotional resonance. Stokes in his own way puts a similar point to Wollheim's:

> We are dynamically implicated with visual stress, particularly with the enveloping use that art makes of it. When the final balancing, the whole that is made up of interacting parts, is suspended for a time by the irregularities of stresses, these same stresses appear to gain an overwhelming, blurring, and unitary action inasmuch as the spectator's close participation as with part objects, removes distance between him and this seeming process.[26]

In other words, Wollheim's two-foldedness is a philosophical reflection of the original carving/modelling distinction, tailored to fit Stokes' post-war modifications to this idea. The stresses and blurs of highly differentiated figures and chiaroscuro overallness of, say, baroque art, once condemned as manipulatively overwhelming of the spectator, are now seen as a necessary feature of the best art. Stokes remarks that 'under the spell of this enveloping pull, the object's otherness, and its representation of otherness, are the more poignantly grasped'.[27]

Klein's notion of the depressive position is precisely one in which whole-objects come to replace part-objects in their function as objects of phantasy and reality. The splitting and excessive idealisation of the paranoid-schizoid position in which objects are introjected as part-ones and as either aggressively 'bad' or as idealistically 'good' is replaced by the externalisation of feelings onto whole-objects, most characteristically the mother. Thus objects take on their own values and properties and are not saturated and immersed in the paranoid phantasies of the infant. The response between infant and mother in the depressive position is one in which reality has a role. There is a resistance, an opposition, which involves a confrontation with the other, and in which judgements and evaluation are possible, grounded in the actuality of the objects themselves. The relationship of this kind of theory to Stokes' views on sculpture during these years is clear. The object of sculpture and its relationship to the sculptor is modelled, so to speak, on a primary primitive relationship between the infant and the mother as whole-object. To this extent, for Stokes, the depressive position always seemed to have a primacy in artistic practice. It is in the depressive position that guilt and reparation are implicit in whole-object relations. For Stokes art is primarily a reparative process for initial attacks on the object.

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Part III
Montage and Realism in Film

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6
The Carving Mode: Rossellini, Antonioni and Dreyer

> Art is . . . a cultural activity: the 'good' imagos at the back of Form
> are identified with the actualities or potentialities of a particular
> culture . . .
>
> Adrian Stokes[1]

As we have seen, the carving mode is the artistic counterpart of the depressive
position. For Klein, Segal and Stokes all art is of the depressive position. The
depressive position is charged by 'eros' or 'love' in Freud's primary dualism
between Eros and Thanatos. I have argued that film's art resides in its capacity,
which it shares with other visual arts, to express carving and modelling values.
These are embedded in the idea that art embodies both an 'invitation' to the
spectator and a form of integrity as an independent self-subsistent object.
Where these capacities or qualities are split and isolated from one another
the result, in the case of modelling, is the overwhelming manic manipulation
of the spectator, at its extreme, almost like an hallucinatory state, or in the
'objectivism' of extreme carving projections, a cold indifference.

Modelling is at the mercy of part-object projections with their concomitant
schizoid-paranoid fragmentation and splitting, while carving answers to the
whole-object relations of the depressive position in which love and repar-
ation dominate. But Stokes believed that art often 'combines a sense of fusion
with the sense of object-otherness'.[2] In other words, it can include both modes.
As we have seen, these are Kleinian reworkings of traditional divisions found
in art theory and aesthetics.

I have suggested that this duality finds its crude reflection in film's historical
division between montage and realist cinema. Thus the montage/realism split
is a response within cultural conditions pertaining since the early years of
cinema, to modes of artistic process which are intrinsic to all art. This view
is a reflection of the founding of art, for artist and spectator, remembering
that ideally the artist is always a spectator too. This is not a rejection of the
influence of individual personalities, different social and cultural conditions
and the ability of art to develop new forms, but only a recognition that

personalities, social and cultural conditions and artistic forms are produced by and for persons – intentional agents with a particular form of mental life. Thus the book falls on the side of Freud and not on language in explanation in art. It rejects the notion of film as a language or, for that matter, of the psychical as linguistic in nature. The fact that I deal with desire-belief constructions in understanding mental phenomena does not mean that conceptual life can be reduced to linguistic frameworks. On the contrary, we may argue that the visual is defined by how it differs fundamentally from language.

The decision to examine the work of Rossellini, Antonioni and Dreyer does not mean that they represent the high points of a carving approach to film. Other contenders exist. For example, Rhode remarks of the Japanese director Ozu that he

> neither lets his material run to triviality nor does he impose upon it. He has the miraculous gift of giving his families the right to take on an independent life. He creates a stability in them which reciprocally strengthens his talent and allows him in a non-compulsive manner . . . to continue refining the same subject throughout his life. . . . His refusal to be possessive is evident in his technique. In his last films especially, he seldom moves his camera. He does not try to conceal the self-contained entity of each shot. There is no attempt to fake narrative flow or to impose expressiveness.[3]

We can discern in this passage a Stokesian sensibility in Rhode's appreciation of Ozu's non-possessiveness, self-containment and independence of image against compulsive demands and overbearing projections. We can also see how it is impossible and unwarranted to identify carving, or for that matter modelling, simply by the recognition of particular formal techniques. Subject matter is important too. The stilled camera at medium shot does not in itself automatically confer carving status on objecthood. The desire to retain a shot's integrity in relation to its subject-matter can formally, so to speak, resemble the cold, blank, envious stare also, for form represents phantasy too. It does not lie outside the psychical, as though it were simply a tool to be applied. On the contrary, like tools they are made and used by us as much as we make and use so-called subject-matter. Form is expressive. For Stokes there was an 'image in form'. In fact, the split between form and content was anathema to his interpretive practice.

Roberto Rossellini and André Bazin

Within European cinema (one hesitates to include American cinema) there is no more profound and influential tradition than the neo-realist cinema which flowed out of Italy in the immediate post-war years.[4] The post-war films of Visconti, de Sica and Rossellini represent a high point not only for twentieth-century European film but also its culture, and it is fascinating that this cinema should have flowered in Italy, and in films which resonate

with the Italian city- and landscape. Fifty years on, this cinema still marks a watershed. In these few years, films were made in Italy which signal the critical establishment of auteurism, of realism and, it has been argued, in the work of Rossellini, of an incipient film modernism consolidated by Antonioni. More ambitiously, Gilles Deleuze has identified Italian neo-realism as the transitional film movement between what he calls the cinema of movement-image (narrative-driven cinema) to that of time-image. Italian neo-realism, notwithstanding the work of Renoir, Vigo and others active before the war, can also be seen as the founding moment of European art cinema.[5] Perhaps more difficult to argue and more contentious is my claim that their humanism is central to an understanding of twentieth-century cinema and especially to post-war Europe itself. These are all large claims which are to be only partly addressed here.

In the context of this book's argument, Rossellini's cinema and neo-realism in general are celebrated as respecting 'the ontological wholeness of the reality they filmed'.[6] In its sense of an objective world, its commitment to non-intrusive (or obtrusive) camera work and editing methods, its humanism and celebration of ordinary human values as against the narrow compulsive aims of much Hollywood sheltered by genre film-making, it would seem to be the most exemplary of the carving mode. In Zavattini's words: '[T]he reality buried underneath myths slowly reflowered. Here was a tree; here a house; here a man eating, a man sleeping, a man crying'.[7] Rossellini delineated the battle-lines more clearly: 'Montage is no longer necessary. Things are there.... why manipulate them?'[8] More broadly, for Rhode, neo-realism was a 'call to individual responsibility' for film directors and 'an attempt to show things *as they were*'[9] although he is caustically sceptical of their offerings. He suggests that Italian neo-realism was more a 'state of mind' than a style as such.

Our own cultural notion of Northern Europe centres no less on the impact of Mediterranean culture issuing from the Renaissance with its recuperation of the ancient Greek and Roman periods. In the visual arts the Italian painters of the Renaissance remain cultural and aesthetic touchstones.[10]

Ann Hollander argues that

> In Italy the colored object is saturated with light and glows of itself; light, and the soul, have no independent scanning movement. Everything spiritual is captured within the colored mass, and its only movement is its struggle onto the surface, for which it requires the help of the artist's encouraging and caressing hand. In the North the hand seems absent, and only the eye engages the moving light in its task.[11]

In a different but connected vein, Rossellini remarks:

> The ability to see both sides of man, to look at him charitably, seems to me to be a supremely Latin and Italian attitude. It results from a degree of civility which has been our custom from very ancient times.[12]

This is a Stokesian observation and reveals how deeply Rossellini's humanism runs although such a 'charity' is no less and may be found more in Jean Renoir's films of the 1930s. But Rossellini's films reveal a schematism which Renoir's do not, even in his class-demarcated *Le Grand Illusion*.

It may be illuminating to consider in the light of Rossellini's 'humanism' claim Giorgione's famous painting *Tempesta* (*The Tempest*) which puzzled commentators even at the time and has mesmerised art historians ever since, including Pater, Venturi, Clarke and Stokes.[13] In the painting a young man, usually identified as a gypsy or a soldier, stands on the left foreground whilst on the right a woman, naked but for a shawl draped across her shoulders, sits suckling a baby. In the mid-ground are ancient ruins and in the background is a city, over which a storm rages. The two figures seem unconnected, perhaps even unaware of each other. Their gazes are not for each other but are directed into the distance. The painting occupies a central place in Stokes' aesthetic in so far as it embodies a mood of tension, of a calmness in a moment caught between an arcadian harmony of figures in the landscape and the thunder and lightning over the distant city which threaten in time to overcome the two figures. The darkening storm-light merges with the light they are bathed in – perhaps a sunset. In this 'moment', the painting invites contemplation by the spectator for 'Giorgione chooses a moment of utter revelation...when things stand "as they really are"'.[14] For Clarke, the painting embodies a 'free fantasy' and depicts a 'strange detachment of the figures, who seem unaware of each other's existence'.[15] For Gombrich, Giorgione's painting seems to be as much about the landscape as about the figures and it innovatively proclaims 'an art with its own secret laws and devices'.[16] Hollander remarks:

> In Giorgione's *Tempesta*, the moist pregnant air and strange relationship among the characters have suggested not any underlying psychological drama, but a possible emblematic meaning. The secret of the indwelling light that seems to irradiate these bodies is the governing and formalizing idea, what Stokes would see as the glow in the stone, from which Italian art takes its original impulse.[17]

Is it too far-fetched to suggest an association of this painting with Rossellini's film *Voyage in Italy*? Of course, the film does not comprise a single binding image, no reverberating accretion of cultural and artistic esteem as is found in *Tempesta*. Instead *Voyage in Italy* is constituted by the transitory projection of light on a white surface. It does not have the original 'objectness' of Giorgione's painting. But in Rossellini's film there is a similar tension between two ideal modes – one of love, warmth and sexuality which recurs time and again throughout the film; the pregnant women in the streets, the confident, zestful life and love of the Burtons and importantly the sounds and sights of street life and especially of Neapolitan songs in the background,

reprised in Enzio Rossellini's fine and sparely used score. The other mode is a cold manic frustration and isolation represented in the Burtons pursuing their pleasures in separation – one in the bourgeois drawing rooms of Capri, the other in the museums and ruins of Naples.

They are also incapable of resolving their relationship's difficulties and are cut off from cultural and psychical reality too. These sounds and images never impose on the narrative but are a *listening* which Katherine cannot refuse, cannot shut out in her travels about the city. (Giorgione was a musician and in the other classic painting of his *Fête Champêtre* which could also be used to examine Rossellini, listening is mingled with the experience of the painting itself.)[18] The woman and suckling child represent this fecund and easeful image of idealised harmony and freedom and what Stokes called 'calm and self-sufficiency'.[19]

In its own way Rossellini's *Voyage in Italy* is also a recuperation of the classical period – the sculptures, the ruins, the 'magical' springs, the mummified lovers – through Katherine's eyes. Her experience is partly a reluctant education. These experiences are counterpointed by modern ones of love and fecundity. On the other side is the male, casually leaning against a staff, a Romantic at ease with the world, perhaps a gypsy, a wanderer, an adventurer who relates to the woman as man himself. Analysis of *Tempesta* breaks down fairly early on, but there is an image here that gains its impact from a hard-won naturalism (these are not obviously stylised, formalised or even mythical figures). Giorgione's 'revolution was a huge stride towards the representation of mere appearance in its broad and hitherto neglected features'.[20]

The same claim has been made for Rossellini's post-war, so-called neo-realist films. He has rightly denied the Brechtian and 'distanciation' strategies of his 'prodigy' by insisting on his humanism, his love of the real, of the objective world which he claimed in Bazinian fashion always to reveal. The strategies of Antonioni, and especially Godard and others are not Rossellini's. It is also true that *Voyage in Italy* cannot be read off as a modern-day *Tempesta*, for the film cannot evoke the same harmony, the same repleteness. None the less it does share its humanism, its themes – love, death and fecundity, a celebration of 'thingness', a hard-won tense naturalism which can be seen to prefigure the alienated figures in landscape and cityscape found in Antonioni, or the breakdown of full-fledged naturalism in Godard. Perhaps Truffaut and Rohmer come close but a Romantic sentimentality in the former and charming irony in the latter sets them apart from Rossellini's sensibility, which is tenser, poised with a steadfast gaze on the world, on its thereness.

Like Giorgione's painting, its wholeness is a summation of detailed fragments, parts which are held together in the lack of idealisation, in the reality of its governing gaze, that of Rossellini which leads his characters to a point of balance won through a reality which never succumbs to facile drama, romantic idealism or banal realism. This explains the fascination and sense of completeness felt in his famous ending where the notion of 'miracle' is

too often cited, just as Giorgione's painting has invited the epithets of 'magical' and 'mysterious'.

Voyage in Italy is a film about Italian life, but Rossellini does not sieve the experience of Italy and Naples in particular through an Italian consciousness but through two English visitors. It may be argued that he needed the difference of another, in this case English, tradition opposed to that of the South and Mediterranean (although their oddly named relation Homer, whose house they are selling, seems to represent another strand of Northern exile in foreign climes). But to see the film as simply a celebration of Italian values, particularly Neapolitan ones, at the expense of another culture is to underestimate its complexity and subtlety. The protagonists are English. It is their, especially Katherine's, crisis, which is not only marital but existential, that gives the film its substance, its theme. On this account one can see how Rossellini may be dramatising something that was in Italian society too, especially middle-class Italian society, which Antonioni later was to make his own subject-matter.[21]

Bergman's acting and persona are perfection in *Voyage in Italy*. Her reactions and feelings are not simple ones. Perceptions of her as frigid, sentimental and prudish miss her at times worldliness and irony. She is not angry at the guard's mock-tying of her to the wall, but rightly mock-exasperated at the persistence of male sexual egotism even into old age. 'All men' means whatever their age, an acknowledgement of their undiscerning sexualisation regardless of anything else, something she senses in front of the ancient depictions of men in the museum of classical sculpture. It is often unremarked how her final words there, before the huge statue of Hercules, are 'Oh, how wonderful.' This appreciation of a classic maleness is also evident at the party when the Italian upper-class men flirt with her to her pleasure.

To some degree, Katherine's is a courtly love underlined by her dead friend, Charles Lewington, the poet who she realises idealised Naples, projected his own vapid phantasies onto it, ones that Katherine identified with and made her own. It is the key memory/phantasy in the film. Katherine's husband discovers that the 'thin, tall, fair' and 'so pale and spiritual' Charles who, it seems, was a victim of tuberculosis, was his wife's friend.

The attrition of this phantasy through her own experiences is her crisis – his sexual asceticism, which she esteemed so highly, is shown to be an empty shell which as a defence mechanism, once withdrawn, leaves her vulnerable and despairing.

A fascinating aspect of the sculpture museum sequence is that we are not presented with Katherine's point of view. She is filmed entering from the side of shots of statuary, and in the montage of Roman emperors we are given Rossellini's own point of view, of another spectator, one who rests awkwardly against her own point of view as we see it. The film's 'modernism' is in its expressiveness of Rossellini's experience and not of a narratively structured story aligned to the characters. We share Katherine's view with

another spectator who is not occupied but with whose repertoire we are familiar. This is a pre-echo of Antonioni's embodiment in his camerawork of an on-looking 'stranger' accompanying the characters themselves, a sense of dislocation, of separateness, of isolation.

Bazin's love of reality is akin to Stokes' love of the stone and more generally of the art object as independent and autonomous in the carving mode. The notion of a love of reality so central to Bazin's aesthetic which he recognised and embraced and tended in Italian neo-realism is too often ignored as a soft-centred subjectivism on the part of critics and artists. But it cannot be shunted to one side without these films collapsing into formalism or social realism. Love here is to be understood as whole-object love, as love embedded in the carving and depressive position. That is, a love, as Freud describes it, which is not one of a voracious possession and massive swamping of the love-object with the lover's own desires, beliefs and feelings, but a love which must fight for its contemplation and engagement with the object of the love on its own terms and against any vacuous idealisation or omnipotent denigration in the name of 'realism', both part-object based attitudes born of splitting and pre-reality principle strategies.

It is the strength and power of Rossellini that, in a handful of his films, he achieves the most potent and redemptive of phantasies through an engagement with reality. The constructionist desire to impress us with the fact that film is not simply a reproduction of the real has overshadowed the fact that the photographic image is of something which was in front of the camera and, at a certain level, is always unmediated, unlike painting's intrinsic mediation. Critiques of Rossellini's loyalty to so-called 'illusionism', as we have seen in earlier chapters, are founded on false premises about what constitutes illusion so-called in film. What can be asserted is that Rossellini largely uses a unified perspectival space just as Godard uses perspective but does not aim to situate his characters, objects, etc. in any comfortable way with perspective. (Nevertheless, each of his shots inevitably complies with perspective for if they did not we would not see anything at all!) But more profoundly, like Renoir, Rossellini deals in an openness, a display of the world, in contrast to the compulsive narrowing straits of Eisenstein, Welles or Godard.

In the early films of Rossellini and De Sica, Bazin encountered films which not only incorporated some of his ideas but also nurtured them. A filmic respect for the unity of space and time, the primacy of reality and importantly a love of reality were the cornerstones of Bazin's aesthetic; and if the latter has been treated as a naive aesthetic principle by some of his opponents it is because they have often ridden roughshod over the subtlety of the filmic image as a picture of reality, or as Cavell puts it 'of the world'.[22]

For Stokes, photography and, by implication, film are transparent media. At times, especially in *Venice* and his essay on Romanesque architecture, he is aware of the merits of the black-and-white photographic plates accompanying the text. Photography is always at the service of modelling values in

the objects in photographs, and well placed to stress them for the viewer. In reference to an Agostino bas-relief carving, for example, he is sensitive to the photograph of the carving as not properly representing its 'carving' values. On the other hand, it serves well as a Donatello 'modelling' piece. This is, of course, to do with black-and-white photography relying on shadowing to represent any object. I will discuss this at length in my chapter on black-and-white film. For Stokes, film can represent modelling and carving modes in its subject-matter, what it literally photographs. Stokes' idea of capturing 'reality' in this way is the same as Bazin's.

Bazin's realism was a development of the earlier French film theory found in Epstein's writings in which the concept of '*photogénie*' played an important part.[23] French film Impressionism of the 1920s celebrated the irreducibility of certain film images, in which there was 'the purest expression of cinema'.[24] It is fascinating to discover the antipathy on the part of French critics in the early years to the close-up and emerging shot-reverse-shot of American cinema. As Abel suggests, 'there was a generally held classical French attitude of moderation and balance'.[25] These characteristics were to remain part of Bazin's post-war aesthetic and, to a large degree, that of Metz and Barthes too. Realism was a strong aesthetic in the early film Impressionist period, which Abel judges may have had much to do with the strong realist tradition in nineteenth-century French literature and painting.[26] The French interest in scientific and documentary films in the same period is given a rather vague motivation, that of the 'power of representation as a means of knowledge'[27] in French culture, stemming, Abel states, from the Renaissance period. Whatever the truth of this explanation, no doubt French aesthetics at the time favoured a broadly realist stance, one it might be argued that they have never quite thrown off.

With the notion of *photogénie*, which circulated among film writers like Epstein, Aragon and others in the post-World War I years, realism took on a revelatory quality. If realist poetics involved the expression of the film-maker or of the narrative's characters, then with *photogénie*, the idea of the camera itself stripping reality to lay bare its essence came to the fore. Abel states that '[A]esthetic creation in the cinema . . . depended not on subjective invention but on the impassive camera eye's discovery of the new within the already given.'[28] What came to be stressed was a phenomenology of the film, but one that seemed to loot the film for ends not necessarily sympathetic to the film as a whole. In other words, the fragmented 'moments' or accidents of the film expressed its most aesthetic moments at the expense of the film's aesthetic coherence. Thus what was gained for phenomenology was lost for aesthetic judgement. An enthusiasm for the accidental (so central to surrealist thinking about films) abrogated any aesthetic responsibility. Or, to put it more sympathetically, the notion of the aesthetic itself became one that failed to deal with the film as a whole, as an intentional object, and more to do with the film's capacity to throw up specific, highly charged

experiences (epiphanies) regardless of artistic endeavour or even object coherence.[29]

Arnheim had already touched on film realism in 1933 when he remarked that:

> even in the simplest photographic reproduction of a perfectly simple object, a feeling for its nature is required which is quite beyond any mechanical reproduction.[30]

But Arnheim was also to advocate montage as the 'royal road to film art'.[31] And this 'feeling for its nature' was to dominate Bazin's writings when he touched upon the film camera's capturing of reality. Much of the phenomenological approach already discussed is at base a philosophical delineation of this very position, an attempt to understand what might be meant by the 'nature' of an object and how it is captured in film.

In Rossellini's *Paisa* in the final partisan sequence, there is a strong sense of the objectivity of things. Similarly, *Voyage in Italy* resonates with the 'thingness' of the world. Of many aesthetic locutions, the idea of thingness has been heavily criticised, at times rightly, for its obscurity, for its reliance on an idea of the ineffable, of reality as a 'given'. The main critique of 'thingness' has come from the Constructionists, from film theorists who believe that film is a construction which creates its own reality, space, time, thematics, etc. The connection between this view and the realism which uses the metaphors of reflection, mirror, window to portray the relationship between the camera and the world has been understood as a carrying forward of the ancient view of art as mimesis. In this way, realism has been a misnomer, for it has reduced a view which in fact has a fairly sophisticated ontology to one that is cited as being a conflation of the film with reality. None of the so-called realists like Bazin have ever believed such a simplistic notion.

Bazin's idea of the democratic framing and construction of the shot is what draws together such disparate directors as Welles, Wyler and Rossellini. For Bazin, the idea of the spectator being able to survey and choose their own position in the frame is unlike montage cinema which essentially draws the spectator into one and only one possible position. Implicit to Bazin's 'democratic spectator' is the idea that this is also a political and ethical gain as well as a purely narrative one. Of course, narrative and ethical position cannot be separated in such a way. It is intrinsic to Wyler that *The Best Years of Our Lives* is just that film which uses those framing methods and tactics of *mise en scène* for it is a narrative of moral ambiguity and freedom compared with other films of the period where moral blame (for example) is quite clearly assigned. This 'democratic' view rests on meanings already delivered to the spectator. We can assign more freely ethical judgement to characters without being constrained by the director's own restraints through his or her means of representation.

It is sometimes asserted that Wyler's organisation of a particular shot or sequence in terms of depth of shot, camera position and movement and dramatic organisation of actors is as manipulative, as limiting, as constraining as more montage-based film-making. A shot is always set up, actors are always organised, *mise en scène* is always chosen by the director. But this is to miss the point; all this criticism seems to suggest is that in the choice of any shot, constraint, limitation, etc. are present. If this is the case, then so it is for all cinema and, rather improbably, there are no real differences between individual directors or schools of film-making. This seems wrong-headed. There is in the work of the realists and other directors not associated with them (e.g. John Ford, Michael Powell) a less manipulative organisation of the narrative structure through the shot and other elements.

Bazin's views on the Italian neo-realist cinema are complex. Not only does he respond to its concern with the reality of post-war Italy and with its use of natural locations, non-professional actors, rather awkward editing techniques and indifference to close-ups and strong montage, he also identifies a humanism wherein art, in this case cinematic art, was not only a matter of a formalist notion of aesthetics but also that a particular aesthetics expressed or reflected a particular response to the world. This was largely to do with an artistic relationship to the world and to the artistic representation of that world. This should not be taken as a crass or simplistic realist position which only finds merit in the photographic reproduction of the world, for as his admiration for Welles and Wyler reveals, it embraces an emotional attitude. For Bazin, expressionism and montage of extreme kinds were intrinsically related to a psychological frame of mind which could be dictated by the individual but more than likely was determined by broader social and cultural values in specific societies in specific historical periods.

In other words, Bazin's sympathy for realism is more than a piece of film aesthetics. Bazin resisted a form of fragmentation in art which he associated with a certain psychology and ethics. The ambiguity of the image, the democratisation of the spectator's relationship to film, all the obvious aspects of Bazin's theory, are incorporated into a larger framework reflecting his cultural values themselves. Interestingly, he is at one with Stokes on some of these broader responses. Both disliked expressionism and were, to say the least, sceptical of the successes of surrealism. Both embraced a humanist standpoint against various forms of political radicalism of their day. Both emphasised the importance of love as a relationship which was determining of the form of representation achieved in art. And both believed in the transparency doctrine of film. I want to argue that there are many shared ideas in their work particularly about artistic form.

Roberto Rossellini's *Voyage in Italy* is perhaps one of the clearest expressions of the carving mode in film. The film has the merit of being set in Mediterranean Italy of the early 1950s. It is a film of light, of emotional *mise en scène* (where that means the opposite of a banal expressiveness of

emotion) and of the body in many forms – real, sculptural, skeletons, mummified remains and icons. Rossellini has stated that the film was important to him because it set out to express 'the variations in a couple's relationship under the influence of a third person: the exterior world surrounding them'.[32] It eschews drama yet is dramatic when recounted in words or as it exists as a script. This is largely due to Rossellini's method. A wealthy middle-class English couple visit Italy to arrange the sale of a house of a dead relative. They come face to face during their stay with a crisis in their marriage. Soon after agreeing to a divorce they are suddenly, even 'miraculously', reconciled. Many commentators have seen the marriage as badly on the rocks but in fact an attentive viewing seems to reveal the depiction of a couple who *do* love each other but have somehow lost sight of their love, which is different from a loveless relationship. On such a view the reconciliation at the end is much more credible. Interestingly, Alex, who is often viewed as the more blameworthy of the two and more alienated in the relationship, is told by a woman in a bar in Capri that he is still in love with his wife. There is also a civility between Katherine and Alex and casual respectfulness which is perhaps very middle-class English (as they talk of divorce, he offers his hand to her as she steps through doorways in the ruins; throughout the pitiful walk he guides her with his hand on her elbow). This bespeaks a way of being together, albeit an almost unconscious one, which has not been quite severed. A further testament to Alex's love is his dismal almost wilful failure with other women in the film, e.g. the married woman with the leg in plaster. Even the attractive but morbid prostitute fails to entice him.

If it is Katherine who experiences Italy's broader culture in her tourist trail, it is Alex who engages with contemporary middle-class Italy. Alex's encounters, although less traumatic than Katherine's, nevertheless are important if *Voyage in Italy* is to be just that. A crucial scene is Katherine's confession to Alex of her close friendship with a young poet who died a few years before. This 'thin, tall, fair' young man who was 'so pale and spiritual' in Katherine's words provokes jealousy in Alex. She recites one of his awful poems: 'Temple of the spirit / No longer bodies / But pure aesthetic image / Compared with which / mere thought / seems flesh, heavy, dim' (my attempt to parse). Interrupted by squabbling outside between a couple about to be married, she remarks that the period just before marriage is a sensitive time. This remark is associated with her story of how the poet had visited her in her garden at dead of night on the day before she married Alex. Alex is disturbed as if for the first time he knows that he was, and perhaps still is, competing with another man. We are also sympathetic, as it seems is the director, to Alex's dismissal of Katherine's dead poet, even if the tone of contempt is unnecessary. Katherine's experiences after this scene, which occurs early in the film, are a kind of working through of this morbid Romanticism, an idealising phantasy.

This memory-phantasy is also continually undercut by her meeting with ageing male guides and the concreteness of the emblems of the past which she visits – the museum, the geysers, the ruins – all of which leave her frustrated, disappointed and on edge. The harsh, cruel reality mocks her. What she had held as an ideal is now in tatters and a despair begins to take a grip of her as this defensive shell is seen to be so empty. What fills the space is a wayward and perverse love and sexuality which in the interrupted conversation with her husband after the museum visit, she begins to address when she speaks of the sculpture's 'lack of modesty'. There is a strong hint here of ascetic idealism being replaced by physical expression of love. Her husband warms to her enthusiastic insights and, as they move to dinner, his arm about her waist, there is a warmth between them that is unique in the film. It is immediately dispersed when she reminds him of how mean he can be and that it is his fault if they don't enjoy their vacation. The moment is lost, never to be recovered until the final brief scene. Their conversation returns to property and money.

But the film is also an engagement of sorts with the classical tradition – its art, its architecture, myths and history. Commentators who have interpreted Katherine as being angry with these incidents fail to catch her real tone, perfectly expressed in Bergman's voice and mannerisms, which is one of weary confirmation of her view of men; a tiresomeness and ironic sarcasm at times. It is only on the walk through the ruins, in the penultimate sequence of the film, that a despair seems to touch them both, but especially Katherine with her memorable cry, 'Life is so short'. Here in the ruins, with the physical traces of the long-past eruption of Vesuvius behind them, Rossellini's couple – Alex, the unsatisfied socialite of Capri and Naples, and Katherine, the thwarted mother – re-enact a modern-day Giorgionesque Arcadia. Except that their autonomous worlds are ones of dissatisfaction: Alex is not a carefree young man, and Katherine is not a woman with an infant at her breast. Quite the contrary.

There is an awkwardness in the film which is due to an inseparable bond between the mode of playing by the main actors – Ingrid Bergman and George Sanders – and the openness of the film's own construction. The narrative is episodic and almost fragmented, except in the emotional flow of the film, its formal encapsulation of the narrative. Scenes of 'moments' between the couple and between themselves and others are more important than any unravelling of a narrative structure as such. It is a film in which expression relies on the merging of its form and content. To this extent it is a film which merits constant return.

Whilst it deals with confused and, at times, ambivalent emotions in its central characters, nevertheless it has a hardness (in the Poundian sense) and clarity in its economy of detail, its assuredness of providing the most stable and sharply outlined image of its form. Peter Brunette has discussed the episodic nature and 'awkwardness' of the film's construction:

all the film's dramatic moments are consistently undercut. Nor is there much plot to speak of – a marriage is breaking up under the strains of a trip to Italy, and we watch; little else happens.

Apparently superficial detail, however – the smallest, most fleeting facial expressions, for example – assumes enormous proportions, as it does in the work of Dreyer, Mizoguchi and Bresson.[33]

Brunette rightly feels that the 'film emphasizes rhythm, suggestion and nuance' and that the film's *longueurs* and its lack of a 'snappy montage' could not have been altered for 'the surface of life is its depths'. But Brunette, like many other commentators, does not do full justice to the visual aspect of the film, a kind of imaging we find in Rossellini's work. For example, in one of the film's most evocative scenes of despair, in which mortality and the finality of things pervade, the couple retreat to their car from the excavation to which they have been invited to witness a couple who suffocated centuries ago in the ashes of Vesuvius. We are not treated to anything like a close-up. The camera keeps its distance, switching from medium to long shots. In eight long shots the couple walk through the ruins with none of the grace of Hollywood productions. Bergman seems unsteady on her feet (Alex always gallant helps her through the doorways) and close to physical as well as mental breakdown. If the film was constructed according to conventional rules, a cut could have been made between the few moments of conversation which occur *en route* to the car. But it is their banal walk through the ruins, the shells of ancient buildings, streets and passageways which have not yet been rendered monuments, to the accompanying refrain of Renzo Rossellini's well-judged music suggestive of the Neapolitan street songs she has heard in her visits to the town, that stand as the images of mortality, of the transitoriness and yet profound centrality of conscious, civilised life. But in a moment of this walk as they enter the ancient 'street' in medium long shot and separate to either side of the screen, the film comes close visually to Giorgione's *Tempesta*: the man and woman on either side of the screen divided by memories, failure and the inability to communicate.

   This sequence is almost a blueprint for Antonioni's alienated characters, especially his women (notably Monica Vitti's characters) but Rossellini resists this collapse into a form of modernist subjectivism. But there are clear differences between the two directors here. Antonioni's Vitti-figures are points of consciousness, of sensibilities sharpened to the point of being somewhat ethereal, not complete and grounded. Katherine's life, on the other hand, is a much more mundane one. She has a fuller and more explicable sense of Angst, which is quite clearly delineated, the result of a failing marriage. Rossellini's couple remain social, communicators, hopeful, outward looking – Rossellini's landscapes and cityscapes are not simply symbols of mental states, they are unalterably themselves and are resistant to his characters,

demanding understanding or suffering indifference, but they *are* existent and not concoctions of the characters' minds.

Rossellini's technique of showing Katherine and the object of her look in the same shot, moving in small swivels or pans, makes us witnesses of her perplexed state and not identical with it (whatever that would mean, as a point-of-view shot is simply that – an *optical* effect) and underpins the thereness of the world depicted for Katherine and for us. It also represents Rossellini's own expressivity. Similarly, Katherine's mental turmoil is 'objective'. It is not to be assimilated to any psychologism. When we do not see what she sees, as happens in her drives through Naples, it is because we do not need to. We need to see instead her emotional state and with no privileged access, except what we would have in life: that is, we hear her expressions, her mutterings, see facial expressions, her body stance, her history, and so forth, but we have no privileged access.

Voyage in Italy can be experienced as being about the 'civilising' of two English people, not simply in the sense of an education in cultural objects – museums, archaeological sites, etc. – but rather an entry into a full and wholesome relationship with life itself as opposed to living it at one remove, here personified by their marital breakdown and inability to communicate properly, and partaking fully in the world itself. Their acquisition and rapid sale of the Italian villa are symptoms of their self-absorption. It is important to say that it is not the couple's frustration with Italian life, so much as the aspects of Italian life they choose to experience, only to find themselves impotent before their choice. Katherine's 'aestheticism' and Alex's 'worldliness' are respectively neither aesthetic nor worldly. Both end up in distorted conversations with themselves – Katherine playing solitaire on the sofa, Alex attempting to have sex with a prostitute who, in offering him her own experience, puts him off sex. Alex and Katherine's failure lies partly, one suspects, in their love for each other, thwarting their attempts to reject the other and embrace their own inevitable phantasies of the world.

The film avoids the dramatic temporality of narrative. As tourists the couple's time is governed by their whims and self-indulgences, the everyday structures of life do not impose themselves. As for anyone on holiday, time and the normal rhythms of everyday existence are suspended. Instead their relationship becomes static and objectified in other things – a visit to the museum, the picking-up of a prostitute, the quarrel over who uses the car, and so forth. In Stokes' sense of the emblematic, *Voyage in Italy* betrays some of the qualities associated with the notion of the emblem. The film depicts surfaces, not psychological 'depths'.

Similarly, the film's style accentuates a stillness, in the almost hard-edged composition of the shots where abstraction threatens. For example, when they come out onto the huge verandah, the hot white of the stonework stands against the velvet shadows in the harsh Mediterranean sun (as it does in *The Bicycle Thieves*, *Paisa* and other Italian black-and-white neo-realist films of the post-war years). To do justice to the image as such and not to

disassociate it from the narrative is to connect with the film's deepest impulses. In *Voyage to Italy* 'things stand' as Stokes claimed. This is due in part to the shooting techniques of medium shot and long shot and framing, but even more to the Mediterranean light which suffuses the film. In this scene on the verandah, the shot's composition is established through light, shadow and stone.

In reply to the critics who claimed that 'the Naples which it [*Voyage in Italy*] depicts is incomplete' Bazin remarked:

> [T]his reality is only a small part of the reality that might have been shown, but the little one sees – statues in a museum, pregnant women, an excavation at Pompeii, the tail-end of the procession of Saint Januarius – has the quality of wholeness.[34]

This 'quality of wholeness' is achieved in part by Rossellini giving us Naples '"filtered" through the consciousness of the heroine'. This is the wholeness of a character's mental point of view, but there is also the director's wholeness of view. That is, the director has rendered the image well-defined, clear and objective. Bazin goes on: '[I]t is rather a mental landscape at once as objective as a straight photograph and as subjective as pure personal consciousness.'[35] This 'straight photograph' is the notion of emblematic as I wish to apply it to the film. The meaning of the film is on the face of it, so to speak and this is as it should be. *Voyage in Italy's* Stokesian aesthetic lies in its tendency to outwardness, its anti-psychologism, its notion of things in space in a basic thereness with no false dramatic symbolism or 'meaning'. As we shall see, such an aesthetic would be richly developed in Antonioni's films.

The primacy of appearances in Bazin has caused major problems for commentators and film theorists. His celebration of a realist ontology of film achieved through mechanical reproduction reality as opposed to the constructivist view of film meaning established through the relationship between images, has been unfashionable for many years. In retrospect there has always been a gnawing problem as to how the real can be excluded from an understanding of film.

Bazin's letter to Guido Aristarco defending Rossellini is one of the most perceptive pieces written on the director. It provides us with one of the most succinct and convincing accounts of what he meant by a neo-realist cinema. It was not simply a movement of a particular period, but an approach to film which connected a particular relationship of film as a record of the real to a profound humanism.

Michelangelo Antonioni

Antonioni's films develop aspects of Rossellini's aesthetic into a more extreme mode. It is as if for Antonioni *Voyage to Italy* is a blueprint, a foundation stone for his sense of female alienation, of space and landscape assigned a character,

or of landscape being a projection of a character's mental life. As a further example of the carving trait in film, especially as it owes to a form of realism, the work of Michelangelo Antonioni must loom large. Not only does he take the earlier neo-realist impulse of the postwar years into a different period (the late 1950s and early 1960s), especially in the notable films *Chronicle of a Love* (*Cronaca di un amore*) (1950), *L'avventura* (1959), *La notte* (1960), *L'Eclisse* (1962), *The Red Desert* (1964) and *Blow Up* (1966), but he imbues that realism, transforming it with a modernist sensibility which distances it, although not ultimately or finally, from his fellow film-makers, Fellini and Pasolini. No other director comes as close to a Stokesian aesthetic of the autonomy of the image, its thereness, nor is as creatively delivered to the spectator.

