

THE EMERGENCE OF RUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
1900 – 1904

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KLAUS FRÖHLICH

THE EMERGENCE
OF RUSSIAN CONSTITUTIONALISM
1900 – 1904

The Relationship Between
Social Mobilization and Political Group Formation
in Pre-revolutionary Russia



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FOREWORD

My interest in the topic of this book traces back over more than ten years to my interest in the history of political parties in pre-revolutionary Russia. To my late tutor Professor Reinhard Wittram, who guided me during my undergraduate and post-graduate days as a student at the University of Göttingen, I owe a special gratitude for giving my interest its special focus. I am indebted to him for my academic training more than this book may indicate. He did not see the results of his influence, but he followed my preparatory work with both sympathy and critical attention.

My thanks are due equally to Professors Hans Roos (Bochum) and Rudolf Vierhaus (Göttingen), whose constant advice and help meant continued encouragement. I am further obliged to Professors Dietrich Geyer (Tübingen) and Hans Kaiset (Oldenburg) and their critical reading of the 1973 draft of my book. In 1977/78, during my revision of the manuscript and its preparation for publication, the most important suggestions came to me from many discussions deep into the night with my friend Jurgen Jahnke. To the many others whose names do not appear here I owe my thanks for their help and encouragement.

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her was for me one of the best and at the same time most useful experiences in revising this book. Together we thank Gustav K. Kemperdick (Kempen), Professor Wolfgang Helbich (Bochum) and John R. Canavan (Dortmund) for many useful suggestions in the translation. Reinhard Schönwälder (Dortmund) has helped me to compile the appendices and the bibliography.

I dedicate this book to my wife, who has done more towards it than anyone else.

KLAUS FRÖHLICH

CONTENTS

FOREWORD	v
ABBREVIATIONS	ix
INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER ONE. THE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC CRISIS ON THE EVE OF THE 20TH CENTURY AND THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF SOCIETY	15
1. Economic crisis and erosion of the governmental system	16
2. Social mobilization and political opposition	26
3. Economic crisis and erosion of social loyalty	46
CHAPTER TWO. TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONALIST PROGRAMME	61
1. Political theory and social change	62
2. The origins of the periodical <i>Osvobozhdenie</i>	82
3. The first constitutionalist programme	101
CHAPTER THREE. CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE 'PUBLIC MOVEMENT' 1900 – 1904	123
1. Institutions and contacts of the 'Public Movement'	123
a. Personal contacts, salons and circles	123
b. The <i>Beseda</i>	128
c. Journalism and the press	137
d. Voluntary associations and interregional congresses	147
e. The zemstvo movement	156
f. The zemstvo movement and the 'Special conference on the needs of agriculture'	164

2. The problems of informal organization	181
3. The transition to formal organization	211
CONCLUSION	235
1. Social structure	237
2. Organizational development	243
3. Strategy and tactics	246
APPENDICES	
I. Biographical sketches	255
II. Members of the Union of Liberation, 1904 - 1905	273
III. Regional distribution of constitutionalist groups	283
NOTES	287
BIBLIOGRAPHY	327
INDEX	341

ILLUSTRATIONS ON COVER

from top left, clockwise:

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4. P.N. Milyukov
5. I.I. Petrunkevich

ABBREVIATIONS

<i>ASEER</i>	<i>The American Slavic and East European Review</i> . Seattle, 1940–1960.
<i>BPIR</i>	Belyaeva, L.N., Zinov'eva, M.K., and Nikiforov, M.M. <i>Bibliografiya periodicheskikh izdanij Rossii 1901-1916</i> , 4 vols. Leningrad, 1958–1961.
Brokgauz-Efron	<i>Entsiklopedicheskij Slovar'</i> . Izdanie F.A. Brokgauza i I.A. Efrona. St. Petersburg, 1890–1907.
CDP	Constitutional Democratic Party.
Galai, <i>LM</i>	Galai, S. <i>The Liberation Movement in Russia, 1900–1905</i> . Cambridge, 1973.
<i>ISSSR</i>	<i>Istoriya SSSR</i> . Moscow, 1956– .
<i>IZ</i>	<i>Istoricheskie Zapiski</i> . Moscow, 1937– .
<i>JGO</i>	<i>Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas</i> . Neue Folge. München, 1953– .
<i>KA</i>	<i>Krasnyj Arkhiv</i> . Moscow/Leningrad, 1922–1941.
Lenin, <i>PSS</i>	Lenin, V.I. <i>Polnoe Sobranie Sochinenij</i> , 5th ed. Moscow, 1958–1965.
<i>NES</i>	<i>Novyj Entsiklopedicheskij Slovar'</i> . Izdanie F.A. Brokgauz i I.A. Efron. St. Petersburg, n.d. (1910–1917).
<i>OD</i>	<i>Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX-ogo veka</i> . L. Martov, P. Maslov, and A. Potresov (editors). St. Petersburg 1909–1912.
<i>Osv</i>	<i>Osvobodzhdenie</i> . Stuttgart / Paris, 1902–1905.
PRP	People's Rights Party (<i>Partiya Narodnago Prava</i>).
PSR	(neo-populist) Party of Socialist Revolutionaries.
PWP	People's Will Party (<i>Narodnaya Volya</i>).

RSDRP	Russian (Marxist) Social Democratic Labour Party.
<i>RV Sbornik</i>	<i>Russkiya Vedomosti 1863–1913</i> . Sbornik statej. Moscow, 1913.
<i>SDG</i>	<i>Sowjetsystem und demokratische Gesellschaft</i> . Eine vergleichende Enzyklopädie. Freiburg, 1966–1972.
<i>SEER</i>	<i>The Slavonic and East European Review</i> . London, 1922–.
<i>SIE</i>	<i>Sovetskaya Istoricheskaya Entsiklopediya</i> . Moscow, 1961–1976.
<i>SR</i>	<i>Slavic Review</i> . Seattle, 1961–.
SSO	Shakhovskoj, D.I. ‘Soyuz Osvobozhdeniya’ in <i>Zarnitsy</i> , Vol. 2, No. 2. St. Petersburg, 1909.
<i>VI</i>	<i>Voprosy Istorii</i> . Moscow, 1926–.
<i>VMGU</i>	<i>Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta</i> . Seriya IX: Istoriya. Moscow, 1946–.

INTRODUCTION

Parmi les lois qui régissent les sociétés humaines, il y en a une qui semble plus précise et plus claire que toutes les autres. Pour que les hommes restent civilisés ou le deviennent, il faut que parmi eux l'art de s'associer se développe et se perfectionne dans le même rapport que l'égalité des conditions s'accroît.

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE

This study is concerned with the problem of political participation in pre-revolutionary Russia. It is generally known that the institutions which help in forming public opinion and in balancing the interests of divergent social forces found entry into the political life of the Russian Empire only at a late date – hardly before the beginning of the 20th century – and then only partially and with hesitation. As a result of delayed industrialization, growing social tensions had led to an acute problem of political participation by broader strata of the population. During the 19th century, however, the ‘art of associating’ had lagged behind the demands for participation. These had to assert themselves against the political system of autocracy which, in the interest of self-preservation, tried to suppress this problem by means of bureaucratic regimentation and police supervision. It was only the 1905 revolution which finally forced the Tsar to guarantee certain civil rights and to summon a parliament. With the opening of the First Duma in April 1906, Russia seemed intent on following the path of her Western neighbours, via constitutional monarchy to parliamentary democratic solutions to the problem of political participation.

The quality of this constitutional experiment and its chances of development have been disputed in the academic literature ever since

Max Weber's contemporary assessment of Russia's 'pseudo-constitutionalism'.¹ During the East-West conflict in the late 1950s and 1960s, the controversy was carried on pointedly in the West under the auspices of a liberal democratic alternative to the Bolshevik revolution.² This controversy, however, allowed mostly those questions to be forgotten which arise from the observation that, with the election campaign for the First Duma, a party system with clear contours emerged virtually overnight, a system with well-defined leading political groups, relatively sharp programme demarcations and a limited number of coalition alternatives. There is admittedly no dispute over the interpretation that in Russia – contrary to her Western neighbours – the concept of the political party as well as the contours of the party system evolved without any context of parliamentary institutions,³ yet comparatively little is known to date of the conditions under which this process occurred and the forms it took before the political parties appeared on the scene as an organized phenomena in 1905/06. The main question dominating this study is therefore: how did consistent political groupings evolve in Russian society?

This question will be examined in the following study in the light of the Russian Constitutionalists prior to 1905, i.e. in the light of those informal groups and circles which followed the common objective of overthrowing the autocracy in Russia by introduction of a liberal or democratic parliamentary system, without connecting this with expectation of social revolution. This restriction means that the study will not be able to provide a comprehensive answer to the question raised. But partial answers can be expected which will give information on some of the social conditions of the party system and parliamentarianism in Russia and which are therefore of interest in evaluating Russia's political development.

In examining '*in what way*' political groups came into being, this work enquires into the growing ability of the individual to associate with others for the purpose of achieving active political responsibility. It will try above all to describe the pattern of informal organization in which constitutionalist group formation occurred initially. By informal organization I mean the non-formalized or not yet formalized relationships between individuals or groups of individuals following a common objective.⁴ The Russian Constitutionalists developed an organization by entering into relationships in order to undertake co-ordinated, purposeful activities. Their organization was informal so long as the relationships between the individuals or groups of in-

dividuals lacked the regularity permitting institutionalized decision-making and control. The study is therefore mainly pre-occupied with the change in attitude of the various social groups towards each other and towards government authority, the means of communication and forms of association preferred, the gradual establishment of typical patterns of political behaviour, the development of programme components and the mobilization of supporters. But since such a description cannot provide an explanation of the way in which groups actually formed, our analysis must constantly refer to the prevailing economic, social and political conditions and seek to understand each programmatic and institutional innovation as a reaction to those conditions.

Within the period under examination, the socio-economic and political life of the Russian Empire underwent a greatly accelerated change which can best be defined by the term 'modernization'.⁵ By modernization we understand 'the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific revolution'.⁶ Wherever this process has been initiated since the 18th century, it has always been accompanied in the economic sector by the transition to industrial machine production or at least by stepped-up efforts to induce industrialization.⁷ Mobilization of large sections of the population — torn from traditional environments, commitments and customs and transferred to new forms of socialization — characterized the process in the social sector, while adjustment to changing functions — legitimation of authority, mobilization and distribution of resources and influence and integration of the various sections of society — was demanded of the political system.

In the meantime modernization has become a universal process set in motion in each individual country by a different combination of endogenous and exogenous stimuli. Seen in international perspective, the modernization process has produced disparate development, so that we have a few 'pioneer societies' and a large number of 'late-comer societies'.⁸ In the 19th century Russia clearly belonged to the late-comers. She was the last of the major European powers to be modernized — chiefly due to the pressure of competition among those powers. Alexander the Second's far-reaching social and political reforms — the Emancipation of the Serfs in 1861 was the most important — were followed by a policy of artificially accelerated

industrialization, the significant results of which matured in the years 1890–1900 and 1910–1914. As can often be observed in ‘late-comer societies’, the government took the lead in the modernization process in Russia as well. While Alexander the Second’s successors understood modernization in a very narrow sense – mainly as improvement of the country’s economic potential – they saw the new ideas, communication methods and social institutions entering into the life of society along with the industrial and economic innovations mainly as a threat to the prevailing autocratic system – a threat to be countered through restriction and conservation of traditional political and social structures. Thus at that stage shaping its attitude *vis-à-vis* the state and its institutions had priority for every participatory movement.

The relevant aspect of modernization in the context of our study is the aspect of ‘social mobilization’. It links the basic economic process with the different areas of political change. Karl W. Deutsch defines social mobilization as ‘an overall process of change, which happens to substantial parts of the population in countries which are moving from traditional to modern ways of life’, a process ‘in which major clusters of old social, economic and psychological commitments are eroded or broken and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour’.⁹ The partial processes which are indicative of social mobilization – increase in the attributes of a modern way of life as demonstrated in day-to-day life, alteration in job structure, change of residential area, growing urbanization rate and intensification of the town-country gap, the spread of education, increase in per capita income, growing importance of communication, etc. – bring about changes in the social environment, in self-assessment and in personal experiences and expectations. For the purposes of this study, the processes can be reduced to the following four aspects: urbanization, educational development, spread of the mass media and the increasing quest for participation pressing for institutionalization.¹⁰

This concept of social mobilization makes it possible to designate more closely the specific object of this study. Just as ‘pioneer societies’ and ‘late-comer societies’ originate in the international context of modernization, social change in individual countries leads to uneven development, especially under conditions of artificially accelerated modernization.¹¹ Not all sections of the population are affected in the same way by social mobilization. Thus differing social fields arise, which can be distinguished by the degree to which they are affected

by social change. The social field in question in this study belongs to those most strongly affected by the processes of change. On the one hand it owed its existence to a combination of all four aspects of mobilization, and on the other it seemed to be particularly jeopardized in the process of disparate modernization in an autocratic state; this is the field of '*bürgerliche Intelligenz*' (Max Weber), made up of an urbanized, highly educated, professionally qualified and distinguished middle class, economically powerless or threatened with economic deprivation and politically underprivileged. Such a class is more clearly distinguishable within a still largely agricultural society with almost 80% illiteracy than in a society undergoing more uniform change. Yet at the same time traces of the various social biographies adding up to the sum total of this middle class still adhere to it, making it appear to a large degree incoherent and unstable.

The group under consideration in this social field can at first be outlined only negatively as far as its participation potential was concerned. Since its members neither belonged to the traditional political elites nor had at their disposal any share worth mentioning in the means of production, the group lacked those chances for participation and joint control under the autocratic regime which it should have enjoyed in the light of its educational standards and social elitist function. With no opportunity for free speech or self-determination, the group found itself in a permanent status crisis which it experienced as frustration and social insecurity. In the broadening process of social mobilization it was constantly forced to re-define its social and political role. This meant that it became tendentially a political power recognizing in organized association the chance for active joint control in the process of change. The group can be defined positively as soon as it articulated its aspirations in the form of a political demand for substitution of the autocratic order by a constitutional order of a West European nature based on guaranteed civil and political rights, and as soon as it initiated joint activities directed towards implementing this demand. With its objective thus phrased, the group can be termed 'constitutionalist'. By 'Russian constitutionalism' we therefore mean to define a coherent political movement originating from the modernization process whose declared objective was the establishment of a parliamentary system of political decision and public control, a movement striving to achieve this objective by means of organized activities.

At first this definition is nothing more than a heuristic means of

distinction. It can be used to identify the group in question and to differentiate it from other groups. To this degree it also provides a cogent statement on the period covered by this study. The conclusion of a study on the way in which political groups form is necessarily the point at which the group in question defines itself as such and makes the transfer to formal organization, i.e. lays down binding objectives, develops strategies for action aimed deliberately at implementing these objectives, forms an internal hierarchy of differentiated functions and guarantees the coherence of the group by means of gratifications and sanctions. This point was reached by the Russian Constitutionalists in 1904, when the 'Union of Liberation' (*Soyuz Osvobozhdeniya*) was constituted. The Union of Liberation was an illegal organization following a specific organizational plan, even though informal structures still strongly overshadowed the formal structures. With its branch organizations, it played a considerable part during the 1905 year of revolution before merging into the newly formed political parties in Autumn 1905.¹²

Selection of the starting point for this study needs more complex substantiation. Our cognitive interest is aimed not at the early history of this or that party but rather deliberately at the phase of informal group formation during which the question as to how consistent political groupings came into being in Russian society is resolved. Yet precisely the informal phase is characterized by the fact that definite collectively active subjects, on which a chronological order could be based, are not easy to distinguish, for the shifts between the various groups are obscured in the unorganized relationships of social life. We must therefore work from the relationships within the social field in which constitutionalist group formation occurred; we must look for a starting point for the study in the broader context of political mobilization in that social field. And in this we are referred to a specific historical context which is generally subsumed in the sources under the concept *obshchestvennoe dvizhenie* (public movement).

In Russian usage this term is very broad and ambiguous. But in all its nuances it is based upon the precise, categorical distinction between state authority and society (*vlast'/gosudarstvo* and *obshchestvo*). Behind this distinction is not so much an elaborate social scientific theory as rather more a concept which reaches far back into Russian history, a concept of an independent province of social life juxtaposed to the sphere of court life and official governmental policy, with their hierarchical institutions and bureaucratic rules. Up to the middle of

the 19th century the term *obshchestvo* (society) was still clearly defined. It designated the politically privileged upper classes which had been released from the obligation of royal service (the landed nobility and the cream of the urban population) as opposed to the tax-paying, predominantly peasant majority of the population, the 'people' (*narod*). Under the pressure of social mobilization, the term lost its fixity and its precise social distinction during the second half of the 19th century. Within certain limits it became 'democratized' by absorbing elements of the new modernity (urban vitality, education, participation in and access to public communication media). At the same time its semantic opposition to the concept of state authority became sharply defined. *Obshchestvo* became more and more a synonym for 'the public'; yet the concept did not blend with the concept *narod*. By the end of the century, it designated the well-to-do classes in Russian society, distinguished by birth, property or education, from which the leading cultural elites were recruited.¹³

The term *obshchestvennoe dvizhenie* is closely connected with the conceptual shift described. This was used to designate the politically diffuse movement of those classes included in the concept *obshchestvo* which, since the days of the Great Reforms, had constituted a sphere of public activity and responsibility opposed to the official public sphere of the state.¹⁴ In our context, the term is best translated as 'public movement'¹⁵ as distinct from the revolutionary movement (*revolyutsionnoe dvizhenie*) arising from the underground of intellectual subcultures and from the mass movements of peasants and workers (*krest'yanskoe* and *rabochee dvizhenie* respectively). — Due to the disparate effects of social mobilization, the latter had hardly any part in the means of communication and the procedures of this public. — Since the period of reform under Alexander II, the profile of the 'public movement' had changed substantially in keeping with the degree of social mobilization. The social change is from landed nobility to a professionalized, intellectually determined functional elite; the institutional change from assemblies of the nobility in the period of reform to a host of social institutions at the turn of the century; and the ideological change from defending class interests of the landed nobility to a variety of claims to participation, whose formulation reflected the history of political philosophy in Russia since the epoch-making dispute between Westernizers and Slavophiles. And yet there was one border the 'public movement' never crossed: it remained *per definitionem* a movement of the 'enlightened public',

distinct from the elementary movements of the 'dark people' (*temnyj narod*).

The 'public movement's' framework of communication was the scene for the broad political mobilization of the social field covering the '*bürgerliche Intelligenz*', a field which, around the middle of the 1890s, became identifiable as far as both decisive aspects of social mobilization and generation development were concerned. At the turn of the century, the first rudiments of an informal constitutionalist group formation became visible, in the sense defined above, in the social life of the major cities, in the institutions of local self-government (*zemstvo*), in academic and charitable societies, at congresses, in the press and in literature. This is the point at which our study, covering the period from 1900 to 1904, begins. In the course of the study there will naturally be frequent references to the history of the 'public movement' from 1860 onwards, since that is where the individual and institutional traditions, the behavioural and socialization patterns are to be found to which we must resort in order to describe adequately the process of constitutionalist group formation.

This study is not the first to concern itself with the formation phase of Russian constitutionalism. The Russian Social Democrats and, as victors in the 1917 Revolution, predominantly the Bolsheviks among them, have admittedly always been given more attention than the non-socialist groupings in the relevant literature; but more than twenty years ago Michael Karpovich, under the axiom 'Vae victis is not a principle for historians to follow', stimulated interest in the history of the underdogs in the Revolution as well.¹⁶ At the same time Donald W. Treadgold published, in his book *Lenin and His Rivals. The Struggle for Russia's Future, 1898-1906* (1955), a penetrating essay on the formation of a 'liberal party' in Russia alongside the two socialist parties. Here the essential ideological and institutional aspects of our subject are already referred to, though not without error in some of the details. In 1958 George Fischer's study, *Russian Liberalism*, was published in which he follows the transformation of a liberal movement moulded after enlightened Western individualism from the 'gentry' to the 'intelligentsia', from the institutions of the provincial *zemstvo* to the mass party of the Constitutional Democrats in the period between 1860 and 1905. Also in 1958, Nathan Smith attempted, in his unpublished dissertation *The Constitutional Democratic Movement in Russia, 1902-1906*, to clarify the early history of the Consti-

tutional Democratic Party by means of a detailed description of the constitutionalist movement after the establishment of the periodical *Osvobozhdenie*. Further elucidation then came with Thomas Riha's Milyukov biography (1969) and above all with Richard Pipe's book on Peter Struve (1970). The latest state of research is reflected in Shmuel Galai's book *The Liberation Movement in Russia, 1900–1905* (1973). While the works mentioned above have shown interest mainly in the development of political ideas and in individual personalities, Galai turns to the question of domestic Russian origins, to the composition, organization and significance of the liberal movement. The 'liberation movement', a coalition of 'zemstvo radicalism' and 'democratic intelligentsia', appears in Galai as that organized force of Russian opposition to which the leading role fell in the 1905 revolution.¹⁷

In Soviet historiography, the developments of interest here have long lain concealed under the priority interest in class analysis of pre-revolutionary society and in the socio-economic circumstances leading to the 1905 revolution. The constitutionalist syndrome finally results in the analysis of the 'liberal bourgeoisie' which, regardless of its undisputed differences with the autocracy, is assigned a place nearer to tsarism than among the revolutionary forces, due to its class situation. I know of no work dating from the 1920s which is concerned specifically with the development of Russian constitutionalism prior to 1905. In the Stalinist era there is only one book to mention – E.D. Chermenskij's *Burzhuaziya i tsarizm v revolyutsii 1905–1907gg* [Bourgeoisie and Tsarism in the 1905–1907 Revolution, 1939], which in passing treats constitutionalist group formation. I.F. Gindin then raised the question of the emergence of the liberal movement in an essay in 1963 on the development and the special features of Russian bourgeoisie during the capitalist period. He differentiates between the older, traditional zemstvo liberalism and a 'genuine bourgeois liberalism' which supposedly formed only around the turn of the century, but remained 'a movement of the bourgeois intelligentsia' until 1905 and 'was not supported by the still politically indolent *grande bourgeoisie*'.¹⁸ Against this E.D. Chermenskij again emphasized in 1965 the dominant role played by the landed nobility in the liberal movement, which he sees essentially as a movement of 'landowners-turned-bourgeois', a movement to which a few 'petit bourgeois camp followers' rallied.¹⁹ This essay has been integrated in the revised edition of his 1939 book, published in 1970, which deals with the 'liberal zemstvo movement' prior to 1905 only

in an introductory chapter. Since then, a few special studies have appeared in the Soviet Union, the value of which lies primarily in the presentation of new material on individual aspects of the movement (Shlemin, Simonova, Krasavin, Shatsillo, Erofeev and others²⁰).

All the works mentioned deal with the problem of the emergence of Russian constitutionalism under the main heading 'Russian liberalism'. This work, however, tries to dispense with the term, mainly for methodological reasons. In the Russian context, the term liberalism seems to me too broad and undifferentiated to be able to define a specific political group formation. Following a historically relational method and enquiring without definitional commitment into those groups which, in a given social context, understood themselves as and called themselves liberal, one arrives, as Marc Raeff has shown, at highly unmanageable results in the case of pre-revolutionary Russian society: 'In popular Russian terminology (and thinking) liberalism obtained the meaning of opposition to the government, or rejection of state authority'.²¹ A more narrow characterization, according to which liberalism in Russia meant simply 'the hope for a nonrevolutionary progress by means of social reforms from above',²² also applies for a number of political groupings, which however should not all be measured with the same yardstick. But one can also use the term heuristically — i.e. searching out those ideas, movements and institutions which can be designated liberal on the basis of their substance, when held against an explicit theory of liberalism. But this method has led to considerable misinterpretations when applied to our subject. The best example of this is Viktor Leontovitsch's book *Geschichte des Liberalismus in Russland* (1957), which works with the legalistic definition of liberalism provided by the French political philosopher Maurice Hauriou. Under the yoke of the French Third Republic's petit bourgeois ideology of property and freedom as reflected in the work of his master, Leontovitsch relegates many phenomena in Russian history, which for others count as liberal, to the radicalist corner. Leonard Schapiro, to give another example, is also influenced by the inherent radicalism when he says of the 'liberal movement', not without a note of disapproval, that it 'ought perhaps more accurately to be called the radical movement'.²³ As we have seen from George Fischer's study, this radicalism in the matter has to do with the belatedness with which legal guarantee of civil and political rights became part of the social movements' programme against the autocracy in Russia, and was thus necessarily seen in proximity with socialist

objectives. But our irritation about the radical features of Russian liberalism stems from the fact that the liberal ideas originally formed with revolutionary intentions against absolutism have long since become a commonplace in the political culture of Western industrial societies, where they are often used as rigid classifications thrown into the field with relish against radicalism and socialism, or whatever may be considered as such. In view of these present-day political connotations, it hardly seems possible, without performing a definitional tight-rope act, to apply the term liberalism to a political movement for which absolutism was still the oppressive reality of everyday life.

For the purposes of this study, the term constitutionalism as used here offers one or two advantages. It takes as its subject only that section of the range of problems raised by the term liberalism in which parliamentary guarantee of participation became part of the programme of certain social movements in Russia. It is thus more suitable for identifying the political grouping sought in a wider field of political programmes and patterns of behaviour. Admittedly this term too is only a heuristic instrument. 'Constitution' was a word which, spoken in public in pre-revolutionary Russia, promptly brought the censor or the police department onto the scene. 'Constitutionalism' therefore remained a foreign word, 'westernized' in confession and unpronounceable for many a nationalist Russian tongue. But at the same time the term thus designates — a second advantage — the origins of the objectives of the constitutionalist grouping, a grouping which differed from others called liberal through its conviction that Russia would be able to overcome its backwardness only if it followed the path already marked out in the history of Western societies. And thirdly, the term is old-fashioned enough to hinder interpretation with undesirable connotations. To me it appears misleading — and in a technical sense alone — only for those who think that the 1905 revolution brought about the constitutionalization of liberal rights in Russia, i.e. that constitutionalism was Russia's political system between 1905 and 1917. I am not of this opinion, but believe rather that the 1906 constitutional octroi established a dualist structure in which the authoritarian elements outweighed the constitutional, democratic elements. In the wider perspective of this study there is also therefore the question as to how far the institutions of political participation developed during the course of a long history in North America and Western Europe were suited for the political socialization of the mass of Russian society. Should this question — which can only

be touched on here but not decided — have to be answered in the negative, the old problem of alternatives to the Bolshevik revolution would be presented in a new light.

The approach of systematic examination in this book calls for a discursive method of presentation. Narrative parts are to be found mainly in places where basic information is offered, where events are reported which have not been considered in the older studies, or where corrections had to be made to the history of events already known. The author would gladly have done more in this respect, had the accessible documentation permitted. But as long as the Soviet archives are not freely available — I had no access to them — studies of this nature must be based on the printed materials generally available.

Nonetheless I have been able to use a certain amount of new material beyond that which was available to Galai and others. In the *Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg* a small amount of documentation has turned up which gives information on the circumstances under which Peter Struve worked as editor of the periodical *Osvobozhdenie* in Stuttgart in the years 1902–1904. (This material has already been used once by R. Pipes.) In the Finnish National Archives in Helsinki there are various collections of files and correspondence relating to the Russian Constitutionalists' negotiations with the Finnish resistance. These have been evaluated by W.R. Copeland (1973). Among these, only the report on a journey through Russia made by Adolf Törnngren on invitation from the Union of Liberation in 1904 was of greater relevance for my study. Apart from this I have collected together extensive biographical material for determining the social structure of the constitutionalist movements; extracts are given below in Appendix I and II. Of decisive importance in precisely specifying the Constitutionalists as a group are the lists of delegates to the four Union of Liberation congresses in 1904/05 and the lists of members of the Union Council extracted by K.F. Shatsillo from the papers of Dmitrii Shakhovskoj and published in 1975. In 1974 Terence Emmons published the statutes of the Union of Liberation and the original version of its programme. There is also an essay in the *Slavic Review*, 1973, in which Emmons, working on the basis of Soviet archive material, has fully treated the history of the *Beseda*, an aristocratic circle to which a leading role in the constitutionalist movement is repeatedly attributed. For the socio-historical background to Russian constitutionalism I have largely relied on more recent Soviet studies on

the nobility (Korelin, Minarik, Solov'ev), the bourgeoisie (Gindin, Laverychev) and the intelligentsia (Lejkina-Svirskaya). The most important sources, however, are the periodical *Osvobozhdenie*, Shakhovskoj's history of the Union of Liberation dated 1909, Belokonskij's compilation on the history of the zemstvo movement (1914) and the numerous memoirs of those involved. Apart from these, Veselovskij's *Istoriya Zemstva za sorok let* [History of the Zemstvo, 4 vols., 1909-1911] and the extensive anthology *Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX-go veka* (1909-1912), edited by the Mensheviks Martov, Maslov and Potresov, have been indispensable in many aspects.*

* The transcription of Russian names, terms and book titles follows a modified LC system which avoids diacritical symbols but permits reconstruction of the original spelling. — Dates are given consistently according to the Julian calendar valid in Russia until 1918; in the case of events outside Russia, either the note (new style) or the Julian date has been added.

CHAPTER ONE

THE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC CRISIS ON THE EVE OF THE 20TH CENTURY AND THE POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF SOCIETY

The vehement advance which Russian industry had experienced in the 1890s was halted at the turn of the century by an abrupt world-wide recession. The growth rate of industrial production had averaged 8% for the years 1890-1899, it fell to almost zero in 1900/1901, and in the subsequent years it remained well behind the growth rates in Central and West European countries, where in 1902 a new advance had already been noticed.¹ Considered in the light of the long cycles of overall economic development, this crisis was only a short-term depression in the international and national phase of economic advance which lasted from the middle of the 1890s to the First World War. In Russia the crisis came upon a national economy which was already determined by factors of capitalist production and commercialization, with their close ties to financial conditions. At the same time strong elements of pre-industrial society had remained effective in the legal and social order, partially also in the social organization of production; these impaired the development of the labour market as well as of the goods and investment markets. The course of the economic trend shows, on one hand, the degree to which Russia was already incorporated into the world economy. Yet on the other hand it also points to a series of peculiarities which lend a significance for Russia to this crisis which, in some features, is reminiscent of the significance of the Great Depression for Germany.² It curtailed the speculative peaks of accelerated industrialization and led up to a phase of depression lasting for years, during which time capitalism in Russia was consolidated. With an industrial share in the gross national product of little more than 20%, however, Russia remained an agrarian country which had to accumulate capital for industrialization from the technologically and economically backward

agricultural sector.³ Since productivity in this sector had lagged behind industrial productivity, and continued to do so, the country's economic and social development suffered serious burdens which became obvious during the crisis. Peasant unrest in 1902 in the black earth region in Southern Russia and a wave of strikes in 1903 in the industrial centres from Baku to Odessa signalled intensification of class antagonism, which continued to have an effect in the mass movements of the 1905–1907 Revolution. Considering the central importance of the state in economic development, the setback in the economy necessarily jeopardized the prevailing trend in the Government's economic and social policies and, in part, in foreign policy as well. The economic crisis destabilized the political system of autocracy, which was less and less in a position to mobilize resources and to command loyalty, and which thus found itself in a serious legitimization crisis.

1. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND EROSION OF THE GOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM

In view of Russia's internal development, the boom in the 1890s can no more be regarded as part of the normal economic cycle than the recession which followed. The boom accompanied the second and strongest thrust, delayed by decades, of the industrial revolution,⁴ the recession drove the politico-economic system, which had wanted and effected the advance, to its limits – the exhaustion of the peasant population's capacity to pay was apparent behind the decline in economic growth.⁵ Domestic accumulation and availability of investment capital had been the central question of economic policy since the Emancipation of the Serfs. This problem had led the Finance Minister, Vitte, to the gold standard and to the international money markets. Nevertheless the success of Vitte's policy depended on the yield from the agricultural sector. Consequently the deplorable state of agriculture became the most important factor in the crisis.

'The harvest is bad', complained Vitte on 7th July 1901 to Sipyagin, Minister of the Interior. 'A great misfortune. Even if we get by without subsidies from the Treasury, it is going to be a difficult year for the economy. And these are already difficult times. A good harvest would have improved things considerably. Now all hope is gone.'⁶ The bad harvest in 1901 in some of the most important agricultural areas in the black earth region was certainly not to be foreseen and,

even with hindsight, the degree to which it aggravated the economic crisis cannot be assessed statistically. But the fact that this bad harvest, like those in 1897/98 and the catastrophe of 1891/92, had such disastrous effects was not least of all the result of the fiscal policies of Vitte and his predecessors. They raised taxes to the extreme for the benefit of industrialization. In the interests of the balance of trade, they simultaneously took from the peasant a growing portion of his produce without being able to provide him with the financial, technological and structural means for improving and increasing agricultural productivity.⁷ Vitte's plan was that state-induced industrialization would raise agricultural prosperity, and in the end, due to the growing capacity of the whole population to pay taxes, would recover national expenditure with interest and compound interest. But Vitte's plan did not work out. The existing agrarian structure, anxiously preserved by the autocracy, made it impossible to earn sufficient investment capital through a rise in agricultural productivity, particularly since the high population growth (1.5% per annum since 1860) all but consumed the modest growth (1.5% – 1.9% per annum) in agricultural production.⁸ Vitte had indeed recognized this problem, but his drive for a comprehensive agrarian reform had met with no response from the Tsar in 1898.⁹ As the reserves of international capital decreased, it became clear that the internal forces of the national economy were not sufficient to permit accumulation of capital. The economic crisis became a crisis of the Vitte system.¹⁰

Yet there was hardly any alternative to national indebtedness and tax levies, to tariffs and industrial protectionism if the autocracy wanted to catch up with international standards and to claim a position in the world. And as far as foreign policy¹¹ was concerned, matters hung very much in the balance after Russia, in order to protect the Manchurian section of the Trans-Siberian Railway and her own economic interests, occupied Manchuria in the summer of 1900. She thus not only gambled away Chinese trust but also attracted the suspicions of Japan and the European powers. It was not least of all Vitte's apparently so peace-loving commercial imperialism in the Far East which now presented Russian politics with the alternative of either giving in to pressure from foreign powers and putting up with a considerable loss of prestige, or of risking a war which the country could afford neither financially nor monetarily. But public opinion provided no support for either solution. The domestic and foreign policy aporiae of the Vitte system became apparent during the econ-

omic crisis and, since the policy of rapid modernization had within very few years revolutionized several areas of national and social life, the capacity for reform of the autocratic regime itself was now called into question.

Within a period of less than ten years in office, the Minister of Finance had attained a key position in the whole governmental system – but he had won few friends in the process. The constant disputes with ministerial colleagues over responsibility and practical decisions, the open and veiled opposition of influential groups involved in large-scale agrarian interests, the intrigues by shady profiteers who had found entry at Court, disdainful remarks about Vitte's wife, a divorced actress, and rumours about the morals of the homo novus occupying the central position of power¹² – all this constitutes only the surface of a more profound, frequently inhibited process of change. The accumulation of responsibilities and powers of decision in the Ministry of Finance – rather more enforced by circumstances than actively pursued by Vitte – undermined the traditional structure of autocratic decision-making and thrust more and more uncontrollable constraints upon the Emperor, the last instance of decision. Not by chance did demands on the state from the most varied societal group interests pile up at the turn of the century – whether the demand for subsidization of nobles' estates, the eruptively expressed peasants' quest for more land, or the various concepts for reform of the political order. The crisis of the Vitte system called for more state authority – and of course for an authority which knew how to adjust its institutions and procedures to the changed conditions.

In 1898/99 Vitte and Goremykin, Minister of the Interior, had controversial discussions on alternative solutions to this problem.¹³ Goremykin tended towards decentralization and the principle of self-government, while Vitte represented the principle of a modernized bureaucratic centralism. The reason for the quarrel between the two ministers was Goremykin's draft bill which proposed the extension of the zemstvo system into the Western provinces. The zemstvos had been introduced in 1864 in 34 provinces in European Russia as institutions of regional self-government and had been equipped with authority in the fields of local trade promotion and development of the infrastructure. The debate on the zemstvo reform had already been accompanied in the 1860s by a wide, partially public discussion on constitutional reform of the Russian system of government;¹⁴ since then, the liberal image stuck to the zemstvo – that was the place

where 'society' asserted itself against the bureaucracy, it was even the nucleus of national representation, the school of parliamentary democracy. Goremykin does not of course adopt the constitutionalist interpretation of the *zemstvo*, but he does clearly refer to traditional arguments of the 'public movement': 'Only getting used to self-government,' he said, 'can bring forth the people's capacity for self-organization and self-determination'; strengthening the bureaucracy, however, created merely 'depersonalized and incoherent population clusters, the mere detritus of mankind'.¹⁵

Vitte hinges his polemics against Goremykin's draft bill on the antithesis between self-government and centralized bureaucracy. In the extensive memorandum of 1899, 'Autocracy and *Zemstvo*', he applies the logic of the Vitte system just as much against the constitutional authority of rural self-government as against the pre-modern practice of Russian administration. He agrees with Goremykin that 'the true power of a state' lies in the capacity of its population for 'self-activity', but he reproaches the Minister of the Interior for his policy which fosters public self-activity with one hand but stifles it with the other by means of supervision and formalistic regimentation. Such lack of planning results in arbitrariness, lawlessness and dilatory economic and social development. Every state, whether 'an autocratic empire, a constitutional monarchy or any form of republic', must create an order based on law and justice, 'which guarantees economic life, the inviolability of the individual and public self-activity'. In order to fulfil this duty, the state needs 'steadfast support and absolutely reliable machinery in its administration', which must therefore be organized at all levels in accordance with standard principles and be consistently aligned with 'the lord of the land'. This demand for uniformity in the administration opposes, in an 'autocratic empire', politically ambitious self-government. The expansion of self-government would strengthen the constitutional principle, inherent to the *zemstvo*, which cannot be applied to the polyglot, multi-ethnic Russian Empire 'without destroying the state authority'. 'A sane policy of the autocratic empire' must rather ensure a wide range of potential development for 'public activity in the field of civil interests', it must trust in 'all forms of this activity which do not directly concern the organization of the state, its internal and external government'. Then the conflict between bureaucracy and society will dwindle; for an administration of this nature, side-by-side with the other forces in public

life, serves 'the common welfare, the gradual social education of the people'.¹⁶

Vitte's memorandum was an appeal for the transformation of the autocracy into a modern bureaucratic regime, controlling the development of the country through planned administrative procedures and providing manoeuvring space in the social institutions for effective economic and cultural activity by the individual. This was an ideal concept which had little in common with Russian realities. It has rightly been said that in his deliberations Vitte could take the example of the German Empire, of the Prusso-German type of the *Rechtsstaat* as a precedent.¹⁷ But this interpretation only makes more obvious the backwardness of modernization in Russia. Even if Vitte really was convinced that the policy he had in mind could be upheld by the institution of the Russian autocracy, the criterion by which he identified it reached beyond the self-appraisal of autocracy: 'The government, which . . . has its finger on the pulse of society, does not, however, come under the command of society; it remains a judicious power and consistent state authority, constantly aware of its goals and also of the means of attaining them'.¹⁸ 'Its finger on the pulse of society' – and there is no doubt that Vitte thought the economic growth rate determines the rhythm of this pulse – that means no less than the demand for a new, determinative hierarchy of values. This is tantamount to depriving the Court of power – a Court into whose pre-industrial social context, following non-bourgeois standards, political decision used to fall – in favour of planned co-operation between the specialized ministries. Vitte's memorandum on local government offers sound arguments for the incompatibility of autocracy and *zemstvo*; but it is equally convincing on the incompatibility of the Vitte system with the autocracy of Nicholas II.

The Court was just as unaware as Vitte himself of the explosiveness of the Finance Minister's bourgeois pragmatic philosophy. His position remained unshaken so long as the boom lasted. Though Goremeykin had to drop his project and even had to quit the Ministry of the Interior in 1899, the more far-reaching parts of Vitte's memorandum fell on deaf ears. The Minister had been just as unsuccessful the year before with his proposals on agrarian reform, and in the following years his warnings and ideas on foreign policy were equally ignored at Court. The Emperor and his most senior Minister seem to have had no basis of mutual understanding to permit a discussion on the relationship between tradition and modernism in Russian politics.

Vitte's way of running his Ministry, his calculating, by no means unemotional method of argumentation, his repeated attempts to establish rational procedures in the administration, and finally his practice of using public relations for political ends – in short, Vitte's whole style of government had always been alien to 'the Spheres'.¹⁹ Here he had engendered an inner opposition which was, it is true, held within limits for years by the rather more apprehensive than shrewd trust of the Emperor; but in effect the disagreements, which survived a series of ministerial changes in various departments,²⁰ speeded up the decline in the autocratic system's ability to govern. When the economic crisis came, when mass unemployment prevailed in the industrial centres and numbers of dismissed workers streamed back to the villages and increased peasant unrest there, when students went onto the streets and the terrorist attacks of the Socialist Revolutionaries claimed their first victims from the Emperor's environment – the Ministers Bogolepov in 1901 and Sipyagin in 1902 – by this time the Government had only strength enough to react. And it reacted, where police state methods were not applied,²¹ by creating ever more commissions and 'special conferences', where the substantive and personal disputes within the Government camp were often enough continued. When after years of deliberations they left off their work, mostly without tangible result, they had in fact only documented the immobility of Russian domestic policy.

An illuminating example is presented by the story of the reform committees, formed at the beginning of 1902 under pressure of the economic crisis, which were meant to point out ways to economic recovery in the agrarian sector. The story began in January 1902 when the Emperor ordered the Minister of the Interior to set about the revision of peasant legislation,²² which no longer conformed with socio-economic development. A few days later a 'Special Conference on the Needs of Agriculture' (*Osoboe soveshchanie o nuzhdakh sel'skokhozyajstvennoj promyshlennosti*) was set up, with the Ministers of Agriculture, the Interior and Finance and a number of high-ranking officials appointed by the Emperor as members.²³ The 'Special Conference' was commissioned very vaguely, in a brief given on the 22nd January 1902, with clarification of the situation in agriculture and the suggestion of measures for its improvement. The Conference was given a free hand to consult experts, to nominate preparatory committees of any composition desired, and to submit texts of resolutions through the Chairman directly to the Emperor. The chairman-

ship was assigned to the Finance Minister by the Emperor with the words: 'If you can't manage this, then nobody can'.²⁴

With this mandate, Vitte seemed to have attained an end he had been pursuing since 1898 – bringing onto the agenda the reform of agricultural conditions, in which he had recognized the key to Russia's economic development. But the Emperor's decisions contained one critical aspect: the central issue of the intended reforms – peasant legislation – was withdrawn from the responsibility of the 'Special Conference' by the order dated 14th January to the Minister of the Interior. Vitte, therefore, could not count on exercising control over the final bill or on decisively influencing the outcome. In conversations with the Emperor, he maintained that agricultural improvement could be achieved neither through subsidiary measures which would burden the national budget, nor through a change in economic policies to the disadvantage of industry; agricultural improvement could be achieved only by releasing peasant initiative. His work in the 'Special Conference' would therefore necessarily touch upon the Minister of the Interior's responsibility for peasant legislation. In order to permit any result at all under these circumstances, the Emperor himself should take the lead in the reform work, as Alexander II had done.²⁵ When Nicholas II turned down the suggestion and Sipyagin insisted on the full powers of his Ministry, the conflict in the 'Special Conference' between the Ministries of the Interior and of Finance was programmed. It became a thinly veiled struggle for power when, on 2nd April 1902, Vitte's personal friend Sipyagin was assassinated and his chair was thereafter occupied by V.K. Pleve, one of the most committed opponents of the Finance Minister and a resolute, tough bureaucrat. While Vitte tried to utilize the energies of provincial society for the work of the 'Special Conference', Pleve reduced by means of police bye-laws the possibilities of free speech in the local committees which had been formed in the meantime; while Vitte tackled the peasant legislation hindering development, Pleve made his opponent's decade of fiscal policy responsible for the wretched state of agriculture. In the end, one had the politically highly dubious mobilization of provincial society to his credit, the other the lack of practical results from the 'Special Conference'.²⁶ Yet there was more than the tactical wiles of two power-conscious men behind all this. The interministerial conflict could easily have been resolved by an authoritative word from the Emperor, but not the aporia between the socio-economic need for development and the autocracy's interest

in self-preservation. — The point where the Vitte system reached its limits was the beginning of the crisis of the autocratic system of government as such.

The Court withdrew from the tensions of the crisis years into mysticism and obscurantism.²⁷ This was the time when Monsieur Philippe, a French occultist and charlatan, exercised the influence so deplored by more sober-minded members of the ruling house; this was the time of the Empress's pseudo-pregnancy and of the precipitate canonization of the hermit Serafim of Sarov at the instigation of Alexandra Fedorovna. The Emperor developed an exaggerated feeling of autocratic self-importance which, coupled with growing contempt for the civil service bureaucracy, could not bypass practical issues but nonetheless permitted him to indulge his inclination towards not letting them get too close to him.

The Imperial Manifesto of 26th February 1903 reads like a reply to the challenge of the Vitte system.²⁸ Here is promising talk of the 'consolidation of law and justice in the country of Russia in accordance with emerging requirements in the life of the people'. The Manifesto refers explicitly to 'the disturbances' (*smuty*) of these times which distract the mind from 'productive work' and not seldom corrupt the 'young forces so dear to Our heart'. Among the measures towards easing the prevailing exigencies, the Emperor first of all commits the authorities to observation of the legally outlined religious tolerance *vis-à-vis* belief and rites of the non-Orthodox population. For the improvement of the national economy, he promises to direct the efforts of the state credit institutions towards raising village prosperity. The joint responsibility (*krugovaya poruka*) of the peasant community for taxes was to be lifted, departure from the village commune was to be made easier for the individual peasant. The review of the agrarian laws, already in hand, would be presented before publication to provincial committees in which the most worthy men 'supported by public trust', would take part. The close relationship, emphasized so much by Vitte, between local self-government and state order is taken up by the Manifesto where it speaks of 'perfecting the order of state through the establishment of a strong regime for regional life as the chief condition for the prosperity of Our sovereignty, firmly based on faith, the law and authority'. Equally reminiscent of Vitte is the assurance that district and provincial administration should be reformed in such a way that the 'efforts of the local people' towards improving rural life should be more strongly

integrated, 'led by the strong and lawful executive, which is strictly accountable to Us'.

But at the same time, the wording of this Manifesto leaves no doubt as to the central aim of restoring the old order behind all these promises of reform. The provision for religious tolerance does not extend beyond the Fundamental Laws of the Russian Empire and explicitly endorses the 'principal and dominant' position of the Orthodox Church. Consideration had obviously also been given to emphasizing this position more strongly in the social life of the province and to countering certain endeavours of the 'public movement' by extending the social cohesion of the parish. For the Manifesto promises to improve the material position of the village clergy so that the priests can 'take part productively in the spiritual and social life of their parishes', and it suggests uniting local social institutions as far as possible with the parish wardships of the Orthodox churches.²⁹ As for the agricultural policy, the Emperor, regardless of the structural changes of the village, stresses the role of the 'land-owning nobility and the peasantry' as 'pillars of rural life in Russia'. To this effect the *obshchina* is declared inviolable, a determination of great significance for the future course of the reform discussion both within the 'Special Conference' and elsewhere. The intended reform of local administration was sketched out in the following weeks by a commission under Pleve's chairmanship: decentralization of some fields of competence strengthened the position of the provincial governors and served rather more to control than to reward 'the efforts of the local people'.³⁰ The aim of the whole government programme is revealed in the preamble, in the ceremonial language of the Court, of the Manifesto: 'When We ascended the throne of Our ancestors, following the will of Divine Providence, We assumed before the countenance of the Almighty and before Our conscience the holy obligation to hold sacred the eternal pillars of Russian sovereignty and to dedicate Our life to the service of Our beloved Fatherland'. The public, impatient for reform, had expected the Manifesto on February 19th, the anniversary of the Emancipation of the Serfs. It appeared on the birthday of Alexander III, whose name stood in the mind of the public for stagnation and restoration.³¹

At this stage, the Vitte system was politically as good as dead. Under the influence of Pleve, the Emperor had already given to understand in August 1902, in three short addresses to representatives of the nobility, the peasantry and the *zemstvos*,³² that he intended to fix

his policy in future on the land-owning nobility and on the peasantry, the two traditional pillars of the Tsarist throne. The Manifesto dated 26th February 1903 marked but a further step in dismantling the Vitte system. The Finance Minister had not even played a part in composing the Manifesto.³³ His influence on foreign policy also dwindled in the same degree as his position in domestic politics. Ignoring Vitte's warnings against war with Japan, the militant group centred on the imperial favourite Bezobrazov – a group with its own business speculations to defend in Korea and on the Yalu River – gained the upper hand at Court. By exploiting imperialistic, anti-semitic and antibureaucratic sentiments, this group undermined Vitte's reputation with the Emperor and strengthened the readiness of the latter to risk armed conflict in the Far East.³⁴ One of Bezobrazov's intimates acclaimed the change of course in domestic and foreign policy, which became clear in Spring 1903, as 'the turn towards a steadfast and definite path after the long period of vacillation and indecision, during which the autocracy of officials and ministers had hoped to overpower the autocracy of the Tsar. May God grant the Tsar resolution in treading this new course. Then Russia will arise anew on worthy ground'.³⁵

On the 16th August 1903, Vitte was dismissed as Minister of Finance and was shunted off to the representative but powerless post of Chairman of the Committee of Ministers. That was the end of the Vitte system. Yet Vitte did not fall because his policies for modernizing Russia were unsuccessful or because he failed during the economic crisis. He fell because his policies appeared to favour the destruction of the God-willed unity of Tsar and people: in the Summer of 1903 the biggest wave of strikes ever witnessed in Russia coincided with the pilgrimage of three hundred thousand people, in their midst the Tsar and his family, to Sarov for the canonization of the hermit Serafim – this was an indication of a Russia torn at its roots. Nicholas is reported to have said then: 'The Lord put in my heart the thought that I must not delay that which I was already persuaded to do'.³⁶ Meantime the results of Vitte's decade of fiscal policy were irreversible, or at most mitigable through restoration. Vitte's dismissal brought no departure toward new horizons but rather limited the scope of the autocracy and presented it with the alternative of either falling back into traditional immobilism or seeking the solution to the crisis of state in a 'small, victorious war'.³⁷

2. SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION

Since the beginning of the 1890s, the lasting establishment of capitalism through Vitte's fiscal policy had met with increasing public resistance. This had been set off, before Vitte took office, by the famine of 1891/92, which had for the first time exposed the aggravation, through the policy of industrial development, of the persistent agrarian crisis. The famine caused a wave of charitable activities, borne along not only by the momentum of social altruism but even more by the sense of shame at this evidence of poverty and backwardness, for which there was a tendency to blame government and bureaucracy.³⁸ In the ensuing period, the target of public criticism was not so much industrialization itself as the extension of economic rationalism, based on the earlier Finance Ministers Bunge and Vyshnegradskij, into industrial protectionism by Vitte, who seemed to tolerate the concurrent impoverishment of the village.

So for the time being the issue was not so much the elimination of a political 'system' — much less alteration of the civil polity — but rather a change in fundamental fiscal and politico-economic aspects and their priorities. If 'manufacturing industry deserves special protection' because it supposedly 'creates the market for Russia's agriculture', then it would only be appropriate to observe equivalent promotional and protective measures for the latter.³⁹ This point was put in December 1895 by the All-Russian Congress of Landowners, then under the chairmanship of N.A. Khomyakov, who soon after was appointed Department Director in the Ministry of Agriculture. The resolutions of this Congress aimed at creating a 'citadel for the zemstvo' in the newly formed Ministry, extending as it were the zemstvo administrations as local agencies of the Ministry right down to village level, in order to counteract Vitte's industrial policy with a consolidated system of agricultural support.⁴⁰ A Ministry survey in 1894 covering the 34 provincial zemstvo assemblies shows that these intentions were entirely in line with efforts towards effective modernization — efforts which perforce were of benefit primarily to the medium-sized estates of the landowning nobility and the *kulaks*. Foremost among the zemstvos' aspirations, apart from the intensification of cattle breeding and the establishment of agricultural schools, were reduction or elimination of conventional tariffs on agricultural machinery and the improvement of terms for agricultural loans.⁴¹ Vyshnegradskij's protectionist tariff of 1891, which Vitte resolutely

defended, was the chief bone of contention in the public discussion. In 1896 the All-Russian Congress of Trade and Industry – at which the industrialists were clearly in the minority – debated in public the resolution against the high tariff policy put forward by L.V. Khodskij, the St. Petersburg finance jurist, and adopted it with a large majority; this was tantamount to a political demonstration. The reiterant bad harvest in 1897 then caused the Imperial Free Economic Society to submit a petition (December 1897) which voiced detailed economic and socio-political criticism of the 1891 tariff regulations.⁴²

Neither this petition nor the resolution of the Trade and Industry Congress can be explained by referring to the market-oriented agricultural producer's interests. In both cases the theorists and employees practising in various professions outweighed the 'agrarians'. In the same period we find analogous instances of the critical approach – still without any clear political attitude – at congresses of, for example, the natural scientists or the Pirogov Society of Russian Doctors.⁴³ The Moscow and St. Petersburg Committees on illiteracy (*Komitety Gramotnosti*) and the committees on famine relief in the Free Economic and the Pirogov Societies were also extremely embarrassing to the Government.⁴⁴ Here one can see the outlines of an opposition, motivated over and over again by the persistent agrarian crisis and by the ever shorter famine cycle, an opposition which nonetheless cannot be identified with the interests of the 'agrarians'. If this opposition gave the appearance of being agrarian, even though it was supported mainly by the urbanized classes, then this demonstrates the continuation of populist and mostly also romanticizing modes of thought in this slowly modernizing 'society'; at the same time it was indicative of the economic and social disparities in a period of transformation. In a country where 80% of the national income came from agriculture, nobody denied that modernization – foisted upon it by the international climate and the intellectual-psychological situation of its social elite – had to be financed predominantly through the agricultural sector. But then it seemed absurd to everybody to expropriate precisely that sector of society on which future progress depended.⁴⁵ In the aporia of wanting to attain European socio-economic standards but of not being able 'for Christ's sake'⁴⁶ to carry the costs, the opposition made up of economically 'disinterested parties' joined forces with the zemstvo resistance then gathering momentum against the Finance Minister⁴⁷ – a resistance co-determined by outright agricultural interests.

This opposition as a whole can no longer be classified under the then prevailing terms of feudal social structure, and it is not yet covered by the definitions of the bourgeois class society. It can best be circumscribed by the contemporary term 'public movement' (*obshchestvennoe dvizhenie*), a movement which gave expression to educated 'society's' claim — as yet hardly defined politically — to publicness and to co-responsibility for the fate of the nation. 'Public opposition' here does not so much mean critical individual opinions or planned political actions but rather the structural objection, expressed in the testimonies cited, of complex social configurations to the binding force of the socio-political system of control. The thesis of this chapter is that the economic crisis from 1900 to 1903 had a decisive effect on the 'public movement' and was the final motivating factor leading to a broad political mobilization and differentiation of 'society'. But before we go into the effects of the crisis on the attitudes of 'society' towards the state, we must sketch the longer term social trends in order to clarify the potential underlying the political mobilization at the turn of the century.

From the time of the Emancipation of the Serfs in 1861, the development of Russian society is marked by a process of social mobilization with extremely disparate effects, a process which more than anything deepened the rift between town and country. Accelerated industrialization concentrated the more developable and greatly assisted sector of national production in some few urban centres, while the great majority of the population was kept on the land in pre-modern living and working conditions. The number of town dwellers rose threefold to more than 20 million by 1914, but at the same time the total population more than doubled to 165 million.⁴⁸ The high population growth rate was manifested in rural over-population, which considerably impaired the chances of economic development on the land. Nonetheless, at the time of the first census in 1897, 25.4% of the total population were not working in agriculture. The degree of urbanization at that time is estimated by Eason at about 20%. The town offered new chances of employment and occupation to parts of the peasantry and also to the old landed nobility. A proletariat developed — still slight in comparison with the total population, yet highly concentrated in a few places — a proletariat confronting an economically powerful but socially heterogeneous bourgeoisie. The capitalist re-structuring of the economy loosened the old feudal bonds more and more, and at the end of the 19th century

the outlines of a bourgeois class society can be discerned at least in the major cities.⁴⁹

The industrial revolution in the 1890s had been preceded in Russia by the modernization of education. Elementary education, however, was not given priority. In 1897 the proportion of the population able to read and write was only 21%, 45% in the towns and 17.4% in the country.⁵⁰ Social mobilization gained stronger impetus from the reform of education at the secondary and university levels which had already been introduced in the 1860s. In the same way that industrialization had gained momentum from the interdependence of economic potential and political state authority, the educational reform had been stimulated by insight into the relationship between internal reorganization of the state and efficiency of the educational system.⁵¹ The rationalism of the Vitte system found an early correlation in the modernist rigidity of the school and university policy represented by Count D.A. Tolstoj, Minister for People's Enlightenment from 1866 till 1880. Without being fully aware of the fact, both Vitte and Tolstoj went beyond the limits of social interaction in the system of autocratic sovereignty and serfdom. The policies of both men, technocratically elitist as they were intended to be, could not in the long run avoid the emancipatory side effects.

The greatest expansion in secondary and university education took place in the period between 1870 and 1885. The most recent and at the same time most thorough Soviet research estimates that, during the 40 years between Alexander the Second's reforms and the turn of the century, approximately 1.2 million people underwent full or partial secondary education.⁵² The scanty statistical material does not permit precise statements on individual phases of growth. It seems, however, that after a period of institutional expansion between 1865 and 1875 — when the increase in the number of students could not be entirely maintained — the subsequent decade saw an increased flow of gymnasium students (see Table 1). Also to be taken into account is the expansion, beginning in 1875, of the *Realschulen*, characteristic of the industrialization process; until 1900 these schools took an ever increasing percentage of secondary school pupils away from the classical gymnasium.⁵³ Nevertheless the number of drop-outs was extraordinarily high. An assessment dated 1905 rates them at 67% for the period 1872-1904.⁵⁴ According to this source, only 400,000 of the 1.2 million secondary school pupils completed their education, and approximately 50% of these achieved the transfer to university.

Table 1. *Development in student numbers at gymnasiums and preparatory schools in Russia, 1865–1900*

Year	Numbers of gymnasiums and preparatory schools	Total numbers of students (in thousands)	Average numbers of students per educational institution
1865	96	31.4	327
1869	115	33.6	292
1870	146	37.3	255
1875	180	44.7	248
1876/77	203	52.4	258
1880	202	56.0	277
1881/82	215	65.7	306
1885	251	72.6	289
1890/91	239	61.0	255
1897/98	228	74.7	328
1899	240	77.7	324
1900	240	82.7	345

Source: *Lejkina-Svirskaya*, p.52

Taking as a base the statistics for the eight universities (nine after 1890) of the Empire, expansion at university level began in 1875, following the necessary delay. It reached a peak in the five years from 1880 to 1885 with a student increase of almost 60% (see Table 2). The main beneficiaries were therefore those age groups born in or after 1860. But at the universities the number of drop-outs was also high, presumably more than 50%.⁵⁶ According to incomplete data, a total of only 85,000 people finished a university education with the final examinations in the period from 1860 till the close of the century. All the same, that was four times the number of academics Russia had had at her disposal at the time of the Great Reforms.⁵⁷


Student distribution among the departments (see Table 3) shows the highest preferences for medicine (about 40% between 1875 and 1890) ahead of law and political science, for which the curve, after a rapid drop, makes a steep climb again after 1880 and intersects the medicine curve at about 1895. For years the science department attracted almost constantly about one-fifth of the students – a pro-

Table 2. *Development in student numbers at the nine* universities of the Russian Empire, 1865-1899*

Year	Total number of students	Increase in %
1865	4,152	—
1870	6,585	58.6
1875	5,569	-15.4
1880	8,045	44.5
1885	12,804	59.2
1890	12,432	- 2.9
1895	14,109	13.5
1899	16,294	15.5

* The Universities of Moscow, St. Petersburg, Dorpat, Kharkov, Kazan', Kiev, Odessa, Warsaw (from 1870), Tomsk (from 1890)

Source: *Lejkina-Svirskaya*, p.56

Table 3. *Distribution of students among the departments at nine universities in the Russian Empire, 1865-1900*

Source: *Lejkina-Svirskaya*, pp. 58-59

portion which would rise considerably if the special science and technical institutes were included, for which comparable figures are not available.⁵⁸ There is a remarkable loss of interest after 1880 in

the arts disciplines, which is clear from the drop in relative and absolute student numbers. On the whole it can be seen that there was a tendency to study in those disciplines which favoured a career in government service (jurisprudence, individual technical disciplines) or which opened up possibilities in the professions or in 'public activity' as physician, lawyer, agronomist, engineer, statistician and journalist. Until well into the 1890s, industry on the other hand offered those with academic training only very limited chances of work;⁵⁹ this is perhaps one reason for the relatively high percentage of science and technology graduates who earned their living in the teaching professions — as indeed the whole educational field attracted increasing interest.⁶⁰ The fact that, with regard to secondary schools, this interest itself was not able to augment the arts disciplines is linked with the political implications of the bitter dispute between 'classicists' and 'realists' over gymnasium education as well as with the socio-political expectations which official educational policies since Tolstoj had connected with gymnasiums providing classical humanities education.⁶¹ There is no doubt that, alongside jurisprudence, the exact and related sciences enjoyed greater social prestige, particularly since almost all the social prerequisites for the cultivation of an aesthetic occupation in the sense of a bourgeois 'culture-for-the-sake-of-culture' humanism were lacking.

The social statistics on secondary school and university students⁶² indicate a certain mobilizing effect of the educational reform. We shall look first of all at the national figures resulting from the 1897 census. They cover all those who, at the time of the census, had attended or were still attending a university or secondary school, but they do not specify the occupations of graduates at the time. Among university students the results were: 70% came from the hereditary nobility and high-ranking officialdom, 20% from the urban estates (no distinction made between *kuptsy*, *meshchane*, *remeslenniki* and *raznochintsy*), 4% were the offspring of clergy and 2% came from the peasantry. Among the secondary school students, we find only 40% nobility as opposed to 32% from the urban estates; the children from clerical families, who preferred the ecclesiastical seminary for the intermediate stage of education, made up 21% of all secondary school students, but only 5% were at state gymnasiums for boys or preparatory schools. Seven per cent came from the peasantry. The last figures given above very nearly approach available statistics on university students between 1880 and 1900. The percentage from the hereditary

nobility lay between 47% (1880) and 52% (1900), that of the urban estates rose from 21% to a maximum of 41% (1895); the sons of the clergy, who represented just on 25% and therefore the second largest group in 1880, made up only 5% of the students after 1895, since universities had been closed to seminary students in 1879.⁶³ Their drop almost corresponds to the rise among the urban estate students. After briefly doubling their percentage (1895), students from the peasantry had by 1900 dropped back to their original level of 5%.

Great caution must be exercised in drawing any conclusions from this incomplete and somewhat discrepant material. It is easy to assume that well into the 1890s the reform of higher education was of benefit to the non-aristocratic classes, and in particular to the urban estates. But at the same time a strong social selection process was apparent in the transfer from secondary school to university, a process which favoured, after the urban elements, the sons of nobles and of high-ranking officials – that is, the privileged classes since the days of yore. Taken together, these two categories made up 73% in the field of secondary education, and 78% (1880) to 86% (1895) at the eight universities, with a tendency to climb. According to the statistics on university students in the 1897 census, the figure is even as high as 90%.

It would be a mistake to put this development down to a protectionist class policy and to the general tendency to perpetuate old social and economic privileges. On the contrary, the development signalled rather symptoms of dissolution in the class order, mobilization and urbanization, be it in only a very narrow social sector. In the 'urban estates' category, the privileged groups of the hereditary honoured citizens and merchants (*pochetnye grazhdane* and *kuptsy*) did not produce even half of the university students of urban origin in 1880; towards the end of the century they produced a fifth to a third of them. Yet in the same period the percentage of students provided by non-privileged *meshchane*, tradesmen and *raznochintsy* (men of mixed rank) multiplied almost threefold. It may be that this tendency gives expression, not only to an increased predisposition towards education and determination to advance, but also to the social uncertainty of tradesmen created by the establishment of monopolistic, capitalist manufacturers.

We must presume analogous developments for the category 'nobility and high-ranking officialdom'. Among the students in 1880, the heirs of the appointed nobility (*sluzhiloe dvoryanstvo*) slightly out-

weighed those of the hereditary nobility (*potomstvennoe dvoryanstvo*). This had its parallels in the unusually high rate of replenishing, after the middle of the 19th century, the peerage with the help of the top four ranks of officials – that is, with groups whose advance was due to qualified knowledge and know-how and those whose financial existence was not based on independent agriculture.⁶⁴ At the same time the decline in nobles' estates disengaged large numbers of the aristocracy. The proportion of estate owners among the hereditary nobility sank after 1860 from 80–85% to 50–55%, while there was an increase in changes of ownership of the land remaining to the nobles, which had been reduced in quantity by 41%.⁶⁵ Up to the end of the century, the number of nobles living in towns rose by 14% to 47.2%, thereby greatly exceeding the urbanization figures for the total population.⁶⁶

Precisely because its economic base was crumbling, the nobility was able to claim a leading position in 'educated society', even in the light of the rapidly rising numbers of school children and students. School and university education opened up career opportunities which commuted the landed nobleman's way of life; and education became more interesting to the offspring of well-to-do families. In this way a certain *rapprochement* usually took place with the descendants of non-aristocrats, above all with urbanized lower classes, with whom there was contact within the community of the intellectual profession. Education and professionalization provided a release from the restrictions of a meantime obsolete social structure based on service to the state. They created a new self-confidence which no longer needed to crave after tokens of the Tsar's goodwill, as in the case of those enjoying class privileges. Awareness of this freedom became a constituent characteristic of the new 'educated society', which sought to make a place for itself through the medium of 'public activity'. Behind this there was a political potential which Lenin described in 1901 as follows: 'If one wanted to judge people who fulfil one or other of the public functions (*obshchestvennyye funktsii*) not according to their official position but according to their knowledge and their merits – would that not lead with unyielding logic to freedom of public opinion and of public control, which would have to reach a verdict on this knowledge and these merits? Would that not completely undermine the privileges of class and rank, which are the only support on which the Russia of absolutism stands?'⁶⁷

It must, however, be noted that 'educated society' was very far

from dislocating the autocracy by means of science and technology and introducing democracy to Russia. If the nobility and the urban classes, together making up less than one-sixth of the total population, represented up to 90% of those who had enjoyed a higher education, then one can hardly speak, in the context of society as a whole, of a socially integrating effect of the educational reforms. At the turn of the century, little more than 20% of the Russian Emperor's subjects commanded the art of reading and writing, and only about 0.8% had attended secondary school. Intellectual professionalization and urbanization hardly brought these groups any closer to 'the people'; perhaps 'educated society' was even further removed from the people than the old society based on service to the state ever could have been.

The graduates of those first gymnasium and university years large in student numbers (1870–1885) had been active in their professions for five or ten years by the middle of the 1890s; as thirty- or forty-year-olds they had mostly attained respectable positions.⁶⁸ Their social self-consciousness and their cultural missionary conviction in the light of Russian backwardness had grown at the sight of destitution in the villages and in the workers' quarters of industrial centres. But their work repeatedly came up against the barriers of official mistrust and administrative traditions. Nowhere else was the establishment of a social role so strongly influenced by national autocratic and administrative practice as in Russia. Professional officialdom and military service, which as ever boasted the largest recruiting capacity for those qualified, exercised the strongest constraints on socialization; yet on the other hand they also offered the best aids to socialization in the form of career, assured income and simple ideology. For the man who was not able to find his feet here, the only opening left was to leave the service and try his hand as a free-lancer or – if means permitted – to abandon gainful employment altogether. Among the members of the bureaucracy in the narrower sense, only few top officials could sometimes, in the shadow of interministerial rivalries, disregard the required bureaucratic discipline and step out into the open.⁶⁹

It was different for groups of people who had not come to specific activities by way of a civil service career but whose special training had brought them within the civil service code or to positions resembling those of state service. Despite its organizational ties with the judiciary, the Russian advocacy, for example, had never been completely ab-

sorbed by the machinery of state and had, in its most remarkable representatives, developed a decidedly public-oriented professional ethos.⁷⁰ Among the established secondary school teachers, a new category of pedagogue concerned with the social effects of education was becoming obvious; this category took recourse to the writings of the great educational reformers Pirogov and Ushinskij. Two progressive educational journals and the Moscow Pedagogic Society, founded in 1898, publicly expressed criticism of the scholastic formalism of the gymnasium of the Tolstoj type.⁷¹ The elementary teachers, whose ambiguous status was difficult to define in terms of civil service criteria, even postulated at their Congress, at the end of December 1902, the incompatibility of the teaching profession with the status of the *chinovniks*. This group's view of their work and their social function was contained in the unequivocal words of a speaker of the Congress: 'There are two ways of proving oneself – socially and bureaucratically. Life itself has invented expressions to define these two types of activity. They either say: "He behaves like someone who is a public activist (*obshchestvennyj deyatel'*)" – and everyone understands what is meant; or they say the complete opposite: "He behaves like a *chinovnik*". So far the teachers have been publicly active, but now people want to turn them into *chinovniki*'.⁷²

This public work ethos, disposed to conflict with government norms and practices, developed most briskly in the field of qualified occupations serving infrastructural and socio-cultural development and – regardless of the respective employment relationships – in functional contact with governmental spheres (e.g. teachers, physicians, engineers, agronomists, lawyers, statisticians). Private industry and the professions were affected to a much smaller degree. Around the turn of the century, the professionally qualified 'servants of the state' already made up many times the number of civil servants occupied in civil administration and judiciary in the narrower sense, and they were – contrary to the latter – widely distributed among the lower administrative echelons.⁷³ These groups found a particularly broad field of activity, which was institutionally and socially relatively safe, in the *zemstvo*. Here their practical abilities joined with the theory of the self-governing region and, thus re-inforced, became the ideology of a 'community' (*obshchestvennost'*) above and beyond – or even integrating – the social ranks and classes.⁷⁴

Following the re-organization of local administration after the abolition of the landed nobility's power over the rural population,

the zemstvo had been introduced in 1864 as an institution of rural self-government; the idea behind this was to let the people themselves participate, 'through the medium of persons elected by them', in the management of the 'economic interests and needs of each province and of each district'.⁷⁵ In 34 provinces of European Russia assemblies of representatives with administrative power were constituted; these elected zemstvo boards, which had executive control within the limits of their responsibilities. These responsibilities covered economic advancement, improvement of the infrastructure and social welfare measures within the relevant region; financing was assured by means of a limited right to levy taxes. The active and passive suffrage to the zemstvo assemblies was based on a property census; the division of the electorate into three curia depended on the legal category of land ownership. Accordingly, private ownership of rural property, private ownership of urban property and peasant communal ownership each substantiated different material interests. But the result was that, as under the mid-nineteenth century distribution of property, one of the three historical estates – nobility, merchantry and peasantry – dominated each of the three electoral colleges; in the end, supremacy in the zemstvo assemblies fell to the nobility as the economically and culturally superior estate.⁷⁶ The district zemstvo assemblies thus composed then sent deputies from among their number to the provincial assemblies, in which the predomination of the aristocratic element emerged even more strongly. The Government retained a certain influence on zemstvo affairs, using the supervisory powers of the provincial governor as its instrument, but refrained on the whole from direct intervention so long as the zemstvos did not step beyond the prescribed framework of responsibilities.

This structure created in 1864 did not, however, stand up to the socio-economic dynamics of the following decades. On the one hand, the state could not abstain from interfering in the economic affairs of the regions. And on the other hand, zemstvo activities repeatedly extended into general politics because replacement of the restricted subsistence economy by multiple interwoven marketing conditions created similar problems everywhere, and these could not be solved on a regional basis. The Government tried to meet the resulting dangers to the cohesion of autocratic centralism by integrating the zemstvo into the bureaucratic hierarchy and by strengthening the aristocratic element in the zemstvo assemblies. A new zemstvo statute in 1890 added to the power of provincial authorities over provincial

society. The content of zemstvo assembly resolutions was now also subject to assessment by the provincial governor, and the assemblies' suffrage to the zemstvo boards degenerated practically to a mere right of proposal. At the same time the electoral system was put on a class basis in order to permit the alleged politically responsible attitudes of the nobility to become fully effective.⁷⁷ These amendments, however, were hardly expedient in surmounting the inherent conflict between zemstvo and autocratic centralism. On the contrary, the new statute enlarged the disparity between the legal order and the socio-economic structure of provincial society in that it returned to the principle of class privileges and, by maintaining the fiction of regional autarchy, built administrative dams against social intermingling of the classes.

The failure of the new statute in this respect is sufficiently documented by the activation of the zemstvo movement in the 1890s. In all the literature since Veselovskij, the growing number of professionally qualified employees (teachers, physicians, agronomists, statisticians, etc.) on the zemstvo boards — the so-called 'Third Element' — is repeatedly held responsible for this process.⁷⁸ Their number did indeed more than double between 1886 and the end of the century, far and away exceeding the number of zemstvo board members elected from the assemblies. For 1908, 65 to 70 thousand established civil servants have been counted in the 34 provinces — that is, about 50 to each elected official.⁷⁹ But the mere growth alone of this group is only a symptom. Zemstvo service was not simply a refuge for subversive forces who would have thrust the zemstvo into any political activity entirely alien to it. Rather the accomplishment of the by now manifold duties called for recruitment of trained specialists and at the same time more and more instrumentalized the decision process borne by the elected councillors (*tsenzoviki*), known as the 'Second Element'. The unclarified position of the 'Third Element' *vis-à-vis* the elected authorities was in fact often a cause of friction,⁸⁰ but just as often the specialists and the zemstvo deputies found a common basis for co-operation in the course of practical work. There was also an increase in the 'Second Element' in the number of elected councillors, with comparable education and professional experience, who viewed their activity in the zemstvo with a similar rational attitude as did the representatives of the 'Third Element'. The 'service' (*sluzhba*) of the one converged with the services rendered by the other in a common understanding of the zemstvo activities as 'work'. But where traditionally legitimate claims to power opposed such modern, purposive-

rational activity, then it was but a short step from the daily problems of cultural activities to the political question on the legitimacy of the ruling order.⁸¹

This contradiction became apparent during the 1890s as a result of social mobilization not only in the *zemstvo* but also – as already indicated above – in all areas of ‘public activity’. Yet it did not lead directly to a confrontation between state and society. The emergence of a modern, professional middle class, accelerated by the modernization of education, was only a part of the more comprehensive transformation of Russian society following industrialization and the establishment of capitalist economic methods. Capitalism, with its power to create classes, distorted the traditional state-society structure dependent on vertical bonds. But since economic modernization was closely interlaced with the interest of the autocratic state, the various classes caught up in social transformation were diversely disposed to opposition.

Characteristic of the ‘public movement’ was the lack of commercial elements. Precisely the economic elites, to whom industrialization – one could suppose – offered the greatest chances of forming a class, showed the least inclination towards political opposition. That, however, was not peculiar to Russia. If one compares it, for example, with the attitude of the Rhenish bourgeoisie during the Prussian constitutional conflicts in 1862–1867, one can come to the conclusion that political timidity and readiness to adapt to state authority belong to the characteristics of the bourgeoisie in late-comer societies. Russian entrepreneurship experienced a distorted structural change which Soviet research likes to designate by means of a comparison reduced to a formula – ‘St. Petersburg capital’ and ‘Moscow capital’.⁸² This refers to a structural and habitual distinction between the new heavy industries in the south and the merchantries (*kupechestva*) in the central rayon. The former were dominated in large measure by foreign capital and were closely connected with the financial world of the capital city and with the bureaucracy; the latter emphasized their independence and, following patrimonial business practices, had on the whole preserved the familial character of their businesses. They wanted the least possible state interference in their economy; they distrusted the risk of speculation in the new industries and preferred to take their investments, according to patrimonial custom, into light industry, trade or property.⁸³ Their self-confidence allowed them to feel themselves the real representatives of ‘national industry’, and

they began to express themselves as the new 'third estate', claiming its place on an equal footing with the nobility at the steps of the throne.⁸⁴ Often coming from families which had bought themselves out of bondage only two or three generations before, they sought, besides economic success, recognition and re-valuation in the framework of the old class structure. The urge to higher things is also reflected statistically: while many merchant families were striving after the more esteemed status of 'honoured citizen' or even, by acquiring property, acceptance into the body of nobles in one of the provinces, the entries in the Register of Merchants remain stagnant at about 220,000 individuals after the middle of the 19th century.⁸⁵

The prestige of the Moscow merchant families could not be attained by the director or financial agent in the younger development industries, dependent as he was on the anonymous stock companies. The status symbols of class privilege were not to be found strewn along his way to the top, his position was determined by performance and the ability to harmonize his interest with that of the company. So the economic strength of the new type of business man, geared to efficiency, was at the same time his political weakness. While the state occupied the central position as investor, contractor and consumer, it was precisely this type which had no cause to quarrel with the autocratic government, so long as it held open the chances for industrial development by means of the tax and tariffs policy, and so long as it drew definite limits to the labour movement.⁸⁶ If in the case of 'Moscow capital' it was mainly the traditional social inferiority and a seemingly barbaric acquisitiveness which brought them into disrepute, then the 'Petersburger' were doubly discredited in the public mind by the apparent blood relationship with the bureaucracy. The Government, very much entwined with the new industries through both personnel and finance, was for its part inclined, in the interests of its own modernization efforts, to let trade and industry take part, through their representative bodies, in the preparation of economic and socio-political decisions, so far as the bureaucracy's principle of freedom of decision was not impaired.⁸⁷

A more colourful picture than that of large-scale industry was in all respects that offered by the landed nobility, if one wants to consider them at all as one social quantity. After the reforms of the 1860s, hardly any other class was so caught up in transformation and decomposition as the nobility. Seen in the long term, however, no other class had experienced so much economic and political support either;

yet this could not have led to enduring improvement in the chances of development of their estates, burdened as they were by the inner-Russian factors of permanent agricultural crisis and rapid inflation on the world markets.⁸⁸ The most important index for the transformation of the nobility is the high mobilization of the nobles' land after the emancipation of the serfs. This was lamented by the 1897 'Special Conference on the Problems of the Nobility' with the following words: 'Private property has lost the characteristic of perpetual ownership which distinguished the patrimonial noble estates in Russia before the reform. These days, properties are being sold, bought and parcelled out with a frivolity never known before. Land has become an object of common trade on the same principles as all other goods'.⁸⁹ Between 1863 and 1904, 80.4 million desyatin of nobles' land in European Russia came onto the market — that is to say, more than 90% of the aristocracy's old lands; 34.6 million desyatin ended up in non-aristocratic hands. Property mobilization and land loss were, however, unevenly distributed in the different regions. The greatest losses were registered in the central industrial rayon around Moscow, in the northern provinces and in the southern and eastern steppe regions. The various classes among the hereditary nobility, which had never represented a uniform entity, were affected in differing degrees.⁹⁰

The most stable, economically most successful group, which politically had the least inclination towards change, was that of the large-scale landowners who held enormous estates deriving from the times of serfdom.⁹¹ As the most important, export-oriented agricultural producers, they had adjusted to capitalist economic conditions with relative ease, having known how to make extensive use of traditional forms of peasant dependence for the purpose of raising capital (leasing) and recruiting labour. A good many of them were also engaged in industrial enterprises in the Urals mines, in the sugar industry, in distilleries, in milling and timber. They had the advantage over their business colleagues in the merchantry through their 'natural' closeness to Court and Government. As far as the industrial protectionism of the Vitte system impaired rationalization of large-scale estates, here too resistance arose which chose to link up with the resentment against the *homo novus* in the Ministry of Finance.⁹² For the Vorontsov and Orlov, Yusupov, Shuvalov and Stroganov families, which had for generations provided governors, ministers and ambassadors, there were certainly ways other than public opinion for making their objections known.

The re-distribution of nobles' land gave the strongest social mobilization impetus to the mass of small landowners (less than 100 desyatin), who made up nearly 60% of the landed nobility in European Russia at the turn of the century.⁹³ Their economic situation was wretched. The size of their estates, on average 30 desyatin, just about ensured sustenance for maintaining a frugal standard of living; here there was no hope of building up a business which could supply the market. In the nine western provinces, where the small landowners were particularly concentrated, but also in several central Russian provinces, the 'Special Conference' even discovered 'hundreds of families of illiterate nobles who had become simple tillers of the land'. Yet if one considers that in the 1870s three-quarters of all university students counted as being materially without provision,⁹⁴ it is easy to assume that many a descendant of the lower landed nobility sought a loophole in professionalization and urbanization.

The situation was different in the case of the medium-sized nobleman's estate (up to 1,000 desyatin).⁹⁵ Here the economic basis was broad enough to provide a living in keeping with social standing, but not strong enough to withstand the economic re-structuring without government subsidy. Their prospects suffered long-term impairment through Vitte's industrial protectionism. The already limited opportunities for amassing agricultural investment capital, particularly relevant in the context of technological modernization, were cut back even further by high domestic industrial prices and artificially increased prices for imports. Through preferential treatment for industry, not only the loss of leading economic positions but even actual withdrawal of social positions seemed to threaten that section of the landed nobility which was independent of service to the state. Opposition to the Vitte system was therefore universal precisely in the sphere of intermediate landowning nobility.

In principle there were two lines of approach open to such an opposition, both of them presupposing a break with the prevailing politico-economic tendencies. The one was to make the medium-sized landed nobility into the basis for a political-social restoration of the old class society screening this class from social transformation; this meant cutting off free circulation of the nobles' land, advancement of aristocratic education, closing the Register of the Nobility to upstarts in the bureaucracy and the urban nouveau riche, expanding the regional representations of the nobility to representations of all-Russian interests and so on.⁹⁶ The other approach meant to strive

for general improvements in agriculture, disregarding narrow class-political considerations, whereby the estate would retain priority, due to its economic weight but not to privileges; in this way the landed nobility would be merged in a sort of agricultural bourgeoisie with the economically powerful peasant farmers, the *kulaki*. The former approach was implemented in the 1890s by the corporative class-organizations of the nobility, the latter by the zemstvo with its 'every-day cultural activities' and the claim to 'all-class representation of the whole country'.

If we turn back to the original question on the social basis of political mobilization in 'society', we can discern, besides the new professionalized interim classes, the lower and intermediate landed nobility as potential recruiting ground for the 'public opposition'; their descendants after all also replenished the 'free professions' along with those coming from less privileged urban classes.⁹⁷ Economically, the lower and intermediate landed nobility as well as the small urban traders were among those who had to bear the burden of industrialization. But what was understood by the former as social demotion served the latter mainly as an incentive to improved status. The maudlin tone and occasional sorry attempts at adjustment on one side were matched on the other by a certain aggressiveness in behaviour. This explains why the 'public opposition' never managed to speak with one voice.

In the 1880s and 1890s the long-term process of transforming Russian society into a modern bourgeois class society experienced previously unknown acceleration, while the development of the political order remained stagnant. The problem of participation thus became acute for the classes affected by social mobilization. The implementation of status opportunities both by the new professional middle class and by the landed nobility, which was struggling to catch up with economic development, was dependent on the possibility of achieving, without hindrance, the civilizing and cultural services necessary and useful to social and economic modernization. But the obstacles within the political system of autocracy time and again deprived this work of its effectiveness without actually making it nonsensical or superfluous. Neither the ideological formulae of political programmes nor the efforts of radical conspirators managed to bring professionalized 'society' onto the path of opposition. The 'public movement' turned to fundamental questions on the legal and governmental system in a step-by-step process through the politic-

ization of practical problems in their everyday cultural activities – from criticism of the tariffs policy to the rejection of bureaucratic control of the economy, from the fight against epidemics to the politico-economic causes of the famines, from elementary education to questions of freedom of opinion and freedom of association, from the problem of insufficient land to the question of equality of the individual before the law, etc. etc. The ‘public opposition’ geared itself first of all to the evidence of backwardness in the country; national questions interested them only within the horizon of local needs. But under the pressure of economic and social modernization, these needs kept turning out to be of national proportions. Wherever the ‘public activists’ turned, their initiative ran up against the same remote, imperious style of the old order, everywhere they experienced the same isolation and impotence in the face of the Russian peasant’s dullness and ignorance.⁹⁸ This fundamental experience of the professional ‘public activists’ was expressed in 1881 by Sergej A. Muromtsev, later President of the First Duma; he said that all cultural work ‘threatens to prove futile so long as the lively reformatory stream does not take hold of the centres of national life’.⁹⁹

This statement discloses the very limited political perspective which the ‘public movement’ followed until the end of the century. They placed their hopes in the Tsar, who should remove the obstacles which the dominance of the bureaucracy put in the path towards free development of ‘public activity’. In March 1880 – the height of the political crisis which led a year later to the assassination of Emperor Alexander II – Muromtsev composed a memorandum which was signed by 25 Moscow professors, lawyers and journalists. This memorandum can be taken as an expression of the ‘public movement’s’ expectations during the last quarter of the 19th century.¹⁰⁰ According to the memorandum, the reason for the conflict between Government and society is ‘the absence in Russia of any opportunity for the free development of public opinion and the free exercise of public activity’. The Government is accused of four cardinal errors in its behaviour towards society: it did not want to hear ‘the voice of the people’, it stood no criticism of its mistakes and failures, it disregarded the opinion of competent advisers and it followed purposes ‘not related in any way to the necessities of the people’. Peace in the country appears in the memorandum as the function of correct behaviour by the Government. Its misbehaviour weakens ‘the loyalty of

those who, under other circumstances, would regard sedition with abhorrence. Educated Society as a whole, irrespective of rank, position or opinion, is intensely dissatisfied . . .’ The central political demands are contained in the following sentences: ‘Moreover, society demands the right to act. It is aroused both by the nature of its own reflections and by circumstances of the time, and it seeks to participate in the life of the state. These strivings the administration regards with hostility, and throws obstacles in its way. But the Russian people are becoming more and more impressed with the conviction that an empire so extensive, and a social life so complicated, as ours, cannot be managed exclusively by officials. If the ruling mechanism in its present form excludes from direct participation in the government a majority of those who have the first right and the strongest desire to take part in it, then that mechanism stands in need of reformation’.

The hope placed in the autocracy’s ability to reform was abstract enough to make it acceptable to the various social groups making up the ‘public movement’. But it was too abstract to permit concrete programmatic directions for action. In the limited areas of experience of ‘public activity’, it was not the autocracy itself which became questionable but only particular aspects of governmental misbehaviour – here the tariff policy, there preferential treatment of Orthodox parish schools, and there again the Governor’s interference in the resolutions of a zemstvo assembly. The ‘public movement’ expressed its desire to participate without theoretical reflection in three ways. Following a strategy of ‘small deeds’,¹⁰¹ it offered civilizing and cultural services towards the peaceful development of social conditions; it reacted to administrative obstacles to its activities with petitions, complaints and appeals addressed to the relevant authority, minister or to the Tsar; and it sought to publicize its work and its criticism of Government and bureaucracy in order to keep ‘society’s’ claim to participation alive in the public mind. Up till the end of the 19th century, the ‘public movement’ did not develop a form of action which would have shown it to be not only an ‘unconscious’ social movement but also an independent political force. When the young Emperor Nicholas II ascended the throne in 1894, nine of the 34 zemstvo assemblies in their welcoming addresses expressed hopes for reforms; these the young Emperor threw overboard as ‘senseless dreams’, and the representatives of ‘society’ once more bowed resignedly before the will of the monarch and abstained from adding emphasis to their petitions through organized political actions.¹⁰² It was the heightening of

social conflicts during the economic crisis which was necessary to awaken 'society' to the need for a programmatic manifestation of its conflict with the autocracy.

3. ECONOMIC CRISIS AND EROSION OF SOCIAL LOYALTY

The political mobilization of 'society' began on a broad front in the years of the economic crisis, from 1900 to 1903. But it was not directly caused either by the slump in industrial growth rates or by the failed harvests. The connection lies in the changes in security of status and in the psychological climate, which were co-determined by the economic trend; these changes could not leave the relationship between state and society undisturbed. Although this had little to do with the absolute figure of investment and growth rates – the economic crisis cost the Vitte system its halo of success and deprived the complete domestic policy of its preceding decade of credibility. The crisis provided the proof of the inadequacy of the Vitte system – welcomed for diverse reasons by critics from various standpoints – and turned attention to the political implications of enforced industrialization.

Conservative critics emphasized the incompatibility of all too rapid modernization and the 'natural basis' of Russian political and social life. The Finance Minister appears sometimes as the revolutionary and 'Marxist' who leads the land '(perhaps consciously – who knows) into economic and social bankruptcy', sometimes as the brilliant innovator who came decades too early, and not exactly to Russia's advantage. The 'iron hand' of a Peter I or Alexander III is greatly missed and with obvious allusions the 'official and ministerial autocracy' is deplored.¹⁰³ But, by the restoration of the proper autocracy, one man meant the Slavophile mystification of identity of Tsar and 'country', the next the influence of his own clique, and some others managed to combine the two.

Radical criticism, on the other hand, pointed out the close connection between Vitte system and Tsarism, between economic crisis and crisis of the autocracy. To the editor of the Populist periodical *Russkoe Bogatstvo*, A.V. Peshekhonov, the most fundamental outcome of Vitte's policy appears to be the centralization of economic power in one hand, which limits to an inadmissible degree the right of the individual and of public communities to manage the national

income.¹⁰⁴ Vitte's policy had favoured capitalism's 'children of fortune', while the 'weak and backward' were at the mercy of the 'harsh consequences of this primitive and often very painful process'. The inconsistencies between capital and labour as well as between town and country have been heightened to such a degree that today a reversal in economic policy is taking shape 'in a fateful way', a reversal which even 'the ruling spheres' are beginning to regard as necessary. In the meantime, the author continues, with a crypticism worthy of Aesop, 'the social consciousness' is clarifying the conditions which will make this reversal possible. — Contemporaries practised in the art of reading censored texts understood the concealed hint at the threatening social revolution. Peter Struve did not need to exercise so much restraint when he qualified the Vitte system as a 'grandiose economic diversion for the autocracy' in *Osvobozhdenie*, the publication of the Russian Constitutionalists abroad.¹⁰⁵ The 'golden rain' of the 'period of promoterism' had distracted the attention of broad masses of the population from the 'cultural and political problems' of the 'Europeanization of Russia'. The removal of the autocracy, the 'strengthening of personal and social freedom', the development of a 'genuine self-government', agricultural and factory reform — all this had been hidden away for years under the 'perspective of general profiteering'. 'But now the morphine is depleted and is less effective'. The 1903 crisis budget is proof enough for the writer: 'There are no more economic and financial diversions available to the autocracy. The trial period for the effectiveness of Vitte's system has come to an end, he has sung his swan-song'.

However far apart the various interests and standpoints were, they all shared the fear, or rather the hope, that the autocracy would not escape this crisis unscathed. Significant light is thrown on the pessimistic mood by the results of secret police investigations of private correspondence in 1903.¹⁰⁶ Many correspondents note with concern, sometimes even with indignation, a sharp contrast between the uncertainty of the political situation and the indifference with which the Court and high-ranking St. Petersburg bureaucrats indulged in their social commitments and pleasures instead of tackling the 'eternal problems of which everyone has long been aware'. 'Whenever I return home from abroad,' wrote General A.A. Kireev to a friend in 1902, 'I become, with constitutionalism in mind, more and more a Slavophile monarchist; but when I see how monarchism, the Orthodox faith, the national character (*narodnost'*) are interpreted in St. Petersburg, I find

myself stuck in a cul-de-sac and am prepared to become a Westernizer, anarchist, collectivist, Marxist – anything you want'.¹⁰⁷ Analogies are often drawn between the ways of the St. Petersburg Court and Government and the last years of Louis XVI's rule in France.¹⁰⁸ The social dynamics behind the developing crisis are visible, it is true, only in the worried hints, in the criticism of court and Government, at 'anti-social and revolutionary tendencies' and 'the number of Socialists and Revolutionaries'.

Of course this type of contemporary report cannot be expected to provide a far-reaching analysis, such as that attempted, for example, by the historian Pavel N. Milyukov in his Chicago lectures in 1903.¹⁰⁹ For him, 'the Russian crisis' was not limited to superficial phenomena of economic and social unrest; it was rather the critical point in a long, historical development of Russia, characterized by the dominance of the state in the development of economic and social conditions. Milyukov understood the prevailing crisis in industry, 'which now follows agriculture in the general collapse', as a crisis of the autocracy, which had proven itself incapable of satisfying the elementary social needs of the population. And he also did not deny himself the impressive comparison with the ancien régime, speaking of the former Finance Minister Bunge as the 'Russian Necker' but of Witte as the 'Russian Calonne'. Beyond the analytical work, Milyukov's forecasting interest was directed towards the chances of a peaceful settlement of the tense relationships between the forces of the social and of the political orders – towards the political reform of state institutions in the constitutional sense before any palliative attempts at appeasement be undertaken.¹¹⁰ So contemporary assessment of the economic situation kept returning to the political problem of the state-society dichotomy. In the discussions, carried on with biased passion, there was a mixture of political hope and intellectual doubt, of economic worries and naked fear for existence. The range of discussions demonstrates the degree to which the socio-economic crisis at the turn of the century shocked the traditional fabric of society.

