What is Journalism?

The Art and Politics of a Rupture

CHRIS NASH

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Cover illustration: Detail of DER BEVÖLKERUNG, 2000-. Hans Haacke. Photo 2007. © Hans Haacke-Artists Rights Society (ARS)

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For
Wendy, Emma and Luke,
Hans and Linda,
Izzy and Esther

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CHAPTER 1

The Case for a Rupture

Hans Haacke is a German-American artist born in 1936 in Köln, Germany, and since 1965 living in New York. His practice is related to conceptual art, with a long list of works, exhibitions, commissions, international honours and publications to his credit. In 1970 Haacke was invited by the Guggenheim Museum in New York to stage a one-person show, which was "for a German-born artist just thirty-five years old …. a remarkably early canonisation."[1] Shortly before the exhibition was due to open in April 1971, the Museum Director, Thomas Messer, cancelled it on the grounds that three of the works produced for the exhibition were not art but journalism.

The rejected works were *Shapolsky et al. Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971* and *Sol Goldman and Alex diLorenzo Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971*, plus a proposed anonymous survey for exhibition visitors. The survey comprised twenty questions about demographic status and political, social, and economic attitudes (Fig. 1.1). The two real estate works comprised a series of black and white frontal photographs of slum tenement buildings in a flat uninterpretive style, supplemented with publicly available information from the New York City County Clerk's Office detailing lot number, address, basic building description, ownership and most recent transfer, assessed land value, and mortgage status (Fig. 1.2). A street map identified the location of the properties (Fig. 1.3), and charts detailed the various companies and individuals that owned the properties, the interconnections between them, and the sources of mort-

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

These questions are and your answers will be part of

Hans Haacke's VISITORS' PROFILE

a work in progress during the Haacke exhibition at the

Guggenheim Museum.

Please fill out the questionnaire and drop it into the box on the white round table near the windows on the Museum's ground floor. Do not sign your name.

1) Do you have a professional interest in art, e.g. artist, student, critic, historian, etc?
yes no

2) Is the use of the American flag for the expression of political beliefs, e.g. on hard-hats and in dissident art exhibitions a legitimate exercise of free speech?
yes no

3) How old are you?
years

4) Should the use of marijuana be legalized, lightly or severely punished?
legalized lightly severely punished

5) What is your marital status?
married single divorced separated widowed

6) Do you sympathize with Womens' Lib?
yes no

7) Are you male, female?
male female

8) Do you have children?
yes no

9) Would you mind busing your child to integrate schools?
yes no

10) What is your ethic background?

11) Assuming you were Indochinese, would you sympathize with the present Saigon regime?
yes no

12) In your opinion is the moral fabric of this country strengthened or weakened by the US involvement in Indochina?
strengthened weakened

13) What is your religion?

14) Do you think the interests of profit-oriented business usually are compatible with the common good of the world?
yes no

15) What is your annual income (before taxes)?
$

16) In your opinion are the economic difficulties of the US mainly attributable to the Nixon Administration's policies?
yes no

17) Where do you live?
city county state

18) Do you think the defeat of the SST was a step in the right direction?
yes no

19) Are you enrolled in or have you graduated from college?
yes no

20) In your opinion should the general orientation of the country be more or less conservative?
more less

Your answers will be tabulated later today together with the answers of all other visitors of the exhibition. Thank you.

Fig. 1.1 Questionnaire for Guggenheim Museum Visitors' Profile (unrealised), 1971. Hans Haacke



Fig. 1.2 Shapolsky et al. Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971. Hans Haacke (3 Buildings)

gage funding (Fig. 1.4). Shapolsky, Goldman and DiLorenzo did not have any association with the Guggenheim Museum.

The curator of the exhibition, Edward F. Fry, was a well-published authority on cubism and contemporary art. He wrote: "In his works Haacke has succeeded in changing the relationship between art and reality, and consequently he has also changed our view of the evolution of modern art."[2] Fry defended Haacke's work and was in turn sacked by Messer, never again to be employed by a US museum despite his preeminent international reputation, although he did go on to have a successful academic career in the USA.[3] Quite clearly, the scale and scope of this confrontation indicated that much more was at stake than a mere difference of opinion over the merit of some individual artworks. *Shapolsky* was exhibited in a group show the following year at the University of Rochester and at the 1978 Venice Biennale; it and *Sol Goldman* were subsequently purchased by the Centre Pompidou in Paris and the Tate Gallery in London, respectively.[4] Haacke had a solo show at The New Museum of Contemporary Art in New York in 1986, and other work by him has been exhibited in the USA over the years at commercial galleries, in group shows and at some smaller public institutions, but until 2008 not in a solo exhibition at a leading US public institution. *Shapolsky* was co-purchased with the



Fig. 1.3 Shapolsky et al. Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971. Hans Haacke (Map of Lower East Side)



Fig. 1.4 Shapolsky et al. Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971, 1971. Hans Haacke (Excerpt of Bldgs & Charts)

Museu d'Art Contemporani Barcelona (MACBA) in 2007 by the Whitney Museum of American Art, where it was included in a group show of recent purchases the following year (Fig. 1.5).

In the meantime Haacke had been enormously productive and exhibited in leading venues internationally, including multiple invited appearances at Documenta and the Venice Biennale. He was invited by the newly reunited Germany to occupy that country's pavilion at the 1993 Venice Biennale, where he and fellow exhibitor German-Korean artist Nam June Paik were awarded the Golden Lion Prize for the best pavilion of that year. In 2000 he was commissioned amid controversy by the German Bundestag to produce the work *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* for the renovated and reoccupied Reichstag building in Berlin. In 2012 he was invited to produce a new work and stage a major retrospective by the Museo Nacional Centro de Arte Reina Sofia in Madrid. This exhibition was titled *Castles in the Air*, and concerned the contemporary burst real estate bubble and impact of the global financial crisis in Spain; the retrospective included the *Sol Goldman* piece excluded from the Guggenheim forty-one years earlier. In 2015 *Gift Horse* was commissioned by the City of London to occupy the vacant fourth plinth in Trafalgar Square (Fig. 1.6). So the jury of his

Fig. 1.5 Shapolsky et al. Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971. Hans Haacke. Whitney Museum 2007 (Photo Hans Haacke)

peers, major galleries, and leading scholars and critics internationally, *contra* Thomas Messer, has judged that Haacke's work is certainly art, and indeed that he is one of the major artists of the last half-century.

But we cannot let Messer go so lightly, and have to ask – is it also journalism? And if so, what is journalism? This book addresses these two questions. Its short answer to the first is yes, to that extent agreeing with Messer, but that opens up the much more interesting questions of what sort of art is journalism, and inversely what sort of journalism is art, and what do the two have to offer each other? I will come back to these questions in Chap. 7. A long answer to the second question – what is journalism? – is the main project of this book.

The conflict over *Shapolsky* and *Goldman* reflected a major rupture in the way that art was to be conceived and practiced, a rupture that precipitated a new way of thinking about art in relation to reality. If the art is also journalism, then similar issues arise: what is the relationship of journalism to reality? This is a profound epistemological issue, which in journalism studies is still largely stuck in the rut of debates about representation. Fry's claim that Haacke's work transcended the representation debates in



Fig. 1.6 Gift Horse 2015. Hans Haacke. 4th Plinth, Trafalgar Square. © Hans Haacke-Artists Rights Society

art signals a comparable opportunity for journalism, and forces an engagement with the basic epistemological and ontological issues that confront any truth-seeking practice. This book is a response to that opportunity.

With few exceptions since 1971, Haacke's supporters among scholars, critics, and fellow artists and curators have not responded to the journal-

ism side of the challenge. They have explored, analysed, and praised the implications of his work for art, while his detractors have damned it for the same, but for both, journalism has been a known object from which art can and should be distinguished. In this view, art is open, dynamic, fractious, and intellectually contestable, whereas journalism might as well be a urinal or paint rag as far as its intrinsic interest is concerned. But for those who take journalism seriously, Haacke's work provides a provocation and an opportunity for a breakthrough in how we might think about journalism, both as art and as a rigorous, reflexive truth-seeking practice.

On the art side of the equation, as Fry observed, by 1971 Haacke's work had been raising fundamental questions about the relationship of art to reality for some time, and the rejected works were just an extension of this challenge into the social realm:

> As young Roy Lichtenstein put the case in a famous interview, the problem for a hopeful scene-making artist in the early sixties was how best to be disagreeable. What he needed was to find a body of subject matter sufficiently odious to offend even lovers of art. And as everyone knows, Lichtenstein opted for the vulgarity of comic book images. Here's what he said to Gene Svenson in November 1963:
>
> It was hard to get a painting that was despicable enough so that no one would hang it – everybody was hanging everything. It was almost acceptable to hang a dripping paint rag, everyone was accustomed to this. The thing everyone hated was commercial art; apparently they didn't hate that enough either.
>
> ….[J]ust eight years later, success came to Hans Haacke, who, upon invitation, produced three unacceptable pieces, which the Guggenheim Museum refused to install.[5]

What was it about a meticulously researched, neutrally presented set of publicly available information about two large landlords' real estate holdings that could not be hung on the walls of the Guggenheim? More broadly, if anything from Duchamp's urinal to Lichtenstein's paint rag could be art, why couldn't journalism? Is journalism 'sufficiently odious' not to be art?

The seed from which this book has sprung germinated on a crisp winter's day in New York City, early in 2008. My partner and I, both journalists teaching in Australian universities, were on holidays and had spent time in contemporary art exhibitions in and around New York. That morning we walked through Central Park to see what was on at the Whitney. Coffee

warming our hands, breath fogging before us, we walked and talked about the ideas behind the art we'd seen, and the question came up: if the art of any particular work resided in the concept, then could journalism – as such – be art? If not, why not? This was not the same question as whether journalism could be *artful* – aesthetically pleasing, beautifully filmed, literary – or whether it could be *about* art, but whether it could *be* art, as could a snow shovel or bottle rack for Duchamp.

We walked into the Whitney galleries, and there on the wall was *Shapolsky et al. Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971*, unanticipated and instantly recognisable to both of us as investigative journalism. So the answer was clearly yes, and to our abject ignorance had been given almost four decades earlier. What were the implications of that for journalism?

Journalism is not static. The question of whether journalism can be art necessarily raises the issue of what journalism can be, and how we might think about its limits. *Shapolsky* and *Goldman* presented the art/journalism relationship as capable of synthesis, but the Guggenheim rejected that proposition – and therefore the works offered the opportunity for an *epistemological break* or *rupture* with the institutionalised view of art and of journalism represented by Guggenheim Director Messer. The concept of an epistemological rupture is widely accepted in the philosophy of the sciences. Bachelard argued that ruptures occur regularly in the history of science and function to transcend obstacles that hinder epistemological development.[6] Kuhn used the term "paradigm shift" to describe a similar process.[7] Althusser, Foucault, and Derrida incorporated the concept into their respective theoretical systems. Bourdieu suggested that the role of the rupture is to break "with modes of thinking, concepts and methods that have every appearance of common sense, of ordinary sense, and of good scientific sense."[8]

In the case of journalism, the common sense and scholarly views largely agree on its status as a nontheoretical craft, to be contrasted with the rigour of scholarly inquiry in the social and natural sciences, or in conceptual art for that matter. This book argues that the transition of journalism to a methodologically self-aware, critically reflexive practice in the production of knowledge has been well underway for half a century or more among leading practitioners – but largely unrecognised by scholars. An epistemological rupture is long overdue, most importantly in journalism studies, to enable a scholarly breakthrough that will catch up with the implications of contemporary transitional practice. This book proposes and justifies a

breakthrough by scholar journalists to a conceptualisation of journalism as an intellectual activity equal to and located among the disciplines of the humanities and social sciences.

Journalism encompasses a very broad and constantly developing set of practices, only a minority of which would aspire to the recognition and standards I am proposing here. But as Ferro[9] and Trouillot[10] among others have pointed out, the same caveat applies to one of the oldest of knowledge practices, history. This book is concerned with the sort of journalism that does take its own intellectual character seriously, and argues how and why journalism should recognise itself as having the status and responsibilities of a discipline. This is not to fetishise disciplinarity, which is a far from settled category, but to assert a certain quality of rigour and engagement with conceptual issues in truth seeking and knowledge production. Necessarily interdisciplinary, journalism makes a comparable but different contribution to other disciplines. The comparability is what locates journalism as one among peers; the differences identify the singularity of its contribution.

The argument proceeds along two interlinked strands, much like a chromosomal helix. The first strand demonstrates that the core methodological challenges for journalism engage with metatheoretical issues in geography, history, sociology, and the creative arts, and therefore it is possible to interrogate and practice journalism at the level required of a disciplinary practice. But demonstrating that possibility is not the same thing as demonstrating its usefulness at the level of a journalist practitioner working inside or outside the academy. The second strand of the helix applies the theoretical frameworks at each point to a set of case studies, to establish whether the theory can be fruitfully applied to real-world published journalism to interrogate the quality of its knowledge production beyond nostrums of balance and fairness. The second strand requires detailed interrogation of the case studies because that is the only way the relevance of theory can be forensically tested and established.

The case studies are drawn from the work of two practitioners: one an artist, Hans Haacke, the other a journalist, I.F. (Izzy) Stone. They shared a methodology based on the analysis and interpretation of authoritative documents, a meticulous approach to the verification of empirical evidence, an acute sensitivity to the political values of information, and an unequivocal willingness to publish challenging information and analyses in pursuit of accountability. Both referenced prominent scholars in the discussion of their methodologies and evidence. By no means were they

the only ones among their contemporaries who worked according to these principles, but the consistency and longevity of their practice in the face of thoroughgoing hostility from their institutional opponents is stark and exemplary, and injects clarity and richness into the case studies. At the time of writing, Stone has been dead for almost three decades, while Haacke is moving through his late seventies; both of them produced some of their most notable work in their senior years. Both were highly regarded by their peers and publics, both took a self-consciously intellectual and reflexive approach to the development of their work, and both refused to deviate from their chosen methodologies in the face of ostracism by conservative opponents and institutions. For these reasons their work precipitated ruptures in the understanding of art and journalism, and breakthroughs in practice among their peers and successors. Haacke has taken no other name for his work but art, but nonetheless recognised Messer's accusation of journalism for the gift it was and developed his practice in a forensic engagement with what that might mean. Stone took no other name for his work but journalism, and in his valedictory publication *The Trial of Socrates* sought to ground journalism in the deepest philosophical debates that he could find about freedom of expression and the politics of knowledge. Both Haacke and Stone practised at a level recognised as comparable to the humanities and social sciences by scholars in those disciplines.

The aim of this current work is not to present a unified "grand theory of journalism": that is neither desirable nor possible. Intellectual practice is constantly developing out of a dialectical relationship between theory and empirical observation and, particularly in the social sciences and humanities, this means that theory can never be stable but is always responding to social and physical change.[11] Indeed, the premise of this book is that changes in the observable practice of journalism require a break with unsatisfactory conceptualisations of journalism among scholars. Building on that premise, the book argues that some of the metatheoretical debates in other disciplines are necessarily relevant to journalism in its own singular research practice. Once that recognition is made, a research agenda for further exploration of both the singularities and commonalities of journalism with respect to other disciplinary research practices can be developed. The important point is that the questions that journalism asks of itself should sit at the same level at which other disciplines examine their practice. The place to begin, no doubt an unlikely one for many readers but where I found myself at the start of this journey, is with Hans Haacke back in 1971 and the question of whether journalism can be art.

As Messer presented the issue in rejecting Haacke's works for the Guggenheim, it is a matter of definition: art and journalism are mutually exclusive because of what they are. But definitions of social products and practices are necessarily social constructs, and therefore themselves up for interrogation and change, which is Haacke's approach to art. Likewise in journalism, the contemporary changes are the product of practitioners challenging the nature and boundaries of their work as its context and conditions change. Clearly not all journalists will want to respond to any particular challenge, but equally some will, wittingly or unwittingly. University-based journalism programs in particular have an obvious stake in the intellectual framework of journalism, although, as Carey and others have noted, that has proven problematic. Haacke and Stone differed in their relationships with academia. Haacke held a tenured professorship for many years in the art program at the Cooper Union in New York City, but Stone dropped out of college in his junior year and indeed expressed a lifelong mild contempt for what he termed the mediocrity of most college professors.[12] Tellingly, it is from outside the journalism academic community that these two practitioners have produced work that explores the intellectual foundations of journalism, and it is undoubtedly true that most of the conceptual innovations in journalism practice are still taking place outside the academy. That said, the location of almost all journalism education in tertiary institutions now mandates that the journalism academy must engage with the conceptual foundations of, and challenges to, its practice.

So how is journalism currently conceptualised? G. Stuart Adam has made a widely referenced contribution:

> If journalism is marked by its public voice, it is marked equally by its relation to the here and now. Michael Oakeshott, a British philosopher, once defined "the world of history [as] the real world as a whole comprehended under the category of the past." The world of journalism, by contrast, may be the real world as a whole comprehended under the category of the present …. [J]ournalism is avowedly about the present, not the past. So the preliminary definition of journalism contains at least these four elements: reporting, judging, a public voice, and the here and now.[13]

James Carey agreed with Adam and added an element:

> Journalism is the whole of the real defined under the category of the present. As such, the natural academic home of journalism is among the humanities and the humanistic social sciences.[14]

Carey's nomination of a potential academic home is useful because it establishes the need for journalism to explain what it has to offer to that environment. But for many journalists and scholars, the claim that journalism has a "natural academic home" is a nonsense. That perspective is the academic version of Messer's opinion on journalism and art: journalism is "sufficiently odious" to be unacceptable as scholarship. Adam's and Carey's definitions nominate a concern with the "real world", the "here and now" and the "public" political interest as core characteristics and therefore strengths of journalism. Conversely, they are the three major problem areas identified by critics, where methodological weakness compromises any claims by journalism to scholarly status, namely

- a crudely positivist conception of empirical reality that separates facts from values and eschews methodological reflexivity
- a temporal restriction to narrowly contemporary events and processes that privileges an intuitive "news sense" and militates against considered reflection and reasoned analysis
- a close and necessary engagement with socially recognised authoritative sources in the production and presentation of truth claims that must necessarily corrupt the detachment required for scholarly analysis.[15]

It is the role of theory to identify and address the methodological challenges in any discipline's pursuit of knowledge, and this book will do that with respect to these concerns with the empirical, the temporal and the political dimensions of journalism practice.

But at the outset it is important to acknowledge a pronounced ambiguity in the treatment of journalism by the established disciplines. Scholars in the humanities and social sciences regularly reference journalism products as *prima facie* evidence of empirical truth, and interrogate the implicit and explicit truth claims and meanings in journalists' reports. As Zelizer puts it: "Where would history be without journalism? What would literature look like? How could we understand the working of the polity?"[16] and long before her, Robert Park of the early Chicago School of Sociology pointed out that "news, as a form of knowledge, contributes from its record of events not only to history and sociology but to folklore and literature; it contributes something not merely to the social sciences but to the humanities."[17]

Clearly scholars in other disciplines recognise at least some validity in the truth claims of at least some journalism, so if they seriously engage with the truth-seeking products of journalism, how should journalists themselves think about the quality of their practices to produce these truth claims? What sort of a partner is journalism as a set of practices contributing to the sum of human knowledge? And if those other contributors to human knowledge are organised as disciplines, should journalism also be thought of as a discipline among the humanities and social sciences? If not, then how can journalism's practices be interrogated for their adequacy in producing truth claims for use by other disciplines? The whole point of theory and disciplinarity is to codify and interrogate the ways in which scholars think about their practices in seeking truth, so under what possible pretences should journalism be excluded from such an interrogation when its products make such a contribution to other disciplines?

There is a widespread recognition that journalism is currently in transition – as a set of crafts, as a profession, as a mode of paid and unpaid labour, as a communication activity, as a corporatised business model in the private and public sectors, and as a creative and aesthetic practice. Ever since the onset of the digital revolution, the meaning and consequences of these changes have been explored in detail.[18] However, another transition fundamental to our inquiry has been underway for a longer period: the move of journalism education away from the in-house apprenticeship model and into the tertiary education sector. The shift was part of the huge worldwide expansion of tertiary education and student populations in the mid-twentieth century, with its unanticipated characteristic of a sharp shift to the left in student politics and an explosion of student and alternative journalism.[19] University-based journalism education had been initiated early in the twentieth century in the USA, and was followed reluctantly and quite slowly in other national systems. Even now it is not complete. The shift has provided a context for the questions this book is addressing, but it is important to reiterate that the questions were appearing anyway, as evidenced by the case studies I will examine. Moreover, higher education has multiple dimensions, not the least being a financially challenging and highly competitive business environment. As anyone who has had anything to do with universities in recent decades will know, they are far from ivory towers dedicated to disinterested knowledge and learning.[20] It also often happens that university education for a profession challenges the comprehensive control over their workforces by the major employer organisations, and it typically has ramifications for the class, gender, and

ethnic composition of these workforces. It can often produce external challenges for curriculum development and research among academics in those professions.[21] For journalism, the curriculum can be contested, sometimes bitterly, within the academy as well as from without.[22]

For as long as national tertiary education sectors were stratified into traditional research-intensive universities and other more education-focused institutions (the so-called "binary system"), journalism was mostly located in the latter – in Australia the colleges of advanced education, in the USA the state universities and community colleges, in the UK the polytechnics, and in many European countries in institutes that are associated with universities but not universities themselves, and therefore not research oriented. There were exceptions, such as the Masters degrees at Columbia University and the University of California at Berkeley in the USA, the University of Queensland in Australia, and City and Cardiff Universities in the UK, but they were the exceptions that proved the rule because they offered an elite version of a craft-oriented curriculum that employed distinguished former and current journalists from industry, who typically did not hold doctoral qualifications and were not expected to conduct scholarly research.

That situation started to change in Australia in 1989 when the binary system was replaced. All degree-granting institutions were given equal university status and their staff granted equal opportunity to apply for competitive government-supported research funding. The UK followed suit within the decade, and while the stratified system still more or less applies in the USA, continental Europe, and elsewhere, the pressure on journalism academics to build a scholarly research profile is inexorable and intensifying. This raises a fundamental dilemma for journalists working in the academy – how to continue practising what they are expected to teach if that practice is not recognised as scholarly, and indeed, as Carey reported, is often treated with "disdain," which he sees as an improvement on the "withering, palpable contempt" of previous times.[23] Twenty years further on, in 2008, the Australian Research Council (ARC), the national governing body for academic research, recognised journalism as a distinct field of research with its own specific Field of Research Code (FoR1903) under the Australian and New Zealand Standard Research Classification, enabling peer evaluation of quality for assessment and funding purposes. The four-digit "1903" code is a subcategory of the two-digit "19" code for Creative Arts and Writing, which includes, as well as journalism, the visual and performing arts, film, television and digital media, art theory,

and creative and professional writing. In passing we can note that for the ARC at least, Messer is wrong and there are commonalities between journalism and art.

The ARC defines research as "the creation of new knowledge and/or the use of existing knowledge in a new and creative way so as to generate new concepts, methodologies and understandings. This could include synthesis and analysis of previous research to the extent that it leads to new and creative outcomes."[24] The UK and New Zealand definitions are comparable.[25] Interestingly, the definitions of investigative journalism used by the European Journalism Fund include that of the Dutch-Flemish Association for Investigative Journalism, which is journalism that is "critical and thorough [which] can be done by creating new facts but also through re-interpretation or correlation of facts already at hand."[26] That is a definition that resonates remarkably with the academic definitions of research. There has been considerable discussion among Australian communication and journalism educators about the appropriate disciplinary home for journalism.[27] What is fundamental is that journalism cannot develop and prosper within a framework where it has its own specifically coded field of research unless it engages with the issue of its own disciplinary status and recognises itself as the agent as well as the object of its own scrutiny. Such a relationship is always dynamic and dialectical; comparable instances would be historiography to history, jurisprudence to the law and justice, and medical science to health and medical practice. There is also the developing issue of doctoral degrees in journalism and what demands that will make on the discipline, if that's what journalism can claim to be.[28]

In short, the proposition that journalism can be intellectually conceptualised or distilled as art precipitates a cascading set of questions about categories and practices, and provides a provocative entrée into what is rapidly emerging as the fundamental issue for journalists as academics or students: how is journalism to be conceptualised on its own terms as an intellectual practice, particularly within the academy but with ramifications for the profession, the industry, and the broad sociopolitical context – and of course art? That is what this book is setting out to explore.

At the outset, some undergrowth needs to be cleared and foundations laid. Firstly, it is not adequate to argue by definition, either to deploy rhetoric that constructs journalism and scholarship in mutually exclusive opposition, or to argue that because journalism is taught in universities, then it is automatically a discipline. Disciplines as such are a human intellectual, social and cultural construct, *and develop out of a distinctive*

engagement with a set of ontological and epistemological problems in a field of knowledge. Disciplinarity itself can be located as a historically and geographically specific phenomenon in the field of knowledge production. It has recently been much discussed with respect to interdisciplinarity in principle and at the interface of specific disciplines.[29] At the very least the measure of disciplinarity resides in the capacity to make a distinctive contribution to that discussion without fetishising definitions of disciplinarity itself.

Secondly, being a craft, profession, and industrial and research practice are not mutually exclusive categories, witness medicine, the law, archaeology, architecture, engineering, laboratory research in the natural sciences, etc. Indeed, all of these dimensions may be jointly present in practice at any point in time, and as many scholars including Pierre Bourdieu[30] and C. Wright Mills[31] have pointed out, scientific research includes a strong element of intellectual craftsmanship. The issue is to identify those aspects of the knowledge production process that can be interrogated methodologically for the purposes of scholarship. To suggest that a practice is a craft is to suggest that it might have methods but does not have methodology, i.e., is not capable of rigorous self-examination and a theoretical grounding of its methods, or of the distinction between intellectual and non-intellectual (e.g., emotional, political, or creative) elements in its practice. The latter, I believe, lies behind the commitment to the craft position in the debate by some of the most distinguished journalism studies scholars in the North American tradition. Carey, Adam, Zelizer, Protess, Ettema and Glasser, among others, exemplify the commitment to Jeffersonian democratic principles of maximal freedom of speech and the press, widespread public participation in political debate, and opposition to privilege, elitism, and corruption among the powerful. In this laudable view, journalism, as Carey puts it, "is a particular kind of democratic practice"[32] and therefore intrinsically political; as such, it is best pursued with passion, even outrage, and creative flair.[33] It is a tradition buttressed by foundations and institutions established and funded for that very purpose; it is exemplified by excellence in reporting by individuals, teams, and organisations within that tradition historically and presently. This tradition is to be celebrated, not repudiated, but it certainly shouldn't be advanced as a reason why journalism cannot also be an academic research discipline – quite the contrary.

Passion, creativity, and openness to widespread participation are not inimical to intellectual rigour. Indeed, Edward Said argued they were inte-

gral aspects of being a public intellectual,[34] and journalism is by definition public. One hopes that medical researchers are passionate, creative and inclusive in their commitment to health as well as rigorous in their research; likewise for legal researchers in their commitment to justice, and so on. But one must be able to distinguish between the emotional, political and creative dimensions of a research project and the intellectual rigour with which it is devised and executed. The tendency common to many journalists, when challenged on the validity of their work, to shift the ground of argument to ethics, creativity, or political agendas (including the claimed lack of same) is not helpful: it avoids the issue of intellectual rigour, which needs to be dealt with openly and confidently. Similarly, one can celebrate craft skills without proposing them to be mutually exclusive of disciplinary processes; acknowledge the social and cultural value of a full range of knowledge, from scholarly to vernacular; and certainly recognise that a university location is not a prerequisite for disciplinary rigour to be exercised. However, it is also true to say that the research and knowledge production that take place within the academic context necessarily require engagement within disciplinary frameworks and their associated methodological scrutiny.

Thirdly, most practice in the professions involves the routine application of existing knowledge and methods to new situations. As such it is not intended to and will not create new knowledge for scholarly purposes. Nor will it in journalism, but that is not the point. In all fields of knowledge production, only a certain proportion of practice, often relatively small, will qualify as research for scholarly purposes. Trouillot makes this point strongly with respect to the production of historical research,[35] and it certainly applies to areas of industrialised professional practice such as medical, legal, engineering and journalistic practice. Everett Hughes argued that professionals develop methodological protocols or "strategic rituals" that they use in everyday practice as an efficient means of maintaining standards of quality without bringing those standards or methods themselves into question on every occasion they are exercised.[36] Professional practice, while it might generate outcomes that could safely be incorporated into subsequent scholarly research – e.g. medical diagnoses that might subsequently be incorporated into an epidemiological study – does not constitute scholarly research itself. On the same basis, journalism – that is, what might be called everyday journal-of-record professional practice that originates credible truth claims about some contemporary detail of the state of the world (this category would include most

reputable short-form news reporting) – cannot be considered research on its own,[37] although it may well produce reliable information, or conversely a silence, that becomes an object within a larger research exercise in journalism or another discipline such as sociology or history.[38] Further, journalism that is a mere communication or popularisation of original research that is produced elsewhere, however accurate, valuable, and stimulating, cannot itself be considered original research unless there is an original element to its own contribution.

Professional practice, even when it generates new information (a legal precedent in a court case, a newly observed condition in a medical examination, factual revelations in a news interview) does not itself qualify as scholarly research practice unless it employs a rigorous methodology. This caveat particularly applies to journalism, whose routine role is to discover/produce and report information and truth claims about the contemporary world. The "professional practice versus research" distinction applies to many areas of knowledge production and it is a complex issue, but for the purposes of this argument we can be cautious and acknowledge that only a small proportion of professional practice in any of these disciplines would merit consideration as original primary research for academic purposes. The point is to establish the methodological basis and criteria for rigorous enquiry in disciplines including journalism such that it can constitute scholarly research practice to be assessed and validated as such by peers.

Fourthly, and most importantly, there is the question of methodology. What defines a discipline as distinctive is its *sui generis* deployment of methodology – i.e., the theorisation of method with respect to its subject matter. Journalistic research methods are typically variations on the standard qualitative research methods of the humanities and social sciences, viz. document or artefact discovery and analysis, witness testimony, direct observation, interviewing, audio-visual recording, and the like. Increasingly, the use of digital data generation and analysis by journalists opens up quantitative methods and methodologies for adaptation and deployment. The underpinning methods, techniques, and technologies of quantitative and qualitative empirical research are shared across the humanities and social sciences, but it is through methodologies specific to each discipline that their interpretation, application, and critical evaluation relative to the concerns and relevant parameters of those disciplines are carried out.

When a disciplinary practice is the object of scholarship in other disciplines – e.g., a geography of medical practice, a history of legal prac-

tice, a communications study of journalism – that object is identified as a geographic/ historical/communications object and a geographic/ historical/communications methodology is deployed for its examination. So, for example, a particular instance of practice in obstetric surgery cannot be assessed for its medical purpose and quality by a geographer examining spatiotemporal patterns in the incidence of caesarean sections, even though it may exemplify such patterns. Or a communications or cultural study of patterns of crime reporting by journalists cannot be used to assess the research quality of a specific journalistic investigation into a specific crime, even though it may exemplify such communication or cultural patterns.

This last is not to say that individual disciplines don't benefit enormously from critical examination of their practices by other disciplines. Journalism is prominent as a research object for other disciplines, and this is welcome. *Such research is a rich resource for a reflexive examination by any discipline of itself as a social, textual, political, or other practice.* Nor is it to say that journalism, like all the humanities, and especially history and geography, is not fundamentally interdisciplinary. However, it is to make the point that being the *subject* or *agent* of one's own disciplinary self-examination enables the assessment of methodologies that can be executed within that discipline, whereas being the *object* of another discipline's examination can reveal presences, absences, and patterns in one's own disciplinary practice but not generate methodological responses for execution within one's discipline. Hence the possession and deployment of a distinctive set of methodological concerns is the *sine qua non* of disciplinary status.

In *Taking journalism seriously: news and the academy* and a series of subsequent publications,[39] Barbie Zelizer has identified a fundamental "uncertainty" about journalism's position in the academy.[40] She identifies five major disciplinary locations for scholarship about journalism – sociology, history, language studies, political science, and cultural studies – and discusses major currents of research within each of those disciplines. Those currents have strengthened and diversified in subsequent years, as evidenced by the expanding content of journals and recent anthologies.[41] "However," Zelizer suggests, "in being everywhere, journalism and its study are in fact nowhere."[42] She identifies a void or absence in the place that journalism could or should occupy among the disciplines. Zelizer attributes this situation to a communications impasse. She identifies three groups of stakeholders or "interpretive communities" on the issue: jour-

nalists, journalism educators, and journalism scholars. She argues that "one of the biggest problems facing journalism research rests within the inability of journalists, journalism educators and journalism scholars to hear each other on each others' terms,"[43] and it is this communicative or discursive failure that leaves journalism "nowhere" in the academy. Her own focus is on the disciplinary frameworks of journalism studies scholarship, and her analysis has been well-received.[44] Some otherwise favourable reviewers of the 2004 book have suggested that she could fruitfully have included the perspectives of journalists on journalism scholarship,[45] but in doing so they also affirm the disjunction between "practitioners" and "scholars," with "educators" trying to straddle the two camps.

Herself a journalist before entering the academy, Zelizer urges the three sets of stakeholders to work towards mutual engagement. "Journalism is too important to not address the issues raised in these pages, but if it does not wrestle with them quickly, it remains questionable what kind of future it will face."[46] She doesn't think this task is insurmountable. "Numerous correctives can help resolve journalism's existential uncertainty. Positioning journalism as the core of a mix of academic perspectives from which it can most fruitfully prosper is essential".[47] In her view, journalism can prosper as the *object* of other academic perspectives if a communications impasse can be overcome, but it is still not the *subject* or *agent* of an academic perspective itself.

An alternative view is that the void that journalism should occupy in the academy is produced not by a communications impasse among the stakeholders, but by an alleged epistemological disjunction between the practice of journalism and the practice of scholarly research. In other words, it is not a communications challenge but a methodological one, and as British journalism historian Martin Conboy has put it:

> With regard to the product of journalism itself, it really is time for journalists – former, current, and those in transition within the academy – to take this bull by the horns and do what other subject areas have done and write an acceptable definition of journalism as research.[48]

From Conboy's perspective, if Zelizer's "nowhere" is to become "somewhere," if the absence is to become a presence, then journalists have to engage with the demands of disciplinary status. But for Zelizer, and it must be said she is far from alone in this view, journalism and academic scholarship appear to be not only distinct but also mutually exclusive cat-

egories, although for her journalism is certainly not "odious," as it was for Messer at the Guggenheim. She recognises "that there are a number of competing visions at the core of journalism's self-definition. Is it a craft, a profession, a set of practices, a collective of individuals, an industry, an institution, a business or a mindset?"[49] She does not ask: is journalism a research discipline? Even when a given individual might perform as a scholar or a journalist at different times, it is implicit that the two functions cannot be performed together.

In Britain, de Burgh[50] makes a similar distinction, although at the same time arguing for journalism to be recognised as an academic discipline and taught as such at the university level. He distinguishes between academic and professional knowledges that are relevant to a well-rounded undergraduate curriculum in journalism: in the former, he nominates sociology, politics, media studies and perhaps philosophy,[51] and distinguishes those "academic" disciplines from "professional" and "vocational" knowledge, which include skills in "research and investigation; information assimilation and assessment; communication skills; and expression" and "the facts of public affairs: how the political and legal systems work; the organisation of the media and the profession of journalism today; what constitutes news values in different media and other cultures (internal and external); media law, regulation and ethics."[52] The vocational curriculum comprises a set of technological, social, and communication skills.[53] The non-academic skills are to be taught in a critical and open-minded mode so that presumably they can interface with the theoretical and methodological issues explored in the academic curriculum, although how this might occur is not articulated. There is a very clear and definite demarcation between academic and non-academic knowledge, and the academic variety is very clearly located outside journalism.

Niblock makes a related distinction between "theory-first research" and "practice-first research" where the key methodological step in the latter is reflexion by the practitioner.[54] She cites a range of practice-led research activities including teaching and the creative arts where the scholarly element is introduced through *post hoc* or simultaneous reflexive consideration that provides a capability in all disciplines for the "self-inquiry and adaptation [that] is a key characteristic of real-world social systems".[55] As she and others have pointed out, reflexivity is a characteristic of the traditional scholarly disciplines, but the established disciplines have a recognised epistemological base with which to reference their reflexivity, which is precisely what journalism is accused of lacking.

In Australasia, Bacon has long argued for the distinctive research contribution that investigative journalism makes in the university context[56] and has championed the exegetical model.[57] In this approach, journalists can publish their work in scholarly journals accompanied by an exegesis that draws upon cognate disciplines such as sociology or criminology to interrogate the methodological adequacy of their journalism.[58] The virtue of this approach is that, firstly, it recognises the interdisciplinarity of journalism research, and secondly, it identifies an epistemological framework against which the truth-claims of the journalism can be tested. The exegetical approach is a fertile one, not only because it is a frequent model for the emerging doctoral programs in journalism, but also because the separate exegesis requires that the scholarly qualities of the journalism be specifically identified and tested for their adequacy.[59]

For James Carey the demarcation between journalism and academic scholarship was not always so stark. For him, the "sociology of place" of the early Chicago School resonated with journalism:

> [M]aster's theses that came out of sociology, except for length and formality, look much like master's projects in journalism: shelf after shelf describing the occupations, neighborhoods, social types, and social problems of the city …. Chicago sociology was a sociology of communication, transportation, settlement and migration, and the social relations and political institutions built along these fronts of the city …. This was a sociology very close to journalism.[60]

Carey considered the uneasy relations between journalists and academics in his forthright remarks on *Where journalism education went wrong*, delivered at a conference in 1996[61] and then published in slightly softened terms in 2000.[62] Citing the antecedents of early Chicago School sociology, he observed that

> the natural academic home of journalism is among the humanities and the humanistic social sciences …. [but] unfortunately – paradoxically – the humanities have had little interest in journalism; indeed they have had little but disdain for it. …. The natural estrangement of journalism from the academy was compounded by the natural snobbism of the humanities.[63]

Carey identified political theory, literature, philosophy, art and history as disciplines with which journalism "naturally belongs,"[64] but at the same time he conceptualised journalism as a "vernacular craft"[65] and "a par-

ticular kind of democratic practice."[66] He is quite clear about the source of the burgeoning estrangement – abstraction and theory removed from empirical spatiality and social engagement:

> Journalism found in a humanistic social science a natural extension of itself into the university before American sociology, like the social sciences in general, became abstract and theoretical and severed its connection to space and place and the lives of real people.[67]

Carey's concerns with the spatial and the lived human experience are welcome because they link journalism to areas of existing scholarly enquiry that I will explore in this book. His objection to the "abstract and theoretical" should not be viewed as a blanket rejection in principle, but as a repudiation of a certain type of empirically disconnected abstraction and theorisation that he saw as increasingly pervasive in North American scholarship, and which he argued was a weakness.[68] But nonetheless, if journalism is a craft that lost its connection to the academic disciplines when the latter became "abstract and theoretical," that poses the question of whether abstraction and theory as such are inimical to journalism as a vernacular and democratic practice. A scholar who shared Carey's Chicago School influences, Karl Weick, has argued that abstract thinking is the *sine qua non* of disciplinary development.[69] He was considering what he characterised as a developmental crisis in his own discipline of organisational studies, arguably a similar requirement for rupture to what journalism is facing. Weick argued the case by analogy to two wildfire tragedies where firefighters failed to understand a shift in the blazes confronting them or to react appropriately, and some perished. Interestingly, his case studies are strongly empirical and spatiotemporal, and he does not draw the science vs. humanities battlelines of Carey.[70] He affirms the guiding values laid down for his discipline by Thompson in 1956: "Administrative science will demand a focus on relationships, the use of abstract concepts, and the development of operational definitions. Applied sciences have the further need for criteria of measurement and evaluation."[71] Weick uses the detailed analogy of the wildfire tragedies to expound these four principles: a focus on social relations as the primary concern of social sciences; the use of abstract concepts to move beyond description and enable generalisation; the deployment of abstract concepts in "operational definitions" or theory available for empirical testing "to avoid concepts that are sterile, forever debatable and unable to be tested widely"; and the use of robust

criteria to assess the value of the abstract concepts and theory.[72] Taken together, these four principles can underpin a lively intellectual practice that is socially and empirically relevant and accommodates a journalism that Carey could have endorsed. Carey argued elsewhere that the failure to explain the "how and why" of events and processes is "the dark continent and the invisible landscape" of American journalism,[73] and clearly questions of how and why go to relationships, abstract concepts, and operational definitions or theory.

Schudson and Anderson make an important point in their discussion of objectivity, professionalism, and truth seeking in journalism:

> US journalism's claim to objectivity – i.e., the particular method by which this information is collected, processed and presented – gives it its unique jurisdictional focus by claiming to possess a certain form of expertise or intellectual discipline. Establishing jurisdiction over the ability to objectively parse reality is a claim to a special kind of authority.[74]

This is a crucial insight. It recognises that the outcomes of "objective" journalism are truth claims about reality, produced with "intellectual discipline" that asserts a "unique jurisdictional focus." These are characteristics that underpin a distinctive disciplinarity. This argument places firmly on the agenda the question of whether, in claiming objectivity, journalism can also lay claim to a distinctive set of theoretical concerns underpinning its use of particular methods that might be of an appropriate calibre for disciplinary status and, on the basis of those concerns, what contribution journalism can make to the humanities and social sciences.

The first question has been addressed before with respect to the social sciences, but not for some time. Zelizer,[75] Klinenberg,[76] and Schudson and Anderson[77] have all noted the withdrawal of sociologists and sociology from engagement with the journalism production process, which is where methodological issues must be addressed. We have to go back to the 1970s when this question was specifically addressed, among others, by Barbara Phillips. She drew upon Robert E. Park's characterisation that journalism is "acquaintance with" rather than "knowledge about," the former tending to "become more and more identical with instinct and intuition" and the latter enabling "philosophic insight."[78] On this basis she argued that journalists are "nontheoretic knowers" deploying a "primitive empiricis[m]" that is "based on direct sense experience, not abstract systematic reflection." She contrasts journalists' instinctual "nose

for news" with the "epistemological stance … taken by the social scientist" to conclude that "[t]he upshot of the journalists' nontheoretic way to knowledge is that they cannot transmit 'philosophic insight' to the public because they themselves do not approach the world from a reflective, theoretical mental attitude."[79]

This is a classic formulation of the anti-theoretical, craft-based view of journalism. In some related versions, "news sense" and intuition are augmented by a moral outrage[80] whereby journalists are "custodians of conscience,"[81] and/or a political commitment to Jeffersonian democracy wherein the anti-elitist craft character of journalism is a fundamental and necessary component of the democratic political process.[82] These political/ethical inflections on the core task of journalism (reporting significant aspects of contemporary reality to publics) are perhaps desirable, though not in some opinion,[83] but they do not resolve or displace the core question: to what extent can journalism produce truth claims of a rigour to meet scholarly standards?

Phillips, and Park before her, assumes a stark polarity between intuition and philosophic insight. At the very least this begs the question of how to understand intuition, which I will consider in Chap. 6, and it ignores the methodological debate in sociology about the differences between subject-object and subject-subject research that Tuchman canvasses, suggesting that the polarity is by no means simple or stark.[84] In 1978 Gaye Tuchman, in what Zelizer describes as one of the foundational and "memorable" studies of journalism production,[85] published "a study of methods of inquiry – how newsworkers determine facts and frame events and debates pertinent to our shared civic life."[86] She concluded from that study that "news itself may be described as a theoretic activity, drawing on the pre-theoretic formulations of new sources."[87] This position seemed counter to what she had advanced in an earlier article "Objectivity as Strategic Ritual"[88] where she argued that "[p]rocessing news leaves no time for reflexive epistemological examination."[89] "Objectivity" becomes a set of procedures or "ritual" that "protects the newspaperman (sic) from the risks of his trade, including critics."[90] The term "ritual" she takes from Hughes, a leading Chicago School scholar, who applied it to all professionals including health and education professionals, and Tuchman refers approvingly to the argument by Gouldner and Mills that "paints a picture of sociological objectivity as *strategic ritual*."[91] I will discuss this concept of ritual linked with news sense in Chap. 6.

In 1978 Tuchman, after reviewing the general arguments about social knowledge in the ethnomethodology literature, concluded *contra* Park and Phillips that

> news itself may be described as a theoretic activity, drawing on the pretheoretic formulations of news sources …. Furthermore, news stories engage in theorizing by juxtaposing facts gleaned from sources. Juxtaposition is a form of categorizing, since it encourages the understanding that these facts have something to do with one another. It both claims and creates a theoretic relationship between and among the phenomena presented as facts.[92]

Following the ethnomethodologists and particularly Berger and Luckmann,[93] Tuchman argues that journalists produce a "web of facticity," by which she means a mutually referential and interlocking set of socially verified facts. Moreover, she doesn't confine the theoretic activity to the construction through juxtaposition of the journalistic report, but recognises it also in the research or investigation stage: the "web of facticity" is produced following analysis and decisions by journalists about how they will efficiently organise their activities to "cast a net" in space and time to investigate phenomena they have identified as potential news stories.[94] For Tuchman as for Carey, space and time are of defining importance for journalism, and I will examine their relevance in Chaps. 4 and 5. Just as juxtaposition is theoretic in the text composition phase, so analysis, differentiation and reasoned decisions in the information-gathering phase are theoretic activities. Referencing Goffman,[95] she argues that "[t]he net-like formation of the dispersion of reporters [in space and time to gather information] is of theoretic importance, for it is a key to the construction of news. The spatial anchoring of the news net … is one element of the frame delineating strips of everyday reality as news."[96] Hence "facts" for journalists are "pertinent information gathered by professionally validated methods specifying the relationship between what is known and how it is known."[97] This is a concise statement of the methodological requirement for journalism to be a research practice in the creation of new knowledge, and so the issue becomes in any given instance whether firstly the "professionally validated methods" have been followed and secondly are sufficiently rigorous, i.e. are methodologically justifiable in a scholarly account.

The discussion so far has brought the argument about the methodological challenges of journalism – the empirical, the temporal and the political

dimensions of its practice – to the following points. Firstly, journalism's empirical methods are typically the qualitative research methods of the humanities and social sciences: direct observation, document discovery and analysis, witness testimony and interrogation, audio-visual recording, etc. These are increasingly being augmented by quantitative and data-mining methods using digital tools. The question is whether these methods are deployed by journalists in the service of a necessarily "crude empiricism" as termed by Phillips, or are amenable to theoretically reflexive interrogation as both a quality assurance measure and also as a path to disciplinary development. One way to answer this question would be to examine whether journalistic practice can be reconciled with theorisation of the empirical elsewhere in the humanities and social sciences: for example, in history, geography and sociology.

Secondly, spatiotemporality is widely recognised as a fundamental issue for journalism practice. Adam identifies the "here and now" as definitive parameters for journalism, though precisely how they might be conceived in specific empirical instances is an open question. Tuchman argues that the web of facticity cast in space and time is an important methodological tool for journalism and that this is amenable to theoretic investigation. Carey argues that the spatial orientation of early Chicago School sociology resonates strongly with journalism's approach to investigation:

> [S]cience as imagined and practiced in Chicago, a science of space and place, a science of the local and particular, a science of the complex relations among humans struggling to create a common life in conflict and division, a science deeply democratic, pluralistic, humanistic, and imaginative in its impulse … journalism education might have become an unambiguous success as an enterprise.[98]

In light of this spatial focus, if it were possible to theorise the spatiotemporal dimensions of journalism practice in order to test their validity in the production of truth claims, that would mitigate Phillip's accusation of a crude empiricism and make a major contribution to the recognition of scholarly validity in journalism methodologies. Scholarly validity does not flow from having neat answers to questions, but from being able to engage with issues at adequate levels of theoretical depth and detail.

Thirdly, news sense or journalistic intuition is recognised as a major component of journalism practice. If it were possible to theorise intuition as an element of human practice and apply that theorisation to journal-

ism, that would elevate news sense to a phenomenon that could be methodologically interrogated and evaluated, rather than being preemptively dismissed as lacking scholarly validity. A related point is this: it is not possible to understand news sense outside the social context within which it is produced and consumed, because it is a phenomenon deeply embedded in the social relations and values of the immediate environment. Taken together, this means that the theorisation of news sense would need to link the subjective (news sense) with the objective (social context of production) dimensions, which occur in space and time.

Fourthly, the characterisation of journalism as democratic practice is widespread in the literature and necessarily implies issues of power, accountability and contestation in the production of truth claims and knowledge, or alternatively, of silence and absence from the news agenda. The deployment of power by journalists, sources, and interested parties in the news production process is widely recognised and analysed in both the academic and professional literature. Again, if that can be recognised and theorised at an adequate level, then the methodological challenges of journalism can be explored at the level of scholarship.

Finally, there are the aesthetic, imaginative, moral and emotional components of journalism, and whether or not they are problematic for aspirations to disinterested research quality for empirical truth claims. Haacke's fusion of information and art was characteristic of a broad current of conceptual art in New York in the 1960s.[99] As scholars and critics have commented, Haacke has taken revolutionary steps in the transcendence of the art/reality opposition, and that is highly relevant to journalism, as Messer inadvertently recognised.[100] Much earlier in the 1920s, the Soviet constructivists had engaged with these issues,[101] and there is a long history of discussion of this issue in documentary cinema, creative nonfiction, and literary journalism. The radical move that Haacke made was to step around the art/reality distinction by leaving the reality engaged by the art still functioning independently regardless of its relationship with the artwork. In this respect, he was proposing art as similar to scientific observation and experimentation, which typically leave the reality they are engaged with functioning in the world. Similarly, the facts that are recorded by journalism remain facts in the world, even when they might be produced intentionally for the journalism, as in an answer to a question. As Fry recognised, Haacke's approach eliminates "arbitrary boundaries within our culture between art, science and society."[102] Science and journalism engage directly with the material world as they seek to know it,

and the material world continues to have its continuing existence without being subsumed into the science or journalism. Haacke achieved the same epistemological status for his art, which is what makes it such a good starting point for the interrogation of journalism (and science, both natural and social, for that matter).