For Rohdie, 'all his [Antonioni's] films' are given 'a concreteness and immediacy of image combined with a vagueness of meaning'.[36] He remarks further that '[T]he image is not the consequence of a thought, but the thought itself taking shape':[37]

> the heart and subject of his films are not with the fiction as a narrative of events, nor with the 'realities' screened, but somewhere between the two, in which the fiction becomes an objective set of events which Antonioni 'finds' as they take place, recording them and his feelings towards them, maintaining, simultaneously, a spontaneity and a distance.[38]

Intimated here is the whole- and part-object aspect of his cinema in the more enveloping 'spontaneity', yet with respect held for the distance of sub-ject-matter. Antonioni, reviewing Visconti's *La terra trema*, admired:

> [M]ovements of the camera that always seem to discover something even if it is only an expression, a gesture; shots that say something even if what they describe is a state of mind, an interior feeling.[39]

Rohdie attempts a summary of some of the most powerful images in Antonioni's work:

> the fascination with water, with a surface, which, though pierced, swallows things up, without a trace, into a nothingness: the loss of figuration, of objects losing shape, and the shimmering between that loss and the figure itself, like a corpse, or an image; a subjectivism, but distanced, 'objective'.[40]

This subjective objectivism recalls Bazin's remark about Rossellini. It is also a reminder of my broader thesis of modelling and carving, the respect for the art object as an independent object which is yet an invitation to the spectator.

Interestingly, although Stokes loved cinema, he rarely referred to it, especially in the post-war writings when he took a more censorious view of it as

a 'dream-screen'. When he did write on it, it is about a single figure, Antonioni. From Stokes' remark made in his book *The Invitation in Art,* we can assume that he had seen much of the director's work to that point when he was writing in 1965.[41] The context for the reference is to some extent enigmatic:

> Some complain that popular culture is so 'material' and overlook the dispiriting 'spiritual' reference imputed to man-made materials surrounding us. But aspects of our new metropolitan environment are of considerable and exciting beauty. Things, I have said, are far better than they were. The fascination is considerable, the fascination of modern Milan, let us say, revealed in an Antonioni film. Almost everywhere light and shadow can bestow beauty, a *mis-en-scène* so often lacking in London.[42]

The ellipsis between the final two sentences is suggestive. Stokes probably had *La notte* in mind. Shot in Milan, the film's use of light and shadow is exemplary. It is suffused like much Italian monochrome film with the light Stokes associated with the Mediterranean in which 'things stand' and, in Antonioni's case, this objectness of things acquires a unique status within his work, only hinted at in other directors' (Hitchcock, Lang, Sirk) films, although it does find its place in some of the work of the film avant-garde (Godard, Snow, Gidal, Warhol *etal.*). But Godard's swirling coffee cups and cars burning in corn fields are more often than not metaphysical or discursive gestures, and at their worst shallow, stylistic tics. On the other hand, Antonioni's much debated final montage sequence in *L'Eclisse* is of a piece with the rest of the film in its sense of space, of figures in and out of space, its paradoxical, engaged disinterestedness.

As we have seen with regard to Rossellini, and as we shall see with Dreyer, the role of perspective and thus of space in the film frame is crucial for Antonioni. While the long shot of figures in the landscape or cityscape is to be found in the latter's work, so are montage sequences and close-ups as, for example, in *L'Eclisse*. In other words, the carving mode is not simply to be identified with the Bazinian realist style. In fact, it is in Antonioni's sense of space that he establishes enormous distance between himself and the neo-realists. A modernist approach is not only a question of subject-matter – the alienated Monica Vitti female of the so-called trilogy – but also one of the relationship between figures, landscape, screen, spectator and director. We only have to witness how Antonioni in *The Red Desert* used the flattening effect of the telephoto lens at the same time as he introduced colour to understand his desire to express space in the most complex way in relation to his subject matter. If Giuliani in *The Red Desert* is the most desperately neurotic of his women characters, the most cut off from reality and the possibilities of action, then such a flattened space suits Antonioni's purposes well.[43]

To return to *L'Eclisse*, P. Adams Sitney remarks on its reflection of the Italian economic and political climate and world current affairs, at the time

especially the East–West tensions hinted at in the nuclear war fears of the newspaper headlines glimpsed in the final montage sequence.[44] He also stresses the role architecture plays throughout the film – in the ancient building of the Roman Borsa and the new buildings being constructed at the time in Milan, the old and the new, aristocracy and new capital. Wedged in between, socially, are those like Vittoria and her lower-middle-class gambling mother.

Vittoria has just broken up with her intellectual lover and is trying to gain solace from her mother who habituates the Rome stock exchange. There she meets Piero, her mother's stockbroker, with whom she has a fleeting relationship which, at the end of the film, seems to have come to an end. As far as Antonioni allows, our sympathies with and our experience of the film are served by the heroine Vittoria, played by Monica Vitti who also plays the female lead of *L'Avventura* and *The Red Desert*. An uneasy, ultimately unhappy figure who seems to be the site of irreconcilable urges and desires, Vittoria is the sole figure in the film who acts as the conduit between consciousness and the world. All the other characters seem firmly ensconced in the determinations of character, life-style, careers and desires – Riccardo wants Vittoria, Piero wants money and professional success and, in some vaguer way, he also wants Vittoria. His failure, if that is what it is, to meet her at the end either belies this, or testifies to his ability to guess that Vittoria would not turn up anyway, which may be his knowing that she knows that he does not want her enough. Her mother wants to keep poverty from the door by neurotically indulging in the very practice (gambling) which will invite it in. Marta simply wants to return to Kenya.

Sitney makes the point that Vittoria is always caressing objects, by which activity she draws out of them all meaning.[45] There is, then, a sensory, sensual and emotive (ambivalent) experiencing depicted through Vittoria which she shares with no other, and which isolates her from all other characters and thus from the world. Objects are moments of petty trauma, which fatally include, as she points out, men: 'There are days when holding a piece of cloth, a needle, a book, a man, all are the same thing.' The scene is shot in the theatrical chiaroscuro of naturalism. In a bizarre scene when she meets the colonialist Marta, Vittoria's rootedness in the world and abeyance of meaning are forcefully addressed by Antonioni. Marta is surrounded by objects from Kenya, objects imbued with her sense of past pleasures and present loss. Vittoria bursts this nostalgic racist bubble by using the objects to dress up as a Kenyan and acting out the stereotype of the native. Her intuition, however racist, betrays the shallowness of the colonialist's reality – a fantasy of pretence, of dressing up, of 'acting out' in a culture in which the reality of the black majority is reduced to the animal (they are monkeys).

The opening sequence of *L'Eclisse*, depicting the break-up of the relationship between Vittoria and her lover, Riccardo, exemplifies a certain placement of the spectator in Antonioni's film. Very few scenes in his films construct such a complex set of relations of space and how characters *are* in that

space. We are presented with a series of shots of the two characters and sometimes of objects. There is a tendency in the sequence to film Vittoria with her back to camera, often turning to reveal her face and to look off-shot at Riccardo, or is it into space? For the cut after such a shot is to Riccardo looking at her although eyeline matches are awry and give the impression of people looking at but not seeing each other. It is as if they are gazing past each other, which in fact they may be doing as Antonioni's camerawork and editing are ambiguous.

Geoffrey Nowell-Smith understands this sequence as capturing the feeling of characters who have spent the night awake, arguing, and through lack of sleep their perceptions are 'subtly altered'. He comments on how the sequence expresses the 'tense exhaustion of the characters'.[46] This seems quite true. But the scene also makes us again subtly aware of the director's hand in the scene. What Nowell-Smith describes as a scene in which the spectator may feel its unnaturalness, at the same time makes us aware of its construction, of the director establishing a space in which both the characters and the spectators have different experiences, so that our own disjointed viewpoint – encouraged by the lack of establishing shot, the refusal to show the two characters together in a shot, the mismatched eyelines, and so forth – establishes a space in the room which we occupy, a space akin to but not the same as that occupied by the characters. This space is not strictly speaking a space identified within the physical space portrayed, for that is never quite coherent or unified, but an imaginary space so to speak. In other words, the camera angles themselves – one a few inches from the floor, another at the height of a low table and, more astonishingly, one just above the head of the standing Vittoria – suggest a disjointed but accumulative gathering together of bits of space and of bits of character perceptions. Within this fragmented space is the restless energy and vivacious blonde hair and face of Vittoria. Forever prowling, moving about the room, turning this way and that, momentarily resting her gaze on this and that and sometimes on Riccardo, Vittoria is without doubt the seat of consciousness in the sequence. It would seem to be her space that is being constructed and which we share but never occupy as she does. It is important that Antonioni does not allow the sequence to become one in which the spectator comes to share Vittoria's position here in any full sense. Of course, we come to understand her restless frustration and hesitancies, her reluctance to hurt Riccardo and her underlying determination to leave him however much she seems to qualify her determination with moments of reaching out to him. But we are experiencing these feelings and attitudes somehow in the space about her and these feelings are conjoined with others related to this space.

'Alienation' may seem to be the word to use to describe the meaning of the sequence (and perhaps the film as a whole) but, as Nowell-Smith remarks, the notion of 'alienation' is too strong, too definable and specific, for Vittoria is experiencing no more and no less what anyone else would in such a painful

situation. She feels distant from things, unable to find a place in the room in which she can rest. But this is easily explained by the fact that she wants to get away from the situation, to be done with the moment of separation. She does not want to come to rest and adopt the position of her lover, who sits at his desk, watching her. To do so would be to weaken her resolve to leave him.

On the face of it, Antonioni's film trilogy, with its slow pacing, deep focus and medium-range camerawork on a wide screen, may seem to confirm his place in the art of carving values, but this would be to ignore the role of more attacking elements associated with the incantatory in art, with the invitation in art. In *L'Eclisse*'s opening sequence this incantatory mode is established I suggest by two means. First, the blocking of the sequence in terms of a fragmented space over which there is no overall viewpoint except at the end of the sequence when Vittoria draws back the curtains. The sequence resembles a montage of shots which are spatially juxtaposed and follow none of the obvious conventions of eyeline matching. Second, and most obviously although not often mentioned, is the framing and physical and dramatic attributes of the actress, Monica Vitti. If the framing and editing of the sequence refuse a certainty of vantage point for the spectator, if the room's parts endlessly become the subject-matter of a casual framing that seems to suggest that what we want to know about this painful break-up is not there to be provided – how could it be in the words and actions of characters like this? – then Vittoria fleshed out by Vitti is the light in the room, the radiance gathering up the parts. Her blonde hair, long pale face and translucent eyes mitigate the darkness, the shadows of the room. Her twisting and turning, volte-faces, fluttering hand movements, her refusal to settle, to look at any-thing purposefully are a rhythm within the scene at odds with the hard-edged editing and cluttered *mise en scènes* of many of the shots. Riccardo sits at his desk and, shot from standing head-height. Almost merges in his dark still-ness with the shadows; he is hardly more than a thing among things.[47] But it is also important that Vitti's physical attributes are achieved in black and white. For Vitti's luminosity is not so apparent in colour. The graphic composition is enhanced and is the *raison d'être* of the black-and-white photography.

Fascinatingly, *L'Eclisse* begins with a *tour-de-force* of an interior peopled by two characters and ends with a *tour-de-force* of an exterior lacking two characters. In both sequences – although the final sequence is more obviously a montage – there is an effort to embrace the parts thrown apart, to draw back together in some moment of restoration what has been torn asunder. Antonioni characteristically struggles for an environment in which objects themselves can be respected and given a beauty denied them in urban life. His admission that objects have as much importance as characters in his films supports this idea.

But the phantasies operative in Antonioni's film are not ones to be simply aligned to the characters' emotional and mental states – we can find that in

any melodrama – rather it is the feelings, experiences of the director's presentation of the artwork. Antonioni seems to confirm this by giving Vittoria's mother a fairly straightforward motivational narrative role. Her problems and neurotic envy channelled through her stock exchange obsessiveness are the stuff of naturalist cinema and literature. She is the polar opposite of her daughter who seems directionless and at times incapable of any substantial intentional acts. (In an odd way, Antonioni expresses the same view in his handling of Monica Vitti's Claudia in *L'Avventura* by making her obsessively motivated in her search for Anna, which is also oddly blind and renders her just as motiveless at root as Vittoria.)

In Stokesian terms, *L'Eclisse* and *L'Avventura* are both attempts to show the possibility of existence in an urban environment of a country whose role in European civilisation in terms of notions of architecture, art, etc. is central.[48] As Nowell-Smith points out, Antonioni does render beautiful the modern buildings, streets, etc. of contemporary Italian city-life. We can compare the confidence of Rossellini and de Sica in depicting Italian exteriors. The famous Italian light suffuses, spreads with equanimity over all beings, a truly democratic light befitting the socially progressive neo-realist school. Roy Armes has spoken in relation to the Italian neo-realist film of a style 'virtually free from chiaroscuro effects or expressionist devices and which at times – as with Rossellini – achieved an almost newsreel simplicity'.[49] It is notable how much Antonioni sets himself against such an aesthetic, although at times it works for him, as in *L'Avventura*, which involves key exteriors and importantly is set in Sicily. Using black-and-white photography which exemplifies the saturation of light and the presence or non-presence of shadow (when shadow exist, it is of the richest black), many of the Italian films of the monochromatic period have reaped strong pictorial advantages from this accident of geography.[50] In France, too, one could cite Renoir (see *Une partie de campagne*), who equally benefited from the Southern light or at least took advantage of full sunlight. In Britain one must seek such films as Powell and Pressburger's *A Canterbury Tale*, especially the pastoral scene between the young couple in the high summer fields of wartime Kent. Stokes describes Italian light in *Stones of Rimini*:

> a luminous whiteness . . . common to sea, to road, to house. Stone gleams, the dust is white: what is of dark hue is dark, what is darker is blacker without mitigation.

In the Mediterranean lands, for Stokes, in such a light 'things stand'. This light is at one with the projection screen's luminosity and preserves its luminosity and retains its integrity as a lit surface. In such a way de Sica's *Bicycle Thieves*, Rossellini's *Paisà* and *Voyage in Italy*, and Rosi's *Salvatore Giuliano* all exemplify the carving mode in cinema. In other words, they represent whole-object values – wholeness, restoration, a just love.

Much has been made of Antonioni's handling of narrative, his ambivalence in relation to the traditional notion of a story as a series of events. Antonioni seems especially to question the status of events both pictorially and motivationally for characters. Rohdie picks out Antonioni's rendering of narrative figures to the status of objects themselves which he argues is achieved in part by Antonioni's placement of figures in landscapes, townscapes, rooms such that it is not a matter of the fairly psychologistic representation of character's feeling (alienation) although that association is firmly there. Nor is it simply the director wanting to establish a closer relationship between his characters and their environment, but as Rohdie suggests, it is as if the camera remaining on or drifting towards an object or space creates a point in the narrative at which it begins to dissolve or lose its momentum and in a way its importance, its centrality. Rohdie also suggests that these moments raise the status of the image *qua* image as opposed to image as depiction of narrative movement or understanding so that they become 'a source of fascination without the need for a narrative anchor'.[51] No doubt there is an oscillation here between narrative and imagery but one that never collapses into a mere pictorialism or narrative prop. But what seems central here is Antonioni's notion of filmic space and thus of space *per se*.

In *L'Eclisse*, as in much of the director's work, it is not easy to assign the film's sensibility to a particular character as if the urban landscape of *The Red Desert* is somehow to be understood as expressive of Giuliana's neurotic mental state, similarly we may ask if *L'Eclisse* is reducible to a portrait so to speak of Vittoria's 'alienated state'. In fact, the way that Antonioni places a character at the 'centre' of his narrative and yet does not construct her as the centre of the imaging of the film (refusing such point-of-view cinema) makes such a view deeply suspect. Why not believe that the film is the world of the narrative portrayed by the director in which the character exists? In looking at a Vermeer interior do we want to assign in the same way the depiction of that interior as simply expressive of the figure's mental states? Surely these are expressive of the depiction of the subject-matter? *The Red Desert* remains the film which many critics have understood, more justifiably, in precisely this way. This is partly one believes because of Antonioni's antirealist use of colour which implies that it is Giuliana's world we see as if through her eyes. But then, as I have suggested, the film is not constructed in such a way as to support such a view. Also Pasolini pointed out that Antonioni's 'delirious vision of aestheticism' identified with Giuliana's neuroticism cannot be complete as these heightened colour compositions are used even when Giuliana is not on screen.[52] We can either believe that this is simply a slippage on the director's part or that Giuliana was always only a figure in Antonioni's 'vision' and that the 'delirious vision' is Antonioni's and not Giuliana's.

Of course, Antonioni's female protagonists are not to be dismissed. On the contrary, they are seats of consciousness at least in the four films in question.

But they are consciousness to which we are not given full access. If there is a radical aspect to his cinema, then it lies in his break with the cinema's traditional naturalistic drama. Antonioni deploys figures, objects and environments so that there is a tension between whole-object and part-object renditions. An ultimately satisfying sense of completeness in his work lies very much in his unclouded placement of figures so that they are integral elements in the *mise en scène*, rendered in spatial relationships which do not fragment the film in the service of psychologistic film devices of shot-reverse-shots, eyeline matches which in order to achieve narrative fluidity damage the integrity of the figure and setting. This is not achieved by Antonioni in a long-static-shot aesthetic which would totally deaden his work in its defensiveness, its inability to attack the film-object.[53] Rather, as we have noted in discussing the scenes that top and tail *L'Eclisse*, he struggles to establish a sustaining reparative relationship between figure and environment. The envelopment encountered in these films is largely one of space as fragmented, but these are not fragments as met in typical montage cinema, of parts but often of wholes.

In the famous village sequence in *L'Avventura*, for example, it is a long-shot montage which accommodates the figures. This sequence creates a space which is not broken down, but is a series of wholes which, although they express fragmentation with their deep slow bass tone of incantation, gather us into the film. But at the same time, they establish a sense of a wholeness which is not facilely produced by conventional establishing shots and spatio-temporal match-cutting (established through eyelines, reverse shots or 'cohesive' editing). In the spectatorial space which this creates we come to occupy the vision of the film-maker which is anything but synonymous with the perceptions and feelings of the characters. What such an aesthetic evokes is an understanding within the film which is dispersed across the film and entails complex feelings associated with the characters (however ambiguous) and with the feelings embodied in the image itself.

Dalle Vacche's attempt to read particular painters and styles of painting into Antonioni's films, especially *The Red Desert*, is an ill-founded project. The problems of painting – oil or other plastic material on canvas – and those of filming – moving photographs of the world – are quite different. Where she makes comparisons between painters they are of theme and schematic composition, ignoring the obvious lack of similarity between the different means of representation. For example, Mario Sironi's naive primitivist work from the example Vache is barely a comparison with the images of *The Red Desert*.[54] Simply to associate figures set in an urban landscape in separate works does not address the quite particular modes of representation in either work, modes which in fact are crucial to the distinctiveness of Antonioni's work.[55]

Rohdie and others rightly stress Antonioni's interest in surfaces, both within the film – walls, faces, landscapes – and of the film itself. Film is

a two-dimensional medium which, through its photographic quality, can readily achieve what in painting took centuries: the representation of three dimensions, objects in space. But, equally, it created, as if by magic, movement itself. It is through colour that these two surfaces come almost to intertwine. In *The Red Desert* colour presents Antonioni with an aesthetic possibility which the earlier *L'Eclisse* could not achieve. The opening shot of *The Red Desert* with its blurred, flattened telephoto-lens space of gas flames and oil refinery leads one to consider its intense painterly quality. But it is unlike painting too and a new means of ascribing to film such 'painterly' effects must be found in order to avoid reducing film to painting.

Carl Dreyer

If the Italian directors express a certain kind of exteriority – the geography, landscape and climate of their country – then Dreyer's films discussed here are marked by an interiority, domestic spaces, interlocking rooms and passageways where darkness and an object-based luminosity dominate.

Dreyer works within a Northern European tradition of luminous light. But he also explores both of its extremes – the stark chiaroscuro of *Day of Wrath* and the luminous 'white and grey' of *Gertrud*. For Truffaut, Dreyer was the filmmaker of 'whiteness'. Dreyer's films fulfil some of the conditions of the carving mode and upset others. In *Gertrud*, for example, the long medium shot and static camera would seem to provide a film aesthetic completely at odds with the fragmented charms of modelling cinema. But in its use of light, its acting/performance techniques and general *mise en scène*, *Gertrud* acquires a luminous, ethereal quality that differentiates it significantly from any loose conception of a carved 'realist' cinema. There is also a narrative centred on Gertrud herself, which is quite disturbing in its portrayal of a sensibility, more than a character, whose notion of love betrays a strong idealisation and masochism quite different from anything possible within a simply naturalist narrative.

Gertrud, resembling in this *Jeanne D'Arc*, is a film that articulates a space around its heroine who fails in an odd way to occupy it. It is as if she emanates space itself. Around Gertrud, the ghosts and wraiths who are her lovers/ex-lovers gather, find existence as tangible beings, alone occupying space and time as if condemned to existence. Achieved partly through lighting, there is a suffused, evenly textured, light, which illuminates all surfaces so that even with deep perspective, as in the piano/dinner sequence, the lack of shadow means that the depth of space in which she sings is not delineated. The effect is a soft, unworldly luminous space determined by persons, objects and architecture and not by the chiaroscuro effects which would greatly heighten the realism of the scene, in fact, and allow it too much reality. Thus even deep space does not have the feeling of depth, for the lighting with its equal dispersion flattens it out.

Of course, the film is a faint, sensitive *trace* of an existence – one made palpable by Gertrud's desires, her regrets, her idealisation, her nursing of a love which is in the end egotistical, narcissistic. The camera rarely moves, and characters rarely catch each other's eyes.[56] The dialogue is stilted and delivered in a monotonous, trance-like fashion. There is a continual looking off into space – off shot – and a stasis which is like a slowed-down theatricality, reminding us of Michael Fried's thoughts on the beholder and theatricality in the paintings of Jean Baptiste Greuze. Gertrud's personality, her speech enunciated slowly as if in a hypnotic state, is introspective, her voice almost that of the somnambulist, divorced from ordinary discourse and events. This shimmering negation, so to speak, is achieved through the opposite ends of his use of close-up to carve Joan of Arc out from her surrounding world. *Jeanne d'Arc* shares an equal obsession with *Gertrud*'s creation of a space for Jeanne too never quite exists. One could suggest that both films, but especially *Gertrud*, are phantasy-like. The world of the film is the heroine's and to that extent the world does not exist except for her. We are spectators of her world and not of her in the world.

Compare Gertrud with the heroine of *Day of Wrath* and the latter film's use of light. *Day of Wrath's* heroine is also a source of light in the film, but she is equally a source of dark. Shot with chiaroscuro lighting effects in stark black and white, its monochromaticism is apt for the colourless world of Puritan garb and judgements. Monochromatic scale reflects its moral tone. It symbolises a world in which there is the constant threat of slippage into moral and literal darkness. This is no more emphasised than in the outdoor scenes with the young lovers which have an unreal, detached quality within the film's overall visual feel. The countryside of trees, streams and fields represents an otherworldly environment, an ideal which is 'other', so that it has the quality of dream, an unreal existence when set against the sinister shadowy interiors of the pastor's home. The rural scenes of snatched love are an ideal possible through the almost incestuous love of the young couple. This is an ethereal affair fitting for Gertrud.

In Noel Burch's brilliant essay on Dreyer, he comments on how *Gertrud* makes the spectator aware of its representational cinematic mode, that is, 'the projection on a *flat surface* of an *image of depth*'.[57] It is interesting how this denial of a conventional cinematic space usually provided by sharper contrasts in lighting so that objects and characters take more substantial shape through shadowing, providing volume and perspectival depth, and also by editing, such as shot-reverse-shot by which the spectator is implicated in different volume of a particular space, leads to a condition close to the very basics of cinema itself, that is the projection of light onto a surface where shape and depth, that is, representation, are achieved by the closing down of light achieving dark areas and hence pictorial forms. At this level, as Burch rightly says, the film's drama and its form are forcefully and innovatively enmeshed.

But there is a wider point to be asserted here, one that concerns the spectator's 'involvement'. *Gertrud* eschews the conventional devices of the invitation in art, the drawing in of the spectator by the overpowering representations of close-up, shot-reverse-shot, perspective and chiaroscuro lighting. Instead, it depicts the individuality, the wholeness of persons and things, held in the static luminosity of the image. A carving whole-objectness is magnificently achieved almost at the cost of what is also integral to cinema – movement. Or so it would seem, for paradoxically what Dreyer's aesthetic does stress is movement. In its minimalism, its fragility, movement is just what is possible in such a taut construction of stillness and suffused light. It is movement, albeit slight, within the frame and not the movement of editing, which returns it to the premisses of cinema itself. Unlike Eisenstein who largely achieves movement by static shots which are then rapidly edited to suggest movement, Dreyer depicts genuine movement of character within the frame, albeit minimally.[58]

Tom Milne has remarked on the theme of 'persistence of love' in Dreyer's films,[59] and as he goes on to say, this love is 'beyond physical proximity, beyond time, even beyond the grave'.[60] One might argue, somewhat contrary to this view, that in *Gertrud* (and in *La Passion de Jeanne d'Arc*, 1928), an intense female denial is at the centre of a love that takes as its object an idealisation – of God and of men – but also, and more interestingly, takes as its object love itself. One of the major achievements of Dreyer is to portray this state of love by way of two quite different formal devices, both of which take space as their main thrust of representation. In *Jeanne d'Arc*, Dreyer, as Burch remarks, cuts the film in such a way that 'one is aware of an ambient space which one cannot see, which is never shown'.[61] In *Gertrud*, we are given the space through the medium/long static shots but flattened by low-key lighting, a flooding of the image, so that we cannot enter it, but are pushed out of it. There is no 'space' between the foreground and background, or if the shot is deep-focus, then it is flattened out by overall lighting and a propensity towards light greys and whites. One might almost claim it to be dead space where dead also suggests the self-inflicted, cold idealisation that passes for love in *Gertrud*. In *Jeanne d'Arc*, we are however given a way into the film, so to speak, through the close-up, through the expressivity of the heroine's facial gestures and those of her antagonists. Thus in *Jeanne d'Arc* balance between autonomy and otherness and the invitation in art is precisely in this tension between the pushing out of the elliptical cutting and the expressivity and relationships set up through acting often shot in overpowering close-up.

In *Gertrud*, on the other hand, the invitation is in the grey illuminated whiteness of the flattened spaces, accentuated in the long-held takes, often in long medium-shot. Rhode has suggested that this film is preoccupied with the 'optical trick' of placing tall characters in small rooms, marking an 'oppressive' effect. No doubt, the overpowering aspect of Dreyer's film, especially as they pertain to women characters, is part of his invitation, in

Gertrud, evoked through its lighting and flat design. What brings us back as viewers to otherness, to some kind of distancing, pulling us back from the cramped spaces of its inner light, even if only partially and never convincingly, is the slow rhythmic pacing of the acting and dialogue, the pronounced delivery of lines almost akin to that of the somnambulist and slow, deliberate, almost self-conscious actions. Gertrud's state is no less than that of a trance-like mesmerisation by her own desires, what Deleuze describes as a 'spiritual automaton' akin to a mummy, 'paralysed, petrified, frozen'.[62] Unlike Falconetti's histrionic facial expressions, an intense display of internal passion and purity of desire, Gertrud's face is essentially the blank beatificism of the sexual saint. No doubt, Gertrud is a version of Jeanne, but the formal treatment is different even if the idealisation intrinsic to each woman's mental state is similar. They are both redolent of female martyrdom, of a sublime masochism, which Rhode, for one, finds distasteful. Even a sympathiser like Perez speaks of Dreyer's close-ups on Falconetti's face in *Jeanne d'Arc* as having 'something merciless and inquisitorial about them'. Although Dreyer's camera sympathises with Joan nevertheless it 'adopts towards her something like their [the judges] unyielding stance of authority'.[63] For Perez, the 'relentless proximity of Dreyer's camera registers as an imposition rather than an earned intimacy, the privilege not of love but of power'.[64]

One might say that a tension exists in Dreyer's later work between a paranoid-schizoid idealisation of numbing force which is salvaged to some extent by the depressive position-based reparation of certain formal aspects of the films – in *Jeanne d'Arc* through the expressiveness of Falconetti herself, abetted by the close-up, and in *Gertrud* by the somnambulistic behaviour and speech of the heroine.

In Deleuze, we find a different articulation of this idea:

> Dreyer's mummy was cut off from an over-rigid, over-burdensome, or over-superficial external world: she was none the less permeated by feelings, by an overfullness of feeling, which she neither could nor should outwardly express, but which would be revealed in consequence of the deeper outside.[65]

Mark Nash suggests that Dreyer's films comprise an 'hysterical discourse'.[66] However, Nash also uses the notion of phantasies of fragmentation and restoration of the body:

> If the fantasy of the body in pieces dominates in Joan of Arc, Ordet and Gertrud demonstrate different economies in which the body is both fragmented and reassembled.[67]

For Nash, in *Gertrud*, this restoration of the body is partly achieved through music. Gertrud's merging with the light and minimalist decor especially in

the final light-bathed sequence also signals, for him, a re-emerging with the unified mother. What seems supreme in *Gertrud* is an idealisation which uses different devices from those found, for example, in Eisenstein. Carving values are corrupted to a large measure by a near-failure of 'invitation' in the film. In *Jeanne d'Arc* and *Gertrud* Dreyer reveals an ability to work only at the extremes of idealisation using modelling techniques in the former film and carving ones in the latter. In each case, the upshot is a sadism directed at the female figure.

If religious subject-matter is always there or implicit in these films, then in *Ordet* Dreyer takes such issues to their limits. The story of a farming family who experience love, madness, death and a 'miraculous' resurrection (described as 'one of the most exalting moments in cinema') in their midst, *Ordet* evokes a morbid melancholic mood in which forms of female idealisation dominate. It is also an expression of different forms of religious belief and action. There are different polarities pulsating throughout the film, between rigid and liberal religious views, between madness and sanity, between religious faith and its loss, between innocence and knowledge and between science and the miraculous.

Again at the centre of the film is the sacrificial woman whose humanity and goodness shine among the squabbling and expressions of different forms of Protestant Christianity and secularism. There seems to be the whole gamut of religious faith from the conventional to the committed to the obsessive and insane. It is as if Dreyer has split the religious into a spectrum of positions, from scepticism to the mad obsessive, with Inger as the 'good' Christian outside the purely conventional (the two young lovers) and doctrinal allegiance, occupying the median point. The 'heroine' Inger attends to all the family – her sceptical, down-to-earth husband, her distracted and melancholic father-in-law, her young brother-in-law thwarted in love by religious divisions, and her other brother-in-law, the demented Johannes, who believes he is Jesus Christ. Her death in childbirth is in fact the loss of a fount of goodness and of love. She is brought back to life by the now sane Johannes given faith by the young child, Maren. A film of resurrection, literally, would seem open to the reparative powers of love and forgiveness and acceptance of guilt for the pain caused to the good object, so to speak. However, miracles are not hard-won but God-determined eruptions in the natural order.

Inger's death brings about the burying of hatchets between the two warring sects and thus the marriage of the thwarted lovers, and Johannes's sanity and thus his father's peace of mind and Inger's husband's return of religious faith. It is a dramatic device in the film whose obviousness has attracted astonishment and high praise from some audiences. But unlike Bresson's moments of 'grace' bestowed on characters sometimes as abruptly in *Ordet* there has not been a hard-won process of which it is the outcome. Without Inger's death, things would have trundled on as usual. In its long

takes and slow pans it is the antithesis of the fragmented editing of much cinema. But it is nevertheless a busy film with multiple parallel plot lines as Bordwell notes, to keep our interest. Its pacing is not as slow experientially as *Gertrud*, partly because much of the acting and dialogue delivery are fairly naturalistic. The ponderous utterings and movements of Johannes are the exception and in fact highlight the general vigour, relatively speaking, of the rest of the film.

Dreyer is a North European director, a Danish one. The films discussed exemplify characteristics found in, for example, Ingmar Bergman and German directors like Pabst, Lang and others. Hollander places Dreyer directly in the lineage of the nineteenth-century Danish realist painting tradition but also as falling under the influence of Dutch art. She notes of *Day of Wrath* how:

> [A] preponderance of stiff black clothing with white neckwear set against the dimly lit and austerely furnished interiors makes the moments featuring flames or outdoor sunlight all the more startling, and the texture of skin almost unbearably telling, as they are in the Northern painting tradition.[68]

The photographer Henning Berndtsen describes how in *Ordet* Dreyer arranged actors 'for the sake of photography and lighting rather than acting' and how each image was 'composed like a painting in which the background and lighting are carefully prepared'.[69] It is this total control which is so remarkable in Dreyer's work that rails against the signs of a more carving mode – the slow, long-held shots and liking of the medium and medium long-shot, the spatial and temporal coherence and unity. Reminiscent of late Eisenstein, Dreyer's over-idealisation expresses intense defensive attitudes. The fragility and emptiness of his idealisation seem to be the result of enormous manic paranoid-schizoid attacks. In such a scenario when the anxiety stems from the persecutory attacks on the self and the ideal object, excessive idealisation is used to shore up the ideal object and as a defence against fear of persecution. How does this relate to *Ordet*? One can see Inger's goodness as coming under severe attack from all sides – from sceptical materialism, deranged God-fantasy, conventional Christianity and bigotry. Her centrality in the frame, the way the narrative organises itself around her and, in the final desperate resort, her death in childbirth to ward off the attacks, to reconcile the differences and then to bring her back to life – as the good object or another constructed ideal one? The miracle after all is the impossible wish granted, the phantasy fulfilled in the flesh. At the same time, her death as ideal object signals or effects the return of Johannes to reality. His severe paranoid-schizoid state is relinquished on her death and it is his demand in the depressive position that brings about her return to life – as the good object? But the film's articulation is Dreyer's and his thematic persistence in depicting the idealised female object expresses a real tension between the calm, measured

and integral forms he uses with a subject-matter dealing with extreme ideal-isation underpinned by an exquisite sadism, the latter noted, as we have mentioned, by many of his critics.

In his early pre-war writings Stokes associated carving values with Southern Europe especially around the Mediterranean where it flourished in Italy in the early Renaissance. Modelling values were identified with North European art. Much of this division had geographical and climatic determinants – the stone and marble and waters of the South and its light. In these years, Stokes believed that Northerners had no love of the stone but rather saw it as a symbol of barrenness.[70] In some ways, this barrenness permeates Dreyer's work.

7
Montage and Modelling Values in Sergei Eisenstein

It is perhaps a paradox that the 'cutter' *par excellence* in film history, the inventor according to some of 'montage' editing, is aligned on this account not to the carving mode but to modelling. As we have seen, to identify Sergei Eisenstein with carving would be to mistake Stokes' distinction as a literal one and not as what it is fundamentally: an attitude, a mode. It is the modelling mode which is to the fore in so radical a proponent of the montage film aesthetic. Eisenstein articulated his thoughts about film largely around two fundamental formal concerns: composition in the frame and montage editing. While commentators and scholars have usually stressed his montage method, it has been argued that Eisenstein's montage as an aesthetic strategy was determined more by the 'saturation' of the shot or image which is then conjoined into rhythmic montage.[1]

To go to the heart of the matter, we need to refer to Eisenstein's essay 'The Cinematographic Principle and the Ideogram', published in 1929, in which he discusses Japanese pictograms in order to point out the representational mode of the Japanese script.[2] The graphic and representational qualities of Japanese writing are relevant to Eisenstein in its merging of pictograms into an ideogram in which by 'the combination of two "depictables" the representation of something that is graphically undepictable' is achieved.[3] Thus the 'picture for water and the picture of an eye signifies "to weep"'. Eisenstein sees this as exactly like the montage method. In both cases, he believes that the relationship of pictorial resemblance between the words, so to speak, and the things they refer to are taken as a model for the artistic practice of each artist.

Eisenstein's film images *qua* shots are also well defined and delineated, highly compressed images with aestheticised qualities which render them autonomous entities like separate images. They stress the thing-like qualities of objects they incorporate, removed from the associational properties of narrative. His anti-narrative tendencies make such a quality possible, for in viewing an Eisenstein film, one is aware of it as a series of film images.[4]

According to Jacques Aumont, Eisenstein used the concept of the 'fragment' (in Russian, *kusock*) as much as he used that of montage.[5] The idea of the fragment is prior to the montage. The fragment connects most resonantly with the frame. The fragment is largely a matter of the shooting of film, a particular piece of film shot by the camera which in turn is a particular composition and framing of what is before the camera. The fragment comprises the image (*obraz*), a term which, again according to Aumont, Eisenstein punningly associated with the Russian word '*otrez*' which 'evokes the idea of a cut'. Eisenstein's dislike of the shot being determined by the intentional organisation of objects before the camera was not a way of condoning a form of realism, for he spent a good deal of time on the details of any *mise en scène* but, given the reality he constructed, its filmic 'reality' so to speak was more to do with 'a piece of reality' being 'sliced off with the camera lens'. Thus the compositional aspect of the fragment was cut from reality. In Aumont's own words, for Eisenstein the fragment was the 'necessity for a choice of point of view, for a carving out of the profilmic'.

In many ways, this conception of the fragment marks out Eisenstein's difference from that of other Soviet 'montage editors' like Kuleshov and Pudovkin. It is a dramatic matter. Lack of protagonists assists montage fragmentation and lends itself as we shall see to idealisation of both 'bad' and 'good' objects. What is notable on this view is that the relationship of the film to the real is crucial and not to be ignored. Montage is not purely a constructivist utopia of editing 'signifiers' to a particular effect, a view which still dominates. On the other hand, embracing a concept of the real does not make Eisenstein's work or ideas simply 'realist'. But it does mean that montage begins, so to speak, with the fragment.

Eisenstein shared with Jacob Epstein, Eric Gill, Henri Gaudier-Brzeska, Ezra Pound, Adrian Stokes and others a distinctive stance on the relationship between the artist and the materials in terms of a metaphor of carving or cutting. In the case of Stokes and the sculptors, carving was meant literally. Pound's idea of the 'cut' in poetry is closer to Eisenstein's montage aesthetic. But Eisenstein had the advantage of dealing with a medium involving a photographic reproduction of reality so that carving into the real had to some degree a more literal implication. However, a further difference is apt here. This cutting into reality does not preserve spatio-temporal coherence; rather, it breaks it down into part-objects with their own compulsions, attacking ones. Paradoxically then, carving in film, so to speak, is a modelling activity.

In the tension between Eisenstein and his rival Dziga Vertov there lies a difference in modes of practice. They understand the relationship between the 'cut' and reality differently. Vertov's idea of factography, by which he meant the documenting of the real and the rejection of 'played' scenarios, suggests, as we shall see when discussing Stokes and collage, a view which merits some comparison with the carving tradition understood in the

purely sculptural sense. There is in Vertov a more Bazinian respect for the real itself, whatever his editing process may have added to it. Too much is made sometimes of Vertovian anti-realism (his constructivism), for after all his films remain portraits of Soviet life in a way that Eisenstein's do not. In contrast, Eisenstein always worked with actors, created sets and costumes, etc. In other words, he constructed the 'reality' for the camera, whereas Vertov vehemently opposed this idea and used footage of events as they occurred, often taking found footage from documentaries shot by others. Like Esther Shub he was often working simply as editor on already provided material. His work is essentially documentary. But first it is worth placing Eisenstein in the context of early twentieth-century art history and aesthetics which he was familiar with and probably influenced by. It also provides an opportunity to compare Wolfflin with Stokes.