The signs of forthcoming tensions had been visible since 1899 in the Russian universities, which a contemporary rather aptly compared with an 'air tunnel through which every political and social dissatisfaction finds its way'.¹¹¹ The student movement, which began in St. Petersburg in 1899, signalled the sensitization of 'society' *vis-à-vis* Government practice, which still hardly touched upon social reality. The movement came into being on a futile pretext.¹¹² The head

(*gradonachal'nik*) of the St. Petersburg administration had let it be known through the university rector that there would be tough penalties if public order was disturbed on 8th February, as had occurred the previous year, when the university celebrated its anniversary. The students felt provoked and boo-ed down the rector during the celebrations. They broke up the event and, singing the *Marseillaise* and *Gaudeamus igitur*, moved into the street. After only a few hundred yards, this spontaneous demonstration was broken up with little tenderness by mounted police. The scenes of fighting in Rumyantsev Square led to the development of this limited student action into a national affair. After this, the student movement spread rapidly to other university towns; taking up the general theme of citizens' independence from state regimentation, it achieved a wide response among the public.

The Government was caught unawares by the size of the movement. The hastily convened investigation commission, under the former Minister of War, General Vannovskij, gained some credit for clarifying the students' material position and, furthermore, drew attention to their inadequate preparatory education through the rigidly formalized gymnasium system.¹¹³ Despite its recommendations, which reached far into the socio-political area, the commission was unable to appease the people, whether because its work had been accompanied by too much optimism, or because its modest success was concealed under tough disciplinary measures, reminiscent of Nicholas I's times. The Provisional Regulations (*Vremennye pravila*) of 29th July 1899 threatened rebellious students with relegation and, as punishment, military conscription. Application of these measures against 183 Kiev students in the autumn of 1900 ensured the permanence of student unrest in the coming years.¹¹⁴ With an increasing degree of organization, the student movement took on political outlines and differentiations, but the catch phrase '*Doloj samoderzhavie!*' ('Down with the autocracy!') remained, according to the 1903 report by the Police Department, common to all its conflicting elements.¹¹⁵

The remarkable point about the student movement was its effect on extramural groups and classes. Even the workers' movement, clearly enervated during the recession, was inspired and in 1901 workers and students demonstrated side-by-side in some places.¹¹⁶ The best-known demonstration against the Provisional Regulations – on 4th March 1901 in St. Petersburg – witnessed the cream of the metropolitan intelligentsia amid the students in Kazan Square.¹¹⁷ On

the preceding evening, the Writers Union (*Soyuz pisatelej*), led by a sense of the journalist's political duty, had decided to take up a pro-student position, and many of them may have hoped that the presence of the protagonists in Russian intellectual life would lend the police cause to restraint.¹¹⁸ The police, however, were not at all impressed by the prominence of the 'disturbers of the peace' and, with the help of a Cossack squad, broke up the demonstration by force. The elderly Nikolaj Annenskij and his colleague Aleksej Peshekhonov, two zemstvo statisticians and journalists famous far beyond St. Petersburg, came under the police cudgels; Peter Struve and Mikhail Tugan-Baranovskij, the leading theoreticians of 'legal marxism', were arrested on the spot. A few days later, 93 writers and professors signed a Writers Union protest against the methods of the police. The Ministry of the Interior replied by closing the Union; most of its members were banned from the capital for a year.¹¹⁹ These events roused the public to the extreme; it was after all the first time that the Government had raised the Cossack knouts, not against striking workers or ravaging peasants, but against the representatives of 'society'. The contemporaries date the active beginning of the 'public movement', which withdrew the basis of loyalty from the autocracy, from those March days in 1901.¹²⁰

Meantime the student movement did not directly add new forces to the 'public movement'. It was only indirectly effective in that it increased the general dissatisfaction and at the same time disquieted fathers about the path their children seemed to be taking. For the student movement rapidly became radical, and its politically conscious elements joined the revolutionary parties – the marxist Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDRP) and the neo-populist Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR) – which were building up their illegal organizations during these years. Particularly the PSR, which harked back in its tactics to the terrorist tradition of the *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will Party) in the late 1870s and the 1880s, saw its revolutionary activism confirmed by the spontaneity of the movement at all levels of the population. In its illegal publication *Revolyutsionnaya Rossiya*, the 'contradiction between society and working classes' was contested in view of the events in spring 1901, 'since the walls dividing the Philistine from the revolutionary, the intelligentsia from the people broke down before our eyes'.¹²¹ Conversely, many students were fascinated by the idea – appealing to youth's noble unselfishness and to the mythical concept of the 'avenging hero' (*mstitel'-geroj*) – the

idea of responding to 'the terrorism from above with the thousand times more human terrorism from below'.¹²² On 14th February 1901 the Minister for People's Enlightenment, Bogolepov, was assassinated by the student Karpovich. The attempts on the Minister of the Interior, Sipyagin (April 1902), on the Governor of Khar'kov, Prince Obolenskij (July 1903) and on the Ufa Governor Bogdanovich (May 1903) were already staged according to plan by the 'Fighting Organization' of the PSR.

The fact that it was mostly students throwing bombs from the foremost front of the revolutionary terror, that in the towns it was precisely the school children and students making up the most restless element, gave food for thought to those groups of 'society' which were hardly inclined to sympathize or express solidarity with the student movement. The university milieu with its special student community customs, removed from 'society's' life style, had for a long time been the cradle of Russian radicalism which can only be explained by the socialization conditions peculiar to academic youth in Tsarist Russia.¹²³ This radicalism can be described as a subculture which was established by the consciousness of simply living in conflict with the whole of society. It becomes identifiable as a particular social phenomenon in the 1860s. Since then, all the life styles of radical groups, which broke through all social norms, and their ideological hopes have represented a fundamental challenge to 'society' and have constantly nourished the widespread fear of revolution. Terrorism was the most extreme, and felt to be the most threatening, expression of this radicalism, through which 'society' painfully experienced its own political impotence. In a draft memorandum of the Kazan Assembly of the Nobility in 1902, 'the exclusion of their fathers from the protection of that order against which youth is scheming' was given as the most important reason for student unrest. Redress lay in 'limiting the omnipotence of the bureaucracy and in giving the people the opportunity of telling the Tsar of their troubles'.¹²⁴ While this statement remained bound up in the tradition of putting all hope in the Tsar, the editor of the periodical *Osvobozhdenie* recognized the solution to the problem in the political activation of 'society'. He visualized 'a heavy moral and political duty' accruing to 'the fathers' as a result of the radicalization of youth; they therefore had to 'throw their political activity and their civil courage into the scales of history, fully aware of the fact that being moderate is a commitment'.¹²⁵

The student movement, its treatment and its effectiveness are in many ways symptomatic of the escalation in tension between 'society' and Government. A much sought-after lawyer in his days and a man who later took considerable part in the formulation of the Constitutional Democrats' policies in the Duma was Vasiliĭ A. Maklakov; he accused the Tsar in retrospect of having placed the security and preservation of the autocracy above solving the 'real' social problems, and of thus arriving at an aggressive policy with which he dealt blows to legal institutions and loyal citizens for lack of openly active opponents.¹²⁶ For example, the Moscow Society of Jurisprudence was closed in 1899 because of its alleged demoralizing 'intellectual influence on the still immature academic youth'.¹²⁷ Public order was supposedly endangered by social welfare institutions, independent of the Government, such as the 'Illiteracy Committees' and the committees for famine relief. A series of laws, decrees and directives cut back zemstvo finances and responsibilities in the years from 1900 to 1903;¹²⁸ in some provinces, zemstvo statistical work was suspended altogether in 1902 following orders from the very highest level, because the Minister of the Interior attributed to the statisticians the principal blame for the revolutionary propaganda among the peasants.¹²⁹ At the same time individuals were, for political reasons, ever more frequently censured, arrested, administratively banned, on trial or under observation. In Milyukov's estimation, it became practically a sign of distinction to be branded as a political offender, 'gradually becoming a quite necessary qualification for everybody who claims to advocate liberal public opinion'.¹³⁰ The criminalization of oppositional thinking, which meant associating 'public activists' with bomb-throwers and revolutionaries, certainly did not level off in social reality the principal and constant differences between revolutionary activism and legalistic reformism, but it did force many a loyal citizen against his will into a position from which there seemed to be hardly any path to reconciliation with the autocratic regime.

The interests of state security and the resulting restrictive policies of the Ministers Sipyagin and Pleve nonetheless made up only one side of the efforts through which the autocracy tried to come to grips with the developing crisis. On the other side were the attempts — set in motion time and again and often frustrated by the preventive measures — to save the basis of loyalty to the autocracy; flexibility in individual cases, submission to this or that demand, expansion of the latitude granted to one social group or another. But behind all this there was

no political concept agreeable to all, and the few positive approaches foundered on the general ill-humour, even if they were not already thwarted from the very beginning by resistance and intrigues within the Government and at Court.¹³¹ This failure was clear even from the behaviour of the nobility and the industrialists, who were particularly favoured by these policies. A 'Special Conference on the Problems of the Nobility' had been meeting since 1897 which was attending especially to safeguarding the socio-economic interests of the landed nobility.¹³² Striving for such interests, it was bound to conflict with Vitte's industrialization policy; its results were accordingly meagre. The disappointment of his compeers was voiced by Prince B.A. Vasil'-chikov as early as 1899, when he declared before the Assembly of the Provincial Marshalls of the Nobility that the times of handing in humiliating 'solicitations' to the Government (*khodatajstva*) were now at an end. In the new century, a more significant role would fall to the public than in the past. But to prevent this development leading to undesirable West European results (i.e. to a constitution or a republic), the nobility would have 'to take the banner in its hands' and unite 'the great principle of autocracy' with the 'benefits of self-government'.¹³³ In 1902 another Marshall of the Nobility noticed a lack of 'radical measures for saving the nobility'. Instead of the unsuccessful 'Special Conference', he wanted provincial committees to be appointed, 'similar to those set up [before 1861] to plan the peasant reform'.¹³⁴ While these opinions held by prominent representatives of the nobility took the same direction as that followed by the 'public movement' in the crisis years, the conservative elements of 'society', disappointed by the autocracy's weak leadership and lack of concept, began to accumulate. 'There have been neither ministers nor an Emperor for a long time, only pale shadows of the past,' noted Lev Tikhomirov in 1904.¹³⁵ Disappointment at the way in which the autocracy conducted itself in the crisis led many conservative monarchists in the following period 'to move closer to a radicalism of the Right that believed in the necessity of saving the autocracy from, and in spite of, itself'.¹³⁶

Discontent began to stir in the crisis years among the industrialists as well. During the recession, industry doubtless had every reason to seek good relations with the Government, although in some industrial circles voices were heard here and there which attributed the blame for the set-back sometimes to the agricultural policy, which restricted markets, and sometimes to the *normirovka* of the Vitte system.¹³⁷

The fact that, despite the sharply falling economic trend, industry retained a residue of stability and growth was not least of all to the credit of the not so unsuccessful state-protectionist crisis management. In these years, the Vitte administration was not sparing either with surplus funds for hindering the most spectacular bankruptcies and stabilizing the economy, or with advice and encouragement for strengthening the entrepreneurs' self-confidence and initiative.¹³⁸ Yet the Government threatened to gamble away this confidence through its double-faced policy on the workers' question. Since 1901, the Ministry of the Interior had been cultivating, somewhat beyond the bounds of legality, a system of self-help organizations and strike funds among the industrial labour force; the system was led by the secret police and had been originated by the Moscow *Okhrana* boss Zubatov.¹³⁹ It was hoped that these would be able to keep the labour movement under control and to distract it from a clash with state authority through limited economic conflicts with the industrialists. Following a successful beginning at the time of the recession, the *Zubatovshchina* collapsed completely in the summer of 1903 in Odessa; here, as a result of the wave of strikes in Southern Russia, the organization led by the police agent Shaevich was forced by the participant workers themselves to organize political strikes and demonstrations. This experiment in 'police socialism' not only failed to bring about the desired effect in the labour force; it also put a long-lasting burden on the basis of trust between industrialists and Government.¹⁴⁰ The fact that the Finance Ministry took the side here of industry against the Ministry of the Interior¹⁴¹ necessarily gave the impression that the Government was divided on a central question of internal peace and was possibly not always prepared and in a position to maintain the social balance of powers. The thought that the autocracy, in order to save its own skin, would not in the last event shun the temptation to sacrifice the interests of capital to the social movement will play a significant part in the political mobilization of the entrepreneurs in 1905.

In the conflict of aims between, on the one side, further rationalization of socio-economic conditions in the interests of international competitiveness and, on the other side, the restoration of a solid social foundation in the interests of self-preservation, the autocracy could no longer satisfy anybody with the reformist instruments at its disposal. It is not sufficient, however, to explain the political mobilization of 'society' during the crisis at the turn of the century

by pointing out the rift between demands and performance of the prevailing political-social order. The more profound reason lay in the intensification of social conflicts which affected the range and the forms of the disputes. What lent the acute economic crisis the dimensions of a crisis in the social structure was the entry of the masses onto the political arena — their entry not in the sense of aimless, isolated rebellions but as a permanent social movement, which as a result of similarity in local needs brought forth similar demands everywhere and thereby created solidarity. This universal process, which had signalled the end of pre-industrial society in Western countries as well, emanated in Russia as elsewhere from the conurbations. But it started, later than in Western Europe, only during the last years of the 19th century, when the industrial revolution had created a numerically small but in a few places highly concentrated proletariat.¹⁴² The student movement took over such weapons as strikes and street demonstrations from the labour movement; conversely the unrest among the students gave a new impetus to the labour movement as well, which had noticeably languished during the recession.¹⁴³ Following the harvest failure in the previous year, Southern Russia experienced in 1902 the outbreak of peasant unrest which, with its features of social rebellion, differed in a disquieting way from the pictures of peasant famine of ten years earlier.¹⁴⁴ The transfer of the bulk of the labour movement from the textile industries in the central industrial rayon to the leading metal producing and working industries in the South corresponded to the transfer of the peasant movement from the less intensely productive central provinces, which had been especially badly hit by the 1891/92 catastrophe, to areas in the black earth belt, where there was a marketable surplus in agricultural production.

The mass movement, arising spontaneously from overwhelming conditions, could nonetheless not be organized and channelled directly into parties and pressure groups. For that, the necessary political prerequisites were still missing in pre-revolutionary Russia. It did, however, first of all initiate the process of political group differentiation in society, in that it showed the balancing of interests under the bureaucratic patriarchalism of the autocracy to be obsolete. Many attitudes and actions of groups of 'society' were at first nothing but the reflex of insecurity incurred by these transformation processes — a reflex born, whether consciously or not, from the fear that here a problem of the masses, which the old framework of autocratic rule

and serfdom would not be able to contain, could break every social order imaginable to date.

The elementary, unpredictable unrest of the underprivileged classes first became a problem to the educated in the summer of 1896, when the St. Petersburg textile workers went on strike for three weeks over payment of wages on public holidays announced for the coronation.¹⁴⁵ Taken up again at the beginning of the following year, this strike brought things to a head in other industrial centres as well, and the Government yielded to it with the law of June 1897, which regulated working hours. This lesson from the years 1896/97 made it clear that much can be achieved in the political struggle if it is possible to motivate the masses.¹⁴⁶ The idea fascinated the radical intellectuals in marxist and populist circles who were discussing the future of Russia. It became the point of departure for the foundation and advance of the revolutionary parties, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDRP) and the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (PSR), both of which tried to convert the elementary character of the social unrest into conscious forms of struggle towards social revolution.¹⁴⁷

Established 'society' was more alarmed than encouraged by the outbreaks of social dissatisfaction. But characteristically it showed clear reaction only with the beginning of the peasant upheavals in 1902. The labour movement, directed before 1900 purely towards economic problems, still allowed itself to be seen as a struggle against the unloved profiteers under the Vitte industrialization policy, and perhaps with a certain grim relish let itself be studied. The situation became threatening when the peasants set fire to the property of the estate owner — and not, for example, to that of the governmental representative — without waiting to ask whether he was particularly ruthless or of a liberal attitude. The relationship between 'society' and the masses was hindered by the imbalance in social transformation, which had not only increased the town-country gap but was also nowhere more prevalent than in the village itself. Here the peasant, held fast in pre-modern working and living conditions, had not been able to catch up with the life styles of the new education and property elites. But, on the other hand, the traditional differentiation between 'society' and 'the people' had remained social reality and maxim for social dealings in the consciousness of the enlightened estate owner and his intellectual colleague in the zemstvo. Ekaterina Kuskova describes the situation: 'The "Barin" [estate owner] had certainly comprehended with his intellect that the "bumpkin" was now a citi-

zen. But in life there are habits and customs, all subconscious. And when the Left demanded that the bumpkin be given the right to think and talk about affairs of state, the liberal "Barin" was genuinely surprised: Think of that — my Grischka should be allowed to vote? The dark people? No! We are all working *for the people*. Russia is not yet mature enough to act *through* the people'.¹⁴⁸ This maturity reservation — shared by many in the urban upper class who did not emanate from the tradition of the landed nobleman used to assessing his property in terms of souls — contained the implication of what was called 'everyday cultural activities'. By means of the 'small deeds' carried out in the spirit of *sluzhenie narodu* (service to the people), the 'public activists' had for decades justified their social position and confirmed themselves in their singular political responsibility.

Confronted with the new type of social movement, the ideologists of 'public self-activity' were overcome with concern that dissatisfaction and unrest among peasants and workers could grow more rapidly than the comprehension of those in power, or in any case more rapidly than the results of cultural work could reach fruition. The mass movements ran counter to 'society's' interest in the gradual, non-violent development of social relationships; they exposed the widespread opportunistic lack of perspective of the 'small deeds' tactic; and moreover they threatened 'society' in its social existence in the same degree as the propaganda of the revolutionary parties — be it only incitement to rebellion — became effective. In August 1902, with the South Russian peasant revolts in mind, Count Peter A. Gejden, President of the Imperial Free Economic Society and landowner in Pskov province, emphasized — in a letter to the Minister of the Interior, Pleve¹⁴⁹ — the legitimate claim of the 'propertied class' to take on the functions of an instrument of public order by means of 'private and public activity' 'based on the law and on justice'. 'We, the representatives of landed property, are not in a position to evade the issue, . . . [we can not] simply sit back and watch when the governmental forces stand face to face with extremist elements which are working with the most dangerous means towards social revolution. . . . I do not believe that we have the right to be only witnesses; even the simple feeling of self-preservation forbids that'. If the state order was such that the real needs of large sections of the population cannot be expressed other than by violating the established order (*besporyadki*), was it not then time to change this order and to grant all classes the benefit of institutional, legal forms for meeting

their needs, so that the necessity of attaining ends through violence as well as the influence of 'extremist elements' have no leg to stand on?¹⁵⁰

Count Gejden did not give voice at this point to the thought which with time will determine even more 'society's' political discussion. As early as the summer of 1901, a mimeographed appeal by the 'Old Zemstvo Men' (*Starye Zemtsy*) had already caused a sensation; in a sharp attack on the zemstvo opposition's still prevailing political abstinence based on opportunistic considerations, the appeal called for a candid discussion, irrespective of formal responsibilities and possible repression, of general national questions in the forthcoming session of the zemstvo assemblies.¹⁵¹ The identity of the *Starye Zemtsy* can only be conjectured.¹⁵² But it is certain that the line of approach recommended by them – shaping up the zemstvo institutions as a political alternative by means of direct antibureaucratic action – represented in 1901/1902 an extreme position which the 'public movement' as a whole was not yet able to accept. Admittedly, the view prevailed everywhere in the zemstvo opposition that the malfunctioning of the administrative machinery was the chief cause of the 'chaotic condition' of the country and small groups discussed a miscellany of projects on institutional safeguarding of public influence on the central authority.¹⁵³ The illegal publication of Vitte's zemstvo Memorandum in 1901 had greatly contributed to this clarification process, 'because without mincing matters it had raised a question which no newspaper dared to raise'¹⁵⁴ – the question of the fundamental incompatibility of self-government and autocracy. But the radical programmatic consequence, which the *Starye Zemtsy* had indicated by referring to the Memorandum, was shared by only a very small circle of convinced Constitutionalists. The break with forty years of zemstvo tradition was still feared and there were still dreams of 'completing the house' which the reforms under Alexander II had left unfinished. And there were still hopes of being able, through personal contacts and institutional rights of petition, to influence 'morally the conscience of the autocrat', so that he might grant the nation and society those freedoms which alone would avert 'the violent collapse of the present order'. 'If only the Tsar himself were to head the "public movement"', the Chairman of the Saratov zemstvo board, N.N. L'vov rhapsodized in 1902, 'what enthusiasm would burst out in our society, what a brilliant page of history would be written'.¹⁵⁵

These attitudes may be described as counter-revolutionary,¹⁵⁶ and in comparison with Lenin's theory of revolution they might well be so. The verbatim texts of the statements quoted and their historical context do, after all, leave no doubt that the intentions of the forces, which were beginning here to reflect on their political responsibility, were aimed at working against the revolutionary break. And yet to assess them as 'counter-revolutionary' does not do them justice. They do, rather, make clear the range the revolution had to compass in a 'late-comer society' such as that in Russia. Faced with the unbroken power of the autocracy, 'society's' political mobilization was not without its revolutionary qualities. It was nonetheless of great significance that revolutionary parties, seeking their organizational field in the workers' quarters and villages, had already come into existence when consistent political groupings first began to form among the educational and propertied elites. The existence of organized revolutionary movements, in which marginal social groups were trying by means other than declamation alone to define their role as leader of the masses, drew a demarcation line which was difficult to cross without reflecting on one's own social position and the resulting mode of political behaviour. The political mobilization of 'society' therefore had to take place outside the wide-ranging expectations of the revolutionaries. But on the other hand even Lenin himself did not hesitate in 1901 to welcome, full of hope, the *Staroye Zemtsy* as possible 'liberal allies' in the fight against tsarism.¹⁵⁷ In the confrontation with bureaucratic government practice, more solidarity sometimes seemed possible to the contemporaries than the social gulfs and wide differences in interests justified. Through obsession with the autocratic government's deficiencies and failures, the question of political participation as an abstract demand on the autocracy's will to reform could for a short time be raised in a national 'liberation movement', covering apparently all factions and founded on the purely negative unity of its antibureaucratic attitude.

The 'public movement' at the turn of the century was a transitional phase in the history of political group formation in pre-revolutionary Russia. The economic crisis worsened the psychological climate, raised political sensibility in society and made a decisive contribution to the insidious crisis in state authority. And with the economic crisis, a phase of political socialization began which lasted well into the first revolution. During this phase, groups ranging from revolutionary Social Democrats through to the reactionary instigators of

the Kishinev and Gomel pogroms were searching for their identity — under the twofold pressure of the mass movement and the Government's restrictive social policy aimed at preserving the autocratic system — and were rehearsing their roles in the field of social and political interaction, which had been re-defined by social modernization.

CHAPTER TWO

TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONALIST PROGRAMME

In this chapter the development and formulation of the constitutionalist programme will be studied with the intention of identifying the beginnings of a constitutionalist group within the broader context of the 'public movement'. With the development of programmatic concepts which put 'public activity' into political perspectives, the 'public movement' emerged from its state of unconsciousness as a purely social movement; it began to take on political differentiations in that each group and circle legitimized its political activity with a different theory. First of all we shall look for developments in the field of political theory which corresponded to the social change already noted, and try to mention a few theoretical positions suitable for giving the 'public movement' a constitutionalist political perspective. The development of a political programme is not, however, only a theoretical problem; it is just as much a question of political practice. Secondly, therefore, we shall study the history of the first constitutionalist platform, which can be coupled with the history of the establishment of the periodical *Osvobozhdenie* (Liberation). Who were the founders and sponsors of this periodical? Which individuals, groups and circles shared in the formulation of the programme? Which stages of deliberation did the programme pass through? The programmatic articles in the first number of the periodical were, after all, interpreted in the light of the questions on what political perspective the Constitution-
alists followed, how they defined their role in the 'public movement' as well as *vis-à-vis* the revolutionary movement, and what range of actions they considered possible for their political activity.

1. POLITICAL THEORY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The development of social sciences in Russia during the second half of the 19th century was basically determined by the antagonistic relationship between state and society and by the constant awareness of Russian backwardness. Since they gave preference to these problems, social philosophy and economics, political theory and history became 'oppositional sciences', reflecting society's impotence in the face of the 'omnicompetence' of the autocratic state (Sumner). 'The less hopeful society's political activity against the leviathan State seemed to be, the more eagerly the intelligentsia tried to deal with the whole historical process philosophically and to make it work for them as political propaganda'.¹ This led to a tendency – typical of Russian political thought – towards evolution sketches and historical trends, tinged with social philosophy, which were articulated through an indissoluble mixture of 'social eschatology and politics'. The central problem embodied in all the discussions can be reduced to one question: must Russia, in order to achieve modern forms of political and social life, follow the footsteps of Western Europe – economically into capitalism, socially into the bourgeois class society, ideologically into possessive individualism and liberalism? This question was a heritage from the dispute between Westernizers and Slavophiles, and was based in the last resort in Russian backwardness.²

The pressure of industrialization in the 1890s had removed the hypothetical character from the discussion of capitalism's fate in Russia, which had been going on for almost half a century. Enlivened by the results of Vitte's industrialization policy, the question of Russia's future perspectives was discussed in marxist and populist terminology.³ That was the Great Debate in 19th century Russian humanities, comparable to the disputes between Slavophiles and Westernizers in the 1840s. But contrary to the earlier discussions, it did not take place within 'the four walls of a few salons among the select circle of philosophical authorities', but rather 'almost completely occupied the intellectual interests of Russian society', as a contemporary observer remarked. 'Wherever one went, the first question was: are you a Marxist or a Narodnik?'⁴ Yet the aim of social development was basically common to both movements – a new, socialist society, freed from the constraints of backwardness through conquest of capitalist exploitation; but the two movements followed different paths of development towards this aim.

The populist theories of non-capitalist development, in which the fears and wishes of small producers — made uneasy by industrialization — were expressed, placed their hopes in the ‘immediate producer’ and pointed to archaic forms of co-operative production, such as the peasant commune, the *artel*’ and ‘popular industry’ (*kustarnaya promyshlennost’*) which through planned, active support were transmuted directly into higher forms of socialized work, avoiding the capitalist stage of development. The Marxists, on the other hand, saw the conditions for the transition to socialism developing along with large-scale capitalist production and recognized in the industrial proletariat the pillars of social progress. The various theoretical demands provided definitive reasons for political behaviour, for programmatic concepts for overcoming the ‘cursed’ Russian backwardness in the fight against tsarism, and the intellectual debate developed often enough into open agitation. The foundation at the turn of the century of two rival revolutionary parties — the Social Democratic Labour Party in 1898 and the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries in 1900/1901 — was thus the practical political outcome of the theoretical dispute in the 1890s. They preceded the political mobilization and differentiation of ‘society’ and thus manifested the political weakness of the Russian bourgeoisie, which was not in a position to break with the protection of the autocratic state, as well as the theoretical weakness of liberal thought in Russia.

Yet the ideological difference between Populists and Marxists does not, however, provide the decisive criterion for the problem of political group formation in pre-revolutionary Russia; the political differentiation of society did not take place as a whole along these lines but on the contradiction between revolutionary and non-revolutionary, reformist types of action, which corresponded to the terminological distinction between ‘revolutionary movement’ and ‘public movement’. This contradiction was diametrically opposed to the front lines of the ideological dispute and was rooted rather more in questions of social status and social expectations in specific classes than in theoretical tenets. Whether the leadership in the liberation from tsarism and the development of a socialist society was allocated, as by the marxist Social Democrats, to the industrial proletariat or, as by the neo-populist Social Revolutionaries, to the ‘working people’ (*trud-yashchiysya narod*)⁵ with predominance given to the part played by the peasantry, was certainly of great consequence to party agitation and propaganda. But both concepts demanded that their exponents

existed in illegal, elite groups for there was a great cultural gap separating the propagators of both marxist and populist ideas from their respective target groups. The profession of the Social Democrats and the Social Revolutionaries of conspiratorial forms of organization – most profoundly argued in Lenin's definition of party – was equivalent to the living conditions of intellectual sub-cultures, whose systems of values hardly touched upon socially accepted behavioural norms, not to mention the police-controlled basic principles of political good conduct.

The 'public opposition', which drew its legitimation precisely from socially useful activity in full public view, could not follow the revolutionaries and terrorists along this path. Only in this sense has the 'public movement' often also been termed 'liberal' and set against the revolutionary movement, although there was no substantial liberal theory which would have corresponded to the marxist and populist theorems and which could provide the 'public activist' with a positive aim as well as concrete directions for his political activity. The term 'liberalism' did not have much significance in Russia;⁶ it could be connected both with slavophile ideas critical of the bureaucracy and with socialist ideas. 'The difference [between liberalism and socialism] was more a question of temperament than of philosophy', the journalist V.V. Vodovozov noted in the Brokgauz-Efron Encyclopaedia in 1906.⁷ 'People are termed liberal whose methods of operation are entirely legal and who keep away from all revolutionary fighting methods'. Inasmuch as the problem of legality was theoretically admitted by both populism and marxism and was related to the problems of Russian backwardness, both positions could be drawn upon for motivation and ideological justification for the political mobilization of 'society'.⁸

Russian populism, as a philosophy permitting much differentiation, was indifferent towards the problem of revolution. Apart from the revolutionary movement which was based particularly in the 1860s and 1870s on populist theories, there had always been non-revolutionary, socially reformist factions as well. They reached their climax in the 1880s and 1890s after the defeat of the 'People's Will Party' (*Narodnaya Volya*). But 'legal populism' – often also misleadingly termed 'liberal' due to its lack of revolutionary will – was from the start non-political.⁹ Its theoretical foundation was formed by 'subjective philosophy', which professed the dominant importance of human will and thought, of ethics and morals as against the 'objective' rules

of a determinist universal evolution. Nikolaj K. Mikhajlovskij, the most prominent and, for the legal Populists, the most important thinker in this school, expressed the essence of social progress in 1869 in the now famous formula:

'Progress is the gradual approach to the integral individual, to the fullest possible and the most diversified division of labour among man's organs and the least possible division of labour among men. Everything that impedes this advance is immoral, unjust, pernicious, and unreasonable. Everything that diminishes the heterogeneity of society and thereby increases the heterogeneity of their members is moral, just, reasonable, and beneficial'.¹⁰

For Mikhajlovskij and his supporters, this amounted to the superiority of the Russian peasant, of the non-specialized individual par excellence — who can develop his individuality in all directions within his commune — over the fragmentary, one-sided individuality of the Western rationalistic specialist, even if the ideal image of the original 'totality' in the real peasant commune may appear blurred and blemished by external influences and the low level of social co-operation. The legal Populists of the 1880s contented themselves with fundamental criticism of the capitalist development pattern and discovered in Russian backwardness the chance to avoid the inhumanity and cruelty of Western liberal economic and social development, which stifled emancipation and self-realization of the personality. It is not surprising that, in such an atmosphere of social romantic considerations, even the theoretical justifications for the 'small deeds', for 'society's' preferred political practice could be devised in the 1880s and 1890s.¹¹ Consolidation of the peasant economy in the framework of the peasant commune, promotion of cottage industry and co-operative forms of small industry, furtherance of literacy and social hygiene — these were the tools with which the legal Populists believed they could achieve the transition to a socialist society, to the association of free producers. And to this end, the pre-industrial political order of tsarism, which hindered the development of capitalism, seemed even more useful sometimes than constitutional forms of representing interests. Legal populism rejected the thought of constitutionalizing abstractly phrased citizens' rights and parliamentary democracy just as much as it rejected economic liberalism.

Following the catastrophic famine of 1891/92 and the beginning of the industrialization boom, the non-political keynote, concentrated

on the 'economic struggle' and the policy of 'small deeds', yielded to the view that it was precisely the autocratic system which was standing in the way of economic and social progress by means of non-capitalist development. The increasingly fervent discussion with marxism was more than enough to dispel the economic romanticism in populist thought. In view of the role played by the autocracy in enforcing capitalist structures without bothering noticeably about 'the welfare of the people', it became ever more improbable that Russia would be able to find its own independent path to socialism without drastic political reforms. In 1892, S.M. Stepnyak-Kravchinskij — previously a devoted advocate of the economic struggle — noted the renunciation of the old populist tenets with the words: 'We believe that political freedom is enough to solve the social question'. At the same time, however, he protested against conceiving political freedom simply as a prerequisite for socialism: 'We are offended by the thought that freedom be considered only as an instrument towards this or that end, as if the feelings and misery of free men were alien to us, as if, for the sake of commitment towards the people, we had no understanding of commitment towards ourselves, towards human dignity'.¹² Stepnyak reduced the ideal quality of this definition of freedom to a politically manageable, pragmatic demand for replacement of the autocracy by a constitutional regime. Under the prevailing conditions, he argued, political freedom for the Russian people could be achieved only in the form of constitutional monarchy. Attaining this should be the immediate goal for socialists of all shades. In view of the Russian peasants' lack of culture and due to the Russian proletariat's low standard of development, Stepnyak can take only the intelligentsia into consideration as a pillar for the movement directed towards political freedom — an intelligentsia which, without renouncing its socialist perspective, must unite with the 'liberal' circles among educated 'society'. This change of attitude arose largely from disillusionment, experienced by many Populists during the 1891/92 famine, with the mass of the peasant people, who had been idealized under the older theories. But the change also spoke equally for the growing self-confidence of the new, professional middle classes, which had gathered experience through daily cultural work and were now staking a claim on political leadership.

Attempts were made to draw a practical conclusion from such reasoning by the illegal 'People's Rights Party' (*Partiya Narodnago Prava*), which had been founded in the summer of 1893 under the

leadership of Mark A. Natanson, a veteran from the populist movement of the 1870s. The Party's manifesto took up the call for freedom precisely along Stepnyak's lines. In the programmatic brochure 'The Urgent Question' (*Nasushchnyj vopros*), the party founders settled with the 'decayed ideas of populism', with cultural patronage', with the 'small deeds' and with the mythical idolization of the people. 'Life itself calls us [...] to the struggle for political liberty, which was never hostile to anything but absolutism. For absolutism it spells death, for the people – *conditio sine qua non* for public life. And as far as socialism is concerned, political freedom and socialism are not only not incompatible but are, on the contrary, complementary and mutually dependent [...] Political freedom is not only the first step towards the achievement of socialism, but also the *conditio sine qua non* for its existence'.¹³ The close relationship between freedom and – as understood by populist criteria – socialism was already expressed in the party name 'People's Rights', which was interpreted in a double sense in the party manifesto published at the beginning of 1894 – as 'the right of the people to political freedom' and as 'the right of the people to fulfilment of their material needs on the basis of popular production'.¹⁴ The party's goal was 'replacement of the autocracy by representative institutions' and the safeguarding of people's rights through civil and political liberty. Despite the challenge to overthrow the autocracy, the manifesto did not propagate revolutionary means but recommended 'confronting the government's inflexibility and the autocracy's narrow dynastic interests with the organized force of public opinion'. The party claimed to be just such a force and to unite 'all oppositional forces in the country', 'in order to destroy the autocracy and to guarantee civil and human rights for every individual'.

The People's Rights Party was founded, however, at an inopportune moment. Limited as it was to a few intellectual circles, it did not succeed in gaining a foothold in 'society's' institutions. Its organization and tactics adhered to the conspiratorial tradition of radical movements, and in April 1894, the *Okhrana* had little trouble in breaking up the party in five towns in a cloak-and-dagger attack, without its having had any noticeable effect on the 'public movement'.¹⁵ Nonetheless the People's Rights Party has recently been interpreted as the immediate predecessor and prototype of the organized constitutionalist movement as it then developed in the first years of the 20th century around the periodical *Osvobozhdenie* and in the Union of Liberation.¹⁶ And in fact an astounding continuity does seem to

connect the two organizations. We find several *narodopravtsy* (members of the People's Rights Party), who were banned or had gone into exile after the police attack in April 1894, among the leaders of the Union of Liberation ten years later, and the idea of overcoming the autocracy by means of a constitutional regime, ensuring the people's rights through legally guaranteed civil and political liberty, is exactly the same as the Constitutionalists' concept after the turn of the century. And yet the history of the People's Rights Party did not serve the *osvobozhdentsy* (subscribers to *Osvobozhdenie*) in establishing a tradition; the party fell into oblivion.¹⁷ The reasons for this can be seen in the sensitive relationship between political practice and social and ideological change. The *narodopravtsy* idea of organizing public opinion in order to overcome the autocracy was confronted by a 'society' whose politically conscious forces — as we have seen — still adhered to the thought of improving the autocracy by means of single reforms. So the party could not gain any social basis in Russian 'society'. The question still applied to this 'society' which had already been raised in 1825 by the military governor of Moscow during the Decembrist uprising, and which had remained a problem for Russian radicalism throughout the 19th century: 'I can understand the French bourgeoisie bringing about the revolution to get rights, but how am I to comprehend the Russian nobleman making a revolution to lose them?'¹⁸ Only during the industrial revolution in the 1890s does the 'public movement' change its social profile to such an extent that the Russian nobleman — wrenched from the patriarchal ways of life of pre-industrial society and confronted with the threat of a mass revolution — develops a willingness to risk a revolution in order to lose rights which have become a burden to him. This goes further: the *narodopravtsy* in their times were not able to satisfy their own strategic and tactical claim to take organized public opinion to field against the obstinacy of the tsarist government. As an organization guarded by conspiracy and without support in 'society', the party was unable to present the 'public movement' with a living image of tradition which would have invited identification. Politically, the party remained a biographical footnote in the careers of its members, preserved in the memories of a few dozen people and in the *Okhrana* archives. The history of its ineffectiveness offers an informative example ex negativo for the relationship between social mobilization and political group formation.

Even if the People's Rights Party was a failure politically, the as-

pects it had represented of the ideological change in Russian populism at the beginning of the 1890s were by no means lost on the theoretical level – the demythologization of ‘the people’ and the hopes put in the forces of ‘society’, the conviction that social progress could be guaranteed only on the basis of a new legal order, modification of traditional anti-liberalism and the preference for open as opposed to illegal methods of action. This inheritance was administered in the following years by a group of journalists – mostly members of or in sympathy with the People’s Rights Party – which N.K. Mikhajlovskij had rallied round the Petersburg periodical *Russkoe Bogatstvo* (Russian Wealth) since 1892.¹⁹ This group can be regarded as the centre of legal populism in the 1890s. It gained its importance, however, not due to its criticism of the older populism’s romantic concepts but rather thanks to Mikhajlovskij’s commitment in the marxism-populism dispute. Along with Nikolaj F. Daniel’son (Nikolaj-on) and Vasilij P. Vorontsov (V.V.) – both leading representatives of economic romanticism in the 1880s – Mikhajlovskij defended the idealistic humanism of subjective philosophy against the claim, expressed vehemently by the young avant-garde Marxists, of a materialistic theory of evolution, which regarded man simply as ‘history’s pliable instrument’.²⁰ But the wind of industrialization was blowing in the face of the Populists. Full of pessimism, Mikhajlovskij noted as early as 1891:

‘Insofar as the division of labour impresses itself deeper and deeper into society, the striving for unity changes its nature and direction; in place of feeling one gets only mimicry. Feeling wanes and imitation increases to such an extent that bloody struggles and deep mutual hatred between different branches of the divided labour of society become possible’.²¹

All the same, Mikhajlovskij and his followers did not turn against industrialization as such; they turned against having to sacrifice without complaint traditional social relationships – in which ‘the wholeness of personality’ nonetheless still had a chance – together with their moral nucleus, in favour of a questionable progress which led only into a ruthless class struggle. In opposition to this tendency in social development – which, it was thought, had been talked into existence by the Marxists and brought to pass by the bourgeoisie at home and abroad – Daniel’son referred again in 1893 to the indigenous Russian forms of life and production, to the peasant commune and the *artel*, which could serve as the foundations for an internally developed industrial method of production.²²

The idea of overtaking capitalism from the village level pointed out to the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* circle – to which prominent representatives of public opinion belonged, such as the author Vladimir G. Korolenko and Nikolaj F. Annenskij, at that time Russia's best-known zemstvo statistician – a way in which justice and freedom could finally be won, not by means of a spectacular revolutionary act but through patient endeavours towards leading the 'dark people' to higher forms of social culture. 'Completely legal, tough work, everyday cultural activity' over the decades would be necessary, Korolenko once explained to his friend Maksim Gor'kij, before 'the diseased but still very strong tooth – the autocracy – whose roots have spread far and deep', could be extracted.²³ This assessment of Russia's future chances definitely implied partial recourse to the theories of the 1880s. But this position no longer lost itself in the old 'possibilism' of cultural work without perspective, which was supposed to offer, under the slogan 'at least something, somehow!' all the 'high ideals', 'social dignity and the rights of personality [. . .] on the altar of small deeds'.²⁴ There is no doubt that behind these words, spoken by Alexej Peshekhonov in 1901, ideas were hidden which we have heard from Stepnyak and found in the *narodopravtsy* programme. Recourse to the cultural work theory made the legal Populists aware of the 'public movement', with which they linked anti-bourgeois sentiment and social welfare initiative. At the same time utilization of the experience gained in the early 1890s permitted them to criticize politically the 'public movement's' daily work.

At the end of the 1890s, we meet developments analogous to those in populism in the marxist camp as well. Here a 'legal' school of thought²⁵ developed out of the internal marxist discussion, which had been intensified through the growth of the mass movement since 1895. On theoretical grounds, this school of thought diverged from the conspiratorial tradition of revolutionary marxist orthodoxy and, after the turn of the century, joined the position of the legal Populists in one point – in critical acceptance of the 'public movement' and its political potential. The 'legal Marxists' had arisen from a vehement defence of the capitalist method against the Populists' pessimism over progress, which the 24-year-old Peter B. Struve had got past the censor and published in 1894. 'We too have a deep sympathy with the suffering nation of martyrs', Struve replied to the Populists. 'But the image of its ruins demonstrates better than anything else its cultural helplessness [. . .] So let us admit our cultural backwardness

and take up an apprenticeship with capitalism'.²⁶ A little later Struve reconciled this emphatic statement — which led Mikhajlovskij and his friends to see in Struve a capitalist ideologist but hardly a socialist²⁷ — with the marxist doctrine on the relative progressiveness of capitalist production methods. He referred to the educational function which capitalism was said to have in Russia, despite all its backwardness, in that it created the conditions for transition to socialism; capitalism would intensify the proletariat's class consciousness and finally also dispense with the idea of an *intelligentsiya* superior to all other classes, which after all was the basis of the populist belief in a special path to socialism in Russia.²⁸

Struve was among the most important marxist theoreticians in the 1890s, and many people also saw in him the presumptive leader of the Social Democratic Party.²⁹ For this position he lacked, admittedly, almost all the personal and political qualifications, as his biographer, Richard Pipes, emphasizes. A passionate, inconstant mind, he could to the recurrent surprise of his friends frequently change his position and spur on the theoretical discussion by raising critical objections. He lacked the essential modes of expression for work at the roots; he also had no inclination towards propaganda operations among the workers and for organizing strikes, all of which were becoming more and more the determining experience for most of his *Genossen*. All the same, in 1898 Struve was still the intellectual authority to whom the social democratic splinter groups entrusted the editing of the founding manifesto for the Social Democratic Labour Party (RSDRP).³⁰

Though a marxist himself, Struve never had shrunk from criticizing the theories of old marxist protagonists. His criticism began with the theory of destitution and *Zusammenbruch*, which Struve opposed with the thesis of organic development of industrial society from one 'socio-economic formation' to the next.³¹ At the same time the legal Marxists — among whom there were, besides Struve, talented young philosophers and economists such as Mikhail I. Tugan-Baranovskij, Nikolaj A. Berdyaev, Sergej N. Bulgakov — were discussing their doubts about the fatal destiny of freedom of action in the predetermined historical process;³² this question was to lead them in the coming years through neo-Kantian epistemology to philosophic idealism. The gradualism of their economic positions, consolidated through close study of Bernstein's revisionism, and the redetermination of the relationship between 'free will and necessity' made them receptive for a reformist policy whose supporters were to be found in Russian

social classes other than the culturally underdeveloped industrial proletariat.

Their critical attitude and the lack of political followers led to increasing isolation of the legal Marxists from the social democratic movement, which had been seeking its own organizational form since 1898. In 1897, in an appreciation of the St. Petersburg strikes, Struve had still assigned the task of political liberation, under the leadership of social democracy, to the Russian workers; even 'the liberals', who had not as yet developed their cultural activity to the point of political militancy, would have to subordinate themselves to the workers.³³ The same idea of the hegemony of the Russian proletariat in the struggle for political freedom appears in the RSDRP Manifesto in the by now classical phrasing:

'The freedom the Russian proletariat requires it can win only by *itself*. The further east in Europe one proceeds, the weaker, more cowardly, and baser in the political sense becomes the bourgeoisie and the greater are the cultural and political tasks that devolve on the proletariat. The Russian working class must and will carry on its powerful shoulders the cause of political liberation.'³⁴

In the context of the philosophical discussions then going on among the legal Marxists this passage can, however, also be interpreted differently: it was not anticipation of the socialist revolution but rather the feebleness of Russian liberalism which kept Struve on the side of marxist social democracy. Struve – to modify a phrase used by the Polish socialist leader Józef Piłsudski – seemed prepared to get off the tram of socialism at the stop called Political Freedom. In a leader in 1899 for the short-lived liberal newspaper *Severnyj kur'er* (The Northern Courier), he took as his subject the 'growing complexity of life' (*uslozhnenie zhizni*) in the transition to higher economic forms, which demanded more complex forms of individual participation than the antiquated political structure of Russia permitted.³⁵ And Struve turned this thesis into the vision of a nationwide liberation movement, without unduly emphasizing the leading role of the proletariat any longer. In the preface to Vitte's zemstvo Memorandum (1901), he finally stressed the importance of legal zemstvo work as a moderate third force in the non-violent, organic transformation into a free *Rechtsstaat*.³⁶ Behind this change of position there was a far-reaching philosophical re-orientation, on which Struve, transcending the gap between what is and what should be, had raised individual freedom to the eternal objective of all law. In accordance with the

arguments of neo-Kantian ethics Struve and his friends established the safeguarding of individual freedom in a democratic national order as the only relevant pivot in their political programme.³⁷ Thus renouncing the ideal of a socialist revolution they sought affiliation with the openly active 'public movement' and – in the eyes of their social democratic counterparts – ceased 'to be *Genossen*'.³⁸

From a standpoint other than Struve's, two Russian Marxists, Sergej N. Prokopovich and his life-long companion Ekaterina D. Kuskova, arrived at in effect related political positions. In the dispute on theory and practice of Russian social democracy they represented a particular type of 'economism' as opposed to the revolutionary intelligentsia's claim for leadership in the Russian labour movement. Within Russia, 'economism' was a pragmatic stream in the labour movement at the turn of the century, strongly attacked by Struve as well as by Lenin, and with little theoretical foundation. It concentrated on the immediately apparent privations and needs of the workers, on working conditions in the factories, on reduction of working hours and on wage disputes.³⁹ The flowery political propaganda of, for example, the RSDRP Manifesto was understood by the 'Economists' as an attempt – bearing no relation to the reality of the working world – by a few intellectuals to graft their own interest (the fight against censorship and the secret police) onto the labour movement. As far as the internal development of social democracy inside Russia was concerned, the difficulties in communication between the anti-intellectual grass-roots groups and the theoretically interested literati agglomerated in these discussions. In the Russian social democratic colony abroad, however, the contrast between 'Economists' and 'Politicians' led to violent group struggles. Young emigrants, some of whom knew the mass movements of the 1890s from first-hand experience, stood up against the old champions of marxist orthodoxy (G.V. Plekhanov, P.B. Aksel'rod, Vera Zasulich) who favoured the political struggle of the working class, and were striving to isolate them and their Geneva 'Liberation of Labour' group.

Prokopovich and Kuskova were involved in these disputes. Both had been closely connected with the People's Rights Party in 1893/94 and had evaded police arrest by going abroad.⁴⁰ At first they were in close contact with the Liberation of Labour group, but soon these relations deteriorated for personal as well as ideological reasons. In their theoretical orientation they did not work on the principle of handling marxism as an analytical social science instrument but rather

as studying the Western European labour and trade union movement. Their conclusions approached, on the one hand, Eduard Bernstein's revisionism, on the other the ideas of the Fabian Society in Britain. They rejected the marxist *Zusammenbruch* theory and declared in favour of an evolutionary transfer to socialism along the path of political reform and accelerating the trade union struggle of the working class down to the last *kopek*, which – as West European and particularly German experience showed – would gradually turn the workers into citizens in society. Thus they learned to appreciate both the workers' struggle for improvement of the living conditions and 'society's' demand for political freedom as the two faces of a historical process directed towards democracy.

In Russia once again in 1899, Ekaterina Kuskova formulated the conclusions for Russia in a sketch – not intended for publication – of her controversies with the Geneva exiles.⁴¹ In Russia, – as opposed to the West, where the advantage of a constitutional regime most easily permitted the labour movement to find its *modus vivendi* in the political struggle – 'the line of least resistance' could 'never be applied to political activity'. The weak forces of the Russian labour movement, which were still in an 'amoeboid state', were facing 'the wall of political enslavement and not only are there no practical ways for them to fight against this yoke, and consequently no ways towards their own development – they are in fact systematically stifled by it and are unable to germinate even reluctant, weak offspring'. 'The economic struggle' was also not exactly easy, 'but it is possible and is after all being put into practice by the masses themselves'. Worried about the fate of society as a whole in the threatening revolution, Kuskova opened up with this empirical argument the traditional marxist formula on the unity of the economic and the political struggles in the social democratic movement. 'As long as the revolution does not take place in the working class itself', she had written to Aksel'rod in 1898, 'I see the revolution in Russia . . . as an ocean of blood in which the active movement will founder for a long time. [. . .] Talking of the social revolution has by now become repugnant to me.'⁴² Drawing Russian backwardness into the theoretical calculation, she pointed out the one expedient for a reasonable Marxist: 'Participation in the proletariat's economic struggle, i.e. support [but not leadership!] of this struggle, and participation in the liberal-oppositional activity' of 'society'.⁴³ These two separate movements theoretically remained indivisible through evolution of the

social process. With the intellectual's double designation of functions, Kuskova was trying to keep the still unformed mass social movement away from the rabble-rousing slogans of the isolated *intelligentsiya*-elite, and to give it the latitude necessary to independent articulation of its interests; and at the same time she put the anti-revolutionary sentiment of the 'public opposition' to work for political and social democratization.

It is difficult to say how far the development of these critical positions had an organizing effect on Russian populism and marxism. None of the three trends alone initiated the formation of political groupings. The legal Populists centred on the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* formed a relatively uniform journalistic group with conspiratorial features, whose members from time to time joined this or that political initiative undertaken by other groups and organizations.⁴⁴ For example, Aleksej Peshekhonov and the historian Venedikt A. Myakotin – both prominent members of the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* group – took part in 1900/01 in the first edition of the PSR party journal *Revoljutsionnaya Rossiya*, then still published illegally inside Russia. Thereafter they maintained loose contact with the Social Revolutionaries. But they could not feel politically at home in this party, which cultivated the conspiratorial tradition in a special way in conjunction with the ideology of terror; for 'the open arena' 'was the essential one for us'.⁴⁵ As far as the legal Marxists were concerned, Struve's hopes – of leading the still fluctuating social democratic movement by introducing Marx criticism away from conspiratorial practice into a nationwide 'liberation movement' – were deceived through the course of disputes and the development of factions within the party. At the turn of the century Struve was politically isolated, even though he had enough personal supporters. Certain mutual political aspects – apart from the personal relationship – associated him with the Prokopovich-Kuskova couple, now back in St. Petersburg, although, due to their fundamental Economist tendency, he definitely could not sanction their views as a whole. Struve's close friend, Mikhail Tugan-Baranovskij, reported in March 1899 that Struve was sitting on the fence in the dispute between Plekhanov and Kuskova, a dispute which at the time was unsettling the marxist scene in St. Petersburg.⁴⁶ But after long years of absence, Kuskova and Prokopovich commanded no political influence in Russia. The remaining Economist groupings connected with the social democratic organization dissociated themselves from them.⁴⁷ Kuskova's paper written in the

summer of 1899 attained historical significance only through the furious protest by some groups of Social Democrats from the Siberian exiles' colony, headed by Lenin, who had simply misunderstood these short self-informatory notes as 'the credo' of economism *per se*.⁴⁸ The 'credo', time and again produced as an anti-document, played a certain role in the internal party disputes in the following years, but Kuskova was without doubt right in 1906 when she opposed the legend that her 1899 paper had served a splinter or counter-revolutionary group as a guiding principle.⁴⁹

Yet the importance of the three philosophical trends mentioned was anyway on a level other than that of organization. They represented journalistically comprehensible, theoretical tendencies whose merit lay first of all in the proof that, even from positions of radical criticism, ways of legal political action were conceivable and, under the prevailing conditions in Russia, also reasonable providing the 'public opposition' was included in the definition of democracy and social progress. Their effect on a wider public was also due to the fact that their works were published legally. Even if only a small readership is assumed for the predominantly highly specialized works, the whole debate on Russia's prospects — as far as it was carried on publicly — nevertheless made an essential contribution to the development of idiomatic patterns, to the production of a colloquial framework for communication, in which a 'speechless' opposition could re-discover itself. The theoretically deduced demands for participation, the lack of which was experienced in a diffuse way by 'society' with its increasing social mobilization, were able to lend a rational perspective to the emotional anti-bureaucratism of the 'public movement' — a perspective essential to political efficiency which the everyday cultural activities alone had till then always been lacking.

The significance of these political trends approached the importance of a man who, more than anyone else, helped to forge the features of Russian constitutionalism up to 1917 — the historian Pavel N. Milyukov. Born in 1859 the son of a professor of architecture in a family of questionable nobility⁵⁰ and without property, student of Klyuchevskij and Vinogradov, he was one of the first readers at Moscow University. Thanks to an urbane and politically open-minded manner, he enjoyed a high reputation among the students. Thanks to his extramural commitment to education, he enjoyed an equally high reputation in the capital's society.⁵¹ In 1895

the Government put an end to his university career on the grounds of 'political unreliability' and banished him permanently from Moscow. He then lectured for a short time as Dragomanov's successor at the University of Sophia, until the Russian ambassador achieved his dismissal through the Bulgarian government.

He seems a unique figure among the oppositional theoreticians prior to 1905 not only because banishment and long years abroad had to all appearances removed him from the petty differences of opinion at home. Even earlier he had hardly been affected by the disputes between Marxists and Populists.⁵² His 'westernism', primed by Auguste Comte, Herbert Spencer and John Stuart Mill, led him to adopt a rational constitutionalism, which seems to be a consequence of recognizing the course of historical processes, of discerning the 'logic' of social and political institutions. The lawyer Iosif V. Gessen, who was closely associated with Milyukov after 1905 in the leadership of the Constitutional Democratic Party and in editing *Rech'* (The Speech), the party newspaper, remarks that Milyukov was constantly exchanging the role of observer, of historical chronicler with that of the political schoolmaster (*guverner*).⁵³ His political stance had been determined not so much by personal predisposition and tendencies as by 'historical prognosis'. Following the Bolshevik triumph, Gessen noted even more categorically in 1918: 'Milyukov is no Cadet. Hardly anybody knows what his real political convictions are; perhaps he does not actually have any but only the confidence that *Realpolitik* is possible in the position now occupied by the Cadets, that he — Milyukov — can realize this policy, that without him it would be realized less well or not at all'.

Milyukov's lack of ostentatious convictions could be interpreted as lack of principles only in a political landscape characterized by disputes on theory and dogma because it lacked opportunities for practical activity. His political versatility was geared time and again to the positivist interpretation of progress in history, to which one had to adjust. But precisely this historical opportunism predestined Milyukov to the leadership of a political movement deriving immediately from the social dynamism of an era of transformation and living from hand to mouth as far as theory was concerned. At an illegal meeting in the St. Petersburg Institute of Mining in January 1901 — a meeting in memory of Peter Lavrov, one of the great *narodnichestvo* leaders in the 1870s — he outlined the history of the older populism from the 'Land and Freedom' organization and the departure of youth

'to the people' (1874) through to the conspiratorial terror organization of the People's Will Party, and from this outline he came to the conclusion: 'Every motive force of the revolutionary movement which fails in its aims ends up in terrorism'.⁵⁴ Milyukov accounted for this historical warning in the thesis on 'struggle on the borders of legality' (*bor'ba na granitse legal'nosti*) which he developed during these weeks in the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* group.⁵⁵ The thesis aimed at letting the historically evolved public step beyond the limit of the autocratic regime by making conscious the value of individual activity in the historically defined cultural field and by making it politically operational. Milyukov saw the 'gradual replacement of socially beneficial acts by individuals through socially beneficial behaviour by the masses' as the way in which 'the spontaneous historical process' can be supplanted 'by the conscious' historical process.⁵⁶ This transformation had occurred in Europe in the transition to constitutional forms of political life and Russia was not destined to follow a different path, judging from the course of her history since Peter the Great.

Communicating such knowledge to the public was the function of historiography, in Milyukov's opinion. As a historian, he always saw himself as a politician as well. With his principal work, 'Outlines of Russian Culture', serialized since 1895 in the widely circulated Petersburg periodical *Mir Bozhij*,⁵⁷ Milyukov made an attempt, unique till then in Russian academic history, 'to analyze the present along with the past'.⁵⁸ In his 1903 and 1904 Chicago lectures on 'The Russian Crisis',⁵⁹ he added to the reflections given in the guise of history in the 'Outlines' the topical proof that the Eastern Empire was at a stage of social and political evolution whose only equivalent, according to the 'laws of political biology'⁶⁰ was 'representation', the constitutional parliamentary system. He reduced this conviction to a precise formula in the programme article 'From the Russian Constitutionalists', written in 1902: here he states that the constitution, as 'a form of higher culture', is indifferent to national peculiarities as are 'the use of the alphabet and of the printing press, of steam and electricity'; but it is also 'broad and flexible enough to encompass the most varied national content'.⁶¹ With such allusions – which Milyukov by no means meant metaphorically – the historian tried to counter the reservation, frequently presented as the Slavophile opinion, that Russia was not mature enough to be in any way fit for Western constitutional experiments. It was not a question of fashionable imitation of the West but, as Milyukov emphasized in 1905 in a dispute with

Dmitrij N. Shipov, rather more a question of 'independent creation (*sozdanie dlya sebya*) of all those elementary conditions of free political life, which 'mankind' everywhere always had to create in order to be worthy of its name'.⁶²

Reviewing the theoretical disputes of the 1890s we have found at least four positions, all of which brought into focus the liberal concept of individual and political freedom as the prerequisite for overcoming Russian backwardness. Far from merging into a coherent political theory, which could hardly have been fashioned from the conglomeration of subjectivist doctrines of perfectionism and neo-Kantian ethics, marxist development theory and positivist interpretations of history, they all deviated from the revolutionary traditions of Russian populism and marxism, thus lending ideological perspective to the pragmatism of 'educated society's' cultural activities. Credit is due to George Fischer for presenting the ideological changes in the 1890s for the first time as the turning point in the relationship between the Russian educated class and socialism, and for having connected the development of liberal concepts at least verbally with the social transformations of the period: 'As the nineteenth century neared its end, the intellegentsia had expanded into a prospering professional middle class. Its new life situation was mellowing it considerably. The 'grandsons' neither were nor felt as outcasts, as socially 'superfluous', as the 'sons' of the mid-century'.⁶³ How far the abbreviated pictorial language of this interpretation holds if it is taken at face value must, however, be examined.

If we ask whether the advance of the 'liberal' policy in 'society' was the outcome of a generation gap, a few parallels come to mind right away. The spokesmen of the new radical movements which began to take shape at the turn of the century belonged to the same generation of thirty-year-olds as did their critics, the ideological protagonists of constitutionalism. Viktor Chernov (born 1873), leader of the PSR, was the youngest in this group, Lenin and Struve (both born 1870), Kuskova and Prokopovich (1869 and 1871 respectively) were in the middle of the age-group, Peshekhonov and Myakotin (both 1867) were the eldest. In their youth they had all been members of populist and marxist school and student groups, and they all began their political careers at the beginning of the 1890s with the experience of the great famine. The same parallelism can also be observed — if in a wider range — among the authoritative father figures, all about one generation older, of the new political move-

ments. But the picture is clearer if we compare the age structure of the active members of the three most important political organizations which derived in the first years of the 20th century from the ideological struggles of the 1890s. David Lane calculates the average age of the local Social Democratic leaders, on the basis of lists of delegates to the Fifth Party Conference in 1907, as 27.7 years.⁶⁴ The delegates to the First PSR General Conference in 1908 were on average 34.3 years old.⁶⁵ The members of the constitutionalist Union of Liberation on the other hand already averaged 41 years in 1904, the year of foundation.⁶⁶ The range of their birth-years is exactly the same as that of the Social Democratic and Social Revolutionary leaders; not a single one of them was born after 1877; the large majority belonged to the first generation of school children and students following the educational reform.

These findings confirm Fischer's model in the one aspect that a new generation really does appear to have entered the political arena at the beginning of the 1890s. But this 'grandchild' generation showed an enormous range of political behaviour patterns, a range incomparably larger than that of the 'sons' in the 1870s on the one hand, and that of the 'great grandchildren' on the other. The figures also show that the constitutionalist movement after the turn of the century was recruited almost exclusively from people born in the 1860s and lacked reinforcements from the rising generation. The 'public opposition', articulate mainly in the zemstvos and in the professional associations, depended too much on professional and social experience to be able to offer young people, without position or vote within the institutions of 'society', any field of activity. Yet the rise of revolutionary parties based upon marxist and neo-populist revolutionary ideologies coincided with the great refusal of the students, who were growing up with the industrial revolution and to whom the bourgeois cultural optimism of their older contemporaries already had nothing more to say. Milyukov considered symptomatic the student reaction to his Lavrov speech in January 1901, with its historical warning against the decline into terrorism. In an excited discussion the students wanted to know which stage the revolutionary movement had by then reached.⁶⁷ The answer was given by history itself: the assassination of Bogolepov, Minister for People's Enlightenment, a few weeks after set off the series of terrorist attacks which was to pre-

occupy government and public years to come. One of Milyukov's listeners in the Institute of Mining, Boris Savinkov, was later to play an important role by making the arrangements for the assassination of Pleve, the Minister of the Interior, and of Grand Duke Sergej Alexandrovich on the eve of the 1905 revolution. In later years Milyukov looks back in his memoirs not without bitterness on youth's rejection of the aims and methods of the 'public opposition'. 'Struve ceased to be youth's ideal, and I never took his place.'⁶⁸

The implications of Milyukov's philosophy of history as well as the arguments by the critics of marxism and populism matched the type of established professional who could see his identity upheld in the parallels – outlined by Milyukov – between scientific-technological progress and the political system of constitutionalism rather than in the utopian ideas – overshooting his reality – of the dictatorship of the proletariat or of peasant socialism of the 'working people'. This may explain the great popularity of Milyukov's 'Outlines of Russian Culture', which seemed to reverse the materialist basis-superstructure interpretation and established for Russia the dominating influence of the state on the economy. This thesis did not touch upon 'organic' socio-economic development, accepted as tendentially 'right', it did not question the performance and position of the bourgeois-tinged intellectual worker. It asked rather about the 'right' legal system, about the 'right' organization of the state, within which the social configurations of this society could be perfected. Peter Struve envisaged this same problem as being prominent on the agenda of Russian national life. Emphasizing the close connection between individual freedom, guaranteed by law, and cultural progress he wrote in 1901:

'It is possible to have a society which lives merely spontaneously, which feels no necessity and has no strength to promote culture, that is, *consciously* to pose and autonomously to solve its tasks – a society where everything can move forward only at the government's beck, by its power, by its decree . . . Such, on the whole, has been Russian society throughout the eighteenth century. But contemporary Russian society is different. From the summits of the intelligentsia to the depths of national life, Russia consciously and autonomously creates culture, working on the solution of its higher tasks . . . alongside and in connection with moral and social

problems. [...] No matter how oppressive the conditions under which the process of the formation of national culture is taking place, we are ready to echo with a joyful heart the classic words of Hutten: *Die Geister sind erwacht – es ist eine Lust zu leben!*⁶⁹

2. THE ORIGINS OF THE PERIODICAL *OSVOBOZHDENIE*

The history of the emergence of the first constitutionalist programme coincides with the preliminary history of the periodical *Osvobozhdenie* (Liberation), whose name in its turn is inextricably bound up with that of Peter Struve. It can be said that this platform for constitutionalism in Russia would never have come into being without Struve, although he was just as untypical of Russian constitutionalism as he had been of social democracy in the 1890s. But Struve's biography for the years 1900–1902 can serve us as Ariadne's clew in searching out the beginnings of a political grouping in the muddled 'public movement' field. This political grouping can be termed constitutionalist since it set itself the goal of disseminating, with the help of a journalistic medium to be published 'beyond the reach of the Russian state authority',⁷⁰ the idea of a constitutional order based on guaranteed political and civil rights.

As we have seen, at the turn of the century Struve, through criticism of Marx and reception of neo-Kantian philosophy, had come to theoretical conclusions the political consequence of which – applied to Russia – lay in the idea of a nationwide liberation movement which would unite all oppositional and revolutionary forces, regardless of theoretical conviction, in the morally necessary fight against absolutism. Against the background of the autocratic regime's legitimisation crisis and of the 'public movement', which was expanding under the economic crisis, this idea seemed to be not entirely without bearing on reality. Notwithstanding his increasing political isolation as far as the Social Democrats were concerned, Struve was held in high esteem at least in the Petersburg scene, which was still hardly organized in the party political sense. Socialist and radical democratic forces here were grouped around the editorial offices of the legal periodicals, such as *Mir Bozhij* and *Russkoe Bogatstvo* and reached the public through the Writers Union and the Free Economic Society.

In the winter of 1899/1900 the legal Marxists met Prokopovich and Kuskova regularly, at the home of Struve's friend Vasilij Ya. Bogucharskij, to discuss the latest political events and to prepare literary campaigns, and frequently the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* Populists also took part.⁷¹ The mood during this winter of the intelligentsia in St. Petersburg, existing somewhere between legality and conspiracy, is described by a young observer in the following words:

'The whole public atmosphere was unusually heated and the revolutionary-minded St. Petersburg intelligentsia lived under semi-legal conditions. The centre of social life for the liberal intelligentsia and the student body was the Free Economic Society. Talks by Myakotin and Peshekhonov, by V.V. [Vorontsov], but especially by Struve and Tugan-Baranovskij were real events. Access to the Free Economic Society was considered a privilege; conversely, inability or disinterest in gaining access to this temple of public thought and sentiment was considered a sign of outdated and reactionary attitudes, and such people were subjected to well-nigh suspicious glances.'⁷²

In those times of social, political and intellectual fermentation, when the delineations between the groupings were still in flux, Struve might have hoped that a resolute political initiative on his part could provide the decisive impetus for the anti-autocratic united front.

To this end, Struve once again sought support from the Social Democrats at the beginning of 1900. Among the Socialists, who had broken up into mutually hostile factions, two old friends from the time of the struggle against populism and from the Petersburg 'Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class' offered themselves as discussion and coalition partners — Alexander N. Potresov and Vladimir I. Ul'yanov (Lenin), both of whom returned from exile in Siberia in January 1900. The two had just agreed with Yulij O. Tserdbaum (Martov) to form their own literary group to undertake concerted action with Plekhanov's Liberation of Labour group against revisionism and economism in social democracy and, from a journalistic basis yet to be created, to organize and discipline the party as a political weapon.⁷³ Dependent on contacts and allies after several years of banishment, they were not hindered by the verdict on the theories⁷⁴ spreading throughout St. Petersburg, pronounced in 1899 in the 'Protest of the Russian Social Democrats', in seeking contact

with the vituperated literary groups in the capital. By the beginning of April 1900 the point was reached where a discussion took place in Pskov between the 'trojka' on the one side, Struve and Tugan-Baranovskij on the other. Following many a clash during complicated negotiations, led by Struve in January 1901 in Munich, the home of the new editorial board, the agreements reached in Pskov on participation by the legal Marxists in the intended party newspapers *Iskra* and *Zarya* were specified and confirmed in a formal contract.⁷⁵

To justify this alliance, Struve subsequently pointed out that he had been united with his opponents by the conviction that, under the circumstances, only the Russian proletariat could be considered as leaders of the future revolution (atrophied liberalism), which would take place on the basis of evolved capitalism (anti-populism); the proletariat had a vital interest in securing civil and political rights, he said, which was why the political struggle for democratic institutions had priority in Russia over the economic struggle (anti-economism).⁷⁶ Yet these points of ideological accord cannot gloss over the fact that the agreement was based on both sides only on utilitarian considerations and tactical scheming. The 'trojka' had set itself the goal of creating a politically active revolutionary party for which it claimed the leadership not only in the labour movement but also *vis-à-vis* the 'oppositional democratic movement'. On their return from exile, Lenin and Potresov had had to convince themselves 'that the legal Marxist group was still the authoritative nucleus of this oppositional democratic movement'.⁷⁷ The link with Struve was therefore intended to help them establish the hegemony of social democracy, reorganized according to revolutionary principles, over the still amorphous liberal movement. In particular Struve was meant to give them access to the 'public opposition's' sources of finance and information.⁷⁸ As for Struve, his tactical position was determined by the continuing political abstinence of 'society'. So long as the 'public opposition' showed not the slightest trace of that political militancy he had been expecting of it in the past years, he was bound to have serious thoughts about his position in the Social Democratic Party. When he travelled to Pskov, he did indeed have in his pocket the offer from an unnamed zemstvo friend to finance an oppositional newspaper abroad,⁷⁹ but without broader support at home this threatened to become a lost cause, so he was hoping to be able to unite his plans with those of the 'trojka'. In the ideologically and organizationally unsettled situation of Russian political life at that time, Struve could

just as much be counted a Social Democrat as Lenin or Plekhanov, and he put special emphasis on this claim in his discussions with the 'trojka'.⁸⁰

But now it is striking that Struve appears in the agreement, signed in Munich on (17th)/30th January 1901, as the representative of a special 'democratic oppositional group' called *Svoboda* (Freedom).⁸¹ There was also no more talk of Struve participating in the Social Democratic Party newspaper; but his contractual partners, 'the social democratic group *Zarya – Iskra*', undertook to publish a supplement entitled *Sovremennoe Obozrenie* (Contemporary Review) to their journal, to be edited and financed by Struve and with the technical operation and distribution in the hands of the '*Zarya*' editorial board. Both parties undertook to provide materials, both parties were granted the right to veto articles and material from the other party. But this document does not simply lay down the allocation of functions in a joint enterprise, which would have complied with Struve's original intention. The implicit object of the contract was the demarcation of two ideologically and organizationally strictly different political groupings, and it must be asked which political reality this contract tallied with.

We know that the special position as representative of the 'democratic opposition' was strongly recommended to Struve by the Geneva Liberation of Labour group (Plekhanov, Aksel'rod, Vera Zasulich), which the 'trojka' had been able to win over for its project during the summer. In a carefully worded letter to Struve, Pavel Aksel'rod substantiated this proposal with the advantages which a coalition of two clearly contrasting partners would gain both from the point of view of actual co-operation and of loyalty *vis-à-vis* the social forces which each partner wanted to capture for its own cause.⁸² Behind this suggestion there was a fervent dispute between the 'trojka' and Plekhanov, in which the latter had agreed to co-operation with Struve only on condition that the Marx critic did not present himself as a Social Democrat.⁸³ Meantime an *Iskra* editorial announcement, written by Lenin, had already appeared as a pamphlet; contrary to the April agreements, it contained violent attacks on the revisionists and here Struve, along with Eduard Bernstein, was even mentioned by name.⁸⁴

We can make only hypothetical suggestions as to what caused Struve to sign this contract, which marked his excommunication as a Social Democrat. The first hypothesis emerges from the wording

of the contract itself. Struve evidently negotiated in Munich from a position of strength which allowed him to turn the tables on the hegemony theory and to 'make use of' his orthodox contractual partners. Despite all the formulae aimed at equality, it was an unbalanced contract which concentrated the essential advantages on Struve's side. The *Zarya-Iskra* group entered into commitments with no definite assurance of the countervalue – information and money; for Struve had absolutely refused to include an article in the contract which would have permitted free use of material, received for *Sovremennoe Obozrenie*, in the social democratic journal.⁸⁵ The agreement thus presented him with the prospect of a press medium beyond the reach of the Russian censor of which – thanks to availability of money and information – he would be, as Lenin wrathfully put it, 'the master, and the sole master at that', without having to burden himself with the bothersome technical problems of production and distribution.⁸⁶

Even if Struve's strength in the Munich negotiations did not result from his opponents' weakness alone, he must certainly have hoped he would be able to exploit the advantages of the contract in future to the benefit of his political concept. In his memoirs written thirty years later, Struve substantiates his attitude mainly with the intransigence of the 'Orthodoxists' which had been apparent in Lenin's *Iskra* editorial announcement, and he goes on: 'I saw quite clearly that my influence among the Liberals and the Democrats would dwindle, or even be reduced to nothing and become a negative quantity, should I submit to the "Orthodoxalists"'.⁸⁷ He presents himself as 'a genuine representative of the views of a social milieu which . . . was entitled to keep its own character', as a man with whom one could negotiate 'no longer as a Social Democrat nor even as an ex-Socialist'. We know too little about his political activities between April and December 1900 to be able to substantiate these sparse references. But there is nevertheless information on new contacts made by Struve in the summer and autumn of 1900, both with the Petersburg labour movement (the *Sotsialist/Workers Library group*)⁸⁸ and with the leaders of the opposition in the Tver' zemstvo (I.I. Petrunkevich)⁸⁹ on which he seems to have set high hopes. It was probably in this period that he came by Vitte's 'Autocracy and Zemstvo' Memorandum from zemstvo circles, which he then took to Munich – along with 6,000 roubles to finance its printing – to have it published by the *Zarya* editorial board.⁹⁰ Admittedly, a political union did not yet result from these

contacts; there is no indication that the 'Democratic Oppositional Group *Svoboda*' – party to the contract with the 'Orthodoxalists' – was anything more than 'a fictitious firm'.⁹¹ This explains why Struve continued to be interested in co-operation with the Social Democrats. But the Munich agreement signals that the contacts made in summer 1900 had awakened Struve's hopes for a decisive expansion of his scope for activity in the near future.

These hopes can be discerned in the new paper's declaration which Struve had prepared to be published jointly with a corresponding document written by Plekhanov.⁹² For his part Plekhanov welcomed the invigoration of the legal struggle against the autocracy through the 'democratic opposition' in the sense of the hegemony theory as the 'politically necessary and long desired complement to the revolutionary activity of the Russian Social Democrats'. Struve, however, was not thinking of complementing principal political activities of any nature, but rather of propaganda for the widest possible anti-autocratic front, in which questions of coalitions and hegemonies were overridden by solidarity in the demand for freedom. He related the idea of coalition only internally to the actual alliance which he himself as an individual had entered into with the *Iskra-Zarya* group, and thereby neglected the political differences separating him from his contractual partners. In the interests of propagating the idea of freedom he rejected almost programmatically every stipulation 'that would predetermine in detail some particular constitutional arrangement for our multinational and multilingual country'. Like Plekhanov, he emphasized 'the prime political importance and mission of the Russian labour movement'; but he was very far from subjecting the struggle for political freedom to class struggle accents. Illegal and revolutionary as well as legal modes of action were in principle all the same to Struve for the future of the movement, whose only course and criterion was 'the steadfast striving to win for Russians . . . the conditions of respectable political life'. The choice of forms and means for the movement was to be left to democratic compromise between the politically mobilized groups and classes in the country. The journalistically active groups abroad were thereby allocated an intermediary function dependent on the dynamism of developments inside Russia. Struve explained that the principal task of his journalistic efforts was 'to give political sense to the legal struggle against the superbly organized absolutism of the bureaucracy'. In this he was concerned with aligning the emancipatory forces hidden in the social

process: 'In our opinion one of the most important achievements of political awareness of recent times is the conviction that there exists an indissoluble historical link between so-called legal and cultural activity and that which aims directly and openly to change the existing political order – a conviction which becomes ever more rooted among both the Russian opposition and . . . the government'. When Struve finally referred all the oppositional elements to the alliance with social democracy, – 'the only organized force among the Russian opposition' – he may privately have seen in the anticipation of political mobilization of 'society' a prospect for social democracy itself to come out of hiding in its corner of illegality.

As a result of the Munich agreement, articles by both Struve and his friend Bogucharskij appeared in the Social Democratic journals in February and April 1901. Besides these, *Zarya* produced Vitte's Memorandum with Struve's preface as a separate publication. *Sovremennoe Obozrenie*, on the other hand, came to nothing. External reasons and the insurmountable differences between the coalition partners, but mainly the politicalization of the 'public movement' in 1901, hoped for by Struve, contributed to the fact that this plan disappeared into the archives without leaving any further trace on the history of Russian party politics.

Struve left Munich shortly after the (14th)/27th February.⁹³ He interrupted his journey in Frankfurt to settle the details for the *Sovremennoe Obozrenie* with Bogucharskij, who – apart from the financier Zhukovskij – was the only person who could still be called a member of the 'Svoboda Group'.⁹⁴ Struve then reached Petersburg on the eve of the big student demonstration in Kazan Square on 4th March 1901. His arrest during this event and banishment from the capital⁹⁵ were the reasons for burying the Munich plans.

Struve chose to live in Tver', the centre of a province on the border of the central industrial rayon, halfway between St. Petersburg and Moscow on the railway line. Thanks to the Volga port and the railway, the town was an important entrepôt with a considerable textiles industry (the Morozov Manufactures). This industrially underdeveloped, remote area – characterized, like most of the less productive Central Russian areas, by extensive difficulties in agricultural adjustment – was distinguished by a relatively high mobility of the population. Since the days of the emancipation of the serfs, Tver' had been considered particularly open-minded and lively among the provinces of European Russia.⁹⁶ The public reprimand by Nicholas II, suffered by

the Tver' zemstvo in 1895 for its address on the occasion of the young Tsar's coronation, had not been forgotten. Struve had also been involved at that time in the subsequent journalistic campaign, during which he had worked together with the initiator and writer of the address, the landed marshall of the nobility Fedor I. Rodichev.⁹⁷

The fact that this province and its local administration was also one of the most important centres in the new advance of the zemstvo movement at the turn of the century was due, apart from its liberal tradition, to the work of Ivan I. Petrunkevich; he had been banished from his home in 'Little Russia' and had acquired responsibility for the census in Tver' so that he could again become active in zemstvo work. Petrunkevich is something of a legend in the history of Russian constitutionalism, the personification of the political, democratic components of the zemstvo movement, which – isolated as the movement was during the second half of the 19th century – became palpable in his biography.⁹⁸ He was born in 1844 into an old noble, landed family in the province of Chernigov; his father was very much committed in the social life of the province during the years of the Great Reforms. Deeply impressed by Alexander Herzen and his periodical *Kolokol* (The Bell), Ivan Il'ich advocated even as a young man a constitutional regime which in his eyes presupposed above all the removal of class privileges of the nobility and the development of self-government born on the basis of equality by all sections of the population. After studying at St. Petersburg University, he devoted himself from 1868 to zemstvo work. He was convinced that this offered the surest guarantee in preparing the country, without violent revolution, for transition to a constitutional, democratic order by raising the level of peasant education and the economic standard of the peasant economy. During the 1878/81 political crisis, he took the initiative in the attempt to unite the zemstvos in a constitutional programme and to head off at the same time the revolutionary underground movement by mobilizing public opinion. But the press as well as the revolutionary groups let him down at that stage, and he could bring only five of the 34 zemstvo assemblies to petition the government for basic reforms.⁹⁹ His part in this so-called First Zemstvo Movement earned Petrunkevich not only police persecution for the next 25 years but also the reputation of being 'the founder of the first serious constitutional movement in Russia'.¹⁰⁰ After that he lived under police observation, first in exile in Kostroma, later in Tver' and Moscow.

During the period of growing social activity following the 1891/92 famine, Petrunkevich's house in Moscow had become the centre of a small but consistent group whose members were united by appreciation of public work and the zemstvo as the starting points for the political revival of Russia.¹⁰¹ Some members of the group were friends from Tver' who had already supported Petrunkevich during the First Zemstvo Movement – his brother Mikhail, a zemstvo doctor, Fedor Rodichev, A.A. and P.A. Bakunin, younger brothers of the anarchist, the well-known journalist V.A. Gol'tsev who had been forced out of a readership at Moscow University and then out of the Tver' zemstvo by the Government. And some of the members were friends with whom Petrunkevich had become acquainted after his move to Moscow, among them the young professor for mineralogy, V.I. Vernadskij, and his student friend D.I. Shakhovskoj from Yaroslavl', the historian and expert on the peasants A.A. Kornilov, the Ol'denburg brothers, also the philosopher P.I. Novgorodtsev, the finance and agricultural expert M. Ya. Gertsenshtejn, and the head of the statistical department of the Moscow zemstvo, N.A. Kablukov. These names constitute a considerable portion of the later Central Committee of the Constitutional Democratic Party. In the history of constitutionalism in Russia there is hardly any other group whose affiliations reached back so far and were so little impaired by the course of events. In the early 1890s, the relief schemes for the starving and the educational movement had been motivated by this group.¹⁰² In 1893 and 1894 Petrunkevich organized two illegal zemstvo congresses in Moscow, which were used a year later as a vehicle for the address campaign on the coronation of Nicholas II.¹⁰³ In 1895 efforts to expand this campaign by the Petrunkevich group were unsuccessful – efforts towards founding a newspaper abroad and a legal daily paper in Moscow around which oppositional political elements outside the zemstvo milieu were intended to gather.¹⁰⁴

It would be difficult to sketch a uniform political line for the Petrunkevich group of the 1890s. It was not an organization and did not follow any specified aims. 'People of a certain way of thinking', Rodichev explained this alliance, 'knew and felt that they were not alone in Russia. They came to think of themselves as reserves and skeleton units, which could be mobilized when the time came'.¹⁰⁵ Neither of the two zemstvo congresses in 1893 and 1894 indicated any far-reaching political prospects. Zemstvo work here still seemed to be a goal in itself and not a concept for overcoming the existing

order, even though in the congress debates the abundant specific grievances in the life of the zemstvo were already considered from the point of view of principles.¹⁰⁶ But even the planned objectives among Petrunkevich's closer friends were at this period still well within the narrow framework of the zemstvo movement. In a discussion in 1894 Shakhovskoj spoke to Struve — thus incurring his scorn — of a 'self-appointed assembly of zemstvo representatives promoting the constitution', and in 1896 he suggested supplementing the State Council with elected representatives from the 34 provincial zemstvo assemblies.¹⁰⁷

Petrunkevich himself had carried over his political beliefs from the zemstvo movement of the late 1870s into the debates of the 1890s — an advantage, one might say, over his friends who were between ten and twenty years his junior. His beliefs consisted of profession to two urgent functions of the 'public movement': achievement of freedom of speech, of the press and of assembly as well as guarantees for the free development of personality as the immediate goal, and as the future target the organization of the 'constituent assembly' by the people themselves.¹⁰⁸ Petrunkevich was always geared more to the effects of cultural development work in the country than to theoretical postulates. In his view the achievement of civil and political rights was a matter of organizing 'educated society' — a matter not limited to the zemstvo milieu, but which could nonetheless find its most important institutional support there. The zemstvo men's awareness of this, their immediate task, and extensive utilization of all legal opportunities for political action would at the same time knock the bottom out of revolutionary terrorism and the radical slogans of emigrants removed from the social context. Under these circumstances, it was only a question of time to Petrunkevich until Russia would undergo transition from autocracy to a constitutional parliamentary system. The dispute over which side Russian society and the people would then take was futile, he once explained to a high government official, 'because we, the Constitutionalists, have the history of all nations behind us'.¹⁰⁹ However much these words may remind us of Milyukov's historical prognosis, there is nonetheless an essential difference between the two positions. In his life style and activities, Petrunkevich was much more closely intertwined with precisely those social movements on which Milyukov built his prognosis than the worldly, learned chronicler and advocate of 'historical necessity'. If one wants to believe his later profession, it was lack

of identification with what was going on in the country and what he thought he had to represent as a 'public activist' which moved Petrunkevich in 1896 to buy a small estate from the Bakunins in the Tver' province and to withdraw completely to the countryside for the next few years.¹¹⁰ It was certainly no coincidence that he decided on this step when the beginnings of political mobilization of 'society', qualified by the Tsar as 'senseless dreams', lost the little coherence they had only just gained. Milyukov was travelling through the Balkans at the time, preoccupied with archaeological studies; Petrunkevich went 'to reconcile himself once again with the village, with the people' – mystification or ideology of the 'enlightened estate owner'; the episode illustrates the bond linking zemstvo constitutionalism with the older traditions of 'service to the people' (*sluzhenie narodu*).

When Struve went to Tver' in April 1901, he may have expected to find himself again in the 'social milieu' on which he had just begun to set his hopes. Petrunkevich, who had voiced an extremely favourable opinion of the 'young author' after their meetings of the previous year,¹¹¹ will have welcomed Struve's decision. During the provincial zemstvo session, they met every day, 'and we talked about the same subject as in our discussions in Moscow with Vernadskij, Shakhovskoj, Kornilov, Novgorodtsev and the others – that is to say, about Russia's political situation, the necessity of creating a free press abroad for the struggle against a government whose domestic policy was becoming ever more arbitrary and was worsening the already unbearable situation, which had to be terminated by introducing a representational constitution'.¹¹² Encouraged by the movement in 'society', which began to expand after the events in Kazan Square, the Petrunkevich group in Moscow took on a concrete political perspective for the first time. In the summer of 1901 this group reached a definitive decision to organize publication abroad of a newspaper under a constitutionalist programme and to collect the necessary funds from possible sympathisers.¹¹³

At first the group wanted Milyukov as editor – he had just been released in June from a long spell of detention pending trial. Although he was interested in the project, Milyukov had little inclination to take on the risk of emigration for an indefinite period. Petrunkevich also agreed that 'such an important man of talent' should not be removed unnecessarily from the internal political struggle by delivering him up 'to the same fate as Herzen'.¹¹⁴ But when Petrunkevich learned

that Struve wanted to get away from police observation by emigrating, the problem of the editorship all but solved itself for him and his friends. Any reservations about entrusting their project to a man regarded until recently as the 'leader of militant marxism' were cleared up by Struve's preface to Vitte's Memorandum, published in the early summer.¹¹⁵ Struve was presented with 'a formal and categorical proposal', which 'excluded the possibility of any coalition with Social Democrats or other socialist elements, which would have tied up [his] freedom of action as the editor of the new organ responsible to the Russian public'.¹¹⁶ Struve for his part asked for complete editorial independence from his friends and the backers, and began to prepare his emigration. In November, his wife and children arrived in Montreux, Struve followed them – probably illegally – at the end of December 1901.¹¹⁷

The precise terms of the agreement between Struve and the Petrunkevich group are not very clear. The details known to us were reported by those concerned in most cases after an interval of several decades; they are correspondingly hazy, do not always tally and have led to contradictory interpretations in the relevant literature.¹¹⁸ A few years ago, Richard Pipes tried to throw some light on the confusion. He succeeded in identifying, with a certain degree of probability, Dmitrij E. Zhukovskij – the sponsor of the agreement with the Social Democrats – as the man who proposed to Struve in Tver' that he take on the editorship of the new periodical.¹¹⁹ Pipes assumes that Struve went about his own business until March 1902, with 30,000 roubles from Zhukovskij's purse – which he could well afford – and the non-committal promises from a few literati and zemstvo people behind him. Although it had long been decided to engage the former 'leader of militant marxism' as editor, the Petrunkevich group had waited with the negotiations until Struve was abroad and had made the technical preparations before supporting what was then an operational business. – But this argument is not convincing. There is no indication that Struve would have left Russia without some form of commitment from Petrunkevich. Had that not been the case, he would have had to stake everything on finally activating the contract with the *Iskra-Zarya* group. But he made no move in that direction.¹²⁰ So what alternative did he have? Zhukovskij's roubles alone could not compensate for the political concept behind the Munich contract which – not least of all thanks to Zhukovskij's roubles – put Struve in the more favourable tactical position. And if it was Zhukovskij who

proposed the editorship of the new journal to his friend, then we must ask what caused him – the man who a few months previously had even been prepared to help finance the ‘Orthodoxists’ – to make his latest offer under the condition that no coalition with any sort of Socialists be undertaken. So we do have to assume that Struve had reached agreement with Petrunkevich before he left Russia, because otherwise Zhukovskij’s role in the preliminary discussions in Tver’ would seem dubious. Shakhovskoj, whose records tally best with the events, also mentions that, before he departed, the future editor made sure of ‘active support’ from the *zemstvo* people, professors and *literati* in the main cities and in the provinces.¹²¹ And that can only mean that the marriage, which in July 1902 resulted in the birth of the periodical *Osvobozhdenie* in Stuttgart, had been contracted about nine months previously in Tver’. The fact that the campaign in Russia, which was meant to guarantee the journal’s existence, was by no means finished when Struve departed in December is easily explained by the lack of time between Zhukovskij’s offer (not before August) and Struve’s emigration. ‘Formal ties’ between the new partners, which Pipes could not establish for the winter of 1901/02, did not in fact exist; they also never came into being. Even after the founding of the ‘Union of Liberation’, *Osvobozhdenie* did not figure officially as its mouthpiece.¹²² The editor’s relationship to the ‘friends’ (*druz’ya*) of *Osvobozhdenie* – as the non-organized group of assistants and sympathizers in Russia was called for a long time – was not established through mutual contractual obligations, but was based rather on the idea of political co-operation between various, till then separate, political forces – an idea which was provided with the chance of realization by the increasing politicalization of the ‘public movement’.

The political undertaking of this initially very small group – it may have been hardly more than a few dozen people – was not limited to starting a newspaper. That was the immediate, practical goal, but efforts in this direction already pointed further to the mobilization and functional organization of forces of various social origins. This happened in the winter of 1901/02 in two ways: recruitment of assistants for the projected journal and development of a rudimentary distribution organization on the one hand, on the other the formulation of the constitutionalist programme and discussions of it in various groups and circles.

Vasilij Ya. Bogucharskij, Struve’s friend and confidant, who had

met him in February 1901 in Frankfurt about the *Sovremennoe Obozrenie*, made the recruitment of assistants his concern. In 1906 he arranged for a report on his efforts to be sent to I.P. Belokonskij – a report which may be considered one of the most important sources on the preliminary history of the periodical *Osvobozhdenie*.¹²³ He had returned to Petersburg shortly after Struve, but as a result of the Kazan Square events he had found almost none of his acquaintances. Bogucharskij belonged to the hard core of the Writers Union, whose leaders had been banished from the capital in connection with the 4th March demonstrations and had mostly (*inter alia* Annenskij, Myakotin) settled in Finland. – Milyukov, who associated with this group, also spent the summer in Finland following his release from prison in June 1901. – Bogucharskij followed his friends and also called on Struve in Tver'. While Struve was preparing for his emigration, Bogucharskij succeeded in organizing some of their mutual friends in Finland into a 'special group for safeguarding *Osvobozhdenie*' – the first *Osvobozhdenie* circle which was to play an important role in distributing the periodical inside Russia and in organizing the 'Union of Liberation'. During the winter Struve's middleman extended his recruiting trip into Southern Russia. In February 1902 he journeyed through Tula, Kursk, Khar'kov and the Crimea. On his travels he visited Gor'kij, Chekhov and N.A. Rubakin, one of the founders of the Writers Union, as well as the young philosopher, Semen L. Frank, from the legal Marxist group, 'in order to inform all sympathisers about the founding of *Osvobozhdenie* . . . and to call upon them to participate'.¹²⁴

Struve could have found no-one better than Bogucharskij for this organizational work. Ekaterina Kuskova, who had a high opinion of him, thought there was probably no intelligent person in Russia who did not know him one way or another. She describes him as a life-long optimist, full of 'voraciousness for communion with people', and yet constantly plagued by the worry of being insufficient.¹²⁵ His was no original mind, but he was an exemplary representative of that stratum of unattached intelligentsia unable to find its footing in Russian society in transition and constantly searching for the ideological lever 'which they could cling to'. In his youth – he had risen to the rank of lieutenant with the Cossacks – he had been a Populist and was arrested in 1884 for participating in the People's Will Party, was cashiered from the Army and banished to Siberia.¹²⁶ On his return in 1890 he had taken part – to the horror of all the police

units responsible for keeping him under observation – in practically everything offered by the *intelligentsiya* scene in these stirring times. In 1893/94 he became active in the People's Rights Party along with Annenskij, Prokopovich and Kuskova, and at the end of the decade we see him as a journalist and historian of the revolutionary movement among the St. Petersburg legal Marxists around Peter Struve. Bogucharskij's inability to commit himself politically on a permanent basis prompted Milyukov to remark that he was 'a politician "without a title"' (*politicheskij deyatel' 'bez zaglaviya'*)¹²⁷ Less interested in theoretical problems than in a coalition of all revolutionary and oppositional elements in the country,¹²⁸ he had followed Struve into the agreement with Lenin and Plekhanov and was now working just as eagerly towards a merger of the 'democratic intelligentsia' with the *zemstvo* people. Ekaterina Kuskova calls him 'the life and soul of *Osvobozhdenie*, its most active member'.¹²⁹

Bogucharskij's travels in the winter of 1901/02 not only prove his talent for organization and his wide-ranging contacts – their results also show that Struve's name enjoyed a good reputation in the 'brotherhood of writers' in Russia.¹³⁰ And what is more, the enterprise which Bogucharskij was publicizing promised to fill a genuine gap, both journalistically and politically. It appeared to offer the alternative of a 'realistic policy' as against the utopias of the social revolution which the illegal groups had indulged in. Even in her old age, Kuskova still spoke with partisan dedication about the prospects opening up here. To all those, to whom 'the socialist cap on the trunk of Russian society, characterized by archaic remainders of feudalism, was a political monstrosity – equally dangerous both to the country and to proper understanding of the complex patterns of socialism', the task of 'bringing the constitutionalist forces in the country into the open and of gathering them into a political organization acting according to a plan'¹³¹ – this task became clear at this period. An initial contact between the 'friends' of *Osvobozhdenie* recruited by Bogucharskij and the Petrunkevich group came about during the last days of December 1901 on the occasion of the Tenth Congress of Scientists and Physicians in St. Petersburg. According to the report by the journalist Ivan P. Belokonskij, who took part in the discussions, the small group already spoke of setting up a secret organization and proposed a 'special bureau consisting of seven St. Petersburg literati and well-known *zemstvo* men'.¹³² Such an initiative was admittedly

premature, yet the five negotiators seem to have achieved an initial consensus on support of the projected journalistic enterprise.