It is the argument of this book that journalism can be interrogated at an adequate theoretical level to be seated at the table of the humanities and social sciences as one among equals, with a singular and distinctive contribution to the production of human knowledge. The singularity of its contribution flows from the singularity of its set of methodological challenges. Theoretical engagement with the problems raised in journalism practice is precisely the role of theory in all disciplinary research practice – to identify and approach problems in ways that are amenable to productive interrogation and resolution.

Hans Haacke's work engages with the core issues for journalism, in a sign that the relationship between his art and journalism goes much deeper than a passing jibe might imply. For that reason it provides an excellent point of access to an interrogation of journalism. I.F. Stone's work similarly engages with these core issues, with the exception of the connection with art – his longer works sat within the stylistic mainstream of North American long-form journalism. Both Stone and Haacke were intensely conscious of the methodological issues their work raised; they identified and discussed the issues explicitly themselves, were engaged by leading scholars in dialogue about the implications of their work, and some of their works were reviewed in the academic literature by other scholars. I give a contextual overview followed by accounts of selected works by Haacke and Stone (Chaps. 2 and 3, respectively), and then discuss their work in detail with reference to metatheoretical frameworks drawn from geography, history, sociology, philosophy, and aesthetics. The point of this exercise is not to privilege these particular theoretical approaches over others, although I do demonstrate and argue for their utility. It is to show that journalism research practice can be productively theorised at this level using these or other frameworks. Hopefully the result will be an empowerment of journalists to develop greater scholarly depth and range in their practice, to the benefit of democratic social practices.

Chapter 4 considers the issue of spatiotemporality, and explores the ideas of geographer David Harvey and philosopher Henri Lefebvre as they might be applied to space in the case studies. Harvey argues that spatiality can be conceptualised in three dialectically related ways: absolute,

relative, and relational space. Similarly Lefebvre has a tripartite dialectical conceptualisation of spatial practice – perceived, conceived, and lived spatial practice – and Harvey has put these two frameworks – of space produced by social practice and of social practice engaging with (socially produced) space – into a matrix.[103] The chapter applies that matrix to examples of spatiality in Haacke's and Stone's work to see what insights it might have to offer, and concludes that this metatheoretical conceptualisation of spatiotemporality is a very fertile framework for analysing the practice of journalism.

Chapter 5 considers the issue of temporality in journalism, not to query the interconnectedness of spatiotemporality but to explore the relationship between journalism and history that has been singled out by Adam and Carey. The particular focus is the theoretical work of Michel-Rolph Trouillot on the production of silences in history, and the two-way interconnectedness of the present and the past.[104] Both Haacke and Stone identified and disrupted silences as a key methodology for revealing and analysing power relations, and both used historical research to confront contemporary silences. The chapter explores how the Harvey-Lefebvre matrix might be applied to the temporal aspects of Stone's and Haacke's work.

Chapter 6 is concerned with the theorisation of news sense, using the field theory of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu uses the term field as a spatial metaphor to describe how human agents occupy objective positions with respect to each other, and from which they compete with each other for the rewards that the field has to offer. That competition is waged using the various forms of capital at the disposal of the protagonists – social, cultural, economic, political, etc. – and that capital is manifested and deployed through the protagonists' habitus or mode of engagement with activity in the field. The chapter argues that field, capital and habitus are very useful concepts for understanding journalism practice: field for identifying the way the parameters of a story or issue are negotiated and determined by journalists and their sources, capital for the attribution of authority to sources and protagonists, and habitus as a way of theorising "news sense". Bourdieu complements Harvey and Lefebvre in that he offers a way of conceptualising the ways in which conflict and competition are carried out in space and time, while the Harvey and Lefebvre frameworks can lift Bourdieu's field from metaphor to an empirically verifiable framework. The last is essential because of the core value placed on empirical verifiability in journalism.

Chapter 7 returns to the starting point of the relationship between journalism and art. It analyses in detail the argument over whether journalism can be art. It considers the recovery and analysis in recent decades of the work by the early Soviet constructivists and productivists such as Tretiakov and Rodchenko.[105] It argues that far from being an idiosyncratic (albeit virtuoso) path that Haacke has blazed, his work can be located at the leading edge of a tradition in art that proposes journalism as a vital element in the engagement of art with dynamic social reality.

Chapter 8 concludes the book by addressing the issue of authenticity, silences and accountability in the democratic practice of journalism. Using Haacke's and Stone's experiences of conflict with powerful institutions, it argues that the ubiquitous confrontation in journalism with the politics of knowledge can be a welcome exercise in intellectual transparency. Bourdieu, Harvey, Lefebvre and Trouillot all engage theoretically with the issues of power in social relations and the production or suppression of historical and contemporary knowledge. Both Haacke and Stone confronted that power in their practice and in their conceptualisation of their role as artist and journalist, respectively. Especially important in their work was the relationship between the contemporary production of meaning through engagement with the historical context of a situation, and that relationship is at the core of Trouillot's definition of authenticity in grappling with reality. The chapter concludes by reprising the argument that journalism cannot make its fullest contribution to such democratic practice unless it transparently and enthusiastically engages with its own methodological challenges as a discipline in the humanities and social sciences.

It is worth repeating that the aim of this book is not to present a tightly-knit grand theory of journalism. The argument threads a path through theoretical debates in the cognate disciplines of geography, history, philosophy, sociology and aesthetics that are profoundly relevant to journalism as a truth-seeking practice, and therefore constitute it as one of the humanities, social sciences and contemporary arts. The various theorists under discussion are broadly compatible in their materialist and relational approaches to knowledge and reality, but they have distinct disciplinary contexts and their own conceptual priorities. Readers will have their own views on the contributions made by this selection of thinkers, and will have other thinkers and frameworks to propose. All such debate and discussion is most welcome. The work of Hans Haacke is an exciting place to start along that path.

Notes

1. Grasskamp (2006: 26).
2. Fry (2011: 29).
3. Grasskamp (2006: 29), Smith (1992).
4. Each of the works was produced in an edition of two.
5. Steinberg (1986: 8).
6. Bachelard (1986).
7. Kuhn (1962).
8. Bourdieu (1992: 251).
9. Ferro (1985).
10. Trouillot (1995).
11. Gorski (2013), Swartz (2013).
12. Stone (1973: 308).
13. Adam (1993: 13).
14. Carey (2000: 22).
15. Nash (2014: 85).
16. Zelizer (2009: 30).
17. Park (2006: 232).
18. e.g. Downie and Schudson (2009), Anderson et al. (2012).
19. Hobsbawm (1995: 296–301), Gitlin (1980, 1987).
20. Tuchman (2009), Aronowitz (2000).
21. Freidson (1994), Tiffen (2012).
22. Carey (1996), Nash (2013).
23. Carey (2000: 22, 13).
24. Australian Research Council (2008: 1).
25. Bacon (2011: 50).
26. Quoted in Bacon (2011: 48).
27. See Nash (2013) for a critical account of the debate.
28. Nash (2014).
29. Klein (1990), Sylvan et al. (1993), Finkenthal (2001, 2008), Frodeman et al. (2012), Repko (2012).
30. Bourdieu and Chartier (2015).
31. Mills (2000).
32. Carey (2000: 22).
33. Protess et al. (1991), Ettema and Glasser (1998).
34. Said (1994).
35. Trouillot (1995: 18ff).
36. Hughes (1964).

37. Park (2006: 229).
38. Park (2006: 232); Trouillot (1995: 26).
39. Zelizer (2004, 2008, 2009, 2010).
40. Zelizer (2009: 30).
41. Adam and Clark (2006), Löffelholz and Weaver (2008), Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch (2009), Allan (2010).
42. Zelizer (2009: 29).
43. Zelizer (2008: 253).
44. McKay (2006), Tracey (2006), Macgilchrist (2007), Berger (2009).
45. McKay (2006), Berger (2009).
46. Zelizer (2009: 39).
47. Zelizer (2009: 38).
48. *Conboy* (2011: 46).
49. Zelizer (2009: 32).
50. de Burgh (2003).
51. de Burgh (2003: 96ff).
52. de Burgh (2003: 98–9).
53. de Burgh (2003: 101).
54. Niblock (2007, 2012).
55. Niblock (2012: 509).
56. Bacon (1997, 1998a, b, 1999, 2006a, b, 2011, 2012).
57. Bacon (2012).
58. *Pacific Journalism Review* under editor David Robie has pioneered the exegetical model in journalism with some success, but without emulators at the time of writing.
59. Nash (2014).
60. Carey (2000: 18).
61. Carey (1996).
62. Carey (2000: 12–23).
63. Carey (2000: 22).
64. Carey (2000: 22).
65. Carey (2000: 20).
66. Carey (2000: 22).
67. Carey (2000: 18).
68. Carey (1997: 149).
69. Weick (1996).
70. Weick (1996: 303).
71. Thompson (1956: 102) quoted in Weick (1996: 302).

72. Weick (1996: 303–4).
73. Carey (1997).
74. Schudson and Anderson (2009: 96).
75. Zelizer (2004: 80).
76. Klinenberg (2005: 48).
77. Schudson and Anderson (2009: 91).
78. Park (2006).
79. Phillips (1976: 71).
80. Protess et al. (1991).
81. Ettema and Glasser (1998).
82. Carey (1996), Adam (1993), Adam and Clark (2006).
83. Merrill et al. (2001).
84. Tuchman (1978: 198ff); see Flyvbjerg (2001) and Weinberg (2002) for more recent discussion.
85. Zelizer (2009: 35).
86. Tuchman (1978: ix).
87. Tuchman (1978: 204).
88. Tuchman (1972).
89. Tuchman (1972: 662).
90. Tuchman (1972: 661).
91. Tuchman (1972: 676–8) italics in original.
92. Tuchman (1978: 204).
93. Berger and Luckmann (1966).
94. Tuchman (1978: 15ff).
95. Goffman (1974).
96. Tuchman (1978: 23).
97. Tuchman (1978: 82).
98. Carey (2000: 23).
99. Alberro (2003), Bryan-Wilson (2009).
100. Fry (2011 [1971]), Grasskamp (2006), and Buchloh (1984, 1988, 2006).
101. Fore (2006), Buchloh (1984).
102. Fry (2011 [1971]: 44).
103. Harvey (2006).
104. Trouillot (1995).
105. Buchloh (1984), Fore (2006).

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CHAPTER 2

Hans Haacke

The first decade of Hans Haacke's life was spent under the Nazi regime near Köln, Germany. Haacke's father was blind in one eye and not drafted into the armed forces. His career as a government employee suffered because he declined to join the Nazi Party, but apart from taking that stand the family was not political.[1] Köln was bombed to rubble by the Allies in World War II, at enormous cost in civilian deaths, injuries, and dislocation. American war correspondent Martha Gellhorn, arriving in the city in March 1945, described it as "one of the great morgues of the world."[2] The same month George Orwell observed "a chaos of jagged walls, overturned trams, shattered statues and enormous towers of rubble out of which iron girders thrust themselves like sticks of rhubarb."[3] After taking a Master's degree in fine arts that concentrated on painting and graphics in Kassel (also destroyed by fire-bombing), in 1960 Haacke moved to Paris on a scholarship. For the next few years he was an informal associate of and sometimes exhibited with the Group Zero[4] based in Düsseldorf, also heavily bombed in the war. Its members spoke of "dispens[ing] with the subjectivism and decisionism of gestural abstraction."[5] In the words of one of the group's founders, Otto Piene, they were looking for "a zone of silence and of pure possibilities for a new beginning."[6]

The rejection of any conceit about the virtues of artistic subjectivity was widespread in Europe in the post-war period, accompanied by a turn towards the pared back, unadorned account of experience exemplified by Primo Levi in Italy (*If this is a man*, 1947) and analysed by Roland Barthes

C. Nash, *What is Journalism?*
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in France (*Writing Degree Zero*, 1953). But not so much in Germany. Commenting fifty years later, W.G. Sebald censured German authors for their prolonged failure to engage with the factuality of the war crimes that Germans both experienced and perpetrated.[7] Caroline Jones, curator of the 2011 retrospective *Hans Haacke 1967*, observed that "[c]ertainly the failure of the great German philosophical tradition either to prevent or comprehend the atrocities of World War II caused a crisis among all thinking Germans. There was also a generational disgust at the traditional discourses of 'empathy' that still haunted art criticism."[8] Haacke from the mid-1970s was one of the few exceptions to Sebald's indictment.

From the beginning Haacke rejected mimetic representation of the real world in art and set out to interrogate and distil a deeper relationship between artwork and reality. There were precedents for this approach, although he had not encountered the ready-mades of Duchamp during his Kassel education,[9] nor did he become aware of 1920s Russian Soviet constructivism and factography till well after his own approach was firmly established.[10] In Paris he met the sculptor Vassilakis Takis who was using physical forces (magnetic fields and electrical energy) in his work. In 1961 he went to Philadelphia on a Fulbright scholarship, and there he met and befriended Jack Burnham, "the artist and theoretician … with whom Haacke later developed a systems approach to art that would be of use and importance to both individuals."[11] Living and teaching in New York, in 1962 Haacke made his first use of water as a medium, adding wind shortly thereafter.

Haacke returned to Germany in 1963 before emigrating permanently to New York in 1965. In what is a rich and empathetic account of the artist's work over this period, Burnham describes visiting Haacke in 1964 in his Köln studio. It was

> a cavernous central room [on the top floor of a pre-war building] where the results of a World War II bombing raids were keenly evident. … There within a shell of missing masonry and blackened roof timbers, visitors came across a new world in incubation – one fragile and alive – like the blades of grass that work their way up between the cracks in a sidewalk. Standing on trestle tables and boxes were many plastic structures. On closer inspection these turned out to be precision made plexiglass containers fully and partially filled with liquids.[12]

Haacke was working with natural forces including gravity, light, and wind (both naturally and mechanically generated), whose impact on water and

objects such as fabrics and balloons he was presenting as natural systems. Sometimes the artwork was spatially constrained and directed, such as by plexiglass structures or fixed airflows; sometimes it occurred in the open air. Before leaving Köln, Haacke articulated a set of principles with which he continued to work over the years ahead:

> … make something which experiences, reacts to its environment, changes, is nonstable …
> … make something indeterminate, that always looks different, the shape of which cannot be predicted precisely …
> … make something that cannot "perform" without the assistance of its environment …
> … make something sensitive to light and temperature changes, that is subject to air currents and depends, in its functioning, on the forces of gravity …
> … make something the spectator handles, an object to be played with and thus animated …
> … make something that lives in time and makes the "spectator" experience time …
> … articulate something natural …
>
> Hans Haacke
> Cologne, January 1965[13]

Haacke produced and exhibited a wide range of natural systems artworks up until the late 1960s.[14] The best known to later audiences are the various versions of the *Condensation Cube* (sometimes called a *Weather Cube*), comprising a sealed plexiglass cube into which a small amount of water had been inserted.[15] Because of the differential temperature inside the cube caused by light energy from the surrounding environment, the water vaporises then condenses on the inside walls of the cube, forming rivulets as it runs down to collect and vaporise again in an endless cycle whose visual patterns never repeat themselves. Burnham commented in detail on the "water boxes":

> Most saw the water box as essentially frivolous: lacking the mystery, restraint, impact, technical bravura, cruelty, wit, optical salience that went into the games of other currently successful artists. Here was an art of essential phenomenalism where the obligation to *see* was passed onto the spectator …. The water boxes in their own way are encapsulated forms of the poetic condition ….

> The dew of the rouge-flower
> When spilled
> Is simply water.
>
> We only see what we want to see and the hardest thing to see is what is non-literary in origin …. This last is what Haacke is about and its full import only came to me after my visit to his studio in Cologne.[16]

Burnham, perhaps on the basis of Haiku references that Haacke had given him, suggested to the artist that he was aiming for "an extremely old and visceral form of beauty," but Haacke demurred: "romanticism is not really my cup of tea, although I don't deny that there's some of it in me. However, I hate the nineteenth century idyllic nature-loving act. I'm for what the large cities have to offer, the possibilities of technology and the urban mentality."[17]

Haacke's project is not to produce an artwork that exhibits the artist's sensibility and creativity, but to explore the relationship of art to reality and the activity of the artist in distilling and mediating that relationship. As Fry put it:

> The weather boxes, as Haacke so aptly called them, thus extend the Duchampian concept of the ready-made to include, at least potentially, any real phenomenon in the world: anything as a result of which the artist might choose to "articulate something natural". The difference between Haacke's appropriation of phenomena and the ready-mades of Duchamp lies in the fact that Haacke's phenomena retain a double identity: once isolated and "signed" by the artist, they nevertheless continue in their original functions, whereas Duchamp's objects lose their original function after having been placed into an aesthetic context …. Haacke's systems, in fact, only enter into the realm of art because they operate as representations of aspects of the world – being those aspects themselves – and because Haacke chooses to present them within an artistic context.[18]

Some of the artist's work from this time involved no greater input than drawing observers' attention to something that was happening anyway and photographing the event for the archive:

> On December 15, 1968, Haacke invited the public to the roof of his apartment in New York to witness a work entitled *Wind in Water*. The work was to be whatever meteorological condition occurred on that day, which was snow, and the meteorological records documenting that day. The work hav-

> ing become *Wind in Water*: *Snow* thus represented Haacke's most extreme extension up to that time of the principle of the Duchampian ready-made. The artist has in effect signed a phenomenon of nature without in anyway having intruded upon it, the only interference with natural processes being their identification and isolation through the selection of a given day.[19]

Haacke's goal was to identify and reveal the systemic aspects of the real processes:

> [C]onsider snow as part of a large meteorological system determined by humidity, temperature, air pressure, velocity, and direction of winds as well as topographical characteristics of the earth. All of these factors are interrelated and affect each other. Taking such an attitude would lead to working strategies that could expose the functioning and the consequences of these interdependent processes.[20]

and

> The working premise is to think in terms of systems; the production of systems, the interference with and the exposure of existing systems. Such an approach is concerned with the operational structure of organisations, in which transfer of information, energy, and/or material occurs. Systems can be physical, biological or social, they can be man-made, naturally existing, or a combination of any of the above. In all cases verifiable processes are referred to.[21]

Although Haacke had not yet moved to explore social systems, the themes of his art are already fundamental to conceptual issues in journalism and more broadly in the arts and social sciences. How does one produce meaning out of fact? How does the act of engagement as art/journalism change an object or event, if at all? How does one come to "see" as art/newsworthy what presents as the banal facts of any reality? What can be the relationship between an account of something real and the reality itself? If the account is not an attempt at mimetic representation or metaphor, what is it? How can the account and relationship be simplified to facilitate insight i.e., to encourage the spectator to "see"? How do you produce accounts of the real that are directly observable? What are the (systemic) processes that produce the observable facts of any reality? What are the relationships that drive those processes? How do the spatial and temporal contexts of any reality relate to its meaning?

In the late 1960s Haacke extended his focus to social systems and immediately addressed the political dimension. Reflecting some four decades later, he said:

> Like many of my generation, in the latter part of the 1960s I became increasingly politicised. I had been reading the newspaper since high school and had been involved in some political rumblings at the art academy in Kassel. But it was the war in Vietnam, the race conflicts in this country, and the general political awakening of students (I was already beyond student age) and with that also the politicisation of the art world, that "brought the war home" for me. I realised that, while until then I had only worked with biological or physical systems, the pervasive interdependence of multiple elements – fundamental to a system – also exists, of course, in the social sphere. A logical step, then, was to also deal with social relations.[22]

The broader US social context of the late 1960s included large angry street protests, race riots in multiple cities since the summer of 1965, rampant police violence at the 1968 Democratic Party Convention in Chicago, the worst labour unrest since the 1930s, revelations in November 1969 of the 1968 My Lai massacre in Vietnam, the killing of students by National Guard and police on Kent State University and Jackson State College campuses in May 1970, and news of the secret US bombing of Cambodia.

In a series of four exhibitions across 1969–1970 in German and US cities, a teletype machine printed real-time continuous transmissions from selected international news agencies, the content of which included reports from the war in Vietnam.[23] This was Haacke's first explicit engagement with journalism in his art. He also initiated audience participation in survey polls, soliciting information from exhibition visitors such as place of birth and residence, demographic characteristics, and political views on a range of contemporary issues. At the *Information* exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) in July 1970, museum visitors were asked to place a ballot in one of two transparent boxes labelled "Yes" and "No" in response to the question "Would the fact that Governor Rockefeller has not denounced President Nixon's Indochina policy be a reason for you not to vote for him in November?" Nelson Rockefeller contacted MoMA Director John Hightower asking him to "kill that element of the exhibition," which Hightower declined to do.[24] After twelve weeks on exhibition, the result was 25,566 (68.7 %) yes and 11,563 (31.3 %) no.[25] In his memoirs published three decades later, MoMA Chairman David

Rockefeller (brother of Governor Nelson Rockefeller) still expressed outrage at this specific artwork by Haacke.[26]

MoMA had been founded on the initiative and support of Abby Rockefeller and some friends in 1929, and in the words of her son David Rockefeller, President and CEO of the Chase Manhattan Bank and the Chairman of the Board at MoMA, "[i]n the 1960s, after forty years of operations, MoMA had become the citadel, sanctuary and principal testing ground for modern art in the United States".[27] The MoMA Board was divided over the issue of whether to collect and exhibit art solely from a recently concluded and defined "golden age" of modernism, or whether to continue collecting and presenting contemporary art into the future.[28] The collection and exhibition policies of MoMA were naturally a vital concern for contemporary artists, at the same time that they were challenging the very definitions of art, artists and museums.

In early 1969, Takis with a group of artists went to MoMA where he unplugged *Tele-sculpture* (*1960*), a kinetic work of his included in *The Machine as Seen at the End of the Mechanical Age* exhibition, and took it into the museum garden. There he distributed a pamphlet announcing his action "as the first in a series of acts against the stagnant policies of art museums all over the world. Let us unite, artists with scientists, students with workers, to change these anachronistic situations into information centres for all artistic activities."[29] Although the museum owned the work,[30] Takis did not want his art represented by that particular piece in this exhibition, nor indeed any other piece of his for which he had not given his permission for its inclusion. Takis had been in Paris for the student/worker revolt of May 1968. Other prominent artists quickly gathered in support of the action and before long had formed the Art Workers' Coalition (AWC), in which Haacke took a prominent role.[31] The AWC was not the only politically radical organisation formed by New York artists in the 1960s, and around it blossomed a range of groups of varying size, membership and concerns. The AWC had its own agenda, in particular to develop policies for artists' working conditions and contractual rights, but also was something of an unorganised umbrella group that mounted actions and protests around these industrial issues and in support of other workers' strikes, in opposition to the war, and on issues around gender, class, race and ethnicity.

MoMA occupied a special place in these conflicts. Apart from its significance as the self-proclaimed "citadel" for modern art in the United States, MoMA was a particular focus for the anti-war actions because of its

close association with the Rockefeller family. Nelson Rockefeller, brother of David, was Governor of New York (1959–1973) and subsequently US Vice President (1974–1977) in the Republican administration of Gerald Ford. He had been President of MoMA from 1939 to 1941 and again from 1946 to 1953, and was a trustee of the Museum from 1939 to 1978, which period included the late 1960s unrest. Although on the more liberal end of the Republican Party, he supported President Nixon's prosecution of the Vietnam War. A confrontation with MoMA over funding for the anti-war poster *And babies?* (from the 1968 My Lai massacre) led to an AWC demonstration on 2 May 1970 in front of *Guernica* and an unsuccessful request to Picasso to withdraw the work from the museum. Prominent artists began withdrawing their work from exhibitions and collections as part of an art strike, and three weeks later the New York Art Strike against Racism, War and Repression was staged on the steps of the Metropolitan Museum in New York.[32]

The AWC campaigns were reported in depth in the *New York Times* (*NYT*) and other media, and prompted heated exchanges among critics, museum staff and artists. For example, the *Art Mailbag* section of the *NYT* on 8 February 1970 included a long letter from the AWC, "Why MoMA Is Their Target," with Hans Haacke as one of three signatories; a letter "Hard to Forget" from artist Alex Gross roundly attacking MoMA for "30 uniformed policemen [who had been] smuggled into the basement" before the large artists' demonstration in the *Guernica* gallery the previous year; and a letter "Erroneous" from a MoMA staff member attacking on behalf of a "silent majority" the report by *NYT* journalist Grace Glueck on the controversy over the *And babies?* poster, accompanied by a response from Glueck.[33]

As well as the museum's politics and policies, some of the exhibitions themselves at MoMA were deeply controversial. Hilton Kramer, the neo-conservative art critic for the *New York Times*, was scathing and openly mocking in several reviews of the July 1970 *Information* exhibition. One article commenced with a description of Haacke's Rockefeller poll exhibit and included the jibe "here all the detritus of modern printing and electronic communications media has been transformed by an intellectual gaggle of demi-intellectuals into a low grade form of show business."[34] Ten days later Kramer returned to the fray with a further review that ended with "What unmitigated nonsense this exhibition is! What tripe we are offered here! What an intellectual scandal!"[35] It was about this time in mid-1970 that Haacke received a prestigious commission for a one-person show the

following May from the Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum, two miles up Fifth Avenue from MoMA and close to the Metropolitan Museum on Central Park.

The contemporary art scene in New York was in sustained uproar, with consequences for all concerned – elite institutions, their managers and staff, and artists and their publics. The confrontations continued into 1971 and at MoMA eventually led to the sacking of the Museum Director. John Hightower, appointed to the role amid the turmoil in 1970, went some distance to accommodate the AWC activists in both their artistic and political/industrial demands. In doing this he angered the MoMA Board of Trustees and its Chair David Rockefeller:

> John was entitled to voice his opinions, but he had no right to turn the museum into a forum for antiwar activism and sexual liberation. …. When MoMA's professional and curatorial staff went on strike in 1971, John immediately yielded to their demands to form a union. With the staff in disarray, contributions drying up, and the trustees in open revolt, Bill Paley [MoMA President and founding CEO of the CBS television network], with my full support, fired Hightower in early 1972.[36]

Meanwhile over at the Guggenheim, there was a showdown among the artists scheduled to exhibit at the Sixth (and as it turned out, last) Guggenheim International in February–April 1971. A minority of five artists objected to the alleged impact on their own art of work by Daniel Buren that included a large striped canvas hanging down into the central void of the ascending broad spiral of galleries:

> Buren made unequivocal the critique developed by his installation by providing a political language outside his work. Speaking to *New York Times* reporter Grace Glueck, who had come to preview the International, Buren insisted that he not be referred to as an artist and proclaimed that "both artists and museums in the traditional sense are obsolete."[37]

The majority of the exhibiting artists supported Buren, who refused a compromise offer of a subsequent solo show and withdrew his work when the curator refused to hang the controversial canvas. There were artists' demonstrations at the Guggenheim during opening hours.

Separate to this conflict, when he reviewed the Guggenheim International for the *NYT*, Hilton Kramer mocked the "inane rubbish that the so-called 'artists' have been invited to fill the museum with"

and directly attacked the Director Thomas Messer for accommodating "a trend toward dismantling the artistic enterprise and casting contempt on the integrity of the museum."[38] The following day Messer wrote to Kramer:

> *Dear Hilton, Your Guggenheim International review and the points you make in it invite some discussion. Would you care to join me for lunch some day next week? I would be glad if you would.* – Thomas M. Messer[39]

It was while Messer and the Guggenheim were under attack for the International Exhibition that Messer was negotiating with Haacke over his upcoming show that was to follow immediately after the International. Haacke and the curator Edward Fry had met with Messer on 19 January, where Messer for the first time expressed reservations about the two real estate pieces that Haacke had been researching and preparing for about six months since receiving the museum's invitation. The works were *Shapolsky et al. Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971* and *Sol Goldman and Alex diLorenzo Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971*.[40] There was no connection between Shapolsky, Goldman, or diLorenzo with the Guggenheim Museum, and none was asserted in the artworks. Various law enforcement agencies including the New York Police Department (NYPD) had been scrutinising Shapolsky, Goldman, and diLorenzo in the preceding decade, and Shapolsky had been indicted for bribery and convicted of rent gouging. The activities of all three had been reported in the New York media over a period of years.

Messer said the museum didn't have the resources to check the accuracy of the information in the artworks. A period of negotiation involved advice from lawyers to both Haacke and the Guggenheim as to whether the artworks might be libellous and defamatory, and an offer by Haacke to disguise slightly the principals' identities, but that was unacceptable to Messer. On 19 March, in the days following his lunch with Kramer, Messer wrote to Haacke describing the works as "a muckraking venture" that as an "active engagement towards social and political ends" were excluded under the Guggenheim's Charter to pursue "esthetic and educational objectives that are self-sufficient and without ulterior motive."[41] On 1 April Messer cancelled the exhibition, and when the curator Edward Fry publicly supported Haacke, Messer dismissed him. Over one hundred artists signed a statement "refusing to allow [their] works to be exhibited

in the Guggenheim until the policy of art censorship and its advocates are changed"[42] and there were rowdy demonstrations by placard-holding artists inside and outside the Guggenheim building. The controversy received extensive coverage in the *New York Times* and other news media as well as the arts press, including publication of the relevant letters and personal explanations by the protagonists. The NYPD after reading the news invited Haacke to visit them and share his research about Goldman and diLorenzo because they suspected a money-laundering operation for organised crime interests.[43]

Messer set out in detail his concerns with Haacke's work in a guest editorial for *Arts Magazine* and made the link with journalism:

> Where do we draw the line? With the revealed identities of private individuals and the clear intention to call their actions into question, and by a concomitant reduction of the work of art from its potential metaphoric level to a form of photo journalism concerned with topical statements rather than with symbolic expression. …. To the degree to which an artist deliberately pursues aims that lie beyond art, his very concentration upon ulterior ends stands in conflict with the intrinsic nature of the work as an end in itself. …. The tendency within this contradiction in the work itself transferred itself from it onto the museum environment and beyond it into society at large. Eventually the choice was between the acceptance of or rejection of an alien substance that had entered the art museum organisation. …. The incident at the Guggenheim Museum is, perhaps, the most dramatic among similar conflicts but by no means an isolated one. Parallel developments have occurred in other museums and more of the same may be predicted unless there is a change of attitude among artists as well as among museums.[44]

Messer presented himself as drawing a set of defensive lines against "an alien substance" on behalf of the museum community and "society at large", and for that reason alone, if not Haacke's prominence in the wider artistic struggles of the time, the significance of the artworks has to be considered in the broadest sociopolitical context.

For his part, Haacke's response to Messer's action and arguments was plain and simple: the cancellation constituted an unacceptable act of censorship of an artist's work.[45] The subsequent development of his thinking and art made clear, however, that he well understood the profound insight that Messer had gifted to him – the response to a work of art can become an intrinsic part of the work's meaning, and therefore artwork that addresses social systems might consider what future responses might

be and how they might be anticipated by the work, incorporated into the work, and contribute to the meaning of the work. This approach can further align art with journalism, which is intrinsically an iterative and dynamic process of prospective and retrospective reference. It also resonates deeply with Trouillot's argument about the meaning of the past being produced in the present, and therefore the present context always being incorporated into any understanding of the past.[46] In this way journalism, art and other knowledge-producing practices, including all scholarly disciplines, become an intrinsic part of the history they draw upon to produce their truth claims. As an extension of this situation, practitioners can try to anticipate the future, knowing that the future will become the past, and lay foundations for the future production of meanings. Journalists do this in constructing their reports and stories, and particularly in the design of tightly structured interviews for broadcast – for example, in anticipating the ways in which the answer to a punch-line final question might reflect back on the earlier content of the interview. The interplay between the present and the past and future is a constant factor in journalism, and after the Guggenheim experience Haacke frequently incorporated it into his art.

At the time it was the sacked curator Edward Fry who most cogently articulated the significance of Haacke's work. He set out his analysis in the essay he had written for the cancelled exhibition catalogue, which was subsequently published in Germany in 1972 and forty years later in the USA in 2011. He was in no doubt about the significance of Haacke's practice: "As a consequence of his efforts he, like every significant artist, has extended the limits of art and has forced the re-examination of both previous art and art theory."[47] In a perception that relates strongly not only to the fact/news value nexus in journalism, but also all attempts at empirical investigation in the natural sciences, Fry argued that the key to Haacke's approach lay in his relational ontology, whereby he sought to reveal through empirical evidence the invisible relations of force that produce the material and social world:

> In his search for the means to demonstrate the *invisible but fundamental* relations which underlie the nature of the world Haacke appears as far more a representational artist than many painters who, returning to traditional craft techniques and academic motifs, merely repeat old retinal habits of external representation.[48]

He shared with fellow artists in the AWC the radical critique of the role of art, artists and art institutions in modern societies:

> Coming at the end of a modern tradition in which art was relegated to a privileged but specialized and often highly esoteric social function, the approach to reality offered by Haacke acts not only as a severe critique of previous modern art, but also serves to eliminate arbitrary boundaries within our culture between art, science and society. Haacke's way of representing the world offers an alternative to subjective limits as well, for he has consistently moved toward the elimination of ego as a guide to the apprehension of reality.[49]

The elimination of "arbitrary boundaries within our culture between art, science and society" occurs through the transposition of the art/reality relationship away from symbolic representation to direct or indexical alignment. This was the rupture through which Haacke brought artistic practice into alignment with truth-seeking disciplines in the humanities and sciences (both physical and social) and with journalism. Empirical evidence or acts that are reported and incorporated into scientific research and into journalists' reports remain facts in the world, even when they might have been produced as a result of the science or journalism itself: for example, a laboratory experiment, an answer to a journalist's question, or a photo opportunity or a press release:

> As an artist, he is perhaps even more subversive than Duchamp, for Haacke so treats his own ready-mades that they remain systems representing themselves and therefore cannot be assimilated to art. Thus he violates the mythic function, to which art has long been assigned, of acting as a buffer between man (sic) and the nature of reality. His work instead presents a direct challenge, not only to the fatal but convenient bourgeois separation of art from life, but also to the related view that art functions as a symbolic transformation and interpretation of experience. Haacke's world is rigorously materialist, not symbolic, but his materialist view is of such large dimensions and possesses a logic and truthfulness of such clarity that it reaches the level of an almost transcendental moral force: rather than setting limits to consciousness, he offers a new freedom.[50]

The complete and fundamental incompatibility between Messer's and Fry's views of art is stark. In Alberro's retrospective observation, the consecutive censorship of Buren and Haacke by the Guggenheim marked a

victory for the forces of reaction in North American art institutions and the onset of "the new cultural conservatism."[51] But for other parts of the art world, including private galleries in New York and major international and European institutions, that was not the case, and Haacke continued to receive prestigious invitations and to mount challenging exhibitions. *Shapolsky* was exhibited in Milan the following January, and then in Rochester in upstate New York and a number of other galleries before inclusion in the Venice Biennale of 1978. *Goldman* trod a similar exhibition path. For Haacke, the actions by the Guggenheim and other institutions gave these social artworks a continuing life and systemic status comparable to the ongoing physical systems of the wind and water works. It was a major beachhead to secure in the exploration of art's relationship to social reality, and because of the link with journalism, highly revealing of what needs to be considered in the conceptualisation of journalism in relation to social reality and as a knowledge-producing practice.

Before exploring those issues, it is necessary to establish whether the two artworks did constitute journalism as well as art. Initially the reaction by supporters of Haacke and Fry bypassed that question in order to support the artistic merit of the works. Messer's description of the work as "muckraking" invokes the North American term for investigative journalism linked with moral outrage going back to the nineteenth century.[52] Subsequently Grace Glueck, the *New York Times* arts reporter who covered the controversy for her paper, recalled how she had

> marvelled at his diligence and skill as an investigative reporter. Had Haacke not devoted himself to art, he might have become an exemplary journalist, not only because of his bulldog talent for research, but also because of his total indifference to the power wielded by important people who are anxious to keep publicly questionable activities private. His work is all the more convincing because, while it comes out of a deep passion for justice, its presentation is studiedly dispassionate.[53]

Glueck also attributed to Haacke the "fourth estate" ethical commitment of journalism to the public interest, and linked it to the calibre of his research, which included both the documentary and human sources of journalists:

> Haacke's success as a watchdog of public morality is due in no small measure to his prodigious research efforts. While many artists need go no further

> than their own studio for their material, he travels far and wide, visiting libraries, checking archives, reading obscure publications, examining court documents, talking with "sources". And he keeps extensive files on his targets.[54]

Glueck's view is that because of the high calibre of his research and his concern with issues involving public morality, Haacke's art substantively is journalism – with the converse implication that as journalism it is also art. As art it is refined and presented differently than it would be in a medium where the practice of journalism is more usually recognised e.g. television, newsprint, or a book – but it is nonetheless journalism because of the methods and practices that he deploys in its production: rigorous and thorough research, a refusal to be intimidated by powerful interests, a concern for justice in the public interest, and dispassionate presentation of information.

Glueck's argument is different from the one advanced by Julia Bryan-Wilson, who sees Haacke's art as borrowing certain journalistic methods much as a sculptor might use stonemasonry or welding techniques. She locates Haacke's work within the "radical dematerialisation of conceptual art"[55] that embraced "the medium of information"[56] where the artist is understood as a "knowledge manager."[57] In her view, *Shapolsky* was "an *appropriation* of investigative journalism,"[58] which is a subtly different thing from *being* investigative journalism, in that "appropriation" is a unilateral adoption or taking of something whereas "being" implies an overlapping identity and mutuality of engagement. Both Messer and Glueck were concerned with the quality of the research and the veracity of the truths claimed; the museum director and the journalist were equally sure the work was journalism, though with profoundly divergent sympathies for the artist and the art. It mattered a great deal whether the reported facts were accurate, and that issue was definitive for the quality of the art. The NYPD took copies of the research data about Goldman and diLorenzo, and the *Village Voice* newspaper "used Haacke's research as a basis for designating the Shapolsky group as one of the worst slumlords in New York."[59] Haacke, as Glueck has noted, was meticulous about the accuracy and scope of his research, but in this work he was also prepared in negotiations with Messer to disguise (minimally) the identity of Shapolsky. Bryan-Wilson uses this to question Haacke's strict commitment to truth, but arguably as an obvious *nom de plume* it was comparable to the standard journalistic device of disguising a name for legal or privacy purposes

at the same time as endorsing the veracity of the reported facts.[60] Either way, it was not a device that Haacke used again, and henceforth any nominated person in his art was clearly identified, which is the standard practice in journalism.

The core characteristic of journalism that Glueck didn't mention – news sense, that "nose for a story" that will be of public interest and also interest the public – is notoriously undefinable. Indeed its alleged lack of definition is a major premise in the argument that journalism is not a rigorous and intellectual research practice but rather a vernacular craft, and therefore "good journalists are born and not taught." In Chap. 6 I will explore the idea of news sense using Bourdieu's field theory and concept of habitus. Haacke's work is an excellent vehicle for that exploration because he developed a finely tuned sensitivity to the contradictions in a given context that would provoke further developments, in much the same way that journalists become sensitised to the ways in which a story might develop, i.e., its newsworthiness. Newsworthiness is a value and as such invisible, but it manifests itself through journalistic social practice that delivers products, and both the practice and products are visible. In his 1971 exhibition essay, Fry noted Haacke's "search for the means to demonstrate the invisible but fundamental relations which underlie the nature of the world."[61] Journalism operates with the same goal, researching and presenting empirical evidence of events and facts of significance for (invisible) social values and relations.

A decade later Walter Grasskamp observed the same characteristic of Haacke's art and made the connection with an attribute of photojournalism: its revelation of invisible values and relations through the documentation of empirical evidence. In 1982 he identified Haacke as the taker of a set of observational photographs of museum workers and visitors during the 1959 *Documenta II* exhibition in Kassel, Germany. For Grasskamp, writing in 2006, the photographs "demonstrated unusual perspicacity" in a "situation of historical tension," and he noted that "[s]kepticism and criticism, two dispositions that would later mark his oeuvre, are already evident in these photographs, along with a playful seriousness of reflection and an unmistakable pleasure in unmasking false claims."[62] Since Grasskamp's essay, those photographs have now been included in Haacke's recognised back catalogue.

Fry and Grasskamp were discussing the significance of social relations and values attached to the art objects, which are both real in the sense that they can be recognised, understood, and acted upon by informed

observers, yet at the same time are not themselves observable but must be imputed from observable evidence. Thus Messer inferred a set of social relations and values in the real estate artworks and in response attached his own value to the artwork and initiated a process of cancellation for the exhibition. Haacke and many others immediately understood and interpreted this reaction as an integral part of the work that transformed its meaning and value as art. This is a parallel process to what occurs in journalism when a piece of information e.g. a statement by a politician – becomes reported as news (that is, it is given a certain value as newsworthy) and then itself is perceived in relation to other statements and events, which process in turn produces reactions that may themselves become newsworthy.

Haacke and Fry were outraged in their public response to the cancellation of the exhibition and Fry's subsequent dismissal, and no one ever accused them of seeking to provoke those reactions.[63] Clearly they had not anticipated that the works and the unexpected disputation with Messer would produce the outcomes they did. That is to say, the subsequent shift in relations with Messer and the Guggenheim and the value that was then to be imputed to the contested works had been invisible to them and indeed to other observers prior to these events. Haacke, however, immediately recognised its significance and not always but regularly in his subsequent practice produced works calculated to provoke a response from audiences and institutions in positions of power, which response then became part of the meaning and value of the original work. Journalists do this all the time; indeed, it is a measure of the value of their work. Commentators including Jameson[64] and Bourdieu[65] have labelled Haacke's approach as "institutional critique," but that is too confining of the concerns of his art, which concerns its relationship to broader realities and not just the institutional context of its exhibition.

So, for example, in 1974, three years after the Guggenheim cancellation, Haacke was invited to contribute to the exhibition *PROJEKT '74*: *Kunst Bleibt Kunst* (*Art Remains Art*) by the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum in Köln. He submitted a proposal for a work called *Manet-PROJEKT '74* on the history of ownership of a small 1880 painting by the impressionist Edouard Manet called *La botte d'asperge* (*Bunch of Asparagus*). The painting had recently been purchased for the Museum by the Association of the Friends of the Museum, whose Chairperson was Hermann J. Abs. The proposed work was to include the painting itself mounted on an easel and "[p]anels on the walls [to] present the social and economic position

of the persons who have owned the painting over the years and the prices paid for it."[66] In a repetition of the *Shapolsky* and *Goldman* research methodology, the information included in the panels was culled from publicly available records. Four of the successive owners were from Jewish families, and the final panel (Fig. 2.1) included information about Hermann Abs, whose career as a banker had prospered mightily under the Nazi regime; he had a prominent position in the Deutsche Reichsbank and was a member of various major government committees and of over fifty boards of directors. After the war in 1946 he was held in a British prison for six weeks while he was investigated as a high-ranking German government official, but he "was cleared by the Allied denazification board and placed in category 5 (exonerated of active support of Nazi regime)."[67]

In a reprise of the Guggenheim experience three years earlier, the proposed work was acknowledged by the modern art curator of the museum to be "one of the best projects submitted," but the Director, following in Messer's footsteps, ruled that it couldn't be exhibited or included in the catalogue.[68] Daniel Buren, whose art had been excluded by the Guggenheim prior to Haacke's cancelled show in 1971, incorporated facsimile copies of Haacke's rejected work in his own work in the exhibition, but the museum pasted sheets of white paper over the offending sections. Other invited artists withdrew their work from the exhibition or declined to participate in protest against the censorship of the two artists and the mutilation of Buren's art. Haacke's piece, with the panels plus a full-size colour reproduction of the original Manet painting, was exhibited in the nearby commercial Galerie Paul Maenz to coincide with the PROJEKT '74 exhibition.

Haacke's reputation and career prospered outside the orthodox circles of North American high art. After the institutional debacles of the Guggenheim and Kassel cancellations no individual museums actively censored his work, but at the same time there was a notable reluctance by public institutions to issue invitations to him for solo exhibitions.[69] Haacke was not deterred, and continued to develop his methodology of identifying apparent contradictions in organisational practice in the museum, corporate, and governmental worlds. The requirement for rigorous and verifiable factual accuracy applied to a long succession of pieces that followed,[70] starting perhaps understandably with *Solomon R. Guggenheim Museum Board of Trustees* (1975),[71] to be followed by *Seurat's Les Poseuses* (*small version*) *1888–1975* (1975)[72] and *On Social Grease* (1975)[73]; a series of works about corporate sponsorship of the

Das Spargel-Stilleben
erworben durch die Initiative des
Vorsitzenden des Wallraf-Richartz-Kuratoriums

Hermann J. Abs

Geboren 1901 in Bonn. – Entstammt wohlhabender katholischer Familie. Vater Dr. Josef Abs, Rechtsanwalt und Justizrat, Mitinhaber der Hubertus Braunkohlen AG. Brüggen, Erft. Mutter Katharina Lückerath.

Abitur 1919 Realgymnasium Bonn. – Ein Sem. Jurastudium Universität Bonn. – Banklehre im Kölner Bankhaus Delbrück von der Heydt & Co. Erwirbt internationale Bankerfahrung in Amsterdam, London, Paris, USA.

Heiratet 1928 Inez Schnitzler. Ihr Vater mit Georg von Schnitzler vom Vorstand des IG. Farben-Konzerns verwandt. Tante verheiratet mit Baron Alfred Neven du Mont. Schwester verheiratet mit Georg Graf von der Goltz. – Geburt der Kinder Thomas und Marion Abs.

Mitglied der Zentrumspartei. – 1929 Prokura im Bankhaus Delbrück, Schickler & Co., Berlin. 1935-37 einer der 5 Teilhaber der Bank.

1937 im Vorstand und Aufsichtsrat der Deutschen Bank, Berlin. Leiter der Auslandsabteilung. – 1939 von Reichswirtschaftsminister Funk in den Beirat der Deutschen Reichsbank berufen. – Mitglied in Ausschüssen der Reichsbank, Reichsgruppe Industrie, Reichsgruppe Banken, Reichswirtschaftskammer und einem Arbeitskreis im Reichswirtschaftsministerium. – 1944 in über 50 Aufsichts- und Verwaltungsräten großer Unternehmen. Mitgliedschaft in Gesellschaften zur Wahrnehmung deutscher Wirtschaftsinteressen im Ausland.

1946 für 6 Wochen in britischer Haft. – Von der Alliierten Entnazifizierungsbehörde als entlastet (5) eingestuft.

1948 bei der Gründung der Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau. Maßgeblich an der Wirtschaftsplanung der Bundesregierung beteiligt. Wirtschaftsberater Konrad Adenauers. – Leiter der deutschen Delegation bei der Londoner Schuldenkonferenz 1951-53. Berater bei den Wiedergutmachungsverhandlungen mit Israel in Den Haag. 1954 Mitglied der CDU.

1952 im Aufsichtsrat der Süddeutschen Bank AG. – 1957-67 Vorstandssprecher der Deutschen Bank AG. Seit 1967 Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats.

Ehrenvorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats:
Deutsche Überseeische Bank, Hamburg – Pittler Maschinenfabrik AG, Langen (Hessen)
Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats:
Dahlbusch Verwaltungs-AG, Gelsenkirchen – Daimler Benz AG, Stuttgart-Untertürkheim – Deutsche Bank AG, Frankfurt – Deutsche Lufthansa AG, Köln – Philipp Holzmann AG, Frankfurt – Phoenix Gummiwerke AG, Hamburg-Harburg – RWE Elektrizitätswerk AG, Essen – Vereinigte Glanzstoff AG, Wuppertal-Elberfeld – Zellstoff-Fabrik Waldhof AG, Mannheim
Ehrenvorsitzender:
Salamander AG, Kornwestheim – Gebr. Stumm GmbH, Brambauer (Westf.) – Süddeutsche Zucker-AG, Mannheim
Stellvertr. Vors. des Aufsichtsrats:
Badische Anilin- und Sodafabrik AG, Ludwigshafen – Siemens AG, Berlin-München
Mitglied des Aufsichtsrats:
Metallgesellschaft AG, Frankfurt
Präsident des Verwaltungsrats:
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau – Deutsche Bundesbahn

Großes Bundesverdienstkreuz mit Stern, Päpstl. Stern zum Komturkreuz, Großkreuz Isabella die Katholische von Spanien, Cruzeiro do Sul von Brasilien. – Ritter des Ordens vom Heiligen Grabe. – Dr. h.c. der Univ. Göttingen, Sofia, Tokio und der Wirtschaftshochschule Mannheim.

Lebt in Kronberg (Taunus) und auf dem Bentgerhof bei Remagen.

Photo aus Current Biography Yearbook 1970 New York

Fig. 2.1 Manet-PROJEKT '74, 1974. Hans Haacke. Panel 9 (Hermann Josef Abs). © Hans Haacke-VG BildKunst

arts – *Mobilization* (1975),[74] *The Good Will Umbrella* (1976),[75] *The Chase Advantage* (1976),[76] *The Road to Profit is Paved with Culture* (1976)[77] and *Tiffany Cares* (1977–1978)[78]; works on the politicisation of employment conditions for government service – *Prognostic Theory of Cognition for a Guarantee of Security, Demonstrated by the Example of a Ban on Professional Training for Christine Fischer-Defoy* (1976)[79] and *Diptych: If you want to become a civil servant you must bend in time* (1976)[80]; *A Breed Apart* about Land Rover and Jaguar cars in relation to the South African military under the apartheid regime (1978);[81] *But I think you question my motives* about the Philips corporation's operations in South Africa under apartheid (1978);[82] *We believe in the power of creative imagination* about international small arms manufacture and sales (1980);[83] *The Chocolate Maker* about the financial and art activities of industrialist Peter Ludwig (1981);[84] and more through the 1990s and beyond to the present.

In a brave reprise of the *Manet-PROJEKT '74* debacle of 1974, in 1981 the Köln Commissioner for Cultural Affairs declined to hang *The Chocolate Maker* in the giant *Westkunst* (*Western Art*) public exhibition for which it had been made, and once again the Paul Maenz commercial gallery stepped into the breach and staged a parallel exhibition.[85] *The Chocolate Maker* has been ever since a frequent inclusion in Haacke's publications and retrospectives, reiterating the significance of a work's reception for its future interpretation and demonstrating how an artist (or journalist) might construct a work, a question, or a statement to reveal its meaning and significance through the provoked subsequent reaction.