Much is suggested by the fact that André Bazin loved French Romanesque churches which were to be the subject-matter of a film he was planning shortly before he died.[6] Eisenstein, on the other hand, returned often in his writings (and films) to El Greco and the Gothic. Eisenstein's and Bazin's conflicting tastes in art and architecture reflected quite clearly and were of a piece with their views on film. Eisenstein even compares the two styles when he remarks approvingly of the principles of Gothic that they 'seem to explode the balance of the Romanesque style'.[7] Stokes associated the Gothic with modelling values and the Romanesque with carving ones. Eisenstein's and Bazin's taste in art and architecture reflected their equally disparate taste in film. Their differences were more than a matter of taste, however, for they implied ideas about art that ran deep, from the role of the artist to that of the spectator, to cultural and moral values in relation to art, to the idea of history itself. Put bluntly, their differences on the issue of montage versus realism are versions of the Stokesian distinction between modelling and carving.[8]

It would seem appropriate at this point to explore more fully these opposing ideas in general and particularly in relation to fine art and to Eisenstein using the writings of the art historian Heinrich Wolfflin. We shall also see that Stokes' distinction between carving and modelling echoes an influential distinction made by Wolfflin. The montage/realism distinction can be mapped to some extent onto Stokes and Wolfflin's dualist views. Eisenstein was familiar with Wolfflin's writings and in *Nonindifferent Nature* remarks:

> We could, like Wolfflin, contrast the Renaissance and Baroque and interpret the excited spirit of the second, winding like a spiral, as an ecstatically bursting temperament of a new epoch.[9]

Eisenstein's identification of his film style with the Baroque makes a lot of sense. Not only was the historical Baroque a stylistic revolution, it also complied with Eisenstein's ideas on social change whereby 'explosive' artistic forms reflected political and social temperaments.

In Wolfflin's seminal work *Renaissance and Baroque* he sets out the stylistic difference between the two broad movements in architecture linking them with a general thesis about the epochs which produced them.[10] In fact, as the *Weltenschauung* dictates, styles in art were expressions of an age, a view which remains in art history, if in a more complex and tortured form, in the theories of some Marxist critics. This methodology is common in film history too, where particular genres (e.g. melodrama, *film noir*) are deemed 'expressive' of specific cultural and social climes and phenomena.[11]

Wolfflin believed that 'painterliness is based on an illusion of movement'.[12] The idea of characterising a certain style of architecture as painterly involved understanding it as being of 'moving masses, the restless, jumping forms or violently swaying ones'. For Wolfflin painting was essentially the art of illusion. It was the depiction of something which did not exist but only seemed to exist, so to speak. The painterly style 'thinks only in masses, and its elements are light and shade'. Shifting and constant change is created through the use of masses of light where there is no clearly defined contour but rather a merging between light and dark; in other words, a chiaroscuro effect.

Based on the comparison with an ideal Renaissance model which was 'entirely linear' and where 'every object has a sharp unbroken outline and the main expressive element is the contour',[13] Wolfflin understood Renaissance painting as producing a flatness which did not aggressively disrupt the picture plane, as in the work of Piero della Francesca. The painterly style, on the other hand, stressed the illusion of modelled relief where 'different objects seem to project or recede into space'. The effects of light and shade lead to a 'rounded and plastic' rendition of what was once flat. Wolfflin asserts:

> [U]npainterly are the uniform series and the regular interval; a rhythmic succession is better, and better still is an apparently quite accidental grouping, depending entirely on the precise distribution of the masses of light.[14]

This is what Wolfflin called the 'dissolution of the regular'. His third feature he ascribed to the painterly is elusiveness, a 'painterly disorder' in which objects are 'not fully and clearly represented, but partially hidden'.[15] Objects and bodies overlap so that parts of the composition are as he calls it 'hidden' from the viewer, who is supposedly more aesthetically engaged through this demand on his or her imagination. Whilst this device was not entirely novel, it was on the scale and excessiveness of its use that it becomes 'painterly' so that the image was restless and not static and placid. Colour equally took a lesser role with the accent on light and shade or chiaroscuro. Chromatic harmony was usurped for the overlying use of light and shade leading to 'infinite modulations and transitions', a view clearly related to Stokes' characterisation of modelling.

Thus, Wolfflin isolated three major features of the painterly style – composition in light and shade, dissolution of the regular and elusiveness. More germane to this argument is his overall view of the Baroque:

> It wants to carry us away with the force of its impact, immediate and overwhelming. It gives us not a generally enhanced vitality, but excitement, ecstasy, intoxication.[16]

It is precisely this experience of art that Stokes identifies with modelling. And it is these qualities that Eisenstein associates with his own montage aesthetic.

As further evidence of a connection between this style of painting and Eisensteinian cinema, Friedlaender's discussion of Mannerist painting (associated and at times identified with many of the key characteristics of the Baroque) sets out its precise characteristics:

> Out of the object given through artistic observation there thus arises a new and strikingly different one. The form of appearance, heretofore canonical, commonly recognized in an intersubjective way and hence counted upon as something one could take for granted – as 'natural', is given up in favor of a new, subjective, 'unnatural' creation. Thus in mannerist art the proportions of the limbs can be stretched, more or less capriciously, merely out of a particular rhythmic feeling of beauty. The length of the head changes from being between an eighth and a ninth of the whole, as had been usual in the Renaissance because this was the norm and the average given by nature, and is now often between a tenth and twelfth of the body length. This was a thoroughgoing change then, and almost a distortion of the form or appearance of an object commonly recognized as valid. Even such particular affectations as the holding of a finger, the wrenching of the limbs which twine in and out among each other, can be traced to this quite conscious rejection of the normative and the natural through an almost exclusive employment of rhythmic feeling. This freer and apparently more capricious rhythm carries with it the fact that symmetry, that is to say the linkage of the parts of the body as they cohere through direct, clearly grasped opposition and distribution of weights, is dislodged or more or less broken up.[17]

Wolfflin in *Renaissance and Baroque* similarly remarks:

> Multiplied layers, brutally projected gestures, strong plastic volumes of bodies which, pressed closely together, leave hardly a single unfilled patch of surface anywhere, strong but entirely unreal colours, characterize this painting, for which the entire Renaissance furnishes no prototype.

Eisenstein's conception of his own film composition carried over this 'Baroque' energy. He states that '"the masses" from the group of regularly placed mannequins would inevitably have to burst into a chaos of torsos, knees, elbows, forearms, and thighs, spread along the canvas of the picture and interwoven with each other'.[18] Eisenstein had always been committed to an art of overwrought expressiveness in which the frame was highly composed in what we can call a painterly manner.[19] Flat perspectival space is attacked and supplanted by the graphic energy of angular shots, layered figures, strong use of black-and-white chiaroscuro, distortion. Eisenstein can be understood in any of these elements as emerging from a particular Western visual art tradition of painting, sculpture and architecture.[20]

Eisenstein's view of the Piranesi drawing *Dark Dungeon* is one that fits Wolfflin's light and dark emphasis found in the painterly style. The chiaroscuro technique of light and shade here works so that 'the dark mass at the bottom, gradually growing light, overflows into the vaulted top flooded with light'. Eisenstein carries out an experiment on the drawing to reveal how it can be transformed into an ecstatic piece.[21] When he has adumbrated all the changes to be made to the drawing he comments:

> as if catching their signal, all the other details seem to be caught up by a whirlwind; and 'everything is swept by a powerful tornado' – as if they would roar out from the sheet, which has lost its initial reticence and 'cosiness' in the name of raging violence.[22]

As in the case of El Greco, Eisenstein finds a second image by the artist Piranesi which fulfils his ecstatic demands. He makes the comparison between its characteristics and that of *Potemkin*:

> the ecstatic image of the staircase, hurled from one world to another, from sky to earth, we already know from the biblical legend of Joseph's dream, but the pathos image of the elemental down surge of human masses on the Odessa steps, reaching up to the heavens, we know from our own opus [Potemkin].[23]

Once again, to emphasise the connection between Wolfflin's conception of the painterly and Eisenstein, witness the latter's remarks on the development of Piranesi's Dungeons drawings:

> And is it possible – after the comparatively short first stage with its dissolution of forms, through the second – already exploding the objects being depicted – and this in two jolts, strengthening the breaking up of forms and the pushing of the elements both into the depths as well as forward (by means of extensions of the foreground) – to foresee and find one more 'jump', one more 'explosion', one more 'thrust' beyond the

limits and dimensions and thus, it seemed, totally and completely to the limit of the exploded 'norms' in the last variant of Dungeons?[24]

Eric Rhode too has commented on Eisenstein's love of Piranesi. In an essay on Max Ophuls, Rhode connects his fascination with Piranesi's dungeons with a 'modern feeling of endless power and ceaseless dissipation'. Rhode quotes Aldous Huxley on Piranesi, suggesting that the painter in these works 'always contrives to give the impression that this colossal pointlessness goes on indefinitely, and is coextensive with the universe'.[25] Thus Rhode sees this ubiquitous power in relation to modern technology, although Eisenstein's own view of the painter has more to do with the properties of montage. Nevertheless, there is something of Piranesi in his films that is more than this rather abstract point. For example, in *Ivan* there are the endless claustrophobic corridors with very little sense of exteriority through which the equally endless machinations and struggles of power in the Russian court find their *mise en scène*. To this extent, these scenes are surely an extension of Eisenstein's machine aesthetic of the earlier films where the rifle, gun, metal bridge, ship, tower-block stairs and machinery in general so often form the overpowering imagery over and against the fragility of human flesh and animal life. Equally for Rhode this kind of *mise en scène* suggests in terms of Ophuls' *Lola Montès* 'sudden effects' and a 'continual movement, like the random shaking of a kaleidoscope'. Eisenstein's own interpretation of this Manneristic scenario is one that emphasises the explosiveness and incoherence of its forms. It is Eisenstein's willingness to embrace such properties that serves as the basis for Rhode's criticism.

In Eisenstein's essay 'Synchronization of the Senses' he had hailed El Greco as 'among the forefathers of film montage'. But in fact the perceptual deformations of El Greco are not what we readily associate with Eisenstein's films (with the exception of *Ivan*). There is much more of Michelangelo's robust monumentality in his work with its aestheticism, its coldness and often in Eisenstein's case its brutality.

Modelling and idealisation

In her book on Eisenstein's *Ivan the Terrible* Kristin Thompson makes this very general comment on the film before launching into her 'neo-formalist' analysis of it:

> Perhaps as important as complexity in making Ivan appropriate to close scrutiny is its strangeness.... Ivan's striking qualities arise in part because it differs so greatly from other films. Ivan's actors stare oddly, pause a great deal, and make abrupt gestures. The settings thrust themselves upon our attention almost as much as the main action itself (sometimes more) because of their unusual shapes and decorative surfaces. Space in general

seems warped, both within and between shots. The giant shadow that Ivan casts in the throne room in what is perhaps the film's most famous composition typifies the overblown, distorted quality of the whole. This strangeness is for me both the beginning and the end point of a critical study.[26]

Besides fulfilling the characteristics linked to the Baroque and Stokes' overpowering modelling mode, Eisenstein's cinema is one of idealisation *par excellence*. Very few film-makers have presented images and concatenations and structures of images so overpowering and overwrought in their projection of an ideal which is at the same time both primitive and sophisticated. This was not always the case, especially in the early film *Strike*, where fairly casual domestic images of the strikers at home with their families have a documentary feel which is rarely found in his later work.

Another film-maker of equal stature who also produced a cinema of out-and-out idealisation is John Ford with whom Eisenstein shares traits even if in the end they differ radically in visual tone and emotional pitch. Of course, Eisenstein was consciously working with an idea of typologies by which characterisation was determined not by the individual psychology or interior mental states of his characters but by the assignment of emotional states to broad social and political types, emotional states which typically were immediate, caused clearly by external events and actions, and expressed in characteristic gestures.

But besides these obvious uses of conventional types in Eisenstein's characterisation there is also a form of idealisation which is more concerned with projection and emotional expression. This idealisation is made even more potent by the Eisensteinian montage method, particularly in its implications for the frame and frame-composition. Part of this aesthetic in which the juxtaposition of shots was a supreme method of structuring his films is the overall view that the Eisensteinian sensibility was overwrought, determined by strong feelings of sadism and masochism. The power of this approach is even visible, in fact quite distinctly so, in the uncompleted film *Que Viva Mexico!* which contains some of the most evocative and powerful aesthetic saturations of the frame witnessed in Eisenstein's films or for that matter in any others. The idealisation at work here is not simply to be identified with the heroic subject-matter, but operates at a more unconscious level in the kind of projections in which he expressed his themes.

Eisenstein typifies the modelling mode, where splitting of the schizoid-paranoid phase results in good and bad part-objects both of a controlling sadistic kind and where aggression and threatening attacks are coped with by an idealisation of those objects so that control is made possible. In scenes like the Odessa steps, for example, we witness a control barely kept, and only at a cost. Eisenstein's ambiguity in his representations of his enemies – the religious patriarchs, the capitalists, the soldiers and *lumpenproletariat* – finds

some explanation in his modes of part-object idealisation. The structuring of the Odessa steps sequence through montage is internally structured by the descending movement of the soldiers, often shot as relentlessly and repetitiously downward moving legs. The sadism here is obvious perhaps, but its integral structuring within the scene allows it to run deeper than simply a matter of the sadistic ruling classes towards the ruled. It has all the marks of a dehumanising sadism.

In one of the most subtle critiques of the film-maker, Rhode offers enlightenment on this point:

> [Eisenstein's] sense of composition is Futuristic in the sense that his shots often include harshly-stressed diagonal lines that press down on the human figures, while his plots resemble the gnashing cogs and wheels of the assembly line in some Modern Times type of factory as they inexorably work through nightmare situations in which groups of people are trapped and destroyed.

Rhode sees the influence of the Futurists on Eisenstein as a baneful one, a view he feels was shared by Trotsky in his critique of Mayakovsky's poetry, which Rhode understands as similar to the film aesthetic of montage by collision. To quote Trotsky:

> The thing that is most lacking in his work [Myakovsky's] is action. This may look like a paradox, for Futurism is entirely founded on action. But there enters the unimpeachable dialectics: an excess of violent imagery results in quiescence. Action must correspond to the mechanics of perception and to the rhythm of our feelings if it is to be perceived artistically, and even physically. A work of art must show the gradual growth of an image, of a mood, of a plot, or an intrigue to its climax, and must not throw the spectator from one to another, no matter if it is done by the most skillful boxing blows of imagery.[27]

Rhode's view of Eisenstein stems from a Kleinian stance (as opposed to a Stokesian one).[28] He stresses the director's machinist anti-nature views. Rhode is at odds here with a central strand of the modernist aesthetic flowing from the Futurist-Dada position. Eisenstein's anti-humanism is identified with modernism's machine aesthetic. Of *Battleship Potemkin* Rhode is critical, claiming it as:

> more a fiery emblem of the 1905 revolution than a systematic interpretation of the past, presenting the Potemkin mutiny as a series of flashpoints. Its most memorable sequence, the massacre on the Odessa steps, was dreamt up when Eisenstein first saw the steps while out looking for locations. Fascinated though he was by the ways in which men relate to their

environment, his use of close-ups tended in Futuristic manner to atomize his characters, almost to blow them up, representing them by a hand or foot or a pince-nez: or he dehumanized them by seeing them as types or members of some group or crowd.[29]

Rhode speaks of these depictions as of 'part-selves' in relationship to their surroundings. He points to other negative aspects of Eisenstein's art:

He [Eisenstein] is most the machine-man in his taste for polished surfaces, in his anti-feminism, in his liking for themes of a collective nature and actors used as types. In these moods he comes closest to Marinetti's denial of psychic reality, without realizing how such a denial may entail the wholesale projection of mental states onto the outside world. For all their machine-tooling, his films are among the most confessional, above all when they enact rigorous machine-like processes.[30]

What does Rhode mean here? First, that Eisenstein's aesthetic entails an elaboration of a narrow set of feelings which take all objects as their focus. It is true that Eisenstein never depicted the individual's inner states but only the world of gesture and posture influenced by the FEKS movement, which stressed the performance aspect of the circus, vaudeville and the marionette. To that extent the film can be seen as related to a form of Expressionism in which mental states are ascribed to surroundings and expressed through them too, where the *mise en scène* is the total expression of emotion and not the individual character. And where, more often than not, there is an envelopment of the characters and audience by these inanimate objects and events. Rhode's citing of the Kleinian (and Freudian for that matter) paradox of the denial of psychic reality heralding the 'wholesale projection of mental states' reminds us that phantasy is at work in perceptions and emotional states in their widest sense and not simply in terms of conscious eventful types but of unconscious ones too that, through the film's techniques and methods, permeate it as a whole.

Rhode, in discussing *October*, stresses Eisenstein's use of machinery and artefacts to act as objects of sadistic cruelty. In the scene where the dead girl's hair 'slides sensuously' across the opening bridge, it is not this image of Eisenstein's eroticism which seems possible only when the woman is a victim that interests Rhode, but 'the slow, vertical movement of girders as they move across the plane of the screen diagonally'. He goes on:

For Eisenstein, these bridges resemble torturers' racks. In *Strike* he had seen the tenement catwalks as a cage containing energies that exploded the moment an infant was dropped from a great height into the courtyard. Again and again he ascribes cruelty to the inanimate.[31]

When Thompson speaks of the strangeness of *Ivan*, part of what she might mean is that even when Eisenstein constructs a narrative with a central character, he remains unseeing of that character except in the latter's most public and behavioural modes. Ivan is an empty husk of gestures, postures and grimaces, and his emotional states are to be found as much in the shadowy halls, narrow corridors and chiaroscuro lighting of the film as in the actor's contorted body and theatrical expressions. As in Expressionist work in general, Ivan is reducible to the *mise en scène*, becoming one element among many. As Thompson remarks:

> Expressionism lends the expressivity of the human body to the entire visual field, while simultaneously trying to make of the body a purely compositional element.[32]

Rhode connects the Futurist and Eisensteinian aesthetics to a more general point about urbanisation and industrialisation:

> The October Revolution had dramatized a change in consciousness; even the physical world, it seemed, had changed. The ecstasy of the young revolutionaries resembled a vertigo. Mankind's most fundamental aware-ness, that of space and time, appeared to have been disturbed. However, war and revolution had done no more than heighten this sense of distur-bance: writers and painters in industrialized societies had been recording something like it since the 1830s. And even now, a walk down any crowded street will re-enact it. Wholeness seems to fragment into random and strident sensation. Under the impact of faces, vehicles, advertisements and shop-displays, one begins to feel that repetition and coincidence provide the only kind of consistency. Viewpoints become relative; an awareness of perspective diminishes.[33]

Crucial to this critique is the idea that there are healthy mental states and also artforms which mirror them. Furthermore, and importantly, these mental states and artforms are dependent upon social and physical environments. Rhode at this point very much reflects Stokes' own views.[34] But the slippage that is possible here, and perhaps inevitable between these levels of the aesthetic, social-historical and mental, poses questions about the relativity of viewpoints in social orders. If Marinetti *et al*. embraced a violence and distortion of shocks and derangement in their work, as Eisenstein did to some extent, then they were also expressing those very feelings operating in the less fortunate classes of Western society in the early decades of the twentieth century. From the viewpoint of the working-class man living in crowded conditions beset by the demands of his family, eking out a living in the dreadful din and violent motions of the factory, then Eisenstein's films are a reflection of that state. Put another way, one can argue that

Eisenstein identified more strongly with the 'enemy' than with his ideological 'comrades'. His passions are spent on the cruelties of the repressors while the repressed are largely passive, romanticised and ultimately masochistic. This, of course, begs the question as to the purpose of art. Is it simply an expressive tool, or is it a means of overcoming such conditions and rescuing them for more palliative and healing ends? Where does the critique rest – at the social, the aesthetic or the psychical? I will return to these questions later.

Rhode associates Eisenstein's experiments with a dominance of a part-object or fragmentary aesthetic. Modernism, or at least parts of it, together with industrialised life, were not conducive to wholeness. Rhode suggests that the Cubist-like attack on perspectival space and unitary temporality went hand in glove with the effects of the environment as experienced in the modern city streets. Futurism simply articulated these feelings and experiences and made a dogma out of them, one that was fully in tune with the times as witnessed by the influence of the movement on the 1920s European avant-gardes. But to return to Eisenstein, it would seem that there is more to explore in his work than Rhode can achieve in his sweeping, broad-brushed project.

For Rhode, the films in their crueller aspects are more often than not reliant 'on personal and very private hatreds than on political insight'. For Eisenstein the Baroque statues in *October* are conceived 'as persecutors that must be attacked and subdued'. These ideas may lead us to make some general claims about the nature of Eisenstein's aesthetic, the montage method.

Eisenstein's profoundest contribution to film theory is his concept of 'montage'. However, it is also a problematic concept in so far as it runs throughout his work despite the development of different ideas in his writings, from the early essays centred on the montage of attractions to the later work on ecstasy and pathos.

Following Aumont, it seems most useful to approach Eisenstein's montage by examining other concepts, particularly that of the fragment and the frame on which montage is heavily reliant. We should also keep in mind a more literal understanding of montage as a kind of cutting or chopping, for in doing so we are immediately reminded of Pound's and Stokes' ideas in poetry and sculpture which revolve around the idea of the 'cut'. Aumont himself suggests that Eisenstein was not an innovator in terms of his use of a general concept of montage. Both Kuleshov and Vertov were working with techniques and theories in which the 'cut' and its consequences played an important part. Eisenstein's uniqueness and influence lie in the systematic and sophisticated development of his notion of montage which placed it beyond that propounded by Kuleshov or Vertov. At the risk of sounding banal, we have to understand that Eisenstein – and for that matter Kuleshov and Vertov – was working in a Modernist climate still reeling from the impact of Cubism and especially Futurism, the effects of which they were trying to

assimilate. That the breakdown of perspectival approaches in painting and a rush towards abstraction should coincide with the early cinema is often remarked upon, largely for the irony of a situation where the new artform, film, took the route of narrative and spurned the novel techniques and ideas of thoroughgoing modernism. But of course, the roots of cinema were clearly not in the fine art practice of the time but in popular culture.

As we have discussed, Eisenstein's montage method is associated with the general interest in the arts at the time in the 'cut'. Stokes was aware of this broad movement in terms of what he called 'collage'. In one of the most important essays of his later years, 'Reflections on the Nude', Stokes discusses collage as part of the reaction in modern art to illusionism, although he believes that as far as painting is concerned any mark on the canvas creates visual 'illusion', if by that is meant the appearance of three-dimensionality where it does not in fact exist. Nevertheless, Stokes is interested in the rush towards the close connection between art and actuality as practised by modern artists. The strong illusionism of naturalism and what he calls 'the studied imitation on a painted surface of objects in the outside world'[35] is overthrown or enormously reduced in its artistic relevance in modern times by the countering force of 'juxtaposition'. Stokes' notion of collage and juxtaposition largely addresses the use of actual materials in painting, as in the case of Schwitters or Pablo Picasso's early collages where the canvas surface is not simply painted to illusionist ends but is an object whereon other objects, or fragments of objects, such as newspapers, metro tickets, are the content in a form which perhaps has more to do with sculpture than with painting. For Stokes, in fact, the collage is not a painting, although it is at times confused visually with a painting. Stokes comments on the sense of disappointment and the breaking of a strong connection between spectator and artist founded on the relationship between artist phantasies in manipulating paint on canvas towards illusionistic ends (however minimal) and the idea of sticking materials together on a surface.

Interestingly, Stokes places collage in the carving mode of art:

> in spite of the superimposition entailed, the art of collage and the influence of collage upon painting and upon sculpture have strengthened the 'carving' approach to visual art, the sense of the independent object, the actuality of the material whose actuality, we shall see, symbolizes both the body and naked mental structures.[36]

Stokes' decision here is perhaps surprising and he admits that it 'will seem arbitrary...that I have associated collage so strictly with the "carving" aspect of visual art'. In many ways he admits that collage is more like working with clay, with the former's use of superimposition like 'one piece of clay worked into another'. But in the case of Schwitters he argues that the 'waste materials' are allowed to 'glitter' like gems: 'it is as if not the stone but the

dull ungleaming clay has been made to irradiate'. For Stokes the collage is associated with carving also because of its characteristics as an *objet trouvé*. Material for carving is a 'potential ready-made, an object fit to be contemplated in isolation'. Stokes' essay on Michelangelo's *Giorno* takes into account the unworked marble from which the unfinished piece emerges as much as the sculpted part. In this sense, sculpture in its carving mode bears properties connected with the ready-made status of the collage. Second, the stone's actuality persists, whatever form it is given by the sculptor. This stress on the role of the material itself in carving again connects with the collage technique and aesthetic. These views are exemplary in showing how Stokes used the distinction between carving and modelling as an aesthetic method-ology by which to link particular art modes and practices with aesthetic relationships between artist and spectator, and the art object itself.

To return to collage. One of its prime features is the use of juxtaposition which Stokes sees as often in opposition to 'the mingling, of actuality and phantasy'. Juxtaposing need not be of a 'shocking' or 'jarring' kind. For example, surrealist art is more often than not based on the 'shock of unexpected conjunctions' in which contentual matter is brought together using traditional *trompe l'oeil* painting methods, as in Salvador Dali's canvases. But as Stokes points out, the 'brassy element of shock, impact, or arrest has of course always been present in art'. In traditional art this has been the enveloping aspect of art, what initially draws us in, the invitation in art where we 'join and merge' with the piece. At this point in his writing, in the early 1960s, Stokes had found a central role for what had been the modelling mode in the idea of the invitation in art, an aspect of art which coexisted in the best of art with the independent whole-objecthood characteristic of the carving mode, which in the early years had been the only 'true' artistic mode.

This shift in position is one in which Stokes applies a broader cultural sweep to his argument. The centrality of juxtaposition and one of its most influential contemporary instantiations, collage, in twentieth-century art is strongly related to the urbanisation and spread of technology in Western societies in which a unifying symbolic system is no longer available to the artist, by which the shocking elements of art, its 'brassiness' as he puts it, could be assimilated into an overriding style often of a contentual, illusionist form. Stokes notes that 'some artists...seek to make capital out of the fugitive propensities of matter, to harness decay or destruction to the purposes of art, a pile of distorted mineral rubbish'.[37] For Stokes, the use of actual materials acts as a substitute, however meagre, for representations imitative of actuality. The crisis of art was one which generated his examination of the nude in art, an object which finds its place in modern art difficult, almost impossible without perhaps juxtaposition, entailing violence, violation and excessive aggression.

There is throughout Stokes' later work an interest in cultural objects in general, a concern for the everyday environment of our lives. So what in the

early books was a comforting, nourishing aspect of his aesthetic experience, as in *The Quattro Cento*, becomes an environment in which art's struggle to achieve form is hard won in an environment of threat, aggression and incoherence with its concomitant psychical effects.[38] 'Modern art shows that we must search for mere fragments of an organisation and that we have an entire impatience with cultural symbolic systems.'[39] Interestingly, Stokes begins his section on collage with a short paragraph about the cinema:

> Spectacular and even panoramic figuration, especially in the close-up, has now gained unlimited scope of a kind by means of the cinema, by means of photography.[40]

Stokes expands on this towards the end of the section. His remarks place these aspects of the photographic medium in a modelling framework:

> The enlargement of objects by magnifying aids, particularly by photography, has forced on us startling units of organisation not apparent to the unreinforced senses. The result in much pictorial art has been the exploitation of the disruption of scale, and the great modern invention of sparse design on a huge canvas (with or without a sea of paint). Totally ambiguous in scale, the works may appear to expand further, to grow over us, very complete though they be in themselves as well. In this way an extreme part-object possessiveness returns.[41]

Beginning with the instance of film and photography, Stokes moves towards abstract painting in which he claims there is often an ambiguity of scale. Are we seeing large things or simply small things rendered large? In film of the non-abstract, narrative and figurative kind, we are of course seeing small things rendered large. If the projection is of the cinema-kind with its large screen, we are seeing the world rendered large, but even more so when the camera treats objects and persons in close-up so that, for example, a face can be many feet high and wide, filling the screen. Walter Benjamin made a similar point but for very different ends.[42] In film the use of camera angle, close-up, zooms, pans has meant at times and in particular cinemas and styles of cinema, domination of fragmentation and juxtaposition as an overall effect for the spectator.

   Possibly the use of colour in film has reduced that large-scale 'possessiveness' in the film close-up by making the image more abstract. But there seems no reason for taking this as a general view of the colour close-up. For example, in Powell's *Black Narcissus* the huge close-up of Sister Clodagh's mouth as she applies lipstick does have an effect in which a bodily part is inserted as a close-up at a particular place in the montage sequence so that it proposes to the spectator an image of immense scale, of voluptuous, erotic coloration

and at the same time, in this scaling and colour, extends the image towards abstraction in that it has a vertiginous effect. In film, of course, the over-powering use of the close-up is made more intense due to the possibility of juxtaposing such a shot against a very different kind of one. It moves from long shot to close-up in a twenty-fourth of a second. The sliced eye of the opening sequence of Bunuel's *Un Chien Andalou* moves from the long shot of the cloud 'slicing' the moon to the woman's eye in massive close-up, a classic example of the surrealist use of shocking juxtaposition.

The shock of juxtaposition, spoken of by Stokes, is intrinsic to the film although resisted by some where the shock is not only that of, say, the close-up but of the effects of rapid montage or startling juxtapositions, a characteristic of film which draws it close to developments in painting and sculpture. After all, the effects of Soviet avant-garde work and German Expressionist film in the 1920s were highly influential on mainstream Hollywood films, particularly in their stronger and more aggressive forms, e.g. the *film noir*, the Wellesian distorted camera of *Citizen Kane*, the Langian close-up. By and large, the systematic use of the close-up in film articulates a modelling mode with its fragmentation of the body and of objects, stressing part-object relations and the enveloping of the spectator by the film at the expense of a carving relationship which stresses whole-object relationship and the independence and separateness of the film from the spectator. An example is the comparison between the carving tendencies of John Ford's Western genre films and the modelling modes of Sergei Leone's Westerns, with their intense close-up, particularly of eyes, rapid montage and titillating use of 'suspense' mechanisms in shoot-outs – all strong enveloping techniques.

Stokes characterises modelling activity in this late essay as an 'activity that creates the looming of forms, rhythm, movement, stress, and strain', whereas carving values are those in which 'especially colour and disposition of space play the part...that can be summed by the expression "enlivenment of the surface"'.[43] The notion of 'looming' here is very much one that might achieve clarity in relationship to film in our discussion of Eisenstein.

It is perhaps useful at this point to approach Eisenstein's films through the idea of the spectator. The spectator is usually spoken of as being in a relationship (or series of relationships) of identification with characters in a film. In orthodox film theory eyeline matches, point-of-view shots and shot-reverse-shot techniques are means of establishing spectator identification. In other words, we see the image from a particular point of view. Of course, we see all visual representations in a trivial sense from the point of view of a spectator looking at a particular image, which itself is a point of view. (For the moment we can set aside abstract films with no clear sense of perspectival spatiality.)

As we have already mentioned, Wollheim makes a distinction between the spectator *of* the painting and the spectator *in* the painting.[44] The spectator in the painting is not to be confused with a spectator figure in the representation

but is a spectator who 'perceives' the represented scene but who is not the spectator of the picture standing in the gallery before the representation. Wollheim is also keen to stress that not all pictures have an internal spectator. His discussion of this centres upon Manet, Hals and Friedrich. Wollheim rests his argument for the internal spectator on his classic distinction between central and acentral imagining. The internal spectator is centrally imagining but under the strictures of the representational content.[45]

> The function of the spectator in the picture is that he allows the spectator of the picture a distinctive access to the content of the picture.[46]

There is a muted form of this phenomenon in Stokes when he attempts to separate the achievement of painting as art from the merely pedestrian or academic. Discussing depth in painting he remarks that 'the first test of merit is the degree to which we are compelled to feel our way into spaces, whether populated or whether empty of shapes'.[47] Later he states that 'we demand to be drawn in among these volumes, almost as if they were extensions of ourselves, and we do not tire of this process, the incantatory process at work'.[48]

What is the spectator in the picture? It is a position created by the artist by which the representation he or she has made is understood in such a way that it is not simply another point of view, a simple perception, for what could that be other than the point of view occupied by the spectator standing in front of the representation? Rather, like central imagining – in fact, a case of it – it is a position endowed with feelings, desires, beliefs – a repertoire, as Wollheim calls it – which the spectator can come to have through identification and the imagination, by which he or she can see the picture. Hence 'distinctive access' can be provided to the picture's content by such a spectator. In some ways, it is Wollheim describing the artist's (often unconsciously propelled) rich emotional endowment of the representation by which the picture can be experienced, as opposed to simply being seen, in a way that is not given by the representation, although it is the property of the representation in question that it offers such an internal spectator.[49] As Wollheim acknowledges, the artist achieves such a spectator when 'he projects what he sees inwardly on to what he sees outwardly'.[50] It is to be noted that Wollheim does not believe that all successful paintings involve a spectator. It is not a defining characteristic of art for Wollheim.

But what of film? Is the spectator in the picture possible in film? For Stokes, photographs 'for the most part, lack that element of assertive handiwork by which the artist points to the invitation'.[51] 'For the most part' is tantalising here, but we must believe that Stokes would have felt the same about film *qua* a form of photography. What Wollheim is postulating in the idea of the spectator in the picture is not a form of identification. And if it is a form of central imagining, he is careful to distinguish it from simply understanding

it as a form of imaginative construction on the part of the spectator. Similarly, we do not simply imagine ourselves in the picture. The spectator in the picture is part of the representational content in so far as the repertoire given to the spectator for him or her to gain access, so to speak, to the picture in this way, is always derived from the experience of the picture's representational content. The difficulty of this account lies in its phenomenological or experiential nature. It is not a piece of analysis, and as such there are no *a priori* criteria available to be applied to any particular picture.[52] We may say that Wollheim is reformulating the Stokesian 'invitation in art'. An objection to the spectator in the picture being applicable to film is the very nature of film as a multitude of images, compared to the single image of a painting. Wollheim implies that the spectator needs time to accomplish the experience of the internal spectator. But with the rapid process of the film and its hundreds of images, some of them moving as the camera moves, how is such an experience possible? One suggestion may be that it is the overall world of the film that the spectator gains access to. That is, the spectator is placed over the entirety of the film in a particular internal relationship to it. It is perhaps something like Bazin's idea of the realist film as something that can be more readily contemplated as opposed to the overwhelming demands of montage (putting it very crudely) in which the spectator is in no position to relate to the film as an autonomous, independent object. It is important to remember that for Wollheim the spectator in the picture applied to certain paintings which suggests that there is almost a structural aspect to particular paintings that marks them as having the possibility of an internal spectator.

To return to Eisenstein and film. It is one of the characteristics of film, with few exceptions, that it provides a representation involving movement and through editing it also provides a series of representations set one against the other, usually in narrative order (which does not mean it is strictly chronological). In the cinema we are seeing a fixed static representation in its framing, but one that represents movement and is temporal, lasting over a period of time (for a feature film, two hours or more). Thus we must expect all the emotional and attitudinal complexity of narrative, as we find in reading novels for example, or watching a play or opera. Does Wollheim's spectator in the picture operate in film? If we are to understand the identification which it implies as being something other than the point of view suggested by the camera shot, then there seems no reason why not, although it will be successful or otherwise, at least for its coherence and consistency, only for the duration of the film. In other words, it must be a spectator in the picture so to speak who is consistent throughout the film and not fragmented in a multitude of 'visions'.

Eisenstein's autobiography is a fascinating document of the director's life and work. But like all autobiographies, it obscures as much as it reveals. There is no doubt on Eisenstein's own account how he was motivated

crucially by 'internal' matters. And two confessions are crucial. He writes of his desire to overthrow authority, personified by his 'menacing father', and of his envy of the theatre director, Nikolai Yevreinov's four large volumes of cutting he saw as a young man, an experience that motivated him to write his own books on film theory.[53]

As Rhode has pointed out, Eisenstein's work is steeped in aggression and cruelty. His subject-matter, as he readily admits, was oppression, murder, fatal riots, and so forth. His depictions of authority figures are also one of caricatural cruelty, pantomime-like at times, as in his depiction of politicians and bankers in his early films. His fascination with animals standing in for persons, especially ones he despises, is also reductive of such characters to the animalistic, devoid of human feelings, identified with a particular narrow trait – cunning, slyness, brute strength, pride. Thus human foibles are personified by animals which in turn have originally been personified as representing particular human traits – the strutting pride of the peacock, for example. His narratives are peopled with compulsive characters, selves dominated by simple projective phantasies, part-selves as Rhode calls them.

But these are expressive elements of his early films which are no more than conventional symbols as they stand; they do not represent expressiveness as it is connected to the internal spectator. In other words, we can understand such content without being moved emotionally to experience anything in particular in relation to the representation of content. Is there then a spectator in Eisenstein's films, or at least some or one of them? For that to be true, the spectator would have to be able to adopt an 'imagined inner life' from a repertoire provided by the film. The feeling of being overwhelmed, of awe and perhaps of anger or indignation on the part of the spectator would not seem to qualify as such a repertoire. We could say that the modelling aspects of his films are too strong for such a repertoire. The idea of gaining access to the film in such a way as to occupy the position of an internal spectator does not seem to exist.

One consideration already remarked upon which may throw light on this is that it is one of the well-known but fascinating aspects of Eisenstein's earlier films (*Battleship Potemkin*, *October*, *Strike*) that they have as their subject-matter kinds and not particulars, with regard to persons. The narratives do not develop along the lines of a personal psychology or agency. There is no particular hero or heroine, so to speak, only at times, in sequences, a nameless character whose fortunes we are allowed to witness – the young girl on the bridge in *October*, the worker's child playing in his room in *Strike*, the bankers gathered in the dark club in *October*, and so forth. The same could be said of films like Marker's *La Jetée* or Buñuel's *Un Chien Andalou*. The upshot of using kind-depictions is an appeal to direct emotional attitudes where the personage is taken as an object of broad emotional states – pity, loathing, fear, etc. As silent cinema, the characters are also expressive through gesture, facial expression and bodily posture so that again emotions are largely of

the bodily expressive kind, recognisable outside the need for dialogue and verbal expression of inner emotional states. Empathic states are not common responses to his films. Part of the reason for this is structural – there are barely any sustained characters of any psychological complexity in the early work. This means that, to a large extent, the audience is freed from that kind of motivational thrust and instead is taken by the film's compositional force so to speak. The awareness of a shot's composition and texture is much more important in Eisenstein's work than in the so-called narratives of the classic film.[54] Awe is experienced at this aspect throughout his films, especially those of the early, 'montage' period.

This technique also allows for fragmented states which are often emotionally extreme – the result of strong attacks and murderous impulses (the girl on the bridge) or ecstatic states of victory, and so on. Otherwise, the film's narrative is, as Rhode suggests, like an overwhelming machine on which the spectator is transported willy-nilly, forever in a state of tension and manic expressiveness in the name of montage editing, powerful, aestheticised compositions and intense close-ups of people, objects and machine parts.