In the meantime Petrunkevich was concerned with the formulation of a programme platform. Following another round of discussions in February 1902, this time in Moscow at the home of Vladimir E. von Dehn, a reader in political economy, Petrunkevich invited Milyukov to his estate, Mashuk, to draft the declaration of principle for the new periodical with him. During discussions lasting several days, in which Prince Dmitrii I. Shakhovskoj and the historian Alexander A. Kornilov also took part, Milyukov's programme notes developed 'into a whole article which was subsequently debated with various individuals and groups'.¹³³ These debates served as a vehicle for creating further friends and sponsors, mainly in zemstvo circles, for the projected periodical. In February Shakhovskoj presented Milyukov's article to trustworthy people in Tver', Kostroma and Vologda. Chances for further discussions arose at the end of March at the All-Russian Exhibition of Domestic Crafts in St. Petersburg, which brought together a large number of zemstvo people and members of the Third Element with intellectuals from the capital. In small conspiratorial conferences on the fringe of the exhibition, Milyukov's programme article was discussed in detail and at least one other text was conceived for the first number of *Osvobozhdenie*.¹³⁴

We know almost nothing of the details of these programme deliberations. We only know the final result — Milyukov's article, which shows a highly personal approach. Judging from this, the deliberations seem to have been more of an informative than of a constructive and resolutive character. Opinion-forming and decision-making were not as yet organizational methods of constituting an autonomous group or of developing organizational infrastructures. Although objections were raised on various sides against the article,¹³⁵ the text published in *Osvobozhdenie* No. 1 shows not the slightest trace of a compromise negotiated between the various interests. The text functioned — still in the first stages of organizational formation — more as a means of publicity and as such took care from the very beginning not to alienate the groups it was appealing to. Discussion of the article at the various conferences forced 'those elements sympathizing with the project to form groups and take up closer mutual contact'.¹³⁶ In this communicative function, discussion of the programme article already created a certain solidarity, but it was aimed

more at the practical goal of bringing about and maintaining the projected periodical than at specific political purport.

The programme conferences, pushed ahead mainly by the Petrunkevich group, were obviously exactly co-ordinated with Bogucharskij's activities. Here Shakhovskoj took over the function Bogucharskij had performed in the St. Petersburg literary circle. Although the exact opposite of the Petersburgers in origins and character, he was no less suited to this task. He was a man with the life style of a Tolstoj character, commended by contemporaries for his childlike candour, who knew how to convince by using his credibility. He had an estate in Yaroslavl', after studying he had spent some years in zemstvo work in Tver' — which explains his involvement in the address campaign in 1894/95 — and he knew the Moscow scene just as well as Petersburg society, reaching into governing circles. The journalist Ariadna Tyrkova, a colleague of his on the Yaroslavl' provincial newspaper *Severnyj Kraj*, called him a '*sobiratel*' — a person who always knew how to gather people to him or to a cause, who was always concerned that his numerous friends throughout the country get to know each other.¹³⁷ Due to his ubiquity during the preparatory phase of *Osvobozhdenie*, he was known to his friends only under the nickname 'the flying Dutchman'. His name turns up in all the preliminary discussions. When Bogucharskij was promoting the periodical in Southern Russia, Shakhovskoj was travelling through the northern provinces. At the beginning of March he travelled to Germany for the first time to clear up technical details (title of the periodical, location of the editorial offices) with Struve,¹³⁸ and he was back in St. Petersburg in time for the Domestic Crafts Exhibition to help Bogucharskij direct the deliberations among the 'friends'.

In April we then see the hard core of the 'friends' of *Osvobozhdenie* — the title of the periodical had just been agreed with Struve — gathered for the first time in Moscow for the final editing of the programme article.¹³⁹ The conference participants numbered not more than 15 or 17, of whom 14 are known by name. They can be divided into three groups according to political origins. The biggest group was made up of members of the Petrunkevich circle — apart from the Petrunkevich brothers and Shakhovskoj, the Moscow professors V.I. Vernadskij, P.I. Novgorodtsev, who brought along his colleague the historian Alexander A. Kizeveter, and the literary historian V.E. Yakushkin, grandson of the famous Decembrist. The St. Petersburg literati were represented by Struve's friends Bogucharskij

and D.E. Zhukovskij, as well as A.P. Mertvago, a journalist specializing in agricultural questions, and L.L. Benua, who probably belonged to the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* group. The third and smallest group was formed by three members of *Beseda*, an exclusive group with aristocratic characteristics, made up of marshalls of the nobility and zemstvo representatives, which had been meeting regularly in Moscow since the end of 1899. These members were the two estate owners Prince Peter D. Dolgorukov (chairman of a district zemstvo board in Kursk province) and Nikolaj N. L'vov (chairman of the Saratov Province zemstvo), and the Moscow reader S.A. Kotlyarevskij (zemstvo deputy in Saratov). They were not among the initiators of the agreement with Struve. It seems they had been called in only during the course of the programme deliberation – presumably by Shakhovskoj, who was also a member of *Beseda*.¹⁴⁰ At the Moscow conference they represented a small group of zemstvo men – who had declared their solidarity with the *Osvobozhdenie* goals in an 'open letter' composed by Peter Dolgorukov and accepted on the occasion of the Domestic Crafts Exhibition in St. Petersburg – but they were at the same time careful to dissociate themselves from conspirators and revolutionaries.¹⁴¹ Among the 'friends', this group made up a minority which was financially perhaps the most well-to-do and also the best informed on events in governmental policy, both behind the scenes and in public.

With this team, the Moscow conference adequately represented the people and groups who had actively collaborated in founding the periodical *Osvobozhdenie*. Clear predominance had fallen to the wing – here briefly termed the 'Moscow wing' – deriving from pragmatic zemstvo work and other public institutions as opposed to the more theoretically oriented 'Petersburg wing', which was still partly rooted in the subculture of Russian radicalism. The reason for this was that the preparations for publishing *Osvobozhdenie* concurred with a lively advance of the zemstvo movement instigated by the establishment of the 'Special Conference on the Needs of Agriculture' in January 1902.¹⁴² This impetus very decidedly extended the Petrunkevich group's scope for activity, while the St. Petersburg literary scene had been robbed of its basis for communication by the closure of the Free Economic Society and the break up of the Writers Union, and had been weakened by the 1901 arrests and sentences to banishment. This imbalance is also noticeable in the programme article, which the Moscow conference approved without any essen-

tial alteration. But this temporary lack of proportion should not be overestimated. Each wing was dependent on the other — the Moscow wing, so that the political mobilization of ‘society’ did not languish in the ghetto of the zemstvo milieu; and the Petersburg wing, so that the lost scope for political activity could be regained through expansion of their social range. In this respect the most important result of the Moscow conference was the material safeguarding of the production and distribution of *Osvobozhdenie*. It was established ‘who will provide which sums for the maintenance of the journal’, and a series of conspiratorial meetings was agreed to win sympathisers who were to ensure circulation of the journal inside Russia.¹⁴³

At the beginning of May Shakhovskoj set off for Germany for a second time. He was accompanied by N.N. L’vov and S.A. Kotlyarevskij, who did not yet know Struve. They presented to the editor the ‘friends’ programmatic declarations and 100,000 roubles as working capital for *Osvobozhdenie*. The encounter was determined at first by cautious scepticism on both sides. But this soon gave way to a more trusting relationship based, admittedly, rather less on identical concrete projects than on a similarity of fundamental politically moral convictions, on the ‘intensified feeling of personal political responsibility and on the powerful urge to work for the revival of the country in the name of a higher interest of state and nation’.¹⁴⁴ This visit may have presented Struve with something like the confirmation of his vision of a nationwide liberation movement. At this time he wrote to Hans Delbrück, the German liberal journalist: *Osvobozhdenie* ‘is neither the organ of any revolutionary group nor the personal enterprise of the editor’ but the common outlet for all those who desired ‘a fundamental peaceful transformation of the wholly untenable bureaucratic order’.¹⁴⁵ The fact that his visitors had also learned their lesson may be documented by the words with which Shakhovskoj — taking up Struve’s theory of the growing complexity of life — tried to drive home the goals of *Osvobozhdenie* to his *Beseda* friends:

‘One cannot after all help realizing that society’s sense of justice has grown beyond the capacity of our present day political forms. And as long as no alignment is established between the two, all other social activities are only a futile waste of money, even of life’.¹⁴⁶

3. THE FIRST CONSTITUTIONALIST PROGRAMME

The first issue of the periodical *Osvobozhdenie* was dated 18th June 1902. Along with reports on the assassination of Minister of the Interior Sipyagin, it contained three major contributions: a leading article by the editor Peter Struve; the 'friends' declaration of principles, which was drafted by Pavel Milyukov; and the supplemental 'Open Letter from a Group of Zemstvo Activists'. These three contributions were the documentary results of the events described above, which led to the establishment of the periodical. They contained the first programmatic statements of such people as supported the journal. Here these people presented themselves for the first time as the representatives of 'the Russian Constitutionalists'.¹⁴⁷

In his opening article, Struve introduced *Osvobozhdenie* as the journal which would be 'dedicated exclusively to the struggle for the universal liberation of our country from police subjugation: to the struggle for the freedom of the Russian individual and of Russian society' (p.1). He concentrated on showing that this struggle was imperative from the ethical point of view and that it would have to be fought with every morally permissible means by all classes of Russian society. Struve developed these basic thoughts in seven loosely-woven sections, starting from the incompatibility between the growing complexity of social life and the forms of autocratic and bureaucratic rule which were hindering all progress. With overpowering pathos he appealed to 'the citizen's moral conscience'; he addressed a nation which had emerged from 'the state of a reactionary social order' but was still hindered by a reactionist government from 'evolving its rich potential' (pp. 1-2). During the decades prior to 1861, he continued, Russian society had clung to the 'hannibalic vow'¹⁴⁸ to struggle for the liberation of the serfs; with the same determination society must now bear in mind the current 'hannibalic vow' to struggle for the political liberation of all the Russians (p.2).

'The question of liberty is not simply one among many questions of domestic policy', Struve explained (p.3). To him, liberty was the highest moral value, an ideal arising directly from man's destiny.¹⁴⁹ The anchoring of this ideal in reality – that is, the concrete realization of the liberty of the individual and of the society – should therefore be the objective of all human activity. This, after all, was where the universal solution to all specific problems in domestic policy could be found. In the prevailing Russian reality, Struve saw the ethos of

liberty in practice in the work of the 'vital popular forces', 'which are creating a new spirit, new forms of life, new social conditions', thus producing a national culture no longer compatible with the cosmopolitan culture of the outdated social order. The 'vital popular forces' consisted of two elements: the *russkij narod* (the Russian people), on the one hand, which affirmed the idea of liberty through its religious consciousness and which set this idea against the reality of police autocracy and government orthodoxy; and the *intelligentsiya*, on the other hand, which critically examined the prevailing conditions from the aspect of liberty and consciously tried to alter them through their work. The point where the religious consciousness of the *narod* and the critical rationality of the *intelligentsiya* fused in a common will to liberty was, as Struve saw it, where 'the true Russian revolution' was taking place; this revolution rose up in the name of an abused and trampled image of man, its only objective was the achievement of liberty (p.3).

The postulate of a comprehensive realization of the idea of man and his liberty led in Struve's eyes to the consequence that the struggle for the political liberation of Russia must be undertaken on a nationwide scale. This meant establishing a 'national liberation movement' in which all classes, groups and nationalities in the multi-ethnic empire suffering under the bureaucratic regime should take part:

'Our task is not to separate, but to unite. The cultural and political liberation of Russia can be neither exclusively nor preferably a matter for one class, for one party, for one doctrine. It must become a national cause, a common task for the entire people, finding an echo in every heart which differentiates between the moral and the immoral in politics, and which therefore will not tolerate the violence and arbitrariness of a horde of bureaucrats administering a great nation with neither control nor any sense of responsibility' (p.2).

This idea of an anti-autocratic united front formed the programmatic nucleus of Struve's article. 'The clear and simple objectives' of the movement, Struve said, 'must be accessible to the largest possible number of people'; 'its ways, forms and means can only be many and varied' (p.5). There should be room for labour movement and peasant unrest, for student rebellion and revolutionary agitation, for journalists' and writers' struggles against censorship and for the legal work of the *zemstvo*. Struve characterized this movement as 'liberal and democratic':

'Liberal because it is aimed at the victory of the struggle for freedom; democratic because it defends the material and spiritual interests of the masses' (p.5).

For Struve, then, the basis of the national liberation movement was not organizational and tactical uniformity but rather the idealistic unity of all those suppressed by the autocracy.

To Struve, the idea of such a movement was no vague vision for the future. He saw it rather as germinal in the socio-cultural development of Russia, which – since it had always been diametrically opposed to the direction of governmental development – provided the liberation movement with a strong 'national tradition' dating back to Novikov and Radishchev in the late 18th century. In this context Struve cited the Decembrists as well as the philosophical circles of the 1840s, the 'public movement' of the reform period, and even the struggle of the revolutionary parties against arbitrariness and political oppression (p.2). In more recent times, this tradition had flowed into the cultural movement of the non-revolutionary forces in 'society' on the one hand and into the revolutionary socialist movement on the other. While the tradition had essentially been supported by the *intelligentsiya* alone during the 19th century, it had taken on a new quality with the rise of the labour movement at the end of the century:

'The enormous importance of the labour movement for the political fortunes of our country lies in the fact that in the form of the working classes, the people are actively and consciously entering the *intelligentsiya's* century-old political dispute with the government. They are roused to freedom, are demanding it, and they will take it for themselves' (p.4).

Struve recognized in this amalgamation of the mass movements of the 'people' with the political endeavours of the *intelligentsiya* the chance of bringing his idea of a national liberation movement to materialization. This, however, presupposed that the political struggle against the autocracy would no longer be undertaken by the revolutionary forces alone. Struve therefore saw his foremost task in enlightening 'the moderates', who had till then kept out of the anti-autocratic struggle for fear of the revolution, and in summoning them to active resistance:

'We are entering a new period of intensified struggle between the revolutionary elements and the government. Not for the first time is Russian youth, from which the growing army of revolutionaries

fighting for liberty is recruited, reacting to arbitrariness and suppression with violence. The terrorism of the government leads to revolutionary terrorism. . . . The fathers and the moderates must join in this struggle. Consciously and like men, they must take part in the cause of national liberation. The non-revolutionary elements in society have the right to call the revolutionaries to moderation, to restrain them from violence and extreme action, only if they themselves, aware that being moderate is a commitment, cast their political activity and their civil courage into the scales of history' (p.5).

Yet one searches Struve's article in vain for specific instructions on political action. Only the frequent use of the word 'reforms' as the one thing Russia most urgently needed permits the conclusion that Struve preferred a non-revolutionary, reformist policy. And where he mentioned that the necessary reforms could be expected only from 'a popular representation, well organized on national and local level' (p.4) did he cautiously indicate a definite programmatic position. Beyond this, Struve did not commit himself to details of programme or strategy; the all-embracing claim of the demand for freedom apparently did not permit the author to identify with any one of the existing political tendencies or their particular programmes. Instead he passed the task of programme formulation to 'the public activists in our country and, first and foremost, to those working in the organs of self-government. Not presenting them with a programme but receiving one from them — that is what the *Osvobozhdenie* editorial board is counting on' (p.5). By appealing to 'all people devoted to the cause of national liberation' to support *Osvobozhdenie* actively (p.6), however, Struve made it clear that he wanted to make his periodical the crystallization point of the national liberation movement.

Struve welcomed the article 'From the Russian Constitutionalists' as an initial attempt at determining the immediate tasks of the Liberation Movement both from the aspects of principles and also as regards practical politics. Responsibility for this contribution was admittedly claimed collectively by the group of 'friends' of *Osvobozhdenie*, but in its essential parts it must nonetheless be identified without doubt as the work of Milyukov.¹⁵⁰ The author was following a double purpose in this article. Firstly, he gave voice to the attitudes and wishes of the 'friends' for whom he was writing, and secondly he tried to set their political aspirations an objective which would guarantee the group both stability and the chance of enlargement. In

this he had to presuppose a special characteristic which distinguished the loosely bound circle of 'friends' from its political and social surroundings and made it identifiable as representative of a specific political tendency. Such a distinction was given in the conviction common to all the 'friends' that Russia's domestic problems could be solved only if the autocracy were replaced by a parliamentary system.¹⁵¹ This was the central thought around which the article revolved. Yet no elaborate programme on political organization was presented here; rather 'the historical significance of the epoch' (p.7) was interpreted in a way which made the political intentions of the Constitutionalists legitimate and placed them in the context of a process taking place as a historical necessity.

The starting-point for the deliberations in this article was the same as it was for Struve's leader:

'Russian social life no longer fits into the old moulds. We need new forms in order to adopt new ways of life. And hoping to solve this problem simply by declaring war on these ways of life, by ignoring them or by forcing them into the old masques with or without surgical refinements is proving to be completely futile' (p.7).

'The whole of society', Milyukov continued, 'is demanding with one voice a serious political reform'. He introduced *Osvobozhdenie* as the spokesman for this 'unanimous, unwavering public opinion', and thus gave the impression that the political intentions of his article were authenticated by the will of society as a whole. Contrary to Struve, however, Milyukov defined the frame of reference for his deliberations in the light of the specific socio-political situation of the 'friends'. He therefore visualized a narrower target group for the periodical than did the editor:

'The difference between our journal and other publications abroad is that we want to unite those groups in Russian society which can find expression for their outraged feelings neither in the class struggle nor in the revolutionary struggle. We want to voice exclusively non-class public opinion (*bessoslovnnoe obshchestvennoe mnenie*) and to find in it our support' (p.7).

Thus the moderate, non-revolutionary forces of 'society' which supported the 'public movement' were designated as the target group.¹⁵² By interpreting these forces' opposition to the autocratic regime in a constitutionalist sense, Milyukov assigned the 'public movement' to be the field in which the Constitutionalists should work politically and seek allies. Within this field he distinguished

that group which was publicly active in the zemstvo institutions (*zemskaya obshchestvennaya gruppa*) as the group closest to the Constitutionalists. In his view, the politically privileged position of the zemstvo and the 'democratic' traditions of the zemstvo movement lent this group 'the right and the duty to act as the active representative of non-class public opinion at a time when other groups are forced to be silent or to limit themselves to less striking manifestations of 'society's' demands' (p.7). In this way, the zemstvo appeared as the political basis of a social movement which promoted the constitution.

In Milyukov's opinion, the future programme of this movement had to satisfy three conditions. First of all, the programme had to focus on the constitutionalist principle. In this way the work of the various 'public' organizations and groups would no longer be lost on aims of secondary importance but could be directed towards the foremost objective, the constitution. Secondly, the programme should not outline utopian visions of the future; all its demands should instead relate to the political, social and cultural conditions of the country. That is, it had to be practicable. And finally, the programme principle was to be combined with practical demands in such a way that the programme could not only serve as a basis for the zemstvo movement or small individual zemstvo groups, but could also permit a wider union between varying groups and circles.

In the second part of his article, Milyukov named first a series of fundamental rights as objectives which were demanded in principle in this spirit and were also practicable: freedom of the individual, guaranteed by independent courts of law; the equality of all before the law, with all the consequences for policies on the peasantry, national minorities and religion; freedom of the press, the right of assembly and association and the right of petition (p.9). Observance of these elementary rights would protect the individual from the arbitrariness of bureaucrats, eliminate discrimination based on nationality, religion and class, and give the forces of society the opportunity to associate in political organizations which could take on the function of public opinion formation and control. Only when these conditions prevailed could – it appeared to Milyukov – the really central demand of the Constitutionalists be realized:

'Non-class representation of the people (*bessoslovnnoe narodnoe predstavitel'stvo*) in a permanently active supreme institution, to

be convened annually, with the rights of supreme control, of legislation and of approving the budget' (p.10).

Milyukov deliberately put off any discussion on details of the new form of government in the future. That he made no mention whatsoever of the form of state in his article is no surprise, for the monarchy had till then never been contested among the oppositional circles for which the article was intended. He did, however, commit the question of suffrage, the problem of the relationship between parliament, government and monarch, the question of ministerial responsibility and the introduction of legislation to a later phase of reform intended to deal with elaboration of the constitution. Furthermore the problems of reforming finance, economy and administration, the labour question, the peasant question and other social problems could not, in his opinion, be the subject of a political programme which – in the interests of its own practicability – could deal only with the initial stage of reform. Everything depended first of all on two questions: what is to be the nature of the institution entrusted with elaboration of the constitution and how can such an institution be created? (p.10).

Milyukov dealt with these questions in the third and longest part of his article. The most difficult point proved to be the question of the initial political spark needed to set the whole procedure of reform in motion. Milyukov was obviously convinced that the supreme state authority itself would have to create the conditions for national reform through means of 'a unilateral act' (pp. 10–11). Accordingly the Tsar was to be induced to declare the civic rights in an Imperial Manifesto, which would bring about a decisive break with political tradition. The political outcome of such an act would be the elimination of the obstacles blocking the development of the free political life of society under the prevailing bureaucratic regime. Only then would the opportunity be given for creating an appropriately composed 'constituent instrument' (Milyukov avoided the precise term 'constituent assembly').

Milyukov made high demands of such an institution. It should create so much confidence in itself that it would be in a position to mediate between government and people in the 'critical moment, when it is a matter of implementing the new order' (p.11) this presupposed that it would voice 'non-class public opinion' without falsification. Its members should therefore 'be elected by society, act

within the framework of powers conferred upon them and be subject to constant public control' (p.11).

Thus, in Milyukov's view, the high-ranking bureaucracy, discredited through demonstrable incompetence, was eliminated as a recruiting field for the 'mediators between government and people'. On the other hand, direct election of the assembly by the people seemed to him too uncertain as a method. Possible election manipulation through the Government and the 'not easily estimated attitude of social classes unused to political life' would make 'the ad hoc election' 'equivalent to a leap in the dark' (p.11). Milyukov therefore proposed graduated suffrage for the constituent instrument, based on existing social institutions, primarily on the zemstvo institutions. Designation of the deputies should be transferred to the zemstvos and city dumas, 'supplemented by those elements which at present are insufficiently represented in the zemstvos' — e.g. the universities (p.12).¹⁵³ The course of further political reform would then be determined by the representatives of public opinion thus selected. This meant that realization of the principal constitutionalist demand was to be achieved step-by-step in a process geared to the country's state of cultural and social development: from the class-influenced zemstvo via the all-class constituent assembly to the non-class constitutional democratic system.

With these proposals, Milyukov conceived the model for an uninterrupted, non-revolutionary transfer from the old autocratic order to the desired new political system. He declared the constitutionalist movement, centred on the politically aware zemstvo forces, to be the principal agent in a transformation process covering state and society and, as it were, prolonged it into the new system. In this he also had to face the inconsistencies inherent to the constitutionalist movement. The scrupulous argumentation with which Milyukov developed his strategic concept in the third part of the article indicates that procedural matters were the critical point on which the stability of the still unconsolidated group of 'friends' would be decided.¹⁵⁴ He replied to those critics who had expected more precision in the draft of future reforms that wanting to decide matters of detail in advance was like 'sharing out the bear's skin before the bear was captured' (p.8). He reassured those who wanted to see the democratic principle of universal suffrage already in operation for the formation of the constituent assembly by pointing out the short term and limited purpose of that instrument. And, finally, by integrating the Tsar into

the reform procedure he tried to keep in line those who could be frightened off by the radicalism of the principal constitutionalist demand.

All these considerations and concessions not only led to impoverishment in the substance of the programme presented; they also strengthened the position of Constitutionalists who were plagued by many a scruple in view of the radicalness of the constitutionalist principle, and who therefore advocated emphatically cautious procedure in the field of strategy and tactics. The fact that these circles played an important role among the 'friends' is documented by the 'Open letter from a Group of Zemstvo Activists', which was the only contribution from a specific group printed together with the programme declaration in the first issue of *Osvobozhdenie* (pp. 13-14). The authors of this Letter argued, like Milyukov, from a twofold front against bureaucracy and revolution. Like Struve, they saw a narrow causal link between the two. But contrary to Struve and Milyukov, who both presented their demands with a smattering of aggressiveness, their political conclusions sounded rather more resigned, defensive:

'We can no longer be silent witnesses of the wretched and dangerous position in which Russia finds herself today; that would be insincere of us. [. . .] Our duty now is to unite as closely as possible and to draw up a defined programme' (p.14).

This passage was followed by a complicated description of the constitutionalist principles, in which the words 'constitution' and 'parliament' were however anxiously avoided. While Milyukov marked out the main line of political struggle between constitutionalism and autocracy, the authors of the Open Letter localized the political front somewhere between 'legal order' and 'anarchy':

'We shall contribute as far as our strength and abilities permit towards eliminating governmental and popular anarchy (*ustranenie pravitel'svennoj i narodnoj anarkhii*); we shall attempt to redress the terrible misunderstandings prevailing here [between government and people], which are capable of throwing Russia into long-lasting and completely unnecessary suffering, violence and bloodshed' (p.14).

We know that most of the signatories of this Open Letter had joined the founders and 'friends' of *Osvobozhdenie* only in March 1902; and it is not certain whether or not several of them found their political home among the Constitutionalists in the following months and

years.¹⁵⁵ But we can assume that the journal's propertied financiers and main sources of information were to be found in the circles these people represented. Milyukov had to take this into account when drafting the programme article. He took their specific standpoint, influenced by the experience of the zemstvo world, as the basis of a programme formulation which, to him, appeared capable of integrating the individually heterogeneous views and expectations of the circle for which he was writing. If in doing so he expected of the more restive forces that they be patient, that was all part and parcel of keeping the programme within the bounds of practicability.

While Milyukov tried to preserve agreement among the 'friends' and sympathizers of *Osvobozhdenie* through exclusion and postponement of controversial matters, he nonetheless clearly marked off the constitutionalist position from other tendencies in the 'public opposition' which were still hoping for conciliation with the autocracy. He warned against an inopportune compromise with the tsarist bureaucracy, against the temptation of coming to a settlement such as might arise from the invitation of selected zemstvo representatives to individual governmental commissions.¹⁵⁶ He recommended countering such bureaucratic tricks with the 'clear and definite demands' of the constitutionalist programme (p.9). This was certainly not meant simply as a tactical recommendation. At the back of it was the attempt to give the constitutionalist movement a tangible political profile. The turn against all attempts to weaken the programme principles served in differentiating between constitutionalist and non-constitutionalist policies in the topical political discussion on Russia's future. Milyukov's article was in this sense directed not only against the autocracy but also against resistance in the ranks of the 'public opposition'.

At the end of the article, Milyukov turned his attention with particular severity against the conservative tendencies which wanted to reserve a special place for Russia among the civilized peoples of Europe by proclaiming – and resuming the old Slavophile notion of an 'ideal autocracy' – the slogan of the 'self-governing country headed by an autocratic Tsar'. Milyukov countered this 'sentimental and harmful illusion' with his philosophical conviction of the 'logic' of social evolution.¹⁵⁷ The argument developed here can be regarded as Milyukov's most original and at the same time most important contribution to the constitutionalist programme. It contained the

enduringly valid theoretical legitimation of Russian constitutionalism and is therefore quoted here in full:

'We proclaim our slogan [the democratic constitution], naturally in the spirit that the representative institutions in our country, as everywhere else, will of their own accord take on a particular shade, corresponding to the peculiarities of Russian cultural and political life. But the free forms of political life as such are no more national than the use of the alphabet or of the printing press, steam or electricity. They are simply forms of higher culture. They are broad and flexible enough to absorb very varied national content. They become inevitable when social life has become so complex that it no longer has enough room within the framework of a more primitive order. When such a time approaches, when the new year of history knocks at the door, it is no use putting obstacles in its way. It will come just the same. He who steps aside and makes way for it acts prudently and wisely' (p.12).

Struve's leader and the programme declaration 'From the Russian Constitutionalists' have been dealt with in detail here because they must be understood as of key importance in the history of Russian constitutionalism. They reflect on the ideological level the development process of a particular political grouping and give some idea of the social range of Russian constitutionalism; they sketch out the institutional framework within which constitutionalist politics in Russia were intended to take place at first, and they make clear the strategic and tactical problems confronting the Russian Constitutionalists. The two articles are interpreted below from these points of view in order to gain insight for the subsequent study.

The fact that we have not one, but two programmatic texts here — which, moreover, both have a very individual touch — is explained by the history of the emergence of the periodical *Osvobozhdenie*. As we have seen, there were no formal relationships between the editor who produced the journal and the circle of 'friends' who supported it materially and in spirit.¹⁵⁸ The link between the two sides consequently materialized in the first issue of the journal in the form of several programmatic contributions. But it is remarkable that the Constitutionalists left the formulation of their position to two 'lone wolves' such as Struve and Milyukov. In the circles of *Osvobozhdenie* 'friends' and sympathizers, however, there was such a heterogeneous collection of political experience and expectations, the circles were so loosely bound that a coherent group ideology had not yet had a chance to

form. Instead, the Constitutionalists adhered to the word of authorities who, thanks to their particular circumstances, were not involved in the daily routine work and therefore appeared to stand above these things. Struve's leader and Milyukov's programme declaration must be read as complementary to this degree, but by no means without inconsistencies.

The two articles differed from earlier statements, which also contained elements of a constitutionalist programme, in that they not only pinpointed specific aspects of the Russian crisis,¹⁵⁹ but by assuming certain theoretical premises even questioned the development chances of the prevailing political and social system as such. Their common fundamental idea can be summarized thus: the autocracy with its controlling machinery is hindering the country's cultural progress; it must therefore be removed and replaced by a parliamentary system. This thesis was based on a notion of individual freedom borrowed, like the programmatic argument, from the political philosophy of 19th century West European liberalism. Related to the political conditions in Russia, this notion led both the authors to the uncompromising confrontation with the autocracy, expressed on the one hand in Struve's 'hannibalic vow', on the other in Milyukov's demand for 'allegiance to principles'. This notion also led to the specific political task which appeared in Struve in the form of an ethical duty to participate in the national liberation movement and in Milyukov in the demand for awareness of historical necessity and activation of the 'forms of higher culture' in Russia as well. The political liberation of the individual and of society from traditional pressures appeared to be the code to the 'historical spirit of the epoch'. Thus legitimated, the two authors' common objective was capable of providing the *Osvobozhdenie* 'friends' and sympathisers with an ideological perspective. The still immature identity of the constitutionalist grouping was balanced by the awareness of being in key with the general moral law or in step with the historical process.

As an instrument of self-assurance, however, the notion of political liberation as presented in the two articles had only a limited range. It is significant that both authors referred first and foremost to the anti-autocratic tradition of the 'public movement'; Struve referred moreover to the tradition of Russian radicalism, but only in as far as this had – and still – turned 'against violence and arbitrariness' (p.2). Both turn out to be representatives of the social forces supporting these movements.

This is shown chiefly by the neglect of social against political aspects in the two contributions. Propagating the idea of political liberation, Struve and Milyukov were replying to the two main problems of the new professional middle class – to the lack of stability in a traditional class society, and to the lack of opportunities for political participation under the autocratic regime. Thanks to its material and cultural circumstances, this class was in a position to practise political freedom immediately, if only the political system permitted. Elimination of class privileges and introduction of the equality of all before the law would be enough to assure the social position of this class; in order to improve its opportunities for political participation it needed only legally and institutionally guaranteed access to the instruments of governmental decision-making. Milyukov anchored these claims in the two essentials in the constitutionalist programme – in the catalogue of fundamental rights and in the demand for a non-class popular representation. But neither his nor Struve's argument covered the social dimension of the demand for liberation. He contented himself with extending the frame of reference of political participation in a formally democratic direction, without considering that granting political freedom for all by no means guarantees that it can also be put into practice by all. The Constitutionalists' programme thus bore the stamp of a middle class ideology characterized by the fact that it took the fundamental living conditions of its own social class as a guideline for the whole of society. Notwithstanding its claim for general validity, it proposed solutions only to the specific problems of 'educated society' and could therefore count on acceptance in only a limited social field. The political effectiveness of this programme must also be estimated as correspondingly limited.

Yet neither Struve nor Milyukov seems to have been in a position to reflect upon the commitment of their demand for freedom to specifically class interests. This theoretical deficit is expressed in the claim to universal commitment they presented in the constitutionalist programme. Both their articles show that the Constitutionalists lacked a theory of society which could have made Russian social conditions as a whole and the particular position of their own group intelligible and could have programmatically confirmed the claim to represent the whole of society. Instead of this, Struve retreated to the field of political ethics, Milyukov to the theory of history. This meant that both were left with only the hope of a natural develop-

ment which would bring in the supporters needed by the Constitution-
alists in order to exist politically. This hope was expressed in the
tone of appeal characterizing both the editor's leader and the 'friends'
programme declaration.

It cannot be said, however, that neither of the authors had seen
the necessity of gaining supporters in other social classes in order to
achieve political effectiveness. But the problem was particularly criti-
cal in a society such as that in Russia, where strong modernization
pressures had led to great dislocations in the social fabric. And this
was not a problem facing the Constitutionalists alone.¹⁶⁰ Struve and
Milyukov approached it differently in their contributions and also
arrived at differing political strategies.

Struve tried to solve the problem of extending the frame of refer-
ence by means of a high degree of abstraction. The pure demand for
liberation as he presented it could in fact be accepted by anyone
without consideration for his individual social or ideological commit-
ments. His concept of a national liberation movement was based on
the idea that all the subjects of the autocratic Tsar were subject to
the same degree of suffering and must consequently all be equally
open to the demand for liberation. If one followed this presumption,
it was then only a matter of awakening all 'honourable Russians' –
regardless of whether they felt an attachment for this or for that
group – to an awareness of their common lot in serfdom, and the
united front of the humiliated and abused would rise up against the
autocracy – 'the true Russian revolution', in which the people would
understand themselves as the source of justice and become a nation.¹⁶¹
Thus Struve claimed the widest possible frame of reference for his con-
cept. He did admittedly reduce the cosmopolitan claim of the liberal
idea of freedom to a national pathos, but his notion of nation was
abstract enough to absorb all social, ideological and ethnic groups.

Nevertheless Struve's concept of a national liberation movement
did not evaporate entirely in the realm of liberty. His specific refer-
ences related to surmounting the contrast between revolutionary and
reformist behaviour, which had had more influence than ideological
differences on the spectrum of political movements in Russia.¹⁶²
Struve's argument in favour of unity between the revolutionary move-
ment and the legal opposition arose directly from the idea of national
liberation. If, he argued, revolutionaries and non-revolutionaries –
guided by one and the same 'feeling of resentment about the false-
hood of Russian life' – would follow one and the same objective,

one could no longer speak of competitive, hostile movements but only of 'the opposition'.¹⁶³ Considered from the point of national liberation, revolutionary action on the one hand and legal petitions on the other therefore designated for Struve simply outward aspects in the field of tactical variations. In order to bring about unity in practice, Struve turned his attention specifically to the 'revolutionaries' and the 'moderates'. He called upon the one group to show more political militancy and to merge on the basis of a specific programme. He urged the other group to renounce their dogmatic exclusiveness and to align themselves with 'the true needs of Russian life'. He admonished both to practise tolerance and to recognize each other as allies in the struggle against arbitrariness and the deprivation of rights.

These deliberations have often been interpreted in the relevant literature as a policy of alliances or even as anticipation of a 'popular front' strategy.¹⁶⁴ Both definitions appear misleading on closer appreciation of Struve's political intentions. They imply that definite groups were to merge on equal footing to implement limited common objectives. But this was not the path which Struve's political-strategic reasoning was following. His idea of liberty formed a bridge only on the ideological level. The objective of national liberation he proclaimed was certainly not limited, and Struve showed himself at pains in his article to keep his distance from existing political groupings and their particular interests. Those to whom he directed his appeal for unity were not addressed as specific collective subjects but only with indistinct, individualizing terms such as 'the moderates' and 'the revolutionaries', 'the fathers' and 'the sons'. He wanted to convey to them understanding of the 'true' political opponent, he wanted to move them to accept their oppositional role and to fulfil it with awareness of their moral responsibility for implementation of the common objective. Thus political enlightenment became the decisive factor in a strategy which was aimed at withdrawing the autocracy's basis of loyalty and creating an atmosphere of pressure for change. This strategy suffused the existing party commitments and political groupings, and Struve could therefore also refrain in his article from indicating specific conclusions relating to programme, organization or policies of alliance. He was not set on specific alliances but on reconstitution and constant expansion of a broad oppositional movement in which 'all honourable Russians' could gather.

The journal *Osvobozhdenie* ranked high in the conversion of this strategy into practice. Struve could create the political atmosphere in

which the necessary changes had to occur almost of their own accord only if he made the lines of conflict in Russian domestic policy visible and attributed the disputes carried on with the autocracy on various fronts to their causes. He therefore promised that his journal would 'throw light on all aspects of Russian life': peasant and worker needs, their deprivation of rights, the struggles of the *intelligentsiya* with the government, the arduous work of the zemstvo institutions, development of the press and the emergence of religious awareness. And he would give no less attention to the activities of the government, in order to obtain from the criticism of these activities programmatic suggestions for the necessary changes (p.3). With this description of the editorial programme, Struve had not so much unprejudiced information of the public in mind as rather agitatorially placed revealing information.¹⁶⁵ With this type of sensational journalism, he hoped to integrate his readership in a feeling of great dismay over the bureaucracy.

However indifferent Struve's enlightenment strategy may appear *vis-à-vis* all social and political differentiations, there is no denying that, not only in matters of ideology but also in the political-strategic sector, the author let himself be guided by certain preferences which overshadow his appeal for unity in the anti-autocratic struggle. Phrases such as 'national consciousness', 'moral civic conscience', 'deciding between the moral and the immoral in politics', etc. indicate that Struve's idea of the unity of all revolutionary and reformist forces was based on a uniform idea of reasonable, morally founded political behaviour. It would then have been natural to leave the actual definition of what was morally necessary and politically reasonable in a given situation to be discussed freely among his readership, the 'honourable Russians'. But Struve qualified the national liberation movement as 'liberal and democratic' (p.5), and thus provided the definition — admittedly, still very indefinite as far as substance was concerned, but entirely identifiable semantically. After all, against the background of the internal Russian discussion, this definition could only mean that the editor wanted to see the national liberation movement distinguished from non-liberal — i.e. in the Russian context, revolutionary — and undemocratic — i.e. egoistic class — endeavours. His position was thus in danger of serving a furtive claim to hegemony by the moderate opposition. This suspicion is substantiated if one reads the article 'Liberalism and the So-Called 'Revolutionary' Tendencies', also written in the Summer of 1902:

'The every day revolutionary struggle is accessible to only very few and its immediate influence must necessarily be limited. This explains why the moderate opposition and all its legal instruments, headed by literature and zemstvo representation, are of such tremendous importance. These instruments really do form the national consciousness and establish strong traditions. . . . Broad social opposition is the very soil out of which 'revolutionary' pressure is growing'.¹⁶⁶

These sentences contain a clear rejection of all forms of revolutionary activism. They were directed in particular against organizational models being developed at the time, for example by Lenin ('What is to be done?' was published in 1902), and placed instead the dynamism of the 'public movement' at the centre of the anti-autocratic struggle. They thus traced the path trodden by Struve himself over the past two years from the alliance with the revolutionary Social Democrats in Munich and Geneva to the association with the Petrunkevich group. But, all biographical references aside, these sentences also substantiate the doubt that Struve's idea of a national liberation movement was capable of extending the Constitutionalists' frame of reference. For Struve's political-strategic deliberations led back to a field of operations with social limits which exactly corresponded to the limited ideological argumentation.

Contrary to Struve, who had derived his political strategy from an idealistic philosophy of liberty, Milyukov's deliberations on strategy were based on the evaluation of a specific socio-political movement centred on the politically aware zemstvo forces. He started off with his target groups' social experience, moulded on the one hand by social mobilization arising from educational expansion, on the other by the conflict with the autocratic order. Milyukov tried to overcome these groups' frustration by giving their will to modernization a political perspective through the constitutionalist programme, a perspective intended to apply not only for the zemstvo sphere alone, but also for 'the whole of educated Russian society' (p.8). In this way he linked the constitutionalist programme with the dynamism of the modernization process. His political hopes were bound up with that section of Russian society in which he had noted the most obvious modernization impulses during the past decades. The peasant and labour movements were not an integral part of the kind of constitutionalist movement he advocated. He saw this movement as covering only the narrow section of social interaction summarized

under the term 'public activity' and connected with the idea of cultural progress. In interpreting the Constitutionalists' political strategy, the question then arises as to whether Milyukov could consider the modernization potential accumulated in 'educated society' as stable enough to support political action and political hope.

The idea that fundamental political changes in the constitutionalist sense could be brought about through cultural progress in Russia was based on two presumptions. It presumed first of all that the process of social mobilization, which had given rise to the constitutionalist programme's target group was not yet concluded but would rather, while still expanding, continue to bring further sections of society into conflict with the autocratic order. Secondly, it presumed that the process of social mobilization would have to be understood as an expansive democratization process aimed at a democratic constitution. The first presumption was justified for Milyukov by the recent experience of the group for which he was writing. In the circle of 'friends', groups representing various sectors of the public whose activities till then had not been co-ordinated had just joined together in order to follow what was recognized as a common interest. This co-ordination had only been possible against the background of politicalization of the 'public movement', which proved that 'educated society' was capable of setting in motion an oppositional development in which political alternatives to the practice of autocracy were concealed. To this degree the 'public movement' appeared to present a basis solid enough to support the political activities of the Constitutionalists.

The second presumption was to be justified only on the basis of a general historical theory which fused social with political evolution and set Russian socio-political development on a parallel with that of Western Europe. Milyukov's argument here ran as follows: just as the modernization of society in Western Europe had led to the victory of the parliamentary system, social mobilization would also lead to the constitutional order in Russia as well; for this order embodied the usual forms of higher political culture innate in a modernized society. With the graduated plan for transfer to the new order conceived in his article, Milyukov extended the modernization process into the future and turned the experience of social mobilization and democratization, peculiar to 'educated society', into a model for the whole of Russian society. The certainty that the modernization process was irresistible justified in Milyukov's eyes the hope that the target groups of the constitutionalist programme would continuously in-

crease and that the Constitutionalists' objectives, after all, would be implemented. Thus Milyukov, forestalling the actual state of development, could say that 'the whole of Russian society' was demanding the constitutional reform 'with one voice' (p.7).

The theoretically founded prospect of further modernization, however, could be regarded as capable of bearing political weight in the sense of the hope for constitutional reform only if it was possible to keep the sector most closely connected with the modernization process — the sector of 'public activity' — free from governmental influence. This explains why Milyukov so decidedly opposed all the forces seeking a compromise with the autocracy. It was both his theoretical reasoning and the experience of his target group which assured him that it was possible to gain a politically relevant basis through productive work in 'society's' institutions, if only those involved were not corrupted by the deceptive prospect of a limited share in autocratic power. Milyukov tried to set the experience of 'public work' with all its connotations — association with like-minded colleagues in the public institutions, the successes and failures of routine cultural work, conflicts with the government, etc. — in a historical perspective in order to show that it was essential and politically sensible to continue working in the framework available to 'educated society' and to urge the modernization process ahead on all levels, including the political level. Thus constitutionalist policy was to Milyukov nothing more at first than 'public activity' which deliberately moved its concealed political significance into the public eye and so took on a new quality.

Against the background of these deliberations, the demand for political liberation of Russian society was given a different political function in Milyukov's article than in Struve's. It served here not as an integrating ideology but rather as legitimation for the current political activity of the group backing the new journal. Contrary to Struve's case, the problem of expanding and consolidating the Constitutionalist grouping was therefore primarily a question of alliances. In view of the narrow basis hitherto accessible to the circle of 'friends', much depended on looking out for other circles and groups with which association and co-ordination of actions would be worthwhile. Milyukov accordingly saw the journal *Osvobozhdenie* — again contrary to Struve — mainly as a journal of party combat.¹⁶⁷ It was intended 'to unite those groups in Russian society' which found satisfaction 'neither in the class struggle nor in the revolutionary struggle' (p.7).

With the function thus defined, Milyukov dissociated himself from forces on the right as well as on the left who could not be won over for the objective and strategy of the Constitutionalists. Though he explicitly designated as unsuitable allies only the supporters of the Slavophile notion of an ideal autocracy, in the long run the revolutionaries had just as little place in his organizational plan, which was aimed less at a broad, national movement than at the formation of a consistent political grouping with an unmistakable profile and capable of action. *Osvobozhdenie* with its circle of 'friends' was intended to be the starting point for this grouping. Milyukov understood the presentation of the political intentions of the 'friends' in the programme declaration as a first attempt at

'setting up a platform on which those circles and groups can come together from which there is a chance of forming a Russian constitutional party under the double pressure of governmental reaction and revolutionary struggle' (p.8).

Since the author did not explicitly name the revolutionary parties, he did admittedly leave the door open for limited tactical joint interests with them, but the passage quoted above as well as the whole tone of the article leave no doubt that Milyukov wanted the future 'constitutional party' to be understood as a counterweight to the revolutionary parties as well.¹⁶⁸

Yet the consequences for organizational policy contained in Milyukov's deliberations may not be taken too far. The foundation of an independent party was certainly the ultimate intention of these deliberations, but on the other hand Milyukov did not fail to recognize that setting up a formal organization under the prevailing political circumstances was conceivable only if the price of illegality was paid. But he held fast to 'public activity's' claim to legality. This was the basis of his political strategy of non-revolutionary transfer, with which he continued and consolidated his old idea of the 'struggle on the borders of legality'.¹⁶⁹ This strategy was aimed at mobilizing and organizing the public with regard to the anticipated seizure of power by the organized forces of 'society'. Milyukov counted on the expansion and re-inforcement of the old regime's legitimization crisis, which had become obvious in the past few years and seemed to indicate the imminent collapse of the autocracy. Inasmuch as he saw in the existing institutions of 'society' — such as the zemstvos, the press, academic and charity associations, or private circles — the germs of his future constitutional society, he sought to preempt the services

of these institutions for the constitutionalist cause by inducing them to exert pressure on the autocratic government.

Milyukov's political strategy was linked with the interests of the professional middle class in the expansion of their work opportunities and consolidation of positions already gained. It was possible by a system of influencing the various sectors of 'public activity', a system already provided by the tradition of the 'public movement'. These tactics of the legal opposition, which were subsequently refined and applied with measurable success by the Constitutionalists, have been described by Alexander Kizevetter, friend and professional colleague of Milyukov, with the following words:

'The leaders of the legal opposition were at pains to form at the head of each institution or enterprise of the public a nucleus of brain workers devoted to the cause who would then develop a uniting and moulding influence on the milieu concerned'.¹⁷⁰

Supported by this tradition, Milyukov could at first forgo the planning of an autonomous political organization. As long as the government's machinery of oppression was still intact and the autocracy's self-confidence was unbroken, he thought rather in terms of small constitutionalist cadre groups, lighting and tending their beacons in the 'public movement' for the day when 'a new paroxysm of reaction . . .' would carry 'the oppositional attitude into the most varied circles of Russian society' and thus prepare the ground for the re-construction of the whole of society (p.8).

Compared with Struve's abstract, idealistic approach, Milyukov's political-strategic deliberations seem more down-to-earth and closer to reality. But he, like Struve, had to ask himself what opportunities for political activity were open to the Constitutionalists above and beyond the routine work in the institutions of 'society'. Struve, who was more intent on motivating political activity through enlightenment, propagated a tactical pluralism and thus passed the problem back to the groups active in the country. Milyukov, on the other hand, only seemingly opened up opportunities for political activity. He conceived the 'public opposition' as a stateless area, as it were, with a pseudo-governmental infrastructure, but he could not show how the Constitutionalists were to implement their political objectives within this framework. In order to achieve political effectiveness, they had to see to it that the state was open to them, they had to gain access to the areas of political decision-making. Since they could not on their own implement this legitimate desire, they were

faced with the alternative of forcing access either by setting up a revolutionary counter-power or by putting their hopes in an external authority empowered to act. Under the autocratic order, such an authority could take only the form of the Tsar himself. Since Milyukov and his friends had decided on a non-revolutionary strategy, they needed the Tsar in their calculation as the *deus ex machina*, using his authoritative decision to free the way for the seizure of power by 'society'. With this turn Milyukov indirectly admitted that instructions for everyday political activity could not be derived from the political perspective he had opened up to 'educated society'. The Constitutionalists saw themselves thrown back on the powerless situation of 'society' which they wanted to overcome. Their ability to act politically was in the long run dependent on the political wisdom of the autocratic opponent.

Thus for the Constitutionalists the problem of political efficiency was concentrated on the question: what can be done to make the Tsar understand? Should one, as some zemstvo leaders were trying at the time, 'morally influence the conscience of the autocrat'?¹⁷¹ Should one, as in earlier times, compose obsequious petitions or, more valiant, aggressive resolutions? Could one be obstructive and evade the demands of the government on the forces of 'society'? What was morally tenable, what was politically practicable? — If the contributions in the first issue of *Osvobozhdenie* are examined in this light, it is clear that the Constitutionalists' strategy did not yet essentially extend beyond the old tactics of the 'public movement'. The question as to the opportunities for action offered to the Constitutionalists by the 'public movement' remained unanswered. The question as to the strategy suited to bringing 'society' to power without a revolutionary break also remained unanswered. Discussion of these points was to fill many a page in *Osvobozhdenie* while the Constitutionalists tried out many and varied solutions in political practice and learned 'the art of association' in the process.

CHAPTER THREE

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE 'PUBLIC MOVEMENT' 1900-1904

1. INSTITUTIONS AND CONTACTS OF THE 'PUBLIC MOVEMENT'

The formation of a broad opposition without any definite programme had taken place within the existing communications channels of 'society'. As we have seen, this was also reflected upon by the constitutionalist programme, which at first aimed at organizing public opinion. Long-standing family connections, school friendships and student contacts played an equally important part in this operation as professional friendships, social intercourse with municipal notables, neighbourly relations with noble landowners and common work in scientific and philanthropic associations, in journalism or in the zemstvo. The social institutions within which the political socialization of 'society' was taking place formed the basis for the Constitutionalists' informal organization. During this phase, however, hardly anything was laid down in programmes, and the borders between the developing political groupings were still in flux. But the crisis at the turn of the century had intensified receptiveness for the various projects discussed either in secret or in public. Communications in the form of railway, telegraph, postal services and telephone, which had been improved considerably during the 1890s, made constant interregional communication much easier. These blessings of civilization had, admittedly, hardly extended into the countryside, but they were already of obvious benefit to urban life.

a. *Personal contacts, salons and circles*

During the initial organizational phase, the Constitutionalists¹ preferred to make use of personal friendships and acquaintances and

tried to make new contacts in this way. This had been the method Bogucharskij and Shakhovskoj used for recruiting contributors and friends of *Osvobozhdenie* and also for preparing the programme discussions. In many cases these personal relationships had originated decades earlier. Shakhovskoj, for example, had belonged in 1881/82 to a student cultural group at the St. Petersburg University from which V.I. Vernadskij and the Ol'denburg brothers, later members of the subsequent Petrunkevich group, had emanated.² A little later Shakhovskoj became acquainted through an old family friend, the liberal professor of law Konstantin D. Kavelin, with the Marshal of the Nobility Fedor I. Rodichev, who recruited him for zemstvo service in Tver'. In the course of this work, the young education expert won the friendship of Petrunkevich and the Bakunins. Shakhovskoj found work at that stage for the expelled student and failed teacher A.V. Peshekhonov in a statistics office in a district zemstvo in Tver' Province, and so initiated his career as the well-known zemstvo statistician. In 1899 Peshekhonov was asked by the zemstvo statistician N.F. Annenskij – then a leading member in the St. Petersburg Writers Union – to join the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* editorial board.³ He thus entered the intellectual circles in the capital which, together with Petrunkevich and Shakhovskoj, prepared the establishment of *Osvobozhdenie* two years later. The list of such long-standing connections could be extended ad libitum. To take other examples, Shakhovskoj's colleague in Yaroslavl', Ariadna Tyrkova, had been friends since schooldays with the wives of Struve and Tugan-Baranovskij, as well as with Lenin's wife, Nadezhda Krupskaya; Bogucharskij knew several of the later leading members of the Union of Liberation who came from the groups formed by the People's Rights Party in 1893.⁴ – and so on and so forth.

The Constitutionalists' connections through relations and friends extended into the ruling 'spheres' on the one hand, into the revolutionary underground on the other. Struve's friend Mikhail Tugan-Baranovskij, for example, was the brother-in-law of D.N. Lyubimov, head of the chancellory of the Ministry of the Interior, and was married to Lydia Davydova, heiress to the marxist oriented periodical *Mir Bozhij*. Lyubimov, for his part, had been on close terms since his childhood with Fedor Golovin, member of the Moscow province zemstvo office, and with the Dolgorukov brothers; and he knew the criminologist V.D. Nabokov, son of the former Minister of Justice, through his government work.⁵ On the other side were connections

with the revolutionaries, and these simply cannot be enumerated in detail. Frequently Social Democrats, living in the underground and trying to make contact with the local party organization in a strange town, got in touch with the 'liberal intelligentsia' acquainted with the area in order to arrange contact with a *Genosse* living in the open.⁶ The Moscow neurologist N.N. Bazhenov, member of the Union of Liberation, employed the Bolshevik S.I. Mitskevich as a doctor in his clinic and tolerated the fact that Mitskevich used his official living quarters as a port of call for members of the underground both from inside the country and from abroad.⁷ Mention has already been made of Peshekhonov's and Myakotin's relations with the Party of the Socialist Revolutionaries.⁸ In 1903 Ivan Kalyaev was still to be seen in the editorial offices of *Severnyj Kraj*, Shakhovskoj's house journal in Yaroslavl'; two years later he assassinated Grand Duke of Sergej Alexandrovich on behalf of the social revolutionary Fighting Organization. Admittedly nobody had any idea of his terrorist tendencies at the time.⁹ However close the personal relationships between Constitutionalists and revolutionaries may have been, they never led in practice to any joint actions by the respective organizations.

A considerable part of Russian society's political life was spent in private houses. People of like social rank and like opinion, professional colleagues and friends met in the salon of landowner or scholar, at soirées held by industrialist or publisher, in the journalist's sitting room and in the back room of a restaurant, and they discussed literary, philosophical and, often enough, also political problems. Only a few metropolitan salons can be shown to have had immediate influence on specific points in the formation of government policy — for example, the group around the reactionary Prince V.P. Meshcherskij, who had great personal influence at Court, or the 'economic banquets' held every month in the Donon Restaurant, where members of the State Council, representatives of academic life and of the *zemstvo* found themselves in opposition to Vitte's financial policy.¹⁰ The dispute between Pleve and Vitte was influenced by the salon of the belletrist K.F. Golovin, who counted among his guests not only high ministerial officials and moderate conservative landowners from the Orel Province but also *Osvobozhdenie* sympathisers.¹¹ Someone with intimate knowledge of the St. Petersburg scene called such private and semi-public gatherings the only 'social channel' 'through which any pressure could be brought to bear upon the government in the interest of a certain course of action'.¹² But this could be said of

only a very few, exclusive groups. The usual soirée served as a parade ground where the local, urbanized educated and propertied elites boosted their self-assurance. Such gatherings reflected the whole spectrum of prevailing views, they seldom had the ambition, much less the chance, to have any direct political influence, but they were always the barometer of 'society's' political moods. Their forms ranged from the *jour fixe* of the Moscow millionaire's wife who loved to surround herself with the great names in the world of art, science and literature and was also not averse to political small talk¹³ – to the somewhat conventicular gatherings of intellectual 'have-nots' somewhere in the provinces where night after night the problems of the world were solved during embittered debates around the samovar.

The salon of Konstantin K. Arsen'ev, editor of the leading liberal journal *Vestnik Evropy* and publisher of the Brokgauz-Efron Encyclopaedia, was entirely devoted to intellectual exchange and not without influence on the educated far beyond the reaches of St. Petersburg. The group – in which the gymnasium student Peter Struve made his debut as a literary critic in 1886/87¹⁴ – had a reputation for 'civilized liberalism'. It thrived on the moral authority of the host, gained through years of public and journalistic work, and on the renown of the guests from the scientific and literary worlds. Vladimir Solov'ev gave talks here, the literary historians A. Pypin and V.D. Spasovich, and also the lawyer A.F. Koni, who had become well known as judge in the 1878 proceedings against Vera Zasulich. Liberal principles and hope for a better, constitutional regime were common denominators among the salon visitors. We find several of them later in the *Osvobozhdenie* group of friends and among the Constitutional Democrats.¹⁵ Yet their individualism and a liberal awareness of social position prevented the host himself and most of his prominent guests from modifying 'the voice of conscience' to the discipline of any party whatsoever.¹⁶

Of an entirely different nature, on the other hand, was the Petrunkevich group in Moscow which, as we have seen, had already been making efforts towards initiating political actions in the 1890s and had been working on the organization of public opinion since 1901. Yet another step towards 'the borders of legality' we find a group of St. Petersburg literati and educational experts from the Writers Union and the Free Economic Society to which Milyukov was introduced in 1900, following his return from abroad, by his fellow historian Myakotin. Together with Peshekhonov, the scholar drew up for this

group a draft constitution for the Russian Empire in the winter of 1900, which then fell into the hands of the police and brought Milyukov to prison for six months.¹⁷ This was no longer a political salon in the usual sense. This group – mainly editors and contributors of *Russkoe Bogatstvo* – showed typical characteristics of the representative intellectual circle (*intelligentskaya kruzhkovshchina*), 'the nurturing bed of Russian intelligentsia ideas and values'¹⁸: a high degree of identity among the visitors with rather uniform social status characteristics, intense internal communication and far-reaching agreement of political views, political commitment which could not always be put to external effect but often necessitated conspiratorial precautions for the protection of the circle. As a type of informal organization, this sort of circle had just as long a tradition as the literary-political salon, dating back to the times of Nicholas I and the years of the Great Reforms. In the 1880s its importance declined along with social activity; where it survived, it was devoted to socio-theoretical and philosophical problems or was used for autodidactic activities (*Kruzhki samoobrazovaniya*) by students frustrated by the rigidity of Tolstoj's educational canon.¹⁹ With the growth of the 'public movement' in the 1890s, this type of circle flourished anew and again became the source of crypto-political activities. As far as any biographical details are known of the Constitutionalists connected with *Osvobozhdenie*, most records show traces of the *kruzhkovshchina*. At the turn of the century, however, the political mobilization of 'society' added party political antitheses to the philosophical differences within and between the various circles and groups. Thus members of any one group often found themselves in different, opposing political camps.²⁰ At the same time, political differentiation permitted the development of new circles following party lines, which could be integrated as organizational elements into the infrastructure of the developing parties.

This development was largely of benefit to the organization of the student movement and of revolutionary propaganda among workers and peasants.²¹ But similar tendencies were becoming obvious in the field of 'public activity' in the provinces as well, and these were intensified when *Osvobozhdenie* presented them with political guidelines.²² There could as yet be no talk of an interregional movement or even of an organizational coherence. For this, the existence of such circles was much too dependent on the committedness of individual personalities and on neighbourly solidarity in the relevant

region. Yet the amalgamation of private intercourse with the public claim of 'public activity' lent these circles a political quality which on a higher level was often reflected, for example, in the formation of factions within the zemstvo assemblies.²³ 'Private associations and individual personalities – those are the partisan commandos and franc-tireurs of social self-activity, legal in appearance, but due to their cultural functions intensely antagonistic to the existing political order', Struve wrote in his preface to Vitte's zemstvo Memorandum.²⁴ The history of *Osvobozhdenie* and its circle of friends can be used to show how an association, made up initially only of direct personal contacts, expanded and developed into an interregional political movement.

b. *The Beseda*

At the juncture between private association and political organization there was an interesting zemstvo grouping which had arisen in November 1899 from the need 'to exchange opinions and information on the various questions of the zemstvo economy'²⁵ on an inter-regional basis. The founding of this group was one of the many attempts made after the middle of the 1890s to extend through private means the upper regions of the rural zemstvo, organized on province and district levels – a structure without foundations in the village and without the roof of an all-Russian zemstvo organization; the purpose was to meet the committed *zemtsy* need for communication. The initiative came in this case from the brothers Pavel and Peter D. Dolgorukov, the one Marshal of the Nobility in Ruza (Moscow Province), the other chairman of the Sudzha (Kursk Province) district zemstvo board. Along with the Marshals of the Nobility Count Pavel S. Sheremetev (Zvenigorod, Moscow Province), Yu. A. Novosil'tsev (Temnikovo, Tambov Province), V.M. Petrovo-Solovovo (Tambov) and Count Dmitriy A. Olsuf'ev (Saratov), they gained the interest of friends and acquaintances in responsible positions in the zemstvo for an exclusive discussion group called *Beseda* (Symposium); the group used to meet two or three times a year at the Dolgorukov residence in Moscow and was soon to become an important point of contact for the zemstvo movement.²⁶

This circle – according to Shakhovskoj, 'something like an exclusive political or – better – social club'²⁷ – was never very large.

The lists of members given by Krasavin and Emmons show 54 names, but meetings were probably attended by an average, at most, of twenty.²⁸ The members represented 21 of the 34 zemstvo provinces – complete territorial representation of the whole of zemstvo Russia was evidently neither attempted nor attained. More than half of the members came from Central Russian provinces around Moscow, the Volga region was also well represented, while the capital and its catchment area was notably ill-represented. The *Beseda* was very much a Moscow affair. It thrived largely on the air of contrast between easy-going, more urban Moscow and Petersburg, considered 'cool' with its officials and intellectuals. The old tsarist metropolis was undisputedly the centre of the zemstvo movement; its provincial zemstvo – well equipped in both staff and materials, thanks to the attraction of the city of Moscow and to the province's high tax revenue – called the tune on topical zemstvo matters and was exemplary for many provincial zemstvos.²⁹

The *Beseda* came together originally simply through personal acquaintance. There were six pairs of brothers alone, at least four members were cousins, three were related through marriage. As the group grew, an elitist principle of selection – admitting, through the unanimously practised co-optation process, only proven men with zemstvo experience – provided for the high social homogeneity of the members. The *Beseda* members came from safe backgrounds and were 'very closely connected in their origins with the ruling classes'.³⁰ Only two, M.V. Chelnokov and N.I. Guchkov – brother of the subsequent leader of the Octobrist Party –, belonged not to the hereditary nobility but to distinguished Moscow business families. The club was given a highly aristocratic tinge by ten scions of princely families from the houses of Baryatinskij, Engalychev, Dolgorukov, Golitsyn, L'vov, Shakhovskoj, Trubetskoj and Volkonskij, as well as by names such as Sheremetev, Bobrinskij, Novosil'tsev and Olsuf'ev, which had been highly regarded both at Court and in government for generations. Most of the members were medium or large landowners, some also owned considerable urban properties, at least two of them were proprietors of and shareholders in industrial and trading companies.³¹ The homogeneity of the group also rested on the members' age structure. Almost two-thirds of them had been born between 1860 and 1870. Only six (out of 45) were under 30 years old in 1900, twelve were over forty. The average age at 38.8 years (in 1900) was two years higher than that of the Union of Liberation members. Of 29

members, about whom I have relevant material, 28 had completed university education — mostly as law students — as was the fashion at the time.³² And yet hardly a single member of the group had any long-term civil service behind him; and apart from the two entrepreneurs, only four *Beseda* members practised a profession: the Trubetskoj brothers and Fedor F. Kokoshkin as university lecturers, and Maklakov as a lawyer.³³ Their property put the rest of the members in the position of being able to lead the independent life of well-to-do, even rich, landowners. The type of landed nobleman, dividing his attention between private affairs and the social interests of the region, was more prominent than the urban, bourgeois symptoms which were nonetheless present in the *Beseda*.

Yet the aristocratic landed-nobility characteristic shows only the external sociological profile of the *Beseda*. The circle was too insignificant economically to represent the interests of the 'noble landowner class', and politically they were just as far removed from the conservative class rigorism of most of the noble corporate bodies as from the status attitudes of those appointed to the nobility in recognition of services rendered. The criterion for membership in this group was not property alone, nor education, nor social rank, but loyalty to the idea of the self-administrating country (*zemlya*) and active commitment to this work, with the seemingly old-fashioned reservation that only landed independence could qualify anyone for such commitment.³⁴ The *Beseda* drew its elitist self-interpretation from the ideology of the superiority of stable, responsible self-activity over mobile, paid labour. The latter was understood as a necessary instrument in 'regional administration' (*zemskoe upravlenie*) but it did not carry the idea of self-administration (*samoupravlenie*) as did the former, and for this reason members of the Third Element usually had no access to the *Beseda*. Among the members there were 21 marshals of the nobility,³⁵ at least 9 zemstvo deputies and 16 chairmen and members of zemstvo boards; four sat in city dumas, and in the period between 1890 and 1905 only two had no mandate in the zemstvo.

Through reflection on the qualitative characteristics of the census, the *Beseda* avoided social and political democratization — as representative of the *tsenzovaya obshchestvennost'*, a social consciousness which saw property as being directly connected with the 'country-side' and its cultural needs, and derived from this the privilege of political participation. When the 'public opposition' began to show political differentiation towards 1905, the *Beseda* was ironically called

the 'chamber of peers' (*palata lordov*).³⁶ This term hit at its outmoded exclusiveness, the social solidarity of the privileged, just as much as at the political abstention which – seen from outside – seemed to remove it from party disputes. The *Beseda* did not follow any political programme, and even the approach towards the closer organizational purpose, outlined by Prince Pavel Dolgorukov during the inauguration meeting in 1899, had been sought pragmatically, out of concern for the 'proper' development of the relationship between state and society:

The objective should be 'stimulation of public activity and public opinion, so weak and artificially repressed in Russia, so that it should become more authoritative for Petersburg. The method should be to work towards this objective – after specific conclusions have been reached in exchanges of opinion – through the zemstvo and noble assemblies and also through the printed and spoken word.'³⁷

On the strength of their social origins and status, the *Beseda* members would very much have liked to see themselves as the born mediators between state and 'society' in the political struggle, which had been intensified through social contrasts. But, like many social equals of their generation who did not want 'to utilize their civic and patriotic feelings for work in the machinery of state', under the prevailing regime they were 'thrust either into the social wilderness (*obshchestvennoe nebytie*) or into the ranks of the opposition.'³⁸

The political ideas being discussed in the 'public movement' were not as yet differentiated in the *Beseda*, and the circle tried as far as possible to avoid the delineation which would have meant the end of the group. Although they had been very much engaged in zemstvo work and other 'public' undertakings for years, the *Beseda* members were, with few exceptions, men with no political past – or rather, they were still staunchly loyal to the idea of the monarchical constitution, and for them the disruption of the traditional legitimacy through the modernization process coagulated only into criticism of 'bureaucratic arbitrariness' at first. In striving for its seemingly so pragmatic organizational aim, however, the *Beseda* was necessarily, if involuntarily, drawn into the conflict of loyalty breaking out in all quarters with the crisis of the Vitte system at the turn of the century. The concurrence of Vitte's zemstvo Memorandum and the restrictive policy of Minister of the Interior Sipyagin³⁹ had right at the beginning oppressingly confronted the *Beseda* with the question of possibilities and limitations in zemstvo work in an autocratic state, without its

being able to surmount the problematical issue between re-organization of the national administration and conquest of the autocratic order.

The activities of the *Beseda* were initially very much of the order of the loyal 'small deeds' tactic of the older 'public movement'. They collected and distributed information on events in the country and in the government, unobtainable through the press; they busied themselves with exploitation and extension of the zemstvo's legally permitted room for activity and considered strategies for countering individual obstacles and limitations to 'public activity' imposed by the bureaucracy.⁴⁰ But after 1902, at the latest, the question of whether 'pure politics' could, or even should, be the subject of discussions never left the agenda. During the January 1902 meeting, Prince Peter Dolgorukov spoke in support of leaving 'the trivial and purely technical special questions of zemstvo work' to the zemstvo assemblies and specialized congresses. 'The agenda for our debates must contain questions of a general nature — political questions, as it were'. He was supported by the Tambov Marshal of the Nobility, V.M. Petrovo-Solovovo, who referred to the student unrest of the previous year:

'It is very probable that society will soon no longer be able to remain silent. The administration has decided to take the strongest measures against the rising unrest, and perhaps blood will soon be flowing. Under such exceptional circumstances society will hardly have the right to remain silent any longer, and then our *Beseda* can be spokesman for public opinion'.⁴¹

The varying views on the *Beseda*'s political orientation collided when Nikolaj N. L'vov presented a memorandum 'On the Reasons for Russia's Present Unsettled Position and on Measures for Improvement'.⁴² In precisely the same style as complaints by the 'public opposition', L'vov placed responsibility for the alienation between state and society and for the threatening revolution on the injudicious, reactionary policies under Alexander III and Nicholas II. He set his hopes on redress through the guarantee of civil rights, through unhindered development of the zemstvo and, not least, through the establishment of a freely elected institution representing the people. Count Sheremetev raised the objection to the last point that in Russia 'the fight against arbitrariness' would be possible 'only in the name of the autocracy'. 'If as a result of our deliberations the idea of autocracy were threatened', Mikhail A. Stakhovich, Marshal of the Nobility in Orel, drew the demarcation line, 'we would be delinquents

(*prestupniki*) and would harm our group's programme'. The struggle against the state order would be acceptable only insofar as its objective were 're-enforcement, and not reduction, of autocratic power'. Against this the opponents claimed that bureaucratic arbitrariness was, however, peculiar to the autocracy in particular; so one could not be against arbitrariness and for the autocracy. The dispute was deliberately left undecided and a more moderate line was agreed, expressed in a formula satisfactory to all sides: 'Russia needs an organized society and a strong, authoritative government'.

With the increasing politicalization of 'society', the members of the group entered into various political associations. Besides the resolute defenders of the autocracy – M.A. Stakhovich, Count P.S. Sheremetev, Count V.A. Bobrinskij – there were also men, such as D.N. Shipov and N.A. Khomyakov, who rejected the constitutional experiment for Russia but not the enlistment of the public, which had meantime materialized in the social institutions, for the preparation of the autocrat's political decisions.⁴³ Through the fluctuation in membership and the political distinction of individual personalities, both wings found themselves confronted by an increasing group of Constitutionalists using the *Beseda's* contacts and connections – which extended far into the provinces – for establishing new contacts.⁴⁴ At least 17 (possibly 21 and a few more) *Beseda* members belonged to the *Osvobozhdenie* friends and sympathisers and, after 1904, to the Union of Liberation; more than half of them took part in zemstvo congresses in 1904/05, mostly on the side of the constitutionalist majority. The political variety, but also the Constitutionalists' preponderance, becomes even more clear if the party connections of the members after 1905 are considered: at least 19 joined the Constitutional Democrats at the end of 1905 – ten of them were elected to the Party Central Committee – nine belonged to the Octobrist Party and one each to the 'Moderate Rightist Fraction' (*Umerennye Pravye*) and the 'Rightist Fraction' (*Pravye*). The 25 State Duma deputies and nine members of the reformed State Council after 1906, all coming from the ranks of the *Beseda*, also go to show the lasting, strong political commitment and the prominence attained by many of their number in the years prior to the Revolution.⁴⁵

As far as can be judged, political differences were always settled in the *Beseda* with remarkable candidness and mutual respect. They did occasionally weigh down the discussions and set narrow limits to the group's political effectiveness, but they were not able to break it up.⁴⁶

This was certainly connected with the group's social homogeneity and its elitist self-interpretation, which excluded 'dyed in the wool party activists' right from the start. This meant that not only the '*intelligentsiya* doctrinairism' noticeable in the zemstvo Third Element and in journalism was kept at arm's length, but even such a prominent zemstvo leader as Ivan Petrunkevich was considered 'too radical' by the *Beseda* 'middle line'.⁴⁷ Yet the fact that fractions were nonetheless clearly taking shape raises the question as to which function, apart from the element of social solidarity and interest in local self-government, actually held the group together until it became superfluous at the end of 1905 with the formation of openly agitating political parties. There is no doubt that exchange of information on developments in the individual zemstvo regions of Russia and on 'the gossip' behind the government scenes⁴⁸ was among its most important functions. In many cases, local activities in the zemstvo assemblies may have been stimulated by the influence of the *Beseda*. Since the summer of 1902 there had indeed been no lack of attempts to turn the group into the organizational centre of constitutionalism.⁴⁹ These repeatedly ran aground on the conclusion that this would mean excluding the non-constitutionalist dissidents. In May 1902 the suggestion of regarding *Osvobozhdenie* as the official journal of the *Beseda* was rejected because the members did not want to present themselves as a partisan, decidedly constitutionalist group. Significantly it was precisely those in the inner circle of 'friends' of *Osvobozhdenie* — especially Peter Dolgorukov — who later spoke out most decisively against the transformation of the group into an association resembling a party. Just back from Germany after a conference between the 'friends' and Struve,⁵⁰ the Prince confronted such organizational plans, in August 1903, with the question as to why it should necessarily be the *Beseda* which had to take the initiative in uniting the opposition. From the point of origins and composition, the circle was too one-sided, he said: 'all of us more or less large-scale landowners, all people from one single milieu'.⁵¹ On the other hand, he said, it made good sense for the group deliberately to renounce programmatic agreements:

'We have preserved a means of influencing those who are not in agreement with us constitutionalists, those who still believe in autocracy (for example Shipov, M.A. Stakhovich, and others). In that way we shall have a greater chance to see them one day in our camp than if we had no contact or exchange of ideas with them.

We still hope to convert them some day . . . In any event, we must recognize the value of a bridge between the Slavophiles and the revolutionaries, and it is just such a bridge that we in *Beseda* are destined to provide.'⁵²

This clearly classifies the role of the *Beseda* in the phase of informal constitutionalist organization as a point of contact and discussion forum for various political shades of the opposition. Until the All-Russian Zemstvo Congresses met in 1904/05, the *Beseda* could not be replaced in this function, and remained for the Constitutionalists 'a place for meeting those from whom one had already parted without yet having become enemies'.⁵³

It is difficult to assess the immediate effects of the *Beseda* work. Many members of this group doubtless played an outstanding part in 'society's' advance after the turn of the century. But as far as can be seen, none of the initiatives which determined the movement was actually originated by the *Beseda* itself.⁵⁴ The group did, however, have political influence in the field of journalism. Its first product was a small pamphlet on the 'Instruction for School Councils', planned by the Minister of People's Enlightenment in 1900, against which there was strong resistance in zemstvo circles because it intended to withdraw elementary education from zemstvo influence and subject it to stricter bureaucratic control.⁵⁵ The memorandum on Russia's political situation, put to the *Beseda* for discussion by N.N. L'vov at the beginning of 1902, was published abroad anonymously in the same year under the title 'Autocracy, Bureaucratism and the Zemstvo'.⁵⁶ Then after 1902 there followed a series of very remarkable anthologies on topical problems in education, the zemstvo situation, the agricultural question, peasant rights and the political constitution.⁵⁷ In order to facilitate the publication of these anthologies the *Beseda*, in January 1904, also became a publishing co-operative. All members were obliged to purchase a share of 100 roubles. But they actually wrote the contributions to the anthologies only if there was a competent, journalistically versed expert on the agreed subject among their number. Most of the contributors were well known scientists accepted by 'society', journalists, members of the Third Element, and the high number of Union of Liberation members is particularly noticeable. The *Beseda* – which itself exercised only slight supervision over the individual volumes – had secured the help of the Petersburg editorial office of the periodical *Pravo* for planning and attending to publication, engaged lawyers who brought with them scientific and

journalistic contacts as well as specialist knowledge.⁵⁸ The products of this co-operation complied with the *Beseda* style: respectable and discriminating in substance, they did not seek broad popularity but – as literature not accessible to the man in the street – aimed rather at a thin educational stratum, at readers like the *Beseda* members themselves – concerned more with ‘the common weal of the people’ than with ‘the will of the people’.⁵⁹ No grassroots were sought among the masses – with this type of subtle propaganda they were not to be won over anyway. Yet this publishing activity certainly moved the *Beseda* out of its narrow zemstvo framework and brought it into contact with wider areas of ‘public activity’.

Soviet research has variously claimed a leading programmatic and tactical role for the *Beseda* in the liberal opposition prior to 1905. A.G. Slonimskij (1955) gives it responsibility for the founding of *Osvobozhdenie*; during their meetings ‘a select group of liberal landowners’ is said to have been ‘consciously and deliberately’ prepared for taking over the functions of leadership.⁶⁰ E.D. Chermenskij (1965) sees in the *Beseda* the ‘centre of the liberal movement’, which he claims was primarily a movement of ‘landowners turned bourgeois’.⁶¹ E.P. Mikheeva regards the *Beseda* organization as ‘the first stage on the way to creating the bourgeois grassroot party, the party of the Cadets’. Thanks precisely to the variety of political opinion, the *Beseda*, she claims, was not only a ‘centre for information and the establishment of contacts’, ‘but also the integrating and guiding centre of the liberal movement’, whose programme and tactics were ‘consciously and deliberately’ worked out during the *Beseda* meetings.⁶² These conclusions reverse the functional relationship between the history of the *Beseda* and the programmatic and organizational formation of politicalized social groups, which took place if anywhere outside and independent of the *Beseda*. Indicative of this very laborious group formation process was the expansion of the communication fields imprisoned in traditional structures, the surmounting of obstacles to communication and the gradual new definition of roles in the ‘public movement’. The *Beseda* on the other hand kept its communication field restricted through the census criterion and its principle of unanimous co-optation; and when political differentiation threatened to break open these restrictions, the *Beseda* realized that its primary function lay in the discussion between the divergent groups. Thus the circle may be characterized as a modest surrogate for a party forum or as a panel discussion *in camera*, as it were, but it

cannot be characterized as a cadre school of the bourgeoisie or as the forerunner of the Constitutional Democrats' Central Committee.⁶³ The importance of the *Beseda* did not increase towards 1905, as Slonimskij's and Mrs. Mikheeva's interpretations would lead us to believe; it dwindled rather in the degree in which groupings within the 'public movement' began to oppose each other, broke with old alliances and made new ones. 'There was nothing left for it to do', the *Beseda* 'shrivelled and died a natural death'⁶⁴ when the zemstvo movement, its political-social substrate, became 'all-Russian' and public, when the former political differences of opinion led to a break in the programmatically established competing groups and the spectrum of non-revolutionary political parties lay almost complete for all to see in the spring of 1905. At the beginning of January 1905, the *Beseda* made a majority decision to promote the founding of a political weekly, planned by Sergej N. Trubetskoj, with a constitutionalist programme.⁶⁵ This clear adoption of a specific line removed to all effects the basis for the circle's continued existence. The energy of its members was completely taken up in the following months by the greatly accelerated process of party formation. The *Beseda* itself merely wound up the editorial works it had begun – an undertaking which led to the circle's activities losing their non-committedness in favour of the wider communications context of a public now openly participating in discussions.

c. *Journalism and the press*

The growing awareness of the structural identity of 'local exigencies' throughout the country had fostered many social initiatives during the 1890s. At the beginning of the twentieth century the main problem of the 'public opposition' was to unite these initiatives and to establish stable, interregional lines of communication. This could not be brought about by means of private associations alone. Rather, the factual circumstances evident in social life had to be communicated openly through generally accessible information and propaganda. The field in which critical, oppositional attitudes could turn to the public was primarily the legal press within the limits set by the censor. Wherever these appeared too narrow, Russian journalism since the times of Herzen and Ogarev had over and again found a way into the underground. It was to become important that after the end of

the 19th century the medium of journalism was to be used purposely to create an operational basis for declared political intentions. Lenin was not alone around this time in realizing the central importance of having one's own newspaper for the development of political organizations. In 1901 many zemstvo assemblies provided extra funds for a central zemstvo journal⁶⁶ – an old zemstvo demand with which they hoped to advance towards the all-Russian zemstvo. In 1902 the *Beseda* decided against publishing its own periodical precisely because it did not want to be recognized as an organization resembling a party.⁶⁷ And *Osvobozhdenie* came into existence thanks not least to the political ambitions of the Petrunkevich group, which had already pursued similar plans in 1895.

Journalism and the press had gone through a remarkable development and gained political weight through the expansion of education and 'society's' growing need for information since the 1860s. The number of periodicals in the Russian language multiplied fivefold after 1860, and passed the 1,000 mark in 1900.⁶⁸ The share of general 'literary-social' (*literaturno-obshchestvennye*) journals, however, remained slight at less than one-fifth, even though the Russian reading public sought its material mainly in journals and newspapers. At the end of the century there were only 88 political dailies in the Russian language.⁶⁹

Despite the lack of freedom of opinion, the press and journalistic worlds, more than any other area of public life, were 'society's' domain. The government's interest in them was very much reduced and was largely content with prohibitive control and prosecution of undesirable statements. The beginnings of official government shaping of public opinion, not to mention development of the propaganda apparatus characteristic of modern dictatorships, can hardly be distinguished here before 1905,⁷⁰ and even the art of forming policy through 'semi-official' media – an art exercised with mastery by Bismarck in Germany – was almost unknown in Russia. The power of journalism, won by the conservative nationalist M.N. Katkov in the 1860s and 1870s with the *Moskovskiya Vedomosti* and used to the benefit of the autocracy, was noted in government circles, and not without mistrust. The government had a thoroughly disturbed relationship to this and other newspapers such as Prince Meshcherskij's *Grazhdanin* and A.S. Suvorin's *Novoe Vremya* – reactionary papers which sought their readers among high ranking officials and at Court.⁷¹ In contrast, 'society's' insufficiently satisfied need for information

led to the public rating literary and journalistic work very highly. It was considered 'public activity' in the best sense, even as the only way in which something resembling practical politics could be pursued outside government spheres. 'In our country', Maklakov said, 'practical political activity was limited to journalism'.⁷² Its political quality existed, admittedly, mainly in self-assertion, in the permanent claim to publicity in the face of monopolization by government and bureaucracy of political authority. To this degree, the restriction on freedom of opinion simply established the press as a genuine 'institution of the debating public', from whose range of competence no object was withheld in principle.⁷³ So in the pages of the 'thick journals', and to an increasing degree in small provincial gazettes as well, a bustling activity blossomed, which may well have given many a contributor the feeling that he was influencing the future of Russia, while in fact his writing still did not present anything more than his private experience put forward for public discussion.

Early in the 19th century, the political nimbus of the press brought into being in Russia the type of 'literary journalist' known in Western Europe since towards the end of the 18th century, and under Nicholas I journalism was first recognized as a profession and livelihood.⁷⁴ The communications gap, becoming ever more noticeable in the course of the socio-economic transformation, and the increasing readiness of the public to remunerate journalistic services appropriately⁷⁵ attracted many people of various origins into journalism, people without any other form of livelihood. Women too found a field of activity more easily in journalism than in other professions. Nowhere else was the dissolution of older social bonds more obvious than among the several thousand members of the 'brotherhood of writers'. The press and journalism were the primary forms of socialization for the *raznochintsy*, people of various classes who had 'climbed up to the light of day' 'on the rungs' of the seminary, gymnasium and university, and had thereby lost their social identity.⁷⁶ Excluded from practical politics, their status insecurity and psychological vulnerability under unhealthy political conditions was communicated to their works. Often enough, however, the aspiring writers did not have the necessary qualifications; in any case, more people thrust their way into the business than the narrow journalistic market could support.⁷⁷ Below the thin layer of well paid literati, to be reckoned in life style and standing to a 'bourgeois' educated society, we see then in Russia – if for reasons other than those in more developed Western Europe

— the growth of a 'writing proletariat', vegetating on the verge of the subsistence minimum and always searching for its social pigeon-hole in, it was thought, a better future for the Russian people. Typical of this development was the benefit drawn by the provincial press from the large number of people banished to remote areas for political reasons, who often converted their suppressed political commitment and their restlessness into the written word. 'The [politically] unreliable, the outcast restless wanderer carried with him all the poison of his rage and the whole ideology of his strangled dreams', wrote Vladimir Korolenko from his own bitter experience.⁷⁸ So long as the journalist's status was not guaranteed and political participation by the public was not legalized, the Russian press remained a press expressing opinions and attitudes, supported by the 'ideologies of strangled dreams' and dependent on the benevolence of patrons. For a newspaper, independence meant social loyalty but seldom non-partisanship as well. Commercialization meant loss of independence and was penalized by public opinion by withdrawal of political trust. The trade press and publications by representatives of trade and finance also played hardly any political role before 1905.

Under such circumstances it is no wonder that the majority of the social-literary periodicals in Russia were of an oppositional nature. Some journals represented special ideological tendencies. *Russkoe Bogatstvo*, for example, had been the organ of the legal Populists since 1892; the legal Marxists, on the other hand, took over a few journals, such as *Mir Bozhij* and *Nauchnoe Obozrenie*, and were also able for a short time to bring out their own new publications (*Novoe Slovo*, *Nachalo*). In addition, the most critical publications — barely tolerated by the censor — were the Petersburg *Vestnik Evropy* (Herald of Europe), the liberal mouthpiece of the enlightened metropolitan educated society, and the Moscow daily *Russkiya Vedomosti* (Russian Records). 'A nasty newspaper', it was called by E.M. Feoktistov, Director of the Censor's Office in 1887; 'its talk is nasty and its silence is nasty too'.⁷⁹ As early as 1873 it had been set on a social-liberal course by a group of young, trained political economists who had become the determining element on the editorial board, and it held fast to this line without renouncing its non-partisan character to all outward appearances. After the illegal *Osvobozhdenie* and the legal weekly *Pravo*, appearing since 1898, this paper became particularly important for the cultivation of constitutionalism in the 'public movement' after the turn of the century.

Besides imparting information, the communicative function of the press lay in the fact that each individual paper or group of publications offered chances of identification with the relevant recognizable party line, chances similar to those embodied in parties and associations under more liberal regimes. From this point of view, the forming and differentiation of public opinion through the 'published opinion' of the oppositional press had an internal aspect, which could be described as journalistic or editorial socialization, and an external aspect – the effect of the journalistic product on the readers. That journals become a crystallization point for political groups, that they can establish something like political schools is certainly not unique to Russia. But this applied in Russia with a certain regularity. The groupings of regular contributors were lasting, often unusually large and, besides the permanent editorial staff, were closely dovetailed into the 'public movement', thanks to the fluid boundaries between journalistic and 'public' activity. The freelancers sometimes exercised greater influence than the permanent editorial staff on the make-up of a paper. There was a lively exchange among the groups of contributors to the individual periodicals, although there was usually a feeling of particular obligation to one or other of the publications. The cumulative effect of all the 'published opinion' was more important than competitive aspects of publishing and commerce.

The group behind the weekly *Pravo* (Law) was only small due to its specialized orientation, but it had a firm basis in the Petersburg advocacy through a co-operative statute, according to which the members of the editorial board accepted unlimited liability and the other partners' liability was limited to the amount of the share (500 roubles and over).⁸⁰ The editors determining the tendency and profile of the paper were not professional journalists. Besides I.V. Gessen, civil servant in the Ministry of the Interior and an independent lawyer from 1903, the editors were the university lecturers V.M. Gessen, A.I. Kaminka and N.I. Lazarevskij, V.D. Nabokov and the very witty legal philosopher L.I. Petražicki, a Pole by birth. The affinity of circumstances and a high degree of political agreement – apart from Lazarevskij, also a Constitutionalist, we find all these names in the Constitutional Democrats' Central Committee in 1906 and 1907 – made mutual understanding easy in a congenial atmosphere and gave the editorial board the appearance of a group of friends with a marked capacity for assimilation. The criminal law department was offered to V.D. Nabokov, the young criminologist, only with some hesitation.

This son of a cabinet minister, gentleman-in-waiting, who was married to the daughter of an industrial millionaire and travelled to the editorial conference by coach from his manorial home on the Morskaya, seemed like 'a being from another planet' to his colleagues.⁸¹ But not only did Nabokov fit in surprisingly well – for him, *Pravo* became the cross-roads where he left his own milieu and turned to the lower elevations of 'public activity' and political struggle. The periodical had originally been conceived as a specialist journal without any party political ambitions. But in the long run it could not avoid political commitment, and with time this became ever more constitutionalist. The carefully edited paper rapidly gained a reputation even outside legal circles, and Minister of the Interior Pleve did not hesitate to call it 'the succursal of the *Osvobozhdenie*'.⁸² The editorial board came into contact with the zemstvo movement through working together with the *Beseda* on editing the anthologies mentioned above.

In complete contrast to the St Petersburg *Pravo*, the very extensive range of contributors to the Moscow *Russkiya Vedomosti* came directly from the 'public movement', and the hierarchy of the latter also determined the allocation of editorial posts. Work in the editorial offices was more concerned with routine collection and screening of material than with the development of initiatives.⁸³ This led to the permanent staff, controlled only slightly by the managing editors, breaking up into rival groups in which those with a headstart in authority as scientists, qualified journalists or worthy zemstvo activists laid down the law. 'Finish studying, become a professor, and the attitude towards you will change overnight', an experienced editorial colleague advised the young S.P. Mel'gunov, who complained about bad treatment of the staff.⁸⁴ The paper gained its unique profile by readily opening up its columns to everyone for public discussion and by trying to portray with scrupulous precision the stirring of 'public' life. Vladimir Korolenko saw in the paper 'something like the living tradition of Russian sociability and literature'.⁸⁵ 'The impact of the paper', wrote Mel'gunov, 'lay by no means in the internal editorial unity, but rather in the group of people brought in to contribute to the paper. *Russkiya Vedomosti* was unique in its time and there was no-one of repute who would not have considered it an honour to write for the paper'.⁸⁶ But it was not only the honour – writing for the *Russkiya Vedomosti* was also tantamount to a commitment, the commitment to belief in 'public activity' and in the emancipatory power of 'public opinion'. There are more than two thousand names

listed in the biographical appendix to the *Festschrift* published on the fiftieth anniversary in 1913; Lejkina-Svirskaya gives 429 authors, 28 of them women, with more than one contribution for the period up to 1900.⁸⁷ In 1905, the year of revolution, the newspaper became practically the inner Russian medium for the constitutional movement emanating from the zemstvo congresses, closely connected with the organizational office of the zemstvo congresses and with the Moscow brains trust of the Union of Liberation.⁸⁸

The effect of newspapers on the public is often inferred from the objective data in press statistics and the structure of the distribution organization. Easy as this method is, the results are dubious so long as they cannot be correlated with definite facts on target groups and readership, on reading habits and behaviour. And even the simplest data on Russian journalism around 1900, documenting more than just the growth in press production, is hardly to be extracted.⁸⁹ So if the quantitative indices are left aside, there remains the question as to the qualitative potential effect of the oppositional press. Here definite limits were set by the censor's red pencil and by the public's retentiveness.

The Russian censor had long since abandoned the rigid principle whereby comments on any occurrences whatsoever in foreign or domestic policy were once reserved to official statements. Since 1873, however, the Ministry of the Interior had busily been making use of the opportunity to point out individual events or topical problem areas in secret circulars – sometimes even bypassing the letter of the press laws. The forbidden subjects ranged from information and commentaries on military policy through to disturbances in factories and universities, from petitions by the zemstvos and assemblies of the nobility through to government re-shuffles, and even a detrimental item on the Turkish sultan's harem was not to be printed, because the honour of a friendly head of state was involved.⁹⁰ By and large the restrictions followed the information policy principle whereby, alongside protection of national interests in foreign and security policies, everything was suppressed which could impair the peace in individual regions and strata of the population. It was easier to criticize fundamentally the inferior legal position of the peasants and the peasant commune than to get an analysis of the economic conditions of West Siberian farmers past the censor. As the example of legal marxism shows, there was greater freedom under Nicholas II for abstract theoretical treatment of socio-philosophical models, even if

they did propagate the ideal of the socialist society. This was an advantage for a periodical like *Pravo*, which gave the Minister of the Interior cause for distrust but no lever for suppression.⁹¹ This type of censorship thus favoured the 'thick journals' while it set very much narrower limits on newspaper coverage and small reports. It promoted further metropolitan press concentration, because concessions 'without pre-censorship' (*bez predvaritel'noj tsenzury*) were granted only for St. Petersburg and Moscow.