If the information presented in any of these works could have been shown to be inaccurate or "fake" to use Trouillot's term, the integrity of the work would have been compromised. Haacke has never been accused of getting his facts wrong. In 1988 there was an arson attack by local neo-Nazis on an artwork *And You Were Victorious After All*, which was a modified recreation of a Nazi wartime monument in the Austrian city of Graz.[86] In 1993 Haacke and German-Korean artist Nam June Paik were selected by the government of the newly reunited country to occupy the German pavilion at the 1993 Venice Biennale, where they shared the Golden Lion prize for the work *GERMANIA*.[87]

Haacke's next major institutional confrontation was with the German Bundestag. In 1998 he and other leading international artists were invited to submit proposals for allocated spaces within the restored Reichstag building in Berlin, to which the Bundestag of the reunited Germany was relocating from Bonn. Haacke submitted a proposal *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* (TO

THE POPULATION)[88] that was endorsed by eight votes to one by the art advisory committee of the parliament. The work was to comprise a large rectangular wooden box in the open-air northern courtyard of the building, to be filled by soil brought in fifty-kilogram bags by members of the Bundestag from a location in their electorate. The "garden," if that is what completely untended cultivation can be called, was not to be cared for in any way, including by weeding or watering (Figs. 2.2 and 2.3). What would grow would grow. The garden was to exist untended for as long as the parliament sat in the building, modified only by the removal of soil when a contributing member leaves the Bundestag and the addition of new soil when a new member contributes. In the middle of the garden is a large neon sign with the title of the work, which was cast in the same font as the inscription DEM DEUTSCHEN VOLKE (TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE) mounted in 1916 on the front of the building by Kaiser Wilhelm as he sought to secure public support for increased taxation in World War I (Fig. 2.4).

Haacke has said that he was inspired for the work while walking one Sunday in the Tiergarten in front of the Reichstag and seeing the many local picnickers of Turkish and other ethnic backgrounds. He recalled Brecht's admonition in his 1935 *Writing the truth: five difficulties* that "In our times anyone who says *population* in place of *people* or *race*, and *privately owned land* in place of *soil*, is by that simple act withdrawing his support from a great many lies."[89] The one dissenting voter on the art advisory committee mounted a strong rear-guard action against Haacke's proposal, and the issue became deeply controversial in the mainstream press. At the time the laws on German citizenship were proposed for amendment, with controversy over whether the *ius sanguinis* (citizenship by parentage, interpreted with genocidal effect by the Nazi regime) should be replaced by *ius soli* (citizenship by birthplace). Instead of a routine confirmation of the committee's decision, after an hour-long debate in the Bundestag the project was approved by a margin of 260–258 votes that crossed party lines, with 31 abstentions.[90] The project was installed and the first bag of soil brought to the garden came from the Jewish cemetery in a Berlin electorate. The state of the garden is recorded by a video camera and twice daily published online.[91]

The suggestion that Haacke's art might be a vehicle for discussing issues for journalism as a scholarly research practice invites the question of whether any other disciplines have recognised themselves in his work. From his earliest days, Haacke's work attracted the attention of scholars in art theory – Jack Burnham, Edward Fry, Benjamin Buchloh and Walter

Fig. 2.2 DER BEVÖLKERUNG, 2000–. Hans Haacke (Photo Stefan Müller, 2008. © Hans Haacke-VG BildKunst)

Grasskamp, to name only the earliest and most prominent – and I will discuss their views in Chap. 7. His shift to social systems around 1970 and the subsequent furores over the proposed exhibitions at the Guggenheim and PROJEKT '74 in Köln extended the disciplinary range to the social sciences. In 1975 Howard Becker and John Walton considered the differ-

Fig. 2.3 DER BEVÖLKERUNG, 2000–. Hans Haacke (Photo Dec. 19, 2001. © Hans Haacke-VG BIldKunst)

ences and similarities between Haacke's social works and academic social science to be both "provocative and illuminating":

> We view Haacke both as an artist (i.e. as a participant in the art world whose activities he investigates) and a social scientist (i.e. as someone whose work

Fig. 2.4 Reichstag, Berlin, West Facade (Photo Stefan Müller)

> can be viewed as an attempt to answer questions posed by social science theories and interests). This will do some violence to the conceptions readers hold of both art and social science, which is probably a good thing.[92]

They focus on art as both the subject and object of his work, and comment that "Haacke is mainly interested in the networks of relationships through which power is exercised in the art world and in the social, economic and political bases of that power."[93] Having compared in detail Haacke's methods of studying power with social science, they note the key difference that as an artist Haacke is embedded in the "social space" he is studying, whereas social scientists in the academy are removed from the world they study.[94] They examine Haacke's theory of the art world that he occupies and which leads to the reflexivity of his method:

> His work provokes reactions from relevant parties such that the reactions themselves provide further information about the original subject of the work, the exercise of power in the art world. In addition, the results of his work, having a kind of unarguably "valid" character, in fact are accepted by all the relevant parties as correct, which adds further to their provocative character.[95]

The accuracy and validity of the truth claims in the work are definitive of its status. They conclude that Haacke's place within a world where

the rich and powerful are intimately involved affords him "a resource not available to the academic social scientist," which he has used "to produce art works with a substantial social science content and interest."[96] Becker and Walton are arguing that although Haacke's work is distinct from the North American mainstream of positivist social science, it is theorised, reflexive, valid, and productive of social science content. As a method of producing new knowledge, it sits alongside the social sciences as a scholarly equal with its own specific disciplinary characteristics. If one substituted "journalism" for "art" in their discussion of Haacke, I suggest their insights would be equally applicable, and indeed the overlap between art, journalism, and the social sciences is one that John Dewey argued for at the outset of Chicago School sociology.[97]

Frederic Jameson[98] also locates Haacke's work in a sociology different from dominant North American models. For him, the logic of Haacke's work sits at the confluence of two tendencies underway in 1960s art and culture: the problematising of a claimed autonomy in art and cultural production and an ideological critique of art and cultural institutions. He argues that the perspective of Kantian philosophy where "the work of art is seen as uncommodified and disinterested" became unsustainable as "the prodigious expansion of commodity logic … began to colonise the very utopian realm of the aesthetic itself." The Frankfurt School made a desperate but failed attempt to resecure an authentic, high modernist art practice, but subsequently the question of the autonomy of art moved from a philosophical to a sociological frame, examining "a prodigious expansion of the cultural sphere generally" to ascertain the social value and meaning of art, and its location within social spaces. "In this context, Haacke poses the political dilemma of a new cultural politics."[99]

Class relations are a major ingredient of Haacke's spatial concerns. In his various poll and survey artworks in Germany, the USA, and elsewhere from 1969[100] to the present (Fig. 2.5), Haacke has located the museum audiences socio-spatially by their demographics, attitudes and residential addresses with clear class implications. The *Shapolsky* and *Goldman* works were spatioeconomic presentations of slum landlordism and therefore class relations. Jameson links Haacke's "nonaesthetic" photographic and presentational style to Bourdieu's recognition of the different social space of "lower- and lower-middle class practitioners" who use photography for recording family events, etc. as matters of fact and not for the purposes of creating art:[101]

Fig. 2.5 World Poll, 2015. Hans Haacke (Venice Bienniale 2015 © Hans Haacke-Artists Rights Society)

> Bourdieu unmasks *all* of the theories of cultural value (autonomous or otherwise) as so much Sartrean bad faith in the service of class activities and class praxis of a nonaesthetic nature (some of Haacke's works – for example the *Visitors Polls* or the *Residence Profiles* – perform analagous operations, with suggestively different results: since in these installations, no pre-existing aesthetic pleasure is present to be demystified, the focus shifts from the destruction of categories of "taste" and "art", as in Bourdieu, to the attempt to grasp and "map" the social system that subtends them).[102]

Pierre Bourdieu and Hans Haacke first met and started a dialogue in the mid-1980s, and in 1991 a series of discussions were recorded, edited, and published as *Free Exchange*.[103] I will examine the relevance of Bourdieu's sociology to Haacke in Chap. 6 but make one comment here. Interestingly, the first half of the book concentrates on the relationship between art, intellectuals and journalism. Bourdieu prefigures the argument that he extended in his later work *On Television,*[104] which is basically that journalists intervene to impose "a kind of censorship through silence. If, when one wants to transmit a message, there is no response in journalistic circles – if it doesn't interest journalists – then the message is not transmitted."[105] Generally Bourdieu has a negative and utilitarian attitude

towards journalism and the media, and while he does acknowledge that journalism is a "site of struggle," he complains that reactionary forces are prominent: journalists are displacing true intellectuals with media personalities, and therefore failing the greater cause of cultural and intellectual enlightenment. Bourdieu does not perceive any original intellectual value in journalism, certainly not when compared to the high arts, humanities and social sciences, and it is Haacke in the conversation who poses a more nuanced role for journalism in art and communication than what is effectively the transmission model of Bourdieu.

Many of Haacke's artworks have involved statements of fact that were verifiable. In semiotic terms, the artworks were indexical; that is, there was a direct verifiable relationship between the sign of the artwork, e.g., the name of a building's owner on a panel in the artwork, and a fact that existed in the world, namely a record in the municipal ownership records. In *DER BEVÖLKERUNG*, there was no such relationship between the untended garden's contents and other facts in the world. In Pierce's taxonomy,[106] the artwork was symbolic. Nonetheless it was deeply controversial because it was interpreted to posit a metaphorical link between banal facts – a patch of weeds – and deeply contested social relations in the historical and contemporary context of German citizenship and society. From a journalistic point of view, it demonstrates the link between verifiable yet banal fact (a patch of weeds) and the invisible values and relations referenced by the fact. From a journalist's perspective, *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* is a metaphor for the core but contingent relationship between invisible news values and empirically verifiable facts that are combined in the production of journalism. The meaning of the metaphor is that the relationship is a social construct specific to the time, place, and social conditions of its production and interpretation. As a work of symbolic art, *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* may have been acceptable to Messer back in the Guggenheim in 1971 and, while it might have metaphorical relevance to journalism, it is not itself journalism because it lacks the indexical connection between artefact and reality. On the other hand, the journalism about the public controversy precipitated by the proposed artwork was indexical and became incorporated into the meaning of the artwork, and so Haacke may be said to have produced a larger work of art that incorporated journalism produced by others as well as the garden produced by himself.

What might be called Haacke's factual or indexical works do qualify as journalism, admittedly of a specific type – art. Messer was right in identify-

ing it as part of the muckraking tradition. Journalism texts take many forms dependent on the ever-expanding range of media and genres using both analogue and digital technologies. As the media and tools for research and reportage change and develop, so will the forms of journalism, but at its core is a set of truth-seeking practices. The *NYT* arts reporter Grace Glueck recognised Haacke's work to be journalism because of the breadth and depth of his research, the focus on contemporary issues and relevance to social values such as justice, accountability, and transparency; she didn't mention medium or genre.[107] It was not the medium or form but the journalistic dimension of Haacke's work – the "revealed identities of private individuals" and concern "with topical statements" and "concentration upon ulterior ends" – that Messer described as "an alien substance that had entered the art museum organisation."[108] Journalism is necessarily about the politics of information: what gets reported and in what terms, and conversely what doesn't get reported and remains invisible or silenced; who gets to define the importance and significance of facts and events, and who is forced to react to those definitions; who gets addressed as the audience for information, who gets talked about, and who gets talked to. It was indeed the journalism that was "sufficiently odious" to Messer to warrant expulsion from the art world.[109]

What are the characteristics of Haacke's journalism as art that invite deeper methodological exploration? The first is clearly the role of place and space, which I will discuss in Chap. 4. The four attempts (three of them successful) to expel Haacke's work from specific places – the Guggenheim in 1971, the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum in Köln in 1974, the *Westkunst* exhibition in Köln in 1981, and the Reichstag building in Berlin in 2000 – were very specifically related to the alleged characteristics of the proposed venue in relationship to the works of art. In the same vein, the subsequent decisions by other venues to exhibit the banned works were also a statement about the suitableness of those works for the venues. So the concerns about spatiality were not simply about the physical characteristics of the places (the walls, lighting, size, etc.) but about those places relative to other alternative places – e.g., the pages of a newspaper for Messer, a nearby private gallery for the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum and *Westkunst* Exhibition, and perhaps a vacant block of land for the Bundestag opponents – and most importantly about the values and social relations that were to be challenged by the exhibition of those particular works in those particular places. We will need to consider the artworks as journalism with respect to theories of space that encompass visible physi-

cal space, the relativities of some spaces with respect to other spaces, and the social relations that construct the defining characteristics of specific spaces. At the same time, we need to consider the artworks as instances of spatial practice themselves: as objects that exist in space and may or may not potentially occupy designated spatial contexts, e.g., the galleries of the Guggenheim compared to the galleries of the Venice Biennale; as products of the conceptual frameworks for the definitions and context of the art practices, e.g., the municipal records of land ownership and transactions, the spatial histories of objects and individuals such as a painting and its owners; and also we need to consider the ways in which artists, their audiences, and the protagonists in such controversies imagine and live the decisions and actions that they take, e.g., the rejection as experienced by the artist and the scandal experienced by the institution.

Alongside spatiality is the linked issue of temporality, to be discussed in Chap. 5. From Messer's point of view in 1971, the recent history of sharp confrontations between artists and arts organisations and the swelling criticism of conservatives such as Hilton Kramer meant "more of the same may be predicted unless there is a change of attitude among artists as well as among art museums".[110] Accordingly, he made a temporal intervention to cancel the exhibition, and indeed, according to Alberro, successfully produced the historic turning point he was seeking.[111] In Köln in 1974, the relationship between Hermann Abs' history as a high-ranking official in Nazi Germany was relevant to the purchase of a painting for the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum some thirty years later and whether that painting could be exhibited at the same time in the same space as the information about Abs, and in Graz in 1988, the re-creation of a model of a Nazi war monument was sufficiently significant to incite the arson of the work.[112] What is the relationship of present to past? How do journalism and history intersect? How do time and space work together?

It isn't possible to understand Haacke's work or the controversies it has provoked without understanding the social and political contexts of their practice, which I will discuss using field theory in Chap. 6. The broad-based social unrest and conflict of the late 1960s was fundamentally relevant to Haacke's transition from physical and biological to social systems, and to the rapid sharpening of the political focus to his work. His education and experience as a post-WWII German artist in the context of the Vietnam War conflict were formative, and the experience of conflict collectively through the Art Workers Coalition and personally through the Guggenheim and subsequent conflicts with arts organisations enabled

and led him to develop his artistic practice in highly specific ways. As Fry so early identified, the relationship between art and reality became his professional and intellectual concern and practice,[113] and so his art and his journalism can only be understood in relation to the reality within which it was practiced and engaged. For Haacke, meaning is produced through practice and the social responses produced in practice, and that will always have a power dimension.

A regular element of the reality included in Haacke's artworks was the journalistic coverage of his controversies in the press. Bourdieu himself, no fan of journalism, complimented Haacke on his productive relationships with journalists and suggested he should be "a sort of technical adviser to all subversive movements."[114] In Bourdieu's terms Haacke had developed a habitus, a way of "playing the game" that was highly engaged with the larger socio-politico-communications environment within which his art was being produced and received, and he was remarkably successful in using that context to amplify his art's very challenge to it.

As Glueck pointed out, as well as the strict accuracy of factual claims, it was the moral and political dimensions to Haacke's art that resonated with journalism. In that connection, the veracity of the information he provided and the dispassionate, if provocative, mode of presentation are what enabled the call to accountability that characterises his work. His art, as journalism, is deeply embedded in the politics of knowledge, and veracity is what underpins the force of its challenge to power. The Guggenheim and the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum were clear about the politics of his work from their perspectives, and any mistake or falsity in the truth claims would have enabled the easy dismissal of the challenge posed by the work. Both institutions perceived an attempted suppression of the respective works to be the most efficacious response, and in terms of their own short- to medium-term institutional interests, they may well have been correct. But in doing so they also bolstered the authenticity of the works as statements of relevance and truth, and raised the question of accountability to those values for their own institutions. How do the questions of truth and accountability operate in journalism and art beyond the basic questions of veracity and verification?

If Fry was right and Haacke has changed the relationship between reality and art, and if Haacke's art can be considered to be journalism, what questions does that raise about the relationship between journalism and reality? Through his commitment to truth and veracity, Haacke sought to transcend issues of accuracy in representation, which is often where debates

in journalism are stalled. Similarly, discussion about the artistic dimension of journalism is very much limited to form – the literary qualities of written journalism, the cinematic qualities of documentary. The veracity of the content and the artfulness of the form are separate issues. However, if there can be forms of journalism where the art and the reality are not separate, what might that mean in terms of the politics of journalism/art practice. As I will discuss in Chap. 7, Haacke wasn't the first person to consider the issue, but he did proffer art as a fertile intellectual context for its consideration. Benjamin Buchloh, art historian and theorist, explored it with respect to the socialist politics of the Soviet factographers Tretiakov and Rodchenko.[115] Arguably, Haacke and the factographers both came to journalism from art, following the trajectory of the relationship of art to reality and to its social relations of production and consumption. It was an approach to social reality based on a theory of practice for both artists and journalists. Trouillot, a historian, discussed the issue in terms of the production of silences and authenticity for the historian practitioner, and related it to the contemporary social context.[116] Stone, the journalist, made a similar argument about philosophy and intellectual responsibility in *The Trial of Socrates*, and it is to his journalism practice that we turn next.

Notes

1. Hans Haacke, personal communication 2012 and 2016.
2. Gellhorn (1945), quoted in Feigel (2016: 2).
3. Orwell (1945), quoted in Feigel (2016: 2).
4. http://www.zerofoundation.de/5.html accessed 9 February 2016.
5. Grasskamp (2006: 25).
6. Piene (2014 [1964]:16).
7. Sebald (2003).
8. Jones (2011: 11).
9. Fry (2011: 33).
10. Buchloh (1984, 1988: 4).
11. Fry (2011: 31).
12. Burnham (1967: 2.)
13. List Visual Arts Centre (2011: 47).
14. Good critical sources on them are the Burnham essay (1967); the catalogue produced for a 2011 retrospective exhibition *Hans*

Haacke 1967 (List Visual Arts Center 2011), which includes essays by the exhibition curator Caroline Jones (Jones 2011); and the essay produced for the catalogue of the cancelled 1971 Guggenheim exhibition by the curator Edward Fry (Fry 2011 [1971]).

15. Flügge and Fleck (2006: 85).
16. Burnham (1967: 6).
17. Burnham (1967: 12, 13).
18. Fry (2011 [1971]: 32).
19. Fry (2011 [1971]: 36).
20. Haacke (2011 [1969]: 51).
21. Haacke (2011 [1969]: 52).
22. Hileman (2010: 81).
23. Wallis (1986: 74).
24. Bryan-Wilson (2009: 192).
25. Wallis (1986: 86).
26. Rockefeller (2003: 452).
27. Rockefeller (2003: 450).
28. Rockefeller (2003: 451).
29. Bryan-Wilson (2009: 13).
30. As part of the Menil collection. Hans Haacke, personal communication 2016.
31. See *Brumaria 15–16* (2010) for a comprehensive collection of AWC original documents and Bryan-Wilson (2009) for an account of the work and contribution to the AWC of four artists including Haacke.
32. Bryan-Wilson (2009: 83ff).
33. NYT 8 February, 1970.
34. 'Show at the Modern Raises Questions' *NYT* 2 July, 1970.
35. Miracles, 'Information', 'Recommended Reading' *NYT* 12 July, 1970.
36. Rockefeller (2003: 453).
37. Alberro (1997: 81).
38. 'Playing the Gracious Host – But to What?' *NYT* 7 March, 1971.
39. Alberro (1997: 83) Italics in original. See Messer and Alberro (1997) for conflicting interpretations of the episode.
40. Wallis (1986: 88–97).
41. Messer (1971: 248).
42. *Arts Magazine* (1971: 4).

43. Haacke (1986: 88–97), Bryan-Wilson (2009: 204).
44. Messer (1971: 5).
45. Haacke (1971: 249).
46. Trouillot (1995).
47. Fry (2011 [1971]: 30).
48. Fry (2011 [1971]: 44) My emphasis.
49. Fry (2011 [1971]: 44).
50. Fry (2011 [1971]: 44).
51. Alberro (1997: 83).
52. Shapiro (1968), Protess et al. (1991), Ettema and Glasser (1998).
53. Glueck (1993: 71).
54. Glueck (1993: 74).
55. Bryan-Wilson (2009: 184).
56. Bryan-Wilson (2009: 178).
57. Bryan-Wilson (2009: 182).
58. Bryan-Wilson (2009: 202) my italics.
59. Bryan-Wilson (2009: 203).
60. Bryan-Wilson (2009: 205).
61. Fry (2011: 44).
62. Grasskamp (2006: 22ff).
63. Haacke and Fry (1971: 249).
64. Jameson (1988).
65. Bourdieu and Haacke (1996).
66. Haacke (1986 [1974]: 118).
67. Haacke (1986 [1974]: 133).
68. Haacke (1986 [1974]: 118).
69. Hans Haacke personal communication, February 2016.
70. These works were initially exhibited in a commercial gallery in New York. Hans Haacke personal communication, February 2016.
71. Flügge and Fleck (2006: 124).
72. Flügge and Fleck (2006: 131).
73. Wallis (1986: 152).
74. Wallis (1986: 156).
75. Wallis (1986: 158).
76. Wallis (1986: 176).
77. Wallis (1986: 178).
78. Wallis (1986: 180).
79. Flügge and Fleck (2006: 139).

80. Wallis (1986: 170).
81. Flügge and Fleck (2006: 144).
82. Flügge and Fleck (2006: 151).
83. Flügge and Fleck (2006: 152).
84. Flügge and Fleck (2006 154).
85. Hans Haacke personal communication February 2016.
86. Haacke (2006c: 189).
87. Flügge and Fleck(2006: 210–212).
88. Haacke (2006a, b, c: 216–224).
89. Brecht (1935).
90. Haacke adds: "In this context, it is also worth noting that the bronze letters DEM DEUTSCHEN VOLKE on the portico of the Reichstag, that my dedication relates to, were cast in a Berlin foundry owned by a Jewish family. Rita Süssmuth, one of the two lone MPs of the CDU party voting for *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* (former president of the Bundestag) had promoted, together with members of the SPD, FDP, Green Party and Linke to open up citizenship to people without German bloodlines. At the time, about 9 percent of German residents (Bevölkerung) were foreigners. Wolfgang Thierse (SPD), who succeeded Rita Süssmuth as president of the Bundestag, gave a forceful speech in support of *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* during the debate preceding the vote in the Bundestag. He was the MP who collected soil from the Jewish cemetery in his Berlin district. Much relevant documentary material was published in "DER BEVÖLKERUNG: Aufsätze und Dokumente um das Reichstagsprojekt von Hans Haacke." Edits. Michael Diers and Kasper König, Verlag der Buchhandlung Walther König, Köln, 2000." Personal communication, February 2016.
91. http://www.derbevoelkerung.de/ accessed 10 February 2016.
92. Becker and Walton (1975: 145).
93. Becker and Walton (1975: 145).
94. Becker and Walton (1975: 151).
95. Becker and Walton (1975: 150).
96. Becker and Walton (1975: 152).
97. Dewey (1927: 180–184).
98. Jameson (1988).
99. Jameson (1988: 40–42).

100. Wallis (1986: 82ff).
101. Jameson (1988: 44–45).
102. Jameson (1988: 45) emphasis in original.
103. Bourdieu and Haacke (1995).
104. Bourdieu (1998).
105. Bourdieu and Haacke (1995: 23).
106. Pierce (1932).
107. Glueck (1993).
108. Messer (1971: 5).
109. Steinberg (1987: 8).
110. Messer (1971: 5).
111. Alberro (1997: 83).
112. Haacke (2006a, b, c: 189).
113. Fry (2011: 29).
114. Bourdieu and Haacke (1995: 28).
115. Buchloh (1984, 1988, 2006).
116. Trouillot (1995: 145ff).

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CHAPTER 3

I.F. Stone

I.F. Stone, born Isadore Feinstein in 1907 and known as Izzy, became one of North America's most highly regarded journalists of the twentieth century. His death in 1989 was front-page news in the *New York Times* (which called him an "iconoclast of journalism"), the *Washington Post* ("a dogged investigator and a clever and precise writer"), the *Philadelphia Inquirer* ("Like Sunday doubleheaders and the five-cent cigar, I.F. Stone was an American institution"), the *Los Angeles Times* ("the conscience of investigative journalism"), and dozens of smaller newspapers.[1]

In 1999, New York University asked a panel of thirty-six eminent journalists, academics, and historians whose political views ranged across the spectrum to select the top one hundred feats of twentieth-century journalism. Stone was ranked number sixteen for his independent publication *I.F. Stone's Weekly* (1953–1967).[2]

Stone was raised mainly within the intensely Jewish community in and around Philadelphia by parents who were poor immigrants.[3] His father started as a peddler; the parents then became successful shopkeepers but lost everything in the 1930s Depression. His siblings became journalists and members of the Communist Party and, although from the 1930s he was an outspoken critic of Stalinism and the soviet system, he didn't embrace anti-communism as most other left-liberals did.[4] Stone consistently identified the intellectual pillars of his life and work as Thomas Jefferson and Karl Marx.[5] Locating himself within the broad non-sectarian left of US politics, in the 1930s he was well-connected to sources high up

C. Nash, *What is Journalism?*
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in the New Deal administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and a prominent political commentator on radio and in the press.

The advent in the late 1940s of the Cold War and, from the early 1950s, the McCarthyist persecution of leftists and liberals in the media, arts and government created a general climate of political fear and intimidation and was brutal in its impact on "blacklisted" individuals. Stone became increasingly isolated in Washington. This was also a period of corporate consolidation in the newspaper industry that led to the successive closures or change in political orientation of publications he had worked for. For several years after the war he travelled to and reported from Europe, India and Palestine/Israel, publishing *Underground to Palestine* in 1946 and *This is Israel* in 1948. From the northern fall of 1950 till mid-1951 he reported from Paris on the Korean War for *L'Observateur* (later called *Le Nouvel Observateur*), exciting "a greater stir in Paris diplomatic circles than anything else the magazine had ever carried."[6] It was the book that flowed from this reporting – *The Hidden History of the Korean War 1950–1951*, first published in 1952 – that generated his "pariah" status in the USA, as he was widely accused of being "basically a Soviet apologist."[7] Mainstream newspapers largely ignored the new book, in contrast to their positive reviews of his previous work. The exception was the *New York Post*, which labelled it "a piece of bland and heavily documented rubbish …. Stone's contribution to American journalism today is that of a man who thinks up good arguments for poor Communist positions."[8] That review by Richard Rovere – himself a former Communist turned avid anti-communist – was characterised by long-time *Post* columnist Murray Kempton as "a hit job"; the *Post* Editor James Wechsler wrote to Rovere to thank him for his "effort in a noble cause. Too many of our silly readers will be quoting Stone as gospel unless this job is done."[9] The press response to the book – both the widespread silences and the isolated attacks – bore testament to the potentially wide readership for Stone's reportage and the influence of his analyses.

At this point Stone was professionally isolated, unemployed, and effectively unemployable as a journalist:

> "My father had a recurrent nightmare," Jeremy Stone remembered. In the dream, some "they" – faceless and nameless – "just wouldn't let him work." One winter afternoon after the [*Daily Compass*] closed, Stone sat at his old desk off the now empty city room on the third floor of the *Compass* building, formerly the *Star* building and before that the *PM* building, watching

> the snow fall on the corner of Hudson and Duane streets. He had gone from the inner councils of the New Deal to the outer darkness of American politics. No daily newspaper in America would hire him. He was forty-four years old. He began to type: "I feel for the moment like a ghost."[10]

In 1953, to support himself and his family and continue working as a journalist, he and his wife Esther launched *I.F. Stone's Weekly* with a subscription list of 5,300.[11] They continued publishing for nineteen years until Izzy retired from regular reporting for health reasons in 1971, at which time the *Weekly's* circulation was 70,000 and Stone had recovered his iconic status as an independent intellectual, writer and journalist. Denied access to government officials, the hallmark of his work became rigorous and extensive documentary research, incisive analysis and a strong editorial interpretation of the information he reported. For later generations of bloggers and non-mainstream journalists, he also embodies success for the entrepreneurial spirit of fighting and winning against the odds. Apart from his own books drawing on his *Weekly* writings, there are two anthologies of selected reports from the *Weekly*.[12]

I want to consider in detail two books by Stone: *The Hidden History of the Korean War 1950–1951* (1952) and *The Trial of Socrates* (1988). The former was rejected by twenty-eight publishers before being picked up by Monthly Review Press,[13] a small New York socialist publisher that also published a second edition in 1969, but it was mostly out of print and unavailable before getting a mainstream publisher in 1988. *The Trial of Socrates*, on the other hand, was a popular triumph: it went on sale in January 1988 and four months later entered the *New York Times* nonfiction bestseller list, where it stayed for nine weeks with total sales of almost 100,000.[14] *Hidden History* exemplifies the methodological approach that made Stone's journalism such a disciplined research and analytical exercise, while *Socrates* explores the philosophical foundation for that approach and for Stone's perspective on intellectual accountabilities.

The Korean War (1950–1952), in a surprisingly short period of time, set in place the structure of the Cold War that officially ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, but for some analysts continues as the basic template for US diplomatic and military policy regionally and globally. The 1953 armistice still awaits final resolution as either a full peace treaty between independent states or reunification of the two Korean states. Although the suffering, loss of life, and economic and physical destruction it caused were immense, at the same time it rapidly became "the forgotten war". As Cumings put it:

> The Korean War, more than any other war in modern times, is surrounded by residues and slippages of memory …. With Korea there is less a presence than an absence; thus the default reflexive American name: "the forgotten war".[15]

Stone's analysis of the progress of the war has stood the test of time. Bruce Cumings, the leading US historian of the Korean War, wrote in his preface to the 1988 edition: "*Hidden History* is above all a truthful book, and it remains one of the best accounts of the American role in the Korean War."[16] Cumings cited and praised Stone's research and analysis in his own scholarship on Korea, war, and journalism.[17] Eisenhower's biographer Stephen Ambrose in 1971 wrote: "It took guts to publish this book in the McCarthy era."[18] Apart from such scholars, there were also contemporary journalists who endorsed Stone's analysis. The *New York Post's* Murray Kempton wrote: "The Korean War book is a very good book. His analysis of the progress of the war was impeccable. Izzy read the war better than any of the rest of us."[19] Korean War correspondent for United Press Rutherford Poats described the book as "no blind-ideologue Communist crap but a very sophisticated analysis by a fellow who can see all sides. Stone presented a well-developed alternative view."[20]

The book was reviewed in contemporary scholarly journals, where Cold War partisan alignments were sometimes evident. Ziff was contemptuous, finding the book "tiresome and tedious" but "tak[ing] little away from the argument that General MacArthur's analysis was the correct one and that the war in eastern Asia could have been ended expeditiously [by waging air and naval war on China] while the overwhelming preponderance of attack power was still in our hands."[21] By implication, Ziff is confirming Stone's account that a major debate was underway in the USA over whether China should be attacked, but more importantly, that the USA lost its strategic military superiority over its Communist foes as a result of the Korean War. F.C. Jones in London penned a withering caricature of the book as a "dark conspiracy" not worth publishing, and opined that "[t]his book is not history, hidden or otherwise. Mr Stone is an American journalist …".[22] However in Utah, Colonel Charles Sweeney wrote an extended and supportive appraisal, probing Stone's main arguments and praising him as "a skilled reporter, endowed with initiative, resource, courage and, what is more rare, a capacity to see both sides of a question."[23]

Twenty years after the war ended and during the final years of the Vietnam War, Park found it "appropriate" to go back and review the

1969 second printing because "some people, particularly anti-war groups, believe or suspect that there is a close parallel between the Vietnam war and the Korean war."[24] He accused Stone of unconvincing conspiracy theories about the commencement of hostilities and preferred to assess "the MacArthur propaganda machinery" as "unreliable and inefficient" rather than "extremely shrewd and rational." Sang-Seek Park acknowledged that Stone's "analysis of official statements and news reports is truly ingenious and intuitive" but nonetheless concluded that "the author's journalistic intuition has done more harm than good to his painstaking effort to search the origins of the Korean war."[25] For both Jones and Park, the epithet "journalism" is sufficient to damn the quality of the analysis.

The best-known books by other journalists about the Korean War are *This kind of war: a study in unpreparedness*,[26] *The Korean War*,[27] and *The Coldest Winter: America and the Korean War*.[28] Their main focus tends to be the unhappy experience of the infantry in bitter conflict and material hardship as the fighting waged up and down the Korean peninsula over the first eighteen months of the war before the stalemate set in. While variously critical of US military unpreparedness and strategy in the war, and with diverse views on General Macarthur's role and the political conflicts in Washington, they shared a visceral anti-Communism and common belief in the righteousness of the US and UN engagement in the war. Clay Blair's *The Forgotten War; America in Korea, 1950–1953*[29] similarly took the righteousness of anti-Communism for granted but was focused on and critical of the policy decisions and conflicts in Washington among the civilian and military leaderships.

Stone was not the only journalist who had difficulty finding a publisher for his book on the war. Reginald Thompson, author of *Cry Korea* (1951, 2009), was the Korean war reporter for the UK *Daily Telegraph* for four months in late 1950. Although "not entirely unsympathetic to American policy", he couldn't find a US publisher for his book that documented "the appalling suffering of soldiers, civilians and, indeed, journalists …. [c]ivilian men, women and children were being slaughtered as the US-led forces with their overwhelming firepower indulged in their 'mad, senseless journey of wanton destruction'."[30] Reports and books by Western journalists also documented the experience of war from the perspective of the North Koreans and their allies, notably *This Monstrous War* by Wilfred Burchett[31] and *I saw the Truth in Korea* by Alan Winnington.[32] Burchett was a well-regarded war correspondent from World War II (reporting for the UK *Daily Express*, he was the first journalist into Hiroshima after the

atomic bomb blast) and the *Ce Soir* correspondent in Korea, where he was regarded as a reliable and accurate source of reportage by UN officials and other journalists,[33] but his and Winnington's work had very limited English-language circulation beyond left-wing milieux.

Stone wrote *Hidden History* in Paris and New York and didn't visit Korea himself. His sources were, firstly, the reports by journalists he respected in major US and UK newspapers, including the *New York Times*, *The Times*, and the *Daily Telegraph*, and secondly, official documents released by the various arms of the US military in Washington and Tokyo, and by US government departments and the White House. In other words, his sources were politically mainstream and/or official, and he himself described the book as "a study in war propaganda, in how to read newspapers and official documents in wartime [and] the facts to be found in the official accounts themselves if texts are carefully examined and reports collated."[34]

The overall argument of the book is that General Macarthur in Tokyo, in concert with the defeated Nationalist Chinese forces under Chiang Kai-shek, Japanese collaborationist Koreans under Syngman Rhee in the south, and right-wing Republicans in Washington, were opposed to "appeasement" of Communist governments and forces in the Pacific. Specifically, it argues that these interests were seeking a war with the newly victorious Communist regime in China, in which nuclear weapons would probably need to be used in order to achieve victory against overwhelming battle-hardened infantry forces. Subsequently China, which had been "lost" to the Communists, would be regained by the Nationalist forces invading from their refuge in Taiwan (then Formosa), and the Soviet-supported North Korean regime would be destroyed, leading to a reunified Korea under US ally Syngman Rhee. This was an ambitious set of goals, to say the least, given that at the onset of the war neither South Korea nor Formosa were within the US Asian Defence Perimeter in the Pacific outlined by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in January 1950.[35] The book presents evidence and argument that the Macarthur-aligned forces were devious in the extreme in pursuit of their goals against President Truman, who was viewed, at least initially, by Stone as "as honourable and decent a specimen of that excellent breed, the plain small-town American, as one could find anywhere in the USA."[36]

For our purposes, there are three important analyses and arguments in *Hidden History*. The first is that the outbreak of war on 25 June 1950 was not the treacherous surprise to South Korea and the USA that it was

purported to be, and that indeed the invasion by the North may have been a response to deliberate South Korean provocation. At the very least the prospect of war in Korea was being openly canvassed in US military and civilian leadership circles. The second is about inconsistent and misleading combat reports coming out of UN Tokyo headquarters in late 1950 about Macarthur's advances and retreats in northern Korea in response to what Stone characterises as restrained, defensive Chinese engagement. Macarthur's aim, according to Stone, was to manoeuvre President Truman into authorising the use of nuclear weapons against China to displace the new Communist government; the atom bomb was argued to be the only available instrument to avoid catastrophic military humiliation by irresistible "Chinese hordes." The third is that a successful challenge to USAF air superiority in North Korea in late 1951 meant that the USA no longer had a secure delivery vehicle for a nuclear weapon. This had huge ramifications for broader US foreign policy in Europe and the Cold War because the atom bomb "was no longer a threat with which either side could hope to dictate terms" and "Western Europe's possible fate was written out in advance in Korea's blood."[37]

Taken together, these arguments present the Korean War as an unsuccessful overreach by the USA that forged the template for a US foreign policy based on calculated destabilisation and a "fear of peace," which needlessly sacrificed the lives of thousands of US soldiers and millions of Korean civilians.[38] It's not hard to see why this was a threatening analysis to US government and conservatives in its year of publication, while the war still raged and the USA was trying to persuade the Europeans to upgrade the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) from diplomatic to full-scale military collaboration. Cumings argues that this destabilisation strategy was played out repeatedly in subsequent Cold War proxy conflicts including Vietnam,[39] and arguably since then against other opponents in Latin America, the Middle East, and West Asia.

Regarding the question of which side started the war, Stone opens the book with a discussion of detailed evidence that the USA at the very least anticipated the strong possibility of an attack across the border by North Korean forces. This undermined the Pearl Harbour analogy of an unprovoked, duplicitous attack being drawn by anti-Communist Republicans in Washington and Macarthur in Tokyo, who were critical of alleged "appeasement" in the Pacific.[40] He places this evidence in the larger context of a concerted right-wing campaign to extend the announced US defence perimeter in Asia beyond Japan to include South Korea and

Taiwan.[41] The anticipated result of such an extension would be firstly to bolster Chiang's and Rhee's positions, and secondly to draw the USA into direct confrontation with the Communist governments in Beijing and Pyongyang. In Korea for the previous twelve months there had been escalating, deadly skirmishes initiated by both sides along the border at the 38th parallel. There is conflicting evidence about whether there was a South Korean-initiated provocation on the day the North Korean invasion began that may have prompted it,[42] but regardless, the North Korean army was well-positioned and prepared to launch a full-scale invasion at dawn on 25 June, capturing Seoul within three days and, after a short delay, pushing through to just north of Pusan on the Sea of Japan by early August. The delay allowed the USA time to react and bring troops across to the "Pusan beachhead" from Japan, thus ensuring a direct conflict involving US soldiers.

Stone made the argument that it would have been impossible for the South Korean and US military intelligence not to have been aware of such a massive preparatory build-up along such a heavily monitored border.[43] Following the *Monthly Review* account[44] in October 1951 of information coming out of Senate hearings and US government actions, he also reported that there had been substantial manipulation of the soybean futures market in Chicago by individuals linked to Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Chinese, who by the start of the war owned options on fully half of all soybean contracts due in July 1950. A large share of the international soybean trade was sourced from Manchuria, which if disrupted would impact on the supply and price. Upon commencement of the war, the price rose sharply, and the speculators netted a profit of some US$30 million. The market manipulation was investigated by a US Senate committee, which identified the leading speculators.[45] Stone doesn't draw a direct causal chain between the market manipulation and the initiation of hostilities, but the evidence is clear that Nationalist Chinese and Rhee-aligned Koreans had wagered a lot of money on war breaking out in Korea by June at the latest. Cumings, with the benefit of hindsight and access to the Soviet and US archives, argues that both North and South Korea wanted the conflict, and both had manoeuvred their reluctant superpower allies to provide the necessary support:

> Thus the logic for both sides was to see who would be stupid enough to move first, with Kim itching to invade and hoping for a clear Southern provocation, and hotheads in the South hoping to provoke an "unprovoked"

> assault, thus to get American help – for that was the only way the South could hope to win.[46]

Within two days, the US government petitioned for United Nations sponsorship of a military response and committed to deploy US ground and air forces in Korea while interposing the Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland, thus extending the Asian Defence Perimeter as Chiang and Rhee wanted, with long-lasting foreign policy consequences. The decision locked the USA into direct military conflict with North Korean and subsequently Chinese armed forces, with the potential for the use of nuclear weapons. It locked Truman and subsequent US administrations into the global Cold War and the associated arms race. In short order a global US military and diplomatic posture was consolidated, which was to last for many decades at a huge cost in money and lives. "The Truman administration identified its stake in Korea in the same 'fifteen weeks' in which the containment doctrine and the Marshall Plan were hammered out,"[47] the consequence of which was that "the United States would now do something that was utterly unimagined at the end of World War II: it would prepare to intervene militarily against anticolonial movements in East Asia – first Korea, then Vietnam, with the Chinese revolution as the towering backdrop."[48]

With difficulty the UN forces stabilised the Pusan perimeter in August 1950, and in mid-September Macarthur launched the brilliant landing at Inchon to recapture Seoul. From there the UN forces crossed into North Korea the following month and raced towards the Chinese border at the Yalu River, a move that Truman had authorised as early as August.[49] They met little resistance but by the time the army reached the Yalu it was dangerously overextended, and then China sent its troops across the border to join the Korean People's Army. The weather was bitterly cold, the terrain impossibly rugged, and the combat merciless.[50] The US Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered a withdrawal and the "combined Sino-Korean offensive cleared North Korea of enemy troops in little more than two weeks from its inception …. By the end of December, Seoul was about to fall once again, to a Sino-Korean offensive launched on New Year's Eve."[51]

A major portion of *Hidden History* (Parts V, "Phantom warfare" and VI, "War as Politics")[52] is given over to a very detailed analysis of the military, government and press reports about Macarthur's December 1951 retreat from the Yalu River past Pyongyang and Seoul, both of which cities the retreating UN forces burnt to the ground in a scorched earth

strategy. Stone compared the various reports and found glaring inconsistencies. In particular, he discovered that the retreat of UN forces was well in advance of enemy forces, with whom they were regularly out of contact. Both Pyongyang and Seoul were not defended by MacArthur but evacuated and destroyed without enemy engagement. At the same time Tokyo headquarters was issuing wildly inflated claims about the overwhelming size of the Chinese forces. Cumings concurs in Thompson's reportage and Stone's analysis of MacArthur's statements:

> Did he mean those famous "Chinese hordes"? There weren't any, Reginald Thompson rightly said [at the time]; in late 1950 the total of enemy forces in the North never outnumbered those of the UN, even though MacArthur's headquarters counted eighteen Chinese divisions.[53]

Stone's analysis was biting:

> MacArthur waged slow-motion war, stretching out a minimum of combat for a maximum of effect, hinting darkly every few days of enemy traps that were never sprung and enemy offensives that were never launched …. This farce no doubt turned stomachs at the White House, the State Department, and even the Pentagon [but they] went along with MacArthur. During the latter half of January, the United States was threatening to withdraw from the United Nations unless the General Assembly obediently condemned Peking as the aggressor, and MacArthur was trying unsuccessfully to find some substantial body of enemy troops which might oblige with a little aggression.[54]

Stone's sources for this analysis included the mainstream press. For example, London's *Daily Express* reported "this much can be said … There has been no sign of any Chinese Communist 'hordes' in the front-line fighting", while in other British headlines "the *Daily Mirror* spoke of 'FAIRY TALES FROM KOREA', and the *Sunday Pictorial* asked in big red type, 'IS THIS A PRIVATE WAR?'" Even in the US "in the *New York Times*, Hanson Baldwin wrote that the troops fighting around Wonju 'said they knew nothing of the four Chinese Communist armies, but had been attacked by four reconstituted North Korean divisions.'"[55]

As the UN forces withdrew down the peninsula, Macarthur ordered an intensive bombing campaign over those parts of the Korean peninsula not held by UN forces. The USAF strategy was firebombing, on the World War II principle that "a city was easier to burn down than blow up."[56]

Napalm was the incendiary device, and the destruction was wholesale and indiscriminate in cities, towns and villages. "In Korea over a three-year period the U.S./UN forces flew 1,040,708 sorties and dropped 386,037 tons of bombs and 32,357 tons of napalm …. The estimated toll of the dead, the majority civilian, is equally difficult to absorb: 2 to 3 million."[57] The bombing continued long after it became superfluous. "Within months few big targets remained in Korea … in late 1951 the air force judged that there were no remaining targets worthy of using the 'Tarzon', its largest conventional bomb at 12,000 pounds."[58] Tibor Meray, a Hungarian journalist reporting from the North, when interviewed on British television after leaving Budapest (having participated in the 1956 anti-Communist rebellion), observed:

> Everything that moved in North Korea was a military target, peasants in the fields often were machine-gunned by pilots who, this was my impression, amused themselves to shoot the targets that moved …. Every city was a collection of chimneys. I don't know why houses collapsed and chimneys did not, but I went through a city of 200,000 inhabitants and I saw thousands of chimneys and that – that was all.[59]

Stone quoted a *New York Times* report:

> A napalm raid hit the village three or four days ago …. This correspondent came across one old woman, the only one who seemed to be left alive, dazedly hanging up some clothes in a blackened courtyard filled with the bodies of four members of her family. The inhabitants throughout the village and in the fields were caught and killed and kept the exact postures they had held when the napalm struck – a man about to get on his bicycle, fifty boys and girls playing in an orphanage, a housewife strangely unmarked, holding in her hand a page torn from a Sears-Roebuck catalogue crayoned at Mail Order No. 3,811,294 for a $2.98 "bewitching bed jacket – coral". There must be almost two hundred dead in the tiny hamlet.[60]

While this fiery destruction rained down from the air MacArthur's forces retreated, citing the overwhelming impact of the elusive "hordes." Stone's argument is that MacArthur's strategy, in concert with the "China lobby" in the US, the Nationalist Chinese in Formosa and Syngman Rhee in South Korea, was to position the US government so that the use of nuclear weapons against Chinese territory was the only option to avoid defeat and humiliation for the US and its UN allies.

As this strategy appeared to be faltering before the queries of sceptical journalists, MacArthur became more openly partisan in US civilian politics, until he publicly aligned with Republican members of Congress in conflict with President Truman, who dismissed MacArthur on 11 April. Stone attributed the dismissal to MacArthur's insubordination, and argued that the only major point of difference in policy terms between the president and the general was whether the war should be taken directly to China using nuclear weapons.[61] Although he notes Truman's threats made from time to time to use atomic weapons in Korea, Stone generally downplays this as diplomatic posturing in response to pressure from some military and Republican opponents. Cumings, using archival sources not available to Stone at the time, argues differently. "It is now clear that Truman did not remove MacArthur simply because of his repeated insubordination, but also because he wanted a reliable commander on the scene should Washington decide to use nuclear weapons: that is, Truman traded MacArthur for his atomic policies."[62] Cumings and specialist historians of the air war in Korea confirm that US provision and plans for the use of atomic weapons in Korea were operational from July 1950 and were continually being updated.[63]

In any case, Stone's third major argument was that the nuclear option disappeared in late 1951 when the USAF lost its capacity safely to deliver a nuclear weapon.[64] The delivery vehicle deployed in Korea was the B-29 Superfortress bomber, and the risk that a plane carrying a nuclear weapon might be shot down before reaching its target could not be countenanced. As Stone pointed out, the loss of this capacity had strategic implications for Cold War geopolitics at a global level far beyond the regional conflict in Korea. The US had severely reduced its non-nuclear military capacity in the late 1940s in terms of enlisted personnel and equipment,[65] and was dependent on the nuclear deterrent to achieve parity in an accelerating Cold War rivalry, particularly in the European theatre. The establishment and militarisation of NATO was a key foreign policy objective under Truman. The successful testing of a nuclear device by the Soviet Union in 1949 was a significant surprise to the USA, but then two years later to lose even the secure capacity to deliver a weapon from its own nuclear arsenal was a further serious setback.

The key events occurred in two related but separate activities by the USAF: first, (unknown to Stone but in retrospect reinforcing his analysis) a program of "dummy runs" in September and October 1951 against potential North Korean targets by lone B-29s simulated the World War II

bombing runs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki,[66] and secondly a series of air raids mounted by the USAF in October 1951 against three airfields being rapidly expanded in the northwestern zone of North Korea. The airfields had long runways capable of handling jet aircraft and were located at Saamcham, Taechon and Namsi, about one hundred and fifty kilometres south of the Chinese border at the Yalu River, all within thirty kilometres of each other and therefore capable of operating in unison both defensively and offensively in a major projection of force. The fear in US headquarters was that the North Korean forces could project airpower against UN ground and naval forces in both North and South Korea to impact strongly on the balance of power. Saamchan was bombed on 18 October without enemy interference, Taechon was attacked on 22 October with the loss of one B-29, and the following day all eight B-29 bombers attacking Namsi airfield were lost. The B-29s were escorted by about 100 US fighter planes, but were not able to withstand the attacking force of 150 MIGs flown by Chinese and North Korean pilots. As the *New York Times* reported on 9 December, "eight of eight was the score – three B-29s lost, the rest cracked up in landing or ditched or badly damaged."[67] The US Air Chief of Staff General Vandenberg made a hurried trip to the battlefront, and upon his return

> he told the press at the Pentagon, on November 21, "as regards the air situation in Korea, a significant and, by some standards, even sinister change has occurred … Almost overnight China has become one of the major air powers of the world … the air supremacy upon which we have relied in the past is now faced with a serious challenge." "Serious challenge" was an understatement. To examine the situation carefully was to see that the Battle of Namsi and its aftermath represented a military, technological, and strategic setback of the first magnitude.[68]

From this time, the B-29s were confined to flying at night but, by June the following year, even the darkness could no longer protect them and three of four B-29s on one mission were caught and destroyed by enemy fighters. As the official USAF history of the air war in Korea put it: "Over Kwaksan on the night of 10 June 1952, the Communists thus served notice that darkness would no longer shield the old B-29s against interception."[69] The significance of this development was that there were no other nuclear-capable bombers deployed by the USAF in Korea, and the two US-based alternatives – the B-36 and the B-50, both with piston-driven engines –

had comparable vulnerabilities to the B-29 when attacked by jet fighters. Until the new generation of B-52 jet bombers could be developed and brought into service, the US now lacked a deliverable nuclear weapons capacity. This is not to say that the B-29, B-36 and B-50 in principle were not capable of delivering a nuclear weapon to its target, nor that the USAF didn't continue to develop operational plans for nuclear attack, but that the context for doing so was now prohibitively risky because of the Soviet and Chinese capacity to destroy the bombers in flight.