Eisenstein's cinema expresses modelling values at their most powerful and looming. Any spectator must admire its control, its aesthetic ambition and innovatory strategies, which have never been surpassed. Nominally in the service of revolutionary ideals, his films are nevertheless expressions of an emotional ambivalence in which his savage attacks on a cruel authoritarianism are carried out with the same authoritarian cruelty. A social idealism of comradeship, justice and equality is disturbingly absent except as an idealisation. Otherwise, reminiscent of infantile phantasies, his characters are masochistic victims or sadistic authority figures.

8
Carving Values and John Ford

There can be no better examples of carving values in the classical period of Hollywood cinema than the films of John Ford. His reputation is secure. In recent years, a younger generation versed in issues around ethnicity and gender have enthusiastically turned to his work. Even in the 1970s 'high theory' period, with its anti-auteurism and fondness for modernism, Ford remained highly visible in the pages of *Screen* and *Cahiers du Cinema*.[1] But his formidable reputation rests on broader characteristics. Studlar and Bernstein speak of his 'gift for visual composition, his ability to use film as an eloquent, often wordless means of expression, his insight into human psychology, and the vigor of his storytelling'.[2] But they are also quick to cite Robin Wood's view that 'the nature of [Ford's] greatness has proved difficult to define'. Tag Gallagher has singled out 'the intricate formal beauty and intelligence' of Ford's cinema. But it is also in the emotional resonance of his best work that Ford establishes his uniqueness. Melancholia, death and loss are confronted, rarely with despair but often by way of a broad knock-about comedy more reminiscent at times of low pantomime and *commedia dell'arte*; and ritual, by which there is an assuaging of loss, a means of repairing damage and a determination to insist on life and mourning proper.

It is helpful to compare Ford as an artist with traditional visual artists – sculptors and painters. The Hollywood studio system and the sheer mechanics of making a film mean that there is an unevenness not only of quality, which is found to some degree among all artists, but also sometimes a difficulty perhaps of even recognising a work by him. The closest parallel is with the Renaissance artists and the Academy of, say, France in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries who also worked in large studios, who assigned aspects of their painting, etc. to apprentices and other artists and who worked often to quite restrictive commissions with a narrow subject-matter and artistic codes.[3] For example, woodcuts were done by craftsmen like Hans Lutzelberger who did the actual carving of blocks for Holbein and others.[4]

As far as Hollywood marketing is concerned, comparisons can be made with the seventeenth-century Dutch genre painters who were also commissioned

(the range of subject-matter was even more restrictive than the Hollywood studio director) and who equally wrangled over fees, budgets, deadlines, and so on.[5] As in Hollywood, the Renaissance artists could have benign patrons but at times petulant, demanding ones. Lisa Jardine reminds us of the central role of Renaissance painting as a commodity:

> Early Renaissance works of art which today we admire for their sheer representational virtuosity were part of a vigorously developing worldwide market in luxury commodities. They were at once sources of aesthetic delight and properties in commercial transactions between purchasers, seeking ostentatiously to advertise their power and wealth, and skilled craftsmen with the expertise to guarantee that the object acquired would make an impact.[6]

If such an understanding of the complex function of Renaissance artworks is not furthermost in the contemporary spectator's mind on seeing these works in the aesthetic space of the gallery, then, in the case of Hollywood, the view is the opposite. Hollywood film is seen by many as primarily a commercial outlet for entertainment, and its claims as art as an aesthetic object are often denied, or at least treated with scepticism and suspicion. We need also to know that Renaissance painting which is now held in the highest aesthetic esteem was often made for the more down-to-earth reasons of sensual pleasure and sexual titillation. As Jardine points out, Titian's *The Venus of Urbino* (1538) was commissioned by the Duke of Urbino who wanted 'a naked woman' and was part of 'a vigorous demand for bedroom paintings depicting erotic nudes in salacious poses'.[7]

These artists were also by and large classicists in so far as their aims – almost unconscious we imagine as they were so ingrained in the culture – were for order and objective values.[8] But their personalities, their temperaments, were often romantic – intense projected feelings, riotous imaginations emerge even in the most restricted genre systems. The Dutch genre work, largely a commercial venture producing paintings for the new bourgeoisie, also sustained an astonishing level of achievement. The same can be said of the so-called Golden Age of American cinema between the early 1930s and the 1950s. Equally, one can cite similar conditions operating in Renaissance Italy and early twentieth-century America, at the time the flowering of the democratic capitalist society with its massive influx of immigrants, burgeoning industrial and agrarian base and an energy remaining from its not too distant pioneering days. Also it need hardly be said that part of the appeal of many Hollywood films in its Golden Age (and arguably still today) is its depiction of erotic beauty or of conspicuous consumption with its often rich interiors, *haute-couture* fashions and evocations of luxurious locations. Its fantasy-fulfilling images and story-lines need hardly be stressed – like Titian's classical erotic painting, Hollywood's titillating narratives smuggled

baser needs into ostensibly serious and 'virtuous' content. Ford, like a handful of other directors working in Hollywood in this period, stamped his artistic personality on the studios' factory production.

Ford, we need to remember, met Wyatt Earp. Ford was making 'historical' films within decades of the occurrence of the actual events. If his were mythologies of American history, it was more often than not very recent history. The US cavalry films were based on incidents from the Indian Wars of the 1870s, and filmed by Ford in the 1940s. These films were also about characters who were often remembering and coming to terms with another historical event, the American Civil War.

Ford's work rarely fell into chiaroscuro-bound artiness (as his film *The Fugitive* (1947) did). Others of his films have mannerist elements (e.g. *Wagon Master* (1950)). He was heavily influenced in the mid-1920s, like others, by Murnau's dramatic lighting style. Gallagher notes that Ford was 'enchanted' by the German director's 'painterly invention' and

> henceforth lighting creates dramatic mood through emphatically contrasting blacks and whites, macabre shadows, shimmering shafts of light, chiaroscuro, and other abstractions.[9]

The films of the immediate post-war period do use a powerful monochromatic expressiveness – *They Were Expendable* (1945), *My Darling Clementine* (1946), *Fort Apache* (1948), *Rio Grande* (1950) – before colour descends fully on his work. Unlike Hitchcock's work, Ford's films do not serve mentally unstable or psychotic personalities – Ethan in *The Searchers* (1956) although seen puzzlingly as a precursor for the anti-hero Travers in Scorsese's *Taxi Driver* (1976), in fact has his good reasons, like any quasi-tragic hero, for his obsessiveness: the death of his loved one – his brother's wife – and the capturing of his nieces by the Indian chief, Scar. Ford pointedly allows Ethan values which remain communal ones – his return to the community does not reveal a disillusionment with it; rather, that a particular obsessive state has been separated off from his broader values and feelings.[10]

As critics have pointed out, Ethan carries the burden of a social and cultural ambiguity as to what constitutes family, sexual corruption and alien cultural values in the person of his niece, Debbie. Unlike Travers, Ethan is not beyond the community at all. His awkwardness with his family and friends has political and social causes – the consequences of the defeat of the South in the Civil War ranks high. But the Jorgensens have no problem with Ethan. He has performed practical tasks for them, looking after his herd. He is concerned about the two young men who accompany him against his wishes; his obsessive vengeance does not cloud his judgement, nor does it hinder his ability to socialise in civilised communities. His outsiderness does not approach the status of a psychosis. As Ford himself remarked about *The Searchers*: '[I]ts the tragedy of a loner.'[11]

Ironically, one of the most acute film portrayals of extreme psychopathology is that of the motherless all-male Clinton family in Ford's *My Darling Clementine*, achieved largely through their unnerving physical passivity and silence and not by strong behavioural means (Ford reworks the vicious all-male family in *Wagon Master*). The Clintons' lives, untouched by ritual, communal effort or feeling, are governed by instinctual demands – greed, envy, murderous hate. They have almost animal-like characteristics, as in old man Clinton's famous verminous sneer in the opening cattle round-up sequence when he first meets Wyatt Earp. Ford depicts this pathology without any histrionic dramatics, but with great assuredness and a chilling economy of means. Ford typically is as sensitive to the old man's loss of his sons as he is of Earp's. The Clintons are a part, albeit a malignant one, of Ford's notion of the West's community.

But Ford's films are peopled by healthy, rational, coherent individuals, and where there is madness and perversity it is not dwelt on as subject-matter in itself but as an aspect of life ('mad' Mose Harper is accommodated like everyone else in *The Searchers*). Ford's characters are not beset by psychological turmoil, though this does not mean that they do not experience mental pain and anguish, for they do. But such states are not rendered in the often extreme psychologistic terms of post-war Hollywood films, where community values are displaced. Other directors, like Howard Hawks, were also intent on broader social values and the experiences of individuals within them, but it is in Ford that a director of the highest calibre treated of the more ideal aspirations of the country, often through a reconstruction of its fairly recent past (for example, *The Searchers*, set in 1868, was made less than a century after its historical period).

Like most Hollywood directors working in the studio system's hey-day, any attempt at aesthetic and thematic coherence proves difficult if not impossible. Ford's films ranged across Westerns, contemporary social events, war films and adventures. The genres were varied, and their quality is uneven. But at his best there is a pictorialism which is rarely equalled by any other director, a celebration of wholeness, of reparation, of forgiveness, all expressed in a style that is emotionally powerful and direct and engages us still. It is important in characterising Ford's films in this way that we recognise how so many of them took defeat, failure and resignation as their themes. If the Stokesian view of art as primarily expressive of the depressive position is true, then Ford often takes the position's moods, feelings and tensions as his themes to the extent that the narrative itself seems subservient to the prevailing mood – in *Rio Grande*, *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon*, *My Darling Clementine*, *The Searchers* and many more.

Gilberto Perez has offered the view that Ford 'feminised' the Western:

[L]inear narrative, with its drive toward a finish, its harnessing of character and situation to the forward movement of action, its thrust toward a climax,

is a mode many feminists consider intrinsically masculine. If that is so, then Ford's style of narrative – relaxed, digressive, episodic, prone to dwelling on character and situation in disregard of action – can only be called feminine.[12]

Whatever the judiciousness of Perez's view of feminisation, there is no doubt that the stylistic elements comprising this characterisation are useful in any discussion of Ford's carving values, ones that stand against an omnipotent narrative drive with its narrower, more obsessive aims. It is Ford's reluctance often to assuage the narrative drive, his tendency to postpone action, that make his Westerns outstanding in the genre. Classic gunfights rarely occur, violent action is often brief and never dwelt on in a sadistic way. As Sarris observes, 'the Fordian hero tends to treasure his memories' and his cinema is one of 'reminiscence'.[13]

Sarris argues for a complex Ford, both conservative and radical within the American mythology and history he so vividly portrayed.[14] For Wollen, Ford is a great director because of the 'richness of the shifting relations between antinomies in [his] work'.[15] Anderson, a discerning devotee of Ford, attributes a moral quality to his poetic lyricism.[16] These are not necessarily exclusive views, but rather differences of approach. A crucial Ford film which separates Wollen and Anderson is *The Searchers*, which perhaps marks a generational difference. Wollen's high praise and influential account of the film is countered by Anderson's view that the film ultimately lacks a 'sense of harmony, of resolution and of faith'.[17] On the other hand, Wollen and others see in the film the 'invasion' by the antinomies of the central character Ethan, so that the film is one in which Ford's thematics are brought to a crisis. Whether 'crisis' is a positive value in an artist's work or not, is important here. Wollen's Hegelian-cum-Marxist-inclined view of a bourgeois film-maker who constructs a text in which the contradictions of his or her society are somehow made 'visible' lends him or her an integrity of sorts, although it is unclear how such an artistic 'merit' can be assigned to the film-maker as such. It is as if Ford, like a ventriloquist's dummy, expresses these social contradictions in spite of himself – why Ford's film should have this 'expression' and not those of any other film-maker of Westerns is hard to say on this account. On the other hand, Anderson's leftish humanism sees *The Searchers* as confused.

Ford is exemplary of the carving mode. There is no excessive pictorial devices of a manipulative kind to envelop the spectator. Extreme chiaroscuro, unwarranted fast editing, overuse of close-up, strange camera angles, florid camera movement, extensive shot-reverse-shot identification are largely absent. More positively, Ford favours the medium and long shot; rapid editing montage is rarely used.[18] The camera is usually set at standard height and rarely moves, thus the reality depicted has a wholeness and integrity to it. As we have seen, he deals not with characters psychologistically but with

their actions (including speech-acts, for utterances are binding, and mental acts, as in Ward Bond's seeing and *not* speaking about Martha's stroking of the coat in *The Searchers*). Buscombe has provided an excellent analysis of the breakfast scene in *The Searchers* where complex actions, all of a piece, are choreographed for the fairly static camera.[19] To this extent Ford is a naturalist director, like Hawks and many other Hollywood directors of the same era, whose careers were almost completed by the mid-1950s. His themes are a striving towards wholeness, a celebration of communal values and often portraits of men for whom action, even if inevitable, is to be postponed, for whom a steady contemplation is almost central as in *Rio Grande* and *My Darling Clementine*.

Rio Grande

Rio Grande (1950) is a film which is admired but usually suffers from comparison with the other two films of the so-called cavalry trilogy – *Fort Apache* (1948) and *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* (1949). Robin Wood fails to discuss the film in his famous article. Made last in the trilogy, in terms of their shared central character played by John Wayne (Brittles in *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* is a late middle-aged version of Yorke in the two other films), chronologically it comes second. Of the three, *Rio Grande* is the most unusual. It has barely any plot compared with the other two and comprises moments of reverie which are extensive even by Ford's standards. What it lacks for some is a focus, although it introduces the Wayne/O'Hara partnership which has attracted praise for the film. By and large, though, it has suffered by its comparison with the other two in the cavalry trilogy. But it is the most beautifully shot of the three, with Bert Glennon doing the main cinematography and Archie Stout, the location work – both men skilled at black-and-white camera work.

Captain Yorke (John Wayne) in the midst of fighting in the Indian Wars is visited by his cavalryman son whom he has not seen since his separation fifteen years earlier after the Civil War from his wife (played by Maureen O'Hara), who also arrives at the fort to gain her son's release from the cavalry. In the film, his reconciliation with his wife and son is intertwined with his continually thwarted attempts to defeat the Indians, who escape his grasp by seeking refuge across the Mexican border, marked by the Rio Grande.

Its use of the close singing harmonies of 'The Sons of the Pioneers' has been seen as a sentimental flaw in the film but in many ways they perfectly match a mood that oscillates between a poetic realism and musical set-pieces. For John Baxter the film is a minor work showing 'curious bitterness'.[20] On the other hand, Garry Wills rates it highly, not least for Bert Glennon's and Archie Stout's camera work.[21] Glennon had shot *Stagecoach*, *Young Mr Lincoln* and *Wagon Master* (Stout working on the Second Unit). Stout also shot *Fort Apache*. Sarris has astutely described the film (as well as *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon*) as

'an obscure reverie' in which 'lyrical and metaphysical circumlocutions' stall 'conflict and confrontation as long as possible'. Sarris also remarks on how 'Wayne's portrayals in *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* and *Rio Grande* float freely in a sea of communal and conjugal feeling'.[22] Sarris has rightly identified what can be described as the 'oceanic feeling' achieved by Ford's depiction of community in so many of his films.

It is fascinating how Ford's Westerns so often contradict the genre's action-driven thematics. The almost languid middle section of *My Darling Clementine*, the at times nonchalant camaraderie of *Wagon Train* and continual digressions of *Rio Grande* and Mannerist slow-starting of the ultimately disappointing *Two Rode Together*, betray Ford's interest in men enjoying time spent outside action, desires and strong motivations. A relaxed bonhomie or quietness achieved through leisurely interludes interrupted by action is intrinsic to Ford's notion of community and civilisation. The opening sequence of *Wagon Master* as the two cowboys, Carey Jr and Ben Johnson, meet Ward Bond and the Mormons is typical. Johnson and Bond whittle away at sticks with their knives, the conversation is desultory. A horse misbehaves in the background, while flirtatious glances are exchanged between Carey and the Mormon woman. Ford seems reluctant to get on with the story. His action scenes are tightly shot and fairly perfunctory in comparison.

As well as being filled with music and song, *Rio Grande* is also a film of light – sunlight diffused through tent cotton, through the trees lining the road into the fort, and of dark – the darkening ambient dusk and of oil lamps at formal meals.[23] Wills rightly remarks that it is 'the most beautifully filmed of the cavalry pictures'[24] and he identifies four key scenes between Wayne and O'Hara which occur in the confines of a tent. He remarks on how the 'translucent canvas of Wayne's small tent cocoons the characters in face-offs that are charged with emotion'.[25]

Ford also uses sound in *Rio Grande* in an interesting way: an echo effect for particular cavalry scenes which lends more physical depth to the scene matching the monochromatic detail with an aural one (a device used for different ends in *The Grapes of Wrath*). There is also a strong nostalgic sense of time as he forsakes the smothering effects of non-diegetic music for the natural sound of horses and equipment. Military orders echo around the landscape lending a further haunting quality to the film, suggesting a memory, a loss, as if the characters are partaking of a world which is not quite real. An emptiness is always present but never quite acknowledged, almost like a horizon for thought and action.

Wayne and O'Hara's perfect physical and temperamental matching dominates the film as they move, at times tentatively, at times passionately, towards a reconciliation often in claustrophobic, erotically charged confined spaces; at the same time, there is a recognition and acceptance of a painful past, emotionally wasted but morally necessary. Ford's belief that moral

integrity can override pain, waste and loss is central to much of his cinema; it is the aching heart of *Rio Grande*. Thus integrity is both political and personal. History pervades the film – the American Civil War and in the distance the revolutionary cause of the Fenian Republicans.[26]

Characteristically, Ford asserts military cohesion and social order with the songs of disunity, social division and civil rebellion. The film is shot through with the grit of rebellion – Yorke and Sheridan against the politicians, the Indians against the cavalry, the son against his father, Yorke against his wife, the South against the North, the Irish Nationalists against the British, his wife against the sergeant, love against duty, and so on. What is deeply satisfying about the film is the condensation of these rebellions, these stirrings into dramatic pictoriality and music.

Key emotional scenes are played to musical accompaniment, for example, in the powerful scene of Yorke on patrol deep in thought on the river bank at dusk, accompanied by the melancholic Irish love-song of his soldiers sitting round the camp-fire. The scene also contains an example of Ford's non-fragmentary use of the close-up as Yorke walks towards the static camera and stops in a slightly low-shot close-up to look off-shot into his memories and hopes. A cut to close-up would have jarred, broken the unity of the shot, its subject and mood of reverie. The technique is exemplary of his commitment to wholeness, away from the broken-up image of much Hollywood editing. Yorke can also be contrasted to the compulsive selves of much Hollywood action drama, although character wholeness is much more pervasive of the classical period than of the post-war years.

The emblematic character of some of Ford's films – especially the Wayne Westerns (Fonda does not cut a melancholic figure) – is perfectly achieved in this film, and the perfunctory handling of the Indian Wars background can be seen less as a weakness than as emblematic itself, standing in for danger, for the attractions of danger and for duty. As someone who served in the military in the Second World War, Ford holds duty in high esteem. The distinction between the horrors of battle and the thrill of military comradeship and professionalism is understood only by those who serve. In *Rio Grande*, the Indian Wars are not simply a peg on which to hang a love story. Quite the opposite, decisions about relationships, loyalty and duty are strung between personal desires and social demands – Yorke's burning of his Southern wife's estates and his love for her, his lack of contact with his son and his role as his commanding officer, and his difficulties of surrendering his life to one of family values. Similarly his estranged wife Kathleen, whose recognition of her independence and freedom from anxiety achieved by sacrificing her marriage to a military man has to be compromised. Her recognition of her son's military ambitions and pride compromise her desire to have him removed from military life. In true Fordian manner, the exchange, the barter, the deal is done with a ten dollar bill – a scene which is to be reprised in *The Quiet Man* using the same actors, Wayne and O'Hara.

Sentimentality is undercut by this honest transaction, verging on the brutal. It is an anti-sentimental exchange, one that signifies their hard-won reparative desires in the film against the general mood of 'retreat and resignation'.[27] It is also achieved economically through the nexus of Civil War loyalties as Yorke offers to pay for Kathleen's laundry services with a Confederate ten dollar bill. In a single action, history, memory, love, pride, independence and a lively sense of identity are fused.

How much the lyrical pictorialism of *Rio Grande* owes to its black-and-white photography is difficult to judge, but Wills (who has seen a colourised version) insists that its visual impact is fundamentally reduced with replacing mono-chromaticism with colour.[28] Ford expresses similar lyricism in the opening scenes of the epic film *The Searchers*, largely through acting style, and a sense of space and of loss in the music and a chiaroscuro-like interior light-ing. It is notable perhaps that *The Searchers* famously opens with a black screen and an opening door through which light floods and colour ensues. In *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* colour is important – widely recognised at the time and since – but it is difficult in colour to capture the suffusion of light on a large scale. In *Rio Grande* (and in *My Darling Clementine*), the dramatic and aesthetic contrast between the brilliant white of sun-lit exteriors and the deep velvety shadows of porches, passageways and interiors suggests moods and a sense of place that are difficult to capture in colour. Ford him-self preferred black-and-white film as a medium. Speaking in the 1960s to Peter Bogdanovich, Ford remarks about black-and-white cinematography in relation to his first colour film *Drums along the Mohawk* (1939):

> There was no change really. It's much easier than black and white for the cameraman; it's a cinch to work in, if you've any eye at all for colour or composition. But black and white is pretty tough – you've got to know your job and be very careful to lay your shadows properly and get the perspective right. In colour – there it is; but it can go awfully wrong and throw a picture off. There are certain films, like *The Quiet Man*, that call for colour – not a blatant kind – but a soft, misty colour. For a good dramatic story, though, I much prefer to work in black and white; you'll probably say I'm old-fashioned, but black and white is real photography.[29]

As with other Hollywood directors of the period, the use of colour was largely dictated by the studios and fashion and there was often a deeply-felt love for black and white, a measure of the esteem in which photography itself was regarded, a control over the pictorial and a dramatic advantage. Raoul Walsh declared that the decision to use colour or black and white 'depend[ed] primarily on the budget', although, like Ford, he believed that some films required one or the other.[30] It is notable that Ford's colour film *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* is very different in mood from *Rio Grande*, made a year later in black and white. *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* is quietist, subdued

and with a melancholia and a heavy sense of an irrecoverable past, whereas *Rio Grande*, although also dealing with the past – both personal and historical – in the intermingling of Yorke's separation from his wife with the burning of her family home during the Civil War, has a broader sweep and a more bitter tang and so is projected towards action, recuperation and forgiveness. Yorke in *Rio Grande* has a future not only through his renewed commitment to his wife, but in the future of his maturing cavalry son. It also represents a political development and maturity. Hence the scene when Yorke has to pay his wife for her laundry services is a hard, unsentimental exchange, a real basis for reparation in order to go forward without negating the past, nor its struggle, its principles, its pain. Of course, the same exchange takes place in *The Quiet Man*.[31] Ford's work at its most exemplary is often moving away from a state of contemplation, of inactivity, of inner loss towards the sustenance of action, moral expression and the succour of social ritual. Ford's individual is melancholic, to some extent in denial, but one who nevertheless recovers internal strength from others, from the moral web of relationships – familial and institutional (army life). Impulses – eventually – are finely balanced.

She Wore a Yellow Ribbon has been recognised as an emotionally warmer film, an effect due in part to its narrative qualities and subject-matter, the mellowing late middle age of Yorke whose main communication is with the tender memories of his late wife and whose retirement from the cavalry is rendered in a typically Fordian mix of poignancy, sentimentality and hard realism. It is also the expression of a single character, whereas *Rio Grande* has the benefit of Maureen O'Hara's vivacious and coquettish character as a counterpoint to Yorke's incipient melancholia and rigidity.

If landscape is a key element in Ford's Westerns, then in *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon* it is its expressionist use of colour which is integrated into the film's themes. The famous shot of the cavalry's retreat through the storm-threatened valley drives the film towards a more metaphysical level, one in which nature transcends at the most profound reaches human character itself. But at other times this level of expression is resisted by a burlesque sentimentality especially around the Victor MacLaglen character. As Sarris has pointed out, the film is like an 'obscure reverie for which [Ford] had not found an articulated form'. Perhaps it is in *The Searchers* that he finds this form.[32] But to return to colour, perhaps it is worth stepping back at this point and considering it in more general terms.

Ann Hollander, who has provided one of the most thought-provoking discussions of the use of black and white and colour in film, suggests that black-and-white film developed the qualities of traditional graphic art which over the centuries had translated paintings and sculpture into drawings onto plates through etching, which were then 'mass'-produced in black and white for more general consumption.[33] The rendering of coloured paintings

into black-and-white etchings is a precursor to black-and-white cinema, she argues, in which 'truth' to subject-matter was more important than the rendition of what can be deemed 'real'. 'If a picture is in black and white, it can be apprehended more clearly, even though it may be enjoyed less', she remarks.[34] For Hollander, the means of representation in painting through chiaroscuro lighting and rendition of colour – moving towards a monochromaticism – is found archetypically in Rembrandt, as many film-makers have recognised. In this way she believes that chiaroscuro has the 'power…to invoke the soul rather than the senses'.[35] Thus it stands for 'psychological truth' rather than the 'abstract fictions' achieved by the 'limitless orchestration of colour'.[36]

But black and white also carries claims to objectivity, largely through its reductiveness, achieved through usurping the diversions, surfaceness and sheer pleasure of colour. This 'basic' quality can be understood in terms of the philosophical division between the primary and secondary qualities of objects. For a seeing subject, what is rendered in black-and-white photography is a minimal state for perception at all, i.e. it is light falling on the world that makes it perceptible at all. Colour is possibly determined by the very perception in biological make-up. Different forms of retina, brain, etc. could lead to a different spectrum, unimaginable to us, but shapes (a primary property) of objects are what they are uninfluenced by our perceptual capacities.[37] Black-and-white representations preserve primary qualities (if they did not we would not be able to recognise black-and-white representations at all) and in film remove the crucial secondary quality of colour, whilst, for example, in colour-blindness we may retain a perception of objects, their shape, relation to other objects, etc. as light is essential to the perception of anything at all. Black and white is the condition of colour being rendered in the tones of light itself. Hollander argues convincingly that in Western culture there was, at the inception of cinema, a population well acquainted with the black-and-white depiction of the world in a variety of media – newspaper cartoons, illustrations and photography. As Hollander points out, one of the reactions of nineteenth-century painting to photography was a vital return to full-blooded colour in the Expressionists and Impressionists and a discussion of the dramatic qualities of chiaroscuro.

The whole-object sensibility of *Rio Grande* expresses its carving values. The phantasy governing its emotional shape and pictorial properties seems firmly lodged in a deep sense of a loss but not one that embraces despair – an emotion not found readily in Ford's work (*The Searchers* stands out). Loss in *Rio Grande* exists at various levels – loss of family (but not of love), of youth (heralding an acceptance of middle age but not envious of youth). It is part of the power of Ford's Westerns (so-called) that loss is incorporated into a ritual of affirmation of life.[38] Thus Ethan's impatience at Martha's funeral in *The Searchers* signals his avenging obsession, his cutting-off of feelings of loss, hatred, anger and guilt from a community and its rituals of

mourning and recuperation and moral adjustment for something that is more modern (in Ford's terms), a character who identifies with his aggressive impulse and thus is dislocated (not cut off) from community values, which in the end are also personal ones, a despair in Ford's terms. Anderson is right to see the film as never quite clear about Ethan's persona. From bitter manic hatred (the shooting of the buffalo herd) to good-humoured member of the community when he returns (in his attitude on returning, when Martin discovers Laurie is about to wed Charlie). For some, this is either a failure of coherence in his vision or a severe and status-raising crack in the Fordian antinomies.

Of course, the happy and conciliatory tying up of narratives should not be seen as the automatic establishment of carving values, otherwise the majority of stories whatever their value would be judged as espousing carving values. It is essential that carving is hard-gained, won from reality and not simply projected wholesale onto the world. The latter must be hard-won and not simply the facile enactment of a convention (however phantastically satisfying that might be in the ordinary sense of an entertainment). We might draw on the internal spectator here. As we noted, the internal spectator is one who by looking at a picture takes on a repertoire of feelings, thoughts and perceptions given in the picture, which allows the spectator to understand under what attitude the representation was made. Without such an attitude, a picture is simply what it is as a representation – a narrative *per se*. Through drawing the spectator into the picture, we either take on feelings, etc. which are then operative when that drawing in is fended off by the means of representation, or the spectator is overwhelmed by the feelings themselves and no repertoire is made available. Much of cinema falls into the latter case – entertainments of massive identification often but which are entirely conventional and do not render any expressive point of view beyond what is represented. How does this operate, if at all, in Ford's *Rio Grande*?

Besides his restrained camerawork (Bert Glennon and Archie Stout on second unit), which was not peculiar to Ford – Hawks too was restrained although his shot-reverse-shot sequences in some films are more enveloping than those found in Ford – Ford used certain devices to undercut his powerful invitations in his film. As Gallagher has pointed out, Ford's shots were not excessively long, but he did resist by and large the cut to close-up. He preferred characters to move towards the camera into close-up (as we shall see in a memorable scene in *Rio Grande*).[39] His powerful opening sequence in *Rio Grande* reveals his ability to draw us in using light filtering through the trees and the clouds of white-grey dust from which the troop emerge like phantoms. It is a diffused light which is absorbed into the light-grey patterns of the women's dresses and aprons (the composition of the aforementioned shot, acting, music and a highly readable iconic-like subject-matter – soldiers returning from battle, weary, downcast, to be met by stoic women in the diffused sunlight of the fort, suggests a welcoming if fragile home). This emotion is

both underlined and distanced by a grounding in real detail of emotion – the women waiting in line revealed to the audience as the troop pass before them, an exquisite shot which is immediately focused by the slight but shocking drawing back of one woman whose companion rushes forward to leave her (we can only guess) husbandless by the skirmishes. It is an attitude which allows that sense of loss, defeat and emotional welcome to be experienced by the spectator as it is.

Although *Rio Grande* has been criticised for its overuse of music especially 'The Sons of the Pioneers', in some ways music is one of the film's strengths. Although the fresh-faced singers who occupy three extended key emotional scenes would seem to interrupt and upset the film's otherwise naturalist aesthetic, they in fact lend to its qualities as reverie and assist its emotional distance on the film's historical narrative. It was also fairly commonplace in Westerns to have singing interludes, together with singing cowboys or bar-room women singers (often thinly disguised prostitutes or women of easy virtue). *Rio Grande*'s songs are thoroughly at one with its nonchalant looming rhythms. The blending of these potentially disruptive elements is one of Ford's achievements, the move between harsh, action-based realism to an almost theatrical staging of emotion, rendered with all the formality and ritual Ford admired. The singing of 'Down by the Glen Side' after dinner with General Sheridan and the senior officers[40] is an intensely evocative scene achieving emotional complexity through its perfect framing, editing and acting.

In the previous scene Ford's unsentimentality has been expressed in Kathleen's toast to the 7th Cavalry ('my only rival'), a gauntlet energetically taken up by Kirby's emptying of his glass and decisive setting of it upside down on the table with an air of finality, an expression of uncompromising loyalty to his profession tinged with flirtation with his wife. This whole scene is a medium shot so that when they stand for the toast, the male figures are shot from below. Quincannon arrives and announces the regimental singers ('The Sons of the Pioneers') and their Fenian Irish rebel song which is dedicated to Sheridan. Shot in Ford's unobtrusive classic style, it uses a high shot to the right of the group from behind the singers. A diagonal medium-shot across the singer and shots of Kathleen who looks to the left to Yorke and then a higher further away shot of him looking off to the right to Kathleen whose glance is noticed in Fordian style by the eye-patched French officer positioned slightly behind Yorke. Finally, it rests with Sheridan, shot in upper torso, wrapped up in thoughts evoked by the song. There is an interesting theatrical aspect to the scene with a reversal in so far as the officers stand on what can be viewed as the stage of the raised tented platform with the performers standing below. The hanging lanterns also lend an air of theatricality to the scene.

The restraint of this powerful scene and its length in which narrative seems suspended but is not within the film's own dynamics, is typically

Ford for its respect given to thought itself, for the self lost in memories, reverie: Ford's characters are perfectly opaque and such moments are too. We can guess at their own interiority but that is all, and that is part of Ford's respect for the integrity of his characters and his audience. In this regard Ford was rightly astonished when an interviewer asked him if Ward Bond realises that Martha loves Ethan when he sees her stroking his coat: 'Well I thought it was pretty obvious – that his brother's wife was in love with Wayne: you couldn't hit it on the nose, but I think it's very plain to anyone with any intelligence.' 'You couldn't hit it on the nose.'[41] Exactly. There are many such moments in *Rio Grande*, for example, the exchange of glances between Yorke and Sheridan when the latter realises that Kathleen is not sharing Yorke's quarters says everything. Ford's silent film aesthetic is always there.

The turmoil of emotions here and the historical associations are in the song, a song for Fenian youth killed in the rebellion against England which Sheridan particularly seems distracted by, capturing as it does a sense of loss felt for his own dead soldiers and his own youth which he shared in part with Yorke. The Fenian Uprising also echoes the Southern States' rebellion, which Sheridan and Yorke helped to quell and which is the cause of the estrangement between Kathleen and Yorke. As for the latter couple, how do they hear and experience the song? For a lost life together, bitter regret for dead youth (whom their son Jeff may soon join), or simply a feeling of love in the song's tender lyrics and music? Ford's rendering of introspection leaves this richly suggestive. But the grounding shot is of Quincannon snivelling sentimentally into his handkerchief, a humorous touch which does not destroy the song's emotional power but throws into relief its unsentimental experiencing by the other listeners, including ourselves. It also grounds our experience in the world. It reminds us that such moments must be always called back to reality, to decision and to action.

Among these disparate reveries, thoughts, feelings – these pieces of emotion – Ford achieves a wholeness, a reparation embedded in and necessitated by the music's melancholic air and its evocation of pain and loss. In fact, the scene's hope and love are the child of that pain and loss; it is not separated from it, contingently related. Rather, it is all of a piece. These are carving values *par excellence*. And to render the scene even more complex, it is also shot through with three historical moments – the nineteenth-century Irish Nationalist Uprisings, the American Civil War and its own historical moment, the Indian Wars, the one depicted in the film. Intertwined are history and the personal. They are not separable, but nor are they reducible to one another. These are the attendant feelings of the internal spectator in the sequence and the film in general. Typically, the camera does not occupy any particular character position but captures the group itself and its relationships, ones that are both determined and open-ended.

She Wore a Yellow Ribbon is also a film of personal loss and, more than *Rio Grande*, of cultural loss in terms of the traditions and history of the cavalry itself and by implication of the movement of social and cultural progress in America. Wayne's character is a more tender one. His role is paternalistic – to his men, his sergeant Quincannon and the quarrelsome young lovers. Sexuality seems to have been surrendered to his bickering junior officers whom he provides with a sentimental education. Scenes are perceived through older characters. Younger characters are but players in scenes distanced emotionally by the experience of defeat felt by the colonel and his wife and by Yorke himself. Quincannon stands as the soldier who has forfeited all the dilemmas of responsibility outside those of a soldier and contrasts with and complements Yorke's more complex character. The passionate embrace and gentle eroticism between Yorke and Kathleen in *Rio Grande* has been displaced onto younger characters whose more aggressive courting behaviour itself seems to herald new times and away from an ageing Yorke whose sexual interests have been eclipsed by age.

It is also shot in colour although for its more tender moments there is a tendency to monochromatic colour, with glowing orange and blood-red sunsets suffusing scenes – notably in the graveyard. Colour inevitably flattens the film although the exception is the famous retreat through the storm which is a Fordian *tour de force*. While the film's range seems broader, its sweep more epic, in many ways it seems less complex than the miniature *Rio Grande* in its graphic sweep. Yorke's relationship to his dead wife and to the army from which he is about to retire concern *faits accomplis*. He is resigned to his wife's death and his resistance to leaving the army is half-hearted, grounded in his own realism. Nothing simmers beneath the surface here, except a grumpiness and irritation with the present, not untypical in an ageing man.

But for all the breathtaking quality of the photography of the storm in long shot, with the cavalry almost physically compressed to the bottom of the frame by the storm's violence and oppressive, bruised-blue sky with lightning flashes, such an epic quality is achieved by an almost Homeric characterisation and rendering of events, a merging of the grand scale and epic with the personal and intimate but the latter carefully measured by tenderness and dignity: the manic gallantry of the wounded soldier being operated on in the wagon, cradled by the elderly nurse who, growing steadily drunk, sings the cavalry song; the white-coated doctor leaning over the body in the chiaroscuro lamp-lit scene, while outside the storm and dark chiaroscuro of blue uniform and barely discernible horses in the night light, a return almost to monochromatic values. At the head of the column, lovers quarrel, and Yorke tends his troops and nurses his pride and self-directed anger: near-love and near-death, both quarrelsome, at either end of the straggling retreating blue line of singing but defeated humanity. This phantasy of optimism, hope, defeat, strength transcends the simpler narrative.

Through the cavalry film Ford manages to harness an emotional complexity, rarely found in any cinema, be it Hollywood or so-called art cinema.

It is worth remarking on another Stokesian aspect of Ford's work: its brotherliness. If Stokes considered such a property as in many ways formal, of colour and shape for instance, there is a residue, or more, of its expression in what we call subject-matter. In *Colour and Form*, he speaks of the organisation of colours in a painting as being in a relationship of brotherliness by which they are separate yet sharing with each other. Ford's continual return to the family in his work, or to communities like that of *The Grapes of Wrath*, *The Searchers* or the 7th Cavalry series, is not unique to him. The benign family permeates Hollywood's classical period.

Ford's sets were noted for their relaxed 'family feel'. He tended to work with the same loose group of actors – '[H]is troupe became affectionate families'. While sadism and bullying were not unknown, in general witnesses remark on the good humour and 'the atmosphere of seriousness, of reverence, even'.[42] Danny Borzage often played the accordion on set (usually 'Red River Valley'), at times providing a background for sad, melancholic scenes. Therefore some of the brotherliness, the sense of community, in Ford's films reflected the filming set-up itself. There seems to be evidence here that Ford treated film and the making of films as akin to a family. But if this is the case, then how, or in what way, did he see that family?

One route into this matter is perhaps tentative but enlightening. Ford's extraordinary habit of chewing on a handkerchief (getting through many in one day sometimes!) as he directed seems more than just nervousness at the fretful, pressurised job of directing (after all he was a major, highly experienced director by the 1920s who won the respect and fear of crew and, by all accounts, the stars). While a means of concentration, as others may smoke or adopt a nervous mannerism, it seems also to be a classic example of an adult survival of D. W. Winnicott's 'transitional object'.[43] The 'transitional object' denotes a soft object (a blanket, piece of cloth, teddy bear, etc.) which the infant sucks, especially at bedtime. For Winnicott, the object serves as 'a defence against anxiety, especially anxiety of the depressive kind',[44] and is strongly related to the perceived loss of the mother. Winnicott's 'transitional object', related to his idea of 'potential space', is a version of the Stokesian 'aesthetic' that undermines the instinctual aspects of Klein's approach to which Stokes owes, for an object-relations one. If Ford's handkerchiefs are 'transitional objects', they would signify the anxiety attendant on occupying the space between the loss of self in the paranoid-schizoid position and the otherness of the depressive position. It is a tantalising pointer perhaps to further research.