Censorship was a heavy burden on Russian journalism. But in the end it left journalism's independence intact and was not able to bring about a controlled press. On the contrary, its prohibitive approach constantly challenged the skills of journalists to present subjects – forbidden, yet crying out to be voiced – in ever new disguise: in literary-artistic cipher, in scientific discussion, in detailed description of conditions abroad, in the hardly audible metaphors of indirect idiom, full of inferences and implications. Under the heading 'Press' (*Pechat'*) in the Brokgauz-Efron Encyclopaedia, for example, we find the following assessment after the general definitions: 'Since it serves as one of the most important means of expression for public opinion and as one of the most powerful tools in the political and in every other struggle, the press is a significant factor in progress. . . . Like every powerful weapon, it can serve very different ends, among them those which are regarded at a given moment as criminal; in its effects, it can benefit or harm the government'.⁹² The subsequent section on the history of government limitation and supervision of publications since the Middle Ages is concluded by the writer of the article with the remark that larger scale prohibitive measures 'are still practised today, among the civilized countries, only in Russia and partly in Austria', and he adds a survey of the constitutionally guaranteed press rights in England, the USA, France, Germany, Austria and Belgium. For Russia he then refers the reader to the headings 'Censorship' and 'Freedom of the Press', where almost the same assessments are to be found, along with comparable details for Western Europe. The 'Censorship' article gives a twelve-page presentation of the legal provisions in Russia and reports on the practice of censorship in unusually plain language.⁹³ Nowhere to be seen, however, is the positive demand for freedom of the press and constitutional guarantees, but ever present is the picture of a Russia which must go without such privileges, backward among the 'civilized peoples' and hampered in its 'progress'. –

'Aesopic language' was the expression used for this type of codified talk, with a tip of the wink understandable to all.⁹⁴

Such makeshifts were decisive in the independent development of Russian journalism. On the other hand, however, they did also impair the lucidity of the printed word, which the mass of the illiterate population could not cope with anyway. A certain foreknowledge was necessary to be able to read between the lines; and so the question remains as to whether, under such circumstances, the effect of legally permitted political journalism was not rather to confirm than to shape opinion. Iosif Gessen once defined 'dry, abrupt conversation', the ability to understand 'each other with half a word' as typical of insiders of the 'public movement'.⁹⁵ With all its circuitous parabolism, the Aesopic code had to do without explanation and was communicable only in circumstances of prior agreement on the implications.

These assumptions seem to be supported by the results of a survey in 1913 of the *Russkiya Vedomosti* readers.⁹⁶ According to these, more than two-thirds of the respondents had undergone university education, about one-fifth 'only' gymnasium education – in other words, some 90% of the readers came from the privileged educated class which made up less than 1% of the Empire's population. In Moscow, the largest readership consisted of students (17%), primary and secondary school teachers (13.5%) and physicians (13%), while every second reader in the provinces was a teacher (20.8%), physician (19.2%) or civil servant (12%). In Moscow as in the provinces, members of the military and the workers made up less than 1%. Farmers, in Moscow also less than 1%, made up only 5.3% of the provincial readers. Urban predominance is underlined by 6.7% and 5.4% industrial and commercial business proprietors respectively and by 13.9% and 7.0% private and national business employees respectively. If the professions with high educational requirements, which were also qualified as 'public activity', are added together,⁹⁷ the result is 44.5% of the readership for Moscow, 58% for the provinces; adding to these the readers without occupation (7.1/6.4%) and higher education students (17.0/1.5%), then more than two-thirds can potentially be regarded as 'public activists' on the strength of their occupational characteristics. Roughly 63% of the readers in 1913 had taken *Russkiya Vedomosti* for more than ten years, i.e. in 1903 the paper already had a strong body of regular subscribers, which thereafter changed very little structurally. Every second reader in 1913 had become a subscriber between 1883 and 1903. In accordance with the

professional structure, in 1913 80% in the provinces and – despite the high proportion of students – 60% in Moscow were older than 30, and the bulk of the readers were between 30 and 50 years old; more than one-third of the Moscow readers, almost half of those in the provinces therefore belonged to the generation born by 1870 – the mainstay of the 'public movement' around 1900.

These figures lack the representative quality of modern demoscopic surveys. They simply reflect the relationships within a group of regular readers which was intellectually capable of filling in the questionnaire and identified with 'its' newspaper to such a degree as to be prepared to declare in its favour. They also leave open the absolute orders of magnitude, the statistical relationship between the Moscow and provincial readership and the distribution density in individual regions.⁹⁸ And finally they say nothing about the actual opinion-shaping effects, unless the disproportionate increases – to be deduced from subscription duration statistics – at the turn of the century and during the 1905-1907 years of revolution are to be over-interpreted as publicity effects of the newspaper's constitutionalist tendency. With all its imponderables, however, the survey permits the impression that the range of influence of a large Moscow daily newspaper with a socio-liberal tendency, enjoying an authoritative reputation with the public, hardly extended beyond the professionalized urban educated classes, and covered only the 'educational and cultural top drawer'.⁹⁹ It can be assumed that the social profiles of the readers covered by the survey and of the paper's staff and contributors were in fact very similar. So the assumption seems not without foundation that the effect of the type of journalism represented by *Russkiya Vedomosti* – the profile of the readership of the 'thick journals' can only have been even more restricted – was reduced to the inner circle of professional, educated society which was well disposed towards public commitment and experienced in 'public activity'. In its effectiveness in confirming opinion, however, the function of the legal press in the political socialization process must not be underestimated; with its patterns of language it did pass on privately fostered convictions and unspoken sentiments to the public, and did let the reader recognize that his individual opinion was in fact communal. The press gave the 'public activists' the assurance that 'we', the 'publicly active public', do actually exist as a unit.¹⁰⁰

d. *Voluntary associations and interregional congresses*

This public presented itself more tangibly, more practically – but also more open to state intervention than in the press – in societies and unions which had formed in great number since the 1860s with the aim of pursuing scientific, cultural, social or charitable objectives. There were at most 25 learned societies when the reign of Nicholas I came to an end; 40 years later there were 340. An official survey in 1899 counted more than 7,000 non-governmental organizations of a charitable and social service nature.¹⁰¹ Here personal and group contacts were motivated by the actual purpose of the society. Through the politicalization of this type of social life since the 1890s, the activity of many societies and unions took on immanently political accents. This applied above all to the famine relief drives flourishing since 1891/92 in competition with the government measures, and to the educational actions, ranging from literacy campaigns and organization of 'home reading' through to a sort of private correspondence course resembling British and American university extensions,¹⁰² which countered state and church education with the idea of self-education (*samoobrazovanie*). In the long term the effects of 'society's' social committedness were shown after the turn of the century in the rapidly developing co-operative movement, in which peasants and small producers were trying to hold their own against the changing conditions of social production and consumption under capitalism.¹⁰³

The professionalization of 'society' led to the development of a series of societies in which members of the professions maintained interregional contacts. The Pirogov Society of Russian Doctors had been in existence since 1886; until the turn of the century it had discarded its original professional character and become a discussion forum for socio-medical problems.¹⁰⁴ The natural scientists held their 10th Congress in Kiev as early as 1898. The jurists had to do without a professional society – the Moscow Juridical Society, a scholarly union founded at the University in 1863, could not be considered a substitute. The first Congress in February 1903, however, documented the extraordinarily highly developed political awareness of this professional class.¹⁰⁵ The teachers shared a fate similar to that of the jurists. General teacher congresses had been banned since 1885, and not until 1902 was it possible to get a Congress of Representatives of Teacher Relief Societies approved by the authorities. New oppor-

tunities for public participation in the closely controlled schools sector were offered in 1898 by the Pedagogical Society at Moscow University, which promptly engaged in the current discussion on the reform of secondary education.¹⁰⁶

In this process of mobilization and organization of 'public activity', two venerable learned societies gained particular importance: the Imperial Free Economic Society of Petersburg, founded in 1765 by Catherine II and endowed with unusual privileges, and the Juridical Society of the University of Moscow. Under the chairmanship of the professor of law Sergej A. Muromtsev, dismissed from his post for political reasons, the Juridical Society paid special attention to international jurisprudence – till then an area completely neglected by Russian law – and working on this aspect of comparative law, tried to develop alternatives to the prevailing legal system.¹⁰⁷ The Free Economic Society had long been engaged in the promotion of practical agriculture, in famine relief and in elementary education. During the presidency of Count Peter A. Gejden, its public meetings had become a favoured centre for the theoretical disputes between Marxists and Populists since 1896.¹⁰⁸ Like many others, these societies were drawn into the wake of practical zemstvo work when their membership lists filled out after the mid-1890s with members of the Third Element, who were suffering more than most from the isolation of their district or province outposts.¹⁰⁹

It is characteristic of the 'public movement' after the turn of the century that the effects of politicalization were evident almost exclusively in societies and unions engaged in the socio-cultural development of the country, in the application of new sciences and technologies, in economics, education or jurisprudence. Pure pressure groups, such as the assemblies of the nobility and bodies representing trade and industry which claimed all but official status, were hardly affected by the wave of opposition. And institutions such as the Imperial Historical Society and the Society of Connoisseurs of the Russian Language and Literature also remained untouched by the political tide of events, although neither history nor literature in Russia was without its political qualities. The Literature Fund, a relief organization founded in 1859 for the benefit of authors and journalists in need, did indeed strengthen the solidarity between the reading public and the 'brotherhood of writers', but it too never served as a sustaining organization.¹¹⁰ The Russian Literary Society (*Russkoe literaturnoe obshchestvo*) founded in 1886 deliberately

remained a private society without any public aspects. The Writers Union (*Soyuz Pisatelej*), brought into being in 1894 by N.K. Mikhajlovskij in the guise of a self-help organization, was the first society to offer a basis for concerted journalistic-political demonstrations by writers and journalists in St. Petersburg.¹¹¹ But its dissolution in connection with the Kazan Square events on 4th March 1901 and the banishment of its leading forces robbed the metropolitan intelligentsia of its most important operational base at exactly the stage where the 'public movement' was just beginning to turn political.

Inasfar as the public plenary meetings of such societies and unions discussed practical questions of the country's development and fundamental theoretical positions, they had the same effect as the press on the shaping of public opinion. People came to see their idols or their ideological opponents, and the public vociferously gave vent to its preconceived opinions.¹¹² It was different with the decisions and resolutions, even if they still retained their traditional forms for a long time – the petition, the 'solicitation to the government' (*khodatajstvo pred pravitel'stvom*) and the most humble appeal. They presupposed opinion-forming processes among the members entitled to vote, processes which could be influenced by the determination and authority of the relevant leading groups; they specified points where action was necessary, revealed pressure and solidarity groups and thus provided a better index for the development of 'public opinion' than the press and other journalistic products. From this point a direct line leads via the numerous specialist congresses after the turn of the century, with their ever more spectacular resolutions, to the deliberately planned banquet and resolution campaigns, which were used to put pressure on the government in 1905.¹¹³

Even the mere procedure of such associations – quite apart from subject matter –, the method, based on systematic agendas, of forming opinion and of democratic decision among members of a constituted institution with formal equal rights – all this affected the barely organized 'public movement' like the arrival of the utopian law and order of a constitutional regime. 'The wonderful figure of Muromtsev arose from the president's seat', Alexander Kizevetter reminisces on the President of the Moscow Juridical Society. 'When he read out the items of the agenda, he rose for the reading of each and every paper and invariably began with one and the same phrase: 'I have the honour of presenting to the Society . . .' He spoke the phrase artistically, in a tone of voice expressing both presidential

dignity and esteem for the Society over which he presided. I say without exaggeration that the sound of this phrase in his mouth in those days gave me as much pleasure as the most enchanting aria sung by Khokhlov, idol of the whole of Moscow at the time'.¹¹⁴ But Muromtsev was a singular figure. No-one knew better than he how to conduct the ceremonies of parliamentary order; and the way in which pressure groups of various political shades after 1904 began to exploit all the rules of procedure in directing societies and congresses was not the manner of a Muromtsev. The impression his handling of procedure made on contemporaries thrived on its contrast to the usual picture of large society meetings, where often enough the clamour of mere publicity buried the expression of autonomous order and corporative freedom.

In view of the destruction of the old political authorities, the role played by Sergej A. Muromtsev in the constitutionalist movement reveals the elementary need for symbolic figures, for demonstration of the new, dominating hierarchy of values. His role became more clearly defined the more constitutionalism gained in organizational stature; and Muromtsev, who had become active in the constitutionalist movement only at the end of 1904, took his place as president of the first Russian parliament in April 1906 almost as a matter of course.¹¹⁵ In spite of the importance for constitutionalist thought in Russia which the then 30-year-old professor of Roman law had won during the last years of Alexander II's reign, Muromtsev was not among the ideas-men in the development phase of constitutionalism. He was more concerned with turning programmatic principles into clear, specific paragraphs, into a 'lively form, with the t's crossed and the i's dotted'. 'You must know precisely what you are going to do the minute power rests in your hands', he once explained to V.D. Nabokov.¹¹⁶ With the legal positivist's firm belief that, wherever well-founded standards are established, circumstances will have no reason to turn to anarchy, the impressive ceremonial of his administration as president of the Juridical Society, as chairman of numerous meetings and congresses in 1905 and later as president of the Duma, was also always determined by the endeavour to illustrate 'the living figure of the constitution'. At the height of the Revolution in autumn 1905, he discussed in all earnestness with a few friends how the future president of the Duma should close the meeting if the Plenary Assembly should break into tumult and the president's words fell on deaf ears: 'Putting on a top hat would be inconvenient. We hardly

wear top hats any more. Putting on a bowler — laughable. I think the president should simply leave his chair. That makes everything clear: no president — no meeting'.¹¹⁷ For the first official event after the election, Muromtsev continued, the president should present himself in tails; and he should also wear tails when presented to the Emperor, but without decorations, please, in order to document independence of the monarch. He should otherwise preside in a morning suit, a staid one, certainly, and one which hindered freedom of movement less than the fashion then offered. — The combination of practicality and ritual was convincing — Muromtsev's dress regulations held sway for the four legislative periods of the Russian State Duma.

Such deliberations, carried out in the private dining room of a noble Moscow restaurant during the mass demonstrations and the general strike, did not appear as surrealist comedy to the contemporaries. While the world outside was all but coming to an end, the marshalling underlying significance remained all the more present to them during the game of etiquette, crystallizing into a ritual gesture. The yet unfinished 'society' was searching for the expression which conveyed symbolically the intended new, 'societal' interaction. Alarmed at the unceremonious handling of any and all established order by the revolutionary masses, 'society' took its bearings in the state wardrobe of the old regime and discovered political hierarchy in its own — the civilian morning suit of the closing 19th century replaced the civil servant's livery fashioned in the 18th century, the tails turned without trappings in bourgeois black in place of full Court regalia. The president's raised podium reflected the confrontation innate in the representation of the sovereign.¹¹⁸ The ritual gesture created distance and incontestability. 'Just like the metropolitan in the cathedral!' a peasant in the public gallery of the Duma is said to have exclaimed on seeing Muromtsev presiding — and the authoress who recorded the remark meant it as a compliment.¹¹⁹ We are familiar with this process from the bourgeois revolutions in Western Europe; even in the 20th century hardly any revolution has been able to refrain from helping itself to the symbolic props of power left behind by the overthrown order. How much less cause had the Russian Constitutionalists, who were trying to flee a revolution in which they would lose chains of a more noble metal than those of the rebellious proletariat and the ravaging peasantry. Before the bourgeois claim to power could present itself in a Russian parliament, it was mainly the voluntary associations, the constituted institutions of 'society' which were able to introduce

the visible procedure of 'societism'. 'I have the honour of presenting to the Society. . . .' — with this phrase of the president of the Juridical Society in his ears, A. Kizevetter confesses that he understood something of the difference 'between the public activist, mainstay of social work, and the philistine (*obyvatel'*) pursuing his own private affairs'.¹²⁰

The autocratic government rather more surmised than recognized the competition threatening from the voluntary associations. While it saw itself as dependent on 'society's' initiatives in many fields, especially in the theoretical and applied sciences, it tried to restrain the political implications of association and union activities by using outdated police control methods. Other than in the case of the press laws, where the censor's intervention was to a certain degree the exception to the rule of legally permitted written expression of opinion, the right of association — as far as it existed at all under the old regime — consisted exclusively of interdictions. Every authorized free association represented an exception in itself and whether it was a private social affair — a banquet, say, with invited guests or a ball — it was nonetheless subject to administrative control.¹²¹ With the politicalization of the 'public movement' at the end of the 1890s, the ambivalent relations of the government with every form of social auto-organization led to a contradictory and therefore discreditable policy. Though the admission of new unions was partially decentralized and liberalized, interference in union activities and dissolution of existing societies were increasing at one and the same time. With the student movement in mind, the Minister for People's Enlightenment closed the Moscow Juridical Society by decree in 1899. The Governor General saw in it the organizational centre of a 'liberal party' which had long been working conspiratorially.¹²² The Free Economic Society caused offence with its interregional 'Literacy Committee' — which, like its Moscow counterpart, came directly under the authority of the Minister for People's Enlightenment in 1895 — and with its famine relief activities. This type of practical commitment was an infringement of the Society's statutory objectives, according to the explanation given to its president, Count Gejden. A series of turbulent plenary assemblies in the winter of 1899/1900 finally occasioned the practical withdrawal in April 1900 of the Society's freedom privilege, the exclusion of the public and subjection of the remaining business to supervision by the Ministry of Agriculture.¹²³

Supervision and bans were equally directed against the noisy osten-

tation of large public assemblies and the conspiracy of malevolent elements suspected in all quarters. It was relatively easy for local authorities to differentiate in speeches and agendas between approved statutory objectives and banned political subjects of national relevance, and thus to prevent open political propaganda. This differentiation, however, was of no use in controlling the communicative, in the long-term politically dangerous, function of unions and societies – the function of arranging co-operation among people of different classes and backgrounds who would otherwise hardly have come into contact with each other. Banning this or that organization did not destroy this contact, it only shifted the communications nexus of those willing to co-operate to other, possibly less jeopardized, forms of organization.

In this way a series of ad hoc congresses became the vehicle preferred by the 'public opposition' after the turn of the century. In comparison with permanent associations, these had the advantage of greater mobility, and they constantly offered new opportunities for creating interregional contacts on seemingly legitimate pretexts between the various overlapping social groups and circles. The Moscow Congress for Agronomic Aid in February 1901 stood at the beginning of this development. Attended by elected and employed zemstvo activists with equal rights, the Congress demonstrated that interregional communication was in fact possible within such a framework, despite the fears of the sceptics. It was followed in September 1901 by a Regional Congress for Domestic Crafts (*kustarnyj s'ezd*) in Poltava, organized by the local Agricultural Society, at which representatives of the zemstvos and professions from Poltava, Chernigov, Khar'kov, Kursk and Kiev Provinces by far outweighed the 'domestic craftsmen'.¹²⁴ Members of the technical and scientific intelligentsia and journalists from the provinces met the metropolitan intellectuals in Petersburg at the Tenth Congress of Natural Scientists and Doctors at the end of 1901 and beginning of 1902.¹²⁵ At the All-Russian Domestic Crafts Congress in Petersburg in March 1902 – in subject matter and attendance a continuation of the Poltava event – and under cover of the Moscow Fire Insurance Congress in April 1902, the decisions were made in favour of a co-ordinated zemstvo initiative in the matter of the 'Special Conference on the Needs of Agriculture'.¹²⁶ Prince Peter D. Dolgorukov had prepared an educational exhibition in Kursk for the end of June 1902, which demonstrated for the first time the state and requirements of the zemstvo educational system;

zemtsy and teachers still negotiated separately here and they did not reach any joint decisions either. At the Congress of Representatives of Teachers Relief Societies in Moscow at the end of 1902 and beginning of 1903, it was mainly elementary teachers who discussed the legal and status questions of their profession, and from this point they rapidly came to politically relevant conclusions.¹²⁷ The plan by a committee of journalists to hold a festival banquet on 3rd January 1903 to celebrate the bicentenary of the first newspaper in Russia seemed all too ostentatious to the authorities to be considered for approval;¹²⁸ the initiators were only able to hand out to all editors a draft resolution for publication, containing the demand for reorganization of the press on the basis of freedom. The trend towards politicalization continued at the two big events in 1903 – the Regional Agricultural Congress in conjunction with the Second Educational Exhibition in Yaroslavl', 15th – 25th August, and the All-Russian Husbandry Exhibition in Khar'kov at the end of September. This phase was brought to a provisional close at the beginning of January 1904 by the Third Congress on Technical Education and, immediately following, the Ninth Congress of the Pirogov Society, both of which brought several thousand delegates to Petersburg.¹²⁹

The tendency of speeches and resolutions at these congresses increasingly moved away from complaints about abuses in the relevant specific field towards political demands. At the Congress for Agronomic Aid (February 1901), it was still difficult to get approval for some questions – such as extension of the *zemstvo* organization to village level and the related democratization of the *zemstvo* ('small *zemstvo* unit') – even as mere objects of debate by a sub-committee. But when the Teachers Congress (December 1902 – January 1903) touched on such highly political questions as the introduction of the *zemstvo* into areas without self-administration, the 'small *zemstvo* unit', general responsibility of local *zemstvos* for elementary education and the legal guarantee of social self-activity, this was simply the logical consequence of the prior inventory of the various aspects of administrative dependence under which the elementary teachers were suffering. To loud applause, one woman delegate replied to the demand that all teachers be given civil servant status: 'The Russian teacher has never been and will never be a *chinovnik*. I am convinced that he will put the rights of a penniless (*golodnoj*) yet independent profession above the rights of the civil service'.¹³⁰

In the end, the professional subject matter at congresses gradually

became nothing more than a mere pretext for discussing concepts for political and social reform. There was already open talk of the constitution at the Congress on Technical Education; the incriminated word was still avoided in official resolutions, and in its place civil and political rights, the eight-hour day for workers and the elimination of religious and racial discrimination were demanded. The Ninth Pirogov Congress in January 1904 then implicitly declared the discussion of medical problems under the prevailing regime to be completely senseless. This reads as follows in the final report of one section: 'The proper and expedient fight against infant mortality, alcoholism, tuberculosis, syphilis and other national epidemics, which represent a social evil of immense importance in Russia, is possible only under conditions guaranteeing wide dissemination of knowledge on the true causes for their development and their remedies; to this end the complete freedom of the individual, of opinion, of the press and of association are essential'.¹³¹ With such statements, the Pirogov Congress developed a pattern which was to have further effects in 1905 on the mobilization of the intellectual professions and their incorporation in politically motivated professional unions. There was still reluctance to elevate the fatal word 'constitution' openly to an object of resolution, although behind the scenes the only subject of conversation now was political freedom. Yet the two big events in January 1904 nonetheless demonstrated their political self-confidence by throwing out the prescribed form for the resolutions of such congresses – the 'solicitation to the government' – and introduced their resolutions with the categorical phrasings 'it is essential that . . .' (*neobkhodimo*), 'it is desirable that . . .' (*zhelatel'no*) or '... must be abolished' (*dolzno byt' ustraneno*).

The success of the two congresses signalled the degree of politicalization of professionalized 'society'. But this success would not have been possible but for the careful planning and organization in which groups of various political shades took part. The Congress on Technical Education was led by its biggest, 1,000-member-strong Section for Workers Education, which had neutralized its General Committee – appointed by the Ministry – in advance by means of a procedural trick.¹³² At the Pirogov Congress, an independently developed 'Organizational Assembly' was able to hold its own against the officially controlled Steering Committee in the editing of resolutions and final reports. Here the group of *zemstvo* doctors with constitutionalist or non-party populist leanings prevailed over the conservative professors

from the Military Medical Academy and over a small group of Social Democrat doctors.¹³³ The tactics of controlling such mass assemblies by politically oriented executive groups was subsequently recognized and perfected by the Constitutionalists as an essential tool in the organization of 'public opinion'. Until January 1904, however, the congresses and exhibitions were in general left to develop spontaneously. They were used predominantly as a cover for conspiratorial associations and arrangements on the perimeters of the official conference agenda. Milyukov's programme article, for example, was discussed by the 'friends' of *Osvobozhdenie* during the St. Petersburg Domestic Crafts Congress. Eighteen months later, the Yaroslavl' Agricultural Congress and the Khar'kov Husbandry Exhibition were used for preparing the foundation of the Union of Liberation, which was then formally concluded at the beginning of January 1904 behind the scenes of the Congress on Technical Education.¹³⁴ With these steps the Constitutionalists began to break with informal organization patterns and to develop their own communications system beneath the visible surface of the 'public institutions'.

e. *The zemstvo movement*

At the turn of the century, the zemstvo was still the most important institutional bond holding the various branches of the 'public movement' together. The increasingly complex functions of the local zemstvo provided a basis founded on communal work for the co-operation between the new professional middle classes and sections of the landed nobility. At the same time, zemstvo work allied the social movement of the new middle classes, concentrating more and more in the cities, with the development problems of the countryside. Since the beginning of the 1890s decisively stimulating ideas had been emanating from the practical on-the-spot work of the zemstvos, and these were being introduced to circles and salons, the press, unions and the all-Russian congresses by the elected and the salaried *zemtsy*.

The image of the zemstvo movement in the years 1900-1903 was determined by dwindling faith in the autocratic regime's ability to govern and by the growing programmatic influence of oppositional tides. Programmed long in advance by Vitte's industrialization policy, the peasant unrest in 1902 provoked leading zemstvo groups active in

agriculture; at the same time the government imposed further restrictions on the zemstvo, revoked areas of responsibility, and thus forced the zemstvos into a struggle for self-preservation which in the long run was only advantageous to oppositional tendencies. The lack of interest in zemstvo affairs shown by large sections of the landed nobility had for long been a source of complaint. But now groups which objected to confrontation with the government began to avoid the zemstvo deliberately and left the field open to oppositional activists of various shades.¹³⁵ This intensified the fundamental conflict between autocracy and zemstvo, about which Vitte had written in his 1899 Memorandum. We have found this conflict reflected in the history of both *Beseda* and particularly those professional congresses sponsored by zemstvo forces. This problem must now be studied in conjunction with the internal development of the zemstvo.

The development was determined during the years in question by two closely related structural problems arising from defects of the Zemstvo Statute:¹³⁶ the 'democratization' of work at the grassroots, and overcoming the isolation of the provinces. Ideologically, 'democratization' meant that 'the welfare of the people' should be placed above individual and class interests and that the results of zemstvo work should benefit primarily the predominantly peasant population. In practice, 'democratization' meant co-operation on equal terms between the elected and the salaried zemstvo forces (*glasnye* and *sluzhashchie*) in order to obviate decisions based on pressure group or governmental interests. Organizationally, 'democratization' meant expansion of zemstvo operations — into the village as well as inter-regionally — in order to make the most balanced range of services available to all classes of the provincial population.¹³⁷ The term, with all its ideological implications, covered very varied tendencies, all of them arising from the dynamism of the zemstvo activities. The divergent modes of interaction of the class-oriented service society and the modern, professional efficiency-oriented society rubbed shoulders with each other in the zemstvo. The resulting tensions demanded institutional solutions which went beyond the prevailing constitutional framework. The political answers provided by the zemstvo itself to this challenge made a fundamental contribution to the political differentiation of the 'public movement'.

During the course of the 1890s the emphasis of zemstvo work had shifted to the province level. In 1890, its share of the total zemstvo budget was 24.2%, which rose to 37.4% by 1902; during this same

period, the volume of the provincial budget multiplied more than threefold, while the district budget only doubled.¹³⁸ The staff on the zemstvo boards also increased with corresponding disparity. It may well be that the bulk of the specialists engaged were still employed at district level, but the Third Element was pressing for concentration and was trying, through regional congresses, to exert equal influence on the work of the whole province. The provincial zemstvo boards maintained advisory committees for questions of agricultural promotion and education, health offices and statistics departments, all of which increasingly took on the role of indispensable assistants in zemstvo assembly decision-making. Relations between the Second and Third Elements were not without their tensions; the 'masters' (*chozyayeva*) often felt snubbed by the intellectual arrogance of the 'hirelings' (*naemniki*) and considered their ideology of private property impaired by the hirelings' brash manner. All the same, efforts were made in many areas to share the responsibility of the elected representatives with the permanent staff by calling them as advisers into the committees which presented ideas and documents to the annual plenary meetings.¹³⁹ The practice of establishing committees was again much more developed at province level than in the districts. The fact, due to disinterest on the part of many local landowners, that only the most active *zemtsy* let themselves be elected to the provincial zemstvo assemblies also contributed to the greater vitality of the superior zemstvo bodies. And the most active *zemtsy* were often men who had only very little in common with the type of inveterate landed Russian nobleman. Their qualifications were mostly equal to those of the Third Element, for whose ideas they showed an attentive ear.

The relationship between district and province was not precisely defined in the zemstvo legislation. Following the narrow definition of local economy in the Law of 1864, however, the district had claimed the lead for some 30 years. The reversal of this relationship since the mid-1890s led to continuous and vehement disputes.¹⁴⁰ The question was raised in principle in the Moscow Province zemstvo. The chairman of the executive board, D.N. Shipov, presented the 1899 plenary assembly with an organizational plan and a scheme for financial equalization in the districts. He was guided here by the conviction that the provincial and district zemstvos followed completely identical objectives. All their endeavours should therefore be directed towards 'satisfying the needs of the *whole* population *more*

completely and more uniformly while employing the smallest possible amount of staff and materials'.¹⁴¹ According to Shipov's interpretation, the zemstvo should offset the social consequences of income disparities caused 'by the land ownership rights and the capitalist nature of industry and trade'. Consequently the more prosperous regions and classes should contribute to the social expenditure of those districts which were unable to satisfy their needs from their own resources. Boris Chicherin, the grand old man of theoretical liberalism in Russia, used this sensitive point of financial equalization as the pivot of his criticism of Shipov's models. — He himself had been a zemstvo deputy and mayor of Moscow for many a long year. — The provincial zemstvo, he objected, which forced one district to pay for another 'is behaving like a bureaucracy pervaded by socialist ideas'. Russia was suffering from over-bureaucratization as it was, and such centralist attitudes were adhered to today particularly 'by those Jacobin tendencies which [want] to implement the aims of liberalism by force and thereby to pervert its very essence'.

The affair was explosive because of the political implications alluded to by Chicherin. Shipov's equalization model really did indicate certain bureaucratic tendencies, which were also evident in the inflation of the zemstvo boards. And these arose in the zemstvo itself, not from governmental supervision. Vitte described them very polemically but not inappositely in his zemstvo Memorandum of 1899.¹⁴² But Shipov was not affected by all these reproaches. To him this was a matter of a politically practicable solution to a fundamental problem of every form of human organization. As a 'social union', the zemstvo was using centralization of its funds and their allocation — contrary to governmental bureaucracy — as a means of bringing about the ethical idea of 'social truth and justice'. To his mind, this had nothing to do with 'bureaucratic socialism' or 'democratic despotism', as it was called in the reactionary press of the time, but rather with the moral duty of mutual assistance 'according to the Christian commandment on neighbourly love'.¹⁴³ The 'Jacobian tendencies' worried Shipov himself; axing these at the roots, however, was in his eyes the task of a rational government policy towards 'society'. But other oppositional forces also saw beginnings in the rationalization of zemstvo work of a counter-bureaucracy which demonstratively implemented 'society's' mission and had the advantage over the government administration of being subject to public criticism and control.¹⁴⁴ These forces could confidently have sub-

scribed to the criticism — based on remarkable insight into the relationship between economics and politics — of a correspondent of the reactionary newspaper *Moskovskiya Vedomosti*: 'Its very structure' did not allow the provincial zemstvo to content itself with 'purely economic questions'. 'It is always engaging in politics at every turn'.¹⁴⁵

Rationalization and centralization, financial equalization and co-operation in the zemstvo, however, had long stopped being a matter of 'either-or'. In adopting Shipov's suggestions in December 1900, the Moscow zemstvo assembly was only adjusting its work organization to the altered overall social and economic conditions caused by industrialization, and it thereby prejudiced the solution to the problem in other zemstvos as well.¹⁴⁶ In his traditionalist liberal criticism, Chicherin had misjudged the dynamism of modern marketing relationships from which the zemstvo — as an institution serving the development of local economy — could not be excluded. 'Similar agricultural and economic needs cannot be limited to the territory of an administrative unit, of an individual district or province', a speaker explained at the Moscow Agronomic Congress in February 1901. 'They occur in several provinces with similar agricultural and economic conditions, and they give rise to the ideal of a permanent area organization consisting of elected representatives from the zemstvos concerned and of local agronomists'. Such an organization would be able to meet these needs 'more cheaply and more pertinently' than the present zemstvo organization.¹⁴⁷

As Chairman of the biggest and most influential zemstvo, Shipov had been working since 1894 on a union of the provincial zemstvos. Practical experience in purchasing and distributing agricultural machinery, seed, fertilizers and building materials — but also the barely tenable fire insurance risk which each province had to bear alone — gave him this idea just as much as the political consideration that the zemstvos could counter the government's distrust of 'social self-activity' only as a united front.¹⁴⁸ He succeeded in 1896 for the first time in gathering together the chairman of 19 provincial zemstvos for a private congress in Nizhnij Novgorod. Minister of the Interior Goremykin had said in conversation that he was prepared to tolerate such private conferences, even though he could not give his official approval.¹⁴⁹ When, however, this first congress set about establishing itself as an institution and — apparently certain of ministerial benevolence — made no effort to conceal its intentions from the government,

Goremykin went back on his word, thus really drawing attention to the political relevance of the zemstvo union. The *zemtsy*, who at this stage were emphatically in favour of co-operation with government authorities, did in fact yield to the decision but never really gave up the idea of interregional co-ordination. They met subsequently in small groups on the periphery of official events both in Moscow and in the provinces and so managed to keep in touch at least on the personal level. As we have seen, the *Beseda* was originally intended as another substitute for the forbidden zemstvo union. At this stage the cohesion of the zemstvos was strengthened mainly through the Third Element's professional associations and other scientific societies and congresses. Count Gejden, president of the Free Economic Society, more than once suggested linking the proposed zemstvo union institutionally to his Society and also arranging publication of a central journal by the Society. But the leading zemstvo representatives around Shipov did not accept this offer on the grounds of fundamental considerations of the zemstvo's independence.¹⁵⁰ Nevertheless, in the very united oppositional trend in the zemstvo sessions from 1901 to 1903,¹⁵¹ there were initial successes in interregional co-operation, which had been operating through informal channels for years. The substantially co-ordinated petitions on matters of general national relevance made by zemstvos from various regions accumulated to such a degree that, as early as 1901, the Ministry of the Interior instructed governors to prevent such contingencies in future.¹⁵²

The other aspect of the problem presented by rationalization of zemstvo work was the need of the zemstvo institutions for better working facilities and greater efficiency at the grassroots. The lower zemstvo level, the district (*uezd*), did after all cover an area about the size of a county. The district was sub-divided into small peasant wards (*volost'*), each of which represented several peasant communes. The *volost'* had been the administrative unit of the non-privileged rural population since 1861. Since 1889 they were subordinate to the land commandant (*zemskij nachal'nik*), an official chosen from the ranks of the local landed nobility. In this way their institutions (*volost'* elder, *volost'* assembly and *volost'* court), functioning on the basis of a special class law, were integrated into the prescribed channels of general national administration.¹⁵³ The zemstvo had no authority in the *volost'* area and here too, as at all other levels, it refrained from using repression in implementing its measures. Whether it was a matter of collecting statistical data, of land surveying or prevention of

cattle diseases, whether roads were to be built or supplies transported to emergency areas, whether the problem was itinerant treatment of epidemics or building a school – the zemstvo staff were always dependent on the readiness and help of the *volost'* administrations. If the peasants made difficulties, the zemstvo had to apply to the local *gendarme* for official assistance. And in all this, the mass of the population remained a passive object, without any real opportunity to show practical initiative. The experience of the 1891/92 famine and intensification of zemstvo work therefore led in the 1890s to a revival of the discussion for a new zemstvo unit, 'smaller than the district' – already talked of without satisfactory results at the beginning of Alexander III's reign.¹⁵⁴

In February 1901 the Congress for Agronomic Aid in Moscow took up the matter and passed a statement to the effect that the 'small zemstvo unit' (*melkaya zemskaya edinitsa*) be set up as a compulsory social union in a precisely defined territory with the right of autonomous taxation. Its institutions should have an 'all-class' character, i.e. should consist of representatives delegated with equal rights by all inhabitants of the given area, and exercise exclusively the functions of self-government without police or judicial powers.¹⁵⁵ The campaign in the following years in favour of the 'small zemstvo unit' seems to have been stepped up mainly by the *Beseda*. Its first comprehensive publication was the anthology *Melkaya zemskaya edinitsa* (1902), in which the model was substantiated in jurisprudence, in history and in comparison with the West European neighbours.¹⁵⁶ Also among the proponents were the Constitutionalists around Ivan Petrunkevich, while journalistic support was lent by the *Pravo* editorial board and such influential journals as *Vestnik Evropy* and *Russkiya Vedomosti*.

The structure sketched out by the 1901 Agronomic Congress was doubtless not felicitous, neither did it bear up in all its parts during the subsequent debates. It severed the problem from the reform of peasant rights and peasant administration, and clothed the peasant-class local administration in a 'democratic' zemstvo, which would have extended all the zemstvo's executive defects down to village level. The opponents of the 'small zemstvo unit' in this form – among them D.N. Shipov – feared moreover that in such an institutional bond the lack of culture of the predominantly peasant population would be detrimental to the general level of zemstvo work and would in the end threaten the existing zemstvo institution itself.¹⁵⁷ Nonetheless, the proponents adhered to this concept for two reasons. Firstly,

since there was no prospect of a reform in peasant administration, the concept seemed to denote the very maximum attainable under the given circumstances, precisely because its implementation would again spur on the long overdue reform of peasant legislation. This is the context in which the demands for equality of the peasants before the law, abolition of corporal punishment, abolition of the village community's collective liability for taxes and other similar demands must be seen — demands which, together with the 'small zemstvo unit', were raised by many zemstvo assemblies and congresses in the years 1901 to 1903.¹⁵⁸ And secondly, the initiators of the campaign linked long-term political hopes to their plans. These were expressed by Ivan Petrunkevich before the zemstvo assembly in Tver' Province:

'So long as the zemstvo is not inseparably bound up with the people, the zemstvo institutions will remain suspended in thin air; they will, admittedly, have a certain significance but by no means that due to institutions of self-government. . . . The small zemstvo unit will include all those elements which put it in a position where, besides developing its activities, it will catch up with the movement existing today only among the educated classes of the Russian nation. The small zemstvo unit will change this movement into a movement not of individuals, not of the educated classes alone. This [movement] will become a popular movement, the betterment of the whole nation. It will not be the idea which prevails today and withholds the chance to raise ourselves to the peak of European thought and European institutions; it will be the element which will turn everyone in the direction we alone are following today.'¹⁵⁹

The connection between 'small zemstvo unit' and constitutional-democratic objective, between local mobilization and parliamentary system could not be more clearly codified in the Aesopic language of the time.

These far-reaching anticipations were way ahead of the consciousness of 'society's' privileged classes and were not supported by the zemstvo movement as a whole. For most of the *zemtsy*, democratization of the zemstvo came to an end with rational, just apportionment of services; this did not touch upon the question of representation. When the Ministry of the Interior carried out a survey among the zemstvos in October 1902 on alteration of the electoral system, most of the district and provincial assemblies were for a return to the 1864 system, modified by a tax and education clause, some were for the

class principle of the prevailing legislation, and only three district zemstvos demanded 'all-class territorial elections'.¹⁶⁰ In the Saratov zemstvo, even the Constitutionalist Nikolaj L'vov voiced the fear that in general, equal elections the peasantry would 'inundate, like a flood, the other sections of more advanced classes'.¹⁶¹ – Around the turn of the century the zemstvo movement did indeed openly talk of abolishing class privileges, yet was intent on maintaining the privileges of education and property; it spoke of 'completion of the Tsar-Liberator's reforms', yet had in mind the all-Russian zemstvo on the steps of the throne, true to the Slavophile slogan: 'Supreme power to the Tsar – opinion to the people!'

f. *The zemstvo movement and the 'Special conference on the needs of agriculture'*

The possibilities and limitations of the zemstvo movement became clear in 1902 when the government – hard pressed by the economic crisis and the bad harvest – put the agricultural problem and reform of peasant legislation at the top of its list of priorities in domestic policy. The 'Special Conference on the Needs of Agriculture', initiated at the beginning of the year under Vitte's chairmanship, had resolved on 9th February to set up special committees in the provinces and districts to gather information on the agricultural situation. In staffing these committees, the elected zemstvo assemblies were bypassed and the old bureaucratic practice was reverted to, whereby officials were dispatched and 'experienced people' (*svedushchie lyudi*) were nominated. Under the chairmanship of the marshal of the nobility, a district committee consisted of the zemstvo board members and any desired number of experts invited by the chairman. The provincial committee consisted of the provincial zemstvo board members, the marshals of the nobility and district zemstvo chairmen, the heads of the provincial administration and all people whose participation was considered useful by the governor, who was chairman of the committee.¹⁶² At Vitte's suggestion, the committees were presented with a guideline in the form of the working programme of the Special Conference in 40 points, without comment and 'nothing more'. The Finance Minister's wish was that the 'local people' should be allowed to pronounce on everything which in their opinion was hampering agriculture, including 'questions pertaining to law and order and to general administration in so far as they have a bearing on agriculture

and local life'.¹⁶³ Vitte made the formula palatable to the Minister of the Interior, who was worried about his range of competence, by pointing out that not only peasant legislation and village administration were thus thrown open to debate, but also the economic policies of the last ten years. It looked as though Vitte wanted to appoint provincial society as arbiter in the interministerial conflict on the direction of Russian domestic policy, which the Emperor had not wanted to settle.¹⁶⁴

The opinion leaders in the zemstvo movement did not at first see the chance which the inconsistency of imperial government rule bestowed upon them. They saw only the enraging exclusion from the committees of the zemstvo assemblies – in their eyes, the only legitimate spokesmen for the local population. They thought they recognized the signature of the zemstvo enemy Vitte in the bureaucratic principle of nomination, especially since petitions by a few zemstvo assemblies for permission to give their opinions on the Special Conference programme had been refused on the flimsy grounds that the zemstvos had already been consulted on the matter by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1894.¹⁶⁵ This government attitude was felt to be a provocation, and in order therefore to unite zemstvo policy towards the Special Conference, the old idea of a zemstvo union was revived again in the spring of 1902. The preparatory discussions for this, held in the background of the Petersburg Domestic Crafts Exhibition and the Moscow Fire Insurance Congress at the end of March and beginning of April, took on extra urgency in the light of the peasant revolts breaking out in Poltava and Khar'kov at the time and of the news of Sipyagin's death. The question of the desired zemstvo union's objective led for the first time, however, to a confrontation between the two most important oppositional groups within the zemstvo movement, led by Ivan Petrunkevich and Dmitrii Shipov.¹⁶⁶

The Constitutionalists were in favour of boycotting the local committees of the Special Conference and of 'depriving their work of all vital importance'.¹⁶⁷ They wanted to prevent the only recently released oppositional energies becoming paralysed again by inopportune compromises. The programme article in *Osvobozhdenie*, also being discussed among the 'friends' behind the scenes at the Domestic Crafts Exhibition in St. Petersburg predicted for the near future 'a new paroxysm of reaction' which would carry 'the oppositional attitude into the widest and most varied classes of the Russian population'; and it warned against forces in the 'public movement' which

found pleasure in the occasional consultation of official zemstvo representatives by government committees as a concession to 'society' without realizing that this only stabilized the prevailing despotic system.¹⁶⁸ It was hardly possible to write the idea of unconditional confrontation into the programme and, in the same breath, to recommend that zemstvo chairmen accept the government invitation in the case of the Special Conference. A more than 20-year-old political dream came true for Petrunkevich at this time,¹⁶⁹ when he and his friends sat at one table with the representatives of ideologies considered revolutionary – with men such as Bogucharskij and Annenskij, Peshekhonov and Prokopovich – in order to work out a common political platform. And if one was convinced that without 'society's' co-operation the regime's endeavours would perforce bear no relation 'to life', it was not really unreasonable to leave government spheres to themselves in a matter of Russia's fate, with all their intrigues and struggles for power;¹⁷⁰ a meanwhile united and organized zemstvo would later be able to dictate its terms all the more easily to the exhausted autocracy. On the strength of such considerations, the majority of the *zemtsy* gathered in Petersburg was inclined to favour the boycott plan.

Shipov was resolutely opposed to this suggestion. According to his political philosophy motivated by Christian ethics,¹⁷¹ there was no sense in the confrontation between state and 'society'. It was precisely this confrontation, he claimed, from which Russia was suffering, from a chasm of astronomical dimensions which Peter I and his successors had torn open between 'the people' and 'the spheres' by introducing the West's rationalist element of bureaucracy. They had sacrificed the socialist purpose of every political order – expressed in Christ's commandment 'Bear ye one another's burdens' – to an abstract reason of state. Yet on the other hand Shipov was no Slavophile romantic, searching for the lost communion between Tsar and people with the Russian soul. He had a lively sense of efficient organization and representation of material interests. But he was firmly convinced that in the Russian politico-social tradition there were elements at work which made it unnecessary to balance out interests in an institutionalized party struggle: on the one hand, the institution of autocratic monarchy, superior to all other interests and, on the other hand, 'the people', absolutely sure in their religious consciousness of their human destiny. To Shipov, the born mediator between the people and the Tsar was 'society'. 'Society' meant for him not

representation of narrow class or status interests, but a body of people who — in the long run in their own interests — shared their property and educational advantages with others: with the 'people', by contributing to the re-distribution of social obligations; with the state by talking to the monarch about the 'people's' needs; and with both, as with themselves, by parrying the bitter revolutionary clash with their cultural activities. Shipov had composed his political programme, evolved from these convictions, in 1900 in the draft for a memorandum which he and other representatives of public life wanted to bring before the Tsar. — The plan never materialized due to differences of opinion within the group.¹⁷² — His programme concentrated mainly on guaranteeing 'society' the right — and not simply the opportunity, granted now and then — to inform the Tsar through elected representatives 'of its needs and of the real situation in the country' and thereby to exert a regular influence on legislative procedure. Referred to the Special Conference this meant that, if the bureaucracy rejected the co-operation of the country's elected spokesmen, the procedural gap must be found through which the authorized zemstvo version of agricultural needs could be brought to the attention of the government even against its will. A boycott, on the other hand, would mean silencing 'society's' voice.

In the early days of April 1902, zemstvo board members, deputies and some participants from the Petersburg Exhibition gathered for secret discussions in Moscow, on the occasion of the Fire Insurance Congress.¹⁷³ Since the impatient Third Element representatives were not present and the *zemtsy* were quite on their own, the Constitutionalists were faced with a different majority from that of a few days earlier in Petersburg. They were forced to realize that their boycott plan was not going to mobilize the mass of the zemstvos. If they adhered to it, they would run the risk of isolating themselves in the radical 'Jacobin' corner. They may well, however, have been compensated for abandoning their plan for tactical reasons by Shipov's determination to organize personally the zemstvo movement's protest with precise demands in the local committees of the Special Conference. So in the end it was easy to reach agreement to the effect that a conference of representatives from, if possible, all provincial zemstvos should co-ordinate the points to be presented in the local committees.¹⁷⁴

The conference met on 23rd May 1902 at Shipov's house in Moscow. It was the first zemstvo congress since the gathering in Nizhnij

Novgorod in 1896 and, as then, there was nothing conspiratorial about this meeting either. They met as a private gathering which in no way concerned the authorities – a tactic which was to be expanded in the following years as one of the constitutional movement's organizational methods and to be practised ostentatiously in 1905 in anticipation of the basic right to freedom of association. Among the 52 participants from 25 provinces¹⁷⁵ there were 16 *Beseda* members; at least 11 were currently taking part in the preparations for founding *Osvobozhdenie*; at least 17 participants were to be found two years later as members of the Union of Liberation. So the Constitutionalists made up hardly more than one-third of the conference participants.

With Shipov as chairman, the first question to be discussed was whether and how zemstvo board members should work in the local committees.¹⁷⁶ The Constitutionalists once again phrased their minority view – that the official zemstvo representatives should have their protest against the Special Conference's procedure in the committees placed on record and should thereafter follow the work passively – but then they entered into detailed deliberations with the congress.¹⁷⁷ In the outcome of the discussion, co-ordinated procedure on three levels was resolved with a large majority: 1. The zemstvo board members were recommended to enter the committees in their role of civil servants – which they were in the eyes of the law – but to declare that they were acting without authorization from the zemstvo assemblies and would therefore be voicing only their personal opinions. This was intended to meet the obligation of loyalty to the imperial will on the one hand, and on the other to preclude the reproach that excessive zemstvo participation could be blamed for a potential failure of the Special Conference. 2. The zemstvo assemblies should deal independently – outside the committees – with the questions raised by the Special Conference by making their memoranda, introduced to the committees by zemstvo representatives, objects of their own resolutions, thereby indicating acceptance or rejection of their representatives' policy. 3. At the same time the zemstvo representatives should persuade the committees to raise a petition to the Special Conference for transfer of the questions considered to the elected zemstvo assemblies.

There was unanimous agreement that the more united the opinions of the official zemstvo representatives, the more weight the zemstvo vote would have in the committees. The principles of the memoranda to be introduced were laid down in a six-point resolution.¹⁷⁸ The first

three Articles stated that from fundamental and practical aspects the elected zemstvo assemblies would have been the appropriate partners for the Special Conference, and that the local committees now drawn up were not in a position to express the views of the local population. Article IV, subsequently the cause of the most vehement disputes both within the zemstvo movement and with the Minister of the Interior, appealed to the government to call in to the Special Conference's consultations representatives elected and authorized by the provincial zemstvo assemblies, 'so that the measures to be worked out are in tune with the genuine needs of everyday life'. These representatives would also have to be allocated permanent seats in the Agricultural Council under the Minister of Agriculture. The fifth Article laid down the programmatic principle whereby the problems of agriculture could not be obviated through 'single, isolated measures' but only through elimination of 'those general conditions hindering its development'. The list of priorities for practicable reforms under Article VI provided firstly for legal guarantees for peasant 'self-activity': equality of the peasants with other estates before the law, freedom of the peasants from administrative regimentation, guarantee of peasant rights through ordinary courts of law and abolition of corporal punishment. Economic development must be promoted through a wide range of educational facilities accessible to all. The zemstvo must be organized 'independently of class considerations' and its institutions must be brought closer to the village population so that the zemstvo could really exercise its responsibility for the local economy. The demand for a fundamental change of direction in the government's economic and financial policies was given only fourth place. Public discussion of politico-economic questions – the final demand – must be allowed to develop freely in the press and at gatherings.

Although the constitutionalist components are not directly expressed in these resolutions, the document as a whole is revealing on the zemstvo movement's political programme. Most striking is that the economic problems are approached with a modern understanding of the relationship between economy and political order. Matters of legal equality, education and the institutional extension of the zemstvo principle are put way ahead of economic questions – and these in turn are dealt with only in the form of taxation and budgeting problems, i.e. as matters with an 'overall national character'. The Constitutionalists stubbornly defended this fundamental ap-

proach to matters of the legal and political order against all attempts at evasion and modification in the debate. In this way they were able to implement their course of confrontation at least on the argumentative level. This line of reasoning, which one-sidedly put the whole responsibility for the critical situation in agriculture on the basic legal and political conditions, in no way touched on the social causes – for example, on the complex relationship between the peasantry and the landed nobility. Lack of land and peasant poverty appear exclusively as functions of the peasants' 'inferior' legal position and their exploitation by the fiscal authorities, and not as the long-term effect of a land distribution favouring the nobility since 1861 as well; only the low level of education is made responsible for low peasant productivity and agro-technical backwardness, but not the ruinous tenancy and interest terms. This programme does not emphasize any specific class interests, it even appeals against them, but it also makes no move to alter anything in the distribution of economic power in the country. Behind the attack on the by now obsolete social class system, in the demand for the abolition of the special peasant courts,¹⁷⁹ there lie hidden the material interests of a modern, market-oriented economic approach, imbedded in the 'public movement's' traditional ideology of cultural leadership. Emancipation of work, introduction of formally equal competitive conditions, dissemination of education and knowledge, a large degree of self-control in economic and social relationships abandoning bureaucratic intervention in the management of provincial society's life – these were the fundamental demands in the programme. It presupposed that – with consolidation of the zemstvo, raising of educational standards and extension of the economic subject's legal and political licence – the economic and social problems involved in the Russian agricultural crisis would, as it were, solve themselves in the free play of the forces. To this degree the programme can be termed liberal in the classical sense.

Although the resolution did not – as demanded in Milyukov's programme article – reply to the government's challenge with the 'clear and definite demand' of the constitutionalist programme,¹⁸⁰ the decisions of the congress did present the Constitutionalists with a more than barely tolerable compromise. So long as they did not have their own political organization and gave the zemstvo preference as their field of action, they were dependent on the co-operation of the moderate critics of the bureaucratic regime who called the tune in the zemstvo movement; it was Shipov, not Petrunkevich, who enjoyed

the confidence of the zemstvo world. The Constitutionalists, however, could book the outcome of the congress as a clear improvement of their position: organizationally, because they occupied at least half the seats in an organizational bureau which was elected at the close of the congress and was commissioned to arrange similar meetings every year;¹⁸¹ and programmatically, inasmuch as they were able to outline their solution to the internal political problems in the platform of the congress. If provincial society could be mobilized on the basis of this resolution, then an important step would have been taken on the way to organizing public opinion in the constitutionalist sense.

During the following weeks and months, 536 district committees throughout the Empire met first of all, followed by 78 provincial committees, in accordance with the resolutions of the Special Conference. Some 10,000 participants – landowners and peasants, zemstvo activists, members of the Third Element and agricultural specialists from various professions – had their first opportunity since the days of the emancipation of the serfs to voice their opinions, in public and at remarkable length, on a fundamental question of Russian life. Just over a quarter of all committee members were officials from general government administration, another quarter in the district committees was made up according to the official nomenclature of 'nobles and landowners', 22% were zemstvo assembly members or zemstvo staff and 17% were peasants (only 2% in the provincial committees).¹⁸² In 49 districts, the presiding marshals of the nobility followed a guideline, discussed at the May congress but rejected by a majority, whereby whole zemstvo assemblies were invited *in corpore* to the committees.¹⁸³

As was to be expected, the stands taken by the committees were divergent. The differences between regional economies were too great, the political leanings of the participants too various; and in addition an unconstrained discussion was soon hindered by pressure from the Minister of the Interior, which influenced one marshal of the nobility more than the next in drawing up the agenda.¹⁸⁴ It is difficult to say whether the picture would have been more colourful without the recommendations of the May congress. After all, a remarkably large number of committees – and this raised the hopes of the congress at least to some degree – had seen the agricultural situation in wider social and legal perspectives. This was more pronounced at the lower than at the more easily controllable upper level. If the decisions of the 34 zemstvo provinces are measured against the resolution of the

May congress, the following results can be seen, according to S.N. Prokopovich's calculations: almost a quarter of 359 district committees (as against 14% of the provincial committees) advocated legal parity for the peasants and development of the rural zemstvo including the 'small zemstvo unit', but only 10% (5% of the provincial committees) also demanded the expansion of political rights (freedom of the press, participation by elected zemstvo representatives in central governmental institutions, etc.). The greatest attention was given to the problem of elementary education; 44% of the district committees and 62% of the provincial committees were in favour of its promotion.¹⁸⁵ Taking into account all the restrictions and contingencies to which the committees' work was subjected, these figures show that the basis of constitutionalism in the 'public movement' was still scanty. Even though the committees documented provincial society's growing, foreboding opposition to 'despotism', 'bureaucracy' and 'lack of rights', most of them still operated on a level way below that prescribed for the 'local people's' political awareness by the resolution of the May congress. Only very few were able to express the connection between economy and political order in the sense of the Constitutionalists, and where their theses were entered in the minutes and final reports, it was by no means certain that they were understood and approved by the bulk of the committee members as well.¹⁸⁶

On the basis of unpublished Special Conference and Ministry of the Interior files, M.S. Simonova identified 23 committees which, in Pleve's eyes, made up the centre of the zemstvo opposition. They were concentrated in the provinces of Moscow, Tver', Tambov, Kursk, Voronezh, Samara, Kazan' and Ufa. Their consultations and resolutions were geared more or less to the resolution of the May congress, but often also went further in some points.¹⁸⁷ It was not by chance that the most spectacular activities could be observed wherever the influence of opinion leaders from the *Beseda* and the Petrunkevich group held sway. Some of them had once again co-ordinated their tactics in June during a meeting at the Kursk Educational Exhibition.¹⁸⁸ In Sudzha (Kursk Province) the first conflict with the Minister of the Interior came as early as July, when the committee chairman, A.V. Evreinov geared the discussions, carefully prepared by Prince Peter Dolgorukov, to the problems of the general legal order. Pleve announced internally that he intended to deal very severely with this committee, 'because here there is a germ centre of the zemstvo revol-

ution — luckily, one of but a few'.¹⁸⁹ Plevé was not, in fact, able to implement his intention of closing the Sudzha district committee, but he did procure from the Emperor the very highest reprimand for Evreinov 'for an attitude which was not in accordance with the views of the government', and he went out of his way to issue personally and demonstratively a very strong rebuke against Prince Dologorukov. The Novotorzhok district committee, chaired by Ivan Petrunkevich's son Mikhail as Marshal of the Nobility, also limited itself entirely to the 'overall national' aspects, and the final resolution, decisively influenced by Ivan Petrunkevich, merely paraphrased the six Articles of the May congress. It was promptly cashiered by the provincial committee.¹⁹⁰ In the Zvenigorod committee (Moscow Province), the conservative but thoroughly tolerant Marshal of the Nobility Count Sheremetev, co-founder of the *Beseda*, let a unanimously adopted memorandum pass in which the lawyer V.A. Maklakov had listed the whole catalogue of political complaints and demands, ranging from citizens' defencelessness in the face of government power to freedom of the press, from freedom of business initiative to the zemstvo's scope of responsibility.¹⁹¹

The most radical final report was presented by the Voronezh district committee. Here a zemstvo organization was suggested in which the democratization of the zemstvo in the 'small zemstvo unit' was complemented by the all-Russian zemstvo with the right to table bills on affairs within the scope of its responsibilities.¹⁹² In its economic section, the report suggested setting up a government land fund from fiscal estates and purchased private property in order to obviate the peasants' land hunger. With this point it anticipated the thoughts which were discussed a little later by the Union of Liberation and were then introduced into the Cadet agrarian programme. The committee's consultations had already been given a fundamental, political direction during the first meeting on 26th August 1902 in the speech by the widely known educationalist N.F. Bunakov, who said *inter alia*:

'The decline of agriculture in Russia is but one of many symptoms of the general backwardness of our mother country in comparison with others; i.e. it is not an isolated phenomenon but is engendered by the generally unsatisfactory order of Russian political and social life, an order unknown throughout Europe, except perhaps in Turkey. . . . To consider and debate any specific measures under such circumstances would do more harm than good, because this would only detract attention from the real problems. . . . Thought

must be given to a fundamental alteration of the whole Russian way of life.'¹⁹³

Bunakov was assisted by the zemstvo doctor S.V. Martynov, who bluntly declared the local committees incompetent and demanded in their place an all-Russian, all-class assembly of elected representatives from the whole country who would have to be granted freedom of speech and personal immunity. The Voronezh events won their great publicity, however, only because the Minister of the Interior made an example of the leading spokesmen: Bunakov, Martynov and the secretary of the committee, the zemstvo statistician A.A. Shcherbina, were banished to remote provinces. — The 65-year-old Bunakov survived this shock for only one year. — Martynov's brother-in-law, D.A. Pereleshin, lost his post on the zemstvo board, and Marshal of the Nobility I.T. Alisov, whose chairmanship had only encouraged the committee in its radical course, was put under house arrest and received a reprimand from the Emperor himself.

Pleve had regarded the local committees, whose establishment he had not been able to hinder in the Special Conference,¹⁹⁴ with distrust right from the start. In June he reported to the Emperor on the *zemtsy* congress in Moscow.¹⁹⁵ He warned of a zemstvo incursion into government prerogatives and procured a reprimand for the official congress participants (zemstvo board members and marshals of the nobility). To counter the effect of the congress, he instructed the committee chairmen to keep the debates strictly within the scope prescribed by the Special Conference and to remove from the agenda all points 'which have no direct and immediate bearing on agricultural needs'. At the same time he forbade the district zemstvo assemblies to deal with agricultural questions from the local committees' programme during their forthcoming autumn sessions or to criticize the procedure of the Special Conference.¹⁹⁶ He had a 'black list' prepared in his Ministry of all committee members who had proven themselves 'not entirely reliable politically'. In October he informed the Emperor of the — in his eyes — subversive events in the Sudzha and Voronezh committees, and with the Emperor's backing then increased still further the pressure on the provincial committees, which had been meeting since the beginning of 1903.¹⁹⁷

This intervention in the autonomy of the local committees and the zemstvo assemblies considerably raised the obvious value of the committees for the 'public movement'. Progressive *zemtsy* often withdrew demonstratively from the committees when they felt their rights

were being infringed. Things came to a head in Sudzha in September, when the whole committee resigned on the initiative of Prince Peter Dolgorukov because Marshal of the Nobility Evreinov was not allowed, on instructions from above, to permit items on the agenda covering zemstvo organization, freedom of the press and the position of religious minorities. Evreinov joined in solidarity with the committee, and he as well as the district zemstvo chairman Dolgorukov were dismissed from their official posts by Pleve. For similar reasons Yu. A. Novosil'tsev and V.M. Petrovo-Solovovo in Tambov, Petrunkevich — both father and son —, V.D. von Derviz and N.K. Milyukov in Tver' and even D.N. Shipov and all Moscow district zemstvo chairmen resigned in protest from the provincial committees.¹⁹⁸

In these circumstances the practical results of the consultations in the local committees were of only doubtful value. The whole business had resulted in nothing which had not been known long before, Pleve's Department Director V.I. Gurko grumbled retrospectively. Was it really necessary, he asked, 'to organize in one country 482 [!] constituent assemblies — for the significance of questions transferred to them made them such —', simply to convince oneself that every conceivable opinion on these problems had adherents all over the country and in 'society'?¹⁹⁹ But that was exactly where the whole value of the Special Conference and its committees lay for the 'public movement'. Prince Pavel Dolgorukov voiced precisely this thought when, at the close of work in the Ruza district committee (Moscow Province), he emphasized that he considered 'the manifestation of social life' in the committees more significant than satisfaction of the wishes expressed during the debates.²⁰⁰ Through the committees, the 'public opposition', though frequently checked and obstructed, emerged from its cover of 'private conferences and semi-conspiratorial congresses'.²⁰¹ And the mobilizing effect on individual 'public activists' was emphasized by Pavel Milyukov: 'The great majority of the committee members were different people when they left the meetings: more enlightened, more developed, better trained in public spiritedness'.²⁰² 'Society' had gained ground against government and bureaucracy.

'Society' owed this success to the resourcelessness of imperial policies, which was reflected during these months in the hardly disguised struggle for power between Finance Minister Vitte and the newly appointed Minister of the Interior Pleve. There is no knowing what could otherwise have moved Vitte to the procedure involved in

the Special Conference, if not tactical considerations concerning his already shaky position at Court and in the government. The solution of the agricultural problem, of which he was convinced, brought him into opposition with the Ministry of the Interior, which was in charge of peasant affairs. And since the whole reform was arranged only at top level, the financial and economic policies of the past ten years, and therefore Vitte himself, came directly into the line of fire. Letting the 'country', the 'local people' phrase the arguments which he could then present to his Emperor did indeed harbour the same risk, but it was easier to parry. Providing all aspects of the problem were thrown open for discussion, opinions were certainly to be expected from the local committees which, at one and the same time, could be used against the Ministry of the Interior and were also practical. And this procedure also seemed to present an opportunity for integrating the then fluid 'public movement' into the government's reform endeavours, for promoting local economic initiatives and interests, and thus for gradually coming to modern forms of autocratic exercise of power. Vitte was certainly not thinking here of the constitution,²⁰³ but rather of a controlled increase of 'society's' pressure, from which he may have expected compensation for the loss of confidence in him at Court and in the government. His calculations were thus a mixture of political conviction and personal interests. The call for the 'local people' to speak out frankly about all agricultural matters including 'questions pertaining to law and order and to general administration' must therefore definitely be interpreted as a genuine offer with which the Finance Minister wanted to ingratiate himself with 'society'. The May congress resolution and the trend of many opinions in the local committees were therefore only too welcome to Vitte.²⁰⁴

Pleve's interest, on the other hand, lay in not letting the local committee debates overstep their limits and, above all, in keeping matters which lay within his responsibility out of the debates as far as possible. This was the aim of the restrictive interpretation of the programme of consultation by the Ministry of the Interior, and of the increased repressions in the late summer against individual committee members who had made themselves disagreeably conspicuous. Yet even Pleve himself cannot have believed that the 'public movement's' dynamism could be smashed with circulars and reprimands, dismissals and banishment. He too considered reforms necessary, especially reforms in the field of economic and financial policies,

of peasant rights and in local government; but they could not be allowed to materialize through pressure of public opinion, otherwise a revolutionary chain reaction must be feared. He was convinced that the bureaucracy, which 'has the experience, tradition and habit of governing on its side', should set limits to 'society' so that the positive energies could then be subjected to the 'unyielding logic of the system'. (Max Weber).²⁰⁵ During these weeks he demonstrated the procedure to be applied here by closing the statistical zemstvo offices in twelve provinces, which he believed to be the source of peasant unrest in Southern Russia.²⁰⁶ The statisticians *ukaz* marks the point where, in Pleve's eyes, bureaucratic and 'public' activity came into conflict, where the good and the bad elements in 'society' parted company. Pleve feared that the moderate zemstvo leaders would soon be pushed from power if the field of constitutional experiments were left to them, 'and then criminal elements, the Jews at their head, will creep out from the underground'.²⁰⁷ Pleve therefore followed a double strategy on 'society', aimed at splitting up the 'public movement'.

On 2nd July 1902 the Minister of the Interior had a long conversation with the Moscow zemstvo chairman Dmitrij Shipov, who had come to be reprimanded by the Emperor for his participation in the May congress.²⁰⁸ The meeting took place in, for Shipov, an unexpectedly friendly atmosphere. The Minister assured the zemstvo man of his warmest understanding for zemstvo work. It was his conviction, he said, that 'a political order is not conceivable unless society is brought into local government'. He was not the zemstvo opponent people made him out to be. He was, however, worried to see that the zemstvo institutions ever more frequently overstepped their responsibilities and followed political objectives, as just recently in the case of the May congress resolution. He could bring about the 'essential contact between government and social institutions' only if the zemstvos would concede a little ground. Shipov should see to it that the debates on peasant legislation and election of zemstvo representatives to central government institutions were discontinued. On the other hand it was entirely desirable that the zemstvo people, with their knowledge of local affairs, should throw light on 'the weak points in our financial and economic policies'.

The next day Shipov was received by Vitte.²⁰⁹ Like the Minister of the Interior, Vitte too complimented the Moscow zemstvo chairman on the usefulness of zemstvo work. He even criticized Sipyagin, now

dead, for his short-sighted zemstvo policy and welcomed the May congress resolution as a completely legitimate response to the questions raised by the Special Conference. When Shipov, referring to the 1899 zemstvo Memorandum, showed his surprise at the Minister's change of attitude, Vitte re-coined the Memorandum as a plea in favour of the zemstvo philosophy. In this he ventured further – probably unaware of the political differences between Shipov and the Constitutionalists – than his views at the time really permitted. Russia, he insinuated, was on the way to a constitutional regime. True, the time had not yet come, but with his Memorandum he had wanted to point out to the Emperor this theoretically and historically founded truth, so that the zemstvo today would have at least better working conditions.

Shipov was very relieved when he returned to Moscow. His optimistic mood was not caused by the tactical quibblings of two Ministers at loggerheads. But he had the impression from his conversations that the government wanted to better its relationship with 'society'.²¹⁰ Had not the Minister of the Interior even hinted that he was considering calling in 'experienced people', enjoying the confidence of the zemstvo assemblies, to the consultations on revising peasant legislation? And would that not achieve even more than the *zemtsy* had dared to demand in May? Back from St Petersburg, Shipov hurried to inform his zemstvo colleagues of the new situation. To some of the May congress participants who happened to be available he suggested, on 18th July, obliging the government by no longer adhering to Article IV of the resolution (participation by elected zemstvo representatives in the Special Conference and other, permanent government institutions). The majority approved the proposal, and, without further consultation with the other May congress participants, the resolution was passed on to all the provincial zemstvos.²¹¹

This event rather confused the zemstvo movement. Admittedly, the decision was largely accepted in the country with equanimity; apart from one district committee,²¹² no other case is known where the Article IV demands would have been pushed through the final version of a committee report. But there was no lack of warning voices which recognized the analogy to Zubatov's 'police socialism', a '*zemskaya zubatovshchina*' in the offers of the two Ministers.²¹³ The most violent reaction came from the Constitutionalists, who very clearly felt that Pleve's game was aimed directly at the relationship between the *zemtsy* and the independent professions, including

the Third Element, made up of constitutionalism's informal organization in general and the connections of the 'friends' of *Osvobozhdenie* in particular. They had originally felt themselves compensated for renouncing the strategy of boycotting the Special Conference by the broader political mobilization of the zemstvo world, signalled by the response to the May congress. Now the elimination of the most important constitutionalist demands from the resolution threw doubt on the unity of the movement, especially since *Osvobozhdenie* friends from the *Beseda* had also taken part in the disastrous decision of July 1902. For this reason, A.V. Peshekhonov, writing in *Osvobozhdenie*,²¹⁴ had only hard words for the Moscow *zemtsy* lack of 'discipline and stamina'. Nobody, he reproached them, was calling them 'to take up arms', but everyone should be able to expect them 'to fulfil their historical mission with dignity and fully aware of their great responsibility'. It had been the students, the peasants and the workers, he argued, who through strikes, demonstrations and terrorism had created the prevailing critical situation. It was, however, for the zemstvo representatives 'to head the negotiations with the government and take over its power' in due course. But, with all their weaknesses, they did not need to be hasty in this matter, because 'the movement itself has not yet spoken its last word'. — The debate on the tactical gap left by the constitutionalist programme was opened up once more.

During the months which followed, the pages of *Osvobozhdenie* presented the echoes of a campaign against the Shipov group's 'fumbling politicking', against the 'dilettanti in the political struggle'.²¹⁵ The indignation of the radical intellectuals without either position or vote in the zemstvo institutions was further nourished by such phrases as 'governmental and popular anarchy' in the Open Letter from a Group of Zemstvo Members in the first issue of *Osvobozhdenie* or Count Gejden's statement on the 'extremist elements which are exploiting the people and working with the most dangerous means towards social revolution'.²¹⁶ Evreinov, the penalized Marshal of the Nobility from Sudzha, complained in a letter to Vitte published by the underground press about 'society's' desperate situation between governmental persecution and the 'unchained horde of anarchists', which after all, 'we, the peaceful landowners, fear no less than the Minister of the Interior'.²¹⁷ To the militant intellectuals, such statements seemed to indicate a lack of democratic solidarity and a fatal political opportunism among the *tsenzoviki*. Milyukov also cautioned insistently against a short-sighted policy of moderation,²¹⁸ and in

February 1903 it was he who brought about the essential separation from the 'incorrigible Slavophiles': it must be accepted, he explained, that there are differences of opinion. For the Constitutionalists it was important to know 'who is going where with whom'. 'If the 'idealists of autocracy' together with the Constitutionalists are to aim for one and the same goal, then this goal obviously cannot be constitutional reform'. With these polemics against Shipov and his friends, a clear dividing line was drawn for the first time – at least verbally – between the constitutionalist and zemstvo movements.²¹⁹

Nonetheless, Pleve's policy was not successful. It caused differences in the 'public movement' but was not able to achieve a split. The Special Conference local committees, with all their moderation, did not turn out to be pliable tools in the hand of the Minister, nor did a remarkable portion of the zemstvo movement forsake the oppositional line. The reason for this lay in the persecution of the May congress participants and the Voronezh and Sudzha committee members – regarded by the opposition as their first political martyrs – but above all in the continued pressure on committees and zemstvo assemblies exerted by the Minister of the Interior. The friendly reception given to the Moscow zemstvo chairman in July was therefore now seen in an entirely different light. Shipov himself very soon realized that he had put more faith in Pleve's words than they merited.²²⁰ Against this background, it was considered more a warning than an offer in August 1902 when Pleve let the Emperor say – in, of all places, Kursk, the provincial capital covering the Sudzha district – that the zemstvo was only 'the local organization in the field of economic needs', and in order to satisfy these needs he was considering uniting 'the activities of all local authorities'.²²¹ After this, 'society' hardly understood as concessions the announcements in the Manifesto of 26th February 1903 – the continuation of the policy introduced with the Kursk speech.²²²

Within the range of the 'public movement', even constitutionalism finally remained bound by many strings to the zemstvo movement and its opinion leaders, those much maligned 'last knights of the autocracy' (Maklakov). As we have seen, maintenance of these contacts became the whole point of the *Beseda's* existence; they continued to prove their value in practical, on-the-spot work and in the, by 1903 numerous, government commissions in which the zemstvo participated.²²³ Direct confrontation was avoided at the special congresses, which rapidly became more radical, reaching a

peak with the Pirogov Congress in 1904. Finally, the previously unknown frankness of opinion in the 'public movement' was indebted to the uninterrupted, partly even intensified intercourse beyond the factional barriers. This frankness was born out by an *Osvobozhdenie* correspondent at the end of 1903: 'These days, in influential social circles, people talk directly and openly without the slightest embarrassment about the need to curtail the autocracy. And afterwards everything is passed on both by the speakers themselves and their audience and by the domestic staff, who pour the tea and eagerly eavesdrop on the conversation. . . . Long gone are the days when such subjects could be discussed only among a few friends behind carefully locked doors'.²²⁴

2. THE PROBLEMS OF INFORMAL ORGANIZATION

With the periodical *Osvobozhdenie* the Constitutionalists had created a mouthpiece which they themselves intended primarily as an instrument in organizing public opinion and mobilizing various oppositional groups and circles. The work involved in running and distributing the journal held the group of 'friends' together and at the same time turned the group into the starting point for the formation of a consistent political group. We shall now examine the impetus the journal gave to the development of constitutionalism and the reflection of this development in the pages of *Osvobozhdenie*.

Struve, with his wife, her widowed mother and their four children, had settled in the village of Gaisburg, near Stuttgart, in March 1902. Here he lived such a withdrawn and unobtrusive life that even the Russian Secret Police agents had trouble in distinguishing him among the people in this working-class suburb. Donations from the 'friends' made up the income for this family with two Russian servants; the Struves were not dependent on any other income.²²⁵ The *Osvobozhdenie* offices were in the same house in the Gaisburg Schloßstraße, and a secretary, whom Struve had recruited from the Russian emigrants in Germany, completed the editorial staff. At Struve's request, the young social philosopher Semen L. Frank (1877-1950), the Benjamin of the St. Petersburg legal Marxists, had been helping him since March 1903. When the journal was moved to Paris in the autumn of 1904, he was replaced by the historian A.A. Kornilov, from the Petrunkevich group.²²⁶ 'Friends' on journeys in Western Europe often

visited the Struves for discussions, which their host always treated with the greatest secrecy.²²⁷

The Constitutionalists had won in Struve 'a born editor' for the journal, 'one of the greatest the country has ever produced, and the best of his generation', in Richard Pipes' judgement. 'The very qualities which repeatedly frustrated his political ambitions — insatiable curiosity and sympathy for the most disparate points of view — enabled him . . . to fashion every journal placed in his care into an outlet for the best informed and most advanced opinion of the time'.²²⁸ Until October 1905, *Osvobozhdenie* appeared fortnightly in one or two quarto sheets. Struve wrote a considerable number of the contributions himself, edited and commented on the information supplied. As if this were not enough, he published 26 large format broad-sheets between April 1904 and March 1905 — these could be distributed more easily than the journal in Russia —, compiled two volumes of extensive contributions and collections of material on theoretical problems, and edited a series of pamphlets on worker legislation and financial policy, on zemstvo affairs and the Jewish pogroms as well as on the draft constitution of the Union of Liberation.²²⁹ And finally he undertook in this period the publication of the memoirs of the revolutionary V. Debogorij-Mokrievich, a two-volume edition of Mikhail Dragomanov's political writings and A.A. Kornilov's history of the 'public movement' under Alexander II. Probably thanks to the efforts of the German Social Democrats, J.H.W. Dietz accepted Struve's works for publication in his programme up till October 1904. The zeal of the small editorial office in Gaisburg even forced the publisher to set up his own Russian department.²³⁰

Despatch of all this literary material — it is said that 12,000 copies of *Osvobozhdenie* were printed, of which 8,000 specially prepared India paper copies went to Russia²³¹ — was in the hands of Struve's wife Nina. When the house in the Gaisburg Schloßstraße was searched in December 1903, the Stuttgart City Police confiscated an address file, addressed envelopes and a large quantity of various Western European postage stamps.²³² Nina Struve used to send the periodical in packets to Russians living abroad on condition that the individual copies were passed on in a closed envelope or camouflaged as a prospectus to the addresses enclosed in Russia. Admittedly only a small portion of the illegal freight reached its destination in this way. Apart from high costs, losses were also particularly high, either because Russian customs authorities discovered the goods, because the re-

cipients were too afraid to pass on the copies or because they wanted to keep such a rarity themselves. A cheaper and more effective method was transport in the baggage of the then very numerous visitors to Western Europe from the Tsar's Empire. But the bulk of the *Osvobozhdenie* literature reached its destination on the northern route via Sweden and Finland.²³³ After the suspension of the Grand Duchy's special rights in 1899, Finnish nationalists had built up a network for smuggling illegal literature, and this was utilized by the *Iskra* group and the Social Revolutionaries in Paris as well as by *Osvobozhdenie*. Transport over the Finnish border into Russia was then in the hands of the Petersburg group of 'friends'. The only major mishap in the *Osvobozhdenie* deliveries occurred on this route in November 1903, when the *gendarmierie* at the border discovered more than 300 copies of the journal and several pamphlets in the baggage of Ariadna Tyrkova and the Petersburg lecturer E.V. Anichkov.²³⁴

The documents on this affair give a little insight into the conspiratorial links among the inner circle of 'friends'. Two so-called 'technical groups' — one in St. Petersburg, the other in Moscow — took care of all the practical jobs. They coded the correspondence with Struve, organized transportation and distribution of the literature, collected money and organized banquets and meetings at which constitutionalist ideas were propagated. The Constitutionalists never seem to have lacked money for all these very expensive undertakings. Prince Peter Dolgorukov, who rapidly developed in the role of the group's 'minister of finance', always knew how to turn growing unrest in well-to-do 'society' into hard cash and to win over influential backers for *Osvobozhdenie*.²³⁵ In coping with the technical problems, the 'friends' were of course always dependent on helpers from among the sympathisers, for there was never any formal membership, with party card and statutory allocation of functions, either in the group of 'friends' or later in the Union of Liberation. Ekaterina Kuskova described the operational methods of the Petersburg group as follows:

'We knew precisely who our members [out of fellow-feeling, without party cards or subscriptions] were. They were those taking part in the banquets and the various public demonstrations against the autocracy. We could also turn to them when various tasks and operations had to be undertaken. [...] There was no question of formal membership, these people simply belonged to the milieu in which [our] association was active, and they used to take part in the writers' dinners (for which a special 'culinary committee'

consisting of *osvobozhdentsy* had been set up). We could turn to any one of these people and ask him to undertake illegal missions; for here we moved in a homogeneous milieu with a family spirit . . .'²³⁶

In this way Ekaterina Kuskova also came across Ariadna Tyrkova, who had been recommended to her by Shakhovskoj.²³⁷ Together with Anichkov, she was meant to take over a large amount of literature from the Finnish contacts in Helsinki and – the two of them disguised as aristocratic lovers – bring it to St. Petersburg in a first-class railway carriage. When the two were arrested at the border, the St. Petersburg group continued to look after them. M.L. Mandel'shtam, the comrade from among the ranks of young Moscow lawyers who were then making a name for themselves in political cases,²³⁸ was engaged for the defence in the subsequent criminal proceedings. He turned the court case into a demonstration in favour of political liberation, and in her final remarks, Ariadna Tyrkova used the word *konstitutsiya*, the *Osvobozhdenie* slogan. Later Ekaterina Kuskova and the secretary of the Free Economic Society, V.V. Khizhnyakov, arranged their colleague's flight abroad after she had been sentenced to two years prison, suspended due to ill-health. Ariadna Tyrkova then lived with the Struves in Stuttgart and Paris, supported financially by the 'friends'.²³⁹

The Russian government did not succeed in preventing *Osvobozhdenie* from finding its way into the country. It made no difference when one transport route via East Prussia, apparently little used by the Constitutionalists, was put out of action by the Königsberg public prosecutor at the end of 1903; during investigations in Memel, occasioned by the Russians, into 'illegal press contacts' for revolutionary literature, their attention had been drawn perchance to Nina Struve, and they then initiated the search in the Stuttgart editorial offices.²⁴⁰ The operation did not turn up any incriminating material and even the confiscated address file does not seem to have been handed over to the Russian police. Yet Minister of the Interior Pleve attached no little importance to the oppositional journal. All the issues of *Osvobozhdenie* – sent directly to the Minister in a sealed envelope from the editorial offices – had to be kept by his head of department under lock and key in his desk, and the Minister made use of them now and then for his audiences with the Emperor.²⁴¹ In June 1904 he even let himself be put up to a diplomatic démarche: he enquired in confidence of the German chargé

d'affaires whether his government had any grounds for suppressing the paper or for deporting the editor – the journal was 'extraordinarily embarrassing' to the Russian government. But Chancellor von Bülow obviously wanted to avoid a second Königsberg case and shunted the matter off to the Wurttemberg government, which in turn extricated itself from the affair by referring to a communication from the Berlin police prefect to the effect that there was nothing to be held against Struve or *Osvobozhdenie*. So this move by the Russian Minister of the Interior also failed to result in negative effects for the Constitutionalists' journal.²⁴²

Pleve's inability to have *Osvobozhdenie* oppressed may have been helped along by the fact that higher ranking officials in the bureaucracy were following the revelations in this paper – sometimes with malicious relish; sometimes with rage, but always with interest. The St. Petersburg 'friends' despatched each issue to the provincial governors, and in a few cases a collusive understanding came about between the officials and their suppliers. E.A. Vatatsi, Governor of Mogilev, used to take every opportunity to surreptitiously ask Ekaterina Kuskova – her husband S.N. Prokopovich was living in banishment in Mogilev –: 'Had the latest *Osvobozhdenie* yet?'²⁴³ The head of the St. Petersburg Censorship Committee is said to have suggested to the Police Department in the autumn of 1902 that all censors should have access to this 'most influential and best informed journal among the illegal press', so that they were '*au courant*' on 'the plans of the scheming intelligentsia'.²⁴⁴ – An ambivalent suggestion, if true.

The distribution of the journal inside Russia was mainly the concern of the St. Petersburg group, as far as copies were not sent in the post or in people's baggage. Shortcomings were all but inevitable in this business with no marketing organization and only few contacts in the provinces to ensure distribution. Some received fewer copies than they needed, others had whole piles of the precious material lying around unused. It must nonetheless be said for the effectiveness of this 'non-organization', whose most important method consisted of passing the journal from hand to hand, that provincial readers had access to the paper within three to four weeks after publication.²⁴⁵ And contemporaries repeatedly emphasize that the journal was widely read in the country, not only in moderate circles but also by the revolutionaries. 'These days one cannot read about Russia without looking at *Osvobozhdenie*. Only by reading *Osvobozhenie* can one get to the heart of matters; there is no other way to understand Russia',

the journalist M.K. Lemke noted in his diary in January 1903.²⁴⁶ Thus the propaganda effects of *Osvobozhdenie* cannot be doubted; its organizational function is more difficult to determine. For the inner circle of 'friends', support and distribution of the journal formed a binding element which in itself caused a certain differentiation in roles — those in St. Petersburg handled the technical services, those in Moscow the search for new sources of money and information. For the groups arising all over the country from reading the journal,²⁴⁷ there remained, admittedly, nothing more than the fortnightly satisfaction of a pithy word against despotism and lack of rights. But they expected more than just slogans from *Osvobozhdenie*, they expected instructions, replies to the question 'what is to be done?'

Struve, in a central position as the editor solely responsible for the leading constitutionalist journal, repeatedly refused to turn the editorial offices into the political centre of constitutionalism.²⁴⁸ In his paper he wanted to reflect the 'liberation movement' in its national dimensions, wanted to be its opinion forum before the public, but not — as he once put it — 'to set up a table of ranks (*tabel' o rangakh*) in the cause of Russian liberation and to settle squabbles over orders of precedence (*mestnicheskie spory*)'.²⁴⁹ It soon turned out, however, that the organizational and tactical deficit left by the programmatic declarations in the first issue of *Osvobozhdenie* was not to be offset with the abstract, undifferentiated liberation formula. In the 'public movement' in 1902/03 the sole internal concern was the *mestnichestvo* of the groups settling in the organizational field of constitutionalism. Political priorities and tactical means were largely dependent on this order of precedence. At first this process of differentiation was deliberately not furthered by the Stuttgart editorial board, but *Osvobozhdenie* certainly took up some of the inner-Russian disputes. If read chronologically, the journal mirrors the grouping of the Constitutionalists, their close connection with the 'public movement' and the changes in organizational patterns occurring irksomely every three months.

After a short phase of undifferentiated proclamations and information, one issue (No. 7) in September 1902 carried Peshekhonov's attack on the Shipov group, harsh criticism of the zemstvo opposition in general by an impatient radical, and two articles in which Struve tried to mollify the revolutionaries on the verbal radicalism of 'society' and the legal opposition on the activism of the revolutionaries. In No. 12 (December 1902), a Constitutionalist from the

Beseda defended the tactic of 'peaceful struggle' and referred to the organizational successes of the legal opposition in the 'public movement', while Struve called for the organization 'of all liberal elements' under the common slogan of *zemskij sobor*. In February 1903 (No. 17) Milyukov drew the demarcation line between constitutionalism and the 'Slavophile' factions and thereby initiated the autochthonization of constitutionalism within the 'public movement'; in the same issue Struve developed guidelines for a constitutional and democratic party. Then in the 22nd issue (May 1903) a wide-ranging discussion on possibilities and forms of constitutionalist organization began, which lasted until the end of the year and accompanied the preparations for the foundation of the Union of Liberation (January 1904).

The central problem in the informal organization lay in the sudden change from the internalized opposition of legal cultural work to the consciously adopted struggle towards defined political objectives. The controversy in the pages of *Osvobozhdenie*²⁵⁰ between two zemstvo activists of very different disposition shows that the Constitutionalists were concerned here not only with tactical alternatives but also with binding behavioural criteria which were intended to settle the question of whether and in what way a constitutionalist policy was possible in Russia. The opponents were on the one side the Tula zemstvo deputy Yakov Ya. Gurevich (*zemskij glasnyj T.*) – son of a famous reform educationalist, himself a gymnasium teacher in Petersburg and closely associated with the metropolitan literary circles – and on the other side Vasilij M. Petrovo-Solovovo (*glasnyj*), a generation older than Gurevich, a large-scale landowner, District Marshal of the Nobility in Tambov Province and spokesman for the constitutionalist wing in the *Beseda*. Gurevich was offended by the vague, informal declaration by the zemstvo activists in the first issue of *Osvobozhdenie*,²⁵¹ particularly by the revealing phrasing on the 'governmental and popular anarchy', which seemed to reserve a special position between the fronts for the zemstvo opposition. He introduced himself as a man who had received his political education on 4th March 1901 in Kazan Square when a troop of Cossacks fell upon unarmed demonstrators. 'This type of experience changes oppositional convictions into an unrestrainable urge to act, it creates the temperament of revolutionary struggle'.²⁵² And with the relevant temperament he then proceeded to attack the tactics of 'peaceful opposition', the zemstvo addresses and 'solicitations' (*khodatajstva*); he demanded that an end be made to the 'timid half-measures', he

demanded the transformation of the zemstvo institutions into instruments of revolutionary struggle: 'Constitutions are not begged for, they are taken!' In this crisis situation characterized by mass unrest and student demonstrations, the *zemtsy* should recognize their political solidarity with the revolutionaries' objectives, they should familiarize the masses with their civic ideals instead of waiting for the opportunity — called upon at the 'will of the monarch' — 'to harvest, like the fowl of the air, where they have not sown' when the inevitable collapse of the old order came about.

Petrovo-Solovovo was sceptical about his comrade's emotional activism. The sight of the Cossacks on an overcrowded metropolitan boulevard had not been necessary for his political education to a "hannibalic" hatred' of the existing order. Sufficient for him was the simple 'conviction that the autocracy opposes all cultural advance in our country . . . that hecatombs of living, intelligent forces, branded as politically unreliable, are sacrificed every hour to the autocracy, as to a new Moloch'.²⁵³ He did not dispute that 'the united struggle by all classes of Russian society' was necessary; he did, however, dispute that the zemstvo had the instruments needed to fight against the autocracy in the much-quoted manner of the students. He ridiculed the idea of a handful of zemstvo deputies 'armed with banners, marching through the streets of some god-forsaken district or provincial town'. Thanks to its services to socio-cultural development and towards increasing social awareness, the zemstvo had already 'earned a place of honour in the political liberation of Russia'. The disparaged addresses and 'solicitations' would, granted, be the more effective 'the more resolutely and more categorically in content' they were employed by the greatest possible number of zemstvo assemblies concurrently. Organizing this joint approach was a function the then zemstvo movement could perform — and, in Petrovo's view, was to a large degree already performing.

The positions of the two opponents had many points in common. Both had the same political objective and each of them accepted the other as a *Genosse*,²⁵⁴ both understood the zemstvo as a suitable political instrument and the zemstvo movement as the primary organizational field available to constitutionalism. But Gurevich went beyond the informal pattern in his practical conclusions. While Petrovo already saw political co-operation in practice in the 'tight network of congresses and conferences', Gurevich demanded the creation of a central, 'integral secret organization' through 'private initiative and per-

sonal association', behind the 'available, public and legally recognized organization'.²⁵⁵ The difference arising from this point was serious because opposing patterns of behaviour were allied to an objective generally accepted as common.

This controversy was based on publicness or conspiracy, and this raised the question as to which position the prosaic 'zemstvo worker' and which the 'political martyr' was to claim in the constitutionalist movement.²⁵⁶ Gurevich clearly sided with the latter, and that determined his organizational and tactical decisions. In his second contribution he developed a tactic of deliberate provocation: the zemstvo assemblies should be used agitatorially by the Constitutionalists as an 'all-Russian auditorium'. The zemstvo assemblies should draw up their budgets according to political priorities alone, without considering legally determined responsibilities or limitations; after rejection by the governor, an extended version should be presented again, and so forth. Those people not acceptable to the government should be preferred for election to zemstvo boards; they should then be allocated duties conflicting with government views. If confirmation of the election were refused, the same candidate should be re-elected or, where applicable, the assemblies should boycott the government agent appointed instead.²⁵⁷ These suggestions accentuated the gap between the prevailing order and the 'higher legality' of political ideals. Petrovo on the other hand was trying to stop this gap with, of all things, cunning sophistry: after all, the government could not prevent 'people who know each other . . . from meeting in private homes and talking about things of common interest'.²⁵⁸

These differences of position cannot be broken down into a revolutionary — counter-revolutionary relationship even if the former is to be understood as more than deliberate infringement of the law, and the latter as anything other than subversion of existing institutions. Just as the cracks in the image of Russian constitutionalism are evidence hardly of overwhelming but rather of deficient class associations, the typology of the opponents was determined in this debate not by economic interests but by a different comprehension of roles in one and the same reference field of politico-social interaction, a field shared by noble landowner and frustrated educationist alike. For the landed marshal of the nobility, private and public, social and political roles were still simply identical. In the same way the zemstvo's social function was the same as its political function in his mind. He saw in the zemstvo a stabilizing factor for the coming

period of change, the 'school' where the *zemtsy* were learning 'to handle efficiently the complicated mechanism of economic and social life'.²⁵⁹ In this sense he could indeed see in the *zemstvo* the vehicle for his political ambitions but he could not manipulate it at his own will. His room for manoeuvre came to an end where the general functioning of the institution was jeopardized.

The St. Petersburg intellectual, thoroughly familiar with the *zemstvo* milieu, had more difficulty in co-ordinating his social role, defined by his particular profession, with his political role. His professional-private life fitted into the role of 'people's representative' in the *zemstvo* just as little as the ideal of the radical politician. Thus he also differentiated between the cultural duties and achievements of the social institutions and their possible political functions. Nobody could claim, he reproached Petrovo, 'that the art of reading and writing in itself . . . is incompatible with the autocracy, that the disseminators of the alphabet (*nasaditeli gramoty*) were [therefore also] the extirpators of depotism (*sokrushiteli despotizma*)'.²⁶⁰ Under certain circumstances — such as those in the prevailing crisis — it thus seemed expedient to him to transform the social institutions into instruments of political struggle, even if their socio-cultural efficiency were to be reduced or even temporarily destroyed in the process. For the *zemstvo* movement that meant renouncing forms of loyalty in dealings with the despotic administration, the political opponent, and for the individual it meant a choice of roles between 'coward or revolutionary'. Thus sharply separated from the forces seeking co-operation with the government in order to gain small advantages for their 'cause', Gurevich would have liked to open up the constitutionalist movement, unconditionally, to the revolutionaries and the masses. He did not seek the third path between revolution and reaction, but one front made up of the people and 'society', which with varying modes of expression and methods would rise in solidarity against the autocracy.

Yet Gurevich's militant language should not disguise the fact that his concept was also no solution to constitutionalism's strategic problem — how to establish the new order. His suggestions are clearly stamped with the actionists' self-satisfaction and were of course, demonstrations to overcome his own frustration. There is no mistaking that Gurevich — and he was not alone — had no access to those mass movements which, in his own analysis, were to bring about the revolution. Since there was no desire at all to leave the familiar field of

social interaction, agitation within the zemstvo movement – unwieldy as it was in many respects – was a substitute activity which showed a lack of revolutionary consistency. As far as they indicate a specific type of behaviour within the constitutionalist movement,²⁶¹ the attacks on ‘peaceful opposition’ document rather less the revolutionary resoluteness of certain intellectual circles than the often too high-flown expectations they had set on the zemstvo movement.