Given the stalemate in the ground war, this turn of events meant an armistice or peace agreement to more or less maintain the original border along the 38th Parallel became the foregone conclusion of the Korean War. Stone was scathing in his prosecution of the argument: "An average of 4,666 American casualties was the price paid for every month's delay in the truce negotiations – the price paid for American insistence on carrying on the fighting while the talks proceeded."[70] The USA quickly accelerated a massive development and expansion program for the Strategic Air Command, which from 1955 progressively brought the B-52 Stratofortress jet bombers into service.[71] Research and development for the urgent replacement of bomber aircraft by nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) was accelerated in both the USSR and the USA, but it wasn't until January and September of 1959, respectively, that the two sides started to deploy operational ICBMs, locked in the mutual parity that would underpin the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction.

In sum, the global significance of the Korean War was that it closed the brief window of US nuclear supremacy. Stone understood this at the time and wrote the story, using only official and mainstream press sources. Isolated from all but documentary sources, working from Paris and then New York, it was a virtuoso performance in research and analysis. In the political climate of the early 1950s, with McCarthyism in full swing in the Congress and accusations being traded over who "lost China" to the Communists, the potential political ramifications at the national and international levels were huge. Little wonder Stone couldn't find a mainstream publisher brave enough to handle the book. When eventually it was published, mainstream newspapers either ignored or denounced it, and reportedly agencies of the US government actively sought to remove it from bookshelves and circulation – arguably a vindication of its analysis.[72]

Taking his three related arguments together, what should we make of Stone's journalism in *Hidden History*? The first point to make is that his empirical sources are all either reputable journalists reporting firsthand

from the field or official documents and spokespeople, and there was no dispute about the credibility of the facts as such. While subsequent archival revelations have augmented and elaborated the details, particularly about Truman's role and the Soviet actions and perspectives, this has involved refinement rather than contradiction, as confirmed by leading scholars and institutional sources. Secondly, there is little dispute about his account of the processes that produced the specific facts, such as the initial US decision to involve the UN and commit ground and air forces, the soybean market manipulation, the conduct of the ground and air wars, the diplomatic and political negotiations and decisions, the timing and sequence of press releases, and so on. Again the empirical evidence here is confirmed by the official and other scholarly sources cited above. Stone's contribution is the forensic way he analyses the spatial and temporal detail and then reconciles the different dimensions of a complex and contradictory set of processes to derive a cogent analysis. In particular he looks for contradictions, absences, and inconsistencies among the documents and statements by official sources. Thirdly, the core of his analysis lies in his understanding and presentation of how the protagonists dynamically position themselves with respect to each other and in relation to the issues at stake. He deduces these positions from the way they "play the game," or participate in the processes. The weakest component of his relational analysis is the failure to appreciate the commitment of Truman to the potential use of the nuclear weapon option, and instead to position Macarthur as the leading nuclear proponent trying to finesse resistance by Truman. The most powerful part of his analysis is the contemporaneous deduction of the collapse in US nuclear supremacy once the B-29 bombers could no longer be safely dispatched to their targets. He was accused of being a Communist apologist for making this analysis, but even if that were the case his personal sympathies one way or the other are not relevant to the accuracy and power of his argument. It was his analysis and argument about the shifting relations of power that was so politically threatening: to dismiss him as biased or treacherous is not to engage with this argument, and perhaps deliberately to avoid it.

Three decades later, when Stone set out to write his last and valedictory book *The Trial of Socrates* (1989), he deployed the same methodology that he had used in the *Hidden History*, and for similar reasons: he was not on location at the prescribed time, and therefore his sources had to be documents and evidence supplied by others. These in turn had to be located critically in the socio-political context of their production

and their authors' positions and perspectives, and then reconciled with each other through juxtaposition, a methodology that Stone embraced: "all knowledge may be reduced to comparison and contrast."[73] Another methodological tool common to both projects was the search for silences and absences in the accounts, to be analysed and interpreted for their meaning alongside the available evidence. The big difference between the two works is the timeframe of their research object; the Korean War was being fought at the same time that Stone was writing, while Socrates' trial had taken place two and a half millennia earlier.

Stone himself was adamant that both were works of journalism. "The trial occurred in 399 B.C. How does a reporter cover a trial that was held almost twenty-four hundred years ago?" he asked himself in the Prelude of *Socrates*.[74] Earlier, when discussing the research stage (when he taught himself Ancient Greek in order to read the sources in the original), he observed: "reporter that I still am, I am drawn by the hope of one last scoop."[75] Stone did not propose to write popular or secondary history, regurgitating the primary research of other scholars, but to produce an original analysis to sit alongside primary scholarship in other disciplines that he perceived to be "caught in the crossfire of often violent and ill-tempered controversy between equally-respected scholars."[76] Without explicitly saying so, he was presenting journalism as an intellectually rigorous research practice on a par with scholarship. Further, potential flaws that he saw in journalism as a research mode he also attributed to other disciplines; in discussing the differences among two classical scholars on the evidence that Socrates may have been a casualty of a witch hunt in ancient Athens, he commented that "Scholars, like journalists, hate to give up a good story as long as it can be attributed to some source, however shaky."[77]

I will examine the issue of time past and present in a later chapter, but will just note here that Stone saw classical antiquity as "our yesterday, and we cannot understand ourselves without it."[78] In other words, the present – the realm of journalism – includes the historical process that produced that present, and therefore the concept of the present is a flexible one whose parameters can be fixed according to the requirements of causality and production. By his own account, Stone set out "to do a study in depth of what concerns me most – freedom of thought and expression, and how to preserve it against the new excuses for repression bound to arise in every generation," and that research led him back through English and European history to "the Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries

B.C., the first extended period of free thought and free speech known to us".[79]

> But the more I fell in love with the Greeks, the more agonizing grew the spectacle of Socrates before the judges. It horrified me as a civil libertarian. It shook my Jeffersonian faith in the common man. It was a black mark for Athens and the freedom it symbolized. How could the trial of Socrates have happened in so free a society? How could Athens have been so untrue to itself? …. I could not defend the verdict when I started and I cannot defend it now. But I wanted to find out what Plato does not tell us, to give the Athenian side of the story, to mitigate the city's crime and thereby remove some of the stigma the trial left on democracy and on Athens.[80]

In Stone's view, Plato was a master propagandist for an anti-democratic political philosophy, and Socrates' story was the vehicle for it. "It is to Plato's literary genius that Socrates owes his pre-eminent position as a secular saint of Western civilisation. And it is Socrates who keeps Plato on the best-seller lists. Plato is the only philosopher who turns metaphysics into drama."[81] But in Stone's opinion "[n]o one ever got away with so much unmitigated nonsense as Plato did out of sheer charm. The 'Apology' itself seems to me to be a masterpiece of evasion and obfuscation, but a masterpiece."[82]

To summarise, Stone wants to re-examine in the present the evidence pertaining to the trial and execution of Socrates in the past in order to challenge the interpretation promoted by Plato, and his purpose in doing that is to draw conclusions not only about the historical events, but also their ramifications for contemporary understandings of freedom of expression and the press. His project offers an excellent case study for exploration of debates about temporality, about methodology in journalism, and about the relationship of journalism and history as two disciplines defined by their relationship to temporality.

The Trial of Socrates has two sections. The first examines the points of difference between Socrates' teaching and philosophy as presented mainly by Plato and Xenophon on the one hand, and the democratic values of the Athenian *polis* as expounded by Aristotle and Aristophanes on the other. The second section examines the trial and execution. The social context was the Peloponnesian War 431–404 BCE that pitted Athens and Sparta with their respective allies against each other, with the gradual denouement being the decline of Athenian democracy and the end of

the Golden Age of Ancient Greece.[83] The conflict included the two brief but bloody periods of oligarchic rule of Athens called the Dictatorship of the Four Hundred (411 BCE) and the Tyranny of the Thirty (404 BCE), and another planned but thwarted coup by the oligarchs in 401 BCE. Stone describes these events as the "three earthquakes" that created the conditions for Socrates' indictment in 399 BCE.[84] The leaders of these brief periods of brutal and violent dictatorship included Socrates' pupils Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides.[85] Socrates himself, and his chronicler Plato, were philosophical opponents of democracy, preferring "rule by one who knows"[86] and, while Socrates didn't personally participate in the two bloody dictatorships, neither did he suffer under them nor did he feel the need to flee as did many who were opponents. Socrates' students were drawn almost exclusively[87] from among the affluent and idle youth of the Athenian aristocracy, whom Aristophanes described as "Socratified."[88]

Socrates was prominent and popular in Athens, and figured as a character in contemporary drama including four plays by Aristophanes, notably *Clouds* and *Birds*, and a number of other authors' works of which only fragments and secondary references survive.[89] Stone's view is that the "Athenian equivalent of a free press was the theatre. The comic poets were the 'journalists' as purveyors of malicious and spicy gossip and as castigators of misdeeds in public office."[90] Drawing on these dramatic references as well as the extensive accounts in Plato and Xenophon, Stone dissects the conflict between Socrates and the defenders of democratic Athens.

The first major difference with the Athenian democratic mainstream, according to Stone, was that Socrates viewed the people as an undifferentiated "herd" requiring an absolute leader, whereas the city conceived of itself as a *polis* where citizens were expected to be actively engaged in political and judicial activities and in the election of their leaders.[91] Socrates was a supporter of the Spartan system of oligarchy and absolute rule. The second difference was that Socrates conceived of virtue as knowledge that was innate and could not be taught or attained through personal effort, whereas the Athenians, particularly a rising middle class of traders and skilled artisans, valued education and debate as vehicles for upward class mobility and participation in democratic life and culture.[92] The corollary of Socrates' argument was that democracy was government by the ignorant, which was a view that he advanced forthrightly and demonstrated by his use of the "negative dialectic" as a logical tool to belittle and humiliate his interlocutors.[93] The third difference was that Socrates viewed the good or virtuous life as one of disengagement and cynicism

about politics and government,[94] even to the point of not condemning extreme instances of state-sanctioned violence such as the notorious Melos massacre by Athenian forces in 416 BCE.[95] His silence about this event and the later killings under the dictatorships meant that although he was a very prominent citizen, it was "as though he wasn't there in the city's hours of greatest need."[96]

Stone is not an apologist for the prosecution and execution of Socrates – indeed, he considers it a "tragic crime"[97] – but he is seeking to understand both the case for the prosecution and Socrates' response to the charges and verdict; in other words, what were the stakes in the conflict as perceived by the protagonists, how did they "play the game" to resolve the conflict, and what could Socrates have done to escape conviction and/or the death penalty, which admittedly would have affirmed the democratic principles to which he was opposed?

Socrates was in his early seventies at the time of the trial. Indictments under the Athenian system were brought not by a public prosecutor but by ordinary citizens, and the judge/jury comprised the citizenry who chose to attend, in Socrates' case five hundred of them. There were three names on the indictment: Lycon representing the orators, Meletus the poets, and Anytus the craftsmen and political leaders, together covering the leading groups of citizens.[98] Stone identifies the leading prosecutor as Anytus, a well-regarded former general and wealthy tanner who had been a leader in the armed resistance against the 404 BCE Tyranny of the Thirty. Anytus had personally suffered a heavy loss of property under the dictatorship and had "won respect because he did not use his political influence to sue for recovery of these lost properties" under the terms of an amnesty implemented at the end of the war.[99] Taken together, these citizen-prosecutors represented a formidable constituency in the city of Athens at that time.

The recorded terms of the indictment are vague: "that Socrates is a wrongdoer because he corrupts the youth and does not believe in the gods the state believes in, but in other new spiritual beings."[100] Stone expends considerable effort analysing the original Greek language of the indictment, the arguments that the prosecutors and Socrates advanced, and the absences and silences in their arguments. "Corrupting the youth" he translates to mean not moral corruption but political subversion: that three consecutive attempts at installing bloody dictatorship using "storm troopers and bully-boys"[101] from among Socrates' pupils had seriously stretched the Athenian citizenry's tolerance. "Lack of belief in the state's gods" is

translated to mean not atheism or theological heresy but a refusal of the state's socio-political values of open democracy, as personified in their city deities: Athena, goddess of wisdom; Peitho, goddess of persuasion; and Zeus Agoraios, god of the assembly. In other words, Socrates is accused of political crimes, and this is a political trial.[102]

According to Xenophon, rather than attempt to win over the judge/jury of his fellow citizens, "Socrates wanted to be convicted and did his best to antagonise the jury" by being boastful and arrogant.[103] The ostensible reason for this, as Xenophon reports Socrates telling his friend and disciple Hermogenes, was that his "inner voice advised him it was better to die now before the ills of old age overtook him."[104] Stone also believes it was a political strategy by Socrates to embrace martyrdom and so condemn his democratic opponents of hypocrisy; an acquittal would have vindicated the integrity of Athens' democratic values. According to the accounts in both Plato and Xenophon, Socrates didn't try to win over the jury but instead belittled and humiliated everyone in comparison to himself.[105] In particular, he didn't advance any argument based on free-speech principles that might have appealed to the political sensibilities of the jury.[106]

When it came to the guilty verdict, it was far from unanimous, with a majority of only thirty out of five hundred, or 280–220. The jury then had to decide upon the penalty. Under Athenian law, the jury could not decide a penalty for itself, but had to choose between the alternative penalties proposed by the prosecution and the defence. The prosecution demanded the death penalty, and Stone suggests that, given the close vote on the guilty verdict, a proposal for a substantial fine or period of banishment would have been acceptable to the jury. However, according to Xenophon, Socrates declined to propose any penalty, and Plato says that Socrates suggested he be feted as a civic hero for the rest of his life, before making a series of other suggestions easily interpreted as mocking the court. Any of these suggestions were a provocation to the assembled jury, and according to Diogenes by a larger margin of 360–140 they accepted and imposed the death penalty. Xenophon reports that it was only at this point, after and not before the penalty was imposed, that Socrates argued against the death penalty.[107] This is far too late in the proceedings to affect the outcome, and can readily be interpreted as trumpeting the political success of Socrates' strategy. Plato reports that Socrates' friends and disciples subsequently made arrangements and tried to persuade him to escape prison and flee into exile, but he declined to do so.[108]

Stone is arguing that Socrates' death was effectively suicide, using the Athenian judicial system that he so vigorously despised to achieve his objective and score the politico-philosophical point at the same time. But he is not suggesting that Athens should therefore be exonerated:

> When Athens prosecuted Socrates it was untrue to itself. The paradox and shame in the trial of Socrates is that a city famous for free speech prosecuted a philosopher guilty of no other crime than exercising it …. The trial of Socrates was a prosecution of ideas. He was the first martyr of free speech and free thought …. Unfortunately Socrates never invoked the *principle* of free speech. Perhaps one reason he held back from that line of defense was because his victory would also have been a victory for the democratic principles he scorned. An acquittal would have vindicated Athens.[109]

Stone was not alone in this analysis of the trial, its rationale from the different protagonists' points of view, and the larger context. The nineteenth-century scholars George Grote in Britain and Fustel de Coulanges in France had argued similar perspectives, and contemporaries Richard Crossman and Karl Popper had made related though distinct arguments.[110] Popper argued that Socrates was badly served by Plato's account, and was therefore more sympathetic to him than Stone was; indeed, Guttenplan suggests that "Popper's Socrates bears a striking resemblance to I.F. Stone."[111] In 1989 the response by press reviewers was mixed, tending to divide along conservative vs liberal lines, and some classicist scholars, evidently irritated by Stone's claims to have "scooped" them on their own turf, dismissed it as "journalism."[112] Journalism scholar Douglas Birkhead analysed Stone's argument sympathetically and canvassed the political perspectives of the various press reviewers.[113] In 2005, historian Paul Millett suggested that Stone had adopted Hegel's "notion of the trial of Socrates as Tragedy" and that "there is much to agree with in Stone's presentation."[114] The popular response at the time was enthusiastic, and the book became a national bestseller.

If we take both books together, *The Hidden History* and *Socrates*, as examples of the best work that Stone produced, can they be considered scholarly in the sense of intellectually rigorous, original contributions to human knowledge? Stone himself once said that he "wanted to apply the tools of scholarship to journalism,"[115] so that is the standard he set for himself. The answer to the question is both a matter of peer review by scholars in the relevant disciplines and also of methodological depth

and rigour. Both books were subject to critical evaluation and review in scholarly journals and in books by leading scholars. Some reviews were supportive to a greater or lesser degree of the scholarship, as is usual in academic reviews, even when they might not be agreeing with Stone's interpretation, and some were dismissive. A close reading of the dismissive ones indicates that firstly, they were arguing by definition – journalism and history are mutually exclusive – and secondly, they caricatured Stone's interpretation as crude – either conspiratorial in *Hidden History* or myopic and reductionist in *Socrates* – and ignored the nuance and detail in his argument. In both cases there were distinguished scholars who supported similar or related interpretations of the evidence: e.g., Cumings on Korea and Grote, Popper, and Millett on Socrates. In the case of Korea, there were official US Air Force histories that registered the key facts in Stone's argument without drawing attention to the implications of those facts. In the case of Socrates, Stone engages in detail with the secondary literature on specific questions and agrees with some scholars and disagrees with others. In any event, both friend and foe to his arguments paid him the respect of arguing their case in scholarly venues, with the direct implication that the work merited that level of engagement. That amounts to a *prima facie* case for acceptance of scholarly status, which only raises the much more interesting question of methodology: i.e., how did Stone conduct his research and draw his conclusions so as to earn that status?

The hallmarks of Stone's approach are clearly presented in both books. Firstly, he works with reputable primary sources to compare and contrast the veracity and reliability of their empirical evidence, the facts. No critic ever disputed the quality of Stone's empirical evidence as available to him at the time, although subsequent access to official archives has shed a different light on some aspects of his Korean analysis. Secondly, he locates that evidence in its context, both physical and social, with particular reference to its specific spatial location and temporal sequence for both verification and analytical purposes. Thirdly, he identifies and analyses the processes that produced those facts in order to understand the interests of the participants that were driving them – for example, the soybean market manipulation or the role of Socrates' students in the two Athenian dictatorships. This is often a matter of deduction or induction, but he cites the available evidence and details the argument. Fourthly, he tries to identify and understand the forces that are driving the processes – for example, the democratic versus authoritarian values, class politics, and experience of brutality by Athenians under the dictatorships or the conflicting attitudes

and stratagems vis-à-vis the newly communist China by Washington politicians. Fifthly, in identifying these necessarily invisible or unverifiable values and relationships, he deploys what all observers described as a formidable intuition borne of long experience as a Washington correspondent, which he applied retrospectively to the machinations in ancient Athens. Sixth, in identifying these values and social relations, for example, among Socrates and his aristocratic students or among the Republican right wing, the Chinese Nationalists, and the Syngman Rhee Korean forces, he locates them in their generative context – what interests spawned and supported them – and how they manifested themselves in specific points of a process or conflict. Seventh, he explores the relationship between what people said and what they did, or between the representation and the material reality of their interests and activities. Eighth, he investigates how the protagonists thought about and explained what they were doing. Ninth, he investigates the protagonists' lived experience of their context, the consequences of their own and others' actions and aspirations as they engaged in their struggles and conflicts. Tenth, he assiduously searches for silences and absences in the documentary record in the belief that they are equally valid evidence of how the protagonists were playing the game to achieve their goals.

To what extent can these methods used by Stone, and similar ones used by Haacke in his research, be integrated into theoretical frameworks that could constitute methodology, that is, a theoretical approach linking what is known and how it is known to epistemological frameworks? That is what is required if journalism is to be accorded disciplinary status, which is to be recognised as having a singular and intellectually valid role to play in producing new knowledge or in the evaluation and reinterpretation of existing knowledge. It is clear from the detailed discussion of Haacke's and Stone's work that space and time are crucial factors in both their own practice and in the events and situations that they are researching, analysing and presenting in their respective modes of artworks and books. In the next chapter I will consider some relevant theoretical frameworks for spatiality, and in the following chapter do the same for temporality. It is also clear that both Haacke and Stone had very finely tuned antennae for social contradictions with challenging ramifications – what journalists call "news sense." In Chap. 6 I will examine Bourdieu's theorisation of intuition (habitus), which he argues is a manifestation of capital (personal resources and capacities accrued through education and experience) that is produced within and characteristic of fields of social relations. Fields

are spatiotemporal phenomena – they exist in space and emerge, develop and disappear in time – and so Bourdieu's field theory with its associated concepts of capital and habitus combines the three key components of Tuchman's account of news production: the web of facticity cast in space and time as determined by news sense. Together, these three chapters present a meta-theoretical framework within which journalism research practice can be assessed for its epistemological validity, using Haacke's and Stone's work as illustrative case studies.

Notes

1. Guttenplan (2009: 464).
2. Guttenplan (2009: 474), MacPherson (2006: xii).
3. MacPherson (2006) and Guttenplan (2009) have published detailed accounts of Stone's life in its professional, social, and political context.
4. Stone (1978: 54).
5. Stone (1978: SM4).
6. Huberman and Sweezy (1952: viii).
7. MacPherson (2006: 270).
8. Guttenplan (2009: 266).
9. Guttenplan (2009: 266).
10. Guttenplan (2009: 283).
11. Gitlin (1989: 77).
12. Middleton (1973), Weber (2006).
13. Knightley (2004: 379).
14. Guttenplan (2009: 459).
15. Cumings (2011: 72).
16. Cumings (1988: xiii).
17. Cumings (1981, 1990, 1992).
18. Guttenplan (2009: 269).
19. Guttenplan (2009: 267).
20. MacPherson (2006: 268).
21. Ziff (1952: 188).
22. Jones (1953: 124).
23. Sweeney (1952: 155).
24. Park (1973: 1456).
25. Park (1973: 1457).
26. Fehrenbach (1963).

27. Hastings (1987).
28. Halberstam (2007).
29. Blair (1987).
30. Keeble (2009: 9ff).
31. Burchett (1953).
32. Winnington (1950).
33. Stone (1988: 316–7).
34. Stone (1988: xxii).
35. Huberman and Sweezy (1951: 122ff), Cumings (2011: 11–13).
36. Quoted by Cumings (2011: xiii).
37. Stone (1988: 344).
38. Stone (1988: 355ff).
39. Cumings (2011: 205ff).
40. Stone (1988: 2).
41. Huberman and Sweezy (1951).
42. Cumings (2011: 9–10).
43. Stone (1988: 4).
44. Huberman and Sweezy (1951: 171–174).
45. Stone (1988: 349).
46. Cumings (2011: 144).
47. Cumings (2011: 208).
48. Cumings (2011: 214).
49. Cumings (2011: 22).
50. Fehrenbach (1963), Hastings (1987), Halberstam (2007), Thompson (2009).
51. Cumings (2011: 29).
52. Stone (1988: 208–273).
53. Cumings (2011: 29).
54. Stone (1988: 249).
55. Stone (1988: 240).
56. Cumings (2011: 149).
57. Young (2009: 157).
58. Cumings (2011: 154).
59. Quoted in Cumings (2011: 258).
60. Stone (1988: 258).
61. Stone (1988: 274–279).
62. Cumings (2011: 156).
63. Futrell (1983), Crane (2000), de Groot (2006: 186–188), Cumings (2011: 156–8).

64. Stone (1988: 335–344).
65. Fehrenbach (1963), Hastings (1987).
66. Cumings (2011: 157).
67. Baldwin (1951), quoted in Stone (1988: 339).
68. Stone (1988: 339).
69. Futrell (1983: 425).
70. Stone (1988: 335).
71. Futrell (1983: 710).
72. Guttenplan (2009: 347).
73. Stone (1989: 6).
74. Stone (1989: 4).
75. Stone (1978: SM4).
76. Stone (1978: SM4).
77. Stone (1989: 239).
78. Stone (1989: 6).
79. Stone (1978: SM4).
80. Stone (1989: xi).
81. Stone (1989: 4).
82. Stone (1978: SM4).
83. Stone (1989: 244ff).
84. Stone (1989: 140ff).
85. Stone (1989: 111).
86. Stone (1989: 11).
87. Stone (1989: 152).
88. Stone (1989: 111).
89. Stone (1989: 134).
90. Stone (1989: 134).
91. Stone (1989: 9–38).
92. Stone (1989: 39–97).
93. Stone (1989: 68ff).
94. Stone (1989: 98–139).
95. Stone (1989: 104).
96. Stone (1989: 110).
97. Stone (1989: 230).
98. Stone (1989: 174ff).
99. Stone (1989: 175).
100. Stone (1988: 198).
101. Stone (1988: 111).
102. Stone (1988: 201ff).

103. Stone (1988: 181).
104. Stone (1988: 183).
105. Stone (1988: 185–6).
106. Stone (1988: 210ff).
107. Stone (1988: 186–7).
108. Stone (1988: 193ff).
109. Stone (1988: 197–8) italics in original.
110. Guttenplan (2009: 454).
111. Guttenplan (2009: 456).
112. Guttenplan (2009: 458–461), MacPherson (2006: 472–4).
113. Birkhead (1989).
114. Millett (2005: 30–31).
115. Cumings (1992: 38).

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CHAPTER 4

Space, Geography and Journalism

The next three chapters explore the manner in which theory might apply to journalism as a research practice. This is not an attempt to construct a "grand theory of journalism," but rather to present a range of relevant theory that can assist journalists to appreciate and engage with the methodological challenges they encounter in their research and analysis. In Chap.1 I aggregated those challenges under three categories: the empirical, the temporal and the political. These challenges manifest in ways that are specific to journalism on the one hand, but are also shared to various extents with humanities and social sciences disciplines on the other, and that dialectical relationship generates journalism's disciplinary singularity. The thinkers whose work I consider do not privilege theory over material reality but view the theoretical and the empirical as two interlocked dimensions of knowledge-seeking practice. It is axiomatic that theory is inherently unstable and invites challenge for its conceptual adequacy and its efficacy in grappling with empirical reality.

For Bourdieu, both empirical social reality and the human practice constituted by social theory are produced in a mutually reflexive field relationship that is unfailingly dialectical in its constant change and development. Theory can predict the existence of empirical reality that has not yet been observed or examined, and thereby throw up methodological opportunities and challenges for its exploration, but conversely no theory can withstand the challenge of contradictory empirical evidence.[1] The generation of theory from within multiple and differentiated fields of practice produces variety, and Harvey follows Marx in suggesting

C. Nash, *What is Journalism?*
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> we can rub different conceptual blocks together to make an intellectual fire. Theoretical innovation so often comes out of the collision between different lines of force. In a friction of this kind, one should never altogether give up one's starting point – ideas will only catch fire if the original elements are not completely absorbed in the new ones.[2]

Lefebvre makes a related point in outlining the dialectical development of understanding:

> Contradictions, which we tend to confuse with alienations, are creative. Contradictions give rise to problems, and thus to a set of possibilities and the need to find a solution, and therefore the need to make a choice. The solution may be optimal, mediocre, bad or phoney (i.e. illusory). A good solution resolves the initial problem by modifying the givens against which it is reacting and which it is transforming …. Movements and conflict are creative per se. Contradictions are always preferable to the absence of contradictions.[3]

To use Lefebvre's terms, one "problem" that journalism faces is that it exists within the academy but is largely not recognised as a disciplinary subject or agent in its own right, merely instead as an object of other disciplines' scrutiny. This is a contradiction that directly challenges journalism educators, scholars and students but also limits the contribution that university-based journalism can make to the development of the profession and to other disciplines. The problematic "givens" that need to be resolved are journalism's lack of methodological reflexivity in dealing with empirical evidence (allegedly manifested by a crude empiricism and dependence on an unreflexive "news sense"), a temporal focus on an ever-changing present that both creates the dependence on news sense to react to events in real time and also curtails the opportunity for reflective *post hoc* consideration, and a necessarily intimate engagement with the politics of knowledge through a dependence on authoritative sources for truth claims, sources which have their own vested interests to pursue in responding to journalists' questions. My approach in this book is to embrace the creative potential in these apparent contradictions and "transform the givens" by locating journalism's truth-seeking practices with respect to relevant epistemological approaches in geography, history, sociology, and art. This interdisciplinary approach will inevitably involve rubbing "different conceptual blocks together to make an intellectual fire," as Harvey put it, or recognising contradictions as a first step towards their resolution,

as Lefebvre put it. Because theory must develop in relation to empirical reality, the discussion will proceed by detailed reference to the practice of Hans Haacke and Izzy Stone, which preceded by many decades this belated attempt to confront a longstanding problem for journalism in the academy. For those journalist readers who remain sceptical of the value of social theory in their practice, this comment by C. Wright Mills is worth noting:

> The primary purpose of both [method and theory] is clarity of conception and economy of procedure, and most importantly, just now, the release rather than the restriction of the sociological imagination. To have mastered 'method' and 'theory' is to have become a self-conscious thinker, a man [sic] at work and aware of the assumptions and the implications of whatever he is about.[4]

Clarity of conception, economy of procedure and release of the imagination have an obvious benefit to journalism as professional practice, and as scholarship and art.

A common view among journalism scholars influenced by Chicago School sociology is that spatiotemporality is a core component of journalism practice. Theory that addresses space and time might facilitate "clarity of conception and economy of procedure" for journalism. However, the problem of "news sense" also looms large because, in the words of Phillips, it determines that journalists are "nontheoretic knowers" deploying a "primitive empiricis[m]" that is "based on direct sense experience, not abstract systematic reflection," in contrast with the "epistemological stance … taken by the social scientist."[5] There is little point in theorising time and space for journalists' research practice if it is to be fatally compromised by intuition or a "nose for news" that is devoid of reflexive capacity or theoretical merit. However, a theory that validated the reflexivity of what appears to be intuition and also linked to spatiotemporality would be a helpful way to address the methodological problem of news sense. Bourdieu's field theory addresses precisely that task.

Pierre Bourdieu proposed field theory as a metatheoretical framework for analysing social practice and relations, to be used to analyse any social practice and relations, including journalism.[6] A key concept in his theory is habitus, a concept dating back via Aquinas and the scholastics to Aristotle that encompasses a person's mode of being in the world, interacting with others and "playing the game" to achieve desired objectives, and which

manifests itself as intuition, style, skill, insight, and related personal attributes. Habitus invites consideration as a way of theorising news sense that is related to the spatial concept of field, which is a major attraction because space is considered so important for journalism practice. However, as David Harvey has commented, space is a much-used metaphor, and to cut through the "fog of miscommunication" that attends it "we need to take the concepts of space and space-time to a much deeper level."[7] In the next three chapters I will explore Harvey's conceptualisation of space and time in conjunction with Henri Lefebvre's theory of spatial practice and the social production of space, and then put them together with Bourdieu's field theory as a potential framework for theorising key elements of journalistic practice.

This framework operates at the metatheoretical level. It proposes ways that we might think about thinking about journalism. In other words, it doesn't prescribe specific theory relevant to specific empirical phenomena but lays out an approach within which other theories specific to particular concerns can be considered and applied as required, e.g., economic theories, geo-political analyses, political theories, social theories, cultural theories and so forth. Most importantly, it proposes ways we might think about practice, which is what research, analysis and reporting are. Harvey, Lefebvre and Bourdieu do share a common materialist and relational approach to ontology and epistemology, as do Tuchman, Haacke, Stone and the other thinkers I have been examining, so there is a broad common and consistent conceptual framework to the metatheory and to the theory and practice of art and journalism that we are exploring. Any suggested theory has no role unless it can identify and meet conceptual challenges, clarify thinking and guide research practice to be methodologically robust and revelatory.

For ease of exposition I have broken the discussion up into three separate chapters on space/geography, time/history, and news sense/field theory. That has produced an element of repetition in the quest for clarity, but the three chapters should be considered as an integrated, cross-referenced set of approaches. I will test the framework against examples from the work of Haacke and Stone in the case studies. The aim is not to argue for or against the Haacke and Stone perspectives and conclusions in their work because that would require theory specific to the topics in particular works. As an aside, that requirement confirms that all journalism is necessarily interdisciplinary. Rather, the approach in these three chapters

illustrates how the methods used by Haacke and Stone can be theorised to interrogate and evaluate their merits.

To recap from the first chapter, in her landmark study on newsrooms, Tuchman (1978) observed and described how journalists cast a "web of facticity" in time and space in order to catch certain events and facts in the news net for inclusion in the production of scheduled reports such as nightly television news bulletins or daily newspapers. While the cycles of news production have tightened and become more or less continuous, with 24-hour radio and television news channels and online publication and streaming, the production practices of journalists still require the allocation of their energies in time and space. Referencing Goffman among others, Tuchman argued that this spatiotemporal activity "is of theoretic importance, for it is a key to the construction of news."[8] Similarly, Carey argued that the Chicago School's production of "a science of space and place, a science of the local and particular" was a very congenial scholarly environment for journalism.[9] Carey celebrated the historical dimension of socio-spatial development, for example in lauding Marvin Gelfand's introductory lecture to incoming students at the Columbia Journalism school about local histories and significant places on the island of Manhattan.[10] In emulation of Chicago School sociology, the students were then sent out as journalists to report on the unfolding life of New York localities. Neither Tuchman nor Carey sought to theorise spatiotemporality with respect to journalism beyond noting and describing its relevance.

Both natural reality and social reality are constituted in space and time, and Henri Lefebvre[11] and David Harvey[12] among others have argued convincingly that space and time themselves are socially constructed. Bourdieu conceives of all social practice occurring within "fields" of social relations. "Rubbing these conceptual blocs together," as Harvey put it, means that the social construction of space and time takes place within fields of social relations and is subject to their dynamics, and conversely the activities of agents within any field take place within space and time, which are contingent parameters and constituents of those fields.

"Field" for Bourdieu is a spatial metaphor that allows him to elaborate his theoretical framework for understanding practice. However, any deployment of his framework to investigate empirical phenomena – that is, to generate research questions capable of empirical interrogation and analysis, which in turn can interrogate the adequacy of the theoretical framework – requires a move beyond metaphor into a rigorous theorisation of space and time. This is necessary just to locate the empirical phenomena

being investigated in cadastral (i.e. able to be empirically delineated and identified) space and chronometric time, so they can be identified by others and re-examined to test the adequacy of the analysis. But even more fundamentally, if the space and time of any phenomenon are socially constructed and therefore part of the factors and parameters of any field, they can be (and may need to be) examined as elements at play within the structural composition of the field. As parameters and constituents of the social relations of the field, space and time may be contested, or not, at any particular conjuncture. So we need theories of space and time that are compatible with Bourdieu's relational approach to social theory and that are available for empirical interrogation.

Harvey argues that space can be conceptualised in three modalities: absolute, relative and relational space).[13] These are conceptual categories, and any given spatial phenomenon can involve all three of them, but to greater or lesser extent depending on the analytical need. Absolute space "is a 'thing in itself' with an existence independent of matter. It then becomes a structure which we can use to pigeonhole or individuate phenomena."[14] Absolute space contains the material world of physically manifest objects (mass and/or energy), with characteristics and dimensions that can be ascertained empirically and whose specific characteristics can be named and verified: for example, the appearance, dimensions, and construction materials of a building in a city. It entails the specificity of points in space. The empirical characteristics of objects in absolute space appear to be stable and unchanging for any given point or period of time. In other words, absolute space does not include time within itself, but time can be used as an external marker to identify when the attributes of the objects existed in space. Absolute space and absolute time (which we will discuss in the next chapter) are the space and time of Newtonian physics and Cartesian philosophy.[15]

In Haacke's *Shapolsky*, addresses and photographs of New York tenement buildings and the associated municipal documents detailing ownership, etc., were stipulated to be stable and accurate as of 1 May 1971. Both the buildings themselves and the tendered documents are objects locatable in Harvey's category of absolute space. The Guggenheim Museum is an object in absolute space, and Haacke's *Shapolsky* artwork is an object in absolute space. Similarly, the locations, objects, people and events in the Korean War or Socrates' trial described by Stone are things that existed in absolute space at the nominated times. The cancellation of Haacke's 1971 exhibition by Messer prevented *Shapolsky* from occupying the absolute

space of the Guggenheim's gallery for the time period of the intended exhibition. Messer produced an absence where there could have been a presence. However, that did not prevent *Shapolsky* from existing in other spaces at other subsequent times. The refusal to publish *Hidden History* by a succession of publishers was a decision by each of them not to bring the manuscript into existence as a book in absolute space. Because one publisher made a different decision, *The Hidden History of the Korean War 1950–1951* as a book exists in front of me as I write these words.

Relative space "proposes that it be understood as a relationship *between* objects which exists only because objects exist and relate to each other."[16] It includes distance and direction so that objects that exist in space can be located relative to each other, and therefore it involves time for movement across that distance; in other words, objects in relative space, whether they comprise mass or energy, are subject to the impact of movement. Harvey gives the example of two classrooms that are physically distant from each other but linked by video-conferencing technology, so that a lecture that is given in one can be watched and heard in the other in real time (i.e., the sounds and images move electronically between the two locations at the speed of light), and therefore students in the two distinct spaces can both experience at effectively the same time the same activities.[17] Harvey uses Marx's phrase of "the annihilation of space through time"[18] for the phenomenon of increases in the speed of transport and communication lessening the time required to travel though space and therefore diminishing (and effectively wiping out in the case of electronic communication) the experience of space between points of departure and arrival of objects or messages.

Relative space can be spoken of as spatiotemporality because spatial relativity involves distance and therefore accommodates movement, change, and process in time and space. The invitation, submission, acceptance, rejection and cancellation of Haacke's Guggenheim exhibition were stages in a process that happened in space and time. The increasing radicalisation of New York artists and the intensifying conflict between the AWC members and the major art institutions including MoMA and the Guggenheim were intersecting processes that occurred in space and time. Socrates' trial was a process that occurred in space and time, and the succession of events in that process – the verdict, the proposals for sentence including Socrates' failure to nominate a serious alternative, the decision for the death penalty, and then Socrates' statement about freedom of speech – was a structured process unfolding in space and time. The soybean market manipulation

in Chicago in 1950 was a process that occurred in space and time, which may or may not have been linked to other processes related to the looming Korean War at the time. Spatiotemporality is the space and time of Einsteinian relativity, in which all objects in the universe are moving with respect to each other. At slow rates of movement, the stability of space and time of Newtonian physics seems to apply, but at velocities approaching the speed of light, space and time "curve" and are no longer stable. A comparable phenomenon exists for spatiotemporal relativities in the social world, where individuals and collectivities are undergoing processes of varying velocities with respect to each other and to the object world: for example, in the international political repercussions of the destruction of the B-29 bomber squadron over North Korea in October 1951.

Relational space is "regarded, in the fashion of Leibniz, as being contained in objects in the sense that an object can be said to exist only insofar as it contains and represents within itself relationships to other objects."[19] It is the conceptualisation of space according to the social relations that produce processes and objects or events and occur with respect to those objects or events. While profoundly meaningful, Harvey argues that relational space is impossible to verify directly, but only through an examination of the processual and objectified effects of the social relations.[20] For example, the physical layout (absolute space) of a typical modern classroom includes a lectern or desk at the front and a series of seats and perhaps desks arrayed in front of and facing the lectern. The space contains or is configured to the advantage of a certain set of social relations – one person generally speaks from the lectern, and those in the seats generally listen. The power relations implicit in this physical layout are familiar to someone who has experienced formal education, but at first encounter might appear incomprehensible to someone who hasn't. Likewise, the material attributes of a shopping mall will convey powerful signals of identity and therefore social relations that encompass class and probably other local axes of social distinction including gender, ethnicity, age, etc. to someone who has experienced the social relations produced within it.

The Guggenheim Museum is an absolute space with identifiable characteristics including the circular ascending galleries around a central atrium. It is relative space within which processes occur including the mounting of exhibitions, public visitation, and occasionally demonstrations by protesting artists. It is a relational space produced by and containing the social relations among staff (director, curators, gallery attendants), exhibiting artists alive and dead, public audiences, professional audiences

including journalists, government bureaucrats, private foundations, and staff of other museums. Likewise Korea is an absolute space with certain physical characteristics, it is a relative space where certain processes took place during the Korean War, and it was a relational space for the various protagonists who participated in or were affected directly or indirectly by the conflict. The same tripartite conceptualisation applies to the Athens of Socrates, and indeed to any space within the universe for either physical or social entities.

Harvey argues that relative space encompasses absolute space, but not vice versa, and that relational space encompasses relative and absolute space but not vice versa. Nonetheless, he explicitly desists from identifying a hierarchy of conceptual categories of space, and prefers "to keep the three categories in dialectical tension."[21] Relationships – for example, between curators and artists, between enemy combatants in a war, or between an accused person and their judge and jury – produce practices that drive processes: an exhibition, a military conflict and a trial respectively in these examples. In the physical world magnetic polarities, air pressure differences, and molecular characteristics produce forces that drive processes: alignment of ferromagnetic particles, weather patterns and chemical reactions. Processes produce facts – events and objects – such as an artwork to be exhibited or not, a bomb to be dropped or not, or a verdict to be decided and carried out or not. Facts can change relationships – for example, among artists, curators, and museum directors or between combatants in a war – which then produce new processes – the cancellation of an exhibition or the decision not to drop a certain bomb – which then produce new relationships and new facts – the celebrity status and enhanced meaning of *Shapolsky*, and the nuclear arms race involving intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). And so on *ad infinitum*.

Harvey has laid out a three-pronged framework for the conceptualisation of space, for two of which prongs – relative and relational space – process and change are intrinsic because distance necessarily invokes temporal duration. Socially, this is the world as it is produced by social practice, but any new instance of social practice both encounters the existing spatiotemporal order and also reproduces it, perhaps in some changed way, through its engagement. One can think of the analogy of a game of football, which exists in absolute space and time at a certain venue, and involves a process (the match) of a certain duration that is driven by the relationships between two teams comprising sets of individual players. The playing of the game and the scoring of goals by particular players both reproduce

the football game as a social artefact but also might change the ranking of the competing teams in the competition hierarchy, and in the longer run might lead to the entrenchment of a certain new style or mode of playing the game. A similar analogy might be found in the art world, in conflict between states, or in the justice system of a particular state. It is a similar distinction and relationship to what exists between language (*langue*), a social practice that pre-exists any individual act of speech (*parole*), but is then reproduced and changed in a developmental process through repeated acts of speech by the collectivity that shares this language.

Lefebvre[22] identified three modes of socio-spatial practice whereby people act in material space to produce not only empirically observable outcomes (objects, facts and events), but also ways of understanding space and the objects in it, and also ways of living socially, culturally, emotionally, imaginatively, and so on within that space and with those objects and practices. He labelled these three modes the space of experience, the representation of space, and spaces of representation. Harvey has been engaged with Lefebvre's spatial philosophy since the early 1970s, and in 2006 he renamed these categories as experienced space, conceived space and lived space respectively. The first is the space that we experience and apprehend through the physical senses of touch, sight, etc. and wherein we can produce physical objects and events; the second is space as we conceptualise it to produce intellectual frameworks such as the laws of physics, geometry, mechanics, relativity, etc. as well as psycho-cultural conceptualisations such as surrealism, cyberspace, virtual space, etc.; the third is space as we live and represent it psychologically, emotionally, culturally and imaginatively to ourselves and each other. Again, they are not hierarchically related but are held in dialectical tension.[23]

As a way of exploring what Lefebvre's three categories of human spatial practice might look like when engaging with Harvey's three categories of socially produced space, Harvey juxtaposed them in a matrix.[24]

The matrix is a visual aid to understanding the complex interactions between Lefebvre's spatial practice (the horizontal top categories) and Harvey's socially produced space (the vertical categories). Harvey makes no greater claim for his matrix than that he finds "it helpful to read across or down the matrix of categories and to imagine complex scenarios of combination."[25] It is a convenient checklist (though not an exhaustive one) against which any theorisation of how we apprehend and act in space can be tested for its adequacy.[26] I've found in my teaching and research that it provides a very rich way of approaching the complexities of spatial



A general matrix of spatialities (the Harvey-Lefebvre matrix)

and social reality in journalism while maintaining an overall coherence and order in the analysis.[27]

To facilitate the interpretation of this framework for journalism, in Table 4.1 I have rephrased and simplified the descriptions of each intersection or slot of the matrix and used spatial terms. In the next chapter I will substitute temporal terms, and it's important to remember that outside of absolute space and time – that is, the top row in each version – space and time cannot be considered separately because we are dealing with change and process.

We can say several things about the use of the matrix for journalism. Firstly, the matrix is not a "theory of space." Rather it represents the product of the "conceptual rubbing together" of the theories that Harvey and Lefebvre have developed in their own attempts to understand spatiality – Harvey in theorising the ways in which spatiotemporality exists in our universe as a result of natural and social production, and Lefebvre in theorising the ways in which human practice engages with the world as it finds it. The matrix is an attempt to categorise the complexities of the interaction between the physical and social worlds: the materiality of space

Table 4.1 Modified Harvey-Lefebvre matrix (spatial)

	Experienced space	*Conceived space*	*Lived space*
Absolute space	Observable facts	Logical framework for identifying facts	IEC* engagement with facts
Relative space/time	Observable processes producing facts	Logical framework for apprehending processes	IEC* engagement with processes
Relational space/time	Invisible values and forces at work to produce processes and facts	Logical framework for apprehending the relationships of forces and values	IEC* engagement with relationships and values

*IEC** imaginative, emotional, cultural, etc.

and its production, apprehension and representation. It is a metatheoretical checklist that identifies what sorts of dimensions need to be considered when dealing with any given phenomena in the world. Underneath metatheory will sit the theory specific to the specified phenomena: e.g., climate theory and practice for climate change, military theory and practice for war, medical theory and practice for health. The matrix is a very useful tool for journalism research because it gives a structure to reflexivity and also points to the interdisciplinarity that is a core aspect of journalism. For example, we have political history, political geography, and political journalism requiring an understanding of political realities, political theory, and political practice; economic history, economic geography, and economic journalism requiring an understanding of economic realities, economic theory, and economic practice; and so on.

Secondly, while absolute and relative space are open to precise observation, measurement and calibration and therefore direct verification, relational space is not measureable, though it can be understood and qualitatively calibrated from its effects in relative and absolute space. Harvey derives this conclusion from the abstract nature of social relations and argues that "[v]alue is, in short, a social relation. As such, it is impossible to measure except by way of its effects (try measuring any social relation directly and you always fail)." And again: "Social relations can only ever be measured by their effects" because social relations are an abstraction – "immaterial but objective" to quote Marx.[28] So, to continue with the classroom spatial analogy, the educational values and pedagogical relations that cause the construction of the arrangement of seating in a certain

configuration in absolute space, and the arrangement of relative spaces with transport and communication technologies in a certain way, can only be detected by observing the material outcomes in time of those relations, viz. the distribution of patterns of speaking and listening among participants, the production of objects (essays, examination papers) by some participants (students) for assessment and grading by other participants (teachers), and the effects contingent upon those grades in the broader social world.

News values are similarly abstract and invisible but very real, as journalists use them to make decisions and act in space and time. Marx used the term "concrete abstractions" to describe such invisible values that drive social processes. Values are relational concepts; that is, they are brought into being socially and don't exist outside social relations. I will discuss news values in detail in Chap. 6, but note the essential point here: that while news values are social and invisible, the facts and processes that journalists observe and report are empirically observable and verifiable. This means that journalistic practice involves a constant dialectical engagement between the materiality of evidence and the abstractions of meaning and value, and it cannot be any other way. Journalism practice necessarily involves engaging with the verifiable evidence of absolute and relative space to produce meaning in relational space, and that practice involves the production of the evidence in physical reports, the reproduction of conceptual systems for understanding the evidence, and lived space where journalists and their audiences experience the psychological, cultural, emotional and imaginative dimensions of the information they are producing and receiving. Or to put it more pithily, the Harvey-Lefebvre matrix can be applied to journalism.

Thirdly, each slot or intersection within the matrix is a fractal dimension of a spatial whole and, because each dimension is socially produced in its meaning, each can be contested as a field by the participants, which will bring us to Bourdieu's theory of contestation within the field, but in a way that displaces the spatial metaphor of the field into the specifically defined spatiotemporal characteristics of the matrix. This generates a framework of enormous complexity and subtlety that is amenable to empirical and conceptual interrogation and testing. It should again be emphasised that Harvey did not propose that each slot be interrogated in isolation but in dialectical relation to other slots. As an indication of what such an interrogation might be, in the remainder of this chapter I will consider aspects of the case studies from Haacke and Stone that were described in earlier

chapters to see how well they accommodate the matrix's categories and what insights this approach might offer.

A word of warning: to some readers this detailed working through the matrix may become an eye-glazing experience, and for them I would suggest skipping through to the next chapter once they feel they grasp the application of the theory to practice. However, for any journalist reflexively acting in real time as they research a story, this level of detail and complexity is familiar and essential to their decision making, and will indeed be scrutinised by their critics or investigators seeking to assess the quality of their work and the validity of the truths they are asserting. I will work vertically down the three columns of the matrix in succession, starting in the top left corner.

Absolute/Experienced Space

This is the space of empirically observable, verifiable, stable facts. There are many facts that contribute to an artwork and that surround and condition its interpretation, and in Haacke's case subsequently become incorporated into the artwork itself. In the case of the *Shapolsky* and *Goldman* real estate works rejected by the Guggenheim in 1971, those facts included detailed information from the municipal records about the individual properties, photographs of the buildings on those properties, details of the ownership links among the portfolio of properties as of a specified date, a map of the property locations, and information about the institutions providing mortgage finance for the properties. Taken together, these facts could arguably be evidence of a property purchase and wealth accumulation process, and a set of relationships between the property owners and residents. Relational values could be attached to the state of the properties, the capital accumulation process, and the owner-renter relationships. Certainly Messer interpreted the statements of fact to be bearers of values. The veracity of these facts therefore was a significant factor in the status of the artworks; Messer claimed that his inability to allocate staff resources to verify them was a reason for his cancelling the show. Conversely, while Haacke offered to make minimal attempts to disguise the actual identities of Shapolsky, diLorenzo and Goldman, the verifiable accuracy of the information was a core element of the works presented as a "real-time social system." The information was typical of official sources that could be cited by an investigating journalist and that could be used as evidence in a court of law. Haacke was similarly rigorous with his reportage of facts

in subsequent artworks using quoted information including the *Bunch of Asparagus*, the critiques of corporate sponsorship, and the apartheid South Africa series of the 1980s.[29]

It is very clear from Messer's account of his reasoning for cancelling the 1971 Haacke exhibition that he was taking into account a set of facts and events at other art institutions and also in the broader public sphere. "The incident at the Guggenheim Museum is, perhaps, the most dramatic among similar conflicts but by no means an isolated one. Parallel developments have occurred in other museums and more of the same may be predicted unless there is a change of attitude among artists as well as among museums."[30] This brings into play not only the empirical characteristics of the Guggenheim as a venue, but also those of other institutions to which the Guggenheim references itself as well as the facts of protests by artists at those venues, and the evidence those facts provided of an escalating process of confrontation between artists and museums.