It has been often observed that Ford's sensibility tends to the melancholic. And in the Westerns of the immediate post-war period such as *My Darling Clementine* and the cavalry trilogy melancholia looms large. In *Rio Grande* and *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon*, it is not so much the Indian Wars

that are the central theme but lost love – in the former through separation by the vicissitudes of the Civil War and in the second through death. But it is in *Rio Grande* that loss of love and perhaps loss in general takes its most complex and satisfying artistic form and where carving values are expressed.

9
Modelling Values and Alfred Hitchcock

If carving values reign in Ford it would seem apt to assign modelling values to the films of Alfred Hitchcock. There seems to be an open-and-shut case for seeing the two directors as opposites in terms of their subject-matter and style though they have some things in common. Although Hitchcock was British and did not spend his entire career in Hollywood, moving there in 1939 after completing some important British films, he is the director who most commentators would agree without much dissension shares artistic status with Ford in the Hollywood tradition. His status as a so-called '*auteur*', compared with many other directors, is now generally agreed and, unlike Ford, his popularity and fame have not diminished with audiences and critics alike. On the contrary, as Ford's reputation declines, Hitchcock's grows and flourishes with even gallery art shows dedicated to his influence on artists.[1] Even more than Ford he seems to have constructed an aesthetics and thematics all of his own, largely because he has remained within the same, albeit broad, genre of the dramatic suspense thriller, sometimes slipping into 'horror' and light comedy. This chapter cannot bear the weight, as in the discussion of Ford above, of anything like a full account of his work. He was prolific and 'masterpieces' abound. He has attracted varied critical approaches – Wood, Durgnat, Rothman, Modelski, Mulvey, Truffaut, Rohmer, Chabrol, Bellour.[2] Like Ford's, his work straddles the introduction of sound and colour. Both directors entered what was still a relatively new industry and artform at an early age. As late as 1960 and in his sixties Hitchcock produced a film in black and white – *Psycho* – which established his reputation forever, at least for a younger generation of viewers. In many ways, I hesitate to say totally for both Ford and Hitchcock share a Catholicism of sorts, but Hitchcock represents the opposite pole to Ford, being a montageist by instinct, an aesthete in film style, an often cruel eroticist, a dealer in extreme mental states and the terrifying and horrific private world of the murderer and pervert, and a dry British sense of humour.[3]

Both directors were also deeply committed to film as mass 'entertainment' and yet both took an aesthetic view of their films, constructing atmospheres,

feelings and moods over and above the demands of narrative. Even though both were cautious (in Hitchcock's case) when not downright hostile (in Ford's) to claims of their status as artists (perhaps as much for studio purposes as for deeply instinctive suspicions about art). Yet they operated under a concept of art[4] – awareness of aesthetic aspects of film, knowledge of a tradition in film and, where it suited them, visual art in general. They both started their careers as art students of sorts. But the most important condition for treating them as artists is their practice under a concept of art. Arguments about mass production, studio systems, commissions, etc. are not arguments for not taking them seriously as artists (too many art history periods have quite similar conditions of production and consumption to justify such a view). This is not to say that their production contexts are not important, for they are. Mass production, film genres, technological advances and limitations, budgets, and so on are important factors in understanding their work and assessing it in the same way that understanding Renaissance artists can benefit from knowledge of the conditions of patronage and technological advances under which they worked. The same factors have ruled our understanding of print and graphic art since the early Renaissance.[5]

If Ford expresses deeply humanist and whole-object values, then much of Hitchcock's work would seem to serve opposing ends, ones intimate with part-object compulsions, split-off feelings and manic energies. Hitchcock's cinema is identified as one dealing often with unhappy mental states – as in *Sabotage*, *Rope*, *Vertigo*, *Psycho*, *Marnie*, *I Confess*, *The Man who Knew Too Much*. Truffaut describes him as an 'artist of anxiety'.[6] Wood seems to believe that the fact that Hitchcock is happy to discuss his films at the level of entertainment (he calls *Psycho* a 'fun' film) means we have to corral him to art. These casual but pointed remarks are less important than two other important themes in his discussions of his work: first, his understanding of the tradition and his relation to it; second, his interest in and the importance he ascribes to technique and *form*. In other words, Hitchcock, like Ford, is operating under the concept of art as it relates to film. To practise under a concept does not mean that a person has to use the term 'art', nor has he or she to reveal a conscious understanding of their work to match the critic's. If such was the case, much of Western art would be rendered inadequate. Such a view assumes that an artist must have the emotion, feelings and thoughts found in the work at the moment of producing that work. As we have seen, this is a banal view of the art process. What we can demand is that art is expressive of the artist, and that expression may not be fully articulated; in fact, it may never be so.

Hitchcock was influenced by European Expressionism via the German and Soviet cinema of the inter-war years which influenced films like *Sabotage*, *The Foreign Correspondent* and the *Thirty-Nine Steps* but arguably reached its climax fairly late in his career with *Psycho*. If modelling values are to be found in high-quality work, then surely *Psycho* must be a fairly uncontroversial contender? Most commentators agree on its formal devices: they are there

to be seen. Durgnat describes the film's editing as having a 'quick, ragged, Stravinskyan rhythm',[7] aided and abetted by a musical score which could be described similarly. Durgnat also suggests that its wide appeal is to a 'lurking nostalgia for evil'[8] on the part of the spectator, a willingness to indulge and enjoy a primitive fantasy we all foster. If Ford's films are liberally sprinkled with meditative moments and spaces in which we, along with the characters, draw emotions and thoughts from the film like a bountiful sustenance in the face of early and continual losses, then in Hitchcock, no such moments and spaces are offered. When they do seem to be, as in the famous sequence at the prairie bus stop in *North by North-West*, it is a reminder that the representation of physical space is not necessarily a projection of mental ease and comfort – to stretch our mental states – rather it is in a tone of black humour – to remind us that open space is also an anxious image, a threatening image, overturning Ford's pastoral albeit threatened landscapes. But threat is not anxiety. The latter has no particular object, or an unknown but suspected one, hence the paranoia found in Hitchcock and not in Ford's genuinely fearful valleys and prairies. Ford's films hide nothing; they can be likened to religious paintings of the Renaissance. Hitchcock's films are founded on darkness, threat and the unknown and, through light and art, we come to see, to understand.

We are not implicated in the Fordian landscape as we are in this Hitchcockian one. We are not overwhelmed by Ford's space; we can consider it and emotionally respond to it because it lies before us within a film aesthetic which is not secretive; it is emblematic so to speak. Cary Grant's isolation and fear on the prairie in those long shots from *North by North-West* are agoraphobic in nature, it is an experience of fearful panic at the lack of threat, a desire for its appearance, for it to take shape and form, as if any object is better than its absence. The plane arrives with all the delight and trepidation of the child's awaiting the most awful part of a nursery story. When Hitchcock speaks of *Psycho* being 'fun', it can only be this infantile state he means to evoke. Truffaut speaks of Hitchcock's cinema as being one of 'anxiety'.

The simple but highly orchestrated construction of *Psycho* is exemplary of the most ravishing and merciless overwhelming by art as opposed to invitation in art. The full paraphernalia of the modelling mode characteristic of film is exercised on the spectator – bold chiaroscuro black-and-white lighting, jagged rhythmic editing with matching musical score, persistent shot-reverse-shot montaging, intense close-ups with bizarre camera angling and, of course, a narrative of grotesque horror. Its central character projects wholesale onto others and her environment. Of course, Hitchcock also uses the long-held shot and camera movement and not simply the quick edits of the shot-reverse-shot. Furthermore, the overall style is classical and cynical. Hitchcock's world is also the contemporary one. While Ford can use the posture, gesture and vocabulary of the epic in his Westerns, the emblems of types, Hitchcock's

characters are more often than not from the modern-day urbane middle or lower classes (mainly the former in his American films). Their apartments, their clothes are nondescript. What is fascinating about *Psycho* is how mundane and uninteresting *qua* characters the characters are, including Norman Bates. If their actions are out of the ordinary – theft, murder, necrophilia – it is not rooted in extraordinary contexts, rationales for behaviour or even exotic personalities. Whether Marion's moral breakdown is on a continuum with Norman's is not suggested by Hitchcock (in interview he seems to reject such an idea),[9] but nor is such a possibility excluded from his universe. *Psycho*'s Freudian ending as exposition, as rationale, is undermined by the final two scenes – the white-out of Norman's incarceration both within his cell and his own fragmented mind, and the image of Marion's car emerging slowly from the *noirish* swamp – almost in a cinematic critique of psychoanalytical explanation in film criticism. Here is the analysis and here is the stubborn image, the horror. As Freud stated, analytical explanation without emotional engagement of the transference is like a hungry man outside the restaurant staring at the menu. What nearly all sympathetic commentators on the film have refused to give up in the film is its level of phantasy, of imagination, of imagery, beyond the psychoanalyst's report on Norman.

But Hitchcock has described the film as a piece of 'fun', one aimed at manipulating the emotions of a mass audience. As Durgnat comments, all of Hitchcock's work can be seen in this light and in his desire for mass entertainment, his almost unswerving commitment to these ends (like Ford's) we are drawn to its manipulative skills. This is not out of step with a particular European tradition in painting (seventeenth-century Dutch painting exemplifies this trait) with its images of mundane private transactions in bourgeois interiors. These are not images of grandeur addressing religious and moral themes, but rather observations, conceits and ironic viewpoints of everyday life whose emotional and moral aspects are found in their establishing of form, in the ordering of light, space and figures. Hitchcock's films have some of this quality. *Vertigo* intertwines this capturing of space, time and the figure with a more atmospherically charged Expressionism often using colour as in the Bocklin-like forest scene in which Madeleine seems to vanish, to be found moments later, 'la belle dame sans merci' Keats-like, reclining in the misty, oddly illuminated Romantic forest of the European tradition. It is an intensely non-American image, but one that he wrests, against the grain, from an American landscape. Even the place of death – the Mission church – is in the European Spanish tradition, with its white reflecting exterior walls and embracing, shade-providing arches.

The distance between this exterior sequence and by comparison his almost sterile American interiors is traversed by Scottie's car, the forever moving car with that characteristic Hitchcockian frontal mid-shot of the character at the steering wheel. The film has many pre-echoes of *Psycho* in these driving scenes especially, but also in the lodging house scene in *Vertigo* in which

Scottie espies Madeleine and from which she vanishes. Its front-on shot of the lobby with the Baroque staircase on the right of frame and wide passageway on the left leading to the house's interior is the same shot (and with similar decor) used in *Psycho*, and even the camera movement used when Scottie enters the house is the same as the one used for Arborgast's entry to Norman's house, as are the approaches to these houses by these characters, which also include the scene in *Shadow of a Doubt* as the two Charlies approach the house when the two detectives are on the porch. It involves a brief point-of-view shot from Arborgast/Scottie/two Charlies of the raised house's entrance doors, a shot which has a slightly wobbly, hand-held feeling which, in the context of the film's normal rigidity of shot, is intensely subjective and anxious but with strong deliberate intent – the feeling is of slight dizziness and swoon, in fact, an experience of vertigo.

The car in both *Psycho* and *Vertigo* is used in similar but not identical ways.[10] Hitchcock uses car journeys as a way to depict a kind of enforced contemplation, introspection of an internal attentivity on the part of characters. In *Psycho*, in the first evening drive, Marion is immersed in thought, the voice-over is of her interior mental state which is then replaced, after her encounter with the policeman on the road, by an attentiveness to that interior anxiety now located in the physical world outside her car, in the classically constructed point-of-view shots through her rear-view mirror of the pursuing policeman. And finally, there is her drive through the rain to the motel – the wipers flicking across the windscreen and the oncoming headlights blinding her.

The journey – by car, train, plane – is a central experience in many Hitchcock films (as in many films). It represents time out from strict narrative, from plotting, moments of mental focus, introspection, contemplation, of the encroachment of omnipotent phantasy. Moreover, they are akin to portraits in their frontality and often are as revealing. The spectator is placed by the camera position in the absurd position of being crouched on the bonnet of a moving car! Hitchcock's refusal at times to use the point-of-view technique in such scenes, instead keeping the camera fixed on the car driver, serves to cut off the spectator (and the character) from the world outside the car (in the case of Marion, this is further emphasised by the dark night surround). Durgnat aptly describes this sequence as one in which Marion is in 'the no-man's-land between reality and the nightmare'.[11] Second, it maintains a tension in that all focus is on the face and in this case voice-over, a tension released by the eventual switch to point of view – what she sees through the windscreen. The classic rhythm of shot-reverse-shot serves a hypnotic purpose, perhaps a metaphor for mental splitting between driving performed almost unconsciously and the contents of the mind. Third, it establishes character internality. Hitchcock is not alone in using this technique for such ends, although his use is at the extreme, such as his long-held frontal shots.

In *Vertigo*, shot by Robert Burks,[12] Hitchcock expresses another world, one perhaps less visually dramatic (Scottie lives in West Coast sunlight and not in Marion's chiaroscuro-lit night) when in the scene in which Scottie follows Madeleine in the car, the elaborate repetitive shot of the pursuit establishes Scottie's burgeoning psychological state, his obsessiveness, his Angst-ridden infatuation. If Marion's projected phantasies are aural (her imagined 'interior' voices in the night drive to the motel, hearing the 'mother's' voice from the house, listening to Norman's troubles and eventually *not* hearing her murderer over the noise in the shower), then Scottie's are visual – paintings, Madeleine's car, vertigo itself denote a distortion of vision, a visual relationship to space (height), and of course his desire for a visual replication of Madeleine. Scottie's car drive is shot mainly from his point of view (not strict, often shot over his shoulder, giving it a slight off-centre quality by the spectator's sharing of Scottie's space). Interestingly, in the strong contrast after Madeleine's death, his obsessive compulsion's object shattered, Scottie is reduced to walking. He wanders the streets until he comes upon Judy. Even then his car is spotted only fleetingly as they leave the restaurant. In fact, they literally go for a walk. The car returns for the final fateful journey to the Spanish Mission. There is a fairly obvious reason for this switch from cars to legs. Scottie's distracted searching cannot be accomplished in a speeding car. He needs to search almost meticulously for his lost love-object, and dramatically, he needs to contemplate at leisure objects, people, environments, something difficult to achieve in a moving car. Also Scottie's obsession has foundered – what the car represented was his desire's movement *towards* its object as is the case in *Psycho*. The car also fades away in *Psycho* after Marion's death.

In relation to this, we might ask whether Scottie's 'tragedy' is defused by his pathological mental state – vertigo. Is Scottie a tragic figure flawed by a character trait, or the victim of an illness? This quandary can be resolved to some degree by the fact that the originating event – the policeman's fall – is one of guilt which provokes vertigo. Vertigo and the rest are the result of a primaeval emotion – guilt. Just as the wood seems to move towards Macbeth, so the world, seen from above, moves away from Scottie. But Macbeth's murderous acts are his own and stem from 'over-vaulting ambition'. Scottie's tragedy is a Freudian one, if such a thing is definitionally possible. It is a contingency of life which determines Scottie's fate – the slip on the rooftops – not a moral choice ill-made like Macbeth's.[13]

Would the film have been possible within the same terms without this already-given condition? For the film's powerful grasp of the visual's expressiveness – in the use of colour, its editing rhythms, deep perspectives (in the pre-death of Madeleine half) – is remarkable. Yet it is interrupted by Scottie's vertigo-distorted visual experiences in dreams, mental flashes (Expressionist hangovers), far removed from the American West Coast dream-like world he constructs for us and Scottie in ordinary perception. This visual split in *Vertigo*, between the imaging of distorted visual experiences

of the central character and a more subtle depiction of everyday space and objects, is found in other Hitchcock films, although often more through editing and framing techniques than through non-realist Expressionist pictoriality, e.g. *Psycho*, *The Birds*, *Rear Window*. These explosive impulses are at odds with the view of Hitchcock as somehow removed from the work or being a mature, controlling hand.[14]

Hitchcock's visual powers are unmatched in *Vertigo,* especially with regard to colour. *Vertigo*'s colour has been noted for good reason. However, like most other Hitchcock films *Vertigo* is discussed critically largely without any real reference to colour and visual aspects, except in the most general way. Narrative, and to some extent editing, dominate most studies of his films.[15] In fact, colour is central to the aesthetic and meaning of both *Vertigo* and *Psycho*. Hitchcock is the supreme visual director of Hollywood in his use of colour, composition, lighting as integral to the meaning of his films. His pictorial style is not a discrete aesthetic effect but inseparable from his films' overall impact and power. Truffaut's extensive interview with Hitchcock reveals time and again his artistic concern with the visual aspect of the film and not simply its story and themes – witness his dislike of 'royal-blue sky' in film and his meticulous choice of Kim Novak's clothes for *Vertigo*.[16] These elements are inseparable. *Vertigo* is not the story and narrative handling of the story, but Hitchcock's visualisation of the story. In fact, its governing artistic phantasy is at the level of its formal elements – colour, lighting, composition, etc.

Vertigo's ethereal and unreal effects are crucial to the film's expressiveness, which owes much to its colour scheme. Hitchcock's first colour film was *Rope* (1948) and according to him, he was 'determined to reduce the colour to a minimum'.[17] Sensitive to colour, Hitchcock knew that lighting techniques had to be different in colour from black and white. Interestingly, he refers to his early years at art school when he moved from line drawing to using light and shade, placing him firmly in Wolfflin's painterly style and Stokes' modelling tradition. He remarks that 'there's no such thing as colour',[18] by which he means that he takes darkness as an original condition and objects become perceptible only through the presence of light (he states that a face is non-existent until 'light hits it'). Hitchcock also remarks that back-lighting (liners) was used in American films in the 1920s to separate figures from background shadows and objects, and to achieve a less two-dimensional look. Colour, he believes, does not require this, as it itself provides depth. A character in a blue suit standing against a red background will have enough detachment through the difference in colour; the man's shape in blue will be quite distinct against a red background. In fact, back lighting, as he claims was used traditionally in Hollywood colour films, produced strong, well-defined black shadows in surroundings where they were not appropriate, calling attention to the artifice of studio lighting. The implication is an interesting one, that is, that with black and white, light sources are fairly obvious and

strong studio lights have to be used for definition of shape, all of which is perfectly acceptable to a spectator. In such films shadow is an inevitability; in fact, light and shadow singularly produce an image-content through the transformation of colour values into monochromatic values. This is not the case in colour. *Vertigo*, for example, rarely uses shadow in a striking way;[19] it is simply a part of normal shadowing found in an ambiently lit situation, whether interior or exterior. Not only that, any shadow examined closely will be coloured through object colour itself, or reflected colour. The creases in Scottie's blue jacket, for example, if examined closely, are a dark blue with only a readable black in the deepest point of the crease. Fascinatingly, Madeleine's grey suit, in its creasing and moulding shadows which are lighter given the lightness of grey often used in sets using dark low-luminosity colours, helps to draw attention to her figure, the sexual object of our and Scottie's gaze. Similarly, Madeleine's lowish-cut black dress in the darkish restaurant scene visually accentuates what Hitchcock desired, her head (largely in profile, part of Scottie's fetishistic obsession) and blonde hair. When Madeleine becomes Judy, what was her blonde hair and head is replaced by her breasts in the green sweater provided modelling shadowing beneath her breasts to accentuate them.[20] A normal sexuality in conventional terms is then evaded by the idealisation of the flattering suit and its crowning glory, her blonde hair distinctively coiled at the back. Sexuality proper – in the form of Judy's more whole-body presentation – is dismissed for the cold, idealised beauty of Madeleine which relies on parts of her body; her hair, the back of her head and an idealisation of those parts and overall 'look'.

Hitchcock's control of lighting and colour effects with a strong move away from black-and-white values is revealed in interview:

> At the beginning of the picture [*Vertigo*], when James Stewart follows Madeleine to the cemetery, we gave her a dreamlike, mysterious quality by shooting through a fog filter. That gave us a green effect, like fog over bright sunshine.[21]

He then goes on to describe how he uses green and a soft look in the scene in which we first meet Judy in her hotel room by the use of the flashing green neon sign which gives her the 'same subtle, ghost-like quality'.[22]

The strong use of electric blues and deep, smothered reds in the early sequences prior to Madeleine's 'death' are quite remarkable. For outdoor sequences, ochre yellow is used for wall surfaces. Overall, the sun is filtered into a haze-like atmosphere and shadows are reduced.[23] In the early graveyard sequence, as we have mentioned, when Scottie follows Madeleine, Hitchcock uses fog filters which gave a green tinge to the scenes.[24] Even in interiors with large windows behind the character, the light is fairly evenly distributed as if the sun is always in a haze or behind thin cloud. In the first sequence in Midge's studio, the dominant colours are blues and yellows and the

light evenly distributed with a low modelling light on the left, *away* from the window.

In the first part of the film, outside walls are yellow-ochre (the shipyard walls as Scottie enters, Madeleine's apartment block) or white as in the church into which he follows her. The roads have a green hue as he follows in the car and a passing taxi is a warm muted yellow with its lustre shininess filtered out. In a remarkable scene when Scottie spies on Madeleine in the florist shop, her shiny grey suit takes on the colours of adjacent flowers as she walks up and down between them waiting for the shop assistant. The grey suit among the rich outburst of colour in this overwrought composed scene lends Madeleine a chameleon-like quality; it also helps to emphasise her blonde hair (an obsessive part of her physicality for Scottie) and give her a 'colourless' visual contrast among the primary colours and the soft yellows, blues and green hue of the exterior scenes.[25] In a film of such vivid colour, Madeleine's grey dress (which Scottie forces Judy to acquire) is a masterstroke of colour composition.

In the restaurant scene when Scottie first sees Madeleine (a painful masochistic falling in love by his expression and the scene's odd, decentred construction), blues and reds dominate with the exception of Madeleine's blonde hair (in an unlocated subtle light) and black suit (the 'colourless' equivalent to her grey one). Others have described the camera movement and editing of this sequence which adds up to a stifling unreal atmosphere which, while not vertiginous, is mesmerisingly unfocused in its expression of a doomed love at first sight. Nevertheless it has a classical feel to it. The cuts are clean, the shots held and the movements sharply motivated. It is not an intuitive Romanticist sequence of swirling emotions. It is Hitchcockian *par excellence* in its clarity and order.

Stanley Cavell has described *Vertigo* as 'great example of [the] combination of fantasy and colour symbolism'.[26] He goes on to state that 'no other movie I know so purely conveys the sealing of a mind within a scorching fantasy'.[27] For Cavell, *Vertigo* depicts a man so identified with his desire that he forgoes reality in order to sustain that desire, and as Freud pointed out, that desire is only sustainable through fantasy. In this sense, *Psycho* is a different kind of film. Norman has toppled into such a fantasy and become psychotic and the film is *not* a pure expression of that state, as *Vertigo* is of Scottie's state. *Vertigo* is a phantasy. A fact underlined by the impoverished animated 'phantasy' scenes which attempt to visualise 'vertigo' which is a sort of (although not entirely) Hitchcockian McGuffin. It is the film which can act as a yardstick of Hitchcock's artistic achievements.

On the issue of art and Hitchcock, Tania Modelski's influential book on the director displays a confusion; a brief discussion may help to highlight the present book's ambitions. Modelski's psychoanalytical feminism (although one of the most coherent and systematic of anti-psychoanalysis thinkers, Sartre, assists too) attempts to distance itself from Hitchcock as artist while

consistently appealing to that very status. She aligns her own analysis with those critics who 'implicitly challenge and decenter directorial authority by considering Hitchcock's work as an expression of cultural attitudes and practices existing to some extent outside the artist's control'.[28] If what interests her is outside the director's control, why choose him as her subject-matter? If Hitchcock's work is expressive of such determinist elements, then surely any directors working in the same industry at the same time must be similarly expressive of the same 'cultural attitudes and practices'? Of course, Modelski could reply that such is the case and her choice of Hitchcock is only as an example of such expression. But she does not claim this but rather the opposite, that Hitchcock somehow exemplifies, at least in certain of his films, such an expression. Even more importantly, he subverts the patriarchal orthodoxy with a 'thoroughgoing ambivalence about femininity'. But how is this auteuristic quality possible if 'cultural attitudes and practices' are beyond his control? The underlying problem of understanding the relationship between an art object as the creation of an individual and as the product of an historical context is not a novel one. This is an enormously complex issue which has long taxed art historians and theorists.[29] Wolfflin confronts the same problem in *Renaissance and Baroque* when he asks:

> What determines the artist's creative attitude to form? It has been said to be the character of the age he lives in; for the Gothic period, for instance, feudalism, scholasticism, the life of the spirit. But we still have to find the path that leads from the cell of the scholar to the mason's yard.[30]

In Michael Podro's words, the question is for 'us to see how the products of art sustain purposes and interests which are both *irreducible* to the conditions of their emergence as well as *inextricable* from them'.[31] But Modelski does not seek to sustain this distinction but rather chooses the reductionist position – the expression of the age (the Hegelian *Zeitgeist* view), in this case ideological values and practices related to the treatment of women in the West. It is unclear whether it covers American women (in the post-war period), although the generality of her argument to 'patriarchy' hardly helps to clarify this. She, for instance, explains some differences (treatment of rape) between *Blackmail* (1929) and *Frenzy* (1972) in terms of differences in film censorship between the pre-war years and early 1970s. Of course, such an explanation fails to explain the stylistic choices Hitchcock made in the rape scene in *Frenzy* (rape became commonplace in films of the 1970s). Hitchcock's deglamorisation of rape (relatively speaking, compared, say, with *Straw Dogs*) finds its meaning in the body of his work *qua* Hitchcock and so Modelski moves to occupy the 'aesthetic' or auteuristic. In fact, her analysis is dedicated to Hitchcock's unique ability not to be expressive simply of 'cultural attitudes and practices'. There is a Hitchcockian input into his work which is not reducible to the influences of the culture *qua* patriarchy and femininity, as Modelski calls it.

Hitchcock's work is in the modelling mode, dominated by part-object phantasies. It is generally recognised that its invitation is overwhelming. His strong identificatory and manipulative film techniques are infamous and well documented. For Hitchcock, cinematic form plays the role of controlling extreme feelings and actions. One is reminded of Stokes' comments on Mexican masks which 'often express a powerful sadism or bloodthirstiness' which can only be mitigated by 'the creation of Form, a benign or unifying experience, however dire … [the] subject matter'.[32] It is one of the achievements of Hitchcock's art that he should have made the cruel, the ferocious energies of Thanatos, the sadistic onslaught of manic attacks, somehow capable of sharing to some degree in wholeness through his formal shaping and control. Witness even his detached heroes and heroines, who add to this Form. The debonair, louche charms of Cary Grant and James Stewart and the cold Nordic neurotic sensuosity of his blonde women are narrow projections, phantasies of controlled marionettes, who we rarely feel for but witness, observe with a *frisson* of horror, of omnipotent sadists.

10
Modelling in Light and Dark

> I think that if you are above a certain age, you tend to think that real movies are black-and-white anyway. I certainly do. I mean the movies that formed me and that are deepest in my unconscious are black-and-white, by and large.
>
> Michael Chapman[1]

It is perhaps opportune at this point to raise the question of black-and-white film. In some ways it is an addendum, or at least a detour, but at the same time, because of its accent on the *visual*, it also seems quite germane. Most of the films discussed in this book, with the exception of *Vertigo*, *The Searchers* and *The Red Desert*, were shot in black-and-white. My bias was not a conscious one. It was determined by my tastes and by the fact that many of the generally accepted film classics were made in the black-and-white era. It may even be the case that black-and-white cinema constitutes a stylistic category, one that crosses national boundaries, genres and even artists. My emphasis has been on Eisenstein's cinema, Dreyer, Italian neo-realism, Hitchcock and Ford, in all of whom black-and-white cinematography plays a large part. The monochromaticism of cinema's greatest achievements (I am excluding early tinted film)[2] includes the major films of Eisenstein, much of Ford, Hitchcock, Wilder, Capra, Welles, Hawks, Fuller, the two Rays, Pabst, Lang, Renoir, Mizoguchi, Vertov, Vigo, Bunuel, Deren, Dreyer, Ozu – the list is endless. In other words, the classic cinema of both Hollywood and international art cinema remains defined largely by works shot in black and white.

Interestingly, any substantial discussion of black and white as a general aesthetic element is largely missing from most accounts of the history of cinema and of particular film-makers.[3] However, the introduction of colour in the 1930s provoked debate on the issue of black-and-white cinematography that is to be found in the writings of Arnheim[4] and Eisenstein,[5] both of whom were fairly unimpressed by the use of colour, especially what they saw as its role in propping up naturalism. The English painter Paul Nash in 1935 was also damning of colour in film.[6] Stokes does not directly address the issue.

But there are fascinating moments in his writings when he discusses black-and-white photographic plates and it is here that we may find some clues as to his views on the medium and monochromaticism in relation to film.

In 1961 Stokes published 'The Impact of Architecture' illustrated by 'thirteen of the superb reproductions in Thames and Hudson's *Romanesque Art in France*'. Stokes had often shown an awareness of the qualities of photographs in reproducing plastic art works.[7] But in 'The Impact of Architecture' we witness Stokes analysing (black-and-white) photographs heeding what they have captured, the angle at which they were shot, their composition and capturing of light and dark. He does not use the photographs as visual reminders for a discussion of the various buildings but rather as the objects. In the section on the abbey of Saint Philibert at Tournus, he asks, 'Do I depend too much on the photograph?'[8] He had just been observing, among other things, how 'the darkness of the [abbey's] apertures' are as 'knots of strength' and the 'darkness of the tower's conical roof' is as 'a reservoir of potency reaped from the sky'. A tree intruding into the right foreground of the photographic plate, on the other hand, 'showed an unsifted and disorganized condition of those materials'. Stokes analyses other aspects before asking the question of his dependence on the photograph.

In researching black-and-white film in the domain of film theory and criticism, it was striking how rarely discussion got beyond monochromatic film being simply what existed before colour.[9] It is often discussed in the context of colour's role in the cinema, with black and white seen as a period before colour proper. Colour was an achievement towards realism in cinema. It was introduced to Hollywood in a significant way in the 1930s and came to dominate after the 1960s although even in the late 1950s about one third of Hollywood film production remained in black and white.[10] Of course, black and white was not a neutral visual form. Film stocks, processing methods, lighting techniques all contributed to black-and-white film's aesthetic. Even the most cursory look at black-and-white films from different historical periods and from different studios and directors reveals richly varied differences.[11]

We perhaps need to be reminded after a century of cinema that its early days of what is called the 'silent cinema' held a visual delight that is now lost. Kevin Brownlow remarks that

> the standard of photography in the silent days was remarkably high. The cameramen had the tradition of Victorian still photographers to draw upon and even the least pretentious film could boast superb photography. Seen in a nitrate print projected on a big screen, the best work of the silent era can be an overwhelming artistic experience. Copy it, and at once the magic disappears. It is like copying a Rembrandt with an Instamatic camera. The silver content of black-and-white film stock has been removed to such an extent that the glistening sheen of early cinematography often registers as an out-of-focus smear. The information is there. The art has gone.[12]

The rather archaic notion of the 'silver screen' was once true. This silver aspect of the silent black-and-white film 'has been removed to such an extent that the glistening sheen of early cinematography often registers as an out-of-focus sheen'. This 'glistening sheen' is what millions of pre-sound cinemagoers, including Stokes, would have experienced. It is a paradox of cinema, that the most accessible mass-produced medium is now less accessible than a Renaissance painting, even considering the ravages of time on the latter. For Brownlow, 'the razor-sharp exteriors, the gauzed close-ups, the ravishing use of tints and tones, and the sheer depth of the image' are but a memory, as they are for this writer.[13] Some of this will be discussed in more detail in the present chapter.

One of the most fundamental divisions in cinema is between black-and-white and colour film. It marks two periods in cinema's brief history, as does sound although less dramatically, as the transition between black and white and colour was much more gradual and, unlike sound, was never fully completed in the mainstream.[14] Since the mid-1950s and early 1960s colour film has reigned supreme, with few exceptions especially in Hollywood, in the last few decades.[15] The artistic high point of black-and-white film had passed by the 1950s. However, the situation was more complex than this historical division suggests. Cinema always had colour as it always had sound by way of orchestral, organ and piano accompaniment. According to Salt, between 1907 and 1913, 'most films were coloured in one way or another' and in the same period tinting became stabilised as a system.[16] In fact, tinting prevailed in cinema between the first decade and the arrival of sound in the late 1920s. Between 1920 and 1926, it was standard practice to tint for night scenes (usually in blue) even when daylight scenes were simply black and white. Kinemacolour, an early colour process, was used for cinemas in larger cities and major film distribution areas between 1908 and 1915. Of course, tinting sustained a monochromatic aesthetic. With these historical facts in mind, standard black-and-white cinema, without tinting, came to true domination only in the 1930s and 1940s and began to give way, fairly rapidly in the longer view, and more substantially, to colour in the 1950s and 1960s. By the 1970s, black and white was no longer standard. Its purest years, so to speak, were the 1930s and 1940s, a fairly brief period. However, much of British social realist film-making of the late 1950s and 1960s was in black and white as were the various European New Waves (*Hiroshima Mon Amour*, *Jules et Jim*, *Closely Observed Trains*, *8½*, *The Gospel According to Matthew*, and so on), although colour was used too, notably by Godard in his *Pierrot le fou*. Similarly in Hollywood, black-and-white was not yet an affectation – witness Hitchcock's return to it in *Psycho*.

This issue is complicated by the fact that contemporary prints of pre-sound films are often not tinted. At the time of release often a plain black-and-white print would circulate outside the large cities where audiences would view a tinted print of the same film. In the pre-sound period then we are

dealing with at least two versions of the same film. In evaluating a particular film, we are faced with the question: which version of the film should we judge? In general, the answer must be the black-and-white version because it involves a more recognisable and controllable system of tonal values which would seem to be aesthetically superior. The addition of tinted colour would seem to be a decorative aspect of what is a more integral visual object. Of course this is not a hard-and-fast rule. But tinting of particular scene types – blue for night exteriors, red for fires, orange and amber for candlelight, and so forth – does have a decorative quality, and at worst a stifling impositional quality, of mechanical styling. Of course, such colour codes are well known in painting especially of the pre- and early European Renaissance period, e.g. the oft-cited blue and gold for the Virgin Mary's garments. As in the latter cases, tinting should not mean aesthetic rejection; particular usage is all. Blue tinting for night scenes often had a practical rationale, to disguise day-filming for such scenes.[17]

Colour is an essential property of film as it is of perception itself. As Goethe states: '[A]ll nature manifests itself by means of colours to the sense of sight.'[18] In recent decades, film criticism and theory have been dominated by the medium's narrative concerns to the detriment of its pictoriality. A film may lack narrative and in fact be abstract or simply a blank screen, but in all cases we are looking at something with colour if we include black and/or white as colour.

Black-and-white cinematography is usually associated with film's *graphic* qualities, with the 'pull and push' of composition either at rest or in movement. For example, the cinematographer Michael Chapman describes black-and-white film as in some sense abstract,[19] as does Laszlo Kovacs[20] and John Boorman.[21] For some film-makers and cinematographers it is given an inarticulable status as seen in the Michael Chapman quote above. Black-and-white film was determined by methods of lighting, types of stock and processing and aesthetics fashions. Salt points out that during the 1940s, monochromatic filming moved away from strong contrasts of blacks and whites to more overall grey values, to the mid-range tones of monochromatic register. This trend towards a greyer image in the late 1930s and early 1940s was eclipsed in the late 1940s by the influence of Tolland's work for *Citizen Kane*, especially his reduction in use of lens diffusion which sharpened shadows aided by use of powerful arc lamps without fill-lighting so that sharp-edged chiaroscuro effects were achieved against soft-focus or diffusion in most films of the early 1940s.[22] Anti-reflective coating on the lens was introduced in 1940 which meant that light was not dispersed so as to give 'a general pale wash of light over the image'. This gave an extra light advantage of half a stop. Salt points out that a coated lens gave a more dramatic sharpness in black and white when shooting against the light, as in the projection room scene in *Citizen Kane*. He surmises:

In this scene the figures silhouetted by the strong arc beam from the projection booth would have been turned from crisp black to grey by a wash of flare, and their edges would have been quite blurred, if uncoated lenses had been used.[23]

What follows is an attempt to explore the relationship between a Stokesian aesthetic and black-and-white film. As we shall see, for Stokes black-and-white representation, especially photographic, suggested modelling values and I would like to see how far this association is true of cinema as well as photography. In other words, can black-and-white cinema be assimilated with modelling values? Any discussion of black and white must consider shadows, chiaroscuro and other forms of modelling with light. To this end I will discuss some of the ideas on shadows in painting found in Ernst Gombrich and Michael Baxandall's writings as they relate to film. Finally, I give a brief analysis of some black-and-white films especially from the so-called Hollywood *film noir* period of the 1940s.

Stokes, modelling and black and white

The aesthetic mode of modelling in painting paradigmatically involves sharp transitions, a profusion of internal differentiation which traditionally is often organised into some kind of pictorial coherence through an overriding device, e.g. meticulous perspective or more relevant to the issue at hand, chiaroscuro. As we have seen, Stokes' celebration of the *quattrocento* and low-relief marble carving was precisely in opposition to the deep cutting of naturalist illusionism, associated with Florentine carving where the modelling of the stone is such to ensure dramatic shadows emphasizing naturalist imitation. Speaking of Donatello's marble relief *Pietà*, Stokes remarks:

> changes of surface meant little more than light and shade, chiaroscuro, the instruments of plastic organisation. The bottom of the angels' robes is gouged and undercut so as to provide a contrast to the open planes of Christ's nude torso. The layers of the stone are treated wholesale. Though some of the cutting is beautiful in itself, the relief betrays a willful, preconceived, manner of approach. In brief, the composition is not so much founded upon the interrelationship of adjoining surfaces, as upon the broader principles of chiaroscuro. Stress and strain is the point: anatomy, the then unrivalled plastic subject, is the point.[24]

These features of the Donatello are well served by photography in a way that carving properties are not, according to Stokes. Referring to the plates in his book of the supreme low-relief carver Agostini's *Madonna and Child with Angels*, Stokes points out that it suffers in comparison to the Donatello,

for 'the greater the modelling conception in sculpture, the less are the values lost in photograph'.[25]

Modelling's characteristic fragmentation encourages the drawing in of the spectator to the extent of feeling overwhelmed often by two extremes – an 'oceanic feeling' of being at one with the part-object (originally the breast) or of being annihilated into bits by the extreme attack of bad part-objects which dominate the paranoid-schizoid position. After the depressive position is attained, as Stokes remarked, 'we continue, of course, to split objects, groups and causes, into the very good and the very bad; for good as well as ill we continue to project and to introject'.[26] This is also the case for artist and spectator. In art, even the most compulsive and manic currents in an artwork can be regained for whole-object values by the relations pertaining between the parts. For Stokes, art is an emotional activity. Its product, the work of art, is not about achieving another reality by copying the one around us, nor is it the fantasy of imaginative life, of images concocted solely in the mind and then projected outwards.[27] Art is a means of rendering a representation in which the inclination to fragmentation, to offer only the illusory, all-encompassing enthralment of the medium is restrained by the desire to create a whole-object, one of integrity to itself as medium, restorative of narrower impulses. One of the problems with Stokes' original carving and modelling distinction was that it seemed to embrace a particular kind of art of carving values, of balance, of equanimity and excluded that where surface and balance were not so easily perceptible – Rembrandt, Turner. In Stokes' *Colour and Form*, the exemplary painters of carving values are Giorgione, Piero della Francesca, Vermeer, Chardin, Brueghel and Cézanne.[28]

As we have seen in previous chapters, the modelling mode is essentially identificatory. At its least domineering, it is the empathic aspect of art – it is 'a *compelling* invitation to identify'[29] – which Stokes also described in later texts as an 'incantatory process' where the spectator is 'enrolled by the formal procedures … and then absorbed to some extent into the subject-matter on show'.[30] For Stokes, art was to be valued for its ability, against the odds, to regain modelling impulses for the wholeness of carving. Modelling in this context, as we have seen, is to be understood as a necessary 'invitation in art', and certain formal devices and processes are to be associated with the modelling mode.