Apart from the controversy between Gurevich and Petrovo-Solovovo and the frequently recurring barbs against Shipov and his supporters, the pages of *Osvobozhdenie* brought very little on the differences described.²⁶² Many things could not be put into words and most expressions of disapproval were not intended for public consumption. But whatever critical voices reached the Stuttgart editorial offices were always directed against the editor as well, of whom more leadership may have been expected during this initial phase. During the first eight months of *Osvobozhdenie*, Struve seems to have had trouble in following inner-Russian developments. At this stage Struve consistently endeavoured to reconcile the extremes in the whole spectrum of oppositional and revolutionary attitudes, a concern which had its roots in his ideal of a nation-wide liberation movement. Congenial as Gurevich’s fanfares were to him,²⁶³ he nevertheless did not like to see the supporters of the ‘national liberation movement’ so bluntly divided into ‘cowards’ and ‘revolutionaries’. He concerned himself mainly with those *zemtsy* who, on the strength of their convictions, could not really be reckoned among the closer friends of his journal. Elimination of the constitutionalist demands from the resolution of the May congress brought astoundingly mild criticism from him; the letters from Count Gejden to Plevé and from Marshal of the Nobility Evreinov to Witte, frowned upon by others, were proof to him of manly courage before the princely throne.²⁶⁴ The May congress of the *zemtsy*, and even more the local committees of the Special Conference supported him – in contrast to his intellectual friends in Petersburg – in his view that the zemstvo movement above all others was at that stage worthy of every effort.²⁶⁵

This is the context in which we must see Struve’s move in December 1902 in favour of ‘organizing the liberal elements in Russian society in a certain closely-knit unit, acting according to plan’.²⁶⁶ The moment was chosen carefully. In November, the political demands of a three-week strike – covering all factories in Rostov on the Don and spreading to a few other areas in the industrial South – signalled the

first effects of social democratic propaganda among the workers. At the same time, 'society's' indignation about the punitive measures against the Sudzha and Voronezh local committees was still so fresh that it could be used as a lever towards broader political mobilization. In his article, Struve also expressly counted among the 'liberal elements' 'followers of the ideal autocracy such as M.A. Stakhovich, D.N. Shipov, N.A. Khomyakov and many other venerable zemstvo men'. In view of the critical internal political situation, Struve said, they would have to decide 'to go the whole way'. Against the background of growing bitterness over Pleve's two-track policy, it seemed to Struve that only a specific offer of alliance was needed to integrate the non-constitutionalist zemstvo leaders into the 'liberation movement' and to turn this into 'a large party working to a strictly organized plan for the political liberation of Russia'. The function of rallying point, which he had still visualized in 1901 as falling to the Social Democrats, now fell in his eyes to the forces of the 'public opposition', mobilized thanks to the Special Conference and Pleve: 'From our point of view, the zemstvo alone is the really great and rewarding field of action for a party which must take on the whole of Russian life in the name of the great national task of liberation'.²⁶⁷ As if to confirm his own judgement, the editor placed Petrovo-Solovovo's article immediately after the leader in the same issue of the journal.

With this article Struve took the initiative for the first time in the question of organizing the 'liberation movement'. He thereby forced himself to make programmatic offers as well which had to convert the abstract formula of the 'Hannibal's vow' into positively defined objectives. With an eye on the non-constitutionalist zemstvo leaders, it was only logical to refrain from insisting on positions which till then had always been in the minority in the zemstvo movement. Tactically, Struve retreated one step behind the Constitutionalists' programme declaration of spring 1902 and pronounced as a slogan for unity 'the convocation of the *zemskij sobor*',²⁶⁸ a formula seeming to lie at the intersection of the divergent streams of public opposition. In contemporary usage, *zemskij sobor* meant an advisory assembly to the Tsar, made up of elected representatives from the estates and public institutions. Shipov and his supporters had constantly demanded such an institution for resolving difficulties and unrest in domestic politics. Following on the Slavophile idealization of the old Russian, pre-Petrine institution of the same name, they saw in it the solution,

suitable to the Russian character and tradition, to the problem of participation. Without democratic legitimation in the strict sense and without the power to decide and control, such a structure would not in itself have broken up the existing order; to this degree it was inconsistent with the constitutionalist objectives, which Milyukov had explicitly separated from the 'sentimental and harmful Slavophile illusions'.²⁶⁹

The less demanding slogan of the *zemskij sobor* however offered Struve one or two advantages. Firstly, it restored in a more general and therefore more far-reaching form the abandoned Article IV of the May congress and, after the incidents in the local committees of the Special Conference, could serve as a test case on the zemstvo movement's degree of mobilization. Secondly, the government was challenged through this slogan to show its colours in this critical situation. Were it to reply with force to this demand conforming, as it did, with the prevailing system, 'then it will be declaring its historical bankruptcy, and the battle cry 'Down with the Autocracy!' (*Doloi samoderzhavie!*) will inevitably and finally become the general slogan of national liberation'.²⁷⁰ The propagation of the *zemskij sobor* was a tactical retreat designed to motivate wider circles of 'society' in favour of more militant behaviour towards obstinate authorities. Such a development would finally also be a suitable instrument for turning the whole of the anti-autocratic movement in Struve's sense the right way up onto its feet. The editor was convinced that Pleve's tough administration at the time was driving more and more young, intelligent forces over to the revolutionary parties. As the recent terrorist attacks seemed to prove, this was of particular benefit to the Socialist Revolutionaries. If Russian experience over the past thirty years was right with its lesson that the police regime was provoking terrorism from below, with positively 'sociological consistency',²⁷¹ then this trend had to be reversible, so long as the pent-up energies found an outlet in creative work. Struve may well have believed that a well organized reform party centred on a, by then, militant zemstvo movement would be able to present the relevant opportunity.

Inside Russia, however, people were thinking in essentially narrower horizons. Struve had not figured that his giving in to the privileged representatives of 'society' in the zemstvo could cost him his credit among the non-franchised professional middle classes. He replied collectively in January 1903 to the criticism which had meanwhile

accumulated in a file in the editorial offices.²⁷² Three reproaches against the political and editorial policy of *Osvobozhdenie* can be deduced from his replies: (1) the policy and programme of the paper along with its view of 'national liberation' were 'an abstract day-dream, indefinite and unrealistic'; (2) the editor's policy showed opportunistic features and gave no sign of programmatic consistency; (3) the content of the journal was too uniform.

Struve replied to the first reproach with renewed confession of his belief in political liberation as the central 'national task', and he once again emphasized the independence of *Osvobozhdenie* from individual tendencies in the 'public movement'. 'Russian liberalism will attain strength and importance only as a democratic movement with a far-reaching scope'. But he nevertheless made a careful correction in his assessment of the zemstvo movement by warning the *zemtsy* not to lose touch with 'the great stream of emerging Russian democracy'. Otherwise the zemstvo cause would be reduced to simple representation of landowners' interests and would lose all its attraction for the 'classless Russian *intelligentsiya*'. He refuted the very personally intended reproach of opportunism — which obviously came not only from political opponents on the left — so far as it meant 'insincerity', 'hypocrisy' and betrayal of 'inalienable political and moral values' for the sake of cheap success. But he admitted that 'the real step forwards' meant more to him than a consistent programme. 'For friends who raise reproaches and for opponents who pitch into us' (meaning mainly the *Iskra* group), he committed his belief in 'idealistic realism' to paper: 'We find no moral satisfaction in the ethical-political purity of 'ascetic guardians of commonly known ideals', in political stylitism. . . . We worldlings do not want to go down in history as the righteous, but as the justified. We do not want to be fighters alone, we want to be victors as well'.²⁷³

And finally Struve passed back the criticism of *Osvobozhdenie's* style to the 'friends' in Russia. He had always been of the opinion, he explained, 'that *Osvobozhdenie* can only be a collective undertaking'.²⁷⁴ His complaint about lack of journalistic support from home, without which the paper would thrive only 'as a common weed', referred to the enormous difficulties in organizing, from abroad, the widely dispersed constitutional adherents. We can take Struve's word that at such a distance he was not able to estimate his paper's importance for the internal development of Russia. But he was right in feeling that *Osvobozhdenie* had till then lived up to

neither the 'friends' nor his own expectations. Yet his request for a branch office in Russia with a staff 'not only of sympathisers and colleagues but of active bosses and managers as well' had also not been fulfilled. Together with the 'Party for Political Liberation', already advocated for six weeks, this suggestion was Struve's last attempt to realize his concept of a national liberation movement by means of centering the 'public movement' organizationally on a free medium of public opinion.

During his first months of editorial activity, Struve did not fully realize how far the process of political differentiation in the 'public movement' had already progressed. He carefully registered and documented in *Osvobozhdenie* the persistent student movement and the peasant unrest, the Socialist Revolutionaries' terrorist attacks and the trials of assassins, the labour movement which gained impetus from the Rostov strike in November, and the autocracy's increasing struggle against racial and religious minorities, especially in Finland and Caucasia.²⁷⁵ Struve interpreted all these symptoms of crisis benevolently, seeking understanding in the sense of the concept of an anti-autocratic united front. But the increasing seriousness of the internal political situation gave the groups and classes supporting constitutionalist thought rather more cause for anxiety than for hope because they, the professional middle classes, were not least among those affected by the government's counter-measures. The steps against the local committees of the Special Conference and controls of the zemstvo assemblies, persecution of zemstvo statisticians and the untold obstructions of the press and of associations all continued in more stringent form a policy of restraint which had already begun under Sipyagin with the dissolution of the Writers Union, the disciplining of the Free Economic Society and other restrictions.²⁷⁶ The danger of being crushed between the two fronts of revolution and reaction was clearly seen by many Constitutionalists. This resulted rather less in their enthusiasm for solidarity with all possible means of resistance against the autocracy than in their urge to amalgamate and stake out their own field of action.

The most obvious tendency was towards development of independent political action among the non-franchised professionals. At the founding of *Osvobozhdenie* during the ascendancy of the zemstvo movement in 1902, they had been in the weaker position, especially after the dissolution of the Writers Union and banishment of its leaders, which meant the loss of their firm basis, partially even of

their presence in the capital. But, by the end of 1902, almost all of the group which Bogucharskij had gathered together among the banished literati to support *Osvobozhdenie* had returned to Petersburg,²⁷⁷ renewed their old contacts and organized the distribution of the foreign-based journal. The banned Writers Union was replaced by a loosely organized dinner society, led by a 'culinary committee' consisting almost exclusively of 'friends' of *Osvobozhdenie*.²⁷⁸ For their regular meetings — which on special occasions with invited guests covered anything up to 200 participants — the untiring Nikolaj Annenskij²⁷⁹ had discovered a third-class restaurant where a somewhat dubious fish was served for one-and-a-half roubles. The culinary interest of those assembled, however, was concentrated not on the cured cod, highly recommended by Annenskij, but on the political *pièce de résistance* which the eloquent guests themselves concocted after the main course. Full of confidence, yet not without irony, they liked to call these communal dinners 'banquets' in memory of the French bourgeoisie's forms of political association on the eve of the 1848 revolution. Many an *Osvobozhdenie* article, many a slogan which turned up later on banners in the capital was cooked up here amidst the fumes of frying fish. 'The *intelligentsiya* clique', Iosif Gessen reported, 'was frying in its own fat here', and sought publicity through all sorts of demonstrations of political attitudes.²⁸⁰

Such occasions offered themselves in the form, for example, of the jubilees of the writers N.K. Mikhajlovskij and V.G. Korolenko which were celebrated before a large audience. An ostentious banquet was planned for 3rd January 1903 to celebrate the bicentenary of Russia's first newspaper. Forty prominent writers and journalists belonged to the festival committee, among them Gor'kij, Korolenko and Mikhajlovskij, the publisher of *Vestnik Evropy* M.M. Stasyulevich, the two resident staff of *Russkiya Vedomosti* in Petersburg Rozenberg and Slonimskij, as well as Annenskij and Peshekhonov of *Russkoe Bogatstvo* and almost the whole *Pravo* editorial board; we are familiar with about half of the committee members from the 'friends' of *Osvobozhdenie*. When the Ministry of the Interior banned the banquet, the festival committee hastened to distribute illegally the resolution which had been prepared, along with a declaration of solidarity by the St. Petersburg literati and a reference to the latest documentation of Russian bondage.²⁸¹ In March 1903 another literary banquet — the eighth, according to the report — passed a further resolution on freedom of the press and complained about obstruction

of the liberal press.²⁸² A month later the Jewish pogrom in the Bessarabian capital Kishinev gave a considerable new boost to anti-autocratic sentiment. The news of this bloody excess against the Jewish minority, the first in twenty years, awakened the suspicion that the local authorities, with the agreement of the Minister of the Interior, had at least let the raging mob have its own way, if not actually encouraged it.²⁸³ In protest against the riots, the Culinary Committee organized a big banquet with over 200 participants for the 20th April. The unanimously adopted resolution saw the events in Kishinev as closely connected with the general condition of despotism and lawlessness under the prevailing regime. The resolution shows the pattern of argument typical for the 'public opposition', whereby all social and political grievances and symptoms of crisis were interpreted as bureaucratic failures or as amoral perversions of the autocratic power monopoly; this argument then served as a peg for the demand for a fundamental change in the state order. 'The Jewish question', we read, 'can be solved, just like all the other vexing problems in everyday life in Russia, only through the free and independent activity of the forces of society. In this sense it merges with the all-Russian question, and a radical solution can be found only in this context'.²⁸⁴

The fact that the tendency towards radical alternatives and, with it, the inclination towards confrontation with the government was growing amongst the non-literary intelligentsia as well is proven by the professional congresses in 1903/04.²⁸⁵ Similar developments were to be seen in the legal profession where, starting in Moscow and St. Petersburg, groups of young lawyers — who for some years had systematically organized legal advice and the defence of penniless and illiterate peasants and workers in the provinces — were coming round to a political interpretation of criminal proceedings. They began to defend 'the case' and not the person, and focused their court appearances on accusing the system of despotism and lawlessness.²⁸⁶ The conflict this caused with their senior colleagues was a repetition on another level of the differences, known in the *zemstvo*, over the political or simply 'public' concept of professional cultural activities. At a jurists congress on 15th February 1903 in Moscow — which was dominated by the group around V.A. Maklakov, N.K. Murav'ev and N.V. Teslenko, all of them members of the subsequent Union of Liberation — the 'fight for political freedom' was already acknowledged as the undisputed guiding principle of a lawyer's professional practice.²⁸⁷ Typical of all these expressions of increasing opposition in

the professional middle classes is the naive optimism which placed all hopes for social success and progress in future, institutionally guaranteed civil and political liberties. This optimism fed on every occurrence which seemed to confirm the malfunctioning of the prevailing regime, and was the other side of the coin of dwindling trust and loyalty accompanying the crisis of the autocracy since the turn of the century.

In the zemstvo movement, however, the Constitutionalists made hardly any progress after the May congress and the selective successes in the local committees of the Special Conference. Bitterness about Pleve's double game did drive some of those in favour of *rapprochement* to realizing that only constitutional limitation of bureaucratic absolutism could still ensure some chance of effectiveness for 'public activity', yet the zemstvo movement leaders around D.N. Shipov and M.A. Stakhovich could not find their way to the resolution demanded by Struve 'to go the whole way!' It seems that some harsh talk was to be heard on this question during the *Beseda* discussions in the 1902/03 winter. During the January 1903 meeting, for example, Count Sheremetev complained that the circle was becoming too active politically and he would have to consider whether he could remain a member.²⁸⁸ The more distinct the outlines of political differentiation became in 'society', the more Shipov feared confrontation on zemstvo territory between the consolidating constitutionalist opposition and the reactionary government. For him, it was more than ever a question of convincing the government through insistently 'correct and benevolent influence' of the trustworthiness of the 'public' forces.²⁸⁹ For all his scepticism about the bureaucracy's willingness for reform, he saw in the imperial February Manifesto new starting-points for distracting 'society' from all programmes aimed at breaking up the system and for concentrating on the practical problems of an all-Russian zemstvo movement, in order to pull the carpet from under the constitutionalist alternative. And the majority of the zemstvo opposition throughout the country followed the Moscow chairman's policy of consensus.

Dissatisfaction with the leading role of the zemstvo movement grew in proportion to the degree to which the professional intelligentsia developed its own forms of protest after the autumn of 1902. Till then people had been content with reminding the *zemtsy* of the 'moral obligation' every now and then, without calling into question the fundamental identity between constitutionalist and zemstvo

movement interests. But when their programmatic and tactical handiwork brought no tangible results, when, on the contrary, the danger arose that the '*tsenzoviki*' – in their fear of more violent forms of political struggle – could betray the movement's ideals together with the interests of the professionals to the autocracy, then a front was drawn up in *Osvobozhdenie* against the indiscriminate acceptance of all and every type of opposition.²⁹⁰ Marginal events took on the importance of paradigms a whole column long: was Mr. Somov, zemstvo chairman in Novgorod, simply doing Pleve's job when he dismissed the statistician B. without notice, because B. had dared to criticize zemstvo administration instructions?²⁹¹ People were sensitive about this sort of lordly arrogance, and it is typical that, in the eyes of the reporter, chairman Somov – participant in the May congress and recently still an 'acknowledged representative of the liberal opposition' – had discredited himself beyond all hope by summarily firing a refractory employee who belonged to a profession regarded with mistrust by the government.

Since public political declarations at meetings, 'banquets' and congresses were allowed in Russia only in the form of insinuations, *Osvobozhdenie* was expected to provide the unmistakable formulation of the political and social-reform aspects of the constitutionalist principle. Struve's considerate all-inclusive *zemskij sobor* slogan could therefore be nothing more than a disappointment to the increasingly self-assured groups among the Constitutionalists. The readers' letters 'bombarding' the editor in these months contrasted the incohesiveness of the 'liberal opposition' with the solidity of organized actions; its terrible indecisiveness with a tactic creating 'that atmosphere of general exasperation and protest in which all reforms must necessarily come about because they have become historic necessity'.²⁹²

In February 1903, Milyukov put himself forward as spokesman of these critics and demanded the formation of constitutionalism as an independent political force. Once more he rejected the idea of union between the Constitutionalists and Dmitrij Shipov's neo-Slavophile approach and combined this with a sharp attack on Struve's editorial policy.²⁹³ Referring to the question of organization, which Struve had raised in December 1902, Milyukov criticized that 'the *Osvobozhdenie* caters for too wide a circle of people and social strata to be able to express exactly the opinion and mood of each individual'. Against the all-inclusive *zemskij sobor* slogan disguising the fundamental differences of opinion he again emphasized the advantages of 'the terms

'political freedom' and 'constitution' which leave nothing in doubt'; and in the matter of tactics he sided with those who advocated an active '— in the broader sense — revolutionary' procedure.

It was not ideological doctrinairism which made Milyukov hoist once more the flag of constitutionalist principles. He was guided by political arguments, foremost among them the Constitutionalists' ability to act. The *zemskij sobor* slogan, he admitted, had still had a certain justification a year ago. But now, when it was known that the 'so-called Liberals' in the *zemstvo* were already engaged in discussions with the government, the alliance favoured by Struve would turn the Constitutionalists into prisoners of the negotiating skills of Mr. Shipov and Co. In the end they could easily find themselves as a 'political bauble' on the structure of Pleve's undivided power.²⁹⁴ But on the other hand the Constitutionalists could not leave Russia's political future to the fateful course of events. There could be no question, Milyukov explained, of waiting 'until the government, blindfold, reaches the edge of the abyss where it will perish'. In the struggle which would then ensue between reaction and revolution 'neither the *zemtsy* nor the Constitutionalists' would have any decisive role to play. This meant that those elements wanting nothing but constitutional reform and expecting the decision 'any moment now' would have to determine the roles within the 'public movement': 'That is the important question — who is going to talk with the government tomorrow in the name of the whole of *zemstvo*-Russia, and who is going to 'wait in the wings'. The answer does not depend on fate . . . but on conscious alignment of forces in the *zemstvo* itself'. Instead of gathering 'a whole army of undesirable, partially even suspicious elements around a vague slogan', it therefore seemed to him morally more genuine, politically more clever and tactically more purposeful to organize 'strong cadres of the party consisting of convinced Constitutionalists' throughout the 'public movement'.

It tallies with Milyukov's analytical mode of thinking, always related to the situation, that he refrained from putting the foundation of a constitutionalist party on the agenda. A party would have to go underground where — without the support of publicly represented interests — it would have been subjected to the rambling radicalism of intellectual sub-cultures. For the same reason he was also careful not to encourage development of the programme principles. He wanted for constitutionalism some of the self-confident dynamism radiated by Gurevich's article, but feared that expansion of the pro-

gramme would cost the support of the 'public' grassroots without respectable target groups coming into view in the politically underdeveloped mass of the population.²⁹⁵ The battlefield he favoured continued to be the public – only it was no longer simply the organized public of a year ago which was intended to make up constitutionalism. He worked on the assumption that the 'public movement' had already become differentiated politically, and he thought in terms of small groups of 'public activists' forming for the sake of a clearly defined political objective and working consciously towards this objective in their public activities. Milyukov's 'cadres of convinced Constitutionalists' settled 'on the borders of legality' – on the far side they formulated their objectives and recruited members, on this side they influenced the 'public' institutions.

Following the months of polemics among the 'friends', Milyukov's deliberate criticism seems to have convinced Struve that solicitude for the non-constitutionalist zemstvo leaders was fruitless and consequently the point had arrived where the constitutionalist movement had first of all to clarify its own identity. In a complementary article,²⁹⁶ he accepted the objections but went further than Milyukov in the political consequences. Centering the 'liberation movement' on the zemstvo and its limited range of interest, he explained, had been a mistake. Since the moderate zemstvo leaders, the 'semi-Constitutionalists', had lost 'all moral credit', the policy of constitutionalism would have to be founded on 'those forces in the classless Russian *intelligentsiya*' then 'standing . . . in the front line of fighters for political liberation'. In order to implement their assumption of the leadership, Struve demanded substitution of the informal system of organization, in which social rank outweighed function, by an autonomous party, which must be 'openly and decidedly constitutional', 'openly and decidedly democratic'.

With the first of these characteristics, the editor committed the party to the constitutionalist principle of the 1902 programme article and excluded 'people of the so-called Slavophile ideology'. Once rid of the unwieldiness of institutions with other objectives, the party would gain the freedom of action which permitted it to gear its activities entirely towards the ethical imperative of liberation. Expediency and effectiveness would determine tactics which, under the prevailing political conditions, would have to combine legal and illegal methods of action. These 'dual tactics' (*dvuedinaya taktika*) would leave room both for use of legal public institutions through petitions and resol-

utions — but purely for purposes of agitation — and for illegal conspiracy and underground propaganda. With the second characteristic — that of 'democratism' — Struve subjected the party to the new 'classless' elites which, as 'central cadres', were to replace the zemstvo movement based on the estates. A 'democratic party' would bring about substitution of the autocratic order by a constitutional system only if it 'includes all those elements of classless Russian society which have awoken to political awareness and are closely connected on the basis of their sympathies and traditions with the mass of the people'. These were once again the familiar but cumbersome definitions of the *intelligentsiya* which we also find in the editor's inaugural article.²⁹⁷ Nonetheless, since it was now a matter of designating the elements of a specific organization, Struve condescended to be a little more precise: the 'zemstvo noble' stood alongside the '*raznochinets-intelligent*' (which included the whole field of urban, independent professions besides the literati), the 'representative of the Third Element' alongside the 'peasant who has worked his way up to political self-assurance'. These details identified Struve's 'liberal party' as a culturally bourgeois, middle class affair with an organizational field very close to that outlined by Milyukov.

Struve called for revisions and augmentation of the constitutionalist programme in order to attract to the party the elements he had named. He left no doubt that he wanted to see the theoretical potential taken into consideration which he and his friends had saved and brought with them from marxism. His list of priorities was headed by the 'clear declaration in favour of universal suffrage' which would logically follow from the principle of equality before the law. As a complement to this he demanded a convincing social programme, particularly with regard to the peasant and worker questions. It becomes clear here that democracy did not end for Struve with formal equality but materialized only where social inequality was eliminated as well. Here a point was approached which the Constitutionalists had constantly avoided during the phase of informal organization so that practical co-operation among the various groups and circles at different levels of 'public activity' would not be encumbered. Struve linked his demand for augmentation of the programme directly with the idea of an independent liberal-democratic party. His argument was as follows:

'Programmatic solution of these questions can no longer be postponed until political transformation itself takes place when it is a

matter of organizing a party which undertakes the task of intense propaganda and agitation in favour of political freedom. In any political reform, one must very fully face the question: *cui bono?* – to whose benefit? And political propaganda cannot remain silent on the principal objection to the autocracy – that is, its inadequacy in the face of the very real, scandalous exigencies of the masses. That is why a liberal-democratic party, completely leaving aside the problem of a socialist order for the time being (mainly because socialism in reality is but a problem), must provide a wide and co-ordinated programme of social reforms'.²⁹⁸

This passage contains too much political dynamite for it to be interpreted as a purely tactical move, as humouring the editor's radical critics. With such suggestions Struve was trying rather to prevent Russian constitutionalism drifting off into socially defensive, counter-revolutionary sentiments, in which case he himself would give up. This danger was always at hand when a liberal party defined its political role as that of 'honest broker' between people and government instead of dealing with the 'real, scandalous exigencies of the masses',²⁹⁹ when it saw itself as the antithesis of the proponents of social revolution instead of defending freedom against the forces threatening it there and then.

Struve convincingly illustrated this situation with the example of German liberalism. In an analysis of the *Reichstag* elections in June 1903, when the Liberals had had to countenance heavy losses to the Social Democrats, he recalled German liberalism's original sin – the alliance with Bismarck against the Social Democrats in 1878 – and warned of an analogous development in Russia.³⁰⁰ A Russian 'national liberalism' of this type – the analogy can be extended in Struve's sense – would, as a prisoner of reaction, lose its own liberal identity and without recognizing its true social functions would help to precipitate just the revolution it wanted to prevent. Against this, Struve set forth the *Nationalsozialer Verein* under the leadership of Friedrich Naumann as a positive model for the Russian Constitutionalists. Basically in agreement on domestic and social policies with the German Social Democrats – the real stronghold of liberal thought in Germany – this, according to Struve, was the only grouping in a position 'to instil the democratic spirit into the other parties'. It had the effect of a 'radicalizing ferment' on the parties favouring the civil order and could in the long run capture from the reactionary camp the 'bourgeois voters' whom the Social Democrats could not reach. In

this way the *Nationalsozialer Verein* would 'initiate the triumph of democracy in Germany', side by side with the Social Democrats.³⁰¹

This positive assessment of the left-wing Liberals — though hardly compatible with the German situation — throws light on the passage quoted above. Struve, convinced that timely and sufficiently far-reaching reforms were the best antidote against revolution, evidently wanted to see the 'liberal-democratic party' in Russia in a role comparable to that of the *Nationalsozialer Verein*. But there the analogy ends, because the Russian Social Democratic Party did not seem to Struve to be in a situation comparable to that of the German Social Democrats. One cannot help thinking, however, that in the social programme accents Struve set there was always an aspect of competition with the revolutionary parties. In the face of Russian Social Democrats' dogmatic obduracy Struve was capable of drawing a very fine distinction. To his liberal friends he recommended as an ally not the partisan social democracy (*sotsial-demokratiya*) but rather the non-partisan social democracy (*sotsial'naya demokratiya*).³⁰² Following this path, Struve may have hoped, the 'liberal-democratic party' in Russia could turn out to be the morally superior and finally also the more successful form of social democracy.

The editor restricted himself to such suggestions and appeals without committing himself to any more detailed substance. He wanted to set off the programme discussion in order to get the organizational process moving. He did not, however, see his journal in a function similar to that of Lenin's *Iskra*, but continued to expect programme formulation to come from the constitutionalist cadres inside Russia. In this spirit he kept on presenting material for discussion in *Osvobozhdenie* which was intended to quicken the Constitutionalists' attentiveness to the social dynamism behind the political crisis. The workers question took up a lot of space here, whether in the form of enquiries into labour and factory legislation or in the form of topical contributions on Zubatov's 'police socialism', which was at its peak in 1902/03.³⁰³ The new, purely political quality of the labour movement which he recognized in the mass strikes in Southern Russia during the summer of 1903 was documented in a four-page supplement in the August 2nd edition.³⁰⁴

Struve had already raised the peasant question in October 1902, when he almost casually confronted his readers with the critical question of re-distribution of productive agricultural land.³⁰⁵ Under the historically developed terms of property ownership in Russia, he

had explained, 'the peasants' share of the land' could 'be enlarged in effect only at the cost of the nobility's share'. It was therefore immoral and opposed to 'the interests of the people and the duties of the state' when the autocracy artificially maintained the nobility's agricultural system simply because it saw in the nobility the mainstay of its own power. This appeal to the conscience of the landed nobility was followed by the warning: 'Every *desyatina* retained in non-peasant hands is a very real proclamation, inciting class hatred. . . . If nothing changes, then, with historical necessity, the Russian revolution must come'. At no other point was Struve so lucid before the 'friends' themselves took up this difficult question.³⁰⁶ On the one hand the question touched upon the material interests of the landowners among the Constitutionalists, but on the other it was also highly disputed between the ex-marxist and populist social theoreticians. As far as Petrunkevich and his group were concerned, the former were not so very far removed from Struve's position, but really wanted to leave the whole complex of social reform to the future, freely elected popular representation.³⁰⁷ The legal Marxists, headed by Struve, Tugan-Baranovskij and Sergej Bulgakov, had for years been in favour of capitalist development of agriculture. They wanted to see peasant property in private ownership on the same terms as the noble estates, and they were not afraid to sacrifice to this end the peasant commune – that populist fetish on the specifically Russian road to socialism. The *Russkoe Bogatstvo* Populists mainly followed the Socialist Revolutionaries' idea of nationalizing the land and preserving the peasant commune as an original, popular democratic element in the Russian social constitution.³⁰⁸ Struve's cautious argument, which set the whole problem only into the political perspective of overthrowing the autocracy, shows that the editor too was aware of the burdens to which the unstable solidarity among the constitutionalist groups would be subjected through discussion of ideas on social reform.

A special column was reserved in *Osvobozhdenie* from May 1903 for the discussion of the question of organization, raised by Struve and Milyukov.³⁰⁹ The contributions printed here and, even more, the growing quantity of local correspondence give some idea of how far the formation of constitutionalist cadres had progressed in Russia. If the journal's distribution density is assessed from the sources of the correspondence – reports on local events, some of them published as independent items, some interspersed in the editor's contributions – and if it is assumed that in every place from which several reports

came there was a group of *Osvobozhdenie* sympathisers, the potential organizational nuclei were distributed over almost the whole of European Russia (see Appendix III). Most of the letters came of course from the two capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg. The network was more dense in the central and southern regions than in the north and north-west, but only at a few points did it extend beyond the borders of the zemstvo provinces. From the beginning the 'friends' maintained good relations to Tiflis and Kiev; other places – such as Baku, Rostov on the Don or Gomel – became particularly conspicuous during the period under review as a result of unusual events (strikes, Jewish pogroms). At best, private papers and local police reports could provide information on the type and structure of groups which are presumed to have existed in the towns mentioned. All retrospective evidence is unfortunately completely silent on the matter. So we are dependent on the few clues in *Osvobozhdenie*, which understandably had to remain vague.

The organizational debate in *Osvobozhdenie* contributed hardly anything of use on the problem of co-ordinating and activating these scattered groups. In line with the original constitutionalist strategy, one correspondent saw the organization of 'the public' as the main task, and complained about the lack of technical facilities. He requested practical instructions from the editor on operating a mimeograph so that he could circulate illegal leaflets with uncensored news among the population. One group, 'Fund of Freedom', wanted to finance constitutionalist propaganda by means of a levy on *Osvobozhdenie* sympathizers.³¹⁰ A third presented a militarily planned model for a secret organization run from abroad, which was intended to control protest activities, stir up peasants and workers and infiltrate the army.³¹¹ And finally a fourth was of the opinion that one should 'take an active part in the fight for liberation', only unfortunately *Osvobozhdenie* did not say 'what and how'.³¹² There was obviously little inclination to follow the path indicated by Struve and to find a way to organizational cohesion through the programme discussion.³¹³ The ideas were vague, nowhere was there a slogan more specific than 'the fight against despotism' and 'political freedom'. The basic constitutionalist conviction can be assumed only from identification with *Osvobozhdenie*. These contributions differ at most from testimonies of mere 'public' opposition through their recognizable will to deliberate, objective action – whatever the objective may have been. The oft repeated question put to Struve about programme and tactical

instruction shows that the *Osvobozhdenie* groups were about to move away from the patterns of 'public activity' and were searching for an independent, politically motivated context for action.

This process of withdrawal also left its marks on the zemstvo movement. There were already hints of the effects of constitutionalist cadre formation in this sector in the Special Conference committees in Voronezh, Sudzha and Novotorzhok, in Tver' and Tambov.³¹⁴ An opportunity for sounding out positions was provided by a conference on insurance matters, to which the Ministry of the Interior called zemstvo experts from 24 provinces to St. Petersburg in April 1903. During the course of these negotiations Shipov invited people to private discussions. — To avoid provoking the government, he had refrained from convening a new zemstvo congress; he did not even trouble the organizational committee, specially elected in May 1902 for the regular arrangement of congresses.³¹⁵ — Under the chairmanship of Prince D.I. Shakovskoj, 28 *zemtsy* from 17 provinces negotiated on 24th and 25th April 1903 on a communal stance on the local reforms announced in the Imperial Manifesto of 26th February. So the conference began again with practically the same question as the May congress and the discussions of the previous year. The debate on whether the zemstvos should demand participation of elected representatives in the work of reform motions in the ministries again had a negative outcome for the Constitutionalists. K.K. Arsen'ev's motion corresponding to the controversial Article IV of the May congress was rejected by 13 to 15 votes.³¹⁶ What remained was Shipov's suggestion that a petition be made to the effect that the reform legislation be presented to the zemstvo assemblies for advisory opinion before being put to the State Council. Furthermore the zemstvos should apply for the assemblies being allowed a freer hand in delegating experts to the various government commissions.³¹⁷ Since the resolution based the problem of 'public' participation in affairs of state entirely on the level of the existing zemstvo institutions, it re-inforced their political weight without any institutional alterations, but could hardly be interpreted in the constitutionalist spirit.

Although the result of the vote did not indicate distinct constitutionalist and non-constitutionalist factions among the zemstvo leaders, the April conference did signal a tentative separation of the zemstvo Constitutionalists from the general zemstvo movement. Since the verdict on Shipov's policy of moderation in *Osvobozhdenie*,

any and every collaboration with the government was considered incompatible with constitutionalist solidarity so long as the government did not see fit to make decisive concessions. When they yet again remained in the minority at the April conference, the zemstvo Constitutionalists hastened to reject, in the columns of *Osvobozhdenie*, the February 26th Manifesto as totally insufficient, and Struve commented with satisfaction: 'A strong and outspoken zemstvo word'.³¹⁸ One zemstvo activist, still anonymous, seized the Manifesto's announcement of local government reform under Pleve's leadership as an opportunity for staking out the 'demarkation line' once more.³¹⁹ He professed his belief in the thesis of Vitte's 1899 Memorandum on the incompatibility of autocracy and zemstvo. Since both had taken recourse to different legal sources, any serious zemstvo reform presupposed 'the liquidation of our autocratic-bureaucratic constitution'. The article contained justification of a radical zemstvo constitutionalism which was no longer able to come to terms with the compliant reformism of the traditional zemstvo movement.

The more clearly the zemstvo Constitutionalists outlined their position, the harsher the opinions on divergent attitudes became. A zemstvo activist from Vologda wrote in April 1903 of 'submissive provincial liberalism', of 'the Russian educated classes' subservience to officialdom'.³²⁰ At this time, people angrily took note of an obsequiously phrased address of thanks from the Orel zemstvo on the occasion of the Imperial Manifesto, suggested and implemented, despite resistance from the zemstvo board, by the provincial Marshal of the Nobility M.A. Stakhovich.³²¹ His brother Alexander, opponent of this action, wrote a distressed letter to Prince Peter Dolgorukov: 'Both Stakhovich brothers will take a terrible fall in your and our group's eyes on account of . . . [this matter]. I know that and am dreadfully worried about it. . . . A thankless and difficult position for poor Misha. Everyone will be dissatisfied with him'.³²² The Emperor's reaction to the address was to prove him right. As it contained, apart from the expression of thanks, the appeal for direct zemstvo participation in the projected local reform, it was withheld from the public by the Minister of the Interior, and in a marginal note the Emperor forbade such transgressions of responsibility. 'Naive Slavophiles', Struve mocked when the imperial reprimand became known; they had to let their most beautiful illusions be shattered by the stereotype bureaucrat's quest for the relevant paragraph.³²³

Yet in outlining their position more clearly the zemstvo Constitutionalists did not intend to split the zemstvo movement, which in all probability would have robbed them of their chances for public effect. The three constitutionalist dissidents at the April conference³²⁴ may perhaps have decided to bring about the majority for Shipov's suggestion on the basis of the consideration that a different forum – and be it illegal – was necessary for their political ambitions, but that the zemstvo movement as such should be kept intact. The demarcation debate among the Constitutionalists in 1903 still showed absolutely no propaganda features. It was completely preoccupied with internal effects in the sense of constitutionalist group formation. From this point of view, its most important outcome was not really the condemnation of the zemstvo opposition's timid practices but rather bridging the programmatic and tactical distance to the more radical, non-franchised groups of intellectuals, reduction of the differences in roles, such as we have seen in the case of Petrovo-Solovovo and Gurevich. Pleve's persecution and the reactionary substance of the February Manifesto marked for the zemstvo Constitutionalists the end of the long-lasting hope of a smooth transfer from everyday zemstvo activities to a constitutional government. From that point onwards, there was a remarkable *rapprochement* at least between the metropolitan *Osvobozhdenie* groups – things seem to have been somewhat different in the provinces³²⁵ – which till then had been working more or less at cross purposes.

At the same time the Russian Constitutionalists began to look around for allies outside the milieu in which they had been circulating till then. In April and May 1903 Struve published in three parts a comprehensive article on contemporary Poland by Leon Wasilewski, the highly individualistic theoretician of the Polish Socialist Party. Struve had already won him over as correspondent for his paper in the summer of 1902.³²⁶ Although Wasilewski had a very critical attitude towards the Russian movement, he wrote further contributions for *Osvobozhenie* in 1904 and 1905, but these did not lead to closer co-operation. There was also no tangible result from discussions in Cracow during the course of 1903 between the leaders of the *Liga Narodowa*³²⁷ and Alexander Lednicki, a Pole by birth from Minsk, who had been running a lawyer's practice in Moscow for years and had the best contacts both with the Russian Constitutionalists (V.A. Gol'tsev and the Petrunkevich group, the young Moscow lawyers) and with the Polish underground. In contrast, contacts made

during the early summer of 1903 with the Finnish resistance were more promising. The technical co-operation involved in transporting *Osvobozhdenie* was already functioning smoothly anyway; Arvid Neovius, who organized the shipments of literature on the Finnish side in Helsinki, had been writing articles for Struve from the very beginning. In April 1903 the 'friends' in St. Petersburg set up a special committee to study the Finnish question to which Iosif Gessen, Vladimir von Dehn and Prince Peter Dolgorukov belonged. Thanks to Struve's mediation, Dolgorukov was able to hold exploratory talks as early as June with the Finnish oppositional leaders in Helsinki and Stockholm. Leo Mechelin, the most authoritative figure in the Finnish resistance, then wrote off his own bat parts of a draft constitution for Russia and two memoranda on the solution of the Finnish question, all of which served as the basis for official negotiations between the Union of Liberation and the Finns at the beginning of 1904.³²⁸ The many contacts in the spring and summer of 1903 do indeed document the growing activity of the constitutionalist groups and the expansion of their social scope, but a fundamental extension of the organizational basis could not yet be gained in this way.

One wonders why the organization process was so tediously slow and followed such devious paths since there were, after all, enough attempts at organization in the country and Struve had already laid out the landmarks in his article in *Osvobozhdenie* No. 17. Yet it is characteristic of Russian constitutionalism in this phase that it presented itself in the form of practical co-operation between differently motivated groups and not as a politically single-minded association based on solidarity. Struve, it is true, was constantly concerned about the ideological equipment, but he was a lone wolf and all too often let his exile's impatience dictate his political designs. The other outsider, Pavel Milyukov, more closely approached the Constitutionalists' terms of existence with his cadre model than did Struve's 'liberal democratic party'. The 'friends' in Russia, involved in diverse relationships and everyday affairs, were faced with the problem in a much more practical and narrower framework than the editor. If the 'new structure' (*novoe obrazovanie*) of a constitutionalist organization was to be anything more than yet another conventicle, if it was to gain certain public qualities despite all the conspiratorial constraint called for by prevailing circumstances, and if it were to include to this end the greatest possible number of prominent 'social' elements, then decreeing the unity of the party

from above was of little use. First of all one had 'to familiarize people with communal work, to strive for natural understanding between the various elements and to prepare programmatic agreement in very general outlines in order to avoid being split after the very first steps'.³²⁹

Here a fundamental contribution was made by the journalistic co-operation between the *Beseda* and the *Pravo* editorial board.³³⁰ Their jointly published anthologies touched on central questions of practical politics, and thorough treatment of these from various theoretical standpoints made a large contribution towards the Constitutionalists' programmatic independence. Following unexpectedly great success with the volume 'The Small Zemstvo Unit', which quickly went into a second enlarged edition, Iosif Gessen proposed to the *Beseda* systematic editorial treatment of the results achieved in the local committees of the Special Conference.³³¹ Planning and implementation of the project were designed to achieve close co-operation between the Moscow *zemtsy* and the Petersburg intellectuals. According to Dmitrii Shakhovskoj, it was precisely the work on this project, started in spring 1903, which made a decisive contribution in making it at all possible to gather together the constitutionalist forces of various shades into one single organization.³³²

3. THE TRANSITION TO FORMAL ORGANIZATION

In the period between the February Manifesto in 1903 and the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war (27th January 1904), the *rapprochement* between the various elements in the constitutionalist movement thrived so well that at the beginning of January 1904 it was possible to found the first formal organization of Russian constitutionalism in the form of the 'Union of Liberation' (*Soyuz Osvobozhdeniya*). The transition to a formal organization took place without any recognizable reference to Struve's concept of arriving at organizational coalition by means of a widely based discussion of the ideological principles of a liberal democratic party. The Constitutionalists took this step — making a virtue of necessity, as it were — because the government's intransigent policies, growing social tension in the countryside and the industrial towns and, finally, the Far East policy followed by the Emperor and the Bezobrazov cabal, which was felt to be hazardous, restricted the tactical scope of the 'public move-

ment' to an intolerable degree. During their banquet on 20th April 1903 and in the wake of the Kishinev pogrom, the Petersburg literati demanded amalgamation of all oppositional forces into a political action group.³³³ A few days later the same idea was expressed by the zemstvo constitutionalists, gathered in St. Petersburg for the insurance conference in the Ministry of the Interior. Their defeat during the private negotiations behind the scenes of the conference forced them to search for a basis from which they could become active in 'society' while by-passing the Shipov group.³³⁴ The preliminary decisions were made at a conference in Germany which, from 20th-22nd July (2nd-4th August), brought twenty *Osvobozhdenie* contributors and sponsors together with the editor at Lake Constance.

With a certain pride, Ivan Petrunkevich emphasizes in his memoirs that the participants consisted of equal numbers of *zemtsy* and non-franchised intellectuals.³³⁵ But this is a misleading breakdown. The profile of the constitutionalist movement's elite leadership becomes clearer if the participants are classified according to the informal groups from which they came. The numerically largest group – even if not united on all questions – consisted of Struve's friends from the earlier St. Petersburg marxist circles (Struve, N.A. Berdyaev, B.A. Kistyakovskij,³³⁶ V. Ya. Bogucharskij (?), S.N. Bulgakov, S.L. Frank, D.E. Zhukovskij – a zemstvo activist! – as well as Ekaterina Kuskova and S.N. Prokopovich). During long walks through the Black Forest, they agreed on their conference tactics before the Schaffhausen Conference actually began.³³⁷ The Moscow Petrunkevich group was numerically only slightly weaker (I.I. Petrunkevich and his wife, F.I. Rodichev, D.I. Shakhovskoj as well as the professors V.I. Vernadskij and P.I. Novgorodtsev the latter without any mandate in the zemstvo). The *Beseda* constitutionalists were represented by Peter D. Dolgorukov, N.N. L'vov, S.A. Kotlyarevskij and Nikolaj N. Kovalevskij, a big landowner from Khar'kov. To the first group we must add two other conference participants, mentioned in this context for the first time as belonging to the group of 'friends': I.M. Grevs, professor of ancient history in St. Petersburg and often mentioned in connection with the 'culinary committee', and the liberal populist journalist V.V. Vodovozov. The latter, who had been involved in 1892-94 in the affairs of the People's Rights Party, was living at the time in Kiev, as was Bulgakov. Accordingly, the groups that were represented at the Conference were largely identical with those informal groups which had already been prominent in the founding of *Osvobozhdenie*.

The Populists connected with the periodical *Russkoe Bogatstvo*, however, and the jurists on the *Pravo* editorial board were not present in Schaffhausen.³³⁸

This Conference cannot be regarded as the first hour of the Union of Liberation.³³⁹ It was intended by the organizers as a means of examining, through personal contact, whether an organizational coalition was possible and whether it promised to be successful. The informal nature of the discussions did not permit defeat of divergent views by vote, so there was simply no question of arriving at formal resolutions. Nonetheless the meetings were of greater significance for the future path of Russian constitutionalism than any preceding conference since the discussions behind the scenes at the St. Petersburg Domestic Crafts Congress, which had settled the destiny of *Osvobozhdenie*.³⁴⁰

The three surviving reports on the Conference³⁴¹ all emphasize the atmosphere of trust and – obviously something of a surprise to the participants – the degree of programmatic harmony. The general principle of Russian Constitutionalism as expressed in the 1902 programme article – the abolition of the autocracy through the establishment of a constitutional order – was not a matter of debate or dispute in the course of the conference. The Schaffhausen discussions, however, went even further, emphasizing the socio-political field as Struve had been demanding for months. The previous year's peasant unrest, directed against the big landowners and the agricultural bourgeoisie and continued in some areas during 1903, along with the revival of the labour movement had convinced the Constitutionalists that the elaboration of programmatic answers to social questions could no longer be postponed until the political and institutional problems had been solved.

The degree of harmony among the Conference participants on these matters seems to have been much stronger than can be presumed from the few rather empty sentences adopted six months later by the constituent congress of the Union of Liberation. In an article published in October 1903, Sergej Bulgakov summarized the outcome of the Conference in the formula expressing the identity between 'political liberalism' and 'socio-economic democratism':

'It is as it were axiomatic to the Russian liberation movement that political liberalism and socio-economic democratism, the demand for political freedom and the demand for democratic social reform cannot be separated from one another in the general programme.

... Political liberalism and socio-economic democratism have essentially one and the same content, they are striving in different ways towards a common goal – freedom of the individual, liberation of the individual from political and socio-economic suppression'.³⁴²

This abstract formula was accompanied by concrete proposals for social reform. As far as the question of the workers was concerned, a whole catalogue of demands was adopted at the Conference as a self-evident part of the constitutionalist programme, disputed apparently from neither theoretical nor practical aspects. Bulgakov wrote:

'All the practical demands for labour protection, reduction of working hours, the right to organize and to strike, independent political action, etc. – which had long been raised by workers parties in the West, to some degree in Russia as well – are also without doubt fully in accord with the fundamental principles of Russian democratic liberalism and are part and parcel of its programme'.³⁴³

In the workers question it was, admittedly, easy to demonstrate solidarity with 'the people' and the international labour movement; there were hardly any private interests at stake here. It was very much more problematical for the Constitutionalists to arrive at binding declarations on the agrarian question. Following publication of his book on 'Capitalism and Agriculture' (1900), Bulgakov was a recognized expert in this field. In the article quoted above he sketched out solutions based on the Schaffhausen discussions which already contained almost all elements of the Constitutional Democratic Party's future agrarian programme.³⁴⁴ elimination of the special peasant legislation and integration of the peasant as a citizen with equal rights; the objective of an efficient individual peasant enterprise with development of every type of co-operative work; 'democratization of property' through peasant entitlement to the land he worked – an old populist demand³⁴⁵ –; the right of the state to intervene through legislation in agrarian matters with the intention of transferring land into the hands of the working masses; and finally the possibility of compulsory expropriation of private property wherever there was no other means of eliminating the need for land, just as in the case of 'railway development or other matters in the public interest'. Struve would certainly not have been able to claim so frankly that 'the closest friends of *Osvobozhdenie* stand firmly behind the practical demands for agrarian policies given in this article' if the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* Populists had taken part in the Schaffhausen Conference. Bulgakov left them a

loophole, however, in that the question of the continued existence of the peasant commune was not touched upon in the whole concept.³⁴⁶

The fact that the Constitutionlists turned their attention to the social question was not simply a concession to the non-franchised urban and Third Element intellectuals affected by populist and marxist theories. The leaders of the Constitutionlists, realizing the necessity to broaden the scope of their frame of reference, directed the programme towards 'the people' mainly for two reasons: Firstly they hoped that the constitutionalist movement could become attractive to radical elements with a socialist leaning and thus take the wind out of the revolutionary parties' sails. During the Schaffhausen discussions, Peter Struve defended — against Rodichev's reservations but with support from Petrunkevich³⁴⁷ — the stance that it should be possible to include even revolutionary groups in the organization. Secondly, it was reasonable to fear that, flirting with the mass movements, the government could actually incite the workers and, above all, the peasants against 'society's' political demands unless these demands clearly promised to deliver tangible results for the underprivileged masses as well. Vitte's agrarian policy, the *Zubatovshchina* and the new laws on workers invalidity insurance — enacted after a long-lasting tug-of-war right at the peak of the South Russian strike on 2nd June 1903³⁴⁸ — may well have caused some disquiet in this respect. Moreover the solutions to the agrarian problem discussed at Lake Constance were thoroughly in harmony with the *zemtsy* interest in unhindered development of the agricultural market. Agreeing to the principle of state intervention in property distribution may also have been easier for them in that these measures, limited as they were in comparison with the ideas of the revolutionary parties, demanded of the landed no sacrifice which would not have been covered by the socio-ethical awareness of the 'social obligation of property' bound up in the *zemstvo* tradition.

What justified 'socio-economic democratism' to the Constitutionlists also applied for them to political democratism. At the Schaffhausen Conference there was only one voice against direct application of the democratic principle to the political institutions of the intended 'new order', i.e. against universal, equal and direct suffrage and secret ballot, and that was the voice of N.N. L'vov,³⁴⁹ big landowner and for years Marshal of the Nobility in Saratov Province, one of the spokesmen of the constitutionalist wing in the *Beseda*. In view of the great cultural gap between 'society' and 'the people', it was indeed

possible to put forward many arguments against the 'four-tailed' suffrage formula (*chetyrekhvostnaya formula*), and L'vov's reservations were also shared at the time by many a Constitutionalist – such as Pavel Milyukov – who could not be suspected of having to disguise his landowner patriarchalism in 'cultural-leadership-constitutionalism' à la *Beseda*.³⁵⁰ Among the Conference participants, however, L'vov's thesis of 'everything for the people but not everything by the people' was submerged 'in the general protestations of devotion to the democratic principle'.³⁵¹ The intensification of social contrasts was forcing the Constitutionalists to make a move in the suffrage question, unless they wanted to exchange the reputation of class privilege for the stigma of class rule. Any other, graded form of suffrage would have provided the opportunity to discredit the constitutional institutions in the eyes of the peasants and workers as tools of the propertied classes. And so the democratic suffrage formula remained controversial among the Constitutionalists until autumn 1905, but even for men like Nikolaj L'vov it was not in the end decisive in the matter of coalition.

It may be surprising that the course of the programme discussions did not bring the participants at the Schaffhausen Conference to following Struve's organizational suggestions as well and to considering the foundation of a liberal party. The reports available on the treatment of this question are contradictory. Shakhovskoj, whose records of the events are the earliest, and Petrunkevich have reported unanimously that the majority of the Conference participants were in favour of founding a union (*soyuz*) and not a party, 'i.e. for the formation of individual groups which maintain their own programme but are united as a whole through the fundamental objective and fundamental method of the struggle to be laid down by the assembly of delegates from all the groups represented in the union'.³⁵² 'All the *zemtsy*,' Petrunkevich continued, 'and also the non-*zemtsy* who joined the Constitutional Democratic Party two years later, voted for the formation of a union . . . on the assumption that unity of action could be preserved in the most important and decisive moments only if the groups, which differ from each other in varying degrees, could maintain their independence'. It can certainly be assumed that this was a vote against Struve who, after all, had raised the question of founding a party with his initiative in *Osvobozhdenie* No. 17 in February 1903. So apart from Struve, according to Petrunkevich's information, Bogucharskij, Prokopovich, Ekaterina Kuskova and

probably also Vodovozov represented the minority opinion at the Schaffhausen Conference, because all the other 'non-zemtsy' joined the Cadet Party in 1905.

Meantime, contrary to surviving written reports, Ekaterina Kuskova has claimed in an interview with Michael Karpovich in 1957 that, at Schaffhausen, it was not a matter of deciding between the alternative of party or union but rather of deciding between continuation of the loose, informal association of independent individuals and a formal union.³⁵³ If this remark, made so many years after the events, is not simply to be dismissed as an error, then the only conclusion is that the views held by the dissidents named above did not agree with Struve's plans; they did not want a party and were even sceptical about a union of independent groups.³⁵⁴ While supporting the constitutional cause, Prokopovich, Kuskova and Bogucharskij – unlike Struve, Bulgakov and Berdyaev – had remained socialists; they had simply not been able to find their proper place in the social democratic factions resulting from doctrinaire disputes. – The 'legal Populists' found themselves in a comparable situation in relation to the Socialist Revolutionary Party. – They had entered into an informal union with the non-socialist opposition on the basis of the old idea of a united front of all oppositional forces against tsarism; but any closer organizational bond which would have reined in their political imagination was repugnant to them, a coalition permissible at most as a temporary action group.³⁵⁵ In this spirit they finally came to terms with the foundation of the Union of Liberation favoured by the majority at the Schaffhausen Conference.

The motives of the individual groups which represented the majority opinion presumably differed greatly. After abandoning marxism, the group which had once made up the nucleus of the Petersburg 'legal Marxists' was faced with the alternative of withdrawing and occupying themselves with philosophical speculations far removed from everyday life or of looking for a partner to share their political ambitions. Excommunicated by the social democratic leadership, without support in the local party organizations, they found this partnership offered in the form of union with the undogmatic constitutionalism of the zemstvo and the independent professions. Their ideological claim to leadership demanded a party – 'openly and decidedly constitutional', 'openly and decidedly democratic' – which could compete with social democracy. While such a party could not be achieved at the first attempt, they might also

be satisfied with a union which could be brought round to more stringent organizational bonds under more suitable circumstances.³⁵⁶

On the other hand, it was out of the question for zemstvo constitutionalists, whose very opportunities for political effectiveness were bound up in the zemstvo itself, to join a party subjected to persecution by the police as well as to rejection by their social equals. To be sure, Petrunkevich had been aware of the close relationship between constitutionalism and democratism under Russian circumstances for more than twenty years.³⁵⁷ But Nikolaj L'vov's objection to universal suffrage recalled that at that stage radical *zemtsy* of the calibre of Petrunkevich were distinctly in the minority in their very own milieu, the zemstvo movement. Therefore the zemstvo constitutionalists feared that open proclamation of the constitutional-democratic objectives and active tactics could cost them their position and authority within the 'public movement'. If they entered into a political commitment, they had to preserve their own tactical flexibility in order to avoid sacrificing their credibility among their zemstvo colleagues through the close community of action with non-franchised radicals suspected of sanctioning terrorism and revolution.³⁵⁸ Moreover, a union of independent groups could strengthen the constitutionalists' influence on 'society' and public opinion through a greater range of feasible methods of action. Be that as it may, it was the final decision of the Schaffhausen Conference in favour of founding the Union of Liberation which was most closely in accordance with the wishes of the zemstvo constitutionalists.

After returning from Germany, the 'friends' developed feverish activity in bringing together the available organizational elements and stimulating the formation of new groups. Ekaterina Kuskova reported to the St. Petersburg group on the results of the Schaffhausen Conference, after which this group undertook to organize the constituent congress of the Union of Liberation at the beginning of January 1904.³⁵⁹ In August and September the Regional Agricultural Congress in conjunction with the Second Educational Exhibition in Yaroslavl' and the All-Russian Husbandry Exhibition in Khar'kov offered further opportunities for preliminary discussions. The official sections of both events were distinguished by a definite oppositional mood among the assembled representatives of the zemstvo, the Third Element and the independent professions. Speeches and resolutions pledged united resistance to the bureaucratic regime. The *osvobozhdenstsy* present made every effort to familiarize the delegates with at

least parts of the Union's objectives discussed at Lake Constance and to recruit them for the forthcoming organization.³⁶⁰

Behind the scenes of the Khar'kov Husbandry Exhibition a secret conference of 16 'friends' took place at the same time. The participants in the Schaffhausen discussions were represented here by six of their number.³⁶¹ The purpose of the conference was to draft a statute for the Union of Liberation, and in this context it dealt thoroughly with the question as to how the zemstvo movement was to be tethered to the newly developing organizational network. There were various concepts for solving this problem. During the summer a few zemstvo Constitutionals had already involved the *Beseda* as a vehicle for the political mobilization of the zemstvo world. At its August meeting, the *Beseda* had discussed various models for transforming the circle into a more representative political association (representation of all zemstvo provinces in the circle or formation of individual provincial groups). Petrovo-Solovovo had even suggested transforming the circle into a 'constitutional political party'. But none of these suggestions was compatible with the plans of the Schaffhausen Conference. Transforming the *Beseda* into any sort of political association with a constitutionalist objective would have excluded the future Union of Liberation from the zemstvo milieu by restraining the oppositional zemstvo forces. Peter Dolgorukov was therefore resolutely against such a transformation; he emphasized that the *Beseda* was and must remain a discussion forum for the various political tendencies within the zemstvo movement.³⁶²

The Khar'kov conference tried to find another way of solving the problem. It suggested triggering off a constitutionalist campaign through individual zemstvo deputies or small groups of deputies during the forthcoming zemstvo assembly sessions, 'so as to accelerate recruitment of zemstvo forces for the Union of Liberation'. It was agreed that it would not be advisable to confront the *zemtsy* wanted as recruits for the Union with the direct proposal of 'joining a conspiratorial organization where they would be faced with elements unknown to them'; it was preferable to invite them to a 'congress with a purely zemstvo nature but with a clearly articulated political objective' and in this way 'to prepare the entry into the Union of those elements which prove themselves suitable and willing'.³⁶³

This plan was put into practice a little later. On 8th November 1903 thirty *zemtsy* met in the Moscow home of the *Beseda* member Yu.A. Novosil'tsev to discuss the next steps.³⁶⁴ These made up the

safe group of zemstvo constitutionalists which the organizers of the Union believed they could bank on in the country, even though not all of them could be considered as Union members. A few lawyers and professors from the inner circle of 'friends' were invited as observers. During the debate the advantages of a constitutionalist campaign in the zemstvo session which was just beginning were weighed up against the risks. If insufficiently prepared, such a step would 'not leave the correct impression' but would rather 'threaten the most active elements with exclusion from the zemstvo assemblies and thus make the imminent organization of the political forces in the country more difficult'. Resolving to postpone the campaign until the 1904/05 zemstvo session and to make appropriate preparations by then, the group set itself a medium-term goal. This was the birth of a special organization, named 'Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists', which was intended to function as a transmitter from the Union of Liberation into the zemstvo movement. Contrary to the organizational models discussed by the *Beseda*, this union maintained no local groups. It operated only with direct, individual membership made up of zemstvo deputies, who tried to assert their personal influence in their own regions of activity. As an autonomous group it made only ad hoc appearances with its meetings, which were called 'Novosil'tsev Congresses' after the host.³⁶⁵ It also had no controlling body; but with the Union of Liberation backing them up, the *osvobozhdenitsy* remained constantly in the lead. In this way the Constitutionalists could anchor their political work directly in the zemstvo movement, and on the other hand such convinced supporters as Count Gejden and Novosil'tsev – whose loyalty to the state and concern for the future of zemstvo work forbade participation in a conspiratorial association – did not need to stand apart from the increasingly concentrated constitutionalist movement.

In the early days of January 1904 the constituent congress of the Union of Liberation met in St. Petersburg under cover of the Third Congress on Technical Education.³⁶⁶ According to the list of participants which has recently come to light, 47 'delegates' represented the 22 or 23 provincial groups; there was also the representative of a 'Jewish Group' which cannot be located precisely.³⁶⁷ On the whole the distribution of the groups throughout the country backs up the hypothesis that the groups of *Osvobozhdenie* 'friends', which had gathered to read and support the foreign-based journal, were the forerunners in the political organization of the Union of Liberation.

The existence of provincial groups is registered mainly in the very places which had particularly zealously provided *Osvobozhdenie* with local news during the preceding months (see Appendix III). Most of the groups were located in the central industrial rayon around Moscow and in the central black earth region (12 groups). The Union of Liberation also had firm bases (5–6 groups) in the Ukraine and in the southern provinces, while the western, northern and eastern provinces were only weakly represented. The most important institutional base for the Constitutionalists' organization continued to be the zemstvo. Beyond the borders of the zemstvo provinces there were only three groups (Kiev, Tiflis and Dorpat), and only the Kiev group under the leadership of Sergej Bulgakov is known to have had any permanence.³⁶⁸

This distribution of the provincial groups does not mean that the Union of Liberation was a child of the zemstvo or that it was dominated by the zemstvo movement. Most of the provincial areas – according to Shatsillo's nomenclature – were, admittedly, represented by *zemtsy*. But against this the metropolitan delegates – all of those from Petersburg and the majority from Moscow – came from the independent professions, and it was the metropolitan delegates who together made up almost half of the congress participants. Allocation of individual participants to specific places is also not always clear; it is known that some delegates had their permanent homes and work at places other than those they represented at the congress. Closer examination shows, moreover, that the division of the delegates into *zemtsy* and representatives of the independent professions is problematical. This leads, for example, to the fact that the Petersburg gymnasium teacher Ya.Ya. Gurevich is registered as a zemstvo activist from Tula, while the Moscow publisher M.V. Sabashnikov or the bank manager A.S. Medved'ev from Samara, who were active in the constitutionalist movement in their roles of zemstvo deputies, are listed under the rubric 'independent professions'. The social profile of the congress participants was determined by other factors – by a high standard of education, by professionalism and mobility. At least 64% of the participants had graduated from university, about 75% (among them at least six of the delegates listed as *zemtsy*) practised an intellectual profession (journalists, lawyers, professors, teachers). The fact that the majority of the delegates came from larger towns emphasizes the urban character of the constitutionalist movement. In this context the metropolitan predominance is also no surprise. The

preponderance of St. Petersburg and Moscow delegates was even clearer at the three following Union of Liberation congresses.³⁶⁹ This obvious metropolitan concentration was characteristic of the Constitutionalists' organization, and cannot be noted at this period among either the Social Democrats or the Socialist Revolutionaries.

The debate during the congress was dominated at first by the question of the new organization's character: was the Union of Liberation to be regarded as the nucleus of a liberal democratic party or was it serving only as 'a temporary tactical action group'?³⁷⁰ As at the Schaffhausen Conference, there were three views on this question. — The only surviving report on the congress does not, unfortunately, permit any definite identification of the spokesmen. — For the one group everything was much too vague. It demanded an exact and detailed programme and a schedule on the future development of the Union. What this group had in mind was indicated by the suggestion of replacing the vague designation 'Union of Liberation' by the more precise 'constitutional democratic party'. Behind these 'contentious questioners' — as Shakhovskoj apostrophized them — were, it may safely be assumed, Struve's and Bulgakov's adherents who wanted to see the new credo of 'true liberalism', the concurrence between political and social democracy, turned into specific objectives and corresponding joint action.

Precisely the opposite position was adopted by another group, which wanted to limit the Union to the immediate political objective — the overthrow of the autocracy. This group therefore opposed all socio-political commitments. The Union, they said, should operate only in 'well-to-do groups'; it should leave the working masses to the mobilizing action of the revolutionary parties. This argument is reminiscent of Kuskova's 'Credo' in 1899, yet according to Shakhovskoj it was often put forward here by the Populists in *Russkoe Bogatstvo* circles.³⁷¹

Between these two groups there was a third faction which seems mainly to have gathered around the Moscow delegates. In an explanatory speech, this faction's spokesman repeated and specified the arguments of zemstvo constitutionalists of the Petrunkevich calibre in favour of a closer organizational coalition of all liberal forces.³⁷² The dangerous development of political conditions in the country, he said, was enforcing determination of the movement's objectives and methods of action. Otherwise there was the danger that 'the Russian liberal party will be ousted at the critical moment by other more ex-

treme and more determined elements before it can prove its abilities in creative work'. The speaker highlighted 'freedom of the individual' as the supreme objective. From this he developed the demand for fundamental political and social reforms, intended to cement 'the freedom of all and not just of the few' in such a way that social and economic democracy had perforce to grow out of political democracy. These objectives, he explained, were fundamentally incompatible with the autocratic regime. Thus far the 'liberal party' following these objectives would be a 'party of overthrow (*partiya perevorota*), the party of rejection of that political form which we consider to be completely outdated and useless'. This led to a clear rejection of 'that starry-eyed Slavophile liberalism which considers it possible to realize the reform of Russian life in union with the autocracy':

'Where the only concern is the abolition of the autocracy, it is naive to expect that one could affect the good will of the monarch. . . . No address or petition, no reminder and not even the most subservient memorandum will influence the monarch unless it is backed by the coercive force of organized public opinion'.³⁷³

But at the same time the speaker also dissociated himself from all 'Jacobin', revolutionary practices. The political strategy he followed was the same as the Constitutionalists' first programme declaration had suggested in 1902. Once again he referred his comrades to the path the zemstvo had traced out long ago — i.e. of bringing about without class prejudice what classless public opinion demanded. In that way 'the idea of truly liberal yet not Jacobin democracy' would be implemented.

From the programmatic and probably also from the tactical standpoint, the Moscow faction was certainly not far removed from the first view sketched above. The difference lay in the reservation with which the speaker treated the political questions. The 'Jacobin' fear, which had led many members of this faction to joining the Constitutionalists, was obviously an obstacle in making precise statements on the organizational future of the Union of Liberation and on the specific details of the intended reforms. Not even universal suffrage was mentioned; the agrarian question and the workers problem were named, admittedly, as central aspects of social reform, but the speaker did not refer to the results of the Schaffhausen Conference. This reservation, however, did not bring the Moscow group any closer to the second faction mentioned above. For the latter to limit the Union of Liberation's radius of action, thus opening up the country

to the revolutionary flood against which the former were building their dam of liberal democratic concessions.

The decision of the congress on the nature of the new organization left all options open to the various factions. The plenary assembly did in fact explicitly reject the populist group's concept, but did not on the other hand commit itself to the foundation of a constitutional democratic party as a medium-term objective. Shakhovskoj's report emphasizes that only a negative declaration was actually wanted, so that future development of the Union would be left to 'life itself'.³⁷⁴ This meant that theoretical clarification of the constitutionalist position was once again put aside in favour of practical organizational work. This had a direct effect on the programmatic resolutions adopted by the congress.

Strictly speaking, the Union of Liberation existed for more than a year without any fully formulated programme; the meagre phrasing of the Union's objectives adopted by the congress³⁷⁵ can hardly be termed the programme of a political organization. In a few general sentences it complains about the immobility of the autocracy's policies and the backwardness of the country; both could be overcome only through 'political liberation of the people'. Political liberation is understood here as the guarantee of 'the most extensive and absolutely equal rights for all citizens' in conjunction with the 'widest and at the same time absolutely equal participation by the whole population in the administration of the country.' 'Destruction of the autocracy and establishment of a constitutional regime in Russia' is said to be the immediate task of the Union. Yet the crucial problem of how to establish the new order is left to 'the historical conditions of the given time and the disposition of forces obtaining in the country at the decisive moment.' In conformity with the state of discussions marked by the Schaffhausen Conference, the following sentences take up the thesis of the unity of political liberalism with socio-economic democratism. 'Many economic and cultural problems of the population,' it is stated here, must be solved at one and the same time and in direct connection with political reform'. In this context the 'democratic nature' of the Union of Liberation was emphasized *expressis verbis*. This formula, however, was completely lacking in content. The text concluded:

'In all economic and cultural matters with which we have to deal we shall let ourselves be guided unwaveringly by the interests of the working people'.

This last sentence, however, seemed to indicate a definite opening up of the constitutionalist movement towards the left and was for that reason the object of passionate controversies during the founding congress. Some of the moderate delegates sensed socialist influences in the expression 'interests of the working people', and did not want to go so far.³⁷⁶ But agreement to this phrase was obviously the price the moderate faction had to pay for the more radical delegates' foregoing precise specification of the social reforms demanded. In this way, and despite the link between political and social reform, the political substance of the Union's objectives extended only in nuances beyond the 1902 declaration of principles; with its hazy interpretation of the liberal democratic principle it lagged far behind the outcome of the Schaffhausen Conference. The programme discussion served the various factions at the congress mainly as a vehicle for accelerating discussion of the Union of Liberation's organizational prospects. Since this question had been left in suspense, the programme finally adopted could hardly be expected to be more specific.

This first version of the Union's objectives was not published at the time as indeed the existence of the Union of Liberation itself was made public only months after its foundation. The objectives are to be found only in an internal document, where they are placed as a preamble to the Statutes of the Union of Liberation. The organizational plan laid down here must be regarded from two aspects. Firstly, it fulfilled a programmatic function in trying to provide an institutional framework for the anticipated expansion of the constitutionalist movement, and secondly it had the pragmatic function of lending a certain regularity to the informal relationships of the existing groups by integrating them into a unifying central organization.³⁷⁷

According to Article 9 of the Statutes, the Union of Liberation understood itself as 'a voluntary federation of self-governing organizations and groups of a local, professional and mixed character which recognize and accept the programme of the Union and have been accepted into the Union.' Hence the Union of Liberation did not formally recognize direct, individual membership. The Union was meant to be constituted on the basis of territorially determined units, the 'Provincial Leagues' (*gubernskie soyuzy*), on the one hand and of 'All-Russian [professional or political] Unions' (*vserossijskie soyuzy*) on the other. The membership of the latter, however, was purely hypothetical because at this stage there simply was no such

'All-Russian Union'. The Provincial Leagues were made up of local groups which were guaranteed complete freedom of action within the scope of the programme and the Congress resolutions (Article 10). The Provincial Leagues sent delegates to the Union Congress and enjoyed the right of communication with the central steering committee. According to the Statutes, the Congress was the supreme body of the Union of Liberation. It adopted resolutions on binding political principles, elected the Union Council investing it with the powers of the Union executive, approved the Council's annual report on activities, and handled the Union's central funds (Article 1). The competence of the Union Council (Article 7) covered implementation of the Congress resolutions, passing resolutions on matters which could not be postponed, admission of new groups, representation of the Union in external matters and maintenance of contacts with other political organizations. Finally, the central bodies of the Union and the local groups were committed to publishing all their public declarations and non-confidential resolutions in *Osvobozhdenie* and to doing all in their power to support and circulate this journal (Articles 19 and 20).

The Statutes stipulated only the various levels of centralization and left a large amount of elbow room for the development of the rank-and-file organization. This stipulation could be interpreted in the spirit of the old idea of the united front made up of all the oppositional forces – the Union of Liberation as the control centre of organized resistance against the autocracy; and it may be presumed that many a delegate was prompted by the hope that the Union would in fact develop in this direction. Evidence against this interpretation, however, is contained in the fact that the original draft of the Statutes which the Khar'kov Conference had worked out in September 1903, planned detailed directives which were more reminiscent of a centrally controlled party organization than of a 'voluntary federation of self-governing groups'.³⁷⁸ The reason for the absence of these directives from the text on hand lies in the fact that the Constitution-
alists were at that stage by no means in a position to make themselves heard as an independent political force on the local level as they were on the centralized level. A more rigid organization at the grass roots would have jeopardized the independence of the existing informal groups and would not have been compatible with the resolution to keep open the Union of Liberation's development prospects. In this way, the Statutes adopted in January 1904 were more a proof of

Russian constitutionalism's organizational shortcomings than of a positive draft for a nationwide united front of the opposition. They fit perfectly into the picture of the founding congress, the results of which extended in no single point beyond the stage of discussions achieved during the course of 1903.

This interpretation is in fact confirmed by the elections for the first Union Council, with which the congress concluded its work. According to Shakhovskoj, it consisted of 'four Petersburg literati' (Annenskij, Bogucharskij, Peshekhonov, Prokopovich), and 'four *zemtsy* who were attributed to the Moscow group, although only one of them lived in Moscow' (Peter D. Dolgorukov, Nikolaj N. L'vov, Ivan I. Petrunkevich and Shakhovskoj himself), as well as 'a professor from Kiev' (Bulgakov) and 'a *zemstvo* activist from Khar'kov' (N.N. Kovalevskij).³⁷⁹ Petrunkevich was elected chairman of the Council, with Annenskij as vice chairman. This election would have done credit to any experienced party executive committee. The marshalling hand of the leading groups is easily recognizable in the symmetry between *zemtsy* and representatives of the independent professions, between metropolitan and provincial representatives. All the names are familiar from the history of the emergence of the Union of Liberation, and what is more, all the informal groups which had already been involved in the founding of *Osvobozhdenie* were adequately represented in the Union Council. Through the co-optation of another nine Council members (in accordance with Article 5 of the Statutes), the group ratios shifted, admittedly, somewhat in favour of the Moscow tendency, but long-standing association with one of the informal groups was maintained as the guiding principle – even in the selection of those co-opted.³⁸⁰

With the first congress of the Union of Liberation, the Constitutionalists summed up a two-year phase of informal organization – no more, but also no less. Did the constitutionalist grouping actually broaden its frame of reference through the transition to formal organization? To what degree did the founding of the Union of Liberation improve the group's ability to act? The answers to these questions will be given in a short account of the programmatic and organizational developing of the Union of Liberation on the eve of the 1905 revolution.

A glimpse of the internal situation in the Union of Liberation three months after its founding is given in a report by the Finnish doctor, Adolf Törngren, on his political fact-finding tour of Russia in April

1904. In January and March, Törngren had negotiated in St. Petersburg on behalf of the Finnish resistance on long-term co-operation with the Constitutionalists, and had been invited to make this journey by the Union of Liberation's Finland Committee (I.V. Gessen, V. von Dehn, Peter Dolgorukov).³⁸¹ His hosts obviously made every effort to put him in touch with the circles then influential in the constitutionalist movement. Among the people Törngren had discussions with were no less than eight members of the Union Council: in Moscow he spoke with members of the Petrunkevich group and of the *Beseda* in Novgorodtsev's home; he was introduced to the circle of lawyers around M.L. Mandel'shtam and was received by the editor of a daily newspaper (A.N. Maksimov?). In Khar'kov he met N.N. Kovalevskij, in Odessa a well-to-do newspaper publisher (K.M. Pankeev?) and in Kiev S.N. Bulgakov and others. In the company of Peter Dolgorukov, he took part in the Crimea in a regional conference of the Union of Liberation's southern groups, chaired by Ivan Petrunkevich, and also had the opportunity for an extensive conversation with the chairman of the Union Council.³⁸²

Törngren's notes on these discussions do not show the Union of Liberation as a vivid, efficiently working political organization. Seen against the background of the accelerated process of group formation during the previous year, they give rather an impression of political stagnation within the Union. The internal relationship between the individual groups do not seem to have undergone any essential change at first. Differing views on the specific substance of the programme continued to dominate among the various circles. The Petrunkevich group, for example, was still considering the possibility of a constituent assembly with delegates from the *zemstvos*, city *dumas* and the universities, while universal suffrage was in no way disputed among the Moscow lawyers. In conversation with Törngren, Petrunkevich remarked diplomatically on the social programme that the Union of Liberation was in fact striving for extensive reforms in the democratic spirit in this sector but was not letting itself be committed to details.³⁸³ Törngren's notes also do not indicate any new views on strategy and tactics. The Constitutionalists still seemed to expect that the spiralling conflict between the revolutionaries and the government would, as it were, automatically bring them, the Constitutionalists, to power, Petrunkevich made it clear that the necessary reforms could be implemented only through public pressure. The 'liberal party' therefore had to follow public opinion and could not hurry

ahead of it; it could not suggest any actions which were not understood by the public and which could therefore isolate 'the party'.³⁸⁴

The explanation for stagnation in the development of the Union of Liberation must be sought in the outbreak, a few weeks after its founding, of the Russo-Japanese war. The war split the Constitution-alists into 'defeatists' (*porazhentsy*) and 'defensists' (*oborontsy*) – i.e. into those who hoped for acceleration in internal change through a Russian defeat, and others who wanted to earn from the Tsar freedom and a constitution for the nation by means of common military effort. Even though they did not share in the patriotic enthusiasm which had seized many circles of 'society' at the outbreak of war, the leading constitutionalist groups were no longer sure whether it was legitimate, or even at least tactically clever, to make a massive assault on the government in this situation.³⁸⁵ The Union of Liberation adopted a policy of wait-and-see in this period, and the various groups took over this attitude *vis-à-vis* the Union's internal problems as well.

It took the political events in the summer and autumn of 1904 to set the Union in motion again. The Russian army's military defeats led to a rapid ebbing of the public wave of patriotism, and at the very latest with the fall of Port Arthur in December 1904 it became clear that both the 'defeatists' and the 'defensists' were going to have to live with a Russian defeat.³⁸⁶ The dilettantish and hapless conduct of the war re-awakened public opposition to the autocratic government. Nobody tried to hide his relief when the most hated man in Russia – Minister of the Interior Pleve – fell victim on 15th July 1904 to the Socialist Revolutionary assassin Sazonov. Pleve's successor, Prince Svyatopolk-Mirskij, who was held to be liberal, let 'society's' hope for extensive internal political changes grow. During a large zemstvo congress, held in Petersburg from 6th to 9th November and tolerated by the Minister of the Interior, the Constitutionalists were able to win a clear majority for the first time for their demand for popular legislative representation.³⁸⁷ The zemstvo assemblies during this autumn and winter, numerous banquets and other meetings all adopted petitions and resolutions which presented the government with 'society's' political demands. The public discussion was constantly stimulated by increasingly sharp criticism of the government in the oppositional press. New daily papers came into being and reported on events with an openness never before known.

The Union of Liberation played no small part in this development.

In October 1904 the Union's second congress had approved a tactical concept worked out by the Union Council. According to this concept, the government was to be put under massive pressure during the course of the winter by means of simulating an extensive popular movement in favour of a constitution. Politicalization of the zemstvo congress in November was part of this plan. The Union of Liberation was no less successful in its organization of a series of banquets in St. Petersburg, Moscow and several provincial towns on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the law courts reform in November 1904. Here the demands for civil and political liberties, amnesty for political prisoners, a constituent assembly and universal suffrage were raised in full public view. A campaign of petitions was initiated in the zemstvo assemblies by the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists, founded the previous year. At the same time, organization of various professional associations (engineers and technicians, academicians, medical staff, lawyers, etc.) was undertaken, and these merged in May 1905 to become the 'Union of Unions' (*Soyuz Soyuzov*).³⁸⁸

The activation of the Union of Liberation also had its effects on the composition of the Union Council, elected anew during the Second Congress (it was supplemented continuously through co-optation during the following months). The selection of members was entirely directed towards highlighting as effectively as possible the new tactics of actively mobilizing 'society' under the open constitutionalist slogan. Apart from a nucleus of long-standing *osvobodhentsy*, the Council consisted mainly of people who were active in the following months in the three fields of operation preferred by the Union of Liberation – in the zemstvo congresses, the banquets campaign and the professional associations.³⁸⁹

A few days after the Zemstvo Congress in November 1904 the Union of Liberation made its existence known publicly. Together with this announcement it also published a statement on the 'general principles' of its programme, which more clearly specified some points of the January 1904 text.³⁹⁰ The first two sections present a concise summary of the Union's January objectives but contain two remarkable alterations: in place of the ambiguous descriptions of the 'democratic principle', the 'four-tailed' suffrage formula is declared essential; and the objective of the socio-political activities is given in the text – going somewhat further than the first version – as 'protection of the interests of the working masses'. The third section is altogether new. It concerns the question of nationalities and

proclaims laconically 'the right to self-determination of different nationalities entering into the composition of the Russian state'. In the next sentence, however, this proclamation is retrenched. With reference to Finland, it is stated here that the Union supports 'the demand for the restoration of the legal [autonomous] status which existed in that country until its legal abrogation during the current reign'. That is to say, faced with a specific case, the Union of Liberation rated the idea of unity of empire above that of unrestricted application of the right to self-determination.

The history of the origins of this second version of the Union's objectives is somewhat obscure. But it is worth trying to reconstruct, because it gives an idea of how the decision processes worked within the Union of Liberation. The key to this is given in the inconsistently phrased third programme point. Let us start with the second sentence, aimed specifically at Finland. The only possible explanation for this specific reference lies in the fact that negotiations between the Constitutionalists and the Finnish resistance had been going on since summer 1903.³⁹¹ They reached the decisive phase in January 1904. While the Union of Liberation's first congress was dealing in some length with the question of nationalities,³⁹² the Union's Finland Committee was negotiating formally with the Finnish emissaries Adolf Törngren and Julio Reuter about closer political co-operation. At that stage, however, the discussions could not be brought to any decisive result.³⁹³ That must have been the reason for the fact that neither the nationalities question in general nor the Finnish question in particular were mentioned in the earlier version of the Union's objectives. During a second round of discussions in March 1904 it became clear that the negotiating partners' objectives could not be entirely aligned. The Finns wanted guarantees on the extension of Finland's autonomous rights by a future Russian parliament to a degree exceeding that enjoyed before the abolition of Finland's special status in 1899. The Russians, on the other hand, did not want to grant anything more than restoration of the *status quo ante* and seemed at most prepared to accept tacitly a Finnish *reservatio mentalis* concerning future development of Finland's constitution. Peter Dolgorukov explained that the Constitutionalists' attitude was based on consideration of nationally minded elements in the Union of Liberation which might leave the organization if there was to be any tampering with the integrity of the Russian empire. And, emphasizing his and his friends' belief in the universal healing powers of a constitution, he added:

'If Finland has managed to get along up to now with a Grand Duke who was, at the same time, the autocrat of Russia, it should be able still better with a ruler who, in his relations with Russia, is restricted by a constitution'.³⁹⁴

It was this state of negotiations which was pinpointed in the second sentence of the third point in the Union's objectives dated November 1904.

The sentence concerning the right to self-determination came into the programme text by a different route, even though it, too, is evidence of the efforts to expand the Union of Liberation's radius of action. In September 1904 a 'Conference of Oppositional and Revolutionary Organizations of the Russian Empire' was held in Paris, in which the Union of Liberation also took part.³⁹⁵ Of the eight organizations represented at the Conference only two operated actually inside Russia (the Union of Liberation and the PSR). The other six were based in the national peripheral areas (Poles, Finns, Latvians, Georgians, Armenians). So the problem of nationalities occupied a dominant position on the agenda. The representatives of the Union of Liberation (Bogucharskij, Peter Dolgorukov, Milyukov and Struve) put high hopes in the Conference; it did, after all, seem possible that a broad anti-autocratic front including the most important nationalist movements could be developed from such beginnings. The Conference declaration is also written — presumably by Milyukov — in this spirit. It featured three common aims: overthrow of the autocracy, establishment of a 'democratic regime on the basis of universal suffrage' and the right to national self-determination. We find all three points again in the second version of the Union's objectives, which was published together with the minutes and declaration of the Paris Conference.³⁹⁶

It is very probable that the changes to the first version were made by the four delegates to the Paris Conference. The text was dealt with afterwards by the Union Council and was available, together with the Paris documents, for the Union's Second Congress in October 1904.³⁹⁷ But the Congress did not have time to deal with the new draft programme; it did however authorize the Union Council to make known the existence of the Union, which then occurred with the printing of the Union's objectives in the altered version. This course of events shows that the Union Council and the informal groups behind it occupied the central position in the Constitutionalists' organization. The amendments and additions to the programme

were not the outcome of fundamental discussions within the Union of Liberation but rather a tactically legitimated adjustment to the declaration of the Paris Conference, undertaken by the leading groups.³⁹⁸ This history shows, moreover, that the Constitutionalists were willing to make programmatic concessions whenever they saw in them the chance for expanding their basis of operations. This willingness came to an end where the supreme objective – the constitution – was affected or where the integrity of the Russian empire was jeopardized. Within these limits, programmatic decisions were made on the merits of each individual case, whereby the benefit for the Union's cohesion and its ability to act took priority.

In view of the essential part which the Union of Liberation undoubtedly played in the political mobilization of 'society' on the eve and during the first months of 1905, its organizational development appears really rather modest. In comparison with the picture presented by the Union's First Congress in January 1904, there had been only slight alteration in the distribution of the provincial groups throughout the country and in the social make-up of the Union. Here and there a group was added – mainly at the end of 1904 and the beginning of 1905 – and it had even been possible to set up a few new groups outside the zemstvo provinces (see Appendix III); on the other hand, some groups are never mentioned again after January 1904. It is conspicuous that the number of groups represented at the Union Congresses declined constantly (January 1904: 22–23 groups; October 1904 and March 1905: 13–15; August 1905: 11–13). This does not mean that the Union dwindled in the same degree; the presence of participants at Union Congresses cannot, after all, be regarded as a reliable indication of the existence of a provincial group. But it can be said that the Constitutionalists had overestimated the organization's ability to integrate. This was particularly clear from the development of the independent professions' associations initiated by the Union of Liberation during the 1904/05 winter. No single one of them ever formally joined the Union of Liberation, and even the Union of Unions – an amalgamation of fourteen such associations dating from May 1905 – had already clearly dissociated itself politically from the Union of Liberation by the summer.³⁹⁹ Since the various minority groups with which it was in touch, in particular the Finns and the Poles, also fought shy of an amalgamation with the Russian opposition, the Union of Liberation remained a regionally based organization, dominated by Russians and fundamentally de-

pendent on support from the two principal cities and the zemstvo provinces.

As far as the internal structure of the provincial organizations is concerned, only the Moscow group is known to have set up a number of local subdivisions.⁴⁰⁰ Otherwise the local groups, mostly based in the principal cities of each province, seem to have served at one and the same time as the 'provincial leagues' in the sense of the Statutes. This means that the Union of Liberation had not succeeded in setting up an organizational network extending beyond a few urban centres. As far as the Union itself operated in the districts and in the countryside, it made use of the old informal pattern of organization. Its local activities were consequently incorporated in the social life of the province.

On the other hand, the strength of the Union of Liberation also lay in its close involvement with the 'public movement'. The results of the Union's First Congress might still give the impression that the new organization represented nothing more than the belated, formal merging of the handful of people who had founded *Osvobozhdenie* in 1902. And yet the Union did not become a conventicle. The transition to formal organization took place against the background of a rapid advance of the 'public movement'. It was the reaction of politically conscious sectors of 'society' to the critical confrontation between the outdated autocratic order and a latent revolutionary situation in the country. To be sure, the constitutionalist movement remained confined to a relatively small social field, both in recruiting members and in its political activities, it was still lacking in a coherent ideology, too. Nevertheless, every one of the political shades represented by prominent names in the movement could claim to be representing anonymous supporters in the country — i.e. social groups and circles, for which the political task of establishing a constitutional order had arisen from the task of cultural development work and which were interested in the expansion of political participation. They joined forces in the Union of Liberation in order to add weight to their quest for participation and to get it accepted against rival interests.

CONCLUSION

In his memoirs published in 1937, during his Paris exile, Vasilij A. Maklakov bears witness to a clear break in the history of the liberal movement in Russia during the reign of Nicholas II:

‘The liberation movement in the broad sense, i.e. the struggle for the principles of liberalism, for individual freedom, the rule of law and self-government, had long been in existence and had at no point disappeared. In the 1860s it even inspired the autocratic state. But under Nicholas II the nature of this struggle altered. It concentrated exclusively and completely on the fall of the autocracy; it became an open war against [the autocracy]. And precisely this war soon took hold of the whole of society’.

In the years prior to the 1905 revolution, the militant forces in society were recruited for this war. The two socialist parties were formed and, alongside them, an ‘organized liberal party’ in the form of the Union of Liberation, the ‘most striking, new and symbolic phenomenon of these times’. ‘Thus the beginning of the ‘Liberation Movement’ in inverted commas . . . which took up the first years of the twentieth century and led to the 17th October 1905’.¹ The author saw the reasons for this development firstly in the short-sighted policy of Nicholas II, which did not want to yield to offers of co-operation by the moderate forces in ‘society’; secondly and mainly in a dramatic change of leadership within the ‘Liberation movement’:

‘The older liberalism believed in attaining a constitution along the path of ‘evolution’ of the existing institutions. In Russia there was a grain of seed from which the constitution was growing all of its own. That was the local self-government, the zemstvo. It concerned itself with the same general needs as the state. Although a statutory organization, it nonetheless realized the principle of ‘people’s

rights'. [...] It was not by chance that the first Constitutionals to raise the question of the constitution *practically* were *zemtsy*. Believing that the Liberation Movement was developing out of the zemstvo milieu was therefore no optical illusion. But for a long time the *zemtsy* did not desire war. [...] The war against the autocracy was openly declared by the foundation of the foreign-based journal '*Osvobozhdenie*' in 1902. Later the Union of Liberation also came into being. And the liberal *zemtsy* still played the leading role. But when the struggle for the principles of liberalism turned into a struggle against the autocracy, the leadership fell into the hands of the 'politicians' (*politiki*). There were, however, no practical politicians in Russia at that time. One could serve 'politics' only in theory, in the field of science or of journalism. [...] The theoreticians became the only specialists in politics. And the leadership of the Liberation Movement was transferred to them, to the political '*intelligentsiya*', which stamped the Liberation Movement with its own image'.

With this interpretation, Maklakov provided a pattern for interpreting the problems treated in this study. It is the pattern of a Janus-faced liberalism in which dogmatic theoreticians, far removed from reality, contended for the leadership with the 'practicians', close to reality and eager for reform; it is the pattern of a portentous change from reformism to radicalism in the liberal movement. This interpretation has been accepted with varying evaluation by the scientific literature in the West and has stubbornly held its own here. Michael Karpovich, who at least in the United States considerably influenced examination of our subject twenty years ago, differentiates between two types of Russian liberalism: the 'zemstvo-liberalism' and 'the liberal-minded part of the professional class', which he exemplifies in the persons of Maklakov and Milyukov.² The same differentiation is the basis of George Fischer's thesis. He examines the metamorphosis of Russian liberalism 'from gentry to intelligentsia' – the subtitle of his book – and notes in the process an increasing radicalization, a movement 'from right to left'.³ Shmuel Galai makes a differentiation, similar to Fischer's, between 'zemstvo oppositional movement', 'zemstvo radicalism' and 'democratic intelligentsia'. According to him, the coalition of the latter two streams after the turn of the century brought about 'the Liberation Movement'. The transfer of the leadership from the *zemtsy* to the *intelligentsiya*, already described by Fischer, is to Galai the hub of an argumentation which sees the

Union of Liberation and its most important branch organization, the Union of Unions, in the centre of the 1905 revolution.⁴

This is not the place to expound in detail the far-reaching implications of these interpretations in the evaluation of the Russian Revolution. We are dealing here with only one aspect: all these interpretations either explicitly or implicitly contain assumptions on the way in which a consistent liberal or constitutionalist grouping formed in pre-revolutionary Russia. Insofar as these assumptions follow the Maklakov pattern, I consider them to be insufficiently supported empirically. The purpose of this work was to specify and, if necessary, to correct our knowledge and concepts of political group formation processes in Russia. The results of this study must therefore finally be confronted with the current, widely accepted patterns of interpretation. This will take the form of three sections – an analysis of the Union of Liberation's social structure, an evaluation of the organizational development of Russian constitutionalism and a discussion on constitutionalist strategy.