The "not art but journalism" accusation also involves a comparison with the material characteristics of other organisations or venues where the information about Shapolsky was published as journalism, including the *New York Times*, the *Village Voice*, and National Public Radio. Messer, Haacke and soon-to-be-dismissed curator Fry were each making reasoned and conceptualised arguments about the value and meaning of the art, and each of them were living the negotiation and cancellation process emotionally and personally as well as intellectually. And at the centre of this complex process involving relativities and relationships were the material, verifiable truth claims in the artworks about the absolute reality of a set of real estate holdings.

Haacke's works were indexical in their relationship to reality; that is to say, there was a direct, verifiable relationship between elements in the work of art – photographs, names, historical details of careers and property purchases – and objects in the real world – buildings, people, contracts and official records. On the other hand, the Reichstag work *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* was symbolic, meaning that there was no direct, empirically verifiable relationship to other objects in the real world but ones that could be imputed or imagined by individuals or groups. Nonetheless, the garden patch of random plants and weeds was a proposed object in absolute space, and so was the neon sign in its midst saying TO THE POPULATION. The Reichstag building has its own specific characteristics as an object, and the decision to be made was whether the object of the garden should exist within the object of the Reichstag building. The

facts of the proposed garden and sign were submitted to the committee process for evaluation and approval/rejection, and then subsequently to the full Bundestag for a vote. Although the committee and parliamentary deliberations were about values and interpretation, the factual characteristics of the proposed artwork were the object to which the values were being attached through a process of symbolic interpretation.

The same process of fact discovery and verification in absolute space applied to Stone's analysis of the Korean War. The absolute spaces of Manchuria, Chicago and the Korean peninsula were significant for the identification and verification of the soybean market manipulation, which was a process bringing certain financial interests into a structured relationship of potential profit or loss dependent on how the market price moved, which in turn depended on whether hostilities broke out. The facts as ascertained in a US Senate Committee inquiry about the soybean market corner were taken as verification of the market dealings, similarly to the way the facts of the municipal records were taken as evidence of the facts of property value and ownership by Shapolsky. The facts of Socrates' teaching as reported by Plato and others were significant for his relations with his pupils and his fellow citizens. The facts of who participated in the two periods of dictatorship in late fifth-century Athens and whether or not they were students of (i.e., in a relationship of influence with) Socrates were relevant to his relationship with the citizenry and to the initiation of the trial proceedings. The facts of what Socrates did and did not say at his trial are important evidence of the process and the relationship that Socrates was asserting to the process and the jury.

Relative/Experienced Space

Relative space links time and space, and so involves activity, movement and process. The facts of Haacke's artworks and the Guggenheim exhibition, the decisions and communications about them, and the conflicts and demonstrations were all produced as a result of dynamic processes, and those processes were largely verifiable for an interested observer. Even when specific factual details were subject to claims and denials, followed by counterclaims and further denials, the disputes themselves became part of the process. Such a process of contested factuality and interpretation is the very stuff of journalism, and in the context of his work Haacke realised that, when dealing with the production of meaning through a work, the contestation over its meaning becomes a fact intrinsic to the work itself.

The same imperative applies in journalism, where stories become facts that beget further stories.

The presentation in the *Manet-PROJEKT '74* work of information about Hermann Abs, who was an officeholder and important person in the museum's establishment, was a further development of the concept of a real-time social system. There was a sense in which the artwork was an open-ended process because, whatever the response of the institution might be to the provocation, it would become part of the work. The simultaneous exhibition of the rejected work in a nearby gallery underlined the significance of the commissioning museum's rejection for the meaning of the work. If the museum had chosen not to respond to the content of the work, or even to embrace and endorse it, it would have cast the work in a different light, perhaps as a celebration of the museum's enlightened transparency or perhaps in pursuit of a strategy of repressive tolerance. This process is quite comparable to an interview with a journalist, where the response by the interviewee to a particular question, whatever that response might be, becomes a part of the ongoing dynamic driving the interview. After *Manet-PROJEKT '74*, no museum or gallery attempted to censor a commissioned work by Haacke, although the city of Köln did with the *Westkunst* Exhibition of 1981, which led to a repeat of the 1974 fiasco. However, for years there was a dearth of commissions from public institutions and some minor negotiations at some other institutions about the terms of some exhibits,[31] which amounted to a *de facto* recognition of the processual nature of Haacke's art and potential pitfalls to be avoided. The next institution to consider censoring Haacke's work was the Bundestag in 2000, with predictable results in terms of the incorporation of the politicians' response as an amplifying element into the artwork itself. In all these instances, the processes of negotiation and rejection/acceptance produced new facts that became evidence of the values attached to the artwork and its relational meanings.

Relational/Experienced Space

Relations are always invisible, and their force has to be induced from evidence of impact in visible processes and the resultant facts. The point of the provocation in Haacke's work is the same as that for a journalist's question in an interview; by participating in the process, the respondents reveal observable evidence of what their position might be with respect to the issue at stake. Arguably Haacke's intuition about what is at stake in a

particular artwork and what the range of potential responses might be is akin to a journalist's news sense at work in the selection and interrogation of a source. Certainly his capacity to generate news coverage in the arts and broader press of controversies surrounding his work indicates that journalists' recognition of the controversies as newsworthy accords with his sense of value, which is something that Bourdieu complimented him on.[32] While the position of a protagonist on an issue is perhaps foreseeable, it is never verifiable until they participate in a process and create facts such as making a statement or decision.

In *Hidden History*, Stone interpreted the facts of the soybean market corner to imply a set of relations among Nationalist Chinese, South Korean and North American political and military figures around the wish, or perhaps plan, for hostilities to commence in Korea in June 1950. There was evidence in official and press accounts of a lack of fighting between the UN forces under MacArthur and the pursuing North Korean and Chinese forces during MacArthur's retreat from the Yalu River back past Pyongyang and Seoul into South Korea. Stone interpreted these facts to mean the relationship between the two armies was not what MacArthur was claiming, and therefore he imputed another set of tense relations between MacArthur and Truman over whether China should be bombed and invaded as the real driving force of the process of retreat.

The facts of Socrates' address to the jury in his trial, which included insults to the democratic citizenry and a failure to address the question of freedom of speech before the verdict, and that Socrates was reported by Xenophon to have embraced the prospect of death before the "ills of old age overtook him"[33], are evidence advanced by Stone that Socrates was taking a discernible stance in relation to the values of democracy and free speech at issue for him in the trial, in order to encourage a conviction and the death penalty.

Each of these three examples at this intersection of experienced and relational space is a demonstration of the way in which values (including news values) are powerful drivers of processes that produce facts such as military retreats and jury verdicts. Journalism is a constant dialectic between the observable facts and process of a story and the significance and value to be interpreted from those facts. In Harvey's terms, journalism is a constant dialectic interaction between absolute, relative, and relational space. However, journalism doesn't operate only in the matrix's vertical column of observable facts; it also operates within and helps to reproduce conceptual frameworks for understanding the facts, processes

and relations in its reporting. We turn to the matrix's middle vertical column of Lefebvre's conceived space.

Absolute/Conceived Space

It is in conceived space that theory resides, and for journalism, like history, it is necessarily interdisciplinary. It brings the journalistic research practices (to ascertain and verify the current state of play of relevant facts, the processes producing those facts, and the relationships and values driving the processes) into partnership with the conceptual framework applicable to that field, e.g., sports, culture, politics, economics, military conflict, etc.

Artworks such as *Shapolsky*, *Manet-PROJECT '74*, and the succession of political projects about apartheid, political censorship and corporate patronage of cultural institutions through the 1970s and 1980s only work if the artist/journalist/viewer understands the conceptual framework within which the object is located. With *Shapolsky* they have to appreciate the concepts of cadastral space, private property, rental, mortgages and so on in order to understand the possible meanings of the information they are receiving. These conceptual frameworks may be multidimensional, intersecting, contradictory and/or ambiguous, and the response to the work – for example, by Messer who saw *Shapolsky* as potentially libellous and certainly political – highlights certain potential interpretations as more significant and powerful than others. Similarly, the controversy only makes sense as competing conceptualisations of what a contemporary art gallery could and should be, and the battle was joined physically in the absolute space of the gallery, firstly in terms of whether the artwork could occupy the space, and then latterly by the demonstrating artists protesting Messer's decision. The same conceptualisation underpins the *Manet-PROJEKT'74* work; the posting of the information about Abs' past career as a Nazi government official within the gallery's confines presupposes a conceptualisation of the challenge to be posed by the juxtaposition of that information with the gallery context, as distinct from some other absolute space like the pages of a newspaper or a billboard. Again, the symbolic significance of a patch of weeds in the Reichstag building depends on a conceptual understanding of what are weeds as distinct from cultivated plants and what the Reichstag building is compared to a vacant block of land, a rural field or a private garden. It also involves the conceptualisation of ethnic diversity and what that idea might mean in the context of a German national monument.

Stone's analysis of the facts of the Korean conflict and of Socrates' trial both depend on readers' understanding of concepts such as war, commodity market manipulation, conflict between politicians and military leaders, freedom of speech and democracy versus dictatorship in ancient Athens. Those concepts and the history of their application to particular spaces such as Korea in the early 1950s and Athens in 399 BCE provide a context or "map of meaning"[34] that journalists, in this case Stone, use to locate the logical or conceptual significance of facts. For example, there is no disagreement among any sources about the fact of the destruction of all eight US B-29 bombers on 23 October 1951 in a bombing raid over Namsi in North Korea. Stone's argument about the significance of that destruction for US nuclear deterrence capability depends on a conceptual framework that he shared with his audience: that nuclear superiority was an advantage the USA held over its Cold War opponents and that the USA would not risk an accidental loss of a nuclear weapon in combat, both for the value of the weapon in enemy hands and also because the fact of a loss would demonstrate military weakness and incapacity to deliver on a threat. Without that understanding, a critic could argue that Stone's argument was flawed, which nobody did, not even his harshest critics who abhorred the book's publication. Indeed, it was precisely the interpretation of the known facts within a cogent conceptual framework that made the book so dangerous to those critics.

Relative/Conceived Space

This intersection is about how process is conceived. Haacke's work ever since the early 1960s exhibits an acute sensitivity to the understanding of change and process in space and time. The *Condensation Cube* is exemplary in this respect, and the aftermath of the *Shapolsky* censorship and the follow-up projects labelled as "institutional critique" of the 1970s and 1980s exemplify Haacke's conceptualisation of his art as an open-ended process where the initial proposal and constructed work were merely the starting points and catalyst for a developing process that helped define the artwork's meaning. The information-based artworks depend for their veracity on recognised processes such as municipal records of land attributes and transactions and historical data about art sales and employment. *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* elevated the conceptualisation of process onto another quantum level because the absolute mundane capriciousness of the physical artefact – a garden box of plants randomly seeded from the

soil and air – when juxtaposed with a word in neon could predictably precipitate a significant controversy in a national monument, the facts of which process would then be absorbed into the artwork itself. Indeed, this outcome was a safe bet because, if the Bundestag and its art advisory committee had unanimously endorsed the project, that would have been a recognition of its artistic merits and an endorsement of its contrast with the words DEM DEUTSCHEN VOLKE on the building's façade – a sophisticated conceptualisation indeed of the process to be initiated by the proposal.

Journalistically it has its parallel in a well-structured interview by an experienced journalist when it comes to the point of the punchline question – the reply to which, whatever it might be, is meaningful because the question itself has made the requisite argument. Stone's account of the process and timing of the soybean market manipulation performs the same function: readers understand the interests at play and the profits to be delivered if certain processes occur, including the outbreak of hostilities and the collapse of soybean supplies from Manchuria. The failure of the US Senate Committee investigating the events to reach a clear conclusion doesn't undercut the conceptual argument about what the process was, and readers will make their own interpretations of the strength of the evidence. In Athens, the flight of Socrates' student Alcibiades to oligarchic Sparta from democratic Athens during the Peloponnesian War and his leading role in promoting the 411 BCE Dictatorship of the Four Hundred are advanced by Stone as an explanation for the allegation against Socrates of "corrupting the youth", which he interpreted not as a moral but as a political allegation.[35] In fact, the arguments of *Hidden History* and *Socrates* are thoroughly conceptual in terms of process and what they reveal about relationships; Stone in both cases is presenting a revisionist interpretation of the known facts to argue for alternative conceptualisations of the processes and of the values and relations among the major protagonists that are driving the processes.

Relational/Conceived Spaces

This is the space where relations and values are conceptualised. In the case of Haacke, the processes of institutional rejection depended on the relationships between the protagonists to the conflicts initiated by the artworks: for example, Messer, Fry, Haacke, Buren, the members of the AWC, Hilton Kramer at the *NYT*, and members of the Guggenheim

Foundation for the cancelled 1971 exhibition. All of these protagonists developed positions in the conflict and consolidated or modified those positions as the process of the conflict and its aftermath got underway. Each of the protagonists was able to articulate arguments and position statements based on their conceptualisation of what was at stake and what the likely consequences of the conflict might be as it unfolded. A key issue for Messer was whether art in general and the Guggenheim in particular could have a direct indexical relationship to a specific social reality such as the real estate system in New York. Once the empirical reality of the *Shapolsky* and *Goldman* works had revealed the conceptual attitudes and values of the Guggenheim, Haacke and other arts community protagonists to such information-based works, their actions and reactions dialectically constituted the process that ensued, and a contested "map of meaning" was produced in which the protagonists were seen to occupy a set of positions in relationship to each other and the values at stake. A similar process took place in the Bundestag with *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* almost thirty years later.

Stone's journalism about the Korean War and the trial of Socrates described and analysed parallel situations: shifting relations and developing positions occupied by protagonists in the respective absolute and conceived spaces, which developed dialectically as the conflicts progressed and events occurred. The meaning and news value in a story reside in the impact on relationships among the "players" of events as they occur in the developing processes. In both cases, Stone saw news or journalistic value in conceptions that challenged the mainstream views of the relations among the protagonists and the processes that were underway, and therefore he adopted a revisionist or contrarian relationship to those mainstream views and the institutions that upheld them. Journalists always have a finely-tuned sensitivity to the orthodoxies and politics of their workplace hierarchies. Journalism is not only about facts and ideas, it's also about emotions and interests and the ways in which journalists and readers carry on their careers and lives in relation to the stories that journalists tell. This brings us to Lefebvre's third column in the matrix – lived space.

Absolute/Lived Spaces

As a conceptual artist, Haacke is very much focused on the ideas and concepts linking the artwork to reality, where possible fusing the two, as Fry recognised.[36] Similarly, Stone was very much directed to the analysis and

reconceptualisation of the events and situations he was reporting on, in our case studies the Korean War and Socrates' trial. But that did not mean for either practitioner that their work was a purely cerebral affair. As practitioners they experienced emotionally and personally the hostile reactions to their work, and subsequently the widespread celebrations of it. For their audiences too, an understanding of the works could lead to a social repositioning of their sense of themselves, with consequences for how they might act and the social relations they might enter into. In Bourdieu's terms, lived space is a prime location of capital and habitus, which are also dialectically engaged with conceived and perceived space.

Haacke experienced and participated in the factuality of the protest demonstrations and the organisational meetings, and the writing of documents and letters of the Art Workers Coalition in the late 1960s. The experience and interpretation of those events had the long-term effect of radically politicising their understanding of the art world for Buren, Haacke and others, as recounted in Chap. 2. Emotions included anger and solidarity as well as frustration and confusion, and also the imagining of alternative futures for the institutions and the artists. The occurrence of those events afforded the participants the opportunity to develop their subjectivity as artists in ways that would not have happened if the events had not occurred. Conversely, the absence of an event or fact can also be formative, as was the case for Haacke and Fry when the 1971 Guggenheim exhibition was cancelled. Apart from the short-term impact, for Fry, his dismissal from employment as a Guggenheim curator ended his distinguished career in museums; for Haacke, it prepared him for the experience of exclusion in 1974 of *Manet-PROJEKT '74* from the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum, in response to which he was able to arrange for inclusion of images of his work in Buren's work on display in the same exhibition and, when that was censored too, for the artwork to be displayed in a nearby gallery.

Haacke's artworks were personally engaged with by individuals and collectivities such as audiences, museum staff and fellow artists. Visits to the exhibitions and discussions about the merits of the works and the controversies surrounding them could constitute a way of living an aesthetically, culturally and politically engaged lifestyle. The artworks themselves, as new and unprecedented forms of art in the context of major institutions, by their very factual presence broke open at least a localised silence on contentious issues in relation to art, and where there was substantial press coverage the absolute space of the discussion ranged much wider

to encompass dispersed communities. *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* required members of the Bundestag to imagine the consequences and make personal decisions to approve or disapprove the commissioning of the work, and subsequently to live the project by choosing whether or not to bring soil from one's electorate. The choice of soil – for the first donor it was from a Jewish cemetery in his electorate[37] – required producing a statement of imagined community and identity around a socially polarising axis using the material facts of the soil and the garden.

The same process of producing exemplary images and verbal accounts is a staple of journalism, where reporters seek "the human angle" or emotional dimension of a story to invite responses of engagement with or distantiation from their stories by audiences. Stone in both *Hidden History* and *Socrates* presented detailed accounts of the impacts, reactions and decisions of lived experience not only of the leading protagonists such as MacArthur and Socrates, but also of groups such as the napalmed villagers of North Korea, Socrates' students and the citizens of Athens. Both books offer very full accounts of the broad social, cultural and lived contexts within which the conflicts are being waged over ideas and programs of action.

Relative/Lived Spaces

As Fry pointed out in 1971, Haacke's work redefined the relationship between art and reality by taking ongoing processes or provoking new ones that he identified as art objects at the same time as those processes and the artefacts they produced continued their functioning activity in the world. Whether it was a snowstorm; the circulation of information about individuals, communities or corporate entities; or a patch of weeds growing untended, Haacke's interventions identified these processes as parts of artworks and invited observers to recognise themselves in relationship to those processes. Further, his "institutional critique" artworks provoked questions specifically about the socio-political identity of the institutions, their stakeholders and practices, and so invited them to take positions in their continuing practice. The response of the Guggenheim and other elite US art institutions was to reject these artworks and their like for the next several decades and, by so doing, define themselves in opposition to trends that other international institutions were embracing. The continuing rejection of Haacke's work, as Buchloh[38] pointed out, was an active process of identification by those institutions as exclusionary of the sort of

art that Haacke produced and of which he was internationally defined as a leader. In journalistic parlance, the institutions were taking a recognisable editorial stance in relation to certain types of artefacts (stories) and defining themselves aesthetically, culturally and politically by their exclusion or inclusion in their institutional repertoire on a continuing basis.

In *Hidden History*, Stone produced an analysis of the contestation in US government and military circles of the war's conduct and purpose. This analysis included the significance of processes on the ground such as troop advances and withdrawals, commodity market manipulations, aerial bombing campaigns, and political argumentation in Washington. He locates the ideas and arguments being contested in the context of personal histories and ambitions, the habitus and ways of "playing the game" of key decision makers – their broad-based modes of managing their lives, careers and ambitions in the world. Stone does this in even more detail in *Socrates* because he wants to justify his argument that Socrates took a personal and "career" decision to choose martyrdom through the way he managed the process of his trial and execution. The book opens with the observation that

> Had Socrates been acquitted, had he died comfortably of old age, he might now be remembered only as a minor Athenian eccentric, a favourite butt of the comic poets.[39]

It concludes with the judgement that

> His martyrdom, and the genius of Plato, made him a secular saint, the superior man confronting the ignorant mob with serenity and humor. This was Socrates' triumph and Plato's masterpiece. Socrates needed the hemlock, as Jesus needed the Crucifixion, to fulfil a mission. The mission left a stain forever on democracy. That remains Athens' tragic crime.[40]

In the intervening pages, Stone moves between three major "portraits" of Socrates by Plato, Xenophon and Aristophanes, plus other fragmentary accounts, to present his own perspective of Socrates the man and how he played the game: how he constituted himself as an agent or subject in his "lived space." Stone puts this portrait together with a forensic analysis of the spatiotemporality of the trial, in particular the sequence of Socrates' arguments in his defence, to justify his verdict of a self-selected martyrdom when other alternatives were available.

Relational/Lived Spaces

One of the ways in which Haacke's art parallels journalism is his concern with potential audience interpretations. Haacke's work invites observers to consider an approach to the issue of art's relationship to reality that he is exploring and promoting. In essence, through his work he is positioning the institutions and their audiences in relationship to a set of values as protagonists in conflicts that he is identifying and bringing into contention. The works engage directly with contemporary realities, and he presents evidence of the relationships among individuals and organisations. Curators, museum directors, and members of the Bundestag are invited to position themselves by making a judgement about the merit of the artworks, which may well imply a judgement of the social issues raised by the work. The Guggenheim and Wallraf-Richartz-Museum recognised that invitation as a threat to their view of art in relation to their own institutions, and cancelled the exhibitions. The refusal of the invitation to engage is of course a position in itself. Similarly, an informed museum visitor can decline to take a position, but that is also a position in itself. Journalism does the same thing; it reveals information about realities that have an ongoing existence beyond the text of the reportage and invites audiences and readerships to form an opinion and position themselves with respect to a set of attitudes and values about that reality. Members of the audience may also choose to act in their own lives in response to the issues raised. When the Speaker of the Bundestag chose the first bag of dirt for the new garden from the Jewish cemetery in Berlin, he was positioning himself and the institution in relation to the artwork and the issues it raised about diversity among Germans.

Artworks occupy specific absolute spaces in the world, although their images can circulate in the communications media. In contrast, in the age of mechanical and electronic reproduction, the information provided by journalism is not at all site specific at the point of reception and interpretation. Stone offers extensive detail about the values and relations driving the processes in the lived spaces of Korea 1950–1951 and of Athens in the time of Socrates. Audiences are dispersed and indeterminate, and so are the ways in which readers might respond to his work in the privacy of their minds as they think through the ramifications of his analysis for themselves and the world in which they live, and perhaps contemplate attitudes and practices as a result of those new understandings. Certainly, large numbers of people individually and collectively responded positively to Stone's

modus vivendi as a dissident journalist and intellectual. Over the thirty-seven years of his life that followed the publication of *Hidden History*, he moved from pariah to intellectual and journalistic icon. As Guttenplan points out, the power of his radical sociopolitical analysis in combination with his personal lived experience was inspiring to many people and required neutralisation: "his mummification into respectability had been underway for some time" when he died in 1989, and has continued apace since then.[41]

In *The Trial of Socrates*, Stone was attempting to reverse the process of mummification to which Socrates the person and the issues raised by his life and death had been subjected since 399 BCE. In Trouillot's terms, he was reaching into the past to explore, verify, and interpret the evidence in order to produce a history of the past that would simultaneously constitute the present in relation to that past and the past in relation to the present.[42] In this view, time is not so much a divide as a bridge, and Trouillot includes journalism, along with museums, theme parks, and historical fiction in literature and film, as contemporary sites where history is produced in the present in relation to the past.

Temporality is a central issue for methodologies in journalism, on its own and in relation to spatiality, and we turn to discuss it in the next chapter. But before doing that I want to emphasise the significance of what the argument in this chapter has revealed. Firstly, the complexity of Harvey's theory of socially produced space, on its own and in relation to Lefebvre's equally complex theory of socio-spatial practice, is demonstrably applicable to the research practices of journalism. This is the case whether it follows the conventions of mainstream written journalism as with Stone or challenges such conventions in avant-garde conceptual art as with Haacke. The medium and form of the communicative product does not compromise the integrity of the journalism research practices or their openness to theoretical interrogation as practices in their own disciplinary right. Indeed, quite the contrary. The successful application of methodological theory in parallel to Haacke's art and Stone's journalism demonstrates that art can be journalism, and journalism can be art.

Secondly, the journalism of Haacke and Stone is manifestly not "crude empiricism." The theoretical interrogation of their practice is conceptually neither crude nor empiricist. The nuance that can be identified and discussed with respect to the distinct intersecting categories of the Harvey-Lefebvre matrix is also evident in the dialectical interactions between the matrix categories. The methodological complexity is rich and deep, and

can be interrogated and justified or criticised at the most profound levels, as is the case with any scholarly discipline. Tuchman and Carey were correct in their assessment of the significance of space for journalistic practice, and, more particularly, Tuchman was correct to identify the spatiality of journalism practice as a key "theoretic" element.[43]

Thirdly, the matrix as a framework for linking its horizontal axis of spatial practice with the vertical axis of socially produced space is a complex methodological tool for exploring reflexivity. Harvey described it as a checklist, and one can easily imagine a methodical forensic interrogation by a litigant lawyer taking a journalist through each of the categories to dissect the validity of his or her practice. Journalists under the pressure of real-time investigation require an almost intuitive capacity to keep the different dimensions in play as they carry out their research, but for analytical purposes the matrix as a checklist is very useful. The reflexivity of its structure in linking the abstract with the empirical also makes it very compatible with Bourdieu's field theory, which I will examine in Chap. 6. But before that, we should consider the other element of spatiotemporality – the question of time.

Notes

1. Swartz (2013).
2. Harvey (2011: 237).
3. Lefebvre (2014: 503).
4. Mills (2000: 120).
5. Phillips (1976: 71).
6. Benson and Neveu (2005).
7. Harvey (2006: 120, 133).
8. Tuchman (1978: 23).
9. Carey (2000: 23).
10. Carey (2000).
11. Lefebvre (1991).
12. Harvey (1973) and *passim*.
13. Harvey (2009 [1973]: 13–4, 2006: 125ff).
14. Harvey (2009: 13).
15. Harvey (2006: 121).
16. Harvey (2009: 13) emphasis in original.
17. Harvey (2006: 127).
18. Marx (1973: 539).

19. Harvey (2009: 13) emphasis in original.
20. Harvey (2006: 141).
21. Harvey (2006: 131).
22. Lefebvre (1991 [1974]).
23. Harvey (2006: 131).
24. Harvey (2006: 135).
25. Harvey (2006: 134).
26. Harvey (2006: 135).
27. For example, Nash (2015).
28. Harvey (2006: 142).
29. Flügge and Fleck (2006).
30. Messer (1971: 5).
31. Buchloh (1988: 159 n. 6).
32. Bourdieu and Haacke (1995: 19ff).
33. Stone (1989: 183).
34. Hall et al. (1978: 54).
35. Stone (1989: 140ff).
36. Fry (2011: 29).
37. Flügge and Fleck (2006: 222).
38. Buchloh (1984, 2006).
39. Stone (1989: 3).
40. Stone (1989: 230).
41. Guttenplan (2009: 464ff).
42. Trouillot (1995).
43. Tuchman (1978: 23).

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CHAPTER 5

Time, History and Journalism

Temporality is fundamental to journalism. Indeed, for Adam[1] and Carey[2] temporality is definitive because journalism is about the "here and now" as distinct from the "there and then" of history. Both thinkers view the relationship between history and journalism as co-extensive in that they both embrace all of reality and are distinguished only by their temporal domain – past and present, respectively. This perspective makes the issue of time definitive for journalism. Journalists act in real time and in an iterative mode so that they can constantly update their reports. From a breaking news situation to a long-form investigation and analysis, the *sine qua non* of successful journalism is to have the most up-to-date information to report and analyse, that is, to be operating at the cutting edge of the present as distinct from the past or future. Time is also important in another way: every fact that journalists report has to be linked to a locatable point in time and space for the purposes of verification; anything less can be dismissed as speculation, and even if suspected to be true, subject to "plausible deniability" after the event by interested parties. In both of these modes – past/present/future and as event locator – the temporality of truth claims is a key terrain for their contestability in the politics of knowledge.

To open this chapter, I want to examine some of the debates about time in these two modes. This will pose questions about the frontier between present and past/future and therefore the relationship between journalism and history; are they so starkly opposed as some have suggested, or does temporality function as much as a bridge as a divide? And if time and space

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are inextricably linked although still distinct, what are the implications of that for temporality? Put another way, how do ideas about temporality fit into the much more spatially focused spatiotemporal matrix of Harvey and Lefebvre, as explored in the previous chapter? Throughout the discussion I will consider how the works of Haacke and Stone illustrate the arguments on these issues.

Alfred Gell's *The Anthropology of Time*[3] is an authoritative recent account, from the perspective of analytical philosophy, of some different ways that time has been conceptualised. It addresses precisely the two journalistic requirements of conceptualising the present in contrast to the past and the future, and of using time as a fact locator for observation and verification purposes. Gell supports Gale's[4] taxonomy that all conceptions of temporality can be categorised as either A-series or B-series.[5] B-series time[6] is chronometric (before/after): every particle of time, no matter how small and fleeting, can be given a unique name relative to a standard reference point such as the notional birth of Christ, and that particle of time can be conceptualised as a point on a grid or line that is unique and not replicable. Particles or segments of time have a unique name in such terms as year, day, hour, minute and second, and they have an unchanging relationship with each other as they stand in serried rank, so that every unique event or object that exists, has existed, or can be predicted to exist in the future can be located by its precise and unchanging temporal referent as before or after some other temporal referent.

By contrast, the A-series[7] is the phenomenological time of past, present and future codified by Husserl, in which the past and the future are defined by their relationship with a definitively unstable present, characterised metaphorically as an impossibly narrow razor's edge that can never be stably identified. Any given moment or particle of time moves in one direction and only once between each of the three states of being, from future to present to past, and is constantly shifting its quantifiable relationship to an ephemeral present, moving out of a distant future towards the present, passing it, and then receding into the ever dimmer recesses of the past.

For phenomenologists such as Husserl, as the future approaches and becomes proximate to the present, it becomes subject to "protentions" of meaning, as actors in an ever-shifting present anticipate looming future developments and their implications for what will become the present. Likewise, as events pass from the present to the past they are subject to "retentions," whereby meanings are produced and modified in terms of

their relationship to a developing present.[8] Protentions and retentions modify the interpretation of the significance of future and past events according to the perspective of the shifting present. Depending on the scale of the protentions and retentions, this can lead to a very narrow temporal range and context for interpretation, which is why news journalists tend to avoid explicit interpretation and restrict themselves to "just the facts," which consequently exposes them to the charges of crude empiricism and shallowness of interpretation.

Journalists are immersed in these twin temporal frameworks as they propose stories to their editors/producers, organise their movement and communications to do the research, confirm the veracity of facts and events, and then work to deadline to produce their reports. Journalists act in the present (A-series), anticipating (protending) events and the denouement of processes in public life such as political or industrial conflicts, in order to allocate their scarce attention and resources within space and time (Tuchman's web of facticity), and also re-evaluating the immediate past with the benefit of hindsight (retentions). At the same time, they need to be able to verify any truth claim by a precise location of events in space and time (B-series).

As ways of conceptualising time, these two alternative modes of the A- and B-series sit within the middle vertical column of the Harvey-Lefebvre matrix, that is, Lefebvre's "space of representation" or conceived space. Gell insisted that time "is intrinsically unitary and unifying – allow[ing] for the coordination of diverse processes; biological processes with social ones, psychological or subjective processes with objective, clock-timed ones, and so forth."[9] Further, Gell insists "on a distinction between time and the processes which happen in time … [and has] opposed the trend of thought which distinguishes different species and varieties of time on the basis of different processes happening in time."[10] The processes that happen in time must be distinguished from time itself, if time is to have any valid referential role as a common denominator across the sciences, both natural and social. Using Harvey's nomenclature, this characterises both Gell's conceptions as "absolute time," comparable to "absolute space" as an empty universal referent for the objects and processes that exist within them. Conceptually, absolute time and space belong to the physics of Newton and the ontology of Descartes, and they occur in the top horizontal row of the Harvey-Lefebvre matrix discussed in Chap. 4. The concept of absolute time (i.e., time as distinct from space) would sit within the middle spot in the top row of the matrix.

But as Harvey argued with respect to space, we need to be able to conceptualise the spatiotemporality of movement and change, for that is what occurs to objects in time and space. While the consideration of specific material processes occurring in time can legitimately be excluded (as Gell says) from the abstract conceptualisation of time, that conceptualisation still has to encompass the logical reality that space and time are not empty, material processes do occur, and further, any process that occurs in time necessarily must also occur in space. In philosophy, this is the position articulated by the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus when he said that "[o]ne cannot step twice into the same river, nor can one grasp any mortal substance in a stable condition but it scatters and again gathers: it forms and dissolves, and approaches and departs"[11] and thereby suggested that change or movement is a fundamental reality that needs to be explained. This is the philosophical position that Stone endorsed against the static definitional approach of Socrates,[12] and it is fundamental to Adam's definition of news as "a shift in the state of things."[13] In mathematics, it is the world of calculus, of measuring rates and effects of change. Time can be conceptualised as duration between points in the B-series during which processes occur, and a process can also be considered to be an extended A-series present, but temporality as change has its own ontological specificity distinct from that of points of time. Movement, process, and change are a fundamental universal reality, and they flow from the fact that time and space are inextricably linked. There is no corner or conception of our universe from which movement and change are precluded, no point of stillness in time or space that is not subject to change and process, and no point in space or time that cannot be subdivided *ad infinitum* into ever smaller points and therefore be measured as distance and duration.

Within the conception of time as process, the borders between the past, present and future are ambiguous. Movement and change are not random or chaotic, even though they may appear so in their complexity, because all movement and change is brought about by the exercise of force (social or physical) within a relational field of forces and is therefore appreciable in qualitative or quantitative terms. The structure of a process is produced in the past and imposed on the present and future, and is subject to modification and possibly termination brought about by forces exercised in the present and future. In that sense the present of any continuing process incorporates the past and the future, and conversely the continuing present is extended across the past and future of a process. This is the point

that Stone derives from Heraclitus's river aphorism, and his related aphorism about the identity of opposites:

> The way up and the way down, he once said, is the same …. Rivers constantly change and are never quite the same …. But in another sense – despite these changes – rivers have an enduring and unmistakable identity. The Amazon, the Mississippi, the Danube and the Ganges have existed for millennia, in much the same course and place, distinctly recognizable despite constant changes …. Change is a constant, but so is identity. The whole truth can only be achieved by taking both into consideration. This is the ultimate inspiration of the Hegelian dialectic.[14]

For the duration of any particular process, there is a dialectical structure to the unfolding events that incorporates the past and future of the specific process as well as possibly other intersecting processes. In this way, journalists and all human beings work both within and across temporal boundaries in the daily practice of their professions and lives. The boundaries themselves can be sites of struggle as the parameters of a Bourdieusian field. Journalists have to anticipate the relevance and likelihood of future events, their characteristics and their meaning, in order to be on location at the correct time and to ask the right questions, such as for a press conference or interview. Anticipation depends on the continuation and predictability of a process to generate future outcomes. Predictability depends upon the interpretation of past events and processes. The same temporal process of referencing the past to predict the future applies to assessments of the relations among agents or forces that might be driving the processes and the application of value and meaning to those events and processes. For example, a journalist's interview with a politician will have a structure of questions followed by answers pursuing an overall pattern and goals determined by the substantive content, the chosen angles of approach by the interviewer and interviewee, the empirical facts and conceptual themes the interviewer and interviewee are each trying to communicate to the audience, and their respective performative tactics, strategies, and mutual responses. On the part of both participants there may have been years of experience at the interview process, accumulated wisdom and knowledge about the subject matter of the interview, and on both parts an appreciation of the larger trajectory of their goals and interests. A multiplicity of processes will converge in a particular interview performance, the results of which may reveal new information that will feed into understandings of past events and facts, modify the structure of understandings that will

then influence future research and interviews, and generally enable the participants and their audience to make assessments of likely future developments. The space in which the interview takes place will also be a factor. The power relations in a one-to-one interview in a live broadcast studio are very different from a prerecorded press conference with many journalists present. An interview is one microcosm of a wide range of journalistic research methods, and our case studies of Haacke's and Stone's work are larger and more complex examples of similar structural processes and analyses.

So journalists continually draw on previous experience in order to make judgements about meaning in the present and future, as do audiences when they interpret the reports that journalists produce. Stuart Hall referred to these background frames of reference as "maps of meaning":

> An event only 'makes sense' if it can be located within a range of known social and cultural identifications. If newsmen (sic) did not have available – in however routine a way – such cultural 'maps' of the social world, they could not 'make sense' for their audiences of the unusual, unexpected and unpredicted events which form the basic content of what is 'newsworthy'.[15]

Hall followed the early Soviet linguist Vološinov in characterising the processes of meaning production as "sites of struggle" and Gramsci in arguing that such struggles had to be understood in their historical context.[16] Hall was concerned with the issue of ideology and the central role of the media in its reproduction. In the tradition of western cultural Marxism to that point he was mainly concerned with the role of ideology in securing the hegemony of ruling class interests in contemporary developed economies. However, if "site of struggle" means anything, it must be that the outcome of contestation cannot be preordained. Further, the notion of historically derived "maps of meaning," which constitute a site of struggle for contemporary practitioners and audiences, applies not only to journalism, but also to the canon of academic disciplines, as Hall himself noted in discussing the emergence of British cultural studies in conflict with the traditional humanities disciplines.[17] Arguably, journalism as a discipline is undergoing a similar process.

A parallel instance is the role of temporality in scholarship through the well-documented and debated phenomenon of the "historical turn" in various humanities and social sciences disciplines. Working in the Chicago School tradition with its affinity for journalism, C. Wright Mills discussed

the "Uses of History" in *The Sociological Imagination*.[18] If we substitute the term journalism for history and its cognates we get both a sense of the complementarity of the two disciplines and also of how the methodological issues for journalism's "maps of meaning" relate to those of history:

> The master task of the ~~historian~~ journalist is to keep the human record straight, but that is indeed a deceptively simple statement of aim. The ~~historian~~ journalist represents the organised ~~memory~~ awareness of mankind (sic), and that ~~memory~~ awareness, as written ~~history~~ journalism, is enormously malleable. It changes, often quite drastically, from one ~~generation~~ group of ~~historians~~ journalists to another – and not merely because more detailed research later introduces new facts and documents into the record. It changes also because of changes in the points of interest and the current framework within which the record is built. These are the criteria of selection from the innumerable facts available, and at the same time the leading interpretations of their meaning. The ~~historian~~ journalist cannot avoid making a selection of facts, although he (sic) may attempt to disclaim it by keeping his interpretations slim and circumspect.[19]

Mills then goes on to make an observation about historians that is congruent with the "crude empiricism" allegations against journalists. It also underlines the extent to which journalism and history are sister disciplines, and why a rupture with anti-theoretical conceptions of journalism to match that of historiography is long overdue:

> All these perils of the ~~historian's~~ journalist's enterprise make it one of the most perilous of the human disciplines, which makes the calm unawareness of many ~~historians~~ journalists all the more impressive. Impressive, yes; but also rather unsettling. I suppose there have been periods when the perspectives were rigid and monolithic and in which ~~historians~~ journalists could remain unaware of the themes taken for granted. But ours is not such a period; if ~~historians~~ journalists have no 'theory', they may provide materials for the writing of ~~history~~ journalism, but they cannot themselves write it. They can entertain, but they cannot keep the record straight. That task now requires explicit attention to much more than just 'the facts'.[20]

"Just the facts" is the touchstone of so-called "objective" journalism in the twentieth century, and it leaves journalism easy prey to the charge of positivism or a crude empiricism. But as discussed in Chap. 1, facts for journalists are "pertinent information gathered by professionally validated methods specifying the relationship between what is known and how it is

known."[21] Professionally validated methods for identifying facts require conceptually justifiable criteria and practices for their observation, recognition, selection, accurate recording, assemblage and transmission, not to mention their interpretation and the production of meaning from them by both the journalists and their audiences. Mills' argument for theory and historical context in the social sciences applies equally to journalism, both in terms of the object of journalistic research – that is, an interdisciplinary appreciation of the historical context of the facts and events being researched – and also in terms of the historical context for the journalistic context and practices themselves. In recognising the role of historical context in the contemporary world – bringing the past into focus with the present – Hall's "maps of meaning" are sites of struggle for all forms of knowledge production, including not only the humanities and social sciences but also the natural sciences, as Thomas Kuhn argued in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.[22]

This is a view of the past and present that is one of active mutual engagement in a continuing process of discovery, interpretation and reinterpretation. The past is constituted not only in relationship to an ever-shifting present, but socially the present is constituted in relationship to an ever-shifting past as it is known to or discovered afresh by practitioners in the present. In this view, both the past and present coexist within each other as far as our understandings go, and in this way the notion of the present can extend to encompass the whole of the period where specified material and conceptual processes can be held to be underway. It is the processes and the relationships of forces that drive them that characterise the duration of the "present," and their scale can vary from the geological to the quantum levels. At one end of the spectrum, for example, the Holocene epoch (c. 11700 BP to the present) of the Quaternary period (2.5 million BP to the present) is identified as an interglacial period within which the Neolithic revolution in human capacities occurred, and all subsequent technological culture. Some scientists have suggested the need for a further subdivision of the Anthropocene, starting with the Industrial Revolution, to distinguish the period in which human activity has been influencing the very constitution of the atmosphere through pollution and global warming.[23] This suggestion itself is now a "site of struggle" within the relevant scientific organisations, as well as in the public and journalistic discussion, but for some people at least the notion of the present with respect to climate change is being conceived in geological timeframes.[24] The point for our purposes is that as soon as one shifts from a conception of time as

points or particles (before/after or future/present/past) to a conception as continuing processes, the definition of the present is available for contestation and reinterpretation. That realisation immediately reframes the issue of temporality, or the past/ present distinction, as a bridge linking journalism with history as much as a barrier dividing the two, and that in turn opens up the field of historiography as highly relevant to methodology in journalism.

Michel-Rolph Trouillot was a historian who explicitly nominated journalism as one among several contemporary truth-seeking practices with a reciprocal link to historiography.[25] He has made several observations about the practice of history and the past that are highly relevant to journalism. Firstly, "each historical narrative renews a claim to truth."[26] He expounds upon this in the notes: "the narrative makes a claim to knowledge: that which is said to have happened is said to be known to have happened. Every historian delivers a narrative with a certificate of authenticity, however qualified."[27] Consequently, history that falsifies truth claims is not fiction but fake. "Empirical exactitude as defined and verified in specific context is necessary to historical production. But empirical exactitude alone is not enough. Historical representations … cannot be conceived only as vehicles for the transmission of knowledge. They must establish some relationship to that knowledge. Further, not any relationship will do. Authenticity is required, lest the representation becomes a fake, a morally repugnant spectacle."[28] The same strictures, word for word, apply to journalism. The issue of authenticity linked to temporality is the key one that Stone raises with respect to Socrates' denunciation of his death sentence as a breach of free speech principles *after* but not *before* the sentence was passed. It is also the basis of the moral challenge that Haacke issued in *Manet-PROKEKT'74*, *The Chocolate Maker*, *DER BEVÖLKERUNG*, and the institutional critique works of the 1970s and 1980s.

Secondly, "the past does not exist independently from the present. Indeed the past is only past because there is a present, just as I can point to something *over there* only because I am *here* …. The past – or more accurately pastness – is a position."[29] Trouillot is arguing that history is a relational form of knowledge produced by social actors who are narrators drawing upon and interpreting evidence of what is known about previous events. Many possible histories can construct different versions of the past depending on what evidence is available and used, and in that sense the present resides in the past, in a relationship that constitutes knowledge of the past. "The crux of the matter is the *here and now*, the rela-

tions between the events described and their public representation is a specific historical context."[30] This is again the point of Haacke's artworks *Shapolsky*, *Manet-PROJEKT'74*, and of *DER BEVÖLKERUNG*, each of which calls on the institution and the audience to position themselves in relation to the present/past of the content of the artwork. Comparable statements can be made about journalism, and the emphasis on the "here and now" in the production of history destabilises the stark temporal polarity between journalism and history proposed by Adam (1993) and Carey (2000). Journalism is a relational form of knowledge production that depends on both the position of the evidence verifiably known to exist and the perspective and position of the persons doing the knowing and interpretation.

Thirdly, a key concern of Trouillot's is the production of silences in the historical narrative. He considers several histories including the Nazi Holocaust but focuses strongly on transatlantic slavery and the Haitian revolution (1791–1804), the only successful revolution by slaves in history. "Narratives are made of silences, not all of which are deliberate or even perceptible as such within the time of their production. We also know that the present itself is no clearer than the past".[31] The production of silences is at least as much an exercise of power as the production of presences:

> Silences enter the process of historical production at four crucial moments: the moment of fact creation (the making of *sources*); the moment of fact assembly (the making of *archives*); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of *narratives*); and the making of retrospective significance (the making of *history* in the final instance).[32]

Once again we can substitute "journalism" for "history" in the text to see the unifying role that temporality plays and the similarities linking the two research practices:

> Silences enter the process of ~~historical~~ journalistic production at four crucial moments: the moment of fact creation (the making of *sources*, including interviews, observations, notes, recordings, photographs); the moment of fact assembly (the making of *archives* or files); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of *narratives* or stories); and the making of ~~retrospective~~ contemporary significance (the making of ~~history~~ news in the final instance).

In the contemporary public sphere, and increasingly in the quasi-private sphere of social media, journalists both produce and retrieve audio-visual

and textual records that then become archived in personal and corporate databases that are searchable and effectively infinite in their capacities. This journalistic production is done by casting Tuchman's web of facticity, which both catches and misses facts and events in space and time so that perhaps a fact or event is not observed or recorded, or if it is recorded, it isn't considered important to archive or include in a story that is published. The ubiquity of digital recordings in the contemporary public and private spheres promotes a sense of universal surveillance and the illusion that all events of significance are being recorded and archived. Certainly the historical archive of the contemporary period will be much greater than that of previous periods, provided the electronic documents are not physically corrupted and remain accessible to later software. But only a tiny portion of the available events that some communities would consider of public relevance and importance attract the attention of journalists. Silences and absences are the norm for those not in a position to exercise power in the world of journalism, and can be found in the interstices of conflicts over interpretations and the production of meaning.[33]

For Trouillot, it is in the last of the four stages – "the making of contemporary significance" – where institutions such as museums, the cinema, television and general media programs, journalism, theme parks, schools and community history organisations become involved; history is produced as an understanding of the past considered relevant to contemporary people. This stage dwarfs the scale and significance of the earlier three stages that are largely the province of what he terms "the guild" of academic historians, and while this last stage is necessarily fraught with the exercise of power, particularly in the production of silences, that is not to be bemoaned:

> We may want to keep in mind that deeds and words are not as distinguishable as we often presume. History does not belong only to its narrators, professional or amateur. While some of us debate what history is or was, others take it in their own hands.[34]

That is precisely the point that Stone was making about Socrates, the philosophy of free speech in ancient Athens, and the tragedy of Socrates' trial. Trouillot recounts similar arguments about slavery and Holocaust museums.[35] History, philosophy and journalism aren't always in a good place, but where they end up is a matter for those who take it in their hands and practice it. A rigorous, reflexive and interdisciplinary journalism is

an excellent partner for history in both interpreting the past for contemporary purposes and also securing verified artefacts and information for future consideration as history. Stone's own work is paradigmatic of this approach.

It is clear from this discussion that journalism has a role not only in producing verifiable knowledge for inclusion in the future historic record, as "the first draft of history" as the saying goes, but also conversely in the analysis and making "of contemporary significance" that informs the contemporary positions from which historical narratives are produced and interpreted, and silences produced but also discovered. This means that issues in historiography are relevant to journalism. For Trouillot it is in the contemporary interpretations where the issue of authenticity arises in the production of history, and the same applies to journalism both in relation to the past and also the present. I will consider the question of authenticity in relation to the politics of knowledge in the concluding chapter.

In the remainder of this chapter, I want to explore how well the positions on temporality and history advanced by Gell, Mills and Trouillot cohere with the spatiotemporal matrix of Harvey and Lefebvre outlined in the previous chapter with respect to spatiality. While the major focus of their work that we've considered was on space, both Harvey and Lefebvre wrote about temporality and argued for its inextricable links with spatiality. We should be able to test the relevance to journalism of their matrix with respect to temporality as much as spatiality. I will examine examples from the works of Haacke and Stone to illustrate the theoretical issues and provide further insight into their practices, and also demonstrate how such a theoretical framework is available to guide and analyse any journalistic practice seeking validation as rigorous research practice.

It is important to remember that Harvey did not present this matrix as a set of nine discrete categories or pigeonholes into which any given case study could be slotted. He saw them as dialectically and dynamically linked, and opening up opportunities for analysis in the interstices among the categories as much as within them. Nonetheless, as a matrix it does offer a checklist of starting points for further research and analysis. In what follows I am treating it as just such a checklist to demonstrate the relevance of this level of metatheorisation to journalism practice. Table 5.1 reproduces my interpretation of the matrix as explained in Chap. 4, but substituting time for space where appropriate in the labels of the rows and columns. The discussion proceeds horizontally across the rows of the matrix.

Table 5.1 Modified Harvey-Lefebvre matrix (temporal)

	Experienced time	*Conceived time*	*Lived time*
Absolute time	Observable facts	Conceptual framework for identifying facts	IEC* engagement with facts
Relative time/space	Observable processes producing facts	Conceptual framework for apprehending processes	IEC* engagement with processes
Relational time/space	Invisible values and forces at work to produce processes and facts	Conceptual framework for apprehending the relationship of forces and values	IEC* engagement with relationships and values

*IEC** imaginative, emotional, cultural, etc.