If editing is a device by which images are separated from each other and hence is not a representation in itself, colour in its broadest sense is basic to any film image and also constitutive of meaning. It is determined by the constitution of the world and the optical system which records it. As a secondary quality of objects, it has both an objective existence and a subjective one. Its mediating form is light. Without light visual perception cannot occur.[31] Any filmic representation (excluding non-object animation and computer effects, etc.) requires light. Unlike painters who can create representations of objects and light through paint, film-makers depend on

real/natural and artificial lighting. The problems attached to creating and capturing light remains a central problem for all film-makers and their cinematographers where they are separate roles. It is also a banal observation but one that seems at times necessary to make that our experience of any film is one of light on a screen – whether that produces gradations of white and black or colour.

In Stokes' case, colour is the essential quality of the medium of paint as an art. It is through the relationships between colour used for representational purposes (whether figurative or 'abstract') that painting achieves its artistic expressiveness. Colour has this status in painting because it is the mark of outwardness; it is dependent on our vision. Our experience of the world is one of colour, of what our optical capacities determine. If for Stokes art is an externalising of inner phantastical complexity in relation to the medium, then it is to colour and not to the plasticity of line, for example, that we must turn for the achievement of *fullness*. In this celebration and defence of the centrality of colour in painting, Stokes contrasts it with the painterly effects brought about by light and what he calls 'other transitory phenomena'.[32] Light devices evoke mood and movement and temporality – all qualities at odds with Stokes' notion of the *disclosure* of colour in painting. Light, with its modelling proclivities, *makes* things as opposed to disclosing them. He remarks that the painter 'may very well seize upon light effects and other transitory phenomena to make a forcible pattern.'[33] Thus,

> [T]he modeller . . . imbues spatial objects with the animus and calculation of inner life. He projects the lively feeling, though not as disclosed state. He accumulates force and directions: he does not reveal an accumulation, an augmentation on the surface, a mere outwardness.[34]

Stokes is railing against 'atmosphere' in painting, against the depiction of inner moods whether understood objectively (say, in a landscape) or psychologically. In vision, Stokes remarks, we 'grope' for the form of objects 'with the look'.[35] And in painting of modelling values, of plasticity, this groping is what dominates. For example, excessive lighting of objects in painting establishes lustre where an object's brightest point is where it loses its colour and becomes a reflective point of the surface – the white speck of paint, used to represent highlighting, over and against its actual depicted colour – a white spot of paint on a yellow vase to depict the light falling on it and emphasising volume, depth, surface curve. Such a device – a modelling one – destroys both integral colour and surface in so far as the latter becomes identical with a polished reflection of light and not constitutive of its own surface. We can see the implication of this for black-and-white film. As light is more active on the surface and as subject-matter in black-and-white cinematography,

then depth and perspective is often represented by light reflected on surfaces – colour is literally retranslated into monochromatic scale between black and white.

Stokes quotes Katz on darkened images:

> The intensity of illumination within a space can be so reduced that it becomes impossible, even with a completely adapted eye, to recognize either the structure or the orientation of the objects. What can still be distinguished are merely the outlines of objects and those of their surfaces which stand out as distinct from each other on the basis of brightness differences. The grey colours perceived under these conditions resemble film colours.[36]

It is the low reliefs of the early Renaissance, especially those of Agostino, whose extremely shallow relief, *rilievo staccato*, was established around 1415. Stokes refers in his early writings to this light as it came to be expressed in Italian carving (especially low-relief marbles) and architecture. When discussing the low-reliefs in his book he warns against the accompanying black-and-white photographic plates in his book which he believes express plastic values of what in fact are really carving ones. He is implying that black-and-white photography being comprised of shadows and shading in black, white and grey tones is essentially modelling in mode. 'Photographs transmit plastic values exceedingly well, carving values hardly at all,' he states in *Stones of Rimini*.[37] Black-and-white photography, for Stokes, is intrinsically a modelling medium in its emphasis on 'design, the organization of masses, the elements of weight and stress and strain'.[38] However black-and-white photographic plates are not a problem in his book on Venice and he never apologises for them. He begins the book with the remark that:

> Venice excels in blackness and whiteness; water brings commerce between them. Italians excel in the use of black and white, white stone and interior darkness.[39]

This is because the photographs are more objective representations of the actual experience of Venice, a three-dimensional object, and aspects of Italian architecture in general. But Stokes here is also noting an aspect of Venice: its walls and openings. As opposed to the stone encrustations and blossoming of *quattrocento* sculpture (for example, Verrocchio's famous *lavabo* in San Lorenzo, Florence),[40] Stokes stresses the blank white walls and bleached Istrian stone, with their dark-to-black doorways, windows and alleys in Venice.

Arguably, the same applies to film in so far as it *photographs* a world before its lens. It is the filmic replication of Italian light and hence of objects and space in *The Bicycle Thieves*, for example, which places it on the carving

side whereas the deep looming shadows of *The Asphalt Jungle* create a more totalising chiaroscuro space (with extensive use of *repoussoirs*) which does not answer in the same way to actual light conditions. This distinction should not be understood as something hard and fast. Quite the opposite, even a fairly small selection of black-and-white films reveals a wide range of approaches in relation to lighting and types of film stock. In, say, John Huston's film *The Asphalt City*, the *noirish* world of criminality and low-life existence is a more constructed one than de Sica's, which is not to say that his filming did not benefit from artificial lighting. It is more the ends of such lighting (as in the case of the ends of using tones, hues in painting) which are relevant here. This would support Bazin's conception of realism exemplified by Italian neo-realism and Renoir's early monochromatic films. In other words, cinematic realism is not a lack of artifice but rather the use of artifice to reveal the reality of the world seen through a camera's lens. Renoir noted: '[G]ood photography . . . sees the world as it is.'[41]

Ann Hollander also makes the familiar demarcation between Northern and Mediterranean art. It is the Northern painting tradition which she dubs 'cinematic'; as such film is primarily a modelling form for her. It is the persistence and popularity of the graphic arts of illustration and printing which since the sixteenth century were the main forms in which the high-art tradition was brought to a wider public, which created the grounds for an essentially black-and-white cinematic art part of the Northern tradition of painting. Black and white is particularly suitable to story-telling. The graphics of the comics, of illustration, cartoons suffice to communicate narrative. So when film began its black-and-white colouring was a convention, dictated by technology, that drew great inspiration and strength albeit often unconsciously from the graphic arts tradition, so ingrained was it in Western culture.

Hollander's argument is more complex and subtle than this suggests. Hollander believes that the graphic impulse is part of the Northern European painting tradition's objectivity, psychologism and reality modelled, revealed by light. If we need a distinction between how light and dark are used in Italian neo-realism and in the *film noir* of Hollywood of the same period, then it is in how a dark world is revealed by light being thrown upon parts of it in the *film noir*, and in neo-realism in objects themselves being the source of light, standing in the light, shown for what they are. This is not an argument about chiaroscuro as such, for of course all black-and-white film must use light as a modelling agent, light and not colour is the point. But in neo-realism, light is not used in such a swamping dramatic form, characters do not emerge from the blackness and slip half-way or totally back into it as they do in the *film noir*. Rather they exist in the steady glare, in the searing and often blinding whiteness of the Italian light. In colour film, vivid colours detract from that light, drain the whiteness from light itself.

Light, shadow and chiaroscuro

> The spray gun was used to cover greens and all dark spots with aluminum to save time, as it was quicker to spray light than to use electric fixtures to photograph dark surfaces.
>
> Josef von Sternberg, *Fun in a Chinese Laundry*[42]

In order to give a fuller account of black-and-white cinematography some discussion of shadows or 'holes in light' would seem in order. A renewed interest in the depiction of shadows in Western painting is of interest to the study of film.[43] Shadow 'originates in a local and relative deficiency of visible light'.[44] Shadows – attached, cast and slanted – are a ubiquitous part of our perceptual world. No visual perception of the world is possible without light. It is essential to our perception of the volume of things how light and shade are distributed. Another aspect of volume, and one that relates strongly to texture, is the reflective qualities of light, how it shines on satin, polished metal, glazed pottery, etc. creating highlights and reflective surfaces. By shadows here is meant the general phenomenon and not simply its dramatic sense. Shadows are such an intrinsic part of our normal perception of the world that we only really identify them when they have a distinctive functional role in our activities – eating lunch in the shade, seeking the shade on the beach, keeping a pram in the shade, pulling the eye-shade down when driving, planting a garden so that some beds have the sun and some shade, and at what times and for how long, and so forth. Or for aesthetics reasons – enjoying the dappled effects of shadow on a tree-lined walk, noticing and taking pleasure in how shadows play on the wall of our study or bedroom. The ubiquity of shadows is matched only by our indifference to them. Nevertheless, we cannot but use them without being aware usually in perception to recognise the shapes of things, distances, volume, time.

Shadows can be distinguished into three types: cast or projected, attached or self-shadow and slant/tilted. Projected shadows are the result of light being blocked by an object and the shadow being cast onto a surface or other objects. Self-shadows are caused by the object itself intervening and resulting in a shadow on the object's furthest side away from the light. Finally, slant/tilting shading occurs on the surfaces or planes of objects which lie adjacent to the lit area.[45] Many representational systems do not imitate light or represent it as such. Light is often taken as a universal phenomenon of perception. Early paintings did not represent light. Hills remarks that the 'preoccupation with representing light that is characteristic of the Western tradition from the Renaissance to the Impressionists is a peculiarity'.[46] As he points out, light has received less research in art history because, unlike linear perspective, it is 'at once universal and elusive'. Any object perceived, whether it be the table in front of me, a newspaper, a golden chalice, a painting, a film involves light,

for without it we would not perceive these objects in the first place. The history of light and painting is a long and difficult one which can only be touched on here.[47] Its relevance is two-fold. First, Western painting has had and still has an enormous influence on film visuals. Second, cinematographers face many of the problems painters do in depicting a scene. Whereas the painter must rely on paint, colour, brushes, etc., the cinematographer needs to know about cameras, lenses, lights, film printing processes, film stocks, and so forth. In both cases they also benefit from a good eye.

A prime distinction in painting then is between light as the *agent* of vision and the *object* of it. This, what Hills calls 'bewildering duality', means that painting requires light as an agent for perception to take place at all, and that the painting depicts light in some form or another. For example, a painting which uses no modelling techniques at all but just a pattern of colours depicting a figure before a landscape say, and had no intention to depict light, nevertheless produces 'light' in so far as we make sense of the representation and recognise its colours, shapes, forms and subject-matter. Such a painting has an overall surface of colour hues. No light source (however complicated or wrongheaded) is ascertainable from the painting. Modelling can be suggested without establishing a light source. For example, highlights can be seen as modelling without being a representation of a reflecting surface. So medieval techniques of modelling, set out in various manuals, were not sensitive to illumination but rather a means to distinguish convex surfaces from flat ones. This was done by layering of colour, one on another, and not by a gradation within one layer of paint.[48] So a uniform area of colour is laid down and then lights and darks, coded according to the first layer of colour, are added on top. The technique is not about representing light but of achieving volume and shape in figures. As modelling technique progressed, a very broad distinction was detectable between the darks using 'darker hues' of the colour in question for folds of garments for example, or mixing black or overpainting black for the same purpose. The latter was a tone-based technique, and the former retained the integrity of the colour through use of hue. Along the tonal lines Alberti states:

> A wide range and variety of colours contribute to the beauty and attraction of painting, but I would prefer learned painters to believe that the greatest art and industry are concerned with disposition of white and black . . . the combination of black and white achieves . . . what the artist must above all desire: that the things he paints should appear in maximum relief.[49]

To turn to film which with regard to light is a different system, film necessarily uses light as agency (in order to see a film) and as object – what we see has some kind of light values – but the former is artificially created by a projector which literally projects white light through moving transparent photographic

frames, which are either coloured or in gradations of blacks and grey transparency (the cinematographer Conrad Hall states that 'black-and-white only concerns itself with the grey scale from white to black').[50] To state the obvious, unlike a painting, a film can be visible in a completely blacked-out space. But like painting we need not be aware of illumination in film; it need not be 'represented' as such, except as an ambient light. However, again unlike painting, the image or representation requires at some point, however minimal, an acknowledgement and judgement about the lighting conditions at the time of lighting. We move therefore from something shot without much thought in good daylight with an unadjustable lens (focused to infinity) to the complex lights paraphernalia of a Hollywood studio. The latter may be and often was used to depict an overall ambient light. On the other hand, it could be used for the rich swirling dramatic chiaroscuro of a *film noir*-like image where represented light can take on the role of a protagonist with overt symbolic meaning, and so forth.

Film is a medium which is essentially about the manipulation of light, what the cinematographer John Alton describes as 'painting in light'.[51] The camera and projector are in mechanical terms similar machines which in the early days could be used for both purposes – filming and projecting – and in some instances, processing and printing also. All film representations, unlike in the case of painting, are true to actual light sources but these light sources are not necessarily, in fact are rarely, compatible with the light source they represent. In Jarman's *Caravaggio* Italian sunlight streaming through an open window was produced by powerful lamps in a room adjacent to the set which was in a darkened London dockside warehouse. Even in the so-called neo-realist exterior shots in Rossellini's *Rome Open City* lights were used (sometimes as fill-light) to boost the natural sunlight, and so forth.[52]

Shadows were used in early fifteenth-century art by such painters as Masaccio, and Gombrich hazards that they were used by Apelles in the classical Greek period.[53] By Leonardo's time they seemed to have waned as a depictive phenomenon in painting, although Leonardo himself used shadow and chiaroscuro effects in a masterly fashion and was one of the great students of light and shadow who greatly influenced the eighteenth-century thinkers on light and shadow, especially as they were used in painting.[54] Martin Kemp remarks of Leonardo's *Virgin on the Rocks*:

> This system of colour and shade – which laid the foundation for what is called tonal painting – allows each colour to declare itself with its full saturation of hue in the lit areas, but prevents any colour from disrupting the unified substratum of deep shadow from which all the forms emerge. Indeed, the power of darkness, the 'privation of light', is ultimately dominant in every sense – theoretically, aesthetically and emotionally – consuming light and colour with the appetite of an insatiable void.[55]

If Apelles was able to create an effect of volume, enough to represent in an illusory fashion, then he would probably have needed some mastery of particular techniques of painting light, such as highlighting where light glances an object especially its edge, thus giving a sense of depth. A cylindrical pole, for instance, which had no shading would hardly be seen as a pole. It would need shading and best, a highlit strip down the surface nearest the spectator to achieve that effect of standing out from the panel on which it was painted.[56] It would seem that there was a distinction between illumination and lustre or gleam. Highlights, as Leonardo knew, were reflections and changed their location when the perceiver moved, so that the gleam, lustre or glitter is determined not only by the angle of incidence of the light falling on the surface, but like a mirror and its reflection, on the position of the viewer too. Illumination does not change if the light source does not, it is the area lit or illuminated by the light itself. Gleam is often the result of grazing light and occurs on shiny surfaces, as opposed to matte ones, and usually on edges where light is reflected. As I write I can see the gleaming highlights on the far and near edge of my circular ceramic ashbowl, of my desk lamp above and slightly behind it. As I move my head, the highlights move. But the shadow caused by the rim further away from me and the illuminated area I can just see on the left and right segments of the inside of the bowl before my vision is cut off by the nearside rim. Thus a fixed light source on an array of objects will illuminate it in a fixed way (of course, if I move I will see different areas of light and shadow which I could not see before, but my moving does not change the light and shadow themselves), but if the objects have certain shapes and are made of certain materials, then highlights will change according to my spatial position in relation to them. Depicting such a phenomenon in painting demands a technique – the use of white for highlights, so that it seems to stand out (for white makes any accompanying colour darker) as a reflecting glitter but always towards lighter tones. It is no accident that shiny materials, fruits and jewellery were common in paintings during the period of such a technique's perfection (e.g. in the work of Jan van Eyck).

   The distinction between shadows and chiaroscuro modelling found in painting is rarely made when discussing film. For example, black-and-white film uses chiaroscuro lighting fairly extensively and in some quite extensively. Shadows, cast by objects and figures, in film are used much less so and usually for quite particular effects. They are used ambiently although usually diffused or softened through lighting techniques, or by flashing prints which can have a softening effect on shadows and lightening of colour. Lighting for black-and-white film needed to be highly controlled and shadows were a matter of decision-making. If used too emphatically they detract from the image's dramatic point. Lighting was directional in a way that overall frontal standard lighting was non-directional and more akin to natural lighting on a cloudy day with no strong modelling effects.

However, the shadows cast by figures, typically on stairways and on hallway walls (where they could be seen by medium standard shots), became a visual icon of the detective '*noir*'. When such shadows were distorted (usually to excessive length) they were justifiably associated with earlier Expressionist film experiments – the most infamous being the vampire's shadow in Murnau's *Nosferatu*[57] – although 'Expressionist' film is not notably shadowy but has rather more to do with decor, angular composition and affected acting style (e.g. Wiene's *The Cabinet of Dr Caligari*). In *Ivan the Terrible Part I*, Eisenstein uses self- and cast shadows fairly extensively in a scene where figures facing inwards towards a strong light source are shown from behind so that their backs are purely self-shadow and the foreground is cast shadow. But often in *noir* films, shadows were no more used than in other film genres of the period; rather, characters were lit in a large area of surrounding darkness, or top lights were used to model faces dramatically again in areas of non-differentiated darkness (*repoussoirs*).[58] On the other hand, cast shadows demanded a particular framing and lighting set-up. The lighting found in some black-and-white films was in the *tenebroso* style found in Rembrandt in which a strong light cast into an environment effects a strong contrast, casting the non-lit areas into such darkness that figures and objects are difficult to see. Interestingly, such a device is there to stress the *power* of the light to represent light as subject-matter, with an almost dazzling effect for the spectator. Such a light has become almost *de rigueur* in sci-fi films since the 1970s when Spielberg in *Close Encounters of the Third Kind* (1977), Ridley Scott in *Alien* (1979) and others used intense white-blue light entering through apertures into dark interiors to denote alien forces.[59] Here we are presented with the representation of light or illumination itself. In any given scene, light becomes a representational element in its own right, along with figures and objects. Compare this with a scene which is evenly lit with no obvious source for lighting – an overall diffused sunlight or similarly lit interior. Light is playing no integral dramatic part in such scenes, it is as unfussy and neutral as possible, allowing us to see what we see. In such scenes, found in Renaissance paintings in Leonardo's time and before, colour and perspective give volume, depth, detail, etc. Gombrich points out that cast shadows were avoided by Renaissance painters 'as if they regarded them as a disturbing and distracting element in an otherwise coherent and harmonious composition'.[60] These are Stokes' carving values in which colour bears the weight of a composition unaided by an emphatic light source. In some of these paintings, subtle lighting, using colour, is often impossibly conflicting. Arnheim associates Hollywood movies with the opposite – with a chiaroscuro effect – where 'the impact of the dazzling rays, the dance of shadows, and the secret of darkness give tonic thrills to the nerves rather than nourishing the mind by the symbolism of light'.[61] Leonardo gave such advice in his *Notes*:

Light too conspicuously cut off by shadows is exceedingly disapproved of by painters. Hence to avoid such awkwardness when you depict bodies in open country, do not make your figures appear illuminated by the sun, but contrive a certain amount of mist or of transparent cloud to be placed between the object and the sun and thus – since the object is not harshly illuminated by the sun – the outline of the shadows will not clash with the outlines of the lights.[62]

At this point the individuality of black-and-white cinema is felt. There is an interesting parallel of sorts in painting with the colour/black-and-white distinction in film. From the discovery of printing methods in Europe in the fifteenth century, many paintings were copied by engraving techniques and printed in multiples in black-and-white for wider and eventually more popular consumption. A monochromatic graphic illustrative art recreated what was originally in colour and into the twentieth century was a popular artform running parallel to and reproducing the products of high-art painting. But in cinema, so early in its history however long that may be, the original high-art works have been in black and white with colour not yet establishing a pantheon of the same calibre. One reason for this is fairly obvious and that is that control of colour over an entire film is enormously complex if an aesthetic effect is required. Minnelli and Sirk, for example, achieved such a control and subtlety in many of their films without descending to the use of overall hues or swamping shots with *repoussoirs*.

Monochromatic colour

The problems of control of colour in film are well known, saturation being an important one. In a recent article, John Boorman makes a fascinating statement about black-and-white cinema, which is worth quoting at some length:

Why, fixated film critics keep asking, have I shot my latest film . . . [*The General*] . . . in black and white? For a number of reasons. First of all, Eastman and Fuji colour films are too saturated. They prettify. They vulgarise. And in particular, they romanticise poverty . . .
Directors and cameramen struggle with this problem – using deep shadow, low-key lighting to dull the hues and attempt to control the palette by keeping the sets and costumes within a narrow colour range. In *Point Blank*, for instance, I shot each scene in a single colour.
The head of the art department at MGM wrote a memo predicting disaster: 'He has a green office with green furniture, there are seven men in green suits with green shirts and green ties. This movie will be laughed off the screen.' I reminded him of Magritte's painting of a pipe on which is written: 'This is not a pipe.' Film is not life. In that office scene the colours were

perceived not only as shades of green, but as browns and yellows, even blacks. The eye saw harmony and subtle nuances. No one, no critic, ever referred to it. In that film I was using colour, but seeking the unifying effect of black and white.

Black and white abstracts while colour detracts from the faces of the actors, diminishes intensity. In *The General* there were many street scenes where I could not control the colour, streets drenched in the lurid poly-plastic colours of the contemporary world – acid yellow anoraks, brick-red Toyotas, electric-blue neon lights. In black and white, film approaches the condition of dream, of memory, reaches out into the audience's unconscious. There was often a mythic dimension to black and white movies. They presented a familiar yet alien world, a contiguous reality.[63]

This lends some support to my view that many colour films, especially those with any sensitivity to colour, are shot in monochromatic registers of colour, largely to gain a 'unifying effect' as Boorman suggests, whether those reasons are primarily aesthetic or simply a technical solution to colour saturation problems. In an odd way this suggests that the overall tinting methods of early cinema have never been completely displaced but have been reintroduced by modern-day directors and cinematographers. Many directors with their cinematographers still choose to film in a certain hue. Vittorio Storaro remarks how he shot Paris in blue tones for *The Conformist* and in orange tones for *Last Tango in Paris*.[64] Monochromatic-like use of colour is found in Chardin, Watteau and Rembrandt. Tonality dominates, with colour used carefully and sumptuously when it appears, fully-fledged. Light is revelatory (see Rembrandt's *The Descent from the Cross*).

One would have to return to an earlier cinema for a colourist's use of colour, a period when high control was possible. The films of Sirk, Minnelli and at times Hitchcock (*Vertigo* especially) do not shirk the responsibilities of colour, although it could be argued that colour equally denied them a certain emotional and aesthetic range particular to black and white.

Of course, black-and-white film lends itself to chiaroscuro. Representing through light or, as cinematographer John Alton describes it, 'painting in light', means that all intelligible representation uses shadow to some degree, while colour is transcribed into monochromatic values. Chiaroscuro is almost as old as the cinema. To pluck out one example from many, Pabst's *Pandora's Box* (1928) is a superb example of the extensive use of chiaroscuro in a film which lies outside so-called *noirish* ends, although Louise Brooks prefigures a stock *noir* woman – the prostitute vamp. Of course, seeing the handling of chiaroscuro effects in a film can be a pleasure in its own right, a delight by the audience in form, although rarely can such a formal pleasure be enough. Nevertheless what else is required by way of characterisation, narrative complexity may be fairly minimal, just enough to get us through 100 minutes or so.[65]

Pabst's use of chiaroscuro is also at the service of aesthetic and expressive ends, but in *Pandora's Box*, these ends do not simply serve narrow neurotic compulsions or severely limited characterisation or purely conventional stylistic and atmospheric ends. Of course, Pabst is not at the mercy of a highly developed studio system with its fairly rigid notions of 'entertainment' and genre film-making. It is also not an Expressionist work as there seems little in the film of non-realistic formal traits (sets, acting style) being used to express mental states.[66]

Film noir and black and white

> But the cleanness or simplicity that the out-and-out abstractionists prize so highly, higher than their simple aesthetic worth, appears to me of more negative value. It means that their pictures are never pretentious or ugly: it means also that they are consistent with the accoutrements of contemporary living. But alas, they are out-distanced in this respect by the *mise en scène* of any good gangster film.
> What figure of today aesthetically best suits our streets, what figure aesthetically is best framed by our doorways? The answer is the man in the long overcoat with hand within pocket holding a revolver on which his fingers tighten. There is no gainsaying the aesthetic appropriateness of the thug in our streets and in our interiors. The idea of him saves our town environment from a suggestion of vacuum.[67]

Stokes would most likely have been referring, given the date of the book *Colour and Form* (1937), to the Hollywood gangster thrillers of the early 1930s (especially Warner's). Stokes' movie gangster figure suggests the recesses and shadows in which the gangster or hoodlum awaits his victim, tense with anticipation and murderous intent. A more seductive and thus, on the face of it, a more benign such figure is that of Harry Lime (played by Orson Welles) in his first appearance in a darkened doorway at night in Carol Reed's *The Third Man* (1949). In this film, the flash of the gun has been replaced by the light from a window flooding momentarily the darkness to reveal the aesthetic of what Stokes believed was the vacuum of urban streets. One could argue that this vacuum was filled in two broad ways in post-war cinema – in the dark night of American *film noir* which thrived on fear and suspicion, and in the sunlight of Italian neo-realism exposing anxiety and alienation. Both were attempts to represent modern urban society, to find images for our symbol-less environments.

At this point it would seem appropriate to discuss a film style associated with a particular genre. It is not surprising that the so-called *film noir* style has been selected as an example here. It is a genre that has often been identified by its lighting style. So much of its style, as is true for much film, derives from the Western art tradition in painting and graphics. It should be

remarked that *film noir*'s lighting style is not as defining as was once thought. It was used long before the period in question by many other kinds of film. What was the case, however, was that such a chiaroscuro lighting was combined with a certain theme or subject-matter. The style has a film history status which should be treated cautiously as more historical work has uncovered the distorted view of the context in which such films were made.[68] Still images from many of these films closely resemble paintings from a chiaroscuro tradition to the extent that such lighting in the cinema was called Rembrandt lighting.[69] But my interest here is not in the *film noir* as a genre, a much debated notion in itself; rather, it is in films associated with it and with other works which may not be strictly speaking *film noir* but share some of its formal visual attributes and sometimes, its subject-matter. In *film noir* from a pictorial point of view (and if *film noir* is characterised by its subject-matter, then such lighting is not a necessary condition of a *film noir*)[70] low-key lighting is primarily directed onto a character from a high position and to one side.[71] Traditional lighting would also include, as well as low-key lights, a fill-light placed near the camera to soften the hard shadowing of the harsh low-key light, and a back-light would often be added which shone directly onto the back of the character to give highlights and to set the character visually apart from the background.[72] With *film noir*, the low-key light would tend to dominate over the fill-light and back-light where the latter, if used at all, produced a style which 'opposes light and dark, hiding faces, rooms, urban landscapes – and by extension, motivations and true character – in shadow and darkness which carry connotations of the mysterious and the unknown'.[73] It should also be noted that strong light could be used as back-light with no fill-light to achieve figures in black silhouette with no other features visible. Whilst *film noir* is often thought of as black and shadowy, it is to be remembered that it necessarily involves strong light and whiteness.[74] This whiteness (often a luminous grey) can take on important motif features of its own as in the final dawn mist sequence of *Gun Crazy* (1949) which until then has descended more and more into chiaroscuro space since its earlier scenes shot in brilliant white daylight (especially the hold-up scenes). Chiaroscuro lighting remains as useful as ever in contemporary colour film especially in such neo-*films noirs* as *Se7en* (1995) and *The Last Seduction* (1993) with their low-key lighting and subdued palettes accentuating monochromatic values and use of chiaroscuro. Aesthetic and psychological demands are prominent in this monochromatic style.

What excites curiosity are those films in which chiaroscuro effects are dominant or extreme, overdetermining even the fact of conventional depictions of night-time when such devices are part of a realist effect. Joseph H. Lewis's *The Big Combo* (1955) (shot by John Alton) is a notorious example which was caused to some extent by Lewis's inability to afford sets and props due to a small budget, so that utter darkness hid a lack of physical *mise en scène*. This budget could be spent on detailed decor and lights could be used to

throw makeshift studios beyond visibility. Of course, Welles' films of the 1940s, especially *Citizen Kane* and memorably *The Magnificent Ambersons* (1942) are lit in a strong chiaroscuro style and do not fall into a *noir* category, although *Touch of Evil* (1958), a much later film, does. Hitchcock's *Shadow of a Doubt* (1942) uses shadow and chiaroscuro extensively, although it is not overwhelmed by darkness as is Joseph Lewis's *Big Combo*. The problem is to define an aesthetic which in many ways is endemic to black-and-white cine-matography, which is probably the wrong problem and perhaps not one at all. Black and white has been used for all genres of film prior to colour unproblematically. Discussion seems always to fall into a general one on such cinematography *per se*. Interestingly, there does seem to be a tendency in the Hollywood films of the post-war period stretching into the mid-1950s and up to Hitchcock's *Psycho*, for black-and-white cinematography to be more Mannerist in its stylistic effects. It was as if the response to the ascendant colour film was a Baroque/rococo use of black and white.

Of course, not all black-and-white films betrayed such tendencies – the black-and-white Westerns like Zinnemann's *High Noon* (1952) and Penn's *The Left-Handed Gun* (1958) were restrained in their monochromaticity. A manic trait in American films found in the pre-war films, like Wellman's *The Public Enemy* (1931), became less socially placed and more psychologically embedded. The psychopathic and manic were released from social determinants like class and poverty and became more pseudo-Freudian, based in the individual's self. *Gun Crazy*'s hero is obsessed with guns, hinted in the court-room scene as a replacement for his father, whilst the woman's interest in guns, more interestingly, is an identification of murderous desires with the sexual and erotic. This is explicit in the film and does not require Freudian interpretation; the film provides that. In both cases, the film treats its central characters as purveyors of part-compulsions. It is the film's clear-cut depiction of compulsion which sets it apart from more 'palatable', and more fudged, A-movie versions of the same theme. Psychical life is reduced to uncontrollable behaviour and a steadily withering interiority which cannot confront reality – a masochistic Romantic aesthetic without the benefits of self-knowledge however idealised that may be in Romanticism. *Gun Crazy*'s modelling values are never gathered into any reparative framework except in the man's confused acknowledgement of some kind of social and mental well-being in the hope of marriage and settling down, an option he has denied himself by his choice of partner, who nevertheless phantastically is the only basis for such an idealised outcome. A phantasy is sustained against the demands of reality. But what Lewis does express is the compulsive energy and honesty of such partial projections. One might say that the film's formal energy is its subject matter in so far as it raises the film above many such B-movies, and A-movies for that matter. For example, the famous static positioning of the camera in the back of the car in the famous bank robbery scene (the position is returned to on other occasions) expresses such a compulsion's unrelieved

fixedness and passivity. We are literally on this narrowly proscribed ride too! Splitting is expressed in the two central characters whose part-object is the same – a gun – and yet for the man, it is an idealised form of control and mental expression with 'good' ends, a means of warding off anxiety at the demands of the real. For the woman, the gun is a means of murder, of gain and of her expression too which finds a displaced but perhaps secondary relief in sex. It is the extreme bad part-object. Restorative feelings on the male character's part are ill-formed, unreal and phantasy-like. Lewis to his credit gives these compulsions nowhere to go but death.[75] *Gun Crazy* is distant tonally from, say, Howard Hawks' *The Big Sleep* (1946) whose central characters are similarly compulsive, if not drawn to such self-destructive ends. Nevertheless Rhode describes the Bogart and Bacall characters as 'little more than bizarre impulses' drawn from Chandler's novel of the same name.

In Stanley Kubrick's early films *The Killing* (1965) and *Killer's Kiss* (1955) and John Huston's *The Asphalt Jungle* (1950), chiaroscuro and *repoussoir* effects are used in distinctive ways. In Huston's tale of a heist which goes wrong (in some ways an early version of Kubrick's *The Killing* made fifteen years later), the opening documentary-style shot of the city at dawn is deeply emblematic of a view of American urbanity current in the post-war years and shared by European art directors. With its tense jangling rhythmic music, echoing the manic rhythms of the network of overhead wires shot criss-crossing the bleak grey sky textures and down-town harshness of architecture shot from a low position, Huston begins a film of urban spaces peopled only in the most tenuous way. Here is a schizoid urbanity relieved by monochromatic beauty. The first sequence cuts to the boardwalk of a building to the right of the frame, its high, deep-shadowed arches providing relief from the brilliant harsh sunlight on the street in a shot reminiscent of the Italian neo-realists (for example, de Sica in *The Bicycle Thieves*). The film is shot almost entirely in darkness driven often into black endless shadows by brilliant light as in the police line-up. At other times, usually in corridors leading to criminal backrooms, jagged internal light rhythms fragment the image as parts of faces and bodies fall almost accidentally in and out of the pitch-black shadows into small pools of light. The jarring, spasmodic shocks of contemporary urban life, with its schizoid visuality of trauma and overwroughtness, are well depicted here. Kubrick's use of chiaroscuro in *The Killing*, on the other hand, is chillingly controlled, as is the robbery. There is more balance here between light and dark. The high-ceilinged racecourse bar with its luminous romantic light streaming in from on high casts precise shadows. At the moment of the killing which is the emotional crux of the film, the lights in the room shift manically in expressionist fashion. Similarly, Aldrich's intensely bad-taste *Kiss Me Deadly* does not neglect West Coast sunshine-lit exteriors, and even its interiors are modishly lit using sun-lit patterns and cool, modish furniture rather than an overwhelming chiaroscuro.

Noir-like films deal with narrow aims, split-off obsessions and bizarre compulsions and not only when they portray psychotics, sadists and other extreme mental states. For example, in Lewis's *Gun Crazy*, such partial drives in the film are alleviated by its energy, its own driven composition as a film, its identification as a form with its content, a quality not always found in the manic schizoid tales that comprise many of the *noir* films and detective/ crime stories of the latter years of the studio system, petering out by the mid-1950s and perhaps crowned by the foetid bizarreness of Sam Fuller's work.[76] Our attraction to Sam Spade, the whole medley of hard-boiled heroes of this period of film-making, is a need to recognise our own projected impulsions, a means of being steadfast within an otherwise empty outer and inner scape, more often than not densely and bleakly urban, or when natural, desert-like – the dusty unbearable heat of the American backlands stretching on either side of the cruising Buick.

Not that the pastoral does not find a space too. The final sequence of *The Asphalt Jungle* takes place, for the first time in the film, in broad daylight, rural Kentucky with its broad fields and copses and the black urban car racing through it, to keep its appointment with death and the American pastoral. The film ends with a long shot of the horses grazing and nuzzling the dying hoodlum in a scene of idyllic rural beauty – the exact opposite of the asphalt city's dark-grey, menacing, gritty urban dawn. Joseph Losey's own British *noirish* thriller of a heist gone wrong, *The Criminal* (1960), also ends in a field (this time a barren one) with the dying Stanley Baker, but with more realistic ends, to find the stashed loot from an earlier robbery. The lust for money – an envy – finds no relief in the pastoral. Perhaps the English countryside unlike the American landscape can no longer stand as an emblem of escape, of a coveted dream in the contemporary world. In the American cinema of the time, the Western is never far away even from the world of the gangster and hoodlum. Losey's film is bleaker as the criminal dies alone, feverishly reciting the *confiteor*, as his 'confederates' ignore him to dig for the money. Ten years after Huston's film, Losey's film does not engage in the same extreme chiaroscuro effects found in Huston's dark cityscape and black interiors.[77] But they do share mute, troubled and compulsive heroes whose internality is all, if meagre. Chiaroscuro, internality and compulsion still elicit a projected world of well-rehearsed fatalism – our compulsions lead to nothing but death, a complete blackness which forever threatens in the film's overwrought black-and-white aesthetic. If part-object envelopment is commonplace in these films, one of the aspects of resistance to such overpowering visuals and compulsive emotions is the steadfast solidity of its heroes – the almost expressionless and enduring physicality and cynicism of Sterling Hayden and Robert Mitchum (Bogart is more twitchily neurotic and affected), for example, still appeal across the decades. They are in many ways the male versions of Manet's prostitute in *Olympia* – ruined, victimised, knowing, cynical, vulnerable but steadfast to

our gaze. Manet's 'heroine' is depicted also before deep shadows, front-lit and almost floating in the darkness given its own displaced energy in the maid. But in *The Asphalt Jungle*, the figure never floats free. Quite the opposite, figures and objects merge with the shadows, the surrounding blackness. Rarely is the figure fully delineated from its surroundings. When the light of electric bulbs does reveal figures, as in the hoodlums' rooms or the boss's tastefully chiaroscuro lit apartment, it is only to reveal the exclusion of sexuality. Angela (played by Marilyn Monroe), 'child' mistress to Hendrik, and Doll, a doll, to Dix, both women naives, childlike, and the master criminal's infantile obsession with young girls which leads to his arrest, establish a trio of compulsive desexualised relationships. This rejection of sexuality and the humanising feelings of a relationship underline the dominant modelling aspects of the film, the compulsive energy of the film cannot tolerate meaningful emotional connections. Personal and family loyalty and friendship serve the film's morality, while the public and institutional domain demands an amoralism and beyond that phantasy by which it is tolerated. This theme is imaged in Dix's final journey into the rural sunshine and his field of horses – a pastoral, an unachievable phantasy that can be delivered only by 'vice' or, as Doc says, 'one way or another we all live our vices'.