1. SOCIAL STRUCTURE

The thesis that Russian constitutionalism was established as an organized force through the coalition of the 'zemstvo liberals' with the 'radical' or 'democratic *intelligentsiya*' is derived in the final analysis from the self-assessment of the Constitutionalists predominantly involved in this process. Not only Maklakov, who adds a specific critical feature to this differentiation, but also Shakhovskoj and Belokonskij, Petrunkevich and Kuskova never missed a chance to figure out the proportion of 'zemtsy' at this or that conference, at one or other of the political initiatives, in relation to the number of 'intelligenty' present.⁵ Although very roughly hewn, the differentiation seems not to be without sense if the various original milieu of the groups and people making up the constitutionalist grouping are examined. One must bring to mind the history of the specific circles concerned with the establishment and running of the periodical *Osvobozhdenie* in order to realize that the political co-operation of these groups as it developed after the turn of the century must have been a new, perhaps even surprising experience for those involved.⁶ As a means of designating the varying backgrounds, the termini *zemtsy* and *intelligentsiya* may then be acceptable. It does, however,

lead to confrontation if they are used as social categories, with the intention of tracing the existing differences within the Union of Liberation quasi from the social history aspect. Maklakov, for example, so willingly seen as a protagonist of the zemstvo wing, never actually held any position within the zemstvo; according to his social status, he was a typical '*intelligent*'. On the other hand, the political views of the landowner and zemstvo veteran, Ivan Petrunkevich, were much more in line with those of the penniless, relegated professor Milyukov than with those of his social equal, Nikolaj L'vov. And on which side does a moderate man of law like Muromtsev belong, who had enough property to be able to survive removal from his Moscow professorship without suffering any loss to the way of life befitting his class? To which side should one attribute Ivan Petrunkevich's brother Mikhail, who had been in zemstvo service for years as a doctor, was a zemstvo deputy at the same time but headed a Petersburg industrial enterprise after 1898? – The *zemtsy/intelligenty* dichotomy obviously does not answer either as a means of describing the social structure of the Constitutional group or as a means of explaining the way in which it formed.⁷

Taken as a social group, the Constitutionalists assembled in the Union of Liberation were characterized by great homogeneity as far as generation and social aspects are concerned.⁸ At the time the Union of Liberation was founded, about three-quarters (91 out of 122) of the members identified were between 30 and 45 years old; the average age of the whole group was 41. Only 4 people were younger than 30 and only 4 older than 60. The predominant group of those born between 1860 and 1874 had grown up during the times of the Great Reforms and spent their youth under the reaction of the 1880s; when the industrialization boom began, they were just entering public life. Each individual biography shows the traces of rapid social mobilization, and that makes these contemporaries appear to be of the same generation. Unfortunately we have only limited information about the origins of individual members. But even this permits the conclusion that the Constitutionalists came mostly from families of the medium to lower landed nobility (with a good sprinkling of the ancient nobility, whose standing was based more on historical merits than on economic strength), from the higher ranking civil service and from military families, as well as from the families of scientists and priests. That was a considerable part of the old social elites, which had been more affected than other classes by social transformation

during the second half of the 19th century. As we have seen, their offspring tried to consolidate or to improve their status mainly through education; and they profited in this by the educational reforms introduced after the Crimean War. We can specify the general educational background of 122 of the 164 Union of Liberation members known by name: all of them completed at least secondary school, 100 of them also concluded their studies at university, another seven had to interrupt their studies prematurely for political reasons.

The group's high level of education corresponds to a high degree of professionalization. There were only a few of those we have examined who did not, following school and university education, take up a profession for a shorter or longer period, whether in the independent professions, as an officer or as a civil servant. In 1904 we find, based on incomplete evidence, only 11 of 135 people who at that point obviously were not active in any specific profession but were managing their estates or living on some other income. As zemstvo deputies and members of various social institutions, they represent the classic type of 'public activist'. In contrast to them are 124 people who, regardless of their financial circumstances, must be assumed to have worked permanently in a profession. The largest share of these, with 28 names, was made up of free-lance and professional journalists and publishers, followed by professors and independent scientists (26) and lawyers (21).⁹ Here 5 marshalls of the nobility and 22 chairmen of members of zemstvo administrations are counted among the professionals. Among these may well have been many a landlord or man of independent means who should be counted in the first category; but the elected official positions in the zemstvo had meantime largely turned into well-paid full-time jobs which, as we know, were often sought after by franchised people who could not live on their private means alone. Altogether we can count 63 elected *zemtsy* and marshalls of the nobility (that means 38.4% of all members known by name), a figure which may have been higher, because it is uncertain whether some members actually held office in the zemstvo or not.¹⁰ We can see that the high degree of mobilization which characterized the group under examination makes a clear-cut division into '*zemtsy*' and '*intelligenty*' (or professional men) impossible.

Judging from these figures, the Constitutionalist group was recruited entirely from that social field which, following Max Weber, we have designated as '*bürgerliche Intelligenz*'.¹¹ By this we mean a functional elite which arose as a result of industrialization and which replaced

the earlier educated intelligentsia of pre-industrial society, made up of nobility, civil service and the priesthood. The new elite's social characteristics – mobility, high level of education, urbanity, professionalism – applied to the various circles covered by the Union of Liberation. They were held together not so much by economic interests but by the general way of life of 'educated society'. The behavioural norms of the new intelligentsia more and more determined the work in the class-based institutions of the zemstvo. Through the zemstvo, Russian constitutionalism was able to integrate, after the turn of the century, parts of the landed nobility who felt their existence was threatened by Vitte's industrialization policy and increased class antagonism in the country, and who saw their chance for survival in a radical but non-violent reform of the legal and social order.

In this social context, the terms *zemtsy* and *intelligentsiya* used by Maklakov and others seem to be residual categories referring to various functional areas of the new intelligentsia. The text cited explicitly names the zemstvo on the one side, science and journalism on the other. These are the sectors in which the opinion leaders of 'educated society' can be located. Whoever was active here in an authoritative position usually enjoyed higher prestige in public, or at least greater publicity than other representatives of the new intelligentsia. And in fact more than two-thirds of the Union of Liberation members on whom we have relevant information must be ascribed to journalism, science or the zemstvo. For a long time these fields of activity were separate and had nothing to do with each other. In its social organization and in its own definition of itself, the zemstvo was still very close to the old elites – nobility and civil service – and had conserved the service ethos of the old class society. Science and journalism, however, had long departed from this tradition. The political consequences of inadequate communication and co-ordination between the zemstvo and the intellectuals can be seen just as clearly from the failure of the so-called 'First Zemstvo Movement' (1878–81) as from the brief history of the People's Rights Party (1893–94).¹² The functional linking of the sectors named with each other and with other sectors of socio-cultural development came about, however, only after the end of the 1880s, when a new generation, educated at the gymnasium and university, came hustling into the independent professions and the zemstvo, where they were confronted by the problems of Russian backwardness, intensified by Vitte's one-sided industrialization policy. As described above, the vitalization of the dif-

ferent branches of 'public activity' around the middle of the nineties and, after the turn of the century, the emergence of the constitutionalist movement closely connected with the 'public movement' must be interpreted as political reflexes of the social mobilization process which had modified the features of 'society' fundamentally. Thus it can be said that the decisive condition for the emergence of organized constitutionalism in Russia was not the repression and marginalization of one social group by another, but rather the co-ordination of various elements of the new intelligentsia in the functional context of a modern intellectual elite.

Yet the figures given above also show that the constitutionalist grouping existing after the turn of the century only partially covered the social field of the new intelligentsia. Constitutionalism and *bürgerliche Intelligenz* were not identical. The constitutionalist movement lacked not only anchorage in the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, it lacked above all the so-called 'lower intelligentsia' – the proletaroid provincial journalists, the country doctors, primary school teachers, agronomists and engineers. One misses also the mass of the zemstvo employees, the 'Third Element'. To this degree the analysis of the social structure of the constitutionalist grouping contradicts the interpretation by George Fischer, who has related the replacement after the turn of the century of the older liberalism in Russia by a broad political movement precisely with the growing importance of the lower intelligentsia.¹³ The results of our analysis may, however, be partially predetermined by the documentation available, for we know that these elements did also exist among the rank-and-file Union of Liberation members who have remained anonymous.¹⁴ But they were not representative. They were in no way present in the Union Council, and they hardly made themselves noticeable among the delegates to the Union Congresses. This bears witness to the extraordinarily low level of institutionalization in the constitutionalist movement.¹⁵ As we have seen, the organization was dominated by the old informal relationships between several metropolitan groups, in which the tune was called by prominent and influential journalists, scientists and zemstvo activists. The lack of stable, functioning procedures, peculiar to this organization, hardly gave the anonymous, simple member a chance to rise. In this way the social basis of Russian Constitutionalism remained essentially unchanged even in the transition to formal organization. In particular there was no significant increase, either quantitative or qualitative (as regards their influence

in the organization), in the 'lower intelligentsia'.¹⁶ The high school status of its representatives, with only slight social difference between leadership and members, was characteristic of the Union of Liberation.

These particular features of the constitutionalist grouping become even more clear if we compare the figures given above with the corresponding data for the Social Democratic Party and the Party of Socialist Revolutionaries.¹⁷ We have already noted that the leaders of these revolutionary parties belonged to the same age group as the members of the Union of Liberation.¹⁸ And the leading social democratic and socialist revolutionary group also show great similarity with the Union of Liberation as far as origins, educational background and professional qualification are concerned. Since the generation covering those born between 1860 and 1875 was predominant in all these organizations, the theory can be expounded that this generation, affected in a special way by social mobilization, was responsible for political group formation in Russia. The revolutionary, socialist movement and the reformist, constitutionalist movement in Russia shared the same socio-historical roots.

Apart from this there were more differences than shared aspects between the three organizations. On the lower and intermediate levels, the two revolutionary parties had a considerably broader social basis than the Union of Liberation. At the same time there was a clear drop in ages between the leading groups and the local leaders and members, who were on average much younger. In the Union of Liberation, on the other hand, there was no significant difference in age to be noticed between the leadership (i.e. the Union Council) and the membership. From this we can conclude that there was a trend towards overmaturity among the Constitutionalists, corresponding to the social structure which maintained a relatively high level. These structural differences had more effect in the medium term among the Social Democrats than the Socialist Revolutionaries. Among the local leaders and the party conference delegates there was an increasing number of younger manual workers of low educational standard (about one-third in 1907)¹⁹ – a sign of a higher level of institutionalization in the RSDRP organization. In contrast, the PSR offered rank-and-file members considerably less opportunities for promotion. Above the local level we find almost exclusively representatives of the new intelligentsia only, as in the Union of Liberation. But it was the lower intelligentsia which was assembling in the PSR. It is, however, true of both the revolutionary parties that their leaders gained

prestige and influence within their own parties. Members of the Union of Liberation had on the other hand to be of respectable social status from the beginning before being able to hold a representative position in the organization. The picture presented by the Union of Liberation is therefore more that of an association of notable citizens than that of a broadly based democratic organization.

2. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The organizational style of the constitutionalist movement corresponded to its social characteristics. As long as social and political roles continued to coincide for many Constitutionalists and as long as the individual's social status was still considered an important criterion in determining his position within the group, the political organization of Russian constitutionalism remained linked to the social structure of the classes supporting the movement. These classes defined themselves as 'educated society' and understood themselves as being quite simply 'the public'. The peculiarities in the constitutionalist organization arose from its commitment to the 'public movement'; they can be summarized in the following three points: (1) the constitutionalist movement went through a relatively long phase of informal organization before creating its own autonomous organization in the form of the Union of Liberation. During that phase it could hardly be differentiated from the 'public movement'; (2) the nucleus of the constitutionalist movement was formed by informal groups based in the two principal cities, Moscow and St. Petersburg. Its political organization in the provinces did not apparently extend beyond a few municipal centres; (3) even after the transition to formal organization, constitutionalism showed an extraordinarily low degree of institutionalization — i.e. internal role differentiation was poorly developed, and in practice the borderline with the activities of 'society's' institutions remained indistinct.

Organized constitutionalism developed in Russia on the basis of political mobilization of 'society', which occurred after the turn of the century when the economic crisis turned into a fundamental dilemma of the autocratic regime's legitimation. Under the pressure of the socio-economic crisis, which limited the new intellectual elites' room for activity and subjected the professional middle classes to increasing social insecurity, informal groups joined together to add

weight to 'educated society's' demands for participation. Under the rigid autocratic system, however, any attempt at creating an organization with political objectives jeopardized the prevailing government order. Thus the constitutionalist movement were pressed into a fatal political radicalism — fatal, because the illegal pattern of action enforced by the circumstances could not be brought into line with the claim to legality by the 'public activists'. This dilemma was evaded for a certain amount of time by means of informal organization. This was the attempt to organize public opinion, by exploiting the unscheduled means of communication available in the form of social life, in such a way that the social institutions stood in for the non-existent autonomous constitutionalist organization.

The informal organization of Russian constitutionalism was not identical with the 'public movement'. They shared the same sociological contour which marked out the behavioural pattern of 'public activity', but they did not share the same social structure. The forms and media of public life and a specific code, the so-called 'Aesopian language', were also common to both. Constitutionalism differed from the 'public movement' in its formulated political objectives and its conscious, deliberate activity. With *Osvobozhdenie* the Constitutionalists created their own journalistic medium for communicating their political objectives to the public. When the founders, contributors and sponsors of this journal, who were connected through informal relationships, were collectively designated 'the friends', the first criteria of an otherwise in no way formalized group membership became recognizable. Feed-back of the 'friends' organizational efforts took the form of solidarity with or rejection of the constitutionalist formula by outsiders. The discussion set off in the pages of *Osvobozhdenie* by Dmitriy Shipov's policy of adjustment towards the government after the May 1902 congress was an attempt to determine the obligations constituting the specific mode of interaction of an autonomous political grouping, which was guaranteed by sanctions (exclusion of Shipov and his adherents). With this the Constitutionalists became identifiable as a special political grouping within the 'public movement'.

One of the most striking features of the constitutionalist grouping was its urban character and, in connection with this, its concentration on the two principal cities. This corresponds to the image of the 'public movement' we gained in considering the institutions and media of the public in the first part of Chapter Three. We located the most

important circles and salons in St. Petersburg and Moscow; there the influential, supra-regional newspapers and journals were published, there the prominent scientific associations were based, which attracted large numbers of intellectuals from the provinces. And finally the establishment of *Osvobozhdenie* as well as the founding of the Union of Liberation were initiated by metropolitan circles.

In explaining this peculiarity it must first be pointed out that the 'public movement' lacked distinctive regional traits which could have hindered the metropolitan concentration.²⁰ The old service society, geared towards the top of the hierarchy, had also never known any such regionalism. Moscow and St. Petersburg had been the ideal and objective of provincial society since time immemorial, and with their good transport facilities, their schools and universities, theatres, libraries and publishing houses, they held a magic attraction for 'educated society'. Those living out their professional existence in the depths of the provinces tried to escape the cultural and political isolation through greater mobility.²¹ The 'public movement' had been mobile from the very beginning because its social basis was mobile, and so was the constitutionalist movement. — In contrast, the peasant movement was hardly ever able to overcome local isolation, even in the 1905–1907 years of revolution; the labour movement, on the other hand, first became 'all-Russian' in 1905 after successful integration into the movement of train crews on the railways and the telegraph workers.²² — Centering the constitutionalist movement on the two principal cities was thus a result of a mobilization process which led to concentration at 'society's' communications centres.

Nonetheless, neither the 'public movement' as a whole nor constitutionalism in particular remained isolated in the two capitals. Just as the provincial intellectuals gravitated towards Moscow and Petersburg, the metropolitan representatives maintained innumerable contacts in the provinces. The most important link joining 'society' and life in the provinces, however, was the franchise — the right to participate in local self-administration. Thus the zemstvo was the most important point of departure for the 'public opposition' because it was most firmly secured by rights and obligations. As we know from Milyukov's programme article dated 1902, the zemstvo also held the same importance for the Constitutionalists' informal organization, and hardly anything was changed in this situation by the establishment of the Union of Liberation. In this way organized constitutionalism was

linked with the 'public opposition' in the provinces through personal contacts as well as institutional bonds, both permitting the leading metropolitan groups to extend their radius of action.

The establishment of the Union of Liberation in 1904 was a milestone in the history of Russian Constitutionalism. It provided the constitutionalist movement with an organizational superstructure which clearly defined the constitutionalist grouping and which was appropriate in making its policy more effective in the long run. The Union of Liberation was not a political party. It maintained an open structure, although it had at its disposal – in the Union Council – a nucleus which worked conspiratorially. It was no accident that the Union of Liberation hardly ever took a stand in public as an organization. The tactical concept dating from October 1904 did not plan any conspicuous Union activities but rather informal influence and control of specific social institutions (*zemstvo* congresses and assemblies, professional associations, municipal worthies) which represented the public but not the Union. By adopting the promise of far-reaching social reforms in the Union's objectives an attempt was made to get through to wide sectors of the society. The inexact formulations in the programme left plenty of room for the details of individual concepts. That is certainly not indicative of coherence in the constitutionalist group, but it does correspond with the claim to unite all oppositional forces interested in overthrowing the autocracy.²³ In practice however the constitutionalist groups, which had been constituted as sub-divisions of the Union, remained isolated. In the report on his tour in April 1904, Adolf Törngren even gives the impression that the old informal group relations hardly permitted the regular procedures scheduled in the organizational plan to be put into operation in the internal opinion-forming and decision-making processes. On the local level at least, the Union as such can only barely be discerned against the background of social life. The 'public movement' continued to be the field in which the Union of Liberation was effective.

3. STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Constitutionalism's claim to represent all forces in Russian society opposing absolutism has led the relevant literature to see not so much

the formation of a coherent political grouping in the rise of Russian constitutionalism as rather a broad, internally differentiated movement which prepared, or even brought about, the overthrow of the autocracy in the first Russian revolution. Leopold Haimson notes categorically:

'The Union of Liberation did not at any time represent a particular political grouping or tendency in any conventional sense. What we actually find represented in the councils of the movement is nothing less than an array of ideological tendencies and attitudes, embracing almost the whole spectrum of contemporary revolutionary and opposition attitudes'.

In the context of the "all-nation" coalition against absolutism', said to have formed in the years prior to 1905, it was 'the most influential, most remarkable, and most symptomatic political organization of the period'.²⁴ This thought appears even more pointed in Richard Pipes:

'Under Struve's influence, the constitutionalists agreed [in 1902] to postpone formulating a specific program and to advance the antiautocratic slogan in its bare, negative form. Thus, instead of a liberal party there emerged the "liberational movement" (*osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie*) which Struve had been advocating since 1899. In this sense, it may be said that Struve was the author of the grand strategy adopted by the liberal movement during the years 1902-1904 which decided the fate of autocracy'.

And, continuing this thought, he says of the Union of Liberation a few pages further on:

'A coalition of liberals and radicals, it was the only successful revolutionary organization in the history of imperial Russia. Before two years passed, it succeeded where all the others had failed: it forced the autocratic regime to give up its monopoly on political power'.²⁵

These opinions and the implications cover a wider field of historical problems than our study. But from the point of this work, they raise more questions than they answer. If the constitutionalist movement did not produce any political grouping in the strict sense, what then was the political organization of the Constitutionalists? Simply the grass roots of a 'nation-wide liberation movement', or just one organization alongside others in the anti-autocratic front? Something like a reservoir for homeless radicals, or the control centre of the first Russian revolution? Apart from Pipes, Shmuel Galai also tends towards the last definition, seeing in the liberation movement the organized structure upon which the leadership in the revolution

devolved.²⁶ Haimson argues with a little more restraint, and referring to the ideological variety covered by the Union of Liberation defines the Constitutionalists' role as follows:

'... not merely to unite and reconcile the variety of tendencies... , but rather to take a hand in the actual creation, ideological delineation, and "independent" organization of a whole spectrum of political groupings and tendencies. [...] Indeed there was many an effort to encourage these various groupings to develop distinct and even conflicting political physiognomies — if only in the interest of a truly broad and successful mobilization of a national movement'.²⁷

In the course of our study we have gained a rather different picture of the constitutionalist movement. During the period in question Russian Constitutionalism grew up from a hazy political tendency to a particular political grouping with specific features. Besides the indefinite liberal-democratic ideology, which corresponded to the professional middle class social basis, it was the organizational structure and first of all a proper political strategy which separated the constitutionalist grouping from others on the right and on the left. The political development of Russian Constitutionalism since the publication of *Osvobozhdenie* No. 1 was more in line with the path Pavel Milyukov had traced out in his 1902 programme article than with Peter Struve's utopia of a national liberation movement. To be sure, the idea of an anti-autocratic united front never waned among the Constitutionalists. But in fact there was no evidence to be found covering our period of study up to 1904 of co-ordinated co-operation by organized groups of varying political tendencies. The Finnish resistance and the Polish opposition refused to bring their organizations under the umbrella of the Union of Liberation, and the revolutionary groups abstained from the constitutionalist movement from the outset. According to Törngren's notes the Union leaders deplored that they had reached no agreements with the Social Democrats; on the other hand they were on a good footing with the Socialist Revolutionaries and there had also been technical co-operation in transporting literature, but further political discussions had not brought any results.²⁸ Even in the broad spectrum of informal groups the influence of the Constitutionalists was limited to a relatively narrow field. They won no reinforcements from the younger generation, nor could they gain a foothold in the labour or peasant movements.

On the other hand, the concurrence of anti-autocratic sentiment

in the most varied classes and circles of Russian society cannot be overlooked. The period of the first Russian revolution gained its characteristic pungency and its unprecedented speed precisely from the concurrence of four factors: the question of the constitution, the labour question, the peasant problem and the question of nationalities.²⁹ But it was a matter of concurrence, not a co-ordination of the movements. What appears in 1904/05 to be an anti-autocratic front ranging from Social Democrats to the zemstvo opposition, from the political general strike to industrial opposition did not signify anything more than erosion of the old regime's power of social and political integration. The progressive disintegration of the basis of loyalty for the autocracy did not produce an 'all-nation coalition against absolutism', not to mention a 'people's front', but rather a somewhat confused field of competing groups and tendencies which found its part-political outline in the controversial question of constitutional reform.

In the process of political mobilization and differentiation in Russian society on the eve of the 1905 revolution, the group of Constitutionalists did indeed occupy a special position. It was the first consistent political grouping to follow a non-revolutionary strategy in the dispute with the autocracy. The Constitutionalists wanted to restrain the social revolution – recognized as inevitable in the medium term – by establishing political rights in a liberal-democratic system. Besides the opposition to the autocracy, it was thus competition with the revolutionary movement which advanced the process of constitutionalist group formation.³⁰ – I will try to substantiate this theory in a brief review of the origins of the constitutionalist movement.

We have seen that the decisive criterion for the problem of political group formation in pre-revolutionary Russia must be sought not so much in ideological differences as rather more in the differentiation between revolutionary and non-revolutionary methods of action. This differentiation was closely connected with accelerated modernization of the country, which has turned the problem of revolution in Russian politics into a permanent problem. It can without doubt be said that the intentions of avoiding, hindering or suppressing revolution have influenced all great political decisions since the Emancipation of the Serfs. And all the theories and models discussed in society for the future development of the country have included the question on whether a revolution were necessary, desirable or even simply avoidable in overcoming Russian backwardness. The decision always

depended more on the degree of social integration than on ideological disposition. It was more a question of political practice than of theory. The new professional middle classes which arose from the disintegration of the old elites sought to stabilize their insecure social position at first in legal, constructive cultural activity. Meantime, homeless intellectuals in the subculture of Russian radicalism, cut off from the context of public activity, were trying out the instruments of resistance available to them: moral insurrection, illegal conspiracy and terrorism.

While, up to the late 1880s, the problem of revolution mainly took the form of the nihilistic drop-out with open shirt and unkempt hair or, more disquieting, of individual terrorism, it had taken on new dimensions since the middle of the 1890s. The industrial revolution intensified social conflict and made demands of the political system which surpassed the autocracy's capacity for adaptation. The new professional middle classes recognized in the autocratic system itself the very factor which was decisively hindering their chances of development. At the same time the mass movements among workers and peasants dismantled the self-confidence of 'educated society'. 'The people' (*narod*) seemed to be departing from their role as the object of 'society's' (*obshchestvo*) cultural activities and to be developing into the subject of politics. Since there were no institutionalized forms of solution to the conflict, this democratization process could only take place in more or less violent convulsions of the social order. At that time the two revolutionary parties formed on the periphery of 'society', setting themselves the objective of organizing the revolution on the basis of mass movements. The established nucleus of the new intelligentsia, existentially interested in continued undisturbed development of social relationships, sought on the other hand the chance to become the active subject in the process of change by means of political organization based on the pattern of Western liberalism.

Supported by the tradition of 'public activity', the Constitution-
alists answered the demands of the crisis years with a strategy of mobilizing the public, radical in its consequences but legal in form. Behind this was the thought that, in view of the backwardness of the broad masses, the culturally leading classes would have to take over the leadership in political liberation as well, if the essential democratization were not to end in chaos and anarchy. When the domestic political situation became more and more critical under the impact of the defeats in the Far East towards the end of 1904, the Consti-

tutionalists increased pressure on the government. With the zemstvo congresses, the banquet and resolution campaigns, in the press and through the organization of professional unions they demonstratively laid claim to the basic rights of freedom of speech and association, but were nonetheless hardly able to make any impression on the workers and peasant movements. A member of the Union of Liberation aptly called these tactics 'simulation of a revolution' (*simulyatsiya revolyutsii*);³¹ it presented a new phase in the 'struggle on the borders of legality'. And it lay in the logic of this struggle that the political mobilization of 'society' would make the use of revolutionary means to overthrow tsarism superfluous and would force the autocracy, deprived of its basis of loyalty, to surrender.

The weakness of this concept lay in the half-hearted approach to power; the Constitutionalists could not or would not imagine the end of the old regime in any form other than that of a regular transfer of power to the organized forces of 'society'. With some justification, Lenin brought to bear against Struve as early as 1901 that constitutionalism could be 'reconciled with the concern for strictly legal development of absolutist Russia', providing one assumed the government capable of good judgement; and he accused Struve of descending 'from the heights of his middle-class wrath to this vulgar stance of a completely immature liberalism'.³² And as it turned out, when the government would not co-operate, when it used force and took refuge — as could be observed after 1906 — in Bonapartist, authoritarian methods, the Constitutionalists were absolutely nonplussed. It was, admittedly, easy for a revolutionary activist such as Lenin, who expected nothing of that particular society except its downfall, to testify to this liberalism's immaturity. Under Russian conditions, 'mature' liberalism would perforce have been largely identical with revolutionary socialism. Here was an irreconcilable contradiction for the Constitutionalists. If they demanded introduction of 'their law', they would have to make a radical break with the law of the old order. But at the same time their existence depended on the permanence of law in view of the threatening revolution.

The Russian Constitutionalists were always faced with this dilemma whenever they tried to alter the existing order by political means. The question of the correct strategy, unanswered in all the programmes, hung over the zemstvo congress of July 1905, which discussed a draft constitution 'in the first reading' and yet failed to declare itself a constituent assembly; and this same question moved the parliamen-

tarians who, in 1906 upon the dissolution of the First Duma, called on the people in Vyborg, Finland, to boycott taxes and to reject army conscription; and again this question loomed behind the tedious procedure of dethroning the Emperor and forming the Provisional Government in the spring of 1917. The position of Russian Constitutionalism between radicalism and adaptation seems to be the dilemma facing liberalism in any 'late-comer' society. It is all too familiar to us from the history of German liberalism between 1848 and 1918. The spectre which Karl Marx claimed was haunting Europe was fast on the heels of the Russian Constitutionalists just as it had been on the heels of the Frankfurt Parliament in 1848. The German liberals finally opted for conciliation when they were tricked by Bismarck into renouncing liberty for the union of empire, and into exchanging equality and fraternity for a sense of social security. The Russian Constitutionalists, however, found no Bismarck who could supply the same services; they remained in the position between adaptation and radicalism. Yet beyond the limits of peaceful, legal means Russian Constitutionalism lost its identity. The history of Russian Constitutionalism could thus be titled 'On the Impossibility of Bourgeois Revolution in Russia'.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

The following 48 biographical sketches make up a section of the prosopographic material on which parts of this work are based. They are intended to illustrate the social field from which the political group of Constitutionalists was recruited.

As a rule the data are extracted from the following works of reference and encyclopaedias: Brokgauz-Efron; *NES*; Granat; *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, 1st and 2nd editions; *SIE*; Boiovich, *Chleny Gosudarstvennoj Dumy*, 4 vols; *Ukazatel' k Stenograficheskim Otchetam Gosudarstvennoj Dumy, Tretij Sozyv; Chetvertyj sozyv* (1908, 1913); *RV Sbornik*, Appendix. Supplementary material was provided by the memoirs of contemporaries as well as by the indices to Lenin, *PSS*; *Padenie Tsarskogo Rezhima*, Vol. 7 (1927); Vitte, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 3; Gurko, *Features and Figures of the Past*. Specialized literature consulted on specific individuals is noted at the end of the relevant sketch.

Of the most prominent leaders of the constitutionalist movement, Milyukov and Struve have not been included here since the most important biographical data occur in the text and more detailed information is easily accessible in the works of Th. Riha and R. Pipes.

ANNENSKIJ, Nikolaj Fedorovich (1843–1912)

Educated in the Cadet Corps. Graduated from St. Petersburg (Department of law) and Kiev (Department of History and Philosophy) Universities. 1867–1880 civil servant under the State Comptroller and in the Ministry of Transportation. Head of the statistical office in the Kazan' (1883) and Nizhnij Novgorod (1887) zemstvos and of the Petersburg city administration (1896). Full-time editor of *Russkoe Bogatstvo* from 1900. — Active in the populist movement from the 1870s. Banished in 1880 due to participation in the People's Will Party. Centre of the provincial intelligentsia in Nizhnij Novgorod along with V.G. Korolenko; promoter of the provincial press; one of the most important zemstvo statisticians. 1893–

1894 member of the People's Rights Party; member of the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* group around Mikhajlovskij from 1894. Active in the interests of the Literary Fund and in the Writers Union, honorary member of the Free Economic Society. Exiled to Finland following the Kazan Square demonstration (4th March 1901). Co-founder of *Osvobozhdenie*; informally head of the 'culinary committee' of the Petersburg literati (from 1902). From January 1904 vice chairman of the Council of the Union of Liberation. Member of the delegation which, on the eve of 9th January 1905, wanted to deter the Minister of the Interior from violent repression of the planned demonstration; arrested as a result of few days later in the Peter Paul Fortress. In Summer 1906 he was among the founders of the People's Socialist Party. Then retired from public life due to ill health.

Literature: M. Gor'kij, 'Annenskij' in *Sobranie Sochinenij*, Vol. 17, pp. 92-96; A. Annenskaya, 'Iz proshlykh let', *Russkoe Bogatstvo*, 1913 No. 1-2.

ARSEN'EV, Konstantin Konstantinovich (1837-1919)

Grandson of a village priest; son of the renowned historian and geographer Professor Konstantin I. Arsen'ev (1789-1865). — Studied at the Imperial Law School in St. Petersburg; 1864-1865 studied philosophy, history and economy in Bonn, Germany. Began career as a civil servant in the Ministry of Justice until 1863. From 1866 lawyer in St. Petersburg. In legal service again from 1874-1882 (Senate Court of Cassation). Freelance journalist from 1882; wrote mainly in the liberal periodical *Vestnik Evropy*; editor-in-chief from 1909. — Journalistic work from 1858. Active in the Literary Fund from 1863, member of the Juridical Society at the University of St. Petersburg, 1900-1903 Vice President of the Free Economic Society, member of the Academy of Sciences from 1900. Maintained a famous literary-political salon in St. Petersburg. Held numerous public offices, zemstvo deputy in St. Petersburg, 1904-1906 deputy on the St. Petersburg Municipal Duma. Took part in the zemstvo congresses in 1904-1905. Co-founder in 1906 of the Party of Democratic Reform.

BELOKONSKIJ, Ivan Petrovich (1855-1931)

Born into a noble family in Chernigov; father was a physician. — Educated at the gymnasium in Chernigov; later went to lectures in Kiev and Odessa Universities but did not graduate. Began his career on the strength of his convictions as a *Volksschule* teacher (Kiev and Podolia Provinces). Zemstvo statistician from 1886 in Orel, then in Kursk. 1899-1901 Secretary of the Khar'kov zemstvo. From 1901 freelance journalist and editor of various provincial newspapers. — Took part in the populist movement during his schooldays. From 1875 on the staff of numerous metropolitan and provincial journals and newspapers. Arrested in 1879 on account of populist propaganda and banished to Siberia until 1886. Continued his journalistic work there. In zemstvo service after his return. Member of the Literary Fund, the Writers Union, the Free Economic Society, the Juridical Societies in Moscow, Khar'kov, etc. Was one of the 'friends' of *Osvobozhdenie* from the beginning; member of the Union of Liberation; joined the Cadet Party in 1905. Wrote a history of the zemstvo movement.

BOGUCHARSKIJ (= Yakovlev), Vasilij Yakovlevich (1861-1915)

Born in Boguchar, Voronezh Province; son of a civil servant. — Gymnasium in Voronezh, military training. Cossack officer 1880-1884. Journalist from 1890. — 1880-1883 participant in a populist circle in the army; arrested for this reason in 1884, cashiered from the army and exiled to Siberia. Under constant police

surveillance after his return in 1890. Connections with many revolutionary and oppositional circles, at first in Voronezh, then in Moscow, from 1897 in St. Petersburg. 1893–1894 active in the People's Rights Party. Turn to marxism from 1895; won Struve's friendship. On the staff of various legal marxist journals. From 1900 diverse works on the history of the revolutionary movement in the 19th century. One of the leaders of the Petersburg Writers Union. In 1901–1902 organizer of the first groups of 'friends' of *Osvobozhdenie*. Took part in the Schaffhausen Conference in 1903. Member of the Union of Liberation Council from January 1904. At the end of 1905 together with Prokopovich and E. Kuskova in the '*Bez zaglaviya, levee KD*' group. Was abroad from 1909–1913. 1914–1915 Secretary of the Free Economic Society.

Literature: V. Kranikhfeld, 'V. Ya. Yakovlev-Bogucharskij', *Byloe*, 1917 No. 1 and 2; E. Kuskova, 'Pamyati zhivoj dushi', *Golos Minuvshago*, 1915 No. 7–8.

BULGAKOV, Sergej Nikolaevich (1871–1944)

Born in Livnyj (Orel Province); son of a priest. – Did not complete ecclesiastical seminary, moved to the classical gymnasium in Eletsk (Orel Province). Graduated from the Department of Law at the University of Moscow (1894); masters degree in political economy (1897), followed by studies abroad. 1894–1897 reader of economy in Moscow, 1901 professor at the Polytechnical Institute in Kiev, 1906 lecturer at the University of Moscow. In 1918 he became a priest; professor at the Russian Theological Institute in emigration in Paris from 1922–1944. – Bulgakov became an atheist during the ecclesiastical seminary; found his way to marxism and joined the marxism-populism dispute with his masters dissertation and public lectures. Friend of P. Struve, worked for legal marxist journals. Together with Struve, turned to neo-Kantianism, then under the influence of V. Solov'ev developed towards a religious mysticism. Took part in the Schaffhausen Conference in 1903; author of the first programmatic article on the agrarian question in *Osvobozhdenie*. Member of the Union of Liberation Council from 1904. Member of the Cadet Party from the end of 1905, member of the Second Duma. Involved with the anthology 'Vekhi' in 1909.

Literature: Kindersley, *The First Russian Revisionists* (1962).

BUNAKOV, Nikolaj Fedorovich (1837–1904)

Completed his education at the gymnasium in Vologda in 1851. *Volksschule* teacher in Vologda Province; worked at the same time on statistical projects. Went to St. Petersburg in the 1860s and sat the gymnasium teacher examinations. Teacher at the Voronezh gymnasium in 1866; founded a private *Volksschule* in 1867. In 1879 he left this service and settled in a village near Voronezh to devote himself to education among the peasants. – Worked for a long time on a union of teachers in Russia. From 1873–1901 director of summer refresher courses for teachers in various provinces. Author of authoritative works on educational reform. Zemstvo deputy in Voronezh for many years. In 1902 spoke in the Voronezh Committee of the Special Conference on the Needs of Agriculture in favour of participation 'by the country' in national administration. For this he was banished, like the zemstvo doctor Martynov. He died in 1904 in exile.

VON DEHN, Vladimir Eduardovich (1867–?)

Born in St. Petersburg of a noble Baltic family. – Gymnasium in St. Petersburg and Moscow (1885); graduated from the Department of Law at Moscow University (1890); studied in Germany 1891–1893. Masters degree 1894. Thereafter

civil servant in the Ministry of Finance. Teacher at the Moscow School of Commerce in 1896, lecturer at Moscow University 1898, professor of economic geography at the St. Petersburg Polytechnical Institute in 1902. — Possibly belonged to the Petrunkevich circle in Moscow; took part in 1902 in the programme discussions for *Osvobozhdenie*; May 1903 member of the Finland Committee; member of the Union of Liberation, co-opted to the Union Council in January 1904.

DOLGORUKOV, Pavel Dmitrievich, Prince (1866–1927)

Twin brother of Peter D., descendant of Rurik. Father was an officer, mother a born Countess Orlova-Davydova, daughter of one of the biggest landowners in the Empire. His older brother Nikolaj, who died young, was a student friend of P.N. Milyukov. — Educated at the Fiedler *Realschule* in Moscow; studied the natural sciences at Moscow University (1889). 1889–1890 civil servant in the chancellery of the State Council. From 1890 he administered the family estate Volynshchina near Moscow. — In 1892 he organized the famine relief in Samara Province, location of his mother's estates. 1893–1908 district Marshal of the Nobility in Ruza (Moscow Province); chairman of the economic council of the Moscow zemstvo. President of the Moscow Society of Teachers, founder and President of the Moscow Peace Society. Founder of *Beseda* in 1899. Contributor to *Osvobozhdenie*, member of the Union of Liberation and of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists. In 1904 official representative of the Red Cross in the Far East; correspondent of the newspaper *Russkiya Vedomosti*. From October 1905 to 1911 chairman of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party, 1911–1918 vice chairman. Member of the Second Duma, chairman of the Cadet fraction. Emigrated in 1918, but returned to Soviet Russia twice illegally; arrested there in 1927 and shot as a counter-revolutionary.

Literature: P.D. Dolgorukov, *Velikaya razrukha* (1964)

DOLGORUKOV, Peter Dmitrievich, Prince (1866–c.1945)

Twin brother of Pavel D. — Classical gymnasium in Moscow; graduated from the Department of History and Philosophy at Moscow University. Military service from 1889–1890. From 1890 he administered his estates in Kursk Province. — Chairman of the district zemstvo board in Sudzha (Kursk Province); removed from office in 1902 due to the incidents in the local committee of the Special Conference on the Needs of Agriculture. Co-founder of *Beseda* (1899) and of *Osvobozhdenie* (1902); took part in the Schaffhausen Conference (1903). May 1903 member of the Finland Committee; Member of the Union of Liberation Council from January 1904; treasurer of the Union and one of the four travel agents of the Union Council. 1904–1905 member of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists and of the Central Office of the Zemstvo Congresses. On the Central Committee of the Cadet Party from October 1905. Member of the First Duma; signatory of the Vyborg Manifesto. Sentenced in the Vyborg proceedings to three months prison and withdrawal of eligibility for election, excluded from the Kursk nobility. Restoration of his former rights in 1909, return to zemstvo service. Emigrated in 1918.

GEJDEN, Peter Alexandrovich, Count (1940–1907)

Of naturalized Dutch lineage. Grandfather was Military Governor of Reval in Napoleonic times. — Educated in the Page Corps. 1858 officer; studied at the Mikhail Artillery Academy (1860). Resigned his commission in 1860. In judicial

service from 1866, judge at the St. Petersburg Court of Law; 1886–1890 headed the Emperor's Office of Petitions; resigned from the Court due to differences. — Zemstvo deputy in Pskov from 1883; district Marshal of the Nobility from 1895. 1895–1907 President of the Free Economic Society. Member of *Beseda* and of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists, took part in the zemstvo Congresses in 1902 and 1904–1905. In 1906 an Octobrist at first, member of the First Duma; in the middle of 1906 founded the Party of Peaceful Renovation along with N.N. L'vov, D.N. Shipov and M.A. Stakhovich.

Literature: Trudy Imp. Vol'nago Ekonomicheskago Obshchestva, 1907 No. 6.

GESSEN, Iosif Vladimirovich (1866–1943)

Born in Odessa of a Jewish family; very limited circumstances; cousin of the jurist Vladimir M. Gessen. — Studied jurisprudence at the Universities of Odessa and St. Petersburg (1889). Following the final examinations he was not admitted to prepare for his professorship, because as a student he had been banned for three years for political reasons. 1890–1893 in legal service in Tula, 1893–1902 in the Ministry of the Interior. Lawyer in St. Petersburg from 1903. — Co-founder of the periodical *Pravo* in 1898, took over the chief editorship; organized the *Beseda* editions. Took part in the 'culinary banquets' of the St. Petersburg literati. May 1903 member of the Finland Committee; Member of the Union of Liberation, co-opted to the Union Council in January 1904 and October 1904. Co-founder of the Cadet Party in 1905, member of the Central Committee until 1917, worked mainly as editor in the Party press. Member of the Second Duma. In the circle around General Yudenich after 1917; then emigrated.

Literature: I.V. Gessen, V dvukh vekakh (1937).

GOL'TSEV, Viktor Alexandrovich (1850–1906)

Son of a teacher. — Educated on a scholarship at the gymnasium in Tula and the Department of Law at the University of Moscow; 1873 studies in Vienna under Lorenz von Stein. Masters degree 1878. 1878 reader at Odessa University, but on orders from the Administration not allowed to lecture; 1881–1882 reader at Moscow University, dismissed from the post for political reasons. Thereafter journalist. — Was close to the Populists as a student, in 1875, when abroad, wrote an open letter to Peter Lavrov in which he supported a constitutionalist programme. Around 1880 zemstvo deputy in Tver'; took part in the so-called 'First Zemstvo Movement' 1879–1881. Close friend of Ivan Petrunkevich, member of the Moscow Petrunkevich circle in the 1890s. Senior editor of the periodical *Russkaya Mysl'* from 1885. Vice President of the Moscow Juridical Society for some years. Membership in the Union of Liberation cannot be documented. Member of the Cadet Party from October 1905.

GOLOVIN, Fedor Alexandrovich (1867–?)

Came from a family of ancient Moscow nobility. — Educated at the 'Tsesarevich Nikolaj Lyceum' in Moscow, founded by Katkov and Leont'ev, and graduated from the Law Department of Moscow University (1891). Administered his estates, worked in the zemstvo. In the railway business in 1910. — Zemstvo deputy from 1892; provincial zemstvo board member, Moscow Province from 1898, board chairman from 1904–1906 (D.N. Shipov's successor). Member of *Beseda*, of the Union of Liberation and of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists. Headed the Central Office of the Zemstvo Congresses in 1904–1905. Joined the Cadet Party in October 1905, member of the Central Committee from April 1906. Member

of the Second and the Third Duma, President of the Second Duma. Resigned his seat in 1910. Elected Mayor of Baku in 1912, not confirmed in office due to Cadet Party membership. Active in the All-Russian Union of Towns during World War I. 1917 Commissar of the Provisional Government for the Ministry of the Court.

GREVS, Ivan Mikhajlovich (1860-1941)

Came from a propertied family in Voronezh Province, his ancestors came from England (Greaves). — Graduated from the Department of History and Philosophy at St. Petersburg University; 1890-1892, 1894-1896 studies in Paris and Rome. Masters degree 1900. Worked initially as a gymnasium teacher, lecturer at St. Petersburg University from 1889, professor in university courses for women (*Bestuzhevskie Kursy*) from 1892. Dismissed from the University in 1899 in connection with student unrest, returned to gymnasium teaching, 1902 reinstated as lecturer. — Together with Shakhovskoj and others G. belonged to the student scientific-literary society in St. Petersburg (1883). Committed reform educationalist (excursion and seminar method in university education). Probably a member of the Writers Union; took part in the 'culinary banquets' in 1902-1904; took part in the Schaffhausen Conference in 1903, member of the Union of Liberation and of the Cadet Party.

GUREVICH, Yakov Yakovlevich (1869-?)

Son of the famous reform educationalist Yakov G. Gurevich. — Graduated from the Department of Physics and Mathematics at St. Petersburg University. Gymnasium teacher in St. Petersburg from 1901, following his father's death in 1906 director of the Gurevich Private Gymnasium; taught at the Teachers Academy. — 1898-1904 zemstvo deputy in Tula; member of the St. Petersburg Writers Union, took part in the 'culinary banquets', contributor to *Osvobozhdenie*, member of the Union of Liberation. Member of the Cadet Party in 1906.

KHIZHNYAKOV, Vasilij Vasil'evich (1871-1949)

Son of the famous zemstvo activist V.M. Khizhnyakov (1842-1917), former Mayor of Chernigov and also an active participant in the constitutionalist movement. — Educated at the gymnasium in Chernigov and the Imperial Military Medical Academy in St. Petersburg (1894). 1894-1901 zemstvo doctor in Saratov, Poltava, Cherson and St. Petersburg. Gave up his profession in 1901. 1903-1910 full-time Secretary of the Free Economic Society; employed in the Moscow provincial zemstvo from 1910. — Active in the People's Rights Party 1893-1894. Member of the Writers Union, took part in the 'culinary banquets' in 1902-1904, contributor to *Osvobozhdenie*, member of the Union of Liberation Council from January 1904. On the editorial board of the left-wing liberal paper *Nasha zhizn'* from 1905-1906. Elected to the Central Committee of the Cadet Party in October 1905, did not accept election, joined the '*Bez zaglaviya*' group. Thereafter active in the co-operative movement. Deputy to the Minister of the Interior in the Provisional Government in 1917.

KHOMYAKOV, Nikolaj Alexeevich (1850-1925)

Son of the Slavophile philosopher Alexej Khomyakov. Of noble lineage, with estates in Smolensk Province. — Graduated in law (1874). Administered his estates, participated in railway concessions in the East; 1896-1902 department director in the Ministry of Agriculture. District Marshal of the Nobility from

1880, 1886–1896 provincial Marshal of the Nobility in Smolensk Province, in 1902 district Marshal of the Nobility. Together with Shipov, leading in the 1890s in the attempt to unite the zemstvo movement in the Slavophile tradition. Member of *Beseda*, participant in the May Congress in 1902. 1904–1905 official representative of the Red Cross at the front in Manchuria. Elected to the State Council in 1906, soon resigned his seat. Member of the Second and Third Duma, President of the Third Duma until 1910, Octobrist.

KIZEVETTER, Alexander Alexandrovich (1866–1933)

Born in St. Petersburg, brought up in Orenburg; son of a high-ranking civil servant. – Gymnasium education (1884), graduated from the Department of History and Philosophy at Moscow University (1888); masters degree 1893. 1893–1903 gymnasium teacher, at the same time lecturer at Moscow University from 1900; 1909 doctoral dissertation, appointed professor of history at Moscow University in 1910, appointment not confirmed by the Minister. Left the University, in 1912 entered the company publishing *Russkiya Vedomosti*, journalistic work and lectures at the private Shanyavskij People's University, at the Institute of Commerce and for the women's university courses. – Active in the 1890s in the popular education movement (Literacy Committee, adult education), journalistic work mainly published in Gol'tsev's *Russkaya Mysl'*, *Russkoe Bogatstvo*, etc. Took part in 1902 in the programme discussions for *Osvobozhdenie*, member of the Union of Liberation and of the Cadet Party. Member of the Second Duma. Permanent contributor to *Russkiya Vedomosti*; in 1907 he took over with Struve the editorial work of the periodical *Russkaya Mysl'*.

KOKOSHKIN, Fedor Fedorovich (1871–1918)

Member of the lower-ranking Moscow nobility; grandfather was director of the Imperial Theatre in Moscow, father was a peasant commissioner in Lublin Province. Following his father's early death, his mother provided for the family as head mistress of a gymnasium for girls in Vladimir provincial zemstvo. – Educated at the gymnasium and graduated from the Department of Law at Moscow University (1893); masters degree in 1897, studied in Heidelberg under Jellinek until 1899. Lecturer at Moscow University 1900, dismissed 1911. Thereafter lectures at the Shanyavskij People's University and for the women's university courses. – Zemstvo deputy in Moscow from 1897, member of the provincial board in 1903. Also briefly in the Moscow municipal administration. Member of *Beseda*, of the Union of Liberation and of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists. Together with Muromtsev, played an authoritative part in the drafting of the Union of Liberation's programme and constitution. 1904–1905 in the Central Office of the Zemstvo Congresses. Member of the Central Committee of the Cadet Party from October 1905. Member of the First Duma, signatory of the Vyborg Manifesto. Sentenced in the Vyborg proceedings to three months prison and withdrawal of eligibility for election, dismissed from the Moscow Assembly of the Nobility. State comptroller in the Provisional Government in July–August 1917, arrested in October and murdered in the prison hospital in January 1918.

KORNILOV, Alexander Alexandrovich (1862–1925)

Graduated from St. Petersburg University. Peasant commissioner in Poland, thereafter civil servant under the Governor General of Irkutsk until 1900. Journalistic work, 1906–1909 Secretary of the Cadet Party Central Committee. Reader of history at the St. Petersburg Polytechnical Institute from 1909. –

1892 active in famine relief in Tambov, Tula and Voronezh Provinces; belonged to the Petrunkevich circle in Moscow. Following the Kazan Square demonstration (4th March 1901) banishment to Saratov, where he edited a provincial newspaper. Editorial assistant to Struve in Paris in 1904. Member of the Union of Liberation, co-opted to the Union Council in October 1904. Took part in the 1904-1905 zemstvo Congresses. On the Central Committee of the Cadet Party from October 1905. Author of important works on the reforms of Alexander II and on the 'public movement' in the 1860s.

KOTLYAREVSKIĬ, Sergej Andreevich (1873-1940)

Graduated from the Department of History and Philosophy at Moscow University; masters degree in history 1901, doctoral dissertation 1904; then as an extramural student passed the diploma examinations of the Department of Law, Master and Doctor of Public Law. 1901 lecturer of history at Moscow University, later professor of public law there. — Zemstvo deputy in Saratov Province. Member of *Beseda*, took part in the founding of *Osvobozhdenie* and in the 1903 Schaffhausen Conference; member of the Union of Liberation, co-opted to Union Council in January 1904. Took part in the 1904-1905 zemstvo Congresses. On the Central Committee of the Cadet Party from October 1905. Member of the First Duma, signatory of the Vyborg Manifesto. Sentenced in the Vyborg proceedings to three months prison and withdrawal of eligibility for election. Belonged to the right wing of the Cadet Party; involved in the anthology '*Vekhi*' (1909). In 1917 commissar of the Provisional Government for non-orthodox religions. Sentenced to five years prison in 1920 in the proceedings against the so-called 'Tactical Centre'. Thereafter worked again in the Institute of Soviet Law in the University of Moscow.

KOVALEVSKIĬ, Nikolaj Nikolaevich (1860-?)

Graduated from Khar'kov University. Large landowner in Khar'kov Province. — Zemstvo deputy in Khar'kov, leader of the opposition in the provincial zemstvo. Member of *Beseda*, took part in the Schaffhausen Conference. Member of the Union of Liberation Council in January 1904; member of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists, took part in the 1904-1905 zemstvo Congresses. In the Cadet Party from October 1905; member of the First Duma, signatory of the Vyborg Manifesto.

KUSKOVA, Ekaterina Dmitrievna, née Esipova (1869-1958)

Daughter of a civil servant from Saratov. — Attended the university for women in Moscow from 1892-94, continued studying in Brussels and Berlin. At the end of 1904 editor of the left-wing liberal paper *Nasha zhizn'* in St. Petersburg. — Associated initially in populist circles, turned to marxism at the beginning of the 1890s. In 1892 in the Marxist A.I. Ryazanov's circle in Moscow, which was also open to Liberals such as P.I. Kuskov, E.K.'s husband, and A.N. Maksimov, and to Populists such as Viktor Chernov. The circle developed into the People's Rights Party in 1893. When the party was suppressed, K. and her companion S.N. Prokopovich escaped abroad; both studied the European labour movement in Brussels and Berlin, and made contacts with the Liberation of Labour group in Geneva, with which they broke in the revisionism dispute. Return to Russia in 1899; K. wrote the so-called 'Credo', a rejection of the political struggle of the working class. After the turn of the century close contact in St. Petersburg with Struve, Bogucharskij and the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* group, active in the Writers

Union and in the 'culinary committee'. Co-founder of *Osvobozhdenie*, organized transport of the periodical over the Finnish border. Took part in the Schaffhausen Conference in 1903, member of the Union of Liberation. Involved in the Union of Unions and the trade union movement in 1905. Together with Bogucharskij, Prokopovich and others, formed the *Bez zaglaviya* group at the end of 1905.

Literature: G. Aronson, 'E.D. Kuskova', *Novyj Zhurnal*, No. 37 (1954); S. Galai, *Liberation Movement*, passim.

LUTUGIN, Leonid Ivanovich (1864-1915)

Graduated from the St. Petersburg Institute of Mining. Worked in governmental mining administration; 1897-1907 professor of geology at the St. Petersburg Institute of Mining. — Leading member of the Imperial Russian Technical Society and of the Free Economic Society. Took part in 1902 in the 'culinary banquets'. Contributor to *Osvobozhdenie*; member of the Union of Liberation, co-opted to the Union Council in October 1904. 1904-1905 organizer of the All-Russian Union of Engineers and Technicians and of the All-Russian Union of Academicians, prominent in the Central Office of the Union of Unions up to its dissolution in 1906. Supported the general strike called for in November 1905 by the St. Petersburg soviet. Took part in the founding congress of the Cadet Party in October 1905 but did not become a party member. Unsuccessfully stood as a candidate for the *Trudoviki* in the elections for the Third Duma in 1907.

Literature: S.D. Kirpichnikov, 'L.I. Lutugin i Soyuz Soyuzov', *Byloe*, 1925 No. 6, pp. 134-146.

L'VOV, Nikolaj Nikolaevich (1867-1944)

Large landowner of ancient noble lineage in Saratov Province. — Graduated from the Department of Law at Moscow University in 1891. — 1893-1900 Marshal of the Nobility in Saratov, from 1899 chairman of the Saratov provincial zemstvo board. Member of *Beseda*; co-founder of *Osvobozhdenie*, participant in the 1903 Schaffhausen Conference, member of the Union of Liberation Council in January 1904; member of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists, took part in the 1904-1905 zemstvo Congresses. On the Cadet Party Central Committee from October 1905; member of the First Duma. Left the Party in Summer 1906 due to differences on the agrarian question, amnesty of political prisoners and because of the Vyborg Manifesto. Co-founder of the Party of Peaceful Renovation. Leading member of the Progressive Party in 1912. Member of the Third and the Fourth Duma. Emigrated after 1917.

MAKLAKOV, Vasilij Alexeevich (1870-1957)

Born in Moscow of a noble family, son of a professor of ophthalmology; a brother was Minister of the Interior from 1913-1915. — Educated at the 5th Moscow Gymnasium; studied first the natural sciences, then history from 1890 in Moscow. Since he was not admitted to a university career for political reasons, he took the examinations of the Department of Law as an extramural student. Worked as a lawyer in Moscow from 1895. — 1887-1890 active in the student movement, relegated twice. As a lawyer, M. belonged to the group of young Moscow advocates who organized legal aid for peasants and politicalized criminal proceedings; appeared as defence lawyer in numerous political trials. Came into contact with the zemstvo movement through the Zvenigorod (Moscow Province) local committee to the Special Conference on the Needs of Agriculture. 1904 member and permanent secretary of *Beseda*; very probably also a member of the Union of

Liberation. In 1905 leading in the All-Russian Union of Lawyers. On the Central Committee of the Cadet Party from October 1905. Defence lawyer in the Vyborg proceedings in 1906. Member of the Second, Third and Fourth Duma, one of the chief speakers of the Cadet fraction. In February 1917 member of the Provisional Executive Committee of the Duma, in July ambassador of the Provisional Government in Paris. Emigrated after 1918.

Literature: G. Adamovich, *Vasilij Alekseevich Maklakov* (1959); D.A. Davies, 'V.A. Maklakov and the Westernizer Tradition in Russia' in Timberlake, *Essays on Russian Liberalism* (1972), pp. 78–89.

MAKSIMOV, Alexander Nikolaevich (1872–?)

Born in Orel Province, son of a priest. — Educated at the gymnasium in Orel, did not complete studies at Moscow University. Worked as journalist and ethnographer. — In 1892 in the Marxist A.I. Ryazanov's circle in Moscow, which turned into the People's Rights Party. Arrested in 1894 and banished to Archangel'sk for three years; had therefore to discontinue his studies. Journalistic work from 1892, contributor to the Encyclopaedia Granat, permanent contributor to *Rus-skiya Vedomosti* from 1902 (Petersburg correspondent of the paper), later member of the company publishing the paper. Took part in the 'culinary banquets'. Member of the Union of Liberation, in the Union Council from January 1904. Took part in the 1904–1905 zemstvo Congresses. Member of the Cadet Party, on the Party's Central Committee from 1905 to 1907.

MUROMTSEV, Sergej Andreevich (1850–1910)

Born in St. Petersburg; son of a Guards officer, of ancient noble lineage with moderate estates. — Educated at the 3rd Moscow Gymnasium, graduated from the Department of Law at Moscow University (1871). 1872 studies in Göttingen under Jhering and in Leipzig. 1875 masters degree in Roman Law, 1877 doctoral dissertation. 1875 lecturer, 1877 professor at Moscow University, 1881 vice chancellor. Dismissed in 1884 for political reasons. Thereafter lawyer. — Connected with the zemstvo movement from 1871, 1879–1881 member of the Moscow Municipal Duma and of the Moscow zemstvo. Editor of *Yuridicheskij Vestnik* from 1878, journal of the Moscow Juridical Society, of which M. became President in 1880. Participation in the constitutionalist movement from 1879–81 (connections with Petrunkevich). Retired from politics after 1884, continued to work only in the Juridical Society. Again zemstvo and Municipal Duma member from 1899; exercised great influence in the Moscow municipal administration. He sought contact with the constitutionalist movement only at the end of 1904; member of the Union of Liberation, played a considerable part in consultations on the Union's programme and draft constitution. Participant, often also president of the 1904–1905 zemstvo Congresses. On the Central Committee of the Cadet Party from October 1905. Member of the First Duma, first Russian President of Parliament. Signatory of the Vyborg Manifesto. Sentenced in the Vyborg proceedings to three months prison and withdrawal of eligibility for election, excluded from Moscow nobility. Thereafter internal Party work.

Literature: S.A. Muromtsev. *Sbornik statej* (1911).

MYAKOTIN, Venedikt Alexandrovich (1867–1937)

Educated at the gymnasium in Kronstadt, graduated from the Department of History and Philosophy at St. Petersburg University. Gymnasium teacher and reader of history at the Imperial Alexander Lyceum as well as at the Military

Academy of Law in Petersburg (until 1901). Thereafter journalist. — Constant contributor to *Russkoe Bogatstvo* from 1897, 1904 full-time member of the staff. Close friend of Peshekhonov, Korolenko and Mikhajlovskij. Introduced Milyukov to the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* circle in 1900. Arrested in 1901 and banished from St. Petersburg and all university towns until the end of 1904. Lived partly in Finland, partly in Novgorod Province. Maintained close contacts with the Socialist Revolutionary Party, but at the same time contributed to *Osvobozhdenie* and member of the Union of Liberation. Co-founder of the People's Socialist Party in 1906.

NABOKOV, Vladimir Dmitrievich (1870–1922)

Came from a wealthy family in the St. Petersburg nobility, son of the Minister of Justice (1878–1885). Married E.I. Rukavishnikova, daughter of an industrialist; father of the Russo-American novelist Vladimir Nabokov. — Graduated from the Department of Law at St. Petersburg University (1892), then studied in Germany. 1890 service in the chancellery of the State Council, appointed Chamberlain. 1896–1904 reader of criminal law at the Imperial School of Law in Petersburg. — 1899 editor of the periodical *Pravo*; 1903 member of the Petersburg Municipal Duma. Member of the Union of Liberation, co-opted to the Union Council in June 1905. For political reasons lost his readership in 1904 and the title of chamberlain in 1905. On the Central Committee of the Cadet Party from October 1905, editor and principal financier of the Party journal *Vestnik Partii Narodnoj Svobody*. Member of the First Duma, signatory of the Vyborg Manifesto. Sentenced in the Vyborg proceedings to three months prison and withdrawal of eligibility for election; excluded from the Petersburg nobility. Internationally renowned criminologist, President of the Russian section of the International Union of Criminologists from 1905. 1917 head of the chancellery in the Provisional Government, 1919 Minister of Justice in the 'white' Crimean Government. Then emigrated. Shot and killed by right-wing extremist emigrants in Berlin in 1922.

NOVGORODTSEV, Pavel Ivanovich (1866–?)

Born in Bakhmut (Ekaterinoslav Province). — Graduated from the Department of Law at Moscow University, followed by studies in Berlin and Paris. 1896 masters degree in public law, 1901 doctoral dissertation. 1896 lecturer, 1904 professor of legal philosophy at the University of Moscow. Gave up professorship in 1906 due to election to the Duma; thereafter again lecturer and director of the Moscow Institute of Commerce. — In the Petrunkevich circle in the 1890s; involved in the programme discussions for *Osvobozhdenie* in 1902, took part in the 1903 Schaffhausen Conference, member of the Union of Liberation, co-opted to the Union Council in January and October 1904. Cadet Party member in 1905, on the Central Committee from March 1906. Member of the First Duma, signatory of the Vyborg Manifesto. Sentenced in the Vyborg proceedings to three months prison and withdrawal of eligibility for election.

NOVOSIL'TSEV, Yuriy Alexandrovich (1853–?)

Of ancient noble lineage originating in Lithuania, resident in Tambov Province, with a town house in Moscow; son-in-law of the Moscow Mayor Prince Shcherbatov, related by marriage to V.M. Petrovo-Solovovo. — No details of education or profession — district Marshal of the Nobility in Temnikovo (Tambov Province); member of *Beseda*; in November 1903 founded the so-called 'Novosil'tsev Con-

gresses', from which the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists emerged. Took part in the 1904–1905 zemstvo Congresses. Probably a Cadet Party member in 1905.

OL'DENBURG, Fedor Fedorovich (1861–1914)

Born of an ancient noble family which immigrated from Germany in the times of Peter I. — Graduated from the Department of History and Philosophy at St. Petersburg University. Declined the offer of a university career in favour of practical educational work. School commissioner in the provincial zemstvo in Tver' Province. — Together with his brother Sergej (later professor of oriental studies), Shakhovskoj and Vernadskij, he founded a student scientific-literary society in St. Petersburg in 1881. Friend of Petrunkevich, belonged to his circle in the 1890s. Contributor to *Osvobozhdenie*, member of the Union of Liberation. Cadet Party member from 1905, chairman of Tver' Province committee.

PERELESHIN, Dmitrij Alexandrovich (1862–1935)

Educated at the gymnasium in Moscow; sent down from the University (Department of Law) in 1884. — Arrested in 1884 for taking part in an event organized by the People's Will Party, imprisoned for two years in the Peter & Paul Fortress. Banished in 1886 to Siberia for three years. Zemstvo deputy in Voronezh from 1890, member of the provincial zemstvo board from 1899. Took part in the zemstvo Congresses in 1902 and 1904–1905. In 1902 came forward with radical demands in the Voronezh local committee to the Special Conference and thereby lost his zemstvo post. Member of the Union of Liberation, in the Cadet Party from October 1905, member of the Party provincial committee in Voronezh. Member of the Second Duma.

PESHEKHONOV, Alexej Vasil'evich (1867–1933)

Born in Tver' Province, son of a priest. Father died soon after, leaving a wife and six children. — Attended the ecclesiastical seminary in Tver', relegated in 1885 due to a populist pamphlet. Took private tuition. Became *Volksschule* teacher in the Telshi district (Kovno Province); 1887 assistant in a *Realschule* in Warsaw. After military service, found a post through Shakhovskoj's mediation as statistician in the Ves'egonsk zemstvo (Tver' Province); 1893–1898 zemstvo statistician in Orel, Kaluga and Poltava. On Annenskij's invitation, he took over the chronicle of domestic politics in *Russkoe Bogatstvo* in 1899 and became one of the literati. Formally editor of *Russkoe Bogatstvo* from 1904. — Associated in populist circles as early as his seminary days. Small journalistic contributions from 1890, in 1893 his first article appeared in *Vestnik Evropy*. In 1894 involved in the wave of arrests concerning the People's Rights Party, although not a Party member. Involved in the Writers Union in St. Petersburg from 1899. Banished from St. Petersburg following the Kazan Square demonstration (4th March 1901). On the 'culinary committee' from 1902. Maintained contact with the Socialist Revolutionary Party; at the same time co-founder and contributor to *Osvobozhdenie*; member of the Union of Liberation Council from January to October 1904. 1905 active in the All-Russian Peasants Union. 1906 co-founder of the People's Socialist Party. 1917 Minister of Food in the 2nd Kerenskij cabinet. Deported from Soviet Russia in 1921.

PETROVO-SOLOVOVO, Vasilij Mikhajlovich (1850–1908)

Large landowner in Tambov Province; residential property in Moscow. —

Graduated from Moscow University. — Zemstvo deputy; district Marshal of the Nobility for Tambov. Member of *Beseda*, contributor to *Osvobozhdenie*, probably also member of the Union of Liberation. Belonged to the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists; took part in the 1904–1905 zemstvo Congresses. Octobrist after October 1905. Member of the Third Duma.

PETRUNKEVICH, Ivan Il'ich (1844–1928)

Born in Chernigov Province of a noble, propertied family which was very open to the ideas of the reform period. — Educated in the Kiev Cadet Corps. Graduated from St. Petersburg University (1867). After studying, settled in the Borzna district (Chernigov Province) and devoted himself entirely to 'public activity'. — Zemstvo deputy from 1868. With a small group of friends tried to establish liberal principles in zemstvo activities. Initiator in 1878/79 of the so-called 'First Zemstvo Movement'; pursued the objective of putting pressure on the government and forcing it to political reforms through co-ordinated political demands from the largest possible number of zemstvo assemblies and support from the press. Arrested in April 1879 and exiled to Kostroma until 1886. Shortly after his return, deported from the area of the Kiev governor-generalship. Settled first in Tver', then in Moscow from 1890. There, together with V.I. Vernadskij, he collected a circle of Constitutionalists about him which came forward in the 1890s with various initiatives (famine relief, zemstvo unity, the address campaign in 1895, etc.). He bought an estate in the Novotorzhok district (Tver' Province); again zemstvo deputy from 1891. First contacts with Struve in 1900. The idea of founding *Osvobozhdenie* originated from the Petrunkevich circle in 1901. P. took part in the programme discussions in 1902; participant in the Schaffhausen Conference, chairman of the Council of the Union of Liberation from January 1904. Deported from Tver' Province at the beginning of 1904, stayed sometimes abroad, sometimes in the Crimea until his deportation was revoked. Played a considerable part in the organization of the zemstvo Congresses from the end of 1904; member of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists. Co-founder of the Cadet Party, on the Central Committee from October 1905, chairman of the Central Committee 1911–1915. Member of the First Duma, signatory of the Vyborg Manifesto. Sentenced in the Vyborg proceedings to three months prison and withdrawal of eligibility for election. Thereafter Party work, publisher of the Party newspaper *Rech'*. Emigrated in 1918.

Literature: I.I. Petrunkevich, *Iz zapisok obshchestvennago deyatelya* (1934); F.I. Rodichev, 'The Veteran of Russian Liberalism', *Slavonic Review*, Vol. 7 (1928); C.E. Timberlake, 'Ivan Il'ich Petrunkevich' in Timberlake (ed.), *Essays on Russian Liberalism* (1972).

PETRUNKEVICH, Mikhail Il'ich (1845–1912)

Brother of Ivan P. — Graduated from the Medico-Surgical Academy (later the Military Medical Academy) in Petersburg (1872). Landowner in Tver' Province. Zemstvo doctor from 1873; from 1898 factory director in St. Petersburg. — Zemstvo deputy in Tver' from 1873; involved in the 'First Zemstvo Movement' 1878–1881 and in the phrasing of the Tver' address in 1894; belonged to the Petrunkevich circle. Also member of the St. Petersburg Municipal Duma from 1898. Member of the Union of Liberation, co-opted to the Union Council in January 1904. Cadet Party member from October 1905. Member of the First Duma, signatory of the Vyborg Manifesto.

PROKOPOVICH, Sergej Nikolaevich (1871–1955)

Born in Tsarskoe Selo. — Educated at the *Realschule* in Smolensk; studied at the Agricultural Academy in Petrovskoe near Moscow (did not graduate), 1894–1899 studies in Brussels and Berlin, 1913 doctoral dissertation at Bern University, Switzerland. Journalist. — Was initially a Populist, then turned to marxism. In Ryazanov's circle in Moscow in 1892, which developed into the People's Rights Party in 1893–1894. Escaped abroad with Kuskova in 1894; made contact with the Geneva 'Liberation of Labour' group and other social democratic groups in exile. Criticism of the orthodox Social Democrats from the revisionist standpoint of Eduard Bernstein. 1899 return to Russia. Worked in the Free Economic Society, the Russian Technical Society, the Co-operative Movement. Belonged to the Writers Union; close association with Struve, Bogucharskij and the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* circle. Banished to Mogilev in 1900. Contributor to *Osvobozhdenie*, took part in the Schaffhausen Conference, elected to the Council of the Union of Liberation in January 1904. 1904–1905 active in the Union of Unions and the trade union movement. Did not join the Cadet Party in October 1905 but formed the 'Bez zaglaviya' group with Kuskova, Bogucharskij and others.

RODICHEV, Fedor Izmajlovich (1854–1933)

Born of a family of ancient nobility with estates in Tver' Province since the 16th century. — Graduated from the Department of Law at St. Petersburg University (1876). 1876–1878 volunteer in the war against Turkey. Thereafter administered his considerable estates. Lawyer in St. Petersburg from 1898. — 1878–1890 district Marshal of the Nobility in Ves'egonsk (Tver' Province); zemstvo deputy, his election as chairman of Tver' provincial zemstvo board in 1892 was not confirmed. Played a major part in the constitutional resolutions of the Tver' zemstvo in 1878, 1881 and 1894. Banned from all public activities due to the address in 1894 which instigated the 'senseless dreams' speech by the Tsar. Close friend of Petrunkevich and Shakhovskoj; in the Petrunkevich group in the 1890s. Involved in the foundation of *Osvobozhdenie*, took part in the 1903 Schaffhausen Conference, member of the Union of Liberation and of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists, took part in the 1904–1905 zemstvo Congresses. On the Central Committee of the Cadet Party from January 1906. Member of the Duma for all four legislative periods.

Literature: A. Tyrkova-Vil'yams, 'F.I. Rodichev, 1854–1933', *Novyj Zhurnal*, No. 38 (1954); K.E. McKenzie, 'The Political Faith of Fedor Rodichev' in Timberlake (ed.), *Essays on Russian Liberalism* (1972).

SHAKHOVSKOJ, Dmitrij Ivanovich, Prince (1861–1939)

Born in Yaroslavl'; father was a general of the Guards; grandson of the Decembrist Fedor Petrovich Sh. — Educated at the gymnasium in Warsaw, graduated from the Department of History and Philosophy at Moscow and St. Petersburg Universities (1884). Wanted to become a gymnasium teacher in the provinces, but on Rodichev's invitation entered zemstvo service as head of the zemstvo schools in the Ves'egonsk district (Tver' Province). Administered the family estates in Yaroslavl' Province from 1890. — As a student, together with the Ol'denburg brothers and Vernadskij, founded the student scientific-literary society in St. Petersburg. Strongly influenced by Ivan Aksakov, but also by Western constitutionalist theories. Close friendship with Rodichev and Petrunkevich from the Ves'egonsk days. Zemstvo deputy in Yaroslavl' from 1889. Gradually got rid of the heavily indebted family estates after 1890, selling the land to peasants and

maintaining only the quantity necessary for franchise eligibility. Settled in the town of Yaroslavl'. Founded a provincial newspaper; active in the Moscow Literacy Committee; involved in the 1894 address campaign. Member of the Petrunkevich group and of *Beseda*. Besides Bogucharskij, most important mediator in the founding of *Osvobozhdenie* in 1901-1902. Took part in the 1903 Schaffhausen Conference, member of the Union of Liberation Council from January 1904, member of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists and of the Central Office of the zemstvo Congresses. 1905 also active in the Union of Unions. On the Central Committee of the Cadet Party from October 1905, author of the Party statutes. Member of the First Duma, Secretary of the Executive Committee; signatory of the Vyborg Manifesto; sentenced in the Vyborg proceedings to three months prison and withdrawal of eligibility for election. After 1913 active mainly in the Co-operative Movement. Minister of Supplies in the 2nd L'vov cabinet. Remained in Russia after 1917; worked in Soviet co-operatives and undertook literary research. Fell victim to the Stalinist purges.

SHIPOV, Dmitrij Nikolaevich (1851-1920)

Came from a family in the Moscow nobility. Landowner in the Volokolamsk district (Moscow Province). — Graduated from the Department of Law at St. Petersburg University. — Zemstvo deputy from 1877, 1891 chairman of the Volokolamsk district zemstvo board, 1893-1904 chairman of the provincial zemstvo board for Moscow Pvince. Strived for rationalization of zemstvo work in the 1890s and for an all-Russian union of zemstvos. Member of *Beseda*; leader of the non-constitutionalist wing of the zemstvo movement and opponent of Petrunkevich from 1901. Initiator of the May Congress in 1902, chairman of the zemstvo Congress in November 1904, at which the majority voted for a constitutional order and a legislative parliament. Shipov led the minority which wanted popular representation only at the advisory level. Co-founder and first chairman of the Union of the 17th of October (Octobrists), left the party in September 1906 due to differences with A.I. Guchkov. Together with Count Gejden, N.N. L'vov and M.A. Stakhovich, founded the Party of Peaceful Renovation. 1906-1909 elected by the Moscow zemstvo to the State Council. Retired from political life in 1911.

STAKHOVICH, Alexander Alexandrovich (1858-1915)

Brother of Mikhail S. — Military training, officer until 1895. — 1895-1904 district Marshal of the Nobility in Elets (Orel Province); involved in the popular education movement, contributor to several progressive journals. Member of *Beseda*, of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists and of the Union of Liberation. Took part in the 1904-1905 zemstvo Congresses. In the Cadet Party from the end of 1905. Member of the Second Duma.

STAKHOVICH, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1861-1923)

Brother of Alexander S. — Graduated from the Imperial School of Law in St. Petersburg. — Zemstvo deputy in Orel from 1883; 1892-1895 district Marshal of the Nobility, from 1895 provincial Marshal of the Nobility in Orel Province. Member of *Beseda*; along with Shipov one of the prominent leaders of the non-constitutionalist wing of the zemstvo movement. 1904-1905 official representative of the Red Cross at the front in the Far East. Octobrist at the end of 1905; together with N.N. L'vov, Count Gejden and Shipov, founded the Party of Peace-

ful Renovation in 1906. Member of the First and Second Duma. Elected by the Orel zemstvo to the State Council in 1907.

TESLENKO, Nikolaj Vasil'evich (1870-?)

Studied jurisprudence. Involved in statistical and economic research on peasant resettlement in Siberia. Lawyer from 1899. Like Maklakov, M.L. Mandel'shtam and N.K. Murav'ev, belonged to the group of young Moscow lawyers which organized legal aid for peasants and politicalized criminal proceedings; defence lawyer in many political trials (*inter alia* in the 1906 Vyborg proceedings). Chairman of the All-Russian Lawyers Congress in 1905. Member of the Union of Liberation, co-opted to the Union Council in October 1904. Leading member of the Union of Lawyers. On the Central Committee of the Cadet Party from October 1905. Member of the Second and Third Duma.

VERNADSKIJ, Vladimir Ivanovich (1863-1945)

Son of a well-known professor of economy, who stood for a strict economic liberalism. Landowner in Tambov Province. — Graduated from the University of St. Petersburg. 1891 head of the Institute of Mineralogy at Moscow University, 1898 professor of mineralogy in Moscow. — As a student he organized, together with the Ol'denburg brothers and Shakhovskoj, the student scientific-literary society in Petersburg. Active in famine relief in 1891-1892. Friend of Ivan Petrunkevich. His house in Moscow became the centre of the Petrunkevich circle. Involved in the foundation of *Osvobozhdenie*, took part in the 1903 Schaffhausen Conference, member of the Union of Liberation and of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists. Took part in the 1904-1905 zemstvo Congresses. On the Central Committee of the Cadet Party from October 1905. 1906-1911 in the State Council (elected by the curia of the universities and the academy).

VODOVOZOV, Vasilij Vasil'evich (1864-1933)

Son of a well-known reform educationalist (from the St. Petersburg merchantry). Mother was a famous authoress of children's books and kindergarten teacher who introduced Friedrich Fröbel's theories to Russia. — Graduated from the Departments of History and Philosophy and of Law at St. Petersburg University. Journalist from 1886. — Worked as a student in revolutionary populist organizations. Banished in 1887 to Archangel'sk for five years. 1893-1894 member of the People's Rights Party. In 1894 banished from St. Petersburg, travelled in the Balkans and Austria. Worked as an editor on various Kiev papers from 1896. Took part in the 1903 Schaffhausen Conference, member of the Union of Liberation; author of a now lost history of the Union of Liberation. In St. Petersburg again as editor of the left-wing liberal newspaper *Nasha Zhizn'* from Autumn 1904. 1905-1911 numerous articles and public lectures on the franchise, parliament, parties, etc. Was close to the *Trudoviki*.

YAKOVLEV, Vasilij Yakovlevich — see BOGUCHARSKIJ

YAKUSHKIN, Vyacheslav Evgen'evich (1856-1912)

Grandson of the Decembrist I.D. Yakushkin; son of a high-ranking civil servant and renowned jurist. Noble family with estates in Kursk Province. — Educated at the gymnasium in Yaroslavl', graduated from the Department of History and Philosophy at Moscow University. Masters degree 1890. Lecturer of Russian history in Moscow. Then turned to the history of literature; Pushkin specialist,

edited the Academy edition of Pushkin. — Zemstvo deputy from 1899 in Kursk; popular education work, journalism; on the editorial staff of *Russkiya Vedomosti* from 1899. His anniversary speech on 'Pushkin's Social Views' on the occasion of Pushkin's centenary in 1899 earned him banishment to Yaroslavl'. Took part in the programme discussions for *Osvobozhdenie* in 1902. Member of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists. Leading member in the Central Office of the 1904–1905 zemstvo Congresses. Co-founder of the Cadet Party, on the Central Committee from October 1905. Member of the First Duma, signatory of the Vyborg Manifesto. Sentenced in the Vyborg proceedings to three months prison, which ruins his health. Nonetheless recommences his work as editor of *Russkiya Vedomosti* and two other popular newspapers.

APPENDIX II

MEMBERS OF THE UNION OF LIBERATION 1904–1905

The following list names 164 people who definitely or very probably belonged to the Union of Liberation in the years 1904–1905. This is basically composed from the lists of delegates to the four Union Congresses given in K.F. Shatsillo, 'Novoe o "Soyuze Osvobozhdeniya"', *ISSSR*, 1975, No. 4, pp. 141–142. Apart from these, people have been included who termed themselves members or who were credibly named as such by contemporaries. ? before a name means that membership can only be deduced from evidence.

The personal data are as a rule taken from the sources given in Appendix I. But not all names could be identified. Where known, the family name, first and father's name as well as (in brackets) the birth and death years are given, followed by the profession practised in 1904, the probable domicile and, where relevant, the function in the local self-government. Here the following abbreviations are used:

- DZ district zemstvo
- DZB district zemstvo board
- PZ provincial zemstvo
- PZB provincial zemstvo board
- MN Marshal of the Nobility

Personal details which deviate from Shatsillo's information are printed in [square brackets]. Where more specific details were not accessible, the classification 'professional man' (*litso svobodnykh professij*) or 'zemstvo deputy' (*zemeis*) made by Shatsillo has been adopted.

The right-hand column gives, where relevant, the place which the person concerned is said to have represented at one or more Union Congresses. The Roman numerals in brackets indicate the Congresses: I = January 1904, II = October 1904, III = March 1905, IV = August 1905. Place details disclosed by Shatsillo are printed in *italics*.

The abbreviation MC, also in the right-hand column, indicates the members of the Union Council who were elected at the First or Second Congress or were later co-opted (according to Shatsillo, pp. 143–144). Behind this in brackets are the month and year of election or *co-optation* (in *italics*).

ANICHKOV, Evgenij Vasil'evich (1866–1937) Reader at St. Petersburg University	
ANNENSKIJ, Nikolaj Fedorovich (1843–1912) Editor of <i>Russkoe Bogatstvo</i> , St. Petersburg	St. Petersburg (I, II) MC (Jan. 04, Oct. 04)
ANSHEL'SKIJ	Kursk (II)
ARGUTINSKIJ–DOLGORUKOV, Prince Alexander Mikhajlovich (1860–1919) professional man	Tiflis (I)
ASHESHEV, Nikolaj Petrovich (1866–?) Journalist in St. Petersburg	
BARATAEV, Prince Sergej Mikhajlovich (1861–?) PZB chairman, Simbirsk Province	
BAZHENOV, Nikolaj Nikolaevich (1857–?) Psychiatrist, professor in Moscow; PZ deputy, Khar'kov Province	
BEKHLI, E. Ya. professional man	Mogilev (IV)
BELOKONSKIJ, Ivan Petrovich (1855–1931) Writer, Khar'kov	Khar'kov (I, II)
BENUA, Leontij Leont'evich (?–?) professional man	St. Petersburg (III) MC (Jan. 05)
BERDYAEV, Nikolaj Alexandrovich (1874–1948) Writer, Kiev	
BIRYUKOV	Vyatka (I)
BLEKLOV, Stepan Mikhajlovich (1860–1913) Zemstvo statistician, Moscow; zemstvo deputy, Tula	Moscow (II)
BOGUCHARSKIJ, Vasilij Yakovlevich (1861–1915) Writer, St. Petersburg	St. Petersburg (I, II, III) MC (Jan. 04, Oct. 04)
BOGUSLAVSKIJ, Peter Rikardovich (1854–?) Landowner, PZ deputy, Khar'kov Province	
BRYUKHATOV, Lev Dmitrievich (?–?) Landowner, PZB member, Tambov Province	Tambov (I, II, III) MC (Oct. 04)
BULGAKOV, Sergej Nikolaevich (1871–1944) Professor of Economics in Kiev	Kiev (I, II) MC (Jan. 04, Oct. 04)
CHARNOLUSSKIJ, Vladimir Ivanovich (1865–1941) Writer, St. Petersburg	St. Petersburg (I, III, IV) MC (Jan. 05)
CHARUSHIN, Nikolaj Apollonovich (1851–1937) Zemstvo employee, Vyatka Province	Vyatka (III)
CHARUSHNIKOV	Vyatka (III)
CHERNENKOV, Nikolaj Nikolaevich (1863–?) Zemstvo statistician, living in St. Petersburg (?)	Rostov (III, IV)

- DELARYU, Mikhail Danilovich (1867-1912)
Landowner; PZB member, Khar'kov Province
- DEHN, Vladimir Eduardovich (1867-?)
Professor of Economics in St. Petersburg
Moscow (I, II) ,
MC (*Jan. 04*)
- DEMIDOV, Igor Platonovich (1873-?)
Landowner, living in Moscow; Justice of Peace in Temnikovo District, Tambov Province
Moscow (I, III)
- DERVIZ, Vladimir Dmitrievich (1861-?)
Landowner; PZB chairman, Tver' Province
Tver' (IV)
- DOLGORUKOV, Prince Pavel Dmitrievich (1866-1927)
Landowner; MN Ruza District, Moscow Province
Moscow (I, II, III, IV)
- DOLGORUKOV, Prince Peter Dmitrievich (1866-1945?)
Landowner; former DZB chairman, Sudzha District Kursk Province
Kursk (I, II, III, IV)
MC (*Jan. 04, Oct. 04*)
- EFIMOV
? (III)
- EFROS, Nikolaj Yefimovich (1867-?)
Lawyer (?), journalist in Moscow
Moscow (IV)
- ESHCHIN, Evsej Markovich (1865-?)
Lawyer, journalist in Nizhnij Novgorod
Nizhnij Novgorod (III)
- FAL'BORK, Heinrich Adolfovich (1864-1942)
Writer, living in St. Petersburg
- FRANK, Semen Ludvigovich (1877-1950)
Writer
Editorial board of *Osv.* (II)
- FRENKEL', [Zakhar'ij Grigor'evich (?) (1869-?)]
[Zemstvo doctor in Kostroma]
Vologda (I)
- ? GERTSENSHTEJN, Mikhail Yakovlevich (1859-1906)
Reader at Moscow University
- GESSEN, Iosif Vladimirovich (1866-1943)
Lawyer in St. Petersburg; editor of *Pravo*
St. Petersburg (I, II, III, IV)
MC (*Jan. 04, Oct. 04*)
- GESSEN, Vladimir Matveevich (1868-?)
Professor in St. Petersburg; editor of *Pravo*
St. Petersburg (I, II)
MC (*Jan. 04*)
- GOLOVIN, Fedor Alexandrovich (1867-?)
Landowner; PZB member, 1904 board chairman
- GREVS, Ivan Mikhajlovich (1860-1941)
Professor of History in St. Petersburg
- GUBSKIJ, Nikolaj Porfir'evich (1877-?)
Zemstvo statistician on PZB, Vladimir Province
- GUR'EV
? (III)
- GUREVICH, I. A. (?-?)
Zemstvo deputy
St. Petersburg (II, III)
- GUREVICH, Lyubov' Yakovlevna (1866-?)
Writer, living in St. Petersburg
- GUREVICH, Yakov Yakovlevich (1869-?)
Gymnasium teacher in St. Petersburg, PZ deputy, Tula Province
Tula (I, III)
- IGELSTRÖM, Andrej Viktorovich (1860-?)
Librarian in Helsinki

- IOGANSON, A. A. [= ? Alexander Alexandrovich (1871-?)] professional man Smolensk (I)
- IVANITSKIJ, Fedor Igorevich (1861-?)
Landowner; DZB member in the Province of Khar'kov
- IZGOEV, Alexander Solomonovich (1872-?) Odessa (II)
Writer, living in Odessa
- ? KABLUKOV, Nikolaj Alexeevich (1849-1919)
Professor of Economics at Moscow University; director of office of statistics on PZB Moscow
- KAMINKA, Avgust Isaakovich (1865-?) St. Petersburg (I)
Lawyer in St. Petersburg; editor of *Pravo*
- KARYSHEV, Nikolaj Alexandrovich (1855-1905)
Professor of Economics in Moscow; PZ deputy, Ekaterinoslav Province
- KHIZHNYAKOV, Vasilij Mikhajlovich (1842-1917) Landowner; former PZB chairman, Chernigov Province
- KHIZHNYAKOV, Vasilij Vasil'evich (1871-1949) St. Petersburg (I, II, III, IV)
Secretary of the Free Economic Society in St. Petersburg; former zemstvo doctor MC (Jan. 04, Oct. 04)
- KILEVEJN, Georgij Robertovich (1864-?)
Landowner; PZB member, Nizhnij Novgorod Province
- KISTYAKOVSKIJ, Bodgan Alexandrovich (1868-1920) Sociologist, 1904 abroad
- KIZEVETTER, Alexander Alexandrovich (1866-1933) Reader of History at Moscow University
- KLEVEZAL, E. R. (?-?) Khar'kov (I)
Zemstvo deputy, Khar'kov Province
- KOKOSHKIN, Fedor Fedorovich (1871-1918)
Reader of Law, Moscow University; PZB member, Moscow Province
- KOLYUBAKIN, Alexander Mikhajlovich (1868-?) Novgorod (III, IV)
Landowner; PZB chairman, Novgorod Province MC (July 05)
- KOMARNITSKIJ, I. N. [= ? Ivan Nikolaevich (1858-1931)] professional man Kursk (II)
- KORENEV ? (III)
- KORNILOV, Alexander Alexandrovich (1862-1925) Writer, 1904 abroad St. Petersburg (II, III, IV)
MC (Oct 04)
- ? KOROLENKO, Vladimir Galaktionovich (1853-1921) Author, living in Poltava; editor of *Russkoe Bogatstvo*
- KORSAKOV, Ivan Assigkritovich (1850-1912) Novgorod (I)
Lawyer in St. Petersburg; PZ deputy, Provinces of Novgorod and Tver'
- KOTLYAREVSKIJ, Sergej Andreevich (1873-1940) Reader of History, Moscow University; PZ deputy, Saratov Province Saratov (I)
MC (Jan. 04)

- ? KOVALEVSKIĬ, Maxim Maximovich (1851-1916)
Sociologist, professor in Paris, lived 1905
in St. Petersburg
- KOVALEVSKIĬ, Nikolaj Nikolaevich (1860-?)
Landowner; PZ deputy, Khar'kov Province
- KROL', S. A. [= ? Moisej Aaronovich (1862-?)]
professional man [Writer]
- KRUTOVSKIĬ
- KURNIN, S. V. (?-?)
Writer and publisher in Moscow
- KUSKOVA, Ekaterina Dmitrievna (1869-1958)
Writer, living in St. Petersburg
- KUSH
- KVASKOV, Mikhail Alexandrovich (1876-?)
Physician in Smolensk
- LANDAU
- LEDNICKI, Alexander R. (1866-1934)
Lawyer in Moscow
- LIND, Vasilij Nikolaevich (?-?)
Landowner; PZB member, Tver' Province
- LINTVAREV, Georgij Mikhajlovich (1865-?)
PZB member, Khar'kov Province
- LINTVAREV, P. M. (?-?)
DZB chairman, Sumy District, Khar'kov
Province
- LOKOT, Timofej Vasil'evich (1869-?)
Professor of Agriculture
- LUCHITSKIĬ, Ivan Vasil'evich (1845-1918)
Professor of History, Kiev University;
PZ deputy, Poltava Province
- LUTUGIN, Leonid Ivanovich (1864-1915)
Professor of Geology in St. Petersburg
- L'VOV, Prince Georgij Evgenevich (1861-1925)
Landowner; PZB chairman, Tula Province
- L'VOV, Nikolaj Nikolaevich (1867-1944)
Landowner; PZB chairman, Saratov
Province
- LYSENKO [V], N.K. [= ? Nikolaj Konstantinovich
(1865-?)] [Professor in Odessa, surgeon]
- ? MAKLAKOV, Vasilij Alexeevich (1870-1957)
Lawyer in Moscow
- MAKSIMOV, Alexander Nikolaevich (1872-?)
Writer, editor of *Russkiya Vedomosti*,
Moscow
- MANDEL'SHTAM, Mikhail L'vovich (?-?)
Lawyer in Moscow
- MASLENNIKOV, N. Ya. (?-?)
PZ deputy, Vologda Province
- MEDVED'EV, [Alexander Semenovich
(1857-1908)] [Banker in Samara, later
in 1904 PZB member, Tver' Province]
- MEDVED'EV
- Khar'kov (I, III)
MC (Jan. 04)
Siberia (IV)
- ? (IV)
Moscow (II, III, IV)
MC (Oct. 04)
St. Petersburg (I, II, III)
- ? (IV)
- Jewish group (I)
Moscow (III, IV)
- Tver' (III)
- St. Petersburg (I, II, III, IV)
MC (Oct. 04)
- Saratov (I, III)
MC (Jan. 04)
- Moscow (I, II, IV)
MC (Jan. 04, Oct. 04)
- Vologda (I, II)
- Samara (I)
- Chernigov (IV)

- METLIN, I. I. (?-?)**
[professional man] living in Novgorod
- METLIN, V. I. (?-?)**
[professional man] living in Novgorod
- MERTVAGO, Alexander Petrovich (1856-?)**
Writer, living in St. Petersburg
- MIKLASHEVSKIJ, Mikhail P. (?-?)**
Physician in St. Petersburg
- MIKLASHEVSKIJ, Nikolaj Nikolaevich (1860-1909)** Judge in Khar'kov; PZ deputy, Chernigov Province
- MILYUKOV, Pavel Nikolaevich (1859-1941)** Former Professor of History, living in St. Petersburg *St. Petersburg (II, III, IV) MC (March 05)*
- MOGILYANSKIJ**
professional man, Chernigov
- MURAV'EV, N. K.** *Moscow (III)*
Lawyer in Moscow
- MUROMTSEV, Sergej Andreevich (1850-1910)**
Lawyer in Moscow, former Professor of Law; DZ deputy, Moscow District, Moscow Municipal Duma deputy
- MYAKOTIN, Venedikt Alexandrovich (1867-1937)** Writer, editor of *Russkoe Bogatstvo*, living in Novgorod
- NABOKOV, Vladimir Dmitrievich (1867-1922)** *St. Petersburg (IV) MC (July 05)*
Professor of Law in St. Petersburg, landowner; St. Petersburg Municipal Duma Deputy
- NIKOL'SKIJ, Alexander Ivanovich (1860-?)** *Odessa (I, III) MC (Oct. 04 ?)*
Veterinarian at PZB, Kherson Province
- NIKONOV, A. A. (?-?)** *Rostov (III, IV)*
professional man
- NOL'DE** *Moscow (IV)*
Lawyer
- NOVGORODTSEV, Pavel Ivanovich (1866-?)** *Moscow (I, II, III, IV) MC (Jan. 04, Oct. 04)*
Professor of Philosophy at Moscow University
- OBNINSKIJ, Viktor Petrovich (1867-1916)**
MN, Kaluga District, Kaluga Province
- OBOLENSKIJ, Prince Vladimir Andreevich (1869-?)** Landowner; PZB member, Taurida Province *Simferopol (I)*
- OGORODNIKOV, Nikolaj Alexandrovich (1872-?)**
Lawyer in Kostroma; zemstvo deputy
- OL'DENBURG, Fedor Fedorovich (1861-1914)**
School Commissioner at PZB, Tver' Province
- ? OL'DENBURG, Sergej Fedorovich (1863-1934)**
Professor of Oriental Studies, Secretary of Academy of Science, St. Petersburg
- OSTANIN, Ivan** *? (III)*

PANKEEV, K. M. (?-?) Landowner, living in Odessa	[Odessa] * (I)
PERELESHIN, Alexander Vasil'evich (1856-1910) MN, Kostroma District, Kostroma Province	Kostroma (IV)
PERELESHIN, Dmitrij Alexandrovich (1862-1935) Landowner; former PZB member, Voronezh Province	
PESHEKHONOV, Alexej Vasil'evich (1867-1933) Writer, editor of <i>Russkoe Bogatstvo</i> , St. Petersburg	St. Petersburg (I) MC (Jan. 04)
? PETROVO-SOLOVOVO, Vasilij Mikhajlovich (1850-1908) Landowner; MN, Tambov District, Tambov Province	
PETROVSKIJ, Ivan Alexeevich (1863-1907) Writer, biologist, living in Moscow	Moscow (I, II, III, IV) MC (Jan. 04, Oct. 04)
PETROVSKIJ, Sergej Antonovich (1863-?) Lawyer; PZ deputy, Voronezh Province	
PETRUNKOVICH, Ivan Il'ich (1844-1928) Landowner; PZ deputy, Tver' Province	Tver' (II, III, IV) MC (Jan. 04, Oct. 04) chairman
PETRUNKOVICH, Mikhail Il'ich (1845-1912) Plant Manager; PZ deputy, Tver' Province, St. Petersburg Municipal Duma deputy	Tver' (I) MC (Jan. 04)
POKROVSKIJ, Mikhail Nikolaevich (1868-1932) Historian, gymnasium teacher	
POLNER, Tikhon Ivanovich (1864-?) Zemstvo statistician on PZB, Tula Province	
PROKOPOVICH, Sergej Nikolaevich (1851-1955) Writer, living in St. Petersburg	St. Petersburg (I, II, III, IV) MC (Jan. 04, Oct. 04)
PROTOPOPOV, Dmitrij Dmitrievich (1865-?) Landowner; PZ deputy, Samara Province	
? DE ROBERTI, Evgenij Valentinovich (1843-1915) Sociologist; landowner, PZ deputy, Tver' Province	
RODICHEV, Fedor Izmajlovich (1854-1933) Lawyer in St. Petersburg; landowner, PZ deputy, Tver' Province	
ROZEMBLYUM Lawyer	Moscow (IV)
SABASHNIKOV, Mikhail Vasil'evich (1871-1943) Merchant and publisher in Moscow; PZ deputy, Provinces of Vladimir and Kursk	Moscow (I, II, III, IV) MC (Oct. 04 ?)
SEMEVSKIJ, Vasilij Ivanovich (1848-1916) Historian, former Professor in St. Petersburg	St. Petersburg (II)
SHAKHOVSKOJ, Prince Dmitrij Ivanovich (1861-1939) Landowner; PZ deputy, Yaroslavl' Province	Yaroslavl' (I, II, III, IV) MC (Jan. 04 Oct. 04)
SHAKHOVSKOJ, Prince Sergej Ivanovich (1865-1908) Landowner; PZ deputy, Moscow Province, DZB member, Serpukhov District, Moscow Province	Moscow (I, III, IV)

* According to Shatsillo, p. 141: *Taurida Province*

- SHCHEPKIN, Evgenij Nikolaevich (1860–1920)
Professor of History in Odessa
- SHEVELEV ? (III)
- SHINGAREV, Andrej Ivanovich (1869–1918)
Zemstvo doctor; PZ deputy, Voronezh Province
- ? SHIRKOV, Nikolaj Vladimirovich (1862–1907)
Landowner; PZ deputy, Kursk Province
- SHNITNIKOV, Nikolaj Nikolaevich (1861–?) ? (III)
Lawyer; St. Petersburg Municipal Duma deputy
- SHREJDER, Grigorij Il'ich (1860–?) Moscow (II, III, IV)
Writer, secretary of the Moscow section of Union of Liberation
- SMIRNOV, Georgij Alexandrovich (?–?) Vladimir (I)
PZB member, Vladimir Province
- SOKOLOV, Nikolaj Dmitrievich (1870–1928) St. Petersburg (I)
Lawyer in St. Petersburg
- SOKOLOVSKIJ Poltava (II)
- SPASSKIJ, Yu. A. (?–?) Kostroma (I, II, III, IV)
Zemstvo deputy
- STAAL', A. F. (?–?)
Lawyer in Moscow
- STAKHOVICH, Alexander Alexandrovich
(1858–1915) Landowner; MN, Elets District, Orel Province
- STISHEV ? (IV)
- STRUVE, Peter Bernardovich (1870–1944)
Writer, living abroad, editor of *Osvobozhdenie*
- SVECHIN, Alexej Alexandrovich (1865–?)
Landowner; PZB chairman, Chernigov Province
- TATARINOV, Fedor Vasil'evich (1860–?) Orel (I, II)
Landowner; DZB chairman, Orel District, Orel Province
- TESLENKO, Nikolaj Vasil'evich (1870–?) Moscow (II, III, IV)
Lawyer in Moscow MC (Oct. 04)
- TRUBETSKOJ, Prince Evgenij Nikolaevich
(1863–1920) Professor of Law, Kiev University
- TUGAN-BARANOVSKIJ, Mikhail Ivanovich
(1865–1919) Economist, former reader at St. Petersburg University
- TYRKOVA, Ariadna Vladimirovna (1869–1962)
Writer in St. Petersburg, living abroad
- UNKOVSKIJ, Semen Alexandrovich Saratov (III)
(1875?–1930) MN, Balashov District, Saratov Province
- USOV, V. V. (?–?)
DZ deputy, Sudzha District, Kursk Province

VAGNER, Yulij Nikolaevich (1865-?) Professor of Zoology in Kiev	Kiev (II, III)
VENTSKOVSKIJ, A. I. (?-?) professional man	<i>St. Petersburg</i> (I)
VERNADSKIJ, Vladimir Ivanovich (1863-1945) Professor of Mineralogy, Moscow University PZ deputy, Tambov Province	
VINAVER, Maxim Moiseevich (1863-1926) Lawyer in St. Petersburg	
VODOVOZOV, Vasilij Vasil'evich (1864-1933) Writer, living in Kiev, later on in St. Petersburg	Kiev (I, II)
YAKUSHKIN, Vyacheslav Evgen'evich (1856-1912) Reader at Moscow University; PZ deputy, Kursk Province	
YANOVSKIJ, Vasilij Vasil'evich (1864-?) Landowner; PZ deputy, Bessarabia Province	Bessarabia Province (IV)
YARONIN	Dorpat (I)
? YURITSYN, Sergej Petrovich (1873-?) Journalist, editor of <i>Syn Otechestva</i> , St. Petersburg	
ZAGOZHSKIJ (ZAGORSKIJ?), Erazm Klement'evich (?-?) PZB member, Kursk Province	
ZHUKOVSKIJ, Dmitrij Evgen'evich (?-?) Publisher, zemstvo deputy, St. Petersburg (?)	
ZVEGINTSEV	? (III)

APPENDIX III

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF CONSTITUTIONALIST GROUPS

ORIGIN AND NUMBER OF LOCAL CONTRIBUTIONS PRINTED IN THE PERIODICAL *OSVOBOZHDENIE* UP TO THE FOUNDATION OF THE UNION OF LIBERATION

REPRESENTATION OF PROVINCIAL GROUPS OF THE UNION OF LIBERATION AT THE FOUR UNION CONGRESSES

The following table compares the places of origin of the local contributions printed in *Osv*, No. 1 18th June 1902 – No. 15/16 (39/40), 19th January 1904 with the distribution of the Union of Liberation's provincial groups in 1904/1905.