Experienced Time/Absolute Time

This category covers Newtonian time, i.e., time as it appears to be stable and a universal referent capable of identifying an event or the existence of a fact in either the before/after or past/present/future (Gell's B and A) series. It is "time as points and periods"; if something can be known to have happened at a specified point or period in time, then it happened. Similarly, if something can be reliably predicted to happen at a specific future time, then it will happen pending no untoward interference. Silences and absences are also produced and locatable in time. Further, material events and objects as they do exist in absolute space are not always perceived because they are held or produced at times as well as places that are private or even secret.[36]

In *Shapolsky et al. Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May, 1971* and *Sol Goldman and Alex DiLorenzo Manhattan Real Estate Holdings, a Real-Time Social System, as of May 1, 1971*, Haacke was meticulous in specifying the minimum period (the date) for which the statements about land holdings, ownership, and mortgage and financial arrangements were accurate. It was essential for the validity of the piece, in the minds of both Haacke and Guggenheim Director Messer, that the information be accurate. Grace Glueck, the *New York Times* journalist reporting on the Guggenheim controversy and Haacke's art generally, nominated his meticulous field research and record keeping as two attributes he shared with journalists:

> While many artists need go no further than their own studio for their material, he travels far and wide, visiting libraries, checking archives, reading

> obscure publications, examining court documents, talking with "sources". And he keeps extensive files on his targets.[37]

For Stone, the information in *The Hidden History of the Korean War 1951–1952* similarly had to be accurate and verifiable in space and time. The statements of fact were rigorously footnoted to sources in datelined official documents and newspaper reports from authoritative mastheads. The validity of the arguments about MacArthur's feigned retreat in the face of alleged Communist "hordes," bombing raids and casualties, political reactions among various protagonists in Washington, manipulation of the Chicago soybean futures market, and the decisions to commit US forces to the conflict, to sack MacArthur, and to recognise the changed risks of an atomic bombing raid all required the detailed specification of points in B-series (before/after) time, and interpretation of meaning and reactions in A-series (past/present/future) time.

Like Haacke, Stone was not accused of getting his facts wrong, and leading Korean War historian Bruce Cumings thirty-five years later attested to the truth and reliability of his reporting in the light of subsequent scholarship.[38] Again later in *The Trial of Socrates*, Stone was meticulous in validating the temporal location of his various sources for claims about statements and events, in locating the sequences of events in before/after time, and in presenting the unfolding chronology in past/present/future time as the various protagonists in the trial interpreted the history of the coups against democracy in Athens and assessed the options for verdicts, sentencing, and then whether Socrates should flee or stay to face his execution. There was scholarly debate about Stone's interpretation of the meaning of the facts and events in his chronicle but no challenge from any source to the temporal accuracy of the facts as such, as verified by him in the historical record. In sum, for both Haacke and Stone temporal referentiality was crucial to their research and statements of fact, and both have been held in high regard by subsequent scholars for the quality of their temporal methodologies, i.e., specifying the time coordinates of what is known and the means by which it is known.

Both Haacke and Stone presented their work as reversals of previous or contemporary silences by introducing new objects into the temporalities of their institutional environments. In Trouillot's terms, they were taking a position to reverse an existing silence by producing objects able to be perceived by audiences. As far as the Guggenheim was concerned, Messer was determined that the silence about real estate wealth and other

empirical realities, not to mention the silence about non-symbolic art forms in general, should continue in the spatiotemporal context of that gallery, although he apparently had no problem with the information itself being published as journalism in other contexts, for example newspapers. The failure of twenty-eight publishers to accept Stone's *Hidden History* amounted to successive individual decisions to maintain a silence that threatened to aggregate into a collective censorship except for the decision by Monthly Review Press to publish the book. In his attempt to fully understand the free speech issue, Stone researched and presented the previously silent case for the prosecution against Socrates that was absent from Plato and Xenophon's accounts of the trial. In each case existing silences, some of them longstanding, were being reversed by the production and publication of new objects.

The hostile reaction to Haacke's work by Messer and subsequent North American elite art institutions, to Stone's information and analysis of the progress of the Korean War by multiple mainstream publishers, and to the prosecution case against Socrates by Plato and Xenophon, confirms Trouillot's argument about the exercise of power in the production of silences. Haacke and Stone replaced absences with the presence of new objects, and thereby reversed silences to make clear and resonant statements. In Haacke's artworks and Stone's *Hidden History*, the statements prompted reactions that magnified the resonances and indeed became part of the object themselves, confirming Trouillot's point about the importance of the position of the present in constituting the past and, as far as journalism is concerned, also constituting the present.

Absolute Time/Conceived Time

A-series and B-series time are conceptualisations of absolute time, i.e., time that is empty of objects and functions as a universal structure for reference. All of the protagonists whose deeds were being recounted in the works that Haacke and Stone produced, and the protagonists in the decisions about whether the artworks and books would be exhibited or published, not to mention Haacke and Stone themselves, understood at the time of decision making the significance of time (and space). If something does not exist in time (A-series or B-series), then it does not exist, at least for that point in time or at that place. Cancelling an exhibition and declining to publish a manuscript are decisions that individuals and organisations knowingly make to preclude realisation of an object or event

in time. The journalistic equivalent is "spiking" a story, i.e., pulling it out of the newspaper or broadcast and therefore suppressing the information it contains.

In some time- and site-specific artworks, such as *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* in 2000 for the German Bundestag, the site was available at a specific point in time and, if the work had been rejected at the relevant time (as its opponents mobilised to achieve), then it could not have existed as conceived. An alternative conception would have been possible on another site, and indeed that could have had a dialectical relationship with the Bundestag from which it would have been rejected. That is what occurred with the exhibition of *Manet-PROJEKT '74* in 1974 at a nearby private gallery in Köln after it was rejected by the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum. The private exhibition took place at the same time as the official exhibition, demonstrating that all concerned understood the importance of precise timing. But in all of the other examples that we are considering, especially *Shapolsky*, *Goldman*, and Stone's *Hidden History*, those rejections amounted to only a temporal deferment, not to a blanket prevention of exhibition or publication. In these cases, the rejections became incorporated into the artwork, which both extended the "present" time parameters of the art works and also turned the art, previously not site specific, into site-specific works. If the Guggenheim had not attempted to impose a silence or absence on the work by cancelling the 1971 exhibition, it would not have associated itself with the conceptualisation of the work for later audiences. *Shapolsky* and *Goldman*, through their rejection at that particular time by the Guggenheim, have forever become defined as art by the rejection, which means the Guggenheim also defined itself in time by the imposition of the exhibition's absence. That was the challenge that Haacke threw up with *Manet-PROJEKT '74* to the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum in 1974 and the *Westkunst* exhibition in 1981, both in Köln, and they were the last institutions to make the same mistake as the Guggenheim. Subsequently Haacke has had no exhibitions cancelled over the nature of his work, because all parties realise that to publicly attempt to impose a silence at a particular point in time and place only ensures the reverse, with negative future consequences for the silencing organisation.

In Stone's case his continuing marginalisation from mainstream journalism after 1950, that is to say, his attempted silencing over this time period by the mainstream press, had the effect of creating at the same time a subscription audience for *I.F. Stone's Weekly*. It was essential for him to keep publishing journalism (that is, to be active in A- and B-series

time) and, in doing so, to keep defining himself as an increasingly successful opponent of the forces that had tried to silence him. More broadly, he became an iconic figure for the dissenting political movements of the 1960s and 1970s, which would not have happened if he had not continued to regularly publish reports that were of interest and relevance to those movement audiences. Quite clearly, Izzy and Esther Stone understood the importance of continuing journalism production and distribution.

Absolute Time/Lived Time

Lived time applies to all of the participants in journalism: the practitioners, the subjects of their reporting, and the audiences who receive and interpret it. Both Haacke and Stone lived emotionally, imaginatively and politically moment by moment, day by day, and year by year through their achievements and challenges in producing work and securing (or not, as the case may have been) its exhibition and publication. Both Stone and Haacke also included the lived dimension of temporality in the people with whom their journalism and art engaged. Stone was forthright in his accounts and analyses of the personalities, habitus and lived experiences of MacArthur, Truman, Kim Jong Il, Chiang Kai-Shek and other protagonists in the Korean War, including the unnamed soldiers on both sides and the civilians experiencing tragedy and death in the conflict. The woman in the North Korean village hanging out the washing among her dead family and friends after a napalm bomb attack was one memorable example.[39] In discussing Socrates and the people involved in his life and trial, Stone is very explicit about their class and gender characteristics, their loyalties and enmities, their personal goals as much as they could be deduced from the evidence, and their manner of responding to the options presented to them for action as events unfolded: in short, their social and cultural capital, and their habitus, their manner of being in the world and playing the game.

Relative Time-Space/Experienced Time

This place in the matrix is about the intersection of experienced time and space with process, that is, the observable evidence for the processes underway. Relative time-space, as Harvey defined it, is the field of Einsteinian relativity.[40] It is the time-space of movement, process and change, in contrast to the apparent stability with respect to each other of

Newtonian absolute time and space. In relative time-space, the positions of the observer and the observed are also each in process and movement with respect to each other. In terms of the uses of history in sociology as discussed by Mills[41] or Trouillot's argument about the present being included in the past,[42] relative time-space accounts for the processes whereby this occurs. Processes can be empirically observed in some cases – e.g., those involving material action such as movement, speaking, or being present for the duration of an event such as a meeting – but even in such cases observers might not be present at important times and might depend on the observation of key facts to deduce or induce the processes that are underway. Stone was not in Korea during the war and relied on reports by the various arms of the UN, the US government, the military and from well-regarded news outlets. From accounts in these documents of facts, events and developments, he made his own analyses of the processes that were underway. By observing the sequence of purchases of soybean options on the Chicago futures market in the first six months of 1950 before the war started and noting reports of the names of persons said to be involved, he deduced that there was a process underway in which forces aligned with the Nationalist Chinese under Chiang Kai-shek were very confident that the market-dominating Manchurian supply of soybeans would be disrupted in June–July 1950, thus sending up the price.[43] Stone reasoned that the likely and indeed only cause of such a disruption over whose timing the Chiang forces and their associates in the USA and South Korea would be able to have any influence, would be the commencement of open hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. As discussed in Chap. 3, current scholarship suggests that both the North and South were agitating to provoke the other side to start the war. Stone calculated from the timing of the market-cornering position taken by the South Koreans' allies that they were confident that, one way or another, the agitation for war would be successful in June 1950.

Stone's evidence for the process he observed through which MacArthur attempted to provoke authorisation to use the atomic bomb against newly Communist China was based on the timeline of the UN forces' retreat down the peninsula in December 1951 without being harried by the enemy forces.[44] His evidence was the reported timing of North Korean advances, which lagged behind the UN forces' withdrawals. Perhaps his most provocative conclusion for the US political and military leadership was that the destruction in aerial combat by enemy MIG fighters of a squadron of B-29 bombers on 23 October 1951 had interrupted any prospective process for safely delivering an atomic weapon into China.[45]

For Haacke, the observable municipal records of the real estate holdings of *Shapolsky* and *Goldman* as of a specific date (1 May 1971) enabled him to deduce a set of processes that he called "a real-time social system". In 1974, having experienced the process of cancellation for the 1971 Guggenheim exhibition, he was able to produce *Manet-PROJEKT '74* for the Köln exhibition, which he must have anticipated might result in a process of exclusion from the exhibition, which fact would then become incorporated into the ongoing "real-time social system" of the artwork. In all of these examples from both practitioners, the key empirical issue was the sequence of events in processes, and then for Haacke with *Manet-PROJEKT '74*, anticipating what opportunities a rejection from the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum might afford.

Relative Time-Space/Conceived Time

The empirical evidence of processes needs to be apprehended in a framework or "map of meaning" if they are going to be participated in by protagonists or reported on and discussed by journalists and their supporters. Facts of themselves are banal, but perceived within a conceptual framework they become evidence: that is, support for propositions in an argument. For investigators, including journalists, the question then turns to the logic of the argument and the nature of the process the facts are evidence of. The facts of the soybean market corner were of themselves a set of contracts among specified buyers and sellers to purchase the commodity at a specified price on a specified day. But as the saying goes, timing is everything. The commercial benefit would accrue to the purchasers only if certain other processes occurred according to an anticipated schedule. It is the logic of temporal linkages among the processes that has to be understood if the purpose, legality, political efficacy, etc. of the process is to be determined. That understanding is what the US Senate enquiry into the market manipulation set out to achieve, and by the accounts of Stone[46] and Huberman and Sweezy,[47] their process of enquiry stopped short of publicly identifying all of the purchasers. The implication of their analysis is that a temporal intervention may have occurred in the Congress to forestall publication and to create a silence where there could have been a statement on the official record.

In the Korean air war, the daytime destruction of the US B-29 bombers by Chinese MIG fighters in late October 1951 and the nighttime destruction of another B-29 formation the following year were acknowledged as

facts at the time by the US government and military officials.[48] But it was Stone who interpreted those facts as propositions in an argument that the USA had thereby lost the capacity to deliver atomic weapons not only in Korea, but also in the much more strategically important European theatre. This may have been an example of what Rovere referred to as "good arguments for bad Communist positions."[49] Certainly, the book articulating that argument was something that twenty-eight publishers in succession thought should not become an object in the historical record, and Stone has recounted how he himself had given up hope of publication until by accident he met the Monthly Review publishers and they accepted it.[50] In this example, the attempt to produce a silence, in Trouillot's terms, was unsuccessful. In Haacke's case at the Guggenheim in 1971, Köln in 1974, and the Bundestag in 1999–2000, whether or not the process of attempting to prevent exhibition was successful, the arguments and processes to produce a silence or absence in the particular space themselves became incorporated into the works and inflected them with meaning.

Whether or not the practitioner is dealing with a presence or an absence – a destroyed aircraft or the banning of an exhibition – the event can be understood as revealing the purposes and effects of a process. The identification of the precise nature of the process and its impetus is a matter of interpretation from the observable evidence in the light of a range of conceptual frameworks. Analysis of such processes and assessment of the evidence for and against different interpretations is the routine stuff of journalism and other disciplines.

Relative Time/Lived Time

It is a standard journalistic trope to seek the human angle to a story – to encourage understanding, empathy or opprobrium with characters in the story. In both *Hidden History* and *Socrates*, Stone was very particular to make detailed character assessments and to describe the personal elements and dilemmas of key persons in the processes as they unfolded in the story. The soldiers and civilians in the Korean conflict are not so central to his account because it is mainly an argument about politics and its intersection with military conflict. But we do get a strong sense of how MacArthur, Truman, Syngman Rhee and others were playing their hands, as it were, and how they reacted to developing events. Certainly in *Socrates*, Stone drew strong portraits of the anti-democratic proclivities and personal styles of Socrates' students such as Alcibiades, and very much

of the personality of Socrates himself, particularly as presented by Plato in his actions during the trial, the verdict, and leading up to his execution. Indeed, Stone presents a strong image of a deliberate career choice of martyrdom by Socrates to illustrate the poverty of the principles and processes of Athenian democracy, and conversely he presents the verdict and sentence as a tragedy (and not just a mistake) for the lived experience of the Athenians.

As well as the lived experience of the personalities in the reports and artworks, it is also important to consider the way the lived experience of the practitioners themselves constitutes and develops their ongoing practice. This is an issue that Bourdieu deals with through his concept of habitus, and it relates particularly well to Harvey's concepts of relative and relational time-space and Lefebvre's concept of lived time-space. Both Stone and Haacke lived with the ostracism of the major journalism and art institutions, respectively, of the United States over many decades in their careers. Although that would have been challenging, certainly in the early years – emotionally, financially, professionally and socially – the conflict itself was also affirming of the power and integrity of their respective analyses of their context, and they both had supporters among their peers and audiences. For Haacke, Buchloh commented:

> In discussing Haacke's work, one needs to avoid the temptation to construct an image of the artist as a political martyr. Nor should one depoliticise his work in an act of art-historical hagiography or canonisation. Rather, the critical task is to determine whether that work has been marginalised because it represents a turning point – one of those historical moments in which a set of traditional assumptions about the structures and functions of art are being effectively challenged.[51]

Buchloh argues that Haacke's work does indeed represent precisely such a rupture or turning point:

> It is precisely the anti-esthetic, the "factographic" element in Haacke's work that demands new skills, develops new forms of historical knowledge and addresses different social groups.[52]

For Buchloh, Haacke is re-positioning the lived process of being an artist in relation to aesthetics, audiences and historical knowledge.

In Stone's case, throughout his career, and particularly when the political climate resulted in his effective blacklisting from the early 1950s, he

lived the life of the politically committed intellectual and journalist. The isolation from human sources in politics greatly sharpened his documentary research methods. Atypically for an American journalist, he did personally endorse political causes, for example the establishment of Israel in the late 1940s and the anti-Vietnam War movement in the 1960s, and he also took (and subsequently modified) strong positions of support and criticism for and against political leaders, including US presidents and vice presidents. In this way he perceived himself to be living his democratic responsibilities as both a citizen and a journalist. It was precisely Socrates' refusal to engage with the democratic politics of Athens and live the full life, professionally and personally, of a citizen of a democracy that Stone documented and denounced in his analysis of political responsibility in *The Trial of Socrates.*

Relational Time/Experienced Time

Both Haacke and Stone experienced deep isolation from the major institutions in the art and journalism worlds, respectively. Haacke went from being a candidate for '"canonisation" with a solo show at thirty-five years of age in the Guggenheim to being effectively a *persona non grata* at elite US art institutions for the next three decades. Both Haacke and Stone built strong international reputations during their periods of national isolation, and Haacke seized the opportunity in his work to directly challenge the elite institutions. In terms of the impact of events on relationships, the focus and great strength of Stone's *Hidden History* and *Socrates* are the fluidity and shifts in relationships among the protagonists. While he is meticulous in verifying the details of events and facts, his arguments flow from the analysis of relational shifts and power plays that drove the processes of conflict, which in turn impacted back on the relationships. In Korea, MacArthur was sacked as Commander-in-Chief of the UN forces, Truman lost the 1952 presidential election, Syngman Rhee became the dictatorial president of South Korea, Kim Jong Il retained power for the Communist Party in North Korea, China was not bombed, but the military dimension of NATO in Europe was massively expanded, and the politico-military structure of the Cold War was established and entrenched. All of these developments were either documented or subsequently consistent with Stone's analysis of the relations driving the conflict.

Stone used the same methodology in *Socrates*, again with meticulous attention to both statements and silences in the various historical accounts

that he compared and contrasted to compose his argument. It is the temporal and spatial detail of what he calls "the three earthquakes" – the actual and threatened periods of dictatorship in Athens in 411, 404, and 401 BCE – that he uses to explain the shift in relations with the Athenian citizenry when Socrates' well-known political views became indictable offences.[53] The sequence and content of Socrates' speeches at his trial are the evidence he uses to justify his conclusion that Socrates actively chose martyrdom over less drastic outcomes.

Relational Time/Conceived Time

There is a strong conceptual basis to the facts and processes described in precise detail in both Haacke's and Stone's works, which empowers arguments and challenges that are highly relevant for their audiences. The conceptual basis will inevitably be relational, involving people and interests at stake in that time and place. Although effectively banned from major American institutions until it was bought and exhibited by the Whitney Museum in 2008, *Shapolsky* had an exhibition life at a succession of smaller galleries in the USA and at major international galleries and exhibitions, including the Venice Biennale in 1978. On the walls of the Whitney in 2008, it looked broadly consistent to the layperson's eye with the other conceptual art on the wall. In justifying his cancellation of the 1971 exhibition, Messer described *Shapolsky* as an "alien substance" relative to his conception of art as symbolic and therefore meriting exclusion.[54] That argument clearly didn't apply around the corner in Manhattan at the Whitney Museum in 2008. The broader conflicts between artists and museums and arguments about the nature of art itself had subsided over time, for better or for worse.[55] Haacke has a very acute sensitivity to the structural dilemmas that social issues of community concern present for institutions and is highly skilled at conceiving of art that will challenge institutions to respond. Stone didn't have the same direct relationship with the institutions he was challenging, but he was very adept at recognising, documenting and articulating the analysis of the conflicted social relations.

Relational Time/Lived Time

Both Haacke and Stone were assiduous in identifying and challenging named individuals, organisations and institutions. In this, their *modus operandi* was quintessential journalism practice. For Haacke, it was this

aspect of his work that the Guggenheim in 1971 and the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum in 1974 found unacceptable. Both practitioners identified the naming of individuals or organisations as a fundamental component of accountability, which I will discuss in the final chapter. They both experienced extended periods of institutional isolation as a result, which only served to endorse the power of their critiques, and also led to both of them articulating the intellectual and professional basis of their approach in some depth. This raises the issue of their own subjectivities as practitioners, which is an essential element in intellectual practice, and which I will consider in the next chapter.

To conclude this chapter, I will summarise the main points. First, temporality is a definitional issue for journalism, both in terms of identifying the present as distinct from the past or future, and as an event or fact locator in tandem with spatial information. This is time conceived as points on a line or grid. Journalism and history are two intellectual practices that are defined by their relationship to temporality (the present and past respectively) and not by any limits to their substantive subject matter. The lack of restrictions on subject matter makes both journalism and history necessarily interdisciplinary in their truth-seeking practices.

Secondly, this Newtonian conception of absolute time (time as completely distinct from space) ignores the universal phenomenon of change and movement, which is also fundamental to journalism. Journalism is about "shifts in the state of things." Change is a phenomenon of spatiotemporality, which conceptually is the Einsteinian realm of relativity. The idea of change creates an extended conception of the present, which may be thought to span the duration of a process, and that automatically problematises the past/present/future distinctions of absolute time. Temporality may function as a shared bridge between journalism and history as much as a dividing wall. This recognition is fundamental to both *Hidden History* and *Socrates* by Stone and to a large amount of Haacke's art, including *Manet-PROJEKT '74*, *The Chocolate Maker* and *DER BEVÖLKERUNG*.

Thirdly, an important element of temporality as a bridge linking history and journalism is Trouillot's concept of authenticity. The linkages between the past and the present, between history and journalism, are not linear but dialectical. That is to say, they involve contradictions that require resolution, and authenticity is one criterion for assessing the quality of the resolution in any given contradiction. In Trouillot's rendering, authenticity has intellectual, moral and political dimensions. It is a major

factor in Stone's criticism of Socrates' approach to issues of free speech in his trial and throughout Haacke's body of work. I will discuss authenticity more fully in the final chapter, but note here that it shouldn't be conceived of as a one-dimensional congruence, but dialectically as an open and searching engagement across boundaries.

Fourthly, and related to the issue of authenticity, is the element of silence or absence from the public record, which is an issue common to the production of all history and all journalism. The careers and life's work of both Haacke and Stone are marked by an assertive identification and repudiation of important silences in their sociopolitical environments. Their assertiveness prompted reciprocal attempts to silence them and to create absences in the places their work previously could have been expected to be present. It is a measure of the quality and insight in their practice that they were both able to engage with the attempts to suppress their work, and indeed use their opponents' attacks to develop and refine their own practice. Active engagement is a way to resolve contradictions.

Finally, the Harvey-Lefebvre matrix of spatiotemporal practice in dialectical engagement with socially produced time and space works well with both components – space and time – as an analytical framework for detailed empirical investigation, as demonstrated by the Haacke and Stone case studies. In particular, it transcends the polarities of objectivity (the perceived and conceived) and subjectivity (the imagined) in practice, and material (absolute and relative) and abstract (relational and value-based) realities in the social and natural worlds. In this way the matrix becomes a fruitful tool to examine the relationship between empirical facts and the values of newsworthiness, which is a fundamental issue for journalism's disciplinary status, and to which we now turn.

Notes

1. Adam (1993: 13).
2. Carey (2000: 22).
3. Gell (1992).
4. Gale (1967).
5. Gell discusses the paradox intrinsic to these two conceptions of absolute time, but we don't need to consider that here.
6. Gell (1992: 166ff).
7. Gell (1992: 156ff).
8. Gell (2001: 224).

9. Gell (2001: 315).
10. Gell (2001: 315).
11. Kahn (1981: 53).
12. Stone (1989: 69).
13. Adam (2006: 353).
14. Stone (1989: 69).
15. Hall et al. (1978: 54).
16. Hall (1982: 73, 68).
17. Hall (1990).
18. Mills (2000 [1959]).
19. Mills (2000: 144).
20. Mills (2000: 145).
21. Tuchman (1978: 82).
22. Kuhn (1962).
23. Steffen et al. (2007).
24. Angus (2015).
25. Trouillot (1995: 19).
26. Trouillot (1995: 6).
27. Trouillot (1995: 158 n. 4).
28. Trouillot (1995: 149).
29. Trouillot (1995: 15) emphasis in original.
30. Trouillot (1995: 147) my emphasis.
31. Trouillot (1995: 153).
32. Trouillot (1995: 26) emphasis in original.
33. Trouillot (1995: 28).
34. Trouillot (1995: 153).
35. Trouillot (1995: 141ff).
36. Ericson et al. (1989: 9).
37. Glueck (1993: 74).
38. Cumings (1988: xiii).
39. Stone (1988: 258).
40. Harvey (2006: 122).
41. Mills (2000: 144–5).
42. Trouillot (1995: 141ff).
43. Stone (1989: 349ff).
44. Stone (1989: 208–273).
45. Stone (1989: 239ff).
46. Stone (1989: 349).
47. Huberman and Sweezy (1951: 171–174).

48. Futrell (1983: 410–411, 425).
49. Guttenplan (2009: 266).
50. Cumings (1988: xii).
51. Buchloh (1988: 98).
52. Buchloh (1988: 101).
53. Stone (1989: 140ff).
54. Messer (1971).
55. Alberro (1997).

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CHAPTER 6

News Sense, Sources, Sociology and Journalism

"News values," "newsworthiness," "news sense," and "a nose for news" are concepts that are deeply challenging to any claim by journalism to scholarly status for its research and reporting practices. An essential, associated element of news sense is the identification, selection and attribution of authority to relevant sources of the information identified as newsworthy: times and places of events to observe, documents to procure and examine, and organisations to monitor and people to interview – all elements in Tuchman's web of facticity.[1] Decisions about newsworthiness and sources are value judgements. News sense and news values are traditionally held to inhibit, even prohibit, the reflexive evaluation and conceptual rigour required of scholarship. Even at the heart of the 1930s Chicago School of Sociology, so sympathetic to the journalistic project of an informed citizenry and the research practices of direct observation and socio-spatial fieldwork, Robert E. Park drew a distinction between "knowledge about" and "acquaintance with" – and journalism was located in the latter, substandard category.[2] Even though the truth claims of reputable journalists are regularly and extensively relied upon by scholars in other disciplines, and sometimes accorded great respect for accuracy, insight and analysis, that fact is not enough to grant disciplinary status to journalism research practice.

Journalists, and no one else will do it for them, have to develop a satisfactory theoretical account for the role of news sense and news values in their practice, because without that account there is a gaping hole in

C. Nash, *What is Journalism?*
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the methodological structure where support for any claims to reflexivity and rigour should be. This is a problem of theory and not immediately of journalistic practice in the field. The conceptual reflexivity and rigorous practice of many practitioners over many decades, Haacke and Stone among them, lays the onus of rupture with inadequate theory at the feet of journalism scholars. The challenge is to make the breakthrough and theorise the structure of journalistic reflexivity in its two intertwined elements: news sense, and relations between journalists and authoritative sources.

News Sense

In an elegant piece of research published in 1981, Ian Baker examined the operation of "news sense" in Australian newsrooms using gatekeeper theory.[3] Baker was critical of White's 1964 version of the theory, which was focused on the power of the terminal gatekeeper to negate the decisions of all previous gatekeepers who may have approved a story for research, production and publication.[4] In its stead, Baker proposed that all along the gatekeeping chain "the process of acceptance or rejection (choices and discards) is governed by objectively practiced notions of 'news sense'. And that no gatekeeper, at any position along the line, can regularly deviate from those notions without risking removal from his (sic) gatekeeping post."[5] Baker's empirical findings confirmed this hypothesis.

Baker was at the time a senior journalist with the then Australian Broadcasting Commission (now Corporation). He undertook two empirical inquiries. First, he independently interviewed forty journalists (including specialist and general reporters and subeditors) drawn from print, radio and television news organisations. The journalists were asked to define their sense of news values and recount how they acquired them. The definitions they gave were "generally imprecise, rambling and vague [and] they were also quite conscious that their responses were garbled in many instances."[6] Many tried to explain by giving examples. On-the-job socialisation was their standard method of acquiring the essential professional skill of "news sense". On this basis, Baker concluded that "[n]ews is not a theoretical concept, it does not have a logical base. This is why journalists themselves cannot articulate a coherent definition of what news is or talk about questions which pre-suppose that 'news sense' derives from a theory."[7] This observation accords with Phillips' argument noted in Chap. 1 that journalists' "nose for news" is a "nontheoretic way to knowledge … because they themselves do not approach the world from

a reflective, theoretical mental attitude."[8] The "non-theoretic" status of news sense has been used by critics of journalism and indeed by some journalists themselves as the key trait distinguishing it from scholarly practice, for better or for worse.

Baker's second activity was to ask sixty-seven journalists, including the forty interviewed in the first activity, to rank ten news stories "according to news value (1–10) to suit the requirements of your present news organization."[9] Methodological precautions were taken to make sure the rankings would be comparable among the diverse range of news organisations, media and genres. A senior terminal gatekeeper (subeditor or equivalent) in each organisation was also asked to rank the stories. The results revealed that journalists had a very finely tuned and detailed knowledge of how "news sense" would be applied to particular stories in their organisation. In each organisation there was a strong sense of familiarity with what was identified as a "house style", and in each the results for the reporters accorded to a greater or lesser extent with those of the terminal gatekeeper. Further, the reporters who were most highly esteemed by their colleagues tended to have the closest match to their terminal gatekeeper's story ranking.

In a later US study, Soloski conducted research into news reporting and professionalism at a US metropolitan newspaper as a participant observer with the role of editor on the copy desk.[10] He observed that journalists were able to recognise the different house styles of news organisations other than their own, and at the same time to judge if and when the range of house styles fell within a larger category of generalised news professionalism. To this broad profession-wide set of values and practices, each news organisation will add its own "news policies", Soloski concluded, as a tighter, intra-organisational means of control "to direct the actions of journalists".[11] It is the combination of professional values and news policies that comprises the house style that the reporters in both Soloski's and Baker's studies were able to recognise and practice in their own employment. "Like a game, professional norms and news policies are rules that everyone has learned to play by; only rarely are these rules made explicit, and only rarely are the rules called into question."[12]

The journalists interviewed for Baker's research were chronically unable to articulate a definition of a core concept in their professional practice, but were able to deploy the concept operationally to guide their truth-seeking practice with detailed skill, and also use it to rank the performance and status of their colleagues. Baker concluded on the one hand that news

is not "theoretical" or "logical", but on the other can be "objectively practiced". How can a notion be objectively practiced and evaluated but not be logical or theoretical? If a notion can be objectively practiced to guide judgment, then the problem would seem to lie with the theory being used to identify the logic. Transcending this impasse is a core methodological challenge for journalism.

The mechanical behaviourism of gatekeeper theory had no way to deal with "objectively practiced notions of news sense". It has since languished in favour of first ideology and subsequently culture as an approach to understanding value judgments in news production analysis.[13] With respect to ideology, Stuart Hall identified a set of professional news values headed by the primary value of extraordinariness, which is further refined to include

> events which concern elite persons or nations; events which are dramatic; events which can be personalised so as to point up the essentially human characteristics of humour, sadness, sentimentality, etc.; events which have negative consequences, and events which are part of, or which can be made to appear part of, an existing newsworthy theme.[14]

This is a broad and descriptive list similar to many that appear in journalism textbooks, but it suffers from the same imprecision and vagueness observed among journalists in Baker's study. Any working journalist who proposed such criteria in an editorial planning conference would be demonstrating that they did not understand the very basics of their professional practice. Which is not to say that ideology is a concept irrelevant to news values, but that values can't be conceived of as an empirically disconnected set of attributes or criteria except in the broadest and vaguest of terms.

The challenge is a metatheoretical one: What sort of theory can identify the journalistic logic and explain the observed practices? Stone would have recognised Baker's problem as characteristic of the Socratic method of seeking to define the stable essence of a concept, a method that is bound to fail when dealing with phenomena that are subject to change as well as continuity, as Heraclitus saw.[15] Harvey would see newsworthiness as an abstract relational value that arises out of actual social relations and practices, and which dialectically returns to mediate and regulate those relations, and therefore, unless it refers to materially specific circumstances, is reduced to broad generalities such as those listed by Hall.[16] Lefebvre also would have seen it as an abstraction; he argued that "abstract space cannot

be conceived of in the abstract. It does have a 'content', but this content is such that abstraction can 'grasp' it only by means of a practice that *deals with it.*"[17] In this view, newsworthiness can be grasped and understood only by the practices of producing it and interpreting it in specific material circumstances. Similarly, Bourdieu argued that any concept can be understood only in relation to the field of knowledge that produced it, which itself is intrinsically and dynamically structured by power relations.[18] In this view, news values are specific to their circumstances, inherently structured by power relations, and can only be detailed in relation to specific material conditions, an observation that the research of both Baker and Soloski supports.

So there are different theoretical approaches one can take to news sense, some of which are mutually compatible and some of which aren't, and some of which don't work and others that potentially can grasp its abstraction, its requirement of practice and empirical referents, and the central role of power relations in its deployment. Newsworthiness is a value used to make judgments in practice, and news sense is the capacity to make those judgments in very short periods of time, perhaps so short that they appear instantaneous, like the space between the end of an answer and the beginning of the next question in a live broadcast interview. The combination of these two facets of news sense – its apparent base in "non-theoretic" intuition and the importance of temporality in its deployment – is what is alleged to distinguish journalism from the "reflective, theoretical mental attitude" of the social sciences.[19]

Journalism is not the only occupation where temporality is a major factor. Medical professionals performing triage procedures in emergencies, teachers in a classroom and engineers supervising complex construction works all operate under comparable demands and temporal constraints, and can likewise be held professionally responsible for the accuracy and consequences of their assessments. Such professionals do not start from basic principles each time they have to perform an evaluation in order to act judiciously; they typically have developed standard procedures and protocols to guide decision making and practice. Gaye Tuchman, as noted in Chap.1, described objectivity as a "strategic ritual" used by journalists "to mitigate such continual pressures as deadlines, possible libel suits and anticipated reprimands of superiors."[20] She took the concept of "ritual" from Everett Hughes, who observed that it is "strongly developed in occupations where there are great unavoidable risks, as in medicine,"[21] and she uses the term to mean "a routine procedure that has relatively

little or only tangential relevance to the end sought. Adherence to the procedure is frequently compulsive. That such a procedure may be the best known means of attaining the sought end does not detract from its characterization as a ritual."[22] The qualifying term "strategic" she took from Gouldner, who she said "paints a picture of sociological objectivity as *strategic ritual*."[23] For Gouldner, these ritualised procedures provide at most "an *operational* definition of objectivity which presumably tells us what we must *do* in order to justify an assertion that some particular finding is objective. It does not, however, tell us very much about what objectivity *means* conceptually and connotatively."[24] By her use and explanation of the term, Tuchman is arguing that the epistemological problems of journalistic research are shared with other professions and disciplines, and these problems are sometimes linked with temporal factors in operational practice, among other issues. The observation is relevant not only to "applied" theory; Bourdieu and Harvey agree that theory as such is also a form of praxis, and therefore specific to the spatiotemporal conditions of its production.[25]

So there is an issue that arises in truth-seeking practice, and indeed all human practice, that people have to make informed decisions to select courses of action from a range of alternatives under the guidance of a set of values and knowledge. For journalists seeking "objectivity" as a defining mode of their practice, it manifests as a set of protocols, parameters and principles to guide them in identifying verifiable facts.[26] Tuchman agrees, defining "facts" to be "pertinent information gathered by professionally validated methods specifying the relationship between what is known and how it is known."[27] Those protocols and methods need to become ingrained in practice as news sense to cope with the temporal pressures of real-time decision making, and they can be examined, reflected upon, and modified or rejected away from the immediacy of action. However, this does not address the issue of newsworthiness or news values in identifying what facts might be relevant or interesting to discover and verify. Likewise, notions of "fairness" and "balance" do not address the question of identifying which issues, events or facts might have newsworthiness, in the investigation of which objectivity, fairness and balance might need to be applied.

Quite clearly in Baker's and Soloski's studies, news sense is learned because it varies from one organisation to the next, and it involves social power because it can be associated with hierarchies and status inside and outside the boundaries of the news organisation. It clearly has a base in

the social relations of the profession and the employing organisation, and therefore both a temporal and a spatial dimension in the observable practice and products of the reports. As both scholars concluded, news sense has a subjective dimension in that it manifests as a set of abstract intuitions, values, skills and capabilities by reporters that both participants and researchers can recognise and interpret in the objective practice of reporters. Pierre Bourdieu developed a theory of practice that aimed to transcend the polarity of "subjectivism" and "objectivism," and incorporated the concept of habitus to explain what appears to be real-time intuition. Habitus is a promising concept to investigate in the theorisation of news sense.

Bourdieu himself did not have a high regard for journalism, but his concern was less with "journalism as a "fourth estate" – but rather the hold that the *mechanisms* of a journalistic field increasingly subject to market demand (through readers and advertisers) have *first on journalists* (and on journalist-intellectuals) and then, in part through them, on the various fields of cultural production – the juridical field, the literary field, the cultural field, and the scientific field."[28]

The concern of this book is precisely with "journalist-intellectuals" and journalism as a fourth estate. Bourdieu's work on journalism is widely perceived to be a less well-elaborated and somewhat one-dimensional view of that field compared to other fields he studied.[29] Because he both achieved star status as a public intellectual and intervened regularly in popular political discussion, Bourdieu sometimes gave polemical presentations of his approach that entailed rhetorical simplifications and inconsistencies with his more considered writings. In spite of this, leading scholars in journalism studies including Schlesinger,[30] Benson and Neveu,[31] Schudson,[32] and Hallin[33] have engaged with Bourdieu's field theory and to an extent they have joined a group of scholars in various disciplines "using Bourdieu against Bourdieu."[34] With this approach in mind, I will examine his field theory and concept of habitus as a way of theorising news sense, news values and journalism practice, and use examples from the work of Haacke and Stone to illustrate the argument.

Bourdieu is a relationist; that is to say, his position is that to understand the nature of any given social reality, it is necessary to look at the objective relations linking the constituents (people, institutions, artefacts, natural environment, etc.) of that reality. One cannot think of the whole as the sum of its parts, nor of the parts as subsections of the whole, but rather the constituent parts being in constantly shifting and reflexive relationships to each other, with the interaction of those relationships determin-

ing the dynamic nature of both the parts and the whole.[35] By "objective," Bourdieu means the structure and nature of a social totality as determined by its constituent relations through practice. Each totality has its own dynamic characteristics and identity beyond the individual apprehensions and activities of its participants. He doesn't mean a structure, fixed or otherwise, generated by some asocial process or force beyond the activities of the participants in that totality over time.[36] By "subjective," he means the dimension of self-aware attitudes, identities and activities of the human participants in that reality, the "consciousness and determinations of agents."[37] Bourdieu is seeking to reconstitute the objective/subjective polarity by introducing the element of practice into both categories.[38] In this respect, his approach is consistent with the Harvey-Lefebvre matrix discussed in Chap. 4 and 5: Harvey theorises the spatial world as constituted by social practice in abstract relationships, observable processes and physical products, while Lefebvre theorises the perceived, conceptual and lived dimensions of social practice as it engages with the world constituted by and in practice. Bourdieu deploys three key concepts to pursue this resolution of the subjective and objective through practice: field, capital and habitus. A fourth concept, symbolic violence or symbolic power, is relevant to the role of journalism.

Fields

The concept of the field is fundamental to Bourdieu's theory of practice. All social interactions occur in fields, which are constituted by the relations of objective interests among the positions occupied by the participants in the fields – for example, employers versus employees in an industry or opposing teams in a sports game:

> We can indeed, with caution, compare a field to a game (*jeu*), although, unlike the latter, a field is not the product of a deliberate act of creation, and it follows rules or, better, regularities, that are not explicit and codified. Thus we have stakes (*enjeux*) which are for the most part the product of the competition between players. We have an investment in the game, illusio (from ludus, the game): players are taken in by the game, they oppose one another, sometimes with ferocity, only to the extent that they concur in their belief (doxa) in the game and its stakes; they grant these a recognition that escapes questioning. Players agree, by the mere fact of playing, and not by the way of a "contract", that the game is worth playing, that it is "worth the candle", and this collusion is the very basis of their competition.[39]

Positions in a field can be occupied by individuals and groups of people, and by organisations, policies, documents, regulatory frameworks, etc. The boundaries or parameters of a field are determined by the activities of the players in the field, and are therefore dynamic; indeed, "the question of the limits of the field … is *always at stake in the field itself*, and therefore admits of no *a priori* answer."[40] Put another way, moving the goalposts is a time-honoured way of winning a contest. In an effort to achieve stability, relational networks can solidify into organisations and institutionally organised processes or patterns of interaction, which gives a strategic dimension to Bourdieu's important conceptualisation of "position-taking": a very effective way of consolidating a powerful position in a field of relations is to institutionalise it, which then also secures the transmission of power through approved processes. Relations in a field can be formally structured through institutionalised processes: for example, contracts regulating the relations of employer and employee in the workplace or buyer and seller in a market. Fields can also be structured by physical environments: for example, a classroom, a sports field or a set of offices. Journalists recognise the importance of institutions, which is one reason why they structure their working activities around them,[41] and Benson has also discussed the relevance of Bourdieu's theorisation to the "new institutionalism."[42]

Bourdieu identifies five major fields of social relations: economic, political, cultural, social and symbolic. There is nothing necessary about this particular taxonomy because by Bourdieu's account the constitution of all fields is dependent on the relations among the positions that come together to constitute the field and the practices of those people and institutions who occupy the positions from time to time. It differs from other taxonomies: for example, the ideological, economic, military and political (IEMP) classification of Michael Mann[43] or the economic, ideological/cultural and political classifications of classical sociology.[44] Further, if all social activity occurs within fields, then within those broad systemic fields are multiple subfields, which might be conceptualised as fractal versions of systemic fields, and any given empirical social interaction may involve overlapping fields of practice and contestation.

Any field is a "structuring structure" of the power relations that constitute it, and for Bourdieu there are two fundamental types of positions that a player can take up with respect to the configuration of these power relations: orthodox and heterodox. The *orthodox* position is occupied by those who dominate the field and exercise the most power in the allocation of its benefits and rewards, which they do by defining the

hierarchy of values and stakes that pertain in the field. The orthodox position usually produces the spokespeople and authoritative sources for journalists to interview and quote. The *heterodox* position is occupied by those who want to redefine certain rules and values (but not all – not the *doxa* or fundamental and accepted rules of the game) in order to advantage their own position and so assume the mantle and rewards of orthodoxy. The contestation between orthodox and heterodox positions is a common source of content for news reports. Minor players in the field align themselves more or less between and with these two opposing positions as they manifest themselves from time to time. According to Bourdieu, these fundamental characteristics of fields are invariant, and so there is a homology to the patterns and structures of power relations in all fields, based on this competition between orthodoxy and heterodoxy. Bourdieu does acknowledge, however, that once one graduates from the fundamental and abstract structures of fields, then all field characteristics are contingent on the historical and geographical specificities of their emergence and continued existence.[45] The orthodoxy/heterodoxy dipole is most strongly evident in stable institutionalised fields, and Bourdieu's field theory is at least as valuable for explaining instability in a field as for accounting for the reproduction of rigidities.[46] For journalists, news value resides in instability and change, rather than the maintenance of the status quo.

Journalism is always about the state of play in a field. It involves the reading of a situation to understand the nature of the field or overlapping fields of which it is an instance: the positions, relations and authority of the various protagonists to any contestation in the fields; an assessment of what is at stake in the contestation; and observation of how the various protagonists are conducting themselves to achieve their goals. Such a reading and assessment will involve the recognition or discovery of facts that might be significant, the observation and understanding of the processes that are producing those facts, and the role and relationships of the protagonists to the processes through which the contest is being waged. The Harvey-Lefebvre matrix intersects with Bourdieu's field theory to offer a valuable checklist for identifying the material and abstract elements at play in a field. The positions and processes of the protagonists might be evidenced by the facts of public statements, official and unofficial documents, observed facts and events, audio-visual records, and so forth. Both Haacke and Stone tended to use officially available documents, but journalism as a practice tends to use the full panoply of available evidence.

For example, Stone's *Hidden History of the Korean War 1950–1951* is a detailed reading of the field of US and regional politics and military strategy with respect to the conflict. It offers rich analyses of the characters and structured positions of the protagonists in the conflict. In the lead-up to war, Stone identified the positions of the defeated Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan, the South Koreans aligned with Syngman Rhee, and the right-wing US Republican Party members who had an interest in promoting US involvement in the conflict. In doing so, he is identifying their structured positions in the field of geopolitics relevant to Korea, their interests and common purposes, and how they were attempting to "play the game" to achieve those ends both by initiating provocations against the North Koreans and in their manner of responding to North Korean provocations. One major aim was to extend the physical boundaries of the field as established by the US-defined Asian Defence Perimeter beyond Japan to include Taiwan and Korea, and this aim was achieved. Stone also concluded, and Cumings concurs in this, that the US geopolitical strategy that developed over the early weeks of the Korean conflict established the structure (*doxa*, orthodoxies and heterodoxies) of the Cold War for decades to come by extending the structure of the Korean conflict to the whole international order.[47] Alongside these activities in the political and military fields, the soybean market manipulation was interpreted by Stone as a related activity in the economic field that provided profits of $30 million, which may or may not have been used to fund activities in the political and military fields or simply for private gain in the economic field.

In December 1950, when the UN forces started their headlong retreat away from the Chinese border through Pyongyang and Seoul, Stone documented the relative dispositions of the opposing armies and the lack of constant military engagement between them that might have been forcing the UN forces' retreat. From that he deduced that MacArthur might have a strategy to suffer an apparent infantry defeat in order to bolster the chances of a nuclear strike. In other words, Stone was suggesting that MacArthur was playing a game with the infantry forces in order to expand the parameters of the field of conflict beyond conventional forces to include a nuclear attack. The loss of the eight B-29s over Namsi airfield on 23 October, 1951 curtailed the operations of daytime bombing raids and, when similar losses the following June did the same for nighttime B-29 flights, the boundaries of the field were constricted to remove the nuclear option from the war. To Stone at the time, MacArthur's preferred strategy of dropping a nuclear bomb on China assumed the status of

the heterodox strategic option relative to President Truman's orthodox reluctance. However, it is clear from subsequent research that the nuclear option was actively being developed and planned for by the US political and military leadership; in other words, it was part of the orthodox range of possibilities, which is why its effective exclusion from the field of viable options was so challenging to the US government.[48]

Bourdieu's field is a spatial metaphor, and requires a theorisation of actual space and time to become empirically verifiable, as the examples from Stone's *Korean War* analysis make clear. Because Harvey and Lefebvre share a relational ontology and epistemology with Bourdieu, their approaches are broadly compatible. Harvey and Lefebvre bring to Bourdieu the opportunity to examine the empirical complexity of objects, processes and relations within a field, and to separate out for analytical purposes the perceived, conceptual and lived dimensions of practice within the field. For his part, Bourdieu brings to Harvey and Lefebvre a way to theorise the subjectivity of agents with respect to the characteristics of a specific spatiotemporal field of practice.

If we apply field theory to Baker's and Soloski's studies, we see that there is a larger field of journalistic news professionalism constituted by individuals and organisations that occupy both formal and informal positions with respect to the field. This includes senior and junior reporters, photojournalists, publishers, editors and subeditors, more or less prestigious print/online mastheads and broadcast/online news organisations, trades unions, professional organisations that promulgate codes of ethics and award prizes, and regulatory bodies such as (in Australia) the Australian Press Council, (in the UK) the Independent Press Standards Organisation (formerly the Press Complaints Commission), and also the courts that can rule on matters affecting journalism. Those organisations and individuals occupy positions in the field of news professionalism that both construct and constrain the range of potential practice for the individuals who occupy them from time to time.

Within the wide field of news professionalism, there is the subfield of individual publications that enforce their own house style. They too have a range of objective positions such as senior and junior reporters, publishers, editors, and so on. General news professionalism and the individual organisation's news policies produce the house style that becomes the *doxa* (taken-for-granted goals and rules of the game) recognised by all the participants in the field or "players in the game." Journalists, as Baker and Soloski observed, understand the structure and parameters

of the fields in which they operate, including the overlapping fields of industry-wide news professionalism and specific organisations' news policies, and they attune their practices to accommodate and prosper within those limits. Sometimes conflict occurs within news organisations or between the house style or modus operandi of particular organisations and the larger field of news professionalism. The News International phone-hacking scandal that started in 2005 in the UK and accelerated in 2011 (and for which court cases at the time of writing are still in process) was one such conflict.[49] In this case, the *News of the World*'s apparent news policies occupied the heterodox position relative to the orthodoxy of news professionalism. Within *News of the World*, although senior management testified that they had not authorised the hacking, the journalists would have had very finely tuned appreciations of the parameters and products of reporting behaviour that were acceptable to management (authorised or not), as Baker and Soloski observed in their studies. There were some early attempts to argue that the phone-hacking behaviour of the News International journalists was much more widespread in other media organisations than was generally acknowledged, and that effectively the parameters of acceptable behaviour by journalists should be extended in recognition of that reality, but that argument was rebuffed and the boundary lines were maintained.[50]

In the case of Haacke's *Shapolsky* and *Goldman* artworks, Messer and the Guggenheim were arguing that the works were outside the parameters of what was acceptable as art. The attempts by Buren and other artists associated with the Art Workers Coalition through their art practice and political mobilisation to redefine the boundaries of art and the relations between museums and artists was firmly rebuffed by the Guggenheim and MoMA, although less so by other institutions. Because of the positional power of MoMA and the Guggenheim in the field of North American and international art, the subfield of elite US institutions was able to maintain a different standard for a period of nearly four decades. At the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum in Köln in 1974, the curator and director were able to exclude Haacke's *Manet-PROJEKT '74* as heterodox to the Museum's orthodoxy. However that polarity was reversed in the wider art world by the numerous objections to the mutilation of Buren's work when he incorporated facsimiles of Haacke's rejected piece into his own exhibited pieces, and when the Haacke work was shown in a nearby private gallery contemporaneously with the main exhibition.[51] The dynamic relations and contests within the field of the New York and Köln art worlds can be

conceptualised in Bourdieu's field terms, but need to be located within their specific spatial and temporal context for the purposes of detailed empirical analysis. The sequence of events, the natures of processes, the identity and institutional positions of the protagonists, and the physicality of the museum spaces and the art objects were all crucial elements in the unfolding contests. Those spatiotemporal contexts as both the terrain and instruments of the contestation in the respective art subfields need to be understood in absolute, relative and relational terms in order to capture the full dimensions of the strategic stakes and manoeuvres. From these few examples it is clear that both the orthodox and heterodox positions in a field are likely to be multifaceted, heavily nuanced, and possibly fluid as contestation unfolds. It is precisely that nuance and fluidity that journalism attempts to track as it unfolds.