Chiaroscuro scenarios found in films are familiar though, since Caravaggio at least, painting of the Northern European schools has never relinquished its emotional impact. For Hollander, black and white 'urges sympathy or promotes thought'[78] unlike colour, which 'working directly on the senses, affects independent responses of mood'.[79] She has argued that 'cinematic paintings' of the late nineteenth century by Edouard Manet, Edgar Degas, and in America Winslow Homer and Thomas Eakins 'tend to be subdued in palette'.[80]

Whilst these films are expressive, they are not expressionist. In fact, they are examples of periodic style – genre style with the expressiveness associated with that style's characteristics. So much of the work done by directors under the broad auspices of such styling devices is at best minor work or simply good genre work. In fact, we have to distinguish between having a style and working in a style.[81] Cinema shares such a designation with painting. For example, Vermeer worked within a particular genre style in seventeenth-century Dutch painting, one which was not rated as highly in the market and by theorists of the time as Italianate 'history' painting.[82] At the same time, Vermeer had a style which was unique to him. What we might suggest is that the latter style does not involve a choice from a schema, which is not to say that there was no choice in a particular painter's work. If Stanley Kubrick decided to give his film *The Killing* a particular *look* in his choice of stock, printing, lighting, actors, *mise en scène*, costume, and so forth, this does not add up to his style or if it did, then we might want to assert that it was a superficial style, not a style proper, but rather a particular choice

which was unique to an individual. In this sense, a bad artist can have a 'style', in that we can recognise his work.

As others have pointed out, the link between American cinema and European Expressionist film is not as explanatory as was once thought. Subjective distortion central to Expressionism is not the aesthetic of the films under discussion, although Expressionist techniques were used by some of these film-makers – for example, Hitchcock, who was very much influenced by European cinema of the inter-war years, in the pre- and war years indulged in them as we can witness in his *Sabotage* (1936) or *Foreign Correspondent* (1940). While *The Asphalt Jungle* is subjective in mood it is nevertheless well grounded in its city environment, signalling a strong objectivism too. Realism or naturalism are more enlightening categories in discussing such a film – as they are of many *noir*-films like Kubrick's or Losey's.

John Ford's black-and-white films have used shadow and lighting quite expressively, especially in *The Fugitive*, *The Grapes of Wrath*, *My Darling Clementine*, *Rio Grande*, and *Wagon Master*. John Baxter's underrated book on Ford draws out the director's penchant for a particular type of lighting, especially in the monochromatic films of this period, between the 1930s and early 1950s, although dark and light are used in *The Searchers* to good effect. There is Ford's tendency to shoot in the low sunlight of evening or morning, when the light is slanted and the shadows long. It also strikes the character's face more fully for medium shots (obviously supported with fill-light) and for the more long shot of riders approaching, wagon trains moving, it creates a nostalgic, atmospheric light which suggests in a contra-dictory fashion a realism and a slightly ethereal image of the past, of a memory being recovered. This is aided by Ford's use of song in such scenes, but also by the way in which he holds such shots longer than any narrative need would require. For example, the long high shot of the wagon train coming through the valley between the mesas in *Wagon Master*, the walking of the horses (another high long shot) by the dismounted troops in the opening sequence of *Rio Grande*, accompanied only by the sound of the horses neighing and the jangling of their harnesses. At such moments Ford's response to the world depicted is beyond its narrative and dramatic demands – the *is-ness* of the world is expressed. *Wagon Master*'s status is high in the Fordian canon for its desultory air, its opening up of space filled only by men talking, whittling sticks, on horseback taking in the sun, dancing, mutual banter – action is forced on characters against their inclinations. Even the malevolent Cleggs do not interrupt this nonchalance, this ease, but rather become part of it as they hang around old man Clegg's brass bed. As I have already pointed out, *Rio Grande* is such a reverie interrupted by action, almost against its will. The film moves between the romantic, timeless, diffused light of Yorke's tent infused with bitter-sweet memories of a past love to the strong and familiar Fordian harsh slanted light lent presence by raised dust through which the cavalry return to fort or break camp while on patrol. So Ford's lighting is not

particular in the context of its times, but only in the use he and his cinematographer make of it. In fact, as in the Renaissance case, the high technical standard of Hollywood film-making of the period affords Ford his expressiveness. The period is not one of stricture in that sense, but on the contrary the merging of talents from cinematography, writing and directing makes the 1930s and 1940s densely populated with films of the highest order. The intensity of technical discoveries and inventions in lighting, stocks, processes, lenses, and so forth measures well, if differently, with Renaissance painting and sculpture[83] – their shared collective processes, highly technical means, strong functional aims and the anonymity/low status of many of those involved.

Ford with Tolland in *The Grapes of Wrath* (1940) created, especially in the first sequence, up to and including the confrontation with Muley in the abandoned Joad house, a most memorable piece of cinema in which photography, gesture, dialogue and Ford's subdued but tingling aesthetic merge into film-making unmatched anywhere. Here the harsh sun is relentless, a metaphor for the oppression of the Joads in the American Dust Bowl. The medium shot of Tom Joad (Henry Fonda) walking along a deserted road, the low horizon behind him, beneath a harsh low sun casting a long shadow before him which rhymes with the thin shadows of the telegraph poles presages any Italian neo-realist film.

Black and white versus colour film

Our problem in cinematography is really controlling colors.

Laszlo Kovacs[84]

The association in film of colour with fantasy and black and white with reality was never a strict convention, if one at all, in the early period of burgeoning colour films. Note, as Salt points out, how Powell and Pressburger use black and white for the dream/fantasy sequences in *A Matter of Life and Death* (1946) while *The Wizard of Oz* (1939) uses the reversed format of black and white to depict the reality of Oklahoma and colour for the fantasy world of Oz.[85] There is no possibility of a strict coding system given these examples. Here the schema-like choice is between two options – colour or black and white. Of course, once a choice had been made, then other options presented themselves in terms of stock, printing, camera lens, costume, sets, etc., which all would influence how colour or, for that matter, black and white would be achieved in a particular film. Style in its fullest and truest sense then is not simply an account of what might be called a medium's scheme at any particular period. In fact, style can be divided at least between period or historical style and individual style.[86] The reduction of style to the former plagues Bordwell's history of film style where he defines style at one point as 'a film's systematic and significant use of techniques of the medium'.[87]

Of course, the tracing of developments in techniques in film is important, although how far it can lead to a convincing account of individual style is questionable on the grounds that it is not able to establish criteria for the individual style of a particular film-maker. In fact listing techniques used by film-makers would in many cases fail to distinguish between them, except banally. What I am suggesting, in keeping with my general argument, is that style and its attendant concept of expression is deeply connected with the psychological, with phantasy as it has been adumbrated here. The shuffling of schema elements hardly seems adequate as an explanation of individual artistic style. The difference between Vermeer's *Lady at the Virginals with a Gentleman* and Emanuel de Witte's *Interior with a Woman at a Clavichord* painted around the same time (1665) is not simply one of demarcating through description the two paintings – the differences relating to choice are hardly the differences which have bite for their style and expressiveness differences.

The association of classic documentary film-making with black-and-white film is not simply an accident of film history, but pertains to the tradition of black-and-white nineteenth-century photography itself (still central today in newspaper photography and art photography). Narrative, equally, does not require colour as our consumption even today of black-and-white graphic popular art and political cartoons, etc. bears witness. Hollander states that 'Colour, working directly on the senses, affects independent responses of mood much more than it urges sympathy or promotes thought'.[88] In photographic and graphic art's rendering of monochromatic sculpture, for example, what was highlighted was its dramatic quality, its narrative impetus; in other words, what makes it especially 'cinematic'. Without colour to distract us with mood, black-and-white representations of colour paintings 'guaranteed the look of both subjective engagement and detached observation'.[89] Painting itself, as we discussed in relation to Stokes' modelling mode in that medium, can be dominated by light and dark as against strong colour values. Monochromatic tendencies are especially discernible in nineteenth-century painting in the work of Manet and Degas and the Americans Homer and Eakins, all of whom used subdued palettes. Black and white emphasises light, that is light as a projective and reflective phenomenon, in a way that colour does not. The light associated with carving values in sculpture were that which came from low-relief marble; it emanated from the depths of the marble and suffused its surface, with no highlights or glitter as is found in bronze with its reflective, mirror-like surface. Stokes' modernist downgrading of dramatic or theatrical effects achieved through externally-sourced light in painting gave precedence to colour *per se*.

Of course, this seems to make black-and-white film with respect to carving beyond the pale. Its mode must surely be essentially modelling. It is dependent on light and dark, and not on colour hues. Black, white and grey represent its range, although all objects can be depicted by this range though not always

identifiably. Arnheim notes how we watch characters in films eat strange black or grey objects which through lack of colour provide no clue to their nature. Eisenstein was aware of colour being used in a mechanical way and enlisted it, theoretically at least, to his notion of montage. For him, colour as an element would need to carry its own weight of meaning within the shot, as did all other elements. But in his examples of a true use of colour Eisenstein seems to support an Expressionist view which would support Ford's use of colour in *She Wore a Yellow Ribbon*, particularly when the bruised storm skies above the darkened prairies and the muted blue ribbon of cavalry depict the rage of Yorke, and his army's mood of defeat. For Eisenstein, 'in filming, say, the burning of Moscow, the producer must be able to present the passions burning in the breasts of his characters, the fire of their patriotism as convincingly as the flames raging in our ancient capital'.[90] But Eisenstein had always treated his black-and-white films as conforming to his montage/ expressionist views. Colour, like sound, was to be welcome as a means of further controlling and orchestrating the film shot.[91] Dreyer shared this general anti-naturalistic trend and, like Eisenstein, asserted the role of colour as an expressive force in cinema.[92] Dreyer echoes Ford's remarks about the problems of perspective in colour film. Using light and dark, depth and space can be more easily controlled, whereas colours have their own spatial relationships to one another (some colours recede, others come forward). Dreyer took this property as a possible basis for abstraction in film; in other words, the removal of perspective altogether.[93]

Black and white was and is used in different ways. In *film noir* sometimes the Rembrandtian lighting was exaggerated. But it is important to bear in mind that monochromatic film always tended towards such lighting, long before *film noir*. Pabst's and Ford's use of deep shadow are exemplary in this matter. In many Italian neo-realist films it is sunlight and its bleaching effects which are often supreme. As we have seen, sometimes in Dreyer's films the light is diffused by a luminous grey as if all objects and characters themselves emit light, e.g. *Gertrud*. At other times chiaroscuro dominates, as in *Day of Wrath*. Thus Dreyer, like Eisenstein, attempted to use black and white non-naturalistically, that is expressionistically, for Dreyer believed that black-and-white photography was essentially naturalist.

Black-and-white film stresses space and perspective. The use of shadows, high white points or just the outdoor sun's light, give a strong, tensile perspectivalism while the introduction of colour allowed an abstraction which it had countenanced only rarely before. As Eisenstein, Arnheim, Dreyer et al. realised, colour would demand a complex control on the film image because colour introduced its own spatial relationships. Of course, in colour films lighting is still used, as are shadows and chiaroscuro. In these ways such films move always because harsh light and deep shadows subvert colour towards a monochromatic style. Contemporary films like *Seven*, *Alien*, *Bladerunner*, and so on, in their different ways, use reduced, dark, often muddied palettes.

The use of overwhelmingly strong white back-light (often married with blue) as in *Alien*, *Close Encounters of the Third Kind*, and so forth, is ultimately a black-and-white effect which drowns out any other colour. We are momentarily returned to monochromatic film. Compare such monochromatic uses of colour with that used in *The Wizard of Oz*. So does black-and-white photography lie with carving or with modelling? On the face of it, the modelling in light and dark of black and white suggests a modelling technique. More important though is how the lighting is used – as in charcoal or pencil drawing, for example. In the harsh, black-drenched images of the *film noir*, modelling characteristics would seem to dominate in the drawing of the spectator into deep recessive spaces, its fragmentation of the figure and objects through shadowing and its attend-ant aggressiveness in the highly dramatised *mise en scène* moulded by light (often shadows standing in for the lack of proper studio sets or props as in Joseph Lewis's *The Big Combo*). We have, in other words, the film equival-ent to chiaroscuro painting. Huston's *The Asphalt Jungle* in many of its interiors uses chiaroscuro as much as Lewis's films, at times verging on the abstract or indecipherable. Its opening sequence in photographic terms stands with any comparable Italian neo-realist film, although its angling seems more deeply Expressionist and graphic with the parallel criss-cross of wires and hard grey dawn light against the more 'objective' opening of, say, *Bicycle Thieves*. The high shot of the tram in the latter film seems less expressionistic than Huston's low shot of the cruising car in his opening sequence. Whether this is to do with the higher shot's meaning being less extremely stated or carrying less emotional impact for cultural reasons is difficult to say.

But we have a difference between film and painting here in so far as the former is constituted by light captured by the camera and projected onto the screen. It is perhaps not too far-fetched to speak of the material conditions of film being the projection of light *per se* and thus the presence of light and its blocking (as opposed to colour film) in black-and-white film is close to the material heart of film, its conditions of existence. Nowhere is this more strongly felt than in some of the work of the neo-realists where light is not used predominantly in a chiaroscuro way but rather discloses its subject-matter in terms that suggest carving values and where the tendency, at least in some of the films, is to reveal the natural light of Italy itself. Something that passes without remark in Italian neo-realist films is the nature of their light, which is one of their most moving characteristics. Stokes speaks of the light in Italy. The opening shots of de Sica's famous *The Bicycle Thieves* is exemplary of this from the beginning of the film with its shots of the sunlight reflecting its perfect whiteness on the huge, white, flat-faced workers' buildings where Ricci awaits the employment lists. The intense sense of a space which is open to the light, to human action, is marked in the film. Part of the bitter irony of *The Bicycle Thieves* is the impossibility of action within such spaciousness.

It is no accident that Ricci, surrounded by the classical buildings of Rome, is seeking a mass-produced mechanism – a bicycle.

Thus black and white is a mode in which the carving/modelling tendencies can enlist dynamic qualities of picture design. It is also a translation of 'reality' whereby film grey as Stokes described it (derived from Katz) is always immanent. That it has tended to serve the modelling ends of mainstream film has meant that the latter's carvers have had to struggle with the overwhelming graphic power of film, more or less since its beginnings. Its narratives, as Stokes recognised, have populated our streets with compulsive, aggressive figures, who have occupied its alleys, doorways and darkened rooms for murderous, sullen ends, but also for idealised and hemmed-in forms of love and often manic sexuality as in the so-called *film noir*.

11
Conclusion

The past decade has seen a sharper analysis of concepts such as representation, meaning, identification than was the case under the auspices of French theory. However, the relish expressed by some thinkers at the overthrow of the latter has been unseemly. It has also involved throwing the Freudian baby out with the bath water. This study attempts to use Kleinian concepts articulated through analytical philosophy. A central aspect of my argument is the importance of the psychological framework in which certain aesthetic questions are located. Since Plato most theories of art have been embedded in models of the mind, and none more so than in the relatively brief history of film theory itself, from the work of Munsterburg less than two decades after the inception of film, to the contemporary writings of Gregory Currie. The Stokesian model is not presented as the last word in the psychoanalytical tradition within film theory, but rather is intended to bring to bear certain aesthetic ideas often informed by philosophical debate to some of the more stubborn questions encountered in thinking about the medium.

One of the most important issues here is the issue of film as an art. To this extent Rudolf Arnheim is a founding figure in so far as he was acutely aware of how such an aim meant that certain approaches to understanding film were inadequate. He was also keen to make sure that the question of whether film is an art chimed with wider theories of art taken from painting, sculpture and the visual arts in general. This has meant placing human agency to the fore and the results are unashamedly *auteurist*. However, the nature of commercial film (as opposed to much artisan-based experimental film-making), with its complex production, does demand some kind of qualification if the role of the individual artist is to be retained. But there seems also to be a *prima facie* case for the central role of the individual artist in film. John Ford and Alfred Hitchcock, to name just two, have the hallmarks of artists. The complicating aspects of genre, screenwriters, actors, cinematographers, etc. do not seem in principle any different from similar production processes in classical painting, architecture and sculpture. Equally, the Stokesian distinction

between carving and modelling marks a profound humanism, but one that is lodged at the very source of life in the dual instincts of love and death. Of course, these seem like relatively recent Freudian prejudices forced on what ought to be the province of the sciences of psychology and the life sciences as seen in the recent intellectual scramble for brain–mind studies. Some of these issues rest on methodological issues as to how we understand mental life and behaviour, which cannot receive full discussion here for reasons of space. The fact that we know more about the brain than we did some twenty years ago does not disqualify some of the older arguments found in Kant, Hume, Wittgenstein, Putnam *et al*. about how we can understand the mind.

Notes

Introduction

1. Lawrence Gowing, *Vermeer* (London: Giles de la mare, 1997; first published 1952), p. 17.
2. Ibid., p. 18.
3. An original setting out of the idea is in Michael O'Pray, 'On Adrian Stokes and Film Aesthetics', *Screen* vol. 21, no. 4 (1980/1), pp. 91–7. See also my essay 'Pater, Stokes and Art History: the Aesthetic Sensibility', in A. L. Rees and Frances Borzello (eds.), *New Art History* (London: Camden Press, 1986).
4. See Peter Fuller, *Art and Psychoanalysis* (London: Writers and Readers Press, 1980); Fred C. Alford, *Melanie Klein and Critical Social Theory* (London: Yale University Press, 1989); Michael Rustin, *The Good Society and the Inner World: Psychoanalysis, Politics and Culture* (London: Verso, 1991); Richard Wollheim, *The Thread of Life* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984); *Painting as an Art* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1987); *The Mind and its Depths* (London: Harvard University Press, 1993); Eric Rhode, *A History of the Cinema: From its Origins to 1970* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979); Marion Milner, *On Not Being Able to Paint* (London: Heinemann, 1977 [1950 under pseudonym Joanna Field]); Tony Pinkney, *Women in the Poetry of T. S. Eliot: A Psychoanalytic Approach* (London: Macmillan, 1984), to cite a few.

1 Representation, Depiction and Portrayal in Film

1. The literature on the subject is huge. The classic account is to be found in Plato, *The Republic*, Book X. See also E. H. Gombrich, *Art and Illusion* (London: Phaidon, 1960); N. Goodman, *Languages of Art*: *An Approach to a Theory of Symbols* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1976); R. Wollheim, *Painting as an Art* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1987); M. Podro, *Depiction* (London: Yale University Press, 1998); R. Scruton, *Art and Imagination* (London, Methuen, 1974); M. C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1958); G. Currie, *Image and Mind: Film*, *Philosophy*, *and Cognitive Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). For a general introduction which includes the most recent debates, see Mark Rollins, 'Pictorial Representation', in *The Routledge Companion to Aesthetics* (London: Routledge, 2001).
2. Schier's excellent account of the major views on depiction includes resemblance, illusion, imaginative visual attention, seeing-as and seeing-in, visual make-believe and Goodman's 'semiotic' position. See F. Schier, *Deeper into Pictures: An Essay on Pictorial Representation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), especially pp. 1–31.
3. On the issue of film transparency, see G. Currie, 'Photography, Painting and Perception', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, Vol. 49, no. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 23–9; J. Friday, 'Transparency and the Photographic Image', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, vol. 36, no. 1 (January 1996), pp. 30–42; E. Martin, 'On Seeing Walton's Great-

Grandfather', *Critical Inquiry* 12 (Summer 1986), pp. 796–800; K. L. Walton, 'Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism', *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 11, no. 2 (December 1984), pp. 246–77; K. L. Walton, 'Looking again through Photographs: A Response to Edwin Martin', *Critical Inquiry* 12 (Summer 1986).

4. See N. Carroll, 'Defining the Moving Image', in his *Theorizing the Moving Image* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). See also M. Roemer, 'The Surface of Reality', in Susan Feagin and Patrick Maynard (eds.), *Aesthetics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

5. R. Scruton, *The Aesthetic Understanding*: *Essays in the Philosophy of Art and Culture* (London: Methuen, 1983), p. 122.

6. This is not a necessary implication for André Bazin.

7. Scruton, *Art and Imagination* (London: Methuen, 1974), p. 124.

8. Ibid., p. 124.

9. Ibid., p. 124.

10. Ibid., p. 125.

11. See S. Cavell, *The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film*, enlarged edition (London: Harvard University Press, 1979).

12. Ibid., p. 17.

13. See 'The Ontology of the Photographic Image' and 'The Evolution of the Language of Cinema', in A. Bazin, *What is Cinema*? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967) and his *Jean Renoir* (New York: Delta Books, 1974) for different articulations of Bazin's notion of film realism.

14. Cavell, *The World Viewed*, p. 22.

15. On depiction, see M. C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics*: *Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1958); C. Peacocke, 'Depiction', *Philosophical Review*, vol. XCVI, no. 3 (July 1987), pp. 383–410; F. Schier, *Deeper into Pictures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); M. Podro, *Depiction* (London: Yale University Press, 1998).

16. The Peircian notion of the 'iconic' could be used here if it did not beg too many questions.

17. The portrait may be recognised in many ways, all of which would be part of the descriptions identifying Tony Blair, e.g. 'the present Prime Minister', 'the man who lives next door', 'the husband of Cherie Booth', etc.

18. Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems*, p. 274.

19. See Goodman, *Languages of Art*.

20. On Goodman's view, see Schier, *Deeper into Pictures*, pp. 26–31.

21. Ibid., ch. 2, sections 3 and 4.

22. More importantly, the role of intention in relation to the object before the artist is complex.

23. Schier, *Deeper into Pictures*, p. 9.

24. There are examples in gallery art of slide projections used craftily to give an illusion of an actual object, e.g. Ceal Floyer's work. The American video artist Gary Hill uses video projection in *Tall Ships* (1992) for similar and uncanny ends. See *Tall Ships: Gary Hill's Projective Installations – Number 2* (New York: George Quasha and Charles Stein, Station Hill Arts/Barrytown Ltd, 1997).

25. Here it is the emotion caused by the film and not the film *qua* representation that overwhelms.

26. R. Allen, *Projecting Illusion: Film Spectatorship and the Impression of Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

27. Ibid., p. 89.

28. K. L. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundation of the Representational Arts* (London: Harvard University Press, 1990).

29. Ibid., p. 294.

30. Ibid., p. 294.

31. For a criticism of Walton's view, see Peacocke, 'Depiction', pp. 391–2 and Schier, *Deeper into Pictures*, pp. 20–6.

32. Much of what follows here owes to Schier's argument.

33. See Walton, in Feagin and Maynard, *Aesthetics*, p. 292.

34. Schier, *Deeper into Pictures*, p. 24.

35. Carroll's example of Picasso and Braque does not defeat this point as Braque never drew a squirrel unintentionally; rather, the accidental conglomeration of lines in his painting *looked like* a squirrel which is a different order of case, like one of seeing a face in a cloud.

36. See A. Phillips, 'Drawing from Life', in J. Hopkins and A. Savile (eds.), *Psychoanalysis, Mind and Art: Perspectives on Richard Wollheim* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).

37. A problem for such a case is the question as to whether when x is playing himself, he is acting himself or being himself.

38. See Richard Wollheim, 'On Pictorial Representation', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,* vol. 56, no. 3 (Summer 1998), p. 218.

39. The titling of paintings, photographs, etc. can be crucial here. See Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems*, pp. 276–7.

40. It is interesting to note that under the impact of feminism these paintings have been the subject of analysis because of their female models. See F. Borzello, *The Artist's Model* (London: Junction Books, 1982).

41. The idea of a model is a fascinating one for film studies. See G. Nowell-Smith's remarks on Monica Vitti in Antonioni's films in his *L'avventura* (London: British Film Institute, 1997).

42. As Carroll admits, his account owes much to Beardsley.

43. This excludes camera-less films like the 'animated' work of Len Lye or Stan Brakhage.

44. Schier, *Deeper into Pictures*, p. 135.

45. Phillips does offer a possible case in painting; see 'Drawing from Life', pp. 331–2.

46. See Walton, 'Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism', *Critical Inquiry*, vol. 11, no. 2 (December 1984), pp. 246–77.

47. Musée du Louvre, Paris.

48. Reproduced in *Photography by Bill Brand* (London: Gordon Fraser, 1977), p. 138.

49. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe*, p. 255.

50. Phillips, 'Drawing from Life'.

51. See R. Wollheim, *The Mind and its Depth* (London: Harvard University Press, 1993), ch. X.

52. At one level there are the findings of picture perception which deal with the role of the optical nerve in relation to depiction. For example, there must be some similarity in terms of the optical nerve patterns between perceiving x and perceiving a successful depiction of x. See Peacocke, 'Depiction', p. 404.

53. Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, p. 62.

54. Ibid., p. 21.

55. See H. Osbourne (ed.), *The Oxford Companion to Art* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), p. 788.

56. See Peacocke, 'Depiction', p. 393, who refers to Pirenne, *Optics*, *Painting and Photography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970).

57. See Scruton, *Art and Imagination*.
58. Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, p. 46.
59. Currie makes the distinction between 'natural representation' (as in the case of surveillance cameras) and 'intentional representation' (as in a fiction film). See G. Currie, 'Photography, Painting and Perception', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. 49, no. 1 (Winter 1991), pp. 23–9.
60. See Wollheim, *Art and its Object*, pp. 207–9.
61. Ibid., p. 209.
62. On the sitter/model distinction, see Beardsley, *Aesthetics*: *Problems*, pp. 274–8.
63. Wollheim, *Art and its Object*, p. 209.
64. Ibid., p. 206.
65. Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, p. 62.
66. See S. L. Feagan, 'Presentation and Representation', *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, vol. 56, no. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 234–40.
67. Currie, *Image and Mind* (1995), p. 90.
68. See Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, p. 77; Wollheim, *The Mind and its Depth*, pp. 187–90.
69. See Peacocke, 'Depiction'.
70. He does not mean by realism any necessary commitment to realism as an aesthetic or historical style.

2   Expression, Projection and Style in Film

1. S. Freud, 'The Moses of Michelangelo' [1914], in *Art and Literature*, Penguin Freud Library, vol. 14 (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 254.
2. See M. C. Beardsley, *Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy of Criticism* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1958), pp. 325–32.
3. See H. Osbourne, *Aesthetics and Art Theory: An Historical Introduction* (London: Longmans, 1968), especially ch. 9.
4. L. Tolstoy, *What is Art?* (London: Duckworth, 1994) p. 59.
5. Benedetto Croce, 'Intuition and Expression', in J. W. Bender and H. G. Blocker (eds.), *Contemporary Philosophy of Art: Readings in Analytic Aesthetics* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993).
6. For recent philosophical discussion of expression in art, see S. Davies, 'Is Music a Language of the Emotions?'; A. Tormey, 'The Concept of Expression: A Proposal'; Guy Sircello, 'Expressive Properties of Art', in Bender and Blocker, *Contemporary Philosophy of Art*.
7. See 'Expression', in R. Wollheim, *On Art and the Mind* (London: Allen Lane, 1973) and *Painting as an Art* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1987) esp. pp. 80–100; 'Correspondence, Projective Properties and Expression', in Wollheim, *The Mind and its Depths* (London: Harvard University Press, 1993).
8. Ibid.
9. Early cinema and the avant-garde are littered with single-image films, for examples of the latter, see Andy Warhol's early films.
10. The literature on film narrative is enormous, but see Stephen Heath's essays in his *Questions of Cinema* (London: Macmillan, 1981).
11. For a particularly convincing argument along such lines, see G. Perez, *The Material Ghost: Films and their Medium* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), ch. 2.
12. On this distinction, see Sircello, 'Expressive Properties of Art'.

13. The same can be the case in painting.
14. See R. W. Hepburn, 'Emotions and Emotional Qualities', in C. Barrett (ed.), *Collected Papers on Aesthetics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965).
15. Even where such aspects seem to be missing from the film then their absence determines the film's meaning, e.g. Straub/Huillet's films.
16. Though with a particular theme – the retreat from Moscow – it may invoke a more precise subject-matter than, say, an abstract painting.
17. See R. Scruton, *Art and Imagination* (London: Methuen, 1974) ch. 14.
18. For a critique of this simplistic methodology, see M. Smith, *Emerging Characters: Fiction, Emotion and the Cinema* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
19. Too many to mention but see Mulvey, Metz et al.
20. Of course, this account describes something of the feeling–structure nature of suspense.
21. As Deleuze has suggested, the difference perhaps lies in the reflectionism of the former and the action-based narrative of the latter. See G. Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* (London: Athlone, 1992) esp. ch. 6.
22. See Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, pp. 141–64.
23. For a recent discussion of communication in art, see M. Budd, *Values of Art: Picture, Poetry and Music* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995), pp. 13–16.
24. Initially, in its weakest sense. An artist may not always be aware of the emotion being expressed in his or her work. Identifying and claiming it as his or hers may come much later, if at all.
25. See Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*; and 'Correspondence, Projective Properties, and Expression in the Arts', in *The Mind and its Depths* (London: Harvard University Press, 1993).
26. See M. Podro, *The Critical Historians of Art* (London: Yale University Press, 1982); and Wollheim, *Art and its Objects*, 2nd edition (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).
27. See Colin Lyas, *Aesthetics* (London: UCL Press, 1997), esp. pp. 219–21; and Wilhelm Worringer, *Abstraction and Empathy* (Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks [1908], 1997).
28. J. Ruskin, *Modern Painters* ed. D. Barrie (London: André Deutsch, 1987); and George Santayana, *The Sense of Beauty: Being the Outline of Aesthetic Theory* (New York: Dover, 1955).
29. Wollheim, 'Correspondence, Projective Properties, and Expression in the Arts', cites Baudelaire's notion of 'correspondence' here.
30. See Sartre on such experiences in J.-P. Sartre, *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* (London: Methuen, 1971).
31. Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, pp. 82–4.
32. Ibid., p. 82.
33. Ibid., p. 83.
34. Ibid., p. 83.
35. Ibid., p. 85.
36. What Wollheim calls the predicative view. See Wollheim, 'Correspondence, Projective Properties, and Expression in the Arts'.
37. Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, p. 83.
38. Ibid., p. 83.
39. Ibid., p. 83.
40. Not always. I am using a Davidsonian model of explanation of actions. See D. Davidson, 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes', in A. R. White (ed.), *The Philosophy of Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 79–94.

41. Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, p. 86.
42. The difference being established will surely be familiar to any teacher of art in whatever medium.
43. M. Smith, *Engaging Characters* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), ch. 2.
44. Though certain semiotic-Lacanian accounts have attempted to assimilate Wollheim's central/acentral imagining distinction. See E. Cowie, *Representing the Woman: Cinema and Psychoanalysis* (London: Macmillan, 1997).
45. Smith, *Engaging Characters*, p. 75.
46. Ibid., p. 64.
47. See E. Gombrich, 'Expression and Communication', in his *Meditations on a Hobby Horse* (London: Phaidon, 1978). Wollheim discusses Gombrich's views in relation to Stokes in his introduction to *The Invitation in Art* (London: Tavistock, 1965) pp. xvi–xx and in 'Reflections on Art and Illusion', in *On Art and the Mind* (London: Allen Lane, 1973).
48. This is an enormous issue which this book is attempting to address.
49. This is an acceptable conclusion to some working within the domains of popular culture and cultural theory, though whether they are asserting that there is an aesthetic equivalence between such films or whether the notion of the aesthetic is moribund and thus inoperable is another matter.
50. On artistic style, see Wollheim, 'Pictorial Style: Two Views', in *The Mind and its Depths* (1993); and *Art and its Object* (1980). See also M. Schapiro, 'Style' [1951], in M. Schapiro, *Theory and Philosophy of Art* (New York: George Braziller, 1994), pp. 51–102.
51. See Arthur C. Danto, *Beyond the Brillo Box* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1992), p. 245.
52. D. Bordwell, *On the History of Film Style* (London: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 4.
53. Ibid., p. 4.
54. Ibid., pp. 260–1.
55. Of course, snapshots are influenced by fashion and other things.
56. P. Hammond, *Marvellous Melies* (London: Gordon Fraser, 1974).
57. Quoted in T. Gunning, 'The Cinema of Attractions: Early Film, its Spectator and the Avant-Garde', in T. Elsaesser (ed.), *Early Cinema*: *Space, Frame, Narrative* (London: British Film Institute, 1990).
58. B. Brewster, 'A Scene at the Movies', in Elsaesser, *Early Cinema*, p. 324.
59. Wollheim, 'Pictorial Style: Two Views' in his *The Mind and its Depths*, p. 183.
60. Bordwell, *On the History of Film Style*.
61. This paragraph is owing to Wollheim's 'Reflections on Art and Illusion', in *On Art and the Mind*, p. 288.
62. Smith, *Engaging Characters*, p. 233.
63. Ibid., See D. Maltravers, *Art and Emotion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001).
64. N. Carroll, *Theorizing the Moving Image* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 127.
65. Carroll's account, as he admits, is a genetic one based on the findings of experimental and cognitive psychology. Of course, he would argue that the latter discipline, unlike psychoanalysis, has a scientific basis.
66. Ibid.
67. M. Le Fanu, *The Cinema of Andrei Tarkovsky* (London: British Film Institute, 1987), p. 85.
68. N. Carroll, *Mystifying Movies* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), ch. 5.

69. Ibid., pp. 204–5.
70. Ibid., p. 204.
71. Ibid., p. 218.
72. See R. Wilkinson, 'Art, Emotion and Expression', in O. Hanfling (ed.), *Philosophical Aesthetics; An Introduction* (Oxford: Blackwell/Open University, 1992), p. 232.

3 Phantasy

1. R. Wollheim, *Art and Its Objects*, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 116.
2. On Kleinian phantasy, see H. Segal, *Klein* (London: Fontana, 1979); H. Segal, *An Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein* (London: Heinemann, 1964); H. Segal, *Dream, Phantasy and Art* (London: Tavistock/Routledge, 1991). The classical text is Susan Isaacs, 'The Nature and Function of Phantasy', *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* vol. 29 (1948), pp. 73–97. See also R. D. Hinshelwood, *A Dictionary of Kleinian Thought*, 2nd edition (London: Jason Aronson Inc, 1991). On Freud and phantasy, see Richard Wollheim, *Freud*, 2nd edition (London: Fontana, 1991). For a philosophical account, see R. Wollheim, *The Thread of Life* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
3. For examples of the desire–belief model applied to Freudian explanation of actions, see J. Hopkins, 'Introduction' to *Philosophical Essays on Freud*, eds. R. Wollheim and J. Hopkins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. vii–xlv. See also R. Wollheim, 'Supplementary Preface' to *Freud*; S. Gardner, *Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
4. See C. Lyas, *Aesthetics* (London: UCL Press, 1997), pp. 219–21.
5. In R. Wollheim, *Painting as an Art* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1987).
6. See Sebastian Gardner, *Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
7. See D. Davidson, 'Actions, Reasons and Causes', in A. R. White (ed.), *The Philosophy of Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 27–41. On the disputes around this view, see Carlos J. Moya, *The Philosophy of Action; An Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).
8. For the cognitivist view, see the essays by Bordwell, Carroll, Hochberg and Brooks, in D. Bordwell and N. Carroll (eds.), *Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies* (London: University of Wisconsin Press, 1996); and M. Smith, *Engaging Characters* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), esp. pp. 46–52. For a discussion of cognitivist psychology in relation to persons and irrational actions, see S. Gardner, *Irrationality and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 53–4.
9. Gardner, *Irrationality*, p. 169.
10. See S. Gardner, 'The Nature and Source of Emotion' in J. Hopkins and A. Savile (eds.), *Psychoanalysis*, *Mind and Art: Perspectives on Richard Wollheim* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
11. Gardner, *Irrationality*, p. 160.
12. See 'On Imagination and Perception' in P. Strawson, *Freedom and Resentment* (London: Methuen, 1974).
13. For example, C. Metz's *Psychoanalysis and Cinema*: *The Imaginary Signifier* (London: Macmillan, 1982) is studded with references to Klein.

14. See R. Wollheim, *The Thread of Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
15. See Bordwell, Carroll et al.
16. See D. Maltravers, *Art and Emotion* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001) for a critique of cognitivism in aesthetics.
17. S. Isaacs, 'The Nature and Function of Phantasy', *International Journal of Psycho-analysis*, vol. 29 (1948), p. 85.
18. See Scruton, *Art and Imagination*, pp. 108–9.
19. Gardner, *Irrationality*, p. 141.
20. What follows owes enormously to Gardner's account in ibid., esp. ch. 6 on phantasy and Kleinian explanation.
21. Ibid., p. 142.
22. Isaacs, 'The Nature and Function of Phantasy', p. 81.
23. Ibid.
24. See Wollheim and Gardner on the distinction between wish and phantasy.
25. There is a huge literature here. See Davidson's influential essays in his *Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982). For more recent debates, see A. R. Mele (ed.), *The Philosophy of Action* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).
26. See Davidson, 'Actions, Reasons and Causes' in Mele, ibid.; and 'Agency, Causal Relations and Mental Events', in D. Davidson, *Actions and Events* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
27. I have borrowed almost completely from Gardner's analysis here, amending details for my own purposes. See Gardner, *Irrationality*, pp. 124–6.
28. Isaacs, 'The Nature and Function of Phantasy'.
29. Quoted in Gardner, *Irrationality*, p. 143.
30. Ibid., pp. 143–4.
31. Ibid., p. 144.
32. Davidson, Hopkins, Wollheim, et al.
33. I have used Colin McGinn's *The Character of the Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), esp. pp. 8–12. But for a broader introduction, see also Tim Crane, *The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995).
34. See Thomas Nagel, 'What it is like to be a bat', in his *Mortal Questions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
35. C. McGinn, *The Character of the Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 8.
36. This is a simplified account of a much more complex issue. See Gardner, *Irrationality*, ch. 6.
37. Ibid., p. 155.
38. On the question of multi-agency, see ibid, and for a classic critique of multi-agency, see J.-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), Part 1, ch. 2.
39. Gardner, *Irrationality*, pp. 161–2.
40. Ibid., p. 161.
41. See C. Peacocke, 'Depiction', *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XCVI, no. 3 (July 1987) for a fuller account of such-like conditions.
42. Gardner, *Irrationality*, p. 163.
43. Ibid., p. 165.
44. Ibid., p. 167.
45. Ibid., p. 168.
46. Ibid., p. 168.

47. On the philosophical notion of the imagination in Kant, Hume and Wittgenstein, see M. Warnock, *Imagination* (London: Faber and Faber, 1976).

48. On the role of envy, see M. Klein, *Envy and Gratitude* (London: Hogarth Press, 1975), p. 195; S. Gardner, 'The Nature and Source of Emotion', in Hopkins and Savile, *Psychoanalysis, Mind and Art*; and C. McGinn, *Ethics, Evil and Fiction* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997).

49. For a discussion of this text, see Gardner, 'The Nature and Source of Emotion'.

50. See ibid.

51. McGinn points out that 'evil' deriving pleasure from inflicting pain on an other is perhaps primitive as a motive, finding no explanation within any proffered area of explanation. See McGinn, *Ethics, Evil and Fiction*, pp. 71–4. See also J. Forrester, 'Justice, Envy and Psychoanalysis', in his *Dispatches from the Freud Wars: Psychoanalysis and its Passions* (London: Harvard University Press, 1997).