Rubric A gives the places of origin, arranged according to provinces, and the number of local contributions which appeared between June 1902 and January 1904; the third column gives the month and year in which the earliest contribution appeared. Contributions originating in Finland and the series of articles on Poland by Leon Wasilewski (mentioned on p. 209 above) have not been taken into account. For the sake of clarity, the provinces have been grouped together on the basis of the regional breakdown used in the official statistics of the Ministry of Finance. A distinction is also made between zemstvo and non-zemstvo provinces. Only in rare cases was it possible to identify the writer of the mostly unsigned contributions.

Rubric B gives the provincial groups (number of delegates) represented at the four Congresses of the Union of Liberation. I = January 1904, II = October 1904, III = March 1905, IV = August 1905. The figures are based on the lists of delegates given in Shatsillo, 'Novoe o "Soyuze Osvobozhdeniya"', *ISSSR*, 1975, No. 4, pp. 141–142. Differing information from other sources is given in the footnotes.

A. Origin and number of local contributions in <i>Osv</i> No. 1-15/16 (39/40), 1902-1903 (according to place of origin)			B. Provincial groups represented at the 4 Union of Liberation Congresses			
Province/Place	No. of Contributions	The earliest contribution appeared (month, year)	No. of delegates			
			I	IIa	III	IV
ZEMSTVO PROVINCES						
<i>Petersburg and Northern Provinces</i>						
St. Petersburg	85	VII, 1902	13	12	12	8
Luga	1	XI, 1903				
Arkhangel'sk	4	VI, 1903				
Vologda	3	I, 1903	2	1	—	—
Novgorod	4	VII, 1902	1b	—	1c	1
Belozersk	1	IX, 1903				
Cherepovets	1	IV, 1903				
<i>Moscow and Central Industrial Provinces</i>						
Moscow	22	VIII, 1902	8	10	11	13
Vladimir	2	I, 1903	1	—	—	—
Nizhnij Novgorod	10	XI, 1902	x d	—	1	—
Kostroma	2	VI, 1903	1	1	1	2
Yaroslavl'	5	XI, 1902	1	1	1	1
Tver'	4	II, 1903	1b	1	2	2
Torzhok	1	VIII, 1903				
Smolensk	3	III, 1903	1	—	—	—
<i>Eastern Provinces</i>						
Vyatka			1	—	2	—
Orlov	1	VI, 1903				
Sarapul	1	VII, 1902				
Perm	1	VII, 1902				
Ekaterinburg	1	XII, 1903				
Kazan'	5	XI, 1902				
Ufa	2	XI, 1903				
Zlatoust	1	V, 1903				
Samara	5	I, 1903	1	—	—	—

a According to SSO, p. 133, 'almost the same groups' were supposedly represented at the Second Congress in October 1904. The lists of delegates do not confirm this statement. But re-assignment of mandates and cumulative votes cannot be excluded in individual cases.

b Not named in SSO, p. 110. The representation of Novgorod (by I.A. Korsakov, a St. Petersburg lawyer) and of Orel (by F.V. Tatarinov) is revealed by Shatsillo, p. 141.

c Introduced as a new group in *Listok Soyuzu Osvobozhdeniya*, No. 3, 8th July 1905.

d Named in SSO, p. 110.

Province/Place	No. of Contributions	The earliest contribution appeared (month, year)	No. of delegates			
			I	IIa	III	IV
<i>Central Black Earth Provinces</i>						
Simbirsk	2	X, 1902				
Saratov	7	VIII, 1902	2	—	2	—
Balashov	1	I, 1904				
Khvalynsk	1	VIII, 1903				
Ryazan	3	X, 1902				
Skopin	1	VIII, 1903				
Tambov	7	II, 1903	1	1	1	—
Borisoglebsk	2	X, 1903				
Kirsanov	1	VI, 1903				
Kozlov	1	V, 1903				
Voronezh	4	XI, 1902	—	—	x c	—
Ostrogzhsk	1	VI, 1903				
Tula	3	VI, 1903	1	—	1	—
Orel	3	I, 1903	1b	1	—	—
Kursk	14	X, 1902	1	3	1	1
Korocha	2	IX, 1902				
<i>Little Russian Provinces</i>						
Chernigov	13	IX, 1902	—de	—e	—o	1
Konotop	1	XI, 1903				
Novozybkov	1	X, 1902				
Surazh	1	VIII, 1903				
Poltava	9	VII, 1902	—	1	—	—
Lokhvitsa	1	XI, 1903				
Pereyaslav	1	VI, 1903				
Zen'kov	1	VII, 1903				
Khar'kov	10	IX, 1902	3	1	—	—
Akhtyrka	1	XI, 1903				
<i>Southern Provinces</i>						
Bessarabia/Kishinev	6	VII, 1903	—	—	—	1
Akkerman	1	I, 1904				
Kherson	2	VI, 1903				
Odessa	16	XII, 1903	2f	2	—	—
Ekaterinoslav	2	III, 1903				
Taurida/Simferopol'			1f	—	—	—
Feodosiya	1	VII, 1902				
Sevastopol'	1	I, 1904				

b Not named in SSO, p. 110. The representation of Novgorod (by I.A. Korsakov, a St. Petersburg lawyer) and of Orel (by F.V. Tatarinov) is revealed by Shatsillo, p. 141.

c Introduced as a new group in *Listok Soyuzu Osvobozhdeniya*, No. 3, 8th July 1905.

d Named in SSO, p. 110.

e It is possible that SSO, p. 110, counts V.V. Khizhnyakov, from Chernigov, as representative of this province. According to the delegates lists, he was present at all four Congresses (without location details; counted by us among the Petersburg group). Two representatives from Chernigov were present in April 1904 at a regional conference of the Union of Liberation in the Crimea (see Törngren, *Medryska samhällsbyggare*, p. 69).

f Shatsillo, *Op. cit.*, p. 141, ascribes K.M. Pankeev to Taurida Province; but according to SSO, p. 110, he represented Odessa. Other details in his biography also speak for this view.

Province/Place	No. of Contributions	The earliest contribution appeared (month, year)	No. of delegates			
			I	Ila	III	IV
NON-ZEMSTVO PROVINCES						
<i>Baltic Provinces</i>						
Estland/Reval	1	V, 1903				
Livonia/Riga	2	I, 1904				
Dorpat	2	V, 1903	1	—	—	—
Courland						
Libava	2	IX, 1903				
Warsaw	5	X, 1902				
<i>North-Western Provinces</i>						
Kowno	6	XII, 1902				
Wilna	1	XII, 1903				
Vitebsk	1	XI, 1903				
Mogilev	1	X, 1903	—	—	—	1
Gomel'	5	IX, 1903				
<i>South-Western Provinces</i>						
Podolia	1	X, 1903				
Kiev	14	XI, 1902	2	3	1	—
Don Region	3	I, 1903				
Novocherkassk	4	II, 1903				
Rostov n.D.	15	X, 1902	—	—	2	2
<i>Caucasia</i>						
Kuban	1	VIII, 1903				
Stavropol'	4	X, 1902				
Black Sea Region						
Sochi	1	V, 1903				
T'uapse	1	X, 1903				
Kutais	2	VIII, 1903				
Batum	1	X, 1903				
Poti	1	VIII, 1903				
Tiflis	6	VI, 1903	1	—	—	—
Elisavetpol'	1	I, 1904				
Baku	7	V, 1903				
Erivan						
Nakhichevan	1	XI, 1903				
<i>Siberia and Central Asia</i>						
(Siberia)			—	—	—	1
Tobol'sk	1	VIII, 1903				
Tomsk	5	IX, 1902				
Enisej/Krasnoyarsk	3	IX, 1902				
Semirechensk Region						
/Vernyj	1	V, 1903				
Jewish Group (without location)			1	—	—	—
Place of origin indefinite			—	—	6	3
<i>Osvobozhdenie</i> editorial representative			—	1	—	—

NOTES

NOTES TO 'INTRODUCTION'

1. M. Weber, 'Rußlands Übergang zum Scheinkonstitutionalismus', *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik*, Vol. 23 (1906), No. 1, Supplement.*
2. Summarizing the discussion: A.P. Mendel, 'On Interpreting the Fate of Imperial Russia', in Th. G. Stavrou (ed.), *Russia Under the Last Tsar* (1969), pp. 13-41; D. Geyer, Article 'Oktoberrevolution', in *SDG*, Vol. 4 (1971), pp. 917-958.
3. Cf. L. Haimson, 'The Parties and the State: The Evolution of Political Attitudes', in C. Black (ed.), *The Transformation of Russian Society* (1960), pp. 110-145.
4. For the theoretical context see R. Mayntz, *Soziologie der Organisation* (1963) and A. Etzioni, *Modern Organizations* (1964).
5. Cf. C.E. Black, 'The Modernization of Russian Society', in C. Black (ed.), *The Transformation*, pp. 661-680 and the other contributions in this volume.
6. C.E. Black, *The Dynamics of Modernization* (1967), p. 7. The modernization models developed in the social sciences offer an abundance of terms, hypotheses and theories which can be helpful to a historical examination in structuring the subject and in the selection and correlation of data and sources. Critical surveys are offered by: P. Flora, *Modernisierungsforschung* (1974) and H.U. Wehler, *Modernisierungstheorie und Geschichte* (1975).
7. Cf. D. Landes, *The Unbound Prometheus* (1969).
8. R. Bendix, 'Towards a Definition of Modernization. Paper delivered at the 6th World Congress of Sociology, Evian 1966', German translation in W. Zapf (ed.), *Theorien des sozialen Wandels* (1969), pp. 505-511.
9. K.W. Deutsch, 'Social Mobilization and Political Development', *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 55 (1961), pp. 493, 494.
10. Cf. D. Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (4th ed. 1967); S.P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Society* (1968), and idem, 'Political Development and Political Decay', *World Politics* Vol. 17 (1965), pp. 386-430.
11. Bendix, 'Towards a Definition of Modernization', p. 509; D. Rüschemeyer, 'Partielle Modernisierung' in Zapf (ed.), *Theorien*, pp. 382-396.

* The works mentioned in the notes are detailed in the Bibliography below.

12. There is still no adequate history of the organization of the Union of Liberation; see, however, D.I. Shakhovskoj, 'Soyuz Osvobozhdeniya' in *Zarnitsy. Literaturno-politicheskij sbornik* Vol. 2 (1909), No. 2, pp. 81-171 and K.F. Shatsillo, 'Novoe o "Soyuze Osvobozhdeniya"', *ISSSR*, 1975 No. 4, pp. 132-144; also treated in N. Smith, *The Constitutional-Democratic Movement in Russia, 1902-1906*, Ph.D. University of Illinois 1958 and S. Galai, *The Liberation Movement, 1900-1905* (1973).
13. The term *obshchestvo* is not identical in our context with the general social sciences concept of integral society. (In the following it is translated with 'society' in inverted commas.) As far as I know, there is as yet no history of the term available. The details in this paragraph rely on observations made by the author when working with the source material as well as on literary documentation on the key words *obshchestvo*, *obshchestvennyj*, *obshchestvennyj deyatel'* in *Slovar' sovremennogo russkogo literaturnogo yazyka*, Vol. 8 (1959) and on a few hints in the study by O.W. Müller, *Intelligenciya* (1971). On the other hand, Yu. S. Sorokin, *Razvitie slovarnogo sostava russkogo literaturnogo yazyka 30-90-e gody XIX veka* (1965) was not very rewarding. Important for the social history of the term: M. Raeff, *Origins of the Russian Intelligentsia* (1966) and D. Geyer, "Gesellschaft" als staatliche Veranstaltung', *JGO*, Vol. 14 (1966), pp. 21-50. For the juxtaposition of *obshchestvo* and *vlast'/gosudarstvo* see R.C. Tucker, 'The Image of Dual Russia' in Black (ed.), *Transformation*, pp. 587-605.
14. See Haimson, 'The Parties and the State', pp. 112-114; T. Emmons, *The Russian Landed Gentry and the Peasant Emancipation of 1861* (1968). Very interesting for the social science aspects, though not concerned with Russia, is J. Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft* (5th ed. 1971).
15. The other derivations from *obshchestvo* are correspondingly translated: *Obshchestvennoe mnenie* – public opinion, *obshchestvennaya deyatelnost'* – public activity, *obshchestvennyj deyatel'* – public activist.
16. M. Karpovich, 'Two Types of Russian Liberalism: Maklakov and Milyukov' in Simmons (ed.), *Continuity and Change*, p. 30.
17. See also Galai, 'The Role of the Union of Unions in the Revolution of 1905', *JGO*, Vol. 24 (1976), pp. 512-525.
18. I.F. Gindin, 'Russkaya burzhuziya v period kapitalizma, ee razvitie i osobennosti', *ISSSR*, 1963 No. 2, p. 80.
19. E.D. Chermenskij, 'Zemsko-liberal'noe dvizhenie nakanune revolyutsii 1905-1907 gg.', *ISSSR*, 1965 No. 5, pp. 41-60.
20. A.V. Ushakov, *Revoljutsionnoe dvizhenie demokraticeskoi intelligentsii v Rossii 1895-1904* (Moscow 1976) came to my attention only after conclusion of this manuscript. Characteristically, in Ushakov neither the periodical *Osvobozhdenie* nor the Union of Liberation is mentioned.
21. M. Raeff, 'Some Reflections on Russian Liberalism', *Russian Review*, Vol. 18 (1959), p. 221. Cf. also P. Scheibert, 'Über den Liberalismus in Rußland', *JGO*, Vol. 7 (1959), pp. 34-48.
22. A. Walicki, *The Controversy over Capitalism* (1969), p. 108.
23. L. Schapiro, *Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (1967), p. 143. Schapiro and Leontovitsch discuss the problem of liberalism in Russia in very broad historical contexts, touching the question of constitutionalist group formation only in passing. They are therefore not mentioned in the survey of literature given above.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE: 'THE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC CRISIS ON THE EVE OF THE 20TH CENTURY AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION OF SOCIETY'

1. A. Gerschenkron, 'The Rate of Industrial Growth in Russia Since 1885', *The Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 7 (1947), Supplement, pp. 144-174. R.W. Goldsmith, 'The Economic Growth of Tsarist Russia 1860-1913', *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 9 (1960/1961), pp. 441-475. The crisis in comparison with West European and American economic development: S.G. Strumilin, 'Promyshlennye krizisy v Rossii, 1847-1917 gg.' (1939) in S.G. Strumilin, *Ocherki ekonomicheskoi istorii Rossii i SSSR* (1966), pp. 443-454. L. Mendel'son, *Ekonomicheskie krizisy i tsikly XIX veka* (1949), pp. 687-695, 723-743. A.S. Nifontov, 'Khozyajstvennaya konyunktura v Rossii vo vtoroj polovine XIX veka', *ISSSR*, 1972 No. 3, pp. 42-64, introduces agronomical indices, but does not treat the 1900-1903 crisis.
2. Cf. H. Rosenberg, *Große Depression und Bismarckzeit. Wirtschaftsablauf, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa* (1967). H.U. Wehler, *Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1871-1918* (1973). I have to thank both works for many a suggestion in the following.
3. J. Nötzold, *Wirtschaftspolitische Alternativen der Entwicklung Rußlands in der Ära Witte und Stolypin* (1966); P. Gregory, 'Economic Growth and Structural Change in Tsarist Russia: A Case of Modern Economic Growth?', *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 23 (1972), pp. 418-434. For basic material on Russian economic policy see also A. Gerschenkron, 'Problems and Patterns of Russian Economic Development' in Black (ed.), *Transformation* (1960), pp. 42-72.
4. Cf. R. Portal, 'Das Problem einer industriellen Revolution in Rußland im 19. Jahrhundert', *Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte*, Vol. 1 (1954), pp. 205-216.
5. Gerschenkron, 'Problems and Patterns', p. 53. See also the reports of the State Controller Lobko for 1901 and 1902, quoted by Th. von Laue, *Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia* (1963), pp. 220-222.
6. *KA*, Vol. 18 (1926), p. 44.
7. For the relationship between the bad harvests and the development of capitalism see P.N. Pershin, *Agrarnaya revolyutsiya v Rossii*, Vol. 1 (1966), pp. 44-63; Nifontov, 'Khozyajstvennaya konyunktura', pp. 49-63. On the problems of agricultural policies see Nötzold, pp. 49-52; Laue, *Witte*, pp. 101-102, 170-172.
8. Nötzold, p. 196.
9. S. Yu. Vitte, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 2 (1960), pp. 505-507, 520-529.
10. An elaboration of this term in Laue, *Witte*, pp. 76-78.
11. Cf. *Ibidem*, pp. 239-248 et passim.
12. *Ibidem*, pp. 195-206.
13. *Samoderzhavie i zemstvo. Konfidentsial'naya zapiska Ministra finansov Stats-sekretarya S. Yu. Vitte* (ed. 1901).
14. S.F. Starr, *Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia, 1830-1870* (1972), pp. 262-271.
15. Quoted in *Samoderzhavie i zemstvo*, p. 194.
16. The quotations *ibidem*, pp. 194, 196-197, 211, 16, 205.
17. Laue, *Witte*, p. 160.
18. *Samoderzhavie i zemstvo*, p. 209.

19. Cf. Laue, *Witte*, pp. 72, 194 and A.L. Sidorov's introduction to Vitte, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, pp. IV-VI.
20. Vitte's term as Minister survived four Ministers of the Interior, five Ministers for People's Enlightenment, four Foreign Ministers and two Ministers of War. See E. Amburger, *Geschichte der Behördenorganisation Rußlands von Peter dem Großen bis 1917* (1966).
21. See the tables on political investigation procedures and administrative penalties in *OD*, Vol. 1, p. 462.
22. In Russia the peasants were not subject to the general Civil Law but to a special legal system resulting from the characteristics of the emancipation of the serfs — a system which excluded peasants from other classes of the population and largely cut them off from social mobilization. See on this Leontovitsch, pp. 154-164.
23. Details on the formation of the 'Special Conference' in 'Dnevnik A.A. Polovtseva', *KA*, Vol. 3 (1923), pp. 114-130 passim; V.I. Gurko, *Features and Figures of the Past* (1939), pp. 205-207; 'Otryvki iz vospominanij D.N. Lyubimova', *Istoricheskij Arkhiv*, Vol. 8 (1962), No. 6, pp. 77-83; Vitte, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 2, pp. 531-534.
24. 'Dnevnik A.A. Polovtseva', *KA*, Vol. 3, p. 114.
25. 'Dnevnik A.A. Polovtseva', *KA*, Vol. 3, pp. 115-116.
26. For the details see pp. 171-177.
27. See in particular: K. Stählin, *Geschichte Rußlands von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*, Vol. 4 (1939) No. 2, pp. 679-685; Laue, *Witte*, pp. 196-199, 245-257. Interesting details on the situation at Court and in the Government in L.G. Zakharova, 'Krizis samoderzhaviya nakanune revolyutsii 1905 goda', *VI*, 1972 No. 8, pp. 119-140.
28. *Polnoe Sobranie Zakonov Rossijskoj Imperii. Sobranie 3-e*, Vol. 23, No. 22581.
29. V.I. Gurko, Department Director in the Ministry of the Interior and one of the authors of the Manifesto, reports that suggestions from the right-wing press had been included here. Gurko, p. 218. — On the material situation of the clergy and their social position see I. Smolitsch, *Geschichte der russischen Kirche 1700-1917*, Vol. 1 (1964), pp. 493-524.
30. *Usilenie gubernatorskoj vlasti. Proekt fon Pleve*. S predisloviem P. Struve, Paris 1904; cf. *OD*, Vol. 1, pp. 473-474.
31. Cf. Milyukov's article 'Derzhavnyj maskerad', *Osv* 19, pp. 321-323 and a compilation of Russian press opinions *ibidem*, pp. 326-328. That the birthday of Alexander III was chosen deliberately is testified by Gurko, p. 219.
32. I.P. Belokonskij, *Zemskoe dvizhenie* (1914), pp. 139-140; Gurko, pp. 227-229.
33. It was composed during the night from 25th to 26th February by three Department Directors in the Ministry of the Interior and edited by Pleve. Gurko, pp. 219-220; 'Otryvki iz vospominanij Lyubimova', p. 78.
34. Laue, *Witte*, pp. 244-248.
35. Letter from A. Abaza to a friend, quoted in 'Nikolaj II i samoderzhavie v 1903 g.', *Byloe*, 1918 No. 2, p. 214.
36. Gurko, p. 225.
37. An unsubstantiated phrase, attributed to Pleve, quoted in Vitte, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 2, p. 291.
38. Cf. Belokonskij, pp. 39-44; B.B. Veselovskij, *Istoriya Zemstva*, Vol. 3 (1910), pp. 373-375; V.A. Maklakov, *Vlast' i obshchestvennost' na zakate staroj*

- Rossii* (1936), pp. 127–131. In the relevant literature these years are frequently interpreted as a turning point: Fischer, *Russian Liberalism*, pp. 72, 76–77; Laue, *Witte*, p. 31; D. Geyer, *Lenin in der russischen Sozialdemokratie* (1962), pp. 1–4.
39. Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 379–380.
 40. D.I. Shakhovskoj, 'V gody pereloma', *Vestnik sel'skogo khozyajstva*, Vol. 20 (1920), No. 4, p. 25; D.N. Shipov, *Vospominaniya i dumy o perezhitom* (1918), pp. 58–60.
 41. Veselovskij, Vol. 3, p. 377.
 42. Laue, *Witte*, pp. 135–138, 168–169.
 43. Cf. *OD*, Vol. 1, p. 270.
 44. On the Committees on Illiteracy see *NES*, Vol. 22, pp. 348–350; Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 385–387. The Pirogov Society's activity in famine relief in 1899–1901 is documented in *Osv* 9, pp. 137–139.
 45. See the Free Economic Society's petition mentioned under Note 42 above, the writings of K.F. Golovin, P.K. Shvanebakh, S. Sharapov, I.Kh. Ozerov (quoted by Laue, *Witte*, pp. 277–290) and A.V. Peshekhonov, *Ekonomicheskaya politika samodержaviya* (1906).
 46. The cry of the starving – 'Khrista radi, khleba!' (Bread, for Christ's sake!) – had become an ever recurrent topos in 1891–1892 in newspapers and journals.
 47. Cf. Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 380–384.
 48. See on this point and the following P. Flora, *Indikatoren der Modernisierung. Ein historisches Datenhandbuch* (1975) and W.W. Eason, 'Population Changes', in Black (ed.), *Transformation*, pp. 72–90.
 49. A.S. Nifontov, 'Formirovanie klassov burzhuaznogo obshchestva v russkom gorode vtoroj poloviny XIX veka', *IZ* 54 (1955), pp. 239–250.
 50. G. Guroff, S.F. Starr, 'A Note on Urban Literacy in Russia, 1890–1914', *JGO*, Vol. 19 (1971), pp. 523–524.
 51. See P.L. Alston, *Education and the State in Tsarist Russia* (1969), p. 44.
 52. V.R. Lejkina-Svirskaya, *Intelligentsiya v Rossii vo vtoroj polovine XIX veka* (1971), pp. 51–52.
 53. Lejkina-Svirskaya, p. 52; Alston, pp. 96–97, 131, 161–162.
 54. Quoted by Alston, p. 123.
 55. Lejkina-Svirskaya, p. 52 reckons on 200,000 university students from 1860 to the end of the century.
 56. G.I. Shchetinina, *Universitety v Rossii i ustav 1884 goda* (1976), p. 75.
 57. Lejkina-Svirskaya, pp. 67–70; cf. Shchetinina, pp. 190–192.
 58. Individual figures in Lejkina-Svirskaya, p. 55 et passim. This refers mainly to the Military Medical Academy, the Polytechnical Institutes in Riga, St. Petersburg and Moscow, the Institute of Road Construction Engineers *inter alia*.
 59. *Ibidem*, p. 120; Shchetinina, p. 43.
 60. Lejkina-Svirskaya, pp. 117, 118, 147–173.
 61. This problem is handled thoroughly by Alston, passim. – In the considerations above, the special characteristics of religious and military university education are not taken into account. Graduates of these teaching institutions occur in such small numbers in the groups dealt with by this study that they could be disregarded.
 62. The following is based on the national data of the 1897 census and selected statistics for the years 1880, 1895 and 1900 from 6–8 universities, prepared by Lejkina-Svirskaya, pp. 52–53, 60–66. The material is in part so defective and it works in part with such diverse basic and reference parameters that

a systematic correlation cannot be undertaken. The surveys always include under the title 'nobility' the high-ranking officials who, in accordance with the Table of Ranks introduced by Peter the Great, also became members of either the personal or hereditary nobility on attaining the relevant official position. Industrial workers are ascribed to the classes in which, according to the system of registration, they were born (more than 90% peasantry).

63. *Ibidem*, pp. 60, 105.
64. A.P. Korelin, 'Rossijskoe dvoryanstvo i ego soslovnaya organizatsiya (1861-1904 gg.)', *ISSSR*, 1971 No. 5, pp. 60-61; *Idem*, 'Dvoryanstvo v poreformennoj Rossii (1861-1904 gg.)' *IZ* 87 (1971), pp. 97-100, 155-164.
65. Korelin, 'Rossijskoe dvoryanstvo', p. 59.
66. *Ibidem*, p. 61; cf. Nifontov, 'Formirovanie klassov', pp. 243-244.
67. Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 5, p. 328. The contrast between 'educated society' and privileged society is also emphasized by I.I. Petrunkevich, *Iz zapisok obshchestvennogo deyatelya. Vospominaniya* (1934), pp. 307-308 et passim; G.B. Sliozberg, *Dorevolutsionnyj stroj Rossii* (1933), p. 100.
68. The quantifying description of intellectual professions presents great source and method difficulties. The available material has been made known by Lejkina-Svirskaya, Chaps. 3-7 under the key-words 'Officials, officers and clergy', 'Technical cadres', 'Medical doctors', 'Teachers', 'Scientists', 'Literati'. The data provided by L.K. Erman, *Intelligentsiya v pervoj russkoj revolyutsii* (1966), pp. 8-18, suffer from the uncritical treatment of the statistical material and from methodically unsatisfactory principles of classification.
69. Examples in Laue, *Witte*, pp. 136, 279-281 and Gurko, p. 169.
70. Cf. *Istoriya russkoj advokatury*, 3 vols. (1914-1916); Lejkina-Svirskaya, pp. 88-91.
71. Alston, pp. 143-145, 156.
72. *Osv* 19, p. 334. On the status of elementary teachers see Lejkina-Svirskaya, pp. 168-170.
73. The body of officials in the civil and judicial service consisted of 42,000 individuals according to the 1897 census; of these only 10% were in the rural districts. 46,000 non-established government clerks must be added to this figure. Lejkina-Svirskaya, p. 72.
74. O.W. Müller, *Intelligencija. Untersuchungen zur Geschichte eines politischen Schlagwortes* (1971), pp. 307-315.
75. Ukase to the Senate, 1st Jan. 1864, quoted in S.S. Tatishchev, *Imperator Aleksandr II*, Vol. 1 (2nd ed. 1911), p. 462. On the birth of the zemstvo see V.V. Garmiza, *Podgotovka zemskoj reformy 1864 goda* (1957); S.F. Starr, *Decentralization and Self-Government in Russia 1830-1870* (1972). On the development of zemstvo law see N.N. Avinov, 'Glavnyia cherty v istorii zakonodatel'stva o zemskikh uchrezhdeniyakh (1864-1913 gg.)' in *Yubilejnyj zemskij sbornik* (1914), pp. 1-34.
76. See L.G. Mamulova, 'Sotsial'nyj sostav uездnykh zemskikh sobranij v 1865-1886 gg.', *VMGU*, 1962 No. 6, pp. 32-48.
77. Cf. L.G. Zakharova, *Zemskaya kontrreforma 1890 g.* (1968); P.A. Zajonchkovskij, *Rossijskoe samoderzhavie v kontse XIX stoletiya* (1970), pp. 401-411. A thorough study of the effects of the 1890 statute has not yet been undertaken.
78. Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 465-466 et passim; L.D. Bryukhatov, 'Znachenie 'tret'ego elementa' v zhizni zemstva' in *Yubilejnyj zemskij sbornik*, pp. 186-205; Fischer, *Russian Liberalism*, pp. 60-62; Smith, pp. 29-30.

79. Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 465 and 494.
80. *Ibidem*, pp. 467–479.
81. *Ibidem*, p. 466. On theoretical aspects see J. Habermas, *Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie* (4th ed. 1970).
82. I.F. Gindin, 'Russkaya burzhuaziya v period kapitalizma, ee razvitie i osobennosti', *ISSSR*, 1963 No. 2, pp. 60–71; No. 3, pp. 43–49. P.A. Berlin, *Russkaya burzhuaziya v staroe i novoe vremya* (1925), pp. 112–141 still speaks of the difference between *kupechestvo* and the Western European type of bourgeoisie.
83. R. Bendix, *Work and Authority in Industry* (new ed. 1974), p. 180; Gindin, 'Russkaya burzhuaziya', *ISSSR*, 1963 No. 2, pp. 63–64.
84. Telling documents quoted in Berlin, pp. 124–125, 137–138.
85. Article 'kupechestvo' in *SIE*, Vol. 8, p. 304; cf. Nifontov, 'Formirovanie klassov', pp. 244–245.
86. Cf. Gindin, 'Russkaya burzhuaziya', *ISSSR*, 1963 No. 2, pp. 68, 71, 74; No. 3, p. 45; *OD*, Vol. 1, p. 318.
87. Ya. I. Livshin, "'Predstavitel'nye" organizatsii krupnoj burzhuazii v Rossii v kontse XIX — nachale XX vekov', *ISSSR*, 1959 No. 2, pp. 95–117; A.O. Gushka, *Predstavitel'nye organizatsii torgovo-promyshlennago klassa v Rossii* (1912); *OD*, Vol. 1, pp. 332–347.
88. On the following see Korelin, 'Dvoryanstvo'; Yu.B. Solov'ev, *Samoderzhavie i dvoryanstvo v kontse XIX veka* (1973), Chapters 3 and 4; G.T. Robinson, *Rural Russia under the Old Regime* (2nd ed. 1949), pp. 129–137.
89. Quoted in Korelin, 'Dvoryanstvo', p. 142.
90. *Ibidem*, pp. 143–144; for the regional breakdown of the data and the development of land prices see N.A. Proskuryakova, 'Razmeshchenie i struktura dvoryanskogo zemlevladieniya evropejskoj Rossii v kontse XIX — nachale XX veka', *ISSSR*, 1973 No. 1, pp. 55–75. (Unfortunately the tables in this essay contain numerous errors in calculation.)
91. This group is best researched by L.P. Minarik, 'Proizkhozhdienie i sostav zemel'nykh vladenij krupnejshikh pomeschchikov Rossii XIX — nachala XX v.' in *Materialy po istorii sel'skogo khozyajstva i krest'yanstva SSSR*, Vol. 6 (1965), pp. 356–395; *Idem*, 'Kharakteristika krupnejshykh zemlevladel'tsev Rossii kontsa XIX — nachala XX v.' in *Ezhegodnik po agrarnoj istorii vostochnoj Evropy. 1963 g.* (1964), pp. 693–708; A.M. Anfimov, *Krupnoe pomeschchich'e khozyajstvo Evropejskoj Rossii* (1969).
92. See Laue, *Witte*, pp. 170, 177–178.
93. See Korelin, 'Dvoryanstvo', pp. 146–148. The quotation below *ibidem*, p. 148.
94. Shchetinina, p. 74.
95. See Korelin, 'Dvoryanstvo', pp. 148–149.
96. See, for example, the debate, carried on since 1887, on the return of the Petrine Right of Primogeniture, i.e. the undivided heredity of inalienable goods, covered by Solov'ev, pp. 201–212. The majority of the Government commissions concerned with this question spoke without mincing matters for the aim of fortifying the medium-sized noble estate; maintenance of the large as well as the small noble properties was on the other hand not a 'national necessity'. On the policies of nobility's representations see also Korelin, 'Rossijskoe dvoryanstvo i ego soslovnaya organizatsiya, 1861–1904 gg.', *ISSSR*, 1971 No. 5; I.F. Gindin and M. Ya. Gefter, 'Trebovaniya dvoryanstva i finansovo-ekonomicheskaya politika tsarskogo pravitel'stva v 1880–1890-kh godakh', *Istoricheskij Arkhiv*, 1957 No. 4, pp. 122–155.

97. Due to a lack of relevant preliminary studies, nothing more can be said here on these urban classes than the statements made on pp. 32–33 above. According to class nomenclature, they largely coincided with the *meshchanstvo*, a class which collected up all those who could not be ascribed to the nobility, the merchantry or even the peasantry – a highly heterogeneous category, subject to taxes, conscription and, until 1863, to corporal punishment. This class covered independent master craftsmen and the bankrupt *kupets*, the small shopowner and the servants, etc. After the emancipation of the serfs, chances of advancement in the civil service and the freelance professions opened up for many *meshchane*. Cf. article ‘meshchane’ in *SIE*, Vol. 9, p. 416.
98. Cf. E.D. Kuskova, ‘Kren nalevo. Iz prozhlago’, *Sovremennyya Zapiski*, Vol. 44 (1930), pp. 375–376.
99. From *Poryadok* 1881, quoted in S.A. Muromtsev. *Sbornik statej* (1911), p. 33.
100. Extracts in English translation in P. Miliukov, *Russia and Its Crisis* (new ed. 1962), pp. 224–226.
101. On this term see Fischer, *Liberalism*, p. 3.
102. See P.I. Shlemin, ‘Zemsko-liberal’noe dvizhenie i adresa 1894–1895 g.’, *VMGU*, 1973 No. 1, pp. 60–73; F.I. Rodichev, ‘Iz vospominanij’, *Sovremennyya Zapiski*, Vol. 53 (1933), pp. 285–296.
103. Quotations taken from ‘Nikolaj II i samoderzhavie v 1903 g.’, pp. 205, 209, 214 and Laue, *Witte*, p. 193. Some fundamental statements ranging from Lev Tolstoj through to Pobedonostsev are cited in Th. von Laue, ‘Die Revolution von außen als erste Phase der russischen Revolution 1917’, *JGO*, Vol. 4 (1956), pp. 153–158 passim.
104. A.V. Peshekhonov, *Ekonomicheskaya politika samoderzhaviya* (1906), p. 28; the following quotations from pp. 55, 63, 72.
105. P. Struve, ‘Finansovo-ekonomicheskoe polozhenie Rossii i politika g. Vitte’, *Osv* 18, pp. 307–309 and No. 2(26), pp. 22–24. The quotations are taken from the second part.
106. Published under the title ‘Nikolaj II i samoderzhavie v 1903 g.’, *Byloe*, 1918 No. 2, pp. 190–222. Reports for the other years of interest here have not been published.
107. *Ibidem*, p. 204. — Kireev, a retired general de suite, had suggested in a memorandum a sort of provincial constitution in order to stem the bureaucracy’s power. The memorandum was suppressed by the Ministry of the Interior.
108. Cf. the article ‘Sovremennoe polozhenie Rossii i vidy na budushchee’, *Osv* 10, pp. 152–153, signed ‘Professor’, which draws the parallels from the point of view of economical and institutional history.
109. P. Miliukov, *Russia and Its Crisis. Crane Lectures for 1903* (1905), quoted here from the new edition dated 1962; the following quotations from pp. 335, 340.
110. See *ibidem*, pp. 407–409.
111. E. Trubetzkoi, ‘Die Universitätsfrage’ in J. Melnik (ed.), *Russen über Rußland* (1906), p. 21.
112. On these events see P.S. Gusyatnikov, *Revolutsionnoe studencheskoe dvizhenie v Rossii 1899–1907* (1971), pp. 31–41; *OD*, Vol. 1, pp. 273–276.
113. The most important outcome of the commission was the circular issued by the Minister for People’s Enlightenment, dated 8th July 1899, which

- severely criticized the bureaucratization of gymnasium education because it ignored the student's individual personality and did not promote his mental maturity. Alston, pp. 140 and 155.
114. See *OD*, Vol. 1, pp. 276–283; Gusyatnikov, *Revolutsionnoe studencheskoe dvizhenie*, pp. 45–94; student movement documents in *KA*, Vol. 75 (1936), pp. 83–112; Vol. 89–90 (1938), pp. 258–308.
 115. 'Nikolaj II i samoderzhavie', pp. 194–195.
 116. *OD*, Vol. 1, pp. 205–207.
 117. Documents in *KA*, Vol. 75 (1936), pp. 102–107. Eye-witness reports in A. Tyrkova-Vil'yams, *Na putyakh k svobode* (1952), pp. 64–72; D. Sverchikov, *Na zare revolyutsii* (3rd ed. 1925), pp. 35–37; A.A. Savel'ev, 'Na zare osvoboditel'nago dvizheniya', *Golos Minuvshago*, 1914 No. 1, pp. 175–176.
 118. *Osv* 14, p. 218; A. Kaun, *Maxim Gorkij and His Russia* (new ed. 1968), p. 324; p. 321 on Gorkij's previous efforts towards a protest action against the 'Provisional Regulations'.
 119. *OD*, Vol. 1, pp. 279 and 385; N. Mogilyanskij, 'Na rubezhe stoletij', *Golos Minuvshago. Na chuzhoj storone*, 1926 No. 4, p. 109.
 120. See e.g. SSO, pp. 84–85; I.V. Gessen, *V dvukh vekakh* (1937), pp. 159–160; Savel'ev, p. 159.
 121. *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 2 (May 1901), p. 2.
 122. L. Gumplowicz in *Socialistische Monatshefte* (1902), quoted by Geyer, *Lenin*, p. 260. See also [Chernov], 'Terroristicheskij element v nashej programme', *Revolutsionnaya Rossiya*, No. 7 (June 1902), pp. 2–5.
 123. D.R. Brower, *Training the Nihilists. Education and Radicalism in Tsarist Russia* (1975) – Chap. 1 is particularly relevant here.
 124. Quoted by Korelin, 'Rossijskoe dvoryanstvo', p. 79 n. 97.
 125. *Osv* 1, p. 5.
 126. Maklakov, p. 136.
 127. Cf. the documentation in *Osv* 6 (30), pp. 97–100.
 128. For the details see Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 525–547.
 129. *Ibidem*, p. 546; Belokonskij, pp. 132–136.
 130. Miliukov, *Crisis*, p. 376 with statistics on political crimes for the years 1894–1903. Measures against leading zemstvo men are given by Belokonskij, p. 102. The head of the Interior Minister's office, D.N. Lyubimov reports on a special dossier on distinguished zemstvo men, professors and intellectuals which, according to the Police Department, was kept by the office of the Ministry of the Interior ('Otryvki iz vospominanij Lyubimova', pp. 72–75); it is said to have dealt entirely with very honourable people, recognized as non-revolutionaries, but Pleve nonetheless considered it his duty to subdue them.
 131. A tragic example is offered by General Vannovskij's period in office as Minister for People's Enlightenment. His appointment as successor to the assassinated Bogolepov in 1901 was intended to pacify the students. But the almost 80-year-old General, although he had the best intentions, was soon exhausted by public mistrust and resistance from the court camarilla. He was dismissed as early as 1902 under somewhat dishonourable circumstances. See 'Dnevnik Polovtseva', *KA*, Vol. 3, pp. 84–88 and 134–135. Alston, pp. 160–165, has thrown light on the obscure picture frequently presented by the Minister.

132. See Yu.B. Solov'ev, 'Samoderzhavie i dvoryanskij vopros v kontse XIX v.', *IZ* 88 (1971), pp. 150-209.
133. Quoted by Korelin, 'Rossijskoe dvoryanstvo', p. 80.
134. Quoted *ibidem*, p. 78, n. 96.
135. Quoted in H. Rogger, 'Reflections on Russian Conservatism: 1861-1905', *JGO*, Vol. 14 (1966), p. 209.
136. *Ibidem*, p. 210. Cf. H. Rogger, 'The Formation of the Russian Right, 1900-1906', *California Slavic Studies*, Vol. 3 (1964), pp. 66-94.
137. Nötzold, p. 185; Laue, *Witte*, p. 250; Berlin, pp. 139-141.
138. Cf. I.F. Gindin, 'Neustavnye ssudy Gosudarstvennogo Banka i ekonomicheskaya politika tsarskogo pravitel'stva', *IZ* 35 (1950), pp. 87-126; Gindin, 'Russkaya burzhuaziya', *ISSSR*, 1963 No. 2, pp. 75-76; Berlin, pp. 134-135, 165-166.
139. On labour policies see A.F. Vovchik, *Politika tsarizma po rabochemu voprosu v predrevolyutsionnyi period* (1964); V.Ya. Laverychev, *Tsarizm i rabochij vopros v Rossii* (1972), Chap. 3; J. Walkin, 'Attitudes of the Tsarist Government Toward the Labor Problem', *ASEER*, Vol. 13 (1954), pp. 163-184; G.V. Rimlinger, 'The Management of Labor Protest in Tsarist Russia, 1870-1905', *International Review of Social History*, Vol. 5, (1960), pp. 226-248; Th. von Laue, 'Tsarist Labor Policy, 1895-1903', *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. 34 (1962), pp. 135-145. On *zubatovshchina* see also K. Tidmarsh, 'The Zubatov Idea', *ASEER*, Vol. 19 (1960), pp. 335-346; J.L.H. Keep, *The Rise of Social Democracy in Russia* (1963), pp. 102-106.
140. *OD*, Vol. 1, pp. 217-218; 'Otryvki iz vospominanij Lyubimova', pp. 76-77.
141. Vitte, Vol. 2, pp. 219-220. Cf. Gurko, pp. 215-217.
142. From 1890 to 1900 the number of industrial workers grew by 66.6% to 2.37 million, but the number of industrial enterprises on the other hand grew by only 18.3%. P.I. Lyashchenko, *Istoriya narodnogo khozyajstva SSSR*, Vol. 2 (1948), pp. 148-149. To these must be added the workers on the national railways (554,400 employees in 1900), the postal and telegraph workers, those employed in building, shipping, trade, transport and small industry, all of which are not included in the figures above. See A.G. Rashin, *Formirovanie rabocheho klassa Rossii* (1958).
143. An informative survey of the workers' movement from 1890 to 1904 is given in *OD*, Vol. 1, pp. 183-229.
144. See L.I. Emelyakh, 'Krest'yanskoe dvizhenie v Poltavskoj i Khar'kovskoj guberniyakh v 1902 g.', *IZ* 38 (1951), pp. 154-175; the report for *Poltava* in *Osv* 2, pp. 23-25 and constant reporting in this periodical.
145. *OD*, Vol. 1, pp. 188-195; R. Pipes, *Social Democracy and the St. Petersburg Labor Movement, 1885-1897* (1963), pp. 99-116.
146. Cf. Lenin's brochure 'Novyj fabrichnyj zakon' in Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 2, pp. 263-314. For origins of the statute see Vovchik, pp. 172-186.
147. On Social Democracy see *inter alia* Geyer, *Lenin*; Keep, *The Rise*; A.K. Wildman, *The Making of a Workers' Revolution* (1967). On the Socialist Revolutionaries see M. Hildermeier, *Die Sozialrevolutionäre Partei Rußlands. Agrarsozialismus und Modernisierung im Zarenreich (1900-1914)*, Köln-Wien 1978.
148. Kuskova, 'Kren nalevo', p. 375.
149. Printed in *Osv* 11, p. 177.
150. Cf. 'Zapiska grafa P.A. Gejdena o zemskikh s"ezdakh (1905 g.)' in *Trudy Imp. Vol'nago Ekonomicheskago Obshchestva*, (1907), Vol. 2, pp. 6-10.

151. Text to be found in Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 6, pp. 349–355, letter of the ‘Starye Zemtsy’. Among other points to be discussed were cancellation of the class franchise for the zemstvo assemblies, the extension of responsibilities and the right to amalgamation in zemstvo congresses, equality of civil rights for peasants, progressive taxation, etc.
152. The appeal is said to have been the outcome of a secret conference at the end of June 1901 (Veselovskij, Vol. 3, p. 555). Lenin devotes a notice in *Iskra*, No. 8 (10th September 1901), to a conference of 40–50 zemstvo men from various governments without mentioning the appeal, which was first published in *Iskra* in March 1902. Fischer, *Liberalism*, p. 126, describes the conference without further verification as an ‘Osvobozhdenie meeting’. But in contemporary reports and in memoirs the appeal is not connected with the groups which later supported *Osvobozhdenie*. In 1902 a second ‘Starye zemtsy’ appeal appeared in the PSR publication *Revolyutsionnaya Rossiya*; A. Egorov assumes the same people are behind this appeal as in 1901 (*OD*, Vol. 1, p. 389). But *Osv* 14, p. 218 disassociated itself from this second appeal.
153. See E.D. Chermenskij, *Burzhuaizya i tsarizm v Pervoj Russkoj Revolyutsii* (1970), pp. 19–21. Also the story of a draft petition by prominent zemstvo men on which the initiators could not after all reach agreement: Shipov, *Vospominaniya*, pp. 135, 150–155.
154. Maklakov, p. 151.
155. Quoted in Chermenskij, p. 20.
156. Cf. M. Pokrowski, *Geschichte Rußlands von seiner Entstehung bis zur neuesten Zeit* (1929), pp. 304, 345–349, 454–458; A.G. Slonimskij, ‘Kontrevolyutsionnaya rol’ liberal’noj burzhuaizii nakanune i vo vremya pervoj russkoj revolyutsii’, *Uchenye zapiski Tadzhikskogo Gos. Universiteta*, Vol. 9 (1955), pp. 124–127; Chermenskij, pp. 17 and 29.
157. Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 6, pp. 355–358.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO: ‘TOWARDS A CONSTITUTIONALIST PROGRAMME’

1. K. von Beyme, *Politische Soziologie im zaristischen Rußland* (1965), p. 3.
2. Cf. A. Gerschenkron, ‘The Problem of Economic Development in Russian Intellectual History of the Nineteenth Century’ in E.J. Simmons (ed.), *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought* (2nd ed. 1967), pp. 11–39.
3. These controversies have often been depicted, so details are not necessary here. Apart from the literature already cited in Chap. 1, see also L.H. Haimson, *The Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism* (1955); A.P. Mendel, *Dilemmas of Progress in Tsarist Russia* (1961); A. Walicki, *The Controversy over Capitalism* (1969); S.M. Schwarz, ‘Populism and Early Russian Marxism On Ways of Economic Development of Russia (The 1880s and 1890s)’ in Simmons (ed.), *Continuity and Change*, pp. 40–62; Th. von Laue, ‘The Fate of Capitalism in Russia: The Narodnik Version’, *ASEER*, Vol. 13 (1954), pp. 11–28. On the term Populism as used here see A. Walicki, Chap. 1.
4. A.A. Kizevetter, *Na rubezhe dvukh stoletij* (1929), pp. 211–212, 214, on the atmosphere of the disputes pp. 211–220. That those taking part in the discussion covered only a narrow section of the public is emphasized by

- Laue, 'Fate of Capitalism', pp. 15-16 as well as the far-reaching effects on all intellectual life beyond the narrower circle of participants.
5. On this term see Geyer, *Lenin*, p. 249; M. Hildermeier, 'Neopopulismus und Industrialisierung', *JGO*, Vol. 22 (1974), pp. 367-368.
 6. Cf. Ch.E. Timberlake, 'The Concept of Liberalism in Russia', in Timberlake (ed.), *Essays on Russian Liberalism* (1972), pp. 1-17.
 7. Brokgauz-Efron, Supplement 3 (1906), p. 76.
 8. On the following see Fischer, *Liberalism*, Chap. 3: 'Third Force', in an extended version under the title 'Russian Intelligentsia and Liberalism' in *Russian Thought and Politics* (1957), pp. 317-336.
 9. Cf. Walicki, Chap. 2: 'Classical Populism and Its Predicaments'.
 10. Quoted *ibidem*, p. 53. On Mikhajlovskij see also J.H. Billington, *Mikhajlovskij and Russian Populism* (1958).
 11. Cf. S.V. Utechin, *Geschichte der politischen Ideen in Rußland* (1966), pp. 130-131; Billington, pp. 146-153.
 12. V. Burtsev, *Za sto let*, Vol. 1 (1897), pp. 251-256, here p. 255.
 13. Quoted by Galai, *LM*, pp. 63-64.
 14. Complete text in Burtsev, Vol. 1, pp. 260-262.
 15. Galai, *LM*, pp. 60-65 has rediscovered the Party for the history of Russian constitutionalism. The only monograph is: V.V. Shirokova, *Partiya 'Narodnogo Prava'. Iz istorii osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniya 90-kh godov XIX veka* (1972).
 16. Galai, *LM*, p. 59 et passim.
 17. Fischer, *Liberalism*, p. 94.
 18. Quoted in Billington, p.V.
 19. Cf. Billington, pp. 156-157; Fischer, *Liberalism*, pp. 88-96.
 20. See Billington on this, pp. 162-172.
 21. Quoted *ibidem*, p. 173.
 22. On Nikolaj-on, *Očerki nashego poreformennago obshchestvennago khozyajstva* (1893) see Walicki, pp. 121-127 et passim; Geyer, *Lenin*, p. 13.
 23. M. Gor'kij, *Sobranie Sochinenij v 30-kh tomakh*, Vol. 15 (1951), p. 38.
 24. A.V. Peshekhonov, *Na ocherednye temy* (1904), pp. 10-11.
 25. On the origin and meaning of the term 'legal marxism' see R. Kindersley, *The First Russian Revisionists* (1962), pp. 231-233; various divergent interpretations are given pp. 222-233. Cf. V.P. Buldakov, 'Istoriograficheskaya problematika "legal'nogo marksizma"', *IZ* 87 (1971), pp. 287-333.
 26. P.B. Struve, *Kriticheskie zametki k voprosu ob ekonomicheskom razvitii Rossii* (1894), p. 288.
 27. R. Pipes, *Struve. Liberal on the Left, 1870-1905* (1970), pp. 116-117; Billington, p. 165.
 28. Quoted in Pipes, *Struve*, p. 104 n.
 29. On Struve's origins and career see Pipes, *Struve*, Chap. 1; cf. the comments on Struve's personality and his insufficient qualities for political leadership, pp. 74-76.
 30. P. Struve, 'My Contacts and Conflicts with Lenin, II', *SEER*, Vol. 13 (1934-1935), p. 75; Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 190-193.
 31. See his report on the International Congress for Worker Protection in Zurich in 1897, quoted in Geyer, *Lenin*, p. 161.
 32. Cf. Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 184-189, 293-307.
 33. Quoted in Fischer, 'Russian Intelligentsia and Liberalism', p. 328.
 34. Text of the Manifesto in *Bor'ba za sozdanie marksistskoj partii v Rossii*.

- Obrazovanie RSDRP. Voznikovenie bol'shevizma, 1894-1904 gg.* (1961), pp. 118-120, here p. 119; English translation in Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 193-196, here p. 195.
35. Extracts from the article quoted by Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 252-253.
 36. *Samoderzhavie i zemstvo* (1901), Predislovie.
 37. See Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 293-307.
 38. Thus A.N. Potresov to Lenin on 2.6.1899, quoted in a letter from Lenin to Potresov dated 27.6.1899, Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 46, pp. 31-32.
 39. On the following see Kindersley, pp. 189-192; Geyer, *Lenin*, pp. 90-93 et passim.
 40. Galai, *LM*, pp. 61-63, 74-83 is informative on the early history of this pair; on the development of their theory see also Fischer, *Liberalism*, pp. 108-112.
 41. Printed in Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 4, pp. 165-169. Cf. Kuskova's own version of her conflict with the Geneva group and origins of the 1899 document in her review of 'F. Dan, Iz istorii rabochego dvizheniya i sotsial-demokratii v Rossii 1900-1906 gg.' in *Byloe*, 1906 No. 10, pp. 320-330, particularly relevant here pp. 324-326.
 42. Quoted in Geyer, *Lenin*, p. 147.
 43. Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 4, p. 168.
 44. See the characterizations of the group in I.V. Gessen, pp. 167, 199; P.N. Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, p. 193.
 45. A.V. Peshekhonov, 'Pochemu my togda ushli', *Russkoe Bogatstvo*, 1917 No. 11-12, p. 329. Peshekhonov still had a few articles published in *Revolyutsionnaya Rossiya* up till 1905; he also wrote pamphlets and proclamations for SR groups occasionally and was in contact with Evno Azef, then still a leading member of the 'Fighting Organization' and the Central Committee of the PSR. In 1903 he played the part of self-appointed umpire in the internal party affair over Krest'yaninov, which threw the first shadow of doubt on Azef, later exposed as an agent provocateur. (See A.V. Peshekhonov, 'Moi otnosheniya s Azefom', *Na chuzhoj storone*, Vol. 5 (1924), pp. 53-69). In 1905, the year of the revolution, the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* group drew very close to the PSR, but soon fell out with it again over the question of terrorism and land nationalization and formed, in 1906, the core of the small 'People's Socialist Party'. (Cf. V. Chernov, 'Ot "Revolyutsionnoj Rossii" k "Synu Otechestva"', *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, Kniga 1, Berlin 1923, pp. 66-98; Peshekhonov, 'Pochemu my togda ushli', pp. 327-350; N.D. Erofeev, 'Liberal nye narodniki zhurnala "Russkoe Bogatstvo" v 1905 g.', *VMGU*, 1973 No. 3, pp. 32-46.)
 46. Letter from Tugan-Baranovskij to A.N. Potresov in Vyatka, *Sotsial-demokraticeskoe dvizhenie v Rossii*, Vol. 1 (1928), p. 38.
 47. Geyer, *Lenin*, pp. 134-138, 188-189; Fischer, *Liberalism*, p. 109.
 48. 'Protest Rossijskikh Sotsial-demokratov' in Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 4, pp. 163-176, containing the unabridged Kuskova text. Cf. J. Martow, *Geschichte der russischen Sozialdemokratie* (1926), pp. 54-55. According to Kindersley, p. 192, the paper reached Lenin with Struve's assistance. The designation 'credo' was originated by Lenin's sister (Geyer, *Lenin*, p. 178 n.).
 49. Kuskova, review on F. Dan, *loc. cit.*, p. 325. In October 1900 A.A. Yakubova wrote on the same lines to Lenin: 'What is more I do not really know if there are many 'creedists' here and whether they are active. If not, then one should not talk about them'. *Leninskij Sbornik*, Vol. 13 (1930), p. 105.
 50. On the family history see Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, pp. 19-21.

51. Kizevetter, pp. 86–88, 246; V.M. Chernov, *Pered burej* (1953), pp. 69–72; Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, pp. 156–165; P.N. Milyukov, *Sbornik materialov po chestvovaniya ego semidesyatiletiiya* (1930), pp. 4–5.
52. Further information on Milyukov's development given in Th. Riha, *A Russian European. Paul Miliukov in Russian Politics* (1969), Chap. 1 and 2; M. Karpovich, 'Two Types of Russian Liberalism. Maklakov and Miliukov' in Simmons (ed.), *Continuity and Change*, pp. 129–143; A. Goldenweiser, 'Paul Miliukov – Historian and Statesman', *Russian Review*, Vol. 16 (1957), No. 2, pp. 3–14.
53. Gessen, pp. 200–201, also for the following quotation.
54. Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, pp. 193–194.
55. *Ibidem*, p. 193. Milyukov had been introduced to the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* group by his colleague Myakotin.
56. P. Milyukov, *Ocherki po istorii russkoj kultury*, Vol. 1 (4th ed. 1900), p. 18.
57. *Mir Bozhi*, 1895–1902. The edition in book form (St. Petersburg 1896–1903) was re-issued several times up to the 1917 Revolution. See the complete bibliography of Milyukov's works to 1930 in P.N. Milyukov, *Sbornik materialov*, pp. 313–351.
58. Riha, p. 31.
59. See above p. 48.
60. Milyukov takes up this expression by James Bryce in 1905 in a polemical article against D.N. Shipov: P.N. Milyukov, *God bor'by* (1907), p. 22.
61. *Osv* 1, p. 12. Cf. the generally parallel references in Milyukov, *Ocherki*, Vol. 1, pp. 236–239.
62. Milyukov, *God bor by*, p. 22.
63. Fischer, 'Russian Intelligentsia', p. 317.
64. D. Lane, *The Roots of Russian Communism* (1969), pp. 35–37.
65. M. Hildermeier, 'Zur Sozialstruktur der Führungsgruppen und zur terroristischen Kampfmethod der Sozialrevolutionären Partei Rußlands vor 1917', *JGO*, Vol. 20 (1972), pp. 527–528.
66. Calculated from a sample of 122 out of 164 named members. See Appendix II.
67. Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, p. 194.
68. *Ibidem*, p. 174.
69. Quoted in Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 306–307.
70. SSO, p. 85.
71. Sverchkov, pp. 19–20. Sverchkov was Bogucharskij's nephew and was living at the time as a student in his family.
72. E. Brojdo, 'Gruppy "Sotsialist" i "Rabochaya Biblioteka" 1899–1901 gg.', *Letopis' Revolyutsii*, Kniga 1, Berlin 1923, pp. 127–128. Cf. V. Ya. Laverychev, 'Obshchaya tendentsiya razvitiya burzhuanzno-liberal'nogo dvizheniya v Rossii v kontse XIX – nachale XX veka', *ISSSR*, 1976 No. 3, p. 56.
73. Cf. Geyer, *Lenin*, pp. 182–186. The 'trojka's' plan of action is outlined in three articles written by Lenin in October 1899, first published in 1925: 'Nasha programma', 'Nasha blizhajshaya zadacha', 'Nasushchnyj vopros' in *Leninskij Sbornik*, Vol. 3 (1925), pp. 14–30 (Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 4, pp. 182–198). On Struve's relationship with Lenin see P. Struve, 'My Contacts and Conflicts with Lenin', *SEER*, Vol. 12 (1933–1934), pp. 573–595; Vol. 13 (1934–1935), pp. 66–84; Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 125–143, 152–153, 166, 214–215, 237–244. On Struve's long-standing friendship with Potresov see *ibidem*, pp. 69–73, 122–146 passim, 171–173 and frequent mentions.

74. See above p. 75.
75. The negotiations are described in detail in Geyer, *Lenin*, pp. 199–202, 215–218; Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 250–269; L.V. Shirikov, 'Vremennyye soglasheniya russkikh sotsial-demokratov s burzhuaznymi liberalami', *Voprosy Istorii KPSS*, 1961 No. 4, pp. 139–144. See also the memoir fragment of L. Martov, 'Pskov', *Leninskij Sbornik*, Vol. 4 (1925), pp. 55–61 and A.N. Potresov in *Sotsial-demokraticeskoe dvizhenie v Rossii*, Vol. 1, pp. 356–357, as well as Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 4, pp. 386–388 and Struve, 'My Contacts and Conflicts. II'; pp. 75–79.
76. Struve, 'My Contacts and Conflicts. II', p. 66.
77. Martov in *Leninskij Sbornik*, Vol. 4, p. 55.
78. *Ibidem*, p. 57. The theoretical outlines of the hegemony thesis were supplied by P. Aksel'rod: 'Die historische Berechtigung der russischen Sozialdemokratie', *Die Neue Zeit*, Vol. 16 (1897–1898), Part 2, pp. 100–111, 140–149. See on this Lenin's letter to Potresov, 26.1.1899, Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 46, pp. 19–21. Potresov gives his fundamental opinion on the hegemony theory in *OD*, Vol. 1, pp. 613–614.
79. Belokonskij, p. 92. The offer was made in February 1900, the unnamed sponsor was probably Dmitriy E. Zhukovskij, a rich landowner, publisher and translator of Kant (Pipes, *Struve*, p. 254), who later took an interest in the 'Iskra' nominal capital with 1,000 roubles (Martov in *Leninskij Sbornik*, Vol. 4, p. 58).
80. Struve, 'My Contacts and Conflicts. II', p. 75.
81. Text published for the first time in Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 4, pp. 389–390.
82. Aksel'rod's letter to Struve, undated, *Perepiska G.V. Plekhanova i P.B. Aksel'roda*, Vol. 2 (1925), pp. 141–142.
83. See Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 4, pp. 334–352; G.V. Plekhanov, 'O moem sekrete' (1910) in *Sochineniya*, Vol. 19 (1927), pp. 93–94; Struve, 'My Contacts and Conflicts. II', p. 76.
84. Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 4, pp. 354–360.
85. According to Lenin's letter to Plekhanov dated (17th)/30th January 1901, (Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 46, pp. 79–81) the relevant point was eliminated, despite Lenin's resistance. This dispels the doubts expressed by Pipes, *Struve*, p. 266, on the authenticity of the published text of the contract.
86. Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 46, p. 80.
87. Struve, 'My Contacts and Conflicts. II', pp. 78–79, the following quotation on p. 81.
88. Brojdo, 'Gruppy "Sotsialist" i "Rabochaya Biblioteka"', pp. 126–133. This was a small, very active group, opposed to the Petersburg economist social democracy, with connections in Vil'na and London. The group was, however, broken up by the police as early as spring, 1901. See also Wildman, pp. 210–212.
89. Ch.E. Timberlake, 'Ivan Il'ich Petrunkevich' in Timberlake (ed.), *Essays*, p. 35 n. and S. Galai, 'A Note on the Establishment of the Liberation Movement', *Russian Review*, Vol. 37 (1978), pp. 308–312 with quotations from two letters from I.I. Petrunkevich to his son Alexander dated 7th August and 17th December 1900. Apparently Struve met Petrunkevich for another conversation in Tver' on the eve of his departure for Munich.
90. Pipes, *Struve*, p. 269. The Memorandum was acquired at the end of 1899 by P.S. Sheremetev, co-founder of the aristocratic *Beseda* group, for a bribe (?) of 100 roubles and was obviously circulated by *Beseda* in zemstvo groups.

- Shatsillo, 'Novoe o "Soyuze Osvobozhdeniya"', *ISSSR*, 1975 No. 4, p. 134.
91. Pipes, *Struve*, p. 266. Galai, *LM*, p. 98 thinks differently, without concrete documentation; in his 'Note on the Establishment of the Liberation Movement', p. 311 Galai argues with more restraint that in the outcome of Struve's conversations with Petrunkevich in 1900 'the foundation, at least, of an agreement had been laid down'.
 92. The Plekhanov and Struve texts, till then unpublished, are given in abbreviated form by Potresov in *OD*, Vol. 1, pp. 615-616; quoted here according to the English translation of Struve's text in Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 268-269.
 93. Lenin announced Struve's imminent departure to Aksel'rod under this date. Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 46, p. 88.
 94. Belokonskij, p. 92 according to direct information from someone unnamed, who can only be Bogucharskij. On this identification see Struve, 'My Contacts and Conflicts. II', p. 77 and below pp. 94-97.
 95. Cf. above pp. 49-50.
 96. Cf. Fischer, *Liberalism*, pp. 28-37; B.B. Veselovskij, *Istoricheskij ocherk deyatel'nosti zemskikh uchrezhdenij Tverskoj gubernii* (1914).
 97. P. Struve, 'My Contacts with Rodichev', *SEER*, Vol. 12, (1933-1934) pp. 346-367; Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 154-156.
 98. See Timberlake, 'Petrunkevich' in Timberlake (ed.), *Essays*, pp. 18-41; F. Rodichev, 'The Veteran of Russian Liberalism: Ivan Petrunkevich', *Slavonic Review*, Vol. 7 (1928), pp. 316-326; Fischer, *Liberalism*, pp. 31-38.
 99. For details see Galai, *LM*, pp. 11-18.
 100. F. Rodichev, 'The Liberal Movement in Russia', *Slavonic Review*, Vol. 2 (1923-1924), p. 7. On the development of the legend about the 'First Zemstvo Movement' see now S. Galai, 'Early Russian Constitutionalism, "Vol'noe Slovo" and the "Zemstvo Union"', *JGO*, Vol. 22 (1974), pp. 35-55.
 101. Petrunkevich, pp. 265-266; Shakhovskoj, 'V gody pereloma', p. 24, Rodichev, 'The Veteran', p. 321.
 102. Petrunkevich, pp. 276-279.
 103. Shlemin, 'Zemsko-liberal'noe dvizhenie i adresa 1894-1895 g.', *VMGU*, 1973 No. 1, pp. 60-73.
 104. Petrunkevich, pp. 296-297; Shakhovskoj, 'V gody pereloma', p. 24.
 105. Rodichev, 'The Liberal Movement', p. 249.
 106. Shlemin, pp. 60-61, 72.
 107. Shakhovskoj, Autobiography in *RV Sbornik*, Appendix, p. 199; S. Mirnyj [D.I. Shakhovskoj] *Adresy zemstv 1894-1895 i ikh politicheskaya programma* (1896), p. 3.
 108. See Petrunkevich's memorandum 'Blizhajshiya zadachi zemstva' dated 1879, given in Petrunkevich, pp. 453-456. This text is said to be the first demanding the constituent assembly in Russia: see Timberlake, 'Petrunkevich', p. 31.
 109. Petrunkevich, p. 274.
 110. *Ibidem*, p. 298.
 111. Timberlake, 'Petrunkevich', p. 34 n.; Galai, 'A Note', p. 312.
 112. Petrunkevich, p. 336.
 113. *Ibidem*, pp. 336-337; SSO, p. 85.
 114. Petrunkevich, p. 337; Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, pp. 197-198.

115. SSO, p. 85. So it was known in the Petrunkevich group who was taking cover behind the pseudonym R.N.S. (cf. p. 86 above).
116. Struve, 'My Contacts and Conflicts. II', p. 81.
117. Pipes, *Struve*, p. 312.
118. Cf. Galai, *LM*, pp. 57, 101, 116–117 and Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 310–316, who extrapolate different stories from the scarce sources.
119. Pipes, *Struve*, p. 311. According to Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, pp. 197–198, Zhukovskij first offered him the editorship on behalf of Petrunkevich; Zhukovskij then served afterwards as intermediary between him and Petrunkevich.
120. Immediately after his arrival abroad, Struve contacted Aksel'rod and Lenin's wife N. Krupskaya (she was a schoolfriend of Nina Struve), but these were obviously only social calls. See Pipes, *Struve*, p. 313; Krupskaya's report on the meeting in *Leninskij Sbornik*, Vol. 3, pp. 43–44. Lenin's polemic article attacking Struve's foreword to the Vitte Memorandum, 'Goniteli zemstva i Annibali liberalizma' (Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 5, pp. 21–72), which deeply offended Struve (Struve, 'My Contacts and Conflicts. II', p. 78), appeared only in December 1901, so it cannot have influenced Struve's decisions.
121. SSO, p. 85.
122. Struve expressly points out his formal independence of the 'Union of Liberation' in *Osv* 61 (1904), p. 185. The informal nature of the relationship is also acknowledged by Pipes, *Struve*, p. 318; but he follows Struve's ideology of the liberation movement too closely when he characterizes *Osvobozhdenie* as a 'national forum of opinion, independent of the editor, who managed it, and the constitutionalists, who financed it'.
123. Belokonskij, pp. 92–94.
124. *Ibidem*, p. 93; S.F. Frank, *Biografiya P.B. Struve* (1956), p. 31.
125. E. Kuskova, 'Pamyati zhivoj dushi. Vasilij Yakovlevich Yakovlev-Bogucharskij', *Golos Minuvshago*, 1915 No. 7–8, p. 223, the following quotation on p. 225.
126. For the biography see V. Kranikhsfeld, 'V. Ya. Yakovlev-Bogucharskij', *Byloe*, 1917 No. 1 (23), pp. 229–253; No. 2 (24), pp. 218–231, and Appendix I pp. 256–257 above.
127. Quoted in Kuskova, 'Pamyati zhivoj dushi', p. 227. Milyukov is alluding to the fact that Bogucharskij belonged to the 'Bez zaglaviya, levee KD' group consisting of former Union of Liberation members who did not join the Cadet Party in October 1905.
128. Struve, 'My Contacts and Conflicts. II', p. 75; Kuskova, 'Pamyati zhivoj dushi', pp. 230–231.
129. E. Kuskova, 'Ob utopiyakh, real'nostyakh i zagadkakh', *Sovremennyya Zapiski*, Vol. 26 (1925), p. 371.
130. See Kuskova, 'Kren nalevo', pp. 382–383.
131. *Ibidem*, pp. 381–382.
132. Belokonskij, p. 87 (mistakenly dated 1900). Those taking part in the discussions were: I.P. Belokonskij (secretary of the Khar'kov provincial zemstvo), V. Ya. Bogucharskij (St. Petersburg), E.D. Kuskova (St. Petersburg), I.N. Komarnitskij (freelancer, Kursk) and D.I. Shakhovskoj (Yaroslavl'). Shatsillo, p. 136.
133. Shatsillo, p. 136; Petrunkevich, p. 337; Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, p. 236; the quotation SSO, p. 86.

134. Shatsillo, p. 136; SSO, p. 86; Belokonskij, p. 92.
135. See Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, pp. 236–237. Milyukov did not take part in the various conferences; shortly after his visit to Mashuk, he spent quite a long time in England.
136. SSO, p. 86.
137. See A. Tyrkova-Vil'yams, *Na putyakh k svobode* (1952), pp. 109–114; on Shakhovskoj's biography see *RV Sbornik*, Appendix pp. 196–200 and Appendix I pp. 268–269 above.
138. Shatsillo, p. 137; Potresov's letter to Lenin, (16th)/29th March 1902: '... I have just received a letter from ... [name obliterated in the original], he was visited by the calf [= Struve] and the well-known liberal Prince D. Shakhovskoj ... — a very agile person. And just imagine, they asked for help !!!', *Leninskij Sbornik*, Vol. 3, p. 288. According to Pipes, *Struve*, p. 314, Struve settled in Stuttgart in March 1902.
139. SSO, p. 86; Belokonskij, pp. 92 and 93 (only gives the participants' places of origin); Shatsillo, p. 137, discovered the names in the Bogucharskij papers. A. Kizevetter (Moscow) must be added to those named here (see Kizevetter, pp. 336–337.) The conference can be dated from the programme article, adopted with editorial alterations during the conference, which refers at the beginning to Pleve taking office as Minister of the Interior (5th April 1902). *Osv* 1, p. 7.
140. At the *Beseda* meeting on 8th January 1902, Peter Dolgorukov suggested founding an oppositional newspaper at home, 'because publication abroad would cause great difficulties'. Quoted in Shatsillo, p. 134 from Shakhovskoj's notes. For details on *Beseda* see pp. 128–137 above.
141. Published in *Osv* 1, pp. 13–14. The previously unknown signatories to the letter are named by Shatsillo, p. 136. They were the *Beseda* members N.A. Khomyakov (Moscow), Prince P.D. Dolgorukov (Kursk), Count P.A. Gejden (Pskov), F.A. Golovin (Moscow), S.A. Kotlyarevskij (Saratov), Baron A.F. Meyendorff (St. Petersburg), Prince D.I. Shakhovskoj (Yaroslavl') and A.A. Stakhovich (Elets/Orel Province) as well as the *zemtsy* [N.V.] Davydov [Moscow ?], G.R. Kilevejn (Nizhnij Novgorod), A.M. Kolyubakin (Novgorod), Mikhail I. Petrunkevich (Tver'), V.V. Usov (Sudzha/Kursk Province) and someone called Shirkov. It can not be proven that all the signatories were also members of the 'Union of Liberation' (see Appendix II).
142. See pp. 165–175 above.
143. V. Ya. Bogucharskij, 'Zemskij Soyuz ili Svyashchennaya družhina?', *Russkaya Mysl'*, 1912 No. 9, p. 81; Kizevetter, p. 337.
144. Date and names in Shatsillo, p. 137, the amount of money is given by Petrunkevich, p. 337; SSO, pp. 86–87 describes the visit, the quotation is also from this source.
145. Struve to Delbrück, 9th July 1902, quoted in Pipes, *Struve*, p. 318.
146. Shakhovskoj at the *Beseda* meeting on 27th May 1902, quoted in Shatsillo, p. 138.
147. 'Ot redaktora', 'Ot russkikh konstitutsionalistov', 'Otkrytoe pis'mo ot gruppy zemskikh deyatelej', all in *Osv* 1, pp. 1–6, 7–12, 13–14. — The references to these articles are given in brackets.
148. The phrase is used by Struve as early as 1901 in the introduction to the Vitte Memorandum (*Samoderzhavie i zemstvo*, p. VII). According to

- Treadgold, *Lenin and His Rivals* (1955), p. 125, Struve adopted the phrase from Alexander Herzen.
149. On Struve's leader cf. the review of four political-philosophical works by the author dating from 1901 in Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 293–307. They contain the philosophical reasoning for the political theses in this article. Pipes sees them as an attempt 'to formulate a consistent doctrine of democratic and national liberalism' (p. 301).
 150. Cf. also Galai, *LM*, pp. 125–126. In the following I therefore speak of Milyukov as the author, regardless of the parts by other people which can no longer be identified in detail.
 151. Galai, *LM*, pp. 117–118 gives a whole catalogue of points of agreement; apart from the one point I mention, I have not been able to find substantiation for any others either in the 1901–1902 debates (as far as they are known) or in the programme declaration itself.
 152. Cf. Introduction, p. 7 above.
 153. The extension of the suffrage beyond the zemstvo institutions derives from a proposal by Dmitrij Shakhovkoj, see Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, p. 237.
 154. On criticism of the programme article see Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, pp. 236–237 and SSO, pp. 91–94. Struve had strong reservations about the election method for the constituent assembly because it could frighten off the radicals (see Pipes, *Struve*, p. 317 n); the disadvantage of areas without zemstvo institutions was lamented in a letter to the editorial offices (*Osv* 7, p. 110).
 155. See note 141 above.
 156. See also Milyukov's critical note 'Chto takoe "konstitutsiya" Loris-Melikova?' in *Osv* 11, pp. 178–179 and the article 'Gosudarstvennyj podlog', *Osv* 3, pp. 35–38, signed *zemets*. — Milyukov signed all his articles in *Osvobozhdenie* with the Russian letters *ss* (Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, p. 235).
 157. See pp. 78–79 above.
 158. See p. 94 above.
 159. Cf. p. 45 above.
 160. On the programme discussion from this viewpoint among the Social Democrats see Geyer, *Lenin*, among the Social Revolutionaries see M. Hildermeier, 'Neopopulismus und Industrialisierung', *JGO*, Vol. 22 (1974). The problem was taken up again by the Constitutionalists in 1903–1904, on which see Chap. III.3 above.
 161. Cf. Struve's short contribution 'Razhdaetsya natsiya' in the Summer of 1905, *Osv* 74, p. 416. There has as yet been no examination of Struve's idea of nation; but see O.W. Müller, *Intelligenciya*, pp. 253–270.
 162. See pp. 63–64 above.
 163. In interpreting Struve's thesis of unity, not only the leader but also the article 'Liberalizm i t.n. "revolyutsionnye" napravleniya', which was written at the same time but printed only later, must be consulted: *Osv* 7, pp. 104–105.
 164. See e.g. Treadgold, pp. 127 et passim; Pipes, *Struve*, p. 317.
 165. This style had gained greatly in importance in legal and illegal Russian press during the preceding years. This can be seen from the increasing scope of the columns devoted to chroniclers (see also Gessen, pp. 145, 159–161). Struve himself had not been entirely without his part in this development

when he was editor of the legal marxist journals *Novoe Slovo* and *Nachalo*, 1897–1899 (see Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 180–184, 219).

166. *Osv* 7, p. 105.
167. See also Milyukov's criticism of *Osvobozhdenie* in February 1903, *Osv* 17, p. 289. See also pp. 199–200 above.
168. Cf. Pipes, *Struve*, p. 317.
169. See p. 78 above.
170. A. Kizeveter in S.A. Muromtsev. *Sbornik statej*, p. 98.
171. See pp. 57–58 above.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE: 'CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE "PUBLIC MOVEMENT", 1900–1904'

1. Constitutionalists here and in the following are those people who can be identified as founders, contributors or sympathizers of *Osvobozhdenie* or as members of the Union of Liberation. – Detailed information on the subject matter of this chapter is to be found in V. Ya. Laverychev, 'Obshchaya tendentsiya razvitiya burzhuzno-liberal'nogo dvizheniya v Rossii v kontse XIX – nachale XX veka', *ISSSR*, 1976 No. 3, pp. 46–59.
2. R.A. Kazakevich and S.Z. Mendel', *Nauchnaya i kul'turno-prosvetitel'skaya deyatel'nost' progressivnogo studenchestva 80-kh godov XIX veka. Stencheskoe nauchno-literaturnoe obshchestvo Peterburgskogo Universiteta* (1967); Shakhovskoj's autobiography in *RV Sbornik*, Appendix, pp. 196–200.
3. Peshekhonov's autobiography, *ibidem*, pp. 142–146.
4. E.g. Prokopovich and Kuskova, A.N. Maksimov (co-publisher of *Russkiiya Vedomosti*) and V.V. Khizhnyakov (Secretary of the Free Economic Society). See Galai, *LM*, pp. 61–62.
5. 'Otryvki iz vospominanij D.N. Lyubimova', p. 75; Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. I, p. 191.
6. S.I. Mitskevich, *Revolutsionnaya Moskva, 1888–1905* (1940), p. 311.
7. *Ibidem*, pp. 330–331.
8. See p. 75 above.
9. Tyrkova, pp. 105–108.
10. Gurko, pp. 169–170, 229 n; Zakharova, 'Krizis samoderzhaviya', pp. 128–129.
11. Gurko, pp. 229–233; Laue, *Witte*, pp. 276–284. The *Osvobozhdenie* sympathizers here were Count P.A. Gejden, President of the Free Economic Society, Prince Peter Dolgorukov's brother Pavel, the District Marshal of the Nobility A.V. Evreinov, who was a close friend of the Dolgorukov brothers and was married to a sister of the Moscow publisher Sabashnikov, a Council member of the Union of Liberation.
12. Gurko, p. 169.
13. For descriptions of the salons of Varvara A. and Margarita K. Morozov in Moscow, see Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, pp. 271, 278–281; S.P. Mel'gunov, *Vospominaniya i dnevniki*, Vol. 1 (1964), pp. 101–103. Andrej Belyj's novel 'St. Petersburg' is a hardly flattering memorial to the upper middle class salons of this period.
14. A.F. Koni, *Na zhiznennom puti*, Vol. 2 (1912), pp. 256–257; Gurko, p. 229 n; Laverychev, 'Obshchaya tendentsiya', pp. 49–50. Pipes, *Struve*, p. 23–

- 24, 181 emphasizes that Struve's journalism was orientated on Arsen'ev's columns in *Vestnik Evropy*.
15. Apart from Struve, other known visitors were V.D. Nabokov and I.V. Gessen from the editorial board of the juridical periodical *Pravo*, as well as S.A. Kotlyarevskij.
 16. Gessen, p. 159. In 1906 Arsen'ev founded the 'Democratic Reform Party', rather more an exclusive voters' union than a political party; it was disbanded again only one year later.
 17. Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, p. 193. Among others, he names N.A. Rubakin and both the publishers of the first comprehensive educational statistics for the Russian Empire, G.A. Fal'bork and V.I. Charnolusskij.
 18. A.K. Wildman, 'The Russian Intelligentsia of the 1890s', *ASEER*, Vol. 19 (1960), p. 157; for general details see *ibidem*, pp. 157-162.
 19. The autodidactic study circles had already played a part in the student movement around 1860; see Alston, pp. 45-49 *passim*.
 20. This applied not only to earlier, long since disbanded circles such as Struve's student group with Potresov and others (see Pipes, *Struve*, p. 70 n) or the Ryazanov circle in Moscow (see Galai, *LM*, p. 61); for a topical example see the report on the salon of Mrs. Sventitskaya in Moscow in Mitskevich, pp. 273-280.
 21. See Gussyatnikov, pp. 94-103, pp. 103-119 for involvement with the Social Democrats. The 'circle propaganda' among the peasants is documented by circulars from the Minister of the Interior and the Tver' Governor in June 1902, in Belokonskij, pp. 133-136. During these years Lenin often wrote - at length in 'What is to be done?', Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 6, pp. 100-104 - against the 'bungling' of the whole body of circles and groups which, he claimed, hindered development of a united party.
 22. See pp. 205-207 above.
 23. See e.g. the documents for the Tver' Province in *Samoderzhavie i zemstvo*, p. 167; Petrunkevich, pp. 267-268.
 24. *Samoderzhavie i zemstvo*, p. XXXVII.
 25. Petr D. Dolgorukov, 'Biografiya pokojnogo' in Pavel D. Dolgorukov, *Velikaya razrukha* (1964), p. 332.
 26. The *Beseda* is mentioned frequently in memoirs: Belokonskij, p. 80; SSO, pp. 103-105; Shakhovskoj, 'V gody pereloma', p. 27; Maklakov, *Vlast' i obshchestvennost' na zakate staroj Rossii*, pp. 291-297; Dolgorukov, pp. 331-337. Nonetheless it was neglected in historiography for a long time; E.D. Chermenskij e.g. does not mention it in the first edition of his book *Burzhuziia i Tsarizm v revolyutsii 1905-1907 gg.* (1939). It is treated for the first time, but with insufficient source material, in A.G. Slonimskij, 'Kontrevolyutsionnaya rol' liberal'noj burzhuzii nakanune i vo vremya pervoj russkoj revolyutsii', *Uchennye Zapiski Tadzhikskogo Gos. Universiteta*, Vol. 9 (1955), pp. 121-161; thereafter in Fischer, *Liberalism*, pp. 124-125; Smith, *Constitutional Democratic Movement*, pp. 159-161; Leontovitsch, pp. 268-269. The history of the *Beseda* became clearer only on the discovery and analysis of its archives in V.A. Maklakov's literary papers: still very superficial and with many errors in E.D. Chermenskij, 'Zemsko-liberal'noe dvizhenie nakanune revolyutsii 1905-1907 gg.', *ISSSR*, 1965 No. 5, pp. 41-60, corresponding to Chermenskij, *Burzhuziia i Tsarizm v Pervoj Russkoj Revolyutsii* (2nd ed. 1970), pp. 18-22; E.P. Mikhheeva, 'Neskol'ko dopolnenij k istorii "Besedy"', *ISSSR*, 1966 No. 2, pp. 241-243. Based on this, Pipes,

- Struve*, pp. 290–292 and Galai, *LM*, passim. Galai's version of the origins and role of the group is based largely on a false interpretation of some parts of D.N. Shipov's memoirs (see mainly pp. 51–57, 116, 133, 273); this version cannot be supported in detail. The most important information for the following is offered by A.S. Krasavin, 'Obzor dokumental'nykh materialov kruzhka 'Beseda' v fonde V.A. Maklakova' in *Arkheograficheskij Ezhegodnik za 1968 god* (1970), pp. 354–359; T. Emmons, 'The Beseda Circle, 1899–1905', *SR*, Vol. 32 (1973), pp. 461–490; T. Emmons, 'Additional Note on the Beseda Circle, 1899–1905', *SR*, Vol. 33 (1974), pp. 741–743; K.F. Shatsillo, 'Novoe o "Soyuze Osvobozhdeniya"', *ISSSR*, 1975 No. 4, pp. 133–135, 137–138 (here p. 134 and in Emmons, 'Additional Note', p. 742, the date of the first meeting – 17th November 1899 – and names of the founders).
27. Shakhovskoj, 'V gody pereloma', p. 27.
 28. See Krasavin, pp. 358–359; Emmons, 'Beseda Circle', pp. 489–490. The fluctuation in membership can no longer be traced precisely.
 29. Dolgorukov, p. 332.
 30. Maklakov, p. 295.
 31. The largest landowners among the *Beseda* members each had over 10 – 15,000 *desyatin* (the Dolgorukov brothers, Count V.A. Bobrinskij, V.M. Petrovo-Solovovo). But there were also members who lived in relatively modest circumstances (e.g. V.A. Maklakov, F.F. Kokoshkin).
 32. According to Emmons, 'Beseda Circle', p. 467, 37 out of 45.
 33. During these years, N.A. Khomyakov (until 1902) and Alexander Baron von Meyendorff also still held high posts in the Ministry of the Interior; but neither of them was dependent on this source of income.
 34. See Maklakov, pp. 293–294.
 35. 17 District and 4 Province Marshals of the Nobility. The Marshal of the Nobility elected by the Nobles' Assemblies in the relevant area chaired the relevant Zemstvo Assembly ex officio.
 36. Dolgorukov, p. 335.
 37. Quoted in Shatsillo, p. 134; see also Emmons, 'Additional Note', p. 742.
 38. Dolgorukov, p. 331.
 39. See above p. 52. Vitte's Memorandum became known to the *Beseda* through Sheremetev as early as January 1900, see Shatsillo, p. 134.
 40. See Emmons, 'Beseda Circle', pp. 471–473.
 41. Quoted in Shatsillo, pp. 134–135.
 42. See Emmons, 'Beseda Circle', pp. 473–474; Chermenskij, pp. 19–21. Here and in Mikheeva, p. 242, the following quotations from the discussion.
 43. On Shipov, the most important representative of the so-called Neo-Slavophile tendency, see pp. 158–159, 166–167 above.
 44. SSO, pp. 103–104.
 45. See also Emmons, 'Beseda Circle', pp. 469–470 with slightly differing figures. The 25 Duma deputies were distributed among the factions as follows: 16 Constitutional Democrats, 7 Octobrists, 1 each from *Umerennye Pravye* and *Pravye*.
 46. Cf. SSO, p. 103; Maklakov, pp. 292–293. Belokonskij's claim, p. 80, that with the growth of the constitutionalist wing 'all the non-constitutionalist elements' had left the *Beseda* applies at most and with considerable reservations to the year 1905.
 47. Dolgorukov, p. 335; Maklakov, p. 294; SSO, p. 103.
 48. Maklakov, p. 295.