Journalism is a practice that operates in the symbolic field, and its products are symbolic products. Bourdieu observes that journalism is a heteronomous field because the private sector media are business enterprises where the economic interests of the publishing organisation set parameters for professional activity, and in the public sector the parameters for political analysis are mostly set by the positions of the political parties capable of forming government.[52] There is another very important sense in which journalism is necessarily heteronomous, and that is that journalism is interdisciplinary and almost always reports on activities in fields other than its own: for example, politics, sport and business. What journalists report about activity in those fields is important within those fields themselves, both in terms of external public perceptions and also internal perceptions and responses by stakeholders to each other in a field. For example, a high level of skill in public communication through the media is a prerequisite for important political office, and politicians speak to each other through the media as well as privately; journalists' perceptions of a company's performance can affect the price of its stock and therefore perceptions of performance by its leadership, both externally and internally. If Stone's analysis of the Korean War hadn't mattered, the political sphere would not have been so hostile to him and publishers would not have refused to take the book. In contemporary times, the communications management and public relations industries have expanded exponentially in order to try to constrain the autonomy of the journalistic field and limit the parameters of journalistic practice.

There is a strong implication in Bourdieu's characterisation of the artistic field that autonomous art has the highest normative value and,

by implication, this valorisation of autonomy might be extended to all fields. But as the history of art and patronage (both economic and political) amply demonstrates, artistic production is thoroughly enmeshed in the social conditions of its production in many complex, layered ways, as well as being caught up in its own discursive conventions and histories. Haacke's 1970s' experience at the Guggenheim and in Köln is clear evidence of that, as his subsequent artworks made a point of demonstrating.[53] Haacke and Bourdieu had a high mutual regard for each other and their respective work, but it's also possible to detect, in the conversations that *Free Exchange* comprises,[54] an occasional sense of them speaking at cross-purposes to each other. While Haacke has strongly challenged certain forms of interference or manipulation of art by political and business interests, it is also true that he has a conception of art that is deeply participatory and political, without being at all instrumentalist. If journalism is by nature heteronomous at the same time as it fights to preserve its independence from ulterior interests, then art also can be deeply heteronomous as it struggles to preserve its independence from ulterior interests.

Bourdieu's conceptualisation of poles within fields of force is a metaphor for thinking about shifting foci or nodes of influence, and the binary notions of orthodoxy/ heterodoxy and autonomy/ heteronomy usefully provide a way of calibrating the quality of capital to the state of power relations in the field. But any actual social situation is going to be a complex interplay of shifting values and positions, operating in a range of timeframes and over a variety of spaces with a dynamic cast of agents participating in the play. Strategic or tactical positions will be occupied and vouchsafed to be orthodox for as long as that affords value in the contest, and then vacated. Coalitions of agents will assemble and disassemble as it suits their mutual advantage. Battles will be fought in one field to achieve goals in another, for example in the political field to achieve goals in the economic field. The essence of Kramer's and Messer's objections to *Shapolsky* was that it was a political battle being inappropriately transposed into the arts arena. Attempts to suppress information about Korea and the status of the US nuclear deterrent were relevant to the conduct of domestic politics in the USA. Simple binary oppositions do a disservice to the fecundity of Bourdieu's framework and need to be reconfigured, firstly in a much more flexible and dynamic set of multiple polarities, and secondly in a way that pays serious attention to the spatiotemporality of any actual field of power relations.

Capital

"A capital does not exist and function as such except in relation to a field."[55] In order to play the game – to participate in a field of practice – players require capital. Capital is acquired through a social process of accumulation: for example, in the cultural field through education, training and experience and in the economic field by profit from investment, from rent, or by financial speculation. Capital can be understood as resources deployed or deployable in a productive process, and cannot be measured solely in quantitative terms. Capital depends on deployment in a relationship for its status as such and to confer power. With any given capital resource, power might be exercised in a variety of ways to a variety of effects. Bourdieu tends to equate capital with power by using the terms interchangeably, but that is problematic; capital enables the exercise of power but only through activity in a field. Capital is specific to a field, it must be acquired (it is not innate) and it is socially defined and recognised: for example, by journalists when they recognise the authority of a source to make definitive statements about a situation on behalf of an organisation. Capital and position in the field, particularly in relation to the orthodox/heterodox polarity, are important factors that journalists consider when they are selecting sources to provide authoritative information, observations, and/or commentary on the state of play in a field.

Bourdieu offers a binary definition of capital, that which is *autonomous* to its field, and that which is *heteronomous*. Autonomous capital is that which is generated within its own field and is specific to it: e.g. musical knowledge and ability in the music field, intellectual knowledge and ability in the academic field, and sporting knowledge and ability in the sporting field. Heteronomous capital is that which is generated in a different field to the one in which it is being deployed: e.g., the resources that a well-connected political appointment brings to the governing board of a cultural organisation, or a corporate business appointee to a sporting organisation.

Capital creates capacity, which can be utilised in the playing of the game, and it is the actual playing of the game that manifests the capital and so secures either success or failure in the particular encounter in which it is deployed. Further, the experience and recognition gained in playing the game at a certain level of skill can further increase the quantity and quality of capital so that players can develop their careers and progress up through a hierarchy. The institutionalisation of a field facilitates the accumulation,

deployment and reproduction of capital in and for that field: for example, university study for admission to practice as a medical professional, lawyer, engineer, etc.

For journalists, knowledge of a specialised field, previously known as a "round" or "beat," is an essential form of capital, which is why journalism is necessarily interdisciplinary and heteronomous. Journalistic capital is the capacity to understand the structure and processes of a field, to recognise the elements of a situation in the field that might constitute news or a "story," and the knowledge to undertake the actions needed to produce the story with the style and content required by their organisational superiors. So journalists require a dual capital: one form to operate in the symbolic sphere in producing journalism and another to operate as an informed and insightful observer in the field being reported about. Such operations in a field require habitus, which is the third essential element to Bourdieu's field theory.

Habitus

The manifestation and deployment of capital is termed "habitus."[56] Habitus is a person's way of being in the world, of "playing the game" in any given field. It is a system of dispositions based on the capital the player has accumulated, which enables him/her to play the game by reacting to the state of affairs in ways that are calculated to achieve his/her goals. Habitus is socially determined and thus not innate but learned through education and training or informally through experience. It is a set of dispositions to respond to opportunities or challenges in certain ways, and so indeterminate, vague or fuzzy and hard to define. It is generative of new responses in unforeseen situations and therefore apparently intuitive. It is the key element in the "logic or political economy of practice" that transcends the subjectivism/objectivism dichotomy and links the actions of individuals into the operations of large fields of power relations. Practice using habitus both enables the reproduction of those fields and at the same time their development to cope with the changing exigencies of social existence.

Habitus involves the capacity to read and interpret the state of play in the field, the power relations that generated the developments up to that point, and the potential developments that may ensue dependent on the player's interaction with the game. Habitus is thoroughly contingent upon and specific to the field, and cannot be developed or derived outside

of the field (though similar fields might generate related forms of habitus, e.g., in television and radio reporting, in public and private sector corporate management, etc.). Capital that is heteronomous to a field can only generate a habitus that derives from its interaction with the field, and the more sympathetic the interaction is with the "structuring structure" of the field, the more efficacious it is likely to be in deployment within the field. For example, the appointment of a marketing executive to the board of directors of a sporting club might be advantageous to the club, but only if that person's marketing habitus is sympathetic to the habitus and needs of the sport and the club.

For journalists, news sense is a form of habitus. It is learned in educational institutions and through experience on the job. It is vague and indeterminate, which is why journalists have such difficulty defining it. It is particularly relevant to relations with sources, both human and documentary. It manifests as a sense of what might be the right question to ask next, what might be an important document to locate and examine, or who might be an appropriate person from whom to get a response to a set of questions. It is the way in which a journalist's dual capital in the form of knowledge of a particular field and the requirements of their editorial organisation come together to generate a story. It is tied to dynamic developments in a field: What's new? What's likely to happen? It requires an appreciation of the way processes in the field are likely to unfold so that the journalist knows what assertions of fact are relevant, how they might be verified, and what questions to which protagonists might be appropriate. Because newsworthiness is typically tied to the impact of unfolding developments on the social and power relations of a field, news sense is the habitus to quickly recognise and interpret the visible evidence in facts and processes signifying shifts in the invisible social and power relations, to ascertain the stakes in a particular process underway, and to discover and interpret evidence that might support various interpretations of what is going on and where it might lead. Deceit, deception and disingenuity and the capacity to detect and interpret the same can be important qualities of habitus in many contests.

To summarise, journalists are always operating in at least two fields simultaneously – their own symbolic field of journalism production and the other field(s) about which they are reporting. They therefore require a dual capital of knowledge and experience to generate a dual habitus so as to be able to operate effectively and interactively in both fields at the same time. To be able to report effectively about a field, journalists require

sources of information that they need to be able to evaluate for their credibility, authority and relevance – that is, for the quality of their capital and their position in a dynamic field. The centrality of journalist-source relations to both the capital and habitus of journalists is clear, and the insights that Bourdieu's conceptualisation of field, capital and habitus can bring to the analysis of source-journalist interactions is widely recognised.[57]

Sources

A fundamental issue in journalist-source relations is power. Is power equally distributed between the fields and positions? If not, why not? And how do the power relations operate? It is not sufficient to say that the relations between fields are heteronomous, because the power relations may impact on the veracity and reliability of the information and analyses in the journalists' reports. First, I will examine Bourdieu's own views on relations between journalism and other fields, and then I will consider how "Bourdieu might be used against Bourdieu" to resolve some impasses in the general literature on journalists and their sources.

Bourdieu himself argued that the symbolic field of journalism was in a subordinated position to the other fields and advanced three arguments to this effect. Firstly, regarding the journalism industry, he argued that "David Manning White the *mechanisms* of a journalistic field [are] increasingly subject to market demand (through readers and advertisers) [which impacts] *first on journalists* (and on journalist-intellectuals) and then, in part through them, on the various fields of cultural production."[58] His concerns revolved around the process of privatisation of the public broadcast sector and deregulation of the media and cultural industries underway in France at the time. His focus was the impact of forces in the economic field on journalistic practice, and less on the impact of the political field on state-owned public broadcasters, which Hall had analysed in the British context.[59] His associated concern was the way in which commercial pressures had enabled "journalist-intellectuals," by which he meant pundits and commentators used by media outlets to provide in-depth commentary on current events, to supplant the role of true intellectuals in public discourse. He recognised that Haacke had broken this mould by successfully engaging journalists in the controversies around his work.[60] At the same time, Haacke's success in escaping the economic impact of exclusion by elite US institutions is due to two characteristics of the arts industry: firstly, that it is competitive and international in scale, so Haacke was able to

access leading European museums for commissions and exhibitions when the US elite institutions excluded him, and secondly, that Haacke's work was not produced to be commodities for sale in a commercial market and therefore he wasn't subject to the constraints of commercial demand – indeed, his response to the American exclusion was to produce work that specifically attacked the use of the art world for commercial and political purposes.[61] In Stone's case, from the late 1940s he was self-employed as editor of *I.F. Stone's Weekly* and so not subject to the pressures of corporate employers.

Bourdieu might cite these two examples as exceptions that prove the rule in that their intellectual achievements and high public profiles were achieved against the grain of the industries within which they worked, and there would be merit in that argument. On the other hand, since Bourdieu died in 2002 the effect of digitisation on the news media oligopolies has been catastrophic for their business models and supported the massive expansion of not-for-profit journalism, of which *Wikileaks* and Julian Assange or *The Intercept* and Glenn Greenwald are globally influential examples.

Secondly, with respect to the professional workforce of journalists, for Bourdieu they are workers in the symbolic and cultural fields and so members of "the dominated fraction of the dominant class."[62] By this he means that they are the professionals whose work reproduces the hegemonic information, education and values in the cultural and symbolic fields for the capital-owning middle class, but their employment and the economic viability of their employing organisations is dependent on the "field of power" comprising the political and economic fields working together largely on behalf of capital-owning interests. Haacke avoided employee dependence by holding a tenured teaching position at the Cooper Union in Manhattan for many decades, and *I.F Stone's Weekly* commenced in 1951 with a paying base of subscribers of 5,000 that increased to 70,000 over the following two decades, thus securing a financial independence for Stone and his family that was founded on his independent and iconoclastic journalism.

Thirdly, Bourdieu argues that there is a structural subordination of the symbolic field to other fields because the reality and associated exercise of power that is being symbolised exists in the original field, and the production of symbols to manifest that reality in the symbolic field is in itself an exercise in production whose relationship to the underlying reality is not necessarily transparent or direct. "Symbolic power, a subordinate power, is a transformed, i.e. misrecognizable, transfigured and legitimated form

of the other forms of power."[63] This is a variation on the reality/representation debates of recent decades. Bourdieu uses symbolic power and symbolic violence as interchangeable terms, and argues that their potency lies in the capacity of symbols to produce misrecognition. "Symbolic systems owe their distinctive power to the fact that the relations of power expressed through them are manifested only in the misrecognizable form of relations of meaning (displacement)" and "[s]ymbolic power … is a power that can only be exercised if it is recognized, that is, *misrecognized* as arbitrary."[64] His argument is not that symbolic power necessarily involves misrecognition, but there is a resonance with the false consciousness and base/superstructure analyses of earlier Marxisms.

Bourdieu himself has acknowledged that his concepts are derived from his empirical work in France and its former colonies, and that their application to other contexts would need to be verified. The concept of symbolic violence and its corollary of "misrecognition" implies a very stable, not to say rigid, social context or field (such as might exist in a tribal social environment like the Kabyle or perhaps the French high culture milieu). Logically, it is hard to see how an exercise of symbolic violence could be contested in a field if it necessarily involves misrecognition, and yet Bourdieu's theory proposes that all relations in the field are contingent and contestable. It implies continuity and stability rather than change, and yet the attraction of Bourdieu's approach to field analysis is precisely that it is capable of explaining change as well as continuity. Misrecognition as a concept would be more useful if it was understood to involve *attempts* by practitioners in the symbolic field to impose certain preferred meanings and to disguise or misrecognise the motivations and interests behind those preferences, rather than *requiring* as a matter of definition that the misrecognition be successfully imposed as a moment of closure on other practitioners. The interpretation of any symbolic text or activity occurs at the point of reception, not production, and we can't foreclose any possible interpretations by participants occupying other positions in any field. Indeed, the *raison d'être* and *illusio* of any field, including the symbolic, is precisely the contestation of its structure and power relations; therefore exercises of symbolic power are necessarily open to contestation. At the same time we can acknowledge that power is often more effectively exercised through being unchallenged.

Regarding misrecognition with respect to Haacke's art, Fry pointed out in 1971 that the great importance and innovation of his approach was that it sought to use reality itself as its medium, and so transposes

the reality/representation issue.[65] Haacke's work has been controversial in the general news as well as arts media, and so demonstrated that the production of meaning in the symbolic sphere is a site of struggle. In particular, his "productive provocations," as he termed them, are open ended and calculated to engage journalists and the public in debate over their meaning, which is very much opposed to the closure of debate implicit in misrecognition.[66]

In a different way, even though his work does involve the reality–representation dialectic, Stone's journalism aims to provoke debate and public engagement about its significance and meaning. Stone presents evidence and analysis and argues for the power and persuasiveness of his interpretation, but it is precisely an argument that he presents and not a foreclosed and exclusive narrative. Indeed, his aim is to expose and counter any misrecognition that might be promoted by interested parties. Both *Hidden History* and *Socrates* are exhaustive in their exploration of the relevant documentation and literature, and *Socrates* in particular is meticulous in the presentation of sources and scholarly debate about their interpretation. In this way Stone's journalism is closer to the mode of traditional scholarship than Haacke's art, though it is not transformative of the reality/representation polarity in the way that the latter is. The work of these two practitioners demonstrate that if we "use Bourdieu against Bourdieu" to explore the contingency and contestability of all relations within and among fields, then the three interlinked concepts of field, capital and habitus are a useful framework for theorising the relationship of journalists to sources. Australian empirical research in several areas has confirmed this analysis and opened up the opportunity to use field theory to review instances of journalism practice for their methodological adequacy: for example, on climate change[67] and on social policy.[68]

Given the centrality of journalist-source relations to the methodologies of journalism, it is important to explore alternatives to Bourdieu's field theory, especially given the limitations of his own approach to journalism. Relationships between journalists and their sources take place in material contexts, with spatial, temporal and organisational characteristics that constitute highly specific terrains for each encounter in the relationship.[69] Underpinning the material instances of interaction is an abstract structure of professional protocols and ethics defining the roles of the two parties in the production process; sources originate information and attest to its significance, while journalists access and interrogate the information to produce reports, arguments and narratives, which they feed into the

production and distribution process. A central issue is whether the contested relations between the two are relatively equal or unequal in power terms, because that may impact on the veracity and qualities of the journalistic truth claims. In recent decades there have been two main approaches, again dating from the sociology of the 1970s and 1980s, which are generally recognised as dominating scholarly debate on this question.[70]

On the one hand, Hall argues that the relationship is structured in dominance to the disadvantage of journalists,[71] while on the other, Ericson Richard argues that there is no underpinning structure and the balance of power depends on the particular circumstances, often to the advantage of journalists.[72] In principle, there is no "default" position in considering this issue. That is to say, there is no *a priori* reason why a level playing field is more or less likely than an unequal field. Either way, any understanding of the relations will depend on the metatheoretical framework being used to analyse it. As an aside, it is worth noting again, as Hall points out, that those metatheoretical frameworks, while abstract in their form, are produced in distinct historical and geographical contexts that themselves have identifiable sociopolitical characteristics and, while hall doesn't argue that the characteristics of the metatheories are reflections of their material contexts, he does suggest that patterns of emergence and predominance in social theory can be related to the sociopolitical context of their production in their historical and geographic specificities.[73] Bourdieu's position on the relation of theory to its generative social context resonates with Hall's perspective.

The first position (that relations are structurally unequal) was articulated by Stuart Hall and his colleagues in their influential book *Policing the Crisis*.[74] Their analysis was embedded in a "culturalist Marxist" position, and commenced with a repudiation of any claim that journalists

> simply and transparently report events which are 'naturally' newsworthy in themselves. 'News' is the end-product of a complex process which begins with a systematic sorting and selecting of events and topics according to a socially constructed set of categories.[75]

The systematisation involves both organisational and ideological dimensions, plus identification and contextualisation in terms that are meaningful to audiences:

> If the world is not to be presented as a jumble of random and chaotic events, then they must be identified (i.e. named, defined, related to other events

> known to the audience), and assigned to a social context (i.e. placed within a frame of meanings familiar to the audience). This process – identification and contextualisation – is one of the most important through which events are 'made to mean' by the media. An event only 'makes sense' if it can be located within a range of known social and cultural identifications. If newsmen (sic) did not have available – in however routine a way – such cultural 'maps' of the social world, they could not 'make sense' for their audiences of the unusual, unexpected and unpredicted events which form the basic content of what is newsworthy. .... This bringing of events within the realm of meanings means, in essence, referring unusual and unexpected events to the 'maps of meaning' which already form the basis of our cultural knowledge, into which the social world is already mapped.[76]

The "maps of meaning" are a textualised version of Bourdieu's fields ('"structuring structures") of social relations,[77] and Hall sees them as key elements in the hegemonic reproduction of the consensus underpinning the stability and reproduction of capitalist social relations. He was writing in 1978, shortly before the onset of the Reagan/Thatcher neoliberal restructuring of the Anglo-American economies. Writing almost thirty years later in a *post hoc* analysis of neoliberal globalisation, Harvey deployed Gramsci's same concept of hegemony to argue that rather than ideology underpinning a stabilising consensus, it is deployed as a necessary precursor to the process of destructive change that capitalism constantly requires.[78]

Hall goes on to argue that the requirement for objectivity and fairness in professional journalistic practice leads to a dependence on truth claims that are "grounded in 'objective' and 'authoritative' statements from 'accredited' sources," who are typically accredited because they are representatives (elected or otherwise) of major social institutions, or sometimes acknowledged independent "experts." In Bourdieu's terms, they represent orthodox interests in the field. Combined with the three factors Hall identified above, this allows the "systematically structured *over-accessing* to the media of those in powerful and privileged institutional positions", which constitutes them as "the *primary definers* of topics [whose] interpretation then 'commands the field' in all subsequent treatment and sets the terms of reference within which all further coverage or debate takes place."[79] "Counter-definers" (the heterodox position for Bourdieu) can sometimes gain access to the media to argue their case, but typically they do so on the terms already established for the issue by the primary definers, and therefore they are at a disadvantage. In this conception, journalists

do have an active and discretionary role to play in selecting the particular primary definers for reportage and choosing the textual characteristics of the representation of the primary definers' contributions, in particular the "public idiom" in which the language of the report is to be cast to suit the "social personality" of the media outlet, and sometimes the "public voice" that the news outlet adopts to speak on behalf of its audience.[80] However, this role for the media is subordinate to that of the primary definers; Hall characterises the media as "secondary definers" "in a position of structured subordination to the primary definers."[81]

Hall's hierarchical formulation of the power relations between journalists and the powers-that-be that constitute their sources was enormously influential. Reviewing the research record over two decades later, Davis found the fundamental proposition of over-representation of institutional and governmental sources in news texts to be incontrovertible.[82] The situation has been exacerbated by the massive expansion of communications management and public relations as an industry[83] allied to a multi-decadal, multi-faceted strategic mobilisation by business leaders against their critics[84] and in support of the neoliberal policy agenda.[85] However, Davis[86] argues that public relations as a professional activity is also available to the opponents of business and neoliberalism, and that various oppositional movements have used the media to good effect. Gitlin, on the other hand, evidenced the relations between the mainstream media and the anti-Vietnam War movement in the USA to argue that the mainstream capitalist media will ultimately proscribe the more radical programs and advocates of movements for social or policy change and support the authority of the existing powers-that-be, who are Hall's primary definers.[87]

Although the empirical evidence from large-scale case studies of news journalism supported Hall's conclusions, there was considerable discussion and criticism of its theoretical basis and of its applicability to specific case studies. *Policing the Crisis* was generally acknowledged as the apogee of the culturalist Marxist tradition emerging from the Birmingham Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies.[88] Though she found this a fertile development in media and cultural studies, Janet Woollacott argued that "[i]n effect, a sophisticated version of 'false consciousness' is proposed."[89] James Curran criticised the functionalism of Hall's approach,[90] and David Miller queried the analytical power of the theory at the level of specific historical-geographical situations; Miller pointed out how, in the case of Northern Ireland, the reporting of the British media shifted over time to

encompass positions oppositional to the British government's and British Army's positions, thus introducing a level of contingency that subverted the "structured subordination" that Hall argued governed the relations between powerful institutional sources and the media.[91]

Perhaps the most thoroughgoing critique of Hall's argument came from Philip Schlesinger in 1990. He identified five crucial inadequacies in the approach:

- It failed to account for contention between powerful sources, such as competing accredited sources from the same institution, e.g., cabinet ministers;
- It failed to account for powerful sources demanding anonymity as confidential sources, thus concealing their authority as accredited sources (though in response it could be argued that this was the ultimate in power without responsibility);
- It failed to account for short-term temporal shifts in equality of access among primary definers, and what might be the factors causing the shift in a source's status from occasion to occasion;
- It failed to account for long-term shifts in the structure of access of important institutions, e.g., the media access given to trade union leaders in periods of conservative government;
- And finally, it failed to account for the occasional role of the media in taking the initiative against primary definers, as when campaigning on particular issues or in investigative journalism mode.[92]

Schlesinger acknowledges that Hall makes a strong case, supported by the findings of contemporary sociological research, that

> the way in which journalistic practice is organised generally promotes the interests of authoritative sources [but] because Hall's approach to 'primary definition' resolves the question of source power on the basis of structuralist assumptions, it closes off any engagement with the dynamic processes of contestation in a given field of discourse.[93]

This is the case even though Hall himself is at pains throughout his writings on the news media to stress that it is a "site of struggle".[94] Schlesinger himself proposed that the most productive way to approach questions of media power would be to "de-centre" the media as the object of analysis and see it within the context of a larger set of social relations, and that

Bourdieu's conceptualisation of the field, capital and habitus would be a productive way to approach the question.[95]

A clear alternative to Hall's approach was advanced by Richard Ericson and his colleagues.[96] Writing in the tradition of North American sociology of deviance, they acknowledged the role of the media in defining the parameters of social normalcy but avoided any consideration of the larger questions of social structure and power relations about why this might be so or who might benefit from such relations. As Hall himself had earlier pointed out, this avoidance is a key deficit in deviance sociology.[97] Nonetheless, some valuable insights into journalist-source relations flowed from both the approach and the extensive empirical work that Ericson and his colleagues undertook. The approach was relational:

> News is a product of transactions between journalists and their sources. The primary source of reality for news is not what is displayed or what happens in the real world. The reality of news is embedded in the nature and type of social and cultural relations that develop between journalists and their sources, and in the politics of knowledge that emerges on each specific newsbeat. As such, it is every person's daily barometer of the 'knowledge structure of society'.[98]

And again:

> News is a representation of authority. In the contemporary knowledge society news represents *who* are the authorised knowers and *what* are their authoritative versions of reality [and] [a]t the same time that it informs about who are the authorised knowers, it suggests, by relegation to a minor role and by omission, who is excluded from having a say in important matters.[99]

Ericson's "authorised knowers" are not Hall's "primary definers" because for Ericson the relationship between sources and journalists is not "structured in dominance" but a complex range of power relations depending on the relative strengths and weaknesses of individual sources and their organisations, media outlets and individual journalists. However, Ericson's "authorised knowers" occupy Bourdieu's orthodox positions in the field, and his minor and omitted knowers are heterodox. In an important innovation, Ericson sees news reports as originating from source organisations rather than the journalists, who are provided with information by sources seeking not only *coverage* of their affairs, but also *access* to the media to

present the information in their own preferred terms.[100] In turn, journalists are seeking access to the organisations, which police their own boundaries. This means that source-journalist interactions can be categorised as heteronomous inter-field rather than intra-field relations.

Ericson argued that all organisations need private times and spaces where their normal business can be negotiated away from the public gaze mediated by journalists, but they also attempt to manipulate journalists' access to information that could and should be made publicly available.[101] Some information is freely distributed and promoted (publicity), some information should be publicly available but is kept hidden (censorship), some private information is made available to selected informants only (confidences), and some information is attempted to be held in private (secrecy). In developing this four-sector model of publicity/confidences/censorship/secrecy, Ericson was applying to the organisational level the front regions/back regions bipolarity of individual life popularised by Goffman[102] and modified by Giddens to include intersecting areas of disclosure and enclosure.[103] Journalists and news publications also participate in this production of visibility/invisibility through spatiotemporal practices that allocate coverage of events and facts to different frameworks and sections of a publication, e.g., the coal industry to business news and global warming to environmental news.[104] Journalists can seek to operate, with or without permission, in all four sectors of Ericson's model, as is recognised through ethical and sometimes legislative protection for the confidentiality of sources.

Ericson doesn't deploy a temporal dimension to this sectoral model, though he does mention in passing the tactical issues of timing,[105] nor does he theorise how the spatial arrangement of one individual organisation's boundaries and activities might intersect in complex interactions with those of other organisations. An organisation (for example, a government minister's office) might publish information on a busy news day or during a crisis that is preoccupying the news media in order both to claim that the information had been published but at the same time be confident that it would be ignored by a news media that was otherwise occupied, and therefore disappear as the news cycle moved on. Similarly, a journalist and source might come to an explicit agreement that publication of known information might be embargoed to a future date or eventuality, or indeed to a tacit understanding that previously revealed information is no longer relevant because it has been superseded by other events and information, and so effectively can be forgotten.

This process of agreeing (implicitly or explicitly) to rendering certain events/processes/personalities invisible is highly significant, and has received remarkably little attention in the academic literature. It is part and parcel of the negotiation in every reporting instance where decisions have to be made about what to include and what to exclude. Typically, the scholarly assumption is that all publicity is good publicity and that the struggle is over the management or terms of visibility rather than the complicit production of invisibility.[106] There is a parallel to be drawn here with Trouillot's (1995) argument about the production of silences in history, which I will discuss in Chap. 8. Every development of a story by a journalist involves a negotiation (explicit and implicit) with sources about what is relevant to the "map of meaning" from the socio-historical context (whether recent or removed) and what can be safely ignored and quickly/eventually forgotten. In short, the rhythmic and arrhythmic temporalities of the news cycle can structure the visibility or otherwise of information and activities at least as effectively as the spatial characteristics of access to information.

Leaving aside the lack of analysis of larger social power relations in his research,[107] Ericson has made important contributions. Firstly, he recognises that sources act to promote certain information and keep other information invisible to the public eye because information and its interpretation is of strategic and tactical value beyond its generalised impact on larger ideological questions. In other words, organisations are players in fields of conflict, and information is a key resource in their contests. This is a significant step beyond the view of news coverage as simply ideological messages, and is compatible with Schlesinger's call to account for the conflict among Hall's primary definers. Secondly, he documents the materiality of journalist-source relations as a "site of struggle," even if he doesn't offer an adequate theoretical account of the process and context of the struggles. Thirdly, he conceives of the process as dynamic and relational, and therefore contingent on the social and material characteristics of the terrain (or field) on which the process occurs, of the participants in the process, and of their behaviour. Fourthly, he regards the primary stake of the contest (Bourdieu's *illusio*) as not the "facts" claimed in the statements themselves, but rather the accreditation by the journalists of the sources' authority to make credible statements – that is, the symbolic representation of the contested political structure of positions in a field, which offers a more contested and nuanced account of the role of the symbolic field than Bourdieu's concept of misrecognition.

The weakness of Ericson's analysis is that he has nothing to say about the larger polarities of social power, which provide the context for the negotiations and contests at the micro level. Hall, on the other hand, has a clear view of the larger social polarities and trajectories, but his weakness, as Schlesinger identified, is that he can't explain, beyond "tendencies," how the contingencies at specific "sites of struggle" relate to the wider context. Bourdieu's theoretical framework facilitates analysis of firstly, the "sites of struggle" among sources, among journalists and between sources and journalists; and secondly, the relationship between these struggles or contests and contests in other social fields, in particular the larger, society-wide fields where wholesale power is exercised. Drawing this discussion to a head, I suggest that the weaknesses outlined earlier in Bourdieu's approach do not obviate the great value to be gained from understanding social relations in terms of field, capital, habitus and symbolic power. Capital, conceived as a deployed capacity and resource rather than power as such, makes the link with the social structures that produce inequalities and enable hierarchies to attempt to reproduce their power and status, but at the same time enables the process of social change. The value of capital is not absolute but depends on the ever-changing state of the field, and its value as a resource depends on the skill (habitus) and contingent circumstances of the agent who is using it. Hence we can progress well beyond "tendencies" as an account of how Hall's primary definers over-access the media to analyse in microscopic detail the actual resources and power plays that transpired in particular instances of journalistic research and reporting. Bourdieu enables a research agenda that can reconcile the structural patterns that Hall identified and subsequent researchers confirmed with Ericson's cut and thrust of micro-politics around the terms, if any, of visibility in the symbolic sphere of the media.

Habitus as a theoretical construct enables analysts to escape any risk of determinism by recognising the skill and happenstance that is so critical to any encounter with the contingency of news production. News sense, that great undefinable core of journalism education and sociology, becomes the acquired capacity to detect the state of power relations in a field of social activity and intervene in the representation of those relations. As both Hall and Ericson agree, news is not so much about the "facts" as such but the social authority to bear witness to and interpret those "facts." As Ericson put it, "the reality of news … is embedded in the politics of knowledge that emerges on each specific news beat."[108] Journalistic habitus (news sense) is about recognising and interpreting the

material evidence for abstract, invisible shifts in the orthodox/heterodox relations of sources within a field (Hall's primary and counter-definers). It requires the perception and verification of the material factuality of events and objects, and the understanding of the processes through which the relations are managed and the facts produced. But of course, to acquire the capital to understand what is happening on that news beat, journalists have to assimilate to the field at the same time that they seek to preserve an estrangement or heteronomy from it in order to maintain their professional independence and not be subject to "source capture". In the symbolic field of journalistic production, heteronomy is not an aberration but a necessity.

Lastly, the concept of field, when applied to the symbolic sphere, acknowledges that media workers are the professional producers who control that field, which both Hall and Ericson recognised, but the rules of the field require engagement with "authorised knowers" or "primary definers" whose status is earned and produced in other fields. That is a particular characteristic of the journalism subfield of the symbolic field, which automatically throws the symbolic field into a singular set of intersecting relationships with other fields. The concept of heteronomy recognises that fields intersect and overlap and, when dovetailed with the understanding that the very parameters of a field are often what is at stake (tactically at least) in a struggle, it allows scholars and practitioners to calibrate the impact of different sorts of capital in a struggle. It also facilitates the exploration of how a struggle in one field may be largely fought in a related field as long as the two are linked by the engagement of the players. This sort of exploration and analysis is a mainstay of professional journalism practice.

Bourdieusian field analyses benefit from reconciliation with the spatiotemporality of the Harvey-Lefebvre matrix. If news is a value and not an object or an empirical fact, it sits in Harvey's relational space-time and is applied to processes and to facts (relative and absolute space-time) as a criterion by which to evaluate them. Precisely what the criterion will be is dependent on the disciplinary specifics of the process (for example, economic and social theory to interpret shifts in employment data and its consequences), which is why "news" cannot be identified in the abstract, separate from observable processes and facts. These are the horizontal rows in Harvey's matrix. In exercising news sense to discern significance, journalists are responding to their perceptions of the facts, processes and relationships; to their conceptions of the logic of those facts, processes and relationships; and to the ways they might be understood and pre-

sented to audiences as empathetic lived experience. These are the vertical columns of Lefebvre's spatiotemporal practice in the matrix. What the metatheoretical frameworks of Bourdieu, Harvey and Lefebvre enable is a profound interrogation of the adequacy of journalism research practice beyond professional nostrums of objectivity, balance and fairness.[109] They place journalism at the level of other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, where discipline-specific interrogation of methodological adequacy is the criterion for disciplinary status, whatever that might mean in any given circumstances. We can now return to the question posed at the beginning of this book: What does this have to do with art?

Notes

1. Tuchman (1978).
2. Park (2006 [1940]).
3. Baker (1980).
4. White (1964).
5. Baker (1980: 137).
6. Baker (1980: 140).
7. Baker (1980: 155).
8. Phillips (1976: 71).
9. Baker (1980: 144).
10. Soloski (1989).
11. Soloski (1989: 218).
12. Soloski (1989: 218).
13. Hall et al. (1978), Hall (1982), Allan (2004).
14. Hall et al. (1978: 53).
15. Stone (1989: 69).
16. Harvey (1989: 166ff).
17. Lefebvre (1991: 306) emphasis in original.
18. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 36ff).
19. Phillips (1976: 71).
20. Tuchman (1972: 660).
21. Hughes (2009: 322).
22. Tuchman (1972: 661).
23. Tuchman (1978: 677) emphasis in original.
24. Gouldner (1970: 249) emphasis in original.
25. Harvey (1973: 11–12).
26. Kovach and Rosenstiel (2007: 89).

27. Tuchman (1978: 82).
28. Bourdieu (1998: 68) emphasis in original.
29. Benson and Neveu (2005: 1).
30. Schlesinger (1990).
31. Benson and Neveu (2005).
32. Schudson (2005).
33. Hallin (2005).
34. e.g. Lovell (2000), Verter (2003).
35. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 96).
36. Bourdieu (1990: 30ff).
37. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 9).
38. Bourdieu (1990: 14ff).
39. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 97, 98) emphasis in original.
40. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 100) emphasis in original.
41. Tuchman (1978).
42. Benson (2006).
43. Mann (1986).
44. Schroeder (2006).
45. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 94–115).
46. Gorski (2013a).
47. Stone (1988: 355ff), Cumings (2011: 205ff).
48. Cumings (2011: 156–8), Futrell (1983), Crane (2000).
49. Davies (2014), Leveson (2012), Watson (2012).
50. Leveson (2012).
51. Wallis (1986: 130).
52. See Hall (1976) for his concept of "the independence/impartiality couplet" and Chubb and Nash (2012) for a Bourdieusian critique of Hall's framework.
53. Wallis (1986).
54. Bourdieu and Haacke (1995).
55. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992: 101).
56. Bourdieu (1990: 52ff).
57. Benson and Neveu (2005), Benson (2004, 2006), Kaplan (2006), Couldry (2007), Dickinson (2007), Zafirau (2007).
58. Bourdieu (1998: 68) emphasis in original.
59. Hall (1976).
60. Bourdieu and Haacke (1995: 19–28).
61. Grasskamp (2006).
62. Bourdieu (2013: 229).

63. Bourdieu (1992: 170).
64. Bourdieu (1992: 170) emphasis in original.
65. Fry (2011 [1971]).
66. Bourdieu and Haacke (1995: 23).
67. Nash (2015), Bacon and Nash (2012), Chubb and Nash (2012).
68. Roberts and Nash (2009).
69. Tuchman (1978), Ericson et al. (1989), Harvey (2006).
70. Hartley (1996: 232), Cottle (2003).
71. Hall et al. (1978).
72. Ericson et al. (1989).
73. Hall (1982: 57ff).
74. Hall et al. (1978).
75. Hall et al. (1978: 53).
76. Hall et al. (1978: 53).
77. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1993: 94–115).
78. Harvey (2006: 16).
79. Hall et al. (1978: 58) emphasis in original.
80. Hall et al. (1978: 61–63).
81. Hall et al. (1978: 59).
82. Davis (2000: 45).
83. Cottle (2003).
84. Dreier (1982).
85. Scot (1997).
86. Davis (2000: 49ff).
87. Gitlin (1980).
88. Turner (1990: 69).
89. Woollacott (1982: 110).
90. Curran (1996).
91. Miller (1993).
92. Schlesinger (1990: 66–68).
93. Schlesinger (1990: 69).
94. Hall (1982: 76–79).
95. Schlesinger (1990).
96. Ericson et al. (1989).
97. Hall (1982: 62–65).
98. Ericson et al. (1989: 377).
99. Ericson et al. (1989: 3, 4) emphasis in original.
100. Ericson et al. (1989: 5).
101. Ericson et al. (1989: 9).

102. Goffman (1959).
103. Giddens (1984: 122–6).
104. Bacon and Nash (2012).
105. Ericson et al. (1989: 20).
106. e.g. Thompson (1995, 2000, 2005).
107. Ericson et al. (1989: 3).
108. Ericson et al. (1989: 377).
109. Nash (2015), Bacon and Nash (2012), Chubb and Nash (2012), Roberts and Nash (2009).

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CHAPTER 7

Art and Journalism

In a discussion about how to think theoretically about journalism as a research practice, why is it necessary or even desirable to consider the question of journalism as art? There are several answers to that question.

Firstly, the question was posed in definitive and confrontational terms at the Guggenheim in 1971, when museum director Thomas Messer identified Haacke's artworks as journalism and used that identity as the basis for a high-profile act of repudiation. If Messer was correct, why was that a problem? The question is disciplinary: what sort of knowledge is possible within the category of art? And therefore it also is methodological: what is the relationship between what is known and how it is known, and how might that relationship produce meaning? Messer specified the verifiability and meaning of the facts being reported by Haacke as a basis for rejecting the works. If Haacke had been merely appropriating some unusual object, medium or process to make a symbolic statement, much as Duchamp did with his urinal, wine rack and snow shovel, then there would have been no problem, but because Haacke's art was making statements about facts open to verification in the material and social worlds, it was unacceptable to Messer. Haacke himself was initially unsure about how to respond, and did offer to disguise minimally the identities of Shapolsky, Goldman and diLorenzo, but when that offer was rejected by Messer, all editions (two) and later published images of the works retained the actual identities. Haacke had quickly realised that Messer's hostility on the verifiability issue was significant for what it revealed about the importance of method-

C. Nash, *What is Journalism?*
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ology in the politics of art and knowledge. Thereafter he used the research methodologies of journalism as a staple of his practice.

Haacke himself has never rejected the art-journalism linkage, although he has never identified himself as anything other than an artist.[1] Grace Glueck, the *New York Times* arts reporter who covered the controversy for her newspaper, was in no doubt about the journalistic qualities of Haacke's methodology.[2] Other journalists over the years who have reported and analysed the controversies generated by Haacke's artworks have also recognised both the reliability of his factual evidence and his journalistic sensitivity for the "productive provocations" that would provide access into institutional politics – his news sense.[3] For most of the other institutions that exhibited these and similar art by Haacke, the works maybe were or were not journalism, but either way it didn't seem to matter. For those institutions for whom it did matter – the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum in Kassel with *Manet PROJEKT '74* in 1974 and Köln's *Westkunst* exhibition with *Der Pralinenmeister* (*The Chocolate Master*) in 1981, not to mention the institutions that discreetly avoided commissioning work from Haacke – the problematic issue was the same one: his claims to verifiable truth about the sensitive activities of people or organisations involved with the museum.

Secondly, there is a long history in the sociology of journalism, going back to the early decades of the Chicago School, of proposing a link between sociology, art and journalism, though without theorising those linkages. Dewey asserted that "a genuine social science would manifest its reality in the daily press" and "democracy is a name for free and enriching communion …. [i]t will have its consummation when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication."[4] Dewey's strong view that journalism, sociology and art share common elements was supported by sociologists who followed in the Chicago School tradition, including Everett and Helen Hughes, James Carey and G. Stuart Adam. Haacke reciprocated this view, seeing art as a communication exercise and all artists as "affected and influenced by the sociopolitical values of the society in which they live …. They work within that frame, set the frame and are being framed."[5] Haacke perceives the foundation of his own art to be a scientific systems approach thoroughly grounded in material reality:[6]

> The approach to reality offered by Haacke acts not only as a severe critique of previous modern art, but also serves to eliminate arbitrary boundaries

> within our culture between art, science and society. Haacke's way of representing the world offers an alternative to subjective limits as well, for he has consistently moved towards the elimination of ego as a guide to the apprehension of reality.[7]

From the late 1960s, Haacke extended the same approach from natural to social systems and, before long, eminent sociologists began endorsing the affinities between Haacke's work and their own discipline.[8] The implication of their endorsement is that methodology in art, journalism and social science can be mutually informing and revelatory.

Thirdly, the very scale and intensity of the conflict at the Guggenheim in 1971 suggests that there was something deep and serious at stake in the journalism-art connection. The conflict was reported in detail in the *New York Times*, and their art critic Hilton Kramer was an assertive combatant in the struggle. Curator Edward Fry, an internationally respected expert on modern art, was dismissed for supporting Haacke and never worked again in a US art institution. It took almost four decades before Haacke's work would be purchased by a major US institution – *Shapolsky* by the Whitney Museum of American Art in 2007, in a half-share with the Museum of Contemporary Art in Barcelona. In the meantime, Haacke's star had risen high in the international art firmament, and, as Buchloh observed in a detailed analysis in 1988, his continuing marginalisation by elite US and German public institutions was meaningful in itself and required analysis.[9] A reunified Germany acted with the 1991 Venice Biennale invitation for *GERMANIA* and the contested Bundestag invitation of 1999. In US art circles, the situation was undoubtedly an embarrassment that finally spurred the Whitney to act in 2007 to purchase *Shapolsky* as one of the major works of 1970s American art. Nonetheless, four decades of prolonged absence demands an explanation. Spatiotemporal facts, including absences, are produced by social relations and processes and should be subject to interrogation.

In passing, the ignorance about this conflict among scholars of journalism is also important and needs to be rectified; in parallel to the art world, that ignorance is indicative of, in Buchloh's terms, a failure to recognise "a turning point – one of those historical moments in which a set of traditional assumptions about the structures and functions of art are being challenged."[10] This book is arguing that Buchloh's comment applies equally to journalism. In many respects, journalism is badly out of date with developments in art theory and practice since the mid-twentieth cen-

tury. There is an extensive literature on literary journalism, documentary cinema and television, and a burgeoning literature on audio documentary and podcasts, but these tend to focus on textual and formal issues among scholars and craft technique among journalists, and therefore avoid the ontological and epistemological issues raised by journalism as art. Haacke's work, precisely because it brings journalism and art together as methodology, highlights the issue and can bring journalism into focus with contemporary art practice and theory.

What was Messer's methodological problem with journalism as art? His explanation was detailed:

> Where do we draw the line? With the revealed identities of private individuals and the clear intention to call their actions into question, and by a concomitant reduction of the work of art from its potential metaphoric level to a form of photo journalism concerned with topical statements rather than with symbolic expression …. To the degree that an artist deliberately pursues aims that lie beyond art, his very concentration on ulterior ends stands in conflict with the intrinsic nature of the work as an end in itself …. Haacke's "social system" exhibit [had] an aesthetic weakness which interacted with a forcing of art boundaries. The tensions within this contradiction within the work itself transferred itself from it onto the museum environment and beyond it into society at large. Eventually, the choice was between the acceptance of or the rejection of an alien substance that had entered the museum organisation.[11]

Empirically, the argument that art by definition excludes content that identifies individuals, breaches privacy, is topical, questions actions, reaches beyond itself into society at large, is not symbolic and metaphorical, and does not constitute an end in itself denies a significant part of the historical canon. Logically, Messer is adopting an essentialist position in arguing to exclude by definition, but as has been observed since ancient times, the negative dialectic is self-defeating when seeking to affirm a definition.[12] It leads to narrow threadbare conclusions, and frequently a *reductio ad absurdum*. The fundamental problem with Messer's approach, which manifests itself in both empirical and theoretical inadequacies, is that it conceives of difference in absolute rather than relational terms. Absolutist approaches create differences as barriers that can only crumble before their own inconsistencies; relational approaches recognise differences as contradictions that invite analysis and resolution through practice.

Haacke proposed a relational approach, asserting the inherent social and political nature of the question:

> Products that are considered "works of art" have been singled out as culturally significant objects by those who, at any given time and social stratum, wield the power to confer the predicate "work of art" onto them; they cannot elevate themselves from the host of man-made objects simply on the basis of some inherent qualities. Today museums and comparable art institutions … belong to that group of agents in a society who have a sizable, though not an exclusive share in this cultural power on the level of so-called "high art". Irrespective of the "avant-garde" or "conservative", "rightist" or "leftist" stance a museum might take, it is among other things a carrier of socio-political connotations. By the very structure of its existence, it is a political institution. This is as true for museums in Moscow or Peking as it is for a museum in Cologne or the Guggenheim Museum.[13]

For Messer, the art character of an exhibit is intrinsic to its being; for Haacke, it is socially conferred in a process that is thoroughly contingent on social and cultural factors and irretrievably political. That is not to say that distinctions are meaningless, that every factor can be reduced to politics, or that there is no such value as qualitative merit, but only that distinctions and values are social constructs and therefore have a political dimension among others. Haacke's approach is consistent with Bourdieu's field theory, with the relational ontology of Harvey and Lefebvre, and with the dialectic tradition of change and contradiction. From Haacke's definition, an artist cannot but be involved in the politics of art, even if only passively as the beneficiary and bearer of a conventional wisdom about the nature of art. Similarly, a journalist cannot but be involved in the politics of knowledge, even if only passively as the beneficiary and bearer of a conventional wisdom about the nature of news.

In repudiating Messer's definition of art, Haacke himself didn't engage with the issue of journalism, even though he had first appraised journalism as a practice and product when he incorporated real-time news agency teletype in earlier artworks.[14] Bryan-Wilson suggested that Haacke's *Shapolsky* and *Goldman* works were "an appropriation of investigative journalism,"[15] but that description misses the point that Messer's objections were not to the form of journalism but to its assertion of verifiable empirical truth claims linked with imputable values. It is precisely the question of methodology that is at issue. That is what constitutes many of Haacke's social works substantively as journalism rather than

a mere appropriation of technique. A parallel argument could be made with respect to scientific methodology about some of his biological and physical systems, including the 1970 *Monument to Beach Pollution* and the 1972 *Rheinwasseraufbereitungsanlage* (*Rhine Water Purification Plant*).[16] Journalism and science require a direct engagement with reality and a provision of direct evidence of that reality as it existed at the time of research: for example, in the replication of information from a municipal record of urban landholdings, in the records of ownership of a painting, in the reports and records of army movements, and in the records of statements that a source such as a politician has made. Even when reality has been produced for the purposes of the journalism, as in a photo opportunity, a press conference, or an interview, it is nonetheless a segment of reality that henceforth exists independently and is "on the record," as a journalist would say. The same applies to Haacke's natural art: the air and moisture trapped inside the *Condensation Cube*[17] or the snow that has fallen naturally on a city tenement rooftop[18] are all real and part of naturally occurring systems even if they have been singled out for the purposes of being an artwork. "Haacke's phenomena maintain a double identity: once isolated and 'signed' by the artist, they nevertheless continue in their original functions."[19]

Bourdieu's field theory sheds further light on the political relationship between art, journalism and reality. A phenomenon such as information about Hermann Abs' past as a high-ranking Nazi government official might exist in the symbolic field as an artwork in *Manet-PROJEKT '74* and also continue to exist as data in the field of publicly available biographical records and as a known fact circulating in the private field of arts administration, as well as in media news coverage of the exclusion of Haacke's work from the exhibition. *Manet-PROJEKT '74* provoked fear and apprehension in the museum field precisely because the verifiable truths of its statements about Abs are evidenced in other fields, and their presentation in the museum environment at this particular time could have ramifications for Abs' reputation and position in those fields. It is the veracity of the empirical truth claim that is the problem, as Messer indicated with respect to *Shapolsky* and *Goldman*, and it exemplifies heteronomy in field relations. It is the linkage between the symbolic and the business and political fields in both the veracity of the statements and their social ramifications that is characteristic of journalism and shared by this artwork.