52. Gardner, 'The Nature and Source of Emotion', p. 48.

53. Klein, *Envy and Gratitude*, p. 195.

54. In *The Ethics*, Spinoza also allots a central place to envy, which he sees as 'hatred in so far as it is regarded as disposing a man to rejoice in another's hurt, and to grieve at another's advantage'. See *The Chief Works of Benedict de Spinoza* (New York: Dover Publications, 1951), p. 147. The passivity of the emotions lies, in Spinoza's view, in their source in inadequate ideas of which, according to Gardner, phantasy is a sub-class. If phantasy does stand at the basis of the emotions, then the latter are not to be understood as phantasies.

55. On this distinction and Stokes, see Wollheim's Introduction to *The Invitation in Art*.

4   Stokes: The Carving and Modelling Modes

1. On Stokes' early life and ideas, see R. Read, *Adrian Stokes: The Early Years* (London: Ashgate, 2002); R. Wollheim, 'Adrian Stokes', in R. Wollheim, *On Art and the Mind* (London: Allen Lane, 1973), pp. 315–35. On the Kleinian School in relation to British culture, see Lyndsey Stonebridge, *The Destructive Element: British Psychoanalysis and Modernism* (New York: Routledge, 1998).

2. See Read, *Stokes*.

3. Rodin's marble statues were carved by Italian craftsmen using the pointing method.

4. See P. Curtis, *Barbara Hepworth* (London: Tate Gallery Publishing, 1998), p. 24. Since writing this chapter Alex Potts' *The Sculptural Imagination: Figurative, Modernist, Minimalist* (London: Yale University Press, 2000) has provided a broader aesthetic context to British sculpture with the inclusion of Stokes' own thinking and influence.

5. C. Harrison, *English Art and Modernism 1900–1939* (London: Allen Lane, 1981), p. 209.

6. See A. S. Elsen, *Pioneers of Modern Sculpture* (London: Hayward Gallery/Arts Council of Great Britain, 1975), pp. 78–82.

7. W. Tucker, *The Language of Sculpture* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1977) p. 43.

8. Adrian Stokes, *Stones of Rimini, Critical Writing*, 3 vols (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978), vol. I, p. 230.

9. Ibid., p. 230.

10. Ibid., p. 230. A more sceptical view of the 'carving' view is taken by Elsen, *Pioneers of Modern Sculpture*, pp. 78–82.

11. Ibid., p. 208.

12. R. Berthoud, *The Life of Henry Moore* (London: Faber and Faber, 1987), p. 56.
13. See Tucker's account of Rodin in *The Language of Sculpture*, ch. 1.
14. Curtis, *Barbara Hepworth*, p. 26.
15. Adrian Stokes, *Michelangelo, Critical Writings*, 3 vols (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978), vol. III, p. 44.
16. Ibid.
17. Henri Gaudier-Brzeska, 'Allied Artists' Association Ltd., Holland Park Hall', in Ezra Pound, *A Memoir of Gaudier-Brzeska* (New York: New Directions, 1970), p. 31.
18. Quoted in Rudolf Wittkower, *Sculpture*: *Processes and Principles* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p. 249.
19. On Stokes on Hepworth, see Alex Potts, 'Carving and the Engendering of Sculpture: Stokes on Hepworth', in *Barbara Hepworth Reconsidered*, ed. David Thistlewood (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press/Tate Gallery Liverpool, 1996). See also Anne M. Wagner, 'Miss Hepworth's Stone *Is* a Mother', in ibid.
20. Gaudier-Brzeska, 'Allied Artists' Association', p. 37.
21. T. E. Hulme, *Speculations: Essays on Humanism and the Philosophy of Art* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), p. 82.
22. The Platonic influence on Hulme seems fairly obvious.
23. Adrian Stokes, *The Quattro Cento, Critical Writings*, 3 vols (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978), vol. I, p. 7.
24. Ibid., p. 28.
25. Adrian Stokes, *Reflections on the Nude, Critical Writings*, 3 vols (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978), vol. III, p. 332.
26. Stokes, *The Quattro Cento*, p. 40.
27. Ibid., p. 135.
28. Ibid., p. 135.
29. Ezra Pound, *Literary Essays of Ezra Pound*, ed. T. S. Eliot (London: Faber and Faber, 1954), p. 4.
30. Ibid., p. 443.
31. Stokes, *The Quattro Cento*, pp. 136–7.
32. Adrian Stokes, *Tonight the Ballet* (London: Faber and Faber, 1934) pp. 23–4.
33. This reminds us of the 'fuzziness' Pound attacked in poetry, which he located originally in the impressionistic poetry of the pre-1914 period in England.
34. According to Rhys Carpenter, Western sculpture began in Greece in about the sixth century BC.
35. Stokes, *The Quattro Cento*, pp. 49–50.
36. W. Pater, *The Renaissance: Studies in Art and Poetry: The 1893 Text*, ed. D. L. Hill (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 50.
37. Stokes, *The Quattro Cento*, p. 75.
38. Pater, *The Renaissance*, p. 54.
39. See Wollheim, *On Art and the Mind*, p. 321.
40. Matisse modelled, for example, although very much as a private act alongside his painting work.
41. Stokes, *Stones of Rimini*, p. 235.
42. Ibid., p. 235. It is interesting to note that Rodin associated food with stone and more particularly the cathedral with a woman. See F. Grunfeld, *Rodin: A Biography* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 16 fn.
43. Ibid., p. 236.
44. Ibid., p. 235.
45. Stokes, *The Invitation in Art*, p. 271.

46. Ibid., p. 270.

47. Ibid., p. 275.

48. Stokes, *Colour and Form, Critical Writings*, 3 vols (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978), vol. II, p. 24.

49. Ibid., p. 24.

50. A. Hollander, *Moving Pictures* (London: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 17.

5   A Stokesian and Kleinian Interpretation

1. Adrian Stokes, *Reflections on the Nude, Critical Writings*, 3 vols (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978), vol. III, p. 307.

 2. Ibid., p. 307.

 3. Adrian Stokes *Tonight the Ballet* (London: Faber and Faber, 1934), p. 65.

 4. See Kant, Hume, Warnock.

 5. On envy, see S. Gardner, 'The Nature and Source of Emotion' in J. Hopkins and A. Savile, *Psychoanalysis, Mind and Art* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).

 6. See R. Read, 'Art Criticism Versus Art History: The Letters and Works of Adrian Stokes and E. H. Gombrich', *Art History*, vol. 16, no. 4 (December 1993), p. 534, fn12.

 7. Adrian Stokes, *Michelangelo*, *Critical Writings*, 3 vols (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978), Vol. III, p. 12.

 8. Ibid., p. 10.

 9. Ibid., pp. 10–11.

10. Ibid., p. 11.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., p. 12.

14. R. Wollheim, 'Preface' to Adrian Stokes, *Invitation in Art* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1965), p. xxix.

15. Ibid., p. xxx.

16. See M. O'Pray, 'Modernism, Phantasy and Avant-garde Film', *Undercut* nos. 3/4 (1981–2).

17. Quoted in Wollheim, Preface, p. xx.

18. M. Podro, *The Critical Historians of Art* (London: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 100.

19. Walter Friedlaender, *Mannerism and Anti-Mannerism* (New York: Schocken Books, 1965, p. 8.

20. R. Wollheim, *Painting as an Art* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1987), p. 133.

21. Ibid., p. 133.

22. Ibid., p. 161.

23. Ibid., p. 162.

24. Ibid., p. 163.

25. Ibid., p. 166.

26. Adrian Stokes, *The Invitation in Art*, *Critical Writings*, 3 vols (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978) Vol. III, p. 270.

27. Ibid., p. 271.

6   The Carving Mode: Rossellini, Antonioni and Dreyer

1. Adrian Stokes, 'Form in Art: A Psychoanalytic Interpretation', in *A Game That Must Be Lost: Collected Papers* (Cheadle: Carcanet, 1972), p. 110.

2. Ibid., p. 110.

3. Eric Rhode, *A History of the Cinema: From its Origins to 1970* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), p. 505.

4. Falling off in the late 1940s and early 1950s before finding in the late 1950s and early 1960s some revisionary energy in the work of Pasolini, Rosi and Antonioni. For general overviews on Italian neo-realism, see G. Deleuze, *Cinema 1: The Movement Image* (1992) and *Cinema 2: The Time-Image* (1989); Rhode, *A History of the Cinema*, ch. 12; P. A. Sitney, *Vital Crises in Italian Cinema* (Austin: University of Texas, 1995); M. Landy, *Italian Film* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); P. Bondanella, *Italian Cinema from Neo Realism to the Present*, 3rd edition (New York: Continuum, 2001); M. Morandini, 'Italy from Fascism to Neo-Realism', in G. Nowell-Smith (ed.), *Oxford History of World Cinema* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); S. Monticelli, 'Italian Postwar Cinema and Neo-Realism', in J. Hill and P. Gibson (eds.), *Oxford Guide to Film Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); A. Dalla Vache, *The Body in the Mirror: Shapes of History in Italian Cinema* (London: Athlone, 1992); R. P. Kolker, *The Altering Eye* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); V. T. Rocchio, *Cinema of Anxiety; A Psychoanalysis of Italian Neo-Realism* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999).

5. Sitney has identified the neo-realist movement with Pasolini's 'vital crises' viewpoint, and Dalla Vache with the influence of opera, Renaissance painting and *commedia dell'arte*.

6. Bondanella, *Italian Cinema*, p. 32.

7. Quoted in Rhode, *A History of the Cinema*, p. 123.

8. Rossellini quoted in P. Bondanella, *The Films of Roberto Rossellini* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 107.

9. See E. Rhode, *Tower of Babel* (New York: Chilton, 1966), p. 123.

10. No more so than in the postmodern sensibility of the art world where recuperation of the classical is commonplace: for example, Barbara Kruger, Sam Taylor Wood, Mat Collishaw.

11. Hollander, *Moving Pictures*, p. 86.

12. 'A Discussion of Neo-Realism: Roberto Rossellini interviewed by Mario Verdone' in Ranvaud (ed.), *Roberto Rossellini* (London: British Film Institute Dossier, 1981), p. 73.

13. See Pater's seminal essay 'The School of Giorgione', in *The Renaissance* [1893] (London: University of California Press, 1980); K. Clarke, *Landscape into Art* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956); L. Venturi, *Italian Painting: The Renaissance* (New York: Skita, 1951) who also influenced Stokes.

14. Adrian Stokes, *Venice, Critical Writing*, 3 vols (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978), vol. II, p. 130.

15. Clarke, *Landscape into Art*, p. 71.

16. E. Gombrich, *The Story of Art* (London: Phaidon, 1995), p. 251.

17. Hollander, *Moving Pictures*, p. 90.

18. Stokes, *Art and Science, Critical Writing*, 3 vols (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978), vol. II, pp. 206–7.

19. Stokes, *Venice*, p. 129.

20. Ibid., p. 130.

21. Monica Vitti is Katherine's 'cool' daughter locked outside male action and certainties, and at the heart of contemporary tensions, anxieties and ultimately, in *The Red Desert,* neurosis.

22. Paradoxically, many of the critics of Bazin's system have embraced Walter Benjamin's without problems, yet the latter was also wedded to a form of realism.

23. See R. B. Ray, 'Impressionism, Surrealism and Film Theory: Path Dependence or how a Tradition in Film Theory Gets Lost', in Hill and Gibson, *Oxford Guide to Film Studies*.

24. Epstein, in R. Abel, *French Film theory and Criticism: 1907–1929* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988), vol. 1, pp. 138–9.

25. Ibid., p. 104.

26. Ibid., pp. 105–6.

27. Ibid., p. 107.

28. Ibid., p. 110.

29. Interestingly, Bunuel never indulged in this but always took a tight and deliberate control over his films and their surrealist sensibility. See Jose de la Colina and Tomas Perez Turrent, *Objects of Desire Conversations with Luis Bunuel* (New York: Marsilio Publishers, 1992).

30. R. Arnheim, *Film as Art* (London: University of California Press, 1957), p. 11.

31. Ibid., p. 87.

32. P. Brunette, *Roberto Rossellini* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 155.

33. Ibid., p. 157.

34. Bazin, *What is Cinema?* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), vol. 2, p. 98.

35. Ibid., p. 98.

36. S. Rohdie, *Antonioni* (London: British Film Institute, 1990).

37. Ibid., p. 27.

38. Ibid., p. 28.

39. quoted in Rohdie, *Antonioni* (London: British Film Institute, 1990), p. 34.

40. Ibid., p. 39.

41. Stokes, *The Invitation in Art*, p. 286.

42. Ibid., pp. 285–6.

43. This film's space also reminds us of Dreyer's spatial aesthetic in *Gertrud*, for instance.

44. Sitney, *Vital Crises in Italian Cinema* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1995) esp. ch. 7.

45. Ibid., p. 162.

46. G. Nowell Smith, 'Shape Around a Black Point', in *The Emergence of Film Art*, eds. Lewis Jacobs, Hopkinson and Blake (New York, 1969) (originally published in *Sight and Sound* [Winter 1963–4], p. 367).

47. On this opening sequence of *L'Eclisse*, see Rohdie, *Antonioni* (1990) p. 116.

48. See G. Nowell Smith, *L'avventura* (London: British Film Institute, 1997), p. 58.

49. See R. Armes, *Patterns of Realism* (London: Tantivy Press, 1971), p. 192.

50. See Tarkovsky on black and white in Antonioni's early work and his view that the latter's use of colour in *The Red Desert* led to inferior painterly effects. *Time within Time* (London: Faber and Faber, 1994), p. 357.

51. Rohdie, *Antonioni*, p. 65.

52. For a discussion of this point, see Sitney, *Vital Crises*, p. 212.

53. Compare the work of Straub/Huillet which does commit to such an avant-garde approach owing in many ways to Antonioni's work.

54. Dalle Vache, *The Body in the Mirror*, pp. 67–8.

55. In the final analysis a black-and-white *film noir* would be a more fruitful starting point for comparison in terms of representational treatment of particular images (figures in a landscape, say).

56. See N. Burch, 'Carl Theodor Dreyer: The Major Phase', in *Cinema: A Critical Dictionary*, ed. Richard Roud (London: Secker & Warburg, 1980), Vol. 1.

57. Ibid., p. 310.
58. See my essay 'The Frame and Montage in Eisenstein's "later" aesthetics', in Ian Christie and Richard Taylor (eds.), *Eisenstein Rediscovered* (London: Routledge, 1993); and S. Cavell, *The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film*, enlarged edition (London: Harvard University Press, 1979).
59. See T. Milne, 'Carl Theodor Dreyer: The Early Works', in Richard Roud (ed.), *Cinema: A Critical Dictionary* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1980), p. 294.
60. Ibid., p. 294.
61. Ibid., p. 297.
62. See G. Deleuze, *Cinema 2*: *The Time-Image* (London: Athlone, 1989), pp. 166 and 167ff, although his Heideggerian account of the film seems incoherent as a generalization about the experience of cinema per se. See pp. 167ff.
63. G. Perez, *The Material Ghost* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 350.
64. Ibid., p. 350.
65. Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, p. 178.
66. M. Nash, *Dreyer* (London: British Film Institute, 1977).
67. Ibid., p. 31.
68. Hollander, *Moving Pictures*, p. 451.
69. Henning Berndtsen, quoted in D. Bordwell, *The Films of Carl-Theodor Dreyer* (London: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 224–5.
70. See Stokes, *The Quattro Cento*, p. 34.

7   Montage and Modelling Values in Sergei Eisenstein

1. See Stanley Cavell's brilliant insight in *The World Viewed* (London: Harvard University Press, 1979), and my essay owing to Cavell, 'Frame and montage in Eisenstein's "later" aesthetics', in I. Christie and R. Taylor (eds.), *Eisenstein Rediscovered* (London: Routledge, 1993).
2. Years before Pound had been influenced by Chinese verse (largely through translation) thanks to Fenellosa's widow presenting him with her husband's manuscripts and notes on Chinese poetry which led to Pound's volume of poetry, *Cathay*. See H. Kenner, *The Pound Era* (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), pp. 192–222.
3. S. Eisenstein, *Film Form* (New York: Harvest, 1949), p. 30.
4. As it was to Pound, who reacted very much against the impressionistic Georgian poetry of England at the time, with its descriptions of moods and precious moments where language did not engage with itself. The connections between the two men at this point are very close and they share the same problems so it seems.
5. See J. Aumont, *Montage Eisenstein* (London: British Film Institute, 1987).
6. According to Truffaut. See his Foreword to A. Bazin, *What is Cinema*? (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. vi.
7. S. Eisenstein, *Nonindifferent Nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 122.
8. See Stokes on Romanesque architecture in 'The Impact of Architecture', *Critical Writings* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978) vol. III.
9. Eisenstein *Nonindifferent Nature*, p. 122.
10. On Wolfflin, see M. Podro, *The Critical Historians of Art* (London: Yale University Press, 1982), esp. chs VI and VII.

11. More importantly, it can be seen that Stokes appreciated similar ideas, refined them and then took them in another direction.
12. H. Wolfflin, *Renaissance and Baroque* (London: Collins, 1964), p. 30.
13. Ibid., p. 31.
14. Ibid., p. 32.
15. Ibid., p. 33.
16. Ibid., p. 38.
17. W. Friedlaender, *Mannerism and Anti-Mannerism in Italian Painting* (New York: Schocken Books, 1965), p. 7.
18. Eisenstein, *Nonindifferent Nature*, p. 116.
19. In *Film Sense*, pp. 88ff; Eisenstein, *Nonindifferent Nature*, p. 116.
20. In the later writings his ideas relating to fine art circled round his notion of ecstasy whereas his earlier idea of 'explosive' montage takes a more profound turn.
21. He performed the same operation on El Greco's *The Expulsion of the Moneylenders from the Temple*.
22. Eisenstein, *Nonindifferent Nature*, p. 130.
23. Ibid., p. 132.
24. Ibid., p. 135.
25. E. Rhode, *The Tower of Babel* (New York: Chilton, 1966), p. 164.
26. K. Thompson, *Eisenstein's Ivan the Terrible: A Neoformalist Analysis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 4.
27. Trotsky, quoted in E. Rhode, *A History of the Cinema* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), p. 100.
28. Rhode's *History* is a Kleinian one. A friend of Stokes, he edited the posthumous Stokes' essays, *A Game that Must be Lost: Collected Papers* (Cheadle: Carcanet, 1973).
29. Rhode, *A History of the Cinema* (1979) p. 97.
30. Ibid., p. 93.
31. Ibid., p. 99.
32. Thompson, *Eisenstein's Ivan the Terrible*, p. 173.
33. Rhode, *A History of the Cinema*, p. 85.
34. In Stokes' essays in the collection *The Invitation in Art, Critical Writings* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978) vol. III.
35. Stokes, *Reflections on the Nude*, p. 314.
36. Ibid., p. 320.
37. Ibid., p. 317.
38. As a source of understanding environmental issues Stokes is sadly neglected. See *The Invitation in Art*.
39. Stokes, *Reflections on the Nude*, p. 321.
40. Ibid., p. 314.
41. Ibid., p. 322.
42. See Benjamin on 'optical unconscious' in Benjamin, 'The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in *Illuminations* (London: Fontana, 1973), p. 239.
43. Stokes, *Critical Writing*, vol. III, p. 318.
44. Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, ch. III.
45. 'The spectator in the picture' is one of the most complex and perhaps puzzling of Wollheim's ideas. On the issues, see essays by Alpers, van der Vall, Feagin, van Heck, Hopkins and Baxandall, in R. van Gerwen (ed.), *Richard Wollheim on the Art of Painting* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

46. Ibid., p. 129.
47. Stokes, *The Invitation in Art*, p. 277.
48. Ibid., p. 278.
49. Of course, the internal spectator of a picture that contains one is not accessible to all spectators.
50. Wollheim, *Painting as an Art*, p. 138.
51. Stokes, *The Invitation in Art*, p. 277.
52. Witness Wollheim's attempts to clarify the spectator in the picture for the contributors in van Gerwen, *Wollheim,* pp. 256–61.
53. S. Eisenstein, *Beyond the Stars the Memoirs of Sergei Eisenstein*, in *Selected Works* (London: British Film Institute, 1995), vol. 4, p. 37.
54. Kristin Thompson's analysis of *Ivan the Terrible* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981, pp. 287–302) and Heath's of Welles' *Touch of Evil* (*Questions of Cinema*, London: Macmillan, 1981, pp. 131–44) are concerned with these matters and may provide raw material for understanding the spectator in the picture.

8   Carving Values and John Ford

1. See Editors of *Cahiers du Cinema*, 'John Ford's *Young Mr Lincoln'*; and Ben Brewster's reply 'Notes on the Text', 'John Ford's *Young Mr Lincoln*', both in *Screen* (Autumn, 1972).
2. Gaylyn Studlar and Matthew Bernstein's introduction in G. Studlar and M. Bernstein (eds.), *John Ford Made Westerns: Filming the Legend in the Sound Era* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), p. 2.
3. Gary Wills makes a comparison between Hollywood and the Renaissance in relation to authorship in his *John Wayne: The Politics of Celebrity* (London: Faber and Faber, 1997), p. 80.
4. See, for example, C. Harbison, *The Art of the Northern Renaissance* (London: Everyman Art Library, 1995), p. 107.
5. See P. C. Sutton, 'Masters of Dutch Genre Painting', in *Masters of Seventeenth-Century Dutch Genre Painting* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Museum of Art, 1984).
6. L. Jardine, *Worldly Goods: A New History of the Renaissance* (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 19.
7. Ibid., p. 12.
8. See H. Osborne, *Aesthetics and Art Theory: An Historical Introduction* (London: Longmans, 1968).
9. T. Gallagher, *John Ford: The Man and his Films* (London; University of California Press, 1986), p. 50.
10. For a fuller account, see E. Buscombe, *The Searchers* (London: British Film Institute, 2000).
11. P. Bogdanovich, *John Ford* (London: Studio Vista, 1967), p. 92.
12. G. Perez, *The Material Ghost: Films and their Medium* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), p. 239. On Ford and feminisation, see Studlar and Bernstein, 'Introduction'.
13. A. Sarris, *The John Ford Movie Mystery* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1976).
14. Ibid.
15. P. Wollen, *Signs and Meanings in the Cinema* (London: Secker & Warburg/BFI, 1969), p. 102.
16. L. Anderson, *About John Ford* (London: Plexus, 1981), p. 207.
17. Ibid., p. 160.

18. But see the opening sequence of his *My Darling Clementine* for a counter-example.

19. Buscombe, *The Searchers*, pp. 10–12.

20. J. Baxter, *The Cinema of John Ford* (London: Zwemmer, 1971), p. 78.

21. G. Wills, *John Wayne* (London: Faber and Faber, 1997).

22. Sarris, *The John Ford Movie Mystery*, p. 157.

23. Wills also acknowledges both the visual superiority of this film in the so-called cavalry trilogy and commends its exceptional use of light.

24. Wills, *John Wayne*, p. 186.

25. Ibid., p. 186.

26. Hawks in *The Big Sleep* cites militant Irish Republicanism as a reverie of an American rugged individualism in the early hothouse scene in the film.

27. Sarris, *The John Ford Movie Mystery*, p. 157.

28. Wills, *John Wayne*, p. 186.

29. P. Bogdanovich, *John Ford* (London: Studio Vista, 1967), p. 74.

30. Phil Hardy (ed.), *Raoul Walsh* (Colchester: Edinburgh Film Festival/Vineyard Press, 1974), p. 47.

31. On the political aspects of Ford's films, see Perez, *The Material Ghost*.

32. Sarris, *The John Ford Movie Mystery*, p. 156.

33. See Hollander, *Moving Pictures*, esp. ch. 1, to which much of this section is indebted.

34. Ibid., p. 33.

35. Ibid., pp. 33–4.

36. Ibid., p. 34.

37. This is the Lockean distinction between primary and secondary qualities.

38. See Deborah Thomas, 'John Wayne's Body', in *The Movie Book of the Western* (London: Studio Vista, 1996), p. 83 where she describes the image of 'healing and recuperation' at the end of *Rio Grande*.

39. T. Gallagher, *John Ford: The Man and His Films* (London: University of California Press, 1986).

40. The song is a homage to Fenian rebels.

41. Bogdanovich, *John Ford*, p. 93.

42. Gallagher, *John Ford*, p. 4.

43. D. W. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974), esp. ch. 4.

44. On carving and Winnicott, see T. Pinckney, *Women in the Poetry of T. S. Eliot* (London: Macmillan, 1984), esp. pp. 12–17.

9 Modelling Values and Alfred Hitchcock

1. See Notorious: Alfred Hitchcock and Contemporary Art, MOMA Oxford show (1999).

2. Some of the most influential have been Robin Wood, *Hitchcock's Films* (London: Studio Vista, 1965); William Rothman, *Hitchcock – The Murderous Gaze* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1982); Eric Rohmer and Claude Chabrol, *Hitchcock: The First Forty-Four Films* (New York: Ungar Publishing, 1979); Slavoj Žižek, *Everything You Always Wanted to Know About Lacan (But Were Afraid to Ask Hitchcock)*, (London: Verso, 1992); Raymond Bellour, 'Hitchcock: The Enunciator', *Camera Obscura*, no. 1 (Fall 1977); 'Psychosis, Neurosis, Perversion', *Camera Obscura* nos. 3–4 (1979); *The Analysis of Film* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002); Ray Durgnat, *The Strange Case of Alfred Hitchcock* (London: Faber and Faber, 1974).

3. The writings on Hitchcock are voluminous, but the best critical works on him remain Durgnat's *The Strange Case of Alfred Hitchcock*, and his posthumously published *A Long Hard Look at 'Psycho'* (London: British Film Institute, 2002); see also R. Wood, *Hitchcock's Films Revisited* (London: Faber and Faber, 1989). For more recent discussions, see R. Allen and S. I. Gonzales (eds.), *Alfred Hitchcock: Centenary Essays* (London: British Film Institute, 1999).

4. One can work under the concept of art without consciously embracing it as a term, or even particularly as an institution (e.g. 'primitive' art or, for that matter, ancient Greek 'art'), whatever that would mean in film at the time.

5. See A. Hollander, *Moving Pictures* (London: Harvard University Press, 1991).

6. Francois Truffaut, *Hitchcock* (London: Panther, 1969), p. 26.

7. Durgnat, *The Strange Case of Alfred Hitchcock*, p. 332.

8. Ibid., p. 332.

9. Truffaut, *Hitchcock*, p. 349.

10. The film opens like *Psycho*, moving from long shot inside a room, except that the two people on the beds (the two Charlies) are geographically separated. *Shadow of a Doubt* in its corruption of the young and innocent involves walking.

11. Durgnat, *The Strange Case of Alfred Hitchcock*, p. 324.

12. Hitchcock's most important cameraman in his middle-period films (until his untimely death).

13. See Durgnat for a powerful and intricate discussion of *Vertigo*, in *The Strange Case of Alfred Hitchcock*, pp. 278–98.

14. Robin Wood, *Hitchcock's Films Revisited* (London: Faber and Faber, 1989).

15. Wood and Durgnat almost totally ignore the power of colour and lighting in *Vertigo*, but see S. Cavell, *The World Viewed* (London: Harvard University Press, 1979).

16. Novak objected to the dresses and their colours, a dispute which was the focus of her initial dissatisfaction with Hitchcock who would not budge on his costume decisions. See F. Truffaut, *Hitchcock*, revised edition (London: Paladin, 1986), p. 376.

17. Truffaut, *Hitchcock*, p. 218.

18. Ibid., p. 221.

19. On shadows as a cliché in film, see 'Hitchcock Talks about Lights, Camera, Action', in S. Gottlieb (ed.), *Hitchcock on Hitchcock: Selected Writings and Interviews* (London: Faber and Faber, 1995), p. 312.

20. In the Truffaut interview the fact that Novak did not wear a bra is commented upon. See Truffaut, *Hitchcock*, p. 310.

21. Ibid., p. 306. This complies with Leonardo's advice to painters. See V. Stroichita, *A Short History of the Shadow* (London: Reaktion Books, 1997) p. 57.

22. Ibid., p. 306.

23. But see the continuity problem in the back alley sequence when Madeleine goes shopping where there is a shadow mismatch that cannot be accounted for by the passing of time.

24. Truffaut, *Hitchcock*, p. 306.

25. Grey (or white) is the colour of an additive of complementary colours (see Arnheim, p. 347).

26. Cavell, *The World Viewed*, p. 84.

27. Ibid., p. 86.

28. T. Modelski, *The Women Who Knew Too Much: Hitchcock and Feminist Theory* (London: Methuen, 1988), p. 3.

29. For an account of the issue and others, see Podro, *The Critical Historians of Art*.

30. H. Wolfflin, *Renaissance and Baroque* (London: Collins, 1964), pp. 76–7.

31. Podro *The Critical Historians of Art*, p. xviii.
32. A. Stokes 'Form in Art', in *A Game that Must be Lost: Collected Papers* (Cheadle: Carcanet, 1973), p. 112.

10   Modelling in Light and Dark

1. Michael Chapman interview, in D. Schaefer and L. Salvato (eds.), *Masters of Light: Conversations with Contemporary Cinematographers* (London: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 122–3.
2. The use of colour tinting for early black-and-white film allowed an expressive modulation to parts of its whole. For example, night sequences were often tinted blue.
3. For an early discussion, see Rudolf Arnheim's writings from 1933 in his *Film as Art* (London: University of California Press, 1957), pp. 65–73.
4. Ibid.
5. See 'Not Coloured but in Colour' and 'Colour Film' both written in the 1940s and collected in S. Eisenstein, *Notes of A Film Director* (New York: Dover, 1970).
6. With the exception of Lye and Disney. See P. Nash, 'The Colour Film', in C. Davey (ed.), *Footnotes to the Film* (London: Lovat Dickson, 1938).
7. In *Venice* and *Stones of Rimini*.
8. A. Stokes, *The Impact of Architecture, Critical Writings* (London: Thames & Hudson, 1978), vol. III, p. 204.
9. The exceptions are to be found largely in technical journals. On the experiential quality of black-and-white cinematography of early film, see Kevin Brownlow's remarks in his Preface to Paolo Cherchi Usai, *Burning Passions: An Introduction to the Study of Silent Cinema* (London: British Film Institute, 1994), pp. 2–3.
10. The source for this fact and others in this chapter is E. Buscombe, 'Sound and Colour', in B. Nichols (ed.), *Movies and Methods* (London: University of California Press, 1985), vol. 2, p. 89. See also P. Ogle, 'Technological and Aesthetic Influences on the Development of Deep-Focus Cinematography in the United States', in ibid. For a fuller account, see B. Salt, *Film Style and Technology: History and Analysis*. 2nd expanded edition (London: Starword, 1992).
11. Equally, black-and-white films were hand-coloured tinted during the pre-colour period. For examples, see Salt, *Style and Technology*.
12. Brownlow 'Preface', p. 2.
13. Ibid., p. 2.
14. This is not true in the avant-garde where film-makers like Stan Brakhage and Peter Gidal have predominantly made silent films.
15. There are exceptions, for example, *Raging Bull*, *Paper Moon*, *Rumblefish*, *Schindler's List*.
16. Salt, *Style and Technology*, p. 101.
17. Toning, altering only the black silver part of images, was rare due to cost. Stencil tinting was also used by Pathe from 1908 onward, but only on certain kinds of films. See ibid., p. 101.
18. Quoted in A. Stokes, *Colour and Form, Critical Writings*, vol. II, p. 9.
19. Schaefer and Salvato, *Masters of Light*, p. 122.
20. Ibid., p. 192.
21. See John Boorman, 'The Future of Film – in Black and White', *Guardian* (16 May, 1998), p. 4.
22. Salt, *Style and Technology*, p. 233.
23. Ibid., p. 233.

24. Stokes, *Stones of Rimini*, *Critical Writings*, vol. I, p. 245.

25. Ibid., p. 243.

26. Stokes, 'Introduction', *Invitation in Art*, *Critical Writings*, vol. III, p. 266.

27. See Collingwood for this kind of view of art as primarily a mental item.

28. Stokes, *Colour and Form*, *Critical Writings*, vol. II, p. 53.

29. Stokes, *The Invitation in Art*, *Critical Writings*, p. 271.

30. Ibid., p. 271.

31. I am excluding the possible counter-examples of closed-eye 'visual' phenomena and dream images, which are interesting and separate cases and do not compromise the present discussion.

32. Stokes, *Colour and Form*, *Critical Writings*, vol. II, p. 18.

33. Ibid., p. 22.

34. Ibid., p. 23.

35. Ibid., p. 20.

36. David Katz, *The World of Colour* (London: Kegan Paul, 1935), quoted in Stokes, *Colour and Form*, p. 22.

37. Stokes, *Stones of Rimini*, *Critical Writings*, vol. I, p. 229 and restates this on pp. 243–4.

38. Ibid., p. 135.

39. Stokes, *Venice*, *Critical Writings*, vol. II, p. 88.

40. *Quattro Cento*, *Critical Writings*, vol. I, p. 58.

41. Quoted in R. Kolker, *The Altered Eye: Contemporary International Cinema* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), p. 43.

42. J. von Sternberg, *Fun in a Chinese Laundry* (London: Columbus Books, 1987), p. 268. Cameraman Hal Mohr sprayed dark areas of Reinhardt's set for *A Midsummer Night's Dream* with aluminum paint. See J. Baxter, *The Hollywood Exiles* (London: Macdonald and Janes, 1976), p. 192.

43. See especially M. Baxandall, *Shadows and Enlightenment* (London: Yale University Press, 1995); E. H. Gombrich, *Shadows: The Depiction of Cast Shadows in Western Art* (London: National Gallery, 1995); V. I. Stoichita, *A Short History of the Shadow* (London: Reaktion Books, 1997). See also E. H. Gombrich, 'Light and Highlights', in *Gombrich on the Renaissance Volume 3 The Heritage of Apelles* (London: Phaidon, 1975). On light in visual art, see R. Arnheim, *Art and Visual Perception* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), ch. VI; P. Hills, *The Light of Early Italian Painting* (London: Yale University Press, 1987).

44. M. Baxandall, *Shadows and Enlightenment* (London: Yale University Press, 1995), p. 1.

45. Ibid., pp. 14–15.

46. Hills, *The Light of Early Italian Painting*, p. 1.

47. Ibid. For a fuller bibliography with particular reference to Renaissance painting, see also M. Kemp, *The Science of Art: Optical Themes in Western Art from Brunelleschi to Seurat* (London: Yale University Press, 1990).

48. Hills, *The Light of Early Italian Painting*, p. 23.

49. L. B. Alberti, *On Painting and on Sculpture*, quoted in Kemp *The Science of Art*, p. 266.

50. Schaefer and Salvato, *Masters of Light*, p. 156.

51. See J. Alton, *Painting in Light* (London: University of California Press [1949], 1995).

52. On Rossellini, see Salt, *Film Style and Technology: History and Analysis*, p. 290.

53. See Gombrich, 'Light and Highlights', in *Gombrich on the Renaissance*, *Volume 3: The Heritage of Apelles* (1976) and *Shadows: The Depiction of Cast Shadows in Western Art* (1995), both of which have informed this brief historical account.

54. For a discussion of Leonardo on shadows, see Baxandall *Shadows and Enlightenment* (1995), pp. 151–5.

55. Kemp, *The Science of Art*, p. 268.
56. Gombrich, 'Light and Highlights'.
57. Shown in a tinted version at South Bank in the 1980s.
58. 'Impenetrable dark masses' used in painting. See Baxandall, *Shadows and Enlightenment*, p. 77.
59. *Alien* also heralded a low-key lighting which was used by other film-makers in the period following. See Salt, *Film Style and Technology*, p. 289.
60. Gombrich, *Shadows*, p. 19.
61. Arnheim, *Art and Visual Perception*, p. 313.
62. Leonardo da Vinci, *A Treatise on Painting* ed. A. Philip McMahon (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 70, quoted in Gombrich, *Shadows*, p. 20.
63. Boorman, 'The Future of Film', p. 4.
64. Schaefer and Salvato, *Masters of Light*, p. 228.
65. With the exception of short experimental films which may use such a formal device for its own aesthetic sensations.
66. Lotte Eisner does not make strong claims for Expressionism in the film in her book *The Haunted Screen* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1969).
67. *Colour and Form*, p. 13.
68. See relevant debunking essays in A. Silver and J. Urzini (eds.), *Film Noir Reader* (New York: Limelight Editions, 1996).
69. Hollander, *Moving Pictures*, is revealing on the relationship between film and painting.
70. Durgnat, for example, takes a subject-matter or attitudinal approach in discussing *film noir* in 'Paint it Black: The Family Tree of the Film Noir' in Silver and Urzini, *Film Noir Reader*.
71. Most of the following remarks are culled from Janey Place and Lowell Peterson, 'Some Visual Motifs in Film Noir' in ibid.
72. This is a simple lighting set-up. See Salt, *Film Style and Technology*.
73. Ibid., p. 66.
74. Such effects are as prevalent in horror and sci-fi, memorably in *Alien* and *Close Encounters of the Third Kind*.
75. The analysis could run further – her murder, the one we see, is of a woman: his family remains as a restorative framework throughout: hers is unknown but she is English! And so on.
76. Eric Rhode's view on this post-war period for both Hollywood and European art cinema is in terms of the effect of the Cold War and a turn to psychologism. See his *A History of the Cinema: From its Origins to 1970* (London: Pelican, 1978), esp. ch. 12.
77. *Noirish* lighting was not novel to the so-called post-war *film noir* period as Marc Vernet points out in '*Film Noir* on the Edge of Doom', in Joan Copjec, *Shades of Noir: A Reader* (London: Verso, 1993), pp. 9–10. See also Salt, *Film Style and Technology*.
78. Hollander, *Moving Pictures*, p. 34.
79. Ibid., p. 34.
80. Ibid., p. 37.
81. Richard Wollheim, 'Pictorial Style: Two Views', in his *The Mind and Its Depths* (London: Harvard University Press, 1993), esp. p. 178.
82. See Peter C. Sutton, 'Masters of Dutch Genre Painting', in *Masters of Seventeenth-Century Dutch Genre Painting* (Philadelphia: Philadelphia Musuem of Art Catalogue, 1984).
83. See Bruce Cole, *The Renaissance Artist at Work*: *From Pisano to Titian* (London: John Murray, 1983).

84. Schaefer and Salvato, *Masters of Light*, p. 192.
85. Salt, *Film Style and Technology*, p. 237.
86. Wollheim suggests that there is a third – universal – style, e.g. classicism, naturalism.
87. David Bordwell, *On the History of Film Style* (London: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 4.
88. Ibid., p. 34.
89. Ibid., p. 37.
90. Eisenstein, *Notes of a Film Director*, p. 120.
91. Ibid., pp. 116–18.
92. Carl Dreyer, *Dreyer*, in *Double Reflection* (New York: De Capo Press, 1973).
93. Ibid., p. 185.

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