49. See details in Emmons, 'Beseda Circle', pp. 475-476, Chermenskij, p. 21, Mikheeva, pp. 241-243 *passim*.
50. The famous 'Schaffhausen Conference', at which the foundation of the Union of Liberation was prepared. See pp. 212-218 above.
51. Quoted in Krasavin, p. 354 n.
52. Quoted in Emmons, 'Beseda Circle', p. 476.
53. Maklakov, p. 296.
54. Chermenskij, pp. 19, 22, 27 places responsibility on the *Beseda* for both the plan for a memorandum to the Tsar in 1900, led by Shipov, and the convening of the Zemstvo Congress in May 1902 (see p. 167 above) and - with reservations - for the founding of *Osvobozhdenie*. He is followed by Galai, *LM*, pp. 54, 57, 101, 116, 133, 144. The works by Krasavin, Emmons and Shatsillo have made clear that *Beseda* members also took part in these procedures, but that the *Beseda* itself by no means took the initiative.
55. See SSO, p. 104; Veselovskij, Vol. 3, p. 542. On the *Beseda's* activities in this campaign, Emmons, 'Beseda Circle', p. 473.
56. *Samoderzhavie, byurokratizm i zemstvo*, Berlin 1902; see SSO, p. 104.
57. For details of the *Beseda's* publishing activities, see Emmons, 'Beseda Circle', pp. 482-487.
58. See Dolgorukov, pp. 336-337; Gessen, pp. 162-166.
59. Maklakov, p. 295.
60. Slonimskij, pp. 126, 127.
61. Chermenskij, 'Zemsko-liberal'noe dvizhenie', pp. 42, 44.
62. Mikheeva, pp. 241, 242, 243. - A considerably more reserved assessment by K.N. Tarnovskij in *Istoriya SSSR s drevnejshikh vremen do nashikh dnei*, Vol. VI (1968), p. 55.
63. According to Slonimskij, p. 126.
64. Maklakov, pp. 296-297.
65. See Emmons, 'Beseda Circle', pp. 479-480. Three issues of this weekly were printed in May 1905 entitled *Moskovskaya Nedelya*, but distribution was prevented by the censor. BPIR, No. 4871.
66. Belokonskij, p. 86. No such journal ever appeared. Cf. also Shipov, pp. 86-90.
67. SSO, p. 104; Shatsillo, p. 135.
68. See N.M. Lisovskij, *Russkaya periodicheskaya pechat' 1703-1900 gg.* (1915). The continuation of the bibliography up to 1916 by L.N. Belyaeva, M.K. Zinov'eva, M.M. Nikiforov, *Bibliografiya periodicheskikh izdanij Rossii, 1901-1916*, 4 Vols. (1958-1961), lists 9,700 items (compared with 2,880 in Lisovskij).
69. See Lejkina-Svirskaya pp. 214-217, as well as details on book and newspaper production in Guroff, Starr, 'A Note on Urban Literacy in Russia, 1890-1914', *JGO*, Vol. 19 (1971), p. 527.
70. During Vitté's premiership in 1905-1906 and thereafter, the relevant efforts were hardly successful. See J. Walkin, *The Rise of Democracy in Pre-Revolutionary Russia* (1962), pp. 110-111.
71. Cf. P.A. Zajonchkovskij, 'Aleksandr III i ego blizhajshee okruzhenie', *VI*, 1966 No. 8, pp. 140-146; Lejkina-Svirskaya, p. 219.
72. Maklakov, p. 142.
73. Cf. J. Habermas, *Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (2nd ed. 1965), pp. 201-202.
74. *Ibidem*, p. 200; Lejkina-Svirskaya, p. 233. On this see the paper by M.K.

- Lemke, *Ocherki po istorii russkoj tsenzury i zhurnalistiki XIX stoletiya* (1904).
75. Examples of prominent journalists' fees, which easily reached a 'professor's income', are given by Lejkina-Svirskaya, p. 235. In contrast the information from A. Tyrkova, pp. 15-16, 21; she was paid 2-5 copecks a line around the turn of the century, as opposed to 50-75 copecks for established writers. S.P. Mel'gunov, Vol. 1, pp. 93-94 also reports on bad payment of *Russkiya Vedomosti* editors.
 76. M. Malia, 'What is the Intelligentsia?', in R. Pipes (ed.), *The Russian Intelligentsia* (1961), pp. 13-14.
 77. On the number of professional writers and their partial 'proletarianisation' see Lejkina-Svirskaya, pp. 229-232, 238-243.
 78. V.G. Korolenko, 'Angel Ivanovich Bogdanovich' in Korolenko, *Sobranie sochinenij v desyati tomakh*, Vol. 8 (1958), p. 150. Korolenko himself came to writing during his banishment to Siberia and made a decisive contribution to the development of the provincial press in Nizhnij Novgorod in the years 1886-1896.
 79. Quoted in V. Rozenberg in *RV Sbornik*, p. 34. On the history of this newspaper see this anthology and V. Rozenberg, *Iz istorii russkoj pechati* (1924), the expanded treatment of his contribution in *RV Sbornik*.
 80. On the periodical *Pravo*, see Gessen, pp. 145-157, here p. 151.
 81. *Ibidem*, p. 154. — The other editors came from very much more modest backgrounds. When the journal was founded in 1899 they were about 30 years old and still had to earn authority and reputation. The only exception in this respect was Petražicki, who was regarded as the rising star of the Law Department at the University of Petersburg.
 82. *Ibidem*, p. 174.
 83. The journal's internal affairs, 1900-1906, are given in Mel'gunov, Vol. 1, pp. 86-116.
 84. *Ibidem*, p. 95.
 85. *RV Sbornik*, p. 154.
 86. Mel'gunov, Vol. 1, p. 87.
 87. *RV Sbornik*, Appendix; Lejkina-Svirskaya, p. 232.
 88. See F.F. Kokoshkin, 'Raboty zemskikh s"ezdov i "Russkiya Vedomosti"' in *RV Sbornik*, pp. 90-94; Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, pp. 271-274.
 89. To give some idea of the dimensions involved, a few details from the period under report: the number of copies of *Russkoe Bogatstvo* rose between 1895 and 1899 from 7,000 to 11,000; *Mir Bozhij* held a leading position in 1895 with 13,000 - 15,000 copies, in 1900 with roughly 16,000 subscribers (Riha, p. 37). Highly specialized publications such as Struve's *Novoe Slovo* reached 4,500 subscribers in 1897, subscriptions for the legal marxist journal *Nauchnoe Obozrenie* (Science Review) rose from 1,500 to 3,800 in 1901 (Lejkina-Svirskaya, pp. 228-229). *Pravo* began with 2,200 subscribers and later had up to 10,000 (Gessen, p. 153).
 90. On censorship see B. Rigberg, 'The Tsarist Press Law, 1894-1905', *JGO*, Vol. 13 (1965), pp. 331-343; *idem*, 'The Efficacy of Tsarist Censorship Operations, 1894-1917', *JGO*, Vol. 14 (1966), pp. 327-346; *idem*, 'Tsarist Censorship Performance, 1894-1905', *JGO*, Vol. 17 (1969), pp. 59-76; Walkin, pp. 111-129; 'Tsenzura' article in *Brokgauz-Efron*, Vol. 74 (1903), pp. 948-962. An example for a catalogue of prohibited subjects is the circular dated 28th June 1902 in *Osv* 7, p. 103.

91. See Gessen, pp. 174-175.
92. *Brokgauz-Efron*, Vol. 46 (1898), p. 530.
93. *Ibidem*, Vol. 57 (1900), pp. 172-174; Vol. 74, pp. 948-962.
94. Cf. Rigberg, 'The Efficacy of Tsarist Censorship Operations', pp. 337-338 and the analysis of an example from *Vestnik Evropy* pp. 343-346.
95. Gessen, pp. 161-162.
96. *RV Sbornik*, pp. 113-126.
97. The independent professions (physicians, lawyers, scholars, literati and journalists) and dependent intellectual professions (teachers, engineers, agriculturalists) and the Third Element were added together.
98. In the early 1890s 25,000 copies of the paper were printed (*Brokgauz-Efron*, Vol. 7, p. 804), by 1914 it had reached 100,000 (Guroff, Starr, p. 527). The survey's nationality statistics (*RV Sbornik*, p. 114: 82% Russians, 7-9% Jews, 10% other nationalities) permit the conclusion that the distribution of the newspaper did not extend into remote peripheral areas.
99. Petrunkevich, p. 296.
100. Tyrkova, p. 114.
101. See Walkin, Chap. 6, here p. 127; 'Obshchestva' article in *Brokgauz-Efron*, Vol. 42, pp. 609-628 as well as extracts 'Uchenyya uchrezhdeniya' and 'Obshchestvennoe prizrenie' in the 'Rossiya' article, *ibidem*, Vol. 54, pp. 410-414, Vol. 55, pp. 421-423.
102. Further details in Kizevetter, pp. 286-309.
103. Cf. V.F. Totomiants, *Kooperatsiya v Rossii* (1922); Walkin, pp. 147-149.
104. See *BSEI*, Vol. 45, pp. 401-402.
105. *Istoriya russkoj advokatury*, Vol. 1 (1914), pp. 392-393; Walkin, pp. 135, 139.
106. Walkin, pp. 139, 277; Alston, p. 156.
107. *S.A. Muromtsev. Sbornik statej*, pp. 29-30.
108. Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 148-153; Lavrychev, 'Obshchaya tendentsiya', pp. 53-56.
109. *OD*, Vol. 1, pp. 269-270.
110. See the article '*Literaturnyj Fond*' in *NES*, Vol. 24, pp. 655-659; Lejkina-Svirskaya, pp. 249-251.
111. The official name was 'Union for Mutual Assistance of Russian Writers in the Russian Literary Society'. See here Lejkina-Svirskaya, pp. 252-254. For the Union's activities in 1900-1901 see Mogilyanskij, p. 108; Savel'ev, pp. 169-171; Kaun, pp. 318-319, 321.
112. Cf. Kizevetter, pp. 211-220.
113. On this see Galai, *LM*, pp. 233-236; Fischer, *Liberalism*, pp. 192-195.
114. Kizevetter, pp. 27-28.
115. On Muromtsev's biography see the contribution by P.N. Milyukov in *S.A. Muromtsev. Sbornik statej*, pp. 1-52.
116. V.D. Nabokov, 'Pyat' let nazad. Odno iz vospominanij o S.A. Muromtseva', *Russkaya Mysl'*, 1910 No. 11, p. 196. Cf. *Muromtsev. Sbornik*, pp. 42-43.
117. 'Iz zapisok F.A. Golovina: S.A. Muromtsev', *KA*, Vol. 58, p. 148.
118. Dolgorukov, p. 340 reports the following characteristic episode: When Muromtsev had been elected chairman of the Zemstvo Congress in July 1905, he interrupted the meeting and arranged for a small podium to be brought in, so that the president's chair was slightly raised above the table of the General Committee and the ranks.

119. Reported by Nelidova-Maklakova, quoted in *Muromtsev. Sbornik*, p. 105. — These portrayals are not intended to belittle either the organizational efficiency of the first President of the Duma or his undisputed merits in drafting the Duma's procedural rules. See on this the contributions by V.D. Nabokov (pp. 281–296), S.A. Kotlyarevskij (pp. 297–308) and N.A. Gredeskul (pp. 309–332) in the memorial volume given above.
120. Kizevetter, p. 28.
121. Cf. Walkin, p. 121.
122. See the documentation in *Osv* 6 (30), pp. 99–100. The ban was raised only in 1910.
123. The attacks on the autonomy of the Society are summarized in V.V. Khizhnyakov, 'Graf P.A. Gejden — deyatel' Imp. Vol'nago Ekonomicheskago Obshchestva', *Trudy Imp. Vol'nago Ekonomicheskago Obshchestva*, 1907, Vol. 2 No. 6, pp. 3–7.
124. Shakhovskoj, 'V gody pereloma', pp. 26–27; Belokonskij, pp. 84, 85–86; *OD*, Vol. 1, pp. 287–288.
125. Belokonskij, p. 87 (here erroneously dated for the end of 1900 — beginning of 1901; the correct date is given in SSO, p. 85).
126. Belokonskij, pp. 92, 94; SSO, pp. 86, 87; see details pp. 165–167 above.
127. *Osv* 6, p. 95; No. 19, pp. 333–334; Belokonskij, pp. 136–139, 151; *OD*, I, pp. 288–289.
128. *Osv* 14, p. 219; No. 15, pp. 251–252.
129. Belokonskij, pp. 172–177, 184–189; *OD*, Vol. 1, pp. 288–290; SSO, pp. 107–108; Mitskevich, pp. 290–294.
130. *Osv* 19, p. 334, Cf. p. 36 above.
131. Quoted in *OD*, Vol. 1, p. 290. Corresponding phrasings occur time and again in the numerous resolutions of the various sections; see *Osv* 18 (42), pp. 320–321; No. 19 (43), pp. 332–333.
132. See Belokonskij, p. 185.
133. See Mitskevich, pp. 291–292; *Osv* 19 (43), p. 333.
134. For details see pp. 218–220 above.
135. For the political context see above pp. 52–60. The partial withdrawal of the conservatives from the zemstvo is documented by W. Golubew, 'Das Semstvo' in J. Melnik (ed.), *Russen über Rußland*, (1906), p. 154; Veselovskij, *Istoricheskij ocherk*, p. 579, specially for Tver' in 1903.
136. See details pp. 37–38 above.
137. The term 'democratization' is widely used in contemporary literature on the zemstvo which appeared after 1905. See e.g. D.I. Shakhovskoj, 'Politicheskaya techeniya v russkom zemstve' in *Yubilejnyj zemskij sbornik* (1914), pp. 450–451; Bryukhatov, 'Znachenie "tret'yago elementa" v zhizni zemstva', *ibidem*, pp. 192, 198–200; Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 465–466, et al.
138. Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 412–413.
139. On the growth of the Third Element see above pp. 38–39. Numerical relationships between provincial and district staff cannot be ascertained. For association endeavours, zemstvo advisory councils and participation in committees see *OD*, Vol. 1, p. 270; Veselovskij, Vol. 1 and 2 passim in the sections on individual branches of zemstvo work, as well as Vol. 3, pp. 460–464; Shipov, p. 30. Bryukhatov, pp. 202–203, Petrunkevich, p. 313 and Veselovskij, Vol. 4, p. 218 report on the more radical, mostly socialist mood in the Third Element.
140. See Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 412–422; for Moscow: Shipov, pp. 40–49.

141. Quoted in Veselovskij, Vol. 3, p. 422 (my italics). The following *ibidem*, pp. 423-424 and Shipov, pp. 27, 54. See also Petrunkevich's argument in favour of a central school fund in Chernigov in 1869, quoted in Timberlake, 'Ivan Il'ich Petrunkevich', p. 24.
142. *Samoderzhavie i zemstvo*, p. 163.
143. See Shipov, pp. 27-30 and his memorial speech on Alexander II in August 1898, *ibidem*, pp. 81-84.
144. Thus Struve in a footnote to the passage cited under Note No. 142 above.
145. Quoted without date in Veselovskij, Vol. 3, p. 425.
146. For the events in Moscow see Shipov, pp. 49-56.
147. Quoted in Veselovskij, Vol. 2, p. 163.
148. Shipov, pp. 57-58. For details on efforts towards a zemstvo union *ibidem*, pp. 58-99; Belokonskij, pp. 54-62.
149. See Shipov, pp. 67-80; Galai, *LM*, pp. 43-45.
150. Shipov, pp. 72, 87-90.
151. See Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 557, 571, 577-578. A congress of marshals of the nobility in Autumn 1903 recommended refraining from hindering treatment of 'general', i.e. political questions in the zemstvo assemblies: *Osv* 15-16 (39-40), p. 289.
152. Belokonskij, pp. 84-85.
153. See 'Volost' article in *NES*, Vol. 11, pp. 482-483.
154. See Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 690-696. On the older discussion see 'Vseslovnaya volost' article in *NES*, Vol. 11, pp. 883-886; Golubew, pp. 127-129; P.A. Zajonchkovskij, *Rossiiskoe samoderzhavie v kontse XIX stoletiya* (1970), pp. 220-221, 227-230.
155. Extracts of the resolution in Veselovskij, Vol. 2, p. 163 note. See also *Melkaya zemskaya edinitsa* (2nd ed. 1903), Vol. 1, pp. 330-335.
156. The first edition was followed as early as 1903 by a second enlarged edition in two volumes. Here Vol. 1, pp. 438-458 and Vol. 2, pp. 202-239 for detailed presentation of the discussion on publications.
157. See *Melkaya zemskaya edinitsa*, Vol. 1, pp. 332-333. The principal objections are summarized by D. Kuz'min-Karavaev, who himself belonged to the opponents, in *NES*, Vol. 26, pp. 219-221. K.K. Arsen'ev expounds the objections in detail in *Melkaya zemskaya edinitsa*, Vol. 1, pp. I-XV. Veselovskij, Vol. 3, p. 692 characterizes the objections as prevarications by noble landowners to disguise their fear of losing influence in the zemstvo.
158. See contributions by B.G. Bazhaev and S. Bleklov in *Melkaya zemskaya edinitsa*, Vol. 1, pp. 329-377; Vol. 2, pp. 90-201.
159. Quoted in Veselovskij, Vol. 3, p. 694. See also the reference to the then current debate on this problem in the programme article 'Ot russkikh konstitutsionalistov' in *Osv* 1, p. 12.
160. Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 684-688.
161. Quoted in *OD*, Vol. 1, p. 392.
162. 'Dnevnik Polovtseva', *KA*, Vol. 3, pp. 120-121; Shipov, pp. 157-158. On the beginnings of the Special Conference see above pp. 21-22.
163. Gurko, p. 207; 'Dnevnik Polovtseva', pp. 126-128.
164. See above p. 22.
165. Veselovskij, Vol. 3, p. 545. Cf. above p. 26.
166. On the following see SSO, pp. 86-88; Shipov, pp. 158-159.
167. SSO, p. 87.

168. *Osv* 1, p. 9. In this context the article refers expressly to the local committees of the Special Conference.
169. See above p. 89. A direct reference to Petrunkevich's effectiveness between 1879 and 1881 is in the programme article *Osv* 1, p. 9.
170. See the article 'Sovremennyya voprosy i nastroyeniya' signed 'zemets' in *Osv* 22, pp. 385-387.
171. See details in Shipov, pp. 136-150, 267-273. The current characterization of Shipov as a Neo-slavophile (see e.g. Fischer, *Liberalism*, pp. 23-26) is contradicted in a highly individual interpretation by L. Shapiro, *Rationalism and Nationalism in Russian Nineteenth-Century Political Thought* (1967), pp. 147-169.
172. On the history of this memorandum see Shipov, pp. 135, 149-155; O. Trubetskaya, *Knyaz' S.N. Trubetskoy. Vospominaniya sestry* (1953), pp. 34-37. Text in Shipov, pp. 150-152, English translation in Shapiro, pp. 151-152. Galai, *LM*, pp. 51-55, 273 mistakenly identifies this group with the *Beseda*. Although six of the eleven group members named by Shipov did at one time or another belong to the *Beseda*, the *Beseda* minutes prove that this circle had nothing to do with the projected memorandum (see also Emmons, 'Beseda Circle', p. 464 note).
173. Shipov, p. 159; SSO, p. 88.
174. The congress did not relate back to a *Beseda* initiative, as assumed by Chermenskij, p. 22 and Galai, *LM*, p. 144. See Emmons, 'Additional Note', p. 743.
175. The list of participants is given in Shipov, pp. 160-161.
176. Minutes of the meeting in *Samoderzhavie i zemstvo* (2nd ed. 1903), pp. LVIII-LXVIII; abbreviated version in Shipov, pp. 161-165.
177. On this tactical question the minutes show several divergent attitudes but no alternative vote (*Samoderzhavie i zemstvo*, 2nd. ed. 1903, p. LX). The vote mentioned by Galai, *LM*, p. 145, refers to the later question of participation by zemstvo representatives in the Special Conference itself (result 24: 16 against the boycott suggestion, not 26: 24). *Samoderzhavie i zemstvo*, (2nd ed. 1903) p. LXVII.
178. Text *ibidem*, pp. LVII-LVIII; Shipov, pp. 165-168; Belokonskij, pp. 94-96; *Osv* 5, pp. 65-66.
179. In the closely related question of the peasant commune (*obshchina*), characteristic overtones of a basic liberal tendency were shown in the traditional, paternalistic ideas. In the opinion of the congress, the *obshchina* should be maintained as a special rural social form, continuing to control its internal relationships according to common law with the aid of its own jurisdiction (*volost'* court), but appearing in matters external to the *obshchina* as a legal entity subject, like every other citizen, to all the generally applicable laws. That meant in the matter of land ownership: retention of the commune's collective right to land and of the practice of re-distribution; but replacement of the legal form of a claim under public law to land supply, which limited the commune's rights of disposal, by common ownership as defined under civil law. The *obshchiny* would then be able to compete with private landowners and appear on the land market as buyers and sellers. See *Samoderzhavie i zemstvo* (2nd ed. 1903), pp. LXII-LXIII.
180. Cf. above p. 110.
181. Shipov, p. 213. The bureau became active, however, only in Autumn 1904 during preparations for the famous zemstvo congress in November 1904.

182. M.S. Simonova, 'Zemsko-liberal'naya fronda, 1902-1903 gg.,' *IZ*, 91 (1973), p. 154.
183. Veselovskij, Vol. 3, p. 557; *Samoderzhavie i zemstvo* (2nd ed. 1903), p. LX.
184. On the committees see Belokonskij, pp. 107-131; Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 557-568; scattered reports in *Osv*, passim. Among the modern papers see Smith, pp. 81-92; Galai, *LM*, pp. 152-155; Simonova, pp. 164-204.
185. Quoted in Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 563-564.
186. Cf. Maklakov, p. 315.
187. Simonova, pp. 151, 164-204.
188. *Ibidem*, p. 165.
189. *Ibidem*, p. 171; on the events in the Sudzha committee, see pp. 165-171.
190. *Ibidem*, pp. 195-198; Belokonskij, p. 125.
191. Maklakov, pp. 312-315; Simonova, pp. 189-193.
192. On the events in Voronezh see Belokonskij, pp. 106-114; Simonova, pp. 174-181; *Osv* 11, pp. 173-175. Struve published the committee's report as a brochure: *Doklad voronezhskago uezdnago komiteta o nuzhdakh sel'sko-khozyajstvennoj promyshlennosti. Izdanie redaktsii 'Osvobozhdeniya'*, Stuttgart, 1903.
193. Quoted in Simonova, pp. 174-175.
194. See 'Dnevnik Polovtstva', p. 121.
195. Simonova, p. 159.
196. Veselovskij, Vol. 3, p. 558; Belokonskij, p. 131.
197. See Simonova, pp. 151, 173, 179, 200.
198. Belokonskij, pp. 115-118, 123-124, 127-130; Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 559-560; Shipov, pp. 195-197.
199. Gurko, pp. 222, 224.
200. Quoted in 'Otryvki iz vospominanij Lyubimova', p. 79.
201. Kizevetter, pp. 341-342. For the assessment of the local committees by the Constitutionalists see the article signed 'Senex' in *Osv* 11, pp. 169-173.
202. Quoted in *Brokgauz-Efron*, supplementary Vol. 3, p. 363. Cf. Milyukov, *Crisis*, pp. 348-349.
203. See his clear rejection of parliamentary solutions given to Polovtsev on 18th April 1902 in 'Dnevnik Polovtseva', pp. 138-139. This attitude is confirmed by several conversations which Vitte had with the lawyer I.V. Gessen in 1903-1904: Gessen, pp. 177-178.
204. In a summary for the Ministry of the Interior, the Office of the Special Conference listed only 6 committees as politically oppositional. Simonova, p. 151.
205. According to a personal note on a dispute between Plevé and Vitte (October 1902) in 'Otryvki iz vospominanij Lyubimova', pp. 81-83.
206. See Belokonskij, pp. 132-133.
207. 'Otryvki iz vospominanij Lyubimova', pp. 82-83.
208. The personal note in Shipov, pp. 171-184. The following quotes pp. 174-175, 178-180.
209. The personal note in Shipov, pp. 185-192.
210. *Ibidem*, p. 193. Vitte gave an equally friendly reception in November 1902 to the penalized *zemtsy* Peter Dolgorukov and Evreinov (Sudzha), Savel'ev and G.R. Kilevejn (Nizhnij Novgorod) and Sadovskij (Smolensk): *Osv* 7, p. 99; No. 14, pp. 245-246.
211. Shipov, p. 193.

212. The committee of Cherpovets (Novgorod Province). *Osv* 4 (28), p. 55.
213. See the correspondence from Moscow, *Osv* 7, p. 99.
214. Anton Staritskij, 'Lozhnyj shag', *Osv* 7, pp. 100–102. Solution to the pseudonym in I.F. Masanov, *Slovar' psevdonimov russkikh pisatelej, uchenykh i obshchestvennykh deyatelej*, Vol. 1 (1956), p. 132.
215. See *Osv* 11, p. 171; No. 17, pp. 289–291; No. 22, p. 383.
216. Cf. above pp. 57, 99, 109.
217. Printed in *Osv* 10, p. 147.
218. *Osv* 11, pp. 178–179.
219. *Osv* 17, pp. 289–291. For details see pp. 199–200 above.
220. See Shipov's letters to M.V. Chelnokov dated 18.9.1902, quoted in Chernenskij, p. 24, and dated 20.1.1903, quoted in Shipov, p. 207 note.
221. Belokonskij, p. 139.
222. Cf. above pp. 23–24; Shipov, pp. 204–205.
223. See Veselovskij, Vol. 3, pp. 575–579; Shipov, pp. 198–203, 221–225.
224. *Osv* 15–16 (39–40), p. 289.
225. On Struve's living conditions see Tyrkova, pp. 171–176; Frank, pp. 32–37; report by the Stuttgart municipal authorities to the Wurttemberg Cabinet, 15th December 1903 (n. st.) in *Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg*, E 150, Vol. 1608, No. 3. Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 329–332 quotes from the Okhrana agents' reports. Shatsillo, p. 135 gives the information, taken from D.I. Shakhovskoj's papers, that the Struves received the handsome salary of 3,500 roubles per annum from the 'friends'. The bibliography of Struve's works in Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 399–404 shows no title apart from the *Osvobozhdenie* issues which would indicate subsidiary income from literary work.
226. Frank, p. 32; Petrunkevich, p. 348.
227. Tyrkova, pp. 172–175, 199 names visitors as D.E. Zhukovskij, Peter D. Dolgorukov, P.N. Milyukov, V.A. Maklakov; Frank, p. 37 names S.N. Bulgakov in addition.
228. Pipes, *Struve*, p. 177.
229. *Listok Osvobozhdeniya*, No. 1–26 (15th April 1904 – 7th March 1905); *Osvobozhdenie*. *Kniga pervaya*, Stuttgart 1903, *Kniga vtoraya*, Paris 1904; the list of brochures is given by Fischer, *Liberalism*, pp. 218–219.
230. Testimony by Dietz during the so-called Königsberg communists case, in K. Eisner (ed.), *Der Geheimbund des Zaren* (1904), p. 261. Dietz was a Social Democrat and member of the *Reichstag*; his publishing house was considered to be closely associated with the SPD. According to the testimony mentioned, Dietz claimed to have undertaken publication of *Osvobozhdenie* only because Struve was turned down by all other publishers, who were allied to the Liberals.
231. M. Weber, 'Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie in Rußland', p. 237. The figure is given here with a question-mark.
232. Report by the Stuttgart municipal authorities, 15th December 1903 (n. st.); see Note 225 above.
233. On transportation of the periodical see SSO, pp. 123–125; Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 351–352; W.R. Copeland, *The Uneasy Alliance* (1973), pp. 92–94.
234. For details of the affair and of the subsequent court case see Tyrkova, pp. 131–161; E.D. Kuskova, 'Zigzag pamyati', *Novoe Russkoe Slovo*, New York, 17th July 1952; *Osv* 24 (48), pp. 426–431; Belokonskij, pp. 171–172. Copeland, pp. 93–94, also names two additional arrests in October and November 1903.

235. See Kuskova, 'Zigzag', *Novoe Russkoe Slovo*, 17th and 18th July 1952.
236. *Ibidem*, 17th July 1952. Here E. Kuskova criticizes Ariadna Tyrkova, who gives the impression in her memoirs that she got mixed up in the business without the slightest idea of who or what was behind the periodical *Osvobodzhdenie*, and that she was never a member of the Union of Liberation. These claims are indeed improbable and are disputed with good grounds by Kuskova; but Ariadna Tyrkova certainly did not belong to the inner circle of the 'friends'.
237. Tyrkova, p. 131.
238. See p. 197 above.
239. Tyrkova, pp. 161-169; Kuskova, 'Zigzag', *Novoe Russkoe Slovo*, 17th July 1952.
240. See above pp. 182-183. On this whole case see Eisner, *Der Geheimbund des Zaren* (1904); O.I. Bershadskaya, 'Iz istorii revolyutsionnogo sodruzhestva russkogo i nemetskogo proletariata. Kenigsbergskij protsess 1904 goda', VI, 1955 No. 9, pp. 85-95. The investigations by the public prosecutor and the Königsberg proceedings 'wegen Geheimbündelei, Hochverrat gegen Rußland und Zarenbeleidigung' led to several interpellations in the German *Reichstag*. In his report on the proceedings, the Liberal Hans Delbrück also refers to the Struve case: D[elbrück], 'Politische Korrespondenz', *Preußische Jahrbücher*, Vol. 115 (1904), pp. 393-395.
241. 'Otryvki iz vospominanij Lyubimova', p. 74.
242. *Staatsarchiv Ludwigsburg*, E 150, Vol. 1608, Nos. 11, 12 and 13, here particularly 'Bericht der Kais. Deutschen Botschaft No. 527' dated (11th)/24th June 1904. Whether Struve's move a little later to Paris had anything to do with Pleve's intervention (thus Pipes, *Struve*, p. 357) cannot be clarified with any certainty due to one or two contradictions in the chronology.
243. E. Kuskova, 'Ob utopiyakh, real'nostyakh i zagadkakh', *Sovremennye Zapiski*, Vol. 26 (1925), pp. 368-369. See also the quotation from the memoirs of the Russian diplomat A. Neklyudov in Riha, p. 45.
244. *Osv* 10, pp. 161-162.
245. SSO, p. 125.
246. M.G. Vandal'kovskaya, 'Obzor materialov dnevnika M.K. Lemke', *Arkheograficheskij ezhegodnik za 1969 g.* (1971), p. 260. Further documentation in Riha, p. 45, Tyrkova, p. 131, Kuskova, 'Kren nalevo', p. 383.
247. SSO, p. 102; *Osv* 22, p. 399; No. 7 (31), p. 124.
248. See *Osv* 1, p. 5; No. 15, p. 251; No. 22, p. 399.
249. *Osv* 15, p. 250.
250. Zemskij glasnyj T. [Ya. Ya. Gurevich], 'Mirnaya oppozitsiya ili revolyutsionnaya bor'ba', *Osv* 7, pp. 106-108; Glasnyj [V.M. Petrovo-Solovovo], 'Golos iz zemstva', *Osv* 12, pp. 190-191; zemskij glasnyj T., 'O priemakh bor'by zemstva s samoderzhaviem', *Osv* 22, pp. 382-385. The pseudonyms are clarified in Masanov, Vol. 1, p. 393 and Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, p. 239.
251. *Osv* 1, pp. 13-14 (see above p. 109).
252. *Osv* 7, p. 107, the following quotations pp. 106 and 108. For the demonstration in Kazan Square see above pp. 49-50.
253. *Osv* 12, p. 190; the following quotations *ibidem*.
254. *Osv* 12, p. 190 (Petrovo); No. 22, p. 383 (Gurevich).
255. *Osv* 12, p. 190; No. 22, p. 385.
256. See parallel terms *ibidem*, p. 191 and p. 383.

257. *Osv* 22, p. 385.
258. *Osv* 12, p. 190.
259. *Ibidem*, p. 191.
260. *Osv* 22, p. 382.
261. Cf. Peshekhonov's article, arguing along the same lines as Gurevich, *Osv* 7, pp. 100–102 (see above p. 179) and the second 'Open Letter from the Old Zemstvo Men' in *Osv* 13, pp. 207–208. The 'Open Letter' was widely circulated in Russia as a mimeographed broadsheet bearing the signature *Gruppa Osvobozhdeniya*. Struve asserted however that, according to his enquiries, the *starye zemtsy* did not belong to the group of 'friends': *Osv* 14, p. 218; No. 15, p. 251.
262. See also SSO p. 95.
263. See the editor's note to Gurevich's article, *Osv* 7, p. 106.
264. See the leading article in *Osv* 10, pp. 145–150.
265. See *Osv* 3, p. 38; No. 5, p. 66; No. 7, p. 99; No. 10, pp. 145–150; No. 17, p. 290 footnotes; also *Samoderzhavie i zemstvo* (2nd ed. 1903), pp. LVI, LXIX–LXXI.
266. Leader in *Osv* 12, pp. 185–189.
267. *Ibidem*, p. 189. — G.L. Freeze, 'A National Liberation Movement and the Shift in Russian Liberalism, 1901–1903', *SR*, Vol. 28 (1969), pp. 89–90, interprets Struve's article as the turning point in the organizational development of constitutionalism, brought about by 'the liberals' notion of a national liberation movement'. I do not consider this a correct interpretation precisely because of the reference to the 'national liberation movement'. Here Struve presents nothing but a more elaborate, somewhat less abstractly phrased version of his old concept. In my opinion the decisive innovation came only three months later when the 'idealists of the autocracy' were excluded from the movement, and the attempt was made to define more precisely what a constitutionalist policy should be in Russia.
268. *Osv* 11, pp. 175–176.
269. *Osv* 1, p. 12.
270. *Osv* 11, p. 176.
271. *Osv* 12, p. 186; also No. 1, pp. 2, 5, 14; No. 7, pp. 104–105 and other frequent references.
272. Leader in *Osv* 15, pp. 249–251.
273. *Ibidem*, pp. 249 and 250. On the *Iskra* attacks on Struve see Geyer, *Lenin*, pp. 284–286.
274. *Osv* 15, p. 251 (the following *ibidem*). Cf. *Osv* 1, p. 6.
275. See the summary of important contributions in Freeze, pp. 88–89.
276. Cf. above Chapter I, 3.
277. See above pp. 95–96.
278. SSO, p. 102; the list of Culinary Committee members is given in T. Emmons, 'Russia's Banquet Campaign', *California Slavic Studies*, Vol. 10 (1977), p. 51 n.: N.F. Annenskij, N.P. Asheshev, Ya. Ya. Gurevich, A.V. Peshekhonov, G.I. Shrejder (all of them later members of the Union of Liberation) and V.B. Carrick, M.A. Slavinskij. Reports on the atmosphere and mood in Tyrkova, pp. 59–63; Gessen, pp. 167–169; Mogilyanskij, pp. 115–116.
279. Annenskij's open sociableness — distinguishing him against the humourless, conspiratorial background of the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* editorial board, of

- which he was a member — is unanimously emphasized by Gessen, p. 167, and Tyrkova, p. 60.
280. Gessen, pp. 168-169.
 281. See the reports in *Osv* 14, p. 219; No. 15, pp. 251-252.
 282. Printed in *Osv* 19, p. 325.
 283. On the events in Kishinev see *Die Judenpogrome in Rußland*, Vol. 2 (1910), pp. 5-37.
 284. *Osv* 23, p. 420; treated in detail in Galai, *LM*, pp. 167-169. There was a strong response to the Kishinev events in *Osvobozhdenie*: see Struve's leader in *Osv* 22, pp. 377-379, the contribution by Maxim Gor'kij in No. 24, pp. 452-453; the material on the *in camera* Kishinev trial was serialized by Struve from No. 12 (36) onwards; see also the brochure *Kishinevskij pogrom*, Stuttgart 1903.
 285. See above pp. 153-155.
 286. See *Istoriya russkoj advokatury*, Vol. 1, pp. 382-393.
 287. *Ibidem*, pp. 392-393. An insight into the atmosphere in this group of Moscow lawyers is given in the report by the Finnish oppositionist Adolf Törngren on his visit to M.L. Mandel'shtam in April 1904: A. Törngren, *Med Ryska samhällsbyggare och statsmän, åren 1904-1905* (1929), pp. 55-57, 58-61.
 288. Quoted in Shatsillo, p. 138.
 289. See Shipov, pp. 214-215.
 290. Informative here is the article based on unpublished readers' letters 'Iz russkoj zhizni', *Osv* 18, pp. 313-314.
 291. *Ibidem*, p. 314.
 291. *Osv* 18, p. 313 and No. 22, p. 398. Cf. Kuskova, 'Kren nalevo', p. 384.
 293. 'K ocherednym voprosam. I.', *Osv* 17, pp. 289-291. See also above, p. 180.
 294. This and the following quotations *ibidem*, pp. 290 and 291. The argument is not entirely justified, since Shipov made clear during these weeks that he was by no means willing to play 'the role of Harlequin in Pleve's masquerade', the role Milyukov cast him in. See the note on a then recent very cool discussion with Pleve in Shipov, pp. 206-210. In April 1904, after 11 years in office, Shipov was not confirmed by the Minister of the Interior as Chairman of the Moscow zemstvo: Belonskonskij, p. 200.
 295. Cf. Milyukov's subsequent explanations of his intentions in Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, p. 238.
 296. 'K ocherednym voprosam. II', *Osv* 17, pp. 291-292.
 297. See pp. 101-104 above.
 298. *Osv* 17, p. 292.
 299. S.N. Prokopovich also stressed this point and criticized the narrow class attitude in many of the Special Conference local committees. (Quoted in Simonova, p. 210.) Cf. also the articles by Peshekhonov (see p. 179 above) and Gurevich.
 300. 'Germanskije vybory', *Osv* 1 (25), pp. 3-5.
 301. *Ibidem*, p. 5. — The *Nationalsozialer Verein*, founded in 1896 by the pastor Friedrich Naumann, followed a social-liberal programme which also found room for imperialist objectives (naval construction programme). It sought its recruiting field — as in the case of the Russian Constitutionalists — in the educated middle classes, but was relatively weak in organization. In 1903 it merged with the *Freisinnige Vereinigung*. But the party was unable to play any considerable part in German politics. See Th. Nipperdey,

- Die Organisation der deutschen Parteien vor 1918* (1961), pp. 185–186 et passim.
302. 'It is not too late for Russian liberalism to adopt the correct political position — not against social democracy (*sotsial'naya demokratiya*) but aligned and in union with it'. *Osv* 1 (25), p. 5. — Galai, *LM*, p. 176, has overlooked the terminological difference.
 303. Apart from small notices, see e.g. documentation in *Osv* 4, pp. 50–53, No. 5, pp. 68–72, No. 6, pp. 88–90 as well as Struve's commentary in No. 8, pp. 119–120; also the article 'Samoderzhavie pered zadachami sotsial'nago zakonodatel'stva', signed 'n-d-i', in No. 1 (25), pp. 7–10. On the *zubatovshchina* see mainly the series of articles in *Osv* 17, pp. 293–295, No. 18, pp. 317–319, No. 19, pp. 331–332, No. 20–21, pp. 361–363.
 304. 'Prilozhenie — poslednye novosti', *Osv* 4 (28), and the leader *ibidem*, p. 49.
 305. *Osv* 9, pp. 129–130.
 306. See above pp. 214–215.
 307. See the relevant passage in the programme article, *Osv* 1, p. 10. Petrunkevich had already expressed opinions to this effect to Mikhajlovskij as early as 1878. Petrunkevich, p. 105.
 308. For Struve, see Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 86–89, 148–151, 196–207; on Bulgakov's version, which varied in matters of detail, see Mendel, *Dilemmas of Progress*, pp. 214–218. On the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* group's version see e.g. the essay 'Krest'yanskij vopros' in A.V. Peshekhonov, *Na ocherednye temy* (1904), and Peshekhonov, 'Pochemu my togda ushli', *passim*.
 309. 'K ocherednym voprosam' in *Osv* 22, pp. 397–399; No. 4 (28), p. 65; No. 7 (31), pp. 124–125.
 310. *Osv* 7 (31), pp. 124–125; No. 22, p. 399.
 311. *Osv* 11 (35), pp. 187–189. The article is signed 'Victor'. According to an editorial note, the writer did not belong to the circle of 'friends'. The article could possibly have been written by Nikolaj Burenin, a Social Democrat, who used to write under this pseudonym (see Törngren, *Med Ryska samhällsbyggare*, p. 49).
 312. *Osv* 4 (28), p. 65.
 313. The only contribution indicating this tendency came from S.L. Frank (*Osv* 22, pp. 398–399), Struve's assistant in the Stuttgart editorial offices at the time. Clarification of the signature N.K. in Frank, p. 35.
 314. See above pp. 172–174.
 315. Shipov, pp. 213–214. Conference reports *ibidem*, pp. 215–221; Belokonskij, pp. 153–161; SSO, p. 101.
 316. For the result of the relevant vote see Shipov, pp. 219–220. Among the Constitutionalists, Peter Dolgorukov, F.A. Golovin, Shipov's representative on the Moscow zemstvo board, and the Chernigov zemstvo chairman A.A. Svechin voted against the motion.
 317. Petitions to this effect were made during the 1903–1904 winter by 24 provincial zemstvo assemblies: SSO, p. 101; Belokonskij, p. 164.
 318. 'Chto-takoe manifest 26-go fevralya?', *Osv* 22, pp. 389–391. Struve's commentary *ibidem*.
 319. 'Demarkatsionnaya liniya', *Osv* 19, pp. 329–330.
 320. *Osv* 20–21, p. 373.
 321. *Osv* 22, pp. 404–405; Belokonskij, p. 165 (with extracts from the text).
 322. 'Nikolaj II i samoderzhavie', p. 222. Alexander Stakhovich was not of the same opinion as his brother in this matter; see *ibidem*, pp. 220 and 221.

323. Belokonskij, p. 165; *Osv* 14 (38), p. 253.
324. See note 316 above.
325. Kuskova, 'Kren nalevo', pp. 389-390, reports on tough factional struggles in the provincial groups of the Union of Liberation during Spring 1904.
326. W. Bułat, 'Korespondencje Leona Wasilewskiego na łamach Oswobodzenia', *Z pola walki*, Vol. XIX No. 1 (73), 1976, pp. 167-170.
327. W. Lednicki, 'Rosyjsko-Polska Entente Cordiale. Jej początki i fundamenty 1903-1905', *Zeszyty Historyczne*, Vol. 10 (1966), p. 26.
328. See Copeland, pp. 163-173 for the details.
329. SSO, p. 105.
330. See pp. 135-136 above.
331. Gessen, pp. 165, 166-167.
332. SSO, pp. 104-105.
333. Belokonskij, p. 164; cf. SSO, p. 101 n.
334. Kizevetter, p. 352.
335. Petrunkevich, p. 338. The list of participants *ibidem*; it diverges from Shatsillo, p. 139 and note 25, in three points. Bogucharskij is named only in Frank, p. 38. — In order to avoid observation by *Okhrana* agents, the participants pretended to be a 'group of pleasure trippers', finding quarters in a different 'democratic lodging-house' every day, in Singen, Radolfzell and Constance. The last place they visited was Schaffhausen, which is why the conference went down in history as the 'Schaffhausen Conference'.
336. The sociological jurist Bogdan Kistyakovskij was working at the time in Heidelberg under Max Weber. Weber obtained information from him on 'the bourgeoisie democracy' in Russia. M. Weber, 'Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie', p. 234 n.
337. Frank, pp. 37-38.
338. Fischer, *Liberalism*, p. 141, divides the participants rather unconvincingly into three categories: 'gentry liberals', 'intelligentsia liberals' and 'intelligentsia socialists'. Smith, p. 131 differentiates even further and comes to the false conclusion: 'The group did adequately represent the views of the diverse public supporting *Osvobozhdenie*'.
339. It is repeatedly claimed in the relevant literature that the Union of Liberation was founded here. This misinterpretation can mostly be traced to Belokonskij, p. 164. SSO, p. 105 has already rejected this claim.
340. Cf. p. 97 above.
341. There are no surviving minutes. But see SSO, pp. 105-107; Petrunkevich, pp. 337-339; Frank, pp. 37-39 as well as Vodovozov's article 'Soyuz Oswobozhdeniya' in *Brokgauz-Efron*, Supplementary Vol. 3 (1906), p. 354. On the following see also Galai, *LM*, pp. 178-187.
342. 'K agrarnomu voprosu', *Osv* 9 (33), pp. 153-158, here p. 153. E. Kuskova has identified Bulgakov as the author of the article: Smith, p. 143. The connection with the Schaffhausen Conference is given in SSO, p. 106.
343. *Osv* 9 (33), pp. 153-154. Struve's footnote p. 153 states the demands in the article to be the opinion of 'the closest friends of *Osvobozhdenie* and of the editor'. The individual programme points on the workers questions, only indicated here, were detailed later in the programme of the Constitutional Democratic Party (October 1905), Section VII (see V. Ivanovich, *Rossiyskiya partii soyuzu i ligi*, 1906, p. 18). They are partially identical with the minimum programme of the RSDRP, which was adopted at the

- Second Party Conference in London at the same time as the Schaffhausen Conference was taking place (text in Ivanovich, p. 6).
344. *Osv* 9 (33), pp. 154–158. For details of the Cadet Party's agrarian programme see N.I. Chernenkov, *Agrarnaya programma Partii Narodnoj Svobody* (1907).
 345. But in Bulgakov's version this objective is not to be attained through simple 'nationalization' of land, as demanded by the Socialist Revolutionaries, but rather through a whole series of measures in the field of settlement and credit policies, of land and labour legislation.
 346. Here Bulgakov adopted arguments which had already been brought forward at the zemstvo congress in May 1902. Cf. pp. 169–170 above and note 179.
 347. Fischer, *Liberalism*, p. 142 according to an unpublished manuscript by Vodovozov.
 348. *OD*, Vol. 1, p. 477.
 349. Frank, p. 39.
 350. Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, p. 239. But he then soon joined the general tendency in favour of universal suffrage: *Ibidem*, p. 272 and Milyukov, *Crisis*, pp. 378–380. Cf. also Maklakov, pp. 151–152.
 351. Frank, p. 39.
 352. SSO, p. 106; Petrunkevich, p. 339. Frank does not broach this question.
 353. Cited in Smith, p. 132 n.
 354. In the autumn of 1905, Bogucharskij, Kuskova and Prokopovich formed the nucleus of a group centred on a periodical with the telling name '*Bez zaglaviya*' ('Without a Title').
 355. See also the debate at the constituent congress of the Union of Liberation, pp. 222–224 above.
 356. See S.L. Frank's comments in *Osv* 22, pp. 398–399.
 357. See Petrunkevich's memorandum in 1879 '*Blizhajshiya zadachi zemstva*' in Petrunkevich, pp. 453–456; Shakhovskoj, '*Politicheskiya techeniya v russkom zemstve*', p. 451; Miliukov, *Crisis*, pp. 226–228.
 358. Kuskova, '*Kren nalevo*', pp. 386–389 provides evidence from the history of the Zemstvo Constitutionalists in 1903–1904.
 359. Belokonskij, p. 174 n.
 360. *Ibidem*, pp. 172–173; SSO, p. 107.
 361. Peter Dolgorukov, N. Kovalevskij, D.I. Shakhovskoj, Bogucharskij, Bulgakov and Ekaterina Kuskova. The other participants came from Khar'kov (among them Belokonskij), Chernigov (V. Khizhnyakov senior), Kursk, Odessa and Moscow (Pavel Dolgorukov). The names given by Shatsillo, p. 139 (thus the list of participants extrapolated in Emmons, '*Beseda Circle*', p. 469 is superseded). Reports on the Khar'kov conference in Belokonskij, pp. 174–175 and SSO, pp. 107–108.
 362. Emmons, '*Beseda Circle*', pp. 475–476; Chermenskij, p. 21; see also pp. 134–135 above.
 363. SSO, p. 108.
 364. *Ibidem*, pp. 108–109.
 365. Within a year the group had grown to more than 60 people: see R. Budberg, '*S"ezd zemskikh deyatelej 6–9 noyabrya 1904 goda v Peterburge*', *Byloe*, 1907 No. 3, p. 72. Meetings of the Union of Zemstvo Constitutionalists are documented for February and October 1904 as well as throughout 1905 immediately before or after each Zemstvo Congress.
 366. For the accompanying circumstances see SSO, p. 109, Belokonskij, p. 191

- and pp. 154-156 above. The only surviving congress report is to be found in SSO, pp. 109-117.
367. List of delegates in Shatsillo, pp. 141-142. The list of local groups represented given in SSO, p. 110 deviates slightly from Shatsillo (see details in Appendix III). The 'Jewish Group' could have been a group based in Wilna which joined the Union of Unions in Spring 1905 under the title 'Union for Equal Rights for Jews', led by the Petersburg lawyer, M.M. Vinaver. See A.D. Kirzhnits, *Evrejskoe rabochee dvizhenie* (1928), pp. 196-197.
 368. See Gessen, p. 180; Törngren, *Med Ryska samhällsbyggare*, p. 84.
 369. The ratios, to the advantage of the metropolitan representatives, were 22 : 17 (October 1904), 23 : 22 (March 1905), 21 : 15 (August 1905). See Appendix III.
 370. SSO, pp. 110-111.
 371. SSO, p. 111. The concept corresponded to the actual position of the *Russkoe Bogatstvo* group in the constitutionalist movement. With its large group of supporters on the Petersburg intellectual scene, it played an important role but developed a strong affinity to the PSR and was always somewhat on the fringe of the constitutionalist grouping.
 372. 'Politika liberal'noj partii', *Osv* 20 (44), pp. 345-346; cf. SSO, pp. 114-115.
 373. *Osv* 20 (44), p. 345.
 374. SSO, p. 112.
 375. The text is published by T. Emmons, 'The Statutes of the Union of Liberation', *Russian Review*, Vol. 33 (1974), pp. 82-83. It differs greatly from the three point programme printed in *Listok Osvobozhdeniya*, No. 17 (19th November 1904), p. 3, to which the relevant literature refers (cf. Fischer, *Liberalism*, pp. 146-148; Galai, *LM*, 189-190). According to Emmons, the undated text, which he published for the first time, puts forward the earlier version of the Union's objectives as adopted in January 1904; the other text was not formulated till October 1904 (see pp. 230-232 above). A detailed programme was passed only in March 1905, but was not regarded as binding for all groups (text in *Osv* 69-70, pp. 305-306; an English translation in S. Harcave, *First Blood* (1964), pp. 273-279).
 376. SSO, p. 112.
 377. The text of the statutes in Emmons, 'The Statutes', pp. 83-85.
 378. See the supplementary information in Belokonskij, p. 175 and SSO, p. 113.
 379. SSO, p. 117; the names are given by Shatsillo, p. 143, from Shakhovskoj's papers. For security reasons the result of the election was also kept secret from the delegates.
 380. A functional angle is unmistakable in the selection of those co-opted. For example, the Gessen cousins (*Pravo* editorial board) and A.N. Maksimov (*Russkija Vedomosti* editorial board) provided the connection with the oppositional press, V.V. Khizhnyakov the connection with the Free Economic Society. Others co-opted were: V.E. von Dehn (St. Petersburg, formerly Moscow, member of the Finland Committee), S.A. Kotlyarevskij (Moscow/Saratov, *Beseda* member), P.I. Novgorodtsev and M.I. Petrunkevich (members of the Petrunkevich group) and the journalist I.A. Petrovskij (Moscow), permanent *Osvobozhdenie* correspondent. — Names given by Shatsillo, p. 144. This means that the extrapolated lists of names in Fischer, *Liberal-*

- ism*, pp. 149–150, Galai, *LM*, pp. 191–192, Chermenskij, *Burzhuaziya i tsarizm*, p. 32 must be corrected.
381. See pp. 231–232 above for the negotiations. The report on the tour, ‘Minnen från en resa i Ryssland under april månad 1904’ is to be found in the *Finnish National Archives*, Helsinki, in the Törngren papers; abridged and altered in parts in Törngren, *Med Ryska samhällsbyggare och statsmän*, pp. 46–92 (here some of the solutions to the names coded in the original). – I have to thank my sister-in-law, Camilla Fröhlich-Souchon, for the translation from Swedish of the report.
382. Törngren was not informed about the positions and functions occupied by the people he talked to in the Union of Liberation. It is conspicuous that no contacts were arranged for him with the more radical Petersburg groups of literati. He made contact with the Social Democrats in Petersburg (Nikolaj Burenin) and Kiev on his own initiative.
383. Törngren, ‘Minnen’, folios 2–3, 6–7, 10, 27 et passim.
384. *Ibidem*, folios 27–29.
385. See details in SSO, pp. 118–119; Fischer, *Liberalism*, pp. 160–167; Galai, *LM*, pp. 197–200. War was also the predominant topic in all the discussions Törngren took part in.
386. The course of the discussion is given in Galai, *LM*, pp. 200–213.
387. See Budberg, pp. 74–92; Belokonskij, pp. 213–238. The latest summary in Galai, *LM*, pp. 228–231. See Seton-Watson, *The Russian Empire*, pp. 565–566 on the political circumstances.
388. On the Union Council’s plan of action see SSO, pp. 131–132; Belokonskij, pp. 210–211. See Belokonskij, pp. 238–239, 240–257; Galai, pp. 232–236 on the various activities of the Union of Liberation; on the banquets T. Emmons, ‘Russia’s Banquet Campaign’, pp. 45–86.
389. For the names see Shatsillo, pp. 143 and 144; see also Appendix II above.
390. *Listok Osvobozhdeniya*, No. 17 (19th November 1904), p. 2. Quotations from English translations in Fischer, *Liberalism*, p. 147 and Galai, *LM*, p. 190.
391. Cf. p. 210 above. The March 1905 programme mentions Poland as well as Finland, since the Constitutionalists had entered into discussions with Polish groups in Autumn 1904. On this see W. Lednicki, ‘Rosyjsko-Polska Entente Cordiale’, pp. 47–138; W. Bulat, ‘Zjazd polsko-rosyjski w Moskwie 21–22 kwietnia 1905 roku’, *Studia z Najnowszych Dziejów Powszechnych*, Vol. II, 1962, pp. 187–208.
392. SSO, p. 112. Details are not reported.
393. Copeland, pp. 175–182; *ibidem*, pp. 189–195 on the following.
394. Quoted *ibidem*, p. 179. – On the basis of this minimal agreement the Russians would have welcomed union of the Finnish opposition with the Union of Liberation. But the Finns were not ready to undertake this step (see Törngren, ‘Minnen’, folios 32, 35).
395. For details see W. Bulat, ‘Konferencja partii opozycyjnych i rewolucyjnych Rosji w Paryżu w 1904 r. – Kilka uściśleń’, *Z Pola Walki*, Vol. XVIII No. 1 (69), 1975, pp. 167–170 and the literature indicated there; also Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 364–366; Galai, *LM*, pp. 214–218.
396. *Listok Osvobozhdeniya*, No. 17 (19th November 1904). See also Emmons, ‘The Statutes’, p. 81.
397. See Milyukov, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. 1, pp. 244–245. SSO, p. 135 mentions a draft worked out by Struve ‘and a few visiting *osvobozhdentsy*’.

398. On the four-tailed suffrage formula see Emmons, 'Banquet Campaign', pp. 53-55. Adoption of this formula in the programme was, it is true, long overdue. It was different with the sentence on the right to self-determination. This was very soon forgotten again when the expectations connected with the Paris Conference were not fulfilled. The fact that the Constitutionalists at no point wanted to concede with this sentence the right for national minorities to leave the Russian empire is shown by the article 'Natsional'nyj vopros v Rossii i konstitutsiya', *Osv* 59, pp. 147-148. In 1905 the nationalities question became one of the most hotly contested problems among the Constitutionalists. The discussion is reported in M. Weber, 'Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie', pp. 258-272.
399. On the Union of Unions see Galai, *LM*, pp. 245-250, 252-254, 258-260 and S. Galai, 'The Role of the Union of Unions in the Revolution of 1905', *JGO*, Vol. 24 (1976), pp. 512-525. I do not agree with Galai's opinion that the Union of Liberation set the 1905 revolution in motion and predominantly controlled it with the assistance of the Union of Unions (see my review in *JGO*, Vol. 23, 1975, pp. 126-129).
400. SSO, pp. 122-123.

NOTES TO 'CONCLUSION'

1. Maklakov, p. 138. The following quotation pp. 141-142.
2. M. Karpovich, 'Two Types of Russian Liberalism: Maklakov and Miliukov' in Simmons (ed.), *Continuity and Change*, pp. 129-143.
3. Fischer, *Liberalism*, in particular pp. 119-123, 152-155.
4. Galai, *LM*, and *idem*, 'The Role of the Union of Unions'.
5. See e.g. SSO, pp. 104-107; Belokonskij, pp. 93, 174; Petrunkevich, p. 338; Kuskova, 'Kren nalevo', pp. 389-390.
6. See above Chapter II, 2.
7. The same argument in G. Freeze, 'A National Liberation Movement and the shift in Russian Liberalism, 1901-1903', *SR*, Vol. 28 (1969), pp. 81-83.
8. See Appendix II above for the following details.
9. The remaining professions are distributed as follows: 8 zemstvo employees, 7 doctors, 3 businessmen and entrepreneurs, 2 teachers, 1 judge, 1 former officer working as a librarian. These were the professions practised in 1904. In many cases there had already been previous changes of profession.
10. Shatsillo, p. 142 on the other hand assumes a two-thirds majority (with a tendency to rise) for the free professions. But according to his categorization system he can allocate members only to the *zemtsy* or to the free professions.
11. See p. 5 above. Also Freeze, p. 84. The source is Weber, 'Zur Lage der bürgerlichen Demokratie', p. 244.
12. Cf. pp. 89, 66-68 above.
13. See Fischer, *Liberalism*, pp. 45-46, 119 and frequent mentions.
14. See Kuskova, 'Kren nalevo', pp. 389-390.
15. On the term 'level of institutionalization' see Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 12-24. Huntington defines institutions as 'stable, valued, recurring patterns of behaviour', institutionalization as 'the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability'.
16. The 'lower intelligentsia' is included temporarily for the first time in 1905

in the Unions of Unions. But the Union of Unions slipped very rapidly out of the Constitutionalists' control, which is not given enough attention in Galai, 'The Role of the Union of Unions'.

17. For the relevant data see Lane, pp. 20-51 and Hildermeier, 'Zur Sozialstruktur', pp. 518-532.
18. See pp. 79-80 above.
19. Lane, pp. 37-38. On the following see Hildermeier, 'Zur Sozialstruktur', p. 525.
20. The political movements among the national minorities are not taken into account here. They were not integrated into the Russian 'public movement'.
21. Evidence is to be found in the biographies of many Constitutionalists cited above in Appendix I.
22. Cf. N. Rostov, *Zheleznodorozhniki v revolyutsionnom dvizhenii 1905 g.* (1926).
23. G. Freeze, 'A National Liberation Movement' sees in 'the liberal's notion of a national liberation movement' the explanation for the emergence of the Union of Liberation.
24. Haimson, 'The Parties and the State', pp. 125-126.
25. Pipes, *Struve*, pp. 317-18, 336-337.
26. Galai, *LM*, Chapters 11 and 12; *idem*, 'The Role of the Union of Unions', p. 519.
27. Haimson, 'The Parties and the State', p. 126.
28. Törnqren, 'Minnen från en resa i Ryssland', folios 2 and 27. I have tried to document the contacts between Constitutionalists and Socialist Revolutionaries mentioned here in the PSR archives in the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, but without success. Unfortunately these archives are very unwieldy, making verification of such a marginal aspect of party history into a search for the needle in the haystack. Despite my lack of success, I must nonetheless take this opportunity to thank Dr. Boris Sapir, whose intimate knowledge of the archives was a great help in my search.
29. See O. Anweiler, 'Die russische Revolution von 1905', *JGO*, Vol. 3 (1955), p. 163.
30. See quotations from Struve, 1902, Milyukov, 1902 and 1903 and from the constituent congress of the Union of Liberation in 1904 above, pp. 117, 120, 200, 222-223.
31. According to Milyukov, *Vospominiya*, Vol. 1, p. 263, the expression came originally from V.P. Obninskij who later belonged to the left wing of the Cadet Party.
32. Lenin, *PSS*, Vol. 5, p. 54.

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INDEX

- Agrarian problem 16-17, 21-22, 23,
 24, 26-27, 107, 116, 135, 160,
 164-165, 169-170, 173, 176, 205,
 214-215, 223. See also peasantry
 Aksel'rod, P.B. 73, 74, 85, 303n (120)
 Alexander II, Tsar 3, 7, 22, 29, 44, 58,
 150, 182
 Alexander III, Tsar 4, 24, 46, 132, 162
 Alexandra Fedorovna, Empress 23
 Alisov, I.T. 174
 Anichkov, E.V. 183, 184, 274
 Annenskij, N.F. 50, 70, 95, 96, 124,
 166, 196, 227, 255-256, 274, 318n
 (278, 279)
 Anshel'skij 274
 Argutinskij-Dolgorukov, A.M., Prince
 274
 Arsen'ev, K.K. 126, 207, 256, 307n
 (16)
 Asheshev, N.P. 274, 318n (278)
 'Autocracy and Zemstvo' (Vitte's
 Memorandum of 1899) 19-20, 58,
 72, 86, 88, 93, 131, 157, 159, 178,
 208, 301n (90), 304n (148), 308n
 (39)
 Azef, E. 299n (45)
- Bakunin, A.A. 90, 92, 124
 Bakunin, P.A. 90, 92, 124
 Banquets 125, 154, 183, 196-197,
 212, 251
 - Banquet campaign 1904/1905
 149, 229, 230
 Barataev, S.M., Prince 274
 Bazhenov, N.N. 125, 274
 Bekhli, E.Ya. 274
- Belokonskij, I.P. 13, 95, 96, 237, 256,
 274, 303n (132), 322n (361)
 Benua, L.L. 99, 274
 Berdyaev, N.A. 71, 212, 217, 274
 Bernstein, Eduard 71, 74, 85
Beseda (Symposium) 99, 100, 128-137,
 138, 142, 157, 161, 162, 168, 172,
 179, 180, 187, 198, 211, 212, 216,
 219, 220, 228, 301n (90), 307n
 (26), 308n (31, 39), 309n (54),
 314n (172)
Bez zaglaviya, levee KD (Without a
 Title, left of KD) 303n (127), 322n
 (354)
 Bezobrazov, A.M. 25, 211
 Biryukov 274
 Bismarck, Otto von 138, 203, 252
 Bleklov, S.M. 274
 Bobrinskij, V.A., Count 129, 133,
 308n (31)
 Bogolepov, N.P. 21, 51, 80, 295n (131)
 Bogucharskij (Yakovlev), V.Ya. 83, 88,
 94-96, 98, 124, 166, 196, 212, 216,
 217, 227, 232, 256-257, 274, 300n
 (71), 303n (132), 322n (354, 361)
 Boguslavskij, P.R. 274
 Bourgeoisie, Russian 9, 13, 39-40, 43,
 53-54, 61, 63, 69, 72, 130, 136-137,
 241, 293n (82)
 Bryukhatov, L.D. 274
 Bulgakov, S.N. 71, 205, 212, 213-214,
 217, 221, 222, 227, 228, 257, 274,
 321n (342), 322n (345, 346, 361)
 Bülow, Bernhard von 185
 Bunakov, N.F. 173, 174, 257
 Bunge, N. Kh. 26, 48

- Burenin, N. 320n (311), 324n (382)
bürgerliche Intelligenz 5, 8, 9, 239–240, 241
- Carrick, V.B. 318n (278)
- Charnolusskij, V.I. 274, 307n (17)
- Charushin, N.A. 274
- Charushnikov 274
- Chekhov, A.P. 95
- Chelnokov, M.V. 129
- Chermenskij, E.D. 9, 136
- Chernikov, N.N. 274
- Chernov, V. 79
- Chicherin, B. 159, 160
- Committees on Illiteracy (*Komitety gramotnosti*) 27, 52, 90, 147, 152
- Congresses, conferences and exhibitions (excluding zemstvo congresses)
 147–156, 161, 180, 197
- All-Russian Congress of Trade and Industry (1896) 27
 - All-Russian Exhibition of Domestic Crafts (St. Petersburg, March 1902) 97, 98, 99, 153, 156, 165, 167, 213
 - All-Russian Husbandry Exhibition (Khar'kov, Sept. 1903) 154, 156, 218, 219
 - Congress for Agronomic Aid (Moscow, Feb. 1901) 153, 154, 160, 162
 - Educational Exhibition (Kursk, June 1902) 172
 - II Educational Exhibition (Yaroslavl', Aug. 1903) 154, 218
 - Fire Insurance Congress (Moscow, April 1902) 153, 165, 167
 - Insurance Conference (St. Petersburg, April 1903) 207, 212
 - IX Congress of the Pirogov Society (St. Petersburg, Jan. 1904) 147, 154–155, 181
 - Regional Agricultural Congress (Yaroslavl', Aug. 1903) 154, 156, 218
 - Regional Congress for Domestic Crafts (Poltava, Sept. 1901) 153
 - Congress of the Representatives of Teacher Relief Societies (1902) 36, 147, 154
 - X Congress of Scientists and Physicians (St. Petersburg, Dec. 1901) 96, 147, 153
 - III Congress on Technical Education (St. Petersburg, Jan. 1904) 154, 155, 156, 220
- Constituent assembly 91, 107–108, 175, 228, 230, 251, 302n (108)
- Constitutional Democratic Party (Cadet Party, KD) 52, 77, 90, 126, 133, 136, 137, 141, 173, 214, 216, 217, 308n (45), 321n (343)
- Constitutionalism, Constitutionalists
 2, 5–6, 8–12, 48, 57–58, 67–68, 76–78, 82, 89, 91–92, 101–122 passim, 127, 133, 140, 143, 150–151, 155, 163, 165–166, 168, 169–171, 172, 179–180, 181–234 passim, 235–252
- programme 61, 82, 94, 97–100, 101–122, 173, 192, 194, 200–205 passim, 213–216, 224–225, 230–232, 233, 245–246, 248, 304n (139), 323n (375), 325n (398)
 - strategy and tactic 61, 104, 108–109, 115–116, 119–122, 179–180, 187–190, 193, 199–201, 208, 228–229, 230, 246–252
 - and revolution 2, 61, 68, 91, 102, 105, 109, 114–117, 120, 135, 187–188, 190, 203, 204, 215, 223, 247–248, 249–252
 - social structure 12, 80, 81, 189, 221–222, 237–243
 - organization 2–3, 6, 82, 94–96, 120, 123–124, 134–137 passim, 156, 168, 183–186, 191, 200–201, 205–206, 210–212, 216–218, 220–224, 225–227, 228, 232–234, 241, 243–246, 318n (267). See also Union of Liberation
 - contacts with the Finnish and the Polish oppositional movements 183, 209–210, 228, 231–232, 233, 248, 324n (391, 394), 325n (398)
- 'Credo' (1899) 74–76, 222, 299n (48, 49)

- Culinary Committee 183, 196, 197, 212, 318n (278)
- Daniel'son, N.F. (Nikolaj-on) 69
- Davydov, N.V. 304n (141)
- Davydova, Lidiya 124
- Debogorij-Mokrievich, V.K. 182
- Dehn, V.E. von 97, 210, 228, 257-258, 274, 323n (379)
- Delaryu, M.D. 275
- Delbrück, Hans 100, 317n (240)
- Demidov, I.P. 275
- Democracy, democratization 1-2, 7, 19, 29, 65, 72-76 *passim*, 102-103, 108, 111, 113, 116, 118, 130, 157, 162-163, 173, 194, 202, 213-216 *passim*, 223-224, 232, 250, 312n (137)
- Democratic Reform Party (*Partiya demokraticheskikh reform*) 307n (16)
- Derviz, V.D. 175, 275
- Deutsch, Karl W. 4
- Dietz, J.H.W. 182, 316n (230)
- Dolgorukov, Pavel D., Prince 124, 128, 129, 131, 175, 258, 275, 306n (11), 308n (31), 322n (361)
- Dolgorukov, Peter D., Prince 99, 124, 128, 129, 132, 134, 153, 172, 173, 175, 183, 208, 210, 212, 219, 227, 228, 231, 232, 258, 275, 304n (140, 141), 308n (31), 315n (210), 316n (227), 320n (316), 322n (361)
- Dragomanov, M.P. 77, 182
- Duma 1, 2, 150, 151, 252
- Economism, Economists 73-76, 84, 301n (88)
- Efimov 275
- Ėfros, N.E. 275
- Emmons, Terence 12, 129, 323n (375)
- Eshchin, E.M. 275
- Evreinov, A.V. 172, 173, 175, 179, 191, 306n (11), 315n (210)
- Fal'bork, G.A. 275, 307n (17)
- Feoktistov, E.M. 140
- Fischer, George 8, 10, 79-80, 236, 241
- Frank, S.L. 95, 181, 212, 275, 320n (313)
- Free Economic Society, Imperial (*Vol'noe Imp. Ėkonomicheskoe Obshchestvo*) 27, 57, 82, 83, 99, 126, 148, 152, 161, 184, 195
- Frenkel' 275
- 'Friends' of *Osvobozhdenie* 94-100, 101, 104-105, 108-112 *passim*, 118, 119, 120, 124, 126, 128, 133, 134, 156, 165, 179, 181-220 *passim*, 230, 244, 318n (261), 321n (343). See also *Constitutionalists*; *Union of Liberation*
- Galai, Shmuel 9, 12, 236, 247
- Gejden, P.A., Count 57-58, 148, 152, 161, 179, 191, 220, 258-259, 304n (141), 306n (11)
- Gertsenshtejn, M.Ya. 90, 275
- Gessen, I.V. 77, 141, 145, 196, 210, 211, 228, 259, 275, 307n (15), 323n (379)
- Gessen, V.M. 141, 275, 323n (379)
- Gindin, I.F. 9, 13
- Golovin, F.A. 124, 259-260, 275, 304n (141), 320n (316)
- Golovin, K.F. 125
- Gol'tsev, V.A. 90, 209
- Goremykin, I.L. 18, 19, 20, 160, 161
- Gor'kij, Maksim 70, 95, 196
- Grazhdanin* 138
- Grevs, I.M. 212, 260, 275
- Gubskij, N.P. 275
- Guchkov, N.I. 129
- Gur'ev 275
- Gurevich, I.A. 275
- Gurevich, L.Ya. 275
- Gurevich, Ya.Ya. 187-191, 200, 209, 221, 260, 275, 318n (278)
- Gurko, V.I. 175, 290n (29)
- Haimson, Leopold 247, 248
- Hauriou, Maurice 10
- Herzen, Alexander 89, 92, 137
- Igelström, A.V. 275
- Industrialization 1, 3-4, 15-17, 26, 28, 29, 39, 43, 46-48, 55, 62, 68, 69, 160, 238, 240, 250
- Intelligentsiya* 9, 13, 50, 62, 64, 66, 71, 73, 79, 83, 95, 102, 103-104, 116, 127, 134, 139-140, 194,

- (*cont.*)
 198–199, 201, 202, 236, 237–238,
 240, 241, 242, 321n (338), 325n
 (16)
 Ioganson, A.A. 276
Iskra 84, 86, 204, 301n (79)
Iskra group 85–87, 93, 183, 194
 Ivanitskij, F.I. 276
 Izgoev, A.S. 276
- Juridical Society at the Moscow
 University 52, 147, 148, 149, 150,
 152
- Kablukov, N.A. 90, 276
 Kalyaev, I. 125
 Kaminka, A.I. 141, 276
 Karpovich, Michael 9, 217, 236
 Karyshev, N.A. 276
 Katkov, M.N. 138
 Kavelin, K.D. 124
 Kazan square demonstration (4th March
 1901) 49–50, 88, 92, 95, 149, 187
 Khizhnyakov, V.M. 276, 322n (361)
 Khizhnyakov, V.V. 184, 260, 276,
 323n (379)
 Khodskij, L.V. 27
 Khomyakov, N.A. 26, 133, 192,
 260–261, 304n (141) 308n (33)
 Kilevejn, G.R. 276, 304n (141), 315n
 (210)
 Kireev, A.A., General 47, 294n (107)
 Kistyakovskij, B.A. 212, 276, 321n
 (336)
 Kizevetter, A.A. 98, 121, 149, 152,
 261, 276, 304n (139)
 Klevezal, E.R. 276
 Klyuchevskij, V.O. 76
 Kokoshkin, F.F. 130, 261, 276, 308n
 (31)
Kolokol 89
 Kolyubakin, A.M. 276, 304n (141)
 Komarnitskij, I.N. 276, 303n (132)
 Koni, A.F. 126
 Korenev 276
 Kornilov, A.A. 90, 92, 97, 181, 182,
 261–262, 276
 Korolenko, V.G. 70, 140, 142, 196,
 276, 310n (78)
 Korsakov, I.A. 276
 Kotlyarevskij, S.A. 99, 100, 212, 262,
 276, 304n (141), 323n (379)
- Kovalevskij, M.M. 277
 Kovalevskij, N.N. 212, 227, 228, 262,
 277, 322n (361)
 Krol', S.A. 277
 Krupskaya, N. 124, 303n (120)
 Krutovskij 277
Kupechestvo 32, 37, 39, 293n (82)
 Kurnin, S.V. 277
 Kuskova, E.D. 56, 73–76, 79, 83, 95,
 183–184, 185, 212, 216–217, 218,
 222, 237, 262–263, 277, 303n
 (132), 321n (342), 322n (354, 361)
 Kuş 277
 Kvaskov, M.A. 277
- Landau 277
 Lane, David 80
 Lavrov, P.L. 77, 80
 Lazarevskij, N.I. 141
 Lednicki, A.R. 209, 277
 Lejkina-Svirskaya, V.R. 13, 30, 31,
 143
 Lemke, M.K. 186
 Lenin, V.I. 34, 59, 64, 73, 76, 79,
 83–86, 96, 117, 138, 204, 251, 299n
 (38, 49), 303n (120), 304n (138),
 307n (21)
 Leontovitsch, Viktor 10
 Liberalism, Liberals, Russian 8, 9,
 10–12, 61, 63–66 *passim*, 72, 74,
 79, 84, 102–103, 112, 114, 116,
 126, 136, 140, 159, 170, 194,
 203–204, 208, 213–214, 223, 224,
 235, 236, 250, 251–252, 305n
 (149), 320n (302), 321n (338)
 Liberation Movement (*Osvoboditel'noe
 dvizhenie*) 9, 59, 72–73, 75, 82,
 87–88, 100, 101–104, 112, 114–117,
 186, 191–193, 195, 201, 235–237,
 247–249, 303n (122), 318n (267),
 326n (23)
 Liberation of Labour group (*Gruppa
 Osvobozhdenie Truda*, Geneva) 73,
 83, 85
Liga Narodowa 209
 Lind, V.N. 277
 Lintvarev, G.M. 277
 Lintvarev, P.M. 277
 Literature Fund (*Literaturnyj Fond*)
 148
 Lokot, T.V. 277
 Luchitskij, I.V. 277

- Lutugin, L.I. 263, 277
 L'vov, G.E. Prince 277
 L'vov, N.N. 58, 99, 100, 129, 132, 135, 164, 212, 215, 216, 218, 227, 238, 263, 277
 Lysenko, N.K. 277
 Lyubimov, D.N. 124, 295n (130)
 Maklakov, V.A. 52, 130, 139, 173, 180, 197, 235–237, 238, 240, 263–264, 277, 308n (31), 316n (227)
 Maksimov, A.N. 228, 264, 277, 323n (379)
 Mandel'shtam, M.L. 184, 228, 277, 319n (287)
 Manifesto of 26th February 1903 23–24, 25, 180, 198, 207, 208, 209, 290n (29, 31, 33)
 Martov (Tsederbaum), Yu.O. 13, 83
 Martynov, S.V. 174
 Marx, Karl 252
 Marxism, Marxists, Russian 62–64, 69, 70, 93, 148, 202
 – Legal Marxism 70–73, 75, 84, 96, 140, 143, 205, 217
 Maslennikov, N.Ya. 277
 Mechelin, Leo 210
 Medved'ev 277
 Medved'ev, A.S. 221, 277
 Mel'gunov, S.P. 142
 Merchantry see *kupechestvo*
 Mertvago, A.P. 99, 278
Meshchanstvo 32, 294n (97)
 Meshcherskij, V.P. Prince 125, 138
 Metlin, I.I. 278
 Metlin, V.I. 278
 Meyendorff, A. von 304n (141), 308n (33)
 Middle class 5, 7, 34–36, 43, 66, 79, 81, 113, 121, 156, 178–179, 193, 195, 202, 236, 240–241, 243, 248, 250, 251, 319n (301)
 Mikhailovskij, N.K. 65, 69, 71, 149, 196, 320n (307)
 Miklashevskij, M.P. 278
 Miklashevskij, N.N. 278
 Milyukov, N.K. 175
 Milyukov, P.N. 48, 52, 76–79, 80–81, 91, 92, 95, 96, 97, 101, 104–122 passim, 126–127, 156, 170, 175, 179–180, 187, 193, 199–201, 202, 205, 210, 216, 232, 236, 238, 245, 248, 278, 300n (55, 60), 303n (119), 304n (135), 305n (156), 316n (227), 319n (294)
Mir Bozhij 78, 82, 124, 140, 310n (89)
 Mitskevich, S.I. 125
 Mogilyanskij 278
Moskovskaya Nedelya 309n (65)
Moskovskiya Vedomosti 138, 160
 Murav'ev, N.K. 197, 278
 Muromtsev, S.A. 44, 148, 149–152, 238, 264, 278, 311n (118), 312n (119)
 Myakotin, V.A. 75, 79, 83, 95, 125, 126, 264–265, 278, 300n (55)
 Nabokov, V.D. 124, 141, 142, 150, 265, 278, 307n (15)
Nachalo 140, 306n (165)
 Natanson, M.A. 67
 Nationalities, question of 106, 195, 230–232, 249, 325n (398). See also Constitutionalism – programme, contacts with the Finnish and Polish oppositional movements
Nationalsozialer Verein 203, 204, 319n (301)
Nauchnoe Obozrenie 140, 310n (89)
 Naumann, Friedrich 203, 319n (301)
 Neovius, Arvid 210
 Nicholas I, Tsar 49, 127, 139, 147
 Nicholas II, Tsar 17, 18, 20–25 passim, 45, 52, 58, 89, 90, 92, 107, 122, 132, 143, 165, 173, 174, 180, 208, 211, 235
 Nikolaj-on see Daniel'son, N.F.
 Nikol'skij, A.I. 278
 Nikonov, A.A. 278
 Nobility, Russian 7, 9, 13, 24, 25, 26, 28, 32–36 passim, 37, 40–43, 57, 68, 129–130, 156, 170, 202, 205, 238, 240
 Nol'de 278
 Novgorodtsev, P.I. 90, 92, 98, 212, 228, 265, 278, 323n (379)
Novoe Slovo 140, 306n (165), 310n (89)
Novoe Vremya 138
 Novosil'tsev, Yu.A. 128, 129, 175, 219–220, 265–266
 Novosil'tsev Congresses see Zemstvo Constitutionalists

- Obninskij, V.P. 278, 326n (31)
 Obolenskij, V.A. Prince 51, 278
Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie see public movement
Obshchestvo see 'society', educated society
Obshchina see peasant commune
 Octobrist Party 129, 133, 308n (45)
 Ogorodnikov, N.A. 278
 'Old zemstvo men' appeals 58, 59, 297n (151, 152), 318n (261)
 Ol'denburg, F.F. 90, 124, 266, 278
 Ol'denburg, S.F. 90, 124, 278
 Olsuf'ev, D.A. Count 128, 129
 'Open Letter from a Group of Zemstvo Activists' (1902) 99, 101, 109-110, 179, 304n (141)
 Ostanin, I. 278
Osvobozhdenie 47, 61, 67, 68, 82, 92-95, 99-100, 101, 104, 109-110, 111, 115-116, 119-120, 122, 124, 127-128, 134, 136, 138, 140, 142, 179, 181-187, 188-193 passim, 194-196, 199, 204-207, 208-210 passim, 221, 226, 227, 234, 236, 237, 244, 245, 288n (20), 297n (152), 303n (122), 306n (1), 317n (236)
 Pankeev, K.M. 228, 279
 Paris Conference of Oppositional and Revolutionary Organizations of the Russian Empire (Sept. 1904) 232, 233, 325n (398)
 Peasant commune (*obshchina*) 23, 24, 63, 65, 69, 161, 205, 215, 314n (179)
 Peasantry, peasant question 24, 25, 28, 32, 37, 43, 56-57, 63, 65, 66, 106, 161-163, 169-170, 172, 202, 204-205, 206, 214-215, 216, 223, 249, 290n (22)
 - peasant movement 7, 16, 21, 55, 56, 102, 117, 156, 165, 195, 213, 245, 248, 250, 251
 Pedagogic Society, Moscow 36, 148
 People's Rights Party (*Partiya Narodnogo Prava*) 66-69, 73, 96, 212, 240
 People's Socialist Party (*Narodno-sotsialisticheskaya partiya*) 299n (45)
 People's Will Party (*Narodnaya Volya*) 50, 64, 78, 95
 Pereleshin, A.V. 279
 Pereleshin, D.A. 174, 266, 279
 Peshekhonov, A.V. 46-47, 50, 70, 75, 79, 83, 124, 125, 126, 166, 179, 186, 196, 227, 266, 279, 299n (45), 318n (278)
 Peter I, Tsar 46, 78, 166, 292n (62)
 Petražickij, L.I. 141, 310n (81)
 Petrovo-Solovovo, V.M. 128, 132, 175, 187-191, 192, 209, 219, 266-267, 279, 308n (31)
 Petrovskij, I.A. 279, 323n (379)
 Petrovskij, S.A. 279
 Petrunkevich, Ivan I. 86, 89-94, 97, 98, 124, 134, 163, 165, 166, 170, 173, 175, 205, 212, 215, 216, 218, 222, 227, 228, 237, 238, 267, 279, 301n (89), 303n (119), 320n (307)
 Petrunkevich group 90-94, 98-99, 117, 124, 126, 138, 162, 165, 172, 181, 205, 209, 212, 228, 303n (115)
 Petrunkevich, Mikhail Il'ich 90, 98, 238, 267, 279, 304n (141), 323n (379)
 Petrunkevich, Mikhail Ivanovich 173, 175
 Piłsudski, J. 72
 Pipes, Richard 9, 12, 71, 93, 94, 182, 247
 Pirogov Society of Russian Doctors 27, 147, 154, 155, 181
 Plekhanov, G.V. 73, 75, 85, 86, 87, 96
 Pleve, V.K. 22, 24, 52, 57, 81, 125, 142, 171-180 passim, 184-185, 191, 192, 193, 197, 198, 199, 200, 208, 209, 212, 229, 290n (33, 37), 295n (130), 304n (139), 317n (242), 319n (294)
 Pokrovskij, M.N. 279
 Police socialism see *zubatovshchina*
 Polner, T.I. 279
 Populism, Populists 27, 62-70, 77-78, 79, 84, 95, 148, 205, 297n (3)
 - Legal Populism 64-66, 69-70, 75, 140, 217
 Potresov, A.N. 13, 83, 84, 299n (38), 304n (138)
Pravo 135, 140, 144, 310n (89)
Pravo group 141-142, 162, 196, 211, 213

- Prokopovich, S.N. 73, 75, 79, 83, 96, 166, 172, 185, 212, 216, 217, 227, 268, 279, 319n (299), 322n (354)
- Proletariat see workers, workers movement
- Protopopov, D.D. 279
- Public activity, public activists (*obshchestvennaya deyatel'nost'*, *obshchestvennye deyateli*) 7, 32, 34–36, 39, 43–46, 52, 57, 79, 118–119, 120, 127–128, 131, 136, 139, 145–146, 152, 177, 201, 207, 239, 240–241, 244, 250, 288n (15)
- Public movement (*obshchestvennoe dvizhenie*) 6–8, 18–19, 24, 26–28, 38–39, 43–46, 46–60 passim, 61, 63–64, 68, 70, 73, 74, 76, 84, 88, 91, 103, 105–106, 110, 112, 117–119, 121–122, 123–234 passim, 240–241, 243–245, 250–251, 295n (130), 326n (20)
- Pypin, A.N. 126
- Radicalism 10–11, 50–51, 53, 64, 67, 68, 76, 99, 109, 112, 236, 244, 250, 252
- Reuter, Julio 231
- Revolutionary movement 7, 9, 48, 50–51, 56, 57, 59, 63–64, 73, 78, 80–81, 87–88, 102–105 passim, 114–117 passim, 124–125, 127, 242, 249
- Revolyutsionnaya Rossiya* 50, 75, 299n (45)
- Rightists (*Pravye*) 53, 133, 308n (45)
- de Roberti, E.V. 279
- Rodichev, F.I. 89, 90, 124, 212, 215, 268, 279
- Rozenberg, V.A. 196
- Rozenblyum 279
- Rubakin, N.A. 95, 307n (17)
- Russkiya Vedomosti* 140, 142–143, 146, 162, 196, 311n (98)
- Russkoe Bogatstvo* 69, 82, 140, 310n (89)
- Russkoe Bogatstvo* group 69, 70, 75, 78, 83, 99, 124, 127, 196, 205, 213, 214, 222, 299n (45), 300n (55), 318n (279), 323n (371)
- Sabashnikov, M.V. 221, 279, 306n (11)
- Sadovskij, B.T. 315n (210)
- Savel'ev, A.A. 315n (210)
- Savinkov, B.V. 81
- Schaffhausen Conference 212–219, 222, 223, 224, 225, 309n (50), 321n (335, 342)
- Semevskij, V.I. 279
- Serafim of Sarov 23, 25
- Sergej Aleksandrovich, Grand Duke 81, 125
- Severnyj Kraj* 98, 125
- Severnyj kur'er* 72
- Shaeovich 54
- Shakhovskoj, D.I. Prince 12, 13, 90, 91, 92, 94, 97–100 passim, 124, 125, 128, 184, 207, 211, 212, 216, 222, 224, 227, 237, 268–269, 279, 303n (132), 304n (138, 141), 322n (361)
- Shakhovskoj, S.I. Prince 279
- Shatsillo, K.F. 10, 12, 221
- Shchepkin, E.N. 280
- Shcherbina, A.A. 174
- Sheremetev, P.S. Count 128, 129, 132, 133, 173, 198, 301n (90), 308n (39)
- Shevelev 280
- Shingarev, A.I. 280
- Shipov, D.I. 79, 133, 134, 158–161, 162, 165, 166–168, 170, 175, 177–178, 180, 186, 191, 192, 198, 199, 200, 207, 209, 244, 269, 300n (60), 319n (294)
- Shirkov, N.V. 280, 304n (41)
- Shnitnikov, N.N. 280
- Shrejder, G.I. 280, 318n (278)
- Sipyagin, D.S. 16, 21, 22, 51, 52, 101, 131, 177, 195
- Slavinskij, M.A. 318n (278)
- Slavophiles, Neo-Slavophiles 7, 46, 62, 78, 110, 135, 164, 192–193, 199, 201, 208, 223, 308n (43)
- Slonimskij, A.G. 136, 137, 196
- Small Zemstvo Unit (*Melkaya zemskaya edinitsa*) 154, 162–163, 172, 173
- Smirnov, G.A. 280
- Social Democratic Laborer Party (RSDRP) 8, 50, 56, 59, 63–64, 71–76 passim, 80, 82–88 passim, 93, 117, 125, 156, 192, 204, 217, 222, 235, 242, 248, 249, 321n (343), 324n (382)
- Socialist Revolutionaries, Party of (PSR) 21, 50, 56, 63–64, 75, 79–80, 125, 183, 193, 195, 205, 217, 222,

- (*cont.*)
 229, 232, 235, 242, 248, 322n
 (345), 323n (371), 326n (28)
 'Society' (*obshchestvo*), educated
 society 6-7, 27-28, 34-36, 43, 45,
 50, 51, 56-57, 66, 68, 69, 79, 91,
 103, 105, 113, 117-122 *passim*, 126,
 130-131, 138, 145-146, 147, 151,
 163, 166-167, 175-178 *passim*,
 198, 208, 215, 234, 240, 243, 245,
 250, 251, 288n (13), 292n (67). See
 also public movement
 Sokolov, N.D. 280
 Sokolovskij 280
 Solov'ev, V.S. 13, 126
 Somov, N.N. 199
Sotsialist/Workers Library Group 86,
 301n (88)
Sovremennoe Obozrenie 85, 86, 88, 95
 Spasovich, V.D. 126
 Spasskij, Yu.A. 280
 Special Conferences
 - on the Needs of Agriculture 21-22,
 24, 99, 153, 164-181, 192,
 314n (177)
 - local committees 164-181 *passim*,
 191, 193, 195, 198, 207, 211,
 315n (204), 319n (299)
 - on the Problems of Nobility 41,
 42, 53
 Staal', A.F. 280
 Stakhovich, A.A. 208, 269, 280, 304n
 (141), 320n (322)
 Stakhovich, M.A. 132, 133, 134, 192,
 198, 208, 269-270
 'Starye zemtsy' see 'Old zemstvo men'
 Stasyulevich, M.M. 196
 Stepnyak-Kravchinskij, S.M. 66-67
 Stishev 280
 Struve, Nina 181, 182, 184, 303n (120)
 Struve, P.B. 12, 47, 50, 51, 70-73, 75,
 79, 81, 82-89, 91, 92-100 *passim*,
 101-104, 105, 109, 111, 112-117,
 119, 121, 124, 126, 128, 134,
 181-187, 191-195, 199, 200,
 201-205, 206, 208-210, 211-218
passim, 222, 232, 247, 248, 251,
 280, 298n (29), 301n (89), 303n
 (120), 304n (138), 305n (154,
 165), 316n (225), 317n (242),
 318n (267)
 Student movement 48-50, 51, 55,
 80-81, 102, 127, 132, 152, 188,
 195, 307n (19)
 Suffrage 107, 108, 305n (153, 154)
 - universal s. 108, 202, 215-216,
 223, 230, 232, 322n (350), 325n
 (398)
 Suvorin, A.S. 138
 Svechin, A.A. 280, 320n (316)
Svoboda group 85, 87, 88
 Svyatopolk-Mirskij, P.D. Prince 229
 Tatarinov, F.V. 280
 Teslenko, N.V. 197, 270, 280
 Tikhomirov, L. 53
 Third Element 38-39, 97, 130, 134,
 148, 158, 161, 202, 218, 241, 312n
 (139)
 Tolstoj, D.A. Count 29, 32, 36, 127
 Törngren, Adolf 12, 227, 228, 231,
 246, 248, 319n (287), 324n (382)
 Treadgold, D.W. 8
 Trubetskoj, E.N. Prince 130, 280
 Trubetskoj, S.N. Prince 130, 137
 Tsederbaum, Yu.O. see Martov
 Tugan-Baranovskij, M.I. 50, 71, 75,
 83, 84, 124, 205, 280
 Tyrkova, A.V. 98, 124, 183, 184, 280,
 317n (236)
 United front 67, 83, 87-88, 102,
 114-116, 195, 217, 226, 232,
 248-249. See also Liberation
 Movement
 Union of Liberation (*Soyuz*
Osvobozhdeniya) 6, 67, 68, 80,
 94, 95, 125, 129, 133, 135, 143,
 156, 168, 173, 182, 183, 187, 197,
 210, 211-234, 235-252 *passim*,
 288n (12), 303n (122), 306n (1),
 309n (50), 317n (236), 321n (339),
 324n (382, 394), 325n (399). See
 also Constitutionalism-organization
 Union of Unions (*Soyuz Soyuzov*) 230,
 233, 237, 323n (367), 325n (399),
 326n (16)
 Unkovskij, S.A. 280
 Usov, V.V. 280, 304n (141)
 Vagner, Yu.N. 281
 Vannovskij, P.S. 49, 295n (131)

- Vasil'chikov, B.A. Prince 53
 Vatatsi, E.A. 185
 Ventskovskij, A.I. 281
 Vernadskij, V.I. 90, 92, 98, 124, 212, 270, 281
 Veselovskij, B.B. 13, 38
Vestnik Evropy 126, 140, 162, 196
 Vinaver, M.M. 281, 323n (367)
 Vinogradov, P.G. 76
 Vitte, S.Yu. 16–25 passim, 26, 29, 41, 42, 46–48, 53, 54, 125, 157, 159, 164–165, 175–178, 179, 191, 215, 290n (20), 309n (70)
 Vorontsov (V.V.), V.P. 69, 83
 Vodovozov, V.V. 64, 212, 217, 270, 281
 Vyshnegradskij, I.A. 26

 Wasilewski, Leon 209
 Weber, Max 2, 5, 177, 239, 321n (336)
 Workers 28, 63, 66, 71, 107, 204, 206, 214, 215, 216, 223, 242, 292n (62), 296n (142), 321n (343)
 – Workers movement 7, 16, 21, 49, 54, 55, 56, 72, 73–75, 84, 86, 87, 102, 103, 117, 127, 151, 191, 195, 204, 213, 214, 245, 248, 249, 250, 251
 Writers Union (*Soyuz pisatelej*) 50, 82, 95, 99, 124, 126, 149, 195, 196, 311n (111)

 Yakovlev, V.Ya. see Bogucharskij
 Yakubova, A.A. 299n (49)
 Yakushkin, V.E. 98, 270–271, 281
 Yanovskij, V.V. 281
 Yaronin 281
 Yuritsyn, S.P. 281

 Zagozhskij (Zagorskij), Ė.K. 281
Zarya 84, 86, 88
 Zasulich, Vera 73, 85, 126
 Zemstvo 18–19, 26, 36–39, 52, 72, 102, 106, 108, 110, 128, 129, 131–132, 138, 154, 156–164, 164–181 passim, 188, 190, 200, 207, 208, 212, 221, 223, 228, 235–236, 239, 240, 245–246, 305n (153), 308n (35), 312n (139)
 Zemstvo Congresses (see also zemstvo movement)
 – 1902: 167–171, 172–180 passim, 191, 207, 309n (54), 314n (174), 322n (346)
 – 1904/05: 133, 135, 143, 229, 230, 251, 314n (181)
 Zemstvo Constitutionalists, Union of 219–220, 230
 Zemstvo movement 8, 9, 13, 18–19, 27, 38–39, 43, 58, 86, 89–91, 99, 104, 106, 116, 117, 128–137 passim, 142, 156–164, 164–181, 187–191 passim, 192–194, 198–199, 200–202, 207–209, 212–218 passim, 219–220, 230, 236, 237–238, 245–246, 295n (130), 297n (152, 153)
 – First zemstvo movement (1878/81) 89–90, 240, 314n (169)
 – Address campaign 1895 89, 90, 98
 See also Zemstvo congresses; Special Conference on the Needs of Agriculture; Constitutionalism
 Zhukovskij, D.E. 88, 93, 94, 99, 212, 281, 301n (79), 303n (119), 316n (227)
 Zubatovshchina 54, 178, 204, 215
 Zvegintsev 281