If Haacke's work is reputably recognised as both art and journalism, what sort of art can be journalism, and inversely what sort of journalism can be art, and what do the two have to offer one another? Some may wish to argue it is possible to conceive of art for art's sake, but it is not possible to make the same claim for journalism. The rights and responsibilities that journalists claim in liberal democratic polities are sourced from a "public right to know". Journalism always involves a communications practice directed to an anticipated public and its "map of meaning" on the relevant topic.[20] Adam included "a public voice" as one of his definitive criteria for journalism.[21] Haacke since 1971 has often anticipated journalistic coverage of controversy over his art in order to incorporate it into the full conceptual scope of the work and to expand its presence in space and time. Indeed, Bourdieu complimented him on his "artistic competence [with which] you produce very powerful symbolic weapons which are capable of forcing journalists to speak, and to speak against the symbolic action exerted by corporations, particularly through their patronage or sponsorship."[22] In 1974, in an article titled "All the Art That's Fit to Show" (paraphrasing the famous *NYT* epigram "All the News That's Fit to Print"), Haacke argued for artists to conceive of their work as an active communications practice:

> Bertold Brecht's 1934 appraisal of "Writing the Truth: Five Difficulties" is still valid today. These difficulties are the need for "the courage to write the truth even though it is being suppressed; the intelligence to recognize it, even though it is being covered up; the judgement to choose those in whose hands it becomes effective; the cunning to spread it among them."[23]

The *Manet-PROJEKT '74* incorporated into the artwork itself specific information that might generate controversy, as did pretty much all of Haacke's work from this point onward. Even when the originating component of the work itself was symbolic rather than indexical,[24] as with *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* in 2000, the reported controversy in the mainstream and arts media was indexical of verifiable statements made by Bundestag members and other commentators, and communicated the political struggle the artwork provoked and came to embody.[25]

The functions and practices of art institutions were a frequent (though not exclusive) site of struggle for Haacke in the 1970s and 1980s. They were being challenged for their role in corporate and government public relations and propaganda relating to conflicts in the wider world, includ-

ing political discrimination in employment, corporate engagement with the apartheid regime in South Africa, the use of art museums for personal and business tax advantages, and so on.[26] In 1983 in an address titled "Museums, Managers of Consciousness" to the annual conference of the Art Museum Association of Australia, Haacke was strongly critical of the use of art museums by corporations for public relations purposes:

> Those engaged in collaboration with the public relations officers of companies rarely see themselves as promoters of acquiescence. On the contrary, they are usually convinced that their activities are in the best interests of art. Such a well-intentioned delusion can survive only as long as art is perceived as a mythical entity above mundane interests and ideological conflict. And it is of course, this misunderstanding of the role that products of the consciousness industry play that constitutes the indispensable base for all corporate strategies of persuasion …. But in nondictatorial societies, the means for the production of consciousness are not all in one hand …. As the need to spend enormous sums for public relations and government propaganda indicates, things are not frozen. Political constellations shift and unincorporated zones exist in sufficient numbers to disturb the mainstream."[27]

Haacke and Bourdieu discussed the issues of patronage, public relations and journalism in *Free Exchange*.[28] They differed on the role of journalism. For Bourdieu, journalism is the enemy of art and serious intellectuals:

> It is above all through journalism that commercial logic, against which all autonomous universes (artistic, literary, scientific) are constructed, imposes itself on those universes. This is fundamentally harmful.[29]

Haacke, on the other hand, favours engagement:

> The problem is not only to say something, to take a position, but also to create a productive provocation. The sensitivity of the context into which one inserts something, or the manner in which one does it, can trigger a public debate. However, it does not work well if the press fails to play its role of amplifier and forum for debate. There has to be a sort of collaboration …. Lest we forget, journalism is not a monolithic enterprise.[30]

Haacke's "productive provocation" is very similar to journalistic goals; every revelation of previously unknown information and every question in an interview aspires to be a productive provocation, and the habitus

of news sense includes the capacity to recognise and take advantage of the opportunity for such provocation. Similarly, "a sort of collaboration" echoes Ericson's and Hall's views that reportage involves a broad range of interactions between sources and journalists, including unauthorised leaks of information, censorship, or suppression unbeknown to one party.

It could be charged that Haacke's approach to journalism is basically utilitarian and that he is seeking promotional opportunities for his ideas and point of view as presented in his artworks, like any publicist would. I rather suggest that he is behaving as a contemporary intellectual who wants to promote a particular piece of open-ended information or perspective as part of an ongoing public debate; that is a very different thing from promoting a commercial interest or product, or buttressing political or commercial reputations and power. This point is a variation on Ericson's observation that every news story starts not with a journalist but with a source of information (often organisational) and that there is an interaction of source and news organisations in the production of journalism.[31] In Ericson's account, source organisations try to protect their "back regions" through censorship and secrecy, whereas Haacke shares with journalists the imperative to breach those boundaries and reveal the hidden object or information. That is why his work can be aligned with journalism and not with public relations. It is why journalists identify with his modus operandi; it is because Haacke understands newsworthiness and the modus operandi of journalism, and his own information gathering and research practice is recognisably valid to journalists, that his art can extend into the journalistic field and incorporate the consequent reportage into itself. Both Haacke and journalists also share with the historian Trouillot the goal of defeating and unmasking inappropriate or unfair silences. They each see the defeat of silences as an intensely political act in negotiating the politics of knowledge, and this task links journalism with history and both with art.

New York in the early 1970s was not the first time that journalism had been cast at the leading edge of art. In Russia, following the October Revolution of 1917, the Soviet avant-garde in the Left Front of the Arts debated the question of what a truly revolutionary form of the literary and pictorial arts would be. Photography and journalism were part of the answer. The Constructivists and Productivists were explicitly debating the conceptual relationship between art and journalism, which is something that Haacke hasn't done. The details of the debates about *faktura* and "factography" have been canvassed by Fore, Dickerman, and Buchloh

among others,[32] but none of that discussion has considered the issue from the point of view of journalism. Buchloh has commented on the resonances of factographic art with the work of Haacke, who was unaware of this tradition when he was developing his own approach based on systems analysis.[33] However, from his early days, Haacke has acknowledged the influence of Walter Benjamin and Bertolt Brecht, who had been directly influenced by the Soviet avant-garde.[34]

The debates to determine what should constitute the new arts occurred at conferences and in the journal *Lef* (1923–25) and its successor *Novyi Lef* (1927–29), which emerged from the Constructivist and Productivist streams of Russian Futurism.[35] By the middle of the 1920s, at least in the minds of the *Lef* editors who used it as the occasion to relaunch and rename the journal, the question was settled; "factography," exemplified by photography and journalism and defined as the "fixation and montage of fact," was the new art.[36] It was Tretiakov who added a social dimension as part of his development towards "operativism" – "raising the interest of the most active in reality, asserting the primacy of the real over fiction, the commentator on public affairs over the *belletrist*."[37]

Sergei Tretiakov and Vladimir Mayakovsky became Editors of *Novyi Lef* and wrote detailed expositions on factography and operativism. The journal survived for two years before closing over a dispute between the two about its future direction.[38] Meanwhile the Left Front had become marginalised from the mainstream of Soviet art because of its alleged Formalism, and was increasingly out of step with the trend towards Socialist Realism, which was formally adopted as official policy in 1934. Tretiakov was executed in Stalin's purges of 1937, and the originals of his vast archive of photographs were lost. By then journalism in the Soviet Union had been largely reduced to a parody of what journalists elsewhere, let alone factographers, would recognise as such.

The *Lef* debates have to be considered in the sociopolitical context of their time, which was indeed a wide-ranging "site of struggle," as the contemporaneous Soviet linguist Vološinov described it.[39] It is important not only to understand the contingencies and polemics of those debates in their historical context, but also to distinguish them from the underlying concepts driving the arguments. We need to recognise Trouillot's principle that both the factual evidence and the conceptualisations of the past are interpreted in terms of the needs and subjectivities of the present.[40]

Lef drew its writers and readers from among Soviet writers, dramatists, photographers, filmmakers, designers and critics. Prominent contributors

included Sergei Eisenstein, Dziga Vertov, Vladimir Mayakovsky, Boris Pasternak, Osip Brik, Nikolai Chuzhak, Sergei Tretiakov and Alexander Rodchenko. Debate was vigorous. "Shortly before the appearance of the seventh and final issue of the journal *Lef* in 1925, members of the organisation were called to the Moscow Proletkul't facilities in the middle of winter to debate the future of the avant-garde group as a mass movement." For the first keynote speaker, Nikolai Chuzhak, the primary concern was "the marriage within its ranks between reactionary politics and traditional forms and media of artistic production."[41] Literature was identified as a recalcitrant art form, while cinema, photography, theatre and sculpture/architecture were all discussed and endorsed for the changes in their practice in response to the demands of the revolutionary social and cultural context. The problem with literature was that "[w]hen challenged to abandon traditional generic conventions, to industrialize and collectivize its techniques of production, and to renounce a reflectionist epistemology based on illusion – in short, when challenged to consummate the break that had been undertaken in the other media of production art – writing drew a blank." Mayakovsky "could not bring himself to admit that he wrote 'poetry.'"[42]

Tretiakov and Chuzhak carried the argument that journalism could be the most advanced form of literary art. Laying the foundations in the Soviet context, Tretiakov followed Bogdanov in espousing a general theory of proletarian labour that extended beyond "physical manufacture exclusively" to accommodate

> all varieties of creation and construction within the master concept of organisational production. In Bogdanov's words, "*creation* of all kinds (technological, socioeconomic, everyday, scientific, artistic) represents a variety of different forms of *labor*. And similarly consists of organizing (or disorganizing) human activity …. There is not and cannot be any strict division between creation and basic labor."[43]

Therefore artists had the possibility to leave the metaphorical garret and recognise themselves as workers not by disowning art as such, nor by subjugating their art to direction by others, but by recognising that art production could be a working class activity in and of itself – for example, through photography or the printing and graphic arts production for newspapers by a blue collar workforce. Dewey had made the same argument in the American newspaper context.[44]

It was in two pieces written for *Novyi Lef*, one in the first edition and one in the last, that Tretiakov was most direct in nominating journalism as the most revolutionary literary art alongside photography, which was to replace painting. The first article was titled "The New Leo Tolstoy," and commenced: "Some are disheartened. They complain: where is the monumental art of the revolution? Where are the 'major canvases' of the red epic? Where are our red Homers and red Tolstoys?"[45] The answer was clear: "We have no reason to wait for Tolstoys. We have our epic literature. Our epic literature is the newspaper …. Today's newspaper is for the Soviet activist what the didactic novel was for the Russian liberal intelligentsia and the bible was for the medieval Christian: the guide to all of life's situations."[46] "The entire anonymous newspaper mass, from the worker correspondent to the writer of the lead article, is the collective Tolstoy of our time …. Our primary task is not to wait for red epicists, but rather to train the entire Soviet public to read the newspaper, this bible of the present day. Second, we must draw the writer into the newspaper …. [a]nd third, we must direct maximum attention towards perfecting the newspaper".[47]

The proposal was not to abolish writing or refuse to recognise creative skills and capacity, but to democratise them. That required bringing writers out of creative isolation and integrating them into the industrialised process of newspaper production. Mass literacy campaigns would create a reading public able to access newspaper information and make demands on the newspaper producers, and that would lead to further and continuing development of the newspaper form and content. It was not to be a didactic process because the writers themselves needed to respond to the developing demands that would be made upon them by their emerging audiences and the new production processes. Further, to be a revolutionary artist meant abandoning what Tretiakov called "revolutionary thematics [where] the revolution remains just an 'event' that people write *about*, that people *describe*."[48] Likewise he dismissed

> Art for all" [that] turns out to be the *mere democratization* of old art. The objects of artistic creation are made as accessible as possible to everyone: concert halls, theaters and picture galleries are filled with the labouring masses …. [so that] people are once again "absorbed in contemplation" and "experiencing life secondhand".[49]

Instead, Tretiakov proposes that

> The true "art for all' should never consist of turning all people into spectators, rather the opposite: it consists of mastering what was previously the particular property of the specialists of art – mastering all of the qualities and abilities necessary to build and organize new material. That comes first. Second is the involvement of the masses in the processes of "creation", which until now only individuals have used to conduct their "liturgies".[50]

The Russian Productivists were modernists, anticipating and celebrating the social and creative impact of communication technologies on non-specialists' capacities to record and communicate their observations and experiences, and the same approach is now a driving impetus in the contemporary development of hardware and software for ubiquitous consumer products, most recently the cellular phone.

Tretiakov was specific in the way he linked factography to journalism:

> In my opinion, it has three decisive aspects:
>
> First, the choice of object. Investigating the facts in their specificity and in their concrete manifestations.
>
> Second, the journalistic processing of found factual material. Enhancing its characteristic moments. Extracting the dialectical chain from the process in which the fact is the essential determining link. Dressing the fact in an effective agitational form. Testing the fact's public, social interest and significance. The fact thereby becomes an argument, a signal, a concrete proposal.
>
> Third, the practical conclusions. Operationalising the literary conclusion within the reorganisation of reality in accordance with socialism.[51]

The first two steps are standard practice in journalism: identify the relevant facts and collect the verifiable evidence, understand the processes that are producing the facts, and clarify the public interest element and the textual characteristics that will attract the desired audience. The attraction of the newspaper as a form was that it was open to mass industrialised participation by the worker-journalists as opposed to elitist and individualist artisanal literature. As Dickerman pointed out, this wasn't just populism but involved organising the flow of information from locals at the factories, construction sites, and industrialising agricultural sector.[52]

"Dressing the fact in an effective agitational form" for Tretiakov did not mean generalised propaganda, but had a more utilitarian social and technological purpose. "What we find most important is neither an art

that entertains nor an art that diverts from reality, but just the opposite: an art that systematises this reality and enhances the capacity of our wills to overcome the defects of real life …. We do not need folktales or fables. We need life delivered as it is."[53] "Agitation" meant engagement with the audience's needs and perspectives. It was part of the development of factography into operativism, which included first an instructional and later a more fully educational role in the presentation of factual material (which today we would term learning materials for skills and social education) in a revolutionary process of full-scale industrialisation of agricultural production.[54] Education required the consideration of current levels of knowledge and capacity of the learners. Tretiakov collaborated with Sergei Eisenstein from 1923 in developing the theory of attractions, which the filmmaker used in cinematic montage. An essential requirement was to anticipate the social and psychological characteristics of an audience, because "attraction" in this theory means "any calculated pressure on the spectator's attention and emotions"[55] as the "spectator steps into an open-ended work."[56] The practical logic of the theory "begins by mastering the material properties of the theatrical activity" and then addresses "the precise social tasks" that produce theatre as "a tool for class action."[57] As Gough noted, "if the medium of this shift from factography to operativism was the camera, it was also and equally fundamentally, the collective farm itself."[58] As Tretiakov put it,"The attention of constructors of our life must be focused not upon *perfect works* of art, but upon the *perfect individual*, full of organizational skill and the will to overcome the obstacles that lie along the path to the total mastery of life".[59] These themes of "remaking man" and "mastering culture" were common to all factions and perspectives, and not just the avant-garde, in the early discussions about the nature and trajectory of Soviet art and culture.[60] It flowed from the argument for a class "in itself" to become a revolutionary subject "for itself," a development that applies to the collective subjectivity of all groups in all societies seeking to achieve social change in their interests.[61]

Leaving aside the didacticism and utopianism in these early Soviet debates, the parallels with Haacke's social systems are clear. The social collectivity, which includes the journalism and photography producers along with the workers on the collective farms, construction sites, etc. are part of the artwork, and they continue their daily lives even as it is captured, developed and represented in this new art form called journalism. *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* was exemplary of this approach, where the

elected legislators did the actual production work for the art by bringing soil from their electorates, making the decisions about which particular soil would be appropriate and, before all that, making a decision in the Bundestag about whether the artwork would be approved for installation. Likewise the curator and museum management had to make decisions about the installation of *Manet PROJEKT '74*, which decisions would become absorbed into the meaning of the artwork itself by revealing the social values and relations underpinning the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum.

Haacke's approach did not share the vanguardist assumptions of Leninism, but was aligned with the critical interrogatory principles of Brecht. It did not assume a leadership role for the artist/journalist. "Experience tells us that artists are not better than other people …. [and] I am afraid the assumption that art, and in particular so-called avant-garde art, is, by definition, something of high moral value is also erroneous."[62] Art work is just another field of work, with relational challenges just like other fields. Again in sympathy with Tretiakov's principles, Haacke asserts a moral and political perspective in his art, but does it by creating an open-ended "productive provocation" and thereby incorporating the response to the provocation into the art.

Putting his theory into practice, between 1928 and 1930 Tretiakov made four extended visits to a collective farm (*kolkhoz*) called the Communist Lighthouse in the northern Caucasus. He became a member of the collective, was elected onto its management committee, and "became directly involved in numerous aspects of its political, cultural and agronomic organization, thereby transcending traditional definitions of the role of the literary writer."[63] He argued that to understand what he was seeing, "the writer first needed to clarify the matter of his or her 'observation post' … the worst thing is to observe in the capacity of a tourist or guest of honor: Either you see like a local or you see nothing."[64] In order to "see like a local," writers need to sustain their involvement over a lengthy period and also acquire, in the case of collective farms, a detailed knowledge of agronomy. This requirement recognises the Bourdieusian heteronomy of fields that is intrinsic to all journalism requiring specialised reporting and begs the question of the power relations between practitioners in the two fields: the journalist and the source. It also recognises the importance of spatiotemporal practices in journalism and art; Tretiakov became a resident and member of the collective farm for long periods while he was photographing and writing his journalism.

The publication span of *Novyi Lef* and its discussion of journalism coincided with the first Soviet Five-Year Plan (1928–1932), which precipitated collectivisation of farms, the notorious "dekulakisation" of wealthy peasants resistant to collectivisation, and the wholesale reorganisation and mechanisation of agricultural production. Some parts of it were brutal, including at the Communist Lighthouse collective farm, which was incorporated into a larger combine called The Challenge.[65] By the early 1930s, the trend towards official endorsement of Socialist Realism as the state-approved aesthetic mode was gaining pace. "By spring 1934, Tretiakov had repudiated the polemical aspects of factography and operativism – the deprofessionalisation of the writer, and the end of literature – but nevertheless maintained his preoccupation with both the essay and the photograph."[66] After official endorsement of Socialist Realism at the 1934 Party Congress, Tretiakov was effectively marginalised and was killed in 1937.

There are some congruences and similarities among factography, operativism and the frameworks we have considered so far in this book. Firstly, the notion of art as a broad-based, formally or informally organised social practice fits very well with Haacke's notion of social systems, and also with his thinking that art is not a representation of reality but can be the reality itself. Examples include the social processes involved with the approval and cyclical reproduction of the garden in *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* or the conflicts over *Shapolsky*, *Goldman*, and *Manet-PROJEKT'74*. The sort of social art that both Haacke and Tretiakov are thinking of is not troupes of happy workers at their easels on the weekend, but any given social practices that the producers and audiences might come to conceptualise as art. That could include journalism, and explicitly did so for Tretiakov and the factographers.

Secondly, the idea of art as production rather than consumption by producers/audiences parallels Trouillot's observation that while the academic guild of historians "debate what history is or was, others take it in their own hands."[67] Haacke, though able to demonstrate considerable technical virtuosity when required in various media, was more often concerned to deploy an "unaesthetic aesthetic" so as to avoid any fetish of technique or form; his aim was to promote a non-elitist paradigm of the artist. The art of his work resides in the clarity and conceptualisation of the social relations that produce it, the process of production, and the product that is testament to these two. The social and physical reality that happens to be the medium for the art cannot be ascribed a predetermined hierarchical value, but is entirely open ended and specific to the circumstances of production. One can say the same of history, and of journalism.

Thirdly, if factographic art is about "mastering all of the qualities and abilities necessary to build and organise new material," then it is about the acquisition of capital and habitus in whatever social situation and medium applies at the time. Tretiakov was working in a highly unstable, revolutionary situation in which maintenance of the status quo was not an option – the only option was to be engaged in some manner with the transformation of the Russian peasantry into the Soviet proletariat. As far as Tretiakov was concerned as a communist revolutionary, moving to the new art forms would involve conflict and contestation – not least of ideas, as had been evident in the Left Front of the Arts since before 1917 and throughout the 1920s.[68] The tussles were fierce over what were to be orthodox and heterodox approaches in Bourdieu's terms, and the *Lef* group also had to take account the wider field of Soviet art beyond the avant-garde and, beyond art, of the "field of power" in economic and political relations with the state. The spatiotemporality and sociopolitical relations of the revolutionary processes were extensively debated and theorised, and the artist/journalist factographers were both engaged and accountable with these processes.

So certain sorts of art can be journalism, but what sort of journalism can be art? Clearly, the answer does not have to require textual "artfulness" in literary, visual or acoustic form. The "unaesthetic aesthetic" deployed by Haacke demonstrates that. Art is a practice, not an object. So is journalism. The answer is that plain journalism, just like plain science, can be art – if it meets certain conceptual values in its practice as journalism or as science. Conceptual values are socially produced, and therefore we cannot be prescriptive about the content or form of art. Stone suggested that the comic poets "played something of the same role in [ancient] Athens as independent journalists in our world."[69] Stone attained an iconic status as an independent journalist in the anti-war, countercultural milieu of the 1960s, attracting a massive following among students and marginalised communities, who created the social relations to become communities *for* themselves and their values through practices that included journalism and art. The advent of offset linotype printing technologies in the 1960s was a major breach in the oligopolistic barricades of corporate journalism, and facilitated these developments. Public, community and free radio, and subsequently video, played the same role.[70]

Great or epic instances of journalism can be recognised as art, and there have been many of them, most particularly since the industrialisation of journalism practice. But Tretiakov's argument was that we need not be

looking for the new Tolstoy, but rather recognise the collective subjectivities that are emerging into practice in the new social and material environments. It is that subjectivity that will produce significance and meaning for itself from the banality of material fact. A common element linking the factographers, Stone and Haacke, was their relationship to clearly identified contemporary constituencies and publics – the peasantry becoming proletarianised in Russia, the New Deal and subsequently New Left communities in the US, and the post-New Left art and intellectual communities in the Americas and Europe. It was that conceptual and social stance that enabled Tretiakov to recognise the significance of the late 1920s industrialisation of agriculture in Russia, Stone to recognise the significance of the catastrophic bomber losses over Namsi in 1951, and Haacke to recognise the significance of Messer's 1971 repudiation of *Shapolsky*, *Goldman*, and the visitors poll. Perhaps the most exemplary instance of this relationship between banal reality and social significance is *DER BEVÖLKERUNG*. An untended garden box of weeds could assume national political significance because of the social and political practices (including journalism) that attended its proposal and acceptance as an artwork.

This analysis begs the question of what would make journalism (or science) good or great art. Judgements of quality are social judgements based in space and time but located within abstract relational frameworks of value. Clarity, complexity and depth are abstract values attached to the social practice of conceptualisation or Lefebvre's "representation of space." Appraising theory for theory's sake is certainly a social practice that attracts a devoted (if small) following in academia; in most instances, however, the evaluation of quality will require the application of a conceptual framework to the material objects and processes that evidence themselves in the world, and the abstract relations and values that are not directly evidenced but are nonetheless powerful. It is the sorts of theory that we have been considering in the preceding chapters of this book that can inform the evaluation of quality, both in journalism and in art, but ultimately it is people through their practice who decide what is good, bad, great, or ugly.

Notes

1. In reviewing this manuscript for factual accuracy before publication, Haacke identified no issues with its argument about his work.
2. Glueck (1993).

3. Bourdieu and Haacke (1995: 23).
4. Dewey (1927: 180, 184).
5. Haacke (2006a [1974]: 263–4).
6. Siegel (2006 [1971]: 252).
7. Fry (2011 [1971]: 44).
8. Becker and Walton (1975), Jameson (1988), Bourdieu and Haacke (1995).
9. Buchloh (1988).
10. Buchloh (1988: 98).
11. Messer (1971: 5).
12. Stone (1989: 60).
13. Haacke (2006a [1974]: 263).
14. Wallis (1986: 74).
15. Bryan-Wilson (2009: 202).
16. Flügge and Fleck (2006: 105, 108).
17. LIST Visual Arts Center (2011: 12).
18. Haacke (2011 [1969]: 51).
19. Fry (2011: 33).
20. Hall et al. (1978: 54).
21. Adam (1993: 13).
22. Bourdieu and Haacke (1995: 20).
23. Haacke (2006a [1974]: 263).
24. Layton (2003).
25. Flügge and Fleck (2006: 216–224), Deutsche et al. (2004: 60–81).
26. See Wallis 1986 for a catalogue and discussion of typical artworks from this period.
27. Haacke (2006b [1983]: 280).
28. Bourdieu and Haacke (1995: 17).
29. Bourdieu and Haacke (1995: 19).
30. Bourdieu and Haacke (1995: 21). The critical literature on ideology, political economy, and resistance in journalism studies is extensive and detailed. The anthologies edited by Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch (2009) and Stuart Allan (2012) offer a good access point into the recent literature.
31. Ericson et al. (1989: 5ff).
32. Fore (2006), Dickerman (2006), Buchloh (1984, 1988, 2006).
33. Buchloh (1988: 104).
34. Fore in Tretiakov (2006d: 64), Haacke (2006a [1974]: 263, b [1983]: 273, [1999] 296).

35. Fore (2006).
36. Dickerman (2006: 134).
37. Tretiakov quoted in Dickerman (2006: 138).
38. Tretiakov (2006a: 45).
39. Vološinov (1973), Hall (1982).
40. Trouillot (1995: 141ff).
41. Fore (2006: 95).
42. Fore (2006: 96).
43. Fore (2006: 11) emphasis in original.
44. Dewey (1927: 184).
45. Tretiakov (2006d: 47).
46. Tretiakov (2006d: 49).
47. Tretiakov (2006d: 50).
48. Tretiakov (2006b: 15) emphasis in original.
49. Tretiakov (2006b: 17).
50. Tretiakov (2006b: 18).
51. Tretiakov (2006e: 68).
52. Dickerman (2006).
53. Tretiakov (2006d: 35).
54. Gough (2006: 161).
55. Tretiakov (2006c: 23).
56. Fore in Tretiakov (2006c: 20).
57. Tretiakov (2006c: 23).
58. Gough (2006: 161).
59. Tretiakov (2006b: 18) emphasis in original.
60. Fitzpatrick (1999: 67–88).
61. Lebowitz (2012).
62. Haacke (1975: 327).
63. Gough (2006: 160).
64. Tretiakov quoted in Gough (2006: 166).
65. Gough (2006: 162).
66. Gough (2006: 175).
67. Trouillot (1995: 153).
68. Fore (2006).
69. Stone (1989: 86).
70. Mattelart and Piemme (1980).

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CHAPTER 8

Accountability, Silences and Journalism

Accountability is a complex principle. It is intrinsic to any social relationship, whether honoured in the observance or breach. It is not only an ethical principle but also an intellectual one. Trouillot uses the term "authenticity" to describe the required accountability between the present and the past in the production of history:

> Empirical exactitude as defined and verified in specific context is necessary to historical production. But empirical exactitude alone is not enough. Historical relations .... must establish some relation to that knowledge. Further, not any relation will do. Authenticity is required, lest the representation become a fake, a morally repugnant spectacle.[1]

Journalism is important for the discipline of history not only in the production of contemporary facts and records as future historical objects, but also as one of the contemporary modalities that produce history as maps of meaning for the present. History and journalism are neither simply facts nor textual narrative, but the moment of contemporary significance where the present and the past are created as meaningful in relation to each other. The journalistic moment of meaningfulness in turn becomes part of the historical record for future examination and interpretation. "The realization that historical production is itself historical is the only way out of the false dilemmas posed by positivist empiricism and extreme formalism."[2] Being part of the historical production of history for Trouillot involves not

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just minimising the "limitless possibility for errors"[3] but the striving for authenticity, for the definition of which he quotes Cascardi:

> [A]uthenticity is not a type of degree of knowledge, but a relationship to what is known. To say that "what is known" must include the present will seem self-evident, but it may be less obvious that historical authenticity resides not in a fidelity to an alleged past but in an honesty vis-à-vis the present as it represents that past.[4]

Exactly the same point applies to journalism in its accountabilities for authenticity to the present as to the past. Journalism is part of the way in which the contemporary relationship to what is known is produced, and good journalism, like good history, requires authenticity. "The crux of the matter is the here and now, the relations between the events described and their public presentation in a specific historic context. These relations debunk the myth of the past as a fixed reality and the related view of knowledge as a fixed content."[5]

Trouillot's example of inauthenticity was a proposed Disney theme park on American history in Virginia that would incorporate the theme of African-American slavery. He didn't doubt that the displays could be as "empirically sound as the average history book,"[6] but the problem lay with the white middle class audiences that are the target demographic for Disney products. His explanatory indictment is excoriating:

> When we imagine Disney's project and visualize a line of white tourists munching on chewing gum and fatty food, purchasing tickets for the "painful, disturbing and agonizing" experience promoted by television ads, we are not into The Past. And we should not ask these tourists to be true to that past: they were not responsible for slavery. What is obscene in that image is not a relation to The Past, but the dishonesty of that relation as it would happen in our present. The trivialization of slavery – and of the suffering it caused – inheres in that present, which includes both racism and representations of slavery. Ironically, a visit by a Klan member actively promoting racial inequality would have stood a better chance of authenticity. At least, it would not have trivialized slavery.[7]

Terms like obscenity and dishonesty highlight the moral dimension in Trouillot's approach. It involves a sense of responsibility linking the evidence from the past with the perspectives of the present, where meaning is being conceptualised and lived not only by academic scholars in the

guild, as he terms it, but in the public sphere. This public morality sits well with journalism because a defining element of journalism is its public voice. It is possible for scholars in other disciplines to directly address only one another through academic texts and conference presentations, but journalism must always directly address a notional public and use a public voice.[8]

For Haacke, *Manet-PROJEKT '74* exposed a moral and political inauthenticity in Hermann Abs' relationship to museum arts and culture in post-war Germany, and that's why it could not be exhibited to the public in the museum with which Abs was associated. Such an exhibition within Abs' own museum could well have led him or his colleagues to decide that any continued role at the museum for him would have been untenable, and therefore it would have had contemporary as well as historical meaning. However, once the artwork as an object itself had been produced, the inauthenticity was highlighted by the attempt to prevent public exhibition, a strategic mistake in dealing with Haacke that was mostly avoided henceforth by galleries and commissioning agents.

In the case of Socrates, Stone argued that he was deliberately seeking the death penalty as a form of suicide. It is Socrates' dishonesty in his trial manoeuvres when seeking to hold Athenians and their democracy accountable to his anti-democratic philosophy that causes Stone to condemn him, while at the same time he condemns the verdict and death sentence as an abomination of the principles of free speech. He documents in great detail Socrates' tactics and strategy during the trial, insulting and provoking the five hundred assembled citizens who are his judge and jury. Most tellingly, Socrates did not argue against the death penalty as a breach of the city state's principles of free speech when he should have – before the verdict was taken – but only after the verdict was imposed, when he mocked and condemned the Athenians for it. Subsequently he refused all opportunities organised by his disciples to escape into exile, at which point even they accused him of actively choosing suicide in breach of a philosopher's duties.[9] If Socrates' anti-democratic philosophy had been valid, he would not have needed to manipulate the trial process to achieve the guilty verdict and his death. For Stone, there is a lack of authenticity in Socrates' actions, tragic as their outcome was, that ultimately compromises the integrity of his philosophical position and validates the democratic principles by which the Athenian public claimed to govern itself, even if dishonoured in this instance.

Authenticity in this conception is not an intrinsic attribute of an object or practice but a relationship between the person knowing and what is known. Therefore it is constantly subject to change with each new act of meaning production. Journalism, like history, involves a constant process of contested evaluation of factual evidence and production of meaning. Lefebvre theorised this process as the dialectic of alienation and disalienation, which is an open-ended process where the perspective of the present is constantly responding to contradictions in the light of new experiences and information. It occurs in the social sciences and in everyday life, and has to be studied in ways that are particularised, historicised and relativised.[10] The alienation/disalienation dialectic is consistent with the metatheoretical frameworks considered in this book. It operates at the interfaces of perceived, conceptualised and lived practice in the social production of space, as proposed by Lefebvre and used by Harvey in his matrix. It is compatible with Bourdieu's concept of the field, where practice mediates the contradictions of subjectivity with respect to objective reality. Habitus is required to interpret constant change and variation in the objective relations of the field, and through practice to generate appropriate responses to unanticipated developments, which in turn both develop the capital and habitus of the subject and change the state of relations in the field. In all respects, authentic journalism is a constant process of challenge, change, and development in understanding present realities. This process mandates rigorous reflexivity with respect to both the practices of journalism and the interdisciplinary understanding of the objective reality being reported on.

An important aspect of accountability involves the production of silences, an exercise of power that Trouillot argued is a defining characteristic of history production. Ericson argued a similar case for the production of secrecy and silences in journalism.[11] Journalists value the unearthing of secrets most highly among their professional duties, exemplified by such nostrums as "news is what people do not want you to print – all the rest is advertising."[12] Trouillot argued that

> Silences enter the process of history production at four crucial moments: the moment of fact creation (the making of *sources*); the moment of fact assembly (the making of *archives*); the moment of fact retrieval (the making of *narratives*); and the making of retrospective significance (the making of history in the final instance).[13]

The same four moments are present in journalism practice, though often temporally compacted. The first stage involves the failure to produce evidence: for example, by not taking a photograph or by not asking a relevant question, so that there is a lack of factual evidence or no "historical object" for the public and interested parties to examine and interpret. Journalism always addresses contemporary publics, but by placing facts and truth claims on the public record, it also creates objects for future retrieval and analysis. Thus, the methodologies of journalism are of prime concern for historians, both in the evaluation of original evidence and its contemporary interpretation. Conversely, journalists must have regard to the likely historical robustness of their evidence and analyses. Again, this requirement mandates rigour and reflexivity in the journalistic methodology and its interdisciplinary engagements, most importantly with respect to the production of silences.

Silences are produced by decisions that might be active or passive, and at the very least involve the opportunity costs of organising journalists' work schedules within certain parameters of spatiotemporality: i.e., Tuchman's "web of facticity." Many silences are produced by industrial-scale decisions about priorities in resource allocation, work schedules and target demographics for audiences, to which decisions most working journalists can make little or no contribution. The active exploitation of spatiotemporality by the communications management and public relations industries is well-known and documented, but it only works because of the established and predictable patterns of spatiotemporal processes within journalism organisations.

However, the production of silences can also be a collaborative exercise, as observed by Renan in his well-known observation that national identity is built on a tacit agreement in a society about what can be forgotten in its history.[14] This would require an active process of forgetting, especially when the disputed events are current or recent with the protagonists still present and active, and therefore can involve journalists. Silences are not always imposed by organisational or systemic decisions. Sometimes they require active decisions by individuals or communities to turn away from a known opportunity. The German writer W.G. Sebald in 1999 savaged the writers of his country for their collective failure to address the facts of war crimes committed against Germany in World War II by the deliberate Allied bombing of civilian populations in large cities. He argued this task was a necessary corollary of addressing the war crimes committed by

Germany. The strategy of "area bombing" – the general bombing of cities without regard to military or industrial targets – "was sanctioned by the [British] governmental decision of February 1942 'to destroy the morale of the enemy civilian population and, in particular, of the industrial workers.'"[15] It is worth noting some of the details of this situation because Köln, where Haacke was born in 1936 and grew up nearby, was one of the most heavily bombed cities. It places the subjectivity of his German works into their spatiotemporal context and locates his refusal to be silenced within the debates about authenticity.

"On the night of 30 May 1942, [Commander-in-Chief of RAF Bomber Command] Harris launched his first thousand-bomber raid, against Cologne …. The devastation was great, but still comparatively little by later standards."[16] The city was bombed on a further 261 occasions and reduced to rubble, with enormous loss of life in the firestorms deliberately created by incendiary munitions. "I once heard a former aircraft gunner say that from his place in his glazed turret at the rear of the plane, he could still see the burning city of Cologne even when they were on their way out again over the Dutch coast; it was a fiery speck in the darkness, like the tail of a motionless comet."[17] Writing for the *New Yorker* after the war ended, Janet Flanner observed that Köln lay "by its riverbanks … recumbent, without beauty, shapeless in the rubble and loneliness of complete physical defeat. Through its clogged streets," the passage continues, "trickles what is left of its life, a dwindled population in black and with bundles – the silent German people appropriate to the silent city."[18] Köln was only one of many cities fire-bombed with massive casualties and severe dislocation of the refugee survivors, and yet

> [t]here was a tacit agreement, equally binding on everyone, that the true state of material and moral ruin in which the country found itself was not to be described. The darkest aspects of the final act of destruction, as experienced by the great majority of the German population, remained under a kind of taboo like a shameful family secret, a secret that perhaps could not even be privately acknowledged.[19]

Local and amateur historians published some research, but it "never really crossed the threshold of the national consciousness …. [Writers] did not try to provide a clearer understanding of the extraordinary faculty for self-anesthesia shown by a community that seemed to have emerged from a war of annihilation without any signs of psychological impairment."[20]

Köln was the location of the *Manet-PROJEKT '74* rejection by the Wallraf-Richartz-Museum in 1974 because of its documentation of Hermann Abs' long and diligent service to the Nazi regime. During the period when Sebald charged that German writers were maintaining an inappropriate silence, Haacke returned to the Nazi past regularly: after Köln in 1974, in Graz in 1988 with *And you were victorious after all*, in Venice in 1993 with *GERMANIA*, and in Berlin in 2000 with *DER BEVÖLKERUNG*. In each case, he made a linkage between the past or continuing events and the perspective of the present. He did the same throughout this period with works involving major companies including Mobil, British Leyland, Philips, Mercedes-Benz, and the leading small arms manufacturer FN and their activities in support of oppression and violence in Africa. All of these works invited both the exhibiting institutions and the viewing public to take a position in the present on the meaning of the facts presented. Journalism performs the same role with the information that it presents to its publishing organisations and publics. Sebald's point was that the acknowledgement of war crimes committed against one's own side was the necessary corollary to recognition of crimes committed by one's own side, and there could be no resolution to a conflict until both sides of the coin were recognised.

The wholesale bombing of German civilian populations was emulated by the US Air Force against civilians in Japanese cities, including Tokyo, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and against North Korean cities during the Korean War. The 1952 decisions by twenty-eight publishers to *not* publish Stone's *Hidden History* were attempts to produce silences, though each publisher in turn might argue that they were speaking only for themselves and not for anyone else. The 1970s decisions to *not* exhibit Haacke's *Shapolsky*, *Goldman*, and *Manet-PROJEKT '74* were attempts to produce silences or absences where a presence was proposed. The 1999 Bundestag debate about *DER BEVÖLKERUNG* was a debate about whether a silence or a statement should be produced, though the fact that there was a debate meant that the silence could never be absolute, at least for the period of the controversy. In the same vein, the contemporary decisions by the International Confederation of Investigative Journalists,[21] Julian Assange and *Wikileaks*,[22] and Edward Snowden, Glenn Greenwald, and First Look Media,[23] and before them by Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers in 1971,[24] to publish secret information from business, military, security and diplomatic archives were decisions to produce information objects and to *not* maintain silences in the face of extreme pressure to do

so. The 2011 argument[25] over whether *Wikileaks* founder Julian Assange was a journalist or a source passing documents to *New York Times* and *Guardian* journalists quickly became passé. The decision by news organisations to emulate *Wikileaks* and establish secure drop boxes for leaked information from anonymous sources was a much more compelling indicator of future organisational trends in research and reporting.

The second stage in Trouillot's production of silences is the archiving of the journalistic/historical object. For journalists, the archive might be contemporary – for example, the notes or videorecordings of a press conference just completed – or it might be historical, requiring accessibility and investigation. An object such as a document, recording, photograph or artefact might exist in an archive that is not usually accessed or accessible by journalists, in which case it slips out of the news agenda and is not available for contemporary consideration by relevant publics. There are organised instances of this, for example government documents such as minutes of Cabinet meetings whose release is delayed by thirty years, but also more manipulative instances such as the release of government reports and decisions during holiday seasons or when other major events are preoccupying journalists. Spatiotemporality becomes a tool for consigning some and not other information to archives, with a view to achieving a strategic or tactical silence about that information. In *Hidden History*, Stone was able to access the contemporary archives of combat reports, press conferences and reputable observational news reports produced by the different government, military, news and other organisations to produce a dissenting analysis of the geopolitical processes underway in the Korean War. In *Manet-PROJEKT '74*, Haacke was able to access archival records of both the painting's successive ownership and Hermann Abs' career history, and publish those records in a way that provoked public interest and controversy about Abs personally and in a more general sense about the relationship of German institutions and publics to the Nazi past. In both cases, the archives for both contemporary and historical purposes facilitated the breaking of silences. Haacke and Stone specialised in the publication and interpretation of information available in public archives – that is to say, information that was "hiding in plain view."

Trouillot's third stage is incorporation of the historical/journalistic object into a historical/journalistic narrative or story. Journalistic discourse and narrative have been widely analysed in the journalism studies literature, and I won't explore them further here. It is worth noting, however, that the journalism of Stone and Haacke does not operate in

the mode of mythical narrative[26] but as propositions and analyses in arguments, and as performative provocations seeking an open-ended response from protagonists and interested publics. This bears on Trouillot's fourth stage, the making of history/maps of meaning in the contemporary public mind, which I discussed earlier with respect to authenticity. It is not possible to recognise and expose silences without a close knowledge requiring interdisciplinary engagement with the field containing the silence. The requirement for mutual intellectual authenticity between journalism and history, geography and sociology, and all of the substantive disciplines with which journalism engages, mandates that journalism transcend a self-limiting craft-based identity to assume accountability for itself with respect to other knowledge-producing practices.

In bringing this book to a conclusion, I want to reflect on several aspects of the argument. Firstly, Haacke and Stone, two white males living in New York City and intensely engaged with their immediate situation (albeit in its international context), are a grievously unrepresentative sample of the profession and publics of art and journalism. There has been a constant temptation to refer to other outstanding examples of practice, which I have resisted. Empirically, there would be far too many instances and too much variety to take a meaningful sample, and the more thinly the evidential base spreads, the more easily it can be challenged to distract from the conceptual argument. Detail and depth are what is required to sustain the case, and the advantage of Haacke and Stone is their consistency of approach over many decades and their published reflections on their practice. Conceptually, I agree with Tretiakov that the goal is not to seek the new Tolstoys producing epics of individual excellence but rather to establish the theoretical foundations for rigour and reflexivity in broad-based practice. There will be many and varied, partial or well-rounded examples of such practice known to the readers of this book, and it is better to encourage the interrogation than to preempt the judgement. The task is not to populate a pantheon with canonised saints, but to create a large functioning field of engaged journalists exploring the art and intellectual politics of their practice in communion with their publics. Haacke and Stone are present not as latter day Tolstoys but as particularly rich and sustained case studies of the ways in which challenges can be understood and met. If theory as a framework for methodological evaluation applies to them, then it applies to all journalism.

Secondly, the references to disciplinarity are not an attempt to stake out a claim in the territorial battles of academia. C. Wright Mills said of history

that it is the perils of the enterprise that "make it one of the most theoretical of the human disciplines," and it is theory that lifts history to being a discipline from the level of just providing facts for others to deal with.[27] If we can identify the distinctive perils of journalism and address them theoretically in an adequate manner, then we have identified the distinctive contribution that journalism research can make. The perils I have discussed have been the spatiotemporality of empirical reality in journalism practice, the role of what appear to be unreflexive intuitions manifesting as news sense, and the inevitable engagement with the politics of knowledge in negotiations with sources. A fundamental characteristic of these perils, and of the metatheory we have considered in this book, is that journalism research is a relational process. It is not possible to think of journalism research in terms other than relational ones, including with other disciplines, and therefore disciplinarity should be understood not as a series of barriers but as a basis for mutual exchange and collaboration. However, journalism must acknowledge and address its own perils in order to make those exchanges work.

If perils are adequately addressed and transcended, they become defining strengths. For journalism, they are a capacity to operate effectively in the space and time of the present to make very quick analytical decisions that serve the needs of publics and other disciplines including history, and the awareness and foregrounding of power relations in the engagement with sources. Failure of journalism as a research and reporting discipline will manifest as the production of silences or ignorance where there should be evidence and analysis, and/or the exercise of power to distort evidence or analysis, leading to a lack of authenticity.

Lastly, if the scholarship of journalism is lagging a half-century behind the leading edge of practice, there must be a reason for that, which may well inhibit the developments in scholarship I am arguing for. It is worth noting that Haacke was a tenured professor for many years at the Cooper Union in New York but that Stone had an ambivalent relationship with the academy. He went to college but dropped out in his junior year to become a journalist. His 1971 valedictory statement in the final edition of *I.F. Stone's Weekly* included the following reflection:

> I loved learning and hated school. I devoured books from the moment I first learned to read but resisted every effort to make me study whatever I saw no sense in learning. A few teachers I loved, the rest I despised …. I thought I might teach philosophy but the atmosphere of a college faculty

> repelled me; the few islands of greatness seemed to be washed by seas of pettiness and mediocrity. The smell of a newsroom was more attractive …. In the mornings, feeling like Jude the Obscure (how I loved Hardy's dark vision in those days!), I would go to the library and read. The high points of my self-education in that period were two books of the *De Rerum Natura* of Lucretius in Latin and one poem of Sappho's in Greek. The other books I gobbled are too numerous to mention, but I still feel like a dropout whose education was cut short.[28]

This was his mature view of his early development, and he doesn't equivocate in his judgments of university-based scholars. However, his undergraduate degree was finally conferred by the University of Pennsylvania in 1975 and, although he preferred to describe himself as a "recycled freshman", that same year it gave him evident satisfaction to be elected Distinguished Fellow in Residence at the American University in Washington.[29] While his undergraduate reading interests might be somewhat rarefied for most journalists, his sentiments about academics will be familiar to them, and intimately so to journalists working as educators within the university system.[30] The relationship between journalism and scholarly research still provokes a profound ambivalence in the psyche of many journalism educators.

Carey noted the relationship of journalism with North American communication studies had been destructive for journalism,[31] and the debate is still active in Australia about whether journalism as a research category for competitive grants and quality assessment should be subsumed within communication studies.[32] In my view this debate is a destructive distraction for journalism away from the interrogation of its own methodological foundations as discussed in this book. Beyond this specific issue, it is incontrovertible that best practice in research by journalists does not occur within universities. The association of not-for-profit journalism organisations with universities is modifying that state of affairs in the USA and, while that is a constructive development in some ways, it is also the exception that proves the rule because that research is usually not theorised for methodological purposes.[33] In other countries, particularly Australia, New Zealand and the UK, the North American foundation funding opportunities do not exist, and therefore journalism scholars depend on competitive academic grants for research funding, where their track record is very poor. Competitive grant regimes encourage conformity and conservatism in research proposals. While peer assessment is supposed to operate and

so-called Non-Traditional Research Outcomes are recognised, the lack of recognised methodological foundations and unsympathetic interdisciplinary evaluations have had a damaging impact.

On the other hand, the development of doctoral research degrees in journalism is building a motivated cohort of graduate student researchers among experienced journalists,[34] and this book is directed at those students, their supervisors and teachers, and their future colleagues to be drawn from the profession. Improving the parlous position of journalism scholars in the academy will require firmness of purpose and collegial organisation. If the task of journalists is to contest the production of silences, then there is a silence in the academy where journalism should be speaking. As Zelizer has observed among scholars, despite "being everywhere, journalism and its study are in fact nowhere."[35] This silence will be challenged by engagement with the metatheoretical challenges that all truth-seeking practices encounter. Some indications of how this might be done have been discussed in this book, and other paths will open up the silences to scrutiny. A promising dimension of all journalistic research is the interdisciplinary character of the knowledge it produces, and the mutual benefit that journalism offers to other disciplines is the informed critical edge of accountability to contemporary publics. Collaboration with other disciplines is likely to be a productive route to reflexive interrogation for journalism scholars.

The fact that there is even an issue to debate about the scholarly status of journalism research is a testament to the persistent quality of the research produced by journalists in the profession. As far as other disciplines are largely concerned, there is no issue to discuss; there is scholarship, there is journalism, and they are different. Journalist scholars are being crushed in a glacial silence, caught between the continuing innovations and achievements in professional practice and the wall of resistance in the academic world. The position is untenable. The way to break a silence is to speak up, as Hans Haacke, Izzy Stone, and countless unsung journalists have done.

Notes

1. Trouillot (1995: 149).
2. Trouillot (1995: 145).
3. Trouillot (1995: 144).

4. Trouillot (1995: 148).
5. Trouillot (1995: 147).
6. Trouillot (1995: 144).
7. Trouillot (1995: 148).
8. Adam (1993).
9. Stone (1989: 181–225).
10. Lefebvre (2014: 500–510).
11. Ericson et al. (1989: 9).
12. This version of the epigram is attributed to the early twentieth-century British press baron Lord Northcliffe, but there is a range of versions attributed to various authors. See http://quoteinvestigator.com/2013/01/20/news-suppress/ accessed 30 March 2016.
13. Trouillot (1995: 26).
14. Renan (1990: 11).
15. Sebald (2003: 17).
16. Beevor (2012: 443).
17. Sebald (2003: 22).
18. Quoted in Sebald (2003: 30).
19. Sebald (2003: 10).
20. Sebald (2003: 11).
21. https://panamapapers.icij.org/ accessed 4 April 2016.
22. Assange (2015).
23. Greenwald (2014), Harding (2014).
24. Ellsberg (2002), Sheehan et al. (1971).
25. Keller (2011).
26. As discussed by Barthes (1982 [1957]) or Bird and Dardenne (2009 [1988]).
27. Mills (2000: 145).
28. Stone (1973: 308).
29. Stone (1978: SM4).
30. Zelizer (2004).
31. Carey (1996).
32. Nash (2013), Lester (2015).
33. Birnbauer (2011).
34. Nash (2014).
35. Zelizer (2009: 29).

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